Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 1 Filed 02/10/10 Page 1 of 19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANNIA

NICHOLAS GEORGE 202 Deaver Road Wyncote, PA 19095
Plaintiff,
v.
REIHL, Given Name Unknown, Philadelphia Police Officer, in his individual capacity;
RICHARDS, Given Name Unknown, Philadelphia Police Sergeant, in his individual capacity;
THREE UNKNOWN NAMED OFFICERS OR AGENTS OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, in their individual capacities;
TWO UNKNOWN NAMED AGENTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, in their individual capacities;
Defendants.

No. _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES (Violation of First and Fourth Amendment Rights)
1. Plaintiff Nicholas George, a 22-year-old senior at Pomona College, was detained, abusively interrogated, handcuffed, and jailed for several hours in a holding cell solely because he passed tlll'ough an airport screening checkpoint with a set of ArabicEnglish flashcards and a book critical of American foreign policy.
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2. Mr. George was attempting to travel from the Philadelphia International Airpmi to California in order to resume his studies, including Arabic language studies. At the airpmi screening checkpoint he was stopped and detained for 30 minutes by TSA screeners and abusively interrogated for an additional15 minutes by a TSA supervisor. He was then handcuffed, without explanation, by a Philadelphia police officer and transpmied to the airpoti police station where he was jailed for approximately four hours, more than two of them with his hands cuffed behind his back. Mr. George was released only after having been subjected to an additional 30 minutes of custodial interrogation at the hands of two FBI agents.
3. The conduct of the TSA officials, the Philadelphia police, and the FBI violated Mr. George's Fomih Amendment right to be free from umeasonable seizure and his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. He brings this lawsuit in order to vindicate those rights.
PARTIES 4. PlaintiffNicholas George is a 22-year-old citizen of the United States and resident of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. He is a senior at Pomona College in Claremont, California, where he is a double-major in Physics and Middle-Eastern Studies. Mr. George began studying the Arabic language in his first year of college as part ofhis Middle Eastern studies major. He has spent a semester studying abroad in Jordan and has traveled to several other countries, including Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 5. John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 were Transpmiation Security Officers of the Transpotiation Sect1rity Administration-commonly known as "airport screeners"-at
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the time of the events giving rise to this action. Each was responsible for detaining Mr. George for 30 minutes at the screening area and, upon information and belief, they summoned the TSA Supervisor known here as Jane Doe 3, as well as the Philadelphia · Police Depatiment, for further interrogation, detention, and arrest of Mr. George. The names and residences of Defendants John Does 1 and 2 were never disclosed to the Plaintiff are not currently known to him. John Does 1 and 2 are sued here in their individual capacities.
6. Jane Doe 3 was an official of the Transpo1iation Security Agency at the time of the events giving rise to this action. Upon information and belief, Jane Doe 3 held a position that involved supervising airpmi screeners, including Defendants John Does 1 and 2. Jane Doe 3 interrogated Mr. George in a hostile and aggressive matmer, continued his detention, and turned him over to Defendant Reihl to be handcuffed, all'ested,jailed, and further intell'ogated. The name and residence ofDefendant Jane Doe 3 was never disclosed to the Plaintiff and is not currently known to him. Jane Doe 3 is sued in her individual capacity.
7. Defendant Reihl was an officer of the Philadelphia Police Depatiment at the time of the events giving rise to this action. He handcuffed Mr. George in the airport te1minal, jailed him in a cell in the airpmi police detachment, failed to remove his handcuffs upon jailing him, and left him in the cell for more than two hours. His given name and residence were never disclosed to the Plaintiff and are not currently known to the Plaintiff. Defendant Reihl was acting under color of state law during the events described in this Complaint. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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8. Defendant Richards was a uniformed officer of the Philadelphia Police Depmiment at the time of the events giving rise to this action. On information and belief, Defendant Richards was the duty sergeant for at least part of the time during which Mr. George was incarcerated. Defendant Richards prolonged Mr. George's detention until the agents of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (John Does 4 and 5) arrived to interrogate him. Defendant Richards's given name and residence were never disclosed to the Plaintiff and are not currently known to the Plaintiff. Defendant Richards was acting under color of state law during the events described in this complaint. He is sued in his individual capacity.
9. John Doe 4 and John Doe 5 were agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the time of the events giving rise to this action. John Does 4 and 5 prolonged Mr. George's detention and interrogated him for approximately 30 minutes. The names and residences of Defendants John Doe 4 and John Doe 5 are not currently known to the Plaintiff. John Does 4 and 5 are both white males. They are both sued here in their individual capacities.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 10. This comi has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). 11. This complaint is for money damages based upon civil rights violations committed by Federal and State officials contrary to the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court
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has authority to award costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
12. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 1391(e).
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 13. On Saturday, August 29, 2009, PlaintiffNicholas George was scheduled to fly on Southwest Airlines from Philadelphia International Airport to Ontario International Airpmi in California, via Phoenix. He was traveling to California in order to begin his senior year at Pomona College.
Arrival at Airport and Check-in 14. After Mr. George arrived at the airport, he waited in the line for check-in and, upon reaching the counter, he presented his identification and received a boarding pass for his flight without incident. He then proceeded to the security screening area. 15. Mr. George canied a single piece of cany-on luggage, a black athletic bag. Inside the athletic bag were two small speakers (approximately 10" x 6" x 6") that he intended to use with his stereo system in California. 16. As Mr. George approached the x-ray screening device, a TSA officialnot a defendant in this action-asked Mr. George to present his identification and boarding pass. Mr. George complied. The TSA official asked Mr. George what was inside his carry-on bag. Mr. George responded that the bag contained his speakers. The TSA official then asked Mr. George to step aside. Mr. George complied. The TSA official asked Mr. George to remove the speakers, so that they could be passed through the x-ray screening device separately. Mr. George complied.
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17. Mr. George placed his carry-on bag and his speakers on the belt. He emptied his pockets of all items containing metal, including his wallet and cell phone, and took off his shoes. These items were also placed on the belt to pass tluough the screening device.
18. Mr. George stepped up to the metal detector. He walked through the metal detector without incident. The detector made no sound.
19. The TSA official who was operating the metal detector-not a defendant in this action-nevertheless asked Mr. George to step aside and to wait. This TSA official asked to see Mr. George's boarding pass. Mr. George showed his boarding pass to the official. There was a glass enclosure located next to the metal detector that was used for additional screening. After this glass-enclosed screening area had been vacated by a previous passenger, the TSA official directed Mr. George to enter. Mr. George stepped into the glass enclosure as directed.
20. Inside the glass enclosure another TSA official (Defendant John Doe 1) asked Mr. George to empty his pockets. Mr. George had already emptied his pockets of any items containing metal, so among the only items remaining was a set of flashcards. Mr. George handed the flashcards to the TSA official, as instructed.
English-Arabic Flashcards 21. Each flashcard had Arabic words on one side and English translations on the other. The flashcards were of the kind that would commonly be used by a person studying a foreign language. Indeed, Mr. George used the flashcards as a tool for learning Arabic vocabulary.
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22. Mr. George had been studying Arabic for three years, beginning in his first year of college, in connection with his Middle-Eastern Studies major. Mr. George had spent a semester in Jordan studying Arabic as part of a study abroad program organized by the Council on International Educational Exchange, a U.S. non-profit organization founded in 1947. He received credit at Pomona College for the courses he took in Jordan. Upon completing the program, he spent approximately five weeks traveling in Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan-the latter two of which are Arabic-speaking countries-as a tourist and in order to practice his Arabic language skills.
23. Mr. George has a strong interest in the contemporary politics of the Middle East, especially as they involve and affect the United States. Mr. George sought to learn Arabic in order to be able to read and understand what was being repmied and debated in contemporary Middle Eastern newspapers, television programs, and other publications or media.
Detention by TSA Screeners 24. The TSA official to whom Mr. George handed the flashcards (Defendant John Doe 1) proceeded to inspect them. The official did not make any comment and did not indicate that there was any kind of problem. He neve1iheless took Mr. George to a different screening area. Mr. George waited there while that TSA official and another TSA official (Defendant John Doe 2) further inspected his bag and the flashcards. One of these two TSA officials swabbed Mr. George's cell phone in order to run a test for explosives. The test returned a negative result. The TSA officials found nothing among Mr. George's personal effects that posed a safety risk or was otherwise prohibited in the "sterile" area of the airpmi and aboard an airplane. Indeed, Mr. George was not carrying
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any prohibited items or items that could pose a safety risk. Nor was Mr. George canying anything suggestive of criminal or otherwise prohibited activity.
25. It soon became apparent to Mr. George that the two TSA officials were stalling. The TSA officials completed their search of Mr. George's carry-on items within ten minutes. One of the officials flipped through the pages of books that Mr. George had among his carry-on items. He swabbed Mr. George's cell phone for a second time and half-hemiedly re-examined Mr. George's other carry-on items. The official also attempted to make small talk, asking Mr. George if he had seen the recent Philadelphia Phillies baseball game. After Mr. George responded in the affirmative and offered his opinion of the game, the TSA official admitted that he had not seen the game and did not generally watch the Phillies.
26. The other official stepped away and placed a phone call. He was speaking on the phone for some time. Mr. George could not hear the call but believed that he might have been speaking with a TSA supervisor. On information and belief, the TSA official was speaking on the phone with a TSA supervisor or other official about Mr. George's screening, including the English-Arabic flashcards.
27. The two TSA officials kept Mr. George in the side screening area for 30 minutes. The TSA officials maintained Mr. George's property-including his wallet, identification, passport, and boarding pass-in their custody. At no point did the TSA officials retum, or offer to retum, Mr. George's propetiy to him. During this period of time Mr. George was detained by the TSA officials. Mr. George was not free to leave and believed that he was not free to leave.
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28. During this time, Mr. George became increasingly concerned that he would miss his flight. He asked the TSA officials how much longer he would have to wait and mentioned to the officials that his flight was leaving shortly.
29. The TSA officials did not explain to Mr. George why he could not proceed to the gate, nor did they explain to him the reason that he was being delayed and detained. The TSA officials at no point suggested that Mr. George could leave the screening area if he wished.
Detention and interrogation by TSA Supervisor 30. After 30 minutes, a TSA Supervisor anived (Jane Doe 3). The Supervisor immediately began questioning Mr. George in a hostile and aggressive manner. Mr. George responded to all questions truthfully and to the best of his ability, in a polite and calm manner. 31. The TSA Supervisor's questioning proceeded, in pmi, as follows:
Jane Doe 3: How do you feel about 9/11? 32. Mr. George responded that he thought 9/11 was a tenible event. 33. At this point, the Supervisor noted that Mr. George had with him a book entitled "Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions," by Clyde Prestowitz, published by Basic Books in 2004. The book has been described by General Wesley Clark as "a fascinating big picture look at America and its place in the world [that] should help provoke the kind of discussion that we have long needed." Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, has described the book as "[a] conservative's sober warning of the dangers ofunilateralism and the temptations of empire."
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34. After noticing the book, the TSA Supervisor continued her hostile and aggressive questioning as follows:
Jane Doe 3: You obviously read. You know who did 9/11? 35. Mr. George, surprised by the question, did not immediately answer. The TSA Supervisor repeated the question:
Jane Doe 3: You know who did 9/11? Plaintiff: Osama bin Laden. Jane Doe 3: Do you know what language he spoke? Plaintiff: Arabic. 36. At this point the TSA Supervisor held up Mr. George's flashcards and stated: Jane Doe 3: Do you see why these cards are suspicious? 37. Mr. George was surprised and intimidated by these questions. Mr. George told the TSA Supervisor that he was carrying the flashcards because he was studying Arabic in college. Nevertheless, the TSA Supervisor's intenogation lasted approximately 15 minutes, during which time Mr. George became increasingly worried that he would miss his flight. 38. Mr. George was detained by the three TSA officials-John Does 1 and 2 and Jane Doe 3-during this interrogation. He was not free to leave and believed that he was not free to leave. He reasonably believed that he was obligated to answer the TSA Supervisor's questions. The three TSA officials maintained custody of his property throughout the interrogation. None of the TSA officials, including the TSA supervisor, ever suggested that Mr. George could leave the screening area if he wished.
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Handcuffing by Philadelphia Police Officer Reihl 39. The TSA Supervisor (Jane Doe 3) was in mid-sentence when a police officer arrived. On information and belief, this was Defendant Reihl, an officer of the Philadelphia Police Depmiment. 40. The first and only thing that the officer said was: "Place your hands behind your back." Mr. George complied and the officer handcuffed Mr. George. 41. Mr. George was shocked by the arrival of the police officer and by the fact that he had been handcuffed. 42. The officer took hold of Mr. George's arms and led him, handcuffed and in plain view of other passengers, through the terminal and down a set of stairs to the airport police station. 43. While he was being led away, Mr. George asked, "Can you tell me what is going on?" The officer replied, "We are taking you for extra screening." No further explanation was given. Mr. George was not informed of the reasons why he had been detained, handcuffed, and arrested, or why "extra screening" was necessary. 44. During this time Mr. George remained shocked and bewildered as to what was transpiring. Mr. George had never been arrested before. He did not lmow why he was being arrested, where he was being taken, how long he would be detained, how he might have avoided being detained, arrested, and handcuffed, or whether he had any right to make a phone call or to speak with an attorney. 45. At no time did the officer inform Mr. George of any rights he retained, including the right to speak with an attorney, the right to remain silent, or the right to leave the airpmi rather than get on the flight. Neither did the officer inform Mr. George
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on what grounds he was being detained or arrested, how long he would be detained, or how he might have avoided being detained, arrested, and handcuffed.
Incarceration for several hours 46. The officer led Mr. George to a jail cell in the airport police station. The officer walked into the cell with Mr. George. 47. The officer asked Mr. George whether he had "ever been arrested before." Mr. George replied, "No. Am I being arrested now?" The officer responded, "No. You are just being detained." 48. The officer then exited the cell and locked the door behind him. He did not remove Mr. George's handcuffs. No one ever provided Mr. George with any reason or explanation for why he was put into and kept in handcuffs. 49. Mr. George remained handcuffed in the cell for approximately two hours. He was able to determine the passage of time by looking at a clock visible through a
'
window in the door of his cell. 50. The cell contained a tile bench and had several windows, including the
one in the door of the cell. Mr. George was able to move around the cell. He could observe what was occurring in the police station by looking out the door's window.
51. Mr. George observed the activities in the police station while he was detained in the cell. He saw that his carry-on items, including the bag containing his speakers, his wallet, and his flashcards had been brought to the station. These items had been placed on a table.
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52. At no point from the moment he was handcuffed until his release from the police station did anybody tell Mr. George that he had the right to make a phone call or to contact an attorney.
53. Mr. George observed several police officers, including Defendants Reihl and Richards, search through his bag and wallet.
54. Approximately 15 minutes after Mr. George was incarcerated in the jail cell, Defendant Reihl took the $30 of cash that was contained in Mr. George's wallet, opened Mr. George's jail cell, placed the cash inside Mr. George's pocket, and then exited the jail cell, locking the door behind him. He did not remove Mr. George's handcuffs.
55. The officers searching Mr. George's bag appeared to be patiicularly interested in the flashcards, and also in a student ID card that had been issued to Mr. George in connection with his study abroad program in Jordan.
56. Approximately two hours after he was first incarcerated, Mr. George saw at the police station an officer who appeared to be a duty sergeant, Defendant Richards. Some time later, Defendant Richards came to Mr. George's cell and asked whether Mr. George had diabetes or a heart condition. Mr. George responded that he did not, but asked whether he could use the restroom. Defendant Richards made no comment about the fact that Mr. George was handcuffed, but directed Defendant Reihl to uncuffMr. George and permitted Mr. George to use the restroom.
57. Defendant Richards escmied Mr. George to the restroom, which was located approximately four feet from the cell. The restroom's door was kept open while Mr. George used the restroom. Mr. George was then escorted back into to the cell by
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Defendant Richards, who exited the cell and locked it, leaving Mr. George alone once agam. Mr. George was not put back into handcuffs.
58. Before Defendant Richards left, Mr. George asked why he was being held. Defendant Richards responded: "I don't know. What did you do?" Mr. George responded: "I don't know. Leam Arabic?"
FBI Interrogation 59. Some time after Mr. George was retumed to his cell without handcuffs, two FBI officers-John Does 4 and 5-arrived at the police station wearing plainclothes. Mr. George observed that the Philadelphia police officers appeared to treat the FBI agents with deference and respect. It appeared that the police officers had been expecting and waiting for the FBI agents to arrive. On information and belief, the Philadelphia police officers called the FBI and requested that they intenogate Mr. George. 60. The FBI officers searched Mr. George's cany-on items, including opening Mr. George's stereo speakers to inspect their insides. 61. Mr. George was subsequently esc01ied out of his cell by the two FBI officers and led to a room inside the police station containing a large table and several chairs. Mr. George was seated near one end of the table. One FBI officer was seated at the head of the table next to Mr. George and the other FBI officer was directly across from Mr. George. 62. The FBI agents never informed Mr. George of any rights that he retained. They did not inform Mr. George that he had the right to contact an attorney or that he had the right not to answer questions or to remain silent. Mr. George was detained during this interrogation, he was not free to leave, and the propeliy that had been seized from him
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was at this time still in the possession of the FBI and Philadelphia police defendants. Mr. George reasonably believed that he was obligated to answer all of the FBI agents' questions. The FBI agents did not inform Mr. George that he was free to leave until the end of the interrogation.
63. The FBI agents interrogated Mr. George for approximately 30 minutes. Mr. George responded truthfully to all questions and maintained a calm and respectful demeanor throughout.
64. The agents asked Mr. George to identify himself, and proceeded to ask a large number of questions about his personal and educational background, his religious and political beliefs, his prior travels, and other personal matters.
65. At one point during the interrogation, the agents asked Mr. George if he knew why he was being held. Mr. George replied that he did not. One of the agents responded, in pmi, by calling Mr. George a "f---ing idiot."
66. The FBI agents had obtained Mr. George's passport. Upon reviewing its pages, the agents asked a series of questions about his time in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Malaysia. The agents asked Mr. George how he had traveled from one place to another, whom he had met while traveling, and whether he had met anybody who was "ove1ily against the U.S. government." Mr. George answered all of these questions truthfully and accurately.
67. The agents asked Mr. George whether he had ever joined a tenorist group. Mr. George responded that he had not One FBI agent asked Mr. George: "Are you Islamic?" Mr. George responded that he was not. The agent followed up, asking whether Mr. George was a member of any "pro-Islamic groups" on campus. Again, Mr. George
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responded that he was not. The agent asked whether Mr. George was part of any "communist groups" on campus. Yet again, Mr. George responded that he was not. These answers, like all of Mr. George's responses, were truthful and accurate.
68. The FBI agents' questioning was wide-ranging and strayed far from any conceivable criminal activity. During their questioning, for example, the FBI agents repeatedly asked Mr. George why he had chosen to study physics at a liberal mis college such as Pomona.
69. After approximately 30 minutes of questioning, one of the FBI agents concluded as follows: "Our job is more an ali than a science. The police call us to evaluate whether there is a real threat. You are not a real threat." At this point, the FBI agents indicated that Mr. George was free to leave.
70. Mr. George never received an apology from anyone involved in his detention, arrest, incarceration, or intenogations.
Post-release 71. Mr. George returned to the airpoti Terminal. His belongings had been returned to him after the FBI officers indicated to him that he was free to leave. He had long since missed the flight on which he was originally scheduled to travel. He approached the Southwest Airlines ticket counter. Airline staff were on the phone. Mr. George observed that they appeared to be having a telephone conversation with the FBI agents who had just released him. Eventually, a Southwest Airlines staff member emerged from a back room and informed Mr. George that he would have to wait until the next day to get a flight.
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72. Mr. George then called his father to pick him up from the airport. Mr. George explained to his father over the telephone what had transpired. Mr. George's father called the local FBI office while en route to the airport. The person with whom he spoke at the FBI office would neither confirm nor deny anything about Mr. George's detention and intell'ogation, and refused to give his name.
73. Mr. George's father all'ived at the airport with Mr. George's mother and brother. Mr. George's father attempted to speak with somebody from the TSA to discuss what had happened. He was able to speak only with a low-level TSA employee who had not been involved in the prior events. The conversation was not productive.
74. Mr. George and his father then went to the airpmi police station. Mr. George's father spoke with Sergeant Richards at the station. They spoke for some time. Mr. George's father thanked the sergeant for having removed the handcuffs from his son. The sergeant acknowledged that he had removed the handcuffs but was otherwise extremely defensive. He would neither admit not confirm anything else. The sergeant offered no apology.
75. The next day, Mr. George returned to the Philadelphia International Airpoti. He boarded a Southwest Airlines flight destined for Phoenix without incident. He also boarded the connecting flight :fi:om Phoenix to Ontario, California without incident.
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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Unconstitutional Search and Seizure- Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
§1983, and Bivens 76. The detention, arrest, unnecessary and extended restraint, incarceration, and interrogation of the Plaintiff by the Defendants, as described in paragraphs 1-75, constituted an umeasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fomih and Fomieenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Excessive Use of Force- Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and § 1983
77. The detention, arrest, unnecessary and extended restraint, and incarceration of the Plaintiff by Defendants Reihl and Richards, as described in paragraphs 1-75, constituted an excessive use of force in violation of the Fomih and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Unconstitutional infringement of the Freedom of Speech- First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, § 1983, and Bivens 78. The detention, arrest, unnecessary and extended restraint, incarceration, interrogation, and search of the Plaintiff by the Defendants on the basis of the flashcards and the book carried by the Plaintiff, as described in paragraphs 1-75, constituted a violation ofthe freedom of speech guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Comi enter a judgment including:

(a) Compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial;

(b) Punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial;

(c) Reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of suit;

(d) Prejudgment interest; and

(e) Such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and just.

PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A JURY TRIAL ON ALL ISSUES SO TRIABLE.

Respectfully Submitted,

Ben Wizner (pro hac vice pending)

Jonathan Manes (pro hac vice pending)

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation

125 Broad Street, 18th Floor

New York, NY 10004

(212) 549-2500 (phone)

(212) 549-2583 (facsimile)

bwizner@aclu.org

jmanes@aclu. org
/ // //t/~ L '/•· '2,.. {//(~ ~'7~~.?

'7/ .~·
..~t;~//./'.,z-r":/ "'

Mary/e'&therine Rope~A No. 71107)

Ary.efican Civil Libe1iies Union Foundation of

Pennsylvania

P.O. Box 40008

Philadelphia, PA 19106

(215) 592-1513 ext. 116

mroper@aclupa.org

Dated: February 10, 2010

David Rudovsky (PA No. 151 )····· Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing & Feinberg, LLP 718 Arch Street Suite 501S Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 925-4400 drudovsky@krlawphila.com
Counsel for Plaintif!Nicholas George
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 Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 10 Filed 05/21/10 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

)

NICHOLAS GEORGE,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

REIHL, Given Name Unknown,

)

Philadelphia Police Sergeant,

)

in his individual capacity;

)

)

RICHARDS, Given Name Unknown

)

Philadelphia Police Sergeant,

)

in his individual capacity;

)

)

THREE UNKNOWN NAMED OFFICERS

)

OR AGENTS OF THE TRANSPORTATION

)

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

)

in their individual capacities;

)

)

TWO UNKNOWN NAMED AGENTS OF

)

THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,)

in their individual capacities;

)

)

)

_____D_ef_en_d_an_t_s. __________________

)
)

No. 2:1 0-cv-00586-EL Senior Judge Edmund V. Ludwig

UNITED STATES' MOTION TO INTERVENE AS AN INTERESTED PARTY
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, the United States moves to intervene in this matter for the limited purpose of submitting a statement of interest in response to Plaintiffs motion for expedited discovery. A proposed order is attached. As support for this motion, the United States submits the following:
On February-10, 2010, PlaintiffNicholas George filed a Complaint for Damages against five federal agents or employees in their individual capacities. The defendants are two

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"unknown named agents" of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and three "unknown named officers or agents of the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA"). All of the defendants are sued in their individual capacities. In addition, three named Philadelphia police officers are sued. On May 14, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Expedited Doe Discovery. Plaintiff moved, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and 45, for an order allowing Plaintiff to serve a Rule 45 subpoena on the FBI and the TSA, both non-parties, for the production of documents identifying the true names and identities of the Doe defendants. Plaintiff would require that the FBI and TSA respond to the subpoena within fifteen (15) business days of the date of service.
28 U.S.C. § 517 expressly authorizes the Attorney General to send any officer ofthe Department of Justice "to attend to the interests of the United States" in any action pending in a state or federal court. Plaintiffs motion seeks permission to conduct discovery against the United States. However, the United States is not a party to this matter. For this reason, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, the United States submits this motion to intervene in order to respond to Plaintiffs motion for expedited discovery. The United States intends to file a response to plaintiff's motion within 14 days, as permitted by local rule 7.1(c). This motion is submitted solely on behalf of the United States, not on behalf of any individual capacity defendant, and does not waive their right to separately object to any discovery sought by Plaintiff, now or in the future. Nor does this motion and response waive the United States' right to seek to quash or otherwise oppose a subpoena or other discovery request that might eventually be served on the United States by Plaintiff in this action.
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CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the United States' motion to intervene in this matter.

Dated: May 21.2010

Respectfully submitted,

ZANE DAVID MEMEGER United States Attorney

ANNM.RAVEL Deputy Assistant Attorney General

THOMAS JOHNSON (PA Bar No. 26095) Assistant United States Attorney 615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250 Philadelphia, PA 19106 Thomas.Johnson@usdoj .gov
PAUL KAUFMAN (PA Bar No. 92805) Assistant United States Attorney 615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250 Philadelphia, PA 19106 Paul.Kaufman2@usdoj .gov

TIMOTHY P. GARREN Director, Torts Branch, Civil Division
MARY HAMPTON MASON Senior Trial Counsel, Torts Branch
s/Kellv Heidrich Kelly Heidrich (PA Bar No. 207407) Trial Attorney, Torts Branch U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division Constitutional and Specialized Tort Litigation P.O. Box 7146, Ben Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044 (202) 616-4371 (phone) (202) 616-4314 (fax) Kelly.Heidrich@usdoj .gov

ATTORNEYS FOR THE UNITED STATES

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Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 10 Filed 05/21/10 Page 4 of 4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 21, 2010, a copy of the foregoing UNITED STATES' MOTION TO INTERVENE AS AN INTERESTED PARTY was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:
Ben Wizner (admitted pro hac vice) Jonathan Manes (admitted pro hac vice) American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 Phone: (212) 549-2500 bwizner@aclu.org jmanes@aclu.org
Mary Catherine Roper (PA No. 71107) American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania P.O. Box 40008 Philadelphia, PA 191 06 Phone: (215) 592-1513 ext. 116 mroper@aclupa.org
David Rudovsky (PA No. 15168) Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing & Feinberg, LLP 718 Arch Street Suite 501S Philadelphia, PA 19106 Phone: (215) 925-4400 drudovsky@krlawphila.com

Dated: May 20, 2010

s/Kellv Heidrich Kelly Heidrich Trial Attorney, Torts Branch UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CIVIL DIVISION P.O. Box 7146, Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 (202) 616-4371 (phone) (202) 616-4314 (fax) Kelly.Heidrich@usdoj .gov

 
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sfi> Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 14 Filed 06/25/10 Page 1 of 5
Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 13-1 Filed 06/15/10 Page 2 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

)

NICHOLAS GEORGE,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

V,

)

FIlED No. 2:10-cv-586 (EL)

)

REIHL, Given Name Unknown, eta/.,

)

)

JUN 2 5 2010

Defendants .

)

MICHAEL E.
By

KUDtae,PC.fCelikn

f'PRWIOSKIJ! STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER

Upon consideration ofthe United States' Unopposed Motion for Stipulated Protective

Order, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

I. For purposes ofthis Order, "Protected lnformation" shall be: (1) the names of the

individuals identified by the United States as the "John Doe 1," "John Doe 2," and "Jane Doe 3,"

referenced in Plaintiff Nicholas George's Complaint.

2. Except as otherwise ordered by trus Court or provided herein, Protected

Information may be disclosed only to the following persons: (a) attorneys of record for the

Plaintiff in this case; (b) Plaintiff, should attorneys ofIecord detennine that such disclosure is

necessary for the prosecution .of this action; (c) any persons regularly in the employ of, or persons

contracted to perform services for such attorneys to the extent reasonably necessary for the

prosecution of this action; (d) attorneys of record for the United States in this case; (e) persons

regularly in the employ ofsuch attorneys to the extent reasonably necessary to render

professional services in this case; (f) employees of federal agencies as deem-ed necessary by

1

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counsel for the United States; and (g) this Court and its support personnel who are involved in this case.
3. Except as provided herein, no person having access to Protected Information shall make any disclosure ofProtected Information without further Order of the Court.
4. Except as provided herein, no person having access to Protected Information pursuant to paragraph 2 (a)-(c) above shall use or disclose Protected Information for any purpose other than prosecuting this action. "Prosecuting this action" does not include contacting directly or indirectly in any manner, except through counsel for the United States, any of the persons whose names are identified as Protected Information, and who are represented parties.
5. Except for the individuals described in paragraph 2 (d)-(g) above, all individuals to whom Protected Information is disclosed shall be informed of and shall agree with the terms ofthis Order~ shall not disclose or use the Protectedlnformation except in compliance with this Order; and shall, before receiving Protected Information, acknowledge their agreement to comply with this Order by signing a copy of the attached acknowledgment form. A copy ofeach such acknowledgment fonn must be provided promptly after its execution to counsel tor the United States.
6. This order shall remain in effect while any dispositive motions filed by defendants are pending; thereafter, each party reserves the right to move to modify the terms of this Protective Order at any time. If, after the. resolution of dispositive motions, this case proceeds to discovery against any or all of the individuals described in paragraph (1) above, the parties will revisit the terms of the Protective Order to determine if the protections are still warranted. Each party also reserves the right to move for additional protections ofany documents or information
2

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Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 14 Filed 06/25/10 Page 3 of 5

Case 2:1 0-cv-00586-EL Document 13-1 Filed 06/15/1 0 Page 4 of 7

at any time. 7. Any documents, briefs, or other materials containing Protected Information shall
be filed publicly with the Protected Information redacted or otherwise concealed through the use ofa pseudonym. ihe pseudonym for the individual identified by the United States as the individual referred to in Plaintiff's Complaint as "John Doe 1" shall be r•John Doe l'1or "Doe Defendant 1." The pseudonym for the individual identified by the United States as the individual referred to in Plaintiffs Complaint as John Doe 2 shall be "John Doe 2" or "Doe Defendant 2." The pseudonym for the individual identified by the United States as the individual referred to in Plaintiffs Complaint as Jane Doe 3 shall be "Jane Doe 3" or "Doe Defendant 3!
8. If necessary, as a supplement to the public filing of any documents, briefs, or other materials concealing Protected Information through the use of a pseudonym or redactions, a party may file under seal said briefs, documents, or other materials containing the Protected Information without concealment. Neither any party nor any third party may use Protected Information in open Court, orally or through documents; without first obtaining the written consent of the Department ofJustice or an Order from the Court ruling that the Protected Infonnation is relevant and may be publicly disclos.ed.
9. Except as provided herein, within ninety (90) days of the conclusion of this case (including any appeals), documents, discovery requests, discovery responses, transcripts, and other materials, and all copies thereof, containing Protected Information must be destroyed by persons in possession of such materials containing Protected fnfonnation. Within ninety (90) days ofthe conclusion of this case and any appeals, Plaintiffs counsel and any other person in possession of documents, discovery requests, discovery responses, transcripts, or other materials
3

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-

... -

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Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 13-1 Filed 06/15/10 Page 5 of7

containing Protected Information must certify in writing that said items. and aJI copies thereof, containing Protected Infonnation have been destroyed. Within ninety (90) days ofthe tennination of this case, including any appeals, Plaintiff's counsel and any other person in possession of documents, discovery requests, discovery responses, transcripts, or other materials containing Protected Infonnation must also certify in writing that any documents they or their attorneys or agents have created which contain Protected Information derived solely from those protected documents, discovery requests, discovery responses, transcripts, or other materials have been destroyed. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions ofthis paragraph, no person is required to destroy any document that has been publicly filed with this Court or with a court of appeals ofcompetent jurisdiction in connection with this case; further, this paragraph does not apply to the United States, its employees, its attorneys, or persons hired or in the employ of its attorneys; or to this Court or its support personnel.
l 0. Neither the United States nor any of its officers, employees, or attorneys shall bear any responsibility or liability under the Privacy Act for any unauthorized disclosure ofany Protected Information obtained under this Order.
11. This Order does not constitute any ruling onthe question of whether any particular document or category of infonnation is properly discoverable and does not constitute any ruling on any potentiaJ objection to the discoverability, relevance, or admissibility of any document or information. Nor does this Order constitute any ruling on the question ofwhether the United States may withhold any particular document or category of information on the basis o f privilege.

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12. This Order does not apply to any information or documents other than the Protected Information as defined in paragraph 1.
SO ORDERED.
Hon. Edmund V. Ludwig Senior United States Distric

 
 Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 1 of 22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANNIA

NICHOLAS GEORGE 202 Deaver Road Wyncote, PA 19095
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM REHIEL, Philadelphia Police Officer, in his individual capacity;
EDWARD RICHARDS, JR., Philadelphia Police Sergeant, in his individual capacity;
JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2, AND JANE DOE 3, employees of the Transportation Security Administration, in their individual capacities;
JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5, Philadelphia Police Department Detectives, in their individual capacities; and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants.

No. 2:10-cv-00586-EL JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES (Violation of First and Fourth Amendment Rights; Federal Tort Claims Act)
1. PlaintiffNicholas George, a 21-year-old student at Pomona College at the time ofthe events described in this Complaint, was detained, abusively interrogated, handcuffed, and jailed for several hours in a holding cell solely because he passed through an airport screening checkpoint with a set of Arabic-English flashcards and a book critical of American foreign policy.

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 2 of 22
2. Mr. George was attempting to travel from the Philadelphia International Airport to California in order to resume his studies, including Arabic language studies. At the airpmi screening checkpoint he was stopped and detained for 30 minutes by TSA screeners and abusively interrogated for an additional 15 minutes by a TSA supervisor. He was then handcuffed, without explanation, by a Philadelphia police officer and transported to the airpoti police station where he was jailed for approximately four hours, more than two of them with his hands cuffed behind his back Mr. George was released only after having been subjected to an additional 30 minutes of custodial interrogation at the hands of two Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) detectives, one affiliated with the PPD Homeland Security unit (PPD-HS) and the other with an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).
3. The conduct of the TSA officials, the Philadelphia police, and the PPDHS/JJTF detectives violated Mr. George's Fomih Amendment right to be free from umeasonable seizure, his First Amendment right to freedom of speech, and also constituted falsely arrest, false imprisonment, tmiious battery and assault, and false light invasion of privacy. He brings this lawsuit in order to vindicate those rights.
PARTIES 4. PlaintiffNicholas George was a 21-year-old citizen of the United States and resident of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania at the time of the events described in this complaint. He was a student at Pomona College in Claremont, California, where he was studying toward a double-major in Physics and Middle-Eastern Studies. Mr. George began studying the Arabic language in his first year of college as part of his Middle Eastern studies major. He has spent a semester studying abroad in Jordan and has
2

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 3 of 22
traveled to several other countries, including Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
5. Jolm Doe 1 and Jolm Doe 2 were employees of the Transportation Security Administration working as screeners at a security checkpoint at the Philadelphia Airport at the time of the events giving rise to this action. Each was responsible for detaining Mr. George for 30 minutes at the screening area and, upon information and belief, they summoned the TSA Supervisor known here as Jane Doe 3, as well as the Philadelphia Police Depatiment, for fmiher interrogation, detention, and arrest of Mr. George. John Does 1 and 2 are sued here in their individual capacities.
6. Jane Doe 3 was an employee of the Transportation Security Agency at the time of the events giving rise to this action. Upon information and belief, Jane Doe 3 held a position that involved supervising airpmi screeners, including Defendants Jolm Does 1 and 2. Jane Doe 3 intenogated Mr. George in a hostile and aggressive manner, continued his detention, and turned him over to Defendant Rehiel to be handcuffed, anested, jailed, and fmiher interrogated. Jane Doe 3 is sued in her individual capacity.
7. Defendant William Rehiel was an officer of the Philadelphia Police Depatiment at the time of the events giving rise to this action. He handcuffed Mr. George in the airport terminal, jailed him in a cell in the airpmi police detachment, failed to remove his handcuffs upon jailing him, and left him in the cell for more than two hours. Defendant Rehiel was acting under color of state law during the events described in this Complaint. He is sued in his individual capacity.
8. Defendant Edward Richards, Jr. was a sergeant of the Philadelphia Police Depatiment at the time of the events giving rise to this action. On information and belief,
3

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 4 of 22
Defendant Richards was the duty sergeant for at least part of the time during which Mr. George was incarcerated. Defendant Richards prolonged Mr. George's detention until John Does 4 and 5 anived to intenogate him. Defendant Richards was acting under color of state law during the events described in this complaint. He is sued in his individual capacity.
9. John Doe 4 and Jolm Doe 5 were detectives of the Philadelphia Police Department at the time of the events giving rise to this action. John Doe 4 was affiliated with the PPD-HS. John Doe 5 was affiliated with the JTTF. John Does 4 and 5 prolonged Mr. George's detention and intenogated him for approximately 30 minutes. They are both sued here in their individual capacities.
10. The United States of America is the appropriate defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
11. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Doe defendants 1-5 were acting within the scope of their offices or employment.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 12. This court has subjectmatterjurisdictionpursuantto 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 1346(b). 13. This complaint is for money damages based upon civil rights violations committed by Federal and State officials contrary to the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court has authority to award costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28
u.s.c. § 2412.
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Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 5 of 22
14. On April9, 2010 Administrative Tort Claims were submitted by Plaintiffs to the Transpmiation Security Administration and the U.S. Depatiment of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation. The claims were both denied on June 11,2010.
15. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 1391(e).
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 16. On Saturday, August 29, 2009, PlaintiffNicholas George was scheduled to fly on Southwest Airlines from Philadelphia International Airport to Ontario International Airpmi in California, via Phoenix. He was traveling to California in order to begin his senior year at Pomona College.
Arrival at Airpmi and Check-in 17. After Mr. George arrived at the airport, he waited in the line for check-in and, upon reaching the counter, he presented his identification and received a boarding pass for his flight without incident. He then proceeded to the security screening area. 18. Mr. George carried a single piece of carry-on luggage, a black athletic bag. Inside the athletic bag were two small speakers (approximately 10" x 6" x 6") that he intended to use with his stereo system in California. 19. As Mr. George approached the x-ray screening device, a TSA officialnot a defendant in this action-asked Mr. George to present his identification and boarding pass. Mr. George complied. The TSA official asked Mr. George what was inside his carry-on bag. Mr. George responded that the bag contained his speakers. The TSA official then asked Mr. George to step aside. Mr. George complied. The TSA
5

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 6 of 22
official asked Mr. George to remove the speakers, so that they could be passed through the x-ray screening device separately. Mr. George complied.
20. Mr. George placed his carry-on bag and his speakers on the belt. He emptied his pockets of all items containing metal, including his wallet and cell phone, and took off his shoes. These items were also placed on the belt to pass through the screening device.
21. Mr. George stepped up to the metal detector. He walked through the metal detector without incident. The detector made no sound.
22. The TSA official who was operating the metal detector-not a defendant in this action-nevertheless asked Mr. George to step aside and to wait. This TSA official asked to see Mr. George's boarding pass. Mr. George showed his boarding pass to the official. There was a glass enclosure located next to the metal detector that was used for additional screening. After this glass-enclosed screening area had been vacated by a previous passenger, the TSA official directed Mr. George to enter. Mr. George stepped into the glass enclosure as directed.
23. Inside the glass enclosure another TSA official (Defendant John Doe 1) asked Mr. George to empty his pockets. Mr. George had already emptied his pockets of any items containing metal, so among the only items remaining was a set of flashcards. Mr. George handed the flashcards to the TSA official, as instructed.
English-Arabic Flashcards 24. Each flashcard had Arabic words on one side and English translations on the other. The flashcards were of the kind that would commonly be used by a person
6

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 7 of 22
studying a foreign language. Indeed, Mr. George used the flashcards as a tool for learning Arabic vocabulary.
25. · Mr. George had been studying Arabic for three years, begilming in his first year of college, in connection with his Middle-Eastern Studies major. Mr. George had spent a semester in Jordan studying Arabic as part of a study abroad program organized by the Council on International Educational Exchange, a U.S. non-profit organization founded in 1947. He received credit at Pomona College for the courses he took in Jordan. Upon completing the program, he spent approximately five weeks traveling in Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan-the latter two of which are Arabic-speaking countries-as a tourist and in order to practice his Arabic language skills.
26. Mr. George has a strong interest in the contemporary politics of the Middle East, especially as they involve and affect the United States. Mr. George sought to learn Arabic in order to be able to read and understand what was being repmied and debated in contemporary Middle Eastern newspapers, television programs, and other publications or media.
Detention by TSA Screeners 27. The TSA official to whom Mr. George handed the flashcards (Defendant John Doe 1) proceeded to inspect them. The official did not make any cmmnent and did not indicate that there was any kind of problem. He nevertheless took Mr. George to a different screening area. Mr. George waited there while that TSA official and another TSA official (Defendant John Doe 2) further inspected his bag and the flashcards. One of these two TSA officials swabbed Mr. George's cell phone in order to run a test for explosives. The test returned a negative result. The TSA officials found nothing among
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Mr. George's personal effects that posed a safety risk or was otherwise prohibited in the "sterile" area of the airport and aboard an airplane. Indeed, Mr. George was not carrying any prohibited items or items that could pose a safety risk. Nor was Mr. George carrying anything suggestive of criminal or otherwise prohibited activity.
28. It soon became apparent to Mr. George that the two TSA officials were stalling. The TSA officials completed their search of Mr. George's carry-on items within ten minutes. One of the officials flipped through the pages of books that Mr. George had among his carry-on items. He swabbed Mr. George's cell phone for a second time and half-heatiedly re-examined Mr. George's other cany-on items. The official also attempted to make small talk, asking Mr. George if he had seen the recent Philadelphia Phillies baseball game. After Mr. George responded in the affirmative and offered his opinion of the game, the TSA official admitted that he had not seen the game and did not generally watch the Phillies.
29. The other official stepped away and placed a phone call. He was speaking on the phone for some time. Mr. George could not hear the call but believed that he might have been speaking with a TSA supervisor. On information and belief, the TSA official was speaking on the phone with a TSA supervisor or other official about Mr. George's screening, including the English-Arabic flashcards.
30. The two TSA officials kept Mr. George in the side screening area for 30 minutes. The TSA officials maintained Mr. George's prope1iy-including his wallet, identification, passpmi, and boarding pass-in their custody. At no point did the TSA officials return, or offer to return, Mr. George's property to him. During this period of
8

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 9 of 22
time Mr. George was detained by the TSA officials. Mr. George was not free to leave and believed that he was not free to leave.
31. During this time, Mr. George became increasingly concerned that he would miss his flight. He asked the TSA officials how much longer he would have to wait and mentioned to the officials that his flight was leaving shmily.
32. The TSA officials did not explain to Mr. George why he could not proceed to the gate, nor did they explain to him the reason that he was being delayed and detained.
Detention and intenogation by TSA Supervisor 33. After 30 minutes, a TSA Supervisor arrived (Jane Doe 3). The Supervisor immediately began questioning Mr. George in a hostile and aggressive mmmer. Mr. George responded to all questions truthfully and to the best of his ability, in a polite and calm manner. 34. The TSA Supervisor's questioning proceeded, in pmi, as follows (as best recalled by Plaintiff):
Jane Doe 3: How do you feel about 9/11? 35. Mr. George responded that he thought 9/11 was a terrible event. 36. At this point, the Supervisor noted that Mr. George had with him a book entitled "Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions," by Clyde Prestowitz, published by Basic Books in 2004. The book has been described by General Wesley Clark as "a fascinating big picture look at America and its place in the world [that] should help provoke the kind of discussion that we have long needed." Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, has
9

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 10 of 22
described the book as "[a] conservative's sober warning of the dangers ofunilateralism and the temptations of empire."
37. After noticing the book, the TSA Supervisor continued her hostile and aggressive questioning as follows:
Jane Doe 3: You obviously read. You know who did 9/11? 38. Mr. George, surprised by the question, did not immediately answer. The TSA Supervisor repeated the question:
Jane Doe 3: You know who did 9/11? Plaintiff: Osama bin Laden. Jane Doe 3: Do you know what language he spoke? Plaintiff: Arabic. 39. At this point the TSA Supervisor held up Mr. George's flashcards and stated: Jane Doe 3: Do you see why these cards are suspicious? 40. Mr. George was surprised and intimidated by these questions. Mr. George told the TSA Supervisor that he was carrying the flashcards because he was studying Arabic in college. Nevertheless, the TSA Supervisor's interrogation lasted approximately 15 minutes. 41. Mr. George was detained by the three TSA officials-]olm Does 1 and 2 and Jane Doe 3-during this interrogation. He was not free to leave and believed that he was not free to leave. He reasonably believed that he was obligated to answer the TSA Supervisor's questions. The three TSA officials maintained custody of his propeliy
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Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 11 of 22
throughout the interrogation. None of the TSA officials, including the TSA supervisor, ever suggested that Mr. George could leave the screening area if he wished.
Handcuffing by Philadelphia Police Officer Rehiel 42. The TSA Supervisor (Jane Doe 3) was in mid-sentence when a police officer atTived. On information and belief, this was Defendant Rehiel, an officer of the Philadelphia Police Department. 43. The first and only thing that the officer said was: "Place your hands behind your back." Mr. George complied and the officer handcuffed Mr. George. 44. Mr. George was shocked by the arrival of the police officer and by the fact that he had been handcuffed. 45. The officer took hold of Mr. George's anns and led him, handcuffed and in plain view of other passengers, through the terminal and down a set of stairs to the airport police station. 46. While he was being led away, Mr. George asked, "Can you tell me what is going on?" The officer replied, "We are taking you for extra screening." No further explanation was given. Mr. George was not informed of the reasons why he had been detained, handcuffed, and atTested, or why "extra screening" was necessary. 47. During this time Mr. George remained shocked and bewildered as to what was transpiring. Mr. George had never been arrested before. He did not know why he was being arrested, where he was being taken, how long he would be detained, how he might have avoided being detained, arrested, and handcuffed, or whether he had any right to make a phone call or to speak with an attorney.
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48. At no time did the officer inform Mr. George of any rights he retained, including the right to speak with an attorney, the right to remain silent, or the right to leave the airport rather than get on the flight. Neither did the officer inform Mr. George on what grounds he was being detained or arrested, how long he would be detained, or how he might have avoided being detained, arrested, and handcuffed.
49. Mr. George was handcuffed and arrested by Officer Rehiel at approximately 2:20 in the afternoon.
Incarceration for several hours 50. Defendant Rehielled Mr. George to a jail cell in the airport police station. The officer walked into the cell with Mr. George. 51. The officer asked Mr. George whether he had "ever been atTested before." Mr. George replied, "No. Am I being arrested now?" The officer responded, "No. You are just being detained." 52. The officer then exited the cell and locked the door behind him. He did not remove Mr. George's handcuffs. No one ever provided Mr. George with any reason or explanation for why he was put into and kept in handcuffs. 53. Mr. George remained handcuffed in the cell for approximately two hours. He was able to determine the passage of time by looking at a clock visible through a window in the door of his cell. 54. The cell contained a tile bench and had several windows, including the one in the door of the cell. Mr. George was able to move around the cell. He could observe what was occurring in the police station by looking out the door's window.
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55. Mr. George observed the activities in the police station while he was detained in the cell. He saw that his carry-on items, including the bag containing his speakers, his wallet, and his flashcards had been brought to the station. These items had been placed on a table.
56. At no point from the moment he was handcuffed until his release from the police station did anybody tell Mr. George that he had the right to make a phone call or to contact an attorney.
57. Mr. George observed several police officers, including Defendants Rehiel and Richards, search through his bag and wallet.
58. Approximately 15 minutes after Mr. George was incarcerated in the jail cell, Defendant Rehiel took the $30 of cash that was inside Mr. George's wallet, opened Mr. George's jail cell, placed the cash inside Mr. George's pocket, and then exited the jail cell, locking the door behind him. He did not remove Mr. George's handcuffs.
59. The officers searching Mr. George's bag appeared to be particularly interested in the flashcards, and also in a student ID card that had been issued to Mr. George in connection with his study abroad program in Jordan.
60. Approximately two hours after he was first incarcerated, Mr. George saw at the police station an officer who appeared to be a duty sergeant, Defendant Richards. Some time later, Defendant Richards came to Mr. George's cell and asked whether Mr. George had diabetes or a heart condition. Mr. George responded that he did not, but asked whether he could use the restroom. Defendant Richards made no comment about the fact that Mr. George was handcuffed, but directed Defendant Rehiel to uncuffMr. George and permitted Mr. George to use the restroom.
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61. Defendant Richards escorted Mr. George to the restroom, which was located approximately four feet from the cell. The restroom's door was kept open while Mr. George used the restroom. Mr. George was then escmied back into to the cell by Defendant Richards, who exited the cell and locked it, leaving Mr. George alone once agam. Mr. George was not put back into handcuffs.
62. Before Defendant Richards left, Mr. George asked why he was being held. Defendant Richards responded: "I don't know. What did you do?" Mr. George responded: "I don't know. Learn Arabic?"
Interrogation 63. Some time after Mr. George was returned to his cell without handcuffs, two detectives-John Does 4 and 5-arrived at the police station wearing plainclothes. Upon information and belief, John Does 4 and 5 were both employees of the Philadelphia Police Depmiment, one of whom was affiliated with the Philadelphia Police Depmiment's Homeland Security Unit and the other with the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force. Mr. George observed that the Philadelphia police officers appeared to treat the detectives with deference and respect. It appeared that the police officers had been expecting and waiting for the detectives to anive. During Mr. George's incarceration, the Philadelphia police officers had called various federal and state agencies including the JTTF and the PPD-HS in order to arrange for Mr. George to be interrogated while in custody. 64. John Does 4 and 5 searched Mr. George's carry-on items, including opening Mr. George's stereo speakers to inspect their insides.
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65. Mr. George was subsequently escorted out of his cell by John Does 4 and 5 and led to a room inside the police station containing a large table and several chairs. Mr. George was seated near one end of the table. One detective was seated at the head of the table next to Mr. George and the other was directly across from Mr. George.
66. The detectives never informed Mr. George of any rights that he retained. They did not inform Mr. George that he had the right to contact an attorney or that he had the right not to answer questions or to remain silent. Mr. George was detained during this interrogation, he was not free to leave, and the property that had been seized from him was at this time still in the possession of John Does 4 and 5, and Philadelphia police defendants. Mr. George reasonably believed that he was obligated to answer all of the detectives' questions. The detectives did not inform Mr. George that he was free to leave until the end of the interrogation.
67. John Does 4 and 5 interrogated Mr. George for approximately 30 minutes. Mr. George responded truthfully to all questions and maintained a calm and respectful demeanor throughout.
68. The detectives asked Mr. George to identify himself, and proceeded to ask a large number of questions about his personal and educational background, his religious and political beliefs, his prior ttavels, and other personal matters.
69. At one point during the interrogation, the agents asked Mr. George if he knew why he was being held. Mr. George replied that he did not. One of the detectives responded, in part, by calling Mr. George a "f---ing idiot."
70. John Does 4 and 5 had obtained Mr. George's passpmi. Upon reviewing its pages, they asked a series of questions about his time in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and
15

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 16 of 22
Malaysia. The detectives asked Mr. George how he had traveled from one place to another, whom he had met while traveling, and whether he had met anybody who was "overtly against the U.S. government." Mr. George answered all of these questions truthfully and accurately.
71. The detectives asked Mr. George whether he had ever joined a terrorist group. Mr. George responded that he had not. One detective asked Mr. George: "Are you Islamic?" Mr. George responded that he was not. The detective followed up, asking whether Mr. George was a member of any "pro-Islamic groups" on campus. Again, Mr. George responded that he was not. The detective asked whether Mr. George was part of any "communist groups" on campus. Yet again, Mr. George responded that he was not. These answers, like all of Mr. George's responses, were truthful and accurate.
72. The detectives' questioning was wide-ranging and strayed far from any conceivable criminal activity. During their questioning, for example, the John Does 4 and 5 repeatedly asked Mr. George why he had chosen to study physics at a liberal arts college such as Pomona.
73. After approximately 30 minutes of questioning, one of the detectives concluded as follows: "Our job is more an art than a science. The police call us to evaluate whether there is a real threat. You are not a real threat." At this point, the detectives indicated that Mr. George was free to leave.
74. Mr. George was released from custody at approximately 7:00 in the evening, nearly five hours after being handcuffed and arrested and well over five hours after he was first detained by the TSA defendants.
16

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 17 of 22
75. Mr. George never received an apology from anyone involved in his detention, arrest, incarceration, or interrogations.
Post-release 76. Mr. George returned to the airport Terminal. His belongings had been returned to him after John Does 4 and 5 indicated to him that he was free to leave. He had long since missed the flight on which he was originally scheduled to travel. He approached the Southwest Airlines ticket counter. Airline staff were on the phone. Mr. George observed that they appeared to be having a telephone conversation with the two detectives who had just released him. Eventually, a Southwest Airlines staff member emerged from a back room and informed Mr. George that he would have to wait until the next day to get a flight. 77. Mr. George then called his father to pick him up from the airport. Mr. George explained to his father over the telephone what had transpired. Mr. George's father called the local FBI office while en route to the airport. The person with whom he spoke at the FBI office would neither confirm nor deny anything about Mr. George's detention and interrogation, and refused to give his name. 78. Mr. George's father arrived at the airport with Mr. George's mother and brother. Mr. George's father attempted to speak with somebody from the TSA to discuss what had happened. He was able to speak only with a low-level TSA employee who had not been involved in the prior events. The conversation was not productive. 79. Mr. George and his father then went to the airport police station. Mr. George's father spoke with Sergeant Richards at the station. They spoke for some time. Mr. George's father thanked the sergeant for having removed the handcuffs from his son.
17

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 18 of 22 The sergeant acknowledged that he had removed the handcuffs but was otherwise extremely defensive. He would neither admit not confirm anything else. The sergeant offered no apology.
80. The next day, Mr. George returned to the Philadelphia International Airport. He boarded a Southwest Airlines flight destined for Phoenix without incident. He also boarded the cmmecting flight from Phoenix to Ontario, California without incident.
18

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 19 of 22
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Unconstitutional Search and Seizure- Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
§1983, and Bivens 81. The detention, arrest, unnecessary and extended restraint, incarceration, and interrogation of the Plaintiff by the Defendants, as described in paragraphs 1-80, constituted an umeasonable search and seizure in violation of clearlyestablished rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Excessive Use of Force- Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and § 1983
82. The detention, arrest, unnecessary and extended restraint, and incarceration of the Plaintiff by Defendants Rehiel and Richards, as described in paragraphs 1-80, constituted an excessive use of force in violation of clearly established rights under the Fomih and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Unconstitutional infringement of the Freedom of Speech -First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, § 1983, and Bivens 83. The detention, arrest, unnecessary and extended restraint, incarceration, interrogation, and search of the Plaintiff by the Defendants on the basis of the flashcards and the book carried by the Plaintiff, as described in paragraphs 1-80, infringed Plaintiffs freedom of speech and constituted unconstitutional retaliation in violation of clearly established rights guaranteed by the First and Fomieenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
19

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 20 of 22
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Federal Tort Claims Act- False Arrest 84. Plaintiffs detention and arrest without probable cause or any other lawful grounds, as described in paragraphs 1-80, constitute the tort of false arrest under the laws ofthe Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 85. Under the Federal Toli Claims Act, defendant United States of America is liable for these actions.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Federal Tort Claims Act- False Imprisonment 86. Plaintiffs detention and imprisonment without probable cause or any other lawful grounds, as described in paragraphs 1-80, constitute the tort of false imprisonment under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pe1msylvania. 87. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, defendant United States of America is liable for these actions.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Federal Tort Claims Act- Battery and Assault 88. The handcuffing, post-arrest pat-down and other unauthorized contacts with Plaintiffs person, as well as the imminent apprehension of such unauthorized · contacts, as described in paragraphs 1-80, constitute the tmis of battery and assault under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
20

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 21 of 22
89. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, defendant United States of America is liable for these actions.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Federal Tort Claims Act- False Ligbt 90. Plaintiff was detained, abusively intenogated, handcuffed, arrested, and forced to walk to the airport police station in plain view of numerous members of the public, as described in paragraphs 1-80. These actions constitute the tort of false light under the laws of the Commonwealth ofPe1msylvania. 91. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, defendant United States of America is liable for these actions.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter a judgment including:
(a) Compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial; (b) Punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial as to all Defendants
except the United States of America; (c) Reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of suit; (d) Prejudgment interest; and (e) Such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and just.
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A JURY TRIAL ON ALL ISSUES SO TRIABLE.
21

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 22 Filed 08/13/10 Page 22 of 22

Dated: August 13, 2010

Respectfully Submitted,

Ben Wizner, pro hac vice

Jonathan Manes, pro hac vice

American Civil Libetiies Union Foundation

125 Broad Street, 18th Floor

New York, NY 10004

(212) 549-2500 (phone)

(212) 549-2583 (facsimile)

bwizner@aclu.org

M~~yle~~(PANo. jmanes@aclu.org "7

71107)

At erican Civil Liberties Union Foundation of

Petmsylvania

P.O. Box 40008

Philadelphia, PA 19106

(212) 592-1513 ext. 116

mroper@aclupa.org

David Rudovsky (PA No. 15168) Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing & Feinberg, LLP 718 Arch Street Suite SOlS Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Plaintif!Nicholas George

22

 
 Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 40 Filed 09/30/11 Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NICHOLAS GEORGE

:

:

v.

:

:

WILLIAM REHIEL, et al.

:

CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-586

ORDER

AND NOW, this 30th day of September, 2011, defendant United States of America’s

“Motion to Dismiss” (doc. no. 25) and individual federal defendants’ “Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims” (doc. no. 26) are both denied.

Ludwig, J.

MEMORANDUM

September 30, 2011

Plaintiff Nicholas George sues for money damages arising from alleged civil rights

intrusions at the Philadelphia International Airport by the Transportation Security

Administration, the Philadelphia Police Department, and the Joint Terrorism Task Force.

The complaint, filed February 10, 2010, as amended August 13, 2010, posits violations of

the Fourth, First, and Fourteenth Amendments: an unreasonable search, seizure, and

arrest; and an infringement of free speech in retaliation for the exercise of plaintiff’s

rights. Federal defendants United States of America, et al. move to dismiss the action for

failure to state a claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motions will be denied because the

amended complaint alleges claims for relief that are “plausible on [their] face.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (U.S. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). Jurisdiction is federal question, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 1346(b).

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Edmund V. Ludwig Edmund V. Ludwig, J.

 
 George v. Rehiel, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

2011 WL 10621600 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania. Nicholas GEORGE
v. William REHIEL, et al.
Civil Action No. 10–586. | Oct. 28, 2011.
Attorneys and Law Firms
David Rudovsky, Kairys Rudovsky Messing & Feinberg LLP, Mary Catherine Roper, American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, Molly M. Tack–Hooper, Berger & Montague PC, Philadelphia, PA, Zachary Katznelson, Benjamin Elihu Wizner, Mitra Ebadolahi, American Civil Liberties Union, New York, NY, for Nicholas George.
Amanda C. Shoffel, City of Philadelphia Law Department, Phildelphia, PA, Kelly E. Heidrich, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for William Rehiel, et al.
Opinion
ORDER
LUDWIG, District Judge.
*1 The “United States’ and Individual Federal Defendants’ Unopposed Motion for Clarification” (doc. no. 41) is ruled on as follows:
1. It is acknowledged that movant’s statement of the law of qualified immunity is substantively correct.
The amended complaint contains sufficient factual allegations of specific conduct on the part of each defendant that, if true, constitute violations of plaintiff’s First and Fourth Amendment rights.
According to the amended complaint, plaintiff Nicholas George arrived at the Philadelphia International Airport on August 29, 2009, bound for California to resume his studies at Pomona College. He obtained a boarding pass

and showed TSA his identification. At the security checkpoint x-ray device, he put his carry-on bags and personal items on the conveyor belt. He emptied his pockets of metal, took off his shoes, and walked through the detector, which made no sound. He was directed to an adjacent area where a TSA screener (Doe 1) asked him to empty his pockets. He did so, removing a set of translation flashcards, each with Arabic words on one side and English on the other. The screener inspected the flashcards and then took plaintiff to a different area, where that screener and another (Doe 2) detained him for 15 minutes while they inspected his belongings. He was not carrying weapons, explosives, or items that posed a safety risk. He was not carrying anything suggestive of criminal or prohibited activity. He did not say or do anything threatening or provocative.
Although the TSA screeners completed their search of plaintiff’s carry-on items, they detained him for an additional 15–20 minutes. One screener flipped through pages of a book critical of United States foreign policy. The other screener stepped away and made a phone call, speaking for some time with a TSA official about plaintiff’s screening and the flashcards. The screeners summoned a TSA supervisor (Doe 3) and the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) for further detention, questioning, and eventual arrest of plaintiff.
The TSA supervisor arrived and questioned plaintiff for 15 minutes, asking: “You know who did 9/11? ... Do you know what language he spoke? ... Do you see why these cards are suspicious?” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37–40. Plaintiff explained that he was using the flashcards to learn Arabic and read the Arabic press. Defendant PPD officer William Rehiel arrived, interrupted the TSA supervisor mid-sentence, and without explanation ordered plaintiff to place his hands behind his back. The supervisor turned plaintiff over to Rehiel, who then handcuffed plaintiff and took him through the terminal in plain view of the traveling public to the airport police station.
Plaintiff was held in a locked cell at the station for about four hours, in handcuffs for more than two hours. From the cell, plaintiff saw several PPD officers, including defendants Rehiel and Edward Richards, Jr., search through his bag and wallet. The officers appeared to be interested in the flashcards and a student ID card that had been issued for a study abroad program plaintiff had attended in Jordan. The officers called various federal and state agencies, including the PPD’s Homeland Security
1

George v. Rehiel, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)
Unit and the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) to make arrangements for plaintiff to be questioned.
*2 About four hours later, two plain-clothed individuals, who had been deputized by the FBI to the JTTF, arrived at the police station. They questioned plaintiff for 30 minutes about his personal and educational background, religious and political beliefs, and prior travels in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Malaysia. Concluding the questioning, one JTTF agent stated: “The police call us to evaluate whether there is a real threat. You are not a real threat.” Am. Compl. ¶ 73. The JTTF agents indicated that plaintiff was free to leave.
Plaintiff is alleged to have been arrested and handcuffed at 2:20 p.m. and released at 7:00 p.m. During that time, he was not informed why he had been detained, handcuffed, and arrested or how long he would be detained. Plaintiff was not informed of any rights to speak with an attorney, remain silent, or leave the airport.
The amended complaint plausibly sets forth a Fourth Amendment violation. Airport security screening of passengers and their baggage, without a warrant or individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, is permissible under the “administrative search doctrine.” United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 177–78 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 945, 127 S.Ct. 111, 166 L.Ed.2d 255 (2006). Such searches are permissible “when a court finds a favorable balance between the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” Id. at 178–79 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Our Court of Appeals has declined to “set the outer limits of intrusiveness in the airport context” or “devise any bright-line test” to implement this standard in future cases. Id. at 180 n. 10. Hartwell, however, confirms that routine airport screening is still a “search” subject to Fourth Amendment limitations. Id. at 177.
The procedures employed by defendants, as alleged here, do not appear to have been minimally designed to protect plaintiff’s personal privacy and individual liberty rights. The TSA’s statutory and regulatory authority appears to have been exhausted after the first 10–15 minutes, once plaintiff was found to possess nothing that would endanger airline safety. 49 U.S.C. § 44901 (TSA empowered to search for explosives or other safety hazards); see United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d 820, 831 (9th Cir.2011) (“individual screener’s actions [must] be no more intrusive than necessary to determine the

existence or absence of explosives that could result in harm to the passengers and aircraft”). Moreover, an investigatory detention and arrest are constitutional only if supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause of a specific crime. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 & n. 18, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (“officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”); Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir.1995) (“the right to be free from arrest without probable cause” is a “clearly established right”). Here, the amended complaint does not provide a reasonable inference of individualized suspicion or probable cause for the prolonged detention and arrest of plaintiff.
*3 If the facts alleged are true, the TSA’s seizure of plaintiff amounted to an investigatory detention, which escalated to an arrest when the PPD handcuffed and locked him in a cell at the direction of the TSA and JTTF. Accordingly, the amended complaint adequately alleges that each individual defendant participated in subjecting plaintiff to an intrusion upon his personal freedom for more than five hours. There were no grounds for reasonable suspicion of any criminality or probable cause. Early on, it was determined that he posed no threat to airline safety.
The amended complaint also plausibly sets forth a First Amendment violation. Except for certain narrow categories, “all speech is protected by the First Amendment.” Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282–83 (3d Cir.2004). The “right to receive information and ideas” is also well established. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972); Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 208–09 (3d Cir.2008) (prisoners retain a broad First Amendment right to view and possess protected materials). To proceed on the retaliation claim, plaintiff must plead “(1) that he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the government responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the retaliation.” Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 282.
The factual matter contained in the amended complaint suggests that the entirety of plaintiff’s airport experience may fairly be attributable to his possession of materials protected by the First Amendment. Plaintiff was “jailed for several hours ... solely because he passed through an airport screening checkpoint with a set of Arabic–English flashcards and a book critical of American foreign
2

George v. Rehiel, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)

policy.” Am. Compl. ¶ 1. TSA screeners inspected the flashcards and one screener “flipped through the pages of books that Mr. George had” and the other screener discussed the flashcards with their supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 27–29. The TSA supervisor questioned plaintiff because the flashcards were “suspicious.” Id. ¶¶ 37–39. “After noticing the book, the TSA Supervisor continued her hostile and aggressive questioning....” Id. ¶¶ 36–37. The amended complaint adequately alleges that each defendant violated plaintiff’s rights to read, study, and possess protected materials by arresting and detaining him for his exercise of those rights.
Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff’s rights to read, study, and possess these materials were protected, provided he was not at an airport: “carrying flashcards with words like ‘bomb’ and ‘explosion’ through airport security is not a protected activity.” F. Defs. br. at 18, doc. no. 26.1 Defendants rely on precedent holding individuals criminally responsible for bomb threats: United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir.2002) (threats about carrying a bomb on an airplane); United States v. Lit, No. 07–903, 2007 WL 1725199, at *11–12 (E.D.Pa. June 12, 2007) (fake bomb in airport bathroom); United States v. Brahm, 520 F.Supp.2d 619, 626 (D.N.J.2007) (law criminalizing phony bomb threats not overly broad because “[s]uch speech would be ... similar to shouting fire in a crowded theater”). These cases are not apposite. It is alleged here that plaintiff made no threats. He took the flashcards out of his pocket only when ordered to do so by the TSA. He remained polite, calm, and respectful and answered questions truthfully.

1

Defendants: “[T]here is no First Amendment right to

say or write ‘bomb’ in an airport.” F. Defs. br. at 16,

18, doc. no. 26.

*4 The defense of qualified immunity in this case may be clarified by discovery.
2. The order in question also denies the government’s motion to dismiss all claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 that arise from the alleged Pennsylvania common law torts of false imprisonment, false arrest, assault, battery, and false light invasion of privacy. This waiver of immunity generally does not apply to claims of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, libel, and slander, among other intentional torts. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). However, that rule is not applicable to claims arising out of assault, battery,

false imprisonment, or false arrest committed by the government’s “investigative or law enforcement officers” (defined as “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law”). Id.
According to the government, this court is without jurisdiction to decide the FTCA claims because the alleged torts are based entirely on conduct by non-federal actors, the Philadelphia Police Department. Moreover, there is no waiver because the TSA and JTTF are not “investigative or law enforcement officers” for purposes of the FTCA.
The amended complaint adequately states federal involvement. The factual averments support a plausible inference that the TSA called for and requested the PPD to arrest and take plaintiff into custody. It is alleged that upon officer Rehiel’s arrival in the screening area, he ordered plaintiff to place his hands behind his back, without making an independent assessment of the situation. He did not wait for the TSA supervisor to finish speaking before handcuffing plaintiff. Concededly, TSA screeners routinely “call law enforcement officers to search, seize, and arrest individuals” because the screeners do not have the authority to do so. U.S. br. at 13, doc. no. 25. It is averred that plaintiff was cast in a false light when he was led in handcuffs through the terminal “in plain view of other passengers.” Am. Compl. ¶ 45. It is also plausible that the JTTF authorized and ratified the PPD’s detention of plaintiff: The PPD defendants “prolonged” plaintiff’s detention for interrogation by the JTTF. Id. ¶ 8. “It appeared that the police officers had been expecting and waiting for the [JTTF] detectives to arrive.” Id. ¶ 63. One JTTF agent said that “[t]he police call us to evaluate whether there is a real threat.” Id. ¶ 73. The JTTF defendants searched plaintiff’s belongings and questioned him. Id. ¶¶ 64–73.
These issues cannot be decided at this stage. Our Court of Appeals has not decided whether the conduct of state police officers, acting in their work on behalf of a federal agency, can be the basis of a FTCA claim. See Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 499 (3d Cir.2006) (suggesting a proper record might raise such a claim). The authority and roles played by the JTTF as well as the PPD and FBI at the Philadelphia airport are unclear. Discovery is needed to resolve whether each individual defendant was authorized to execute searches, seize evidence, or make arrests and if so, by whom, and the actions of each on the day of this incident.
3

George v. Rehiel, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011)
*5 Defendant specifically disclaims liability for the tort of false light because the FTCA reserves the United States’ immunity from certain intentional tort claims “arising out of” “libel” or “slander.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Invasion of privacy and false light are not explicitly barred by the FTCA. Id. Under Pennsylvania law, defamation is a distinct tort from false light invasion of privacy. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt. b; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8343. For purposes of the FTCA, the tort of

false light does not arise out of the tort of defamation. See Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269, 1275–76 (3d Cir.1974) (one remedy for defamation did not pre-empt another for negligence under the FTCA). Accordingly, the false light tort claim was allowed to proceed to discovery.
	  

4

 
 Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 64 Filed 04/09/12 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NICHOLAS GEORGE v.
WILLIAM REHIEL, et al.

:

CIVIL ACTION

:

:

:

:

NO. 10-586

Ludwig, J.

MEMORANDUM

April 10, 2012

This is an action for money damages for an alleged unlawful search and seizure at the

Philadelphia Airport by federal and state personnel employed by the Transportation Security

Administration (TSA), Philadelphia Police Department (PPD), and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). Jurisdiction is federal question, 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), 1346(b).

On September 30, 2011, the motion to dismiss of the individual federal defendants

because of qualified immunity (doc. no. 26) was denied, see order-memorandum opinion October 28, 2011 (doc. no. 43); and they appealed.1 On November 30, 2011, this action was

placed in civil suspense pending the appeal’s resolution.

Plaintiff Nicholas George now moves to reactivate this case and proceed with discovery (doc. no. 56). Federal appellant defendants object.2

1 The United States’ motion to dismiss because of sovereign immunity was also denied, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Orders, doc. nos. 40, 43). The complaint appeared to state claims for relief that were “plausible on [their] face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (U.S. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570 (2007)). The United States did not appeal.
2 State defendants PPD officers William Rehiel and William Edwards, Jr. do not object.
1

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 64 Filed 04/09/12 Page 2 of 4
On February 10, 2010, as amended on August 17, 2010, plaintiff filed suit against the individual federal defendants under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and the state defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint also pleads liability of defendant the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, for the state common law torts of its employees and agents – false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, and false light invasion of privacy.
The tipping point of plaintiff’s motion to proceed with discovery despite the qualified immunity appeal is that regardless of the outcome of that issue the case will remain litigable at least on the § 1983 and FTCA claims. The same evidence and witnesses will be discoverable.
Plaintiff on qualified immunity: it is “‘a right to immunity from certain claims, not from litigation in general.’” Pl. br. at 5, doc. no. 56, quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312 (1996) (emphasis in original). And delay may cause substantial prejudice because of loss of evidence and witnesses’ recollection.
Individual federal defendants’ position: To uphold the interests of qualified immunity, the stay of discovery in this case should include all issues inasmuch as the evidence is inseparable. These defendants quote Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953, 1954 (U.S. 2009) for the all-inclusive need to protect government officials – regardless of the presence of non-immune defendants.
2

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 64 Filed 04/09/12 Page 3 of 4
Iqbal dismissed the complaint because it was insufficient under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 to state a claim, which disentitled plaintiff to the right of any discovery. 129 S. Ct. at 1954. It is not authority for broadening the defense of qualified immunity to include the other claims in this case. Galarza v. Szalczyk, Nos. 10-6815, 11-4988, 2012 WL 627917 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2012) (Perkins, M.J.). Here, the stay on appeal does not cover the § 1983 claims against defendants Rehiel and Edwards or the FTCA claims against the United States.
To ask the Court of Appeals to resolve this conflict on what amounts to interlocutory review, when as a virtual certainty the same discovery matters cannot now be finally decided, is hardly a logical or desirable result.
Two Pennsylvania District Courts have authorized discovery proceedings during the pendency of similar appeals. Galarza, supra; Seeds of Peace Collective v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 09-1275, 2010 WL 2990734 (W.D. Pa. July 28, 2010) (Lancaster, C.J.). Plaintiff also cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions, four of which were decided after Iqbal.3
3 Plaintiff also cites: In re Scott ex. rel. Simmons v. United States, No. 10cv1578 TCM, 2011 WL 1791824 (E.D. Mo. May 10, 2011); S.D. ex. rel. A.J.D., &.M.P. ex rel. O.J.P. v. St. Johns County Sch. Dist., No. 3:09-cv-250-J-20TEM, 2009 WL 4349878 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2009); Charvat v. NMP, LLC, No. 2:09-cv-209, 2009 WL 3210379 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2009); Cabral v. County of Glenn, No. 2:08-cv-00029-MCE-DAD, 2009 WL 1911692 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2009). See also Pl. br. at 6-7 & n.1, doc. no. 56 (collecting cases).
3

Case 2:10-cv-00586-EL Document 64 Filed 04/09/12 Page 4 of 4 Considering all of the interests involved, practicality, as well as fairness, weighs in favor of granting plaintiff’s motion. An order accompanies this memorandum.
BY THE COURT: /s/ Edmund V. Ludwig Edmund V. Ludwig, J.
4

 
 Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 1 of 18

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NICHOLAS GEORGE,

CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

.

v.

~~HJEu

WILLIAM REHIEL, et al.

JAN ~ 2 2015

Defendants.

MICHAEL~.

By

:

KU!NDZ~C~iJaek00-586

~

©

m-rw~.

ll1i~"\
. 1.

JAN 2 0 2015~-'

__ .

.

l~By~======-~~

STIPULATED ORDER OF DISMISSAL=

Plaintiff and Defendants having settled their disputes and memorialized that settlement in

a Settiement Agreement signed by counsel on December 11, 2014 and December 29, 2014

(Attached as Exhibit A), it is hereby stipulated by the parties and ORDERED by the Court that:

1. Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)(2).

2. Defendant the City of Philadelphia's cross-claim against the United States is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)(2).

3. This Court shall retain jurisdiction over the case for 18 months from the date of this

Order, solely for purposes of enforcement of the Settlement Agreement's ongoing terms

between Plaintiff and Defendant City ofPhiladelphia. TI1ose terms are incorporated

herein by reference.
l£E~
Attorney for Plaintiff

Dated:~ /2., 2015

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 2 of 18

PAi1Lw. KAUFMAN Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for the United States ofAmerica
. ..#.n ~.' :·.·····,~·
.·.. ·~~~AM _·ND .. ··• S ·oF EL
Attorney for the City o:f Philadelphia

· Dated: J~ I)-. I • 2015

~ ====:iii m. ~(2~A.(~«"~

United States District Judge

/

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 3 of 18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 13, 2015, I did serve the above Stipulated Order of Dismissal via electronic mail to the Clerk's Office, copying the following counsel for Defendants:
Thomas F. Johnson U.S. Attorney's Office 615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250 Philadelphia, PA 19106 215-861-8380 Email: thomas.johnson@usdoj.gov
Paul F. Kaufman U.S. Department of Justice 615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250 Philadelphia, PA 19106 215-861-8579 Email: paul.kaufman2@usdoj.gov
Amanda C. Shoffel City of Philadelphia Law Department Civil Rights Unit 1515 Arch Street, 14th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102 215-683-5443 Fax: 215-638-5397 Email: amanda.shoffel@phila.gov
Lee Rowland

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 4 of 18

AMEl!UCJ!.l\l Cl!V!IL LllllEllU'll!:S UIHOINf FOVll\ll:IATRON

January 20, 2015
Mr. Rick Sabol Operations Manager Office of the Clerk of the Court United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Sent by Electronic Mail
Re: Nicholas George v. William Rehiel, No. 10-cv-586
Dear Mr. Sabol,
As per our conversation on Friday January 16, 2015, I am writing with regards to the reassignment of case No. 10-586 (Nicholas George v. William Rehiel).
As we discussed, I am requesting this reassignment solely for the purposes of filing a modification to the Order of Dismissal entered by Judge Ludwig on October 31, 2014. That Order was entered upon settlement in principle, but the final settlement agreement contains provisions retaining the Court's jurisdiction for purposes of enforcement. The proposed modification to the Order of Dismissal has been signed by all counsel in the case, and we have included the final, fully executed settlement agreement as an exhibit.
Local Rule 41.1 (b) states that an Order of Dismissal may be modified "within 90 days of the entry of such an order of dismissal" without requiring the filing of a motion to modify the dismissal. As such, we understand that we have until January 28, 2015 to both reassign the case and file the revised order and exhibits. Please let me know if you require any further information in order for the Court to enter the modified Order before the 41.l(b) clock has run.
Please also do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or conc~rns. Counsel for all parties have approved this letter, and a copy has been served on all counsel via e-mail.
Sincerely,
Lee Rowland
Counsel for Plaintiff

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 5 of 18

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NICHOLAS GEORGE,

CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM REHIEL, et al.
Defendants.

No. 10-586

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JAN 2 0

2W015iil[U~1

lsy

STIPULATION FOR COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT AND RELEASE

It is hereby stipulated and agreed, by and between plaintiffNicholas George, by and
through his attorneys, Lee Rowland of the American Civil Liberties Union, Mary Catherine

Roper of the American Civil Liberties Union, and David Rudovsky of Kairys, Rudovsky,

Messing & Feinberg LLP; defendant the United States of America (the "United States"), by

and through its attorneys, United States Attorney Zane David Memeger and Assistant United

States Attorneys Thomas F. Johnson and Paul W. Kaufman (the "United States"); and the

City of Philadelphia, by and through its attorney, Assistant City Solicitor Amanda C. Shoffel

(the "City," collectively with defendant the United States, the "Defendants," and collectively

with plaintiff George and the United States as the "Parties"), as follows:

1. The Parties do hereby agree to settle and compromise the above-entitled action under the terms and conditions set forth herein.

2. Defendant United States agrees to settle under the terms provided in the sub-

paragraphs to this paragraph all remaining claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which

shall be in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all claims, demands, rights, and causes

1

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 6 of 18
of action of whatsoever kind and nature, arising from, and by reason of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries, including all mental or emotional injuries, damage to property and the consequences thereof resulting, and to result, from the security screening, questioning, and subsequent detention of Plaintiff at the Philadelphia International Airport (the "Airport") on or about August 29, 2009, and which is the subject matter that gave rise to the above-captioned civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, No. 1O-cv-586 (the "Incident"). including any claims for wrongful death, including, but not limited to, any and all claims for which Plaintiff and/or his heirs, executors, administrators, guardians, or assigns, and each of them, now have or may hereafter acquire against the United States of America, the United States Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA"), the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation ("FBI''), or their agents, servants, and employees stemming from the Incident.
a. Defendant United States has provided the Declaration attached as Exhibit A to this Stipulation.
b. Defendant United States agrees to pay to Plaintiff the sum of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000). 3. Plaintiff and his heirs, executors, administrators, guardians, or assigns hereby agree to accept the sum of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000) in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all claims, demands, rights, and causes of action of whatsoever kind and nature, arising from, and by reason of, any and all known and unknown,
2

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 7 of 18
foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries, including but not limited to mental or emotional damages, damage to property and the consequences thereof resulting, and to result, from the Incident, including any claims for wrongful death, which he may have or hereafter acquire against the United States, DHS, TSA, DOJ, FBI, their heirs, executors, successors, or their agents, servants and employees. Plaintiffand his heirs, executors, administrators, guardians, and/or assigns further agree to reimburse, indemnify and hold harmless the United States, DHS, TSA, DOJ, FBI, and their agents, servants, and employees, from and against any and all such causes of action, claims, liens, rights, or subrogation or contribution interests incident to or resulting from further litigation or the prosecution of claims by Plaintiff and/or his heirs, executors, guardians, administrators or assigns against any third party or against the United States, DHS, TSA, DOJ, FBI, including claims any claims for wrongful death.
4. Payment of the settlement amount of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000) shall be made by check drawn on the United States Treasury and made payable to PlaintiffNichol~s George. The check will be mailed to Plaintiff's attorney of record, Lee Rowland at the American Civil Liberties Union, 125 Broad St., l 81h Floor, New York, NY 10004.
5. The City agrees to the relief described in the sub-paragraphs to this paragraph, which shall be in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all claims, demands, rights, and causes of action of whatsoever kind and nature, arising from, and by reason of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries, including mental and emotional damages, damage to property and the consequences thereof resulting, and to result, from the Incident, including any claims for wrongful death, including, but not limited
3

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 8 of 18
to, any and all claims for which Plaintiff and/or his heirs, executors, administrators, guardians, or assigns, and each of them, now have or may hereafter acquire against the City and/or its principals, agents, servants, and employees, including but not limited to individual defendants William Rehiel and Edward Richards, Jr..
a. The City shall communicate to Philadelphia Police Department officers assigned to the Airport the following: Investigative detentions may be made only on reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct and any arrest must be based on probable cause. A referral by TSA agents is not grounds for arrest unless an officer makes a judgment of probable cause; similarly, referral by TSA agents is not grounds for detention unless an officer makes a judgment that there is reasonable suspicion ofcriminal conduct. Any detentions or arrests should be documented on appropriate police paperwork consistent with PPD Directives.
b. This communication shall occur during the Airport officers' roll call, quarterly.
c. This communication shall be made for three days in a row each quarter, and it shall be made at each of the three shifts' roll call briefings on those days.
d. Such communication will continue for eighteen months (six quarters). e. The first such communication of each quarterly period will be
delivered, in person, by Captain Fran Healy, Esq., Special Advisor to the Police Commissioner, or by another individual designated by the City and approved by the Plaintiff, through counsel.
4

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 9 of 18
f. At the conclusion of the six quarters (eighteen months), the communication in sub-paragraph (a), above, shall be placed into the materials given to Philadelphia Police Department officers assigned to the airport upon their orientation to that assignment.
6. Plaintiff and his heirs, executors, administrators, guardians, or assigns hereby agree to accept the foregoing actions in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all claims, demands, rights, and causes of action of whatsoever kind and nature, arising from, and by reason of, any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries, including mental or emotional injuries, damage to property and the consequences thereof resulting, and to result, from the Incident, including any claims for wrongful death, which they may have or hereafter acquire against the City and/or its principals, agents, servants and employees, including William Rehiel and Edward Richards, Jr., including any future claim or lawsuit of any kind or type whatsoever, whether known or unknown, and whether for compensatory or exemplary damages, based on events relating to the Incident. The Plaintiff and his heirs, executors, administrators, guardians, and/or assigns further agree to reimburse, indemnify and hold hannless the City and/or its principals, agents, servants, and employees, including William Rehiel and Edward Richards, Jr., from and against any and all such causes of action, claims, liens, rights, or subrogation or contribution interests incident to or resulting from further litigation or the prosecution of claims by Plaintiff and/or his heirs, executors, guardians, administrators or assigns against any third party or against the City, including claims for wrongful death.
5

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 10 of 18
7. Plaintiff, for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators, guardians, successors and assigns, do fully and forever release, acquit and discharge the United States, DHS, TSA, DOJ, FBI, and their agents, directors, departments, officers, employees, contractors, administrators, representatives, attorneys, divisions, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors (and agents, directors, officers, employees, contractors, administrators, representatives, and attorneys of such departments, divisions, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors), and all persons acting by, through, under, or in concert with any of them, of and from any and all actions, causes of action, agreements, judgments, claims, damages, loss of services, expenses (including attorneys' fees and costs actually incurred) and all demands of whatever kind or nature, including but not limited to claims for indemnity or contribution, on account of, or in any way growing out of, any and all known and unknown personal injuries, death, damages, loss of consortium, property damage and the consequences thereof, and/or any other losses, resulting or to result from the Incident, and does for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators, guardians, successors and assigns, covenant with said releasees to indemnify and save harmless the said releasees from all claims and demands for damages, costs, loss of services, expenses or compensation on account of such events or actions, whether said harm be to said releasor's physical person, or mental or psychological injury, including wrongful death.
8. Plaintiff, for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators, guardians, successors and assigns, does fully and forever release, acquit and discharge the City and its principals, agents, directors, departments, officers, employees, contractors, administrators, representatives, attorneys, divisions, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors (and agents, directors,
6

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 11 of 18
officers, employees, contractors, administrators, representatives, and attorneys of such departments, divisions, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors), and all persons acting by, through, under, or in concert with any of them of, including William Rehiel and Edward Richards, Jr., and from any and all actions, causes of action, agreements, judgments, claims, damages, loss of services, expenses (including attorneys' fees and costs actually incurred) and all demands of whatever kind or nature, including but not limited to claims for indemnity or contribution, on account of, or in any way growing out of, any and all known and unknown personal injuries, death, damages, loss of consortium, property damage and the consequences thereof, and/or any other losses, resulting or to result from the Incident, and do for themselves, their heirs, executors, administrators, guardians, successors and assigns, covenant with said releasees to indemnify and save harmless the said releasees from all claims and demands for damages, costs, loss of services, expenses or compensation on account of such events or actions, whether said harm be to said releasor's physical person, or mental or psychological injury, including wrongful death.
9. The City agrees that this Stipulation is in full satisfaction of its cross-claims against the United States and agrees therefore to dismiss its cross-claims in the abovecaptioned matter with prejudice and without further payment of any kind, including but not limited to payment ofindemnification, contribution, attorneys' fees, and/or costs; and with the Court retaining jurisdiction for any violation of the terms of this Stipulation by the City.
10. The terms, conditions and requirements of this Stipulation are not severable and the failure to agree, fulfill or comply with any term, condition or requirement renders the entire Stipulation null and void. The authorization by the Attorney General or the Attorney
7

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 12 of 18
General's designee to negotiate and consummate a settlement for the amount agreed upon by the Parties does not make the settlement binding upon the United States unless and until the other terms, conditions and requirements of this Stipulation have been completely agreed upon in writing.
11. This Stipulation is not, is in no way intended to be, and should not be construed as an admission of liability or fault on the part of the United States, OHS, TSA, DOJ, FBI, the City, or their principals, agents, servants, or employees, including William Rehiel and Edward Richards, Jr., and it is specifically denied that they are liable to Plaintiff. This settlement is entered into by all parties for the purpose of compromising any and all disputed claims specified in the instant complaint and avoiding the expenses and risks of further litigation.
12. It is also agreed, by and among the Parties to this settlement agreement and release, that the settlement amount of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000) and the relief specified in Paragraphs 2 and 5, supra, collectively represents the entirety of the compromise settlement and that each respective Party will each bear its own costs, fees, and expenses, and that any attorneys' fees owed by Plaintiff will be paid out of the settlement amount and not in addition thereto.
13. It is also understood by and among the parties to this settlement agreement and release that pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2678, attorneys' fees for services rendered in connection with this action shall not exceed 25 percent of the amount of the settlement amount.
8

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 13 of 18
14. Each of the signatories to this Stipulation warrants and represents that he or she had the full power and authority to enter into this Stipulation and to bind the person(s) on whose behalf he or she is signing to the terms of the settlement.
15. Defendants shall not be required to pay more than the amounts specified above to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff agrees that he will not seek payment from Defendants greater than the specified amounts set forth above.
16. Plaintiff and his attorneys agree that any tax liabilities resulting from receipt of the settlement amount will be the sole responsibility of Plaintiff and his attorneys. This settlement agreement is executed without reliance upon any representation by defendant United States as to the tax consequences of the settlement amount.
17. In consideration of the payments and relief specified above, Plaintiff's attorneys agree that they will execute and file with the Court such documents, including a stipulation of dismissal, as shall be necessary to cause the dismissal with prejudice from the docket of this Court of all of Plaintiff's claims against Defendants United States of America, the City, William Rehiel and Edward Richards, Jr., with each party bearing its own fees, costs, and expenses, subject to the limitations identified in~ 13, supra; and with the Court retaining jurisdiction for any violation of the terms of this Stipulation by the City. In consideration of obligations incurred above, the City's attorneys agree that they will execute and file with the Court such documents, including a stipulation of dismissal, as shall be necessary to cause the dismissal with prejudice from the docket of this Court of all of the City's claims against the United States, with each party bearing its own fees, costs, and
9

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 14 of 18
expenses; and with the Court retaining jurisdiction for any violation of the terms of this Stipulation by the City.
18. The Parties agree that this Stipulation, including all of the terms and conditions of this compromise settlement and any additional agreements relating thereto, may be made public in their entirety, and Plaintiff expressly consents to such release and disclosure
pursuant to S U.S.C. § 552a(b).
19. It is contemplated that this Stipulation may be executed in several counterparts, with an attached Exhibit and a separate signature page for each undersigned party. All such counterparts and signature pages, together, shall be deemed to be one document. Such counterparts may be electronic or physical.
20. Neither this Stipulation nor its exhibits shall have any precedential value whatsoever in any future or pending complaints, grievances, appeals or lawsuits against the United States, DHS, TSA, DOJ, FBI, the City, and their agents, officers, or employees.
21. The undersigned parties agree that they are entering into this Stipulation voluntarily, that this Stipulation is being voluntarily executed by the Parties, and that they fully understand all aspects of this Stipulation.
22. This agreement relates only to the Parties and the named defendants who are no longer parties. The provisions of this agreement shall not apply to other federal or state agencies.
23. It is also agreed, between the Parties, that the settlement terms as reflected in this document and its accompanying Exhibit encompass the entire agreement between the Parties and that there are no unwritten agreements, understandings or assurances and no other
10

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 15 of 18

wlitten agreements upon which tbe U1)detsigned parties a1·e relying in agreeing to tllls

Stipulntion.

24.,

this $tip1.1lation may not be modified, ~tended, or tel'.!lllnitted ~ceptby

written agreement sign~d by all of th& Pal'ties .and specifica1Iy referring to this Stipulation>

except that Pl~ntiff C!lll modify this stipulation ~ it affects elthel' Defendant ~one by written

Dated: 12../ a._(,

, 2014

Attorney for Plaintiff

ZANE DAVID MEMEOEn.
Uoited Smtes Attorney

.MA~ARETi. HUTciSON
Assistant United States Attoiney Ohiet Ci ' Division

Dated:

'2014

PA W. KAUFMAN

THOMAS F. JO:E:JNSON

Assistant United Stutes Attorneys

Attomeys for the Unite_d

o f America

Dated: 'J:>..·r- l (

,2014

Dated: te_c. . !J._ q .2014

Attorney for the City of Philadelphia 11

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 16 of 18
EXHIBIT 1

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 17 of 18

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NICHOLAS GEORGE,

CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff, v.

WILLIAM REHIEL, et al.

Defendants.

No. 10-586

DECLARATION OF SARAH TAUBER I, Sarah Tauber, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, declare as follows:
1. I am an employee ofthe Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is a component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I have s~rved with TSA and DHS in varying capacities since October 17, 2002, including a term
3:S Branch Manager for TSA's Behavior Detection and Analysis (BDA) Program within
TSA's Office of Security Operations (OSO), beginning on June 12, 2012 and ending on October 14, 2014. As of October 14, 2014~ I serve as the Deputy Director for Threat Assessment Division of OSO, and the BDA Program remains part of my portfolio. This Declaration is based on my personal knowledge or knowledge gained in those official capacities.
2. As the head of the BDA Program, I oversaw all aspects ofTSA's behavior detection program and procedures. TSA employees trained specifically as Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) observe passengers prior to and during the screening process in order to determine whether any are exhibiting acts or behaviors indicative of a high

Case 2:10-cv-00586-MAK Document 105 Filed 01/22/15 Page 18 of 18
risk passenger who may attempt to cause harm to an aircraft or the passengers on an aircraft. Where a BDO observes sufficient high risk indicators, an individual. is simply subject to some additional screening similar to that employed when carry-on baggage XRay displays an anomaly. This type of additional screening usually takes five minutes or less.
3. When appropriate, BDOs may refer the passenger to a Law Enforcement Officer (LEO} for resolution of any potential security concerns that the BDO may have identified. Under current procedures, this is known as a LEO Referral.
4. TSA does not have direct authority over law enforcement officers. Therefore, if a LEO responds to a BDO referral, that officer will use his or her training and judgment to decide what actions to take.
5. I am aware of no TSA document or policy that requires a police officer responding to a LEO Referral under TSA behavior detection procedures to arrest the passenger in question. The BDA program anticipates that responding poHce officers will exercise their independent judgment on how to proceed after the referral is made. Ill Ill
I declare under penalty ofperjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed November IO, 2014.
Arlington, Virginia
Deputy Director, Threat Assessment Division Office of Security Operations Transportation Security Administration U.S. Department of Homeland Security ·

 
 Case: 2:10-cv-00586-MAK As of: 03/16/2015 04:01 AM EDT 1 of 13
SEALDC,CLOSED,02−20244,STANDARD
United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:10−cv−00586−MAK

GEORGE v. REIHL et al Assigned to: HONORABLE MARK A. KEARNEY Referred to: MAGISTRATE JUDGE LINDA K. CARACAPPA (Settlement) Case in other court: USCA FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT,
11−04292
11−04292 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 02/10/2010 Date Terminated: 10/31/2014 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

NICHOLAS GEORGE

represented by DAVID RUDOVSKY KAIRYS RUDOVSKY MESSING & FEINBERG LLP THE CAST IRON BLDG STE 501 SOUTH 718 ARCH STREET PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 215−925−4400 Fax: 215−925−5365 Email: drudovsky@krlawphila.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

LEE ROWLAND ACLU 125 BROAD ST 18TH FL NEW YORK, NY 10004 212−549−2500 Email: lrowland@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

MARY CATHERINE ROPER ACLU OF PA PO BOX 40008 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 215−592−1513 Email: mroper@aclupa.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

ZACHARY KATZNELSON AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT 125 BROAD ST 18TH FL NEW YORK, NY 10004 212−549−2622 Email: zkatznelson@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

BENJAMIN ELIHU WIZNER AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 125 BROAD STREET 18TH FLOOR NEW YORK, NY 10004

Case: 2:10-cv-00586-MAK As of: 03/16/2015 04:01 AM EDT 2 of 13
212−549−7860 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: bwizner@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JONATHAN MATTHEW MANES GIBBONS P.C. ONE GATEWAY CENTER NEWARK, NJ 07102 973−596−4823 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: jmanes@gibbonslaw.com TERMINATED: 11/08/2011
MITRA EBADOLAHI ACLU NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT 125 BROAD ST 18TH FL NEW YORK, NY 10004 212−284−7305 Email: mebadolahi@aclu.org TERMINATED: 07/17/2013
MOLLY M. TACK−HOOPER ACLU FOUNDATION OF PA POBOX 40008 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 215−592−1513 Email: mtack−hooper@aclupa.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SEEMA SAIFEE ACLU−FOUNDATION OF PA POBOX 40008 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 215−592−1513 Email: ssaifee@aclupa.org TERMINATED: 07/30/2012

V. Defendant REIHL GIVEN NAME UNKNOWN, PHILADELPHIA POLICE OFFICER, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY TERMINATED: 08/13/2010
Defendant RICHARDS GIVEN NAME UNKNOWN, PHILADELPHIA POLICE SERGEANT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY TERMINATED: 08/13/2010
Defendant THREE UNKNWON NAMED OFFICERS OR AGENTS OF THE

represented by GENELLE FRANKLIN NAULTY SCARICAMAZZA & MCDEVITT LLC 851 ROUTE 73 NORTH SUITE A MARLTON, NJ 08053 856−985−2005 Email: Gfranklin@naulty−nj.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by GENELLE FRANKLIN (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by PAUL W. KAUFMAN U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Case: 2:10-cv-00586-MAK As of: 03/16/2015 04:01 AM EDT 3 of 13

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES TERMINATED: 08/13/2010

615 CHESTNUT STREET SUITE 1250 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 215−861−8579 Email: paul.kaufman2@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 08/13/2010

THOMAS F. JOHNSON U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 615 CHESTNUT ST., SUITE 1250 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 215−861−8380 Email: thomas.johnson@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 08/13/2010

Defendant
TWO UNKNOWN NAMED AGENTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES TERMINATED: 08/13/2010

represented by PAUL W. KAUFMAN (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2010
THOMAS F. JOHNSON (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2010

Defendant
WILLIAM REHIEL PHILADELPHIA POLICE OFFICER, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

represented by AMANDA C SHOFFEL CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LAW DEPARTMENT CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT 1515 ARCH STREET 14TH FLOOR PHILDELPHIA, PA 19102 215−683−5443 Fax: 215−638−5397 Email: amanda.shoffel@phila.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
EDWARD RICHARDS, JR. PHILADELPHIA POLICE SERGEANT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

represented by AMANDA C SHOFFEL (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3 EMPLOYEES OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES

represented by KELLY E. HEIDRICH U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE 1425 NEW YORK AVE NW RM 8135 WASHINGTON, DC 20005 202−616−4371 Email: Kelly.Heidrich@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

PAUL W. KAUFMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

THOMAS F. JOHNSON (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

represented by

Case: 2:10-cv-00586-MAK As of: 03/16/2015 04:01 AM EDT 4 of 13

JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5 PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT DETECTIVES, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES

KELLY E. HEIDRICH (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

PAUL W. KAUFMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

THOMAS F. JOHNSON (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

represented by KELLY E. HEIDRICH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

PAUL W. KAUFMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

THOMAS F. JOHNSON (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant
EDWARD RICHARDS, JR. PHILADELPHIA POLICE SERGEANT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

represented by AMANDA C SHOFFEL (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant
WILLIAM REHIEL PHILADELPHIA POLICE OFFICER, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

represented by AMANDA C SHOFFEL (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Cross Defendant JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3 EMPLOYEES OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES
Cross Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

represented by KELLY E. HEIDRICH (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PAUL W. KAUFMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
THOMAS F. JOHNSON (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by KELLY E. HEIDRICH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PAUL W. KAUFMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:10-cv-00586-MAK As of: 03/16/2015 04:01 AM EDT 5 of 13

THOMAS F. JOHNSON (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant
EDWARD RICHARDS, JR. PHILADELPHIA POLICE SERGEANT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

represented by AMANDA C SHOFFEL (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant
WILLIAM REHIEL PHILADELPHIA POLICE OFFICER, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

represented by AMANDA C SHOFFEL (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Cross Defendant JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3 EMPLOYEES OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES
Cross Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

represented by KELLY E. HEIDRICH (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PAUL W. KAUFMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
THOMAS F. JOHNSON (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by KELLY E. HEIDRICH (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PAUL W. KAUFMAN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
THOMAS F. JOHNSON (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/10/2010
02/10/2010 02/10/2010 02/22/2010

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against REIHL, RICHARDS, THREE UNKNWON NAMED OFFICERS OR AGENTS OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, TWO UNKNOWN NAMED AGENTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number PPE017560.), filed by NICHOLAS GEORGE. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Case Management Track, # 3 Designation Form)(cw, ) (Entered: 02/16/2010)
Summons Issued as to REIHL, RICHARDS. Two Forwarded To: Counsel on 2/16/10 (cw, ) (Entered: 02/16/2010)
DEMAND for Trial by Jury by NICHOLAS GEORGE. (cw, ) (Entered: 02/16/2010)
2 Application of BEN WIZNER, ESQUIRE to Practice in this Court Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure on behalf of NICHOLAS GEORGE, Certificate of Service. ($40.00 filing paid)(mbh, ) (Entered: 02/22/2010)

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02/22/2010 02/24/2010 02/24/2010 04/27/2010 05/04/2010
05/14/2010 05/21/2010
05/21/2010 05/28/2010 06/09/2010 06/15/2010 06/25/2010 06/30/2010
06/30/2010

3 Application of JONATHAN MATTHEW MANES, ESQUIRE to Practice in this Court Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 83.5.2(b) on behalf of NICHOLAS GEORGE, Certificate of Service. ($40.00 filing fee paid) (mbh, ) (Entered: 02/22/2010)
4 ORDER THAT ATTORNEY JONATHAN MATTHEW MANES IS ADMITTED PRO HAC VICE FOR NICHOLAS GEORGE. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 2/23/2010. 3/1/2010 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED. (ems) (Entered: 03/01/2010)
5 ORDER THAT ATTORNEY BENJAMIN ELIHU WIZNER IS ADMITTED PRO HAC VICE FOR NICHOLAS GEORGE. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 2/23/2010. 3/1/2010 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED, E−MAILED.(md) (Entered: 03/01/2010)
6 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, together with Affirmative Defenses by REIHL, RICHARDS, Certificate of Service. (FRANKLIN, GENELLE) Modified on 4/28/2010 (nd). (Entered: 04/27/2010)
7 NOTICE of Hearing: A RULE 16 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON WEDNESDAY, 5/19/2010 AT 10:30 AM BEFORE HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG BY TELEPHONE, PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO INITIATE THE CALL TO CHAMBERS. 215−580−2030. (Attachments: # 1 C A S E Management Program)(kc, ) (Entered: 05/04/2010)
8 MOTION for Discovery to identify Doe Defendants filed by NICHOLAS GEORGE.Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(ROPER, MARY) (Entered: 05/14/2010)
9 ORDER THAT BY 5/28/2010 SERVE SELF−EXECUTING DISCLOSURES. BY 6/2/2010, IF NO RESPONSE HAS BEEN RECEIVED TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION, PLAINTIFF SHALL SUMBIT A FORM OF ORDER PERMITTING THE REQUESTED DISCOVERY. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 5/20/2010. 5/21/2010 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 05/21/2010)
10 MOTION TO INTERVENE AS AN INTERESTED PARTY FILED BY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.(mbh, ) (Entered: 05/24/2010)
11 ORDER THAT THE UNITED STATES' MOTION TO INTERVENE AS AN INTERESTED THIRD PARTY IS GRANTED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 5/21/2010. 5/28/2010 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 05/28/2010)
12 ORDER THAT THE PARTIES SHALL REPORT IN WRITING ON THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS PERTAINING TO THE DOE DISCOVERY REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFF. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 6/9/2010. 6/10/2010 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 06/10/2010)
13 Consent MOTION for Protective Order filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(HEIDRICH, KELLY) (Entered: 06/15/2010)
14 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 6/25/10. 6/25/10 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED. (jpd) (Entered: 06/25/2010)
15 NOTICE of Appearance by THOMAS F. JOHNSON on behalf of THREE UNKNWON NAMED OFFICERS OR AGENTS OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, TWO UNKNOWN NAMED AGENTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION with Certificate of Service(JOHNSON, THOMAS) (Entered: 06/30/2010)
16 NOTICE of Appearance by PAUL W. KAUFMAN on behalf of THREE UNKNWON NAMED OFFICERS OR AGENTS OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, TWO UNKNOWN NAMED AGENTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION with Certificate of Service(KAUFMAN, PAUL)

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07/19/2010 07/22/2010
08/11/2010 08/11/2010 08/13/2010 08/13/2010 08/13/2010 08/17/2010
09/28/2010 10/05/2010 10/05/2010 10/06/2010 10/06/2010 10/08/2010 10/12/2010 11/02/2010

(Entered: 06/30/2010)
17 Expedited Discovery filed under seal by the United States on behalf of Transportation Safety Administration. (FILED UNDER SEAL) (mbh, ) (Entered: 07/19/2010)
18 ORDER THAT BY 8/6/10, THE PARTIES SHALL REPORT IN WRITING ON THE STATUS OF EXPEDITED DISCOVERY AND IF THE SCHEDULING OF A FURTHER RULE 16 CONFERENCE IS APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 7/22/10. 7/22/10 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 07/22/2010)
19 ORDER THAT THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT LIMITED EXPEDITED DOE DISCOVERY IS DENIED AS MOOT. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 8/11/10. 8/12/10 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 08/12/2010)
20 ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF SHALL FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT BY 8/13/10. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 8/11/10. 8/12/10 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 08/12/2010)
21 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint for Damages filed by NICHOLAS GEORGE.Certificate of Counsel & Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint for Damages, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Granting Motion to File Amended Complaint for Damages)(ROPER, MARY) (Entered: 08/13/2010)
22 Amended Complaint for Damages against UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WILLIAM REHIEL, EDWARD RICHARDS, JR, JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5 filed by NICHOLAS GEORGE.(mbh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2010)
Summons Issued as to WILLIAM REHIEL, EDWARD RICHARDS, JR. Forwarded To: Mary Catherine Roper on 8/13/10 (mbh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2010)
23 ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO FILE THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IS GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT IS HEREBY FILED OF RECORD. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 8/17/10. 8/18/10 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 08/18/2010)
24 ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF SHALL FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT BY 8/13/10. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 9/28/10. 9/28/10 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 09/28/2010)
25 MOTION to Dismiss filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.Memorandum. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix)(HEIDRICH, KELLY) (Entered: 10/05/2010)
26 MOTION to Dismiss filed by JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5.Memorandum.(HEIDRICH, KELLY) (Entered: 10/05/2010)
27 Joint MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order filed by NICHOLAS GEORGE.Certificate of Service.(ROPER, MARY) (Entered: 10/06/2010)
28 NOTICE of Appearance by THOMAS F. JOHNSON on behalf of JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA with Certificate of Service(JOHNSON, THOMAS) (Entered: 10/06/2010)
29 ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF SHALL RESPOND TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS BY 11/11/10. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 10/8/10. 10/12/10 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 10/12/2010)
30 NOTICE of Appearance by PAUL W. KAUFMAN on behalf of JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA with Certificate of Service(KAUFMAN, PAUL) (Entered: 10/12/2010)
31 NOTICE of Appearance by MARTHA M. TACK−HOOPER on behalf of NICHOLAS GEORGE with Certificate of Service(TACK−HOOPER, MARTHA)

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11/11/2010 11/11/2010 11/30/2010 11/30/2010 03/31/2011
04/01/2011 06/14/2011
09/15/2011 09/30/2011 10/14/2011 10/14/2011 10/28/2011
11/08/2011
11/17/2011 11/17/2011 11/22/2011

(Entered: 11/02/2010)
32 RESPONSE in Opposition re 26 MOTION to Dismiss John Does 1−5 filed by NICHOLAS GEORGE. (ROPER, MARY) (Entered: 11/11/2010)
33 RESPONSE in Opposition re 25 MOTION to Dismiss the United States filed by NICHOLAS GEORGE. (ROPER, MARY) (Entered: 11/11/2010)
34 REPLY to Response to Motion re 25 MOTION to Dismiss filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (HEIDRICH, KELLY) (Entered: 11/30/2010)
35 REPLY to Response to Motion re 26 MOTION to Dismiss filed by JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5. (HEIDRICH, KELLY) (Entered: 11/30/2010)
36 NOTICE of Appearance by AMANDA C SHOFFEL on behalf of WILLIAM REHIEL, EDWARD RICHARDS, JR (SHOFFEL, AMANDA) (FILED IN ERROR BY ATTORNEY; ATTORNEY WILL REFILE WITH CORRECT PDF) Modified on 4/1/2011 (lisad, ). (Entered: 03/31/2011)
37 NOTICE of Appearance by AMANDA C SHOFFEL on behalf of WILLIAM REHIEL, EDWARD RICHARDS, JR (SHOFFEL, AMANDA) (Entered: 04/01/2011)
38 NOTICE of Hearing: TELEPHONE CONFERENCE SET FOR THURSDAY, 6/16/2011 AT 11:30 AM BEFORE HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG, PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO INITIATE THE CALL TO CHAMBERS. 215−580−2030.(kc, ) (Entered: 06/14/2011)
39 NOTICE by NICHOLAS GEORGE re 32 Response in Opposition to Motion, 33 Response in Opposition to Motion Notice of Additional Authority (TACK−HOOPER, MOLLY) (Entered: 09/15/2011)
40 MEMORANDUM/ORDER THAT DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS ARE BOTH DENIED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 9/30/11. 10/3/11 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 10/03/2011)
41 MOTION for Clarification filed by JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.memorandum of law and certificate of service.(HEIDRICH, KELLY) (Entered: 10/14/2011)
42 Consent MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by NICHOLAS GEORGE.Certificate of Counsel, Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(MANES, JONATHAN) (Entered: 10/14/2011)
43 ORDER THAT IT IS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MOVANT'S STATEMENT OF THE LAW OF QUALIIED IMMUNITY IS SUBSTANTIVELY CORRECT, ETC. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 10/28/11. 10/31/11 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 10/31/2011)
44 ORDER THAT UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL, IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED THAT THE MOTION OF JONATHAN MANES TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF IS GRANTED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 11/8/11.11/8/11 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(ti, ) (Entered: 11/08/2011)
45 Application of MITRA EBADOLAHI, ESQUIRE to Practice in this Court Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 83.5.2(b) on behalf of NICHOLAS GEORGE, Certificate of Service. ($40.00 filing fee paid) (mbh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2011)
46 Application of SEEMA SAIFEE, ESQUIRE to Practice in this Court Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 83.5.2(b) on behalf of NICHOLAS GEORGE, Certificate of Service. ($40.00 filimg fee paid) (mbh, ) (Entered: 11/17/2011)
47 ORDER THAT THE APPLICATION OF MITRA EBADOLAHI, ESQUIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONDUCT OF THIS CIVIL ACTION PRO HAC VICE UNDER LOCAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 83.5.2(b) IS GRANTED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 11/22/11. 11/22/11 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED, E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 11/22/2011)

Case: 2:10-cv-00586-MAK As of: 03/16/2015 04:01 AM EDT 9 of 13

11/22/2011
11/28/2011
11/29/2011 11/29/2011 11/30/2011
12/06/2011 12/16/2011 12/16/2011 12/20/2011 12/23/2011 02/14/2012 02/24/2012 02/28/2012
02/28/2012 03/09/2012

48 ORDER THAT THE APPLICATION OF SEEMA SAIFEE, ESQUIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONDUCT OF THIS CIVIL ACTION PRO HAC VICE UNDER LOCAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 83.5.2(b) IS GRANTED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 11/22/11. 11/22/11 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED, E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
49 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 40 Order (Memorandum and/or Opinion) by JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5. Copies to Judge, Clerk USCA, Appeals Clerk and Certificate of service. (HEIDRICH, KELLY) (FILED IN ERROR BY ATTORNEY; ATTORNEY RE−FILED CORRECT DOCUMENT) Modified on 11/29/2011 (nd, ). (Entered: 11/28/2011)
50 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 40 Order (Memorandum and/or Opinion) by JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5. Copies to Judge, Clerk USCA, Appeals Clerk and Certificate of Service (HEIDRICH, KELLY) Modified on 11/30/2011 (nd, ). (Entered: 11/29/2011)
51 Clerk's Notice to USCA re 50 Notice of Appeal. (mbh, ) (Entered: 11/30/2011)
52 ORDER THAT THE CLERK OF COURT MARK THIS ACTION CLOSED FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES AND PLACE THE MATTER IN THE CIVIL SUSPENSE FILE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE COURT SHALL RETAIN JURISDICTION; AND THAT THE CASE BE RESTORED TO THE TRIAL DOCKET WHEN THE ACTION IS IN A STATUS SO THAT IT MAY PROCEED TO FINAL DISPOSITION. THIS ORDER SHALL NOT PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES TO THIS LITIGATION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 1/30/11. 12/1/11 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
NOTICE of Docketing Record on Appeal from USCA re 50 Notice of Appeal, filed by JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5. USCA Case Number 11−4292 (ems) (Entered: 12/06/2011)
53 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 43 Order by JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5. Copies to Judge, Clerk USCA, Appeals Clerk and Certificate of Service. (KAUFMAN, PAUL) Modified on 12/19/2011 (nd, ). (Entered: 12/16/2011)
54 Clerk's Notice to USCA re 53 Notice of Appeal. (mbh, ) (Entered: 12/19/2011)
55 Copy of TPO Form re 53 Notice of Appeal.(mbh, ) (Entered: 12/21/2011)
Record Complete for Purposes of Appeal re 53 Notice of Appeal. The Clerk's Office hereby certifies the record and the docket sheet available through ECF to be the certified list in lieu of the record and/or the certified copy of the docket entries. (afm, ) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
56 MOTION Reopen Case re 52 Suspense Order, filed by NICHOLAS GEORGE.Certificate of Service.(EBADOLAHI, MITRA) (Entered: 02/14/2012)
57 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 56 MOTION Reopen Case re 52 Suspense Order, filed by JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.Certificate of Service.(HEIDRICH, KELLY) (Entered: 02/24/2012)
58 ORDER THAT FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IS GRANTED. THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS SHALL HAVE UNTIL OR BEFORE 3/9/12 IN WHICH TO FILE A RESPONSE TO THE MOTON TO REOPEN. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 2/28/12. 2/28/12 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 02/28/2012)
59 Statement of Officers Rehiel and Richards, No Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Re−open the Case, Docket Entry No. 56 by WILLIAM REHIEL, EDWARD RICHARDS, JR. (SHOFFEL, AMANDA) (Entered: 02/28/2012)
60 RESPONSE in Opposition re 56 MOTION Reopen Case re 52 Suspense Order, filed by JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (HEIDRICH, KELLY) (Entered: 03/09/2012)

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03/20/2012 03/21/2012 03/28/2012 04/09/2012 04/09/2012
04/10/2012 04/20/2012 05/04/2012 05/17/2012 06/04/2012 06/12/2012 06/28/2012 06/28/2012

61 MOTION for Leave to File Reply filed by NICHOLAS GEORGE.Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(EBADOLAHI, MITRA) (Entered: 03/20/2012)
62 Application of ZACHARY KATZNELSON, ESQUIRE to Practice in this Court Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 83.5.2(b) on behalf of NICHOLAS GEORGE, Certificate of Service. ($40.00 filing fee paid) (mbh, ) (Entered: 03/21/2012)
63 ORDER THAT THE APPLICATION OF ZACHARY KATZNELSON, ESQUIRE, TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONDUCT OF THIS CIVIL ACTION PRO HAC VICE UNDER LOCAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 83.5.2(b) IS GRANTED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 3/28/2012. 3/29/2012 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED. (ems) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
64 MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 4/10/12. 4/10/12 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 04/10/2012)
65 ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A REPLY AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REOPEN ARE GRANTED. THE CLERK OF THE COURT IS DIRECTED TO REMOVE THIS ACTION FROM THE CIVIL SUSPENSE FILE AND TO REOPEN THIS ACTION FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES. BY 5/4/12, DEFENDANT THE USA SHALL ANSWER THE AMENDED COMPLAINT. THE NEXT RULE 16 CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 5/29/12 AT 11:00 AM BY TELEPHONE. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 4/10/12. 4/10/12 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 04/10/2012)
NOTICE of Docketing Record on Appeal from USCA re 53 Notice of Appeal filed by JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5. USCA Case Number 11−4292 (mc, ) (Entered: 04/10/2012)
66 ANSWER to 22 Amended Complaint with Affirmative Defenses and Jury Demand, First CROSSCLAIM against JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA by EDWARD RICHARDS, JR, WILLIAM REHIEL.(SHOFFEL, AMANDA) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
67 ANSWER to 66 Answer to Amended Complaint, Crossclaim, 22 Amended Complaint , ANSWER to 66 Answer to Amended Complaint, Crossclaim, 22 Amended Complaint by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.(HEIDRICH, KELLY) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
68 Proposed Case Management Plan (pursuant to FRCP Rule 26(f)) by NICHOLAS GEORGE. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Govt Supplemental Report to Court)(EBADOLAHI, MITRA) (Entered: 05/17/2012)
69 ORDER THT DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S REQUEST FOR INTERLOCUTORY CERTIFICATION IS DENIED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 6/4/12. 6/5/12 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 06/05/2012)
70 First MOTION for Leave to File Amended Answer, Unopposed by Plaintiffs filed by WILLIAM REHIEL, EDWARD RICHARDS, JR. Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Amended Answer with Crossclaim and Jury Demand)(SHOFFEL, AMANDA) Modified on 6/13/2012 (ahf, ). (Entered: 06/12/2012)
71 ORDER THAT THE NEXT RULE 16 CONFERENCE IS ON 8/2/2012 AT 11:30 AM BY TELEPHONE WITH COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO INITIATE THE CALL. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 6/28/12. 6/29/12 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
72 ORDER THAT DEFENDANTS' "UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS GRANTED AND DEFENDANTS' "ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH JURY DEMAND AND CROSSCLAIM" SHALL BE DEEMED FILED OF RECORD THIS DATE. SIGNED BY HONORABLE

Case: 2:10-cv-00586-MAK As of: 03/16/2015 04:01 AM EDT 11 of 13

06/28/2012 07/05/2012 07/09/2012 07/09/2012
07/25/2012
07/30/2012 08/20/2012 08/29/2012
07/17/2013 04/18/2014
04/22/2014 04/22/2014 04/25/2014

EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 6/28/12. 6/29/12 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
73 Defendant Reihl and Richards' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint with Jury Demand and Crossclaim, Certificate of Service.(mbh, ) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
74 NOTICE by JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Of Motion for Stay of Discovery Filed in Third Circuit Court of Appeals (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(HEIDRICH, KELLY) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
75 NOTICE by JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of Third Circuit Administrative Stay . Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(HEIDRICH, KELLY) Modified on 7/10/2012 (ahf, ). (Entered: 07/09/2012)
76 ORDER of USCA dated 7/9/2012 THAT THE FOREGOING EMERGENCY MOTION BY APPELLANTS TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING APPEAL IS GRANTED TEMPORARILY IN ORDER TO ALLOW A FULL PANEL OF THIS COURT THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW AND CONSIDER APPELLANTS' EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY AND ANY RESPONSE FILED BY APPELLEE; ETC.. (ems) (Entered: 07/10/2012)
77 NOTICE of Continuance of Scheduling Conference: THE RULE 16 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED FOR THURSDAY, 8/2/2012 BEFORE HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG IS CONTINUED PENDING A RULING FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY OF DISCOVERY.(kc, ) (Entered: 07/25/2012)
78 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by SEEMA SAIFEE on behalf of NICHOLAS GEORGE(SAIFEE, SEEMA) (Entered: 07/30/2012)
79 Certified Copy of Order from USCA that the foregoing motion for stay of discovery is referred to the merits panel. (lvj, ) (Entered: 08/21/2012)
80 ORDER THAT THE CLERK OF COURT MARK THIS ACTION CLOSED FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES AND PLACE THE MATTER IN THE CIVIL SUSPENSE FILE, AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE COURT SHALL RETAIN JURISDICTION; ETC.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 8/29/2012. 8/29/2012 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED. (ems) (Entered: 08/29/2012)
81 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by MITRA EBADOLAHI on behalf of NICHOLAS GEORGE(EBADOLAHI, MITRA) (Entered: 07/17/2013)
82 ORDER of USCA as to 53 Notice of Appeal filed by JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2 AND JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 4 AND JOHN DOE 5. Ordered and Adjudged by this Court that the orders of the said District Court entered 9/30/11 and 10/3/11, be and the same are hereby vacated and the matter is remanded with instructions to grant the motions to dismiss filed by the individual federal officials. (mbh, ) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
83 NOTICE of Hearing: A RULE 16 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON THURSDAY, 5/1/2014 AT 11:30 AM BEFORE HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG BY TELEPHONE, PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO INITIATE THE CALL TO CHAMBERS. 215−580−2030.(kc, ) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
84 APPLICATION FOR PRO HAC VICE OF LEE ROWLAND by NICHOLAS GEORGE. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE, PROPOSED ORDER. $40.00 FEE PAID, RECEIPT NO. 099899. (Attachments: # 1 PROPOSED ORDER)(sg, ) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
85 ORDER THAT THE APPLICATION OF LEE ROWLAND, ESQUIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONDUCT OF THIS CIVIL ACTION PRO HAC VICE UNDER LOCAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 83.5.2(b) IS GRANTED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 4/23/14. 4/28/14 ENTERED AND

Case: 2:10-cv-00586-MAK As of: 03/16/2015 04:01 AM EDT 12 of 13

04/29/2014
05/01/2014 05/01/2014 05/08/2014
05/28/2014 07/24/2014
07/25/2014 08/28/2014
08/29/2014 09/04/2014
09/04/2014 09/10/2014
09/17/2014

COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 04/28/2014)
86 AMENDED NOTICE of Hearing: THE RULE 16 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED FOR 5/1/2014 IS RESCHEDULED FOR TUESDAY, 5/6/2014 AT 11:00 AM BEFORE HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG BY TELEPHONE, PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO INITIATE THE CALL TO CHAMBERS. 215−580−2030.(kc, ) (Entered: 04/29/2014)
87 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint filed by NICHOLAS GEORGE.Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Complaint)(TACK−HOOPER, MOLLY) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
88 Memorandum of Law re 87 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint filed by NICHOLAS GEORGE. (TACK−HOOPER, MOLLY) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
89 ORDER THAT THE PARTIES ARE REFERRED TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARACAPPA FOR A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WILL BE DEFERRED PENDING CONCLUSION OF THE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WITGH MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARACAPPA. A CONFERENCE WILL BE CONDUCTED ON 7/24/14AT 11:00 AM. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 5/7/14. 5/8/14 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
90 ORDER THAT A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 8/13/14 AT 10:00 AM. SIGNED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE LINDA K. CARACAPPA ON 5/28/14. 5/29/14 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
91 ORDER THAT THIS ACTION SHALL REMAIN IN CIVIL SUSPENSE AS NOT READY TO BE TRIED. A RULE 16 CONFERENCE WILL BE CONDUCTED ON 8/28/14 AT 11:00 AM. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 7/24/14. 7/25/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 07/25/2014)
92 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG: Telephone Conference held on 7/24/2014. (aeg, ) (Entered: 07/28/2014)
93 NOTICE of Hearing: THE RULE 16 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 28,2014 BEFORE HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG IS CONTINUED TO SEPTEMBER 4, 2014 AT 11:00 AM BY TELEPHONE, PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO INITIATE THE CALL TO CHAMBERS. 215−580−2030 (cl, ) (Entered: 08/28/2014)
94 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG: Telephone Conference held on 8/28/2014 (ems) (Entered: 08/29/2014)
95 NOTICE of Hearing:THE RULE 16 CONFERENCE INITIALLY SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 28, 2014, AND RESCHEDULED TO SEPTEMBER 4, 4014, IS CONTINUED TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2014 AT 11:00 A.M. BY TELEPHONE, BEFORE THE HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO INITIATE THE CALL TO CHAMBERS. 215−580−2030. (cl, ) (Entered: 09/04/2014)
96 Minute Entry for a Telephone Conference held on 9/4/14 before Judge Ludwig. (mbh, ) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
97 NOTICE of Hearing: THE RULE 16 CONFERENCE INITALLY SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 28, 2014, AND RESCHEDULED TO SEPTEMBER 4, 2014 IS CONTINUED TO SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 AT 11:00 AM BY TELEPHONE, PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO INITIATE THE CALL TO CHAMBERS. BEFORE HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG.(cl, ) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
98 ORDER THAT THE RULE 16 CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 9/18/14 AT 11:00 AM IS CANCELLED. A CONFERENCE WILL BE CONDUCTED ON 10/17/14 AT 11:30 AM BY TELEPHONE.SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 9/17/14. 9/17/14 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Main Document 98 replaced on 9/17/2014) (mbh, ). (Main Document 98 replaced on 9/18/2014) (mbh, ). (Entered: 09/17/2014)

Case: 2:10-cv-00586-MAK As of: 03/16/2015 04:01 AM EDT 13 of 13

09/18/2014 10/06/2014
10/30/2014 10/30/2014 10/31/2014 01/21/2015
01/22/2015

99 ORDER THAT A RULE 16 CONFERENCE WILL BE CONDUCTED ON 10/16/2014 AT 11:30 AM. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 9/18/14. 9/18/14 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
100 NOTICE of Hearing:THE RULE 16 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 16, 2014 IS CONTINUED TO OCTOBER 30,2014 AT 11:00 AM BY TELEPHONE, PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO INITIATE THE CALL TO CHAMBERS.BEFORE HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG.(cl, ) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
101 Minute Entry for Telephone Conference held on 10/30/14 before Judge Ludwig. (mbh, ) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
102 ORDER THAT THE CLERK OF COURT TRANSFER SAID CASE FROM THE CIVIL SUSPENSE FILE TO THE CURRENT DOCKET FOR FINAL DISPOSITION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 10/30/14. 10/31/14 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
103 ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE 41.1(b). SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG ON 10/31/14. 10/31/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED, E−MAILED AND FAXED.(db, ) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
104 ORDER THAT THIS CASE IS REASSIGNED FROM THE CALENDAR OF THE HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG TO THE CALENDAR OF THE HONORABLE MARK A. KEARNEY. SIGNED BY MICHAEL E. KUNZ ON 1/21/15. 1/21/15 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 01/21/2015)
105 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS ARE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. DEFENDANT CITY OF PHILADELPHIA'S CROSS−CLAIM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IS DIMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARK A. KEARNEY ON 1/21/15. 1/23/15 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered: 01/23/2015)

 
 George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)

738 F.3d 562 United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit. Nicholas GEORGE
v. William REHIEL, Philadelphia Police Officer, in
his Individual Capacity; Edward Richards, Philadelphia Police Officer, in his Individual Capacity; John Doe 1, John Doe 2 and John Doe 3,
Employees of the Transportation Security Administration, in their Individual Capacities; John Doe 4 and John Doe 5, Philadelphia Police
Department Detectives, in their Individual Capacities; United States of America John Does
1–5, Appellants.
No. 11–4292. | Argued: Oct. 5, 2012. | Filed: Dec. 24, 2013.
Synopsis Background: Airline passenger brought action against five federal agents, three of whom were employed by Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and two of whom were employed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), alleging under Bivens that agents violated his Fourth and First Amendment rights during course of airport screening. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Edmund V. Ludwig, J., denied agents’ motion to dismiss for failure to state claim. Agents appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, McKee, Chief Judge, held that:
[1] District Court’s order denying motion to dismiss would be regarded as appealable collateral order;
[2] TSA agents’ brief detention of passenger did not violate Fourth Amendment;
[3] FBI agents did not violate passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights;
[4] TSA agents were not subject to liability for passenger’s allegedly unconstitutional arrest and detention by local police; and
[5] agents were entitled to qualified immunity from First

Amendment retaliation claim.
Vacated and remanded with instructions.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*566 Mark B. Stern, Esq., Douglas N. Letter, Esq., Sharon Swingle, Esq. (Argued), Attorneys, Appellate Staff, Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Appellants.
Zachary Katznelson, Esq. (Argued), Mitra Ebadolahi, Esq., Benjamin E. Wizner, Esq., Lee B. Rowland, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY, Mary Catherine Roper, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, of Pennsylvania, David Rudovsky, Esq., Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing & Feinberg, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Attorneys for Appellee.
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.
Opinion

OPINION

McKEE, Chief Judge.
This appeal arises from a suit against five Federal Officials, three of whom were employed by the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”)1, and two of whom were employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and who were assigned to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”).2 They appeal the district court’s denial of their Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motions in which they asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity against Nicholas George’s claims that they violated his Fourth and First Amendment rights during the course of an airport screening at the Philadelphia International Airport.3 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the federal defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and will reverse the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss.

1

John Does 1 and 2 and Jane Doe 3.

2

John Does 4 and 5.

1

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)

3

Pursuant to a stipulated protective order entered in the

district court, the three TSA employees named as

individual defendants were named as John Does 1–2

and Jane Doe 3, and were identified under seal. The

two individual defendants alleged in the complaint to

be “detectives of the Philadelphia Police Department,”

were identified in preliminary discovery to be FBI

Agents with the JTTF. Those two individual defendants

have been designated John Does 4–5 pursuant to the

stipulated protective order.

*567 I. FACTS
[1] According to the allegations in his amended complaint,4 on August 29, 2009, Nicholas George, a 21–year old citizen of the United States, was scheduled to fly from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to California to begin his senior year at Pomona College. George claims that after he arrived at the Philadelphia International Airport, he was detained, interrogated, handcuffed, and then jailed, in violation of his Fourth and First Amendment rights, because he was carrying a deck of Arabic–English flashcards and a book critical of American interventionism.

4

In reviewing a denial of qualified immunity at the Rule

12(b)(6) stage of litigation, we must accept all

plaintiff’s allegations as true and draw all inferences in

his or her favor. Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438,

442 (3d Cir.2006).

When he arrived at the Airport, George presented his boarding pass and showed TSA Officials valid identification. He was then asked about the contents of his carry-on bag, and he told a TSA screening Official that it contained two stereo speakers. He was asked to remove them so that they could be separately screened by x-ray. After George walked through the screening device, a TSA Official told him to enter a glass-enclosed area for additional screening. George did so and another TSA Official (“John Doe 1”) told him to empty his pockets. George complied and handed over a set of approximately 80 handwritten Arabic–English flashcards.
George contends that the flash cards included words commonly used in contemporary Middle Eastern publications and electronic media. He claims that he had them because he was trying to become sufficiently proficient in Arabic to be able to read and understand

discussions in contemporary Middle Eastern media. The flashcards included every day words and phrases such as “day before yesterday,” “fat,” “thin,” “really,” “nice,” “sad,” “cheap,” “summer,” “pink,” and “friendly.” However, they also contained such words as: “bomb,” “terrorist,” “explosion,” “attack,” “battle,” “kill,” “to target,” “to kidnap,” and “to wound.”
George had a double major in Physics and Middle Eastern Studies and had traveled to Jordan to study Arabic as part of a study abroad program organized by the Council on International Educational Exchange.5 He acknowledges that after completing his program—for which he received course credit at Pomona College—he spent approximately five weeks traveling in Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. He travelled there as a tourist and to practice his Arabic.6

5

The Council is a non-profit U.S. organization founded

in 1947.

6

It does not appear that George was questioned about his

travels by the TSA Officials.

After seeing the flashcards, John Doe 1 took George to another screening area where Doe 1 and a second TSA screener (“John Doe 2”) swabbed George’s cell phone for explosives, and searched his carry-on items. Either John Doe 1 or John Doe 2 then telephoned a supervisor, Jane Doe 3, and she arrived at the screening area within 30 minutes.
George claims that upon her arrival, Jane Doe 3 subjected him to aggressive interrogation and detained him for an additional 15 minutes. When asked about his flashcards, George explained that he was using them to learn Arabic vocabulary. He submits that the interrogation included the following exchange:
Jane Doe 3: You know who did 9/11?
George: Osama bin Laden.
Jane Doe 3: Do you know what language he spoke?
*568 George: Arabic.
Jane Doe 3: Do you see why these cards are suspicious?
Jane Doe 3 also commented about one of his books entitled, “Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions.” The book was critical of
2

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)
United States foreign policy. However, in responding to Jane Doe 3’s questioning, George insists that he made no threatening statements, and that he neither said nor did anything that would lead a reasonable government official to regard him as a threat.
As Jane Doe 3 was in mid-sentence questioning George, William Rehiel, a Philadelphia Police Officer, arrived at the airport screening area. Rehiel immediately handcuffed George and led him through the Terminal and down a set of stairs to the Airport Police Station in the plain sight of other passengers. Upon arriving there, he was locked in a cell for more than 4 hours. He remained in handcuffs for the first two hours of that detention.
Philadelphia Police held George for further questioning by two FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”) Officials, “John Doe 4” and “John Doe 5.” However, no Philadelphia Police officers questioned him or took any meaningful steps to investigate whatever suspicions they may have had while he was confined. Furthermore, no one told George why he was being held. Rather, the Philadelphia Police called the JTTF Officials for them to evaluate whether he was a threat.
When the JTTF Officials finally arrived, they searched his carry-on belongings, and then escorted him out of his cell to a room where they interrogated him for 30 minutes. They questioned him about his personal and religious beliefs, travel, educational background, and political and social associations, e.g., whether he was a member of “pro-Islamic” or “communist” groups on campus, or whether he met anyone during his travels who was overtly against the U.S. government.
After about 30 minutes of questioning, the JTTF Officials told George that the Philadelphia Police called them to evaluate whether he was a real threat, that they (the JTTF Officials) had concluded that he was not a threat, and that he was free to leave. Thus, more than five hours after his ordeal began, he was released from custody. George claims that he was not free to leave at any time before the JTTF Officials allowed him to go, and he was not advised of his rights, allowed to make a phone call or contact an attorney before then.
The following day, George returned to the airport and boarded a flight that took him to his destination without further incident.
II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

[2] George filed a complaint and an amended complaint in the district court asserting a Bivens ‘ action against the three TSA Officials and the two JTTF Officials.7,8 The amended complaint alleges *569 that the individual Federal Officials subjected him to an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and that they detained him in retaliation for his possession of Arabic-language flashcards and the content of a book he was carrying, in violation of his First Amendment rights.

7

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed.

Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29

L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), the Supreme Court held that

federal officers who acted under color of law were

liable for damages caused by their violations of a

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Pursuant to

Bivens, “a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a

constitutionally protected interest could invoke the

general federal-question jurisdiction of the district

courts to obtain an award of money damages against

the responsible federal official.” Butz v. Economou, 438

U.S. 478, 504, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978).

8

George also asserted claims against the United States

under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §

1346(b)(1), and against two Philadelphia Police

officers, Rehiel and Edward Richards, who George

alleges was the duty sergeant for at least part of the

time he was detained by the Philadelphia Police, under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, those claims are not before

us in this appeal.

As we noted at the outset, the TSA and JTTF Officials filed motions to dismiss the Bivens ‘ claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). They argued that George’s allegations did not establish a constitutional violation, and that even if he had adequately pled such a violation, they were entitled to qualified immunity because the underlying constitutional rights were not so clearly established at the time of his detention to deprive them of that defense.
The district court denied the motions to dismiss explaining that “the amended complaint alleges claims for relief that are ‘plausible on [their] face.’ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).” The individual Federal Officials filed an appeal from the denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motions and an unopposed motion for clarification in which they asked the district court to confirm its intent to reject their assertion of
3

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)
qualified immunity.
In response, the district court further explained that the amended complaint “contains sufficient factual allegations of specific conduct on the part of each defendant that, if true, constitute violations of plaintiff’s First and Fourth Amendment rights.” The Court further explained:
The procedures employed by the defendants, as alleged here, do not appear to have been minimally designed to protect plaintiff’s personal privacy and individual liberty rights. The TSA’s statutory and regulatory authority appears to have been exhausted after the first 10–15 minutes, once plaintiff was found to possess nothing that would endanger airline safety. Moreover, an investigatory detention and arrest are constitutional only if supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause of a specific crime. Here, the amended complaint does not provide a reasonable inference of individualized suspicion or probable cause for the prolonged detention and arrest of plaintiff.
If the facts alleged are true, the TSA’s seizure of plaintiff amounted to an investigatory detention, which escalated to an arrest when the [Philadelphia Police Department] handcuffed and locked him in a cell at the direction of the TSA and JTTF. Accordingly, the amended complaint adequately alleges that each individual defendant participated in subjecting plaintiff to an intrusion upon his personal freedom for more than five hours. There were no grounds for reasonable suspicion of any criminality or probable cause. Early on, it was determined that he posed no threat to airline safety.
Joint Appendix (JA) 84–85 (citations omitted).
The court explained its refusal to dismiss George’s First Amendment claim as follows:
The amended complaint also plausibly sets forth a First Amendment violation. Except for certain narrow categories, “all speech is protected by the First Amendment.” The “right to receive information and ideas” is also well-established. To proceed on the retaliation claim, plaintiff must plead “(1) that he *570 engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the government responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the retaliation.”
The factual matter contained in the amended complaint suggests that the entirety of plaintiff’s airport experience may fairly be attributable to his possession of materials protected by the First Amendment.

Plaintiff was “jailed for several hours ... solely because he passed through an airport screening checkpoint with a set of Arabic–English flashcards and a book critical of American foreign policy.” Am. Compl. ¶ 1. TSA screeners inspected the flashcards and one screener “flipped through the pages of books that Mr. George had” and the other screener discussed the flashcards with their supervisor, Id. ¶¶ 27–29. The TSA supervisor questioned plaintiff because the flashcards were “suspicious.” Id. ¶¶ 37–39. “After noticing the book, the TSA supervisor continued her hostile and aggressive questioning....” Id. ¶¶ 36–37. The amended complaint adequately alleges that each defendant violated plaintiff’s right to read, study and possess protected materials by arresting and detaining him for his exercise of those rights.
JA 86 (certain citations omitted).
The court also explained that the individual Federal Officials’ assertion of qualified immunity, “may be clarified by discovery.” JA 87.
The Federal Officials then filed this appeal from the district courts’ October 28, 2011, Order.9

9

We treated this as an Amended Notice of Appeal.

III. APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Before addressing the merits, we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 83, 88 n. 5 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958–59 (3d Cir.1997)) (We “have an ‘independent responsibility to examine our own jurisdiction sua sponte.’ ”).10

10

The Clerk of this Court initially entered an order stating

that the appeal was not taken from a final order and

asking the parties to address this Court’s jurisdiction.

Following the parties’ response to that Order, the Clerk

referred the jurisdictional issue to this merits panel.

The district court denied the individual Federal Officials’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, “because the amended complaint alleges claims for relief that are ‘plausible on [their] face.’ ” Apparently unsure about whether the district court was rejecting the defendant’s assertion of
4

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)

qualified immunity, the individual Federal Officials filed an unopposed motion for clarification.

In response to the motion, the district court stated that George’s amended complaint “contains sufficient factual allegations of specific conduct on the part of each defendant that, if true, constitute violations of plaintiff’s First and Fourth Amendment rights.” The court also concluded that the individual federal defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity “may be clarified by discovery.”

After a review of the parties’ initial submissions and their briefs, it is clear that we have jurisdiction over this appeal.
[3] “Ordinarily we do not have jurisdiction to review district court orders denying motions to dismiss ... because there is no final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 605 (3d Cir.1994) (citation omitted). However, in *571 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672–675, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court held that a district court order denying a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity is appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
[4] Here, however, the district court did not specifically engage in the traditional qualified immunity analysis before denying the individual federal defendants’ motions to dismiss. Rather, as noted, in its order addressing the individual federal defendants’ motion for clarification, it simply said the “defense of qualified immunity in this case may be clarified by discovery.” However, in that same order the district court held that the amended complaint stated a valid claim against each federal defendant for violation of the First and Fourth Amendments. Thus, because the district court held that the amended complaint sufficiently pled valid constitutional claims against the individual federal defendants, the practical effect of the district court’s order was a denial of the defense of qualified immunity. Accordingly, we will regard that order as an appealable collateral order.

Where the district court bases its

refusal

to

grant

a

qualified-immunity motion on the

premise that the court is unable, ...

or prefers not to, determine the

motion without discovery ..., that

refusal constitutes at least an

implicit decision that the complaint

alleges a constitutional claim on

which relief can be granted. That

purely legal decision does not turn

on whether the plaintiff can in fact elicit any evidence to support his allegations; it thus possesses the requisite finality for immediate appealability under the collateral order doctrine.... A district court’s perceived need for discovery does not impede immediate appellate review of the legal questions of whether there is a constitutional right at all and, if so, whether it was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct, for until these threshold immunity questions are resolved, discovery should not be allowed.
X–Men Security, Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 66 (2d Cir.1999) (citations, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
[5] [6] The Supreme Court has repeatedly “stressed the importance of resolving [qualified] immunity questions at the earliest possible stage of the litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991). Thus, district courts should move “expeditiously to weed out suits ... without requiring a defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity to engage in expensive and time-consuming preparation to defend the suit on the merits.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). Qualified immunity is not merely a defense, but also “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Accordingly, “any claim of qualified immunity must be resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation.” Miller v. Clinton County, 544 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir.2008).
[7] “We exercise de novo review of a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds as it involves a pure question of law.” James v. City of Wilkes–Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir.2012) (citation omitted). In reviewing a denial of qualified immunity at the 12(b)(6) stage of litigation, we must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true and draw all inferences in his or her favor. Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 442 (3d Cir.2006).
IV. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE.
[8] [9] [10] Qualified immunity shields government officials
5

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)
from personal liability for *572 civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The doctrine is intended “to mitigate the social costs of exposing government officials to personal liability,” Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 610, 613 (D.C.Cir.1998), by giving officials “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Ashcroft v. Al–Kidd, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). Properly applied, it protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)).
[11] [12] Determining whether a right alleged to have been violated is so clearly established that any reasonable officer would have known of it “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In order for the official to lose the protections of qualified immunity, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Al–Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2083.
[13] Because a government official may only be held personally liable under Bivens “for his or her own misconduct,” the plaintiff must allege that “each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
[14] [15] Accordingly, in order to overcome the defense of qualified immunity here, George must allege facts showing that the conduct of each individual federal defendant (1) “violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Al–Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2080. However, we need not undertake our inquiry in that order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).
V. DISCUSSION
The individual Federal Officials make a number of arguments in support of their appeal. Each is discussed separately below.

A. George’s factual allegations do not establish that any individual
Federal Official violated his clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Before addressing the merits of this argument, it is first necessary to consider airport security screenings in context with the Fourth Amendment’s limitations on governmental searches. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
In United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir.2006), we held that a warrantless airport security screening of a passenger and his baggage without individualized suspicion is tantamount to a permissible administrative search under the Fourth Amendment. There, Hartwell arrived at the Philadelphia International Airport intending to catch a flight to Phoenix, Arizona. He placed his carry-on luggage on *573 the conveyor belt to be x-rayed, and approached a metal detector. His luggage was scanned without incident, but he set off the magnetometer when he walked through it. A TSA Officer took Hartwell aside after he passed through the metal detector a second time. The TSA Officer then used a magnetic wand to determine why Hartwell had triggered the metal detector. The wand revealed a solid object in Hartwell’s pocket and the TSA Officer asked to see it. Ultimately, the TSA Officers discovered that the object was crack cocaine, and Hartwell was arrested by the police.
In his appeal following a conditional guilty plea,11 Hartwell argued that the drugs should have been suppressed because the search violated the Fourth Amendment. We disagreed and held that the search “was permissible under the administrative search doctrine.” 436 F.3d at 177 (quoting United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir.2005)) (“Airport screenings of passengers and their baggage constitute administrative searches and are subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment.”).
6

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)

11

Hartwell reserved his right to appeal the denial of his

suppression motion in his plea agreement.

[16] [17] We began our analysis in Hartwell by observing that the Fourth Amendment “limits government action in two ways. First, it requires that searches and seizures be reasonable, and, second, it states that when a warrant is required—in circumstances that are not explicitly defined by the text—it must have certain characteristics.” Id. (citation omitted). We then noted that the Supreme Court has “read the Amendment’s twin commands in tandem, holding that when people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their persons or effects, all searches and seizures must be supported by a warrant, unless they fall into one of the exceptions to that requirement.” Id. (citation omitted). The “first step in Fourth Amendment analysis is [identifying] whether a search or seizure has taken place.” Id. However, the government conceded that “an airport pre-boarding security screening is a search,” id. It was therefore not disputed that Hartwell had “experienced a single, warrantless search, which was initiated without individualized suspicion” and “was not conducted pursuant to a warrant.” Id. at 178. Thus, in order to survive a Fourth Amendment challenge, “the search must [have been] grounded in an exception to the warrant requirement.” Id.
In concluding that “Hartwell’s search at the airport check-point was justified by the administrative search doctrine,” id., we first explained that:

A search or seizure is ordinarily

unreasonable in the absence of

individualized suspicion of

wrongdoing. While suspicion is not

an “irreducible” component of

reasonableness, the Supreme Court

has recognized only limited

circumstances in which the usual

rule does not apply. These

circumstances typically involve

administrative searches of “closely

regulated” businesses, other

so-called “special needs” cases, and

suspicionless

“checkpoint”

searches.

Id. (citation, brackets, footnotes and certain internal quotation marks omitted).12 We then noted that:

12

In Hartwell, we noted that the Supreme Court has not

directly addressed the issue of airport administrative searches, but that it has discussed them in dicta in two cases. 436 F.3d at 178 n. 5 (citing cases).
Suspicionless checkpoint searches are permissible under the Fourth Amendment when a court finds a favorable balance between “the gravity of the public *574 concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427, 124 S.Ct. 885, 157 L.Ed.2d 843 (2004) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)). Id. at 178–789 (footnote omitted). [18] [19] Turning to the specifics of Hartwell’s search, we held that “the airport checkpoint passes the Brown [v. Texas, supra ] test.” Id. at 179. In doing so we noted the following considerations. First, “there can be no doubt that preventing terrorist attacks on airplanes is of paramount importance.” Id. (citations omitted). Second, “airport checkpoints also advance the public interest” because “absent a search, there is no effective means of detecting which airline passengers are reasonably likely to hijack an airplane.” Id. at 179–80 (citations and brackets omitted). Third, “the procedures involved in Hartwell’s search were minimally invasive.” Id. at 180 (footnote omitted).
They were well-tailored to protect personal privacy, escalating in invasiveness only after a lower level of screening disclosed a reason to conduct a more probing search. The search began when Hartwell simply passed through a magnetometer and had his bag x-rayed, two screenings that involved no physical touching. Only after Hartwell set off the metal detector was he screened with a wand—yet another less intrusive substitute for a physical pat-down. And only after the wand detected something solid on his person, and after repeated requests that he produce the item, did the TSA agents (according to Hartwell) reach into his pocket.
In addition to being tailored to protect personal privacy, other factors make airport screening procedures minimally intrusive in comparison to other kinds of searches. Since every passenger is subjected to a search, there is virtually no stigma attached to being subjected to a search at a known, designated airport search point. Moreover, the possibility for abuse is minimized by the public nature of the search. Unlike searches conducted on dark and lonely streets at night where often the officer and the subject are the only witnesses, these searches are made under supervision
7

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)

and not far from the scrutiny of the traveling public. And the airlines themselves have a strong interest in protecting passengers from unnecessary annoyance and harassment. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he entire procedure is rendered less offensive—if not less intrusive—because air passengers are on notice that they will be searched.” Id.

Air passengers choose to fly, and screening procedures of this kind have existed in this country since at least 1974. The events of September 11, 2001, have only increased their prominence in the public’s consciousness. It is inconceivable that Hartwell was unaware that he had to be searched before he could board a plane. Indeed, he admitted that he had previously been searched before flying.

Id. at 181 (citations omitted).

Based on these considerations, we concluded:

Hartwell’s search does not offend

the Fourth Amendment even

though it was initiated without

individualized suspicion and was

conducted without a warrant. It is

permissible

under

the

administrative search doctrine

because the State has an

overwhelming interest in

preserving air travel safety, and the

procedure is tailored to advance

that interest *575 while proving to

be only minimally invasive....

Id. (footnote omitted).

Because we held that a search pursuant to routine airport screening was constitutionally permissible under the administrative search doctrine, we found it unnecessary to address issues concerning consent-based rationales for airport searches. 436 F.3d at 181 n. 11. However, we note that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, has held that the constitutionality of an airport screening search does not depend on the passenger’s purported consent. In United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir.2007), the court held:

The constitutionality of an airport

screening search, however, does

not depend on consent, and

requiring that a potential passenger

be allowed to revoke consent to an

ongoing airport security search

makes little sense in a post–9/11

world. Such a rule would afford

terrorists multiple opportunities to

attempt to penetrate airport security

by electing not to fly on the cusp of

detection until a vulnerable portal

is found. This rule would also

allow terrorists a low-cost method

of

detecting

systematic

vulnerabilities in airport security,

knowledge that would be extremely

valuable in planning future attacks.

Likewise, given that consent is not

required, it makes little sense to

predicate the reasonableness of an

administrative airport screening

search on an irrevocable implied

consent theory. Rather, where an

airport screening search is

otherwise reasonable and

conducted pursuant to statutory

authority ... all that is required is

the passenger’s election to attempt

entry into the secured area. Under

current TSA regulations and

procedures, that election occurs

when a prospective passenger

walks through the magnetometer or

places items on the conveyor belt

of the x-ray machine.

497 F.3d at 961 (citations and footnote omitted).

With this background as our analytical compass, we examine the merits of the individual Federal Officials’ Fourth Amendment argument.

1. George’s factual allegations do not establish a Fourth Amendment violation.
(a). The TSA Officials—John Does 1–2 and Jane Doe 3. The TSA Officials—John Does 1 and 2, and Jane Doe 3—submit that George’s factual allegations do not establish that they violated a Fourth Amendment right. We agree.
8

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)

[20] George alleges that the two TSA screening Officials, John Does 1 and 2, inspected his Arabic–English flashcards, searched his carry-on bag, swabbed his cell phone for explosives, and that one of them contacted their supervisor for assistance. John Does 1 and 2 kept him in the side screening area for 30 minutes. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 27–30. George was not handcuffed while detained in the screening area. Then, the TSA Supervisor, Jane Doe 3, arrived, and was informed about the Arabic–English flashcards. She responded by further questioning George for about 15 minutes. Amended Compl. ¶¶ 33–40. During that questioning, while Jane Doe 3 was in mid-sentence, a Philadelphia Police Officer, William Rehiel, arrived at the scene, handcuffed George and took him to the Airport Police Station. Amended Compl. ¶¶ 42–45.
In his Memorandum in Opposition to the United States’ Motion to dismiss,13 George *576 conceded that the search conducted by the two TSA screening Officials who searched his person and baggage “began properly” and that they acted lawfully in “conduct[ing] a thorough search of his carry-on items for weapons and explosives.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to United States’ Motion to Dismiss at 2–3. However, in the district court George argued that once this search failed to discover any explosives or other hazardous weapons, John Does 1 and 2 had to release him and their failure to do so, and to instead contact their supervisor (Jane Doe 3), violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

13

As we have noted, see n. 8, supra, George asserted

claims against the United States under the Federal Tort

Claims Act. However, as also noted, those claims are

not before us in this appeal.

The district court agreed, opining that the TSA screeners’ authority to search and question George “appears to have been exhausted after the first 10–15 minutes, once plaintiff was found to possess nothing that would endanger airline safety.” JA 84. The district court then held:
[A]n investigatory detention and arrest are constitutional only if supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause of a specific crime. Here, the amended complaint does not provide a reasonable inference of individualized suspicion or probable cause for the prolonged detention and arrest of plaintiff.... If the facts alleged are true, the TSA’s

seizure of plaintiff amounted to an investigatory detention and arrest of plaintiff.
JA 84–85 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480 (3d Cir.1995)). We disagree.
In Terry, the Supreme Court announced the general standards for a limited search pursuant to a brief investigative detention, and in Orsatti, we recited the general standards governing an arrest. Although neither case is definitive in the context of the Fourth Amendment parameters within which TSA officials can detain, search and question passengers at an airport security checkpoint, we did examine those limitations in United States v. Hartwell, supra.
As discussed above, we there held that airport security screening of a passenger and his/her baggage without a warrant or individualized suspicion is permissible under the Fourth Amendment as an administrative search. In Hartwell, we upheld an airport screening search that involved an escalating level of scrutiny and intrusion where “a lower level of scrutiny disclosed a reason to conduct a more probing search.” 436 F.3d at 180.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also upheld an airport security search involving increased levels of screening. In United States v. Aukai, supra, Aukai arrived at the Honolulu International Airport to take a flight from Honolulu, Hawaii, to Kona, Hawaii. He checked in at the ticket counter but did not produce a government-issued ID. Accordingly, the ticket agent wrote “No ID” on Aukai’s boarding pass.
Aukai then went to the security checkpoint, where signs advised prospective passengers that they and their baggage were subject to search. He entered the security checkpoint, placed his shoes and other items into a plastic bin and voluntarily walked through the magnetometer. The magnetometer did not signal the presence of metal as he walked through it, and nothing in his personal belongings triggered an alarm. After he walked through the magnetometer, Aukai presented his boarding pass to a TSA officer.
Pursuant to TSA procedures, a passenger who presents a boarding pass with “No ID” written on it is subject to secondary screening even though s/he has passed through the initial screening without triggering an alarm or otherwise raising suspicion. Pursuant to that policy, a TSA official passed a hand-held magnetometer or wand around Aukai’s body and an item in *577 his pocket
9

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)
triggered an alarm. Aukai repeatedly refused to produce the item and tried to leave. When a TSA supervisor told Aukai to empty his pocket, he again refused. The TSA supervisor then touched the outside of Aukai’s pocket and concluded that Aukai had something in his pocket. Aukai eventually removed an object wrapped in tissue paper from his pocket and placed it in the tray in front of him. Fearing that the item may be a weapon, the TSA supervisor summoned a nearby police officer. The TSA supervisor then unwrapped the object and discovered a glass pipe used to smoke methamphetamine. The police officer arrested Aukai and, after a search, discovered several bags of methamphetamine. Aukai was eventually taken into federal custody and admitted to illegal possession of methamphetamine after being advised of his Miranda rights.
Aukai was indicted for knowingly and intentionally possessing, with intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). He eventually entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence that was seized pursuant to the airport search and his subsequent statement.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that it had previously held that airport screening searches are constitutionally permissible administrative searches under the Fourth Amendment. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 959–60 (citing cases). It then held, citing to our decision in Hartwell, that the search procedures to which Aukai was subjected were constitutionally permissible because they were “minimally intrusive.” Id. at 962 (citing Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180). The court of appeals also concluded that the “duration of the detention associated with his airport screening”—eighteen minutes—was “reasonable.” Id. at 962–963. For all of these reasons, the court held that “the airport screening search of Aukai was a constitutionally reasonable administrative search.” Id. at 963.
We believe that the conduct of the TSA Officials here was also consistent with Fourth Amendment limitations. It is not disputed that the initial airport screening to which George was subjected by the TSA Officials was a constitutionally permissible administrative search under the Fourth Amendment, even though it was initiated without individualized suspicion and was conducted without a warrant. It was not until after the TSA Officials discovered that he was carrying some handwritten Arabic–English flashcards containing such words as “bomb,” “terrorist,” “explosion,” “an attack,” “battle,” “to kill,” “to target,” “to kidnap,” and “to wound,” that George was taken by John Does 1 and 2 to another screening area where he was eventually questioned by

Jane Doe 3. However, at that point, the Officials had a justifiable suspicion that permitted further investigation as long as the brief detention required to conduct that investigation was reasonable. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868.14

14

In Terry, the Court reasoned: “there is no ready test for

determining reasonableness other than by balancing the

need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the

search [or seizure entails]” (internal quotation marks

omitted, brackets in original).

We caution, however, that the detention at the hands of these TSA Officials is at the outer boundary of the Fourth Amendment. Once TSA Officials were satisfied that George was not armed or carrying explosives, much of the concern that justified his detention dissipated. However, it did not totally vanish or suggest that further inquiry was not warranted. Suspicion remained, and that suspicion was objectively reasonable given the realities and *578 perils of air passenger safety. The TSA Officials still were confronted with an individual who was carrying Arabic–English flashcards bearing such words as: “bomb,” “terrorist,” “to kill,” etc. In a world where air passenger safety must contend with such nuanced threats as attempts to convert underwear into bombs and shoes into incendiary devices, we think that the brief detention that followed the initial administrative search of George was reasonable.
[21] Nevertheless, it is important to note that harboring views that appear to be hostile to the United States government or its foreign policy is most assuredly not, by itself, grounds for detaining someone and investigating them pursuant to the administrative search doctrine or an investigative seizure under Terry. However, it is simply not reasonable to require TSA Officials to turn a blind eye to someone trying to board an airplane carrying Arabic–English flashcards with words such as “bomb,” “to kill,” etc. Rather, basic common sense would allow those Officials to take reasonable and minimally intrusive steps to inquire into the potential passenger’s motivations.
Thus, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for John Does 1 and 2 to briefly continue George’s seizure to consult with a supervisor. As noted above, 15 minutes after the supervisor (Jane Doe 3) arrived, and while she was in mid-sentence of a conversation with George, Officer Rehiel of the Philadelphia Police Department arrived, placed George in handcuffs and took him away. At that point, the rather brief detention that arose from the initial administrative search ended. As we explain below, despite George’s failed attempt at establishing an agency
10

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)

relationship, none of the TSA Officials played any further role in the protracted seizure that followed.
[22] Thus, the actions of the TSA Officials corresponded to the level of concern raised by the flashcards.15 As we have already observed, an airport security search may become more invasive when “a lower level of screening disclose[s] a reason to conduct a more probing search.” Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180. Indeed, we think that these TSA Officials would have been derelict in their duties had they simply ignored the flashcards.16

15

Admittedly, some of the Arabic–English flashcards also

contained harmless, everyday words. However, we do

not think that the presence of the flashcards containing

innocuous words mitigates the presence of the cards

containing threatening and violent words. We

appreciate that George was studying Arabic and

claimed to have these items to advance his study of

Arabic language, culture stories in Arabic media and

literature. The TSA Officials did not have to accept that

explanation and allow him to board an airplane without

any further inquiry. Rather, it was reasonable for them

to make additional inquiries and to consult with a

supervisor.

16

We reiterate however, that this does not mean that John

Does 1 and 2 could have subjected George to a lengthy

detention based merely on the suspicions that arose

from the words on the flashcards. Nevertheless, we

cannot hold that continuing to detain George for

approximately 30 minutes under the circumstances here

was so unreasonable that it violated the limitations that

must surround administrative searches.

Moreover, George’s allegation that “he was not free to leave and believed that he was not free to leave” the screening area during the interrogation, Amended Compl. ¶ 41, does not establish that TSA Officials violated the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, in Hartwell, we flatly rejected the contention that a passenger has a right to leave an airport security checkpoint once the TSA officials increase the level of their screening scrutiny. We wrote:
Hartwell argues that once the TSA agents identified the object in his pocket and he refused to reveal it, he should *579 have had the right to leave rather than empty his pockets. We reject this theory.... [A] right to leave once screening procedures begin would constitute

a one-way street for the benefit of a party planning airport mischief, and would encourage airline terrorism by providing a secure exit where detection was threatened.

436 F.3d at 181 n. 12 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Airport screening is obviously informed by unique concerns and risks. Accordingly, we are reluctant to attach the same weight to the inability to leave that that may have in a different context.
We therefore do not agree with George’s contention that once John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 completed their administrative search for weapons and explosives (within ten to fifteen minutes, Amended Compl. ¶¶ 27–28), without finding weapons or explosives, they had reached the parameters of a legitimate administrative search.
Under the circumstances alleged here, the Fourth Amendment was not violated by continuing this investigation even though John Does 1 and 2 found no weapons or explosives on George’s person or luggage. Items other than weapons or explosives can give a TSA Screening Official reason to increase the level of scrutiny when circumstances suggest that it is reasonable to conduct a more probing investigation. This does not, of course, give TSA screeners license to detain and inquire based on a mere hunch, and we certainly do not suggest that TSA screeners have a license to detain purportedly suspicious travelers for a protracted amount time. But that is not what happened here.17

17

We similarly caution against detaining someone solely

because of their nationality and/or choice of reading

material. However, we reiterate that that is not what

happened here.

Given the circumstances here, it was reasonable for the TSA Screening Officials to increase the level of scrutiny by briefly detaining George so that he could be further questioned in an effort to ascertain whether he posed a risk to passengers or airplane security. After the justifiable administrative search conducted by the TSA Officials, George was detained by Philadelphia Police who are not part of this appeal.
For all of the above reasons, we find that George has failed to allege facts showing that the TSA Screening Officials—John Does 1 and 2 and Jane Doe 3—violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We therefore need not proceed to the second step of the qualified immunity analysis to determine whether that right was clearly
11

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)
established at the time of the challenged conduct. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
Accordingly, the TSA Screening Officials are entitled to qualified immunity on George’s Fourth Amendment claim, and we will vacate the district court’s order denying their motion to dismiss and remand with directions to grant the motion.
(b). FBI Agents assigned to the JTTF—John Does 4 and 5. [23] The two FBI Agents assigned to the JTTF also argue that the factual allegations in the amended complaint do not establish that they violated a Fourth Amendment right. We agree. The essence of the allegations regarding the JTTF Agents is that they went to the Airport Police Station at the request of the Philadelphia Police in order to question George, searched George’s carry-on luggage, and questioned him for about thirty minutes before concluding that he was not a security threat and allowing him to leave. Amended Compl. ¶¶ 63–73. The district court did not explain how or why these *580 allegations stated a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
We are unable to find any authority that would support a finding that Federal Officials’ response to a call for assistance by local police and their subsequent questioning of the subject of that call for 30 minutes constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation. Moreover, George has not provided us with any authority to support his contention that his allegations are sufficient to support a claim of a Fourth Amendment violation against the JTTF Officials.
Accordingly, we again need not proceed to the second step of the qualified immunity analysis. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 377, 127 S.Ct. 1769. We hold that the JTTF Agents are entitled to qualified immunity and we will therefore vacate the district court’s order denying their motion to dismiss and remand with directions to grant the motion to dismiss.
As we have noted, George also asserted a First Amendment claim against the individual Federal Officials. However, before beginning a discussion of that claim, it is necessary to discuss the basis for George’s contention that the Federal Officials violated the Fourth Amendment by leaving him “locked in a jail cell for four hours (much of the time in handcuffs) without further investigation,” that they were “directly involved in detaining [him] and instructing the local police to prolong his seizure,” and that his “seizure escalated from an

investigatory stop to an arrest when the local police, acting on the TSA’s request, handcuffed [him], led him to the airport jail, and locked him in a cell.” George is apparently contending that the individual Federal Officials are somehow liable for his purportedly unconstitutional arrest and prolonged detention by Philadelphia Police Officers. George bases that contention on his assertion that the Federal Officials had either legal or functional control over the decisions and actions of the Philadelphia Police Officers.18 The contention is meritless.

18

As noted, see n. 8, supra, George also asserted claims

against the Philadelphia Police Officers pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. However, those claims are not before us

in this appeal, and we take no position on the propriety

of the Philadelphia Police Officers’ conduct in this

case.

The only allegations in George’s amended complaint to support this rather attenuated agency theory that the Philadelphia Police Officers were under the legal or functional control of the TSA Screening Officials are as follows:
• John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 were Transportation Security Officers of the [TSA]—commonly known as “airport screeners”—at the time of the events giving rise to this action. Each was responsible for detaining Mr. George for 30 minutes at the screening area, and, upon information and belief, they summoned the TSA Supervisor known here as Jane Doe 3, as well as the Philadelphia Police Department, for further interrogation, detention and arrest of Mr. George.... Amended Compl. ¶ 5
• Jane Doe 3 was an official of the [TSA] at the time of the events giving rise to this action. Upon information and belief, Jane Doe 3 held a position that involved supervising airport screeners, including Defendants John Does 1 and 2. Jane Doe interrogated Mr. George in a hostile and aggressive manner, continued his detention, and turned him over to Defendant Rehiel to be handcuffed, arrested, jailed, and further interrogated.... Amended Compl. ¶ 6.
The amended complaint further alleges that while George was being questioned by *581 Doe 3, Officer Rehiel, arrived on the scene, handcuffed George and took him to the Airport Police Station without speaking to any of the Federal Officials. Amended Compl. ¶¶ 42–45. Finally, the amended complaint alleges that George’s “detention, arrest, unnecessary and extended restraint, incarceration, and interrogation ... by the Defendants, as described in
12

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)
[the preceding paragraphs], constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of clearly established rights under the Fourth ... Amendment[ ] to the United States Constitution.” Amended Compl. ¶ 81.
As we have noted, in reviewing a denial of qualified immunity pursuant to a denial of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), we must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true and draw all inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Torisky, 446 F.3d at 442. However, “a pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id.
George’s allegations are an attempt to construct a theory that the Philadelphia Police Officers acted under the legal or functional control of the TSA Screening Officials. This purported agency relationship is based entirely on George’s allegations that Does 1 and 2 “summoned ... the Philadelphia Police Department, for [his] further interrogation, detention and arrest,” and that Doe 3 “turned him over to [Police Officer Rehiel] to be handcuffed, arrested, jailed and further interrogated.” George attempts to further weave a tapestry of inferences culminating in a conclusion of agency by contending that an arrest is the inevitable result of summoning Police and turning someone over to them.
George cites the majority opinion in Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379 (4th Cir.2013), to support that contention. There, Tobey was scheduled to fly from Richmond, Virginia to Wisconsin to attend his grandfather’s funeral. He waited until there was a short line at the TSA screening checkpoint and then presented his boarding pass and ID to the TSA pre-screening official. Tobey also placed his belt, shoes, sweatshirt and other carry-on items on the conveyor belt. However, TSA Official Smith diverted him from the standard screening device to the Advanced Imaging Technology (“AIT”) scanning unit for enhanced screening.
Anticipating that he might be subjected to enhanced screening, Tobey had written the text of the Fourth Amendment on his chest because he believed that AIT scanning was unconstitutional.19 Before going through the AIT unit, Tobey placed his sweatpants and t-shirt on the conveyor belt, leaving him dressed only in running shorts

and socks and revealing the text of the Fourth Amendment written on his chest. Smith, the TSA Official, told Tobey that he did not need to remove his clothes. Tobey responded that he wanted to express his belief that the TSA’s advanced screening procedures violated the Fourth Amendment.

19

This does not appear to have been particularly

thoughtful, and it surely was not the least bit effective,

but it certainly was creative.

Thereupon, Smith radioed for assistance. Smith’s supervisor, Jones, told Smith to order Tobey to remain in front of *582 the AIT unit. Jones and an unknown TSA Official then asked the Richmond International Airport (“RIA”) Police for assistance. Tobey never refused to undergo the AIT screening and never declined to comply with any TSA request.
RIA Police Officers arrived on the scene and immediately handcuffed and arrested Tobey. None of the TSA Officials informed the RIA Police about what had occurred at the screening station and the RIA police never asked. A Police Officer escorted Tobey to a side area and told him he was under arrest for creating a public disturbance. An unknown TSA Official searched Tobey’s belongings and removed unidentified items. A Police Officer then collected Tobey’s belongings with the assistance of TSA Officials.
The RIA Police then took Tobey to the RIA Police Station where police officers questioned him and threatened him with various criminal sanctions. Tobey was eventually charged with the state crime of disorderly conduct in a public place. The police officers later released Tobey after consulting with an Air Marshal from the Federal Air Marshal’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, and he boarded the plane without further incident after being held for over an hour. The county attorney subsequently dropped state criminal charges.
Tobey filed a Bivens ‘ action against TSA Officials Smith and Jones and a § 1983 action against the RIA Police Officers alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, his First and Fourteenth Amendments rights, and his right to Equal Protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thereafter, Smith and Jones, the TSA Officials, moved to dismiss all of the claims, asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted the TSA Officials’ motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection claims. However, it did not dismiss Tobey’s First Amendment retaliation claim against those officials. The Court of Appeals for the
13

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)

Fourth Circuit explained the district court’s reasoning as follows:

The court held that because there is a question of whether the TSA Agents in fact radioed for assistance because of the message Plaintiff sought to convey or because of some other reasonable restriction on First Amendment activity in the security area, dismissal [of the First Amendment claims] on the basis of qualified immunity would be improper.

706 F.3d at 385 (citation, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
The TSA Officials argued that Tobey had not alleged a facially valid First Amendment claim and that, even if he had, he had not alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and so they were entitled to qualified immunity.
For our purposes, it is important to note that the majority in Tobey concluded that before it could determine if Tobey had alleged a plausible First Amendment violation, it had to “correct an erroneous conclusion reached by the district court.” 706 F.3d at 385. The majority concluded that the district court had erred “in concluding that Mr. Tobey failed to plead [that the TSA Officials] in some way caused his arrest.” Id. (citation omitted) (brackets added). The district court had concluded

that Mr. Tobey’s complaint is devoid of any facts suggesting that the [TSA Officials]—neither of whom are law enforcement officers with the power to arrest—made any such assertion or otherwise indicated to the [RIA] police that [Tobey] should be arrested.
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets added).20

20

TSA Screening Officials here remind us that they lack

the authority to make an arrest. See TSA Management

Directive 1100.88–1(A) at 2. available at

http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/foia/TSA_MD_1100_88

_1_Final_ 0070511.pdf (omitting security screening

screeners from categories of TSA employees authorized

to make arrests).

*583 Correcting what it believed to have been error, the majority stated: “[f]ortunately for Mr. Tobey, he was not required to state these precise magical words in order to plausibly plead that [the TSA Officials] caused his arrest.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The majority then concluded:
It is an undoubtedly natural consequence of reporting a person to the police that the person will be arrested; especially in the scenario we have here, where TSA and [RIA] police act in close concert. So long as Mr. Tobey’s complaint rendered it plausible that [the TSA Officials] helped effectuate his arrest, the district court should have factored the arrest into its decision as to whether Mr. Tobey alleged plausible Bivens claims against [the TSA Officials].
Id. at 386 (brackets added). Later, the majority opined: “It is reasonable to infer that whatever [the TSA Officials] told [RIA] police caused Mr. Tobey’s arrest.” Id. (brackets added).
We disagree with the Tobey majority’s conclusion that “[i]t is an undoubtedly natural consequence of reporting a person to the police that the person will be arrested.” That conclusion does not appear to have been based on anything in the record. Rather, it seems to arise from the majority’s personal assumptions and inferences. However, absent something on the record to the contrary, it seems just as likely that police officers who are summoned by TSA Officials would use their own independent discretion to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to take someone into custody.
[24] [25] Traditionally, law enforcement officers have the discretion in deciding whether to make an arrest. Burella v. City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 145 (3d Cir.2007), (citing Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005)). Police officers clearly know that they need probable cause to arrest someone and we can assume that they know they face personal liability if they arrest someone without probable cause. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also, e.g., Pritzker v. City of Hudson, 26 F.Supp.2d 433, 443 (N.D.N.Y.1998) ( “Police officers are presumed to know the law governing their conduct. Reasonable police officers would know that it is a violation of well-settled constitutional rights to arrest or prosecute someone absent probable cause.”) (citing Catone v. Spielmann, 149 F.3d
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George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)
156, 161 (2d Cir.1998)).
[26] [27] [28] Moreover, there is a distinct and constitutionally sacrosanct demarcation between the intrusion that is inherent in an investigative detention and the kind of detention that is sufficiently intrusive to rise to the level of an arrest. For example, a Terry stop is an intermediate level of intrusion allowing police to conduct a limited investigation into the possibility of criminal activity based on reasonable suspicion “even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145–46, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). Accordingly, without more than appears on this record, we reject George’s argument that the Philadelphia Police Officers were under either the legal or functional control of the TSA Screening Officials.
Furthermore, George’s allegations that the TSA Officials had either legal or functional control of the Philadelphia Police Officers cannot survive the pleading requirements established by the Court’s decision in Iqbal. Iqbal was a Pakistani *584 Muslim who, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was arrested in the United States on criminal charges and detained by Federal officials. He claimed that he was deprived of a number of constitutional protections while in Federal custody and sued a number of Federal officials, including the Attorney General and the Director of the FB1. The Attorney General and the Director of the FBI were the only Federal officials before the Court.
In his complaint, Iqbal alleged, inter alia, that the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI “ ‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]’ to harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest,’ “ that “Ashcroft was the ‘principal architect’ of this invidious policy,” and that the Director of the FBI “was ‘instrumental’ in adopting and executing it.” 556 U.S. at 680–81, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (record citations omitted). The Attorney General and the Director of the FBI moved to dismiss, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
After reviewing its prior decision in Twombly, supra, and analyzing the pleading standards contained in Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, the Court held that “[t]hese bare assertions ... amount to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a constitutional discrimination claim” and “[a]s such are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.” Id. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the relevant allegations in George’s amended complaint are simply conclusory allegations of a Fourth Amendment violation.21 After Iqbal, we can no longer assume the truth of those averments in determining whether the complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.

21

See p. 580–81, supra.

Accordingly, we reject George’s contention that the TSA Screening Officials are liable for what he alleges was his unconstitutional arrest and detention by the Philadelphia Police Officers. That contention, as we have explained, is based solely on his conclusory assertions that TSA Officials had either the legal or functional control over the decisions and actions of the Philadelphia Police Officers.
We also reject George’s claim that allegations about the two JTTF Agents show that they participated in his allegedly unlawful seizure, arrest and detention. Those allegations are summarized above.22 The JTTF Agents simply responded to a call from the Philadelphia Police, questioned George for about thirty minutes, determined that he posed no security threat, and told him he was free to leave. The JTTF Agents were not at all involved in George’s allegedly unconstitutional seizure, arrest and detention. Indeed, the two JTTF Agents were responsible for George’s release from the alleged unconstitutional detention. Even though the JTTF agents were called to investigate a potential terrorist, and despite the fact that they knew George had been detained for over four hours because of suspicions raised by his Arabic flash cards, the JTTF agents were able to determine that he posed no threat and allowed him to go on his way after spending only 30 minutes with him.

22

See p. 579, supra.

*585 B. George’s factual allegations do not establish that any individual Federal official violated his clearly established rights under the First Amendment. As noted, in his amended complaint, George alleged that the Federal Officials searched and questioned him in retaliation for his possession of the Arabic–English flashcards and a political book critical of American policy in the Middle East in violation of his First Amendment Rights.23 As also noted, the district court, in response to the Federal Officials motion for clarification, held that the amended complaint plausibly set forth a First Amendment
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George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)

retaliation claim.

23

George’s amended complaint also alleges that the

Federal Officials arrested and incarcerated him in

violation of his First Amendment rights. However, we

have already determined that the allegations in the

amended complaint are insufficient to show that the

Federal Officials somehow participated in, or were

somehow responsible for, what George alleges was his

unlawful seizure, arrest and detention by the

Philadelphia Police.

In this portion of their appeal, the Federal Officials contend that the allegations in the amended complaint do not establish that they retaliated against George for his exercise of his First Amendment rights.24

24

We are mindful of the fact that the Supreme Court has

twice in recent years noted that it has not extended

Bivens implied causes of action to First Amendment

claims. See Reichle v. Howards, –––U.S. ––––, 132

S.Ct. 2088, 2093 n. 4, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (“We

have never held that Bivens extends to First

Amendment claims.”), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)

(“Because implied causes of action are disfavored, the

Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability to

any new context or new category of defendants....

Indeed, we have declined to extend Bivens to a claim

sounding in the First Amendment. Petitioners do not

press this argument, however, so we assume, without

deciding, that respondent’s First Amendment claim is

actionable under Bivens.”). Nonetheless, despite the

cautionary notes sounded by the Court, it does appear

that the Court has held that there is a Bivens cause of

action for First Amendment retaliation claims. In

Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164

L.Ed.2d 441 (2006), the Court wrote:

Official reprisal for protected speech offends the

Constitution because it threatens to inhibit exercise

of the protected right, and the law is settled that as

a general matter the First Amendment prohibits

government officials from subjecting an individual

to retaliatory actions ... for speaking out. Some

official actions adverse to such a speaker might

well be unexceptionable if taken on other grounds,

but when nonretaliatory grounds are in fact

insufficient to provoke the adverse consequences,

we have held that retaliation is subject to recovery

as the but-for cause of official action offending the

Constitution. When the vengeful officer is federal,

he is subject to an action for damages under the

authority of Bivens.

Id. at 256, 126 S.Ct. 1695 (citations, internal

quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, we will

proceed on the assumption that there is a Bivens

cause of action for First Amendment retaliation

claims.

[29] [30] In order to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff “must prove (1) that he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the government responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the retaliation.” Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir.2004) (citations omitted). “The threshold requirement is that the plaintiff identify the protected activity that allegedly spurred the retaliation.” Id.
[31] It is beyond dispute that the First Amendment protects George’s right to possess, read and study the flashcards and the book he was carrying. Indeed, the individual Federal Officials25 readily concede *586 that an airplane passenger may read whatever he or she pleases. However, the fact that George had a First Amendment right to possess, read and study the materials he possessed does not end the inquiry.

25

The “individual Federal Officials” are the three TSA

Screening Officers and the two FBI Agents assigned to

the JTTF.

The fact that George clearly had a right to have these flash cards, does not mean that TSA Officials had to ignore their content or refrain from investigating him further because of the words they contained. The totality of circumstances here could cause a reasonable person to believe that the items George was carrying raised the possibility that he might pose a threat to airline security. That suspicion was the reason for their increased level of scrutiny during the airport screening.
The TSA Officials’ suspicion was an obvious alternative explanation for their conduct, which negates any inference of retaliation. See American Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir.2010) (“Importantly, the Court held in Iqbal, as it had in Twombly, that courts may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint ‘obvious alternative explanation[s]’, which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.”) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682, 129 S.Ct. 1937).26

26

Although it is too obvious to require citation, we

nevertheless stress that the First Amendment will not

tolerate singling someone out for enhanced scrutiny

because s/he is carrying materials critical of the United

States or its foreign policy. Indeed, it is fair to say that

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George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (2013)

periodicals as diverse as The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post will frequently contain articles critical of the United States and/or its foreign policy during any given administration and at any given moment in time. However, this incident survives scrutiny under both the First and Fourth Amendment because of the flash-cards George was carrying. As we have explained, the Federal Officials acted reasonably in briefly detaining George for further investigation because of concerns that were raised by those flash-cards.

Moreover, because we have found that the individual Federal Officials’ search and questioning of George during the screening did not violate George’s Fourth Amendment rights, we are hard-pressed to find that it could result in a First Amendment retaliation claim on this record. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006).27

27

In Hartman, the Court held that a plaintiff cannot state

a claim for retaliatory prosecution in violation of the

First Amendment if the charges were supported by probable cause.
Accordingly, the individual Federal Officials are entitled to qualified immunity on George’s First Amendment retaliation claim.
VI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Federal Officials are entitled to qualified immunity on George’s Fourth and First Amendment claims. Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the district court denying their motion to dismiss and remand with instructions to grant the motion.
	  

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