Case 1:05-cv-00507-MHW Document 1-1 Filed 07/29/2005 Page 1 of 8 '•

05 JUt 29 Al1 8: t.IJ
·· · ·· ··· ·~ ~,- ~-:unr
i~)~; i;t~;~/::?Ni:1HW~~
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO ·
WESTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

)

CORPORATE SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC. )

)

Defendant.

)

----------~------------------>

CIVIL ACTION NO.
t:U6CV501 .•
COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMAND
J. WATSON
J•BLACK

NATURE OF THE ACTION This an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of I964 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex and pregnancy and to provide appropriate relief to Jeri Hagemeyer who was adversely affected by such practices. The Commissionalleges that Jeri Hagemeyer, a female, had her employment with Defendant terminated on January 21 , 2004, because of her sex female and condition of pregnancy. Ms. Hagemeyer received emergency medical treatment and was hospitalized on January 19, 2004 due to complications relating to her pregnancy. Defendant first learned ofher condition ofpregnancy at that time and terminated her employment when she returned to work on January 21,2004.

..., _

Case 1:05-cv-00507-MHW Document 1-1 Filed 07/29/2005 Page 2 of 8
Additionally, as alleged with greater particularity in paragraphs 16 and 17, below, this is an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title I ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct actions undertaken by Defendant to retaliate against Jeri Hagemeyer and other individuals affected by Defendant's "Certification and Understanding" Agreement, under which they were required to signas a condition of employment, because of its unlawfully seeking to limit the periods allowed by law for them to bring actions in court prescribed by these statutes.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction ofthis Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This Action is authorized and instituted pursuant to: a. Section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the "FLSA"), as amended, 29
U.S.C. Section 217, to enforce the requirements of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (the "EPA"), codified as Section 15 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 215; b. Sections 704(a) and 706(f)(1) and (3) ofTitle VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section.s 2000e-3(a) and 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3), ("Title VII"); c. Sections 4(d) and 7(b) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sections 623(d) and 626(b) (the "ADEA''), which incorporate by reference Sections 16(c) and 17 of the FLSA, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sections 216(c) and 217; and d. Section 102 ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981A.
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Case 1:05-cv-00507-MHW Document 1-1 Filed 07/29/2005 Page 3 of 8
2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the jurisdiction ofthe United States District Court for the Southern Districtof Ohio, Western Division.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of the EPA, Title VII, and the ADEA and is expressly authorized to bring this action by: a. Section I7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 2I7, as amended by Section I of
Reorganization Plan No. I of1978, 92 Stat. 3781, andPublicLaw98-532 (1984), 98 Stat. 2705; b. Sections 704(a)and 706(f)(1)and(3)ofTitleVII,42 U.S.C. Sections2000e-3(a)and 2000e-5(f)(l) and (3); and c. Sections 4(d) and 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. Sections 623(d) and 626(b),as amended by Section 2 of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 92 Stat. 3781, and Public Law 98-532 (1984), 98 Stat. 2705. 4. At all relevant times, Corporate Security Solutions, Inc. (referred to as the "Employer"), has been a Michigan Corporation, doing business in the State ofOhio and the City ofCincinnati, and has continuously had at least 20 employees. 5. At all relevant times, Defendant has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 70l(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
3

Case 1:05-cv-00507-MHW Document 1-1 . Filed 07/29/2005 Page 4 of 8
6. At all relevant times, Defendant has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 11(b), (g), and (h) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. Sections 630(b), (g), and (h).
7. At all relevant times, Defendant has acted directly or indirectly as an employer in retaliation to employees and has continuously been an employer within the meaning of Section (d) ofthe FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 203(d).
8. At all relevant times, Defendant has continuously employed employees engaged in commerce or in the production ofgoods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(b), (i), and G) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Sections 203(b), (i), and G), or has continuously been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production ofgoods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(r) and (s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 203(r) and (s), in that said enterprise has continuously been an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000.00.
STATEMENT OF TITLE VII CLAIMS 9. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Jeri Hagemeyer filed a charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Corporate Security Solutions, Inc. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 10. Since at least on or about January 21, 2004 and continuously up until the present time, Defendant Employer has intentionally engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Cincinnati, Ohio facility in violationofSection 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2(a). The practices include discharging Jeri Hagemeyer because of her sex, female, and condition of pregnancy or related medical condition.
4

Case 1:05-cv-00507-MHw · Document 1-1 Filed 07/29/2005 Page 5 of 8
11. The effect ofthe practices complained of above has been to deprive Jeri Hagemeyer of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect her status as an employee because of sex, condition of pregnancy. Section2000e-2a.
12. Since at least January 21, 2004, Employer has engaged in continuing Wllawful employment practices at its Cincinnati, Ohio facility in violation ofSection 704(a) ofTitle VII, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-3(a). The continuing practices include retaliating against individuals affected by its "Certification and Understanding" Agreement, limiting the statutorily-granted time frame to sue "under State or Federal civil rights" statutes, in violation of law .
13. The effect of the continuing practices complained of in paragraph 12 above has been to deprive Jeri Hagemeyer and similarly situated individuals of equal employment opportWlities or their statutorily-granted rights to institute litigation challenging practices made unlawful by Title VII.
14. The unlawful employment practices complained ofin paragraphs 10 and 11 above were and are intentional.
15. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 10 and 11 above were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Jeri Hagemeyer.
STATEMENT OF EPA CLAIMS 16. Since at least January 21, 2004, Defendant has continually violated Section 15(a)(2) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 215(a)(2), by retaliating against individuals affected by the "Certification and Understanding" Agreement by limiting the statutorily-granted time frame to sue under EPA and other civil rights statutes.
5

Case 1:05-cv-00507-MHW Document 1-1 Filed 07/29/2005 Page 6 of 8
STATEMENT OF ADEA CLAIMS 17. Since at least January 21, 2004, Defendant has continually engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Cincinnati, Ohio facility, in violation of Section 4(d) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Section 623(d) by retaliating against individuals affected by the "Certification and Understanding" Agreement by limiting the statutorily-granted rights to sue under ADEA and other civil rights statutes. · 18. The effect of the continuing practice complained ofin paragraph 17 above has been to deprive Jeri Hagemeyer and similarly situated individuals of equal employment opportunities regarding their rights granted by statute to litigate and challenge practices made unlawful by the AD EA.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF . Wherefore, the Commission requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining the Defendant, its officers, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from engaging in the institution, maintenance or utilization ofthe "Certification and Understanding" Agreement, or any other similar plan which retaliates due to employee rights to litigate the statutorily-provided time periods under the above statutes and other "Federal civil rights"acts. B. Order the Defendant to make whole Jeri Hagemeyer by providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affmnative reliefnecessary to eradicate the effects ofits unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to the rightful place rehiring of Jeri Hagemyer.
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., ' ·'

Case 1:05-cv-00507-MHW Document 1-1 Filed 07/29/2005 Page 7 of 8

C. Order the Defendant to make whole Jeri Hagemeyer by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawfulpractices complained of in the "Nature of the Action" and paragraphs 9 through 11 above, including past and future out-of-pocket losses in amounts to be determined at trial.
D. Order the Defendant to make whole Jeri Hagemeyer by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraphs 9 through 11 above, including nonpecuniary losses such as emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.
E. Order the Defendant to pay Jeri Hagemeyer punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct described in the ''Nature ofthe Action" and paragraphs 9 through 11 above.
F. Grant such further reliefas the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest. G. Award the Commission its costs of this action.

JURY TRIAL DEMAND The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
ERIC S. DREIBAND GENERAL COUNSEL JAMESL. LEE DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL
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Case 1:05-cv-00507-MHW Document 1-1 Filed 07/29/2005 Page 8 of 8
~~ cw~1.:l43)
Regional Attorney lany.watson@eeoc.gov ·
~
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION CLEVELAND DISTRICT OFFICE 1660 W. Second Street, Suite 850 Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1412 Tel. (216) 522-7675 Fax. (216) 522-7430
8

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

JERI HAGEMEYER 2491 E. Ridge Drive Hamilton, Ohio 45011,
Intervenor,
vs.
CORP. SEC. SOLUTIONS, INC. 1147 28th Street S.E. Grand Rapids, Michigan 49508,
Defendant.

: Case No. 1:05-cv-0507

:

: Judge Michael Barrett

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

COMPLAINT

:

IN INTERVENTION

:

NOW COMES intervenor, by and through counsel, and for her Complaint in Intervention states the following:
Parties 1 . Plaintiff JERI HAGEMEYER ("Hagemeyer") is a citizen of the State of Ohio residing at 2491 E. Ridge Drive in the City of Hamilton, Butler County, Ohio, within the Southern District of Ohio. 2 . Defendant CORPORATE SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC. (“Corporate Security") is a Michigan corporation engaged in the business of providing private security services. At all times herein, Corporate Security operated offices at 570 Northland Boulevard in City of Springdale, Hamilton County, Ohio (“Cincinnati Office”), within the Southern District of Ohio, for that purpose. 3 . At all times relevant herein, Christopher Coppola ("Coppola"), was the Regional Vice-President, and Frank Sullivan (“Sullivan”) the General Manager, at the Cincinnati Office. At all times herein, Coppola and Sullivan acted as agents and employees of Corporate Security.
- 1 -

Jurisdiction and Venue 4 . Hagemeyer brings this action for monetary damages pursuant to: (a) 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2; (b) Sections 2(A) and 99 of the Ohio Fair Employment Practices Act, R.C. §§4112.02(A) and 4112.99; and (c) the common law of the State of Ohio. 5 . Each of the tortious acts set forth hereinbelow occurred in the City Springdale, Hamilton County, Ohio, within the Southern District of Ohio.
General Allegations 6 . From December 1, 2003 to January 21, 2004, Corporate Security employed Hagemeyer as an administrative assistant. At all times relevant herein, Coppola was Hagemeyer’s immediate supervisor. 7 . Throughout that period, Corporate Security considered Hagemeyer to be a conscientious and diligent employee who satisfactorily performed the duties of her position. During her employment, Hagemeyer did not receive any verbal written warnings regarding her work performance. 8 . On December 19, 2003, learned that she was pregnant, and immediately reported her condition to Sullivan. 9 . On January 19, 2004, Hagemeyer developed severe abdominal pains, for which she sought medical treatment on her lunch hour. Initially, she sought treatment at the Ft. Hamilton Hospital Emergency Room; she followed up the next day with her family physician. That physician placed her on medical leave for January 19, 20 and 21, 2004. 1 0 . On both January 19 and 20, 2004, Hagemeyer spoke with Coppella, explaining her situation, and informing him her physician had given her a medical slip, a copy of which she faxed over that day, and the original of which she would present on January 22, 2004, upon her return.
- 2 -

1 1 . Later on January 21, 2004, Sullivan contacted Hagemeyer by telephone, told her that things were not working out, and terminated her employment. Sullivan also admitted, upon inquiry by Hagemeyer, that the reason for her termination was her pregnancy.
1 2 . Subsequently, on or about February 1, 2004, Hegemeyer filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Thereafter, on july 29, 2005, The EEOC initiated this action, based upon said charge of discrimination.
Count One 1 3 . Plaintiff restates each and every allegation raised in the General Allegations set forth in Paragraph One through Twelve (1-12) of the Complaint as is fully rewritten herein. 1 4 . Corporate Security, through the actions of Coppola and Sullivan set forth above, has discriminated against Hagemeyer on the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII, section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2. 1 5 . As a direct and proximate result of said discrimination, Hagemeyer has suffered and continues to suffer damages in an amount estimated to be in excess of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00), to be more fully determined at trial.
Count Two 1 6 . Plaintiff restates each and every allegation raised in the General Allegations set forth in Paragraph One through Twelve (1-12) of the Complaint as is fully rewritten herein. 1 7 . Corporate Security, through the actions of Coppella and Sullivan set forth above, has discriminated against Hagemeyer on the basis of her gender in violation of Sections 2(A) and 99 of the Ohio Fair Employment Practices Act, Ohio Rev. Code §§4112.02(A) and 4112.99. 1 8 . As a direct and proximate result of said discrimination, Hagemeyer has suffered and continues to suffer damages in an amount
- 3 -

estimated to be in excess of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00), to be more fully determined at trial.
Request for Relief WHEREFORE, plaintiff Jeri Hagemeyer respectfully requests that judgment be entered in his favor and against defendant Corporate Security Solutions, Inc., as follows: A . An award of compensatory damages in an amount that will fully compensate plaintiff for her injuries, an amount estimated to be in excess of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00); B. An award of punitive damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00); C. An award of the costs of bringing this action, including reasonable attorney's fees; and D. Such other relief as this court may deem just and proper.
/s/ John H. Forg JOHN H. FORG (0041972) 6 So. Second St., Suite 208 Hamilton, Ohio 45011 tel: (513) 889-0007 fax: (513) 889-0087 Email: johnhforg@cinci.rr.com
/s/ Bradley M. Kraemer BRADLEY M. KRAEMER (0070329) Lyons & Lyons 8310 Princeton-Glendale Road West Chester, Ohio 45069 tel: (513) 942-5555 fax: (513) 870-5442
Attorneys for Intervenor Jeri Hagemeyer
- 4 -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A copy of the foregoing Complainti in Intervention was served upon Howard Besser, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1660 W. Second St., Suite 850, Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1412, attorney for plaintiff, and upon Lawrence E. Barbiere, Schroeder, Maundrell, Barbiere & Powers, 11935 Mason Road, Suite 110, Cincinnati, Ohio 45249, attorney for defendant, by electronic mail, on this 10th day of August, 2006.
/s/ John H. Forg JOHN H. FORG (0041972) Attorney for Intervenor Jeri Hagemeyer
- 5 -

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO DISTRICT
EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

And

)

)

JERI HAGEMEYER

)

)

)

Plaintiff-I ntervener,

)

)

vs.

)

)

CORPORATE SECURITY SOLUTIONS, )

INC.,

)

)

Defendant.

)

Case No.1 :05-CV-00507
Judge Michael R. Barrett
Magistrate Judge Kemp

CONSENT DECREE

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), an agency of the United States government, filed this action, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title Villi), Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (,,1991 CRA"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"). In its Complaint, the Commission alleged that Defendant Corporate Security Solutions, Inc. ("CSS"), violated Title VII and the 1991 CRA by terminating the employment of Jeri Hagemeyer, because of her sex, female, due to condition of pregnancy. The Commission further alleged that Defendant retaliated, in violation of Title VII, the CRA of 1991, the ADEA and the EPA, against Hagemeyer and other individuals affected by Defendant's "Certification and Understanding" Agreement, which they were required to sign as a condition of employment,

because it unlawfully sought to limit the periods allowed by law for them to bring actions in court prescribed by these statutes.
CSS was served a Summons and a copy of the Commission's Complaint filed in this matter, filed an Answer and for purposes of this Consent Decree only, admits the jurisdiction of this Court over the subject matter of this action. In its Answer, CSS denied that it violated Title VII and denied that it discriminated against Hagemeyer or any other individuals it employed.
The Commission and Defendant have conferred and resolved their differences and have advised this Court (ECF Doc. #27) that they desire to resolve the allegations in EEOC's Complaint without the burden, expense and delay of further litigation.
Now, therefore, without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law raised by the Commission's Complaint, it is the finding of this Court that: (1) this Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 451, 1331, 1337, 1343, and 1345; and (2) the provisions of Title VII, the 1991 CRA, the ADEA and EPA will be carried out by the implementation of this Decree and this Decree is entered into pursuant to Title VII, the 1991 CRA , the ADEA and EPA.
It is therefore DECREED as follows: 1. The term of this Decree shall be two (2) years. 2. During the term of this Decree, the Commission may review compliance with this Decree. As a part of its review, the Commission may require written position statements relevant to compliance, and may at all reasonable times inspect CSS' Cincinnati, Ohio facility and have access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy, any evidence relevant to compliance with this Decree, and to interview employees in CSS' Cincinnati, Ohio facility.
2

3. Defendant, its officers, agents, employees, successors, assigns and all others in active concert with them, shall not discriminate against any employee because of her sex, condition of pregnancy and shall not require employees, applicants for employment or separated employees to waive or agree to limit the periods allowed by law for making claims or bringing actions in court under Title VII, the 1991 CRA, the ADEA and EPA.
4. Nothing in this Decree shall preclude the Commission from bringing suit to enforce the terms of the Decree; nothing in this Decree shall preclude future action by the Commission or other persons to remedy any other alleged violations of Title VII, the 1991 CRA, the ADEA and EPA by the Defendant; nor shall this Decree preclude or otherwise effect the individual claims of Plaintiff-Intervener Jeri Hagemeyer asserted in her pending Complaint in Intervention (ECF Document #9-2).
5. This Decree, being entered with the consent of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Defendant, shall not constitute an adjudication or finding on the merits of this case nor shall it be deemed an admission by Defendant of any violation of Title VII, the 1991 CRA, the ADEA and EPA.
6. Defendant shall post and keep posted, during the term of this Decree, in conspicuous places upon their premises, where notices to employees or applicants are customarily posted, Attachments A (Notice to All Employees) and B (EEOC's "Facts About Pregnancy Discrimination" information sheet).
7. Within sixty (60) days of the entry of this Decree, Defendant will distribute copies of Attachments A and B to each employee.
8. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Decree, Defendant will revise its "Equal Employment Opportunity" policy (such as the policy on page 6 of the Employee Manual for Security Officers) to insert "pregnancy" as a stated basis of prohibited discrimination.
3

9. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Decree, Defendant will revise its written condition of employment regarding employees' time limits for bringing lawsuits or claims by replacing existing subparagraph (a) in the May 27, 2005 version of its "Certification and Understanding" with a new subparagraph (a):
(a) For Lawsuits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"), as provided by those laws; or
10. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Decree Defendant will present its revised written condition of employment regarding employees' time limits for bringing lawsuits or claims above to each of its employees for signature.
11. Within ninety (90) days of the entry of this Decree, all supervisors, managers and officials of Defendant's Cincinnati, Ohio facility, shall attend a training session on the issue of pregnancy discrimination, covering at a minimum each of the matters discussed in Attachment B.
12. Defendant will report in writing to the Associate Regional Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity CommiSSion, Cleveland Field Office, The AJC Federal Office Building, 1240 East 9th Street, Room 3001, Cleveland, Ohio 44199, when the undertakings outlined in paragraphs six (6) through eleven (11) of this Decree have been completed. The report will describe the manner in which the undertakings were carried out, including the names of the officials, managers and supervisors receiving the training under paragraph eleven (11) above including the training date(s), training location(s), identification of the trainer and copies of the training script, agenda, handout or slide show. This report shall be submitted not later than one hundred ten (110) days from the date of this Decree.
4

13. Defendant shall, during the term of this Decree, submit to Plaintiff semi-

annual reports listing the name(s), date of birth, last known address and telephone number of

each female employee separated from employment at Defendant's Cincinnati, Ohio facility.

The first semi-annual report is due six (6) months and thirty (30) days after the

date of this decree, and thereafter reports are due every six (6) months covering the term of

this Decree.

14. This Court shall retain jurisdiction of this case for purposes of compliance

with this Decree and entry of such further orders as may be necessary or proper to effectuate

the purposes of this Decree.

15. Each party to this action shall bear its own costs and fees, including

bearing its own attorneys fees.

il!!..1 IT IS SO ORDERED THIS

day of ,,1fO/t/;t/~/

7

,2002

4~/J/~Y United States District Court Judge

5

ATTACHMENT A

NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES

This notice to all employees is being posted by agreement between Corporate Security Solutions, Inc. and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Federal law requires, among other things, that there be no discrimination against any employee or applicant for employment because of the employee's pregnancy, with respect to compensation, hiring, leave of absence or other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Federal law further provides, among other things, that employees, applicants for employment and former employees may file discrimination charges with EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination and may file discrimination suits in federal court within 90 days of receipt of a Notice of Right to Sue from EEOC. For Lawsuits under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) suit may filed at any time from 60 days after a charge has been filed with EEOC until 90 days after receipt of notice that EEOC has completed its action on the age discrimination charge. For Lawsuits under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), suit may be filed within 2 years (3 years for willful violations) of the alleged EPA underpayment of wages. Employees, applicants for employment and former employees will not be required to waive or limit these time periods for filing EEOC charges or lawsuits under these laws.

It is the policy of Corporate Security Solutions, Inc to maintain a working environment free of

pregnancy

discrimination.

ATTACHMENT B
FACTS ABOUT PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act is an amendment to Title vn of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions constitutes unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII. Women affected by pregnancy or related conditions must be treated in the same manner as other applicants or employees with similar abilities or limitations.
IDRING
An employer cannot refuse to hire a woman because of her pregnancy related condition as long as she is able to perform the ~or functions of her job. An employer cannot refuse to hire ber because of its prejudices against pregnant workers or the prejudices of C<rworkers, clients or customers.
PREGNANCY AND MATERNITY LEAVE
An employer may not single out pregnancy related conditions for special procedures to detennine an employee's ability to work. However, an employer may use any procedure used to screen other employees' ability to work. For example, if an employer requires its employees to submit a doctor's statement concerning their inability to work before granting leave or paying sick benefits, the employer may require employees affected by pregnancy related conditions to submit such statements.
If an employee is temporarily unable to perform her job due to pregnancy, the employer must treat her the same as any other temporarily disabled employee; for example, by providing modified tasks, alternative assignments, disability leave or leave without pay.
Pregnant employees must be permitted to work as long as they are able to perform their jobs. If an employee has been absent from work as a result of a pregnancy related condition and recovers, her employer may not require her to remain on leave until the baby's birth. An employer may not have a rule which prohibits an employee from returning to work for a predetermined length of time after childbirth.
Employers must hold open a job for a pregnancy related absence the same length of time jobs are held open for employees on sick or disability leave.
HEALTH INSURANCE
Any health insurance provided by an employer must cover expenses for pregnancy related conditions on the same basis as costs for other medical conditions. Health insurance for expenses arising from abortion is not required, except where the life of the mother is endangered.
Pregnancy related expenses should be reimbursed exactly as those incurred for other medical conditions, whether payment is on a fixed basis or a percentage of reasonable and customary charge basis.
(over)

The a.mounts payable by the insurance provider can be limited only to the same extent as costs for other conditions. No additional, increased or larger deductible can be imposed.
If a health insurance plan excludes benefit payments for pre-existing conditions when the insured's coverage becomes effective, benefits can be denied for medical costs arising from an existing pregnancy.
Employers must provide the same level of health benefits for spouses of male employees as they do for spouses of female employees.
FRINGE BENEFITS
Pregnancy related benefits cannot be limited to married employees. In an all-female workforce or job classification, benefits must be provided for pregnancy related conditions if benefits are provided for other medical conditions.
If an employer provides any benefits to wqrkers on leave, the employer must provide the same benefits for those on leave for pregnancy related conditions.
Employees with pregnancy related disabilities must be treated the same as other
temporarily disabled employees for accrual and crediting of seniority, vacation calculation, pay increases and temporary disability benefits.
FILING A CHARGE
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has issued guidelines, including questions and answers, interpreting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (29 CPR 1604.10).
Charges of pregnancy discrimination may be filed at any field office of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Field offices are located in !SO cities throughout the United States and are listed in most local telephone directories under U.S.
Government. Information on all EEOC-enforced laws may be obtained by calling toll free on 800-669-EEOC. EEOC's toll free TDD number is 800-800-3302. This fact sheet is also available in alternate formats, upon request.

 
 E.E.O.C. v. Corporate Security Solutions, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 1026376 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. Ohio,
Western Division.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
CORPORATE SECURITY SOLUTIONS, Defendant.
No. 1:05cv507. | March 29, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
C. Larry Watson, Lawrence Mays, Jeffrey A. Stern, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.
John H. Forg, III, Forg & Forg, Cincinnati, OH, for Intervenor Plaintiff Jeri Hagemeyer.
Lawrence Edward Barbiere, Schroeder Mundrell Barbiere & Powers, Cincinnati, OH, for Defendant.
Opinion
OPINION & ORDER
MICHAEL R. BARRETT, United States District Judge.
*1 This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Corporate Security Solutions, Inc.’s (“Corporate Security”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26). Intervening Plaintiff Jeri Hagemeyer filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. 29), and Corporate Security filed a Reply (Doc. 31) This matter is now ripe for review.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This action was brought before the Court upon a Complaint filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Doc. 1) On August 8, 2006, this Court granted Intervening Plaintiff, Jeri Hagemeyer’s, Motion to Intervene. (Doc. 14) On January 11, 2007, the

EEOC and Corporate Security filed a Joint Motion for Approving and Entering a Consent Decree (Doc. 27). The Court granted the Joint Motion, and the Consent Decree was entered on January 12, 2007. (Doc. 28)
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Corporate Security provides security services for local businesses. Hagemeyer originally applied for a position with Corporate Security as a security guard. (Doc. 31-4, Hagemeyer Depo. at 56) Hagemeyer was instead hired on November 26, 2003 as a secretary/receptionist in the company’s administrative offices. (Doc. 30, Jeri Hagemeyer Affidavit, ¶ 2) Hagemeyer technically reported to Frank Sullivan, the General Manager, but Chris Coppola, the Regional Vice-President, and Matt Yalack, the Personnel Manager, also worked out of that office and sometimes directed her activities. (Hagemeyer Aff., ¶ 3) Corporate Security had just acquired American Sentry Protection Service, an existing business, to gain a foothold in the Cincinnati area. (Doc. 31-2, Christopher Coppola Depo. at 17) Sherry Harney, who had worked for American Sentry Protective Service for 18 years, and who essentially ran the front office, quit shortly after Hagemeyer’s hire. (Hagemeyer Depo. at 64; Coppola Depo. at 36) Harney did train Hagemeyer for three days before she left, but Harney was unfamiliar with Corporate Security’s policies and procedures. (Hagemeyer Depo. at 64)
On several occasions, Sullivan and Coppola told Hagemeyer that she was doing a good job. (Id. at 91-92) Hagemeyer never received a formal warning or reprimand. (Id. at 72) Hagemeyer admits that Coppola did, on two occasions, point out mistakes Hagemeyer had made. (Id. at 87) Soon after she first started, Coppola told Hagemeyer to be more detailed in writing out telephone messages, which she corrected to his satisfaction. (Id. at 87, 88, 89) On another occasion, Hagemeyer copied an incorrect address from a fingerprint card. When the materials came back, Hagemeyer and Coppola together looked up the correct address and made the necessary corrections. (Id. at 87)
Coppola has identified several other mistakes Hagemeyer made. Coppola maintains that Hagemeyer sent out W-2 forms to the security guards in the same envelopes as their paychecks, contrary to his instructions. (Coppola Depo. at 91) Coppola states that the W-2 forms were sent to the wrong employees and he was forced to drive to the
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E.E.O.C. v. Corporate Security Solutions, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

employees’ houses, pick up the forms, and deliver the forms to the correct employee. (Id. at 92) Coppola also states that on another occasion, Hagemeyer neglected to give him a message regarding an order for computers that Coppola had promised to a client. (Id. at 81-82) Coppola also points to Hagemeyer’s failure to include checks for state licensing fees along with the applications submitted for new employee to the state licensing board. (Id. at 85) Coppola explains that there were other typographical errors made on these applications. (Id. at 87) Corporate Security also maintains that numerous packages were returned to the office due to insufficient postage, and Hagemeyer lost the mail box key. (Id.)
*2 These mistakes were apparently memoralized in three typewritten documents.1 Coppola has testified that these documents were typed up “[b]ecause we were going to fire her. We wanted documentation of our notes.” (Coppola Depo. at 56)

1

Hagemeyer explains that at her deposition counsel for

Corporate Solutions produced three typewritten

documents relating to her job performance. The first

was a document titled “Memo To: File” dated January

21, 2004, and signed by Sullivan. The other two

documents, entitled “Performance Issues for Jeri

Hagemeyer,” and “Notes on Jeri Hagemeyer,” both

undated, were created by Coppola.

In mid-December 2003, Hagemeyer learned that she was pregnant, and informed Sullivan, Coppola, and Yalacki. Hagemeyer states that they all appeared to be happy for her. (Hagemeyer Aff., ¶ 6; Hagemeyer Depo. at 108-09)
On January 6, 2004, Hagemeyer experienced severe abdominal cramps at work. (Hagemeyer Aff., ¶ 7) During her lunch break, and with Sullivan’s permission, Hagemeyer went to a Urgent Care facility. (Hagemeyer Depo. at 100) The nurse told Hagemeyer that she should go to an emergency room. (Hagemeyer Aff., ¶ 7) Because Hagemeyer’s lunch hour was over, she went back to the office and received permission from Coppola and Yalacki to take the rest of the day off. (Hagemeyer Depo. at 101-102) At the emergency room, Hagemeyer learned that she was pregnant with twins. (Id. at 102-103) Hagemeyer was released that evening, but told to stay off her feet for several days. (Id. at 103) That evening, Hagemeyer contacted Coppola on his cell phone and explained what had happened. (Hagemeyer Aff. ¶ 8) Coppola asked Hagemeyer to bring a doctor’s note when she returned the next day, which she did. (Hagemeyer

Depo. at 103)
On January 18, 2004, Hagemeyer developed flu-like symptoms. (Hagemeyer Aff., ¶ 9) With the permission of Sullivan and Coppola, Hagemeyer left work to see her doctor. (Hagemeyer Depo. at 110) Hagemeyer’s physician ordered her to take off work for three days. (Hagemeyer Aff. ¶ 9) Hagemeyer contacted Coppola, informed him of this development and was told that would be fine. (Id.) Hagemeyer then faxed a copy of the doctor’s note. (Id.)
On January 21, 2004, Hagemeyer received a call from Sullivan, who told her that she need not return the next day. (Hagemeyer Depo. at 18-20) When Hagemeyer asked Sullivan the reason for her termination, he stated that several problems had arisen. (Hagemeyer Aff., ¶ 10) When Hagemeyer asked for specifics, Sullivan mentioned the mailing of W-2 forms the “wrong way.” (Hagemeyer Depo. at 111; Hagemeyer Aff., ¶ 10) Hagemeyer then asked Sullivan if she was being terminated because of her pregnancy. (Hagemeyer Aff., ¶ 10) Hagemeyer states that Sullivan responded: “Partial of it is your pregnancy, yes. We cannot afford to have someone out of the office at all times, especially with you getting sick, you being pregnant with twins, its going to be a little bit hard.” (Hagemeyer Depo. at 112)
Hagemeyer filed a charge with an EEOC, which led to the filing of the instant action by the EEOC. In Hagemeyer’s Complaint in Intervention, Hagemeyer brings claims of discrimination based upon her pregnancy in violation Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(k), and in violation of Ohio law.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard *3 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but then the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
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E.E.O.C. v. Corporate Security Solutions, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

317 (1986); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. However, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere allegations in the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U .S. at 324.
B. Discrimination under Title VII Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Title VII was amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which provides that:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(k).
In a case alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII, a plaintiff can withstand a motion for summary judgment either by presenting direct evidence of discrimination or circumstantial evidence from which a jury may infer a discriminatory motive. Rallins v. Ohio State University, 191 F.Supp.2d 920, 928 (S.D.Ohio 2002), citing, Kline v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 128 F.3d 337, 348-49 (6th Cir.1997). Hagemeyer claims that there is evidence of both direct and indirect discrimination.
1. Direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination

Direct evidence “is that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th Cir.1999); see also Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865 (6th Cir.2003) (“[D]irect evidence of discrimination does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences in order to conclude that the challenged employment action was motivated at least in part by prejudice against members of the protected group.”). Generally, direct evidence cannot be based on isolated and ambiguous remarks, but when made by an individual with decision-making authority, such remarks become relevant in determining whether there is enough evidence to establish discrimination. DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 416 (6th Cir.2004), citing Carter v. Univ. of Toledo, 349 F.3d 269, 273 (6th Cir.2003) (“comments made by individuals who are not involved in the decision-making process regarding the plaintiff’s employment do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination”); Hopson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 427, 433 (6th Cir.2002) (comments by manager lacking any involvement in the decision-making process do not constitute direct evidence); Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 354 (6th Cir.1998) (“isolated discriminatory remark made by one with no managerial authority over the challenged personnel decisions is not considered indicative of [ ] discrimination”).
*4 Once the plaintiff has produced credible direct evidence, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it would have taken the employment action of which the plaintiff complains even in the absence of discrimination. Jacklyn, 176 F.3d at 926; Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of E. Tenn., 302 F.3d 367, 382 (6th Cir.2002) (explaining that “an employee who has presented direct evidence of improper motive does not bear the burden of disproving other possible nonretaliatory reasons for the adverse action. Rather, the burden shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision absent the impermissible motive.”)
As direct evidence of discrimination, Hagemeyer points to Sullivan’s statement made on January 21, 2004 during the telephone conversation where he informed her of her termination. Hagemeyer states that Sullivan stated: “Partial of it is your pregnancy, yes. We cannot afford to have someone out of the office at all times, especially with you getting sick, you being pregnant with twins, its going to be a little bit hard.” Defendants do not dispute
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E.E.O.C. v. Corporate Security Solutions, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

that Sullivan made this statement, but instead argue that the statement by Sullivan cannot constitute direct evidence of discrimination because Cuppola, not Sullivan, made the decision to terminate Hagemeyer.
Hagemeyer relies on Coppola’s deposition testimony to prove that Sullivan had direct input in the decision to terminate her employment:
Q. So you and Mr. Sullivan talked about the termination and both of you decided to type up notes?
A. We had talked about the problems we were having with her, and at that point, you know, I had notes scattered, you know. They weren’t specific notes so we decided at that point we would make, put all our, combine our notes on to one-he would combine his notes, I would combine my notes ...
(Coppola Depo. at 57) The Court finds that this testimony is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sullivan was involved in the decision to terminate Hagemeyer. Therefore, Hagemeyer has produced credible direct evidence that her pregnancy was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate her employment.
Accordingly, the burden shifts to Corporate Security to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision to terminate Hagemeyer’s employment absent the impermissible motive. In addressing this burden, Corporate Security has cited to the following passage from Copolla’s deposition testimony:
And we can cut right to the chase here, if you want to ask me straight out if her pregnancy had any reason to do with her firing, I will tell you it absolutely did not.... I thought she did a horrible job, and that was what my issues were. They really weren’t with her pregnancy. To be honest with you, when I heard that that was what the issue was with her, her conflict with her termination, I really couldn’t believe it. I really couldn’t believe it. Because at no time did I ever make her feel that her being pregnant had anything to do with the problem that I had with her performance. And, you know, just

flat out that’s the way it was. I mean, I really didn’t-it really didn’t even occur to me that-you know, it didn’t mean anything to me that she was pregnant or not pregnant. She could have been pregnant or not been pregnant, it wouldn’t have made a difference. The issues I had with her was her performance, the fact that she wasn’t doing the job that I needed to have done.
*5 (Coppola Depo. at 99-100) However, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Hagemeyer’s job performance alone was a sufficient basis for her termination. Coppola testified that on previous occasions he has sat down face-to-face with the employees and explained to employees why they are being terminated and what the problems are with their performance. (Id. at 101) Coppola explained that he then gives the employees an opportunity to talk to him. (Id.) Coppola stated that often he gave the employee a second or third chance. (Id.) Hagemeyer was not afforded such an opportunity. (Id.) Therefore, the Court finds that Hagemeyer has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on pregnancy through the use of direct evidence. Accordingly, Corporate Security is not entitled to summary judgment.
2. Indirect evidence of pregnancy discrimination The Court also finds that Hagemeyer has presented sufficient indirect evidence to support her claim of pregnancy.
Where a plaintiff relies on indirect evidence of discrimination, a claim of employment discrimination is to be analyzed using the burden-shifting approach first announced in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A plaintiff has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 802.
To establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, the plaintiff must show that “(1) she was pregnant, (2) she was qualified for her job, (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment decision, and (4) there is a nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment decision.” Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir.2000). If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, an inference
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E.E.O.C. v. Corporate Security Solutions, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

of discrimination arises, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981). If the defendant articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons put forth by the defendant were not its true reasons but were a mere pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The plaintiff may prove pretext by showing either that: (1) the proffered reason had no basis in fact, (2) the proffered reason did not actually motivate the adverse action, or (3) the proffered reason was insufficient to motivate the adverse action. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir.1994). The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against her remains at all times with the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
Corporate Security argues that Hagemeyer cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination because Hagemeyer was not qualified for her job. Corporate Security points to Hagemeyer’s work history, which consists of only one experience as an administrative assistant for a five-month period. Hagemeyer counters that her work history is not relevant because it was known to Coppola when he hired Hagemeyer. The Court agrees. This is not a case involving a failure to promote. Hagemeyer was hired on November 26, 2003 for the very job that she was fired from on January 21, 2004. Without any evidence to the contrary, the Court must conclude that Hagemeyer was qualified for the position.
*6 Next, Corporate Security argues that Hagemeyer cannot show that there is a nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment decision. Hagemeyer counters that she has established a causal connection based upon temporal proximity. The Court agrees. Temporal proximity can satisfy the nexus requirement in the pregnancy discrimination context. Asmo v. Keane, Inc., 471 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir.2006). Here, Hagemeyer told Sullivan, Coppola, and Yalacki in mid-December 2003 that she was pregnant. Hagemeyer was terminated approximately one month later on January 21, 2004. This temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a link between Hagemeyer’s pregnancy and her termination for the purposes of a prima facie case. Id. (two months), citing DiCarlo, 358 F.3d at 422 (twenty-one days); DeBoer v. Musashi Auto Parts, Inc., 2005 WL 434526, *3 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished) (approximately two months).

Therefore, the Court concludes that Hagemeyer has established a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination.
Corporate Security has articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Hagemeyer’s employment. Corporate Security maintains that Hagemeyer was incompetent and was unable to be trained to properly perform the job of secretary/receptionist. Corporate Security cites to the numerous mistakes made by Hagemeyer. Hagemeyer disputes the factual basis of Corporate Security’s proffered reason for her termination, or argues that the proffered reason did not actually motivate the decision to terminate her.
Regarding the licensing applications, Hagemeyer explains that the forms were completed by the applicant themselves, and then reviewed by Sullivan or Coppola before being mailed out. (Hagemeyer Depo. at 129) Hagemeyer states that her role was only to make any changes requested by Sullivan or Coppola, place the applications in an envelope, and then mail the applications. (Id.) Hagemeyer argues that she had no control over the content of the applications.
Next, regarding incidents of incorrect postage, Hagemeyer states that she was never informed of any mailings returned for insufficient postage. (Id. at 127) Moreover, Hagemeyer states that she was never shown how to read the postal chart, and had to ask the mailman to explain the chart to her. (Id. at 81)
Regarding the mailing of the W-2 forms, Hagemeyer explains that the W-2 forms were computer-generated by payroll and presented to the administrative office in a sealed envelope with a pre-printed address. (Id. at 112) Hagemeyer states that her only responsibility was to mail the forms. (Id.) Hagemeyer also maintains that W-2 Forms were mailed separately, not stuffed into the envelopes with the paychecks. (Id. at 131)
Regarding the mailbox key, Hagemeyer explains that one night she accidentally took the key. (Id. at 133) Hagemeyer states that later that evening Yalacki contacted her on her cellphone. (Id.) Realizing her mistake, Hagemeyer arranged to meet Yalacki and gave him the key. (Id.)
*7 Regarding the checks for licensing applications, Hagemeyer maintains that the only application which was returned was one she mistakenly sent to an old address.
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E.E.O.C. v. Corporate Security Solutions, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

(Id. at 127)
Regarding the telephone messages, Hagemeyer admits that Coppola talked to her during her first or second week about writing more detailed messages. (Id. at 135) However, Hagemeyer explains that after that one conversation, no one ever complained about those telephone messages. (Id.)
Finally, regarding the personnel files, Hagemeyer admits that she was in charge of creating each file, but was forced to write and whiteout the labels because she did not have a typewriter or computer. (Id. at 163) Hagemeyer states that she was given permission to handwrite the labels from Coppola. (Id.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Hagemeyer has carried her burden of showing that the legitimate reasons put forth by Corporate Security were not its true reasons for her termination, but were a mere pretext for discrimination. Therefore, the Court finds that Corporate Security is not entitled to summary judgment on Hagemeyer’s claim of pregnancy discrimination.

C. Discrimination under Ohio law The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is generally applicable to cases involving alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 4112.” Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Comm. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 421 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ohio 1981); see also Tysinger v. Police Dept. of City of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir.2006) (“The federal and state pregnancy discrimination claims are evaluated generally under the same substantive standards.”). Therefore, the above analysis applies to Hagemeyer’s state law claims, and Corporate Security is not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant Corporate Security Solutions, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
	  

6

 
 ,

FILED

MA~ - .2 2007
JAMSS BONINI, Clerk
Cf~C/NNAT/. OHIO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

I EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff

CASE NO.l:05CV00507 Barrett, J.

VS.
CORPORATE SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC., : Defendant

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

The within action having been fully compromised and settled among the parties hereto, the complaint ofIntervenor Jeri Hagemeyer against Defendant Corporate Security Solutions, Inc. may be and is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice, without record, each party to bear its own costs.
The terms of the Full And Final Release And Settlement Agreement executed by the parties are hereby incorporated into and made an express condition of this Stipulation. The obligations of the parties to that Full And Final Release And Settlement Agreement to comply with the terms ofthat Agreement are hereby incorporated into and made an express condition of this Stipulation of Dismissal, and this Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce those obligations.
.
d~~
MICHAEL R. BARRETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1
004 John H. Forg (OH# 972)
6 South Second Street, Suite 208 Hamilton, OH 45011 (513) 889-0007 (513) 889-0087 (fax) Email: jforglaw0duse.net Counsel for Intervenor Jeri Hagemeyer
L ren~ . Barbiere (OH# 0027106) yD. atton (OH# 0068188)
SCHROEDER, MAUNDRELL, BARBIERE & POWERS 11935 Mason Road, Suite 110 Cincinnati, OH 45249 (513) 583-4200 (513) 583-4203 (fax) Email: patton(ii:smbplaw.com Counsel for Defendant Corporate Security Solutions, Inc.
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U.S. District Court Southern District of Ohio (Cincinnati) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:05-cv-00507-MRB

CLOSED, JURY

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Corporate Security Solutions Inc Assigned to: Michael R. Barrett Cause: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

Date Filed: 07/29/2005 Date Terminated: 04/10/2007 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by C Larry Watson Equal Employment Opportunity Commission AJC Federal Office Building Suite 3001 1240 East Ninth Street Cleveland, OH 44199 216-522-7455 Fax: FAX-522-7430 Email: larry.watson@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Howard R Besser Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Cleveland District Office 1660 West Second Street Suite 850 Cleveland, OH 44113-1454 216-522-7455 Email: howard.besser@eeoc.gov TERMINATED: 10/16/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lawrence Mays Equal Employment Opportunity Commission AJC Federal Office Building Suite 3001 1240 East Ninth Street Cleveland, OH 44199 216-522-4796 Fax: 216-522-7430 Email: Lawrence.Mays@EEOC.GOV LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Intervenor Plaintiff Jeri Hagemeyer
V. Defendant Corporate Security Solutions Inc

Jeffrey A. Stern Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Anthony J. Celebrezze Federal Office Building 1240 East 9th Street Suite 3001 Cleveland, OH 44199 216-522-7458 Fax: 216-522-7430 Email: jeffrey.stern@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John H Forg, III Forg & Forg 6 South Second Street Suite 208 Cincinnati, OH 45011 513-889-0007 Fax: 513-889-0087 Email: jforglaw@fuse.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Lawrence Edward Barbiere Schroeder Mundrell Barbiere & Powers - 1 11935 Mason Road Suite 110 Cincinnati, OH 45249 513-583-4200 Email: lbarbiere@smbplaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/29/2005 11/17/2005

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT with Jury Demand against Corporate Security Solutions Inc , filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 48BG (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(mlc, ) (Entered: 07/29/2005)
2 Summons Issued as to Christopher Coppola, Statutory Agent for Corporate Security Solutions Inc. (ph, ) (Entered: 11/17/2005)

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11/22/2005 12/06/2005 12/07/2005 01/11/2006 01/20/2006
04/10/2006 04/10/2006 04/14/2006 04/24/2006 06/26/2006 07/31/2006 08/01/2006 08/08/2006 08/12/2006 08/12/2006

3 SUMMONS Returned Executed Corporate Security Solutions Inc served on 11/21/2005, answer due 12/12/2005. (mlc, ) (Entered: 11/25/2005)
4 ANSWER to Complaint by Defendant Corporate Security Solutions Inc.(Barbiere, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/06/2005)
5 NOTICE of Deadline: Rule 26(f) Report due by 1/11/2006. (ba, ) (Entered: 12/07/2005)
6 RULE 26(f) REPORT Of the Parties by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Besser, Howard) (Entered: 01/11/2006)
7 CALENDAR ORDER: Amended Complaint due by 8/1/2006. Motions directed to pleadings due by 8/15/2006. Disclosure of Non-Expert Witness(es) due by 8/1/2006. Plaintiff Primary Expert(s)/Report(s) due by 4/4/2006. Defendant Primary Expert(s)/Report(s) due by 6/1/2006. Discovery cut-off 10/1/2006. Dispositive Motions due by 11/1/2006. Proposed Final Pretrial Order/Jury Instructions due by 2/15/2007. Final Pretrial Conference set for 2/22/2007, 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 815 & Jury Trial set for 3/12/2007, 9:30 a.m., in Courtroom 836 before Michael H. Watson. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 01/20/06. (dms) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
8 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE for Intervenor. (Forg, John) Modified on 4/14/2006-text changed to reflect Notice of Appearance (ph, ). (Entered: 04/10/2006)
9 MOTION to Intervene by Intervenor Jeri Hagemeyer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit proposed Complaint in Intervention)(Forg, John) (Entered: 04/10/2006)
Notice of Correction re:8 MOTION for Leave to Appear for Intervenor- Motion was terminated and text modified - actual pleading is a Notice Of Appearance NOT a MOTION (ph, ) (Entered: 04/14/2006)
10 RESPONSE to Motion re 8 MOTION for Leave to Appear for Intervenor filed by Defendant Corporate Security Solutions Inc. (Barbiere, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/24/2006)
11 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to Judge Michael R. Barrett for all further proceedings. Judge Michael H. Watson no longer assigned to case (srj, ) (Entered: 06/26/2006)
12 Witness List by Defendant Corporate Security Solutions Inc. (Barbiere, Lawrence) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
13 Witness List by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Besser, Howard) (Entered: 08/01/2006)
14 ORDER granting 9 Motion to Intervene by Jeri Hagemeyer; Hegemeyer is instruction to file her Complaint wihtin 10 days of the entry of this Order. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 8/8/2006. (ba, ) (Entered: 08/08/2006)
15 Intervenor COMPLAINT, filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Jeri Hagemeyer, Defendant Corporate Security Solutions Inc.(Forg, John) (Entered: 08/12/2006)
16 Witness List by Intervenor Plaintiff Jeri Hagemeyer. (Forg, John) (Entered: 08/12/2006)

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10/13/2006 10/19/2006 11/08/2006 11/30/2006 12/07/2006
01/05/2007 01/11/2007

17 ANSWER to Intervenor Complaint by Defendant Corporate Security Solutions Inc.(Barbiere, Lawrence) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
18 NOTICE of Appearance by Jeffrey A. Stern Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Stern, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/15/2006)
19 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery New date requested 12/1/2006. and to revise Calendar Order dates by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1)(Stern, Jeffrey) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
20 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER granting 19 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery New date requested 12/1/2006. and to revise Calendar Order dates filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Final Pretrial Conference set for 4/5/2007 at 10:00 AM before Michael R. Barrett, Room 815. Discovery due by 12/1/2006. Motions due by 1/5/2007. Proposed Final Pretrial Order/Jury Instructions due by 3/29/2007. Jury Trial set for 4/23/2007 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 3, Room 836, before Michael R. Barrett. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 9/25/2006. (ba, ) (Entered: 09/25/2006)
21 NOTICE by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Withdrawal and Substitution of Trial Attorney (Stern, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/13/2006)
22 NOTICE by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of Service of Subpoena for deposition and documents on Christopher Coppola, Proof of Service and Declaration of Server executed (Stern, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/19/2006)
23 NOTICE by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of Service of Subpoena for deposition and documents on Frank Bert Sullivan, Jr., Proof of Service and Declaration of Server executed (Stern, Jeffrey) (Entered: 11/08/2006)
24 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery New date requested 12/22/2006. by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Defendant Corporate Security Solutions Inc. (Barbiere, Lawrence) (Entered: 11/30/2006)
25 ORDER granting 24 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery New date requested 12/22/2006 filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Corporate Security Solutions Inc; Discovery due by 12/22/2006. All other dates remain in effect. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 12/7/2006. (ba, ) (Entered: 12/07/2006)
26 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendant Corporate Security Solutions Inc. Responses due by 1/29/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Excerpts from Hagemeyer deposition# 2 Exhibit Excerpts from Coppola deposition)(Barbiere, Lawrence) (Entered: 01/05/2007)
27 Joint MOTION for Order to Approve and Enter a Consent Decree by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Stern, Jeffrey) (Entered: 01/11/2007)

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01/12/2007 01/26/2007 01/29/2007 02/07/2007
03/27/2007 03/28/2007
03/28/2007 03/29/2007
03/30/2007 04/03/2007 04/04/2007 04/05/2007
04/10/2007 05/02/2007

28 CONSENT DECREE - ORDER granting 27 Motion for Order to enter a Consent Decree. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 1/12/2007. (ba, ) (Entered: 01/12/2007)
29 RESPONSE in Opposition re 26 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Jeri Hagemeyer. (Forg, John) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
30 AFFIDAVIT in Support of 29 Response in Opposition to Motion re 26 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Intervenor Plaintiff Jeri Hagemeyer. (Forg, John) Modified docket text on 1/30/2007 (eh1, ). (Entered: 01/29/2007)
31 REPLY to Response to Motion re 26 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Corporate Security Solutions Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Excerpts from Coppola's deposition# 2 Exhibit Defendant's Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff's deposition# 3 Exhibit Excerpts from Plaintiff's deposition)(Barbiere, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/07/2007)
32 ORDER extending the deadline for Joint Final Pretrial Order and Jury Instructions to 4/3/2007; items to be emailed to the chambers email address. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 3/27/2007. (ba, ) (Entered: 03/27/2007)
33 NOTICE by Defendant Corporate Security Solutions Inc of Filing of Deposition Transcripts (Attachments: # 1 Transcript deposition of Christopher Coppola# 2 Transcript of deposition of Jeri Hagemeyer)(Barbiere, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/28/2007)
34 DEPOSITION of Jeri Hagemeyer taken on November 1, 2006 by Intervenor Plaintiff Jeri Hagemeyer. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Deposition transcript)(Forg, John) (Entered: 03/28/2007)
35 ORDER denying 26 Motion for Summary Judgment; case to proceed with final pretrial conference scheduled for 4/5/2007; joint final pretrial order/jury instructions due 4/3/2007. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 3/29/2007. (ba, ) (Entered: 03/29/2007)
36 NOTICE by Defendant Corporate Security Solutions Inc Proof of Service of Subpoena (Patton, Jay) (Entered: 03/30/2007)
37 Proposed Jury Instructions by Intervenor Plaintiff Jeri Hagemeyer. (Forg, John) (Entered: 04/03/2007)
38 NOTICE by Defendant Corporate Security Solutions Inc Frank Sullivan Subpoena Proof of Service (Patton, Jay) (Entered: 04/04/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Michael R. Barrett; Final Pretrial Conference and Settlement Conference held on 4/5/2007; John Forg appeared with client Jerri Hagemeyer; Jay Patton appeared with company rep Leigh Jennings; matter was not settled; case to proceed with trial on 4/24/2007 at 9:00 am, Courtroom 3, Room 836. (ba, ) (Entered: 04/05/2007)
39 ORDER DISMISSING CASE pursuant to a conditional dismissal. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 4/10/2007. (ba, ) (Entered: 04/10/2007)
40 STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 5/2/2007. (ba, ) (Entered: 05/02/2007)

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