UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

)

CITY OF NEWARK,

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

___________________________________ )

No. COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The United States of America, by its undersigned attorneys, brings this civil action against
the City of Newark for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (“Section 14141”). 2. The United States brings this action to remedy a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers of the Newark Police Division (“NPD”), the law enforcement agency of the City of Newark, New Jersey, that has deprived persons of rights, privileges, and immunities secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 3. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345, and 2201. 4. The United States is authorized to initiate this action under Section 14141. Section 14141 authorizes the United States to bring suit against a state or local government for equitable and declaratory relief in order to remedy a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

5. Venue is proper in the District of New Jersey under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Defendant is located in New Jersey, and all events, actions, or omissions giving rise to this claim occurred in New Jersey.
II. PARTIES 6. The Plaintiff is the United States of America. 7. The Defendant is the City of Newark, a municipality located in Essex County, New
Jersey. The City of Newark is a local government within the meaning of Section 14141. Defendant controls and operates NPD, and is liable for the acts or omissions of NPD.
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 8. On July 22, 2014, following a three-year investigation, the United States issued a
Findings Report concluding that NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of constitutional violations in its stop and arrest practices, responses to individuals’ exercise of their rights under the First Amendment, uses of force, and theft by officers. The investigation also revealed that the pattern or practice of constitutional violations stems in part from deficiencies in NPD’s systems that are designed to prevent and detect misconduct, including its systems for reviewing force and investigating complaints regarding officer conduct.
A. Defendant’s Pattern or Practice of Unlawful Stops, Searches, and Arrests
9. NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawful stops, searches, and arrests in violation of the Fourth and First Amendments. 2

10. NPD officers have engaged in a pattern of pedestrian stops without the individualized suspicion of wrongdoing required by the Fourth Amendment under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1986). Approximately 75% of reports of pedestrian stops by NPD officers failed to articulate sufficient legal basis for those stops, despite NPD policy requiring such justification. For example, the United States’ investigation revealed that NPD made thousands of stops of individuals described by officers merely as being present in a high crime area or “milling,” “loitering,” or “wandering,” without any indication of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
11. NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of conducting searches and arrests without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment, including some narcotics arrests and searches preceding arrests.
12. NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of arresting individuals for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment, including lawfully objecting to police actions, or other constitutionally protected behavior that officers perceived as insubordinate or disrespectful.
13. Black individuals in Newark have borne the brunt of NPD’s pattern of unconstitutional stops and arrests. Black individuals in Newark have been at least 2.5 times more likely to have been subjected to a pedestrian stop or arrested than white individuals.
B. Defendant’s Pattern or Practice of Using Unreasonable Force
14. NPD officers have engaged in a pattern or practice of using unreasonable force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
3

15. In more than twenty percent of the incidents reviewed by the United States in which NPD officers used force, the force as reported was unreasonable and thus in violation of the Constitution.
16. Further, there has been substantial underreporting of force by NPD officers, and most NPD use of force investigations have been too inadequate to support reliable conclusions about whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable.
C. Defendant’s Pattern or Practice of Subjecting Individuals to Theft
17. NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of theft by officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.
18. The United States’ investigation revealed evidence of theft of citizens’ property and money by officers, specifically in NPD’s specialized units such as the narcotics and gang units, and in the prisoner processing unit at the Green Street Cell Block.
19. NPD has conducted inadequate investigations into theft complaints, failed to take corrective action against offending officers, and declined to implement methods recommended by its own investigators that could substantially reduce and deter future theft by officers.
4

D. NPD’s Inadequate Accountability Systems
20. The pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct has arisen, in part, from deficiencies in Defendant’s systems for directing, training, supervising, and holding accountable NPD officers.
21. Defendant’s systemic deficiencies have included a failure to adequately review and investigate officers’ uses of force and fully and objectively investigate all allegations of misconduct. For example, NPD’s internal affairs system sustained only one civilian complaint of excessive force out of hundreds received during a six-year period.
22. NPD has also failed to provide officers with the tools necessary to support constitutional policing, such as adequate training, clear and easily accessible policies, and meaningful supervisory direction.
IV. CAUSE OF ACTION: PATTERN OR PRACTICE OF VIOLATIONS OF THE FIRST, FOURTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AND SECTION 14141
23. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth above. 24. The United States is authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b) to seek declaratory and
equitable relief to eliminate a pattern or practice of law enforcement officer conduct that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 25. By the actions set forth above, Defendant and its agents, including NPD officers, have engaged in unreasonable stops, searches, and seizures of individuals in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
5

26. By the actions set forth above, Defendant and its agents, including NPD officers, have violated individuals’ rights to engage in protected speech in violation of the First Amendment.
27. By the actions set forth above, Defendant and its agents, including NPD officers, have used unreasonable force against individuals in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
28. By the actions set forth above, Defendant and its agents, including NPD officers, have stolen property from individuals in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
29. By the actions set forth above, Defendant and its agents, including NPD officers, have engaged and, absent the relief sought, are likely to continue to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct causing irreparable harm by depriving persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Fourth, First, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and laws of the United States, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a).
V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 30. WHEREFORE, the United States prays that the Court:
a. Declare that Defendant, its officers, agents, and employees have engaged in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, in violation of Section 14141;
b. Enjoin Defendant, its officers, agents, and employees from engaging in any of the predicate acts forming the basis of the pattern or practice of conduct;
c. Order Defendant, its officers, agents, and employees to adopt and implement policies and procedures to remedy the pattern or practice of unconstitutional and
6

unlawful conduct described herein, and to prevent Defendant, its officers, agents, and employees from depriving persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and d. Order such other appropriate relief as the interests of justice may require.

s/ Paul J. Fishman PAUL J. FISHMAN United States Attorney District of New Jersey

s/ Vanita Gupta VANITA GUPTA Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division

s/ Sabrina G. Comizzoli SABRINA G. COMIZZOLI Executive Assistant United States Attorney KRISTIN L. VASSALLO Deputy Chief, Civil Division 970 Broad Street, Suite 700 Newark, NJ 07102 Tel. (973) 645-2700 Email: Sabrina.Comizzoli@usdoj.gov Email: Kristin.Vassallo@usdoj.gov

s/ Steven H. Rosenbaum STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM Chief Special Litigation Section
s/ Rashida Ogletree CHRISTY LOPEZ Deputy Chief RASHIDA OGLETREE Special Counsel JEFFREY R. MURRAY COREY M. SANDERS PATRICK KENT Trial Attorneys United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 Tel. (202) 305-3712 Email: Christy.Lopez@usdoj.gov Email: Jeff.Murray@usdoj.gov Email: Rashida.Ogletree@usdoj.gov Email: Corey.Sanders@usdoj.gov Email: Patrick.Kent@usdoj.govil: Patrick.Kent@usdoj.gov

7

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v. CITY OF NEWARK,
Defendant.

No.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION FOR ENTRY OF CONSENT DECREE

Plaintiff, the United States of America, and Defendant, the City of Newark (“City”), (collectively “the Parties”) have agreed upon and jointly move the Court to approve and enter the attached Consent Decree as an Order of the Court. The Consent Decree would resolve litigation initiated by the United States with the concurrent filing of a Complaint under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (“Section 14141”). I. Background
In May 2011, the United States, through the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division and the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey (“DOJ”), opened a civil investigation of the operations of the Newark Police Department (“NPD”). Following this independent review, DOJ issued a report detailing its investigative findings on July 22, 2014. In that report, DOJ alleges that NPD officers have engaged in a pattern or practice of theft, unlawful stops and arrests, excessive use of force, and retaliation against individuals who exercise their rights under the First Amendment. Also on July 22, 2014, DOJ and the City entered into an agreement in principle that broadly outlined the reforms necessary to address the DOJ’s findings.

Following the announcement of the agreement in principle, the Parties engaged in extensive negotiations to address and resolve DOJ’s findings. These negotiations have resulted in the attached Consent Decree, an agreement that mandates reforms of the NPD to remedy the constitutional violations that DOJ alleged in its report and Complaint. In particular, the reforms address allegations that NPD has engaged in: (1) a pattern or practice of effecting stops and arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) a pattern or practice of policing which results in disproportionate stops and arrests of Newark’s black residents; (3) a pattern or practice of retaliating against individuals who question police actions, in violation of the First Amendment; (4) a pattern or practice of using unreasonable and excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (5) a pattern or practice of stealing citizens’ property and money, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
By agreeing to enter into the Consent Decree, the City, including NPD, does not admit the truth of, or legal liability for, any of the allegations in the Complaint. Rather, with this Consent Decree, the Parties recognize that the City has committed to implementing reforms that are intended to improve public confidence in law enforcement. II. Legal Standards
Public policy strongly favors settlement in “complex cases where substantial judicial resources can be conserved by avoiding formal litigation.” In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995). When considering whether to approve and enter a consent decree, the court should assess whether the decree is “fair, reasonable, and consistent with the Constitution and the mandate of law.” United States v. Kramer, 19 F.Supp.2d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 1998); see also United States v. New Jersey, No. 10-91 (KSH)(MAS), 2012 WL 3265906, at *7 (D.N.J. Jun. 12, 2012), aff’d, 522 F. App’x 167 (3d Cir.
2

2013); United States v. New Jersey, Nos. CIV. 88-5087 (WGB), 88-4080 (MTB), 87-2331 (HAA), 1995 WL 1943013, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 1995). The United States and the City have entered into a Consent Decree that they believe is consistent with federal law and the public interest, and that is fair, adequate, and reasonable. III. Discussion
A. The Consent Decree Is Consistent with Section 14141 and the Public Objectives of the Law.
Section 14141 prohibits law enforcement officers from engaging in a pattern or practice “that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Pursuant to the authority of Section 14141, DOJ conducted an investigation of the NPD over a period of three years. This investigation was conducted with the cooperation of the City and NPD.
Following its investigation, DOJ issued a report alleging that NPD and its officers had engaged in a pattern or practice of, among other actions, unlawful stops and arrests, theft, retaliation, and excessive force in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States. DOJ’s investigative findings are contained in its July 22, 2014, Findings Report.1 Although the City did not concede the accuracy of, or truth of, DOJ’s findings, the Parties entered into negotiations to address them and other concerns raised by the investigation. The fact that the City does not admit DOJ’s findings does not preclude entry of the Consent Decree as an order of the Court. See, e.g., United States v. Armour & Co., 42 U.S. 673, 682 (1971) (“Because the defendant has, by the decree, waived his right to litigate the issues raised...the conditions upon which he has given that waiver must be respected. . . .”); Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450
1 A copy of the Findings Report is available at: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/07/22/newark_findings_7-22-14.pdf.
3

U.S. 79, 88 (1981) (parties to settlement do not need to admit liability, because doing so “den[ies] the parties their right to compromise their dispute on mutually agreeable terms”).
The proposed Consent Decree before the Court is consistent with the public interest because it requires NPD to reform its practices and deliver police services in a manner that is both constitutional and effective. Through the proposed Consent Decree, the City commits to develop and implement new policies, training, and practices throughout NPD in the areas of community engagement, use of force, search and seizure, bias-free policing, accountability and supervision, and transparency and oversight.
The Consent Decree is an appropriate resolution of the issues raised by DOJ’s findings because voluntary compliance with a negotiated agreement entered as a consent decree is more likely to expediently accomplish agreed upon goals than forced compliance with orders imposed at the end of contested and protracted litigation. Indeed, the DOJ’s investigation and the Parties’ subsequent negotiations already have set in motion a process of reform within NPD. Throughout this process, the City and NPD leadership have expressed a commitment to improve the performance of NPD in its efforts to interact with and protect the safety of the community. The proposed Consent Decree will assist both the City as a whole and NPD officers in achieving that goal.
The Consent Decree establishes the basis for undertaking reform efforts within NPD for the express purpose of better promoting effective community engagement, effective policy guidance, improved training, and closer supervision. The Consent Decree will promote broader officer support and supervision systems and make investigations of alleged misconduct and discipline more fair and constructive. Perhaps most important, the Consent Decree seeks to substantively improve the relationships among NPD and the diverse communities it serves.
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Settling this matter in this way thus allows the City, DOJ, and NPD to work together to implement reforms within NPD without the unnecessary delay or expense of protracted litigation.
B. The Consent Decree Is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable. DOJ’s investigation and subsequent community outreach efforts and the Parties’ lengthy negotiations provide evidence that the negotiated Agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. The Consent Decree includes provisions that have been extensively discussed and agreed upon in an effort to create sustained and comprehensive reforms. The Consent Decree takes into consideration and effectively reflects the thoughts and concerns of the community. DOJ organized and participated in community meetings to learn from the citizens of Newark what reforms they wanted for their police department. In those meetings and independently, various individuals and community groups shared their ideas and expectations for the Consent Decree and the selection of an Independent Monitor. In all, the DOJ relied on input from police officers, police unions, subject matter experts, community members and leaders, including representatives from faith-based communities and civil rights organizations, in drafting and negotiating the Consent Decree. Thereafter, the Parties negotiated in good faith and have reached agreement on numerous reforms to NPD’s existing policies, practices, and procedures, as well as its training, oversight, and accountability structures that sufficiently address the concerns of the United States set forth in the Complaint. Further, the nature and extent of the good faith negotiations that were undertaken in arriving at this Consent Decree provide the Court with additional assurance that it is fair, adequate, and reasonable to remediate the violations alleged in the Complaint, despite the
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absence of ongoing litigation. In determining that the Consent Decree is fair, adequate and reasonable, the Court may rely on the judgment of experienced counsel for the parties. Kramer, 19 F.Supp.2d at 281.
Counsel for the Parties to this Consent Decree are experienced attorneys who, for many months, engaged in discussions in which, “in exchange for the savings of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with litigation.” Armour & Co., 402 U.S. at 681. In reaching a negotiated resolution, both DOJ and the City took steps to guarantee that the concerns of all interested parties were considered in reaching this Agreement and the shared goal of ensuring constitutional policing by NPD.
Counsel for both Parties are familiar with the practices of NPD and spent many hours negotiating the details of the Consent Decree. The DOJ consulted with subject matter experts and NPD leadership to ensure that each remedial measure in the Consent Decree is tailored to require effective and sustainable reforms that address the concerns raised by the DOJ’s investigation and that can be implemented and measured. Thus, the adversarial posture, combined with the respective duties of these government agencies toward those they represent, and the good faith, extensive negotiations among seasoned attorneys, provide further assurance that the Consent Decree is fair, adequate and reasonable.
C. The Proposed Monitor Is Well Qualified to Assess the City’s Compliance with the Consent Decree.
In Paragraph 170 on the Consent Decree, the Parties jointly have selected Peter C. Harvey of Patterson Belknap to “assess the City’s progress in implementing, and achieving compliance with, the Agreement; report on the status of implementation to the Parties and the Court; work with the Parties to address any barriers to compliance; and assist the Parties to informally resolve any disputes or differences.” (Consent Decree, Par. 169). The Parties
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solicited applications from a wide pool of qualified monitoring teams and engaged in an in-depth and cooperative process to reach agreement as to which of the applicants would be best qualified to serve as Monitor in this case. The process included an in-depth review of all final applications; lengthy in-person interviews of a number of the teams; and multiple follow-up interviews with some of those teams. The Parties agreed that Mr. Harvey is particularly qualified to assess and report on the City’s compliance with the Decree and ensure that the City is engaging in effective and constitutional policing.
Mr. Harvey served as Attorney General for the State of New Jersey during the time that the New Jersey State Police was under a federal Consent Decree between the State of New Jersey and the Department of Justice. In this role, Mr. Harvey assisted the State Police in achieving full compliance with all components of the Consent Decree, including requirements related to discriminatory policing. Mr. Harvey possesses a deep understanding of state and local practices and has direct experience overseeing organizational change and law enforcement reforms.
Mr. Harvey will be assisted by a variety of local and nationally recognized experts who are all committed to ensuring constitutional policing and 21st Century policing practices. The Parties agree that the proposed Monitor and the monitoring team will have a depth and breadth of skills to monitor effectively and efficiently NPD’s implementation of the Consent Decree. Mr. Harvey has direct experience facilitating police reform, and the team will be comprised of members who have documented expertise in the subject matter areas addressed by the Consent Decree. The Parties respectfully request that the Court approve Mr. Harvey as the Monitor.
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IV. Conclusion The City of Newark and the Department of Justice share the same interest in protecting
the constitutional rights of Newark residents, effectively preventing crime, better preparing and protecting officers and have worked cooperatively to achieve this Consent Decree. The Consent Decree resolves between the Parties all issues identified in the Department of Justice’s investigation of the NPD. Because the proposed Consent Decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable, and because it promotes the public interest and the purposes underlying Section 14141, the Parties jointly and respectfully move this Court to approve and enter the Consent Decree in its entirety as an Order of the Court.

Respectfully submitted, For Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

PAUL J. FISHMAN United States Attorney District of New Jersey
s/ Sabrina G. Comizzoli SABRINA G. COMIZZOLI Executive Assistant United States Attorney KRISTIN L. VASSALLO Deputy Chief, Civil Division 970 Broad Street, Suite 700 Newark, NJ 07102 Tel. (973) 645-2700 Email: Sabrina.Comizzoli@usdoj.gov Email: Kristin.Vassallo@usdoj.gov

VANITA GUPTA Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
s/ Rashida Ogletree STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM Chief CHRISTY LOPEZ Deputy Chief RASHIDA OGLETREE Special Counsel JEFFREY R. MURRAY COREY SANDERS PATRICK KENT Trial Attorneys United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Section

8

For Defendant CITY OF NEWARK
s/ Willie L. Parker WILLIE L. PARKER, ESQ., L.L.M. Corporation Counsel
AVION M. BENJAMIN First Assistant Corporation Counsel Department of Law Room 316, City Hall Newark, NJ 07102 Tel. (973)733-3880

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 Tel. (202) 305-3712 Email: Christy.Lopez@usdoj.gov Email: Rashida.Ogletree@usdoj.gov Email: Jeff.Murray@usdoj.gov Email: Corey.Sanders@usdoj.gov Email: Patrick.Kent@usdoj.gov

9

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

)

CITY OF NEWARK,

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

------------------------)

No.
CONSENT DECREE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 
 II. DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................ 1 
 III. POLICY REVIEW AND REVISION .................................................................... 8 
 IV. TRAINING ............................................................................................................. 9 
 V. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT..................... 10 

A. Civilian Oversight.......................................................................................... 10 
 B. Community Engagement Measures and Training ......................................... 10 
 C. Annual Community Survey ........................................................................... 12 

VI. STOPS, SEARCHES, AND ARRESTS ............................................................... 13 

A. Investigatory Stops and Detentions ............................................................... 13 
 B. Searches ......................................................................................................... 15 
 C. Arrests ............................................................................................................ 15 
 D. Stop, Search, and Arrest Training.................................................................. 17 
 E. Supervisory Review of Stops, Searches, and Arrests .................................... 18 
 F. Stop, Search, and Arrest Data Collection and Review .................................. 19 
 G. First Amendment Right to Observe, Object to, and Record Officer 

Conduct.......................................................................................................... 21 

VII. BIAS-FREE POLICING....................................................................................... 22 
 VIII. USE OF FORCE ................................................................................................... 24 

A. Use of Force Policy ....................................................................................... 24 
 B. Use of Firearms.............................................................................................. 27 
 C. Use of Force Reporting and Investigation ..................................................... 28 
 D. Use of Force Review ..................................................................................... 32 
 E. Reporting and Investigation of Serious Force Incidents................................ 33 
 F. Use of Force Review Board........................................................................... 36 

IX. IN-CAR AND BODY-WORN CAMERAS ......................................................... 38 
 X. THEFT .................................................................................................................. 39 
 XI. COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATION .............................................. 41 

ii

A. Complaint Process ......................................................................................... 41 
 B. Complaint Classification and Assignment of Investigative Responsibility .. 43 
 C. Misconduct Complaint Investigation............................................................. 44 
 D. Parallel Administrative and Criminal Investigations of Officer 

Misconduct .................................................................................................... 46 
 E. Review and Analysis of Investigations.......................................................... 46 
 F. Staffing and Training Requirements............................................:................. 47 

XII. COMPLIANCE REVIEWS AND INTEGRITY AUDITS .................................. 49 
 XIII. DISCIPLINE......................................................................................................... 49 
 XIV. DATA SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENT .................................................................. 50 

A. Early Warning System ................................................................................... 51 
 B. Record Management System ("RMS") ......................................................... 52 

XV. TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT ............................................................. 53 
 XVI. AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT ......................... 54 

A. Selection and Role of Independent Monitor .................................................. 54 
 B. Compliance Reviews and Audits ................................................................... 55 
 C. Outcome Assessments ................................................................................... 55 
 D. Monitoring Plan ............................................................................................. 59 
 E. Monitor Recommendations and Technical Assistance .................................. 60 
 F. Comprehensive Re-Assessment..................................................................... 60 
 G. Monitor Reports ............................................................................................. 61 
 H. Communication Among the Parties, the Monitor, and the Public ................. 62 
 I. Public Statements, Testimony, Records, and Conflicts of Interest................ 63 
 J. Record Collection and Retention ................................................................... 64 
 K. Consent Decree Implementation Unit ........................................................... 64 
 L. Access and Confidentiality ............................................................................ 65 
 M. Compensation and Term of the Monitor ....................................................... 66 

XVII. COURT JURISDICTION, MODIFICATION, AND ENFORCEMENT ............ 69 
 XVIII. TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT .......................................................... 70 

111

I. INTRODUCTION
1. Pursuant to the authority granted under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the United States has filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking declaratory or equitable relief to remedy a pattern or practice of conduct by the Newark Police Division that deprives individuals of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and federal law.
2. In lieu of litigation, and noting the general principle that settlements are to be encouraged, particularly settlements between government entities, the United States and the City ofNewark ("City") (collectively "the Parties") enter into this Consent Decree ("Agreement" or "Decree") with the goals that police services delivered to the people ofNewark fully comply with the Constitution and the laws of the United States, promote public and officer safety, and increase public confidence in the Newark Department of Public Safety and Newark Police Division (collectively "NPD") and its officers. The Parties recognize that NPD is also committed to these objectives and is taking steps to better achieve them.
3. The City and NPD do not admit to the allegations of the complaint. Nothing in this Agreement will be construed as an acknowledgment, agreement, admission, statement, or evidence of liability of the City, NPD, or any of its officers or officials under 42 U.S.C § 14141.
II. DEFINITIONS
4. The following terms and definitions apply to this Agreement:
a. "Active Resistance" means verbal or physical actions that are intended to prevent an officer from placing a subject in custody and taking control, but are not directed at harming the officer. Examples include walking or running away or breaking the officer's grip.
b. "Aggravated Aggressive Resistance" means that a subject's actions are likely to result in death or serious bodily harm to an officer, the subject, or another person. These actions may include use of a firearm, a blunt or bladed weapon, or extreme physical force.
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c. "Aggressive Resistance" means the intent to harm an officer, the subject, or another person, and to prevent an officer from taking control and placing a subject in custody. The aggression may manifest itself through a subject's taking a fighting stance, or punching, kicking, striking, attacks with weapons, or other actions that present an imminent threat of physical harm to the officer or another person.

d. "Arrest" means a seizure of greater scope or duration than an investigatory stop or detention.

e. "Auditable form" or "auditable format" means a method of documentation or recordkeeping that is maintained consistently and uniformly and is readily accessible and verifiable for subsequent review and evaluation.

f. "Best practices" are guidelines or standards that are recognized in policing, civil rights, or other relevant professional fields as the most efficient, effective, and current means for achieving constitutional and effective policing. Recognition may include acceptance by nationally recognized police professionals or organizations in the relevant subject area.

g. "City" means the City of Newark, including its agents, officers, and employees.

h. "Collective bargaining agreement" means an agreement in effect as of the Effective Date of this Agreement that is negotiated by NPD and its employees' unions regulating the terms and conditions of employment.

1. "Complainant" means any person, including an NPD officer or employee, who makes a complaint against NPD or an officer or employee ofNPD.

J.

"Complaint" means any allegation from any source that an NPD officer or

employee has engaged in criminal behavior or misconduct.

k. "Court" means the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.

2 


l. "Critical use of force" means any use of force by a law enforcement officer resulting in death or serious bodily injury to a person, or where deadly force is employed with no injury, or where any injury to a person results from the use of a firearm by a law enforcement officer.
m. "Deadly Force" means any use of force likely to cause death or serious injury, including the use of a firearm, neck hold, or strike to the head, neck, or throat with a hard object, including a fist.
n. "Demographic Category" means any shared common characteristic of a population including age, race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, gender identity, language ability, disability, or sexual orientation.
o. "Detention" or "seizure" means any restriction on the liberty interest of an individual. A seizure of the person occurs when an officer's words or actions convey to a reasonable person that he or she is not free to leave. A seizure of property occurs when an officer's words or actions result in a meaningful interference with a person's possessory interest in that property.
p. "Discriminatory policing" and "biased policing" mean selective enforcement or non-enforcement of the law, including the selection or rejection of particular policing tactics or strategies, based on a subject's demographic category that is not part of a specific suspect description from a trustworthy source that is relevant to the locality or time.
q. "Discipline" means a personnel action for violation of a law, regulation, rule, or NPD policy, including an admonishment, written reprimand, suspension, demotion, or dismissal.
r. "DOJ" means the United States Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division, the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey, and their agents and employees in their official capacity.
s. "Effective Date" means the day this Agreement is signed by the Parties and
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submitted to the Court for approval.
t. "EWS" means Early Warning System.
u. "Field Inquiry" or "Field Interview" means an investigatory stop as defined in this Agreement.
v. "Implement" or "implementation" means the development or putting into place of a policy or procedure, and requires the appropriate training of all affected personnel and the consistent and verified performance of that policy or procedure in actual practice.
w. "Including," "includes," and "include" mean "including, but not limited to."
x. "Intermediate Force" or "Intermediate Use of Force" includes the use of chemical spray; use of an impact weapon to strike a person but where no contact is made; use of a baton for non-striking purposes (e.g., prying limbs, moving or controlling a person); or weaponless defense techniques (e.g., elbow strikes, kicks, leg sweeps, and takedowns).
y. "Investigatory stop" or "Investigatory detention" means, for the purposes of this Agreement, a temporary restraint where the subject of the stop or detention reasonably believes that she or he is not free to leave within the meaning of Terry v. Ohio. I An investigatory stop or detention may be a pedestrian, vehicle, or bicycle stop.
z. "Low Level Force" or "Low Level Use of Force" includes the use of hand controls or escort techniques (e.g., elbow grip, wrist grip, or shoulder grip) applied as pressure point compliance techniques or that result in injury or complaint of injury.
aa. "Mere Inquiry" means a non-custodial interview that is voluntary and consensual about crime or quality of life issues.
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
4 


bb. "Misconduct" means any action or inaction by an officer or other NPD employee that violates the law, NPD policy, procedure, rules, or regulations, or other standards of conduct required of City employees.
cc. "Neck hold" means: (1) a bar-arm control hold, which inhibits breathing by compression of the airway in the neck; (2) a carotid restraint hold, which inhibits blood flow by compression of the blood vessels in the neck; (3) a lateral vascular neck constraint; or (4) a hold with a knee or other object to the back of a prone subject's neck. A neck hold is considered Deadly Force.
dd. "Non-punitive corrective action" refers to action other than discipline by an NPD supervisor to enable or encourage a subordinate to modify or improve performance. It may include: oral or written counseling; training; increased field supervision for a specified period; mandatory professional assistance; referral to Behavioral Science Services or to the Employee Assistance Program; a change of an officer's partner; or a reassignment or transfer.
ee. "NPD" or "the Department" means the Newark Police Division and its agents, officers, supervisors and employees (both sworn and unsworn).
ff. "Operational Date" means the day that an Independent Monitor is appointed by the Court.
gg. "OPS" means the Office of Professional Standards, the NPD unit charged with conducting internal investigations of NPD officers and employees.
hh. "Passive Resistance" occurs when a subject is uncooperative and is not complying with an officer's commands, but is taking only minimal physical action to prevent an officer from placing the subject in custody and taking control. Examples include refusing to move, going limp, locking arms, or holding onto a fixed object.
11. "Pedestrian stop" means an investigatory stop of an individual that does not involve an automobile.
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JJ. "Police Officer" or "Officer" means any law enforcement agent of any rank employed by, or acting under the appointment of, NPD, including Special Police Officers.
kk. "Policies" and "Procedures" mean regulations or directives, regardless of their official title, describing the duties, functions, and obligations of NPD officers or employees, specifically directing how to fulfill those duties, functions, or obligations.
II. "Precinct" means one of the five police service areas of NPD, which together cover the entire geographic area of the City of Newark and are each led by a Commanding Officer.
mm. "Pretext stop or detention" means an investigatory stop or detention premised on an infraction or violation for which an officer has reasonable suspicion but where the officer's true motivation is to investigate a different offense for which there is no reasonable suspicion at the outset of the investigatory stop or detention.
nne "Probable cause" means reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances that, within the totality of the circumstances, lead an officer to reasonably believe that there is a fair probability that an individual has committed or is committing a crime.
00. "Reasonable force" means force that is objectively reasonable under the circumstances and the minimum force necessary to effect an arrest or protect the officer or another person. In determining whether the force used by a police officer was reasonable under the circumstances, factors to be considered include: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the person poses an immediate threat to the safety of the police officers or others; (3) the physical size, strength, and weaponry of the officers as compared to the person; (4) the chance of the person's escape if the particular means are not employed; and (5) the existence of alternative methods of arrest. Force
6

that is not "reasonable" is "unreasonable."
pp. "Reasonable suspicion" means specific, articulabIe facts that, within the totality of the circumstances, would lead an officer to reasonably suspect that an individual has or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. An individual's mere presence in a particular neighborhood or area is not sufficient to support reasonable suspicion.
qq. "RMS" means the Record Management System used by NPD to enter, store, and retrieve official forms and reports.
rr. "Serious Force" or "Serious Use of Force" means any use of force that results in loss of consciousness, any canine bite, any strike, blow, or kick against a handcuffed or restrained subj ect, or any head, neck, or throat strike or neck hold resulting in injury that is not investigated by the Essex County Prosecutor's Office pursuant to New Jersey Attorney General Directive 2005­ 06.
ss. "Serious Injury" includes death or substantial risk of death, permanent harm to health, disfigurement or permanent loss of function to any organ of the body, broken bone, or any injury that requires hospitalization or treatment at a health care facility beyond a first-aid level of care.
tt. "Serious Misconduct" includes but is not limited to: criminal misconduct; excessive force; discriminatory policing; false arrest or planting evidence; untruthfulness/false statements; unlawful stop or detention; unlawful search; retaliation; interference with civilians' First Amendment rights; sexual misconduct; domestic violence; and theft.
uu. "Shall" or "will" means that the relevant provision imposes a mandatory duty; "should" does not indicate such a duty.
vv. "Specialized unit" means any designated organization of officers within NPD engaged in issue-specific enforcement activities, such as narcotics, gang, and
7

street-crime units.
ww. "Supervisor" means a sworn NPD employee at the rank of sergeant or above (or anyone acting in those capacities) and non-sworn personnel with oversight responsibility for other officers.
xx. "Training" means traditional lecture formats, as well as methods incorporating role-playing scenarios and interactive exercises that instruct officers about how to exercise their discretion. Training also includes testing, writings, or other measures that assess whether officers comprehend the material taught.
yy. "Use of force" for the purposes of this Agreement means any physical coercion used to control an individual or gain compliance with an officer's order beyond the standard techniques used for unresisted handcuffing and escort. Unholstering a firearm and pointing a firearm will be reported and tracked under this Agreement. Unholstering a firearm and pointing a firearm are considered Constructive Authority in the New Jersey Attorney General's Guidelines.
zz. "Use of force report" means a written statement documenting a use of force as defined by this Agreement.
III. POLICY REVIEW AND REVISION
NPD policies and procedures will reflect and express its core values and priorities, and provide clear direction that officers and civilian employees will enforce the law effectively and constitutionally.
5. NPD will develop comprehensive and agency-wide policies and procedures that are consistent with and incorporate all substantive requirements of this Agreement. Unless otherwise noted, NPD will develop and implement all such policies, procedures, and manuals within two years of the Effective Date.
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6. NPD's policies and procedures will define terms clearly in accordance with applicable law and the requirements of this Agreement and comport with professional police standards and best practices. NPD will provide drafts of all new or revised policies or procedures that are relevant to this Agreement to the Monitor and DO} for review and approval prior to implementation.
7. NPD will review its policies and procedures annually for consistency with the Agreement and current developments in law and police practice.
8. Regardless of when promulgated, all policies and procedures will be readily accessible to all NPD personnel.
IV. TRAINING
NPD will enhance its academy, annual in-service, and other training so that they are sufficient in duration and scope to prepare officers to carry out NPD directives consistently, effectively, and in accordance with the law, NPD policy, and this Agreement.
9. NPD will provide officers a minimum of 40 hours of in-service training each year. NPD will provide additional training as necessary to address changes in the law, or issues identified through its review of use of force incidents, arrest reports, misconduct complaints, or other means. All training will be consistent with and incorporate current law, professional police standards, and best practices.
10. Within 90 days of the Operational Date, NPD will provide training to officers regarding the requirements of this Agreement, and the timeline for their implementation.
11. Within 30 days of approval by the Monitor and DO} of any new or revised policy or procedure that implements a requirement of this Agreement, NPD will provide appropriate training to officers. NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training curricula related to the requirements of this Agreement to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation.
12. NPD will maintain complete and consistent training records for all officers.
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V. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT
NPD will engage constructively with the community to promote and strengthen partnerships and to achieve collaborative, ethical, and bias-free policing. As part of this effort, the City will establish a civilian oversight entity to enhance NPD's accountability and transparency and the public's confidence in the Division. In addition, NPD will integrate concepts of community and problem-oriented policing into its management, policies and procedures, recruitment, training, personnel evaluations, resource deployment, tactics, and accountability systems to increase cooperation and trust between it and the community.
A. Civilian Oversight
13. During the term of this Agreement, and to the extent permitted by law, including civil service rules and any collective bargaining agreements, the City will fund and maintain a civilian oversight entity for NPD, the structures and protocols of which adhere to the principles ofthis Agreement. To facilitate this civilian oversight entity's ability to address the needs and concerns of Newark's residents and increase confidence in the NPD, within 90 days of the Effective Date, the City will establish a mechanism to work with a broad spectrum of Newark community stakeholders, including police unions and DOJ, to determine the appropriate form and scope of oversight, within the parameters of this Agreement. The civilian oversight entity will include elements to assist NPD in adhering to the principles of this Agreement and foster positive relations between NPD and the Newark community. The Monitor will evaluate and report on the City's establishment and ongoing implementation ofthis civilian oversight entity to determine if it is achieving the goals of this Agreement.
B. Community Engagement Measures and Training
14. NPD will provide direction and training to officers on the benefits of and means to achieve effective community engagement, including which police tactics and strategies are more likely to alienate community members, and how to employ alternatives to those tactics and strategies where consistent with public safety. Within 60 days of the Operational Date and annually thereafter, the NPD will provide eight hours of structured in-service training on
10 


community policing and problem-oriented policing methods and skills for all officers, including supervisors, managers and executives. "This training shall include:
a. methods and strategies to improve public safety and crime prevention through community engagement, including how to establish formal partnerships with community organizations, how to work with communities to set public safety and crime prevention priorities, and how to create opportunities for positive interactions with youth;
b. scenario-based training that promotes the development and strengthening of partnerships between the police and community;
c. leadership, ethics, and interpersonal skills;
d. problem-oriented policing tactics; and
e. conflict resolution, including verbal de-escalation of conflict.
15. Within 180 days of the Operational Date, NPD will assess and revise its staffing allocation and personnel deployment to support community policing and problem-solving initiatives, and will modify any deployment strategy that is incompatible with effective community-oriented policing. This assessment and modified deployment strategy will be provided to the Monitor and DO] for review and approval.
16. Pending completion of the above assessment, NPD will assign two officers for each precinct who will become familiar with the geographic area, its issues, problems, and community leaders; whose principal duty will be to identify and address the community's priorities; and who are not assigned to answer calls for service except in exigent circumstances.
17. Within 90 days of the Operational Date, NPD will implement mechanisms to periodically measure the breadth, extent, and effectiveness of its community partnerships and problem­ solving strategies, including officer outreach, particularly outreach to youth.
18. Within 120 days of the Effective Date, and thereafter on a quarterly basis, NPD will prepare a publicly available report of its community policing efforts overall and in each precinct,
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including specific problems addressed and steps taken by NPD and the community toward their resolution. This report shall also identify the results of the assessment NPD has conducted pursuant to paragraph 15, including identification of obstacles faced and recommendations for future improvement.
19. NPD and the City will implement practices to seek and respond to input from the community about this Agreement's implementation. Such practices may include direct surveys, comment cards, and town hall meetings.
20. All NPD studies, analyses, and assessments required by this Agreement will be made publicly available, including on NPD and City websites, in English, Spanish, and Portuguese, to the fullest extent permitted under law.
21. NPD will implement a policy to collect and maintain all data and records necessary to facilitate transparency and wide public access to information related to NPD policies and practices, as permitted by law.
C. Annual Community Survey
22. Within 180 days of the Operational Date, and every year thereafter, the Monitor will conduct a reliable, comprehensive, and representative survey, consistent with the criteria set out directly below, of the Newark community's experience with and perceptions ofNPD and public safety. The initial annual survey will be referred to as the "baseline survey."
23. To assist the Monitor in conducting the baseline and annual surveys, the Monitor will retain an individual or entity, to be approved by the City and DOJ, that will:
a. develop measurements of public satisfaction with policing, attitudes among police personnel, and the quality of police-citizen encounters;
h. identify representative samples of City residents, police personnel, and custodial arrestees;
c. review and consider prior law enforcement surveys in Newark and other cities; 12

d. engage in informal conversations with Newark residents, NPD officers and command staff, and DOJ representatives, and observe community meetings, to identify current and recent issues or concerns specific to Newark;
e. conduct the surveys in English, Spanish, and Portuguese as necessary, to ensure representation of the entire Newark community; and
f. formally discuss the methodology with NPD supervisors and DOJ and seek their input in the development of the baseline survey and in making improvements to the methodology used in the annual surveys.
24. NPD and the City will cooperate with the design and conduct of the surveys by, for example, helping to organize focus groups of officers and obtaining and providing previous survey instruments and data. The reports of the baseline and annual surveys will be provided to the Court and be publicly distributed and available on the City's and NPD's websites.
VI. STOPS, SEARCHES, AND ARRESTS
NPD will conduct all investigatory stops, searches, and arrests in accordance with the rights secured or protected by the Constitution and federal and state law. NPD will conduct investigatory stops, searches, and arrests fairly and respectfully as part of an effective overall crime prevention strategy that is consistent with community priorities for enforcement.
A. Investigatory Stops and Detentions
25. NPD will prohibit officers from conducting investigatory stops or detentions, when they lack reasonable suspicion that a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in the commission ofa crime.
26. NPD will require officers to articulate their reasonable suspicion for stops in a specific and clear manner in their reports. NPD will train officers to use specific and individualized descriptive language in reports or field inquiry forms when documenting investigatory stops or detentions, and NPD will evaluate whether officers have done so.
27. NPD will prohibit NPD officers from:
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a. Conducting "pretext" vehicle stops or detentions without prior approval of a supervisor.
b. Using pro forma or conclusory language without supporting detail in documents or reports documenting investigatory stops or detentions.
c. Using information known to be materially false or incorrect in effectuating an investigatory stop or detention;
d. Using any demographic category as a factor, to any extent or degree, in establishing reasonable suspicion or probable cause during routine or spontaneous enforcement activities, except that officers may rely on a demographic category in a specific suspect description from a trustworthy source that is relevant to the locality or time;
e. Using an individual's geographic location, presence in a high crime area, or proximity to the scene of suspected or reported crimes without any other reliable indicator that an individual has or is engaged in criminal activity, as the basis for an investigatory stop or detention;
f. Basing investigatory stops or detentions solely on an individual's response to the presence of police officers, such as an individual's attempt to avoid contact with an officer;
g. Basing investigatory stops or detentions solely on information or evidence discovered after the stop was initiated (e.g., open warrants) or the fact that the individual was ultimately arrested; and
h. Basing investigatory stops or detention solely on an individual's presence in the company of others suspected of criminal activity.
28. NPD will require documentation of all investigatory detentions, field inquiries and mere inquiries, however they are described internally.
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B. Searches
29. NPD will prohibit officers from considering any demographic category in determining whether to conduct a search or to seek a search warrant, except that officers may rely on a demographic category in a specific suspect description, where the description is from a trustworthy source that is relevant to the locality and time.
30. NPD will prohibit officers from relying on information known to be materially false or incorrect to justify a warrantless search or to seek a search warrant.
31. NPD will prohibit officers from seeking consent to search a motor vehicle unless the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the search will reveal evidence of a crime, or the officer has legal authority for the search that is independent of consent. Officers will document in writing the basis for this suspicion or other legal authority.
32. NPD will require that officers obtain the approval of a supervisor on the scene prior to conducting a search of an individual or a home based upon consent.
33. NPD will require that an officer seeking consent for a search will affirmatively inform the subject of the right to refuse and to revoke consent at any time. The officer will record this notification and the subject's grant or denial of consent on his or her body-worn camera, and on a written form that explains these rights. Supervisors will review the video and written documentation of consent prior to approving an arrest based on evidence obtained via a consent search.
34. NPD will ensure that the consent to search form includes separate signature lines for officers to certify that they have advised the subject of the right to refuse a search and for the subject to affirm that they understand that right.
c. Arrests
35. NPD will prohibit officers from arresting an individual unless the officer has probable cause to do so, and from relying on information they know to be materially false or incorrect when effecting an arrest.
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36. NPD will prohibit officers from considering a subject's demographic category to justify an arrest, except that officers may rely on a demographic category in a specific suspect description, where the description is from a trustworthy source that is relevant to the locality and time.
37. NPD will require that an officer notify a supervisor immediately after: effecting an arrest where the officer used force; an incident in which an officer unholstered or pointed a firearm; an arrest for obstructing or resisting an officer; any disorderly conduct type arrest; or a custodial arrest for a vehicle infraction.
38. NPD will also require that, absent exceptional circumstances, a supervisor will immediately respond to the scene to approve an arrest for obstructing or resisting an officer, any disorderly conduct type arrest, or a custodial arrest for a vehicle infraction or as required by the use of force review provisions of this agreement. In the event that a supervisor is unable to respond to the scene, the supervisor will document in the case file the circumstances preventing his or her presence.
39. NPD will require that the responding supervisor approve or disapprove the officer's arrest recommendation, based on the existence ofjustifiable probable cause and NPD policy.
40. NPD will require that the supervisor take appropriate action to address violations or deficiencies in the officer's arrest recommendation, including releasing the subject, recommending non-disciplinary corrective action for the involved officer, and/or referring the incident for administrative or criminal investigation.
41. NPD will require that, at the time of presentment at the NPD precinct or headquarters, a watch commander or supervisor visually inspect each detainee or arrestee for injury, interview the detainee or arrestee for complaints of pain, and ensure that the detainee or arrestee receives any necessary medical attention from an appropriate medical provider. The watch commander or supervisor will document the results of the visual inspection in writing.
42. NPD will require that officers complete all arrest reports, properly documenting the probable cause for arrests, by the end of their shifts.
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D. Stop, Search, and Arrest Training
43. NPD will provide all officers with at least 16 hours oftraining on stops, searches, arrests, and the requirements of this Agreement, within 180 days of the Operational Date, and at least an additional 4 hours on an annual basis thereafter. Such training will be taught by a qualified legal instructor with significant experience in First and Fourth Amendment issues, and will address:
a. the requirements of Fourth Amendment and related law, NPD policies, and this Agreement regarding investigatory stops and detentions, searches and seizures, including:
1. the differences among the scope and degree of intrusion of various police contacts; between probable cause, reasonable suspicion and mere speculation; and between voluntary consent and mere acquiescence to police authority;
11. the types of facts and circumstances that may be considered in initiating, conducting, terminating, and expanding an investigatory stop or detention;
111. the level of permissible intrusion when conducting searches, such as "pat-downs" or "frisks";
IV. the permissible nature and scope of other pre-arrest searches, including those conducted pursuant to probation or parole release provisions; and
v. the permissible nature and scope of searches incident to arrest.
b. First Amendment and related law in the context of the rights of individuals to verbally comment on, observe, and record officer conduct;
c. procedures for executing searches, and the handling, recording, and taking custody of seized property or evidence; and
d. the effect that differing approaches to stops, searches, and arrests can have on
17 


community perceptions of police legitimacy and public safety.
E. Supervisory Review of Stops, Searches, and Arrests
44. NPD's first-line supervisors will review all documentation, including video from bodyworn cameras as appropriate, of investigatory stops and detentions, searches, and arrests for completeness and adherence to law and NPD policy.
45. NPD's desk lieutenant or unit commander will review each arrest report by officers under their command and will memorialize that review in writing within 24 hours of the arrest, absent exceptional circumstances. Supervisors will review reports and forms for deficiencies including:
a. pro forma or conclusory language, inconsistent information, insufficient articulation of the legal basis for the action, or other indicia that the information in the reports or forms is not correct or complete;
b. arrests following stops based solely on information or evidence discovered after the stop was initiated (e.g., open warrants) or on the fact that the individual was ultimately arrested, without plausible justification for the initial stop or search; and
c. arrests that are unsupported by probable cause, or are otherwise in violation of the law, NPD policy, or this Agreement.
46. NPD's desk lieutenant or unit commander will document for review by their chain of command: (1) investigatory stops and detentions that appear unsupported by reasonable and articulable suspicion, or that are otherwise in violation ofNPD policy or this Agreement; (2) searches that appear to be without legal justification or are in violation ofNPD policy or this Agreement; or (3) stops or searches that, while comporting with law and policy, indicate a need for corrective action or review of agency policy, strategy, tactics, or training to support effective and legitimate policing principles.
47. For every search or arrest involving the recovery of contraband evidence, the desk lieutenant or unit commander will review the circumstances of the encounter, including video from body-worn cameras, to assess the adequacy of the seizure. The supervisor will memorialize
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that review in writing and will include an assessment of the circumstances under which the search was conducted, the evidence was recovered, and/or the probable cause for the arrest.
48. NPD supervisors will take appropriate action to address all apparent violations or deficiencies in investigatory stops or detentions, searches, and arrests. Appropriate action may include recommending non-disciplinary corrective action for the involved officers, or referring the incident for administrative or criminal investigation. For each subordinate, the supervisor will maintain a record of each violation or deficiency and any corrective action taken. The supervisor will document each violation or deficiency in the officer's perfonnance evaluations and NPD's EWS to identify officers needing repeated corrective action.
49. Within seven days, a command-level official will confirm in writing that her or she has reviewed any stop or detention, search, and arrest that another supervisor detennined were: not supported by probable cause; were in violation of NPD policy or this Agreement; or that indicated a need for corrective action or review of agency policy, strategy, tactics, or training. The commander will evaluate the supervisor's assessment and recommendations and take all appropriate corrective action, including referring the incident to the OPS for investigation if warranted. The commander will also take appropriate corrective or disciplinary action against supervisors who fail to conduct complete, thorough, and accurate reviews of officers' investigatory detentions, searches, and arrests.
50. Supervisory and commander performance evaluations will take into account the quality and completeness of supervisory and commander reviews of officer stops, searches, and arrests.
F. Stop, Search, and Arrest Data Collection and Review
51. NPD will modify its procedures as set out below to collect and preserve stop, search, and arrest data sufficient to detennine the nature and scope of demographic disparities in stop and search practices, as well as which stop, search, and arrest practices are most effective and efficient.
52. Within 180 days of the Operational Date, NPD will modify or develop a written or electronic report fonnat to collect data on all investigatory stops and searches, whether or not they result in an arrest or issuance of a summons or citation. This system will be integrated into
19 


NPD's EWS and allow for the information in stop and search records to be searched and summarized electronically. NPD's stop and search data collection system will be subject to the review and approval of the Monitor and DO], and will require officers to document the following:
a. the officer's name and badge number;
b. date and time of the stop;
c. location of the stop;
d. duration of the stop;
e. subject's apparent gender, race, ethnicity or national origin, and age;
f. if a vehicle stop, the presence and number of any passengers and the apparent gender, race, ethnicity, national origin, and age of each passenger; if a non­ vehicle stop (e.g. pedestrian or bicycle), the number of individuals stopped and apparent gender, race, ethnicity, national origin, and age of each person;
g. reason for the stop, including a description of the facts creating reasonable suspicion and whether it was a pretext stop;
h. if a vehicle stop, whether the driver or any passenger was required to exit the vehicle, and the reason for doing so;
1. whether any individual was asked to consent to a search and whether such consent was given; whether a pat-down, frisk, or other search was performed on any individual, including a description of the facts justifying the action;
J. a full description of any contraband or evidence seized from any individual;
k. whether a probable cause search was performed on any individual, including a brief description of the facts creating probable cause; and
1. disposition of the stop, including whether a citation or summons was issued to
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or an arrest made of any individual.
53. NPD will develop a protocol for comprehensive analysis of stop, search, and arrest data. The protocol will establish steps for determining the nature and scope of demographic disparities in stop and search practices, and whether any such disparities can be decreased or eliminated, as well as steps for determining which stop, search, and arrest practices are most effective and efficient in increasing public safety and police legitimacy within the Newark community. The analysis will include an assessment of the efficacy and any demographic disparities in the use of pretext stops and consent searches. This protocol will be subject to the review and approval of the Monitor and DOJ.
54. NPD will ensure that all databases comply fully with federal and state privacy standards governing personally identifying information. NPD will restrict database access to authorized, identified users who will be permitted to access the information only for specific, legitimate purposes.
G. First Amendment Right to Observe, Object to, and Record Officer Conduct
55. NPD will require that officers respect the legal rights of onlookers or bystanders to witness, observe, record, and comment on or complain about officer conduct, including stops, detentions, searches, arrests, or uses of force. NPD will train officers that the exercise of these rights, secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, serves important public purposes.
56. NPD will prohibit officers from detaining, arresting, or threatening to detain or arrest, individuals based on activity protected by the First Amendment, including verbal criticism, questioning police actions, or gestures. NPD will also prohibit officers from using or threatening force in response to mere verbal criticism or gestures that do not give rise to reasonable fear of harm to the officers or others.
57. NPD will require that officers take no law enforcement action against a bystander unless the bystander:
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a. violates the law;
b. incites others to violate the law; or
c. refuses to comply with an officer's order to observe or record from an alternate location and the bystander's presence would jeopardize crime scene integrity or the safety of the officer, the suspect, or others.
58. NPD will permit individuals observing stops, detentions, arrests, and other incidents to remain in the proximity of the incident unless one of the conditions in paragraph 57 is met.
59. NPD will permit individuals to record police officer enforcement activities by camera, video recorder, cell phone recorder, or other means, unless one of the conditions in paragraph 57 is met.
60. NPD will prohibit officers from threatening, intimidating, or otherwise discouraging an individual from remaining in the proximity of or recording law enforcement activities and from intentionally blocking or obstructing cameras and recording devices.
61. NPD will prohibit officers from detaining, prolonging the detention of, or arresting an individual for remaining in the proximity of, recording or verbally commenting on officer conduct directed at the individual or a third party, unless one of the conditions in paragraph 57 is met.
62. NPD will prohibit officers from destroying, seizing, or otherwise coercing a bystander to surrender recorded sounds or images made of officers in the course of their duties, without first obtaining a warrant. Nor may officers order a bystander to destroy any such recording. Where an officer has a reasonable belief that a bystander or witness has captured a recording of critical evidence related to a felony crime, the officer may secure such evidence only as long as necessary to obtain a subpoena, search warrant, or other valid legal process or court order.
VII. BIAS-FREE POLICING
NPD will deliver police services that are equitable, respectful, and free of unlawful bias, in a manner that promotes broad community engagement and confidence in the Division. In
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conducting its activities, NPD will operate without bias based on any demographic category and in accordance with the rights, privileges, or immunities secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States. To achieve these outcomes, NPD will implement the requirements below.
63. NPD will provide all officers with a minimum of eight hours of comprehensive and interdisciplinary training on bias-free policing, including implicit bias, procedural justice, and police legitimacy, within 180 days of the Operational Date, and at least four hours annually thereafter. Such training will emphasize that discriminatory policing, in the form of either selective enforcement or non-enforcement of the law, including the selection or rejection of particular policing tactics or strategies, is prohibited by policy and will subject officers to discipline. In addition, this training will address:
a. methods and strategies for more effective policing which rely upon nondiscriminatory factors;
b. the differences and similarities between police and community perspectives related to discriminatory policing;
c. constitutional and other legal requirements related to equal protection and unlawful discrimination, including the requirements of this Agreement;
d. the protection of civil rights as a central part of the police mission and as essential to effective policing;
e. the impact of arbitrary classifications, stereotyping, and implicit bias;
f. instruction in the data collection protocols required by this Agreement;
g. identification of key decision points where prohibited discrimination can take effect at both the incident and strategic-planning levels; and
h. methods, strategies, and techniques to reduce misunderstanding, conflict, and complaints due to perceived bias or discrimination, including problem­ oriented policing strategies. 23

64. NPD will prohibit officers from considering any demographic category when taking, or refraining from taking, any law enforcement action, except when such information is part of an actual and credible description of a specific suspect in an ongoing investigation that includes other appropriate non-demographic identifying factors. NPD will also prohibit officers from using proxies for demographic category, including language ability, geographic location, mode of transportation, or manner of dress.
65. NPD will conduct cumulative and quarterly demographic analyses of its enforcement activities to ensure officer, unit, and Division compliance with the bias-free policy through the identification of trends, outliers, or other relevant indicators. In addition to collecting and analyzing stop data set out above in Section VI.F., NPD's analysis will include evaluations and assessments of enforcement activities by type, unit or assignment, demographics of the subject, the shift or time of day, location, the nature of offense, force used and resistance encountered, and comparisons of those factors among similar officers or units. These analyses will be made
publicly available pursuant to Section xv. below.
VIII. USE OF FORCE
NPD will develop and implement policies and training directing that the use of force by NPD officers accords with the rights secured and protected by the Constitution and state and federal law. NPD will also develop and implement policies and review mechanisms that will promptly identify and appropriately respond to any unreasonable uses of force. NPD will direct that officers use techniques other than force to effect compliance with police orders whenever feasible; use force only when necessary, and in a manner that avoids unnecessary injury to officers and civilians; and deescalate the use of force at the earliest opportunity. To achieve these outcomes, NPD will implement the requirements set out below.
A. Use of Force Policy
66. NPD will develop and implement a use of force policy or set of policies that comply with applicable law and requirements of this Agreement, including the Use of Force principles set out above. The comprehensive use of force policy or policies will comprise all force techniques, technologies, and weapons that are available to NPD officers, including standard-issue weapons
24 


that are made available to all officers and weapons that are made available only to specialized units. The comprehensive use of force policy will clearly defme and describe each force option and the circumstances under which use of such force is appropriate and consistent with potential types of resistance. The policy will specify that the unreasonable use of force will subject officers to discipline, possible criminal prosecution, and/or civil liability.
67. NPD's use of force policy will include the following requirements:
a. Officers will use advice, warnings, and verbal persuasion, when possible, before resorting to force;
b. Force will be appropriately de-escalated as resistance decreases;
c. When feasible, officers will rely on area containment; employ surveillance; wait out subjects; summon reinforcements; or call in specialized tactical units, in order to reduce the need for force and increase officer and civilian safety;
d. Officers will allow individuals the opportunity to submit to arrest before force is used wherever possible;
e. NPD will explicitly prohibit neck holds, except where lethal force is authorized;
f. NPD will explicitly prohibit head strikes with hard objects, except where lethal force is authorized;
g. NPD will explicitly prohibit using force against persons in handcuffs, except as objectively reasonable to prevent imminent bodily harm to an officer or another person or persons, or, as objectively reasonable, where physical removal is necessary to overcome passive resistance;
h. NPD will explicitly prohibit the use of force beyond unresisted handcuffing to overcome passive resistance, except that physical removal is permitted as necessary and objectively reasonable;
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1. NPD will explicitly prohibit the use of retaliatory force by officers, including: force used after a threat has diminished or that is otherwise not reasonably necessary; force used to punish individuals for fleeing or otherwise resisting arrest; and force used in response to disrespectful language or actions.
J. Unholstering a firearm and pointing a firearm at a person will be documented and tracked and used only when objectively and reasonably necessary to accomplish a lawful police objective;
k. NPD will prohibit officers from using force to effect compliance with a command that is knowingly unlawful. A use of force is unreasonable when the initial arrest or detention was knowingly unlawful to the officer based on information that was known to the officer at the time of arrest or detention; and
1. Immediately following a use of force, officers and, upon arrival, a supervisor will inspect and observe subjects for injury or complaints of pain resulting from the use of force, and immediately obtain any necessary medical care. If qualified to do so, an officer will be expected to provide emergency first aid until professional medical care providers are on scene.
68. NPD's use of force policies will include training and certification requirements that each officer must meet in order to carry and use any authorized weapon.
69. NPD will provide initial and in-service training to officers to enable them to provide emergency first aid until professional medical care providers are on the scene.
70. NPD will provide adequate opportunity and resources for officers to maintain proper weapons certifications. NPD will develop and implement effective sanctions for officers who do not keep their training and weapons certifications current.
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B. Use of Firearms
71. NPD will prohibit officers from possessing or using unauthorized firearms or ammunition. In addition, all authorized firearms carried by officers will be loaded with the capacity number of rounds of authorized ammunition.
72. NPD will prohibit officers from discharging a firearm at a moving vehicle unless a person in the vehicle is immediately threatening the officer or another person with deadly force. A moving vehicle itself shall not presumptively constitute a threat that justifies an officer's use of deadly force. Considering that firearms are not generally effective in bringing moving vehicles to a rapid halt, officers shall not fire from a moving vehicle unless the officer reasonably believes there exists an imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or another person and no other means are available at that time to avert or eliminate the danger. Officers shall not fire a weapon solely to disable a moving vehicle. Officers shall not discharge their weapons at a moving vehicle unless it is absolutely necessary to do so to protect against an imminent threat to the life of the officer or others. When confronting an oncoming vehicle, officers shall make every effort to move out of its path, rather than discharge their firearms at the oncoming vehicle. Officers shall not intentionally place themselves in the path of an oncoming vehicle and attempt to disable the vehicle by discharging their firearms. Officers shall not discharge their firearms at a fleeing vehicle (a vehicle moving in the direction away from the officers) or its driver.
73. NPD will prohibit officers from unholstering or exhibiting a firearm unless the officer reasonably believes that the situation may escalate to create an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death to the officer or another person. Under those circumstances, the officer will place his or her finger outside the trigger guard and have it ready for self-defense. The fmger is only to be placed on the trigger when on target and ready to engage a threat.
74. NPD will require that officers successfully qualify at least twice a year with each firearm they are authorized to use or carry while on duty. Officers who fail to qualify will immediately relinquish the corresponding NPD-issued firearms. Those officers who still fail to qualify after remedial training within a reasonable time will be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment.
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c. Use of Force Reporting and Investigation
75. NPD will adopt a use of force reporting system and a supervisor Use of Force Report that is separate from NPD's arrest and incident reports and includes individual officers' accounts of their use of force.
76. NPD will require that officers notify their supervisor as soon as practicable following any reportable use of force.
77. In consultation with DOJ and the Monitor, NPD will categorize force into levels for the purposes of reporting, investigating, and reviewing each use of force. These levels will be based on the following factors: potential of the technique or weapon to cause injury or disability; degree of actual injury or disability; duration of force; potential for abuse of misuse of weapon or force; and physical vulnerability of the subject. Each level of force will require increasingly rigorous reporting, investigation, and review.
78. Lower or intermediate force will be investigated by officers' supervisors in the chain of command. NPD will establish a Serious Force Investigation Team ("SFIT") to review Serious Force incidents. NPD's response to every use of force, regardless of level, will include at least the following elements:
a. Initial Reporting and Response: requirements that describe officers' duty to report force and NPD supervisors' duty to respond and direct activities at the scene.
b. Investigation and Supervisory Assessment: requirements that describe who is responsible for the investigation and assessment as to the use of force and how that investigation or assessment is to be conducted. Intermediate and Serious Uses of Force will require a critical examination of the incident to assess whether the use of force was reasonable, as well as to identify any violations of policy, and any concerns regarding, training, tactics, equipment, or supervision.
c. Departmental Review: requirements that describe how use of force incidents
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are reviewed by the NPD command and how information gathered about the incident could be used to increase the effectiveness of the officer and the Division as a whole.
d. Record Keeping and Follow-up: the force report, investigation, and review will be maintained, tracked, and used to inform NPD force-related practices and training.
79. Every level of force reporting and review will include at least the following requirements:
a. Every officer will complete a use of force form and narrative each time the officer uses force. Officers observing force used by another officer will complete a supplemental narrative.
b. Except for incidents involving only unholstering or pointing a weapon or unresisted handcuffing or Low Level uses of force, the supervisor of an officer using force will respond to the scene and determine, based upon policy and the facts then known, the level at which the use of force should be categorized. A supervisor may opt for a higher level response than would usually be required for the level of the force used, depending upon the circumstances of the incident.
c. When an incident involves multiple types of force or multiple officers, the entire incident will be reported and investigated at the highest level of force used by any officer during the incident.
d. Whenever a supervisor uses, directs, or is otherwise personally involved in any type of force, a supervisor who was not involved in the use of force will conduct the investigation.
e. The supervisor will notify the commanding officer by the end of the shift during which the force occurred. The notification will contain basic information concerning the incident.
29 


80. Upon arrival at the scene, the supervisor will identify and collect evidence sufficient to establish the material facts related to the use of force, where reasonably available, including physical evidence, audio and video recordings, photographs, and other documentation of injuries or the absence of injuries.
81. All officers who used force above Low Level will provide an oral Use of Force statement in person to the supervisor on the scene prior to the subject's being booked, or released, or the contact otherwise concluded, unless impractical under the circumstances. If the subject is free to leave, the detention will not be extended to facilitate the screening process; however, the subject should be offered the opportunity to remain at the scene to speak with a supervisor.
82. As appropriate pursuant to policy and necessary to complete a thorough, reliable investigation, the supervisor will:
a. Make reasonable attempts to locate relevant civilian witnesses including the subj ect and third parties, and arrange for those witnesses to be interviewed. Witnesses should be interviewed separately where possible. Supervisors should use interview techniques taught in use of force investigation courses, including avoiding leading questions.
b. Use department-issued equipment to record interviews with civilian witnesses. Interviews of the subject, or the subject's refusal to be interviewed, will be also audio or video recorded.
c. Conduct separate interviews of all officers involved in or witness to a use of force incident, unless unreasonable under the circumstances.
d. Require each officer at the scene to complete either a witness statement (if the officer did not use Intermediate Force) or a Use of Force Statement (if the officer did use Intermediate Force). Each officer will describe comprehensively his or her conduct and that of other officers, identifying each officer involved in the incident, when possible. The supervisor will assure such statements comply with NPD guidelines.
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e. Review any body-worn, in-car or other available video related to the incident, and red flag for retention any video that documents contact with the subject.
f. Canvass the area for privately owned video that may have captured the contact, and attempt to obtain copies voluntarily. If the owner refuses, document the location and/or owner of the video. If no privately owned video is discovered, document that none was found.
g. Photograph the location where the incident occurred, to determine damage, and ensure that relevant evidence is collected. Photograph any officer injuries or areas about which the officer complains, as well as any damaged government or private property.
h. Respond to the subject's location, and photograph the subject for identification purposes, and any visible injuries or places where the subject complains of injury.
83. The supervisor will investigate and evaluate in writing all uses of force for compliance with law and NPD policy, as well as any other relevant concerns (tactical, threat assessment, etc.). The supervisor will address any concerns with the officers involved. If it appears that misconduct may have been involved in the use of force, the supervisor will ensure that OPS is contacted and will consult the SFIT team regarding reclassification of the incident as Intermediate or Serious Use of Force.
84. The supervisor's documentation of the investigation and evaluation will be completed within 72 hours of the use of force, unless the supervisor's commanding officer approves an extension. This documentation will include the following:
a. The supervisor's detailed narrative description of the incident. The supervisor's narrative will describe the force used by the officers and the subject(s), any injuries sustained by the subject(s) and the officer(s), and the sequence of events comprising the incident. Additionally, it will document the supervisor's actions in reviewing or screening the incident. The summary should provide a commander, who is reviewing the report, a complete 31 


understanding of the incident from beginning to end, including, crucially, when each officer used force, why the force was necessary at each point in time, and how each injury, if any, occurred.
b. A use of force investigative report that contains documentation of all evidence that was gathered, including physical evidence; photographs; and names, phone numbers, addresses, and summaries of statements by all civilian and NPD witnesses to the incident. In situations in which there are no known witnesses, the report will so state. In situations in which witnesses were present but the author of the report did not determine their identities, phone numbers, or addresses of those witnesses, the report will explain the reasons for that failure.
c. The supervisor's evaluation of the evidence, including a discussion and resolution of any material inconsistencies in the evidence or statements.
85. NPD will analyze the data captured in officers' force reports and supervisors' investigative reports on an annual basis to identify significant trends, to correct deficient policies and practices, and to document its findings in an annual report that will be made publicly available pursuant to Section XV. below. NPD's analysis will include evaluations and assessments of use of force by type, unit or assignment, demographics of the subjects, the shift or time of day, location, the nature of offense, the resistance encountered, and comparisons among officers or units.
D. Use of Force Review
86. The chain-of-command supervisor reviewing the investigative report will ensure that the investigation is thorough, complete, and makes the necessary and appropriate findings of whether the use of force was lawful and consistent with policy. Each higher-level supervisor in the chain of command will review the investigative report to ensure that it is complete, the investigation was thorough, and that the findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
32 


87. A supervisor should ensure that additional investigation is completed when it appears that additional relevant and material evidence may assist in resolving inconsistencies or improve the reliability or credibility of the findings. When it appears that the findings are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the supervisor will recommend changes to the findings after consultation with the investigating supervisor and the previous reviewer, and document the specific evidence or analysis supporting the modification. Any supervisor in the chain of command may discuss the modification with the investigating supervisor and/or reviewers. If any investigative deficiencies exist, the reviewer will initiate corrective action where appropriate. Every supervisor in the chain of command is responsible to assure the accuracy and completeness of the Investigation Reports completed by supervisors.
88. When the precinct or unit commander finds that the investigation is complete and the evidence supports the findings, the investigation file will be forwarded to the Use of Force Review Board.
89. At the discretion of the officer's chain of command, or OPS in the case of potential misconduct, a use of force investigation may be assigned or re-assigned for investigation to SFIT or to another supervisor, whether within or outside of the precinct or unit in which the incident occurred, or may be returned to the unit for further investigation or analysis. Where, after investigation, a use of force is found to be inconsistent with NPD policy, or the investigation of the incident is lacking, the Director of Public Safety ("Director") or designee will direct and ensure appropriate corrective action, if warranted. When the use of force raises policy, training, tactical, or equipment concerns, the Director or designee will ensure also that necessary training is delivered and that all other concerns are addressed.
E. Reporting and Investigation of Serious Force Incidents
90. NPD will create a multi-disciplinary Serious Force Investigation Team ("SFIT") to conduct both the criminal and administrative investigations of Serious Force incidents, and to determine whether these incidents raise policy, training, tactical, or equipment concerns. To guide SFIT practices and investigations, NPD will develop and implement a SFIT training curriculum and procedural manual.
33 


91. SFIT will respond to and investigate the following types of incidents:
a. all Serious Force incidents;
b. uses of force that potentially involve criminal conduct or misconduct on the part of the officer; and
c. uses of force referred to SFIT by any NPD supervisor (and approved by the SFIT commander), the Director, his/her designee, or OPS. Response by SFIT to a scene does not assume a criminal or administrative violation has occurred.
92. SFIT will investigate and document the incident with assistance from the on-scene supervisor. SFIT will tailor its response to the circumstances but will normally include one to three SFIT detectives, the SFIT sergeant, a Homicide Unit command level officer, and a Training Section representative. The Training Section representative will not have an investigative role at the scene of a use of force, but will attempt to identify any policy or training issues. At least one member of SFIT or a homicide supervisor will be available at all times to evaluate potential referrals from NPD supervisors. SFIT staff members will have appropriate expertise and investigative skills to ensure that uses of force that are contrary to law or policy are identified and appropriately resolved; and that its investigations allow the Use of Force Review Board to identify trends or patterns of policy, training, equipment, or tactical deficiencies, or positive lessons related to the use of force.
93. The on-scene supervisor shall take initial steps in response to the incident consistent with the requirements for Intermediate Force incidents until turning the scene over to the arriving SFIT personnel. The scene will be left intact to be processed by SFIT personnel. The supervisor will also make reasonable attempts identify civilian witnesses to the event and request that they stand by for the SFIT personnel's arrival.
94. SFIT will have the following responsibilities in responding to a Serious Force incident:
a. SFIT personnel will assume control of the use of force investigation upon their arrival.
34

b. SFIT detectives will record all interviews with civilian witnesses.

c. SFIT personnel will arrange for a canvass for any privately owned video that may have captured the contact, and attempt to obtain copies voluntarily. If the owner refuses, they will document the location and/or owner of the video. If no privately owned video is discovered, they will document that none was found.

d. The SFIT supervisor will arrange for photographing and processing of the scene.

e. SFIT detectives will attempt to interview the subject of the use of force to determine whether the subject needs additional medical attention and to obtain the subj ect' s account of what happened, if possible, as an audio­ recorded interview. They will also photograph areas of injury or complaint of InJury.

f. The SFIT supervisor or commander will respond to the SFIT office and arrange for body-worn or in-car camera video downloads as well as witness statements from all witness officers prior to the end of their shift(s) unless impracticable.

g. SFIT detectives will conduct in-person interviews of the involved officers as soon as possible.

h. The SFIT supervisor or commander will arrange for the involved officers to submit use of force written statements as soon as practicable.

i. The SFIT supervisor or commander will be responsible for notifying the involved officers' chain of command up to the Director, as well as the OPS, no later than 12 hours after learning of the use of force, unless impractical. This notification will contain basic information about the incident.

J.

Within 30 days or as soon as possible thereafter, the SFIT commander will

present the completed investigation to the commander of the OPS and the

35

officers' chain of command. Upon completion of the review, OPS, the chain of command~ and the SFIT commander, will be responsible for presenting the investigation to the Use of Force Review Board (UFRB) when it next convenes. Consistent with current officer-involved shooting protocols, any presentations to the command staff will also be the responsibility of the SFIT commander.

k. If the SFIT investigation indicates potential criminal conduct or administrative misconduct, the SFIT commander will be responsible for notifying the command staff and taking the following actions as appropriate:

1.

If the investigation indicates potential criminal conduct by an NPD

officer, the SFIT commander will confer immediately with OPS and

the Director and refer the matter to the appropriate federal or state

authorities for investigation. Notwithstanding the referral and unless

otherwise directed by the prosecutive agency, SFIT will proceed with

its administrative investigations. Under no circumstances will OPS

compel a statement from the subject officer without first consulting

with the Chief or Director and with the prosecuting agency.

11. Any allegations of administrative misconduct that are discovered during the force investigation will be referred within five days to OPS, which will be responsible for the administrative misconduct investigation. SFIT will retain responsibility for the force investigation.

F. Use of Force Review Board

95. NPD has established and shall continue to maintain a Use of Force Review Board in a manner that is consistent with this Agreement. The UFRB will conduct timely, comprehensive, and reliable reviews of all Intermediate and Serious Force incidents. The UFRB also will conduct the administrative review of incidents in which the ECPO has completed an investigation pursuant to New Jersey Attorney General Directive 2006-05. Where additional

36 


investigation is necessary to reach administrative findings, the UFRB will refer to SFIT for additional investigation.
96. The UFRB will include the Chief of Police or the Chiefs designee (who will chair the UFRB); supervisors from the Training Section; one representative from each involved precinct, selected by each precinct captain; and a representative from the OPS. The UFRB may consult with any subject matter experts the UFRB feels would be helpful in reviewing particular incidents and other advisors as necessary.
97. Each member will receive a minimum of eight hours of training on an annual basis, including legal updates regarding use of force and the Training Section's current use of force curriculum.
98. Review of Intermediate Force investigations: The UFRB will review each Intermediate Force investigation to determine whether the findings by the chain of command regarding the use of force are consistent with law and policy and supported by a preponderance of the evidence; whether the investigation is thorough and complete; and whether there are tactical, equipment, or policy considerations that need to be addressed.
99. Review of SFIT Investigations: The review of SFIT investigations is the same as for Intermediate Force investigations, except the SFIT investigation review will be chaired by the Director or his or her designee.
100. Consistent with current practice and the provisions above, the UFRB will document its findings and recommendations for SFIT investigations. Unless the UFRB Chair grants an extension, the review should be conducted within seven days of the SFIT presentation to the UFRB.
101. The NPD will explore ways to include civilian observers in the review of completed SFIT investigations.
102. The UFRB will not make recommendations concerning discipline; however, the Chair of the UFRB is obligated to ensure a referral to OPS if potential misconduct is discovered in the review process. Should policy, equipment, or training deficiencies be noted in the review
37 


process, the UFRB Chair will ensure that they are brought to the attention of the relevant commanding officer for appropriate action. The unit commander of the officer involved with the use of force will have the final responsibility regarding retraining or recommending discipline to the Director.
IX. IN-CAR AND BODY-WORN CAMERAS
NPD will develop, implement, and maintain a system of video recording officers' encounters with the public with body-worn and in-car cameras. The use of video cameras will be designed to increase officer accountability, improve NPD legitimacy in the community, and augment NPD's records of law enforcement activities.
103. NPD will equip all marked patrol cars with video cameras, and require all officers, except certain officers engaged in only administrative or management duties, to wear body cameras and microphones with which to record enforcement activity. NPD will develop and implement a policy to designate cars and officers that will not be equipped with video cameras or that will be equipped with concealed cameras, because the visibility of a camera might compromise undercover work or other appropriate and lawful clandestine police activity. NPD will develop a policy to designate the categories of officers who will not wear body cameras because they are engaged only in administrative or management duties.
104. In conjunction with the Monitor and DOJ, NPD will develop and implement a policy regarding body-worn camera video and audio recording that will address issues including use, retention, privacy issues, the use of recordings as evidence in force and complaint reviews, and the use of recordings for other criminal justice purposes (such as evidence in prosecutions). At a minimum, NPD's body-worn camera policy will:
a. Clearly state which officers are required to use body-worn cameras and under which circumstances;
b. Specify the location(s) on the body where the camera should be worn;
c. Require officers to activate their cameras when responding to calls for service and during all law enforcement-related encounters and activities, with
38

appropriate exceptions (e.g., interviews with crime victims) that occur while on duty, and to continue recording until the conclusion of the incident(s) or encounter( s);

d. Require officers to articulate in writing or on camera their reasons for failing to record an activity that NPD policy otherwise requires to be recorded;

e. Require officers to inform subjects that they are being recorded unless doing so would be unsafe, impractical, or impossible;

f.

Establish a download and retention protocol;

g. Permit officers to review video of incidents in which they were involved;

h. Require periodic random review of officers' videos; and

1.

Require supervisors to review videos of incidents involving use of force and

consent searches.

x. THEFT

So that individuals are not deprived of property without due process and to increase NPD's legitimacy and confidence in the community, NPD shall take comprehensive efforts to prevent theft of property by officers.

105. In all instances where property or evidence is seized, the responsible officer will immediately complete an incident report documenting a complete and accurate inventory of the property or evidence seized, and will submit the property or evidence seized to the property room before the end of tour of duty.

106. As detailed in Section XII. below, NPD will conduct regular, targeted, and random integrity audits to detect and deter theft by officers. NPD will employ tactics such as increased surveillance, stings, and heightened scrutiny of suspect officers' reports and video-recorded activities.

39

107. NPD will conduct periodic reviews of the disciplinary histories of its officers who routinely handle valuable contraband or cash, especially those in specialized units, to identify any patterns or irregularities indicating potential risk of theft by officers.
108. To the extent permitted by law and NPD's collective bargaining agreements, NPD will transfer officers with any sustained complaint, or multiple not sustained or unfounded complaints, of theft from positions where those officers have access to money, property, and evidence. Aspects of officers' disciplinary histories that relate to honesty and integrity will be considered in making decisions regarding reassignment, promotions, and similar decisions.
109. NPD will report all theft allegations to the New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety and will continue to report such allegations to the Essex County Prosecutor. Officers who have been the subject of multiple theft allegations will be identified as such in said reports.
110. NPD will maintain policies and procedures for the intake, storage, and release of property. To that end, NPD will:
a. direct that no fewer than two officers jointly process all cash and other property seized from or otherwise held for arrestees;
b. prohibit officers from allowing a detainee to sign a blank property form;
c. provide appropriate guidance for how seized property is to be packaged and labeled;
d. require that all seized property is to be stored in a secure property room, to which access will be limited to specifically designated personnel;
e. secure property room doors with mechanisms that automatically lock upon closing;
f. install and maintain working video cameras in the property room and other areas where property is stored, and establish a video retention policy that maintains recordings to support investigations of allegations of theft;
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g. take appropriate precautions to effectively secure all money, precious metals, jewelry or other items of value; and
h. maintain an itemized inventory in a computerized database of all seized or held property.
111. NPD will conduct and document periodic audits and inspections of the property room and immediately correct any deficiencies.
XI. COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATION
NPD and the City will establish policies and procedures directing that all allegations of officer misconduct are received and fully and fairly investigated; that all investigative findings are supported using the preponderance of the evidence standard and documented in writing; and that all officers who commit misconduct are held accountable pursuant to a disciplinary system that is fair and consistent.
A. Complaint Process
112. Within 365 days of the Effective Date, the City and NPD, in collaboration with the CCRB or other community input, will develop and implement a program to effectively publicize to the Newark community how to make misconduct complaints.
113. The City and NPD will make forms and other materials outlining the complaint process and OPS contact information available on their websites and at appropriate government properties, such as NPD headquarters and precincts, City Hall, and public libraries. Copies will also be made available for distribution through the offices or gathering places of interested community groups. Complaint forms and related informational materials will be available in English, Spanish, and Portuguese.
114. NPD will accept all complaints, whether made in writing or verbally, in person or by mail, telephone (or TDD), facsimile, or electronic mail. Individuals will also be able to submit misconduct complaints through the City'S and NPD's websites. NPD will accept all misconduct complaints, including from anonymous, confidential, and third-party complainants.
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115. NPD will provide civilians, including complainants and witnesses to alleged police misconduct, with full access to NPD's complaint process. NPD will revise its policies to prohibit practices that discourage complainants and witnesses from coming forward, including the following:
a. Complaint forms and information materials will not include any language that can be construed as discouraging civilians from submitting complaints, including warnings regarding potential criminal prosecution for false or untrue complaints;
b. NPD investigators will not check the criminal history of a complainant or witness unless such information would be relevant to the allegations under investigation. When criminal history checks are conducted, NPD investigators will document in writing the justification for doing so; and
c. NPD investigators will not give complainants or witnesses Miranda warnings prior to or during non-custodial interviews. If a complainant's allegation arises from a criminal arrest, investigators will communicate with the complainant's criminal defense attorney.
116. Within 180 days of the Operational Date, NPD will train all police personnel, including dispatchers, to properly handle complaint intake, including how to provide complaint materials and information; the consequences for failing to take complaints; and strategies for turning the complaint process into positive police-civilian interaction.
117. As detailed in Section XII. below, NPD will conduct regular, targeted, and random integrity audits to identify officers or other employees who refuse to accept or discourage the filing of misconduct complaints, fail to report misconduct or complaints, or provide false or misleading information about filing a misconduct complaint. Any officer or employee who engages in such conduct will be subject to discipline, up to and including termination. All allegations of such conduct will be documented and monitored in NPD's early warning system.
118. NPD will review the results of these audits and take appropriate action to remedy any problematic patterns or trends.
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119. NPD will require that all officers and employees report allegations of criminal behavior or administrative misconduct by another NPD officer toward a member of the public that they may observe themselves or receive from another source to a supervisor or directly to OPS for review and investigation. When a supervisor receives such allegations, the supervisor will promptly document and report this information to OPS. Failure to report or document such allegations will be grounds for discipline, up to and including termination of employment. The presumptive discipline for a failure to report such allegations will be commensurate with the presumptive discipline for the underlying misconduct.
120. NPD will investigate as a misconduct complaint any information or testimony arising in criminal prosecutions or civil lawsuits that indicate potential officer misconduct not previously investigated by NPD.
B. Complaint Classification and Assignment of Investigative Responsibility
121. NPD will adopt a complaint classification protocol that is based on the nature of the alleged misconduct in order to guide OPS in determining where a complaint should be assigned for investigation.
122. OPS will investigate all allegations of Serious Misconduct as defined in this Agreement.
123. NPD shall develop a protocol for determining whether other complaints will be assigned to the subject officer's supervisor, the precinct's Integrity Compliance Officer, or retained by OPS for an administrative investigation. OPS will also determine whether the misconduct complaint warrants a referral to federal or state authorities for a criminal investigation.
124. OPS will routinely monitor investigations referred to officers' precincts and specialized units for quality, objectivity and thoroughness, and take appropriate action if investigations are deficient. OPS will also identify trends in investigative or leadership deficiencies.
125. NPD will maintain a centralized numbering and tracking system for all misconduct complaints. NPD will promptly assign a unique identifier upon receipt of a complaint, which will be provided to the complainant at the time the complaint is made. Where a misconduct complaint is received in the field, a supervisor will obtain the unique identifier and provide this
43 


identifier to the complainant. NPD's centralized numbering and tracking system will maintain accurate and reliable data regarding the number, nature, and status of all misconduct complaints, from initial intake to final disposition, including investigation timeliness and notification to the complainant of the interim status and final disposition of the investigation. The system will be used to determine the status of complaints and to confirm that a complaint was received, as well as for periodic assessment of compliance with NPD policies and procedures and this Agreement, including requirements of timeliness of administrative investigations.
C. Misconduct Complaint Investigation
126. NPD will adjudicate all complaints based on the preponderance of the evidence. This standard will be clearly delineated in policies and procedures and be accompanied by extensive examples to ensure proper application by investigators.
127. In each investigation, NPD will collect and consider all relevant circumstantial, direct, and physical evidence, including officer-recorded video as it becomes available through NPD's implementation of in-car and body-worn cameras pursuant to this Agreement.
128. NPD policy will require that investigators consider patterns in officer behavior based upon disciplinary history and other information in NPD's Early Warning System.
129. Investigators will make efforts to resolve material inconsistencies in officers' and witnesses' statements and will not discount witnesses' statements solely due to minor inconsistencies.
130. Investigators will apply the same criteria in assessing the credibility of all witnesses' testimony, whether they are civilians, officers, victims, or suspects. Investigators will not give greater weight or credibility to officers' statements merely because they are officers, nor will investigators discredit, disregard, or give less weight to a statement merely because of the relationship between a complainant or subject of police action and the person who made it. An individual's criminal history will not be solely dispositive in weighing his or her credibility.
131. No investigation will be limited to the allegations that prompted it. NPD will evaluate all relevant police activity and evidence of any potential misconduct uncovered during the course of
44

the investigation, including each use of force (i. e., not just the type of force complained about) and any stops, searches, or seizures that occurred during the incident.
132. In addition to determining whether an officer committed misconduct, administrative investigations will include an assessment of whether: (a) the police action was in compliance with training and legal standards; (b) the use of different tactics should or could have been employed; (c) the incident indicates a need for additional training, counseling, or other non­ disciplinary corrective measures; and (d) the incident suggests that NPD should revise its policies, strategies, tactics, or training. Any such assessments which identify policy, training, tactical, or other concerns'will be promptly forwarded to the Police Director and, if the issue is force-related, to the UFRB, for review and appropriate action.
133. NPD will not find make a finding that an allegation of misconduct is unfounded or not sustained, or otherwise exonerate an officer, simply because the complaint is withdrawn or the complainant is unavailable, unwilling, or unable to cooperate with an investigation, or refuses to provide medical records or proof of injury; rather, the investigation will continue as necessary to resolve the original allegation(s) where possible based on the evidence and investigatory procedures and techniques available.
134. If a complainant pleads guilty or is found guilty of an offense, NPD will not consider the fact of conviction to be evidence whether an NPD officer engaged in misconduct, nor will it justify discontinuing the investigation.
135. A misconduct complaint investigation may not be conducted by any supervisor or officer who authorized, engaged in conduct that led to, or otherwise participated in the incident complained of; who was on the scene at the time of the incident; or who has a conflict of interest as defined by NPD policy.
136. The Police Director or Chief of Police will not be authorized to personally conduct an investigation of officer misconduct or violation of policy, or to prevent such an investigation.
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D. Parallel Administrative and Criminal Investigations of Officer Misconduct
137. If after a reasonable preliminary inquiry into an allegation of misconduct, or at any other time during the course of an administrative investigation, the OPS has cause to believe that an officer or employee might have engaged in criminal conduct, the OPS will refer the matter to the ECPO, DO], or other law enforcement agency as appropriate.
138. Notwithstanding the referral and unless otherwise directed by the prosecutive agency, NPD will proceed with its administrative investigations. Under no circumstances will OPS compel a statement from the subject officer without first conSUlting with the Chief or Director and with the prosecuting agency.
139. Nor will NPD automatically end its administrative investigation in matters in which the prosecuting agency declines to prosecute or dismisses after initiation of criminal charges. Instead, NPD will require investigators to conduct a complete investigation and assessment of all relevant evidence.
140. NPD will work with DO], the ECPO, and the New Jersey Attorney General's Office as appropriate to improve its processes for investigations of use of force incidents and referrals of complaints of police misconduct for criminal investigation.
E. Review and Analysis of Investigations
141. NPD will train OPS supervisors to ensure that investigations are thorough and complete, and that investigators' conclusions and recommendations that are not adequately supported by the evidence will not be approved or accepted.
142. NPD will develop and implement a protocol for regular supervisory review and assessment ofthe types of complaints being alleged or sustained to identify potential problematic patterns and trends.
143. NPD's protocol shall include the following as separate categories of misconduct complaints:
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a. Allegations that an officer has in any way interfered with a civilian's First and Fourth Amendment rights to: 1. verbally criticize officers' conduct; or
11. observe and record officers' conduct in areas open to the public or where an individual has a right to be, such as a home or business.
Improper interference with these rights include: improperly detaining or arresting individuals on discretionary charges for engaging in protected conduct; seizing a cell phone or other photographic or recording equipment without a valid warrant; and using force against a person in response to verbal criticism. b. Allegations of discriminatory policing, including allegations that an officer: 1. conducted a stop or arrest based on an individual's demographic
category; or 11. used a slur based on race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender
identity. NPD will require that complaints of discriminatory policing are captured and tracked appropriately, even if the complainant does not so label the alleged misconduct. c. Allegations of unlawful stops or detentions. F. Staffing and Training Requirements 144. Within 30 days of the Operational Date, NPD will review staffing of OPS and ensure that misconduct investigators and commanders possess appropriate investigative skills, a reputation for integrity, the ability to write clear reports with recommendations supported by the evidence, and the ability to assess fairly and objectively whether an officer has committed misconduct.
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145. Officers with a sustained complaint of, or who have been disciplined for, excessive use of force, false arrest, unlawful search and seizure, sexual harassment, discrimination, or dishonesty will be ineligible for assignment to OPS.
146. NPD will use a case management system to track and maintain appropriate caseloads for OPS investigators and promote the timely completion of investigations by OPS.
147. NPD will require and provide appropriate training for OPS investigators upon their assignment to OPS, with refresher training at periodic intervals. At a minimum, NPD will provide 40 hours of initial training and eight hours additional in-service training on an annual basis.
148. Training for OPS investigators will include instruction in:
a. investigative skills, including proper interview techniques and gathering and objectively analyzing evidence;
b. the particular challenges of administrative police misconduct investigations, including identifying alleged misconduct that is not clearly stated in the complaint or that becomes apparent during the investigation; properly weighing the credibility of civilian witnesses and officers; using objective evidence to resolve inconsistent statements; and the proper application of the preponderance of the evidence standard; and
c. NPD rules and policies, including the requirements of this Agreement, and protocols related to criminal and administrative investigations of alleged officer misconduct.
149. NPD will improve OPS's complaint tracking and assessment practices to achieve:
a. consistent tracking of civilian and departmental complaints by allegation and outcomes;
b. consistent tracking of penalties imposed;
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c. periodic assessments of the data to identify and address any deficiencies in the process (e.g., low rates of sustained complaints, patterns in types of allegation, etc.);
d. periodic assessments of the data to determine the relative rates of complaints against officers from particular precincts, specialized units, etc.; and
e. summaries of complaint data are routinely made available to the public in a manner consistent with the New Jersey Attorney General's guidelines.
XII. COMPLIANCE REVIEWS AND INTEGRITY AUDITS
NPD will develop and implement a schedule for planning and executing regular, targeted, and random internal reviews and integrity audits to promote compliance with NPD policy and constitutional policing.
150. NPD will conduct integrity audits and compliance reviews to identify and investigate all officers who have engaged in misconduct including unlawful stops, searches, seizures (including false arrests); excessive uses of force; theft of property or other potential criminal behavior; racial or ethnic profiling, and bias against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons.
151. The integrity audits and compliance reviews will also seek to identify officers who discourage the filing of complaints, fail to report misconduct or complaints, or otherwise undermine NPD's integrity and accountability systems. OPS will have the oversight responsibility within NPD for these operations. OPS will use relevant EWS data and other relevant information in selecting targets for integrity audits.
XIII. DISCIPLINE
NPD will adopt policies that are consistent and fair in their application of officer discipline throughout the Division, including establishing a formal, written, presumptive range of discipline for each type of violation.
152. NPD will apply discipline for sustained allegations of misconduct based on the nature and severity of the policy violation and defined mitigating and aggravating factors, rather than
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the officer's identity, rank or assignment; relationship with other individuals; or reputation in the broader community.
153. Within 90 days of the Effective Date, NPD will implement disciplinary guidance that:
a. establishes a presumptive range of discipline for each type of violation;
b. increases the presumptive discipline based on an officer's prior violations of the same or other rules;
c. sets out defined mitigating or aggravating factors;
d. requires that any departure from the presumptive range of discipline must be justified in writing;
e. prohibits taking only non-disciplinary corrective actions when the disciplinary matrix calls for the imposition of formal discipline; and
f. provides that NPD will consider whether additional non-disciplinary corrective action may be appropriate in a case where discipline is also imposed.
154. NPD will establish a unified system for reviewing sustained findings and applying the appropriate level of discipline pursuant to NPD's disciplinary guidance. This disciplinary system will be subject to review and approval of the Monitor and DOJ. NPD will document all disciplinary decisions, including the rationale for any decision to deviate from the level of discipline set out in the disciplinary matrix.
155. NPD will conduct annual reviews of its disciplinary process and actions, which will include an analysis of the implementation of a progressive discipline model, and whether the discipline system's mitigating and exacerbating factors are appropriate and effectively applied.
XIV. DATA SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENT
NPD and the City will develop, implement, and maintain contemporary records and management systems to allow the close and effective supervision necessary for officers to
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improve and grow professionally; to police actively and effectively; and to identify, correct, and prevent misconduct.

A. Early Warning System

156. Within one year of the Effective Date, and consistent with applicable law and best practices, NPD will enhance its Early Warning System (EWS) to support the effective supervision and management ofNPD officers. NPD will use the EWS to promote constitutional policing and professional police practices. The EWS will use a relational database to track and analyze information regarding the activities of all NPD personnel. The City will provide NPD with sufficient funding levels to implement and maintain the EWS, including its ongoing hardware and support requirements.

157. NPD will develop and implement a data protocol describing in detail what information is to be recorded and maintained in the EWS. The EWS and the data protocol will be subject to review and approval by the Monitor and DO]. At a minimum, the EWS will include all relevant information, including the results of any investigation or supervisory review related to:

a. use of force incidents and allegations of use of force;

b. all injuries to individuals in the custody or control of an NPD officer or injured as a result of an officer's actions;

c. all allegations of unlawful arrest;

d. all allegations of unlawful search or seizure;

e. all allegations of theft, missing property, or planted evidence;

f.

all complaints of misconduct against officers;

g. all arrests for disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and assaulting a police officer;

h. all disciplinary action taken;

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1.

all non-disciplinary or corrective action, including actions taken pursuant to

the operation of the EWS;

J.

officer rank, assignment, and training history; and

k. judicial determinations of officers' credibility.

158. NPD will revise its use of EWS as an effective supervisory tool. The EWS will use comparative data and peer group analysis to identify patterns of activity by officers and groups of officers for supervisory review and intervention. The protocol will require supervisors to conduct a comprehensive written review of officers and groups of officers identified for potential intervention and will provide an array of individualized alternatives for resolving problems identified during the review, such as counseling, training, additional supervision or monitoring, and action plans for modifying future behavior.

159. Additionally, the protocol will require commanders and supervisors to promptly review the records of all officers who are transferred to their command and to conduct periodic reviews of all officers and groups under their command to identify potential trends. The EWS will produce reports for supervisors to use in these reviews. The purpose of these evaluations will not be disciplinary, but to provide officers necessary support to police effectively and constitutionally and to prevent negative practices from developing or continuing.

160. NPD will make reasonable efforts to ensure that the EWS makes use of available technologies, including the electronic transfer of information from other data systems, to maximize efficiency. DOJ will advise NPD of other agencies with functioning EWS for ideas and technical assistance.

161. NPD will continue to use its current IAPro software's alert and warning features to identify officers for intervention while further developing and implementing an EWS that is fully consistent with this Agreement.

B. Record Management System ("RMS")

162. NPD will revise its use and analysis of the RMS to make more efficient and effective use ofthe data it contains and improve its ability to interface with other technology systems. These
52

improvements will include the use of automation for transferring data to and from other systems (in particular, the EWS) and the development or implementation of reporting modules that allow more flexible queries of the police records and data contained in NPD's systems.
163. The City will provide NPD with sufficient funding and personnel to implement and maintain the RMS, including ongoing hardware and support requirements.
xv. TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT
To ensure comprehensive, effective, and transparent oversight ofNPD, NPD and the City will develop, implement, and maintain systems that are meant to be sustained after the completion of this Agreement. To facilitate effective and constitutional policing and increase trust between NPD and the broader Newark community, these oversight systems shall ensure that improper incidents, practices, or trends are identified and corrected in an equitable and timely manner.
164. To the extent permissible by law, including civil service rules and collective bargaining agreements, NPD will make its policies publicly available, and will regularly report information regarding officer use of force; misconduct complaints; and stop/search/arrest data. Where NPD seeks to withhold a policy from the public, it will confer with DOJ and the Monitor to determine whether the particular policy, or any part of it, should be withheld from publication.
165. NPD will work with the CCRB to overcome impediments to the release of information consistent with law and public safety considerations. As part of this effort, NPD and the CCRB should consider NPD's policies and practices regarding disclosure of documents, videos, and other materials.
166. To ensure transparency, all NPD audits, reports, and outcomes analyses as described in Section XVI.C. below, related to the implementation of the Agreement, will be made publicly available, including on the City and NPD websites, to the fullest extent permissible under law.
167. The data points of such audits and reports will be posted on NPD's website in a readily accessible format, displayed as interpreted and not raw data.
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168. On at least an annual basis, NPD will issue reports summarizing and analyzing the stop, search, arrest, and use of force data collected, the analysis of that data, and the steps taken to correct problems and build on successes.
XVI. AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT
A. Selection and Role of Independent Monitor
169. As described in greater detail below, the Independent Monitor will assess the City's progress in implementing, and achieving compliance with, the Agreement; report on the status of implementation to the Parties and the Court; work with the Parties to address any barriers to compliance; and assist the Parties to informally resolve any disputes or differences.
170. The Parties have jointly selected the team of Peter C. Harvey to be appointed by the Court as the Independent Monitor. ("Monitor"). Within 60 days of the effective date, the Monitor will make a written proposal to the City and DOl identifying the persons or entities he proposes to hire, employ, or contract with to perform the tasks assigned by the Agreement. The Monitor may request that DOl and the City grant up to a IS-day extension to provide the written proposal to the DOl and the City. The monitoring team will include persons or entities with subject matter expertise in police practices covered by the Agreement, police accountability, community engagement and civilian oversight, police data analysis, survey development and analysis, and project management. The team will be comprised of persons or entities reflecting both local and national perspectives. The City and DOl will have 15 days to review the proposed monitoring team. If both the City and DOl approve the proposed monitoring team, the Monitor will proceed forthwith to-hire or otherwise retain the team members. If either the City or DOl does not approve the proposed monitoring team, they will have 30 days to reach a resolution in consultation with the Monitor. If they do not reach a resolution within 30 days, then the issue will be presented to the Court for resolution. Any person or entity hired or otherwise retained by the Monitor will be subject to the provisions of the Agreement.
171. The Monitor will be subject to the supervision and orders of the Court, consistent with this Agreement and the Monitoring Plan. The Monitor will have only the duties, responsibilities, and authority conferred by this Agreement. The Monitor will not, and is not intended to, replace
54 


or assume the role and duties of the City or NPD, including the Police Director or Chief of Police.

172. In order to assess and report on NPD's implementation of this Agreement, and whether implementation is resulting in constitutional policing, the Monitor will conduct compliance reviews and audits and outcome assessments as specified below, and such additional audits, reviews, and assessments that the Monitor or Parties jointly deem necessary. If there is disagreement over proposed additional audits, reviews, or assessments, the Parties and the Monitor may request that the Court resolve the issue.

B. Compliance Reviews and Audits

173. The Monitor will conduct compliance reviews or audits as necessary to determine whether the City and NPD have implemented and continue to comply with the requirements of this Agreement. Compliance with a requirement of this Agreement requires that the City and NPD have: (a) incorporated the requirement into policy; (b) trained all relevant personnel as necessary to fulfill their responsibilities pursuant to the requirement; and (c) implemented the requirement in practice. The Monitor's compliance reviews and audits will consider all information necessary for a reliable and comprehensive assessment, and may rely on sampling and compilation of data where appropriate.

C. Outcome Assessments

174. In addition to compliance reviews and audits to determine whether the specific requirements of this Agreement have been met, the Monitor will assess whether implementation of this Agreement is resulting in the desired outcomes (i.e., policing that is consistent with the Constitution and that engenders effective cooperation and trust between NPD and the community it serves.) These outcome assessments will include collecting and analyzing the following data to establish a baseline and assess change over time:

a. Stop, Search, and Arrest:

1.

stop rates by subject(s) race or ethnicity, gender, and age per sector,

precinct, shift, and unit;

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11. post-stop activity rates, such as frisks, searches, requests for consent to search; in-car detentions, citations issued, by subject(s) race or ethnicity, gender and age per sector, precinct, shift, and unit; and
111. analyses of the frequency and effectiveness of stop and post-stop activities, including rates at which contraband is discovered pursuant to a search, by type of search, race or ethnicity, gender, and age per sector, precinct, shift, and unit.
b. Use of Force
1. the rate of force used per arrest by NPD;
11. the rate of force by types of force used;
iii. the rate of force by geographic data and type of arrest;
IV. the rate of force used, measured against the subject's race or ethnicity, gender, and age;
v. the rate of force complaints that are sustained, overall and by force type; sources of complaint (internal or external); types of arrest; types of force complained of;
VI. uses of force that were found to violate policy overall and by the following subsets: force type; type of arrest; force implement used; and number of officers involved;
vii. the number and rate of use of force administrative investigations/reviews in which each finding is supported by a preponderance of the evidence;
viii. the number of officers who have more than one instance of force found to violate policy; and
IX. claims and lawsuits filed regarding uses of force, judgments entered, 56 


or cases settled.
c. Theft Allegations
1. the rate of theft allegations over time by sector, precinct, unit, etc.;
11. the success rate of targeted and random stings and integrity audits;
111. the rate of sustained theft allegations; and
IV. the effectiveness NPD's other efforts to reduce theft by officers as reflected in the above information.
d. Training
I. training effectiveness; and
11. modifications or improvements to training resulting from review and analysis of uses of force, stops, searches, arrests, citizen complaints, community input or oversight, and other sources as required by the Agreement.
e. Supervision
1. effectiveness of first-line supervisors' and the chain of commands' identification of and response to incomplete or insufficient reporting for stops, searches, arrests, and uses of force;
ii. ability of supervisors and commanders to identify trends related to use of force; or stops, searches, or arrests in violation of NPD policy or the law that go unaddressed by supervisors;
iii. the number and rates of civilian and administrative complaints against supervisors' and commanders' direct subordinates;
IV. effectiveness at implementing NPD's community engagement and law enforcement strategies, including metrics such as arrest rates, 57

community contacts, and crime rates in command areas; and
v. response to officers or units identified for supervisory review or intervention by NPD's Early Warning System.
f. Accountability
1. the number of misconduct complaints (broken out by type of complaint), with a qualitative assessment of whether any increase or decrease appears related to access to the complaint process;
ii. the rates at which complaints are deemed to have been sustained, not sustained, unfounded, and exonerated.;
111. the number of officers who are subjects of repeated misconduct complaints, or have repeated instances of sustained misconduct complaints;
IV. the number, nature, outcome, and settlement amount, if any, of civil suits against NPD officers related to use of force regardless of whether the City is a defendant in the litigation;
v. arrests and summons of officers for off-duty conduct;
VI. the results of and conclusions drawn from community surveys and outreach efforts; and
V11. criminal prosecutions of officers for on or off-duty conduct.
175. In conducting these assessments, the Monitor may use any relevant data collected and maintained by NPD, and information available from claims and settlements filed against NPD, provided that it has determined, and the Parties agree, that this information is reasonably reliable and complete. The Monitor should also consider the annual community survey as an outcome measure in determining whether the implementation of this Agreement has had any unintended
58 


negative consequences on either accomplishing the purposes of the Agreement or the ability of NPD to conduct effective and constitutional policing.
D. Monitoring Plan
176. Within 90 days of the Operational Date of this Agreement, the Monitor will develop a monitoring plan, including proposed deadlines for conducting the above assessments, compliance reviews and audits. This plan will:
a. clearly delineate the requirements of the Agreement to be assessed for compliance, indicating which requirements will be assessed together;
b. establish a schedule for assessing each outcome measure at least annually, except where otherwise noted, with the first assessment occurring within 365 days of the Operational Date;
c. establish a schedule for completing a compliance review or audit of each requirement of this Agreement within the first two years of the Agreement, and a compliance review or audit of each requirement at least annually thereafter; and
d. set out the method of communicating with the public and receiving public input.
177. The Monitor will submit the initial and any revised Monitoring Plans to the Parties for review, and the Parties will have 30 days to either approve or propose changes. If either Party proposes changes, the Monitor will have 15 days to accept or object to those changes. If the Monitor objects to any of the proposed changes or the Parties suggest changes that are in conflict, either Party or the Monitor will provide the rationale for its proposal or objection, in writing, and the Parties and Monitor will confer to resolve the disagreement.
178. The Parties may submit the Monitoring Plan to the Court after it is approved by the Parties. If after good faith attempts, disagreements remain among the Parties and/or Monitor, either Party or the Monitor may petition the Court to resolve them.
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179. Where the Parties agree, and subject to Court approval, the Monitor will refrain from auditing a provision of this Agreement, provided that the City has been previously found to be in sustained compliance (i.e., findings of compliance for two consecutive audits) with that provision by the Monitor, or where outcome assessments indicate that the intended effect of tIle requirement has been achieved.
180. At least 45 days before initiating any assessment, review, or audit, the Monitor will submit a proposed methodology to the Parties. The Parties will submit any comments or concerns regarding the proposed methodology to the Monitor within 30 days of the proposed date of the assessment, review, or audit. The Monitor will modify the methodology as necessary to address any concerns or inform the Parties in writing of the reasons it is not modifying its methodology as proposed.
E. Monitor Recommendations and Technical Assistance
181. The Monitor may make recommendations to the Parties regarding any relevant issues, including measures the Monitor believes are necessary to ensure timely, full, and effective implementation of this Agreement and its underlying objectives. Such recommendations may include proposals to change, modify, or amend a provision of the Agreement, subject to Court approval; additional training in any area related to this Agreement; or to seek technical assistance. In addition to such recommendations, the Monitor may also, at the request of DOJ or the City and based on the Monitor's reviews, provide technical assistance consistent with the Monitor's responsibilities under this Agreement.
F. Comprehensive Re-Assessment
182. Two years after the Operational Date, the Monitor will conduct a comprehensive re­ assessment to determine whether and to what extent the outcomes intended by this Agreement have been achieved, and whether any modifications to the Agreement are necessary for continued progress. This re-assessment also will address areas of greatest achievement and the requirements that appear to have contributed to this success, as well as areas of greatest concern, including strategies for accelerating full and effective compliance. The Monitor will file the re­ assessment with the Court and it will be a public record. Based upon this re-assessment, the
60 


Monitor will recommend modifications to the Agreement that are necessary to achieve and sustain intended outcomes. Where the Parties agree with the Monitor's recommendations, the Parties will submit such stipulation to the Court and request approval. This provision in no way diminishes the Parties' ability to modify this Agreement, subject to Court approval, as set out in paragraph 217 below. Nothing in this re-assessment will empower the Monitor to unilaterally modify the terms of this Agreement.
G. Monitor Reports
183. The Monitor will file with the Court quarterly written, public reports covering the reporting period that will include:
a. a description of the work conducted by the Monitor during the reporting period;
b. a listing of each Agreement requirement indicating which requirements have been: (1) incorporated into implemented policy; (2) the subject of sufficient training for all relevant NPD officers and employees; (3) reviewed or audited by the Monitor to determine whether they have been fully implemented in actual practice, including the date of the review or audit; and (4) found by the Monitor to have been fully implemented in practice, and the date of this finding;
c. the methodology and specific findings for each audit or review conducted, redacted as necessary for privacy concerns. An unredacted version will be filed under seal with the Court and provided to the Parties. The underlying data for each audit or review will not be publicly available but will be retained by the Monitor and provided to either or both Parties upon request;
d. for any requirements that were reviewed or audited and found not to have been fully implemented in practice, the Monitor's recommendations regarding necessary steps to achieve compliance;
e. the methodology and specific findings for each relevant assessment
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conducted; and
f. a projection of the work to be completed during the upcoming reporting period and any anticipated challenges or concerns related to implementation of the Agreement.
184. The Monitor will provide a copy of quarterly reports to the Parties in draft form at least 15 business days prior to Court filing and public release to allow the Parties to comment informally on the reports. The Monitor will consider the Parties' responses and make appropriate changes, if any, before filing the reports with the Court and issuing them to the public.
H. Communication Among the Parties, the Monitor, and the Public
185. The Monitor will maintain regular contact with the Parties in order to ensure effective and timely communication regarding the implementation of and compliance with this Agreement. To facilitate this communication, the Monitor will conduct regular meetings, on a schedule agreed upon by the Parties that will include participation by the Police Director or designee when necessary, and other NPD representatives, and representatives of the City's Office of Corporation Counsel, the Department of Justice, and the police unions.
186. The Monitor will hold additional meetings in an open, public forum at a location accessible to members of the community on a quarterly basis to explain the Monitor's reports, to inform the public about the implementation process, and to hear community perspectives of police interactions.
187. The Monitor will meet with NPD officers on at least a quarterly basis to inform them about the implementation process and to hear their questions and concerns regarding policies and procedures and other matters related to this Agreement.
188. NPD officers may report misconduct, including retaliation, to the Monitor either anonymously or on the record. The Monitor will not investigate, but will convey information regarding any complaints to the appropriate agency or entity without revealing the officer's identity if anonymity has been requested.
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I. Public Statements, Testimony, Records, and Conflicts of Interest
189. Except as required or authorized by the tenns of this Agreement, by the Parties acting together, or by authorization of the Court, the Monitor, including any agent, employee, or independent contractor thereof, will not make any public statements or issue findings of fact with regard to any act or omission of the City or its agents, representatives, or employees. Nor will the Monitor, or any agent, employee, or contractor thereof, disclose non-public information provided to the Monitor pursuant to the Agreement.
190. The Monitor may testify as to its observations, findings, and recommendations before the Court with jurisdiction over this matter, but will not testify in any other litigation or proceeding with regard to any act or omission of the City or any of its agents, representatives, or employees related to this Agreement or regarding any matter or subject of which the Monitor may have received knowledge as a result of its perfonnance under this Agreement. This paragraph does not apply to any proceeding before a court related to performance of monitoring services under this Agreement.
191. The Monitor will not accept employment or provide consulting services that would present a conflict of interest with the Monitor's responsibilities under this Agreement, including future retention (on a paid or unpaid basis) by any current or future private litigant or claimant, or such litigant's or claimant's attorney, in connection with a claim or suit against the City or its departments, officers, agents, or employees.
192. Neither the Monitor nor any member of the Monitoring Team will be permitted to represent or work for any individual or organization in any criminal or civil matter adverse to the City ofNewark or the United States Attorney's Office, District of New Jersey, including any individual or organization designated as a witness, consultant, victim, defendant, subject, target, or person of interest, for the duration of the monitorship.
193. The Monitor is not a state or local agency, or an agent thereof, and accordingly the records maintained by the Monitor will not be deemed public records subject to public inspection. In the event that the Monitor receives a Freedom of Information Act, Open Public
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Records Act, or common law right to access request, the Monitor will promptly notify and confer with the Parties regarding how to respond to the request.
194. Neither the Monitor nor any person or entity hired or otherwise retained by the Monitor to assist in furthering any provision of this Agreement shall be liable for any claim, lawsuit, or demand arising out of and substantively related to the Monitor's performance pursuant to this Agreement. This paragraph does not apply to any proceeding before a court related to performance of monitoring service under this Agreement.
J. Record Collection and Retention
195. The City and NPD agree to collect and maintain all data and records necessary to: (1) document implementation of and compliance with this Agreement, including data 'and records necessary for the Monitor to conduct reliable assessments, compliance reviews, and audits; and (2) allow NPD or other City entities to perform ongoing quality assurance in each of the areas addressed by this Agreement.
K. Consent Decree Implementation Unit
196. The City and NPD agree to hire and retain, or reassign current City or NPD employees to form an inter-disciplinary unit with the skills and abilities necessary to facilitate implementation of this Agreement. This unit will serve as a liaison between the Parties and the Monitor and will assist with the implementation of and compliance with this Agreement. At a minimum, this unit will coordinate the City and NPD's compliance and implementation activities; facilitate the provision of data, documents, materials, and access to the City and NPD personnel to the Monitor and DO], as needed; direct that all data, documents, and records required by this Agreement be maintained in an auditable format; and assist in assigning implementation and compliance related tasks to NPD personnel, as directed by the Police Director or his designee.
197. Within 180 days of the Effective Date, and every six months thereafter as long as this Agreement is in effect, the City implementation unit will produce a status report that will be filed with the Court, with a copy to the Monitor and DO], and shall be a public record. This report shall delineate the steps taken by NPD during the reporting period to implement this Agreement;
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the City's assessment of the status of its progress; plans to correct any problems; and response to any concerns raised in the Monitor's previous quarterly reports.
L. Access and Confidentiality
198. To facilitate its work, the Monitor may conduct on-site visits and assessments without prior notice to the City and NPD. The Monitor will have reasonable access to all necessary individuals, facilities, and documents, which will include access to trainings, meetings, and reviews, such as critical incident reviews, use of force review boards, and disciplinary hearings.
199. NPD will notify the Monitor and DOl as soon as practicable, and in any case within 24 hours, of any critical fIrearm discharge, in-custody death, or arrest of any officer.
200. The City and NPD will provide the Monitor with timely, full, and direct access to all City and NPD staff, employees, facilities, and locations of events that the Monitor reasonably deems necessary to carry out the duties assigned by this Agreement. The Monitor will cooperate with the City and NPD for access to individuals and facilities in a reasonable manner that, consistent with the Monitor's responsibilities, minimizes interference with daily operations.
201. The City and NPD will ensure that the Monitor has full and direct access to all City and NPD documents and data that the Monitor reasonably deems necessary, except any documents or data protected by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law. Such access includes, but is not limited to, internal affairs and criminal investigation fIles. The Monitor shall be permitted to observe activities and trainings such as use of force review boards, or disciplinary hearings. Should the City and NPD decline to provide the Monitor access to documents or data based on privilege, the City and NPD will so inform the Monitor and DOl and will provide the Monitor and DOl with a log describing the documents or data and the basis of the privilege for withholding. If the Monitor or DOl disagrees with the basis for the privilege they may seek further relief from the Court.
202. For the purpose of implementing this Agreement, DOl and its consultants and agents will have full and direct access to all City and NPD staff, employees, facilities, documents, and data. DOl and its consultants and agents will cooperate with the City and NPD for access to relevant personnel, facilities, and documents in a reasonable manner that, consistent with DOl's
65 


responsibilities to enforce this Agreement, minimizes interference with daily operations. Should the City and NPD decline to provide DOJ with access to documents or data based on privilege, the City and NPD will so inform DOJ that they are withholding documents or data on this basis and will provide DOJ with a log describing the documents or data and the basis of the privilege for withholding. If the Monitor or DOJ disagrees with the basis for the privilege they may seek further relief from the Court.
203. The Monitor and DOJ will provide the City and NPD with reasonable notice of a request for copies of documents. Upon such request, the City and NPD will provide in a timely manner copies (electronic, where readily available) of the requested documents to the Monitor and DOJ.
204. The Monitor will have access to all NPD records and information relating to criminal investigations ofNPD officers as permissible by law. The Monitor will have access to all NPD documents in such files that have been closed by NPD after the Effective Date. The Monitor also will have reasonable access to all NPD arrest reports, warrants, and warrant applications initiated after the Effective Date whether or not contained in open criminal investigation files.
205. The Monitor and DOJ will maintain the confidentiality of all non-public information provided by the City and NPD. Other than as expressly provided in this Agreement, this Agreement will not be deemed a waiver of any privilege or right the City and NPD may assert, including those recognized at common law or created by statute, rule or regulation, against any other person or entity with respect to the disclosure of any document.
M. Compensation and Term of the Monitor
206. The Monitor will be appointed for a period of five years from the Operational Date. The appointment may be extended at the request of the Parties and with Court approval. The extension of the Monitor beyond five years will be allowed only if the Court determines that it is reasonably necessary in order to assess and facilitate full and effective compliance with this Agreement.
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207. The City will bear all reasonable fees and costs of the Monitor. During the selection process for the Monitor, the Parties and Monitor agreed to an overall cap of $7,400,000.00 for the Monitor based on a five year term.
208. Within 60 days of the Effective Date, the City will deposit $200,000.00 into the Registry of the Court as interim payment of costs incurred by the Monitor. This deposit and all other deposits pursuant to this Agreement will be held in the Court Registry and will be subject to the standard registry fee imposed, if any, on depositors. The Monitor will submit monthly statements to the Court, with copies to the Parties, detailing all expenses the Monitor incurred during the prior month. The Court will order the clerk to make payments to the Monitor. Upon receipt of an Order from the Court directing payment, the clerk will ensure timely payment of all approved statements received from the Monitor. Within 45 days of the entry of each Order directing payment, the City will replenish the fund with the full amount paid by the clerk in order to restore the fund's total to $100,000.00.
209. Before submitting monthly statements to the Court, the Monitor will submit them to the Parties. The Parties will review such statements for reasonableness. Upon completion of the Parties' review, but in no case more than 30 days after submission of the statements by the Monitor, the Parties will notify the Monitor of their approval. Upon receipt of the Parties' approval, the Monitor may submit the statement to the Court for payment. The statements submitted to the Court will indicate that they were reviewed and approved by the Parties. In the event the Parties cannot agree on approval of a statement, the Parties will attempt to resolve such a dispute cooperatively prior to seeking the assistance of the Court.
210. The Monitor, at any time after approval of the initial team members" may request to be allowed to hire, employ, or contract with such additional persons or entities as are reasonably necessary to perform the tasks assigned by the Agreement, provided that any resulting expenditures fall within the approved budget. The Monitor will notify the City and DO] in writing if the Monitor wishes to select such additional persons or entities, and will identify and describe their qualifications and the need for their involvement. The City and DOJ must both approve of the person or entity before they may be hired or employed, although substantial
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deference will be afforded to the Monitor's choice. Any person or entity hired or otherwise retained by the Monitor will be subject to the provisions of the Agreement.
211. In the event that the Monitor is no longer able to perform his/her functions, the City and DOJ will together select and advise the Court of a replacement Monitor, acceptable to both, within 60 days unless extended by agreement of the Parties. If the Parties are unable to agree on a replacement Monitor or a method of selection, each Party will submit to the Court the names of three candidates or candidate groups, along with resumes and cost proposals. The Court will select and appoint the Monitor from among the qualified candidates/candidate groups.
212. The City will provide the Monitor with permanent office space and reasonable office support such as office furniture, telephones, internet access, secure document storage, and photocopying.
213. In the event that full and effective implementation of this Agreement requires technical assistance beyond the scope of the Monitor's duties, DOJ, NPD, and/or the Monitor will so inform the City. The Monitor, with assistance from the City, will arrange for the prompt acquisition of the required technical assistance, to be performed by the Monitor or its agent or independent contractor, or a separate entity. The City will set aside $100,000.00 for this purpose, and will allocate additional funds as necessary. If either Party disagrees with the need for the technical assistance requested, the Party will, within 15 days of being so informed in writing, inform the Court, which will resolve the dispute.
214. Should either of the Parties to this Agreement determine that the Monitor's individual members, agents, employees, or independent contractors have exceeded their authority or failed to satisfactorily perform the duties required by this Agreement, the Party will provide notice to the Monitor and a reasonable opportunity to cure. If there is no satisfactory resolution, the Party may petition the Court for such relief as the Court deems appropriate, including replacement of the Monitor, and/or any individual members, agents, employees, or independent contractors of the Monitor. The Court will grant such relief upon a showing of good cause.
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XVII. COURT JURISDICTION, MODIFICATION, AND ENFORCEMENT
215. This Agreement will become effective upon entry by the Court. To ensure that the requirements of this Agreement are properly and timely implemented, the Court will retain jurisdiction of this action for all purposes until such time as the Court determines the City has achieved full and effective compliance with this Agreement and maintained such compliance for no less than two consecutive years.
216. The City and NPD will bear the burden of demonstrating full and effective compliance with this Agreement. DOJ acknowledges the good faith of the City in trying to address measures that are needed to promote police integrity and ensure constitutional policing in Newark. DOJ, however, reserves its right to seek enforcement of the provisions of this Agreement if it determines that the City has failed to fully comply with any material provision. DOJ agrees to consult with officials from the City before instituting such enforcement proceedings.
217. The City and DOJ may jointly stipulate to make changes, modifications, and amendments to this Agreement, which will be subject to Court approval. Such changes, modifications, and amendments to this Agreement will be encouraged when the Parties agree, or where the reviews, assessments, and/or audits of the Monitor demonstrate that the Agreement provision as drafted is not furthering the purpose of the Agreement, or that there is a preferable alternative that will achieve the same purpose. Where the Parties or the Monitor are uncertain whether a change to the Agreement is advisable, the Parties with Court approval may agree to suspend the current Agreement requirement for a time period agreed upon at the outset of the suspension. During this suspension, the Parties with Court approval may agree to temporarily implement an alternative requirement. The Monitor will assess and report to the Court whether the suspension of the requirement and the implementation of any alternative provision is as, or more, effective at achieving the purpose as was the original/current Agreement requirement, and the Parties will consider this assessment in determining whether to request that the Court approve the suggested change, modification, or amendment.
218. The Parties will defend the provisions of this Agreement. The Parties will notify each other and the Court of any court or administrative challenge to this Agreement. In the event any provision of this Agreement is challenged in any court other than the Court, removal, transfer, or
69 


consolidation to this Case in the Court will be sought by the Parties, to the extent permitted by law.
219. The City and NPD will promptly notify DO] if any term of this Agreement becomes subject to collective bargaining and consult with DO] ina timely manner regarding the position the City and NPD will take in any collective bargaining consultation connected with this Agreement.
220. The City and NPD will require compliance with this Agreement by their respective 
 officers, employees, departments, assigns, or successors. 

221. In the event the NPD or the City fails to fulfill any obligation under this Agreement, the '. DO] shall, prior to pursuing any remedy with the Court, give written notice of the failure to the NPD and the City. The NPD and the City shall have 30 days from receipt of such notice to cure the failure. However, if DO] determines that an emergency condition exists that places persons at risk of serious and imminent harm, DO] may immediately seek a remedial order from the Court. At the end of the 3~-day period, in the event DO] determines that the failure has not been cured, DO] may, upon three days notice to the City (excluding weekends and federal or state holidays), at its election seek a remedy from the Court.
XVIII. TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT
222. The City and NPD will endeavor to reach full and effective compliance with this Agreement within five years of its Effective Date. The Parties may jointly ask the Court to terminate this Agreement after this date, provided that the City has been in full and effective compliance with this Agreement for two years. "Full and Effective Compliance" will be defined to require sustained compliance with all material requirements of this Agreement and sustained and continuing improvement in constitutional policing, as demonstrated pursuant to the Agreement's outcome measures, all as determined by the Court.
223. If, after seven years from the Effective Date, the Parties disagree whether the City has 
 been in full and effective compliance for two years, either Party may file a motion requesting 
 that the Court terminate all or part of this Agreement. In the case oftermination sought by the 
 City, prior to filing a motion to terminate, the City agrees to notify DO] and the Monitor in 

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writing when the City has determined that it is in full and effective compliance with this Agreement and that such compliance has been maintained for no less than two years. Thereafter, the Parties and the Monitor will promptly confer as to the status ofcompliance. DO] and the Monitor will have a period of 45 days, unless extended by mutual agreement or order ofthe Court, for consultation and the completion ofany audit or evaluation necessary to assess the City's compliance, including on-site observations, document review, or interviews with City and NPD personnel. If the Parties and the Monitor cannot then resolve any compliance issues, the City may file a motion requesting that the Court terminate this Agreement. If the City moves for termination of this Agreement, DO] will have 60 days after the receipt ofthe City's motion to object to the motion. The Court will hold a hearing on the motion and the burden will be on the City to demonstrate that it is in full and effective compliance with this Agreement and has maintained such compliance for at least two years. 224. Upon the Court's determination that the City and NPD have achieved full and effective compliance and have maintained such compliance for at least two years, the Court will terminate the Agreement and dismiss the case.
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IT IS SO ORDERED this _ _ day of_ _ _ _, 2016. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

72 


FOR THE PLAINTIFF 


PAUL ~ . Fill MAN
U. S\~orney for the District of New Jersey

VANITA GUPTA Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division

SABRINA COMIZZOLI Executive Assistant United States Attorney KRISTIN VASSALLO Deputy Chief, Civil Division United States Attorney' s Office District of New Jerse y 970 Broad Street Newark, NJ 07102 (973) 645 -2700

STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM Chief Special Litigation Section
4~~1V-f-f~ 

CHRISTY E. LOPEZ Deputy Chief RASHIDA J. OGLETREE Special Counsel JEFFREY R. MURRAY COREY M. SANDERS PATRICK KENT Trial Attorneys Special Litigation Section Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave. , N W Washington, DC 20530 Telephone: (202) 305-3712

73 


FOR

h.I"1IJiiANT

ayor City of Newark, New Jersey

Corpora on Counsel
AV ION M. BENJAMIN First Assistant Corporation Counsel DepaItment of Law Room 316, City Hall Newark, NJ 07102 Tel. (973)733-3880

ANTHONY AMBROSE Director of Public Safety City of Newark, New Jersey

74 


 
 www.justice.gov/usao/nj

United States Attorney District of New Jersey
CONTACT: Matthew Reilly Office of Public Affairs (973) 645-2888

LIST OF APPLICANTS FOR FEDERAL MONITORSHIP OF NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT
Daniel R. Alonso, Exiger Matthew Barge Esq., Police Assessment Resource Center A. Matthew Boxer Esq., Lowenstein Sandler LLP/Price Waterhouse Coopers Michael Bromwich, The Bromwich Group James R. Bucknam, Freeh Group International Eric P. Daigle Esq., Police Performance Consulting, LLC Richard J. Davis Esq. Clark Ervin, Squire Patton Boggs Peter C. Harvey, Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP Arnette F. Heintze Esq., Hillard Heintze Roger B. Jacobs Esq., Jacobs Center for Justice and Alternative Dispute Resolution William Johnson, Strategic Community Interventions LLC Randy Khatami, Elite Performance Assessment Consultants LLC Walter Mack, Doer Rieck Kaley & Mack Antonio Perez Preston Pugh, Pugh, Jones & Johnson Lauren J. Resnick Esq., Baker Hostetler Bridget Rohde, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, PC James “Chips” Stewart, CNA Safety and Security Division/OIR Group Lee Vartan, Holland & Knight Joseph R. Wolfinger Esq. , Transparency Matters LLC

 
 FACT SHEET: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AGREEMENT WITH THE CITY OF NEWARK TO REFORM NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the City of Newark (City) have reached a Settlement Agreement (Agreement) to reform the Newark Police Department (NPD). The Agreement is intended to resolve the allegations in DOJ’s complaint that NPD engages in a pattern or practice of making stops, searches, and arrests in violation of the Fourth and First Amendments, and that have a disparate impact on minorities in Newark; a pattern or practice of using unreasonable force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and a pattern or practice of theft by officers.
PROVISIONS OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Community engagement with NPD:  Development of formal and informal mechanisms to ensure greater community engagement with NPD.  Creation of a civilian oversight entity to enhance NPD’s accountability and transparency and the public’s confidence in the Department. The oversight entity will represent Newark’s many communities and should be able to assist NPD efforts to adhere to the principles of the agreement.  Implementation of a comprehensive community and problem-oriented policing model to strengthen partnerships with the community and ensure collaborative problem-solving.  An annual survey to assess the Newark community’s experience with and perceptions of NPD and public safety.
Stop, search and arrest practices:  Revision of policies and training to ensure that all stops, searches, and arrests are conducted in accordance with the Constitution and in a manner that takes into account community priorities.  Significantly more supervision of officers’ stop, search and arrest practices.  Development on policies that require officers to respect the First Amendment rights of onlookers or bystanders to witness, observe, record, and comment on or complain about officer conduct.
Bias-Free Policing:  NPD will deliver police services that are equitable, respectful, and free of unlawful bias, in a manner that promotes broad community engagement and confidence in the Department.  Development of a bias-free policing policy that makes clear that biased policing, including deciding to detain someone based solely on racial stereotypes, is prohibited. Includes training on cultural competency and implicit bias.  Tracking and analysis of interactions between the police and residents, including the race, ethnicity, age, and gender of people who are stopped and against whom force was used.  NPD will conduct quarterly analyses of its enforcement activities to ensure compliance with bias-free policing policies.
Use of force:  Revision of force policies and improved training and guidance on when and how officers may use force, including an emphasis on de-escalation of incidents.  Strengthening of the systems for reviewing and investigating uses of force.  Further development of the Use of Force Review Board to review intermediate and serious uses of force, including whether the use of force investigation is thorough and complete and whether there are tactical, training, equipment, or policy considerations that need to be addressed.
1

In-car and Body-worn Cameras:  NPD will equip all marked patrol cars with video cameras.  Require most officers to wear body-cameras to record enforcement activities (excluding officers who will not wear body cameras because they are engaged only in administrative or management duties).  Require supervisors to review video recordings when evaluating officers’ enforcement activities, including uses of force.
Theft:  Improved storage and recordkeeping practices to ensure that citizens are not deprived of property without due process.  Random and targeted integrity audits to identify and deter theft.
Accountability:  Revised systems to ensure that all allegations of officer misconduct are investigated fully, fairly, and efficiently, and that officers who engage in misconduct are held accountable.  Substantial changes to processes used by the Office of Professional Standards to ensure that all civilian complaints of police misconduct are thoroughly and effectively investigated.  Acquisition and deployment of in-car and body-worn cameras to improve accountability, officer legitimacy, and law enforcement records.
Discipline:  Application of discipline will be consistent and fair throughout NPD.  Development of written disciplinary guidance that is based on the nature and severity of the policy violation rather than an officer’s rank, assignment, reputation, or personal associations.
Data systems improvement:  Enhance early warning system to support the effective supervision and management of NPD officers and develop data protocols and use of the system to make it an effective supervisory tool.  Improve existing records management system so that it can more effectively and efficiently share information with NPD’s other systems.
Transparency and oversight:  Establishment of a civilian oversight entity to enhance NPD’s transparency and the public’s confidence in the Department.  Broad data collection regarding many of NPD’s activities, including its use of force and stop and search practices, and public reporting of that data.
Implementation and Termination:  Filed in federal Court and operates as a federal court order once approved by a judge.  Overseen by an independent monitor, chosen by the Parties for an initial term of five years, to assess and report on whether the requirements of this Agreement have been implemented.  Termination of the Agreement when the city has demonstrated to a judge that it has been in substantial and effective compliance for two consecutive years.
2

 
 Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 4 Filed 04/29/16 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 99

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v. CITY OF NEWARK,
Defendant.

No. 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR ENTRY OF CONSENT DECREE

On March 30, 2016, Plaintiff, the United States of America, and Defendant, the City of Newark (“City”), (collectively “the Parties”) jointly moved the Court to enter the Consent Decree (ECF No. 2, Att. 1). The Consent Decree resolves the United States’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (“Section 14141”) that the Newark Police Division (“NPD”) has engaged in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives persons of rights, privileges, and immunities secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
After a status conference on April 7, 2016, the Parties revisited some of the Consent Decree’s provisions, continued to negotiate in good faith, and now submit a revised final form of the Consent Decree for the Court’s review and approval. The Municipal Council of the City of Newark, at its Wednesday, April 20, 2016 meeting, approved the Consent Decree submitted to Your Honor.

Respectfully submitted,

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 4 Filed 04/29/16 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 100

For Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

PAUL J. FISHMAN United States Attorney District of New Jersey s/ Sabrina G. Comizzoli SABRINA G. COMIZZOLI Executive Assistant United States Attorney KRISTIN L. VASSALLO Deputy Chief, Civil Division 970 Broad Street, Suite 700 Newark, NJ 07102 Tel. (973) 645-2700 Email: Sabrina.Comizzoli@usdoj.gov Email: Kristin.Vassallo@usdoj.gov
For Defendant CITY OF NEWARK

VANITA GUPTA Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
s/ Rashida Ogletree STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM Chief CHRISTY LOPEZ Deputy Chief RASHIDA OGLETREE Special Counsel JEFFREY R. MURRAY COREY SANDERS PATRICK KENT Trial Attorneys United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 Tel. (202) 305-3712 Email: Christy.Lopez@usdoj.gov Email: Rashida.Ogletree@usdoj.gov Email: Jeff.Murray@usdoj.gov Email: Corey.Sanders@usdoj.gov Email: Patrick.Kent@usdoj.gov

s/ Willie L. Parker WILLIE L. PARKER, ESQ., L.L.M. Corporation Counsel
AVION M. BENJAMIN First Assistant Corporation Counsel Department of Law Room 316, City Hall Newark, NJ 07102 Tel. (973)733-3880
2

 
 I. RESUMEN
El Departamento de Justicia inició una investigación del Departamento de la Policía de Newark ("NPD" o "el Departamento") en mayo del 2011, luego de recibir denuncias graves acerca de violaciones de derechos civiles por parte del NPD, entre ellas las alegaciones de que el NPD sujeta a los residentes de Newark a fuerza excesiva, detenciones y arrestos injustificados, y acciones discriminatorias por parte de la policía.
Esta investigación de las prácticas policiales de Newark se llevó a cabo de manera conjunta por la Sección de Litigios Especiales de la División de Derechos Civiles y la Fiscalía Federal del Distrito de Nueva Jersey (en conjunto, "DOJ") conforme a la Ley de control de los delitos violentos y Orden público de 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 ("Sección 14141"), el Título VI de la Ley de derechos civiles de 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("Título VI") y la Ley general de control de los delitos y de seguridad en las calles de 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d ("Ley de seguridad en las calles"). La Sección 14141 les prohíbe a las autoridades del gobierno incurrir en un patrón o práctica de conducta indebida por los agentes del orden público que viole los derechos constitucionales o estatutarios federales de las personas. El Título VI y la Ley de seguridad en las calles prohíben la discriminación por motivo de raza, color, sexo, religión u origen nacional por parte de los beneficiarios de ciertos fondos federales.
La investigación se benefició de la asistencia del NPD y la ciudad de Newark ("Ciudad"), los cuales proporcionaron acceso a los oficiales, personal de mando, documentos y datos disponibles. El DOJ también recibió aportaciones de otras partes interesadas en la justicia criminal, como miembros de la comunidad, organizaciones del orden público, grupos de defensa, uniones que representan a los oficiales del NPD y otras partes que compartieron sus experiencias con el NPD.
Este informe expone los hallazgos de la investigación del DOJ. En resumen, y como se discute más a fondo abajo, esta investigación mostró un patrón o práctica de violaciones constitucionales en las prácticas de detenciones y arrestos del NPD, su respuesta al ejercicio de los derechos de las personas conforme a la Primera Enmienda, el uso de la fuerza por el Departamento y el hurto por parte de los oficiales. La investigación también reveló deficiencias en los sistemas del NPD que están diseñados para evitar y detectar la conducta indebida, incluidos sus sistemas para revisar el uso de la fuerza e investigar denuncias acerca de la conducta de los oficiales. La investigación también identificó inquietudes que no parecen llegar al nivel de patrón de conducta indebida en violación de la Constitución, pero que son significativas y merecen consideración por parte del NPD. Estas inquietudes se relacionan con las prácticas del NPD al interactuar con detenidos potencialmente suicidas, investigaciones de agresiones sexuales por parte del NPD y el efecto de las prácticas policiales del NPD en la comunidad homosexual, bisexual y transexual ("LGBT", por sus siglas en inglés).
La ciudad de Newark resulta menoscabada y el NPD resulta menos efectivo por causa de estos patrones y prácticas de conducta inconstitucional. Las prácticas policiales del NPD han erosionado la confianza de la comunidad, y la percepción del NPD como una agencia con rendición de cuentas insuficiente también ha socavado la confianza de otras partes interesadas en la justicia criminal de Newark. El resolver los problemas identificados por esta investigación no

sólo hará que Newark se convierta en una comunidad más equitativa, pero también una comunidad más segura. Como expresó el NPD en su Política de transparencia, Orden general 2013-03, "es un principio fundamental que la confianza y la cooperación del público son esenciales para la efectividad del Departamento de la Policía de Newark...El Departamento no puede evitar delitos futuros sin el compromiso y la cooperación de la comunidad..."
Como se discute en más detalle en el cuerpo de este informe, hay causa razonable para creer que el NPD ha incurrido en un patrón o práctica de:
 Efectuar detenciones y arrestos en violación de la Cuarta Enmienda. Aproximadamente el 75% de los informes de detenciones de peatones por oficiales del NPD no articularon un fundamento legal suficiente para la detención, a pesar de que la política del NPD exige dicha justificación. Durante el periodo investigado, el NPD hizo miles de paradas a personas que estaban "caminando sin rumbo", "vagando" o "deambulando", sin indicio alguno de sospecha razonable de actividad criminal. Además, una revisión de los informes de arresto del NPD suscitó inquietudes de que, en un subgrupo de arrestos por el NPD relacionados con narcóticos, los oficiales no informaron de forma completa o exacta las circunstancias de dichos arrestos.
 Prácticas policiales que resultan en detenciones y arrestos desproporcionados de residentes negros de Newark. El NPD detiene a las personas negras en una proporción mayor que a las personas blancas. Como resultado, las personas negras en Newark llevan la carga del patrón de detenciones y arrestos inconstitucionales por parte del NPD. Esta investigación no determinó si dicha diferencia es intencional o si simplemente no tiene fundamento jurídico. De todas maneras, esta experiencia de ser sujeto de forma desproporcionada a detenciones y arrestos en violación de la Cuarta Enmienda moldea las interacciones de los residentes negros con el NPD, en detrimento de la confianza de la comunidad, y hace que la tarea de proporcionar servicios policiales en Newark sea más peligrosa y menos efectiva.1
 Represalias contra personas que cuestionan las actuaciones de la policía. En violación de la Primera Enmienda, los oficiales del NPD han detenido y arrestado a personas que han objetado legalmente a las actuaciones de la policía o se han comportado de una manera que los oficiales han percibido como irrespetuosa.
 Uso de fuerza injustificada y excesiva en violación de la Cuarta Enmienda. En más del 20% de los incidentes de uso de la fuerza del NPD que se revisaron, la fuerza, según se informó, parecía ser irrazonable y, por ende, en violación de la Constitución. Además, ha habido una falta de notificación sustancial de la fuerza por parte de oficiales del NPD,
1 Mientras se finalizaba este informe, la afiliada de Nueva Jersey de la Unión Americana de Libertades Civiles (ACLU-NJ) publicó los resultados de su revisión de estadísticas de detenciones por el NPD. La revisión de ACLU-NJ se limitó a un subgrupo de datos de detenciones sumarias que el NPD ahora publica en su sitio web. Como se explica a continuación, el DOJ obtuvo acceso directo a los registros del NPD y, por consiguiente, la investigación del DOJ incluyó el análisis de información más precisa, incluida la ubicación de las detenciones, la justificación documentada, si la detención fue de un peatón o una detención vehicular y descripciones de las actuaciones posteriores a la detención, como registros y cacheos. Al igual que la investigación del DOJ, la revisión de ACLU-NJ de datos diferentes, pero más recientes, identificó disparidades raciales en las detenciones por parte del NPD.

y la mayor parte de las investigaciones sobre el uso de la fuerza del NPD han sido demasiado inadecuadas como para apoyar conclusiones fiables acerca de si el uso de la fuerza por un oficial -- incluida la fuerza mortal -- fue razonable.
 Sujetar a personas a hurtos por parte de oficiales del NPD en violación de la Cuarta y Decimocuarta Enmienda. La investigación reveló pruebas de hurto de bienes y dinero de los ciudadanos por oficiales, específicamente en las unidades especializadas del NPD como las unidades de narcóticos y pandillas, y en la unidad de procesamiento de prisioneros en el bloque de celdas de Green Street. El NPD ha realizado investigaciones inadecuadas de denuncias de hurto, no ha tomado acción correctiva contra los oficiales que cometieron el delito y se rehusó a implementar los métodos recomendados por sus propios investigadores que podrían evitar hurtos futuros por parte de los oficiales.
El hallazgo de un patrón o práctica de conducta ilícita dentro de una agencia del orden público no significa que la mayor parte de los oficiales viola la ley. Tampoco un patrón o práctica refleja que cierto número de oficiales ha violado la ley o que el número de actos ilícitos ha llegado a un umbral específico. Véase United States v. Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5o Cir. 1971). ("El número de [violaciones)...no es determinante..., [no] hay una fórmula matemática que funcione, ni fue la intención establecer alguna. Cada caso dependerá de sus propios hechos"). Más bien, lo esencial es si la conducta ilícita parece ser más típica que aislada o anormal. Existe un patrón o práctica cuando la conducta parece ser parte de una práctica usual, ya sea sancionada oficialmente por la política existente o de otra manera. Véase, por ejemplo, Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (un patrón o práctica es "algo más que meros actos aislados o "accidentales" o "esporádicos"; en su lugar, tiene que ser una "práctica regular y no inusual").
Los patrones de violaciones constitucionales descritos en este informe son en gran parte el resultado de la inexistencia de sistemas de rendición de cuentas y revisión dentro del NPD. El NPD no tiene un sistema en funcionamiento de advertencias tempranas ni una estructura efectiva de asuntos internos. Esas deficiencias socavan la capacidad del Departamento de identificar y abordar la conducta indebida de los oficiales. La recopilación y análisis de datos del NPD, y su sistema para la revisión regular del uso de la fuerza por oficiales son igualmente deficientes.
Una muestra de la inefectividad del sistema de asuntos internos del NPD es que la Unidad de Asuntos Internos ("IA", por sus siglas en inglés) confirmó sólo una denuncia por un civil de fuerza excesiva de los cientos de denuncias recibidas entre 2007 y 2012. Aunque no hay un porciento "correcto" de denuncias que se deben confirmar, sólo un hallazgo de fuerza irrazonable de entre los cientos de denuncias durante un periodo de seis años demuestra la existencia de sistemas de rendición de cuentas sumamente disfuncionales. El NPD tampoco ha recopilado o analizado adecuadamente datos sobre el uso de fuerza, detenciones o arrestos por parte de los oficiales. El NPD tampoco ha tomado medidas adecuadas para implementar un sistema de advertencias tempranas que monitorice e identifique el comportamiento problemático de los oficiales. Como resultado de estas deficiencias sistémicas, el NPD no discierne ni responde a las tendencias problemáticas en la conducta de los oficiales que podrían constituir o causar una conducta indebida.

El NPD tampoco ha proporcionado a los oficiales las herramientas necesarias para dar apoyo a las prácticas policiales constitucionales, como capacitación adecuada, políticas claras y de fácil acceso y dirección significativa por parte de los supervisores. Entre las deficiencias básicas se encuentran el no asegurarse de que los oficiales del NPD realmente tengan acceso a las políticas que se supone que cumplan, la falta de actualizar las políticas con regularidad y la falta de proveer o monitorizar la capacitación necesaria. La revisión de las acciones de los oficiales por los supervisores, incluidos el uso de la fuerza y los arrestos, ha sido laxa. El efecto acumulado de estas deficiencias es una organización que es demasiado propensa a proteger a sus oficiales de tener que rendir cuentas y que no está lo suficientemente enfocada en proteger los derechos constitucionales.
La responsabilidad de corregir las prácticas policiales inconstitucionales del NPD radica en cada nivel dentro del Departamento. Los supervisores y líderes de comando del NPD deben asegurarse de que los oficiales reciban la capacitación, orientación y dirección necesarias para ejercer sus funciones policiales de manera efectiva y constitucional, y comunicar claramente a los oficiales que las prácticas policiales constitucionales y el orden público efectivo no están en conflicto el uno con el otro, y más bien son interdependientes. Los oficiales deben actuar dentro de los parámetros que la ley impone sobre las detenciones, registros y arrestos, y evitar intensificar las interacciones hasta el punto en que se utilice la fuerza innecesariamente. El NPD también debe recopilar y analizar los datos relacionados con las detenciones, registros y arrestos de manera que pueda minimizar el impacto desproporcionado de sus esfuerzos de control del orden público y evitar la parcialidad en las prácticas policiales. Los líderes del NPD también deben asegurarse de que cuando los oficiales violen las políticas existentes o la ley, sean obligados a rendir cuentas y que las acciones correctivas, incluidas las medidas disciplinarias, sean efectivas, justas y consistentes.
Todos estos hallazgos, al igual que las soluciones propuestas, se han discutido con los oficiales de la Ciudad y los líderes del NPD, y la Ciudad y el NPD se han comprometido a atender estos problemas de forma rápida y minuciosa. A dicho fin, la Ciudad y el DOJ han llegado a un Acuerdo de Principio que constituirá el fundamento de un acuerdo exhaustivo, ejecutable por la vía judicial y supervisado independientemente para implementar reformas significativas.
El Acuerdo de Principio adjunto aborda cada uno de los patrones de violaciones constitucionales que se describen en este informe. El Acuerdo exige que la Ciudad establezca una entidad de supervisión civil para el NPD y mecanismos adicionales para la participación comunitaria efectiva para ayudar a asegurar la sostenibilidad de las reformas y fomentar las relaciones positivas entre el NPD y la comunidad de Newark. La Ciudad, el NPD y el DOJ acuerdan que el NPD examinará y revisará sus políticas, capacitación y mecanismos de supervisión interna, particularmente en lo relacionado con el uso de la fuerza y las prácticas de detención, registros y arrestos. El NPD también le proporcionará a los oficiales la orientación adecuada acerca del ejercicio por las personas de sus derechos conforme a la Primera Enmienda. El NPD desarrollará e implementará prácticas de rendición de cuentas y de supervisión para evitar, detectar y abordar las detenciones, registros y arrestos ilícitos y la fuerza irrazonable, y detectar y evitar hurtos por los oficiales. El NPD revisará sus prácticas de asuntos internos para asegurarse de la recepción efectiva de denuncias, investigaciones objetivas de conducta indebida

y medidas disciplinarias justas y consistentes. El NPD también mejorará la recopilación y análisis de datos de manera que pueda entender mejor sus prácticas de control del orden público y asegurarse de la efectividad y constitucionalidad de dichas prácticas.
Durante la investigación de las prácticas del NPD, todas las partes han reconocido que Newark es una ciudad llena de retos para la policía debido al nivel significativo de delitos y limitaciones presupuestarias de dicha ciudad. El DOJ reconoce en particular las destrezas y la dedicación de los numerosos oficiales de la policía de Newark que cumplen con la ley y se comprometen a diario a la labor difícil y poco agradecida, de proteger la seguridad pública. Los hallazgos de esta investigación no tienen como propósito restarle valor a los esfuerzos de estos oficiales. De hecho, muchos de los hallazgos de la investigación hacen hincapié en la necesidad del NPD y de la Ciudad de proporcionar mejor apoyo y dirección a sus oficiales.
Junto a la apreciación de las dificultades del trabajo de la policía, todas las partes están de acuerdo en que se deben identificar y resolver todas las políticas o prácticas del NPD que violan los derechos civiles. Este respeto compartido por los derechos civiles de las personas refleja no sólo la importancia fundamental de estos derechos, pero también el entendimiento de que las violaciones repetidas de los derechos civiles hacen que las prácticas policiales sean menos efectivas y más peligrosas. El DOJ espera trabajar de manera conjunta con la Ciudad y el NPD, al igual que con las demás partes interesadas en este proceso, incluidos los miembros de la comunidad y las uniones de la policía, para llevar a cabo estas reformas.

 
 1. RESUMO EXECUTIVO
O Departamento de Justiça abriu uma investigação no Departamento de Polícia de Newark ("NPD" ou "o Departamento") em Maio de 2011 após receber várias queixas de violações dos direitos humanos por parte da NPD, incluindo de que a NPD sujeitava os residentes de Newark a violência excessiva, paragens injustificadas, prisões e ainda acções policiais discriminatórias.
Esta investigação das práticas policiais de Newark foi realizada em conjunto com a Secção de Litigância Especial do Departamento de Direitos Civis e o Escritório de Advogados dos Estados Unidos para o Distrito de Nova Jérsia (colectivamente, "DOJ") de acordo com a Lei de Reforço Policial e Controlo do Crime Violento de 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (“Secção 14141”), Título VI da Lei de Direitos Civis de 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“Título VI”) e a Lei Ruas Seguras e Controlo de Crime Omnibus de 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d (“Lei Ruas Seguras”). A Secção 14141 proíbe as autoridades governamentais de se envolverem num padrão ou numa prática de má conduta de aplicação da lei que viole os direitos constitucionais ou estatutários federais dos indivíduos. O Título VI e a Lei Ruas Seguras em conjunto proíbem a descriminação com base na raça, cor, sexo, religião ou origem por parte dos recipientes de certos fundos federais.
A investigação beneficiou da assistência da NPD e a Cidade de Newark ("Cidade") que deu acesso aos oficiais, pessoal de comando, documentos e dados disponíveis. O DOJ recebeu ainda contributos de outros interessados da justiça criminal, incluindo membros da comunidade, organizações de aplicação da lei, grupos de advocacia, sindicatos a representar os oficiais NPD e outros que tenham partilhado as suas experiências com a NPD.
Este relatório indica ainda as conclusões da investigação do DOJ. Resumindo, e tal como discutido abaixo, esta investigação mostro um padrão ou prática de violações constitucionais nas práticas de paragem e prisão da NPD, a sua resposta ao exercício dos indivíduos dos seus direitos tendo em conta a Primeira Emenda, o uso da força do Departamento e roubo por parte dos oficiais. A investigação revelou ainda deficiências nos sistemas NPD que foram indicados para evitar e detectar má conduta, incluindo sistemas para revisão de força e investigação de queixas relativamente à conduta do oficial. A investigação também identificou preocupações que não aparentam criar padrões de má conduta constitucional mas que, mesmo assim, são significativas e garantem a consideração da NPD. Estas preocupações relacionadas com as práticas da NPD ao lidar com potenciais detidos suicidas, as investigações de assédio sexual da NPD e o impacto do policiamento da NPD na comunidade LGBT.
A Cidade de Newark está diminuída e a NPD é menos eficaz tendo em conta estes padrões e práticas de conduta inconstitucional. As práticas de policiamento da NPD foram desgastando a confiança da comunidade e a percepção da NPD como agência com responsabilidade suficiente minaram a confiança de outros actores da justiça criminal de Newark. Resolver os problemas que esta investigação identificou não tornará Newark numa comunidade apenas mais equitativa mas também mais segura. Tal como indicado pela NPD na sua Política de Transparência, Ordem Geral 2013-03, "é um princípio fundamental que a cooperação e a confiança do público seja essencial para a eficácia do Departamento de Polícia de Newark. O Departamento não pode prever futuros crimes sem o compromisso e a cooperação da comunidade.”
Tal como discutido no corpo deste relatório, existem causas razoáveis para se crer que a NPD se envolveu num padrão ou prática de:

Realizar paragens e prisões que violem a Quarta Emenda. Aproximadamente 75% dos relatórios de paragens a pedestres por parte de oficiais da NPD falharam em articular uma base legal adequada para a paragem, apesar da política da NPD requerer tal justificação. Durante o período em causa, a NPD fez milhares de paragens a indivíduos que foram descritos como estando meramente a "vaguear" ou a "caminhar devagar" sem qualquer indicação de suspeita razoável de actividade criminal. Para além disso, uma revisão dos relatórios de prisão da NPD levantaram questões que, em alguns cenários de prisões relativas a narcóticos da NPD, os oficiais falharam em reportar, completa e correctamente, as circunstâncias de tais prisões.
Policiamento que resulta em paragens e prisões desproporcionais de residentes negros de Newark. A NPD manda parar indivíduos negros muito mais do que mandar parar indivíduos caucasianos. Em resultado disso, os indivíduos negros em Newark sofrem as consequências do padrão de prisões e paragens inconstitucionais da NPD. Esta investigação não determinou se a disparidade é intencional ou se, por outro lado, é legalmente injustificada. Assim, esta experiência de ser, de forma desproporcional, sujeito a paragens e prisões em violação da Quarta Emenda forma as interacções dos residentes negros com a NPD, para detrimento da confiança da comunidade e torna o trabalho de realizar serviços policiais em Newark mais perigoso e menos eficaz. 1
Retaliar contra indivíduos que questionam acções policiais. Em violação da Quarta Emenda, os oficiais NPD detiveram e prenderam indivíduos que contrariaram, de forma legal, as acções policiais ou que se comportaram de uma forma entendida como desrespeitosa por parte dos oficiais.
Utilizar força excessiva e injustificada em violação da Quarta Emenda. Em mais de vinte por cento dos incidentes revistos da NPD, a força como indicada como irrazoável, violando assim a Constituição. Para além disso, houve sub declarações razoáveis da força dos oficiais da NPD e a maioria da utilização da força da NPD foi demasiadamente inadequada para apoiar conclusões fiáveis sobre se o uso da força do oficial, incluindo força mortal, foi razoável.
Acusar indivíduos de roubo por parte de oficiais da NPD em violação da Quarta e da Décima-Quarta Emendas. A investigação revelou evidências de roubo de dinheiro e propriedade dos cidadãos por parte dos oficiais, especificamente nas unidades especializadas da NPD como por exemplo narcóticos e unidades de gangue e na unidade de processamento de prisioneiros no Bloco da Célula de Green Street. A NPD realizou investigações inadequadas relativamente a queixas de roubo, falhando em tomar as providências de acções correctivas contra os oficiais ofendidos,
1 Assim que este relatório foi finalizado, o afiliado de Nova Jérsia (ACLU-NJ) do Sindicato de Liberdades Civis Americanas divulgou os resultados das estatísticas de paragem da NPD. A revisão do ACLU-NJ foi limitada a um subconjunto de dados de paragem de resumo que a NPD publica agora na sua página web. Tal como explicado abaixo, o DOJ obteve acesso directo aos registos de base da NPD e a investigação DOJ incluiu a análise de informações mais precisas, incluindo a localização de paragens, a justificação documentada, se a paragem foi a um pedestre ou a um veículo, e descrições para paragem como

por exemplo buscas e revistas. Tal como aconteceu com a investigação DOJ, a revisão, por parte do ACLU­ NJ, de dados mais recentes identificou disparidades raciais em paragens NPD e houve um declínio na implementação de métodos recomendados pelos investigadores que poderiam ter evitado futuros roubos por parte de oficiais.
A procura de um padrão ou prática de conduta ilegal dentro de uma agência policial não significa que a maioria dos oficiais viole a lei. Nem um padrão ou prática reflecte que um certo número de oficiais tenha violado a lei ou que o número de actos ilegais tenha atingido um limite em particular. Consultar United States v. Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5ª Circ. 1971) (“Número de violações)... não é determinante ...., [não] fórmula matemática aplicável, nem foi intencional. Cada caso deverá ter os seus próprios factos"). Ao invés disso, o ponto importante é se a conduta ilegal aparenta ser mais típica do que isolada ou aberrante. Um padrão ou prática existe onde a conduta aparenta fazer parte da prática normal, oficialmente sancionada pela política ou outros. Consultar, por exemplo, Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (um padrão ou prática é "mais do que uma mera ocorrência ou actos "acidentais" ou "esporádicos"; ao invés disso deverá ser "uma prática regular e não anormal").
Os padrões de violações descritos neste relatório resultam numa parte significativa de falta de responsabilidade e revisão de sistemas dentro da NPD. A NPD não tem um sistema de aviso antecipado a funcionar ou uma estrutura de assuntos internos eficaz. Estas falhas minam a capacidade do Departamento para identificar e abordar a má conduta do oficial. A análise e recolha de dados da NPD e o seu sistema para revisão regular do uso da força por parte do oficial, são similarmente deficientes.
Uma indicação da ineficácia do sistema de assuntos internos da NPD é de que a Unidade de Assuntos Internos ("AI") abordou apenas uma reclamação de um civil de força excessiva no meio de milhares que recebeu entre 2007 e 2012. Uma vez que não existe taxa de "direito" sobre a qual as queixas de força dever­ se-ão basear, apenas uma conclusão de força irrazoável no meio de milhares de queixas durante um período de seis anos é sintomático de sistemas de responsabilidade profundamente disfuncional. A NPD falhou ainda em recolher ou analisar dados adequadamente sobre prisões, paragens e uso de força por parte dos oficiais. Nem sequer a NPD tomou as providências necessárias para implementar um sistema de aviso antecipado que iria acompanhar e identificar o comportamento problemático dos oficiais. Em resultado destas deficiências sistémicas, a NPD não identifica ou responde a tendências problemáticas na conduta dos oficiais que poderiam constituir ou levar a má conduta.
Nem a NPD forneceu aos oficiais as ferramentas necessárias para apoiar o policiamento constitucional, como por exemplo formação adequada, políticas claras e facilmente acessíveis e direcção de supervisão adequada. As deficiências básicas incluíram a falha em assegurar que os oficiais NPD têm de facto acesso às políticas que devem supostamente seguir, a políticas de actualização regular e fornecimento de formação necessária de acompanhamento. Revisões de supervisão de acções do oficial, incluindo prisões e uso da força, foram negligenciadas. O efeito acumulado destas deficiências é uma organização com tendência a proteger os oficiais da responsabilidade e insuficiente concentrada na protecção dos direitos constitucionais.
A responsabilidade por corrigir as práticas de policiamento inconstitucional da NPD situa-se em todos os níveis dentro do Departamento. Os supervisores da NPD e a liderança do comando deverão assegurar que os oficiais recebem formação, orientação e as indicações necessárias para policiar de forma eficaz e constitucional, e comunicar de forma clara com oficiais que a aplicação da lei e o policiamento constitucional não estão em conflito uma com a outra, mas são interdependentes. Os oficiais devem agir dentro dos parâmetros indicados por ler quanto a paragens, buscas e prisões e evitar interacções de escalada até ao ponto onde utilizam a força desnecessariamente. A NPD deverá ainda recolher e analisar dados

relacionados com paragens, buscas e prisões para que possa diminuir o impacto desigual destes esforços de aplicação da lei e evitar tendências no policiamento. A liderança da NPD deverá ainda assegurar que, quando os oficiais violam a política ou a lei, são dados como responsáveis e a acção correctiva, incluindo disciplina, é eficaz, justa e consistente. Todas estas conclusões e também as soluções propostas, foram discutidas com os oficiais da Cidade e com a liderança da NPD e a Cidade e a NPD comprometeram-se a abordar, de forma rápida e adequada, estes problemas. Para tal, a Cidade e o DOJ chegaram a um Acordo de Princípio que será a base de um acordo monitorizado de forma independente, judicialmente aplicável e adequado para implementar uma reforma significativa.
O Acordo de Princípio, anexo, aborda cada um dos padrões de violações constitucionais descritas neste relatório. O Acordo exige que a Cidade estabeleça uma entidade de supervisão do cidadão para a NPD e os mecanismos adicionais para envolvimento eficaz da comunidade para ajudar a assegurar a sustentabilidade de reformas e para desenvolver relações positivas entre a NPD e a comunidade de Newark. A Cidade, a NPD e o DOJ concordam que a NPD irá rever as suas políticas, a formação e os mecanismos de supervisão internas, particularmente relativos ao uso da força e boas práticas de prisão, busca e paragem. A NPD também irá fornecer aos oficiais com orientação adequada relativamente ao exercício dos direitos da Primeira Emenda. A NPD irá desenvolver e implementar práticas de responsabilidade e de supervisão para evitar, detectar e abordar paragens ilegais, buscas e prisões e força inadequada e detectar e prevenir o roubo por parte de oficiais. A NPD irá rever as suas práticas de assuntos internos para assegurar a entrada de uma reclamação eficaz, investigações objectivas ou má conduta e disciplina consistente e justa. A NPD irá melhorar a sua recolha e análise de dados para que possa entender melhor as suas práticas de aplicação e assegurar a sua eficácia e constitucionalidade.
Durante a investigação das práticas da NPD, todas as partes reconheceram que Newark é uma cidade desafiadora para a polícia, dado o seu nível significativo de crime e restrições orçamentais. O DOJ reconhece em particular as capacidades e a dedicação de muitos oficiais de polícia de Newark que são abordados pela lei e se comprometem-se diariamente para a dificuldade, e normalmente ingrato, do trabalho de proteger a segurança pública. As conclusões desta investigação não têm como objectivo o desvio destes esforços dos oficiais. De facto, muitas das conclusões da investigação destacam a necessidade da NPD e a Cidade em apoiar e orientar melhor os seus oficiais.
Juntamente com a apreciação pelas dificuldades do trabalho da polícia, todas as partes concordam que quaisquer práticas ou políticas da NPD que violem os direitos civis devem ser identificadas e resolvidas. Este respeito partilhado pelos direitos civis dos indivíduos reflecte não apenas a importância fundamental destes direitos mas também um entendimento de que direitos civis repetidos tornam o policiamento menos eficaz e mais perigoso. O DOJ espera trabalhar em cooperação com a Cidade e com a NPD e também com muitos outros interessados neste processo, incluindo membros da comunidade e sindicatos de polícia para realizar estas reformas.

 
 Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 74 Filed 02/02/18 Page 1 of 6 PageID: 1600 Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 73-1 Filed 01/18118 Page 1 of 6 PagelD: 1594

iN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v. CITY OF NEWARK,
Defendant.

CIVIL NO: 16-1731 (MCA)(MAH)

STIPULATED ORDER TO AMEND CONSENT DECREE The Parties have stipulated to the following amendments to the Consent Decree in this case, and the Court, having fully considered the stipulation and proposed amendments hereby amend the Consent Decree in the following manner (additions in bold and deletions in double strikethrough):
Paragraph 4(c)
The provision in Paragraph 4(c) currently defines “aggressive resistance” as follows: pafia“nicenAgtrochisgotuotghinsnnretsegorstdphssyietav.artenspoTcRrnehe,,eessoeaainnrsgdttpgaaunrtnoencsceipshm”riioenmmvngeie,nmnakentanisayctnktmthihonearfgenfi,ainictfsteeetorrsnifttkfpriittonohsmgyeh,slafitacrattmahktalricnoahkgunasgrcomhwoffniaitttcohrseoutrwlhb, eeajteahnocpedtfo’fspsniuclsatbe,acjrkeoionicrnrgto,gataonharsoeurthbejerct
The amended provision shall read as follows: iai“ntnAseocgltnfghtretoehrsdrpsoyieuvrgweshohRnai,elessauinasbdtcajhentciocete’vps”irnetmavgkeeainanntlgasawnathffoeuifglfihinocttibeenrjngetfcrsttootiamvhneac.treaTm,khioneargnpacguoognffnrcietchrseiosnrli,goa,tnnhkedmicspakuyiibanjmigen,cagtns,tiraofierksitng,

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 74 Filed 02/02/18 Page 2 of 6 PageID: 1601 Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 73-1 Filed 01/18/18 Page 2 of 6 PageD: 1595

attacks with weapons, or other actions harm to the officer or another person.

that

present

an

imminent

threat

of

physical

Paragraph 4(m)

The provision in Paragraph 4(m) currently defines “deadly force” as follows:

a“inDhcealaurdddliyon’bgjFetohcretc, eui”nsecmlouefdaiannsgfiaraenayfrismut.s,enoetckfohroceldl,ikoerlystrtiokecatuosethedehaetahdo, rnseecrki,ouosr

injury. throat with

The amended provision shall read as follows:

ai“nDhcaeluradddilonybgjFetohcrtec. eui”nsecmlouefdaiannsgfiaraneayfricmut.s,enoefcklohrcoeldl,ikoerlystrtiokecatuosethedehaetahdo, rnseecrki,ouosr

injury, throat with

Paragraph 4(x)

The Use

provision of Force”

in as

Paragraph follows:

4(x)

currently

defines

“Intermediate

Force”

or

“Intermediate

saus“wpsIpnereeateroeypsrf;osmau,nes)abe:dnaiodtoaortfntewaaknFfeoeoaidrrpmocnoepwon”anlnc—eosts)rss.wt“rdie[kenaifptneeognnnspneuetodrtpeisacotthrseienksiUeq(suaeee.pgsoe.,f(respF.ogrony.r,icnbeeugl”bt loiwinmwchbleussrtd,ereimknseootsvh,cieonknuigctsakoecsrt,ocfilosecgnmhteraomdleliic:nagl

The amended provision shall read as follows:
daus“pesIpnfereeatreoynsr;sfomeaunes)tbed;eaciftaohoitsfnentiaqnsFfuotorierirmskcnepeo(”easn.c-gonts.rot,wr“tieeIkllnabiiknptoeegowrlnmypsutettorodrpiiskaoctetrasesieuk,sUseke(siaeced.kpgeose.a,,frtsplFheorognyoricrshnewugs”teelreiwinimpochsubl,eussrad,eniemndnsjoouttavhrckieyone;nugdtsooaoerwcrtowncfiseosc)an.mhpteroaomndllelieic;nsagsl Paragraph 4(xx)

The provision in Paragraph 4(xx) currently defines Training as follows emr“oxTeleerar—asciuinpsrileenasygtih”nthegmairtsecdaaesinsnsscearsrteisrotaiswodinhat.ineoTdtnhraeianlritnloeeifrncfagticucteraievrlsseohce)oirxnmmecralpcutrsidse,eehassesnttwehdsaetttlihlniengas,smtwrmautrceeitttrihinoaogfldfstis,acueoIrngrschootat.rbhpoeorurtathinogw to
The amended provision shall read as follows:

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 74 Filed 02/02/18 Page 3 of 6 PageID: 1602 Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 73-1 PHed 01/18/18 Page 3 of 6 Page ID: 1596

atst“hrscTaseereiinarnsaisidnrniiiuosgncsgh,r”eeaattnnhimdodeneriaf.nointeTfeslfrrdiaatcricetanrtrdiiasvniitegcniooieannmxlagseplorralcesieinhcswceetulnseurdldetlhetaafhssotertmiemmnsesatatittrnthseug,orc,dirtaoswlollri—ftnIfaticucicnoagelgrhlrpsstt,.oraroabaritoniounitntghgher,orowdlmei-setpotaalsaenuyxcrieeenrsgctihseat Paragraph 27(a)

The provision in Paragraph 27(a) that currently reads as follows: NPD will prohibit NPD officers from:

a. Conducting supervisor.”

‘pretext’

vehicle

stops

or

detentions

without

prior

approval

of a

The amended provision shall read as follows:

NPD will prohibit NPD officers from: ssIsattf.uoopoCppefo,fravnitcnhidesdeuorycsrwt,wicinulailgnlnldln‘eooposbcrsteutatoimetibxnietsta’nsintuvnocewthshhuricayeplpaeeisptrosvrwtnoiosaavposbasrllnyyooarasptdprpsepaotrceraootncnivtctiiaaoacslnlasppltorowtiosooistborihbtbotalotueiantaianpsf“rtupipeocrrrhreicotapoerprxnpaitdorp”ourpvcvraateopilhnvpoigacrflol.tae”vhael. Paragraph 31

The provision in Paragraph 31 that currently reads as follows: seiNtnhuvPdesidpDeoepicfnewficniociednleleoronpfhrtraaoooshctfhiarcbiemorirtenelaose,sefgofonainrtcl.aetabhOruselfethffoiroacfonrfemiidrtcsyeas.rwretheiiclaklusindllagoebcgcluaeolmnsaseuuenstnpthtiiocntrioiowtnsyreitafthoirnacrtghththtaehemesseboeaatarosrcirchshvftehwohariitlctlhliseriesuvnelaelss

The amended provision shall read as follows:

siNetnhuvPdesipdoDopiecfnowficniociednleloroonpfhrtraaoooshtcfhirabreiomirrtenelaore,osfgofnoainrtcl.aetahbOrusolfethffoiroacoonremidrtosyas.rwretheiiaclklGuindlalgoobcgcluoeo!mnsaseuuenstnpthtiiocntroiiowtnsyreitafthoirnacrtghththatohemeosbaoeartaoosrirchshvtfehwohariitlctlhlioeriesuvnelaelss Paragraph 32

The provision of Paragraph 32 that currently reads as follows:

3

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 74 Filed 02/02/18 Page 4 of 6 PageID: 1603 Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 73-1 Elted 01/18/18 Page 4 of 6 PageD: 1597

NPD prior

two icllornedquucitriengthaatsoefafriccherosfoabntaiinndtihveidaupapl roorvaalhoofmaesbuapseerdviuspoor noncothnesesncte. ne

The amended provision shall read as follows:

NPD prior

two icllornedquucitriengthaatsoefafriccherosfoabntaiinnditvheidaupapl roorvaalhoofmaesbuapseerdviuspoor n

thc consent.

Paragraph 44

The provision in Paragraph 44 that currently reads as follows:
bsNeoPadrDyc-’hsewsf,oirrasnnt-dclianamrereesrsuatpsseafrosvriascpooprmsrowpplireliltaetrneee,vsoisefwainnadvlelasddtiohgceaurtemonrecynestattootipolsanw,aniandncddlueNdteiPnnDtgiovpniodsl,eicoyf.rom The amended provision shall read as follows:
psNeoPaliDrccyhw.eisNl,l PaeDnnds’suarserurepsusetprsveifrsovorirsscoorwsmirlple:lveiteewneisnsvaensdtigaadthoeryresntcoepstoalnadwdaentednNtioPnDs, a. Review all written documentation; pochsb.efua. rvpsOcRteeoenrepncvvosatiisnmeoaowfnporadlnrsilgeeludldosseeipttvnwoeeagpncintstthbstioa,avlnsnfaiiodsdws,re,dosoraeeenrrtavyeeNrinccerPhtwoeiDeroadsasn,iposnroan,agnl,snisdcetdhyfaooa;racmrrtarhaenaelssndlset,slioenafcacnftmiidicdoeoenarnur’otnsrseftcisivnontisgnd.wd”etoouhcicartehtmclotehaaryedstinn1og0ts
Paragraph 62

The provision in Paragraph 62 that currently reads as follows: oatbobNhbyyffaPtessttaDthltiaoaanennniwbdrdayyieedlsscrlruutraptittboimonrepodsdeoshe,,ueeriwsnrtbhrtoaireietr,tonhyowsodoeffeiuafaftrintinrcccryefeeehisrrrcsssswuomthfcrarodhaaorbesyrmradtceasnaciesdtnpoc,oeiurtuonsudrntrgreirdneooasdgsytuh.iwoanceWrahgrrrie,vhmrecasaevoanelririgietddzd.eeiaisNnnlnnegcgmoge,oraoafolomfdfrinpeccaolrreyyootirhtcfioaehecsofrasaffwsslilfociieoacensvreregrsriecdscaaooeossiurnneodnrcrnteecteharcoinebreraegdlscelseaoaarbtu.reeyrdslietetoof
The amended provision shall read as follows: obNyfPstDhtaeniwrdiedllrutptioreossh,uiwrbrieittnhodofeufritcrfeeirrcssotfrordobemdtaisdnoeiunsntgrdoasywionragri,rmasnaegitz.eisNngmo,raomdreaoyothfoeofrffwifciiceseresrscooirnedrecthrineagcoaurse

4

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 74 Filed 02/02/18 Page 5 of 6 PageID: 1604 Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 73-1 Fed 01/18/18 Page 5 of 6 PageD: 1598

plobdcabtorhbeieynorfatfssegccatottleiuraoranaosmennssbyadyasnyeoetsesdsrrawutce,nactberaonolcpisoroudesodrsursaeeaettrr,snsnwyottaoctrarh,rtordomciesywemaerorpneiaa.ebtenrn,tibcryatetheehisindssseowuabrhwcoaeahtfrsiaafsrutiairshcbncenoepacetonr,poodrartemo,ubdonrarailatneeonhy,dgtdethss.oreaeew(Wacr2brrui)evechsrcalhoeeeiolrenirwesrdvldeuyeaianclnrnefhtdrggohaeoeanraorflvttefaf,ipisddtccorheerolrueionrctosnicehrcetgeseahalsescleoasorsoneasrrlvvndryaiaceedisloac(nie1usdeegn)osrvctlsnwiieeandaogirberrlayeldenllxelectbaioregbeteaeedsnlitetof Paragraph 67(g)
The provision in Paragraph 67(g) that currently reads as follows: npoNeebPcrjseDeocsnstwiaxorielyrllypteoexrreposalvoisencorisntc.laoyobmrpl,eeraotsphoaiobspbsirjtieevvuceestiinrvnetegsilimysfotmrarecniaencseeoangntaabibnolsedt,ilpwyehrhseaorrenmsphitnovhaicnaanoldfcrfuiecfmfesro, oaerlxacinesoptthaesr
The amended provision shall read as follows:
-- osprNherrPoesaDtswnruaiompnitnoghpeleittdcirhvyaiienntwlyddtihiilvvlueiineddfxrouuepraaalcllissce.o.itnulTyasebhpdlereow.uhsaiAebs inotnfeothcffoefeirscgcseearraraytmugtiaaotyionpuosrstvoeautersrcceeotsomttfhreaeuistnshinaeefgdeptfiryonerdsocieufvmtaihdgpeuataiisnoluslblitsjbeyct iviy rc ;c-aabie, ‘. here phy-l-re:nca! i ;:e’.ry te eereeme

Paragraph 71

The provision in Paragraph 71 that currently reads as follows:

waNmiPthmDuthwneiitlciloapnpr.aocIhniitbyaidtndouifmtfioibcnee,rrsaolflfrraooumuthnpodorsiszsoeefdsasufinitrhgeoaorrrimzuessdicnaagrmriumenduanubitythiooonrfif.ziceedrsfiwreiallrmbes

or loaded

The amended provision shall read as follows:

caaNadmPpdmDaitciuiowtnnyii,ltnliaouplnlmroaibnhueitbrhcoiootnrfoinzrfeoeficductneifodrirssneafovrrfomitmalsuitpchoaoorrsrrwsiizeehesdsidlibenaygmpoeomfrrffuiuocnseriimrtnsiogiwnnu.ginllpabuoetlhiclooirnaizdgeedddufwtiirieetsha.rtmIhnes or

5

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 74 Filed 02/02/18 Page 6 of 6 PageID: 1605 Case 2:16-cv-O1731MCA-MAH Document 73-I Filed 01/18/18 Page 6 of 6 PagelD: 1599

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED.

HONORABLE MADELINE COX ARLEO United States District Court

6

 
 Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 144-1 Filed 04/16/19 Page 1 of 65 PageID: 2181
United States v. City of Newark, et al., Civil Action No. 16-1731 (MCA) (MAH)
CONSENT DECREE
Independent Monitor - Seventh Quarterly Report
Peter C. Harvey Independent Monitor April 16, 2019

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 144-1 Filed 04/16/19 Page 2 of 65 PageID: 2182 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF SEVENTH QUARTER’S ACTIVITIES..........................1 II. DETAILED STATUS UPDATES.......................................................................................3
A. NPD’s Transition Towards Community-Oriented Policing ....................................3 1. Self-Reported Community Engagement ......................................................3 2. Positive Development in Engaging the Newark Community in the Policy Development Process........................................................................4 3. NPD’s Staffing Assessment and Modified Deployment Strategy ...............5
B. Property and Evidence Management .......................................................................5 C. Internal Affairs.........................................................................................................6 D. Body-Worn and In-Car Cameras .............................................................................7
1. Expansion of Body-Worn and In-Car Camera Program..............................7 2. NPD’s Internal Review of Body-Worn and In-Car Camera Usage
and Records..................................................................................................8 E. Data Systems............................................................................................................9 F. Training Administration.........................................................................................10 G. Independent Monitoring Team’s Community Outreach ........................................13
1. Community Events.....................................................................................13 2. Surveys.......................................................................................................14 III. APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................15 A. Chronology of Key Events.....................................................................................15 B. NPD Community Engagement Report - Second Quarter 2018 .............................15 C. Compliance Chart ..................................................................................................15 D. Status of NPD’s Consent Decree Policies .............................................................15
i

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SEVENTH QUARTERLY REPORT (July 1, 2018 to September 30, 2018) I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF SEVENTH QUARTER’S ACTIVITIES This is Independent Monitor Peter C. Harvey’s Seventh Quarterly Report, which comments on the City of Newark (the “City”) and Newark Police Division’s (“NPD”) progress with Consent Decree reforms during the period from July 1 to September 30, 2018. The exhibits attached to this Report provide summary charts that describe both the City’s and NPD’s work during this period: Appendix A provides a list of this quarter’s key Consent Decree events; Appendix B sets forth NPD’s Community Engagement Report for the second quarter of 2018, which summarizes NPD’s community events and meetings for the period from April 1 through June 30; Appendix C is a Compliance Chart, which assesses NPD’s progress with Consent Decree tasks; Appendix D provides the status of all of NPD’s new or revised Consent Decree policies. The Monitoring Team is pleased to report that NPD has nearly completed writing all of its Consent Decree-related policies. In the Eighth Quarterly Report, the Monitoring Team will list the new and revised policies that the NPD has actually adopted and promulgated, meaning, the policies that have been authorized by the Director of Public Safety and issued to NPD officers (as opposed to simply being approved for adoption by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Monitoring Team).1
1 In most instances, until a General Order (policy) is adopted and promulgated, it is not an actual rule and officers are not required to follow the policy. For example, no disciplinary action may be taken against an
1

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Regarding training, the Monitoring Team is also pleased to report that after this reporting period, NPD began training officers on two of the most critical Consent Decree policies that it has adopted: Use of Force; and Stops, Searches, and Arrests.2 Significantly, NPD has begun to assess proactively its officers’ deployment of in-car and body-worn cameras, and to mandate additional training for Supervisors who did not carry out their responsibilities consistent with NPD’s policies. These are the type of management initiatives critical to a highfunctioning police department.
NPD has also continued to make progress engaging the community it serves through policy forums, increased use of its Community Service Officers (“CSOs”) to collect public comments on community priorities, and by developing (with technical assistance from the Monitoring Team) an electronic database to record and assess the efficacy of NPD’s engagement efforts.
The Monitoring Team reiterates its position that NPD should complete its comprehensive staffing plan and modified deployment strategy, to ensure its deployments further community-oriented policing and other Consent Decree objectives. Developing and implementing a comprehensive staffing plan is overdue—under the Consent Decree, NPD was required to complete this task by December 2016. Such a plan will address the Newark community’s concerns—expressed repeatedly in public meetings—that residents seek regular patrols at key hours of the day and night, and shorter (under 30 minutes) response times for service calls.
officer based upon a policy that has not been adopted and promulgated by the Director. Alternatively, a General Order (policy) can take effect if the General Order sets forth a specific effective date. In that case, the policy becomes effective on the specified date after it has been adopted (signed) by the Director. 2 NPD began training officers on Use of Force and Stops, Searches, and Arrests after the policies were approved by DOJ and the Monitoring Team but before the policies were formally adopted by NPD.
2

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Additionally, NPD’s Training Division simply does not have the human resources to develop a modern police training infrastructure, which includes electronic maintenance of training records and a deep roster of qualified and effective trainers. The Monitoring Team has been impressed by many of the trainers that we have observed deliver Consent Decree Use of Force training and Stops, Searches, and Arrests training. However, the Monitoring Team notes that NPD still has only one curriculum developer on staff, and an insufficient number of full-time trainers for a department of its size. NPD’s Training Division also requires clerical assistance to support its operations.
Lastly, the City and NPD should be preparing to implement the recommendations of an independent data and information technology consultant retained to review NPD’s data systems. Currently, NPD’s data systems are inadequate to meet Consent Decree requirements. These data systems are not capable of producing the information required to be delivered to the Independent Monitor for conducting certain audits required by the Consent Decree. II. DETAILED STATUS UPDATES
A. NPD’s Transition Towards Community-Oriented Policing 1. Self-Reported Community Engagement Consent Decree Paragraph 17 requires NPD to “implement mechanisms to
measure the breadth, extent, and effectiveness of community partnerships and problem-solving strategies, including officer outreach, particularly outreach to youth.” Paragraph 18 requires NPD to prepare “quarterly reports on its community policing efforts,” and Paragraph 19 requires NPD and the City to “implement practices to seek and respond to input from the community about this Agreement’s implementation.” Pursuant to Paragraph 20, all of these studies and reports must be made publicly available, and posted on NPD and City websites.
3

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NPD continues to make progress toward compliance with these paragraphs. NPD has begun publishing quarterly reports of its community engagement efforts, and made better use of its website to provide relevant information to the public. On September 24, 2018, NPD posted to its website its second quarterly report on community engagement—covering the period from April 1 through June 30, 2018. (This Second Quarterly Report is attached to this Report as Appendix B, and posted to NPD’s website: https://www.npdconsentdecree.org/.)
Additionally, during this reporting period, the Rutgers Center on Policing, a member of the Monitoring Team, worked with NPD to develop a Community Policing Data Collection Tracking Tool, which will be used to assess how community policing issues or problems are being recorded, tracked, and resolved. This database will help streamline NPD’s community engagement efforts, inform its public reports, and guide NPD’s CSOs in each of NPD’s seven precincts.3
2. Positive Development in Engaging the Newark Community in the Policy Development Process
During the reporting period, NPD held three policy forums with the community to discuss its draft General Orders (policies) for (1) Use of Force Reporting, Investigation and Review and Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake & Investigation Process (July 19, 2018 at the Stephen N. Adubato Sports Complex), (2) Community Policing (August 23, 2018 at the Training, Recreation, and Education Center), and (3) First Amendment Right to Observe, Object to, and Record Police Activity (September 27, 2018 at the All Stars Project of New Jersey). While the Monitoring Team provided substantial technical assistance to NPD’s forum planning activities during the first two years of the Consent Decree, NPD has now taken the lead in
3 The Community Service Officers (CSOs) for each precinct are identified on the CDPU website at https://www.npdconsentdecree.org/community-service-officers.
4

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preparing the substantive portions of the forums and the facilitated discussion sessions. Comments collected during these forums by NPD and the New Jersey Institute for Social Justice (“NJISJ”), a member of the Monitoring Team, suggest community members recognize the effort that NPD is putting into listening and responding to community concerns. Indeed, these community meetings have proven to be a valuable opportunity for NPD officers to develop relationships with community members, and the engagement has been embraced by both community members and members of the Division. The Monitoring Team is very pleased to report NPD’s significant progress in this area.
3. NPD’s Staffing Assessment and Modified Deployment Strategy Consent Decree Paragraph 15 requires that, by July 9, 2017, NPD must assess and revise its officer staffing assignments to support its transition towards community-oriented policing and problem-solving initiatives. NPD did not meet this deadline. However, on September 12, 2018, NPD did submit its staffing and allocation assessment to the Monitoring Team for review and comment. The Monitoring Team will make detailed comments about the staffing assessment in its next (Eighth) Quarterly Report, covering the period from October 1, through December 31, 2018. B. Property and Evidence Management Section X of the Consent Decree requires NPD to take “comprehensive efforts to prevent theft of property by officers.” These efforts include “maintaining policies and procedures for the intake, storage, and release of property.” See Consent Decree ¶ 110. NPD is also required to conduct periodic audits of its property room. See Consent Decree ¶ 111. In the Fifth Quarterly Report (covering the period of January 1 through March 30, 2018) the Monitoring Team reported that NPD committed to forming a working group dedicated to consolidating and streamlining its property and evidence policies. During this reporting
5

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period, the Monitor reviewed and provided comments on the two policies, “Property and Evidence Management” and “Property and Evidence Division” policies, which were generated by the working group. These two policies consolidated multiple separate property and evidence policies, and represent a substantial improvement over NPD’s former property policies. They clearly identify the responsibilities and procedures related to property and evidence intake, storage and management, including by providing detailed guidance on handling firearms, cash, and narcotics. The policies also memorialize the “Two-Officer Rule,” which requires at least two officers to inventory and transport property and evidence. Once adopted, these policies will be a valuable resource to officers in the Property Division and those handling evidence.
Also during the reporting period, NPD continued to conduct an inventory of all items stored at its permanent storage facility to identify and reduce its backlog of evidence. One of the central challenges facing the Property Division has been the retention of evidence long past the date on which the New Jersey Attorney General Guidelines require its destruction. As the quantity of materials stored by the Property Division perpetually increases, older, outdated property can degrade. This issue has been discussed in prior quarterly reports. (See First Quarterly Report § V(C)(2); Second Quarterly Report § IV(D)(2).) The Monitor will continue to report on this issue in future quarterly reports.
C. Internal Affairs On July 6, 2018, the Monitoring Team approved the draft Intake and Investigation
General Order (policy) for release to the public for comment and feedback. On July 19, 2018, the Monitoring Team and parties participated with community members in a policy forum hosted by NPD with support from NJISJ. At the forum, NPD and NJISJ led facilitated discussions with community members to solicit and discuss their input on the draft policy. NPD then revised the
6

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policy, and submitted the revised policy to the Monitoring Team and DOJ for review. The Monitoring Team looks forward to NPD completing this critical Consent Decree policy.
Regarding training on internal affairs investigations, during this reporting period, NPD began working with DOJ and one of DOJ’s vendors to develop internal affairs training materials. To aid this training, NPD also will develop a Standard Operating Procedure Manual, that will memorialize NPD’s best practices for conducting investigations. The Monitoring Team looks forward to reviewing the training materials and manual.
The Monitoring Team also encourages NPD to address Consent Decree Paragraphs 117 and 118, which require NPD to conduct regular, targeted, and random integrity audits to identify and hold accountable officers or other employees who subvert the misconduct complaint process, such as by refusing to accept or discouraging the filing of complaints. The parties previously agreed that NPD would submit a written plan to carry out this audit function by September 1, 2018. NPD did not meet this September 1 deadline. Nor did it submit a draft plan or outline by the close of this reporting period. NPD has since reported that its written plan will be addressed in its Internal Affairs procedural manual, which is currently under development by DOJ’s vendor. NPD has not yet provided a draft manual or plan to the Monitoring Team. Internal affairs is one of the most important areas of police reform. NPD must give its immediate attention to this area.
D. Body-Worn and In-Car Cameras 1. Expansion of Body-Worn and In-Car Camera Program During this reporting period, NPD continued to deploy Body-Worn and In-Car
Cameras across the Division. NPD reports that by the end of this period, 421 of NPD’s 1,002 officers, detectives and sergeants had been trained on NPD’s Body-Worn Camera and In-Car Camera policies and equipped with body-worn cameras. These include officers in the First,
7

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Second, Fourth and Fifth Precincts, and the Municipal Arrests Processing Section. Expanding body-worn cameras into NPD’s new prisoner processing facility adds a layer of transparency to areas that were previously not subject to video coverage, creating audio and video records of contact between officers and prisoners.
Additionally, a total of 65 patrol vehicles out of NPD’s 307 marked patrol cars have been equipped with in-car cameras as of the close of this reporting period.
NPD was able to expand its body-worn and in-car camera program despite a number of technological issues with uploading complete videos, malfunctioning cameras, and technical “bugs” in its software updates. 4 The Monitoring Team suggested to the City and NPD that, before deploying cameras in the field, NPD should conduct trial runs in a test environment, and develop a Division-wide protocol to ensure that NPD tests new technology before integrating it into daily operations. NPD agreed to implement this recommendation.
2. NPD’s Internal Review of Body-Worn and In-Car Camera Usage and Records
As described in the Independent Monitor’s previous (Sixth) Quarterly Report, NPD’s Consent Decree and Planning Unit (“CDPU”) conducted an internal review of NPD Supervisors’ compliance with NPD’s revised Body-Worn Camera and In-Car Camera policies to determine if Supervisors conducting compliance checks of officers were themselves in compliance with NPD’s policies. While this internal review is not a substitute for the Monitoring Team’s future audits of NPD’s practices, the Monitoring Team commends NPD for this self-evaluation. 4 After the close of this reporting period, NPD experienced additional technical issues involving its bodyworn cameras. For example, some body-worn cameras experienced issues with their memory cards, while others experienced corrupt or missing videos. NPD also experienced delays when attempting to play back videos retrieved from body-worn cameras because of buffering issues. NPD is engaged in ongoing work with its vendor to resolve these technical issues. As more information becomes available, the Monitor will report on these issues in future quarterly reports.
8

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NPD’s review evaluated: (1) whether the Desk Supervisor submitted a BodyWorn Camera Compliance Report5 during their shift to document the review of two videos; (2) whether the Body-Worn Camera Compliance Report was accurate; (3) whether the Field Supervisor submitted a Field Inspection Report6 during his/her respective tour of duty; and (4) whether the body-worn camera section of the Field Inspection Report was accurate.
As a result of this review, the CDPU developed an additional Body-Worn Camera training course specifically for Supervisors. The additional training focuses on addressing the deficiencies identified in NPD’s review and emphasizes requirements in the Body-Worn Camera policy that are unique to Supervisors. NPD also modified its Field Inspection Report, clarifying prompts for information, in order to facilitate more accurate data collection. The Monitoring Team commends NPD for these remedial efforts, and hopes that its initiative extends to other areas of the Division.
E. Data Systems The City and NPD decided not to expand their data systems capacity until after
they had received the results of an independent consultant’s comprehensive assessment of its existing technology. This consultant would interview NPD officers, review the efficacy, capacity and functionality of their existing data systems, and compare NPD’s data systems to peer government agencies, including other police departments around the country. At the
5 Body-Worn Camera Compliance Reports are to be completed by a Desk Supervisor to document the Desk Supervisors’ review of two randomly selected videos from each tour of duty. These reports document the Desk Supervisor’s determination of whether an officer’s actions, as captured on the recording, were legal and compliant with NPD policy. 6 Field Inspection Reports capture body-worn camera compliance data from a Supervisor’s inspection of vehicle and foot patrol units during each tour. The reports record, for example, whether an officer entered an event number for every assignment found in the video archive and whether an officer correctly classified each video.
9

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conclusion of its review, the consultant would issue a report to the City and NPD with a slate recommendations and cost projections.
In June 2018, the City officially retained the consultant. During this reporting period, the consultant completed its interviews of NPD personnel, including supervisors and rank and file officers, and developed an understanding of NPD’s processes, goals, and priorities. After this reporting period, the consultant released its report, which the Monitoring Team will discuss in future quarterly reports. The City and NPD’s ability to undergo the detailed audits required by the Consent Decree and to achieve compliance with the Consent Decree will depend in large part on the speed at which it can adopt the consultant’s recommendations and its ability to produce the data required for Consent Decree audits.
F. Training Administration NPD has made substantial progress administering training to NPD personnel
based on the Use of Force and Stops, Searches, and Arrests training materials approved by both DOJ and the Monitoring Team. These are the substantive Consent Decree trainings that have the potential to ensure that officer behavior comports with the requirements of the United States Constitution, the New Jersey State Constitution, and NPD policy. The Monitoring Team looks forward to continuing to report on NPD’s progress in this area. The following chart provides the status of NPD’s progress with the critical Consent Decree-required trainings, as of the filing of this report.
10

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Training Community-Oriented Policing7 Body-Worn and In-Car Cameras Use of Force Stops, Searches, and Arrests Bias-Free Policing Internal Affairs
Property and Evidence Management

Status
NPD reports that training has been administered to all applicable NPD officers. NPD reports that all NPD officers have been trained on NPD’s camera policies. Training underway as of November 2018. NPD reports that all officers were trained by the end of March 2019. Training underway as of December 2018. NPD reports that all officers will be trained by the end of April 2019. NPD is in the process of retaining a vendor to develop its training materials. NPD expects to begin training on April 30, 2019. NPD is developing an internal affairs investigations procedural manual in collaboration with DOJ’s vendor. It will need to develop training materials based on this manual. NPD needs to develop a procedural manual and training reflecting Consent Decree-compliant practices.

At the request of the Monitoring Team, NPD’s Use of Force training incorporated videos from around the nation of police officers’ use of force—some proper and some improper—to ensure that the course teaches real-world scenarios that NPD officers may encounter. NPD’s use of force training vendor also filmed its own videos featuring community members and police officers, to be used as a teaching tool. Using interactive technology, trainers ask officers how they would handle each situation at various points throughout the video, the officers select their respective answers from the list of options, the technology posts the officers’ anonymous responses, and the instructor discusses the officers’ responses.
On September 25 and 26, 2018, NPD’s Use of Force training vendor conducted a two-day program to train NPD’s instructors, including the NPD Academy Captain, on how to 7 NPD administered Community-Oriented Policing training to its officers prior to completing its Community-Oriented Policing policy.
11

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administer the training materials to the rest of NPD. Members of the Monitoring Team who attended these sessions noted that NPD trainer participation was active and conscientious. Although NPD expected to have administered training to all relevant officers by the end of February 2019, after the close of this reporting period, NPD reported that trainings were completed in March 2019. On March 15, 2019, the Monitoring Team sent a letter to the Parties, notifying them that the Monitoring Team will audit NPD’s training records to determine whether they have delivered this (and other) Consent Decree trainings to all relevant NPD personnel. The Monitor will report on the results of this audit in future quarterly reports.
As reported in the prior (Sixth) Quarterly Report, the Monitor asked the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office to detail several Assistant Attorneys General and Deputy Attorneys General to help NPD draft real-life scenarios based on New Jersey case law to be incorporated into NPD’s Stops, Searches, and Arrests training. The Attorney General’s Office agreed. On July 25, 2018, the Independent Monitor, members of the Monitoring Team, members of the CDPU and several Deputy Attorney Generals met for a kick-off meeting to discuss how the Deputy Attorney Generals could best assist NPD. In August, the Attorney generals provided scenarios to NPD for incorporation into the training.
In addition to the real-world scenarios, the training—developed in-house by NPD—uses modern educational philosophy and technology, including the use of “clickers,” which are small remote devices operated by NPD officers to provide anonymous answers to multiple choice questions presented during the training. These “clickers” provide instant information about how NPD officers responded to questions at various stages of the scenarios, permitting the instructor to reinforce the correct answer and explain why other answers are incorrect. The training is also strengthened by having a retired Assistant Prosecutor serve as an
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instructor for the course, bolstering NPD’s ability to provide legal background to officers. After the close of this reporting period, NPD continued to implement agency-wide stops, searches, and arrests, training. NPD expects to have administered training to all relevant officers by the end of April 2019.
Still, the Monitoring Team remains concerned—as it has been since the inception of the Consent Decree—about the staffing level of the Newark Training Division. While NPD has developed a core of instructors who are skilled in teaching the Use of Force and Stops, Searches, and Arrests training, NPD needs more highly skilled trainers. The number of full-time training staff is below what is required to ensure that the quality training required by the Consent Decree is developed, administered, and updated on a timely basis. Additionally, the Monitor has suggested—and continues to recommend—that NPD hire a Training Director, as described in the Monitor’s Second-Year Reassessment,8 to oversee the development of all the training courses that the Department must implement to comply with the requirements of the Consent Decree. Currently, NPD uses a person of the rank of Captain to, as the City describes it, function as the Training Director. This methodology is insufficient for several reasons, including, (i) NPD has not adopted any requirements for a Training Director, (ii) this Captain has no defined annual training requirements and (iii) the Captain is not dedicated exclusively to training.
G. Independent Monitoring Team’s Community Outreach 1. Community Events Paragraph 186 of the Consent Decree requires the Monitor to hold community
meetings to discuss the quarterly reports, inform the public about the implementation process,
8 See Independent Monitor’s Second-Year Reassessment, Exhibit B, filed on October 12, 2018. Available at https://www.newarkpdmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Second-YearReassessment_10.12.18.pdf.
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and hear community perspectives of police interactions. As part of this outreach, the Monitor holds periodic community forums in different locations throughout Newark to discuss the City’s and NPD’s progress with achieving the Consent Decree’s requirements, the Monitor’s Quarterly Reports, and the Monitoring Team’s work. On June 28, 2018, the Monitoring Team released its Fifth Quarterly Report covering the period from January 1 through March 31, 2018. On September 10, the Monitoring Team held a community event to discuss its Fifth Quarterly Report at New Community Corporation. NJISJ coordinated this event, which was attended by approximately 30 community members, as well as members of the Monitoring Team, NPD, and DOJ.
NPD should make a better effort to have the command staff and community service officers from the precinct in which the meeting is held attend the community meeting. Often, community members have comments and questions that can be addressed by precinct leadership. Additionally, these community meetings will give the commanders an opportunity to further develop their relationship with people who live and work within their precinct.
2. Surveys The Consent Decree requires the Monitor to conduct an annual survey “of the Newark community’s experience with and perceptions of NPD and public safety.” (Consent Decree ¶¶ 22-23.) During this reporting period, the Monitoring Team engaged Suffolk University Political Research Center (“Suffolk”) to carry out the Monitor’s second probability survey of Newark residents, which consists of asking Newark residents about, among other things, their perceptions of their own safety, the safety of their neighborhoods, and NPD’s responsiveness to their concerns. Suffolk is a nationally-recognized leader in political polling and research, and the Monitoring Team believes NPD, the City, and Newark residents will benefit greatly from their expertise. The Monitoring Team chose Suffolk after a competitive
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Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 144-1 Filed 04/16/19 Page 17 of 65 PageID: 2197 bidding process, in which the Monitoring Team received written proposals from both universityaffiliated research centers and private polling firms. In September 2018, Suffolk, led by Director David Paleologos, began fielding survey responses in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. As of the end of this reporting period, survey administration was ongoing. The Monitoring Team looks forward to publishing the results of the second probability survey in its next Report. III. APPENDICES A. Chronology of Key Events B. NPD Community Engagement Report - Second Quarter 2018 C. Compliance Chart D. Status of NPD’s Consent Decree Policies
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Appendix A

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Timeline (Meetings, Milestones and Events)

Monitoring Team’s Seventh Quarterly Report — July 1, 2018 through September 30, 2018.

Date

Event

July 6, 2018

DOJ and Monitoring Team approve NPD’s Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake & Investigation Process policy for external review.

July 12, 2018 July 12-16, 2018

Second-year anniversary of the Consent Decree 51st Anniversary of the Newark Rebellion

July 16, 2018

DOJ and Monitoring Team approve NPD’s Community Policing policy for external review.

July 19, 2018

NPD hosts city-wide community meeting to seek community comment on NPD’s draft Use of Force Reporting, Investigation and Review Policy and Complaint Intake & Investigation Process Policy.

July 25, 2018

Kick-Off meeting attended by the Independent Monitor, members of the Monitoring Team, members of the CDPU and several New Jersey Assistant Attorneys General to discuss collaboration to further develop NPD’s Stop, Search and Arrest training.

August 23, 2018

NPD hosts city-wide community meeting to seek community comment on NPD’s draft Community Policing Policy.

September 5, 2018

The Independent Monitor meets with NPD Commanders to discuss the Consent Decree process.

September 5, 2018

Status conference before the Honorable Madeline Cox Arleo, United States District Court Judge for the District of New Jersey.

September 10, 2018

The Monitoring Team, led by the New Jersey Institute for Social Justice, holds a “Meet the Monitor” event at the New Community Corporation to speak with Newark community members about the Consent Decree and discuss the Monitor’s Fifth Quarterly Report.

September 20, 2018 DOJ and Monitoring Team approve NPD’s Stop, Search and Arrest policies in principal.

September 21, 2018 DOJ and Monitoring Team approve NPD’s Internal Affairs: Disciplinary Process and Matrix for external review.

September 21, 2018 DOJ and Monitoring Team approve NPD’s Property and Evidence Division/Property and Evidence Management policies for external

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review.

September 24, 2018 NPD posts its second quarterly report on community engagement— covering the period from April 1 through June 30—online.

September 25 and 26, Force Concepts staff conducts a two day train-the-trainer program for

2018

26 NPD trainers, including the NPD Academy Captain.

September 27, 2018 NPD hosts city-wide community meeting to seek community comment for NPD’s draft First Amendment policy.

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Appendix B

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Consent Decree Compliance and Implementation (through September 30, 2018)

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Table of Contents Page

I.

Definitions ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 1

II. Use of Force...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3

III. Stop, Search and Arrest..................................................................................................................................................................................... 6

IV. Community Policing and Bias-Free Policing.................................................................................................................................................... 8

V. Property and Evidence Management .............................................................................................................................................................. 12

VI. Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation .................................................................................................................................... 14

VII. In-Car Cameras and Body-Worn Cameras ..................................................................................................................................................... 19

VIII. General Officer Training................................................................................................................................................................................. 20

IX. Community Engagement ................................................................................................................................................................................ 22

X. Data Systems Improvements: Early Warning and Records Management Systems ........................................................................................ 23

XI. Consent Decree Implementation and Enforcement ........................................................................................................................................ 24

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I. DEFINITIONS NPD’s compliance with the deadlines set forth in the Consent Decree and the Second-Year Monitoring Plan will be
assessed using the following categories: (1) not assessed, (2) initial development, (3) preliminary compliance, (4) operational compliance, (5) non-compliance, (6) administrative compliance, and (7) full compliance. Each of these terms is defined below.
1. Not Assessed “Not Assessed” means that the Monitoring Team did not assess the Consent Decree provision during this reporting
period. Acceptable reasons for why a requirement was not assessed may include that the deadline has not passed or some other substantive reason.
2. Initial Development “Initial Development” means that during the auditing period, NPD has taken meaningful steps toward achieving
compliance with a Consent Decree requirement that is not yet scheduled for completion. Initial Development will be noted only if NPD’s efforts are consistent with established timeframes in the Monitoring Plan or Consent Decree. Where NPD was expected to have achieved at least Initial Development during the auditing period, and has not, NPD has been found not to be in compliance.
3. Preliminary Compliance “Preliminary Compliance” means that during the reporting period, NPD has developed, and the Independent Monitor,
DOJ, and City have approved, respective policies or standard operating procedures (“SOPs”) and related training materials that are consistent with a Consent Decree requirement. This category only applies to SOPs and training.
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4. Operational Compliance “Operational Compliance” means that NPD has satisfied a Consent Decree requirement by demonstrating routine
adherence to the requirement in its day-to-day operations or by meeting the established deadline for a task or deliverable that is specifically required by the Consent Decree or Monitoring Plan. NPD’s compliance efforts must be verified by reviews of data systems, observations from the Monitoring Team, and other methods that will corroborate its achievement. In this report, the Monitoring Team only will assess NPD for compliance with established deadlines.
5. Non-Compliance “Non-Compliance” means that NPD has either made no progress towards accomplishing compliance, or has not
progressed beyond Initial Development at the point in time when NPD is expected to have at least achieved Preliminary Compliance for the reporting period.
6. Administrative Compliance “Administrative Compliance” means that during the auditing period, NPD has completed all necessary actions to
implement a Consent Decree requirement, but General Compliance has not yet been demonstrated in NPD’s day-to-day operations.
7. Full Compliance “Full Compliance” means that all Monitor reviews have determined that NPD has maintained Operational Compliance
for the two-year period.
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II. USE OF FORCE

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

Develop Use of Force Policy: NPD will develop and implement a use of force policy or set of policies that cover all force techniques,

technologies, and weapons that are available to NPD officers. The policy or policies will clearly define each force option and specify

that unreasonable use of force will subject officers to discipline. (¶¶ 66-74)

NPD will review and revise its current use of force policy or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree.

March 31, 2018

Preliminary Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section II.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. (¶ 11)

Within 60 days after Preliminary approval of policy Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section II.

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training curricula to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. (¶ 11)

Within 60 days after Preliminary approval of policy Compliance

See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(F)(1).

NPD will develop a protocol to gauge retention of training and approve testing mechanisms to ensure compliance with Consent Decree.

45 days before training is implemented

Not Assessed

The deadline has not passed. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will provide the proposed testing for review.

30 days before training is implemented

Not Assessed

The deadline has not passed. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

Audit of NPD Firearms Certification Oversight (¶¶ 70-71, 74)

NPD will provide resources for officers to maintain proper weapons certifications and will implement sanctions for officers who fail to do so. Officers will be prohibited from using

Ongoing

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance

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Achievement unauthorized weapons or ammunition. (¶¶ 70-71, 74)

Deadline for Achievement

Status

Discussion audits.

NPD Use of Force Reporting and Investigation: NPD will adopt a use of force reporting system and a supervisor Use of Force Report, separate from the NPD’s arrest and incident reports, and which includes individual officers’ accounts of their use of force. (¶¶ 75-85) NPD will establish a mechanism by which use of force and citizen September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance N/A interaction complaints are reviewed by training staff to form the basis of changes in training to address the issues arising from these complaints.

NPD, in consultation with Monitor and DOJ, will categorize force September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance See Fifth Quarterly

into levels to report, investigate, and review each use of force. The

Report, Section

levels will be based on the factors set forth in ¶ 77.

III(A)(1).

NPD will establish a Serious Force Investigation Team (“SFIT”) to review Serious Force Incidents, conduct criminal and administrative investigations of Serious Force incidents, and determine whether incidents raise policy, training, tactical, or equipment concerns. Lower or intermediate force incidents will be investigated by line supervisors. (¶¶ 78-84, 86-94)

NPD will create and implement (1) a General Order establishing the AFIT to ensure sufficient staffing consistent with ¶ 92 of the Consent Decree; and (2) General Orders establishing line supervisors’ responsibilities to investigate lower and intermediate use of force incidents.
NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. (¶ 11)
NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training curricula related to the requirements of the Consent Decree to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. (¶ 11)

March 31, 2018
Within 60 days after approval of General Orders
Within 60 days after approval of General Orders

Preliminary Compliance
Initial Development
Preliminary Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(1).
See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(1)
See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(1).

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Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

NPD will maintain a Use of Force Review Board (“UFRB”) to conduct timely, comprehensive and reliable reviews of all

Intermediate and Serious Force incidents, in accordance with the requirements set forth in the Consent Decree. (¶¶ 88, 95, 96, 98,

102)

NPD will create a General Order establishing the UFRB, ensure that it is staffed consistent with Consent Decree provisions, and ensure that the responsibilities assigned are consistent with Consent Decree provisions.

March 31, 2018

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required, which will provide the UFRB with 8 hours of training. (¶¶ 11, 97)

Within 60 days after approval of General Order

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training curricula related to the requirements of the Consent Decree to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. (¶ 11)

Within 60 days after approval of General Order

NPD’s UFRB will conduct timely, comprehensive, and reliable reviews of SFIT and Intermediate Force incidents and document its findings and recommendations. (¶¶ 13, 96-101)

Ongoing

NPD will provide Monitor with Use of Force data for a baseline assessment. NPD will provide the Monitor with Use of Force data, including, June 30, 2018 but not limited to, field inquiry reports and incident reports.

Preliminary Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(1).

Initial Development

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(1)

Preliminary Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(1).

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(E).

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III. STOP, SEARCH AND ARREST

Achievement

Deadline for

Achievement

NPD will revise policies in accordance with ¶¶ 25-42, 55-62 of the Consent Decree.

Status

Discussion

NPD will begin training modules for the revised policies upon the Monitor and DOJ’s approval of the revised policies.

NPD will review and revise its current stop, search, and arrest policy or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree.

March 31, 2018

Preliminary Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(2).

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training Within 60 days after curricula related to the requirements of the Consent Decree to the approval of policy Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. (¶ 11)

Initial Development

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the stop, search, and arrest policies or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the inservice training required. (¶ 11)

Within 60 days after approval of policy

Not Assessed

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(2).
The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will develop a protocol to gauge retention of stop, search, and 45 days before

arrest training and approve testing mechanisms to ensure

training is

compliance with Consent Decree.

implemented

Not Assessed

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will provide the proposed testing to the Monitor, DOJ and the 30 days before

City for review.

training is

implemented

Not Assessed

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this

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Achievement

Deadline for Achievement

Status

Discussion
requirement in a future report.

Data Analysis Protocol: NPD will develop a protocol for comprehensive analysis of stop, search and arrest data, subject to the review and approval of the DOJ and Monitor. (¶ 53)

NPD will review its current data collection and analysis capacity September 30, 2018 and identify the gaps between its current capacity and the capacity required by the Consent Decree.

NPD will develop categories and fields for capturing the data required by the Consent Decree. (¶ 51-54)

September 30, 2018

Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(E).
Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(E).

Data Report: NPD will issue a report summarizing and analyzing the data collected on its stops, searches, arrests, and uses of force. The report will also set forth the steps taken by the NPD to correct problems and build successes indicated by the data. (¶ 168)

NPD will provide a draft report to Monitor and Parties.

May 15, 2018

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(F)(1).

NPD will finalize the report based on feedback from the Monitor June 30, 2018 and Parties.

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(F)(1).

NPD will provide periodic reports to Monitor and Parties.

Yearly after June 30, Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly

2018

Report, Section III(F)(1).

NPD supervisors will take appropriate action to address any violations or deficiencies related to stops, detentions, searches, and arrests; maintain records; and identify repeat violators. (¶ 48)

NPD supervisors to take appropriate action to address violations or Ongoing deficiencies in stops, detentions, searches, and arrests; maintain records; and identify repeat violators. (¶ 48)

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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IV. COMMUNITY POLICING AND BIAS-FREE POLICING

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

Community-Oriented Policing Policy: NPD will integrate concepts of community and problem-oriented policing into its policies.

(Section V)

NPD will review and revise its current community policing policy May 15, 2018 or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree.

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(3).

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand Within 60 days after Not Assessed their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that approval of policy the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. (¶ 11)

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training Within 60 days after Not Assessed curricula to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to approval of policy implementation. (¶ 11)

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will develop a protocol to gauge retention of training and approve testing mechanisms to ensure compliance with the Consent Decree.

45 days before training is implemented

Not Assessed

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will provide the proposed testing for review.

30 days before training is implemented

Not Assessed

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The

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Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

Evaluation of Community Policing Protocol: By February 7, 2017, NPD will implement a protocol to periodically measure the breadth, extent, and effectiveness of its community partnerships and problem-solving strategies, including officer outreach, particularly outreach to youth.

NPD will submit first drafts of its measurement mechanisms to the March 31, 2018 Monitor and DOJ for review.

Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(A)(1).

NPD will submit a final draft of the measurement protocol.

May 5, 2018

Non-Compliance

See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section III(DA)(1).

NPD will begin implementing the measurement protocol.

May 10, 2018

Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(A)(1).

NPD will prepare a publicly available report of its community policing efforts overall and in each precinct. (¶ 18)

April 30, 2018

Initial Development

See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(A)(1).

Phase I: Community Policing: NPD will provide its officers training on the benefits and means to achieve effective community engagement. (¶ 14)

NPD will provide 8 hours of in-service training on community Within 60 days after Operational policing and problem-oriented policing methods and skills for all approval of policy Compliance officers, including supervisors, managers and executives. (¶ 14)

Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(3).

Bias-Free Policing Training: NPD will provide its officers training on bias-free policing. (¶ 11) NPD will provide all officers with a minimum of eight hours of comprehensive and interdisciplinary training on bias-free policing,
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including implicit bias, procedural justice, and police legitimacy, within 180 days of the Operational Date, and at least four hours annually thereafter. (¶ 63)

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training curricula to the Within 60 days after Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly

Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. approval of policy

Report, Section II(F).

(¶ 11)

NPD will develop a protocol to gauge retention of training and approve testing mechanisms to ensure compliance with the Consent Decree.

45 days before training is implemented

Not Assessed

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will provide the proposed testing for review.

30 days before training is implemented

Not Assessed

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

Monitor, DOJ and City will provide NPD with feedback on proposed testing.

15 days before training is implemented

Not Assessed

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will develop a protocol to gauge retention of training and approve testing mechanisms to ensure compliance with the Consent Decree.

45 days before training is implemented

Not Assessed

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will conduct quarterly demographic analyses of its enforcement activities to ensure bias-free policing. (¶ 65)

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NPD will update its data systems so that it has the capacity to conduct demographic analyses of its enforcement activities.

September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(E).

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V. PROPERTY AND EVIDENCE MANAGEMENT

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

Implement Chain of Custody and Inventory Policy: The NPD will ensure that in all instances where property or evidence is

seized, the responsible officer will immediately complete an incident report documenting a complete and accurate inventory of the

property or evidence seized, and will submit the property or evidence seized to the property room before the end of tour of duty.

(¶¶ 105, 110)

NPD will create a chain of custody and inventory policy or policies May 1, 2018 to ensure compliance with ¶ 110 of the Consent Decree.

Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(B).

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand Within 60 days after Not Assessed their responsibilities pursuant to the policies or procedures and that approval of policies the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. (¶ 11)

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training curricula related to the requirements of the Consent Decree to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. (¶ 11)

Within 60 days after Not Assessed approval of policies

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD Internal Review of Disciplinary Files: NPD will review the disciplinary histories of its officers who routinely handle valuable contraband or cash, especially those in specialized units, to identify any patterns or irregularities indicating potential risk of theft by officers. (¶ 107)

NPD will provide a report to the Monitor and supporting documents identifying officers handling contraband or cash.

July 1, 2018

Non-Compliance N/A

Transfer of NPD officers: To the extent permitted by law and NPD’s collective bargaining agreements, NPD officers identified as

12

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having a sustained complaint of theft, or two not sustained or unfounded complaints of theft occurring within one year, will be moved out of positions where those officers have access to money, property, and evidence. (¶ 108)

City legal department to review legal requirements and collective Ongoing bargaining agreements regarding transfer of NPD officers consistent with ¶ 108 of the Consent Decree.

Initial Development

See First Quarterly Report, Section V(C)(6).

NPD Audits: NPD will conduct and document periodic audits and inspections of the property room and immediately correct any deficiencies. (¶ 111)

NPD will conduct a complete audit of all firearms stored in the property and evidence room and other storage facilities.

July 1, 2018

Initial Development

See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(B).

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VI. INTERNAL AFFAIRS: COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATION

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

Transparent Complaint Process: NPD will revise its policies to prohibit practices that discourage complainants and witnesses

from coming forward, including the requirements set forth in ¶ 115.

NPD will review and revise its policies for releasing complaints and misconduct allegations to make such complaints and allegations publicly available and ensure compliance with the Consent Decree.

March 31, 2018

Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(C).

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or

Within 60 days after Not Assessed

training curricula to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval approval of policy

prior to implementation. (¶ 11)

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Within 60 days after Not Assessed approval of policy

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will submit to the Monitor and DOJ its written plan for

September 1, 2018

conducting and reporting on an integrity audit to identify officers/

employees who refuse to accept or discourage the filing of

misconduct complaints, fail to report misconduct or complaints, or

provide false or misleading information about filing a misconduct

complaint. (¶¶ 117-118)

Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(C).

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Achievement

Deadline for

Achievement

NPD will take appropriate disciplinary actions against officers/ Ongoing

employees who refuse to accept or discourage the filing of

misconduct complaints, fail to report misconduct or complaints, or

provide false or misleading information about filing a misconduct

complaint, as set forth in ¶¶ 117-118.

Status

Discussion

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(F)(2)(a).

NPD will create a training curriculum and/or training bulletins for police personnel, including dispatchers, to properly handle

complaint intake, including how to provide complaint materials and information; the consequences for failing to take complaints;

and strategies for turning the complaint process into positive police-civilian interaction. (¶ 116)

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training curricula to the Within 60 days after Not Assessed The deadline had not

Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. approval of policy

passed by the end of this

(¶ 11)

reporting period. The

Monitor will assess this

requirement in a future

report.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Within 60 days after Not Assessed approval of policy

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD and City, in collaboration with the civilian oversight entity or other community input, will develop and implement a program to publicize to the Newark Community how to make police misconduct complaints. (¶ 112)

NPD and the City will revise and make forms and other materials outlining the complaint process and OPS contact information available on their website and appropriate government properties. (¶ 113)

June 1, 2018

Initial Development

See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(4).

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Achievement
NPD will accept all complaints, by all methods and forms detailed in ¶ 114.

Deadline for Achievement Ongoing

NPD will provide civilians, including complainants and witnesses Ongoing to alleged police misconduct, with full access to NPD’s complaint process. (¶ 115)

Status
Initial Development
Initial Development

Discussion
See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(4). See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(4).

NPD Misconduct Reporting and Investigation Process: NPD will require that all officers and employees report allegations of criminal behavior or administrative misconduct by another NPD officer toward a member of the public, that they may observe themselves or receive from another source, to a supervisor or directly to OPS for review and investigation. When a supervisor receives such allegations, the supervisor will promptly document and report this information to OPS. (¶ 119)

NPD will investigate as a misconduct complaint any information or Ongoing testimony arising in criminal prosecutions or civil lawsuits that indicate potential officer misconduct not previously investigated by NPD. (¶ 120)

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

NPD will train OPS supervisors to conduct thorough and complete September 1, 2018 investigations that include conclusions and recommendations that are adequately supported by the evidence. (¶ 141)

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B).

Complaint Classification Protocol: NPD will adopt a complaint classification protocol that is based on the nature of the alleged misconduct, in order to guide OPS in determining where a complaint should be assigned for investigation. (¶ 121)

NPD will implement complaint classification protocol to ensure March 31, 2018 compliance with the Consent Decree.

Preliminary Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(6).

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand Within 60 days after Not Assessed their responsibilities pursuant to the protocol or procedure and that approval of protocol the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future

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Achievement

Deadline for Achievement

Status

Discussion report.

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training Within 60 days after Not Assessed curricula to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to approval of protocol implementation. (¶ 11)

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD’s OPS will investigate all allegations of Serious Misconduct Ongoing as defined in the Consent Decree. (¶¶ 122)

NPD/OPS will submit to the Monitor and DOJ its written plan for monitoring and reporting on investigations referred to officers’ precincts and specialized units for quality, objectivity and thoroughness, for identifying trends in investigative or leadership deficiencies, and for taking appropriate action if investigations are deficient. (¶ 124)

September 1, 2018

Not Assessed Non-Compliance

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits. See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(6).

NPD’s OPS will routinely monitor investigations referred to

Ongoing

officers’ precincts and specialized units for quality, objectivity and

thoroughness, and take appropriate action if investigations are

deficient. OPS will also identify trends in investigative or

leadership deficiencies. (¶ 124)

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

NPD will maintain a centralized numbering and tracking system for all misconduct complaints. (¶ 125)

NPD will create a protocol to link an “event” number retrieved May 31, 2018

Initial

from the CAD, which enables NPD to provide a complainant with

Development

an identifying number in real time.

See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(4).

NPD will use a case management system to ensure appropriate caseloads for OPS investigators and timely completion of investigations. (¶ 146)

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Achievement
NPD will use a case management system to track and maintain appropriate caseloads for OPS investigators and promote the timely completion of investigations by OPS. (¶ 146)

Deadline for Achievement Ongoing

Status Not Assessed

Discussion
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

NPD will require and provide appropriate training for OPS investigators upon their assignment to OPS, with refresher training at periodic intervals. At a minimum, NPD will provide 40 hours of initial training and eight hours additional in-service training on an annual basis. (¶¶ 147-148)

NPD will review and revise its current OPS policy to require training of OPS investigators.

March 31, 2018

Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(C).

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training curricula to the Within 60 days after Not Assessed Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. approval of policy (¶ 11)

The deadline had not passed by the end of this reporting period. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

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VII. IN-CAR CAMERAS AND BODY-WORN CAMERAS

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

In consultation with the DOJ and Monitor, NPD will develop a policy regarding footage and audio recordings from its in-car and

body-worn cameras and a policy to designate which cars and officers will not be equipped with cameras or will be equipped with

concealed cameras. (¶¶ 103-104)

NPD will review and revise its current policy or policies to ensure March 31, 2018 compliance with the Consent Decree.

Preliminary Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(7).

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training Within 60 days after Preliminary curricula to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to approval of policy Compliance implementation. (¶ 11)

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(7).

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the Body-Worn Cameras and InCar Cameras policies and that the topic is incorporated into the inservice training required. (¶ 11)

Within 60 days after Preliminary approval of the policy Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(7).

NPD will begin the work required to equip all marked patrol cars with video cameras and require all officers, except those set

forth in ¶¶ 103-104, to wear body cameras and microphones with which to record enforcement activity. (¶ 103)

NPD will conduct pilot program on body-worn cameras and

Ongoing

Initial

See Sixth Quarterly

develop recommendations for possible device implementation

Development Report, Section III(A)(7).

based on the results of the pilot.

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VIII. GENERAL OFFICER TRAINING

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

NPD will provide officers at least 40 hours of training to address changes in the law, or issues identified in complaints, or other

means. NPD will provide additional training as necessary to address changes in the law, or issues identified through its review of

use of force incidents, arrest reports, misconduct complaints, or other means. All training will be consistent with and incorporate

current law, professional police standards and best practices. (¶¶ 9, 14)

Note: The timelines for training requirements in other Sections of the Consent Decree (e.g., use of force, bias-free policing), are located in those Sections of this Chart.

NPD will review and revise its current General Orders to ensure June 30, 2018 compliance with the Consent Decree.

The status for training requirements for each Consent Decree area (e.g., use of force, bias-free policing), are located in those sections of this Chart.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand Within 60 days after their responsibilities pursuant to the policies or procedures and that approval of the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. (¶ 11) individual policies

The status for training requirements for each Consent Decree area (e.g., use of force, bias-free policing), are located in those sections of this Chart.

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training Within 60 days after

curricula to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to approval of

implementation. (¶ 11)

individual policies

The status for training requirements for each Consent Decree area (e.g., use of force, bias-free policing), are located in those sections of this

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Achievement

Deadline for Achievement

NPD will compile, and provide Monitor with, all current State and March 31, 2018 NPD curricula and course materials for new recruits.
NPD and Monitor will identify where State/NPD curricula differ April 24, 2018 from the Consent Decree.
NPD will maintain complete and consistent training records for all officers. (¶ 12)

NPD will develop a protocol to gauge retention of training and approve testing mechanisms to ensure compliance with Consent Decree.

45 days before training is implemented

NPD will implement any necessary updates to its data storage system to retain training records as set forth in the protocol.

Ongoing

NPD will provide the necessary data to allow the Monitoring Team March 31, 2018 to conduct a baseline assessment of NPD’s training records.

Status

Discussion

Chart.

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(8).
Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(8).

The status for training requirements for each Consent Decree area (e.g., use of force, bias-free policing), are located in those sections of this Chart.

Not Assessed Non-Compliance

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits. See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(F).

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IX. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

NPD will assess and revise its staffing allocation and personnel deployment to support community policing and problem-solving initiatives, and will modify deployment strategies that are incompatible with community policing, such assessment and modified strategy to be provided to the DOJ and Monitor for approval. (¶ 15)

NPD will conduct review of its current staffing allocation and personnel deployment and develop a community policing strategy that involves all officers assigned to policing precincts, including the Community Policing Officers.

March 31, 2018

NPD will review and revise its current staffing allocation and

March 31, 2018

personnel protocol to ensure compliance with the Consent Decree.

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(2).
Non-Compliance See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(2).

NPD will identify what changes in personnel allocation will be made, if necessary, based on the staffing study.

April 30, 2018

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(2).

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X. DATA SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENTS: EARLY WARNING AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

Assessment of Current Data Systems: NPD will provide the Monitor with sample data to analyze its current data collection

processes and NPD will engage a consulting firm to determine its data needs.

NPD will provide sample data to the Monitor in each subject area June 30, 2018

Initial

See Sixth Quarterly

where data collection/analysis is required so the Monitor can

Development Report, Section E.

determine NPD data collection abilities (i.e., “data baseline”).

NPD will engage an IT consulting firm to conduct an assessment September 30, 2018 Initial

See Seventh Quarterly

and gap analysis to help NPD determine what systems need to be

Development Report, Section II(E).

upgraded or replaced to enable NPD to meet the data collection

and analysis requirements of the Consent Decree. This will include

the development of high level requirements for a Records

Management System (“RMS”).

Early Warning System: NPD will enhance its Early Warning System so as to comply with the requirements set forth in the

Consent Decree. (¶¶ 156-165)

NPD will develop and implement a data protocol describing

September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly

information to be recorded and maintained in the Early Warning for enhanced/current

Report, Section II(E).

System. (¶ 157)

EWS

NPD will revise its use of EWS as an effective supervisory tool. September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly

To that end, the EWS will use comparative data and peer group for enhanced/current

Report, Section II(E).

analysis to identify patterns of activity by officers and groups of EWS

officers for supervisory review and intervention. (¶ 158)

Records Management System: NPD will revise its use and analysis of the RMS and the City will provide NPD with sufficient

funding and personnel to implement and maintain the RMS. (¶¶ 162-163)

NPD will provide the Monitor with sample data extracts from its September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly

current RMS solution.

Report, Section II(E).

NPD will begin the procurement process for a new RMS.

September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly

Report, Section II(E).

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XI. CONSENT DECREE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Achievement

The Monitor will conduct Outcome Assessments according to the requirements of ¶¶ 174-175.

NPD will provide Monitor with data required by the Consent

August 31, 2018

Non-Compliance

Decree. (¶ 174-175)

Discussion
See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(E).

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Appendix C

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NEWARK POLICE DIVISION
Community Engagement Report
Second Quarter - 2018
Consent Decree and Planning Division Captain Brian O’Hara
Commander
September 2018

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NEWARK POLICE DIVISION COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT REPORT
Second Quarter – 2018
Introduction
The Newark Police Division (NPD) is committed to transparency in its procedures and performance and seeks opportunities to engage with the community. Additionally, it is the goal of the Newark Police Division to foster a true collaborative partnership through positive engagements and build public trust between the Division and the community. To achieve these goals, the Newark Police Division and its members shall approach all interactions with the public as opportunities to enhance the perception of law enforcement and build upon public trust. The following community engagement report has been prepared to reflect the period of April 1, 2018 through June 30, 2018.
Criteria
Paragraph 18 of the Consent Decree states “Within 120 days of the Operational Date, and thereafter on a quarterly basis, NPD will prepare a publicly available report of its community policing efforts overall and in each precinct, including specific problems addressed and steps taken by NPD and the community toward their resolution”.
Summary
Through the devotion and diligence of the precincts’ Community Service Officers (CSO’s), the Command Staff and through selfless dedication of the Community Affairs and Clergy Unit, many of the initiatives that were successful during the 1st Quarter of this year, were expanded upon and new partnerships were developed. The CSO’s attended eighty-eight (88) community meetings during this quarter. In addition to the community meetings, the Division personnel participated and/or orchestrated numerous events.
1

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NEWARK POLICE DIVISION COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT REPORT
Second Quarter – 2018

Table No. 1 - Community Engagements Summary

Precinct 1st

Community Meetings
12

Goal Oriented Encounters
79

Special Events 17

2nd

14

73

49

3rd

29

37

21

4th

8

3

7

5th

16

9

14

6th

9

8

1

Problems Identified
6 19 20 2 17 4

First Precinct Qualitative Community Engagements
Community Service Officers: Police Officer J. Bright and Police Officer R. Thomas
 Ms. Blind Diva Pageant Press Release Party – 17 Academy St.  Toast Off & Prom Day – 311 So. 10th St.  End of School Year Cookout Fun – 50 Newton St.  14th Ave. School Visit  Community Walk - So. 9th St.  Community Service Clean Up Project – Court & Mlk Blvd  St. Benedict’s Prep School – Spring Fling  Internet & Online Safety Class – 180 South Orange Ave.  Toast Off & Prom Day – 311 So. 10th St.  NCC Residents Only Traffic Signs  Community Walk – So. 10th St between 13th Ave. & South Orange Ave.  Community Walk – So. 9th St. between 13th Ave. & South Orange Ave.  Coffee with a Cop – 180 South Orange Ave.  Bingo & Game Night – 180 South Orange Ave.  Community Walk – So. 9th St.  Neighborhood Community Policing Plan – 269-271 So. 9th St.
2

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NEWARK POLICE DIVISION COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT REPORT
Second Quarter – 2018
 Neighborhood Community Policing Plan – Newark Fairmount Neighborhood Association  Breakfast Celebration – 45-47 Hayes St.  1st Precinct Community Relations Council Meeting  Community Walk – Kent St. & Brenner St.  1st Precinct Community Relations Council Meeting – 205 Spruce St.  Captain Mos Hosts Community Policing Meeting with Habitat for Humanity  1st Precinct Community Meeting  Comstat Community Engagements  Habitat for Humanity – Neighborhood Community Policing Meeting  4th Of July Cookout – 1st Precinct  Rebellion Park Clean Up – 15th Ave. & Springfield Ave.  Reservoir Neighborhood Community Policing Plan  Lunch with Summer Camp Students – JFK Creation Center  Community Walk – So. 8th St.
Second Precinct Qualitative Community Engagements
Community Service Officers: Police Officer J. Molina and Police Officer T. Rich
 Commander's Community Engagement and Business Walk- 6th Avenue and North 5th Street  Community Street Fair-55 - 57 Springdale Avenue  Business Check/Business Talk Meet & Greet-453 and 449 Orange Street  Taking Back Our Streets-Roseville Avenue and 2nd  2nd Precinct Council Meeting - Mount Pleasant Baptist Church 27 Lincoln Avenue  Coffee with a Cop New Community Senior Citizens (aka NCC Associates)-180 South Orange Ave  Tenant Association Monthly Meeting-Stephen Crane Elderly Tenant Association Community Room.  Occupy the Block - Taking Back Our Streets - Oriental Village Broadway & 2nd Avenue  Community Meeting - Forest Hill Community Association  Senior Citizen Scams & Safety Tips - The North Ward Center 298 Mount Prospect Ave  Commander's Walk - Roseville Avenue and 7th Avenue  Fallen Officer's Son Graduation Day Roselle Park High School - Raymond A. Arocha  B.A.N.D. Community Meeting at Urban League of Essex County located at 506 Central Avenue.  Community Meeting 110 Broad Street Association  The Roseville Neighborhood Association Community Meeting 285 Roseville Avenue
3

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NEWARK POLICE DIVISION COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT REPORT
Second Quarter – 2018
Third Precinct Qualitative Community Engagements
Community Service Officers: Police Officer M. Silva and Police Officer C. Reed
 Portuguese Flag raising ceremony - Newark City Hall  Bullying Presentation - East Side High School  Lafayette Street School Career Day  Youth Basketball Recreation - Hyatt Court and Terrell Homes  Cleanup of Newark Riverfront Park.  Community Meeting - Jesus O Lord Presbyterian Church Broad Street.  Leaguers Preschool a Safety Presentation  Oliver Street School Fun Day.  lronbound Little League Picnic at the Little League Field.  Newark Riverfront Park walk along the Water and Arts Festival  Newark Downtown District Monthly Meeting  Business/Resident/PSE&G Walk (regarding better lighting) - Magazine Street and Ferry Street  Community Walk - Napoleon Street and New York Avenue to Wilson Avenue.  Community Walk - Ferry Street to Merchant Street to Union Street.  Community Walk - Scott Street to Orchard Street.  Block Watch Walk - Lafayette Street and Van Buren St to Jefferson St with members of the Ironbound Block
Watch Association.  Coffee with a Cop  Community meeting - "Friends of Lincoln Park"
Fourth Precinct Qualitative Community Engagements
Community Service Officers: Police Officer A. Porter and Police Officer B. Burrows
 Captain Leroux conducted an inspection of 44 vacant units - 15th Avenue / South 18th Street  Community Walk - Avon Avenue / South 10th Street  Block Watch Meeting for Mead Street  Community Walk and met with the patrons of Carnell's Barbershop, 289 16th Avenue  Community Cleanup - 15th Ave / S 18th St with kids from IYO (International Youth Org.)  Block Watch Meeting - 19th Avenue  Kipp NJ Rise Academy - 21 Ashland Street  Community Walk and met with Ms. Lynn at 426 South 17th Street  Meet Bloomfield College baseball team - West Side Park  Make-up with a Cop - 281 16th Avenue  Assisted homeless woman at S.O.A. / Sanford Avenue in finding permanent shelter
4

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NEWARK POLICE DIVISION COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT REPORT
Second Quarter – 2018
 Paint and Sip with a Cop - 2 Nevada Court  Captain Leroux hosted children from the Leaguers School at the 4th Precinct  Wash with a Cop - 309 16th Avenue
Fifth Precinct Qualitative Community Engagements
Community Service Officers: Police Officer G. Hines and Police Officer M. Muhammed
 Chadwick Avenue Community Walk  Frelinghuysen / Chancellor Avenue Business Walk  Grace West Manor Tenant Meeting (Monthly Meeting)  Clinton Hill Meet & Greet Community Meeting  Nairn Place Community Walk  Newark Community Street Team Public Safety Round Table 400 Hawthorne Avenue  S 17th & S 18th Neighborhood Community Meeting (Monthly Meeting)  Leslie Street Block Association Meeting  Weequahic Park Sports Authority Community Engagement  Coffee with a Cop / Dunkin Donuts 257 Lyons Avenue  Hansbury & Maple – Community Service Officer walks neighborhood  34th Renaissance Block Association Meeting  Hunterdon Street-Peshine/Madison Avenue Community Walk  87 Chadwick Avenue Collaborated with Code Enforcement for Clean & Lien  Hansbury Avenue Cookout  South Ward Community Council Meeting (Monthly Meeting)  Donald Bradley Center Community Meeting (Monthly Meeting)
Sixth Precinct Qualitative Community Engagements
Community Service Officers: Police Officer S. Okerchiri and Police Officer C. Corbett
 Neighborhood Walk and Talk - Marsac Pl/Ellery Ave/Sanford Pl/South Orange Ave/Sanford Ave  Neighborhood Walk and Talk - Columbia Avenue/Isabella Avenue/Bradley Court  Meet and Greet and Luncheon with the Residents - 425 Sanford Avenue-Saint Mary Villa  Community/Neighborhood Free Shoe Donations Boylan Rec Center-916 South Orange Ave  Community/Neighborhood Location Investigation - 104 Sanford Place/Residential Property  Community Outreach/Church - 17 Alexander Street Shekinah Glory Church  Westward District leaders Meeting - 998 South Orange Avenue Faith Christian Center  UVSO (Unified Vailsburg Services Organization) Family Fun Day for kids - 475 Irvington Avenue
5

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NEWARK POLICE DIVISION COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT REPORT
Second Quarter – 2018
 Sanford Place Block Association & Friends - 844 Sanford Avenue Igbo Anglican Church  Neighborhood Walk and Talk - Columbia Avenue/N. Munn/Bradley Court/Cedar  St. Mary’s Villa Health Fair 425 Sanford Avenue - Saint Mary’s Villa  Unified Family Festival - Smith Street /South Orange Avenue  Community/Neighborhood Location Investigation - Norwood, Sanford Place  Deceased Raymond Arocho’s son Graduation - Roselle Park High School  Ivy Hill Neighborhood Monthly Meeting - 209 Ivy Street  Community Outreach/A Journey from A to Z (Read a Book) - 75 Alexander Street (Library)  Reorganized the 6th Pct Det. Morgan Community room with community - 491 Irvington Ave  87 Chadwick Avenue Collaborated with Code Enforcement for Clean & Lien  Hansbury Avenue Cookout

Table No. 2 - Problems Identified

Precinct 1st

Problem List – Steps for Resolution Discussion of Auto thefts in lots in area- Active Investigation

1st

Illegal Dumping on abandoned property – CSO visited Tax Dept. got ownership and reported to Code Enforcement.

1st

Elderly Community Member lost his/her vehicle – Lieutenant drove individual until vehicle was located.

1st

Raw Sewage erupting from abandoned house onto sidewalk – followed up with 4311 and Water Department

1st

Request via Community Meeting for additional crossing guard – 3 way Stop Sign posted

1st

Illegal Activity in Park – Active Investigation

2nd

Quality of life concerns - Active Investigation

2nd

General Complaint - Active Investigation

2nd

Illegal Activity – Active Investigation

2nd

Abandoned Trailers/Illegal Activity – Active Investigation

2nd

Abandoned Home/Illegal Activity – Active Investigation

2nd

Drug odors - Active Investigation

6

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NEWARK POLICE DIVISION COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT REPORT
Second Quarter – 2018

2nd

Possible Wanted Persons/Building Code Violations - Active Investigation

2nd

Illegal Activities - Active Investigation

2nd

Garbage not picked up – Active Investigation (Complaint sent to city via MYNEWARK app)

2nd

Abandoned House/Illegal Activity - Active Investigation

2nd

Abandoned House/Cars and garbage - Active Investigation

2nd

Abandoned House/Garbage - Active Investigation (Complaint sent to city via MYNEWARK app)

2nd

Abandoned Property - Active Investigation (Complaint sent to city via MYNEWARK app)

2nd

Garbage on Sidewalk – Active Investigation (Complaint sent to city via MYNEWARK app)

2nd

Partially Demolished Building - Active Investigation (Complaint sent to city via MYNEWARK app)

2nd

Quality of Life Concerns/Improper Parking – Parties Advised and Sent on Way

2nd

Abandoned Vehicle - Active Investigation

2nd

Quality of Life Complaint - Active Investigation

2nd

Abandoned Property - Active Investigation (Complaint sent to city via MYNEWARK app)

2nd

Garbage on Sidewalk – Active Investigation (Complaint sent to city via MYNEWARK app)

3rd

Homeless Congregating in R.A. Brown Park – Scheduled cleanup of Park with residents

3rd

Homeless Congregating in Hennessey Park – Scheduled cleanup of Park with residents

3rd

Noise Complaints/Fights/Quality of life issues – Area made strenuous lookout for 3rd Precinct Personnel and Supervisors

3rd

Parking Issues – Resolved with complainant

3rd

Noise Complaint Bar – Establishment Investigated by A.B.C. – Completed - Checked OK

3rd

Noise/Fights Complaint Bar – Establishment Investigated by A.B.C. – Completed – Bar Shut down

3rd

Trash/Street Litter – Area checked OK

3rd

Graffiti/Drug Paraphernalia – Sanitation Notified

3rd

Commercial Overnight Parking preventing Garbage Pickup - Active Investigation

3rd

Abandoned Property - Active Investigation (Code Enforcement Notified)

7

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Second Quarter – 2018

3rd

Noise Complaint/Religious Worship over loudspeaker - Active Investigation

3rd

Not Enough Traffic Lights near School – Engineering Department Notified

3rd

Abandoned Property - Active Investigation (Code Enforcement Notified)

3rd

Double and Triple Parking - Active Investigation

3rd

Night Time Car Racing - Active Investigation

3rd

Noise Complaints - Active Investigation

3rd

Quality of Life Issues at Abandoned Property – Code Enforcement Notified, Property Boarded up

3rd

Vagrancy in Park – Monitored by Sheriffs and NPD

3rd

Squatters in Abandoned Property – Made contact with property owner

3rd

Quality of life concerns/Vagrancy – Active Investigation

4th

Multiple locations Street Lights out – PSE&G notified - lights fixed

4th

Garbage/Debris Several Locations – Complaint sent to city via 4311- areas cleaned

5th

Loud Music - Active Investigation

5th

Family member refuses to leave - Active Investigation

5th

Police response/Rear door security - Active Investigation

5th

Unsecured Building – Referred to Code Enforcement

5th

Improper Parking - Addressed

5th

Violation of Properties – Investigation Completed

5th

Quality of life issues – location checked ok

5th

Basketball Hoop/Loud Talking/Music/Drug use - Active Investigation

5th

Parking violations/Drug sales - Active Investigation

5th

Quality of Life/Drug Activity/Drinking in public/Littering - Active Investigation

5th

MV Violations/Drug Activity - Active Investigation

5th

Sneakers hanging from power lines – List created to remove same

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Second Quarter – 2018

5th

Quality of life issues, Illegal Dumping, Abandoned houses - Active Investigation

5th

Quality of life issues, Drug Dealing, Over-weight trucks, Vacant home with squatters - Active Investigation

5th

Absent Crossing Guards/Drug Dealing - Active Investigation

5th

Drug Dealing, Quality of life issues, Police Barricades, Sneakers on wires, Trucks on Roadway and speeding vehicles - Active Investigations

5th

Drug Dealing and Fire crackers - Active Investigation

6th

Males Hanging out in front of Businesses - Active Investigation

6th

Suspicious Vehicles Parked - Active Investigation

6th

Parking Violations - Active Investigation

6th

Street Lights not working - Active Investigation

Community/Clergy Affairs Unit
The Community / Clergy Affairs unit works hand in hand with the Community Service Officers in supplementing, organizing, and augmenting their community engagement efforts. Below is a list of various community engagement efforts that have undertaken during the second quarter of 2018.
The Public Safety Academy is an eight-week course where participants learn the basic functions and operations of the Police/Fire and OEM division. Participants must complete six of the eight scheduled classes. We started a class on March 6 and ended on April 23. Eighty-Seven (87) residents and clergy members graduated the program. This is our largest class ever having broken the previous record set in December 2017. We also instituted an alumni association of our participants. Approximately 60 alumni have chosen to continue to participate with us when called upon. They have been useful in disseminating all manner of Police community relations info and serve as volunteers at community events.
G.R.E.A.T. Program is an anti-bully program taught to grades 3-8 throughout the Newark School District. The program also teaches gang awareness as well as drug prevention. Currently GREAT is taught 5 days a week in schools throughout the city by detectives of our unit. GREAT Graduation was scheduled for June 15, 2018 where approximately 1,500 students attended the
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NEWARK POLICE DIVISION COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT REPORT
Second Quarter – 2018
ceremony. Upon graduation the department treats all children to popcorn, soda and a movie at the Cityplex where they also receive a T-shirt.
Clergy Alliance- We currently have 76 clergy members that we actively collaborate with. We have a ride-along program in which clergy members respond out into the community (hospitals/senior homes) to offer prayer and other services to members of the community. We also host monthly meetings of our participants and provide them with services and opportunities to volunteer in other worthwhile projects. Clergy alliance members will receive training on hurricane preparedness on June 23, 2018.
Police Explorer Program is hosted by our unit twice a week where explores are given insight and instruction into what it is like to enter a career in the Police Division. They also compete against other local explorer posts. Currently The Explorer post boasts 22 members. These members also participate in competitions based on police training against other Police explorer posts. Police Explorers recently placed 3rd overall at the South Jersey Police Explorer competition. The undersigned and Executive Officer Latasha Taylor presented all participants with command citations in recognition of their achievement.
Block Watch Program - can be organized through the precinct community service officers as well as the community affairs/clergy unit. Our Block Watch program requires 7-10 people to start the program. It teaches members of the community crime safety tips, crime prevention and the proper reporting procedure for reporting a crime or incident. There are 69 registered block watch programs within the city with a Block watch creation drive underway.
There is currently one School Resource Officer assigned to each command. The School Resource officers are available to address any concerns within the schools. They also conduct safety presentations throughout the school year. We in the Community Clergy affairs unit also conduct safety presentations on Stranger Danger, Gun Safety and Anti-Bullying. Community requests are taken into account and our presentations can be tailored to whatever the requesting community stakeholder needs.
Coffee with a Cop is a program started in California that we have adopted in our city and have augmented it to include Pizza with a cop, Hero (sandwich) with a hero and Ice Cream with a Cop. These programs bring police officers and the community members they serve together– over coffee–to discuss issues and learn more about each other.
Community Service Officers and members of the Community/Clergy Affairs Unit visit Senior Citizen Housing and Nursing Homes to conduct the "Paint and Sip" program whereby Officers
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Second Quarter – 2018
sit with the seniors and paint small art projects while sipping coffee and tea. (Paint and sips are ongoing and we are looking to collaborate with Newark Housing for future events.) Hope One Cares Project: This program has been modeled after a similar program in Morris county. It is a mobile outreach vehicle bringing services to the addicted and afflicted and their families. Narcan training, rehab and recovery facilities, light refreshments served, CPR training and all manner of referrals provided. Citywide all officers and Detectives of the Newark Police Division continue to break new ground with their imaginative approach and dedicated commitment to community policing.
CommUnity & Cops town hall-style meetings
During the 2nd Quarter, the Consent Decree and Planning Division hosted six (6) town hall-style meetings to solicit input from the community on the implementation of Consent Decree mandates. Below are the forums hosted during this period:
 The Community Policing Policy forum was held at the Jehovah Jireh Praise & Worship Center at 505 S. 15th Street, on April 4.
 A community forum on the Stop Policy was held on April 24, at the Jehovah Jireh Praise & Worship Center.
 A public demonstration on the use of the Body Worn Camera and In Car Camera was held at Nan Newark Tech World at 400 Hawthorne Avenue on April 26.
 The community vetted the Search Policy during a panel discussion at the Waterfront Sports, Arts & Entertainment Center at 2 Grafton Avenue on May 2.
 On May 9, the Arrest Policy was the subject of a forum hosted at the Sports Club Portuguese at 55 Prospect Street.
 The 6th Precinct was the site of a community discussion on the implementation of the Consent Decree on June 5.
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NEWARK POLICE DIVISION COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT REPORT
Second Quarter – 2018
Staffing Assessment Newark Police Division
The Newark Police Division (NPD) commissioned the Urban League of Essex County to conduct a staffing study of the department in compliance with the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree requires the NPD to “assess and revise its staffing allocation and personnel deployment to support community policing and problem-solving initiatives, and modify any deployment strategy that is incompatible with effective communityoriented policing.”
Staffing Assessment Summary The Newark Police Department needs additional personnel to support its community policing and problem-solving initiatives. If the department wants Precinct Patrol officers to have adequate time to engage the community and work on problem solving projects, it needs 247 additional officers assigned to the precincts. In addition, it needs six additional detectives assigned to investigate Part 1 Crimes.
City of Newark Department of Public Safety Police Division
Consent Decree and Planning Division
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Appendix D

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STATUS OF NPD’S CONSENT DECREE POLICIES

The following chart notes the status of each Consent Decree policy.

GO#

Subject

Consent Decree Provision

Status

GO 17-06 Bias-Free Policing

Paragraph 5

GO 18-05 Body Worn Cameras

Paragraph 104

GO 18-06 In-Car Cameras

Paragraph 104

GO 18-20 Use of Force

Paragraphs 66-67

GO 18-21 Use of Force Reporting, Investigation and Review
GO 18-22 Firearms and Other Weapons

Paragraphs 66-67 Paragraphs 66-67

Date Adopted by NPD September 19, 2017 (Effective September 19, 2017) June 5, 2018 (Effective June 5, 2018) June 5, 2018 (Effective June 5, 2018) November 8, 2018 (Effective January 1, 2019) November 8, 2018 (Effective January 1, 2019) November 8, 2018 (Effective January 1, 2019)

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GO#

Subject

Consent Decree Provision

Status

Date Adopted by NPD

GO 18-14 Consensual Citizen Contacts and Paragraph 5; Section VI

December 31, 2018

Investigatory Stops (“Stops”)

(Effective January 10, 2019)

GO 18-15 Searches With or Without a

Paragraph 5; Section VI

December 31, 2018

Search Warrant (“Searches”)

(Effective January 10, 2019)

GO 18-16 Arrests With or Without an

Paragraph 5; Section VI

December 31, 2018

Arrest Warrant (“Arrests”)

(Effective January 10, 2019)

GO 18-13 Community Policing

Section V

April 4, 2019

(Effective April 4, 2019)

GO 18-24 Property and Evidence

Paragraph 110

Final approval from April 3, 2019

Division/Property and Evidence

the Independent

(Effective April 3, 2019)

Management

Monitor on March 20, (Property and Evidence

2019.

Division only)

Internal Affairs: Complaint

Section XI

Undergoing review

Intake & Investigation Process

with the Department

of Justice and

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GO#

Subject

Consent Decree Provision

Status

Date Adopted by NPD

Independent Monitor.

GO 18-26 Internal Affairs: Disciplinary Section XIII

Final approval from

Process and Matrix

the Independent

Monitor on February

25, 2019.

GO 19-03 LGBTQ Community & Police N/A Interactions1

April 3, 2019 (Effective April 3, 2019)

First Amendment Right to

N/A

Undergoing review

Observe, Object to, and Record

with the Department

Police Activity2

of Justice and

Independent Monitor.

1 Although the Consent Decree requires NPD to “operate without bias based on any demographic category,” see Consent Decree § VII, it does not require a standalone policy to address the LGBTQIA community. To help institutionalize its practices, NPD decided to draft a policy dedicated to its stop, search, and arrest of these community members.
2 The Consent Decree requires NPD to respect the public’s First Amendment right and prohibits officers from taking certain actions to discourage the exercise of these rights. Consent Decree ¶¶ 55-62. It does not expressly require NPD to create standalone policy to this end, but NPD endeavored to do so.

 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.

NO. 16-01731(MCA-MAH)

CITY OF NEWARK, Defendant.
________________________________

NEWARK POLICE DIVISION SIXTH STATUS REPORT

INTRODUCTION Pursuant to paragraph 197 of the Consent Decree entered in this matter, Defendant, the
City of Newark (“City”), submits this status report to delineate the many steps taken by the Newark Police Division (“NPD,”) to implement the Consent Decree; plans to correct any issues; and responses to any concerns that have been raised by the Independent Monitor (“Monitor”).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Newark Police Division has made significant progress toward complying with the Consent Decree and improving overall services to the community. Below are selected highlights for the reporting period of October 27, 2018 to April 27, 2019.
1. The NPD continues to collaborate with the Independent Monitoring Team (“IMT”) Subject Matter Experts (“SME”) and members of the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office to develop and draft high quality progressive police policies and training in accordance with the Consent Decree.

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2. The NPD continued to deploy body worn cameras and in-car cameras with all seven (7) precincts and detective units equipped during the reporting period. Only a handful of administrative positions remain for training and camera dissemination. Cameras serve as useful tools for recording evidence, more importantly however; they promote professionalism, accountability, and transparency by documenting officer conduct and interactions with the public in compliance with the Consent Decree.
3. The NPD continues to make progress in conducting training in substantive areas of the Consent Decree. NPD completed1 training for all Division members in Community Oriented Policing and Use of Force. The NPD is near completion on Stops, Searches and Arrests and Body Worn Cameras. Stops, Searches and Arrests is anticipated for completion on April 30th, 2019. Body Worn Camera training is anticipated for completion on or about May 31, 2019.
4. During the reporting period, the NPD continued to utilize the “PowerDMS” document management system to conduct various in-service trainings, training bulletins and storage of agency wide policies and memorandums.
5. During the reporting period, the NPD has collaborated with the Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”). On March 30th, the NPD hosted a training with CCRB in collaboration with the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office. This training covered Attorney General Guidelines and NPD’s new corresponding policy in the area of Use of Force. The training also included Vehicular Pursuit and Domestic Violence policies.
6. NPD has participated in several community engagements during the reporting period. Some highlighted community events included the NPD’s successful community rollout of the new Disciplinary Process & Matrix policy and two LGBTQ community meetings to discuss the NPD’s new LGBTQ policy and Newark specific training. The NPD continues to prioritize collaborative community engagement and the building of public trust.
7. NPD has expanded its use of the Bar Coded Evidence Analysis Statistical Tracking (“BEAST”) System. The BEAST was added in the 4th Precinct and three (3) additional software licenses are on order for the 6th and 7th Precincts and the Major Crimes Division. The BEAST continues to improve data integrity, centralize information and in general assist in applying
1 Members of the agency on various leaves of duty remain in need of these training blocks.
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consistent data and evidence handling standards across the NPD. The BEAST is on order for the two remaining precincts.
8. During the reporting period, the Gartner Group finalized its IT plan for the NPD and provided a strategic IT roadmap for NPD, supported by actionable plans and recommendations. The defined roadmap of key initiatives direct NPD’s IT investment in public safety IT for the next 3-5 years. Gartner provided an actionable IT plan that NPD can follow to enable operations and meet defined strategic objectives. The City of Newark is currently identifying funding sources to initiate the plans and recommendations submitted by the Gartner Group.
9. NPD’s commitment to transparency in its procedures and performance remains a priority. During the reporting period, transparency data has been posted and updated in compliance with Consent Decree requirements.
10. During the reporting period, members of the Consent Decree and Planning Division (“CDPD”), which serves, as the Consent Decree paragraph 196 required implementation unit, attended management training at Google headquarters in New York City and a Methods of Instruction, (MOI) course to better assist in administering all NPD trainings.
11. In compliance with Consent Decree Paragraph 78, the NPD created an All-Force Investigation Team, (“AFIT”). AFIT was initiated on January 1, 2019. AFIT is a sub-component of the Office of Professional Standards, and is responsible for tracking, reviewing and monitoring all uses of force in the NPD. In addition, AFIT is responsible for investigating serious uses of force, and may supersede any low-level or intermediate level use of force investigation. In addition to compliance with Paragraph 67, sub-sections “a” through “l”, under sub-section “j”, NPD officers are now required to report any ‘constructive authority’ wherein police personnel unholster and point a firearm at a person to exert verbal command and control over the person.
12. In furtherance of its compliance with Consent Decree, Section XIV, “Data Systems Improvements”, on January 1, 2019, the NPD launched “BlueTeam” software. BlueTeam is a companion software to the NPD’s current Internal Affairs database. BlueTeam allows the NPD to capture and feed ‘Early Warning System’ data directly into its existing Internal Affairs database, known as IAPro. Presently, NPD personnel submit Investigations of Personnel, (formal Internal Affairs complaints), Use of Force reports, Constructive Authority reports, Vehicular Pursuit reports, and Non-Disciplinary Actions into BlueTeam.
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POLICIES
During the reporting period and in compliance with Paragraph 5 of the Consent Decree, the following policies and procedures have been drafted in collaboration with members of the IMTSME’s, the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Community.
 Use of Force Policy – Approved by Monitor 09/29/17; policy effective 01/01/19.  Consensual Citizen Contacts and Investigatory Stops – Approved by Monitor 03/15/2018;
policy effective 01/24/19.  Searches with and without a Search Warrant Policy – Approved by Monitor 03/15/2018;
policy effective 01/16/19.  Arrests with and without an Arrest Warrant Policy – Approved by Monitor 03/15/18; policy
effective 01/16/19.  Body-Worn Camera Policy – Approved by Monitor 03/21/18 – Issued to NPD 06/08/18.  In-Car Camera Policy – Approved by Monitor 03/21/18 – Issued to NPD 06/06/18.  Use of Force Reporting, Investigation and Review – Approved by Monitor 03/16/18; policy
effective 01/01/19.  Firearms and Other Weapons Policy – Approved by Monitor 03/16/18; policy effective
01/01/19.  Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake Policy – Approved by Monitor 07/12/18 – Policy
revised and sent to Monitor for final approval 09/28/18. Policy has undergone several revisions in the reporting period due to procedural language of Consent Decree paragraphs 107 & 108. Presently under review with Department of Justice and Monitoring Team.  Community Policing Policy – Approved by Monitor 07/16/18 – Final approval 02/19/19; policy effective 04/04/19.  Property & Evidence Management Policy – Approved by Monitor 08/02/18 – Policy Final approval 10/19/18; policy effective 04/22/19.  Property & Evidence Division Policy – Approved by Monitor 08/02/18 – Final approval 03/20/19; policy effective 04/08/19.  First Amendment Policy – Approved by Monitor 08/09/18 for community review – Policy has undergone several revisions in the reporting period and is presently under Monitoring Team review.
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 Disciplinary Process & Matrix – Approved by Monitor 09/21/18 – Final policy approval 02/25/19; PowerDMS training block approved 03/20/19; presently undergoing NPD review at Department of Public Safety.
 LGBTQ Community & Police Interactions – This policy is not specifically cited in the Consent Decree, however the NPD continued to exhibit its commitment to community outreach with this new policy and procedure guideline for NPD officers when engaged with a member of this traditionally disenfranchised community. Policy effective April 4, 2019.
BODY WORN CAMERA
The NPD developed the body-worn and in-car camera policies addressing the requirements in paragraph 104. The Monitor and DOJ approved these policies on March 21, 2018. Following the community policy review and demonstration of the equipment on April 26, 2018, the policies were finalized and issued to the NPD on June 8, 2018.
The NPD initially implemented a "Body-Worn and In-Car Camera Pilot Program" in the Second and Fifth Precincts. As of April 2019, body-worn cameras have been deployed in all Seven Police Precincts.
Technology challenges have been uncovered during the deployment process relating to networking and BWC software/firmware issues. NPD has been working with Panasonic North America, supplier of our BWCs, and G.T.B.M., technology vendor, in order to address these issues. On January 16, 2019, Panasonic North America began deploying engineers on-site to assist NPD in remediating issues that were encountered as BWC deployment progressed. As of April 18, 2019, Panasonic engineers remain on site assisting NPD in remediating these issues.
In spite of these technological issues, NPD was able to fully deploy BWCs in all Seven (7) Precincts at year end 2018.
On April 9, 2018, the NPD implemented an 8-hour training program based on the approved BWC and In-Car Camera policies. Upon the successful deployment of BWCs in all seven Precincts, NPD began to deploy BWCs and train personnel in specialized, administrative, and investigative units.
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As of April 18, 2019, 986 officers have received the 8-hour training. The training of personnel from the below organizational components have been issued a BWC and have received training in the Panasonic Arbitrator software, in order operate, and in certain positions evaluate and monitor the proper use of the equipment, and compliance with procedure:
 Office of Professional Standards  Legal & Internal Affairs Unit  Transparency and Risk Analysis Management  Technology Unit  Integrity Control Officers  Municipal Arrest Processing Section  Communications Division / 911 Call Center  Alcohol and Beverage Control  All-Force Investigation Team  Auto Squad  Community Affairs  Criminal Intelligence Section  Crime Scene Unit  Emergency Services Unit  Environmental & Vice Unit  Fugitive Squad  Robbery Squad  Shooting Response Team  Special Victims Division
TRAINING
In compliance with Consent Decree paragraphs 10, 11, 14, training on Community Policing began on March 12, 2018 following approval of the curriculum by the Independent Monitor and DOJ. The eight (8) hour training was completed on 06/01/2018, 1043 Police Officers and 110 Special Police Officers were trained. New Police Officers will also receive the eight (8) hour training.
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The next installment of Community Policing training is scheduled to begin agency wide on May 13, 2019. The NPD has continued to participate in the "Trauma-Informed Responses to Violence Training" which brings together groups of officers and civilians, and uses a Restorative Justice approach to build trust between officers and civilians. This training is ongoing and has occurred for over two (2) years. The Trauma-Informed Responses to Violence Training is hosted by Equal Justice USA (EJUSA) focuses on pairing small groups of community members and officers to work together. It has proven to be extremely valuable in the sense that it fosters police-community engagement, better understanding, establishes better working relationships, promotes trust building, problem solving, and the exchange of different points of view from the different perspectives of both the community and law enforcement officers. The Trauma-Informed training is well received by community members and police officers alike. The training classes are small and the number of participants is limited, which is conducive to meaningful dialogue. Since its inception a total of 170 NPD personnel have participated in the training. 257 community members have also received the training. In compliance with Consent Decree paragraph 43, the NPD continues to employ an experienced Training Officer who is assisting in the development of training curricula and lesson plans as directed by the Public Safety Director or his designee. During the reporting period, the Training Officer has developed PowerPoint training blocks and examinations for the Complaint Intake and Investigations policy, the Disciplinary Process and Matrix policy and is currently developing the Property and Evidence Management and LGBTQ policy trainings. During the LGBTQ community meetings, the NPD collaborated with community members to seek input on creating videos and scenarios to better focus LGBTQ training on Newark specific topics and concerns. The NPD Training Officer was also instrumental in developing the Stop, Search and Arrest training.
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Stops, Searches and Arrests training began with a focus group on 11/08/18. The training is near completion, as of April 16th there were 95 officers remaining. The training is anticipated to be completed2 by April 30th. This training was administered by NPD personnel in conjunction with an experienced, former trial attorney.
“Fair and Impartial Policing LLC” (FIP) was selected by the NPD to administer bias free policing training. The training is scheduled to begin on April 30th for mid-manager supervisory training, and a two-day course on May 1st and 2nd for Command level officers with community members. A train-the-trainer course is scheduled for May 14th & 15th. NPD trainers will then administer bias free policing training to all NPD members.
The NPD hired an independent contractor "Force Concepts", through a grant from the National Training and Technical Assistance Center (NTTAC), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), United States Department of Justice (DOJ). The selection process was handled by NTTAC with feedback from the Independent Monitoring Team and the NPD. This training included an extensive use of force curriculum and an in-depth block of instruction for de-escalation.
Use of Force training began on October 24th, 2018 and was completed3 on February 28, 2019. A total of 1,147 NPD members were trained, including 1,050 sworn NPD members and 97 Special police officers.
NPD is working with the ‘Rodgers Group LLC’, which has been contracted by the U.S. Department of Justice to assist the NPD in developing a comprehensive 40-hour Internal Affairs Investigators Training Course along with an Internal Affairs Guidebook. A total of 10 blocks of instruction and an investigator’s guidebook were received, reviewed and forwarded back to the Rodgers Group LLC with commentary. In addition, members of the NPD are assisting with the project on the Day 5, (final training day) practical exercise. The training is still under development and review by the U.S. Department of Justice as of this reporting.
NPD has conducted 8 hours of CPR / Bleeding Control Training for 675 members to date and provided first aid equipment to each attendee. The training is ongoing. First Aid & CPR training
2 There are approximately 50 officers on various leave from active duty (long term sick/injured, military, suspension, etc.) that will have to be scheduled upon return. 3 There were approximately 74 NPD members out on various leave from duty.
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is initially provided to all personnel as part of the Police Training Commission requirements for all NJ Police Officers.
In addition to the 8-hour Body Worn Camera training for all personnel as noted above in the “Body Worn Camera” section of this report, during the reporting period the NPD developed a 4-hour body worn camera block of supervisory specific training. During the reporting period, forty (40) supervisors have been trained. This training is set to resume in May 2019.
During the reporting period, members of the Consent Decree & Planning Division responded to all precincts on all tours of duty in order to provide complementary and specific ‘roll call’ training for compliance with Body Worn Camera usage. During this roll call training, the CDPD members were able to answer and clarify direct questions posed by the men and women of the NPD tasked with wearing and utilizing the cameras.
In response to issues discovered and presented at roll call trainings, the NPD issued additional Memorandums highlighting specific procedures for compliance. Specifically, Memo #19-01, “Integrity of BWC Recordings” issued on January 3rd, 2019, reminded all personnel that under certain circumstances, improper or purposeful deactivation of a body worn camera may be a crime under N.J.S. 28-7(c). Memo #19-51, “Deactivation of BWC Recordings” issued on January 28, 2019, reminded all NPD personnel that body worn camera recordings must stay activated at crime scenes, and can only be deactivated under specific circumstances. Memo #19-89 (addendum), “Standard Issued Equipment” was issued on March 20, 2019 specifically instructed officers to ensure their body worn cameras are utilized during any patrol duties including overtime assignments, parade and festival duties. Lastly, on April 10, 2019, the NPD issued a Training Bulletin entitled “BWC Log-In” which highlighted some areas of concern for NPD officers in log in procedures for the body worn cameras.
POWER DMS
In compliance with Consent Decree paragraphs 8 and 12, during the reporting period, the NPD implemented a document management system, “Power DMS” that has condensed cabinets full of paper into a single, searchable online source that automatically disseminates, collects signatures on, and tracks NPD’s policies and procedures. Power DMS will also be used to manage training
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records and make NPD policies accessible to the community online. To date, the entire Police Division has been trained on Power DMS with the exception of fifteen (15) members, who are currently Long Term Sick or Injured, Suspended, or on Terminal Leave.
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT During the reporting period, the NPD has collaborated with the Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”). On March 19, 2018, Superior Court Judge Kessler rendered a final opinion indicating that the CCRB can serve strictly in an oversight capacity in accordance with paragraph 13 of the Consent Decree. However, the CCRB is prohibited from engaging in investigations, hearings, adjudications, or issuance of subpoena power, in matters relative to officer misconduct or discipline. The City of Newark has filed an appeal of the court’s decision. The NPD continues to provide quarterly summaries of Internal Affairs data to the Office of the Public Safety Director to be forwarded to the CCRB for review. Currently, all Consent Decree related policies developed by the NPD are being made available to the CCRB for review and input as part of the policy development process. During the reporting period, the CCRB reviewed and commented on the NPD’s Disciplinary Process and Matrix policy. On March 30th, 2019 the NPD hosted a 4-hour training session with CCRB in conjunction with the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office. This training covered Attorney General Guidelines and NPD’s new corresponding policy in the area of Use of Force. The training also included Vehicular Pursuit and Domestic Violence policies. Oral argument before the Appellate Division occurred on May 13, 2019.
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT The NPD created a ‘7th Precinct’ in Newark’s north ward. This new precinct is headquartered at 159 North 10th Street, and commenced operations on November 19, 2018. The new precinct specifically services Newark’s upper north ward, bordered by East Orange, Bloomfield and Belleville townships. This new police precinct will greatly foster a sense of community partnership and security for Newark’s upper north ward area.
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In addition, the NPD has continued to participate in numerous community engagements during the reporting period. During the reporting period, each of NPD’s precincts participated in Halloween, Thanksgiving and December holiday events including “trunk or treats”, turkey and toy giveaways. The NPD also continued to foster community engagement with events such as ‘coffee with a cop’, ‘soup with a cop’ and ‘skate with a cop’. These engagements bring police officers and community members together to discuss issues and learn more about each other. In addition, the NPD continued its outreach to youth with several school events including school safety and anti-bullying campaigns.
Precinct commanders are required to attend community events every week in an effort to foster the partnerships established with community stakeholders such as residents, business owners, faith-based organizations, school employees, social services, community groups and youth. Precinct commanders are also tasked with ensuring that the precinct Community Service Officers (CSO), and precinct School Resource Officers (SRO) are active participants in these events, in accordance with DPS Memorandum: 18-313A, Re: Neighborhood Policing Plans. NPD continues to make collaborative community engagement and the building of public trust a priority.
The Community and Clergy Affairs Unit in collaboration with Precinct CSO’s and SRO’s engage further with the community by hosting a number of events. Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.), is an evidence-based and effective gang and violence prevention program built around school-based, law enforcement officer-instructed classroom curricula. The Program is intended as an immunization against delinquency, youth violence, and gang membership for children in the years immediately before the prime ages for introduction into gangs and delinquent behavior.
On April 4, 2019, the NPD launched a new policy specifically tailored to the LGBTQ Community. This policy creates comprehensive guidelines and procedures for NPD members when encountering a person from the LGBTQ community. On April 17, 2019, New Jersey Advanced Media/Star-Ledger cited NPD’s new policy as “blazing a trail” in the area of police and transgender relations.
During the reporting period, the City of Newark in collaboration with the NPD initiated the ‘Hope One’ program, modeled after a Morris County program with the same name. The program utilizes One Newark Mobile Unit and assists area residents with social services for drug rehabilitation and
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addiction recovery, mental health issues and homelessness. To date, Newark has assisted several dozen residents with these services.

In compliance with paragraph 15, the Final Staffing Assessment Report findings submitted by the Urban League of Essex County was reviewed by the Monitoring Team. The Monitoring Team has requested additional information including a ‘relief factor’ and workload study. The NPD in collaboration with members of the Monitoring Team are presently revising the Staffing Assessment.

In accordance with paragraph 19, the CDPD continued to conduct CommUnity & Cops town hall style meetings, which exist as a platform to seek and respond to input from the community about the implementation of Consent Decree mandates. During these meetings, the community is encouraged to express their opinions and concerns, and to become involved in future forums, as well as provide their input to be considered as part of the NPD policy development process. Community feedback is gathered during the forums, and any questions or concerns are addressed by the NPD and made publicly available on the NPD and Consent Decree websites.

The following Consent Decree Community Forums have taken place during this reporting period:

•

10/30/18: Disciplinary Process and Matrix Policy Forum at the Terrell Homes

Housing complex community room, 35 Riverview Court, Newark.

•

02/28/19: Consent Decree & Planning Division’s Consent Decree Progress Report

at Saint James A.M.E. Church, 588 Dr. Martin Luther King Blvd, Newark.

•

11/12/18: LGBTQ Community & Police Interactions Policy Forum at the Unity

Fellowship Church, 23 Branford Place, Newark.

•

03/11/19: LGBTQ Community & Police Interactions Policy Forum at the Unity

Fellowship Church, 23 Branford Place, Newark.

In compliance with Paragraph 18 of the Consent Decree, the NPD has posted its Community Policing Quarterly Reports for the 3rd (01/15/19) and 4th (03/05/19) quarters of 2018 to its NPD Consent Decree website, npdconsentdecree.org. The NPD will be submitting its 1st Quarter 2019 report in the near future.

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PROPERTY AND EVIDENCE MANAGEMENT During the reporting period, the Monitor has approved the NPD Property and Evidence Management and Property and Evidence Division policies. The Property and Evidence Management policy was effective April 22, 2019 while the Property and Evidence Division policy was effective on April 8th, 2019. Temporary evidence lockers have been installed in Municipal Arrest and Processing Section (“MAPS”) which has allowed for the process of securing evidence and property at MAPS to be streamlined.
Property & Evidence Division personnel now monitor 38 newly installed HD cameras in and around the property facility daily to ensure security and integrity is maintained.
The BEAST software is being utilized to electronically track property and evidence via a barcode scanning system. In the reporting period, the 4th Precinct received the BEAST software. Three (3) additional BEAST licenses are currently on order. Upon receipt, these will be disseminated to the 6th and 7th Precincts and Major Crimes Division. After dissemination and training of personnel at the three aforementioned NPD facilities, all NPD sites accepting property and evidence will have the BEAST software installed.
As per paragraph 110, subsection d, of the Consent Decree, working video cameras have been installed at each precinct and the property room to monitor areas where property is handled and stored. Additionally, plans are still in development regarding the NPD’s new Property & Evidence Division facility.
During the reporting period, the following accomplishments have been noted by the Property & Evidence Division.
 7,480 pounds of obsolete IT equipment recycled;  1,634 firearms destroyed;  69,411 old narcotics cases destroyed;  All known firearms (8,943) and narcotics (20,497) entered into the BEAST;  Establishment of Firearms only storage room;  Separation of Police Division property and evidence from supplies  Construction of new racks for Homicide Cases;
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 Computerized electronic key card access;
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The Gartner Group held its final presentation with the NPD on December 12th, 2018. Gartner Group officials presented the NPD with its strategic IT roadmap for the NPD supported by actionable plans and recommendations. The defined roadmap of key initiatives direct NPD’s IT investment in public safety IT for the next 3-5 years. Gartner provided an actionable IT plan that NPD can follow to enable operations and meet defined strategic objectives consistent with the Consent Decree. The Gartner Group also held its final presentation with City Hall officials on February 21st, 2019. The city of Newark is currently identifying funding sources to initiate the plans and recommendations submitted by the Gartner Group.
TRANSPARENCY NPD’s commitment to transparency in its procedures and performance remains a priority. During the reporting period, transparency data has been posted and updated in compliance with Consent Decree requirements. The Department of Public Safety's (DPS) website is regularly updated and revised to make the most up-to-date information available to all members of the community. The website can be accessed online by going to: http://npd.newarkpublicsafety.org/ Within the DPS website, the public can also access a separate website, which was specifically designed and created by the Consent Decree & Planning Division to include all Consent Decree related activity. The site is available by clicking the tab CommUNITY & COPS, or by accessing it from any internet connected computer or mobile device by going to: https://www.npdconsentdecree.org/. As the NPD continues the process of developing and revising its policies and procedures in collaboration with the Independent Monitoring Team and DOJ, the NPD will publish all policies on its website.
The following is transparency data is currently available on the NPD website:
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1. Sworn Personnel Rules and Regulations

2. Civilian Personnel Rules and Regulations

3. ComStat related information

4. Crime Statistical Data

5. Transparency Data

•

Discipline

•

Misconduct Complaints

•

Body Worn Camera Policy and Survey

•

Use of Force Data to include; Type of Force Used, Race and Gender of the

person and injuries sustained by person/s and/or officer/s

AUDITS

During the reporting period, the NPD initiated the ‘Compliance Unit” within the Consent Decree and Planning Division. The Compliance Unit is tasked with conducting audits pursuant to the Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (“G.A.G.A.S.”).

During the reporting period, NPD’s Compliance Unit completed several Body Worn Camera (BWC) audits. The following tables summarize the inspection results.

Emergency Services Unit Audit

CDPD randomly selected January 14, 2019 to and including January 20, 2019, as the inspection period. All related tour and log sheets were reviewed along with BWC videos that were related to our Emergency Services Unit (ESU).

Summary of Inspection Findings:

Objective No.

Objective Description

Did the officer activate the BWC when the policy 1.
required it to be.

Number Meeting Standards

Percentage Meeting Standard

33/39

85%

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2.

Was the BWC video classified correctly

30/30

100%

This audit revealed that all the critical incidents involving contact with civilians were documented on the BWC recordings. However, six incidents involving no contact with civilians but requiring BWC recordings were not done.
As a result of this audit the following recommendations were made:
 The supervisors of the Emergency Services Unit (ESU) are to check on a daily basis that assignments requiring the activation of the BWC camera are done so in compliance with the General Order 18-05.
 Integrity Control Officers are to conduct random checks to verify that assignments where ESU personnel are dispatched to are recorded, when required to, and in compliance with General Order 18-05.
 Further non-compliance shall result in NDA’s or formal investigations of personnel.
Supervisory BWC policy audit
CDPD randomly selected November 16, 2018 to and including November 23, 2018, as the inspection period. As of the inspection date, First, Second, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Precincts have deployed BWC’s. All related tour sheets, supervisor logs, supervisor Field Inspection reports, administrative reports and all emails submitted by desk supervisors pursuant to their review of two videos per tour were gathered and examined.
This inspection evaluated five objectives. Of the five objectives, the NPD attained a compliance rate of 95% or lower in each. The following table summarizes the inspection results:

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Table No. 1 – Summary of Inspection Findings

Objective No.

Objective Description

Did the desk supervisor submit a BWC

1.

Compliance Report during their shift to

document the review of two videos?

Was the BWC Compliance Report 1a.
Accurate?

Did the Field Supervisor submit a Field

2.

Inspection Report during his/her

respective tour of duty?

Was the BWC section of the Field 2a.
Inspection Report Accurate?

Did the desk supervisor review BWC

3.

footage of arrests or searches involving

the recovery of contraband evidence?

Number Meeting Standards

Percentage Meeting Standard

Percentage Meeting Standard
1st Inspection

Difference in
Compliance Rate

112/120

93%

48%

↑ 45%

160/224

72%

67%

↑ 5%

168/240

70%

63%

↑ 7%

155/162

95%

71%

↑ 24%

0/9

0%

---

---

BWC Supervisory Review Forms Audit

One hundred and twelve of the one hundred and twenty instances where BWC review forms should have been submitted were found and reviewed. The forms indicated 224 BWC videos were reviewed out of a possible 240 for a 93% compliance rate. The following table breaks down compliance for Objective No. 1 by Precinct.

Compliance by Precinct

Precinct
1st 2nd

No. of Forms Submitted 23 21

Number to Meet Standard 24 24

Percentage Meeting Standard 96% 87%

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4th

24

24

5th

22

24

6th

22

24

Supervisor’s Field Inspection Reports Audit

100% 92% 92%

The Compliance Unit identified 240 instances where Supervisor’s Field Inspection Reports (SFIR), DP1:2048 should have been submitted. CDPD reviewed SFIR’s submitted by field supervisors along with log sheets and tour sheets to determine if the SFIR was submitted.

One-hundred sixty-eight out of the two-hundred forty (70%) instances where forms should have been submitted were found. The following table breaks down compliance for Objective No. 2 by Precinct.

Compliance by Precinct

Precinct
1st 2nd 4th 5th 6th

No. of SFIR’s Reviewed 38 30 30 31 39

Number to Meet Standard 48 48 48 48 48

Percentage Meeting Standard 80% 63% 63% 65% 82%

Accuracy of Supervisor’s Field Inspection Reports
CDPD reviewed Supervisor’s Field Inspection Reports (SFIRs) submitted by field supervisors, tour sheets, log sheets and the Arbitrator back end client to determine if the reports submitted were accurate in their details, specifically relating to the BWC section. CDPD reviewed onehundred twenty-two SFIRs for accuracy by checking the corresponding Arbitrator back-end client log. CDPD determined there were two-hundred and five instances where the field supervisor checked individual officers for BWC compliance.
One hundred fifty-five out of one-hundred sixty-two (95%) SFIRs BWC sections were found to be accurate in their details and met the standard for this objective. Seven SFIRs indicated
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officers were compliant with policy regarding the use of Body Worn Camera specifically by indicating officers had logged in and synced their BWC to the In-Car Camera. However, upon review of the corresponding Arbitrator back-end client log of those seven instances, inaccuracies were found. The following table breaks down compliance Precinct.

Compliance by Precinct

Precinct
1st 2nd 4th 5th 6th

No. of SFIR BWC Inspections Reviewed
38 30 30 25 39

No. of SFIR’s found to be Accurate in their details 38 30 30 25 32

Percentage Meeting Standard
100% 100% 100% 100% 82%

BWC Evidence Recovery
CDPD set out to review BWC Evidence Recovery Video Reports submitted by desk supervisors, arrest records, tour sheets and Arbitrator backend client administrative software to determine if BWC videos have been reviewed as indicated by policy and to determine if the reports submitted were accurate in their details.
CDPD identified nine instances where BWC footage should have been reviewed for accuracy. No reviews of those associated BWC videos was conducted. No BWC Evidence Recovery Video Reports were completed for the inspection period for a 0% compliance rate.

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Precinct
1st 2nd 4th 5th 6th

Compliance by Precinct

No. of Arrest or Searches involving
recovery of Contraband Evidence
2 0 3 4 0

No. of BWC Evidence Recovery
Video Reports Completed 0 0 0 0 0

Percentage Meeting Standard
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

In response to the above results of non-compliance by precincts the following steps were taken to correct the deficiency.

(a) Communications Division was given instructions to issue a “General” broadcast, every tour to all units reminding them that if they have an arrest involving contraband evidence they must download their video of the incident and notify their desk supervisor of the arrest.
(b) A diagram was printed and disseminated agency wide showing officers and supervisors what specific steps have to be taken when a contraband arrest has been made:

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(c) Consent Decree & Planning Division personnel have conducted Precinct inspections on body worn cameras as well as officer inspections in the field.
(d) A review of the ’24 Hour’ arrest reports for contraband arrests is done on a daily basis. Any arrest involving contraband is checked for compliance.
It should be noted that as a result of these new steps taken by the Consent Decree & Planning Division compliance with this objective has seen a dramatic increase in compliance. Every arrest that involves the recovery of any type of contraband/evidence is reviewed by the CDPD’s Compliance Unit on a daily basis and a report is completed with the results. This practice started in January 2019. In January and February, the CDPD Compliance Unit has viewed over one-hundred videos and has referred four, to either commands or the Office of Professional Standards for further action due to officer’s actions. The Compliance Unit also reviews any arrest involving the below listed charges and check to ensure that a field supervisor was at the scene to approve the arrest. Under G.O. 18-16 XIII. SUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITES A. Field Supervisors 1. Field Supervisors will respond to the incident scene, absent exceptional circumstances, to approve arrests made by officers:
 where the officer used force  for obstructing the administration of law  for resisting arrest  for disorderly conduct  for a violation where there is a breach of the peace  for a custodial arrest for a motor vehicle infraction
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In addition, the NPD CDPD completed two quarterly audits for the second half of 2018 of FI/Stop Reports and is currently in the process of conducting the first quarter audit of 2019. The following table summarizes the inspection results.

Objective No.

Objective Description

Does the Stop Report articulate

1. reasonable articulable suspicion for

the stop?

2.

Does the Stop Report articulate reasonable suspicion for frisk?

3.

Does the Stop Report articulate probable cause for a search?

4.

Was the Stop Report Accurately completed?

Number Meeting Standard – 1st Quarter

Number Meeting Standard – 2nd Quarter

Number Meeting Standard – 3rd Quarter

Number Meeting Standard – 4th Quarter

46/61

44/61

48/64

45/62

2/7 9/17 26/61

0/5 8/10 30/61

0/2 11/12 36/65

3/7 11/14 35/62

In response to the Audit results, the NPD has initiated some procedural changes including:
During the reporting period, NPD’s “Stop Report”, DP1: 1388 was revised and forwarded to the Department of Justice and Independent Monitoring Team for review. On April 17th, 2019, NPD’s Stop Report was approved by the Department of Justice and Independent Monitoring Team. The report has been forwarded to ‘Enforsys Inc.’ for digital development and entry into NPD’s Records Management System.

RESPONSES TO MONITOR'S CONCERNS/REPORTS
During the reporting period, the monitor issued 6th and 7th Consent Decree Quarterly Reports. The 6th Quarter Report was published on January 16th, 2019 and covered the period of April 1, 2018 to June 30th, 2018. The 7th Quarterly Report was published on April 16th, 2019 and covered the period of July 1st, 2019 to September 30th, 2019. The Quarterly Reports highlight accomplishments and deficiencies related to NPD Consent Decree activity.
It should be noted that these reports are filed in the current reporting period, however the reported activity occurred during prior reporting periods. NPD's response to the cited Monitor’s concerns are:

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Data Systems:
As referenced above, the NPD has received IT plans and recommendations from the Gartner Group in order to improve its data systems for greater Consent Decree compliance. The NPD is in the process of identifying funds to enable the agency to move forward in this critical area. The NPD activated BlueTeam software to streamline its mandated reporting consistent with NJ Attorney General Guidelines and Consent Decree. This software works in conjunction with the NPD’s Internal Affairs software database, IAPro for more reliable reporting, tracking and monitoring.
Training:
Section IV of the Consent Decree specifically addresses broad training issues for the NPD. The monitor has maintained that the NPD lacks a training infrastructure due to an insufficient amount of skilled trainers assigned to the unit. During the reporting period, there was a new commander installed at the Training Division due to retirement.
Community Engagement:
The NPD believes that the level of community engagement underway in the NPD is unprecedented and unmatched in modern policing. Evidence of the level of community engagement is available daily through the NPD's social media as noted above.
Internal Affairs: The Monitor’s 6th Quarterly Report paid considerable attention to NPD’s Internal Affairs process, specifically citing a comprehensive account of NPD Internal Affairs investigations and processes from 2015 and 2016. During the reporting period, the following updates and revisions were enacted regarding the Office of Professional Standards:
 The policy has undergone several procedural language revisions since initial approval to address the Monitor’s concerns as related to Paragraphs 107 & 108, ‘potential risk of theft’. The latest revision is presently under review by Department of Justice and Monitoring Team.
 A civilian complaint form entitled “Complaint of Employee Misconduct” was drafted and forwarded to the Department of Justice and Monitoring Team on October 16th, 2018. After several reviews and revisions, the report was forwarded to the Monitor for final approval
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on March 22, 2019. The report will be translated into Portuguese and Spanish upon final approval.  The NPD revised its Office of Professional Standards pamphlet and forwarded same to the Department of Justice and Monitoring Team on October 16th, 2018. After several reviews and revisions, the pamphlet was forwarded to the Monitor for final approval on March 22, 2019. The pamphlet will be translated into Portuguese and Spanish upon final approval.  The Office of Professional Standards civilian ‘Contact Letter’ was revised as per 6th Quarter report concerns and sent to Department of Justice and Monitoring Team on March 29th, 2019.  On March 20, 2019, the NPD initiated Office of Professional Standards ‘Investigator Logs’ for every OPS investigation. These logs will be affixed to each investigation and have a written, itemized account of all investigative steps taken during an investigation.  On March 20th, 2019, the NPD initiated an Office of Professional Standards ‘Social Media’ memorandum to ensure investigators are reviewing various social media during investigations.  The NPD revised its standard investigative statement form for the Office of Professional Standards. The statement form was forwarded to the Department of Justice and Monitoring Team on February 1st, 2019. This revised statement incorporated several concerns as cited by the 6th Quarter Report including voluntary consent, confidentiality, retaliation, seeking individuals the complainant spoke with regarding the complaint, etc. It has since undergone several reviews and revisions and is presently under review by the Department of Justice regarding the “swearing in” of complainants and witnesses.  As noted above, the Rodgers Group LLC is presently developing and revising the NPD Internal Affairs Guidebook and 40-hour training curricula. Training and Guidebook presently under review by the Department of Justice.  During the reporting period, the NPD initiated ‘Non-Disciplinary Actions’, (“NDA’s”) which are generally defined as on-the-spot remedial or corrective actions, such as counseling or re-training, taken by supervisors to address minor deficiencies or inadequate performance committed by their subordinates. NDA’s are submitted into BlueTeam and are now part of the NPD Early Warning System. An In-Service Training Bulletin on NDA’s was issued agency wide on January 25th, 2019.
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 During the 7th Quarterly Report, the Monitoring Team cited concerns about NPD’s processes for conducting targeted and random integrity audits related to accepting or discouraging the filing of misconduct complaints, as cited in Paragraphs 117 & 118. The NPD had provided a sub-section to the new Complaint Intake & Investigations policy regarding these matters in June 2018. However, at that time it was decided in conjunction with the Monitor’s Internal Affairs Subject Matter Expert that the integrity auditing and compliance information would best be suited for an investigator’s manual. The investigator manual/guidebook is presently still under Department of Justice review.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Avion M. Benjamin Avion M. Benjamin First Assistant Corporation Counsel City of Newark
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the City of Newark's Sixth Status Report was filed electronically on May 20, 2019. Notice of this filing will be sent to all parties via the Court's electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court's system.

By:

/s/ Avion M. Benjamin

Avion M. Benjamin First Assistant Corporation Counsel City of Newark

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 Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 1 of 179 PageID: 2292
United States v. City of Newark, et al., Civil Action No. 16-1731 (MCA) (MAH)
CONSENT DECREE
Independent Monitor - Eighth Quarterly Report
Peter C. Harvey Independent Monitor August 9, 2019

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 2 of 179 PageID: 2293 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF EIGHTH QUARTER’S ACTIVITIES (OCTOBER 1, 2018 – DECEMBER 31, 2018) ..................................................................1
II. DETAILED STATUS UPDATE .........................................................................................2 A. NPD’s Staffing Assessment and Modified Deployment Strategy ...........................2 B. Surveys.....................................................................................................................6 1. Community Probability Survey (Telephone Survey) ..................................7 2. Non-Probability Community Survey (Street Survey) ................................10 C. Consent Decree Trainings......................................................................................12 D. Consent Decree-Related Policies ...........................................................................13 E. Independent Monitoring Team’s Community Events............................................16
III. NEXT QUARTER ACTIVITIES (JANUARY 1, 2019 – MARCH 31, 2019) .................17 A. Audits .....................................................................................................................17 B. Youth Engagement.................................................................................................17
IV. APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................18 A. Chronology of Key Events.....................................................................................18 B. Compliance Chart ..................................................................................................18 C. Probability Community Survey Final Report and Summary Materials .................18 D. Non-Probability Survey Report .............................................................................18 E. Training Status Update Chart.................................................................................18 F. Policy Status Update Chart ....................................................................................18
i

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EIGHTH QUARTERLY REPORT (October 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018)
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF EIGHTH QUARTER’S ACTIVITIES (OCTOBER 1, 2018 – DECEMBER 31, 2018)1 This is Independent Monitor Peter C. Harvey’s Eighth Quarterly Report, which
comments on the City of Newark (the “City”) and Newark Police Division’s (“NPD”) progress with Consent Decree reforms during the period from October 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.2
Appendix A provides a list of this quarter’s key Consent Decree events. Appendix B is the Monitoring Team’s Compliance Chart, which assesses NPD’s progress with Consent Decree tasks. Appendix C is the Probability Community Survey Final Report and summary materials, which sets forth the results of the Monitor’s annual survey of the Newark community’s experiences with and perceptions of NPD and public safety. Appendix D contains the full report of the Monitoring Team’s Non-Probability Community Survey—a non-scientific survey that collects information on the public’s perceptions of NPD and public safety. Appendix E provides the status of NPD’s Consent Decree-related trainings. Appendix F provides the status of NPD’s new or revised Consent Decree policies (“General Orders”).
1 Unless otherwise stated, the City’s and NPD’s progress with respect to Consent Decree tasks, as described in this Quarterly Report, reflects developments as of December 31, 2018. 2 For a more detailed introduction to the Independent Monitoring Team, the Consent Decree, and the Parties to the Consent Decree, please see the Monitoring Team’s website: https://www.newarkpdmonitor.com/.
1

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II. DETAILED STATUS UPDATE A. NPD’s Staffing Assessment and Modified Deployment Strategy The way that a police department allocates its resources reflects its priorities. For
this reason, a foundational requirement of the Consent Decree mandates that, at the outset of the Consent Decree, NPD assess and revise its officer staffing allocation (a “Staffing Assessment”), as well as create a deployment strategy (“Deployment Plan”), to strengthen the community policing presence in the precincts. (Consent Decree ¶ 15.) Specifically, Paragraph 15 of the Consent Decree provides that “[b]y July 9, 2017, NPD will assess and revise its staffing allocation and personnel deployment to support community policing and problem-solving initiatives, and will modify any deployment strategy that is incompatible with effective community-oriented policing.”
NPD is committed to accomplishing this requirement and has taken steps to revise its staffing allocation and personnel deployment to support community policing and problem solving initiatives. During this reporting period (October 1- December 31, 2018), NPD submitted for review a Staffing Assessment of current deployments. This Staffing Assessment is a preliminary evaluation of NPD’s future deployment strategy. We note that this Staffing Assessment was submitted for review more than two years into the Consent Decree. As of this report’s publishing, NPD is still working, with technical assistance from the Monitoring Team, to develop a more comprehensive evaluation of its Staffing Assessment and Deployment Plan that will allow NPD to transition fully to a community-oriented policing and problem-solving model as required by the Consent Decree. NPD, through the City of Newark, agreed with the U.S. Department of Justice that it would adopt this policing strategy and deployment model. NPD will likely need to increase its deployment of street patrol officers in each precinct, ensure that those officers have ample time to engage with community members in a meaningful way, build
2

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relationships of trust with them, and begin to evaluate officer performance by metrics that demonstrate their success in developing relationships with the community and implementing problem-solving efforts, and holding Precinct Commanders accountable for the quality of police service delivery and community engagement. This approach is distinguished from a purely numbers- or statistics- driven measurement of success that examines only the number of law enforcement actions taken (e.g., the number of arrests or stops). Neither NPD nor the Monitoring Team can determine the full scope of changes without a comprehensive Staffing Assessment.
As background, the delay in developing a comprehensive Staffing Assessment and revised staffing/personnel Deployment Plan is due in large part to the limited budget that the City allocated to hire a policing expert to prepare an analysis for NPD. Staffing studies of this type for a major metropolitan city typically cost around $100,000. The City allowed approximately $17,000 to hire a staffing expert. This low budget may be attributable to the complexities of the bidding process that attaches to city contracts that exceed a certain dollar amount. Whatever the reason, the City, in our view, must allocate a sufficient budget to obtain a quality Staffing Assessment.
NPD’s efforts to develop an overall Staffing Assessment and Deployment Plan have been ongoing. In May 2017, two months prior to the deadline established by the Consent Decree to complete this task, NPD retained a consultant to assess its staffing allocations and deployments. On September 12, 2018, over two years after the Consent Decree was filed and more than one year after the Consent Decree’s July 2017 deadline, NPD submitted its Staffing Assessment to the Monitoring Team for review and comment. The Staffing Assessment revealed that NPD’s police precincts are dramatically understaffed to handle calls for service, leaving
3

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officers little time for community engagement and problem solving and in many cases, having insufficient units on the street to respond to 911 calls at certain times of the day. The Staffing Assessment also recommended that NPD assign additional patrol officers to its precincts in proportion to the number of service calls received in that area.
Shortly after NPD shared the Staffing Assessment with the Monitoring Team, NPD opened (and staffed) two additional police precincts, and executed several other organizational changes aimed at increasing precinct staffing, such as transferring all 46 police officer positions from the “Community Focus Division” to the individual police precincts. While it is true that NPD undertook these precinct changes to address the Staffing Assessment recommendation that additional staffing was required in the Precincts, it is difficult to determine how these staffing decisions will fit into an overall police deployment plan at this stage given the incomplete nature of the Staffing Assessment. It is clear, however, that these changes alone will not sufficiently address precinct staffing shortages.
NPD has not provided the Monitoring Team with a date on which it expects to complete the revised Staffing Assessment to support community policing and problem-solving initiatives as contemplated by Paragraph 15 of the Consent Decree. After this reporting period, NPD provided one of the Monitoring Team Subject Matter Experts with new data from NPD’s Computer Aided Dispatch system concerning calls for service and the length of time needed to complete the assignment. NPD must incorporate this data into the revised Staffing Assessment. The Monitoring Team will continue to provide technical assistance to assist NPD in the completion of its obligations under Paragraph 15 of the Consent Decree.
NPD’s delay in completing the Staffing Assessment and developing and executing an officer Deployment Plan that prioritizes community engagement has impeded its
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compliance with Paragraph 15 of the Consent Decree and Consent Decree reforms. Indeed, at several community meetings hosted by the Monitor throughout the City, Newark residents have expressed concern to the Monitoring Team about inadequate officer staffing during particular times of the day and in certain neighborhoods. That concern also has been reflected in responses to surveys conducted by the Monitoring Team regarding (i) the lack of consistent police presence in many neighborhoods, (ii) delayed response time to service calls, and (iii) the absence of beat officers engaging with community members generally and in problem-solving initiatives. The current structure for community policing relies on the assignment of a few community policing officers to precincts, with only limited engagement by other precinct officers in community engagement as a part of their regular work due to response demands from 911 calls. The Newark community wants engagement by all officers in a Precinct, more regular police patrols and quicker response times.3
There is no doubt that to fully staff each precinct—and provide the level of police service that Newark residents want and deserve—the City should continue to hire additional police officers. Community-oriented policing is not a responsibility relegated to a few NPD officers, whether they are designated as “Community Service Officers,” “School Resource Officers” or some other title. NPD also will have to ensure that its Precinct Commanders focus on holding their officers accountable for building relationships with community members and problem solving, in addition to the traditional metrics of reducing crime and solving cases.
3 Results from the Community Probability Survey, discussed below, suggest that community members want NPD to provide more regular police patrols and a quicker response time to service calls. As discussed in section II(B) of this Report, for example, survey respondents reported that their feelings of safety increased with more frequent police patrols. Additionally, 80% of respondents reported that they would like to see an increase in the number of NPD officers patrolling their neighborhoods. In fact, 31% of the survey participants answered that Newark police “rarely” or “never” respond to 911 calls quickly enough. See Appendix C.
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NPD should complete its revised Staffing Assessment as soon as possible. It should then develop a Deployment Plan that reflects the results of its Assessment. The implementation of community policing is long overdue.
B. Surveys The Consent Decree requires the Monitor to conduct an annual survey “of the
Newark community’s experience with and perceptions of NPD and public safety.” (Consent Decree ¶¶ 22-23.) The Monitoring Team has addressed this Consent Decree requirement by conducting three annual surveys, which will be described in more detail below: (1) a Probability Community Survey; (2) a Non-Probability Community Survey and (3) a survey of police officers. Each of these surveys serves a different purpose.
The Community Probability Survey is a telephone survey conducted using statistical sampling techniques that allow the Monitoring Team to glean the perceptions of NPD policing across all Newark residents based on the results provided by a scientifically selected random sample of residents. The questions used in connection with this survey are the same as those used in the baseline probability survey conducted by the Monitoring Team in 2016-17. Thus, the data gathered from the survey allows the Monitoring Team to measure changes, if any, in Newark residents’ experiences with and perceptions of NPD and public safety over time.
The Non-Probability Community Survey of Newark residents in person on the street (also known as a “street survey”) attempts to capture the experiences and perceptions of Newark residents, including those who may not have participated in the phone survey. The street survey was conducted using a modified version of the Community Probability Survey instrument. Because the street survey was not administered using sampling techniques, the results cannot be extrapolated from the individual survey responses to the Newark community at
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large in the same way that the results from the Community Probability Survey can be extrapolated. Nonetheless, the street survey can help NPD to identify current and recent issues or concerns specific to Newark.
The Police Survey provides data on officer attitudes on a range of issues primarily relating to how officers perceive they are being treated by NPD’s leadership.
The Monitoring Team has completed its Community Probability Survey and NonProbability Survey and discusses the findings from both surveys below. The Monitoring Team will present the results of its Police Survey in a subsequent Quarterly Report.
1. Community Probability Survey (Telephone Survey) As reported in the Seventh Quarterly Report (July 1 – September 30, 2018), the Monitor engaged Suffolk University Political Research Center (“Suffolk”), led by Director David Paleologos, to carry out the second-year probability survey. From September 9 to September 30, 2018, Suffolk conducted phone interviews with 700 Newark residents—92 by landline and 608 by cell phone—who were distributed across the Central, East, North, South, and West wards. Suffolk selected survey respondents randomly from a sample pool of over 61,000 Newark residents. Starting from a pool of over 61,000 Newark residents, Suffolk randomly selected a stratified sample of survey respondents that matched Newark’s census demographics with respect to age, sex, level of education, race/ethnicity, and ward. This permits statistically valid conclusions to be extrapolated to the community as a whole. The survey followed the industry standard of a 1.96 standard deviation at a 95% level of confidence for a margin of +/3.7 percentage points. As mentioned above, in administering the second annual probability survey Suffolk used the same questions that were developed by the Monitoring Team and the Parties for the baseline survey. This allows for a year-over-year comparison of Newark residents’
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Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 10 of 179 PageID: 2301 experiences with and perceptions of NPD and public safety. The second annual survey is now completed. (A summary of Suffolk’s second annual survey findings and the full report and analysis are attached to this Quarterly Report as Appendix C.) The survey results show some positive signs of NPD’s progress in changing the perception of safety in Newark communities. Suffolk identified a number of interesting shifts in survey responses from the firstyear survey. For example, survey respondents reported feeling safer in their homes (54% reported feeling “very safe,” up eight percentage points from last year) and walking around their neighborhoods at night (17% reported feeling “very safe,” also up eight percentage points from last year).
Figure 1 2018 Community Probability Survey
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Figure 2 2017 Community Probability Survey 55% How safe do you feel under the following circumstances?

46% 40%
37%

33% 28% 27%

5% 3%

7% 7%

9%

At Home During the Day

At Home At Night

Walking Around Neighborhood at Night

Very safe Somewhat safe Not very safe Not safe at all

When asked about the level of concern they felt regarding the possibility of excessive force being used on them if they were stopped by an NPD officer, a 9 point decrease can be seen in those who felt “somewhat concerned” (16%) and a 10 point increase in those who were “not at all concerned” (37%). Similarly, survey respondents were less concerned about being the victim of a crime compared to first-year respondents.
Figure 3 2018 Community Probability Survey
How worried are you that you will be a victim of a crime?
32%

15%

19%

22%

11%

Very Worried Somewhat Worried

Not Very

Not At All Already Have Been

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Figure 4 2017 Community Probability Survey

How worried are you that you will be a victim

36%

of a crime?

28%

22%

11%

3%

Very worried Somewhat worried

Not very worried

Not at all Already been

worried

victim of

crime

The survey revealed substantial increases in the percentage of Newark residents who obtain information about NPD from the Internet and social media. NPD should consider using more social media and other Internet tools to both better communicate with the public and improve its transparency and community relations.
Suffolk’s recommendation (which the Monitor endorses) is that NPD establish an Instagram page and hire a civilian social media manager to maintain it.
2. Non-Probability Community Survey (Street Survey) The Monitoring Team, led by the New Jersey Institute for Social Justice (“NJISJ”), completed its second non-probability community survey. On Saturday, November 17, 2018, from 12:00pm to 2:00pm, NJISJ led a city-wide “street survey” throughout Newark’s five wards to collect information on the public’s perceptions of NPD and public safety. The

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street survey was conducted by 18 volunteers, consisting of NJISJ staff and local law students. A team of two or three volunteers was assigned to each ward, with suggestions from NJISJ and other community organizations on where to find heavy foot traffic. The questions used in the street survey were the same as those used in the Monitoring Team’s first year street survey. Pedestrians agreeing to complete the survey could respond by stopping and filling out the survey themselves, having the volunteer read the questions aloud and record the answers, or taking a copy of the survey with them and returning a completed version to NJISJ later.4 The team collected approximately 81 responses. (The results of the Non-Probability Survey are attached as Appendix E.)
The data gathered from the street survey provides insight into the experiences, perceptions and attitudes of individual Newark residents about policing in the city. Additionally, much like community members’ comments during community events, these responses shed light on issues of concern to the community. On the whole, the results of the second-year street survey are similar to those of the first. The survey responses contained some encouraging results: for example, over 40% of respondents indicated that they have “a lot” of respect for Newark Police in general, compared to only 17% who reported having “none at all;” almost twothirds of survey respondents reported feeling at least “somewhat safe” in their neighborhood during the day; and 63% indicated they would like to see an increase in the number of NPD officers patrolling their neighborhood, compared to only 10% who wanted a decrease.
But the survey responses also revealed some troubling results: for example, (1) over half of respondents reported feeling “not very safe” or “not safe at all” walking around their neighborhood at night; (2) 40% of respondents indicated they were “not very likely” to ask for
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help from an NPD officer if they were in need of assistance; (3) when asked how much trust they had for NPD, 32% said they have “none at all;” and (4) over half of respondents believed that if they were to file a complaint with NPD, their complaint would not be adequately investigated. A majority of respondents believed that use of body-worn cameras would improve relations between NPD and the community and increase trust of NPD.
C. Consent Decree Trainings During this reporting period NPD continued administering training to NPD
personnel based on (a) Use of Force, (b) Consensual Citizen Contacts and Investigatory Stops, (c) Searches With or Without a Search Warrant, and (d) Arrests With or Without an Arrest Warrant. These training sessions used training materials approved by both DOJ and the Monitoring Team. SMEs from the Monitoring Team observed 20 training sessions in total, including 13 Use of Force and 7 Stops, Searches and Arrests training sessions. NPD also reports that by December 31, 2018, all relevant NPD officers had been trained on body-worn and in-car cameras. (For the status of each of NPD’s Consent Decree-related training, see Appendix E.)
As of the close of this reporting period, NPD had not yet finalized a contract with a vendor hired to develop its Bias-Free Policing training curriculum. However, after the close of this reporting period, NPD retained Fair & Impartial Policing, LLC (“FIP”), a provider of implicit-bias-awareness training for law enforcement in the United States and Canada, to develop its Bias-Free Policing training curriculum. In April 2019, FIP began to deliver components of its Bias-Free training to mid-managers, command staff and community members. These components are not the final product on which officers will be trained. NPD must incorporate Newark-specific scenarios and content that is uniquely applicable to its police force and its City
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in order to comply with the Consent Decree. The Monitoring Team looks forward to reporting on NPD’s progress administering the training in future quarterly reports.
Also during this reporting period, NPD and DOJ report their continued collaboration to assist one of DOJ’s training vendors to develop an internal affairs training curriculum and procedural manual to provide investigative guidance and protocols for detectives assigned to NPD’s Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”), the name for NPD’s internal affairs unit. Because the Parties have not provided drafts of these materials to the Monitoring Team, we are not in a position to comment on them. It is the Monitoring Team’s understanding and expectation that the procedural manual will address Consent Decree Paragraph 149’s requirement that NPD develop capabilities for consistent tracking of complaint, investigation, and disciplinary data.
D. Consent Decree-Related Policies As of the filing of this Report, NPD has put into effect 14 of 16 new or revised
Consent Decree-related policies. Only two policies required by the Consent Decree remain to be put into effect by the Public Safety Director, both of which are critical for a renewed focus on internal affairs: (a) Complaint Intake and Investigation (OPS/Internal Affairs), and (b) Disciplinary Process and Matrix. (For the status of each of NPD’s new or revised Consent Decree-related policies, including when those policies became effective, see Appendix F.)
NPD is nearing completion of its Complaint Intake and Investigation policy, which is among the most critical Consent Decree benchmarks in this area. In its current form, the draft policy already represents a significant improvement over its predecessor as it addresses many process gaps that limited NPD’s ability to reliably assess, report on, and most importantly,
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notify complainants of the status of investigations, as envisioned by Paragraph 125 of the Consent Decree.
Specifically, the revised policy requires the assignment of an Event Number to every external complaint upon intake. NPD personnel taking complaints will provide the Event Number to the complainant so that the complainant has a clear reference number that can be used to seek and receive updates on the status of the investigation into his or her complaint. In the past, external complaints were not assigned a tracking number until OPS, or its designee, incorporated the substance of the complaint and the complainant’s demographic data into an Investigation of Personnel form (“IOP”). In some instances, there was a time lapse between intake and transfer of the complaint information into an IOP. Under the newly revised policy, NPD will continue to assign unique identifiers to the IOP that will correspond to the Event Number provided to the complainant at intake. This process will improve NPD’s ability to track investigations and update complainants accordingly.
During the previous reporting period, the Monitoring Team asked the Parties whether or to what extent investigators would consider the prior conduct of the officer who is the subject of an internal affairs complaint in connection with a pending complaint. Paragraph 128 of the Consent Decree states that “NPD policy will require that investigators consider patterns in officer behavior based upon disciplinary history and other information in NPD’s Early Warning System (EWS),” (emphasis added) but does not clearly state the purpose of the review — e.g., whether the past conduct would be used as part of assessing the officer’s compliance with policy in the pending investigation or merely used to assess what discipline might be imposed in case of a policy violation. During this review period, the Parties moved closer to resolving the issue. They agreed in principle that an officer’s disciplinary history and prior OPS investigative files
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may contain information that may be helpful in (1) assessing the appropriate level of discipline for proven misconduct and (2) identifying any potentially problematic patterns and practices during a pending investigation.
After the end of this reporting period, the Parties resolved the issue by incorporating into the draft Complaint Intake and Investigation policy (General Order) two pertinent provisions: First, they added a provision requiring that, upon completion of any internal investigation, OPS review the subject officer’s disciplinary history and Blue Team entries to detect potentially problematic patterns and practices of force, vehicular pursuits, and similar activities that may bear on the conduct alleged in the complaint. Second, they added a provision requiring that, during the course of an open investigation, Investigators would consider patterns in officer behavior drawn from disciplinary history and other sources of information, including NPD’s Early Warning System. Although this review may not itself dictate the outcome of a pending investigation, the investigators would be able to consider information obtained from prior investigations - among all of the other evidence they obtained - to assess whether the present case presented similar fact patterns or reflected an apparent modus operandi for one or more parties involved.
In October 2018, NPD notified the Monitoring Team of its intent to further amend the draft Complaint Intake and Investigation policy to incorporate the provisions of Paragraphs 107 and 108, which aim to ensure that NPD takes appropriate action to prevent, deter, and respond to potential theft by those employees who routinely handle valuable contraband or cash. Under the revised policy, NPD command level Supervisors will periodically review the disciplinary histories of their subordinate officers to determine whether the officers have been
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the subject of internal investigations alleging theft, dishonesty, and similar conduct relating to issues of professional integrity.5
After the close of this reporting period, on June 18, 2019, the Monitor approved NPD’s revised Internal Affairs and Complaint Intake policy. The policy will go into effect once it is authorized by the Director of Public Safety.
The Monitoring Team will continue to track the development of these crucial policies in future quarterly reports.
E. Independent Monitoring Team’s Community Events Paragraph 186 of the Consent Decree requires the Monitor to hold community
meetings to discuss its Quarterly Reports, inform the public about the City’s and NPD’s progress with Consent Decree reforms, and receive community comments on their experiences with NPD. As part of this outreach, the Monitor holds periodic community forums in different locations throughout Newark. On October 12, 2018, the Monitoring Team released its Second-Year Reassessment. On December 11, 2018, the Monitoring Team held a community event at Central Assembly of God Church in Newark, which was hosted by the Urban League of Essex County and coordinated by NJISJ, to discuss its Second-Year Reassessment. The event was attended by members of the Monitoring Team, DOJ, the community, and NPD’s CDPU. However, neither NPD’s Public Safety Director, a representative from the City of Newark, nor local NPD precinct leadership attended the event. In the future, leadership from the City and NPD (other than members of the CDPU) should make an effort to attend community events to listen and respond to community members’ questions and concerns.
5 Because the amended policy directly impacts the duties and responsibilities of its Supervisors, NPD also revised G.O. 80-1, Responsibilities of Command and Supervisory Personnel, to reflect these changes.
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III. NEXT QUARTER ACTIVITIES (JANUARY 1, 2019 – MARCH 31, 2019) A. Audits After the close of this reporting period, the Monitoring Team requested NPD’s
attendance records for the following Consent Decree-related trainings: (i) community-oriented policing, (ii) body-worn cameras and in-car cameras; (iii) use of force; and (iv) consensual citizen contacts and investigatory stops, searches with or without a search warrant, and arrests with or without an arrest warrant. The Monitoring Team will use this information to assess NPD’s compliance with the paragraphs of the Consent Decree requiring training in such areas.
As the Monitoring Team prepares to conduct compliance audits in some Consent Decree areas, NPD’s data systems—as they currently exist—remain inadequate to meet Consent Decree requirements in many other areas. NPD’s data systems are not capable of producing and delivering to the Monitoring Team the information required to permit an audit of NPD’s compliance with the Consent Decree. Thus, many of the substantive audits required by the Consent Decree cannot be performed by the Independent Monitor unless and until NPD’s data systems are upgraded.
B. Youth Engagement From May to September 2018, Dr. Delores Jones-Brown of the Monitoring Team
conducted “listening sessions” with groups of youth across the city of Newark, to collect and report on their experiences with and perceptions of NPD. (See Consent Decree ¶¶ 22-23.) The Monitoring Team also sought their suggestions for creating more positive interactions between Newark youth and the police. The Monitoring Team will report on the results of these listening sessions in its next (Ninth) Quarterly Report, covering the period from January 1 through March 31, 2019.
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developing a comprehensive youth engagement strategy that will invite participation from Newark youth—both in school and those who have dropped out of school—to develop practical strategies to prevent crime and solve neighborhood problems. IV. APPENDICES
A. Chronology of Key Events B. Compliance Chart C. Probability Community Survey Final Report and Summary
Materials D. Non-Probability Survey Report E. Training Status Update Chart F. Policy Status Update Chart
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Appendix A

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Timeline (Meetings, Milestones and Events)

Monitoring Team’s Eighth Quarterly Report — October 1 through December 31, 2018.

Date

Event

October 12, 2018 The Monitoring Team files its Second Year-Reassessment.

October 24, 2018

The Newark Police Division (“NPD”) conducts first Use of Force training session.

October 30, 2018

NPD holds Community & COPS Town Hall to discuss its Disciplinary Process and Matrix policy.

November 8-9, 2018 NPD conducts “pilot” training sessions of its Stops, Searches, and Arrests training.

November 12, 2018 NPD holds LGBTQ Policy Discussion to discuss its draft LGBTQ Community and Police Interaction Policy.

November 17, 2018

The New Jersey Institute for Social Justice conducts a street survey throughout Newark’s five wards to assess Newark residents’ perceptions of NPD and public safety.

December 3, 2018

The Center of Policing at Rutgers University, working with NPD, administers its first officer perception survey.

December 4, 2018

Independent consultant presents findings from its review of NPD’s data systems to the Monitoring Team.

December 11, 2018 The Monitoring Team holds its Second-Year Reassessment community event at Central Assembly of God Church.

December 28, 2018

NPD holds focus group with officers to discuss proposed changes to NPD’s “Stop Report” and to discuss officer impressions of NPD’s Consent Decree reform efforts.

December 31, 2018 NPD reports that by this date all patrol officers were trained on bodyworn and in-car cameras.

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Appendix B

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Consent Decree Compliance and Implementation (through December 31, 2018)

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Table of Contents Page

I.

Definitions ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 1

II. Use of Force...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3

III. Stop, Search and Arrest..................................................................................................................................................................................... 6

IV. Community Policing and Bias-Free Policing.................................................................................................................................................... 8

V. Property and Evidence Management .............................................................................................................................................................. 11

VI. Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation .................................................................................................................................... 13

VII. In-Car Cameras and Body-Worn Cameras ..................................................................................................................................................... 19

VIII. General Officer Training................................................................................................................................................................................. 20

IX. Community Engagement ................................................................................................................................................................................ 22

X. Data Systems Improvements: Early Warning and Records Management Systems ........................................................................................ 23

XI. Consent Decree Implementation and Enforcement ........................................................................................................................................ 25

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I. DEFINITIONS NPD’s compliance with the deadlines set forth in the Consent Decree and the Second-Year Monitoring Plan will be
assessed using the following categories: (1) not assessed, (2) initial development, (3) preliminary compliance, (4) operational compliance, (5) non-compliance, (6) administrative compliance, and (7) full compliance. Each of these terms is defined below.
1. Not Assessed “Not Assessed” means that the Monitoring Team did not assess the Consent Decree provision during this reporting
period. Acceptable reasons for why a requirement was not assessed may include that the deadline has not passed or some other substantive reason.
2. Initial Development “Initial Development” means that during the auditing period, NPD has taken meaningful steps toward achieving
compliance with a Consent Decree requirement that is not yet scheduled for completion. Initial Development will be noted only if NPD’s efforts are consistent with established timeframes in the Monitoring Plan or Consent Decree. Where NPD was expected to have achieved at least Initial Development during the auditing period, and has not, NPD has been found not to be in compliance.
3. Preliminary Compliance “Preliminary Compliance” means that during the reporting period, NPD has developed, and the Independent Monitor,
DOJ, and City have approved, respective policies or standard operating procedures (“SOPs”) and related training materials that are consistent with a Consent Decree requirement. This category only applies to SOPs and training.
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4. Operational Compliance “Operational Compliance” means that NPD has satisfied a Consent Decree requirement by demonstrating routine
adherence to the requirement in its day-to-day operations or by meeting the established deadline for a task or deliverable that is specifically required by the Consent Decree or Monitoring Plan. NPD’s compliance efforts must be verified by reviews of data systems, observations from the Monitoring Team, and other methods that will corroborate its achievement. In this report, the Monitoring Team only will assess NPD for compliance with established deadlines.
5. Non-Compliance “Non-Compliance” means that NPD has either made no progress towards accomplishing compliance, or has not
progressed beyond Initial Development at the point in time when NPD is expected to have at least achieved Preliminary Compliance for the reporting period.
6. Administrative Compliance “Administrative Compliance” means that during the auditing period, NPD has completed all necessary actions to
implement a Consent Decree requirement, but General Compliance has not yet been demonstrated in NPD’s day-to-day operations.
7. Full Compliance “Full Compliance” means that all Monitor reviews have determined that NPD has maintained Operational Compliance
for the two-year period.
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II. USE OF FORCE

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

Develop Use of Force Policy: NPD will develop and implement a use of force policy or set of policies that cover all force techniques,

technologies, and weapons that are available to NPD officers. The policy or policies will clearly define each force option and specify

that unreasonable use of force will subject officers to discipline. (¶¶ 66-74)

NPD will review and revise its current use of force policy or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree.

March 31, 2018

Preliminary Compliance

See Eighth Quarterly Report, Appendix F.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. (¶ 11)

Within 60 days after Preliminary approval of policy Compliance

See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(C).

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training curricula to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. (¶ 11)

Within 60 days after Preliminary approval of policy Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(1).

NPD will develop a protocol to gauge retention of training and approve testing mechanisms to ensure compliance with Consent Decree.

45 days before training is implemented

Preliminary Compliance

NPD will provide the proposed testing for review.

30 days before training is implemented

Audit of NPD Firearms Certification Oversight (¶¶ 70-71, 74)

NPD will provide resources for officers to maintain proper weapons certifications and will implement sanctions for officers who fail to do so. Officers will be prohibited from using unauthorized weapons or ammunition. (¶¶ 70-71, 74)

Ongoing

Preliminary Compliance

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

NPD Use of Force Reporting and Investigation: NPD will adopt a use of force reporting system and a supervisor Use of Force

Report, separate from the NPD’s arrest and incident reports, and which includes individual officers’ accounts of their use of

force. (¶¶ 75-85)

NPD will establish a mechanism by which use of force and citizen September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance N/A

interaction complaints are reviewed by training staff to form the

basis of changes in training to address the issues arising from these

complaints.

NPD, in consultation with Monitor and DOJ, will categorize force September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance See Fifth Quarterly

into levels to report, investigate, and review each use of force. The

report, Section

levels will be based on the factors set forth in ¶ 77.

III(A)(1).

NPD will establish a Serious Force Investigation Team (“SFIT”) to review Serious Force Incidents, conduct criminal and administrative investigations of Serious Force incidents, and determine whether incidents raise policy, training, tactical, or equipment concerns. Lower or intermediate force incidents will be investigated by line supervisors. (¶¶ 78-84, 86-94)

NPD will create and implement (1) a General Order establishing the AFIT to ensure sufficient staffing consistent with ¶ 92 of the Consent Decree; and (2) General Orders establishing line supervisors’ responsibilities to investigate lower and intermediate use of force incidents.
NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. (¶ 11)
NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training curricula related to the requirements of the Consent Decree to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. (¶ 11)
NPD will issue a report, analyzing the data in its officer force reports and supervisor investigative reports and identifying significant trends, as well as policies and practices that need to be

March 31, 2018
Within 60 days after approval of General Orders
Within 60 days after approval of General Orders
December 31, 2018

Preliminary Compliance

See Eighth Quarterly Report, Appendix F.

Preliminary Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(1)

Preliminary Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(1).

Non-Compliance N/A

4

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Achievement revised. (¶¶ 85, 168)

Deadline for Achievement

Status

Discussion

NPD will maintain a Use of Force Review Board (“UFRB”) to conduct timely, comprehensive and reliable reviews of all Intermediate and Serious Force incidents, in accordance with the requirements set forth in the Consent Decree. (¶¶ 88, 95, 96, 98, 102)

NPD will create a General Order establishing the UFRB, ensure that it is staffed consistent with Consent Decree provisions, and ensure that the responsibilities assigned are consistent with Consent Decree provisions.

March 31, 2018

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required, which will provide the UFRB with 8 hours of training. (¶¶ 11, 97)

Within 60 days after approval of General Order

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training curricula related to the requirements of the Consent Decree to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. (¶ 11)

Within 60 days after approval of General Order

NPD’s UFRB will conduct timely, comprehensive, and reliable reviews of SFIT and Intermediate Force incidents and document its findings and recommendations. (¶¶ 13, 96-101)

Ongoing

NPD will provide Monitor with Use of Force data for a baseline assessment. NPD will provide the Monitor with Use of Force data, including, June 30, 2018 but not limited to, field inquiry reports and incident reports.

Preliminary Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(1).

Preliminary Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(1)

Preliminary Compliance

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(1).

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(E).

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III. STOP, SEARCH AND ARREST

Achievement

Deadline for

Achievement

NPD will revise policies in accordance with ¶¶ 25-42, 55-62 of the Consent Decree.

Status

Discussion

NPD will begin training modules for the revised policies upon the Monitor and DOJ’s approval of the revised policies.

NPD will review and revise its current stop, search, and arrest policy or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree.

March 31, 2018

Preliminary Compliance

See Eighth Quarterly Report, Appendix F.

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training Within 60 days after curricula related to the requirements of the Consent Decree to the approval of policy Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. (¶ 11)

Preliminary Compliance

See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(F).

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the stop, search, and arrest policies or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the inservice training required. (¶ 11)

Within 60 days after approval of policy

Preliminary Compliance

See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(C).

NPD will develop a protocol to gauge retention of stop, search, and 45 days before

arrest training and approve testing mechanisms to ensure

training is

compliance with Consent Decree.

implemented

Preliminary

N/A

Compliance

NPD will provide the proposed testing to the Monitor, DOJ and the 30 days before

City for review.

training is

implemented

Preliminary

N/A

Compliance

Data Analysis Protocol: NPD will develop a protocol for comprehensive analysis of stop, search and arrest data, subject to the review and approval of the DOJ and Monitor. (¶ 53)

NPD will review its current data collection and analysis capacity September 30, 2018 Initial

and identify the gaps between its current capacity and the capacity

Development

required by the Consent Decree.

See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(E).

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Achievement
NPD will develop categories and fields for capturing the data required by the Consent Decree. (¶ 51-54)

Deadline for Achievement September 30, 2018

Status

Discussion

Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(E).

Data Report: NPD will issue a report summarizing and analyzing the data collected on its stops, searches, arrests, and uses of force. The report will also set forth the steps taken by the NPD to correct problems and build successes indicated by the data. (¶ 168)

NPD will provide a draft report to Monitor and Parties.

May 15, 2018

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(F)(1).

NPD will finalize the report based on feedback from the Monitor June 30, 2018 and Parties.

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(F)(1).

NPD will provide periodic reports to Monitor and Parties.

Yearly after June 30, Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly

2018

Report, Section III(F)(1).

NPD supervisors will take appropriate action to address any violations or deficiencies related to stops, detentions, searches, and arrests; maintain records; and identify repeat violators. (¶ 48)

NPD supervisors to take appropriate action to address violations or Ongoing deficiencies in stops, detentions, searches, and arrests; maintain records; and identify repeat violators. (¶ 48)

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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IV. COMMUNITY POLICING AND BIAS-FREE POLICING

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

Community-Oriented Policing Policy: NPD will integrate concepts of community and problem-oriented policing into its policies.

(Section V)

NPD will review and revise its current community policing policy May 15, 2018 or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree.

Preliminary Compliance

See Eighth Quarterly Report, Appendix F.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand Within 60 days after Non-Compliance N/A their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that approval of policy the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. (¶ 11)

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training Within 60 days after Non-Compliance N/A curricula to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to approval of policy implementation. (¶ 11)

NPD will develop a protocol to gauge retention of training and approve testing mechanisms to ensure compliance with the Consent Decree.

45 days before training is implemented

Non-Compliance N/A

NPD will provide the proposed testing for review.

30 days before

Non-Compliance N/A

training is

implemented

Evaluation of Community Policing Protocol: By February 7, 2017, NPD will implement a protocol to periodically measure the

breadth, extent, and effectiveness of its community partnerships and problem-solving strategies, including officer outreach,

particularly outreach to youth.

NPD will submit first drafts of its measurement mechanisms to the March 31, 2018 Monitor and DOJ for review.

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(D)(1).

NPD will submit a final draft of the measurement protocol.

May 5, 2018

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly

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Report, Section III(D)(1).

NPD will begin implementing the measurement protocol.

May 10, 2018

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(D)(1).

NPD will prepare a publicly available report of its community policing efforts overall and in each precinct. (¶ 18)

April 30, 2018

Initial Development

See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(A)(1); Appendix B.

Phase I: Community Policing: NPD will provide its officers training on the benefits and means to achieve effective community engagement. (¶ 14)

NPD will provide 8 hours of in-service training on community Within 60 days after Preliminary policing and problem-oriented policing methods and skills for all approval of policy Compliance1
officers, including supervisors, managers and executives. (¶ 14)

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(3).

Bias-Free Policing Policy: NPD will revise policies in accordance with ¶ 64 of the Consent Decree.

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training curricula to the Within 60 days after Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly

Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. approval of policy

Report, Section III(B)(3).

(¶ 11)

NPD will develop a protocol to gauge retention of training and approve testing mechanisms to ensure compliance with the Consent Decree.

45 days before training is implemented

Not Assessed

The deadline has not passed. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

1 The status for this achievement was incorrectly noted as “Operational Compliance” in the Sixth and Seventh Quarterly Reports. The Monitor will assess NPD’s compliance after the training audits are completed.
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NPD will provide the proposed testing for review.

30 days before training is implemented

Not Assessed

The deadline has not passed. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will conduct quarterly demographic analyses of its enforcement activities to ensure bias-free policing. (¶ 65)

NPD will update its data systems so that it has the capacity to conduct demographic analyses of its enforcement activities.

September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(E).

10

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V. PROPERTY AND EVIDENCE MANAGEMENT

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

Implement Chain of Custody and Inventory Policy: The NPD will ensure that in all instances where property or evidence is

seized, the responsible officer will immediately complete an incident report documenting a complete and accurate inventory of the

property or evidence seized, and will submit the property or evidence seized to the property room before the end of tour of duty.

(¶¶ 105, 110)

NPD will create a chain of custody and inventory policy or policies May 1, 2018 to ensure compliance with ¶ 110 of the Consent Decree.

Preliminary Compliance

See Eighth Quarterly Report, Appendix F.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand Within 60 days after Non-Compliance N/A their responsibilities pursuant to the policies or procedures and that approval of policies the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. (¶ 11)

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training curricula related to the requirements of the Consent Decree to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. (¶ 11)

Within 60 days after Non-Compliance N/A approval of policies

NPD Internal Review of Disciplinary Files: NPD will review the disciplinary histories of its officers who routinely handle valuable contraband or cash, especially those in specialized units, to identify any patterns or irregularities indicating potential risk of theft by officers. (¶ 107)

NPD will provide a report to the Monitor and supporting documents identifying officers handling contraband or cash.

July 1, 2018

Non-Compliance N/A

Transfer of NPD officers: To the extent permitted by law and NPD’s collective bargaining agreements, NPD officers identified as having a sustained complaint of theft, or two not sustained or unfounded complaints of theft occurring within one year, will be moved out of positions where those officers have access to money, property, and evidence. (¶ 108)

City legal department to review legal requirements and collective Ongoing bargaining agreements regarding transfer of NPD officers

Initial

See First Quarterly Report,

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consistent with ¶ 108 of the Consent Decree.

Development Section V(C)(6).

NPD Audits: NPD will conduct and document periodic audits and inspections of the property room and immediately correct any deficiencies. (¶ 111)

NPD will conduct a complete audit of all firearms stored in the property and evidence room and other storage facilities.

July 1, 2018

Initial Development

See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(B).

12

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VI. INTERNAL AFFAIRS: COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATION

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

Transparent Complaint Process: NPD will revise its policies to prohibit practices that discourage complainants and witnesses

from coming forward, including the requirements set forth in ¶ 115.

NPD will review and revise its policies for releasing complaints and misconduct allegations to make such complaints and allegations publicly available and ensure compliance with the Consent Decree.

March 31, 2018

Non-Compliance See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(D)(2).

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Achievement

Deadline for

Achievement

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training Within 60 days after

curricula the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to approval of policy

implementation. (¶ 11)

Status Not Assessed

Discussion
The deadline has not passed. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Within 60 days after Not Assessed approval of policy

The deadline has not passed. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD will submit to the Monitor and DOJ its written plan for

September 1, 2018

conducting and reporting on an integrity audit to identify officers/

employees who refuse to accept or discourage the filing of

misconduct complaints, fail to report misconduct or complaints, or

provide false or misleading information about filing a misconduct

complaint. (¶¶ 117-118)

Upon approval of its audit plan by the Monitor and DOJ, NPD will Within 60 days of conduct an initial audit to identify officers/employees who refuse approval of auditing to accept or discourage the filing of misconduct complaints, fail to plan. report misconduct or complaints, or provide false or misleading information about filing a misconduct complaint. NPD will submit the results of its audit to the Monitor and DOJ for review. (¶¶ 117118)

NPD will take appropriate disciplinary actions against officers/ Ongoing employees who refuse to accept or discourage the filing of misconduct complaints, fail to report misconduct or complaints, or provide false or misleading information about filing a misconduct

Non-Compliance See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(C).

Not Assessed

The deadline has not passed. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

Not Assessed2

See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(F)(2)(a).

2 The status was incorrectly reported as “Non-Compliance” in the Sixth Quarterly Report. The Monitor’s review during that reporting period did not constitute a baseline audit. Thus, until the Internal Affairs audit is conducted, the status will remain as “Not Assessed.”
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Achievement complaint, as set forth in ¶¶ 117-118.

Deadline for Achievement

Status

Discussion

NPD will create a training curriculum and/or training bulletins for police personnel, including dispatchers, to properly handle

complaint intake, including how to provide complaint materials and information; the consequences for failing to take complaints;

and strategies for turning the complaint process into positive police-civilian interaction. (¶ 116)

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training curricula to the Within 60 days after Not Assessed The deadline has not

Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. approval of policy

passed. The Monitor will

(¶ 11)

assess this requirement in a

future report.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Within 60 days after Not Assessed approval of policy

The policy was not approved this quarter. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD and City, in collaboration with the civilian oversight entity or other community input, will develop and implement a program to publicize to the Newark Community how to make police misconduct complaints. (¶ 112)

NPD and the City will revise and make forms and other materials outlining the complaint process and OPS contact information available on their website and appropriate government properties. (¶ 113)

June 1, 2018

Initial Development

See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(4).

NPD will accept all complaints, by all methods and forms detailed Ongoing in ¶ 114.
NPD will provide civilians, including complainants and witnesses Ongoing to alleged police misconduct, with full access to NPD’s complaint process. (¶ 115)

Initial Development
Initial Development

See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(4). See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(4).

NPD Misconduct Reporting and Investigation Process: NPD will require that all officers and employees report allegations of criminal behavior or administrative misconduct by another NPD officer toward a member of the public, that they may observe

15

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Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

themselves or receive from another source, to a supervisor or directly to OPS for review and investigation. When a supervisor

receives such allegations, the supervisor will promptly document and report this information to OPS. (¶ 119)

NPD will investigate as a misconduct complaint any information or Ongoing testimony arising in criminal prosecutions or civil lawsuits that indicate potential officer misconduct not previously investigated by NPD. (¶ 120)

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

NPD will create an OPS Notification protocol to ensure compliance with the Consent Decree.

October 1, 2018

Non-Compliance N/A

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand Within 60 days after Not Assessed N/A their responsibilities pursuant to the protocol or procedure and that approval of protocol
the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training Within 60 days after Not Assessed N/A curricula related to the requirements of the Consent Decree to the approval of protocol Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. (¶ 11)

NPD will train OPS supervisors to conduct thorough and complete September 1, 2018 investigations that include conclusions and recommendations that are adequately supported by the evidence. (¶ 141)

Non-Compliance N/A

Complaint Classification Protocol: NPD will adopt a complaint classification protocol that is based on the nature of the alleged misconduct, in order to guide OPS in determining where a complaint should be assigned for investigation. (¶ 121)

NPD will implement complaint classification protocol to ensure March 31, 2018 compliance with the Consent Decree.

Preliminary Compliance

See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(5).

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand Within 60 days after Not Assessed their responsibilities pursuant to the protocol or procedure and that approval of protocol the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

The deadline has not passed. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a

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Achievement

Deadline for Achievement

Status

Discussion future report.

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training Within 60 days after Not Assessed curricula to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to approval of protocol implementation. (¶ 11)

The deadline has not passed. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

NPD’s OPS will investigate all allegations of Serious Misconduct Ongoing as defined in the Consent Decree. (¶¶ 122)

NPD/OPS will submit to the Monitor and DOJ its written plan for monitoring and reporting on investigations referred to officers’ precincts and specialized units for quality, objectivity and thoroughness, for identifying trends in investigative or leadership deficiencies, and for taking appropriate action if investigations are deficient. (¶ 124)

September 1, 2018

Not Assessed Non-Compliance

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits. See Sixth Quarterly report, Section III(B)(6).

NPD’s OPS will routinely monitor investigations referred to

Ongoing

officers’ precincts and specialized units for quality, objectivity and

thoroughness, and take appropriate action if investigations are

deficient. OPS will also identify trends in investigative or

leadership deficiencies. (¶ 124)

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

NPD will maintain a centralized numbering and tracking system for all misconduct complaints. (¶ 125)

NPD will create a protocol to link an “event” number retrieved May 31, 2018

Initial

from the CAD, which enables NPD to provide a complainant with

Development

an identifying number in real time.

See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(4).

NPD will improve OPS’ complaint tracking and assessment practices in accordance with ¶ 149.

November 30, 2018 Non-Compliance N/A

NPD will use a case management system to ensure appropriate caseloads for OPS investigators and timely completion of investigations. (¶ 146)

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Achievement
NPD will use a case management system to track and maintain appropriate caseloads for OPS investigators and promote the timely completion of investigations by OPS. (¶ 146)

Deadline for Achievement Ongoing

Status Not Assessed

Discussion
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

NPD will require and provide appropriate training for OPS investigators upon their assignment to OPS, with refresher training at periodic intervals. At a minimum, NPD will provide 40 hours of initial training and eight hours additional in-service training on an annual basis. (¶¶ 147-148)

NPD will review and revise its current OPS policy to require training of OPS investigators.

March 31, 2018

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(5).

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training curricula to the Within 60 days after Not Assessed Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to implementation. approval of policy (¶ 11)

The deadline has not passed. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.

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VII. IN-CAR CAMERAS AND BODY-WORN CAMERAS

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

In consultation with the DOJ and Monitor, NPD will develop a policy regarding footage and audio recordings from its in-car and

body-worn cameras and a policy to designate which cars and officers will not be equipped with cameras or will be equipped with

concealed cameras. (¶¶ 103-104)

NPD will review and revise its current policy or policies to ensure March 31, 2018 compliance with the Consent Decree.

Preliminary Compliance

See Eighth Quarterly Report, Appendix F.

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training Within 60 days after Preliminary curricula to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to approval of policy Compliance implementation. (¶ 11)

See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(C).

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the Body-Worn Cameras and InCar Cameras policies and that the topic is incorporated into the inservice training required. (¶ 11)

Within 60 days after Preliminary approval of the policy Compliance

See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(C).

NPD will begin the work required to equip all marked patrol cars with video cameras and require all officers, except those set

forth in ¶¶ 103-104, to wear body cameras and microphones with which to record enforcement activity. (¶ 103)

NPD will conduct pilot program on body-worn cameras and

Ongoing

Initial

See Sixth Quarterly

develop recommendations for possible device implementation

Development Report, Section III(A)(7).

based on the results of the pilot.

NPD will equip all marked patrol cars with video cameras. (¶ 103) December 31, 2018 Preliminary Compliance

See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(C).

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VIII. GENERAL OFFICER TRAINING

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

NPD will provide officers at least 40 hours of training to address changes in the law, or issues identified in complaints, or other

means. NPD will provide additional training as necessary to address changes in the law, or issues identified through its review of

use of force incidents, arrest reports, misconduct complaints, or other means. All training will be consistent with and incorporate

current law, professional police standards and best practices. (¶¶ 9, 14)

Note: The timelines for training requirements in other Sections of the Consent Decree (e.g., use of force, bias-free policing), are located in those Sections of this Chart.

NPD will review and revise its current General Orders to ensure June 30, 2018 compliance with the Consent Decree.

The status for training requirements for each Consent Decree area (e.g., use of force, bias-free policing), are located in those sections of this Chart.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand Within 60 days after their responsibilities pursuant to the policies or procedures and that approval of the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. (¶ 11) individual policies

The status for training requirements for each Consent Decree area (e.g., use of force, bias-free policing), are located in those sections of this Chart.

NPD will provide drafts of new or revised training plans or training Within 60 days after

curricula to the Monitor and DOJ for review and approval prior to approval of

implementation. (¶ 11)

individual policies

The status for training requirements for each Consent Decree area (e.g., use of force, bias-free policing), are located in those sections of this

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Achievement

Deadline for Achievement

Status

Discussion Chart.

NPD will compile, and provide Monitor with, all current State and March 31, 2018 NPD curricula and course materials for new recruits.
NPD and Monitor will identify where State/NPD curricula differ April 24, 2018 from the Consent Decree.
NPD will maintain complete and consistent training records for all officers. (¶ 12)

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(8).
Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(8).

NPD will develop a protocol to gauge retention of training and approve testing mechanisms to ensure compliance with Consent Decree.

45 days before training is implemented

The status for training requirements for each Consent Decree area (e.g., use of force, bias-free policing), are located in those sections of this Chart.

NPD will implement any necessary updates to its data storage system to retain training records as set forth in the protocol.

Ongoing

NPD will provide the necessary data to allow the Monitoring Team March 31, 2018 to conduct a baseline assessment of NPD’s training records.

Not Assessed Non-Compliance

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits. See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(8).

NPD will establish a central database for training records for all officers and a mechanism for inputting training attendance and assessment data for all courses.

December 31, 2018 Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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IX. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

NPD will assess and revise its staffing allocation and personnel deployment to support community policing and problem-solving initiatives, and will modify deployment strategies that are incompatible with community policing, such assessment and modified strategy to be provided to the DOJ and Monitor for approval. (¶ 15)

NPD will conduct review of its current staffing allocation and personnel deployment and develop a community policing strategy that involves all officers assigned to policing precincts, including the Community Policing Officers.

March 31, 2018

NPD will review and revise its current staffing allocation and

March 31, 2018

personnel protocol to ensure compliance with the Consent Decree.

Non-Compliance See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).
Non-Compliance See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).

NPD will identify what changes in personnel allocation will be made, if necessary, based on the staffing study.

April 30, 2018

Non-Compliance See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).

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X. DATA SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENTS: EARLY WARNING AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Discussion

Achievement

Assessment of Current Data Systems: NPD will provide the Monitor with sample data to analyze its current data collection

processes and NPD will engage a consulting firm to determine its data needs.

NPD will provide sample data to the Monitor in each subject area June 30, 2018

Initial

See Sixth Quarterly

where data collection/analysis is required so the Monitor can

Development Report, Section E.

determine NPD data collection abilities (i.e., “data baseline”).

NPD will engage an IT consulting firm to conduct an assessment September 30, 2018 Initial

See Seventh Quarterly

and gap analysis to help NPD determine what systems need to be

Development Report, Section II(E).

upgraded or replaced to enable NPD to meet the data collection

and analysis requirements of the Consent Decree. This will include

the development of high level requirements for a Records

Management System (“RMS”).

Early Warning System: NPD will enhance its Early Warning System so as to comply with the requirements set forth in the

Consent Decree. (¶¶ 156-165)

NPD to submit funding request to the City, which sets forth the November 1, 2018 Non-Compliance N/A

necessary enhancements to its Early Warning System and

estimated costs.

NPD will develop and implement a data protocol describing

September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance N/A

information to be recorded and maintained in the Early Warning for enhanced/current

System. (¶ 157)

EWS

NPD will revise its use of EWS as an effective supervisory tool. September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance N/A

To that end, the EWS will use comparative data and peer group for enhanced/current

analysis to identify patterns of activity by officers and groups of EWS

officers for supervisory review and intervention. (¶ 158)

Records Management System: NPD will revise its use and analysis of the RMS and the City will provide NPD with sufficient

funding and personnel to implement and maintain the RMS. (¶¶ 162-163)

NPD will provide the Monitor with sample data extracts from its September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance N/A

current RMS solution.

NPD will begin the procurement process for a new RMS.

September 30, 2018 Non-Compliance

23

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NPD to submit funding request to the City, which sets forth the necessary enhancements to its Early Warning System and estimated costs. NPD will revise its use and analysis of its RMS so it can make efficient and effective use of the data in the System. (¶ 162)

November 1, 2018 Non-Compliance N/A December 31, 2018 Non-Compliance N/A

24

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 50 of 179 PageID: 2341

XI. CONSENT DECREE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT

Achievement

Deadline for

Status

Achievement

The Monitor will conduct Outcome Assessments according to the requirements of ¶¶ 174-175.

NPD will provide Monitor with data required by the Consent

August 31, 2018

Non-Compliance

Decree. (¶ 174-175)

Discussion
See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(E).

25

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 51 of 179 PageID: 2342
Appendix C

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NEWARK, NEW JERSEY COMMUNITY SURVEY
SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY POLITICAL RESEARCH CENTER DAVID PALEOLOGOS, DIRECTOR DECEMBER 2018

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ABOUT THIS SURVEY
This report was prepared at the request of Peter C. Harvey, Independent Monitor of the Consent Decree signed by the City of Newark and the United States Department of Justice.
Paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Consent Decree require that the Independent Monitor conduct a reliable, comprehensive, and representative survey of the Newark Community’s experience with and perceptions of the Newark Police Division and public safety.

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 54 of 179 PageID: 2345
STATEMENT OF METHODOLOGY
This poll was conducted between September 9, 2018 and September 30, 2018 using a sample of 700 residents distributed nearly equally across the Central, East, North, South, and West wards of the city. This poll follows the industry standard of a 1.96 standard deviation at a 95% level of confidence for a margin of +/- 3.7 percentage points.
As sample size decreases, sampling error increases, therefore statements based on various population subgroups may be more subject to error than those based on the total sample available.

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 55 of 179 PageID: 2346
SURVEY DEMOGRAPHICS

• Ward:
– Central 19% – East 19% – North 18% – South 20% – West 24%
• Gender:
– 49% Male – 51% Female

• Age:
– 18-24 Yrs. 15% – 25-34 Yrs. 23% – 35-44 Yrs. 19% – 45-64 Yrs. 31% – 65+ Yrs. 13%
• Interview Language:
– 91% English – 8% Spanish – 1% Portuguese

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 56 of 179 PageID: 2347
KNOWLEDGE OF CONSENT DECREE
How much have you heard about the Newark Consent Decree before taking this survey?
80%

5% A LOT

5% SOME

7% A LITTLE NONE AT ALL

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KNOWLEDGE OF NEWARK PD

71% 27%

Where do you get information about the Newark PD?

68% 30%

67% 32%

66% 32%

61% 37%

55% 44%

68% 29%

WORD OF MOUTH

SOCIAL MEDIA FRIENDS AND FAMILY

ONLINE
Yes No

LOCAL TV NEWS

LOCAL

GOVERNMENT

NEWSPAPER OFFICIALS

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 58 of 179 PageID: 2349
• 2017 vs. 2018 Results
• Tier 1 Movement • Tier 2 Movement
SURVEY COMPARISONS

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TIER I: SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT
1. Increased feelings of general safety 2. Less worry of being victim of a crime 3. Less worry of the use of excessive force 4. Decrease in feelings of being discriminated against by NPD 5. Increase in usage of social media as information source 6. Positive economic changes in Newark employment and
housing

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 60 of 179 PageID: 2351
TIER 2: SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT
1. Fewer formal complaints filed with NPD 2. Increase in satisfaction with results 3. Fewer residents report being stopped by NPD 4. Decrease in safety concerns during stops 5. More see stops as legitimate 6. Less confidence that NPD handles evidence properly or tells
the truth 7. Decrease in feeling safe when NPD is nearby

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2018 FINDINGS
• Survey Results • Recommendations

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• Neighborhood Safety • Reporting Crimes • Police Presence
LIVING IN NEWARK

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LIVING IN NEWARK

How would you rate Newark as a place to live? 42%
30%

Over the last year has Newark gotten…?
43%
34%

19%

19%

8%

EXCELLENT GOOD FAIR

POOR

BETTER

WORSE

HASN'T BEEN MUCH
CHANGE

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 64 of 179 PageID: 2355
NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY

How safe do you feel under the following circumstances?

62%

54%

30% 3% 4%

33% 6% 7%

30%

28%

17%

19%

At Home During the Day

At Home At Night

Walking Around Neighborhood at Night

Very Safe Somewhat Safe Not Very Safe Not Safe At All

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 65 of 179 PageID: 2356
VICTIMIZATION & POLICE ASSISTANCE

How worried are you that you will be a victim of a crime?
32%

19%

22%

15%

11%

How likely are you to ask a Newark police officer for help?
58%

25%

7%

8%

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 66 of 179 PageID: 2357
REPORTING CRIME

58%

54%

25%

23%

8% 5%

10% 7%

If you WITNESSED a If you HEARD of a crime,

crime, how likely are you how likely are you to

to report/provide

report/provide

information to NPD?

information to NPD?

Very Likely Not Very Likely

Somewhat Likely Not At All

Why are you unlikely to report a crime to NPD?

“Pointless/Nothing will happen” 21%

“Don’t want to intrude”

20%

“General Fear”

9%

“No trust in police”

9%

“Fear of retaliation from criminals”

8%

“Depends on the crime”

4%

“Police don’t keep confidential”

3%

“Bad previous experience”

1%

“Inconvenient/Takes too long”

1%

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POLICE PATROLS

In a typical month, how often do you see NPD officers patrolling your neighborhood?
35%

Would you like to see an increase or decrease in the number of NPD officers patrolling your neighborhood?
80%

21%

13% 13%

12%

4%

Once a Several Once or day times a twice a week week

A few times

Once Never

3% INCREASE DECREASE

15%
STAY THE SAME

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• Trust in Police • Police Practices
COMMUNITY EXPERIENCES & PERCEPTIONS

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PERCEPTIONS OF NPD

33% 32%

38% 30%

20%

20%

10% 7%

How would you rate the job Newark PD How would you rate the job Newark PD

does serving YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD?

does serving NEWARK as a whole?

Excellent Good Fair Poor

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PERCEPTIONS OF NPD

58%

34% 28%
21%
12%

25%
11% 6%

36% 35%
18% 10%

How much impact do you think How much respect do you have How much trust do you have in

Newark PD has on lowering the

for the Newark Police in

the Newark Police in general?

crime rate?

general?

A Lot Some A Little None At All

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 71 of 179 PageID: 2362
NPD PRACTICES

How often does Newark PD do the following?
42%

22%

14% 9%

8% 5%

30%

23% 13%

18% 8% 8%

28% 21%

27%

12%

7% 7%

32% 27%
17% 8% 9% 7%

PROPERLY HANDLE
EVIDENCE
All of the Time

USE APPROPRIATE FORCE

MAKE TRUTHFUL,

USE RESPECTFUL, POLITE

ONLY WHEN NECESSARY ACCURATE STATEMENTS

LANGUAGE

Most of the Time Some of the Time Rarely Never Don't Know

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 72 of 179 PageID: 2363
NPD PRACTICES
How often does Newark PD do the following?

24%

25%

17% 14%

10% 10%

29%

20% 13%

17%
12% 9%

25% 19% 20%
13% 12% 11%

26% 24%
21%

16% 10%

4%

DETAIN PEOPLE ONLY AS
LONG AS NECESSARY

STOP AND/OR SEARCH
PEOPLE WITH GOOD REASON

TREAT ALL EQUALLY
REGARDLESS OF
RACE/ETHNICITY

RESPECT RESIDENTS'
PERSONAL PROPERTY

All of the Time Most of the Time Some of the Time Rarely Never Don't Know

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NPD PRACTICES
How often does Newark PD do the following?

34%

32%

30%

19%

24%

8%

9%

5%

9% 8%

24%

24%

19% 17%
15%

11% 8%

19% 13%

10% 9%

22%

15%

14%

TAMPER OR INTERFERE WITH
EVIDENCE

USE MORE FORCE THAN
NECESSARY

MAKE UNTRUTHFUL/FALSE
STATEMENTS

USE DISRESPECTFUL/OFFENSIVE
LANGUAGE

All of the Time Most of the Time Some of the Time Rarely Never Don't Know

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 74 of 179 PageID: 2365
NPD PRACTICES
How often does Newark PD do the following?

24%

26%

17%

11% 11%

11%

22%

20% 18%

15% 12%

13%

29%

24%

14%

13%

11%

9%

29% 25%

18%

9% 6%

12%

DETAIN PEOPLE LONGER STOP/SEARCH WITHOUT DISCRIMINATE BASED ON

THAN NECESSARY

GOOD REASON

RACE/ETHNICITY

UNLAWFULLY TAKE
PROPERTY FROM RESIDENTS

All of the Time Most of the Time Some of the Time Rarely Never Don't Know

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• Feelings of Safety • Information and Interactions • Positive and Negative Experiences
INTERACTIONS WITH NPD

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 76 of 179 PageID: 2367
PRESENCE OF NEWARK PD

41%

35%

49%

34%

9%

11%

9%

7%

How do you feel when you have How do you feel when NPD officers

DIRECT contact with NPD officers?

are NEARBY?

More Safe Less Safe No Different Depends on Situation

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 77 of 179 PageID: 2368
REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE

Have you requested assistance from Newark PD or not?

84%

74%

68%

25%

14%

IN THE LAST MONTH

IN THE LAST 3 MONTHS
Yes No

30% IN THE LAST YEAR

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 78 of 179 PageID: 2369
REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

Has Newark PD requested information from you or not?

76%

87%

76%

23% IN THE LAST MONTH

11%
IN THE LAST 3 MONTHS Yes No

22% IN THE LAST YEAR

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 79 of 179 PageID: 2370
MEMORABLE NEGATIVE EXPERIENCES

“Never Had a Negative Experience”
“NPD took too long to respond/did not respond at all/did not help or file report”
“Officer was unprofessional/rude” “Traffic/car violations: pulled over, tickets, car searched/towed without cause” “Experienced/witnessed abuse, aggression, harassment by officer” “Falsely accused, fined, arrested and/or detained without cause” “Police treated someone differently based on race” “Officer forced entry into home without cause” “Stopped and frisked”

53%
9%
8% 8% 5% 3% 1% 1% >1%

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MEMORABLE POSITIVE EXPERIENCES

“Never Had a Positive Experience” “Officer was nice/polite, positive interaction” “Officers engaged with community members/kids” “Police arrived quickly when needed” “Officer was helpful, even when they didn’t need to be” “Received warning instead of ticket” “Knows of, related to, or works regularly with police” “Police made me feel safe”

83% 4% 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% >1%

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 81 of 179 PageID: 2372
• Following Up on Reports • Deciding Not to Report • 911 Calls and Responses
COMPLAINTS & REPORTING

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INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS
40%

25%

27%

18%

17%

15%

20% 18%

10%

10%

How often do you think Newark PD

How often do you think Newark PD

investigates complaints filed by residents? investigates complaints filed specifically

against a Newark PD officer?

All of the Time Some of the Time Rarely Never Don't Know

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 83 of 179 PageID: 2374

FILING FORMAL

Reasons why the 49

COMPLAINTS

people who did not report made that

In the last 12 months, 12% or

decision:

85 respondents have had a reason to file a complaint with Newark PD.
Of those 85 respondents,

They did not think it

would make a

37%

difference.

42% or 36 respondents actually followed through and filed a formal complaint.

Concerned there would be a backlash.

14%

How satisfied were those 36 respondents with the result of their complaint?
• Very Satisfied…28%
• Somewhat Satisfied…33%

They did not know how.
It would take too much time.

10% 4%

• Not Very Satisfied…6% • Not Satisfied At All…33%

Some other reason. 35%

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 84 of 179 PageID: 2375
911 CALLS

Have you ever made a 911 emergency call in Newark?

Do Newark police respond quickly enough to 911 calls…?
40%

45%

55%

21%
Yes
No

17% 14%
9%

ALL OF SOME RARELY NEVER DON'T

THE OF THE

KNOW

TIME TIME

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• Stops • Searches • Use of Force
POLICE STOPS

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MOST RECENT POLICE STOP
How concerned for your safety were you during the most recent time you were stopped by Newark PD? (413 respondents who reported a recent stop.)
40%

16%

12%

14%

15%

VERY CONCERNED

SOMEWHAT CONCERNED

NOT VERY

NOT

DON’T KNOW

CONCERNED CONCERNED AT

ALL

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 87 of 179 PageID: 2378
EXPLANATIONS FOR STOPS

Did the officer explain why they were stopping you?

How satisfied were you with the explanation given?
49%

20% 23%

57%

Yes
No
Don't Know/Refused

25%

10%

16%

Very

Somewhat Not Very Not Satisfied

Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied

At All

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 88 of 179 PageID: 2379
OBSERVING POLICE STOPS

How often have you seen a Newark PD officer stop someone else in the
last year?

Did you feel the officer had legitimate reason to stop that
person?

15%

18%

18%

11% 10%

20%

4%

32% 21%

47%

Yes No Don't Know

At Least Several Once or Few Few Once in Never Once a Times a Twice a Times a Times a the Past
Day Week Week Month Year Year

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 89 of 179 PageID: 2380
USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE

How concerned are you about the following?

37%

38%

29%

27%

16%

14%

19% 11%

Excessive force will be used on you if you Excessive force will be used on a member

are stopped by Newark PD?

of your family if they are stopped by

Newark PD?

Very Concerned Somewhat Concerned Not Very Concerned Not Concerned At All

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• Comfort with Body Cams • Compliance • Information Sharing
BODY CAMERAS

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USE OF BODY CAMS

Do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea for more Newark police
officers to wear body cameras?
2% 3%

How comfortable are you knowing you are being filmed when communicating with officers wearing body cameras?
76%

95%

Good Idea Bad Idea Don't Know
18%

2%

2%

Very

Somewhat Not Very Not At All

Comfortable Comfortable Comfortable Comfortable

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 92 of 179 PageID: 2383
ISSUES RELATED TO BODY CAMS

67%

62%

51%

68%

64%

22% 6% 3% 2%

20% 11% 3% 3%

20% 9% 10% 5%

17% 4% 4% 5%

23% 4% 4% 3%

I would have more I would be more I would be more

trust in Newark PD likely to comply

likely to share

if they wore body with Newark PD if information with

cameras.

they were wearing a Newark PD if they

body camera.

were wearing a

body camera.

Footage from Newark PD body cams should be
made publicly available without
alterations.

Strongly Agree Somewhat Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Somewhat Disagree

Body cameras would improve relations between Newark PD and
community.
Strongly Disagree

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 93 of 179 PageID: 2384
• Police Engagement • Police Treatment of Different Demographics • Suggestions for Improvements
POLICE IN THE COMMUNITY

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KNOWLEDGE AND ENGAGEMENT

How knowledgeable are Newark officers about the
background/experiences of your community?
42%

21%

15%

13%

9%

Very Somewhat Not Very Not At All Don't Know

Do Newark PD officers…?

37%

38%

22%

16% 14% 11%

18%

16% 15% 12%

Attend Community Events
All of the Time Rarely Don't Know

Interact with Community in a
Positive Way
Some of the Time
Never

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 95 of 179 PageID: 2386
EQUAL TREATMENT

In general, do you think the Newark PD…?

How often do you feel discriminated against by Newark PD because of who you are or how you identify?

12%

33%

54%

Treats all members of the community equally.
Treats some members of the community better than others.
Don't Know

58%

15%
7%
Very Often Somewhat Often

16%
Not Very Often

Not At All

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 96 of 179 PageID: 2387
EQUAL TREATMENT

Do you think the Newark PD treats this group…?

40% 40%

48%

28%

16%

15%

9% 4%

39% 32% 21%
7%

39% 33%
21%
7%

MEN

WOMEN Better Worse

HOMELESS PEOPLE NON-ENGLISH SPEAKERS
Same Don't Know

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 97 of 179 PageID: 2388
EQUAL TREATMENT

Do you think the Newark PD treats this group…?

43% 38%

48%

44%

35%

45% 32%

16%

23%

19%

18%

16%

9% 2%

6% 2%

BLACK PEOPLE

HISPANIC/LATINO WHITE PEOPLE PEOPLE
Better Worse Same Don't Know

LGBT PEOPLE

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 98 of 179 PageID: 2389
NEWARK PD ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY

What should the role of Newark Police officers be in the community?

“Protect and serve”

37%

“Be empathetic, caring, and helpful to people in the community”

19%

“Act as leaders/role models”

10%

“Enforce the law, investigate/prevent crime”

8%

“Community policing”

6%

“Treat everyone equally”

3%

“Be respectful”

3%

“None/Nothing (doing a good job)”

3%

“Respond quickly”

1%

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 99 of 179 PageID: 2390

IMPROVING POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS

What is the one thing Newark PD should do to improve community relations?

“Positively interact with/learn about people in the community”

30%

“More presence in the community”

15%

“More positive attitude (more respectful/friendlier/nicer)”

9%

“Better communication, listen to residents”

7%

“Nothing (doing a good job).”

4%

“Keep the city safe, do their job”

3%

“Improve response time”

3%

“Engage with schools/youth”

2%

“Treat everyone equally, stop profiling”

2%

“Training/education”

1%

“Integrity, be good people, do their job”

1%

“Wear body cameras”

1%

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 100 of 179 PageID: 2391
• Recommendations • A “New Arc” for Newark • Survey Weaknesses
CONCLUSIONS & ANALYSIS

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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
• Disassociation between positive firsthand experiences and negative media consumed
• NPD officers should be integrated members of the community, not just protectors or enforcers of the law
• NPD may consider bolstering presence on online social media platforms

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 102 of 179 PageID: 2393
MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS
• Increase communications and highlight positive interactions between NPD and citizens
• Professional social media expertise and positive citizen testimony is key
• Host and participate in community events consistently
• Image is not enough; back up words with continual improvements in police practices

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 103 of 179 PageID: 2394
Citizen Testimonials
A “NEW ARC” FOR N E WA R K

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 104 of 179 PageID: 2395
SURVEY WEAKNESSES
• Continuing to replicate the survey as previously written may not be enough going forward
• Disparities between perceptions of life in Newark overall and the NPD are glaring
• Adding new questions to address citizens’ perceptions of city officials, as well as other departments and services aside from the NPD could further clarify the relationship between residents and the city

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 105 of 179 PageID: 2396
CONTACT SUPRC
• David Paleologos, Director
• dpaleologos@suffolk.edu • 617-557-2096
• Meri Power-Ayer, Senior Program Coordinator
• mpower@suffolk.edu • 617-725-4165

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH

Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 106 of 179 PageID:

Suffolk U2n3iv9e7rsity Political Research Center

supolls@suffok.edu

8 Ashburton Place

dpaleologos@suffok.edu

Boston MA 02108

(617) 725-4165

NEWARK POLICE DIVISION CONSENT DECREE 2017-2018 COMMUNITY PROBABILITY SURVEY
The following contains an analysis of the 2017-2018 Newark survey conducted by Suffolk University. The focus of this analysis will be on key movement which has proven to be greater than the margin of error and indicative of possible new trends or directions of public opinion.

Suffolk University Political Research Center (SUPRC)
David Paleologos Director, SUPRC Suffolk University Professor
Merideth Power-Ayer, Senior Program Coordinator
Keith Horvath, Special Consultant to Director Michaela Giandello, Political Data Analyst Desiree Pelletier, Political Data Analyst
December 2018

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 107 of 179 PageID: 2398 2
Established in 2002 and based in Boston, the Suffolk University Political Research Center (SUPRC) conducts statewide and national surveys as well as bellwether polls. It examines political races and analyzes voters' opinions on key issues. Suffolk University polls have predicted outcomes in key states including New Jersey, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Maine, Colorado, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
Having conducted extensive polls and bellwether surveys in the 2004 presidential election and beyond, SUPRC has now expanded its reach overseas. Suffolk was the only US university to poll the 2017 French election. The Center found that Emmanuel Macron led his opponent, Marine Le Pen, by 16 points in the run-up to France's presidential runoff. Macron went on to win by a comfortable margin.
SUPRC Director David Paleologos has worked at Suffolk University since 2002. He is also a lecturer in the Government Department, where he teaches Political Survey Research each spring. Students in this course are immersed in questionnaire design, sampling, interviewing, coding data, and analyzing results. In 2018, Paleologos successfully partnered with numerous media outlets including USA TODAY, the Boston Globe, Arizona Republic, York Daily Record, Cincinnati Enquirer, Reno Gazette Journal, Saint Cloud Times, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, and six Florida newspapers.
Before entering academia, he was one of the most sought-after pollsters and field operatives in Massachusetts. Paleologos gives frequent guest lectures on the political survey process at many Boston-area institutions. In 2018, Paleologos was invited to present his outlook for the 2018 midterms and 2020 presidential election to 30 members of Congress in Washington, D.C. A graduate of Tufts University, he is a member of the American Association of Public Opinion Researchers and the Northeast Political Consultants Association. The Rendon Group voted him “Pollster of the Year” at their inaugural ELKEY Awards in 2015.
To read more about the Suffolk University Political Research Center, please visit our website: www.suffolk.edu/SUPRC

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Introduction
This report was prepared at the request of Peter C. Harvey, Independent Monitor of the Consent Decree signed by the City of Newark and the United States Department of Justice. Paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Consent Decree require that the Independent Monitor conduct a reliable, comprehensive, and representative survey of the Newark Community’s experience with and perceptions of the Newark Police Division and public safety.
Statement of Methodology
The poll fieldwork was conducted between September 9, 2018 and September 30, 2018 and interviewed 700 Newark residents distributed nearly equally across the Central, East, North, South, and West wards of the city. This poll follows the industry standard of 1.96 standard deviation at a 95% level of confidence for a margin of error of plus or minus 3.7 percentage points. As sample size decreases, sampling error increases, therefore statements based on various population subgroups may be more subject to error than those based on the total sample available. To better express where the most emphasis should be placed, we have organized movement into two groups: Tier 1 and Tier 2. The first tier contains only movement with a difference greater than 8 percentage points from the previous year’s findings and comprised of a sample size of 700, while the second tier includes all other subgroups which may contain less than 700 total respondents. All noted movement is compared directly to the findings of the 2017 survey.
The address-based sample for this study contained 61,202 records of Newark residents, broken down to 18,774 landline and 42,428 smart cell samples. The sample was generated by Survey Sampling International (SSI) a globally recognized, accredited, and established survey sample provider in the survey research industry. Survey respondents were randomly selected to participate and were contacted by a live survey interviewer through either their landline phone number or cellular phone number to respond orally. The sample is made up of 700 Newark residents; 92 completed via landline and 608 by cellular phone.

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2017-2018 Newark Community Probability Survey Weighted Sample Demographics

U.S. Census

Sample

Parameters

Demographics

Sex

Male

49%

49%

Female

51%

51%

Age 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-64 65+

15%

15%

23%

23%

19%

19%

31%

31%

12%

13%

Education

HS grad or less (incl voc/tech)

61%

58%

Some college

26%

27%

College grad+

12%

13%

Race/Ethnicity

White, not Hispanic

11%

10%

Black, not Hispanic

48%

48%

Hispanic

36%

36%

Other/mixed, not Hispanic

5%

6%

Ward Central East North South West

19%

19%

20%

19%

18%

18%

19%

20%

23%

24%

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Tier 1 Movement
T 1.1 Initial Good News for the Newark Police Department Generally speaking, people feel safer (QSA2, QSA4) and are less worried about being the
victim of a crime in Newark (Q6). More specifically, 54% of respondents feel “very safe” in their home at night, up 8 points from last year, and while 17% of residents feeling “very safe” walking around their neighborhood at night may sound low, this number is also up 8 points from last year. When it comes to feelings of safety at home men lead women 61% to 48%, and the Central ward reported the highest number of those who answered “very safe,” with the North ward reporting the lowest (63% - 46% respectively).
Frequency of seeing police patrols had an effect on feelings of overall safety. Of those who have seen a police patrol once a day over the past month, 62% felt “very safe,” whereas only 39% of those who saw a patrol once in the past month felt “very safe.” The survey suggests that income level is not driving people’s responses; when comparing general feelings of safety against income, we see that there is not much of a difference between those in the lowest bracket versus those who make greater than $55k; for example, 20% of those who make 0-$15k feel “not very safe” walking around their neighborhood at night compared to 21% of those who make more than $55k. The same can be said when looking at how safe respondents feel in their home at night, with numbers not diverging too greatly based on income.
When asked how worried they are about being the victim of a crime, 15% of respondents said they were “very worried,” a 13 point decrease from 2017, and 22% responded with “not at all worried,” an 11 point increase. Frequency of seeing patrols did not appear to play a role in how worried respondents were of being the victim of a crime, however for those who were “somewhat worried” or “very worried” there was a nearly even split amongst those who wanted a decrease versus an increase in patrols. Respondents appear to be less worried about being the victim of a crime but are not yet ready to attribute that directly to the efforts of the NPD.

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T 1.2 Mixed Signals on Neighborhood Safety and Policing Behaviors Moving from safety in the home onto safety in the neighborhood at night, men once again
lead women in feeling “very safe” 22% to 13%. The link between frequency of seeing patrols and the feeling of safety walking around at night is less clear than previously seen, and one possible takeaway from this difference is a fear that the Newark Police Department (NPD) will not quickly respond to a 911 call, according to the survey. Of those who feel “not safe at all” walking around their neighborhood at night, just 21% believe the NPD responds quickly to 911 calls “all of the time” while 46% believe the NPD “never” responds quickly. Compare this to the previous question about safety in the home at night, where of those who feel “very safe” 63% believe the NPD responds quickly to calls “all of the time.”
When asked about the level of concern they felt regarding the possibility of excessive force being used on them if they were stopped by an NPD officer, a 9 point decrease can be seen in those who felt “somewhat concerned” (16%) and a 10 point increase in those who were “not at all concerned” (37%) (Q26A). Both genders are within a few points of each other on this question, as are all age categories. The racial breakdown of this question aligns Hispanic residents closer to white residents than black; 48% of white respondents said they were “not at all concerned” compared to 32% of black respondents and 42% of Hispanics.
To take this one step further, 27% of respondents said they were “not at all” concerned about excessive force being used on a family member, up 11 points from last year. Going back to one of the first questions covered, this works alongside the noted increase in general feelings of safety and decrease in fear of being the victim of a crime. In terms of race, 36% of white respondents were “not at all concerned” about the use of excessive force on a family member, followed closely by 34% of Hispanic respondents and then 19% of black respondents. Confidence that excessive force will not be used on a family member drops alongside a police officer’s perceived knowledge of a resident’s background. Thirty-six percent of those “not at all concerned” about the use of excessive force believe the NPD is “very” knowledgeable of their background or experiences, while just 17% of those who believe the NPD does not have any knowledge of their background are “not at all concerned.”

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T 1.3 How Individual Demographics Perceive Treatment by the NPD In terms of how people perceive certain demographics to be treated, there was not much
movement from 2017 in groups such as men, women, blacks, whites, and non-English speakers. Larger shifts can be seen in how two particular groups are perceived to be treated: Hispanics and those of the LGBT community (Q34F/Q34H). When asked if they think the NPD treats Hispanic/Latino people better, worse, or the same as other groups in the community, there was an 8 point decrease from 2017 in those who felt the Hispanic community is treated the same as others. When asked the same question about the LGBT community, there was an 11 point decrease in those who felt they were treated equally, as well as a 10 point increase in those who did not know.
Question 35A indicates that while respondents feel certain groups are not being treated equally, they appear to feel they are either separate from that mistreatment or simply do not consider themselves to be a victim of it. Compared to 2017, a 7 point decrease was seen when respondents said they feel discriminated against by the NPD “somewhat often,” and an 8 point increase in those who said they were “not at all” discriminated against by the NPD because of who they are or how they identify. It seems that public perception of the treatment of certain groups has declined, and yet when it comes to examining their own personal experiences with the NPD, respondents are more optimistic. When looking at the racial breakdown of those who answered “not at all” to this question, 75% of whites feel this way compared to 55% of blacks and 59% of Hispanics. Despite respondents believing that Hispanics are less likely to be treated the same as other groups in the community, a majority of Hispanic respondents do not feel discriminated against at all.
Furthermore, when looking at how the numbers break when compared against income, we see that those who make between $0-$15k are slightly less likely to say they experience no discrimination with 44% responding “not at all” in regard to whether or not they feel personally discriminated against by the NPD. Of those who make $15k - $35k, 61% also said “none at all” and 62% of those who make $55k gave the same response.

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T 1.4 Relationship Between NPD and Opinions of Newark This brings us to our next observation, which examines the relationship between having a
low opinion of Newark and the way in which residents view the performance of the NPD. Still using Q35A as a reference, 69% of respondents who rated Newark as an “excellent” place to live answered “none at all” when asked if they experienced discrimination by the NPD, compared to just 46% of those who answered “poor” when rating Newark. A similar pattern can be seen when looking at whether the respondent believes Newark has gotten better or worse. Of those who believe it has gotten better, 58% answered “not at all” in regards to experiencing discrimination from the NPD, as opposed to 44% from those who answered with “worse.” It is tempting to assume that more patrols and greater police presence can lead to more negative experiences and that this may account for the respondents who are less likely to experience no discrimination, but when comparing these responses to frequency of seeing police patrols, this narrative does not hold true. In fact, the opposite appears to be closer to the truth, as 62% of respondents who reported seeing police patrols at least once a day in the past month answered “not at all” to feeling discriminated against by the NPD, compared to just 39% from those who saw a police patrol only one time in the past month.
The situation grows more interesting when looking at the movement seen regarding the main source of information about the Newark police. From the findings in 2017, there has been an 11 point increase in friends and family, a 16 point increase in word of mouth, a 27 point increase in social media, a 15 point increase in local newspapers, a 26 point increase in online, and a 16 point increase in government officials. Currently, 61% of respondents get their information from local TV news, while 68% of respondents get their information from social media. Social media as a main source of information has seen a significant increase from last year, whereas TV news has remained static. In addition to growing reliance on social media, going online to get information has also seen a nearly identical increase, with 66% of respondents saying they get information about the NPD from an online source. (QD22A, QD22D, QD22E).

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T 1.5 Information Sources and Impact on Perception When comparing sources of information, certain trends emerge; of those who rely on
social media for their information, 75% have no trust in the NPD while 47% of those who rely on TV news have no trust (QD22D/QD22A). Online does not follow this as dramatically as social media, but there is a small association between respondent’s thoughts on the NPD’s impact on lowering crime and their source of information. Perhaps a bit surprisingly, the difference is not too large amongst age demographics when it comes to who is more likely to rely on social media. Of those who get information about the Newark police through social media, 70% are between 18-24 and 71% are between 35-44. The number not unexpectedly drops a bit when looking at those who are older than 65, with just 51% of respondents that age using social media as a source of news. In addition to levels of trust, the likelihood to file a complaint also appears to be connected. Of those who get their information from social media, 79% have filed a complaint with the NPD, whereas just 66% of those who get their information from TV news have filed a complaint before. Similarly, 74% of those who go online for the information said they have filed a report before.
Along these lines, the difference between social media/online groups and TV news groups grows even more apparent when compared to how often they believe the NPD investigates complaints filed by residents, or properly investigates complaints against fellow officers. Of those who get their information from TV news, 67% believe the NPD investigates complaints filed by residents all of the time, and 65% believe the NPD investigates complaints against fellow officers all of the time. Compare this to those who get their information from social media, and a contrast emerges; 78% believe that the NPD investigates complaints filed by residents rarely, and the same percentage of respondents also believe the NPD investigates complaints against other officers rarely. There is a potential narrative wedge being driven between groups of people who consume traditional news media and groups of people who have accepted social media/online as their new conduit of information.
T 1.6 Lack of Positive Experiences and Negative Experiences with NPD When asked to talk about their most memorable positive interaction with a Newark police
officer, 83% of respondents said they have “never had a positive experience” with a Newark officer. This stands as a 48 point increase from last year. In comparison, when asked to describe

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their most memorable negative experience with a Newark officer, 53% of respondents said they “never had a negative experience,” a 13 point increase from last year. In both cases, no racial categories deviate more than a few points from each other, and the same can be said for gender, income, and rating of Newark as a place to live. The cause of these shifts cannot be precisely determined from the survey results. It is possible, for example, that the perception of what constitutes a “positive” or a “negative” interaction has changed since the 2017 survey. Because these increases are significant—particularly in the number of residents reporting never having had a positive experience with NPD—responses to these and similar questions should be tracked closely in future survey efforts.
T 1.7 Optimistic Economic Movement There is encouraging movement when it comes to changes in the economic state of
Newark. Of those who were asked if they are the chief wage earner in their household, 62% answered “yes.” This is an 8 point increase from last year (QD4). Of those who answered yes, there were only marginal differences to be found in racial breakdown: those who graduated from college are slightly more likely to report being the chief wage earner, with 68% of college graduates responding “yes” compared to 60% from those who completed high school or less.
When looking at employment status in Newark, 58% of respondents said they were “employed full time” and 4% responded said they were “unemployed.” This also marks an improvement from last year, with an 11 point increase in those who are employed full time and a 6 point decrease in those unemployed. Unlike the previous question, race plays a somewhat larger role; 45% of whites report full time employment, compared to 57% of blacks and 63% of Hispanics. Looking at the gender breakdown, 52% of women are employed full time compared to 64% of men. Disparity between wards also emerges; the Central, East and West ward all hover around the same number (60%, 63%, and 60% respectively), but the South ward comes in last with 49% of those from the area reporting full time employment (QD11).
The housing situation has also seen positive movement with 27% of respondents saying they own a house, 27% renting a house, and 37% renting an apartment. From last year, there has been an 11 point increase in those renting a house and a 9 point decrease in those renting an apartment (QD8A). Among black and Hispanic respondents, there is no significant difference when it comes to comparing the percentage of those who rent a house versus own a house, but

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the gap widens but looking at white respondents. Of those who are renting a house, 22% are black compared 36% of white respondents who own a house.
Tier 2 Movement
T 2.1 Complaints Filed against NPD and Stop/Search Conduct While the number of respondents who had reason to file a complaint with the NPD in the
last 12 months was relatively the same, (12% in 2018 versus 9% in 2017, [Q21B]) the number of those in 2018 who ended up filing a formal complaint dropped by 12 points. Of those who did file a complaint, there was a 7 point increase in respondents being “very satisfied” (28%) and a 32 point increase in being “somewhat satisfied” (33%) with the result. It is worth remembering that the total number of respondents who filed a complaint in 2018 was just 36, meaning just a few people with more positive experiences caused a significant shift (Q21D). When those who did not file a complaint were asked to explain their reasoning, 38% of respondents said it was because they did not think it would make a difference, a 25 point decrease from last year, and a 14 point rise can be seen with 35% of respondents citing “some other reason” (Q21EM1).
When asked if a Newark police officer had stopped them in the last year, 11% of respondents said “yes, an officer has” and 87% said “no, an officer has not.” For those who were stopped, this is a 10 point decrease from last year, and a 10 point increase for those who were not stopped (Q51C). For both those who were stopped and those who were not, there was no statistically significant difference when it came to the race of the person answering the question. When thinking back to the most recent time they were stopped by a police officer, respondents showed a 10 point decrease in feeling somewhat concerned about their own safety (12%), and an 11 point increase in not knowing (15%). Black respondents were a bit more likely to say they “don’t know” as opposed to white respondents, and white respondents led black respondents 49% to 35% when answering “not concerned at all.” Forty-six percent of Hispanic respondents also answered with “not concerned at all.”
Further supporting this idea is Question 18C, in which respondents were asked to think back again to the most recent time in which they were stopped and whether or not the NPD officer explained why they were stopping them. There was a 9 point decrease in those who said “no” (23%) but a 7 point increase in those who did not know whether or not an NPD officer

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explained their situation (16%). Sixty-three percent of white respondents said the officer explained the reason for the stop, along with 61% of Hispanics; only 51% of black respondents said they received an explanation.
T 2.2 Hispanic/Latino Residents May View NPD as More Legitimate Than Non-Hispanic Black or White Respondents
Certain findings indicate that Hispanic/Latino residents may view the NPD as more legitimate than non-Hispanic respondents who identify as black or white do.1 For example, when asked about the most recent time they saw an NPD officer stop someone else, 45% of English-speakers believed the officer had a legitimate reason to stop that person, while 56% of Spanish-speakers and 65% of Portuguese-speakers believed the stop was legitimate. Similarly, while 43% and 45% of respondents identifying as solely black or white, respectively, believed the stop was legitimate, 54% of respondents identifying as Hispanic viewed the stop as legitimate. This is a reminder that one cannot assume that Hispanic residents and non-Hispanic black residents will fall into the same easily definable categories simply because they classify as minority demographics, and this should be kept in mind by the NPD moving forward.
When thinking back to the most recent time a respondent saw an NPD officer stop someone else, 47% felt the officer had a legitimate reason for the stop (Q19B), an 8 point decrease from last year. Still thinking back to this- stop, there was an 11 point decrease (Q25) from last year among those who felt “very concerned” for the safety of the person being stopped and searched (41%). When it came to whether or not an officer had a legitimate reason to stop someone, both black and white respondents were within a few points of each other (43% and 45% respectively) and 54% of Hispanic respondents answered “yes, officer had legitimate reason.” All things considered, the positive movement seen here can be somewhat of a mixed bag in that the numbers are moving in the right direction, but there are still gaps to be conscious of; the data is not necessarily trending in a more negative direction, but one which potentially reflects a more aware and conflicted base and is certainly something to watch and study further.
1 Respondents who identified themselves as “of Latino or Hispanic origin, such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Brazilian, Dominican, or some other Spanish or Portuguese-speaking background” were asked if they also consider themselves to be part of a racial category.

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T 2.3 Areas to Watch Regarding NPD Behaviors When asked how often they believe the NPD properly handles evidence, respondents
seemed less sure this year than the last. Of those asked, 42% did not know, up 14 points from the previous year. In addition to that added uncertainty, 9% of respondents answered with “all of the time,” a 9 point decrease (Q12A1). Thirty-one percent of white respondents say they “don’t know,” compared with 38% of black respondents and 50% of Hispanic respondents.
This pattern continues into one of the next questions where respondents were asked how often they believed the NPD made truthful or accurate statements, with 12% saying “all of the time” and 27% saying they did not know. Respectively this is an 8 point decrease and a 13 point increase from last year (Q12A3). Mirroring the previous question, the race categories for those who answered “don’t know” are 6% of whites, 29% of blacks, and 28% of Hispanics. Black and Hispanic members of the community appear unsure of exactly how much trust they should have in the integrity of the NPD and their ability to fulfill their duties with honesty. Note that the sample size of this particular question set is 340, widening the margin of error to plus or minus 5.3 percentage points. This is worth noting when trying to understand the reservations that some people of color may hold when it comes to their trust in NPD officers.
Interestingly, despite general feelings of safety increasing, respondents were 13 points less likely to feel “more safe” when Newark Police officers are nearby as opposed to moments before they arrived, and 7 points more likely to say their feeling depends on the situation (Q17B). White (53%) and Hispanic (52%) respondents were slightly more likely to say they felt “more safe” when in the presence of a Newark officer as opposed to black respondents (45%). There is also a bit of a decrease when compared alongside the NPD’s knowledge of residents’ background or experiences; of those who feel “more safe” when in the presence of a Newark officer, 59% believe the NPD is “very knowledgeable” about their background or experiences, as opposed to the 40% who feel the NPD is “not at all knowledgeable.”
The final point of observation related to this particular question is the relationship between residents feeling discriminated against and how knowledgeable they feel the NPD is of their background or experiences. Of those who feel the NPD is very knowledgeable, 67% responded with “not at all” when asked if they feel discriminated against by the NPD, versus only 49% of those who feel the NPD is not at all knowledgeable about their background or

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experiences. A similar trend can be seen when compared against how often respondents believe the NPD attends events in the neighborhood, with a drop in those who respond “not at all” to feeling discriminated against falling consistently alongside a decline in frequency of police attending events.

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Final Observations The NPD has a lot of movement to be proud of: fewer stops and searches this year, less
fear of residents being victim to a crime, an increase in general feelings of safety, and more. Yet Newark appears to be a city that has grown more distrustful in the past year; while there have been no substantial drops in the level of trust given to the NPD, the people of the city are less willing to interact with their local officers, and more unsure than last year when it comes to a multitude of topics. The gap emerging between groups based on their sources of information speaks to the possibility of a greater trend which can be followed throughout this survey. The general feeling of safety has increased and the fear of being the victim of a crime has gone down. In spite of these developments, respondents feel less safe this year than last year while in the presence of an NPD officer, and are less inclined to believe that officers detain people only as long as possible or that they handle evidence properly.
The people of Newark want their police to reflect their community, they want those who protect them to also understand them, and to be truly aware of where they come from. NPD should continue its efforts to prove to the community that it is invested on the ground floor. This survey shows levels of comfort or positive experiences often rise alongside the amount of knowledge a resident perceives the NPD to have of their background or experiences. While it is not exactly a one-to-one relationship, this trend is significant enough to warrant an increased effort in focus on community relations. Residents must see the officers as integrated members of their community, not just protectors of it. Ultimately when thinking about the increasing reliance on social media and online media as a source of information, it would be wise to bolster the online presence of the department in a major way. Consider creating an Instagram page to reflect positive interactions within the community and have this be the image projected to residents: that the NPD are neighbors and members of the community first, and enforcers second. The pros of an increased presence on social media far outweigh the cons when remembering that the accounts are free; if this idea is acted upon, it would be helpful to designate an expert social media professional to head up the accounts and keep the content consistent across all platforms to ensure quality control. The NPD currently has a Twitter account, but the content is impersonal and related more to community safety updates; new content projecting positive interactions with the NPD among the community can also be presented on Twitter to increase coverage, as this would also fall under the control of the social media professional.

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Recommendations Moving Forward Newark residents appear to relate their personal opinions of the quality of life in Newark to their perceptions of the NPD itself; when looking at how often respondents felt they experienced discrimination from a Newark police officer, the number of those who responded with “not at all” consistently dropped alongside their rating of Newark in general. As the ratings lowered, the number of people who reported experiencing no discrimination mirrored the decline. The responsibility of improving residents’ opinion of Newark as a whole cannot completely fall to the NPD, but in working to address the lack of connection between Newark officers and the residents, the NPD may consider hosting more public events. These do not have to be large scale and could even be charitable in nature, such as 10k races to raise money for certain causes, as well as having a barbecue or food component alongside these events. In addition to this, the NPD could also consider hosting cultural highlight days in which certain people may cook and bring food traditional to their own cultures and share stories with Newark officers over a meal. Not only would hosting charitable events legitimately benefit the community by fostering peace and connectivity, but events such as these will show a side of the NPD beyond policing. The NPD has already shown a willingness to host events such as “Pop-up Community Talks” which allows greater connection between the department and the community, so increasing the frequency and variety of such events could prove beneficial. These events should appear to be spontaneous to the community but rolled out methodically by the department. In addition, if a resident is willing to approach a Newark officer with an issue, the department must ensure that the resident’s issue is directly addressed and even if a solution is not immediately available, the resident should feel heard and experience a follow up to ensure connectivity between the department and those willing to speak about their concerns.
In addition to the previously stated recommendations, the NPD may also consider consolidating all efforts moving forward under the umbrella of one specified branding campaign: “A New Arc for Newark.” Stylized as NewArc, this granular branding campaign would openly outline the new points being addressed by the NPD going into the future and put a transparent face towards the community during the NPD’s efforts to address their concerns. The points along the “Arc” would include an Instagram page, charity events, personal video testimonials and postings from citizens (about how a recent event saved their life), church related events, and

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food/culture socials. This new “Arc” could show a major improvement for an urban city and ultimately become a national model.
There is progress being made, but there are also subgroups of people who have not yet been convinced that this progress has reached them. The main concern facing the NPD should be keeping this momentum going in the right direction and upping their social media communications to project a more understanding and welcoming face to the community; this new face must in turn be bolstered by continued improvement in police practices. If the people of Newark see their police department investing time into the community for no reason other than it is the right thing to do, that will be a step forward reaching the residents who are unsure of where they stand in regard to their thoughts on the NPD.
In Summary  NPD should focus on increasing the connection between the community and the department.  Address the lack of connection between individuals in the community and members of the NPD by hosting local events. Special focus should be given to highlighting the culture of those in the community and allowing them to feel welcome. o For example, potlucks with emphasis on food traditional to the culture of the household, that projects a positive face for the NPD by “breaking bread”.  Keeping in mind the increased reliance on social media and online platforms for news, the NPD may consider bolstering its presence on such platforms. o People in Newark seem to put greater weight behind what they see and hear on social media as opposed to their own personal perceptions, so an increased presence on online platforms could allow the NPD a chance to highlight positive interactions between the department and the community, allowing greater control over the narrative they project. o Consider designating an expert social media professional to head up the accounts, placing greater emphasis on community interactions. o In addition, an emphasis should be placed on filming NPD officers interacting with their community in day to day activities, with a special focus placed on capturing church-related events.

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o Testimonials may also be included from Newark residents with particularly powerful or moving stories and posted on all social media platforms, highlighting moments between residents and NPD officers who went provided a service that was very much needed. This can be posted in the form of a short video, or a photo of the resident along with a caption quoting their retelling of the interaction.
 While a strong image is important, do not forget to back up these claims with continued, legitimate improvements police practices. o Encouraging movement has been observed since 2017, and this momentum must continue if there is to be any weight behind the image the NPD conveys.
 “A New Arc for Newark.” NewArc branding campaign outlining efforts being made by the department to directly address concerns of the community.
 Suffolk University was commissioned to exactly replicate the Rutgers 2017 survey questions but recommends the addition of questions about individual politicians (including boards, city leadership etc.) to examine and further explain the disparity between NPD relations and perceptions, and to more broadly define the relationship between residents and the city as a whole.

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 124 of 179 PageID: 2415
Appendix D

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 125 of 179 PageID: 2416
City of Newark Consent Decree 2018 Community Survey
Created on: 2-Feb-2019
Total questions: 39 Total Number of Responses: 81

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCCityAo-Mf NAeHwarDkoCcounmseennt Dt 12ec54r81e-7e1201F8ileCdom08m/u0n9i/t1y9SurPveayge 126 of 179 PageID:
Q1 What is your home zip code?
Answered: 78 Skipped: 3
(See Appendix for results)
1 / 39

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Q2 How long have you lived in Newark? (Number of Years)
Answered: 79 Skipped: 2
(See Appendix for results)
2 / 39

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Q3 Thinking back over the last year, would you say Newark has gotten better as a place to live, gotten worse, or there hasn't been much change?
Answered: 80 Skipped: 1
Better

Worse

No Change

Don't Know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Better Worse No Change Don't Know TOTAL

RESPONSES

36.25%

29

26.25%

21

35.00%

28

2.50%

2

80

3 / 39

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Q4 When you are walking in your neighborhood during the DAY, do you feel:
Answered: 81 Skipped: 0

Very safe

Somewhat safe

Not very safe

Not safe at all

Don’t know 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Very safe Somewhat safe Not very safe Not safe at all Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

30.86%

25

41.98%

34

14.81%

12

8.64%

7

3.70%

3

81

4 / 39

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Q5 When you are walking in your neighborhood at NIGHT, do you feel:
Answered: 81 Skipped: 0

Very safe

Somewhat safe

Not very safe

Not safe at all

Don’t know 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Very safe Somewhat safe Not very safe Not safe at all Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

17.28%

14

30.86%

25

20.99%

17

30.86%

25

0.00%

0

81

5 / 39

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Q6 If you were in need of assistance, how likely would you be to ask a Newark police officer for help?
Answered: 81 Skipped: 0
Very likely

Somewhat likely

Not very likely

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Very likely Somewhat likely Not very likely Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

29.63%

24

27.16%

22

39.51%

32

3.70%

3

81

6 / 39

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Q7 If you had information about a crime that took place, how likely would you be to report it or to provide information to the Newark Police?
Answered: 80 Skipped: 1
Very likely

Somewhat likely

Not very likely

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Very likely Somewhat likely Not very likely Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

46.25%

37

18.75%

15

30.00%

24

5.00%

4

80

7 / 39

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Q8 Would you like to see an increase or a decrease in the number of Newark Police officers on foot or in a car patrolling in your neighborhood,
or would you like to see the number of officers stay the same?
Answered: 80 Skipped: 1
Increase

Decrease

Stay the same

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Increase Decrease Stay the same Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

63.75%

51

10.00%

8

21.25%

17

5.00%

4

80

8 / 39

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Q9 Thinking about the area where you live, how would you rate the job the Newark Police are doing serving people in your neighborhood?
Answered: 81 Skipped: 0

Excellent

Good

Fair

Poor

Don’t know 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Excellent Good Fair Poor Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

8.64%

7

22.22%

18

30.86%

25

32.10%

26

6.17%

5

81

9 / 39

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Q10 How much impact do you think the Newark Police have on lowering the city’s crime rate?
Answered: 81 Skipped: 0

A lot

Some

A little

None at all

Don’t know 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES A lot Some A little None at all Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

16.05%

13

22.22%

18

27.16%

22

27.16%

22

7.41%

6

81

10 / 39

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Q11 How much respect do you have for the Newark Police, in general?
Answered: 80 Skipped: 1

A lot

Some

A little

None at all

Don’t know 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES A lot Some A little None at all Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

41.25%

33

18.75%

15

20.00%

16

17.50%

14

2.50%

2

80

11 / 39

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Q12 How much trust do you have for the Newark Police, in general?
Answered: 81 Skipped: 0

A lot

Some

A little

None at all

Don’t know 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES A lot Some A little None at all Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

22.22%

18

24.69%

20

17.28%

14

32.10%

26

3.70%

3

81

12 / 39

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Q13 Have you requested assistance from a Newark police officer in the last year?
Answered: 81 Skipped: 0
Yes

No

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes No Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

18.52%

15

81.48%

66

0.00%

0

81

13 / 39

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Q14 Has a Newark police officer requested information from you in the last year?
Answered: 81 Skipped: 0
Yes, an officer has
No, an officer has not

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes, an officer has No, an officer has not Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

19.75%

16

80.25%

65

0.00%

0

81

14 / 39

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Q15 Do you know how to file a complaint with the Newark Police Department?
Answered: 77 Skipped: 4
Yes

No

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes No TOTAL

RESPONSES

62.34%

48

37.66%

29

77

15 / 39

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Q16 If you were to file a complaint with the Newark Police, do you believe that your complaint would be adequately investigated?
Answered: 79 Skipped: 2
Yes

No

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes No Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

25.32%

20

55.70%

44

18.99%

15

79

16 / 39

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Q17 In the last 12 months, have you filed a complaint with the Newark police? If your answer to this question is no, skip to Question 19.
Answered: 71 Skipped: 10
Yes

No

Don’t know

N/A

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes No Don’t know N/A TOTAL

RESPONSES

12.68%

9

84.51%

60

1.41%

1

1.41%

1

71

17 / 39

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Q18 If you answered yes to Question 17, were you satisfied with the result?
Answered: 17 Skipped: 64

Very satisfied

Somewhat satisfied Not very satisfied
Not satisfied at all

Don’t know 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Not very satisfied Not satisfied at all Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

11.76%

2

29.41%

5

11.76%

2

41.18%

7

5.88%

1

17

18 / 39

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Q19 Has a Newark police officer stopped you in the last year? If your answer to this question is no, Skip to Question 26.
Answered: 76 Skipped: 5
Yes, an officer has
No, an officer has not

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes, an officer has No, an officer has not Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

23.68%

18

76.32%

58

0.00%

0

76

19 / 39

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Q20 If you answered yes to Question 19, about how many times have you been stopped by a Newark police officer in the last year?
Answered: 21 Skipped: 60

1 or 2

3 or 4

5 or 6

More than 6

Don’t know 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES 1 or 2 3 or 4 5 or 6 More than 6 Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

42.86%

9

28.57%

6

0.00%

0

19.05%

4

9.52%

2

21

20 / 39

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Q21 If you answered yes to Question 19, did the officer explain why he/she stopped you?
Answered: 20 Skipped: 61
Yes

No

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes No Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

55.00%

11

45.00%

9

0.00%

0

20

21 / 39

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Q22 If you answered yes to Question 19, how satisfied were you with the explanation you were given?
Answered: 19 Skipped: 62

Very satisfied

Somewhat satisfied Not very satisfied
Not satisfied at all

Don’t know

I was not given an...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Not very satisfied Not satisfied at all Don’t know I was not given an explanation TOTAL

RESPONSES

5.26%

1

31.58%

6

15.79%

3

31.58%

6

5.26%

1

10.53%

2

19

22 / 39

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Q23 If you answered yes to Question 19, how concerned were you for your own safety when you were stopped by the police officer?
Answered: 19 Skipped: 62

Very concerned

Somewhat concerned
Not very concerned Not concerned
at all

Don’t know 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Very concerned Somewhat concerned Not very concerned Not concerned at all Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

36.84%

7

31.58%

6

21.05%

4

10.53%

2

0.00%

0

19

23 / 39

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Q24 If you answered yes to Question 19, did you think you were stopped for good reason?
Answered: 19 Skipped: 62
Yes

No

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes No Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

26.32%

5

52.63%

10

21.05%

4

19

24 / 39

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Q25 If you answered yes to Question 19, do you think you were stopped longer than necessary?
Answered: 18 Skipped: 63
Yes

No

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes No Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

55.56%

10

33.33%

6

11.11%

2

18

25 / 39

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Q26 Do you think Newark police officers use the appropriate level of force during encounters with the public?
Answered: 73 Skipped: 8
Yes

No

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes No Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

36.99%

27

39.73%

29

23.29%

17

73

26 / 39

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCCityAo-Mf NAeHwarDkoCcounmseennt Dt 12ec54r84e-3e1201F8ileCdom08m/u0n9i/t1y9SurPveayge 152 of 179 PageID:
Q27 Would you have more overall trust in Newark police officers if they were wearing body cameras?
Answered: 79 Skipped: 2
Yes

No

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes No Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

75.95%

60

16.46%

13

7.59%

6

79

27 / 39

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Q28 Do you think that footage from Newark police body-worn cameras should be made publicly available without any alterations or editing?
Answered: 79 Skipped: 2
Yes

No

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes No Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

83.54%

66

10.13%

8

6.33%

5

79

28 / 39

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Q29 Do you think body cameras would improve relations between the Newark Police and the community?
Answered: 80 Skipped: 1
Yes

No

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes No Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

66.25%

53

18.75%

15

15.00%

12

80

29 / 39

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Q30 To the best of your knowledge, do Newark police officers attend events in your community all of the time, some of the time, rarely, or
never?
Answered: 76 Skipped: 5

All of the time Some of the time Rarely

Never

Don’t know 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES All of the time Some of the time Rarely Never Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

10.53%

8

27.63%

21

21.05%

16

21.05%

16

19.74%

15

76

30 / 39

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Q31 For each of the following groups, please tell us if you think the Newark Police treat this group better, worse, or the same as other groups
in the community:
Answered: 79 Skipped: 2

A. Men B. Women C. Black people D. Hispanic and Latino people E. White people F. Homeless people G. LGBT people H. Non-English Speakers

BETTER
7.69% 6
39.74% 31
3.80% 3
6.67% 5
60.26% 47
6.41% 5
8.97% 7
14.29% 11

WORSE
60.26% 47
14.10% 11
59.49% 47
40.00% 30
1.28% 1
47.44% 37
24.36% 19
33.77% 26

SAME
21.79% 17
29.49% 23
26.58% 21
34.67% 26
19.23% 15
25.64% 20
26.92% 21
23.38% 18

DON'T KNOW
10.26% 8
16.67% 13
10.13% 8
18.67% 14
19.23% 15
20.51% 16
39.74% 31
28.57% 22

TOTAL 78 78 79 75 78 78 78 77

WEIGHTED AVERAGE 3.35 3.23 3.43 3.65 2.97 3.60 3.97 3.66

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Q32 In just a few words, what is one thing the Newark Police should do differently to improve police-community relations?
Answered: 65 Skipped: 16
(See Appendix for results)
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Q33 Is there anything that we have not asked you that you want to share with us?
Answered: 30 Skipped: 51
(See Appendix for results)
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Q34 What is your age range?
Answered: 76 Skipped: 5

14-17 18-20 21-24 25-29 30-34 35-44 45-49 50-54 55-64 65 OR OVER
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES 14-17 18-20 21-24 25-29 30-34 35-44 45-49 50-54 55-64 65 OR OVER
TOTAL

RESPONSES

3.95%

3

10.53%

8

10.53%

8

11.84%

9

14.47%

11

11.84%

9

3.95%

3

13.16%

10

9.21%

7

10.53%

8

76

34 / 39

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Q35 What best describes your employment situation today?
Answered: 80 Skipped: 1
Employed full time
Employed part time
Employed in temporary or...
Unemployed Stay at home
parent or... A student

Retired

On Disability 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Employed full time Employed part time Employed in temporary or seasonal work Unemployed Stay at home parent or caregiver A student Retired On Disability TOTAL

RESPONSES

51.25%

41

7.50%

6

2.50%

2

17.50%

14

1.25%

1

10.00%

8

7.50%

6

2.50%

2

80

35 / 39

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Q36 Which of these groups would you say best represents your race?
Answered: 73 Skipped: 8

White Black/African
American Asian/Asian
American Native
American or... Native
Hawaiian and... Some other race
Don’t know 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES White Black/African American Asian/Asian American Native American or Alaska Native Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Some other race Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

6.85%

5

69.86%

51

1.37%

1

4.11%

3

1.37%

1

12.33%

9

4.11%

3

73

36 / 39

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Q37 Are you of Latino or Hispanic origin, such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Brazilian, Dominican, or some other Spanish or Portuguesespeaking background?
Answered: 72 Skipped: 9
Yes

No

Don’t know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes No Don’t know TOTAL

RESPONSES

25.00%

18

70.83%

51

4.17%

3

72

37 / 39

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Q38 What is your gender?
Answered: 78 Skipped: 3

Male

Female

Transgender

Other

Prefer not to say 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Male Female Transgender Other Prefer not to say TOTAL

RESPONSES

71.79%

56

28.21%

22

0.00%

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

0

78

38 / 39

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Q39 Do you identify as LGBT?
Answered: 69 Skipped: 12
Yes

No

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES Yes No TOTAL

RESPONSES

2.90%

2

97.10%

67

69

39 / 39

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Q1 What is your home zip code?
Answered: 78 Skipped: 3

#

RESPONSES

1

07102

2

07108

3

07112

4

07108

5

07108

6

07102

7

07102

8

07108

9

07105

10

07103

11

07055

12

07108

13

07102

14

07108

15

07103

16

07103

17

07108

18

07111

19

07102

20

07107

21

07112

22

07105

23

07102

24

07107

25

07102

26

07108

27

07108

28

07108

29

07108

30

07114

31

07102

32

07114

33

07012

34

07108

35

07107

1 / 3

DATE 12/17/2018 12:32 PM 12/17/2018 12:30 PM 12/17/2018 12:27 PM 12/17/2018 12:24 PM 12/17/2018 12:22 PM 12/17/2018 12:15 PM 12/17/2018 12:12 PM 12/17/2018 12:10 PM 12/17/2018 12:10 PM 12/17/2018 12:07 PM 12/17/2018 12:07 PM 12/17/2018 12:04 PM 12/17/2018 12:03 PM 12/17/2018 12:01 PM 12/17/2018 12:00 PM 12/17/2018 11:56 AM 12/17/2018 11:55 AM 12/17/2018 11:52 AM 12/17/2018 11:50 AM 12/17/2018 11:49 AM 12/17/2018 11:46 AM 12/17/2018 11:45 AM 12/17/2018 11:43 AM 12/17/2018 11:37 AM 12/17/2018 11:33 AM 12/17/2018 11:30 AM 12/17/2018 11:27 AM 12/17/2018 10:56 AM 12/17/2018 10:28 AM 12/17/2018 10:22 AM 12/17/2018 10:17 AM 12/14/2018 6:35 PM 12/14/2018 6:29 PM 12/14/2018 6:18 PM 12/14/2018 6:13 PM

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36

07114

12/14/2018 6:09 PM

37

07102

12/14/2018 6:02 PM

38

07114

12/14/2018 5:57 PM

39

07114

12/14/2018 5:38 PM

40

07114

12/14/2018 5:34 PM

41

07114

12/14/2018 5:31 PM

42

07114

12/14/2018 5:23 PM

43

07114

12/14/2018 5:14 PM

44

07114

12/14/2018 4:52 PM

45

07107

12/14/2018 4:49 PM

46

07114

12/14/2018 4:48 PM

47

07108

12/14/2018 4:43 PM

48

07108

12/14/2018 4:40 PM

49

07108

12/14/2018 4:38 PM

50

07106

12/14/2018 4:35 PM

51

07108

12/14/2018 4:33 PM

52

07102

12/14/2018 4:31 PM

53

07108

12/14/2018 4:29 PM

54

07108

12/14/2018 4:26 PM

55

07107

12/14/2018 4:26 PM

56

07108

12/14/2018 4:23 PM

57

07107

12/14/2018 4:23 PM

58

07108

12/14/2018 4:20 PM

59

07106

12/14/2018 4:19 PM

60

07108

12/14/2018 4:17 PM

61

07003

12/14/2018 4:15 PM

62

07103

12/14/2018 4:14 PM

63

07104

12/14/2018 4:12 PM

64

07103

12/14/2018 4:11 PM

65

07108

12/14/2018 4:09 PM

66

07932

12/14/2018 4:06 PM

67

07112

12/14/2018 4:03 PM

68

07112

12/14/2018 4:00 PM

69

07112

12/14/2018 3:59 PM

70

07108

12/14/2018 3:56 PM

71

07107

12/14/2018 3:56 PM

72

07105

12/14/2018 3:54 PM

73

07108

12/14/2018 3:53 PM

74

07105

12/14/2018 3:49 PM

75

07105

12/14/2018 3:43 PM

76

07108

12/14/2018 3:37 PM

2 / 3

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77

07112

12/14/2018 12:52 PM

78

07105

12/14/2018 12:41 PM

3 / 3

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Q2 How long have you lived in Newark? (Number of Years)
Answered: 79 Skipped: 2

#

RESPONSES

1

45

2

2

3

5

4

15

5

63

6

3

7

1

8

1

9

19

10

3

11

25

12

12

13

26

14

25

15

40

16

10

17

5

18

45

19

1

20

2

21

20

22

30

23

25

24

1

25

53

26

1

27

5

28

2

29

32

30

28

31

2

32

36

33

27

34

51

35

33

1 / 3

DATE 12/17/2018 12:32 PM 12/17/2018 12:30 PM 12/17/2018 12:27 PM 12/17/2018 12:24 PM 12/17/2018 12:22 PM 12/17/2018 12:18 PM 12/17/2018 12:15 PM 12/17/2018 12:12 PM 12/17/2018 12:10 PM 12/17/2018 12:10 PM 12/17/2018 12:07 PM 12/17/2018 12:07 PM 12/17/2018 12:04 PM 12/17/2018 12:03 PM 12/17/2018 12:01 PM 12/17/2018 12:00 PM 12/17/2018 11:56 AM 12/17/2018 11:55 AM 12/17/2018 11:52 AM 12/17/2018 11:50 AM 12/17/2018 11:49 AM 12/17/2018 11:46 AM 12/17/2018 11:45 AM 12/17/2018 11:43 AM 12/17/2018 11:37 AM 12/17/2018 11:33 AM 12/17/2018 11:30 AM 12/17/2018 11:27 AM 12/17/2018 10:56 AM 12/17/2018 10:28 AM 12/17/2018 10:22 AM 12/17/2018 10:17 AM 12/14/2018 6:35 PM 12/14/2018 6:29 PM 12/14/2018 6:18 PM

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCCityAo-Mf NAeHwarDkoCcounmseennt Dt 12ec54r86e-0e1201F8ileCdom08m/u0n9i/t1y9SurPveayge 169 of 179 PageID:

36

19

12/14/2018 6:13 PM

37

1

12/14/2018 6:09 PM

38

57

12/14/2018 6:02 PM

39

20

12/14/2018 5:57 PM

40

40

12/14/2018 5:38 PM

41

6

12/14/2018 5:34 PM

42

10

12/14/2018 5:31 PM

43

17

12/14/2018 5:27 PM

44

30

12/14/2018 5:14 PM

45

45

12/14/2018 4:52 PM

46

30

12/14/2018 4:49 PM

47

19

12/14/2018 4:48 PM

48

50

12/14/2018 4:43 PM

49

52

12/14/2018 4:40 PM

50

24

12/14/2018 4:38 PM

51

54

12/14/2018 4:35 PM

52

13

12/14/2018 4:33 PM

53

21

12/14/2018 4:31 PM

54

52

12/14/2018 4:29 PM

55

13

12/14/2018 4:26 PM

56

3

12/14/2018 4:26 PM

57

30

12/14/2018 4:23 PM

58

8

12/14/2018 4:23 PM

59

32

12/14/2018 4:20 PM

60

6

12/14/2018 4:19 PM

61

1

12/14/2018 4:17 PM

62

34

12/14/2018 4:15 PM

63

40

12/14/2018 4:14 PM

64

20

12/14/2018 4:12 PM

65

54

12/14/2018 4:11 PM

66

20

12/14/2018 4:09 PM

67

20

12/14/2018 4:06 PM

68

8

12/14/2018 4:03 PM

69

16

12/14/2018 4:00 PM

70

37

12/14/2018 3:59 PM

71

70

12/14/2018 3:56 PM

72

14

12/14/2018 3:56 PM

73

11

12/14/2018 3:54 PM

74

55

12/14/2018 3:53 PM

75

4

12/14/2018 3:49 PM

76

14

12/14/2018 3:43 PM

2 / 3

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77

16

12/14/2018 3:37 PM

78

35

12/14/2018 12:52 PM

79

68

12/14/2018 12:41 PM

3 / 3

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Q32 In just a few words, what is one thing the Newark Police should do differently to improve police-community relations?
Answered: 65 Skipped: 16

#

RESPONSES

DATE

1

Stop harassing us and being disrespectful. We are humans!

12/17/2018 12:32 PM

2

Stop harassing people and look for people who are doing stuff.

12/17/2018 12:30 PM

3

Treat everybody equally.

12/17/2018 12:24 PM

4

Get involved in community organizations. Eyes and ears of neighborhood.

12/17/2018 12:22 PM

5

Get involved in community

12/17/2018 12:18 PM

6

Come out and meet and greet!

12/17/2018 12:10 PM

7

Treat people they way they want to be treated.

12/17/2018 12:07 PM

8

Frequent neighborhood more get to know them by name

12/17/2018 12:07 PM

9

COMMUNICATE!

12/17/2018 12:04 PM

10

More community initiatives people think police are the enemy so being more involved would help

12/17/2018 12:03 PM

11

Kids shouldn't be scared of cops. Try to sole real crimes; is it a quota system. Not protect and

12/17/2018 12:01 PM

serve - now just patrol. Cops need to know the kids. Rookies shouldn't be out here.

12

Less aggressive in their interactions they think the uniform keeps them safe so they treat people

12/17/2018 12:00 PM

worse

13

Talk better w/more respect to folks.

12/17/2018 11:56 AM

14

More interaction with community; everybody are not in the gang

12/17/2018 11:55 AM

15

Be more present and culturally sensitive when performing their duties and sharing with people how 12/17/2018 11:52 AM

to prevent contact w/police dept.

16

Stop pulling us over for random checks

12/17/2018 11:50 AM

17

More communication, relaxed cituation, a part of common events

12/17/2018 11:49 AM

18

Be more on foot and present in community.

12/17/2018 11:46 AM

19

have been pulled over for a non-existant sign.

12/17/2018 11:43 AM

20

More police and avoid bringing people in as informants

12/17/2018 11:37 AM

21

Respectful communications with local community and culturally responsive/sensitive training

12/17/2018 11:33 AM

22

More patrol in the community. I think they should ask questions before pulling out guns on people. 12/17/2018 11:30 AM

23

I don't know, never had any contact with any officers to know.

12/17/2018 11:27 AM

24

To help the community

12/17/2018 10:56 AM

25

I believe things are just fine.

12/17/2018 10:28 AM

26

Get to know people

12/17/2018 10:22 AM

27

More police on foot, in cars.

12/14/2018 6:35 PM

28

More patrols. IDK

12/14/2018 6:32 PM

29

Learn how to talk to people

12/14/2018 6:18 PM

30

Make it a priority to talk to people about what goes on in the neighborhood. Respect people.

12/14/2018 6:13 PM

31

More police, talk to community members.

12/14/2018 5:38 PM

32

Get to know members of community. Build trust.

12/14/2018 5:34 PM

1 / 2

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33

Listen

12/14/2018 5:31 PM

34

Patrol on foot. Don't assume everyone is on drugs or is a dealer. Some people are sick. Have

12/14/2018 5:27 PM

more respect for the seniors. They don't correct their mistakes. They don't admit when they make

a mistake.

35

Do their job. Be more active with the public. They should live in the neighborhood.

12/14/2018 5:23 PM

36

Investigate major crimes rather than harass people on corner.

12/14/2018 5:14 PM

37

Increase 5-0 walking on the streets, show their faces and not just ride in a car

12/14/2018 4:52 PM

38

Keep on the body cameras

12/14/2018 4:49 PM

39

Have more than two officers in an area; only see once every couple of hours as opposed to every 12/14/2018 4:48 PM

couple of minutes

40

They should take drugs off of the street

12/14/2018 4:40 PM

41

Do better.

12/14/2018 4:38 PM

42

Nothing

12/14/2018 4:35 PM

43

Keep talking to each other.

12/14/2018 4:33 PM

44

Speak to the people!

12/14/2018 4:31 PM

45

Communicate with public better.

12/14/2018 4:29 PM

46

They should treaat people equally

12/14/2018 4:26 PM

47

Listening

12/14/2018 4:23 PM

48

Well they can should stay true to the public for eveything they do, whether it's right or wrong

12/14/2018 4:23 PM

49

N/A

12/14/2018 4:20 PM

50

Engage in local town hall meeting which do happen however, I don't feel the "trickle-down effect"

12/14/2018 4:19 PM

to police departments entirely.

51

Everything!

12/14/2018 4:17 PM

52

Stop being ignorant

12/14/2018 4:15 PM

53

Come talk to us.

12/14/2018 4:14 PM

54

Be more involved in the general community

12/14/2018 4:12 PM

55

Come talk to me.

12/14/2018 4:11 PM

56

Surveys; monitoring; body cameras

12/14/2018 4:06 PM

57

Cut folks who don't know the drug dealer.

12/14/2018 4:03 PM

58

Better training

12/14/2018 4:00 PM

59

communication to young black men

12/14/2018 3:59 PM

60

more foot patrols

12/14/2018 3:56 PM

61

Interact with people at community events

12/14/2018 3:56 PM

62

stop discriminating

12/14/2018 3:53 PM

63

Vivir melhor o forto ocorriolo e iinvestigar con mas clariza.

12/14/2018 3:49 PM

64

Collecting data and reporting to community group where the crime is increasing & decreasing in

12/14/2018 12:52 PM

the neighborhood when events or plan.

65

Be more personable -- make effort to overcome language barrier.

12/14/2018 12:41 PM

2 / 2

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Q33 Is there anything that we have not asked you that you want to share with us?
Answered: 30 Skipped: 51

#

RESPONSES

DATE

1

No

12/17/2018 12:24 PM

2

The women should be in position of leadership.

12/17/2018 12:22 PM

3

No

12/17/2018 12:18 PM

4

Khalif - good cop!

12/17/2018 12:10 PM

5

They treat _____, already vidible, gen good

12/17/2018 12:10 PM

6

Pray more and Love God enough to do it his way.

12/17/2018 12:07 PM

7

Brutality they way they treat you by appearance - hoody wear

12/17/2018 12:07 PM

8

NO

12/17/2018 12:04 PM

9

I have told my son what to do if he gets arrested, told him at 6.

12/17/2018 12:01 PM

10

Wy they don't do more heroic or community oriented things like offer rides to people

12/17/2018 12:00 PM

11

No, but thanks.

12/17/2018 11:55 AM

12

Cops need to be more reasonable and stop trying to fill their quota.

12/17/2018 11:50 AM

13

Self awareness classes to relieve stress against comm.

12/17/2018 11:49 AM

14

Had a PO refuse to write a report for car accident and then had officer testify against her in court

12/17/2018 11:43 AM

15

no

12/17/2018 11:30 AM

16

Nothing at all

12/17/2018 11:27 AM

17

No

12/17/2018 10:22 AM

18

No

12/14/2018 4:40 PM

19

No.

12/14/2018 4:38 PM

20

No

12/14/2018 4:26 PM

21

No

12/14/2018 4:23 PM

22

Nothing really

12/14/2018 4:23 PM

23

N/A

12/14/2018 4:20 PM

24

No

12/14/2018 4:19 PM

25

Nope

12/14/2018 4:12 PM

26

yes, do we believe Newark cops are corrupt?

12/14/2018 3:59 PM

27

No

12/14/2018 3:56 PM

28

A policia en si deceria ser mas colriente no algun foto relatialo e assim tomas as conciercias

12/14/2018 3:49 PM

cabiveis.

29

How to organize the youth and how they feel about crime and working with the police. The creation 12/14/2018 12:52 PM

of a youth cadet program for all the words.

30

More police around holidays on Ferry Street.

12/14/2018 12:41 PM

1 / 1

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Appendix E

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 175 of 179 PageID: 2466

STATUS OF NPD’S CONSENT DECREE TRAINING

The following chart notes the status of Consent Decree-related training.

Training

Status

Community-Oriented Policing1 Body-Worn and In-Car Cameras Use of Force Stops, Searches, and Arrests Bias-Free Policing
Internal Affairs
Property and Evidence Management

NPD reports that training has been administered to all relevant NPD officers.
NPD reports that training has been administered to all relevant NPD officers.
NPD reports that by the end of March 2019, training had been administered to all relevant NPD officers.
NPD reports that by the end of April 2019, training had been administered to all relevant NPD officers.
Mid-Level Management session held on April 30.
Two-day course for Command-level officers and community members held May 1 – May 2.
Train the Trainer sessions held May 14 – May 15.
NPD is developing an internal affairs investigations procedural manual in collaboration with DOJ’s vendor. It will need to develop training materials based on this manual.
DOJ provided draft training materials to the Monitoring Team on July 2.
NPD needs to develop a procedural manual and training reflecting Consent Decree-compliant practices.

1 NPD administered Community-Oriented Policing training to its officers prior to completing its Community-Oriented Policing policy.

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 176 of 179 PageID: 2467
Appendix F

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 177 of 179 PageID: 2468

STATUS OF NPD’S CONSENT DECREE POLICIES

The following chart notes the status of effective Consent Decree-related policies.

GO#

Subject

Consent Decree Provision

Date Adopted by NPD

GO 17-06 Bias-Free Policing

Paragraph 5

GO 18-05 Body Worn Cameras

Paragraph 104

GO 18-06 In-Car Cameras

Paragraph 104

GO 18-20 Use of Force

Paragraphs 66-67

GO 18-21 Use of Force Reporting, Investigation and Review
GO 18-22 Firearms and Other Weapons

Paragraphs 66-67 Paragraphs 66-67

GO 18-14 Consensual Citizen Contacts and Paragraph 5; Section VI Investigatory Stops (“Stops”)

GO 18-15 Searches With or Without a

Paragraph 5; Section VI

September 19, 2017 (Effective September 19, 2017) June 5, 2018 (Effective June 5, 2018) June 5, 2018 (Effective June 5, 2018) November 8, 2018 (Effective January 1, 2019) November 8, 2018 (Effective January 1, 2019) November 8, 2018 (Effective January 1, 2019) December 31, 2018 (Effective January 10, 2019) December 31, 2018

Search Warrant (“Searches”)

(Effective January 10, 2019)

GO 18-16 Arrests With or Without an Arrest Warrant (“Arrests”)

Paragraph 5; Section VI

December 31, 2018 (Effective January 10, 2019)

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 178 of 179 PageID: 2469

GO#

Subject

Consent Decree Provision

Date Adopted by NPD

GO 18-13 Community Policing

Section V

GO 18-24 Property and Evidence Division Paragraph 110

GO 18-23 Property and Evidence Management
GO 19-03 LGBTQI Community & Police Interactions1
GO 18-12 First Amendment Right to Observe, Object to, and Record Police Activity2

Paragraph 110 N/A N/A

April 4, 2019 (Effective April 4, 2019) April 3, 2019 (Effective April 3, 2019) April 12, 2019 (Effective April 12, 2019) April 3, 2019 (Effective April 3, 2019) June 12, 2019 (Effective June 12, 2019)

1 Although the Consent Decree requires NPD to “operate without bias based on any demographic category,” see Consent Decree § VII, it does not require a standalone policy to address the LGBTQIA community. To help institutionalize its practices, NPD decided to draft a policy dedicated to its stop, search, and arrest of these community members.
2 The Consent Decree requires NPD to respect the public’s First Amendment right and prohibits officers from taking certain actions to discourage the exercise of these rights. Consent Decree ¶¶ 55-62. It does not expressly require NPD to create standalone policy to this end, but NPD endeavored to do so.

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 158-1 Filed 08/09/19 Page 179 of 179 PageID: 2470

The following chart notes the status of Consent Decree-related policies that have not yet been adopted.

GO#

Subject

Consent Decree Provision

Status

Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake & Investigation Process
GO 18-26 Internal Affairs: Disciplinary Process and Matrix

Section XI Section XIII

Final approval from the Independent Monitor on June 18, 2019.
Final approval from the Independent Monitor on February 25, 2019.

 
 Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 1 of 214 PageID: 2482
United States v. City of Newark, et al., Civil Action No. 16-1731 (MCA) (MAH)
CONSENT DECREE
Independent Monitor - Ninth Quarterly Report
Peter C. Harvey Independent Monitor October 25, 2019

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF NINTH QUARTER’S ACTIVITIES (JANUARY 1, 2019 – MARCH 31, 2019)...............................................................................................1
II. DETAILED STATUS UPDATES.......................................................................................2 A. Data Systems............................................................................................................2 B. Youth Engagement...................................................................................................7 1. Methodology ................................................................................................8 2. Findings and Themes Identified Across Listening Sessions .....................11 3. Recommendations from Dr. Jones-Brown.................................................14 C. NPD Officer Survey...............................................................................................15 D. Independent Monitor’s Request for Data from January 28 OfficerInvolved Shooting ..................................................................................................17 E. NPD’s Community Engagement............................................................................19 F. Monitoring Team’s Community Engagement .......................................................20
III. NEXT QUARTER ACTIVITIES (APRIL 1, 2019 – JUNE 30, 2019) .............................21 A. Audits .....................................................................................................................21 B. Property and Evidence Management .....................................................................21
IV. APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................22 A. Chronology of Key Events.....................................................................................22 B. Compliance Chart ..................................................................................................22 C. Training Administration Status Update Chart .......................................................22 D. Policy Status Update Chart ....................................................................................22 E. Youth Engagement Report.....................................................................................22 F. 2019 Officer Survey Final Report..........................................................................22
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NINTH QUARTERLY REPORT (JANUARY 1, 2019 to MARCH 31, 2019)
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF NINTH QUARTER’S ACTIVITIES (JANUARY 1, 2019 – MARCH 31, 2019)1 This is Independent Monitor Peter C. Harvey’s Ninth Quarterly Report, which
comments on the City of Newark’s (the “City”) and Newark Police Division’s (“NPD”) progress with Consent Decree reforms during the period from January 1, 2019 to March 31, 2019.2
Appendix A provides a list of this quarter’s key Consent Decree events. Appendix B is the Monitoring Team’s Compliance Chart, which assesses NPD’s progress with Consent Decree tasks through the publication of this Quarterly Report. Appendix C provides the status of NPD’s Consent Decree-related trainings. Appendix D provides the status of all of NPD’s new or revised Consent Decree policies (“General Orders”). Appendix E is the Monitoring Team’s Youth Engagement Report, which captures the results of listening sessions with Newark Youth as conducted by Dr. Delores Jones-Brown. Appendix F is the NPD Officer Survey Final Report, which provides the results of the Monitor’s second survey of NPD officers.
1 Unless otherwise stated, the City’s and NPD’s progress with respect to Consent Decree tasks, as described in this Quarterly Report, reflects developments as of March 31, 2019. 2 For a more detailed introduction to the Independent Monitoring Team, the Consent Decree, and the Parties to the Consent Decree, please see the Monitoring Team’s website: https://www.newarkpdmonitor.com/.
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II. DETAILED STATUS UPDATES A. Data Systems One of the most critical steps toward building both a modern police force and a
Consent Decree-compliant police force is developing and maintaining current and detailed police information technology (“IT”) and data systems. As the Monitoring Team has emphasized since its First Quarterly Report, published April 24, 2017 – and it remains true as of March 31, 2019 – NPD’s IT systems do not meet this standard. This is largely because NPD lacks the skills and resources to enable this type of progress, as detailed below in the summary of the Gartner Report.
NPD’s IT and data systems should consist of tools that: (i) reduce the time police officers spend on administrative tasks, (ii) provide more time for each officer to participate in community engagement, (iii) enhance the level of service NPD can provide to the public, (iv) improve crime reduction, and officers’ ability to address quality of life issues and other public safety challenges, and (v) help NPD demonstrate accountability. NPD should develop and adopt an overarching IT and data systems strategy, hire personnel to execute and maintain it, and in some cases, implement new IT and data programs. Absent these changes, NPD will remain unable to achieve substantial compliance with the Consent Decree, and it certainly will not do so within the five-year time period set forth in the May 2016 Order.
In June 2018, the City and NPD took important first steps toward developing a plan to improve police IT and data systems. At the Monitoring Team’s recommendation, NPD retained a qualified, independent consulting group, to perform a comprehensive assessment of NPD’s IT and data systems, and recommend a path for IT modernization. In November 2018, Gartner, Inc. (“Gartner”) completed a detailed report of the results of its assessment (“the
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Gartner Report”), and gave a presentation of the report to the City, NPD, and the Monitoring Team in February 2019. The Gartner Report identified key deficiencies in NPD’s IT and data systems, compared NPD to peer organizations around the country, and offered a number of recommendations that would lead to short-term and long-term improvements to NPD’s technology infrastructure. The Monitoring Team believes the Gartner Report’s recommendations are essential to NPD’s ability to create and implement the Early Warning System (“EWS”) required by the Consent Decree. The following provides a summary of Gartner’s process, assessment and recommendations, as well as the Monitoring Team’s perspective.
1. The Gartner Report Information Gathering Gartner’s assessment of NPD’s IT and data systems focused on three main components: (1) stakeholder expectation; (2) technology needs; and (3) challenges and risks. First, Gartner sought to understand NPD’s and key stakeholders’ goals for its IT and data systems. This process entailed examining the Consent Decree and talking with NPD leadership, City leadership, the City Office of Information Technology (“OIT”), the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), community members, and businesses within Newark. Second, after collecting and analyzing these various inputs, Gartner reviewed NPD’s current technology needs, meaning, the places where NPD has gaps or deficiencies in personnel, software, processes, or facilities. Finally, Gartner analyzed NPD’s current challenges, such as a heavy reliance on manual processes and paper; duplicative data entries into multiple data silos that increase the likelihood of error or inconsistency; NPD IT’s and OIT’s limited capacity to undertake major initiatives; and a lack of consistent IT Governance (meaning, lack of consistent planning and oversight of NPD’s IT and data systems).
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Comparison to Peer Organizations After collecting all of this information, Gartner compared NPD’s IT and data systems to those used by peer police and government organizations. This comparison is an important component of Gartner’s assessment, ensuring that its assessment is rooted in what is practical and reasonably attainable given a city of Newark’s size and population, and given NPD’s personnel. Gartner uses a “capability maturity” score to compare organizations’ IT and data systems, and in particular, whether an organization’s functions are mature enough to meet the organization’s demands. From poor quality to high quality, capability maturity scores range from Level 1 (functional), to Level 5 (transformational). Scores take into account a wide range of considerations including, but not limited to, strategy and vision, leadership, and business and financial management capabilities. Gartner scored NPD at Level 1 (i.e., “functional”), the lowest score on Gartner’s capability maturity model, primarily because NPD: (i) possesses reliable, but functionally and technically limited systems; (ii) lacks a person in a senior IT position; (iii) lacks a current IT strategic plan; (iv) has narrowly focused IT roles and responsibilities for personnel without an adequate plan for developing and utilizing its workforce; (v) relies upon informal and simplistic IT performance measures; and (vi) needs to create a framework that supports the maintenance and financial management of the IT services that NPD provides. Following this assessment, Gartner provided recommendations to address and remedy NPD’s deficiencies. Recommendations The Gartner Report contained an IT strategic plan with a roadmap to allow NPD to develop its organizational capabilities and ensure its ability to comply with the IT and data
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systems requirements set forth in several provisions of the Consent Decree. Gartner
recommended the City and NPD adopt nine objectives:
1. Update officers’ technology tools by providing NPD personnel with adequate solutions and capabilities for accessing and processing data as necessary to discharge their duties.
2. Improve records management, transparency, and information sharing by creating an integrated data and records management system that is capable of storing, in an easily searchable manner, all data required to support operations and the specific requirements of the Consent Decree.
3. Increase accountability and support for officer performance and wellness by developing an Early Warning System (“EWS”) or ‘intervention’ system capable of capturing all information necessary to ensure supervisory awareness and early identification of potentially problematic individual and department-wide conduct or signs of stress or other behavior that must be addressed.
4. Create strong foundation for a technology enabled NPD by implementing enabling technologies, processes and organizational structure required to meet the NPD’s needs and user requirements, including but not limited to those of the Consent Decree.
5. Reduce the number of system silos across NPD to improve user experience, improve data through better data standards, structures, access and management; and maximize the use of limited resources through a rationalized, more manageable set of systems.
6. Reduce NPD’s reliance on paper forms and paper-based information to create process efficiencies, improve the availability, access and quality of data and reduce the risk to business continuity.
7. Ensure effective IT operating and governance models that align decision makers appropriately based on stakeholder-determined roles – identifying needs, prioritizing IT investments, and implementing strategic solutions and ultimately satisfying NPD and users’ expectations.
8. Increase the depth and breadth of professional IT skills and talent, and improve the technology capability of end-users through increasing training and IT professional staffing levels, and improving IT maturity and the effectiveness of the IT organization(s) supporting NPD.
9. Improve IT infrastructure – platforms, information sharing capabilities, availability and disaster recovery to leverage enterprise IT services and
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capabilities, break down silos, foster innovation, encourage collaboration City-wide and improve user experience.
Gartner’s recommendations are comprehensive. If implemented, NPD will have a data system that allows it to provide better response times and better deployment throughout the city.
Currently, NPD lacks personnel with the requisite experience in building police data systems. Additionally, implementing the entirety of Gartner’s recommendations will require a significant financial investment from the City of Newark – Gartner estimated that NPD’s IT overhaul would cost approximately $31.4 million over a four-year period, with a significant portion of the cost allocated to personnel and staffing. To assist the City with a segmented implementation of the recommendations in the Gartner Report, at the Monitoring Team’s request, Gartner developed a 12-month plan of action to provide NPD with manageable, fundamental, and incremental steps. This plan of action prioritizes: (1) hiring the appropriate personnel and human resources to address staffing and expertise deficits; and (2) building foundational technology capabilities. Based upon Gartner’s recommendations, the Monitoring Team recommends that NPD take the following next steps:
1. Hire an IT leader immediately to assume ownership of the IT plan set forth in the Gartner Report. The IT leader should be empowered to hire or contract with IT managers and staff to implement the IT strategy and roadmap presented by Gartner.3
2. Implement an IT governance structure to enable NPD to prioritize IT needs and make IT-related decisions. Going forward, the governance structure must lead IT planning, oversee procurement, and ensure IT service management is performed according to best practices.
3. Engage with subject matter experts in data analysis to determine how NPD’s current siloed systems can be accessed to produce meaningful reports for police supervisors
3 NPD and the City report that as of the publication of this quarterly report, NPD has published a job posting and begun to interview candidates for this position.
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and analysis to assist with both Consent Decree compliance and the overall management of NPD.4 4. Contract with subject matter experts to: (a) develop requirements for a records management system (“RMS”); (b) perform a gap analysis to determine if the current RMS can be configured to meet those RMS requirements under the Consent Decree; and (c) either oversee the modifications to the existing RMS, or develop a request for proposal for the procurement of a new RMS. B. Youth Engagement
The Consent Decree requires the Monitoring Team to assess the attitudes of representative samples of City residents. (See Consent Decree ¶ 22).
In fulfilling its obligation, the Monitoring Team sought to ensure that it did not overlook the perspective of Newark’s youth – a segment of the population that is more likely than other groups to come into contact with police. The Monitoring Team also hoped that reaching out to youth might encourage their participation in the consent decree process and NPD’s community engagement efforts.
While the Monitoring Team has conducted surveys of the Newark community, see First Quarterly Report, Section V(H) and Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(B), those surveys are not administered to and do not capture the perspective of Newark residents under the age of eighteen, particularly hard-to-reach youth, who are unlikely to have participated in the surveys’ random sample polling. Moreover, at past community events, community members have expressed concerns that the surveys do not capture responses from Newark youth.
To that end, the Monitoring Team, led by Subject Matter Expert Dr. Delores Jones-Brown,5 conducted fourteen “listening sessions” wherein young people living in Newark
4 NPD and the City report that as of the publication of this quarterly report, NPD plans to apply for financial assistance through the Bureau of Justice Assistance National Training and Technical Assistance Center to hire data experts. 5 Dr. Jones-Brown is a retired Professor in the Department of Law, Police Science and Criminal Justice Administration at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York. She was the
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were invited to share their experiences with and perceptions of NPD, along with their suggestions for creating more positive interactions between youth and police. Dr. Jones-Brown recorded and anonymized the information provided by Newark’s youth during these listening sessions, and memorialized them in a Youth Engagement Report. The full Report can be found in Appendix E of this Quarterly Report. The Consent Decree also requires NPD to make reforms related to its engagement with Newark youth, including developing training that teaches officers “how to create positive interactions with youth,” “measure[ing] the breadth, extent, and the effectiveness of its . . . outreach to youth,” and require[ing] both NPD and the City “to seek and respond to input from the community about” the Consent Decree’s implementation (¶¶ 14(a), 17, & 19). While the Monitoring Team’s recommendations outlined in the Youth Engagement Report may assist NPD in developing mechanisms to satisfy these requirements, the listening sessions and Report are not meant to, and do not, satisfy NPD’s youth engagement obligations under Paragraphs 14, 17, and 19 of the Consent Decree. The Youth Engagement Report has three components: (1) methodology; (2) findings and themes; and (3) recommendations from Dr. Jones-Brown. Those aspects are summarized below.
1. Methodology Listening sessions are what the term suggests. They are an opportunity to hear from participants about their experiences. In this instance, listening sessions offered Newark Youth an opportunity to provide suggestions for creating positive change, and suggestions for creating (or maintaining) opportunities for positive interaction with NPD officers. These
founding director of the John Jay College Center on Race, Crime and Justice where she served as faculty research fellow. Her areas of research and scholarship include: race, crime and the administration of justice; police-community relations; juvenile justice; and the legal socialization of adolescent males. Dr. Jones-Brown has spent time as a criminal justice practitioner in multiple areas, including prosecution, community-based and institutional corrections and program development for court-involved youth. She continues to be involved with the development of law and justice-related education for middle schools and high schools.
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sessions are less structured and are far more organic than other methods of capturing people’s perspectives, such as focus groups, community forums and surveys. Surveys and focus groups require participants to respond to a limited number of questions, usually in a preset response format, and using words that youth may not understand. Other qualitative methods, such as ethnographic observations, require more time, specialized training, and research ethics safeguards than were within the scope of the proposed project. During the listening sessions, youth were able to describe their experiences in detail using their own words. For these reasons, listening sessions were chosen over surveys and focus groups.
Dr. Jones-Brown’s listening sessions were arranged through contact with Newarkbased individuals and organizations with a direct connection to the youth whose participation was being sought, such as the All Stars Project-New Jersey and the New Jersey Institute for Social Justice (“NJISJ”), a member of the Monitoring Team. To ensure that the Monitoring Team captured experiences from youth who live in areas with high police activity, Dr. JonesBrown compared a geographic map of the Newark wards to an NPD Arrest Density Map displaying “hot spots” for arrests, and attempted to identify youth living in wards with high levels of enforcement activity and calls for service.6 Dr. Jones-Brown, with some co-facilitation by faculty or staff at the locations where the sessions were held, led each listening session. To maximize participation and minimize fear of retaliation or privacy concerns, Dr. Jones-Brown used handwritten notes to memorialize the discussions rather than audio or video recordings.
Dr. Jones-Brown conducted listening sessions over a four-month period, from May 30th to September 26th, 2018, with a total of 158 youth, ages 8 to 28, and approximately 28 teachers and staff. In arranging the listening sessions, Dr. Jones-Brown was especially interested
6 See Attachments A and B to the Youth Engagement Report. 9

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in receiving comments and observations from the following youth: (1) those engaged in serious misconduct; (2) school dropouts; (3) students in alternative schools; (4) high school age; (5) middle school age; (6) elementary school age; (7) residents of public housing; (8) immigrants; (9) LGBTQI; and (10) females. Youth were asked to comment on three main topics: (a) whether they were aware of the Consent Decree; (b) whether they had contact with NPD; and (c) whether they had suggestions for positive engagement between NPD and youth.
Dr. Jones-Brown held fourteen listening sessions at schools and the offices of community-based organizations across Newark:
• two sessions at the headquarters of the All Stars Project-New Jersey, a youth program that has a relationship with the City and NPD via its Operation Conversation: Cops and Kids Program;7
• one session with the NJISJ Youth Council; • two sessions with LGBTQI youth; • one session with high school girls; • one session consisted of youth who have been arrested for serious and violent crimes; • one session devoted to alternative school students; • three sessions with male and female high school students; and • three sessions with third, fourth and fifth graders.
7 According to its website, All Stars Project-New Jersey (ASP-NJ) has been “on the ground in Newark since 1999, and has touched the lives of more than 35,000 young people.” Operation Conversation: Cops and Kids (OCCK) is run by Dr. Leonora Fulani, based at the All Stars Project headquarters in Manhattan. A February 2018 ASP-NJ newsletter notes that OCCK was officially launched in Newark on April 5, 2017 by Mayor Ras Baraka. The newsletter reported that, as of that date, 12 workshops had been held in various Newark locations with 118 youth and 104 police officers participating. To learn more about All Stars Project-New Jersey visit: https://allstars.org/locations/new-jersey/. To learn more about Operation Conversation: Cops and Kids visit: https://allstars.org/copsandkids/.
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2. Findings and Themes Identified Across Listening Sessions The listening sessions provided a wealth of information about the three main topics youth were asked to comment on. First, the listening sessions revealed most youth had no knowledge of the Consent Decree. Second, youth described varied levels of interaction with police. Some youth reported positive interactions, including contact as simple as having officers holding doors open for them as they walked, or feeling safer in the presence of NPD officers. A few youths from crime-challenged neighborhoods acknowledged that police presence has reduced crime in their community. Many more participants, however, described interactions that they found undesirable – that is, the police did not behave the way the youth thought they should have behaved. As reported, these experiences included the police having been rude, calling them names, “treating them like criminals,” and handling them in ways that they found verbally or physically abusive. For example, one alternative school student complained that NPD officers “strip searched” him down to his underwear while in public. A youth in one of the LGBTQI listening sessions reported that he had been “harassed” by the police when he was younger, including being called derogatory terms by NPD officers. Lastly, youth presented thoughtful and practical suggestions for improving interactions between young people and NPD officers. Suggestions from younger participants included that NPD wear larger name tags, say “hello,” and not be “mean” when a child does something wrong, ultimately reflecting a need for NPD to interact with children in a way that is cognizant of their age. Youth also expressed a desire to engage in more recreational activities with officers, such as sports and block parties. Other common suggestions were developing inschool assemblies to provide NPD and youth an opportunity to interact, and Know Your Rights sessions with youth, parents and officers to educate people on youth’s constitutional rights.
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LGBTQI youth suggested that officers receive training on how to interact with them and would
like these trainings to take place at LGBTQI-supporting centers and utilize LGBTQI trainers.
Furthermore, NPD’s respect for their constitutional rights was critical to creating legitimacy with
older youth, youth in alternative schools, and youth who have had contact with the juvenile
justice system.
While youth across various demographics reported varying experiences with NPD
and offered a range of recommendations for more robust youth engagement, Dr. Jones-Brown
identified several themes across the listening sessions, which are detailed in the Youth
Engagement Report and presented below.
Youth Experiences with Newark Police • Aggressive Behavior. Youth have experienced or witnessed officers acting in a way they believed was unnecessarily violent or aggressive toward Newark residents (10)(23).8 These experiences caused youth to feel fear and distrust of and anger toward Newark police officers.
• Racial and Appearance Profiling. Youth feel they are profiled by their race, where they live, or their appearance, including their choice of hairstyle, tattoos, style of dress, and gender presentation (11)(23)(29).
• Sexual and Gender-Based Harassment. A young woman reported experiencing catcalls and sexual remarks from NPD officers, and feared that this behavior gave permission to men in the community to engage in the same behavior (8). Transgender young women also reported being questioned about their gender identity, and reported that officers will frequently physically touch them to determine their “real” gender (24). Gay young men reported that NPD officers will frequently use homophobic slurs towards them (22-23).
• Slow Responses. Youth feel NPD is too slow in responding to calls for service, especially in emergency situations, such as shootings (8)(11)(21)(35)(47)(61).
• Fear of Newark Neighborhoods. Youth feel that NPD officers are not familiar with the people of Newark, and that many officers are fearful of Newark neighborhoods (11)(16)(25)(52). Some youth believe that nationally circulated
8 Where relevant, we have included citations to specific pages of the Youth Engagement Report in parentheses.
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videos of police conduct have impacted the behavior of both police and the community, with both sides being more fearful of one another (13).
• Lack of Accountability. Some youth expressed the opinion that reform efforts are “a waste of time” because NPD officers are not ultimately held accountable for their behavior (16).
• Avoidance. Youth intentionally avoid contact with NPD (7)(13)(22)(37)(40). Young people who are not involved in criminality find themselves going out of their way to avoid the police for fear that they will be stopped and questioned and treated like suspects. They find it very difficult to avoid this kind of treatment by police officers because of the way police are deployed across the city, e.g., around their schools at certain hours, coupled with officers’ aggressive policing tactics. Even if they are victims of criminal behavior, some do not feel that they can approach the police for help. And, many report an unwillingness to cooperate with police investigations for fear of how the police will treat them, and because of the negative experiences that they have had with the police.
• Perpetual Criminalization. Youth who have juvenile justice histories feel that they are treated as if they are always involved in criminal activity, and have no constitutional rights (36).
Youth Suggestions for Creating Positive Youth Engagement
• Lift Up Positive Behavior. Identify officers who interact positively with youth and use them to train other officers on positive youth engagement (11).
• Use Positive Language. Officers should use positive language when engaging with youth. For example, the officer can ask “How are you doing?” instead of initiating an interaction by asking “Where are you coming from or going to?” (18).
• Education. Given the demanding and complex nature of officers’ duties, officers should be required to obtain a certain degree of education in relevant fields, such as sociology and psychology, and training on how to positively interact with youth, and specialized training for interacting with LGBTQI youth, females and youth who are not English-proficient (15)(18).
• Use Community Feedback. Officers should receive regular professional development training that incorporates participation from youth in each ward (15). NPD should also consider hosting discussions with youth in the community to review and discuss nationally circulated videos of controversial police conduct, especially incidents involving police contact with youth (12).9
9 Dr. Jones-Brown added that, if available, videos of local police misconduct should be used in these trainings as well.
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• Have Fun. Officers should engage in recreational activities with youth, like sports and going to the movies (11). Many youth expressed a desire to engage with officers in ways that are unrelated to law enforcement or public safety (57). However, even among the youngest participants, the youth were clear that youth engagement strategies should not be limited to recreational events.
• Residency Requirements. Officers should be required to live in the communities they serve (18)(28).
• Meet Youth Where They Are. Officers should, for example, visit youth at school and other community-based settings to engage in interactive activities, including Know Your Rights sessions and other events where youth are given a leadership role or officers and youth work together to plan the event and present information (17-18).
3. Recommendations from Dr. Jones-Brown
Dr. Jones-Brown concludes the Report with several recommendations for NPD to
improve its positive youth engagement efforts and incorporate ideas presented by participants in
the listening sessions. Dr. Jones-Brown recommends that NPD should:
• read the Youth Engagement Report and assess the feasibility of implementing recommendations provided by youth;
• hold community fora to discuss the findings and suggestions of the Report with youth, their parents, and the Newark community and afford youth an opportunity to lead one or more community forums;
• develop training that specifically addresses communication techniques for interacting with youth and involve youth in the training’s development;
• address “appearance profiling” in its bias-free training, with specific attention to hairstyles, specifically dreadlocks, gender-presentation, grooming, and style of dress;
• hold specific LGBTQI youth listening sessions and related NPD training in spaces supportive of the LGBTQI community;
• work with each neighborhood’s local precinct to hold additional listening sessions, particularly for the difficult-to-reach populations, including immigrant youth, school dropouts, gang-affiliated youth and residents of public housing – populations who were somewhat underrepresented in the listening sessions;
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• create a process that will allow the department to continue to receive and incorporate feedback from a wide-range of youth, especially those who have had criminal justice system contact and who live in wards with high levels of police presence; and
• recognize that the youth of Newark are not all the same. Youth engagement strategies/programs should be developed in partnership with the self-identified and varying needs of youth across differing age groups, identities and social circumstances.
C. NPD Officer Survey The Monitoring Team has completed the Second Officer Survey, which provides
data on officer attitudes on a range of issues, including job satisfaction, police-community relations, the potential for within-department bias, and NPD leadership. The results of the Second Officer Survey are described in more detail below.
The Officer Survey was undertaken by the Center on Policing at Rutgers University, led by Monitoring Team members Linda Tartaglia, Director of the Center On Policing, Dr. Wayne Fisher, Dr. Rosalyn Bocker Parks, and Alisa Matlin (the “Rutgers Team”). Over the course of six months, the Rutgers Team distributed the Police Survey in paper and electronic format to each NPD officer. The survey was administered through the same written instrument used in the first year Police Survey, allowing the Monitoring Team to track changes in NPD officers’ attitudes and perceptions over time. As described more fully in the Police Survey Report (attached to this Quarterly Report as Appendix F), the Rutgers Team was able to draw a number of conclusions from this year’s survey responses compared to the first-year Police Survey. (The first-year Police Survey is appended to the First Quarterly Report as Appendix D, available at https://www.newarkpdmonitor.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/First-Quarterly-Report.pdf.)
For example, NPD officers generally reported perceiving lower levels of withindepartment bias in the 2019 survey than in the 2017 survey: in the 2017 survey, 48.7% of
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respondents reported “low” levels of within-department bias, whereas 56.1% reported “low” levels in the 2019 survey. “Within-department bias” refers to any perception by NPD officers that NPD command staff treats some employees differently due to race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation. Some trends, however, remained the same: in both surveys, officers with less than two years of experience perceived lower levels of within-department bias than officers with 10+ years of experience. In the 2019 survey, 95.8% of officers with less than two years of experience reported “low” levels of bias, compared to 43.1% of officers with 10+ years. Meanwhile, 22.1% of officers with 10+ years of experience reported perceiving “high” levels of within-department bias, compared to 4.2% of officers with less than two years of experience.
Similarly, a larger percentage of officers in the 2019 survey reported “low” levels of policing bias (79%) than in 2017 (69.8%). “Policing bias” refers to any perception by NPD officers that their fellow NPD officers are less respectful or use more force against citizens who are non-white, do not speak English, or are gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender. As in the firstyear survey, however, officers’ race and experience were both significant factors associated with perception of policing bias. While white officers and officers of other races overwhelmingly indicated “low” levels of policing bias (94.3% and 84.3%, respectively), the percentage of black officers perceiving “low” levels of policing bias was just over half (58%). Similarly, officers with less than two years of experience and officers with between two and nine years of experience overwhelmingly reported perceiving “low” levels of policing bias (93.2% and 89.1% respectively), while a comparatively lower percentage of officers with 10+ years of experience reported “low” levels of policing bias (73.7%). The first-year survey revealed similar reports.
The Monitoring Team thanks NPD for its cooperation in the administration of the Police Survey. We hope that the data provided in this survey serves as both a useful guide to
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NPD in continuing to formulate its internal and community-facing practices and as a window for
community members and other stakeholders into the current experience of NPD officers.
D. Independent Monitor’s Request for Data from January 28 Officer-Involved Shooting The Monitoring Team’s primary functions – (1) overseeing NPD’s progress in
implementing, and achieving compliance with the Consent Decree and (2) reporting on the status
of implementation – requires timely access to documents and materials in the City’s and NPD’s
possession. Indeed, the Consent Decree expressly requires that NPD give the Monitor access to
NPD’s data, including, but not limited to internal affairs and criminal investigation files. (See Consent Decree ¶¶ 201, 203, 204).10
During this reporting period, the Monitor repeatedly requested from NPD records
and camera-footage related to a January 28, 2019 officer-involved shooting that left one
individual deceased and another seriously wounded (the “Officer-Involved Shooting”). The
Monitor sought to study the videos and reports concerning the shooting to determine whether, or
not, recommendations were in order regarding NPD’s newly implemented, revised Use of Force
Policies and/or training. The City and NPD’s response in refusing to produce the requested
information violated the letter and spirit of Consent Decree Paragraphs 201, 203 and 204.
10 Paragraph 201 of the Consent Decree provides in part: “[t]he City and NPD will ensure that the Monitor has full and direct access to all City and NPD documents and data that the Monitor reasonably deems necessary . . . [s]uch access includes, but is not limited to, internal affairs and criminal investigation files.” Paragraph 203 states: “[t]he Monitor and DOJ will provide the City and NPD with reasonable notice of a request for copies of documents. Upon such request, the City and NPD will provide in a timely manner copies (electronic, where readily available) of the requested documents to the Monitor and DOJ.” Paragraph 204 adds that “[t]he Monitor will have access to all NPD records and information relating to criminal investigations of NPD officers as permissible by law. The Monitor will have access to all NPD documents in such files that have been closed by NPD after the Effective Date. The Monitor also will have reasonable access to all NPD arrest reports, warrants, and warrant applications initiated after the Effective Date whether or not contained in open criminal investigation files.” The “Effective Date” of the Consent Decree is March 30, 2016.
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On January 29, 2019, NPD sent a notice to both the Independent Monitor and U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) advising that the Officer-Involved Shooting had occurred. On February 7, the Monitor made an initial request for NPD and the City to turn over records and camera-footage related to the shooting. In response to the Monitor’s initial request, the City asserted that the requested information could not be released because the Officer-Involved Shooting was “currently under investigation by the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office.”
On February 19, the Monitor reiterated his request for camera footage and reports concerning the shooting, clarifying that the Monitoring Team was not requesting documents, video, or testimony comprising county grand jury exhibits, nor was it seeking any of the City’s or the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office’s (“ECPO”) investigative files, however defined by the City or ECPO.
On February 21, the City again advised that it would not release the requested records and documents because the incident was the subject of an ongoing ECPO investigation. However, the City’s purported rationale is unconvincing because the Monitor is bound by the confidentiality provision of the Consent Decree, which requires the Monitor to “maintain the confidentiality of all non-public information provided by the City and NPD.” (See Consent Decree ¶ 205). On the same date, correspondence from an ECPO Assistant Prosecutor stated that ECPO would not release records until its investigation of the Officer-Involved Shooting had “reache[d] the point of substantial completion.” The assistant prosecutor estimated that the investigation would be completed “within one week,” presumably, of the February 21 letter. Despite this representation, or prediction, by mid-March, the Monitor had not received the requested data or any additional information from the City, NPD or the Prosecutor’s Office.
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In a letter to the City dated March 19, 2019, the Monitor persisted in his request for information. Nonetheless, the Assistant Prosecutor, in a letter dated March 22, 2019, responded that ECPO’s investigation would not reach a point of substantial completion until it was presented to the grand jury “next month,” presumably in April 2019. The Monitor received no further communication regarding his request for information about the shooting.
On May 21, 2019, a grand jury indicted the officer involved in the shooting. That evening, news media released reports containing body-worn camera footage of the OfficerInvolved Shooting.11 One or more law enforcement agencies released to the media video capturing the shooting and related police behavior. Despite the indictment – which precluded any assertion that an investigation was ongoing – neither the City nor NPD turned over the requested data to the Monitor.
As of the end of this reporting period, March 31, 2019, neither the City nor NPD had turned over the requested data. After this reporting period ended, NPD turned over all of the requested data to the Monitoring Team. The Monitoring Team will report on the data in the Independent Monitor’s Eleventh Quarterly Report, covering the period from July 1, 2019 to September 30, 2019.
E. NPD’s Community Engagement Consent Decree Paragraph 17 requires NPD to “implement mechanisms to
measure the breadth, extent, and effectiveness of community partnerships and problem-solving strategies, including officer outreach, particularly outreach to youth.” Paragraph 18 requires
11 See e.g., Newark Cop Charged in Traffic Stop Shooting That Left 1 Man Dead, NBC (May 21, 2019, 7:28 PM) https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Newark-Cop-Charged-Shooting-Excessive-Force510216231.html (updated May 22, 2019, 8:17AM); Everett, R., Wild video shows indicted Newark cop repeatedly jump from cop car to fire at fleeing vehicle, killing driver, NJ.COM, May 21, 2019, https://www.nj.com/essex/2019/05/grand-jury-indicts-newark-police-officer-who-fatally-shot-fleeingdriver.html (updated May 22, 2019).
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NPD to prepare “quarterly reports on its community policing efforts,” and Paragraph 19 requires NPD and the City to “implement practices to seek and respond to input from the community about this Agreement’s implementation.” Pursuant to Paragraph 20, all of these studies and reports must be made publicly available, and posted on NPD and City websites.
NPD continues to make progress toward compliance with these paragraphs. During this reporting period, NPD posted to its website its fourth quarterly report on community engagement – covering the period from October 1 to December 31, 2018. NPD also hosted two community forums. On February 28, NPD hosted a town hall meeting to discuss its progress implementing Consent Decree mandates at Saint James A.M.E. Church. On March 11, NPD hosted a town hall meeting at Unity Fellowship Church to discuss and hear comments from the community about its LGBTQ+ policy training curriculum.
F. Monitoring Team’s Community Engagement Paragraph 186 of the Consent Decree requires the Monitor to hold community
meetings to discuss the quarterly reports, inform the public about the implementation process, and hear community perspectives of police interactions. As part of this outreach, the Monitor holds periodic community forums in different locations throughout Newark to discuss the City’s and NPD’s progress with achieving the Consent Decree’s requirements, the Monitor’s Quarterly Reports, and the Monitoring Team’s work.
During this reporting period, the Monitoring Team released its Sixth Quarterly Report. On March 19, the Monitoring Team held its Sixth Quarterly Report Community discussion at the New Hope Baptist Church. The New Jersey Institute for Social Justice, in partnership with the New Hope Baptist Church, coordinated this event, and it was attended by approximately 20 community members, as well as members of the Monitoring Team, NPD, and DOJ.
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III. NEXT QUARTER ACTIVITIES (APRIL 1, 2019 – JUNE 30, 2019) A. Audits During this reporting period, on March 15, 2019, pursuant to Consent Decree
Paragraph 180, the Monitoring Team provided NPD with notice that in no fewer than 45 days, the Monitoring team would initiate an audit of NPD’s training records for the following Consent Decree-related trainings: (i) community-oriented policing, (ii) body-worn cameras and in-car cameras; (iii) use of force; and (iv) consensual citizen contacts and investigatory stops, searches with or without a search warrant, and arrests with or without an arrest warrant. The training records audit commenced after the close of this reporting period. The Monitoring Team will include the results of the audit in a future report.
After this reporting period, on May 24, 2019, the Monitoring Team provided NPD with notice that it would soon initiate an audit of NPD’s Body-Worn Cameras to assess its compliance with NPD’s revised Body-Worn Camera policy. As of the publication of this quarterly report, the Monitoring team has nearly completed its audit of NPD’s Body-Worn Cameras. The Monitoring Team will report on the results on the audit in a future report.
B. Property and Evidence Management The Monitoring Team previously reported on NPD’s need to take steps to address
deficiencies in its property and evidence management systems, including by: (i) improving its inventory procedures and officer surveillance systems; (ii) making appropriate personnel decisions; (iii) implementing new and/or revised policies and procedures that govern property storage and security and (iv) addressing physical limitations of NPD’s property storage facilities (see First Quarterly Report, Section V(C); Second Quarterly Report, Section IV(D); Fourth Quarterly Report, Section III(E).) Members of the Monitoring Team have conducted an on-site
21

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Appendix A

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Timeline (Meetings, Milestones and Events)

Independent Monitor’s Ninth Quarterly Report — January 1 through March 31, 2019.

Date

Event

January 16, 2019 The Monitoring Team releases its Sixth Quarterly Report.

February 14, 2019

NPD conducts a focus group with NPD officers to discuss community engagement and arrest procedures.

February 28, 2019

NPD hosts a town hall meeting at Saint James A.M.E. Church to discuss its progress implementing Consent Decree mandates.

March 5, 2019

NPD posts its fourth quarterly report on community engagement (covering the period from October 1 to December 31, 2018) to its website.

March 11, 2019

Public Safety Director meets with members of the Office of Professional Standards and the Independent Monitoring Team to discuss integrity audits and personnel investigations.

March 11, 2019

NPD hosts a town hall meeting at Unity Fellowship Church to discuss and collect feedback from the community on the LGBTQI training curriculum.

March 19, 2019

The Monitoring Team holds its Sixth Quarterly Report community forum at the New Hope Baptist Church.

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Appendix B

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Consent Decree Compliance and Implementation (March 30, 2016 to October 25, 2019)

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Table of Contents Page
I. Definitions ................................................................................................................................................................................................1 II. General Officer Training .........................................................................................................................................................................3 III. Community Engagement and Civilian Oversight (including Community Policing) .............................................................................4 IV. Stops, Searches, and Arrests...................................................................................................................................................................6 V. Bias-Free Policing ...................................................................................................................................................................................9 VI. Use of Force .........................................................................................................................................................................................10 VII. In-Car and Body-Worn Cameras ........................................................................................................................................................16 VIII. Theft (including Property and Evidence Management).....................................................................................................................17 IX. Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation...........................................................................................................................20 X. Compliance Reviews and Integrity Audits ............................................................................................................................................27 XI. Discipline..............................................................................................................................................................................................28 XII. Data Systems Improvement ................................................................................................................................................................29 XIII. Transparency and Oversight ..............................................................................................................................................................31 XIV. Consent Decree Implementation and Enforcement............................................................................................................................32
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I. Definitions
NPD’s compliance with the deadlines set forth in the Consent Decree and the Second-Year Monitoring Plan will be assessed using the following categories: (1) not assessed, (2) initial development, (3) preliminary compliance, (4) operational compliance, (5) non-compliance, (6) administrative compliance, and (7) full compliance. Each of these terms is defined below.
1. Not Assessed “Not Assessed” means that the Monitoring Team did not assess the Consent Decree provision during this reporting period.
Acceptable reasons for why a requirement was not assessed may include that the deadline has not passed or some other substantive reason.
2. Initial Development “Initial Development” means that during the auditing period, NPD has taken meaningful steps toward achieving
compliance with a Consent Decree requirement that is not yet scheduled for completion. Initial Development will be noted only if NPD’s efforts are consistent with established timeframes in the Monitoring Plan or Consent Decree. Where NPD was expected to have achieved at least Initial Development during the auditing period, and has not, NPD has been found not to be in compliance.
3. Preliminary Compliance “Preliminary Compliance” means that during the reporting period, NPD has developed, and the Independent Monitor, DOJ,
and City have approved, respective policies or standard operating procedures (“SOPs”) and related training materials that are consistent with a Consent Decree requirement. This category only applies to SOPs and training.
4. Operational Compliance “Operational Compliance” means that NPD has satisfied a Consent Decree requirement by demonstrating routine
adherence to the requirement in its day-to-day operations or by meeting the established deadline for a task or deliverable that is specifically required by the Consent Decree or Monitoring Plan. NPD’s compliance efforts must be verified by reviews of data systems, observations from the Monitoring Team, and other methods that will corroborate its achievement. In this report, the Monitoring Team only will assess NPD for compliance with established deadlines.
5. Non-Compliance “Non-Compliance” means that NPD has either made no progress towards accomplishing compliance, or has not progressed
beyond Initial Development at the point in time when NPD is expected to have at least achieved Preliminary Compliance for the reporting period.
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6. Administrative Compliance “Administrative Compliance” means that during the auditing period, NPD has completed all necessary actions to
implement a Consent Decree requirement, but General Compliance has not yet been demonstrated in NPD’s day-to-day operations. 7. Full Compliance “Full Compliance” means that all Monitor reviews have determined that NPD has maintained Operational Compliance for
the two-year period. 8. Effective Date The “Effective Date” is March 30, 2016. See Consent Decree, Section II(4)(s). 9. Operative Date The “Operational Date” is July 12, 2016. See Consent Decree, Section II(4)(ff).
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II. General Officer Training

Achievement
NPD will provide officers at least 40 hours of inservice training each year.
NPD will provide training to officers regarding the requirements of the Consent Decree, and the timeline for their implementation.
NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 9
¶ 10
¶ 11

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement1
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) and then annually thereafter Within 90 days of the Operational Date (October 10, 2016) Within 60 days after approval of individual policies

Status Ongoing
Preliminary Compliance N/A

NPD will maintain complete and consistent training ¶ 12 records for all officers.

Within two years of Initial the Effective Date Development (March 30, 2018)2

Discussion
See First Quarterly Report, Section IV(B).
The status for training requirements for each Consent Decree area (e.g., use of force, bias-free policing), are located in those sections of this Chart. The Monitor will include the results of its audit of NPD’s training records in a future quarterly report.

1 Deadlines in the Compliance Chart reflect the original deadlines set forth in the Consent Decree. The deadlines do not reflect deadlines established as part of the First or Second-Year Monitoring Plans.
2 Consent Decree Paragraph 5 provides that “NPD will develop comprehensive and agency-wide policies and procedures that are consistent with and incorporate all substantive requirements of this Agreement. Unless otherwise noted, NPD will develop and implement all such policies, procedures, and manuals within two years of the Effective Date.”
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Community Engagement and Civilian Oversight (including Community Policing) Continued

III. Community Engagement and Civilian Oversight (including Community Policing)

Achievement
NPD will review and revise its current community policing policy or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree. NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. Civilian Oversight (¶ 13) The City will implement and maintain a civilian oversight entity.

Consent Decree Paragraph § V; ¶ 5
¶ 11
¶ 13

Community Engagement Measures and Training (¶¶ 14-21) NPD will provide 8 hours of in-service training on ¶ 14 community policing and problem-oriented policing methods and skills for all officers, including supervisors, managers and executives, and at least 4 hours annually thereafter.
NPD will assess and revise its staffing allocation and ¶ 15 personnel deployment to support community policing and problem solving initiatives, and will modify deployment strategies that are incompatible with community policing. NPD’s assessment and modified strategy must be approved by the DOJ and Monitor for approval.

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) Within 60 days after approval of policy
Within 365 days of the Effective Date (March 30, 2017)
July 9, 2017
July 9, 2017

Status Preliminary Compliance Non-Compliance
Non-Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Non-Compliance

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D. The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(2).
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.
See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).

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Community Engagement and Civilian Oversight (including Community Policing) Continued

Achievement
NPD will assign two officers to each precinct to work with residents to identify and address communities’ priorities, and who are not assigned to answer calls for service except in exigent circumstances.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 16

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Pending completion of the assessment required in ¶ 15

Status
Initial Development

NPD will implement mechanisms to measure the

¶ 17

breadth, extent, and effectiveness of its community

partnerships and problem-solving strategies,

including officer outreach, particularly outreach to

youth.

NPD will prepare a publicly available report of its ¶ 18 community policing efforts overall and in each precinct.

NPD and the City will implement practices to seek ¶ 19 and respond to input from the community about the Consent Decree’s implementation. Such practices may include direct surveys, comment cards and town hall meetings.

All NPD studies, analyses, and assessments required ¶ 20 by this Agreement will be made publicly available, including on NPD and City websites, in English, Spanish, and Portuguese, to the fullest extent permitted under law.

NPD will implement a policy to collect and maintain ¶ 21 all data and records necessary to facilitate transparency and wide public access to information related to NPD policies and practices, as permitted by law.

Within 210 days of the Operational Date (February 7, 2017)

Initial Development

Within 240 days of Initial

the Operational

Development

Date March 9, 2017

Within two years of Initial the Effective Date Development (March 30, 2018)

Within two years of Not Assessed the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Within two years of Not Assessed the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

5

Discussion
See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(A)(1).
See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(A)(1).
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(E). See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(E).

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IV. Stops, Searches, and Arrests

Achievement
Investigatory Stops and Detentions (¶¶ 25-28) NPD will review and revise its current stop, search, and arrest policy or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree, consistent with Paragraphs 2528. NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the stop, search, and arrest policies or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. NPD will train officers to use specific and individualized descriptive language in reports or field inquiry forms.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 5
¶ 11
¶ 26

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Within 60 days after approval of policy
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance

Searches (¶¶ 29-34) NPD will review and revise its current stop, search, ¶ 5 and arrest policy or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree, consistent with Paragraphs 2934. NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and ¶ 11 understand their responsibilities pursuant to the stop, search, and arrest policies or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Within two years of Preliminary the Effective Date Compliance (March 30, 2018)

Within 60 days after approval of policy

Preliminary Compliance

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(C).
See Fourth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(3).
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.

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Stops, Searches, and Arrests Continued

Achievement
Arrests (¶¶ 35-42) NPD will review and revise its current stop, search, and arrest policy or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree, consistent with Paragraphs 3542.

Consent Decree Paragraph
¶ 5

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and ¶ 11 understand their responsibilities pursuant to the stop, search, and arrest policies or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Stop, Search, and Arrest Training (¶¶ 43-50)

NPD will provide 16 hours of training to all NPD

¶ 43

personnel on the First and Fourth Amendments,

including the topics set forth in ¶ 43 of the Consent

Decree, and at least an additional 4 hours on an

annual basis thereafter.

NPD supervisors will take appropriate action to

¶ 48

address violations or deficiencies in stops, detentions,

searches, and arrests; maintain records; and identify

repeat violators.

Stop, Search, and Arrest Data Collection and Review (¶¶ 51-54) NPD will implement use of data collection form, in ¶ 52 written or electronic report form, to collect data on all investigatory stops and searches, as approved by the DOJ and Monitor.

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) Within 60 days after approval of policy
November 1, 2017
Ongoing
September 9, 2017

Status
Preliminary Compliance Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Not Assessed
Initial Development

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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Stops, Searches, and Arrests Continued

Achievement
NPD will develop a protocol for comprehensive analysis of stop, search and arrest data, subject to the review and approval of the DOJ and Monitor.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 53

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status Non-Compliance

Discussion

NPD will ensure that all databases comply fully with ¶ 54

Within two years of Not Assessed

federal and state privacy standards governing

the Effective Date

personally identifiable information. NPD will restrict

(March 30, 2018)

database access to authorized, identified users who

will be permitted to access the information only for

specific, legitimate purposes.

First Amendment Right to Observe, Object to, and Record Officer Conduct (¶¶ 55-62)

NPD will require or prohibit officer conduct to

¶¶ 55-62 Within two years of Preliminary

comply with ¶¶ 55-62 of the Consent Decree.

the Effective Date Compliance

(March 30, 2018)

See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.

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V. Bias-Free Policing

Achievement
NPD will review and revise its current bias-free policing policy to ensure compliance with Consent Decree, consistent with Section VII.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 5

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and ¶ 11 understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

NPD will provide all NPD personnel with a minimum ¶ 63 of eight hours of training on bias-free policing, including implicit bias, procedural justice, and police legitimacy, and at least four hours annually thereafter.

NPD will prohibit officers from considering any

¶ 64

demographic category when taking, or refraining

from taking, any law enforcement action, except

when such information is part of an actual and

credible description of a specific suspect in an

ongoing investigation that includes other appropriate

non-demographic identifying factors. NPD will also

prohibit officers from using proxies for demographic

category, including language ability, geographic

location, mode of transportation, or manner of dress.

NPD will conduct quarterly demographic analyses of ¶ 65 its enforcement activities to ensure officer, unit and Division compliance with the bias-free policing policy.

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) Within 60 days after approval of policy
July 1, 2017
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) and then Quarterly thereafter.

Status Preliminary Compliance Non-Compliance
Non-Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Non-Compliance

Discussion See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D. See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Fourth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(4).

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VI. Use of Force

Achievement
Use of Force Policy (¶¶ 66-70) NPD will develop and implement a use of force policy or set of policies that cover all force techniques, technologies, and weapons that are available to NPD officers consistent with ¶¶ 66-70. The policy or policies will clearly define each force option and specify that unreasonable use of force will subject officers to discipline.
NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the use of force policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.
NPD will provide resources for officers to maintain proper weapons certifications and will implement sanctions for officers who fail to do so.
Use of Firearms (¶¶71-74) NPD will develop and implement a use of firearms policy consistent with ¶¶71-74.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 66
¶ 11
¶ 70
¶ 5

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Within 60 days after approval of policy
Ongoing
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and ¶ 11 understand their responsibilities pursuant to the use of force policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Within 60 days after approval of policy

Status
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Not Assessed
Preliminary Compliance Preliminary Compliance

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits. See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.

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Use of Force Continued

Achievement
Officers will be prohibited from using unauthorized weapons or ammunition in connection with or while performing policing duties. In addition, all authorized firearms carried by officers will be loaded with the capacity number of rounds of authorized ammunition.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 71

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

NPD will prohibit officers from discharging a firearm ¶ 72 at a moving vehicle unless a person in the vehicle is immediately threatening the officer or another person with deadly force.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

NPD will prohibit officers from unholstering or

¶ 73

exhibiting a firearm unless the officer reasonably

believes that the situation may escalate to create an

immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death to

the officer or another person.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

NPD will require that officers successfully qualify at ¶ 74 least twice a year with each firearm they are authorized to use or carry while on duty.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Use of Force Reporting and Investigation (¶¶ 75-85) NPD will adopt a use of force reporting system and a ¶ 75 supervisor Use of Force Report, separate from the NPD’s arrest and incident reports, and which includes individual officers’ accounts of their use of force.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

NPD will require that officers notify their supervisor ¶ 76 as soon as practicable following any reportable use of force.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.

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Use of Force Continued

Achievement
NPD, in consultation with Monitor and DOJ, will categorize force into levels to report, investigate, and review each use of force. The levels will be based on the factors set forth in ¶ 77.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 77

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

NPD will establish a Serious Force Investigation

¶ 78

Team (“SFIT”) to review Serious Force Incidents,

conduct criminal and administrative investigations of

Serious Force incidents, and determine whether

incidents raise policy, training, tactical, or equipment

concerns. Lower or intermediate force incidents will

be investigated by line supervisors.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Every level of force reporting and review will include ¶ 79 the requirements set forth in ¶ 79.
Upon arrival at the scene, the supervisor will identify ¶ 80 and collect evidence sufficient to establish the material facts related to use of force, where reasonably available.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

All officers who used force above Low Level will

¶ 81

provide an oral Use of Force statement in person to

the supervisor on the scene prior to the subject’s

being booked, or released, or the contact otherwise

concluded, unless impractical under the

circumstances.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Pursuant to policy and as necessary to complete a

¶ 82

thorough, reliable investigation, supervisors will

comply with the requirements of ¶ 82.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status Preliminary Compliance Preliminary Compliance
Not Assessed Not Assessed
Not Assessed
Not Assessed

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits. The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits. The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

12

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Use of Force Continued

Achievement
Supervisors will investigate and evaluate in writing all uses of force for compliance with law and NPD policy, as well as any other relevant concerns.
Supervisors’ documentation of the investigation and evaluation will be completed within 72 hours of the use of force, unless the supervisor’s commanding officer approves an extension.
NPD will analyze the data captured in officers’ force reports and supervisors’ investigative reports on an annual basis to identify significant trends, to correct deficient policies and practices, and to document its findings in an annual report that will be made publicly available pursuant to Section XV of the Consent Decree.
Use of Force Review (¶¶ 86-89) The chain-of-command supervisor reviewing the investigative report will ensure that the investigation is thorough, complete, and makes the necessary and appropriate findings of whether the use of force was lawful and consistent with policy. Each higher-level supervisor in the chain of command will review the investigative report to ensure that it is complete, the investigation was thorough, and that the findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 83

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

¶ 84

Within two years of

the Effective Date

(March 30, 2018)

¶ 85

Within two years of

the Effective Date and

annually thereafter

(March 30, 2018)

¶ 86

Within two years of

the Effective Date

(March 30, 2018)

Status Not Assessed Not Assessed Non-Compliance
Not Assessed

Discussion
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits. The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

13

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Use of Force Continued

Achievement

Consent

Consent Decree

Decree

Deadline for

Paragraph

Achievement

A supervisor should ensure that additional

¶ 87

Within two years of

investigation is completed when it appears that

the Effective Date

additional relevant and material evidence may assist

(March 30, 2018)

in resolving inconsistencies or improve the reliability

or credibility of the findings.

When the precinct or unit commander finds that the ¶ 88

Within two years of

investigation is complete and the evidence supports

the Effective Date

the findings, the investigation file will be forwarded

(March 30, 2018)

to the Use of Force Review Board.

Reporting and Investigation of Serious Force Incidents (¶¶ 90-94)

NPD will create a multi-disciplinary Serious Force ¶¶ 90-94 Within two years of

Investigation Team (“SFIT”)3 to conduct both the

the Effective Date

criminal and administrative investigations of Serious

(March 30, 2018)

Force incidents, and to determine whether these

incidents raise policy, training, tactical, or equipment

concerns. SFIT will operate consistent with ¶¶ 91-94.

NPD will develop and implement a SFIT training

¶¶ 11, 90 Within 60 days after

curriculum and procedural manual. NPD will ensure

approval of policies

that officers have received, read and understand their

responsibilities pursuant to the General Order

establishing the AFIT and General Orders

establishing line supervisors’ responsibilities to

investigate lower and intermediate use of force

incidents and that the topic is incorporated into the in-

service training required.

Status Not Assessed
Not Assessed
Initial Development
Preliminary compliance

Discussion
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

3 NPD created an All Force Investigation Team (“AFIT”) to address this Consent Decree requirement. 14

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Use of Force Continued

Achievement
Use of Force Review Board (¶¶ 95-102) NPD will implement a General Order establishing the Use of Force review Board (“UFRB”), ensure that it is staffed consistent with the Consent Decree provisions, and ensure that the responsibilities assigned are consistent with Consent Decree provisions. NPD’s UFRB will conduct timely, comprehensive, and reliable reviews of all Intermediate and Serious Force incidents. The UFRB also will conduct the administrative review of incidents in which the ECPO has completed an investigation pursuant to New Jersey Attorney General Directive 2006-05. Each member of the UFRB will receive a minimum of eight hours of training on an annual basis, including legal updates regarding use of force and the Training Section’s current use of force curriculum. The NPD will include the civilian oversight entity in the review of completed SFIT investigations, as permitted by law.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶¶ 95-102
¶¶ 95-102
¶ 97
¶ 101

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Ongoing
Within 60 days after approval of policies
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status Preliminary Compliance
Not Assessed
Not Assessed Not Assessed

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits. The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

15

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VII. In-Car and Body-Worn Cameras

Achievement
NPD will develop, implement and maintain a system of video recording officers’ encounters with the public with body-worn and in-car cameras. NPD will develop a policy to designate which cars and officers are exempt from the general in-car and body-worn camera requirements and a policy regarding footage and audio recordings from its in-car and body-worn cameras.

Consent Decree Paragraph Section IX, ¶¶ 103-104

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read ¶ 11 and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or policies and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

NPD will equip all marked patrol cars with video cameras, and require all officers, except certain officers engaged in only administrative or management duties, to wear body cameras and microphones with which to record enforcement activity.

¶ 103

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Within 60 days after approval of policy
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Initial Development

Discussion See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(C).
See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(C).

16

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VIII. Theft (including Property and Evidence Management)

Achievement
NPD will ensure that in all instances where property or evidence is seized, the responsible officer will immediately complete an incident report documenting a complete and accurate inventory of the property or evidence seized, and will submit the property or evidence seized to the property room before the end of tour of duty. NPD will conduct regular, targeted, and random integrity audits to detect and deter theft by officers. NPD will employ tactics such as increased surveillance, stings, and heightened scrutiny of suspect officers’ reports and videorecorded activities. NPD will conduct periodic reviews of the disciplinary histories of its officers who routinely handle valuable contraband or cash, especially those in specialized units, to identify any patterns or irregularities indicating potential risk of theft by officers.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 105
¶ 106
¶ 107

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Ongoing
Ongoing

Status Not Assessed
Not Assessed Non-Compliance

Discussion
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
N/A

17

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Theft (including Property and Evidence Management) Continued

Achievement
To the extent permitted by law and NPD’s collective bargaining agreements, NPD will transfer officers with any sustained complain of theft, or two not sustained or unfounded complaints of theft occurring within one year, out of positions where those officers have access to money, property, and evidence. Aspects of officers’ disciplinary histories that relate to honesty and integrity will be considered in making decisions regarding reassignment, promotions, and similar decisions.
NPD will report all theft allegations to the New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety and will continue to report such allegations to the Essex County Prosecutor. Officers who have been the subject of multiple theft allegations will be identified as such in said reports.
NPD will create a chain of custody and inventory policy or policies to ensure compliance with ¶ 110 of the Consent Decree.
NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the chain of custody and inventory policy or policies and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 108
¶ 109
¶¶ 5; 110 ¶ 11

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Ongoing
Ongoing
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) Within 60 days after approval of policies

Status Initial Development
Not Assessed
Preliminary Compliance Non-Compliance

Discussion See First Quarterly Report, Section V(C)(6).
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D. See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.

18

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Theft (including Property and Evidence Management) Continued

Achievement
NPD will conduct and document periodic audits and inspections of the property room and immediately correct any deficiencies.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 111

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Ongoing

Status Initial Development

Discussion
See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(B)

19

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IX. Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation

Achievement
Complaint Process (¶¶ 112-120) NPD will create an Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation policy or policies to ensure compliance with Section XI of the Consent Decree.

Consent Decree Paragraph
¶ 5, Section XI

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read ¶ 11 and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

The City and NPD, in collaboration with the civilian oversight entity or other community input, will develop and implement a program to effectively publicize to the Newark community how to make misconduct complaints.

¶ 112

NPD and the City will revise and make forms and other materials outlining the complaint process and OPS contact information available on their website and appropriate government properties.

¶ 113

NPD will accept all complaints, by all methods and ¶ 114 forms detailed in ¶ 114.

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement

Status

Within two years of Preliminary the Effective Date Compliance (March 30, 2018)

Within 60 days after approval of policy

Non-Compliance

Within 365 days of the Operational Date (July 12, 2017)

Not Assessed

Within two years of Initial the Effective Date Development (March 30, 2018)

Ongoing

Initial Development

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D. See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.
See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(4). See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(4).

20

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Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation Continued

Achievement
NPD will provide civilians, including complainants and witnesses to alleged police misconduct, with full access to NPD’s complaint process. NPD will review and revise its policies for releasing complaints and misconduct allegations to make such complaints and allegations publicly available and ensure compliance with the Consent Decree.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 115

NPD will train all police personnel, including dispatchers, to properly handle complaint intake; the consequences for failing to take complaints; and strategies for turning the complaint process into positive police-civilian interaction.

¶ 116

NPD will conduct regular, targeted, and random integrity audits to identify officers or other employees who refuse to accept or discourage the filing of misconduct complaints, fail to report misconduct or complaints, or provide false or misleading information about filing a misconduct complaint.

¶ 117

NPD will review the results of the audits conducted ¶¶ 117-118 pursuant to ¶ 117 and take appropriate action to remedy any problematic patterns or trends.

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Ongoing
Within 180 days of the Operational Date (January 8, 2017) Ongoing
Ongoing

Status Initial Development
Non-Compliance Non-Compliance
Not Assessed

Discussion See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(D)(2).
See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(C).
See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(F)(2)(a).

21

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Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation Continued

Achievement
NPD will require that all officers and employees report allegations of criminal behavior or administrative misconduct by another NPD officer toward a member of the public, that they may observe themselves or receive from another source, to a supervisor or directly to OPS for review and investigation. When a supervisor receives such allegations, the supervisor will promptly document and report this information to OPS.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 119

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status
Preliminary Compliance

NPD will investigate as a misconduct complaint any information or testimony arising in criminal prosecutions or civil lawsuits that indicate potential officer misconduct not previously investigated by NPD.

¶ 120

Ongoing

Not Assessed

Complaint Classification and Assignment of Investigative Responsibility (¶¶ 121-125)

NPD will adopt and implement a complaint

¶ 121

Within two years of Preliminary

classification protocol that is based on the nature of

the Effective Date Compliance

the alleged misconduct, in order to guide OPS in

(March 30, 2018)

determining where a complaint should be assigned

for investigation.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read ¶ 11 and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Within 60 days after approval of protocol

Non-Compliance

NPD’s OPS will investigate all allegations of Serious Misconduct as defined in the Consent Decree.

¶ 122

Ongoing

Not Assessed

Discussion See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(5).
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

22

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Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation Continued

Achievement
NPD shall develop a protocol for determining whether other complaints will be assigned to the subject officer’s supervisor, the precinct’s Integrity Compliance Officer, or retained by OPS for an administrative investigation. OPS will also determine whether the misconduct complaint warrants a referral to federal or state authorities for a criminal investigation.
OPS will routinely monitor investigations referred to officers’ precincts and specialized units for quality, objectivity and thoroughness, and take appropriate action if investigations are deficient. OPS will identify trends in investigative or leadership deficiencies.
OPS will routinely monitor investigations referred to officers’ precincts and specialized units for quality, objectivity and thoroughness, and take appropriate action if investigations are deficient. OPS will also identify trends in investigative or leadership deficiencies.
NPD will maintain a centralized numbering and tracking system for all misconduct complaints.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 123
¶ 124
¶ 124
¶ 125

Misconduct Complaint Investigation (¶¶ 126-136) NPD will review and revise its policies for releasing ¶¶ 126-136 complaints and misconduct allegations to incorporate the requirements set out in ¶¶ 126-136.

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status
Preliminary Compliance

Ongoing

Non-Compliance

Ongoing

Not Assessed

Within two years of Initial Development the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Within two years of Preliminary the Effective Date Compliance (March 30, 2018)

Discussion
See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(6).
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(4).

23

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Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation Continued

Achievement
NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 11

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within 60 days after approval of protocol

Status Not Assessed

Parallel Administrative and Criminal Investigations of Officer Misconduct (¶¶ 137-140)

If after a reasonable preliminary inquiry into an

¶ 137

Ongoing

Not Assessed

allegation of misconduct, or at any other time during

the course of an administrative investigation, the

OPS has cause to believe that an officer or employee

might have engaged in criminal conduct, the OPS

will refer the matter to the ECPO, DOJ, or other law

enforcement agency as appropriate.

Notwithstanding the referral and unless otherwise ¶ 138

Ongoing

Not Assessed

directed by the prosecutive agency, NPD will

proceed with its administrative investigations. Under

no circumstances will OPS compel a statement from

the subject officer without first consulting with the

Chief or Director and with the prosecuting agency.

NPD will not automatically end its administrative ¶ 139

Ongoing

Not Assessed

investigation in matters in which the prosecuting

agency declines to prosecute or dismisses after

initiation of criminal charges. Instead, NPD will

require investigators to conduct a complete

investigation and assessment of all relevant evidence.

NPD will work with DOJ, the ECPO, and the New ¶ 139

Ongoing

Not Assessed

Jersey Attorney General's Office as appropriate to

improve its processes for investigations of use of

force incidents and referrals of complaints of police

misconduct for criminal investigation.

24

Discussion
The deadline has not passed. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation Continued

Achievement

Consent

Decree

Paragraph

Review and Analysis of Investigations (¶¶ 141-143)

NPD will train OPS supervisors to ensure that

¶ 141

investigations are thorough and complete, and that

investigators' conclusions and recommendations that

are not adequately supported by the evidence will not

be approved or accepted.

NPD will develop and implement a protocol for

¶¶ 142-143

regular supervisory review and assessment of the

types of complaints being alleged or sustained to

identify potential problematic patterns and trends.

Staffing and Training Requirements (¶¶ 144-149)

Within 30 days of the Operational Date, NPD will ¶¶ 144, 145

review staffing of OPS and ensure that misconduct

investigators and commanders possess appropriate

investigative skills, a reputation for integrity, the

ability to write clear reports with recommendations

supported by the evidence, and the ability to assess

fairly and objectively whether an officer has

committed misconduct.

NPD will use a case management system to track and maintain appropriate caseloads for OPS investigators and promote the timely completion of investigations by OPS.

¶ 146

NPD will require and provide appropriate training for OPS investigators upon their assignment to OPS, with refresher training at periodic intervals. At a minimum, NPD will provide 40 hours of initial training and eight hours additional in-service training on an annual basis.

¶¶ 147, 148

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement

Status

Within 60 days after approval of policy

Non-Compliance

Within two years of Non-Compliance the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Within 30 days of the Operational Date (August 11, 2016)

Operational Compliance (achieved after deadline)

Within two years of Not Assessed the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Within 60 days after approval of protocol and annually thereafter

Non-Compliance

25

Discussion
See Second Quarterly Report.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation Continued

Achievement
NPD will improve OPS’ complaint tracking and assessment practices in accordance with ¶ 149.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 149

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status Non-Compliance

Discussion
See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(C).

26

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X. Compliance Reviews and Integrity Audits

Achievement
NPD will conduct integrity audits and compliance reviews to identify and investigate all officers who have engaged in misconduct including unlawful stops, searches, seizures, excessive uses of force; theft of property or other potential criminal behavior’ racial or ethnic profiling and bias against lesbian, gay bisexual and transgender persons.
The integrity audits will also seek to identify officers who discourage the filing of complaints, fail to report misconduct or complaints, or otherwise undermine NPD’s integrity and accountability systems.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶¶ 150, 151

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status
Preliminary Compliance

Discussion
NPD has begun to conduct some integrity audits (e.g., body-worn cameras, and stops). See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(D)(2).

27

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XI. Discipline

Achievement
NPD will adopt policies that are consistent and fair in their application of officer discipline, including establishing a formal, written, presumptive range of discipline for each type of violation.

Consent Decree Paragraph Section XIII

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status
Preliminary Compliance

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and ¶ 11 understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Within 60 days after approval of guidance

Non-Compliance See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.

NPD will apply discipline for sustained allegations of misconduct based on the nature and severity of the policy violation and defined mitigating and aggravating factors, rather than the officer’s identity, rank or assignment; relationship with other individuals; or reputation in the broader community.

¶ 152

Ongoing

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

NPD will implement disciplinary guidance for its

¶ 153

personnel that addresses the topics addressed in ¶ 153

of the Consent Decree.

NPD will establish a unified system for reviewing sustained findings and applying the appropriate level of discipline pursuant to NPD’s disciplinary guidance.

¶ 154

Within 90 days of the Operational Date (October 10, 2016) Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Non-Compliance Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

NPD will conduct annual reviews of its disciplinary ¶ 155 process and actions.

Annually

Non-Compliance

28

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XII. Data Systems Improvement

Achievement
Early Warning System (¶¶ 156-161) NPD will enhance its Early Warning System (“EWS”) to support the effective supervision and management of NPD officers. City will provide sufficient funding to NPD to enhance its EWS.

Consent Decree Paragraph
¶ 156
¶ 156

NPD will develop and implement a data protocol

¶ 157

describing information to be recorded and maintained

in the EWS.

NPD will revise its use of EWS as an effective supervisory tool. To that end, the EWS will use comparative data and peer group analysis to identify patterns of activity by officers and groups of officers for supervisory review and intervention.

¶ 158-160

NPD will continue to use its current IAPro software's alert and warning features to identify officers for intervention while further developing and implementing an EWS that is fully consistent with this Agreement.

¶ 161

Records Management System (“RMS”) (¶¶ 162-163) NPD will revise its use and analysis of its RMS to ¶ 162 make efficient and effective use of the data in the System and improve its ability to interface with other technology systems.

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within one year of the Effective Date (March 30, 2017) Within one year of the Effective Date (March 30, 2017) Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Ongoing
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status Non-Compliance Non-Compliance Non-Compliance Non-Compliance
Not Assessed
Non-Compliance

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(A). See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).

29

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Data Systems Improvement Continued Achievement
City will provide sufficient funding and personnel to NPD so NPD can revise its use and analysis of its Record Management System.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 163

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
N/A

Status

Discussion

Non-Compliance See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).

30

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XIII. Transparency and Oversight
Achievement
NPD will make its policies publicly available, and will regularly report information regarding officer use of force; misconduct complaints; and stop/search/arrest data.
NPD will work with the civilian oversight entity to overcome impediments to the release of information consistent with law and public safety considerations.
On at least an annual basis, NPD will issue reports, summarizing and analyzing the stop, search, arrest and use of force data collected, the analysis of that data, and the steps taken to correct problems and build on successes.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 164

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Ongoing

Status Not Assessed

¶ 165

N/A

Not Assessed

¶¶ 85, 168 Annually

NonCompliance

Discussion

31

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XIV. Consent Decree Implementation and Enforcement

Achievement
Consent Decree Implementation Unit The City and NPD will form an interdisciplinary unit to facilitate the implementation of the Consent Decree.

Consent Decree Paragraph

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement

Status

¶ 196

Within 180 days after the Effective Date (September 26, 2016)

Operational Compliance

The City implementation unit will file a status report with the Court, delineating the items set forth in the Consent Decree.

¶ 197

Within 180 days after the Effective Date (September 26, 2016) and every six months thereafter

Operational Compliance

Discussion

32

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Appendix C

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STATUS OF NPD’S CONSENT DECREE TRAINING

The following chart notes the status of Consent Decree-related training.1

Training

Status

Community-Oriented Policing2 Body-Worn and In-Car Cameras Use of Force Stops, Searches, and Arrests Bias-Free Policing3

NPD reports that training has been administered to all relevant NPD officers.
NPD reports that training has been administered to all relevant NPD officers.
NPD reports that by the end of March 2019, training had been administered to all relevant NPD officers.
NPD reports that by the end of April 2019, training had been administered to all relevant NPD officers.
Mid-Level Management session held on April 30.
Two-day course for Command-level officers and community members held on May 1 to 2.

1 While NPD accomplished many achievements with respect to Consent Decree-related trainings by the end of this reporting period, the Police Academy had difficulty adhering to its curricula for certain trainings because, too often, high-ranking instructors were suddenly called to attend meetings at their scheduled teaching time. Interruptions are especially problematic for NPD training instructors because Consent-Decree related trainings, such as Stops, Searches and Arrests or Use of Force, involve presenting large amounts of important information in a limited amount of time. For training instructors, adhering to a set schedule is critically important to ensuring that that each training session reflects the Monitorapproved curriculum.
Indeed, most police agencies prohibit such interruptions to ongoing training instruction, especially lastminute interruptions that prevent instructors from making appropriate accommodations. NPD’s failure to protect training instructors’ instruction time is disruptive to an effective training process and exhibits a lack of commitment to training that is inconsistent with the achievements that NPD has accomplished thus far.
2 NPD administered Community-Oriented Policing training to its officers prior to completing its Community-Oriented Policing policy.
3 NPD has not completed all of the training elements with respect to incorporating “scenario-based training that promotes the development and strengthening of partnerships between the police and community;” and “conflict resolution, including verbal de-escalation of conflict” (¶ 14(b) & (e)), as it relates to training on community policing and problem-oriented policing methods and skills. NPD intends to incorporate these elements into its training on bias-free policing.

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Training Internal Affairs Property and Evidence Management

Status
Train the Trainer sessions held May 14 to 15.
NPD needs to incorporate Newark-specific content into the training.
NPD is developing an internal affairs investigations procedural manual in collaboration with DOJ’s vendor.
The Monitoring Team is currently reviewing the draft procedural manual.
NPD needs to develop a procedural manual and training reflecting Consent Decree-compliant practices.

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Appendix D

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STATUS OF NPD’S CONSENT DECREE POLICIES

The following chart notes the status of effective Consent Decree-related policies.

GO#

Subject

Consent Decree Provision

Date Adopted by NPD

GO 17-06 Bias-Free Policing

Paragraph 5

GO 18-05 Body Worn Cameras

Paragraph 104

GO 18-06 In-Car Cameras

Paragraph 104

GO 18-20 Use of Force

Paragraphs 66-67

GO 18-21 Use of Force Reporting, Investigation and Review
GO 18-22 Firearms and Other Weapons

Paragraphs 66-67 Paragraphs 66-67

GO 18-14 Consensual Citizen Contacts and Paragraph 5; Section VI Investigatory Stops (“Stops”)

GO 18-15 Searches With or Without a Search Warrant (“Searches”)

Paragraph 5; Section VI

GO 18-16 Arrests With or Without an Arrest Warrant (“Arrests”)

Paragraph 5; Section VI

September 19, 2017 (Effective September 19, 2017) June 5, 2018 (Effective June 5, 2018) June 5, 2018 (Effective June 5, 2018) November 8, 2018 (Effective January 1, 2019) November 8, 2018 (Effective January 1, 2019) November 8, 2018 (Effective January 1, 2019) December 31, 2018 (Effective January 10, 2019) December 31, 2018 (Effective January 10, 2019) December 31, 2018 (Effective January 10, 2019)

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GO#

Subject

Consent Decree Provision

Date Adopted by NPD

GO 18-13 Community Policing1

Section V

GO 18-24 Property and Evidence Division Paragraph 110

GO 18-23 Property and Evidence Management
GO 19-03 LGBTQI Community & Police Interactions2
GO 18-12 First Amendment Right to Observe, Object to, and Record Police Activity3

Paragraph 110 N/A N/A

April 4, 2019 (Effective April 4, 2019) April 3, 2019 (Effective April 3, 2019) April 12, 2019 (Effective April 12, 2019) April 3, 2019 (Effective April 3, 2019) June 12, 2019 (Effective June 12, 2019)

1 Attached as an addendum to NPD’s Community Policing policy is a Department of Public Safety Memorandum regarding NPD’s Neighborhood Policing Plans. Neighborhood Policing Plans are plans designed by Precinct Commanders. The Plans identify neighborhoods within a Precinct for Commanders to provide a more localized approach to problem-solving and crime reduction and involve collaboration between officers, residents, business-owners, faith-based organizations, school officials and other service organization to jointly identify and solve local problems.
2 Although the Consent Decree requires NPD to “operate without bias based on any demographic category,” see Consent Decree § VII, it does not require a standalone policy to address the LGBTQIA community. To help institutionalize its practices, NPD decided to draft a policy dedicated to its stop, search, and arrest of these community members.
3 The Consent Decree requires NPD to respect the public’s First Amendment right and prohibits officers from taking certain actions to discourage the exercise of these rights. Consent Decree ¶¶ 55-62. It does not expressly require NPD to create standalone policy to this end, but NPD endeavored to do so.
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GO#

Subject

Consent Decree Provision

Date Adopted by NPD

GO 18-25 Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake & Investigation Process4
GO 18-26 Internal Affairs: Disciplinary Process and Matrix

Section XI Section XIII

August 21, 2019 (Effective August 21, 2019) September 9, 2019 (Effective September 9, 2019)

4 During this review period, NPD addressed the scope and practical application of its commitments under Consent Decree Paragraphs 104, 107 and 108, in portions of two personnel policies: General Order 18-25, Complaint Intake & Investigation Process, and General Order 80-1, Responsibilities of Command and Supervisory Personnel. The parties acknowledged that, as a practical matter, most field assignments included “officers who routinely handle valuable contraband or cash,” as part of their ordinary arrest duties: A simple search incident to arrest might, for example, turn up cash valuable items such as smartphones , jewelry, or drugs. Consequently, NPD worked with DOJ and the Monitoring Team to address how supervision of employees could reasonably include consideration of officer integrity issues as a matter of course.
General Order 18-25 contemplates that NPD’s Office of Professional Standards (OPS) will assign periodic reviews of officer disciplinary histories with an eye toward identifying any patterns in officer behavior or allegations that present integrity concerns. For example, an officer with a history of complaints regarding the handling of arrestee property may warrant closer supervision, even if OPS had not been able to substantiate the complaints. Any such response would need to be tailored so as not to run afoul of legal and collective bargaining constraints. General Order 80-1, a related policy, which is not yet in final form, likewise seeks to provide a standard means of reviewing officers’ disciplinary histories when they are new to an assignment.
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Appendix E

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Report on Youth Engagement Listening Sessions with Newark, New Jersey Youth
Delores Jones-Brown, J.D., Ph.D. Professor Emeritus, CUNY Graduate Center Consultant to the NPD Consent Decree Monitoring Team
2018 Submitted to Peter C. Harvey, Esq.
Independent Monitor Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP

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Table of Contents I. Introduction........................................................................................................................... 1 II. Methods ................................................................................................................................ 2 III. Summary of Findings.......................................................................................................... 4 IV. Youth Voices ........................................................................................................................ 6
a. Female High School Students: May 30, 2018 ............................................................ 7 b. High School Students: June 13, 2018 ......................................................................... 9 c. LGBTQI Youth: July 12, 2018 and August 9, 2018 ................................................. 18 d. Alternative School Students: August 10, 2018 ......................................................... 32 e. Serious Delinquents: August 19, 2018 ...................................................................... 49 f. Elementary and Middle School Students: August 26, 2018 ................................... 54 V. NPD’s Juvenile Services Section ................................................................................... 67 VI. Summary and Conclusions.............................................................................................. 69 VII. Recommendations ............................................................................................................ 70

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“Treat me like a person, not an object” Alternative school student 8/10/18 & Serious Delinquent 8/19/18

“Be mean in a nice way.”— “don’t make the angry face” and “don’t talk loud.”
Third grade girl 8/26/18

“Yes I steal, but I am not stealing today.” Alternative school student 8/10/18

I.

Introduction

On May 5, 2016, the Newark Police Division (“NPD”) and the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) submitted to the United States District Court, District of New Jersey, and the Court entered, a revised Consent Decree intended to improve the quality of policing in Newark. Mr. Peter C. Harvey, along with his team of attorneys and experts (“Monitoring Team”), is tasked with supervising the implementation of the Consent Decree and ensuring NPD’s compliance with its requirements.

The Consent Decree requires the Monitoring Team to measure the satisfaction and assess the attitudes of representative samples of City residents. (See Consent Decree ¶¶ 22, 23).1 While the Monitoring Team has conducted surveys of the Newark community, see First Quarterly Report section V(H) and Eighth Quarterly Report section IV(C), those surveys do not capture the perspective of Newark’s younger residents, those under the age of eighteen. This is particularly true of hard-to-reach youth, who are unlikely to have participated in the surveys’ random sample polling.2 To that end, Dr. Delores Jones-Brown, a member of the Monitoring team, conducted a series of “listening sessions” where young people shared their experiences with and perceptions of NPD, along with their

1The Consent Decree requires NPD to develop training that teaches officers “how to create positive interactions with youth” (¶14(a)), to “measure the breadth, extent, and the effectiveness of its . . . outreach to youth” (¶17), and requires both NPD and the City of Newark (the City) “to seek and respond to input from the community about” the Consent Decree’s implementation (¶19). The recommendations outlined in this Report may assist NPD in developing mechanisms to satisfy these requirements; however, the listening sessions and Report do not satisfy NPD’s youth engagement obligations under the Consent Decree. 2The Monitor’s probability surveys capture responses from Newark residents age 18 and older.
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suggestions for creating more positive interactions between youth and police. The results of those listening sessions are presented below.
Of particular interest was input from youth in those areas of Newark with the highest police presence, crime complaints, arrests and calls for service. Based on a GIS map provided by NPD (see Attachment B), youth residing in the Central, South and West Wards and certain sections of the North and East Wards are most likely to have police contact.3 Youth from each of these wards were included among those who participated in the listening sessions.
In addition, priority was given to hearing the perspectives of the following youth:
1) Serious delinquents4 2) School drop outs 3) Students in alternative schools 4) High school age 5) Middle school age 6) Elementary school age 7) Residents of public housing 8) Immigrants 9) LGBTQI 10) Females5
II. Methods
Listening sessions are what the term suggests. They are an opportunity to hear from participants about their experiences. Listening sessions also offer participants an opportunity to provide suggestions for creating positive change— in this instance, suggestions for creating (or maintaining) opportunities for positive interaction with Newark Police officers. Listening sessions are less structured and are far more organic than other methods of capturing people’s perspectives, such as focus groups, community forums and surveys. During the
3Attachment A contains a map identifying Newark’s five wards. Attachment B contains a map of “Arrest/Charge Density August 1, 2017 to July 31, 2018.” 4For example, those known to be gang-involved, those who have spent time in detention, those who have the equivalent of felony convictions, those who have been accused of or involved in violent offenses. 5See Investigation of the Newark Police Department, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney’s Office, District of New Jersey, dated July 22, 2014, at p. 46-47; Crenshaw et al., 2015; and Richie, 2012.
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listening sessions, youth were able to describe their experiences in detail using their own words.6
The listening sessions conducted by Dr. Jones-Brown were arranged through contact with individuals and organizations with a direct connection to the youth whose participation was being sought. To ensure that experiences from youth who live in areas with high police activity were gathered from the listening sessions, a geographic map of the Newark wards was compared to an Arrest Density Map from the NPD.7 The overlap of the two maps provided a guide to the neighborhoods and youth most important to include in the sessions—wards with high levels of enforcement activity and calls for service. Each session was led by Dr. Jones-Brown with some co-facilitation by faculty or staff at the location where the session was held. To maximize participation and minimize fear of retaliation or privacy concerns, the discussions were captured by handwritten notes rather than through audio or video recording.
Fourteen listening sessions were held at schools or the offices of communitybased organizations across Newark. Two sessions were held at the headquarters of the All Stars Project-New Jersey, a youth program that has a relationship with the City and NPD via its Operation Conversation: Cops and Kids Program.8 One session was held with the Youth Council of the New Jersey Institute for Social Justice (NJISJ)—a member of the Monitoring Team. Two sessions were held with LGBTQI youth at two different locations. One session was held with a female-only group of high school girls. Another session consisted of youth who have been arrested for serious and violent crimes; and, one session was devoted to alternative school students. Three sessions were held with co-ed classes of high school students. And, three sessions were held
6Listening sessions were chosen over surveys and focus groups because both surveys and focus groups have participants respond to a limited number of questions, usually in a preset response format, and using words that youth may not understand. Other qualitative methods, e.g. ethnographic observations, require more time, specialized training, and research ethics safeguards than were within the scope of the proposed project design or budget. 7See Attachments A and B of this Report. 8According to its website, All Stars Project -New Jersey (ASP-NJ) has been “on the ground in Newark since 1999, and has touched the lives of more than 35,000 young people.” Operation Conversation: Cops and Kids (OCCK) is run by Dr. Leonora Fulani, based at the All Stars Project headquarters in Manhattan. A February 2018 ASP-NJ newsletter notes that OCCK was officially launched in Newark on April 5, 2017 by Mayor Ras Baraka. The newsletter reported that, as of that date, 12 workshops had been held in various Newark locations with, 118 youth and 104 police officers participating. To learn more about All Stars Project-New Jersey visit: https://allstars.org/locations/new-jersey/. To learn more about Operation Conversation: Cops and Kids visit: https://allstars.org/copsandkids/.
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with elementary school students (third, fourth and fifth graders). The locations of these later sessions are withheld in order to maintain the anonymity of the participants. The listening sessions were conducted over a four-month period, from May 30th to September 26th, 2018, with a total of 158 youth, ages 8 to 28,9 and approximately 28 teachers and staff.
Participants in the sessions were asked to comment on three primary areas:
 whether they were aware of the consent decree  whether they had had contact with NPD  whether they had suggestions for positive engagement between
NPD and youth
III. Summary of Findings
First, the majority of youth who participated in the sessions had no knowledge of the consent decree. Out of the fourteen sessions, only two groups contained one or more members who knew that the Consent Decree exists.10 Older youth, specifically high school age and those in the alternative school and serious delinquents sessions, expressed disbelief that the Consent Decree and other efforts at police reform will result in any significant change. A fifth grader expressed concern that there might even be trouble for talking during the listening sessions.
Second, few youth reported having had no contact with the police. Among those youth, most reported that they deliberately avoid the police or that they “stay inside” most of the time. They reported that “staying inside” is a strategy that they utilize to avoid harm from criminals and to avoid police contact. The youth who did report having had contact with NPD described a range of interactions from receiving car rides home from NPD members to being harassed by officers because of their appearance and having experienced aggressive verbal and physical treatment.
Third, the youth provided many suggestions for NPD to improve its youth engagement efforts. The youths’ suggestions for positive engagement with the NPD ranged from the simple: “They should wear bigger name tags” and “Police
9 One member of the LGBTQI listening session was age twenty-eight. Though most definitions of “youth” have an upper boundary of age 25, given the particular vulnerability of this hard to reach population, the researcher determined that it would be inappropriate to exclude this person from the session, 10 One of those two groups was the NJISJ Youth Council.
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should say hello”– to recommendations for sophisticated collaborations such as conducting in-school assemblies that would sometimes be led by students and sometimes be co-led by students and members of the NPD (discussed in more detail at pp. 8-9).
Across all age categories it was suggested that it is important for the NPD to do things that are “fun” with youth, not just “watch” them and “harass” them. Typical “fun” suggestions included playing sports together, block parties and holiday and back to school give-aways. Less typical was the suggestion that police and youth engage in acts of altruism together such as visiting cancer patients and persons with autism and raising funds for individuals who are unable to pay their hospital bills.
The suggestions also varied amongst the different groups of youth who participated. Younger students requested that police not “be mean” when interacting with children. Even when the child has done something wrong, they ask that officers remember they are “just a kid”. (See their other suggestions at pp. 56-57). Several of the older participants in the sessions felt that the police need to be more mindful of youths’ constitutional rights and suggested that an outside agency11 might conduct “Know Your Rights” (KYR) sessions for youth, their parents, and the police. LGBTQI youth suggested that police training on how to interaction with this population should take place at a LGBTQI supporting center and utilize LGBTQI trainers and/or officers. (See their other suggestions at pp. 21-22 and 27-28). Youth from the All Stars Project and the NJISJ Youth Council wanted to become more involved with helping the NPD develop its youth strategies. The Youth Council developed the attached response to the decision to aggressively enforce the curfew ordinance during the summer of 2018 (see Attachment C); and, a member of the All Stars group engaged in an exemplary role play when asked how he would behave as an officer required to enforce the ordinance against an under-age person he found on the street after curfew. His response demonstrated a high level of emotional intelligence and compassion as he gave a clear explanation of his actions consistent with the police legitimacy literature.12 Similarly, a member of the alternative school group articulately described her need to have police act in a manner that demonstrates that they recognize that she has rights; and, that they (the police) will act in accordance with those rights. She also verbalized how police failure to recognize and
11My suggestion is the ACLU or Public Defender’s Office. 12Tyler, 2004.
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observe her rights only serves to reduce her motivation to comply with the law or police commands—thus creating a self-enforcing cycle of noncompliance and police illegitimacy. All of these youth responses and suggestions demonstrate the great potential for utilizing young people in police training related to engaging with youth. Their influence has the potential to be useful during curriculum development as well as implementation and delivery.
The overarching message from the listening sessions was that youth in the City of Newark are not all the same. Their needs and expectations of the NPD vary. Consequently, the NPD’s strategies for engaging with youth will need to vary. Some youth desire more police contact, some desire less. All expressed a need for interactions that are genuinely caring13. Older youth specifically requested interaction that is respectful. Respect was a dominant theme among the males. Few females reported having experienced sexually inappropriate behavior from members of the NPD, but thought that it was important for officers to not engage in such conduct and serve as role models to the public for not engaging in such behavior. Alternative school students, serious delinquents, and youth who live in crime challenged neighborhoods all reported that they need members of the NPD to stop treating them as if they are criminals or criminals “all the time” and to respond more quickly when there is a shooting.
IV. Youth Voices
The Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing published by the Community Oriented Policing Services office in May 2015 makes note of the following:
Communities should support a culture and practice of policing that reflects the values of protection and promotion of the dignity of all— especially the most vulnerable, such as children and youth most at risk for crime or violence. . . In addition, communities need to affirm and recognize the voices of youth in community decision making, facilitate youth participation in research and problem solving, and develop and fund youth leadership training and life skills through positive youth/police collaboration and interactions. (p. 3).
13See Rios, 2017 noting the need for a “culture of care” to counter the “culture of control” typically used against youth of color.
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Section IV of this Report details the discussions from the 14 listening sessions held with Newark youth over the four-month period from May 30 to September 26, 2018. For each session, there is a brief description of the session; a recounting of the participants’ reported police experiences and a listing of their suggestions for positive youth engagement. At pages 67-68 their suggestions are compared to a list of programs that NPD reports having engaged in the past (see Attachment D). This report concludes with additional recommendations from this author.
a. Female High School Students: May 30, 2018
The listening session took place at a Newark high school led by the author and facilitated by a member of the faculty and a staff member from a local community organization that focuses on positive youth development for girls. The session lasted approximately 50 minutes.
The group was small (4-5 girls); mostly sophomores; who reported being residents of the Central and South Wards. One student reported that she resides on the border of Newark and Hillside. The girls were all young women of color.
Police Experience
Two members of the group denied having any direct contact with the police, but admitted deliberately avoiding police when they see them in their neighborhoods.
One member of the group reported having a gun pointed at her during a police encounter. (It was difficult to follow the details of the encounter).
The girls who had had direct contact with the police noted that they felt they were treated better than they would have been had they been males.
One member of the group dressed in a traditionally masculine fashion and wore her hair in short dreadlocks. This youth noted that she believes she receives police attention, in part, because “they sometimes can’t tell if I am a girl or a boy.” She was the most vocal participant during the session. I have given her the pseudonym Ada.
Beyond pointing a gun, the most serious complaint made against the police was their reported failure to take sexual assault complaints seriously. Ada alleged that the NPD failed to investigate complaints made by her family when they
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reported that a 9-year-old had been touched inappropriately and an 11-year-old had been raped by the mother’s boyfriend. A different member of the group stated that the NPD needed to investigate domestic violence complaints more seriously.
There was a general agreement that the police appear to engage in stereotyping, especially racial stereotyping, and that “that needs to stop”.
There was a general belief that boys are stereotyped as gang members; especially when they wear certain colors. And, that the police fear young male residents and that the police want to intimidate them (the young men).
One young woman, who lives in a neighborhood where she says gun fire is prevalent, complained about the slow response time from police during a shooting that she described as “recent.” This same young woman was the only one in the group to report that she has had police officers make catcalls and other sexual comments to her while the officers were on duty and in uniform. She reported being very angry because, “if the police treat me like that, other guys will think it is okay too.”
At one point she became very emotional and made it clear that she just wants the police to “act like they care about people in my neighborhood… for real.”
Ada was most vocal about feeling as if the police don’t respect her first amendment rights. And that their lack of respect for the constitutional rights of residents is racialized. She stated that “White people get it all.” When asked to explain, she said White people can “act up” and “question the police” without getting arrested or hurt.
The girls who reported having no direct police contact were equally likely to say that the people in their neighborhoods don’t call the police out of fear of how the police will act when they come.
There was a general concern with being “over-policed.”
Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
The young women who participated in the listening session uniformly expressed an interest in having the police come into their school for reasons other than arresting or “watching” the students. They suggested two types of school-wide assemblies or class visits that might improve the relationship between the police
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and youth. One assembly would feature police officers responding to questions from a student audience. The group emphasized that they want honest answers [from the police] to questions posed by students, without restriction. The other program would have police officers as the audience, while students presented the problems that they have with the way police behave in their communities. The students and police officers would then collaboratively brainstorm about what aspects of policing can be done differently.
Ada suggested that the police could partner with student mentees or a small group of student advisors to plan the two assemblies and to get to know the youth in the community. She noted that this working relationship might help the students by making them comfortable enough to point out to the police who the school bullies are, help police solicit suggestions about what youth would like to see in terms of police services, and improve police willingness to hear and implement those suggestions.
While the young women in this session seemed very receptive to the police coming into the school and engaging with them in cooperative and collaborative ways, the faculty member who was present and who, until recently, was a lifelong resident of Newark, pointed out that the commander of the 3rd precinct had used some similar strategies 3 to 4 years ago but that parents of students had ultimately objected to the police presence in the school because they (the parents) “don’t trust the cops”. This input suggests that any effort at positive youth engagement between NPD and youth will also need to include a component that builds a bridge between the reluctant parents and the police.
b. High School Students: June 13, 2018
The author conducted three listening sessions with Newark High School students on this date. The sessions were organized by a member of the school’s faculty. Though each session was predominantly male, both males and females were represented. A cumulative total of about 40 youth and 8 faculty members were present for the sessions. The students were all youth of color. The sessions ranged from 50 to 80 minutes.
All of the students who participated in these three sessions reported that they had no knowledge of the consent decree.
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Session 1
Eight to ten students were present. The students were all juniors who reported living in the Central and South Wards. Two students reported that they live in Irvington.
Police Experience
A female student began by describing a high-speed chase involving a stolen car where her cousin, who was a pedestrian, was killed. She said that the chase had begun in East Orange but was joined by NPD and other jurisdictions. She said that the case was still pending further investigation. She expressed anger that her cousin, a pedestrian bystander, was killed by the police chasing criminals through the streets. She also reported that her father had once had a gun held on him by police for “no reason”.
Most of the group reported that they have had no interaction with the police. One female reported that she “doesn’t go outside a lot,” and that her family is “very quiet,” but that there is noticeable police presence in the “complex”14 where she lives.
Police were described as being “violent” and treating people “aggressively.” More than one student reported having witnessed what they call “aggressive” police behavior. When asked to describe aggressive behavior, they reported that they witnessed people being punched, slapped or thrown to the ground.
One member of the group described the police as “no help” and stated that “police come too late.” She went on to report that her best friend’s brother was shot (by a civilian) and the “police were a no show.” She stated that they cannot be “counted on.”
Another student reported witnessing an incident on a city bus where the police boarded the bus and told a rider that he had to get off. According to the student, when the passenger refused and began to question the officers, the officers instructed the bus driver to “turn off the camera,” whereupon the passenger left the bus. The student said he thought the officers instructed the bus driver to turn off the camera because they were preparing to beat and physically remove the passenger from the bus.
14I assumed she meant a public housing project but for privacy reasons did not ask her directly. 10

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When there was a lull in the student remarks, the facilitator joined the discussion to describe his own experiences with the NPD. He recounted that once when he went to the precinct in the Central Ward to request a police report, the officers were having a conversation of a sexual nature that they did not stop having once he arrived. He described how the conversation continued for about two minutes while his request for a police report was ignored. He further explained that after he had waited for two hours, he was sent to another precinct. He described the officers’ behavior as “unprofessional” and sexually explicit.
There was a level of consensus among the group that police are fearful of Newark neighborhoods and Black people; and, that this fear is held by both Black and White NPD officers.
One male student pointed out that he did not understand why murders continue to be a problem in Newark, given the amount of CCTV surveillance.
Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
At least one student stated that NPD needs to “come quicker” when needed, especially in response to serious incidents like shootings. One student said she believes the police are there to “protect you.” Others wanted to see officers improve their communication skills—that is, how the officers speak to young people.
More than one student reported that “there are some cops who are nice” and they want NPD to identify those officers and use them as trainers and designers of positive youth engagement strategies to be used with youth.
More than one youth agreed with one youth’s statement that “police will stare you down” but will “not say hello.”
Suggestions for improved relations included:
 Saying “Hi” and “don’t ask where I am going”  NPD coming to the school to give a presentation  The school hosting a “Fun Day with the Cops” program, including
trips to the movies  Opportunities to interact with police who are not in uniform.  Continuous opportunities to play ball or engage in other athletic
activities with (as opposed to against) police (monthly or weekly as opposed to annually).
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At least one student suggested that video footage of national, highly publicized police shootings and other controversial conduct, should be used as part of police training in joint sessions—where police and youth watch the footage together, and then both police and youth discuss the legal appropriateness of the amount of force used and what was done right and what was done wrong by the police in the encounter.15
Students suggested that the police should not just sit in cars outside the school. They should be expected to do “something.” They want the police to be more interactive but “with kindness” “not suspicion.” As an example, a student suggested that the police should interact with the people in the community in a positive way “instead of standing next to the bodega talking to each other.”
It was also stated that the police need to recognize that not all Blacks are African American.
Session 2
There were approximately 14 students present for this session. They reported living in the West, Central, East and South Wards. One student reported living in East Orange.
Police Experience
A male student described being stopped by NPD and being told that the police were looking for someone and that he “fit the description”. He reported feeling intimidated by the police and feeling that he draws police attention because of what he wears. He stated that “I can’t wear what I want to wear.” He went on to explain that, in his view, the police suspect you based on what you wear and the people you are out with. He stated that if you have nice sneakers, the police believe that you are gang affiliated or are selling drugs or are stealing, especially if you have money in your pockets—they don’t think that it is from working a legal job.
One youth reported that when there was a shooting around Irvine Turner Boulevard there was no police response for thirty minutes.
15The students made the point that often the focus is placed on what the civilian did wrong during a use of force incident but that the police are supposed to be the trained professionals, not the civilian.
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Several students reported that they intentionally avoid the police to be “better safe than sorry.” A student was adamant that “I don’t want to deal with this.” “This” seemed to be having police contact.
A student reported that he did something “stupid” but that was not an arrestable offense. Still, police were called. He said that when the police arrived he was angry and upset, so he started pacing back and forth. He described one officer as being “patronizing” toward him and threatened to handcuff him for being “aggressive.” He was told to “stop moving.” The student felt that this command interfered with his first amendment rights.
He also reported an incident from when he was a student in the 4th grade. His sister had been involved in a fight. He reported that the police came to the school asking questions and he walked away. He said that the police grabbed him and continued to ask him questions. He pulled away. His sister was suspended. His parents filed a complaint against the police department. This student’s overall assessment was that the police need better social skills and that there has to be a way to “make sure that cops are equipped to interact with young people”. He felt that the police should have tried to calm him down, instead of threatening him. He added that police officers who arrive on a scene should not make assumptions about the youth who are there but should ask other people who are around about the person. He said the police should take more time to “semi-analyze the situation” and keep the person occupied before becoming aggressive with him/her. For example, students expect police officers to act differently when weapons are present as opposed to when there are only verbal threats. Presumably, in the absence of weapons, they expect the police to be less aggressive.
The students had opinions about how videos have impacted police and community behavior. There was a sense that videos have made both sides more fearful and increased the likelihood that residents might run from the police. They asked: “How are police trained to deal with this?”
There was disagreement about whether the NPD are currently conducting more or less stop and frisk activity. There were general complaints of police officers “getting in someone’s face.”
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Trauma
Two students reported incidents that involved the execution of arrest warrants that seemed to have been very upsetting for them even though they were not the targets of the warrant.
A female student became so emotionally upset during this session that the facilitator took her out of the room for a while. Initially, this student had reported that she had had no contact with the police. Later in the session she reported that the police once came to her house looking for her brother. She was home alone and when she came downstairs to open the door the police pushed past her into the house. She said that she was threatened with being taken to the station, and that the officers kept smirking at her when she said that her brother was not at home. She said she became very afraid because she did not know what the officers were going to do to her.
A male student reported that his sister had an outstanding warrant and was stopped while seated in a car with his mother. The student said that he was outside the car, further down the street, but saw the police officer reach for his gun when he approached the car. He says that he saw the officer yank the car door open. The student said that he then ran up to the car and told the officer that he wasn’t going to let him (the officer) touch his mother. He says that the officer pushed him away from the mother and told him that he did not look like her son. He said that the officer then tried to handcuff him. He stated that the incident ended with the mother being given five tickets, in part, because the car had tinted windows. He said that his mother has received a tinted-window citation more than once. He stated that this happened to his family even though his father is a police officer in a neighboring department.
He noted that some of the police behavior might have been “his fault”, but also felt that the police “are trying to embarrass the person”. Eight cars came. He thought that was overkill. He thinks that the only solution is “staying in the house”. Because he lives in a “bad neighborhood,” he believes that the police probably believe he is “one of them” (the bad people).
One female student reported that her mother keeps her in the house because “there are gangs”. Another student asked if the police are one of those gangs.
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Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
The youth in this listening session provided the following suggestions:
The police should not focus so much on their own personal safety.
The selection criteria for NPD should be more stringent.
Officers should have a minimum of an Associates Degree. The suggestion that officers have more education was repeated more than once. It was suggested that officers particularly need to be educated in “use of authority”. Officers should be required to take Sociology, Anthropology and Psychology courses.
Training should focus on people skills rather than forceful tactics.
Officers should be multicultural and Psychology majors.
Officers should be trained not to have tunnel vision.
Students said an officer needs to be: “a well-rounded” person and understanding of multiple cultures.
It was suggested that officers have professional development workshops twice a month, including best practices as informed by psychological and sociological research.
It was also suggested that the workshops include community members.
Officers should be required to speak to the people in the community first and that this will give the community a feeling of safety and belonging. And, that this type of interaction is more welcome than officers only showing up “to enforce the law to the letter.”
The group was in support of the idea that there should be youth panels who interview new recruits.16
It was mentioned that, in the past, police officers had a basketball game with students. There was some support for the idea of this happening again with more frequency.
16This is a practice used previously by former New Haven, CT police Chief Francisco Ortiz, Jr. 15

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Session 3
This session began with a male student reporting that he thinks of himself as a “victim” to police contact because of the way he dresses. He stated that because of the way he dresses, the police will think that he is a drug dealer. He reported in detail about a situation in which officers “pulled up” on him and his friends and gave them “eye contact” and then “jumped out” wanting to know what they were doing, then the officer asked to “check” his bag. He said he refused and told the officer not to touch him either. He reported that, when he said this, the officer got back into the car and drove away. The student said that at the time he didn’t know anything about getting information from the officer in order to file a complaint.
One member of the session noted that young people are running from the police because they are afraid. It was reported that residents want to feel like “We [residents and police] help each other”—not like there is a hierarchy with police on top.
One student reported that: “I don’t trust no police officer. They just be following me.” She reported that she gets scared because “the car is driving slowly” by her.
A minority of students participating in this session commented that they think the listening session and the consent decree are useless because they have the feeling that, “cops will still get away with ‘it’”—that these interviews and the consent decree are “a waste of time”. They pointed to the number of existing videos, nationally, the release of which does not seem to have changed problematic police behavior; and the fact that very few have resulted in the successful prosecution of a police officer. According to one student, “There are mad videos… and the cops still get away with it.”
Students in this session also stated that they believe that police officers are fearful of working in Newark.
One student pointed to slavery as influencing cops “to do what they are doing today.”
Two young ladies reported that they do not go outside because of police.
In another reported incident, police held a gun to the head of the sixteen year old cousin of the student describing the encounter. Reportedly a homeless man
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begged for the girl’s life. The student said the police responded to the homeless man by saying, “no begging”.17
Trauma
A female teacher reported that she fears the police and see them as a danger to herself and her family.
She lives in a neighborhood where police raids occur and when she began to describe one of those raids, she became visibly upset, shaking, tearful and emotional.
She described that sometimes when she is sitting on her porch with her children, black jeeps pull up and people get out carrying long guns and wearing long black coats. She says that she knows they are the police because their shields are visible, but that they cross silently through her yard without saying anything to her and her children. She says they pass through her gate to get to a target location that is behind her house. She said it feels like something out of a movie. She said these raids take place near Chadwick and Clinton Avenues and have caused her and her family to abandon sitting on the porch. She asked why are “death penalty weapons” being used for non-death penalty offenses?
Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
The suggestions from this session came from both youth and teachers. They included:
Not allowing police officers to carry guns—arming them only with tasers.
Officers should stop just sitting around in police cars.
The national videos should be used as “reflections” for the NPD officers.
There should be Know Your Rights (KYR) sessions that involve police officers and the community, though one student commented that officers cannot be trusted with the curriculum for the KYR sessions and that the police may not be knowledgeable enough to teach the sessions.
17 Understood to mean that the officer was trying to make a joke related to panhandling. 17

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It was suggested that the KYR sessions be held in the schools as a mandatory part of the school curriculum, and that the police and/or other instructors be required to come to the school to teach them.
It was suggested that the sessions be recorded and that guidelines for the course should be based on the location. This suggestion was pin pointed as potentially successful or unsuccessful depending on the “color” of the person’s skin who delivers the curriculum.
It was recommended that officers should be required to have college credits.
Students reported that they would be more comfortable with officers if they “used their words on a higher level.” This included the suggestion that officers ask: “How are you doing?”; “How’s your Day?”; or, “What’s going on?”; rather than asking, “Where are you coming from or going to”.
Students demanded that police encounters be handled by officers who are the same gender as the civilians involved.
Some students pushed back against the idea that there should be any increase in contact with police. They wanted the police to stop being suspicious of young people and to bring the Mayor and politicians into the process of developing, implementing and evaluating projects for positive youth development.
Students felt that police officers should endure similar penalties as civilians when they act outside the law.
Youth thought that it is important for White officers to really get to know the people in Newark’s different neighborhoods.
Youth thought that a residency requirement might help bridge the gap.
c. LGBTQI Youth: July 12, 2018 and August 9, 2018
Two listening sessions were held with LGBTQ youth. The sessions took place on July 12, 2018, for one hour, and on August 9, 2018 for approximately one hour and forty-five minutes.
All of the participants were youth of color.
All of the youth said that they had no knowledge of the consent decree.
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July 12 Session
There were approximately ten youth present at this session, a few of whom floated in and out of the room. They ranged in age from 17 to 20 and reported living in the West, East or North Wards. One youth reported living on Avon Street. Most reported that they are in school, including Essex County College, Marion P. Thomas, People’s Prep, Orange High School and High School for the Arts.
Police Experience
One participant reported that the only contact that s/he/they18 have with the police is when the police come into the neighborhood to interdict drug activity; but, feels like the police do not do a good job. It was reported that all the police do is to tell people on the street to leave the area, but when the police drive off, more people come. According to him/her/them, the police “did nothing” and consequently s/he/they felt that the police did not do their job. When asked what s/he/they thought the police should have done, it was reported that, “I wish the people [who were standing around] had been [at least] questioned.” S/he/they said that the people in the neighborhood don’t listen to the police.
Other comments from the group included:
 “Police get hooked up on their power.”  They turn on their sirens to run through red lights.  They are “terrible” and over-weight.  “Cops have really bad attitudes.”  When fights occur the police do not intervene to stop them
(reported more than once).  “Cops are bored and give tickets to have something to do.”  Officers take more than forty-five minutes to respond to shootings.
One participant complained that when a homeless woman was screaming and blocking the door to a store, the police did not intervene at all. When s/he/they was asked what the police should have done, s/he/they said the police should have removed her from the area.
One participant reported that s/he/they were pulled over “for no reason” but was told by the police that the stop was for not giving the right of way to a pedestrian.
18 The preferred personal pronouns of members of the group varied. 19

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The participant stated that there was no pedestrian in the area where the stop occurred. S/he/they said that the (female) police officer whispered to her partner that the participant (driver) “had an attitude”. S/he/they were given a ticket.
The same participant reported an incident that happened during the Caribbean Festival. According to the participant, during the incident a police officer asked a friend’s mom if she was “stupid”. The officer was reportedly disrespectful to the mom because she didn’t understand directions that the police were giving about traffic flow. It was reported that the female officer gave the friend’s mom a $200 ticket.
There was a report of a 2015 fight/riot at Barringer High School where the police arrived and “maced everyone.” None of the participants thought that that was an appropriate police response.
One participant reported that when s/he/they see police at night s/he/they “feel safer.” Another reported that s/he/they don’t have any problems with the police.
When asked if any of them had had personal encounters with the police that were related to their identity as a LGBTQI person, all of them responded no. But one person reported that a Black transgender friend (a trans woman) was stopped by the police and asked if she was a boy or girl. Reportedly, the male cop then felt her breast, gave no explanation for the stop, then let her go.
A lesbian participant reported that when she called the police to report an “incident” in which she was the victim, they would not accept her complaint. She said the police were “no f---ing help”. She did not expressly attribute this lack of assistance to her identity as a lesbian.
There were some complaints about the number of police cars that are outside of gay clubs when patrons come out at night.
None of the group reported being solicited for sexual favors by police but had heard from friends that this sometimes happens. Their sense was that trans people are most likely to have this experience or people who “look sis”—those who wear both men’s and women’s clothes. One participant reported believing that “things are worse for males than females”.
One participant whose gender identity is ambiguous by physical appearance reported that s/he/they have had problematic encounters with the NPD on the border of Newark and East Orange. S/he/they reported an incident of being
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stopped while walking with a friend and being told that they fit the description of robbery suspects. S/he/they felt that they had been singled-out out by the police. They were searched. Reportedly, $70 was taken from them by the police, and then they were released. This incident is reported to have taken place in January 2018. S/he/they also reported that in June 2018, a fight took place in a park, the police arrived, and began physically abusing everyone present. As reported, in particular, a LGBTQI female who was walking away from the fight was thrown onto concrete, by the police, and suffered a concussion.19
Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
Both the youth and the staffers contributed to the following list of suggestions:
 “Be more supportive of the community.”  “Be more kind—respond to requests for help.”  Don’t be so aggressive/coercive when dealing with the public. “We
want to be protected.”
The group expressed the thought that the police need to be retrained to deal with “everyone” and need to be more “open-minded”. The sense was that some police are in denial about LGBTQI identity and LGBTQI rights.
One idea was that it should be mandatory for members of the NPD to attend the LGBTQ Day party during PRIDE week. It was reported that one Black male officer regularly attends the event as part of an initiative to “get out from behind the desk” and attend “all community events.”
It was suggested that there should be special training for officers to confront “toxic masculinity”. When asked how toxic masculinity can be recognized in the policing context, members of the group listed: Police making jokes, shrugs and other body language during encounters with LGBTQI youth, referring to LGBTQI people as if they are objects, rather than people, placing LGTBQI youth under hyper-surveillance or ignoring them when they request assistance.
19Staff at the organization where this listening session was held complained that when something happens at their office and they call the police, the police almost never come. They said that they believe that the police are afraid of encounters that involve LGBTQI people. They report that they have waited as long as three hours for the police to respond to a call about a disturbance at their location and that when they have complained about the slow response time, there have been no results. The failure of the police to respond is particularly disturbing for the staff because the office is located in the downtown area where they know police are always present.
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It was also suggested that officers have to be trained to control their emotions; that there have to be mechanisms in place to deal with their own trauma (past and present); and, that they (the officers) not be forced to keep secrets about their own gender identity or sexual orientation.
One staffer offered that, officers should be provided with LGBTQI Training 101 that would include how to interact legally, effectively and respectfully with LGBTQI youth in multiple settings including: schools, youth court, crisis situations, those in the care of family and children’s services (formerly DYFS), social service agencies and mental health facilities.
August 9 Session
There were nine participants present during this session. The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 28. They reported living in South and East Wards, Ivy Hill and in Downtown Newark. The session lasted for approximately an hour and thirty minutes.
Three members of the group were transgender women, one was non-binary20, the remainder were gay males of color.
During this session, I was provided with a fourteen page glossary of gay terms, slang and definitions that might be useful to the NPD if the department doesn’t already have it.21
Police Experience
When asked about their experience with the NPD, one participant responded that he “tries to avoid them at all cost”, but especially when he is walking around with his boyfriend.
He stated that he was “harassed” by the police when he was younger. When asked to explain what he meant, he specifically noted being called a “faggot” on numerous occasions by the police. He said that now he asks police officers for their name and badge number when they speak to him in a derogatory way.
20Meaning that the individual does not ascribe to one gender identity. 21It is not included here as an attachment because of its length and because I have not secured permission from the organization to share it.
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One member of the group said that he has never had a bad experience with the police, but reported that he has witnessed LGBTQI persons be mistreated by police and has heard stories of such mistreatment. He specifically pointed out police using the word “faggot” to refer to gay males.
He also reported a situation where a friend’s lesbian mother was “called a name” by a police officer and when the friend objected verbally to the officer’s behavior, the officer put the young man in handcuffs but subsequently released him.
One participant reported being stopped by police because, according to the officer, there was a report of two males engaged in public lewdness behind a building. The officer said the participant and the person he was with “fit the description”. The participant said he was not involved and after some additional questions the officer released him with the admonishment to “stay safe”.
Several members of this group repeated a concern raised in other sessions—the belief that NPD officers profile based on hair style—specifically, dreadlocks. One participant said that when he wore “locks” he got stopped “all the time”, but once he cut them he was no longer stopped and stared at by the police. When he was asked why he thought wearing dreadlocks attracted police attention, he reported that he thinks police see youth who wear dreadlocks as potential gang members, troublemakers and as violent people.
Various members of the group reported the following as problems they see with the police experience in Newark:
 Police being overly aggressive toward youth  Police using the term faggot and the N word  Police degrading the character of trans women
One openly gay male specifically pointed out that on more than one occasion an officer has made comments like, “Is this how your mother and father raised you, to be a little faggot?” He went on to state that “not all police officers are like that, but some think that they are ‘king of the city’”.
There was a general sense that the LGBTQI community is “bullied” by members of the police department.
When asked what percentage of NPD officers they believed to be bad/disrespectful, responses included: 100%, 80%, 20% and 15%.
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One trans woman said she doesn’t have trouble with the police because she can “pass” (police cannot readily discern that her birth identity was male). But, she stated, if a person is visibly trans, the police assume that this person is engaged in prostitution, is looking for drugs or is participating in some other form of criminal activity. She said that police often intentionally engage in misgendering trans people; for example, using male pronouns and male names to refer to trans women even when their identification has been updated to reflect their current gender identity.
For trans women, in particular, it was stated that “they don’t like to call the police because the police get physical with the victim”. This includes physical touching, reportedly in the attempt to determine the victim’s “real” gender identity.
One trans woman reported that she had at least one incident where she feels the police “jumped out at” her, thinking she was a potential criminal, when all she was doing was walking down the street.
Another trans women reported that she did not feel safe going to the police for protection from social media attacks she was experiencing. Another reported being told by a police officer that she “is a man and will never be a woman.”
It was also reported that when trans women turn down police officers’ requests for sexual favors, the officers “put charges on” them; and, that some officers go to the known gay areas of the City and bash gay men. The term “badge and bash” was used but there wasn’t an opportunity to gather more details about it.
One participant reported that when standing outside in downtown Newark, one “real fat cop” would “hop out” at members of the trans community and make them move along. It was reported that the officer referred to them as “hoes” when directing them to move along.
The non-binary member of the group stated that they believe that the police are frustrated and angry when they cannot easily figure out which gender to ascribe to a person. This, said the participant, “complicates the police role in the world.” They noted that the police have a false sense of power and a false sense of the police role. One of the trans women indicated that she believes she is arrested for who she is rather than what she has done. She believes she is “put through more hoops” to resolve her cases, despite the fact that she gets a White lawyer and “dresses up nice”.
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One gay male said he did not have any problems with the police because “I do be wrong” when the police make contact with him. He went on to report that the police yell out at him over the bullhorn, saying his name and asking if he has been staying out of trouble. He is accepting of this behavior by the police.
Another gay male said that when the police see him in his “belly shirt” they call him by a nickname that he stopped using some time ago. He said that the officers sometimes ask him if he is “staying safe”. He also said that he feels that the police always assume that he is involved in fights and crime and that he avoids the police in order to avoid suspicion.
One of the trans women then commented that she does not feel that her gender self-expression makes her suspicious, insinuating that the police should not hold a belief that it does.
Two of the participants said that they do not experience problems with the police.
All participants reported that lesbian women who present as masculine are treated more aggressively by the police—stating that when couples fight, the feminine one is not treated aggressively, even when she is the aggressor. They also reported the more masculine partner is usually the one to be arrested, even when not the aggressor.
There was some disagreement over which officers are more likely to be aggressive with the LGBTQI community. One sense was that the “older seasoned” officers are less aggressive. One trans woman said that she finds the older cops to be more problematic. She reported that the “older cops” seem like they are “tired of seeing this” (openly LGBTQI persons in the community). Other participants agreed that they find younger officers to be more accepting. By contrast, some participants said they are having more “trouble” with younger officers, both personally and through witnessing their behavior with others. A participant stated that s/he/they believe that the officers with one to five years on the job are more likely to be aggressive with the LGBTQI community to impress the older officers.
A participant also stated that “Cops disrespect the LGBTQI community because they (members of the LGBTQI community) disrespect each other.”
Complaints were made about the amount of time that it takes for the police to respond to reported incidents of gay bashing and when there is an incident
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where both the victim and perpetrator are from the LGBTQI community. There was some disagreement as to whether this is a consistent problem.
A question was raised as to whether or not the police are using social media to spy on, and subsequently arrest LGBTQI people.
A preference not to call the police was reported by more than one participant. One participant indicated that this is due, in part, to not liking the way the police speak to members of the LGBTQI community. It was also reported that there are serious “trust issues” between the LGBTQI community and the police.
One participant specifically stated that if you are “Black and gay you have a reason to be paranoid” about potential police contact. One of his complaints was about being handcuffed too tightly during such encounters and the police ignoring his complaints about the discomfort.
Detention
There was considerable conversation about what happens when the police take a LGBTQI person into custody. A major concern expressed was the misgendering of trans women. It was reported that trans women are “put on the male side” of holding even when their ID reads: female. It was reported that gay men are put in with straight men and only rarely is that not the case.
One trans woman reported that a jail attendant touched her in order to determine whether she should be in a cell with males or females. And that she was asked: “Did you get your bottom surgery yet”.
It was reported that a trans woman who was transitioning was placed in a holding cell with men.
One of the trans woman reported that when she was taken into custody in a jurisdiction outside of Newark, “based on how I was dressed”, she was asked what she would be most comfortable with—being placed with men, with women or in isolation. She indicated that Newark does not ask this.
She specifically pointed out that when she was taken into custody two or three years ago, NPD “would take you to Green Street and isolate you all the way in the back and forget about you.”
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Frustration was expressed for the lack of change in how police treated the LGBTQI community in the past and how they currently treat them.
Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
Members of this group offered a broad range of suggestions for improving police engagement with the LGBTQI community. They suggested that, before NPD hires officers, they should conduct more in-depth screening regarding the potential officer’s background—specifically addressing whether s/he was a bully or was bullied or suffered trauma earlier in life.
It was also suggested that officers should undergo trauma-informed training to better understand the trauma LGBTQI youth experience—the anxiety of keeping their sexual orientation or gender identity a secret; the trauma of “coming out”; the reaction of family members, which sometimes includes being put out of the residence, resulting in homelessness and prostitution. Stigma and implicit bias training for officers was also suggested.
This group stated that the NPD needs to put an end to “quota-driven” policing. There was a sense that there is more police activity in the neighborhoods towards the end of the month in order to meet expected quotas for police activity and that the LGBTQI community is targeted as a means to meet these quotas.
They noted that, LGBTQI persons should be greeted by police without the use of the term “faggot” and, for trans women, without a revelation to the general public that, “you know that’s a man”; or, the question, “Are you a real woman?”
They suggested that police training should include officers having to sit in a room and listen to the LGBTQI community talk about their experience in the community in general, especially their safety concerns, and about their experiences with the police.
The use of openly LGBTQI officers to deliver the LGBTQI training to officers, was recommended; and the avoidance of discriminating between LGBTQI groups within the community—that is, treating some more favorably and others less favorably. This group also suggested that the NPD should:
 Recognize discrimination against this population when it is occurring.
 “Unpack” the term trans-gender for officers more and distinguish their concerns from those of gay men. 27

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 Improve relations with the LGBTQI community by addressing the LGBTQI status of members of the department.
This group also supports a residency requirement for officers.
It was suggested that as part of the LGBTQI training offered to officers, the trainer should pose the question: “If your child was LGBTQ and was apprehended, how would you want them handled/[treated]?”
It was also suggested that LGBTQI persons should be invited to be present at the LGBTQI training sessions and that the training should be held “at a center like this one.”
NJISJ Youth Council: August 9, 2018
There were six youth present for this session. They ranged in age from 16 to 25. They resided in the North, West and South Wards and Jersey City. This session lasted just over two hours.
This session opened with the youth asking questions about the recent policy that the NPD should aggressively enforce the curfew ordinance during the Summer.22 See Attachment D. It is unclear whether the Mayor’s Office or NPD has formally responded to the concerns they raised.
Police Experience
This group of young people was extremely articulate and clear about their police experiences and suggestions for improvements. Some members admitted to having had enforcement related contact with the police when they were younger. Those encounters included fighting incidents and drug investigations. The bulk of the experience reported by members of this group centered around false accusations, aggressive treatment, unwarranted profiling and unsatisfactory communication.
The session began with one young woman reporting that once, when she was at her brother’s house, several police cars came and she was thrown against the wall for no specific charge. She felt that the police were “acting on impulse”. They did not give her any details of why they were there and did not ask her any
22 https://www.newarknj.gov/news/mayor-baraka-announces-summer-2018-juvenile-curfew-initiativecurfew
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questions before approaching her in such an aggressive manner. She said the experience left her feeling on-edge for the rest of the Summer.
She also reported that she has several friends who are incarcerated, including one friend who is incarcerated for a murder that he did not commit. She said that she feels that the NPD are doing a shoddy job of investigating the case, and that witnesses are not being interviewed. She also reported that one of her friends was falsely accused of robbery; and, that she lost a loved one to gun violence, but she does not feel as though the police took the investigation into his death seriously.
In her opinion, dark-skinned youth with dreadlocks and tattoos are all viewed by police as “typical criminals” who lack access to private attorneys. A male member of the group described himself as “traumatized” by his police contact. He denied that he has had any positive interactions with police; and, believes that any communication with police now is “just going to be bad”.
A complaint was made that in some neighborhoods the police “just stand or walk around without speaking to residents, only talking to each other.” According to the group, this failure to communicate with residents was attributed to the fact that police are “disconnected” from the community, as evidenced by their inability to accurately respond when asked for directions and a sense of being “uptight” while patrolling in residential areas.
There was a complaint that officers sometime act out emotionally and are impulsive instead of following the law. One youth recounted an incident where she and a male cousin were “harassed” by an officer who she described as “a dark Hispanic”. She said the officer cornered them and accused them of having a stolen bike. She reported that during the incident, the officer “crashed” the bike with the patrol car, then handcuffed and arrested the cousin. She said that her mother sued the department over the incident and that the department countersued. She did not know the final outcome of the suits.
Members of this group thought that the police “need to know the law better” in order to do their job “correctly”. When asked what they see as the ‘job” of the police, the response was: “to protect the citizens and enforce the law” and “to help keep violence down”. They cited police becoming more aggressive than necessary, racial profiling/stereotyping, and “not ‘giving’ someone their rights before arresting them,” as examples of “incorrect” policing. There was also a sense that written NPD policies were not being practiced on the street.
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Members of the group indicated that they see a difference in how NPD patrols downtown Newark in comparison to some residential neighborhoods. Specifically, it was noted that, “in the downtown district, the cops behave nicely.” One participant noted that “[t]hey tell the dudes not to ‘holler at’ the young ladies”—though the officers themselves sometimes try to impress women by turning on their sirens. Someone in the group expressed the feeling that: “Police really stopped caring about the people deep in Newark”; but, that this is not true of downtown Newark. It was reported that gentrification is making it harder for people of color (POCs) and low-income people to find a place to live; and that NPD needs to be mindful of this when making policy and strategic decisions.
There was a consistent feeling that it is important for the police to be “from the area.” One participant was really annoyed that when she asked for help with directions, the officer’s response was, “I don’t know”. The general sense was that, with few exceptions, NPD members are not familiar with the people or geographic areas where they patrol, and that this is something that needs to change. This group felt that it is important for members of the department to be able to demonstrate that they (the police) are comfortable policing in Newark, and particularly, that they be familiar with the geographic layout of the ward where they are assigned.
The majority of this group expressed a desire for more familiarity with the NPD and more opportunities for open communication with members of the department.
There was also acknowledgement of positive interactions with NPD. Female members of the group reported that police officers sometimes held doors open for them. And, residents from more crime-challenged communities acknowledged that police presence has reduced violence.
Participants mentioned NPD blocking off streets in the South Ward, with no one allowed in or out without proof of residency there; and, that on Bergen St, “before and after the bridge”, the neighborhood “has become a lot more quiet.” It was also noted that the Central Ward is “changing drastically”. (There was not enough time to explore this statement in more detail). Use of these violence reduction strategies was not free of complaints. It was reported that there was “no communication with the residents” while police were in the community; people were inconvenienced by the police barricades; police were “reckless”— had a shoot-out with drug dealers on Avon Avenue; and, that the police got “lazy”
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and didn’t want to engage with the public. It was specifically reported that on one occasion, the police were sitting in the patrol car in front of the barricade on “Osborne near Beth Israel” and a person with a gun crossed in front of the officers, and the officers kept talking to each other without questioning the person with the gun.
Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
There was a consensus among the group that NPD members must take an individualized approach to interacting with youth and improve their communication with youth and the general public.
Comments related to communication included statements that:
 Youth should be able to have simple conversations with police.  Police in the South and West Wards should say “Hello”.  Police should speak to young people. Ask, “How are you” instead
of “Where are you going”?  NPD mandate that police speak to the community cordially as soon
as they make contact
Consistent with comments made by participants in other sessions, these participants noted that dreadlocks should not cause police to form negative assumptions about youth.
Their suggestions for “fun” activities to improve youth engagement included:
 The police should host the Block Party in each ward. The party should be for all ages. They should occur monthly or bi-monthly.
 Police should come to the block parties and play basketball and/or other sports with the youth.
Beyond engaging in “fun” activities, the youth in this group were willing to lead training sessions to orient the police to the geographic layout and needs of residents in the wards where they live. A male participant indicated that he would like to see “assigned” rather than “rotating” patrol assignments. There was a general consensus that policing strategies and interactions should be tailored to the needs and circumstances of individual neighborhoods.
There was a call for more female and minority officers. A member of the group noted that, “I don’t feel safe around the police,” but also stated that, s/he feels
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safer when dealing with officers of color. Members of the group reported that they believe female officers will be more empathetic, and that having more of them on the NPD would be better for girls who become involved with criminal behavior. They also noted that they believe female officers are better for handling homeless women and children.
It was suggested that, rather than focusing primarily on what is wrong within a neighborhood, the NPD needs to engage in “asset mapping” and refer youth and families to resources to address their needs. Mental health issues were pointed to as a major contributor to violence, along with a lack of resources for residents to solve problems in a noncriminal way. It was suggested that there needs to be a mechanism for NPD to directly refer residents to needed services without “putting them through the system first”.
The group listed a number of community-based organizations with whom the police should partner, but, also noted that more are needed. They felt that police need to know where they can send young people for help instead of arresting them. They called for the police to have a “direct link” to these organizations. They also suggested that the NPD should constantly be assessing and reassessing: “Who are we arresting?” and “What are we arresting them for?”
It was felt that police need to be connected to more African American therapists who can counsel youth of color, and, that police need to become “credible messengers” to youth. It was noted that some members of the NPD already act in this capacity by sharing their stories of “coming from the streets.” They suggested that this needs to happen more.
This group felt strongly that in order to develop meaningful strategies for positive youth engagement, youth “need to have a seat at the table” when ideas are being discussed. A youth-only or youth-led community forum or series of forums, with NPD members of all ranks in the audience, was suggested as a means to give youth a platform for informing the NPD of their ideas and concerns.
d. Alternative School Students: August 10, 2018
There were six youth present for this session. They ranged in age from 18 to 21. They reported currently residing in the South and Central Wards. One reported having resided in Irvington previously.
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Both males and females were represented in this session. The session was cofacilitated by two staff members. This session lasted for an hour and forty-five minutes.
Police Experience
The youth in this group reported much more contact with the police than did youth in earlier sessions; but, several of their experiences with police and suggestions for youth engagement are similar. There were two dominant voices among the group. There was some concern among this group about police retaliation; consequently, the most verbal participants are referred to by pseudonyms.
The first person to speak during this session denied that he has ever been the victim of crime and emphatically stated that he is “not afraid of no cop.” He reported having many encounters with NPD. I have given him the pseudonym Monty. The sole female member of the group joined the session late but was very measured and articulate about her concerns and suggestions. If there is a youth-led community forum, she should be invited to be one of the youth leaders. I have given her the pseudonym Pearl.
Monty recounted an incident where he was “by the corner store” and was told by the police that “you can’t stand in front of this store.” Monty said he then moved to the front porch of his house and was told by the same police officer that he could not sit on the porch. He said the officer then asked him for identification but he refused to produce any. He said the officer “left angry but without the ID.” He stated that the officer was alone in his patrol car and was just probably “looking for ‘something’ to do in the morning.”
He went on to report the about “40 cops” patrol the area where he lives and “just sit in their cars and just stare at us.”
He then went on to describe an incident allegedly involving the light rail, by first stating that, “Everyone hops on the light rail for free.” Monty reported that during the incident he and some friends where “hanging out” in a place they call “the frat house” when police entered pointing guns at them and saying they had followed the group from the light rail. Monty reports that he was taken to the police station where he was handcuffed to a chair and the younger members of the group were placed in holding cells. Presumably the charge was fare evasion.
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In one of his police encounters, Monty noted that the court date kept being changed and eventually a warrant was issued. He says the he was able to get the case dismissed. For this incident, he said the New Jersey Institute of Technology police were involved but he was not sure whether the NPD was also involved. He reported that once when there was an open warrant for him, the NPD kicked in the doors at his cousin’s house and his grandmother’s house looking for him, before he went and turned himself in.
Another male member of the group said he was approached by police while standing in front of his job smoking a cigarette. The officer reported that someone had beat up a security guard. The officer then asked how long the participant had been outside. The manager verified that the youth had been inside working. When the officer was asked why he was there alone, he reportedly said, “have a nice day.”
Monty believes that the police engage in ‘appearance profiling’23—noting that when he wears a tie the police treat him differently than when he wears a teeshirt and jeans. He reported that “the cops don’t go by the rules”; and, that “cops need a training course on emotions”. He went on to note that “cops shouldn’t be allowed to bring their trauma to work… [because] other workers can’t”. It was also felt that “officers abuse their power against young teens—expecting them to escalate the situation.”
Pearl reported a situation where she and others she was with were told by an officer that “y’all gotta move” and when she asked “why” the officer then said “you think that you are tough” and began asking her about her tattoos. When she indicated to the officer that her tattoos were irrelevant to the situation and “none of [the officer’s] business,” the officer said, “I could arrest you now for the things that you are saying.” (It is noted that Pearl wears her hair cut very short and on the day of the listening session she was wearing clothing that would be described as masculine).
Pearl asked a question about de-escalation training, noting that she was maced by police during a large fight outside a school. She stated that the incident happened about a year or two ago and that the police stood on top of cars and indiscriminately sprayed mace over the crowd. She said that when she was
23A term I coined to encompass police targeting based on a combination of factors including race/ethnicity, style of dress (including colors), style of hair, gender presentation and other visible characteristics.
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maced, she felt like she was “on fire” and that she was not involved in the fight. In other police experiences, she recalls being made to repay for a bus ride. The driver accused her of not paying and called the police. When the police came onto the bus, she paid the fare again. She did report an experience with the police that she saw as positive. She was told to go sit in the police car but was also told that she was not under arrest. She was taken out of school because she was “attending school illegally.” She was enrolled in a Newark school while a resident of Irvington. But, she was never formally charged, arrested or processed.
Her general impression of the NPD is that they are bored sometimes and that they expect to get back the same kind of energy that they give out; but, she says she tries not to let them bait her into aggressive behavior. She pointed out something she sees as gender-biased behavior. Once, she observed two girls fighting in the street while nearby police officers did nothing to stop the fight. She reported believing that the police inaction was gender related. She felt that the police would have behaved differently if the fighters were male. She expressed the belief that when females are involved, police “let a lot of stuff go.” Monty noted that he thinks that “the police treat better looking people better.” He also pointed out that he believes a lot of police response is “based on looks”— stereotyping and profiling people as “gangsters” based on their appearance.
Like others, members of this group asked “why do the cops take so long to show up” when they are called? Someone reported that officers took twenty minutes to respond to a call about an injured person and that the ambulance took an additional thirty minutes to arrive. Another member of the group reported that when his brother was shot, “the police took thirty minutes to come.” There was a sense that “the police respond to what they want to respond to.”
As more members of the group joined in the discussion, a contradictory image of the NPD began to emerge. One participant stated that, “things are not really that bad with the NPD”. “They don’t kill us.” While another said, “They [are] constantly harassing us and making us move.” A participant complained that he “got strip searched” down to his underwear while he was outside; and, that on another occasion he was told to “get against the wall” and “strip”. He asked, “Why do they touch my private parts?” He also expressed that he was seriously offended by officers’ pulling up his private area.
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Monty complained that “they never give you a ride home” and when you ask for a ride, “the cops say sorry we can’t give rides.” “But, they give rides to ‘snitches’.” He stated that undercover police ride around in “taxi” mode; use their sirens when there is no emergency; and, put on their sirens to go through red lights. Another member of the group said he was given a ride from a police officer when he needed one, adding that he is not a snitch.
Another participant stated that “cops are not your friends”, especially when “they need to meet their numbers [quotas].” Issuing tickets for “tinted windows” was one way the participants thought police “get their numbers.” Participants saw “being stopped for tinted windows” as unfair, noting that, “It’s not fair that [people] get tickets for tints when the windows are down—you can see everyone in the car.” This discussion about tickets for tinted windows and its perceived unfairness coincided with one participant’s claims that, “I hate cops.”
Monty reported that in his experience, officers will not call a supervisor when asked to do so. And, that officers get mad “when you know your rights”. He stated that when he attempts to assert his rights, officers tell him, “oh, you think you are smart”. He also expressed his frustration with being the subject of false statements and false accusations by the police. Others in the group nodded their heads in agreement. Monty stated that once, in response to a false accusation by police, he told the officer, “Yes I steal, but I am not stealing today.”
Like other groups, the participants in this group felt that the NPD needs to be more respectful during encounters. Their primary complaints were that, “they yell; “they get in your face”; and, they don’t “respect my space”. There was a sense that police try to over control the lives of youth, rather than simply enforce the law. Monty noted that the police need to understand that they are “not here to control people” when there is no criminal conduct. He felt that it was important for the police to understand that, “I am not an animal”.
It seems particularly important that the NPD develops successful strategies for engaging positively with this youth population as evidenced by the following list of negative sentiments expressed by a small segment of the group:
 “Police aren’t getting paid to do much”  “Police are never leaving my area”  “We might as well just get rid of the cops”  “They [NPD] think of themselves as a gang”  “Ban guns [for cops]”
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 “Police are making stuff worse”  “The streets are not that quiet”  “Drug dealers are trying to encourage the youth.”  “NPD are bullies. They have to be shown that we are not scared”  “They [NPD] are going to get the message once they get shot at”  “No more peaceful marches”
Monty was among those who expressed some of these sentiments stating that he is starting to think that reforms are not possible without “riots”, “looting” and “burn downs”. He stated, “I be feeling a certain type of way.” He says he wants mutual respect during police encounters but finds himself having to say to some officers, “You talking to me crazy—you must be drunk.”
Like members of other groups, these youth report intentionally avoiding contact with the police. They report that they run from the police to keep from being arrested or assaulted or being told what to do. They reported feeling that the police abuse their authority. Consequently, one reported specifically that, “I go the opposite direction of where they go”—noting that even “some [officers who were] from the hood [and] were okay, become bad.” Monty noted that police try to make thinking of themselves as a gang is “okay”, since they say that they are helping the community. He notes that drug dealers are also helping the community by providing water, food, clothing and encouragement, while the police only make arrests. He thinks that it is important for the police to recognize that, “Some people in the street are just trying to survive.”
This was the second group to note that some members of the NPD are overweight. Monty stated that, “Police are too big to be cops.” “Why are we paying them if they are not physically fit.” He made specific reference to how this contributes to foot chases and youthful criminal actors “not getting caught.”
Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
Suggestions from this group began with:
 “Hire people from the neighborhood to be the police”  “Have more cops who can relate to [our] story”
This group also developed a list of Dos and Don’ts to be shared with NPD:
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DO
 Ask my name  Treat me like a person not an object  Be professional – not emotional  Care about the job – don’t just do ‘random stuff’  Recognize that there are certain things you cannot do when you are at
work  Be mindful of ‘the way you speak’  Listen to youth and try putting yourself in our shoes
DON’T
 “Flip the bird” at civilians  Act like we don’t know our rights  Get mad when we know our rights  Act like you are better than me  Talk to me like you are my parent  Ask me about ‘my business’  Call me names  Yell at me  Point at me
The youth in this session noted that there must be consequences for unprofessional police behavior, more training on self-respect, and “extreme mental toughness training.” When this group suggested that a training course was needed on “emotions”, a staff person indicated that he has observed some existing training that is directed at trauma among both police and civilians. It was not clear whether there is a particular focus on youth interactions within that training.
A simple but compelling suggestion from this group is that members of the NPD “need bigger name tags”. Monty noted that “If you ask a police officer their name, the police ‘catch an attitude’” and say “Oh, read it”. He finds the name tags difficult to read, at their current size, without getting really close to the officer(s)—closer than he is comfortable with.
He also said that he is “getting tired of playing basketball” as a youth engagement strategy. He says the department needs to recognize that this is
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“not enough to do”. Monty suggested taking away badges and uniforms, as a means to reduce the gang-like thinking and behavior of police. When questioned further about this suggestion, Monty clarified that, if there is a real desire to improve the relationship between NPD and youth, it is important for police to appear less intimidating to young people. He added that it would be better to have police wear their street clothes during positive youth engagement programs instead of their uniforms.
All Stars Project of New Jersey: August 18, 2018
Sixteen youth participated in two listening sessions at this site. Although the listening sessions took place at the All Stars of New Jersey headquarters, the sessions were not affiliated with Operation Conversation: Cops and Kids. None of the teens who participated in the listening sessions were verified as ever having participated in a Cops and Kids workshop.
Session 1
The three students present for this session were unsure of the ward(s) where they live but gave the following descriptions: South Vailsburg, Upper Vailsburg/Ivy Hill and Roseville Street near Branch Brook. All of them were 17 years old. There were two males and one female. One male was Latino.24 One male was African American. The female was African American and AfroCaribbean. The session lasted for 80 minutes.
Police Experience
The participants in this group reported little direct contact with the police.
The discussion was somewhat dominated by the Latino male, who I have given the pseudonym Luis. Luis says he does not see police patrolling the area where he lives much. He identified the area as being within the 6th precinct.
The young woman, who I have given the pseudonym Mary, said that she saw the police in her grandfather’s business—a candy store—last summer (2017). She says they were asking questions about whether there had been any “trouble” in the area. She had not seen the police around the store again until recently. She says there were more patrols around the store, at the time of the interview,
24He comes from a Spanish-speaking background but is not from the Caribbean or Central or South America. In some official statistics he would be designated “White-Hispanic”.
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because more people were “hanging out” across from the store. She said it was a mixed age group and that the police told the people they “have to move on”.
Mary went on to report that there are police on the corners and on school property during the school year. She has seen young people get arrested for fighting. She identified the high schools that she is familiar with as, Donald Payne School of Technology (formerly 18th Street); University High School (where she says there is no police presence); and East Orange High School. There was a conversation amongst the group where they concluded that there is either a NPD or Sheriff’s Office outpost next to the Donald Payne School; and, that when it was the 18th Street High School, there were police inside and metal detectors. They said they believe that metal detectors are used inside University High School, and, that there are maybe 15 police officers inside the East Orange High School.
Mary reported that her younger relatives (12-year-old brother and cousins ages 4-10) speak with the police regularly. The police ask how they are doing and answer their questions. She says her ten-year-old cousin wants to become a police officer. She acknowledged that “a good majority” of her friends avoid the police. But, she seemed to have fond memories when she reported that the police would let her sit in the patrol car when she was a small child.
Luis reported that when he was in the 6th grade, he was detained by the police for a petty theft. He says they were going to get arrested for stealing but the principal of his school spoke to the police and he and his friend were let go. He admitted that he and his friend were stealing at the time.
One of the males in the session reported that he has been in several fights but has not been arrested. He says when the police arrive, he “drops stuff” and “walks away”. He has not been detained or arrested—noting that, “when police arrive, everyone runs.”
One of the male participants also reported that he usually “stays home”, but once, went to a party in another part of Newark where one person was arrested. He said that during the arrest, the police yelled, but “weren’t too aggressive.”
Luis reported that a friend got a ride from the police once—last summer (2017) around 11pm or midnight. He reported feeling like the police should “be giving kids a ride”. He said, especially if they ask where home is, then officers should offer the youth a ride. “It’s nice.”
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Luis was aware of the curfew enforcement for the Summer of 2018. He said he saw it on social media. He said he was not concerned about being stopped because he is older looking now and lives near Seton Hall University.
The African American male, who I have given the pseudonym, Jonathan, thought that the curfew enforcement was a good idea because it would “stop people from being out on the street”. He thought it would work well if the officers “ask you questions” and “have flexibility” instead of being strictly focused on enforcement. He noted that if the youth was outside because of school or work, the officer should not enforce the ordinance; but would be justified in enforcing the ordinance if the youth was outside because of a party. Jonathan gave a very compassionate example of how he would like the police to behave during a curfew stop.
Luis said he would be upset if the officer “did strict enforcement”. He admitted that when asked why he was on the street, he would probably lie. He said he would also ask “why am I being detained?”; and if the officer gets upset, he said he would tell him to relax and control his feelings. He said he does realize that this could make the officer more upset. However, he said teachers have told him, in drivers training, how he should behave when stopped by the police. He said he would “use one of my amendments” then walk away after asking, “am I free to go.”
Mary and Luis said they have been exposed to a Law and Public Safety Program. She says that the teacher “gives the sessions from both perspectives.” When asked to clarify, she said the course is presented from the police perspective and the perspective of different civilians. Mary noted that some students in the class said, “I don’t like the police”. Luis’s critique of the course was that it is too focused on the police perspective instead of the rights of minorities. The following thoughts were reportedly highlighted from the program:
 Show that you are educated  You know your rights  Keep it modest
Jonathan said that he would like to have the talk about what to do when the police stop you. He says he has not had it in any setting. Mary thought that it might be better for the police to teach the course described above, since the police are doing the work. The group did note that the police might not know the
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law; and, mentioned that police should control their emotions. There was a sense that police may be acting more on instinct and emotion. They were hopeful that this could be corrected through training.
There were statements from the group that demonstrate how conflicted these young people are over the role of the police in their community. Their perceptions and beliefs are not necessarily limited to experiences with NPD. They believe that officers may be prejudiced, but one of them thinks that officers of color are not. They expressed a collective belief that NPD officers of color have a “better understanding” of the people of color in the City.
They recognized that police are human beings and that all human beings have emotions, but, see it as inappropriate for the police to act on their emotions while performing their police duties.
They questioned whether members of the NPD know the law, but say, “most police do follow the law”.
Luis said “there is a hierarchy and the police are on the top.” “Since the police have the badge and the gun, the police think they are more powerful than us.” He said that the police are “not service oriented—not even where I live” (a more affluent section of the city). They are “suppose to protect and serve—but most people don’t think or feel [that] they are doing that.” Even though Luis lives in a more affluent section of the city, he says that some people he is around “don’t like the police.” Among the three of them, estimates for what percentage of their peers and relatives don’t like police were: 85%, 20% and 30%. They all were concerned that friends who are angry over police use of excessive force might take their anger out on police. They also expressed the sentiment that: “If we don’t know a police officer well, we’ll assume he is going to shoot us one day.”
Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
Luis felt that one key to better engagement between youth and police is for officers to learn to control their feelings. He also felt that officers need to be trained about micro-aggressions25 and how to avoid engaging in them. He
25Columbia professor Derald Sue uses this term to refer to “brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults toward people of color.” It has also been used in reference to these actions toward other marginalized groups.
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suggested that a better job needs to be done in assessing a potential officer’s EQ (emotional quotient)26 and IQ (intelligence) in advance of the hire.
This groups also provided some policing Dos and Don’ts:
DO
 Be respectful  Stop fights  De-escalate situations  “Keep the community together”  Patrol to make sure everyone is okay  “Try to connect with the people in neighborhoods you patrol”  Answer questions from community members respectfully  “Leave the person alone if they don’t want to talk to police”
DON’T
 “Assume a bunch of kids on the corner is engaged in crime”
This group thought that there should be more extensive training that includes psychology and behavioral science courses to teach officers how to more accurately “read a person.” They thought scenario-based training with youth would be helpful. They noted that field training is particularly important, especially when officers are not from the neighborhoods to which they are assigned. They also supported a residence requirement. They thought that it would help officers exercise better judgement by being around the people they are expected to “serve”. The youth in this session see the job of the police as: to “serve and protect”27— with service being the “backbone”. When asked to elaborate more, they said:
26Emotional quotient refers to the capability of individuals to recognize their own emotions and those of others, discern between different feelings, and label and use those emotions appropriately. 27Rather than to protect and serve.
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“serve” means to interact with the community members and balance being friendly with not being too friendly. In their view, protection involves understanding the needs of the community from all perspectives,28 including remembering how they [the police officers] were when they were younger.
Session 2
There were 13 youth present for this session. They ranged in age from 16 to 19 years old. The group included both males and females and was made up of primarily youth of color. They reported residing in the South, North, Central and West Wards. Two reported residing in East Orange. The session lasted for 85 minutes.
Police Experience
One Black male member of this group reported that he has never had a police experience. Another member of the group suggested that this is because he is a relatively recent immigrant.
A female member of the group began the session by recounting an experience that she had in the Winter of 2017. She reported that she was walking near her home in the South Ward, at about 10pm, with three friends. She said the police pulled up “aggressively” and said “We need to check y’all.” She said the officers patted them down, looked into their bags, then told them to go home. She said that she and her friends were “uncomfortable” with the experience. She asked, “Why can’t we just chill in our own neighborhood?”
This group was so large and there were so many reports of police contact that the incidents are reported here by time period (if given) or location, rather than an individualized identity of the person who reported the incident:
 A female participant reported that one night in July 2017, at about 11pm, she went to get gas for her mother at a station off South Orange Avenue. She was stopped by a patrol car with no [siren] lights and no headlights. Two officers got out of the car and said that they were pulling her over for not “indicating”. She said that she did signal. She said that the officers were not friendly; and, that one had his hand on his gun. She said she had actually pulled over because she had arrived back at home. She said that she felt
28This includes all members of the community not just the ‘good’ kids. 44

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as if the officers were just looking for someone to bother. She felt that the incident could have “gone really right or really wrong.”  Another female participant reported that during the Summer of 2015, she was caught driving with a probationary license after hours but was let go. She acknowledged that the officer had the right to stop her. She says she is anxious when she encounters the police and has seen aggressive interactions with the police “a lot.” She reported that she becomes scared when she sees “cops,” but thinks she should feel safe. Despite having been given a break once, she thinks “most are not friendly”.  Another member of the group reported that the police were looking for a cousin who wears “dreads” but stopped another cousin who wears “dreads” instead. The teen believes that “dreads threatens their [the police] supremacy”. This teen also believes that “police are intimidated by women who have natural hair” and, she noted that the police once put their hands in a friend’s hair.  One female reported that her mother heard gunshots once but thought they were fireworks. She said, “no police noticed.”  The teen who started off the session with her police experience recounted another encounter from 2017. In that encounter, she says she was with her older brother when the police “checked” him. She said the police told him to “pull his pants up”. When she and her brother came out of their house again later, the police stopped them again. She said she believes it is because they think her brother “looks aggressive” because he has tattoos.  Another teen said that she had her first encounter with the police when she was nine years old. She said that the police drew guns on her and were cursing at her. She said they kicked the door down and took a person out naked. She said her mother was yelling but the police “thought it was funny”. She said that the police had an arrest warrant for the person they took out but “tore up the house” in the course of the arrest. She says her mother requested compensation for the damage but was not given any.  Another teen girl reported that three years ago she was fighting in school. When the police arrived, she stopped. The other girls were not from the school; but, the police told her that she was going to be arrested. She said she was held by many officers, but they eventually released her without making an arrest. When she went
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outside, the other girls jumped her. The police had to be called back to the school. They did not arrest the girls who jumped her. She was upset because the police did not protect her. She was injured and had to be taken away in an ambulance. She missed a tournament and was afraid to go back to school. She said the resource officer was a “no show” during the entire incident. She reported that this incident occurred in the North Ward.  A Latina teen reported an incident from Spring 2017. She said that her mother dropped her off at school early and a “sheriff” yelled at her (the mom). He said that he would deport her if he saw her again. The mother was using the father’s driver’s license. She said her mother took her back home. Her father brought her back to the school; and, “then the sheriff didn’t say anything more.”  Another female teen said that when the police were called for a burglary at her house, “the police didn’t seem like they were interested in the investigation.”  Similarly, a female participant said that when the police were called for an altercation between her father and a female neighbor the police laughed because her dad had been injured by the female. Her father said that the neighbor had threatened him with a gun but the police did not take it seriously. The officers asked among themselves “who’s going to write this up?” She says no report was ever written. She felt that the three male officers didn’t take the matter seriously. She lived near Hawthorne and Lyons Avenues, at the time.  One participant reported that the police came to her house a lot because her mother had many domestic disputes. She said that the police kept their guns holstered during the incidents.  Another female participant said that when she was about six, a neighbor called the police on her father for fighting with a neighbor but no one was arrested.  One teen told a somewhat confusing story about an incident that occurred during the winter of 2017 involving a 25-year-old brother and the NPD. The brother ran into the house followed by the police with guns drawn. Someone in the house had let the police in. The brother’s friend ran into the house after him. Allegedly the police had confused the brother with the friend. The police started yelling at the brother, “What do you have? What do you have?” The teen
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reported that the police told the brother that they would let the friend “go easy” if he (the brother) “snitched”. According to the teen, the officer who was talking to them got another call, took the handcuffs off the friend, let him go, and said, “this is your lucky day.”  Another female participant reported that a few months prior to the session, when she was coming from church and was stopped in a car with the blinkers on, the police came up to the vehicle. The officer went to her friend who was driving and asked for “the papers”. The officer said “they were just checking to see if she was okay.” She reported that the papers for the vehicle were fine and she was confused because the police didn’t approach the car until after she got out.  Another participant in this session reported that on one afternoon in July 2018, around 3pm, a guy put a knife to his brother’s neck. He said the NPD “has to have cops down in the light rail stations [because] it’s not safe.”  A teen reported that “a Spanish officer was nice” when there was confusion over whether a group of kids was involved in an incident where it turned out that they were not involved.  A participant reported that the police took a long time to come when the family car was broken into on 17th Avenue; and that, the police laughed and smirked once they arrived. There was no follow-up from the police and the family had to file the report again. The participant reported that the “police seemed to be having a language barrier issue.” (The teen was from the Afro-Caribbean).  One participant said the police just told them to “go inside” when she and friends were outside cursing.
Additional comments from this group included:
 Police show up late to school fights and then tell people to go home or pepper spray everyone.
 Police act more hostile because it’s a violent area.  “The police will be on the corner but there is still a lot of crime going
on in that area”  Response time is based on the location of the incident  “What’s up” with the precinct that covers Columbia and South
Orange Avenue?
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 The West Ward response time is “terrible”  “There was a shooting in the South Ward. The police were in the
area; but, still didn’t immediately respond.”  “The police aren’t doing anything. Even when they see known
criminals”  “The police are afraid”  “The police are not from the area”  “There is not enough focus on the officers’ mental condition”  Officers must control their emotions
One teen reported a positive experience of having an officer provide transportation to the hospital.
Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
This group of teens report so much police contact that there is little wonder that they have provided information for a list of police Dos and Don’ts. Participants in this session believed that members of the NPD need to be from urban areas. Their suggestions for the NPD include:
DO
 “Treat people like people”  “Say hello”  “Stop threatening people with deportation”  “Respond faster”  “Be more proactive than reactive”  Have police volunteer at giveaways
DON’T
 “Just worry about [your] own personal safety”  “Forget you are not above the law—you have to follow the law too”  Assume a person’s immigration status  Pull out a gun before thinking  “Take advantage of the power that [you] have”  “Police sagging pants”  “Bother me because [you] are bored”  “Stop my brother for no reason and ask ‘What are you doing?’”  “Make me feel like I’m being harassed”
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 Act like this is “my job”—“it’s more than a job”  “Just hand out guns and badges”
In general, this group agreed that police should live in the community; that the NPD should host workshops where youth are invited into the precinct; and, have internships for youth. They felt that police should “be in the community more,” because “it is all about the community.” Suggestions included cookouts, playing with kids, and annual, seasonal or twice-a-year events. Suggestions for the timing of these events included the “back to school” period and holidays.
One female resident of the North Ward said “it’s very bad there” and “the police should come check around more.” Another thought that the qualifications for becoming a NPD officer needs to be changed. She suggested that good qualifications would require officers to major in psychology and undergo training to “understand social signals” better. Another female member of the group would like to see police officers or male security guards in schools. She says her request is based on the fact that there was a man shooting outside her school and the police took a long time to respond.
Similar to other groups, members of this group called for mutual respect and someone stated that: “Police have to have consequences for their bad behavior.”
e. Serious Delinquents: August 19, 2018
There were nine participants in this session. They ranged in age from 16 to 23. Three staff members were also present. The participants reported residing in the West, South and Central Wards. The youth who participated in this session had a history of justice system involvement—with charges including car theft, carjacking, armed robbery, gun possession, drug and drug paraphernalia possession, domestic violence, shootings, “gang participation” and violations of probation. There was only one female in the group and all participants were people of color. The majority of the group has spent some time incarcerated. The session lasted approximately 80 minutes.
Police Experience
This was another group with considerable contact with the police. Though most of it was for enforcement purposes, one participant reported that the police helped him and his friends when they were asleep in their car. The police took them and the car home and no arrests were made or summonses issued.
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In this group, the discussion was dominated by a participant that I have given the pseudonym, Ben. Ben began the session by saying that when he sees the NPD, he experiences fear. He walks away. He wants to mind his business. But, he feels “they [the police] do anything they can to lock up Black people.” He went on to say that the “majority of the time the police will hop out in front of your house” and tell you to “lift your shirt up” to “see if you have a gun.” He also said that if he is riding a bike, “they ask to see a permit”.
While as a group there was an acknowledgement that “not all officers are the same,” Ben recounted many stories and expressed many sentiments that were negative about the police. Ben said “it’s all about respect”. He said that where he is from, when the police are aggressive “we fight back”. He said the police “be slamming folks on their face” and threatening them with guns. Ben made a point of noting that he has a gun too. He said that “they [the police] are like a gang.” When there is an encounter, “they call for backup”. According to one youth, “[t]hey be ‘wilding’ on Black people.”
Ben noted further that police run stop signs, which is dangerous, because people in the community have families too. He stated, “you shouldn’t have police contact if you aren’t doing anything wrong. He seemed annoyed because he was told by police that, “you can’t be around here (18th Street) unless you live around here.” He said, “they try to lock you up if you don’t leave”. He said that one person was told, by the police, that he was going to be charged with “everything on the block”.
Ben reported that he was threatened for recording the police. He said that the police once came from 18th Street to Hawthorne Avenue just to shut down a party that he was at. He was annoyed and stated: “We just want to live and party too.” He said the police should not abuse their authority—citing, as an example, officers “asking do you have something in your bag while they are going through it.” He reported that a rookie cop “broke weed up in front of” him and “bagged it up” then went through his (Ben’s) phone. He reported that, on one occasion, he was held for six hours and that an officer went into his house, walked around inside, and then asked if his parents were home. He said he was taken back home in a patrol car after being missing (but with the police) for nine hours; while no one knew. He says that at some point he was taken inside Weequahic Park and was questioned about shootings in the area.
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On another occasion, a rookie officer locked him up for spitting on the ground. He said the officer thought that it was disrespectful. The officer followed him down the street and tried to take him into custody, but he ran. He says he ended up spending a week in county jail for loitering, indecent exposure and criminal mischief. On another occasion he says that an officer threatened to lodge lots of charges against him if he did not give the officer the keys to the Jeep that he stole.
One of the young men in the group said that he takes everything to trial. He wants to “test their bluff” “to see if they really have something on me”. Another says that the police harass his friends and relatives when they (the police) are looking for him. He says the police believe he is in the EBB gang. He says the police have “hopped out” on him and his cousin who was locked up before. The cousin was driven around and asked to “tell on people”.
Another participant said that he avoids the police; but, they follow him and ask do you have “a gun on you today”. He said if you get in a confrontation with an officer, “they come back with a whole squad”. A member of the group stated that, “Black officers are ‘more aggressive’” and “White officers come out in their vests.” It was reported that the 5th precinct has mostly Black officers.
Another participant in this group talked about being locked up for a shooting; but, reports that he was “nowhere near” the incident. He said he automatically put his hands up when the “crown vic” pulled up. And, that he was taken to the “old Chicken Shack on Bergen” where he was interrogated and photographed. He said he was in the Youth House for two months and then released on house arrest.
Ben talked about an incident from about two years ago where 2 youth were killed by the police. He said they were 17 and 18 and had been committing robberies. According to Ben, the pair robbed a police officer’s wife. He said the police officer and some of his colleagues shot and killed the two t teens.
Similarly, he reported that an acquaintance was in a car “without papers.” He says the police followed, and fatally shot into the car. He thinks that the acquaintance was believed to be someone who had previously shot at an officer.
Ben also complained that when he has his book bag on after school, the police go into his bag without requesting permission. He says that the police say derogatory things like, “You were a bitch in the Youth House.” He also
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complained that police turn off the body worn camera before approaching the youth. Then turn it back on just before the arrest. Consequently, he says, he keeps videos on his phone.
He said in his neighborhood, “these folks pull out their phones.” He reported that during an incident, the police “stole” his phone and asked if he had a gun. He said the officer refused to give the phone back stating “this is evidence now.” He said he suspects that the police are monitoring his social media pages because he sees a message about an “unknown device” accessing the page.
The group reported feeling like the police act aggressively in their neighborhoods out of fear and lack of caring. One participant reported that the police put a gun to his head when he was stopped in a stolen car, after a high-speed chase. Another member of the group also reported having a gun pulled on him, by the police, when he was in a stolen car, “running to avoid being caught”. He said that when the police approached, he asked why; and, the police responded: “What’s going on? Why are you outside?” The participant may have been on probation at the time.
Ben says that he watched a young male get searched “five times” in his driveway; and, that when he reached down to pull up his pants, the officers said he was “reaching” (for a gun). No gun was found, only a “dime bag and $300.” Ben seemed to admit that he likes smoking marijuana in his driveway. But, says if he is outside “chilling”, when four or more people are together, the police will come.
Another participant recounted an incident when he was walking in a group “wearing dark colors” and the police followed them “into the projects”. He said that the situation didn’t make him feel safe. Especially when the officer (who was in plainclothes) asked, “Do you know where I can get a gun?”
There was a theme of feeling pressured by the police to give information about others. A participant reported that when his brother escaped, the police “harassed” him (the participant) for information about the brother’s whereabouts.
This group complained a lot about actual or perceived police misconduct during encounters; and, Ben bragged about having this misconduct on video.
Additional comments from this group included:
 “If they want us to follow the rules, they have to follow the rules” 52

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 “Stop harassing witnesses”  “Stop threatening youth offenders with 60 years of imprisonment”  “Why do the males always get locked up in DV cases?”  There needs to be “more accountability around report writing on
(documenting) stops”
The group also called out specific members of the NPD as being problematic.29
Towards the end of the session, Ben said, “I am tired of talking… Probably nothing is going to change.” Some of the other youth also expressed the sentiment that there is “nothing they can do.”
Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
Some police Dos and Don’ts from this group included:
DO
 “Go by the rules”  Search “right”  Speak “right” (“Don’t say ‘what’s popping’. Say ‘how are you doing sir’”)  Be more polite and courteous  Speak to youth with more respect—like a person, instead of an object  Stop using lights and sirens to get through red lights and stop signs  Provide more public service  Do more things that let the public know [the police] care about community
members  Train officers to engage the public while patrolling (“officers say they aren’t
trained to do that”)  Handle DV cases “better”  Provide better training for DV cases  Put a “harder” safety lock on the holster (“It’s too easy for the officer to just
pull it [the gun] out”)  Follow the BWC policy
29 This report will not identify those officers to protect their anonymity. However, the list of officers was provided to NPD.
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DON’T
 Fabricate cases when there is no evidence  Intimidate witnesses into giving evidence  Just suspect the male in DV cases  Treat males as if they are the suspect instead of the complainant when
males call the police.  “Hop out” and “get in people’s faces” saying “Do something” or asking
“What you want to do”  Racially Profile  “Blitz” houses during raids and while executing warrants
My recommendation is that, if the young people are willing to make them available and the department is willing to accept them, some of these private videos might be used for training purposes. They might be a powerful graphic for illustrating and enforcing the recommended Dos and Don’ts.30
f. Elementary and Middle School Students: August 26, 2018
Three sessions were held with elementary school students. A total of 39 students were involved and 6 faculty or staff. The sessions were divided by grade—third, fourth and fifth. A fourth session was held with middle-school/junior high school students. The sessions were all held at a community-based organization in the Central Ward.
Session 1 (Third Graders)
Twenty youth were present for this session. They were mostly eight and nine years old. They were all children of color. The session lasted for one hour.
Police Experience
In response to an opening question “How do you feel when you see the police in your neighborhood or on your street?” one youngster said she feels fear
30 To implement this recommendation, NPD would have to publically announce its willingness to view private videos that might help improve its training around youth engagement. Youth who are under age eighteen who are willing to share their videos will need to have parental/caregiver permission. All youth should receive advise from legal counsel who have viewed the tapes to address privacy and other concerns before tapes can be shared with the Department.
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because; “my mom says police knock down your door.” When asked if she had ever seen the police knock down a door, she said no.
A young man said that he had been questioned by the police because he witnessed a shooting. He reported being afraid. It wasn’t clear if he was afraid of the police or afraid that the shooter might come after him or both. (I did not delve more deeply into this subject with him because of his vulnerability to harm by making him relive this potential source of trauma).
Another young man reported that one time the police came to his house because his uncle had “kicked down” his mother’s door. When asked how the police acted when they were at his house, he said that the police asked questions “nicely”. On another occasion the police came while he was playing outside and told him to “try to watch out” while he was playing.
Another youth reported hearing “a lot” of gun shots in his neighborhood. But his direct experience with police occurred when his mom was in a car accident and was arrested for lying about the accident. The young person admitted to being “a little scared at first” when the police arrived but the police were nice (despite the arrest).
One young man dramatically recounted a situation when he was at a playground with friends when there were gunshots. He said he was “paralyzed with fear” and that the police carried him home. He said he couldn’t “snap out of it.” He reported that the police did catch the shooters.
Another youth also reported hearing gunshots while at a park. The youth said that there were “lots of police” and they “asked questions about did you see anyone?” The youth added that the police went to a house and arrested a boy and his mother.
Among this group, there were many reports of shootings and car crashes.
One youngster reported seeing a man arrested and thought that the police were “mean” to the man. Similarly, another youngster reported that a man was driving “on a one way street”. The police were called because the man crashed. The police started yelling at him and asking why he was in the middle of the street.
Another youngster reported that someone was being bullied. The police were called. The police came and asked what happened, but they were “mean”.
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A member of the group expressed some disappointment that her brother’s bike was stolen but the girl who stole it wasn’t arrested.
Another youth said the police came to her house when her and her siblings were home alone and asked questions about who they live with. She said the police left when an adult arrived.
A Latina member of the group reported that a man tried to kidnap her. Her mother saw him and began hitting him. The police arrived and yelled at the man then arrested him.
There was a sentiment among the group that the police blame them for crimes that they didn’t commit.
One young female reported that the police yelled at her for breaking a window that she did not break, and would not believe her when she said she didn’t do it. She said the officer apologized when it was established that she had not done it.
Another female member of the group said that she was yelled at by police for sitting in the front seat of the car. But she believes the officer confused her family with another. The officer said that he had warned them about “this” before.
A female also reported that a Black officer on a horse made a face at her and her mother, after her mother said hello. She said the face was like the officer thought they were “disgusting”.
One member of the group was adamant that police “need to be nicer”, “even to the guilty”. That youth reported seeing the police “being mean” to a “little girl” when they were arresting her and her mother for “robbing”31 a jewelry store.
One female participant said the police are “not suppose to be mean to little kids”. She felt that even when police are blaming kids for crimes that they did commit, the police should not be yelling and screaming and acting like bullies.
She added that the police shouldn’t treat kids like “that” (yelling and screaming) “because they are not yours”.
31It seems more likely that they were shoplifting. 56

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Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
Despite their young age, this group offered a number of suggestions for engaging with young people. They primarily suggested that the police “not be mean to little kids”. The suggestion received many affirmations among the group.
The Dos and Don’ts from this group included:
DO
 “Be mean in a nice way”  “Treat a little kid like a relative”32  Treat people fairly (and don’t be mean—a recurrent theme)  Treat people how you want to be treated  “Fire mean cops”
DON’T
 “Discriminate with treatment”  “Treat different kinds of people with skin colors different”  “Be racist”
One youth suggested that even if a person is guilty, “be mean in a nice way”. When I asked her how that could be done, she said, “don’t make the angry face” and “don’t talk loud.”
Another suggestion was that the police should say “tell me where ‘they’ are” instead of “tell me where that ‘criminal’ is.” This seems to be an attempt to reject criminalization of themselves and people in their community.
These youth said they were interested in sharing the following activities with police:
 Playing sports  Playing board games  Watching movies  Going on a ride along  Visiting the police station  Learning about handcuffs
32Presumably without yelling and screaming. 57

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They were apparently familiar with some police stereotypes and suggested that the police could buy them doughnuts.
A bold suggestion was that they would like to visit police at their [the police] homes and share snacks.
Session 2 (Fourth Graders)
Thirteen youth were present at this session. They were 9 and 10 year olds. They were all children of color. The session lasted for 55 minutes.
Police Experience
These youngsters had a broad range of police experience, both direct and indirect, and had widely divergent attitudes toward NPD.
The first person to speak said that s/he had seen the police give people tickets for opening fire hydrants. The next youngster noted that police put people in jail for shootings. Another said that the police don’t catch “them”33 because “they” run. Another said that the police arrest people who cause accidents and “surround the neighborhood”. This young person said that s/he thinks there is less crime “now” because the police do these things.
When asked how s/he feels when the police are in the neighborhood, one young person said that “they keep us safe.” Another said “they keep me safe,” and then went on to report that a house exploded in his/her neighborhood about two months before the listening session and people were killed. S/he appeared to credit the police with the fact that more lives were not lost. A female participant in the group who said that she “lives on a very quiet street,” also reported that the police once caught a shooter in her neighborhood and that, at the time of the listening session, someone had disappeared from the area and had not been found.
Others said that when they see the police in their neighborhood they “wonder what happened”. One said I feel “satisfied”. Another said I feel “depressed” but “not at the police”. This youngster said the “police are doing a ‘good’ job.”
33It wasn’t clear whether the participant was talking about criminals, in general, or him/herself and peers when they break the law.
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Another youngster said the police “are terrible”. She then recounted a situation that her mother told her about. She said her mother told her that once, when she called the police for an accident, the police didn’t come, but a police car rode past her. Another participant also reported that the police arrived “much later” after being called to an accident.
Like the third graders, for the fourth graders, situations involving car accidents and shootings were a common theme. Several youth had witnessed car accidents. One youth reported seeing a person run over by a car. He added that his cousins “beat up” the man who was the driver. And that, “the police came but didn’t arrest anyone.” One person reported that s/he observed the police stop a car that ran a red light.
There was also an attempted kidnapping report from this group. One of the participants reported that a 5-year-old girl was jumping rope by herself and a “tall man” grabbed her. According to this account, the police came and shot the man and the “little girl was saved”.
One female participant reported generally being afraid that the police would come to her mom’s house.34
Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
This group had suggestions for better policing generally. They included:
 “Every call you get, go to the address immediately—no hesitation.”  “Stop killing Black people for no reason.”  “Pull over people who go past the stop signs.”  “Lock up people who do drugs.”  “Stop people from texting while driving and walking.”  “Pay attention to your walkie talkie” and “keep an eye on the people
you think are suspicious.”  “Use ’proper’ communication and wait for people to respond to your
command.”  Arrest people who walk on other people’s property.  Respond to every call  Never leave children alone  Make better roads for people who drive
34I did not delve into her reasons for holding this fear. 59

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 Help with people in need. Examples included cancer patients and people with autism
There were two young males in this group who seemed to be obsessed with technology. They thought that the NPD should make greater use of technology. They believe that the equipment for the NPD should include walkie talkies, drones and tasers; and, that there should be a drone app where the public can report crime in real time. The pair also thought that the NPD should utilize helicopters more.
The group’s thoughts about “fun” activities to engage with youth, and the broader public, included NPD hosting or co-hosting “festivals in the park” and events and parties for occasions like Halloween and Christmas.35
This group was also apparently aware of some police stereotypes; and, also suggested that the police could provide free doughnuts for kids in school.
Session 3 (Fifth Graders)
This group consisted of 10-, 11- and 12-year-olds. Sixteen youth were present for the session. One member of this group was White, the others were children of color.
Police Experience
For logistical reasons, this session only lasted 35 minutes. The members of this group spent most of their time expressing their feelings about the police in combination with talking about their direct experiences.
One member of this group questioned whether the group or their parents might “get in trouble” for talking to me about the police.
Three members of this group said that they would like to be police officers when they grow up. One member reported that her father is a security guard and her uncle is a police officer. She described the police role as: “to pursue justice and stop violence.” She reported that she has seen the inside of a police station and has asked police officers questions and that “they [the police] were nice.” Several said they would like to do a ride along.
35NPD might consider hosting other substantive events. During the post-Ferguson unrest, the San Diego Police Department co-sponsored a Martin Luther King Day march.
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The role of the NPD was described as, “to help and stuff” and to “capture bad people” and “to take them to jail, to earn their punishment.” Someone stated that, “being a police is a real good job” and reiterated that the policing job is “to capture the bad people”.
A youth in this group noted that, “Some police don’t care”. “They don’t find the perpetrators”: and, “They say they’ll get back to you but they don’t, or it takes a long time.” Another participant said that she is “in the middle” about how she feels about the police. She thinks the police will act differently when: “they may know the person who is getting locked up.”
A participant reported that once when s/he heard a gunshot, “only two police came” and there was “no investigation”. There was another complaint that “they [the police] don’t come on time or follow-up”. Another participant reported feeling like “they [the police] kinda are for justice”; and, that, “they curse a lot”. A participant also reported an incident of being behind a SWAT vehicle coming from a movie with his or her family. The youth reported that the police “jumped out on a boy” and “somebody screamed”.
Three members of this group reported being “afraid” when they see the police in their neighborhood because that signifies that something “really bad” has happened and they are “afraid of what’s happening.” More than one youth reported having had experiences “that they are not allowed to tell” about. In keeping with their privacy and the protection of human subjects, I did not delve further into these statements.
A youth reported being in the car with his/her father during a police stop. S/he reported that s/he was driven home along with his/her “little brother”; but, the father “sat in jail for a day for no license.” Another participant reported that there was a shooting “by my block. I was in the classroom. The police told me to duck.” A participant also reported that s/he was at a park where there was shooting; and, the police shot and killed a girl. S/he said it was Jesse Allen Park last year.
One of these fifth graders reported that “police pull out their guns and say ‘put your hands up’.” There was not an opportunity to explore whether this youngster had actually had this experience and, if so, under what circumstances.
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Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
Like the fourth graders, this group had suggestions for improved policing generally and specifics for positive youth engagement. They want officers to “do your job”. When asked what that job is, they said, “save people” and “put bad people in jail.” The list of dos and don’ts that came from their suggestions include:
DO
 “Be aware of what you are doing”  “Look out for your surroundings”  Catch criminals  Protect ‘selves’ and others  Turn off sirens  Be there when the people need you  “Be sure of what you are doing”  Pay attention  “Investigate first, instead of assuming young people did something wrong
because of skin color”  “Ask witnesses who they think were part of the crime”  “Make a commercial for teachers and principals”  Go to the schools between 1pm and 6pm  Bring youth to the police department to explore and talk into the walkie
talkie  Come to the school and have snacks with the kids
DON’T
 Assume skin color is the same as ‘your [a young person’s] background’”  Arrest Black people for no reason (as seen on the news)
These young people would like to have a party with NPD to celebrate those occasions when the NPD does what the community thinks they are ”suppose” to do. This suggestion is far more complicated than these youngsters realize, given the multiple “communities” that exist within various neighborhoods.36
36See for example, Elijah Anderson’s Code of the Street, 1999. 62

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This groups’ broad dictate for the NPD is to “save the world and make it a better place.” They also associated policing with coffee and doughnuts.
Session 4 (6th-8th Graders)
This session lasted sixty-five minutes. It included 18 participants. The majority of participants were youth of color. There was one participant who was White. Some were from immigrant backgrounds with English as a second language (ESL). An independent translator was needed for one of the students; but, one was not available.
Police Experience
In this group, many participants reported direct police contact during a wide range of incidents, but, mostly related to loud parties, vehicle accidents and shootings. A female participant reported that a cousin’s birthday party “was too loud”. The police arrived and told everyone they had to leave. She said the younger kids cried and she was “sad”. The party was in a public park.
A participant reported that at a party for her niece, someone reported that the music from the cars was “too loud.” The police came and told them that they had to lower the music. One participant reported that tenants in his building “gave them trouble” for loud music. The police came inside their house and his family had to go to court. Another participant reported that his two older brothers had graduation parties where there were complaints that the music was too loud, and the police shut the party down around 10 pm.
In contrast, a female participant said that when her godfather was in a car accident, the police called her mother to report the accident and were “comforting”. In another reported incident, a participant said that she was in Newark at about 7 pm when a drunk driver hit her mother’s jeep and she [the mother] was knocked unconscious. She reported that the police came and were wondering why she [the participant] was outside the car alone. She said the police were asking “random questions” instead of asking “are you okay”.
Accounts of shootings were all too common among this group, and unlike their younger counterparts, these youth were often directly involved in the shooting incidents or had peers or relatives who were directly involved. One participant reported that the track team often runs near 21 Ashton Street. Recently people
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were fighting and someone got shot. The police locked down the building. Some friends were called out for questioning by the police.
A participant reported that there was a shooting near her school. The police blocked off the road. Her mother was mad because it obstructed her route to work. She said this incident occurred during March of 2018.
Another member of the group reported that there was a lockdown at his/her school in 2017. The participant reported that the shooter walked in through the playground door; and, was never caught.
A participant reported a shooting outside his/her house. Police came and bullet holes were found in the house closet. The participant reported that once the police “figured out what happened” they left. There was no follow-up. The participant reports feeling “unsafe.”
The participants in the group denied having had guns pointed at them by the police but did report having seen police point guns at other community residents. One reported that his/her brother robbed a bank. A police officer pointed the gun to his head. The brother, reportedly, was the only one who got locked up. When the police arrived, the father told the brother to run.
Another youth reported that during the same week as the listening session, one of his/her friend’s got off a bus and started shooting. According to the participant, the police returned fire and the friend was killed.
These participants reported that, in addition to shootings, vandalisms and robberies are high in Newark. A participant also reported that while s/he was outside one day, the police said that they were looking for a white van used in kidnapping children. The participant’s family was notified by the police. The participant said that the police thanked the family for their cooperation. Another participant reported that a dead body was found in Weequahic Park and the police came to investigate. A participant also reported that her brother and cousin were breaking into houses. The brother had a gun. The police shot the cousin who did not have a gun. The family was “hurt” by this.
There were several positive police interactions reported by this group. One participant reported that her cousin went to the corner store and got caught in a shootout. She reported that the cousin was shot in the mouth, but, police came and took him to the hospital. After asking him questions, the police were able to
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capture the shooter. She reported that the family was satisfied with how the case was handled and its outcome. Another participant recounted a story where the police transported a loved one to the hospital after he had been shot. A member of the group reported having had an opportunity to go to work with her godmother who is a member of NPD. And, a participant reported that when a twelve-yearold cousin ran away, after 24 hours, the police searched for the cousin and found him. The family was happy.
Suggestions for Positive Youth Engagement
A member of this group started off the session by suggesting that members of the NPD should, “Think about what you do before acting.” In their own words, the suggestion was, “less brutality, more mentality.” The list of dos and don’ts that came from this group’s suggestions included:
DO
 “Take people’s opinions”  “Be equal, don’t racially discriminate”  “Ask questions first—shoot later” (offered by the participant whose cousin
was shot by police)  Respond when people call you for something important  Remember that Black lives matter  “Do things and ask questions”  Give commands to put weapons down before shooting
DON’T
 “Think people look dangerous because of the way they dress”  “Be rude to the people”
This group had several suggestions for how youth and police might have fun together. They included:
 Conducting Toys-for-Tots giveaways together at Christmas  Holding fundraisers at the station  Going to hospitals to give money to parents who can’t afford the
hospital stay;  Playing basketball or football together  “Dress up” and “come to school for more support”
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 “Have a field day activity with the kids”  “Block off the neighborhood and play with kids”  Host a “fun day with the police”  Take a field trip to Washington, DC to visit veterans’ memorials and
military sites (This suggestion was offered by a participant who would like to become a member of the military.)
Participants in this group said that they had already had the following social interactions with police:
 Police came to class to talk about “what to do if someone tries to kidnap you”.
 Some officers were (already) involved with Toys-for-Tots  One participant said that the police specifically came to her block
Members of this group said that they would like to become part of police investigations. They want to investigate shootings with the police and to investigate racism with the police. They thought that it was important to “have civilians be a part of investigations of police shootings.” One wanted police to teach him how to be a “cop or a soldier”. The suggestions have implications for a Police Explorers Program, a Youth Advisory Board and a Civilian Complaint Review Board that includes youth members.
At the end of this session, a female student said that I made her “so happy” talking about “this” because “police get away with doing stuff that is bad” and maybe these sessions can be responsible for police “doing something different”. A staffer who heard her comment said he shared her sentiment.
Echoes from the Past
Between sessions 1 and 2, I had the opportunity to interview a member of the staff who had been with this community-based program for thirty years. She indicated that in the past both police and corrections officers were a mainstay in the building. They were a part of several programs:
 Passport to Manhood  Worked in the game room  Coached basketball  Were involved with the choir
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 Volunteered with homework  Became mentors
She said that this stopped about fifteen years ago. She reported that, in her experience, “if you have police in the building, the children will see them as a friend, not just someone who comes for you when you are in trouble.”
She reported that police and corrections officers use to workout at the facility (more corrections officers than police). They would chaperone events, provide security, and act as mentors. The officers were armed, but their guns were not visible. They were under their jackets. She reported that currently, several of the students who attend the facility have parents who are police officers or corrections officers. It seems that this facility would be a central location for hosting some youth engagement events and ongoing programs.
V. NPD’s Juvenile Services Section
After reviewing the five page description of NPDs Juvenile Services Section attached to this report as Attachment D,37 it appears that the NPD has—on paper38—made some strides towards addressing some of the concerns raised by the youth, teachers, and staffers in this report—most notably the suggestions (at p. 32) that youth and families be referred to resources to help address their needs; and, that there be mechanisms for NPD to directly refer residents to needed services without “putting them through the system first.”
The NPD’s implementations of Stationhouse Adjustments, involvement with Newark Youth Court, and partnership with Family Referral Services, to varying degrees, have the potential to address concerns about matching needs to services and avoidance of formal justice processing, but, seem to be fairly limited in the types and number of juveniles who are given access to these opportunities. The same seems true of the “Officer in the Classroom” program, which is described as led by a single detective who mentors 7th grade students who are ‘hand-picked’ by a single school principal.
37Dated September 26, 2018. 38 It has been reported that many of the programs described in Attachment D may not be fully funded or fully implemented.
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None of the programs appear to give youth a leadership or co-facilitative role in program operation and decision-making. As noted earlier, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing finds that this is an essential component of community engagement.
The majority of the fifteen listed programs seem to focus on youth who have already come in contact with the NPD for law violations. There seems to be little in the way of engaging with youth in preventative ways, or with younger youth who are not court involved or involved with social services.
Admittedly the program descriptions are short, and some are somewhat vague, so these descriptions undoubtedly do not convey the full essence of what is taking place among the NPD members and community residents who participate in each program. But, the description of the Newark Cares Program, for example, excludes any mention of therapeutic intervention or partnerships with therapeutic professionals—a feature that young people, the teachers and community organization staff who participated in the listening sessions, identified as essential.
The Newark Children’s Cabinet Safety Subcommittee appears to be an ideal place to insert youth voices and participation. If youth are already involved with this subcommittee, their involvement needs to be elevated more in the description. As currently described, this appears to be another mechanism where adults, especially those who are justice system actors, are making decisions for and about youth, without their input.
The Cops and Kids workshops sponsored by the All Stars Project of New Jersey provide innovative approaches to youth engagement. However, the description of the program notes that 200 officers have participated so far. 39 The NPD website indicates that there are 990 sworn officers and a staff of up to 1900 in the Public Safety Division. Consequently, less than five to ten percent of law enforcement personnel seem to be involved with this innovation so far. The accounts of the youth who participated in the listening sessions suggest that participation in these workshops or other opportunities for positive youth engagement needs to be more pervasive, and, especially opportunities that allow for engagement that is collaborative rather than hierarchical—top down with the police at the top and youth at the bottom.
39 An increase of 96 from the number reported in the February 2018 Newsletter cited in footnote 8. 68

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Attachment D does not include specific activities that the NPD hosts or collaborates with the community to produce. Based on the listening sessions, these types of activities are desired, in addition to those that help meet communities’ needs for caring and security. Striking the balance in the provision of resources to address both these sets of needs—care and safety, and, establishing mechanisms for addressing these needs simultaneously through effective, constitutional, practical, cost effective and sustainable means is perhaps the greatest challenge for the NPD under the consent decree.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Newark’s youth of all ages and backgrounds provide a wealth of information that can be used in the creation of positive youth engagement strategies that are both simple and complex. They are the experts in understanding and articulating what they want from the NPD in the role of “serving and protecting the community.” Although they may not be fully aware of the practical, political, fiscal, legal and logistical nuances of police service, they are acutely aware of flaws they perceive in the current service delivery, and, can identify the “successes” that they would like to see replicated in order to implement organization-wide changes that they would like to see implemented.
They are divided over the extent to which they and their parents are willing to engage with police to make things “better”, but, those who are willing, have constructed important potential solutions based on their own “lived experiences”. They expect that the NPD and Newark government will be receptive to their input, but, some are skeptical about whether change is truly possible or will occur. It is problematic that young people are fearful that talking about their police experiences and their ideas for better policing might lead to retaliation against themselves or the parents.
The youth want to be engaged around their safety needs, but also want to be treated respectfully and with a genuine sense of caring. They want to be involved with the decision-making related to positive youth engagement; and, those who have significant law enforcement contact, are very keen on being treated fairly and within the dictates of the constitution.
They recognize that not all members of the NPD engage in constitutionally and legally flawed behavior, but, would like to see more disciplinary action taken against those who do, and, more rewards for those who don’t. They desperately would like to see more police who are from the City, because they believe that
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those officers will be less afraid of them and more understanding of the challenges that they face in the effort to remain or become law-abiding.
They want police who will recognize their individuality and who won’t stereotype them as “criminal” based on their appearance—their age, race, ethnicity, English proficiency, gender, style of dress, perceived immigration status, hairstyle, gender presentation or sexual orientation, or their behavior in the past.
They recognize that some of them live in really crime-challenged neighborhoods, but, many would like to see the police as friends not enemies, and, see the way for this to happen is through the police engaging with them under circumstances that do not involve surveillance and enforcement.
A primary theme among these young people is that they want the police to communicate with them in a different way—a way that recognizes their humanity and personhood, and that has some non-derogatory recognition of their youth and immaturity.
VII. Recommendations
In my opinion, the youth who participated in these listening sessions did a more than adequate job of speaking for themselves. Their personhood and both their emotional and intellectual quotients are manifested in their comments and suggestions. The challenge for the NPD is to respond in ways that value these young peoples’ contributions, and incorporate those that are feasible into NPD practice. The assessment of what is feasible needs to be monitored and evaluated.
1) An NPD coordinator for youth engagement or someone within the Division who is responsible for youth engagement should read this report and assess the feasibility of incorporating the ideas and practices that the youth have suggested. The assessment should include an investigation of how closely the ideas comport with existing and past NPD youth engagement practices, and, an examination of the forces for and against successful implementation.
2) Within the immediate future, the NPD should convene meetings with parents in the City to discuss the NPD’s desire to increase police presence in schools beyond law enforcement purposes—that is, in order to engage with the youth in supportive ways and to learn about their special needs and concerns. During these meetings, the NPD, via its youth coordinator or other personnel,
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can review the findings of this report with the audience, and announce its intent to hold community forums addressing these results.
3) The NPD should plan a community forum or series of forums that are youthled, where youth “leaders” present, and discuss the ideas in this report and the community’s concerns related to youth, including and beyond those addressed in this report.
4) The NPD should make plans to incorporate youth members into existing subcommittees whose substantive work directly concerns youth engagement, or, create a subcommittee that has this focus and includes youth.
5) The NPD should modify or create training that specifically addresses police communication with youth and the general public.
6) The NPD should modify or create anti-bias training that addresses “appearance profiling”, with specific attention to hair styles—specifically dreadlocks—and other indicators that police may be using as “evidence” of criminality.
7) The NPD should adopt the recommendation from the LGBTQI listening sessions that training be held in spaces where the staff are LGBTQI supporting, that LGBTQI trainers be LGBTQI officers and civilians, and, that they have a role in creating the training curriculum.
8) The NPD should work at the precinct or neighborhood level to learn from residents and their children and young adults, ways in which the NPD can work to meet their needs and expectations. Ideas from school drop outs, immigrant youth and residents of public housing are under-represented in these findings. These youth should be given priority in future sessions conducted by the NPD.
9) The NPD should explore or better publicize programs that it offers or can offer that allow youth to come in and work with the police; e.g. Police Explorers, internships, youth councils or advisory boards, PAL, etc.
10)Develop a mechanism for consistently soliciting and aiming to incorporate youth input — give youth a platform for consistently and formally informing the NPD of their ideas and concerns.
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Acknowledgements I would like to thank all of the youth who took the time to participate in the listening sessions and for sharing their experiences and wisdom, even though it was sometimes painful. Thanks go out the teachers, staff and community coordinators who provided access to the youth and space in which to conduct the sessions. Thank you to members of the monitoring team who brokered many of the connections to the organizations who hosted the groups. A special thank you to Retha Onitiri and the NJISJ Youth Council and the staff of the All Stars Project of New Jersey, for organizing the groups and coordinating the logistics of the sessions and to Andrea McChristian and Brooke Lewis of NJISJ for preparing the executive summary of this Report included in the Independent Monitor’s Ninth Quarterly Report. To the organizations whose names have been withheld, for privacy and human subjects’ protection, much appreciation for allowing me to reach your “hard to reach” clients and for your invaluable input to this conversation. Thank you to Jim Horton of the All Stars Project of New Jersey for Attachment A; to Captain Brian O’Hara of the NPD for Attachments B and D; and to the NJISJ Youth Council for Attachment C. An extra special thank you to Dr. Janice Johnson-Dias for trusting me with your circle of ‘magical’ girls, as the introduction to this data collection effort. Thank you to Christopher Wilds, Michael Buchanan and the Independent Monitor, Peter Harvey, of Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP for entrusting me with this important task.
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References Anderson, E. (1999). Code of the Street: Decency. Violence and the Moral Life of the Inner City. W.W. Norton and Company. Crenshaw, Kimberlé Williams, Andrea J. Ritchie, Rachel Anspach, Rachel Gilmer and Luke Harris. (2015). Say her name: Resisting police brutality against black women. African American Policy Forum and Center for Intersectionality and Social Policy Studies. NY: New York. President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015). Final report of the President’s task force on 21st century policing. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Richie, B. (2012). Arrested Justice: Black Women, Violence and America’s Prison Nation. New York University Press.
Rios, V. (2017). Human Targets: Schools, Police, and the Criminalization of Latino Youth.University of Chicago Press. Tyler, T. R (2004). Enhancing Police Legitimacy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716203262627. United States Department of Justice (DOJ)(2014). Investigation of the Newark Police Department. Civil Rights Division, United States Attorney’s Office, District of New Jersey.
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ATTACHMENT A

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ATTACHMENT B

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19

Arrest/Charge Density

2629Mill St BELLEVILLE

NN8t1h0tShtSt Franklin Ave
DegraBwellAavire Pl Mt ProspeRictdgAeveSt

August 1, 2017 to July 31, 2018
BLOOMFIELD

Verona AveSylvan Ave Irving St

WEST ORANGE

217 Delavan Ave

Grafton Ave

212
ORANGE

Page 148 of 214 PageID:
NORTH ARLINGTON

McCarteOrraHtowny St

Summer Ave Broadway

NoSrf7otlShkS9tSStt1h1tSht1s3tSrt5tdShtSStS1t2Sth1G4aStr3trhsiddSteStSNtNN1291ttH4hhiNtgh5SShtttlShtaCNlinSf7ttdtohAnvSteAvPNear1kP1Lteearhck4kNetSStthA6tSvtNhSet1St3th St

EAST ORANGE

Park Ave

7th Ave

214

216 2nd Ave
3rd Ave 4th Ave

Ogden St

KEARNY

Passaic St

Bloomfield Ave

Manor Dr

SOUTH ORANGE

StuSymvitehsaStnt Ave Boylan St

Dover St

613

Woodbine 614

Ave Ivy

LSSetcnhooxfieSltd

612 18th Ave
St

Vail St HalPsaltemdSStt

VCeorlummobnitaAAvvee

Tremont Ave 414 11th Ave

611

S O1r3atnhgAevAeve 114

S 19th St

413 16th Ave 412

211

Orange Sussex

St Ave

7th Ave 215

EAST NEWARK

Interstate 280

13th Ave 12th 14th Ave 15th Ave

115

Central

Ave11S2WO1r3MathanrgAkWeevateArSrveten St

Springfield Ave

James Ave

St

Fulton

312

Clinton St

St

River St

HARRISON

Blanchard St

Lister Ave Albert Ave
Raymond Blvd

Pulaski Skwy

Irvine Turner Blvd Dr ML King Jr Blvd MulberrByroWStaadshiStngtonPaSrtk Pl

S 10th St S 10th St
S 6th St

S 2S01t8hthStSt

Ellery Ave

Brill St Mott St

MAPLEWOOD UNION

³ IRVINGTON
Field Pl
HILLSIDE

Schley St

411

18th

17th Ave

Ave

111

SS1157ttShh1SSt9tth St

Avon Ave 113

Spruce St

SeyBemroguernASvte

Madison Ave

Clinton Pl

Aldine

Fabyan Hobson St

Pl

St

512 Lyo5n1s1AKCveheearnWAcLeveeleSlehohqrigeVWuAhaapvEHshheAcRRsiaacvkaeurewerAdnnrAvtntAyh5evANevoo1erveyrn3AeenSveAetvAeve

515 Clinton

Ave

W Bigelow St

514

RT 78 E Peddie St

WrigAhst tSotr 516

US Hwy 22

Haynes Ave

517

ShEelirzmaabnetAhvAeve NJ Railroad Ave

McCarter Hwy Meeker Ave

314 St 3M1il1lAePSsret3oSon1utrPn3tShiantrgSkthtounrsSNEtteSKwtiL3naY1nfoea5ryykEeSAltmtteveSStt
Frontage Rd US Hwy 1 Exp

VPaulnaBAskudiraeSmntsStSt

Market St

Ferry St

316

Polk St

MNaiinWagSialstroanSAtve

Walnut St

GaJrraisboenz

St St

Ave L

RPoamreisSStt

StocAkvteonKSt

Pulaski Skwy

Delancey St

RtO7l8ympia Dr

317

Brewster Rd Port St

KelDloigstgribSut tion

HPouralatisokiSStkwy

St

Port

New St

Ave P

New Jersey Tpke

Delancey St Jersey Tpke Ext

Dayton St Frelinghuysen Ave
Carnegie Ave US Hwy 1
Express Rd NewCJorerbisneyStTpke Exp Export St
CranNeawvayyStSt

ELIZABETH

Radar Rd

Marsh St

Tyler Starboard St

St

BAYONNE

LYNDHURST SECAUCUS

JERSEY CITY

Legend
Precincts Sectors Public Housing Park-Cemetery Arrest Density Lowest

Highest

0

0.5

1

Miles

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ATTACHMENT C

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Newark Curfew
Questions:
 How were the rules/penalties determined? o Was there a discussion? o What exactly was discussed? o Who was involved in this discussion?  Were youth involved?  Were community members involved? Or people that are familiar with Newark community?  Were you (Dr. Delores Brown) involved in this conversation?
 Policy states that the second offense will be kept on file for 6 months o What does that actually mean? o We thought this was only a summer curfew? o How does that effect youth if they have a different interaction with police?  Can other cops see this?  Does it stay on the youth’s record?  How long?
 What are you doing now that the curfew is in place? o Is this the plan for next summer as well? o Is there discussion about offering/developing actual resources as alternatives?
Recommendations:
 Use a different word besides “PENALTIES”  Create and provide funding for community resources
o Shelters o Community activities o Community centers
 Make access to these resources easier o More funding o No waiting list
 Use positive consequences o Community service o Take the youth home/Do they need shelter? o Engage in conversation with the youth to uncover the “why” of their behavior
 Utilize us as a Youth Council as advisors o We have an inside perspective

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Our main issues with this policy:
 It funnels the youth into the juvenile justice system (studies shown that when youth are exposed to the system they are more likely to keep getting involved)
 This policy targets at risk youth  This policy is not helping our youth  This policy does not provide any positive outcomes  If fined, youth will engage in negative risky behaviors in order to pay for the fine
Recommendations for Police officers in Newark
 Police should be knowledgeable about community resources  Police should either be from the community or be knowledgeable and have specialized training
on the area they are serving and the demographic in the area  Police officers need to use individually focused strategies
o Every youth is not the same o Different approaches in order to make a connection and determine if there is a need  Polices officers should be able to refer youth and families to resources  Have community members and youth engage in the highering process of Police Officers

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ATTACHMENT D

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POLICE DEPARTMENT

ADMINISTRATIV2E6S3U4BMISSION

NEWARK, NJ

TO:

Brian O’Hara, Commander

DATE:

SEPTEMBER 26, 2018

Consent Decree and Planning Division

FROM:

Elvis Perez, Police Lieutenant Juvenile Services Section

SUBJECT: JUVENILE SERVICES SECTION

Sir:
School Resource Officers
In addition to personnel assigned to the Juvenile Services Section, six (6) school resource officers also now have a function with this office. Although assigned to a precinct command, instruction is provided by this office. With over 140 schools, district and charter, the school resource officers primarily handle majority of school related incidents. With the opening of the seventh Precinct, an additional school resource officer will be assigned accordingly.
Serious incidents such as robberies, sexual assault and weapon possession are included. These matters are documented and referred accordingly throughout the appropriate investigative section. However, school resource officers are usually the first contact.
Implementation of Stationhouse Adjustments – Promotion and Practice General Order 04-16
A stationhouse adjustment is an alternative method that law enforcement agencies may use to handle firsttime juvenile offenders who have committed minor juvenile delinquency offenses within their jurisdiction. The intent of the stationhouse adjustment program is to provide for immediate consequences, such as community service or restitution and a prompt and convenient resolution for the victim, while at the same time benefitting the juvenile by avoiding the stigma of a formal juvenile delinquency record. In many instances, this early intervention will deter the youth from continuing their negative behavior and divert the youth from progressing further into the juvenile justice system.
In 2017, the juvenile Services Section completed 65 Station House Adjustments. This means 65 juveniles were not arrested and avoided the stigma of being arrested for minor offenses. In 2018 Year to Date 45 Station House Adjustments have been completed. The juvenile Services section also promotes Satin House Adjustments when warranted through training and promoting throughout the department.
Newark Youth Court
In 2018, we developed a strong partnership with Newark Youth Court. The Newark Youth works with Newark Schools, Truancy Court and Police officers. We utilize Youth Court predominantly during Station House Adjustments. Young people are referred based on disorderly conduct and low-level behavior while the court refers truancy cases. Youth Court staff members speak to each young person and parents to explain program for a youth court hearing.

SIGNATURE: ____________________________ SIGNATURE: Elvis Perez,
SUPERIOR RECEIVING REPORT

DATE: _________________________________ RANK:
DPI 1001

Lieutenant

OS227OPOLICE

_ __

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 154 of 214 PageID:

POLICE DEPARTMENT

ADMINISTRATIV2E6S3U5BMISSION

NEWARK, NJ

TO:

Brian O’Hara, Commander

DATE:

SEPTEMBER 26, 2018

Consent Decree and Planning Division

FROM:

Elvis Perez, Police Lieutenant Juvenile Services Section

SUBJECT: JUVENILE SERVICES SECTION

Anti-Bullying Training / HIB Policy – Harassment Intimidation Bullying
In 2018, Juvenile Services personnel were required to attend HIB training and workshops. The HIB program is the State Policy that handles bullying in the Newark Schools. Bullying is considered a form of Harassment. Cyber Bullying is perhaps the most dangerous of all bullying because of its ability to transcend across social media. Its impact and message can be impacting and harmful.
The HIB program has over sixty specialists in Newark that can be utilized to respond and assist with bullying incidents not limited to cyber bullying. Each school has a HIB specialist assigned to them. In addition, we have six (6) school resource officers and six detectives assigned to the Juvenile Services Section to handle these types of assignments. In addition, we also have juvenile referrals forms that any Newark Police Department Police officer can completed and forward to this office for follow up and further investigation if warranted.
C.O.P.Y. (Call-Out Program for Youth) – Partnership with Rutgers University
The Juvenile Services Section collaborates with Rutgers University to link first time offending youth to developmentally salient family, social, educational, and vocational services. Initially the program catered to first time offenders. Since that time weapons possessions and chronic receiving stolen property offenders are considered. Doctor Paul Boxer, Rutgers university is director, founder and coordinator of this program. C.O.P.Y was started in 2015. Since that time, various first time offenders involved in a serious crime have been referred to the C.O.P.Y program. A C.O.P.Y referral was made when a guardian /parent agreed to complete a waiver that would allow Rutgers to contact them and provide further information on their program.
The C.O.P.Y program and the multiple services provided by Rutgers have showed us over time that there certainly are cohorts of youth under court supervision who need to be connected to services; and there are service providers in need of appropriate referral streams. C.O.P.Y encourages an open discussion of how we can best facilitate these "matches," as well as any other issues relevant to reducing and preventing youth violence and delinquency.

The Youth Workforce Opportunity Initiative

The Youth Workforce Opportunity Initiative enrolls youth between the ages of 14 to 21 that have been involved in the Juvenile Justice System and reside in Essex, Hudson, and Union Counties. The program is voluntary and seeks to assist youth in workforce development, high school graduation, as well as provides one on one mentoring. Big Brothers Big Sisters ask for the youth to commit to one full year of mentoring and programming as part of the Youth Workforce Opportunity Initiative.

SIGNATURE: ____________________________ SIGNATURE: Elvis Perez,
SUPERIOR RECEIVING REPORT

DATE: _________________________________ RANK:
DPI 1001

Lieutenant

OS227OPOLICE

_ __

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 155 of 214 PageID:

POLICE DEPARTMENT

ADMINISTRATIV2E6S3U6BMISSION

NEWARK, NJ

TO:

Brian O’Hara, Commander

DATE:

SEPTEMBER 26, 2018

Consent Decree and Planning Division

FROM:

Elvis Perez, Police Lieutenant Juvenile Services Section

SUBJECT: JUVENILE SERVICES SECTION

Newark Children’s Cabinet Safety Subcommittee
Includes representatives from Newark Police Division, the Mayor’s Newark Children’s Cabinet, Newark Board of Education, DEA Hidta, Rutgers Department of Criminal Justice, NJ Transit, Essex County Probation Department, and various community service organizations. The Safety Subcommittee meets every last Tuesday of the month. The Goal of this subcommittee is to identify 2-3 key strategies that can be collectively employed to increase school community and police relationships. As well, raise awareness of public safety efforts, and increase safety inside and around the schools. The following key strategies have been identified:
 Streamline the process for officers alerting the schools about traumatic incidents involving students through the implantation of “Handle with Care”.
 Plan community and police engagement efforts in the school (i.e. listening tour, feedback forums etc.)
 Align district and city safe passageway strategies and create cohesive, streamline system. Safe passageways provide safety for a person in trouble. Provides a juvenile with a safe route.
Officer in the Classroom
This pilot program, beginning at Speedway Academy, is designed to foster positive relationships between members of the Newark Police Division and the Newark student community. Detective Sequoya Martin from the Police Division’s Juvenile Services Section is assigned to mentor a group of 7th grade students selected by the school’s principal. Detective Martin has met with students for approximately two hours on Thursdays to discuss topics mutually agreed upon by the school principal, a designated school staff member, the students and/or the detective. The topics will include current events or other topics or matters of interest.
Home Visits - Weekly Electric Monitoring / GPS Monitoring
Personnel assigned to the Juvenile Services Section also provide a list of individuals who are on Electric Monitoring and/or GPS Monitoring Alternative Detention Program. Electronic Monitoring is widely known to law enforcement as an ankle bracelet. A more appropriate definition is community supervision through wireless equipment (Ankle Bracelet). Juveniles sometimes violate their sanctions. A condition of the sanctions is for the juvenile to cooperate and participate in the program. However, too often, they do not and there is no follow up. A judge will then issue a warrant for a probation violation. Juvenile Services personnel are provided this information for Home Visit Wellness Checks where the intent is to meet with the parent or guardian and discuss programs. If a juvenile violates the agreement then parents and juvenile are encouraged to turn themselves in.

SIGNATURE: ____________________________ SIGNATURE: Elvis Perez,
SUPERIOR RECEIVING REPORT

DATE: _________________________________ RANK:
DPI 1001

Lieutenant

OS227OPOLICE

_ __

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 156 of 214 PageID:

POLICE DEPARTMENT

ADMINISTRATIV2E6S3U7BMISSION

NEWARK, NJ

TO:

Brian O’Hara, Commander

DATE:

SEPTEMBER 26, 2018

Consent Decree and Planning Division

FROM:

Elvis Perez, Police Lieutenant Juvenile Services Section

SUBJECT: JUVENILE SERVICES SECTION

Family Referral Services
Personnel assigned to the Juvenile Services Section, assist families and juveniles with non-police related matters. By referring troubled or at-risk juveniles and families to the appropriate social service programs. Listed below are some of the organizations and programs the Juvenile Services Section works closely with.
Essex County Juvenile Day Report Center
Juvenile services personnel work closely with the Essex County Day Reporting Center, or DRCs, are nonresidential treatment facilities designed to provide services and supervision to a variety of offender groups. The programming consists of regular drug testing and daily treatment sessions and is divided into three Phases. The first phase involves orientation sessions and assessments that are intended to be used to create a treatment plan, while the second phase includes treatment based on the plan. Individuals are considered to be in the third phase of the program when they gain employment or attend an approved educational or vocational training program; this phase also involves the creation of a relapse prevention plan. Each DRC provided the following services, at a minimum: assessment and case management, life skills training, job skills development, employment counseling and placement, substance abuse counseling that is typically provided by external service providers, academic assistance, referrals to mental health counseling, parenting skills, stress and anger reduction, money management, and health-focused sessions. The standard programming length is 90 days
Essex County Juvenile Evening Reporting Center- Newark
Much like the Day reporting Center, this program involves juveniles who have been placed on an electronic monitoring program. Usually a higher impact juvenile offender. They are picked up and activities are scheduled and involve community service as well as sporting actives like boxing. Juvenile services personnel prepare random visits and engage with the juveniles in a positive non-threating manner to follow up on progress and transition.
Newark Cares Program
The Newark Police Division has collaborated with the DEA, the Newark Board Education, to implement the Newark Cares program. The Newark Cares program is a tool for school personnel to assist with mitigating negative affects experienced by children exposed to trauma. School Resource Officers coordinates with the Newark Board of Education security to ensure the Newark Cares notice is forwarded to the proper authority at the respective school.

SIGNATURE: ____________________________ SIGNATURE: Elvis Perez,
SUPERIOR RECEIVING REPORT

DATE: _________________________________ RANK:
DPI 1001

Lieutenant

OS227OPOLICE

_ __

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 157 of 214 PageID:

POLICE DEPARTMENT

ADMINISTRATIV2E6S3U8BMISSION

NEWARK, NJ

TO:

Brian O’Hara, Commander

DATE:

SEPTEMBER 26, 2018

Consent Decree and Planning Division

FROM:

Elvis Perez, Police Lieutenant Juvenile Services Section

SUBJECT: JUVENILE SERVICES SECTION

Cops and Kids Workshops
All Stars project -Operation Cops and kids is the All Stars projects award –winning police community relations program designed to foster positive interactions between the police and young people from poor communities. Through a series of workshops and theatrical productions that use performance, improvisation and conversation. Over 200 Newark Police officers have participated thus far.
Youth Advocate Program Inc.
Youth Advocate is a nationally recognized nonprofit organization committed to providing cost-effective, community based alternatives to institutional placement. Youth Advocate specializes in serving the most high and complex need children, youth and families by providing intensive, unconditional support.
New Jersey Youth Challenge Academy
The Mission of the New Jersey Youth Challenge Academy is to provide highly disciplined environment fostering academics, leadership development, physical training and personal growth to educate and train unemployed youth who have ceased to attend high school. Detectives assist through the application process and recruit interested candidates through engagement in school events or through community contact.

SIGNATURE: ____________________________ SIGNATURE: Elvis Perez,
SUPERIOR RECEIVING REPORT

DATE: _________________________________ RANK:
DPI 1001

Lieutenant

OS227OPOLICE

_ __

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Appendix F

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City of Newark Consent Decree Community Assessment Second Assessment of the Newark Police Division July 2019 Rutgers University Center on Policing Rutgers Institute for Secure Communities
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Table of Contents
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................................................. 4 Methodology................................................................................................................................................................................. 5
Identifying Themes ................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Results ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................................................................................. 7 Themes and Officer Characteristics ........................................................................................................................................ 11 Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................................... 19 Within Department Bias ......................................................................................................................................................... 19
2019 Findings ...................................................................................................................................................................... 19 Comparisons Between 2017 and 2019 ............................................................................................................................... 19 Policing Bias ............................................................................................................................................................................ 19 2019 Findings ...................................................................................................................................................................... 19 Comparisons Between 2017 and 2019 ............................................................................................................................... 19 Department Leadership .......................................................................................................................................................... 20 2019 Findings ...................................................................................................................................................................... 20 Comparisons Between 2017 and 2019 ............................................................................................................................... 20 Community Support................................................................................................................................................................20 2019 Findings ......................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Comparisons Between 2017 and 2019 .................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. Fear of Criticism ...................................................................................................................................................................... 20 2019 Findings ...................................................................................................................................................................... 20 Comparisons Between 2017 and 2019 ............................................................................................................................... 20 Filmed Encounters .................................................................................................................................................................. 20 2019 Findings ...................................................................................................................................................................... 20 Comparisons Between 2017 and 2019 ............................................................................................................................... 20 Media Scrutiny ........................................................................................................................................................................ 21 2019 Findings ...................................................................................................................................................................... 21 Comparisons Between 2017 and 2019 ............................................................................................................................... 21 Appendix A: Design and Administration of the Survey...............................................................................................................22 Survey Design..........................................................................................................................................................................23 2018/2019 Assessment...........................................................................................................................................................23
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Appendix B: Survey Instrument .................................................................................................................................................. 26 Appendix C: Frequency Tables for Individual Survey Items........................................................................................................34
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List of Tables
Table 1: Descriptions of Themes.................................................................................................................................. 6 Table 2: Officer Personal Background Characteristics .................................................................................................. 7 Table 3: Officer Professional Background Characteristics ............................................................................................ 9 Table 4: Reason for Becoming an Officer (Pick 2) – Not Ranked…............................................................................... 10 Table 5: Reason for Becoming an Officer (Pick 2) – Ranked…………………………………………………………………………………...11 Table 6: Police Priorities (Pick 3) – Not Ranked……………………………………………………………………………………………………..11 Table 7: Police Priorities (Pick 3) – Ranked… ..............................................................................................................12 Table 8: Level of Perceived Within Department Bias and Officer Characteristics ..................................................... 13 Table 9: Level of Perceived Bias in Policing and Officer Characteristics .....................................................................14 Table 10: Level of Perceived Department Leadership and Officer Characteristics.................................................... 15 Table 11: Level of Perceived Community Support and Officer Characteristics…....................................................... 16 Table 12: Level of Fear of Criticism and Officer Characteristics…..............................................................................17 Table 13: Level of Perceived Changes Due to Potentially Filmed Encounters and Officer
Characteristics………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….18 Table 14: Level of Perceived Negative Effects of Media Scrutiny and Officer Characteristics………………………………..19
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Methodology
The Consent Decree aims to reform the Newark Police Division (NPD) so its policing services “delivered to the people of Newark fully comply with the Constitution and the laws of the United States, promote public and officer safety, and increase the public confidence in the Newark Department of Public Safety and the Newark Police Division. . . and it’s officers.”1 Paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Consent Decree require a representative survey of the Newark Police Division (among other stakeholder groups) be completed.
This report details the experiences, attitudes, and perceptions of NPD officers, and differences over time, by analyzing the results of a department-wide survey of NPD officers (see Appendix A for a detailed description of the design and administration of this survey). It follows and largely replicates the methodology of the survey of NPD officers conducted by Dr. Todd Clear and the Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice reported in January 2017.
The survey (see Appendix B) was divided into four sections: 1) personal and professional background; 2) job satisfaction; 3) community policing, police legitimacy, and procedural justice; and 4) police-community relations. Background items presented in Section 1 were designed to be forced choice and rank-order responses. Items in Sections 2 through 4 were posed as statements with participants answering on a six-point Likert scale.
1 = Strongly Disagree 2 = Moderately Disagree 3 = Slightly Disagree 4 = Slightly Agree 5 = Moderately Agree 6 = Strongly Agree
A total of 493 NPD officers completed this survey. The present analysis focuses on the attitudes and opinions of these officers, and compares these findings to the results of the 2017 analysis.
Identifying Themes
The first step in the 2017 analysis was to identify themes related to police-community relations that were captured in the instrument. To identify themes, the researchers performed a series of factor analyses. Factor analysis is a commonly used strategy for reducing a large number of items in a survey into a series of “factors” that are conceptually related and mathematically consistent. Each item that goes into a factor represents a dimension of a larger abstract concept, or theme.2 The analyses identified seven coherent factors that each reflect themes of interest to the consent decree.3 These themes include: 1) department leadership; 2) within department bias; 3) policing bias; 4) fear of criticism; 5) community support; 6) media scrutiny, and 7) filmed encounters.
Researchers then created a summary score for each of these factors by adding together the individual items and dividing by the number of items making up each theme. This conversion yields an average response on the original six-point Likert scale. Descriptions of each of these themes are provided in Table 1, along with the number of survey items represented in each construct.
1 United States of America v. City of Newark (2016). Consent Decree, No. 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH. 2 Frankfort-Nachmias, Chava & David Nachmias (2008). Research Methods in the Social Sciences (7th ed.). New York, NY: Worth Publishers. 3 Each factor consisted of at least three questions with an Eigenvalue of at least 1 and factor loadings greater than 0.60.
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Table 1: Descriptions of Themes

Theme Department Leadership Within Department Bias Policing Bias
Fear of Criticism Community Support Media Scrutiny Filmed Encounters

Description
Represents officers’ trust in the department, the clarity of departmental rules, and belief that the department is heading in a positive direction working with the community Assesses the extent to which officers believe NPD command staff treats all of its employees the same regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation Assesses the extent to which respondents believe police officers in Newark are less respectful or use more force against citizens who are non-white, do not speak English, or are gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender Measures the degree to which participants feel community complaints and fear of being unfairly punished impact officer behavior Captures how supportive the community is perceived of being to Newark PD
Examines whether repeated media coverage questioning police use of force impacts officer behaviors and attitudes towards the job Represents the extent to which officers report reduced aggression or engagement with civilians due to the potential of being filmed or recorded in a police-citizen encounter

# of Items 8 4 6
3 4 6 3

Results
Results are presented in two ways. First, we present descriptive information on individuals who participated in this survey. Second, we present the distribution of responses for each theme along various officer characteristics (personal and professional).4

4 In these tables, we provide a chi-square test for each item. Chi-square is a non-directional test that examines the probability that differences between observed and expected frequencies in a sample could be due to chance, rather than actual differences in the larger population.
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Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 contains descriptive information on a variety of officer personal background characteristics.5 The average age of the respondents was 40.7 years, with the largest age group being 40 to 49 years old (34 percent). Eighty percent of NPD officers (N=383) identified as male compared to female (N=96). In terms of racial composition, the majority of officers were white (45.2 percent; N=198), followed by black officers (35.2 percent; N=154), officers of other races (18.9 percent; N=83), and Asian officers (.7 percent; N= 3). Additionally, approximately half of respondents identified as Hispanic or Latino (46.8 percent ; N=203).
5 For all tables, percentages within each variable may not exactly total 100.0 due to rounding error.
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Examining educational attainment, half of the officers have some college (N=217), while 12.2 percent have an Associate’s Degree (N=53), 22.4 percent have a Bachelor’s Degree (N=97), and 1.6 percent have a Master’s Degree or higher (N=7). Similar numbers of officers are married (45.8 percent; 218) or single (43.5 percent; N=207), and 9.2 percent of officers are divorced or separated (N=44). More than half of officers do not live in the City of Newark (55.4 percent; N=236), and approximately 10 percent (N=48) have prior military experience.
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Table 3 contains descriptive information on the professional background characteristics of officers. The average number of years of total experience as a police officer was comparable to the average experience as a police officer in Newark at 13.7 versus 14 years, respectively. Over half of officers have more than 15 years of experience as a police officer in general (52.3 percent; N=246) and as a police officer in Newark (50.6 percent; N=235). A third of officers have less than five years’ experience in policing in general (33.4 percent; N=157) and experience policing in Newark (34.9; N=162). In terms of rank, officers comprised the majority of respondents (57.1 percent; N=265) followed by detectives (21.1 percent; N=98), supervisors (18.5 percent; N=86), and special police officers (3.2 percent; N=15). Most officers reported patrol as their current assignment (55.8 percent; N=224), while 22.4 percent of officers indicated investigative (N=90) and 21.7 percent administrative (N=87). When disaggregated by precinct, the two precincts with the largest representation were the 3rd and 5th precincts at 27.9 percent (N=69) and 16.6 percent (N=41), respectively. The 2nd precinct was a close third at 16.2 percent (N=40). The shift with the highest number of officers working was the 2nd shift (37.5 percent) followed by 1st shift (31.4 percent), while fewer officers worked the 3rd shift (17.6 percent) or a rotating shift (10.1 percent). Only 13 officers (3.5 percent) work the 4th shift. Approximately 20 percent of officers (N= 94) reported ever having discharged their firearm in the line of duty. When reviewing responses on citizen complaints, 40.3 percent (N=184) of officers indicated that they have had two to five citizen complaints filed against them, whereas 22.1 percent (N=101) reported zero complaints and 19.7 percent (N=90) reported six or more complaints.6 Finally, 74.9 percent (N=347) of officers indicated that they have been the subject of an internal affairs investigation during the course of their career.
Respondents were also asked to rank the top two reasons for why they became a police officer. These results are expressed in two different ways. First, in Table 4, we report the number of officers who indicated a given reason was one of their top two choices in no particular order (e.g., not ranked). Nearly 63 percent of officers (N=297) indicated “to serve the community” as one of the top two reasons why they became a police officer. The next most frequently selected option was “to protect people from violent criminals” (44.9 percent; N=213), then “to fight crime” (38.0 percent; N=180) and “for the steady pay and benefits” (30.8 percent; N= 146).
6 Responses on the number of citizen complaints from the original 2017 report cannot be directly compared to the findings of this report. While the survey item calling for the number of citizen complaints was formatted identically to the survey instrument included with the original report (see Appendix B), the responses in this survey were aggregated into different numerical categories (i.e., officers with zero complaints, officers with one compliant; officers with two to five complaints, etc.) than the numerical categories used in the 2017 report. As a result, the findings of each report must be viewed as standalone measures for this area.
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Second, in Table 5, we report the ranked version of the question. Officers ranked “to serve the community” as their first and second most frequent reasons at 35.3 (N=144) percent and 31.5 (N=121) percent respectively.
Similar to the previous question, officers were asked to rank the top three priorities for police from a list of eight potential options. We report in Table 6 the number of officers who indicated an option was a top three priority for law enforcement in no particular order (e.g., not ranked). The most frequently selected priority was “develop positive relationships with people in neighborhoods I serve” (65.9 percent; N=301) followed by “improve the quality of life for all members of the community” (47.5 percent; N=218) and “protect the constitutional rights of all citizens” (47.5 percent; 217). The next most chosen priority of police was “be a role model and/or mentor to youth” with 39.2 percent (N=179).
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Table 7 addresses the same question but reports responses in a ranked order. “Improve the quality of life for all members of the community” was ranked the number one priority of police more than any other options (17.6 percent; N=75). Officers ranked “develop positive relationships with people in neighborhoods I serve” as their second and third most frequent reasons at 29.3 (N=124) and 25.1 (N=104) percent respectively.
Themes and Officer Characteristics
This section contains a series of cross-tabulations of themes identified in Table 1 and officer characteristics. Percentages that are provided reflect the within-group percent distribution. We cross-tabulate seven NPD officer characteristics (gender, race, residence, experience, rank, citizen complaints, and current precinct) with each of the seven themes: (1) bias within the department; (2) policing bias; (3) department leadership; (4) community support; (5) fear of criticism; (6) filmed encounters; and (7) media scrutiny. Each key concept is displayed in a table showing the responses of NPD officers by officer characteristic.
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For ease of interpretation, the response scale was divided into three groups. Specifically, low represents “strongly disagree” and “moderately disagree”; medium represents “slightly disagree” and “slightly agree”; and, high represents “moderately agree” and “strongly agree.” To provide a sense of the importance of the differences, we provide the chi-square statistic (see footnote 4 above). These results are presented in tables 8 through 14 (for frequency distributions of individual survey items, see Appendix C). Within Department Bias (Table 8)
Overall, 56.1 percent of officers (N = 250) perceived low levels of within department bias. Approximately 27.1 percent of officers (N = 121) indicated a medium degree of within department bias and 16.8 percent (N = 75) suggested within department bias is high. Table 8 provides a breakdown of officers’ perceptions by various officer traits.7 First, officers who live in Newark reported lower levels of perceived within department bias compared to officers who do not live in the city. Second, while the majority of all officers perceived low levels of within department bias, officers with less than two years of experience overwhelmingly perceived lower levels of within department bias (95.8 percent) than officers with more experience. Third, officers who reported having previous citizen complaints filed against them perceived higher levels of within department bias than officers with no complaints. Fourth, the 5th precinct had the largest percentage rating of within department bias as low (69.4 percent) whereas the smallest portion with a low rating for within department bias was the 7th precinct (44.4
7 For all analyses, Chi-square *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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percent). The 4th precinct was most likely to report within department bias as high (27.8 percent) and the 1st precinct was least likely to do so (6.9 percent). No substantive differences across gender or race were observed for perceived levels of within department bias. Newark residency, police experience in Newark, and an officer’s history of citizen complaints were all significant factors when examining levels of perceived bias within the department in both the 2017 and 2019 analyses. In 2019, all officers regardless of residency status were more likely to perceive lower levels of within department bias than in 2017. Officers with less than five years of experience policing in Newark were also more likely than their 2017 counterparts to perceive the same low levels of within department bias. Finally, officers in 2019 perceived lower levels of policing bias than officers in 2017 regardless of their history of citizen complaints. Policing Bias (Table 9)
Overall, 79 percent of officers (N = 336) reported low levels of policing bias by NPD. Almost 16.5 percent of officers (N = 70) indicated there is a medium level of bias in NPD policing practices and only 4.5 percent (N = 19) suggested policing bias is high. Table 9 demonstrates that a substantial majority of police officers perceive low levels of policing bias in NPD. However, there were some differences in responses between the races of the officers. White officers and officers of other races indicated low levels of policing bias at 94.3 percent and 84.3 percent respectively, while 58 percent of black officer perceived low levels of policing bias. Additionally, while approximately 10 percent of black officers perceived high levels of policing bias, one percent or less of officers in all other groups perceived these same high levels. Second, the more
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experience an officer has at NPD, the more likely they are to perceive high levels of policing bias. While officers with less than two years of experience or between two and nine years of experience reported low levels of perceived policing bias (93.2 percent and 89.1 percent respectively), less than three quarters of officers with 10 or more years of experience reported low levels of policing bias. No substantive differences across gender, residency, rank, citizen complaint history, or precinct were observed for perceived levels of policing bias. An officer’s race and experience in Newark were both significant factors when examining levels of perceived policing bias in the 2017 and 2019 analyses. Officers of all races were more likely to perceive low levels of policing bias than officers in 2017. The same is true for officers with any length of experience in Newark. Department Leadership (Table 10)
Overall, 55 percent of officers (N = 137) reported high levels of department leadership. Almost 42.6 percent of officers (N = 106) indicated there is a medium level of leadership within the department. Notably, only 2.4 percent of officers (N = 6) rated department leadership as low. Table 10 presents officers’ opinions of department leadership across select traits. First, while the majority of black officers and officers of other races reported higher confidence in department leader, the majority of white officers reported moderate confidence in departmental leadership (49.5 percent), with high levels of department leadership the next most frequent category (46.2 percent). Second, the majority of officers overwhelmingly ranked department leadership as moderate or high across all precincts. The 4th precinct was most likely to report department leadership as high (80 percent) and the 2nd precinct was least likely to do so (40 percent).The 1st precinct had the largest percentage of respondents rating
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department leadership as low (4.3 percent) whereas no respondents in the 2nd, 4th, 6th, or 7th precincts rated department leadership as low. No substantive differences across gender, residency, years of experience, rank, or citizen complaint history were observed for perceived levels of departmental leadership. Community Support (Table 11)
Collectively, the majority of officers (56 percent) rated community support for NPD as medium (N = 230), followed by high (29.7 percent; N = 122) and low (14.4 percent; N = 59). Table 11 reports participants’ perceived level of community support varied across a number of officer characteristics. While gender, residency, experience, and precinct were all significant factors in 2017, none of the variables were significant in this year’s analysis.
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Fear of Criticism (Table 12)
Overall, 49.2 percent of officers (N = 214) indicated high levels of fear of criticism while 43.9 percent (N= 191) indicated medium levels. In contrast, only 6.9 percent of officers (N = 30) reported low levels of fear of criticism. Table 12 displays results disaggregated by officer characteristics for self-reported levels of fear of criticism. First, both female and male officers report high levels of fear of criticism (50.6 percent and 49.3 percent respectively), yet females are more likely than males to report low levels of fear of criticism (12.9 and 5.6 percent respectively). Second, officers with a history of citizen complaints are more likely than their peers to have high levels of fear of criticism. No substantive differences across race, residency, years of experience, rank, or precinct were observed for perceived levels of fear of criticism. An officer’s history of citizen complaints was a significant factor when examining levels of fear of criticism in both the 2017 and 2019 analyses. Compared to 2017, officers in 2019 were less likely to report high levels of fear of criticism.
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Filmed Encounters (Table 13)
Overall, slightly more than half of officers (55 percent; N = 238) report low levels of changes in behavior due to potentially being filmed, followed by medium levels of change (32.6 percent; N = 141) and high levels of change (12.5 percent; N = 54). Table 13 reports the distribution of officer attitudes towards the potential of being filmed and select officer characteristics. First, officers with two to nine years of experience were most likely to report low levels of change in officers’ behaviors due to the potential of being filmed in a citizen encounter (68 percent). Officers with more than 10 years of experience were the most likely group to perceive high levels of such change (14.9 percent). Second, officers with a rank below sergeant were more likely to perceive lower levels of change in officers’ behaviors due to the potential of being filmed in a citizen encounter (62.1 percent) compared to officers who hold a rank of sergeant or above (45.1 percent). No substantive differences across gender, race, residency, citizen complaint history, or precinct were observed for perceived levels of change due to filmed encounters. An officer’s police experience in Newark was a significant factor when examining attitudes toward potentially being filmed in both the 2017 and 2019 analyses. In 2019, regardless of their amount of experience, very few officers reported high levels of perceived change due to potentially being filmed. These results are similar to the findings in 2017.
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Media Scrutiny (Table 14)
Overall, results indicate that media coverage questioning police use of force influences a police officer’s perceptions of the job and policing practices. Specifically, approximately half of officers indicated that the media’s impact is moderate (N = 195) and 29 percent indicated the impact was high (N = 113). By comparison, only 20.8 percent of officers (N = 81) characterized the impact of media scrutiny on officers’ attitudes and behaviors as low. Table 14 presents results by individual characteristics for officers’ perceived effect of media scrutiny. First, while the majority of each group reported moderate effects, males were more likely than females to report high levels of perceived effect of media scrutiny on police work. Second, officers who are not Newark residents report slightly higher levels of perceived effect of media scrutiny than those who are Newark residents (32.6 percent and 28.1 percent respectively), while the majority of each group perceived moderate effects. Third, officers with between two and nine years of experience were the most likely to report higher levels of perceived effect of media scrutiny (35.7 percent). Fourth, while the majority of officers of both groups reported moderate effects, officers with a history of citizen complaints were most likely to report higher levels of perceived effect of media scrutiny (36.5 percent). No substantive differences across race, rank, or precinct were observed for perceived levels of effect of media scrutiny. An officer’s residency in Newark was a significant factor when examining a police officer’s perceived effects of media scrutiny in both the 2017 and 2019 analyses. Compared to 2017, officers in 2019 were more likely to report lower levels of influence in their responses.
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Conclusions
Within Department Bias 2019 Findings
When examining officer’s perceived levels of within department bias, an officer’s residency in Newark, amount of experience, citizen complaint history, and precinct were found to have statistically significant differences within these groups.
• Officers who live in Newark reported lower levels of perceived within department bias compared to officers who do not.
• Officers with less than two years of experience perceived the lowest levels of within department bias compared to more experienced officers.
• Officers who reported having a citizen complaint filed against them perceived higher levels of within department bias than those with no complaints.
• Officers in the 5th precinct were the mostly likely to report low levels of within department bias, while officers in the 4th precinct were most likely to report within department bias as high.
Comparisons Between 2017 and 2019 Compared to the officers who completed the survey in 2017, officers who responded to the 2019 survey reported lower levels of within department bias.
• In 2019, all officers were more likely to perceive lower levels of within department bias than in 2017 regardless of their residency status.
• Officers with less than five years of experience policing in Newark in 2019 were also more likely than their 2017 counterparts to perceive the same low levels of within department bias.
• Finally, officers in 2019 perceived lower levels of policing bias than officers in 2017 regardless of their history of citizen complaints.
Policing Bias 2019 Findings
Upon reviewing the results of survey items on policing bias, race and experience were significant factors.
• A substantial majority of police officers believe there is a low level of policing bias. • A lower percentage of black officers reported perceiving low levels of policing bias than white officers and officers
of other races. • Officers with more experience are more likely to perceive high levels of policing bias.
Comparisons Between 2017 and 2019 Officers who completed the survey in 2019 reported lower levels of policing bias than officers who participated in the survey in 2017.
• Officers of all races in 2019 were more likely to perceive low levels of policing bias than officers in 2017. • The same is true for officers with any length of experience in Newark.
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Department Leadership 2019 Findings
Race and precinct were significant factors when examining departmental leadership.
• White officers were less likely than black officers and officers of other races to report high levels of confidence in department leadership.
• Across all precincts, very few officers reported low levels of confidence in department leadership.
Comparisons Between 2017 and 2019 While residency, experience, and a history of citizen complaints were statistically significant variables for department leadership in 2017, these variables were not statistically significant in 2019.
Community Support
Levels of reported community support did not differ significantly from those in 2017. However, while gender, residency, experience, and precinct were statistically significant variables for community support in 2017, these variables were not statistically significant in 2019.
Fear of Criticism 2019 Findings
The results indicate that both gender and an officer’s citizen complaint history were significant factors when examining officers’ fear of criticism.
• Approximately half of all male and female officers reported high levels of fear of criticism. • Officers with a history of citizen complaints were more likely than officers with no citizen complaints to have high
levels of fear of criticism.
Comparisons Between 2017 and 2019 While officers who responded to the survey in 2019 still report high levels of fear of criticism, these figures have diminished from the responses of officers who took the survey in 2017.
• Compared to 2017, officers with a history of citizen complaints in 2019 were less likely to report high levels of fear of criticism.
Filmed Encounters 2019 Findings
An officer’s years of experience and rank were both significant factors for officer attitudes towards the potential of being filmed.
• Officers with more than 10 years of experience were the most likely group to perceive high levels of change in response to being filmed.
• Officers with a rank below sergeant perceived lower levels of change in officers’ behaviors compared to officers who hold a rank of sergeant or above.
Comparisons Between 2017 and 2019 Officers in this survey reported levels of perceived changes due to filming similar to those reported in 2017.
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• In 2019, regardless of their amount of experience, very few officers reported high levels of perceived changes due to potentially being filmed. These results are similar to the findings in 2017.
Media Scrutiny 2019 Findings
Finally, an officer’s gender, residency in Newark, years of experience, and history of citizen complaints were found to be statistically significant attributes with respect to perception of the effect of media scrutiny.
• Males were more likely than females to report high levels of perceived effect of media scrutiny on police work. • Officers who are not Newark residents reported slightly higher levels of perceived effect of media scrutiny than
those who reside in Newark. • Officers with between two and nine years of experience were more likely to report higher levels of perceived effect
of media scrutiny than officers of other experience levels • Officers with a history of citizen complaints were more likely to report higher levels of perceived effect of media
scrutiny than officers with no citizen complaints Comparisons Between 2017 and 2019 Compared to officers who participated in the 2017 survey, officers who took part in the survey in 2019 were less likely to report high levels of perceived effect of media scrutiny on how officers fulfilled their duties.
• In 2019, officers who were Newark residents were more likely to report lower levels of media influence than Newark-resident officers reported in 2017.
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Appendix A: Design and Administration of the Survey
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Survey Design
The construction of the NPD survey in 2016-2017 was a joint effort among members of the Consent Decree’s Community Assessment Team. Broadly, there were three key components that went into composing the survey instrument. First, survey items from instruments used in evaluations of police from other cities under a Consent Decree (e.g., Los Angeles, CA; New Orleans, LA; Seattle, WA) were incorporated to facilitate generalizability of findings. Second, existing research on police officers’ perceptions, attitudes, and experiences (e.g., Nix & Wolfe 2016, 2017; Reisig et al. 2007; Spector 1994; Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Tankebe 2014; Tyler 2006; Wolfe & Nix 2016) to ensure empirically validated measures of key concepts in police- community relations were included. Third, given the sociodemographic composition and geographic proximity, Newark, NJ is uniquely situated relative to other cities where police departments have been subjected to a Consent Decree. Therefore, in addition to drawing on existing resources, researchers found it prudent to tailor the survey instrument to address issues specific to Newark, NJ.
After the survey was drafted, the research team performed a pre-test of the survey with six sworn police officers from Rutgers University-Newark’s Department of Public Safety (DPS) to examine the validity and reliability of the instrument. Rutgers University-Newark’s DPS was selected for pre-testing the survey for a number of reasons: 1) DPS officers possess the same law enforcement powers as NPD officers, 2) DPS and NPD often collaborate on public safety initiatives, and 3) both departments police in the same urban environment. The composition of the six DPS officers who participated in the pre-test was diverse, representing various races, ethnicities, ranks, and years served in law enforcement. Each participant completed the officer survey in a classroom-type setting comparable to the environment where NPD would later take the survey. Following the completion of the survey, DPS officers discussed the instrument with RU-SCJ representatives; specifically, whether there were any ambiguous or problematic questions and other ways the survey may be improved. Feedback obtained from this pre-test was then incorporated into a revised survey instrument before submitting to Rutgers University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) for approval.
This first administration of the survey took place in 2016 and 2017.
2018/2019 Assessment
Administration of the second assessment began in 2018 following the renewed approval of the IRB. Using the same survey instrument, all NPD officers were given the opportunity to take the survey and document their attitudes and experiences. As a self-reporting survey, all of the data was reported by the officers themselves. For example, participants reported their own rank and assignment in the department.
Because the survey requested personal and professional background information from subjects, the survey was not considered anonymous; instead, the survey was strictly confidential.
The survey was delivered in two formats: pen and paper surveys, and electronic surveys. While administered in two different formats, officers only had one opportunity each to participate in the survey.
Over the course of four months (December 2018 through March 2019), NPD held Use of Force training sessions twice a day up to four days a week. Officers who attended one of the 21 classes where Center on Policing proctors were present were given the opportunity to participate by filling out the paper survey. Prior to the start of the survey, proctors read a disclosure statement indicating that participation was both voluntary and anonymous, that responses would be kept
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confidential, that they could terminate the survey at any time without penalty, and that the Rutgers IRB and Center on Policing staff could be reached at the provided email address and phone numbers should they have any questions about their participation in the survey and/or data handling procedures. A copy of this form was also handed out to all officers.
Officers who did not attend one of these sessions were sent an identical version of the survey electronically through NPD’s PowerDMS system. Prior to the start of the survey, participants read an electronic disclosure statement indicating that participation was both voluntary and anonymous, that responses would be kept confidential, that they could terminate the survey at any time without penalty, and that the Rutgers IRB and Center on Policing staff could be reached at the provided email address and phone numbers should they have any questions about their participation in the survey and/or data handling procedures. Participants were encouraged to save or print a copy of this form for their records.
The software program Qualtrics was used to administer the survey electronically because of its ability to secure data and restrict access. Specifically, the program centralizes survey responses on a secure server without information being stored on any computer used to input the data.
All paper survey responses were entered into an Excel database for cleaning and preliminary descriptive analysis. This database was located on a password protected computer in a locked office at the Rutgers University Center on Policing to ensure only Center on Policing staff had access to the data. Data entry was completed by two student interns at the Rutgers University Center on Policing.
Throughout the process, access to hard copies of completed surveys and the centralized database was restricted to only members of the COP team.
The final descriptive and the thematic analyses were completed using the statistical software program R.
References
Nix, Justin & Scott E. Wolfe (2016). Sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect: The role of managerial organizational justice. Journal of Criminal Justice, 47: 12-20.
Nix, Justin & Scott E. Wolfe (2017). The impact of negative publicity on police self-legitimacy. Justice Quarterly, 34(1).
Reisig, Michael D., Jason Bratton, & Marc G. Gertz (2007). The construct validity and refinement of process-based policing measures. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 34(8): 1005-1028.
Spector, Paul E. (1994). Job satisfaction survey. Tampa, FL: Department of Psychology, University of South Florida.
Sunshine, Jason & Tom R. Tyler (2003). The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping public support for policing. Law & Society Review, 37(3): 513-548.
Tankebe, Justice (2014). Rightful authority: Exploring the structure of police self-legitimacy.
Social Science Research Network: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2499717.
Tyler, Tom (2006). Why People Obey the Law. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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Wolfe, Scott E. & Justin Nix (2016). The alleged “Ferguson Effect” and police willingness to engage in community partnerships. Law and Human Behavior, 40(1): 1-10.
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Appendix B: Survey Instrument

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City of Newark Consent Decree Confidential Survey of Police Officers
2018
This survey is CONFIDENTIAL. The U.S. Department of Justice has approved the confidentiality procedures established by Rutgers University that protect the identities of individuals who complete this survey.
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Section 1: Officer Background

Personal Background

1.1. Age (Years): _________

1.2. Gender:

Male / Female

1.3. Race:

White Black/African American Asian Other: ___________

1.4. Hispanic or Latino/a: 1.5. Highest level of education completed: 1.6. Marital Status:

Yes / No

< High School Some College Bachelor’s Degree

High School/GED Associate Degree Master’s Degree or Higher

Married Divorced Separated Single Other

1.7. Do you live in the city of Newark, NJ?

Yes / No

1.8. Have you ever served in the military?

Yes / No

1.8a. If yes, for how many years? _______
1.8b. If yes, during your service were you ever mobilized or deployed to a combat zone?

Yes / No

1.9. Which of the following best describes why you became a police officer? Rank the top 2 reasons: “1” = primary reason and “2” = secondary reason.
___ To fight crime ___ To serve the community ___ To protect people from violent criminals ___ For the steady pay and benefits ___ For the excitement
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___ For the power and authority ___ Other: _____________________________________________________

Professional Background

1.10. How many years have you been a police officer in your career? ______

1.10a. How many years have you been an officer with the Newark Police Division (NPD)? _____

1.11. Current Rank: ________________________

1.12. Current Assignment:

Patrol

Investigative

Administrative

1.12a. What assignments have you previously had with Newark PD? (check all that apply)

[ ] Alcohol Beverage Control [ ] Patrol

[ ] Homicide

[ ] Fugitive Apprehension [ ] Major Crimes [ ] Narcotics

[ ] Other Investigative

[ ] Metro Division [ ] Traffic

[ ] Special Victims [ ] Taxi Unit [ ] Administrative

1.13. Current Precinct:

1st

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

1.14. Current Shift:

1st

2nd

3rd Rotating

1.15. Have you ever discharged your firearm in the line of duty?

Yes / No

1.16. Have you ever had a citizen’s complaint filed against you?

Yes / No

1.16a. If yes, how many complaints?
1.17. Have you ever been the subject of an internal affairs investigation?

1

2-5

6-10

11+

Yes / No

1.18. In your opinion, what are the most important tasks for law enforcement? Rank the 3 highest priorities: “1” = most important, “2” = second most important, and “3” = third most important.
___ Be a role model and/or mentor to youth ___ Communicate with victims of crime about the status of their case ___ Respond to all calls for service quickly
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___ Make arrests and issue summonses ___ Develop positive relationships with people in neighborhoods I serve ___ Protect the constitutional rights of all citizens ___ Improve the quality of life for all members of the community ___ Control the streets

Section 2: Job Satisfaction

Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

2.1. As a police officer, I believe I occupy a position of special importance in society. 2.2. I feel a sense of pride in doing my job.

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

2.3. I feel I am being paid fairly for the work I do.

1

2

3

4

5 6

2.4. The daily tasks that I perform for my job are what I expected them to be when I first became an officer. 2.5. I feel that the local community I police values the work I do. 2.6. I feel that my supervisors support me in the work I do.

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

2.7. Generally, in my precinct, my fellow officers treat me with respect. 2.8. Generally, in my precinct, my supervisors treat me with respect. 2.9. NPD command staff treats employees the same regardless of their:
2.9a. Race
2.9b. Ethnicity 2.9c. Gender 2.9d. Sexual Orientation
2.10. My precinct provides a quality work environment.

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

2.11. I receive the training I need from the police department that helps me do my job. 2.12. I receive quality equipment from the police department that helps me do my job. 2.13. The goals of this organization are clear to me.

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

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2.14. I understand clearly what type of behavior will result in discipline within my department. 2.15. NPD’s investigation of civilian complaints is fair.
2.16. My agency’s policies are designed to allow employees to have a voice in agency decisions (e.g., assignment changes, discipline). 2.17. I trust the direction that my department’s command staff is taking our agency. 2.18. NPD policies clearly define how to interact with people who exhibit symptoms of mental illness, in order to get them the help they need. 2.19. NPD provides the training, resources and tools that I need to safely resolve situations involving individuals who are in crisis situations.

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

Section 3: Community Policing, Police Legitimacy, and Procedural Justice

Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

3.1. The manner in which I interact with civilians influences the way the community perceives the police department. 3.2. I feel my job helps the community.

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

3.3. I routinely work with community members in my daily duties. 3.4. Youth programs improve relations between the police and community. 3.5. Law enforcement strategies in my precinct promote community relations. 3.6. To do their jobs well, police officers need to try to solve non-crime problems in their patrol areas. 3.7. Performance evaluation measures for NPD encourage officers to engage in community policing. 3.8. Community policing is most effective when there is a specialized community policing unit responsible for it. 3.9. The community has confidence in NPD to reduce crime. 3.10. The fact that I could be filmed or recorded by civilians:
a. Makes me change my approach to the situation b. Makes me less aggressive c. Makes me less likely to get involved 3.11. Community complaints about NPD change the way NPD officers perform their jobs. 3.12. Fear of being unfairly disciplined changes the way many police officers do their jobs.

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

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3.13. I am afraid I will be punished for making an honest mistake. 3.14. NPD command staff takes a tough stance on improper behavior by police. 3.15. It is not unusual for a police officer in Newark to turn a blind eye to improper conduct by other officers. 3.16. An officer in Newark who reports another officer’s misconduct is likely to be given the cold shoulder by fellow officers. 3.17. Police officers in Newark treat white people better than they do black people. 3.18. Police officers in Newark treat white people better than they do people who are Latino. 3.19. Police officers in Newark often treat people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender with less respect than others. 3.20. Police officers in Newark treat people who do not speak English with less respect than English speakers. 3.21. Police officers in Newark are more likely to use physical force against black people than against white people in similar situations. 3.22. Police officers in Newark are more likely to use physical force against people who are Latino than against white people in similar situations.

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

Section 4: Police-Community Relations

Strongly Disagree

4.1. Generally, officers in my precinct are respected by adults in the community. 4.2. Generally, officers in my precinct are respected by juveniles in the community. 4.3. Generally, residents in the community I work in trust NPD. 4.4. Generally, NPD today receives more support from the community than one year ago. 4.5. The community does not understand the risks officers face in their job. 4.6. Being a police officer is a dangerous job.

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

4.7. My career has been negatively affected by citizen complaints. 4.8. Having police wear cameras improves relations between the police and community. 4.9. Footage from police officers’ body-worn cameras should be made available to the public.

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

Strongly Agree

4

5 6

4

5 6

4

5 6

4

5 6

4

5 6

4

5 6

4

5 6

4

5 6

4

5 6

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4.10. When wearing a camera, officers are less likely to use force even when it is necessary. 4.11. Repeated media coverage questioning police use of force has: a. Made it more difficult to do my job.
b. Made it more dangerous to be a law enforcement officer.
c. Caused me to be more apprehensive about using force even though it may be necessary.
d. Caused me to be less likely to want to work with community members to solve local problems.
e. Made it less enjoyable to have a career in law enforcement.
f. Caused my coworkers to be more apprehensive about using force even though it may be necessary.

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

33

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 192 of 214 PageID: 2673
Appendix C: Frequency Tables for Individual Survey Items

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 193 of 214 PageID: 2674

As a police officer, I believe I occupy a position of special importance in society. 2017

(NA = 18) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 998 22
11 38 102 226 599

Percent 2.2
1.1 3.8 10.2 22.7 60

Cumulative Percent 2.2
3.3 7.1 17.3 40 100

N = 467 23 6 28 40 90
280

2019

Percent 4.9 1.3 6.0 8.6
19.3 60.0

Cumulative Percent 4.9 6.2
12.2 20.8 40.0 100.0

Cum. % Point Change 2.7 2.9 5.1 3.5 0.0 0.0

I feel a sense of pride in doing my job.

2017

(NA = 17) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 1000 21
12 16 57 179 715

Percent 2.1
1.2 1.6 5.7 17.9 71.5

Cumulative Percent 2.1
3.3 4.9 10.6 28.5 100

N = 476 18 6 17 26
77 332

2019

Percent 3.8 1.3 3.6 5.5
16.2 69.7

Cumulative Percent 3.8 5.0 8.6
14.1 30.3 100.0

Cum. % Point Change 1.7 1.7 3.7 3.5 1.8 0.0

I feel I am being paid fairly for the work I do.

2017

(NA = 16) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree
Strongly Agree

N = 994 128 104 188 254 170
150

Percent 6.3 9.7
17.9 26.2 22.6
17.3

Cumulative Percent 6.3
16.0 33.9 60.1 82.7
100.0

N = 477 115 51 96 113 66
36

2019

Percent 24.1 10.7 20.1 23.7 13.8
7.5

Cumulative Percent 24.1 34.8 54.9 78.6 92.5
100.0

Cum. % Point Change 17.8 18.8 21.0 18.5 9.8
0.0

% Point Change 2.7 0.2 2.2 -1.6 -3.4 0.0
% Point Change 1.7 0.1 2.0 -0.2 -1.7 -1.8
% Point Change 17.8 1.0 2.2 -2.5 -8.8 -9.8

35

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 194 of 214 PageID: 2675

The daily tasks that I perform for my job are what I expected them to be when I first become an officer.

2017

2019

(NA = 16) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 994 63 96
178 260 225 172

Percent 6.3 9.7
17.9 26.2 22.6 17.3

Cumulative Percent 6.3 16
33.9 60.1 82.7 100

N = 476 50 54 92
127 96 57

Percent 10.5 11.3 19.3 26.7 20.2 12.0

Cumulative Percent 10.5 21.8 41.2 67.9 88.0
100.0

I feel that the local community I police values the work I do. 2017

(NA = 15) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 996 124 137 212 241 148 134

Percent 12.5 13.8 21.3 24.2 14.9 13.5

Cumulative Percent 12.5 26.2 47.5 71.7 86.6 100

2019

N = 478 80 76
110 105
64 43

Percent 16.7 15.9 23.0 22.0 13.4 9.0

Cumulative Percent 16.7 32.6 55.6 77.6 91.0
100.0

I feel that my supervisors support me in the work I do. 2017

(NA = 215) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree

N = 1003 42 60 87
186 329

Percent 4.2 6 8.7
18.5 32.8

Cumulative Percent 4.2
10.2 18.8 37.4 70.2

2019

N = 278 9 9
34 61 91

Percent 3.2 3.2
12.2 21.9 32.7

Cumulative Percent 3.2 6.5
18.7 40.6 73.4

Cum. % Point Change 4.2 5.8 7.3 7.8 5.3 0.0
Cum. % Point Change 4.2 6.4 8.1 5.9 4.4 0.0
Cum. % Point Change -1.0 -3.7 -0.1 3.2 3.2

% Point Change 4.2 1.6 1.4 0.5 -2.4 -5.3
% Point Change 4.2 2.1 1.7 -2.2 -1.5 -4.5
% Point Change -1.0 -2.8 3.5 3.4 -0.1
36

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 195 of 214 PageID: 2676

Strongly Agree

299

29.8

100

74

26.6

100.0

0.0

-3.2

Generally, in my precinct, my fellow officers treat me with respect. 2017

(NA = 20) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 994 14 17 18 73
326 547

Percent 1.4 1.7 1.8 7.3
32.8 55

Cumulative Percent 1.4 3.1 4.9
12.3 45
100

N = 473 12 9 12 33
131 276

2019

Percent 2.5 1.9 2.5 7.0
27.7 58.4

Cumulative Percent 2.5 4.4 7.0
14.0 41.6 100.0

Generally, in my precinct, my supervisors treat me with respect. 2017

(NA = 20) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 995 20
24 37 97 327 489

Percent 2
2.4 3.7 9.8 32.9 49.2

Cumulative Percent 2
4.4 8.2 17.9 50.8 100

N = 473 12 11 26 42
113 269

2019

Percent 2.5 2.3 5.5 8.9
23.9 56.9

Cumulative Percent 2.5 4.9
10.4 19.2 43.1 100.0

NPD command staff treats employees the same regardless of their race. 2017

(NA = 26) Strongly Disagree

N = 995 Percent

115

11.6

Cumulative Percent 11.6

2019

N = 467 Percent Cumulative Percent

59

12.6

12.6

Cum. % Point Change 1.1 1.3 2.1 1.7 -3.4 0.0
Cum. % Point Change 0.5 0.5 2.2 1.3 -7.7 0.0
Cum. % Point Change 1.0

% Point Change 1.1 0.2 0.7 -0.3 -5.1 3.4
% Point Change 0.5 -0.1 1.8 -0.9 -9.0 7.7
% Point Change 1.0
37

Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 196 of 214 PageID: 2677

87

8.7

142

14.3

160

16.1

195

19.6

296

29.8

20.3

31

6.6

19.3

-1.0

34.7

58

12.4

31.7

-3.0

50.7

77

16.5

48.2

-2.5

70.3

70

15.0

63.2

-7.1

100

172

36.8

100.0

0.0

NPD command staff treats employees the same regardless of their ethnicity. 2017

(NA = 37) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 967 105 77 135 154 194 302

Percent 10.9 8 14 16 20.1 31.2

Cumulative Percent 10.9 18.8 32.8 48.7 68.8 100

2019

N = 456 56 27 60 68 76
169

Percent 12.3 5.9 13.2 14.9 16.7 37.1

Cumulative Percent 12.3 18.2 31.4 46.3 62.9
100.0

Cum. % Point Change 1.4 -0.6 -1.4 -2.4 -5.9 0.0

NPD command staff treats employees the same regardless of their gender. 2017

(NA = 38) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 966 101
81 138 152 190 304

Percent 10.5
8.4 14.3 15.7 19.7 31.5

Cumulative Percent 10.5
18.8 33.1 48.9 68.5 100

2019

N = 455 51 31 49 83 78
163

Percent 11.2 6.8 10.8 18.2 17.1 35.8

Cumulative Percent 11.2 18.0 28.8 47.0 64.2
100.0

Cum. % Point Change 0.7 -0.8 -4.3 -1.9 -4.3 0.0

NPD command staff treats employees the same regardless of their sexual orientation. 2017

2019

(NA = 40) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree

N = 958 88 58
132 152

Percent 9.2 6.1
13.8 15.9

Cumulative Percent 9.2
15.2 29
44.9

N = 453 35 20 53 68

Percent 7.7 4.4
11.7 15.0

Cumulative Percent 7.7
12.1 23.8 38.9

Cum. % Point Change -1.5 -3.1 -5.2 -6.0

-2.1 -1.9 0.4 -4.6 7.0
% Point Change 1.4 -2.1 -0.8 -1.1 -3.4 5.9
% Point Change 0.7 -1.6 -3.5 2.5 -2.6 4.3
% Point Change -1.5 -1.7 -2.1 -0.9
38

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 197 of 214 PageID: 2678

Agree

197

20.6

65.5

84

18.5

57.4

-8.1

-2.1

Strongly Agree

331

34.6

100

193

42.6

100.0

0.0

8.0

My precinct provides a quality work environment. 2017

(NA = 26) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 983 71
95 139 227 233 218

Percent 7.2
9.7 14.1 23.1 23.7 22.2

Cumulative Percent 7.2
16.9 31
54.1 77.8 100

2019

N = 467 32 31 48 87
132 137

Percent 6.9 6.6
10.3 18.6 28.3 29.3

Cumulative Percent 6.9
13.5 23.8 42.4 70.7 100.0

I receive the training I need from the police department that helps me do my job. 2017

2019

(NA = 17) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 998 128
169 197 225 151 128

Percent 12.8
16.9 19.7 22.6 15.1 12.8

Cumulative Percent 12.8
29.8 49.5
72 87.2 100

N = 476 39 49 95
110 96 87

Percent 8.2
10.3 20.0 23.1 20.2 18.3

Cumulative Percent 8.2
18.5 38.4 61.6 81.7 100.0

I receive quality equipment I need from the police department that helps me do my job. 2017

2019

(NA = 18)

N = 993 Percent Cumulative Percent

N = 475 Percent Cumulative Percent

Cum. % Point Change -0.3 -3.4 -7.2 -11.7 -7.1 0.0
Cum. % Point Change -4.6 -11.3 -11.1 -10.4 -5.5 0.0
Cum. % Point Change

% Point Change -0.3 -3.1 -3.8 -4.5 4.6 7.1
% Point Change -4.6 -6.6 0.3 0.5 5.1 5.5
% Point Change
39

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 198 of 214 PageID: 2679

Strongly Disagree

195

19.6

19.6

75

15.8

15.8

-3.8

-3.8

Disagree

193

19.4

39.1

79

16.6

32.4

-6.7

-2.8

Weakly Disagree

200

20.1

59.2

96

20.2

52.6

-6.6

0.1

Weakly Agree

207

20.9

80.1

104

21.9

74.5

-5.6

1.0

Agree

118

11.9

91.9

65

13.7

88.2

-3.7

1.8

Strongly Agree

80

8.1

100

56

11.8

100.0

0.0

3.7

The goals of this organization are clear to me. 2017

(NA = 20) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 994 43 55
124 207 308 257

Percent 4.3 5.5
12.5 20.8
31 25.9

Cumulative Percent 4.3 9.9
22.3 43.2 74.1 100

N = 473 27 33 63 97
127 126

2019

Percent 5.7 7.0
13.3 20.5 26.8 26.6

Cumulative Percent 5.7
12.7 26.0 46.5 73.4 100.0

I understand clearly what type of behavior will result in discipline within my department. 2017

(NA = 20) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 989 27
26 77 128 293 438

Percent 2.7
2.6 7.8 12.9 29.6 44.3

Cumulative Percent 2.7
5.4 13.1 26.1 55.7 100

N = 473 27 16 35 61
125 209

2019

Percent 5.7 3.4 7.4
12.9 26.4 44.2

Cumulative Percent 5.7 9.1
16.5 29.4 55.8 100.0

Cum. % Point Change 1.4 2.8 3.7 3.3 -0.7 0.0
Cum. % Point Change 3.0 3.7 3.4 3.3 0.1 0.0

% Point Change 1.4 1.5 0.8 -0.3 -4.2 0.7
% Point Change 3.0 0.8 -0.4 0.0 -3.2 -0.1
40

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 199 of 214 PageID: 2680

NPD's investigation of civilian complaints is fair. 2017

(NA = 28) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 987 87 87
145 266 235 167

Percent 8.8 8.8
14.7 27
23.8 16.9

Cumulative Percent 8.8
17.6 32.3 59.3 83.1 100

2019

N = 465 70 38 78 94
100 85

Percent 15.1 8.2 16.8 20.2 21.5 18.3

Cumulative Percent 15.1 23.2 40.0 60.2 81.7
100.0

Cum. % Point Change 6.3 5.6 7.7 0.9 -1.4 0.0

% Point Change 6.3 -0.6 2.1 -6.8 -2.3 1.4

My agency's policies are designed to allow employees to have a voice in agency decisions (e.g., assignment changes, discipline).

2017

2019

(NA = 25) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 992 224 190 202 214 94 68

Percent 22.6 19.2 20.4 21.6 9.5 6.9

Cumulative Percent 22.6 41.7 62.1 83.7 93.2 100

N = 468 127 61 92 94 57 37

Percent 27.1 13.0 19.7 20.1 12.2 7.9

Cumulative Percent 27.1 40.2 59.8 79.9 92.1
100.0

I trust the direction that my department's command staff is taking our agency. 2017

(NA = 24) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 994 56
85 146 252 261 194

Percent 5.6
8.6 14.7 25.4 26.3 19.5

Cumulative Percent 5.6
14.2 28.9 54.2 80.5 100

2019

N = 469 43 32 81
115 119
79

Percent 9.2 6.8
17.3 24.5 25.4 16.8

Cumulative Percent 9.2
16.0 33.3 57.8 83.2 100.0

Cum. % Point Change 4.5 -1.5 -2.3 -3.8 -1.1 0.0
Cum. % Point Change 3.6 1.8 4.4 3.6 2.7 0.0

% Point Change 4.5 -6.2 -0.7 -1.5 2.7 1.0
% Point Change 3.6 -1.8 2.6 -0.9 -0.9 -2.7
41

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 200 of 214 PageID: 2681

NPD policies clearly define how to interact with people who exhibit symptoms of mental illness, in order to get them the help they need.

2017

2019

(NA = 24) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 993 78
117 184 239 228 147

Percent 7.9
11.8 18.5 24.1
23 14.8

Cumulative Percent 7.9
19.6 38.2 62.2 85.2 100

N = 469 27 35 76
112 121
98

Percent 5.8 7.5
16.2 23.9 25.8 20.9

Cumulative Percent 5.8
13.2 29.4 53.3 79.1 100.0

Cum. % Point Change -2.1 -6.4 -8.8 -8.9 -6.1 0.0

% Point Change -2.1 -4.3 -2.3 -0.2 2.8 6.1

NPD provides the training, resources, and tools that I need to safely resolve situations involving individuals who are in crisis situations.

2017

2019

(NA = 22) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 998 128
176 205 218 154 117

Percent 12.8
17.6 20.5 21.8 15.4 11.7

Cumulative Percent 12.8
30.5 51
72.9 88.3 100

N = 471 45 44 95
115
98 74

Percent 9.6 9.3
20.2 24.4 20.8 15.7

Cumulative Percent 9.6
18.9 39.1 63.5 84.3 100.0

The manner in which I interact with civilians influences the way the community perceives the police department.

2017

2019

(NA = 45) Strongly Disagree Disagree

N = 999 20 15

Percent 2
1.5

Cumulative Percent 2
3.5

N = 448 12 7

Percent 2.7 1.6

Cumulative Percent 2.7 4.2

Cum. % Point Change -3.2 -11.6 -11.9 -9.4 -4.0 0.0
Cum. % Point Change 0.7 0.7

% Point Change -3.2 -8.3 -0.3 2.6 5.4 4.0
% Point Change 0.7 0.1
42

Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 201 of 214 PageID: 2682

31

3.1

100

10

229

22.9

604

60.5

6.6

17

3.8

8.0

1.4

16.6

55

12.3

20.3

3.7

39.5

95

21.2

41.5

2.0

100

262

58.5

100.0

0.0

I feel my job helps the community.

2017

(NA = 43) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 1001 13
15 34 119 268 552

Percent 1.3
1.5 3.4 11.9 26.8 55.1

Cumulative Percent 1.3
2.8 6.2 18.1 44.9 100

N = 450 8 5
26 63 129 219

2019

Percent 1.8 1.1 5.8
14.0 28.7 48.7

Cumulative Percent 1.8 2.9 8.7
22.7 51.3 100.0

Cum. % Point Change 0.5 0.1 2.5 4.6 6.4 0.0

0.7 2.3 -1.7 -2.0
% Point Change 0.5 -0.4 2.4 2.1 1.9 -6.4

I routinely work with community members in my daily duties. 2017

(NA = 48) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 983 86
69 142 252 209 225

Percent 8.8
7 14.5 25.6 21.3 22.9

Cumulative Percent 8.8
15.8 30.2 55.9 77.1 100

N = 445 31 37 78
116 97 86

2019

Percent 7.0 8.3
17.5 26.1 21.8 19.3

Cumulative Percent 7.0
15.3 32.8 58.9 80.7 100.0

Youth programs improve relations between the police and community. 2017

2019

Cum. % Point Change -1.8 -0.5 2.6 3.0 3.6 0.0

% Point Change -1.8 1.3 3.0 0.5 0.5 -3.6
43

(NA = 49) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 202 of 214 PageID: 2683

N = 993 21
26 46 132 252 516

Percent 2.1
2.6 4.6 13.3 25.4 52

Cumulative Percent 2.1
4.7 9.4 22.7 48 100

N = 444 13 7 39 61
124 200

Percent 2.9 1.6 8.8
13.7 27.9 45.0

Cumulative Percent 2.9 4.5
13.3 27.0 55.0 100.0

Cum. % Point Change 0.8 -0.2 3.9 4.3 7.0 0.0

Law enforcement strategies in my precinct promote community relations. 2017

(NA = 56) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 975 48
59 145 282 234 207

Percent 4.9
6.1 14.9 28.9
24 21.2

Cumulative Percent 4.9
11 25.9 54.8 78.8 100

N = 437 17 14 51
112 121 122

2019

Percent 3.9 3.2
11.7 25.6 27.7 27.9

Cumulative Percent 3.9 7.1
18.8 44.4 72.1 100.0

Cum. % Point Change -1.0 -3.9 -7.1 -10.4 -6.7 0.0

To do their jobs well, police officers need to try to solve non-crime problems in their patrol areas. 2017

2019

(NA = 47) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 997 33 38
101 248 331 246

Percent 3.3 3.8
10.1 24.9 33.2 24.7

Cumulative Percent 3.3 7.1
17.3 42.1 75.3 100

N = 446 11 12 49
127 134 113

Percent 2.5 2.7
11.0 28.5 30.0 25.3

Cumulative Percent 2.5 5.2
16.1 44.6 74.7 100.0

Performance evaluation measures for NPD encourage officers to engage in community policing. 2017

2019

(NA = 57)

N = 987 Percent Cumulative Percent

N = 436 Percent Cumulative Percent

Cum. % Point Change -0.8 -1.9 -1.2 2.5 -0.6 0.0
Cum. % Point Change

% Point Change 0.8 -1.0 4.2 0.4 2.5 -7.0
% Point Change -1.0 -2.9 -3.2 -3.3 3.7 6.7
% Point Change -0.8 -1.1 0.9 3.6 -3.2 0.6
% Point Change
44

Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 203 of 214 PageID: 2684

79

8

83

8.4

177

17.9

269

27.3

213

21.6

166

16.8

8

28

6.4

6.4

-1.6

16.4

26

6.0

12.4

-4.0

34.4

73

16.7

29.1

-5.3

61.6

121

27.8

56.9

-4.7

83.2

104

23.9

80.7

-2.5

100

84

19.3

100.0

0.0

Community policing is most effective when there is a specialized community policing unit responsible for it.

2017

2019

(NA = 58) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 981 80
88 142 235 236 200

Percent 8.2
9 14.5
24 24.1 20.4

Cumulative Percent 8.2
17.1 31.6 55.6 79.6 100

N = 435 32 23 67
102 109 102

Percent 7.4 5.3
15.4 23.4 25.1 23.4

Cumulative Percent 7.4
12.6 28.0 51.5 76.6 100.0

Cum. % Point Change -0.8 -4.5 -3.6 -4.1 -3.0 0.0

-1.6 -2.4 -1.2 0.5 2.3 2.5
% Point Change -0.8 -3.7 0.9 -0.6 1.0 3.0

The community has confidence in NPD to reduce crime. 2017

(NA = 51) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 994 126
157 233 280 125
73

Percent 12.7
15.8 23.4 28.2 12.6
7.3

Cumulative Percent 12.7
28.5 51.9 80.1 92.7 100

N = 442 38 46
104 134
72 48

2019

Percent 8.6
10.4 23.5 30.3 16.3 10.9

Cumulative Percent 8.6
19.0 42.5 72.9 89.1 100.0

Cum. % Point Change -4.1 -9.5 -9.4 -7.2 -3.6 0.0

% Point Change -4.1 -5.4 0.1 2.1 3.7 3.6
45

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 204 of 214 PageID: 2685

The fact that I could be filmed or recorded by civilians makes me change my approach to the situation.

2017

2019

(NA =54) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 983 402
176 109 120
85 91

Percent 40.9
17.9 11.1 12.2
8.7 9.3

Cumulative Percent 40.9
58.8 69.9 82.1 90.7 100

N = 439 179 67 54 47 40 52

Percent 40.8 15.3 12.3 10.7 9.1 11.8

Cumulative Percent 40.8 56.0 68.3 79.0 88.2
100.0

Cum. % Point Change -0.1 -2.8 -1.6 -3.1 -2.5 0.0

The fact that I could be filmed or recorded by civilians makes me less aggressive. 2017

(NA = 57) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 977 388 183 131 113 77 85

Percent 39.7 18.7 13.4 11.6 7.9 8.7

Cumulative Percent 39.7 58.4 71.9 83.4 91.3 100

N = 436 172 61 66 60 30 47

2019

Percent 39.4 14.0 15.1 13.8 6.9 10.8

Cumulative Percent 39.4 53.4 68.6 82.3 89.2
100.0

Cum. % Point Change -0.3 -5.0 -3.3 -1.1 -2.1 0.0

% Point Change -0.1 -2.6 1.2 -1.5 0.4 2.5
% Point Change -0.3 -4.7 1.7 2.2 -1.0 2.1

The fact that I could be filmed or recorded by civilians makes me less likely to get involved. 2017

(NA = 56) Strongly Disagree Disagree

N = 973 485 169

Percent 49.9 17.4

Cumulative Percent 49.9 67.2

N = 437 221 64

2019

Percent 50.6 14.6

Cumulative Percent 50.6 65.2

Cum. % Point Change
0.7 -2.0

% Point Change 0.7 -2.8
46

Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 205 of 214 PageID: 2686

100

10.3

93

9.6

56

5.8

70

7.2

77.5

47

10.8

76.0

-1.5

87.1

47

10.8

86.7

-0.4

92.8

25

5.7

92.4

-0.4

100

33

7.6

100.0

0.0

Community complaints about NPD change the way NPD officers perform their jobs. 2017

(NA = 52) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 983 83
70 141 212 238 239

Percent 8.4
7.1 14.3 21.6 24.2 24.3

Cumulative Percent 8.4
15.6 29.9 51.5 75.7 100

N = 441 42 28 64
120 78
109

2019

Percent 9.5 6.3
14.5 27.2 17.7 24.7

Cumulative Percent 9.5
15.9 30.4 57.6 75.3 100.0

Cum. % Point Change 1.1 0.3 0.5 6.1 -0.4 0.0

Fear of being unfairly disciplined changes the way many police officers do their jobs. 2017

(NA = 50) Strongly Disagree

N = 992 Percent

55

5.5

Cumulative Percent 5.5

Disagree

45

4.5

10.1

Weakly Disagree

85

8.6

18.7

Weakly Agree

159

16

34.7

Agree

263

26.5

61.2

Strongly Agree

385

38.8

100

I am afraid I will be punished for making an honest mistake. 2017

N = 443 17 14 51 91 90
180

(NA = 53) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 994 115 73 99 176 217 314

Percent 11.6 7.3 10 17.7 21.8 31.6

Cumulative Percent 11.6 18.9 28.9 46.6 68.4 100

N = 440 30 39 54 92 77
148

2019

Percent 3.8 3.2
11.5 20.5 20.3 40.6

Cumulative Percent 3.8 7.0
18.5 39.1 59.4 100.0

2019

Percent 6.8 8.9
12.3 20.9 17.5 33.6

Cumulative Percent 6.8
15.7 28.0 48.9 66.4 100.0

Cum. % Point Change -1.7 -3.1 -0.2 4.4 -1.8 0.0
Cum. % Point Change -4.8 -3.2 -0.9 2.3 -2.0 0.0

0.5 1.2 -0.1 0.4
% Point Change 1.1 -0.8 0.2 5.6 -6.5 0.4
% Point Change -1.7 -1.3 2.9 4.5 -6.2 1.8
% Point Change -4.8 1.6 2.3 3.2 -4.3 2.0
47

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NPD command staff takes a tough stance on improper behaviour by police. 2017

(NA = 53) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 988 30 35 73
197 304 349

Percent 3
3.6 7.4 19.9 30.8 35.3

Cumulative Percent 3
6.6 14 33.9 64.7 100

N = 440 15 9 40 76
124 176

2019

Percent 3.4 2.0 9.1
17.3 28.2 40.0

Cumulative Percent 3.4 5.5
14.5 31.8 60.0 100.0

It is not unusual for a police officer in Newark to turn a blind eye to improper conduct by other officers.

2017

2019

(NA = 62) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 989

Percent

262

26.5

196

19.8

161

16.3

197

19.9

103

10.4

70

7.1

Cumulative Percent 26.5 46.3 62.6 82.5 92.9 100

N = 431 148 92 71 62 25 33

Percent 34.3 21.3 16.5 14.4 5.8 7.7

Cumulative Percent 34.3 55.7 72.2 86.5 92.3
100.0

Cum. % Point Change 0.4 -1.1 0.5 -2.1 -4.7 0.0
Cum. % Point Change 7.8 9.4 9.6 4.0 -0.6 0.0

% Point Change 0.4 -1.6 1.7 -2.6 -2.6 4.7
% Point Change 7.8 1.5 0.2 -5.5 -4.6 0.6

An officer in Newark who reports another officer's misconduct is likely to be given the cold shoulder by fellow officers.

2017

2019

(NA = 60) Strongly Disagree

N = 988 Percent

193

19.5

Cumulative Percent 19.5

N = 433 88

Percent Cumulative Percent

20.3

20.3

Cum. % Point Change
0.8

% Point Change 0.8
48

Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 207 of 214 PageID: 2688

132

13.4

167

16.9

193

19.5

153

15.5

150

15.2

32.9

65

15.0

35.3

2.4

49.8

91

21.0

56.4

6.6

69.3

97

22.4

78.8

9.5

84.8

41

9.5

88.2

3.4

100

51

11.8

100.0

0.0

Police officers in Newark treat white people better than they do black people. 2017

(NA = 55) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 989 573
149 77 72 48 70

Percent 57.9
15.1 7.8 7.3 4.9 7.1

Cumulative Percent 57.9
73 80.8 88.1 92.9 100

N = 438 281 53 33 34 18 19

2019

Percent 64.2 12.1 7.5 7.8 4.1 4.3

Cumulative Percent 64.2 76.3 83.8 91.6 95.7
100.0

Cum. % Point Change 6.3 3.3 3.0 3.5 2.8 0.0

Police officers in Newark treat white people better than they do people who are Latino. 2017

(NA = 56) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 989 571
152 86 80 44 56

Percent 57.7
15.4 8.7 8.1 4.5 5.7

Cumulative Percent 57.7
73.1 81.8 89.9 94.3 100

N = 437 280 56 32 39 16 14

2019

Percent 64.1 12.8 7.3 8.9 3.7 3.2

Cumulative Percent 64.1 76.9 84.2 93.1 96.8
100.0

Cum. % Point Change 6.4 3.8 2.4 3.2 2.5 0.0

1.6 4.1 2.9 -6.0 -3.4
% Point Change 6.3 -3.0 -0.3 0.5 -0.8 -2.8
% Point Change 6.4 -2.6 -1.4 0.8 -0.8 -2.5

Police officers in Newark often treat people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender with less respect than others.
49

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 208 of 214 PageID: 2689

2017

2019

(NA = 56)

N = 991 Percent Cumulative Percent

N = 437 Percent Cumulative Percent

Strongly Disagree

601

60.7

60.7

303

69.3

69.3

Disagree

175

17.7

78.3

61

14.0

83.3

Weakly Disagree

94

9.5

87.8

26

5.9

89.2

Weakly Agree

57

5.8

93.5

29

6.6

95.9

Agree

41

4.1

97.7

11

2.5

98.4

Strongly Agree

23

2.3

100

7

1.6

100.0

0.0

Police officers in Newark treat people who do not speak English with less respect than English speakers.

2017

2019

(NA =56) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 993 557
178 119
77 33 29

Percent 56.1
17.9 12 7.8 3.3 2.9

Cumulative Percent 56.1
74 86 93.8 97.1 100

N = 437 283 59 36 35 15 9

Percent 64.8 13.5 8.2 8.0 3.4 2.1

Cumulative Percent 64.8 78.3 86.5 94.5 97.9
100.0

Cum. % Point Change 8.6 5.0 1.4 2.4 0.7 0.0
Cum. % Point Change 8.7 4.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.0

Police officers in Newark are more likely to use physical force against black people than white people in similar situations.

2017

2019

(NA = 63) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 991 604 135 81 59 52 60

Percent 61
13.6 8.2 6 5.3 6.1

Cumulative Percent 61
74.6 82.7 88.7
94 100

N = 430 298 46 33 23 13 17

Percent 69.3 10.7 7.7 5.3 3.0 4.0

Cumulative Percent 69.3 80.0 87.7 93.0 96.0
100.0

Police officers in Newark are more likely to use physical force against people who are Latino than white people in similar situations.

2017

2019

(NA = 62)

N = 989 Percent Cumulative Percent

N = 431 Percent Cumulative Percent

Cum. % Point Change 8.3 5.4 5.0 4.3 2.0 0.0
Cum. % Point

% Point Change 8.6 -3.7 -3.6 0.8 -1.6 -0.7
% Point Change 8.7 -4.4 -3.8 0.2 0.1 -0.8
% Point Change 8.3 -2.9 -0.5 -0.7 -2.3 -2.1
% Point Change
50

Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 209 of 214 PageID: 2690

606

61.3

132

13.4

94

9.5

65

6.6

53

5.4

39

3.9

61.3

302

70.1

74.6

52

12.1

84.1

28

6.5

90.7

27

6.3

76.1

13

3.0

100

9

2.1

70.1 82.1 88.6 94.9 97.9 100.0

Change
8.8 7.5 4.5 4.2 21.8 0.0

Generally, officers in my precinct are respected by adults in the community. 2017

2019

(NA = 65) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 990

Percent Cumulative Percent

37

3.7

3.7

48

4.9

8.6

120

12.1

20.7

293

29.6

50.3

319

32.2

82.5

173

17.5

100

N = 428 17 12 65
128 124
82

Percent 4.0 2.8
15.2 29.9 29.0 19.2

Cumulative Percent 4.0 6.8
22.0 51.9 80.8 100.0

Cum. % Point Change 0.3 -1.8 1.3 1.6 -1.7 0.0

Generally, officers in my precinct are respected by juveniles in the community. 2017

(NA = 70) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 987 151
192 211 222 145
66

Percent 15.3
19.5 21.4 22.5 14.7
6.7

Cumulative Percent 15.3
34.8 56.1 78.6 93.3 100

N = 423 76 57 95
106 53 36

2019

Percent 18.0 13.5 22.5 25.1 12.5 8.5

Cumulative Percent 18.0 31.4 53.9 79.0 91.5
100.0

Cum. % Point Change 2.7 -3.4 -2.2 0.4 -1.8 0.0

8.8 -1.3 -3.0 -0.3 -2.4 -1.8
% Point Change 0.3 -2.1 3.1 0.3 -3.2 1.7
% Point Change 2.7 -6.0 1.1 2.6 -2.2 1.8

51

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Generally, residents in the community I work in trust NPD. 2017

(NA = 68) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 994 82
112 223 319 174
84

Percent 8.3
11.3 22.4 32.1 17.5
8.5

Cumulative Percent 8.3
19.5 42 74
91.6 100

N = 425 34 31 97
147 83 33

2019

Percent 8.0 7.3
22.8 34.6 19.5
7.8

Cumulative Percent 8.0
15.3 38.1 72.7 92.2 100.0

Generally, NPD today receives more support from the community than one year ago. 2017

(NA = 73) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 992 147 150 226 246 149 74

Percent 14.8 15.1 22.8 24.8 15 7.5

Cumulative Percent 14.8 29.9 52.7 77.5 92.5

N = 420 38 33 86
137 79 47

2019

Percent 9.0 7.9
20.5 32.6 18.8 11.2

Cumulative Percent 9.0
16.9 37.4 70.0 88.8 100.0

The community does not understand the risks officers face in their job. 2017

(NA = 64) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 996 42 37 52
103 247 515

Percent 4.2 3.7 5.2
10.3 24.8 51.7

Cumulative Percent 4.2 7.9
13.2 23.5 48.3 100

N = 429 8 9
30 63 101 218

2019

Percent 1.9 2.1 7.0
14.7 23.5 50.8

Cumulative Percent 1.9 4.0
11.0 25.6 49.2 100.0

Cum. % Point Change -0.3 -4.2 -3.9 -1.3 0.6 0.0
Cum. % Point Change -5.8 -13.0 -15.3 -7.5 -3.7 100.0
Cum. % Point Change -2.3 -3.9 -2.2 2.1 0.9 0.0

% Point Change -0.3 -4.0 0.4 2.5 2.0 -0.7
% Point Change -5.8 -7.2 -2.3 7.8 3.8 3.7
% Point Change -2.3 -1.6 1.8 4.4 -1.3 -0.9

52

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Being a police officer is a dangerous job.

2017

(NA = 65) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 995 25 5 10 25
148 782

Percent 2.5 0.5 1 2.5
14.9 78.6

Cumulative Percent 2.5 3 4 6.5
21.4 100

N = 428 5 1 7
12 60 343

2019

Percent 1.2 0.2 1.6 2.8
14.0 80.1

Cumulative Percent 1.2 1.4 3.0 5.8
19.9 100.0

My career has been negatively affected by citizen complaints. 2017

(NA = 67) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 992 503
169 113
94 34 79

Percent 50.7
17 11.4
9.5 3.4
8

Cumulative Percent 50.7
67.7 79.1 88.6
92 100

N = 426 207 79 51 47 21 21

2019

Percent 48.6 18.5 12.0 11.0 4.9 4.9

Cumulative Percent 48.6 67.1 79.1 90.1 95.1
100.0

Having police wear cameras improves relations between the police and community. 2017

2019

(NA = 63) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree

N = 997 108 58 128

Percent 10.8 5.8 12.8

Cumulative Percent 10.8 16.7 29.5

N = 430 57 29 62

Percent 13.3 6.7 14.4

Cumulative Percent 13.3 20.0 34.4

Cum. % Point Change -1.3 -1.6 -1.0 -0.7 -1.5 0.0
Cum. % Point Change -2.1 -0.6 0.0 1.5 3.1 0.0
Cum. % Point Change 2.5 3.3 4.9

% Point Change -1.3 -0.3 0.6 0.3 -0.9 1.5
% Point Change -2.1 1.5 0.6 1.5 1.5 -3.1
% Point Change 2.5 0.9 1.6
53

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 212 of 214 PageID: 2693

Weakly Agree

222

22.3

51.8

110

Agree

212

21.3

73

83

Strongly Agree

269

27

100

89

Footage from police officers’ body-worn cameras should be made available to the public.

2017

25.6 19.3 20.7
2019

60.0 79.3 100.0

(NA = 66) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 988 186 112 144 192 138 215

Percent 18.8 11.3 14.6 19.5 14 21.8

Cumulative Percent 18.8 30.2 44.7 64.3 78.2 100

N = 427 110 52 69 82
54 60

Percent 25.8 12.2 16.2 19.2 12.6 14.1

Cumulative Percent 25.8 37.9 54.1 73.3 85.9
100.0

8.2 6.3 0.0
Cum. % Point Change 7.0 7.7 9.4 9.0 7.7 0.0

When wearing a camera, officers are less likely to use force even when it is necessary. 2017

2019

(NA =68) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 989 190 127 167 189 159 157

Percent 19.2 12.8 16.9 19.1 16.1 15.9

Cumulative Percent 19.2 32.1 48.9 68.1 84.1 100

N = 425 81 37 76 84 58 89

Percent 19.1 8.7 17.9 19.8 13.6 20.9

Cumulative Percent 19.1 27.8 45.6 65.4 79.1
100.0

Cum. % Point Change -0.1 -4.3 -3.3 -2.7 -5.0 0.0

Repeated media coverage questioning police use of force has made it more difficult to do my job. 2017

2019

(NA =62) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 999 107 83 88 155 223 343

Percent 10.7 8.3 8.8 15.5 22.3 34.3

Cumulative Percent 10.7 19 27.8 43.3 65.7 100

N = 431 51 33 58 82 72
135

Percent 11.8 7.7 13.5 19.0 16.7 31.3

Cumulative Percent 11.8 19.5 32.9 52.0 68.7
100.0

Cum. % Point Change 1.1 0.5 5.1 8.7 3.0 0.0

3.3 -2.0 -6.3
% Point Change 7.0 0.9 1.6 -0.3 -1.4 -7.7
% Point Change -0.1 -4.1 1.0 0.7 -2.5 5.0
% Point Change 1.1 -0.6 4.7 3.5 -5.6 -3.0
54

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Repeated media coverage questioning police use of force has made it more dangerous to be a law enforcement officer.

2017

2019

(NA = 68) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 996 72 48 65
104 229 478

Percent 7.2 4.8 6.5
10.4 23 48

Cumulative Percent 7.2
12.1 18.6
29 52 100

N = 425 36 21 45 61 80
182

Percent 8.5 4.9
10.6 14.4 18.8 42.8

Cumulative Percent 8.5
13.4 24.0 38.4 57.2 100.0

Repeated media coverage questioning police use of force has caused me to be more apprehensive about using force even though it may be necessary.

2017

2019

(NA = 67) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 991 180 135 136 171 170 199

Percent 18.2 13.6 13.7 17.3 17.2 20.1

Cumulative Percent 18.2 31.8 45.5 62.8 79.9 100

N = 426 79 59 68 71 64 85

Percent 18.5 13.8 16.0 16.7 15.0 20.0

Cumulative Percent 18.5 32.4 48.4 65.0 80.0
100.0

Repeated media coverage questioning police use of force has caused me to be less likely to want to work with community members to solve local problems.

2017

2019

(NA = 69) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree

N = 995 337 222 141

Percent 33.9 22.3 14.2

Cumulative Percent 33.9 56.2 70.4

N = 424 147 99 61

Percent 34.7 23.3 14.4

Cumulative Percent 34.7 58.0 72.4

Cum. % Point Change 1.3 1.3 5.4 9.4 5.2 0.0
Cum. % Point Change 0.3 0.6 2.9 2.2 0.1 0.0
Cum. % Point Change 0.8 1.8 2.0

% Point Change 1.3 0.1 4.1 4.0 -4.2 -5.2
% Point Change 0.3 0.2 2.3 -0.6 -2.2 -0.1
% Point Change 0.8 1.0 0.2
55

Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 165-1 Filed 10/25/19 Page 214 of 214 PageID: 2695

Weakly Agree

143

14.4

84.7

65

15.3

87.7

3.0

0.9

Agree

77

7.7

92.5

24

5.7

93.4

0.9

-2.0

Strongly Agree

75

7.5

100

28

6.6

100.0

0.0

-0.9

Repeated media coverage questioning police use of force has made it less enjoyable to have a career in law enforcement.

2017

2019

(NA = 68) Strongly Disagree
Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 993 208 143 129 173 146 194

Percent 21
14.4 13
17.4 14.7 19.5

Cumulative Percent 21
35.4 48.3 65.8 80.5 100

N = 425 78 56 61 80
77 73

Percent 18.4 13.2 14.4 18.8 18.1 17.2

Cumulative Percent 18.4 31.5 45.9 64.7 82.8
100.0

Repeated media coverage questioning police use of force has caused my coworkers to be more apprehensive about using force even though it may be necessary.

2017

2019

(NA = 69) Strongly Disagree Disagree Weakly Disagree Weakly Agree Agree Strongly Agree

N = 992 133 120 141 189 188 221

Percent 13.4 12.1 14.2 19.1 19 22.3

Cumulative Percent 13.4 25.5 39.7 58.8 77.7 100

N = 424 56 45 59 83 77
104

Percent 13.2 10.6 13.9 19.6 18.2 24.5

Cumulative Percent 13.2 23.8 37.7 57.3 75.5
100.0

Cum. % Point Change -2.6 -3.9 -2.4 -1.1 2.3 0.0
Cum. % Point Change -0.2 -1.7 -2.0 -1.5 -2.2 0.0

% Point Change -2.6 -1.2 1.4 1.4 3.4 -2.3
% Point Change -0.2 -1.5 -0.3 0.5 -0.8 2.2

56

 
 Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 166 Filed 11/15/19 Page 1 of 19 PageID: 2696
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.

NO. 16-01731(MCA-MAH)

CITY OF NEWARK, Defendant.
________________________________

NEWARK POLICE DIVISION SEVENTH STATUS REPORT

INTRODUCTION Pursuant to paragraph 197 of the Consent Decree entered in this matter, Defendant, the
City of Newark (“City”), submits this status report to delineate the many steps taken by the Newark Police Division (“NPD,”) to implement the Consent Decree; plans to correct any issues; and responses to any concerns that have been raised by the Independent Monitor (“Monitor”).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The NPD has made significant progress toward complying with the Consent Decree and improving overall services to the community. Below are selected highlights for the reporting period of April 28, 2019 to October 28, 2019.
1. During the reporting period, the Monitor filed the Eighth Quarterly Report on August 9, 2019, which included the Suffolk University Political Research Center Probability Community Survey Final Report and summary materials. The report sets forth the results of the Monitor’s Annual Survey of the Newark community’s experiences with and perceptions of NPD and public safety. Overall, the communities’ perception of the NPD has improved when compared to the 2017 survey results.

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2. During the reporting period and in response to the Monitor’s Sixth Quarterly Report filed on January 16, 2019, NPD met with community members to discuss the challenge of domestic violence as it relates to the NPD reform effort. Meetings were held in the Shani Baraka Women’s Resource Center located at 300 Clinton Avenue, Newark, NJ. Members of the Newark Police Division (i.e., Special Victims Division, Consent Decree & Planning Division) Newark AntiViolence Coalition, Shani Baraka Women’s Resource Center, Unity Fellowship Church, the Ironbound Community Corporation, Newark Communities for Accountable Policing, and members from the community were present. NPD gathered feedback and implemented responses to address community concerns.
3. The NPD continues to collaborate with the IMT Subject Matter Experts (“SME”) and members of the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office to develop and draft high quality progressive police policies and training in accordance with the Consent Decree.
4. During the reporting period, the IMT conducted an audit of training records for all relevant officers in the following Consent Decree areas: (1) community-oriented policing; (2) stops, searches, and arrests; (3) use of force; and (4) in-car and body-worn cameras pursuant to Consent Decree paragraphs 12 and 173.
5. During the reporting period, members of the Consent Decree and Planning Division (CDPD), which serves as the Consent Decree paragraph 196 required implementation unit, attended 128 roll calls to conduct Consent Decree compliance related training. The CDPD also held focus group discussions with NPD officers of various ranks where they had opportunities to share suggestions for community engagement, training, and improving morale.
6. NPD continued to deploy body worn cameras and in-car cameras with all supervisory and Command Staff, equipped during the reporting period. Cameras serve as useful tools for recording evidence, more importantly however; they promote professionalism, accountability, and transparency by documenting officer conduct and interactions with the public including interactions made by command rank officers, in compliance with the Consent Decree. During the reporting period, specifically the weeks of July 29, 2019 and September 2, 2019, the IMT conducted an audit of body worn camera and in-car camera use by members of the NPD. Auditors were given full access to data, videos, documents and materials in compliance with paragraph 196
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of the Consent Decree. As of this reporting period the Monitor has yet to provide the results of the audit to NPD.
7. NPD has participated in numerous community engagements during the reporting period. Among them and most notably, “Operation Conversation: Cops and Kids” where performance, improvisation and conversation help inner-city teenagers and police officers develop a positive relationship. NPD continues to make community engagement and the building of public trust a priority.
8. During the reporting period, NPD created a committee made up of NPD officers and supervisors to develop a youth engagement strategy. Although community engagement is a daily practice in NPD, which also includes engagement with the youth at levels never seen before, NPD acknowledges that a guiding document which creates a framework for all officers, will help NPD focus its efforts and help guide future engagement with youth in a more efficient and consistent manner.
9. NPD has expanded its use of the Bar Coded Evidence Analysis Statistical Tracking (BEAST) System across all precincts, the Major Crimes Division and the Municipal Arrest Processing Section (MAPS) during the reporting period. The BEAST has helped to improve upon the documenting and tracking of property and evidence, ensuring consistent data collection, and the centralizing of information relevant to property & evidence.
10. During the reporting period, NPD has undertaken the review of disciplinary histories of NPD personnel who routinely handle valuable contraband or cash to identify any patterns or irregularities indicating potential risk of theft by officers in compliance with paragraphs 107 and 108 of the Consent decree.
11. NPD’s commitment to transparency in its procedures and performance remains a priority. During the reporting period, transparency data has been posted and updated in compliance with Consent Decree requirements on the NPD website, and some of the data is also available on the NPD app. The change of culture envisioned by the Consent Decree cannot be completed in a matter of months, and progress is ongoing, however, a meaningful shift in the transparency data has been observed as it pertains to complaints against personnel, specifically excessive force complaints against NPD officers. There has been a 73% decrease in excessive force complaints since 2010. This is meaningful change and evidence of a culture shift within the NPD.
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SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY SURVEY
The Suffolk University Community Survey that was initiated by the Monitor was conducted between September 9,2018 to September 30,2018. The population polled was equally distributed amongst varied demographics (gender, language, age and ward). Eighty percent of the respondents were not familiar with the Consent Decree. The top two sources how the community received information about NPD was through word of mouth and social media. The number one complaint about NPD was response time and failure to help or file a report. The community report that their positive experience with NPD was with officers who were nice, police and positive.
The results of the recent Monitor’s Community Survey when compared to the 2017 survey shows significant improvements in many areas relevant to community perceptions of the Newark Police Division and its officers. This is critical as it is the best indicator of improved community satisfaction and perceptions. The areas that showed improvement are listed below:
o people have increased feelings of general safety o less worry of being a victim of crime o have less worry of the use of excessive force o have decreased in feelings of being discriminated against by NPD o have increased in usage of social media as information source o have filed fewer complaints with NPD o have increased satisfaction with results o fewer residents stopped by NPD o decrease in safety concerns during stops o more see stops as legitimate o less confidence that NPD handles evidence properly or tells the truth o decrease in feeling safe when NPD is nearby
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The Monitor’s Sixth Quarterly Report filed on January 16, 2019, showed the findings were based on the investigations in 2014 and 2015, prior to the Consent Decree’s implementation. Since then a new centralized location for the housing of the Special Victims Division was opened. This location is responsible for investigating domestic violence complaints and assisted domestic
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violence victims. Also, NPD partners with the Shani Baraka Women’s Resource Center to provide victims of domestic violence with additional resources.
The NPD has set up and participated in forums and meetings between June 2019 and September 2019 with members of the community to discuss the findings in the Monitor’s report, address concerns, answer questions, and obtain feedback for a path moving forward. Acknowledging that more could be done in this area, NPD took the following steps;
o NPD collaborated with the Shani Baraka Women’s Resource Center to create and distribute a new flier with resources and information for victims of Domestic Violence.
o Integrity Control Officers (“ICO”) were tasked with reviewing a random selection of Domestic Violence calls for service. The ICO’s reviewed reports and associated body worn camera videos. These reviews uncovered areas where training could improve NPD’s response to Domestic Violence incidents.
o In July 2019, a Memorandum was issued to all NPD personnel via PowerDMS reminding officers of the proper procedures in handling of domestic violence incidents involving law enforcement officers.
o In September 2019, police radio announcements were made on all shifts reminding officers that state law mandates that an arrest be made when there is probable cause to believe that an act of Domestic Violence has occurred; the victim exhibits signs of injury; a warrant is in effect; a weapon is involved; or there is a violation of a no contact order. Additionally, officers were reminded that they are strictly prohibited from discouraging victims from filing complaints and that allegations of domestic violence shall be documented without exception by completing an Incident Report and all other applicable reports. Finally, officers were reminded that failure to take a report or make an arrest when required is a serious neglect of duty and will result in discipline.
o Members of the CDPD also conducted numerous roll call trainings to discuss the Monitor’s findings; to remind officers of their responsibilities under the law, attorney general guidelines and NPD policies.
o On October 3, 2019, an In-Service Training Bulletin alert was also issued via PowerDMS alerting officers of their responsibilities as it relates to the issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence victims.
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USE OF FORCE

In regards to use of force, the Consent Decree has various paragraphs that deal with this subject, which includes but is not limited to training, reporting, investigation, and the review of use of force incidents.

The All-Force Investigations and Tracking team and the Use of Force Review Board continues to review all uses of force by NPD officers, which is not mandated by the Consent Decree. Incomplete or deficient reports and investigations are returned to the preparer for completion prior to approval. Transparency statistical information relevant to NPD officers’ use of force continues to be reported via the NPD website and NPD app on a monthly basis.
On October 15th, 2019, the Federal Monitor issued a 45-Day Notice Letter (appendix B) to the Newark Police Division and the City of Newark requesting information relevant to use of force reports and investigations in preparation for the first use of force audit.

Excessive Force Complaints (EFCs)

At the time of this report, NPD has made significant changes with respect to transparency data which has made a difference in the dispositions of complaints against personnel. In 2010, there were eighty-eight excessive force complaints filed against NPD officers. Only one complaint out of eighty-eight was sustained. In 2018, there were twenty-three excessive force complaints made against NPD officers, which is a decrease of 73% and out of the twenty-three, seven of the complaints were sustained. In 2019, there have been sixteen excessive force complaints filed as of October of 2019, seven of which were generated internally by supervisors that have reviewed use of force reports and associated body worn camera video, where the victim/arrestee made no complaint. This is meaningful change and evidence of a culture shift within the NPD. The following charts are representations of excessive force complaints and relevant costs:

Excessive Force Complaints (EFCs)

Year 2010 2018 2019

# of EFCs 88 23 16

Sustained 1 7 4

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Excessive Force Lawsuits

Year 2010-2014 2014-2019

Number of Cases Resolved 48
18

Total Costs $1,384,750.00 $51,000.00

POLICIES
During the reporting period and in compliance with paragraph 5 of the Consent Decree, the
following policies and procedures have been finalized and issued to members of the NPD in
collaboration with members of the IMT-SME’s, the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S.
Attorney’s Office and the Community.
o Disciplinary Process & MATRIX went into effect on September 9, 2019.1 o Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake Policy went into effect on August 29, 2019First
Amendment Right to Observe, Object to and Record Police Activity Policy went in to effect on June 12, 2019. o LGBTQ Community and Police Interactions – This policy is not specifically cited in the Consent Decree, however the NPD continued to exhibit its commitment to community outreach with this new policy and procedure guideline for NPD officers when engaged with a member of this traditionally disenfranchised community. Policy became effective on April 4, 2019. During the reporting period NPD has collaborated with the LGBTQIA+ community stakeholder group to develop training for NPD personnel on the policy.

TECHNOLOGY In response to recommendations from the Monitor and as a result of Newark’s technology assessment conducted by the Gartner Group in late 2018, and to begin implementation of the NPD IT Strategic Plan and Roadmap developed by Gartner Group, NPD posted an opening for an IT Director. NPD also applied to the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) National Training and Technical Assistance Center (NTTAC) to help with the cost of the IT Director, which as the filing of this report is still pending approval. NPD is reviewing applicants and conducting interviews to fill this position.

1 As of the date of this report, the Superior Officers Association has filed grievances challenging both General Orders.
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TRAINING
During the reporting period, NPD has taken steps to integrate new technology and leverage existing systems and technology to improve the training record retention process. The NPD has acquired computer tablets, which will be utilized to administer all Consent Decree related trainings, and associated tests. The use of the tablets to administer tests automatically creates a training entry into the PowerDMS system. NPD conducted a trial test of this electronic record keeping process with training for the Command Staff and the results showed that the information was automatically uploaded onto the PowerDMS system. By transitioning to an electronic training record, NPD has streamlined record keeping and eliminated an antiquated manual process, hence becoming more efficient and collecting data more accurately.
Community Policing Training
In compliance with Consent Decree paragraphs 10, 11, 14, training on Community Policing for the second time began in May 2019. As of October 2019, 1134 NPD Officers were trained.
School Resource Officer Training
In order to further enhance our relationship with youth in our community, strengthen our partnerships with the schools in our district, and ensure that officers have the appropriate training to handle problems and issues relevant to youth, several additional officers where recently sent to and completed an in-depth ‘Safe Schools Resource Officer – School Liaison’ training (9.30.19 to 10.4.19).
Trauma-Informed Responses to Violence Training
In addition to the above mentioned training, for the last (2) years, the NPD has been participating in the "Trauma-Informed Responses to Violence Training" which brings together groups of officers and civilians, and uses a Restorative Justice approach to build trust between officers and civilians.
The Trauma-Informed Responses to Violence Training is hosted by Equal Justice USA (EJUSA) focuses on pairing small groups of community members and officers to work together. It has proven to be extremely valuable in the sense that it fosters police-community engagement, better understanding, establishes better working relationships, promotes trust building, problem solving,
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and the exchange of different points of view from the different perspectives of both the community and law enforcement officers.
The Trauma-Informed training is well received by community members and police officers alike. The training classes are small and the number of participants is limited, which is conducive to meaningful dialogue. Since its inception, approximately three hundred NPD officers have participated in the training. The next phase of this training has resumed on September 16,2019 and will continue through November 25,2019.
Roll-Call Training
During the reporting period, members of the Consent Decree and Planning Division (“CDPD”), attended approximately one hundred and ninety-six roll calls to conduct Consent Decree compliance related training. The trainings addressed Consent Decree requirements regarding body worn camera use, stop reports, handling of property and evidence, complaints against personnel policies, and use of force related policies.
Stops, Searches, and Arrests
Training on Stops, Searches and Arrests was completed during the reporting period. The NPD incorporated scenarios provided by the NJ State Attorney General’s Office, for a better and more realistic understanding of the topics. A total of one thousand one hundred and eighty NPD officers were trained.
Bias Free Policing Training In compliance with paragraph 63, the NPD explored different options to implement the best available training on Bias-Free Policing to its officers. In collaboration with the Monitoring Team and the Department of Justice, a renowned independent contractor Fair and Impartial Policing LLC (FIP) was selected to deliver the ‘Bias Free Policing’ training curriculum. FIP delivered the following training components to approximately 100 NPD members, which included the Public Safety Director, Chief of Police, Captains, Lieutenants, and community members:
o April 30, 2019 (1-day Mid-Manager Session) o May 1st, 2019 (1.5-day Command Community Session) o May 14, 15, 2019 (2-day Train the Trainer Session) During the reporting period, NPD also engaged community stakeholders, and community youth to gather feedback for Newark specific scenarios to include in the ‘Bias Free Policing’ training. The ‘Bias Free Policing’ training is in its final stages of completion and review and is targeted to begin in January of 2020.
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The NPD has also developed a PowerPoint presentation based on the approved ‘Bias Free Policing’ policy, which will be delivered to all NPD personnel prior to the FIP training.
Internal Affairs Training & Manual
NPD is working with the Rogers Group, which has been contracted by the U.S. Department of Justice to assist the NPD develop an Internal Affairs Investigators Training Course along with an Internal Affairs Manual. A total of ten blocks of instruction and an investigator’s guidebook were received, and then reviewed and forwarded back to the Rodgers Group LLC with commentary. The completed block of instruction and guidebook were forwarded to the Monitor during the reporting period for review and approval on July 3, 2019. It was not until October 28, 2019 that NPD received feedback from the Monitoring Team on the guidebook, which will require significant revisions. Additionally, the Monitoring Team has reported that the training will not be reviewed until the guidebook is finalized.
CPR/Bleeding Control Training
NPD has provided eight hours of CPR / Bleeding Control Training to over seven hundred and twenty members and supplied first aid equipment to each attendee. The training is ongoing and will be resumed once the contract is renewed with University Hospital. First Aid & CPR training is initially provided to all personnel as part of the Police Training Commission requirements for all NJ Police Officers. This enhanced training has been instrumental in better serving our community and saving lives. Although the impact of this invaluable training is not quantified there have been several incidents that we are aware of during the reporting period that merit recognition and attention:
o On July2, 2019 under NPD CC# 19-32663 PO A. Romero (5th) responded on a ‘shot spotter’ detection and found a female with a gunshot wound to the neck. They immediately provided aid and stopped the bleeding, saving the victim’s life.
o On July23,2019 under NPD CC# 19-36800 PO C. Peterson (4th) responded to a shooting in progress and located a victim with a gunshot wound to his arm and applied a tourniquet to stop the bleeding.
o On September1, 2019 under NPD CC# 19-43903 PO J. Massenburg and F. Rodriguez (1st) responded to call for overdose, found unresponsive individual, conducted chest compressions and revived individual while waiting for EMS and supervisor with ‘Narcan’, individual was taken to hospital for further treatment.
o On September8,2019 under NPD CC# 19-45149 PO N. Afonso and Sgt. M. Gonzalez (4th) were dispatched to overdose, administered ‘Narcan’ and revived civilian who later received additional medical treatment.
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o On September17,2019 under NPD CC# 19-46784 PO M. Sosa (4th) 9/17/19 applied a tourniquet to individual struck by gunfire. The officer’s quick actions resulted in the victim surviving.
IMT’s Training Audit
The IMT conducted an audit of training records for the following Consent Decree areas: (1) community-oriented policing; (2) stops, searches, and arrests; (3) use of force; and (4) in-car and body-worn cameras pursuant to Consent Decree paragraphs 12 and 173.
Findings: 100% of the sample of 377 officers had complete and correct training records as compared to the records in the Master Course Files.
Recommendations: The audit also brought a number of recommendations including, NPD’s facilities should be improved and modernized, the trainer selection process should be formalized, additional staff be acquired to assist in the migration of data into the records management system and the Training Division should implement a monthly and yearly training schedule. NPD is working to address the Monitor’s recommendations.
BODY WORN CAMERA
NPD developed the body-worn and in-car camera policies addressing the requirements in paragraph 104. The Monitor and DOJ approved these policies on March 21, 2018. Following the community policy review and demonstration of the equipment on April 26, 2018, the policies were finalized and issued to the NPD on June 8, 2018.
The NPD initially implemented a "Body-Worn and In-Car Camera Pilot Program" in the Second and Fifth Precincts. As of October 2019, body-worn cameras have been deployed in all seven Precincts and have been issued to all NPD personnel. Yet again, NPD goes above and beyond the requirements of the Consent Decree, which only requires issuance of BWCs to field officers and supervisors. By issuing BWCs to all NPD personnel, including those at the Command level, the NPD reaffirms its commitment to transparency and makes most interactions of police personnel and the public a matter of public record. Body-worn cameras have helped further ensure that officers conduct themselves in accordance with the standards set by the NPD, strengthening our legitimacy in the eyes of the community, and ensuring procedural justice.
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Body Worn Cameras continue be effective in assisting with the complaint investigations process. Complaints captured on BWCs in 2010 were non-existent because BWCs were none-existent in NPD. In 2018, a total of eighty-one complaints were captured by BWCs. Out of the eighty-one complaints twenty-two were exonerated, eighteen were sustained, ten were not sustained, and twenty are still pending. In 2019, year to date a total of one hundred and twelve complaints were captured on BWCs. Out of the one hundred and twelve complaints forty-four were exonerated, four were unfounded, twenty-six were sustained, sixteen were not sustained, one was administratively closed, and twenty-one are still pending.
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT The Consent Decree and Planning Division continues to share policies and solicit feedback on training from the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB), while its authority and limitations are being resolved in court. On October 21, 2019, the Supreme Court granted the Plaintiff’s Petition for Certification.
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT NPD has participated in numerous community engagements during the reporting period. Precinct commanders regularly attend community events, in an effort to foster the partnerships established with community stakeholders such as residents, business owners, faith-based organizations, school employees, social services, community groups, etc. Precinct commanders are also tasked with ensuring that the precinct Community Service Officers (CSO), and precinct School Resource Officers (SRO) are active participants in these events, in accordance with DPS Memorandum: 18313A (Ref. Neighborhood Policing Plans). NPD continues to make collaborative community engagement and the building of public trust a priority. The Community Affairs and Clergy Unit in collaboration with Precinct CSO’s and SRO’s engage further with the community by hosting a number of events. Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.), is an evidence-based and effective gang and violence prevention program built around school-based, law enforcement officer-instructed classroom curricula. The Program is intended as an immunization against delinquency, youth violence, and gang membership for
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children in the years immediately before the prime ages for introduction into gangs and delinquent behavior.

In compliance with paragraph 18 of the Consent Decree, the CDPD continues to submit the Community Policing Quarterly Reports, which are posted to the NPD Consent Decree website, www.npdconsentdecree.org. The NPD is currently working to finalize the 2019 Third Quarter Report.

Below is the Community Engagement summary table for the 2nd Quarter of 2019 (April-June):

Precinct
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Totals

Community Meetings
17 19 14 11 23 21 12 117

Goal Oriented Encounters
12 11 13 10 14 13 7 80

Special Events
6 10 8 5 10 8 11 58

Youth Engagements
8 14 24 7 4 11 9 77

Problems Identified
9 12 11 9 12 9 9 71

(Appendix A- NPD 2nd Quarter Community Engagement Report - Page 2)

The Newark Police Division in collaboration with the Independent Monitoring Team developed databases to track and measure the breath of community engagement and problem solving throughout the Division. The databases have been used since June of 2019, and we continue to work on ensuring that all community engagement and problem solving efforts are entered and tracked in the databases consistently by all Division members. Statistical information obtained from the databases is posted to the Consent Decree and Planning Division website (www.npdconsentdecree.org).

Staffing Assessment and Re-Deployment Strategies

In compliance with paragraph 15, the Urban League of Essex County assisted NPD by contracting an expert Mr. Craig Frasier, recommended by the Monitor, to conduct a staffing assessment, and make recommendations to support community policing and problem-solving initiatives. The Final Staffing Assessment Report was forwarded to the Monitor for review on or about September of 2018. In a meeting on November 29, 2018 the Monitoring Team’s SME offered technical assistance in modifying the staffing assessment. Since then the Monitoring Team’s SME and NPD worked collaboratively to modify the information contained in that assessment to ensure that the information needed was more comprehensive and accurate. NPD completed a revised staffing
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assessment in June of 2019 and provided same to the Monitor. It was not until September 11, 2019 that NPD received a letter from the Monitor indicating that the staffing assessment has not been approved. The Monitor noted several deficiencies, including but not limited to NPD’s need to conduct a city-wide precinct staffing analysis, revise the staffing factor, and the need for redeployment decisions to meet effective community-oriented policing strategies. It is not clear to NPD how the Monitor reached his conclusions since the commanders, the police chief or the police director were not involved in any communications regarding staffing.
The NPD is committed to becoming an exemplary law enforcement agency that prioritizes community policing, and the progress that has been made demonstrates the strength of that commitment. NPD opened additional precincts in areas that have been historically disenfranchised which was not an easy task and further galvanizes the City of Newark’s and NPD’s commitment to support community policing and problem-solving initiatives. The addition of the two precincts is an investment that helps to decrease the geographical responsibility of each officer, increases officer presence in the community, improves response times, and promotes and helps facilitate community engagement strategies.
In accordance with paragraph 19, the CDPD has conducted a series of CommUnity & Cops town hall style meetings, which exist as a platform to seek and respond to input from the community about the implementation of Consent Decree mandates. During these meetings, the community is encouraged to express their opinions and concerns, and to become involved in future forums, as well as provide their input to be considered as part of the NPD policy development process. Community feedback is gathered during the forums, and any questions or concerns are addressed by the NPD and made publicly available on the NPD and Consent Decree websites.
The following Consent Decree Community Forums have taken place during this reporting period:
o A discussion on the NPD Sixth Status Report where progress the Newark Police has made in implementing Consent Decree mandates was held on Tuesday, June 18, 2019 from 6:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. at the Jehovah-Jireh Praise and Worship Center 505 S 15th Street Newark, NJ 07103.
o A discussion on the LGBTQ Community and Police Interactions Policy Training was held on Monday, June 24, 2019 from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. at the Unity
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Fellowship Church 23 Branford Pl Newark, NJ 07102. (Stakeholders meetings ongoing).
PROPERTY AND EVIDENCE MANAGEMENT The Monitor has approved the NPD Property and Evidence Management and Property and Evidence Division policies. The Property and Evidence Management policy was effective April 22, 2019 while the Property and Evidence Division policy was effective on April 8, 2019. Temporary evidence lockers have been installed in Municipal Arrest and Processing Section (“MAPS”) which has allowed for the process of securing evidence and property at MAPS to be streamlined. Property Room personnel now monitor 38 newly installed HD cameras in and around the property facility daily to ensure security and integrity is maintained. The BEAST software is being utilized to electronically track property and evidence. Terminals and additional licenses were installed, and training has been imparted to personnel who handle property and evidence at the Property and Evidence Division, Crime Scene Unit, Ballistics Unit, Municipal Arrest Processing Section, Special Victims Division and all Police Precincts. As per paragraph 110, subsection d, of the Consent Decree, working video cameras have been installed at each precinct and the property room to monitor areas where property is handled and stored. Additionally, NPD Property and Evidence Division Command Staff have been working closely with the City Architect and City officials in designing a new secure evidence and “purpose built” property facility to meet NPD’s needs and to be compliant with NJAG Guidelines and IAPE standards. During the reporting period, General Order 80-1 Responsibilities of Command and Supervisory Personnel was revised to implement mandates contemplated by paragraphs 107 and 108 of the Consent Decree, regarding the disciplinary history reviews of NPD personnel who routinely handle valuable contraband or cash to identify any patterns or irregularities indicating potential risk of theft by officers. Those reviews are under way, the Major Crimes Division and the Municipal Arrest and Processing Section have been completed with the rest of the identified officers scheduled to be reviewed by January 2020.
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TRANSPARENCY

NPD’s commitment to transparency in its procedures and performance remains a priority. During the reporting period, transparency data has been posted and updated in compliance with Consent Decree requirements.

The Department of Public Safety's (DPS) website is regularly updated and revised to make the most up-to-date information available to all members of the community. The website can be accessed online by going to: http://npd.newarkpublicsafety.org/

Within the DPS website, the public can also access a separate website, which was specifically designed and created by the Consent Decree & Planning Division to include all Consent Decree related activity. The site is available by clicking the tab CommUNITY & COPS, or by accessing it from any internet connected computer or mobile device by going to: https://www.npdconsentdecree.org/.

As the NPD continues the process of developing and revising its policies and procedures in collaboration with the Independent Monitoring Team and DOJ, the NPD continues to publish all policies on its website.

The following is transparency data is currently available on the NPD website:

1. Sworn Personnel Rules and Regulations

2. Civilian Personnel Rules and Regulations

3. ComStat related information

4. Crime Statistical Data

5. Transparency Data

•

Discipline

•

Misconduct Complaints

•

Body Worn Camera Policy and Survey

•

Use of Force Data to include; Type of Force Used, Race and Gender of the

person and injuries sustained by person/s and/or officer/s, etc.

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AUDITS, INSPECTIONS AND COMPLIANCE
During the reporting period, the Consent Decree and Planning Division (“CDPD”) Compliance officers, conducted audits relevant to Consent Decree requirements. CDPD audits have revealed instances where NPD officers were not compliant with policy and resulted in the following disciplinary actions;
o 10 Investigations of Personnel (IOP’s) o 65 Written Warnings o 60 Non-Disciplinary Corrective Actions o 35 additional instances were flagged as needing further review by the respective
commander.
The following is a listing of compliance related audits, inspections, and training that were conducted during the reporting period:
o The Compliance Unit checks daily to ensure that Supervisors are conducting required BWC reviews, and furthermore review corresponding reports.
o Audit/Review of all reports approved by MAPS between July 1, 2019 to July 7, 2019 o Audit of Supervisor’s Daily BWC/ICC Reports September 8, 2019 to September 14, 2019 o Department of Public Safety (DPS) Memo. 18-539 ‘Cleanliness of MAPS & MHD’ o BWC Discrepancies Ticklers 19-206/19-2007/19-216 o BWC Video Review (IOP #2019-0101) o DPS Memo. #19-91 Warning Notice o BWC Compliance Field Inspections o DPS Memo. #19-01 Integrity of BWC Videos, Ref. Inspections o Property & Evidence Division Inspections 4-1-19, 7-5-19, 10-1-2019 o Temporary Property & Evidence Location Inspections (various locations/dates) o Municipal Holding Division (MHD) Supervisor Audits of Reports Submitted 5/19 to 9/19 o MHD Property Room Accountability Reports (Completed every tour- A,B,C) o MAPS Prisoner Status Reports (September 2019) o Consent Decree Compliance Roll Call Training Sign-In Sheets June – July 2019 o Stops Audits (CDPD 19-01) April 2019, May 2019
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o Random Audits on Investigations G.O. 80-1, DPS Memo. 2018-496/DPS Tickler 2018765 (November 2018- October 2019)
o Disciplinary Process & Matrix Re. Command Staff Training Sign-In Sheets/Test Results o Disciplinary Process & Matrix G.O. #18-26 o Communications Division/911 Call Center DPS #19-380 o ‘Complaint of Employee Misconduct’ & DPS #19-369 ‘OPS Pamphlet’ – Sign-In Sheets o Customer Service & De-Escalation Training Ref. CD/911 Call Center Personnel o Contraband Evidence Audits 2019 o Camera Recording Compliance Inspections 2019 o DPS Memo. #2019-486/Tickler #2019-488 Monthly Review of BWC Videos- Ref.
Domestic Violence Related Assignments. o BWC Login Training Bulletin o DPS Memo. #19-51 Deactivation of BWC- Ref. Continuous Operation of BWC (1-25-19)-
Re-Issued o Back-End Client Error Training Bulletin o DPS Memo. #19-412 BWC/ICC Pre-Recording Time Change (8-9-19) o BWC General Order #18-05 Ref. Special Privacy Notes (9-11-19) o DPS Memo. #19-277 Docking of BWC (5-21-2019) o DPS Memo. #18-321 BWC Ref. G.O. #18-05 (10-19-2018) o DPS Memo. #19-435 New BWC E-Mail Account Ref. Forwarding of Daily BWC/ICC
Review and Inspection Reports (8-29-19) o Office of Professional Standards Audits (4-1-2019 to 10-1-2019). o Training Broadcasts (April-September 2019)
Additionally, the NPD contracted with an outside investigator to conduct a number of undercover integrity tests of officers. The purpose was to evaluate compliance with established policies and procedures and to evaluate the demeanor of officers when interacting with the public.
Respectfully submitted, Kenyatta K. Stewart Corporation Counsel City of Newark
Page 18 of 19

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the City of Newark's Status Report was filed electronically on November 15, 2019. Notice of this filing will be sent to all parties via the Court's electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court's system.

By:

/s/ Avion M. Benjamin

Avion M. Benjamin First Assistant Corporation Counsel City of Newark

Page 19 of 19

 
 Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 173-1 Filed 01/13/20 Page 1 of 73 PageID: 2727
United States v. City of Newark, et al., Civil Action No. 16-1731 (MCA) (MAH)
CONSENT DECREE
Independent Monitor - Tenth Quarterly Report
Peter C. Harvey Independent Monitor January 13, 2020

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I. DETAILED STATUS UPDATES.......................................................................................1 A. Property and Evidence Management .......................................................................2 1. Property and Evidence Policies ...................................................................2 2. NPD’s Property Storage Facilities ...............................................................3 3. Areas in Need of Improvement....................................................................9 B. Independent Monitor’s First Training Records Audit ...........................................10 C. NPD’s Internal Stop Report Audit .........................................................................13 D. Independent Monitor’s Request for Data from January 28, 2019 OfficerInvolved Shooting ..................................................................................................15
II. NEXT QUARTER ACTIVITIES (JULY 1, 2019 – SEPTEMBER 30, 2019) .................15 A. Audits .....................................................................................................................15
III. APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................16 A. Chronology of Key Events.....................................................................................16 B. Compliance Chart ..................................................................................................16 C. Training Administration Status Update Chart .......................................................16 D. Policy Status Update Chart ....................................................................................16 E. Training Records Review Report...........................................................................16
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TENTH QUARTERLY REPORT (APRIL 1, 2019 to JUNE 30, 2019) This is Independent Monitor Peter C. Harvey’s Tenth Quarterly Report, which comments on the City of Newark’s (the “City”) and Newark Police Division’s (“NPD”) progress with Consent Decree reforms during the period from April 1, 2019 to June 30, 2019.1 Appendix A provides a list of this quarter’s key Consent Decree events. Appendix B is the Monitoring Team’s Compliance Chart, which shows NPD’s progress with every Consent Decree requirement through the publication of this Quarterly Report. Appendix C provides the status of NPD’s Consent Decree-related trainings. Appendix D provides the status of all of NPD’s new or revised Consent Decree policies (“General Orders”). Appendix E is the Monitoring Team’s Training Records Review Report, which captures the results of the Independent Monitor’s first audit of NPD’s training records. I. DETAILED STATUS UPDATES In this Quarterly Report, the Monitoring Team is pleased to provide a detailed update on NPD’s property and evidence management procedures. In the Tenth Quarter, and more recently, the Monitoring Team toured NPD’s property management facilities and found that substantial progress has been made since the Monitoring Team’s first inspection, which is reflected in the First Quarterly Report. In this report, the Monitoring team also details the results of its first training records audit and reports on NPD’s internal stop report audit.
1 Unless otherwise stated, the City’s and NPD’s progress with respect to Consent Decree tasks, as described in this Quarterly Report, reflects developments as of June 30, 2019. For a more detailed introduction to the Independent Monitoring Team, the Consent Decree, and the Parties to the Consent Decree, please see the Monitoring Team’s website: https://www.newarkpdmonitor.com/.
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A. Property and Evidence Management Section X of the Consent Decree requires NPD to take “comprehensive efforts to
prevent theft of property by officers.” These efforts include “maintaining policies and procedures for the intake, storage, and release of property.” (See Consent Decree ¶ 110.) NPD is also required to conduct periodic audits of its property room. (See Consent Decree ¶ 111.) NPD’s property and evidence management practices are critical components of the Consent Decree’s reforms. The way in which NPD officers handle and respect civilians’ personal property directly impacts Newark’s residents and is an important consideration in residents' perception of the NPD. Moreover, NPD’s property procedures and practices are a direct reflection of its ability to implement new technology, train officers effectively, and adhere to written policies.
The Monitoring Team is pleased to report that NPD has made substantial progress in this area. As of the publication of this report, NPD has streamlined its property and evidence policies so that they are better organized, easier to understand, and up to modern property management standards. NPD also has decluttered, reorganized, and enhanced security in its property storage facilities. Further, it has fully implemented an electronic property management system. Still, there is room for improvement. NPD’s Property Division remains limited by its antiquated property room. Given the present condition of the building in which NPD keeps property and evidence, the Monitoring Team believes that full Consent Decree compliance will be difficult for NPD to achieve without a new facility.
1. Property and Evidence Policies Between March 2018 and June 2018, NPD worked with the Monitoring Team to develop three new policies that combined and streamlined multiple policies that previously governed NPD’s property and evidence management. These three new policies—all of which
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NPD put into effect during this reporting period—created a management system for the intake and handling of evidence, prisoner property and found property.
First, General Order 18-23, Property and Evidence Management, outlines the process and system by which prisoner property, found property, and evidence is taken in and stored. Second, General Order 18-24, Property and Evidence Division, establishes the requirements of NPD’s Property Division, which is responsible for managing this system. General Order 16-04, Municipal Arrest Processing Section, outlines how prisoner property is taken in, handled, and released at the Municipal Arrest Processing Section (“MAPS”).
Together, these policies provide clear guidance to NPD officers concerning how to document, package, and store personal property and evidence. The new policies were disseminated to all command personnel. Shortly before the publication of this report, NPD informed the Monitoring Team that it disseminated training on General Order 18-23 via NPD’s electronic communications system on May 23, 2019, and that training of all personnel was completed on June 22, 2019. The Monitoring Team was not made aware of this training during its development or implementation, and did not approve the training. As of January 6, 2020, the Monitoring Team has received the training and is reviewing it.
NPD is in the process of developing a standard operating procedures manual for everyday use by members of the Property Division. On December 5, 2019, NPD provided a draft of the manual to the Monitoring Team. As of the publication of this report, the Monitoring Team is reviewing the manual and plans to work with NPD to finalize it.
2. NPD’s Property Storage Facilities NPD takes in and stores property at multiple locations. Its main property room, located in downtown Newark, houses evidence, large personal property, found items, and contraband. Each precinct also has its own, smaller property room, which is used to temporarily
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secure and store found property and prisoner property obtained in connection with bench warrants. Finally, MAPS stores all other non-bulk prisoner property while a prisoner is in NPD custody.
During this reporting period, in May 2019, the Monitoring Team toured NPD’s main property room. After the close of this reporting period, on September 17, 2019, members of the Monitoring Team inspected NPD’s precinct property rooms and storage facilities maintained by MAPS and NPD specialized units.
Neither the September 17 inspection nor the Monitoring Team’s visit to the property room constituted “audits” as that term is used in the Consent Decree. Rather, these were informal visits made for the purpose of verifying NPD’s progress in implementing basic property management controls and for anecdotal reporting to the Court, the Parties, and the Newark community. Formal audits of NPD’s property and evidence systems are forthcoming.
Overall, the Monitoring Team’s review and inspection of NPD facilities revealed that NPD has substantially improved the security of each of these facilities since the beginning of the Monitorship.
a. Main Property Room In 2016, the Monitoring Team toured NPD’s main property room and noted many areas of concern. (See First Quarterly Report § V.C.2.) At the time, the Monitoring Team observed that the property room had: (i) inadequate access and control features; (ii) poor lighting; (iii) no climate control; (iv) lack of electricity on some floors; (v) insufficient interior and exterior cameras; (vi) a disorganized storage system; and (vii) a decrepit building structure. Additionally, overgrown vegetation surrounded the building. There was evidence that unknown civilians had broken into the property room through holes in the cinderblock walls. The building had flooded. Parts of the structure had been condemned, and remain condemned to this day.
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Nearly three years later, in May 2019, the Monitoring Team toured the property room for a second time to verify NPD’s progress in implementing basic property management controls. Since the Monitoring Team’s first tour in 2016, the Property Division Captain, NPD leadership, and members of the Property Division have made significant progress in improving property and evidence operations in this facility.
The security of the interior of the property room has been substantially improved. For example, in the past there was no restriction of access to the property room and internal storage areas were not locked. Now, access has been restricted to authorized personnel within the Property Division. To access the property room, officers must pass through two gates using a specially authorized electronic key card. Additionally, all of the rooms containing property in the facility are padlocked, and all of the windows in the building are intact and unbroken. Members of the Property Division installed new or additional lighting on multiple floors that previously had either no or inadequate lighting.
NPD also has improved surveillance in the property room. Since the Monitoring Team’s first tour, the Property Division has installed outside perimeter and interior cameras. The Captain of the Property Division is able now to view—from his office—video of the facility using the 25 high-definition interior cameras, that are equipped with motion detectors. The Captain can review any videos that are flagged as detecting suspicious movement. These cameras cover hallways, corridors, stairwells, and critical storage areas containing valuables, narcotics, and firearms.
At the time of the Monitoring Team’s 2019 inspection, the exterior camera feeds were not accessible by the Property Division, and were only available to one person located at NPD headquarters. NPD has informed the Monitoring Team that as of the publication of this
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report, both interior and exterior camera footage is available to the Property Division, and exterior cameras are monitored remotely when the Property Room is closed.
The security of the exterior of the property room has been improved, but some work remains to be done. NPD repaired damaged fencing and installed new high-powered LED flood lights around the exterior of the building. While the shrubbery, trees, and other brush surrounding the building were trimmed after the Monitoring Team’s first property room inspection in 2016, the area is overgrown again. The Monitoring Team encourages NPD and the City to determine which City department or agency has the responsibility for maintaining the exterior of the property room and devote the resources necessary to resolve this security issue. As of the publication of this report, NPD has informed the Monitoring Team that the Department of Public Works, Division of Parks and Grounds, will monitor the Property Room every two weeks for high weeds and vegetation.
NPD also has made important changes to the way evidence and property are stored within the Property Division. NPD established a dedicated narcotics room that is wellorganized and secure. NPD uses the Bar Coded Evidence Analysis Statistics and Tracking (BEAST) electronic records management system to catalogue this evidence, which is organized chronologically based on date of intake within the narcotics room. The Property Division is working to clear a backlog of old narcotics evidence from the building. This process is ongoing, but has been effective. The Monitoring Team estimates that there is space in the narcotics room for an additional five years’ worth of evidence.
NPD also established a new storage room dedicated to firearms. Sorted in moving library-style shelving units, neat boxes of firearms are catalogued by year of intake and labeled in the BEAST system by date and contents. Over 11,000 firearms are currently housed
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here. The Monitoring Team estimates that there is space for six to seven years’ worth of additional firearms storage.
As the Monitoring Team has described in past reports, a full inventory of the property room is ongoing, but will take years to complete. Meanwhile, NPD continues to purge old and outdated evidence. The Monitoring Team understands that seven decades of files were also removed to the city archive for long-term storage.
b. Precinct Property Rooms, MAPS, and Specialized Units Subsequent to this monitoring period, on September 17, 2019, members of the Monitoring Team toured eight additional locations where property is taken in and stored until picked up by members of the Property Division: MAPS, the First, Fourth, and Fifth Precincts, and NPD’s Crime Scene, Major Crimes, and Robbery units. The Monitoring Team focused its examination on five components: (1) security, (2) access control, (3) record keeping practices, (4) cleanliness and organization, and (5) BEAST training. In general, the Monitoring Team found these locations to be orderly and secure, with some exceptions described below. We noted in previous reports that MAPS is a modern, highly secure, and well-surveilled facility, and it remains so today. In contrast, the precinct property rooms are not modern. Most are closets secured by padlock.2 NPD’s specialized units also handle only a small amount of property, but these units each have secure storage locations. Each of the individual officers encountered at MAPS, the precincts, and the specialized units appeared to be knowledgeable about property and evidence management procedures.
2 The Monitoring Team notes, however, that little property passes through these sites as precincts collect only found property and property recovered in connection with bench warrants, and property is transferred from the precincts to the main property room on a regular basis.
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Regarding safety, all of the storage spaces that the Monitoring Team observed were locked, except for one. At the First Precinct, an unlocked drawer was used to hold prisoner property on a temporary basis, although it held no property at the time of inspection. This arrangement is unacceptable even for property being held temporarily. NPD indicated that it would obtain a locking file cabinet for this location.
The Monitoring Team noted that, during the inspections, working cameras were present at each location. At each location property storage areas were accessible only by key, key card, or a combination of the two, ensuring, at least in theory, that only authorized personnel have access to these locations. (See Consent Decree ¶ 110(d).)
Each location was equipped with BEAST equipment and software, which were online and functioning. This system is key to securely and efficiently tracking the movement of property across NPD’s various intake and storage locations, and NPD appears to have successfully implemented it Division-wide. Each location also had a paper property log as a backup.
As to organization and cleanliness, the locations toured were generally orderly and clean. Some of NPD’s precinct headquarters are located in old and converted buildings. These locations lack modern security technology, such as automatically locking doors. [See Consent Decree ¶ 110(e).] However, the maintenance of these locations appeared to be otherwise satisfactory.
As to training, each of the officers to whom the Monitoring Team spoke reported having been trained on using the BEAST system. They reported that trainings and re-trainings continue on a rolling basis as necessary. As described above, NPD reports that it provided
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Division-wide training on its over-arching property policy, but the Monitoring Team has not had the opportunity to review or approve such training.
3. Areas in Need of Improvement While the Monitoring Team recognizes the progress made by NPD in the area of property management, there are still barriers to full compliance with the Consent Decree. The most limiting factor is the physical condition of NPD's (and the City’s) main property room. The property room does not meet the Consent Decree requirement for automatically locking doors, and climate control remains an issue. (See Consent Decree ¶ 110(e).) In 2016, the Monitoring Team observed that the upper floors were not air conditioned or otherwise temperature controlled. There is still no climate control on most of the floors where property and evidence are stored, which may cause degradation of biomaterials such as DNA evidence. The condition of the property room’s outside garage is illustrative of the poor quality of this location. This space, primarily used to hold evidence from vice cases (i.e., alcohol and gambling machines), can be accessed only from an exterior garage door. There is no direct access into this area from inside the building. There is no heating in this garage. When it rains, dirt, water and mud leak through the cracks in the walls, flooding the floor. The facility is also infested with rodents. This is not an acceptable condition for a modern police evidence and property facility. As the Monitoring Team has reported in the past, the Monitoring Team believes that full Consent Decree compliance, while not dependent upon a new building, will be difficult for NPD to achieve without a new property room. The Monitoring Team understands that plans for a new facility have been submitted to an architect, including recommendations for storage equipment, information technology, and safety and security features. As of this monitoring period, NPD and the City are still searching for a suitable site for such a facility.
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Overall, NPD has made progress in the area of property management. However, it remains hampered by substandard facilities. The Monitoring Team looks forward to reporting on NPD’s property procedures in more detail after conducting audits of NPD’s property and evidence management systems.
B. Independent Monitor’s First Training Records Audit The Consent Decree also requires NPD to “maintain complete and consistent
training records for all officers.” (¶ 12.) Pursuant to Consent Decree Paragraph 173, the Monitoring Team’s compliance reviews and audits are conducted to determine whether “the City and NPD have: (a) incorporated the [Consent Decree] requirement into the policy; (b) trained all relevant personnel as necessary to fulfill their responsibilities pursuant to the requirement; and (c) implemented the requirement in practice.”
As reported in the Ninth Quarterly Report, the Monitoring Team conducted an audit of NPD’s records regarding its training of NPD personnel in the following areas: (i) community-oriented policing, (ii) stops, searches, and arrests; (iii) use of force; and (iv) in-car and body-worn cameras. The audit methodology consisted of a review of attendance sheets for each training session that NPD administered in these four areas by March 1, 2019. The Monitoring Team next selected an officer from each session (377 officers in total), reviewed the training records in his or her file, and compared those records to NPD’s Master Course Training Files. The Master Course Training File should contain all materials related to the training, such as curriculum, lesson plans, underlying policy, copies of officer test answer sheets, and a list of all officers who received the training.
The Monitoring Team’s audit found that the sample of 377 officers had complete and correct training records as compared to the records in the Master Course Training Files. The
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Monitoring Team also concluded that the Master Course Training Files contained all information related to the particular course.
The Monitoring Team was able to conclude that NPD complied with the Consent Decree with respect to creating and maintaining training records for this first audit.
Based on the Monitoring Team’s observations while conducting the review, and its audit findings, the Monitoring Team made the following five recommendations to NPD:
1. NPD’s training staff and facilities require augmentation. Because of the importance of accurate record keeping, NPD should hire at least one civilian to maintain its electronic records management system. Simply put, NPD needs additional training staff to assist with all training required by the Consent Decree, the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, and NPD’s revised or newly written policies. Subsequent to this reporting period, NPD’s training facilities are antiquated and dilapidated. While NPD has moved some training courses to other locations, it should consider moving additional training courses to a local school, such as Rutgers Law School, while repairs are made. 2. NPD should codify and formalize its process for selecting trainers and
reviewing training after it has been administered. NPD should codify its process for selecting trainers in the future, such as maintaining a file with (i) the capabilities of the instructor, (ii) completion of an instructional methods course, (iii) instructors’ training experience on the subject matter, and (iv) feedback. Further, NPD should maintain information used to decide whether to retain a specific trainer. This information would include at least the name of the instructor, his or her position or affiliation with NPD, and any evaluations or feedback on the instructor’s past performance.
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NPD should also continue to review trainings after they have been administered for ways to improve the course and also for changes in the law and best police and training practices.
3. NPD should formalize its process for administering remedial training. Currently, if a test-taker does not achieve 80% on a training’s post-test, he or she is required to review all incorrect answers with the instructor. Once the instructor is satisfied that the test-taker fully comprehends the material, he or she is marked as having been “remediated” on that specific topic. The Monitoring Team recommends that, in addition to the current process of remediation, NPD also administer a second test to determine whether the test-taker achieves the 80% required threshold after remediation. This second test and certification would be consistent with General Order 18-28, Training Standards, which requires that if a test-taker does not achieve at least 80% on the second test, he or she is then referred to the commanding officer for appropriate action. Moreover, for certain subjects, such as use of force, a higher score should be required since these topics are critical to the daily work of every NPD officer. Hence, NPD personnel must know the law. 4. NPD’s training staff requires additional assistance to transition to its
electronic records management system. NPD’s Police Academy currently has one officer who, among other duties, is responsible for inputting training records for all officers into the electronic records management system. For the four courses that were reviewed, that officer had to create and update over 5,000 individual records. As recommended above, NPD needs additional assistance from a civilian to maintain these records. Clerical and administrative activities such as this are not an efficient use
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of sworn officers’ time. NPD should also seriously consider hiring a professional Director of Training to run the Police Academy and oversee all training programs.
5. NPD must create monthly and annual calendars of its training. NPD should maintain a schedule of all required trainings, both monthly and annually. The process of creating and maintaining such schedule should be memorialized in a standard operating procedure. C. NPD’s Internal Stop Report Audit Internal audits serve two important purposes for police departments: (1) improve officer integrity and raise professional standards and (2) provide valuable information on the implementation of new or revised policies. Conducting internal audits is also key to institutionalizing reforms that come out of a Consent Decree. Thus, a modern, Consent Decreecompliant police department cannot rely solely on third parties (i.e., an Independent Monitor) to audit implementation of its reforms. To that end, in May 2019, NPD’s Consent Decree and Planning Division (CDPD) conducted its second internal Stop Report audit to ensure that officers were complying with NPD policies and practices. While this internal audit is not a substitute for the Monitoring Team’s future audits of NPD’s practices with respect to Stops, the Monitoring Team commends NPD for this self-evaluation. The CDPD reviewed a total of 65 Stop Reports covering the period from January 1 to March 31, 2019. The audit allowed NPD to compare officers’ performance meeting Stop Report standards in the first quarter of 2019 to officers’ performance in 2018. CDPD’s internal audit evaluated four basic data points, including whether a Stop Report: (1) articulated a reasonable suspicion for the stop; (2) articulated a reasonable suspicion for the frisk; (3) articulated probable cause for a search; and (4) was accurately completed.
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In June 2019, following completion of CDPD’s Stop Report audit, the Public Safety Director shared a division-wide memorandum that (i) explained the results of the audit, (ii) identified common problems uncovered by the auditors, such as the use of boilerplate language in establishing reasonable suspicion for stops and frisks, and (iii) reminded officers about resources available to help explain the legal standards for conducting investigative stops, frisks, and searches.
NPD’s effort towards self-monitoring in this area is commendable. The Monitoring Team recommends as a next step, along with addressing any deficiencies identified by the audit, that NPD expand the scope of its audit to include analysis beyond the four data points described above. NPD could, for example, include in its audit an analysis of whether officers conducting stops (1) were courteous, respectful and professional, (2) introduced themselves to the person being stopped prior to requesting information from them, and (3) detained the person being stopped for only the reasonable amount of time needed to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicion for the violation of law. (See General Order 18-4(VI)(B)). A more expansive review might require additional resources to complete and may involve going beyond a review of Stop Reports (i.e., reviewing body-worn camera footage), but would allow NPD to have a more comprehensive outcome assessment. An expanded NPD self-audit would allow NPD to analyze officer compliance with additional requirements set forth in NPD’s Stop Policy and would better prepare NPD for the Independent Monitoring Team’s more extensive audit with respect to Stops, which is forthcoming.
NPD might also consider conducting similar audits in additional subject matter areas, such as (i) searches, (ii) arrests, and (iii) use of force. (See Consent Decree Paragraph 150 (requiring that NPD conduct internal audits in the areas of “stops, searches, seizures (including
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false arrests); excessive uses of force” and more)). These audits will provide NPD with valuable information about how well NPD officers are implementing Consent Decree policies in important subject areas and will also help NPD to prepare for audits conducted by the Monitoring Team.
D. Independent Monitor’s Request for Data from January 28, 2019 Officer-Involved Shooting As described in the Ninth Quarterly Report, the Independent Monitor had
previously, during that reporting period, requested data related to the January 28, 2019 officerinvolved shooting. During this reporting period, on May 21, 2019, a grand jury indicted a Newark police officer for his role in the shooting. Yet, neither NPD nor the City turned over the requested data this reporting period.
After this reporting period, NPD turned over the requested materials to the Monitoring Team. The Monitoring Team will report on its review of the data in its next, Eleventh Quarterly Report. II. NEXT QUARTER ACTIVITIES (JULY 1, 2019 – SEPTEMBER 30, 2019)
A. Audits As reported in the Independent Monitor’s Ninth Quarterly Report, during this
reporting period, on May 24, 2019, the Monitoring Team provided NPD with notice that it would soon initiate an audit of NPD’s body-worn cameras to assess NPD’s compliance with its revised Body-Worn Camera policy. As of the publication of this quarterly report, the Monitoring team has completed its audit of NPD’s Body-Worn Cameras. The Monitoring Team will report on the results on the audit in an upcoming report.
After this reporting period, on October 15, 2019, pursuant to Consent Decree Paragraph 180, the Monitoring Team provided NPD with notice that, no sooner than November
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Appendix A

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Timeline (Meetings, Milestones and Events)

Monitoring Team’s Tenth Quarterly Report — April 1, 2019 through June 30, 2019.

Date

Event

April 3, 2019

NPD’s Property and Evidence Division Policy (GO 18-24) becomes effective.

April 3, 2019

NPD’s LGBTQI Community & Police Interactions Policy (GO 1903) becomes effective.

April 4, 2019

NPD’s Community Policing Policy (GO 18-13) becomes effective.

April 12, 2019

NPD’s Property and Evidence Management Policy (GO 18-23) becomes effective.

May 20, 2019

The City of Newark files its Sixth Status Report.

May 21, 2019

The Monitoring Team hosts a community event to discuss the Seventh Quarterly Report at the Salvation Army Newark Ironbound Corps.

May 24, 2019

Pursuant to Consent Decree Paragraph 180, the Monitoring Team provides NPD with notice regarding its First Audit of NPD’s BodyWorn Camera practices.

June 12, 2019

NPD’s First Amendment Right to Observe, Object to, and Record Police Activity Policy (GO 18-12) becomes effective.

June 12, 2019

NPD posts its Community Engagement Report for the First Quarter of 2019 on its website.

June 18, 2019

NPD hosts a community event to discuss its Sixth Status Report at Jehovah-Jireh Praise and Worship Center.

June 19, 2019

NPD’s Responsibilities of Command and Supervisory Personnel Policy (GO 80-1) becomes effective.

June 24, 2019

NPD hosts a community event to discuss its LGBTQ Community and Police Interactions Policy training.

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Appendix B

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Consent Decree Compliance and Implementation (March 30, 2016 to January 13, 2020)

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Table of Contents Page
I. Definitions ................................................................................................................................................................................................1 II. General Officer Training .........................................................................................................................................................................3 III. Community Engagement and Civilian Oversight (including Community Policing) .............................................................................4 IV. Stops, Searches, and Arrests...................................................................................................................................................................6 V. Bias-Free Policing ...................................................................................................................................................................................9 VI. Use of Force .........................................................................................................................................................................................10 VII. In-Car and Body-Worn Cameras ........................................................................................................................................................16 VIII. Theft (including Property and Evidence Management).....................................................................................................................17 IX. Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation...........................................................................................................................20 X. Compliance Reviews and Integrity Audits ............................................................................................................................................27 XI. Discipline..............................................................................................................................................................................................28 XII. Data Systems Improvement ................................................................................................................................................................29 XIII. Transparency and Oversight ..............................................................................................................................................................31 XIV. Consent Decree Implementation and Enforcement............................................................................................................................32
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I. Definitions
NPD’s compliance with the deadlines set forth in the Consent Decree and the Second-Year Monitoring Plan will be assessed using the following categories: (1) not assessed, (2) initial development, (3) preliminary compliance, (4) operational compliance, (5) non-compliance, (6) administrative compliance, and (7) full compliance. Each of these terms is defined below.
1. Not Assessed “Not Assessed” means that the Monitoring Team did not assess the Consent Decree provision during this reporting period.
Acceptable reasons for why a requirement was not assessed may include that the deadline has not passed or some other substantive reason.
2. Non-Compliance “Non-Compliance” means that NPD has either made no progress towards accomplishing compliance, or has not progressed
beyond Initial Development at the point in time when NPD is expected to have at least achieved Preliminary Compliance for the reporting period.
3. Initial Development “Initial Development” means that during the auditing period, NPD has taken meaningful steps toward achieving
compliance with a Consent Decree requirement that is not yet scheduled for completion. Initial Development will be noted only if NPD’s efforts are consistent with established timeframes in the Monitoring Plan or Consent Decree. Where NPD was expected to have achieved at least Initial Development during the auditing period, and has not, NPD has been found not to be in compliance.
4. Preliminary Compliance “Preliminary Compliance” means that during the reporting period, NPD has developed, and the Independent Monitor, DOJ,
and City have approved, respective policies or standard operating procedures (“SOPs”) and related training materials that are consistent with a Consent Decree requirement. This category only applies to SOPs and training.
5. Operational Compliance “Operational Compliance” means that NPD has satisfied a Consent Decree requirement by demonstrating routine
adherence to the requirement in its day-to-day operations or by meeting the established deadline for a task or deliverable that is specifically required by the Consent Decree or Monitoring Plan. NPD’s compliance efforts must be verified by reviews of data systems, observations from the Monitoring Team, and other methods that will corroborate its achievement. In this report, the Monitoring Team only will assess NPD for compliance with established deadlines.
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6. Administrative Compliance “Administrative Compliance” means that during the auditing period, NPD has completed all necessary actions to
implement a Consent Decree requirement, but General Compliance has not yet been demonstrated in NPD’s day-to-day operations. 7. Full Compliance “Full Compliance” means that all Monitor reviews have determined that NPD has maintained Operational Compliance for
the two-year period. 8. Effective Date The “Effective Date” is March 30, 2016. See Consent Decree, Section II(4)(s). 9. Operative Date The “Operational Date” is July 12, 2016. See Consent Decree, Section II(4)(ff).
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II. General Officer Training

Achievement
NPD will provide officers at least 40 hours of inservice training each year.
NPD will provide training to officers regarding the requirements of the Consent Decree, and the timeline for their implementation.
NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 9
¶ 10
¶ 11

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement1
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) and then annually thereafter Within 90 days of the Operational Date (October 10, 2016) Within 60 days after approval of individual policies

Status Ongoing
Preliminary Compliance N/A

NPD will maintain complete and consistent training ¶ 12 records for all officers.

Within two years of Initial the Effective Date Development (March 30, 2018)2

Discussion
Eight hours of community policing training have been provided in 2019.
See First Quarterly Report, Section IV(B).
The status for training requirements for each Consent Decree area (e.g., use of force, bias-free policing), are located in those sections of this Chart. NPD is in the process of entering all training records into PowerDMS.

1 Deadlines in the Compliance Chart reflect the original deadlines set forth in the Consent Decree. The deadlines do not reflect deadlines established as part of the First or Second-Year Monitoring Plans.
2 Consent Decree Paragraph 5 provides that “NPD will develop comprehensive and agency-wide policies and procedures that are consistent with and incorporate all substantive requirements of this Agreement. Unless otherwise noted, NPD will develop and implement all such policies, procedures, and manuals within two years of the Effective Date.”
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Community Engagement and Civilian Oversight (including Community Policing) Continued

III. Community Engagement and Civilian Oversight (including Community Policing)

Achievement
NPD will review and revise its current community policing policy or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree. NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. Civilian Oversight (¶ 13) The City will implement and maintain a civilian oversight entity.

Consent Decree Paragraph § V; ¶ 5
¶ 11
¶ 13

Community Engagement Measures and Training (¶¶ 14-21) NPD will provide 8 hours of in-service training on ¶ 14 community policing and problem-oriented policing methods and skills for all officers, including supervisors, managers and executives, and at least 4 hours annually thereafter.

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) Within 60 days after approval of policy
Within 365 days of the Effective Date (March 30, 2017)
July 9, 2017

Status Preliminary Compliance Non-Compliance
Non-Compliance
Preliminary Compliance

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D. The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(2).
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.

NPD will assess and revise its staffing allocation and ¶ 15 personnel deployment to support community policing and problem solving initiatives, and will modify deployment strategies that are incompatible with community policing. NPD’s assessment and modified strategy must be approved by the DOJ and Monitor for approval.

July 9, 2017

Non-Compliance See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).

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Community Engagement and Civilian Oversight (including Community Policing) Continued

Achievement
NPD will assign two officers to each precinct to work with residents to identify and address communities’ priorities, and who are not assigned to answer calls for service except in exigent circumstances.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 16

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Pending completion of the assessment required in ¶ 15

Status
Initial Development

NPD will implement mechanisms to measure the

¶ 17

breadth, extent, and effectiveness of its community

partnerships and problem-solving strategies,

including officer outreach, particularly outreach to

youth.

NPD will prepare a publicly available report of its ¶ 18 community policing efforts overall and in each precinct.

NPD and the City will implement practices to seek ¶ 19 and respond to input from the community about the Consent Decree’s implementation. Such practices may include direct surveys, comment cards and town hall meetings.

All NPD studies, analyses, and assessments required ¶ 20 by this Agreement will be made publicly available, including on NPD and City websites, in English, Spanish, and Portuguese, to the fullest extent permitted under law.

NPD will implement a policy to collect and maintain ¶ 21 all data and records necessary to facilitate transparency and wide public access to information related to NPD policies and practices, as permitted by law.

Within 210 days of the Operational Date (February 7, 2017)

Initial Development

Within 240 days of Initial

the Operational

Development

Date March 9, 2017

Within two years of Initial the Effective Date Development (March 30, 2018)

Within two years of Not Assessed the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Within two years of Not Assessed the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

5

Discussion
See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(A)(1).
See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(A)(1).
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(E). See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(E).

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IV. Stops, Searches, and Arrests

Achievement
Investigatory Stops and Detentions (¶¶ 25-28) NPD will review and revise its current stop, search, and arrest policy or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree, consistent with Paragraphs 2528. NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the stop, search, and arrest policies or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required. NPD will train officers to use specific and individualized descriptive language in reports or field inquiry forms.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 5
¶ 11
¶ 26

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Within 60 days after approval of policy
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance

Searches (¶¶ 29-34) NPD will review and revise its current stop, search, ¶ 5 and arrest policy or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree, consistent with Paragraphs 2934. NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and ¶ 11 understand their responsibilities pursuant to the stop, search, and arrest policies or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Within two years of Preliminary the Effective Date Compliance (March 30, 2018)

Within 60 days after approval of policy

Preliminary Compliance

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(C).
See Fourth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(3).
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.

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Stops, Searches, and Arrests Continued

Achievement
Arrests (¶¶ 35-42) NPD will review and revise its current stop, search, and arrest policy or policies to ensure compliance with Consent Decree, consistent with Paragraphs 3542.

Consent Decree Paragraph
¶ 5

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and ¶ 11 understand their responsibilities pursuant to the stop, search, and arrest policies or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Stop, Search, and Arrest Training (¶¶ 43-50)

NPD will provide 16 hours of training to all NPD

¶ 43

personnel on the First and Fourth Amendments,

including the topics set forth in ¶ 43 of the Consent

Decree, and at least an additional 4 hours on an

annual basis thereafter.

NPD supervisors will take appropriate action to

¶ 48

address violations or deficiencies in stops, detentions,

searches, and arrests; maintain records; and identify

repeat violators.

Stop, Search, and Arrest Data Collection and Review (¶¶ 51-54) NPD will implement use of data collection form, in ¶ 52 written or electronic report form, to collect data on all investigatory stops and searches, as approved by the DOJ and Monitor.

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) Within 60 days after approval of policy
November 1, 2017
Ongoing
September 9, 2017

Status
Preliminary Compliance Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Not Assessed
Initial Development

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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Stops, Searches, and Arrests Continued

Achievement
NPD will develop a protocol for comprehensive analysis of stop, search and arrest data, subject to the review and approval of the DOJ and Monitor.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 53

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status Non-Compliance

Discussion

NPD will ensure that all databases comply fully with ¶ 54

Within two years of Not Assessed

federal and state privacy standards governing

the Effective Date

personally identifiable information. NPD will restrict

(March 30, 2018)

database access to authorized, identified users who

will be permitted to access the information only for

specific, legitimate purposes.

First Amendment Right to Observe, Object to, and Record Officer Conduct (¶¶ 55-62)

NPD will require or prohibit officer conduct to

¶¶ 55-62 Within two years of Preliminary

comply with ¶¶ 55-62 of the Consent Decree.

the Effective Date Compliance

(March 30, 2018)

See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.

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V. Bias-Free Policing

Achievement
NPD will review and revise its current bias-free policing policy to ensure compliance with Consent Decree, consistent with Section VII.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 5

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and ¶ 11 understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

NPD will provide all NPD personnel with a minimum ¶ 63 of eight hours of training on bias-free policing, including implicit bias, procedural justice, and police legitimacy, and at least four hours annually thereafter.

NPD will prohibit officers from considering any

¶ 64

demographic category when taking, or refraining

from taking, any law enforcement action, except

when such information is part of an actual and

credible description of a specific suspect in an

ongoing investigation that includes other appropriate

non-demographic identifying factors. NPD will also

prohibit officers from using proxies for demographic

category, including language ability, geographic

location, mode of transportation, or manner of dress.

NPD will conduct quarterly demographic analyses of ¶ 65 its enforcement activities to ensure officer, unit and Division compliance with the bias-free policing policy.

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) Within 60 days after approval of policy
July 1, 2017
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) and then Quarterly thereafter.

Status Preliminary Compliance Non-Compliance
Non-Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Non-Compliance

Discussion See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D. See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Fourth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(4).

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VI. Use of Force

Achievement
Use of Force Policy (¶¶ 66-70) NPD will develop and implement a use of force policy or set of policies that cover all force techniques, technologies, and weapons that are available to NPD officers consistent with ¶¶ 66-70. The policy or policies will clearly define each force option and specify that unreasonable use of force will subject officers to discipline.
NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the use of force policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.
NPD will provide resources for officers to maintain proper weapons certifications and will implement sanctions for officers who fail to do so.
Use of Firearms (¶¶71-74) NPD will develop and implement a use of firearms policy consistent with ¶¶71-74.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 66
¶ 11
¶ 70
¶ 5

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Within 60 days after approval of policy
Ongoing
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and ¶ 11 understand their responsibilities pursuant to the use of force policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Within 60 days after approval of policy

Status
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Not Assessed
Preliminary Compliance Preliminary Compliance

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits. See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.

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Use of Force Continued

Achievement
Officers will be prohibited from using unauthorized weapons or ammunition in connection with or while performing policing duties. In addition, all authorized firearms carried by officers will be loaded with the capacity number of rounds of authorized ammunition.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 71

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

NPD will prohibit officers from discharging a firearm ¶ 72 at a moving vehicle unless a person in the vehicle is immediately threatening the officer or another person with deadly force.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

NPD will prohibit officers from unholstering or

¶ 73

exhibiting a firearm unless the officer reasonably

believes that the situation may escalate to create an

immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death to

the officer or another person.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

NPD will require that officers successfully qualify at ¶ 74 least twice a year with each firearm they are authorized to use or carry while on duty.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Use of Force Reporting and Investigation (¶¶ 75-85) NPD will adopt a use of force reporting system and a ¶ 75 supervisor Use of Force Report, separate from the NPD’s arrest and incident reports, and which includes individual officers’ accounts of their use of force.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

NPD will require that officers notify their supervisor ¶ 76 as soon as practicable following any reportable use of force.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.

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Use of Force Continued

Achievement
NPD, in consultation with Monitor and DOJ, will categorize force into levels to report, investigate, and review each use of force. The levels will be based on the factors set forth in ¶ 77.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 77

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

NPD will establish a Serious Force Investigation

¶ 78

Team (“SFIT”) to review Serious Force Incidents,

conduct criminal and administrative investigations of

Serious Force incidents, and determine whether

incidents raise policy, training, tactical, or equipment

concerns. Lower or intermediate force incidents will

be investigated by line supervisors.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Every level of force reporting and review will include ¶ 79 the requirements set forth in ¶ 79.
Upon arrival at the scene, the supervisor will identify ¶ 80 and collect evidence sufficient to establish the material facts related to use of force, where reasonably available.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

All officers who used force above Low Level will

¶ 81

provide an oral Use of Force statement in person to

the supervisor on the scene prior to the subject’s

being booked, or released, or the contact otherwise

concluded, unless impractical under the

circumstances.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Pursuant to policy and as necessary to complete a

¶ 82

thorough, reliable investigation, supervisors will

comply with the requirements of ¶ 82.

Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status Preliminary Compliance Preliminary Compliance
Not Assessed Not Assessed
Not Assessed
Not Assessed

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits. The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits. The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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Use of Force Continued

Achievement
Supervisors will investigate and evaluate in writing all uses of force for compliance with law and NPD policy, as well as any other relevant concerns.
Supervisors’ documentation of the investigation and evaluation will be completed within 72 hours of the use of force, unless the supervisor’s commanding officer approves an extension.
NPD will analyze the data captured in officers’ force reports and supervisors’ investigative reports on an annual basis to identify significant trends, to correct deficient policies and practices, and to document its findings in an annual report that will be made publicly available pursuant to Section XV of the Consent Decree.
Use of Force Review (¶¶ 86-89) The chain-of-command supervisor reviewing the investigative report will ensure that the investigation is thorough, complete, and makes the necessary and appropriate findings of whether the use of force was lawful and consistent with policy. Each higher-level supervisor in the chain of command will review the investigative report to ensure that it is complete, the investigation was thorough, and that the findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 83

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

¶ 84

Within two years of

the Effective Date

(March 30, 2018)

¶ 85

Within two years of

the Effective Date and

annually thereafter

(March 30, 2018)

¶ 86

Within two years of

the Effective Date

(March 30, 2018)

Status

Discussion

Not Assessed Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

Non-Compliance

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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Use of Force Continued

Achievement

Consent

Consent Decree

Decree

Deadline for

Paragraph

Achievement

A supervisor should ensure that additional

¶ 87

Within two years of

investigation is completed when it appears that

the Effective Date

additional relevant and material evidence may assist

(March 30, 2018)

in resolving inconsistencies or improve the reliability

or credibility of the findings.

When the precinct or unit commander finds that the ¶ 88

Within two years of

investigation is complete and the evidence supports

the Effective Date

the findings, the investigation file will be forwarded

(March 30, 2018)

to the Use of Force Review Board.

Reporting and Investigation of Serious Force Incidents (¶¶ 90-94)

NPD will create a multi-disciplinary Serious Force ¶¶ 90-94 Within two years of

Investigation Team (“SFIT”)3 to conduct both the

the Effective Date

criminal and administrative investigations of Serious

(March 30, 2018)

Force incidents, and to determine whether these

incidents raise policy, training, tactical, or equipment

concerns. SFIT will operate consistent with ¶¶ 91-94.

NPD will develop and implement a SFIT training

¶¶ 11, 90 Within 60 days after

curriculum and procedural manual. NPD will ensure

approval of policies

that officers have received, read and understand their

responsibilities pursuant to the General Order

establishing the AFIT and General Orders

establishing line supervisors’ responsibilities to

investigate lower and intermediate use of force

incidents and that the topic is incorporated into the in-

service training required.

Status Not Assessed
Not Assessed
Initial Development
Preliminary compliance

Discussion
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

3 NPD created an All Force Investigation Team (“AFIT”) to address this Consent Decree requirement. 14

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Use of Force Continued

Achievement
Use of Force Review Board (¶¶ 95-102) NPD will implement a General Order establishing the Use of Force review Board (“UFRB”), ensure that it is staffed consistent with the Consent Decree provisions, and ensure that the responsibilities assigned are consistent with Consent Decree provisions. NPD’s UFRB will conduct timely, comprehensive, and reliable reviews of all Intermediate and Serious Force incidents. The UFRB also will conduct the administrative review of incidents in which the ECPO has completed an investigation pursuant to New Jersey Attorney General Directive 2006-05. Each member of the UFRB will receive a minimum of eight hours of training on an annual basis, including legal updates regarding use of force and the Training Section’s current use of force curriculum. The NPD will include the civilian oversight entity in the review of completed SFIT investigations, as permitted by law.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶¶ 95-102
¶¶ 95-102
¶ 97
¶ 101

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Ongoing
Within 60 days after approval of policies
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status Preliminary Compliance
Not Assessed
Not Assessed Not Assessed

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits. The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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VII. In-Car and Body-Worn Cameras

Achievement
NPD will develop, implement and maintain a system of video recording officers’ encounters with the public with body-worn and in-car cameras. NPD will develop a policy to designate which cars and officers are exempt from the general in-car and body-worn camera requirements and a policy regarding footage and audio recordings from its in-car and body-worn cameras.

Consent Decree Paragraph Section IX, ¶¶ 103-104

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read ¶ 11 and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or policies and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

NPD will equip all marked patrol cars with video cameras, and require all officers, except certain officers engaged in only administrative or management duties, to wear body cameras and microphones with which to record enforcement activity.

¶ 103

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Within 60 days after approval of policy
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status Preliminary Compliance
Preliminary Compliance
Initial Development

Discussion See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(C).
See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(C).

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VIII. Theft (including Property and Evidence Management)

Achievement
NPD will ensure that in all instances where property or evidence is seized, the responsible officer will immediately complete an incident report documenting a complete and accurate inventory of the property or evidence seized, and will submit the property or evidence seized to the property room before the end of tour of duty. NPD will conduct regular, targeted, and random integrity audits to detect and deter theft by officers. NPD will employ tactics such as increased surveillance, stings, and heightened scrutiny of suspect officers’ reports and videorecorded activities. NPD will conduct periodic reviews of the disciplinary histories of its officers who routinely handle valuable contraband or cash, especially those in specialized units, to identify any patterns or irregularities indicating potential risk of theft by officers.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 105
¶ 106
¶ 107

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)
Ongoing
Ongoing

Status Not Assessed
Not Assessed Non-Compliance

Discussion
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
N/A

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Theft (including Property and Evidence Management) Continued

Achievement
To the extent permitted by law and NPD’s collective bargaining agreements, NPD will transfer officers with any sustained complain of theft, or two not sustained or unfounded complaints of theft occurring within one year, out of positions where those officers have access to money, property, and evidence. Aspects of officers’ disciplinary histories that relate to honesty and integrity will be considered in making decisions regarding reassignment, promotions, and similar decisions.
NPD will report all theft allegations to the New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety and will continue to report such allegations to the Essex County Prosecutor. Officers who have been the subject of multiple theft allegations will be identified as such in said reports.
NPD will create a chain of custody and inventory policy or policies to ensure compliance with ¶ 110 of the Consent Decree.
NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the chain of custody and inventory policy or policies and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 108
¶ 109
¶¶ 5; 110 ¶ 11

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Ongoing
Ongoing
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018) Within 60 days after approval of policies

Status Initial Development
Not Assessed
Preliminary Compliance Non-Compliance

Discussion See First Quarterly Report, Section V(C)(6).
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D. See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.

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Theft (including Property and Evidence Management) Continued

Achievement
NPD will conduct and document periodic audits and inspections of the property room and immediately correct any deficiencies.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 111

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Ongoing

Status Initial Development

Discussion
See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(B)

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IX. Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation

Achievement
Complaint Process (¶¶ 112-120) NPD will create an Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation policy or policies to ensure compliance with Section XI of the Consent Decree.

Consent Decree Paragraph
¶ 5, Section XI

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read ¶ 11 and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

The City and NPD, in collaboration with the civilian oversight entity or other community input, will develop and implement a program to effectively publicize to the Newark community how to make misconduct complaints.

¶ 112

NPD and the City will revise and make forms and other materials outlining the complaint process and OPS contact information available on their website and appropriate government properties.

¶ 113

NPD will accept all complaints, by all methods and ¶ 114 forms detailed in ¶ 114.

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement

Status

Within two years of Preliminary the Effective Date Compliance (March 30, 2018)

Within 60 days after approval of policy

Non-Compliance

Within 365 days of the Operational Date (July 12, 2017)

Not Assessed

Within two years of Initial the Effective Date Development (March 30, 2018)

Ongoing

Initial Development

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D. See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.
See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(4). See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(C)(4).

20

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Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation Continued

Achievement
NPD will provide civilians, including complainants and witnesses to alleged police misconduct, with full access to NPD’s complaint process. NPD will review and revise its policies for releasing complaints and misconduct allegations to make such complaints and allegations publicly available and ensure compliance with the Consent Decree.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 115

NPD will train all police personnel, including dispatchers, to properly handle complaint intake; the consequences for failing to take complaints; and strategies for turning the complaint process into positive police-civilian interaction.

¶ 116

NPD will conduct regular, targeted, and random integrity audits to identify officers or other employees who refuse to accept or discourage the filing of misconduct complaints, fail to report misconduct or complaints, or provide false or misleading information about filing a misconduct complaint.

¶ 117

NPD will review the results of the audits conducted ¶¶ 117-118 pursuant to ¶ 117 and take appropriate action to remedy any problematic patterns or trends.

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Ongoing
Within 180 days of the Operational Date (January 8, 2017) Ongoing
Ongoing

Status Initial Development
Non-Compliance Non-Compliance
Not Assessed

Discussion See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(D)(2).
See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(C).
See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(F)(2)(a).

21

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Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation Continued

Achievement
NPD will require that all officers and employees report allegations of criminal behavior or administrative misconduct by another NPD officer toward a member of the public, that they may observe themselves or receive from another source, to a supervisor or directly to OPS for review and investigation. When a supervisor receives such allegations, the supervisor will promptly document and report this information to OPS.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 119

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status
Preliminary Compliance

NPD will investigate as a misconduct complaint any information or testimony arising in criminal prosecutions or civil lawsuits that indicate potential officer misconduct not previously investigated by NPD.

¶ 120

Ongoing

Not Assessed

Complaint Classification and Assignment of Investigative Responsibility (¶¶ 121-125)

NPD will adopt and implement a complaint

¶ 121

Within two years of Preliminary

classification protocol that is based on the nature of

the Effective Date Compliance

the alleged misconduct, in order to guide OPS in

(March 30, 2018)

determining where a complaint should be assigned

for investigation.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read ¶ 11 and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Within 60 days after approval of protocol

Non-Compliance

NPD’s OPS will investigate all allegations of Serious Misconduct as defined in the Consent Decree.

¶ 122

Ongoing

Not Assessed

Discussion See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
See Fifth Quarterly Report, Section III(A)(5).
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation Continued

Achievement
NPD shall develop a protocol for determining whether other complaints will be assigned to the subject officer’s supervisor, the precinct’s Integrity Compliance Officer, or retained by OPS for an administrative investigation. OPS will also determine whether the misconduct complaint warrants a referral to federal or state authorities for a criminal investigation.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 123

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status
Preliminary Compliance

Discussion

OPS will routinely monitor investigations referred to officers’ precincts and specialized units for quality, objectivity and thoroughness, and take appropriate action if investigations are deficient. OPS will identify trends in investigative or leadership deficiencies.

¶ 124

Ongoing

Non-Compliance See Sixth Quarterly Report, Section III(B)(6).

OPS will routinely monitor investigations referred to officers’ precincts and specialized units for quality, objectivity and thoroughness, and take appropriate action if investigations are deficient. OPS will also identify trends in investigative or leadership deficiencies.

¶ 124

Ongoing

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

NPD will maintain a centralized numbering and tracking system for all misconduct complaints.

¶ 125

Misconduct Complaint Investigation (¶¶ 126-136) NPD will review and revise its policies for releasing ¶¶ 126-136 complaints and misconduct allegations to incorporate the requirements set out in ¶¶ 126-136.

Within two years of Initial Development See Fifth Quarterly

the Effective Date

Report, Section III(C)(4).

(March 30, 2018)

Within two years of Preliminary the Effective Date Compliance (March 30, 2018)

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Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation Continued

Achievement
NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 11

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within 60 days after approval of protocol

Status Not Assessed

Parallel Administrative and Criminal Investigations of Officer Misconduct (¶¶ 137-140)

If after a reasonable preliminary inquiry into an

¶ 137

Ongoing

Not Assessed

allegation of misconduct, or at any other time during

the course of an administrative investigation, the

OPS has cause to believe that an officer or employee

might have engaged in criminal conduct, the OPS

will refer the matter to the ECPO, DOJ, or other law

enforcement agency as appropriate.

Notwithstanding the referral and unless otherwise ¶ 138

Ongoing

Not Assessed

directed by the prosecutive agency, NPD will

proceed with its administrative investigations. Under

no circumstances will OPS compel a statement from

the subject officer without first consulting with the

Chief or Director and with the prosecuting agency.

NPD will not automatically end its administrative ¶ 139

Ongoing

Not Assessed

investigation in matters in which the prosecuting

agency declines to prosecute or dismisses after

initiation of criminal charges. Instead, NPD will

require investigators to conduct a complete

investigation and assessment of all relevant evidence.

NPD will work with DOJ, the ECPO, and the New ¶ 139

Ongoing

Not Assessed

Jersey Attorney General's Office as appropriate to

improve its processes for investigations of use of

force incidents and referrals of complaints of police

misconduct for criminal investigation.

24

Discussion
The deadline has not passed. The Monitor will assess this requirement in a future report.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation Continued

Achievement

Consent

Decree

Paragraph

Review and Analysis of Investigations (¶¶ 141-143)

NPD will train OPS supervisors to ensure that

¶ 141

investigations are thorough and complete, and that

investigators' conclusions and recommendations that

are not adequately supported by the evidence will not

be approved or accepted.

NPD will develop and implement a protocol for

¶¶ 142-143

regular supervisory review and assessment of the

types of complaints being alleged or sustained to

identify potential problematic patterns and trends.

Staffing and Training Requirements (¶¶ 144-149)

Within 30 days of the Operational Date, NPD will ¶¶ 144, 145

review staffing of OPS and ensure that misconduct

investigators and commanders possess appropriate

investigative skills, a reputation for integrity, the

ability to write clear reports with recommendations

supported by the evidence, and the ability to assess

fairly and objectively whether an officer has

committed misconduct.

NPD will use a case management system to track and maintain appropriate caseloads for OPS investigators and promote the timely completion of investigations by OPS.

¶ 146

NPD will require and provide appropriate training for OPS investigators upon their assignment to OPS, with refresher training at periodic intervals. At a minimum, NPD will provide 40 hours of initial training and eight hours additional in-service training on an annual basis.

¶¶ 147, 148

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement

Status

Within 60 days after approval of policy

Non-Compliance

Within two years of Non-Compliance the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Within 30 days of the Operational Date (August 11, 2016)

Operational Compliance (achieved after deadline)

Within two years of Not Assessed the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Within 60 days after approval of protocol and annually thereafter

Non-Compliance

25

Discussion
See Second Quarterly Report.
The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

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Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake and Investigation Continued

Achievement
NPD will improve OPS’ complaint tracking and assessment practices in accordance with ¶ 149.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 149

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status Non-Compliance

Discussion
See Eighth Quarterly Report, Section II(C).

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X. Compliance Reviews and Integrity Audits

Achievement
NPD will conduct integrity audits and compliance reviews to identify and investigate all officers who have engaged in misconduct including unlawful stops, searches, seizures, excessive uses of force; theft of property or other potential criminal behavior’ racial or ethnic profiling and bias against lesbian, gay bisexual and transgender persons.
The integrity audits will also seek to identify officers who discourage the filing of complaints, fail to report misconduct or complaints, or otherwise undermine NPD’s integrity and accountability systems.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶¶ 150, 151

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status
Preliminary Compliance

Discussion
NPD has begun to conduct some integrity audits (e.g., body-worn cameras, and stops). See Seventh Quarterly Report, Section II(D)(2).

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XI. Discipline

Achievement
NPD will adopt policies that are consistent and fair in their application of officer discipline, including establishing a formal, written, presumptive range of discipline for each type of violation.

Consent Decree Paragraph Section XIII

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Status
Preliminary Compliance

Discussion
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix D.

NPD will ensure that officers have received, read and ¶ 11 understand their responsibilities pursuant to the policy or procedure and that the topic is incorporated into the in-service training required.

Within 60 days after approval of guidance

Non-Compliance See Ninth Quarterly Report, Appendix C.

NPD will apply discipline for sustained allegations of misconduct based on the nature and severity of the policy violation and defined mitigating and aggravating factors, rather than the officer’s identity, rank or assignment; relationship with other individuals; or reputation in the broader community.

¶ 152

Ongoing

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

NPD will implement disciplinary guidance for its

¶ 153

personnel that addresses the topics addressed in ¶ 153

of the Consent Decree.

NPD will establish a unified system for reviewing sustained findings and applying the appropriate level of discipline pursuant to NPD’s disciplinary guidance.

¶ 154

Within 90 days of the Operational Date (October 10, 2016) Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Non-Compliance Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

NPD will conduct annual reviews of its disciplinary ¶ 155 process and actions.

Annually

Non-Compliance

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XII. Data Systems Improvement

Achievement Early Warning System (¶¶ 156-161)

Consent Decree Paragraph

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement

Status

Discussion

NPD will enhance its Early Warning System (“EWS”) to support the effective supervision and management of NPD officers.

¶ 156

Within one year of the Effective Date (March 30, 2017)

Non-Compliance See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).

City will provide sufficient funding to NPD to enhance its EWS.

¶ 156

NPD will develop and implement a data protocol

¶ 157

describing information to be recorded and maintained

in the EWS.

Within one year of the Effective Date (March 30, 2017) Within two years of the Effective Date (March 30, 2018)

Non-Compliance Non-Compliance

See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).
See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).

NPD will revise its use of EWS as an effective supervisory tool. To that end, the EWS will use comparative data and peer group analysis to identify patterns of activity by officers and groups of officers for supervisory review and intervention.

¶ 158-160

Within two years of Non-Compliance See Ninth Quarterly

the Effective Date

Report, Section II(A).

(March 30, 2018)

NPD will continue to use its current IAPro software's alert and warning features to identify officers for intervention while further developing and implementing an EWS that is fully consistent with this Agreement.

¶ 161

Ongoing

Not Assessed

The Monitor will assess this requirement during compliance audits.

Records Management System (“RMS”) (¶¶ 162-163) NPD will revise its use and analysis of its RMS to ¶ 162 make efficient and effective use of the data in the System and improve its ability to interface with other technology systems.

Within two years of Non-Compliance See Ninth Quarterly

the Effective Date

Report, Section II(A).

(March 30, 2018)

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Data Systems Improvement Continued Achievement
City will provide sufficient funding and personnel to NPD so NPD can revise its use and analysis of its Record Management System.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 163

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
N/A

Status

Discussion

Non-Compliance See Ninth Quarterly Report, Section II(A).

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XIII. Transparency and Oversight
Achievement
NPD will make its policies publicly available, and will regularly report information regarding officer use of force; misconduct complaints; and stop/search/arrest data.
NPD will work with the civilian oversight entity to overcome impediments to the release of information consistent with law and public safety considerations.
On at least an annual basis, NPD will issue reports, summarizing and analyzing the stop, search, arrest and use of force data collected, the analysis of that data, and the steps taken to correct problems and build on successes.

Consent Decree Paragraph ¶ 164

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement
Ongoing

Status Not Assessed

¶ 165

N/A

Not Assessed

¶¶ 85, 168 Annually

NonCompliance

Discussion

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XIV. Consent Decree Implementation and Enforcement

Achievement
Consent Decree Implementation Unit The City and NPD will form an interdisciplinary unit to facilitate the implementation of the Consent Decree.

Consent Decree Paragraph

Consent Decree Deadline for Achievement

Status

¶ 196

Within 180 days after the Effective Date (September 26, 2016)

Operational Compliance

The City implementation unit will file a status report with the Court, delineating the items set forth in the Consent Decree.

¶ 197

Within 180 days after the Effective Date (September 26, 2016) and every six months thereafter

Operational Compliance

Discussion

11500884

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Appendix C

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STATUS OF NPD’S CONSENT DECREE TRAINING

Tenth Quarterly Report – April 1, 2019 – June 30, 2019

The following chart notes the status of Consent Decree-related training.

Training

Status

Community-Oriented Policing
Body-Worn and In-Car Cameras Use of Force Stops, Searches, and Arrests
Bias-Free Policing3

Training was administered to all relevant NPD officers in 2018. 1
NPD reports that it completed its second year of training on Community-Oriented Policing in 2019.
This training was not provided to the Monitoring Team and the Monitoring team has not approved it.
Training has been administered to all relevant NPD officers.
Training has been administered to all relevant NPD officers.
Training has been administered to all relevant NPD officers. NPD is developing the second generation of training on Stops, Searches, and Arrests and plans to begin administering training as early as January 2020.2
NPD is developing its training on Bias-Free Policing and plans to begin administering training as early as January 2020.

1 NPD administered Community-Oriented Policing training to its officers prior to completing its Community-Oriented Policing policy. 2 Consent Decree Para. 43 requires NPD to “provide all officers with at least 16 hours of training on stops, searches, arrests and the requirements of this Agreement…and at least an additional 4 hours on an annual basis thereafter.” 3 NPD has not completed all of the training elements with respect to incorporating “scenario-based training that promotes the development and strengthening of partnerships between the police and community;” and “conflict resolution, including verbal de-escalation of conflict” [Consent Decree Para. 14(b) & (e)], as it relates to training on community policing and problem-oriented policing methods and skills. NPD intends to incorporate these elements into its trainings on Community Policing, Use of Force, and Stop, Search, and Arrest.
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Training Internal Affairs
Property and Evidence Management

Status
NPD is developing an internal affairs investigations Procedural Manual in collaboration with the vendor selected by DOJ. The Monitoring Team has provided the Parties with detailed comments to its draft Procedural Manual. At NPD’s request, the Monitoring Team will provide technical assistance to NPD with respect to revising the Procedural Manual.
NPD must develop a Procedural Manual. NPD reports that it, as of June 22, 2019, it has completed training on its primary property policy via PowerDMS.
This training was not provided to the Monitoring Team and the Monitoring Team has not approved it.

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Appendix D

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STATUS OF NPD’S CONSENT DECREE POLICIES

Tenth Quarterly Report – April 1, 2019 – June 30, 2019

The following chart notes the status of effective Consent Decree-related policies.

GO#

Subject

Consent Decree Provision

Date Adopted by NPD

GO 17-06 Bias-Free Policing

Paragraph 5

September 19, 2017 (Effective September 19, 2017)

GO 18-05 Body Worn Cameras

Paragraph 104

GO 18-06 In-Car Cameras

Paragraph 104

GO 18-20 Use of Force

Paragraphs 66-67

GO 18-21 Use of Force Reporting, Investigation and Review
GO 18-22 Firearms and Other Weapons

Paragraphs 66-67 Paragraphs 66-67

June 5, 2018 (Effective June 5, 2018) June 5, 2018 (Effective June 5, 2018) November 8, 2018 (Effective January 1, 2019) November 8, 2018 (Effective January 1, 2019) November 8, 2018 (Effective January 1, 2019)

GO 18-14 Consensual Citizen Contacts and Paragraph 5; Section VI Investigatory Stops (“Stops”)

GO 18-15 Searches With or Without a Search Warrant (“Searches”)

Paragraph 5; Section VI

GO 18-16 Arrests With or Without an Arrest Warrant (“Arrests”)

Paragraph 5; Section VI

December 31, 2018 (Effective January 10, 2019) December 31, 2018 (Effective January 10, 2019) December 31, 2018 (Effective January 10, 2019)

1

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GO#

Subject

GO 18-13 Community Policing1

GO 18-24 Property and Evidence Division

GO 18-23 Property and Evidence Management
GO 19-03 LGBTQI Community & Police Interactions2
GO 18-12 First Amendment Right to Observe, Object to, and Record Police Activity3

Consent Decree Provision Section V Paragraph 110 Paragraph 110 Not Required Not Required

Date Adopted by NPD April 4, 2019 (Effective April 4, 2019) April 3, 2019 (Effective April 3, 2019) April 12, 2019 (Effective April 12, 2019) April 3, 2019 (Effective April 3, 2019) June 12, 2019 (Effective June 12, 2019)

1 Attached as an addendum to NPD’s Community Policing policy is a Department of Public Safety Memorandum regarding NPD’s Neighborhood Policing Plans. Neighborhood Policing Plans are plans designed by Precinct Commanders. The Plans identify neighborhoods within a Precinct for Commanders to provide a more localized approach to problem-solving and crime reduction and involve collaboration between officers, residents, business-owners, faith-based organizations, school officials and other service organization to jointly identify and solve local problems.
2 Although the Consent Decree requires NPD to “operate without bias based on any demographic category,” (see Consent Decree § VII), it does not require a standalone policy to address the LGBTQIA community. To help institutionalize its practices, NPD decided to draft a policy dedicated to its stop, search, and arrest of these community members.
3 The Consent Decree requires NPD to respect the public’s First Amendment right and prohibits officers from taking certain actions to discourage the exercise of these rights. (Consent Decree ¶¶ 55-62.) It does not expressly require NPD to create standalone policy to this end, but NPD decided to write such a policy.
2

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GO#

Subject

GO 18-25 Internal Affairs: Complaint Intake & Investigation Process4

GO 18-26 Internal Affairs: Disciplinary Process and Matrix

Consent Decree Provision Section XI
Section XIII

Date Adopted by NPD August 21, 2019 (Effective August 21, 2019) Revised November 15, 2019 (Effective November 15, 2019) September 9, 2019 (Effective September 9, 2019)

4 On June 19, 2019, NPD promulgated the Responsibilities of Command and Supervisory Personnel policy (GO 80-1). Because the Complaint Intake & Investigation Process policy required command level Supervisors to periodically review the disciplinary histories of subordinate officers, NPD revised this policy to reflect these changes.
3
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Appendix E

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First Audit of the Newark Police Division’s Training Records
I. REVIEWERS
Robert Wasserman, Hillard Heintze LLC Thomas J. O’Reilly, Rutgers University Center on Policing Linda Tartaglia, Rutgers University Center on Policing II. BACKGROUND
In letters dated March 15, 2019 and April 30, 2019, the Monitoring Team informed the Parties to the Consent Decree that it would audit whether the Newark Police Division (“NPD”) maintained records showing that it had (or would) administer training to all relevant officers in the following Consent Decree areas: (1) community-oriented policing; (2) stops, searches, and arrests; (3) use of force; and (4) in-car and body-worn cameras. These training sessions were the only substantive Consent Decree-required trainings that NPD has administered as of March 1, 2019, the point in time that the Monitoring Team would analyze.
The Monitoring Team conducted this audit pursuant to Consent Decree Paragraphs 12 and 173. Paragraph 173 of the Consent Decree provides:
The Monitor will conduct compliance reviews or audits as necessary to determine whether the City and NPD have implemented and continue to comply with the requirements of this Agreement. Compliance with a requirement of this Agreement requires that the City and NPD have: (a) incorporated the requirement into the policy; (b) trained all relevant personnel as necessary to fulfill their responsibilities pursuant to the requirement; and (c) implemented the requirement in practice.
Paragraph 12 provides: “NPD will maintain complete and consistent training records for all officers.”
A. Materials Requested and Reviewed
The Monitoring Team requested that NPD make the following materials available for its audit as of March 1, 2019:
(1) Master Course Training File for each of the four trainings. This File should contain all course materials, including course objectives, curriculum, instructor listing, instructor training materials, schedules for the course, the policy underlying the course, instructor teaching guidelines, and a list of all officers who have received the training.
(2) Original course sign in sheets, course evaluations, and course pre-test and posttest results for each NPD officer who participated in these four trainings.
(3) NPD’s description of how it tracked the training administered pursuant to the Consent Decree.
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(4) Access to NPD’s Consent Decree training database, which shows the name, rank, assignment, and dates of attendance for each officer who attended a particular training, as well as the date on which all relevant NPD officers received training (or whether an officer still needs to be trained in a particular subject).
(5) Documentation and an analysis of each officers’ pre-and post-training assessments.
NPD made these materials available to the Reviewers in Newark, New Jersey, in the Consent Decree conference room located on the second floor of police headquarters (480 Clinton Avenue), and in the NPD Police Academy building (1 Lincoln Avenue). All the files available at the time of review were in hard copy, spread over approximately ten boxes, and had not yet been entered into NPD’s new electronic records management system, PowerDMS.1 Each training course had a paper file that included the sign-in roster co-signed by a member of the training staff, copies of the pre-and post-test, if given, the name of the instructor, and a copy of the evaluation form given to participating officers. The Reviewers analyzed these records during site visits on March 1, 2019 and August 8, 2019.
B. Methodology
The Reviewers performed this training records audit by doing the following: (1) assembling the attendance sheets for each of the 377 training sessions that NPD administered on these four subject areas as of March 1, 2019, (2) selecting one officer from each of these sheets (377 officers in total), (3) reviewing the training records in that particular officer’s file, and (4) comparing those records to the contents of NPD’s Master Course Training Files for each of the four subject areas on which the officer was trained. The Reviewers also obtained a list of all NPD officers by rank and assignment as of March 1, 2019 and examined the files for every officer who was returning from leave to active duty during the audit period.
C. Sample Size
NPD reported to the Reviewers that as of March 1, 2019, NPD had 1,113 sworn officers in total. Thirty-six of those officers were not available to be trained. This group of unavailable officers included 17 officers on military leave, 12 officers on long-term injury leave, and 7 officers who were indefinitely suspended. Thus, as of March 1, 2019, NPD had 1,077 officers eligible for training.2
1 NPD is in the process of transitioning to an electronic records system. As described in the Monitoring Team’s Quarterly Reports, an electronic records system will provide NPD with significant benefits, including ensuring the integrity of its records as well as facile analysis and data exports. Electronic record management also will enable the Monitoring Team to perform many of the audits required by the Consent Decree. 2 The number of NPD officers eligible to be trained is constantly in flux due to such factors as the number of officers on military leave, disability, or suspension on any given day. For example, between August 8, 2019 and September 10, 2019, the number of NPD officers available to be trained varied from 986 to 996.
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As evidenced by the attendance sheets—and as expected when administering training to a large police department—the number of NPD officers in each training session ranged from 3 to 30. The following chart shows the number of training sessions that NPD administered for each of the four subject areas. The number of training sessions is the same as (i) the number of training sheets reviewed, and (ii) the number of officer training records reviewed, since one officer’s records were reviewed per training sheet.

Training

Number of sessions, training Number of Officers sheets, and officers reviewed Trained in Total3

Community-Oriented Policing 69

1,250

Use of Force

80

1,147

Stop, Search, and Arrest

37

9204

Body-Worn and In-Car

191

8525

Cameras

Total

377

4,169

III. ANALYSIS
A. Findings
The Reviewers found that 100% of the sample of 377 officers had complete and correct training records as compared to the records in the Master Course Files. Those few officers who had not yet received training in one of the subjects were scheduled to do so. Additionally, the Reviewers found that all officers who had returned from leave to active duty as of March 1, 2019 had received the four Consent Decree trainings before returning to active duty.
Additionally, the Reviewers found that NPD’s Master Course Files for the four covered subjects contain all of the information that NPD reports they do. NPD’s Master Course Files contained: (a) the relevant training curriculum, (b) list of instructors and instructional learning objectives, (c) instructor guidelines, (d) course schedules, (e) sample student evaluation form, (f) sample course pre-test, (g) sample course post-test, (h) analysis of course test scores, (i) student feedback where provided, and (j) teaching materials such as PowerPoint, handouts, and videos.
3 The variation in number of officers trained is predominantly attributable to fluctuations in the number of officers eligible for training at any given point, and the fact that these trainings were staggered over a nearly two-year period. 4 NPD had not yet completed administration of Stop, Search, and Arrest training as of March 1, 2019, the control date for this audit. 5 NPD had not yet completed administration of Body-Worn and In-Car Camera training as of March 1, 2019, the control date for this audit.
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NPD is in the process of compiling a report for all four courses that analyzes each question to identify who answered questions correctly or incorrectly on the pre and post-tests.
Finally, the Reviewers note that every officer in the sample with a patrol or communityfacing function was trained in the four covered subjects by January 29, 2019. Officers, Detectives, and Command staff had all completed training by July 2019.
B. Recommendations
During the course of this audit, the Reviewers spent significant time with NPD’s training staff, reviewing its processes and procedures. Based on their experience, the Reviewers make the following observations.
(1) NPD’s training staff and facilities require augmentation.
Given NPD’s size and the amount of training required by the Consent Decree, the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, and NPD’s revised or newly written policies, NPD should add additional training staff, including at least one civilian support person who is dedicated to the maintenance and upkeep of its electronic records management system, PowerDMS.
Additionally, NPD’s training facilities are antiquated and dilapidated. They do not provide an environment conducive to learning or a positive image to those receiving training, particularly recruits during their six to eight-week orientation. New officers get their first exposure to NPD during training; poor facilities impair morale and can send the message that officer training is a low priority. The Reviewers recommend a temporary change of the training location for new officers while repairs can be made. NPD could use classroom space at Rutgers Law School, Seton Hall Law School, and Berkeley College.
(2) NPD should codify and formalize its process for selecting trainers and reviewing training after it has been administered.
While NPD has recruited well-qualified trainers to administer the four Consent Decree trainings, it should codify its process for selecting trainers in the future. Best practices include maintaining an organized file of at least the following information: (i) the capabilities of the instructor, (ii) completion of an instructional methods course, (iii) instructors’ training experience on the subject matter; and (iv) feedback.
This system should maintain basic information about data used in the decision-making process of whether to retain a specific trainer, including the name of the instructor, position or affiliation with NPD, instructional training attended, rank of the police officer, other relevant subject matter taught, and any evaluations or feedback on the instructor’s past performance. This information should be stored in two places: the individual instructor files, and in the Master Course Files.
Finally, NPD should designate a member of the Academy to review comments received from the students who suggest ways to improve the course after it has been completed, and at least one member who reviews each training for changes in the law and best police and training practices.
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(3) NPD should formalize its process for administering remedial training.
The training academy uses a percentage of correct answers on the post-test form as the predesignated passing score for each particular topic taught. If an individual does not achieve the 80% threshold on the post-test, the training participant is required to review all incorrect answers with instructors. The instructor explains the rationale for why a particular choice is correct and why other answers are incorrect. Once the instructor is satisfied that the training participant fully comprehends the material, the instructor signs the post-test form indicating that the instructor feels the student has been “remediated” on the relevant topic.
We suggested a consistent policy aligned with General Order 18-28, Section 4, under which the Academy would create a more formalized process for individuals who do not achieve the 80% score on the post-test. This process should include remediation as is currently being done, followed by administration of a second test to the officer to gauge whether he or she achieves the required 80% completion. General Order 18-28 provides that if an officer, upon taking the test the second time after remediation, does not achieve a score of at least 80%, then he or she is referred to the commanding officer for appropriate action.
We also suggest that the required passing score be tied to the particular subject matter being assessed; some subject areas must require a higher score. For example, Use of Force testing should require close to a 100% score. Other tests might require a lower score.
(4) NPD’s training staff requires additional assistance to transition to its electronic records management system.
The Police Academy has only one officer devoted to entering the records of the officers into the PowerDMS electronic records management system. It is clear that this personnel allocation is inadequate. For example, for the four courses subject to this compliance review, a single person is required to create and update over 5,000 individual records. Further, the officer devoted to data entries, now a lieutenant, has numerous other responsibilities for NPD’s training program beyond data entry.
Progress has been significant and steady, but NPD needs additional temporary help with these files. To properly maintain these files, NPD should dedicate one or more civilian support persons fully trained in the operation of PowerDMS. The PowerDMS system applications are particularly critical for training records. The successful management and implementation of Power DMS will help NPD comply with various Consent Decree requirements and should be prioritized.
(5) NPD must create monthly and annual calendars of its trainings, Consent Decree and otherwise.
In order to ensure that NPD is optimizing its training resources, it must formalize the process for creating a monthly calendar of trainings, and create an annual training schedule, which would include trainings required by the Consent Decree, New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, and other required courses. The process for formalizing the master calendar, as well as other aspects of the training function at NPD, should be memorialized in a training standard
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operating procedure. This standard procedure is imperative in ensuring a comprehensive training program that reflects best practices, as well as ensuring smooth transition of leadership and staff.

The four charts attached to this audit as Appendix A provide details regarding the training records of the officers who received training regarding (1) Community-Oriented Policing, (2) Use of Force, (3) Stops; Searches, with or without a warrant; and Arrests, with or without a warrant, and (4) Body-Worn and In-Car Cameras.

Dated: October 15, 2019

Peter C. Harvey Independent Monitor

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Appendix A: Analysis of NPD’s Training by Subject Matter

Community-Oriented Policing

Hours of training: 8 Number of attendance sheets reviewed: 69
Information included on attendance sheet: Course/ Policy Name ID number Date attended Assignment Test sheets Evaluation Recorded on training academy records
Course start date: March 12, 2018 Completed: May 31, 2018 Total trained: 1,250 Sworn members: 1,140 Special Police: 110 Sick/Injured: 49 Other Leave: 8 Remaining to be trained as of March 1, 2019: 0

Possible Assignments for Sample Officers • First Precinct • Second Precinct • Third Precinct • Fourth Precinct • Fifth Precinct • Sixth Precinct • Seventh Precinct • Traffic • Juvenile • Municipal Holding • Robbery • Special Chiefs Office • Holding • Fugitive • Property • Emergency Services • Auto • 911 Center • Metro • RTCC

Police Rank of 2 (3%) Sample Officers
5 (7%) 6 (9%) 7 (10%)
12 (17%) 37 (54%)

Special Police Police Officer Detective Sgt. Lt. Capt.

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Use of Force

Hours of training: 8 Number of attendance sheets reviewed: 80
Information included on attendance sheet: Course/ Policy Name ID number Date attended Assignment Test sheets (No pre-test administered) Evaluation Recorded on training academy records
Course Start Date: October 24, 2018 Completed: February 28, 2019 Total trained: 1,147 Sworn members: 1,050 Special Police: 97 Sick/ Injured: 40 Other Leave: 34 Remaining to be trained as of March 1, 2019: 0

Possible Assignments for Sample Officers • First Precinct • Second Precinct • Third Precinct • Fourth Precinct • Fifth Precinct • Sixth Precinct • Seventh Precinct • Traffic • Juvenile • Municipal Holding • Special Chiefs Office • Emergency Services • Auto • Taxi • 911 Center • Chiefs Office • Finance • Fleet • FOP

Police Rank of 2 (3%)

Sample Officers

1 (1%)5 (6%)

8 (10%) 6 (7%) 7 (9%)

51 (64%)

Special Police Police Officer Detective

Sgt.

Lt.

Capt.

Chief of Police

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Stops, Searches, and Arrests

Hours of training: 16 Number of attendance sheets reviewed: 37
Information included on attendance sheet: Course/ Policy Name ID number Date attended Assignment Test sheets Evaluation (no evaluations were administered) Recorded on training academy records
Course Start Date: November 8, 2018 As of March 1, 2019 (projected completion May 2019) Total trained: 920 Police Officers: 843 Special Police Officers: 77 Total Sworn members: 1,098 Special Police: 110 Remaining as of March 1, 2019: 291 (255 Sworn and 36 Special Police Officers).

Possible Assignments for Sample Officers • First Precinct • Second Precinct • Third Precinct • Fourth Precinct • Fifth Precinct • Sixth Precinct • Seventh Precinct • Municipal Holding • Robbery • Emergency Services • Special Chiefs Office • Holding

Police Rank of1 (3%) Sample Officers
2 (5%)
3 (8%) 2 (5%)

2 (6%)

27 (73%)

Special Police Police Officer Detective Sgt. Lt. Capt.
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Body-Worn and In-Car Cameras

Number of attendance sheets reviewed: 191

Possible Assignments for Sample Officers

Information included on attendance sheet: Course/ Policy Name ID number Date attended Assignment Test sheets Evaluation Recorded on training academy records
Course Start Date: April 9, 2018 Trained as of March 1, 2019: 852 (required patrol officers completed training by 1/29/2019) Total trained: 852 Total Sworn members: 1,098 Special Police: 0 Remaining to be trained as of March 1, 2019: 246

• First Precinct • Second Precinct • Third Precinct • Fourth Precinct • Fifth Precinct • Sixth Precinct • Seventh Precinct • Traffic • Juvenile • Municipal Holding • Special Chiefs Office • Emergency Services
• Auto • Holding • 911 Center • Metro • Robbery • Fugitive • Property • RTCC

Police Rank of 5 (2%) Sample Officers
17 (9%)

30 (16%) 13 (7%)

126 (66%)

11191111

Police Officer Detective Sgt. Lt. Capt.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

________________________________

:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

NO. 16-01731(MCA-MAH)

vs.

CITY OF NEWARK, Defendant.
________________________________

NEWARK POLICE DIVISION EIGHTH STATUS REPORT

INTRODUCTION Pursuant to paragraph 197 of the Consent Decree entered in this matter, Defendant, the
City of Newark (“City”), submits this status report to delineate the many steps taken by the Newark Police Division (“NPD,”) to implement the Consent Decree; plans to correct any issues; and responses to any concerns that have been raised by the Independent Monitor (“Monitor”).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The NPD has made significant progress toward complying with the Consent Decree and
improving overall services to the community. Below are selected highlights for the reporting period of October 28, 2019 to April 27, 2020.
1. During the reporting period, the Monitor filed the Ninth Quarterly Report (October 2019) where a number of recommendations were made regarding technology and youth engagement. NPD has taken some significant steps to address these recommendations during the reporting period including the hiring of AH Datalytics through a Bureau of Justice Grant, drafting a Youth Engagement Strategy and meeting with some community stakeholders regarding that engagement strategy.
2. During the reporting period, the Monitor also filed the Tenth Quarterly Report (January 2020) where a number of recommendations where made regarding training. In response to those
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recommendations NPD updated its Training Standards Policy in collaboration with the Subject Matter Experts, where processes for selecting instructors have been updated, training evaluations have been standardized and monthly training calendars have been implemented.
3. During the reporting period, the Monitor did not approve the Internal Affairs Guidebook, which NPD drafted with the assistance of the Rogers Group hired through a Department of Justice Grant Program. It took NPD over a year to draft the Internal Affairs Guidebook, which is not required to be done under the Consent Decree. The Monitor recommended that NPD have a Guidebook and NPD chose to implement the Monitor’s recommendation. NPD is now redrafting the Guidebook with technical assistance provided by some of the subject matter experts on the Monitoring Team.
4. NPD continues to make community engagement and the building of public trust a priority. During the reporting period NPD officers engaged the community in numerous ways including: the CommUnity and Cops meeting; the Blueline Buddies program in partnership with the NJ Devils; toy drives; the Hope One program; community clean up events; Community walks with precinct commanders; coat drives; Domestic Violence awareness workshops; Newark Police Explorers program; and Bullying workshops at schools to name a few. In response to the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, NPD officers continue to engage the community through community walks and the distribution of essential supplies to those community members in need of assistance.
5. The NPD continues to collaborate with the subject matter experts on the Monitoring Team and members of the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office to develop and draft high-quality progressive police policies and training in accordance with the Consent Decree.
6. During the reporting period and in continued response to the Monitor’s concerns regarding Domestic Violence as it relates to the NPD reform effort, NPD reviewed Domestic Violence related assignments. The reviews consisted of comparisons of Body Worn Camera footage to filed reports and victim callbacks.
7. During the reporting period, members of the Consent Decree and Planning Division (CDPD), which serves as the Consent Decree paragraph 196 required implementation unit conducted inspections of compliance with General Order 18-25 Complaint Intake and Investigation Process. The inspections were geared to determine if NPD officers are properly taking and forwarding complaints made against officers in compliance with policy. Additionally,
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Office of Professional Standards investigations and disciplinary reviews were assessed for compliance with policy.
8. During the reporting period, NPD has started training officers and supervisors in implicit bias awareness provided by Fair & Impartial Policing®, LLC in compliance with paragraph 63 of the Consent Decree. The state-of-the-art Fair & Impartial Policing® training program is about how the mind works. The program teaches officers how implicit biases can influence wellintentioned individuals outside their conscious awareness. The goal of this training is to further NPD’s efforts to strengthen the relationship with the community.
9. NPD’s commitment to transparency in its procedures and performance remains a priority. During the reporting period, transparency data has been posted and updated in compliance with Consent Decree requirements. The change of culture envisioned by the Consent Decree cannot be completed in a matter of months, and progress is ongoing, however, a meaningful shift in the transparency data has been observed in sustained excessive force complaints against NPD officers when comparing 2016 and 2019 sustained complaint percentages.
10. Prior to the end of this reporting period, NPD requested from the Monitor a temporary suspension of all on-site inspections and audits due to the public health emergency caused by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic. NPD however stands ready to provide documents or information, where feasible, by remote access, in order for the Monitoring Team to complete any planned audits.
TECHNOLOGY
In response to recommendations from the Monitor and the technology assessment conducted by the Gartner Group in late 2018, and to begin implementation of the NPD IT Strategic Plan and Roadmap developed by Gartner Group, NPD applied to the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) National Training and Technical Assistance Center (NTTAC) for technical assistance to enhance NPD’s capabilities to use technology to comply with Consent Decree requirements. Through this collaborative effort, AH Datalytics was hired to conduct a comprehensive gap analysis of NPD’s capabilities to provide actionable recommendations across the technology landscape.
The gap analysis will consider best practices and market capabilities as well as detail how to build human capacity to deliver data-driven management within NPD. Ultimately, this product
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will leave NPD with a detailed roadmap for achieving the data collection and reporting requirements of the Consent Decree as well as enhance NPD’s crime analysis and community engagement needs. AH Datalytics project team will include Mr. Ben Horwitz as project lead and Mr. Jeff Asher providing analytic support. Mr. Horwitz created the nationally recognized Management Analytics for Excellence (MAX) data platform at the New Orleans Police Department to deliver data products to the public, command-staff, supervisors, and officers covering topics from crime analysis to Consent Decree compliance. Mr. Asher has expertise in delivering criminal justice data to the community through his work as the public safety consultant with the New Orleans City Council. In particular, the dashboards on crime and on key topics of the Consent Decree have enabled greater community engagement on these topics.
YOUTH ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY
NPD continues its efforts to establish a youth engagement strategy through the development of a guiding document which creates a framework for all officers that will help NPD focus its efforts and help guide future engagement with youth in a more efficient and consistent manner. During the reporting period, NPD met with members of the All Stars Project of Newark, a national nonprofit that uses a performance-based approach to help tens of thousands of innercity youth and their families create success in their lives. The All Stars Project runs Operation Conversation: Cops and Kids in partnership with the NPD. The program is designed to foster positive interactions between the police and inner-city youth. It consists of a series of community workshops that use performance, improvisational games and conversation to help teenagers and police officers to develop and improve their relationship.
TRAINING STANDARDS
During the reporting period, NPD updated General Order 18-28 Training Standards with the assistance of the subject matter experts. This order has been updated to include new reporting and record keeping requirements, procedures for the selection of instructors and the successful completion of use of force training standards. The revisions include responsibilities of the Training Division Commander and Training Division personnel in the use of the PowerDMS system to maintain training records. This revision also includes a requirement for the Training Division to submit a weekly report containing a training schedule that includes topics that will be taught to
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Division personnel for the upcoming twenty-eight-day period. The weekly report shall include a course description for all in-service training and outside training Division personnel are scheduled to attend.
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
NPD continues to make community engagement, particularly outreach to youth, and the building of public trust a priority. During the reporting period NPD officers engaged the community in numerous ways. The Blueline Buddies is a program that allows police officers and underprivileged youth to bond over a night of hockey. Through the Blueline Buddies program, children and officers get to see games and meet professional hockey players. P.K. Subban, a defenseman for the New Jersey Devils, founded the program.
During the reporting period, NPD participated in over ninety toy drive events in an effort to give to less fortunate children the ability to experience the joys of the Holidays and continue to build positive relationships with the community. The Hope One program continued its successes during the reporting period by engaging with over three hundred community members, referring over seventy of those community members to rehabilitative and mental health services, training seventeen people on the use of naloxone and distributing fourteen naloxone kits.
NPD participated in over thirty community clean up events, where officers worked alongside community members to improve public spaces and encourage environmental stewardship. NPD command staff and Community Service Officers participated in over two hundred and fifty community walks with community members. NPD participated in over twenty coat drives during the reporting period to assist community members in need. NPD hosted Domestic Violence awareness workshops throughout the city to provide community members information as to what services are available to them and what they should expect from police during an incident of Domestic Violence.
Newark Police Explorers, an educational training program for youth on the duties, service, and structure of Policing and Law Enforcement, met with NPD during the reporting period. There are approximately forty active members in Newark Police Explorers Post #2808. The focus of the program is to provide a career-oriented curriculum that gives young adults a chance to explore a career in law enforcement through contact and training with NPD and other law enforcement
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agencies. The Newark Police Explorers Program is available to qualified youth who have passed the 8th grade and are ages 14 through 21. NPD conducted over thirty anti-bullying workshops at schools to ensure youth have a better understanding of what bullying is and are equipped with the tools and resources to take action.
In response to the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, NPD officers continue to engage the community through community walks and distribution of essential supplies to those community members in need of assistance. NPD officers distributed over twelve hundred facemasks in April 2020 to community members as officers made attempts to educate community members on social distancing and the dangers associated with the novel corona virus.
In accordance with paragraph 19, the CDPD has conducted a series of CommUnity & Cops town hall style meetings, which exist as a platform to seek and respond to input from the community about the implementation of Consent Decree mandates. During these meetings, the community is encouraged to express their opinions and concerns, and to become involved in future forums, as well as provide their input to be considered as part of the NPD policy development process. Community feedback is gathered during the forums, and any questions or concerns are addressed by the NPD and made publicly available on the NPD and Consent Decree websites.
In compliance with Paragraph 18 of the Consent Decree, the CDPD continues to submit the Community Policing Quarterly Report, which is posted to the NPD Consent Decree website, www.npdconsentdecree.org. The NPD is currently working to finalize the 2020 First Quarter Report.
POLICIES
During the reporting period and in compliance with paragraph 5 of the Consent Decree, the following policies and procedures have been finalized and issued to members of the NPD in collaboration with members of the Monitoring Team, the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Community.
o General Order 18-25 Complaint Intake & Investigation Process – Reissued 11/15/19 o General Order 18-28 Training Standards – Reissued 12/31/19

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

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The Monitor’s Sixth Quarterly Report filed January 16, 2019 suggests their review of Internal Affairs investigations revealed several areas of concern related to NPD’s handling of Domestic Violence assignments. In response, and during the reporting period, NPD took the following steps:
o Issued a Domestic Violence Policy for Employees in December of 2019, which delineates procedures and actions, NPD should take when an employee is involved in a Domestic Violence situation. The purpose of the policy is also to encourage employees who are victims of Domestic Violence to seek assistance from their human resource officers and provide a standard for human resource officers to follow when responding to employees.
o On October 2019, an In-service Training Bulletin alert was also issued via PowerDMS alerting officers of their responsibilities as it relates to the issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence victims.
o The Office of Professional Standards (OPS) continued reviews of random Domestic Violence calls for service. OPS is reviewing incident reports and associated body worn camera videos. These reviews continue to uncover areas where training could improve NPD’s response to Domestic Violence incidents.
o In April of 2020, a training bulletin was issued as a reference guide for Domestic Violence incidents.
COMPLAINT INTAKE/OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS INSPECTIONS
During the reporting period, members of the CDPD, conducted inspections of compliance with General Order 18-25 Complaint Intake and Investigation Process. The inspections sought to determine if NPD officers are properly taking and forwarding complaints made against officers in compliance with policy. CDPD staff members placed numerous calls to various precincts posing as victims. CDPD staff members remained anonymous and made allegations of officer misconduct. CDPD staff members then checked to see if complaints were properly filed as per policy. This inspection revealed most officers are compliant with policy, but there are areas where training could improve NPD officer’s compliance with the Complaint Intake Policy. In response to these findings, members of the CDPD conducted numerous roll call trainings to remind officers of their responsibilities under the law, attorney general guidelines and NPD policies.
Office of Professional Standards investigations and disciplinary reviews were assessed for compliance with policy. This review also revealed gaps continue to exist regarding compliance
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with the Complaint Intake and Investigation Process Policy by members of the Office of Professional Standards and NPD superiors.

During the reporting period, members of the CDPD conducted inspections of randomly selected Body Worn Camera videos and randomly selected Stop reports for compliance with policy. The following table summarizes the inspection outcomes.

Table No. 1 – Summary of Inspection Outcomes

Non-Disciplinary Corrective Action Warning Notices Investigations of
Personnel

October 2019 0 8 0

November 2019 0 5 1

December 2019 3 20 0

January 2020 0 7 0

February 2020 0 0 0

March 2020
0 4 0

April 2020
2 0 0

Totals
5 44 1

CONSENT DECREE AND PLANNING DIVISION CONFIDENTIAL INVESTIGATION
During the reporting period, Public Safety Director Anthony Ambrose issued a revision to General Order 18-04, Consent Decree and Planning Division, directing members of the CDPD to supersede the Office of Professional Standards at the discretion of the Public Safety Director and the Chief of Police to conduct internal inspections and confidential investigations.
On or about January 20, 2020, the Public Safety Director designated the CDPD as the lead investigative unit in collaboration with the Office of Professional Standards, to investigate a motorvehicle accident involving an off-duty Newark Police Officer. The investigation stemmed from a motor-vehicle accident involving an off-duty Newark Police Officer, who was on his way to work. The driver of the other vehicle complained that the officer, who was in police uniform at the time, was drunk.
An administrative investigation was initiated immediately. During the course of the investigation other matters of a criminal nature were discovered, which involved several other Newark Police Officers. In total, three officers and one supervisor became targets of a criminal investigation. On Feb. 4, 2020, the Administrative Investigation was tolled by the Essex County Prosecutor's Office due to the criminal matters that surfaced. At that point, the Essex County Prosecutor's Office - Professional Standards Bureau took the lead over the investigation, with the NPD Investigators continuing to work on the investigation. On April 4, 2020, the four officers

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were charged, pre-indictment, with a third-degree charge of tampering with public records and additional charges may be presented before a grand jury. The investigation is active and ongoing.

TRANSPARENCY

NPD’s commitment to transparency in its procedures and performance remains a priority. During the reporting period, transparency data has been posted and updated in compliance with Consent Decree requirements.

The Department of Public Safety's website is regularly updated and revised to make the most upto-date information available to all members of the community. The website can be accessed online by going to: http://npd.newarkpublicsafety.org/

Within the DPS website, the public can also access a separate website, which was specifically designed and created by the CDPD to include all Consent Decree related activity. The site is available by clicking the tab CommUNITY & COPS, or by accessing it from any internet connected computer or mobile device by going to: https://www.npdconsentdecree.org/.

All policies are published on DPS’s website when revised.

The following is transparency data is currently available on the website:

1. Sworn Personnel Rules and Regulations

2. Civilian Personnel Rules and Regulations

3. ComStat related information

4. Crime Statistical Data

5. Transparency Data

•

Discipline

•

Misconduct Complaints

•

Body Worn Camera Policy and Survey

•

Use of Force Data to include; Type of Force Used, Race and Gender of the

person and injuries sustained by person/s and/or officer/s

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A meaningful shift in the transparency data has been observed in relation to excessive force complaints sustained against NPD officers. In 2016 there were 24 excessive force complaints filed against NPD officers. Of those 24, 2 (or 8.3%) were sustained. In 2019, there were 32 excessive force complaints made against NPD personnel, 11 (or 34.3%) of which were sustained. Many excessive force complaints have been generated internally by supervisors that have reviewed use of force reports and associated body worn camera video, where the victim/arrestee made no complaint. This is meaningful change and continues to demonstrate evidence of a culture shift within the NPD. The following table summarizes the percentage of sustained excessive force complaints by year.

Table No. 2 - Percentage of Sustained Excessive Force Complaints

Excessive Force Complaints 2016 2017 2018 2019

Total 24 15 29 32

Sustained 2 1 8 11

Percentage 8.3% 6.6% 27.5% 34.3%

FAIR AND IMPARTIAL POLICING TRAINING
During the reporting period, NPD started training officers and supervisors in implicit bias awareness provided by Fair & Impartial Policing®, LLC in compliance with paragraph 63 of the Consent Decree. The program teaches officers how implicit biases can influence well-intentioned individuals outside their conscious awareness. The NPD Training Division has trained over 175 Division members including supervisors and officers. The training has been well received by personnel. The use of the tablets to administer tests, which automatically creates a training entry into the PowerDMS system has proven to be effective at streamlining the record keeping process and has eliminated antiquated manual record keeping processes.
However, due to the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, all classroom training has been suspended to comply with social distancing orders and to prevent the spread of the virus amongst the department. NPD is currently looking to resume training online, using the remote education methods, systems and best practices currently taking place throughout the country. The intent is to deliver the same content (PPTs, videos, lectures, interactions, assessments, etc.) as in the

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classroom, only do it online. This would not be a permanent change in delivery methods. NPD intends to resume classroom training as soon as safe and practicable. RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
Our community is currently facing an unprecedented crisis. As of the date of the filing of this report, it appears Newark is nearing its apex of COVID-19 related deaths. Newark has the most deaths of any municipality in New Jersey, and Essex County has just become the county with the most deaths in the state. In response to the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, the Department of Public Safety declared an internal emergency on March 18, 2020.
The Newark Police Division directed efforts toward keeping personnel as disease free as possible and maintaining a continuity of essential operations by altering police schedules, the cancellation of all class room training, issuing personal protective equipment, adopting enhanced police reporting modalities and redeployed personnel, including those assigned to the CDPD, to perform critical city functions necessary to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and to respond to the rapidly changing needs of the community. Additionally, Public Safety Director Anthony Ambrose requested in writing on March 20, 2020, that all on-site inspections by the Independent Monitoring Team be postponed and or suspended until state health officials indicate that it is safe to resume such activities. NPD remains committed to providing professional service to its community by complying with Consent Decree mandates during these difficult times.
Respectfully submitted, /s/Avion M. Benjamin Avion M. Benjamin First Assistant Corporation Counsel City of Newark
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Case 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH Document 184 Filed 05/12/20 Page 12 of 12 PageID: 3006 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the City of Newark's Eighth Status Report was filed electronically on May 8, 2020. Notice of this filing will be sent to all parties via the Court's electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court's system.

By:

/s/ Avion M. Benjamin

Avion M. Benjamin First Assistant Corporation Counsel City of Newark

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 Investigation of the Newark Police Department
United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division
United States Attorney’s Office District of New Jersey
July 22, 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 1
II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................... 5
A. Investigation and Methodology........................................................................................ 5 B. Newark, New Jersey and the Newark Police Department................................................ 5 III. FINDINGS.............................................................................................................................. 7
A. STOPS AND ARRESTS.................................................................................................. 7 1. Stops .......................................................................................................................... 7 a. Legal Standards.................................................................................................. 7 b. NPD Stops Have Routinely Violated the Fourth Amendment .......................... 8 c. Unconstitutional Stop Practices Undermine Effective Policing and Officer Accountability .................................................................................................. 11 2. Arrests ..................................................................................................................... 11 a. Legal Standards................................................................................................ 12 b. “Contempt of Cop” Arrests, Seizures, and Citations Have Violated the Fourth and First Amendments.......................................................................... 12 c. Narcotics Searches and Arrests Have Violated the Fourth Amendment ......... 15
B. DISPARATE IMPACT BASED ON RACE ................................................................. 16 1. Legal Standards ....................................................................................................... 17 2. Failure to Track and Analyze Appropriate Data With Respect to Race ................. 18 3. NPD’s Unconstitutional Stop, Search, and Arrest Practices Have Had a Disparate Impact on Black People in Newark ........................................................ 19 a. Pedestrian Stop Practices ................................................................................. 19 b. Arrest Practices ................................................................................................ 20 4. Quality of Life Citation Practices Have Been Ineffective and Have Facilitated Abuse....................................................................................................................... 21
C. USE OF FORCE............................................................................................................. 22 1. Legal Standards ....................................................................................................... 22 2. NPD Format for Reporting and Tracking Force ..................................................... 22 3. NPD’s Unreasonable Use of Force ......................................................................... 23 a. Examples of NPD’s Use of Unreasonable Force ............................................. 24 b. Lack of Effective System for Use of Force Reporting and Review................. 25 i. NPD’s Force Reporting and Supervisory Review Systems...................... 25 ii. NPD’s Administrative and Criminal Force Review Systems ................... 28
D. THEFT............................................................................................................................ 30 1. Legal Standards ....................................................................................................... 31 2. Theft by NPD Officers ............................................................................................ 31 3. NPD Practices Have Failed to Adequately Address Theft by Officers................... 32
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a. Failure to Adequately Screen Candidates for Specialized Units ..................... 32 b. Failure to Follow the NPD’s Established Rotation Policy............................... 33 c. Failure to Monitor Problem Officers or Conduct Integrity Tests .................... 34 E. INADEQUATE MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS .................................... 34 1. Overview of NPD’s Internal Affairs Process .......................................................... 36 2. Investigative Deficiencies ....................................................................................... 38 a. Failure to Collect Evidence from Complainants .............................................. 38 b. Failure to Objectively Assess Evidence from Officers, Complainants, and
Witnesses ......................................................................................................... 38 c. Unequal Treatment of Officer and Complainant History ................................ 39 d. Discouraging Complainants Through Miranda Warnings ............................... 40 3. NPD’s Application of Discipline ............................................................................ 41 F. INADEQUATE SUPERVISION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS ............................................................................ 42 1. Failures in Supervision and Management ............................................................... 42 2. Absence of an Effective Early Warning System ..................................................... 42 G. DEFICIENT TRAINING PRACTICES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS ................................................... 44 1. Inadequate Officer Training .................................................................................... 44 2. Inadequate Training of Internal Affairs Investigators ............................................. 45 IV. OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN....................................................................................... 46 A. Gender-Biased Policing.................................................................................................. 46 B. Green Street Cell Block Suicide Prevention Policies and Practices............................... 47 C. Policing Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity ......................................... 48 V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 48
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Department of Justice opened an investigation of the Newark Police Department (“NPD” or “the Department”) in May 2011, after receiving serious allegations of civil rights violations by the NPD, including that the NPD subjects Newark residents to excessive force, unwarranted stops, and arrests, and discriminatory police actions.
This investigation of Newark’s policing practices was conducted jointly by the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division and the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey (collectively, “DOJ”) pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (“Section 14141”), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“Title VI”), and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d (“Safe Streets Act”). Section 14141 prohibits government authorities from engaging in a pattern or practice of law enforcement misconduct that violates individuals’ constitutional or federal statutory rights. Title VI and the Safe Streets Act together prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin by the recipients of certain federal funds.
The investigation benefited from the assistance of the NPD and the City of Newark (“City”), which provided access to officers, command staff, documents, and available data. The DOJ also received input from other criminal justice stakeholders, including members of the community, law enforcement organizations, advocacy groups, unions representing NPD officers, and others who shared their experiences with the NPD.
This report sets out the DOJ’s investigative findings. In sum, and as discussed further below, this investigation showed a pattern or practice of constitutional violations in the NPD’s stop and arrest practices, its response to individuals’ exercise of their rights under the First Amendment, the Department’s use of force, and theft by officers. The investigation also revealed deficiencies in the NPD’s systems that are designed to prevent and detect misconduct, including its systems for reviewing force and investigating complaints regarding officer conduct. The investigation also identified concerns that do not appear to amount to patterns of constitutional misconduct, but which nonetheless are significant and warrant consideration by the NPD. These concerns relate to the NPD’s practices in dealing with potentially suicidal detainees, the NPD’s sexual assault investigations, and the impact of the NPD’s policing on the LGBT community.
The City of Newark is diminished, and the NPD rendered less effective, by these patterns and practices of unconstitutional conduct. The NPD’s policing practices have eroded the community’s trust, and the perception of the NPD as an agency with insufficient accountability has undermined the confidence of other Newark criminal justice stakeholders as well. Fixing the problems this investigation identified will not only make Newark a more equitable community, but also a safer one. As the NPD stated in its Transparency Policy, General Order 2013-03, “[i]t is a fundamental principle that the public’s trust and cooperation is essential to the Newark Police Department’s effectiveness . . . . The Department cannot prevent future crimes without commitment and cooperation from the community . . . .”
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As discussed more fully in the body of this report, there is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of:

 Effecting stops and arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Approximately 75% of reports of pedestrian stops by NPD officers failed to articulate sufficient legal basis for the stop, despite the NPD policy requiring such justification. During the period reviewed, the NPD made thousands of stops of individuals who were described merely as “milling,” “loitering,” or “wandering,” without any indication of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In addition, a review of the NPD’s arrest reports raised concerns that, in some subset of NPD narcotics arrests, officers have failed to report completely or accurately the circumstances of those arrests.



Policing that results in disproportionate stops and arrests of Newark’s black

residents. The NPD stops black individuals at a greater rate than it stops white

individuals. As a result, black individuals in Newark bear the brunt of the NPD’s

pattern of unconstitutional stops and arrests. This investigation did not determine

whether the disparity is intentional or is otherwise legally unjustified. Regardless,

this experience of disproportionately being subjected to stops and arrests in

violation of the Fourth Amendment shapes black residents’ interactions with the

NPD, to the detriment of community trust, and makes the job of delivering police services in Newark more dangerous and less effective.1

 Retaliating against individuals who question police actions. In violation of the First Amendment, NPD officers have detained and arrested individuals who lawfully object to police actions or behave in a way that officers perceive as disrespectful.

 Using unjustified and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In more than twenty percent of the NPD force incidents reviewed, the force as reported appeared unreasonable and thus in violation of the Constitution. Further, there has been substantial underreporting of force by NPD officers, and most NPD use of force investigations have been too inadequate to support reliable conclusions about whether an officer’s use of force—including deadly force— was reasonable.

 Subjecting individuals to theft by NPD officers in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The investigation revealed evidence of theft of

1 As this report was being finalized, the American Civil Liberties Union’s New Jersey affiliate (ACLU-NJ) released the results of its review of NPD stop statistics. The ACLU-NJ review was limited to a subset of summary stop data the NPD now publishes on its website. As explained below, the DOJ obtained direct access to the NPD’s source records and the DOJ investigation thus included analysis of more precise information, including the location of stops, the documented justification, whether the stop was a pedestrian or vehicle stop, and descriptions of post stop activity such as searches and frisks. Like the DOJ investigation, the ACLU-NJ review of different, but more recent data identified racial disparities in NPD stops.

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citizens’ property and money by officers, specifically in the NPD’s specialized units such as the narcotics and gang units, and in the prisoner processing unit at the Green Street Cell Block. The NPD has conducted inadequate investigations into theft complaints, failed to take corrective action against offending officers, and declined to implement the methods recommended by its own investigators that could prevent future theft by officers.
The finding of a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct within a law enforcement agency does not mean that most officers violate the law. Nor does a pattern or practice reflect that a certain number of officers have violated the law, or that the number of unlawful acts have reached a particular threshold. See United States v. Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The number of [violations) ... is not determinative ...., [no] mathematical formula is workable, nor was any intended. Each case must turn on its own facts”). Rather, the touchstone is whether the unlawful conduct appears more typical than isolated or aberrant. A pattern or practice exists where the conduct appears to be part of usual practice, whether officially sanctioned by policy or otherwise. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (a pattern or practice is “more than the mere occurrence of isolated or ‘accidental’ or ‘sporadic’” acts; instead it must be a “regular rather than the unusual practice”).
The patterns of constitutional violations described in this report result in significant part from a lack of accountability and review systems within the NPD. The NPD has neither a functioning early warning system nor an effective internal affairs structure. Those inadequacies undermine the Department’s ability to identify and address officer misconduct. The NPD’s data collection and analysis, and its system for regular review of officer use of force, are similarly deficient.
One indication of the ineffectiveness of the NPD’s internal affairs system is that the Internal Affairs Unit (“IA”) sustained only one civilian complaint of excessive force out of hundreds received from 2007 through 2012. While there is no “right” rate at which force complaints should be sustained, only one finding of unreasonable force out of hundreds of complaints over a six-year period is symptomatic of deeply dysfunctional accountability systems. The NPD also has failed to adequately collect or analyze data about officers’ use of force, stops, or arrests. Nor has the NPD taken adequate steps to implement an early warning system that would track and identify officers’ problematic behavior. As a result of these systemic deficiencies, the NPD does not discern or respond to problematic trends in officer conduct that could constitute or lead to misconduct.
Nor has the NPD provided officers with the tools necessary to support constitutional policing, such as adequate training, clear and easily accessible policies, and meaningful supervisory direction. Basic deficiencies have included the failure to ensure that NPD officers actually have access to the policies they are supposed to follow, to regularly update policies, and to provide or track necessary training. Supervisory review of officer actions, including use of force and arrests, has been lax. The cumulative effect of these deficiencies is an organization that is too prone to shield officers from accountability, and insufficiently focused on protecting constitutional rights.
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The responsibility for correcting the NPD’s unconstitutional policing practices lies at every level within the Department. NPD supervisors and command leadership must ensure that officers receive the training, guidance, and direction necessary to police effectively and constitutionally, and clearly communicate to officers that constitutional policing and effective law enforcement are not in tension with each other, but rather are interdependent. Officers must act within the parameters that the law places on stops, searches, and arrests, and avoid escalating interactions to the point where they use force unnecessarily. The NPD further must collect and analyze data related to stops, searches, and arrests, so that it can minimize the disparate impact of its enforcement efforts and avoid bias in policing. NPD leadership must also ensure that, when officers do violate policy or the law, they are held accountable and that corrective action, including discipline, is effective, fair, and consistent.
All of these findings, as well as proposed remedies, have been discussed with City officials and NPD leadership, and the City and NPD have pledged to quickly and thoroughly address these problems. To that end, the City and DOJ have reached an Agreement in Principle that will form the foundation of a comprehensive, judicially enforceable and independently monitored agreement to implement significant reform.
The Agreement in Principle, which is attached, addresses each of the patterns of constitutional violations described in this report. The Agreement requires the City to establish a civilian oversight entity for the NPD and additional mechanisms for effective community engagement to help ensure the sustainability of reforms and to foster positive relations between the NPD and the Newark community. The City, NPD, and DOJ agree that the NPD will review and revise its policies, training, and internal oversight mechanisms, particularly regarding the use of force and stop, search and arrest practices. The NPD also will provide officers with proper guidance regarding individuals’ exercise of their First Amendment rights. The NPD will develop and implement accountability and supervisory practices to prevent, detect, and address unlawful stops, searches, and arrests and unreasonable force, and to detect and prevent theft by officers. The NPD will revise its internal affairs practices to ensure effective complaint intake, objective investigations of misconduct, and fair and consistent discipline. The NPD will also enhance its collection and analysis of data so that it can better understand its enforcement practices and ensure their effectiveness and constitutionality.
Throughout the investigation of the NPD’s practices, all parties have recognized that Newark is a challenging city to police, given its significant level of crime and its budget constraints. The DOJ acknowledges in particular the skills and dedication of the many Newark police officers who abide by the rule of law and commit themselves daily to the difficult, and too often thankless, job of protecting public safety. The findings of this investigation are not meant to detract from these officers’ efforts. Indeed, many of the investigative findings underscore the need for the NPD and the City to better support and direct its officers.
Alongside this appreciation for the difficulties of police work, all parties agree that any NPD policies or practices that violate civil rights must be identified and remedied. This shared respect for individuals’ civil rights reflects not only the fundamental importance of these rights, but also an understanding that repeated civil rights violations make policing less effective and more dangerous. The DOJ looks forward to working cooperatively with the City and the NPD—
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as well as with the many other important stakeholders in this process, including community members and police unions—to carry out these reforms.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Investigation and Methodology
The DOJ provided notice to the City and the NPD of its investigation pursuant to Section 14141, Title VI, and the Safe Streets Act on May 9, 2011, and that the investigation would focus on allegations of excessive force; unconstitutional stops, searches, and seizures; discriminatory policing on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, and gender identity; risk of harm to detainees confined in holding cells; and retaliation by officers against individuals who legally attempt to observe or record police activity.
The team investigating the NPD’s police practices consisted of experts in police practices, and lawyers and other staff from the DOJ. Police practice experts included current and former police chiefs and supervisors from other jurisdictions, who provided expertise on law enforcement issues, as well as an expert in the collection and analysis of police-related data.
The investigation included intensive on-site review of NPD practices and procedures. The team conducted interviews and meetings with NPD officers, supervisors, and command staff, and participated in “ride-alongs” with officers and supervisors. The team also met with representatives of police fraternal organizations, conducted numerous community meetings, met with advocates and other individuals, and interviewed a wide array of local, regional, and federal stakeholders in the Newark criminal justice system, including representatives of the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office (“ECPO”), the Essex County Public Defender’s Office, the Newark Municipal Prosecutor’s Office, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The team set up a tollfree number and email address to receive information related to the NPD. The DOJ also worked with NPD’s contracted data management vendor to obtain substantial amounts of data related to NPD stops and arrests.
Throughout this report, specific facts and incidents are included as examples and illustrations, but the conclusions reflect the entirety of the information received, and are not based only on the individual events described here.
B. Newark, New Jersey and the Newark Police Department
Newark is New Jersey’s largest city, with a population of 277,140 people, according to the 2010 census. Newark’s population is racially and ethnically diverse: 53.9% black, 26.4% white, and 19.8% other or unknown.2 Of the entire population, approximately 33.9% identify themselves as Hispanic or Latino, with 30.6% identifying as non-black Hispanic.
2 This demographic breakdown for the population used in this report differs slightly from the percentages in the overall 2010 census for Newark. The breakdown in this report is calculated on a block-by-block basis, a smaller geographic unit than the U.S. Census Bureau uses to calculate data. This breakdown is a more accurate figure for assessing NPD’s policing practices within precinct and sector geographic boundaries.
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The NPD currently employs approximately 1,000 sworn officers, and is still recovering from the layoff of 167 officers at the end of 2010 due to budget cuts. The Department is led by a Police Director, appointed by the Mayor of Newark and approved by the Newark City Council, and a Chief of Police, who reports to the Police Director. The NPD is composed of four precincts and additional bureaus and special units, including the Detective Bureau, the Special Operations Division, and the Support Services Bureau. All of these report to the Chief, whereas the Director directly oversees the Internal Affairs Unit,3 the Training Section, and the Administration Bureau.
General Orders and Director’s Memoranda set forth the NPD’s policies and procedures.4 The investigation included a review of the NPD’s written policies, procedures, and training materials. To gain a complete picture of the NPD’s police practices, the team also reviewed myriad records and reports completed by NPD officers to document their activities and enforcement actions. When officers conduct a traffic or pedestrian stop, they are required to complete a Field Inquiry Report which, by policy, must include the legal support for the stop. If officers make an arrest, or take some other enforcement action, they are required to complete an Incident Report in which the officer is required to describe the legal support for the arrest, the elements of the alleged offense, and, if force was used, a narrative description of the nature of and reason for the use of force. Officers using force are required also to complete a Use of Force Report, which consists of data fields to complete, but provides no space for any narrative description of the force used or its justification. A supervisor is required to sign the Use of Force Report to document that the force has been reviewed and approved.
When an individual complains that an officer committed misconduct, the NPD’s internal affairs unit is required to conduct an administrative investigation of the allegation and document its investigation and findings in an Internal Affairs Investigation Report. The NPD’s internal affairs unit also is required by policy to conduct an administrative investigation of all officerinvolved shootings, whether or not they result in any complaint, and independent of any criminal investigation of the incident. These shooting investigations also are documented in an Internal Affairs Investigation Report. The administrative investigation of a shooting differs from a criminal investigation in that the administrative investigation is focused on determining whether the shooting violated departmental policy and was a reasonable use of force, rather than whether the shooting was potentially criminal. This investigation included close review of a representative sample of each category of these reports.
Three separate unions represent NPD officers: the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 12 (“FOP”), the Superior Officers’ Association (“SOA”), and the Deputy Chiefs’ Association (“DCA”). All three unions have collective bargaining contracts with the City. SOA members
3 During the course of the investigation and drafting of this report, the name of the NPD’s internal investigations unit changed. At present, the NPD organizational chart no longer lists a specific “Internal Affairs” unit, although the Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”), of which IA was previously a sub-unit, still appears in the chart. NPD staff use the terms OPS and Internal Affairs interchangeably. This report refers to the NPD’s internal investigations unit as Internal Affairs or “IA.” 4 These policies and procedures are informed by the New Jersey State Attorney General’s Office guidelines for law enforcement agencies, which apply to all municipalities in New Jersey. These guidelines are available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide.htm.
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may also join the FOP to obtain that union’s legal defense benefits. Separately, NPD officers may also join the Newark Police Benevolent Association which advocates on behalf of NPD officers and also offers legal defense benefits, but is not the collective bargaining unit. The NPD currently does not have any form of civilian oversight, although the previous mayor announced a plan to establish a civilian-led police oversight panel in 2013.
III. FINDINGS
A. STOPS AND ARRESTS
The NPD’s stops and arrests are problematic in a number of respects. The NPD engages in a pattern or practice of effecting pedestrian stops without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In addition, the NPD’s response to perceived disrespect violates the First and Fourth Amendments. Further, an uncertain number of the NPD’s narcotics-related arrests appear to violate the Fourth Amendment.
1. Stops
Generally, a search or seizure is unreasonable “in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (emphasis added). There is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD nonetheless engages in a widespread pattern or practice of making pedestrian stops without such individualized suspicion.5 This conclusion is based on review of NPD policies, stop reports for a three-and-a-half year period, arrest records, IA files, site visits to the NPD, interviews with stakeholders in the criminal justice system, and information provided by community members.
a. Legal Standards
Under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers may briefly detain an individual for investigative purposes if the officers possess reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop may be “the result of any combination of one or several factors: specialized knowledge and investigative inferences, personal observation of suspicious behavior, information from sources that have proven to be reliable, and information from sources that—while unknown to the police—prove by the accuracy and intimacy of the information provided to be reliable at least as to the details contained within that tip.” United States v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 478 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). Courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures to mean that law enforcement officers must satisfy escalating legal standards of “reasonableness” for each level of intrusion upon a person—stop, search, seizure, and arrest.
While reasonable suspicion is evaluated by looking at the totality of circumstances, an officer must be able to “articulate specific reasons justifying [the] detention.” Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164,
5 The investigation focused on pedestrian stops and did not assess the NPD’s vehicle stop practices.
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167 (3d Cir. 2002). A stop must be based on something more substantial than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The officer must be able to point to some particular and objective manifestation that the suspect was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); see also United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2006); Johnson, 332 F.3d at 206.
The Third Circuit has found that a stop is unconstitutional where an officer thinks an individual’s behavior is “suspicious” but is not able to articulate why or link it to criminal activity. Johnson, 332 F.3d at 210 (report that plaintiff was pacing and acting agitated, followed by officer’s observation of plaintiff sitting in a car reading the newspaper, did not give rise to articulable suspicion that plaintiff was about to commit a crime). Similarly, an officer may not stop individuals based only on a generalized description of appearance that could apply widely, when the officer has not observed suspicious activity by those individuals. See Brown¸ 448 F.3d at 248-52 (stop was unconstitutional when officer stopped two individuals he observed hailing a taxi based on description of robbery suspects as two black males, ages 15 to 20, wearing dark clothing).
Nor is an individual’s mere presence in a particular neighborhood or area—even “an area of expected criminal activity” or “a high crime area”—sufficient “to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); see also United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 81 (3d Cir. 1996) (mere presence on a corner known as a “hot corner” for drug sales does not support reasonable suspicion to justify a stop). Rather, while presence in a high crime area may be a factor, police must make their determination of reasonable suspicion upon the individual’s actions.
b. NPD Stops Have Routinely Violated the Fourth Amendment
The NPD uses a Field Inquiry Report to document stop activity by officers, and NPD policy requires that the report contain sufficient facts to demonstrate reasonable suspicion for a stop.6 Reports failing to meet reasonable suspicion standards are to be rejected by the reviewing supervisor, and corrective training conducted to prevent a recurrence. Therefore, in theory, the Field Inquiry Report offers the best record of the NPD's stop activities. However, the NPD’s use of Field Inquiry Reports is not entirely consistent with its policy, as NPD officers also use Field Inquiry Reports to document encounters other than stops for which reasonable suspicion is not required, such as witness interviews.
To ensure that the review assessed the NPD’s core pedestrian stop practices and not other encounters, the review of Field Inquiry Reports was conservatively limited to those in which the individual was described as a suspect, instead of a witness, and subject to a warrant check. By this measure, during the period of January 2009 to June 2012, NPD officers completed 39,308 Field Inquiry Reports, each documenting a pedestrian stop. Of those 39,308 encounters, the officer did not record any justification for the stop on 6,200 occasions (15.8%). These encounters were excluded from further analysis. DOJ investigators analyzed a sample of one-
6 NPD GO 97-8 (Revised 7/1/2000).
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third (n=10,179) of the Field Inquiry Reports that recorded a justification for the stop. In approximately 75% of these remaining Reports, the officers failed to articulate reasonable suspicion to justify the stop, as required by NPD policy.7 Cf. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding violations of class members’ Fourth Amendment rights where statistical analysis revealed that 6% of stops lacked reasonable suspicion).
In particular, thousands of the stops—all of which were at least long enough to run warrant checks—involved individuals who were described merely as “milling,” “loitering,” or “wandering,” without any indication of criminal activity or suspicion. Some of those were augmented with a notation that the “milling,” “loitering,” or “wandering” was taking place in high-crime areas, high-narcotics areas, or high-gang activity areas. Officers also routinely stopped and ran warrant checks for individuals solely for being present in high-crime areas, near scenes of suspected or reported crimes, or simply “in areas.” Without any indicator of criminal activity or suspicion of an intent to engage in criminal activity, these reasons do not constitute reasonable suspicion to detain an individual, and are therefore constitutionally deficient. Yet, the reports demonstrate that these have been the most common type of pedestrian stops made by NPD officers.8
While poor report-writing may amplify the number of stops that appear unjustified, the repeated reliance on these insufficient justifications strongly suggests that NPD officers do not appreciate what is legally required for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Moreover, the frequent use of certain types of illegitimate justifications for stops, combined with the failure of reviewing supervisors to reject reports that contain them, suggests that the NPD has tolerated its officers’ stopping people for reasons that do not meet constitutional muster.
7 This high rate of unjustified stops may actually understate the problem. For example, if the Field Inquiry Report indicated that the stop was dispatch-initiated rather than officer-initiated, the review did not consider the stop insufficiently justified, even where the report did not articulate facts that would justify a stop. Similarly, stop reasons referencing quality of life citations were also generally not included in the “no reasonable suspicion” category because the majority of behaviors giving rise to quality of life citations are evident by observation. However, stop reasons consisting solely of the fact that an individual was arrested were included in the “no reasonable suspicion” category for reasons explained later in this section. Even when excluding this latter category of stops, the analysis shows that officers failed to articulate reasonable suspicion in 69% of the Field Inquiry Reports reviewed. In addition, if this analysis had considered the 15.8% of reports that recorded no justification for the stop to be insufficient, approximately 93% of the stops would have been considered unsupported by articulated reasonable suspicion. 8 Backseat detentions are another troubling aspect of NPD stop practices. Being placed in the backseat of a police vehicle can be a humiliating and often frightening experience. Police departments should use this practice only in strict accordance with the law. In Newark, there were credible complaints from community members that NPD officers routinely detain people and place them in the backs of police vehicles for significant periods of time and without cause, and then release them without actually filing charges, or even informing the individuals of the reasons for detention. It is difficult to assess the extent of this practice because of the lack of written documentation, in violation of policy, of the officers’ action. NPD policy (GO No. 09-03) requires officers to document detentions in Incident Reports, even when an officer subsequently releases an individual without bringing the person to the precinct for processing or filing formal charges. However, like other NPD documentation requirements assessed, this policy does not appear to have been consistently followed, reviewed, or enforced. The NPD should ensure that backseat detentions are used only as appropriate for officer safety or other legitimate reasons and should enforce its policies that require documenting this activity.
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These deficiencies in the NPD’s stop practices were also reflected in IA investigations of complainants that officers used excessive force, discussed more fully later in this report. Nineteen percent—almost one in five—of those IA files described a stop without a constitutional justification. If the initial stop that culminated in the use of force was itself unjustified, any use of force, whether otherwise appropriate or not, is troubling, and perhaps unconstitutional.
At least part of this pattern of unlawful stops can be traced to NPD policies and training. NPD policy includes “[h]igh crime areas and the type of activity that takes place there” and “[p]roximity to scene of a crime” in its list of “reasonable suspicious factors to stop a person.”9 Although the policy provides examples for each of these factors that include the factor plus additional information (i.e. high crime area plus exchange of currency and objects by the individual, proximity of scene of crime plus individual matches a description or is engaged in activity such as running or hiding), the policy does not clearly state that any of those factors alone are insufficient and that additional information is required to establish reasonable suspicion. This lack of clarity in NPD policies effectively promotes a view that living or simply being in a high-crime area is criminally suspicious. This violates the Fourth Amendment’s fundamental tenet requiring individualized suspicion to justify deprivation of liberty by law enforcement. The lack of clarity may also result in inadequate documentation of stops that might actually have been constitutional but were not fully described.
In addition to stopping individuals based on their mere presence in high crime areas, NPD officers also have too often stopped pedestrians for other impermissible reasons. For example, NPD officers illegally stopped individuals whom officers perceived to react negatively to the presence of police officers, without any additional indicia of criminal activity. See, e.g., Bonner, 363 F.3d 217-18 (flight upon noticing police, without some other indicia of wrongdoing, is not grounds for reasonable suspicion). Officers also have impermissibly stopped individuals solely because they were in the presence of an arrestee or other suspicious person, without any other articulated indicia of criminal activity. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (“[A] search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.”). Specific examples of these types of reasons for stops include: “Actor Upon Noticing Our Presents [sic] Changed His Direction of Travel,” “Observed Actor Hid Behind A Car When He Observed Police Car,” and “Subject Was In the Company of a Female Who Was Cited For Drinking.”
NPD officers also regularly have justified stops based solely on information or evidence discovered after the stop was initiated. Examples include “Individual Was Stopped on Bicycle No Proper ID” and “A Record Check of the Above Individual Revealed an Open Warrant.” The reasonableness of a stop is determined based on “facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (emphasis added); Johnson, 332 F.3d at 205; see also Brown, 448 F.3d at 245 (attempt to escape after stop was irrelevant in determining reasonableness of stop because attempt to escape occurred after stop was initiated).
Similarly, officers have justified stops based on the fact that the individual was ultimately arrested. Typical examples of these justifications include “Arrested,” “CDS Arrest,” “Narcotics
9 See NPD GO 97-8 (Revised 7/1/2000).
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Arrest,” and “Individual Arrested for [charge].” This is constitutionally impermissible: an officer must first have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to conduct a stop, and the discovery of evidence during or after the stop that provides probable cause for arrest cannot be used to retroactively establish reasonable suspicion for the stop. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963). Because the stop was not justified in the first place, the subsequent search and arrest are the direct result of impermissible police activity and are invalid.
c. Unconstitutional Stop Practices Undermine Effective Policing and Officer Accountability
The NPD’s unconstitutional stop practices negatively affect not only Newark’s residents but also the NPD’s ability to effectively police the City. First, the practice erodes the community’s trust, as individuals feel that they will be treated as criminals based on where they live or spend time, rather than on how they act. Indeed the NPD’s own stop policy warns that “[t]he indiscriminate use of stopping and questioning individuals will be detrimental to the positive community relations that this Department strives to obtain.” And representatives from other criminal justice agencies, advocates, and community members reported throughout the investigation that many Newark residents have come to expect that officers might stop, recordcheck, and search them at any time without any justification at all. One individual characterized this experience as “just part of living in Newark.” As with the NPD’s Quality of Life citation practices discussed later in this report, residents perceive these stops as harassment by police. Research has shown, and individuals interviewed during this investigation recounted, that witnesses who experienced such stops are less likely to accept police legitimacy and to provide assistance to police during investigations.
Second, stops without adequate justification result in the over-collection, and improper retention and use, of personal information. NPD policy states that information about individuals in the NPD’s database is relevant for evaluating the veracity and reliability of their statements in the future. As a result, NPD officers’ unjustified stops can have long-lasting and substantial consequences for people’s lives, as well as for the NPD’s ability to hold officers accountable for misconduct. For example, as discussed later in this report, the NPD’s IA may improperly discredit the complaint of an individual in part because the individual has multiple recorded encounters with police.
The NPD’s undisciplined stop practices also increase the risk that officers, without appropriate guidance to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate justifications for conducting stops, may rely on impermissible factors such as an individual’s race, color, or ethnicity. The NPD should be particularly attentive to this concern in light of the disproportionate impact its stop and arrest practices have on Newark’s black residents, which is discussed below.
2. Arrests
Although NPD officers generally write reports that facially appear to establish probable cause to arrest, those reports have reflected two categories of problematic practices. First, there is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional arrests for behavior perceived as insubordinate or disrespectful to officers—
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often charged as obstruction of justice, resisting arrest, or disorderly conduct. Second, there is reasonable cause to believe that some number of NPD narcotics arrest reports may not have accurately described the circumstances leading to arrest, and that the NPD has not addressed this problem. This assessment of NPD arrest practices is based on: a review of a random sample of 100 arrest reports and associated incident reports from a three-and-a-half year period, January 2009 to June 2012; NPD policy; IA files; Use of Force Reports; site visits to the NPD; interviews with stakeholders in the criminal justice system; and information provided by community members.
a. Legal Standards
Probable cause to arrest an individual exists “when the information within the officer’s knowledge at the time of the arrest is sufficient to warrant a reasonable officer to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000). In determining whether an officer had probable cause to make an arrest, courts consider the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the moment the arrest was made. Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005). The constitutional validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed any crime, and probable cause cannot be retroactively established or disproven by the fact that the suspect later pleads guilty, is found guilty, or is acquitted. See id.; Johnson, 332 F.3d at 211. The totality of the circumstances test is objective: the question is whether “an officer would be justified in believing that an actual offense was being committed,” not whether an officer subjectively believed there was probable cause to make an arrest. Johnson, 332 F.3d at 214. An officer’s erroneous belief that a suspect’s actions constitute criminal activity is irrelevant if the available evidence would not support that conclusion. Id.
Officers may not arrest individuals for exhibiting behavior that is disrespectful or obnoxious, but legal, and must be mindful that some speech challenging or objecting to police action is protected by the First Amendment. Police officers “are expected to endure significant burdens caused by citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment rights,” including “provocative and challenging” speech and gestures. Gilk v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011); City of Houston, Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987); see also Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A] reasonable police officer would not have believed he was entitled to initiate the law enforcement process in response to giving the finger.”); Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250 (7th Cir. 1997) (extending middle finger and shouting profanity protected by the First Amendment); Duran v. City of Douglas, Arizona, 904 F.2d 1372, 1377-78 (9th Cir. 1990) (while police officers “may resent having obscene . . . gestures directed at them, they may not exercise the awesome power at their disposal to punish individuals for conduct that is not merely lawful, but protected by the First Amendment.”).
b. “Contempt of Cop” Arrests, Seizures, and Citations Have Violated the Fourth and First Amendments
The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects verbal challenges to police action, holding that “[t]he freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.” Hill, 482 U.S. at 462-63. NPD officers have
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engaged in a pattern of violating constitutional rights by detaining and arresting individuals who lawfully object to police actions or behave in a way that officers perceive as disrespectful. These types of arrests are sometimes referred to as “contempt of cop” arrests, and are often charged as obstruction of justice, resisting arrest, or similar offenses, even though the behavior has not met the legal standards for such charges. Contempt of cop detentions and arrests in retaliation for questioning or expressing criticism of police violate individuals’ rights under both the Fourth and First Amendments.10
The NPD’s arrest reports and IA investigations, including some incidents involving unreasonable uses of force, reflect numerous instances of the NPD's inappropriate responses to individuals who engage in constitutionally protected First Amendment activity, such as questioning or criticizing police actions.
For example, in one IA investigation, an individual was arrested after he questioned officers’ decision to arrest his neighbor. The individual alleged that officers immediately proceeded to use force against him. The officers’ own version of events, reporting that the individual told them loudly and “in a belligerent manner” that they could not arrest his neighbor, did not establish probable cause for the officers’ decision to arrest the man for obstructing the administration of law.
In another incident, officers reported that a woman standing outside her apartment yelled profanity and spat in their direction. According to the officers, based on this conduct, they decided to arrest her for aggravated assault and disorderly conduct and used “physical contact” to effect the arrest. According to the woman, she had publicly criticized an officer for questioning a street vendor about a permit. Although the officers’ and complainant’s accounts of the incident differ, the officers’ own explanation of the incident—that they used force and arrested the woman in response to her using profanity and spitting towards them—provides insufficient justification for their actions.
In another example, a civilian complainant alleged that a plainclothes detective used force and arrested him after he walked away from the detective. The IA investigation revealed that the detective first observed a group of people standing near the street and deemed them suspicious based solely on “the area” they were in. The detective’s report indicates that, although he had observed no criminal activity, he announced police presence and “randomly approached one actor” (emphasis added) and ordered him to stop. The individual attempted to walk away from the detective, and allegedly used profanity toward the detective while the
10 In addition to the examples of First Amendment violations discussed here, prior to the initiation of this investigation, there were several highly publicized incidents where NPD officers prohibited citizens from recording police action. NPD ultimately settled at least three of the resulting lawsuits, and promulgated a Director’s memorandum in the fall of 2011 with guidance on individuals’ right to record police. However, this investigation found that NPD has not fully corrected the practice of inappropriately prohibiting individuals from recording the police, and needs to issue more detailed policies to guide officer behavior. For example, the current policy states that individuals have a First Amendment right to record police activities but gives officers the discretion to order individuals to stop recording if they “truly interfere with legitimate law enforcement operations.” The policy does not explain or provide examples of the types of conduct that might amount to such interference and thus does not provide sufficient guidance to officers on how to lawfully exercise their discretion.
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detective continued to issue verbal commands for him to stop. The complainant alleged that the detective grabbed him from behind and he turned in response. It is not clear from the detective’s report when he first touched the individual, but the report states that the individual turned around, raised his hands and reached for the detective’s wrists, suggesting that the officer had already initiated his use of force. The detective’s report indicates he pushed the individual up against the hood of a car, before arresting him for resisting arrest, obstructing the administration of law, and disorderly conduct. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a refusal to cooperate with the police, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991); see also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.
In addition to a pattern of unjustified arrests in which individuals are formally charged, there is evidence that, in violation of the Constitution, the NPD has seized and detained individuals or issued unjustified Quality of Life citations in retaliation for protected conduct.
For example, in one incident investigated by the NPD’s IA, the complainants alleged that a plainclothes officer stopped an individual on the street. Two complainants were present and one, unaware that the plainclothes officer was a police officer, asked the officer why she had stopped the individual. According to that complainant, the officer slammed him to the ground and used a choke hold on him. The second complainant then asked the officer why she was choking the other observer. The officer allegedly kicked the second complainant in the ribs and placed both individuals in handcuffs. In her interview with IA, the officer stated that she “bumped into” the first complainant causing him to fall on the ground. She admitted detaining the two individuals after they became “loud and hostile.” Both individuals were ultimately released from handcuffs and issued Quality of Life citations for disorderly conduct. The municipal court later refused to adjudicate the citations.
In another excessive force complaint investigated by IA, two officers dispersing crowds at a high school following a large fight reported that a student spat on the ground in front of the officers. One officer reported to the IA investigator that he then grabbed the juvenile by his arm, “placing” his head against the hood of the police cruiser. The second officer confirmed this account. The juvenile was ultimately frisked, given a summons and released when his father arrived on the scene. Several of the IA files reviewed contained similar descriptions of officers detaining, arresting, or issuing citations to individuals perceived to have spat in the general direction of the officers, giving credence to these complaints and indicating that this practice may be more widespread.
The NPD’s exercise of its police power to respond to “contempt of cop” behavior is part of the pattern of unreasonable stops and arrests by NPD officers, and consistent with the pattern of unreasonable force discussed below. A police officer’s job is difficult, requiring a thick skin and patience. Unfortunately, rather than using de-escalation techniques and acting within the constraints of the Constitution when confronted with disrespectful behavior, NPD has engaged in a pattern and practice of taking immediate offensive action, without regard to whether that conduct complies with the law.
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c. Narcotics Searches and Arrests Have Violated the Fourth Amendment
There is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD’s pattern of unlawful arrests extends to its narcotics arrests. NPD narcotics-related arrest reports reflect a strikingly high number of instances in which officers did not have to conduct a search to find the narcotics that provided the probable cause for the arrest. These numbers, and the circumstances of these arrests, suggest that some number of these narcotics arrest reports have been inaccurate. While this investigation did not determine which, or how many, arrest reports suffered such deficiencies, it is troubling that the NPD appears neither to have noticed this pattern nor to have taken appropriate steps to ensure that officers write accurate, reliable narcotics arrest reports that reflect legitimate searches.
Out of a sample of 100 reports documenting NPD arrests between January 2009 and June 2012, 58 documented arrests on narcotics-related charges. The overwhelming majority of these narcotics arrests and associated incident reports contained remarkably similar language to support officers’ reasonable suspicion to stop the individual. According to the narratives written by officers, in at least 46 of the 58 narcotics arrest reports in the sample, officers reportedly did not have to conduct a search in order to find narcotics. Rather, officers reported, using similar language, that suspects either voluntarily and immediately offered or discarded an otherwise concealed CDS (controlled dangerous substance) to the police upon mere announcement or recognition of police presence, or that the CDS was “in plain view” of the officers when they approached the suspects. In the “plain view” scenarios, individuals often were purportedly seated in cars holding clear plastic baggies in front of them or on their laps and officers could “immediately” see the contraband, even though the report indicated that the subject’s back was to an officer, or that the officer had not yet approached the car.
The concerns raised by these reports may be partly explainable by poor report writing, and some portion of these plain view narcotics arrests may also reflect that NPD practices are far too opportunistic, with some officers’ relying too heavily on only the most obvious violations. Nonetheless, the sheer frequency with which NPD officers report finding contraband in plain view, sometimes in what appear to be less than plausible circumstances, makes it difficult to ascribe this problem to these dynamics alone. Indeed, police practice experts reviewing these reports observed that, in their experience reviewing such narcotics arrest reports in multiple jurisdictions across the country, the proportion of narcotics arrests in Newark that did not require a search is markedly high. These expert observations are consistent with concerns expressed by community members and other criminal justice stakeholders in Newark. The NPD and the City of Newark should engage a broad spectrum of criminal stakeholders, including the Essex County Public Defender’s Office and the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office, to determine how widespread this problem may be and develop an effective plan to combat it.11
11 Improved report writing within NPD would also yield stronger cases for prosecution. One of the NPD arrest files reviewed also contained a report about the same incident written by Essex County Sheriff’s Department officers, providing an opportunity to compare these two agencies’ accounts of the same incident. In marked contrast to the canned language used in narratives written by NPD officers, the Essex County report contained many details
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Prior to this investigation, the NPD apparently had not recognized this pattern in its arrests. This is due in part to the NPD’s insufficient accountability systems, such as adequate supervisory review, that are discussed later in this report. When this pattern was brought to their attention, City and NPD officials noted the brazen, open-air drug markets that plague Newark as a potential explanation for the high proportion of plain view arrests, and maintained that the NPD’s arrest reports accurately reflect the encounters. It is doubtless true that many of these arrest reports are accurate, and the review of these reports did not attempt to include an evaluation of the overall merits of any particular arrest, or examine the work of any particular officer. Rather, the prevalence of instances in which officers purportedly recovered drugs without the need for a search, together with the circumstances of those arrests as described by the reports, indicated that some portion of NPD arrest reports may have been inaccurate and that the NPD does not have the systems in place to reliably detect such deficient reports so that it can ensure that the underlying circumstances of the stop, search, and arrest are lawful.12
B. DISPARATE IMPACT BASED ON RACE
This investigation found that black people in Newark have been stopped and arrested at a significantly higher rate than their white and Hispanic counterparts. This disparity is stark and unremitting. Approximately 80% of the NPD’s stops and arrests have involved black individuals, while Newark’s population is only 53.9% black. Black residents of Newark are at least 2.5 times more likely to be subjected to a pedestrian stop or arrested than white individuals. Between January 2009 and June 2012, this translated into 34,153 more stops of black individuals than white individuals. The disparity persists throughout the city regardless of whether sectors have highly concentrated black residential populations or comparatively fewer black residents.13
This investigation did not determine whether this disparity reflects intentional race discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or whether this disparity is avoidable or unnecessary, in violation of Title VI or the Safe Streets
specific to the incident, including individualized descriptions of the suspects and specific actions giving rise to probable cause, locations of officers, approximate lengths of time of observation of actions by officers, reasons specific to the incident that led the officer to conclude they had reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and a plausible sequence of events. 12 It is important also to note that, for the purposes of this investigation, the question was not whether arrestees were engaged in drug activity; rather, it was whether NPD officers were acting in accordance with fundamental constitutional requirements, such as individualized reasonable suspicion to support a detention, legal authority to support a search, and probable cause to support an arrest. The fact that an officer actually discovers evidence during or after a stop or search that provides reasonable suspicion for the stop or probable cause for the arrest does not render the officer’s actions constitutional. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-85. Nor does the fact that some of the individuals arrested and charged in the narcotics arrests reviewed pled guilty or were convicted in state court determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation in the arrest process occurred, or preclude consideration of this issue by a federal court in a subsequent Fourth Amendment challenge. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 314-23 (1983); Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1986). Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized that there are various incentives for a defendant to plead guilty independent of whether there may have been a Fourth Amendment violation. Prosise, 462 U.S. at 318-19. 13 As this report was being finalized, the ACLU-NJ released the results of its own review of stop data that NPD publishes on its website. The ACLU-NJ’s review of this different, more recent data also showed racial disparities in NPD stops.
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Act. As discussed in the Legal Standards section below, policing that has a disparate impact on members of a particular race may be unlawful not only where it is intentional, but also where it is unintentional, but avoidable.
Nonetheless, regardless of why the disparity occurs, the impact is clear: because the NPD engages in a pattern of making stops in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Newark’s black residents bear the brunt of the NPD’s pattern of unconstitutional policing. This undeniable experience of being disproportionately affected by the NPD’s unconstitutional policing helps explain the community distrust and cynicism that undermines effective policing in Newark. In individual interviews and group meetings, many community and criminal justice stakeholders consistently described Newark as a city where black residents, and particularly black men, fear law enforcement action, regardless of whether such action is warranted by individualized suspicion. They indicated that unjustified stops by NPD officers have become so routine that many members of the black community have ceased feeling a sense of outrage and simply feel a sense of resignation.
These conclusions about the racially disparate impact of the NPD’s policing practices are based on an analysis of NPD data obtained directly from the NPD’s data management vendor because the NPD does not maintain, track, or analyze demographic data for its law enforcement actions in a manner that could be relied upon for the close scrutiny required by this investigation. Further refinement of the systems and analysis of this data are necessary to more fully understand the nature and cause of this disparate impact, and the NPD should implement systems to collect and analyze this data as part of its effort to ensure that unlawful racially discriminatory policing does not occur.
1. Legal Standards
Discriminatory policing in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from either an explicit classification or a facially neutral policy or practice that is implemented or administered with discriminatory intent. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 457 (1996); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). Discriminatory policing under the Fourteenth Amendment includes selective enforcement of the law based on race. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). In addition, Title VI and the Safe Streets Act prohibit law enforcement agencies that receive federal financial assistance, such as the NPD, from engaging in intentional discrimination or in law enforcement activities that have an unjustified disparate impact based on race, color, or national origin. The Safe Streets Act provides that “[n]o person in any State shall on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex be … subjected to discrimination under or denied employment in connection with any programs or activity” receiving federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)(1). Title VI establishes that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participating in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Title VI’s implementing regulations prohibit law enforcement agencies from using “criteria or methods of administration” that have a disparate impact based on race, color, or national origin. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001). Thus, under these statutes, discriminatory impact may be unlawful even where it is not intentional.
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2. Failure to Track and Analyze Appropriate Data With Respect to Race
A full understanding of the race-based effects of the NPD’s policing practices is made more difficult by the NPD’s failure to track and analyze data with respect to race, which is unusual, and at odds with sound policing practices, for a police department in a major city, especially one with such diversity. Although NPD Field Inquiry forms track race, and the Arrest Report and Incident Report forms track race and ethnicity, the NPD does not use this demographic data to analyze and inform its policing practices. In fact, when requested to produce basic data on stops and arrests that included race, the NPD was unable to do so because the NPD has not enabled its records management system to provide this information. Indeed, the NPD has not implemented any systems through which it can effectively monitor and assess the race-based effects of its policing practices. This failure is particularly surprising as the NPD has adopted a COMSTAT process similar to the one pioneered by the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) to help command staff ensure that the Department is policing effectively. Although the NYPD COMSTAT process includes tracking and analysis of policing activities by race, the NPD chose not to incorporate those features, meaning that NPD can use COMSTAT to analyze crime rates, but not to analyze the impact of its enforcement efforts on different racial or ethnic groups.
Moreover, the NPD does not collect race and ethnicity data for any of the Quality of Life citations it issues, which made it impossible to use these forms to help determine the accuracy of widespread complaints from the community that the NPD uses Quality of Life citations in a racially discriminatory manner. These deliberate decisions by the NPD when the process was implemented make it difficult for anyone within or outside of NPD to assess the racial impact of NPD’s policing.
After persistent efforts spanning approximately one year in which the NPD was unable to provide comprehensive data, the DOJ ultimately arranged to work directly with the vendor that created the NPD’s record management system to gain access to the raw data, including demographic information on race and, where tracked, ethnicity, for NPD stop and arrest activities from January 2009 through June 2012. Although there are deficiencies in this data resulting from the NPD’s inconsistent record-keeping practices and lack of corrective supervisory review, the sheer volume of the available records provided a sufficiently reliable data set to analyze.
Further study of these numbers and their explanations is warranted, particularly because the data show that Newark’s black residents bear a disparate burden of stops, searches, and detentions that violate the Fourth Amendment. Without carefully tracking, analyzing, and addressing the racially disparate effects of its law enforcement activities in Newark, the NPD will be unable to fully understand and respond to this divisive disparity, and will face greater difficulty gaining the community trust and legitimacy required for effective and constitutional policing.
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3. NPD’s Unconstitutional Stop, Search, and Arrest Practices Have Had a Disparate Impact on Black People in Newark
The disparate impact of the NPD’s stop, search, and arrest practices appears to be an additional harm stemming, at least in part, from the same poor policing practices that result in stops, searches, and arrests that violate the First and Fourth Amendments. NPD officers, failing to apply constitutional and legal standards for stops, searches, and arrests, appear to have substituted their own judgments for these standards in determining when a stop, search, or arrest is justified. Without meaningful supervisory review, this practice increases the opportunity for officers to rely—consciously or unconsciously—on impermissible factors such as an individual’s race when conducting law enforcement actions.
In addition to the broad statistical evidence of disparate impact set out below, there is more specific evidence that, while not conclusive, supports a conclusion that the NPD’s failure to require its officers to adhere to legal standards for stops facilitates impermissible reliance on race. For example, NPD officers used the conclusory phrase “suspicious person,” without articulating any facts that establish actual reason for suspicion, to justify approximately 1,500 stops conducted during the three-and-a-half year time period reviewed.14 Of these 1,500 illegal “suspicious person” stops, 85% were stops of individuals identified by officers as black, and 15% were stops of individuals identified as white, a proportion starkly inconsistent with Newark’s demographic breakdown.
a. Pedestrian Stop Practices
Community perceptions of disparate treatment by the NPD are confirmed by the data. NPD officers documented a total of 52,235 pedestrian stops between January 2009 and June 2012.15 Overall, 80.9%, or 42,234, of these stops were of black individuals; 15.5%, or 8,081, were of white individuals (which includes a large number of Hispanic individuals); and 3.7%, or 1,920, of the stops were of individuals identified as “other races” or “unknown.” In comparison, according to 2010 U.S. census data, Newark’s population is 53.9% black, 26.4% white, and 19.8% other races.16 While the NPD conducted approximately 111 stops per 1,000 residents for white people, the NPD conducted approximately 283 stops per 1,000 residents for black people.
14 As discussed previously, identifying someone as a “suspicious person,” without articulating any factual basis for that suspicion, does not establish a legal basis for a stop. 15 This analysis included all pedestrian stops, not just those that were accompanied by a warrant check. This was done because the analysis sought to discover the demographic impact of all police-initiated pedestrian stops. 16 Because pedestrian stops are more likely to stop persons who actually live in Newark than are vehicular stops, residential population (census) provides a useful benchmark for conducting a preliminary analysis to discern whether a pattern of racially disparate policing appears to exist. While using residential population as a benchmark for measuring the rate of people subjected to law enforcement activity relative to the potential population of people who could have been subjected to such activity is not a perfect fit, it is adequate, and was the best benchmark available, given NPD’s failure to collect, track, and analyze demographic data. Residential population for this analysis was calculated on a block-by-block basis. Of the 26.4% of Newark’s population that is white, 14.7% also are Hispanic according to the 2010 census data. However, because, until January 2014, the NPD’s stop data did not include ethnicity, this stop analysis considered race but not ethnicity. By contrast, as discussed below, the arrest data did include ethnicity during the period this investigation was conducted.
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This means that black individuals in Newark have been 2.5 times more likely on average to be subjected to a pedestrian stop by an NPD officer than white individuals.
In addition to being 2.5 times more likely to be stopped than their white counterparts, black individuals in Newark also have been 2.7 times more likely on average to be subjected to searches and 3.1 times more likely to be subjected to frisks by the NPD. NPD officers conducted 34,153 more stops, 13,174 more searches, and 12,130 more frisks of black individuals than of white individuals over three-and-a-half years. Yet, according to the NPD’s documentation, the likelihood that a search or frisk by the NPD recovers evidence is essentially the same for both racial groups. The likelihood of recovering evidence during a frisk is 13.6% for whites and 12.7% for blacks, and the likelihood of recovering evidence during a search is 14.2% for whites and 14.8% for blacks.17 Thus, not only are the unconstitutional stop practices of the NPD falling most heavily on black individuals, but those massively additional stops are not yielding more evidence of crime. In other words, the stops are both impermissible and ineffective.
These racial disparities characterized every one of the NPD’s policing precincts and sectors, regardless of the racial makeup of those areas. For example, in the 3rd Precinct, which covers the southeast area of the city and has a relatively low black residential population (22%), black individuals have been stopped at a rate 5.5 times that of their white peers, with stops of black individuals totaling 4,819 and stops of white individuals totaling 2,194, despite white residents’ comprising 55% of the population. In the 4th Precinct, which covers the western area of the city, and where the residential population is heavily black (85%), black people accounted for 95%, or 14,693 of the stops, compared to 4%, or 572, stops of white people. When the precincts are broken down by sector, in 12 of Newark’s 29 sectors (including sectors from each of the four precincts), black people have been stopped at a rate more than 4 times that of white people. In some sectors in the 3rd Precinct, the stop rate for black individuals exceeded ten times the stop rate for white individuals.
b. Arrest Practices
The analysis of arrests by NPD officers over the three-and-a-half year period are almost identical to the analysis of pedestrian stops over that time period. Out of the 84,396 arrests in the three-and-a-half year period reviewed, 66,888, or 79.3%, were arrests of black people, while black residents accounted for 53.9% of Newark’s population. By comparison, only 5,567, or 6.6%, were arrests of white people, while non-Hispanic white residents account for 11.6% of Newark’s population.18 Stated differently, black individuals were 2.6 times more likely to be
17 These evidence recovery rates are provided for race-comparison reasons only. The NPD’s actual evidence recovery rates likely are materially lower than this, given the methodology of this review, which restricted the dataset of stops reviewed to those in which a warrant check was run, and the likelihood that the NPD did not complete this report for all stops. 18 Although there were anecdotal accounts of mistreatment of Hispanic individuals by NPD officers based on perceived ethnicity and national origin, particularly when these individuals have sought assistance from the police, the arrest data reviewed as part of this investigation did not show a disparity in arrests of Hispanics. Out of the 84,396 arrests, 10,277, or 12.2%, were arrests of Hispanic non-black individuals, compared to Hispanic non-black individuals accounting for 30.6% of Newark residents. As noted above, because the NPD’s stop data did not track
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arrested than white individuals in Newark. As with stops, the disparity held true across all NPD precincts and sectors. It is also consistent throughout most categories of arrests, based on charges reported at the time of arrest. It is crucial that the NPD implement data collection and analysis so that it can more fully understand the nature and causes of these racial disparities.
4. Quality of Life Citation Practices Have Been Ineffective and Have Facilitated Abuse
Community members, criminal justice stakeholders, and NPD officers and stakeholders widely recounted complaints about the NPD’s use of Quality of Life citations (commonly referred to by officers and community members as “blue summonses”). These citations are issued by NPD officers pursuant to Newark’s Municipal Code. Officers and residents alike perceive that the NPD issues these citations in order to satisfy quotas rather than to improve public safety. This perception alienates many community members and there is some evidence that calls into question the effectiveness of NPD’s use of Quality of Life citations on reducing crime in Newark.
During various time periods in recent years, NPD leadership reportedly instituted a quota to encourage officers to increase the number of citations issued. Officers’ eligibility for overtime and desirable assignments apparently were linked to meeting the Quality of Life citation quota, thus giving officers an incentive to issue more. Although there was conflicting information about whether a formal quota still exists, the perception of at least an unofficial quota persists among officers.
There were consistent reports from a variety of stakeholders that, in recent years, the NPD’s increased emphasis on the use of the citations, coupled with poor training,19 has disproportionately and ineffectively targeted black individuals. Because the NPD does not track race and ethnicity for citations, the DOJ could not confirm the accuracy of this perception. However, given the racially disparate effects of the NPD’s stop practices, the allegations that the citations disparately affect the black community have some basis.20
Moreover, complaints from NPD officers and—particularly in public housing projects— the community allege that the NPD’s practice of requiring officers to issue high numbers of citations results in officers’ focusing on convenient targets, rather than on the individuals involved in serious criminal activity. Issuing high numbers of citations, particularly if this
ethnicity until January of 2014, this investigation did not include an analysis of stops of Hispanics in Newark. Further inquiry is necessary to determine more conclusively whether the NPD’s police activities have a disparate impact on Hispanics. 19 That lack of appropriate training concerning Quality of Life citations results in officers’ improper issuance of citations is supported by the fact that these citations are dismissed by the municipal and county prosecutor’s offices approximately thirty percent of the time. 20 Community members and groups also raised concerns that the NPD inappropriately uses Quality of Life citations to target people with mental illness, people with disabilities, and seniors. During the site visit, members of the NPD command staff lacked a sufficient understanding and sophistication about issues related to mental illness and disabilities, highlighting the need for training on these issues. Some community members reported that seniors and people with disabilities are terrified of calling the police because they perceive that NPD officers will assume that they have mental health concerns and will treat them like suspects.
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practice is seen as focused on low level targets of opportunity rather than the individuals more likely to be involved in serious criminal activity, alienates potential allies in the community who might otherwise be helpful as witnesses, or in providing information related to crime.
C. USE OF FORCE
There is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Relying primarily on officers’ own descriptions of and justifications for the force they used, this review found that more than twenty percent of NPD officers’ reported uses of force were unreasonable and thus violated the Constitution. The investigation also revealed significant underreporting of force by NPD officers. This pattern and practice of unreasonable force both results from and is evidenced by failures in policy, supervision, investigation, training and discipline.
1. Legal Standards
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The use of excessive or unnecessary force by a law enforcement officer during an arrest or stop is considered an “unreasonable” seizure that violates the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). The assessment of reasonableness and, therefore, constitutionality of an officer’s use of force is objective. Just as an officer’s bad intentions will not render an objectively reasonable use of force unconstitutional, an objectively unreasonable use of force is unconstitutional, even where the officer had good intentions. Id. at 397. Determining whether the use of force was reasonable requires carefully balancing the risk of bodily harm that the officer’s actions pose to the individual in light of the threat to the public that the officer was trying to eliminate. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). In Graham, the Supreme Court noted that, in order to properly balance these interests, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances, including the severity of the crime, whether the subject posed an immediate threat to the officer or public safety, and whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to escape. Id.
2. NPD Format for Reporting and Tracking Force
The NPD’s use of force policy appropriately charges officers to use the “minimum force necessary to effect a lawful arrest” and officers must be able to “justify the degree of force used.” General Order 63-02. The policy requires that officers clearly document all uses of force in an Incident Report and complete a separate Use of Force Report, both of which are to be submitted to a supervisor for review and approval. The Use of Force Report (Form DPI:2000) (“Force Report”) is a paper form intended to track the specific details about use of force incidents. The Incident Report Form (Form DPI:802) (“Incident Report”) is an electronic record contained in the NPD’s Record Management System (“RMS”) that officers complete for all arrests, crime reports, uses of force and other incidents. Only the Incident Report includes a place to include a narrative description of an officer’s actions. The Force Report provides space to indicate what force was used, what resistance was encountered and whether there were injuries, but its format makes it impossible for a reviewer to tell what happened, especially in situations where more than one type of force is used, or force is used against more than one person. Upon approval,
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supervisors are to forward copies of both reports to the Office of the Police Director, Internal Affairs, and the Police Academy. In addition, the policy requires each precinct or unit to maintain file copies of the Incident, and Use of Force Reports (and any associated Arrest Reports).
The policy requires copies of Use of Force Reports to be forwarded to IA, where they are to be entered into a computerized case management system, IAPro, and for the Police Academy to retain them for “future purposes.”21 In apparent conflict with this policy, although IAPro appears to contain a record noting the occurrence of each use of force, very little of the data from the Use of Force Report is actually entered into the NPD’s data system for tracking or further analysis. The omission of this detailed data from any electronic database limits the ability of the NPD to track and analyze officer use of force practices for accountability, training, or officer safety purposes.
3. NPD’s Unreasonable Use of Force
With the assistance of experts, the team reviewed all 82 of the NPD’s IA investigations of allegations of excessive force for the eighteen-month period, from January 2010 to June 2011.22 In 67 of these investigative files, IA determined that NPD officers had used force and IA then made efforts to conduct an investigation.23 Yet, IA did not find the force used by officers in any of these investigations to be unreasonable. In fact, IA sustained only one excessive force allegation in the six-year period from 2007 to 2012.
The DOJ’s review yielded very different results. Upon evaluating the information in these 67 files, the investigation concluded that 14 incidents involved the use of unreasonable force by NPD officers, some of which are described below. In 27 other incidents, the documentation of the internal affairs investigation lacked sufficient information to allow an assessment of whether the force was reasonable.
In addition to its review of IA investigations, the team also evaluated the NPD’s Force and Incident Reports for the nine-month period from January 1, 2011, to October 4, 2011 by selecting a statistically significant, random sample of 100 out of 336 incidents for review. Because the Force Reports included only officers’ accounts, without any documented investigation or additional information gathering by the NPD, such as interviews with victims or third-party witnesses, the review simply examined whether the officers provided sufficient
21 The policy does not describe what those future purposes might entail, apart from an additional requirement for IA to include in its monthly reports a summary of all uses of force and firearm discharges that occurred. 22 To assess the NPD’s use of force, the team reviewed NPD’s Force Reports, Incident Reports, Internal Affairs investigations of excessive force allegations, and investigations of shootings in which officers were involved. Because this review of individual incidents relied on the same documentation that was available at the time of the incidents to the NPD’s direct supervisors and IA investigators, it permitted an assessment of both the reasonableness of each force incident and the supervisory or investigatory process that followed. Interviews with NPD officials, from line officers to NPD leadership, were also critical to evaluating the NPD’s use of force, as was information from other law enforcement stakeholders, community groups and individuals. 23 In 15 of these 82 investigations, the NPD either affirmatively concluded that the incidents did not occur, or was unable to confirm that the allegations involved NPD officers and halted the investigation. As a result, these investigation files contained insufficient information for review and were excluded.
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justification for their uses of force in their own reports. Similar to the results of the IA force investigation review, in nearly one third of the Force and Incident Reports reviewed, the force appeared unreasonable, and thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment, based on the officer’s own description of the nature of and reason for the use of force. In a significant number of additional incidents the reporting was too unclear to permit an assessment of whether the force used was reasonable. Force appeared reasonable on its face in only a little more than half of the 100 Force and Incident Reports reviewed.24
a. Examples of NPD’s Use of Unreasonable Force
The overall impression of this review is that NPD officers escalate common policing situations, in which force should be unnecessary or relatively minimal, to situations in which they use significant force, sometimes unreasonably. Taken as a whole, the investigation revealed that NPD officers too often use open and closed fist strikes, especially to the head of the subject. In many cases, these actions were not necessary for the officer to control the situation and seemed to be simply retaliatory.
The NPD’s own force documents helped explain why many in the community perceive NPD officers as needlessly escalating incidents, rather than as officers committed to protecting their community. Indeed, the NPD appears to be a department that too frequently turns to force as its first option when dealing with the public.
In one incident, for example, while an officer was escorting an intoxicated 140-pound, 69-year-old man from a store, the man grabbed the officer’s upper chest. The officer reported that he punched the man twice in the face in response.
In another incident, a man suffered a concussion, loss of consciousness, and bruises and cuts after a detective in plainclothes struck him several times in the face with a closed fist. The detective’s incident report indicates that the man swung first, but acknowledged that the detective had startled the man with his sudden presence behind him. The police practice experts who reviewed this incident for this investigation noted this response did not appear to be a defensive or control tactic, but rather was retaliatory. Additionally, a sergeant on the scene admitted during the IA investigation that, although he had kicked the man, he did not complete a Force Report as required by policy. Despite the severity of his injuries, the man was not taken to the hospital until he complained of mouth pain at the police station. Further, while the man’s hospital records were included in the investigative file, the loss of consciousness and concussion were barely acknowledged in the investigator’s summary, and appear not to have been discussed with the complainant.
Another aspect of the pattern of unreasonable force is the number of incidents in which officers appeared to respond with significant force against individuals who questioned police activities, sometimes, in the language of one police report, “in a loud and hostile manner.” In an incident more fully discussed in the assessment of arrest practices above, according to a citizen
24 Because the information available in these reports was less than that available in an internal affairs investigation, the review of the use of force reports was limited to an assessment of whether the officer’s own report of the incident adequately justified the officer’s actions.
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complaint, when a man asked a plainclothes officer why another individual had been stopped, the officer reportedly slammed the man to the ground and used a choke hold on him. When the man’s female cousin asked why the officer was choking her cousin, the officer kicked her in the ribs and placed both individuals in handcuffs. Both the officer’s account and the IA investigation are incomplete, raising questions about the reliability of the investigation: while the complainants alleged specific details, including a choke hold and a kick, the officer’s account was minimal and uninformative, reporting only that she and other officers “quelled” the behavior.
The investigation uncovered that officers also have used force in furtherance of an investigation rather than to effect a lawful arrest or prevent harm. In an incident in January 2011, two officers decided to conduct a “well-being check” of a man and woman whom they observed arguing, and called over to them. As the couple approached the officers, the officers reportedly observed the man put something into his mouth and ordered him to spit it out. When the man did not comply, one officer immediately placed him in a choke hold to prevent him from swallowing the item. The choke hold was unsuccessful. After the man had swallowed the item, he reportedly refused to give the officers his hands to be cuffed and was “taken to the ground and given two strikes to the side of his head.” Although the officer’s report states that he acted for the man’s safety as well as to prevent him from swallowing the item, the encounter at that point was voluntary and the officers had not established a basis for any seizure. Although police officers may use reasonable force to secure or prevent the destruction of evidence while conducting a lawful arrest, they must have constitutionally adequate grounds for doing so. In this and similar incidents, NPD officers have used force before establishing probable cause to justify a seizure, as is required by the Constitution. Additionally, in this instance the NPD failed to scrutinize the use of a choke hold as a potentially deadly use of force that likely was unreasonable in response to the man’s resistance.
b. Lack of Effective System for Use of Force Reporting and Review
The pattern of using unreasonable force is both perpetuated and further evidenced by significant problems with the NPD’s force reporting and review practices. First, although NPD policies in many (but far from all) respects comport with contemporary best practices, the NPD does not always follow its own force policies, contributing to and reflecting the pattern of unreasonable use of force. Second, the NPD lacks a robust process for supervisory review of officers’ use of force by first-line supervisors. Third, the NPD often fails to refer serious use of force cases to the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office for review for criminal prosecution. When the NPD has referred cases, the criminal referral prematurely has ended the NPD’s administrative investigations of serious force, including officer-involved shootings.
i. NPD’s Force Reporting and Supervisory Review Systems
Consistent with the discussion above describing a culture that facilitates unreasonable force, the review revealed an unacceptable tolerance within the NPD for Force Reports that are insufficient to permit meaningful review. In particular, officers’ reports repeatedly failed to describe the actions that prompted the use of force. Instead, officers frequently have made conclusory statements that a person was “resisting arrest,” “flailing his arms,” or “swinging his shoulders,” without providing the facts that would permit an assessment of whether the level of
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resistance warranted the level of force used in response. Similarly, officers often documented their actions with vague, conclusory, and non-descriptive language that failed to describe what force they used and why, such as:
 “appropriate amount of force to effect a lawful arrest”
 “necessary level of physical force”
 “placed under arrest after a struggle”
 “all necessary force”
Other problematic descriptions of force indicated only that, after some unspecified amount and type of force, the subject was placed in handcuffs:
 “administered several compliance holds to handcuff and then escort”
 “attempted to handcuff him as he violently resisted being handcuffed. [Officers] eventually were able to place [the suspect] into handcuffs.”
 “after several attempts … [three officers] were finally able to put handcuffs on the suspect.”
Such descriptions make it impossible for a supervisor, investigator, or outside reviewer to determine whether the force used by officers in these situations was reasonable, or even whether the officers’ tactics raise officer safety concerns. Yet, there was no indication in the records that supervisors questioned the adequacy of officers’ force descriptions, or requested additional information. In fact, of more than 300 Force Reports reviewed as part of this investigation, supervisors approved every use of force description, including those DOJ found to be deficient.
It is widely accepted and understood in the field of modern policing that, without meaningful review of officers’ use of force, it is more difficult to detect and correct uses of unreasonable force and officer safety issues, or to identify training needs, poor tactics, policy failures or inadequate equipment. Without routine, thorough force review, officers may become less careful about whether they use force consistently with policy or law. Poor decisions, bad tactics, and lax adherence to policy and law can reinforce themselves over time and become a part of the culture. Without effective supervisory review, the lines of accountability throughout the Department weaken, making it more difficult for leadership to promote and ensure its operational mandates and vision.
The NPD’s Force Report, meant to facilitate NPD’s tracking and assessment of officer force, instead facilitates both poor reporting and ineffective review. The Force Report is intended to track the specific details when force is used, including the name, age and race of the individual(s) involved, the level of resistance the officer encountered, the type of force used, and whether anyone was injured or received medical treatment. While these are all important details for the NPD to document and track, the Force Report’s usefulness as a management tool is undermined by its failure to require a narrative description of the event and an explanation of the connection between an individual’s behavior and the officer’s use of force. For example, when
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an officer uses more than one type of force, the Force Report provides no way of indicating which force was used first or what behavior prompted it. Similarly, if force was used against multiple individuals, the form offers a reviewer no way of discerning what force was used against which specific individual. By contrast, the New Jersey State Attorney General’s Guidelines on Use of Force include a model Use of Force Report—albeit last revised in 2001— that, although organized differently, does require information regarding what force was used against a specific individual when multiple individuals are involved.
Pursuant to NPD policy, NPD officers are instead instructed to describe their uses of force in the narrative of the Incident Report Form, a separate electronic form. Although Force Reports and Incident Reports can be cross-referenced by the unique, computer-generated Criminal Complaint Number assigned to every incident, the NPD does not file the two reports together. Indeed, completed Force Reports are routed differently through the NPD than their related Incident Reports, and they are neither tracked nor routinely evaluated together by NPD supervisors. Thus, unless supervisors match up each Force Report with its corresponding Incident Report (a time-consuming process completed for this investigation), supervisors reviewing Force Reports do not see the accompanying narrative in the Incident Report that, theoretically at least, describes what happened. Nor is there any other mechanism within the NPD to ensure that this comprehensive force review occurs: IA staff reported that, although they track the number of force incidents, they have no responsibility to review individual officers’ Force Reports to ensure that the reports are accurate and complete.
Exacerbating these problems, the NPD tolerates significant underreporting of force by its officers. In 30% of the Incident Reports reviewed that described a use of force, the officer did not complete the required Force Report. Similarly, in at least a dozen of the approximately 87 internal affairs investigations of force complaints, officers reported uses of force during internal affairs interviews that they had failed to document contemporaneously in Force Reports. Thus, if the complainants in these cases had not come forward to pursue allegations of excessive force, there would have been no record that these officers even had used force.
The NPD has not held officers accountable for failing to document their uses of force, even though this is a clear violation of the NPD’s use of force policy,25 and the NPD’s IA policy requires investigators to pursue evidence that an officer violated department rules or engaged in other misconduct, even if that misconduct was not the basis for the original complaint.26 The NPD’s tolerance of officers’ failure to report force therefore suggests that NPD condones such behavior, and may well significantly contribute to the widespread underreporting of force.
Acknowledging the deficiencies in the NPD’s use of force reporting and review systems, NPD’s leadership reports that it has created a Use of Force Review Board to more closely assess uses of force and patterns of officer behavior. While establishing such a board is a necessary component of an adequate force review system, the NPD must also ensure that officers diligently report force and that supervisors, or dedicated force investigators, are equally diligent in their reviews.
25 See GO 63-02 at 9. 26 See GO 05-04 at 14.
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ii. NPD’s Administrative and Criminal Force Review Systems
NPD also has mishandled serious use of force incidents that require both criminal and administrative review, including cases where officers have used deadly force. In particular, the NPD often has failed to refer serious use of force cases to the ECPO to be considered for criminal prosecution, and when the NPD has done so, the criminal referral inappropriately has ended the NPD’s administrative investigation.
1. Failure to Appropriately Review Cases Involving Serious Use of Force
The NPD’s policies require IA to refer to the ECPO any complaint “where a preliminary investigation indicates that the accused officer may have engaged in a criminal act or used force which resulted in serious bodily injury or death.”27 IA staff reported that all excessive force allegations are referred to the ECPO, not just allegations involving serious bodily injury or death as required by policy. However, this claim was not substantiated by the review of IA files. Instead, the review shows that, in practice, some excessive force files are referred to the ECPO, some are reviewed internally only by IA, and still others may be reviewed only at the command level without ever being assessed by IA.
This review revealed multiple instances in which credible complaints of potentially criminal uses of force were not referred to prosecutors for review, even though by any objective measure they should have been. For example, in one investigation a complainant alleged that he was physically assaulted by four officers at the Green Street Cell Block. He reported suffering a broken nose, lacerated lip and bruises to his cheek. Officers acknowledged administering blows to the complainant’s torso after they had already taken him to the ground. This review determined that the force used appeared excessive and potentially criminal under the relevant legal standards, but the NPD never referred this case to the ECPO.
When the NPD has referred excessive force allegations to the ECPO and the ECPO has declined to prosecute the case, the NPD routinely has closed the administrative case with little additional investigation. Some NPD investigators expressly have relied on the prosecutor’s decision not to proceed to justify an exoneration recommendation. One IA investigator wrote in support of his recommendation to clear an officer that the ECPO “determined there was insufficient evidence to warrant criminal prosecution. Therefore, the actions of the officers were within the legal realm of their responsibilities and functions as Newark Police Officers.” There are numerous other cases where the investigator received notice of non-prosecution from the ECPO, and closed the investigation mere days later.28 See Garcia v. City of Newark, 2011 WL 689616 *4 (D.N.J. Feb 16, 2011) (noting, in a civil case alleging that NPD officers engaged in excessive force, that NPD’s “IA investigator . . . stated that he has never sustained an excessive force allegation unless the Prosecutor had already found sufficient evidence to bring a criminal charge.”).
27 Id. at 9. 28 The IA investigators usually requested written statements from the accused officers, but this appears to have been a formality, based on the subsequent lack of investigation and quick closure of the file.
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The standard for criminal conviction and the standard for sustaining an administrative complaint are significantly different, and a decision by the ECPO not to prosecute criminally does not mean that an officer acted legally or in keeping with NPD policies. The NPD’s practice results in failures to sufficiently investigate serious uses of force and recommend appropriate disciplinary action, and is contrary to both the expectations of the ECPO and the New Jersey Attorney General’s IA Guidelines, which require that the NPD take appropriate administrative action even when cases are not criminally prosecuted. N.J. AG Guidelines at 20.
2. Inadequate Review of Officers’ Use of Deadly Force
The most significant and “intrusive” use of force is the use of deadly force, which can result in the taking of human life, “frustrat[ing] the interest of . . . society in judicial determination of guilt and punishment.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). Because deadly force poses such a high risk, it must be closely reviewed and controlled by a police department to ensure that it is used only when justified. Deadly force incidents, such as officerinvolved shootings, also often draw substantial attention to the Department, and can be a source of significant tension with the community when a police department responds inappropriately.
NPD’s handling of officer-involved shootings has fallen strikingly short of generally accepted police practices. The NPD has not conducted adequate administrative investigations to determine if officer-involved shootings violate NPD policy. Indeed the investigations of all 29 officer-involved shootings between May 2010 and January 2012 were generally incomplete.29 This deficiency is partly due to how the NPD has handled its split jurisdiction with the ECPO for shootings involving law enforcement officers. The ECPO conducts the criminal investigation, while the NPD retains authority for the administrative review. However, as with its handling of other serious uses of force as described above, the NPD has misunderstood or misapplied the distinction between criminal and administrative investigations and abdicated its independent responsibility to conduct an administrative investigation to determine whether officer-involved shootings violate NPD policy or present officer safety concerns.
Criminal and administrative investigations of officer-involved shootings are both critical processes for a police department and the community it serves. A criminal investigation assesses the lawfulness of the use of force and may result in prosecution. The administrative review assesses whether the incident involved any violation of policy and whether it raises any tactical, training, or other concerns for the agency. The NPD starts an administrative investigation after each officer-involved shooting, but always suspends the administrative investigation while the ECPO conducts a criminal review. A blanket rule of not conducting an administrative investigation of a shooting pending completion of the criminal review is problematic due to the unnecessary delay it imposes, but it is less troubling if the administrative investigation restarts once it is clear it will not interfere with a potential criminal prosecution. However, it appears that the NPD has not resumed its administrative review of the use of force once the ECPO has completed its criminal review and declines to prosecute. This is consistent with all IA
29 Of these 29 officer-involved shootings, thirteen were confirmed hits, twelve were confirmed misses, and four were of unknown effect. According to NPD reports, five of the shootings resulted in critical injuries and four were fatal.
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investigators’ statements that, once a criminal review is initiated, they are precluded from taking administrative action regarding the use of deadly force, although they may investigate and take action for any other rule violations that may be identified.
Therefore, when the NPD suspends its administrative investigation pending criminal review, the NPD effectively ends its review of the incident.30 The NPD’s files do not include material gathered by the ECPO for its criminal review, and the NPD has not itself collected or considered critical evidence, or its absence.31 For example, some files lack photographs or diagrams of the scene or even a clear description of a subject’s injuries. Others lack a coroner’s report discussing the cause of death. The files do not contain statements from the subjects of the shootings, or any indication that the investigator tried to obtain such statements. The NPD’s response to officer-involved shootings appears to have been based only on the perspective of officers who were involved as witnesses and friendly civilian witnesses. The lack of thoroughness of NPD’s officer-involved shooting investigations is reflected in the brevity of the investigative files: one investigation file of a fatal shooting was nine pages long, and another file where the shooting left the subject in critical condition was twelve pages.
As a result of the NPD’s practice of not conducting meaningful administrative investigations, shootings that violate policy, but have not been criminally prosecuted, have avoided review. Except in the extremely rare instance where a shooting is prosecuted criminally, there is no possibility of holding officers accountable, or determining whether there were training or other failures. Indeed, while the NPD’s lack of investigations made it impossible to draw firm conclusions about any shooting based upon the investigative file, at least one appeared unreasonable based solely on the documents available.
The NPD’s weak investigations of officer-involved shootings provide a patina of oversight that is wholly insufficient to determine whether shootings are justified. Further, because it has conducted no investigation, the NPD has had little information to assess the need for changes to training, equipment, policies or tactics that may be placing officers and civilians at risk. By not conducting thorough investigations followed by appropriate disciplinary action when warranted, the NPD fails to deter officers from using deadly force unnecessarily and decreases public confidence that the NPD is exercising appropriate supervision and review.
D. THEFT
There is reasonable cause to believe that NPD officers have engaged in a pattern or practice of theft from civilians, and that the NPD has taken inadequate measures to prevent, investigate, and remediate incidents and allegations of such theft.
30 While there is no good rationale for the NPD’s practice of dispensing with an administrative review altogether, delaying initiation of the administrative review may be the result of the potentially confusing guidance offered in the Attorney General’s guidelines on how departments should proceed in these situations. During the course of this investigation the Attorney General’s Office expressed its interest in considering modifications to its guidelines to provide greater clarity. 31 With the potential exception of Grand Jury secrecy and similar requirements, there is no legal barrier to including information from a criminal investigative file in an administrative investigation.
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1. Legal Standards
Law enforcement officers who extort and rob persons of their property violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of those individuals. See e.g., Hernandez v. Borough of Palisades Park Police Dep’t, 58 Fed. Appx. 909, 912 (3d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. McClean, 528 F.2d 1250 (2d Cir. 1976).
2. Theft by NPD Officers
The team reviewed numerous documents produced by the NPD, including general orders, audits, disciplinary histories for officers assigned to the Narcotics and Gang Bureau, and all thirty IA files provided by the NPD involving allegations of theft or lost property. The evidence makes clear that theft from arrestees has been more than an aberration limited to a few officers or incidents within NPD. Examples of the problem include allegations of theft of money and drugs during arrests and allegedly deliberate failure to return money and property such as wallets, cell phones, jewelry, and car keys upon arrestees’ release by the NPD.32
The NPD has been aware for several years that theft by some of its officers is a serious problem. The Special Investigations Unit and IA have conducted several reviews of officers with high numbers of theft complaints.33 Some of the officers reviewed in the NPD’s internal reports had more than ten complaints of theft in a period of two to three years, and many additional complaints of other misconduct, generated both internally, by the NPD, and externally, by civilians. The NPD’s reviews concluded that theft of civilians’ property and money by officers was particularly problematic in the NPD’s specialized units, such as narcotics and gangs, and in the prisoner processing unit at the NPD’s Green Street Cell Block.34 Moreover, these reports reflected that theft had become a problem not only with line officers, but also with more highly ranked officers and supervisors. Yet the NPD did not sustain any of the misconduct complaints of theft against any of the officers with the largest number of incidents. Further, the NPD’s internal documents mirror the many accounts of NPD theft alleged by community members and other criminal justice stakeholders, including law enforcement. Indeed, while the DOJ’s investigation was ongoing, there were several high-profile incidents of alleged theft by NPD officers.
The issue of theft is especially evident at the Green Street holding facility. On several occasions the Essex County Jail has rejected the property bags of prisoners transferred from Green Street because of discrepancies between prisoner property and their corresponding inventory forms. A late 2009 NPD memorandum indicated that property bags were being opened and money or property removed at Green Street. The NPD installed video cameras in the Prisoner Processing Division to determine who was stealing from the property bags. In 2011 the
32 Review of this issue was hindered by the deficiencies in IA investigations discussed later in this report, as well as NPD’s inability to provide all of the documents requested. Specifically, the NPD was unable to provide documents evidencing actions taken in response to the policy recommendations made by the Special Investigations Unit or to confirm that no additional documents existed. 33 According to an NPD internal memorandum, ten officers generated 42 investigations of theft complaints in a twoand-a-half year period. 34 The NPD holds detainees at a 58-cell facility on the lower level of its building at 31 Green Street.
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cameras recorded two officers—including a supervisor—disabling the camera. Although these two officers were charged with misconduct, neither was ever disciplined for tampering with the video cameras: the NPD terminated one officer for unrelated reasons and allowed the other to retire without sanctioning him, even though he had been being found guilty in a police trial regarding this incident.
The ECPO also has expressed concern with the handling of arrestees’ property by the NPD. In one instance of theft (where a prisoner’s property bag was found to have been ripped open and fixed with a staple), the matter was referred to the ECPO for criminal investigation. After more than a year of investigating this incident, the ECPO declined prosecution in March 2012, noting that “even though it is evident that a theft did occur, no specific officer can be identified for prosecution.” The ECPO also noted that “after a thorough investigation, it appears that the NPD’s’ general orders regarding the custody and inventory of prisoners’ property at 31 Green Street ha[ve] been fundamentally deficient for some time,” but that the ECPO hoped the new holding facility in police headquarters on Clinton Avenue “is better equipped to safeguard prisoners’ personal property.” Although the NPD had planned to transfer its detention operations from Green Street to the new police headquarters on Clinton Avenue, that transition has been delayed indefinitely.
3. NPD Practices Have Failed to Adequately Address Theft by Officers
Despite its awareness of the theft problem, the NPD has not enforced its own rules regarding theft prevention, has conducted inadequate investigations into theft complaints, has failed to take corrective action against offending officers, and has not taken other steps it knows are necessary to prevent or effectively respond to theft allegations. The NPD has failed to follow through on the recommendations of its own internal audits and reviews regarding theft, including reassigning the problem officers out of specialized units, video monitoring the Prisoner Processing Division, and requiring supervisors to inspect and document prisoner property. Instead, the NPD has routinely allowed officers with multiple theft complaints to be assigned to or remain in units with the most opportunity for theft, and then—contrary to its own recommendations—has failed even to monitor or conduct internal integrity checks of these officers.
The NPD’s lax response to allegations of theft by officers is longstanding and remained evident during this investigation. For example, despite the 2009 memorandum and other information alerting the NPD to problems in its property room, an early 2013 visit to the property room revealed that many obvious, easily correctable deficiencies still lingered: the property room door did not automatically lock; valuables other than cash were not stored as securely as cash; documentation of property was limited to a handwritten log book; property was not counted and inventoried by at least two people; and there appeared to be no systematic inspection of property bags for damage.
a. Failure to Adequately Screen Candidates for Specialized Units
Accusations of theft and corruption are most often leveled against officers in specialized units—particularly the various narcotics, gang, and street crimes units—where officers often come into contact with individuals carrying large sums of money. The NPD is well aware of this
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pattern: a 2010 internal review showed that the officers with the most theft complaints had been assigned almost exclusively to specialized units like the Central Narcotics Enforcement Team, the precinct Narcotics Enforcement Teams, the Narcotics Gang Enforcement Bureau, and the Street Crimes Task Force. Recognizing that inadequate screening has allowed such problems to occur, the NPD’s Special Investigations Unit recommended a policy of thoroughly reviewing an officer's IA history before assignment to a specialized unit. Despite the clear need for such a policy, the NPD did not act on this recommendation.
Nor has the NPD implemented screening measures to ensure assignment of officers with appropriate and tested integrity to these units. Newark’s assignment policy, General Order 9608, includes general requirements for an officer’s becoming a member of a specialized unit: two years on patrol before a police officer can join a precinct narcotics enforcement team; two years of experience on a precinct narcotics team or anti-crime unit before a detective can join the Centralized Narcotics Division. This bare two-year service requirement may be waived for department “need,” a term not defined in the policy.
The NPD’s assignment policy does not include any other criteria, let alone rigorous, objective, integrity-based criteria designed to minimize the possibility of theft or other forms of corruption, such as the absence of any history of dishonesty, theft, or similar allegations. Of most concern among these deficiencies is the lack of any prohibition against assigning officers with multiple theft complaints—even sustained theft complaints—to specialized units. The policy instead places a restriction on assignments in instances where an officer affirmatively requests a particular assignment, and provides that such a request will be denied if the officer has a pending “major” disciplinary case, discipline greater than three days’ suspension within the past twelve months, or two prior findings of guilty by trial board within the past twelve months. Other than these very narrow restrictions, the assignment policy does not limit selection of officers for the units, even if they have had prior discipline for theft, have been the recipients of multiple theft allegations, or other integrity-related complaints (e.g., truthfulness, falsifying reports, etc.). The assignment policy does not set a maximum number of theft complaints for candidates or otherwise discuss what kind of disciplinary history would be acceptable. These inadequate screening procedures allow officers with multiple theft complaints to be assigned to a specialized unit or transferred to another specialized unit while continuing to accumulate integrity-related complaints.
b. Failure to Follow the NPD’s Established Rotation Policy
Rotating personnel out of specialized units is an essential tool for combating theft and corruption in police departments. NPD policy clearly recognizes as much, stating in General Order 96-08 that rotation is an “effective method at controlling police misconduct” designed to “minimize complacency and prevent corruption.” According to the rotation policy, officers are limited to two years in a narcotics unit and one year in a vice unit before they must be rotated to another assignment. The policy also requires the Human Resources Unit to notify officers in advance of the expiration of their term that they should submit a request for transfer.
Although command staff emphasized the importance of such a rotation procedure in interviews during the investigation, the NPD largely has failed to enforce its “mandatory” policy. Many of the NPD officers with the highest number of theft complaints remained in specialized
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units beyond the maximum amount of time provided in the rotation policy. In fact, in several instances where memoranda made specific recommendations to enforce the rotation policy and rotate the officers with the highest number of theft complaints out of their units, the NPD did not transfer these officers for many months, and in some instances, transferred them to other specialized units with similar opportunities for theft. In one egregious example, an internal report recommended a transfer for an officer with more than ten theft complaints in just four years, but this officer was not transferred to a non-specialized unit (i.e., a unit that did not focus on narcotics or vice) until ten months later, more than two years after he had initially been identified as one of the officers with the most theft complaints lodged against him. Indeed, in the three years after this officer was first identified as a top offender he accumulated an additional six theft complaints.
Not only has the NPD ignored its own rotation policy, but the policy is itself inadequate. While the policy sets a maximum amount of time in a particular specialized unit (e.g., two years in narcotics), there is no restriction on the number of rotations in a specialized unit or on transfers from one specialized unit to another, and then back again. There is also no requirement that officers who accumulate one or more theft or other integrity-related complaints will be rotated out of these assignments before the maximum time has elapsed. The fact that officers in specialized units continued to accumulate civilian complaints underscores the importance and effectiveness of adhering to a rigorous and regular rotation policy.
c. Failure to Monitor Problem Officers or Conduct Integrity Tests
The NPD itself recommended integrity tests and closer monitoring in 2010 in connection with the NPD’s internal review of officers with the highest number of theft complaints. Although such measures are an integral tool for combating theft, there is no information suggesting that the NPD took any action on these important recommendations.
As part of a comprehensive approach to reducing the incidence of theft, the NPD should conduct regular integrity tests not only in response to allegations against specific officers, but routinely throughout the Department, both on a random and a targeted basis. The NPD should monitor officers suspected of theft, including those with high numbers of complaints.
E. INADEQUATE MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
An effective system for investigating complaints of officer misconduct is a basic component of any department’s accountability. Such a system requires the prompt and thorough investigation of civilian complaints; the sustaining of those complaints when they are supported by a preponderance of the evidence; and the imposition of fair and consistent discipline when appropriate. By contrast, a police department that fails to adequately investigate civilians’ allegations of misconduct through its IA system tacitly permits officers to engage in such conduct. See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a deficient internal investigation process is evidence of a custom tolerating the tacit use of excessive force by police officers).
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Much like the IA system assessed in Beck, the NPD’s system for investigating civilian complaints appears to have been “structured to curtail disciplinary action and stifle investigations into the credibility of the City’s police officers.” Id. While the NPD has severely and inconsistently disciplined officers for internal rule violations, there are serious deficiencies in the NPD’s handling of civilian complaints that translate to a lack of accountability for serious misconduct.35 For example, as noted above, according to the NPD’s own records, IA sustained only one misconduct complaint of excessive force in the six-year time period from 2007 through 2012. Every police department is different and there is no threshold percentage of sustained complaints that a law enforcement agency must attain in order to demonstrate that its investigations of misconduct complaints are effective. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the NPD’s failure to sustain more than one excessive force complaint in six years is implausible on its face and appears significantly aberrant: a 2006 Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report found that large municipal police departments sustained an average of 8% of citizens’ complaints about police use of force.36
Similarly, summaries of IA investigations involving complaints of theft from 2009 to 2011 and disciplinary histories of officers assigned to the Central Narcotics Unit in August 2011 (which included more than fifty theft complaints over six years against these officers) indicated that the NPD sustained allegations against only two officers.37 This means that officers with high numbers of credible complaints that have not been adequately investigated by the NPD, as discussed below, have continued to work on the force, often in the specialized unit from which the complaints originate, without any discipline or other corrective action, such as re-training or increased supervision.38
The NPD’s low rate of sustaining civilian complaints has not been limited to allegations of theft or excessive force. In 2010, only 38 out of 814 (4.6%) complaints by civilians were sustained. In 2011, only 29 out of 601 (4.8%) civilian complaints were sustained. In 2012, 38 of 561 (6.8%) civilian complaints were sustained. This slight increase between 2011 and 2012 appears to have resulted from an increase in the number of relatively low-level “demeanor”
35 The assessment of NPD’s IA and disciplinary processes included a review of the NPD’s policies and general orders related to IA and the disciplinary process, IA data on complaint intake and adjudication provided by the NPD, annual reports, an external audit conducted by the ECPO, interviews of IA command staff, the commanders responsible for making disciplinary decisions, and officers familiar with the disciplinary process, and a review of all of the IA files provided by the NPD where individuals alleged that they were subjected to excessive force, unlawful arrests, or theft during a period of approximately 18 months, from January 2010 to June 2011. In addition, members of the community and advocates provided feedback about their experience pursuing complaints through the NPD’s
IA process.
36 Citizen Complaints about Police Use of Force, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, June 2006. The report did not address whether an 8% sustained rate is appropriate or acceptable. The report further noted that many factors, including variations between departments in complaint intake, review and documentation processes, can skew data in either direction. 37Although certain documents reflect that administrative charges were sustained against these two officers in 2009 for failing to properly document the receipt of a prisoner's property, the NPD provided no information whether these officers went to police trial on these charges, or whether they were ever disciplined. 38Poor record-keeping by the NPD and incomplete production of requested records prevented a review of all theftrelated IA files and the outcome of all investigations.
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complaints sustained. These sustained complaints were generally either ancillary to criminal charges (in which another law enforcement agency had already charged the officer with an offense), or were for low-level rule violations such as “neglect of duty” or “language” (e.g. derogatory speech). Overall, it has been exceedingly rare for the NPD to sustain citizen complaints of misconduct, particularly serious misconduct.
The NPD is far more likely to sustain complaints against officers when the complaint is made by another NPD officer or a supervisor. The sustained rates of internally generated complaints, while decreasing, are strikingly high: of the 653 internal complaints filed in 2010, 453 (69.3%) were sustained. In 2011, of the 291 internal complaints filed, 171 (59%) were sustained, and in 2012, 285 internal complaints were filed and 153 (53.6%) were sustained.
The NPD has been aware of deficiencies in its internal affairs system since at least February 2011, when a federal court found that the NPD condoned police officers’ use of excessive force by failing to adequately investigate civilian complaints. The ruling in Garcia v. City of Newark, No. 08-1725 (SRC), 2011 WL 689616 at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2011), was based in part on expert testimony that “it is the custom, practice and policy of the [Newark Police Department] to stringently discipline any misconduct against the organization itself but pay little or no attention to complaints from citizens, especially those regarding use of force.” 2011 WL 689616 at *4 (D.N.J. Feb 16, 2011) (unpublished). Although, the district court issued this opinion just three months before this investigation commenced, the NPD appears to have done little since the court’s admonishment to improve its practices. Indeed, the NPD reduced the staffing of its IA by more than half in 2011 and 2012, making it more difficult to adequately investigate allegations of officer misconduct.
1. Overview of NPD’s Internal Affairs Process
The NPD’s IA process begins when the complainant completes a form called an Investigation of Personnel Report (“IOP”). A complaint can be filed by a civilian (“external” complaint) or by a member of the Department (“departmental” or “internal” complaint). The NPD then divides complaints into two categories: major offenses and minor offenses. Major offenses are those that may result in a penalty of more than five days of suspension, and minor offenses are those where the penalty may not exceed five days. The list of major offenses is not exhaustive, and in practice is highly variable.39 Unlike many modern police agencies, NPD policy does not set out the presumptive punishment for various categories of offenses: that failure reduces transparency and compromises consistency in discipline.
Once categorized by IA, minor and major offenses follow two separate processes. Each precinct has a dedicated Integrity Control Officer (“ICO”) who is responsible for investigating allegations of minor offenses. Minor offenses are typically resolved at a “Disciplinary
39 The NPD’s General Order categorizes the following as major offenses, and specifies that the list is not exhaustive: criminal offenses or allegations of criminal acts; aggravated insubordination; unauthorized discharge of firearms; refusal to submit to drug screening; and violations of Radio Discipline. See General Order 93-2 (“Disciplinary Process”), April 1, 2010, at 4.
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Conference,” where a precinct or division commander conducts an administrative review of the alleged offense.40
By contrast, the NPD’s IA unit investigates major offenses. NPD policies require that the IA investigator document the investigation in a report and recommend one of four findings: Exonerated, Sustained, Not Sustained, or Unfounded.41 The IA Commander, who is responsible for managing IA’s daily operations, the IA Executive Officer (the second-in-command), and the Police Director subsequently review the report and either accept the investigator’s recommendation, override it and issue a different finding, or ask the investigator to seek additional evidence. If, after that review, an allegation against an employee is ultimately “sustained,” a formal Complaint Against Personnel (“CAP”) is initiated, charging the officer with the relevant policy violation. Once a CAP is filed, the NPD’s complaint adjudication process is triggered and the accused officer is notified to appear before the Trial Board.
The Trial Board is a three-member panel consisting of the Police Director’s designee and two commanders.42 NPD policy mandates that Trial Board proceedings “shall be informal” and the parties are not bound by the rules of evidence.43 The policy states “[t]he sole purpose of the Trial Board is to determine the facts and situations surrounding a case,” and to “determin[e] the truth.” 44 Although a sustained finding by Internal Affairs amounts only to a charge and is not a formal finding of guilt or innocence, Trial Board members reported that their main function is to sustain the decisions of Internal Affairs.45 Officers similarly perceive that the Trial Board makes decisions about an officer’s guilt or innocence before the evidence against the officer is tested at the hearing.
Pursuant to state law, disciplinary sanctions imposed through the Trial Board process may be appealed through the Office of Administrative Law and the Civil Service Commission, and then to the Superior Court of New Jersey. The NPD can impose administrative sanctions prior to the completion of the appeal process. NPD staff reported that it can take more than two years to complete this process, which potentially magnifies the burden imposed on officers by an arbitrary disciplinary decision.
40 See General Order 93-2. 41 See General Order 05-04 (“IA”), September 21, 2005 at 14: Exonerated: When the evidence indicates that the act complained of did in fact occur but the action taken by the officer was legal and the officer was in compliance with Department policies and procedures, or an incident occurred and the officer was not involved. Sustained: When the facts support the complaint and the Investigator reasonably believes that the incident occurred and that involved officers(s) engaged in the violation of Department policy/procedure and/or Criminal Law/Ordinances. Not sustained: When the facts and/or investigation fails to disclose sufficient information to clearly prove or disprove the allegation or when material conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the accused employee. Unfounded: Indicates that the act complained of did not occur and the complaint is false. 42 See General Order 93-02 (“Disciplinary Process”), April 27, 2011 at 3. 43 See G.O. 93-02 at 8. 44 See G.O. 93-02 at 8. 45 See G.O. 93-02 at 8.
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2. Investigative Deficiencies
a. Failure to Collect Evidence from Complainants
IA records reflect that IA investigators failed to make consistent attempts to follow up with complainants to clarify critical facts. Similarly, community members reported filing complaints with IA and receiving little or no subsequent contact from investigators. In order to conduct an effective investigation, investigators must exhaust reasonable means to contact a person, including telephone calls and in-person attempts, and document what steps were taken to do so. Moreover, in cases alleging serious misconduct such as excessive force, where the complaint is credible upon review, the NPD should move forward with the investigation, even if the complainant cannot be reached.
b. Failure to Objectively Assess Evidence from Officers, Complainants, and Witnesses
When investigating civilian complaints, NPD investigators have routinely failed to probe officers’ accounts or assess officer credibility. IA investigators have not, for example, inquired further when officers’ Force Reports or interviews with subjects have included non-descriptive language such as the “necessary level of force” or “minimum force necessary.” Investigators instead appeared to have presumed that officers had not used excessive force or committed other violations alleged, even when that presumption was plainly refuted by the weight of the evidence.
Consistent with the NPD’s practice of accepting officers’ accounts with little critical analysis, investigators failed to give statements from complainants and witnesses sufficient weight. And investigators generally discredited statements that did not support accused officers’ accounts. For example, a complainant alleged that an officer threatened to hurt him, pulled him into the precinct bathroom, beat him, and pushed him through the bathroom window, shattering the glass and causing lacerations to the front and back of his head. A witness reported seeing the officer threaten the complainant, force him into the bathroom, and throw him into the window. She then observed the complainant having seizures and a group of officers enter the bathroom and shut the door. In exonerating the officer, IA concluded that the incident did occur, but accepted without question the officer’s description in the incident report that the officer “lunged forward to close the gap that was between him and [the complainant] after [the complainant] threw a punch at him. His forward momentum caused their bodies to collide, which caused [the complainant] to fall forward and into the window.” The investigator never interviewed the officer and ignored the complainant’s and corroborating witness’s statements.
Even minor conflicts between complainant and witness accounts have often been deemed fatal to a complainant’s credibility, whereas IA investigators have not similarly probed conflicts between officers’ statements or Force Reports. In one record, five witnesses confirmed the complainant’s allegation that officers beat him repeatedly during his arrest. One witness provided the names of four additional witnesses who also observed the arrest, but the IA investigator never contacted any of them. And even though medical records documented the complainant’s injuries, the investigator recommended a finding of “not sustained” because the
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officers uniformly denied witnessing or using excessive force, and because the witnesses’ accounts, which all described excessive force, had minor differences among them.
In another record, a complainant reported that an officer struck him repeatedly with a waffle grill. The investigator accepted the officer’s version of the facts despite conflicting information in his Force Report and subsequent reports. Although the officer’s report documented only that he had used “hands/fists,” he later reported that he inadvertently struck the complainant on the head with a waffle grill in self-defense. Instead of probing this inconsistency, the IA investigator exonerated the officer and noted that the use of force was “reported and filed with complete transparency.”
This elevation of officer credibility, and simultaneous unwarranted discounting of complainant and civilian witness accountability, helps perpetuate patterns of misconduct. See Beck, 89 F.3d 966, 974 (finding that failure to adequately investigate IA complaints of misconduct permitted officers to engage in misconduct and this failure, in part, was fueled by a pattern of giving little weight to the accounts of credible witnesses who supported the complainant’s version of the facts while being overly favorable towards officers’ statements).
c. Unequal Treatment of Officer and Complainant History
The NPD’s bias in favor of officers was particularly evident in IA’s reliance on complainants’ criminal histories while discounting officers’ disciplinary histories. Investigators often have questioned complainants about their arrest histories during interviews, run checks of complainants’ criminal histories, and used this information to impugn complainants’ credibility, bolster the credibility of officers, and support findings that officers should be exonerated. Generally, a complainant’s criminal history should not be used in resolving a misconduct complaint unless there is a genuine issue of credibility. To its credit, the NPD’s leadership recently acknowledged that this practice is problematic and that investigators should cease routinely checking and invoking complainants’ criminal histories.
The NPD’s inappropriate use of criminal histories has resulted in premature terminations of investigations and inaccurate assessments of available evidence. For example, IA reports commonly have referred to a complainant’s criminal history in the “findings” section of the report, noting that, for example, the complainant’s “criminal history would lead a prudent person to believe that he has the probability to be less than truthful,” or the complainant’s prior crimes demonstrated a “pattern of anti-authority behavior and an unstable relationship with law enforcement.”
Investigators’ improper emphasis on complainants’ criminal history has not been limited to considering criminal convictions. Some IA records also have included consideration of NPD reports of previous stops of complainants, or incident and arrest reports from previous arrests, even where no conviction resulted. This is especially problematic because, as detailed in this report, the NPD’s stop and arrest practices have not comported with constitutional requirements and have resulted in unjustified stops. In one file, the investigator checked the complainant’s criminal history and compiled related incident and arrest reports for offenses dating back to 1996 – offenses that predated the complainant’s allegation of excessive force by fourteen years. In recommending that the officer be exonerated, the investigator relied in part on the complainant’s
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criminal history to question the complainant’s version of the facts. In other IA investigations, investigators reviewed the complainants’ juvenile court records and called the prosecutor’s office to inquire about details of the complainant’s previous arrests not captured in reports.
In stark contrast, investigators have given no weight to accused officers’ disciplinary history, even when that history has demonstrated a pattern of similar allegations of misconduct. While investigators typically have included the officer’s disciplinary history in the IA record, those references appear perfunctory, with no indication that the disciplinary history should affect credibility determinations or other aspects of the investigation. For example, in one force investigation, an officer had 55 entries in his IA history over four years, including 26 use of force incidents. Both numbers are comparatively high but were not addressed in the investigation. In another force investigation, the officer’s 70 entries in his IA history over six years, including 40 use of force incidents, were not considered by the investigator.
An officer’s tendency to elicit certain types of allegations by civilians should be considered highly relevant in an IA investigation. See Beck, 89 F.3d 966, 973 (recognizing that a “system of investigation [where] each complaint was insulated from other prior and similar complaints and treated in a vacuum” is “sterile and shallow”). However, the NPD has taken the reverse approach, scrutinizing complainants’ criminal records, but routinely ignoring officers’ disciplinary histories.
d. Discouraging Complainants Through Miranda Warnings
The New Jersey Attorney General’s Internal Affairs Guidelines appropriately mandate that a complainant must be accorded all appropriate protections when the complaint arises from an incident where the complainant has been charged with a criminal offense. N.J. AG Guidelines at 27-28. Accordingly, contact with such a complainant must be coordinated through his or her defense counsel. Id. However, the guidelines also appropriately state that the need to issue Miranda warnings is triggered only “whenever the questioning of an individual is custodial in nature.” 46 Id. at 40 (“The question is whether a reasonable person would believe that he or she is free to leave.”); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When a civilian voluntarily meets with an investigator in furtherance of an administrative complaint of police misconduct, and remains free to leave the interview at any time, the interview is neither custodial nor an interrogation. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (“An officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches, however, ‘only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’”) (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977); see also Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1244 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Because the presence of both a custodial setting and official interrogation is required to trigger the Miranda right-to-counsel prophylactic, absent one or the other, Miranda is not implicated.”)
46 The fact that a complainant may have been arrested during the course of the incident about which he is filing a complaint does not change a voluntary interview by Internal Affairs into a custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1984) (Although the probation officer questioned probationer about a crime, the interview with the probation officer, which was “arranged by appointment at a mutually convenient time,” and where probationer was “not physically restrained and could have left the office” did not amount to custodial interrogation.).
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Despite these limitations, NPD investigators routinely have given Miranda warnings to complainants, and sometimes witnesses, before taking their statements. Over a quarter of the misconduct investigation files reviewed documented Miranda warnings to complainants.
This practice is not only unnecessary and demonstrates a lack of understanding of the purpose of Miranda warnings, but it inappropriately suggests to complainants and witnesses that they are being questioned as suspects in a criminal case instead of as potential victims or witnesses of police misconduct. Ultimately, it can intimidate and discourage victims’ and witnesses’ participation in the complaint process. Indeed, NPD records included examples where the Miranda warning either prompted complainants to end the interview or dissuaded complainants from moving forward with their complaints. For example, in one record the complainant stated that he was unsure about moving forward with his complaint because the investigator asked him to sign a Miranda waiver.
This practice is out of the norm for police departments across the country, and the NPD’s leadership acknowledged that it is inappropriate and may discourage complainants from coming forward.
3. NPD’s Application of Discipline
The way in which the NPD determines appropriate discipline in sustained cases is also seriously flawed.47 First, the NPD has no set presumptive penalties for particular violations. As a result, the Trial Board can impose the same punishment for an officer’s failure to report to work on time as for the officer’s use of excessive force against a civilian. Similarly, officers can receive vastly disparate discipline for committing similar offenses. While Trial Board members report that they consider past Board disciplinary decisions when meting out discipline, this practice appears to be haphazard and to rely heavily on Board members’ recollections.48 The current system also lacks guidance for what mitigating or aggravating circumstances might warrant consideration in determining the appropriate penalty. This means there is no structured, transparent way for the NPD to take into account the particular circumstances of the incident in determining discipline. And, with no guidelines for disciplinary penalties, there is no opportunity, much less requirement, for the NPD to explain why penalties diverge in seemingly similar cases. Accordingly, officers have no way to form a reliable expectation of the consequences for misconduct.
Officers also report that the Trial Board’s decisions appear to be arbitrary. For example, officers have complained that some officers were not disciplined after testing positive for drugs or driving under the influence, while others were terminated for the same conduct. Disciplinary penalties appear inordinately harsh in some instances, particularly in response to internal
47 This is not a new problem. The independent consultants that reviewed the Department’s IA system in 2007 recommended “a complete review” of the disciplinary system due to the widespread perception that it is “administered in an arbitrary and capricious manner,” “often unnecessarily focus[es] on minor violations of rules and regulations,” and has historically operated on a “patronage system.” 48 NPD reports that it plans to appoint a permanent chairperson who will participate in all Trial Board proceedings as a means of ensuring consistent decision-making. However, such a position is insufficient by itself to ensure objective decision-making and is not an adequate replacement for formal and transparent standards.
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complaints, and weak or nonexistent in others, mainly in response to misconduct complaints from civilians. For example, the NPD has not disciplined an officer for engaging in excessive force in more than five years. Yet an NPD officer who assisted a disabled tractor-trailer was suspended for 30 days for failing to strictly abide by the Department’s towing policy and other minor rule violations, despite the officer’s almost otherwise flawless disciplinary record.
Without transparent, objective criteria to guide and document disciplinary decisions, the NPD is ill equipped to persuasively respond to the widespread belief, both within and outside the Department, that discipline is meted out, at least in part, based on how well-liked or wellconnected an officer is. The NPD can and should work with officers and community members to develop disciplinary sanctions that make sense, and a system for imposing discipline that is transparent, consistent, and fair.
F. INADEQUATE SUPERVISION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
1. Failures in Supervision and Management
Effective supervision is critical to the operation of any police department. It is particularly important for supervisors in the field, where the requirements of law and policy are at risk of being misapplied in the heat of the moment, or even disregarded completely. Through consistent daily interactions, supervisors can shape and guide officers’ conduct and help them learn from their mistakes. They are able to identify problems and act immediately to prevent or minimize harm. For example, a supervisor on the scene can identify an arrest made without sufficient probable cause and order the citizen’s immediate release. Similarly, a more experienced supervisor at the scene of a use of force might be able to advise an officer of alternative techniques to minimize or avoid using force in future similar encounters.
Unfortunately, the NPD does not take full advantage of its chain of command to promote accountability and constitutional policing. When officers use force, the NPD does not require supervisors to respond to the scene, where they would be able to conduct an immediate initial assessment of the incident. Further, although supervisors are required to approve officers’ Force Reports, the approval confirms only that the report was completed. Similar concerns are manifest with respect to the NPD’s stops and arrests. With nearly three quarters of documented stops lacking an articulation of reasonable suspicion, it is clear that supervisors are not reviewing and holding officers accountable for their actions.
By not requiring meaningful review of officer actions by supervisors, the NPD loses a principal benefit of their supervision. During the investigation NPD leadership acknowledged that NPD officers and supervisors often view each other as peers rather than superiors and subordinates, making it more difficult for supervisors to properly scrutinize officers under their command.
2. Absence of an Effective Early Warning System
Early warning systems are a significant component of police department supervision and risk management systems across the country. Such systems are comprised of one or more
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databases that track, and make it possible to analyze, various facets of officer activity, including stops, arrests, uses of force and misconduct complaints. That analysis, in turn, allows departments to identify outlier units and individuals whose behaviors are undermining their own successes. Early warning systems identify patterns of activity by officers and groups of officers for supervisory review and intervention. Once an officer is identified for review by the Early Warning System, a supervisor should conduct a comprehensive written review and provide an array of individualized alternatives for resolving any problems identified during the review, such as counseling, training, additional supervision or monitoring, and action plans for modifying future behavior. By identifying problematic trends and behavior as they develop, early warning systems enable management to provide direction and take corrective action before serious problems occur. Early warning systems also can be critical components of a City’s system for managing risk and liability, as police leadership is responsible for responding appropriately to officers with a history of problems. See Beck, 89 F.3d at 973 (finding that when an officer receives multiple similar complaints over a short time period, it can be inferred that the Chief of Police knew, or should have known, of the officer’s propensity for violence when making arrests). Especially in larger departments where an officer’s problematic behavior may otherwise continue undetected for some time, early warning systems have become valuable tools for effective and supportive officer supervision.
To be effective, early warning systems require not only a reliable, accurate, and complete computer database, but strong policies and protocols that allow the Department to use the data to identify and change problematic officer behavior. Unfortunately, the NPD has failed to implement such a system. Since 2006, the NPD has used commercial case management software called IAPro. IAPro includes some early warning functionality, including the ability to generate alerts when officers reach specified thresholds, such as a certain number of misconduct complaints over a specified period. The NPD apparently did not use this capability at all until 2010. In 2010, NPD tested an early warning system based on IAPro called the “Performance Monitoring System.” This system was designed to use IAPro’s alert features to identify NPD officers with multiple records in the system, who would then be subject to increased training and supervision rather than formal disciplinary action. Although this feature was reportedly implemented in late 2010 and identified approximately 100 officers for monitoring, the NPD could not provide documentation regarding the details or outcomes. And, in August 2011, NPD personnel provided only tentative and inconsistent answers about whether and how the Performance Monitoring System was being applied. However, there was general consensus that monitoring had stopped for most, if not all, of the officers initially identified, and that no others had been placed on monitoring. No alternative tracking or early warning system was formally implemented to replace the Performance Monitoring System, although NPD has asserted that it is now making efforts to increase the use of IAPro to identify officers for corrective action.
The NPD’s attempts at implementing an early warning system have been undermined not only by its failure to use the information it gathers, but also by the poor quality and inconsistency of the information itself. There are significant, widespread data failures in areas critical to evaluating whether officers are in need of support and intervention. Although a principal purpose of an early warning system is to promote awareness of developing issues before they become problems, it appears that the NPD does not inform supervisors and district commanders of pending complaint investigations and charges against officers under their command. At a
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minimum, the complaint information in an early warning system should include: allegations, investigation outcomes (e.g., guilty, sustained, dismissed); charges against officers; and discipline imposed. The NPD’s system has not consistently included these data, which can make it impossible for NPD supervisors to properly identify and hold officers accountable for patterns of problematic behavior.

The NPD’s use of inconsistent terminology when entering data further complicates accountability efforts. For example, the NPD tracks uses of physical force in IAPro as “physical force,” but omits the more specific description of the type of force used that is recorded on the Force Report. As a result, supervisors reviewing data in IAPro have no way of knowing what types of force are actually being used by their officers, and therefore are limited in their ability to detect an emerging problematic trend, or respond most effectively.

In sum, the NPD’s nascent efforts to implement a meaningful early warning system faltered some time ago, and efforts to restart this program have been insufficient and unsuccessful. This failure to institute an effective early warning system underscores the NPD’s lack of sufficient, sustained commitment to monitoring officers’ complaint and disciplinary histories and the supervision and intervention necessary to change problematic behavior.

G. DEFICIENT TRAINING PRACTICES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS

1.

Inadequate Officer Training

NPD officers’ patterns of misconduct are consistent with the NPD’s failure to provide adequate training and sufficiently track the training it does provide. At the outset of this investigation, a random sample of 212 officers’ training cards—reportedly the NPD’s primary record of officers’ training—reflected that only two officers attended training in 2011. One had attended a class on drug, crime and terrorist vehicle interdiction, the other on a fingerprint and facial recognition software package. Although the NPD claimed that many other officers had attended training, there was no supporting documentation. The NPD must maintain a detailed, current record management system so it can effectively track and monitor what training has been offered and completed by its officers.

In addition to the sample of training cards, the NPD provided a schedule of the training it offered from 2009 to 2011.49 That schedule showed a decline in training opportunities in 2011, when compared to the preceding years. In addition, the training identified in the NPD’s records appeared limited to external specialty classes that certain officers were authorized or directed to attend. The NPD’s officer training records did not document any regular annual training on routine police practices and current legal developments, such as those related to use of force, or search and arrest practices. Although the NPD reports that such matters are covered in refresher training presented annually by the legal advisor from the ECPO, that training reportedly was provided to only 280 NPD members in 2010 and to 418 members in 2011. Moreover, the NPD could not provide a syllabus of the training, but related that it covered several definitions of

49 We have repeatedly asked Newark to provide updated training information, but have not been provided any.

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force, review of actual use of force, and examples of permissible uses of force in the NPD. There was no indication that this training was tailored to the NPD’s particular force training needs, or was part of an overall NPD training plan.
Based on a recently provided summary of training activities, the NPD appears to have increased specialized and subject-specific training opportunities for officers in 2012 and 2013. However, attendance at the annual training sessions provided by the ECPO legal advisor declined to 124 officers in 2012 and only 55 officers in 2013. This decline is of particular concern because these sessions, while far too limited in length and scope, nonetheless stand as NPD’s closest analog to the annual use of force training that is standard in well-run police agencies.
The investigation also raised concerns that the NPD also may have underemphasized the importance of regular firearms qualification. Regular firearms qualification helps ensure that officers can fire their weapons accurately and appropriately in a variety of conditions. It is a critical component of officer and public safety. The New Jersey State Attorney General’s Guidelines and NPD policy require officers to qualify twice annually, with at least 90 days between qualifications. The policy does not prohibit officers who do not qualify from carrying their weapons, and only precludes them from working outside employment. This is an inadequate sanction. Officers who do not qualify with their firearms should be prohibited from carrying their firearms and be required to requalify promptly.
A review of firearms qualification records in the early stages of this investigation raised concerns that a significant number of officers might not have satisfied the twice annual qualification requirement in 2011. However, a recent training summary from the NPD indicates that all officers may have qualified with their firearms in 2012 and 2013, although the information that the NPD provided was not sufficiently detailed to allow for confirmation of this assertion. Further, this information indicates that as many 77 officers in 2012 and 67 officers in 2013 may not have qualified twice, as required by NPD policy. Nonetheless, if these numbers are confirmed, the NPD appears to have improved the rate at which officers qualify on their firearms in recent years, but the NPD should take steps to ensure that all officers comply with the policy and the accurate records.
2. Inadequate Training of Internal Affairs Investigators
In addition to the numerous deficiencies with the NPD’s IA policies, procedures, and practices, the NPD has failed to appropriately train its investigators. NPD command staff and officers, IA investigators, and Integrity Compliance Officers (“ICO”) consistently reported that investigative experience has not been required to become an investigator. The NPD is well aware of its IA training needs. In 2007, the City hired a consulting firm to conduct an analysis of the NPD’s organizational structure and operational methodology.50 The consultants interviewed members of the Department, conducted focus groups and reviewed documents. Their analysis included a review of the NPD’s Internal Affairs system. The consulting firm warned that the
50 The goal of the analysis was to provide the City with recommendations on how to reduce crime through increased effectiveness and efficiency within NPD.
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NPD’s investigators “receive[] no formal training” and emphasized that IA must be “staffed with quality personnel.” Those training deficiencies remain. For example, one ICO interviewed had been on the job for three months, yet had not received any training, even though, prior to becoming an ICO, he had never been in a detective position or received any formal training on how to conduct investigations. The 2007 assessment also recommended that all investigators receive training in interview techniques, evidence collection, search and seizure law, administrative law, and advanced IAPro user training. Yet, the NPD’s Deputy Chief of Training and Support reported that there is no required training specifically for IA investigators. While a statewide training class is available, he reported that it has been difficult for the NPD to get its investigators into the program. This failure must be addressed if the NPD is to ensure adequate investigations of officer misconduct.
IV. OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN
At the beginning of the investigation, the DOJ notified the City that its review would include allegations of gender-biased policing with respect to criminal investigations of sexual assault, bias related to sexual orientation and gender identity, and risk of harm to detainees confined in the NPD’s holding cells. While the available evidence does not support a finding of a pattern or practice of misconduct in any of these areas, the investigation revealed potential issues or deficiencies in some practices that warrant further examination by the NPD.
A. Gender-Biased Policing
A review of a sample of NPD sexual assault files and interviews of the supervisor of the NPD’s special victims division and relevant staff at the ECPO who handle or supervise sexual assault prosecutions revealed crucial deficiencies in the way the NPD has responded to and investigated sexual assault complaints. This deficiency is, in part, grounded in what appears to be ignorance or bias concerning victims of sexual assault, as evidenced by comments made by several command staff during interviews and a review of a sample of sexual assault investigative files. Specifically, there is evidence that some NPD officers and detectives have made mistaken assumptions about who can or cannot be a “true” victim of sexual assault. This includes views that sex workers, employees of nightclubs or adult establishments, and women who consumed alcohol with an assailant cannot be legitimate sexual assault claimants.
The NPD’s problematic response to sexual assault complaints is also structural, embedded in procedural problems with the way the NPD has handled sexual assault investigations. The NPD has not made significant efforts to provide vital support for victims such as referrals to counseling services or a competent liaison to assist them who is not the detective investigating the matter.
Nor has the NPD evidenced an understanding of the emotional rollercoaster a sexual assault victim might experience, especially with regard to whether to participate in investigative and legal proceedings. Partly because of this, the NPD has stopped some sexual assault investigations prematurely. Often, as soon as the complainant indicates she or he may not want to move forward, the NPD has brought the complainant in to sign a declination form, without recognizing that complainants often change their minds several times throughout the charging and prosecution process.
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In addition, investigators have appeared to ignore basic investigatory steps, such as checking the alleged assailant’s criminal record even when the assailant’s name and date of birth are known. For example, in one incident the investigator spoke to the alleged assailant, who acknowledged having had sexual intercourse with the complainant. But there was no further investigation, including no evidence that the investigator ran a record check. A record check would have determined whether the alleged assailant had an open warrant, and could have influenced the direction of the investigation. The NPD should revise its practices to better serve sexual assault complainants, and therefore better protect the public from sexual assaults.
B. Green Street Cell Block Suicide Prevention Policies and Practices
In response to several suicides at the NPD’s Green Street Cell Block, this investigation reviewed the holding facility’s suicide prevention measures. In assessing jail suicide precautions, the Third Circuit applies a three-part test to establish a violation: (1) the detainee had a “particular vulnerability to suicide,” (2) officials knew or should have known of that vulnerability, and (3) acted with “reckless indifference” to the detainee’s vulnerability. Colburn v. Darby Upper Tp., 838 F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that allegation of a jail’s custom of inadequate monitoring for potential suicides could sustain a cause of action). Reckless indifference requires a level of culpability that is at least higher than a negligent failure to protect, such that the custodian either knew or should have known of a strong likelihood of selfharm. Colburn v. Upper Darby Tp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991).
The Cell Block is comprised of fifty cells for males and eight cells for females, and is where the NPD holds detainees prior to their initial court appearance and subsequent transfer into the custody of Essex County. Detainees are usually held in the Cell Block for fewer than 24 hours. The NPD provides no special or additional training to officers who are assigned to the holding facility, and some officers report that assignment to the holding facility is undesirable, and commonly perceived as an informal punishment. The layout of the Cell Block offers only limited lines of sight into the cells, and the cells all contain suicide hazards such as exposed cross bars which could be used as hanging points.51
The hours immediately following arrest are a period of heightened risk of suicide, and the NPD must be able to identify suicidal detainees and immediately take precautions. General Order 08-08 requires intake officers to conduct a screening of all detainees entering the Cell Block,52 which includes checklist items for “Mental/Emotional Problems” and “Suicidal/Aggressive Behavior.”53 However, because officers have received no specific training regarding custodial operations in the cell block, it is unclear that the intake screening is effective in identifying potentially suicidal detainees.
51 During this investigation, the NPD completed construction of a new police headquarters at Clinton Avenue that includes a modern holding facility which would likely mitigate concerns regarding suicide hazards. However, the NPD recently informed the DOJ that it will not be moving operations to the Clinton Avenue facility. As a result of this change in plans, the United States may seek additional remedies to ensure NPD ensures adequate suicide precautions are maintained at Green Street. 52 See GO 08-08 at 11. 53 Prisoner Intake and Medical Status Report (Form DP1:1885-2).
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If a detainee is determined to be at risk, the General Order authorizes the cell block supervisor “to employ extraordinary measures to protect a prisoner from self harm,” including but not limited to: placement in a cell that is easily viewable, constant observation, 15-minute checks, and referral to the EMS or the hospital. During a site visit, however, NPD officers working in the Cell Block acknowledged that only one of the options in the written policy was available: any detainees they believe to be suicidal are automatically sent to the hospital for assessment, where they remain until they are medically or psychologically cleared. NPD officers described no other precautions or steps they would take with potentially suicidal detainees. The discrepancy between policy and practice was evident in a review of the NPD’s documentation of suicide and suicide attempts, which showed also that suicidal detainees are not always sent to the hospital, raising concerns that the NPD’s current suicide prevention policies, practices, and training create an unacceptable suicide risk to future Green Street detainees if not corrected.
C. Policing Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
During the investigation there was anecdotal evidence that the NPD has engaged in discriminatory policing practices based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The investigation did not produce evidence sufficient to demonstrate a pattern or practice in this area. The LGBT community expressed concerns about the NPD’s lack of responsiveness to complaints about violent assaults against LGBT individuals, as well as harassment of female transgender persons by NPD officers—including the mistaken assumption that all female transgender persons are prostitutes. They also described a lack of cultural competence and insensitivity by NPD officers when engaging the LGBT community, and the transgender community, in particular.
The NPD does not appear to have any policy or training that would provide officers guidance on how to interact respectfully and effectively with LGBT individuals.54 Community advocates report that NPD command staff are amenable to training on LGBT issues, although none had yet occurred. The NPD should engage with the LGBT community around the concerns noted, and develop training on policing related to sexual orientation and gender identity.
V. CONCLUSION
The patterns of misconduct identified by this investigation present both a challenge and an opportunity for the NPD. The City of Newark took an important first step by acknowledging the community’s concerns and cooperating with the investigation. Further, during the course of the investigation, the City initiated efforts to modify and improve its practices in some of the areas identified in this report. Most importantly, the City and NPD have already reached an Agreement in Principle with the United States to remedy the problems identified by this investigation.
54 GO 03-04, “Biased-Based Policing” directs officers to enforce the law in a “fair and impartial manner” but does not provide any guidance on how that is to be accomplished with respect to any protected class, including race, gender and sexual orientation, apart from an admonition to comply with the Fourth Amendment and an acknowledgment in its introduction of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the law for all who live in the United States.
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An effective and long lasting remedy to these violations will require the full and sustained commitment from the City’s leadership, as well as from the members of the NPD and the residents of Newark. Only a true partnership between the NPD and the broader community will establish a foundation for simultaneously respecting the rights of all Newark residents, effectively preventing crime, and better preparing and protecting officers. The DOJ is fully committed to working with the City, the NPD, and the Newark community to ensure that this effort is successful.
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 City of Newark and United States of America Agreement in Principle
This is an agreement in principle of the terms to be included in a formaL judicially enforceable agreement ("the Agreement") to be negotiated between the City of Newark, New Jersey, ("the City") and the United States of America, (collectively, ..the Parties") in connection with the Department of Justice's investigation of the Newark Police Department ("NPD"). pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.c. 14141. the Omnibus Crime Control and Safc Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.c. 3789d, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. 2000d. The United States and the City have been working cooperatively and the Agreement is intended to ensure that NPD engages in practices that comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States. implements best practices to make it a national model of policing, and to increase the community's confidence in its police department.
The Agreement will include:
1. Civilian Review and Community Engagement
a. The City is establishing and will fund a civilian oversight entity for the NPD to assist ~PD in adhering to the Agreement and to foster positive relations between NPD and the Newark community. The City will establish a mechanism through which it will work with the community to determine the appropriate form and scope of oversight, within the parameters set forth in the Agreement. The Independent Monitor of the Agreement will evaluate and report on the City's establishment and ongoing implementation of a civilian oversight entity.
b. NPD will continue to develop mechanisms for effective community engagement beyond the civilian oversight. The intent of these community engagement measures will be to increase cooperation and trust between NPD and the community to whom it provides police services. NPD will provide direction and training to officers on the benefits of and means to achieve effective community engagement and will update these directives and training as needed.
c. The Parties will engage the community on an ongoing basis to seek input on and reaction to the Agreement's implementation.
d. NPD will continue to increase its transparency by making available more information about its practices to the pUblic. NPD will, to the extent permissible by law. make its policies publicly available. and shall regularly report information regarding officer use of force; handling of misconduct complaints; and stop/search/arrest data.
2. Policy Review/Revision
NPD will continue to review and revise policies. including. but not limited to, all general orders. rules and regulations. to ensure they comport with the Agreement. All requirements of
1

the Agreement shall be reflected in NPD policy. The Monitor and DO] will review any new policy provisions purporting to incorporate requirements of the Agreement. In addition, NPD will conduct annual reviews to ensure its policies remain consistent with the Agreement and current developments in law and police practice. NPD policies will be readily accessible to all NPD personnel.
3. Training
NPD will enhance its annual training so that it is sufficient in duration and scope that all officers can consistently and effectively carry out NPD directives. In addition, NPD will provide sufficient training on any new or revised policies implemented as a result of the Agreement. NPD will provide updated training as necessary to reflect changes in the law, or to address other identified needs. In addition, NPD shall continue to improve its recordkeeping system and will ensure that complete and consistent training records are maintained for all officers.
4. Use of Force
NPD will continue to review and revise as necessary its use of force policies and training to ensure that officers have the necessary guidance to determine when and what f'Orce is reasonable. The policy and training shall be consistent with modern defensive techniques and best practices, and will provide instruction in alternatives to the use of force, such as disengagement and de-escalation.
5. Documenting and Reviewing Use of Force
NPD shall continue to review and revise its policies to establish a clear threshold t'Or reportable uses of force and provide clear direction to officers and supervisors on reporting and reviewing force. NPD policy shall be consistent with law and best practices. NPD will ensure that all information related to a use of f'Orce, including the narrative, is tracked and maintained together f'Or purposes of review, investigation, and data collection. NPD will ensure that when force is used, a narrative will describe the details surrounding the use of force, including the nature and level of resistance encountered. and a detailed description of the force.
All NPD officers who are involved in or witness a reportable use of force shall document their own accounts of the incident, describing in detail the sequence of events surrounding the use of force, including the resistance encountered, the force used in response, and whether the f'Orce was effective in obtaining compliance from the subject.
NPD will require officers to promptly notify a supervisor upon engaging in a reportable use of force. Reportable uses of f'Orce will include any use of force greater than unresisted handcuffing. Absent exigent circumstances, a supervisor who was not involved in using or directing the force will respond to the scene of a use of force to conduct an initial evaluation of the incident, including directing the collection of evidence, and identifying and obtaining statements from witnesses. Supervisors shall be held accountable f'Or appropriately reviewing officer use of force.
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All uses of force shall be assessed by an uninvolved supervisor. The uninvolved supervisor will document in writing his or her assessment of the incident, including any apparent policy violations, policy failures or tactical concerns. In conducting their assessments, supervisors will make appropriate assessments based on the evidence available, with no automatic preference for either the police officers' or any other person's account of events.
NPD has established an internal multi-disciplinary Use of Force Review Board responsible for reviewing more serious uses of force. NPD will enhance this Use of Force Review Board as needed to meet the objectives of the Agreement. This Use of Force Review Board will determine whether the use of force was consistent with policy and whether the incident raises any additional training, equipment, tactical, or other concerns.
NPD will equip all marked patrol cars with video cameras, and require all officers, except certain officers engaged in only administrative or management duties, to wear body cameras and microphones with which to record all enforcement activity. NPD will develop a policy to designate cars and officers that will not be equipped with video cameras, or that will be equipped with concealed cameras, because the visibility of a camera might compromise undercover work or other appropriate and lawful clandestine police activity. NPD will develop a policy to designate the categories of officers who will not wear body cameras because they are only engaged in administrative or management duties.
NPO's policy regarding video and audio recording shall address retention, privacy issues, the use of recordings as evidence in force and complaint reviews, and the use of recordings for other criminal justice purposes (such as evidence in prosecutions), among other issues.
6. Internal Affairs ("I A")
NPD asserts that it has required and provided training tor IA investigators, focusing on IA investigative skills, objective analysis of evidence, and other topics to ensure fair. objective and thorough investigations. NPD agrees to enhance this training, of IA investigators and supervisors as necessary to ensure that investigations are thorough and complete, and that investigators' conclusions and recommendations that are not adequately supported by the evidence will not be approved or accepted. NPO agrees to continue and update training as needed. Training will be provided upon an officer's assignment to lA, with refresher training at periodic intervals.
To the extent permitted by law, NPO agrees that it will revise its policies and practices as necessary to ensure effective complaint intake, and to ensure objective and complete investigations of misconduct. Areas addressed by new or revised policies will include prohibiting practices that discourage complainants from coming forward (e.g., policies prohibiting use of criminal histories alone to determine credibility, and forbidding the use of Miranda warnings during non-custodial interviews). NPD policy will ensure that IA investigators consider patterns in officer behavior based upon disciplinary history and other information in NPO's early warning system. Similarly, NPD policy will provide appropriate guidance regarding when a civilian's criminal history may be considered. NPO shall conduct administrative investigations of all civilian and departmental complaints alleging officer
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misconduct, including incidents that are also referred for review or investigation by a prosecutor. The purpose of the administrative investigation shall not be to determine whether the officer's conduct was criminal but rather to determine whether the conduct was consistent with NPD policy or raises training, policy, equipment, or tactical concerns. Some components of the administrative investigation may be temporarily halted where, after consultation with the prosecutor, the NPD director determines that a criminal prosecution is viable. and failing to postpone part or all of the administrative investigation would impede the criminal investigation/prosecution.
NPD supervisors (or commanders) will conduct periodic assessments of complaints against officers to identify and assess potential problematic patterns and trends.
7. Discipline
The City of Newark and NPD are committed to ensuring that disciplinary actions are applied fairly and consistently. Towards that end, the NPD will review and revise its policies, as necessary, to establish clear standards of proof and appropriate roles for advocates and finders of fact in disciplinary hearings.
To the extent permitted by law, including civil service rules and the collective bargaining agreement, the NPD will also develop written requirements that establish clear penalty ranges for violations of departmental policy. The disciplinary requirements will include provisions that allow for the consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors in determining appropriate discipline.
The City will continue to confer with all relevant collective bargaining units that represent sworn members of the NPD, and will confer with other criminal justice and community stakeholders to determine the appropriate presumptive penalty ranges and mitigating and aggravating factors. The requirements will provide for progressive discipline as appropriate. NPD policy and practice shall require that any deviation from the presumptive disciplinary range, including the application of mitigating and aggravating factors, be documented and explained in writing. NPD will conduct annual reviews of its disciplinary process, which will include an analysis of progressive discipline's effects and the application of mitigating and aggravating factors in meting out discipline.
8. Stops, Searches, and Arrests
NPD will ensure that its policies, training and practices are consistent with current law and professional police practice and will revise any such policy, training and practice as needed to ensure that that stops, arrests, and searches by NPD officers are consistently conducted in accordance with law. NPD shall also develop and implement accountability and supervisory practices to ensure that any unlawful stops. searches. and arrests are detected and effectively addressed. NPD shall ensure that supervisors are held accountable for appropriately reviewing reports and documentation related to stops, searches. and arrests.
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NPD will review and revise its policies and training as needed to ensure that officers have proper guidance regarding individuals' exercise of their First Amendment rights, including the acts of observing, recording and questioning police actions. The policy will require officers to properly document reasonable suspicion and probable cause when completing incident and arrest reports. NPD supervisors will review all incident and arrest reports for completeness relevant to these requirements.
NPD will continue to provide initial and annual training on its policies and the relevant legal standards for stops, searches, and arrests and promoting positive community relationships.
9. Bias Free Policing
NPD will continue to collect and begin to analyze race. ethnicity and gender data for stops and arrests to identify any trends and issues that may lead to violations of law or policy. To help assess this data, the City and NPD will consult with experts in the field. The NPD will collect and preserve in an accessible manner the age, race. ethnicity, gender, location, time of day, reason for stop, post-stop activity, duration, and result or outcome of each encounter.
NPD will regularly analyze the collected data to detect and address any issue. NPD will conduct comprehensive annual reviews of the data. and take appropriate steps in response to any trends or issues that are identified. In addition, NPD will make efforts to incorporate regular analysis of this data into its routine operational decisions.
NPD will provide to all employees initial and annual training that sufficiently addresses the prevention of bias based on race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, gender and gender identity. The curriculum will include discussion of the causes of bias, as well as strategies to avoid and mitigate its effects. The training will not focus solely on the effects of bias on the subjects oflaw enforcement activity, but will also address officers' interactions with victims of crime, such as the potential impacts of bias in the response to and in the investigation of sexual assaults.
10. Theft
NPD will ensure periodic review of the disciplinary histories of its officers. especially those in specialized units, and the use of periodic integrity tests. To the extent permitted by law, the policy will require the transfer of officers with any sustained complaint, or multiple not sustained or unfounded complaints, of theft from positions where those officers have access to money, property, and evidence. Officers' disciplinary histories will be considered in making decisions regarding reassignment, promotions, and similar decisions. NPD will report all theft allegations to the New Jersey Attorney General's Office Department of Law and Public Safety. and continue to report same to the Essex County Prosecutor, indicating each officer who has been the subject of multiple theft allegations.
NPD has reviewed and revised where appropriate all procedures for the intake, storage. and release of all property from arrestees to ensure the protection of all property under its control and custody. NPD will ensure that the inventory of all cash and other property taken from
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people in custody is conducted by at least two officers. NPD will specifically prohibit officers from allowing a detainee to sign a blank property form. NPD's policy will provide appropriate guidance for how property is to be packaged and labeled. The policy will require that all property is to be stored in a secure property room. to which access will be limited to specifically designated personnel. Property room doors will be secured with mechanisms that automatically lock upon closing. NPD will install and maintain working video cameras in areas where property is stored, and shall establish a video retention policy that maintains recordings as necessary to support investigations of allegations of theft. Additional security precautions shall be taken to effectively secure all money, precious metals, jewelry or other items of value.
An itemized inventory of all property taken from detainees and held by NPD shall be maintained in a computerized database. NPD will conduct periodic audits and inspections of the property room.
11. Early Warning System
To the extent permitted by law, NPD will enhance its comprehensive early warning system ("EWS") to support the effective supervision and management ofNPD officers. NPD will use the EWS to promote constitutional policing and professional police practices. The EWS will use a relational database to track and analyze information regarding the activities of all NPD personnel. The City shall ensure that NPD continues to be sufficiently funded to implement and maintain the EWS. including its ongoing hardware and support requirements.
NPD will implement a protocol dictating what information is to be entered into and maintained in the EWS. At a minimum, the EWS will include all relevant information, including the results of any investigation or supervisory review related to:
• use of force incidents and allegations of use of force: • all injuries to individuals in the custody or control of an NPD officer or injured as a result
of an officer's actions: • all allegations of unlawful arrest; • all allegations of unlawful search or seizure; • all allegations of theft, missing property, or planting evidence; • all complaints of misconduct against officers; • all arrests for disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and assaulting a police officer; • all disciplinary action taken against an officer; • all non-disciplinary or corrective action taken, including actions taken pursuant to the
operation of the EWS; and • officer rank, assignment, and training history.
NPD will revise its protocol for the operation of the EWS to ensure that EWS is used as an effective supervisory tool. The EWS will use comparative data analysis and peer group analysis to identify patterns of activity by officers and groups of officers for supervisory review and intervention. The protocol shall require supervisors to conduct a comprehensive written review of officers and groups of officers identified for review and shall provide an array of individualized alternatives for resolving any problems identified during the review. such as
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counseling, training, additional supervision or monitoring, and action plans for modifying future behavior.
Additionally, the protocol will require commanders/supervisors to conduct periodic reviews of all officers and groups under their command to identify potential trends. The EWS shall produce reports for supervisors to use in these reviews. The purpose of these evaluations shall not be disciplinary, but rather to provide officers necessary support to police effectively and constitutionally and to prevent negative practices from developing or continuing.
NPD will make reasonable efforts to ensure that the EWS makes use of available technologies, including the electronic transfer of information from other data systems, to maximize efficiency. The United States will advise NPD of other agencies with functioning EWS for ideas and technical assistance.
NPD will continue to use its current IAPro software's alert and warning features to identify officers for intervention while further developing and continuing to implement an EWS that is fully consistent with the Parties' agreement.
12. Record Management System Improvement
The CitylNPD will revise its use and analysis of the RMS so that it can more efficiently and effectively process and analyze the data it contains, and better interface with other technology systems. These improvements will include the use of automation for transferring data between systems (specifically, the EWS) and the development or implementation of reporting modules that allow more flexible queries of the police records and data contained in NPD's systems. The City shall ensure that NPD is provided sufficient funds to implement and maintain the RMS, including its ongoing hardware and support requirements.
13. Judicial Enforceability and Independent Monitoring
The United States and the City of Newark will seek entry of the Agreement as a judicially enforceable order. The Parties will agree to the selection of an Independent Monitor who will act as an agent of the Court in assessing whether the Agreement is being implemented. The Independent Monitor will be required to assess all substantive provisions of the Parties' Agreement. The Independent Monitor will conduct periodic reviews ofNPD's compliance with the Agreement and will report publicly on the City'S implementation of the Agreement. The Independent Monitor also will conduct and report on assessments to determine whether the intended results of the Agreement are being achieved, including the outcome assessments discussed below. The Independent Monitor's reviews will include on-site observations, review of records and incidents, and frequent communication with NPD and DOJ personnel. Additionally, the Independent Monitor may offer technical assistance to NPD in furtherance of the City'S and NPD's compliance with the Agreement. The City shall bear responsibility for all agreed-upon costs related to the Independent Monitor.
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Nothing in this Ag recment shall be interpreted to req uire the Ci ty of Newark to violate any law. co ll ec ti ve bargai ning agreemen t. c ivil serv icc ru les. or New Jersey Attorney General Guidelines.
14. Baselinc Measu res and Outcome Studies
The Parties wi ll agree on a set of objective ou tcome mC<lsu res to assess whether this Agreement is having thc cffect intcnded by thc Parties of ensuring constitutional policing. promoting best practice in polic ing. and increas ing community trust.
As part of these ou tcome assessments. rpD will cstablish baseline measurements in agreed-upon areas. Among ot her baseli ne measurements. NPD shall conduct a re prese ntative. methodo logica ll y sound survey of' community members and police offi ce r pcrspcc tivcs regarding NPD and NPD activitics. N PD will periodicall y gather and assess data. including periodic surveys. to measure changes ovcr timc in thc areas asscssed .
15. Timi ng
The United States and the City agree to reach a final agreement and seck court approval as ex peditiously as possib le. so that the important work of impleme nting the above -described rcforms can begin. The Parties will slr',- 0 complete negotiations on the Agreement by September 15. 201 ..L

J. IlARAKA J ayor C ity of Newark. New Jcrsey

~~~ s~s~ Ac ti ng Ass istant Attorney General Un ited Statcs De partment o f Justice Civil" i hIs Di isio n

Corporat io n Counsel C ity or Newark. New Jersey
Date:

PAU L J. FISI I 1A N U.S. A torney f r the District ofNcw Jerscv

B

 
 Request for Applications to Serve as Court Monitor of the Newark Police Department

The United States Department of Justice (“United States” or “DOJ”) is seeking applications for an independent monitoring team to assess and guide implementation of a judicially enforceable consent decree (“Decree”) resolving the United States’ investigation of the Newark, New Jersey, Police Department (“NPD” or “the Department”). The report of the United States’ findings was publicly released on July 22, 2014, and is available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/newark_findings_7-22-14.pdf. The framework for the Decree will be the Parties’ July 22, 2014, Agreement in Principle, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/newark_prinagree_7-22-14.pdf.

The Decree will provide for an independent monitor to assess and guide implementation of reforms in the following areas: community engagement and civilian oversight; stops, searches, and arrests; use of force; bias-free policing; theft by officers; intake and investigation of misconduct complaints; discipline; early warning systems; records management systems; policy review and revision; documentation and review of officers’ actions; and academy and in-service training.

Groups or individuals interested in serving on the court-appointed monitoring team may submit an application by email or by hard copy to both recipients listed below:

Jeffrey R. Murray Trial Attorney Special Litigation Section 601 D Street NW, 5th Floor Washington, DC 20530 jeff.murray@usdoj.gov

Sabrina G. Comizzoli Executive Assistant U.S. Attorney U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of New Jersey 970 Broad St., Suite 700 Newark, N.J. 07102 USANJ.NPD_Monitor_Applications@usdoj.gov

Applications

must be received by February 13, 2015, at 5:00 p.m. EST. If submitting a

hard copy, packages should be sent by USPS Priority Mail or overnight carrier (e.g., FedEx,

UPS, DHL) to ensure timely delivery. Please state “NPD Monitoring Application” in the email

subject line or on the package containing the application.

A description of the scope of work required by this project, along with the information that must be included in the application, is set out below. The exact requirements and terms of monitoring, as well as the designation of the monitor, will be included in the Decree. A copy of this Request for Applications can be found at:

http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/npd_rfa_01-16-2015.pdf

http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/racmnpd.html

This Request for Applications is issued solely by the United States and does not constitute a part of, and shall not be governed by, any formal municipal, state, or federal procurement process. As a material part of the resolution of the DOJ’s investigation, the

1

monitoring team will be selected jointly by the Parties and approved by the United States District Court. This Request for Applications does not commit the Parties to select an individual or firm to serve as the monitor or a member of the monitoring team. The Parties may solicit additional information from applicants to supplement information provided in response to this Request.
Background
The City of Newark (“City”) is New Jersey’s largest city, with a population of 277,140 people, according to the 2010 census. The Newark Police Department currently employs approximately 1,000 sworn officers. The Department is led by a Police Director, appointed by the Mayor of Newark and approved by the Newark City Council, and a Chief of Police, who reports to the Police Director. The NPD is composed of four precincts and additional bureaus and special units.
Monitoring Term
The ultimate term of the monitorship is to be determined by the Parties and the Court, but is expected to be at least five years. Respondents should carefully consider this multi-year commitment in developing their monitoring teams and plans. As set out below, applications must include a projection of estimated costs and expenses, including yearly estimates and an estimated overall total.
Scope of Work
The following descriptions of the monitoring team’s expected responsibilities and duties are illustrative and non-exclusive. Generally, the monitoring team will be responsible for independently and objectively assessing and reporting on whether the requirements of the Decree are being implemented, and whether implementation is resulting in constitutional policing by and increased community trust of the Newark Police Department.
The monitoring team’s duties are expected to include the following:
• Development and implementation of an organizational plan, including appropriate staffing and scheduling, for auditing and reviewing NPD’s compliance with the requirements and purpose of the Decree;
• Development of methodologies for conducting reliable audits and reviews of NPD’s compliance with the Decree;
• Recommendation and review of metrics for assessing police practices and their effects during the pendency of the Decree;
• Conducting reliable assessments to determine whether policing has improved during the pendency of the Decree;
• Reviewing and commenting on policies, training, and initiatives developed pursuant to the Decree;
• Conducting, analyzing, and reporting on methodologically sound surveys of community members and police officers regarding NPD police practices;
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• Reviewing of use of force and misconduct investigations to assess their quality reliability, and adherence to requirements of the Decree;
• Providing or facilitating technical assistance to the NPD, including recommending strategies to improve the NPD’s implementation of the Decree;
• Receipt from and provision of information to the Newark community, including any civilian oversight entity, related to implementation of the Decree;
• Regularly communicating with the NPD and the United States regarding the Department’s progress implementing the Decree, any obstacles to implementation, and as otherwise necessary to facilitate effective implementation;
• Regularly producing public reports on the NPD’s progress implementing the Decree and any obstacles to implementation;
• Maintaining all documents related to this project in a confidential manner as required by the Decree;
• Testifying in proceedings only as provided by the Decree; • Making public statements only as permitted by the terms of the Decree; and • Maintaining the highest ethical standards.
As noted above, the substantive requirements of the Decree will be generally grouped into the following areas:
• Community Engagement and Civilian Oversight; • Stops, Searches and Arrests; • Bias-Free Policing; • Use of Force; • Theft by Officers; • Intake and Investigation of Misconduct Complaints; • Discipline; • Early Warning System; • Records Management Systems Improvement; and • Academy and In-Service Officer Training
Requirements of Monitoring Team
The application to serve as or on the court appointed monitoring team should clearly demonstrate the respondent’s qualifications to perform the requested scope of work. The application to monitor the Decree should include the following:
I. Executive Summary
A brief description of how the team would complete the project.
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II. Personnel
• The names of the individuals and/or subcontractor consultants who would comprise the team;
• A summary of the relevant background of each team member; • The internal organization of the team including the areas of responsibility for each
member; and • A description of all other current employment, projects, or other professional
undertakings for each team member, noting the team member’s time commitments for each.
III. Qualifications
Each team member’s qualifications, addressing the following areas as applicable:
• Monitoring, auditing, evaluating, or otherwise reviewing performance of organizations, including experience in monitoring settlements, consent decrees, or court orders;
• Law enforcement practices, including training, community policing and problemoriented policing, complaint and use of force investigations, and constitutional policing;
• Evaluating the breadth and depth of organizational change, including the development of outcome measures;
• Development of effective quality improvement practices; • Mediation and dispute resolution; • Statistical and data analysis; • Information technology; • Data management; • Working with government agencies, municipalities, and collective bargaining units; • Language skills and experience working with limited English proficient persons and
communities, in particular communities whose primary language is Spanish or Portuguese; • Familiarity and understanding of local issues and conditions; • Effective engagement with diverse communities; • Creation and evaluation of meaningful civilian oversight; • Familiarity with federal, New Jersey and local laws, including civil rights laws and policies and rules governing police practices; • Completing projects within anticipated deadlines and budget; • Preparing for and participating in court proceedings; and • Report writing for a broad variety of stakeholders.
IV. Prior Experience and References
List current or recent (within the past 10 years) project experience for members of the team relevant to the monitoring duties and responsibilities; references for each project listed,
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including the name of the organization, contact person, title, address, e-mail address and telephone number; and, if available, examples of non-confidential work product that is similar to the reports required for this project.
V. Proposed Activities
Describe (in as specific detail as possible and using illustrations as necessary) the activities proposed to perform the Scope of Work. This discussion may address but not be limited to:
• Methods of obtaining information; • Methods of analyzing information; • Methods of reporting information; • Frequency of proposed activities; • Personnel responsible for the various activities described in the Scope of Work and
the number of hours anticipated to be devoted to specific aspects of the project by month or quarter, including the number of hours that would be spent on site in Newark; • Coordination with the City and the NPD to arrange visits, on-site records reviews and interviews; and • Coordination of monitoring activities, information gathering, and communications with the NPD, the United States and members of the community.
VI. Potential Conflicts of Interest or Bias
Disclose any potential or perceived conflicts of interest involving team members, associated firms or organizations, and any employee(s) assigned to the project, or proposed subcontractor(s), including current or former employment, contracts or grants with the City, the NPD, or the United States and any involvement in the last eight years (whether paid or unpaid) with a claim or lawsuit by or against the City, the NPD, or the United States or any of their officers, agents, or employees. Any close, familial, or business relationship with any of the mentioned entities, or their agents or employees, must be disclosed. Disclose whether any member of the team has been the proponent or subject of any complaint, claim, or lawsuit alleging misconduct. To the extent a conflict or potential bias exists, explain why it does not bar the individual’s or the team’s selection, including any legal or ethical opinions or waivers upon which the team relies.
Please note that, for the duration of the monitorship, no individual member of the monitoring team will be permitted to represent any individual or organization in any criminal or civil matter involving the United States Attorney’s Office, District of New Jersey, including any individual or organization designated as a witness, victim, defendant, subject, target, or person of interest.
The following shall be ineligible for selection as the monitor or as a member of the monitoring team: previous directors and chiefs of the NPD, and individuals with past or pending legal claims against the City or the NPD.
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VII. Estimated Costs Provide a Cost Estimate for this project based on the above Scope of Work and
requirements of the Decree: • Include a projected budget for all costs including but not limited to: hourly billing rates, travel, sub-consultant/contractor services, overhead, and supplies. • Break down the different activities that members of the team will perform (e.g., policy review, technical assistance, training assessment, report writing, and/or incident review). • Include a projected allocation of hourly commitments by each team member, broken down by the number of hours projected for both on-site and off-site work. • Take into account the uncertainty of the duration of the Decree and include both onetime or fixed costs that are expected regardless of the duration of the contract, and annual costs that are expected for each year the contract is in effect. • Include a total five-year cost estimate that fees and costs are not expected to exceed.
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 Investigation of the 
 Newark Police Department 

United States Department of Justice 
 Civil Rights Division 

United States Attorney’s Office 
 District of New Jersey 

July 22, 2014 


TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 1

II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................... 5

A. Investigation and Methodology........................................................................................ 5
 B. Newark, New Jersey and the Newark Police Department................................................ 5
 III. FINDINGS.............................................................................................................................. 7

A. STOPS AND ARRESTS.................................................................................................. 7
 1. Stops .......................................................................................................................... 7
 a. Legal Standards.................................................................................................. 7
 b. NPD Stops Have Routinely Violated the Fourth Amendment .......................... 8
 c. Unconstitutional Stop Practices Undermine Effective Policing and Officer 
 Accountability .................................................................................................. 11
 2. Arrests ..................................................................................................................... 11
 a. Legal Standards................................................................................................ 12
 b. “Contempt of Cop” Arrests, Seizures, and Citations Have Violated the 
 Fourth and First Amendments.......................................................................... 12
 c. Narcotics Searches and Arrests Have Violated the Fourth Amendment ......... 15

B. DISPARATE IMPACT BASED ON RACE ................................................................. 16
 1. Legal Standards ....................................................................................................... 17
 2. Failure to Track and Analyze Appropriate Data With Respect to Race ................. 18
 3. NPD’s Unconstitutional Stop, Search, and Arrest Practices Have Had a 
 Disparate Impact on Black People in Newark ........................................................ 19
 a. Pedestrian Stop Practices ................................................................................. 19
 b. Arrest Practices ................................................................................................ 20
 4. Quality of Life Citation Practices Have Been Ineffective and Have Facilitated 
 Abuse....................................................................................................................... 21

C. USE OF FORCE............................................................................................................. 22
 1. Legal Standards ....................................................................................................... 22
 2. NPD Format for Reporting and Tracking Force ..................................................... 22
 3. NPD’s Unreasonable Use of Force ......................................................................... 23
 a. Examples of NPD’s Use of Unreasonable Force ............................................. 24
 b. Lack of Effective System for Use of Force Reporting and Review................. 25
 i. NPD’s Force Reporting and Supervisory Review Systems...................... 25
 ii. NPD’s Administrative and Criminal Force Review Systems ................... 28

D. THEFT............................................................................................................................ 30
 1. Legal Standards ....................................................................................................... 31
 2. Theft by NPD Officers ............................................................................................ 31
 3. NPD Practices Have Failed to Adequately Address Theft by Officers................... 32

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a. Failure to Adequately Screen Candidates for Specialized Units ..................... 32
 b. Failure to Follow the NPD’s Established Rotation Policy............................... 33
 c. Failure to Monitor Problem Officers or Conduct Integrity Tests .................... 34
 E. INADEQUATE MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS HAVE CONTRIBUTED 
 TO THE PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS .................................... 34
 1. Overview of NPD’s Internal Affairs Process .......................................................... 36
 2. Investigative Deficiencies ....................................................................................... 38
 a. Failure to Collect Evidence from Complainants .............................................. 38
 b. Failure to Objectively Assess Evidence from Officers, Complainants, and 

Witnesses ......................................................................................................... 38
 c. Unequal Treatment of Officer and Complainant History ................................ 39
 d. Discouraging Complainants Through Miranda Warnings ............................... 40
 3. NPD’s Application of Discipline ............................................................................ 41
 F. INADEQUATE SUPERVISION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE PATTERN OF 
 CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS ............................................................................ 42
 1. Failures in Supervision and Management ............................................................... 42
 2. Absence of an Effective Early Warning System ..................................................... 42
 G. DEFICIENT TRAINING PRACTICES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE 
 PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS ................................................... 44
 1. Inadequate Officer Training .................................................................................... 44
 2. Inadequate Training of Internal Affairs Investigators ............................................. 45
 IV. OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN....................................................................................... 46
 A. Gender-Biased Policing.................................................................................................. 46
 B. Green Street Cell Block Suicide Prevention Policies and Practices............................... 47
 C. Policing Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity ......................................... 48
 V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 48

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Department of Justice opened an investigation of the Newark Police Department (“NPD” or “the Department”) in May 2011, after receiving serious allegations of civil rights violations by the NPD, including that the NPD subjects Newark residents to excessive force, unwarranted stops, and arrests, and discriminatory police actions.
This investigation of Newark’s policing practices was conducted jointly by the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division and the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey (collectively, “DOJ”) pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (“Section 14141”), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“Title VI”), and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d (“Safe Streets Act”). Section 14141 prohibits government authorities from engaging in a pattern or practice of law enforcement misconduct that violates individuals’ constitutional or federal statutory rights. Title VI and the Safe Streets Act together prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin by the recipients of certain federal funds.
The investigation benefited from the assistance of the NPD and the City of Newark (“City”), which provided access to officers, command staff, documents, and available data. The DOJ also received input from other criminal justice stakeholders, including members of the community, law enforcement organizations, advocacy groups, unions representing NPD officers, and others who shared their experiences with the NPD.
This report sets out the DOJ’s investigative findings. In sum, and as discussed further below, this investigation showed a pattern or practice of constitutional violations in the NPD’s stop and arrest practices, its response to individuals’ exercise of their rights under the First Amendment, the Department’s use of force, and theft by officers. The investigation also revealed deficiencies in the NPD’s systems that are designed to prevent and detect misconduct, including its systems for reviewing force and investigating complaints regarding officer conduct. The investigation also identified concerns that do not appear to amount to patterns of constitutional misconduct, but which nonetheless are significant and warrant consideration by the NPD. These concerns relate to the NPD’s practices in dealing with potentially suicidal detainees, the NPD’s sexual assault investigations, and the impact of the NPD’s policing on the LGBT community.
The City of Newark is diminished, and the NPD rendered less effective, by these patterns and practices of unconstitutional conduct. The NPD’s policing practices have eroded the community’s trust, and the perception of the NPD as an agency with insufficient accountability has undermined the confidence of other Newark criminal justice stakeholders as well. Fixing the problems this investigation identified will not only make Newark a more equitable community, but also a safer one. As the NPD stated in its Transparency Policy, General Order 2013-03, “[i]t is a fundamental principle that the public’s trust and cooperation is essential to the Newark Police Department’s effectiveness . . . . The Department cannot prevent future crimes without commitment and cooperation from the community . . . .”
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As discussed more fully in the body of this report, there is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of:
 Effecting stops and arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Approximately 75% of reports of pedestrian stops by NPD officers failed to articulate sufficient legal basis for the stop, despite the NPD policy requiring such justification. During the period reviewed, the NPD made thousands of stops of individuals who were described merely as “milling,” “loitering,” or “wandering,” without any indication of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In addition, a review of the NPD’s arrest reports raised concerns that, in some subset of NPD narcotics arrests, officers have failed to report completely or accurately the circumstances of those arrests.
 Policing that results in disproportionate stops and arrests of Newark’s black residents. The NPD stops black individuals at a greater rate than it stops white individuals. As a result, black individuals in Newark bear the brunt of the NPD’s pattern of unconstitutional stops and arrests. This investigation did not determine whether the disparity is intentional or is otherwise legally unjustified. Regardless, this experience of disproportionately being subjected to stops and arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment shapes black residents’ interactions with the NPD, to the detriment of community trust, and makes the job of delivering police services in Newark more dangerous and less effective.1
 Retaliating against individuals who question police actions. In violation of the First Amendment, NPD officers have detained and arrested individuals who lawfully object to police actions or behave in a way that officers perceive as disrespectful.
 Using unjustified and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In more than twenty percent of the NPD force incidents reviewed, the force as reported appeared unreasonable and thus in violation of the Constitution. Further, there has been substantial underreporting of force by NPD officers, and most NPD use of force investigations have been too inadequate to support reliable conclusions about whether an officer’s use of force—including deadly force— was reasonable.
 Subjecting individuals to theft by NPD officers in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The investigation revealed evidence of theft of
1 As this report was being finalized, the American Civil Liberties Union’s New Jersey affiliate (ACLU-NJ) released the results of its review of NPD stop statistics. The ACLU-NJ review was limited to a subset of summary stop data the NPD now publishes on its website. As explained below, the DOJ obtained direct access to the NPD’s source records and the DOJ investigation thus included analysis of more precise information, including the location of stops, the documented justification, whether the stop was a pedestrian or vehicle stop, and descriptions of post stop activity such as searches and frisks. Like the DOJ investigation, the ACLU-NJ review of different, but more recent data identified racial disparities in NPD stops.
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citizens’ property and money by officers, specifically in the NPD’s specialized units such as the narcotics and gang units, and in the prisoner processing unit at the Green Street Cell Block. The NPD has conducted inadequate investigations into theft complaints, failed to take corrective action against offending officers, and declined to implement the methods recommended by its own investigators that could prevent future theft by officers.
The finding of a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct within a law enforcement agency does not mean that most officers violate the law. Nor does a pattern or practice reflect that a certain number of officers have violated the law, or that the number of unlawful acts have reached a particular threshold. See United States v. Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The number of [violations) ... is not determinative ...., [no] mathematical formula is workable, nor was any intended. Each case must turn on its own facts”). Rather, the touchstone is whether the unlawful conduct appears more typical than isolated or aberrant. A pattern or practice exists where the conduct appears to be part of usual practice, whether officially sanctioned by policy or otherwise. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (a pattern or practice is “more than the mere occurrence of isolated or ‘accidental’ or ‘sporadic’” acts; instead it must be a “regular rather than the unusual practice”).
The patterns of constitutional violations described in this report result in significant part from a lack of accountability and review systems within the NPD. The NPD has neither a functioning early warning system nor an effective internal affairs structure. Those inadequacies undermine the Department’s ability to identify and address officer misconduct. The NPD’s data collection and analysis, and its system for regular review of officer use of force, are similarly deficient.
One indication of the ineffectiveness of the NPD’s internal affairs system is that the Internal Affairs Unit (“IA”) sustained only one civilian complaint of excessive force out of hundreds received from 2007 through 2012. While there is no “right” rate at which force complaints should be sustained, only one finding of unreasonable force out of hundreds of complaints over a six-year period is symptomatic of deeply dysfunctional accountability systems. The NPD also has failed to adequately collect or analyze data about officers’ use of force, stops, or arrests. Nor has the NPD taken adequate steps to implement an early warning system that would track and identify officers’ problematic behavior. As a result of these systemic deficiencies, the NPD does not discern or respond to problematic trends in officer conduct that could constitute or lead to misconduct.
Nor has the NPD provided officers with the tools necessary to support constitutional policing, such as adequate training, clear and easily accessible policies, and meaningful supervisory direction. Basic deficiencies have included the failure to ensure that NPD officers actually have access to the policies they are supposed to follow, to regularly update policies, and to provide or track necessary training. Supervisory review of officer actions, including use of force and arrests, has been lax. The cumulative effect of these deficiencies is an organization that is too prone to shield officers from accountability, and insufficiently focused on protecting constitutional rights.
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The responsibility for correcting the NPD’s unconstitutional policing practices lies at every level within the Department. NPD supervisors and command leadership must ensure that officers receive the training, guidance, and direction necessary to police effectively and constitutionally, and clearly communicate to officers that constitutional policing and effective law enforcement are not in tension with each other, but rather are interdependent. Officers must act within the parameters that the law places on stops, searches, and arrests, and avoid escalating interactions to the point where they use force unnecessarily. The NPD further must collect and analyze data related to stops, searches, and arrests, so that it can minimize the disparate impact of its enforcement efforts and avoid bias in policing. NPD leadership must also ensure that, when officers do violate policy or the law, they are held accountable and that corrective action, including discipline, is effective, fair, and consistent.
All of these findings, as well as proposed remedies, have been discussed with City officials and NPD leadership, and the City and NPD have pledged to quickly and thoroughly address these problems. To that end, the City and DOJ have reached an Agreement in Principle that will form the foundation of a comprehensive, judicially enforceable and independently monitored agreement to implement significant reform.
The Agreement in Principle, which is attached, addresses each of the patterns of constitutional violations described in this report. The Agreement requires the City to establish a civilian oversight entity for the NPD and additional mechanisms for effective community engagement to help ensure the sustainability of reforms and to foster positive relations between the NPD and the Newark community. The City, NPD, and DOJ agree that the NPD will review and revise its policies, training, and internal oversight mechanisms, particularly regarding the use of force and stop, search and arrest practices. The NPD also will provide officers with proper guidance regarding individuals’ exercise of their First Amendment rights. The NPD will develop and implement accountability and supervisory practices to prevent, detect, and address unlawful stops, searches, and arrests and unreasonable force, and to detect and prevent theft by officers. The NPD will revise its internal affairs practices to ensure effective complaint intake, objective investigations of misconduct, and fair and consistent discipline. The NPD will also enhance its collection and analysis of data so that it can better understand its enforcement practices and ensure their effectiveness and constitutionality.
Throughout the investigation of the NPD’s practices, all parties have recognized that Newark is a challenging city to police, given its significant level of crime and its budget constraints. The DOJ acknowledges in particular the skills and dedication of the many Newark police officers who abide by the rule of law and commit themselves daily to the difficult, and too often thankless, job of protecting public safety. The findings of this investigation are not meant to detract from these officers’ efforts. Indeed, many of the investigative findings underscore the need for the NPD and the City to better support and direct its officers.
Alongside this appreciation for the difficulties of police work, all parties agree that any NPD policies or practices that violate civil rights must be identified and remedied. This shared respect for individuals’ civil rights reflects not only the fundamental importance of these rights, but also an understanding that repeated civil rights violations make policing less effective and more dangerous. The DOJ looks forward to working cooperatively with the City and the NPD—
4 


as well as with the many other important stakeholders in this process, including community members and police unions—to carry out these reforms.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Investigation and Methodology
The DOJ provided notice to the City and the NPD of its investigation pursuant to Section 14141, Title VI, and the Safe Streets Act on May 9, 2011, and that the investigation would focus on allegations of excessive force; unconstitutional stops, searches, and seizures; discriminatory policing on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, and gender identity; risk of harm to detainees confined in holding cells; and retaliation by officers against individuals who legally attempt to observe or record police activity.
The team investigating the NPD’s police practices consisted of experts in police practices, and lawyers and other staff from the DOJ. Police practice experts included current and former police chiefs and supervisors from other jurisdictions, who provided expertise on law enforcement issues, as well as an expert in the collection and analysis of police-related data.
The investigation included intensive on-site review of NPD practices and procedures. The team conducted interviews and meetings with NPD officers, supervisors, and command staff, and participated in “ride-alongs” with officers and supervisors. The team also met with representatives of police fraternal organizations, conducted numerous community meetings, met with advocates and other individuals, and interviewed a wide array of local, regional, and federal stakeholders in the Newark criminal justice system, including representatives of the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office (“ECPO”), the Essex County Public Defender’s Office, the Newark Municipal Prosecutor’s Office, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The team set up a tollfree number and email address to receive information related to the NPD. The DOJ also worked with NPD’s contracted data management vendor to obtain substantial amounts of data related to NPD stops and arrests.
Throughout this report, specific facts and incidents are included as examples and illustrations, but the conclusions reflect the entirety of the information received, and are not based only on the individual events described here.
B. Newark, New Jersey and the Newark Police Department
Newark is New Jersey’s largest city, with a population of 277,140 people, according to the 2010 census. Newark’s population is racially and ethnically diverse: 53.9% black, 26.4% white, and 19.8% other or unknown.2 Of the entire population, approximately 33.9% identify themselves as Hispanic or Latino, with 30.6% identifying as non-black Hispanic.
2 This demographic breakdown for the population used in this report differs slightly from the percentages in the overall 2010 census for Newark. The breakdown in this report is calculated on a block-by-block basis, a smaller geographic unit than the U.S. Census Bureau uses to calculate data. This breakdown is a more accurate figure for assessing NPD’s policing practices within precinct and sector geographic boundaries.
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The NPD currently employs approximately 1,000 sworn officers, and is still recovering from the layoff of 167 officers at the end of 2010 due to budget cuts. The Department is led by a Police Director, appointed by the Mayor of Newark and approved by the Newark City Council, and a Chief of Police, who reports to the Police Director. The NPD is composed of four precincts and additional bureaus and special units, including the Detective Bureau, the Special Operations Division, and the Support Services Bureau. All of these report to the Chief, whereas the Director directly oversees the Internal Affairs Unit,3 the Training Section, and the Administration Bureau.
General Orders and Director’s Memoranda set forth the NPD’s policies and procedures.4 The investigation included a review of the NPD’s written policies, procedures, and training materials. To gain a complete picture of the NPD’s police practices, the team also reviewed myriad records and reports completed by NPD officers to document their activities and enforcement actions. When officers conduct a traffic or pedestrian stop, they are required to complete a Field Inquiry Report which, by policy, must include the legal support for the stop. If officers make an arrest, or take some other enforcement action, they are required to complete an Incident Report in which the officer is required to describe the legal support for the arrest, the elements of the alleged offense, and, if force was used, a narrative description of the nature of and reason for the use of force. Officers using force are required also to complete a Use of Force Report, which consists of data fields to complete, but provides no space for any narrative description of the force used or its justification. A supervisor is required to sign the Use of Force Report to document that the force has been reviewed and approved.
When an individual complains that an officer committed misconduct, the NPD’s internal affairs unit is required to conduct an administrative investigation of the allegation and document its investigation and findings in an Internal Affairs Investigation Report. The NPD’s internal affairs unit also is required by policy to conduct an administrative investigation of all officerinvolved shootings, whether or not they result in any complaint, and independent of any criminal investigation of the incident. These shooting investigations also are documented in an Internal Affairs Investigation Report. The administrative investigation of a shooting differs from a criminal investigation in that the administrative investigation is focused on determining whether the shooting violated departmental policy and was a reasonable use of force, rather than whether the shooting was potentially criminal. This investigation included close review of a representative sample of each category of these reports.
Three separate unions represent NPD officers: the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 12 (“FOP”), the Superior Officers’ Association (“SOA”), and the Deputy Chiefs’ Association (“DCA”). All three unions have collective bargaining contracts with the City. SOA members
3 During the course of the investigation and drafting of this report, the name of the NPD’s internal investigations unit changed. At present, the NPD organizational chart no longer lists a specific “Internal Affairs” unit, although the Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”), of which IA was previously a sub-unit, still appears in the chart. NPD staff use the terms OPS and Internal Affairs interchangeably. This report refers to the NPD’s internal investigations unit as Internal Affairs or “IA.” 4 These policies and procedures are informed by the New Jersey State Attorney General’s Office guidelines for law enforcement agencies, which apply to all municipalities in New Jersey. These guidelines are available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide.htm.
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may also join the FOP to obtain that union’s legal defense benefits. Separately, NPD officers may also join the Newark Police Benevolent Association which advocates on behalf of NPD officers and also offers legal defense benefits, but is not the collective bargaining unit. The NPD currently does not have any form of civilian oversight, although the previous mayor announced a plan to establish a civilian-led police oversight panel in 2013.
III. FINDINGS
A. STOPS AND ARRESTS
The NPD’s stops and arrests are problematic in a number of respects. The NPD engages in a pattern or practice of effecting pedestrian stops without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In addition, the NPD’s response to perceived disrespect violates the First and Fourth Amendments. Further, an uncertain number of the NPD’s narcotics-related arrests appear to violate the Fourth Amendment.
1. Stops
Generally, a search or seizure is unreasonable “in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (emphasis added). There is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD nonetheless engages in a widespread pattern or practice of making pedestrian stops without such individualized suspicion.5 This conclusion is based on review of NPD policies, stop reports for a three-and-a-half year period, arrest records, IA files, site visits to the NPD, interviews with stakeholders in the criminal justice system, and information provided by community members.
a. Legal Standards
Under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers may briefly detain an individual for investigative purposes if the officers possess reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop may be “the result of any combination of one or several factors: specialized knowledge and investigative inferences, personal observation of suspicious behavior, information from sources that have proven to be reliable, and information from sources that—while unknown to the police—prove by the accuracy and intimacy of the information provided to be reliable at least as to the details contained within that tip.” United States v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 478 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). Courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures to mean that law enforcement officers must satisfy escalating legal standards of “reasonableness” for each level of intrusion upon a person—stop, search, seizure, and arrest.
While reasonable suspicion is evaluated by looking at the totality of circumstances, an officer must be able to “articulate specific reasons justifying [the] detention.” Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164,
5 The investigation focused on pedestrian stops and did not assess the NPD’s vehicle stop practices.
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167 (3d Cir. 2002). A stop must be based on something more substantial than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The officer must be able to point to some particular and objective manifestation that the suspect was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); see also United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2006); Johnson, 332 F.3d at 206.
The Third Circuit has found that a stop is unconstitutional where an officer thinks an individual’s behavior is “suspicious” but is not able to articulate why or link it to criminal activity. Johnson, 332 F.3d at 210 (report that plaintiff was pacing and acting agitated, followed by officer’s observation of plaintiff sitting in a car reading the newspaper, did not give rise to articulable suspicion that plaintiff was about to commit a crime). Similarly, an officer may not stop individuals based only on a generalized description of appearance that could apply widely, when the officer has not observed suspicious activity by those individuals. See Brown¸ 448 F.3d at 248-52 (stop was unconstitutional when officer stopped two individuals he observed hailing a taxi based on description of robbery suspects as two black males, ages 15 to 20, wearing dark clothing).
Nor is an individual’s mere presence in a particular neighborhood or area—even “an area of expected criminal activity” or “a high crime area”—sufficient “to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); see also United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 81 (3d Cir. 1996) (mere presence on a corner known as a “hot corner” for drug sales does not support reasonable suspicion to justify a stop). Rather, while presence in a high crime area may be a factor, police must make their determination of reasonable suspicion upon the individual’s actions.
b. NPD Stops Have Routinely Violated the Fourth Amendment
The NPD uses a Field Inquiry Report to document stop activity by officers, and NPD policy requires that the report contain sufficient facts to demonstrate reasonable suspicion for a stop.6 Reports failing to meet reasonable suspicion standards are to be rejected by the reviewing supervisor, and corrective training conducted to prevent a recurrence. Therefore, in theory, the Field Inquiry Report offers the best record of the NPD's stop activities. However, the NPD’s use of Field Inquiry Reports is not entirely consistent with its policy, as NPD officers also use Field Inquiry Reports to document encounters other than stops for which reasonable suspicion is not required, such as witness interviews.
To ensure that the review assessed the NPD’s core pedestrian stop practices and not other encounters, the review of Field Inquiry Reports was conservatively limited to those in which the individual was described as a suspect, instead of a witness, and subject to a warrant check. By this measure, during the period of January 2009 to June 2012, NPD officers completed 39,308 Field Inquiry Reports, each documenting a pedestrian stop. Of those 39,308 encounters, the officer did not record any justification for the stop on 6,200 occasions (15.8%). These encounters were excluded from further analysis. DOJ investigators analyzed a sample of one­
6 NPD GO 97-8 (Revised 7/1/2000).
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third (n=10,179) of the Field Inquiry Reports that recorded a justification for the stop. In approximately 75% of these remaining Reports, the officers failed to articulate reasonable suspicion to justify the stop, as required by NPD policy.7 Cf. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding violations of class members’ Fourth Amendment rights where statistical analysis revealed that 6% of stops lacked reasonable suspicion).
In particular, thousands of the stops—all of which were at least long enough to run warrant checks—involved individuals who were described merely as “milling,” “loitering,” or “wandering,” without any indication of criminal activity or suspicion. Some of those were augmented with a notation that the “milling,” “loitering,” or “wandering” was taking place in high-crime areas, high-narcotics areas, or high-gang activity areas. Officers also routinely stopped and ran warrant checks for individuals solely for being present in high-crime areas, near scenes of suspected or reported crimes, or simply “in areas.” Without any indicator of criminal activity or suspicion of an intent to engage in criminal activity, these reasons do not constitute reasonable suspicion to detain an individual, and are therefore constitutionally deficient. Yet, the reports demonstrate that these have been the most common type of pedestrian stops made by NPD officers.8
While poor report-writing may amplify the number of stops that appear unjustified, the repeated reliance on these insufficient justifications strongly suggests that NPD officers do not appreciate what is legally required for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Moreover, the frequent use of certain types of illegitimate justifications for stops, combined with the failure of reviewing supervisors to reject reports that contain them, suggests that the NPD has tolerated its officers’ stopping people for reasons that do not meet constitutional muster.
7 This high rate of unjustified stops may actually understate the problem. For example, if the Field Inquiry Report indicated that the stop was dispatch-initiated rather than officer-initiated, the review did not consider the stop insufficiently justified, even where the report did not articulate facts that would justify a stop. Similarly, stop reasons referencing quality of life citations were also generally not included in the “no reasonable suspicion” category because the majority of behaviors giving rise to quality of life citations are evident by observation. However, stop reasons consisting solely of the fact that an individual was arrested were included in the “no reasonable suspicion” category for reasons explained later in this section. Even when excluding this latter category of stops, the analysis shows that officers failed to articulate reasonable suspicion in 69% of the Field Inquiry Reports reviewed. In addition, if this analysis had considered the 15.8% of reports that recorded no justification for the stop to be insufficient, approximately 93% of the stops would have been considered unsupported by articulated reasonable suspicion. 8 Backseat detentions are another troubling aspect of NPD stop practices. Being placed in the backseat of a police vehicle can be a humiliating and often frightening experience. Police departments should use this practice only in strict accordance with the law. In Newark, there were credible complaints from community members that NPD officers routinely detain people and place them in the backs of police vehicles for significant periods of time and without cause, and then release them without actually filing charges, or even informing the individuals of the reasons for detention. It is difficult to assess the extent of this practice because of the lack of written documentation, in violation of policy, of the officers’ action. NPD policy (GO No. 09-03) requires officers to document detentions in Incident Reports, even when an officer subsequently releases an individual without bringing the person to the precinct for processing or filing formal charges. However, like other NPD documentation requirements assessed, this policy does not appear to have been consistently followed, reviewed, or enforced. The NPD should ensure that backseat detentions are used only as appropriate for officer safety or other legitimate reasons and should enforce its policies that require documenting this activity.
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These deficiencies in the NPD’s stop practices were also reflected in IA investigations of complainants that officers used excessive force, discussed more fully later in this report. Nineteen percent—almost one in five—of those IA files described a stop without a constitutional justification. If the initial stop that culminated in the use of force was itself unjustified, any use of force, whether otherwise appropriate or not, is troubling, and perhaps unconstitutional.
At least part of this pattern of unlawful stops can be traced to NPD policies and training. NPD policy includes “[h]igh crime areas and the type of activity that takes place there” and “[p]roximity to scene of a crime” in its list of “reasonable suspicious factors to stop a person.”9 Although the policy provides examples for each of these factors that include the factor plus additional information (i.e. high crime area plus exchange of currency and objects by the individual, proximity of scene of crime plus individual matches a description or is engaged in activity such as running or hiding), the policy does not clearly state that any of those factors alone are insufficient and that additional information is required to establish reasonable suspicion. This lack of clarity in NPD policies effectively promotes a view that living or simply being in a high-crime area is criminally suspicious. This violates the Fourth Amendment’s fundamental tenet requiring individualized suspicion to justify deprivation of liberty by law enforcement. The lack of clarity may also result in inadequate documentation of stops that might actually have been constitutional but were not fully described.
In addition to stopping individuals based on their mere presence in high crime areas, NPD officers also have too often stopped pedestrians for other impermissible reasons. For example, NPD officers illegally stopped individuals whom officers perceived to react negatively to the presence of police officers, without any additional indicia of criminal activity. See, e.g., Bonner, 363 F.3d 217-18 (flight upon noticing police, without some other indicia of wrongdoing, is not grounds for reasonable suspicion). Officers also have impermissibly stopped individuals solely because they were in the presence of an arrestee or other suspicious person, without any other articulated indicia of criminal activity. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (“[A] search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.”). Specific examples of these types of reasons for stops include: “Actor Upon Noticing Our Presents [sic] Changed His Direction of Travel,” “Observed Actor Hid Behind A Car When He Observed Police Car,” and “Subject Was In the Company of a Female Who Was Cited For Drinking.”
NPD officers also regularly have justified stops based solely on information or evidence discovered after the stop was initiated. Examples include “Individual Was Stopped on Bicycle No Proper ID” and “A Record Check of the Above Individual Revealed an Open Warrant.” The reasonableness of a stop is determined based on “facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (emphasis added); Johnson, 332 F.3d at 205; see also Brown, 448 F.3d at 245 (attempt to escape after stop was irrelevant in determining reasonableness of stop because attempt to escape occurred after stop was initiated).
Similarly, officers have justified stops based on the fact that the individual was ultimately arrested. Typical examples of these justifications include “Arrested,” “CDS Arrest,” “Narcotics
9 See NPD GO 97-8 (Revised 7/1/2000).
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Arrest,” and “Individual Arrested for [charge].” This is constitutionally impermissible: an officer must first have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to conduct a stop, and the discovery of evidence during or after the stop that provides probable cause for arrest cannot be used to retroactively establish reasonable suspicion for the stop. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963). Because the stop was not justified in the first place, the subsequent search and arrest are the direct result of impermissible police activity and are invalid.
c. Unconstitutional Stop Practices Undermine Effective Policing and Officer Accountability
The NPD’s unconstitutional stop practices negatively affect not only Newark’s residents but also the NPD’s ability to effectively police the City. First, the practice erodes the community’s trust, as individuals feel that they will be treated as criminals based on where they live or spend time, rather than on how they act. Indeed the NPD’s own stop policy warns that “[t]he indiscriminate use of stopping and questioning individuals will be detrimental to the positive community relations that this Department strives to obtain.” And representatives from other criminal justice agencies, advocates, and community members reported throughout the investigation that many Newark residents have come to expect that officers might stop, recordcheck, and search them at any time without any justification at all. One individual characterized this experience as “just part of living in Newark.” As with the NPD’s Quality of Life citation practices discussed later in this report, residents perceive these stops as harassment by police. Research has shown, and individuals interviewed during this investigation recounted, that witnesses who experienced such stops are less likely to accept police legitimacy and to provide assistance to police during investigations.
Second, stops without adequate justification result in the over-collection, and improper retention and use, of personal information. NPD policy states that information about individuals in the NPD’s database is relevant for evaluating the veracity and reliability of their statements in the future. As a result, NPD officers’ unjustified stops can have long-lasting and substantial consequences for people’s lives, as well as for the NPD’s ability to hold officers accountable for misconduct. For example, as discussed later in this report, the NPD’s IA may improperly discredit the complaint of an individual in part because the individual has multiple recorded encounters with police.
The NPD’s undisciplined stop practices also increase the risk that officers, without appropriate guidance to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate justifications for conducting stops, may rely on impermissible factors such as an individual’s race, color, or ethnicity. The NPD should be particularly attentive to this concern in light of the disproportionate impact its stop and arrest practices have on Newark’s black residents, which is discussed below.
2. Arrests
Although NPD officers generally write reports that facially appear to establish probable cause to arrest, those reports have reflected two categories of problematic practices. First, there is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional arrests for behavior perceived as insubordinate or disrespectful to officers—
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often charged as obstruction of justice, resisting arrest, or disorderly conduct. Second, there is reasonable cause to believe that some number of NPD narcotics arrest reports may not have accurately described the circumstances leading to arrest, and that the NPD has not addressed this problem. This assessment of NPD arrest practices is based on: a review of a random sample of 100 arrest reports and associated incident reports from a three-and-a-half year period, January 2009 to June 2012; NPD policy; IA files; Use of Force Reports; site visits to the NPD; interviews with stakeholders in the criminal justice system; and information provided by community members.
a. Legal Standards
Probable cause to arrest an individual exists “when the information within the officer’s knowledge at the time of the arrest is sufficient to warrant a reasonable officer to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000). In determining whether an officer had probable cause to make an arrest, courts consider the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the moment the arrest was made. Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005). The constitutional validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed any crime, and probable cause cannot be retroactively established or disproven by the fact that the suspect later pleads guilty, is found guilty, or is acquitted. See id.; Johnson, 332 F.3d at 211. The totality of the circumstances test is objective: the question is whether “an officer would be justified in believing that an actual offense was being committed,” not whether an officer subjectively believed there was probable cause to make an arrest. Johnson, 332 F.3d at 214. An officer’s erroneous belief that a suspect’s actions constitute criminal activity is irrelevant if the available evidence would not support that conclusion. Id.
Officers may not arrest individuals for exhibiting behavior that is disrespectful or obnoxious, but legal, and must be mindful that some speech challenging or objecting to police action is protected by the First Amendment. Police officers “are expected to endure significant burdens caused by citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment rights,” including “provocative and challenging” speech and gestures. Gilk v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011); City of Houston, Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987); see also Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A] reasonable police officer would not have believed he was entitled to initiate the law enforcement process in response to giving the finger.”); Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250 (7th Cir. 1997) (extending middle finger and shouting profanity protected by the First Amendment); Duran v. City of Douglas, Arizona, 904 F.2d 1372, 1377-78 (9th Cir. 1990) (while police officers “may resent having obscene . . . gestures directed at them, they may not exercise the awesome power at their disposal to punish individuals for conduct that is not merely lawful, but protected by the First Amendment.”).
b. “Contempt of Cop” Arrests, Seizures, and Citations Have Violated the Fourth and First Amendments
The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects verbal challenges to police action, holding that “[t]he freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.” Hill, 482 U.S. at 462-63. NPD officers have
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engaged in a pattern of violating constitutional rights by detaining and arresting individuals who lawfully object to police actions or behave in a way that officers perceive as disrespectful. These types of arrests are sometimes referred to as “contempt of cop” arrests, and are often charged as obstruction of justice, resisting arrest, or similar offenses, even though the behavior has not met the legal standards for such charges. Contempt of cop detentions and arrests in retaliation for questioning or expressing criticism of police violate individuals’ rights under both the Fourth and First Amendments.10
The NPD’s arrest reports and IA investigations, including some incidents involving unreasonable uses of force, reflect numerous instances of the NPD's inappropriate responses to individuals who engage in constitutionally protected First Amendment activity, such as questioning or criticizing police actions.
For example, in one IA investigation, an individual was arrested after he questioned officers’ decision to arrest his neighbor. The individual alleged that officers immediately proceeded to use force against him. The officers’ own version of events, reporting that the individual told them loudly and “in a belligerent manner” that they could not arrest his neighbor, did not establish probable cause for the officers’ decision to arrest the man for obstructing the administration of law.
In another incident, officers reported that a woman standing outside her apartment yelled profanity and spat in their direction. According to the officers, based on this conduct, they decided to arrest her for aggravated assault and disorderly conduct and used “physical contact” to effect the arrest. According to the woman, she had publicly criticized an officer for questioning a street vendor about a permit. Although the officers’ and complainant’s accounts of the incident differ, the officers’ own explanation of the incident—that they used force and arrested the woman in response to her using profanity and spitting towards them—provides insufficient justification for their actions.
In another example, a civilian complainant alleged that a plainclothes detective used force and arrested him after he walked away from the detective. The IA investigation revealed that the detective first observed a group of people standing near the street and deemed them suspicious based solely on “the area” they were in. The detective’s report indicates that, although he had observed no criminal activity, he announced police presence and “randomly approached one actor” (emphasis added) and ordered him to stop. The individual attempted to walk away from the detective, and allegedly used profanity toward the detective while the
10 In addition to the examples of First Amendment violations discussed here, prior to the initiation of this investigation, there were several highly publicized incidents where NPD officers prohibited citizens from recording police action. NPD ultimately settled at least three of the resulting lawsuits, and promulgated a Director’s memorandum in the fall of 2011 with guidance on individuals’ right to record police. However, this investigation found that NPD has not fully corrected the practice of inappropriately prohibiting individuals from recording the police, and needs to issue more detailed policies to guide officer behavior. For example, the current policy states that individuals have a First Amendment right to record police activities but gives officers the discretion to order individuals to stop recording if they “truly interfere with legitimate law enforcement operations.” The policy does not explain or provide examples of the types of conduct that might amount to such interference and thus does not provide sufficient guidance to officers on how to lawfully exercise their discretion.
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detective continued to issue verbal commands for him to stop. The complainant alleged that the detective grabbed him from behind and he turned in response. It is not clear from the detective’s report when he first touched the individual, but the report states that the individual turned around, raised his hands and reached for the detective’s wrists, suggesting that the officer had already initiated his use of force. The detective’s report indicates he pushed the individual up against the hood of a car, before arresting him for resisting arrest, obstructing the administration of law, and disorderly conduct. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a refusal to cooperate with the police, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991); see also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.
In addition to a pattern of unjustified arrests in which individuals are formally charged, there is evidence that, in violation of the Constitution, the NPD has seized and detained individuals or issued unjustified Quality of Life citations in retaliation for protected conduct.
For example, in one incident investigated by the NPD’s IA, the complainants alleged that a plainclothes officer stopped an individual on the street. Two complainants were present and one, unaware that the plainclothes officer was a police officer, asked the officer why she had stopped the individual. According to that complainant, the officer slammed him to the ground and used a choke hold on him. The second complainant then asked the officer why she was choking the other observer. The officer allegedly kicked the second complainant in the ribs and placed both individuals in handcuffs. In her interview with IA, the officer stated that she “bumped into” the first complainant causing him to fall on the ground. She admitted detaining the two individuals after they became “loud and hostile.” Both individuals were ultimately released from handcuffs and issued Quality of Life citations for disorderly conduct. The municipal court later refused to adjudicate the citations.
In another excessive force complaint investigated by IA, two officers dispersing crowds at a high school following a large fight reported that a student spat on the ground in front of the officers. One officer reported to the IA investigator that he then grabbed the juvenile by his arm, “placing” his head against the hood of the police cruiser. The second officer confirmed this account. The juvenile was ultimately frisked, given a summons and released when his father arrived on the scene. Several of the IA files reviewed contained similar descriptions of officers detaining, arresting, or issuing citations to individuals perceived to have spat in the general direction of the officers, giving credence to these complaints and indicating that this practice may be more widespread.
The NPD’s exercise of its police power to respond to “contempt of cop” behavior is part of the pattern of unreasonable stops and arrests by NPD officers, and consistent with the pattern of unreasonable force discussed below. A police officer’s job is difficult, requiring a thick skin and patience. Unfortunately, rather than using de-escalation techniques and acting within the constraints of the Constitution when confronted with disrespectful behavior, NPD has engaged in a pattern and practice of taking immediate offensive action, without regard to whether that conduct complies with the law.
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c. Narcotics Searches and Arrests Have Violated the Fourth Amendment
There is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD’s pattern of unlawful arrests extends to its narcotics arrests. NPD narcotics-related arrest reports reflect a strikingly high number of instances in which officers did not have to conduct a search to find the narcotics that provided the probable cause for the arrest. These numbers, and the circumstances of these arrests, suggest that some number of these narcotics arrest reports have been inaccurate. While this investigation did not determine which, or how many, arrest reports suffered such deficiencies, it is troubling that the NPD appears neither to have noticed this pattern nor to have taken appropriate steps to ensure that officers write accurate, reliable narcotics arrest reports that reflect legitimate searches.
Out of a sample of 100 reports documenting NPD arrests between January 2009 and June 2012, 58 documented arrests on narcotics-related charges. The overwhelming majority of these narcotics arrests and associated incident reports contained remarkably similar language to support officers’ reasonable suspicion to stop the individual. According to the narratives written by officers, in at least 46 of the 58 narcotics arrest reports in the sample, officers reportedly did not have to conduct a search in order to find narcotics. Rather, officers reported, using similar language, that suspects either voluntarily and immediately offered or discarded an otherwise concealed CDS (controlled dangerous substance) to the police upon mere announcement or recognition of police presence, or that the CDS was “in plain view” of the officers when they approached the suspects. In the “plain view” scenarios, individuals often were purportedly seated in cars holding clear plastic baggies in front of them or on their laps and officers could “immediately” see the contraband, even though the report indicated that the subject’s back was to an officer, or that the officer had not yet approached the car.
The concerns raised by these reports may be partly explainable by poor report writing, and some portion of these plain view narcotics arrests may also reflect that NPD practices are far too opportunistic, with some officers’ relying too heavily on only the most obvious violations. Nonetheless, the sheer frequency with which NPD officers report finding contraband in plain view, sometimes in what appear to be less than plausible circumstances, makes it difficult to ascribe this problem to these dynamics alone. Indeed, police practice experts reviewing these reports observed that, in their experience reviewing such narcotics arrest reports in multiple jurisdictions across the country, the proportion of narcotics arrests in Newark that did not require a search is markedly high. These expert observations are consistent with concerns expressed by community members and other criminal justice stakeholders in Newark. The NPD and the City of Newark should engage a broad spectrum of criminal stakeholders, including the Essex County Public Defender’s Office and the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office, to determine how widespread this problem may be and develop an effective plan to combat it.11
11 Improved report writing within NPD would also yield stronger cases for prosecution. One of the NPD arrest files reviewed also contained a report about the same incident written by Essex County Sheriff’s Department officers, providing an opportunity to compare these two agencies’ accounts of the same incident. In marked contrast to the canned language used in narratives written by NPD officers, the Essex County report contained many details
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Prior to this investigation, the NPD apparently had not recognized this pattern in its arrests. This is due in part to the NPD’s insufficient accountability systems, such as adequate supervisory review, that are discussed later in this report. When this pattern was brought to their attention, City and NPD officials noted the brazen, open-air drug markets that plague Newark as a potential explanation for the high proportion of plain view arrests, and maintained that the NPD’s arrest reports accurately reflect the encounters. It is doubtless true that many of these arrest reports are accurate, and the review of these reports did not attempt to include an evaluation of the overall merits of any particular arrest, or examine the work of any particular officer. Rather, the prevalence of instances in which officers purportedly recovered drugs without the need for a search, together with the circumstances of those arrests as described by the reports, indicated that some portion of NPD arrest reports may have been inaccurate and that the NPD does not have the systems in place to reliably detect such deficient reports so that it can ensure that the underlying circumstances of the stop, search, and arrest are lawful.12
B. DISPARATE IMPACT BASED ON RACE
This investigation found that black people in Newark have been stopped and arrested at a significantly higher rate than their white and Hispanic counterparts. This disparity is stark and unremitting. Approximately 80% of the NPD’s stops and arrests have involved black individuals, while Newark’s population is only 53.9% black. Black residents of Newark are at least 2.5 times more likely to be subjected to a pedestrian stop or arrested than white individuals. Between January 2009 and June 2012, this translated into 34,153 more stops of black individuals than white individuals. The disparity persists throughout the city regardless of whether sectors have highly concentrated black residential populations or comparatively fewer black residents.13
This investigation did not determine whether this disparity reflects intentional race discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or whether this disparity is avoidable or unnecessary, in violation of Title VI or the Safe Streets
specific to the incident, including individualized descriptions of the suspects and specific actions giving rise to probable cause, locations of officers, approximate lengths of time of observation of actions by officers, reasons specific to the incident that led the officer to conclude they had reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and a plausible sequence of events. 12 It is important also to note that, for the purposes of this investigation, the question was not whether arrestees were engaged in drug activity; rather, it was whether NPD officers were acting in accordance with fundamental constitutional requirements, such as individualized reasonable suspicion to support a detention, legal authority to support a search, and probable cause to support an arrest. The fact that an officer actually discovers evidence during or after a stop or search that provides reasonable suspicion for the stop or probable cause for the arrest does not render the officer’s actions constitutional. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-85. Nor does the fact that some of the individuals arrested and charged in the narcotics arrests reviewed pled guilty or were convicted in state court determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation in the arrest process occurred, or preclude consideration of this issue by a federal court in a subsequent Fourth Amendment challenge. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 314-23 (1983); Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1986). Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized that there are various incentives for a defendant to plead guilty independent of whether there may have been a Fourth Amendment violation. Prosise, 462 U.S. at 318-19. 13 As this report was being finalized, the ACLU-NJ released the results of its own review of stop data that NPD publishes on its website. The ACLU-NJ’s review of this different, more recent data also showed racial disparities in NPD stops.
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Act. As discussed in the Legal Standards section below, policing that has a disparate impact on members of a particular race may be unlawful not only where it is intentional, but also where it is unintentional, but avoidable.
Nonetheless, regardless of why the disparity occurs, the impact is clear: because the NPD engages in a pattern of making stops in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Newark’s black residents bear the brunt of the NPD’s pattern of unconstitutional policing. This undeniable experience of being disproportionately affected by the NPD’s unconstitutional policing helps explain the community distrust and cynicism that undermines effective policing in Newark. In individual interviews and group meetings, many community and criminal justice stakeholders consistently described Newark as a city where black residents, and particularly black men, fear law enforcement action, regardless of whether such action is warranted by individualized suspicion. They indicated that unjustified stops by NPD officers have become so routine that many members of the black community have ceased feeling a sense of outrage and simply feel a sense of resignation.
These conclusions about the racially disparate impact of the NPD’s policing practices are based on an analysis of NPD data obtained directly from the NPD’s data management vendor because the NPD does not maintain, track, or analyze demographic data for its law enforcement actions in a manner that could be relied upon for the close scrutiny required by this investigation. Further refinement of the systems and analysis of this data are necessary to more fully understand the nature and cause of this disparate impact, and the NPD should implement systems to collect and analyze this data as part of its effort to ensure that unlawful racially discriminatory policing does not occur.
1. Legal Standards
Discriminatory policing in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from either an explicit classification or a facially neutral policy or practice that is implemented or administered with discriminatory intent. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 457 (1996); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). Discriminatory policing under the Fourteenth Amendment includes selective enforcement of the law based on race. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). In addition, Title VI and the Safe Streets Act prohibit law enforcement agencies that receive federal financial assistance, such as the NPD, from engaging in intentional discrimination or in law enforcement activities that have an unjustified disparate impact based on race, color, or national origin. The Safe Streets Act provides that “[n]o person in any State shall on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex be … subjected to discrimination under or denied employment in connection with any programs or activity” receiving federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)(1). Title VI establishes that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participating in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Title VI’s implementing regulations prohibit law enforcement agencies from using “criteria or methods of administration” that have a disparate impact based on race, color, or national origin. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001). Thus, under these statutes, discriminatory impact may be unlawful even where it is not intentional.
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2. Failure to Track and Analyze Appropriate Data With Respect to Race
A full understanding of the race-based effects of the NPD’s policing practices is made more difficult by the NPD’s failure to track and analyze data with respect to race, which is unusual, and at odds with sound policing practices, for a police department in a major city, especially one with such diversity. Although NPD Field Inquiry forms track race, and the Arrest Report and Incident Report forms track race and ethnicity, the NPD does not use this demographic data to analyze and inform its policing practices. In fact, when requested to produce basic data on stops and arrests that included race, the NPD was unable to do so because the NPD has not enabled its records management system to provide this information. Indeed, the NPD has not implemented any systems through which it can effectively monitor and assess the race-based effects of its policing practices. This failure is particularly surprising as the NPD has adopted a COMSTAT process similar to the one pioneered by the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) to help command staff ensure that the Department is policing effectively. Although the NYPD COMSTAT process includes tracking and analysis of policing activities by race, the NPD chose not to incorporate those features, meaning that NPD can use COMSTAT to analyze crime rates, but not to analyze the impact of its enforcement efforts on different racial or ethnic groups.
Moreover, the NPD does not collect race and ethnicity data for any of the Quality of Life citations it issues, which made it impossible to use these forms to help determine the accuracy of widespread complaints from the community that the NPD uses Quality of Life citations in a racially discriminatory manner. These deliberate decisions by the NPD when the process was implemented make it difficult for anyone within or outside of NPD to assess the racial impact of NPD’s policing.
After persistent efforts spanning approximately one year in which the NPD was unable to provide comprehensive data, the DOJ ultimately arranged to work directly with the vendor that created the NPD’s record management system to gain access to the raw data, including demographic information on race and, where tracked, ethnicity, for NPD stop and arrest activities from January 2009 through June 2012. Although there are deficiencies in this data resulting from the NPD’s inconsistent record-keeping practices and lack of corrective supervisory review, the sheer volume of the available records provided a sufficiently reliable data set to analyze.
Further study of these numbers and their explanations is warranted, particularly because the data show that Newark’s black residents bear a disparate burden of stops, searches, and detentions that violate the Fourth Amendment. Without carefully tracking, analyzing, and addressing the racially disparate effects of its law enforcement activities in Newark, the NPD will be unable to fully understand and respond to this divisive disparity, and will face greater difficulty gaining the community trust and legitimacy required for effective and constitutional policing.
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3. NPD’s Unconstitutional Stop, Search, and Arrest Practices Have Had a Disparate Impact on Black People in Newark
The disparate impact of the NPD’s stop, search, and arrest practices appears to be an additional harm stemming, at least in part, from the same poor policing practices that result in stops, searches, and arrests that violate the First and Fourth Amendments. NPD officers, failing to apply constitutional and legal standards for stops, searches, and arrests, appear to have substituted their own judgments for these standards in determining when a stop, search, or arrest is justified. Without meaningful supervisory review, this practice increases the opportunity for officers to rely—consciously or unconsciously—on impermissible factors such as an individual’s race when conducting law enforcement actions.
In addition to the broad statistical evidence of disparate impact set out below, there is more specific evidence that, while not conclusive, supports a conclusion that the NPD’s failure to require its officers to adhere to legal standards for stops facilitates impermissible reliance on race. For example, NPD officers used the conclusory phrase “suspicious person,” without articulating any facts that establish actual reason for suspicion, to justify approximately 1,500 stops conducted during the three-and-a-half year time period reviewed.14 Of these 1,500 illegal “suspicious person” stops, 85% were stops of individuals identified by officers as black, and 15% were stops of individuals identified as white, a proportion starkly inconsistent with Newark’s demographic breakdown.
a. Pedestrian Stop Practices
Community perceptions of disparate treatment by the NPD are confirmed by the data. NPD officers documented a total of 52,235 pedestrian stops between January 2009 and June 2012.15 Overall, 80.9%, or 42,234, of these stops were of black individuals; 15.5%, or 8,081, were of white individuals (which includes a large number of Hispanic individuals); and 3.7%, or 1,920, of the stops were of individuals identified as “other races” or “unknown.” In comparison, according to 2010 U.S. census data, Newark’s population is 53.9% black, 26.4% white, and 19.8% other races.16 While the NPD conducted approximately 111 stops per 1,000 residents for white people, the NPD conducted approximately 283 stops per 1,000 residents for black people.
14 As discussed previously, identifying someone as a “suspicious person,” without articulating any factual basis for that suspicion, does not establish a legal basis for a stop. 15 This analysis included all pedestrian stops, not just those that were accompanied by a warrant check. This was done because the analysis sought to discover the demographic impact of all police-initiated pedestrian stops. 16 Because pedestrian stops are more likely to stop persons who actually live in Newark than are vehicular stops, residential population (census) provides a useful benchmark for conducting a preliminary analysis to discern whether a pattern of racially disparate policing appears to exist. While using residential population as a benchmark for measuring the rate of people subjected to law enforcement activity relative to the potential population of people who could have been subjected to such activity is not a perfect fit, it is adequate, and was the best benchmark available, given NPD’s failure to collect, track, and analyze demographic data. Residential population for this analysis was calculated on a block-by-block basis. Of the 26.4% of Newark’s population that is white, 14.7% also are Hispanic according to the 2010 census data. However, because, until January 2014, the NPD’s stop data did not include ethnicity, this stop analysis considered race but not ethnicity. By contrast, as discussed below, the arrest data did include ethnicity during the period this investigation was conducted.
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This means that black individuals in Newark have been 2.5 times more likely on average to be subjected to a pedestrian stop by an NPD officer than white individuals.
In addition to being 2.5 times more likely to be stopped than their white counterparts, black individuals in Newark also have been 2.7 times more likely on average to be subjected to searches and 3.1 times more likely to be subjected to frisks by the NPD. NPD officers conducted 34,153 more stops, 13,174 more searches, and 12,130 more frisks of black individuals than of white individuals over three-and-a-half years. Yet, according to the NPD’s documentation, the likelihood that a search or frisk by the NPD recovers evidence is essentially the same for both racial groups. The likelihood of recovering evidence during a frisk is 13.6% for whites and 12.7% for blacks, and the likelihood of recovering evidence during a search is 14.2% for whites and 14.8% for blacks.17 Thus, not only are the unconstitutional stop practices of the NPD falling most heavily on black individuals, but those massively additional stops are not yielding more evidence of crime. In other words, the stops are both impermissible and ineffective.
These racial disparities characterized every one of the NPD’s policing precincts and sectors, regardless of the racial makeup of those areas. For example, in the 3rd Precinct, which covers the southeast area of the city and has a relatively low black residential population (22%), black individuals have been stopped at a rate 5.5 times that of their white peers, with stops of black individuals totaling 4,819 and stops of white individuals totaling 2,194, despite white residents’ comprising 55% of the population. In the 4th Precinct, which covers the western area of the city, and where the residential population is heavily black (85%), black people accounted for 95%, or 14,693 of the stops, compared to 4%, or 572, stops of white people. When the precincts are broken down by sector, in 12 of Newark’s 29 sectors (including sectors from each of the four precincts), black people have been stopped at a rate more than 4 times that of white people. In some sectors in the 3rd Precinct, the stop rate for black individuals exceeded ten times the stop rate for white individuals.
b. Arrest Practices
The analysis of arrests by NPD officers over the three-and-a-half year period are almost identical to the analysis of pedestrian stops over that time period. Out of the 84,396 arrests in the three-and-a-half year period reviewed, 66,888, or 79.3%, were arrests of black people, while black residents accounted for 53.9% of Newark’s population. By comparison, only 5,567, or 6.6%, were arrests of white people, while non-Hispanic white residents account for 11.6% of Newark’s population.18 Stated differently, black individuals were 2.6 times more likely to be
17 These evidence recovery rates are provided for race-comparison reasons only. The NPD’s actual evidence recovery rates likely are materially lower than this, given the methodology of this review, which restricted the dataset of stops reviewed to those in which a warrant check was run, and the likelihood that the NPD did not complete this report for all stops. 18 Although there were anecdotal accounts of mistreatment of Hispanic individuals by NPD officers based on perceived ethnicity and national origin, particularly when these individuals have sought assistance from the police, the arrest data reviewed as part of this investigation did not show a disparity in arrests of Hispanics. Out of the 84,396 arrests, 10,277, or 12.2%, were arrests of Hispanic non-black individuals, compared to Hispanic non-black individuals accounting for 30.6% of Newark residents. As noted above, because the NPD’s stop data did not track
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arrested than white individuals in Newark. As with stops, the disparity held true across all NPD precincts and sectors. It is also consistent throughout most categories of arrests, based on charges reported at the time of arrest. It is crucial that the NPD implement data collection and analysis so that it can more fully understand the nature and causes of these racial disparities.
4. Quality of Life Citation Practices Have Been Ineffective and Have Facilitated Abuse
Community members, criminal justice stakeholders, and NPD officers and stakeholders widely recounted complaints about the NPD’s use of Quality of Life citations (commonly referred to by officers and community members as “blue summonses”). These citations are issued by NPD officers pursuant to Newark’s Municipal Code. Officers and residents alike perceive that the NPD issues these citations in order to satisfy quotas rather than to improve public safety. This perception alienates many community members and there is some evidence that calls into question the effectiveness of NPD’s use of Quality of Life citations on reducing crime in Newark.
During various time periods in recent years, NPD leadership reportedly instituted a quota to encourage officers to increase the number of citations issued. Officers’ eligibility for overtime and desirable assignments apparently were linked to meeting the Quality of Life citation quota, thus giving officers an incentive to issue more. Although there was conflicting information about whether a formal quota still exists, the perception of at least an unofficial quota persists among officers.
There were consistent reports from a variety of stakeholders that, in recent years, the NPD’s increased emphasis on the use of the citations, coupled with poor training,19 has disproportionately and ineffectively targeted black individuals. Because the NPD does not track race and ethnicity for citations, the DOJ could not confirm the accuracy of this perception. However, given the racially disparate effects of the NPD’s stop practices, the allegations that the citations disparately affect the black community have some basis.20
Moreover, complaints from NPD officers and—particularly in public housing projects— the community allege that the NPD’s practice of requiring officers to issue high numbers of citations results in officers’ focusing on convenient targets, rather than on the individuals involved in serious criminal activity. Issuing high numbers of citations, particularly if this
ethnicity until January of 2014, this investigation did not include an analysis of stops of Hispanics in Newark. Further inquiry is necessary to determine more conclusively whether the NPD’s police activities have a disparate impact on Hispanics. 19 That lack of appropriate training concerning Quality of Life citations results in officers’ improper issuance of citations is supported by the fact that these citations are dismissed by the municipal and county prosecutor’s offices approximately thirty percent of the time. 20 Community members and groups also raised concerns that the NPD inappropriately uses Quality of Life citations to target people with mental illness, people with disabilities, and seniors. During the site visit, members of the NPD command staff lacked a sufficient understanding and sophistication about issues related to mental illness and disabilities, highlighting the need for training on these issues. Some community members reported that seniors and people with disabilities are terrified of calling the police because they perceive that NPD officers will assume that they have mental health concerns and will treat them like suspects.
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practice is seen as focused on low level targets of opportunity rather than the individuals more likely to be involved in serious criminal activity, alienates potential allies in the community who might otherwise be helpful as witnesses, or in providing information related to crime.
C. USE OF FORCE
There is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Relying primarily on officers’ own descriptions of and justifications for the force they used, this review found that more than twenty percent of NPD officers’ reported uses of force were unreasonable and thus violated the Constitution. The investigation also revealed significant underreporting of force by NPD officers. This pattern and practice of unreasonable force both results from and is evidenced by failures in policy, supervision, investigation, training and discipline.
1. Legal Standards
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The use of excessive or unnecessary force by a law enforcement officer during an arrest or stop is considered an “unreasonable” seizure that violates the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). The assessment of reasonableness and, therefore, constitutionality of an officer’s use of force is objective. Just as an officer’s bad intentions will not render an objectively reasonable use of force unconstitutional, an objectively unreasonable use of force is unconstitutional, even where the officer had good intentions. Id. at 397. Determining whether the use of force was reasonable requires carefully balancing the risk of bodily harm that the officer’s actions pose to the individual in light of the threat to the public that the officer was trying to eliminate. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). In Graham, the Supreme Court noted that, in order to properly balance these interests, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances, including the severity of the crime, whether the subject posed an immediate threat to the officer or public safety, and whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to escape. Id.
2. NPD Format for Reporting and Tracking Force
The NPD’s use of force policy appropriately charges officers to use the “minimum force necessary to effect a lawful arrest” and officers must be able to “justify the degree of force used.” General Order 63-02. The policy requires that officers clearly document all uses of force in an Incident Report and complete a separate Use of Force Report, both of which are to be submitted to a supervisor for review and approval. The Use of Force Report (Form DPI:2000) (“Force Report”) is a paper form intended to track the specific details about use of force incidents. The Incident Report Form (Form DPI:802) (“Incident Report”) is an electronic record contained in the NPD’s Record Management System (“RMS”) that officers complete for all arrests, crime reports, uses of force and other incidents. Only the Incident Report includes a place to include a narrative description of an officer’s actions. The Force Report provides space to indicate what force was used, what resistance was encountered and whether there were injuries, but its format makes it impossible for a reviewer to tell what happened, especially in situations where more than one type of force is used, or force is used against more than one person. Upon approval,
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supervisors are to forward copies of both reports to the Office of the Police Director, Internal Affairs, and the Police Academy. In addition, the policy requires each precinct or unit to maintain file copies of the Incident, and Use of Force Reports (and any associated Arrest Reports).
The policy requires copies of Use of Force Reports to be forwarded to IA, where they are to be entered into a computerized case management system, IAPro, and for the Police Academy to retain them for “future purposes.”21 In apparent conflict with this policy, although IAPro appears to contain a record noting the occurrence of each use of force, very little of the data from the Use of Force Report is actually entered into the NPD’s data system for tracking or further analysis. The omission of this detailed data from any electronic database limits the ability of the NPD to track and analyze officer use of force practices for accountability, training, or officer safety purposes.
3. NPD’s Unreasonable Use of Force
With the assistance of experts, the team reviewed all 82 of the NPD’s IA investigations of allegations of excessive force for the eighteen-month period, from January 2010 to June 2011.22 In 67 of these investigative files, IA determined that NPD officers had used force and IA then made efforts to conduct an investigation.23 Yet, IA did not find the force used by officers in any of these investigations to be unreasonable. In fact, IA sustained only one excessive force allegation in the six-year period from 2007 to 2012.
The DOJ’s review yielded very different results. Upon evaluating the information in these 67 files, the investigation concluded that 14 incidents involved the use of unreasonable force by NPD officers, some of which are described below. In 27 other incidents, the documentation of the internal affairs investigation lacked sufficient information to allow an assessment of whether the force was reasonable.
In addition to its review of IA investigations, the team also evaluated the NPD’s Force and Incident Reports for the nine-month period from January 1, 2011, to October 4, 2011 by selecting a statistically significant, random sample of 100 out of 336 incidents for review. Because the Force Reports included only officers’ accounts, without any documented investigation or additional information gathering by the NPD, such as interviews with victims or third-party witnesses, the review simply examined whether the officers provided sufficient
21 The policy does not describe what those future purposes might entail, apart from an additional requirement for IA to include in its monthly reports a summary of all uses of force and firearm discharges that occurred. 22 To assess the NPD’s use of force, the team reviewed NPD’s Force Reports, Incident Reports, Internal Affairs investigations of excessive force allegations, and investigations of shootings in which officers were involved. Because this review of individual incidents relied on the same documentation that was available at the time of the incidents to the NPD’s direct supervisors and IA investigators, it permitted an assessment of both the reasonableness of each force incident and the supervisory or investigatory process that followed. Interviews with NPD officials, from line officers to NPD leadership, were also critical to evaluating the NPD’s use of force, as was information from other law enforcement stakeholders, community groups and individuals. 23 In 15 of these 82 investigations, the NPD either affirmatively concluded that the incidents did not occur, or was unable to confirm that the allegations involved NPD officers and halted the investigation. As a result, these investigation files contained insufficient information for review and were excluded.
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justification for their uses of force in their own reports. Similar to the results of the IA force investigation review, in nearly one third of the Force and Incident Reports reviewed, the force appeared unreasonable, and thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment, based on the officer’s own description of the nature of and reason for the use of force. In a significant number of additional incidents the reporting was too unclear to permit an assessment of whether the force used was reasonable. Force appeared reasonable on its face in only a little more than half of the 100 Force and Incident Reports reviewed.24
a. Examples of NPD’s Use of Unreasonable Force
The overall impression of this review is that NPD officers escalate common policing situations, in which force should be unnecessary or relatively minimal, to situations in which they use significant force, sometimes unreasonably. Taken as a whole, the investigation revealed that NPD officers too often use open and closed fist strikes, especially to the head of the subject. In many cases, these actions were not necessary for the officer to control the situation and seemed to be simply retaliatory.
The NPD’s own force documents helped explain why many in the community perceive NPD officers as needlessly escalating incidents, rather than as officers committed to protecting their community. Indeed, the NPD appears to be a department that too frequently turns to force as its first option when dealing with the public.
In one incident, for example, while an officer was escorting an intoxicated 140-pound, 69-year-old man from a store, the man grabbed the officer’s upper chest. The officer reported that he punched the man twice in the face in response.
In another incident, a man suffered a concussion, loss of consciousness, and bruises and cuts after a detective in plainclothes struck him several times in the face with a closed fist. The detective’s incident report indicates that the man swung first, but acknowledged that the detective had startled the man with his sudden presence behind him. The police practice experts who reviewed this incident for this investigation noted this response did not appear to be a defensive or control tactic, but rather was retaliatory. Additionally, a sergeant on the scene admitted during the IA investigation that, although he had kicked the man, he did not complete a Force Report as required by policy. Despite the severity of his injuries, the man was not taken to the hospital until he complained of mouth pain at the police station. Further, while the man’s hospital records were included in the investigative file, the loss of consciousness and concussion were barely acknowledged in the investigator’s summary, and appear not to have been discussed with the complainant.
Another aspect of the pattern of unreasonable force is the number of incidents in which officers appeared to respond with significant force against individuals who questioned police activities, sometimes, in the language of one police report, “in a loud and hostile manner.” In an incident more fully discussed in the assessment of arrest practices above, according to a citizen
24 Because the information available in these reports was less than that available in an internal affairs investigation, the review of the use of force reports was limited to an assessment of whether the officer’s own report of the incident adequately justified the officer’s actions.
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complaint, when a man asked a plainclothes officer why another individual had been stopped, the officer reportedly slammed the man to the ground and used a choke hold on him. When the man’s female cousin asked why the officer was choking her cousin, the officer kicked her in the ribs and placed both individuals in handcuffs. Both the officer’s account and the IA investigation are incomplete, raising questions about the reliability of the investigation: while the complainants alleged specific details, including a choke hold and a kick, the officer’s account was minimal and uninformative, reporting only that she and other officers “quelled” the behavior.
The investigation uncovered that officers also have used force in furtherance of an investigation rather than to effect a lawful arrest or prevent harm. In an incident in January 2011, two officers decided to conduct a “well-being check” of a man and woman whom they observed arguing, and called over to them. As the couple approached the officers, the officers reportedly observed the man put something into his mouth and ordered him to spit it out. When the man did not comply, one officer immediately placed him in a choke hold to prevent him from swallowing the item. The choke hold was unsuccessful. After the man had swallowed the item, he reportedly refused to give the officers his hands to be cuffed and was “taken to the ground and given two strikes to the side of his head.” Although the officer’s report states that he acted for the man’s safety as well as to prevent him from swallowing the item, the encounter at that point was voluntary and the officers had not established a basis for any seizure. Although police officers may use reasonable force to secure or prevent the destruction of evidence while conducting a lawful arrest, they must have constitutionally adequate grounds for doing so. In this and similar incidents, NPD officers have used force before establishing probable cause to justify a seizure, as is required by the Constitution. Additionally, in this instance the NPD failed to scrutinize the use of a choke hold as a potentially deadly use of force that likely was unreasonable in response to the man’s resistance.
b. Lack of Effective System for Use of Force Reporting and Review
The pattern of using unreasonable force is both perpetuated and further evidenced by significant problems with the NPD’s force reporting and review practices. First, although NPD policies in many (but far from all) respects comport with contemporary best practices, the NPD does not always follow its own force policies, contributing to and reflecting the pattern of unreasonable use of force. Second, the NPD lacks a robust process for supervisory review of officers’ use of force by first-line supervisors. Third, the NPD often fails to refer serious use of force cases to the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office for review for criminal prosecution. When the NPD has referred cases, the criminal referral prematurely has ended the NPD’s administrative investigations of serious force, including officer-involved shootings.
i. NPD’s Force Reporting and Supervisory Review Systems
Consistent with the discussion above describing a culture that facilitates unreasonable force, the review revealed an unacceptable tolerance within the NPD for Force Reports that are insufficient to permit meaningful review. In particular, officers’ reports repeatedly failed to describe the actions that prompted the use of force. Instead, officers frequently have made conclusory statements that a person was “resisting arrest,” “flailing his arms,” or “swinging his shoulders,” without providing the facts that would permit an assessment of whether the level of
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resistance warranted the level of force used in response. Similarly, officers often documented their actions with vague, conclusory, and non-descriptive language that failed to describe what force they used and why, such as:
 “appropriate amount of force to effect a lawful arrest”
 “necessary level of physical force”
 “placed under arrest after a struggle”
 “all necessary force”
Other problematic descriptions of force indicated only that, after some unspecified amount and type of force, the subject was placed in handcuffs:
 “administered several compliance holds to handcuff and then escort”
 “attempted to handcuff him as he violently resisted being handcuffed. [Officers] eventually were able to place [the suspect] into handcuffs.”
 “after several attempts … [three officers] were finally able to put handcuffs on the suspect.”
Such descriptions make it impossible for a supervisor, investigator, or outside reviewer to determine whether the force used by officers in these situations was reasonable, or even whether the officers’ tactics raise officer safety concerns. Yet, there was no indication in the records that supervisors questioned the adequacy of officers’ force descriptions, or requested additional information. In fact, of more than 300 Force Reports reviewed as part of this investigation, supervisors approved every use of force description, including those DOJ found to be deficient.
It is widely accepted and understood in the field of modern policing that, without meaningful review of officers’ use of force, it is more difficult to detect and correct uses of unreasonable force and officer safety issues, or to identify training needs, poor tactics, policy failures or inadequate equipment. Without routine, thorough force review, officers may become less careful about whether they use force consistently with policy or law. Poor decisions, bad tactics, and lax adherence to policy and law can reinforce themselves over time and become a part of the culture. Without effective supervisory review, the lines of accountability throughout the Department weaken, making it more difficult for leadership to promote and ensure its operational mandates and vision.
The NPD’s Force Report, meant to facilitate NPD’s tracking and assessment of officer force, instead facilitates both poor reporting and ineffective review. The Force Report is intended to track the specific details when force is used, including the name, age and race of the individual(s) involved, the level of resistance the officer encountered, the type of force used, and whether anyone was injured or received medical treatment. While these are all important details for the NPD to document and track, the Force Report’s usefulness as a management tool is undermined by its failure to require a narrative description of the event and an explanation of the connection between an individual’s behavior and the officer’s use of force. For example, when
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an officer uses more than one type of force, the Force Report provides no way of indicating which force was used first or what behavior prompted it. Similarly, if force was used against multiple individuals, the form offers a reviewer no way of discerning what force was used against which specific individual. By contrast, the New Jersey State Attorney General’s Guidelines on Use of Force include a model Use of Force Report—albeit last revised in 2001— that, although organized differently, does require information regarding what force was used against a specific individual when multiple individuals are involved.
Pursuant to NPD policy, NPD officers are instead instructed to describe their uses of force in the narrative of the Incident Report Form, a separate electronic form. Although Force Reports and Incident Reports can be cross-referenced by the unique, computer-generated Criminal Complaint Number assigned to every incident, the NPD does not file the two reports together. Indeed, completed Force Reports are routed differently through the NPD than their related Incident Reports, and they are neither tracked nor routinely evaluated together by NPD supervisors. Thus, unless supervisors match up each Force Report with its corresponding Incident Report (a time-consuming process completed for this investigation), supervisors reviewing Force Reports do not see the accompanying narrative in the Incident Report that, theoretically at least, describes what happened. Nor is there any other mechanism within the NPD to ensure that this comprehensive force review occurs: IA staff reported that, although they track the number of force incidents, they have no responsibility to review individual officers’ Force Reports to ensure that the reports are accurate and complete.
Exacerbating these problems, the NPD tolerates significant underreporting of force by its officers. In 30% of the Incident Reports reviewed that described a use of force, the officer did not complete the required Force Report. Similarly, in at least a dozen of the approximately 87 internal affairs investigations of force complaints, officers reported uses of force during internal affairs interviews that they had failed to document contemporaneously in Force Reports. Thus, if the complainants in these cases had not come forward to pursue allegations of excessive force, there would have been no record that these officers even had used force.
The NPD has not held officers accountable for failing to document their uses of force, even though this is a clear violation of the NPD’s use of force policy,25 and the NPD’s IA policy requires investigators to pursue evidence that an officer violated department rules or engaged in other misconduct, even if that misconduct was not the basis for the original complaint.26 The NPD’s tolerance of officers’ failure to report force therefore suggests that NPD condones such behavior, and may well significantly contribute to the widespread underreporting of force.
Acknowledging the deficiencies in the NPD’s use of force reporting and review systems, NPD’s leadership reports that it has created a Use of Force Review Board to more closely assess uses of force and patterns of officer behavior. While establishing such a board is a necessary component of an adequate force review system, the NPD must also ensure that officers diligently report force and that supervisors, or dedicated force investigators, are equally diligent in their reviews.
25 See GO 63-02 at 9. 26 See GO 05-04 at 14.
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ii. NPD’s Administrative and Criminal Force Review Systems
NPD also has mishandled serious use of force incidents that require both criminal and administrative review, including cases where officers have used deadly force. In particular, the NPD often has failed to refer serious use of force cases to the ECPO to be considered for criminal prosecution, and when the NPD has done so, the criminal referral inappropriately has ended the NPD’s administrative investigation.
1. Failure to Appropriately Review Cases Involving Serious Use of Force
The NPD’s policies require IA to refer to the ECPO any complaint “where a preliminary investigation indicates that the accused officer may have engaged in a criminal act or used force which resulted in serious bodily injury or death.”27 IA staff reported that all excessive force allegations are referred to the ECPO, not just allegations involving serious bodily injury or death as required by policy. However, this claim was not substantiated by the review of IA files. Instead, the review shows that, in practice, some excessive force files are referred to the ECPO, some are reviewed internally only by IA, and still others may be reviewed only at the command level without ever being assessed by IA.
This review revealed multiple instances in which credible complaints of potentially criminal uses of force were not referred to prosecutors for review, even though by any objective measure they should have been. For example, in one investigation a complainant alleged that he was physically assaulted by four officers at the Green Street Cell Block. He reported suffering a broken nose, lacerated lip and bruises to his cheek. Officers acknowledged administering blows to the complainant’s torso after they had already taken him to the ground. This review determined that the force used appeared excessive and potentially criminal under the relevant legal standards, but the NPD never referred this case to the ECPO.
When the NPD has referred excessive force allegations to the ECPO and the ECPO has declined to prosecute the case, the NPD routinely has closed the administrative case with little additional investigation. Some NPD investigators expressly have relied on the prosecutor’s decision not to proceed to justify an exoneration recommendation. One IA investigator wrote in support of his recommendation to clear an officer that the ECPO “determined there was insufficient evidence to warrant criminal prosecution. Therefore, the actions of the officers were within the legal realm of their responsibilities and functions as Newark Police Officers.” There are numerous other cases where the investigator received notice of non-prosecution from the ECPO, and closed the investigation mere days later.28 See Garcia v. City of Newark, 2011 WL 689616 *4 (D.N.J. Feb 16, 2011) (noting, in a civil case alleging that NPD officers engaged in excessive force, that NPD’s “IA investigator . . . stated that he has never sustained an excessive force allegation unless the Prosecutor had already found sufficient evidence to bring a criminal charge.”).
27 Id. at 9.
 28 The IA investigators usually requested written statements from the accused officers, but this appears to have been
 a formality, based on the subsequent lack of investigation and quick closure of the file. 

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The standard for criminal conviction and the standard for sustaining an administrative complaint are significantly different, and a decision by the ECPO not to prosecute criminally does not mean that an officer acted legally or in keeping with NPD policies. The NPD’s practice results in failures to sufficiently investigate serious uses of force and recommend appropriate disciplinary action, and is contrary to both the expectations of the ECPO and the New Jersey Attorney General’s IA Guidelines, which require that the NPD take appropriate administrative action even when cases are not criminally prosecuted. N.J. AG Guidelines at 20.
2. Inadequate Review of Officers’ Use of Deadly Force
The most significant and “intrusive” use of force is the use of deadly force, which can result in the taking of human life, “frustrat[ing] the interest of . . . society in judicial determination of guilt and punishment.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). Because deadly force poses such a high risk, it must be closely reviewed and controlled by a police department to ensure that it is used only when justified. Deadly force incidents, such as officerinvolved shootings, also often draw substantial attention to the Department, and can be a source of significant tension with the community when a police department responds inappropriately.
NPD’s handling of officer-involved shootings has fallen strikingly short of generally accepted police practices. The NPD has not conducted adequate administrative investigations to determine if officer-involved shootings violate NPD policy. Indeed the investigations of all 29 officer-involved shootings between May 2010 and January 2012 were generally incomplete.29 This deficiency is partly due to how the NPD has handled its split jurisdiction with the ECPO for shootings involving law enforcement officers. The ECPO conducts the criminal investigation, while the NPD retains authority for the administrative review. However, as with its handling of other serious uses of force as described above, the NPD has misunderstood or misapplied the distinction between criminal and administrative investigations and abdicated its independent responsibility to conduct an administrative investigation to determine whether officer-involved shootings violate NPD policy or present officer safety concerns.
Criminal and administrative investigations of officer-involved shootings are both critical processes for a police department and the community it serves. A criminal investigation assesses the lawfulness of the use of force and may result in prosecution. The administrative review assesses whether the incident involved any violation of policy and whether it raises any tactical, training, or other concerns for the agency. The NPD starts an administrative investigation after each officer-involved shooting, but always suspends the administrative investigation while the ECPO conducts a criminal review. A blanket rule of not conducting an administrative investigation of a shooting pending completion of the criminal review is problematic due to the unnecessary delay it imposes, but it is less troubling if the administrative investigation restarts once it is clear it will not interfere with a potential criminal prosecution. However, it appears that the NPD has not resumed its administrative review of the use of force once the ECPO has completed its criminal review and declines to prosecute. This is consistent with all IA
29 Of these 29 officer-involved shootings, thirteen were confirmed hits, twelve were confirmed misses, and four were of unknown effect. According to NPD reports, five of the shootings resulted in critical injuries and four were fatal.
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investigators’ statements that, once a criminal review is initiated, they are precluded from taking administrative action regarding the use of deadly force, although they may investigate and take action for any other rule violations that may be identified.
Therefore, when the NPD suspends its administrative investigation pending criminal review, the NPD effectively ends its review of the incident.30 The NPD’s files do not include material gathered by the ECPO for its criminal review, and the NPD has not itself collected or considered critical evidence, or its absence.31 For example, some files lack photographs or diagrams of the scene or even a clear description of a subject’s injuries. Others lack a coroner’s report discussing the cause of death. The files do not contain statements from the subjects of the shootings, or any indication that the investigator tried to obtain such statements. The NPD’s response to officer-involved shootings appears to have been based only on the perspective of officers who were involved as witnesses and friendly civilian witnesses. The lack of thoroughness of NPD’s officer-involved shooting investigations is reflected in the brevity of the investigative files: one investigation file of a fatal shooting was nine pages long, and another file where the shooting left the subject in critical condition was twelve pages.
As a result of the NPD’s practice of not conducting meaningful administrative investigations, shootings that violate policy, but have not been criminally prosecuted, have avoided review. Except in the extremely rare instance where a shooting is prosecuted criminally, there is no possibility of holding officers accountable, or determining whether there were training or other failures. Indeed, while the NPD’s lack of investigations made it impossible to draw firm conclusions about any shooting based upon the investigative file, at least one appeared unreasonable based solely on the documents available.
The NPD’s weak investigations of officer-involved shootings provide a patina of oversight that is wholly insufficient to determine whether shootings are justified. Further, because it has conducted no investigation, the NPD has had little information to assess the need for changes to training, equipment, policies or tactics that may be placing officers and civilians at risk. By not conducting thorough investigations followed by appropriate disciplinary action when warranted, the NPD fails to deter officers from using deadly force unnecessarily and decreases public confidence that the NPD is exercising appropriate supervision and review.
D. THEFT
There is reasonable cause to believe that NPD officers have engaged in a pattern or practice of theft from civilians, and that the NPD has taken inadequate measures to prevent, investigate, and remediate incidents and allegations of such theft.
30 While there is no good rationale for the NPD’s practice of dispensing with an administrative review altogether, delaying initiation of the administrative review may be the result of the potentially confusing guidance offered in the Attorney General’s guidelines on how departments should proceed in these situations. During the course of this investigation the Attorney General’s Office expressed its interest in considering modifications to its guidelines to provide greater clarity. 31 With the potential exception of Grand Jury secrecy and similar requirements, there is no legal barrier to including information from a criminal investigative file in an administrative investigation.
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1. Legal Standards
Law enforcement officers who extort and rob persons of their property violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of those individuals. See e.g., Hernandez v. Borough of Palisades Park Police Dep’t, 58 Fed. Appx. 909, 912 (3d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. McClean, 528 F.2d 1250 (2d Cir. 1976).
2. Theft by NPD Officers
The team reviewed numerous documents produced by the NPD, including general orders, audits, disciplinary histories for officers assigned to the Narcotics and Gang Bureau, and all thirty IA files provided by the NPD involving allegations of theft or lost property. The evidence makes clear that theft from arrestees has been more than an aberration limited to a few officers or incidents within NPD. Examples of the problem include allegations of theft of money and drugs during arrests and allegedly deliberate failure to return money and property such as wallets, cell phones, jewelry, and car keys upon arrestees’ release by the NPD.32
The NPD has been aware for several years that theft by some of its officers is a serious problem. The Special Investigations Unit and IA have conducted several reviews of officers with high numbers of theft complaints.33 Some of the officers reviewed in the NPD’s internal reports had more than ten complaints of theft in a period of two to three years, and many additional complaints of other misconduct, generated both internally, by the NPD, and externally, by civilians. The NPD’s reviews concluded that theft of civilians’ property and money by officers was particularly problematic in the NPD’s specialized units, such as narcotics and gangs, and in the prisoner processing unit at the NPD’s Green Street Cell Block.34 Moreover, these reports reflected that theft had become a problem not only with line officers, but also with more highly ranked officers and supervisors. Yet the NPD did not sustain any of the misconduct complaints of theft against any of the officers with the largest number of incidents. Further, the NPD’s internal documents mirror the many accounts of NPD theft alleged by community members and other criminal justice stakeholders, including law enforcement. Indeed, while the DOJ’s investigation was ongoing, there were several high-profile incidents of alleged theft by NPD officers.
The issue of theft is especially evident at the Green Street holding facility. On several occasions the Essex County Jail has rejected the property bags of prisoners transferred from Green Street because of discrepancies between prisoner property and their corresponding inventory forms. A late 2009 NPD memorandum indicated that property bags were being opened and money or property removed at Green Street. The NPD installed video cameras in the Prisoner Processing Division to determine who was stealing from the property bags. In 2011 the
32 Review of this issue was hindered by the deficiencies in IA investigations discussed later in this report, as well as NPD’s inability to provide all of the documents requested. Specifically, the NPD was unable to provide documents evidencing actions taken in response to the policy recommendations made by the Special Investigations Unit or to confirm that no additional documents existed. 33 According to an NPD internal memorandum, ten officers generated 42 investigations of theft complaints in a two­ and-a-half year period. 34 The NPD holds detainees at a 58-cell facility on the lower level of its building at 31 Green Street.
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cameras recorded two officers—including a supervisor—disabling the camera. Although these two officers were charged with misconduct, neither was ever disciplined for tampering with the video cameras: the NPD terminated one officer for unrelated reasons and allowed the other to retire without sanctioning him, even though he had been being found guilty in a police trial regarding this incident.
The ECPO also has expressed concern with the handling of arrestees’ property by the NPD. In one instance of theft (where a prisoner’s property bag was found to have been ripped open and fixed with a staple), the matter was referred to the ECPO for criminal investigation. After more than a year of investigating this incident, the ECPO declined prosecution in March 2012, noting that “even though it is evident that a theft did occur, no specific officer can be identified for prosecution.” The ECPO also noted that “after a thorough investigation, it appears that the NPD’s’ general orders regarding the custody and inventory of prisoners’ property at 31 Green Street ha[ve] been fundamentally deficient for some time,” but that the ECPO hoped the new holding facility in police headquarters on Clinton Avenue “is better equipped to safeguard prisoners’ personal property.” Although the NPD had planned to transfer its detention operations from Green Street to the new police headquarters on Clinton Avenue, that transition has been delayed indefinitely.
3. NPD Practices Have Failed to Adequately Address Theft by Officers
Despite its awareness of the theft problem, the NPD has not enforced its own rules regarding theft prevention, has conducted inadequate investigations into theft complaints, has failed to take corrective action against offending officers, and has not taken other steps it knows are necessary to prevent or effectively respond to theft allegations. The NPD has failed to follow through on the recommendations of its own internal audits and reviews regarding theft, including reassigning the problem officers out of specialized units, video monitoring the Prisoner Processing Division, and requiring supervisors to inspect and document prisoner property. Instead, the NPD has routinely allowed officers with multiple theft complaints to be assigned to or remain in units with the most opportunity for theft, and then—contrary to its own recommendations—has failed even to monitor or conduct internal integrity checks of these officers.
The NPD’s lax response to allegations of theft by officers is longstanding and remained evident during this investigation. For example, despite the 2009 memorandum and other information alerting the NPD to problems in its property room, an early 2013 visit to the property room revealed that many obvious, easily correctable deficiencies still lingered: the property room door did not automatically lock; valuables other than cash were not stored as securely as cash; documentation of property was limited to a handwritten log book; property was not counted and inventoried by at least two people; and there appeared to be no systematic inspection of property bags for damage.
a. Failure to Adequately Screen Candidates for Specialized Units
Accusations of theft and corruption are most often leveled against officers in specialized units—particularly the various narcotics, gang, and street crimes units—where officers often come into contact with individuals carrying large sums of money. The NPD is well aware of this
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pattern: a 2010 internal review showed that the officers with the most theft complaints had been assigned almost exclusively to specialized units like the Central Narcotics Enforcement Team, the precinct Narcotics Enforcement Teams, the Narcotics Gang Enforcement Bureau, and the Street Crimes Task Force. Recognizing that inadequate screening has allowed such problems to occur, the NPD’s Special Investigations Unit recommended a policy of thoroughly reviewing an officer's IA history before assignment to a specialized unit. Despite the clear need for such a policy, the NPD did not act on this recommendation.
Nor has the NPD implemented screening measures to ensure assignment of officers with appropriate and tested integrity to these units. Newark’s assignment policy, General Order 96­ 08, includes general requirements for an officer’s becoming a member of a specialized unit: two years on patrol before a police officer can join a precinct narcotics enforcement team; two years of experience on a precinct narcotics team or anti-crime unit before a detective can join the Centralized Narcotics Division. This bare two-year service requirement may be waived for department “need,” a term not defined in the policy.
The NPD’s assignment policy does not include any other criteria, let alone rigorous, objective, integrity-based criteria designed to minimize the possibility of theft or other forms of corruption, such as the absence of any history of dishonesty, theft, or similar allegations. Of most concern among these deficiencies is the lack of any prohibition against assigning officers with multiple theft complaints—even sustained theft complaints—to specialized units. The policy instead places a restriction on assignments in instances where an officer affirmatively requests a particular assignment, and provides that such a request will be denied if the officer has a pending “major” disciplinary case, discipline greater than three days’ suspension within the past twelve months, or two prior findings of guilty by trial board within the past twelve months. Other than these very narrow restrictions, the assignment policy does not limit selection of officers for the units, even if they have had prior discipline for theft, have been the recipients of multiple theft allegations, or other integrity-related complaints (e.g., truthfulness, falsifying reports, etc.). The assignment policy does not set a maximum number of theft complaints for candidates or otherwise discuss what kind of disciplinary history would be acceptable. These inadequate screening procedures allow officers with multiple theft complaints to be assigned to a specialized unit or transferred to another specialized unit while continuing to accumulate integrity-related complaints.
b. Failure to Follow the NPD’s Established Rotation Policy
Rotating personnel out of specialized units is an essential tool for combating theft and corruption in police departments. NPD policy clearly recognizes as much, stating in General Order 96-08 that rotation is an “effective method at controlling police misconduct” designed to “minimize complacency and prevent corruption.” According to the rotation policy, officers are limited to two years in a narcotics unit and one year in a vice unit before they must be rotated to another assignment. The policy also requires the Human Resources Unit to notify officers in advance of the expiration of their term that they should submit a request for transfer.
Although command staff emphasized the importance of such a rotation procedure in interviews during the investigation, the NPD largely has failed to enforce its “mandatory” policy. Many of the NPD officers with the highest number of theft complaints remained in specialized
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units beyond the maximum amount of time provided in the rotation policy. In fact, in several instances where memoranda made specific recommendations to enforce the rotation policy and rotate the officers with the highest number of theft complaints out of their units, the NPD did not transfer these officers for many months, and in some instances, transferred them to other specialized units with similar opportunities for theft. In one egregious example, an internal report recommended a transfer for an officer with more than ten theft complaints in just four years, but this officer was not transferred to a non-specialized unit (i.e., a unit that did not focus on narcotics or vice) until ten months later, more than two years after he had initially been identified as one of the officers with the most theft complaints lodged against him. Indeed, in the three years after this officer was first identified as a top offender he accumulated an additional six theft complaints.
Not only has the NPD ignored its own rotation policy, but the policy is itself inadequate. While the policy sets a maximum amount of time in a particular specialized unit (e.g., two years in narcotics), there is no restriction on the number of rotations in a specialized unit or on transfers from one specialized unit to another, and then back again. There is also no requirement that officers who accumulate one or more theft or other integrity-related complaints will be rotated out of these assignments before the maximum time has elapsed. The fact that officers in specialized units continued to accumulate civilian complaints underscores the importance and effectiveness of adhering to a rigorous and regular rotation policy.
c. Failure to Monitor Problem Officers or Conduct Integrity Tests
The NPD itself recommended integrity tests and closer monitoring in 2010 in connection with the NPD’s internal review of officers with the highest number of theft complaints. Although such measures are an integral tool for combating theft, there is no information suggesting that the NPD took any action on these important recommendations.
As part of a comprehensive approach to reducing the incidence of theft, the NPD should conduct regular integrity tests not only in response to allegations against specific officers, but routinely throughout the Department, both on a random and a targeted basis. The NPD should monitor officers suspected of theft, including those with high numbers of complaints.
E. INADEQUATE MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
An effective system for investigating complaints of officer misconduct is a basic component of any department’s accountability. Such a system requires the prompt and thorough investigation of civilian complaints; the sustaining of those complaints when they are supported by a preponderance of the evidence; and the imposition of fair and consistent discipline when appropriate. By contrast, a police department that fails to adequately investigate civilians’ allegations of misconduct through its IA system tacitly permits officers to engage in such conduct. See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a deficient internal investigation process is evidence of a custom tolerating the tacit use of excessive force by police officers).
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Much like the IA system assessed in Beck, the NPD’s system for investigating civilian complaints appears to have been “structured to curtail disciplinary action and stifle investigations into the credibility of the City’s police officers.” Id. While the NPD has severely and inconsistently disciplined officers for internal rule violations, there are serious deficiencies in the NPD’s handling of civilian complaints that translate to a lack of accountability for serious misconduct.35 For example, as noted above, according to the NPD’s own records, IA sustained only one misconduct complaint of excessive force in the six-year time period from 2007 through 2012. Every police department is different and there is no threshold percentage of sustained complaints that a law enforcement agency must attain in order to demonstrate that its investigations of misconduct complaints are effective. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the NPD’s failure to sustain more than one excessive force complaint in six years is implausible on its face and appears significantly aberrant: a 2006 Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report found that large municipal police departments sustained an average of 8% of citizens’ complaints about police use of force.36
Similarly, summaries of IA investigations involving complaints of theft from 2009 to 2011 and disciplinary histories of officers assigned to the Central Narcotics Unit in August 2011 (which included more than fifty theft complaints over six years against these officers) indicated that the NPD sustained allegations against only two officers.37 This means that officers with high numbers of credible complaints that have not been adequately investigated by the NPD, as discussed below, have continued to work on the force, often in the specialized unit from which the complaints originate, without any discipline or other corrective action, such as re-training or increased supervision.38
The NPD’s low rate of sustaining civilian complaints has not been limited to allegations of theft or excessive force. In 2010, only 38 out of 814 (4.6%) complaints by civilians were sustained. In 2011, only 29 out of 601 (4.8%) civilian complaints were sustained. In 2012, 38 of 561 (6.8%) civilian complaints were sustained. This slight increase between 2011 and 2012 appears to have resulted from an increase in the number of relatively low-level “demeanor”
35 The assessment of NPD’s IA and disciplinary processes included a review of the NPD’s policies and general orders related to IA and the disciplinary process, IA data on complaint intake and adjudication provided by the NPD, annual reports, an external audit conducted by the ECPO, interviews of IA command staff, the commanders responsible for making disciplinary decisions, and officers familiar with the disciplinary process, and a review of all of the IA files provided by the NPD where individuals alleged that they were subjected to excessive force, unlawful arrests, or theft during a period of approximately 18 months, from January 2010 to June 2011. In addition, members of the community and advocates provided feedback about their experience pursuing complaints through the NPD’s
IA process.
36 Citizen Complaints about Police Use of Force, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, June 2006. The report did not address whether an 8% sustained rate is appropriate or acceptable. The report further noted that many factors, including variations between departments in complaint intake, review and documentation processes, can skew data in either direction. 37Although certain documents reflect that administrative charges were sustained against these two officers in 2009 for failing to properly document the receipt of a prisoner's property, the NPD provided no information whether these officers went to police trial on these charges, or whether they were ever disciplined. 38Poor record-keeping by the NPD and incomplete production of requested records prevented a review of all theftrelated IA files and the outcome of all investigations.
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complaints sustained. These sustained complaints were generally either ancillary to criminal charges (in which another law enforcement agency had already charged the officer with an offense), or were for low-level rule violations such as “neglect of duty” or “language” (e.g. derogatory speech). Overall, it has been exceedingly rare for the NPD to sustain citizen complaints of misconduct, particularly serious misconduct.
The NPD is far more likely to sustain complaints against officers when the complaint is made by another NPD officer or a supervisor. The sustained rates of internally generated complaints, while decreasing, are strikingly high: of the 653 internal complaints filed in 2010, 453 (69.3%) were sustained. In 2011, of the 291 internal complaints filed, 171 (59%) were sustained, and in 2012, 285 internal complaints were filed and 153 (53.6%) were sustained.
The NPD has been aware of deficiencies in its internal affairs system since at least February 2011, when a federal court found that the NPD condoned police officers’ use of excessive force by failing to adequately investigate civilian complaints. The ruling in Garcia v. City of Newark, No. 08-1725 (SRC), 2011 WL 689616 at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2011), was based in part on expert testimony that “it is the custom, practice and policy of the [Newark Police Department] to stringently discipline any misconduct against the organization itself but pay little or no attention to complaints from citizens, especially those regarding use of force.” 2011 WL 689616 at *4 (D.N.J. Feb 16, 2011) (unpublished). Although, the district court issued this opinion just three months before this investigation commenced, the NPD appears to have done little since the court’s admonishment to improve its practices. Indeed, the NPD reduced the staffing of its IA by more than half in 2011 and 2012, making it more difficult to adequately investigate allegations of officer misconduct.
1. Overview of NPD’s Internal Affairs Process
The NPD’s IA process begins when the complainant completes a form called an Investigation of Personnel Report (“IOP”). A complaint can be filed by a civilian (“external” complaint) or by a member of the Department (“departmental” or “internal” complaint). The NPD then divides complaints into two categories: major offenses and minor offenses. Major offenses are those that may result in a penalty of more than five days of suspension, and minor offenses are those where the penalty may not exceed five days. The list of major offenses is not exhaustive, and in practice is highly variable.39 Unlike many modern police agencies, NPD policy does not set out the presumptive punishment for various categories of offenses: that failure reduces transparency and compromises consistency in discipline.
Once categorized by IA, minor and major offenses follow two separate processes. Each precinct has a dedicated Integrity Control Officer (“ICO”) who is responsible for investigating allegations of minor offenses. Minor offenses are typically resolved at a “Disciplinary
39 The NPD’s General Order categorizes the following as major offenses, and specifies that the list is not exhaustive: criminal offenses or allegations of criminal acts; aggravated insubordination; unauthorized discharge of firearms; refusal to submit to drug screening; and violations of Radio Discipline. See General Order 93-2 (“Disciplinary Process”), April 1, 2010, at 4.
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Conference,” where a precinct or division commander conducts an administrative review of the alleged offense.40
By contrast, the NPD’s IA unit investigates major offenses. NPD policies require that the IA investigator document the investigation in a report and recommend one of four findings: Exonerated, Sustained, Not Sustained, or Unfounded.41 The IA Commander, who is responsible for managing IA’s daily operations, the IA Executive Officer (the second-in-command), and the Police Director subsequently review the report and either accept the investigator’s recommendation, override it and issue a different finding, or ask the investigator to seek additional evidence. If, after that review, an allegation against an employee is ultimately “sustained,” a formal Complaint Against Personnel (“CAP”) is initiated, charging the officer with the relevant policy violation. Once a CAP is filed, the NPD’s complaint adjudication process is triggered and the accused officer is notified to appear before the Trial Board.
The Trial Board is a three-member panel consisting of the Police Director’s designee and two commanders.42 NPD policy mandates that Trial Board proceedings “shall be informal” and the parties are not bound by the rules of evidence.43 The policy states “[t]he sole purpose of the Trial Board is to determine the facts and situations surrounding a case,” and to “determin[e] the truth.” 44 Although a sustained finding by Internal Affairs amounts only to a charge and is not a formal finding of guilt or innocence, Trial Board members reported that their main function is to sustain the decisions of Internal Affairs.45 Officers similarly perceive that the Trial Board makes decisions about an officer’s guilt or innocence before the evidence against the officer is tested at the hearing.
Pursuant to state law, disciplinary sanctions imposed through the Trial Board process may be appealed through the Office of Administrative Law and the Civil Service Commission, and then to the Superior Court of New Jersey. The NPD can impose administrative sanctions prior to the completion of the appeal process. NPD staff reported that it can take more than two years to complete this process, which potentially magnifies the burden imposed on officers by an arbitrary disciplinary decision.
40 See General Order 93-2.
 41 See General Order 05-04 (“IA”), September 21, 2005 at 14:
 Exonerated: When the evidence indicates that the act complained of did in fact occur but the action taken by the 
 officer was legal and the officer was in compliance with Department policies and procedures, or an incident
 occurred and the officer was not involved.
 Sustained: When the facts support the complaint and the Investigator reasonably believes that the incident occurred 
 and that involved officers(s) engaged in the violation of Department policy/procedure and/or Criminal
 Law/Ordinances.
 Not sustained: When the facts and/or investigation fails to disclose sufficient information to clearly prove or
 disprove the allegation or when material conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the accused employee. 
 Unfounded: Indicates that the act complained of did not occur and the complaint is false.
 42 See General Order 93-02 (“Disciplinary Process”), April 27, 2011 at 3.
 43 See G.O. 93-02 at 8.
 44 See G.O. 93-02 at 8.
 45 See G.O. 93-02 at 8.

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2. Investigative Deficiencies
a. Failure to Collect Evidence from Complainants
IA records reflect that IA investigators failed to make consistent attempts to follow up with complainants to clarify critical facts. Similarly, community members reported filing complaints with IA and receiving little or no subsequent contact from investigators. In order to conduct an effective investigation, investigators must exhaust reasonable means to contact a person, including telephone calls and in-person attempts, and document what steps were taken to do so. Moreover, in cases alleging serious misconduct such as excessive force, where the complaint is credible upon review, the NPD should move forward with the investigation, even if the complainant cannot be reached.
b. Failure to Objectively Assess Evidence from Officers, Complainants, and Witnesses
When investigating civilian complaints, NPD investigators have routinely failed to probe officers’ accounts or assess officer credibility. IA investigators have not, for example, inquired further when officers’ Force Reports or interviews with subjects have included non-descriptive language such as the “necessary level of force” or “minimum force necessary.” Investigators instead appeared to have presumed that officers had not used excessive force or committed other violations alleged, even when that presumption was plainly refuted by the weight of the evidence.
Consistent with the NPD’s practice of accepting officers’ accounts with little critical analysis, investigators failed to give statements from complainants and witnesses sufficient weight. And investigators generally discredited statements that did not support accused officers’ accounts. For example, a complainant alleged that an officer threatened to hurt him, pulled him into the precinct bathroom, beat him, and pushed him through the bathroom window, shattering the glass and causing lacerations to the front and back of his head. A witness reported seeing the officer threaten the complainant, force him into the bathroom, and throw him into the window. She then observed the complainant having seizures and a group of officers enter the bathroom and shut the door. In exonerating the officer, IA concluded that the incident did occur, but accepted without question the officer’s description in the incident report that the officer “lunged forward to close the gap that was between him and [the complainant] after [the complainant] threw a punch at him. His forward momentum caused their bodies to collide, which caused [the complainant] to fall forward and into the window.” The investigator never interviewed the officer and ignored the complainant’s and corroborating witness’s statements.
Even minor conflicts between complainant and witness accounts have often been deemed fatal to a complainant’s credibility, whereas IA investigators have not similarly probed conflicts between officers’ statements or Force Reports. In one record, five witnesses confirmed the complainant’s allegation that officers beat him repeatedly during his arrest. One witness provided the names of four additional witnesses who also observed the arrest, but the IA investigator never contacted any of them. And even though medical records documented the complainant’s injuries, the investigator recommended a finding of “not sustained” because the
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officers uniformly denied witnessing or using excessive force, and because the witnesses’ accounts, which all described excessive force, had minor differences among them.
In another record, a complainant reported that an officer struck him repeatedly with a waffle grill. The investigator accepted the officer’s version of the facts despite conflicting information in his Force Report and subsequent reports. Although the officer’s report documented only that he had used “hands/fists,” he later reported that he inadvertently struck the complainant on the head with a waffle grill in self-defense. Instead of probing this inconsistency, the IA investigator exonerated the officer and noted that the use of force was “reported and filed with complete transparency.”
This elevation of officer credibility, and simultaneous unwarranted discounting of complainant and civilian witness accountability, helps perpetuate patterns of misconduct. See Beck, 89 F.3d 966, 974 (finding that failure to adequately investigate IA complaints of misconduct permitted officers to engage in misconduct and this failure, in part, was fueled by a pattern of giving little weight to the accounts of credible witnesses who supported the complainant’s version of the facts while being overly favorable towards officers’ statements).
c. Unequal Treatment of Officer and Complainant History
The NPD’s bias in favor of officers was particularly evident in IA’s reliance on complainants’ criminal histories while discounting officers’ disciplinary histories. Investigators often have questioned complainants about their arrest histories during interviews, run checks of complainants’ criminal histories, and used this information to impugn complainants’ credibility, bolster the credibility of officers, and support findings that officers should be exonerated. Generally, a complainant’s criminal history should not be used in resolving a misconduct complaint unless there is a genuine issue of credibility. To its credit, the NPD’s leadership recently acknowledged that this practice is problematic and that investigators should cease routinely checking and invoking complainants’ criminal histories.
The NPD’s inappropriate use of criminal histories has resulted in premature terminations of investigations and inaccurate assessments of available evidence. For example, IA reports commonly have referred to a complainant’s criminal history in the “findings” section of the report, noting that, for example, the complainant’s “criminal history would lead a prudent person to believe that he has the probability to be less than truthful,” or the complainant’s prior crimes demonstrated a “pattern of anti-authority behavior and an unstable relationship with law enforcement.”
Investigators’ improper emphasis on complainants’ criminal history has not been limited to considering criminal convictions. Some IA records also have included consideration of NPD reports of previous stops of complainants, or incident and arrest reports from previous arrests, even where no conviction resulted. This is especially problematic because, as detailed in this report, the NPD’s stop and arrest practices have not comported with constitutional requirements and have resulted in unjustified stops. In one file, the investigator checked the complainant’s criminal history and compiled related incident and arrest reports for offenses dating back to 1996 – offenses that predated the complainant’s allegation of excessive force by fourteen years. In recommending that the officer be exonerated, the investigator relied in part on the complainant’s
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criminal history to question the complainant’s version of the facts. In other IA investigations, investigators reviewed the complainants’ juvenile court records and called the prosecutor’s office to inquire about details of the complainant’s previous arrests not captured in reports.
In stark contrast, investigators have given no weight to accused officers’ disciplinary history, even when that history has demonstrated a pattern of similar allegations of misconduct. While investigators typically have included the officer’s disciplinary history in the IA record, those references appear perfunctory, with no indication that the disciplinary history should affect credibility determinations or other aspects of the investigation. For example, in one force investigation, an officer had 55 entries in his IA history over four years, including 26 use of force incidents. Both numbers are comparatively high but were not addressed in the investigation. In another force investigation, the officer’s 70 entries in his IA history over six years, including 40 use of force incidents, were not considered by the investigator.
An officer’s tendency to elicit certain types of allegations by civilians should be considered highly relevant in an IA investigation. See Beck, 89 F.3d 966, 973 (recognizing that a “system of investigation [where] each complaint was insulated from other prior and similar complaints and treated in a vacuum” is “sterile and shallow”). However, the NPD has taken the reverse approach, scrutinizing complainants’ criminal records, but routinely ignoring officers’ disciplinary histories.
d. Discouraging Complainants Through Miranda Warnings
The New Jersey Attorney General’s Internal Affairs Guidelines appropriately mandate that a complainant must be accorded all appropriate protections when the complaint arises from an incident where the complainant has been charged with a criminal offense. N.J. AG Guidelines at 27-28. Accordingly, contact with such a complainant must be coordinated through his or her defense counsel. Id. However, the guidelines also appropriately state that the need to issue Miranda warnings is triggered only “whenever the questioning of an individual is custodial in nature.” 46 Id. at 40 (“The question is whether a reasonable person would believe that he or she is free to leave.”); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When a civilian voluntarily meets with an investigator in furtherance of an administrative complaint of police misconduct, and remains free to leave the interview at any time, the interview is neither custodial nor an interrogation. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (“An officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches, however, ‘only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’”) (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977); see also Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1244 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Because the presence of both a custodial setting and official interrogation is required to trigger the Miranda right-to-counsel prophylactic, absent one or the other, Miranda is not implicated.”)
46 The fact that a complainant may have been arrested during the course of the incident about which he is filing a complaint does not change a voluntary interview by Internal Affairs into a custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1984) (Although the probation officer questioned probationer about a crime, the interview with the probation officer, which was “arranged by appointment at a mutually convenient time,” and where probationer was “not physically restrained and could have left the office” did not amount to custodial interrogation.).
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Despite these limitations, NPD investigators routinely have given Miranda warnings to complainants, and sometimes witnesses, before taking their statements. Over a quarter of the misconduct investigation files reviewed documented Miranda warnings to complainants.
This practice is not only unnecessary and demonstrates a lack of understanding of the purpose of Miranda warnings, but it inappropriately suggests to complainants and witnesses that they are being questioned as suspects in a criminal case instead of as potential victims or witnesses of police misconduct. Ultimately, it can intimidate and discourage victims’ and witnesses’ participation in the complaint process. Indeed, NPD records included examples where the Miranda warning either prompted complainants to end the interview or dissuaded complainants from moving forward with their complaints. For example, in one record the complainant stated that he was unsure about moving forward with his complaint because the investigator asked him to sign a Miranda waiver.
This practice is out of the norm for police departments across the country, and the NPD’s leadership acknowledged that it is inappropriate and may discourage complainants from coming forward.
3. NPD’s Application of Discipline
The way in which the NPD determines appropriate discipline in sustained cases is also seriously flawed.47 First, the NPD has no set presumptive penalties for particular violations. As a result, the Trial Board can impose the same punishment for an officer’s failure to report to work on time as for the officer’s use of excessive force against a civilian. Similarly, officers can receive vastly disparate discipline for committing similar offenses. While Trial Board members report that they consider past Board disciplinary decisions when meting out discipline, this practice appears to be haphazard and to rely heavily on Board members’ recollections.48 The current system also lacks guidance for what mitigating or aggravating circumstances might warrant consideration in determining the appropriate penalty. This means there is no structured, transparent way for the NPD to take into account the particular circumstances of the incident in determining discipline. And, with no guidelines for disciplinary penalties, there is no opportunity, much less requirement, for the NPD to explain why penalties diverge in seemingly similar cases. Accordingly, officers have no way to form a reliable expectation of the consequences for misconduct.
Officers also report that the Trial Board’s decisions appear to be arbitrary. For example, officers have complained that some officers were not disciplined after testing positive for drugs or driving under the influence, while others were terminated for the same conduct. Disciplinary penalties appear inordinately harsh in some instances, particularly in response to internal
47 This is not a new problem. The independent consultants that reviewed the Department’s IA system in 2007 recommended “a complete review” of the disciplinary system due to the widespread perception that it is “administered in an arbitrary and capricious manner,” “often unnecessarily focus[es] on minor violations of rules and regulations,” and has historically operated on a “patronage system.” 48 NPD reports that it plans to appoint a permanent chairperson who will participate in all Trial Board proceedings as a means of ensuring consistent decision-making. However, such a position is insufficient by itself to ensure objective decision-making and is not an adequate replacement for formal and transparent standards.
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complaints, and weak or nonexistent in others, mainly in response to misconduct complaints from civilians. For example, the NPD has not disciplined an officer for engaging in excessive force in more than five years. Yet an NPD officer who assisted a disabled tractor-trailer was suspended for 30 days for failing to strictly abide by the Department’s towing policy and other minor rule violations, despite the officer’s almost otherwise flawless disciplinary record.
Without transparent, objective criteria to guide and document disciplinary decisions, the NPD is ill equipped to persuasively respond to the widespread belief, both within and outside the Department, that discipline is meted out, at least in part, based on how well-liked or wellconnected an officer is. The NPD can and should work with officers and community members to develop disciplinary sanctions that make sense, and a system for imposing discipline that is transparent, consistent, and fair.
F. INADEQUATE SUPERVISION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
1. Failures in Supervision and Management
Effective supervision is critical to the operation of any police department. It is particularly important for supervisors in the field, where the requirements of law and policy are at risk of being misapplied in the heat of the moment, or even disregarded completely. Through consistent daily interactions, supervisors can shape and guide officers’ conduct and help them learn from their mistakes. They are able to identify problems and act immediately to prevent or minimize harm. For example, a supervisor on the scene can identify an arrest made without sufficient probable cause and order the citizen’s immediate release. Similarly, a more experienced supervisor at the scene of a use of force might be able to advise an officer of alternative techniques to minimize or avoid using force in future similar encounters.
Unfortunately, the NPD does not take full advantage of its chain of command to promote accountability and constitutional policing. When officers use force, the NPD does not require supervisors to respond to the scene, where they would be able to conduct an immediate initial assessment of the incident. Further, although supervisors are required to approve officers’ Force Reports, the approval confirms only that the report was completed. Similar concerns are manifest with respect to the NPD’s stops and arrests. With nearly three quarters of documented stops lacking an articulation of reasonable suspicion, it is clear that supervisors are not reviewing and holding officers accountable for their actions.
By not requiring meaningful review of officer actions by supervisors, the NPD loses a principal benefit of their supervision. During the investigation NPD leadership acknowledged that NPD officers and supervisors often view each other as peers rather than superiors and subordinates, making it more difficult for supervisors to properly scrutinize officers under their command.
2. Absence of an Effective Early Warning System
Early warning systems are a significant component of police department supervision and risk management systems across the country. Such systems are comprised of one or more
42


databases that track, and make it possible to analyze, various facets of officer activity, including stops, arrests, uses of force and misconduct complaints. That analysis, in turn, allows departments to identify outlier units and individuals whose behaviors are undermining their own successes. Early warning systems identify patterns of activity by officers and groups of officers for supervisory review and intervention. Once an officer is identified for review by the Early Warning System, a supervisor should conduct a comprehensive written review and provide an array of individualized alternatives for resolving any problems identified during the review, such as counseling, training, additional supervision or monitoring, and action plans for modifying future behavior. By identifying problematic trends and behavior as they develop, early warning systems enable management to provide direction and take corrective action before serious problems occur. Early warning systems also can be critical components of a City’s system for managing risk and liability, as police leadership is responsible for responding appropriately to officers with a history of problems. See Beck, 89 F.3d at 973 (finding that when an officer receives multiple similar complaints over a short time period, it can be inferred that the Chief of Police knew, or should have known, of the officer’s propensity for violence when making arrests). Especially in larger departments where an officer’s problematic behavior may otherwise continue undetected for some time, early warning systems have become valuable tools for effective and supportive officer supervision.
To be effective, early warning systems require not only a reliable, accurate, and complete computer database, but strong policies and protocols that allow the Department to use the data to identify and change problematic officer behavior. Unfortunately, the NPD has failed to implement such a system. Since 2006, the NPD has used commercial case management software called IAPro. IAPro includes some early warning functionality, including the ability to generate alerts when officers reach specified thresholds, such as a certain number of misconduct complaints over a specified period. The NPD apparently did not use this capability at all until 2010. In 2010, NPD tested an early warning system based on IAPro called the “Performance Monitoring System.” This system was designed to use IAPro’s alert features to identify NPD officers with multiple records in the system, who would then be subject to increased training and supervision rather than formal disciplinary action. Although this feature was reportedly implemented in late 2010 and identified approximately 100 officers for monitoring, the NPD could not provide documentation regarding the details or outcomes. And, in August 2011, NPD personnel provided only tentative and inconsistent answers about whether and how the Performance Monitoring System was being applied. However, there was general consensus that monitoring had stopped for most, if not all, of the officers initially identified, and that no others had been placed on monitoring. No alternative tracking or early warning system was formally implemented to replace the Performance Monitoring System, although NPD has asserted that it is now making efforts to increase the use of IAPro to identify officers for corrective action.
The NPD’s attempts at implementing an early warning system have been undermined not only by its failure to use the information it gathers, but also by the poor quality and inconsistency of the information itself. There are significant, widespread data failures in areas critical to evaluating whether officers are in need of support and intervention. Although a principal purpose of an early warning system is to promote awareness of developing issues before they become problems, it appears that the NPD does not inform supervisors and district commanders of pending complaint investigations and charges against officers under their command. At a
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minimum, the complaint information in an early warning system should include: allegations, investigation outcomes (e.g., guilty, sustained, dismissed); charges against officers; and discipline imposed. The NPD’s system has not consistently included these data, which can make it impossible for NPD supervisors to properly identify and hold officers accountable for patterns of problematic behavior.

The NPD’s use of inconsistent terminology when entering data further complicates accountability efforts. For example, the NPD tracks uses of physical force in IAPro as “physical force,” but omits the more specific description of the type of force used that is recorded on the Force Report. As a result, supervisors reviewing data in IAPro have no way of knowing what types of force are actually being used by their officers, and therefore are limited in their ability to detect an emerging problematic trend, or respond most effectively.

In sum, the NPD’s nascent efforts to implement a meaningful early warning system faltered some time ago, and efforts to restart this program have been insufficient and unsuccessful. This failure to institute an effective early warning system underscores the NPD’s lack of sufficient, sustained commitment to monitoring officers’ complaint and disciplinary histories and the supervision and intervention necessary to change problematic behavior.

G. DEFICIENT TRAINING PRACTICES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS

1.

Inadequate Officer Training

NPD officers’ patterns of misconduct are consistent with the NPD’s failure to provide adequate training and sufficiently track the training it does provide. At the outset of this investigation, a random sample of 212 officers’ training cards—reportedly the NPD’s primary record of officers’ training—reflected that only two officers attended training in 2011. One had attended a class on drug, crime and terrorist vehicle interdiction, the other on a fingerprint and facial recognition software package. Although the NPD claimed that many other officers had attended training, there was no supporting documentation. The NPD must maintain a detailed, current record management system so it can effectively track and monitor what training has been offered and completed by its officers.

In addition to the sample of training cards, the NPD provided a schedule of the training it offered from 2009 to 2011.49 That schedule showed a decline in training opportunities in 2011, when compared to the preceding years. In addition, the training identified in the NPD’s records appeared limited to external specialty classes that certain officers were authorized or directed to attend. The NPD’s officer training records did not document any regular annual training on routine police practices and current legal developments, such as those related to use of force, or search and arrest practices. Although the NPD reports that such matters are covered in refresher training presented annually by the legal advisor from the ECPO, that training reportedly was provided to only 280 NPD members in 2010 and to 418 members in 2011. Moreover, the NPD could not provide a syllabus of the training, but related that it covered several definitions of

49 We have repeatedly asked Newark to provide updated training information, but have not been provided any.

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force, review of actual use of force, and examples of permissible uses of force in the NPD. There was no indication that this training was tailored to the NPD’s particular force training needs, or was part of an overall NPD training plan.
Based on a recently provided summary of training activities, the NPD appears to have increased specialized and subject-specific training opportunities for officers in 2012 and 2013. However, attendance at the annual training sessions provided by the ECPO legal advisor declined to 124 officers in 2012 and only 55 officers in 2013. This decline is of particular concern because these sessions, while far too limited in length and scope, nonetheless stand as NPD’s closest analog to the annual use of force training that is standard in well-run police agencies.
The investigation also raised concerns that the NPD also may have underemphasized the importance of regular firearms qualification. Regular firearms qualification helps ensure that officers can fire their weapons accurately and appropriately in a variety of conditions. It is a critical component of officer and public safety. The New Jersey State Attorney General’s Guidelines and NPD policy require officers to qualify twice annually, with at least 90 days between qualifications. The policy does not prohibit officers who do not qualify from carrying their weapons, and only precludes them from working outside employment. This is an inadequate sanction. Officers who do not qualify with their firearms should be prohibited from carrying their firearms and be required to requalify promptly.
A review of firearms qualification records in the early stages of this investigation raised concerns that a significant number of officers might not have satisfied the twice annual qualification requirement in 2011. However, a recent training summary from the NPD indicates that all officers may have qualified with their firearms in 2012 and 2013, although the information that the NPD provided was not sufficiently detailed to allow for confirmation of this assertion. Further, this information indicates that as many 77 officers in 2012 and 67 officers in 2013 may not have qualified twice, as required by NPD policy. Nonetheless, if these numbers are confirmed, the NPD appears to have improved the rate at which officers qualify on their firearms in recent years, but the NPD should take steps to ensure that all officers comply with the policy and the accurate records.
2. Inadequate Training of Internal Affairs Investigators
In addition to the numerous deficiencies with the NPD’s IA policies, procedures, and practices, the NPD has failed to appropriately train its investigators. NPD command staff and officers, IA investigators, and Integrity Compliance Officers (“ICO”) consistently reported that investigative experience has not been required to become an investigator. The NPD is well aware of its IA training needs. In 2007, the City hired a consulting firm to conduct an analysis of the NPD’s organizational structure and operational methodology.50 The consultants interviewed members of the Department, conducted focus groups and reviewed documents. Their analysis included a review of the NPD’s Internal Affairs system. The consulting firm warned that the
50 The goal of the analysis was to provide the City with recommendations on how to reduce crime through increased effectiveness and efficiency within NPD.
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NPD’s investigators “receive[] no formal training” and emphasized that IA must be “staffed with quality personnel.” Those training deficiencies remain. For example, one ICO interviewed had been on the job for three months, yet had not received any training, even though, prior to becoming an ICO, he had never been in a detective position or received any formal training on how to conduct investigations. The 2007 assessment also recommended that all investigators receive training in interview techniques, evidence collection, search and seizure law, administrative law, and advanced IAPro user training. Yet, the NPD’s Deputy Chief of Training and Support reported that there is no required training specifically for IA investigators. While a statewide training class is available, he reported that it has been difficult for the NPD to get its investigators into the program. This failure must be addressed if the NPD is to ensure adequate investigations of officer misconduct.
IV. OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN
At the beginning of the investigation, the DOJ notified the City that its review would include allegations of gender-biased policing with respect to criminal investigations of sexual assault, bias related to sexual orientation and gender identity, and risk of harm to detainees confined in the NPD’s holding cells. While the available evidence does not support a finding of a pattern or practice of misconduct in any of these areas, the investigation revealed potential issues or deficiencies in some practices that warrant further examination by the NPD.
A. Gender-Biased Policing
A review of a sample of NPD sexual assault files and interviews of the supervisor of the NPD’s special victims division and relevant staff at the ECPO who handle or supervise sexual assault prosecutions revealed crucial deficiencies in the way the NPD has responded to and investigated sexual assault complaints. This deficiency is, in part, grounded in what appears to be ignorance or bias concerning victims of sexual assault, as evidenced by comments made by several command staff during interviews and a review of a sample of sexual assault investigative files. Specifically, there is evidence that some NPD officers and detectives have made mistaken assumptions about who can or cannot be a “true” victim of sexual assault. This includes views that sex workers, employees of nightclubs or adult establishments, and women who consumed alcohol with an assailant cannot be legitimate sexual assault claimants.
The NPD’s problematic response to sexual assault complaints is also structural, embedded in procedural problems with the way the NPD has handled sexual assault investigations. The NPD has not made significant efforts to provide vital support for victims such as referrals to counseling services or a competent liaison to assist them who is not the detective investigating the matter.
Nor has the NPD evidenced an understanding of the emotional rollercoaster a sexual assault victim might experience, especially with regard to whether to participate in investigative and legal proceedings. Partly because of this, the NPD has stopped some sexual assault investigations prematurely. Often, as soon as the complainant indicates she or he may not want to move forward, the NPD has brought the complainant in to sign a declination form, without recognizing that complainants often change their minds several times throughout the charging and prosecution process.
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In addition, investigators have appeared to ignore basic investigatory steps, such as checking the alleged assailant’s criminal record even when the assailant’s name and date of birth are known. For example, in one incident the investigator spoke to the alleged assailant, who acknowledged having had sexual intercourse with the complainant. But there was no further investigation, including no evidence that the investigator ran a record check. A record check would have determined whether the alleged assailant had an open warrant, and could have influenced the direction of the investigation. The NPD should revise its practices to better serve sexual assault complainants, and therefore better protect the public from sexual assaults.
B. Green Street Cell Block Suicide Prevention Policies and Practices
In response to several suicides at the NPD’s Green Street Cell Block, this investigation reviewed the holding facility’s suicide prevention measures. In assessing jail suicide precautions, the Third Circuit applies a three-part test to establish a violation: (1) the detainee had a “particular vulnerability to suicide,” (2) officials knew or should have known of that vulnerability, and (3) acted with “reckless indifference” to the detainee’s vulnerability. Colburn v. Darby Upper Tp., 838 F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that allegation of a jail’s custom of inadequate monitoring for potential suicides could sustain a cause of action). Reckless indifference requires a level of culpability that is at least higher than a negligent failure to protect, such that the custodian either knew or should have known of a strong likelihood of selfharm. Colburn v. Upper Darby Tp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991).
The Cell Block is comprised of fifty cells for males and eight cells for females, and is where the NPD holds detainees prior to their initial court appearance and subsequent transfer into the custody of Essex County. Detainees are usually held in the Cell Block for fewer than 24 hours. The NPD provides no special or additional training to officers who are assigned to the holding facility, and some officers report that assignment to the holding facility is undesirable, and commonly perceived as an informal punishment. The layout of the Cell Block offers only limited lines of sight into the cells, and the cells all contain suicide hazards such as exposed cross bars which could be used as hanging points.51
The hours immediately following arrest are a period of heightened risk of suicide, and the NPD must be able to identify suicidal detainees and immediately take precautions. General Order 08-08 requires intake officers to conduct a screening of all detainees entering the Cell Block,52 which includes checklist items for “Mental/Emotional Problems” and “Suicidal/Aggressive Behavior.”53 However, because officers have received no specific training regarding custodial operations in the cell block, it is unclear that the intake screening is effective in identifying potentially suicidal detainees.
51 During this investigation, the NPD completed construction of a new police headquarters at Clinton Avenue that includes a modern holding facility which would likely mitigate concerns regarding suicide hazards. However, the NPD recently informed the DOJ that it will not be moving operations to the Clinton Avenue facility. As a result of this change in plans, the United States may seek additional remedies to ensure NPD ensures adequate suicide precautions are maintained at Green Street. 52 See GO 08-08 at 11. 53 Prisoner Intake and Medical Status Report (Form DP1:1885-2).
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If a detainee is determined to be at risk, the General Order authorizes the cell block supervisor “to employ extraordinary measures to protect a prisoner from self harm,” including but not limited to: placement in a cell that is easily viewable, constant observation, 15-minute checks, and referral to the EMS or the hospital. During a site visit, however, NPD officers working in the Cell Block acknowledged that only one of the options in the written policy was available: any detainees they believe to be suicidal are automatically sent to the hospital for assessment, where they remain until they are medically or psychologically cleared. NPD officers described no other precautions or steps they would take with potentially suicidal detainees. The discrepancy between policy and practice was evident in a review of the NPD’s documentation of suicide and suicide attempts, which showed also that suicidal detainees are not always sent to the hospital, raising concerns that the NPD’s current suicide prevention policies, practices, and training create an unacceptable suicide risk to future Green Street detainees if not corrected.
C. Policing Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
During the investigation there was anecdotal evidence that the NPD has engaged in discriminatory policing practices based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The investigation did not produce evidence sufficient to demonstrate a pattern or practice in this area. The LGBT community expressed concerns about the NPD’s lack of responsiveness to complaints about violent assaults against LGBT individuals, as well as harassment of female transgender persons by NPD officers—including the mistaken assumption that all female transgender persons are prostitutes. They also described a lack of cultural competence and insensitivity by NPD officers when engaging the LGBT community, and the transgender community, in particular.
The NPD does not appear to have any policy or training that would provide officers guidance on how to interact respectfully and effectively with LGBT individuals.54 Community advocates report that NPD command staff are amenable to training on LGBT issues, although none had yet occurred. The NPD should engage with the LGBT community around the concerns noted, and develop training on policing related to sexual orientation and gender identity.
V. CONCLUSION
The patterns of misconduct identified by this investigation present both a challenge and an opportunity for the NPD. The City of Newark took an important first step by acknowledging the community’s concerns and cooperating with the investigation. Further, during the course of the investigation, the City initiated efforts to modify and improve its practices in some of the areas identified in this report. Most importantly, the City and NPD have already reached an Agreement in Principle with the United States to remedy the problems identified by this investigation.
54 GO 03-04, “Biased-Based Policing” directs officers to enforce the law in a “fair and impartial manner” but does not provide any guidance on how that is to be accomplished with respect to any protected class, including race, gender and sexual orientation, apart from an admonition to comply with the Fourth Amendment and an acknowledgment in its introduction of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the law for all who live in the United States.
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An effective and long lasting remedy to these violations will require the full and sustained commitment from the City’s leadership, as well as from the members of the NPD and the residents of Newark. Only a true partnership between the NPD and the broader community will establish a foundation for simultaneously respecting the rights of all Newark residents, effectively preventing crime, and better preparing and protecting officers. The DOJ is fully committed to working with the City, the NPD, and the Newark community to ensure that this effort is successful.
49


 
 Justice Department Reaches Agreement with City of Newark, New Jersey, to Reform Police Department’s Unconstitutional Practices | OPA | Department of Justice

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Justice Department Reaches Agreement with City of Newark, New Jersey, to Reform Police Department’s Unconstitutional
Practices
The Justice Department announced today it has reached a comprehensive settlement with the city of Newark, New Jersey, that will bring wide-ranging reforms and changes to the Newark Police Department (NPD). The agreement, which is subject to court approval, resolves the department’s findings that NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional stops, searches, arrests, use of excessive force and theft by officers in violation of the First, Fourth and 14th Amendments. The proposed consent decree also resolves the department’s findings that NPD’s law enforcement practices had a disparate impact on minorities in Newark.
The Justice Department’s findings were announced in July 2014 following a comprehensive investigation into the NPD started in May 2011. The investigation also found that this pattern of constitutional violations has eroded public confidence in the police. As a result, public safety suffers and the job of delivering police services was more difficult and more dangerous.
“This agreement holds the potential to make Newark a national model for constitutional, effective and accountable community policing in the 21st century,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Vanita Gupta, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. “The Department of Justice looks forward to working closely with the city as we implement this agreement and begin to change policies, improve systems and rebuild trust between Newark police officers and the residents they serve.”
“The men and women who wear the uniform of the Newark Police Department bring enormous dedication, integrity and pride to their jobs every day,” said U.S. Attorney Paul Fishman of the District of New Jersey. “At the same time, the department is challenged in fundamental ways and has engaged in a pattern and practice of unconstitutional policing in a broad range of areas. And it is also clear that the Police Department’s relationship with the people of the city has suffered dramatically from the combination of those practices. Community trust has deteriorated, and that in turn has compromised the effectiveness of the Department. Today we are taking a major step toward breaking that cycle.”

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https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-agreement-city-newark-new-jersey-reform-police-department-s[8/16/2016 3:57:55 PM]

Justice Department Reaches Agreement with City of Newark, New Jersey, to Reform Police Department’s Unconstitutional Practices | OPA | Department of Justice

Under the consent decree, the city of Newark and NPD will implement comprehensive reforms in 12 substantive areas. The agreement ensures that:
NPD will improve officer training to ensure that officers develop the necessary technical and practical skills required to carry out NPD directives consistently. NPD will revise search and seizure policies, training and supervision to ensure that all stops, searches and arrests are conducted in accordance with the Constitution and in a manner that takes into account community priorities. NPD will integrate bias-free policing principles into all levels of the organization, including comprehensive training of officers and supervisors. NPD will reform use of force policies, including requirements for using de-escalation techniques whenever possible and appropriate, prohibiting retaliatory force and ensuring mandatory reporting and investigation standards following use of force. NPD will deploy in-car and body-worn cameras to promote accountability, instill community confidence and improve law enforcement records. NPD will implement measures to prevent theft of property by officers, including robust reporting and complete accounting of property or evidenced seized. Office of Professional Standards investigators will be appropriately qualified and trained. Investigations of civilian complaints will be conducted in an objective, thorough and timely manner. Newark will create a civilian oversight entity to give voice to and pursue concerns of its residents. NPD will develop protocols for conducting compliance reviews and integrity audits. NPD will implement steps to ensure that the disciplinary process is fair and consistent. NPD will improve records management and early intervention systems and collect data on all uses of force and investigatory stops, searches and arrests, and develop a protocol for the comprehensive analysis of the data. The information will be publicly reported. NPD will strengthen its public information programs to ensure that members of the public are informed of NPD’s progress toward reform.

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Newark and the Department of Justice have jointly proposed Peter Harvey to lead the team of experts that will monitor the city’s compliance with the agreement. Harvey is a former New Jersey Attorney General, and has experience under a Justice Department consent decree in the New Jersey State Police Case. He brings a deep understanding of issues specific to New Jersey and Newark and has direct experience overseeing organizational change and law enforcement reforms. Harvey will propose a team of local and nationally-recognized experts who are all committed to ensuring effective and constitutional policing, subject to the approval of the city and the Justice Department.

The investigation was conducted jointly by the Civil Rights Division’s Special Litigation Section and the U.S. Attorney’s Office of the District of New Jersey. For more information on the Civil Rights Division, please visit www.justice.gov/crt. For more information about the U.S. Attorney’s Office of the District of New Jersey, please visit http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj.   

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16-379 Topic: Civil Rights

Civil Rights Division Civil Rights - Special Litigation USAO - New Jersey

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-agreement-city-newark-new-jersey-reform-police-department-s[8/16/2016 3:57:55 PM]

 
 Justice Department Opens Investigation into the Newark, N.J., Police Department | OPA | Department of Justice

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Justice Department Opens Investigation into the Newark, N.J., Police Department
NEWARK, N.J. – The Justice Department announced today that it has opened a civil pattern or practice investigation into the Newark, N.J., Police Department (NPD) involving allegations of use of excessive force, discriminatory policing, whether detainees confined to holding cells are subjected to unreasonable risk of harm and whether officers retaliate against citizens who legally attempt to observe or record police activity. The investigation is in accordance with the pattern or practice provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the antidiscrimination provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The Justice Department will determine whether there are systemic violations of the constitution or federal law by officers of the NPD. During the course of the investigation, the Justice Department will consider all relevant information, including all efforts that Newark has undertaken to ensure compliance with federal law. The Justice Department has engaged in similar reviews of a variety of state and local law enforcement agencies, both large and small, in jurisdictions such as New York, Ohio, Washington, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, Louisiana and California.

This matter is being investigated jointly by attorneys from the Special Litigation Section of the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey. The department welcomes any information from the community. If you have any comments or concerns, please feel free to contact the department at 855-281-3339, via email at community.newark@usdoj.gov or submit a complaint using our web site at www.justice.gov/usao/nj/files/CivilRightsComplaint.pdf .

11-585

Civil Rights Division Updated September 15, 2014

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https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-opens-investigation-newark-nj-police-department[8/17/2016 1:44:23 PM]

 
 U.S. District Court District of New Jersey [LIVE] (Newark) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CITY OF NEWARK Assigned to: Judge Madeline Cox Arleo Referred to: Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

Date Filed: 03/30/2016 Date Terminated: 05/06/2016 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

represented by CAROLINE A. SADLOWSKI UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 970 BROAD STREET SUITE 700 NEWARK, NJ 07102 (973) 645-2700 Email: caroline.sadlowski@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CRAIG CARPENITO UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE ROOM 700 970 BROAD STREET NEWARK, NJ 07102 (973) 645-2891 Email: craig.carpenito@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

KRISTIN LYNN VASSALLO OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 970 BROAD STREET NEWARK, NJ 07102 973-645-2835 Email: kristin.vassallo@usdoj.gov

V. Defendant CITY OF NEWARK

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SABRINA G. COMIZZOLI OFFICE OF THE US ATTORNEY 970 BROAD STREET SUITE 700 NEWARK, NJ 07102 (973) 645-2700 Email: sabrina.comizzoli@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 03/26/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HOUSING & CIVIL ENFORCEMENT SECTION - G STREET 950 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE WASHINGTON, DC 20530 (202) 514-2447 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
KELLY HORAN FLORIO OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 970 BROAD STREET 7TH FLOOR NEWARK, NJ 07102 973-645-2700 Email: kelly.horan@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by AVION MONIQUE BENJAMIN CORPORATION COUNSEL OFFICE CITY OF NEWARK 920 BROAD STREET

Interested Party
Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey)

ROOM 316 NEWARK, NJ 07102 973-733-3880 Email: benjamina@ci.newark.nj.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
WILLIE L. PARKER , JR. LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by PETER C. HARVEY PATTERSON, BELKNAP, WEBB & TYLER, LLP 1133 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS NEW YORK, NY 10036 (212) 336-2810 Fax: (212) 336-2222 Email: pcharvey@pbwt.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/30/2016 03/30/2016
03/30/2016

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against CITY OF NEWARK, filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(dam) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
2 NOTICE OF JOINT MOTION FOR ENTRY OF CONSENT DECREE by CITY OF NEWARK, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit to Notice of Motion: Consent Decree, # 2 Brief Attachment to Notice of Motion: Memorandum of Law, # 3 Text of Proposed Order Attachment to Notice of Motion, # 4 Certificate of Service)(dam) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 2 NOTICE OF JOINT MOTION FOR ENTRY OF CONSENT DECREE. Motion set for 5/2/2016 before Judge Madeline C. Arleo. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, this motion will be decided on the papers and no appearances are required. Note that this is an automatically generated message from the Clerk`s Office and does not supersede any previous or subsequent orders from the Court. (dam) (Entered: 03/30/2016)

04/05/2016
04/07/2016 04/08/2016 04/25/2016 04/29/2016
05/05/2016 05/06/2016 07/12/2016 07/21/2016 08/12/2016
09/19/2016 09/20/2016 10/03/2016

3 TEXT ORDER, setting a Status Conference for 4/7/2016 at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 2A before Judge Madeline C. Arleo. Your attendance is required. So Ordered by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 4/5/16. (aa, ) (Entered: 04/05/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline C. Arleo: Status Conference held on 4/7/2016. (aa, ) (Entered: 04/28/2016)
Case Reassigned to Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer. Magistrate Judge Leda D. Wettre no longer assigned to the case. (aw, ) (Entered: 04/08/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline C. Arleo: Status Conference held on 4/25/2016. (aa, ) (Entered: 04/28/2016)
4 Supplemental MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment Consent Decree by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Consent Decree)(VASSALLO, KRISTIN) (Entered: 04/29/2016)
5 ORDER/CONSENT DECREE. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 5/5/16. (sr, ) (Entered: 05/06/2016)
***Civil Case Terminated. (sr, ) (Entered: 05/06/2016)
6 Letter from Sabrina G. Comizzoli. (COMIZZOLI, SABRINA) (Entered: 07/12/2016)
7 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ $200,000.00, Receipt Number NEW030288 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified) (sr, ) (Entered: 07/22/2016)
8 TEXT ORDER, scheduling a telephone status conference for 9/20/2016 at 2:00 PM before Judge Madeline C. Arleo. Plaintiff's shall initiate the call. So Ordered by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 8/12/16. (aa, ) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
9 TEXT ORDER, resetting the time of the Telephone Status Conference on 9/20/2016 for 3:00 PM before Judge Madeline C. Arleo. So Ordered by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 9/19/16. (aa, ) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline C. Arleo: Status Conference held on 9/20/2016. (aa, ) (Entered: 10/04/2016)
10 TEXT ORDER, setting a telephone status conference for 12/13/2016 at 3:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 2A before Judge Madeline C. Arleo. So Ordered by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 10/3/16. (aa, ) (Entered: 10/04/2016)

10/17/2016 10/19/2016 10/26/2016 10/28/2016 11/07/2016 11/29/2016 12/02/2016 12/13/2016
12/15/2016
12/16/2016

11 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) re 5 Order ([PROPOSED] ORDER AMENDING PARAGRAPHS 14, 17, and 18 OF THE CONSENT DECREE) (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
12 ORDER amending paragraphs 14,17, and 18 of the Consent Decree. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 10/19/16. (sr, ) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
13 STATUS REPORT INITIAL STATUS REPORT by CITY OF NEWARK. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Establishment of the Consent Decree Unit, # 2 Exhibit B - Ordinance CCRB)(BENJAMIN, AVION) (Entered: 10/26/2016)
14 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [PROPOSED] ORDER OF DISBURSEMENT (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 10/28/2016)
15 ORDER OF DISTRIBUTION of Funds. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 11/4/16. (cm ) (Entered: 11/07/2016)
16 Letter from Independent Monitor Peter C. Harvey, to the Honorable Madeline Cox Arleo enclosing a Proposed Second Order of disbursement of payments. (Attachments: # 1 [proposed] Second Order Of Disbursement)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 11/29/2016)
17 SECOND ORDER OF DISTRIBUTION of Funds, (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 11/30/16. (DD, ) (Entered: 12/02/2016)
27 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline C. Arleo: Status Conference held on 12/13/2016. Telephone Status Conference set for 3/2/2017 at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 2A before Judge Madeline C. Arleo. (Court Reporter/Recorder Charles McGuire.) (aa, ) (Entered: 12/27/2016)
18 ORDER that an in person status conference is scheduled for March 2, 2017 at 2:00 p.m. The City of Newark and the DOJ shall appear on December 22, 2016 at 11:00 a.m. to propose any amendments to the consent decree with respect to dates for compliance. If such dates can be agreed to in advance the parties shall submit the order to the Court before December 22, 2016. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 12/14/16. (sr, ) (Entered: 12/15/2016)
19 NOTICE of Appearance by AVION MONIQUE BENJAMIN on behalf of CITY OF NEWARK (BENJAMIN, AVION) (Entered: 12/16/2016)

12/21/2016 12/21/2016 12/21/2016 12/22/2016 12/22/2016 12/22/2016 12/22/2016 01/31/2017 02/02/2017 02/15/2017 02/17/2017
02/21/2017

20 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) re 5 Order [Proposed] Order Amending Paragraphs 208 and 209 of the Consent Decree (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 12/21/2016)
21 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) re 17 Order of Distribution of Funds, Util - Finance NEF, 5 Order [Proposed] Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 12/21/2016)
22 STIPULATION Joint Stipulation and Order to Amend the Consent Decree by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (VASSALLO, KRISTIN) (Entered: 12/21/2016)
23 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ $200,000.00, Receipt Number NEW031819 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified) (sr, ) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
24 JOINT STIPULATION AND ORDER TO AMEND THE CONSENT DECREE. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 12/22/16. (sr, ) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
25 ORDER OF DISBURSEMENT. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 12/22/16. (sr, ) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
26 ORDER amending paragraphs 208 and 209 of the CONSENT DECREE. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 12/22/16. (sr, ) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
28 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [PROPOSED] ORDER OF DISBURSEMENT (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 01/31/2017)
29 ORDER RE: DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 2/1/17. (sr, ) (finance notified) (Entered: 02/03/2017)
30 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 02/15/2017)
31 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) re 5 Order Memorandum Submitting First-Year Monitoring Plan (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order - First Year Monitoring Plan)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 02/17/2017)
32 ORDER RE: DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 2/21/17. (DD, ) (Entered: 02/22/2017)

02/23/2017 02/24/2017 02/24/2017 03/01/2017 03/01/2017 03/02/2017
03/17/2017 04/07/2017 04/11/2017 04/13/2017
04/24/2017

33 Letter from Independent Monitor Peter C. Harvey, to the Honorable Madeline Cox Arleo, dated February 23, 2016 regarding City replenishment. (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 02/23/2017)
34 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ $500,000.00, Receipt Number NEW032370 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified) (sr, ) (Entered: 02/24/2017)
35 NOTICE of Appearance by AVION MONIQUE BENJAMIN on behalf of CITY OF NEWARK (BENJAMIN, AVION) (Entered: 02/24/2017)
36 TEXT ORDER, in response to Mr. Harvey's letter, Mr. Kelly, the Newark Business Administrator, is ordered to attend the March 2, 2017 conference, which is now an in person conference. So Ordered by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 3/1/17. (aa, ) (Entered: 03/01/2017)
37 Letter from City of Newark. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(BENJAMIN, AVION) (Entered: 03/01/2017)
47 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo: Status Conference held on 3/2/2017,. Status Conference set for 6/1/2017 at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. (Court Reporter/Recorder Charles McGuire.) (aa, ) (Entered: 05/12/2017)
38 TEXT ORDER,Setting a Status Conference for 6/1/2017 at 1:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. A status letter shall be due on 5/30/17. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 3/17/17. (aa, ) (Entered: 03/17/2017)
39 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ $500,000.00, Receipt Number NEW032848 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified) (sr, ) (Entered: 04/07/2017)
40 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 04/11/2017)
41 ORDER that the Clerk shall pay and disburse the amounts that remain outstanding for services rendered and related costs incurred during the time period October 1 through October 31, 2016, such payments to be made to the entities and/or persons from the funds presently on deposit in the registry of the Court in connection with this matter.. Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 4/12/17. (sr, ) (finance notified) (Entered: 04/13/2017)
42 Letter from Peter C. Harvey to Judge Arleo enclosing First Quarterly Report pursuant to Paragraph 183 of the Consent Decree. (Attachments:

04/28/2017 05/01/2017 05/05/2017 05/10/2017 05/12/2017
05/30/2017 06/01/2017 06/01/2017 06/02/2017 06/08/2017

# 1 Exhibit Independent Monitor - First Quarterly Report)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 04/24/2017)
43 STATUS REPORT SECOND STATUS REPORT by CITY OF NEWARK. (BENJAMIN, AVION) (Entered: 04/28/2017)
44 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 05/01/2017)
45 ORDER OF DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS. Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 5/5/17. (sr, ) (finance notified) (Entered: 05/08/2017)
46 Letter. (BENJAMIN, AVION) (Entered: 05/10/2017)
48 Transcript of Proceedings of a Status Conference held on 3/2/2017, before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. Court Reporter/Transcriber Charles McGuire (215-840-7030). NOTICE REGARDING (1) REDACTION OF PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS IN TRANSCRIPTS AND (2) MOTION TO REDACT AND SEAL: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this Transcript to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P.5.2(a) (personal identifiers). Parties seeking to redact and seal this Transcript, or portions thereof, pursuant to L.Civ.R. 5.3(g) must e-file a Motion to Redact and Seal utilizing the event `Redact and Seal Transcript/Digital Recording`. Redaction Request to Court Reporter/Transcription Agency due, but not filed, by 6/2/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/12/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/10/2017. (sm, ) (Entered: 05/12/2017)
49 TEXT ORDER, the Status Conference set for 6/1/2017 will be at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 5/30/17. (aa, ) (Entered: 05/30/2017)
50 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) /(Proposed) Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 06/01/2017)
53 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo: Status Conference held on 6/1/2017. (Court Reporter/Recorder Charles McGuire.) (aa, ) (Entered: 06/09/2017)
51 Letter from Avion M. Benjamin. (BENJAMIN, AVION) (Entered: 06/02/2017)
52 ORDER OF DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS. (finance notified) Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 6/7/17. (sr, ) (Entered: 06/08/2017)

06/09/2017
06/15/2017 06/20/2017 06/27/2017 07/27/2017 08/08/2017 09/01/2017 09/07/2017 09/13/2017 09/22/2017

54 TEXT ORDER, setting a Status Conference for 9/7/2017 at 2:30 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. A status letter/agenda shall be submitted by 9/5/17. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 6/9/17. (aa, ) (Entered: 06/09/2017)
55 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 06/15/2017)
56 ORDER FOR DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS (finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 6/19/17. (sr, ) (Entered: 06/20/2017)
57 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ $300,000.00, Receipt Number NEW033685 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified) (sr, ) (Entered: 06/27/2017)
58 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 07/27/2017)
59 ORDER FOR DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS. (finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 8/8/2017. (ld, ). (Entered: 08/09/2017)
60 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
64 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo: Status Conference held on 9/7/2017. (Court Reporter/Recorder Charles McGuire.) (aa, ) (Entered: 10/03/2017)
61 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ $300,000.00, Receipt Number NEW034367 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified) (sr, ) (Entered: 09/13/2017)
63 Transcript of Status Conference Proceedings held on June 1, 2017, before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. Court Reporter: Charles McGuire (215-840-7030). NOTICE REGARDING (1) REDACTION OF PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS IN TRANSCRIPTS AND (2) MOTION TO REDACT AND SEAL: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this Transcript to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P.5.2(a) (personal identifiers). Parties seeking to redact and seal this Transcript, or portions thereof, pursuant to L.Civ.R. 5.3(g) must e-file a Motion to Redact and Seal utilizing the event `Redact and Seal Transcript/Digital Recording`. Redaction Request to Court Reporter Agency due, but not filed, by 10/13/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/23/2017.

09/26/2017 10/04/2017 10/06/2017
10/11/2017 10/26/2017 11/28/2017 12/06/2017 01/02/2018 01/15/2018
01/18/2018

Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/21/2017. (mfr) (Entered: 09/27/2017)
62 ORDER RE: DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS. (finance notified) Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 9/26/17. (sr, ) (Entered: 09/26/2017)
65 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - [proposed] Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 10/04/2017)
66 Letter from Peter C. Harvey, to the Honorable Madeline C. Arleo, dated October 6, 2017 enclosing the Second Quarterly Report pursuant to Paragraph 183 of the Consent Decree. (Attachments: # 1 Monitoring Team Second Quarterly Report, # 2 Appendix A, Second Quarter Monitoring Plan Chart, # 3 Appendix B, Second Quarterly Report, # 4 Appendix C, Second Quarterly Report, # 5 Appendix D, Second Quarterly Report, # 6 Appendix E, Second Quarterly Report, # 7 Appendix F, Second Quarterly Report)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 10/06/2017)
67 ORDER RE: Disbursement of Funds (finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 10/6/17. (sr, ) (Entered: 10/11/2017)
68 STATUS REPORT Third Status Report by CITY OF NEWARK. (BENJAMIN, AVION) (Entered: 10/26/2017)
69 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 11/28/2017)
70 ORDER RE: Disbursement of Funds (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 12/1/17. (sr, ) (Entered: 12/06/2017)
71 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ $400,000.00, Receipt Number NEW035278 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified) (cm, ) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
72 Letter from Peter C. Harvey, to the Honorable Madeline C. Arleo, dated January 15, 2018 enclosing the Third Quarterly Report pursuant to Paragraph 183 of the Consent Decree. (Attachments: # 1 Monitoring Team Third Quarterly Report)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 01/15/2018)
73 STIPULATION JOINT STIPULATION AND ORDER TO AMEND PARAGRAPHS 4(c), 4(m), 4(x), 4(xx), 27(a), 31, 32, 44, 62, 67(g), and 71 OF THE CONSENT DECREE by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Stipulated Order to Amend Consent Decree)(VASSALLO, KRISTIN) (Entered: 01/18/2018)

02/02/2018 02/13/2018
02/21/2018 03/06/2018 03/16/2018 03/20/2018 03/22/2018 03/26/2018
03/27/2018 03/27/2018

74 STIPULATED ORDER amending Consent Decree. Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 1/31/18. (sr, ) (Entered: 02/05/2018)
75 TEXT ORDER, rescheduling the Status Conference for 3/27/2018 02:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. A status letter/agenda shall be submitted by 3/23/18. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 2/13/18. (aa, ) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
76 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ $325,000.00, Receipt Number NEW035667 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified) (sr, ) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
77 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 03/06/2018)
78 ORDER RE: Disbursement of Funds. (finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 3/14/18. (sr, ) (Entered: 03/16/2018)
79 NOTICE of Appearance by KELLY HORAN FLORIO on behalf of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (FLORIO, KELLY) (Entered: 03/20/2018)
80 TEXT ORDER. The status conference is rescheduled to Wednesday, March 28 at 2:00 p.m. SO ORDERED BY Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on March 23,2018. (Arleo, Madeline) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
81 Substitution of Attorney - Attorney SABRINA G. COMIZZOLI terminated. Attorney CAROLINE A. SADLOWSKI for UNITED STATES OF AMERICA added.. (SADLOWSKI, CAROLINE) (Entered: 03/26/2018)
82 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) ) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
83 Transcript of Proceedings of a Status Conference held on 9/7/2017, before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. Court Reporter/Transcriber Charles McGuire (215-840-7030). NOTICE REGARDING (1) REDACTION OF PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS IN TRANSCRIPTS AND (2) MOTION TO REDACT AND SEAL: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this Transcript to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P.5.2(a) (personal identifiers). Parties seeking to redact and seal this Transcript, or portions thereof, pursuant to L.Civ.R. 5.3(g) must e-file a Motion to Redact and Seal utilizing the event `Redact and Seal Transcript/Digital Recording`. Redaction Request to Court Reporter/Transcription Agency due, but not filed, by 4/17/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for

03/28/2018
03/29/2018 04/04/2018
04/19/2018 04/19/2018 04/19/2018 04/19/2018 04/19/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018

4/27/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/25/2018. (sm, ) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
85 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo: Status Conference held on 3/28/2018. Status Conference set for 6/12/2018 02:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. Parties are to submit a proposed agenda/status letter prior to next conference. (Court Reporter/Recorder Charles McGuire.) (aa, ) (Entered: 04/04/2018)
84 ORDER FOR DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 3/28/18. (DD, ) (Entered: 03/29/2018)
86 TEXT ORDER, scheduling a Status Conference set for 6/12/2018 at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. Parties are to submit a proposed agenda/status letter prior to next conference. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 4/4/18. (aa, ) (Entered: 04/04/2018)
87 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for August 2017 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
88 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for September 2017 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
89 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for October 2017 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
90 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for November 2017 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
91 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for December 2017 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
92 ORDER FOR DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS re 87 Notice filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 4/23/18. (sr, )(finance notified) (Entered: 04/24/2018)
93 ORDER FOR DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS re 88 Notice filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 4/23/18. (sr, )(finance notified) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

04/23/2018

94 ORDER FOR DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS re 89 Notice filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 4/23/18. (sr, )(finance notified) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

04/23/2018

95 ORDER FOR DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS re 90 Notice filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 4/23/18. (sr, )(finance notified) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

04/23/2018

96 ORDER FOR DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS re 91 Notice filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 4/23/18. (sr, )(finance notified) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

04/25/2018

97 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ $725,000.00, Receipt Number NEW036228 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified) (sr, ) (Entered: 04/25/2018)

04/27/2018 98 STATUS REPORT Fourth Status Report by CITY OF NEWARK. (BENJAMIN, AVION) (Entered: 04/27/2018)

05/04/2018

99 Letter from Peter C. Harvey to Hon. Madeline C. Arleo dated May 4, 2018 enclosing the Fourth Quarterly Report pursuant to Paragraph 183 of the Consent Decree. (Attachments: # 1 Monitoring Team Fourth Quarterly Report)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 05/04/2018)

05/10/2018

100 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) re 5 Order Memorandum Submitting Second-Year Monitoring Plan (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order - Second-Year Monitoring Plan)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 05/10/2018)

05/16/2018

101 ORDER, that immediately upon entry of this Order, the Second-Year Monitoring Plan shall be adopted; etc. Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 05/15/2018. (sms) Modified on 5/24/2018 (th). (Entered: 05/16/2018)

05/31/2018

102 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for January 2018 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 05/31/2018)

05/31/2018

103 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for February 2018 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 05/31/2018)

06/08/2018

104 ORDER FOR DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS re 102 Notice filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 06/07/2018. (sms) (finance notified) (Entered: 06/08/2018)

06/08/2018

105 ORDER FOR DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS re 103 Notice filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 06/07/2018. (sms) (Entered: 06/08/2018)

06/11/2018

106 TEXT ORDER, rescheduling the Status Conference for 8/15/2018 at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 6/11/18. (aa, ) (Entered: 06/11/2018)

06/12/2018

107 NOTICE of Appearance by PETER C. HARVEY on behalf of Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 06/12/2018)

06/27/2018

108 TEXT ORDER, rescheduling the Status Conference for 8/8/2018 at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 6/27/18. (aa, ) (Entered: 06/27/2018)

06/28/2018

109 Letter from Peter C. Harvey to Honorable Madeline C. Arleo dated June 28, 2018 enclosing the Fifth Quarterly Report pursuant to Paragraph 183 of the Consent Decree. (Attachments: # 1 Monitoring Team's Fifth Quarterly Report)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 06/28/2018)

07/05/2018

110 Letter from Peter C. Harvey to Honorable Madeline C. Arleo regarding the Independent Monitor's January 2018 invoice re 105 Order, Util Finance NEF, 104 Order, Util - Finance NEF. (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 07/05/2018)

07/06/2018

111 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for March 2018 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 07/06/2018)

07/11/2018

112 ORDER OF DISBURSEMENT re 111 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 07/09/2018. (sms) (Entered: 07/11/2018)

07/11/2018

113 Transcript of Status Conference held on March 28, 2018, before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. Court Reporter: Charles McGuire (215-8407030). NOTICE REGARDING (1) REDACTION OF PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS IN TRANSCRIPTS AND (2) MOTION TO REDACT AND SEAL: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this Transcript to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P.5.2(a) (personal identifiers). Parties seeking to redact and seal this Transcript, or portions thereof, pursuant to L.Civ.R. 5.3(g) must e-file a Motion to Redact and Seal utilizing the event `Redact and Seal Transcript/Digital Recording`.

Redaction Request to Court Reporter due, but not filed, by 8/1/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/13/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/9/2018. (jml) (Entered: 07/12/2018)

07/16/2018

114 TEXT ORDER,rescheduling the Status Conference for 8/9/2018 at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 7/16/18. (aa, ) (Entered: 07/16/2018)

08/06/2018

115 TEXT ORDER, rescheduling the Status Conference for 9/5/2018 at 3:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 8/6/18. (aa, ) (Entered: 08/06/2018)

08/07/2018

116 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for April 2018 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 08/07/2018)

08/07/2018

117 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for May 2018 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 08/07/2018)

08/10/2018

118 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ $500,000.00, Receipt Number NEW037148 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified) (sms) (Entered: 08/10/2018)

08/14/2018

119 ORDER of Disbursement re 117 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 08/14/2018. (sms) (Entered: 08/14/2018)

08/14/2018

120 ORDER of Disbursement re 116 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 08/14/2018. (sms) (Entered: 08/14/2018)

09/05/2018

121 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo: Status Conference held on 9/5/2018. Status Conference set for 12/5/2018 at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. (Court Reporter/Recorder Charles McGuire.) (aa, ) (Entered: 10/02/2018)

10/12/2018

122 Letter from Peter C. Harvey to the Honorable Madeline C. Arleo dated October 12, 2018 enclosing Second-Year Reassessment Pursuant to Paragraph 182 of the Consent Decree. (Attachments: # 1 Independent Monitor - Second-Year Reassessment)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 10/12/2018)

10/26/2018 123 STATUS REPORT by CITY OF NEWARK. (BENJAMIN, AVION) (Entered: 10/26/2018)

11/02/2018

124 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for June 2018 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 11/02/2018)

11/02/2018

125 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for July 2018 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 11/02/2018)

11/14/2018

126 Order of Disbursement of Funds of June 2018 re 124 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 11/8/2018. (sms) (Entered: 11/14/2018)

11/14/2018

127 Order of Disbursement of Funds of July 2018 125 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 11/8/2018. (sms) (Entered: 11/14/2018)

11/27/2018

128 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for August 2018 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 11/27/2018)

11/27/2018

129 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $250,000.00, Receipt Number NEW038000 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified) (sms) (Entered: 11/27/2018)

11/29/2018

130 Order of Disbursement of Funds of August 2018 re 128 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 11/29/2018. (sms) (Entered: 11/29/2018)

12/04/2018

131 TEXT ORDER, due to the Court Closing on 12/5/18 the Status Conference is rescheduled for 1/7/2019 at 2:00 PM in Newark Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 12/4/18. (aa, ) (Entered: 12/04/2018)

01/02/2019

132 TEXT ORDER, rescheduling the Status Conference for 1/28/2019 at 11:00 AM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 1/2/19. (aa, ) (Entered: 01/02/2019)

01/08/2019

133 Transcript of Status Conference held on September 5, 2018, before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. Court Reporter: Charles McGuire (215840-7030). NOTICE REGARDING (1) REDACTION OF

PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS IN TRANSCRIPTS AND (2) MOTION TO REDACT AND SEAL: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this Transcript to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P.5.2(a) (personal identifiers). Parties seeking to redact and seal this Transcript, or portions thereof, pursuant to L.Civ.R. 5.3(g) must e-file a Motion to Redact and Seal utilizing the event `Redact and Seal Transcript/Digital Recording`. Redaction Request to Court Reporter due, but not filed, by 1/29/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/8/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/8/2019. (mfr) (Entered: 01/08/2019)

01/14/2019

134 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for September 2018 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 01/14/2019)

01/16/2019

135 Letter from Peter C. Harvey, to the Honorable Madeline C. Arleo, dated January 16, 2019 enclosing the Sixth Quarterly Report pursuant to Paragraph 183 of the Consent Decree. (Attachments: # 1 Independent Monitor - Sixth Quarterly Report)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 01/16/2019)

01/22/2019

136 Order of Disbursement of Funds of September 2018 re 134 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 01/17/2019. (sms) (Entered: 01/22/2019)

01/25/2019

137 Letter from the United States, with the consent of all parties and the independent monitor, requesting an adjourment of the conference currently scheduled for January 28. (VASSALLO, KRISTIN) (Entered: 01/25/2019)

01/28/2019

138 TEXT ORDER, the status conference currently scheduled for today is cancelled per the request received this morning; we will schedule a new date shortly. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 1/28/19. (aa, ) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

01/29/2019

139 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ 500,000.00, Receipt Number NEW038532 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified). (sms) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

03/01/2019 140 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 03/01/2019)

03/07/2019

141 ORDER of Disbursement of Funds of October 2018 re 140 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 03/05/2019. (sms) (Entered: 03/07/2019)

03/27/2019 142 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 03/27/2019)

03/29/2019

143 ORDER for Disbursement of Funds for November 2018 142 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 3/29/2019. (sms) (Entered: 03/29/2019)

04/16/2019

144 Letter from Peter C. Harvey, to the Honorable Madeline C. Arleo, dated April 16, 2019 enclosing the Seventh Quarterly Report pursuant to Paragraph 183 of the Consent Decree. (Attachments: # 1 Seventh Quarterly Report)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/30/2019 145 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 04/30/2019)

04/30/2019 146 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement (Jan.) (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 04/30/2019)

05/01/2019

147 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) CORRECTED [Proposed] Order of Disbursement (Jan.) (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 05/01/2019)

05/06/2019

148 ORDER of Disbursement of Funds of December 2018 re 145 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 5/2/2019. (sms) (Entered: 05/06/2019)

05/06/2019

149 ORDER of Disbursement of Funds of January 2019 re 147 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 5/3/2019. (sms) (Entered: 05/06/2019)

05/07/2019

150 TEXT ORDER, scheduling a Status Conference for 7/9/2019 at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 5/7/2019. (aa, ) (Entered: 05/07/2019)

05/20/2019 151 STATUS REPORT SIXTH STATUS REPORT by CITY OF NEWARK. (BENJAMIN, AVION) (Entered: 05/20/2019)

05/31/2019

152 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ 350,000.00, Receipt Number NEW039691 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified). (sms) (Entered: 06/04/2019)

06/14/2019

153 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for February 2019 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 06/14/2019)

06/20/2019

154 ORDER of Disbursement of Funds of February 2019 re 153 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 6/19/2019. (sms) (Entered: 06/20/2019)

07/09/2019

155 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo: Status Conference held on 7/9/2019. Status Conference set for 9/24/2019 at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. (Court Reporter/Recorder Charles McGuire.) (aa, ) (Entered: 07/17/2019)

08/05/2019

156 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for March 2019 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 08/05/2019)

08/06/2019

157 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for April 2019 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 08/06/2019)

08/09/2019

158 Letter from Peter C. Harvey to the Honorable Madeline C. Arleo, dated August 9, 2019, enclosing the Eighth Quarterly Report. (Attachments: # 1 Independent Monitor - Eighth Quarterly Report)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 08/09/2019)

08/12/2019 159 ORDER OF DISBURSEMENT, etc, (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 8/12/2019. (ld, ) (Entered: 08/13/2019)

08/22/2019

160 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for May 2019 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 08/22/2019)

08/29/2019

161 ORDER of Disbursement of Funds of May 2019 re 160 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey), (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 8/27/2019. (sms) (Entered: 08/29/2019)

09/09/2019

162 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ 250,000.00, Receipt Number NEW40466 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified). (sms) (Entered: 09/10/2019)

09/24/2019

164 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo: Status Conference held on 9/24/2019. Status Conference set for 1/14/2020 at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge

Madeline Cox Arleo. (Court Reporter/Recorder Charles McGuire.) (aa, ) (Entered: 10/01/2019)

09/25/2019

163 ORDER; granting 156 Order of Disbursement for March 2019, filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey); etc. Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 9/24/2019. (sms) (Entered: 09/25/2019)

10/25/2019

165 Letter from Peter C. Harvey to the Honorable Madeline C. Arleo, dated October 25, 2019, enclosing the Ninth Quarterly Report.. (Attachments: # 1 Independent Monitor - Ninth Quarterly Report)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 10/25/2019)

11/15/2019 166 STATUS REPORT Seventh Status Report by CITY OF NEWARK. (BENJAMIN, AVION) (Entered: 11/15/2019)

11/21/2019

167 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for June 2019 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 11/21/2019)

11/21/2019

168 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for July 2019 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 11/21/2019)

11/21/2019

169 NOTICE of Appearance by CRAIG CARPENITO on behalf of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (CARPENITO, CRAIG) (Entered: 11/21/2019)

11/26/2019

170 ORDER of Disbursement of Funds of June 2019 re 167 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey); (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 11/22/2019. (sms) (Entered: 11/26/2019)

11/26/2019

171 ORDER of Disbursement of Funds of July 2019 re 168 Notice (Other) filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey); (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 11/22/2019. (sms) (Entered: 11/26/2019)

12/05/2019

172 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement for August 2019 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 12/05/2019)

01/13/2020

173 Letter from Peter C. Harvey to the Honorable Madeline C. Arleo, dated January 13, 2020, enclosing the Tenth Quarterly Report. (Attachments: # 1 Independent Monitor - Tenth Quarterly Report)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 01/13/2020)

01/14/2020

174 ORDER of Disbursement of Funds of August 2019 re 172 Notice filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey); (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 1/14/2020. (sms) (Entered: 01/14/2020)

01/14/2020

175 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo: Status Conference held on 1/14/2020. Status Conference set for 4/21/2020 at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. (Court Reporter/Recorder Charles McGuire.) (aa, ) (Entered: 01/15/2020)

01/22/2020

176 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement for September 2019 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 01/22/2020)

01/27/2020

177 ORDER of Disbursement of Funds of September 2019 re 176 Notice filed by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey); (Finance notified). Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 1/23/2020. (sms) (Entered: 01/27/2020)

02/25/2020

178 Clerk's Certificate of Cash Deposit in the amount of $ 250,000.00, Receipt Number NEW042180 filed by CITY OF NEWARK (Finance Notified) (sm) (Entered: 02/27/2020)

04/04/2020

179 Transcript of Status Conference held on January 14, 2020, before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. Court Reporter: Charles McGuire (215-8407030). NOTICE REGARDING (1) REDACTION OF PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS IN TRANSCRIPTS AND (2) MOTION TO REDACT AND SEAL: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this Transcript to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P.5.2(a) (personal identifiers). Parties seeking to redact and seal this Transcript, or portions thereof, pursuant to L.Civ.R. 5.3(g) must e-file a Motion to Redact and Seal utilizing the event `Redact and Seal Transcript/Digital Recording`. Redaction Request to Court Reporter due, but not filed, by 4/27/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/5/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/6/2020. (wh) (Entered: 04/06/2020)

04/16/2020

180 TEXT ORDER, resetting the Status Conference for 6/24/2020 at 2:00 PM in Newark - Courtroom 4A before Judge Madeline Cox Arleo. So Ordered by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 4/16/20. (aa, ) (Entered: 04/16/2020)

04/27/2020

181 Letter from Peter C. Harvey to Hon. Madeline C. Arleo dated April 27, 2020 enclosing the Eleventh Quarterly Report pursuant to Paragraph 183 of the Consent Decree. (Attachments: # 1 Monitoring Team's Eleventh Quarterly Report)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 04/27/2020)

04/27/2020

182 Letter from Peter C. Harvey to Hon. Madeline C. Arleo dated April 27, 2020 enclosing the Twelfth Quarterly Report pursuant to Paragraph 183 of the Consent Decree. (Attachments: # 1 Monitoring Team's Twelfth Quarterly Report)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 04/27/2020)

05/01/2020

183 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement for October 2019 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 05/01/2020)

05/12/2020 184 STATUS REPORT EIGHTH STATUS REPORT by CITY OF NEWARK. (BENJAMIN, AVION) (Entered: 05/12/2020)

05/21/2020 185 ORDER OF DISBURSEMENT. (Finance notified) Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 5/21/2020. (sm) (Entered: 05/22/2020)

06/09/2020

186 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) - (Proposed) Order of Disbursement for November 2019 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 06/09/2020)

06/12/2020

187 NOTICE by Independent Monitor (Peter C. Harvey) [Proposed] Order of Disbursement for December 2019 (HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 06/12/2020)

06/16/2020

188 Letter from Peter C. Harvey to the Honorable Madeline C. Arleo, dated June 16, 2020, enclosing the Thirteenth Quarterly Report. (Attachments: # 1 Thirteenth Quarterly Report)(HARVEY, PETER) (Entered: 06/16/2020)