Case: 1:16-cv-08303 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/24/16 Page 1 of 37 PageID #:1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

T.S., a minor by and through his parent and guardian, S.S.; Q.B., a minor by and through his grandparent and guardian, V.P,
On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc.; Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc.; Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.; Fox Entertainment Group, Inc.; Fox Networks Group, Inc.; Fox Television Group; The County of Cook, Illinois; Leonard Dixon; and John Does 1 through 20,
Defendants.

Case No. ___________________ (Complaint—Class Action) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Introduction
Three times during the summer of 2015, the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (the “JTDC”) was placed on lockdown so that it could be used as a film set to shoot scenes for Empire, a hit Fox television show. Numerous areas that are essential to the JTDC’s mission of educating and rehabilitating the children housed there—including the JTDC’s school, its facilities for family visits, its only outdoor recreation yard, its library, and its chapel—were placed off limits so that Fox’s agents and employees could use them to stage and film the show.
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The children for whom these facilities were intended, meanwhile, were ordered to remain in their cells, or were confined to the jail-style “pod” areas just outside their cell doors. There they were told to sit, for days on end. Their schooling continued in name only, visits from their families were interrupted, cut back, or effectively eliminated, sick-call requests were ignored, and programs that are intended to help them overcome the problems that landed them at the JTDC in the first place were cancelled or interrupted.
The purpose of these lockdowns was to provide Fox with a realistic prison facility to use as the primary set of two highly profitable Empire episodes. The children at JTDC, meanwhile, were placed under restrictions more severe than those governing many adult jails. Putting the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown so that the Defendants could use the facility to film a profitable television show was a breach of fiduciary duty, and it violated the children’s rights under the U.S. Constitution and state law. The profits gained from this misconduct were unjustly obtained. In this lawsuit Named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarlysituated children who were subject to these lockdowns, seek the disgorgement of the Defendants’ unjust gains, punitive damages, and related remedies.
Nature of the Action1 1. Named Plaintiffs T.S. and Q.B. were housed at the JTDC in the summer of 2015 during the lockdowns imposed to facilitate the filming of Empire there. They seek to represent a class of similarly situated children. On behalf of that class, Named Plaintiffs seek disgorgement, nominal damages, punitive damages, an alternative award of actual damages, and an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.
1 Plaintiffs make the allegations in this complaint based on personal knowledge as to matters in which they have had personal involvement and on information and belief as to all other matters.
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Parties 2. Plaintiff T.S. is a 17-year-old boy who was housed at the JTDC during the summer of 2015 when it was placed on lockdown to facilitate the filming of Empire. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, T.S. brings this complaint by and through S.S., his parent and legal guardian. Like all minors identified in this complaint, T.S. is identified by his initials, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2. S.S. is identified by initials in order to protect T.S.’s identity. At the time of the filing of this complaint, T.S. is not incarcerated. 3. Plaintiff Q.B. is a 17-year-old boy who was housed at the JTDC during the summer of 2015 when it was placed on lockdown to facilitate the filming of Empire. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, Q.B. brings this complaint by and through V.P., his grandparent and legal guardian. V.P. is identified by initials in order to protect Q.B.’s identity. At the time of the filing of this complaint, Q.B. is not incarcerated. 4. The Defendants identified in the sub-paragraphs of this paragraph are referred to as the “Fox Defendants” or “Fox.”
a. Defendant Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. (a/k/a 21st Century Fox, Inc.) is a diversified global media and entertainment conglomerate with operations in cable network programming, television, and filmed entertainment. b. Defendant Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. c. Defendant Fox Networks Group, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. and/or Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.
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d. Defendant Fox Television Group is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. and/or Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. Fox Television Group is also a division of Fox Networks Group, Inc. e. Defendant Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc. (a/k/a 20th Century Fox Television, Inc.) produces television shows that are broadcast on Fox’s network, including Empire. Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc. is given production credit for both of the Empire episodes that were filmed in the JTDC. Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc. is a unit of Fox Television Group. Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. and/or Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. f. Defendant Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc. is a broadcast television network that broadcasts Empire, among other television programming. Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc. is a unit of Fox Television Group. Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. and/or Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. 5. Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois (“Cook County”) is a county in Illinois. The JTDC is operated as a branch of Cook County’s government. Cook County employs the administrators of the JTDC, including Leonard Dixon. 6. Defendant Leonard Dixon is the superintendent of the JTDC. He oversaw the JTDC’s daily operations at all times during the summer of 2015 when the children housed there were placed on lockdown to facilitate the filming of Empire. 7. Defendants Does 1 through 20 are sued herein by fictitious names for the reason that their true names are unknown to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend this
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complaint to allege the true names and capacities of these Defendants when their identities have been ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that these fictitiously-named Defendants are responsible in some manner for the misconduct alleged herein.
8. The Defendants at all times herein were the agents, joint venturers, and/or coconspirators of each of the other remaining Defendants, and in doing the things alleged in this complaint they were acting in the course of such agency, joint venture, and/or conspiracy.
Jurisdiction and Venue 9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 because this is an action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because those claims are so related to the claims providing the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 10. Venue is proper in this jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred in this district and this is a convenient and reasonable forum for the resolution of this dispute.
Facts A. Normal Operation of the JTDC
11. The JTDC is a five-story building near the intersection of Ogden Avenue and Roosevelt Road, a few miles southwest of downtown Chicago. It is among the largest juvenile detention facilities in the country, housing between 250 and 400 children from the ages of 10 to 18. The average stay for a child at the JTDC is around three weeks.
12. Under normal operation, the JTDC’s floors serve distinct functions. Children detained at the JTDC are housed primarily on the fourth and fifth floors, which contain rows of
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cells that open onto small “pods.” The pods serve as common areas in the same manner as a pod or “dayroom” in an adult jail cell block. A portion of the third floor also contains this cell-andpod arrangement, including an “intake” pod for newly detained children.
13. The remainder of the third floor, and the first and second floors, are taken up with facilities designed to provide schooling and structured programming to the children housed at JTDC, along with related administrative services. The third floor houses the JTDC’s infirmary, as well as a large open-air courtyard, which serves as the JTDC’s primary recreation yard for the children. This courtyard is the only place where children detained at the JTDC are allowed outdoors during their detention. There are smaller auxiliary gymnasium facilities in the basement that can be used by limited numbers of children, and are accessed via elevator.
14. The second floor is dedicated almost entirely to education and programming, and is the floor on which the bulk of the JTDC’s schooling and structured programming services are provided. The second floor contains the facilities of the Nancy B. Jefferson Alternative School, which is operated by Chicago Public Schools. In addition to the school’s numerous classrooms, the second floor contains a library, a computer lab and music room, and an indoor “game” area with resources to help children detained at the JTDC engage in constructive pastimes. The second floor also contains a chapel for religious services and other programming, as well as visiting facilities where children can spend time with their families.
15. The first floor contains courtrooms, reception, and administrative offices. Parts of the first floor are directly accessible to the public, but the remainder of the building is secure and restricted, not accessible to the public without an escort.
16. The numerous facilities on the JTDC’s lower floors are reflective of the purpose for which the children are placed in detention at the JTDC. The JTDC does not operate as an
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adult prison, or even an adult jail. None of the children housed at the JTDC have been convicted of adult crimes, and they are not detained at the JTDC in order to be punished. To the contrary, because they are children, the purpose of their detention at the JTDC is to nurture and rehabilitate them, which is done by providing the children with schooling, care, and structured programming designed to address the problems that landed them at the JTDC in the first place. As the JTDC’s website states, its mission is to “provide[] the children with a safe, secure and caring environment with programs and structure that enhance personal development and improve opportunity for success upon return to the community.”
17. And indeed, the children housed at the JTDC are in pressing need of these services. For one thing, they are among the most vulnerable children in Chicago: more than 90 percent of this population has reported one or more traumatic experiences, with an average child reporting six different traumas. Sixty percent of the children who enter the JTDC are diagnosed with a mental disorder, and around one-quarter of them are prescribed psychotropic medication. Added to this, the children frequently arrive at the JTDC in a state of crisis, having been separated from their families and placed in confinement, many for the first time. Other children, meanwhile, are held at the JTDC not because of a delinquency adjudication, but simply because their home lives are in disarray: a judge has ordered the child’s release, but the Department of Children and Family Services cannot find a foster home in which to place the child, or the child’s guardian has not come to pick the child up. As Superintendent Dixon noted in a recent news interview, “[juvenile] detention is like the emergency room of the juvenile justice system.” For that reason, Superintendent Dixon has explained, rather than an incarceration-style setting, “[o]ur thing is to have some normalcy when they [detained children] come here.” Conventional incarceration, in which inmates are essentially warehoused in cells or pods with nothing to
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occupy the hours, aggravates the psychological and emotional traumas suffered by this already
vulnerable population, and decreases the children’s chances of successfully re-entering society.
18. What is more, subjecting juveniles to forced idleness is dangerous for the children
themselves. As the U.S. Department of Justice has explained,
The amount and quality of structured daily programming in juvenile facilities has a significant impact on the rate of violent and antisocial incidents. Simply stated, youth who do not have adequate opportunities to engage in programmed activities become bored, and are more likely to become involved in mischief or assaultive behavior. Generally accepted professional standards mandate that youth in juvenile justice facilities receive a minimum of one hour of large muscle activity per weekday, two hours of large muscle activity per weekend day, educational programming during weekdays, and other structured developmental and rehabilitative activities. Inadequate youth programming . . . contributes to . . . high levels of youth violence, and departs substantially from generally accepted professional standards.
19. To fulfill the JTDC’s rehabilitative mission and provide a safe and structured
environment, the JTDC’s lower floors are dedicated to offering extensive schooling and
structured programming to the children housed there.
20. Under normal operation, the children detained at JTDC eat breakfast on their pods
in the upper floors, but quickly head down to the second floor for school, typically by 8:00 a.m.
The children attend classes at the school during the day, and take lunch there as well. After
classes finish, around 3:00 p.m., the children are typically placed in various structured after-
school programs on the second floor, and sometimes on the third-floor recreation yard as well
(the recreation yard contains a garden, for instance, which some of the children help maintain).
The JTDC’s numerous rehabilitative programs include yoga, creative writing courses, computer
classes, art, music, and singing. These programs are aimed at addressing the problems that
brought each child to JTDC, and at preparing the children to lead more constructive and stable
lives once they leave the facility.
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21. During the day children are also given time for recreation in the third floor openair courtyard and game time in the JTDC’s indoor game area on the second floor, and they receive visits from family in the JTDC’s visiting rooms. These activities, though not formally structured, are also critical for the children’s wellbeing, both while they are at the JTDC and after they re-enter society.
22. In the early evening the children return to the pods for dinner and bathing. Shortly thereafter they are placed in their cells for the night.
23. As this itinerary indicates, under normal operation the children spend relatively little time on their pods and cells in the JTDC’s upper floors. This is so because, in contrast with the extensive programming and activities the children receive on the second and third floors, their time on the pods is spent under restrictions that can be even more confining than those of an adult jail.
24. Each cell-and-pod arrangement has around 15 to 20 children, overseen by guards. Most of the pods are long, narrow rooms—essentially a large, enclosed corridor outside of a row of cells—with jail-style seating arrangements, consisting of tables that are each fused to short stools and fixed to the floor. Pods are also typically equipped with a television (and accompanying seats) at one end, but they otherwise have little in the way of materials for activities, and certainly nothing comparable to the resources and programming available on the second and third floors.
25. To prevent the monotony of the pods from leading to altercations and physical violence, when the children are on the pod they are prohibited from moving freely. Whereas inmates in an adult jail are typically allowed to move around their “day rooms” as they please, children on the pods at the JTDC must all remain sitting in the same spot, at all times. If a child
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needs to use the restroom or otherwise leave his seat, that child must raise his hand and receive permission from the guards. While that child is out of his seat, no other children may leave their seats. Breaking this rule—that is, if one child stands up without first receiving permission—is punishable as a “major rule violation.” Some limited services are offered on the pods themselves—priests and pastors are allowed to visit the children there, for example—but otherwise the pods are devoid of programming.
26. Exigent circumstances—such as staffing shortages or security concerns— sometimes force JTDC administrators to hold children on the pods, where these significant restrictions govern. Otherwise, though, the JTDC attempts to minimize the time children spend in the restrictive conditions of the pod, in favor of the school facilities, recreation, and structured programming offered in the second and third floors of the facility.
27. Notably, providing meaningful schooling and programming opportunities requires a considerable number of personnel, in addition to facilities where these services can be provided. This is so because the children must be escorted by guards every time they leave their pods to travel to schooling or programming elsewhere in the JTDC.
B. Filming Empire at the JTDC 28. Sometime in the spring of 2015, Cook County, Superintendent Dixon, one or
more of the Fox Defendants, and/or one or more of the Defendant Does entered into an agreement that Empire’s film crew would be permitted to film at the JTDC. This agreement contemplated that the Empire film crew would have access to many of the restricted facilities on the JTDC’s second and third floors that are intended to rehabilitate and educate the children housed at the JTDC—and that these children would be barred from those same facilities so that the film crew could work without interruption. Instead, by necessary implication, the children
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housed at the JTDC would be confined to their cells and pods on the facility’s upper floors. In reaching this agreement, the Defendants knew that filming Empire at the JTDC would result in the lockdowns and attendant restrictions on the children housed there.
29. The production and filming of Empire at the JTDC lasted two weeks in the summer of 2015, spread over three different shootings: June 21 through 26, July 13 through 16, and August 23 through 26.
30. The film crews that descended on the JTDC to conduct these shootings were enormous. Empire employed a film crew of approximately 250 in Chicago, and city permits taken in the name of “Fox Entertainment Group” show that each time Empire came to film at the JTDC, parking was suspended around the facility for as many as seven city blocks. These restrictions were needed to accommodate the large number of cargo vans, production trailers, motor homes, tractor-trailer rigs, crew vehicles, and other support vehicles used in filming.
31. During each of the three shootings Empire’s film crew—including dozens of production staff, actors, and extras—took over much of the JTDC’s second and third floors. The Nancy B. Jefferson school’s classrooms were largely occupied with film crews and production equipment. The JTDC’s chapel was converted into an area for eating, and garbage cans were placed there for Empire’s crew to throw away trash. The library, which was normally used by children at the JTDC to read, study, and check out books, was made into crew support area. The infirmary was used as a film set, as were some of the JTDC’s intake facilities. So was the JTDC’s visiting area, where the children normally meet with their families. One area of particular focus for the film crew was the third floor open-air courtyard, which Empire’s crew used to film large, long-format scenes involving numerous actors and extras.
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32. Empire took over more than just the many facilities on the JTDC’s second and third floors. Internal JTDC documents prepared to plan for the Empire filming indicate many staff were expected or directed to leave their normal duties in order to render services to the film crew instead. Some were chosen to act as extras in the show. Others were assigned to clean and clear out several areas in the building (this included removing children from some pods that the Empire crew wanted to use for filming), man the delivery docks to permit the free flow of film equipment, escort actors and crew members to and from the film set, keep Empire’s production crew from wandering around the facility, provide security for areas where filming was to occur, help escort filming equipment into place, and clean up after the crew. The Empire filming, in short, not only took over many of the facilities that furnished the schooling and structured programming that the JTDC was intended to provide; it also diverted a number of staff whose job it was to help fulfill the JTDC’s rehabilitative mission.
33. As a result, the only place for the children housed at the JTDC was their cells and pods. That is where they were kept. To accommodate Empire, Superintendent Dixon and/or Defendant Does deliberately placed the JTDC on lockdown, confining the children to the jailstyle cell-and-pod arrangements in the JTDC’s upper floors. This was not an accidental or inadvertent result of the filming. Rather, it was the planned method by which the JTDC was cleared out to make way for Empire’s film crew. In an internal JTDC document circulated among staff to organize the facility in preparation for Empire’s arrival, for example, the JTDC’s custodial staff were instructed:
Notify storeroom for additional supplies that the pods may need for increase of resident [sic] on pods. There will be a significant increase in utilization of custodial supplies. Toilet paper, C-fold towels, hand soap, hand sanitizer, garbage bags etc… [sic] will be needed.
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34. When Empire arrived at the JTDC to film, the lockdown began with school. Instead of going down to their second-floor classrooms after breakfast as they normally would, the children remained on their pods. Nancy B. Jefferson teachers were ordered up into these areas, and instructed to go from pod to pod to teach their students. This was “school” in name only. The pods are not set up or even shaped like classrooms; instead, the teacher must stand in the midst of the seating that is arranged around the pod. There is no whiteboard or other teaching equipment for the instructor to use, and what supplies the teachers can bring to the pods are limited. What is more, during Empire filming many of the children whom the teachers had to instruct had not been allowed to move all day, and were going stir-crazy in what amounted to their own jail “day room.” Indeed these obvious obstacles are why the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities existed in the first place, and why the hundreds of children at the JTDC are escorted down to the school’s second-floor classrooms on a daily basis. Up on the pods instruction was markedly less effective and often chaotic, and during the Empire filming teachers often did not appear in the pods at all.
35. Recreation was drastically reduced, and for many children it was eliminated. Because the JTDC’s primary recreation facility—the third floor’s open-air courtyard—was being used to film Empire, the children were banned from that area. (The courtyard is divided into three sections, separated by walls, which allows different groups of children to use the yard independently. The Empire film crew only filmed in one of the sections, but the children were still banned from the remainder of the yard.) This left the smaller gymnasium facilities in the JTDC’s basement. But with limited space there, and the logistical challenge of bringing children down from the JTDC’s upper floors during filming, there was a backlog and many children never received any recreation or exercise at all.
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36. Instead, in an evident attempt to comply with the letter of juvenile facility standards, many children were given “rec time” up on the pods themselves. An “instructor” would arrive and ask whether any of the children wanted to partake in “large muscle activity,” by which the instructor apparently meant push-ups, sit-ups, and jumping-jacks, to be done among the tables on the pod. In other pods a ball would be introduced and the children would be told to play. Even these pretenses were often abandoned, and there was simply no recreation at all. At no point during the Empire filming were the children allowed outdoors, as they would have if they had been allowed to use the third floor courtyard.
37. For many of the children detained at the JTDC, visits with families were effectively eliminated during Empire filming. For others, visits were restricted and severely shortened, with parents, who normally waited just a few minutes to visit with their children for an hour or more, forced to sit in waiting rooms for hours on end, for the opportunity to see their children for markedly shortened visits.
38. Other appointments were cancelled as well. For example, in order to seek medical attention the children can fill out sick-call slips on their pods. During normal operation, these requests usually receive prompt attention. The Empire film crew used the JTDC’s infirmary to shoot scenes for the show, however, and during filming numerous sick call requests were ignored.
39. Structured programming for children was also cancelled. Most of the structured programming normally occurs on the JTDC’s second floor, with some limited programming, such as a botany project that is run on the open-air courtyard, occurring on the third floor. Because the second and third floors had largely been taken over by Empire’s film crew, many of
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the JTDC’s after-school programs, including music and dance, were cancelled. Instead of attending these programs, children remained on their pods.
C. Individual Experiences 40. T.S. a. During the summer of 2015, T.S. was 16 years old and was housed in a JTDC living unit. Children on T.S.’s pod normally left the pod in the morning to attend class in the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities on the second floor, which they attended through mid-afternoon. During the day, they had recreation time in the third-floor courtyard. They also took advantage of games and activities on the commissary area on the JTDC’s second floor. b. When Empire arrived to film, these routines were eliminated. T.S. and the rest of the children on his pod were held there. They were not allowed down to the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities; instead, teachers would sometimes come up to the pods. This was a chaotic teaching environment. The teacher could not teach in front of the children, and had no whiteboard to instruct from. To make matters worse, the children on the pod, who had been prohibited from meaningful recreation, were going stir-crazy, and the pod was out of control. In this setting, teaching simply did not occur. c. During Empire’s filming, the children on T.S.’s pod did not leave for recreation. Instead a JTDC staff “instructor” would occasionally come to the pod and ask, “Who wants to do large-muscle?” This meant, apparently, that the children should do push-ups, sit-ups, and jumping-jacks in front of the seats they had been forced to sit in all day. After none of the children took the instructor up
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on this “recreation” offer, he would leave the pod. Often, no instructor arrived at all. Sick call requests by children on T.S.’s pod were also ignored during filming, whereas during regular operation they were responded to relatively promptly. d. T.S.’s visits with his mother were also interrupted and curtailed. During the JTDC’s normal operation, T.S.’s mother visited him during the two visiting periods T.S. was allotted each week. To visit T.S., his mother would arrive during T.S.’s designated visiting time slots, which were in the late afternoon or early evening. Once she arrived, it would typically take 20 minutes for JTDC staff to locate T.S. and bring him to the visiting facilities on the second floor. T.S. and his mother would then be able to have a visit that typically lasted at least an hour. e. During Empire’s filming, T.S.’s mother arrived at the designated time slot for her visit. Instead of bringing T.S. down, however, she, and several other parents who had arrived to visit during the same slot, were forced to sit in the waiting area. After around two hours had passed, she saw a large group of what appeared to be Empire’s cast or crew leave the building. Sometime thereafter, she was escorted to visit with T.S. in a room much smaller than the JTDC’s normal visiting rooms. Instead of being allowed to visit for an hour, their visit was shortened significantly. 41. Q.B. a. During the summer of 2015, Q.B. was 16 years old and was housed in a JTDC living unit. Children on Q.B.’s pod normally attended classes at the Nancy B. Jefferson school throughout the day. The children on Q.B.’s pod were
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provided with two recreation periods, one for gym class as part of their schooling, and another for an after-school recreation hour. b. The schooling on the second floor, and the recreation hours, were important to Q.B. and the other the children because they provided a meaningful escape from the monotony of confinement on the pod. While on the pod the children were required to sit in one place, and could only move, one at a time, with prior permission. Even to stand up without first obtaining permission was treated as a major rule violation. c. Q.B. had two visiting hours during the week, on Tuesdays and Saturdays, and during his confinement at the JTDC his father and his grandmother visited him frequently. d. One day the children on Q.B.’s pod were told they would not be going down to the school, because Empire had arrived to film at the JTDC. During the Empire filming teachers occasionally came up to the pod to teach, but sometimes they did not. When they did arrive, the teaching environment was chaotic, as the children had been locked on the pod all day without any opportunity for movement. Children on Q.B.’s pod never received recreation during Empire’s filming, making time on the pod miserable. In addition to these restrictions, sick call requests put in by children on Q.B.’s pod were ignored. Normally such requests were responded to relatively promptly. e. Q.B.’s grandmother visited him at the JTDC whenever she could. She works at a supermarket that frequently requires her to work over the weekends, however, making visits during Q.B.’s Saturday visiting slot difficult. After being
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unable to get time off to visit one Saturday, Q.B.’s grandmother asked her boss to take off of work Tuesday, so that she could visit her grandson. Empire was filming that day, however, and when she arrived at the JTDC during Q.B.’s visiting slot, she was told that visits in that time had been cancelled. 42. N.T. a. N.T. is a 16-year-old boy who was housed at the JTDC. During normal operation, he and the other children in his unit would leave the pod after breakfast for classes downstairs at the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities. They would attend school through the afternoon, with outdoor recreation in the third-floor courtyard during the school day. The children in N.T.’s unit participated in multiple after-school programs, including a drum circle and a dance class. During the two visiting periods that N.T. was allotted each week, either N.T.’s mother, his grandmother, or both would visit with him in the JTDC’s visiting area. b. When Fox arrived to film Empire, N.T.’s unit was placed on lockdown. The children did not leave the pod for school. Instead, they remained in their pod, where they were told to remain in their seats. Movement was permitted only to one child at a time, after the child received permission. Some teachers came up to the pod, but there was no whiteboard board for writing, the teachers brought few materials, and teaching in the pod environment was ineffective. After-school programming was cancelled entirely, and N.T. was unable to visit with his mother or grandmother. Children in N.T.’s unit could only escape the monotony of the pod by buying “room time”—30 minutes alone in their cells—using points they earned for good behavior.
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c. During lockdown the children in N.T.’s unit were taken to the gymnasium facilities in the JTDC’s basement, but only occasionally, apparently because administrators from different pods were fighting for scarce recreation time slots there. As a substitute the children were given “recreation” in their pods, during which they were allowed to play cards or write letters. Otherwise, the children were confined to their chairs on the pod and not allowed to move. 43. G.M. a. G.M. is a 16-year-old boy who was housed in the JTDC’s intake unit when Empire arrived to film. Children in the intake unit are normally allowed out of their cells the entire day. They take breakfast in their pods, are allowed some activities there, and are given recreation either in the basement gymnasium facility or the third-floor open-air courtyard. There is also an area in the intake unit where the children can watch television. b. The intake unit is on the third floor and was thus close to much of the filming that occurred for Empire. While Empire was filming, G.M. was not allowed out of his cell. He was given meals in his cell and was instructed to be quiet. He was allowed out of his cell only for dinner, and then returned to the cell for the evening. 44. D.G. a. D.G. is a 16-year-old boy who was housed in a JTDC living unit on the JTDC’s third floor. Children in his unit normally left the pod to attend school in the Nancy B. Jefferson classrooms on the JTDC’s second floor, and they would participate in structured programming later in the day.
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b. When Empire arrived to film at JTDC, the children did not leave the pod for school. Instead, teachers came to the pod, though the instruction was much less effective than instruction in the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities. Eventually no teachers came to the pods. c. Otherwise there was a television on the pod, turned on at low volume. Some children watched the television, but in all events, the children on D.G.’s pod were told not to speak, even at conversational levels. At times during the lockdown, the guards attempted to provide the children with “recreation,” but this consisted of a red rubber ball that was given to the children in the pod. During the Empire filming the children on D.G.’s pod were not permitted to leave the pod for recreation. D. The Children Housed at JTDC Were Injured by The Lockdown 45. As a proximate result of the Empire lockdown, the children housed at the JTDC suffered harm. 46. The lockdown interrupted and degraded the rehabilitation and structured programming that is designed to address the problems, many of them very serious, that brought the children to the JTDC. This includes the children’s education and schooling, which was degraded and often eliminated as a result of the lockdown. 47. The lockdown was also psychologically damaging to children in and of itself. Placing children for days on end under the forced idleness that governed in the pods is psychologically and emotionally harmful. This is particularly so for a vulnerable population like the children housed at the JTDC, many of whom come from unstable or broken homes and suffer from psychological trauma and diagnosed psychological impairments.
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48. As a proximate result of the lockdown, the children housed at the JTDC were also subject to an increased the risk of physical violence. It is well established that depriving children housed in juvenile facilities of meaningful opportunities for recreation and structured programming, and instead forcing them into idleness on their pods, increases the risk of confrontation and violence among the children themselves. The Empire lockdowns created just such a hazard for the children at JTDC, increasing risk from attack or altercation with other children there.
E. The Defendants Profited From Locking Down JTDC 49. The Defendants profited as a proximate result of the JTDC lockdown. 50. The Fox Defendants profited from using the JTDC’s incarceration facilities as the
primary set for two highly profitable Empire episodes. Scenes shot at JTDC were featured prominently in the first two episodes of Empire’s second season, accounting for more than a third of the running time in each. These episodes were immensely profitable. Advertisers paid $750,000 per 30-second advertising spot in Episode 1, and $600,000 per 30-second spot in Episode 2. An advertising industry publication called these rates “astonishing.”
51. In addition to this revenue, the Fox Defendants realized profits from Empire by broadcasting these episodes overseas, as well as licensing the episodes, streaming them over the internet, and selling them for download. In reports to investors covering this period, Defendant Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. noted that Empire was highly profitable and had contributed significantly to the company’s revenues.
52. These profits were the result of joint effort by the Fox Defendants. Defendant Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc. was the producer of both episodes featured at the JTDC, which were broadcast by Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc.; the two companies, which share joint
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CEOs, work closely together to design programming, including Empire, that will maximize Fox’s revenue. Indeed, one reason for Empire’s multiple visits to the JTDC was that Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc. and Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc. demanded that certain scenes set at the JTDC be re-filmed. In particular, one of the characters in the Empire episodes filmed at the JTDC, played by comedian Chris Rock, had originally been depicted as a cannibal. After they learned about this depiction, executives of the Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc., and/or one or more of the Defendant Does acting as an agent for the Fox Defendants, ordered that certain scenes at the JTDC be re-shot to change this depiction. The JTDC was placed on lockdown at least in part to accommodate these demands.
53. Defendant Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. was involved in the production of these episodes, having, for example, secured the parking permits for filming at the JTDC. Profits from the episodes flowed through Fox Television Group and Fox Networks Group, Inc. to Defendant Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.
54. Cook County and/or certain Defendant Does profited from Empire’s filming as well, receiving “reimbursement” revenue connected with the use of the JTDC.
F. Cook County’s Final Decision Maker Regarding JTDC’s Operation Knew About and Approved Of the Lockdown 55. From the facts available, Named Plaintiffs allege that the person who exercises
final decision-making authority regarding operation of the JTDC, Chief Judge Timothy Evans, knew about and approved the filming of Empire at the JTDC, and the facility’s consequent lockdown.
56. As described herein, the Empire lockdown occurred during a high-profile transition in which Judge Evans took control of the JTDC for the first time, and it is simply not plausible that Superintendent Dixon, who had just started his job, would authorize the Empire
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filming and lockdown without first checking with his new boss. And indeed, as described herein, Superintendent Dixon implied in correspondence that Chief Judge Evans was aware of the filming, and had approved of it.
57. In the summer of 2015, the JTDC was starting a new chapter in its administration. Sixteen years earlier, in 1999, a federal civil rights lawsuit was filed against Cook County, alleging systematic mistreatment and neglect of children housed at the JTDC. See Doe v. Cook County, 99-cv-3945 (N.D. Ill.).
58. The Doe parties originally entered into a settlement agreement under which Cook County would improve conditions at the JTDC. In 2007, though, after concluding that the County was not complying with the agreement’s terms, the District Court appointed a federal temporary administrator to operate the JTDC and bring it into compliance. On January 1, 2008, a few months after the federal District Court took over the JTDC, the Illinois Legislature enacted a reform measure that transferred final decision making authority over the JTDC’s operation from the Cook County Board President to the Chief Judge of Cook County. Notwithstanding this intra-County transfer of authority, the JTDC would remain under control of the federal District Court’s temporary administrator for the next several years.
59. Years later, the District Court finally determined that Cook County was capable of reassuming operation of the JTDC, and it ordered that control of the JTDC be transferred from the temporary federal administrator back to Cook County in 2015.
60. In preparation for the JTDC’s transfer back to Cook County’s control, Chief Judge Evans, who at all relevant times has been Chief Judge of Cook County, appointed Leonard Dixon as the JTDC’s new superintendent. This was a high-profile selection. Judge Evans announced his choice with a lengthy press release, and held a joint press conference with
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Superintendent Dixon to discuss Dixon’s appointment and Cook County’s impending takeover of the JTDC. The transfer was the object of intense media scrutiny, and Judge Evans and Superintendent Dixon gave media interviews on the subject. In these press events and interviews, both men stressed that their priority in reassuming control of the JTDC would be the care for and welfare of the children housed there. They also stressed the need to provide the children housed at the JTDC with a non-penal environment that had structured programming, to help the children cope with difficulties in the outside world once they left the facility.
61. The federal District Court finally transferred administration of the JTDC to Cook County’s control on May 20, 2015. Empire arrived to film four weeks later, on June 21.
62. It is exceedingly unlikely that Superintendent Dixon, who oversaw the JTDC’s daily operations, would have allowed Empire to film there without Judge Evans’s approval. Dixon, who has held high-profile positions in the juvenile corrections field for decades, had become the JTDC’s superintendent just four weeks earlier when it was placed under Judge Evans’ control, for the very first time. And as noted above, Judge Evans had publicly expressed keen interest in this transfer. Under these circumstances, it would be implausible to suggest that an experienced administrator like Superintendent Dixon would have placed the JTDC on lockdown so that a large television crew could use it as a film set, without first checking with his boss.
63. And indeed, in contemporaneous correspondence Superintendent Dixon implied that he had just such approval from Chief Judge Evans. In July 2015, an attorney wrote to Superintendent Dixon to express concern about reports the attorney had received that JTDC had been placed on lockdown so that Fox could film Empire there. Superintendent Dixon responded by formal letter on July 24, 2015. He acknowledged that Empire had filmed at JTDC, but he
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claimed that the experience for the children had been positive, and they hadn’t been inconvenienced in any way. The letter’s closing “courtesy copy” notation indicated that Dixon was sending a copy of the letter to Dr. Beverly Butler, whom the letter noted represented the office of the Chief Judge. Indeed, Dr. Butler was Chief Judge Evans’ special assistant for the transition of the JTDC to Chief Judge’s control. It is reasonable to infer that Superintendent Dixon’s purpose in copying Dr. Butler on the letter was to imply that Judge Evans was aware of, and had approved of, the Empire filming. Crediting Superintendent Dixon this implication, and considering the circumstances discussed above, it is reasonable to infer that Chief Judge Evans knew that the JTDC was being used as a film set for Empire, and that he had approved of it.
Class Allegations 64. Named Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims for a class of others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and/or Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 65. Named Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of all children housed at the JTDC when the facility was placed on lockdown during the filming of Empire in the summer of 2015. 66. Numerosity—The individuals in this class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. There are between 250 and 400 children housed at JTDC during normal operation. 67. Commonality—There are questions of law and fact common to this class. Among those questions are:
 Whether Empire was filmed at the JTDC during the summer of 2015.  Whether the JTDC was placed on lockdown in order to facilitate this filming.  Whether locking down the children at the JTDC in order to facilitate the
filming of a commercial television show is an action reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
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 Whether it was a breach of fiduciary duty to place the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown so that Empire could be filmed there.
 Whether the Fox Defendants and Defendant Does acted jointly with the JTDC’s administrators to place the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film scenes for Empire.
 Whether the Defendants conspired with one another to place the children at the JTDC on lockdown in order to realize a profit from the filming of Empire.
 Whether locking down children housed at the JTDC in the manner described in the complaint created an increased risk of physical violence.
 Whether locking down the children housed at the JTDC in order to film Empire departed substantially from generally accepted professional standards for the operation of juvenile facilities.
 Whether locking down the children housed at the JTDC in order to film Empire violated their Due Process rights under the U.S. Constitution.
 Whether locking down the children housed at the JTDC in order to film Empire effected an unreasonable seizure in violation their rights under the U.S. Constitution.
 Whether the profits that the Defendants realized from locking down the JTDC in order to film Empire were unjustly obtained.
 Whether the Defendants are subject to disgorgement of the profits they realized by placing the children at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film Empire there.
 Whether the Defendants are subject to nominal damages for placing the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film Empire there.
 Whether the Defendants are subject to punitive damages for placing the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film Empire there.
 Whether the Defendants are subject to actual damages for placing the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film Empire there.
68. Typicality—Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class.
Named Plaintiffs were housed at the JTDC when the children at the facility were placed on
lockdown in order to facilitate filming for Empire. Their treatment in being placed on lockdown
is typical of other children housed at JTDC who were placed on lockdown in order to facilitate
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the filming of Empire. Named Plaintiffs seek to prove that the locking down of the children housed at the JTDC in order to facilitate the filming of Empire violated the constitutional and state-law rights of the children subjected to the lockdown, and that the Defendants are subject to nominal damages, actual damages, punitive damages, and disgorgement for the profits resulting from this misconduct.
69. Adequacy—Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. They are represented by skilled counsel with experience in complex civil litigation, class actions, and litigation concerning constitutional and prisoners’ rights. Attorneys Stephen H. Weil, Pamela Hanebutt, and Susan Razzano have decades of experience in complex civil litigation, including class action litigation. The attorneys also have substantial experience in litigation under Section 1983, including individual and class-action litigation on behalf of jail and prison inmates.
70. Rule 23(b)(1)(B)—Named Plaintiffs’ claims for disgorgement, among other remedies, are certifiable under this rule because adjudications with respect to individual members of the class will as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members of the class.
71. Rule 23(b)(3)— Named Plaintiffs’ claims for actual damages, among other remedies, are certifiable under this rule because the questions of law and fact common to the class predominate over any individual issues, and a class action would be superior to other methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy.
COUNT I - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (All Defendants—Due Process) 72. Each paragraph of this complaint incorporated as if fully restated here.
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73. As described more fully herein, each of the Defendants subjected Named Plaintiffs and similarly situated children at the JTDC to lockdown, which impeded these children from accessing meaningful schooling, rehabilitation, structured programming, recreation, and visits from families, and subjected them to restrictions more severe than those that are commonly imposed in many adult jails. The Defendants did this so that the JTDC’s schooling and other facilities on its second and third floors could be used to stage and shoot scenes for the Empire television show. The Defendants did this while acting individually, jointly, and in conspiracy with one another, as well as under color of law and within the scope of their employment.
74. The lockdowns and attendant conditions were not imposed for a legitimate governmental purpose, but rather to facilitate the filming of a commercial television show and to realize the profits therefrom. The Fox Defendants acted together with and obtained significant aid from Defendants Cook County, Dixon, and Does 1 through 20 in filming Empire for commercial purposes at the JTDC. The Defendants knew that filming Empire at the JTDC would result in the lockdowns and attendant restrictions on the children housed there.
75. The Defendants knew that the lockdowns violated the children’s rights and imposed harm and a risk of harm on the children, yet they carried out the lockdown and filming anyway. This misconduct was undertaken knowingly, intentionally, and/or with reckless indifference to the rights of the children housed at the JTDC.
76. The lockdowns and attendant conditions violated the Due Process rights of the children housed at the JTDC.
77. As a proximate result of these lockdowns and resulting conditions, the children housed at the JTDC suffered emotional and psychological pain, were deprived of meaningful
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opportunities for rehabilitation, education, and family visits, and were subject to increased risk of physical violence at the hands of other children at the facility.
78. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
COUNT II - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (All Defendants—Unlawful Seizure) 79. Each paragraph of this complaint incorporated as if fully restated here. 80. Under the JTDC’s normal operation, children are permitted to attend classes in the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities, participate in structured programming in appropriate facilities on the JTDC’s lower floors that is designed to assist in their rehabilitation, participate in recreation, including outdoor recreation in the third floor courtyard, and visit with family members in the JTDC’s visiting areas at appropriate times and for extended periods. 81. As described more fully herein, the Defendants deliberately placed the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in their cells and pods, physically restraining and limiting their range of movement, and preventing them from leaving the pods and partaking in the numerous educational and rehabilitative activities that they would otherwise be entitled to do. The Defendants did this while acting individually, jointly, and in conspiracy with one another, as well as under color of law and within the scope of their employment. 82. The Fox Defendants acted together with and obtained significant aid from Defendants Cook County, Dixon, and Does 1 through 20 in filming Empire for commercial purposes at the JTDC. The Defendants knew that filming Empire at the JTDC would result in the lockdowns and attendant restrictions on the children housed there. The Defendants jointly acted to improperly impose these additional restrictions on the children housed at the JTDC as a
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result of the Empire filming, which constituted a new seizure—that is, a seizure different from, and in addition to, their existing lawful detainment.
83. This new seizure was objectively unreasonable. The Defendants did not effect it pursuant to a legitimate governmental purpose, but rather so that the schooling, rehabilitation, and recreation areas of the JTDC could be used to film scenes for a profitable television show.
84. As a proximate result of these lockdowns and resulting conditions, the children housed at the JTDC were deprived of their liberty interest to be free from unreasonable restraint. They also suffered emotional and psychological pain, were deprived of meaningful opportunities for rehabilitation, and were subject to increased risk of physical violence at the hands of other children housed at the facility.
85. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
COUNT III - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Monell liability—Cook County) 86. Each paragraph of this complaint incorporated as if fully restated here. 87. What happened to Named Plaintiffs and similarly situated children was the implementation of Defendants Cook County, Dixon, and Does 1-20 agreement with the Fox Defendants. The lockdowns of the JTDC were the result of the official policy and decisions of Cook County. 88. Specifically, the Chief Judge of Cook County, Timothy Evans, is, under Illinois law, the person with final policymaking and decision-making authority regarding the administration and operation of the JTDC, including the decision of whether to allow the filming of Empire at the JTDC.
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89. As set forth in more detail in this complaint, the Chief Judge was informed of, knew about, and approved of the filming of Empire at the JTDC, and its consequent lockdown. Because Chief Judge Evans was and is Cook County’s final policy- and decision-maker regarding the JTDC’s administration and operation, Cook County may be said to have caused the injuries and unjust enrichment described in this complaint.
COUNT IV - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fox Defendants—Joint Action Liability) 90. Each paragraph of this complaint incorporated as if fully restated here. 91. The Fox Defendants and their employees and/or agents willfully induced and participated in the lockdown of the children at the JTDC facility, and their actions were inextricably intertwined with those of the named and unknown governmental Defendants, acting under color of law, who placed the facility on lockdown and imposed the conditions described herein. The Defendants agreed to engage jointly in an enterprise that only the government could lawfully institute for the mutual benefit of both the public and private Defendants. 92. The Fox Defendants deliberately encouraged the Government Defendants to improperly place the JTDC on lockdown during the filming of Empire, for commercial benefit. The Fox Defendants reached an agreement with the JTDC’s administrators that the JTDC’s administrators would prohibit the children housed at the JTDC from using the various schooling and rehabilitative facilities on the JTDC’s second and third floors so that the Fox Defendants could use those facilities to stage and film scenes for Empire. The contemplated and obvious result of this agreement was that the children would be confined to their cells and pods on the JTDC’s upper floors. It was to accommodate the Fox Defendants’ filming needs that the children at JTDC were placed on lockdown at all. Indeed, it was the intention of the Fox Defendants that the children not be allowed to use their designated schooling and rehabilitation
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facilities so that the Fox Defendants and their agents could film Empire without distraction. In reaching this agreement with the JTDC’s administrators, the Fox Defendants entered into a conspiracy and undertook joint action, under color of law, to violate the rights of the children housed at the JTDC.
93. The acts taken in furtherance of this conspiracy and joint action proximately resulted in the injuries and unjust enrichment described elsewhere in this complaint.
COUNT V – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fox Defendants—Respondeat Superior) 94. Each paragraph of this complaint incorporated as if fully restated here. 95. While committing the misconduct alleged in the preceding paragraphs, one or more of the Defendant Does 1-20 were employees and/or agents of one or more of the Fox Defendants and were acting within the scope of their employment and/or agency. One or more of the Fox Defendants are liable as principal for all torts and constitutional violations committed by their employees and/or agents or on their behalf.
COUNT VI - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Conspiracy)
96. Each paragraph of this complaint incorporated as if fully restated here. 97. The Defendants reached an agreement among themselves to deprive the children housed at the JTDC of their constitutional rights, as described throughout this complaint. 98. In furtherance of this conspiracy, each of the co-conspirators committed overt, tortious acts and was an otherwise willful participant in joint activity. 99. The misconduct described in this count was undertaken intentionally and/or with reckless indifference to the rights of the children housed at the JTDC. 100. As a direct and proximate result of the illicit prior agreement referenced above, the rights of the children housed at the JTDC were violated, and they suffered emotional and
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psychological injuries as well as a wrongfully increased risk of physical injury, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
101. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
COUNT VII – State Law Claim (Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Cook County, Dixon, and Defendant Does) 102. Each paragraph of this complaint incorporated as if fully restated here. 103. Defendants Cook County, Dixon, and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20, were guardians of the children housed at the JTDC. 104. In turn, the children housed at the JTDC were the wards of these Defendants. 105. As guardians, these defendants had a fiduciary relationship with the children housed at the JTDC. 106. Among their obligations as guardians, these Defendants were obliged to act in the best interest of the children housed at the JTDC. 107. As described more fully throughout this complaint, these Defendants breached these fiduciary duties by placing the children housed at JTDC on lockdown for the purposes of facilitating the filming of a profitable television show there. 108. As a proximate result of this breach of fiduciary duty, the children housed at the JTDC suffered harm and an increased risk of physical injury, as described elsewhere in this complaint. 109. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
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Count VIII State Law Claim (Inducement of Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Fox Defendants and Defendant Does)
110. Each paragraph of this complaint incorporated as if fully restated here. 111. As set forth more fully herein, Defendants Cook County, Dixon, and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20 were fiduciaries of the children housed at the JTDC. 112. As set forth more fully herein, one or more of the Fox Defendants and/or Defendant Does colluded with one or more of these fiduciaries in committing the breaches of fiduciary duty described elsewhere in this complaint. 113. These Fox Defendants and/or the Defendant Does knowingly induced and knowingly participated in this breach, and they knowingly accepted the benefits resulting from this breach. 114. As a proximate result of this breach of fiduciary duty, the children housed at the JTDC suffered harm and an increased risk of physical injury, as described elsewhere in this complaint. 115. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
COUNT IX – State Law Claim (All Defendants – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 116. Each paragraph of this complaint incorporated as if fully restated here. 117. The actions, omissions, and conduct of the Defendants as set forth in this complaint were extreme and outrageous. These actions were rooted in an abuse of power and authority and were undertaken with the intent to cause, or were in reckless disregard of the probability that their conduct would cause, severe emotional distress to the children housed at the JTDC.
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118. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ actions, the children housed at the JTDC suffered emotional distress as set forth above.
119. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
COUNT X – State Law Claim (All Defendants – Civil Conspiracy) 120. Each paragraph of this complaint incorporated as if fully restated here. 121. As described more fully in the preceding paragraphs, the Defendants reached an agreement among themselves to place the children housed in the JTDC on lockdown so that the facility could be used to film scenes for a profitable television show, and conspired by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose by an unlawful means. 122. In furtherance of their conspiracy, each of these co-conspirators committed overt acts and were otherwise willful participants in joint activity. 123. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable and was undertaken intentionally, with malice, with reckless indifference to the rights of others, and in total disregard of the conditions imposed by or the effects of the lockdowns on the children housed at the JTDC. 124. As a proximate result of the Defendants’ misconduct described in this Count, the children housed at the JTDC suffered harm and the increased risk of physical injury, as described elsewhere in this complaint. 125. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
COUNT XI – State Law Claim (Respondeat Superior)
126. Each paragraph of this complaint incorporated as if fully restated here. 35

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127. While committing the misconduct alleged in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants Dixon, and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20 were employees and agents of Cook County and acting within the scope of their authority or employment. Defendant Cook County is liable as principal for all misconduct committed by these employees and agents.
128. While committing the misconduct alleged in the preceding paragraphs, one or more of the Defendant Does 1-20 were employees or agents of one or more of the Fox Defendants acting within the scope of their employment. One or more of the Fox Defendants are liable as principal for all torts committed by their employees or agents.
COUNT XII – State Law Claim (Cook County – Indemnification) 129. Each paragraph of this complaint incorporated as if fully restated here. 130. Illinois law provides that public entities are directed to pay any tort judgments for compensatory damages for which employees are liable within the scope of their employment activities. 131. Defendants Dixon and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20 were employees and agents of Cook County and acting within the scope of their employment in committing the misconduct described herein. 132. Cook County is obligated by Illinois law to pay any judgment entered against Defendants Dixon and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20.
WHEREFORE, Named Plaintiffs demand a jury trial for all issues so appropriate and requests that this Court issue the following relief in their favor against the Defendants:
a. A judgment ordering disgorgement of enrichment realized by the Defendants resulting from the misconduct described in this complaint. 36

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b. A judgment ordering the payment of nominal damages against all Defendants. c. A judgment ordering the payment of punitive damages against the Defendants. d. A judgment ordering the payment of actual damages against all Defendants (in
alternative to disgorgement). e. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable law. f. Any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

JURY DEMAND Named Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) on all issues so triable.

Dated: August 24, 2016

By:
Stephen H. Weil sweil@eimerstahl.com
Pamela R. Hanebutt phanebutt@eimerstahl.com
Susan M. Razzano srazzano@eimerstahl.com
Eimer Stahl LLP 224 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 1100 Chicago, IL 60604 Tel: (312) 660-7600
Attorneys for Named Plaintiffs T.S. and Q.B.

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 Case: 1:16-cv-08303 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/05/16 Page 1 of 39 PageID #:73

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

T.S., a minor by and through his parent and guardian, S.S.; Q.B., a minor by and through his grandparent and guardian, V.P.,
On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX TELEVISION, a division of TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION; FOX BROADCASTING COMPANY; TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FOX, INC.; FOX ENTERTAINMENT GROUP LLC; FOX NETWORKS GROUP, INC.; THE COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS; THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY in his official capacity; LEONARD DIXON; and JOHN DOES 1 through 20,
Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-cv-08303 Hon. Amy J. St. Eve (Complaint—Class Action) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Introduction
Three times during the summer of 2015, the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (the “JTDC”) was placed on lockdown so that it could be used as a film set to shoot scenes for Empire, a hit Fox television show. Numerous areas that are essential to the JTDC’s

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mission of educating and rehabilitating the children housed there—including the JTDC’s school, its facilities for family visits, its only outdoor recreation yard, its library, and its chapel—were placed off limits so that Fox’s agents and employees could use them to stage and film the show.
The children for whom these facilities were intended, meanwhile, were ordered to remain in their cells, or were confined to the jail-style “pod” areas just outside their cell doors. There they were told to sit, for days on end. Their schooling continued in name only, visits from their families were interrupted, cut back, or effectively eliminated, sick-call requests were ignored, and programs that are intended to help them overcome the problems that landed them at the JTDC in the first place were cancelled or interrupted.
The purpose of these lockdowns was to provide Fox with a realistic prison facility to use as the primary set of two highly profitable Empire episodes. The children at JTDC, meanwhile, were placed under restrictions more severe than those governing many adult jails. Putting the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown so that the Defendants could use the facility to film a profitable television show was a breach of fiduciary duty, and it violated the children’s rights under the U.S. Constitution and state law. The profits gained from this misconduct were unjustly obtained. In this lawsuit Named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarlysituated children who were subject to these lockdowns, seek the disgorgement of the Defendants’ unjust gains, punitive damages, and related remedies.
Nature of the Action1 1. Named Plaintiffs T.S. and Q.B. were housed at the JTDC in the summer of 2015 during the lockdowns imposed to facilitate the filming of Empire there. They seek to represent a class of similarly situated children. On behalf of that class, Named Plaintiffs seek disgorgement,
1 Plaintiffs make the allegations in this complaint based on personal knowledge as to matters in which they have had personal involvement and on information and belief as to all other matters.
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nominal damages, punitive damages, an alternative award of actual damages, and an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.
Parties 2. Plaintiff T.S. is a 17-year-old boy who was housed at the JTDC during the summer of 2015 when it was placed on lockdown to facilitate the filming of Empire. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, T.S. brings this complaint by and through S.S., his parent and legal guardian. Like all minors identified in this complaint, T.S. is identified by his initials, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2. S.S. is identified by initials in order to protect T.S.’s identity. At the time of the filing of the complaint in this action, T.S. was not incarcerated. 3. Plaintiff Q.B. is a 17-year-old boy who was housed at the JTDC during the summer of 2015 when it was placed on lockdown to facilitate the filming of Empire. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, Q.B. brings this complaint by and through V.P., his grandparent and legal guardian. V.P. is identified by initials in order to protect Q.B.’s identity. At the time of the filing of the complaint in this action, Q.B. was not incarcerated. 4. The Defendants identified in the sub-paragraphs of this paragraph are referred to as the “Fox Defendants” or “Fox.”
a. Defendant Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. is a diversified global media and entertainment conglomerate with operations in cable network programming, television, and filmed entertainment. It is a publicly-traded company and is the ultimate parent of all the other Fox Defendants. b. Defendant Fox Entertainment Group LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.
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c. Defendant Fox Networks Group, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fox Entertainment Group LLC. d. Defendant Twentieth Century Fox Television produces television shows that are broadcast on Fox’s network, including Empire. Twentieth Century Fox Television is given production credit for both of the Empire episodes that were filmed in the JTDC. Twentieth Century Fox Television is a division of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation. Twentieth Century Fox Television is not a legal entity distinct from Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, and therefore Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation is liable for all acts and omissions made by or on behalf of Twentieth Century Fox Television. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. e. Defendant Fox Broadcasting Company operates the television network that broadcasts Empire, among other television programming. Fox Broadcasting Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fox Networks Group, Inc. 5. Defendant Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County is sued in his official capacity. The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County administers the JTDC. 6. Defendant Leonard Dixon is the superintendent of the JTDC. He oversaw the JTDC’s daily operations at all times during the summer of 2015 when the children housed there were placed on lockdown to facilitate the filming of Empire. 7. Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois (“Cook County”) is a county in Illinois. The JTDC is operated as a branch of Cook County’s government. Cook County established and operates the JTDC, and it supports, funds, and maintains the facility. Cook County is obligated
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to indemnify judgements entered against the administrators of the JTDC arising from the operation of the JTDC.
8. Defendants Does 1 through 20 are sued herein by fictitious names for the reason that their true names are unknown to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend this complaint to allege the true names and capacities of these Defendants when their identities have been ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that these fictitiously-named Defendants are responsible in some manner for the misconduct alleged herein.
9. The Defendants at all times herein were the agents, joint venturers, and/or coconspirators of each of the other remaining Defendants, and in doing the things alleged in this complaint they were acting in the course of such agency, joint venture, and/or conspiracy.
Jurisdiction and Venue 10. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 because this is an action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because those claims are so related to the claims providing the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 11. Venue is proper in this jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred in this district and this is a convenient and reasonable forum for the resolution of this dispute.
Facts A. Normal Operation of the JTDC
12. The JTDC is a five-story building near the intersection of Ogden Avenue and Roosevelt Road, a few miles southwest of downtown Chicago. It is among the largest juvenile
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detention facilities in the country, housing between 250 and 400 children from the ages of 10 to 18. The average stay for a child at the JTDC is around three weeks.
13. Under normal operation, the JTDC’s floors serve distinct functions. Children detained at the JTDC are housed primarily on the fourth and fifth floors, which contain rows of cells that open onto small “pods.” The pods serve as common areas in the same manner as a pod or “dayroom” in an adult jail cell block. A portion of the third floor also contains this cell-andpod arrangement, including an “intake” pod for newly detained children.
14. The remainder of the third floor, and the first and second floors, are taken up with facilities designed to provide schooling and structured programming to the children housed at JTDC, along with related administrative services. The third floor houses the JTDC’s infirmary, as well as a large open-air courtyard, which serves as the JTDC’s primary recreation yard for the children. This courtyard is the only place where children detained at the JTDC are allowed outdoors during their detention. There are smaller auxiliary gymnasium facilities in the basement that can be used by limited numbers of children, and are accessed via elevator.
15. The second floor is dedicated almost entirely to education and programming, and is the floor on which the bulk of the JTDC’s schooling and structured programming services are provided. The second floor contains the facilities of the Nancy B. Jefferson Alternative School, which is operated by Chicago Public Schools. In addition to the school’s numerous classrooms, the second floor contains a library, a computer lab and music room, and an indoor “game” area with resources to help children detained at the JTDC engage in constructive pastimes. The second floor also contains a chapel for religious services and other programming, as well as visiting facilities where children can spend time with their families.
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16. The first floor contains courtrooms, reception, and administrative offices. Parts of the first floor are directly accessible to the public, but the remainder of the building is secure and restricted, not accessible to the public without an escort.
17. The numerous facilities on the JTDC’s lower floors are reflective of the purpose for which the children are placed in detention at the JTDC. The JTDC does not operate as an adult prison, or even an adult jail. None of the children housed at the JTDC have been convicted of adult crimes, and they are not detained at the JTDC in order to be punished. To the contrary, because they are children, the purpose of their detention at the JTDC is to nurture and rehabilitate them, which is done by providing the children with schooling, care, and structured programming designed to address the problems that landed them at the JTDC in the first place. As the JTDC’s website states, its mission is to “provide[] the children with a safe, secure and caring environment with programs and structure that enhance personal development and improve opportunity for success upon return to the community.”
18. And indeed, the children housed at the JTDC are in pressing need of these services. For one thing, they are among the most vulnerable children in Chicago: more than 90 percent of this population has reported one or more traumatic experiences, with an average child reporting six different traumas. Sixty percent of the children who enter the JTDC are diagnosed with a mental disorder, and around one-quarter of them are prescribed psychotropic medication. Added to this, the children frequently arrive at the JTDC in a state of crisis, having been separated from their families and placed in confinement, many for the first time. Other children, meanwhile, are held at the JTDC not because of a delinquency adjudication, but rather because their home lives are in disarray: a judge has ordered the child’s release from whatever underlying matter brought the child to the JTDC, but the Department of Children and Family
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Services cannot find a foster home in which to place the child, or the child’s guardian has not
come to pick the child up. As Superintendent Dixon noted in a recent news interview,
“[juvenile] detention is like the emergency room of the juvenile justice system.” For that reason,
Superintendent Dixon has explained, rather than an incarceration-style setting, “[o]ur thing is to
have some normalcy when they [detained children] come here.” Conventional incarceration, in
which inmates are essentially warehoused in cells or pods with nothing to occupy the hours,
aggravates the psychological and emotional traumas suffered by this already vulnerable
population, and decreases the children’s chances of successfully re-entering society.
19. What is more, subjecting juveniles to forced idleness is dangerous for the children
themselves. As the U.S. Department of Justice has explained,
The amount and quality of structured daily programming in juvenile facilities has a significant impact on the rate of violent and antisocial incidents. Simply stated, youth who do not have adequate opportunities to engage in programmed activities become bored, and are more likely to become involved in mischief or assaultive behavior. Generally accepted professional standards mandate that youth in juvenile justice facilities receive a minimum of one hour of large muscle activity per weekday, two hours of large muscle activity per weekend day, educational programming during weekdays, and other structured developmental and rehabilitative activities. Inadequate youth programming . . . contributes to . . . high levels of youth violence, and departs substantially from generally accepted professional standards.
20. To fulfill the JTDC’s rehabilitative mission and provide a safe and structured
environment, the JTDC’s lower floors are dedicated to offering extensive schooling and
structured programming to the children housed there.
21. Under normal operation, the children detained at JTDC eat breakfast on their pods
in the upper floors, but quickly head down to the second floor for school, typically by 8:00 a.m.
The children attend classes at the school during the day, and take lunch there as well. After
classes finish, around 3:00 p.m., the children are typically placed in various structured after-
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school programs on the second floor, and sometimes on the third-floor recreation yard as well (the recreation yard contains a garden, for instance, which some of the children help maintain). The JTDC’s numerous rehabilitative programs include yoga, creative writing courses, computer classes, art, music, and singing. These programs are aimed at addressing the problems that brought each child to JTDC, and at preparing the children to lead more constructive and stable lives once they leave the facility.
22. During the day children are also given time for recreation in the third floor openair courtyard and game time in the JTDC’s indoor game area on the second floor, and they receive visits from family in the JTDC’s visiting rooms. These activities, though not formally structured, are also critical for the children’s wellbeing, both while they are at the JTDC and after they re-enter society.
23. In the early evening the children return to the pods for dinner and bathing. Shortly thereafter they are placed in their cells for the night.
24. As this itinerary indicates, under normal operation the children spend relatively little time on their pods and cells in the JTDC’s upper floors. This is so because, in contrast with the extensive programming and activities the children receive on the second and third floors, their time on the pods is spent under restrictions that can be even more confining than those of an adult jail.
25. Each cell-and-pod arrangement has around 15 to 20 children, overseen by guards. Most of the pods are long, narrow rooms—essentially a large, enclosed corridor outside of a row of cells—with jail-style seating arrangements, consisting of tables that are each fused to short stools and fixed to the floor. Pods are also typically equipped with a television (and accompanying seats) at one end, but they otherwise have little in the way of materials for
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activities, and certainly nothing comparable to the resources and programming available on the second and third floors.
26. To prevent the monotony of the pods from leading to altercations and physical violence, when the children are on the pod they are prohibited from moving freely. Whereas inmates in an adult jail are typically allowed to move around their “day rooms” as they please, children on the pods at the JTDC must all remain sitting in the same spot, at all times. If a child needs to use the restroom or otherwise leave his seat, that child must raise his hand and receive permission from the guards. While that child is out of his seat, no other children may leave their seats. Breaking this rule—that is, if one child stands up without first receiving permission—is punishable as a “major rule violation.” Some limited services are offered on the pods themselves—priests and pastors are allowed to visit the children there, for example—but otherwise the pods are devoid of programming.
27. Exigent circumstances—such as staffing shortages or security concerns— sometimes force JTDC administrators to hold children on the pods, where these significant restrictions govern. Otherwise, though, the JTDC attempts to minimize the time children spend in the restrictive conditions of the pod, in favor of the school facilities, recreation, and structured programming offered in the second and third floors of the facility.
28. Notably, providing meaningful schooling and programming opportunities requires a considerable number of personnel, in addition to facilities where these services can be provided. This is so because the children must be escorted by guards every time they leave their pods to travel to schooling or programming elsewhere in the JTDC.
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B. Filming Empire at the JTDC 29. Sometime in the spring of 2015, Superintendent Dixon, one or more of the Fox
Defendants, and/or one or more of the Defendant Does entered into an agreement that Empire’s film crew would be permitted to film at the JTDC. This agreement contemplated that the Empire film crew would have access to many of the restricted facilities on the JTDC’s second and third floors that are intended to rehabilitate and educate the children housed at the JTDC—and that these children would be barred from those same facilities so that the film crew could work without interruption. Instead, by necessary implication, the children housed at the JTDC would be confined to their cells and pods on the facility’s upper floors. In reaching this agreement, the Defendants knew that filming Empire at the JTDC would result in the lockdowns and attendant restrictions on the children housed there.
30. The production and filming of Empire at the JTDC lasted two weeks in the summer of 2015, spread over three different shootings: June 21 through 26, July 13 through 16, and August 23 through 26.
31. The film crews that descended on the JTDC to conduct these shootings were enormous. Empire employed a film crew of approximately 250 in Chicago, and city permits taken in the name of “Fox Entertainment Group” show that each time Empire came to film at the JTDC, parking was suspended around the facility for as many as seven city blocks. These restrictions were needed to accommodate the large number of cargo vans, production trailers, motor homes, tractor-trailer rigs, crew vehicles, and other support vehicles used in filming.
32. During each of the three shootings Empire’s film crew—including dozens of production staff, actors, and extras—took over much of the JTDC’s second and third floors. The Nancy B. Jefferson school’s classrooms were largely occupied with film crews and production
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equipment. The JTDC’s chapel was converted into an area for eating, and garbage cans were placed there for Empire’s crew to throw away trash. The library, which was normally used by children at the JTDC to read, study, and check out books, was made into crew support area. The infirmary was used as a film set, as were some of the JTDC’s intake facilities. So was the JTDC’s visiting area, where the children normally meet with their families. One area of particular focus for the film crew was the third floor open-air courtyard, which Empire’s crew used to film large, long-format scenes involving numerous actors and extras.
33. Empire took over more than just the many facilities on the JTDC’s second and third floors. Internal JTDC documents prepared to plan for the Empire filming indicate many staff were expected or directed to leave their normal duties in order to render services to the film crew instead. Some were chosen to act as extras in the show. Others were assigned to clean and clear out several areas in the building (this included removing children from some pods that the Empire crew wanted to use for filming), man the delivery docks to permit the free flow of film equipment, escort actors and crew members to and from the film set, keep Empire’s production crew from wandering around the facility, provide security for areas where filming was to occur, help escort filming equipment into place, and clean up after the crew. The Empire filming, in short, not only took over many of the facilities that furnished the schooling and structured programming that the JTDC was intended to provide; it also diverted a number of staff whose job it was to help fulfill the JTDC’s rehabilitative mission.
34. As a result, the only place for the children housed at the JTDC was their cells and pods. That is where they were kept. To accommodate Empire, Superintendent Dixon and/or Defendant Does deliberately placed the JTDC on lockdown, confining the children to the jailstyle cell-and-pod arrangements in the JTDC’s upper floors. This was not an accidental or
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inadvertent result of the filming. Rather, it was the planned method by which the JTDC was cleared out to make way for Empire’s film crew. In an internal JTDC document circulated among staff to organize the facility in preparation for Empire’s arrival, for example, the JTDC’s custodial staff were instructed:
Notify storeroom for additional supplies that the pods may need for increase of resident [sic] on pods. There will be a significant increase in utilization of custodial supplies. Toilet paper, C-fold towels, hand soap, hand sanitizer, garbage bags etc… [sic] will be needed. 35. When Empire arrived at the JTDC to film, the lockdown began with school. Instead of going down to their second-floor classrooms after breakfast as they normally would, the children remained on their pods. Nancy B. Jefferson teachers were ordered up into these areas, and instructed to go from pod to pod to teach their students. This was “school” in name only. The pods are not set up or even shaped like classrooms; instead, the teacher must stand in the midst of the seating that is arranged around the pod. There is no whiteboard or other teaching equipment for the instructor to use, and what supplies the teachers can bring to the pods are limited. What is more, during Empire filming many of the children whom the teachers had to instruct had not been allowed to move all day, and were going stir-crazy in what amounted to their own jail “day room.” Indeed these obvious obstacles are why the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities existed in the first place, and why the hundreds of children at the JTDC are escorted down to the school’s second-floor classrooms on a daily basis. Up on the pods instruction was markedly less effective and often chaotic, and during the Empire filming teachers often did not appear in the pods at all. 36. Recreation was drastically reduced, and for many children it was eliminated. Because the JTDC’s primary recreation facility—the third floor’s open-air courtyard—was being used to film Empire, the children were banned from that area. (The courtyard is divided into
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three sections, separated by walls, which allows different groups of children to use the yard independently. The Empire film crew only filmed in one of the sections, but the children were still banned from the remainder of the yard.) This left the smaller gymnasium facilities in the JTDC’s basement. But with limited space there, and the logistical challenge of bringing children down from the JTDC’s upper floors during filming, there was a backlog and many children never received any recreation or exercise at all.
37. Instead, in an evident attempt to comply with the letter of juvenile facility standards, many children were given “rec time” up on the pods themselves. An “instructor” would arrive and ask whether any of the children wanted to partake in “large muscle activity,” by which the instructor apparently meant push-ups, sit-ups, and jumping-jacks, to be done among the tables on the pod. In other pods a ball would be introduced and the children would be told to play. Even these pretenses were often abandoned, and there was simply no recreation at all. At no point during the Empire filming were the children allowed outdoors, as they would have if they had been allowed to use the third floor courtyard.
38. For many of the children detained at the JTDC, visits with families were effectively eliminated during Empire filming. For others, visits were restricted and severely shortened, with parents, who normally waited just a few minutes to visit with their children for an hour or more, forced to sit in waiting rooms for hours on end, for the opportunity to see their children for markedly shortened visits.
39. Other appointments were cancelled as well. For example, in order to seek medical attention the children can fill out sick-call slips on their pods. During normal operation, these requests usually receive prompt attention. The Empire film crew used the JTDC’s
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infirmary to shoot scenes for the show, however, and during filming numerous sick call requests were ignored.
40. Structured programming for children was also cancelled. Most of the structured programming normally occurs on the JTDC’s second floor, with some limited programming, such as a botany project that is run on the open-air courtyard, occurring on the third floor. Because the second and third floors had largely been taken over by Empire’s film crew, many of the JTDC’s after-school programs, including music and dance, were cancelled. Instead of attending these programs, children remained on their pods.
C. Individual Experiences 41. T.S. a. During the summer of 2015, T.S. was 16 years old and was housed in a JTDC living unit. Children on T.S.’s pod normally left the pod in the morning to attend class in the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities on the second floor, which they attended through mid-afternoon. During the day, they had recreation time in the third-floor courtyard. They also took advantage of games and activities on the commissary area on the JTDC’s second floor. b. When Empire arrived to film, these routines were eliminated. T.S. and the rest of the children on his pod were held there. They were not allowed down to the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities; instead, teachers would sometimes come up to the pods. This was a chaotic teaching environment. The teacher could not teach in front of the children, and had no whiteboard to instruct from. To make matters worse, the children on the pod, who had been prohibited from meaningful
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recreation, were going stir-crazy, and the pod was out of control. In this setting, teaching simply did not occur. c. During Empire’s filming, the children on T.S.’s pod did not leave for recreation. Instead a JTDC staff “instructor” would occasionally come to the pod and ask, “Who wants to do large-muscle?” This meant, apparently, that the children should do push-ups, sit-ups, and jumping-jacks in front of the seats they had been forced to sit in all day. After none of the children took the instructor up on this “recreation” offer, he would leave the pod. Often, no instructor arrived at all. Sick call requests by children on T.S.’s pod were also ignored during filming, whereas during regular operation they were responded to relatively promptly. d. T.S.’s visits with his mother were also interrupted and curtailed. During the JTDC’s normal operation, T.S.’s mother visited him during the two visiting periods T.S. was allotted each week. To visit T.S., his mother would arrive during T.S.’s designated visiting time slots, which were in the late afternoon or early evening. Once she arrived, it would typically take 20 minutes for JTDC staff to locate T.S. and bring him to the visiting facilities on the second floor. T.S. and his mother would then be able to have a visit that typically lasted at least an hour. e. During Empire’s filming, T.S.’s mother arrived at the designated time slot for her visit. Instead of bringing T.S. down, however, she, and several other parents who had arrived to visit during the same slot, were forced to sit in the waiting area. After around two hours had passed, she saw a large group of what appeared to be Empire’s cast or crew leave the building. Sometime thereafter, she
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was escorted to visit with T.S. in a room much smaller than the JTDC’s normal visiting rooms. Instead of being allowed to visit for an hour, their visit was shortened significantly. 42. Q.B. a. During the summer of 2015, Q.B. was 16 years old and was housed in a JTDC living unit. Children on Q.B.’s pod normally attended classes at the Nancy B. Jefferson school throughout the day. The children on Q.B.’s pod were provided with two recreation periods, one for gym class as part of their schooling, and another for an after-school recreation hour. b. The schooling on the second floor, and the recreation hours, were important to Q.B. and the other the children because they provided a meaningful escape from the monotony of confinement on the pod. While on the pod the children were required to sit in one place, and could only move, one at a time, with prior permission. Even to stand up without first obtaining permission was treated as a major rule violation. c. Q.B. had two visiting hours during the week, on Tuesdays and Saturdays, and during his confinement at the JTDC his father and his grandmother visited him frequently. d. One day the children on Q.B.’s pod were told they would not be going down to the school, because Empire had arrived to film at the JTDC. During the Empire filming teachers occasionally came up to the pod to teach, but sometimes they did not. When they did arrive, the teaching environment was chaotic, as the children had been locked on the pod all day without any opportunity for
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movement. Children on Q.B.’s pod never received recreation during Empire’s filming, making time on the pod miserable. In addition to these restrictions, sick call requests put in by children on Q.B.’s pod were ignored. Normally such requests were responded to relatively promptly. e. Q.B.’s grandmother visited him at the JTDC whenever she could. She works at a supermarket that frequently requires her to work over the weekends, however, making visits during Q.B.’s Saturday visiting slot difficult. After being unable to get time off to visit one Saturday, Q.B.’s grandmother asked her boss to take off of work Tuesday, so that she could visit her grandson. Empire was filming that day, however, and when she arrived at the JTDC during Q.B.’s visiting slot, she was told that visits in that time had been cancelled. 43. N.T. a. N.T. is a 16-year-old boy who was housed at the JTDC. During normal operation, he and the other children in his unit would leave the pod after breakfast for classes downstairs at the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities. They would attend school through the afternoon, with outdoor recreation in the third-floor courtyard during the school day. The children in N.T.’s unit participated in multiple after-school programs, including a drum circle and a dance class. During the two visiting periods that N.T. was allotted each week, either N.T.’s mother, his grandmother, or both would visit with him in the JTDC’s visiting area. b. When Fox arrived to film Empire, N.T.’s unit was placed on lockdown. The children did not leave the pod for school. Instead, they remained in their pod, where they were told to remain in their seats. Movement was permitted only to
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one child at a time, after the child received permission. Some teachers came up to the pod, but there was no whiteboard board for writing, the teachers brought few materials, and teaching in the pod environment was ineffective. After-school programming was cancelled entirely, and N.T. was unable to visit with his mother or grandmother. Children in N.T.’s unit could only escape the monotony of the pod by buying “room time”—30 minutes alone in their cells—using points they earned for good behavior. c. During lockdown the children in N.T.’s unit were taken to the gymnasium facilities in the JTDC’s basement, but only occasionally, apparently because administrators from different pods were fighting for scarce recreation time slots there. As a substitute the children were given “recreation” in their pods, during which they were allowed to play cards or write letters. Otherwise, the children were confined to their chairs on the pod and not allowed to move. 44. G.M. a. G.M. is a 16-year-old boy who was housed in the JTDC’s intake unit when Empire arrived to film. Children in the intake unit are normally allowed out of their cells the entire day. They take breakfast in their pods, are allowed some activities there, and are given recreation either in the basement gymnasium facility or the third-floor open-air courtyard. There is also an area in the intake unit where the children can watch television. b. The intake unit is on the third floor and was thus close to much of the filming that occurred for Empire. While Empire was filming, G.M. was not allowed out of his cell. He was given meals in his cell and was instructed to be
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quiet. He was allowed out of his cell only for dinner, and then returned to the cell for the evening. 45. D.G. a. D.G. is a 16-year-old boy who was housed in a JTDC living unit on the JTDC’s third floor. Children in his unit normally left the pod to attend school in the Nancy B. Jefferson classrooms on the JTDC’s second floor, and they would participate in structured programming later in the day. b. When Empire arrived to film at JTDC, the children did not leave the pod for school. Instead, teachers came to the pod, though the instruction was much less effective than instruction in the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities. Eventually no teachers came to the pods. c. Otherwise there was a television on the pod, turned on at low volume. Some children watched the television, but in all events, the children on D.G.’s pod were told not to speak, even at conversational levels. At times during the lockdown, the guards attempted to provide the children with “recreation,” but this consisted of a red rubber ball that was given to the children in the pod. During the Empire filming the children on D.G.’s pod were not permitted to leave the pod for recreation. D. The Children Housed at JTDC Were Injured by The Lockdown 46. As a proximate result of the Empire lockdown, the children housed at the JTDC suffered harm. 47. The lockdown interrupted and degraded the rehabilitation and structured programming that is designed to address the problems, many of them very serious, that brought
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the children to the JTDC. This includes the children’s education and schooling, which was degraded and often eliminated as a result of the lockdown.
48. The lockdown was also psychologically damaging to children in and of itself. Placing children for days on end under the forced idleness that governed in the pods is psychologically and emotionally harmful. This is particularly so for a vulnerable population like the children housed at the JTDC, many of whom come from unstable or broken homes and suffer from psychological trauma and diagnosed psychological impairments.
49. As a proximate result of the lockdown, the children housed at the JTDC were also subject to an increased the risk of physical violence. It is well established that depriving children housed in juvenile facilities of meaningful opportunities for recreation and structured programming, and instead forcing them into idleness on their pods, increases the risk of confrontation and violence among the children themselves. The Empire lockdowns created just such a hazard for the children at JTDC, increasing risk from attack or altercation with other children there.
E. The Defendants Profited From Locking Down JTDC 50. The Defendants profited as a proximate result of the JTDC lockdown. 51. The Fox Defendants profited from using the JTDC’s incarceration facilities as the
primary set for two highly profitable Empire episodes. Scenes shot at JTDC were featured prominently in the first two episodes of Empire’s second season, accounting for more than a third of the running time in each. These episodes were immensely profitable. Advertisers paid $750,000 per 30-second advertising spot in Episode 1, and $600,000 per 30-second spot in Episode 2. An advertising industry publication called these rates “astonishing.”
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52. In addition to this revenue, the Fox Defendants realized profits from Empire by broadcasting these episodes overseas, as well as licensing the episodes, streaming them over the internet, and selling them for download. In reports to investors covering this period, Defendant Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. noted that Empire was highly profitable and had contributed significantly to the company’s revenues.
53. These profits were the result of joint effort by the Fox Defendants. Defendant Twentieth Century Fox Television was the producer of both episodes featured at the JTDC, which were broadcast by Fox Broadcasting Company; the two companies, which share joint CEOs, work closely together to design programming, including Empire, that will maximize Fox’s revenue. Indeed, one reason for Empire’s multiple visits to the JTDC was that Fox Broadcasting Company and Twentieth Century Fox Television demanded that certain scenes set at the JTDC be re-filmed. In particular, one of the characters in the Empire episodes filmed at the JTDC, played by comedian Chris Rock, had originally been depicted as a cannibal. After they learned about this depiction, executives of the Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, and/or one or more of the Defendant Does acting as agents for the Fox Defendants, ordered that certain scenes at the JTDC be re-shot to change this depiction. The JTDC was placed on lockdown at least in part to accommodate these demands.
54. Defendant Fox Entertainment Group LLC was involved in the production of these episodes, having, for example, secured the parking permits for filming at the JTDC. Profits from the episodes flowed through Fox Networks Group, Inc. and Fox Entertainment Group LLC to Defendant Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.
55. Cook County and/or certain Defendant Does profited from Empire’s filming as well, receiving “reimbursement” revenue connected with the use of the JTDC.
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F. The Final Decision Maker Regarding JTDC’s Operation Knew About and Approved of the Lockdown 56. From the facts available, Named Plaintiffs allege that the person who exercises
final decision-making authority regarding operation of the JTDC, Timothy Evans, who was the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, knew about and approved the filming of Empire at the JTDC, and the facility’s consequent lockdown.
57. As described herein, the Empire lockdown occurred during a high-profile transition in which the Chief Judge’s office took administrative control of the JTDC for the first time. It is simply not plausible that Superintendent Dixon, who had just started his job, would authorize the Empire filming and lockdown without first checking with his new boss. And indeed, as described herein, Superintendent Dixon implied in correspondence that Chief Judge Evans was aware of the filming, and had approved of it.
58. In the summer of 2015, the JTDC was starting a new chapter in its administration. Sixteen years earlier, in 1999, a federal civil rights lawsuit was filed against Cook County, alleging systematic mistreatment and neglect of children housed at the JTDC. See Doe v. Cook County, 99-cv-3945 (N.D. Ill.).
59. The Doe parties originally entered into a settlement agreement under which Cook County would improve conditions at the JTDC. In 2007, though, after concluding that the County was not complying with the agreement’s terms, the District Court appointed a federal temporary administrator to operate the JTDC and bring it into compliance. On January 1, 2008, a few months after the federal temporary administrator took over the JTDC, the Illinois Legislature enacted a reform measure providing that the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, rather than the Cook County Board, would appoint the JTDC’s administrator and all other necessary personnel, who would then serve at the Chief Judge’s pleasure.
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Notwithstanding this transfer of authority, the JTDC would remain under control of the federal District Court’s temporary administrator for the next several years.
60. Years later, the District Court finally determined that the JTDC could be returned to local control. It ordered that control of the JTDC be transferred from the temporary federal administrator back to local control in 2015.
61. In preparation for the JTDC’s transfer from federal control, Chief Judge Evans appointed Leonard Dixon as the JTDC’s new superintendent. This was a high-profile selection. Chief Judge Evans announced his choice with a lengthy press release, and held a joint press conference with Superintendent Dixon to discuss Dixon’s appointment and his impending takeover of the JTDC. The transfer was the object of intense media scrutiny, and Chief Judge Evans and Superintendent Dixon gave media interviews on the subject. In these press events and interviews, both men stressed that their priority in reassuming control of the JTDC would be the care for and welfare of the children housed there. They also stressed the need to provide the children housed at the JTDC with a non-penal environment that featured structured programming, to help the children cope with difficulties in the outside world once they left the facility.
62. The federal District Court finally transferred administration of the JTDC to local control on May 20, 2015. Empire arrived to film four weeks later, on June 21.
63. It is exceedingly unlikely that Superintendent Dixon would have allowed Empire to film there without Chief Judge Evans’ approval. Dixon, who has held high-profile positions in the juvenile corrections field for decades, had become the JTDC’s superintendent just four weeks earlier when it was placed under Chief Judge Evans’ control, for the very first time. And as noted above, Chief Judge Evans had publicly expressed keen interest in this transfer. Under
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these circumstances, it would be implausible to suggest that an experienced administrator like Superintendent Dixon would have placed the JTDC on lockdown so that a large television crew could use it as a film set, without first checking with his boss.
64. And indeed, in contemporaneous correspondence Superintendent Dixon implied that he had just such approval from Chief Judge Evans. In July 2015, an attorney wrote to Superintendent Dixon to express concern about reports the attorney had received that the JTDC had been placed on lockdown so that Fox could film Empire there. Superintendent Dixon responded by formal letter on July 24, 2015. He acknowledged that Empire had filmed at the JTDC, but he claimed that the experience for the children had been positive, and they hadn’t been inconvenienced in any way. The letter’s closing “courtesy copy” notation indicated that Dixon was sending a copy of the letter to Dr. Beverly Butler, whom the letter noted represented the office of the Chief Judge. Indeed, Dr. Butler was Chief Judge Evans’ special assistant for the transition of the JTDC to the Chief Judge’s control. It is reasonable to infer that Superintendent Dixon’s purpose in copying Dr. Butler on the letter was to imply that Chief Judge Evans was aware of, and had approved of, the Empire filming. Crediting Superintendent Dixon this implication, and considering the circumstances discussed above, it is reasonable to infer that Chief Judge Evans, the final decision-maker regarding the operation and administration of the JTDC, knew that the JTDC was being used as a film set for Empire, and had approved of it.
Class Allegations 65. Named Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims for a class of others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and/or Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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66. Named Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of all children housed at the
JTDC when the facility was placed on lockdown during the filming of Empire in the summer of
2015.
67. Numerosity—The individuals in this class are so numerous that joinder of all
members is impractical. There are between 250 and 400 children housed at JTDC during normal
operation.
68. Commonality—There are questions of law and fact common to this class. Among
those questions are:
 Whether Empire was filmed at the JTDC during the summer of 2015.
 Whether the JTDC was placed on lockdown in order to facilitate this filming.
 Whether locking down the children at the JTDC in order to facilitate the filming of a commercial television show is an action reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
 Whether it was a breach of fiduciary duty to place the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown so that Empire could be filmed there.
 Whether the Fox Defendants and Defendant Does acted jointly with the JTDC’s administrators to place the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film scenes for Empire.
 Whether the Defendants conspired with one another to place the children at the JTDC on lockdown in order to realize a profit from the filming of Empire.
 Whether locking down children housed at the JTDC in the manner described in the complaint created an increased risk of physical violence.
 Whether locking down the children housed at the JTDC in order to film Empire departed substantially from generally accepted professional standards for the operation of juvenile facilities.
 Whether locking down the children housed at the JTDC in order to film Empire violated their Due Process rights under the U.S. Constitution.
 Whether locking down the children housed at the JTDC in order to film Empire effected an unreasonable seizure in violation their rights under the U.S. Constitution.
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 Whether the profits that the Defendants realized from locking down the JTDC in order to film Empire were unjustly obtained.
 Whether the Defendants are subject to disgorgement of the profits they realized by placing the children at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film Empire there.
 Whether the Defendants are subject to nominal damages for placing the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film Empire there.
 Whether the Defendants are subject to punitive damages for placing the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film Empire there.
 Whether the Defendants are subject to actual damages for placing the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film Empire there.
69. Typicality—Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Named Plaintiffs were housed at the JTDC when the children at the facility were placed on lockdown in order to facilitate filming for Empire. Their treatment in being placed on lockdown is typical of other children housed at JTDC who were placed on lockdown in order to facilitate the filming of Empire. Named Plaintiffs seek to prove that the locking down of the children housed at the JTDC in order to facilitate the filming of Empire violated the constitutional and state-law rights of the children subjected to the lockdown, and that the Defendants are subject to nominal damages, actual damages, punitive damages, and disgorgement for the profits resulting from this misconduct.
70. Adequacy—Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. They are represented by skilled counsel with experience in complex civil litigation, class actions, and litigation concerning constitutional and prisoners’ rights. Attorneys Stephen H. Weil, Pamela Hanebutt, and Susan Razzano have decades of experience in complex civil litigation, including class action litigation. The attorneys also have substantial experience in litigation under Section 1983, including individual and class-action litigation on behalf of jail and prison inmates.
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71. Rule 23(b)(1)(B)—Named Plaintiffs’ claims for disgorgement, among other remedies, are certifiable under this rule because adjudications with respect to individual members of the class will as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members of the class.
72. Rule 23(b)(3)— Named Plaintiffs’ claims for actual damages, among other remedies, are certifiable under this rule because the questions of law and fact common to the class predominate over any individual issues, and a class action would be superior to other methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy.
COUNT I - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (All Defendants—Due Process) 73. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 74. As described more fully herein, each of the Defendants subjected Named Plaintiffs and similarly situated children at the JTDC to lockdown, which impeded these children from accessing meaningful schooling, rehabilitation, structured programming, recreation, and visits from families, and subjected them to restrictions more severe than those that are commonly imposed in many adult jails. The Defendants did this so that the JTDC’s schooling and other facilities on its second and third floors could be used to stage and shoot scenes for the Empire television show. The Defendants did this while acting individually, jointly, and in conspiracy with one another, as well as under color of law and within the scope of their employment. 75. The lockdowns and attendant conditions were not imposed for a legitimate governmental purpose, but rather to facilitate the filming of a commercial television show and to realize the profits therefrom. The Fox Defendants acted together with and obtained significant aid from Defendants Cook County, the office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Dixon, and Does 1 through 20 in filming Empire for commercial purposes at the JTDC.
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The Defendants knew that filming Empire at the JTDC would result in the lockdowns and attendant restrictions on the children housed there.
76. The Defendants knew that the lockdowns violated the children’s rights and imposed harm and a risk of harm on the children, yet they carried out the lockdown and filming anyway. This misconduct was undertaken knowingly, intentionally, and/or with reckless indifference to the rights of the children housed at the JTDC.
77. The lockdowns and attendant conditions violated the Due Process rights of the children housed at the JTDC.
78. As a proximate result of these lockdowns and resulting conditions, the children housed at the JTDC suffered emotional and psychological pain, were deprived of meaningful opportunities for rehabilitation, education, and family visits, and were subject to increased risk of physical violence at the hands of other children at the facility.
79. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
COUNT II - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (All Defendants—Unlawful Seizure) 80. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 81. Under the JTDC’s normal operation, children are permitted, among other things, to attend classes at the Nancy B. Jefferson school, participate in structured programming in appropriate facilities on the JTDC’s lower floors that is designed to assist in their rehabilitation, participate in recreation, including outdoor recreation in the third floor courtyard, and visit with family members in the JTDC’s visiting areas at appropriate times and for extended periods. 82. As described more fully herein, the Defendants deliberately placed the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in their cells and pods, physically restraining and limiting their
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range of movement, and preventing them from leaving the pods and partaking in the numerous educational and rehabilitative activities that they would otherwise be entitled to do. The Defendants did this while acting individually, jointly, and in conspiracy with one another, as well as under color of law and within the scope of their employment.
83. The Fox Defendants acted together with and obtained significant aid from Defendants Cook County, the office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Dixon, and Does 1 through 20 in filming Empire for commercial purposes at the JTDC. The Defendants knew that filming Empire at the JTDC would result in the lockdowns and attendant restrictions on the children housed there. The Defendants jointly acted to improperly impose these additional restrictions on the children housed at the JTDC in order to facilitate the Empire filming. This constituted a new seizure—that is, a seizure different from, and in addition to, the children’s existing lawful detainment.
84. This new seizure was objectively unreasonable. It was not effected pursuant to a legitimate governmental purpose, but rather so that the schooling, rehabilitation, and recreation areas of the JTDC could be used to film scenes for a profitable television show.
85. As a proximate result of these lockdowns and resulting conditions, the children housed at the JTDC were deprived of their liberty interest to be free from unreasonable restraint. They also suffered emotional and psychological pain, were deprived of meaningful opportunities for rehabilitation, and were subject to increased risk of physical violence at the hands of other children housed at the facility.
86. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
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COUNT III - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Monell liability— Cook County and/or the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County) 87. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 88. The lockdowns of the JTDC were the result of the official policy and decisions of Defendants Cook County and/or the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County. 89. Specifically, Chief Judge Timothy Evans was the person with final policymaking and decision-making authority regarding the administration and operation of the JTDC, on behalf of Defendants Cook County and/or the office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County. This included the decision of whether to allow the filming of Empire at the JTDC. 90. As set forth in more detail in this complaint, Chief Judge Evans was informed of, knew about, and approved of the filming of Empire at the JTDC, and its consequent lockdown. Because Chief Judge Evans was the final policy- and decision-maker regarding the JTDC’s administration and operation, Defendants Cook County and/or the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County may be said to have caused the injuries and unjust enrichment described in this complaint.
COUNT IV - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fox Defendants—Joint Action Liability) 91. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 92. The Fox Defendants and their employees and/or agents willfully induced and participated in the lockdown of the children at the JTDC facility, and their actions were inextricably intertwined with those of the named and unknown defendant administrators of the JTDC, acting under color of law, who placed the facility on lockdown and imposed the conditions described herein. The Defendants agreed to engage jointly in an enterprise that only
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the government could lawfully institute for the mutual benefit of both the public and private Defendants.
93. The Fox Defendants deliberately encouraged the JTDC’s administrators to improperly place the JTDC on lockdown during the filming of Empire, for commercial benefit. The Fox Defendants reached an agreement with the JTDC’s administrators that the JTDC’s administrators would prohibit the children housed at the JTDC from using the various schooling and rehabilitative facilities on the JTDC’s second and third floors so that the Fox Defendants could use those facilities to stage and film scenes for Empire. The contemplated and obvious result of this agreement was that the children would be confined to their cells and pods on the JTDC’s upper floors. It was to accommodate the Fox Defendants’ filming needs that the children at JTDC were placed on lockdown at all. Indeed, it was the intention of the Fox Defendants that the children not be allowed to use their designated schooling and rehabilitation facilities so that the Fox Defendants and their agents could film Empire without distraction. In reaching this agreement with the JTDC’s administrators, the Fox Defendants entered into a conspiracy and undertook joint action, under color of law, to violate the rights of the children housed at the JTDC.
94. The acts taken in furtherance of this conspiracy and joint action proximately resulted in the injuries and unjust enrichment described elsewhere in this complaint.
COUNT V – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fox Defendants—Respondeat Superior) 95. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 96. While committing the misconduct alleged in the preceding paragraphs, one or more of the Defendant Does 1-20 were employees and/or agents of one or more of the Fox Defendants and were acting within the scope of their employment and/or agency. One or more
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of the Fox Defendants are liable as principal for all torts constitutional violations committed by their employees and/or agents or on their behalf, and the resulting unjust enrichment.
COUNT VI - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Conspiracy—All Defendants) 97. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 98. The Defendants reached an agreement among themselves to deprive the children housed at the JTDC of their constitutional rights, as described throughout this complaint. 99. In furtherance of this conspiracy, each of the co-conspirators committed overt, tortious acts and was an otherwise willful participant in joint activity. 100. The misconduct described in this count was undertaken intentionally and/or with reckless indifference to the rights of the children housed at the JTDC. 101. As a direct and proximate result of the illicit prior agreement referenced above, the rights of the children housed at the JTDC were violated, and they suffered emotional and psychological injuries as well as a wrongfully increased risk of physical injury, as described elsewhere in this complaint. 102. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint. COUNT VII – State Law Claim (Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Dixon and Defendant Does) 103. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 104. Defendants Dixon and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20 were guardians of the children housed at the JTDC. 105. In turn, the children housed at the JTDC were the wards of these Defendants. 106. As guardians, these defendants had a fiduciary relationship with the children housed at the JTDC.
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107. Among their obligations as guardians, these Defendants were obliged to act in the best interest of the children housed at the JTDC.
108. As described more fully throughout this complaint, these Defendants breached these fiduciary duties by placing the children housed at JTDC on lockdown for the purposes of facilitating the filming of a profitable television show there.
109. As a proximate result of this breach of fiduciary duty, the children housed at the JTDC suffered harm and an increased risk of physical injury, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
110. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
Count VIII State Law Claim (Inducement of Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Fox Defendants and Defendant Does)
111. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 112. As set forth more fully herein, Defendants Dixon and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20 were fiduciaries of the children housed at the JTDC. 113. As set forth more fully herein, one or more of the Fox Defendants and/or Defendant Does induced and/or colluded with one or more of these fiduciaries in committing the breaches of fiduciary duty described elsewhere in this complaint. 114. These Fox Defendants and/or the Defendant Does knowingly induced and knowingly participated in this breach, and they knowingly accepted the benefits resulting from this breach. 115. As a proximate result of this breach of fiduciary duty, the children housed at the JTDC suffered harm and an increased risk of physical injury, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
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116. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
COUNT IX – State Law Claim (All Defendants – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 117. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 118. The actions, omissions, and conduct of the Defendants as set forth in this complaint were extreme and outrageous. These actions were rooted in an abuse of power and authority and were undertaken with the intent to cause, or were in reckless disregard of the probability that their conduct would cause, severe emotional distress to the children housed at the JTDC. 119. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ actions, the children housed at the JTDC suffered emotional distress as set forth above. 120. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
COUNT X – State Law Claim (All Defendants – Civil Conspiracy) 121. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 122. As described more fully in the preceding paragraphs, the Defendants reached an agreement among themselves to place the children housed in the JTDC on lockdown so that the facility could be used to film scenes for a profitable television show, and conspired by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose by an unlawful means. 123. In furtherance of their conspiracy, each of these co-conspirators committed overt acts and were otherwise willful participants in joint activity. 124. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable and was undertaken intentionally, with malice, with reckless indifference to the rights of others, and in
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total disregard of the conditions imposed by or the effects of the lockdowns on the children housed at the JTDC.
125. As a proximate result of the Defendants’ misconduct described in this Count, the children housed at the JTDC suffered harm and the increased risk of physical injury, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
126. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
COUNT XI – State Law Claim (Respondeat Superior)
127. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 128. While committing the misconduct alleged in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants Dixon and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20 were employees and agents of Defendants Cook County and/or the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County and acting within the scope of their authority or employment. Defendants Cook County and/or the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County are liable as principal for all misconduct committed by these employees and agents. 129. While committing the misconduct alleged in the preceding paragraphs, one or more of the Fox Defendants and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20 were employees or agents of one or more of the Fox Defendants acting within the scope of their employment. One or more of the Fox Defendants are liable as principal for all torts committed by their employees or agents.
COUNT XII – State Law Claim (Cook County – Indemnification) 130. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here.
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131. Illinois law provides that public entities are directed to pay any tort judgments for compensatory damages for which employees are liable within the scope of their employment activities.
132. Defendants Dixon and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20 were employees and agents of Defendants Cook County and/or the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County and acting within the scope of their employment in committing the misconduct described herein.
133. Cook County is obligated by Illinois law to pay any judgment relating to the operation of the JTDC entered against Defendant Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Defendant Dixon, and/or one or more of Defendant Does 1-20.
WHEREFORE, Named Plaintiffs demand a jury trial for all issues so appropriate and requests that this Court issue the following relief in their favor against the Defendants:
a. A judgment ordering disgorgement of enrichment realized by the Defendants resulting from the misconduct described in this complaint.
b. A judgment ordering the payment of nominal damages against all Defendants. c. A judgment ordering the payment of punitive damages against the Defendants. d. A judgment ordering the payment of actual damages against all Defendants (in
alternative to disgorgement). e. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable law. f. Any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
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JURY DEMAND Named Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) on all issues so triable.

Dated: October 5, 2016

By:
Stephen H. Weil sweil@eimerstahl.com
Pamela R. Hanebutt phanebutt@eimerstahl.com
Susan M. Razzano srazzano@eimerstahl.com
Eimer Stahl LLP 224 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 1100 Chicago, IL 60604 Tel: (312) 660-7600
Attorneys for Named Plaintiffs T.S. and Q.B.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Stephen Weil, an attorney, hereby certify that on October 5, 2016, I caused the foregoing First Amended Class Action Complaint to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system, which effects service on all counsel of record.
/s/ Stephen H. Weil . Stephen H. Weil

 
 Case: 1:16-cv-08303 Document #: 73 Filed: 04/20/17 Page 1 of 32 PageID #:463

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

T.S., et al., Plaintiffs,
v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX TELEVISION, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

Case No. 16 C 8303

)

)

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:

On October 5, 2016, minor Plaintiffs T.S. and Q.B., through their legal guardians,

brought the present twelve-count First Amended Class Action Complaint against Defendants

Twentieth Century Fox Television and other Fox entities (“Fox Defendants”); Cook County,

Illinois; Leonard Dixon, the Superintendent of Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention

Center (“JTDC”); the Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County (Chief

Judge’s Office); and Defendant Does alleging violations of their constitutional rights, along with

supplemental state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367(a). Plaintiffs, who seek to

represent a class of similarly situated juveniles, bring the following substantive claims and

claims seeking to establish certain Defendants’ liability in their First Amended Complaint: (1) a

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against all Defendants (Count I); (2) a Fourth

Amendment claim against all Defendants (Count II); (3) a Monell liability claim against Cook

County/and or the Chief Judge’s Office (Count III); (4) a joint action liability claim against the

Fox Defendants (Count IV); (5) a respondeat superior liability claim against the Fox Defendants

in relation to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims (Count V); (6) a constitutional conspiracy claim

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against all Defendants (Count VI); (7) a state law breach of fiduciary duty claim against Superintendent Dixon and Defendant Does (Count VII); (8) an inducement of breach of fiduciary duty claim against the Fox Defendants (Count VIII); (9) an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against all Defendants (Count IX); (10) a state law civil conspiracy claim against all Defendants (Count X); (11) a state law respondeat superior claim against Cook County, the Chief Judge’s Office, and the Fox Defendants (Count XI); and (12) an indemnification claim pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102 against Cook County (Count XII).
Before the Court are three separate motions to dismiss brought by the Fox Defendants, Defendants Dixon and Cook County, and the Chief Judge’s Office pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court denies the Cook County Defendants’ and Chief Judge’s Office’ motions to dismiss the following claims – Counts I, III, VII, IX and X, and grants without prejudice these Defendants’ motions to dismiss Count VI. As to the Fox Defendants, the Court grants without prejudice Defendants’ motions to dismiss Counts I, IV, VI, VIII, IX, and X. The Court grants with prejudice Defendants’ motions to dismiss Counts II and V. Furthermore, the Court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend their allegations in Counts IV, VI, VIII, IX, and X in a Second Amended Class Action Complaint – in accordance with this ruling and consistent with counsel’s Rule 11 obligations – by no later than May 12, 2017.1 See Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir. 2015) (there is a “presumption in favor of giving plaintiffs at least one opportunity to amend.”). Last, at this stage of the proceedings, Defendants Dixon and the Chief Judge’s
1 If Plaintiffs sufficiently allege joint action liability (Count IV) or their constitutional conspiracy claim (Count VI) in the Second Amended Complaint, the Fox Defendants will remain Defendants as to Plaintiffs’ constitutional due process violation as alleged in Count I.
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Office have not established their affirmative defenses regarding immunity. See Hyson USA, Inc. v. Hyson 2U, Ltd., 821 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2016) (“a plaintiff ordinarily need not anticipate and attempt to plead around affirmative defenses.”).
LEGAL STANDARD “A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Hill v. Serv. Emp. Int’l Union, 850 F.3d 861, 863 (7th Cir. 2017). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under the federal pleading standards, a plaintiff’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Put differently, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). When determining the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, courts must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.” Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016).
BACKGROUND I. Introduction
In the summer of 2015, officials placed the JTDC on lockdown so that it could be used to film episodes for the Fox television show Empire. (R. 23, First Am. Compl. Intro. ¶ 1.) More
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specifically, the filming of Empire at the JTDC occurred over three different time periods in the summer of 2015, namely, June 21 through 26, July 13 through 16, and August 23 through 26. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiffs, who were juvenile detainees during that time, allege that JTDC officials “placed off limits” certain areas that are essential to the JTDC’s mission of educating and rehabilitating the hundreds of juveniles housed there, including the JTDC’s school, its facilities for family visits, the outdoor recreation yard, the library, the infirmary, and the chapel. (Id. Intro. ¶ 1, ¶¶ 30, 32, 35.) JTDC officials placed these areas off limits so the Fox Defendants’ agents and employees could use these areas to stage and film the television show. (Id. Intro. ¶ 1.) To that end, JTDC officials ordered that the juvenile detainees either remain in their cells or be placed in jail-style “pod” areas, which significantly limited the juveniles’ movement. (Id. Intro. ¶ 2, ¶¶ 34, 36.) As a result, the juvenile detainees sat for days on end, their schooling existed in name only, visits from their families were effectively eliminated, and sick-call requests were ignored, among other alleged deprivations. (Id. Intro. ¶ 2, ¶¶ 35, 38.) In short, these lockdowns effectively cancelled or interrupted the JTDC programs intended to help the juvenile detainees. (Id. Intro. ¶ 2, ¶ 40.) Plaintiffs allege that the purpose of these lockdowns was to provide the Fox Defendants with a realistic prison facility for the Empire episodes. (Id. Intro. ¶ 3.) II. Agreement to Film at the JTDC
In the spring of 2015, Superintendent Dixon and/or the Chief Judge’s Office, one or more of the Fox Defendants, and/or one or more of the Defendant Does entered into an agreement permitting Empire’s crew to film at the JTDC. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 56.) The parties’ agreement contemplated that the Empire crew of approximately 250 individuals, including dozens of staff,
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actors, and extras, would have access to many of the restricted facilities on the JTDC’s second and third floors and that the juveniles would be barred from those facilities so the crews could work without interruption. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 31, 32.) Plaintiffs allege that under this agreement, the JTDC would confine the juvenile detainees to their cells and pods on the JTDC’s upper floors for extended periods of time. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 34.) According to Plaintiffs, in reaching this agreement, all of the Defendants knew that filming Empire at the JTDC would result in the lockdowns and attendant restrictions on the juvenile detainees housed there. (Id. ¶ 29.) In addition, internal JTDC planning documents prepared for the Empire filming indicate that many JTDC staff members were expected or directed to leave their normal duties to provide services to the Empire crew, including acting as extras in the show, assisting at the delivery docks to permit the free flow of film equipment, escorting actors and crew members to and from the set, and cleaning up after the crew. (Id. ¶ 33.) III. Juvenile Pretrial Detainees
To put the disruptions resulting from the filming of Empire in context, Plaintiffs allege that many of the juveniles housed at the JTDC have encountered traumatic experiences prior and during their detention, including that sixty percent of the juveniles who enter the JTDC have been diagnosed with a mental disorder and around one-quarter of them are taking prescribed psychotropic medications. (Id. ¶ 18.) Added to this, Plaintiffs assert that the juveniles frequently arrive at the JTDC in a state of crisis having been separated from their families and placed in confinement. (Id.) Plaintiffs also allege that the 2015 lockdowns were psychologically damaging to many of the juvenile detainees because they were forced to remain idle in their cells and pods. (Id. ¶ 48.) According to Plaintiffs, as a proximate result of these lockdowns and the
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attendant conditions, the juveniles housed at the JTDC suffered emotional and psychological pain, were deprived of meaningful opportunities for rehabilitation, education, and family visits, and were subjected to increased risk of physical violence at the hands of other juveniles at the facility. (Id. ¶ 78.)
ANALYSIS I. Constitutional Claims
In Counts I through VI of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs bring substantive constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims seeking to establish certain Defendants’ liability for the alleged constitutional violations. To succeed on their § 1983 claims, Plaintiffs must show: “(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law and (2) that defendants were acting under color of state law.” Wilson v. Warren Cnty., Illinois, 830 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2016). As Plaintiffs acknowledge, the Fox Defendants are not state actors, and thus they cannot be liable for any constitutional violations unless Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged their joint action with state actors and/or that the Fox Defendants conspired with state actors to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. See id.; see also L.P. v. Marian Catholic High Sch., 852 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2017). Before determining whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the Fox Defendants acted jointly with the state actor Defendants, the Court first turns to whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged the substantive constitutional claims under Iqbal and Twombly.
A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim – Count I In Count I of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that as juvenile detainees, the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause provides them certain protections in relation to
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the conditions of their confinement and that all of the Defendants violated these protections. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (“[d]ue process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished”) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)); see also Bergren v. City of Milwaukee, 811 F.2d 1139, 1142-43 (7th Cir. 1987). As the Seventh Circuit instructs, “there is little practical difference, if any, between the standards applicable to pretrial detainees and convicted inmates when it comes to conditions of confinement claims, and that such claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment are appropriately analyzed under the Eighth Amendment test.” Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 310 (7th Cir. 2015). That being said, under the seminal Supreme Court decision relating to pretrial detainees’ due process rights, namely, Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court held that “court[s] must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 538. More specifically, “[i]n the absence of an expressed intent to punish, a pretrial detainee can nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are not ‘rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose’ or that the actions ‘appear excessive in relation to that purpose.’” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 561). Also, “[i]n assessing whether the treatment of the detained juvenile satisfies the requirements of due process, it is quite appropriate – indeed necessary – to consider that in such an environment juveniles may indeed have different needs and more importantly, different capacities than adults.” Bergren, 811 F.2d at 1143.
Here, the challenged governmental action consists of the three lockdowns at the JTDC that occurred in June, July, and August 2015. Plaintiffs argue that these lockdowns, which
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resulted in the denial of their due process rights, were not rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive purpose, but rather, the purpose of these lockdowns was to provide the Fox Defendants with a realistic prison facility to film two Empire episodes. In response, Defendants Dixon and Cook County argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a sufficient deprivation of their liberty interests in the context of substantive due process protections pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 415 (1995), and its progeny – which is not Plaintiffs’ theory of liability concerning the conditions of their confinement because Plaintiffs are not incarcerated adult prisoners challenging disciplinary segregation. See id. at 485 (“The punishment of incarcerated prisoners, on the other hand, serves different aims than those found invalid in Bell.”); see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005) (“The Sandin standard requires us to determine if assignment to [a Supermax prison] ‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”) (citation omitted). Instead, Plaintiffs’ theory of the case is that all of the Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights in relation to the conditions of their confinement as juvenile pretrial detainees in contradiction of Bell v. Wolfish. As such, Defendants’ arguments relying on Sandin and Wilkinson are unavailing. Similarly, the Chief Judge’s Office’s “shock the conscience” argument is without merit because Bell did not instruct “federal courts to inquire into the state of anyone’s conscience.” Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Bell v. Wolfish did not instruct the inferior federal courts to inquire into the state of anyone’s conscience, and to the extent ‘substantive due process’ applies, it is ‘at best redundant of [sic] that provided by the Eighth Amendment.’”) (citation omitted).
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Next, all of the Defendants attempt to pick apart each alleged constitutional deprivation in isolation despite well-settled Seventh Circuit authority “that some conditions which taken singly do not constitute cruel or unusual punishment, may in cumulative effect violate the Eighth Amendment.” Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation in combination when each alone would not do so.”) (citation omitted). Viewing the allegations and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor – and the alleged deprivations as a whole – Plaintiffs have plausibly stated the denial of their due process rights by alleging that the filming of the Empire episodes and Defendants’ attendant conduct resulted in depriving the juvenile detainees access to the infirmary and the denial of sick-call requests, along with the elimination of schooling, family visits, and restricting the juveniles’ movement and outdoor activities. See Smith, 803 F.3d at 313 (“We have recognized that lack of exercise can rise to a constitutional violation”); Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523, 531 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Each state actor who encounters a detainee must reasonably respond to medical complaints.”); Swansey v. Elrod, 386 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (“children who remain unconvicted of any crime may not be subjected to devastating psychological and reprehensible physical conditions”). In fact, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the denial of access to the infirmary and the rejected sick-call requests – alone – state an actionable claim. See, e.g., Dobbey v. MitchellLawshea, 806 F.3d 938, 940 (7th Cir. 2015); Gallagher v. City of Winlock, Wash., 287 Fed. Appx. 568, 576 (9th Cir. 2008).
Nevertheless, all of the Defendants argue that the deprivations were short-term inconveniences – taking issue with Plaintiffs’ characterization of the alleged constitutional
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deprivations. At this procedural posture, however, the Court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, not in Defendants’ favor. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2196, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Smith, 803 F.3d at 309. Additionally, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that there was no legitimate governmental purpose for the lockdowns, but rather the lockdowns provided the Fox Defendants with a realistic prison facility to use as a set for two Empire episodes – allegations that allow the Court to reasonably infer the purpose of the governmental action was punishment. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39 (“if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal – if it is arbitrary or purposeless – a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees.”); Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cnty., 850 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2017) (“A pretrial condition can amount to punishment in two ways: first, if it is ‘imposed for the purpose of punishment,’ or second, if the condition ‘is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal – if it is arbitrary or purposeless – a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the government action is punishment.’”) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39). As such, Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient at this stage of the proceedings. Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count I of the First Amended Complaint.2
2 In their opening brief, the Fox Defendants make a cursory argument that Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims fail because “named plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citation omitted). Not only is this argument undeveloped, but as the direct quotation implicates, it is best left for Plaintiffs’ class certification motion. See United States v. Cisneros, 846 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 2017) (perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are waived). In addition, the Fox Defendants did not make any cogent standing arguments based on Spokeo until their reply brief. See Wedemeyer v. CSX Transp., Inc., 850 F.3d 889, 897(7th Cir. 2017) (arguments made first time in reply brief are waived).
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B. Fourth Amendment Claim – Count II In the alternative to their Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, in Count II, Plaintiffs bring a Fourth Amendment claim against all of the Defendants arguing that the Supreme Court has not definitely determined whether the Fourth Amendment continues to provide protection against the use of excessive force beyond arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); see also Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2479 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“we should decide whether a pretrial detainee can bring a Fourth Amendment claim based on the use of excessive force by a detention facility employee,” because “[w]e have not yet decided that question.”). Plaintiffs’ argument is misplaced because the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that “the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 127, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) (“the Due Process Clause of its own force requires that conditions of confinement satisfy certain minimal standards for pretrial detainees”). As such, an alternative claim based on the Fourth Amendment is unwarranted. The Court grants, with prejudice, Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim as alleged in Count II. II. Claims Pertaining to Liability A. Joint Action Liability – Count IV As mentioned above, Plaintiffs seek to establish that the Fox Defendants – despite being private actors – acted under color of state law as required by § 1983, and thus are liable for the purported constitutional violations. “The Supreme Court has set forth various tests to use when
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deciding whether someone is a governmental actor, including the ‘symbiotic relationship test, the state command and encouragement test, the joint participation doctrine, and the public function test.’” Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs seek to establish that the Fox Defendants are liable for the alleged constitutional deprivations under the “joint action” or “joint participation” doctrine in relation to their Fourteenth Amendment due process claim alleged in Count I. “To act ‘under color’ of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State,” it “is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (citation omitted). As the Seventh Circuit recently explained, a “private person acts under color of state law when she is a ‘willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents,’” which requires “‘evidence of a concerted effort between a state actor and that individual.’” L.P., 852 F.3d 690 (citation omitted). More specifically, for “a private actor to act under color of state law he must have ‘had a ‘meeting of the minds’ and thus reached an understanding’ with a state actor to deny plaintiffs a constitutional right.” Wilson, 830 F.3d at 468 (citation omitted); see also L.P., 852 F.3d 690 (“The plaintiff must identify a sufficient nexus between the state and the private actor to support a finding that the deprivation committed by the private actor is ‘fairly attributable to the state.’”) (citation omitted). Under this standard, Plaintiff must allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that there was “a meeting of the minds” between the private and public defendants and that they shared a common goal in relation to the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Wilson, 830 F.3d at 468.
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In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Superintendent Dixon or the Chief Judge, one or more of the Fox Defendants, and/or one or more of the Defendant Does willfully entered into an agreement that would permit Empire’s crew to film at the JTDC, and that as a result of implementing this agreement, Defendants deprived the juvenile detainees of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Plaintiffs further contend that the Fox Defendants acted together with – and obtained significant assistance from – the Cook County Defendants in filming Empire for commercial purposes, and that Defendants knew that filming Empire at the JTDC would result in lockdowns that placed unconstitutional restrictions on the juveniles housed there. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 83.) According to Plaintiffs, the Fox Defendants deliberately encouraged the JTDC’s administrators to improperly place the JTDC on lockdown during the filming of Empire, and the contemplated and obvious result of this agreement was restricting the juvenile detainees’ movement. (Id. ¶ 93.)
Construing Plaintiffs’ allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, they have failed to sufficiently allege that the Fox Defendants and any of the state actor/government Defendants reached an understanding to deny the juvenile detainees’ constitutional rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”). Although Plaintiffs’ allegations suggest an agreement between the private and state actors that resulted in restricting the juvenile detainees’ movement and access to facilities, Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts raising a reasonable inference that the state and private actors had a “meeting of minds” in relation to a shared unconstitutional goal. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 158; Wilson, 830 F.3d at 468-69.
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In support of their joint action allegations, Plaintiffs rely on cases in which federal courts have concluded that media defendants acted under color of state law because they and the public defendants had either collaborated in an arrest or agreed to film actual criminal activity. See, e.g., Smart v. City of Miami, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (media defendant’s filming murder scene and arrest violated Fourth Amendment); Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp.2d 380, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“for the sake of a more exciting television show,” media defendant “instigated and then placed itself squarely in the middle of a police operation.”); cf. Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000) (staged “perp walk” constitutes Fourth Amendment violation); Frederick v. Biography Channel, 683 F. Supp. 2d 798, 800 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“a symbiotic relationship between a governmental body and a private party can place the private party squarely in the crosshairs of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). These cases are not persuasive because Plaintiffs allege that the Fox Defendants filmed scripted episodes of Empire with actors – not that the parties agreed to recreate or film actual criminal activity. As such, the Court grants this aspect of the Fox Defendants’ motion without prejudice. The Court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend their joint action allegations keeping in mind counsel’s Rule 11 obligations.
Last, the Fox Defendants’ argument that the parties’ “Location Agreement” is the only relevant contract at issue and that the Location Agreement (and presumably its subsequent addenda) does not contemplate denying Plaintiffs’ civil rights is an overly formalistic argument ignoring the alleged relationship and agreement between the Fox Defendants and the government officials in this matter. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 302 n.4, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (“[I]f formalism were the sine qua non
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of state action, the doctrine would vanish owing to the ease and inevitability of its evasion, and for just that reason formalism has never been controlling.”).3 Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have still failed to sufficiently allege joint action under the federal pleading standards.
B. Federal Conspiracy Claim – Count IV In Count IV, Plaintiffs seek to establish the Fox Defendants’ liability, in tandem with the other Defendants’ liability, for the alleged due process deprivations via a § 1983 conspiracy claim. First, despite Defendants’ arguments to the contrary, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged constitutional deprivations underlying their conspiracy claim. See Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641, 650 (7th Cir. 2016) (“there is no independent cause of action for § 1983 conspiracy”). Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that the state and private Defendants acted in conspiracy to deny the juvenile detainees’ constitutional rights. The Court agrees. The elements of a § 1983 conspiracy claim include that (1) the individuals reached an agreement to deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional rights; and (2) overt acts in furtherance of the agreement actually deprived the plaintiff of those constitutional rights. See Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Cooney v. Casady, 735 F.3d 514, 518 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The participants in the conspiracy must share the general conspiratorial objective, but they need not know all the details of the plan designed to achieve the objective or
3 The Fox Defendants’ attempt to rebut Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations with their own contract interpretation of the Location Agreement is misplaced at this stage of the case, especially because Plaintiffs do not refer to this contract in their First Amended Complaint nor did Plaintiffs attach this contract to their First Amended Complaint. See Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based only on the complaint itself, documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice.”).
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possess the same motives for desiring the intended conspiratorial result.”) (citation omitted). In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Fox Defendants conspired with the government Defendants to inflict a wrong on the juvenile detainees that ultimately violated their due process rights. Although Plaintiffs have adequately alleged violations of their due process rights as juvenile detainees and that Defendants had an agreement, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged facts raising a reasonable inference that Defendants’ agreement concerned depriving the juvenile detainees’ constitutional rights. See Tom Beu Xiong v. Fischer, 787 F.3d 389, 398 (7th Cir. 2015) (“bare allegation of a conspiracy between private and state entities is insufficient to bring the private entity within the scope of § 1983.”) (citation omitted). The Court thus grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 conspiracy claim without prejudice and grants Plaintiffs leave to amend these allegations in their Second Amended Class Action Complaint.
C. Respondeat Superior – Count V In Count V, Plaintiffs allege that the Fox Defendants are liable for their employees’ and agents’ conduct in relation to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 due process claim under the theory of respondeat superior. Plaintiffs base this claim on dicta in the Seventh Circuit’s decision Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014), to preserve their argument as an alternative basis for liability in case this dicta becomes law. To clarify, in Shields, the Seventh Circuit recognized that under § 1983 a private corporation cannot be held liable based on the employeeemployer relationship, namely, respondeat superior, but that this issue deserved “fresh consideration” in the future. See id. at 789 (citing Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982)). The Court thus grants the Fox Defendants’ motion with prejudice.
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D. Immunity Affirmative Defenses Before addressing Plaintiffs’ allegations under Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) – which concern Superintendent Dixon and the Chief Judge’s Office – the Court turns to these Defendants’ immunity arguments to determine whether they remain named Defendants to this lawsuit.
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity – The Chief Judge’s Office The Chief Judge’s Office brings the affirmative defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Hess v. Port Authority Trans–Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994) (“The Eleventh Amendment largely shields States from suit in federal court without their consent.”). In particular, the Chief Judge’s Office argues that because the Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits against state officers acting in their official capacities, the Court must dismiss Chief Judge Evans from this lawsuit because Illinois Circuit Court judges are state officials. See Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Bd., 127 Ill. 2d 453, 475, 130 Ill. Dec. 455, 537 N.E.2d 784 (Ill. 1989) (“members of the judicial branch of State government ... are not county officers”). Indeed, Plaintiffs agree that the Eleventh Amendment generally affords Chief Judge Evans immunity from suit. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs seek to establish that the Chief Judge’s Office is liable because operation of the JTDC is a county function – as opposed to the Chief Judge’s actions taken pursuant to his state-officer judicial powers. In support of their argument, Plaintiffs point to the Illinois County Shelter Care and Detention Home Act (“Detention Home Act”), which allows counties in Illinois to create and operate juvenile detention centers. See 55 ILCS 75/1; see also Acme Markets, Inc. v. Callanan, 236 Ill. 2d 29, 31, 337 Ill.Dec. 867, 923 N.E.2d 718 (Ill. 2009) (taxes for the funding county’s detention home as provided by the
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Detention Home Act are levied by each Illinois county). In response, the Chief Judge’s Office maintains that Chief Judge Evans’ actual function
under the Detention Home Act is limited because the Act merely gives the Chief Judge power to “appoint an administrator to serve as Superintendent,” as well as other “necessary personnel” to administer the JTDC, along with direct control of the JTDC’s budget. See 55 ILCS 75/3(b), (c); see also McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 786, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997) (the court’s “understanding of the actual function of a governmental official, in a particular area, will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official’s functions under relevant state law.”). Accordingly, the Chief Judge’s Office argues that – even if administration under the Detention Home Act is a county function – Defendant Superintendent Dixon is the individual with administrative authority over the JTDC pursuant to the Act. See 55 ILCS 75/3(b). At this stage of the proceedings – and in light of the transition of administrators during the relevant time period – whether Superintendent Dixon had administrative authority over the JTDC during the relevant time period and was the governmental official who gave the Fox Defendants permission to film Empire at the JTDC is not as clear-cut as the Chief Judge’s Office suggests. See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785 (“the question is not whether [the official] acts for [the state] or [c]ounty in some categorical, ‘all or nothing’ manner.... Our cases on the liability of local governments under § 1983 instruct us to ask whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue.”).
To give context, in 2007, the State of Illinois enacted legislation that transferred the administration of the JTDC from Cook County’s executive branch (Board of Commissioners) to the Chief Judge’s Office allowing the Chief Judge to appoint and remove administrators to run
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the JTDC. See Doe v. Cook Cnty., Illinois, 798 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 2015). The Chief Judge appointed Superintendent Dixon as JTDC Superintendent in May 2015 – one month before the filming of Empire began. See id. Prior to May 2015, Transitional Administrator Earl Dunlap was tasked with running the JTDC.4 Also, in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Chief Judge Timothy Evans knew about and approved the filming of Empire at the JTDC, as well as the facility’s consequent lockdown, and that the lockdown occurred during the highprofile transition in which the Chief Judge’s Office took administrative control of the JTDC. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56, 57.) Plaintiffs further assert that despite Superintendent Dixon’s experience in the field of juvenile corrections, he had just become the JTDC’s Superintendent prior to the Empire filming raising a reasonable inference that the filming was done with Chief Judge Evans’ approval. (Id. ¶¶ 63, 64.) Under these circumstances and allegations, whether someone in the Chief Judge’s Office, the Chief Judge, Superintendent Dixon, and/or Transitional Administrator Dunlap was the relevant administrator and/or decision-maker regarding the Fox Defendants filming Empire at the JTDC remains unclear. In short, the parties’ legal arguments concerning immunity are muddied by this change in administration, as well as Plaintiffs’ allegations that the Chief Judge’s Office was exercising county administrative authority – not judicial authority. Until the parties take discovery to determine which final policy decision-
4 In relation to the 2002 settlement agreement between detainees and the JTDC, the “district court retained jurisdiction over implementation of the settlement,” and in 2007 the district court “appointed Dunlap as the Transitional Administrator of the Center.” Coleman v. Dunlap, 695 F.3d 650, 651 (7th Cir. 2012). “The 2007 order gave Dunlap plenary authority to ‘oversee, supervise, and direct all management, administrative, financial, contractual, personnel, security, housing, custodial, purchasing, maintenance, technology, health services, mental health services, food and laundry service, recreational, educational, and programmatic functions relating to the operation of the [Center] consistent with the authority vested in the position of Superintendent of the [Center].’” Id. at 651-52.
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maker allowed the Fox Defendants to film Empire at the JTDC, the Chief Judge’s Office remains a Defendant to this lawsuit.
2. Qualified Immunity – Superintendent Dixon Similarly, Superintendent Dixon argues that he is protected by qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). When evaluating qualified immunity, courts consider: “(1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 340 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff can show that a right is ‘clearly established’ by statute or constitution in at least two ways: (1) he can point to a clearly analogous case establishing the right to be free from the conduct at issue; or (2) he can show that the conduct was ‘so egregious that no reasonable person could have believed that it would not violate established rights.’” Beaman, 776 F.3d at 508 (citation omitted). Defendant Superintendent Dixon’s first argument is that Plaintiffs’ constitutional deprivation allegations amount to mere inconveniences, and thus Plaintiffs have not established the first prong of the qualified immunity test. Defendant Dixon relies on his version of the facts and not the facts taken in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, therefore, this argument is without merit. See Gill, 850 F.3d at 340. The Court thus turns to the second prong of Defendant Dixon’s qualified immunity defense, namely, whether the juvenile detainees’ right to be free from the alleged unconstitutional conduct at issue was clearly established in the summer of 2015.
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Plaintiffs’ allegations fall squarely within the protections provided by the seminal case Bell v. Wolfish (as further articulated by the Schall Court in the context of juvenile detainees) because Plaintiffs have alleged that the conditions of their confinement – including the denial of health care – amounted to punishment and that Defendants had no legitimate governmental reason for the lockdowns that took place in June, July, and August 2015. See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473; see also Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2012) (“It is clearly established that state actors who, without justification, increase a person’s risk of harm violate the Constitution.”). In sum, Defendant Dixon has not established the affirmative defense of qualified immunity at this early stage of the litigation.
E. Monell Liability – Count III Because the Chief Judge’s Office and Superintendent Dixon have not established their affirmative defenses of Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’ arguments under Monell. Specifically, in Count III, Plaintiffs allege that Cook County and/or the Chief Judge’s Office are liable for the alleged due process deprivations pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Cook County, Superintendent Dixon, and the Chief Judge’s Office move to dismiss this claim. To recover under Monell, Plaintiffs must establish that (1) they suffered a deprivation of a constitutional right; (2) as a result of an express municipal policy, widespread custom, or deliberate act of a decision-maker with final policy-making authority, that was (3) the cause of his constitutional injury. See Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017); Dixon v. Cnty. of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2016).
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Plaintiffs seek to establish Monell liability pursuant to the deliberate act of the individual with the “final policy-making authority” in relation to the administration of the JTDC and the decision to allow the Fox Defendants to film Empire there. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). To do so, they allege that Superintendent Dixon, Chief Judge Evans, and/or someone in the Chief Judge’s Office knew about and approved the filming of Empire at the JTDC, and the facility’s consequent lockdowns. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 56, 63-65.) Although it is undisputed that the Detention Home Act gives the Chief Judge the power to “appoint an administrator to serve as Superintendent” and that the Chief Judge appointed Superintendent Dixon in May 2015, as discussed above, it is unclear who made the decision to allow the Fox Defendants to film episodes of Empire at the JTDC. As such, viewing Plaintiffs’ allegations as true and all reasonable inferences in their favor, they have sufficiently stated a claim for Monell liability under Iqbal and Twombly based on a final policy-maker’s decision. See Presser v. Acacia Mental Health Clinic, LLC, 836 F.3d 770, 776 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Under Rule 8, a plaintiff only needs to ‘give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.’”) (citation omitted). Once the parties conduct discovery and uncover who made the final policy decision to allow the Fox Defendants to film Empire at the JTDC, Plaintiffs can narrow their claims.
Moreover, although Cook County argues that Plaintiffs have pleaded themselves out of court because they allege that Chief Judge Evans was the decision-maker with final policymaking authority, Plaintiffs have also set forth sufficient allegations that Superintendent Dixon may have also been a final policy decision-maker, and, at this procedural posture, the Court is
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required to view the allegations and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. See Domanus v. Locke Lord LLP, 847 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2017). These allegations include Superintendent Dixon’s significant background and experience in the field of juvenile corrections, that he allegedly entered into the agreement with the other Defendants to permit the crews to film Empire at the JTDC, and that he aided the Fox Defendants in filming Empire while acting in the scope of his employment. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 63, 83.) The Court therefore denies Defendants Cook County’s, Superintendent Dixon’s and Chief Judge’s Office’s motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell liability claim. III. State Law Claims
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Count VII In Count VII of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Superintendent Dixon and Defendant Cook County Does breached their fiduciary duty based Superintendent Dixon’s role as a guardian or warden of the juvenile detainees. See In re Estate of Gustafson, 268 Ill. App. 3d 404, 407, 206 Ill.Dec. 45, 644 N.E.2d 813 (2d Dist. 1994) (“A ‘fiduciary’ is a person, having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another’s benefit in matters connected with such an undertaking, and it includes relationships such as a guardian.”). On the other hand, Defendant Dixon argues: Plaintiffs are mistaken because none of the residents of the JTDC are wards of Defendant Dixon – or anyone else for that matter. The residents of the JTDC are individuals who are awaiting an adjudication proceeding where the court may adjudicate them as wards of the court and commit them to the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice. Until that adjudication takes place, the parents or guardians maintain their status related to the residents of the JTDC. Accordingly, there is no fiduciary relationship between Defendant Dixon and Plaintiffs’ claim must be dismissed with prejudice. (R. 48, Mot. Dismiss, at 12.)
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In essence, Defendant Dixon is arguing that no state actor has the duty to protect the juvenile detainees from harm while they were housed at the JTDC – an argument in direct contradiction of well-established law. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 2008, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) (“when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.”); Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[o]nce the state assumes custody of a person, it owes him a rudimentary duty of safekeeping”); cf. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974) (“When a state assumes the place of a juvenile’s parents, it assumes as well the parental duties, and its treatment of its juveniles should, so far as can be reasonably required, be what proper parental care would provide.”).
In the tort context and pursuant to the duty of assuming some responsibility for the juvenile detainees’ safety and well-being, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Superintendent Dixon and Defendant Does owed them a fiduciary duty similar to that of guardian’s fiduciary duty to its wards – even though Plaintiffs had not been officially adjudicated as “wards” of the court under Illinois’ Juvenile Court Act during the relevant time period. See Parks v. Kownacki, 193 Ill. 2d 164, 169, 249 Ill.Dec. 897, 737 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. 2000) (once individual “accepted the responsibility of plaintiff’s care and education, he took on the role of her guardian, even though he was not given that title by a court”); Clayton v. Millers First Ins. Co., 384 Ill. App. 3d 429, 435, 322 Ill.Dec. 976, 892 N.E.2d 613 (5th Dist. 2008) (“In Parks, Illinois recognized that the term ‘ward’ could be used to describe a person despite no prior adjudication of that status.”); Parks v. Kownacki, 305 Ill. App. 3d 449, 461, 238 Ill.Dec. 547, 711 N.E.2d 1208 (5th Dist.
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1999), rev’d on other grounds, 193 Ill. 2d 164 (Ill. 2000) (“The duty to protect from harm certainly encompasses a duty to refrain from harming and to restrain others within one’s control from harming.”). Based on this Illinois case law, the Court agrees.
In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Superintendent Dixon and Defendant Does had a fiduciary duty in relation to the juveniles’ safety and well-being and Superintendent Dixon and the Cook County Doe Defendants breached their duty by subjecting the juveniles to numerous restrictions that were detrimental to their health and safety so that the Fox Defendants could film a television show. Under these allegations, Plaintiffs have stated sufficient factual detail raising a reasonable inference that Superintendent Dixon and the Doe Defendants are liable for breaching their fiduciary duty. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Therefore, the Court denies Defendants Dixon’s and Cook County’s motion to dismiss Count VII.
B. Inducement to Breach Fiduciary Duty – Count VIII Plaintiffs further allege that the Fox Defendants tortiously induced Defendant Dixon and the Doe Defendants to breach their fiduciary duty. The elements for the inducement of a breach of fiduciary duty include that the third party: (1) colluded with the fiduciary in committing a breach of fiduciary duty; (2) knowingly induced or participated in such breach; and (3) obtained the benefits resulting from the breach of duty. See Village of Wheeling v. Stavros, 89 Ill. App. 3d 450, 454-55, 44 Ill.Dec. 701, 411 N.E.2d 1067 (1st Dist. 1980). In their motion to dismiss, the Fox Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege that they knowingly participated with Defendant Dixon and the Doe Defendants in breaching any fiduciary duty. The
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Fox Defendants also argue Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Fox Defendants received any benefit from the JTDC administration’s impositions on the juvenile detainees.
As discussed above, Plaintiffs allege that the Fox Defendants acted together with – and obtained significant assistance from – the Cook County Defendants in filming Empire for commercial purposes, and that Defendants knew that filming Empire at the JTDC would result in the lockdowns, which placed significant restrictions on the juveniles’ movement within the facility. According to Plaintiffs, the Fox Defendants deliberately encouraged the JTDC’s administrators and officials to improperly place the JTDC on lockdown during the filming of Empire for economic and commercial benefits. In doing so, JTDC administrators accommodated the Fox Defendants’ filming needs over the juveniles’ health and well-being. Missing from these allegations, however, is that the Fox Defendants “knowingly participated in a breach of duty.” Village of Wheeling, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 454. Hence, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not plausibly suggest that they have a right to relief above a speculative level as to the Fox Defendants’ tortious inducement. The Court therefore grants – without prejudice – the Fox Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VIII. Plaintiffs may re-allege Count VIII in their Second Amended Complaint.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress – Count IX Next, Plaintiffs bring a common law intentional infliction of emotional (“IIED”) claim against all of the Defendants. “To recover on a claim for IIED, Illinois law requires a plaintiff to prove: (1) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous, (2) that the actor intended that his conduct inflict severe emotional distress or knew that there was a high probability that his conduct would inflict such distress, and, (3) that the conduct in fact caused severe emotional
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distress.” Bailey v. City of Chicago, 779 F.3d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 2015). The tort of IIED does not extend to “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Boston v. U.S. Steel Corp., 816 F.3d 455, 467 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The “extreme and outrageous character of a defendant’s conduct may arise, not so much from what he says or does, but from the defendant’s improper use of a position of power which gives him the ability to adversely affect the plaintiff’s interests.” Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 842 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Also, Illinois “courts consider whether the defendant knew the plaintiff was particularly susceptible to emotional distress and acted inappropriately despite that knowledge.” Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 836 (7th Cir. 2016). “In determining whether conduct is extreme and outrageous, courts use an objective standard based on all the facts and circumstances of the case.” Bianchi v. McQueen, 58 N.E.3d 680, 700, 405 Ill.Dec. 419 (2d Dist. 2016).
Key to Plaintiffs’ IIED claim is Defendant Dixon’s and the Doe Defendants’ position of power over them because they were juvenile detainees who were susceptible to emotion distress due to their known mental health issues and other circumstances of their confinement. See Cairel, 821 F.3d at 836; Fox, 600 F.3d at 842. In this context, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the juveniles detainees were psychologically vulnerable and that by being placed in their cells or jail-like pods, they suffered additional emotional trauma and a resultant lack of access to medical and other JTDC facilities. To state a claim for IIED, however, Plaintiffs must also allege that Defendants’ conduct went beyond all possible bounds of decency and is regarded as intolerable in a civilized community. See Cairel, 821 F.3d at 835; Bianchi, 58 N.E.3d at 700. In Bianchi, for example, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the defendant special
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prosecutors’ abuse of power was extreme and outrageous where “plaintiffs alleged that defendants fabricated and manufactured evidence and concealed exculpatory evidence for the purpose of falsely and maliciously detaining, arresting, and charging plaintiffs, knowing that such charges lacked probable cause.” Id. at 700; see also Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 425 (7th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff prosecuted without probable cause due to fabricated evidence sufficiently stated extreme and outrageous conduct under Rule 12(b)(6)); Thomas v. City of Blue Island, 178 F. Supp. 3d 646, 656 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (plaintiff adequately alleged extreme and outrageous conduct based on allegations that “police purposely failed to investigate a crime against a child resulting in the child’s death in order to protect a political or personal connection or friend”); Chatman v. City of Chicago, No. 14 C 2945, 2016 WL 4734361, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2016) (defendants’ conduct in “knowingly withholding exculpatory information, even though they were aware that there was a high likelihood that disclosure of the information would impact [plaintiff’s] trial and appeal” amounted to extreme and outrageous conduct.)
In light of these cases and viewing the allegations in Plaintiffs’ favor, they have alleged sufficient details that the Defendant Dixon and the Cook County Defendants had a position of power over them and abused this power by depriving them freedom of movement and access to vital services, such as health care, amounting to extreme and outrageous conduct. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Dixon and the Doe Defendants were aware of the detainees’ emotional and psychological problems in abusing this power. “Mindful of the relatively low bar [Plaintiffs are] required to clear at this preliminary stage of his case,” Plaintiffs’ IIED claim against Defendant Dixon and the Doe Defendants sufficiently passes muster under Rule 12(b)(6). See Alexander, 721 F.3d at 425. The Court views Plaintiffs’ allegations as to the Fox Defendants’ conduct
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differently because the First Amended Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to establish that the Fox Defendants were in a position of power over Plaintiffs and it is not reasonable to infer from the facts as alleged that the Fox Defendants knew of Plaintiffs’ mental health care issues and the circumstances of their confinement. Thus, Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that the Fox Defendants knew that there was a high probability that their conduct would cause severe emotional distress. See McGreal v. Village of Orland Park, 850 F.3d 308, 314 (7th Cir. 2017); Bailey, 779 F.3d at 696. The Court therefore grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ IIED claim. The Court grants Plaintiffs leave to re-allege their IIED claim against the Fox Defendants keeping in mind counsel’s Rule 11 obligations.
In addition, the Chief Judge’s Office did not respond to Plaintiffs’ IIED allegations in its legal memoranda, and thus the Chief Judge’s Office, its agents, and employees remain Defendants to Plaintiffs’ IIED claim. See Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 2007) (absence of discussion in brief amounts to abandonment of argument).
Last, Defendant Dixon and Cook County argue that the one-year limitations period pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/8-101 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act bars Plaintiffs’ IIED claim (and presumably Plaintiffs’ other state law claims). Because this one-year limitations period does not begin to run until Plaintiffs reach 18 years of age, and Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit when they were under the age of 18, Defendants’ statute of limitations argument is misplaced. See Lee v. Naperville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 203, 53 N.E.3d 55, 61, 403 Ill.Dec. 1 (2d Dist. 2015) (“although section 13–211 tolls the limitations period until the plaintiff attains the age of 18, section 8–101 requires the action to be commenced within one year thereafter.”).
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D. State Law Conspiracy Claim – Count X The Court next considers whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged their state law civil conspiracy claim – which sounds in tort – against all of the Defendants under the dictates of Iqbal and Twombly. “In Illinois, civil conspiracy is defined as ‘a combination of two or more persons for the purpose of accomplishing by concerted action either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means.’” Independent Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 938 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Under Illinois law, “to state a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege an agreement and a tortious act committed in furtherance of that agreement.” McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill.2d 102, 133, 720 N.E.2d 242, 241 Ill.Dec. 787 (Ill. 1999); see also Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54, 63, 206 Ill.Dec. 636, 645 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 1994) (“A cause of action for civil conspiracy exists only if one of the parties to the agreement commits some act in furtherance of the agreement, which is itself a tort.”). Although Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged their breach of fiduciary duty and IIED claims, they have failed to adequately allege that the Fox Defendants had an agreement with Defendant Dixon and other Doe Defendants and committed tortious acts in furtherance of that agreement. To do so, Plaintiffs would need to plausibly allege that the Fox Defendants planned, assisted, and encouraged the tortious conduct at issue. See McClure, 188 Ill. 2d at 133 (“The civil conspiracy theory has the effect of extending liability for a tortious act beyond the active tortfeasor to individuals who have not acted but have only planned, assisted, or encouraged the act.”). On the other hand, because the Chief Judges’ Office did not respond to Plaintiffs’ IIED and state law civil conspiracy allegations, the Chief Judge’s Office remains a Defendant to these
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claims. See Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads v. Foxx, 815 F.3d 1068, 1078 (7th Cir. 2016) (failing to respond to arguments amounts to waiver). The Court therefore grants in part without prejudice and denies in part Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim as alleged in Count X. IV. Respondeat Superior and Indemnification Claims – Counts XI and XII
Plaintiffs bring a respondeat superior claim against the Chief Judge’s Office, Cook County, and the Fox Defendants in Count XI based on the liability of their employees and agents acting within the scope of their authority or employment. Because certain state law claims survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Cook County and the Chief Judge’s Office, this respondeat superior claim remains in this lawsuit. See Coghlan v. Beck, 984 N.E.2d 132, 153, 368 Ill.Dec. 407 (1st Dist. 2013) (“Under the theory of respondeat superior, an employer can be liable for the torts of an employee, but only for those torts that are committed within the scope of the employment, including negligent, willful, malicious, or even criminal acts.”).5 Finally, because Cook County is a necessary party to this lawsuit for indemnification purposes under 745 ILCS 10/9-102, Count XII is properly alleged. V. Named Fox Defendants
As to the argument that not all of the Fox entities can be held liable in this lawsuit, the Fox Defendants made this argument in two perfunctory footnotes (and again in a cursory fashion it the reply brief) that merely contradict Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations. The Fox
5 Although the Fox Defendants seek to dismiss Count XI as redundant, it is not uncommon for litigants in this district to allege state law respondeat superior and indemnification claims as separate counts. Therefore, the Court denies the Fox Defendants’ request.
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Defendants have therefore waived this argument at this procedural posture. See Evergreen

Square of Cudahy v. Wisconsin Hous. & Econ. Dev. Auth., 848 F.3d 822, 829 (7th Cir. 2017)

(“A party may waive an argument by presenting it only in an undeveloped footnote.”).

Nonetheless, the Court encourages Plaintiffs to attempt to narrow the Fox Defendants in their

Second Amended Class Action Complaint.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motions to

dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Dated: April 20, 2017

ENTERED

______________________________ AMY J. ST. EVE United States District Court Judge

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 Case: 1:16-cv-08303 Document #: 88 Filed: 05/23/17 Page 1 of 45 PageID #:571

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

T.S. and Q.B., a minor by and through his grandparent and guardian, V.P.,
On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX TELEVISION, a division of TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION; FOX BROADCASTING COMPANY; TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FOX, INC.; THE COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS; THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY in his official capacity; LEONARD DIXON; and JOHN DOES 1 through 20,
Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-cv-08303 Hon. Amy J. St. Eve (Complaint—Class Action) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Introduction
Three times during the summer of 2015, the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (the “JTDC”) was placed on lockdown so that it could be used as a film set to shoot scenes for Empire, a hit Fox television show. Numerous areas of the JTDC that are designed for and essential to its mission of educating and rehabilitating the children housed there—including the JTDC’s school, its facilities for family visits, its only outdoor recreation yard, its library, and
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its chapel—were placed off limits so that Fox’s agents and employees could use them to stage and film the show.
The children for whom these facilities were intended, meanwhile, were ordered to remain in their cells, or were confined to the jail-style “pod” areas just outside their cell doors. There they were told to sit, for days on end. Their schooling continued in name only, visits from their families were interrupted, cut back, or effectively eliminated, sick-call requests were ignored, and programs that are intended to help them overcome the problems that landed them at the JTDC in the first place were cancelled or interrupted.
The purpose of these lockdowns was to provide Fox with a realistic prison facility to use as the primary set of two highly profitable Empire episodes. The children at the JTDC, meanwhile, were placed under restrictions more severe than those governing many adult jails. Putting the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown so that the Fox Defendants could use the facility to film a profitable television show was a breach of fiduciary duty, and it violated the children’s rights under the U.S. Constitution and state law. The profits gained from this misconduct were unjustly obtained. In this lawsuit Named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly-situated children who were subject to these lockdowns, seek an accounting and disgorgement of the Defendants’ unjust gains, punitive damages, and related remedies.
Nature of the Action1 1. Named Plaintiffs T.S. and Q.B. were housed at the JTDC in the summer of 2015 during the lockdowns imposed to facilitate the filming of Empire there. They seek to represent a
1 Plaintiffs make the allegations in this complaint based on personal knowledge as to matters in which they have had personal involvement and on information and belief as to all other matters.
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class of similarly situated children. On behalf of that class, Named Plaintiffs seek an accounting, disgorgement, nominal damages, punitive damages, an alternative award of actual damages, and an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.
Parties 2. Plaintiff T.S. is 18 years old. He was housed at the JTDC during the summer of 2015 when it was placed on lockdown to facilitate the filming of Empire. At the time of the filing of the complaint in this action, T.S. was not incarcerated. T.S. is identified by initials in order to protect his identity. 3. Plaintiff Q.B. is 17 years old. He was housed at the JTDC during the summer of 2015 when it was placed on lockdown to facilitate the filming of Empire. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, Q.B. brings this complaint by and through V.P., his grandparent and legal guardian. V.P. is identified by initials in order to protect Q.B.’s identity. At the time of the filing of the complaint in this action, Q.B. was not incarcerated. 4. The Defendants identified in the sub-paragraphs of this paragraph are referred to as the “Fox Defendants” or “Fox.”
a. Defendant Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. is a diversified global media and entertainment conglomerate with operations in cable network programming, television, and filmed entertainment. It is a publicly-traded company and is the ultimate parent of the other Fox Defendants. b. Defendant Twentieth Century Fox Television produces television shows that are broadcast on Fox’s television network, including Empire. Twentieth Century Fox Television is given production credit for both of the Empire episodes that were filmed in the JTDC. Twentieth Century Fox Television is a division of
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Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation. Twentieth Century Fox Television is not a legal entity distinct from Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, and therefore Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation is liable for all acts and omissions made by or on behalf of Twentieth Century Fox Television. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. c. Defendant Fox Broadcasting Company operates the television network that broadcasts Empire, among other programming. Fox Broadcasting Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. 5. Defendant Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County is sued in his official capacity. The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County administers the JTDC. 6. Defendant Leonard Dixon is the superintendent of the JTDC. He oversaw the JTDC’s daily operations at all times during the summer of 2015 when the children housed there were placed on lockdown to facilitate the filming of Empire. 7. Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois (“Cook County”) is a county in Illinois. The JTDC is operated as a branch of Cook County’s government. Cook County established and operates the JTDC, and it supports, funds, and maintains the facility. Cook County is obligated to indemnify judgments entered against the administrators of the JTDC arising from the operation of the JTDC. 8. Defendants Does 1 through 20 are sued herein by fictitious names for the reason that their true names are unknown to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend this complaint to allege the true names and capacities of these Defendants when their identities have
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been ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that these fictitiously-named Defendants are responsible in some manner for the misconduct alleged herein.
9. The Defendants at all times herein were the agents, joint venturers, and/or coconspirators of each of the other remaining Defendants, and in doing the things alleged in this complaint they were acting in the course of such agency, joint venture, and/or conspiracy.
Jurisdiction and Venue 10. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 because this is an action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because those claims are so related to the claims providing the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 11. Venue is proper in this jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred in this district and this is a convenient and reasonable forum for the resolution of this dispute.
Facts A. Normal Operation of the JTDC
12. The JTDC is a five-story building near the intersection of Ogden Avenue and Roosevelt Road, a few miles southwest of downtown Chicago. It is among the largest juvenile detention facilities in the country, housing between 250 and 400 children from the ages of 10 to 18. The average stay for a child at the JTDC is around three weeks.
13. Under normal operation, the JTDC’s floors serve distinct functions. Children detained at the JTDC are housed primarily on the fourth and fifth floors, which contain rows of cells that open onto small “pods.” Each pod serves as a common area in the same manner as a
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pod or “dayroom” in an adult jail cell block. A portion of the third floor also contains this celland-pod arrangement, including an “intake” pod for newly detained children.
14. The remainder of the third floor, and the first and second floors, are taken up with facilities designed to provide schooling and structured rehabilitative programming to the children housed at JTDC, along with related administrative services. The third floor houses the JTDC’s infirmary, as well as a large open-air courtyard, which serves as the JTDC’s primary recreation yard for the children. This courtyard is the only place where children detained at the JTDC are allowed outdoors during their detention. There are smaller auxiliary gymnasium facilities in the basement that can be used by limited numbers of children, and are accessed via elevator.
15. The second floor is dedicated almost entirely to education and programming, and is the floor on which the bulk of the JTDC’s schooling and structured rehabilitative programming services are provided. The second floor contains the facilities of the Nancy B. Jefferson Alternative School, which is operated by Chicago Public Schools. In addition to the school’s numerous classrooms, the second floor contains a library, a computer lab and music room, and an indoor “game” area with resources to help children detained at the JTDC engage in constructive pastimes. The second floor also contains a chapel for religious services and other programming, as well as visiting facilities where children can spend time with their families.
16. The first floor contains courtrooms, reception, and administrative offices. Parts of the first floor are accessible to the public, but the remainder of the building is secure and restricted, not accessible to the public without an escort.
17. The numerous facilities on the JTDC’s lower floors are reflective of the purpose for which the children are placed in detention at the JTDC. The JTDC does not operate as an adult prison, or even an adult jail. None of the children housed at the JTDC have been convicted
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of adult crimes, and they are not detained at the JTDC in order to be punished. To the contrary, because they are children, the purpose of their detention at the JTDC is to nurture and rehabilitate them, which is done by providing the children with schooling, care, and structured programming designed to address the problems that landed them at the JTDC in the first place. As the JTDC’s website states, its mission is to “provide[] the children with a safe, secure and caring environment with programs and structure that enhance personal development and improve opportunity for success upon return to the community.”
18. And indeed, the children housed at the JTDC are in pressing need of these services. For one thing, they are among the most vulnerable children in Chicago: more than 90 percent of this population has reported one or more traumatic experiences, with an average child reporting six different traumas.2 Sixty percent of the children who enter the JTDC are diagnosed with a mental disorder, and around one-quarter of them are prescribed psychotropic medication.3 Added to this, the children frequently arrive at the JTDC in a state of crisis, having been separated from their families and placed in confinement, many for the first time. Other children, meanwhile, are held at the JTDC not because of a delinquency adjudication, but rather because their home lives are in disarray: a judge has ordered the child’s release from whatever underlying matter brought the child to the JTDC, but the Department of Children and Family Services cannot find a foster home in which to place the child, or the child’s guardian has not
2 See National Child Traumatic Stress Network (“NCTSN”), Victimization and Juvenile Offending, 2016, http://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/assets/pdfs/victimization_juvenile_offending.pdf. See also NCTSN, Assessing Exposure to Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms in the Juvenile Justice Population, 2014, http://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/assets/pdfs/assessing_trauma_in_jj_2014.pdf (“The majority of youth in the juvenile justice system report experiencing multiple types of trauma, termed polyvictimization.” (citations omitted).)
3 The National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Juvenile Detention in Cook County: Future Directions, Feb. 2012 at 27, http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/cook-countyreport.pdf (prepared for office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County).
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come to pick the child up. As Superintendent Dixon noted in a recent news interview,
“[juvenile] detention is like the emergency room of the juvenile justice system.” For that reason,
Superintendent Dixon has explained, rather than house the children in an incarceration-style
setting, “[o]ur thing is to have some normalcy when they [detained children] come here.”
Conventional incarceration, in which inmates are essentially warehoused in cells or pods with
nothing to occupy the hours, aggravates the psychological and emotional traumas suffered by
this already vulnerable population, and decreases the children’s chances of successfully re-
entering society.
19. What is more, subjecting juveniles to forced idleness is dangerous for the children
themselves. As the U.S. Department of Justice has explained,
The amount and quality of structured daily programming in juvenile facilities has a significant impact on the rate of violent and antisocial incidents. Simply stated, youth who do not have adequate opportunities to engage in programmed activities become bored, and are more likely to become involved in mischief or assaultive behavior. Generally accepted professional standards mandate that youth in juvenile justice facilities receive a minimum of one hour of large muscle activity per weekday, two hours of large muscle activity per weekend day, educational programming during weekdays, and other structured developmental and rehabilitative activities. Inadequate youth programming . . . contributes to . . . high levels of youth violence, and departs substantially from generally accepted professional standards.
20. To fulfill the JTDC’s rehabilitative mission and provide a safe and structured
environment, the JTDC’s lower floors are dedicated to offering extensive schooling and
structured programming to the children housed there.
21. Under normal operation, the children detained at JTDC eat breakfast on their pods
in the upper floors, but quickly head down to the second floor for school, typically by 8:00 a.m.
The children attend classes at the school during the day, and take lunch there as well. After
classes finish, around 3:00 p.m., the children are typically placed in various structured after-
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school programs on the second floor, and sometimes on the third-floor recreation yard as well (the recreation yard contains a garden, for instance, which some of the children help maintain). The JTDC’s numerous rehabilitative programs include yoga, creative writing courses, computer classes, art, music, and singing. These programs are aimed at addressing the problems that brought each child to JTDC, and at rehabilitating the children so that they can lead more constructive and stable lives once they leave the facility.
22. During the day children are also given time for recreation in the third-floor openair courtyard and game time in the JTDC’s indoor game area on the second floor, and they receive visits from family in the JTDC’s visiting rooms. These activities, though not formally structured, are also critical for the children’s wellbeing, both while they are at the JTDC and after they re-enter society.
23. In the early evening the children return to the pods for dinner and bathing. Shortly thereafter they are placed in their cells for the night.
24. As this itinerary indicates, under normal operation the children spend relatively little time on their pods and cells in the JTDC’s upper floors. This is so because, in contrast with the extensive programming and activities the children receive on the second and third floors, their time on the pods is spent under restrictions that can be even more confining than those of an adult jail.
25. Each cell-and-pod arrangement has around 15 to 20 children, overseen by guards. Most of the pods are long, narrow rooms—essentially a large, enclosed corridor outside of a row of cells—with jail-style seating arrangements, consisting of tables that are each fused to short stools and fixed to the floor. Pods are also typically equipped with a television (and accompanying seats) at one end, but they otherwise have little in the way of materials for
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activities, and certainly nothing comparable to the resources and programming available on the second and third floors.
26. To prevent the monotony of the pods from leading to altercations and physical violence, when the children are on the pod they are prohibited from moving freely. Whereas inmates in an adult jail are typically allowed to move around their “day rooms” as they please, children on the pods at the JTDC must all remain sitting in the same spot, at all times. If a child needs to use the restroom or otherwise leave his seat, that child must raise his hand and receive permission from the guards. While that child is out of his seat, no other children may leave their seats. Breaking this rule—that is, if one child stands up without first receiving permission—is punishable as a “major rule violation.” Some limited services are offered on the pods themselves—priests and pastors are allowed to visit the children there, for example—but otherwise the pods are devoid of programming.
27. Exigent circumstances—such as staffing shortages or security concerns— sometimes force JTDC administrators to hold children on the pods, where these significant restrictions govern. Otherwise, though, the JTDC attempts to minimize the time children spend in the restrictive conditions of the pod, in favor of the school facilities, recreation, and structured rehabilitative programming offered in the second and third floors of the facility.
28. Notably, providing meaningful schooling and programming opportunities requires a considerable number of personnel, in addition to facilities where these services can be provided. This is so because the children must be escorted by guards and otherwise have their movements controlled every time they leave their pods to travel to schooling or programming elsewhere in the JTDC.
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B. Filming Empire at the JTDC 29. Sometime in the spring of 2015, the Fox Defendants scouted the JTDC, and
decided that they wanted to use the facilities on the JTDC’s second and third floors to stage and shoot scenes for Empire. The Fox Defendants were confronted with the fact, however, that the facilities they wanted were the facilities that enabled JTDC administrators to let the children housed there off their pods, and were the facilities that provided a venue for the children housed at the JTDC to receive education and rehabilitation services. Further, the Fox Defendants were confronted with the fact that indeed, hundreds of children relied on the facilities on the second and third floors to provide space from which they could leave their pods and receive education and rehabilitation. Further, the Fox Defendants were confronted with the fact that the only way Empire’s crew could use the facilities on the JTDC’s second and third floors was for the children to be prevented from using them, which meant confining hundreds of children to their pods during filming—both because that was the only place at the JTDC left for the children to go, and because the presence of a large film crew would be massively disruptive to the JTDC’s normal operations.
30. The Fox Defendants were thus confronted with the problem that the facilities they desired were also required for the education and rehabilitation of hundreds of children (and indeed provided the space needed for the children to be able to leave their pods), yet would be worthless to the Fox Defendants for filming unless the JTDC’s administrators excluded those same children from the facilities, which would be accomplished by confining them to their pods.
31. When confronted with this problem, the Fox Defendants could have found another facility or built a set for the incarceration scenes they wanted to shoot. They did neither. Instead, they sought to enter an agreement with the JTDC’s administrators that they knew or
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were substantially certain would induce the administrators to exclude the children from the JTDC’s second and third floors so that Empire’s film crew could use those areas for staging and filming.
32. To induce the JTDC’s administrators to let Empire’s crew use the education and rehabilitation facilities that were normally used by the children at the JTDC, the Fox Defendants offered to pay a rental fee for the use of the JTDC. The Fox Defendants also offered to pay wages and overtime for JTDC staff to leave their duties facilitating the normal operation of the JTDC—duties occupied in substantial part with enabling the children’s use of the education and rehabilitation facilities—and instead facilitate the Empire crew’s use of those same facilities for filming. These offers were made on the condition that the JTDC’s administrators would change the facility’s normal operations to make the second and third floors available to Empire’s crew, which all the Defendants knew or were substantially certain could only be accomplished by excluding from those areas the hundreds of children who normally used them, and which, in turn, the Defendants knew or were substantially certain could only be accomplished by confining the children to their pods.
33. The JTDC’s administrators accepted the inducements offered by the Fox Defendants, and the Fox Defendants reached an agreement with Superintendent Dixon and/or one or more of the Defendant Does for Empire’s film crew to film at the JTDC. This agreement contemplated that the Empire film crew would have access to many of the restricted facilities on the JTDC’s second and third floors that are intended to rehabilitate and educate the children housed at the JTDC—and that the children who normally used those facilities would be barred from them, so that the film crew could work without interruption. Instead, by necessary implication, the children housed at the JTDC would be confined to their cells and pods on the
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facility’s upper floors. In reaching this agreement, the Defendants knew or were substantially certain that filming Empire at the JTDC would result in the lockdowns and attendant restrictions on the children housed there.
34. The production and filming of Empire at the JTDC lasted two weeks in the summer of 2015, spread over three different shootings: June 21 through 26, July 13 through 16, and August 23 through 26.
35. The film crews that descended on the JTDC to conduct these shootings were enormous. Empire employed a film crew of approximately 250 in Chicago, and city permits taken in the name of “Fox Entertainment Group” show that each time Empire came to film at the JTDC, parking was suspended around the facility for as many as seven city blocks. These restrictions were needed to accommodate the large number of cargo vans, production trailers, motor homes, tractor-trailer rigs, crew vehicles, and other support vehicles used in filming.
36. During each of the three shootings Empire’s film crew—including dozens of production staff, actors, and extras—took over much of the JTDC’s second and third floors. The Nancy B. Jefferson school’s classrooms were largely occupied with film crews and production equipment. The JTDC’s chapel was converted into an area for eating, and garbage cans were placed there for Empire’s crew to throw away trash. The library, which was normally used by children at the JTDC to read, study, and check out books, was made into crew support area. The infirmary was used as a film set, as were some of the JTDC’s intake facilities. So was the JTDC’s visiting area, where the children normally meet with their families. One area of particular focus for the film crew was the third-floor open-air courtyard, which Empire’s film crew used to shoot large, long-format scenes involving numerous actors and extras.
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37. Empire took over more than just the many facilities on the JTDC’s second and third floors. Internal JTDC documents prepared to plan for the Empire filming indicate many staff were expected or directed to leave their normal duties in order to render services to the film crew instead. Some were chosen to act as extras in the show. Others were assigned to clean and clear out different areas in the building (this included removing children from some pods that the Empire crew wanted to use for filming), man the delivery docks to permit the free flow of film equipment, escort actors and crew members to and from the film set, keep Empire’s production crew from wandering around the facility, provide security for areas where filming was to occur, help escort filming equipment into place, and clean up after the crew. The Empire filming, in short, not only took over many of the facilities that furnished the schooling and structured programming that the JTDC was intended to provide; it also diverted a number of staff whose job it was to help fulfill the JTDC’s rehabilitative mission. And indeed, the Fox Defendants paid for these JTDC staff members to serve the Fox Defendants’ needs during the filming.
38. As a result, the only place left for the children housed at the JTDC was their cells and pods. That is where they were kept. To accommodate Empire, Superintendent Dixon and/or Defendant Does deliberately placed the JTDC on lockdown, confining the children to the jailstyle cell-and-pod arrangements in the JTDC’s upper floors. This was not an accidental or inadvertent result of the filming. Rather, it was the planned method by which the JTDC was cleared out to make way for Empire’s film crew. In an internal JTDC document circulated among staff to organize the facility in preparation for Empire’s arrival, for example, the JTDC’s custodial staff were instructed:
Notify storeroom for additional supplies that the pods may need for increase of resident [sic] on pods. There will be a significant increase in utilization of custodial supplies. Toilet paper, C-fold towels, hand soap, hand sanitizer, garbage bags etc… [sic] will be needed.
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39. When Empire arrived at the JTDC to film, the lockdown began with school. Instead of going down to their second-floor classrooms after breakfast as they normally would, the children remained on their pods. Nancy B. Jefferson teachers were ordered up into these areas, and instructed to go from pod to pod to teach their students. This was “school” in name only. The pods are not set up or even shaped like classrooms; instead, the teacher must stand in the midst of the seating that is arranged around the pod. There is no whiteboard or other teaching equipment for the instructor to use, and what supplies the teachers can bring to the pods are limited. What is more, during Empire filming many of the children whom the teachers had to instruct had not been allowed to move all day, and were going stir-crazy in what amounted to their own jail “day room.” Indeed these obvious obstacles are why the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities existed in the first place, and why the hundreds of children at the JTDC are escorted down to the school’s second-floor classrooms on a daily basis. Up on the pods instruction was markedly less effective and often chaotic, and during the Empire filming teachers often did not appear in the pods at all.
40. Recreation was drastically reduced, and for many children it was eliminated. Because the JTDC’s primary recreation facility—the third floor’s open-air courtyard—was being used to film Empire, the children were banned from that area. (The courtyard is divided into three sections, separated by walls, which allows different groups of children to use the yard independently. The Empire film crew only filmed in one of the sections, but the children were still banned from the remainder of the yard.) This left the smaller gymnasium facilities in the JTDC’s basement. But with limited space there, and the logistical challenge of bringing children down from the JTDC’s upper floors during filming, there was a backlog and many children never received any recreation or exercise at all.
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41. Instead, in an evident attempt to comply with the letter of juvenile facility standards, many children were given “rec time” up on the pods themselves. An “instructor” would arrive and ask whether any of the children wanted to partake in “large muscle” activity, by which the instructor apparently meant push-ups, sit-ups, and jumping-jacks, to be done among the tables on the pod. In other pods a ball would be introduced and the children would be told to play. Even these pretenses were often abandoned, and there was simply no recreation at all. At no point during the Empire filming were the children allowed outdoors, as they would have if they had been allowed to use the third-floor courtyard.
42. For many of the children detained at the JTDC, visits with families were effectively eliminated during Empire filming. For others, visits were restricted and severely shortened, with parents, who normally waited just a few minutes to visit with their children for an hour or more, forced to sit in waiting rooms for hours on end, for the opportunity to see their children for markedly shortened visits.
43. Other appointments were cancelled as well. For example, in order to seek medical attention the children can fill out sick-call slips on their pods. During normal operation, these requests usually receive prompt attention. The Empire film crew used the JTDC’s infirmary to shoot scenes for the show, however, and during filming numerous sick call requests were ignored.
44. Structured programming for children was also cancelled. Most of the structured programming normally occurs on the JTDC’s second floor, with some limited programming, such as a botany project that is run on the open-air courtyard, occurring on the third floor. Because the second and third floors had largely been taken over by Empire’s film crew, many of
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the JTDC’s after-school programs, including music and dance, were cancelled. Instead of attending these programs, children remained on their pods.
45. That the children at the JTDC had been placed on lockdown was made obvious to the Fox Defendants from the first day they arrived at the JTDC for filming. Despite this, the Fox Defendants continued to use the facilities at the JTDC for filming. The Fox Defendants continued to pay the JTDC’s administrators to make the JTDC’s second and third floors available to Empire’s crew even though the Fox Defendants knew or were substantially certain that this was accomplished by keeping the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown, and they continued knowingly to benefit from the lockdowns at the expense of the children housed there, by using the spaces freed up by the lockdowns to record footage for Empire.
46. During the course of filming, the Fox Defendants also rewarded the JTDC’s administrators, including Superintendent Dixon, for making the second and third floors available to the Fox Defendants for filming. The Fox Defendants did this by allowing the JTDC’s administrators to rub shoulders and take photographs with Empire’s star actors, including Chris Rock and Terrence Howard. Indeed, in the months after Empire’s filming at the JTDC ended, Superintendent Dixon had lined the walls of his JTDC office with framed photographs of himself posing with Empire’s stars.
C. Individual Experiences 47. T.S. a. During the summer of 2015, T.S. was 16 years old and was housed in a JTDC living unit. Children on T.S.’s pod normally left the pod in the morning to attend class in the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities on the second floor, which they attended through mid-afternoon. During the day, they had recreation time in
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the third-floor courtyard. They also took advantage of games and activities on the commissary area on the JTDC’s second floor. b. When Empire arrived to film, these routines were eliminated. T.S. and the rest of the children on his pod were held there. They were not allowed down to the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities; instead, teachers would sometimes come up to the pods. This was a chaotic teaching environment. The teacher could not teach in front of the children, and had no whiteboard to instruct from. To make matters worse, the children on the pod, who had been prohibited from meaningful recreation, were going stir-crazy, and the pod was out of control. In this setting, teaching simply did not occur. c. During Empire’s filming, the children on T.S.’s pod did not leave for recreation. Instead a JTDC staff “instructor” would occasionally come to the pod and ask, “Who wants to do large-muscle?” This meant, apparently, that the children should do push-ups, sit-ups, and jumping-jacks in front of the seats they had been forced to sit in all day. After none of the children took the instructor up on this “recreation” offer, he would leave the pod. Often, no instructor arrived at all. Sick call requests by children on T.S.’s pod were also ignored during filming, whereas during regular operation they were responded to relatively promptly. d. T.S.’s visits with his mother were also interrupted and curtailed. During the JTDC’s normal operation, T.S.’s mother visited him during the two visiting periods T.S. was allotted each week. To visit T.S., his mother would arrive during T.S.’s designated visiting time slots, which were in the late afternoon or early evening. Once she arrived, it would typically take 20 minutes for JTDC
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staff to locate T.S. and bring him to the visiting facilities on the second floor. T.S. and his mother would then be able to have a visit that typically lasted at least an hour. e. During Empire’s filming, T.S.’s mother arrived at the designated time slot for her visit. Instead of bringing T.S. down, however, she, and several other parents who had arrived to visit during the same slot, were forced to sit in the waiting area. After around two hours had passed, she saw a large group of what appeared to be Empire’s cast or crew leave the building. Sometime thereafter, she was escorted to visit with T.S. in a room much smaller than the JTDC’s normal visiting rooms. Instead of being allowed to visit for an hour, their visit was shortened significantly. 48. Q.B. a. During the summer of 2015, Q.B. was 16 years old and was housed in a JTDC living unit. Children on Q.B.’s pod normally attended classes at the Nancy B. Jefferson school throughout the day. The children on Q.B.’s pod were provided with two recreation periods, one for gym class as part of their schooling, and another for an after-school recreation hour. b. The schooling on the second floor, and the recreation hours, were important to Q.B. and the other the children because they provided a meaningful escape from the monotony of confinement on the pod. While on the pod the children were required to sit in one place, and could only move, one at a time, with prior permission. Even to stand up without first obtaining permission was treated as a major rule violation.
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c. Q.B. had two visiting hours during the week, on Tuesdays and Saturdays, and during his confinement at the JTDC his father and his grandmother visited him frequently. d. One day the children on Q.B.’s pod were told they would not be going down to the school, because Empire had arrived to film at the JTDC. During the Empire filming teachers occasionally came up to the pod to teach, but sometimes they did not. When they did arrive, the teaching environment was chaotic, as the children had been locked on the pod all day without any opportunity for movement. Children on Q.B.’s pod never received recreation during Empire’s filming, making time on the pod miserable. In addition to these restrictions, sick call requests put in by children on Q.B.’s pod were ignored. Normally such requests were responded to relatively promptly. e. Q.B.’s grandmother visited him at the JTDC whenever she could. She works at a supermarket that frequently requires her to work over the weekends, however, making visits during Q.B.’s Saturday visiting slot difficult. After being unable to get time off to visit one Saturday, Q.B.’s grandmother asked her boss to take off of work Tuesday, so that she could visit her grandson. Empire was filming that day, however, and when she arrived at the JTDC during Q.B.’s visiting slot, she was told that visits in that time had been cancelled. 49. N.T. a. N.T. is a 16-year-old boy who was housed at the JTDC. During normal operation, he and the other children in his unit would leave the pod after breakfast for classes downstairs at the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities. They would
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attend school through the afternoon, with outdoor recreation in the third-floor courtyard during the school day. The children in N.T.’s unit participated in multiple after-school programs, including a drum circle and a dance class. During the two visiting periods that N.T. was allotted each week, either N.T.’s mother, his grandmother, or both would visit with him in the JTDC’s visiting area. b. When Fox arrived to film Empire, N.T.’s unit was placed on lockdown. The children did not leave the pod for school. Instead, they remained in their pod, where they were told to remain in their seats. Movement was permitted only to one child at a time, after the child received permission. Some teachers came up to the pod, but there was no whiteboard for writing, the teachers brought few materials, and teaching in the pod environment was ineffective. After-school programming was cancelled entirely, and N.T. was unable to visit with his mother or grandmother. Children in N.T.’s unit could only escape the monotony of the pod by buying “room time”—30 minutes alone in their cells—using points they earned for good behavior. c. During lockdown the children in N.T.’s unit were taken to the gymnasium facilities in the JTDC’s basement, but only occasionally, apparently because administrators from different pods were fighting for scarce recreation time slots there. As a substitute the children were given “recreation” in their pods, during which they were allowed to play cards or write letters. Otherwise, the children were confined to their chairs on the pod and not allowed to move.
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50. G.M. a. G.M. is a 16-year-old boy who was housed in the JTDC’s intake unit when Empire arrived to film. Children in the intake unit are normally allowed out of their cells the entire day. They take breakfast in their pods, are allowed some activities there, and are given recreation either in the basement gymnasium facility or the third-floor open-air courtyard. There is also an area in the intake unit where the children can watch television. b. The intake unit is on the third floor and was thus close to much of the filming that occurred for Empire. While Empire was filming, G.M. was not allowed out of his cell. He was given meals in his cell and was instructed to be quiet. He was allowed out of his cell only for dinner, and then returned to the cell for the evening.
51. D.G. a. D.G. is a 16-year-old boy who was housed in a JTDC living unit on the JTDC’s third floor. Children in his unit normally left the pod to attend school in the Nancy B. Jefferson classrooms on the JTDC’s second floor, and they would participate in structured programming later in the day. b. When Empire arrived to film at JTDC, the children did not leave the pod for school. Instead, teachers came to the pod, though the instruction was much less effective than instruction in the Nancy B. Jefferson school facilities. Eventually, no teachers came to the pods. c. Otherwise there was a television on the pod, turned on at low volume. Some children watched the television, but in all events, the children on D.G.’s
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pod were told not to speak, even at conversational levels. At times during the lockdown, the guards attempted to provide the children with “recreation,” but this consisted of a red rubber ball that was given to the children in the pod. During the Empire filming the children on D.G.’s pod were not permitted to leave the pod for recreation. D. The Children Housed at JTDC Were Injured and Humiliated by The Lockdowns 52. As a proximate result of the Empire lockdown, the children housed at the JTDC suffered harm. 53. The lockdown interrupted and degraded the rehabilitation and structured programming that is designed to address the problems, many of them very serious, that brought the children to the JTDC. This includes the children’s education and schooling, which was degraded and often eliminated as a result of the lockdown. 54. Being placed on lockdown was also humiliating, and it was psychologically damaging to the children in and of itself. Placing children for days on end under the forced idleness that governed in the pods is psychologically and emotionally harmful. This is particularly so for a vulnerable population like the children housed at the JTDC, many of whom come from unstable or broken homes and suffer from psychological trauma and diagnosed psychological impairments. 55. As a proximate result of the lockdown, the children housed at the JTDC were also subject to an increased the risk of physical violence. It is well established that depriving children housed in juvenile facilities of meaningful opportunities for recreation and structured programming, and instead forcing them into idleness on their pods, increases the risk of confrontation and violence among the children themselves. The Empire lockdowns created just
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such a hazard for the children at JTDC, increasing risk from attack or altercation with other children there.
E. The Defendants Profited from Locking Down JTDC 56. The Defendants profited as a proximate result of the JTDC lockdown. 57. The Fox Defendants profited from using the JTDC’s incarceration facilities as the
primary set for two highly profitable Empire episodes. Scenes shot at JTDC were featured prominently in the first two episodes of Empire’s second season, accounting for more than a third of the running time in each. These episodes were immensely profitable. Advertisers paid $750,000 per 30-second advertising spot in Episode 1, and $600,000 per 30-second spot in Episode 2. An advertising industry publication called these rates “astonishing.”
58. In addition to this revenue, the Fox Defendants realized profits from Empire by broadcasting these episodes overseas, as well as licensing the episodes, streaming them over the internet, and selling them for download. In reports to investors covering this period, Defendant Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. noted that Empire was highly profitable and had contributed significantly to the company’s revenues.
59. These profits were the result of joint effort by the Fox Defendants. Defendant Twentieth Century Fox Television was the producer of both episodes featured at the JTDC, which were broadcast by Fox Broadcasting Company; the two companies, which share joint CEOs, work closely together to design programming, including Empire, that will maximize Fox’s revenue. Indeed, one reason for Empire’s multiple visits to the JTDC was that Fox Broadcasting Company and Twentieth Century Fox Television demanded that certain scenes set at the JTDC be re-filmed. In particular, one of the characters in the Empire episodes filmed at the JTDC, played by comedian Chris Rock, had originally been depicted as a cannibal. After
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they learned about this depiction, executives of the Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, and/or one or more of the Defendant Does acting as agents for the Fox Defendants, ordered that certain scenes at the JTDC be re-shot to change this depiction. The JTDC was placed on lockdown at least in part to accommodate these demands. Profits from the episodes filmed at the JTDC flowed to Defendant Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.
60. Cook County and/or certain Defendant Does profited from Empire’s filming as well, receiving rental fees and “reimbursement” revenue connected with the use of the JTDC.
F. The Final Decision Maker Regarding JTDC’s Operation Knew About and Approved of the Lockdown 61. From the facts available, Named Plaintiffs allege that the person who exercises
final decision-making authority regarding operation of the JTDC, Timothy Evans, who was the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, knew about and approved the filming of Empire at the JTDC, and the facility’s consequent lockdown.
62. As described herein, the Empire lockdown occurred during a high-profile transition in which the Chief Judge’s office took administrative control of the JTDC for the first time. It is simply not plausible that Superintendent Dixon, who had just started his job, would authorize the Empire filming and lockdown without first checking with his new boss. And indeed, as described herein, Superintendent Dixon implied in correspondence that Chief Judge Evans was aware of the filming, and had approved of it.
63. In the summer of 2015, the JTDC was starting a new chapter in its administration. Sixteen years earlier, in 1999, a federal civil rights lawsuit was filed against Cook County, alleging systematic mistreatment and neglect of children housed at the JTDC. See Doe v. Cook County, 99-cv-3945 (N.D. Ill.).
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64. The Doe parties originally entered into a settlement agreement under which Cook County would improve conditions at the JTDC. In 2007, though, after concluding that the County was not complying with the agreement’s terms, the District Court appointed a federal temporary administrator to operate the JTDC and bring it into compliance. On January 1, 2008, a few months after the federal temporary administrator took over the JTDC, the Illinois Legislature enacted a reform measure providing that the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, rather than the Cook County Board, would appoint the JTDC’s administrator and all other necessary personnel, who would then serve at the Chief Judge’s pleasure. Notwithstanding this transfer of authority, the JTDC would remain under control of the federal District Court’s temporary administrator for the next several years.
65. Years later, the District Court finally determined that the JTDC could be returned to local control. It ordered that control of the JTDC be transferred from the temporary federal administrator back to local control in 2015.
66. In preparation for the JTDC’s transfer from federal control, Chief Judge Evans appointed Leonard Dixon as the JTDC’s new superintendent. This was a high-profile selection. Chief Judge Evans announced his choice with a lengthy press release, and held a joint press conference with Superintendent Dixon to discuss Dixon’s appointment and his impending takeover of the JTDC. The transfer was the object of intense media scrutiny, and Chief Judge Evans and Superintendent Dixon gave media interviews on the subject. In these press events and interviews, both men stressed that their priority in reassuming control of the JTDC would be the care for and welfare of the children housed there. They also stressed the need to provide the children housed at the JTDC with a non-penal environment that featured structured
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programming, to help the children cope with difficulties in the outside world once they left the facility.
67. The federal District Court finally transferred administration of the JTDC to local control on May 20, 2015. Empire arrived to film four weeks later, on June 21.
68. It is exceedingly unlikely that Superintendent Dixon would have allowed Empire to film there without Chief Judge Evans’ approval. Dixon, who has held high-profile positions in the juvenile corrections field for decades, had become the JTDC’s superintendent just four weeks earlier when it was placed under Chief Judge Evans’ control, for the very first time. And as noted above, Chief Judge Evans had publicly expressed keen interest in this transfer. Under these circumstances, it would be implausible to suggest that an experienced administrator like Superintendent Dixon would have placed the JTDC on lockdown so that a large television crew could use it as a film set, without first checking with his boss.
69. And indeed, in contemporaneous correspondence Superintendent Dixon implied that he had just such approval from Chief Judge Evans. As part of the Doe litigation the District Court appointed Thomas F. Geraghty, a professor at Northwestern University School of Law, as “next friend” of the Doe child class members at the JTDC. (Doe, 99-cv-3945, Doc. # 8 (Aug. 4, 1999).) In July 2015, while the JTDC transition was still being monitored by the District Court, (see id., Doc. # 786 (May 15, 2015)), Professor Geraghty wrote to Superintendent Dixon to express concern about reports he had received that the JTDC had been placed on lockdown so that Fox could film Empire there. Superintendent Dixon responded by formal letter on July 24, 2015. He acknowledged that Empire had filmed at the JTDC, but he claimed that the experience for the children had been positive and that they hadn’t been inconvenienced in any way. The letter’s closing “courtesy copy” notation indicated that Dixon was sending a copy of the letter to
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Dr. Beverly Butler, whom the letter noted represented the office of the Chief Judge. Indeed, Dr. Butler was Chief Judge Evans’ special assistant for the transition of the JTDC to the Chief Judge’s control. It is reasonable to infer that Superintendent Dixon’s purpose in copying Dr. Butler on the letter was to imply that Chief Judge Evans was aware of, and had approved of, the Empire filming. Crediting Superintendent Dixon this implication, and considering the circumstances discussed above, it is reasonable to infer that Chief Judge Evans, the final decision-maker regarding the operation and administration of the JTDC, knew that the JTDC was being used as a film set for Empire, and had approved of it.
70. Alternatively, if Superintendent Dixon was the person who exercised final decision-making authority regarding operation of the JTDC, he knew of and approved of Empire’s filming at the JTDC and the facility’s the consequent lockdown, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
Class Allegations 71. Named Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims for a class of others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and/or Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 72. Named Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of all children housed at the JTDC when the facility was placed on lockdown during the filming of Empire in the summer of 2015. 73. Numerosity—The individuals in this class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. There are between 250 and 400 children housed at JTDC during normal operation. 74. Commonality—There are questions of law and fact common to this class. Among those questions are:
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 Whether Empire was filmed at the JTDC during the summer of 2015.
 Whether the JTDC was placed on lockdown in order to facilitate this filming.
 Whether locking down the children at the JTDC in order to facilitate the filming of a commercial television show is an action reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
 Whether it was a breach of fiduciary duty to place the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown so that Empire could be filmed there.
 Whether the Fox Defendants and Defendant Does acted jointly with the JTDC’s administrators to place the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film scenes for Empire.
 Whether the Defendants conspired with one another to place the children at the JTDC on lockdown in order to realize a profit from the filming of Empire.
 Whether locking down children housed at the JTDC in the manner described in the complaint created an increased risk of physical violence.
 Whether locking down the children housed at the JTDC in order to film Empire departed substantially from generally accepted professional standards for the operation of juvenile facilities.
 Whether locking down the children housed at the JTDC in order to film Empire violated their Due Process rights under the U.S. Constitution.
 Whether locking down the children housed at the JTDC in order to film Empire effected an unreasonable seizure in violation their rights under the U.S. Constitution.
 Whether the profits that the Defendants realized from locking down the JTDC in order to film Empire were unjustly obtained.
 Whether the Defendants are subject to disgorgement of the profits they realized by placing the children at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film Empire there.
 Whether the Defendants are subject to nominal damages for placing the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film Empire there.
 Whether the Defendants are subject to punitive damages for placing the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film Empire there.
 Whether the Defendants are subject to actual damages for placing the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in order to film Empire there.
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75. Typicality—Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Named Plaintiffs were housed at the JTDC when the children at the facility were placed on lockdown in order to facilitate filming for Empire. Their treatment in being placed on lockdown is typical of other children housed at JTDC who were placed on lockdown in order to facilitate the filming of Empire. Named Plaintiffs seek to prove that the locking down of the children housed at the JTDC in order to facilitate the filming of Empire violated the constitutional and state-law rights of the children subjected to the lockdown, and that the Defendants are subject to nominal damages, actual damages, punitive damages, and disgorgement for the profits resulting from this misconduct.
76. Adequacy—Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. They are represented by skilled counsel with experience in complex civil litigation, class actions, and litigation concerning constitutional and prisoners’ rights.
77. Rule 23(b)(1)(B)—Named Plaintiffs’ claims for accounting and disgorgement, among other remedies, are certifiable under this rule because adjudications with respect to individual members of the class will as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members of the class.
78. Rule 23(b)(3)— Named Plaintiffs’ alternative claims for actual damages, among other remedies, are certifiable under this rule because the questions of law and fact common to the class predominate over any individual issues, and a class action would be superior to other methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy.
COUNT I – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (All Defendants – Due Process) 79. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here.
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80. As described more fully herein, each of the Defendants subjected Named Plaintiffs and similarly situated children at the JTDC to lockdown, which impeded these children from accessing meaningful schooling, rehabilitation, structured programming, recreation, and visits from families, and subjected them to restrictions more severe than those that are commonly imposed in many adult jails. The Defendants did this so that the JTDC’s schooling and other facilities on its second and third floors could be used to stage and shoot scenes for the Empire television show. The Defendants did this while acting individually, jointly, and in conspiracy with one another, as well as under color of law and within the scope of their employment.
81. The lockdowns and attendant conditions were not imposed for a legitimate governmental purpose, but rather to facilitate the filming of a commercial television show and to realize the profits therefrom. The Fox Defendants acted together with and obtained significant aid from Defendants Cook County, the office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Dixon, and Does 1 through 20 in filming Empire for commercial purposes at the JTDC. The Defendants knew that filming Empire at the JTDC would result in the lockdowns and attendant restrictions on the children housed there.
82. The Defendants knew that the lockdowns violated the children’s rights and imposed harm and a risk of harm on the children, yet they carried out the lockdown and filming anyway. This misconduct was undertaken knowingly, intentionally, and/or with reckless indifference to the rights of the children housed at the JTDC.
83. The lockdowns and attendant conditions violated the Due Process rights of the children housed at the JTDC.
84. As a proximate result of these lockdowns and resulting conditions, the children housed at the JTDC suffered emotional and psychological pain, were deprived of meaningful
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opportunities for rehabilitation, education, and family visits, and were subject to increased risk of physical violence at the hands of other children at the facility.
85. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
COUNT II – 42 U.S.C. § 19834 (All Defendants – Unlawful Seizure) 86. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 87. Under the JTDC’s normal operation, children are permitted, among other things, to attend classes at the Nancy B. Jefferson school, participate in structured programming in appropriate facilities on the JTDC’s lower floors that is designed to assist in their rehabilitation, participate in recreation, including outdoor recreation in the third-floor courtyard, and visit with family members in the JTDC’s visiting areas at appropriate times and for extended periods. 88. As described more fully herein, the Defendants deliberately placed the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown in their cells and pods, physically restraining and limiting their range of movement, and preventing them from leaving the pods and partaking in the numerous educational and rehabilitative activities that they would otherwise be entitled to do. The Defendants did this while acting individually, jointly, and in conspiracy with one another, as well as under color of law and within the scope of their employment. 89. The Fox Defendants acted together with and obtained significant aid from Defendants Cook County, the office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Dixon, and Does 1 through 20 in filming Empire for commercial purposes at the JTDC. The Defendants knew that filming Empire at the JTDC would result in the lockdowns and attendant
4 The Court has dismissed this count with prejudice. Plaintiffs re-assert it here for purposes of preservation.
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restrictions on the children housed there. The Defendants jointly acted to improperly impose these additional restrictions on the children housed at the JTDC in order to facilitate the Empire filming. This constituted a new seizure—that is, a seizure different from, and in addition to, the children’s existing lawful detainment.
90. This new seizure was objectively unreasonable. It was not effected pursuant to a legitimate governmental purpose, but rather so that the schooling, rehabilitation, and recreation areas of the JTDC could be used to film scenes for a profitable television show.
91. As a proximate result of these lockdowns and resulting conditions, the children housed at the JTDC were deprived of their liberty interest to be free from unreasonable restraint. They also suffered emotional and psychological pain, were deprived of meaningful opportunities for rehabilitation, and were subject to increased risk of physical violence at the hands of other children housed at the facility.
92. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
COUNT III – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Monell liability – Cook County and/or the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County) 93. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 94. The lockdowns of the JTDC were the result of the official policy and decisions of Defendants Cook County and/or the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County. 95. Specifically, Chief Judge Timothy Evans was the person with final policymaking and decision-making authority regarding the administration and operation of the JTDC, on behalf of Defendants Cook County and/or the office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County. This included the decision of whether to allow the filming of Empire at the JTDC.
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96. As set forth in more detail in this complaint, Chief Judge Evans was informed of, knew about, and approved of the filming of Empire at the JTDC, and its consequent lockdown. Because Chief Judge Evans was the final policy- and decision-maker regarding the JTDC’s administration and operation, Defendants Cook County and/or the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County may be said to have caused the injuries and unjust enrichment described in this complaint.
COUNT IV – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fox Defendants – Action Under Color of Law) 97. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 98. The Fox Defendants and their employees and/or agents willfully induced and participated in the lockdown of the children at the JTDC facility, and their actions were inextricably intertwined with those of the named and unknown defendant administrators of the JTDC, acting under color of law, who placed the facility on lockdown and imposed the conditions described herein. The Defendants agreed to engage jointly in an enterprise that only the government could lawfully institute for the mutual benefit of both the public and private Defendants. The JTDC’s administrators placed the JTDC on lockdown pursuant to an understanding with (and pursuant to payment by) the Fox Defendants, in order to achieve the Fox Defendants’ goals. 99. The Fox Defendants deliberately encouraged the JTDC’s administrators to improperly place the JTDC on lockdown during the filming of Empire, for commercial benefit. The Fox Defendants reached an agreement with the JTDC’s administrators that the JTDC’s administrators would prohibit the children housed at the JTDC from using the various schooling and rehabilitative facilities on the JTDC’s second and third floors so that the Fox Defendants could use those facilities to stage and film scenes for Empire. The contemplated, obvious, and
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substantially certain result of this agreement was that the children would be confined to their cells and pods on the JTDC’s upper floors. It was to accommodate the Fox Defendants’ filming needs that the children at JTDC were placed on lockdown at all. Indeed, it was the intention of the Fox Defendants that the children not be allowed to use their designated schooling and rehabilitation facilities so that the Fox Defendants could use those same facilities to film Empire instead. In reaching this agreement with the JTDC’s administrators, the Fox Defendants undertook joint action, under color of law, to violate the rights of the children housed at the JTDC. The actions of the Fox Defendants and the JTDC’s administrators were also inextricably intertwined in bringing about the violations alleged in this complaint.
100. The acts taken in furtherance of the agreement between the Fox Defendants and the JTDC’s administrators proximately resulted in the injuries and unjust enrichment described elsewhere in this complaint.
COUNT V – 42 U.S.C. § 19835 (Fox Defendants – Respondeat Superior) 101. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 102. While committing the misconduct alleged in the preceding paragraphs, one or more of the Defendant Does 1-20 were employees and/or agents of one or more of the Fox Defendants and were acting within the scope of their employment and/or agency. One or more of the Fox Defendants are liable as principal for all torts constitutional violations committed by their employees and/or agents or on their behalf, and the resulting unjust enrichment.
COUNT VI – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Conspiracy – All Defendants) 103. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here.
5 The Court has dismissed this count with prejudice. Plaintiffs re-assert it here for purposes of preservation.
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104. The Defendants reached an agreement among themselves to deprive the children housed at the JTDC of their constitutional rights, as described throughout this complaint.
105. In furtherance of this conspiracy, each of the co-conspirators committed overt, tortious acts and was an otherwise willful participant in joint activity.
106. The misconduct described in this count was undertaken intentionally and/or with reckless indifference to the rights of the children housed at the JTDC.
107. As a direct and proximate result of the illicit prior agreement referenced above, the rights of the children housed at the JTDC were violated, and they suffered emotional and psychological injuries as well as a wrongfully increased risk of physical injury, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
108. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
COUNT VII – State Law Claim (Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Dixon and Defendant Does) 109. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 110. Defendants Dixon and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20 were guardians of the children housed at the JTDC. 111. In turn, the children housed at the JTDC were the wards of these Defendants. 112. As guardians, these defendants had a fiduciary relationship with the children housed at the JTDC. 113. Among their obligations as guardians, these Defendants were obliged to act in the best interest of the children housed at the JTDC.
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114. As described more fully throughout this complaint, these Defendants breached these fiduciary duties by placing the children housed at JTDC on lockdown for the purposes of facilitating the filming of a profitable television show there.
115. As a proximate result of this breach of fiduciary duty, the children housed at the JTDC suffered harm and an increased risk of physical injury, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
116. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
Count VIII – State Law Claim (Inducement of Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Fox Defendants and Defendant Does)
117. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 118. As set forth more fully herein, Defendants Dixon and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20 were fiduciaries of the children housed at the JTDC. 119. As set forth more fully herein, one or more of the Fox Defendants and/or Defendant Does colluded with and/or induced one or more of these fiduciaries to commit the breaches of fiduciary duty described elsewhere in this complaint. 120. These Fox Defendants and/or the Defendant Does knowingly participated in this breach, and they knowingly accepted the benefits resulting from this breach. 121. Alternatively, the Fox Defendants and/or the Defendant Does knowingly induced this breach, and they knowingly accepted the benefits resulting from this breach. 122. As a proximate result of this breach of fiduciary duty, the children housed at the JTDC suffered harm and an increased risk of physical injury, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
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123. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
COUNT IX – State Law Claim (All Defendants – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 124. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 125. The actions, omissions, and conduct of the Defendants as set forth in this complaint were extreme and outrageous. These actions were rooted in an abuse of power and authority and were undertaken with the intent to cause, or were in reckless disregard of the probability that their conduct would cause, severe emotional distress to the children housed at the JTDC. 126. Among other things, there is substantial evidence to permit the inference that the Fox Defendants acted in reckless disregard of the probability that the lockdowns would cause severe emotional distress. Empire’s filming at the JTDC took place amid rising awareness of mass incarceration and its effects on poor and vulnerable populations, including the psychological damage of incarceration on young people. In the weeks before the filming at the JTDC, this included extensive media coverage of the suicide of a young man who had been jailed as a juvenile in New York.6 In light of the prominence of the subject, the Fox Defendants sought to include themes of mass incarceration in the plot of the two Empire episodes filmed at
6 See, e.g., Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, The New Yorker, June 7, 2015 http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015; Iyana Robertson, 22-Year-Old Man Held on Rikers Island Without Trial Commits Suicide, Vibe, June 8, 2015 http://www.vibe.com/2015/06/kalief-browder-commits-suicide-at-22; Jim Dwyer, A Life That Frayed as Bail Reform Withered, N.Y. Times, June 9, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/nyregion/after-ashocking-death-a-renewed-plea-for-bail-reform-in-new-york-state.html; Matt Ford, Justice Kennedy Denounces Solitary Confinement, The Atlantic, June 18, 2015 https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/kalief-browder-justice-kennedy-solitaryconfinement/396320.
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the JTDC.7 It is reasonable to infer that in developing these Empire episodes the Fox Defendants familiarized themselves with the effects of mass incarceration, including the demographics who gets incarcerated and the psychological vulnerability of people subject to such incarceration. These are established areas of study with ample literature discussing the psychological vulnerability of the population in detention, including studies supporting the statistics Plaintiffs have cited elsewhere in this complaint. Thus, it is further reasonable to infer that the Fox Defendants acted in reckless disregard of the effects of causing the children housed at the JTDC to be placed on lockdown.
127. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ actions, the children housed at the JTDC suffered emotional distress as set forth above.
128. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
COUNT X – State Law Claim (All Defendants – Civil Conspiracy) 129. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 130. As described more fully in the preceding paragraphs, the Defendants reached an agreement among themselves to place the children housed in the JTDC on lockdown so that the facility could be used to film scenes for a profitable television show, and conspired by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose by an unlawful means.
7 See, e.g., Spencer Kornhaber, Empire’s Ambiguous Take on the Social-Justice Movement, The Atlantic, Sept. 23, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/09/empire-season-2premiere-mass-incarceration/406921; Gene Demby, ‘Empire’ Nods to a Very Different Take on Policing Than We Usually See in Prime Time, NPR – Code Switch, Oct. 2, 2015, http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/10/02/445045620/empire-nods-to-a-very-different-take-onpolicing-than-we-usually-see-in-primetim; Jada Uan, Empire’s Soapy Take on Social Justice is Also Very Nuanced, Vulture, Sept. 24, 2015, http://www.vulture.com/2015/09/empire-black-lives-matter-nuancedopening.html.
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131. In furtherance of their conspiracy, each of these co-conspirators committed overt acts and were otherwise willful participants in joint activity.
132. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable and was undertaken intentionally, with malice, with reckless indifference to the rights of others, and in total disregard of the conditions imposed by or the effects of the lockdowns on the children housed at the JTDC.
133. As a proximate result of the Defendants’ misconduct described in this Count, the children housed at the JTDC suffered harm and the increased risk of physical injury, as described elsewhere in this complaint.
134. As a further proximate result of this misconduct, the Defendants profited and were unjustly enriched, as described in this complaint.
COUNT XI – State Law Claim (Respondeat Superior)
135. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 136. While committing the misconduct alleged in the preceding paragraphs, Defendants Dixon and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20 were employees and agents of Defendants Cook County and/or the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County and acting within the scope of their authority or employment. Defendants Cook County and/or the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County are liable as principal for all misconduct committed by these employees and agents. 137. While committing the misconduct alleged in the preceding paragraphs, one or more of the Fox Defendants and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20 were employees or agents of one or more of the Fox Defendants acting within the scope of their employment. One or more of the Fox Defendants are liable as principal for all torts committed by their employees or agents.
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COUNT XII – State Law Claim (Cook County – Indemnification) 138. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 139. Illinois law provides that public entities are directed to pay any tort judgments for compensatory damages for which employees are liable within the scope of their employment activities. 140. Defendants Dixon and one or more of Defendant Does 1-20 were employees and agents of Defendants Cook County and/or the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County and acting within the scope of their employment in committing the misconduct described herein. 141. Cook County is obligated by Illinois law to pay any judgment relating to the operation of the JTDC entered against Defendant Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Defendant Dixon, and/or one or more of Defendant Does 1-20.
COUNT XIII (Fox Defendants – Unjust Enrichment and/or Accounting) 142. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 143. The administrators of the JTDC placed the children housed at the facility on lockdown, and subjected them to conditions described elsewhere in this complaint, for the purpose of allowing the Fox Defendants to use the children’s educational and rehabilitative facilities to record television footage. 144. In so doing, the JTDC’s administrators violated the children’s rights, including by (a) breaching their fiduciary duties to the children, (b) subjecting them to punishment in violation of due process, and (c) subjecting them to emotional distress. 145. The Fox Defendants knew or should have known that the JTDC’s administrators were fiduciaries of the children housed at the JTDC.
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146. The Fox Defendants knew or should have known that the JTDC’s administrators were placing the children housed at the JTDC on lockdown and violating their rights, and that the JTDC’s administrators did so for the purpose of allowing the Fox Defendants to use the facility to record television footage.
147. Despite what the Fox Defendants knew or should have known, the Fox Defendants used the lockdowns to record television footage from for the purpose of realizing profits and benefits for themselves.
148. The Fox Defendants used the footage that they were able to record at the JTDC by virtue of the lockdowns to realize profits and benefits in an amount unknown to Plaintiffs, by broadcasting and otherwise monetizing the two Empire episodes filmed at the JTDC.
149. The Fox Defendants have retained these profits and benefits to the detriment of the children housed at the JTDC, who were placed on lockdown and had their rights violated so that the Fox Defendants could record the filming from which the Fox Defendants’ profits and benefits were realized.
150. The Fox Defendants’ retention of the profits and benefits, realized at the expense of the children who were placed on lockdown at the JTDC, violates fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.
151. Plaintiffs seek an accounting to recover and disgorge the profits and benefits realized by the Fox Defendants from the filming at the JTDC.
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WHEREFORE, Named Plaintiffs demand a jury trial for all issues so appropriate and requests that this Court issue the following relief in their favor against the Defendants:
a. A judgment ordering an accounting and disgorgement of all profits and benefits realized by the Fox Defendants resulting from the filming at the JTDC, with interest.
b. A judgment ordering an accounting and disgorgement of enrichment realized by the remaining Defendants resulting from the misconduct described in this complaint, with interest.
c. A judgment ordering the payment of nominal damages against all Defendants. d. A judgment ordering the payment of punitive damages against all Defendants except
the office of the Chief Judge and Cook County. e. A judgment ordering the payment of actual damages against all Defendants (in
alternative to nominal damages, accounting, and disgorgement). f. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable law. g. Any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
JURY DEMAND Named Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) on all issues so triable.
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Dated: May 19, 2017

By: /s/ Stephen H. Weil Stephen H. Weil steve@weilchardon.com Alexis G. Chardon ali@weilchardon.com
Weil & Chardon LLC 1713 W. School Street Chicago, IL 60657 Tel: (267) 240-5585
Attorneys for Named Plaintiffs T.S. and Q.B.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Stephen H. Weil, an attorney, hereby certify that on May 23, 2017, I caused the foregoing Second Amended Class Action Complaint to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system, which effects service on all counsel of record.
/s/ Stephen H. Weil . Stephen H. Weil

 
 Case: 1:16-cv-08303 Document #: 110 Filed: 10/16/17 Page 1 of 14 PageID #:824

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

T.S., et al., Plaintiffs,
v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX TELEVISION, et al.,
Defendants.

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)

)

)

Case No. 16 C 8303

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)

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AMY J. ST EVE, District Court Judge:
On April 20, 2017, the Court granted the Twentieth Century Fox Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss certain claims set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Class Action Complaint.1 Also, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their allegations in accordance with the April 20, 2017 ruling and consistent with counsel’s Rule 11 obligations. The Court presumes familiarity with its April 20, 2017 Memorandum Opinion and Order. On May 23, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Class Action Complaint re-alleging certain claims against the Fox Defendants in Counts IV, VI, VIII, and X. Moreover, Plaintiffs added an unjust enrichment claim in Count XIII. Before the Court is the Fox Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss that the Court grants in part with prejudice and denies in part.
LEGAL STANDARD “A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

1 The Fox Defendants include Twentieth Century Fox, a division of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Fox Broadcasting Company, and Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.

Case: 1:16-cv-08303 Document #: 110 Filed: 10/16/17 Page 2 of 14 PageID #:825
granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Hill v. Serv. Emp. Int’l Union, 850 F.3d 861, 863 (7th Cir. 2017). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pursuant to the federal pleading standards, a plaintiff’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Put differently, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). When determining the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, courts must “accept all wellpleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.” Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016).
BACKGROUND On May 23, 2017, minor Plaintiffs – through their legal guardians – filed the present Second Amended Class Action Complaint alleging the following claims against the Fox Defendants: (1) a joint action liability claim in conjunction with an underlying Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (Count IV); (2) a constitutional conspiracy claim based on the due process claim (Count VI); (3) a claim based on the inducement of the County Defendants’ breach of their fiduciary duties (Count VIII); (4) a state law tort conspiracy claim (Count X); and (5) an unjust enrichment and/or accounting claim (Count XIII).2 Turning to the general allegations, in the summer of 2015, officials placed the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (“JTDC”) on lockdown so that it could be used to 2 Plaintiffs voluntarily withdraw their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the Fox Defendants as alleged in Count IX, and thus the Court dismisses Count IX against the Fox Defendants with prejudice.
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film episodes for the Fox television show Empire. (R. 88, Second Am. Compl. Intro., ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs allege that prior to filming, the Fox Defendants scouted the JTCD and decided that they wanted to use the facilities of the JTDC’s second and third floors to stage and shoot scenes for Empire. (Id. ¶ 29.) Thereafter, the filming of Empire occurred over three separate time periods in the summer of 2015, namely, June 21 through 26, July 13 through 16, and August 23 through 26. (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiffs, who were juvenile detainees during that time, allege that JTDC officials “placed off limits” certain areas that are essential to the JTDC’s mission of educating and rehabilitating the juveniles housed there, including the JTDC’s school, its facilities for family visits, the outdoor recreation yard, the library, the infirmary, and the chapel. (Id. Intro., ¶¶ 14, 21, 22.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that JTDC officials placed these areas off limits so the Fox Defendants’ agents and employees could use the areas to stage and film the television show. (Id. Intro., ¶¶ 29-32.) To that end, JTDC officials ordered that the juvenile detainees either remain in their cells or be placed in jail-style “pod” areas, which significantly limited the juveniles’ movement. (Id. Intro., ¶ 38.) As a result, the juvenile detainees sat for days on end, their schooling existed in name only, visits from their families were effectively eliminated, and sick-call requests were ignored. (Id. Intro., ¶¶ 39, 41-44.) According to Plaintiffs, these lockdowns effectively cancelled or interrupted the JTDC programs intended to help them. (Id. Intro. ¶ 2, ¶ 40.)
ANALYSIS I. Joint Action Liability – Count IV
Plaintiffs seek to establish that the Fox Defendants – despite being private actors – acted under color of state law as required by § 1983, and thus are liable for the purported Fourteenth Amendment due process violations. “The Supreme Court has set forth various tests to use when
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deciding whether someone is a governmental actor, including the ‘symbiotic relationship test, the state command and encouragement test, the joint participation doctrine, and the public function test.’” Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs seek to establish that the Fox Defendants were liable for the alleged due process deprivations under the “joint action” or “joint participation” doctrine in relation to their due process claim. “To act ‘under color’ of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State,” it “is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (citation omitted). As the Seventh Circuit recently explained, a “private person acts under color of state law when she is a ‘willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents,’” which requires “‘evidence of a concerted effort between a state actor and that individual.’” L.P. v. Marian Catholic High Sch., 852 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). More specifically, for “a private actor to act under color of state law he must have ‘had a ‘meeting of the minds’ and thus reached an understanding’ with a state actor to deny plaintiffs a constitutional right.” Wilson v. Warren Cnty., Ill., 830 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Adickes, 398 U.S. at 158); see also Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Private action can become state action when private actors conspire or are jointly engaged with state actors to deprive a person of constitutional rights”); Steigmann v. Democratic Party of Ill., 406 F. Supp. 2d 975, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“a plaintiff must allege that a private party acted under color of state law by working in concert with the state officials to deprive them of their constitutional rights”). Under this standard, Plaintiffs must allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that there was “a meeting of the minds” between
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the private and public defendants to deny Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Wilson, 830 F.3d at 468.
Viewing the well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, in the April 2017 ruling, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged that the Fox Defendants and any state actor had reached an understanding to deny the juvenile detainees’ constitutional rights. Specifically, the Court noted that although Plaintiffs’ allegations suggested an agreement between the private and state actors that resulted in restricting the juvenile detainees’ movement and access to certain JTDC’s facilities, Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the state and private actors had an agreement in relation to a shared unconstitutional goal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”).
To remedy the deficiencies in their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have added allegations to support their argument that the Fox Defendants and the state actors had an agreement to “impinge on others.” In particular, Plaintiffs state that before filming, the Fox Defendants scouted the JTDC, after which a film crew of approximately 250 individuals took over the JTDC’s second and third floors. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-37.) Once the Fox Defendants became aware of the JTDC’s needs for its detainees, Plaintiffs allege that the “Fox Defendants were thus confronted with the problem that the facilities they desired were also required for the education and rehabilitation of hundreds of children (and indeed provided the space needed for the children to be able to leave their pods), yet would be worthless to the Fox Defendants for filming unless the JTDC’s administrators excluded those same children from the
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facilities, which would be accomplished by confining them to their pods.” (Id. ¶ 30.) In addition, Plaintiffs assert:
When confronted with this problem, the Fox Defendants could have found another facility or built a set for the incarceration scenes they wanted to shoot. They did neither. Instead, they sought to enter an agreement with the JTDC’s administrators that they knew or were substantially certain would induce the administrators to exclude the children from the JTDC’s second and third floors so that Empire’s film crew could use those areas for staging and filming. (Id. ¶ 31.) Further, Plaintiffs maintain that to “induce the JTDC’s administrators to let Empire’s crew use the education and rehabilitation facilities that were normally used by the children at the JTDC, the Fox Defendants offered to pay a rental fee for the use of the JTDC.” (Id. ¶ 32.) Also, Plaintiffs allege that the Fox Defendants offered to pay wages and overtime for JTDC staff to leave their duties of facilitating the normal operation of the JTDC to work on the production of the television show. (Id.) Plaintiffs further assert that the Fox Defendants’ offers were made on the condition that the JTDC’s administrators would change the facility’s normal operations to make the second and third floors available to television crew. (Id.) Based on these conditions, Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants knew or were substantially certain that these conditions “could only be accomplished by excluding from those areas the hundreds of children who normally used them, and which, in turn, the Defendants knew or were substantially certain could only be accomplished by confining the children to their pods.” (Id.) Plaintiffs further add that the JTDC administrators accepted the Fox Defendants’ inducements and by “reaching this agreement, the Defendants knew or were substantially certain that filming Empire at the JTDC would result in the lockdowns and attendant restrictions on the children housed there.” (Id. ¶ 33.)
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Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently alleged that the Fox Defendants and state actors had an “illicit” agreement. Assuming these allegations support the inference that an “illicit” agreement existed, to establish joint action liability under the law of the Circuit, the parties must have more than an “illicit” agreement, they must reach an understanding or agreement to deny a plaintiff’s constitutional rights – or at the very least – they must share a common, unconstitutional goal. See Wilson, 830 F.3d at 468; Hallinan, 570 F.3d at 815; Thurman v. Vill. of Homewood, 446 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2006); Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Starnes v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 39 F.3d 1394, 1397 (7th Cir. 1994) (“It is necessary to this charge that the “public and private actors share a common and unconstitutional goal.”); Cunningham v. Southlake Ctr. for Mental Health, Inc., 924 F.2d 106, 107 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A requirement of the joint action charge ... is that both public and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal.”).
Construing Plaintiffs’ allegations and all reasonable inferences in their favor, they have not plausibly alleged that the Fox Defendants and any state actor had an agreement to deny Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights or that the Fox Defendants and a state actor had a common, unconstitutional goal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”). Rather, Plaintiffs’ allegations suggest that the Fox Defendants were aware that their desire to film Empire at the JTDC conflicted with the juvenile detainees’ needs. At best, Plaintiffs have alleged that the Fox Defendants sought to enter into an agreement that would induce the administrators to exclude children from the JTDC’s second and third floors and that all of the Defendants knew that filming Empire would result in restrictions on the children. Although the result of this alleged agreement may have deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional
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rights, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support the inference that the state and private actors shared an unconstitutional goal in the first instance. See Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986, 1003 (7th Cir. 1999) (“We have held that to establish joint action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the public and private actors shared a common, unconstitutional goal.”). The Court therefore grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ joint action liability claim as alleged in Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint. Because the Court previously granted Plaintiffs leave to amend this claim, the Court dismisses Count IV with prejudice.3 II. Constitutional Conspiracy Claim – Count VI
Likewise, in Count VI, Plaintiffs seek to establish the Fox Defendants’ liability for the alleged due process deprivations through a § 1983 conspiracy claim. The elements of a § 1983 conspiracy claim include that (1) the individuals reached an agreement to deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional rights; and (2) overt acts in furtherance of the agreement actually deprived the plaintiff of those constitutional rights. See Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Cooney v. Casady, 735 F.3d 514, 518 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The participants in the conspiracy must share the general conspiratorial objective, but they need not know all the details of the plan designed to achieve the objective or possess the same motives for desiring the intended conspiratorial result.”) (citation omitted).
As with joint action liability, § 1983 conspiracy claims require that “the private individual and a state official reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights.” Hanania v. Loren-Maltese, 212 F.3d 353, 356 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Lewis v. Mills, 677 F.3d 324, 333 (7th Cir. 2012) (“a plaintiff must demonstrate that … a state official and a private individual(s) reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of his
3 The Court distinguished Plaintiffs’ reliance on the “media cases” in the April 2017 ruling, and thus will not repeat that discussion here. (R. 73, 4/20/17 Mem. Op. & Order, at 14.)
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constitutional rights”) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs rely on the same arguments and allegations that they made in support of their joint action liability claim. As with their joint action allegations, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that the public and private actors in this lawsuit reached an understanding or agreement to deny Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Again, invoking the word “illicit” does not necessarily describe a shared, unconstitutional goal, and it is well-established that vague allegations of a conspiracy between private and state actors do not bring private actors within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Tom Beu Xiong v. Fischer, 787 F.3d 389, 398 (7th Cir. 2015). The Court therefore grants the Fox Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VI with prejudice. III. Tortious Inducement of Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Count VIII
In Count VIII, Plaintiffs allege that the Fox Defendants tortiously induced Defendant Dixon and the Doe Defendants – the warden and guardians of the juvenile detainees – to breach their fiduciary duty. “Under Illinois law, a party is liable for tortious inducement if a plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant (1) colluded with a fiduciary in committing a breach; (2) knowingly participated in or induced the breach of duty; and (3) knowingly accepted the benefits resulting from that breach.” Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Regnery v. Meyers, 287 Ill. App. 3d 354, 364 (1st Dist. 1997)); see also Village of Wheeling v. Stavros, 89 Ill. App. 3d 450, 454-55, (1st Dist. 1980).
As discussed in the Court’s April 2017 ruling, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege the first element of their claim, namely, that the Fox Defendants “colluded” with the County Defendants by acting together and that the Fox Defendants obtained significant assistance from the Cook County Defendants in filming Empire. Further allegations supporting this element included that the Fox Defendants deliberately encouraged the JTDC’s administrators and officials to
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improperly place the JTDC on lockdown during the filming of Empire. Also, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the third element of their claim because the Fox Defendants received commercial and economic benefits from the alleged breach. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege the second element of their inducement claim requiring a “third party’s inducement of, or knowing participation in a breach of duty[.]” Wheeling, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 454.
In the present motion, the Fox Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have once again failed to adequately allege that they knowingly participated with Defendant Dixon and the Doe Defendants in breaching their fiduciary duties or that they induced the County Defendants to breach their fiduciary duties. Despite the Fox Defendants’ arguments to the contrary, in their new allegations, Plaintiffs add more factual details as to how the Fox Defendants induced the breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs, for example, allege that the Fox Defendants induced the breach by offering to pay rent for the JTDC and wages and overtime for JTDC staff. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiffs further allege that the Fox Defendants made their offers on the condition that the JTDC’s administrators would change the facility’s normal operations to make the second and third floors of the JTDC available for filming of the television show. (Id.) In addition, Plaintiffs state that the JTDC’s administrators accepted the Fox Defendants’ inducements, and the Fox Defendants reached an agreement with the County Defendants for Empire’s film crew to film at the JTDC. (Id. ¶ 33.) Viewing these allegations and all reasonable inferences as true, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Fox Defendants induced the County Defendants to breach their fiduciary duty. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). As such, the Court denies the Fox Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VIII of the Second Amended Complaint. IV. State Law Conspiracy Claim – Count X
In Count X, Plaintiffs bring a state law conspiracy claim, which the Fox Defendants move to dismiss. “Under Illinois tort law, a civil conspiracy requires ‘(1) an agreement between two or more persons for the purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means; and (2) at least one tortious act by one of the co-conspirators in furtherance of the agreement that caused an injury to the plaintiff.’” Turner v. Hirschbach Motor Lines, 854 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted); see also McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill.2d 102, 133 (Ill. 1999) (“to state a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege an agreement and a tortious act committed in furtherance of that agreement.”). Plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the Fox Defendants, therefore, their state law conspiracy claim against the Fox Defendants is based on their alleged inducement of the County Defendants’ breach of fiduciary duties.4
In the April 2017 ruling, the Court concluded Plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege that Defendants had an unlawful agreement and that one of the co-conspirators had committed a tortious act in furtherance of that agreement. See McClure, 188 Ill. 2d at 133 (“Civil conspiracy is an intentional tort and requires proof that a defendant ‘knowingly and voluntarily participates in a common scheme to commit an unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful manner.’”) (citation omitted). Under the facts as alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have
4 Although a breach of fiduciary duty claim does not sound in tort, see Kinzer on Behalf of City of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 128 Ill. 2d 437, 445 (Ill. 1989), tortious inducement of a breach of fiduciary duty necessarily does. See Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2007).
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sufficiently alleged the second element of their Illinois civil conspiracy claim, namely, that the Fox Defendants tortiously induced the County Defendants to breach their fiduciary duty. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs’ allegations lack sufficient detail raising their right to relief above the speculative level that the Fox Defendants and the County Defendants had an agreement “for the purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means.” Indeed, although Plaintiffs adequately allege that the Fox Defendants induced the County Defendants to breach their fiduciary duty, there are no allegations suggesting that the parties had an agreement to unlawfully restrict the juvenile detainees. See id. at 133-34 (“Accidental, inadvertent, or negligent participation in a common scheme does not amount to conspiracy.”). The Court therefore grants the Fox Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Illinois civil conspiracy claim with prejudice. V. Unjust Enrichment/Accounting Claim – Count XIII
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint also includes an unjust enrichment/accounting claim in Count XIII. In Illinois, “[t]o state a cause of action based on a theory of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has unjustly retained a benefit to the plaintiff’s detriment, and that defendant’s retention of the benefit violates the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.” Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 131 Ill.2d 145, 160 (1989)). As the Cleary decision observed, “it appears that the Illinois Supreme Court recognizes unjust enrichment as an independent cause of action.” Id. at 516. Nevertheless, the Cleary decision also noted that recent Illinois Appellate Court cases suggest the opposite. See id. at 516-17. In recognizing these differences, the Seventh Circuit suggested “one way to make sense of it” –
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Unjust enrichment is a common-law theory of recovery or restitution that arises when the defendant is retaining a benefit to the plaintiff’s detriment, and this retention is unjust. What makes the retention of the benefit unjust is often due to some improper conduct by the defendant. And usually this improper conduct will form the basis of another claim against the defendant in tort, contract, or statute. So, if an unjust enrichment claim rests on the same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then the unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related claim – and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall with the related claim. Id. at 517; see also Reid v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 893, 923 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Another panel of the Seventh Circuit concluded that “[u]nder Illinois law, unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action,” but “‘[r]ather, it is a condition that may be brought about by unlawful or improper conduct as defined by law, such as fraud, duress, or undue influence, and may be redressed by a cause of action based upon that improper conduct.’” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The Pirelli decision further explains, “[f]or example, a breach of a contract, or of a fiduciary duty, might create a situation in which someone has retained a benefit that ought to be disgorged based on principles of equity.” Id.; see also Devco v. T10 Meltel, LLC, 237 F. Supp. 3d 804, 812 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“a breach of a contract, or of a fiduciary duty, might create a situation in which someone has retained a benefit that ought to be disgorged based on principles of equity”). At this stage of the proceedings, whether a claim for unjust enrichment can stand alone as an independent claim or must have a predicate cause of action involving improper conduct does not make or break Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim. More specifically, as addressed above, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the Fox Defendants’ conduct was improper, namely, that they tortiously induced the County Defendants to breach their fiduciary duties. Moreover, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the Fox Defendants economically benefitted from their improper conduct in connection to the filming of Empire at the JTDC. Plaintiffs specifically allege that
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the “Fox Defendants profited from using the JTDC’s incarceration facilities as the primary set

for two highly profitable Empire episodes [because the] scenes shot at JTDC were featured

prominently in the first two episodes of Empire’s second season, in which advertisers paid

$750,000 per 30-second advertising spot in Episode 1, and $600,000 per 30-second spot in

Episode 2.” (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 57.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs assert that “the Fox Defendants

realized profits from Empire by broadcasting these episodes overseas, as well as licensing the

episodes, streaming them over the internet, and selling them for download.” (Id. ¶ 58.) Based on

these allegations and all reasonable inferences, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Fox

Defendants unjustly benefitted from their improper conduct to the detriment of Plaintiffs under

Iqbal and Twombly. As such, the Court denies the Fox Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count

XIII.

Dated: October 16, 2017

______________________________ AMY J. ST. EVE United States District Court Judge

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 Case: 1:16-cv-08303 Document #: 319 Filed: 01/16/20 Page 1 of 32 PageID #:5445

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

T.S. and Q.B., individually and on behalf of all )

others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX TELEVISION, FOX )

BROADCASTING COMPANY, TWENTY-FIRST )

CENTURY FOX, INC., FOX ENTERTAINMENT )

GROUP, LLC, FOX NETWORKS GROUP, INC., )

FOX TELEVISION GROUP, THE COUNTY OF )

COOK, ILLINOIS, LEONARD DIXON, JOHN

)

DOES 1 THROUGH 20, and THE CHIEF JUDGE )

OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, )

)

Defendants.

)

No. 16 cv 08303 Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION

During the summer of 2015, Plaintiffs T.S. and Q.B. were pretrial detainees at the Cook

County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (“JTDC”). On several days during that summer,

Defendant Twentieth Century Fox and other Fox entities (collectively, “Fox Defendants”) filmed

scenes for the television show Empire at the JTDC. Plaintiffs allege that Empire filming altered

the normal operations of the JTDC in ways that harmed them and other juvenile detainees. In

this proposed class action, they assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various supplemental

state law theories. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367(a). Plaintiffs bring constitutional claims against

Defendants Cook County, Illinois; Leonard Dixon, the Superintendent of the JTDC; the Chief

Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County in his official capacity; and Defendant Does

(collectively, “County Defendants”). Plaintiffs assert supplemental state law claims against the

County and Fox Defendants. The parties’ cross-motions on the issue of class certification1 are

1

The County Defendants and the Fox Defendants submitted a combined motion to

deny class certification. References to this brief [212] therefore reflect the arguments of all

Defendants. The County and Fox Defendants then submitted separate briefs in reply to Plaintiffs’

motion for class certification.

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now before the court. As explained here, while some of Plaintiffs’ claims may be amenable to class treatment, the class as currently defined—“all youths who were detained at the JTDC during the Empire filming”—is overbroad. Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification [235] and Defendants’ motion to strike class allegations [212] are both denied without prejudice.
BACKGROUND During three brief periods in the summer of 2015 (June 21–26, July 13–16, and August 23–26), the Fox Defendants filmed scenes for the television show Empire at the JTDC. (Mot. to Deny Class Cert. (“Mot. to Deny”) [212] at 7.) Between 250 and 400 detainees under the age of 18 are held at the JTDC at any given time while they await trial or other court proceedings, remaining there, on average, for less than a month.2 (Kraus Report ¶ 20, Ex. 2 to Mot. for Class Cert. [236]; Dunlap Dep. 93:8–11, Ex. D to Gov’t Reply Mem. [248]; Dunlap Report ¶ 27, Ex. 1 to Mot. for Class Cert.) The JTDC is a five-story building with residential areas on floors three through five, and other facilities for the detainees on the lower floors such as the Nancy B. Jefferson School’s classrooms, recreation areas, a visiting room, and a chapel. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 6.) Detainees at the JTDC are housed in residential “pods”—living units of generally fewer than 15 detainees, in which individual cells open onto a shared common area. (Id. at 6, 14.) The detainees’ activities at the JTDC occur with the other residents of their pods, and pods generally remain separate from each other. (Mot. to Deny at 8.) The JTDC is under the authority of the Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, and Defendant Leonard Dixon is the JTDC’s Superintendent. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 7.) In May 2015, JTDC officials, including Dixon, were contacted by a Fox location scout and ultimately agreed to allow the show Empire to film at the facility. (Id.) At times during filming, Plaintiffs allege, there were more than 200 of Empire’s cast and crew members at the JTDC. (Id.)

2

Dr. Kraus’s expert report said that detainees spend, on average, less than ten days

at the JTDC, whereas Mr. Dunlap, an expert for Plaintiffs and former Transitional Administrator of

the JTDC, said in his deposition that the average stay was under twenty-five days. (Kraus Report

¶ 20; Dunlap Dep. 93:8–11.)

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Superintendent Dixon permitted the Fox Defendants access to several areas of the JTDC, including the northern part of the outdoor recreation area, pods 3A and 3B (normally two of JTDC’s intake pods for male detainees), the chapel, the visitation room, several classrooms, and the hallways surrounding these areas. (Id. at 7–8.)
Plaintiffs allege that the decision to allow filming at the JTDC caused numerous disruptions to the facility’s normal operations. (See id. at 8–16.) According to Plaintiffs, these disruptions included additional confinement of detainees to their pods, the elimination of outdoor recreation, July classes being conducted on the pods rather than in the Nancy B. Jefferson School classrooms,3 reduced opportunities for off-pod recreation and programming, disruption to intake procedures, overpopulation of the pods, confinement of visitation to an unusually small space, and delayed response to requests for medical attention. (Id.) The Plaintiffs also allege that filming disrupted the JTDC behavior economy, which uses points to reward detainees for good behavior. (Id. at 16.) Specifically, as detainees earn points, they advance to higher “levels” (starting at level one and moving to level four) and enjoy greater privileges, such as increased access to the commissary, voluntary programs, and tournaments. (Id.; Steward Dep. at 163:8–10, Ex. 15 to Mot. for Class Cert.; Steward Decl. ¶¶ 8–11, Ex. D to Mot. to Deny.)
As noted, most JTDC residents stay, on average, for periods shorter than one month, but Plaintiff T.S. was a JTDC resident during all three of Empire’s filming periods. T.S. claims that he was required to spend more time on his pod during filming. In July, the residents of T.S.’s pod did not go to the classrooms for school, but instead received instruction from teachers who came to the pod. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 9, 18.) T.S. was assigned to level four at the time of filming and was eligible to participate in the JTDC’s voluntary programs. (T.S. Dep. 114:12–116:24, Ex. E to Mot. to Deny.) T.S. claims that he signed up for a writing program and a parenting class that

3

School was not in session during the June and August filming periods. (See Dixon

Dep. at 71:2–10, Ex. 6 to Mot. for Class Cert.; Steward Decl. ¶¶ 3–5.)

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were canceled during Empire filming.4 (Id.; Exs. 12, 33–36 to Mot. for Class Cert.) T.S. asserts, further, that he was denied access to the outdoor recreation yard during Empire filming and that his pod had no off-pod recreation on at least June 24, 2015. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 19.) During Empire filming, T.S. submitted requests for medical attention for a toothache, headaches, and psychological distress, and he believes that the response time was greater than usual. (Id. at 22.) T.S. claims, in addition, that he had less privacy during family visits in the alternative visitation room during filming. (Id.)
Plaintiff Q.B. was detained at the JTDC during parts of the summer of 2015, but was not detained at the JTDC on any day when school was in session in July. (Mot. to Deny at 24.) Q.B. was assigned to level one and was not eligible to participate in the JTDC’s voluntary programs. (Q.B. Dep. 53:9–54:2, 56:9–57:10, Ex. C to Mot. to Deny.) Q.B. does not recall submitting a request for medical attention while Empire was filming at the JTDC. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 22.) Q.B. states that on June 23, 2015, recreation time scheduled for his pod occurred in the pod’s common area rather than outdoors or in one of the designated areas on the lower floors of the facility. (Id. at 19.) Q.B. also claims that a visit with his grandmother was canceled on June 23, 2015 when Empire was filming at the JTDC, and that he had less privacy during his visits in the alternative visitation room with his court-appointed mentor. (Id. at 22.)
Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of all youth detained at the JTDC during Empire filming. They seek money damages from the County Defendants for the alleged violation of their due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I, II, and VI). They also seek damages under state law theories: intentional infliction of emotional distress against the County Defendants (Count IX) and breach of fiduciary duty against Defendant Dixon and Defendant Does (Count VII).

4

Anna Buckingham, the JTDC Director of Gender Services who coordinated these

programs, did not recall offering a parenting class in 2015, but did not dispute that some programs

were rescheduled or canceled during Empire filming. (Buckingham Dep. 14:23–15:5, 50:15–56:4,

65:16–22, 83:4–84:13, Ex. E to Gov’t Reply Mem.)

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Against the Fox Defendants, Plaintiffs assert state law claims of inducement of a breach of fiduciary duty (Count VII), civil conspiracy (Count X) and unjust enrichment (Count XII).5
DISCUSSION Any proposed class must meet four requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). The class then must satisfy the requirements of one of the three types of classes listed in Rule 23(b). See Messner v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012). For all of their claims, Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a showing that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). In the alternative, Plaintiffs ask the court to certify a class for their claims against the Fox Defendants under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), appropriate if “adjudications with respect to individual class members . . . would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). A “party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that Rule 23’s requirements are met by a preponderance of the evidence. Messner, 669 F.3d at 811. A court may look beyond the pleadings to determine whether class certification is appropriate, because “[o]n issues affecting class certification, [ ] a

5

Although labelled as Counts in the Complaint, Counts III, XI, and XII are not

mentioned in the certification motion and do not set forth independent claims. They instead allege

theories on which the government-entity Defendants may be held liable for the acts of various

agents. See Count III (seeking to impose municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social

Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against the County Defendants); Count XI

(alleging that Cook County and the Chief Judge’s Office have respondeat superior liability for

state law claims); and Count XII (asserting that Cook County must indemnify its agents under

state law).

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court may not simply assume the truth of the matters as asserted by the plaintiff.” Id. If there are

factual disputes, “the court must receive evidence and resolve the disputes before deciding

whether to certify the class.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). This inquiry may involve “some

overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim,” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 351, but class

certification is not a “dress rehearsal for a trial on the merits,” Messner, 669 F.3d at 811.

I.

Rule 23(a) Requirements

A. Class Overbreadth

Although Rule 23 does not explicitly address the issue, courts have recognized that a

proposed class must be ascertainable, meaning that it is “defined clearly and based on objective

criteria.” Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2015). If “a class is defined so

broadly as to include a great number of members who for some reason could not have been

harmed by a defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, the class is defined too broadly to permit

certification.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 824. Class overbreadth is not a merits question. That is, if

“a proposed class consists largely . . . of members who are ultimately shown to have suffered no

harm, that may not mean that the class was improperly certified but only that the class failed to

meet its burden of proof on the merits.” Id.

A class definition is not infirm merely because it may include a small percentage of persons

who were not harmed. Messner, 669 F.3d at 825–26 (reversing denial of class certification where

defendant admitted that only about 2.4 percent of the putative class members could not have

been harmed by alleged anticompetitive practices). Still, a class definition that sweeps in a large

proportion of persons who could not have been injured is overbroad. See Oshana v. Coca-Cola

Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming district court’s refusal to certify a proposed class

that included millions of people who could not have been injured by defendant’s failure to disclose

ingredients in diet fountain drinks).

In the case before this court, Plaintiffs’ proposed class, defined as all youth detained at

the JTDC during Empire filming, may indeed include some individuals who could not have been

6

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harmed. William Steward, a Deputy Executive Director of the JTDC, testified in his deposition that many detainees arrive at the JTDC and are released shortly thereafter, without ever having left the intake unit. (Steward Dep. 266:3–21.) This could happen, for example, if a detainee is not ultimately charged, or the court does not order the individual to be confined at the JTDC. (Id.) As Plaintiffs have not specifically stated what it means to be “detained” for purposed of the class definition, some detainees who never leave the intake unit are currently included in the class definition. (See Gov’t Sur-Reply [278] at 1.) Plaintiffs defend this, noting that these individuals were nevertheless affected by Empire filming because when scenes were filmed at the entrance of the JTDC, new detainees were required to be shackled as they entered the facility.6 (Pls.’ SurReply [279] at 7.) As Defendants observe, however, individuals who were never assigned to a pod could not have experienced the alleged alterations to the normal operations of the pods. Moreover, the injury that this group is alleged to have experienced—shackling—has not been raised as a class claim. That said, the court is uncertain how many putative class members fall within the group of individuals who were never transferred from the intake area to a residential pod, and believes that the inclusion of some number of individuals who were not ultimately confined at the JTDC is not, by itself, a basis to deny class certification in this case. Instead, this concern must be addressed by means of a narrower class definition.
B. Numerosity To be certified, the proposed class must be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). In the Seventh Circuit, a class as small as forty members may suffice. See Neil v. Zell, 275 F.R.D. 256, 260 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Based upon the report of their expert that the JTDC was operating near its Functional Operating Capacity of 382 detainees

6

The parties do not explain whether new arrivals were shackled when they entered

the JTDC at other times when Empire was not filming. Plaintiffs cite “OAG 5300” to support their

statement that “guards were instructed to make sure that detainees entering the facility were

‘handcuffed and shackled.’” (Pls.’ Sur-Reply at 7.) OAG 5300 likely refers to the page number of

an exhibit, but Plaintiffs did not attach this exhibit to their response to Defendants’ Sur-Reply

[279], nor was the court able to find it elsewhere in the record.

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during the period of Empire filming (Dunlap Report ¶ 60), Plaintiffs estimate that there are at least 300 potential class members. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 17.) Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ ability to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a)(1).
C. Commonality To satisfy the commonality requirement, Plaintiffs must show that there are “questions of law or fact common to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). Even one common question may suffice. See Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 828 F.3d 542, 550 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359). A superficial common question, such as whether class members “have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law,” McCaster v. Darden Rests., 845 F.3d 794, 800 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350), is not sufficient for class treatment, however. See Van v. Ford Motor Co., 332 F.R.D. 249, 273 (N.D. Ill. 2019). Rather, a prospective class must show that “determination of [the] truth or falsity [of a common contention] will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Phillips, 828 F.3d at 550 (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 340). “The critical point is ‘the need for conduct common to members of the class.’” Phillips, 828 F.3d at 553 (quoting Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2014)). “[S]upplemental proceedings can [ ] take place if, for example, the common question relates to liability of the defendant to a class and separate hearings are needed to resolve the payments due to each member.” Spano v. The Boeing Co., 633 F.3d 574, 585 (7th Cir. 2011). Defendants’ motion to deny class certification does not challenge Plaintiffs’ ability to meet the commonality requirement, conceding that “the presence of Empire’s cast and crew on those few days in June, July, and August 2015 had some impact on the JTDC’s normal operations.” (Mot. to Deny at 17.) The court finds that Plaintiffs have identified at least one question that is common to the class—whether Empire filming disturbed operations at the JTDC in ways that violated class members’ constitutional rights. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement.
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Plaintiffs assert that the County Defendants violated their due process rights by altering the JTDC’s normal operations to facilitate Empire filming. To pursue such a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs must allege “(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law and (2) that defendants were acting under color of state law.” Wilson v. Warren Cty., Ill., 830 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2016). After the close of briefing, the Seventh Circuit clarified the correct standard to apply to unlawful conditions of confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees. See Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2019). It is the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, that governs challenges to a pretrial detainee’s conditions of confinement. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). This is because pretrial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, may not be punished. Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 821; see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984). For some time, courts in this Circuit have recognized “little practical difference, if any, between the standards applicable to pretrial detainees and convicted inmates when it comes to conditions of confinement claims,” and have therefore analyzed such claims under the Eighth Amendment test. Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 310 (7th Cir. 2015). More recently, the Supreme Court has clarified that “the interests of pretrial detainees and prisoners derive from separate sources and must be assessed differently.” Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 822 (citing Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473). Accordingly, in Hardeman, the Seventh Circuit held that “Kingsley’s objective inquiry applies to all Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees.”7 933 F.3d at 823.
As explained in Judge Sykes’s concurring opinion, to succeed on a conditions-ofconfinement claim, a pretrial detainee must prove that

7

As explained in Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 824, the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate

indifference standard that governs conditions claims brought by convicted prisoners is “more

demanding” than “the objective inquiry” that governs this one. Accordingly, the deliberate-

indifference standard described in Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County does not control the outcome

of Plaintiffs’ claims.

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(1) the conditions in question are or were objectively serious (or if the claim is for inadequate medical care, his medical condition is or was objectively serious); (2) the defendant acted purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly with respect to the consequences of his actions; and (3) the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable—that is, ‘not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or . . . excessive in relation to that purpose.’ Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 827 (Sykes, J., concurring) (quoting Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473–74). A court should consider the severity and duration of the conditions experienced by pretrial detainees because there is “a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.21 (1979) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977)); see also Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 824 (majority). A combination of conditions of confinement that are “not individually serious enough to work constitutional violations, may violate the Constitution . . . when they have ‘a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need’” such as food or exercise. Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842– 43 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)). The second element, requiring purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, reflects that “liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2472; see also Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[N]egligent conduct does not offend the Due Process Clause.”). The third element of a conditions-of-confinement claim incorporates the reasoning of Bell v. Wolfish. In Bell, the Supreme Court explained that, when assessing whether “particular restrictions and conditions accompanying pretrial detention amount to punishment,” the court “must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” 441 U.S. at 538. “In the absence of an expressed intent to punish, a pretrial detainee can nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are not ‘rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose’ or that the actions ‘appear excessive in relation to that purpose.’” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 561).
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The primary common question that Plaintiffs have identified is whether “the deprivations imposed on the hundreds of detainees at the JTDC were done for a legitimate governmental purpose.”8 (Mot. for Class Cert. at 31.) As so stated, that question appears to assume one element that Plaintiffs need to prove—that the alterations to the normal operations of the JTDC experienced by each detainee were serious enough to be considered “a problem of constitutional magnitude.” Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 824. The core issue that Plaintiffs raise, however, is whether allowing Empire to film at the JTDC is a legitimate justification for altering the normal operations of the facility.9 This is an issue that is common to all proposed class members. As Plaintiffs have not alleged that the County Defendants intended to punish them, their due process claim requires a showing either that the County Defendants’ actions were “not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective,” or that their actions were “excessive” in relation to a legitimate governmental objective. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473. Whether filming serves a legitimate government purpose may not be dispositive of the County Defendants’ liability (cf. Mot. for Class Cert. at 31), but that question is one that is common to every member of the putative class. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement.

8

Plaintiffs identify several other questions that they claim are common to the class,

but because Plaintiffs need only identify one common question, the court will not individually

address the additional proposed questions:

(1) Whether the outdoor recreation yard was closed due to filming, maintenance, or some

other reason. (Pls.’ Reply Mem. [270] at 7.)

(2) Whether Empire filming, or instead a delinquent employee or technical difficulties,

disrupted psychological intake screenings during filming. (Id. at 10.)

(3) Whether additional pod confinement is harmful to detainees. (Id. at 5, 28.)

(4) Whether fewer tables in the visiting room ever led to canceled visits. (Id. at 11.)

(5) Whether holding visits in a smaller room reduced the distance between tables and led

to decreased privacy for detainees during visits. (Id.)

(6) Whether the response to requests for medical care was delayed during filming. (Id.)

9

Plaintiffs suggest that the court has already concluded that altering the JTDC’s

operations to facilitate filming is “not a legitimate governmental purpose.” (Mot. for Class Cert. at

31.) The court has not made such a finding; when denying the Defendants’ motion to dismiss,

the court observed that Plaintiffs had “adequately alleged that there was no legitimate

governmental purpose for the lockdowns.” (Order on Mot. to Dismiss [73] at 10, emphasis added.)

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D. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the “claims or defenses of the representative parties [must be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). The typicality requirement is “liberally construed.” Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp., 167 F.R.D. 51, 57 (N.D. Ill. 1996). The claims of the representatives need not be identical to those of the class members, but they should have the “same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514; Van, 332 F.R.D. at 280. The representatives’ injuries must “arise[ ] from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members” and must be “based on the same legal theory.” Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514 (quoting Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992)). Overall, “there must be enough congruence between the named representative’s claim and that of the unnamed members of the class to justify allowing the named party to litigate on behalf of the group.” Spano, 633 F.3d at 586. As an initial point, because the parties only briefed the due process standard applicable to conditions-of-confinement claims by pre-trial detainees (rather than the Eighth Amendment standard that applies to convicted persons), the class definition should be limited to individuals who have not been convicted of a crime. Some of the conduct giving rise to Q.B. and T.S.’s claims appear to be typical of the class, but other alleged deprivations that they experienced appear to be unique. The primary issues of typicality relate to Plaintiffs’ claims arising out of the altered school schedule, voluntary programming, and medical care. The current class definition includes detainees who were not at the JTDC while school was in session, detainees who were not eligible to participate in voluntary programming, and detainees with varying medical needs. The class could be redefined to include only the alleged deprivations that are common to every class member; to the extent this would risk prejudicing class members with stronger claims by grouping them with weaker claims, see Van, 332 F.R.D. at 282, the court would entertain proposed subclasses.
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Schooling. The Nancy B. Jefferson School at the JTDC was on break in late June and August; thus, the only sessions interrupted by Empire filming days were in July. (See Dixon Dep. at 71:2–10, Ex. 6 to Mot. for Class Cert.; Steward Decl. ¶¶ 3–5.) T.S., but not Q.B., was detained at the JTDC in July when classes were conducted in the pods rather than in the classrooms. As currently defined, the class is overbroad with respect to this claim. The court recognizes, further, that because the average stay at the JTDC may be as short as ten days, many of the proposed class members likely never experienced schooling on the pods.
Voluntary Programming. Similarly, T.S.’s claim arising out of canceled voluntary programming is not typical of all members of the proposed class. The JTDC offered structured programming in addition to recreation and schooling that some detainees could participate in. Many of these programs were canceled on the days that Empire filmed at the JTDC. (See Exs. 12, 33–36 to Mot. for Class Cert.; Keesling Dep. 52:3–6, Ex. 37 to Mot. for Class Cert.) Not all detainees were eligible for these programs, however: each detainee was assigned a level from one to four based on his “individual needs and disciplinary record,” with level one detainees having the fewest privileges, and level four having the most. (Steward Decl. ¶ 7.) Only level four and level three detainees were eligible to participate in voluntary programming, and level three detainees could enroll only after all interested level four detainees had signed up. (Id. at ¶¶ 3–4.) Q.B., a level one detainee, was not eligible. (Q.B. Dep. 53:9–54:2, 56:9–57:10.) T.S., who was at level four, was enrolled in a program called Free Write for detainees interested in music or poetry and a fatherhood class. (T.S. Dep. 114:12–116:24; Mot. for Class Cert. at 21.) Free Write was canceled on days Empire was filmed. Additionally, during the school’s summer break in June and August, the JTDC arranged for residents to have additional off-pod recreation such as tournaments among pods. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 11, 20.) Participation in these activities, as well, was based on the detainee’s level; it appears that level one and two detainees were not eligible to participate in sports tournaments during summer break from school. (Steward Decl.
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¶ 8.) A class challenging the denial of non-school programming must be narrowed to those detainees who were in fact eligible for such programming during the relevant time period.
Female Detainees. The proposed class representatives, Q.B. and T.S., are both male, but the proposed class includes female detainees as well. Without more information about which claims, if any, female detainees assert, the court is unable to determine whether Q.B. and T.S. have claims that are typical of those detainees. The record at least suggests that female and male detainees were not equally affected by the decision to allow Empire filming at the JTDC. Boys and girls are housed separately at the JTDC. (Dunlap Dep. 80:12–21.) Intake procedures for female detainees take place in a separate unit called WINGS, while intake for male detainees occurs in a unit known as Alpha which consists of several pods. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 13.) When detainees enter the JTDC, they ordinarily undergo a psychological health screening called the Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument (“MAYSI”). (Id.) Boys took the MAYSI test in pod 3A or pod 3B within the Alpha unit. Fox used these pods for filming, which Plaintiffs claim disrupted MAYSI screening.10 (Id.) Fox did not film in the WINGS unit, and it appears that MAYSI screening for girls was not disrupted to the same extent as MAYSI screening for boys during filming. (Id.; Steward Dep. 103:20–24.) Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that the closure of pods 3A and 3B during filming led to overpopulation in the other male pods. Because boys and girls were housed separately, any alleged overpopulation stemming from a disruption to Alpha’s intake procedures would not affect female detainees. It appears that male and female detainees used the same school and recreation facilities, but none of Plaintiffs’ claims with regard to schooling or recreation mentions female detainees. The deposition testimony of Anna Buckingham, the JTDC employee who coordinated the programming aside from school and recreation, suggests that the

10

Defendants propose an alternative explanation. Zenaida Alonzo, General Counsel

at the JTDC, stated in a declaration that one of the machines used to administer the MAYSI test

was moved, causing technical difficulties, and that a caseworker responsible for administering the

screenings was derelict in their duties and did not do so. (Alonzo Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. S to Gov’t Reply

Mem. [248].)

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girls’ voluntary programs were not canceled or postponed, unlike the voluntary programming for boys. (See Buckingham Dep. 65:18–24.)
While female detainees may have been affected by Empire filming, Plaintiffs have not described the conditions experienced by female detainees or whether those conditions give rise to similar legal claims. Plaintiffs’ claims may be typical of those of female class members, but the court does not yet have adequate information to so conclude. Cf. Van, 332 F.R.D. at 281 (“[W]ith no named Plaintiffs from the MP & L department at the Assembly Plant, it is not clear to the Court why any named Plaintiff would have the incentive to establish the extent to which improper conduct was occurring in that department.”); see also Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.
Off-Pod Recreation. Defendants contest whether named Plaintiffs were denied off-pod recreation while Empire filmed at the JTDC, but they do not deny that JTDC officials closed the outdoor recreation yard during filming. (Mot. to Deny at 17.) Superintendent Dixon testified in his deposition that detainees are supposed to have one hour of “large muscle exercise,” that is recreation, per day. (Dixon Dep. 36:10–14.) Q.B. claims that he had no off-pod recreation on June 23, 2015,11 and T.S. states that he had no off-pod recreation on at least June 24, 2015. The parties have submitted conflicting records relating to Q.B. and T.S.’s access to recreation on those days (compare Ex. T to Mot. to Deny with Ex. 49 to Mot. for Class Cert.; see also Exs. 50–51 to Mot. for Class Cert.), but there appears to be sufficient evidence that Q.B. and T.S.’s claimed losses of off-pod recreation on June 23 and June 24, respectively, are typical of the proposed class because the other residents on their pods were affected in the same way on those days.
Medical Treatment. Plaintiffs’ initial claim based on medical treatment was that JTDC detainees were denied access to the facility’s infirmary and that certain sick call requests were denied during Empire filming. (See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 43.) Discovery has revealed, however,

11

Q.B. also claims that he was denied recreation on June 24 and 25, but Defendants

contend that Q.B.’s June 24 and 25 recreation claims are not typical of the class because he was

in court on June 24, 2015 and confined to his cell for fighting on June 25, 2015. That assertion is

supported by the record and uncontested by Plaintiffs. (See Mot. to Deny at 22–23.)

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that the infirmary was in fact open during filming. (Mot. to Deny at 13; Pls.’ Reply Mem. [270] at 20). As they now present this claim, Plaintiffs allege that they suffered delays in response to requests for medical care. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 22.) Q.B. does not recall submitting any request for medical attention while Empire was filming at the JTDC, but T.S. submitted requests for medical attention for a toothache, headaches, and mental health treatment. (Id.) During discovery, T.S. recalled that during Empire filming, his sick call requests were not responded to for several days, rather than in one day as during normal operations at the JTDC. (Id.) The only evidence of a request by T.S. for medical treatment that was denied was apparently submitted as an off-color joke. (See Mot. for Class Cert. at 22; T.S. Dep. 104:1–107:21.) Q.B. recalled that a resident of his pod with an eye injury requested medical care during filming and allegedly was not treated for one week.12 (See Q.B. Dep. 106:8–107:10.) T.S. recalled four other detainees who submitted sick call requests but could not recall their ailments or how long they waited for treatment. (T.S. Dep. 147:3–149:10.)
Plaintiffs claim that the delay in treatment presents a common claim that satisfies the typicality requirement. In opposition, Defendants argue that detainees had a wide range of medical complaints during Empire filming that each required a different urgency of response. (Mot. to Deny at 18–19.) Absent evidence that detainees were denied medical treatment altogether during filming, the court agrees. As in McFields v. Sheriff of Cook County, each request for medical attention described by Plaintiffs involves “a different situation,” different medical issues, “different delays,” and “different treatments.” No. 17 C 7424, 2019 WL 4645443, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2019). In McFields, the named plaintiffs complained that they did not receive face-to-face assessments by a registered nurse or other practitioner after submitting requests for

12

Defendants dispute that this request for medical treatment was made. (See

Kampe Decl. ¶¶ 6–9, Ex. J to Gov’t Reply Mem. [248].) Specifically, Linda Kampe, the Director

of Health Information Management for Cermak Health Services of Cook County, found no record

of a request for eye care by the individual identified by Q.B., although that individual was seen by

Cermak medical staff on several days when Empire filmed at the JTDC. (Id.)

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dental treatment. Id. at *2. The named plaintiffs experienced different dental issues, different wait times, and different courses of treatment. In this case, consideration of whether medical treatment was delayed in violation of detainees’ constitutional rights similarly involves individualized inquiries such that “no case is typical.” Id.; see also Phillips, 828 F.3d at 555 (“[T]he length of the delay that is tolerable depends on the seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing treatment.”). With respect to delays in medical treatment, Plaintiffs here have not shown they have claims that are typical of those of a class.
Visitation. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims of disruption to visitation are also not typical of the proposed class. Q.B. claims that a visit with his grandmother was canceled on June 23, 2015 while Empire was filming at the JTDC. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 22.) The visitation records for that day show, however, that Q.B.’s canceled visit is not typical of the proposed class because many other detainees had visits that day, including residents of Q.B.’s pod. (See Ex. U to Mot. to Deny.) T.S. initially claimed that a visit with his mother on June 25, 2015 was delayed and shortened after she was made to wait for two hours in the waiting room prior to the visit. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 47(e).) Plaintiffs do not reassert this claim in their motion for class certification, and T.S.’s mother’s deposition testimony shows that she actually waited about 45 minutes on that day. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 21–22; Ex. L to Mot. to Deny.) Defendants do, however, concede that visitation occurred in a different room while Empire filmed in the normal visitation room. (Mot. to Deny at 17.) Plaintiffs’ claim of loss of privacy due to the smaller visiting room is the only visitrelated claim that may be typical of the class.
Disruption of Alpha. Named Plaintiffs T.S. and Q.B. do not have standing to the extent that they seek to challenge the alleged suspension of MAYSI screening for newly admitted residents during Empire filming. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 21.) Mr. Dunlap’s expert report reflects that 168 of 182 admitted male residents did not receive MAYSI screening (as noted, for reasons disputed by the parties), but T.S. and Q.B. were not scheduled to receive MAYSI screening during the relevant time period because they had already gone through the intake process. “[E]ven
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named plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 n.6 (2016) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)).
T.S. and Q.B. also, however, allege that the pods became overpopulated because pods 3A and 3B in the Alpha unit were closed during filming, and the residents of those pods were assigned to other locations.13 The court is not aware of any residents moved from 3A or 3B to T.S.’s pod during filming; but one new resident did move to Q.B.’s pod, and Q.B. became involved in a physical fight with this new resident on June 24, 2015, a day when the population of his pod exceeded its functional capacity by one resident. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 21; Pod Capacity Log at PageID #: 5032, Ex. U to Gov’t Sur-Reply.) Plaintiffs allege that overcrowding creates safety risks and can be psychologically harmful to detainees. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 21.) Plaintiffs make no mention of other altercations involving residents transferred from pods 3A or 3B during filming, so the fight Q.B. describes may not have been a typical event, but pod capacity records reflect that several pods had populations that exceeded their functional capacity on the same day. (See Pod Capacity Log at PageID #: 5032.)
Behavior Economy. Plaintiffs last argue that Empire filming disrupted the behavior economy at the JTDC by diminishing the incentives for good behavior. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 23–24.) Plaintiffs’ experts contend that an elimination of incentives for good behavior creates a sense of unfairness that increases “the risk for violence and worsen[s] the psychological impact of incarceration at the facility.” (Id. at 24; see also Pls.’ Reply Mem. at 17.) This alleged disruption presents a problem of standing rather than typicality; neither T.S. nor Q.B. has identified any concrete injury he suffered as a result of the alleged alteration of the behavior economy. Standing

13

The Defendants dispute that Alpha was closed during filming, contending instead

that Alpha intake activities were moved to other pods. (See Gov’t Reply Mem. at 14.)

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cannot be conferred by potential injuries, nor by injuries suffered by other members of the proposed class. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 n.6.
In sum, some, but not all, of T.S. and Q.B.’s claims are typical of a class of detainees at the JTDC. The proposed class definition is, however overbroad: it includes both male and female detainees, detainees from all behavioral levels, detainees with varying medical needs, and detainees who were not at the JTDC while school sessions were allegedly disrupted. Though it appears class treatment may be appropriate for some claims, Plaintiffs must redefine the class or propose appropriate subclasses in a renewed motion for class certification.
E. Adequacy of Representation Rule 23(a)’s requirement that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” implicates both the named representatives and the proposed class counsel. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). Specifically, the “claims and interests of the named Plaintiffs must not conflict with those of the class, the class representatives must have sufficient interest in the outcome of the case, and class counsel must be experienced and competent.” Van, 332 F.R.D. at 282 (citing Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993)). The experience and competence of class counsel includes “counsel’s work on the case to date, counsel’s class action experience, counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law, and the resources counsel will commit to the case.” Reliable Money Order, Inc. v. McKnight Sales Co., 704 F.3d 489, 498 n.7 (7th Cir. 2013). A court may consider whether class counsel has “demonstrated a lack of integrity,” including through misconduct or an ethical breach, if the lack of integrity “jeopardizes the court’s ability to reach a just and proper outcome in the case.” Id. at 498–99. The credibility of the class representatives is also relevant as “[o]ne who intentionally does not tell the truth about the case cannot be an effective class representative.” Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. Allscripts Health Sols., Inc. 254 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1024 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (citing Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 724 (7th Cir. 2014)).
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Defendants’ challenge to the adequacy of Plaintiffs as class representatives and of class counsel appears only in a footnote in which Defendants mention “contradictions in their testimony, and [ ] refusals to withdraw false allegations.” (Mot. to Deny at 25 n.7; see also Gov’t Reply Mem. at 32 n.7.) “For an assault on the class representative’s credibility to succeed, the party mounting the assault must demonstrate that there exists admissible evidence so severely undermining plaintiff’s credibility that a fact finder might reasonably focus on plaintiff’s credibility, to the detriment of the absent class members’ claims.” CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 728 (7th Cir. 2011). Defendants have not met this burden. Their footnote does not identify the specific testimony or allegations they consider to be false nor which evidence would severely undermine Plaintiffs’ credibility, instead stating merely that they have established this elsewhere in the briefs. See Evergreen Square of Cudahy v. Wis. Hous. & Econ. Dev. Auth., 848 F.3d 822, 829 (7th Cir. 2017) (“A party may waive an argument by presenting it only in an undeveloped footnote.”).
Defendants further question Plaintiffs’ counsel’s integrity, arguing that counsel “filed multiple complaints in this matter with false claims that an adequate investigation would have disproved.” (Mot. to Deny at 25 n.7.) Plaintiffs’ counsel do have an obligation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to ensure, to the best of their knowledge and after a reasonable inquiry, that the factual contentions in the complaint had evidentiary support or likely would have evidentiary support. But Defendants do not specify which claims were false, so the court does not have sufficient information to find that a serious ethical violation warranting denial of class certification. Compare Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2011) (reversing certification where proposed class counsel obtained evidence using false promises and made misleading representations to named plaintiffs); see also, e.g., Van, 332 F.R.D. at 287 (finding to be inadequate proposed class counsel who altered a document potentially demonstrating an intra-class conflict and who, in prior class action litigation, had been sanctioned).
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The County Defendants also briefly challenge the adequacy of the proposed class counsel’s prior experience litigating class actions. (Gov’t Reply Mem. at 32 n.7.) Mr. Stephen Weil and Ms. Alexis Chardon claim to have more than a decade of experience litigating class actions. (Pls.’ Reply Mem. at 19.) Brief review of this court’s docket records does not confirm this; those records show that Mr. Weil and Ms. Chardon have filed appearances in several cases in this court, including a number of prison conditions cases, but none appears to be a class action. Those records do not account for counsel’s activities in other jurisdictions. In any event, the court is not troubled by the purported absence of prior class action experience; any experienced class action litigator got his or her start somewhere, and Mr. Weil and Mrs. Chardon have been effective and well-prepared in their appearances in this case. The court notes, further, that since the close of briefing, Mr. Weil has joined the firm Loevy & Loevy, a firm whose class-action litigation experience is well-recognized. In a renewed or refined motion for class certification, Plaintiffs are invited to provide updated biographies for Mr. Weil and Ms. Chardon and address how, if at all, the addition of counsel from Loevy & Loevy will affect class representation in this case. II. Rule 23(b) Requirements
Plaintiffs seek certification as a Rule 23(b)(3) class, and in the alternative on the counts alleged against the Fox Defendants, as a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class. Although the Plaintiffs have not yet met the elements of Rule 23(a), the court believes they may be able to do so and will therefore address the Rule 23(b) requirements.
A. Rule 23(b)(3) To certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must find that common questions predominate over individual ones and that a class action is “superior to other available methods of adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). “The decision whether to certify a class is one that depends on a careful assessment of the facts, of potential differences among class members, of management challenges, and of the overall importance of the common issues of law or fact to the ultimate outcome.” Riffey v. Rauner, 910 F.3d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 2018). The
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predominance requirement is “far more demanding” than the commonality requirement, and tests whether the proposed class is “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997).
The Rule 23(b)(3) analysis begins with the “elements of the underlying cause of action.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 815. “If, to make a prima facie showing on a given question, the members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from member to member, then it is an individual question.” Id. (quoting Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 2005)). “If the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing, then it becomes a common question.” Id. Rule 23(b)(3) does not require “that each element of [a] claim is susceptible to classwide proof.” Alicea v. Cty. of Cook, No. 18 C 5381, 2019 WL 3318140, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2019) (quoting Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 800 F.3d 360, 381 (7th Cir. 2015)). But the “common questions must be a significant aspect of a case.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 815 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (“When one or more of the central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages or some affirmative defenses.”) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs recognized that Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance inquiry focuses on the elements of each cause of action, but only discussed the elements of their Section 1983 conditions-ofconfinement claim. Since the close of briefing, the Seventh Circuit clarified the standard for a due process conditions-of-confinement cause of action, so the predominance briefing on that claim is incomplete. Application of Kingsley’s objective due process standard, rather than the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard, may ultimately make it easier for Plaintiffs to show that class treatment is appropriate. In a renewed motion for class certification, Plaintiffs should connect the common evidence they propose to use to the elements required to make a prima facie showing for each cause of action. See Van v. Ford Motor Co., No. 14-CV-8708, 2018 WL
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4635649, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2018); Messner, 669 F.3d at 815. The parties should also address the extent to which a class action is, or is not, superior to other methods available to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
1. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Violation To establish a due process claim, Plaintiffs will need to show that the conditions of confinement during the few days of filming were objectively serious, that the County Defendants acted at least recklessly with regard to the consequences of allowing the Fox Defendants to film at the JTDC, and that the County Defendants’ actions were “not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective,” or were “excessive in relation to that purpose.” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473–74; Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 927 (Sykes, J., concurring). The court recognizes that the conditions experienced by each JTDC detainee vary, so it may be difficult to assess whether the conditions support a class-wide claim. In some cases, “an illegal policy might provide the ‘glue’ necessary to litigate otherwise highly individualized claims as a class.” Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 498 (7th Cir. 2012). In Mulvania, for example, all of the female prisoners were subjected to a prison’s policy requiring women to wear white underwear or no underwear at all. Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cty., 850 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Flood v. Dominguez, No. 2:08 CV 153 PPS PRC, 2011 WL 238265, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 2011) (certifying class of inmates in county jail, all of whom suffered common conditions: “no bedding, cold temperatures, lack of hygiene, lack of exercise, small meal portions”); Adair v. Town of Cicero, No. 18 C 3526, 2019 WL 2866708, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2019) (certifying a Fourth Amendment claim for a class of female detainees who alleged that “the configuration of the lock-up facility required them to use the bathroom (and thereby expose their genitals) in full view of male lock-up employees and male detainees”). In this case, in contrast, although Plaintiffs challenge a single decision regarding use of the JTDC facility, the putative class members (at least as the class is currently defined) were not all exposed to the same set of conditions.
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This variance in complained-of conditions also affects the determination of whether the challenged conditions are excessive in relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473. Kingsley’s objective inquiry essentially assesses whether the challenged “conditions of confinement [ ] were objectively unreasonable.” Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 824. As Defendants note, pointing to cases where courts declined to certify classes alleging other constitutional violations, “reasonableness is a standard that must be considered individually.” Perez v. City of Chicago, No. 13-CV-4351, 2019 WL 7290848, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2019) (addressing challenge to police officers’ delay in publicizing the fact of plaintiffs’ arrests) (quoting Portis v. City of Chicago, 613 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2010) (challenge to length of detention of persons arrested for offenses punishable by fine)); see also Harper v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 581 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2009) (challenge to practice of requiring detainees to undergo certain jail intake procedures before being released on bond). That is not to say that a class of juveniles adversely affected by filming could never be certified, see, e.g., Driver v. Marion Cty. Sheriff, 859 F.3d 489, 491–94 (7th Cir. 2017) (appropriate to certify subclass of individuals who were held after legal authority for detention ceased, and subclass of persons “whose excessive detention resulted from the [jail’s] inadequate computer system”). As the class is currently defined, however, individual inquiries would be a significant aspect of the litigation of Plaintiffs’ claims.
Whether Empire filming caused class members’ injuries may also require individualized determinations. Cf. Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming certification of classes of purchasers of windows that suffered from design defects while acknowledging that “[p]roximate cause [ ] is necessarily an individual issue”). For example, Q.B.’s missed visit with his grandmother may not have resulted from Empire filming; other residents of his pod were allowed visits on the same day. Additionally, detainees did not have outdoor recreation every day—residents of Q.B.’s pod, for example, normally went outside two times per week (Q.B. Dep. 45:17–22)—so whether any particular detainee’s injuries were caused by filming
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in the outdoor recreation area would depend on his pod’s weekly schedule. “[T]he need for individual proof alone does not necessarily preclude class certification,” but if individual issues predominate, class treatment is not appropriate. Cf. Pella, 606 F.3d at 394.
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Dixon breached a fiduciary duty to the JTDC detainees by allowing Empire to film at the facility. To succeed on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Illinois law, Plaintiffs must show that “(1) a fiduciary duty existed, (2) that duty was breached, and (3) the breach of the duty proximately caused damages.” Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sinikovic, 125 F. Supp. 3d 769, 777 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing Gross v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 619 F.3d 697, 709 (7th Cir. 2010)). A fiduciary duty may arise “(1) automatically pursuant to specific legal relationships, . . . or (2) by virtue of circumstances unique to the parties’ relationship, where one party places trust in another so that the latter gains superiority and influence over the former.” Landale Signs & Neon, Ltd. v. Runnion Equip. Co., No. 16-CV-7619, 2016 WL 7409916, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2016). A guardian owes fiduciary duties to his ward, see Estate of Osborn, 128 Ill. App. 3d 453, 455, 470 N.E. 2d 1114, 1117 (5th Dist. 1984), and an individual may assume the role of guardian “even though he was not given that title by a court.” Clayton v. Millers First Ins. Cos., 384 Ill. App. 3d 429, 436, 892 N.E.2d 976, 982 (5th Dist. 2008) (citing Parks v. Kownacki, 193 Ill. 2d 164, 169, 737 N.E.2d 287, 290 (Ill. 2000)). One fiduciary duty that a guardian owes to his ward is the duty of care. See Parks v. Kownacki, 305 Ill. App. 3d 449, 461, 711 N.E.2d 1208, 1216 (5th Dist. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 193 Ill. 2d 164, 737 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. 2000). Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Dixon owed a fiduciary duty to JTDC detainees,14 and Defendants do not appear to challenge this assertion. Rather, they contend that proving a breach

14

Judge St. Eve recognized in her ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss [73] that

Plaintiffs’ allegations “rais[ed] a reasonable inference that Superintendent Dixon and the Doe

Defendants are liable for breaching their fiduciary duty.” (Order on Mot. to Dismiss at 25.) The

court also explained that the state has a duty, under clearly established principles of constitutional

and tort law, “to assume some responsibility” for the “safety and general well-being” of detainees.

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of a fiduciary duty requires Plaintiffs to show that Dixon put the detainees “at substantial risk of harm”—an inquiry they claim to be highly individualized.15 (Gov’t Reply Mem. at 7.) Plaintiffs argue that they will use common evidence to show that “Dixon approved the alleged lockdowns not for the benefit of the detainees at the JTDC, but rather so that Fox could film Empire there.” (Mot. for Class Cert. at 35.) But to establish that Dixon’s decision amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty, Plaintiffs need to show that this decision had a class-wide effect on the detainees’ safety or well-being. Additionally, while Plaintiffs are correct that the need for individualized inquiries into damages does not defeat class certification (id. at 36), proving that the proposed class was harmed at all is part of a prima facie showing of breach of fiduciary duty.16 See Sinikovic, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 777; Messner, 669 F.3d at 815 (“If, to make a prima facie showing on a given question, the members of a proposed class will need to prevent evidence that varies from member to member, then it is an individual question.”). Plaintiffs must address this issue, too, to establish that common questions predominate for purposes of a renewed motion for class certification.
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Plaintiffs devote just one paragraph to their state law claim against the County Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and have not made the case that common questions predominate. To succeed on such a claim, Plaintiffs would have to prove: “(1) that the conduct

(See id. at 24 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974))); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment imposes duties on prison officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates”).

15

Defendants cite no authority for this proposition, except for a case describing the

showing required for a failure to protect claim, rather than a claim of a breach of fiduciary duty.

See Potts v. Manos, No. 11 C 3952, 2017 WL 4340157, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2017) (“For a

failure to protect claim, as plaintiff asserts here, he must show that he was incarcerated under

conditions posing a substantial risk of harm.”) (internal citation omitted).

16

Plaintiffs need not prove that the extent of their damages is the same, but must be

able to show with common evidence that members of the class were harmed in some way.

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was extreme and outrageous, (2) that the actor intended that his conduct inflict severe emotional distress or knew that there was a high probability that his conduct would inflict such distress, and, (3) that the conduct in fact caused severe emotional distress.” Bailey v. City of Chicago, 779 F.3d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 2015). Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous may, in some cases, depend on the plaintiff; for example, if “the defendant’s improper use of a position of power [ ] gives him the ability to adversely affect the plaintiff’s interests,” Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 842 (7th Cir. 2010), or if “the defendant knew the plaintiff was particularly susceptible to emotional distress and acted inappropriately despite that knowledge.” Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 836 (7th Cir. 2016). The “intensity and duration of the distress” are important to assessing its severity. McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 86, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988).
Plaintiffs assert as a common issue that Defendants “imposed the deprivations at issue in this case in order to accommodate the Empire filming,” but do not connect this allegation to any element of the claim. Plaintiffs also expect their expert, Dr. Kraus, to offer “common evidence that [the alleged] deprivations are psychologically harmful.” (Mot. for Class Cert. at 36.) The court recognizes that, as a general matter, restrictive conditions of confinement may be harmful to detained youth. (Kraus Report ¶ 30.) But Plaintiffs must show that Defendants’ conduct in fact caused them severe emotional distress, Bailey, 779 F.3d at 696, using evidence of, for example, physical symptoms or a resulting need for medical treatment. Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 495 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Rowell v. Voortman Cookies, Ltd., No. 02 C 0681, 2005 WL 1026715, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2005) (“Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claim would [ ] require the highly individualized inquiry of whether the Defendants’ conduct caused severe emotional distress in numerous individuals.”) As noted, Plaintiffs have not alleged that the County Defendants intended to punish them; instead, Plaintiffs’ position appears to be that Defendant Dixon was motivated by a desire to spend time with celebrities—potentially common evidence, but not tending to show that Plaintiffs’ emotional distress was the intended or highly probable
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result of Dixon’s conduct. (See Pls.’ Reply Mem. at 13.) In sum, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the predominance requirement for their claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
4. Tortious Inducement of Breach of Fiduciary Duty To succeed on a claim for tortious inducement of a breach of fiduciary duty, Plaintiffs must show that the Fox Defendants “(1) colluded with a fiduciary in committing a breach; (2) knowingly participated in or induced the breach of duty; and (3) knowingly accepted the benefits resulting from that breach.” Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Regnery v. Meyers, 287 Ill. App. 3d 354, 364, 679 N.E.2d 74, 80 (1st Dist. 1997)). Liability requires a showing of some “active misbehavior on the part of [the Fox Defendants].” Borsellino, 477 F.3d at 509; see also Lansing v. Carroll, 71 F. Supp. 3d 765, 770 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (quoting In re Pritzker, No. 02 CH 21426, 2004 WL 414313, at *7 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 5, 2004) (“[T]he parties [must know] or [have] reason to believe at the time of their alleged participation that the acts were wrongful.”)). The requisite active misbehavior has been found in cases of bribery, see, e.g., People ex rel. Daley v. Warren Motors, 114 Ill. 2d 305, 500 N.E.2d 22 (Ill. 1986); Chicago Park Dist. v. Kenroy, 89 Ill. App. 3d 450, 411 N.E.2d 1067 (1st Dist. 1980), misuse of confidential information, Conant v. Karris, 165 Ill. App. 3d 783, 520 N.E.2d 757 (1st Dist. 1987), and other types of wrongful conduct, see, e.g., Regnery, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 363–64, 679 N.E.2d at 80 (finding the brother of a majority shareholder liable because he initiated the idea that a voting trust should authorize a “sale of stock to his brother and himself at a price far below market value,” and “fully participated in all steps of the transaction”). Merely “accepting a deposit,” on the other hand, was not sufficient to hold a bank liable for participating in an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Chabraja v. Martwick, 248 Ill. App. 3d 995, 999, 618 N.E.2d 800, 803 (1st Dist. 1993). The Fox Defendants argue that establishing that they induced a breach of fiduciary duty will require individualized inquiries into whether “each Fox Defendant ‘knew or was substantially certain’ that specific changes by the JTDC to [each detainee’s] daily routine would put his safety and well-being at risk.” (Fox Reply Mem. [249] at 2, 5; Mot. to Deny at 27.) Plaintiffs appear to
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argue more generally, however, that the decision to alter normal JTDC operations to facilitate filming constituted a single breach of fiduciary duty that affected all class members—a common inquiry. Plaintiffs explain that they would draw on the common evidence of Fox’s code of conduct acknowledging the disruptive impacts of filming, and Fox’s general practice of making payments to compensate neighbors who were impacted by filming. (Mot for Class Cert. at 39.) As the court explained in an earlier order, Plaintiffs’ allegations—that the Fox Defendants offered to pay rent at the JTDC, that they offered to pay wages and overtime for JTDC staff “on the condition that the JTDC’s administrators would change the facility’s normal operations to make the second and third floors of the JTDC available for filming,” and that the Fox Defendants continued filming despite the alleged obviousness that the JTDC “had been placed on lockdown”—all tend to show knowing inducement or participation as needed for the second element of the tortious inducement cause of action. (Order Mot. for Recons. [117] at 2–3.) Proving such allegations would not require individualized inquiries.
Whether the Fox Defendants knew that filming would result in a breach of fiduciary duty can therefore be assessed on a class-wide basis.17 It will not be sufficient for Plaintiffs to show that “it was obvious to Fox that the children at the JTDC had to be placed on lockdown in order to accommodate the filming” (cf. Mot. for Class Cert. at 38); they will also have to prove that the Fox Defendants knew or had reason to know that their acts could be harmful. See Chabraja, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 999, 618 N.E.2d at 803. But whether the Fox Defendants did knowingly induce or participate in, and accept the benefits of, a breach of fiduciary duty raises questions of fact that are common to the class.

17

Plaintiffs propose the following as common questions: Did the Fox Defendants’

tours of the JTDC make it obvious to them that to “occupy the bulk of the second and third floors

and the outdoor yard the children would need to be deprived access to all these areas” in a way

that “would substantially limit them to their pods”? (Mot. for Class Cert. at 38.) Did the Fox

Defendants know that “no children were being allowed out on the outdoor yards, and that the

children had nowhere else to go outside while Fox was filming”? (Id.) Were the Fox Defendants

on notice that “taking over the two floors of the JTDC that had facilities for recreation and

education would impose deprivations on the youth detained there”? (Id. at 39.)

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5. Unjust Enrichment Plaintiffs last argue that the Fox Defendants were unjustly enriched by the profits from the two episodes of Empire filmed at the JTDC. To succeed on an unjust enrichment claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “unjustly retained a benefit to the plaintiff’s detriment, and that defendant’s retention of that benefit violates the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.” Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 561 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 145, 160, 545 N.E.2d 672, 679 (Ill. 1989)). While “a plaintiff need not show loss or damages, he must show a detriment, and significantly, a connection between the detriment and the defendant’s retention of the benefit.” Cleary, 656 F.3d at 518–19. This is because “[u]njust enrichment is not a mode of imposing punitive damages; it is a means of recovering something that the defendant is not entitled to but is unfairly possessing to the plaintiff’s detriment.” Id. at 520. The court need not decide at the class certification stage which remedy may be appropriate should Plaintiffs succeed on the merits of their claims, but will clarify two points raised during briefing. First, in its earlier order on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court acknowledged some debate as to “whether Illinois law recognizes an independent cause of action for unjust enrichment, or whether unjust enrichment must always be tied to another underlying claim found in tort, contract, or statute.” Id. at 516. Since that order, the Seventh Circuit has concluded that “[u]nder Illinois law, there is no stand-alone claim for unjust enrichment.” Benson v. Fannie May Confections Brands, Inc., 944 F.3d 639, 648 (7th Cir. 2019). Plaintiffs’ “request for relief based on unjust enrichment is therefore ‘tied to the fate of the[ir] claim’” against the Fox Defendants for inducing a breach of Defendant Dixon’s fiduciary duty. Id. (quoting Vanzant v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., 934 F.3d 730, 740 (7th Cir. 2019)). Second, Plaintiffs devote the unjust enrichment section of their brief to discussing the Fox Defendants’ requisite state of mind rather than the elements of unjust enrichment described above. (Mot. for Class Cert. at 38–40.) In this regard, the court notes that the choice of remedy does not change the state of mind Plaintiffs must prove to succeed
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on their underlying tort claim against the Fox Defendants. See Hoagland ex rel. Midwest Transit, Inc. v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The fact that restitution was sought instead of conventional damages [ ] does not alter the nature of the suit.”).
B. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) The court may certify a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) if “prosecuting separate actions . . . would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). Plaintiffs argue, in the alternative to certification under Rule 23(b)(3), that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification is appropriate for their claims against the Fox Defendants (Count VIII for tortious inducement of a breach of fiduciary duty and Count XIII for unjust enrichment). The court will defer resolution of whether the putative class could be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to a subsequent motion based on a more narrowly-defined class, but notes a few points for further briefing. Plaintiffs suggest that, if a class is not certified, the first individual plaintiff with a successful claim will seek the “largest payout[ ] possible,” which would “put subsequent plaintiffs at a disadvantage, since Fox would be able to assert that it has already disgorged its unjust profits [from the two episodes of Empire filmed at the JTDC] to the plaintiffs who came before.” (Pls.’ Reply Mem. at 29.) This appears to be, essentially, a limited fund rationale, and the Fox Defendants respond that certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is not appropriate because Fox has adequate financial resources to pay individual damages awards. (Mot. to Deny at 29; see also Ortiz v. Fibreborad Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).) Given that the Fox Defendants appear to have sufficient funds to satisfy the claims of each putative class member and that restitution based on unjust enrichment may not be a fitting remedy in this context, Plaintiffs have not shown that certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is warranted based on a limited fund theory. See Oshana v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 583–84 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 472 F.3d 506
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(7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a nearly identical argument by a plaintiff seeking class certification on a claim of deceptive marketing against Coca-Cola in light of the need to interpret Rule 23(b)(1)(b) narrowly because class members cannot opt out, and Coca-Cola’s clear ability to pay the claims of all putative class members).18
CONCLUSION Plaintiffs have not yet met the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) and the court, therefore, declines to certify their proposed class at this time. Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification [235] is denied without prejudice to renewal within 21 days of this order. Defendants may then respond to the renewed motion for class certification or seek a determination on the merits. The court notes, further, that although it appears Plaintiffs’ claims present common questions, it may well be that some residents of the JTDC were affected by the Empire filming only briefly or in relatively insignificant ways. Moreover, as time passes, it likely will become increasingly difficult to locate and provide meaningful relief to a class of persons who were juveniles at the time of the relevant events but may well now be moving toward adulthood. For all of these reasons, the court encourages the parties to explore the possibility of settlement before incurring the expense of another round of briefing.
ENTER:

Date: January 16, 2020

____________________________ REBECCA R. PALLMEYER United States District Judge

18

Plaintiffs also suggest that certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is appropriate

because “when a breach of fiduciary duty is at issue, any individual adjudication regarding the

breach would necessarily affect the interests of others.” (Pls.’ Reply Mem. at 29 (quoting Godshall

v. The Franklin Mint, No. 01 CV 6539, 2004 WL 2745890, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2004).) But

absent a common showing that the class was harmed by the alleged breach of fiduciary duty, see

Sinikovic, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 777, it is not clear that one class member’s success on that claim

would “necessarily settle the issue for all other prospective plaintiffs.” Neil, 275 F.R.D. at 267.

32

 
 Case: 1:16-cv-08303 Document #: 434 Filed: 06/10/21 Page 1 of 72 PageID #:9414

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

T.S. and Q.B., on behalf of themselves

)

and all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX TELEVISION, )

FOX BROADCASTING CO.,

)

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FOX, INC.,

)

THE COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS, and

)

LEONARD DIXON,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 16 C 8303 Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In the summer of 2015, Plaintiffs T.S. and Q.B. were pretrial detainees at the Cook County

Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (“JTDC”). During three short intervals that summer,

Defendant Twentieth Century Fox and other Fox entities (collectively, “Fox Defendants”) filmed

scenes for the television show Empire at the JTDC. Plaintiffs allege that Empire filming disrupted

the normal operations of the JTDC in ways that harmed them and other juvenile detainees. They

further allege that Defendant Leonard Dixon (the Superintendent of the JTDC), and Cook County,

Illinois (collectively, “County Defendants”), lacked a legitimate government purpose for imposing

certain conditions of confinement to facilitate the filming. In this proposed class action, Plaintiffs

assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various supplemental state law theories. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331, 1367(a). The court previously denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification without

prejudice. T.S. v. Twentieth Century Fox Television, 334 F.R.D. 518, 541 (N.D. Ill. 2020).

Before the court are four motions: Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint to add H.C.

as a class representative [365], Plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification [351], the County

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [411], and the Fox Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment [409]. For the reasons below, the court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their

Case: 1:16-cv-08303 Document #: 434 Filed: 06/10/21 Page 2 of 72 PageID #:9415
complaint; grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification; and grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment. Because the court grants summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, the only remaining claims arise under state law. In light of this case’s long procedural history and the substantial expenditure of judicial resources, the court will exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction of the remaining claims. See, e.g., Timm v. Mead Corp., 32 F.3d 273, 276–77 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding district court’s retention of jurisdiction over state claims after granting summary judgment on only federal claim in the case).
BACKGROUND The JTDC is a five-story juvenile detention facility in Cook County, Illinois that housed more than 300 youth in the summer of 2015. (Defs.’ SOF [415] ¶ 1; PSOAF [421-3] ¶¶ 1–2.) These detainees were awaiting trial or other court proceedings and typically remained at the JTDC for around 10 days, though some stayed far longer. (Pls.’ Ex. 10 [422-10] (hereinafter “Kraus Rpt.”), ¶ 20). There is conflicting evidence on the range of detainee ages, but the parties agree that no detainee was younger than 12 or older than 21. (Compare Pls.’ Ex. 4 [422-4] (hereinafter “Dunlap Rpt.”) ¶ 27, with Defs.’ Ex. 3 [412-3] (hereinafter “Klemke Dep.”), at 22:16–24.) Detainees at the JTDC live in units called “pods” which contain rooms for individual residents that open to an enclosed common area. (PSOAF ¶ 1.) 1. Fox and the JTDC In May 2015, the Fox Defendants were looking for a prison-related backdrop for two episodes of Empire, a television show set in New York City but filmed in Chicago. (See PSOAF ¶ 12; Fox Summ. J. Mot. [410] at 9.) Fox’s “location scout” Jonathan Klemke was part of the team that first came across the JTDC. (Klemke Dep. at 19:3–5.) Klemke testified that a friend found the JTDC on Google Maps and recommended he look into it. (Id. at 19:6–19.) Klemke “follow[ed]
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up on” the recommendation by “call[ing] and g[etting] in touch with” Dixon. (Id.) Dixon expressed interest, and Klemke drove over to the JTDC to meet with him that same day. (Id. at 23:18–24:3.)
Once at the JTDC, Klemke toured portions of the facility; the extent of the tour is not clear from the record. (Klemke Dep. at 27:18–24, 81:19–82:12.) Klemke took photos, including two pictures of the outdoor yard that appear to be taken from a window on the fourth or fifth floor of the facility.1 (Defs.’ Resp. to PSOAF [430] (hereinafter “Resp. to PSOAF”), ¶ 18; Pls.’ Ex. 19 [42219]; Pls.’ Ex. 20 [422-20].) At some point during the tour, Klemke saw groups of 15 to 20 detainees being transported in the hallways but did not know why they were moving about the hallways at the time. (Klemke Dep. at 25:11–26:2, 69:8–11.) Klemke saw that the classrooms on the second floor were empty during his tour. (Id. at 69:17–70:12.) He was surprised the classrooms were empty, but he testified that Dixon explained the kids at the JTDC were “off during the summer.” (Id.) Dixon himself testified that there is summer school at the JTDC, and, thus, he “couldn’t have told [Klemke] school was out for the entire summer . . . .” (Defs.’ Ex. 5 [412-5] (hereinafter “Dixon Dep.”) at 71:8–19.)
Klemke admitted that, based on his tour, he understood that the yards were the only place that the detainees could go outdoors. (Klemke Dep. at 110:1–14.) Klemke testified, however, that Dixon told him there were alternative indoor locations that would allow the detainees to exercise. (Id. at 109:1–12.) Likewise, Klemke testified that Dixon assured him that visitors only use the visitation room “on certain days and that we would be able to use the [visitation] room on off days.” (Id. at 100:24–101:9.) At the time, Klemke raised these questions because “part of the initial scouting is to determine whether a facility can continue its operation while also accommodating a film crew.” (Id. at 103:23–104:18.) Klemke testified that he did not “really know

1

Plaintiffs cite page 46 of Klemke’s deposition for the proposition that Klemke toured

JTDC’s upper “Pod” floors (floors four and five) and took photographs of pods on the upper floors.

(PSOAF ¶ 18.) The cited page, however, does not appear in the record.

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about running a prison,” so he trusted the JTDC to ensure that “filming at the detention center [did not] interfere[ ] with the day-to-day existence of the juveniles held there . . . .” (Id. at 67:8–68:7.)
On June 2, 2015, five days later, Klemke emailed Dixon to follow up on their visit. (Pls.’ Ex. 16 [422-16] (hereinafter “Klemke Follow-up Email”).) Klemke explained that if filming were to proceed at the JTDC, Fox would want to use “a pod, the yard, the medical center, and the visitation room.” (Id.) Fox expected to make “extensive use of several parts of the facility over the course of two days or so,” likely for about 12 hours per day. (Id.) Klemke wrote that Fox could “attempt to limit the personnel in the facility to only the most essential,” dropping their numbers from the usual 80 crew members to “closer to 30 people total.” (Id.) And “the two largest segments of filming would be in the visitation room and the yard, which hopefully makes our presence less of an impact.” (Id.) Klemke noted, “Obviously your schedule would take precedence over ours, and we would discuss a way of making sure that we don't interfere with your day to day operations too badly.” (Id.) When asked why he made that offer, Klemke testified, “My intention in writing that was to give Superintendent Dixon an opportunity to tell me that he wasn’t comfortable with the things that I had suggested.” (Klemke Dep. at 36:19–37:8.) Klemke explained that his understanding was that “a film crew would not be normal but [would] not necessarily [be] a hindrance.” (Id. at 36:8–17.)
On June 5, 2015, Klemke forwarded this email to his supervisor Brady Breen, Fox’s Location Manager. (Klemke Follow-up Email.) Over the next couple of weeks, Breen toured the JTDC, as did creator of Empire Lee Daniels and other members of the Empire production team. (Defs.’ Ex. 7 [412-7]; Defs.’ Ex. 8 [412-8].) Daniels testified that his tour did not include any of the indoor gyms or other recreational areas. (Defs.’ Ex. 2 [412-2] (hereinafter “Daniels Dep.”), at 93:7–11.) The parties point to little other evidence concerning these tours.
On June 12, 2015, Breen emailed Dixon’s assistant, Yvonne Akins, formally requesting permission to film at the JTDC. (Defs.’ Ex. 8.) On June 17, Dixon, Akins, and JTDC’s Acting
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Project Director Gene Robinson met with Breen and other Fox representatives to discuss the logistics of Fox’s plan to film. (Defs.’ Ex. 12 [412-12] (hereinafter “Akins Dep.”) at 21:22–25:10; Defs.’ Ex. 7.) There was no discussion about “any changes to the schedules of residents that would need to occur in order to facilitate the filming.” (Akins Dep. at 25:6–10.) Breen explained that “there was a lot of conversation about how can we accomplish the work that we want to accomplish and be respectful of what’s going on in the building, and those guidelines were set very clearly by the team that works at . . . the juvenile detention facility.” (Defs.’ Ex. 4 [412-4] (hereinafter “Breen Dep.”) at 111:7–21.)
On June 18, 2015, Breen and Cook County’s Director of Real Estate Management Anna Ashcraft signed a contract to allow Fox to film at the JTDC. (Defs.’ Ex. 1 [412-1] (hereinafter “Location Agreement”).) The Location Agreement would allow Fox to film in the visitation room, exercise yard, medical office, living pod, and hallways and lobby areas each day from Monday, June 22, 2015 to Friday, June 26, 2015 at a cost of $1,500 per day, payable to the Cook County Real Estate Management Division. (Id.) Paragraph 1(D) of the agreement read as follows:
[Fox] acknowledges that the [JTDC] is a functioning Municipal Building, operating as a residential facility for juveniles. [Fox] will cooperate with the County, JTDC Administration, and Security . . . so that normal operations of the Building and its occupants, and access by the public, are not disrupted in any manner whatsoever. (Id.) Although Daniels testified that he personally was not aware of Paragraph 1(D) (Daniels Dep. at 95:8–25), he also testified that no one ever told him that Fox’s presence had the potential to have a negative impact on the detainees, and “in choosing to film at JTDC,” he “assumed that the residents of JTDC would be treated with respect.” (Id. at 96:19–22, 127:16–20.) The agreement also allowed Fox to return to JTDC to film additional scenes or retakes within a reasonable time so long as Fox provided notice. (Location Agreement ¶ 5.) Later, Fox and the JTDC would sign two addenda to the Location Agreement: one on July 7, 2015, allowing Fox to return to the JTDC to continue filming from July 13 to July 16 and another on August 14, 2015, allowing Fox to return from August 23 to August 25. (Defs.’ Ex. 13 [412-13] (hereinafter “July Addendum”); Defs.’ Ex.
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Case: 1:16-cv-08303 Document #: 434 Filed: 06/10/21 Page 6 of 72 PageID #:9419
14 [412-14] (hereinafter “August Addendum”).) The other language from the Location Agreement applied to the addenda as well. (Defs.’ Ex. 11 [412-11] (hereinafter “Kruzel Dep.”) at 54:9–18.)
After signing the Location Agreement, the parties continued their discussions. JTDC General Counsel Zenaida Alonzo worked with Dixon to tell Fox “what areas [JTDC] could put off for filming and . . . still meet the requirements for the kids.” (Defs.’ Ex. 42 [412-42] (hereinafter “Alonzo Dep.”) at 12:13–13:23, 27:17–29:21.) For example, Fox had initially wanted to film in the infirmary. (Location Agreement ¶ 1(A).) Alonzo emailed Breen on June 30, 2015, however, telling him that “JTDC cannot accommodate any filming [in our infirmary]” because “we have federal standards that we have to comply with and this would impact our ability to provide medical care for our residents.” (Defs.’ Ex. 45 [412-45] at 2–4.) When asked how much equipment Fox would need to store at the JTDC while filming, Breen responded, “Imagine if we emptied a semi trailer filled to the roof.” (Defs.’ Ex. 20 [412-20] at 2.) JTDC agreed to allow Fox to use Pod 3B for filming and Pod 3A to store their equipment, though Breen had suggested Fox could store the equipment under tarps in the outdoor yard if necessary. (Id. at 2–4.) Pods 3A and 3B are ordinarily “Alpha” intake pods, where new detainees are screened and assessed upon admission, but JTDC agreed to clear out these two pods during filming. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 29; see Pls.’ Ex. 66 [422-66]; Defs.’ Ex. 20.) 2. Filming
Fox filmed at JTDC from June 22 to 26, from July 13 to 16, and from August 23 to 25. (Location Agreement; July Addendum; August Addendum.) During that time, Fox occupied, in some capacity, the library, Pods 3A and 3B, the outdoor yards, the chapel, and several classrooms. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶¶ 28–30.) Each of these rooms is located on the second or third floor of the JTDC building. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶¶ 4–5; see Pls.’ Ex. 2 [422-2] at 3–4.)
Fox brought more than 150 people into the JTDC on at least four days and more than 200 people on at least one day. (Pls.’ Ex. 27 [422-27] (hereinafter “July 31 Robinson Email”) at 3.)
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But Plaintiffs have identified no evidence that the presence of the additional crew members by itself resulted in any additional restrictions on the JTDC detainees. Breen understood that, despite Fox’s presence, JTDC staff “had made accommodations to make sure that normal operations [of the JTDC] should continue.” (Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ SOF [421-2] (hereinafter “Resp. to SOF”) ¶ 87.) Breen explained that, while filming, Fox had “consistent conversations about, ‘Yes, you can be here, no, you can’t be here, these are the times at which we can do these things.’” (Breen Dep. at 80:1–8.) There were “certainly numerous situations where [Fox wasn’t] able to do things that [they] wanted to do because of the . . . staff telling [Breen], you know, we can’t do that right now, we can’t do this right now because of the sensitivities of the location . . . . ” (Id. at 146:22–147:6.) For example, Breen testified that there were “many times” when “traffic from the lunch area to the third floor where the pods were was restricted” during filming in order to “protect the kids.” (Id. at 148:12–20.)
Outdoor Yards. Detainees at the JTDC ordinarily get some form of Large Muscle Exercise (“LME”) every day. (Pls.’ Ex. 43 [422-43] (hereinafter “Taylor Decl.”), ¶ 13(c).) While the parties do not define LME, the court presumes it includes active play such as running around, working out, or playing sports. The JTDC has a large open-air courtyard on its third floor which is split into three adjoining yards and serves as the jail’s only venue for outdoor recreation. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 4.) A rotating schedule determines each day whether detainees in a given pod will exercise in the outdoor yards or in indoor gyms on the first floor of the JTDC. (Taylor Decl. ¶ 13(c); Pls.’ Ex. 49 [422-49]; Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 6.) No pod was scheduled to be outside every day that summer. (Pls.’ Ex. 49.) JTDC would sometimes prohibit detainees from participating in off-pod exercise as a form of discipline or to accommodate a staff shortage. (Taylor Decl. ¶ 13(c)(iv).) In fact, JTDC Deputy Executive Director William Steward testified that “[l]arge muscle exercise is done on pod quite a bit,” and “[i]t doesn’t matter where the exercise occurs as long as they get
7

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it . . . [and get it] with the proper staff.” (Defs.’ Ex. 17 [412-17] (hereinafter “Steward Dep.”), at 233:14–234:1, 235:5–10; see also Defs.’ Ex. 56 [412-56] at 12 (Aug. 10), 13–14 (Aug. 17).)
Fox planned to a spend substantial time filming in the outdoor yards. (Klemke Follow-up Email.) JTDC closed off the yards each time Fox came to film, and the yards remained closed on the day after at least the June and July sessions so that JTDC could clean and “thorough[ly] search” the yards. (Taylor Decl. ¶ 17; Pls.’ Ex. 34 [422-34]; Pls.’ Ex. 36 [422-36].) Although the indoor gyms remained open, the closure of the outdoor yards meant there were not enough offpod spaces and time slots for every pod to use, so residents in many pods received their daily LME activity within their pods while Fox was filming. (Taylor Decl. ¶ 18; July 31 Robinson Email at 3.) One detainee filed a grievance (not signed or dated, but referred to by Plaintiffs as the “June 2015 Resident Grievance”), complaining, “We need RECK. We haven’t had Reck in days. Fuck the empire. Just cause there [sic] here doesn’t mean we don’t gotta have reck.” (Pls.’ Ex. 57 [422-57].) Plaintiffs have identified no evidence that anyone at Fox knew that detainees were forced to exercise on their pods during Fox’s visit.
Classrooms. The JTDC also houses the Nancy B. Jefferson School, which is part of the Chicago Public School system and serves detainees year-round with breaks in June and August. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 33; Fox Summ. J. Mot. at 17.) The school’s classrooms are located on the second floor of the JTDC and are used for classes, after-school programming, recreation, and commissary. (Dunlap Rpt. ¶ 67.) On normal school days, JTDC staff transport detainees from their pods to the second-floor classrooms. (Taylor Decl. ¶ 13(a).) Although Fox never filmed in the classrooms, the JTDC allowed Fox to use classrooms to store equipment and give the crew a place to rest. (Resp. to SOF ¶¶ 21–22.) During Fox’s June and August filming dates, the school was on summer break. (Resp. to SOF ¶ 42.) During the July filming session, however, Fox occupied classrooms during three scheduled days of school. (Id. ¶¶ 41–43.)
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On those three days in July, detainees remained in their pods for school, and teachers travelled to the individual pods to instruct the students. (Id. ¶ 43.) T.S., one of the named plaintiffs in this case, had school instruction in his pod for one or two of the three affected July days.2 He testified that, during filming, many of his teachers did not show up, and those that did show up arrived late and left early, while the detainees just “continued to play cards and watch TV . . . [until] it was time for [the teacher] to roll off.” (Defs.’ Ex. 22 [412-22] (hereinafter “T.S. Dep.”) at 30:4–31:21, 32:18–33:24.) Kenya Taylor, who then worked at JTDC as a Youth Development Specialist, stated, “It was harder to maintain discipline during school because there were more distractions and temptations on the pods (televisions, rooms and beds).” (Taylor Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3, 21.) JTDC detainees had taken classes in their pods on previous occasions, for example when guests such as Congressman John Lewis had come to speak at the facility. (Defs.’ Updated Ex. 17 [431-2] at 129:23–130:24.) Earl Dunlap, the JTDC’s former Transitional Administrator, testified that in another instance, JTDC’s administration had decided to switch to on-pod schooling due to a safety issue.3 (Defs.’ Ex. 60 [431-7] (hereinafter “May Dunlap Dep.”) at 27:4–10.) Plaintiff’s psychiatric expert Dr. Louis Kraus4 testified that while, in general, missing “a week of school here or there” is “likely not going to have a long-term impact on your general educational needs,” and “[o]ne or two days may not impact the general education,” such disruptions “may impact the youth for other reasons.” (Defs.’ Ex. 53 [412-53] (hereinafter “Kraus Dep.”) at 58:4–59:4.) Dr. Kraus

2

T.S. testified that, on July 14, he left the jail to appear in court. (T.S. Dep. at 136:1–

24.) Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 statement claims that T.S. was confined to his individual cell

for a disciplinary violation on July 15, but they have cited no evidence in the record to support that

statement. (Resp. to SOF ¶ 47.)

3

Dunlap has experience administering the JTDC, and Plaintiffs have retained him

as an expert witness based on his “50 years of experience in the profession of juvenile justice

and specifically in the area of juvenile detention.” (Dunlap Rpt. ¶¶ 2–3.)

4

Among other things, Dr. Louis Kraus is a Professor and Chief of Child and

Adolescent Psychiatry at Rush University Medical Center in Chicago, Illinois and has worked with

juveniles in correctional settings for the past 28 years. (Kraus Rpt. ¶ 1.)

9

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did not specify what those “other reasons” are. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that Fox knew that school was in session during the July filming session.
The second-floor classrooms, and other second-floor areas such as the library, are also ordinarily used for after-school programming such as “Free Write” and nutrition education. (Resp. to SOAF ¶ 37; Pls.’ Ex. 60 [422-60]; Pls.’ Ex. 62 [422-62]; Buckingham Dep, Ex. E to Defs.’ Class Cert. Mot. [248-5] at 54:1–11.) During the weeks when Fox was filming, the JTDC postponed or cancelled a number of these programs. (Resp. to SOF ¶ 44.) The JTDC also eliminated or postponed some commissary visits to the second-floor classrooms during filming. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 39.) “Commissary” involved opportunities to buy snacks, as well as activities like ping pong and video games. (PSOAF ¶ 39.) Not all commissary visits were cancelled, however. (Defs.’ Ex. 62 [431-9] at 2 (noting that on June 23, 2015, JTDC employees “escorted residents to classroom 319 for commissary”).) Again, there is no evidence that anyone at Fox knew that the JTDC cancelled any programs or commissary visits to accommodate filming.
Visitation room. JTDC typically dedicates a room on the second floor for detainees to meet visitors such as parents or grandparents. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 11.) That room is 1302 square feet and contains twelve tables. (Id.; Defs.’ Ex. 35 [412-35] (hereinafter “Robinson Decl.”) ¶ 4.) Fox filmed in this visitation room on at least some of its days at the JTDC. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 30.) Visitation continued on every day of filming; JTDC used classrooms as a substitute visitation area. (Resp. to SOF ¶¶ 65, 70; July 31 Robinson Email at 3.) The substitute visitation area was somewhat smaller: it was just 1148 square feet and could accommodate just eight visitors at a time instead of twelve. (Robinson Decl. ¶ 6; Pls.’ Ex. 47 [422-47] at 2, 7.) Robinson testified that he “personally designed the table arrangement [in the substitute room] . . . to ensure that visitors had space and privacy consistent with” the regular visitation space. (Robinson Decl. ¶ 6.) Nonetheless, two detainees testified that they felt there was less privacy during their visits in the alternate locations. (T.S. Dep. 43:14–44:5; Defs.’ Ex. 21 [412-21] (hereinafter “Q.B. Dep.”)
10

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at 64:3–14.) It is undisputed that “[t]here is no evidence that [Fox] knew or had reason to know that the JTDC had moved visitation to a classroom, . . . the dimensions or layout of that [classroom], or the impact that the shift may have had . . . if any.” (Resp. to SOF ¶ 67.)
Intake. Fox also used Pod 3A for storage and Pod 3B for filming. (Defs.’ Ex. 20 at 2–4.) As noted, these pods ordinarily serve as two of three “Alpha” intake pods, where the JTDC screens and assesses new detainees upon admission. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 29.) During Fox’s visits, the JTDC transferred detainees housed in Pods 3A and 3B to other pods. (Pls.’ Ex. 66.) At least 14 residents in Pod 3A were transferred to other pods. (Id.) This forced the JTDC to “fill up” other pods “with 15 and 16 residents each.” (Id.) While each JTDC pod was built to hold either 18 or 16 occupants, for safety reasons the JTDC’s written policies limit the functional operating capacity of each pod to 14 or 12 occupants, respectively. (Pls.’ Ex. 67 [422-67] Part IV(a).) Plaintiffs’ experts, Mr. Dunlap and Dr. Kraus, stated in their reports that such overcrowding put the detainees’ safety at risk. (Dunlap Rpt. ¶¶ 53, 57–58; Kraus Rpt. ¶ 38.) Although occupancy in certain pods regularly exceeded functional capacity independent of the Empire filming, the days in June when Fox filmed saw a significant increase in the number of pods that exceeded their functional capacity. (Compare Defs.’ Ex. 37 [412-37] (hereinafter “Pod Populations”), at 1–20, with id. at 21–26.) Plaintiffs have identified no evidence that the JTDC informed Fox that its use of Pods 3A and 3B would force JTDC to overpopulate other pods.
General harms. Dr. Kraus opined that forcing child-detainees to remain in their pods with fewer activities magnifies the psychological harm associated with keeping children in a detention center. (Kraus Rpt. ¶ 30(a)–(b).) JTDC’s current director of mental health, Dr. Brian Conant, agreed. (Pls.’ Ex. 11 [422-11] at 177:15–178:7; see also Dunlap Rpt. ¶¶ 9, 65–67.) Taylor, the Youth Development Specialist, noticed that during filming, the detainees on her pods felt “cooped up” and “there was a feeling of more tension, stress and anxiety on the pods where [she] worked.” (Taylor Decl. ¶ 22.)
11

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Alonzo, in her capacity as the JTDC’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness,5 testified that nobody at JTDC “notif[ied] Twentieth Century Fox Television that it was disrupting the normal operations of the JTDC.” (Defs.’ Ex. 6 [412-6] at 86:12–15.) 3. T.S, Q.B., and H.C.
Plaintiffs have presented three representatives of the putative class: T.S., Q.B., and H.C.6 Each is a former resident of the JTDC and was detained at the JTDC on some of the days in June, July, and August 2015 when Fox filmed Empire. (Resp. to SOF ¶¶ 1–2.)
T.S. T.S. resided at the JTDC from December 3, 2014 until September 24, 2015. (Id. ¶ 37.) While Fox was filming, T.S. recalls multiple days when JTDC provided no off-pod exercise and instead brought recreation specialists to the pods to engage the detainees in minimal exercise activities, such as twenty jumping jacks. (Pls.’ Ex. 106 [422-106] (hereinafter “T.S. Interrog.”), ¶ 13.) T.S. also missed a Free Write session—and possibly a parenting class—that were cancelled due to Fox’s presence. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 10(a); T.S. Interrog. ¶¶ 19–21.) Due to Fox’s presence at the JTDC, T.S. had school classes in his pod for one or two days during the July filming period. (T.S. Interrog. ¶ 15.) Finally, T.S.’s mother visited him in the “less private” setting of the substitute visitation room, and her visit with him was shorter than usual. (Id. ¶ 16.)
Q.B. Q.B. resided at the JTDC during the June and August filming sessions. (Resp. to SOF ¶ 38.) Q.B. also had recreation on his pod for at least one day. (Pls.’ Ex. 105 [422-105] ¶ 13.) On one of the days that Fox was filming, Q.B.’s grandmother attempted to visit him but was turned away. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 10(b).) Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ suggestion that

5

Alonzo gave two separate depositions: one that appears to be in her capacity as

JTDC’s General Counsel (Alonzo Dep.), and one on behalf of the JTDC pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), which allows an organization to designate a person to testify on its

behalf. (Defs.’ Ex. 6.)

6

Plaintiffs have sought leave to amend their complaint by, among other things,

adding H.C. as a class representative. (Mot. to Am. Compl. [365].) The court will address their

motion below, but for now, the court includes all relevant facts about H.C.

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Q.B.’s grandmother’s inability to visit with Q.B. had anything to do with the number of tables available, and, indeed, Plaintiffs fail to cite any evidence that supports this claim. (Id.)
H.C. H.C. resided at the JTDC from May 2015 to June 2016. (Resp. to SOF ¶ 39.) H.C. had recreation on his pod for at least one day during the filming (Pls.’ Ex. 107 [422-107] (hereinafter “H.C. Interrog.”), ¶ 10), and missed a Free Write session that was cancelled due to Fox’s presence. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 10(c).) Like T.S., H.C. was in court on one of the three days that Fox filmed in July but had school on his pod for at least one day. (Resp. to SOF ¶ 46; H.C. Interrog. ¶ 8.) It is undisputed that H.C. did not leave his pod for at least one 24-hour period during Fox’s filming, but the parties disagree as to why.7 (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 10(c).) 4. Dixon’s involvement
Dixon testified that he agreed to allow Fox to film Empire at the JTDC for a number of reasons. He felt it “would be good for the kids,” “would create a certain energy in the facility,” and would give everyone a “chance to see the actors.” (Dixon Dep. at 111:23–112:8.) The only scheduled interaction between the detainees and the actors was a meeting in which actor Chris Rock spoke to a group of approximately 24 detainees for about 30 minutes during the June filming. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 47.) Terrence Howard also met with some of the detainees after filming concluded and later returned to the facility to develop a “book club.” (Dixon Dep. at 205:19– 207:11.) After the June filming session, a letter from the JTDC’s Division of Resident Advocacy & Quality of Life to JTDC administrator Millicent McCoy commented on the effects of Empire’s visit, and identified a number of benefits from the filming, including “excited-happy-enthusiastic staff,” “elevated energy level,” and increased staff interaction. (Pls.’ Ex. 51 [422-51] (hereinafter “Resident Advocacy Letter”), at 2–3.) A July 31 email from the Acting Project Director Robinson listed similar benefits. (July 31 Robinson Email at 4.) Both communications, however, also listed

7

Defendants note that some other residents of H.C.’s pod attended off-pod activities

on the day in question. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 10(c); see also Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. [397]

at 39 (citing Justice Center Shift Report of 7/13/15, Opp’n Ex. LL).)

13

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a number of negative effects of the filming, including interruptions to school, recreation, and intake (id.), as well as the fact that residents did not have the opportunity to “burn off some of their energy” in the school area and yards during the first week of their June summer break. (Resident Advocacy Letter at 2.)
Dixon, for his part, invited his wife to the filming and directed Akins to ask Breen to bring the actors to Dixon’s office for photos before the shoot. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 49.) Dixon was photographed with many of the Empire stars. (Id. ¶ 52.) When Fox asked to return to film in August, Dixon’s assistant said, “[I]f Dixon approve[s] this [Breen] will need to get Dixon a directors [sic] chair.” (Pls.’ Ex. 86 [422-86].) Breen did have such a chair made and gave it to Dixon. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 53.)
On July 15, 2015, Dixon received an email from Professor Thomas Geraghty concerning the conditions imposed on the JTDC detainees during Empire filming. (Pls.’ Ex. 90 [422-90] at 9.) At the time, the JTDC was subject to monitoring under the ruling in Doe v. Cook County, No. 99-cv-3945, Dkt. No. 786 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2015). In Doe, Judge Holderman appointed Dunlap to monitor the JTDC as a “Court Appointed Expert” and imposed a three-month observation period on the JTDC from May 20, 2015 to August 20, 2015. Id. at 1–2. In the July 15, 2015 email, Geraghty raised concerns that, in light of the Empire filming, the JTDC might be, among other things, putting juvenile detainees on lockdown. (Pls.’ Ex. 90 [422-90] at 9.) Dixon responded by assuring Geraghty that the Empire filming had “no impact on regular programming for our kids other than changing the locations of some programs and visits.” (Id. at 4.)
On August 7, Breen reached out to Dixon to propose that Fox return on August 12 for a third session of filming. (Pls.’ Ex. 93 [422-93] at 2–3.) When Dixon forwarded the request to Alonzo, Alonzo replied, “I don’t advise having them come before the Doe party meeting on 8/20,” to which Dixon responded, “Agreed.” (Id.) August 20, 2015 was the date that Judge Holderman had set for terminating the court-imposed monitoring of the JTDC. (Dunlap Rpt. ¶ 22; Doe, No.
14

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99-cv-3945, Dkt. No. 786 at 1.) Alonzo denied any nefarious purpose for this advice, testifying that it simply would have been “burdensome” to accommodate filming while preparing for the Doe meeting because of the “time, effort, [and] preparation for the Doe meeting” and “just having a lot of people on site.” (Defs.’ Updated Ex. 42 [431-4] at 91:12–93:6.) 5. Procedural history
Plaintiffs T.S. and Q.B. filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated on August 24, 2016. They asserted constitutional and state-law claims against the Fox entities, Cook County, Dixon, and numerous John Does. The case was assigned to the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve. On October 5, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Class Action Complaint (“FAC”) [23]. The FAC added a Defendant: the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, in his official capacity (hereinafter the “Chief Judge”). The court later granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. See T.S. v. Twentieth Century Fox Television, No. 16 C 8303, 2017 WL 1425596 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2017). Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“SAC”) [88] on May 23, 2017. The Fox Defendants filed a second Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which the court granted in part and denied in part. See T.S. v. Twentieth Century Fox Television, No. 16 C 8303, 2017 WL 4620841 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2017).
The following claims from the SAC moved forward: a claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dixon, Cook County, and the Chief Judge (Count I); a state-law claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Dixon (Count VII); a state-law claim for inducement of breach of fiduciary duty against the Fox Defendants (Count VIII); a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Dixon, Cook County, and the Chief Judge (Count IX); and a state-law claim for unjust enrichment against the
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Fox Defendants (Count XIII).8 Two remaining counts do not set forth independent claims but allege theories for holding Cook County liable for the acts of its agents: a state-law respondeat superior claim (Count XI), and a state-law claim for indemnification against Cook Country (Count XII).9
On May 23, 2018, the case was reassigned to this court after Judge St. Eve was confirmed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. On January 16, 2020, the court denied without prejudice Defendants’ motion to strike the class allegations [215] and Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification [235]. See T.S. v. Twentieth Century Fox Television, 334 F.R.D. 518 (N.D. Ill. 2020). As discussed in more detail below, the court determined that although some of Plaintiffs’ claims may be amenable to class treatment, the proposed class definition was overbroad. See id. at 525.
Later, on cross-motions for partial summary judgment, the court determined that the Chief Judge is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because he acts on behalf of the State of Illinois, rather than Cook County, in his administrative role with respect to the JTDC. See T.S. v. Twentieth Century Fox Television, No. 16 C 8303, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2020 WL 6870809, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2020). Therefore, the court granted the Chief Judge’s motion for summary judgment on all claims against him. See id. Further, based on the parties’ stipulation, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Dixon was the Chief Judge’s final decisionmaker with respect to the Empire filming. See id. at *2.

8

In the SAC, Plaintiffs asserted a claim against Cook County and/or the Chief Judge

for liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiffs

withdrew that claim in their brief opposing summary judgment (see Pls.’ Br. in Opp’n to Mot. for

Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Opp’n”) [421-1] at 50 n.10), so the court dismisses it with prejudice. The court

also notes that the SAC (and the proposed Third Amended Complaint) asserts Counts VII and

VIII against Doe Defendants. The time for identifying and serving the Doe Defendants passed

long ago. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). Therefore, the court assumes that the Plaintiffs are not

pursuing any claims against those Defendants and dismisses them without prejudice. See id.

9

The parties do not discuss respondeat superior liability in their briefs on summary

judgment and class certification, but they do address indemnification. See infra Part II.C.

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DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows that there is no genuine

dispute of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R.

CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law, and

a dispute is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In ruling on a

motion for summary judgment, the court construes all facts and draws all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lopez v. Sheriff

of Cook Cnty., 993 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 2021).

Under Rule 23, a proposed class must satisfy four threshold requirements: numerosity,

commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). The class must

then meet the requirements of one of the categories of class actions in Rule 23(b). See Messner

v. Northshore Univ. HealthSys., 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs seek certification of

three classes under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a showing that “questions of law or fact common

to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a

class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the

controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs also seek to bring their unjust enrichment claims

against the Fox Defendants under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), which is appropriate when “adjudications with

respect to individual class members . . . would be dispositive of the interests of the other members

not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to

protect their interests.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).

I.

Conditions of Confinement Claims under § 1983

Defendants Cook County and Dixon have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’

conditions of confinement claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the alternative, Defendant Dixon

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argues that qualified immunity applies. Because the merits of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are closely intertwined with the qualified immunity inquiry, the court addresses them together.
A. Merits The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause prohibits conditions of confinement that amount to punishment of pretrial detainees. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015) (“pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all”); Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821–22 (7th Cir. 2019).10 “[I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). “Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.” Id. A combination of conditions of confinement, “even if not individually serious enough to work constitutional violations, may violate the Constitution . . . when they have ‘a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need.’” Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)). In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the Supreme Court clarified that “a pretrial detainee can prevail by providing only objective evidence that the challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398 (emphases added). In other words, a pretrial detainee need not show evidence of a defendant’s subjective intent to punish. Id at 397–98. Although Kingsley addressed conditions-of-confinement claims in the excessive force context, the Seventh Circuit has extended Kingsley’s objective unreasonableness inquiry to “all Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees.”

10

By contrast, convicted prisoners may bring claims for unconstitutional conditions

of confinement under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause. See

Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 821 (citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 400).

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Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 823; see also Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018) (applying Kingsley to pretrial detainee’s claims of inadequate medical care). Courts must also consider whether the defendant acted purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396 (“[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process”) (emphasis in original).11 Defendant Dixon does not dispute that he personally approved both the filming of Empire at the JTDC and operational changes that enabled the filming. Indeed, the parties previously stipulated that Dixon was the final decisionmaker with respect to “whether to permit the staging and filming of scenes for Empire at the [JTDC]” and “whether and how the JTDC's operations would be altered in order to accommodate the Empire filming.” T.S., 2020 WL 6870809 at *2.
To survive summary judgment on their conditions-of-confinement claims, therefore, Plaintiffs must show a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the conditions at issue were “not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective” or were “excessive in relation to that purpose.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398. In Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cnty., pretrial detainees challenged a jail’s policy requiring female detainees to wear either white underwear or no underwear at all. 850 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 2017). The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants, concluding that genuine disputes of material

11

At least one judge on the Seventh Circuit would impose a third requirement: that

the conditions in question be “objectively serious.” Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 827 (Sykes, J.,

concurring). But see McCann v. Ogle Cnty., 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018) (identifying only

two inquiries for due process challenges to pretrial detainees’ medical care: (1) “whether the [ ]

defendants acted purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly when they considered the

consequences of their handling of [plaintiff’s] case,” and (2) “whether the challenged conduct was

objectively reasonable”); accord Clark v. Trammell, No. 18 C 5142, 2021 WL 979157, at *4 (N.D.

Ill. Mar. 16, 2021) (Lee, J.) (applying McCann’s two-step framework).

Chief Judge Sykes’s concurrence draws upon the Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference standard for claims brought by convicted prisoners. See Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 827

(Sykes, J., concurring) (“only ‘objectively [and] sufficiently serious’ deprivations are actionable as

a violation of the Constitution”) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). This court

has previously quoted the Hardeman concurrence, see T.S., 334 F.R.D. at 529, 536, but

acknowledges here that the Seventh Circuit has not yet held that “objectively serious” is a required

element for all Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims.

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fact as to whether the policy was rationally related to a government interest—or, even if it was rationally related, whether the policy was excessive in light of detainees’ dignitary interests— precluded summary judgment. Id. at 857–58.
Plaintiffs in this case have made a showing sufficient to survive summary judgment as well. They have identified facts suggesting that Dixon’s decision to allow Fox to film at the JTDC was not rationally related to a government purpose, or that the conditions imposed to facilitate the filming were excessive in light of that purpose. Dixon testified that he believed filming “would be good for the staff” and “good for the kids.” (Defs.’ SOF ¶ 26 (citing Dixon Dep. 112:1–8).) There is some evidence that staff morale improved during filming, possibly because filming provided opportunities for staff to earn overtime. (See Defs.’ SOF ¶ 36; PSOAF ¶ 54.) But Plaintiffs have offered facts suggesting there was little effort to encourage detainee meet-and-greets with the stars, such that any potential benefit the detainees would have derived from such contacts was minimal. (See Pls.’ Opp’n at 21–22.) Some detainees were able to meet briefly with actors Chris Rock and Terrence Howard in June, but there were no interactions between Empire’s cast and crew and the detainees during the July or August filming periods. (PSOAF ¶ 47.) A reasonable jury could find that Dixon’s motivations were more personal ones: He met and took photos with all of Empire’s stars, and he even received a “director’s chair” to use during the August filming. (Id. ¶¶ 49–53.) There also is some evidence that Dixon took steps to minimize scrutiny of the filming by Professor Geraghty and Judge Holderman, who was monitoring the JTDC as part of the Doe litigation. (Id. ¶¶ 56–58.) A reasonable jury could conclude that Dixon lacked a legitimate governmental purpose for imposing the challenged conditions, or that the conditions were excessive in light of that purpose. See Mulvania, 850 F.3d at 856–58.
It is not enough, however, for Plaintiffs to show that Defendant Dixon may have violated their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs are suing Dixon in his individual capacity (Pls.’ Opp’n at 45), meaning that he may raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense. Kentucky v. Graham,
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473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“[A]n official in a personal-capacity action may, depending on his position, be able to assert personal immunity defenses,” including qualified immunity.).12 If Dixon is entitled to qualified immunity, then Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims cannot go forward.
B. Qualified Immunity The doctrine of qualified immunity consists of two related inquiries: “first, whether the constitutional right asserted by the plaintiffs was clearly established at the time the defendants acted; and second, whether defendants’ actions violated that clearly established right.” Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 820 (citations omitted). “If either inquiry is answered in the negative, the defendant official is protected by qualified immunity.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (concluding that courts may exercise “discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first”). Once defendants have raised qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the constitutional right was “clearly established.” Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 820; see also Mannoia v. Farrow, 476 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Although the privilege of qualified immunity is a defense, the plaintiff carries the burden of defeating it.”). Courts should not define clearly established law “at a high level of generality.” Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 820 (citations omitted). “An appropriately defined right is clearly established if there is a closely analogous— though not necessarily identical—case identifying that right, or if the defendant's conduct was so egregious and unreasonable that . . . no reasonable [official] could have thought he was acting lawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The dispositive question is whether

12

Because Plaintiffs’ claims against Dixon are in his individual capacity, not his

official capacity, the County Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment arguments are irrelevant. See

Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 (“The only immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action

are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh

Amendment.”). The court also notes that Mathlock v. Fleming, No. 18-cv-6406, 2019 WL 2866726

(N.D. Ill. July 3, 2019), is inapposite here. In Mathlock, Dixon and the Chief Judge were named

as defendants in their official capacities, and the district court concluded that both had Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Id. at *4. In any case, the fact that an officer has Eleventh Amendment

immunity in a single case does not mean the officer has such immunity in all cases.

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the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original).
At a high level of generality, the right of pretrial detainees to be free of conditions of confinement imposed for no legitimate governmental purpose is clearly established. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. “The dispositive question,” however, “is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 820 (emphasis in original). As discussed above, the parties dispute whether the challenged conditions were objectively unreasonable or were excessive in relation to a legitimate government purpose. In the absence of an analogous case holding that similar conditions are unconstitutional, the court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that pretrial detainees have a clearly established right to be free of the arguably modest disruptions at issue here.
The two cases that Plaintiffs cite in their brief opposing summary judgment are not analogous. In Demery v. Arpaio, the Ninth Circuit held that the practice of installing webcams in a county jail and livestreaming the video online violated detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment rights because the webcams were not reasonably related to a nonpunitive purpose. 378 F.3d 1020, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2004). Applying Bell, the court reasoned that “the webcams did not improve the security of the pretrial detention center when closed-circuit video cameras were already present,” and “turning pretrial detainees into the unwilling objects of the latest reality show” did not serve a legitimate goal, such as ensuring detainees’ attendance at trial or promoting prison safety. Id. at 1030, 1031. In Robles v. Prince George’s Cnty., the Fourth Circuit held that police officers violated a pretrial detainee’s due process rights when they tied him to a metal pole in a deserted parking lot and left him there for approximately ten minutes. 302 F.3d 262, 269–70 (4th Cir. 2002). The court observed that the detainee’s injury “was more than de minimis” because he was “tied up in a dark and deserted location in the middle of the night” and “did not know when or if anyone would come to rescue him or who might discover him.” Id. at 270.
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Neither Demery nor Robles dealt with the kinds of conditions at issue in this case: operational disruptions to a juvenile detention facility. Plaintiffs have not pointed to cases involving, for example, changes to the location of schooling or recreation; missed opportunities for enrichment programs; marginally reduced privacy during visitation; or “overcrowding” in pods that nonetheless provide detainees with their own rooms.13 The court is sensitive to the fact that Plaintiffs are or were juveniles at the time of the filming, and that the standard for substantive due process violations may well be lower for juvenile pretrial detainees than for adult detainees. See Bergren v. City of Milwaukee, 811 F.2d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 1987) (“In assessing whether the treatment of the detained juvenile satisfies the requirements of due process, it is quite appropriate—indeed necessary—to consider that in such an environment juveniles may indeed have different needs and more importantly, different capacities than adults.”); Doe v. Cook Cnty., No. 99 C 3945, 1999 WL 1069244, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 1999) (“[T]he 14th amendment due process standard should, as a general matter, be more liberally construed when applied to juvenile pretrial detainees.”). But even under a more liberal standard, Plaintiffs have not identified an analogous case that would have put Defendant Dixon on notice that his conduct was unlawful.14

13

The court notes that in Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court held that the practice of

“double-bunking” did not violate pretrial detainees’ constitutional rights. Bell, 441 U.S. at 541.

Here, there is no evidence that detainees had to share rooms; a pod may have had 15 or 16

detainees, each with their own room, even though the JTDC’s internal policies set the “functional

operating capacity” of a given pod at 14. (See Defs.’ SOF ¶¶ 71–72; Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 40–41.)

To be sure, Bell involved adult detainees rather than juveniles, but Plaintiffs have not provided

precedent for their assertion that minor increases to pod population amount to a constitutional

violation.

14

In Bergren, for example, the Seventh Circuit held that a juvenile detainee who was

arrested and held in custody for ten hours did not suffer unconstitutional conditions of confinement

because he was not punished or confined for an excessive amount of time. Bergren, 811 F.2d at

1144 (“We stress that, in holding that the actions of the police officers in this case did not violate

the minimum standards imposed by the federal constitution, we do not express in any way our

approval of the methodology employed by the officers in this case. We simply hold that, under

these circumstances, there was no violation of the federal constitution.”).

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Plaintiffs are correct that, when determining whether a government official violated a constitutional right, courts should view the facts “in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. But if the right asserted is not clearly established, then the court need not proceed to the other qualified immunity inquiry. See Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 820 (“If either inquiry is answered in the negative, the defendant official is protected by qualified immunity.”). Furthermore, this case does not involve such extreme circumstances that no reasonable officer could have concluded that the conditions were constitutionally permissible. Compare Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020) (holding that correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where inmate was confined in a pair of shockingly unsanitary cells for six days).
Because Plaintiffs have not met their burden, Defendant Dixon is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. The court grants the County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to those claims. II. State-Law Claims
The following state-law claims remain: breach of fiduciary duty against Dixon (Count VII), intentional infliction of emotional distress against the County Defendants (Count IX), indemnification against Cook County (Count XII), inducement of a breach of fiduciary duty against the Fox Defendants (Count VIII), and unjust enrichment against the Fox Defendants (Count XIII). Now that the court has dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the court would ordinarily dismiss Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims without prejudice. Harvey v. Town of Merrillville, 649 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is the well-established law of this circuit that the usual practice is to dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” (quoting Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir.1999))). Here, however, given this case’s lengthy procedural history and the extensive judicial resources expended thus far, the court will exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction over the remaining
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state law claims. See, e.g., Timm, 32 F.3d at 276–77 (holding that it was not improper for district court to retain jurisdiction over state claims after granting summary judgment on only federal claim in the case).
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 1. Merits
Plaintiffs argue that Dixon owed them a fiduciary duty and breached it by permitting the Empire filming. Specifically, they contend that Dixon “misdirected [the JTDC’s] resources for his own benefit and that of Fox, to the detriment of the youth who had been placed in his care.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 38.) By Plaintiffs’ account, Dixon’s actions injured them by exacerbating the psychological impact of incarceration and endangered them by increasing the risk of physical violence at the JTDC.
To prevail on their claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Illinois law, Plaintiffs must show that “(1) a fiduciary duty existed, (2) that duty was breached, and (3) the breach of the duty proximately caused damages.” Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sinikovic, 125 F. Supp. 3d 769, 777 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing Gross v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 619 F.3d 697, 709 (7th Cir. 2010)). This court has repeatedly recognized that “the state has a duty, under clearly established principles of constitutional and tort law, ‘to assume some responsibility’ for the ‘safety and general well-being’ of detainees.” T.S., 334 F.R.D. at 538 n.14 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989)); see also T.S., 2017 WL 1425596 at *10 (same). Defendants agree that detention center officials owe detainees a duty to provide “for basic human needs, such as ‘food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.’” (County Defs.’ Summ. J. Mot. [414] at 27 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200)). But they argue that the duty is not a fiduciary one. (See, e.g., County Defs.’ Summ. J. Mot. at 27; County Defs.’ Summ. J. Reply [428] at 1 (maintaining that “no Illinois case, state or federal, has held that detention officials are fiduciaries for detainees”).)
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In this court’s view, Defendants have defined the scope of their responsibility too narrowly. Illinois law recognizes a guardian-ward relationship as a type of fiduciary relationship. See In re Estate of Gustafson, 268 Ill. App. 3d 404, 407, 644 N.E.2d 813, 816 (2d Dist. 1994). At the motion to dismiss stage, Judge St. Eve recognized that Plaintiffs “were not officially adjudicated as ‘wards’ of the court . . . during the relevant time period.” T.S., 2017 WL 1425596 at *10. She nevertheless agreed that Illinois law supports Plaintiffs’ theory that Dixon acted as their guardian while they were housed at the JTDC, and that he therefore owed them a fiduciary duty. See id. (citing cases). Defendants maintain that Judge St. Eve did not determine that Dixon’s duty “definitely was fiduciary in nature.” (County Defs.’ Summ. J. Reply at 9.) This court is comfortable concluding that it was.
Parks v. Kownacki supports this conclusion. 305 Ill. App. 3d 449, 461, 711 N.E.2d 1208, 1216 (5th Dist. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 193 Ill. 2d 164, 737 N.E.2d 287 (2000). There, an Illinois appellate court determined that a guardian-ward relationship arose between a priest and a teenaged girl when the priest kept the girl “in the rectory as his housekeeper, [sent] her to school far away from her parents and family, and . . . exercise[d] all the control over her that a legal guardian would be allowed to exercise.” Id. Likewise, the court determined that the priest owed the girl a fiduciary duty because of this relationship. See id. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision on other grounds and therefore did not expressly endorse these conclusions. 193 Ill. 2d 164, 737 N.E.2d 287. But the Court did state that when the priest “accepted the responsibility of plaintiff’s care and education, he took on the role of her guardian, even though he was not given that title by a court.” Id. at 169, 737 N.E.2d at 290; see also Clayton v. Millers First Ins. Cos., 384 Ill. App. 3d 429, 436, 892 N.E.2d 613, 619 (5th Dist. 2008) (noting same). The JTDC housed and educated these Plaintiffs while they were away from their parents, and Dixon “exercise[d] all the control over [them] that a legal guardian would be allowed to exercise.” Parks,
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305 Ill. App. 3d at 461, 711 N.E.2d at 1216. So, like the priest in Parks, Dixon can fairly be said to have acted as Plaintiffs’ guardian and fiduciary while they were detained at the JTDC.
That Parks involved different kinds of harm does not change this conclusion. See Parks, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 454, 711 N.E.2d at 1211 (priest allegedly beat and sexually abused teenaged girl). Nor do Defendants’ cited cases, in which, according to Defendants, the courts held either that “there is no fiduciary relationship between prison officials and detainees” or that “[any] fiduciary relationship is limited to physicians and detainee patients or . . . the handling of detainees’ funds.” (County Defs.’ Summ. J. Mot. at 28.) In the only cited case applying Illinois law, Day v. Jeffreys, the court stated that it was “unclear” whether the plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the director of the Illinois Department Corrections was cognizable under a statute concerning sexually dangerous persons. No. 19-CV-00945-NJR, 2019 WL 6701671, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2019). Despite the uncertainty, the court denied the motion to dismiss the claim. See id. If anything, therefore, Day undermines Defendants’ position. More importantly, neither Day nor the other cited cases (which are, in any event, not controlling authority) concerned juvenile detainees. See id.; Surratt v. McClaran, 234 F. Supp. 3d 815 (E.D. Tex. 2016), aff'd sub nom. Surratt v. McClarin, 851 F.3d 389 (5th Cir. 2017); Rua v. Glodis, 52 F. Supp. 3d 84 (D. Mass. 2014); Sperry v. Corizon Health, Inc., No. 18-3119-SAC, 2020 WL 905745 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2020); Hernandez v. Cate, No. EDCV 11-00627 R AJW, 2014 WL 6473769 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. EDCV11-00627 R AJW, 2014 WL 6606901 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2014). This line of cases does not disturb the basis for finding a fiduciary duty here: the guardian-ward relationship between Dixon and the JTDC detainees.
Defendants next argue that, even if Dixon owed Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty, the scope of the duty is the same as Dixon’s obligation to juveniles or pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. For support, they observe that the court has cited DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200, for the proposition that Dixon’s fiduciary duty involved protecting Plaintiffs’
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safety and well-being. See, e.g., T.S., 2017 WL 1425596 at *10. Defendants are correct that in the cited portion of DeShaney, the Supreme Court discussed a constitutional standard. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200 (explaining that when a state restrains a person’s liberty by taking him into custody, “the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being”). But the DeShaney Court also emphasized that a state can “impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as it wishes,” and that “not ‘all common-law duties owed by government actors were . . . constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Id. at 202 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335 (1986)); see also Daniels, 474 U.S. at 335 (“Jailers may owe a special duty of care to those in their custody under state tort law . . . .”). Because DeShaney draws a distinction between constitutional obligations and state-law tort duties, it does not establish that Dixon’s fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs was congruent with his obligations to them under the Fourteenth Amendment. See also, e.g., T.S., 2017 WL 1425596 at *10 (recognizing that Dixon’s duty to protect Plaintiffs has constitutional and tort-law dimensions).
Illinois courts require a child’s guardian-fiduciary to “protect the child from harm.” Parks, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 461, 711 N.E.2d at 1216 (citing People v. Watson, 103 Ill. App. 3d 992, 998, 431 N.E.2d 1350, 1355 (4th Dist. 1982)). That duty includes “refrain[ing] from harming and . . . restrain[ing] others within one’s control from harming” the child. Parks, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 461, 711 N.E.2d at 1216. It can also be understood as encompassing an obligation to “care” for the child. See, e.g., Parks, 193 Ill. 2d at 169, 737 N.E.2d at 290 (priest assumed role as teenager’s guardian by “accept[ing] the responsibility” for her “care and education”). Under these definitions, a guardian necessarily must protect a child’s “safety and general well-being.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. But because a guardian’s fiduciary duty arises under Illinois law, there is no support for importing Fourteenth Amendment standards to limit it—even in the juvenile detention context. Defendants point to no Illinois law providing otherwise.
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If the standard for establishing a breach of fiduciary duty is lower than that for establishing a Fourteenth Amendment violation, Defendants contend, the court must conclude Plaintiffs cannot meet that standard because none of Dixon’s actions “put detainees’ safety and well-being at risk.” (County Defs.’ Summ. J. Mot. at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).) A reasonable jury could disagree. Dixon did testify during his deposition that he permitted the Empire filming because he thought it would benefit the detainees. (Dixon Dep. 112:1–8.) But Plaintiffs have presented evidence tending to show that by permitting the filming, Dixon interrupted the normal operations of the JTDC in ways that harmed the detainees’ well-being. For example, a jury reasonably could infer that the filming caused T.S., Q.B., and H.C. to miss at least one day of recreation outside of their pods. In addition, a jury reasonably could find that because of the filming, T.S. had less privacy during a family visit; T.S. had to take one day of summer school classes in his pod rather than in a classroom; and T.S. and H.C. missed one session of a free-writing program that they regularly attended after school. Considering (among other things) Dr. Kraus’s opinion that spending more time on the pod with fewer activities can worsen the psychological impact of detention on juveniles (see, e.g., Kraus Rpt. ¶ 6), a reasonable jury could conclude that Dixon breached his fiduciary duty and caused Plaintiffs harm.
There is also evidence tending to show that the Empire filming required increasing the population in certain pods beyond their functional capacity. Dunlap opined that following functional capacity guidelines was “essential [for] youth in custody to fe[el] safe and [to be] safe.” (Dunlap Rpt. ¶ 57.) Dr. Kraus opined that overcrowding in pods can put detainees’ safety at risk. (Kraus Rpt. ¶¶ 30(c), 38.) Although Plaintiffs have not identified evidence that fights occurred more frequently in the pods whose population exceeded functional capacity, a jury reasonably could conclude based on the expert opinions that detainees in those pods felt less safe. In turn, a reasonable jury could find that Dixon breached his fiduciary duty to protect the detainees in those pods, and that those detainees suffered harm to their well-being.
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It bears mention that Plaintiffs’ failure to present evidence that the Empire filming jeopardized their medical treatment is not fatal to their claim. Defendants argue that the claim survived only because of medical-related claims that Plaintiffs later withdrew, but they are incorrect. In ruling on Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, the court credited Plaintiffs’ allegations that Dixon and Cook County subjected them “to numerous restrictions that were detrimental to their health and safety so that the Fox Defendants could film a television show.” T.S., 2017 WL 1425596 *10 (emphasis added). That language cannot reasonably be understood as limiting Plaintiffs’ claim to a medical context. And it is broad enough to encompass restrictions that increased detainees’ time on the pod and interfered with their schooling, activities, and family visits.
For the reasons just explained, a reasonable jury could find that Dixon breached his fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs and caused them harm. The court, therefore, denies the County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. In addition to seeking damages for harm resulting from the alleged breach, Plaintiffs seek restitution. First, they appear to seek the value of the director’s chair and autographed photographs that Dixon received from Fox and Empire actors. (See Pls.’ Renewed Mot. for Class Cert. [351] (hereinafter “Renewed Mot.”) at 32.) Plaintiffs maintain that the value of those items is “quantifiable” (id.), though they have not identified evidence showing that the value is significant. On the other hand, the County Defendants do not cite legal authority providing that restitution is unavailable for an ill-gotten benefit whose value is de minimis. Because the evidence permits a reasonable inference that Dixon received the items in question because of the alleged breach, the court denies the County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ restitution claim as it relates to Dixon. See Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33, 56–57, 643 N.E.2d 734, 745 (1994) (to obtain restitution from breaching party, a plaintiff must show that the party obtained a benefit from the breach). Second, Plaintiffs seek restitution of the benefits that the Fox Defendants gained
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because of Dixon’s alleged breach: the revenue Fox received from the Empire filming. The court addresses this request in its discussion of the Fox Defendants’ alleged liability. See infra Part II.D.2.
2. State-Law Sovereign Immunity The County Defendants have raised state sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense to Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. (County Defs.’ Summ. J. Mot. [414] at 23–24.) They argue that the Illinois Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over all tort claims against the State of Illinois, and Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against Dixon and the County are claims against the State because Dixon is a state employee.15 See Illinois Court of Claims Act, 705 ILCS 505/8(d); Healy v. Vaupel, 549 N.E.2d 1240, 1246–47, 133 Ill.2d 295, 307–08 (Ill. 1990). The Seventh Circuit has recognized, however, that “Congress, not the states, determines the jurisdictional authority of the federal courts.” Rodriguez v. Cook County, 664 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2011). Thus, “a state employee’s sovereign-immunity defense does not impact a federal court’s jurisdiction over a case.” Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 518 (7th Cir. 2012). The court concludes that the Illinois Court of Claims Act does not deprive it of jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims in this case. See id. at 518–19. Setting aside the jurisdictional issue, Defendant Dixon is not entitled to sovereign immunity under Illinois law, at least at this juncture. Defendants appear to invoke the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 5/1, which provides that the State is generally immune from suit in federal court. That immunity can shield state employees even when those employees are sued in their

15

Plaintiffs do not concede that Dixon is a state employee. (Pls.’ Opp’n [421] at 48.)

But the same rationale that justified concluding that “the Chief Judge acts an arm of the State of

Illinois when he operates and administers the JTDC” could apply to Dixon. T.S., 2020 WL

6870809, at *8. In the November 23, 2020 opinion, this court granted summary judgment on the

parties’ stipulation that “Dixon was the Chief Judge’s final decision-maker.” Id. It follows that

Dixon was exercising State authority rather than County authority when he made the decision to

allow Empire filming at the JTDC.

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individual capacity. Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 441 (7th Cir. 2001). But the Seventh Circuit has recognized an exception where the “plaintiff alleges that state officials or employees violated ‘statutory or constitutional law.’” Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Healy, 549 N.E.2d at 1247); see also Fritz v. Johnson, 807 N.E.2d 461, 468, 209 Ill. 2d 302, 313 (2004) (“Whenever a state employee performs illegally, unconstitutionally, or without authority, a suit may still be maintained against the employee in his individual capacity and does not constitute an action against the State of Illinois.”). This exception, which appears to eviscerate the statutory immunity in many cases, applies to state-law claims as well, “so long as the same alleged conduct underlies both the constitutional claims and the state tort claims.” Gay v. Ortman, No. 18 C 50310, 2020 WL 5593283, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2020).
Because Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against Dixon are based on the same conduct as their constitutional claims, the court is not prepared at this time to conclude that Defendant Dixon claim has sovereign immunity. Murphy, 844 F.3d at 660 (denying sovereign immunity where plaintiff alleged and proved that state officers “acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law”). He will be free to raise the sovereign immunity defense again at trial. Murphy, 844 F.3d at 660 n.3 (“We believe Illinois also requires a plaintiff ultimately to prove the alleged [constitutional] violations.”); Nadzhafaliyev v. Hardy, No. 16 C 6844, 2020 WL 7027578, at *10–11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2020) (denying state sovereign immunity at the summary judgment stage because “a jury reasonably could find that Defendants . . . violated Plaintiff's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment”). In other words, sovereign immunity may apply if Dixon can persuade the jury that he had a legitimate government purpose for imposing the challenged conditions, or that the conditions were reasonable in relation to that purpose, and thus Plaintiffs have not proved their constitutional claim. This is so even though the court has granted summary judgment for Dixon on the constitutional claims on the basis of qualified immunity. The application of qualified immunity shields an officer from liability, but it does not negate the possible presence of an
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underlying constitutional violation. See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 34–36 (2015) (examining cases in which courts recognized that a constitutional violation had occurred but nonetheless granted qualified immunity because the violation was not clearly established at the time).
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Plaintiffs also assert a claim against Dixon and the County for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). In short, they argue that by allowing Fox to film Empire at the JTDC, Dixon exacerbated the adverse psychological impact of incarceration on the detainees. To prevail on their IIED claim, Plaintiffs must prove three elements. “First, the conduct involved must be truly extreme and outrageous. Second, the actor must either intend that his conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or know that there is at least a high probability that his conduct will cause severe emotional distress. Third, the conduct must in fact cause severe emotional distress.” Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 263, 269, 798 N.E.2d 75, 80 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (same). “[M]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities” do not give rise to an IIED claim. McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 86, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (1988) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. d, at 73 (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). Instead, “the nature of the defendant’s conduct must be so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community.” Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d at 270, 798 N.E.2d at 80–81. The court first considers whether the evidence permits a reasonable conclusion that Dixon’s conduct was objectively extreme and outrageous. Three non-exclusive factors are relevant to this inquiry. See Cairel, 821 F.3d at 835. The first is “the degree of power or authority the defendant holds over the plaintiff.” Id. The more control a defendant has over a plaintiff, “the more likely that defendant’s conduct will be deemed outrageous . . . .” Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d at
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273, 798 N.E.2d at 82 (quoting McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 86–87, 533 N.E.2d at 809). “Second, courts consider whether the defendant knew the plaintiff was particularly susceptible to emotional distress and acted inappropriately despite that knowledge.” Cairel, 821 F.3d at 836; see also Graham v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 318 Ill. App. 3d 736, 746, 742 N.E.2d 858, 867 (1st. Dist. 2000). “Behavior that would not normally be considered outrageous may be actionable if the defendant knows that the plaintiff is particularly susceptible.” Graham, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 746, 742 N.E.2d at 867 (citing McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 89–90, 533 N.E.2d at 811). “Third, courts consider whether the defendant reasonably believed that his objective was legitimate.” Cairel, 821 F.3d at 836 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 88, 533 N.E.2d at 810).
In contending that Dixon’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, Plaintiffs suggest that Dixon permitted the Empire filming not for a legitimate purpose, but rather because he wanted to meet celebrities. Plaintiffs also emphasize that the detainees were children and Dixon was responsible for their care. In addition, Plaintiffs argue that Dixon knew the detainees were particularly susceptible to emotional distress. To that end, they cite Dixon’s testimony during his deposition for this case that “juvenile detention is the emergency room of the juvenile justice system.” (Dixon Dep. at 49:13–15.) Finally, Plaintiffs maintain that Dixon exercised “complete control” over the detainees. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 44.) Whether Dixon’s decision to permit the Empire filming went “beyond all possible bounds of decency” is debatable. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d at 270, 798 N.E.2d at 80–81. But considering the power Dixon wielded over the children and their vulnerability as detainees, a jury drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor could conclude that it did.
Plaintiffs stumble on the other elements of their claim, however. Regarding intent, Plaintiffs parrot the case law. They argue that Dixon knew there was a high probability that his conduct could cause the detainees severe emotional distress, but they do not explain why.
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Dixon’s deposition testimony that “juvenile detention is the emergency room of the juvenile justice system” does not fill this gap. (Dixon Dep. at 49:13–15.) The testimony can fairly be understood as showing Dixon’s knowledge that the detainees were susceptible to emotional distress. But it says nothing about how JTDC operations or changes thereto can affect the detainees, psychologically or otherwise. Considering the cited testimony alone, no reasonable jury could find that Dixon acted with the requisite knowledge that permitting the disruptions generated by the Empire filming would cause Plaintiffs severe emotional distress.
Nor is it clear that Plaintiffs’ suffering in fact rose to this level. “The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 86, 533 N.E.2d at 809 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. j, at 77–78 (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). Where plaintiffs have alleged that defendants’ actions “caused them simply to become annoyed, frustrated, stressful, distressed, embarrassed, humiliated or nervous,” courts generally have determined that they did not state a claim for IIED under Illinois law. Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 495 (7th Cir. 2001); see also, e.g., Welsh v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 306 Ill. App. 3d 148, 155, 713 N.E.2d 679, 684 (1st Dist. 1999). True, a plaintiff can establish that he suffered severe emotional distress without proof of a physical injury or the need for medical or psychiatric treatment. See Honaker, 256 F.3d at 496; Bristow v. Drake St. Inc., 41 F.3d 345, 350 (7th Cir. 1994). But courts are “more inclined” to find that a plaintiff has established such a claim “when the distress has manifested itself either through physical symptoms or has necessitated medical treatment.” Honaker, 256 F.3d at 495.
According to Dixon and the County, Plaintiffs have not submitted evidence suggesting that T.S., Q.B., or H.C. suffered any emotional distress, let alone severe emotional distress. Defendants also emphasize that Dr. Kraus—who opined that increasing juveniles’ time on the pod and limiting their activities can exacerbate the psychological effects of incarceration—did not examine T.S., Q.B., or H.C. Plaintiffs do not dispute these points. Furthermore, in their IIED
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briefing, Plaintiffs do not mention the statement from Taylor—a youth development specialist at the JTDC—that detainees in the pods where she worked seemed more anxious and felt “cooped up” during the Empire filming. (Taylor Decl. ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs certainly do not attempt to argue that the changes Taylor claims to have observed in the detainees went beyond mere annoyance, frustration, or stress, which do not supply a basis for an IIED claim under Illinois law. See, e.g., Honaker, 256 F.3d at 495. Instead, Plaintiffs maintain that, based solely on the purported outrageousness of Dixon’s conduct, a jury reasonably could find that T.S., Q.B., H.C., or other putative class members suffered severe emotional distress.
It is true that “the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant’s conduct” may itself be “important evidence that the distress has existed.” Honaker, 256 F.3d at 496 (quoting Wall v. Pecaro, 204 Ill. App. 3d 362, 368, 561 N.E.2d 1084, 1088 (1st Dist. 1990)). Relatedly, Illinois courts “tend to merge the issue of the outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct with the issue of the severity of the plaintiff’s emotional distress . . . .” Bristow, 41 F.3d at 350. But Plaintiffs have not cited any authority providing that outrageous conduct, without more, constitutes proof that a victim suffered severe emotional distress. Indeed, the court in Honaker stated that outrageous conduct may be “important” to the inquiry, not that it is sufficient. 256 F.3d at 496. And in Bristow, the court explained that “the weaker the evidence of distress,” the more evidence of outrageousness is required to tip the balance in the plaintiff’s favor. 41 F.3d at 350 (emphasis added). Bristow does not establish that a plaintiff can satisfy his burden of proof without any evidence that he suffered severe emotional distress.
In short, the purported outrageousness of Dixon’s conduct does not substitute for evidence that Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress. And although the court has concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Dixon’s breach of fiduciary duty harmed Plaintiffs—including by increasing the psychological effects that incarceration had on them—Plaintiffs make no effort to
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explain how that harm was sufficiently severe to support an IIED claim. The court grants summary judgment on the IIED claim in favor of Dixon and the County.
C. Indemnification Because at least one state-law claim against Dixon survives this ruling, the court turns to Plaintiffs’ argument that Cook County is obligated by Illinois law to pay any judgment entered against Dixon. In Illinois, counties are obligated to “pay any tort judgment” against an employee found liable for actions taken “within the scope of his employment.” 745 ILCS 10/9-102. Cook County argues, however, that this obligation is not triggered here because, as an employee of the Chief Judge’s office, Dixon is a state employee rather than a county employee. But that status does not control the analysis; that is, “the fact that [the defendant] is not an employee of the County is not dispositive.” Cannon v. Burge, No. 05 C 2192, 2006 WL 273544, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2006). Instead, “under the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003), the County has a duty to indemnify claims brought against State officials where the County funds the office of that state official.” Cannon, 2006 WL 273544, at *21. Cook County funds the JTDC, see 55 ILCS 75/1(a), and thus remains liable for indemnification for any tortious actions that Dixon takes within the scope of his employment.16 In challenging this determination, Cook County contends that Robinson’s holding applies only to state employees where the county not only funds, but also “maintain[s]” the office in question. Robinson, 351 F.3d at 339 (“The responsibility for maintaining and funding the Macon County Circuit Court lies with Macon County.”). And the County notes that, in its November 2020 decision to grant partial summary judgment, this court already found that there is no evidence that Cook County has the authority “to dictate how the Chief Judge operates and administers the

16

Cook County argues that although it pays JTDC salaries such as Dixon’s, those

salaries are reimbursed by the state. See 730 ILCS 110/15(4). But Cook County points to no

caselaw suggesting that such a reimbursement structure affects whether a county funds the office

of a particular state official for the purposes of indemnification.

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[JTDC].” T.S., 2020 WL 6870809, at *5. That statement appears, however, in a separate discussion of whether the Chief Judge was, himself, an agent of the county. Id. Elsewhere in the opinion, the court listed a number of ways in which the county might be said to “maintain” the JTDC, including the county’s ability to rebuild or relocate the JTDC if the county determines it is obsolete; the ability to fix the monthly salary of the superintendent and other necessary personnel; and the ability, at any time, to require the superintendent to provide information concerning the conduct, maintenance, or residents of the JTDC. Id.
Further, although the Seventh Circuit in Robinson noted that the county defendant there both maintained and funded the county court in question, the Seventh Circuit did not go so far as to say that such maintenance was a requirement for finding the county responsible for indemnifying the defendant state judge. Notably, the Seventh Circuit grounded the Robinson holding in the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle Cnty., 203 Ill. 2d 497, 787 N.E.2d 127 (2003). The Carver Court made no mention of the county’s role in “maintaining” the sheriff’s office at issue there; instead the Court said only, “Because the office of the sheriff is funded by the county, the county is therefore required to pay a judgment entered against [defendant sheriff’s office employee] . . . . ”17 Id. at 522, 787 N.E.2d at 141. For that reason, the court denies Cook County’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ indemnification claim. See Haag v. Cook County, No. 1:17-CV-05403, 2021 WL 1192440, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2021) (finding, in dicta, that Robinson’s and Carver’s holding suggest that “[b]ecause Cook County funds the Office of the Chief Judge for Cook County, it would have been responsible for indemnification” of an employee of that office).

17

Unlike the defendants in Robinson and Carver, Dixon faces suit here in his

individual, rather than official, capacity. Cook County did not argue that this distinction materially

distinguishes these cases from Dixon’s.

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D. Inducement and Unjust Enrichment Plaintiffs next argue that Fox is liable for inducing Dixon to breach his fiduciary duty. “Under Illinois law, a party is liable for tortious inducement if a plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant (1) colluded with a fiduciary in committing a breach; (2) knowingly participated in or induced the breach of duty; and (3) knowingly accepted the benefits resulting from that breach.” Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 477 F.3d 502, 508–09 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Regnery v. Meyers, 287 Ill. App. 3d 354, 364, 679 N.E.2d 74, 80 (1st Dist. 1997)). In short, Plaintiffs must show both that the Fox Defendants engaged in “active misbehavior” that facilitated the breach and that the Fox Defendants knew that this behavior would cause Dixon to breach his fiduciary duty to the JTDC’s detainees. Id.; see also In re Pritzker, No. 02 CH 21426, 03 CH 7531, 2004 WL 414313, at *7 (Cir. Ct. of Ill. Mar. 5, 2014) (finding that active participation requires “that the parties knew or had reason to believe at the time of their alleged participation that the acts were wrongful”). Here, the Fox Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ evidence could not support a jury finding on either front.
1. Tortious Inducement to Breach a Fiduciary Duty First, Fox contends that they did not engage in the requisite level of “active misbehavior.” A reasonable jury could disagree. Illinois courts define active misbehavior as “an act or omission which furthers or completes the breach of trust by the trustee.” Chabraja v. Martwick, 248 Ill. App. 3d 995, 998, 618 N.E.2d 800, 803 (1st Dist. 1993) (citing G. Bogert, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 901, 258–259 (2d ed. 1982)). Courts apply this standard liberally. For example, in Vill. of Wheeling v. Stavros, the court reversed dismissal of a complaint alleging tortious inducement where the defendant “was in a position to and did control certain officials of the Village” who “violated their fiduciary duties to the village” even though “the means by which [the defendant] influenced Village officials to breach their duties [we]re not set forth” in the complaint. 89 Ill. App. 3d 450, 452–53, 455, 411 N.E.2d 1067, 1068–69, 1071 (1st Dist. 1980). Likewise, in Regnery, the First District
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Appellate Court affirmed a judgment for a group of minority shareholders following a bench trial where the evidence showed that defendant, the brother of a majority shareholder, not only initiated the majority shareholder’s “sale of stock to his brother and himself at a price far below market value,” but also “fully participated in all steps of the transaction.” 287 Ill. App. 3d at 363– 64, 679 N.E.2d at 80.
In support of its argument that no jury could find that Fox engaged in active misbehavior, Fox cites Chabraja, where plaintiffs alleged that the Cook County School Superintendent had violated a fiduciary duty to the county by improperly holding public funds in a non-interest-bearing account. 248 Ill. App. 3d at 996, 618 N.E.2d at 801. Plaintiffs in Chabraja also alleged that the bank was liable for allowing the Superintendent to deposit the public funds. Affirming dismissal of that claim, the First District Appellate Court explained that “the mere act of accepting a deposit” did not amount to an “act or omission which furthers or completes the breach.” Id. at 999, 618 N.E.2d at 803 (internal citations omitted). Fox also cites Borsellino, where plaintiff—a partner in a stock-trading company—claimed that defendant Goldman Sachs had tortiously induced plaintiff’s two partners to breach their fiduciary duty to him by defrauding him of his rightful interest in the company. 477 F.3d at 504, 508. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of that claim on motion, explaining that “the plaintiffs have not alleged any active misbehavior on the part of Goldman Sachs,” because the allegations that Goldman Sachs conspired against plaintiff with plaintiff’s business partners “ma[de] neither economic nor common sense.” Id. at 508–09. Thus, “even accepting all of the plaintiffs’ allegations at face value, there was no interference by the defendant that could have induced a breach.” Id. at 508.
In the case before this court, there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Fox “further[ed] or complete[d]” Dixon’s breach of fiduciary duty. Chabraja, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 998, 618 N.E.2d at 803 (internal citations omitted). Klemke reached out to Dixon to propose filming Empire at the JTDC (Klemke Dep. at 19:6–21); Klemke and Breen requested use of the
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classrooms, the outdoor yards, the visitation room, the chapel, and Pods 3A and 3B (Klemke Follow-up Email; Defs.’ Ex. 20 at 2–5); and Fox repeatedly used those spaces, bringing some 150 crew members to the JTDC on at least four different days. (July 31 Robinson Email at 3.) These actions substantially exceed the conduct at issue in Chabraja, where the bank merely accepted a deposit. 248 Ill. App. 3d at 999, 618 N.E.2d at 803. Thus, if a jury finds that Dixon breached his fiduciary duty to the JTDC’s detainees, then that jury could also reasonably find that Fox’s actions furthered or completed that breach.
Fox’s more powerful argument relates to knowledge: Fox argues that no reasonable jury could find that Fox knew that Dixon was breaching his fiduciary duty by allowing Fox to film at the JTDC. The parties debate whether the tortious inducement standard requires a plaintiff to show actual knowledge or whether constructive knowledge will suffice. This question does not appear to have a simple answer. Compare People ex rel. Daley v. Warren Motors, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 305, 319, 500 N.E.2d 22, 28 (1986) (quoting Restatement (First) of Restitution § 174 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1937)) (“A person has notice of facts giving rise to a constructive trust not only when he knows them, but also when he should know them.”),18 with In re Canopy Fin., Inc., No. 12-cv4646, 2015 WL 3505010, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2015) (“[A]nalysis of claims of aiding and abetting . . . breach of fiduciary duty has consistently distinguished actual knowledge and participation from the ‘should have known’ state of mind, and has just as consistently held that the latter mindset is not actionable.”).
The court need not decide whether constructive knowledge suffices, however, for the record lacks sufficient evidence to support a finding that Fox had even constructive knowledge. Fox, of course, knew that the detainees could not use the classrooms, chapel, outdoor yards, or

18

The court in Warren Motors was referring to fiduciary breach in the context of the

“constructive trust” doctrine in which courts of equity will “impose a constructive trust to prevent a

person from holding for his own benefit an advantage gained by the abuse of a fiduciary

relationship.” 114 Ill. 2d 305, 314, 500 N.E.2d 22, 26 (1986) (internal citations omitted).

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intake pods while Fox was filming. But Klemke was under the impression that the JTDC could provide indoor alternatives for exercise (Klemke Dep. at 109:1–12), and there is no evidence that anyone at Fox knew that school would be in session at all that summer. School was in fact not in session during the June filming period (Resp. to SOF ¶ 42), and there is no evidence to suggest anybody at Fox knew or should have known that the July schedule would be any different. Plaintiffs have also identified no evidence that the Fox Defendants knew their use of Pods 3A and 3B would force JTDC to overpopulate other pods. And regarding visitation, Plaintiffs do not dispute that there is no evidence suggesting that Fox had any reason to know that JTDC had moved visitation to a smaller or less accommodating space. (Resp. to SOF ¶ 67.)
The only reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that JTDC officials created the impression that they would inform Fox if any of Fox’s requests jeopardized the detainees’ needs. In fact, Fox and the JTDC agreed to as much in Paragraph 1(D) of the Location Agreement.19 (Location Agreement.) And JTDC’s actions sent the same signals. JTDC General Counsel Alonzo testified that she worked with Dixon before the filming to tell Fox “what areas [JTDC] could put off for filming and . . . still meet the requirements for the kids.” (Alonzo Dep. at 12:13–13:23, 27:17–29:21.) For example, while Fox originally wanted to film in the infirmary (Location Agreement ¶ 1(A)), Alonzo rejected Fox’s request, explaining that filming in the infirmary would not comply with federal standards surrounding detainee care. (Defs.’ Ex. 45 at 2–4.) Such communication continued during filming, as well. Breen testified that, during filming, Fox had “consistent conversations” about where they could and could not be at certain times, leading to

19

Plaintiffs cite to a footnote in Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic

Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 302 n.4 (2001), for the proposition that such “formalism” present in this

clause of the Location Agreement is not the “sine qua non” of liability in cases such as this one.

Plaintiffs also cite Wickersham v. City of Columbia, 481 F.3d 591, 599 (8th Cir. 2007), for

essentially the same proposition. Each of these cases, however, deals not with questions of

liability, but rather with questions of whether formalistic lines drawn in rules or legislation can be

dispositive of whether behavior by a defendant constitutes state action. In this case, the text of

the Location Agreement is far from the only evidence suggesting that JTDC assured Fox that it

would notify Fox if any of the filming requests had gone too far.

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“numerous situations” where staff told Breen that they could not “do this right now because of the sensitivities of the location . . . . ” (Breen Dep. at 80:1–8, 146:22–147:6.) Given JTDC’s behavior, the only reasonable conclusion about Fox‘s knowledge is that Fox assumed that JTDC would inform the filming crew if their actions were negatively impacting the detainees.
Plaintiffs’ counterarguments are not persuasive. First, Plaintiffs point to Klemke’s posttour email to Dixon as evidence that Klemke knew Fox’s visit would lead Dixon to breach his fiduciary duty. In that email, Klemke stated that he hoped the filming schedule would make Fox’s presence “less of an impact,” and that he hoped that Fox and the JTDC could “discuss a way of making sure that we don’t interfere with your day to day operations too badly.” (Klemke FollowUp Email (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs seize on this language, arguing that Klemke knew Fox’s presence would impact the JTDC and interfere with the jail’s day to day operations to some extent. At most, however, Klemke’s language indicates only what is obvious: that Fox’s presence would have some effect on the day-to-day operations of the JTDC. No reasonable jury could conclude from Klemke’s comment that Fox knew that the impact on operations would amount to a breach of fiduciary duty. In fact, when asked about this language, Klemke testified that his intention was to “give Superintendent Dixon an opportunity to tell me that he wasn’t comfortable with the things that I had suggested.” (Klemke Dep. at 36:19–37:8.) And Plaintiffs ignore the first part of the “too badly” quote in which Klemke stated, “Obviously your schedule would take precedence over ours . . .” (Id.) It is true that, in the same email, Klemke suggested Fox would try to only bring 30 people into the facility—a number that Fox ultimately far exceeded, bringing at least 100 people every day of filming. (Klemke Follow-up Email; July 31 Robinson Email at 3.) But Plaintiffs can point to no evidence suggesting that the increased number of visitors caused the JTDC to place any extra restrictions on the detainees. Indeed, much of the requested space was used for filming or equipment storage and thus would have been unavailable to detainees even if Fox had brought only 30 people. (Klemke Follow-up Email; Defs.’ Ex. 20 at 2–4.)
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Plaintiffs also emphasize evidence that Fox typically paid third parties for the inconvenience of having television shows filmed nearby. Whatever the significance of this evidence might be in another context, it is not sufficient to support a finding that Fox had constructive knowledge of harm that the Empire filming allegedly was inflicting on JTDC detainees. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 59.) For one, Breen testified that these payments are not for mere inconvenience but rather for encroachments such as placing a light on someone’s front lawn, boarding a barking dog in a kennel, or changing the neighbors’ drapes if they are going to appear in a shot. (Pls.’ Corrected Ex. 15 [426-3] at 55:21–56:19.) And if Plaintiffs are correct that Fox had a practice of paying third parties for mere inconvenience, that also does not change the outcome. Fox’s potential knowledge of possible inconvenience for the JTDC is not sufficient to support an inference that Fox knew or should have known that its presence would harm the detainees.
Plaintiffs also suggest that Fox must have been aware of the potential for harm, because “Fox had filmed at night in both Cook County’s downtown administration building and its courthouse at 26th and California so that it would not disturb the governmental work being done in those locations.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 59.) Assuming this is true, it does not obviously support Plaintiffs’ claims; it is at least as consistent with a conclusion that Fox would have catered to the JTDC’s request to film at night, had the JTDC suggested that was necessary in order to protect the detainees. The court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that Fox had even constructive knowledge that Dixon was breaching his fiduciary duty to the detainees at the JTDC. For that reason, Plaintiffs’ tortious inducement claim against Fox fails.
2. Unjust Enrichment Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that even if the Fox Defendants are not liable for tortious inducement, they are liable under an unjust enrichment theory because they benefitted from Dixon’s breach of fiduciary duty. In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite Stavros, where the
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First District Appellate court of Illinois explained that “[a] third party who . . . knowingly accepts any benefit from . . . a breach [of a trustee’s duty of loyalty] becomes directly liable to the aggrieved party.” 89 Ill. App. 3d at 455, 411 N.E.2d at 1070; accord Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 43 cmt. g (Am. L. Inst. 2011) (“Benefits derived from a fiduciary's breach of duty may therefore be recovered from third parties, not themselves under any special duty to the claimant, who acquire such benefits with notice of the breach.”) But as Plaintiffs admit, this theory of unjust enrichment still requires a showing that the third party in question had notice or knowledge of the breach when accepting the benefit in question. For the reasons already stated, the court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that the Fox Defendants had knowledge of the breach of duty in this case.
In a similar vein, Plaintiffs cite Pro-Pac, Inc. v. WOW Logistics Co. for the proposition that “[a] person who obtains a benefit . . . in consequence of another’s breach of [a fiduciary duty] is liable in restitution to the person to whom the duty is owed.” 721 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 43(c)). But in Pro-Pac—a case decided under Wisconsin law—the Seventh Circuit discussed the possibility of the plaintiff recovering under an unjust enrichment theory only after affirming a bankruptcy court’s determination that the defendant had aided and abetted a third party’s breach of fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff. See 721 F.3d at 782–84, 787 (explaining that the third party breached its fiduciary duty by diverting a deal from the plaintiff to the defendant, and that the plaintiff might be entitled to restitution from the defendant of the value the defendant obtained from the deal). The Seventh Circuit provided no discussion of how Section 43(c) of the Third Restatement applies where, as here, there is no reasonable basis for finding that the party from whom restitution is being sought (Fox) tortiously induced (or was otherwise liable for) another party’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty. The courts in Plaintiffs’ other cited cases did not address that issue, either. See Martin, 163 Ill. 2d at 56, 643 N.E.2d at 745 (considering only whether the breaching party had a
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duty to return the benefit he obtained); Happy R Sec., LLC v. Agri-Sources, LLC, 2013 IL App (3d) 120509, ¶ 44, 988 N.E.2d 972, 982 (stating in dicta that Section 43 “discuss[es] restitution in the context of a breach of fiduciary duty”). For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim fails. III. Class Certification
The court previously denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification without prejudice. T.S. v. Twentieth Century Fox Television, 334 F.R.D. 518, 541 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (“the January 16, 2020 opinion”). Plaintiffs have filed a renewed motion for class certification [351] along with a motion to amend their complaint by adding H.C. as a class representative [365]. As explained below, the court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint, and grants in part and denies in part the motion to certify the class.
A. Motion to Amend Complaint or, Alternatively, Add Class Representative The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that leave to amend a pleading should be freely given “when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). When assessing such a request, courts typically consider whether granting or denying leave to amend will prejudice the parties. See 6 Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1487 (3d ed. 2021) (“This entails an inquiry into [1] the hardship to the moving party if leave to amend is denied, [2] the reasons for the moving party failing to include the material to be added in the original pleading, and [3] the injustice resulting to the party opposing the motion should it be granted.”); accord Kasak v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 552 F. Supp. 2d. 787, 793–94 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (granting leave to amend where new claim would not affect defendants’ pending summary judgment motion, and prejudice plaintiff would face outweighed prejudice to defendants). Plaintiffs have requested leave to amend their Second Amended Complaint [88] solely for the purpose of adding H.C. as a class representative. (See Pls.’ Mot. to Amend Compl. or to Permit Consideration of H.C. as Potential Class Representative [365] (hereinafter “Mot. to
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Amend”) at 1 & n.1.) They offer H.C. in response to concerns that the court raised in its January 16, 2020 opinion denying class certification. Plaintiffs now propose three classes. The first, labeled “Class 1—Increased Confinement Class,” would include “[a]ll youth detained at the JTDC for at least 24 consecutive hours during the Empire filming periods” who were “confined to their pods more than they otherwise would [have] been because of the filming . . . .” (Pls.’ Renewed Mot. for Class Cert. [351] (hereinafter “Renewed Class Mot.”) at 6.) In the alternative, Plaintiffs have identified six subclasses within Class 1, depending on the type of off-pod activity that detainees allegedly were denied due to filming. (Id. at 6–7.) Subclass 1(f) would consist of detainees who were subject to “severe confinement,” meaning that they did not leave their pods for at least 24 hours consecutively. (Mot. to Amend at 3; Renewed Class Mot. at 7.) Because neither T.S. nor Q.B. were confined to their pods for at least 24 consecutive hours during filming, Plaintiffs have proposed the addition of H.C. to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement for Subclass 1(f). Again, Plaintiffs believe that this subclass is unnecessary, but they have proposed it in the event the court determines that Class 1’s injuries are not constitutionally cognizable. (Mot. to Amend at 3; Renewed Class Mot. at 27.)
In support of their motion, Plaintiffs have provided a redline comparison of the Second Amended Complaint and the proposed Third Amended Complaint. (See Redline, Ex. 2 to Mot. to Amend [365-2].) Aside from the addition of allegations concerning H.C. (see Redline at 2–3, 23), the only other changes are corrections to allegations that Plaintiffs now acknowledge were inaccurate in light of discovery. (See id. at 13, 16, 18–20.)20 According to the Third Amended Complaint, H.C. and the other residents of Pod 3J normally left the pod every day for activities, such as recreation, school, and programming, but on multiple days during filming, H.C. and the

20

Specifically, Plaintiffs have deleted their allegations that: the JTDC infirmary was

used as a film set (Redline at 13); visitation was “severely shortened” (id. at 16); T.S.’s mother

saw “a large group of what appeared to be Empire’s cast or crew leave the building” while waiting

to visit her son (id. at 19); and detainees on Q.B.’s pod “never” received recreation during Empire’s

filming (id. at 20).

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other residents were confined to their pod for the entire day. (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 53, Ex. 2 to Renewed Class Mot [365-2].)
Defendants oppose amendment of the complaint and H.C.’s addition as a class representative. They argue that a declaration submitted by Plaintiffs’ counsel in support of Subclass 1(f) contained factual inaccuracies. (See Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot. to Amend [374] at 1–3.) Specifically, Plaintiffs’ counsel created a chart that purported to summarize the number of juvenile detainees who did not leave their pods for at least 24 consecutive hours. (See Ex. A to Weil Decl. 6/15/20 [351-2].) The chart relied solely on the JTDC’s “DC5 Movement Logs,” which are Microsoft Excel spreadsheets that track the movement of all detainees. (Weil Decl. 6/15/20 ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs concede that this declaration contained unintentional errors, but they insist that H.C. is nonetheless a suitable class representative. (Pls.’ Reply in Support of Mot. to Amend [380] at 1; Pls.’ Status Report 8/2/20 [388] (acknowledging that “[t]he missing data renders the DC5 logs insufficient, standing alone, to supply reliable “no movement” figures set out in the ECF 375-1 table”).) Plaintiffs have submitted a supplemental chart that attempts to address the errors in the original declaration. (See Weil Decl. 8/7/20, Ex. A to Pls.’ Suppl. Filing Pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1) [390-1].) In any event, Defendants have been able to conduct some discovery already, including a deposition of H.C. on August 4, 2020. (See generally H.C. Dep., Ex. O to Defs.’ Class Opp’n [398-3]; see also H.C. Responses to Defense Rule 33 Discovery of July 14, 2020, Ex. 3 to Pls.’ Reply in Support of Mot. to Amend [380-1].)
The court agrees with Plaintiffs that they would suffer hardship if they are unable to add H.C. because Subclass 1(f) would be left without a class representative. Plaintiffs’ failure to add H.C. as a named plaintiff until now is an understandable response to the court’s January 16, 2020 opinion. By contrast, any prejudice to Defendants would be minimal; indeed, discovery pertaining to H.C. is already underway and should not take long to complete. Accordingly, the court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint.
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B. Renewed Motion to Certify Class
With H.C. added as a named plaintiff, the court turns to the renewed motion for class
certification. In response to this court’s January 16, 2020 opinion denying their first motion for
class certification, Plaintiffs have made significant changes to their class definition. Rather than
attempting to certify a class of all juveniles detained at the JTDC during the filming of Empire,
Plaintiffs now propose three classes that they believe will satisfy Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality
requirement: (1) detainees subject to additional confinement, (2) detainees who experienced
“degraded visitation,” and (3) detainees subject to overcrowding. (Renewed Class Mot. at 2, 6–
7.) All three classes are limited to detainees who were at the JTDC for at least 24 hours
consecutively. (Id.)
Specifically, Plaintiffs have offered the following class definitions:
Class 1—Increased confinement class: All youth detained at the JTDC for at least 24 consecutive hours during the Empire filming periods. Each member of this proposed class was confined to their pods more than they otherwise would [have] been because of the filming of Empire in the JTDC facility.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs have divided Class 1 into subclasses. . . . [:]
Subclass 1(a)—LME subclass—All youth detained at the JTDC for at least 24 consecutive hours during the Empire filming periods who did not receive at least one hour of Large Muscle Exercise (“LME”) recreation off-pod during any day of the filming periods.
Subclass 1(b)—Outdoor recreation subclass—All youth detained at the JTDC for at least 24 consecutive hours during the Empire filming who did not receive scheduled outdoor recreation during the filming periods or whose outdoor recreation was not scheduled because of the filming of Empire in the JTDC facility.
Subclass 1(c)—School break recreation subclass—All youth detained at the JTDC for at least 24 consecutive hours during the Empire filming periods who did not receive off-pod recreation or programming in addition to one hour of LME during each day of the June and August filming periods because of the filming of Empire in the JTDC facility.
Subclass 1(d)—School subclass—All youth detained at the JTDC for at least 24 consecutive hours during the Empire filming periods who were detained on residential pods during the July filming period who did not travel to the Nancy B. Jefferson school each day for class.
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Subclass 1(e)—Program subclass—All youth detained at the JTDC for at least 24 consecutive hours during the Empire filming periods who were scheduled to participate in off-pod programs like Free Write, Karma Garden, or off-pod activities like commissary or game room but who did not do so because of the Empire filming.
Subclass 1(f)—Severe confinement subclass—All youth detained at the JTDC for at least 24 consecutive hours during the Empire filming periods who did not leave their pods for at least 24 consecutive hours because of schedule disruptions caused by the filming of Empire. For this subclass, Plaintiffs propose a new class representative, H.C. . . .
Class 2. All youth detained at the JTDC for at least 24 consecutive hours who had family visitation during the June and July filming periods.
Class 3. All youth detained at the JTDC for at least 24 consecutive hours during the Empire filming periods who were . . . on pods with populations that exceeded safe functional operating capacity.
(Id. at 6–7.)
Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that a proposed class complies with Rule 23, “but
they need not make that showing to a degree of absolute certainty.” Messner v. Northshore Univ.
HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012). “It is sufficient if each disputed requirement
has been proven by a preponderance of evidence.” Id. A court may look beyond the pleadings
to determine whether class certification is appropriate, because “[o]n issues affecting class
certification, [ ] a court may not simply assume the truth of the matters as asserted by the plaintiff.”
Id. If there are factual disputes, “the court must receive evidence and resolve the disputes before
deciding whether to certify the class.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). This inquiry may involve
“some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim,” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011), but class certification is not a “dress rehearsal for a trial on the merits,”
Messner, 669 F.3d at 811.
Because the court has granted summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ constitutional
claims on the basis of qualified immunity, as well as the inducement and unjust enrichment claims
against the Fox Defendants, the court’s class certification analysis is limited to the remaining
state-law claims against Defendants Dixon and Cook County. In other words, the court will 50

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consider whether certification of the proposed classes and subclasses is appropriate for the breach of fiduciary duty and indemnification claims against the County Defendants.
1. Rule 23(a) Requirements Ascertainability
As explained in the January 16, 2020 opinion, courts have recognized that a proposed class must be ascertainable, meaning it must be “defined clearly and based on objective criteria.” Mullins v. Direct Digit., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2015). If a proposed class sweeps in a large proportion of persons who could not have been injured by a defendant’s conduct, the class is overbroad. See Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006). The court previously expressed concerns that the Plaintiffs’ proposed class included some individuals who could not have been harmed because they were released shortly after arriving at the “Alpha” intake unit and thus were never assigned to a pod. T.S., 334 F.R.D. at 527–28. Plaintiffs have attempted to correct potential overbreadth problems by limiting each of the three proposed classes to detainees who were at the JTDC for at least 24 consecutive hours. (Renewed Class Mot. at 2, 6–7.) Plaintiffs emphasize that even “Alpha” intake detainees are typically provided with daily off-pod recreation. (Id. at 8 (citing Dunlap Supp. Rpt. ¶ 4).) Thus, intake detainees who spent at least 24 hours at the JTDC may have been affected by Empire filming if they did not receive off-pod recreation.
Defendants argue that the proposed classes are still overbroad for several reasons. First, they point out that not all detainees were juveniles—between 6 and 14 detainees were adults on each day of the June and July filming periods. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. [397] at 21 (citing Opp’n Ex. M 21:3–22:20 & Opp’n Ex. L).) Second, they argue that T.S. and Q.B. (as well as presumably H.C.) lack standing to represent female detainees, who are housed separately and receive separate schooling, recreation, and programming. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 22 (citing Opp’n Ex. M 108:1–109:10).) Third, Defendants argue that Alpha detainees should be
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excluded from the class definitions because they do not attend school and are more likely to be restricted from recreation. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 22 (citing Opp’n Ex. AA and Opp’n Ex. BB ¶ 4).)
The court is satisfied that Plaintiffs’ adjustments to their proposed classes have mitigated any potential overbreadth problems. First, the court is not concerned that the presence of a handful of adult detainees will have a significant impact on the certifiability of the proposed classes.21 See Messner, 669 F.3d at 825–26 (reversing denial of class certification where only 2.4 percent of putative class members could not have been harmed by defendant’s conduct). Second, Defendants’ arguments regarding female detainees go more to typicality and adequacy than overbreadth. As Plaintiffs explain, female pods are segregated from male pods, but female detainees still attend school on the JTDC’s second floor, receive off-pod recreation, and participate in programming. Accordingly, they may have been subject to increased confinement during filming. (Renewed Mot. at 5.) Finally, the court agrees that the 24-consecutive-hours requirement for all proposed classes ensures that even Alpha detainees are among those who would normally have received some off-pod movement. As the court explains below, the addition of subclasses within Class 1, the “increased confinement” class, means that Alpha detainees will be included in a subclass only if they actually would have left their pods for recreation. The court is therefore no longer concerned about overbreadth, and now turns to Rule 23(a)’s four requirements. Numerosity
To satisfy numerosity, Plaintiffs must show that the proposed classes are “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). Generally, classes of forty or more members are sufficiently numerous. Anderson v. Weinert Enters., Inc., 986 F.3d 773,

21

Plaintiffs’ class definitions arguably exclude adult detainees by referring to “youth,”

but the parties do not address this argument.

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777 (7th Cir. 2021). Even if a plaintiff cannot provide precise numbers at the certification stage, “a good faith estimate is sufficient to satisfy the numerosity requirement where it is difficult to assess the exact class membership.” Buycks-Roberson v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 162 F.R.D. 322, 329 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Defendants do not challenge numerosity under Rule 23(a)(1). (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 23.) Nonetheless, as the party seeking class certification, Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that their proposed classes are sufficiently numerous. Anderson, 986 F.3d at 777 (citing Chi. Tchrs. Union, Local No. 1 v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 797 F.3d 426, 433 (7th Cir. 2015)).
Class 1, the “increased confinement” class, easily satisfies numerosity. More than 300 juvenile detainees were confined at the JTDC during each of the Empire filming sessions, and Plaintiffs maintain that the vast majority of those detainees were detained for at least 24 consecutive hours. (Renewed Mot. at 9.) The numerosity of subclass 1(a), the off-pod LME subclass, is less certain, but Plaintiffs point the court to the number of detainees who were confined to their pods for at least 24 hours (Subclass 1(f)) as evidence in support of finding numerosity for Subclass 1(a) because those same detainees were presumably denied off-pod LME, as well. (See Ex. A to Weil Decl. 8/7/20.)22 The court agrees that this is a logical assumption and finds that Subclass 1(a) satisfies numerosity.
For Subclass 1(b), the outdoor recreation subclass, Plaintiffs have submitted an exhibit showing the recreation schedule for one of the JTDC’s centers, showing that multiple pods were scheduled for outdoor recreation every day between June 1, 2015 and June 13, 2015. (See Ex. B to Weil Decl. 6/15/20 [351-2].) The first Empire filming period spanned June 22–26, 2015, so

22

The court notes that this new chart does not attempt to calculate the total number

of detainees who were confined for at least 24 consecutive hours, as previous versions of the

exhibit did. Instead, the chart calculates the number of detainees who satisfied that criteria per

pod per day of filming. Nonetheless, by the court’s reading of the chart, well over 40 detainees

may have been subject to “severe confinement” on at least one day during each of the three

filming periods.

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the schedule set forth in Plaintiffs’ exhibit is not clear evidence of the frequency of outdoor recreation later in June, much less in July and August. Nonetheless, given that Defendants have not challenged the numerosity of this or any subclass, the court is willing to assume—solely for purposes of class certification—that on a typical day in June, at least two pods would have been scheduled for outdoor recreation. If each pod contained at least a dozen detainees, and there were twelve days of filming across all three filming periods, then well over forty detainees could have been affected.
Subclass 1(c), the school-break recreation subclass, consists of detainees who did not receive “extra” off-pod activity during the school breaks in June and August. According to Earl Dunlap’s supplemental expert report, all detainees, regardless of behavioral level, would have been eligible for additional time off-pod when school was not in session. (See Dunlap Suppl. Expert Rpt., Ex. 1 to Renewed Class Mot. [351-1] ¶ 5; Ex. 10 to Dunlap Suppl. Expert Rpt. (showing “break tournament!” between August 17, 2014 and August 29, 2014).) Plaintiffs again point to counsel’s declaration as evidence that well over 100 detainees would be part of this subclass. (See Ex. A to Weil Decl. 8/7/20.) As with Subclass 1(a), the court is willing to assume that detainees confined for at least 24 consecutive hours during the June and August filming periods would also have been denied extra school-break recreation. Subclass 1(c) therefore satisfies numerosity.
Subclass 1(d), the school subclass, consists of detainees who did not travel to classes at the Nancy B. Jefferson school during the July filming period. Plaintiffs attest that this would have included all detainees at the JTDC, except for those in the Alpha intake pods. The court agrees that this subclass is sufficiently numerous.
Subclass 1(e), the programming subclass, includes detainees who were deprived of programming during the filming periods. Plaintiffs contend that the cancellation of Free Write alone affected 41 detainees in June. (Renewed Mot. at 10 (citing Ex. A to Weil Decl. 6/15/20).)
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Although the cited declaration does not make clear how Plaintiffs arrived at this number, the court notes that other parts of the record suggest that at least 40 detainees may have missed programming opportunities during the filming periods. (See Renewed Mot. at 25; PSOAF ¶ 54.)
Subclass 1(f), the “severe confinement” subclass, is sufficiently numerous for the same reasons as Subclasses 1(a) and 1(c). (See Ex. A to Weil Decl. 8/7/20.)
Class 2, the “degraded visitation” class, includes all detainees who had visitors during the June and July filming periods, when the Fox Defendants used the room where visitation typically occurred. Detainees in this class received visitors in a classroom that was approximately 10 percent smaller than the normal visitation room. (See Defs.’ SOF ¶ 66; Resp. to Defs.’ SOF ¶ 66.) Because dozens of detainees receive visitors every day, this class is sufficiently numerous. (See PSOAF ¶ 42 (“Detainees have two one-hour visiting slots per week.”); Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 42 (not disputing this fact).)
Finally, Class 3, the “overcrowding” class, consists of detainees who were assigned to pods that exceeded the JTDC’s own guidelines. The JTDC’s pods contain 16 or 18 single-bed rooms, but the JTDC’s written policies provide that the “functional operating capacity” of those pods is 12 or 14 residents, respectively. (See PSOAF ¶¶ 40.) Based on undisputed pod population records during the filming periods, the court concludes that this class satisfies numerosity. (See PSOAF ¶¶ 40–41; Resp. to PSOAF ¶¶ 40–41 (conceding the existence of the JTDC’s policy and the pod population records, but noting that no pod housed more detainees than the number of single-bed rooms in the pod).) Commonalit.
Rule 23(a) requires Plaintiffs to show that there are “questions of law or fact common to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). A single common question may be sufficient, so long as “determination of [the] truth or falsity [of a common contention] will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 828 F.3d
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541, 550 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350). This inquiry may “entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.” Phillips, 828 F.3d at 550 (quoting WalMart, 564 U.S. at 351). A common question need not resolve every issue in the case. Phillips, 828 F.3d at 551. Supplemental proceedings may be appropriate “if, for example, the common question relates to liability of the defendant to a class and separate hearings are needed to resolve the payments due to each member.” Spano v. The Boeing Co., 633 F.3d 574, 585 (7th Cir. 2011).
The court previously concluded that Plaintiffs had satisfied commonality by identifying at least one common question: “whether Empire filming disturbed operations at the JTDC in ways that violated class members’ constitutional rights,” and specifically whether “allowing Empire to film at the JTDC is a legitimate justification for altering the normal operations of the facility.” T.S., 334 F.R.D. at 528, 530. Because the court has granted summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, however, it must now reexamine whether Plaintiffs have met this requirement for the remaining state-law claims. Plaintiffs identify the following common questions regarding breach of fiduciary duty: (1) whether Defendant Dixon owed JTDC detainees a fiduciary duty, (2) whether Dixon breached that duty, and (3) whether the breach proximately caused damages. (Renewed Mot. at 29 (citing T.S., 334 F.R.D. at 537).) Plaintiffs intend to offer common evidence that (1) Defendant Dixon assumed the position of guardian over the JTDC’s detainees, (2) Dixon breached his duty to ensure the “safety and general well-being” of his wards by eliminating or degrading services for his own benefit, and (3) Dixon’s breach proximately caused injuries to the classes in the form of psychological harm and increased risk of violence. (Renewed Mot. at 29–30.) Defendants concede that Plaintiffs have identified common questions but argue that they are “too superficial” to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 23.)
The court concludes that Plaintiffs have identified at least two common questions that can be proved with common evidence. Specifically, the first two elements of their breach of fiduciary duty claim—(1) whether Defendant Dixon owed JTDC detainees a fiduciary duty, and (2) whether
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Dixon breached that duty by allowing filming at the JTDC—are clearly “capable of classwide resolution.” Phillips, 828 F.3d at 550 (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350). These questions pertain to all three classes and the subclasses within Class 1. The third element of a breach of fiduciary duty, proximate cause, may be more challenging to prove with common evidence, but the first two common questions are sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). Typicality
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the “claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). “A claim is typical if it ‘arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and . . . [the named plaintiff’s] claims are based on the same legal theory.” Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514 (quoting Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992)). The claims of the representatives need not be identical to those of the class members, but they should have the “same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, “there must be enough congruence between the named representative's claim and that of the unnamed members of the class to justify allowing the named party to litigate on behalf of the group.” Spano, 633 F.3d at 586.
In the January 16, 2020 opinion, the court noted that “[s]ome of the conduct giving rise to Q.B. and T.S.'s claims appear to be typical of the class, but other alleged deprivations that they experienced appear to be unique.” T.S., 334 F.R.D. at 530–31. The court recommended narrowing the class “to include only the alleged deprivations that are common to every class member” or, alternatively, proposing subclasses. Id. at 531. In response to these concerns, Plaintiffs have proposed three classes and offered H.C. as a class representative for Subclass 1(f). (See Renewed Mot. at 15 n.2.) The court will first describe the classes or subclasses that satisfy the typicality requirement, and then describe those that do not.
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Class 1, the increased confinement class, includes detainees who were subject to increased confinement for a variety of reasons (denial of off-pod LME, outdoor recreation, “extra” school-break recreation, school in the Nancy B. Jefferson classrooms, and/or programming). Plaintiffs insist that subclasses are unnecessary because the increased confinement stemmed from the same course of conduct: Defendant Dixon’s decision to allow the filming of Empire at the JTDC. (Id. at 12–13.) They also emphasize that each subclass is bringing claims based on the same legal theory: that Defendant Dixon breached his fiduciary duty to detainees at the JTDC, and that the breach proximately caused them harm. (Id. at 13.) According to Dr. Kraus’s expert report, “any increased restrictions on juveniles are psychologically harmful,” and “any youth detained at the JTDC who spent more time on the pod than he or she otherwise would have was harmed.” (Id. at 14 (citing Kraus Rpt. ¶ 6).)
The court agrees with Defendants, however, that the reason for a given detainee’s increased confinement matters and that Class 1 does not satisfy typicality in the absence of subclasses. Without dividing class members into subclasses, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that the decision to permit filming at the JTDC proximately caused detainees’ increased confinement—a separate question from the amount of damages they may have incurred as a result of that confinement. To take just one example, Empire filming may not have caused the cancellation of off-pod recreation for H.C.’s pod on one day in July because a fight broke out around the time that pod members would have left to go to the gym. (See Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 16 (citing Robinson Decl. of 7/17/20, Opp’n Ex. MM ¶¶ 17–20).) Defendants have challenged typicality only as to Subclasses 1(c), 1(d), and1(f), (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 23), but the court addresses the issue with respect to each class and subclass for completeness.
Subclass 1(a), the off-pod LME subclass, consists of detainees who did not leave their pods for LME on at least one day during the Empire filming periods. T.S., Q.B., and H.C. each
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claim that they received LME on their pods—instead of traveling to the yard, the gym, or the game room—on at least one day.23 (PSOAF ¶ 10.) Because their claims are typical of the subclass that they seek to represent, this subclass satisfies Rule 23(a)(3). Defendants emphasize that whether Empire filming was the cause of a given pod not receiving off-pod recreation on a given day is a fact-intensive inquiry (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 34–35), but that alone does not justify denying certification of this subclass.
All named plaintiffs claim to have lost extra school-break recreation, such as tournaments, that they allegedly would have received but for the filming. (PSOAF ¶¶ 10, 34.) Defendants nevertheless challenge the typicality of Subclass 1(c) because H.C. never participated in a tournament despite opportunities to do so later in 2015. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 36 n.5 (citing H.C. Dep. at 48:8–49:4).) It is similarly unclear whether T.S. or Q.B. would have participated in a tournament during the June or August filming periods. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 36 n.5; but see T.S. Dep. at 117:1–9 (stating that T.S. recalled participating in a basketball tournament while on a school break at the JTDC).) At the time of T.S. and Q.B.’s depositions, Plaintiffs had not yet asserted claims on the basis of a right to extra recreation during school breaks, so T.S. and Q.B. were not asked about tournaments at their depositions. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 36 n.5.) Plaintiffs respond that, according to Dunlap’s expert report, break activities were not limited to tournaments, and all residents would have been brought off their pods for other recreation activities. (Pls.’ Reply in Support of Renewed Mot. [400] at 18 (citing Dunlap Suppl. Expert Rpt. ¶¶ 5, 8.) This report satisfies the court that the named Plaintiffs’ claims are sufficiently typical of those in Subclass 1(c), regardless of whether T.S., Q.B., or H.C. personally participated in tournaments.

23

Defendants continue to dispute whether T.S. was denied off-pod recreation, noting

that the JTDC’s records offer conflicting evidence regarding his pod’s recreation schedule on the

day in question. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 33–34.)

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Next, Subclass 1(d), the school subclass, satisfies typicality because T.S. and H.C. claim that they had school instruction on their pods on at least one day during the July filming period. (PSOAF ¶ 10.) Defendants concede that this happened because of filming but dispute whether conducting the classes in the pod common areas was harmful. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 36–37.) Plaintiffs are no longer arguing that these classes were less effective; instead, they contend that the loss of movement to the Nancy B. Jefferson school was psychologically harmful, in that it contributed to increased confinement on the pods. (Renewed Mot. at 15.) With this narrower definition, Subclass 1(d) satisfies typicality.
Subclass 1(e), the programming subclass, also satisfies typicality because T.S. and H.C. both missed one Free Write session during filming. (PSOAF ¶ 10(a), (c).) Defendants do not dispute that the sessions were cancelled or that T.S. and H.C. were otherwise eligible to attend. (Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 10(a), (c).)
T.S. and Q.B.’s claims are not typical of those in Subclass 1(f), the “severe confinement” subclass, because they were not confined to their pods for 24 consecutive hours during the filming periods. Plaintiffs acknowledge this and have proposed the addition of H.C. as a class representative. (See Renewed Mot. at 15 n.2.) Defendants argue the evidence that H.C. himself spent 24 consecutive hours on his pod is suspect because some residents on his pod left to watch a movie on the day in question. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 39 (citing Justice Center Shift Report of 7/13/15, Opp’n Ex. LL).) At the class certification stage, however, Plaintiffs need not prove their claims to an absolute certainty. Messner, 669 F.3d at 811 (“It is sufficient if each disputed requirement has been proven by a preponderance of evidence.”) There is evidence that H.C. was confined to his pod for at least 24 hours consecutively, so his claims are typical of those of Subclass 1(f) for purposes of Rule 23(a)(3).
Finally, Class 3, the overcrowding subclass, satisfies typicality. According to the JTDC’s pod capacity logs, Q.B.’s pod exceeded its functional capacity by one resident during filming.
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T.S., 334 F.R.D. at 534. That resident was moved from pod 3A or 3B (Alpha intake pods), which were closed due to filming, to Q.B.’s pod. Id. Plaintiffs allege that overcrowding creates safety risks and can be psychologically harmful to detainees. (Renewed Mot. at 16.) Because Q.B.’s claims are typical of those in Class 3, the class satisfies Rule 23(a)(3).
By contrast, the court concludes that Subclass 1(b) and Class 2 do not satisfy typicality. Turning to Subclass 1(b): none of the named plaintiffs alleges that he was personally denied scheduled outdoor recreation during the filming periods, or that outdoor recreation was not scheduled for his pod because of the Empire filming. Instead, T.S. and Q.B. attest that they were confined to their pods for LME for at least one day and that they lost “break rec” during the June and August filming periods. (PSOAF ¶¶ 10(a)–(b).) H.C. similarly does not claim to have been denied outdoor recreation, arguing only that he lost “break rec” in June and August. (Id. ¶ 10(c).) Because none of the named plaintiffs claims to have personally experienced the loss of outdoor recreation that they otherwise would have received, they lack standing to represent Subclass 1(b). See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 n.6 (2016) (“[E]ven named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In any event, there is likely substantial overlap between this proposed subclass and Subclasses 1(a) and 1(c), which claim more generally that members were denied off-pod recreation, whether indoors or outdoors.
Class 2, the “degraded visitation” class, also cannot survive typicality. The JTDC moved visitation to a different location during the June and July filming periods (no Empire filming occurred in the visitation room during the August filming period). As Defendants note, the JTDC used a different classroom during the June filming period than it did in July. Both classrooms used eight tables, but according to JTDC documents prepared in anticipation of filming, the placement of those tables within the rooms varied significantly between June and July. (See
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Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 6 (citing Opp’n Ex. C at 6, 13).) Specifically, the June layout placed six of the eight desks along the walls of the classroom, with two desks in the center, while the July layout placed all eight desks in the center of the room in two rows of four desks. (Id.) Neither T.S. nor Q.B. had visitation during the July filming period,24 and H.C. has not made any allegations regarding reduced privacy during visitation. (See T.S. Dep. at 127:17–129:7, Opp’n Ex. N [3983]; Q.B. Dep. at 65:13-66:3, Opp’n Ex. P [398-3]; H.C. Dep. at 54:19–57:19, Opp’n Ex. O [3983].) Because the basis for Plaintiffs’ claims hinges on the reduced privacy that detainees may have experienced during visitation due to the spacing of the tables, the named Plaintiffs are not proper representatives of detainees who had visitation in July. Adequacy
Rule 23(a)'s requirement that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” implicates both the named representatives and the proposed class counsel. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). Specifically, the “claims and interests of the named Plaintiffs must not conflict with those of the class, the class representatives must have sufficient interest in the outcome of the case, and class counsel must be experienced and competent.” Van v. Ford Motor Co., 332 F.R.D. 249, 282 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (citing Retired Chi. Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993)). The experience and competence of class counsel includes “counsel's work on the case to date, counsel's class action experience, counsel's knowledge of the applicable law, and the resources counsel will commit to the case.” Reliable Money Order, Inc. v. McKnight Sales Co., 704 F.3d 489, 498 n.7 (7th Cir. 2013).
In the January 16, 2020 opinion, the court invited Plaintiffs to provide updated biographies of Ms. Chardon and Mr. Weil, and to explain how the addition of Loevy & Loevy would affect class representation in this case. T.S., 334 F.R.D. at 535. Ms. Chardon has since withdrawn as

24

Q.B. alleges that his grandmother was not able to visit him on one day during

Empire filming (see Third Am. Compl. ¶ 49), but Plaintiffs are not attempting to certify Class 2 on

that basis.

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Plaintiffs’ counsel (Minute Entry of 7/21/20 [376]), so the court will focus on Mr. Weil and Loevy & Loevy’s collective experience with class action litigation. While working for various law firms, Mr. Weil has represented clients in multi-district litigation, an ERISA class action, and a parens patriae action (a lawsuit brought by a state on behalf of its own citizens). (Renewed Mot. at 17.) This experience, combined with Mr. Weil’s long history litigating this case, satisfies the court that he will perform adequately as class counsel. Mr. Weil is now associated with Loevy & Loevy, a firm that has extensive experience representing incarcerated people. The firm has committed to provide resources toward all phases of the litigation, including class certification, trial, appeal, and settlement negotiations. (Id. at 17–18.) Mr. Weil and his firm are adequate class counsel in this case.
Indeed, Defendants do not challenge the adequacy class counsel. They do argue, however, that T.S., Q.B., and H.C. are not adequate class representatives. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 43–44.) Specifically, Defendants suggest that T.S., Q.B., and H.C. have had minimal communication with their attorneys and have not been kept apprised of settlement negotiations. (Id. (citing H.C. Dep. at 26:11–13).) Defendants concede that putative class representatives need not be legal experts, but they nonetheless contend that the three proposed representatives have not met even minimum standards of supervision. (Id. at 44 (citing In re: Ocean Bank, No. 06 C 3515, 2007 WL 1063042, at * 8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2007).) Defendants point out that H.C. seemed caught off-guard during his deposition on August 4, 2020, in that he had not seen the proposed Third Amended Complaint before it was filed on July 1, 2020, and was not familiar with the interrogatory responses his attorneys had prepared. (See H.C. Dep. at 28:1–10, 115:21–116:21, 118:4–10, 119:3–22.)
Plaintiffs respond that “understanding the minutia of a case is not a prerequisite to being a class representative.” (Pls.’ Reply in Support of Class Cert. at 29 (quoting Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., 232 F.R.D. 295, 300 (N.D. Ill. 2005).) With respect to keeping Plaintiffs
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apprised of progress, counsel reports that he was able to meet with T.S. but not Q.B. on January 30, 2020 at the Cook County Jail. (Pls.’ Reply in Support of Class Cert. at 30 (citing Weil Decl. 9/25/20, Ex. 11 to Pls.’ Reply).) Counsel did speak with Q.B. on February 25, 2020. (See Minute Entry of 6/24/20 [359] (ordering Plaintiffs to disclose the dates of any additional communications with their attorneys since August 7, 2018); Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 43.) With respect to H.C.’s deposition testimony, Mr. Weil attests that he showed H.C. the Second Amended Complaint before filing the Third Amended Complaint, and reviewed H.C.’s interrogatory responses with him before H.C. signed them. (Pls.’ Reply in Support of Class Cert. at 30 (citing Weil Decl. 9/25/20 ¶¶ 10–11).)
The court concludes that T.S., Q.B., and H.C. are adequate class representatives for purposes of Rule 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs are correct that “[e]xperience teaches that it is counsel for the class representative and not the named parties, who direct and manage these actions.” Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2002). Indeed, “[I]t is well established that a named plaintiff's lack of knowledge and understanding of the case is insufficient to deny class certification, unless his ignorance unduly impacts his ability to vigorously prosecute the action.” In re Ocean Bank, 2007 WL 1063042, at *5 (quoting Murray, 232 F.R.D. at 300). Here, H.C.’s missteps during his deposition are not so significant as to defeat his adequacy as a class representative. The court is confident that counsel understands the need to continue updating T.S., Q.B., and H.C. about the litigation, including the possibility of a settlement, while recognizing that the COVID-19 pandemic has complicated their ability to meet in person.
* * * To summarize, the remaining classes are: Subclass 1(a) (the off-pod LME subclass), Subclass 1(c) (the school-break recreation subclass), Subclass 1(d) (the school subclass), Subclass 1(e) (the programming subclass), Subclass 1(f) (the severe confinement class), and Class 3 (the overcrowding class).
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2. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements Because Plaintiffs have shown that at least some of their proposed classes and subclasses satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a), the court now assesses whether they can meet the criteria of Rule 23(b)(3). To certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must find that common questions predominate over individual ones and that a class action is “superior to other available methods of adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Predominance The predominance requirement is “far more demanding” than the commonality requirement, and tests whether the proposed class is “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997). The Rule 23(b)(3) analysis begins with the “elements of the underlying cause of action.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 815. “If, to make a prima facie showing on a given question, the members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from member to member, then it is an individual question.” Id. (citation omitted). “If the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing, then it becomes a common question.” Id. Rule 23(b)(3) does not require “that each element of [a] claim is susceptible to classwide proof.” Alicea v. Cnty. of Cook, No. 18 C 5381, 2019 WL 3318140, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2019) (quoting Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 800 F.3d 360, 381 (7th Cir. 2015)). But the common questions must “represent a significant aspect of a case.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 815 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (“When one or more of the central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages or some affirmative defenses.”) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Dixon breached a fiduciary duty to JTDC detainees by allowing Empire to film at the facility. To succeed on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty for
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damages under Illinois law, Plaintiffs must show that “(1) a fiduciary duty existed, (2) that duty was breached, and (3) the breach of the duty proximately caused damages.” Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Sinikovic, 125 F. Supp. 3d 769, 777 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing Gross, 619 F.3d at 709). As explained above in the court’s summary judgment analysis, Defendant Dixon may have owed a fiduciary duty to detainees similar to that of a guardian to his wards. A reasonable jury could also conclude that Defendant Dixon breached that duty by approving the Empire filming. Plaintiffs can prove these elements with common evidence. More complicated is whether common questions predominate regarding the third element: whether the approval of filming proximately caused the specific harms alleged by each class or subclass.
In the January 16, 2020 opinion, the court concluded that “Plaintiffs need to show that [Dixon’s] decision had a class-wide effect on the detainees’ safety or well-being.” T.S., 334 F.R.D. at 538. For the Class 1 subclasses, Plaintiffs argue that the expert reports from Dunlap and Dr. Kraus constitute common evidence that increased confinement, regardless of the precise reason, was psychologically harmful to detainees. (Renewed Mot. at 27.) For Class 3, Plaintiffs again point to the expert reports as evidence that overcrowding on the pods was not only psychologically harmful, but also put detainees at greater risk of violence. (Id. at 28–29 (citing Dunlap Rpt. ¶ 57; Kraus Rpt. at ¶ 38).)25

25

Class 2, the visitation class, does not satisfy Rule 23(a). Even if it did, this class

would fail Rule 23(b)(3) because Plaintiffs have not offered common evidence that the spacing of

the tables in the alternate classrooms offered reduced privacy during visitation. (See Pl.’s Resp.

to Defs.’ SOF ¶ 66 (not disputing that there was only 10% less space (by square footage) in the

classroom used for visitation during filming compared to the typical room).) The normal visitation

room had 12 tables, but the evidence suggests that the alternate visitation rooms had 8 tables.

(PSOAF ¶ 42–43.) Empirically, it is unclear if there was in fact less space between the tables

and/or visitors in the classrooms. And as Defendants observe, the precise spacing of the tables

matters only to the extent that the alternate visitation room was full at a given time. (Defs.’ Opp’n

to Renewed Mot. at 39–40.) Individual inquiries into the number of people in the alternate

visitation room and their locations at a given time would render this class unmanageable. Without

common evidence, Plaintiffs cannot make a prima facie showing that the loss of privacy amounted

to a breach of Defendant Dixon’s fiduciary duty to detainees.

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Defendants assert that proving a breach and subsequent harm to detainees will require extensive individual inquiries. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 32–33, 41–42.) Plaintiffs respond that the individual issues Defendants have identified concern the amount of damages that each detainee suffered. (Pls.’ Reply in Support of Renewed Mot. at 11–12.) The court agrees that Plaintiffs may satisfy predominance “despite the need to make individualized damage determinations.” Mulvania, 850 F.3d at 859. Plaintiffs can use common evidence to show that Defendant Dixon had a fiduciary duty and that he breached that duty. But the expert reports alone are not common evidence that Defendant Dixon’s breach is what caused detainees to spend more time on their pods than they otherwise would have. Individual questions regarding the precise cause of a detainees’ increased confinement would predominate among Class 1 in the absence of subclasses.
Subclass 1(a), the off-pod LME subclass, does not satisfy predominance. The evidence necessary to prove whether, but for the filming, a particular pod would have received off-pod LME would vary from pod to pod, and even from detainee to detainee within a given pod. See Messner, 669 F.3d at 815 (“If, to make a prima facie showing on a given question, the members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from member to member, then it is an individual question.”). To take just one example, on the day that Plaintiffs claim T.S. had on-pod recreation, another JTDC record states that his pod went to the gym. (See Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 15–16.) The jury would need to make an individual determination as to whether T.S. had off-pod recreation on a single day, and that determination might differ from whether the rest of the detainees in his pod had off-pod recreation. Those determinations would also not advance the claims of any other pod because detainees in each pod had their own recreation schedules. (See Steward Decl., Opp’n Ex. Q ¶ 13; May Dunlap Dep., Opp’n Ex. K 35:12–20.) Similarly, Defendants do not dispute that Q.B. had on-pod recreation on one day of filming, but it was not uncommon for Q.B.’s pod, which had a history of disciplinary problems, to have on-pod
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recreation due to safety concerns. (See Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 16.) A jury would need to consider whether it was the presence of the Empire crew or some other factor that resulted in Q.B.’s pod being limited to on-pod recreation. Because individual questions of causation would predominate over common questions of duty and breach, this subclass does not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3).
Subclass 1(c), the extra school-break recreation subclass, does satisfy the predominance requirement. Plaintiffs can use common evidence to show that all detainees would have received extra recreation opportunities during the June and August filming periods when school was not in session. According to Dunlap’s supplemental expert report, “all kids, regardless of [behavior] level, would spend as much time off the ‘Center’ pods as possible . . . in addition to the one-hour of ‘large muscle activity’ recreation that they were normally provided.” (Opp’n Ex. BB ¶¶ 4–5.) Defendants dispute whether detainees actually received “extra” recreation when Dunlap worked at the JTDC in 2014, the year before Empire filming. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 15.) But Plaintiffs need not establish that they will prevail on their claims at this stage. Should they ultimately be unable to do so, the court would dismiss all such claims for members of a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3).
Subclass 1(d), the school subclass, also satisfies predominance. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that almost all detainees would have attended school in the Nancy B. Jefferson classrooms during the July filming period. Defendants do not dispute that “this happened because of the filming,” with the minor caveat that some detainees may have been in court, in the Alpha pods, or confined to their rooms for disciplinary reasons at the time. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 36.) Defendants also question whether offering classes on the pods instead of in classrooms was harmful, but this argument goes to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim rather than certification.
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Subclass 1(e), the programming subclass, narrowly satisfies predominance. Although Plaintiffs have not provided a definitive list of programs that were scheduled but cancelled due to filming, there is evidence in the record that the following programs were cancelled: a program by the Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation, a University of Illinois nutrition education program, Karma Garden, and Free Write. (See PSOAF ¶ 37–38; Free Write Roster [400-10].)26 At least some trips to the “commissary,” which took place in repurposed classrooms where detainees could purchase items or engage in activities like ping pong or video games, were cancelled because of filming. (PSOAF ¶ 39; Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 39.) To comply with Rule 23(b)(3), the court narrows the subclass definition to include detainees who would have attended these off-pod programs (as opposed to unspecified additional programs) during Empire filming.
Subclass 1(f), the severe confinement class, does not satisfy predominance. Plaintiffs have made repeated attempts to compile charts calculating the number of detainees who did not leave their pods for at least 24 consecutive hours during filming. Each time, Defendants have pointed out inaccuracies in those charts, and Plaintiffs now concede that the DC5 logs, alone, are insufficient to establish numerosity of this subclass. (See Pls.’ Status Report 8/2/20 [388].) As with Subclass 1(a), individual questions regarding why a particular detainee did not leave his or her pod abound. Because Plaintiffs cannot prove their claims with common evidence, the court denies certification of this subclass.
For Class 3, common questions predominate over individual inquiries because Plaintiffs can rely on pod population records for evidence that pod populations increased during filming. (See PSOAF ¶ 41.) In turn, Plaintiffs can rely on the expert reports to establish that such overcrowding may have caused harm. Again, Defendants will be free to demonstrate that Dixon’s

26

Defendants dispute whether all of these programs were offered in the summer of

2015 and whether they were canceled because of filming. (Defs.’ Resp. to PSOAF ¶ 37–39.)

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breach did not proximately cause the alleged overcrowding and that such overcrowding did not compromise detainees’ safety. (See Defs.’ Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 40–41.)
The elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty for restitution under Illinois law are similar to but distinct from a claim for damages. Instead of showing that the breach proximately caused damages to the plaintiff, a plaintiff must show that the breach benefitted the fiduciary. See Pro-Pac Inc., 721 F.3d at 787 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 43). Plaintiffs argue that they will offer common evidence that Defendant Dixon received quantifiable benefits from the breach, including autographed photographs from Empire stars and a director’s chair. (Renewed Mot. at 32.) Defendants argue that restitution is unavailable as a remedy, but it is unclear if they are referring solely to restitution flowing from the Fox Defendants’ alleged inducement of a breach. (See Opp’n to Renewed Mot. at 41.) Because the court has granted summary judgment to the Fox Defendants on the inducement count, Plaintiffs may seek restitution only from the County Defendants. The amount of such restitution may be de minimis, but the court concludes that common questions predominate for this aspect of their restitution claim. Superiority
Rule 23(b)(3) requires that proceeding as a class action under this provision be “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Courts consider the following factors:
(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. Id. Plaintiffs argue that Rule 23(b)(3)(A)–(C) all weigh in favor of proceeding as a class action. (Renewed Mot. at 33.) Specifically, a class action will enable detainees to pursue many small
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claims together and avoid repeated litigation of threshold issues, such as whether Dixon owed detainees a fiduciary duty. See Chi. Tchrs. Union, 797 F.3d at 433 (“The purpose of class action litigation is to avoid repeated litigation of the same issue and to facilitate prosecution of claims that any one individual might not otherwise bring on her own.”). Plaintiffs are also unaware of any additional litigation pertaining to the conduct at issue in this case. Defendants’ brief implicitly raises Rule 23(b)(3)(D), the likely difficulties in managing a class action, as a reason to deny certification, but they otherwise do not challenge superiority. The court concludes that Plaintiffs have satisfied superiority for the remaining classes and subclasses.
3. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) The court may certify a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) if “prosecuting separate actions . . . would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). Plaintiffs argue that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification is appropriate for their claims against the Fox Defendants (Count VIII for tortious inducement of a breach of fiduciary duty and Count XIII for unjust enrichment). In their renewed motion for class certification, Plaintiffs clarify that they are not seeking certification of this class in the alternative; instead, they believe that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is preferable to Rule 23(b)(3) for their unjust enrichment claims. (Renewed Mot. at 34.) Because the court has granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the inducement and unjust enrichment claims against the Fox Defendants, the court need not consider whether certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) would be appropriate here.
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CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motions for summary judgment [361, 409, 411], grants Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend [365], and grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification [351]. The following classes and subclasses are certified under Rule 23(b)(3): Subclass 1(c), Subclass 1(d), Subclass 1(e), and Class 3. Although the only remaining claims are state law claims, the court will exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction of those claims. Plaintiffs are directed, within 21 days, to prepare and submit a proposed class certification order consistent with this opinion. The court encourages the parties to consider the possibility of settlement in light of the narrowed scope of the litigation.
ENTER:

Dated: June 10, 2021

_________________________________________ REBECCA R. PALLMEYER United States District Judge

72

 
 Alerts not yet Supported for this Docket

CASREF,KIM,PROTO

United States District Court Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:16-cv-08303

T.S et al v. Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc. et al Date Filed: 08/24/2016

Assigned to: Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

Jury Demand: Both

Referred to: Honorable Young B. Kim (Settlement)

Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights:

Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Other

Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
T.S. a minor by and through his parent and guardian, S.S, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated.

represented by Adam J Pessin Fine, Kaplan and Black, RPC One South Broad Street 23rd Floor Philadelphia, PA 19107 (215) 567-6565 Email: apessin@finekaplan.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen H. Weil Loevy & Loevy 311 N. Aberdeen Street Chicago, IL 60607 312-243-5900 Email: weil@loevy.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexis Garmey Chardon Alexis Garmey Chardon, Esq. 4422 North Ravenswood Chicago, IL 60640 3127526046 Email: ali@weilchardon.com TERMINATED: 07/21/2020

Jonathan I. Loevy Loevy & Loevy

311 N. Aberdeen 3rd FL Chicago, IL 60607 (312)243-5900 Email: jon@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariah Esperanza Garcia Loevy & Loevy 311 N. Aberdeen 3rd Floor Chicago, IL 60607 (312) 243-5900 Email: mariah@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael I Kanovitz Loevy & Loevy 311 N. Aberdeen 3rd FL Chicago, IL 60607 United Sta (312)243-5900 Email: mike@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Pamela Reasor Hanebutt Eimer Stahl LLP 224 South Michigan Avenue Suite 1100 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 660-7600 Email: phanebutt@eimerstahl.com TERMINATED: 05/01/2017
Sarah Copeland Grady Loevy & Loevy 311 N. Aberdeen Street 3rd Floor Chicago, IL 60607 (312) 243-5900 Email: sarah@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan M. Razzano Eimer Stahl LLP

Plaintiff
Q.B. a minor by and through his grandparent and guardian, V.P, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated.

224 South Michigan Avenue Suite 1100 Chicago, IL 60604-2516 312 660-7600 Email: srazzano@eimerstahl.com TERMINATED: 05/01/2017
TERRENCE D GARMEY TERRY GARMEY & ASSOCIATES SUITE 402 482 CONGRESS STREET PORTLAND, ME 04101 (207) 899-4644 Email: TGARMEY@GARMEYLAW.COM TERMINATED: 07/21/2020 PRO HAC VICE
represented by Adam J Pessin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen H. Weil (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexis Garmey Chardon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/21/2020
Jonathan I. Loevy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariah Esperanza Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael I Kanovitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Pamela Reasor Hanebutt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2017
Sarah Copeland Grady (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan M. Razzano (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2017
TERRENCE D GARMEY (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/21/2020 PRO HAC VICE

V.
Defendant
Twentieth Century Fox Television a division of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation

represented by Jeffrey S. Jacobson Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 1177 Avenue of the Americas, 41st Floor New York, NY 10036 212-248-3191 Email: jeffrey.jacobson@faegredrinker.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine E. James Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 333 West Wacker Drive Suite 2600 Chicago, IL 60606 312-857-7078 Email: cjames@kelleydrye.com TERMINATED: 08/21/2020
Christina Rae Chapin Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LlP 191 N Wacker Dr Suite 3700 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 569-1106

Defendant Fox Broadcasting Company

Email: christina.chapin@faegredrinker.com TERMINATED: 07/02/2021 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janine Nicole Fletcher-Thomas Kelley Drye & Warren Llp 333 W. Wacker Drive 26th Floor Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 857-7070 Email: jfletcher@kelleydrye.com TERMINATED: 08/21/2020
Justin O'Neill Kay Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 191 N. Wacker Drive Suite 3700 Chicago, IL 60606 312 569 1381 Email: justin.kay@faegredrinker.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Charles Luzadder Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 333 West Wacker Drive Suite 2600 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 857-7070 Email: mluzadder@kelleydrye.com TERMINATED: 08/21/2020
represented by Jeffrey S. Jacobson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine E. James (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/21/2020
Christina Rae Chapin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2021

Defendant Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.
Defendant Fox Entertainment Group LLC TERMINATED: 05/23/2017

Janine Nicole Fletcher-Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/21/2020
Justin O'Neill Kay (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Charles Luzadder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/21/2020
represented by Jeffrey S. Jacobson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine E. James (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/21/2020
Christina Rae Chapin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2021 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janine Nicole Fletcher-Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/21/2020
Justin O'Neill Kay (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Charles Luzadder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/21/2020
represented by Jeffrey S. Jacobson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine E. James

Defendant Fox Networks Group, Inc. TERMINATED: 05/23/2017
Defendant Fox Television Group TERMINATED: 10/05/2016 Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/21/2020
Matthew Charles Luzadder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/21/2020
represented by Jeffrey S. Jacobson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine E. James (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/21/2020
Matthew Charles Luzadder (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/21/2020
represented by Anthony E. Zecchin Hale Law LLC 53 West Jackson Blvd. Suite 330 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 870-6933 Email: azecchin@ahalelaw.com TERMINATED: 11/26/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Danielle Mikhail Cook County State's Attorney Office 50 West Washington Street Richard J. Daley Center, 500 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603-3368 Email: danielle.mikhail@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Francis J. Catania Cook County State's Attorney Richard J Daley Center 50 W Washington St Room 530 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603-5440 Email: francis.catania@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marissa D. Longoria Cook County State's Attorney's Office 50 W. Washington Street Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603-5691 Email: Marissa.Longoria2@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allyson Lynn West Hale Law LLC 53 W Jackson Blvd. Suite 330 Chicago, IL 60604 312-870-6924 Email: awest@ahalelaw.com TERMINATED: 01/15/2019
Ryan Gillespie Liberty Mutual Insurance 225 W. Washington Street Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 761-7394 Email: ryan.gillespie@libertymutual.com TERMINATED: 12/09/2019
Thomas Edward Nowinski Cook County State's Attorneys Office 50 West Washington Avenue 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60602

Defendant Leonard Dixon

312-603-4327 Email: tnowinski@cookcountyassessor.com TERMINATED: 05/04/2017
represented by Anthony E. Zecchin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/26/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Francis J. Catania (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lyle Kevin Henretty Cook County State's Attorney 2760 50 West Washington 20th Floor Chicago, IL 60602 312-603-1424 Email: lyle.henretty@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick Daniel Morris Cook County State's Attorney's Office 50 W. Washington Street Suite 2760 Chicago, IL 60602 312.603-1426 Email: patrick.morris@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allyson Lynn West (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/15/2019
Joi Kamper City of Chicago Law Dept 2 N. LaSalle St., Suite 420

Defendant John Does 1 through 20 Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County in his official capacity
Date Filed # Docket Text

Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744-0226 Email: Joi.Kamper@cityofchicago.org TERMINATED: 09/11/2020
Thomas Edward Nowinski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/04/2017
represented by Hal Dworkin Office Of Illinois Attorney General 100 W. Randolph 13th Fl. Chicago, IL 60613 (312) 814-5159 Email: hdworkin@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael T. Dierkes Illinois Attorney General's Office (100 West Randolph) 100 West Randolph Street 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814-3672 Email: michael.dierkes@illinois.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T. Andrew Horvat Cook County State's Attorney's Office Complex Litigation Unit 50 West Washington Street 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 312-603-3362 Email: timothy.horvat@cookcounty.il.gov TERMINATED: 06/11/2019

08/24/2016
08/24/2016 08/24/2016
08/24/2016
08/24/2016
08/24/2016 08/24/2016
08/24/2016 08/29/2016 08/30/2016 08/31/2016

1 COMPLAINT filed by Q.B., a minor by and through his grandparent and guardian, V.P, T.S., a minor by and through his parent and guardian, S.S. ; Jury Demand. Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 075212285760.(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Q.B., a minor by and through his grandparent and guardian, V.P, T.S., a minor by and through his parent and guardian, S.S. by Stephen Heschel Weil (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
4 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Q.B., a minor by and through his grandparent and guardian, V.P, T.S., a minor by and through his parent and guardian, S.S. by Pamela Reasor Hanebutt (Hanebutt, Pamela) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
5 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Q.B., a minor by and through his grandparent and guardian, V.P, T.S., a minor by and through his parent and guardian, S.S. by Susan M. Razzano (Razzano, Susan) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Young B. Kim. (daj, ) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
6 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., a minor by and through his grandparent and guardian, V.P, T.S., a minor by and through his parent and guardian, S.S. to Permit Guardians to Proceed Anonymously (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
7 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen Heschel Weil for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 6 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 9/1/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois (pg, ) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
8 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Q.B., T.S. as to The County of Cook, Illinois on 8/29/2016, answer due 9/19/2016. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/30/2016)
9 WAIVER OF SERVICE returned executed by Q.B., T.S.. Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc. waiver sent on 8/29/2016, answer due 10/28/2016; Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. waiver sent on 8/29/2016, answer due 10/28/2016; Fox Networks Group, Inc. waiver sent on 8/29/2016, answer due 10/28/2016; Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc. waiver sent on 8/29/2016, answer due 10/28/2016; Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. waiver sent on 8/29/2016, answer due 10/28/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Fox Entertainment Group LLC, # 2 Fox Networks

09/01/2016
09/07/2016 09/07/2016
09/07/2016 09/08/2016
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Group, Inc., # 3 Twentieth Century Fox Television, # 4 Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
10 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Motion hearing held on 9/1/2016. Plaintiffs' motion to permit guardians to proceed anonymously 6 is entered and continued to 10/20/16 at 8:30 a.m. Status hearing set for 10/20/16 at 8:30 a.m. If no motion to dismiss is filed, a joint status report shall be filed by 10/17/16 if the defendants have appeared. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
11 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc., Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., Fox Networks Group, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc., Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. by Jeffrey S. Jacobson (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 09/07/2016)
12 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc., Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., Fox Networks Group, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc., Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. by Matthew Charles Luzadder (Luzadder, Matthew) (Entered: 09/07/2016)
13 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc., Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., Fox Networks Group, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc., Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. by Catherine E. James (James, Catherine) (Entered: 09/07/2016)
14 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc., Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., Fox Networks Group, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc., Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. by Jeffrey S. Jacobson (Amended) (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 09/08/2016)
15 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois by Thomas Edward Nowinski (Nowinski, Thomas) (Entered: 09/15/2016)
16 MOTION by Defendants Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois for extension of time to answer or otherwise plead (Unopposed) (Nowinski, Thomas) (Entered: 09/15/2016)
17 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Edward Nowinski for presentment of extension of time 16 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 9/21/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Nowinski, Thomas) (Entered: 09/15/2016)
18 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois by Anthony E. Zecchin (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 09/15/2016)
19 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendants Cook County and Leonard Dixon's unopposed motion for extension of time 16 is granted. Said defendants shall answer or otherwise plead by

10/04/2016 10/04/2016 10/05/2016 10/05/2016
10/06/2016 10/07/2016 10/19/2016 10/20/2016 10/20/2016 10/21/2016

10/28/16. Status hearing set for 10/20/16 is stricken and reset to 11/3/16 at 8:30 a.m. If no motion to dismiss is filed, a joint status report shall be filed by 10/31/16. Hearing on plaintiff's motion to Permit Guardians to Proceed Anonymously 6 set for 10/20/16 is stricken and reset to 11/3/16 at 8:30 a.m. No appearance is required on the 9/21/16 notice motion date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
20 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to amend/correct complaint 1 Unopposed Motion to Amend Complaint (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/04/2016)
21 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen Heschel Weil for presentment of motion to amend/correct, motion for relief 20 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 10/10/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/04/2016)
22 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for leave to file an amended complaint 20 is granted. No appearance is required on the notice motion date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 10/05/2016)
23 First AMENDED complaint by Q.B., T.S. against Leonard Dixon, Fox Networks Group, Inc., John Does, The County of Cook, Illinois, TwentyFirst Century Fox, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Television, a division of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Fox Broadcasting Company, Fox Entertainment Group LLC, The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County in his official capacity and terminating Fox Television Group, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc., Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc. and Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/05/2016)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County in his official capacity (pg, ) (Entered: 10/06/2016)
24 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Q.B., T.S. as to The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County on 10/6/2016, answer due 10/27/2016. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/07/2016)
25 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County by T. Andrew Horvat (Horvat, T.) (Entered: 10/19/2016)
26 MOTION by Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County for extension of time to file answer (Unopposed) (Horvat, T.) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
27 NOTICE of Motion by T. Andrew Horvat for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer 26 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 10/26/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Horvat, T.) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
28 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County's unopposed motion for

10/26/2016 10/26/2016 10/26/2016 10/26/2016 10/27/2016
10/27/2016 11/02/2016 11/02/2016

extension of time 26 is granted. Said defendant shall answer or otherwise plead by 11/10/16. No appearance is required on the 10/26/16 notice motion date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 10/21/2016)
29 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to amend/correct Unopposed Motion to Rename Parties and Amend the Docket (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/26/2016)
30 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen Heschel Weil for presentment of motion to amend/correct 29 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 11/3/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/26/2016)
31 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to amend/correct order on motion for extension of time to answer,, terminate deadlines and hearings, 28 , order on motion for extension of time,,, terminate deadlines and hearings,,, set deadlines/hearings,,, set motion and R&R deadlines/hearings,, 19 Plaintiffs Unopposed Motion to Amend Schedule (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/26/2016)
32 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen Heschel Weil for presentment of motion to amend/correct,, motion for relief,,,,,,,,,,, 31 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 11/3/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/26/2016)
33 ORDER: Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to rename parties and amend the docket 29 is granted. The Clerk's Office is directed to change Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc. to Fox Broadcasting Company; Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. to Fox Entertainment Group LLC; and Twentieth Century Fox Television, Inc. to Twentieth Century Fox Television, a division of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation. The Clerk's Office is also directed to reinstate these defendants as parties. Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to amend schedule 31 is granted in part. Defendants shall answer or otherwise plead by 12/5/16. Plaintiffs' motion to permit guardians to proceed anonymously 6 is reset to 12/8/16 at 8:30 a.m. Status hearing set for 11/3/16 is stricken and reset to 12/8/16 at 8:30 a.m. at which time the court will set a briefing schedule. Notice motion date of 11/3/16 is stricken. Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 10/27/2016. Mailed notice (mc, ) (Entered: 10/27/2016)
34 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiffs' motion to Permit Guardians to Proceed Anonymously 6 is entered. Defendants' response shall be filed by 11/3/16. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 10/27/2016)
35 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to Permit Serving of Document Preservation Subpoenas (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 11/02/2016)
36 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen Heschel Weil for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 35 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 11/7/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 11/02/2016)

11/03/2016 11/03/2016 11/04/2016 11/04/2016 11/04/2016 11/07/2016
11/11/2016 11/21/2016 11/30/2016 11/30/2016

37 CERTIFICATE of Service of Discovery Documents (Mincieli, Jonathan) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
38 NOTICE of Correction regarding certificate 37 . (kp, ) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
39 MEMORANDUM by Fox Broadcasting Company, Fox Entertainment Group LLC, Fox Networks Group, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in Opposition to motion for miscellaneous relief 35 (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
40 MEMORANDUM by Fox Broadcasting Company, Fox Entertainment Group LLC, Fox Networks Group, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in Opposition to motion for miscellaneous relief 35 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
41 REPLY by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to motion for miscellaneous relief 35 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
43 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Motion hearing held on 11/7/16. Plaintiffs' motion to permit serving of document preservation subpoenas 35 is granted in part as stated in open court. Defendants shall disclose the names of non-Fox employees and third parties as directed in court and file a response verifying whether or not there are non-Fox employees and third parties who may have relevant knowledge on the identified subjects by 11/11/16. Defense counsel must also advise Plaintiff's counsel if he can accept preservation subpoenas for the identified individuals. Plaintiffs' motion to permit guardians to proceed anonymously 6 is granted without objection.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
42 RESPONSE by Fox Broadcasting Company, Fox Entertainment Group LLC, Fox Networks Group, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to Permit Serving of Document Preservation Subpoenas 35 (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 11/11/2016)
44 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (Horvat, T.) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
45 MOTION by Defendants Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, Fox Entertainment Group LLC, Fox Networks Group, Inc., The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. for leave to file excess pages (unopposed) (James, Catherine) (Entered: 11/30/2016)
46 NOTICE of Motion by Catherine E. James for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages, 45 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 12/5/2016 at 08:30 AM. (James, Catherine) (Entered: 11/30/2016)

12/02/2016 12/05/2016 12/05/2016 12/05/2016 12/05/2016
12/05/2016 12/08/2016 12/14/2016
01/17/2017

47 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Joint motion for leave to exceed page limitation 45 is granted. No appearance is required on the 12/5/16 notice motion date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 12/02/2016)
48 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (Nowinski, Thomas) (Entered: 12/05/2016)
49 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Edward Nowinski for presentment of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 48 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 12/8/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Nowinski, Thomas) (Entered: 12/05/2016)
50 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 12/05/2016)
51 MEMORANDUM by Fox Broadcasting Company, Fox Entertainment Group LLC, Fox Networks Group, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 50 (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Catherine E. James, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C)(Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 12/05/2016)
52 NOTICE of Motion by Jeffrey S. Jacobson for presentment of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 50 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 12/8/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 12/05/2016)
53 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 12/8/2016 and continued to 4/12/17 at 8:30 a.m. Defendants' motions to dismiss 44 48 50 are entered. Responses by 1/17/17. Replies by 2/7/17. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 12/08/2016)
54 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 11/7/16 before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve. Court Reporter Contact Information: Joseph Rickhoff, 312-435-5562, joseph_rickhoff@ilnd.uscourts.gov. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 1/4/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/17/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/14/2017. (Rickhoff, Joseph) (Entered: 12/14/2016)
55 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for leave to file excess pages Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to Exceed Page Limit (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/17/2017 01/18/2017
01/18/2017
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02/10/2017 02/10/2017 02/14/2017

56 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen Heschel Weil for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 55 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 1/23/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 01/17/2017)
57 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to exceed page limit 55 is granted. Counsel shall separately file their response to the motion to dismiss upon receipt of this order. No appearance is required on the 1/23/17 notice motion date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
58 RESPONSE by Q.B., T.S.in Opposition to MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 48 , MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 44 , MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 50 Plaintiffs' Consolidated Response to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Stephen Weil, # 2 Exhibit A)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
59 REPLY by The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County to response in opposition to motion, 58 (Horvat, T.) (Entered: 02/03/2017)
60 MOTION by Defendants Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois for extension of time to file response/reply as to response in opposition to motion, 58 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 02/06/2017)
61 NOTICE of Motion by Anthony E. Zecchin for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 60 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 2/9/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 02/06/2017)
62 REPLY by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Fox Entertainment Group LLC, Fox Networks Group, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 50 (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 02/07/2017)
63 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendants Cook County and Leonard Dixon's unopposed motion for extension of time 60 is granted. Said defendants' reply brief shall be filed on 2/10/17. No appearance is required on the 2/9/17 notice motion date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/08/2017)
64 REPLY by Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois to response in opposition to motion, 58 (Nowinski, Thomas) (Entered: 02/10/2017)
65 NOTICE by Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois re reply to response to motion 64 (Nowinski, Thomas) (Entered: 02/10/2017)
66 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for leave to file a SurReply (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Sur Reply)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 02/14/2017)

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05/04/2017

67 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen Heschel Weil for presentment of motion for leave to file 66 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 2/21/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 02/14/2017)
68 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a sur-reply 66 is granted. Counsel shall separately file the sur-reply upon receipt of this order. No further briefing unless ordered by the court. No appearance is required on the notice motion date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/15/2017)
69 SUR-REPLY by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to reply to response to motion 59 Plaintiffs' Sur-Reply (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 02/15/2017)
70 NOTICE by Stephen Heschel Weil of Change of Address (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
71 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Status hearing set for 4/12/17 is stricken and reset to 5/4/2017 at 08:30 AM. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 04/10/2017)
72 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motions to dismiss. 44 48 50 The Court grants Plaintiffs leave to file a Second Amended Complaint in accordance with this ruling by no later than 5/12/17. [For further details, see separate Memorandum Opinion and Order.] Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 04/20/2017)
73 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 4/20/2017:Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 04/20/2017)
74 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. by Alexis Garmey Chardon (Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 04/28/2017)
75 MOTION by Attorney Pamela R. Hanebutt and Susan M. Razzano to withdraw as attorney for Q.B., T.S.. No party information provided (Hanebutt, Pamela) (Entered: 04/28/2017)
76 NOTICE of Motion by Pamela Reasor Hanebutt for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 75 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 5/4/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Hanebutt, Pamela) (Entered: 04/28/2017)
77 ORDER: Motion for leave to withdraw 75 is granted. Pamela Hanebutt and Susan Razzano are given leave to withdraw as counsel for plaintiffs T.S. and Q.B. Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 5/1/2017. Mailed notice (nsf, ) (Entered: 05/01/2017)
78 ORDER: Status hearing held on 5/4/17 and continued to 6/29/17 at 8:30 a.m. Plaintiffs' second amended complaint shall be filed by 5/19/17. Defendants shall answer or otherwise plead by 6/19/17. Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures shall be exchanged by 5/31/17. Thomas Nowinski's oral motion to withdraw is granted. Thomas Nowinski is given leave to withdraw as counsel for defendants The County of Cook, Illinois and

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05/23/2017 05/23/2017
05/23/2017 05/24/2017

Leonard Dixon. Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 5/4/2017. Mailed notice (aee, ) (Entered: 05/04/2017)
79 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois by Allyson Lynn West (West, Allyson) (Entered: 05/16/2017)
80 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to amend/correct Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Second Amended Class Action Complaint)(Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 05/19/2017)
81 NOTICE of Motion by Alexis Garmey Chardon for presentment of motion to amend/correct 80 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 5/24/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 05/19/2017)
82 MOTION by Plaintiff T.S. For Leave to Proceed Anonymously (Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 05/19/2017)
83 NOTICE of Motion by Alexis Garmey Chardon for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 82 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 5/24/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 05/19/2017)
84 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to permit named plaintiff T.S. to continue to proceed anonymously 82 is granted. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 05/22/2017)
85 RESPONSE by Fox Broadcasting Company, Fox Entertainment Group LLC, Fox Networks Group, Inc., Fox Television Group, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to amend/correct Complaint 80 (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/22/2017)
86 REPLY by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to motion to amend/correct 80 (Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 05/23/2017)
87 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a second amended class action complaint 80 is granted. Counsel shall separately file the second amended complaint upon receipt of this order. Defendant can raise its arguments in a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. As previously ordered, defendants shall answer or otherwise plead by 6/19/17. Status hearing remains set for 6/29/17 at 8:30 a.m. No appearance is required on the 5/24/17 notice motion date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 05/23/2017)
88 SECOND AMENDED complaint by Q.B., T.S. against All Defendants and terminating Fox Entertainment Group LLC and Fox Networks Group, Inc. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/23/2017)
89 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. by Janine Nicole Fletcher (Fletcher, Janine) (Entered: 05/24/2017)

06/07/2017 06/19/2017
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07/21/2017 07/25/2017

90 NOTICE by Stephen H. Weil of Change of Address (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
91 MOTION by Defendants Fox Entertainment Group LLC, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Fox Networks Group, Inc., Fox Broadcasting Company, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/19/2017)
92 NOTICE of Motion by Jeffrey S. Jacobson for presentment of motion to dismiss 91 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 6/29/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/19/2017)
93 ANSWER to amended complaint by Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(West, Allyson) (Entered: 06/19/2017)
94 ANSWER to amended complaint by The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County(Horvat, T.) (Entered: 06/19/2017)
95 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 6/29/2017 and continued to 7/25/17 at 8:30 a.m. Fox Defendants' motion to dismiss 91 is entered. Response by 7/14/17. Reply by 7/28/17. Parties shall submit (not file) an agreed protective order by 7/10/17. Parties shall file an agreed proposed discovery schedule by 7/18/17. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 06/29/2017)
96 AGREED CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 7/11/2017:Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 07/11/2017)
97 RESPONSE by Q.B., T.S.in Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Fox Entertainment Group LLC, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Fox Networks Group, Inc., Fox Broadcasting Company, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 91 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/14/2017)
98 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for extension of time to file Rule 26(f) Report (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
99 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 98 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 7/25/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
100 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for extension of time 98 is granted. The parties' Rule 26(f) report shall be filed by 7/21/17. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 07/18/2017)
101 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting by Q.B., T.S. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/21/2017)
102 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 7/25/2017 and continued to 9/27/2017 at 08:30 AM. Written discovery

07/28/2017
07/31/2017 07/31/2017 08/01/2017 08/01/2017 09/27/2017 10/16/2017
10/16/2017 10/16/2017 10/24/2017

shall be issued by 8/11/17. Fact discovery shall be completed by 3/16/18. Discovery is stayed as to the Fox defendants. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 07/25/2017)
103 REPLY by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to response in opposition to motion, 97 Reply Memorandum in Support of the Fox Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (Luzadder, Matthew) (Entered: 07/28/2017)
104 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to strike reply to response to motion, 103 And Motion to File Sur-Reply (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Sur-Reply)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/31/2017)
105 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to strike 104 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 8/7/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/31/2017)
106 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: The Court enters the motion to strike and grants the motion to file a sur-reply 104 . No further briefing unless ordered by the Court. Mailed notice(maf) (Entered: 08/01/2017)
107 SUR-REPLY by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to reply to response to motion, 103 Plaintiffs' Sur-Reply in Opposition to the Fox Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/01/2017)
108 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 9/27/2017 and continued to 11/29/2017 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 09/27/2017)
109 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: The Court grants in part with prejudice and denies in part the Fox Defendants' motion to dismiss. 91 . The Fox Defendants have until 10/30/17 to answer the remaining claims. [For further details, see separate Memorandum Opinion and Order.] Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
110 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 10/16/2017:Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
111 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: At the Fox Defendants' unopposed request, Status hearing set for 11/29/17 is stricken and reset to 12/6/2017 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
112 MOTION by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to clarify , MOTION by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. for reconsideration regarding

10/24/2017 10/24/2017 10/25/2017
10/25/2017
10/30/2017 10/30/2017 10/30/2017 11/01/2017
11/13/2017 11/29/2017

memorandum opinion and order 110 (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/24/2017)
113 MEMORANDUM by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in support of motion to clarify, motion for reconsideration,, 112 (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/24/2017)
114 NOTICE of Motion by Jeffrey S. Jacobson for presentment of motion to clarify, motion for reconsideration,, 112 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 11/2/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/24/2017)
115 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: The stay on discovery as to the Fox Defendants is lifted. Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures as to the Fox Defendants should be issued by November 1, 2017. Written discovery should be issued by November 3, 2017. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 10/25/2017)
116 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Fox defendants' motion for clarification or reconsideration 112 is entered and taken under advisement. No briefing unless ordered by the Court. No appearance is required on the 11/2/17 notice motion date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 10/25/2017)
117 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 10/30/2017: The Court, in its discretion, denies Defendants' motion for reconsideration, but grants their motion for clarification. 112 [For further details, see Order.] Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
118 MOTION by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. for extension of time to file answer (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
119 NOTICE of Motion by Jeffrey S. Jacobson for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer 118 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 11/2/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
120 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Fox Defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time 118 is granted. Fox Defendants shall answer the remaining claims by 11/13/17. No appearance is required on the 11/2/17 notice motion date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 11/01/2017)
121 ANSWER to amended complaint by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.(Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 11/13/2017)
122 MOTION by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to amend/correct protective order, set/clear flags 96 AGREED MOTION (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 11/29/2017)

11/29/2017 11/30/2017
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123 NOTICE of Motion by Jeffrey S. Jacobson for presentment of motion to amend/correct 122 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 12/6/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 11/29/2017)
124 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Agreed motion to amend protective order 122 is granted. The Agreed Confidentiality Order 96 is amended to include the Fox Defendants as parties subject to and beneficiaries of the Agreed Confidentiality Order for all purposes. If parties wish for an amended protective order to be entered, parties should submit (not file) a proposed amended order for entry. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 11/30/2017)
125 AMENDED AGREED CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 12/6/2017:Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 12/06/2017)
126 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 12/6/2017 and continued to 1/24/2018 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 12/06/2017)
127 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel discovery response from Chief Judge (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' First RFP to Chief Judge)(Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 12/27/2017)
128 NOTICE of Motion by Alexis Garmey Chardon for presentment of motion to compel 127 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 1/9/2018 at 08:30 AM. (Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 12/27/2017)
129 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Motion hearing held on 1/9/2018. Plaintiffs' motion to compel 127 is granted. The Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County shall respond to all outstanding discovery by 1/22/18. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/09/2018)
130 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 1/24/2018 and continued to 2/6/2018 at 09:00 AM (for the county defendants) and to 3/7/2018 at 08:30 AM (general status). Parties are directed to meet and confer in person regarding discovery. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/24/2018)
131 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: At the parties' request, Status hearing as to the county defendants set for 2/6/18 is stricken and reset to 2/15/2018 at 10:15 AM. A joint status report regarding the discovery disputes shall be filed by 2/13/18. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/05/2018)
132 STATUS Report Joint Status Report by Q.B., T.S. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 02/13/2018)

02/15/2018 02/27/2018 02/27/2018 03/01/2018 03/02/2018 03/02/2018 03/02/2018 03/05/2018 03/06/2018 03/06/2018 03/07/2018
03/07/2018

133 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 2/15/2018 and continued to 3/7/2018 at 09:30 AM (parties shall note the time change). An attorney appearance for defendant Dixon shall be filed by 3/2/18. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
134 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Status hearing set for 3/7/2018 is reset from 9:30 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/27/2018)
135 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 150, receipt number 0752-14169071. (Pessin, Adam) (Entered: 02/27/2018)
136 ORDER: Motion for leave to appear pro hac vice by Adam Pessin on behalf of plaintiffs 135 is granted. Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 3/1/2018.Mailed notice(las, ) (Entered: 03/01/2018)
137 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Leonard Dixon by Lyle Kevin Henretty (Henretty, Lyle) (Entered: 03/02/2018)
138 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel discovery responses from Fox defendants (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits 1-17)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 03/02/2018)
139 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to compel 138 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 3/7/2018 at 09:00 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 03/02/2018)
140 MEMORANDUM by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in Opposition to motion to compel 138 (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 03/05/2018)
141 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to seal document MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel discovery responses from Fox defendants 138 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Redacted exhibits 1-17 to ECF No. 138)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 03/06/2018)
142 REPLY by Q.B., T.S. to memorandum in opposition to motion 140 to compel (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 03/06/2018)
143 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 3/7/2018: The Court, in its discretion, grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs' motion to compel brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a). 138 . Defendants must produce the discovery discussed in the Order and file an affidavit attesting to the completeness of its discovery searches and production by no later than March 30, 2018. [For further details, see Order.] Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 03/07/2018)
144 ORDER: Status hearing held on 3/7/2018 and continued to 4/4/18 at 9:00 a.m. Parties are directed to file a joint proposed discovery schedule by 3/28/18. Plaintiff's motion to seal document 141 is granted. The Clerk's Office is directed to seal doc 138-1. Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 3/7/2018.Mailed notice(gcy, ) (Entered: 03/08/2018)

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04/06/2018 05/04/2018 05/04/2018 05/05/2018 05/05/2018

145 STATUS Report Joint Proposed Discovery Schedule by Q.B., T.S. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
146 MOTION by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. for extension of time Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Affidavit of Completeness (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 03/29/2018)
147 NOTICE of Motion by Jeffrey S. Jacobson for presentment of extension of time 146 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 4/4/2018 at 09:00 AM. (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 03/29/2018)
148 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Fox Defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time until 4/6/18 to submit affidavit of completeness 146 is granted. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 03/29/2018)
149 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Status hearing held on 4/4/2018 and continued to 6/20/2018 at 8:45 AM (as opposed to the 6/13/18 date given in open court) Plaintiffs' amended complaint to add plaintiffs shall be filed by 6/29/18. Written fact discovery (except for Requests for Admission and Contention Interrogatories) shall be completed by 8/31/18. No extensions. Oral fact discovery shall be completed by 10/31/18. Burden of proof expert disclosures by 11/30/18. Rebuttal expert disclosures by 1/15/19. Reply expert reports by 3/19/19. All expert discovery shall be completed by 4/1/19. Service of Requests for Admission and Contention Interrogatories by 4/8/19. Parties are directed to meet and confer pursuant to Rule 26(f) and exhaust all settlement possibilities prior to the next status hearing. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 04/04/2018)
150 AFFIDAVIT of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., Fox Broadcasting Company, and Twentieth Century Fox Television of Completeness of Discovery Searches and Production. (Luzadder, Matthew) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
151 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for attorney fees (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/04/2018)
152 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion for attorney fees 151 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 5/9/2018 at 08:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/04/2018)
153 Corrected NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion for attorney fees 151 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 5/9/2018 at 08:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/05/2018)
154 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to amend/correct MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for attorney fees 151 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/05/2018)

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05/10/2018 05/23/2018
05/24/2018

155 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to amend/correct 154 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 5/10/2018 at 08:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/05/2018)
156 MEMORANDUM by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in Opposition to motion for attorney fees 151 (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/07/2018)
157 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiffs' motion to correct filing 154 is granted. Counsel is directed to separately file the corrected motion. Plaintiffs' motion for payment of expenses 151 is denied as moot in light of the corrected motion. The court takes the motion under advisement. No appearance is required on the notice of motion dates. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 05/08/2018)
158 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for attorney fees (corrected) (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/08/2018)
159 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for leave to file Reply in Support of Motion for Payment of Fees and Expenses (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Reply)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/08/2018)
160 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion for leave to file 159 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 5/15/2018 at 08:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/08/2018)
161 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file reply in support of motion for fees and expenses 159 is granted. Counsel shall separately file the reply upon receipt of this order. No appearance is required on the 5/15/18 notice of motion date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 05/10/2018)
162 REPLY by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to memorandum in opposition to motion 156 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/10/2018)
163 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: It appearing that cases previously assigned to the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve requires reassignment; therefore It is hereby ordered that the cases on the attached list are to be reassigned to the other judges of this Court as indicated, pursuant to Local Rule 40.1(f) within the guidelines of IOP 16. Case reassigned to the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer for all further proceedings. Honorable Amy J. St. Eve no longer assigned to the case. Signed by Executive Committee on 5/23/2018. (bg, ) (Entered: 05/23/2018)
164 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: This case has been reassigned from Judge St. Eve. The court adopts the schedule entered by Judge St. Eve on 4/4/2018 149 , except that the court sets status for 6/13/2018 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 05/24/2018)

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165 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: By agreement, status hearing set for 6/13/2018 is stricken and re-set to 7/6/2018 at 9:30 AM. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 05/29/2018)
166 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel Discovery from Defendant Leonard Dixon (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1-4)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 06/26/2018)
167 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to compel 166 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/6/2018 at 09:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 06/26/2018)
168 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel the Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 110)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 06/27/2018)
169 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to compel 168 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/6/2018 at 09:30 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 06/27/2018)
170 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 150, receipt number 0752-14663953. (GARMEY, TERRENCE) (Entered: 07/05/2018)
171 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Status hearing held on 7/6/2018. Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery from the Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook Count 168 is granted without prejudice. Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery from Defendant Leonard Dixon 166 is granted by agreement. All parties to respond to outstanding discovery to be submitted within 21 days. Status hearing set for 8/29/2018 at 9:00 AM. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 07/06/2018)
172 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Motion for leave to appear pro hac vice 170 is granted. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 07/10/2018)
173 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel discovery from defendant Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1-4)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
174 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to compel 173 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/17/2018 at 08:45 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
175 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Motion hearing held on 7/17/2018. Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery from the Office of The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County 173 is granted. Parties are encouraged to discuss appropriate parameters for the document request. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 07/17/2018)

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176 MOTION by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to take deposition of Plaintiff Q.B. Unopposed motion for leave to depose committed Plaintiff Q.B. (Luzadder, Matthew) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
177 NOTICE of Motion by Matthew Charles Luzadder for presentment of motion to take deposition 176 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/24/2018 at 09:00 AM. (Luzadder, Matthew) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
178 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Unopposed motion for leave to depose committed Plaintiff Q.B 176 is granted without an appearance. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 07/20/2018)
179 ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO DEPOSE COMMITTED PLAINTIFF Q.B.: Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/23/2018. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 07/23/2018)
180 MOTION by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Declarations of Peggy Woon of TCFTV, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Declarations of Veera Tirumalai of FBC, # 3 Exhibit 3 - Declaration of Matthew C. Luzadder in Support of Fox Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, # 4 Exhibit A (to Exhibit 3) Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Production and First Set of Interrogatories, # 5 Exhibit B (to Exhibit 3) - Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' discovery, # 6 Exhibit C (to Exhibit 3) - Dkt. No. 143 at 3, # 7 Exhibit D (to Exhibit 3) - Defendants' Affidavit of Completeness of Discovery Searches and Production, # 8 Exhibit E (to Exhibit 3) Plaintiffs' Second Set of Requests for Production and Interrogatories to FBC and to TCFTV, # 9 Exhibit F (to Exhibit 3) - Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Interrogatories, # 10 Exhibit G (to Exhibit 3) 7/10/18 letter from Plaintiffs to Defendants, # 11 Exhibit H (to Exhibit 3) - 7/23/18 letter to Plaintiffs' counsel, # 12 Exhibit I (to Exhibit 3) 8/16/18 letter from Plaintiffs to Defendants, # 13 Exhibit J (to Exhibit 3) 8/16/18 email from Plaintiffs to Defendants)(Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/21/2018)
181 NOTICE of Motion by Jeffrey S. Jacobson for presentment of motion for protective order,,,,, 180 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 8/29/2018 at 09:00 AM. (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/21/2018)
182 SEALED MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. (1) Cross-Motion to Compel and to Reconsider in Part, and (2) Opposition to The Fox Defendants Motion for Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
183 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel (1) Cross-Motion to Compel and to Reconsider in Part, and (2) Opposition to The Fox Defendants Motion for Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/27/2018)

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08/29/2018 08/29/2018
09/06/2018 09/17/2018

184 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to seal document SEALED MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. (1) Cross-Motion to Compel and to Reconsider in Part, and (2) Opposition to The Fox Defendants Motion for Protective Order 182 and exhibits thereto (182-1), MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to seal , MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to seal case (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
185 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for leave to file excess pages regarding ECF No. 182 / 183 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
186 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to seal document,,,, motion to seal case, 184 , motion for leave to file excess pages 185 , Sealed motion 182 , motion to compel 183 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 8/29/2018 at 09:00 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
187 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Leonard Dixon by Joi Kamper (Kamper, Joi) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
188 REPLY by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to MOTION by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, TwentyFirst Century Fox, Inc. for protective order 180 , MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel (1) Cross-Motion to Compel and to Reconsider in Part, and (2) Opposition to The Fox Defendants Motion for Protective Order 183 (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/28/2018)
189 NOTICE by Janine Nicole Fletcher-Thomas of Change of Address . Notification of Change of Attorney Name. (Fletcher-Thomas, Janine) (Entered: 08/29/2018)
190 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Status hearing held on 8/29/2018. Defendant Fox's motion for protective order 180 is granted without prejudice and Plaintiffs' cross-motion to compel [182, 183 ] is denied without prejudice to Plaintiffs' damages theories. Motions for leave to file excess pages 185 and motion for leave to file under seal 184 are granted. Status hearing set for 10/10/2018 at 9:00 AM, at which time the court expects the parties to submit a schedule for completion of discovery, including a calendar of dates on which depositions have been or will be taken. Mailed notice. (etv, ) Modified on 8/29/2018 (etv, ). (Entered: 08/29/2018)
191 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois by Danielle Mikhail (Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 09/06/2018)
192 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 8/29/18 before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer. Order Number: 32004. Court Reporter Contact Information: Kathleen_Fennell@ilnd.uscourts.gov. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the

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10/15/2018

deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 10/9/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/18/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/17/2018. (Fennell, Kathleen) (Entered: 09/17/2018)
193 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: On the court's own motion, status hearing set for 10/10/2018 is stricken and reset to 10/12/2018 at 9:30 AM. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 10/02/2018)
194 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: By agreement, status hearing set for 10/12/2018 is stricken and re-set to 10/18/2018 at 8:45 AM. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 10/03/2018)
195 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel discovery responses from Cook County (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1-3)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/05/2018)
196 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to compel 195 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 10/18/2018 at 08:45 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/09/2018)
197 SEALED MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel discovery from the Fox Defendants and witness Brady Breen (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 14)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/12/2018)
198 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel to compel discovery from the Fox Defendants and witness Brady Breen (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 14)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/12/2018)
199 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to seal ECF Nos. 197 & 197-1 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/12/2018)
200 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of Sealed motion 197 , motion to seal 199 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 10/18/2018 at 08:45 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/12/2018)
201 MOTION by Defendants The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, Fox Entertainment Group LLC, Fox Networks Group, Inc., Fox Television Group, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, TwentyFirst Century Fox, Inc. for leave to file excess pages (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
202 NOTICE of Motion by Danielle Mikhail for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages, 201 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 10/18/2018 at 08:45 AM. (Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 10/15/2018)

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10/16/2018 10/17/2018 10/17/2018 10/17/2018 10/18/2018

203 MEMORANDUM by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in Opposition to motion to compel 198 , Sealed motion 197 Fox Defendants' Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery From the Fox Defendants and Witness Brady Breen (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
204 MEMORANDUM by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in Opposition to motion to compel 198 , Sealed motion 197 Fox Defendants' Amended Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery From the Fox Defendants and Witness Brady Breen (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/16/2018)
205 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County by Michael T. Dierkes (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 10/16/2018)
206 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to strike MOTION by Defendants The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, Fox Entertainment Group LLC, Fox Networks Group, Inc., Fox Television Group, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Televis 201 or to hold in abeyence, and to set a class certification briefing schedule (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/16/2018)
207 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to strike, 206 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 10/18/2018 at 08:45 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/16/2018)
208 REPLY by Q.B., T.S. to memorandum in opposition to motion, 204 and in Support of Motion to Compel Discovery From the Fox Defendants and Witness Brady Breen 197 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/17/2018)
209 REPLY by Defendants The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to motion to strike, 206 (Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 10/17/2018)
210 RESPONSE by The County of Cook, Illinoisin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel discovery responses from Cook County 195 (Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 10/17/2018)
211 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Status hearing held on 10/18/2018. Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery responses from Cook County 195 and motion to compel discovery from the Fox Defendants and witness Brady Breen 198 are granted in part and denied in part as stated in court. Named Plaintiffs' motion to seal their motion to compel discovery from the Fox Defendants and witness Brady

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Breen 199 is granted. Defendants' motion to exceed page limit 201 is granted, and the oversize brief may be filed instanter. Plaintiffs' motion to strike or hold in abeyance Defendants' motion to deny class certification 206 is denied. Response to Defendant's motion to strike class allegations is entered and continued. Response to be filed by or on 12/18/2018; reply to be filed by or on 1/10/2019. Status hearing set for 1/16/2019 at 9:00 AM. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 10/18/2018)
212 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion to Deny Class Certification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 10/18/2018)
213 Exhibit E by The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in Support of Motion to Deny Class Certification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit F, # 2 Exhibit G, # 3 Exhibit H, # 4 Exhibit I, # 5 Exhibit J, # 6 Exhibit K, # 7 Exhibit L)(Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 10/18/2018)
214 Exhibit M by The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in Support of Motion to Deny Class Certification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit N, # 2 Exhibit O, # 3 Exhibit P, # 4 Exhibit Q)(Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 10/18/2018)
215 Exhibit R by The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in Support of Motion to Deny Class Certification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit S, # 2 Exhibit T, # 3 Exhibit U)(Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 10/18/2018)
216 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 10/18/18 before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer. Order Number: 32561. Court Reporter Contact Information: Frances Ward (312)435-5561 wardofficialtranscripts@gmail.com.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

10/25/2018 11/20/2018 11/20/2018 11/26/2018
12/12/2018 12/12/2018 12/13/2018
12/14/2018 01/11/2019

Redaction Request due 11/14/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/26/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/22/2019. (Ward, Frances) (Entered: 10/24/2018)
217 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Plaintiff's motion to compel 197 was granted in part and denied in part on 10/18/2018 and should be terminated. Mailed notice (lf, ) (Entered: 10/25/2018)
218 MOTION by Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois to withdraw Anthony Zecchin as attorney for Cook County and Leonard Dixon and Allyson West as attorney for Leonard Dixon (Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
219 NOTICE of Motion by Danielle Mikhail for presentment of motion to withdraw 218 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 11/29/2018 at 08:45 AM. (Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
220 ORDER: Motion to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Local Rule 83.17 218 is granted without an appearance. Assistant State's Attorney Anthony Zecchin is granted leave to withdraw his appearance on behalf of Defendants Cook County and Leonard Dixon. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 11/26/2018. Mailed notice. (bg, ) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
221 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for extension of time (Joint Agreed) (Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
222 NOTICE of Motion by Alexis Garmey Chardon for presentment of extension of time 221 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 12/17/2018 at 09:00 AM. (Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
223 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Joint agreed motion for an enlargement of time 221 is granted without an appearance. Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' motion to deny class certification (ECF 212) is enlarged from December 18, 2018 to March 7, 2018. Status hearing set for 1/16/2019 is stricken and re-set to 2/27/2019 at 9:00 AM. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 12/13/2018)
224 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Minute entry of 2/13/2018, #223, is amended as follows: Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' motion to deny class certification (ECF 212) is extended to 3/7/2019. Remainder of order to stand. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 12/14/2018)
225 MOTION by Attorney Allyson West to withdraw as attorney for The County of Cook, Illinois. No party information provided (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/11/2019)

01/11/2019 01/11/2019 01/15/2019 02/14/2019 02/14/2019 02/19/2019
03/21/2019 03/25/2019
04/05/2019
04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019

226 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 225 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 1/16/2019 at 08:45 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/11/2019)
227 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois by Francis J. Catania (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/11/2019)
228 ORDER: Motion to withdraw Allyson Lynn West as counsel 225 is granted without an appearance. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 1/15/2019. Mailed notice. (bg, ) (Entered: 01/15/2019)
229 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for extension of time to file response/reply to Defendants' Motion to Strike Class Allegations (Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 02/14/2019)
230 NOTICE of Motion by Alexis Garmey Chardon for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 229 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 2/21/2019 at 08:45 AM. (Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 02/14/2019)
231 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Joint agreed motion for an enlargement of time 229 is granted without an appearance. Deadline for Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' motion to deny class certification 212 is extended to and including 4/12/2019; Defendants reply extended to and including 5/3/2019. Status hearing set for 2/27/2019 is stricken and re-set to 5/9/2019 at 9:00 AM. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 02/19/2019)
232 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois by Ryan J. Gillespie (Gillespie, Ryan) (Entered: 03/21/2019)
233 ORDER : Plaintiffs' motion for an award of attorneys' fees as a discovery sanction 158 is granted in part and denied in part. The court directs the Fox Defendants to pay half of the fees requested by Plaintiffs for litigating their motion to compel. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/25/2019. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 03/25/2019)
234 NOTIFICATION of Affiliates pursuant to Local Rule 3.2 by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. Fox Defendants' Supplemental Disclosure of Corporate Interest and Notification of Affiliates (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 04/05/2019)
235 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to certify class (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
236 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. sealed memorandum in support of [ECF 235] and sealed exhibits (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1-19, # 2 Exhibit 20-62)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
237 MEMORANDUM by Q.B., T.S. in support of motion to certify class 235 and in opposition to motion to deny certification [ECF

04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/18/2019
05/16/2019
05/20/2019 06/10/2019 06/10/2019 06/11/2019 06/14/2019

212] (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1-62)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
238 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to seal document sealed document 236 and exhibits thereto (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
239 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for leave to file excess pages instanter (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
240 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to certify class 235 , motion to seal document 238 , motion for leave to file excess pages 239 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 4/18/2019 at 08:45 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
241 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Motion hearing held on 4/18/2019. Plaintiffs' cross-motion for class certification 235 is entered and continued for briefing. Response to be filed by or on 6/18/2019; reply to be filed by or on 7/9/2019. Motion for leave to file excess pages 239 and for leave to fie under seal 238 are granted. Within seven (7) days, Plaintiff to provide documents relevant to 5/6/2019 depositions. Also within seven (7) days, Defendant to furnish information regarding schedules within the detention facility. Status hearing set for 5/9/2019 is stricken and re-set to 5/16/2019 at 9:00 AM. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 04/18/2019)
242 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Status hearing held on 5/16/2019. Status hearing set for 6/20/2019 at 9:00 AM. Response to contention interrogatories to be furnished 21 days after conclusion of fact and expert discovery. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 05/17/2019)
243 NOTICE by Jeffrey S. Jacobson of Change of Address (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/20/2019)
244 MOTION by Attorney T. Andrew Horvat to withdraw as attorney for The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County. No party information provided (Horvat, T.) (Entered: 06/10/2019)
245 NOTICE of Motion by T. Andrew Horvat for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 244 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 6/13/2019 at 08:45 AM. (Horvat, T.) (Entered: 06/10/2019)
246 ORDER: Motion to withdraw as counsel of record 244 is granted without an appearance. Attorney T. Andrew Horvat is granted leave to withdraw as counsel of record. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 6/11/2019. Mailed notice (jh, ) (Entered: 06/11/2019)
247 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 4/18/19 before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer. Order Number: 34614. Court Reporter Contact Information: Frances Ward - (312)435-5561 wardofficialtranscripts@gmail.com.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

06/18/2019
06/18/2019 06/20/2019 06/20/2019

Redaction Request due 7/5/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/15/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/12/2019. (Ward, Frances) (Entered: 06/14/2019)
248 MEMORANDUM by The County of Cook, Illinois in Opposition to motion to certify class 235 and Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Deny Class Certification 212 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Deposition of Jonathan Klemke, # 2 Exhibit B: Deposition of Leonard Dixon, # 3 Exhibit C: Deposition of Brady Breen, # 4 Exhibit D: Deposition of Earl L. Dunlap, # 5 Exhibit E: Deposition of Anna Buckingham, # 6 Exhibit F: Deposition of William Steward, # 7 Exhibit G: Deposition of T.S., # 8 Exhibit H: Deposition of Q.B., # 9 Exhibit I: Declaration of Shawn Withers, # 10 Exhibit J: Declaration of Linda Kampe, # 11 Exhibit K: Deposition of Gene Robinson, # 12 Exhibit L: Declaration of J. Brian Conant, Psy.D., # 13 Exhibit M: Declaration of Shannon Rayford, # 14 Exhibit N: Declaration of Gene Robinson, # 15 Exhibit O: Deposition of S.S., # 16 Exhibit P: Deposition of V.P., # 17 Exhibit Q: S.S. Visitation logs, # 18 Exhibit R: Deposition of Louis. J. Kraus, M.D., # 19 Exhibit S: Declaration of Zenaida Alonzo)(Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 06/18/2019)
249 MEMORANDUM by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in Opposition to motion to certify class 235 and Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Deny Class Certification 212 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Deposition of Leonard Dixon, # 2 Exhibit B: Deposition of Brady Breen, # 3 Exhibit C: Deposition of Jonathan Klemke, # 4 Exhibit D: Email exchange re: Location Agreement)(Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/18/2019)
250 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. by Justin O'Neill Kay (Kay, Justin) (Entered: 06/20/2019)
251 ORDER: Status hearing held on 6/20/2019. The Clerk's Office is directed to remove Exhibit #9 from the Government Defendants' memorandum of law in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, document # 248 . Redacted version to be filed with the Court. Evidentiary Hearing

06/21/2019 06/25/2019 06/27/2019 06/27/2019 06/27/2019 06/27/2019
06/27/2019 07/01/2019

set for 6/25/2019 at 11:00 AM. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on June 20, 2019. Mailed notice (ph, ) (Entered: 06/20/2019)
252 EXHIBIT by Defendants The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois (Redacted #9 Exhibit I: Declaration of Shawn Withers) regarding memorandum in opposition to motion,,,, 248 (Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 06/21/2019)
253 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Status hearing held on 6/25/2019. Reply in support of class certification motion to be filed by or on 7/31/2019. Status hearing set for 8/13/2019 at 11:00 AM. Evidentiary hearing stricken. Mailed notice. (etv, ) (Entered: 06/26/2019)
254 SEALED MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to Compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1-9)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 06/27/2019)
255 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel Additional Deposition Testimony of Leonard Dixon and to Permit an Inspection of Leonard Dixons Personal Email (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1-9)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 06/27/2019)
256 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to seal ECF 254 and ECF 254-1 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 06/27/2019)
257 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 6/25/19 before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer. Order Number: 35169. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy LaBella, nlabella.ilnd@gmail.com, (312) 435-6890. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 7/18/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/29/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/25/2019. (Labella, Nancy) (Entered: 06/27/2019)
258 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to compel 255 , motion to seal 256 , Sealed motion 254 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/1/2019 at 09:00 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 06/27/2019)
259 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motions to compel 254 and 255 are entered and continued. Defendants' response shall be filed by 7/12/19. Plaintiffs' reply in support shall be filed by 7/19/19. Plaintiffs' motion to seal 256 is granted. Ruling on Plaintiffs' motions to compel set for 8/2/19 at 10:00 a.m. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 07/01/2019)

07/01/2019

260 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 6/20/19 before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer. Order Number: 35125. Court Reporter Contact Information: Frances Ward - (312)435-5561 wardofficialtranscripts@gmail.com.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

07/02/2019

Redaction Request due 7/22/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/1/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/30/2019. (Ward, Frances) (Entered: 07/01/2019)
261 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 7/1/19 before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer. Order Number: 35245. Court Reporter Contact Information: Frances Ward - (312)435-5561 wardofficialtranscripts@gmail.com.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

07/12/2019 07/12/2019 07/12/2019 07/12/2019

Redaction Request due 7/23/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/2/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/30/2019. (Ward, Frances) (Entered: 07/02/2019)
262 MOTION by Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois for protective order HIPAA Qualified (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit proposed order)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/12/2019)
263 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion for protective order 262 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/18/2019 at 08:45 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/12/2019)
264 RESPONSE by Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County to motion to compel 255 (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 07/12/2019)
265 RESPONSE by Leonard Dixonin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel Additional Deposition Testimony of Leonard Dixon

07/17/2019 07/18/2019
07/19/2019

and to Permit an Inspection of Leonard Dixons Personal Email 255 (Henretty, Lyle) (Entered: 07/12/2019)
266 RESPONSE by Q.B., T.S.in Opposition to MOTION by Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois for protective order HIPAA Qualified 262 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/17/2019)
267 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated on the record, Defendant County of Cook's motion for protective order 262 is granted. Defendant shall submit a proposed protective order to this court's proposed order inbox. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 07/18/2019)
268 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 7/18/19 before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer. Order Number: 35439. Court Reporter Contact Information: Frances Ward - (312)435-5561 wardofficialtranscripts@gmail.com.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

07/19/2019 07/31/2019
07/31/2019
07/31/2019 07/31/2019 07/31/2019

Redaction Request due 8/9/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/19/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/17/2019. (Ward, Frances) (Entered: 07/19/2019)
269 REPLY by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to Sealed motion 254 , motion to compel 255 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/19/2019)
270 REPLY by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to motion to certify class 235 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 63-77)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/31/2019)
271 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. sealed exhibits for Reply in Support of Cross-Motion for Class Certification [ECF 270] (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/31/2019)
272 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for leave to file excess pages (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/31/2019)
273 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to seal document sealed document 271 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/31/2019)
274 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to seal document 273 , motion for leave to file excess pages 272 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 8/5/2019 at 09:00 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/31/2019)

08/02/2019
08/05/2019 08/07/2019 08/07/2019 08/09/2019 08/13/2019 08/16/2019

275 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motions to compel 254 and 255 are granted in part and denied in part. The court directs additional search of Defendant Dixon's personal email account by an independent third party; fruits of that search shall be submitted to this court for an in camera inspection. Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file excess pages 272 is granted. Plaintiffs' motion to seal 273 is granted. Defendants have leave to file sur-reply, limited to 10 pages, shall be filed by 8/7/19. Plaintiff's sur-response, if any, also limited to 10 pages, shall be filed by 8/12/19. Motion hearing date of 8/5/19 is stricken. Status hearing remains set for 8/13/19 at 11:00 a.m. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 08/02/2019)
276 HIPAA Qualified Protective Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 8/5/2019. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 08/05/2019)
277 SUR-REPLY by Defendants The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois to reply 270 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit T, # 2 Exhibit U)(Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 08/07/2019)
278 SUR-REPLY by Defendants The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois to reply 270 (Corrected) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit T, # 2 Exhibit U)(Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 08/07/2019)
279 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to sur-reply 278 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/09/2019)
280 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Status hearing held. Arguments held on Plaintiffs' motion for class certification 235 . The Court will issue its ruling by mail. Mailed notice (mw, ) (Entered: 08/13/2019)
281 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 8/13/19 before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer. Order Number: 35732. Court Reporter Contact Information: Frances Ward - (312)435-5561 wardofficialtranscripts@gmail.com.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

09/27/2019 09/27/2019 10/01/2019 10/01/2019 10/02/2019
10/02/2019 10/02/2019 10/02/2019 10/02/2019 10/03/2019
10/10/2019

Redaction Request due 9/6/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/16/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/14/2019. (Ward, Frances) (Entered: 08/16/2019)
282 MOTION by Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County for leave to file supplemental authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 09/27/2019)
283 NOTICE of Motion by Michael T. Dierkes for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 282 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 10/3/2019 at 08:45 AM. (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 09/27/2019)
284 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for leave to file Response to Defendants' Submission of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/01/2019)
285 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion for leave to file 284 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 10/3/2019 at 08:45 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/01/2019)
286 RESPONSE by The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County to MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for leave to file Response to Defendants' Submission of Supplemental Authority 284 (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 10/02/2019)
287 NOTICE by Stephen H. Weil of Change of Address (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/02/2019)
288 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. by Sarah Copeland Grady (Grady, Sarah) (Entered: 10/02/2019)
289 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. by Michael I Kanovitz (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 10/02/2019)
290 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. by Jonathan I. Loevy (Loevy, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/02/2019)
291 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Defendant Chief Judge's motion for leave to file supplemental authority 282 is granted. Plaintiff's motion to file response to Defendants' proposed submission of supplemental authority 284 is granted. Motion hearing date of 10/3/19 is stricken. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 10/03/2019)
292 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 8/2/19 before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer. Order Number: 36292. Court Reporter Contact Information: Frances Ward - (312)435-5561 wardofficialtranscripts@gmail.com.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained

through the Court Reporter or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

10/15/2019 10/15/2019 10/17/2019

Redaction Request due 10/31/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/12/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/8/2020. (Ward, Frances) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
293 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel 30(b)(6) Deposition (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1- Deposition Notice, # 2 Exhibit 2Pembaur Stipulation, # 3 Exhibit 3- Interrogatory Responses, # 4 Exhibit 4-Email Correspondence)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/15/2019)
294 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to compel, 293 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 10/17/2019 at 08:45 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/15/2019)
295 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 10/17/19 before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer. Order Number: 36445. Court Reporter Contact Information: Frances Ward - (312)435-5561 wardofficialtranscripts@gmail.com.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

10/17/2019 10/18/2019 11/07/2019

Redaction Request due 11/7/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/18/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/15/2020. (Ward, Frances) (Entered: 10/17/2019)
296 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated on the record, Plaintiffs' motion to compel 30(b)(6) deposition 293 is granted. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 10/17/2019)
297 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Minute entry dated 10/17/19 296 is amended as follows: For the reasons stated on the record, Plaintiffs' motion to compel 30(b)(6) deposition 293 is denied. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 10/18/2019)
298 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S.Leave to Serve Rule 33 Discovery on Defendant Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 11/07/2019)

11/07/2019 11/18/2019
11/20/2019

299 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 298 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 11/18/2019 at 09:00 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 11/07/2019)
300 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Motion hearing held. Defendants' object to plaintiffs' motion for leave to serve Rule 33 discovery on defendant Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County 298 is taken under advisement. Plaintiffs' counsel intends to move for summary judgment. The briefing schedule is as follows: motion due: 12/9/19; response due 1/3/2020; reply due 1/15/2020. As discussed in open court, Defendant Leonard Dixon's affidavit is due 11/25/19. Answers regarding interrogatories should be submitted on 11/25/19. Status hearing is set for 1/22/2020 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 11/18/2019)
301 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 11/18/19 before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer. Order Number: 36829. Court Reporter Contact Information: Frances Ward - (312)435-5561 wardofficialtranscripts@gmail.com.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

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Redaction Request due 12/11/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/23/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/18/2020. (Ward, Frances) (Entered: 11/20/2019)
302 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to compel Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County to Supplement Interrogatory Response (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 11/27/2019)
303 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to compel 302 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 11/2/2020 at 09:00 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 11/27/2019)
304 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to withdraw motion to compel 302 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 12/02/2019)
305 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to withdraw 304 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 12/9/2019 at 09:00 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 12/02/2019)
306 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to withdraw motion to compel 304 is granted.

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Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion to compel 302 is withdrawn. Motion hearing date of 12/9/19 is stricken. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 12/05/2019)
307 MOTION by Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois to withdraw , MOTION by Attorney Ryan J. Gillespie to withdraw as attorney for The County of Cook, Illinois. No party information provided (Gillespie, Ryan) (Entered: 12/05/2019)
308 NOTICE of Motion by Ryan J. Gillespie for presentment of motion to withdraw, motion to withdraw as attorney 307 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 12/12/2019 at 08:45 AM. (Gillespie, Ryan) (Entered: 12/05/2019)
309 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Defendant County of Cook's motion to withdraw attorney pursuant to Local Rule 83.17 307 is granted. Attorney Ryan J. Gillespie is given leave to withdraw as counsel for Defendant. Motion hearing date of 12/12/19 is stricken. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 12/09/2019)
310 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for partial summary judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 12/09/2019)
311 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois by Marissa D. Longoria (Longoria, Marissa) (Entered: 12/11/2019)
312 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County by Hal Dworkin (Dworkin, Hal) (Entered: 12/17/2019)
313 MOTION by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. for leave to file Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kay, Justin) (Entered: 12/31/2019)
314 NOTICE of Motion by Justin O'Neill Kay for presentment of motion for leave to file 313 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 1/8/2020 at 08:45 AM. (Kay, Justin) (Entered: 12/31/2019)
315 MOTION by Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion for partial summary judgment 310 (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 01/03/2020)
316 NOTICE of Motion by Michael T. Dierkes for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 315 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 1/8/2020 at 08:45 AM. (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 01/03/2020)
317 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Motion hearing held. Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County's unopposed motion for extension of time to file response 315 is granted.

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Defendants' motion for leave to file supplemental authority 313 is granted. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/08/2020)
318 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Plaintiffs' reply in support of their motion for partial summary judgment 310 shall be filed by 1/29/2020. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/14/2020)
319 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Plaintiffs have not yet met the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) and the court, therefore, declines to certify their proposed class at this time. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification 235 is denied without prejudice to renewal within 21 days of this order. Defendants may then respond to the renewed motion for class certification or seek a determination on the merits. The court notes, further, that although it appears Plaintiffs' claims present common questions, it may well be that some residents of the JTDC were affected by the Empire filming only briefly or in relatively insignificant ways. Moreover, as time passes, it likely will become increasingly difficult to locate and provide meaningful relief to a class of persons who were juveniles at the time of the relevant events but may well now be moving toward adulthood. For all of these reasons, the court encourages the parties to explore the possibility of settlement before incurring the expense of another round of briefing. Status set for 1/22/2020 is stricken and re-set to 2/6/2020 at 9:30 a.m. This case is referred to Magistrate Judge Kim for settlement conference. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 1/16/2020. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/16/2020)
320 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Honorable Young B. Kim for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: a settlement conference. (ntf, ) Notice mailed by judge's staff (Entered: 01/16/2020)
321 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: A preliminary settlement discussion with the attorneys of record is scheduled for January 23, 2020, at 10:00 a.m. by phone. The conference call number is (877) 336-1839 and the passcode is 4333213. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 01/16/2020)
322 RESPONSE by The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County to MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for partial summary judgment 310 and cross-motion for summary judgment (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 01/17/2020)
323 MOTION by Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County for summary judgment (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 01/17/2020)
324 NOTICE of Motion by Michael T. Dierkes for presentment of motion for summary judgment 323 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 1/22/2020 at 08:45 AM. (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 01/17/2020)

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325 Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts by The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 01/17/2020)
326 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Motion hearing held. Defendant Chief Judge's motion for summary judgment 323 is taken under advisement. Plaintiffs' reply in support of their motion for partial summary judgment and response to Defendant Chief Judge's motion for summary judgment shall be filed by 1/29/2020. Chief Judge's reply in support shall be filed by 2/19/2020. Renewed motion for class certification shall be filed by 3/16/2020. Status hearing set for 2/6/2020 is stricken and re-set to 3/18/2020 at 9:30 a.m. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/22/2020)
327 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Preliminary settlement discussion held by phone and continued to January 31, 2020, at 10:30 a.m. by phone. Parties are to use the same call-in information. Parties will be expected to report on whether they wish to discuss settlements for just the named Plaintiffs or a class settlement. This information will dictate when an in-person settlement conference can take place. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 01/23/2020)
328 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: By agreement, deadline for Plaintiffs' reply in support of their motion for partial summary judgment and response to Defendant Chief Judge's motion for summary judgment is extended to 1/31/2020. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/24/2020)
329 MOTION by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to set a briefing schedule (Kay, Justin) (Entered: 01/31/2020)
330 JOINT AGREED NOTICE of Motion by Justin O'Neill Kay for presentment of motion by filer to set a briefing schedule 329 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 2/6/2020 at 08:45 AM. (Kay, Justin) (Entered: 01/31/2020)
331 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Second preliminary settlement discussion held by phone. Defendant County of Cook did not appear. An in-person settlement conference is scheduled for August 25, 2020, at noon in courtroom 1019. If this date and time pose a scheduling conflict for those who are required to appear, they must contact the court by noon on February 3, 2020. If the settlement conference must be rescheduled, it will be rescheduled for August 26, 2020. Parties are ordered to review and follow this court's standing order on "Settlement Conferences" on its webpage. Individuals with the authority to settle this matter must appear in person. A status hearing is scheduled for July 8, 2020, at 10:30 a.m. by phone to discuss whether to reschedule the settlement conference. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 01/31/2020)

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332 REPLY by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to response to motion 322 , motion for partial summary judgment 310 Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition to Defendant Chief Judge's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 01/31/2020)
333 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Parties' joint agreed motion for entry of a briefing schedule 329 is granted as follows: Deadline for Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification is extended to 3/23/2020. Defendants' response is extended to 4/30/2020. Plaintiffs' reply in support is extended to 5/21/2020. Motion hearing date of 2/6/2020 is stricken. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 02/03/2020)
334 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Fox Defendants reported to the court that they are not available for an in- person settlement conference on any of the dates provided by the court during the preliminary settlement discussion. In light of this report, the settlement conference scheduled for August 25, 2020, is cancelled. Parties are to contact the court by noon tomorrow and confirm the new settlement conference date that the court provided by email. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 02/03/2020)
335 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: At the parties' request, an in-person settlement conference is scheduled for September 3, 2020, at noon in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 02/04/2020)
336 MOTION by Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County for extension of time to file response/reply as to reply, 332 , response to motion 322 (Dworkin, Hal) (Entered: 02/18/2020)
337 NOTICE of Motion by Hal Dworkin for presentment of (Dworkin, Hal) (Entered: 02/18/2020)
338 NOTICE of Motion by Hal Dworkin for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 336 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 2/24/2020 at 09:00 AM. (Dworkin, Hal) (Entered: 02/18/2020)
339 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Defendant Chief Judge's unopposed motion for extension of time to file reply in support of his cross-motion for partial summary judgment 336 is granted to and including 3/4/2020. Motion hearing date of 2/24/2020 is stricken. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 02/19/2020)
340 REPLY by The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County to reply, 332 , response to motion 322 Reply in Support of Chief Judge's

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Cross-Motion For Summary Judgement (Dworkin, Hal) (Entered: 03/04/2020)
341 ORDER Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on March 16, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Amended General Order. See attached Order for guidance.Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/16/2020: Mailed notice. (pj, ) (Entered: 03/17/2020)
342 ORDER Seconded Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on March 30, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Second Amended General Order. Amended General Order 20-0012, entered on March 17, 2020, and General Order 20-0014, entered on March 20, 2020, are vacated and superseded by this Second Amended General. See attached Order for guidance.Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/30/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 03/31/2020)
343 ORDER Third Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on April 24, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Third Amended General Order. Parties are must carefully review all obligations under this Order, including the requirement listed in paragraph number 5 to file a joint written status report in most civil cases. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 4/24/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 04/27/2020)
344 STATUS Report (Joint) by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. (Kay, Justin) (Entered: 05/15/2020)
345 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: The court thanks the parties for their Joint Status Report. Plaintiffs are directed, on or before June 8, 2020, to provide responses to interrogatories served on February 13 by the Office of the Chief Judge and on February 14 by the County of Cook. Responses to certain contention interrogatories from those Defendants will be served at the close of fact discovery. Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification will be filed on or before June 15, 2020. Defendants' opposition brief will be due on or before July 30, 2020; Plaintiffs' reply on or before August 20, 2020. Magistrate Judge Kim is encouraged to postpone any in-person settlement efforts until the court has ruled on the renewed motion for class certification. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 05/18/2020)
346 ORDER ORDER Fourth Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the

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Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on May 26, 2020. This Order does not extend or modify any deadlines set in civil cases. For non-emergency motions, no motion may be noticed for presentment on a date earlier than July 15, 2020. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 5/26/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 05/26/2020)
347 MOTION by Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County to compel responses by T.S. and Q.B. to his second set of interrogatories (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 06/12/2020)
348 NOTICE of Motion by Michael T. Dierkes for presentment of motion to compel 347 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/27/2020 at 09:00 AM. (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 06/12/2020)
349 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. by Mariah Esperanza Garcia (Garcia, Mariah) (Entered: 06/12/2020)
350 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Defendant Chief Judge'smotion to compel 347 is entered and continued. Motion hearing date of 7/27/2020 is stricken. Plaintiffs are directed to respond in writing within seven days, by 6/22/2020. Reply, if any, to be filed seven days thereafter, by 6/29/2020. The court notes the Chief Judge's assertion that Plaintiffs' timeliness objections to the interrogatories must be disregarded in light of Plaintiffs' own statements in open court that discovery is not closed. The court will expect Plaintiff to explain the basis for their timeliness objection and identify the date(s) on which discovery in this case should be deemed closed. If the parties in fact agree that discovery remains open, they are directed to identify all remaining necessary discovery and propose a joint schedule for its completion. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 06/15/2020)
351 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to certify class (Renewed) Responses due by 7/30/2020 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 06/15/2020)
352 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to seal document (ECF No. 3511) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 06/16/2020)
353 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Plaintiffs' motion to seal document 352 is granted. The Clerk's Office is directed to seal document [351-1]. Plaintiffs shall file the redacted exhibit on the docket of this case. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 06/18/2020)
354 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. (Document 351-1) regarding MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to certify class (Renewed) 351 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 06/22/2020)

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355 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to motion to compel 347 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
356 REPLY by The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County to Response 355 (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 06/23/2020)
357 MOTION by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. for leave to file excess pages (UNOPPOSED) (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/24/2020)
358 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Motion of the Chief Judge to compel responses to his second set of interrogatories 347 is granted in part and denied in part. By agreement, Plaintiffs will advise Defendants of the dates and nature of any arrests or criminal convictions for either T.S. or Q.B. since the dates of their depositions. They will also provide copies of any sworn statements Plaintiffs have given since those dates. The court grants the motion to compel a further response to Interrogatory 1 in part; Plaintiffs will disclose the dates only of any additional communications with their attorneys since August 7, 2019. The parties agree that Defendants are entitled to discovery regarding Mr. Dunlap's supplemental report and to discovery concerning M.C., should the court permit him to serve as a new proposed class representative. The parties will confer and propose dates for the additional discovery referred to here, as well as discovery on punitive damages, discovery on the cost of construction of a sound stage in the alternative to filming at JTDC, and discovery relating to profits generated by the relevant episodes of Empire. Discovery is otherwise closed. The parties are directed to submit a proposed schedule for the completion of the discovery referred to here, together with a further written status report on 7/27/2020. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 06/24/2020)
359 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Minute entry dated 6/24/2020 358 is amended as follows: Plaintiffs will disclose the dates only of any additional communications with their attorneys since August 7, 2018. Remainder of order shall remain. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 06/24/2020)
360 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Fox Defendants' unopposed motion for leave to file an oversized brief 357 is granted up to 35 pages. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 06/26/2020)
361 MOTION by Defendants Twentieth Century Fox Television, Fox Broadcasting Company, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. for summary judgment (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/26/2020)

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362 MEMORANDUM by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in support of motion for summary judgment 361 (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/26/2020)
363 RULE 56 56.1 Statement by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. regarding motion for summary judgment 361 (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/26/2020)
364 DECLARATION of Jeffrey S. Jacobson regarding motion for summary judgment 361 Declaration of Jeffrey S. Jacobson in Support of Fox Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26)(Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/26/2020)
365 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to amend/correct Complaint or To Permit Consideration Of H.C. As Potential Class Representative (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/01/2020)
366 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen H. Weil for presentment of motion to amend/correct, 365 before Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/27/2020 at 09:00 AM. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/01/2020)
367 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Plaintiffs' motion to amend complaint to add additional class representative 365 is entered and continued. Defendants are directed to respond on or before July 20, 2020; reply, if any, to be filed on July 27, 2020. Motion hearing date of 7/27/2020 is stricken. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 07/06/2020)
368 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Today's status hearing is cancelled. The settlement conference scheduled for September 3, 2020, to stand. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 07/08/2020)
369 ORDER Fifth Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on July 10, 2020. This Order does not extend or modify any deadlines set in civil cases. No motions may be noticed for in-person presentment; the presiding judge will notify parties of the need, if any, for a hearing by electronic means or in-court proceeding. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/10/2020: Mailed notice. (Clerk3, Docket) (Entered: 07/10/2020)

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370 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for extension of time and for clarification (JOINT) (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/13/2020)
371 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Parties' joint motion for extension of time and for clarification 370 is granted. By agreement, date for Defendants' response to the renewed class certification motion is extended to August 20, 2020; Plaintiffs' reply to be filed on or before September 14, 2020. The court directs that the parties proceed immediately with discovery concerning H.C. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 07/14/2020)
372 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. by Christina Rae Chapin (Chapin, Christina) (Entered: 07/20/2020)
373 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. TO SET A CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BRIEFING SCHEDULE (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/20/2020)
374 RESPONSE by The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, Fox Entertainment Group LLC, Fox Networks Group, Inc., Fox Television Group, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to amend/correct Complaint or To Permit Consideration Of H.C. As Potential Class Representative 365 (Attachments: # 1 Declaration A, # 2 Declaration B)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/20/2020)
375 MOTION by Attorney Alexis Chardon and Terrence Garmey to withdraw as attorney for Q.B., T.S.. No party information provided (Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 07/21/2020)
376 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Plaintiffs' motion to set a consolidated summary judgment briefing schedule 373 is taken under advisement. Defendants' responses shall be filed by 7/28/2020. Plaintiffs' reply in support shall be filed by 8/4/2020. Plaintiffs' motion to permit withdrawal 375 is granted. Attorney Alexis Garmey Chardon and Terrence D. Garmey are given leave to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiffs. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 07/21/2020)
377 RESPONSE by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. TO SET A CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BRIEFING SCHEDULE 373 (Fox Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Set a Consolidated Summary Judgment Briefing Schedule, and Cross Motion for Entry of a Briefing Schedule on the Fox Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and for Expedited Briefing Thereon) (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 07/21/2020)

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378 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: As the Fox Defendants have responded promptly to Plaintiffs' Motion to Set a Consolidated Summary Judgment Briefing Schedule 373 , Plaintiffs are directed to file their reply in support of that motion in seven days, on or before July 31, 2020. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 07/22/2020)
379 STATUS Report (Joint) by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 07/27/2020)
380 RESPONSE by Q.B., T.S.in Support of MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to amend/correct Complaint or To Permit Consideration Of H.C. As Potential Class Representative 365 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1-3)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/27/2020)
381 MOTION by Defendants The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. for leave to file Sur-Reply and, MOTION by Defendants The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to Postpone further Discovery from Proposed Plaintiff H.C. (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 07/28/2020)
382 RESPONSE by Leonard Dixonin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. TO SET A CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BRIEFING SCHEDULE 373 (Kamper, Joi) (Entered: 07/28/2020)
383 RESPONSE by The County of Cook, Illinoisin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. TO SET A CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BRIEFING SCHEDULE 373 (Mikhail, Danielle) (Entered: 07/28/2020)
384 RESPONSE by The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. TO SET A CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BRIEFING SCHEDULE 373 (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 07/28/2020)
385 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Telephone status hearing set for 8/3/2020 at 1:00 p.m. Members of the public and media will be able to call in to listen to this hearing. The call-in number is 877-336-1839 and the access code is 6708061. Counsel of record will receive an email 15 minutes prior to the start of the telephonic hearing with instructions to join the call. Persons granted remote access to proceedings are reminded of the general prohibition against photographing, recording, and rebroadcasting of court proceedings. Violation of these prohibitions may result in sanctions, including removal of court issued media credentials, restricted entry to future hearings,

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denial of entry to future hearings, or any other sanctions deemed necessary by the Court. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 07/30/2020)
386 REPLY by Q.B., T.S. to response in opposition to motion 382 , response in opposition to motion 384 , response in opposition to motion,, 377 , response in opposition to motion 383 to set a consolidated summary judgment briefing schedule (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/31/2020)
387 RESPONSE by Q.B., T.S.in Opposition to MOTION by Defendants The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. for leave to file Sur-Reply andMOTION by Defendants The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to Postpone further Discovery from P 381 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/31/2020)
388 STATUS Report by Q.B., T.S. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/02/2020)
389 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Telephone status hearing held. Plaintiffs' counsel will file further information in support of the renewed motion for class certification by 8/7/2020. Date for Defendants' response to that motion is extended to 8/31/2020; Plaintiffs' reply to be filed by 9/25/2020, and the court will make every effort to rule on that motion within 30 days. Defendants' motion for leave to file sur-reply and to postpone further discovery from proposed additional named Plaintiff H.C. 381 is denied. Plaintiffs' motion to set a consolidated summary judgment briefing schedule 373 is granted as follows: Defendants' motion for consolidated summary judgment shall be filed by 11/16/2020. Plaintiffs' response shall be filed by 12/18/2020. Defendants' reply shall be filed by 1/15/2021. The parties anticipate service of contention interrogatories, if any, by 8/15/2020. Interrogatories shall be completed by 8/15/2020. Discovery will not proceed at this time on the following issues: on the profitability of the Empire season, the cost of building a sound stage, or punitive damages. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 08/03/2020)
390 SUPPLEMENT to motion to certify class 351 regarding numerosity (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 08/07/2020)
391 MOTION by Attorney Matthew C. Luzadder, Catherine E. James, and Janine N. Fletcher-Thomas to withdraw as attorney for Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.. No party information provided (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Fletcher-Thomas, Janine) (Entered: 08/20/2020)

08/21/2020 08/24/2020 08/25/2020
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08/31/2020
09/11/2020 09/25/2020

392 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Defendant's motion to permit withdrawal of attorneys 391 is granted. Attorneys Matthew Charles Luzadder, Janine Nicole Fletcher-Thomas, and Catherine E. James are given leave to withdraw as counsel for Defendants. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 08/21/2020)
393 MOTION by Defendant The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County for leave to file excess pages (Unopposed) (Dierkes, Michael) (Entered: 08/24/2020)
394 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: At the parties' request, the settlement conference scheduled for September 3, 2020, is cancelled. Parties are to select one of the following dates for a settlement conference: (1) November 16th; (2) November 24th; (3) December 7th; and (4) December 11th. The settlement conference will take place by phone and will start at 12:00 p.m. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 08/25/2020)
395 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Defendants' unopposed motion for leave to exceed page limit 393 is granted to 45 pages. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 08/25/2020)
396 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: At the parties' request, a telephonic settlement conference is scheduled for December 7, 2020, at 12:00 p.m. The court will email the parties the call-in information to participate in the settlement conference by no later than December 4, 2020. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 08/26/2020)
397 MEMORANDUM by The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in Opposition to motion to certify class 351 (Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification) (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/31/2020)
398 DECLARATION of Jeffrey S. Jacobson regarding memorandum in opposition to motion, 397 (Declaration of Jeffrey S. Jacobson in Support of Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A-C, # 2 Exhibit D-M, # 3 Exhibit N-Z, # 4 Exhibit AA-GG, # 5 Exhibit HH-MM)(Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/31/2020)
399 WITHDRAWING Joi Kamper as counsel for Defendant Leonard Dixon and substituting Patrick Daniel Morris as counsel of record (Morris, Patrick) (Entered: 09/11/2020)
400 REPLY by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to motion to certify class 351 (in support) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8,

09/25/2020 09/28/2020 11/12/2020 11/13/2020
11/23/2020
11/24/2020 12/04/2020

# 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 09/25/2020)
401 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for leave to file excess pages (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 09/25/2020)
402 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to exceed page limits instanter 401 is granted to 30 pages. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 09/28/2020)
403 MOTION by Defendants The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. for extension of time Defendants' Unopposed Motion To Modify And Extend The Summary Judgment Briefing Schedule (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 11/12/2020)
404 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Defendant's unopposed motion to modify and extend summary judgment briefing schedule 403 is granted. Fox Defendants may, but need not, file an amended opening brief on or before December 16, 2020. All other Defendants that wish to move for summary judgment must do so on or before December 16, 2020. To the extent practicable, all Defendants will coordinate their briefs and rely on a common set of undisputed facts. Government Defendants are not required to submit a single brief, so long as their separate briefs are coordinated, do not duplicate argument, and are no more than 15 pages in length. Plaintiffs' responses to all motions for summary judgment will be due on January 18, 2021. Defendants' replies in support of their motions for summary judgment will be due on February 15, 2021. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 11/13/2020)
405 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. The court grants the Chief Judge's Motion for Summary Judgment that all claims against him are barred by the Eleventh Amendment 323 and denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that the Chief Judge is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity 310 . The court grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that Dixon was the Chief Judge's final decisionmaker regarding (1) whether to permit the Empire filming at the JTDC and (2) whether and how to alter the JTDC's operations to accommodate the filming 310 . Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 11/23/2020. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 11/23/2020)
406 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to serve Rule 33 discovery 298 is terminated as moot. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 11/24/2020)
407 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: At the parties' request, the December 7, 2020 settlement conference is rescheduled for June 29, 2021, at noon. Parties prefer to engage in settlement discussions

12/16/2020 12/16/2020 12/16/2020 12/16/2020 12/16/2020
12/17/2020

after the pending class certification issue has been resolved. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 12/04/2020)
408 MOTION by Defendants Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. for leave to file Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Leave to File an Enlarged Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment and Consolidated Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 12/16/2020)
409 MOTION by Defendants Twentieth Century Fox Television, Fox Broadcasting Company, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. for summary judgment The Fox Defendants' Updated Motion for Summary Judgment (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 12/16/2020)
410 MEMORANDUM by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in support of motion for summary judgment 409 (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 12/16/2020)
411 MOTION by Defendants The County of Cook, Illinois, Leonard Dixon for summary judgment (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 12/16/2020)
412 DECLARATION of Francis J. Catania regarding motion for summary judgment 411 , motion for summary judgment 409 Declaration of Francis J. Catania in Support of Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Consolidated Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29 Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32, # 33 Exhibit 33, # 34 Exhibit 34, # 35 Exhibit 35, # 36 Exhibit 36, # 37 Exhibit 37, # 38 Exhibit 38, # 39 Exhibit 39, # 40 Exhibit 40, # 41 Exhibit 41, # 42 Exhibit 42, # 43 Exhibit 43, # 44 Exhibit 44, # 45 Exhibit 45, # 46 Exhibit 46, # 47 Exhibit 47, # 48 Exhibit 48, # 49 Exhibit 49, # 50 Exhibit 50, # 51 Exhibit 51, # 52 Exhibit 52, # 53 Exhibit 53, # 54 Exhibit 54, # 55 Exhibit 55, # 56 Exhibit 56, # 57 Exhibit 57)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 12/16/2020)
413 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Defendants' unopposed motion for leave to file an enlarged memorandum of law in support of their motion for summary judgment and consolidated Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts 408 is granted. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 12/17/2020)

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414 MEMORANDUM by Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois in support of motion for summary judgment 411 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 12/17/2020)
415 RULE 56 56.1 Statement by Leonard Dixon, Fox Broadcasting Company, The County of Cook, Illinois, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. regarding motion for summary judgment 409 , motion for summary judgment 411 Defendants' Consolidated Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 12/17/2020)
416 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion for summary judgment 409 , motion for summary judgment 411 (UNOPPOSED) (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 01/15/2021)
417 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Plaintiffs' unopposed for enlargement of time to respond to Defendants' motions for summary judgment 416 is granted as follows: Plaintiff's response is extended to 2/8/2021. Defendants' reply in support is extended to 3/5/2021. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/19/2021)
418 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Minute entry dated 1/19/2021 417 is amended as follows: Plaintiffs' unopposed for enlargement of time to respond to Defendants' motions for summary judgment 416 is granted as follows: Plaintiff's response is extended to 2/5/2021. Defendants' reply in support is extended to 3/8/2021. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/19/2021)
419 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for extension of time to file response/reply to Defendants' motions for summary judgment (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 02/05/2021)
420 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Plaintiff's unopposed motion for enlargement of time to respond to Defendants' motions for summary judgment 419 is granted as follows: Deadline for Plaintiff's response is extended to 2/8/2021; Defendants' replies in support are extended to 3/11/2021. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 02/08/2021)
421 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for leave to file Instanter Oversized Consolidated Summary Judgment Response Brief and Rule 56.1 Materials (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Consolidated Summary Judgment Response, # 2 Proposed Response to Defendants' Consolidated Statements of Fact, # 3 Proposed Statements of Additional Facts)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 02/09/2021)
422 Exhibit List in Support of Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Response by Q.B., T.S.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3,

02/09/2021
02/09/2021 02/10/2021

# 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29 Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32, # 33 Exhibit 33, # 34 Exhibit 34, # 35 Exhibit 35, # 36 Exhibit 36, # 37 Exhibit 37, # 38 Exhibit 38, # 39 Exhibit 39, # 40 Exhibit 40, # 41 Exhibit 41, # 42 Exhibit 42, # 43 Exhibit 43, # 44 Exhibit 44, # 45 Exhibit 45, # 46 Exhibit 46, # 47 Exhibit 47, # 48 Exhibit 48, # 49 Exhibit 49, # 50 Exhibit 50, # 51 Exhibit 51, # 52 Exhibit 52, # 53 Exhibit 53, # 54 Exhibit 54, # 55 Exhibit 55, # 56 Exhibit 56, # 57 Exhibit 57, # 58 Exhibit 58, # 59 Exhibit 59, # 60 Exhibit 60, # 61 Exhibit 61, # 62 Exhibit 62, # 63 Exhibit 63, # 64 Exhibit 64, # 65 Exhibit 65, # 66 Exhibit 66, # 67 Exhibit 67, # 68 Exhibit 68, # 69 Exhibit 69, # 70 Exhibit 70, # 71 Exhibit 71, # 72 Exhibit 72, # 73 Exhibit 73, # 74 Exhibit 74, # 75 Exhibit 75, # 76 Exhibit 76, # 77 Exhibit 77, # 78 Exhibit 78, # 79 Exhibit 79, # 80 Exhibit 80, # 81 Exhibit 81, # 82 Exhibit 82, # 83 Exhibit 83, # 84 Exhibit 84, # 85 Exhibit 85, # 86 Exhibit 86, # 87 Exhibit 87, # 88 Exhibit 88, # 89 Exhibit 89, # 90 Exhibit 90, # 91 Exhibit 91, # 92 Exhibit 92, # 93 Exhibit 93, # 94 Exhibit 94, # 95 Exhibit 95, # 96 Exhibit 96, # 97 Exhibit 97, # 98 Exhibit 98, # 99 Exhibit 99, # 100 Exhibit 100, # 101 Exhibit 101, # 102 Exhibit 102, # 103 Exhibit 103, # 104 Exhibit 104, # 105 Exhibit 105, # 106 Exhibit 106, # 107 Exhibit 107)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 02/09/2021)
423 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. Exhibit List in Support of Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Response (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 27 [SEALED], # 2 Exhibit 37 [SEALED], # 3 Exhibit 40 [SEALED], # 4 Exhibit 41 [SEALED], # 5 Exhibit 43 [SEALED], # 6 Exhibit 48 [SEALED], # 7 Exhibit 54 [SEALED], # 8 Exhibit 55 [SEALED], # 9 Exhibit 56 [SEALED], # 10 Exhibit 66 [SEALED], # 11 Exhibit 68 [SEALED], # 12 Exhibit 69 [SEALED], # 13 Exhibit 70 [SEALED], # 14 Exhibit 71 [SEALED], # 15 Exhibit 102 [SEALED])(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 02/09/2021)
424 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to seal document sealed document,, 423 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 02/09/2021)
425 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file instanter oversized consolidated summary judgment response brief and Rule 56.1 materials 421 is granted. Plaintiffs' motion to seal 424 is granted. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 02/10/2021)

03/01/2021
03/02/2021 03/11/2021
03/11/2021 03/11/2021 03/11/2021 06/03/2021 06/10/2021
06/10/2021 06/24/2021

426 MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. to amend/correct exhibit list,,,,,,,, 422 (UNOPPOSED) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 7 (corrected), # 2 Exhibit 9 (corrected), # 3 Exhibit 15 (corrected), # 4 Exhibit 29 (corrected), # 5 Exhibit 33 (corrected), # 6 Exhibit 73 (corrected), # 7 Exhibit 79 (corrected), # 8 Exhibit 103 (corrected))(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 03/01/2021)
427 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to correct exhibits 426 is granted. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 03/02/2021)
428 REPLY by Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois to MOTION by Plaintiffs Q.B., T.S. for leave to file Instanter Oversized Consolidated Summary Judgment Response Brief and Rule 56.1 Materials 421 , memorandum in support of motion 414 , MOTION by Defendants The County of Cook, Illinois, Leonard Dixon for summary judgment 411 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 03/11/2021)
429 REPLY by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. to motion for summary judgment 409 (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 03/11/2021)
430 RESPONSE by Defendants Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. Defendants' Consolidated Response to Plaintiffs' Statements of Additional Facts (Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 03/11/2021)
431 DECLARATION of Jeffrey S. Jacobson regarding Response 430 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 5, # 2 Exhibit 17, # 3 Exhibit 31, # 4 Exhibit 42, # 5 Exhibit 58, # 6 Exhibit 59, # 7 Exhibit 60, # 8 Exhibit 61, # 9 Exhibit 62)(Jacobson, Jeffrey) (Entered: 03/11/2021)
432 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: At the parties' request, the June 29, 2021 settlement conference is rescheduled for September 21, 2021, at noon. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/03/2021)
433 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion and Order, the court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motions for summary judgment [361, 409, 411], grants Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 365 , and grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification 351 . Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Parties are directed to file a Joint Status Report by 07/08/2021. Notices mailed by judge's staff. (rbf, ) (Entered: 06/10/2021)
434 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 06/10/2021.(rbf, ) (Entered: 06/10/2021)
435 MOTION by Defendants Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois for certificate of appealability of Court's Order on Defendants' Motion for

06/24/2021 06/29/2021
07/02/2021 07/07/2021 07/08/2021 07/19/2021

Summary Judgment (Dkt. 434) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (Morris, Patrick) (Entered: 06/24/2021)
436 MEMORANDUM by Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois in support of motion for certificate of appealability 435 of Court's Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 434) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (Morris, Patrick) (Entered: 06/24/2021)
437 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: The Court adopts the parties' proposed briefing schedule on Defendants, the County of Cook, Illinois and Leonard Dixon's motion for certification of the Court's Order on Defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(B) 435 as follows: Plaintiffs' response in opposition shall be filed by 07/19/2021 and defendants' reply brief shall be filed by 08/02/2021. Notices mailed by judge's staff. (rbf, ) (Entered: 06/29/2021)
438 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL by Fox Broadcasting Company, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. (Notice of Withdrawal by Christina R. Chapin) (Chapin, Christina) (Entered: 07/02/2021)
439 STATUS Report Joint by The County of Cook, Illinois (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/07/2021)
440 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer: At the parties' request, as set forth in their joint status report 439 , class notice is hereby stayed pending resolution of motions before this court and the Court of Appeals. (rbf, ) (Entered: 07/08/2021)
441 RESPONSE by Q.B., T.S.in Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Leonard Dixon, The County of Cook, Illinois for certificate of appealability of Court's Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 434) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) 435 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 07/19/2021)

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