Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 1 of 16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

CHRISTY DAWN VARDEN, et al. Plaintiffs,
v.
THE CITY OF CLANTON, Defendant.

Case No. 2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC (Class Action)

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES Incarcerating individuals solely because of their inability to pay for their release, whether through the payment of fines, fees, or a cash bond, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961). In this case, Plaintiffs allege that they are subjected to an unlawful bail scheme in Clanton, Alabama. Under this scheme, Plaintiffs are allegedly required to pay a cash “bond” in a fixed dollar amount for each misdemeanor charge faced or else remain incarcerated. Without taking a position on the factual accuracy of Plaintiff’s claims, the United States files this Statement of Interest to assist the Court in evaluating the constitutionality of Clanton’s bail practices. It is the position of the United States that, as courts have long recognized, any bail or bond scheme that mandates payment of pre-fixed amounts for different offenses in order to gain pre-trial release, without any regard for indigence, not only violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, but also constitutes bad public policy.

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 2 of 16
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
The United States has authority to file this Statement of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C §
517, which permits the Attorney General to attend to the interests of the United States in any
case pending in a federal court. The United States can enforce the rights of the incarcerated
pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997. The United
States uses that statute to address unconstitutional conditions of confinement, many of which are
caused by the overcrowding of prisons and jails.
The United States has a clear interest in ensuring that state and local criminal justice systems are fair, nondiscriminatory, and rest on a strong constitutional foundation.1
Unfortunately, that is not always the case. As noted by Attorney General Eric Holder at the
National Symposium on Pretrial Justice in 2011:
As we speak, close to three quarters of a million people reside in America’s jail system. . . . Across the country, nearly two thirds of all inmates who crowd our county jails—at an annual cost of roughly nine billion taxpayer dollars—are defendants awaiting trial. . . . Many of these individuals are nonviolent, nonfelony offenders, charged with crimes ranging from petty theft to public drug use. And a disproportionate number of them are poor. They are forced to remain in custody—for an average of two weeks, and at a considerable expense to taxpayers —because they simply cannot afford to post the bail required . . . .2 For these reasons, the United States is taking an active role to provide guidance on the due
process and equal protection issues facing indigent individuals charged with state and local
crimes. For example, the United States filed Statements of Interest in Wilbur v. City of Mount
1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution and Defense Function, Standard 3-1.2(d) (1993) (“It is an important function of the prosecutor to seek to reform and improve the administration of criminal justice. When inadequacies or injustices in the substantive or procedural law come to the prosecutor’s attention, he or she should stimulate efforts for remedial action.” ). 2 Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at the National Symposium on Pretrial Justice (June 1, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-ericholder-speaks-national-symposium-pretrial-justice.
2

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 3 of 16
Vernon in 20133 and Hurrell-Harring v. State of New York in 2014.4 Both cases involved the
fundamental right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants and the role counsel plays in ensuring the fairness of our justice system.5
Accordingly, the United States files this Statement of Interest, reaffirming this country’s
commitment to the principles of fundamental fairness and to ensuring that “the scales of our legal system measure justice, not wealth.”6
BACKGROUND
It is long established that the American criminal justice system should not work
differently for the indigent and the wealthy. Indeed, as early as 1956, the Supreme Court
declared that “there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has.” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). Twenty years later, the
Fifth Circuit extended that precept to incarceration: “[t]o imprison an indigent when in the same
circumstances an individual of financial means would remain free constitutes a denial of equal
3 Statement of Interest of the United States, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, Civ. Action No. 11-1100 (W.D. Wash., Aug. 8, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/wilbursoi8-1413.pdf. 4 Statement of Interest of the United States, Hurrell-Harring v. State of New York, Case No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Sept. 25, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/hurrell_soi_9-25-14.pdf. 5 In both Statements of Interest, the United States did not take a position on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. In Wilbur, the United States provided its expertise by recommending that if the court found for the plaintiffs, it should ensure that public defender counsel have realistic workloads, sufficient resources, and are carrying out the hallmarks of minimally effective representation. In Hurrell-Harring, the United States provided an informed analysis of existing case law to synthesize the legal standard for constructive denial of counsel. 6 Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address to the Criminal Law Section of the American Bar Association (Aug. 10, 1964), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/rfkspeeches/1964/08-10-1964.pdf; see also Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting (Aug. 1, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2014/agspeech-140801.html (quoting Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy).
3

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 4 of 16
protection of the laws.” Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir. 1977)7, vacated as moot,
439 U.S. 1041 (1978). Under the clear precedent of this Circuit, “imprisonment solely because of
indigent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible.” Pugh v.
Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
The sweeping reforms to the federal bail system during the 1960s were based on these
same constitutional principles—that access to justice should not be predicated on financial
means. In 1962, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy called for wide-scale bail reform, noting
that “[i]f justice is priced in the market place, individual liberty will be curtailed and respect for law diminished.”8 In 1964, Attorney General Kennedy convened a National Conference on Bail
and Criminal Justice with the express purpose of understanding and improving both the federal and state bail systems.9 During his closing remarks at the conference, Attorney General Kennedy
declared:
[U]sually only one factor determines whether a defendant stays in jail before he comes to trial. That factor is not guilt or innocence. It is not the nature of the crime. It is not the character of the defendant. That factor is, simply, money. How much money does the defendant have?10 At the time, federal courts routinely employed cash bail schemes similar to the one alleged in
this case: bail amounts were based on the charges for which defendants were arrested, and
7 The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 8 Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address to the American Bar Association (Aug. 6, 1962), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/08-06-1962%20Pro.pdf. 9 Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Welcome Address to the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice (May 27, 1964), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/05-27-1964.pdf. 10 National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Proceedings and Interim Report from the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice 297 (1965), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Photocopy/355NCJRS.pdf.
4

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 5 of 16
judicial officers routinely set cash bail amounts that some defendants simply could not afford to pay.
Attorney General Kennedy’s conference on bail reform sparked wide-scale changes to the federal pre-trial detention and bail system. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee while bail reform legislation was under consideration, Attorney General Kennedy articulated the Department’s growing concern that “the rich man and the poor man do not receive equal justice in our courts. And in no area is this more evident than in the matter of bail.”11 The main reason for this disparity, according to Attorney General Kennedy, was that the federal bail-setting process was “unrealistic and often arbitrary.” Bail was set “without regard to a defendant’s character, family ties, community roots or financial status.” Instead, bail was frequently set based on the nature of the crime alone.12
Today, federal law expressly forbids that practice with a single sentence: “The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person.”13 This concise but profound change was initiated as part of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, which marked a significant departure from past practices. The stated purpose of the Act was “to revise the practices relating to bail to assure that all persons, regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal, when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest.”14
11 See Hearings on S. 2838, S. 2839, & S. 2840 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. (1964) (Testimony by Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/08-04-1964.pdf. 12 Id. 13 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2). 14 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 2, 80 Stat. 214 (1966). See also Allen v. United States, 386 F.2d 634, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (“It plainly appears from the language and
5

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 6 of 16
The Bail Reform Act requires federal judges and magistrates to conduct an individualized analysis of each defendant prior to ordering pretrial detention.15 The individualized analysis requires consideration of factors such as ties to the community, employment, and prior record and precludes fixing bail based solely on the charge.16 In weighing these factors, judges are to consider 1) the extent to which pre-trial release will endanger the safety of those in the community, and 2) what is necessary to reasonably assure that the defendant will return to court when necessary—i.e., that the defendant will not flee or otherwise attempt to avoid justice.17
Federal judges must also consider a wide range of “conditions” to be placed upon a defendant’s pre-trial release that could alleviate these concerns. These conditions include regular community reporting, establishing curfews, abstaining from drug or alcohol use, and various types of community supervision.18 Financial conditions, including money bonds, can be among these measures and, in appropriate cases where an accused might be a flight risk, financial conditions can provide strong incentives to return to court. But the imposition of financial conditions can only be made after an individualized assessment of the particular defendant. And, importantly, the Bail Reform Act expressly precludes any federal judge or magistrate from
history of the Bail Reform Act that its central purpose was to prevent pretrial detention because of indigency.”) (citations omitted). 15 Federal judges must make these determinations during or following detention hearings in open court, in which defendants facing pre-trial detention are represented by counsel, either appointed or retained. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). 16 The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, signed into law by President Ronald Reagan, modified several sections of the 1966 Act, but made even more explicit the requirement of an individualized determination and the prohibition against cash bail for those who could not pay. 17 See generally, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)-(d) (outlining factors the courts must consider in determining whether or not to hold a defendant over until trial, or release him or her on his or her own recognizance or pursuant to conditions). 18 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
6

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 7 of 16
imposing money bail that an accused person cannot afford to pay and would therefore result in that person’s pretrial detention.19
If the judge determines that no amount of conditions can reasonably secure the safety of the community and the return of the defendant, the judge may order pretrial detention. In doing so, the judge must provide a written statement of facts and the reasons for detention via a “detention order.”20 Reasons for or against pretrial detention include the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s charges, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the defendant’s history and character (including family and community ties and employment), and the dangerousness or risk of flight that the defendant may pose if released.21
Essentially, the Bail Reform Act’s provisions ensure that pretrial detention is based on an objective evaluation of dangerousness and risk of flight, rather than ability to pay. Previous critics of bail reform suggested that the Act would “create a nation of fugitives,”22 but the Department has not found that to be the case. To the contrary, the Department has found that judicial officers are well suited to make fair, individualized determinations about the risks, if any, of releasing a particular defendant pending his or her next court date and that they are able to do so efficiently with the assistance of an able pretrial services staff and the input of both the prosecutor and defense counsel. Individualized determination and the basic elements of due
19 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person.”). 20 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(1). 21 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). 22 Hearings on S. 2838, S. 2839, & S. 2840 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. (1964) (Testimony by George L. Will, Executive Director of the American Society of Professional Bail Bondsmen).
7

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 8 of 16
process help ensure that federal defendants are not detained unnecessarily or simply because they are poor.
DISCUSSION Plaintiffs in this case seek declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief, alleging that the mandatory imposition of a bail schedule that sets bail at a fixed amount per charge violates due process and equal protection. If Clanton’s bail system indeed fixes bond amounts based solely on the arrest charge, and does not take individual circumstances into account, the Court should find this system to be unconstitutional. Not only are such schemes offensive to equal protection principles, they also constitute bad public policy. I. Fixed-sum Bail Systems are Unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment In general, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “punishing a person for his poverty.” Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983). This is especially true when it comes to depriving a person of his liberty. The Supreme Court has considered a variety of contexts in which the government attempted to incarcerate or continue incarceration of an individual because of his or her inability to pay a fine or fee, and in each context, the Court has held that indigency cannot be a barrier to freedom. Tate, 401 U.S. at 398; Williams, 399 U.S. at 240-41; Smith, 365 U.S. at 709. Although much of the Court’s jurisprudence in this area concerns sentencing or early release schemes, the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis applies in equal, if not greater force to individuals who are detained until trial because of inability to pay fixed-sum bail amounts. Liberty is particularly salient for defendants awaiting trial, who have not been found guilty of any crime. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (recognizing the fundamental nature of the right to pretrial liberty). To be sure, pretrial detention may be
8

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 9 of 16
necessary in some circumstances including if a court finds a likelihood of future danger to society or that the defendant poses a flight risk. Fixed-sum bail systems, however, such as the one allegedly used in Clanton, Alabama, do not take these considerations into account. Such systems are based solely on the criminal charge. Because such systems do not account for individual circumstances of the accused, they essentially mandate pretrial detention for anyone who is too poor to pay the predetermined fee. This amounts to mandating pretrial detention only for the indigent.
The Fifth Circuit briefly discussed fixed-sum bail systems, otherwise referred to as “bail schedules,” in Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). There, the Court held that the new bail scheme passed by the Florida legislature was not constitutionally deficient simply because it failed to articulate a presumption against imposing cash bail. The en banc court noted that Florida’s new system allowed for six different types of pretrial release—cash bail was but one option of many. Importantly, however, the Court pointed out that the utilization of bond schedules, and only bond schedules, creates an injustice for individuals who cannot meet the financial threshold:
Utilization of a master bond s chedule provides speedy and convenient release for those w ho ha ve no di fficulty i n meeting its r equirements. T he i ncarceration o f those w ho c annot, w ithout m eaningful c onsideration of ot her pos sible alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal protection requirements. Pugh, 572 F.2d at1057. As correctly noted in Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or in the Alternative Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 34), courts in this Circuit have had occasion to address scenarios analogous to those alleged here. For example, in Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726, 728 (5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit invalidated a sentencing scheme that offered defendants the choice of immediately paying a $17 fine or serving a 13-day jail sentence as
9

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 10 of 16
applied to indigent defendants who could not pay the fine. As the Court noted, “[t]he alternative fine before us creates two disparately treated classes: those who can satisfy a fine immediately upon its levy, and those who can pay only over a period of time, if then. Those with means avoid imprisonment; the indigent cannot escape imprisonment.” Id.
Similarly, in Tucker v. City of Montgomery, 410 F. Supp. 494 (M.D. Ala. 1976), this Court held that the City’s practice of charging a bond to exercise appellate rights denied the equal protection of the law to indigent prisoners. In so holding, the court found that “[t]he imposition by the State of financial barriers restricting the availability of appellate review for indigent criminal defendants has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice Under Law.” Id. at 502 (quoting Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959)).
Finally, this Court’s recent decision in United States v. Flowers, 946 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (M.D. Ala. 2013), addressed practices analytically indistinguishable from those practices Plaintiffs allege are occurring in Clanton. In Flowers, the defendant could avoid prison only if she paid for her home confinement, an option her poverty prevented. This Court noted correctly that “it is inequitable for indigent defendants who cannot pay for home-confinement monitoring to be imprisoned while those who can pay to be subject to the more limited monitored home confinement avoid prison.” Id. at 1302. If Plaintiffs’ allegations in this case are true, indigent defendants in Clanton face a similar problem—pay a monetary bond they cannot afford or go to jail. This determination, like the sentence in Flowers, would be “constitutionally infirm and [unable to] stand.” Id. at 1300.
II. Public Policy Weighs Strongly Against Fixed Bail Systems In addition to being unconstitutional, fixed-bail systems that do not account for a defendant’s indigency are an inadequate means of securing the safety of the public or ensuring
10

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 11 of 16
the return of the defendant to the court – the central rationales underlying pretrial detention. Indeed, such schemes are driven by financial considerations, rather than legitimate public safety concerns. This is bad public policy, and results in negative outcomes for both defendants and the community at large.
The problems with bail systems based on financial considerations are well-documented.23 As summarized in a recent Department of Justice publication: “The two central issues concerning money bail are: (1) its tendency to cause unnecessary incarceration of defendants who cannot afford to pay secured financial conditions either immediately or even after some period of time; and (2) its tendency to allow for, and sometimes foster, the release of high-risk defendants, who should more appropriately be detained without bail.”24
When bail amounts are too high for indigent individuals to afford, fewer defendants will be released pretrial,25 thereby creating a burden on local jails.26 Today, according to a Bureau of Justice Statistics analysis, more than 60 percent of all jail inmates nationwide are in custody awaiting an adjudication of their charges, and the majority of these pretrial detainees are charged
23 See, e.g., Timothy R. Schnacke, United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a Framework for American Pretrial Reform (2014), available at http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/Fundamentals%20of%20Bail%20-%20NIC%202014.pdf. 24 Id. at 15. 25 Thomas H. Cohen & Brian A. Reaves, United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts: State Court Processing Statistics, 1990-2004, Special Report, NCJ 214994 (2007) (study of state courts in the 75 largest counties from 1990 to 2004, finding that about 7 of 10 defendants secured release when bail was set at less than $5,000, but only 1 in 10 secured release when bail was set at $10,000 or more), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf. 26 See generally Ram Subramaniam, et al., Vera Institute of Justice, Incarceration’s Front Door: The Misuse of Jails in America 29-35 (Feb. 2015), available at http://vera.org/pubs/incarcerations-front-doormisuse-jails-america.
11

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 12 of 16
with nonviolent offenses.27 Jail overcrowding, in turn, can result in significant security and life
and safety risks for both inmates and staff.28
While there is a need for continued quantitative research on the effects of pretrial
detention, it is clear that the decision to release or detain a defendant pretrial has many collateral
consequences beyond the loss of liberty. As detailed by the Supreme Court:
The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness. Most jails offer little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs. The time spent in jail is simply dead time. . . Imposing those consequences on anyone who has not yet been convicted is serious. It is especially unfortunate to impose them on those persons who are ultimately found to be innocent.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972). Incarceration carries weighty mental and
social burdens for the accused and for those closest to them. Family obligations may go
unmet while defendants are detained, and jobs may be lost, both of which can cause
irreparable harm to the defendant, their families, and their communities.
In addition, for many reasons, the judicial decision to detain or release the accused
pretrial may be a critical factor affecting the outcome of a case.29 Pretrial detention can impede
27 Todd D. Minton, United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2012 – Statistical Tables, NCJ 241264, at 1 (2013) available at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim12st.pdf (showing that the percentage of pretrial detainees in jail has remained unchanged since 2005); see also Donna Lyons, Predicting Pretrial Success, State Legislatures, February 2014 at 18-19, available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/magazine/articles/2014/SLG_0214_Pretrial_1.pdf; Arthur W. Pepin, Conference of State Court Administrators, Policy Paper: Evidence-Based Pretrial Release (2014), available at http://www.colorado.gov/ccjjdir/Resources/Resources/Ref/EBPre-TrialRelease_2012.pdf. 28 See generally Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (overcrowding in California prisons created unconstitutional conditions of confinement, including inadequate medical and mental health care); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978) (upholding 30-day limit on confinement in isolation, noting that overcrowding in the isolation unit contributed to violence and vandalism of cells). 29 Mary T. Phillips, New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc., Pretrial Detention and Case Outcomes, Part 1: Nonfelony Cases (2007), available at http://www.nycja.org/lwdcms/docview.php?module=reports&module_id=669&doc_name=doc.
12

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 13 of 16
the preparation of a defense, such as gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses, and pretrial
detention can make it more difficult to confer with an attorney.30 Research indicates that these
barriers have practical consequences: defendants who are detained pretrial have less favorable
outcomes than those who are not detained, notwithstanding other relevant factors such as the
charges they face or their criminal history. One contributing factor is that detained defendants are
more likely to plead guilty, if only to secure release, possibly resulting in at least some wrongful
convictions.31 In some instances, the time someone is detained pretrial can even exceed the likely
sentence if the defendant were later found guilty.32
For these reasons, many states have moved away from bail systems that are based
entirely on the criminal charge and towards systems that allow for different pretrial release
options based on individualized determinations of dangerousness or risk of flight.33 The
30 Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1123, 1165 (2005); see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 532-33 (noting that a defendant detained pretrial “is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense.”). 31 Id. See also Mary T. Phillips, New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc., Bail, Detention, and Felony Case Outcomes, Research Brief No. 18 (2008), available at http://www.nycja.org/lwdcms/docview.php?module=reports&module_id=597&doc_name=doc; Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, n.35. 32 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2463, 2492 (2004). 33 States employ a variety of bail systems that satisfy constitutional concerns. The federal model, while constitutionally sufficient, is not the only adequate scheme. See Arizona (AR.S. Crim. Proc. Rule 7.2); Arkansas (Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9.2); Connecticut (C.G.S.A § 54-63b(b)); Illinois (725 ILCS 5/110-2); Maine (15 M.R.S.A §§ 1002, 1006); Massachusetts (MGL Ch. 276, § 58); Michigan (M.C.L.A 780.62-for misdemeanors only); Minnesota (49 M.S.A, Rules Crim. Proc. § 6.02(1)); Missouri (Missouri Supreme Court Rule 33.01); Montana (MCA 46-9-108 (2)); Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29901); New Mexico (NMRA, Rule 5-401(D)(2)); North Carolina (N.C.G.S.A. § 15A-534(b)); North Dakota (N.D.R. Crim. P. 46); Oregon (ORS 135.245(3)); Rhode Island (RI ST § 12-13-1.3(e)); South Carolina (S.C. Code § 17-15-10—for non-capital cases only); South Dakota(SDCL § 23A-43-2—for noncapital cases only); Tennessee (T. C. A § 40-11-116(a)); Vermont (13 V.S.A § 7554—for misdemeanors only); Washington (WA ST SUPER CT CR CrR 3.2(b)—for non-capital cases only); Wisconsin (W.S.A 969.01(4)); Wyoming (WY RCRP Rule 46.1(c)(1)(B)—for non-capital cases only). See generally Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free:” Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinants, 16 N.Y.U. J. Leg. & Pub. Pol’y 919, 930 (2013).
13

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 14 of 16
American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice have also evolved to reflect the importance of the presumption of pretrial release and the need for individualized determinations before imposing pretrial detention. The Standards advocate for the imposition of the least restrictive of release conditions necessary to ensure the defendant’s appearance in court. The Standards also include guidelines to limit the use of financial conditions for pretrial release.34
The use of a more dynamic bail scheme, such as that set forth in the federal Bail Reform Act, not only ensures adherence to constitutional principles of due process and equal protection, but constitutes better public policy. Individualized determinations, rather than fixed-sum schemes that unfairly target the poor, are vital to preventing jail overcrowding, avoiding the costs attendant to incarceration,35 and providing equal justice for all. Consequently, in light of the potential harmful consequences of prolonged confinement and the strain that unnecessary confinement puts on jail conditions, the United States urges that pretrial detention be used only when necessary, as determined by an appropriate individualized determination.
CONCLUSION Fundamental and long-standing principles of equal protection squarely prohibit bail schemes based solely on the ability to pay. Fixed-sum bail schemes do not meet these mandates. By using a predetermined schedule for bail amounts based solely on the charges a defendant faces, these schemes do not properly account for other important factors, such as the defendant’s potential dangerousness or risk of flight. For these reasons, if the bail system in Clanton is as Plaintiff describes, the system should not stand.
34 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Pretrial Release, Standard 10-1.4 (3d ed. 2007). 35 As noted by the Supreme Court, pretrial detention not only adversely impacts defendants – it also creates significant costs for taxpayers. See Tate, 401 U.S. at 399 (prolonged pretrial detention “saddles the State with the cost of feeding and housing [the defendant] for the period of his imprisonment.”).
14

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 15 of 16

Of Counsel: Lisa Foster (CA 122178) Director Access to Justice Initiative Telephone: (202) 514-7073 lisa.foster3@usdoj.gov
Jennifer Katzman (NY 4388898) Senior Counsel Access to Justice Telephone: (202) 514-7086 jenni.katzman@usdoj.gov
Robert B. Bullock (CA 219942) Senior Counsel Access to Justice Telephone: (202) 514-5324 bob.bullock@usdoj.gov
Andrew Stanner (DC 979839) Senior Counsel Access to Justice Telephone: (202) 353-9024 andrew.stanner@usdoj.gov

Respectfully submitted,
VANITA GUPTA Acting Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division United States Department of Justice
MARK KAPPELHOFF Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
JONATHAN M. SMITH (DC 396578) Chief Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Section
GEORGE L. BECK, JR. United States Attorney Middle District of Alabama
/s/ Winsome G. Gayle WINSOME G. GAYLE (DC 479887) Special Litigation Counsel Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Section Winsome.Gayle@usdoj.gov
/s/ Paul Killebrew PAUL KILLEBREW (LA 32176) Paul.Killebrew@usdoj.gov
/s/ Sharon Brett SHARON BRETT (NY 5090279) Trial Attorneys Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Section Sharon.Brett@usdoj.gov
15

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 26 Filed 02/13/15 Page 16 of 16
/s/Robert G. Anderson ROBERT G. ANDERSON (MSB 1589) Assistant United States Attorney 131 Clayton Street Montgomery, AL 36104 (334) 223-7280 Robert.Anderson@usdoj.gov Attorneys for the United States of America
_____________________________________________________________________________ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on February 13, 2015, a copy of the foregoing Statement of Interest was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by email to all parties by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court’s CM/ECF System.
/s/ Robert G. Anderson Assistant United States Attorney
16

 
 Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 1 of 14 2:15-cv-34-MHT

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 2 of 14

·

,

a,ssuring that her rights and the rights of the other Class members will no~ continue to be violated,

<PIQ <J. decl~a,tion tha.t the City' s conduct is unlawful

Nature of the Action'

I. It is the policy and practice of the City of Clanton to refuse to release misdemeanor

arrest~ from jail unless they pay a generically set "hoop" amount. That amount is $500 for every

misdemeanor offense except DUI offens.es, for which an arreste_e is kept in jail unless she can pay
$1 ,000..2 peqJ,I,se this sum is set gqJ.~ricaUy by refert::nce to l,be al1~ged QffeIl~~ of"arrest, no iildiv'idualized factors ate considered, and anyone who canil6t afford t6 pay is held in jail at least

until the following Tuesday at 3:00 p.m., when the· City holds its only weekly court session.

M~mbers of the pubUc 'P'c;: barred (rom @1;tend.ingtb;;t.tcourtsessioI;l..

2. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief.

Jurisdiction .and Venue

3.. Thi.s i.s a civil rights action arising \IIlder42 U,S.c. § 1983 and 28 U,S:C. § 2201,

et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

4.

Venu.e in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1391.

Parties

5. PlaintiffChristy Dawn Varden is a 41-year-old resident ofClanton, Alabama. She
represents herself as an individual and a Class of similarly situ~ted people IJU s1,lbject to tbe City's

post-arrest det~nt.ion scb~e.

1 Plamtiff makes the allegations in this Complaint based on personal knowledge as 10 mat,etS il:t whic~ sl:te hil.S ~
personal involvement aM on iruortl);ation apd belief as 10 aU ot.bet niallers. 2 Felony arrestees are nol subject to the jurisdiction of the City of Clanton and are instead processed according to policies adopt.ed by Chilton County.
2

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 3 of 14

· I

6.

Defendant City of Clanton is a mUl)icip~J corporatiol) org:;qJ.ized under tbe l,)ws of

I

I

the State ofAlabama. The City operate.s the Clanton Police: Department and'the Clariton Municipal

Court. The City also contracts with the Chilton County Jail to confine arrestees of the Clanton

Police Department who cannot afford ~o pay the generically scheduled C;:lsh bond. The CHy

notifies the Chilton County Jail to release atfestees as soon as the cash ootid is paid to the City.

Factual.Background

A. The Plaintiff's Arrest

7. Christy Dawn Varden is a 41-year-old mother of two children. 8. M~. Varden was arrested by Clanton police on Janu~ 13, 2015, ouJside of a

Walmart store in Clanton, Alabama. She was charged with fout misdemeanor offenses, including

shoplifting, resisting arrest, failure to obey a police o.ffi.cer, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

9. Ms. Varden was taken tojail and told that she would be released ifshe paid a "'bond"

to the City ofClaftton of$500 fot each ofherchatges. She was told that she would be kept in jail
unless she paid $2,000. See Exhibit i , Declaration ofChristy Dawn Varden.3

10. Ms" Va,rden is indige'J:lt. She h~ no assets and is not employed. She suffers from

sevetal sevete physical and mental illnesses that prevent her from working. She is prescribed'

several medications to deal with her physical and mental illnesses. She was Qlost re~tly"

employed approx,imately two ye~ ago, but sI,.e h.ad, to qui,t her job due to an extended hospital

stay in the intensive ca,re l.lIlit.

11. Ms. Varden d_epends on food stamps to survive. She re.ceives less than $200 per

month in food stamps, which is her only income. She does not own any real property or a car.

12. Ms. Varden resides with her 66-year-old mother and children in Clanton.

3 Another person arrested by the City ofClanton within eight minutes ofMs. Varden and charged with multiple ti:\inor drug offenses was released from jail immediately after paying the City of Clanton the required cash P\tytp~pt.
3

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 4 of 14
13. Ms. Varden w'!,s not told when she would be brouJPtt to court and has not been brought to court for an init.ial appearlilJlce. PUnll,lant to Ci.ty policy. the e<$..rl.iest that M.s. Varden. would be brought to CQurt for a first appe.a.railce is Tuesday, January 20, 2015, neatly a week after her arrest.
B. The City's Policies and Practices 14. The named Plaintiff would be released immediately by the City of Clanton if she or a family member paid the amount set by the City of Clanton. 15, The treat.roent oft,he naJl)ed PlaintiffCj,l1d other Class members is caused by and is representative of the City's post-arrest detention policies and practices. 16. As a matter of policy and practice, when the City of Clanton Police Department makes an arrest for a minor misdemeanor offense, officers infonn the arrestee at booking that the person wi.1I be released immediately if the person pays $500 cash.4 In the case of misdemeanor DUI offenses, the person is told that the amount necessary to secure release is $1 ,000. The arrestee is told that th~ arrestee wiH remCj,jn injaiJ if the arrestee is not ",ble to mo,tke that payment. 17. Those arrestees unable to pay for release are eventually told that their first court appearance will be the following Tuesday at 3:00 p.m. The City of Clanton holds court only one time per week: each Tuesday at 3:00 p.m. 18. Becau"se court is held only (,)pce per week, an arrestee too poor to buyout of jail could spend more than s~x days iIi jail priot to a first court appearance.
4 Because of the common availability ofcommercial bail bonds, those that remain in the custody ofthe City of Clanton are typically those that cannot even afford to pay a third-party bonding agent. The amount charged by a bonding agent
to pay a $500 cash bood is typically $50, although such agents are free to refuse to pay for the release of an arrestee for any reason or for no reason. Thus, the availability of third-party agents, at least for those arrestees who can afford
$50 but not $500, is no guarantee.
4

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 5 of 14
19. After an arrest, City of Clanton offici~s do not deviate from this '"bail schedule" of
!
$1,000 pet DUI offense and $500 per other misdemeanot offense. 5 20. Unlike many other cities, the City of Clanton does not allow post-arrest release on
recognizance or with an unsecured bond (in which a person would be re.Ieased by promisjJ:lg to pay the scheduled amount if the person later does not appear). Instead, City officials requite that the payment amount be made up front.
21. The City of Clanton Police Depart.ment made 1,079 arrests for misdemeanor offenses in 2013. The Clanton police made 931 misdemeanor arrests in 2012 and 822 in 2011.
22. Many ofClanton's minor misdemeanor arrestees are released soon after arrest UpOI) payment of the scheduled amount of cash. Some remain detained fot varying lengths of time until
they ot their families are able to borrow sufficient amounts of money or arrange for third-party
payment. Others, like the named Plaintiff, who are too poor even to fi.nd anyone to pay the cash bond for them, are kept injail for up to six days befote their first court appeatance.
23. Each Tuesday afternoon, there are commonly between three and ten destitute defendap.ts who were not able to pay enough money to secure their release. The City of Clanton for.ces these inmates to appear by video screen in the courtroom from the jail.
24. The City of Clanton requires that the courtroom be empty and closed t9 the publjc
for all such video proceedings. No person is allowed to enter the proceedings, which ofteQ. include
only the City prosecl,ltor, City judge, ~d t.he defeQ.dant on video. On occasion, an arrestee is represented by an at.tomey, who is allowed to be present. All other members of the public are
5 In the case of arrests on warral;lts for the ~I1eged vio~tion of probation rather than on a new arrest. the City's policy and p,ractice is to base the amOWlt of money necessary to secure relea~ on the amount of debts owed by the person on their court costs arid privatized probation fees. Thus, if an arrestee is unable to afford the balance of her court costs an~ fees, the person will be held at least until the following Tues~ay by the City of Clanton. If the probationer is able to afford the balance of the fees, the arrestee is allow,ed to pay immediately and the person is released.
5

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 6 of 14
infonned by ~.nifonned City of Clanton Police Oijicers t.l:lat they are nolt ~.llowed to observe the City's Judicial proceedings, whiCh include arraignments, pleas, trials, revocation hearingS, and other proceedings.
25. The video feed from the jail is broadcast in the builging'& waitiQg roOrTI, 3ltJtpugh
I
the,screen is muted so that no sound from the proceedings is audible, City officials refuse, as a matter of City policy, to allow the sound to be broadcast. According to City officials, no audio recordings OJ;' transcripts of the proceedings are available.
26. Despite the First Amendment' s guarantee of open public coUrt proceedings and binding precedent from the Supreme Court ofthe United States and the Eleventh Circuit requiring ~ll sucI,. proceedi.Qgs to be opeQ to the publjc, it is not .possible for a member of the public to observe court proceedings involving ihIflates ih the City of Clanton.
27. Because of Clanton's unprecedented and illegal courtroom closure policies, it is gifficult for the p~blic to obtain accurate det~I.s cot]<;e01ing how rTlany impoverished Clanton arrestees are unable to buy their release each week.
Class Action All~gations 28. The named Plaintitfbrings this action, on behalf of herself and all others sim.ilarly s.tuated, for the p1J.Wose of ;,l,sserting ~he claims aUeged in this Complaint on a common basis. 29. A class action is a s'uperior means, and the only practicable means, by which the named Plaintiff and unknown Class members can challenge the City' s unlawful poverty-based post-arrest detention scheme. 30. This action is brought and may properly be maihtained as a Class action pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1 )-(4) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Feder,!! Rules of Civil Procedure. 31. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality. and adequacy
6

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 7 of 14
req1,lireroents of those provisions. 3.2. The Plaintiff proposes one Class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The
Declaratory and Injunctive Clas_s is defined as:, All persons who _lP"e currC:;:Qtly or who will. beoom.~ in the custody of the City of Clanton as a result ofan arrest involving a misdemeanor offense.
A. Numerosity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(0)(1) 33. The City of Clanton Police Department made 1,079 arrests fot misdemeanor offenses in 2013.6 Each arrestee is presented with the City's standard cash bond choice of pay or j<;liL Arrestees are beld it) jail for varyilJ.g .lengt.hs oftime depending on how long it takes them to make the cash payment that the City requires for their release. 34. Some arrestees are able to pay for release immediately. Others are forced to wait a day or two d~ys until they or f~ily members can make the payment. Others are not able to pay or to find sOmeone else to pay for them even after a few days. 35. Each weekly court appearance in the City's municipal court commonly includes up to ~en Cot)fined in,mates arrested sin~e the; previous T~esday who are st.iJnl) custody beca1,lse they could not afford the cash amoiiht set by the City's schedule. Thus, the number of future class members, even in a period of several months, numbers in the hundreds.
B. (:ommonality. Fe4. R. eiv. P.23(a)(2). 36. The relief ~ught i.s cOl1)mon to <;lI1 met;r:lbers of the Cla,ss, and common questions of law and fact exist 'as to all members of the Class. The named Plaintiff seeks relief concerning whether the City's policies, practices, and procedures violate the rights of the Class members and
I:eliefm~dat.ing the City to change its policies, practices, and procedures so that the constitutional
rights of the Class members will be protected in the future.
6 The City appears to have been on a simHar pace ofatrests in 2014, but final statistics are not yet publicly available. 7

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 8 of 14
37. These common legal and factual questions arise from one central scheme and set of policies and practices: the City's post-arrest detention schedule. The City operates this scheme
openly and in materially the same mannetevery day. The mat.erial components of the scheme do not vary from Class member to Class member, and the resolution of these legal and factual issues
will determine whether all oft.he members of the class are entitled to t.he constitutional relief that
they seek. Among the most i'mportant, but not the only, common questions of fact are:
• Whether the City of Clanton has a policy and practice of using a generic offensebased "'bail schedule" to determine the amount 'of money necessary to secure postarrest relea,se;
• Whether the City of Clanton requires that scheduled amount to be paid up front in order to allow release;
• What post-arreSt procedures the City of Clanton performs on misdemeanor arrestees;
• Whether the City of Clanton b.ars the public from attending its coUrt proceedmgs. 38. Among the most important common question oflaw are:
• Whether a "bail schedule" setting standard amounts of cash required up front to 'avoid post-arrest detention violates the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses.7
C. TYpicalitY. Fed. R. Civ•.P. 23(8)(3). 39. The named Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class, and she has the same interests in this case as all other members of the Classes that she represents. Each of them suffers injuries from the failure of th~ City to comply witl) the baSic
7 Other common questions pervade this case relating to other claims made in this Complaint. See infra a:~ 1i[49-52. For ell:ample, whether the City of Clanton bars the public from entering its coUrtroom su<;h that the Plain.~iff's and other Class members' appearances will be closed to the public an~. if so, whe!,he:r t1$t policy vi91~.tes t1:Je Fi}St Amendment and Supreme C:;oun llI).d I;leveIltb C~ui,t precedent requiring ~I jud.icia,l proceedings in American courts
to be fu.l1y open to t,he PlIbl.ic, Simil.ariy, common questions exist as to whether non-individualized and entirely generic
monetary ba.i1 requlrerm:ms are arbitrary and ell:cessive under the Eighth Amendment.
8

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 9 of 14
constitutional provisions: they are ~ach confined in jail because they could not afford to pay the City's standardized cash bond amount. The answer to whether the City's scheme of policies and practices is unconstitutional will detennine the claims ofthe named Plaintiffand every other Class member.
40. If the naroed Pl~jntiff succeeds in the c1~im that the City' s policies and pr~ctices concetning post-arrest detention violate her constitutional rights, that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the Class:
D. Adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 41. The named Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because her interests in t.he vindic~t.ion. of the legal c1ai.ms th~t she rai.ses are ep.tjrely a.Jjgned with the interests of the other Class members, who each have the same basic constitutional claims. She is a member of the Class, and her interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those ofthe other Class members. 4~. There .are no }qtown r;onfl.ic~ of interest amoI).g members of the proposed Class, all of whom have a similar interest in vindicating their constitutional rights in the face of their uniawful treatment by their local government. 43. The Plaintiff is tepresented by attorneys from Equal Justice Under Law who have experience litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge ofboth "bail schedule" schemes and "the relevant constitutional law. Class Counsel has conducted an investigation over a peri9d of month$ i.nto the use of the gen~ric "baJI schedule," including nu.merou.s interviews with witnesses, experts, Ciry employees, inmates, families of inmates, local attorneys, community members, statewide experts in the functioning of Alabama municipal courts, and na.tional experts in post-arrest detention procedures and constitutional law. Class Counsel has studied the way that these systems fuQ-ctiOI;t in Qther cities in ord~ to ilwest.igate the wide array of
9

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 10 of 14
reasonable constitutional options in practice for municipalities like t\leCity ofClanton. As a result, Class Counsel has devoted enormol,ls resources to becoming familiar with the "bail schedule" scheme and with all of the relevant state and fedetallaws and procedures that relate t9 it.
44. Counsel for the Plaintiff has also been the lead attorney in a recent con.stitl,l.tiol).al
civil rigl:tts class act.iolJ. l~wsu.it ag~jnst the City of Montgomery. See Mitchell et ai, v. City 0/
Montgomery, 2014-cv-186 (M.D. Ala. 2014). That case involved a major investigation and landmark litigation to end widespread injustices involving the jaiJi.ng of impoverished people by the City of Montgomery over a period of years fot their non-payment of debt from traffic tickets.'
45. The Plaintiff is also represented in this case by multiple local Cla.ss Counsel. Matthew Swerdlin and J. Mitch McGui.re9 have also devoted time and tesources to investigating the City's policies and practices, and they each have experience in the functioning of Alabama municipal police departments, including post-arrest procedures. Each also reg\,lI.a:rly represents Impoverished a.nd .margi.lJ.alized people in civil and criminal actions in Alabama and federal .courts. Each was also local counsel in the Mitchell class action lawsuit before this Court. Moreover, Class counsel William Dawson is one of the most experi(';I)ced crim.in~l defense and civil rights lawyers i.n the State of Alabama. having worked for ovet 40 ye.ars on behalf of impoverished criminal defendants in the St.ate of Alabama, tried over 500 jury trials ·in state and federal CQu$., ~d successfully brought dozens of class action cases. The interests 9f the l1J.et);lbers of the Class Will
g Counsel was alS9 previously the lead anomey in a constitutionill civil rigbts class action agai.nst ~ District of Columbia in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See 1:13-c"v-00686-ESH (D.i>.C. 2013). In that litigation, undersigned counsel was·responsible for investigating and building the complex constitUtional c1!J,iin.s against the District of Columbia. authoring the legal filings in the class action case, and negotiatiIlg a ~e.mo~@un,t of Understanding with the District ofColwnbia Anomey General that stayed the claSs acti.oJ:lli.tig~tjon an.d began to implement sweeping changes to the dty' s polic"ies and practices govemi.Ilg t,h" civil forfe:lture of property by the
District's Metropolitan Police Department- procedures ~t affect t,ho~ds of putative ci8$S members every year.
9. Matthew Swerdlin is owner of ~.anl:lew Swerdlin, Anomey at Law, in Birmingham. J. Mitchell McGuire is Managing Panner of McGuire & A.s;sociates, in Montgomery. William Dawson is the owner of the Dawson Law Office" in airqiingha.m..
10

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 11 of 14
be fa.irly and adequately protected by the Plaintiff and her attomeys.IO E. Rille 23(b)(2)
46. Class action status is appropriate because the City, through the policies, practices, an~ pro<;:ed~es t.hat w<Pc.e up its post-<m"est detention scheme has acted in the same unconstitutional maniler with respect to all class members. The City of Clanton has created and applied a simple scheme of post-arrest detention and release: it charges $500 to every misdemeanor ~rrestee (and $1,000 for~very PUI arrestee). The City releases those who can pay and detains those who cannot. The detained artestees are eventually taken to court on the following Tuesday for a first
appearance, sometimes as many as six days after arrest.
47. The Class therefore seeks declaratory arid injuhctive relief to enjoin the City from continuing in the future to detain impoverished arrestees who cannot afford cash payments. Because the putative Class challenges t.he C:~ty's s<;:h.en;te as unconstitu.tional through declaratory
and injunctive relief that would apply the same feJiefto every member of the Class, Rule 23(b)(2)
is appropriate and necessary. 48. InjuQctive relief compeIJi~g t,he City to comply with these constitutional rights will
similarly protect each member of the Class from being subjected to the City's unlawful policies and practices. A declaration and injunction stating that the City cannot use a cash "ba·il schequle"
10 At least with respeCt to a Damages Class under Rule 23(b)(3) (which the Plai.ntifT does not S:eek here), courts have. held that "ascertainability" is, in essence, a fifth Rule 23 prerequisit~. A class llJust be "adeq~tely defined and dearly ascertainable." De Bremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970). "Iil o¢er words, the class must m~t a minimum standard of definiteness which will allow the trial court to detenniJ:le mel,Tlbership in the proposed class," although "'it is not necessary that the members of the class be so clea,rly identified that any member c.an be presently
ascertained.'" Earnest v. GMC, 923 F. Supp. 1469, 1473 & n.4 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (quoting Carpenter v. Davis. 424
F.2d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 1970». A1thp~gh it is doubtful that such a requirement should exist with respect to a purely injunctive class under
R!l.le 23(b)(2), ·see, e.g., Marcus v. BMW olN. Am., UC, 687 F.3d 583, 592-593 (3d Cir. 2012), that requirement is easily me.t here. The City of Clanton already has in its possession the identity of each and every person who it is keeping in its custody after an arrest because of the inability to post a cash bond. A1so, ·by necessity, the City will come to know the identity of each person that it arrests in the future.
I)

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 12 of 14

that jajls indig~nt arr~tees but free$ arrestees with financial means wOl,lld proviqe r~lief to every mero-her of the elas-s. Therefore, d~laratory aJ)d injunctive relief witb respect to the CI":5s ~ a whole is appropriate.
49. Plaintiff seeks the following relief and hereby demands a jury in this cause for all lJI..tters so appropn.ate,
Claims fot Relief Count One: Defendant City of Clanton Violates Plaintitrs Rights By Jailing Her Because She Can.not Afford A Cash Payment Prior to a Fi.rst CO\lrt Appe~raDce. 5.0. PI~intiff in.corpor&!tes by reference the allegations in paragrapbs 1..49; 51. The Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection claUses have long prohibited imprisoning a person for the person's inability to make a monetary payment. Defendant violates PI~ntifrs rights by jailing her when she cannot a.fford t.o pay tbe ;:u.nOunt set by the generic "schedule" used by the City of Clanton. Count Two: befendant City of Clanton Violates Plaintitrs Rights By Imprisoning Her After Arrest Based on a Generic Non-Indivic:h,lalized Monetary J;laiJ. 52. Pi~intiffi.ncorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-51. 53. The Defendailt's lise of Ii generic non-individualized offense-based "bail schedule" is arbitrary and excessive. By applying the same $1 ,0'00 per charge cash bond to all nUl arrestees and the same $500 cash bond to all other arrestees, the Defendant divorces the post-;m-est, pretri~l rel~~e 4eterm.ination from any individuali.zed fa~tors. The fiJnd~entai st.ateJJ and federal right to an individual 's liberty, therefore, is cOnditioned on ail amouilt of money unrelated to any process

I I In a~dition to tJte fundamel).tai constitutional liberty intere.st in freedom from physical confmement, A1abama law

creates a sta~e-Iaw liberty in~erest in release after arrest and prior to trial. Alabama law defmes " bail" as the "release"

ofa person '·'with or without security." Ala. Code § 15-13-102. A1abama law also provides an explicit state-law right

to bail, with the Iib:erty interest recognized both in the A1abama Constitution and 'in seyeral statutes. See Ala. Code §

15-13-2 ("In all cases other than [capital cases). a defendant is, before conviction, entitled to bail as a matterofright.");

see a/so A1a. Code § 15-13-102; Ala. Const. Art. I § 16.

'

12

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 13 of 14
or ~ssessment of what would be required to assure that person' s appearance in violation of the Fol,lJteeI).th Amel)dment's substomtive and Pro9ed~.I due process ·guarantees, the Eighth
Amendment 's prohibition on Excessive 'Bail, and the Supreme (::(mrt's holding that setting of a
non-excessive and reasonable bail requires an individualized consideration of circum~tances .
Cou..nt Tbree:· D~fel.ldaDt City of Clanton' s Closure of the Courtroom for aU He:arings, Including Arraignments, Pleas, and Trials, Violates the Firs't Amendment.
54. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-53 above. 55. The City of Clanton enforces a policy ~o b~ the pQ.blic &om its co\lrtrQoJIl. The
CitY of Clanton Police Department stations officets and supervisors at the Courtroom entrance and
blocks the entry of any individual who is not a party to a case on the docket. During the inmate
d09k:~t. which i.s conducted by video from the jail, no member of the public is allowed to enter the
eourtroom. Proceedings involving inmates are thus conducted, usually without an attorney
representing the inmate, solely in the presence of t~e City prosecutor ~4 Ci.ty judge. These policies <J.I:ld practices a,r~ in fl$gra,nt violation of clearly es~blished Supteme CoUrt and Eleventh
Circuit precedent requiring that all crjminal judicial proceedings be open to the public.
Request for Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and t~e other Class members request that this Court issue the
following relief:
a. A declaratory judgment that the Defendant City violates the Plaintiffs and Class memberS' constitutional rights by jailing them because of their inability to pay a geperically set amount of money to secure release after an arrest;
b. A 4eclaratory judgment th~t the Defend$Ilt City vioJa~e$ Plaintiff's and Class members' constit\ltional rightS by forcing them to appear for criminal coUrt proceedirigs that are closed to the public and ail order requiring the City to ensure that its officers and officials allow proceedings in criminal cases to be open to the public;
c. An order ap,d jqdgment preliminarily and pennanently enjoining Defendant CityofClanton from enforcing the unconstitutional post-arrest money-based detention policies and practices a~ainst the'Plaintiff and the Class ofsimilarly situated peopl~ t.bat s.\1~ represents; .
'-..,
13

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 1 Filed 01/15/15 Page 14 of 14
d. A judgment compensating the individual named Plaintiff for: the damages that she previously sutTered as a result of the City' s unconstitutional ' and unlawful conduct. including damages resulting from her confinement in jail;
e. Al:I order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys ' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1988, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
IslMat-thew ..S-w-erdlin Matthew Swerdlin (ASB-9090-M74S)
Matthew Swerdlin, Attorney at Law
i 736 Oxmoor Road # I0 I
Birmingham, AL 35209 (205)-793-351 7 matt@ attorneyswerdlin.com
lsi J. Mitch McGuire J. Mitch McGuire (ASIi-8317-S69M) .
M~agip.g Partp,er McGuire & Associates, LLC . 31 Clayton Street Montgomery, AL 3 6104 (334)-517-1000 hnp: / / www.m3l)dablj.si.nesslaw .c o m
, lsi William M. Dawson William M. Dawson (ASB-DAW002)
Dawson Law Office 2~29 Morris Av~nue Birmingham, Alabama 35203 205-307-7021
~
Alec Karakatsanis (D.C. Bar No. 999294) (Pending admission Pro Rac Vice)
Co-Founder E.qual Justice Under Law 916 G Street, NW Suite 701 Washington, DC 20001 (202)-681-2409 alec@ equaljus ticeunderlaw .org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
14

 
 Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 1 of 14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

)

PEGGY JONES, as Administrator of the )

Estate and Personal Representative of

)

Christy Dawn Varden, et al.

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

THE CITY OF CLANTON,

)

)

Defendant.

)

___________________________________ )

Case No. 2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC (Class Action)

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Introduction

This case is about the City of Clanton jailing some of its poorest people because they cannot

pay a small amount of money. Christy Dawn Varden is a recent arrestee who is currently

imprisoned by the City because she cannot afford to pay the amount of money generically set by

the “bail schedule” used by the City of Clanton and its police department. In the City of Clanton,

most people arrested for minor misdemeanor offenses are released almost immediately upon

payment of $500 cash. Those arrestees who are too poor to afford $500 remain in jail because of

their poverty until at least the following Tuesday at 3:00 p.m., when they first appear via video

conference from the jail at the City’s only weekly court session.

On behalf of the many other arrestees subjected to the City’s unlawful and ongoing post-

arrest money-based detention scheme, the Plaintiff challenges in this action the use of an unlawful

generic offense-based “bail schedule” that operates to detain only the most impoverished of minor

misdemeanor arrestees. The City’s policy has no place in modern American law.

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 2 of 14

By and through her attorneys and on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, the

Plaintiff seeks in this civil action the vindication of her fundamental rights, injunctive relief

assuring that her rights and the rights of the other Class members will not continue to be violated,

and a declaration that the City’s conduct is unlawful.

Nature of the Action1

1. It is the policy and practice of the City of Clanton to refuse to release misdemeanor

arrestees from jail unless they pay a generically set “bond” amount. That amount is $500 for every

misdemeanor offense except DUI offenses, for which an arrestee is kept in jail unless she can pay

$1,000.2 Because this sum is set generically by reference to the alleged offense of arrest, no

individualized factors are considered, and anyone who cannot afford to pay is held in jail at least

until the following Tuesday at 3:00 p.m., when the City holds its only weekly court session.

Members of the public are barred from attending that court session.

2. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief.

Jurisdiction and Venue

3.

This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201,

et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

4.

Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Parties

1 Plaintiff makes the allegations in this Complaint based on personal knowledge as to matters in which she has had personal involvement and on information and belief as to all other matters. 2 Felony arrestees are not subject to the jurisdiction of the City of Clanton and are instead processed according to policies adopted by Chilton County.
2

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 3 of 14

5.

Plaintiff Christy Dawn Varden is a 41-year-old resident of Clanton, Alabama. She

represents herself as an individual and a Class of similarly situated people all subject to the City’s

post-arrest detention scheme.

6. Defendant City of Clanton is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of

the State of Alabama. The City operates the Clanton Police Department and the Clanton Municipal

Court. The City also contracts with the Chilton County Jail to confine arrestees of the Clanton

Police Department who cannot afford to pay the generically scheduled cash bond. The City

notifies the Chilton County Jail to release arrestees as soon as the cash bond is paid to the City.

Factual Background

A. The Plaintiff’s Arrest

7. Christy Dawn Varden is a 41-year-old mother of two children.

8. Ms. Varden was arrested by Clanton police on January 13, 2015, outside of a

Walmart store in Clanton, Alabama. She was charged with four misdemeanor offenses, including

shoplifting, resisting arrest, failure to obey a police officer, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

9. Ms. Varden was taken to jail and told that she would be released if she paid a “bond”

to the City of Clanton of $500 for each of her charges. She was told that she would be kept in jail

unless she paid $2,000. See Exhibit 1, Declaration of Christy Dawn Varden.3

10. Ms. Varden is indigent. She has no assets and is not employed. She suffers from

several severe physical and mental illnesses that prevent her from working. She is prescribed

several medications to deal with her physical and mental illnesses. She was most recently

employed approximately two years ago, but she had to quit her job due to an extended hospital

stay in the intensive care unit.

3 Another person arrested by the City of Clanton within eight minutes of Ms. Varden and charged with multiple minor drug offenses was released from jail immediately after paying the City of Clanton the required cash payment.
3

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 4 of 14
11. Ms. Varden depends on food stamps to survive. She receives less than $200 per month in food stamps, which is her only income. She does not own any real property or a car.
12. Ms. Varden resides with her 66-year-old mother and children in Clanton. 13. Ms. Varden was not told when she would be brought to court and has not been brought to court for an initial appearance. Pursuant to City policy, the earliest that Ms. Varden would be brought to court for a first appearance is Tuesday, January 20, 2015, nearly a week after her arrest. B. The City’s Policies and Practices 14. The named Plaintiff would be released immediately by the City of Clanton if she or a family member paid the amount set by the City of Clanton. 15. The treatment of the named Plaintiff and other Class members is caused by and is representative of the City’s post-arrest detention policies and practices. 16. As a matter of policy and practice, when the City of Clanton Police Department makes an arrest for a minor misdemeanor offense, officers inform the arrestee at booking that the person will be released immediately if the person pays $500 cash.4 In the case of misdemeanor DUI offenses, the person is told that the amount necessary to secure release is $1,000. The arrestee is told that the arrestee will remain in jail if the arrestee is not able to make that payment. 17. Those arrestees unable to pay for release are eventually told that their first court appearance will be the following Tuesday at 3:00 p.m. The City of Clanton holds court only one time per week: each Tuesday at 3:00 p.m.
4 Because of the common availability of commercial bail bonds, those that remain in the custody of the City of Clanton are typically those that cannot even afford to pay a third-party bonding agent. The amount charged by a bonding agent to pay a $500 cash bond is typically $50, although such agents are free to refuse to pay for the release of an arrestee for any reason or for no reason. Thus, the availability of third-party agents, at least for those arrestees who can afford $50 but not $500, is no guarantee.
4

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 5 of 14
18. Because court is held only once per week, an arrestee too poor to buy out of jail could spend more than six days in jail prior to a first court appearance.
19. After an arrest, City of Clanton officials do not deviate from this “bail schedule” of $1,000 per DUI offense and $500 per other misdemeanor offense.5
20. Unlike many other cities, the City of Clanton does not allow post-arrest release on recognizance or with an unsecured bond (in which a person would be released by promising to pay the scheduled amount if the person later does not appear). Instead, City officials require that the payment amount be made up front.
21. The City of Clanton Police Department made 1,079 arrests for misdemeanor offenses in 2013. The Clanton police made 931 misdemeanor arrests in 2012 and 822 in 2011.
22. Many of Clanton’s minor misdemeanor arrestees are released soon after arrest upon payment of the scheduled amount of cash. Some remain detained for varying lengths of time until they or their families are able to borrow sufficient amounts of money or arrange for third-party payment. Others, like the named Plaintiff, who are too poor even to find anyone to pay the cash bond for them, are kept in jail for up to six days before their first court appearance.
23. Each Tuesday afternoon, there are commonly between three and ten destitute defendants who were not able to pay enough money to secure their release. The City of Clanton forces these inmates to appear by video screen in the courtroom from the jail.
24. The City of Clanton requires that the courtroom be empty and closed to the public for all such video proceedings. No person is allowed to enter the proceedings, which often include
5 In the case of arrests on warrants for the alleged violation of probation rather than on a new arrest, the City’s policy and practice is to base the amount of money necessary to secure release on the amount of debts owed by the person on their court costs and privatized probation fees. Thus, if an arrestee is unable to afford the balance of her court costs and fees, the person will be held at least until the following Tuesday by the City of Clanton. If the probationer is able to afford the balance of the fees, the arrestee is allowed to pay immediately and the person is released.
5

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 6 of 14
only the City prosecutor, City judge, and the defendant on video. On occasion, an arrestee is represented by an attorney, who is allowed to be present. All other members of the public are informed by uniformed City of Clanton Police Officers that they are not allowed to observe the City’s judicial proceedings, which include arraignments, pleas, trials, revocation hearings, and other proceedings.
25. The video feed from the jail is broadcast in the building’s waiting room, although the screen is muted so that no sound from the proceedings is audible. City officials refuse, as a matter of City policy, to allow the sound to be broadcast. According to City officials, no audio recordings or transcripts of the proceedings are available.
26. Despite the First Amendment’s guarantee of open public court proceedings and binding precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States and the Eleventh Circuit requiring all such proceedings to be open to the public, it is not possible for a member of the public to observe court proceedings involving inmates in the City of Clanton.
27. Because of Clanton’s unprecedented and illegal courtroom closure policies, it is difficult for the public to obtain accurate details concerning how many impoverished Clanton arrestees are unable to buy their release each week.
Class Action Allegations 28. The named Plaintiff brings this action, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, for the purpose of asserting the claims alleged in this Complaint on a common basis. 29. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the named Plaintiff and unknown Class members can challenge the City’s unlawful poverty-based post-arrest detention scheme. 30. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a Class action pursuant
6

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 7 of 14
to Rule 23(a)(1)-(4) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 31. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
requirements of those provisions. 32. The Plaintiff proposes one Class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The
Declaratory and Injunctive Class is defined as: All persons who are currently or who will become in the custody of the City of Clanton as a result of an arrest involving a misdemeanor offense.
A. Numerosity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 33. The City of Clanton Police Department made 1,079 arrests for misdemeanor offenses in 2013.6 Each arrestee is presented with the City’s standard cash bond choice of pay or jail. Arrestees are held in jail for varying lengths of time depending on how long it takes them to make the cash payment that the City requires for their release. 34. Some arrestees are able to pay for release immediately. Others are forced to wait a day or two days until they or family members can make the payment. Others are not able to pay or to find someone else to pay for them even after a few days. 35. Each weekly court appearance in the City’s municipal court commonly includes up to ten confined inmates arrested since the previous Tuesday who are still in custody because they could not afford the cash amount set by the City’s schedule. Thus, the number of future class members, even in a period of several months, numbers in the hundreds. B. Commonality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 36. The relief sought is common to all members of the Class, and common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class. The named Plaintiff seeks relief concerning whether the City’s policies, practices, and procedures violate the rights of the Class members and
6 The City appears to have been on a similar pace of arrests in 2014, but final statistics are not yet publicly available.
7

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 8 of 14
relief mandating the City to change its policies, practices, and procedures so that the constitutional
rights of the Class members will be protected in the future.
37. These common legal and factual questions arise from one central scheme and set
of policies and practices: the City’s post-arrest detention schedule. The City operates this scheme
openly and in materially the same manner every day. The material components of the scheme do
not vary from Class member to Class member, and the resolution of these legal and factual issues
will determine whether all of the members of the class are entitled to the constitutional relief that
they seek.
Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of fact are:
 Whether the City of Clanton has a policy and practice of using a generic offensebased “bail schedule” to determine the amount of money necessary to secure postarrest release;
 Whether the City of Clanton requires that scheduled amount to be paid up front in order to allow release;
 What post-arrest procedures the City of Clanton performs on misdemeanor arrestees;
 Whether the City of Clanton bars the public from attending its court proceedings.
38. Among the most important common question of law are:
 Whether a “bail schedule” setting standard amounts of cash required up front to avoid post-arrest detention violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses.7
C. Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
39. The named Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the
7 Other common questions pervade this case relating to other claims made in this Complaint. See infra at ¶¶ 49-52. For example, whether the City of Clanton bars the public from entering its courtroom such that the Plaintiff’s and other Class members’ appearances will be closed to the public and, if so, whether that policy violates the First Amendment and Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent requiring all judicial proceedings in American courts to be fully open to the public. Similarly, common questions exist as to whether non-individualized and entirely generic monetary bail requirements are arbitrary and excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
8

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 9 of 14
Class, and she has the same interests in this case as all other members of the Classes that she represents. Each of them suffers injuries from the failure of the City to comply with the basic constitutional provisions: they are each confined in jail because they could not afford to pay the City’s standardized cash bond amount. The answer to whether the City’s scheme of policies and practices is unconstitutional will determine the claims of the named Plaintiff and every other Class member.
40. If the named Plaintiff succeeds in the claim that the City’s policies and practices concerning post-arrest detention violate her constitutional rights, that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the Class.
D. Adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 41. The named Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because her interests in the vindication of the legal claims that she raises are entirely aligned with the interests of the other Class members, who each have the same basic constitutional claims. She is a member of the Class, and her interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the other Class members. 42. There are no known conflicts of interest among members of the proposed Class, all of whom have a similar interest in vindicating their constitutional rights in the face of their unlawful treatment by their local government. 43. The Plaintiff is represented by attorneys from Equal Justice Under Law who have experience litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both “bail schedule” schemes and the relevant constitutional law. Class Counsel has conducted an investigation over a period of months into the use of the generic “bail schedule,” including numerous interviews with witnesses, experts, City employees, inmates, families of inmates, local attorneys, community members, statewide experts in the functioning of Alabama municipal courts,
9

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 10 of 14
and national experts in post-arrest detention procedures and constitutional law. Class Counsel has studied the way that these systems function in other cities in order to investigate the wide array of reasonable constitutional options in practice for municipalities like the City of Clanton. As a result, Class Counsel has devoted enormous resources to becoming familiar with the “bail schedule” scheme and with all of the relevant state and federal laws and procedures that relate to it.
44. Counsel for the Plaintiff has also been the lead attorney in a recent constitutional civil rights class action lawsuit against the City of Montgomery. See Mitchell et al, v. City of Montgomery, 2014-cv-186 (M.D. Ala. 2014). That case involved a major investigation and landmark litigation to end widespread injustices involving the jailing of impoverished people by the City of Montgomery over a period of years for their non-payment of debt from traffic tickets.8
45. The Plaintiff is also represented in this case by multiple local Class Counsel. Matthew Swerdlin and J. Mitch McGuire9 have also devoted time and resources to investigating the City’s policies and practices, and they each have experience in the functioning of Alabama municipal police departments, including post-arrest procedures. Each also regularly represents impoverished and marginalized people in civil and criminal actions in Alabama and federal courts. Each was also local counsel in the Mitchell class action lawsuit before this Court. Moreover, Class counsel William Dawson is one of the most experienced criminal defense and civil rights lawyers in the State of Alabama, having worked for over 40 years on behalf of impoverished criminal
8 Counsel was also previously the lead attorney in a constitutional civil rights class action against the District of Columbia in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See 1:13-cv-00686-ESH (D.D.C. 2013). In that litigation, undersigned counsel was responsible for investigating and building the complex constitutional claims against the District of Columbia, authoring the legal filings in the class action case, and negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding with the District of Columbia Attorney General that stayed the class action litigation and began to implement sweeping changes to the city’s policies and practices governing the civil forfeiture of property by the District’s Metropolitan Police Department—procedures that affect thousands of putative class members every year. 9 Matthew Swerdlin is owner of Matthew Swerdlin, Attorney at Law, in Birmingham. J. Mitchell McGuire is Managing Partner of McGuire & Associates, in Montgomery. William Dawson is the owner of the Dawson Law Office in Birmingham.
10

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 11 of 14
defendants in the State of Alabama, tried over 500 jury trials in state and federal courts, and
successfully brought dozens of class action cases. The interests of the members of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiff and her attorneys.10
E. Rule 23(b)(2) 46. Class action status is appropriate because the City, through the policies, practices,
and procedures that make up its post-arrest detention scheme has acted in the same unconstitutional
manner with respect to all class members. The City of Clanton has created and applied a simple
scheme of post-arrest detention and release: it charges $500 to every misdemeanor arrestee (and
$1,000 for every DUI arrestee). The City releases those who can pay and detains those who cannot.
The detained arrestees are eventually taken to court on the following Tuesday for a first
appearance, sometimes as many as six days after arrest.
47. The Class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the City from
continuing in the future to detain impoverished arrestees who cannot afford cash payments.
Because the putative Class challenges the City’s scheme as unconstitutional through declaratory
and injunctive relief that would apply the same relief to every member of the Class, Rule 23(b)(2)
is appropriate and necessary.
48. Injunctive relief compelling the City to comply with these constitutional rights will
10 At least with respect to a Damages Class under Rule 23(b)(3) (which the Plaintiff does not seek here), courts have held that “ascertainability” is, in essence, a fifth Rule 23 prerequisite. A class must be “adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.” De Bremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970). “In other words, the class must meet a minimum standard of definiteness which will allow the trial court to determine membership in the proposed class,” although “‘it is not necessary that the members of the class be so clearly identified that any member can be presently ascertained.’” Earnest v. GMC, 923 F. Supp. 1469, 1473 & n.4 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (quoting Carpenter v. Davis, 424 F.2d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 1970)).
Although it is doubtful that such a requirement should exist with respect to a purely injunctive class under Rule 23(b)(2), see, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592-593 (3d Cir. 2012), that requirement is easily met here. The City of Clanton already has in its possession the identity of each and every person who it is keeping in its custody after an arrest because of the inability to post a cash bond. Also, by necessity, the City will come to know the identity of each person that it arrests in the future.
11

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 12 of 14
similarly protect each member of the Class from being subjected to the City’s unlawful policies and practices. A declaration and injunction stating that the City cannot use a cash “bail schedule” that jails indigent arrestees but frees arrestees with financial means would provide relief to every member of the Class. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate.
49. Plaintiff seeks the following relief and hereby demands a jury in this cause for all matters so appropriate.
Claims for Relief Count One: Defendant City of Clanton Violates Plaintiff’s Rights By Jailing Her Because She Cannot Afford A Cash Payment Prior to a First Court Appearance. 50. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-49. 51. The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses have long prohibited imprisoning a person for the person’s inability to make a monetary payment. Defendant violates Plaintiff’s rights by jailing her when she cannot afford to pay the amount set by the generic “schedule” used by the City of Clanton. Count Two: Defendant City of Clanton Violates Plaintiff’s Rights By Imprisoning Her After Arrest Based on a Generic Non-Individualized Monetary Bail. 52. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-51. 53. The Defendant’s use of a generic non-individualized offense-based “bail schedule” is arbitrary and excessive. By applying the same $1,000 per charge cash bond to all DUI arrestees and the same $500 cash bond to all other arrestees, the Defendant divorces the post-arrest, pretrial release determination from any individualized factors. The fundamental state11 and federal right to
11 In addition to the fundamental constitutional liberty interest in freedom from physical confinement, Alabama law creates a state-law liberty interest in release after arrest and prior to trial. Alabama law defines “bail” as the “release” of a person “with or without security.” Ala. Code § 15-13-102. Alabama law also provides an explicit state-law right to bail, with the liberty interest recognized both in the Alabama Constitution and in several statutes. See Ala. Code §
12

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 13 of 14
an individual’s liberty, therefore, is conditioned on an amount of money unrelated to any process or assessment of what would be required to assure that person’s appearance in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive and procedural due process guarantees, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on Excessive Bail, and the Supreme Court’s holding that setting of a non-excessive and reasonable bail requires an individualized consideration of circumstances.
Count Three: Defendant City of Clanton’s Closure of the Courtroom for all Hearings, Including Arraignments, Pleas, and Trials, Violates the First Amendment.
54. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-53 above. 55. The City of Clanton enforces a policy to bar the public from its courtroom. The City of Clanton Police Department stations officers and supervisors at the courtroom entrance and blocks the entry of any individual who is not a party to a case on the docket. During the inmate docket, which is conducted by video from the jail, no member of the public is allowed to enter the courtroom. Proceedings involving inmates are thus conducted, usually without an attorney representing the inmate, solely in the presence of the City prosecutor and City judge. These policies and practices are in flagrant violation of clearly established Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent requiring that all criminal judicial proceedings be open to the public.
Request for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the other Class members request that this Court issue the following relief: a. A declaratory judgment that the Defendant City violates the Plaintiff’s and Class members’ constitutional rights by jailing them because of their inability to pay a generically set amount of money to secure release after an arrest; b. A declaratory judgment that the Defendant City violates Plaintiff’s and Class members’ constitutional rights by forcing them to appear for criminal court proceedings that are closed to the public and an order requiring the City to ensure that its officers and officials allow proceedings in criminal cases to be open to the public;
15-13-2 (“In all cases other than [capital cases], a defendant is, before conviction, entitled to bail as a matter of right.”); see also Ala. Code § 15-13-102; Ala. Const. Art. I § 16.
13

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 55 Filed 04/03/15 Page 14 of 14
c. An order and judgment preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendant City of Clanton from enforcing the unconstitutional post-arrest money-based detention policies and practices against the Plaintiff and the Class of similarly situated people that she represents;
d. A judgment compensating the individual named Plaintiff for the damages that she previously suffered as a result of the City’s unconstitutional and unlawful conduct, including damages resulting from her confinement in jail;
e. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Matthew Swerdlin______________ Matthew Swerdlin (ASB-9090-M74S) Matthew Swerdlin, Attorney at Law 1736 Oxmoor Road #101 Birmingham, AL 35209 (205)-793-3517 matt@attorneyswerdlin.com
/s/ J. Mitch McGuire______________ J. Mitch McGuire (ASB-8317-S69M) Managing Partner McGuire & Associates, LLC 31 Clayton Street Montgomery, AL 36104 (334)-517-1000 http://www.mandabusinesslaw.com
/s/ William M. Dawson____________ William M. Dawson (ASB-DAW002) Dawson Law Office 2229 Morris Avenue Birmingham, Alabama 35203 205-307-7021
/s/ Alec Karakatsanis_______________ Alec Karakatsanis (D.C. Bar No. 999294) (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) Co-Founder Equal Justice Under Law 916 G Street, NW Suite 701 Washington, DC 20001 (202)-681-2409 alec@equaljusticeunderlaw.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
14

CCaassee22:1:155--ccvv--0000003344--MMHHTT--WWCC DDooccuummeenntt515--11 FFilieledd0014/1/053/1/155 PPaaggee11ooff11

i)

,

; s7 twA

.. I 1 ye.r—ot

oii&i

3)

cc 1 A E.. _ir___

trL

_,n1'._i

I

I

ty.__,

 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

PEGGY JONES, as

)

Administrator of the

)

Estate and Personal

)

Representative of Christy )

Dawn Varden,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

THE CITY OF CLANTON,

)

)

Defendant.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15cv34-MHT (WO)

OPINION Plaintiff Peggy Jones brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983

case as administrator of the estate of Christy Dawn

Varden, the original plaintiff in this case, who is now

deceased. Administrator Jones claims that, in violation

of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Varden

was jailed because she was too poor to pay a small amount

of bail money, which she was required to pay under the

terms of defendant City of Clanton’s bail schedule.

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal

question) and 1343 (civil rights).

The litigation is now before the court on the parties’ joint motion for entry of final judgment as to all matters excluding attorney’s fees. Based on the representations made on the record on July 1, 2015, and after a review of the entire record, the motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND Administrator Jones claims that Varden was unconstitutionally jailed because she could not afford to pay the amount of money set by the Clanton Municipal Court’s generic bail schedule. Although the facts remain disputed, the court will briefly review them--as alleged by Jones--to give background for the court’s decision to approve the settlement. Administrator Jones alleges that Varden was arrested and jailed for four misdemeanor offenses: shoplifting, resisting arrest, failure to obey a police officer, and possession of drug paraphernalia. At the time of Varden’s arrest, the Clanton Municipal Court utilized a
2

generic bail schedule for new misdemeanor arrests, a
schedule from which it did not deviate: $ 500 per charge
(and $ 1,000 per DUI charge). Those able to pay the
amount of the bond always obtained immediate release.
Those unable to pay were required to wait in jail until
the next court date, typically held on Tuesday
afternoons. The bail schedule required payment upfront
and provided no option to secure release on recognizance
or by an unsecured bond (that is, a promise to pay the
amount only if one did not appear for the scheduled court date).1
Administrator Jones alleges that under the terms of
the bail schedule, Varden could have been released
immediately had she paid a bond of $ 500 per charge, or
$ 2,000 in total. Varden was indigent, however, and too
1. Some people who cannot make this payment seek the assistance of third-party commercial bail agents, who typically charge an upfront fee of 10 %. Thus, a bonding agent would charge $ 50 for each $ 500 cash bond. However, the availability of third-party agents is not guaranteed, and agents are free to refuse to pay for the release of any arrestee. Further, some arrestees cannot afford even the 10 % fee.
3

poor to pay this amount. Because she was arrested on a Tuesday, after the weekly court hearings had already occurred, she would have been forced to remain in jail for seven days, until the next week’s hearings, before any judge reviewed her imprisonment or determined that the required bail was appropriate and reasonable in the context of her individualized circumstances. However, upon learning of the lawsuit, the city released her from jail a day after her arrest.
Jones also alleges that at the time Varden was arrested, the municipal court enforced a policy of barring the public from its courtroom.
The parties agree that, in the time since this lawsuit was filed, the city’s municipal-court policies as to both bail and public access have changed. Specifically, while the standard bail schedule for secured bonds remains the same, any person arrested on a misdemeanor violation is now released on an unsecured appearance bond as long as she has no outstanding warrant for failure to appear. Thus, the arrestee can be
4

released without any upfront payment, but will be required to pay the bond if she does not appear for her scheduled court date. An arrestee who has an outstanding failure-to-appear warrant is required to post a cash bond, commercial surety bond, or signatory bond (backed by real property) in the amount established by the bail schedule. The current policy also allows city officials to deny the release of anyone who poses a danger to herself or others or whose release is precluded by statute.
For a person who does not obtain immediate release under this policy, the municipal court will now hold a hearing within 48 hours of arrest to make an individualized determination as to whether the person may be released, and if so, under what conditions. The court understands the requirement in the city’s current policy guaranteeing “the arrestee ... the opportunity to object to the bail amount set for him or her” to mean that the municipal court will consider objections regarding ability to pay in determining the necessity and
5

appropriate amount of bail and whether to use an alternative to bail. A new policy also allows the public access to the courtroom during court sessions.
II. DISCUSSION With the now pending joint motion for entry of final judgment and the settlement agreement in support of it, the parties seek a judgment that, among other things, (1) resolves all disputes in this matter with the exception of attorney’s fees; (2) declares that the Clanton Municipal Court’s current bail practices, as they are reflected in the settlement agreement, are facially constitutional; (3) requires that the parties comply with the settlement agreement; and (4) dismisses this litigation with the exception that the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and to resolve the matter of attorney’s fees. Because a court’s declaration reflects its own views, this court has an independent obligation to make sure that the declaration is accurate and appropriate. Having
6

reviewed the Clanton Municipal Court’s current bail practices, the court, as explained below, agrees with the parties that, facially, they are consistent with applicable law and, as result, the court will enter the requested declaration.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “punishing a person for his poverty,” Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983), and this includes deprivations of liberty based on the inability to pay fixed-sum bail amounts. Indeed, this principle applies with special force to criminal defendants awaiting trial, who have not been found guilty of any crime. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (recognizing the fundamental nature of the right to pretrial liberty).
While the “[u]tilization of a master bond schedule provides speedy and convenient release for those who have no difficulty in meeting its requirements,” “[t]he incarceration of those who cannot [meet them], without meaningful consideration of other possible alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal protection
7

requirements.” Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978)2.
Thus, the use of a secured bail schedule to detain a person after arrest, without an individualized hearing regarding the person’s indigence and the need for bail or alternatives to bail, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1056-57 (“[I]imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible. ... Such requirement as is necessary to provide reasonable assurance of the accused’s presence at trial is constitutionally permissible. Any requirement in excess of that amount would be inherently punitive and run afoul of due process requirements.”); Bearden, 461 U.S. at 673-74 (explaining, in the context of probation, that to deprive a person “of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot
2. In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
8

pay the fine ... would be contrary to the fundamental

fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); State

v. Blake, 642 So. 2d 959, 968 (Ala. 1994) (“Under Alabama

law a defendant has an absolute right to bail in all

noncapital cases. A system of bail based totally on some

form of monetary bail, and not providing for release on a

defendant’s

own

recognizance

in

appropriate

circumstances, would be unconstitutional.”) (internal

citations omitted).

Under this precedent, the court finds that, facially,

the Clanton Municipal Court’s new bail policy, as

reflected in the municipal court’s new standing order,

see joint motion for entry of final judgment (doc. no.

72-2) at 8-9, and the court’s above explanation of its

understanding of that policy, see supra at 5-6, meets

constitutional due-process standards. This court need

not--and will not--determine whether the new policy

merely constitutes the constitutional minimum or goes

beyond what is required. But it does commend the city

and the municipal court for taking swift action to

9

rectify the former policies. Bail schemes such as the one formerly enforced in the municipal court result in the unnecessary pretrial detention of people whom our system of justice presumes to be innocent. This period of detention “has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972). It can also impede the preparation of one’s defense, see id. at 533 (noting that pretrial detention hinders a defendant’s “ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense”); it can induce even the innocent to plead guilty so that they may secure a quicker release, see Andrew D. Leipold, “How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions,” 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1123, 1154 (2005); and it may result in a period of detention that exceeds the expected sentence, see Stephanos Bibas, “Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial,” 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2463, 2492 (2004). Moreover, unnecessary pretrial detention burdens States, localities, and taxpayers, and
10

its use appears widespread: nationwide, about 60 % of jail inmates are pretrial detainees, and the majority of those people are charged with nonviolent offenses. See Todd D. Minton and Zhen Zeng, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2014, at 4, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf (PDF replication in this litigation (doc. no. 75)); Richard Williams, Bail or Jail, State Legislatures, May 2012, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/ bail-or-jail.aspx (PDF replication in this litigation (doc. no. 75)).
Criminal defendants, presumed innocent, must not be confined in jail merely because they are poor. Justice that is blind to poverty and indiscriminately forces defendants to pay for their physical liberty is no justice at all. By enacting a new policy that takes account of the circumstances of those who come before its courts, the Clanton Municipal Court has made marked strides in improving the quality of the justice it delivers. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16
11

(1956) (“Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem. People have never ceased to hope and strive to move closer to that goal.”).
*** The court will, therefore, enter an appropriate judgment granting the parties’ joint motion for entry of final judgment and, in accordance with that motion, (1) declaring that the Clanton Municipal Court’s current bail policies are facially constitutional, (2) requiring that the parties comply with their settlement agreement, and (3) dismissing administrator Jones’s claims with prejudice albeit with the exception that the court will
12

retain jurisdiction over the case to enforce the
settlement agreement and adjudicate the matter of
attorney’s fees.
DONE, this the 14th day of September, 2015. /s/ Myron H. Thompson___
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 71-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 1 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

PEGGY JONES, as Administrator of the )

Estate and Personal Representative of )

Christy Dawn Varden, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

THE CITY OF CLANTON,

)

)

Defendant.

)

Case No.: 2:15-cv-34-MHT

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Plaintiff Peggy Jones, as Administrator of the Estate and Personal Represe ntative of Christy Dawn Varden ("Plaintiff') in the above-styled matter and the City of Clanton ("the City"), hereby enter into this Settlement Agreement (" Agreement") as a full and final settlement of all Jones' claims, with the exception of attorney 's fees, and hereby agrees as follows:

I.

That the City and all of its officers, employees, and agents will comply with the

Order of the Municipal Court attached hereto as Exhibit 1 for not less than three years from the

effective date of this Agreement, so long as the order is in place.

2.

T hat the City represents that it has no current expectation that said Exhibit 1 will

be altered and the Municipal Court Judge (who serves by appointment of the City for a

renewable term provided by statute) has represented to the City that it is his current intention to

keep Exhibit 1 in place for the three-year period referenced in ~ I.

3.

Notwithstanding the above provisions, that, to the extent that Exhibit 1 is altered

in any material respect during the three-year period referenced in ~ I, the City will, upon any

agent of the City learning of said alteration, provide notice to the Plaintiff's counsel, Alec

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 71-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 2 of 7

Karakatsanis at the following telephone number and email add ress: (202) 681 -2409, a lec@ equaljusticeunderlaw.org, within seventy-two hours of the agent learning of such event.

4.

That if an event described in ~3 above occurs, the City represents that the City

wi ll petition the Court within seven days to reinstate Exhibit 1 or its material equivalent, or

provisions otherwise agreed upon with Plaintiff's counsel.

5.

That the City represents that it will ensure that the material provisions set out in

Exhibit 1 will be posted at the Chilton County Jail for the period referenced in ~I above such

that anyone arrested by the City of Clanton Police Department and taken to jail will be able to

view said posting.

6.

That for the same time period referenced in ~I above, the City agrees to comply

with
\.

the

provisions

set

out

in

the

Order

attached

hereto

as

Exhibit

2

and

to

provide

the

monetary

support to the Municipal Court of Clanton to ensure that the provisions set out therein are

practicable.

7.

That the City represents that it has no current expectation that said Exhibit 2 wi ll

be altered, but, to the extent that it is a ltered in any material respect during the period referenced

in ~ 1 above, the City's attorney w ill , upon any agent of the City learning of said alteration,

provide notice to Plaintiff's counsel, A lec Karakatsanis, at the following telephone number and

email address: (202) 681 -2409, alec@ equaljusticeunderlaw.org, within seventy-two hours of the

agent learning of such event.

8.

That the City represents that should an event occur as referenced in ~7 above, the

City will petition the Court to re instate Exhibit 2 or its materia l equivalent, or provisions

otherwise agreed upon with Plaintiff's counsel.

2

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 71-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 3 of 7

9.

That Plaintiff agrees to waive, and to release the City of and from, any and all

(known and unknown) complaints, and specifically that certain cause in the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Northern Division, styled as Peggy Jones, as

Administrator of the Estate and Personal Representative of Christy Dawn Varden, et a!. v. The

City of Clanton; Case No.: 2: 15-cv-34-MHT, and all other claims, causes of actions, actions,

damages, law suits, counterclaims, dues, accounts, agents, promises, expenses, liabilities,

punitive damages, compensatory damages, and any and all other claims of every kind (known

and unknown) and nature specifically, but not limited to, such claims arising out of, but not

limited to, the arrest and/or detention of Christy Dawn Varden, up to and including the Effective

Date of this Agreement.

I0. That Plaintiff agrees to the dismissal of her Motion for Class Certification and to forego her request for class certification and agrees not to file a Motion for Class Certification of any kind in the future in connection with this case or any claim that could have been brought in this case.

I I. That Plaintiff a nd Plai ntiffs counsel agree to notify counsel for the City immediate ly upon the discovery of any alleged material breach of the forego ing agreement. This notice shall include the specific nature of said breach and, if available, the time and date of said breach, the City, County or court personnel involved in the breach, and any other details necessary to identify the case or proceeding in which the said breach occurred to the extent the information is available. Said notice shall be conveyed both through e mail and telephonically to Shannon Holliday or Lee Copeland at the follow ing te lephone number and email addresses: (334) 834-11 80, ho lliday(a),cope landfranco.com, cope land@copelandfranco.com and Jim Porter at the following telephone number and emai l address: (205) 322-1 744, jw porterii@ pphlaw.net
3

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 71-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 4 of 7
with copies sent to the attention of the City Attorney for the C ity of C lanton, via the City Clerk' s office, at dorange(a),cityofclanton.org. Plaintiff agrees to g ive the City a reasonable opportunity to remedy the alleged breach before seeking rel ief from the United States District Court and w ill only notify the United States District Court if the action constituti ng the alleged material breach has not been corrected within a reasonable period of time.
12. That Plaintiff agrees that her heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns wi ll be bound by the terms of this Agreement.
13. That the Parties agree to file a Joint Motion for Entry of Final Judgment as to al l Matters Excluding Attorney ' s Fees w ithin ten days of the Effective Date of this Agreement. Sa id Joint Motion is attac hed hereto as Exhibit 3.
14. That the Parties agree that this Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original , but all of which, taken together, shall constitute one a nd the same agreement.
15. That each party hereto recognizes and acknowledges that the making of payment set forth herein does not constitute any admission of liability of any sort.
16. That Plaintiff hereby recognizes that she will not be able to initiate administrative or lega l proceedings against or otherwise sue those hereby released with respect to any matters herein released and that this Agreement is all compromising and is not limited by the specification of specific claims or specific injuries or damages, all of which are only partial subjects of thi s Agreement, which Agreement is intended to release all claims that Plaintiff has, or may have had against any of the released parties up to and incl uding the Effective Date of this Agreement.
4

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 71-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 5 of 7
17. That all obligations, agreements, releases and covenants not to sue contained herein and in all documents delivered hereunder shall survive the execution of thi s Agreement and continue in full force and effect.
18. That this Agreement may not be amended, modified or supplemented, except in writing executed by the party or parties which is or are to be bound by such amendment, modification or supplement.
19. That each party hereto shall use its best efforts and shall take all action and do all things necessary and prope r in order to consummate a nd make effective the transactions contemplated herein .
20. That this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties referenced herein and their respective successors, assigns, heirs and representatives.
21. That whenever and so often as requested by a party hereto, the other parties will promptly execute and deliver, or cause to be executed and delivered, all such other and further instruments, documents or assurances, and promptly do or cause to be done all such other and further things as may be necessary and reasonably required in o rder to further and more fully vest in such party al l rig hts, interest, powers, benefit, privileges and advantages conferred or intended to be conferred upon it by this Agreement.
22. That the Parties acknowledge and agree that thi s Agreement has been written in a manner understood by them and that they, in fact, understand this Agreement and entered into this Agreement knowingly and voluntari ly.
23 . That the effective date of this Agreement is the date that all parties have signed this Agreement and/or a counterpart of this Agreement.
5

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 71-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 6 of 7
Peggy n s, Administrator of the Estate and Personal Re resentative of Christy Dawn Varden Alec Karakatsanis Matthew Swerdlin William M. Dawson Counsel for Plaintiff- Peggy Jones
6

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 71-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 7 of 7
. . .
CITY OF CLANTON By: Bill oe Driver Its: Mayor
James W. Porter, II R. Warren Kinney Counsel for Defendant - City of Clanton Lee H. Copeland Shannon L. Holliday Counsel for Defendant- City of Clanton
7

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 71-2 Filed 06/29/15 Page 1 of 2 EXHIBIT
I !l
IN THE CITY OF CLANTON MUNICIPAL COURT
) ) ) )
STANDING ORDER REGARDING BAIL AND INDIGENCY DETERMINATIONS
Per the authority vested upon the Clanton Municipal Court pursuant to the Code of Alabama (1975), the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration, the Court hereby issues the following Order regarding bail for persons arrested on criminal charges to be tried within its jurisdiction:
As reflected through the previously existing schedule for setting bail for persons charged with municipal ordinance violations, all such violations, with the exception of Driving Under the Influence, shall have bail set at $500.00. Persons charged with Driving Under the Influence shall have bail set at $1,000.00. This dollar bail amount shall be referred to as the City of Clanton's "bail schedule." All persons charged with violations of an Ordinance of the City of Clanton, who
.have no outstanding warrants from the City of Clanton for fai lure to appear, shall be released
pursuant to an unsecured appearance bond in the amount established by the bail schedule. The unsecured appearance bond form which should be used is attached hereto as Addendum A. Any individual with an outstanding failure to appear arrest warrant from the City of Clanton must post a cash bond, commercial surety bond, or the signatory bond of an owner of real property within the State of Alabama in the amount established by the bail schedule. All such bonds shall be in an amount reflecting the total bail figure for all charges pending against a particular person. It is the opinion of the Clanton Municipal Court that the bail schedule for persons charged with Ordinance violations represents the least burdensome manner in which to reasonably ensure a

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 71-2 Filed 06/29/15 Page 2 of 2
criminal defendant's future appearance in court. Furthermore, utilization of such a bail schedule "provides speedy and convenient release for those who have no difficulty in meeting its requirements." Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (51h Cir. 1978).
Nothing in this Order, though, shall inhibit the ability of a judicial officer to eliminate bail as an option to a person arrested for violations of Ordinances of the City of Clanton in order to obtain his or her release if that person poses a danger to himself, herself or others in the community. Furthermore, the judicial officer shall adhere to all statutory requirements governing release of persons charged with certain offenses, e.g. domestic violence or driving under the influence of alcohol, which may preclude, for instance, the arrestee's immediate release.
For those individuals who do not obtain release pursuant to the bail schedule as outlined above, the Court will, within forty-eight hours of their arrest, hold a hearing either to arraign the arrestee or otherwise hold the proceeding to which the arrestee failed to appear (unless that proceeding was a trial or other matter requiring the setting of a new court date) and to determine, if necessary, what conditions, if any, should be placed on the arrestee pending release. At this time, the arrestee will be given the opportunity to object to the bail amount set for him or her. In the unlikely event that no hearing can be held within the forty-eight hour time frame, the arrestee shall be released pursuant to an unsecured bond. The jailing authority for the City of Clanton (the Sheriff's Department of Chilton County) shall inform the Municipal Court of any such arrestees in a timely fashion and will facilitate their appearance via teleconference with the Municipal Court of the City of Clanton at the time set by the Court.
,-
J DONE, this the / day ofMay 2015.

Case 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC Document 71-3 Filed 06/29/15 Page 1 of 1
R
~

EXHIBIT
19 l-

IN THE CITY OF CLANTON MUNICIPAL COURT
) ) ) ) ) ) )
STANDING ORDER REGARDING ACCESS TO COURTROOM
Per the authority vested upon the Clanton Municipal Court pursuant to the Code of Alabama (1975), the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration, the Court hereby issues the following Order regarding access to the Clanton Municipal Courtroom during court sessions:

As space is limited in the courtroom to sixty pursuant to the authority of the fire marshal, defendants whose cases are on the docket, their representatives and witnesses as well as prosecutors and their witnesses will be permitted entry into the courtroom first. To the extent that, after all such persons have taken their seats in the courtroom, there is any remaining seating available, it will made available to others. The proceedings, however, will be accessible to all others in the lobby of the courtroom by live video and audio feed.

j _ DONE, this the

day of March 2015.

(

 
 Case: 2:15-cv-34 As of: 05/04/2020 06:37 PM CDT 1 of 8
CLOSED,MHT−ClerkA,MHT−ClerkC
U.S. District Court Alabama Middle District (Montgomery) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:15−cv−00034−MHT−WC

Jones v. The City of Clanton Assigned to: Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson Referred to: Honorable Judge Wallace Capel, Jr Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 01/15/2015 Date Terminated: 09/14/2015 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Christy Dawn Varden TERMINATED: 04/03/2015

represented by Alec Karakatsanis Equal Justice Under Law Executive Director 916 G St NW − Ste 701 Washington, DC 20001 202−681−2409 Email: alec@civilrightscorps.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Mitchell McGuire McGuire & Associates LLC 31 Clayton Street Montgomery, AL 36104 334−517−1000 Fax: 334−517−1327 Email: jmcguire@mandabusinesslaw.com TERMINATED: 04/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew Scott Swerdlin Matthew Swerdlin, Attorney at Law P.O. Box 131131 Birmingham, AL 35213 2054403214 Email: matt@attorneyswerdlin.com TERMINATED: 04/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William M Dawson , Jr. Attorney at Law 1736 Oxmoor Road Birmingham, AL 35209 205−795−3512 Fax: 205−870−7763 Email: bill@billdawsonlaw.com TERMINATED: 04/03/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Peggy Jones as Administrator of the Estate and Personal Representative of Christy Dawn Varden

represented by Alec Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Mitchell McGuire (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:15-cv-34 As of: 05/04/2020 06:37 PM CDT 2 of 8
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Scott Swerdlin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William M Dawson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant The City of Clanton

represented by James Wallace Porter , II Porter, Porter & Hassinger PC 880 Montclair Road Suite 175 Birmingham, AL 35213 205−322−1744 Fax: 205−322−1750 Email: jwporterii@pphlaw.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Hall Copeland Copeland Franco Screws & Gill, PA PO Box 347 Montgomery, AL 36101−0347 334−834−1180 Fax: 334−834−3172 Email: copeland@copelandfranco.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon Lynn Holliday Copeland Franco Screws & Gill, PA PO Box 347 Montgomery, AL 36101−0347 334−834−1180 Fax: 334−834−3172 Email: holliday@copelandfranco.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Warren Kinney , III Porter, Porter & Hassinger, PC 880 Montclair Road; Suite 175 Birmingham, AL 35213 United Sta 205−322−1744 Fax: 205−322−1750 Email: wkinney@pphlaw.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 01/15/2015

# Docket Text
1 Inmate 1983 COMPLAINT against The City of Clanton ( Filing fee $ 400.00 receipt number 4602035196.), filed by Christy Dawn Varden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 fee receipt)(djy, ) (Entered: 01/15/2015)

Case: 2:15-cv-34 As of: 05/04/2020 06:37 PM CDT 3 of 8

01/15/2015
01/15/2015
01/15/2015 01/15/2015 01/15/2015 01/16/2015 01/16/2015 01/16/2015 01/16/2015 01/16/2015 01/16/2015
01/20/2015
01/22/2015 01/22/2015 01/22/2015 01/22/2015 01/22/2015 01/22/2015

2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order or in the alternative MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Christy Dawn Varden. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(djy, ) (Main Document replaced on 1/15/2015 to correct typographical error in case number only) (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 01/15/2015)
3 Motion for Alec Karakatsanis to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Filing fee $ 50.00 receipt number 4602035196.) by Christy Dawn Varden. (Attachments: # 1 certificate of good standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 fee receipt)(djy, ) Modified on 1/16/2015 to correct typographical error in attorney name (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 01/15/2015)
4 MOTION to Certify Class by Christy Dawn Varden. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(djy, ) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
5 Summons Issued as to The City of Clanton and returned to counsel for personal service on defendant. (djy, ) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
MOTION for Expedited Hearing re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, by Christy Dawn Varden. (No PDF document attached to this entry; see 2 Motions.) (scn, ) (Entered: 01/20/2015)
6 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Christy Dawn Varden. The City of Clanton served on 1/16/2015, answer due 2/6/2015. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Main Document 6 replaced on 1/16/2015) (scn, ). (Entered: 01/16/2015)
7 Notice of Deficiency requiring filing of Corporate Disclosure/Conflict Statement sent to Christy Dawn Varden. Corporate Disclosures due by 1/26/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Standing ORDER and sample format)(scn, ) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
8 ORDER granting 3 Motion for Leave for Alec Karakatsanis to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 01/16/2015. (scn, ) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
9 NOTICE by Christy Dawn Varden Notice of Release from Custody (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
MOTION to Withdraw 2 MOTION for Expedited Hearing, by Christy Dawn Varden. (No PDF document attached; see 9 Notice.) (scn, ) (Entered: 01/20/2015)
MOTION for a briefing schedule re 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, MOTION for hearing or telephone conference re 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, by Christy Dawn Varden. (No PDF document attached; see 9 Notice) (scn, ). (Entered: 01/20/2015)
10 ORDER directing that, pursuant to the notice of release from custody (doc. no. 9 ), it is ORDERED that the motion for temporary restraining order (doc. no. 2 ) is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/20/15. (scn, ) (Entered: 01/20/2015)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 1/22/2015 01:15 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by Richard Warren Kinney on behalf of The City of Clanton (Kinney, Richard) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by James Wallace Porter, II on behalf of The City of Clanton (Porter, James) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
13 Notice of Deficiency requiring filing of Corporate Disclosure/Conflict Statement sent to The City of Clanton. Corporate Disclosures due by 2/2/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Standing ORDER and sample format)(scn, ) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
14 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 1/22/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 1:17 − 1:31.) (ag, ) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
15 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by The City of Clanton. (Kinney, Richard) (Main Document 15 replaced with a published version on 1/23/2015) (scn, ). (Entered: 01/22/2015)

Case: 2:15-cv-34 As of: 05/04/2020 06:37 PM CDT 4 of 8

01/23/2015
01/26/2015
01/26/2015 01/26/2015 01/28/2015 02/03/2015 02/03/2015
02/04/2015 02/04/2015 02/06/2015 02/10/2015 02/13/2015 02/13/2015 02/13/2015 02/13/2015

16 ORDER directing as follows: (1) Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction (doc. no. 2 ) is set for an evidentiary hearing on February 24, 2015 at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson, Jr. U.S. Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama; (2) By February 6, 2015, the defendant is to file a brief summarizing the law and the proposed facts; (3) By February 13, 2015, the plaintiff is to file a reply brief. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 01/23/2015. (Furnished to Calendar/AG) (scn, ) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
17 ORDER directing as follows: (1) The motion to withdraw (doc. no. 9 ) is granted; (2) The motion for expedited hearing on motion for temporary−restraining order (doc. no. 2 ) is withdrawn; (3) The motion for hearing on motion for preliminary injunction (doc. no. 2 ) is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/26/15. (scn, ) (Entered: 01/26/2015)
18 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Christy Dawn Varden re 7 Notice of Deficiency requiring filing of Corporate Disclosure/Conflict Statement. (McGuire, Joseph) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/26/2015: # 1 Corrected certificate of service) (scn, ). (Entered: 01/26/2015)
19 STATUS REPORT Regarding Mediation by The City of Clanton. (Kinney, Richard) (Entered: 01/26/2015)
20 NOTICE of Non−Compliance re Attorney William M Dawson, Jr.. (Attachments: # 1 Standing ORDER, # 2 Renewal Form)(scn, ) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
21 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer/Response to 1 Inmate 1983 Complaint, by The City of Clanton. (Kinney, Richard) Modified on 2/3/2015 to terminate erroneous duplicate MOTION (scn, ). (Entered: 02/03/2015)
22 ORDER directing as follows: (1) Plaintiff's motion for class certification (doc. no. 4 ) is set for an evidentiary hearing at the same time as the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, on February 24, 2015 at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson, Jr. U.S. Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama; (2) By February 17, 2015 at 5 p.m., the defendant is to file a brief in response to the motion for class certification; (3) By February 23, 2015 at 5 p.m., the plaintiff may file a reply brief. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on February 3, 2015. (scn, ) (Entered: 02/03/2015)
23 TEXT ORDER granting 21 Motion for Extension of Time to and including 03/03/2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on February 4, 2015. (No PDF document attached to this entry.) (scn, ) Modified on 2/4/2015 to reset deadline pursuant to TEXT ORDER (scn, ). (Entered: 02/04/2015)
Reset ANSWER Deadlines pursuant to text order: The City of Clanton due 03/03/2015. (No PDF document attached to this entry.) (scn, ) (Entered: 02/04/2015)
24 RESPONSE in Opposition re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by The City of Clanton. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Tinsley Affidavit with Attachments, # 2 Affidavit Ann Davis Affidavit with Attachments)(Kinney, Richard) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
25 SECOND NOTICE of Non−Compliance re Attorney William M Dawson, Jr.. (Attachments: # 1 Standing ORDER, # 2 Attorney Renewal Form)(scn, ) (Entered: 02/10/2015)
26 NOTICE by United States of America (Statement of Interest of the United States (Anderson, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
27 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by United States of America. (Anderson, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
28 REPLY to Response to Motion re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Christy Dawn Varden. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
29 ORDER directing that, because of a scheduling conflict, it is ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction (doc. no. 2 ) and motion for class certification (doc. no. 4 ) are reset for an evidentiary hearing on March 16, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson, Jr. U.S. Courthouse

Case: 2:15-cv-34 As of: 05/04/2020 06:37 PM CDT 5 of 8

02/13/2015 02/13/2015 02/13/2015 02/13/2015 02/13/2015 02/13/2015 02/17/2015 02/20/2015 02/20/2015 02/20/2015
02/23/2015 03/03/2015 03/05/2015
03/09/2015 03/09/2015 03/09/2015
03/09/2015

Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on February 13, 2015. (Furnished to Calendar/AG)(Term'd: Hearing 02/24/2015)(scn, ) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
***Attorney Robert G Anderson for United States of America added. (scn, ) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
***Attorney Winsome G. Gayle for United States of America added. (scn, ) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
***Attorney Paul Killebrew for United States of America added. (scn, ) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
***Attorney Sharon Brett for United States of America added. (scn, ) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
30 NOTICE of Appearance by Lee Hall Copeland on behalf of The City of Clanton (Copeland, Lee) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
31 NOTICE of Appearance by Shannon Lynn Holliday on behalf of The City of Clanton (Holliday, Shannon) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
32 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 4 MOTION to Certify Class filed by The City of Clanton. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(Holliday, Shannon) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference re hearing date set for 2/20/2015 09:00 AM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
33 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 2/20/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 9:08 − 9:18.) (ag, ) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
35 TEXT ORDER RESETTING Evidentiary Hearing re: 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and 4 MOTION to Certify Class from 3/16/2015 @ 10:00 am to 3/13/2015 @ 10:00 AM before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, in Courtroom 2FMJ, Frank M. Johnson, Jr. U.S. Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/20/15. Furnished to calendar group & AG. (NO PDF document attached to this notice).(djy, ). (Entered: 02/20/2015)
34 REPLY to Response to Motion re 4 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Christy Dawn Varden. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 02/23/2015)
36 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by The City of Clanton. (Kinney, Richard) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
37 (VACATED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S 48 ORDER) ORDER directing that the motion to dismiss (doc. no. 36 ) is set for submission, without oral argument, on, April 9, 2015, with any opposition brief due by March 26, 2015, and any reply to the opposition due by April 9, 2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on March 5, 2015. (scn, ) Modified on 3/27/2015 (kh, ). (Entered: 03/05/2015)
38 SUGGESTION OF DEATH Upon the Record as to Christy Dawn Varden by Christy Dawn Varden. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
39 MOTION to Continue by The City of Clanton. (Kinney, Richard) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
40 Supplement to the 39 MOTION to Continue Hearing, by The City of Clanton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Kinney, Richard) Modified on 3/10/2015 to terminate erroneous motion, create relationship to 39 motion, and correct docket text pursuant to PDF document (scn, ). (Entered: 03/09/2015)
NOTICE of Docket Text Correction re 40 Supplement to 39 Motion to Continue Hearing to reflect (a) termination of erroneous motion, (b) creation of relationship to 39 Motion, and (c) correction of docket text from MOTION to Supplement to Motion. (No PDF document attached to this entry.) (scn, ) (Entered: 03/10/2015)

Case: 2:15-cv-34 As of: 05/04/2020 06:37 PM CDT 6 of 8

03/10/2015 03/10/2015 03/10/2015 03/10/2015 03/10/2015 03/11/2015
03/11/2015 03/25/2015 03/27/2015
03/27/2015 03/31/2015 03/31/2015 03/31/2015 03/31/2015 04/01/2015
04/03/2015 04/03/2015

41 RESPONSE in Opposition re 39 MOTION to Continue filed by Christy Dawn Varden. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 03/10/2015)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference re 38 Suggestion of Death set for 3/10/2015 02:45 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 03/10/2015)
42 MOTION for Discovery [Expedited] by Christy Dawn Varden. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 03/10/2015)
43 RESPONSE to Motion re 42 MOTION for Discovery [Expedited] filed by The City of Clanton. (Kinney, Richard) (Entered: 03/10/2015)
44 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 3/10/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 2:50 − 3:16.) (ag, ) (Entered: 03/10/2015)
45 ORDER directing that: (1) The motion to continue (doc. no. 39 ) is granted; (2) The hearing on the motions for preliminary injunction (doc. no. 2 ) and for class certification (doc. no. 4 ) previously set for March 13, 2015, is reset for April 17, 2015, at 10 a.m. in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson, Jr. U.S. Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama; (3) Should there be any changed circumstances before the hearing, each party shall, no later than five days before the hearing, file a brief with the court explaining those changes and the legal implications of said changes. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 03/11/2015. (Furnished to Calendar/AG) (scn, ) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
46 SUGGESTION OF DEATH Upon the Record by The City of Clanton. (Holliday, Shannon) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
47 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by Christy Dawn Varden. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
48 ORDERED that: (1) The unopposed 47 motion for extension of time is granted. (2) The 37 submission order is vacated. (3) The 36 motion to dismiss is reset for submission, without oral argument, on May 11, 2015, with any opposition brief due by April 27, 2015, and any reply to the opposition due by May 11, 2015. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/27/2015. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
49 MOTION to Substitute Party by Peggy Jones. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1: Letters of Administration)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
50 (STRICKEN AS ERRONEOUS DOCKET ENTRY ON 03/31/2015) MOTION for Protective Order by The City of Clanton. (Kinney, Richard) Modified on 3/31/2015 (scn, ). (Entered: 03/31/2015)
51 MOTION for Protective Order unopposed by The City of Clanton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Kinney, Richard) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
52 NOTICE of FILING ERROR re 50 MOTION for Protective Order to reflect striking as erroneous docket entry. (scn, ) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
53 PROTECTIVE ORDER granting 51 Motion for Protective Order, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Wallace Capel, Jr on March 31, 2015. (scn, ) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
54 ORDER directing that the motion to substitute plaintiff (doc. no. 49 ) is granted, and the plaintiff is given leave to file an amended complaint substituting the new plaintiff within seven days of this order, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on April 1, 2015. (scn, ) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
55 AMENDED COMPLAINT against The City of Clanton, filed by Peggy Jones. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 04/03/2015)
***Attorney Matthew Swerdlin, Joseph Mitchell McGuire, and William M Dawson, Jr for Peggy Jones added pursuant to 55 Amended Complaint. (scn, ) (Entered: 04/06/2015)

Case: 2:15-cv-34 As of: 05/04/2020 06:37 PM CDT 7 of 8

04/06/2015 04/06/2015 04/08/2015 04/08/2015 04/08/2015 04/08/2015
04/08/2015 04/09/2015 04/29/2015 05/06/2015
05/11/2015 05/13/2015 05/13/2015 05/14/2015
06/03/2015

56 Notice of Deficiency requiring filing of Corporate Disclosure/Conflict Statement sent to Peggy Jones. Corporate Disclosures due by 4/16/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Standing ORDER and sample format)(scn, ) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
57 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Peggy Jones re 56 Notice of Deficiency requiring filing of Corporate Disclosure/Conflict Statement. (McGuire, Joseph) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
58 Joint MOTION to Continue Deadlines for Briefing and to Continue Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification Hearing by The City of Clanton, Peggy Jones, and Christy Dawn Varden. (Holliday, Shannon) Modified on 4/9/2015 to add joint filers pursuant to PDF document (scn, ). (Entered: 04/08/2015)
59 RESPONSE in Opposition re 49 MOTION to Substitute Party filed by The City of Clanton. (Kinney, Richard) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
60 REPLY to Response to Motion re 49 MOTION to Substitute Party filed by Peggy Jones. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
61 ORDER that: (1) The 58 Joint Motion to Continue is granted. (2) The hearing on the motions for preliminary injunction (doc. no. 2 ) and for class certification (doc. no. 4 ), previously set for 4/17/2015, is RESET for 5/18/2015 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ in Montgomery, AL before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson, with the previously ordered briefing (see doc. no. 45 ) due five days before the new date. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/8/2015. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
62 ORDER: As the original complaint has been superseded by an amended complaint, it is ORDERED that the 36 Motion to Dismiss is denied with leave to renew within 21 days of the date of this order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/8/2015. (dmn, ) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
63 ORDER directing that the objection to motion for substitution (doc. no. 59 ) is overruled. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on April 9, 2015. (scn, ) (Entered: 04/09/2015)
64 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by The City of Clanton. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Exhibit 1)(Kinney, Richard) (Entered: 04/29/2015)
65 ORDER directing that the motion to dismiss (doc. no. 64 ) is set for oral argument on May 18, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on May 6, 2015. (Furnished to Calendar/AG) (scn, ) (Entered: 05/06/2015)
66 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 4 MOTION to Certify Class SHOWING CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES filed by The City of Clanton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Holliday, Shannon) (Entered: 05/11/2015)
Set Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 5/13/2015 03:30 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 05/13/2015)
67 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 5/13/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 3:37 − 3:41.) (ag, ) (Entered: 05/13/2015)
68 ORDER directing as follows: (1) All pending motions are denied without prejudice; (2) All deadlines are suspended and all hearings are cancelled; (3) An on−the−record status conference is set for June 3, 2015, at 10:00 a.m. Counsel for the parties are to arrange for the conference to be conducted by telephone. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on May 14, 2015. (Furnished to Calendar/AG) (Term'd: Motion hearing 05/18/2015) (scn, ) (Entered: 05/14/2015)
69 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 6/3/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 10:13 − 10:23.) (ag, ) (Entered: 06/03/2015)

Case: 2:15-cv-34 As of: 05/04/2020 06:37 PM CDT 8 of 8

06/04/2015
06/29/2015
07/01/2015
07/01/2015 07/20/2015 09/14/2015 09/14/2015 09/14/2015

70 ORDER directing as follows: (1) Another on−the−record status conference is set for July 1, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., as further set out; (2) On or before June 29, 2015, the parties are to file their settlement papers, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on June 4, 2015. (Furnished to Calendar/AG)(scn, ) (Entered: 06/04/2015)
71 NOTICE of Settlement, by Peggy Jones and The City of Clanton re 70 Order. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 to Ex A, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit A to Ex 3, # 6 Exhibit 1 to Ex A)(McGuire, Joseph) Modified on 6/30/2015 to clarify text and add joint filer pursuant to PDF document (scn, ). (Entered: 06/29/2015)
72 Joint MOTION for Entry of Final Judgment as to All Matters Excluding Attorney's Fees by Peggy Jones and The City of Clanton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit 1 to Ex. A)(McGuire, Joseph) Modified on 7/1/2015 to add joint filer and clarify text pursuant to PDF document (scn, ). (Entered: 07/01/2015)
73 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 7/1/2015 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time 10:10 − 10:23.) (ag, ) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
74 NOTICE by Peggy Jones of New Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1: Dothan TRO, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2: Velda City Judgment)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 07/20/2015)
75 NOTICE OF ONLINE CITATIONS. (wcl, ) (Entered: 09/14/2015)
76 OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/14/2015. (wcl, ) (Entered: 09/14/2015)
77 JUDGMENT: it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court as follow: (1) The parties' 72 joint motion for entry of final judgment is granted; (2) The parties' 72 settlement agreement is adopted as the order of the court; (3) As expressly requested by the parties in their 72 joint motion for entry of final judgment at 2, the following facial declaration is adopted and entered by the court, as further set out in the judgment; (4) The parties are to comply with all terms of the 72 settlement agreement for the period set out in the agreement; (5) Plf's claims are dismissed with prejudice but with two exceptions: the court retains jurisdiction (a) to enforce the 72 settlement agreement for the period set out in the agreement and (b) to resolve the matter of attorney's fees; (6) Plf Peggy Jones is allowed 42 days from today's date to file a motion for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The court will enter a briefing schedule after the motion is filed; DIRECTING the clerk to enter this document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 58 FRCP; This case is closed. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/14/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist) (wcl, ) (Entered: 09/14/2015)