IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

BRIAN OTERO, Plaintiff, v.
THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook County, and COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

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Case No. 12 C 3148

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Defendants Thomas J. Dart (“Dart”) and Cook County Illinois (collectively, the “Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff Brian Otero’s (“Otero”) claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(b)(1) or to strike under Rule 12(f). For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part.1
RELEVANT FACTS Otero alleges the following facts in support of his claims, which the Court accepts as true for the purpose of this motion. On November 23, 2009, the Chicago Police Department arrested Otero for an alleged burglary. (R. 1, Compl. ¶ 21.) Otero was charged with burglary and held in Cook County Jail pending trial because he could not afford to make bail. (Id.) Otero stood trial for burglary July 18-21, 2011 and was found “not guilty” on all charges. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 24.) Otero
1 Otero withdrew his prayer for punitive damages. (R. 20, Resp. at 8.) The Court, therefore, denies Defendants’ requests regarding punitive damages as moot.

had no outstanding warrants at the time of the acquittal. (Id. ¶ 25.) After the acquittal, Defendants placed Otero in handcuffs and transported him back to Cook County Jail for processing. (Id. ¶ 27.) Defendants detained Otero in the “bullpen” at Cook County Jail for approximately twelve hours while Defendants completed the procedure to process Otero for release. (Id. ¶ 29.) Defendants have a policy or practice to hold individuals in custody pending the completion of a check for warrants and holds (the “Unlawful Detention Policy”). (Id. ¶ 32.) While in the bullpen, an inmate punched and pummeled Otero about the face and body after Otero informed the inmate that he had been acquitted. (Id. ¶ 30.)
LEGAL STANDARD I. Rule 12(b)(1)
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the allegations regarding subject matter jurisdiction on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443-44 (7th Cir. 2009); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by MinnChem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012). “Where jurisdiction is in question, the party asserting a right to a federal forum has the burden of proof, regardless of who raises the jurisdictional challenge.” Craig v. Ontario Corp., 543 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2008). II. Rule 12(b)(6)
“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will
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ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)).
“In evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, [courts] view it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and making all possible inferences from the allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.” AnchorBank, 649 F.3d at 614. “To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 934-35 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The complaint ‘must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations that raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Id. at 935 (citing Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., 536 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2008)). “[A] plaintiff’s claim need not be probable, only plausible: ‘a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation omitted)). “To meet this
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plausibility standard, the complaint must supply ‘enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ supporting the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). III. Rule 12(f)
“Rule 12(f) provides that a district court ‘may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.’” Delta Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Const., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)). Motions to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) are usually discouraged. See Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 903 (7th Cir. 2012). Motions to strike are appropriate, however, if they serve to expedite litigation. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992) (allegations may be stricken if the matter bears no possible relation to controversy). District courts have considerable discretion to strike allegations under Rule 12(f). See Delta, 554 F.3d at 1141–42. “The party moving to strike has the burden of showing that the challenged allegations are so unrelated to plaintiff's claim as to be devoid of merit, unworthy of consideration, and unduly prejudicial.” E & J Gallo Winery v. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 247 F. Supp. 2d 979, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citation and internal quotation omitted).
ANALYSIS On April 27, 2012, Otero filed a one count complaint against Thomas Dart, the Sheriff of Cook County, and Cook County Illinois. (Compl. ¶¶ 34-41.) Defendants jointly filed Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike the Plaintiff’s Complaint. (R. 16, Mot. to Dismiss.) Defendants’ argue (1) Otero has failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2)
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Otero lacks standing to seek equitable relief; and (3) Otero cannot assert substantive claims against Cook County, which is an essential party only for the purposes of indemnification. (Id.) The Court addresses these arguments in turn. I. Unlawful Detention in Violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Otero alleges that Defendants have a “policy or practice of unlawfully detaining, holding in custody or imprisoning free citizens following a trial or other proceeding at which the citizen is found not-guilty or otherwise acquitted” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 36.) Defendants move to dismiss on the basis that Otero has not sufficiently alleged facts to demonstrate that a custom or policy by either Sheriff Dart or Cook County caused injuries of a “constitutional magnitude.” (Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) The Court disagrees.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Where, as here, the Section 1983 defendants are public entities,2 the plaintiff must demonstrate both an underlying deprivation of a federal right, and that the deprivation “was caused by an official policy or custom.” Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 301 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)).
2 Otero sues Dart in his official capacity only. (Compl. ¶ 10.) “Actions against individual defendants in their official capacities are treated as suits brought against the government entity itself.” Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S. Ct. 358, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1991)).
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A plaintiff may establish that a governmental entity’s policy caused a violation of his constitutional rights through one of three ways. A governmental entity may be liable under Section 1983 if the alleged constitutional violations were caused by: (1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by the entity’s officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom that, though not officially authorized by law or express policy, is widespread and well settled so as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) an act by an official with final policymaking authority where that act is in conformity with, or in the creation of, governmental policy or rules that essentially have the force of law. See Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690); Valentino v. Vill. of S. Chi. Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2009)). Otero alleges that Defendants’ policy or practice of holding in custody or imprisoning citizens after their acquittal “is so widespread, permanent and well settled that it constitutes a custom or usage with the force of law.” (Compl. ¶ 8.)
Otero asserts that the Unlawful Detention Policy violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because Defendants detained him for an unreasonable length of time and in an unreasonable manner after Defendants no longer had probable cause or any right to detain him. (Id. ¶ 32.) Specifically, Otero alleges that the Unlawful Detention Policy led to twelve hours of unlawful detention, during which he sustained physical injuries from a beating in the bullpen. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 30.) Whether the factual record fully bears out Otero’s allegations after discovery is a matter for another day. “The issue [at the motion to dismiss stage] is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” AnchorBank, 649 F.3d at 614.
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Otero need not identify a specific unlawful policy at this stage because he sufficiently describes the policy or practices at issue. See Wiek v. Keane, No. 09 CV 920, 2010 WL 1976870, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2010) (holding that a plaintiff “is not required to provide extrinsic evidence that a policy existed” and that “[plaintiff’s] assertions that the officers held him overnight in accordance with a municipal policy are sufficient to put the City on notice of his claim.”); Padilla v. City of Chi., No. 07 CV 5253, 2011 WL 3793413, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2011) (finding it sufficient for a Monell claim that plaintiff pointed to particular practices, though plaintiff did not point to a particular policy); Riley v. Cnty. of Cook, 682 F. Supp. 2d 856, 861 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“[A]n official capacity claim can survive even with conclusory allegations that a policy or practice existed, so long as facts are pled that put the defendants on proper notice of the alleged wrongdoing.”). Specifically, Otero alleges that the Unlawful Detention Policy includes placing acquitted inmates in the general population and holding them in custody pending the completion of a check for warrants and holds. (Compl. ¶ 32.) These allegations amount to more than just boilerplate language reciting the elements of the offense. Otero has sufficiently apprised Defendants of the allegedly unconstitutional policy or custom, and thus has alerted Defendants to the nature of his claim.
It is also not fatal that Otero alleges facts relating only to his own detention, while asserting that the Unlawful Detention Policy is “widespread” and applies to others. See Hunt v. Hardy, No. 11 C 4396, 2012 WL 2458943, at * 6 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2012) (denying a motion to dismiss when plaintiff alleged that he was denied medical treatment while incarcerated as a result of a widespread custom among correctional employees and the warden); Hoskins v. Dart, No. 09 CV 5145, 2010 WL 4823065, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2010) (finding plaintiff stated a
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claim for relief under Section 1983 by alleging that the sheriff, in his official capacity, carried out a policy of placing rival gangs together in lockup, despite the fact that plaintiff only referenced facts relating to incidents involving himself); see also McCormick v. City of Chi., 230 F.3d 319, 324–35 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that inclusion of phrases such as “highest policymaking officers” and “widespread custom” is enough to withstand a motion to dismiss for a Section 1983 municipal liability claim). Because Otero has sufficiently pled a Section 1983 claim, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint. II. Otero’s Requests for Equitable Relief
Otero seeks a permanent injunction and other equitable relief necessary to eliminate the Unlawful Detention Policy. (Compl. ¶ 2.) Defendants move to dismiss or strike these claims for equitable relief asserting that Otero does not have standing to seek injunctive relief because he is not subject to ongoing unconstitutional detention following acquittal and was not detained at the time he filed suit. (Mot. to Dismiss at 8.) The Court agrees that Otero lacks standing to seek equitable relief under Article III of the Constitution because he has not shown a “real and immediate danger that the alleged harm will occur.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983) (“past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case for injunctive relief”); see also Sierakowski v. Ryan, 223 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that plaintiff lacked the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the litigation to seek injunctive relief because the prospects of future injury were purely speculative).
Otero was previously incarcerated in Cook County Jail, but is not currently incarcerated or being detained in any way at Cook County Jail. (Compl. ¶¶ 23-29.) Otero, therefore, does not assert any harm that is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v.
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Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). Even if Otero had alleged that he may personally be subjected to the Unlawful Detention Policy in the future, which he does not, such allegations would be highly speculative and too attenuated to establish standing. Indeed, he would have to show that he might one day be arrested, detained in Cook County Jail, acquitted, and then detained after his acquittal. Speculation about a possible chain of future events does not establish standing. See e.g., O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S. Ct. 669, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974) (finding a plaintiff lacks standing when the “prospect of future injury rests on the likelihood that respondents will again be arrested for and charged with violations of the criminal law and will again be subjected to bond proceedings, trial, or sentencing before petitioners”); Campbell v. Miller, 373 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a plaintiff alleging a policy of unlawful body-cavity searches lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief because “unless the same events are likely to happen again to him there is no controversy between him and the City about the City’s future handling of other arrests”) (emphasis in original); Knox v. McGinnis, 998 F.2d 1405, 1413 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding the “mere possibility” that the prisoner plaintiff would be returned to the segregated unit of the prison where officers use a “black box” on prisoners did not establish a real and immediate case or controversy); Robinson v. City of Chi., 868 F.2d 959, 969 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to obtain an injunction against certain policies that resulted in misdemeanor arrestees being held for excessive periods of time because they could not “show a real or immediate threat that they will be wronged again”); Swanigan v. City of Chi., No. 08 C 4780, 2012 WL 28696, at * 5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2012) (finding no actual case and controversy existed as to a police “hold” procedure because plaintiff did not plead that he would be arrested
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again and the court assumed he would follow the law and not encounter the allegedly unlawful procedure again); Simack v. City of Chi., No. 02 C 3139, 2003 WL 924335, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2003) (finding the possibility that the plaintiff would be wrongfully arrested for a misdemeanor and detained unreasonably too speculative to establish standing).
Otero also cannot attain standing to seek equitable relief based on the harms that may occur to potential members of an alleged class that has not been certified and may never be. See e.g., Miller, 373 F.3d at 836 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that where a district court has yet to certify a class, plaintiff may not rely on “the prospect that other arrested persons may be subjected” to the same treatment he is now challenging as unconstitutional); Yachnin v. Village of Libertyville, 803 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (refusing to allow defendant, for purposes of standing, to represent all persons arrested or all persons who may be arrested in the future pursuant to a particular policy, when the class was not yet certified).
Otero has sufficiently pled a claim for relief under Section 1983, as discussed above, and may seek damages, but he does not have standing to seek equitable relief. See Yachnin, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (“‘plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought’”) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000)); see also Lyons, 461 U.S. at 95 (finding that plaintiff had standing to seek damages but not to seek injunctive relief against abusive police practices). The Court, therefore, strikes all references to equitable relief from the Complaint. See Jumpfly, Inc. v. Torling, No. 10 C 0385, 2010 WL 1978732, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2010) (granting in part motion to strike prayer for injunctive relief).
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III. Cook County as a Party Otero sues Sheriff Dart in his official capacity and joined Cook County as a party
pursuant to Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle Cnty., 324 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003). (Compl. ¶ 10) Cook County is an indispensable party to this lawsuit because state law requires the county to pay judgments entered against the Sheriff’s office in its official capacity. See Carver, 324 F.3d at 948 (“a county in Illinois is a necessary party in any suit seeking damages from an independently elected county officer (sheriff, assessor, clerk of court, and so on) in an official capacity”); see also Askew v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 568 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2009). “Illinois law establishes that the Sheriff is an independently elected county officer and is not an employee of the county in which the sheriff serves.” Askew, 568 F.3d at 636 (citations omitted); Thomas 604 F.3d at 305 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2010) (“the Sheriff is an independently-elected officer who is accountable only to the people, rather than the County board”) (citing Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir. 1989)). Cook County, therefore, is not vicariously liable for actions taken by the Sheriff or his hired deputies. See Milestone v. City of Monroe, Wis.,665 F.3d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 2011) (“There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; the Supreme Court ‘distinguish[es] acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality.’”) (citation omitted); see also Franklin v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682, 685–86 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that the county cannot be liable under Section 1983 Monell claim for policies of a sheriff, and also explaining that the county has no respondeat superior liability) (citing Moy v. Cnty. of Cook, 159 Ill.2d 519, 203 Ill. Dec. 776, 640 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. 1994) (holding that Cook County is not liable under respondeat superior for the acts of the sheriff because the sheriff is an independently elected county officer rather than an employee of the county)).
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Additionally, Cook County cannot be held liable under Monell because the county lacks the authority to establish any policies regarding the training or performance by the employees of the Sheriff’s Office. See Thompson, 882 F.2d at 1187 (affirming dismissal of Cook County as a defendant against a Monell claim since the County had “no authority to train the employees involved or to set the policies under which they operate”); see also Ebrahime v. Dart, No. 09 C 7825, 2010 WL 4932655, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2010) (dismissing a Monell claim against the county “because it is the Sheriff who is the policymaker at the county jail”). It is unclear from the Complaint whether Otero asserts substantive claims against Cook County beyond indemnification because Otero refers to Defendants collectively. To the extent that Otero alleges substantive claims against Cook County, the Court dismisses those claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count I, but grants the motion to the extent that the Complaint asserts substantive claims against Cook County. The Court also grants Defendants’ motion to strike Otero’s requests for equitable relief.

Date: October 18, 2012

ENTERED

_______________________________ AMY J. ST. EVE United States District Court Judge

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 Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/27/12 Page 1 of 11 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

BRIAN OTERO, individually and

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on behalf of a class of similarly situated )

individuals,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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THOMAS J. DART,

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SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, and )

COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS,

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Defendants.

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Case No. Judge:
Magistrate Judge: JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT NOW COMES PLAINTIFF, BRIAN OTERO (hereinafter “Plaintiff” and/or “Otero”), individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly situated people, by and through his undersigned Counsel of Record, and for his Class Action Complaint against Defendants, SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, (hereinafter “Defendants”), states as follows:
NATURE OF ACTION 1. Plaintiff, Brian Otero, brings this Class Action Complaint against Defendants, seeking damages for Defendants’ policy or practice of unlawfully detaining, holding in custody or imprisoning free citizens following a trial or other proceeding at which the citizen is found not-guilty or otherwise acquitted (the “Unlawful Detention Policy”). From the time of the “not guilty” verdict or judgment in favor of the criminal defendant, through the final processing step at the jail, Plaintiff and Class members are subjected to Defendants’ illegal policies and/or pro-

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cedures which result in class members being detained for unreasonable amounts of time and in an unreasonable manner. The Unlawful Detention Policy and related illegal conduct deprived Plaintiff and the putative class of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution. Defendants’ actions and the Unlawful Detention Policy constitute violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983.
2. Plaintiff, in his representative capacity, seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ policy or practice is unlawful pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, in his representative capacity, also seeks a permanent injunction and other equitable relief necessary to eliminate the Unlawful Detention Policy and to prevent such policy or practice from continuing to affect the liberty, freedom, and Constitutional rights of citizens in the future. The relief sought by Plaintiff includes, but is not limited to: affirmative restructuring of Defendants’ criminal defendant processing procedures, implementation of equitable relief to include declaratory relief and injunctive relief, reimbursement of expenses incurred in prosecuting this action, and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff further seeks actual damages, emotional distress, and other equitable remedies and damages necessary to make him and members of the class whole.
2. Plaintiff Otero brings his §1983 claim individually and on behalf of a class of all other similarly situated prior criminal defendants in Cook County, who stood trial while detained, were found not guilty or otherwise acquitted at trial, and were subsequently detained, held in custody, or imprisoned pursuant to Defendants’ Unlawful Detention Policy. Plaintiff Otero brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. All allegations and claims are pled in the alternative to the extent such an interpretation is necessitated by law, required for proper construction under the law, and permitted under federal law.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1343. This is a suit authorized and instituted pursuant to the Act of Congress known as the “Civil Rights Act of 1991,” and the “Civil Rights Act of 1866,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5. Upon information and belief, the amount in controversy in this action exceeds $5,000,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. 6. Upon information and belief, at least one member of the Rule 23 Class is a citizen of a different state than that of Defendants. 7. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) and (c). Defendants reside and do business in the Northern District of Illinois and the Plaintiff is a resident of the Northern District of Illinois. Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the State of Illinois for the purposes of this lawsuit. All or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred within this judicial district. 8. Plaintiff, in his class-wide claims, requests injunctive and declaratory relief and compensation for actual damages, emotional distress and punitive damages and/or any and all other damages permitted by applicable law, and attorneys’ fees and lawsuit costs.
THE PARTIES a. Plaintiff
9. The representative Plaintiff, BRIAN OTERO, is a resident of the City of Chicago, in Cook County, Illinois. b. Defendants
10. Defendants are the Sheriff of Cook County, Thomas J. Dart and Cook County, Il3

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linois. The Sheriff is sued in his official capacity only. The County is joined pursuant to Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2003).
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 11. Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individually, and as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23. The Rule 23 Class is defined as:
“All people who were criminal defendants in Cook County, were detained at the time of trial or other proceeding, were found not guilty or otherwise acquitted at trial or other proceeding and were subjected to Defendants’ illegal policies and/or procedures by being detained, held in custody, or imprisoned by Defendants after their not-guilty verdict or acquittal from April 27, 2010 through the present.” 12. Excluded from the Rule 23 Class are Defendants’ legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors; the Judge to whom this case is assigned and any member of the Judge’s immediate family; and all persons who will submit a timely and otherwise proper request for exclusion from the Rule 23 Class. 13. Numerosity: The persons in the Rule 23 Class identified above are geographically diverse and so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The precise number of such persons is unknown, and the calculation of that number is presently within the sole control of Defendants. However, on information and belief, Plaintiff believes there are thousands of members of the class. Additionally, because the Unlawful Detention Policy is continuing, there are new class members every day. 14. Commonality: There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Rule 23 Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The questions of law and fact common to this Rule 23 Class that predominate over any question solely affecting individual members of the Rule 23 Class include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Whether Defendants maintain a policy or practice that causes an unrea-
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sonable duration and manner of detaining, holding in custody, or imprisoning free citizens, who stood trial as “detained” criminal defendants, after they have been found not-guilty or otherwise acquitted at trial or other proceeding (“Unlawful Detention Policy”); (b) Whether Defendants lacked policies and procedures that would ensure the prompt release of Class members and protect their Constitutional rights; (c) Whether Defendants’ Unlawful Detention Policy is so widespread, permanent, and well settled that it constitutes a custom or usage with the force of law; (d) Whether Defendants’ Unlawful Detention Policy was carried out under color of custom or usage of State law and whether Plaintiff’s and Class members’ constitutional rights were violated under the color of State law; and (e) Whether Defendants’ Unlawful Detention Policy violates Plaintiff’s and putative Class members’ constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.
15. Typicality: The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of all members of the Rule 23 Class. Plaintiff’s claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the Class, namely, Plaintiff and the members of the Class were all subjected to and damaged by Defendants’ Unlawful Detention Policy.
16. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Rule 23 Class. Plaintiff’s interests and the interests of the Class members do not conflict. Plaintiff’s interests in pursuing this matter are aligned with the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff is
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willing to actively prosecute the class claims at issue in this case and has retained counsel experienced in and capable of handling class action lawsuits.
17. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
18. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.
COMMON ALLEGATIONS 19. Plaintiff suffered severe damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ illegal conduct, as alleged herein. 20. All allegations herein are pled in the alternative to the extent necessitated for viable construction under applicable federal law. 21. On November 23, 2009, the Chicago Police Department arrested Plaintiff for an alleged burglary. Plaintiff was subsequently charged with burglary and was held, pending trial, in Cook County Jail, since he could not afford to make bail. 22. On July 18-21, 2011, Plaintiff stood trial for the alleged burglary. 23. Plaintiff was in Defendants’ custody from the time he was arrested on November 23, 2009, through his trial and subsequent post-acquittal processing. 24. The jury found Plaintiff “not guilty” following a trial and acquitted him of all charges. The court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. 25. At the time of acquittal, Plaintiff had no outstanding warrants. 26. When Plaintiff was acquitted, Defendants were obligated to process his release without unreasonable delay and ensure that his constitutional rights were protected. Defendants
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failed on both obligations. 27. Following his acquittal, and despite the fact that there were no other pending
charges or warrants against Plaintiff, Defendants placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and transported him back to the Cook County Jail.
28. When they returned to the Cook County Jail, Defendants detained Plaintiff in the “bullpen.”
29. Plaintiff was kept locked up in the bullpen for approximately twelve hours, from 4:00 p.m. on July 21, 2011, until 4:00 a.m. on July 22, 2011. Sometime during this twelve hour period, Defendants conducted their procedure to “process” Plaintiff for release.
30. While being detained, held in custody and imprisoned in the bullpen, other inmates asked Plaintiff about the outcome of his trial. After informing the prisoners that he had been found not guilty and would be leaving jail, one of the prisoners punched and pummeled Plaintiff about the face and body. Plaintiff sustained physical injuries as a result of the jailhouse beating he suffered while being detained by Defendants after his acquittal.
31. Plaintiff did not report the beating to Defendants because he was afraid he would somehow catch another charge as a result of being beaten in the bullpen, and his release would be delayed further.
32. The policy or practice followed by Defendants for detaining individuals who are found not guilty or who are otherwise acquitted at trial or other proceeding causes an unreasonable length and manner of detention in violation of the Constitution. Among other things, Defendants’ policy or practice is to detain individuals such as Plaintiff and Class members with the general prison population, which not only substantially and unnecessarily increases the procedural steps for processing out an individual, but also creates a serious risk that the individual will
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Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/27/12 Page 8 of 11 PageID #:8
be the victim of a violent assault. Even though Defendants no longer have probable cause or any other right to detain or investigate individuals who were found not-guilty or who were otherwise acquitted, Defendants’ policy or practice is to hold such individuals in custody pending the completion of a post-release check for wants and holds. This is a laborious and time consuming process that unnecessarily prolongs an individual’s detention and which could have been done during the individual’s detention prior to his or her not-guilty verdict or acquittal. These and other aspects of Defendants’ policies or practices results in a post-acquittal detention of individuals that is unreasonable in both length and manner and, therefore, is unconstitutional.
33. Defendants’ policy or practice of detaining, holding in custody or imprisoning free citizens, who stood trial as “detained” criminal defendants, after they are found not-guilty or otherwise acquitted at trial or other proceeding, is so widespread, permanent and well settled that it constitutes a custom or usage with the force of law.
COUNT I UNLAWFUL DETENTION IN VIOLATION OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 34. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 35. Plaintiff brings Count I in both his individual and representative capacities. 36. Defendants maintain a policy or practice of detaining, holding in custody or imprisoning free citizens for unreasonable amounts of time and in an unreasonable manner with deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights following a trial or other proceeding where the citizen is found not-guilty or otherwise acquitted, constituting violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983. 37. The aforementioned policy or practice deprived Plaintiff and the putative Class of
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liberty without due process, in violation of their constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
38. The aforementioned policy or practice deprived Plaintiff and the putative Class of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.
39. The aforementioned policy or practice was carried out under color of custom or usage of State law and Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ constitutional rights were violated under the color of State law.
40. Defendants’ conduct is intentional, deliberate, willful, and conducted with disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class. In fact, Defendants have been sued on at least two prior occasions for, among other things, their unconstitutional policy or practice of detaining individuals for excessive and unreasonable periods of time after they were found notguilty or otherwise acquitted. See Watson v. Sheahan, et al., Case No. 94-cv-6891 (N.D. Ill.) and Bullock v. Dart, et al., Case No. 04-cv-1051 (N.D. Ill.). Despite being put on notice of their unconstitutional polices or practices and paying millions of dollars to settle prior class actions challenging those polices or practices, Defendants continue to adhere to their Unlawful Detention Policy.
41. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ policy or practice of detaining, holding in custody or imprisoning free citizens for unreasonable amounts of time and in an unreasonable manner following a trial where the citizen is found not-guilty or otherwise acquitted, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class have experienced extreme harm, including actual damages, emotional distress damages and other damages.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants as follows: i. Acceptance of jurisdiction of this cause; ii. A declaratory judgment that the policies or practices challenged herein are illegal
and violative of the Constitutional rights secured to Plaintiff and the Class; iii. A preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants and their partners,
officers, owners, agents, successors, employees, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with them, from engaging in any further unlawful practices, policies, customs and usages as set forth herein; iv. An Order requiring the Defendants to initiate and implement programs that: (1) do not violate the Constitutional rights of free citizens acquitted on criminal charges; (2) remedy the effects of the Defendants’ past and present unlawful practices; and (3) eliminate the continuing effects of the unlawful practices described herein above; v. Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; vi. Designation of Plaintiff as representative of the Rule 23 Class, and counsel of record as Class Counsel; vii. Awarding damages sufficient to compensate Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class for their injuries; viii. Awarding actual, compensatory and emotional distress damages; ix. Awarding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; x. Awarding reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of this action;
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xi. Awarding punitive damages; and xii. Any and all other relief that this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable.
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all questions of fact raised by the complaint.

Dated: April 27, 2012

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/Robert M. Foote Robert M. Foote, Esq. (#03124325) Matthew J. Herman, Esq. (#06237297) Michael D. Wong, Esq. (#06291089) Foote Meyers Mielke & Flowers, LLC 3 N. Second Street, Suite 300 St. Charles, IL 60174 Tel. No.: (630)232-6333
Kathleen C. Chavez, Esq. (#6255735) Chavez Law Firm, P.C. 3 N. Second Street, Suite 300 St. Charles, IL 60174 Tel. No.: (630) 232-4480
Peter L. Currie, Esq. (#06281711) The Law Firm of Peter L. Currie, PC 536 Wing Lane Saint Charles, IL 60174 Tel. No.: (630) 862-1130
Myron M. Cherry, Esq. Jacie C. Zolna, Esq. Myron M. Cherry & Associates, LLC 30 North LaSalle Street, Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60602 Tel. No. (312) 372-2100
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

BRIAN OTERO, individually and on behalf of )

a class of similarly situated individuals,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

THOMAS J. DART, SHERIFF OF COOK

)

COUNTY, and COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS,

)

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 12-cv-3148

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Plaintiff Brian Otero has sued the Cook County Sheriff for allegedly violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by detaining him for an unreasonable amount of time and in an unreasonable manner after a jury acquitted him of all charges.1 Plaintiff now moves to certify a class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 23. (R. 41, Mot.) For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion with prejudice to the extent he seeks to certify a class based on the alleged unreasonableness of the delay in releasing acquitted detainees from Cook County Jail, and without prejudice to the extent he seeks to certify a class challenging one or more specific detention procedures applied to acquitted detainees.

1 Otero joined Cook County as a party pursuant to Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003). Cook County is an indispensable party to this suit because state law requires the county to pay judgments entered against the Sheriff’s Office in its official capacity. Id. To the extent that Otero alleged substantive claims against Cook County in the Complaint, the Court dismissed those claims under Rule 12(b)(6) on October 18, 2012. (See R. 24 at 12.)

BACKGROUND Plaintiff Brian Otero alleges that Defendants maintain an unlawful policy or practice of “detaining, holding in custody, or imprisoning free citizens following a trial or other proceeding at which the citizen is found not-guilty or otherwise acquitted.” (R. 1, Compl. ¶ 1.) According to Plaintiff, “[f]rom the time of the ‘not guilty’ verdict or judgment in favor of the criminal defendant, through the final processing step at the jail, Plaintiff and [c]lass members are subjected to Defendants’ illegal policies and/or procedures which result in class members being detained for unreasonable amounts of time and in an unreasonable manner.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Chicago police arrested Plaintiff for an alleged burglary on November 23, 2009. Plaintiff was charged with burglary and held in Cook County Jail pending trial because he could not afford to make bail. Plaintiff stood trial for burglary in July 2011. On July 21, 2011 at approximately 6:20 p.m., the jury returned a verdict finding Plaintiff “not guilty” of all charges. Plaintiff had no outstanding warrants at the time of his acquittal. The Sheriff’s Office, however, did not release Plaintiff from Cook County Jail until 3:00 a.m., nearly nine hours after the jury returned its verdict. In the meantime, the Sheriff’s Office took Plaintiff back into custody, returned him to Cook County Jail, and processed him back into the general prison population. The Sheriff asserts that these post-judgment procedures exist because “[w]hen a detainee is acquitted, the Cook County Jail staff do not yet know if that detainee can be released from [jail].” (R. 44, Def. Resp. Br. at 2.) While the staff checks for pending cases, outstanding warrants, and other circumstances that may prevent an acquitted detainee’s release, the Sheriff’s Office subjects the acquitted detainees to the same procedures applied to any detainees returning from court.
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The Sheriff’s Office (or a court security officer) places an acquitted detainee into custody and transports him back to Cook County Jail. For detainees who stood trial at the Cook County Criminal Courts Building, the Sheriff’s deputies transport the acquitted detainees through a series of holding cells on the way back to Cook County Jail. During this process, the deputies do not segregate the acquitted detainees from convicted felons, new detainees remanded to the Sheriff’s custody, or any other detainees returning from court. Once the detainees arrive at Cook County Jail, officers handcuff the acquitted detainees side-by-side with all other returning detainees, transport them to their assigned divisions, and process them back into the general jail population.
While the acquitted detainee waits in jail along with the rest of the inmates, the Cook County Jail staff performs a series of checks to ensure that no grounds exist to hold the detainee. The staff does not begin this process, however, until it receives the court order releasing the acquitted detainee, which, Defendants assert, “can take hours.” (Def. Resp. Br. at 3.) Once the staff receives the court order and identifies the detainee to whom the order applies, the staff retrieves and reviews the detainee’s file (the “pack”) to ensure that the Sheriff’s Office should in fact release him. The staff also performs a LEADS check to determine if the detainee has any outstanding warrants or if the staff must contact any agencies before releasing the detainee. “In all cases, the records staff person makes inquiries into any and all possible warrants to rule out any measure that would hold that person in custody to avoid a wrongful release.” (Id.) The warrants check can take up to two hours to complete.
After the records staff completes these checks, a sergeant and an auditor review the detainee’s pack to ensure that his release is appropriate. If everything is in order, the sergeant
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directs the correction officers to retrieve the detainee from his division. The detainee then passes through two identification check points before leaving the jail.
The Sheriff’s Office follows these procedures for all acquitted detainees at Cook County Jail. (See Mot. at 4-5.) The amount of time it takes the Sheriff’s Office to complete these procedures for a given acquitted detainee, however, varies based on several factors, including, among others, the amount of time it takes for the detainee’s paperwork to arrive from the court, the distance from the courthouse to Cook County Jail for detainees arriving from suburban courthouses, the number of detainees for whom the records office staff must review packs on that particular day and time, and the results of the detainee’s LEADS check. (See Def. Resp. Br. at 24.)
The Sheriff’s Office followed these standard procedures with respect to Plaintiff Otero. The jury acquitted Plaintiff at approximately 6:20 p.m. The Sheriff’s deputies then took Plaintiff back into custody and transported him to a series of holding cells and eventually back to Cook County jail. During the transport back to jail, the Sheriff’s deputies did not segregate Plaintiff from the other detainees returning from court that day. Several of those detainees punched Plaintiff in the body and the head in one of the holding cells after learning that the jury had acquitted him. Once Plaintiff arrived at Cook County Jail, the correction officers handcuffed him along with the other detainees and processed him back into the general jail population to wait for the results of the records office’s review of his pack. The Sheriff’s Office released Plaintiff from Cook County Jail at 3:00 a.m., nearly nine hours after the jury had acquitted him.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Sheriff’s unlawful detention policy and the Sheriff’s continued detention of him after his acquittal constitute violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff seeks to assert this claim on behalf of a class of similarly situated former
4

detainees in Cook County. (Id. ¶ 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff requests certification of the following class:
All males who were criminal defendants in Cook County, were detained at the time of trial or other proceeding and were found not guilty or otherwise acquitted at a trial or other proceeding and for whom the Sheriff’s Office no longer had any legal right to detain from April 27, 2010 through the present. (Mot. at 7 n.5.)
LEGAL STANDARD To obtain class certification under Rule 23, a plaintiff must satisfy each requirement of Rule 23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation—and one subsection of Rule 23(b). See Harper v. Sheriff of Cook County, 581 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 2009); Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006). In this case, Plaintiff argues that class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) or, in the alternative, Rule 23(b)(2). (Mot. at 14.) A court may certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class where “questions of law and fact common to members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and . . . a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently resolving the dispute in question.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(b)(2), a court may certify a class where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). In order to grant class certification under Rule 23, the Court must be “satisfied, after a rigorous analysis” that the Rule's requirements are met. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011) (citation omitted). “‘Failure to meet any of the Rule's requirements precludes class certification.’” Harper, 581 F.3d at 513 (quoting Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2008)). Satisfaction of these requirements, on
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the other hand, categorically entitles a plaintiff to pursue his claim as a class action. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393, 398-99, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 176 L. Ed. 2d 311 (2009). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving each disputed requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012). District courts have broad discretion in determining whether the plaintiff has satisfied this burden. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345, 99 S. Ct. 2326, 60 L. Ed. 2d 931 (1979); Messner, 669 F.3d at 811.
ANALYSIS I. The Seventh Circuit’s Decisions in Harper and Portis
In order to determine whether Plaintiff’s proposed class satisfies Rule 23’s requirements, a review of the Seventh Circuit’s opinions in Harper v. Sheriff of Cook County, 581 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2009). and Portis v. City of Chicago, 613 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2010), is instructive. In Harper, the plaintiff claimed that the Sheriff of Cook County was unconstitutionally holding new detainees after bond had been posted. See 581 F.3d 511. The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion for certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class, but the Seventh Circuit vacated the decision, finding that class treatment of the plaintiff’s claim was not appropriate. Id. at 512. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the constitutionality of the detentions at issue depended on whether the length of the delay before the detainee’s release was reasonable in any given case, which, in turn, depended on “how long each detainee was held after bond was posted and what justifications there might be for the delay on that particular day or for that particular detainee.” Id. at 515. The court noted various justifications that may exist for any given delay, including “the time of day, whether the jail was processing an unusually large number of detainees at that time, whether other events occurring at the jail legitimately slowed processing times, whether the detainee’s
6

lack of cooperation delayed processing, etc.” Id. (citing Lewis v. O’Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1988)). The court therefore determined that “[l]iability, to saying nothing of damages, would need to be determined on an individual basis. Thus, common issues do not predominate over individual issues, making this case inappropriate for class disposition.” Id.
Similarly, in Portis, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class in a case challenging the Chicago Police Department’s allegedly unconstitutional detention of individuals arrested for non-jailable offenses. See 613 F.3d 702. The plaintiffs contended that taking more than two hours to process and release those individuals made their detention unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 703. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in prescribing a two-hour limit to this process and, as a result, erred in certifying a class premised on the propriety of that limitation. Id. at 705. As the Seventh Circuit recognized, to prevail on their claim, the plaintiffs would need to show “that any particular detention was excessive, and the court must examine not only the length of a given detention but also the reasons why release was deferred.” Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause reasonableness is a standard rather than a rule, and because one detainee’s circumstances differs from another’s, common questions do not predominate and class certification [was] inappropriate.” Id. II. Plaintiff’s Attempt to Distinguish Harper and Portis Is Unavailing
Plaintiff acknowledges that if he sought to challenge only the alleged unreasonableness of the Sheriff’s delay in releasing acquitted detainees from Cook County Jail, Harper and Portis would preclude class certification. (See R. 46, Pl. Reply Br. at 8-10.) Plaintiff attempts to distinguish this case from Harper and Portis, however, on the grounds that here he is challenging specific aspects of the Sheriff’s detention procedures that applied equally to all potential class
7

members, not just the allegedly unreasonable length of the delay in the release of potential class members after their acquittal. (Id. at 9.)
As Plaintiff notes, numerous courts in this district have granted class certification in cases where the plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of specific detention procedures on grounds other than an allegedly unreasonable delay in the detainee’s release that results from those procedures. See, e.g., Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 256 F.R.D. 609 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (claiming that the Sheriff’s Office conducted group strip searches for detainees returning from court in an “unreasonable and unnecessarily humiliating manner”); Parish v. Sheriff of Cook County, No. 07 4369, 2008 WL 4812875 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008) (alleging that the Sheriff had implemented a policy of denying or delaying necessary prescription medication to detainees at Cook County Jail); Young v. County of Cook, No. 06 C 552, 2007 WL 1238920 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) (challenging the constitutionality of the Sheriff’s policy of strip searching every detainee that enters Cook County Jail, irrespective of the nature of the charges against him); Jackson v. Sheriff of Cook County, No. 06 C 0493, 2006 WL 3718041 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2006) (challenging the Sheriff’s policy of requiring pre-trial detainees to undergo screening for sexually transmitted diseases without valid consent); Bullock v. Sheahan, 525 F.R.D. 227 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (alleging that the Sheriff’s different treatment of male and female detainees with respect to the jail’s “out-processing” procedures violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); see also Flood v. Dominguez, 270 F.R.D. 413 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (certifying class of pre-trial detainees allegedly held in holdings cells for more than 24 hours without bedding, personal hygiene items, allotted exercise time, and full meals).2 In all but one of the cases
2 Plaintiff also cites two cases from district courts in the District of Columbia in which the courts certified classes with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims that the department of corrections had detained inmates “beyond the point at which their release had been ordered, for a period ranging from an extra day to many days or even months on end.” See Barnes v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 113, 115 (D.D.C. 2007);
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Plaintiff cites, class certification occurred pre-Harper. Neither Harper nor Portis, though, necessarily precludes class certification in these types of cases challenging the constitutionality of a specific detention procedure.
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit implicitly left open the possibility for class treatment where the plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a particular detention procedure as long as the length of detention is not a central issue in the case. See Harper, 581 F.3d at 514. In Harper, the court noted that “Harper assured [the court] multiple times at oral argument that this case is not about searching and swabbing, and we take him at his word.” Id. The court went on to explain that having “[f]ail[ed] to take issue with any particular intake procedure, Harper [was] left with a claim that the Sheriff [was] unconstitutionally holding detainees after bond ha[d] been posted.” Id. at 514-15. The Seventh Circuit held that this claim was inappropriate for class disposition, but it did not necessarily foreclose class treatment, in an appropriate case, of claims challenging a specific intake procedure, like those that Harper had abandoned. Id. at 515.
The Seventh Circuit considered Harper’s argument that a common issue—the assignment of a jail identification number to a detainee who had posted bond—predominated, but ultimately rejected it, finding that Harper “[was] trying to focus the class certification discussion around an issue that is not central to the litigation” in order to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. Id. The Seventh Circuit further noted that there was “nothing unconstitutional about assigning an identification number to a detainee who has been remanded to the custody of the Sheriff, unless it takes an unreasonable amount of time or is done in some unreasonable manner.” Id. at 516. Because those were both “individual issues,” the court held that Harper had failed to establish predominance. Id. In doing so, though, the Seventh Circuit left the door open
Bynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27 (D.D.C. 2003). These cases, however, contradict the Seventh Circuit’s holdings in Harper and Portis, which serve as binding authority on this Court.
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for a plaintiff in an appropriate “overdetention-plus” case to obtain class certification if the plaintiff challenged a specific detention procedure on grounds other than the allegedly unreasonable amount of time that the procedure took to perform or the unreasonable manner in which the Sheriff’s Office performed it.
Even if the Seventh Circuit would approve of class certification in certain “overdetentionplus” cases, though, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that this “overdetention-plus” case is amenable to class treatment. In Flood v. Dominguez—the only post-Harper decision Plaintiff cites regarding predominance—the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana certified a class of pre-trial detainees held in the Lake County, Indiana jail on the plaintiffs’ claim that the sheriff unconstitutionally detained them in a holding cell for more than 24 hours without basic amenities such as bedding, personal hygiene items, time to exercise, and adequate food. See 270 F.R.D. at 420-22. The plaintiffs’ core complaint in Flood was that the jail “had a policy of not providing detainees beds, mattresses, or other bedding on which to sleep,” which, combined with other conditions in the holding cells, deprived the detainees of any meaningful sleep for over 24 hours. Id. at 416. The district court held that class certification was appropriate and distinguished Harper on the grounds that the common conditions to which the defendants allegedly subjected the detainees, not the length of their detentions, were the central issues in the case:
[In Harper,] the only potentially common issue—whether it was reasonable to assign a jail identification number to a detainee before allowing him to be released on bond—did not predominate because the plaintiff’s identification number was not central to the litigation. In contrast to Harper, the common issues here—lack of bedding, no hygiene items, no exercise, and inadequate food—are fundamental to the Plaintiffs’ claims and allegedly gave rise to the injuries they suffered.
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Id. at 420 (citations omitted).3 Plaintiff argues that the present case is more akin to Flood and other cases challenging
specific detention procedures than it is to Harper and Portis, which dealt primarily with challenges to the allegedly unreasonable length of class members’ detentions. (See Pl. Reply Br. at 9-10.) The allegations in the Complaint and Plaintiff’s broad proposed class, however, belie Plaintiff’s argument. The thrust of Plaintiff’s claim is that the Sheriff’s Office held acquitted detainees for an unreasonable amount of time after their acquittals. Although Plaintiff alleges generally in the Complaint that Defendants subjected him and other class members to unlawful policies that “result[ed] in class members being detained for unreasonable amounts of time and in an unreasonable manner” (see Compl. ¶ 1 (emphasis added)), most of Plaintiff’s allegations focus on the allegedly unreasonable delay in his release, rather than the constitutionality of any specific detention procedures. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 14(a)-(b), 26, 29, 31-32.)
Furthermore, even where Plaintiff identifies specific procedures he challenges as “unreasonable” (see id. ¶¶ 27 (placing Plaintiff in handcuffs and transporting him back to the Cook County Jail after his acquittal), 28 (detaining Plaintiff in the “bullpen” upon his return to Cook County Jail)), he appears to challenge those procedures in large part on the grounds that they caused an unreasonable delay in his and other proposed class members’ releases. (See id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff alleges, for example, that holding an acquitted detainee in the general prison population while the Sheriff’s Office performs the administrative tasks related to his release
3 The court in Flood also distinguished Harper on the grounds that “the plaintiff in Harper did not limit the proposed class by the length of time detainees were held after they posted bond,” while the plaintiffs in Flood limited the proposed class to only those detainees that defendants had held for more than 24 hours. Id. Flood, however, was decided two months before Portis, which reversed class certification in an “overdetention” case even though the plaintiffs included a two-hour limitation in the class definition. See Portis, 613 F.3d at 704-05 (“Given the contextual nature of the analysis under the fourth amendment, . . it is very hard to justify an inflexible two-hour rule. More than hard. It is impossible.” (citation omitted)).
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“substantially and necessarily increases the procedural steps for processing out an individual,” and, it follows, increases the length of the detainee’s post-acquittal detention. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that the Sheriff’s policies regarding the performance of post-acquittal checks for warrants and holds “is a laborious and time consuming process that unnecessarily prolongs an individual’s detention . . . .” (Id.; see also id. ¶ 29 (noting that Plaintiff remained locked in the “bullpen” for approximately twelve hours while Defendants conducted their procedures to process Plaintiff for release).)
Plaintiff’s motion for class certification also focused largely on the unreasonable delay in the release of acquitted detainees, rather than challenges to any specific detention procedures applied to them irrespective of the time those procedures took or the time they added to an acquitted detainee’s detention. (See, e.g., Mot. at 1 (“Any then they wait. And they continue to wait, generally for several hours, until Defendant finds the time to complete a post-acquittal check for warrants and to navigate a host of other administrative checkpoints that have been needlessly interposed between these prisoners’ supposed victories at trial and their freedom-infact.”); id. at2 (“But because individuals who are found not-guilty or are otherwise acquitted are free citizens entitled to a prompt release, the practices employed by Defendant violate their constitutional rights.”); see also id. at 3-6.) Plaintiff attempts to distance his claims from pure “overdetention” claims in his reply brief in order to distinguish this case from Harper and Portis by arguing that he “is not claiming that the mere length of his or any other class member’s detention was unreasonable . . . . Rather, Plaintiff challenges specific aspects of Defendants’ release procedures (or lack thereof) that applied equally to all class members and which, collectively, create an unconstitutional policy or practice.” (Pl. Reply Br. at 9.) The allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff’s broad proposed class, and even his arguments in his opening brief,
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however, undermine Plaintiff’s purported new position. Like in Harper, Plaintiff fails to explain how any of the specific detention procedures he challenges are unconstitutional “unless [they] take[] an unreasonable amount of time or [are] done in some unreasonable manner.” See Harper, 581 F.3d at 516. Because those are individual issues, see id., Plaintiff has not satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The Court, therefore, denies Plaintiff’s request for certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class.4 III. Rule 23(b)(2)
Plaintiff requests, in the alternative to his motion for certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class, that the Court certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class. (Mot. at 14.) Rule 23(b)(2) permits certification of a class where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Plaintiff, however, does not have standing to obtain the prospective relief that he seeks. (See R. 24.) The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive and other equitable relief on October 18, 2012. (Id.) As the Court explained, Plaintiff does not have standing to seek prospective relief because although he previously was incarcerated in Cook County Jail, he is not currently detained there. (Id. at 8.) Any allegations that he may one day be arrested, detained in Cook County Jail, acquitted, and then detained after his acquittal, moreover, are too speculative to impart standing to seek prospective relief. (Id. at 9.)
4 Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(c)(4), which permits a court, when appropriate, to certify a class with respect to particular issues only. (See Mot. at 14-15; Pl. Reply Br. at 14-15.) According to Plaintiff, “the issues of the existence and constitutionality of Defendants’ release procedures . . . . are unquestioningly common to every class member.” (Pl. Reply Br. at 14.) As explained above, however, the determination of whether Defendants’ release procedures based on the length of the detention are constitutional is not suitable for class treatment under Harper and Portis. The Court, therefore, denies Plaintiff’s request to certify a class on particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4).
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Because the proposed class consists of previously acquitted detainees, nearly all proposed class members also likely lack standing to seek prospective relief. Certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class is inappropriate under these circumstances. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559-60 (finding that Rule 23(b)(2) did not authorize certification of a class where about half of the proposed class members lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to Wal-Mart’s allegedly unlawful employment practices because they no longer worked for WalMart).
Finally, Plaintiff fails to establish that “final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief” would be appropriate with respect to the proposed class as a whole. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The Seventh Circuit has held that overdetention claims require individualized inquiries into the length of an individual’s detention and the potential justifications for the delay in that individual’s release. See Harper, 581 F.3d at 514-16; Porter, 613 F.3d at 704-05; see also Lewis,853 F.2d at 1370 (“We recognize that the administrative tasks incident to a release of a prisoner from custody may require some time to accomplish—in this case perhaps a number of hours. Reasonable time must be allowed for such matters as transportation, identity verification, and processing. . . . What is a reasonable time for detaining a prisoner in custody is a question best left open for juries to answer based on the facts presented in each case.”). For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2).
CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. The denial is with prejudice to the extent Plaintiff seeks to certify a class based on the alleged unreasonableness of the delay in releasing acquitted detainees from Cook County
14

Jail, but without prejudice to the extent Plaintiff seeks to certify a class challenging specific detention procedures that the Cook County Sheriff applied to acquitted detainees.

DATED: December 20, 2013

ENTERED

______________________________ AMY J. ST. EVE U.S. District Court Judge

15

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

BRIAN OTERO, individually and on behalf of )

a class of similarly situated individuals,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

THOMAS J. DART, SHERIFF OF COOK

)

COUNTY, and COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS,

)

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 12-cv-3148

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Plaintiff Brian Otero has sued the Cook County Sheriff for allegedly violating his Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights by detaining him in an unreasonable manner after a jury acquitted him of all charges.1 Plaintiff has filed an Amended Class Action Complaint on behalf
of himself and all other similarly situated male inmates. (R. 56, Amended Class Action
Complaint.) Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Class Certification. (R. 60,
Mot.) For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion with a modification of the
class definition.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Brian Otero filed his initial Complaint in April 2012, alleging that Defendants
maintain an unlawful policy or practice of “detaining, holding in custody, or imprisoning free
1 Otero joined Cook County as a party pursuant to Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003). Cook County is an indispensable party to this suit because state law requires the county to pay judgments entered against the Sheriff’s Office in its official capacity. Id. To the extent that Otero alleged substantive claims against Cook County in the Complaint, the Court dismissed those claims under Rule 12(b)(6) on October 18, 2012. (See R. 24 at 12.)

citizens following a trial or other proceeding at which the citizen is found not guilty or otherwise
acquitted.” (R. 1, Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleged that “Defendants’ illegal policies and/or
procedures” subjected class members to “being detained for unreasonable amounts of time and in
an unreasonable manner.” (Id., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff moved to certify the following class:
All males who were criminal defendants in Cook County, were detained at the time of trial or other proceeding and were found not guilty or otherwise acquitted at a trial or other proceeding and for whom the Sheriff’s Office no longer had any legal right to detain from April 27, 2010 through the present.
(R. 41, Mot. for Class Cert. at 7, n. 5.) On December 20, 2013, the Court denied Plaintiff’s
motion with prejudice to the extent that he sought to certify the class based on the alleged
unreasonableness of the delay in releasing acquitted detainees from Cook County Jail, and
without prejudice to the extent he sought to certify a class challenging one or more specific detention procedures applied to acquitted detainees. (R. 52.)2
On January 15, 2014, Plaintiff filed an Amended Class Action Complaint “on behalf of
himself and other male inmates who were victimized by Defendant’s policy of unconstitutionally
detaining, holding in custody and imprisoning free citizens following an acquittal or other
favorable disposition of the charges brought against them.” (R. 56, ¶ 1.) Count I of the
Amended Complaint alleges that this unlawful detention violates the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendants have:
[A] policy or practice under which it shackles, transports and detains acquitted individuals to change back into their prison jumpsuit and be processed back into the general prison population. In fact, Defendant has conceded that it has no policies or procedures in place that distinguish acquittees from other inmates over whom Defendant has the continued right to detain or that in any way acknowledge an inmate’s right to freedom that he acquires by virtue of an acquittal or other favorable disposition of the charges brought against him.
(Id. ¶ 8.)
2 The Court presumes familiarity with its December 20, 2013 Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Plaintiff’s motion for class certification.
2

With respect to his own circumstances, Plaintiff alleges that following his acquittal, and despite the fact that he had no other pending charges or warrants against him, Cook County Sheriff’s officers seized him and placed him in handcuffs. (Id., ¶ 17.) The Sheriff’s Officers then detained Plaintiff with other regular inmates in a number of different holding cells and ultimately processed him back into his Division within the general prison population. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that while he was detained after his acquittal, other inmates “punched and pummeled Plaintiff about the face and body” after they learned that he was acquitted and would be leaving jail. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint adds a second count for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as, Plaintiff alleges, “similarly situated female acquitted inmates are not subjected to these policies or practices, but rather are segregated from other inmates and not returned to their original jail cells.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff asserts that these similarly situated females “are segregated from other inmates and are given the option to either remain in the receiving room or return to their jail cell while Defendant processes their release.” (Id. ¶ 10.)
The parties have conducted class certification discovery and Plaintiff asserts the following facts in his motion for class certification. When a male detainee is acquitted or otherwise has the charges brought against him dismissed, he is immediately taken back into the custody of the Cook County Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s Office”) and placed in a holding cell behind the judge’s chambers. The Sheriff’s Office then transports him to a larger holding cell known as the “bridge,” which is located in the basement of the criminal court building at 26th Street and California. The bridge consists of eight holding cells (known as “bullpens”), which hold new inmates as well as other inmates returning from court. Each bullpen holds
3

approximately 50 individuals at any given time. The Sheriff’s Office does not segregate or otherwise treat differently the acquitted detainees from the other inmates.
Sheriff’s officers then transport the acquitted detainees along with the regular inmates through a tunnel that connects the criminal court building to the Cook County Department of Corrections (“DOC”). Upon arrival at the DOC, Sheriff’s officers hold the acquitted detainees with the regular inmates in another bullpen. Eventually, a transport team arrives and calls out the detainees one by one, handcuffs them, and transports them back to their respective Division. Upon arrival at the Division, the Sheriff’s Office identifies each detainee and returns all of the detainees to another holding cell. At some point, the Sheriff’s Office processes all of the detainees back into the Cook County Jail and their respective cells.
Although the DOC has a written policy on handling court-ordered releases, that policy identifies procedures for processing an acquitted detainee’s release after he has already begun the process of transferring back into the general jail population. This DOC General Order, which addresses “inmate/detainee discharge procedures,” assigns responsibility for reviewing court documents for acquitted detainees to a “Transportation Officer.” There is no transportation officer assigned to the criminal courthouse at 26th Street and California. The DOC has no system or policy in place at the criminal court building to differentiate between acquitted detainees and other inmates. After the Sheriff’s Office returns the detainees to their jail cells, the DOC’s Records Office reviews the court documents from all of the returning inmates on that day. It is only after this process that the DOC retrieves the acquitted detainee from his cell, escorts him to an outtake area, verifies his identification, and releases him.
Defendant has acknowledged that it treated Mr. Otero in the same exact manner as every other acquitted detainee. Defendant also has acknowledged that female inmates who are
4

acquitted or otherwise ordered to be released do not undergo the same procedure. Rather than automatically returning female acquitted detainees to the Cook County Jail, the Sheriff’s Office gives them the option of remaining in the receiving department or returning to their cells to collect and pack their own belongings.
LEGAL STANDARD To obtain class certification under Rule 23, a plaintiff must satisfy each requirement of Rule 23(a) – numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation – and one subsection of Rule 23(b). See Harper v. Sheriff of Cook County, 581 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 2009); Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006). Once a party satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a), he must meet one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). In this case, Plaintiff argues that class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) or, in the alternative, Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(c)(4). (Mot. at 14.) A court may certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class where “questions of law and fact common to members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and . . . a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently resolving the dispute in question.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(b)(2), a court may certify a class where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23(c)(4) provides that “[w]hen appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” In order to grant class certification under Rule 23, the Court must be “satisfied, after a rigorous analysis” that the Rule’s requirements are met. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, -- U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011) (citation omitted). “‘Failure to meet any of
5

the Rule's requirements precludes class certification.’” Harper, 581 F.3d at 513 (quoting Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2008)). Satisfaction of these requirements, on the other hand, categorically entitles a plaintiff to pursue his claim as a class action. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393, 398-99, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 176 L. Ed. 2d 311 (2009). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving each disputed requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012). District courts have broad discretion in determining whether the plaintiff has satisfied this burden. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345, 99 S. Ct. 2326, 60 L. Ed. 2d 931 (1979); Messner, 669 F.3d at 811.
ANALYSIS I. Rule 23(a)
Plaintiff moves to certify the following class: All male inmates who while being detained by the Cook County Sheriff’s Office were found not guilty, were acquitted, had charges brought against them dismissed or otherwise received a judicial determination requiring their release and for whom the Sheriff’s Office no longer had any legal right to detain from April 27, 2010 through the present. Plaintiff argues that the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3). When determining whether to certify a class, the Court must make an independent determination about the appropriateness of certifying the class. Davis v. Hutchins, 321 F.3d 641, 649 (7th Cir. 2003). A. Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be so numerous that joinder of all its members is impracticable. Courts may not rely solely on the plaintiff’s allegations as to the size of a class or the impracticability of joinder, and instead may rely on evidence to prove class size. Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676. In this case, Defendant has testified that on any given day the DOC could release
6

between 50 and 300 individuals, and that DOC’s records would be able to identify who was released pursuant to an acquittal or other court order. Further, Defendant does not address or challenge Plaintiff’s claim that he satisfies the numerosity requirement. The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the numerosity requirement.
B. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires the existence of questions of law or fact common to the class. “Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, -- U.S. --, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011) (quotation and citation omitted). This requirement, however, does not mean that the proposed class members have merely “all suffered a violation of the same provision of law.” Id. Rather, the claims of a class must depend upon a common contention, and that contention must be capable of classwide resolution. Id. “What matters to class certification is the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., -- F.3d -- (7th Cir. Aug. 22, 2014) (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551). “The critical point is the need for conduct common to members of the class.” Id. (citing IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 14-1532, 2014 WL 2958615 (7th Cir. July 2, 2014); Keele v. Wexler ,149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir.1998). Where the defendant’s allegedly injurious conduct differs from class member to class member, courts are not likely to find common answers. Id. Where the same conduct or practice by the same defendant gives rise to the same kind of claims from all class members, however, there is a common question. Id. (citing cases). In Harper v. Cook County, 581 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s class certification of detainees because it reasoned that the constitutionality of the
7

detentions at issue depended on whether the length of the delay before the detainee’s release was reasonable in any given case. This determination depended on “how long each detainee was held after bond was posted and what justifications there might be for the delay on that particular day or for that particular detainee.” Id. at 515. The Seventh Circuit identified various justifications that may exist for any given delay and determined that “liability, to say nothing of damages, would need to be determined on an individual basis.” Id.
In Portis v. City of Chicago, 613 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2010), the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s decision to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class in a case challenging the Chicago Police Department’s allegedly unconstitutional detention of individuals arrested for non-jailable offenses. The plaintiffs argued that taking more than two hours to process and release those individuals made their detention unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 703. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in prescribing a two-hour limit to this process, and that plaintiffs would need to show “that any particular detention was excessive.” Id. In making that determination, the Court would need to examine both the length of a given detention and the reasons why the release was deferred. Id.
Here, the Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s initial attempt to certify the class because Plaintiff was unable to distinguish his class from the failed classes in Harper and Portis. Specifically, the Court found that “[t]he thrust of Plaintiff’s claim is that the Sheriff’s Office held acquitted detainees for an unreasonable amount of time after their acquittals,” and that “most of Plaintiff’s allegations focus on the allegedly unreasonable delay in his release, rather than the constitutionality of any specific detention procedures.” (R. 52 at 11.) The Court also noted, however, that the Seventh Circuit implicitly left open the possibility for class treatment where
8

the plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a particular detention procedure as long as the length of detention is not a central issue in the case. See Harper, 581 F.3d at 514.
While Plaintiff’s amended proposed class is largely the same as his initial proposed class, he has changed the focus of his claim. In his renewed motion for class certification, Plaintiff presents the following common questions of fact and law that he asserts apply to the unlawful detention claims of both Plaintiff and the proposed class:
1. Whether Defendant lacked policies and procedures that acknowledge a male inmate’s right to freedom that he acquires by virtue of an acquittal or other favorable disposition of the charges brought against him; 2. Whether Defendant maintains a policy or practice of detaining male citizens who were found not guilty or otherwise received a judicial determination requiring their release by seizing and handcuffing them, detaining and transporting them in the same holding cells as the other regular inmates, processing them back into the general prison population and continuing to hold them until running a check for outstanding warrants; and 3. Whether such policies or practices (or lack thereof) are unconstitutional. (Mot. at 7-8.) Based on these questions, Plaintiff’s claim challenges Defendant’s alleged restriction of acquitted detainees’ right to freedom by treating them in the same manner as regular inmates returning to their cells in the general population of the Cook County Jail. Rather than focus on the length of time of Plaintiff’s post-acquittal detention, he now focuses on Defendant’s practice of grouping acquitted detainees together with regular inmates, and transporting them to their cells in the jail’s general population. Plaintiff’s equal protection claim further clarifies his new argument. Plaintiff’s equal protection claim is based on his allegation that Defendant segregates similarly situated female acquitted inmates from other inmates and does not return them to their jail cells. Rather, Defendant gives them the option to either remain in a separate receiving room or return to their jail cell while Defendant processes their release. (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 2, 10.)
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Defendant repeatedly acknowledges that it did not treat Plaintiff any differently than any other person who was scheduled to be discharged. (See, e.g., R. 60-2, Holmes Dep. Tr. at 10:112 (agreeing that “Mr. Otero was treated exactly like any other person who at that time was scheduled to be discharged”); pp. 95:22-96:4 (acknowledging that “all the not guilties are treated also alike because they’re in the same group with everybody else who’s treated the same without differentiation”); pp. 111:14-17 (“Q: Now, this process I described is without exception applicable to everybody at the end of each day at trial. A: Yes.”).) Defendant’s alleged practice, therefore, was common as to each member of the class. Thus, the question of the constitutionality of this practice is also common to each class member.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish commonality because his claim fails to generate common answers, rather than common questions. (R. 80, Def. Resp. at 17.) Defendant asserts that no common answer can exist because the length of time that each class member remained in custody will invariably differ. (Id.) In support, Defendant identifies a number of variables – such as computer malfunctions, transportation issues, and the number of detainees on a given day – that can complicate the timing of a detainee’s discharge. As stated above, however, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and motion for class certification do not focus on the length of time that he remained in custody after acquittal.
Defendant also argues that the number of detainees at Cook County Jail suffering from mental illness – approximately 20-30% of the population – defeats Plaintiff’s commonality argument. Defendant argues that these detainees require individualized discharges. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and renewed motion for class certification identify a potential common “answer” that would satisfy his proposed class: that Defendant segregate acquitted male detainees from regular inmates following their acquittal. Defendant fails to explain how,
10

especially at this stage of the litigation, this solution would prevent the individualized attention that some acquitted detainees may require.
In his renewed motion for class certification, Plaintiff has identified at least two factual and legal issues common to the class: whether Defendant maintains a policy or practice of treating acquitted detainees exactly as it does regular inmates until the acquitted detainee is processed back into the general jail population, and whether that policy violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Further, Plaintiff presents a potential “answer” or solution that has the potential for class-wide resolution. The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff has met his burden with respect to commonality.
C. Typicality “The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.” Spano v. The Boeing Co., 633 F.3d 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 72 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1982)). In analyzing the typicality requirement, the Seventh Circuit instructs that “there must be enough congruence between the named representative’s claim and that of the unnamed members of the class to justify allowing the named party to litigate on behalf of the group.” Id. Generally, “a claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other class members and is based on the same legal theory.” Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). “Although ‘the typicality requirement may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiff[] and those of other class members,’” the named plaintiff’s claims must share “the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” Muro v. Target Corp., 580
11

F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983)).
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot meet the typicality requirement because his class definition is far too broad. (Resp. at 22.) Defendant explains that Plaintiff’s proposed class would include “many different categories of detainees that are clearly and certainly distinct from Plaintiff.” (Id.) As an example, Defendant identifies detainees who have had charges dismissed via a nolle prosequi (nolle pros) or have had charges stricken with leave to reinstate (SOL). Defendant explains that these detainees are in a different position than Plaintiff, or any other detainee who has been acquitted, because they are not final adjudications and they do not preclude a subsequent indictment or reinstatement of charges. Defendant also contends that the proposed definition is too broad because it includes all detainees for whom there has been “a judicial determination requiring their release.” As Defendant asserts, this class could include, to name a few examples, (1) detainees whom a judge has ordered to be placed on electronic monitoring; (2) detainees who are to be released to another agency based on a warrant or other hold; (3) detainees who have been found unfit to stand trial and must be remanded to the Illinois Department of Human Services; (4) detainees who have posted bond; and (5) detainees who have been held on a probation violation and have been recommitted to probation. (Id. at 8-9, 23-24.)
Plaintiff’s proposed class clearly focuses on detainees who have been acquitted or found not guilty. Plaintiff himself obtained a “not guilty” verdict from a jury following his trial. Plaintiff’s briefs are replete with references to “acquitted detainees” rather than the broader and amorphous category of those who have received “a judicial determination requiring their release.” (See, e.g., Mot. at 1 (“the challenged aspects of Defendant’s policy were applied in the same manner to all acquitted male detainees”); 2 (“when a detainee is acquitted in court …”); 3
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(“citizens who were acquitted that day are not segregated from the other inmates…”); 4 (“the Sheriff’s Office has no policies in place that distinguish acquittees from other inmates or that acknowledge their acquittal and right to freedom”).) Further, the first “common questions” upon which, Plaintiff asserts, the unlawful detention claims hinge, address a male inmate’s “right to freedom that he acquires by virtue of an acquittal or other favorable disposition of the charges brought against him.” (Mot. at 6.)
The Court agrees with Defendant, in part, that Plaintiff’s proposed class is too broad to satisfy the typicality requirement. The types of detainees who might fall under the category of those for whom there has been “a judicial determination requiring release” includes detainees whose charges have not been dismissed. These detainees with pending criminal charges are not entitled to the same “right to freedom” as an acquitted detainee. The Court, however, disagrees with Defendant regarding detainees who have had charges dismissed by nolle prosequi or have had charges stricken with leave to reinstate. While the principle of double jeopardy does not apply to these types of detainees, the charges brought against them have been dismissed and they are entitled to the same freedom at the time of the dismissal as a detainee who has been acquitted. See People v. Norris, 214 Ill.2d 92, 104, 291 Ill. Dec. 629, 824 N.E.2d 205 (2005) (“[W]hen a nolle prosequi is entered before jeopardy attaches, the State is entitled to refile the charges against the defendant”); Ferguson v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 94, 100, 289 Ill. Dec. 679, 820 N.E. 2d 455 (2004) (“Where a case is stricken with leave to reinstate, the matter remains undisposed of. The same charges continue to lie against the accused, albeit in a dormant state”).
The Court, therefore, finds that a modified class that includes only “those detainees who were found not guilty, acquitted, or had the charges brought against them dismissed” satisfies the
13

typicality requirement. Under this definition, there would be enough congruence between Plaintiff’s claim and the class members’ claims to allow Plaintiff to litigate on behalf of the group. See Spano, 633 F.3d at 586. The class definition may not, however, include the language “or otherwise received a judicial determination requiring their release.”
D. Adequacy of Representation Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “Adequacy of representation is composed of two parts: the adequacy of the named plaintiff’s counsel, and the adequacy of representation provided in protecting the different, separate, and distinct interest of the class members.” Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Sec’y of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 697 (7th Cir. 1986)(en banc). “A class is not fairly and adequately represented if class members have antagonistic or conflicting claims.” Id. (citations omitted). Defendant does not challenge the adequacy of Plaintiff’s counsel, but it does assert that Plaintiff would not be an adequate class representative because his criminal background, which includes multiple felony convictions, presents “serious credibility problems.” (Resp. at 25.) Defendant further notes that one of Plaintiff’s convictions is for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, which involves dishonesty. Plaintiff argues that both of his prior convictions occurred more than ten years ago when Plaintiff was a teenager. Further, neither conviction relates to the claims brought in Plaintiff’s suit. (R. 87, Reply at 8.) Defendant’s argument ignores that the proposed class members are all one-time inmates detained at Cook County Jail. The nature of the suit and of the proposed class means that all class members will at least have been arrested and detained, and some will likely have criminal
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records and prior convictions. Defendant has not explained how Plaintiff’s criminal history differentiates him from the proposed class members. Further, if convicted felons could not serve as adequate class representatives, “there would be no such thing as a class action in the prison or jail context.” Parish v. Sheriff of Cook County, 07 C 4369, 2008 WL 4812875 at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
Defendant also challenges Plaintiff’s adequacy as a class representative on the basis that there are too many divergent categories of class members, but the Court has already addressed this argument in the typicality analysis. Ultimately, the Court finds that there is no basis to hold that Plaintiff and his counsel will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the protected class. II. Rule 23(b)(3)
A. Predominance and Superiority A court may certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class where “questions of law and fact common to members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and . . . a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently resolving the dispute in question.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Predominance is similar to commonality but requires a “far more demanding” inquiry. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997); Messner, 669 F.3d at 814. In broad terms, predominance requires that the “legal or factual questions that qualify each class member’s case as a genuine controversy” are “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 814 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623). It requires more than simply “counting noses” – i.e., “determining whether there are more common issues or more individual issues, regardless of relative importance.” Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir.
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2014). Instead, predominance requires a qualitative decision regarding whether “common questions represent a significant aspect of [a] case and … can be resolved for all members of [a] class in a single adjudication.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 815.
Defendant makes a number of arguments explaining why Plaintiff fails to meet the predominance requirement. None are persuasive. Defendant argues that the large and diverse number of categories to which individual detainees could belong defeat the predominance of any one issue. The Court has already modified the class definition to address this concern. Plaintiff challenges what he alleges is a policy and practice that applies to all Cook County Jail detainees, who are found not guilty, acquitted, or otherwise have the charges against them dismissed. The predominant issue in this litigation will be the existence and constitutionality of that alleged practice.
Defendant argues that it will be impossible for the Court to separate the time it takes to discharge a detainee from Plaintiff’s claims, and that the Court will have to analyze individually each detainee’s discharge. Defendant, however, seems to concede that it applies this practice to all detainees equally. Given the modified class definition, there will be no need to distinguish each detainee’s discharge. Defendant suggests that the proposed class members’ damages claims will vary on an individual basis and that this variance overwhelms any common issue. But Plaintiff is not required to establish common proof of damages for class members. Butler v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014). Indeed, “[i]t is very common for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions to involve differing damage awards for different class members.” De La Fuente, 713 F.2d at 233. Defendant also argues, in seeming contrast to its “time” argument, that Plaintiff’s detention claim remains the same, and that he has simply removed the time allegation. Plaintiff’s removal of the time allegation from the detention
16

claim shifts the focus of the claim away from the length of the post-acquittal detention, to Defendant’s practice of treating acquitted detainees no differently than regular inmates until they return to their cells. Plaintiff’s allegations now focus on a specific detention procedure, rather than the length of detention. Defendant’s argument also ignores Plaintiff’s new equal protection claim, which provides context to Plaintiff’s detention claim because it identifies the alternative release procedure that Plaintiff believes should apply to male detainees.
A class action is the superior procedure for litigating these claims because the Court can determine the legality of the alleged practice and procedure in one proceeding. The proposed class might include hundreds, if not thousands of members, many of whom are unlikely to pursue their claims on their own. Even if damages vary among class members, the Court may hold separate liability and damages trials or appoint a magistrate judge to preside over individual damages proceedings. Butler,727 F.3d at 798; see also Arreola, 546 F.3d at 801.
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. The Court
certifies the following class under Rule 23(b)(3):
All male inmates who while being detained by the Cook County Sheriff’s Office were found not guilty, were acquitted, or had charges brought against them dismissed, and for whom the Sheriff’s Office no longer had any legal right to detain from April 27, 2010 through the present.
The Court designates Plaintiff Brian Otero as the class representative and appoints Myron
M. Cherry and Jacie C. Zolna of Myron M. Cherry & Associates, LLC and Robert M. Foote of
Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O’Neil, LLC as class counsel.

DATED: September 2, 2014

ENTERED

______________________________ AMY J. ST. EVE U.S. District Court Judge

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 Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 168 Filed: 09/22/15 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:1923

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

BRIAN OTERO, Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook County, and COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 12 C 3148

)

)

Judge Amy J. St. Eve

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER
On September 4, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request for reasonable fees related to Plaintiff’s motion to strike and exclude expert testimony for the reasons stated in open court. Plaintiff filed his fee petition on September 11, 2015, and Defendant subsequently filed its objections. The Court sustains the objections in part.
STATEMENT
I. Rate is Not Reasonable
Mr. Zolna seeks an hourly rate of $600 per hour. The Seventh Circuit has defined reasonable hourly rate as one that is “derived from the market rate for the services rendered.” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 2011). Under this standard, courts presume “that an attorney’s actual billing rate for similar litigation is appropriate to use as the market rate.” Id.; see also Broaddus v. Shields, 665 F.3d 846, 859–60 (7th Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, as the Seventh Circuit teaches, “[r]ecognizing the difficulty of determining the hourly rate of an attorney who uses contingent fee agreements, we have advised district courts to rely on the ‘next best evidence’ of an attorney’s market rate, namely ‘evidence of rates similarly experienced attorneys in the community charge paying clients for similar work and evidence of fee awards the attorney has received in similar cases.’” Pickett, 664 F.3d at 640 (quoting Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 555 (7th Cir. 1999)).
The Court sustains Defendant’s objection to Mr. Zolna’s hourly rate of $600 and instead awards an hourly rate of $ 375.00. First, neither attorney has indicated how much experience he has in practicing civil rights law. Second, as Defendant points out, highly qualified, experienced, and talented civil rights attorneys such as Jon Loevy, who has over twenty years of trial experience, and the attorneys in his law firm have reported fees at an hourly rate of $395-$425.

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 168 Filed: 09/22/15 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:1924

See Sandra T.-E. v. Sperlik, No. 05 C 473, 2012 WL 1107845, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2012). Finally, Mr. Zolna’s performance in court on this issue does not warrant an hourly rate of $600 per hour.
Mr. Dzananovic has only been practicing law for two years. It is also unclear if he has any experience in civil rights law. Based on his lack of experience, an hourly rate of $300 is unreasonable. Instead, the Court will reimburse his time at $175 per hour.
II. Hours Reasonably Expended
Both Mr. Zolna and Mr. Dzananovic attended court on the motion to strike at issue. The appearance of both attorneys was duplicative, especially because Mr. Dzananovic did not participate in the arguments in court. Accordingly, the Court strikes Mr. Dzananovic’s time for the court hearings on September 3 and 4, 20151. The Court also strikes Mr. Zolna’s time for the September 4, 2015 court appearance given his unprofessional, unproductive conduct in court. The Court addressed his conduct on the record and need not elaborate further here.
In addition, work spent on preparing a fee petition is generally not recoverable unless the prevailing party is forced to litigate the fee petition. See Ratliff v. City of Chicago, No. 10 C 0739, 2013 WL 3418070, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2013); Sughayyer v. City of Chicago, No. 09 C 4350, 2012 WL 2359065, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2012). As such, the Court strikes the September 11, 2015 entry of 1.20 hours spent preparing the fee petition.
Therefore, the Court awards fees for 7.5 hours of Mr. Zolna’s time at $375 per hour, and 3.5 hours of Mr. Dzananovic’s time at $175 per hour, for a total of $3,425. Defendant must pay this amount on or before October 16, 2015.

Dated: September 22, 2015

_______________________ AMY J. ST. EVE United States District Court Judge

1 The fee petition incorrectly reflects that both court hearings were on September 3, 2015. Instead, one was on September 3 and one was on September 4, 2015. (R. 160, 161.)
2

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

BRIAN OTERO, individually, and

)

on behalf of a class of similarly situated )

individuals,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook

)

County and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,1 )

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 12 C 3148

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:

On January 15, 2014, Plaintiff Brian Otero, individually and on behalf of a class of

similarly situated individuals, filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants Cook County

Sheriff Thomas J. Dart, in his official capacity, and Cook County, Illinois alleging violations of

his constitutional rights based on his post-acquittal detention at the Cook County Jail (“CCJ”),

which is administered by the Cook County Department of Corrections (“CCDOC”) as part of the

Cook County Sheriff’s Office.2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for

partial summary judgment and Defendant Dart’s motion for summary judgment brought pursuant

1 Plaintiff joined Cook County as a Defendant in this action because state law requires the County to pay judgments entered against the Sheriff in his official capacity. See Askew v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 568 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2009); Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle Cnty., 324 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003); 55 ILCS 5/5–1002.
2 Under Illinois’ County Jail Act, “[t]he Sheriff of each county in this State shall be the warden of the jail of the county, and have the custody of all prisoners in the jail, except when otherwise provided in the “County Department of Corrections Act.” 730 ILCS 125/2; see also Moy v. County of Cook, 159 Ill. 2d 519, 526, 203 Ill.Dec. 776, 640 N.E.2d 926 (1994).

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) and Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in regard to Plaintiff’s claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process protections, but denies the remainder of Defendant’s motion. The Court also denies Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment.
BACKGROUND I. Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1
Local Rule 56.1 “is designed, in part, to aid the district court, ‘which does not have the advantage of the parties’ familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information,’ in determining whether a trial is necessary.” Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Local Rule 56.1(a) requires the moving party to provide “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law.” Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014). “The non-moving party must file a response to the moving party’s statement, and, in the case of any disagreement, cite ‘specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.’” Id. (citation omitted); see also L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(A). Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) “requires specifically that a litigant seeking to oppose a motion for summary judgment file a response that contains a separate ‘statement ... of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment.’” Sojka v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 686 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
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In general, the purpose of Local Rule 56.1 statements and responses is to identify the relevant admissible evidence supporting the material facts, not to make factual or legal arguments. See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006) (“statement of material facts did [ ] not comply with Rule 56.1 as it failed to adequately cite the record and was filled with irrelevant information, legal arguments, and conjecture”). “When a responding party’s statement fails to dispute the facts set forth in the moving party’s statement in the manner dictated by the rule, those facts are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion.” Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009). Moreover, “[e]vidence supporting or opposing summary judgment must be admissible if offered at trial, except that affidavits, depositions, and other written forms of testimony can substitute for live testimony.” Widmar v. Sun Chem. Corp., 772 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 2014).
The parties challenge many of each other’s Rule 56.1 Statements of Facts and Statements of Additional Facts as not abiding by the Local Rules. The Court will consider these objections within each statement and follow the Local Rule’s parameters as discussed immediately above. II. Relevant Facts
A. Procedural Background On April 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed his original class action Complaint alleging that Defendant Dart has a “policy or practice of unlawfully detaining, holding in custody or imprisoning free citizens following a trial or other proceeding at which the citizen is found notguilty or otherwise acquitted.” (R. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 1, 36.) Plaintiff alleged that this policy or practice was unreasonable in length and manner. (Id. ¶ 32.) After the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss in October 2012, Plaintiff filed his first motion for
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class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) on July 23, 2013. Because Plaintiff’s theory of liability was based on the length of his post-acquittal detention, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification on December 20, 2013 under well-established Seventh Circuit case law. See Portis v. City of Chicago, 613 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2010); Harper v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 581 F.3d 511, 514-15 (7th Cir. 2009). More specifically, “the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion with prejudice to the extent that he sought to certify the class based on the alleged unreasonableness of the delay in releasing acquitted detainees from Cook County Jail, and without prejudice to the extent he sought to certify a class challenging one or more specific detention procedures applied to acquitted detainees.” Otero v. Dart, 306 F.R.D. 197, 200 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
On January 15, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint alleging that Defendant Dart “maintains a policy or practice of detaining, holding in custody and imprisoning male inmates in an unreasonable manner with deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights following a trial or other court appearance where the individual is found not guilty, is acquitted, obtains a dismissal of the charges brought against him or otherwise receives a judicial determination requiring his release.” (R. 56, Am. Compl. ¶ 27.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “treats male inmates differently than similarly situated female inmates who were found not guilty, were acquitted, obtained a dismissal of the charges brought against them or otherwise received a judicial determination requiring their release.” (Id. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff bases his claims on the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive and procedural due process protections, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
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Plaintiff then filed his renewed motion for class certification on January 30, 2014 changing the focus of his claims. Rather than relying on the length of his post-acquittal detention, Plaintiff readjusted his claim to focus on Defendant’s practice of placing acquitted detainees with regular detainees and transporting them from court back to their cells in CCJ’s general population. See Otero, 306 F.R.D. at 204. Based on Plaintiff’s fine-tuning of his claim, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for certification and certified the following class under Rule 23(b)(3):
All male inmates who while being detained by the Cook County Sheriff’s Office were found not guilty, were acquitted, or had charges brought against them dismissed, and for whom the Sheriff’s Office no longer had any legal right to detain from April 27, 2010 through the present. Otero, 306 F.R.D. at 208. B. Cook County Jail and Cook County Department of Corrections The CCJ is one of the largest jail systems in the United States and is situated on a 96-acre site at 26th Street and California Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. (R. 185, Def.’s Rule 56.1 Stmt. Facts ¶ 15; R. 198, Pl.’s Stmt. Add’l Facts ¶ 1; R. 182, Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Stmt. Facts ¶ 4.)3 There are fourteen courthouses in Cook County, including the criminal courthouse located at 26th Street and California Avenue in Chicago. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 9.) Representatives from the Sheriff’s Office estimate that staff transports approximately 800 to 1,000 CCJ detainees to and from the numerous Cook County courthouses to the CCJ on any given day. (Id. ¶ 12.) The
3 Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s reliance on Defendant’s own website, namely, www.cookcountysheriff.org, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to lay a proper foundation to authenticate this information. In general, records from government websites are selfauthenticating. See SEC v. Berrettini, No. 10 CV 1614, 2015 WL 5159746, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2015).
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CCDOC’s General Order 9.27, dated October 15, 1995, provides a framework for detainee discharge procedures. (Id. ¶ 56.)
C. Defendant’s Policies and Practices When a detainee is admitted to or discharged from the CCJ – whether he is being initially admitted, ultimately discharged, or is traveling to and from court – the Sheriff’s Office processes him through the Reception Classification Diagnosis Center (“RCDC”). (Def.’s Stmt. Facts ¶¶ 15, 28; Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 23.) The RCDC operates in three buildings, including the basement of Division V, the newly constructed RCDC building, and the “bridge” or basement level of the criminal courts building at 26th and California. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 25.) The RCDC staff uses the various holding cells in the RCDC throughout the day for different and varying purposes. (Id. ¶ 24.) Officers take detainees going from the CCJ to the criminal courthouse at 26th and California through a bridge in the criminal courts building. (Id. ¶ 26.) The RCDC staff at the bridge segregates the detainees into holding cells by courtroom location so the courtroom deputies can retrieve and transport the detainees to their court appearances. (Id.) When staff members transport detainees from the bridge to the courtrooms, they separate the detainees based on whether they are going to the north or south side of the courtroom building and by courtroom floor. (Id. ¶ 27.) Immediately before and after their court appearances, detainees are held in the holding cells located behind the courtrooms. (Id. ¶ 28.) After their court appearances, staff members transport the male detainees – whether they have had a judicial determination of discharge or not – to a holding area in the bridge of the criminal courthouse. (Id. ¶ 49.) The bridge consists of eight holding cells (also known as
6

“bullpens”) that hold about 50 detainees at any given time. (Id. ¶ 50.) Thereafter, Sheriff’s Office personnel transport the male acquittees along with other male detainees from the bridge through the tunnel, and, ultimately, to the RCDC where an officer locks them up together in another bullpen. (Id. ¶ 51; Def.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 19.) When transporting detainees from the bridge, officers segregate the maximum security detainees and the increased maximum security detainees from the other detainees. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 52; Def.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 38.) The staff then transports the remainder of the detainees in groups that could be anywhere from 10 to 100 detainees depending on volume and staffing levels. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 52.) After staff members place the male detainees in the RCDC holding cells, a transportation unit takes them back to their respective living units within the CCJ. (Id. ¶ 53.)
Once male acquittees – who have had a judicial determination of discharge – are back in their living unit, the Records Division conducts its review of the court orders (“mittimuses”) and creates a discharge packet. (Id. ¶¶ 55, 58; Def.’s Stmt. Facts ¶¶ 49, 51.) A Records Division supervisor then reviews and approves the discharge packet, after which he or she sends the packet to the RCDC for staff review. (Def.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 67.) When the packet is returned to the Records Division supervisor after the RCDC review, the supervisor conducts the final review of the discharge packet. (Id.) An officer in the Discharge Unit then conducts an exit interview of the detainee. (Id. ¶ 68.) When the detainee is ready for discharge, staff transport him to Division V where CCDOC officials conduct a final check. (Id. ¶¶ 69, 70.)
With respect to female detainees who are found not guilty or otherwise acquitted in court, a Sheriff’s officer conducts a pre-screening of the mittimuses to determine whether the female detainee is a potential candidate for release. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 61; R. 201, Def.’s Rule 56.1
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Stmt. Add’l Facts ¶ 13.) If the mittimus indicates a disposition of the female’s charges, an officer then checks the jail management computer system to determine whether there are other pending cases, warrants, or holds. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 63.) It only takes a few moments to look at a mittimus to determine whether an individual is a potential candidate for release. (Id. ¶ 65.) Once the jail staff is aware of a female detainee’s favorable disposition, the staff member commences the final review and release process for her. (Id. ¶ 66.) When the staff identifies a potential female release candidate through the pre-screening process, they give her the option of remaining in the RCDC pending the Records Division’s final review of her file. (Id. ¶ 68; Def.’s Stmt. Add’l Facts ¶ 16.) A Sheriff’s Office employee then segregates the female detainees who choose to remain in the RCDC to hold them separately from other detainees. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 71; Def.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 82.) Also, if a female detainee elects to remain in the RCDC, a staff member places a call to her jail division so that an officer assigned to her former living unit can collect her personal belongings. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 73.)
D. Plaintiff’s Detention Plaintiff Brian Otero was incarcerated at the CCJ following an arrest for burglary on November 24, 2009. (Def.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 6.) Almost one and a half years later, on July 21, 2011, a jury returned a not guilty verdict as to Plaintiff on the burglary charge. (Id. ¶ 7.) The Cook County States Attorney tried Plaintiff with his brother for the burglary at the same time, but the jury returned a guilty verdict as to Plaintiff’s brother. (Id. ¶ 8.) Following the jury verdict, staff took Plaintiff to a holding pen in Division V with other detainees at which time the other detainees overheard a conversation that the jury found Plaintiff not guilty. (Id. ¶ 9.) Three unknown detainees then attacked Plaintiff causing him injury when he was in the Division V
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holding cell on his way back from court. (Id. ¶ 10.) Thereafter, personnel transferred Plaintiff back to his living unit, namely, Division VI of the CCJ. (Id. ¶ 13.) After the discharge paperwork was completed, but before his release, staff returned Plaintiff to a holding cell in Division V. (R. 185-2, Def.’s Ex. 2, Otero Dep., at 49-50.)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); see also Life Plans, Inc. v. Security Life of Denver Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 343, 349 (7th Cir. 2015). In determining summary judgment motions, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After “a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (quotation omitted). “To survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must show evidence sufficient to establish every element that is essential to its claim and for which it will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Life Plans, Inc., 800 F.3d at 349.
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ANALYSIS I. Overdetention Claim – Count I
In Count I of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s policies and practices deprived him of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff seeks to hold Sheriff Dart liable under § 1983 because he is a lawmaker whose “edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). As discussed in the Court’s September 2, 2014 class certification ruling, “Plaintiff’s claim challenges Defendant’s alleged restriction of acquitted detainees’ right to freedom by treating them in the same manner as regular inmates returning to their cells in the general population of the Cook County Jail.” Otero, 306 F.R.D. at 204. More specifically, Plaintiff contends that the Sheriff’s Office has no policies in place that distinguish male acquittees from other detainees.4 In Count I, Plaintiff brings his overdetention claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive and procedural due process protections, as well as the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures. Defendant Dart moves for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s overdetention claim as alleged in Count I of the Amended Complaint.
A. Fourth Amendment and Substantive Due Process 1. Fourth Amendment
The Court first examines Defendant’s argument that the Fourteenth Amendment applies under the circumstances and not the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable
4 Although the certified class includes individuals who had judicial determinations of discharge other than acquittal, for the sake of clarity, the Court refers to the class and policy as involving post-acquittal detainees.
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searches and seizure. Defendant specifically argues that Fourth Amendment protections only apply to detainees during the period of confinement between their arrest and the judicial determination of probable cause. See Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir. 2011); Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on his post-acquittal confinement, and thus he was “a free citizen protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Shultz v. Dart, No. 13 C 3641, 2013 WL 5873325, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2013) (after defendant “was sentenced to time served and told by the judge that he was free to leave, he once again became a free person and thus protected by the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Smith v. Dart, No. 13 C 8223, 2015 WL 1727341, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2015) (“after he was acquitted, plaintiff was no longer in custody pursuant to legal process, the touchstone of Fourteenth Amendment protection.”); cf. Lewis v. O’Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1372 (7th Cir. 1988) (delay in “releasing an individual from custody could violate his fourth amendment rights”).5
The Court therefore turns to Plaintiff’s argument that he has presented sufficient evidence creating an issue of material fact for trial that Defendant’s policy is unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. “The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). In assessing the reasonableness of Defendant’s policy, the Court
5 Defendant relies on Lewis v. O’Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1988), for the proposition that retaining custody over a detainee while tending to pre-release administrative tasks is not per se unconstitutional, which is an accurate statement of law. Nevertheless, relying on case law discussing the Fourth Amendment, the Lewis decision reversed the district court’s directed verdict and remanded the case to allow a jury to determine whether the length of the detainee’s detention was reasonable under the circumstances. See id. at 1367 (citing Gramenos v. Jewel Co., Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 1986), and Moore v. Marketplace, 754 F.2d 1336, 1351 (7th Cir. 1985)).
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examines “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard is inherently fact dependent. See Williams v. Indiana State Police Dep’t, 797 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s overdetention policy is unreasonable rests on Defendant’s lack of policy for pre-screening acquitted male detainees for release and failure to segregate them from the general population after they return from court – like Defendant’s policy for acquitted female detainees. Due to this lack of policy, Plaintiff argues that the nature and quality of his continued detention after acquittal was burdensome and unacceptably dangerous, especially because Defendant no longer had any legal right to detain him. Plaintiff has presented evidence in the form of the expert opinion of Jeffrey Schwartz, Ph.D. – that Defendant does not challenge under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) – raising an issue of fact for trial that Defendant’s lack of policy subjects acquitted male detainees to unreasonable risks of violence from other detainees and unreasonable risks of the jail staff’s use of force. Plaintiff’s evidence concerning the general risk of violence at the CCJ is also supported by the testimony of Defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness and the RCDC’s Superintendent. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶¶ 16, 17.)
On the other hand, examining the facts and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendant has failed to present sufficient evidence to establish – as a matter of law – that countervailing governmental interests outweigh Plaintiff’s right to be released as a free man.
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Defendant, for example, suggests that it is necessary to process acquitted male detainees under the present procedures due to volume and space constraints at the CCJ. As far as space is concerned, there is evidence in the record that even during some of the busier times at the RCDC, there are several unused male holding cells available, as well as additional unused space on the first floor of Division V. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶¶ 87-89.) Equally important, Defendant’s argument does not directly address why jail staff does not segregate male detainees with courtordered discharges from the other male detainees, especially because evidence in the record creates a triable issue of fact that this category of detainees is a fraction of the detainees returning from the Cook County criminal courthouses on any given day and that it only takes a few seconds to verify a mittimus to determine whether an individual is a potential candidate for release. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶¶ 12, 52, 65.) Furthermore, Plaintiff has presented evidence that the Sheriff’s Office has the resources to segregate acquitted female detainees, as well as detainees with “new bonds,” namely, individuals who have been in court, remanded to the Sheriff’s custody, and are waiting for someone to post their bond. (Id. ¶ 37; 209-1, Johnsen Dep., at 2628.)
In further support of the argument that countervailing governmental interests justify his post-acquittal detention policy, Defendant Dart presents evidence and argues that the CCDOC’s discharge procedures are acceptable by highlighting different factors that may cause reasonable delays. Defendant, for example, points to traffic concerns when transporting detainees from the many Cook County courthouses back to the CCJ, completing and processing paperwork, and processing new detainees. (Def.’s Stmt. Facts ¶¶ 21-26, 30, 45-46, 59.) Defendant also argues that the staff must conduct a complete review of an acquitted detainee’s paperwork, including
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searching for outstanding warrants or holds. (Id. ¶¶ 54-58, 60-61, 63-68.) In response, Plaintiff does not dispute that CCDOC personnel must process the necessary paperwork, verify court orders, and check for outstanding warrants before releasing detainees – especially because the question of delay or length of time concerning Plaintiff’s overdetention is not at issue in this lawsuit. Indeed, in relation to these routine delays, Plaintiff explains that he “does not dispute that such burdens and delays exist. They do. But they can and would be avoided altogether if males were treated the same as females and allowed to remain outside of the general population pending their release.” (R. 200, Pl.’s Resp. Brief, at 17.) Thus, Defendant’s argument based on the reasonableness of the delay in releasing acquitted detainees is unavailing.
Accordingly, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor – as the Court is required to do at this procedural posture – he has presented sufficient evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact for trial that Defendant’s overdetention policy is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court thus denies Defendant’s summary judgment motion in this respect.
2. Substantive Due Process The Court recognizes that if an action falls squarely within the Fourth Amendment’s protections, such as an excessive force claim, substantive due process would not govern that claim. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (“where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”). Because Defendant argues that the present claim does not fall “within the ambit of those activities regulated by the Fourth Amendment” – and Plaintiff asserts a
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substantive due process claim in the alternative – the Court also considers Plaintiff’s claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process protections for the sake of completeness. See Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 754 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Does the distinction between the two legal categories (search and seizure, and due process) make any practical difference? Probably not, since whether the issue [of continued confinement] is addressed under the Fourth Amendment or under the due process clause, the benefits of confinement to the government must be compared with the costs to the person confined.”).
“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government,” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), “whether the fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness, or in the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (internal citations omitted). “[T]o determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place” courts “must look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972).
Here, Plaintiff has “a liberty interest in being free from incarceration absent a criminal conviction.” Oviatt By & Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Slone v. Herman, 983 F.2d 107, 110 (8th Cir. 1993) (once order “suspending [inmate’s] sentence became final and nonappealable, the state lost its lawful authority to hold [inmate]”); Shultz, 2013 WL 5873325, at *5 (“The substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
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due process guarantee recognizes that the detention of an individual without legal authority may constitute a deprivation of liberty.”) Because Plaintiff has fulfilled this threshold requirement, the Court turns to his substantive due process claim.
“[T]he Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (citation omitted). “In the context of substantive due process, the inquiry involves ‘an appraisal of the totality of the circumstances rather than a formalistic examination of fixed elements.’” Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 570 (7th Cir. 1998)). In his summary judgment motion, Defendant Dart argues that Plaintiff has failed to show that the totality of the Sheriff Office’s “actions rise to the level of shocking the conscience that is required for a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation to have occurred.” (R. 186, Def.’s Opening Brief, at 17.) To clarify, “the substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when it ‘can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.’” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 (quotation omitted).
In examining the “shocks the conscience” standard under the Supreme Court’s Lewis decision, the Seventh Circuit explained that “less horrible conduct also violates substantive due process.” Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 576. The Armstrong decision clarified that “the Court endorsed the use of the deliberately indifferent standard for cases in which the defendants have the luxury of forethought” explaining “that prison is the quintessential setting for the deliberately indifferent standard because ‘in the custodial situation of a prison, forethought about an inmate’s
16

welfare is not only feasible but obligatory.’” Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 576 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851). The Seventh Circuit thus concluded that “[i]f any doubt remained about whether deliberate indifference could shock the conscience, the [Lewis] Court summed up with: ‘When such extended opportunities to do better are teamed with protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly shocking.’” Id. at 577 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853). In other words, “when the circumstances permit public officials the opportunity for reasoned deliberation in their decisions, [courts] shall find the official’s conduct conscience shocking when it evinces a deliberate indifference to the rights of the individual.” King ex rel. King v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 819 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Christensen v. County of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 468 (7th Cir. 2007) (“it is often important to differentiate between situations in which the state actor is acting under exigent circumstances and those situations in which the state actor is working at a more deliberate pace.”).
In response to Defendant’s summary judgment motion, Plaintiff asserts that his claim is based on Defendant’s policy and practice that restricts acquitted detainees’ right to freedom by treating them in the same manner as regular detainees returning from court, which is based on a deliberative policy as opposed to any exigent circumstances. The Court agrees and applies the deliberate indifference standard to Plaintiff’s claim. Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process protections, the Seventh Circuit defines “deliberate indifference as ‘conscious disregard of known or obvious dangers.’” Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 577 (citation omitted). Put differently, “the defendant must have known that the plaintiff ‘was at serious risk of being harmed [and] decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.’” Id. (citation omitted); see also Board v. Farnham, 394
17

F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). The Court also notes that it is well-settled that jail officials have a duty to protect detainees from violent assaults at the hands of fellow detainees pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)).
Plaintiff has presented evidence that detainees have filed lawsuits against Defendant Dart and his predecessors regarding unsafe conditions due to the commingling of detainees of different classifications, as well as in the specific context of overdetention, yet the Sheriff’s Office has not altered its policies or General Order 9.27, which was promulgated twenty years ago. Further, Plaintiff has presented Dr. Schwartz’s expert opinion that Defendant is and was on notice that the CCJ is a dangerous place and that placing acquitted detainees among other detainees increases their risk of harm based on the pervasive pattern of assaults when detainees of different classifications are commingled. This evidence creates a triable issue of fact that the Sheriff’s Office was aware of a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff, yet did not take steps to protect him from this danger.
Defendant Dart, on the other hand, argues that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Smith v. Sangamon County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 715 F.3d 188 (7th Cir. 2013), forecloses Plaintiff’s claim. In Smith, a detainee based his Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference due process claim on the Sheriff’s security classifications arguing that this policy did not do enough to separate violent from nonviolent detainees within the jail. See id. at 191. The Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s claim because he failed to present any evidence that the classification policy created a serious risk of physical harm to the detainees. See id. at 192. As discussed above, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence creating a triable issue of fact to survive Defendant Dart’s
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summary judgment motion in this respect. Next, relying on the deposition testimony of the RCDC’s Superintendent, Defendant
argues that returning acquitted detainees to their housing unit is a safer course of action than holding detainees in bullpens or holding cells. This argument does not establish – as a matter of law – that Defendant did not act with deliberate indifference based on Defendant’s failure to separate acquittees while holding them in the various bullpens before returning the detainees to their housing units. In fact, the RCDC’s Superintendent testified that holding detainees collectively for long periods of time in bullpens creates tension. (R. 208-1, Johnsen Dep., at 163.)
Defendant further attempts to ameliorate any showing of deliberate indifference by setting forth evidence that the Sheriff’s Office “has implemented several measures over the last few years to reduce the number of total hours it takes to process a detainee and to improve the accuracy and efficiency of the discharge process.” (Def.’s Opening Brief, at 26.) Again, Defendant’s argument focuses on the timing of the acquitted detainees release and not the risk of harm resulting from commingling detainees in holding pens and returning them to their housing units.
Examining the facts and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence creating a triable issue of fact that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference under the circumstances. The Court therefore denies Defendant’s summary judgment motion concerning Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim.
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B. Procedural Due Process Plaintiff also brings his overdetention claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process protections. In evaluating procedural due process claims, courts engage in a two-step analysis: (1) whether the plaintiff was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest and (2) what type of process was due. See Hinkle v. White, 793 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2015). Because Plaintiff has a protected liberty interest to be free from incarceration absent a criminal conviction, the Court examines what process Plaintiff was due under the circumstances. “Generally, due process requires some kind of hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property,” although, “in some circumstances [] a postdeprivation hearing or a common-law-tort remedy satisfies due process.” Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In support of his summary judgment motion, Defendant Dart argues that pursuant to Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), the common law tort of false imprisonment provides an adequate post-deprivation procedural safeguard under the circumstances.6 See Schepers v. Commissioner of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 691 F.3d 909, 916 (7th Cir. 2012) (“in some circumstances, a deprivation of liberty or property might be the result of a ‘random and unauthorized’ act by a state official, and the aggrieved person is thus relegated to post-deprivation remedies such as state tort actions.”). In Parratt, the Supreme Court “held that a claim based on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not actionable if the alleged violation was the unauthorized act of a rogue state officer rather than an application of
6 The Parratt doctrine does not apply to substantive due process claims. See Armstrong v. Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2015); Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2007); Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1996).
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state law or policy, as long as the state provides an adequate remedy for the wrongful act of its employee.” Llovet v. City of Chicago, 761 F.3d 759, 761 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Armstrong, 786 F.3d at 539 (“Parratt is limited to a narrow category of due process cases where the plaintiff claims he was denied a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing, but under circumstances where the very notion of a pre-deprivation hearing would be impractical and even nonsensical, and where the deprivation was not carried out through established state procedures.”). Because Plaintiff’s claim is based on Defendant’s policies and practices, the Parratt doctrine does not apply, and thus Defendant’s argument is without merit. See Schepers, 691 F.3d at 916 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982)); see, e.g., Smith, 2015 WL 1727341, at *3 (“plaintiff is not complaining that state actors deviated, through inadvertence or design, from a permissible state procedure,” instead, “he attacks the procedure itself as unconstitutional, which is an actionable due process claim.”).
Turning to what process was due under the circumstances, the Court recognizes that “[d]ue process requires government to follow reasonable procedures for minimizing mistaken deprivations of liberty.” Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 2011). “While the requirements of due process vary with the particulars of the proceeding, it is well-established that the essential requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Tom Beu Xiong v. Fischer, 787 F.3d 389, 400 (7th Cir. 2015). “The purpose of notice under the Due Process Clause is to allow an interested party to challenge the deprivation of a protected liberty interest before it occurs” and the “case law involving what type of notice is required under the Due Process Clause is numerous, and its applicability wide-spread.” Matamoros v. Grams, 706 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir. 2013). “The amount and timing of the process due when a deprivation of
21

liberty or property (in the constitutional sense of these terms) is alleged varies with circumstances.” Chicago United Indus., Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 445 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2006).
In his response brief, Plaintiff does not explain what type of notice was required or the nature of the process he was due under the circumstances – nor has Plaintiff cited legal authority lending guidance to this question. After careful research, the Court has not found any legal authority concerning what pre-deprivation process would be appropriate for Plaintiff’s overdetention claim – most likely because the protections under substantive due process are a better fit under the circumstances. See Barnes v. D.C., 793 F. Supp. 2d 260, 274-75 n.11 (D.D.C. 2011); see, e.g., Shultz, 2013 WL 5873325, at *5. To clarify, Plaintiff’s claim essentially rests on the premise that no matter how much process Defendant could or would provide, the substantive component of due process bars Defendant from unreasonably detaining him after his acquittal. See Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing difference between substantive and procedural due process); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125 (procedural due process is “a guarantee of fair procedure”).
In sum, construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, he has failed to submit evidence to establish every element that is essential to his procedural due process claim for which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Life Plans, Inc., 800 F.3d at 349. As such, the Court grants Defendant’s motion regarding Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim.
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II. Equal Protection Claim – Count II In Count II of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s overdetention
policy discriminates against acquitted male detainees based on gender. Both Plaintiff and Defendant move for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim. “The Equal Protection Clause grants to all Americans the ‘right to be free from invidious discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental activity.’” D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980)). “Gender is a quasi-suspect class that triggers intermediate scrutiny in the equal protection context; the justification for a gender-based classification thus must be exceedingly persuasive.” Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996)). This “burden is met only by showing at least that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982); see also Young v. County of Cook, 616 F. Supp. 2d 834, 853 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish the existence of sufficiently different treatment of male and female detainees implicating constitutional concerns. In particular, Defendant argues that the only way the Sheriff’s Office treats females differently than males is that female acquittees have the option to either stay at the RCDC or return to their living unit pending the processing of their discharge packet. Defendant’s argument fails to recognize that Plaintiff has presented evidence creating a triable issue of fact that staff pre-screens female
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acquittees for discharge and gives preferential treatment when processing discharge packets of female detainees. Moreover, Plaintiff has presented evidence establishing a triable issue that Defendant’s policy and procedures for discharging acquitted female detainees are safer than the policies in place for acquitted male detainees, and it is well-settled that jail officials have a duty to protect detainees from violent assaults at the hands of fellow detainees pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, Defendant’s first argument is misplaced.7
Next, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has failed in his burden of offering an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for processing female acquittees differently than the male acquittees. Looking to Defendant Dart’s justifications, he argues that the lower number of female detainees, fewer female living units, and lower number of incidents among female detainees allows for the different treatment because it is easier and less staff-intensive to transport and discharge female detainees. (Def.’s Stmt. Add’l Facts ¶¶ 12, 14.) Defendant further contends that the important governmental objective of safety in the CCJ underscores the need for gender-based differences and that courts have counseled against micro-managing the day-to-day operations of jails and prisons. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 545-46. In the context of prison and jail management, the Supreme Court also teaches that there must be a “mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556.
In any event, Defendant’s argument that it is less staff-intensive and easier to discharge female detainees is of no consequence in the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s Equal Protection
7 Based on the argument that the CCJ’s present procedures do not result in different treatment of male and female acquittees, Defendant asserts that the proper standard for Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim is the rational basis test. Under the circumstances, however, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of gender-based differences triggering intermediate scrutiny in the equal protection context. See Hayden, 743 F.3d at 577.
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claim because “[f]inancial constraints may not be used to justify the creation or perpetuation of constitutional violations.” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 392, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). Also, Defendant’s stated reasons do not show – as a matter of law – that discharging acquitted female detainees differently then acquitted male detainees serves “important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723; see also Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983) (“the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment [] requires that the party seeking to uphold a policy that expressly discriminates on the basis of gender must carry the burden of showing an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the differing treatment.”) (citation omitted). There is no doubt that jail safety and security issues concern important governmental objectives, but Defendant fails to establish that the procedures the Sheriff’s Office employs to discharged acquitted male detainees substantially relate to that objective. See, e.g., Bullock v. Sheahan, 568 F.Supp.2d 965, 973 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“The blanket strip search policy of all male potential discharges is not substantially related to the achievement of prison safety and security as articulated by defendants.”).
To further underscore Defendant failing in his burden of showing that the different treatment between acquitted male detainees and acquitted female detainees serves an important governmental interest, Plaintiff presents the RCDC Superintendent’s testimony that he does not know why female acquittees get the option to remain in the RCDC pending the final review of their files as opposed to returning to their housing unit. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 69.) Although this is a relevant fact for the jury’s consideration when determining Defendant’s rationale for the
25

difference in treatment, it does not establish, as a matter of law, that Defendant’s justification for a gender-based classification policy or procedure violates the Equal Protection Clause as Plaintiff suggests.
Because both sides have presented evidence showing disputed material facts for a jury to decide, the Court denies Defendant’s and Plaintiff’s summary judgment motions regarding Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim as alleged in Count II of the Amended Complaint.
CONCLUSION For these reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [184] and denies Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment [181]. Dated: January 7, 2016
ENTERED
______________________________ AMY J. ST. EVE United States District Court Judge
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 Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 293 Filed: 08/17/16 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:5915

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

BRIAN OTERO, Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook County, and COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 12-cv-3148

)

)

Judge Amy J. St. Eve

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER
Before the Court is Larry Oruta’s motion to waive fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. (R.289). For the following reasons, the Court denies Mr. Oruta’s motion.
BACKGROUND
On August 8, 2016, the Court denied both timely motions objecting to the proposed class action settlement in this case. (R.284). In relevant part, the Court ruled:
The second objecting class member—Mr. Larry Oruta—also appears to misunderstand the scope of the release. (R.278). Specifically, Mr. Oruta objects to the $100 payment as “unsatisfactory.” He requests “additional compensation” in light of his claims against Cook County—apparently pending in state and federal court—for wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, gross negligence in the provision of medical assistance, and negligent exposure to toxic asbestos. (Id. at 1-3). These claims, however, are not covered by the Settlement Agreement. Mr. Oruta is free to pursue—or to continue to pursue—them on his own. His objection, therefore, does not impact the fairness of the proposed settlement. See Mangone, 206 F.R.D. at 230 (“The pleadings frame the case, and, therefore, it is not surprising, nor does it render the settlement unfair, that claims not included in the lawsuit were not included in the Settlement Agreement”).
(Id. at 3). On August 11, 2016, after the final approval hearing, the Court granted final approval to the class action settlement and dismissed this case with prejudice. (R.285, R.286).
Mr. Oruta subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his objection. (R.287). In connection with that appeal, Mr. Oruta has filed a motion to waive fees “pursuant [to] Fed. R. 24, [the] Court having waived fees as indigent previously.” (R.289). The Court now considers that motion.

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 293 Filed: 08/17/16 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:5916
ANALYSIS
The Court construes Mr. Oruta’s motion as a motion to waive fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3). This rule provides that:
A party who was permitted to proceed in forma pauperis in the district-court action, or who was determined to be financially unable to obtain an adequate defense in a criminal case, may proceed on appeal in forma pauperis without further authorization, unless:
(A) the district court--before or after the notice of appeal is filed--certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith or finds that the party is not otherwise entitled to proceed in forma pauperis and states in writing its reasons for the certification or finding; or (B) a statute provides otherwise.
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3).
Here, Mr. Oruta has failed to identify or explain when the Court “previously” permitted him to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See Fontanez v. Time Warner Cable, 618 F. App’x 288, 289 (7th Cir. 2015) (“permission to proceed in forma pauperis before the district court likewise permits the party to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal”). The Court has not granted Mr. Oruta IFP status in this case. Furthermore, the Court has no record of Mr. Oruta’s IFP status in any other case. See, e.g., Oruta v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 3:13-CV-600 JVB, 2013 WL 3201795, at *2 (N.D. Ind. June 21, 2013) (denying motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis).
Even assuming that the Court previously permitted Mr. Oruta to proceed in forma pauperis, moreover, the Court certifies that this appeal is not taken in good faith. Rather, like the underlying objection to the class action settlement, this appeal is legally frivolous. See generally Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2000). Mr. Oruta again misunderstands the scope of the settlement’s release, arguing that he is entitled to “relief other than [the] token award of $100.00.” (R.287, Notice of Appeal). As noted in the Court’s previous ruling, however, the $100 settlement payment does not purport to resolve Mr. Oruta’s other lawsuits pending against the Cook County Department of Corrections or other parties.1 As such, he remains free to pursue those claims on his own. (R.284). Because no reasonable person could view this appeal— stemming from Mr. Oruta’s fundamental misunderstanding as to the scope of the settlement’s release—as having “some merit,” the Court certifies that it is not taken in good faith under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3). See Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1992) (an IFP claim is frivolous where there is no “arguable basis” for relief).
1 The Seventh Circuit recently considered an appeal by Mr. Oruta concerning the dismissal of his complaint which had alleged “an unlawful arrest and exposure to asbestos in county jail.” See Oruta v. Cont’l Air Transp., Inc., 607 F. App’x 568 (7th Cir. 2015). The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal because Mr. Oruta had failed “to illuminate how his amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief[.]” Id.
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CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Mr. Oruta’s motion to waive fees. (R.289).

Dated: August 17, 2016

_________________________________ AMY J. ST. EVE United States District Court Judge

3

 
 Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 56 Filed: 01/15/14 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:841

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS – EASTERN DIVISION

BRIAN OTERO, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS J. DART, SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

) ) ) Case No. 1:12-cv-03148 ) ) ) Honorable Amy J. St. Eve ) ) ) ) ) )

AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

For his amended class action complaint against Defendants Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of

Cook County (“Defendant”) and Cook County, Illinois, Plaintiff Brian Otero (“Otero” or

“Plaintiff”), on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, states as follows:

NATURE OF ACTION

1. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and other male inmates who were

victimized by Defendant’s policy of unconstitutionally detaining, holding in custody and

imprisoning free citizens following an acquittal or other favorable disposition of the charges

brought against them. Rather than freeing these citizens, Defendant instead manacles them,

herds them together with inmates of the general prison population, and subjects them to a

labyrinthine ordeal during which they are locked and confined in a series of holding cells and

even returned to their original jail cells precisely as if they had been found guilty of the very

crime of which they were acquitted.

2. These policies or practices violate Plaintiff’s and class members’ rights under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Furthermore, similarly

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situated female acquitted inmates are not subjected to these policies or practices, but rather are segregated from other inmates and not returned to their original jail cells. Defendant’s policies or practices, therefore, also violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, Defendant’s policies or practices deprived Plaintiff and the putative class of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and, therefore, constitute violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to the Act of Congress known as the “Civil Rights Act of 1991” and the “Civil Rights Act of 1866,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)-(c). Defendants reside and do business in the Northern District of Illinois and Plaintiff is a resident of the Northern District of Illinois. Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the State of Illinois for the purposes of this lawsuit. All or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred within this judicial district.
PARTIES 5. Plaintiff Brian Otero is a resident of the City of Chicago, in Cook County, Illinois. 6. Defendants are the Sheriff of Cook County, Thomas J. Dart and Cook County, Illinois. The Sheriff is being sued in his official capacity only. The County is joined pursuant to Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2003).
COMMON ALLEGATIONS 7. Defendant has a policy or practice of detaining free citizens following an acquittal or other favorable disposition of the charges brought against them in a manner that results in an
2

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unconstitutional seizure and deprivation of liberty under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and which also violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
8. More specifically, Defendant has a policy or practice under which it shackles, transports and detains acquitted individuals with other regular inmates. Defendant also requires all acquitted individuals to change back into their prison jumpsuit and be processed back into the general prison population. In fact, Defendant has conceded that it has no policies or procedures in place that distinguish acquittees from other inmates over whom Defendant has the continued right to detain or that in any way acknowledge an inmate’s right to freedom that he acquires by virtue of an acquittal or other favorable disposition of the charges brought against him. Furthermore, even though an acquittee’s file already includes a warrant check, Defendant’s policy or practice is to hold acquitted individuals in custody pending the completion of yet another warrant check. Moreover, Defendant intentionally waits until the last minute to run such a check instead of doing so upon realizing the detainee has been ordered to be released. These and other aspects of Defendant’s policies or practices result in a post-acquittal detention of individuals that is unconstitutional.
9. The policies or practices described above apply equally to every single acquitted male detainee and are so widespread, permanent and well settled that they constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.
10. Furthermore, similarly situated female acquitted inmates are not subjected to these policies or practices. Unlike their male counterparts, female inmates who are acquitted or otherwise ordered to be released are segregated from other inmates and are given the option to either remain in the receiving room or return to their jail cell while Defendant processes their
3

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release. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
11. After his acquittal, Plaintiff was subjected to the exact same policies and procedures set forth above.
12. On November 23, 2009, the Chicago Police Department arrested Plaintiff for an alleged burglary. Plaintiff was subsequently charged with burglary and was held, pending trial, in Cook County Jail, since he could not afford to make bail.
13. On July 21, 2011, Plaintiff stood trial for the alleged burglary. 14. Plaintiff was in Defendant’s custody from the time he was arrested on November 23, 2009 until his trial. 15. The jury found Plaintiff “not guilty” following a trial and acquitted him of all charges. The court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. 16. At the time of his acquittal, Plaintiff had no outstanding warrants and no other pending cases that would justify his continued detention. 17. Following his acquittal, and despite the fact that there were no other pending charges or warrants against Plaintiff, Defendant seized Plaintiff and placed him in handcuffs. Plaintiff was then detained with other regular inmates in a number of different holding cells and ultimately processed back into his Division within the general prison population. 18. While being detained, held in custody and imprisoned in one of the various bullpens, other inmates asked Plaintiff about the outcome of his trial. After informing the prisoners that he had been found not guilty and would be leaving jail, the prisoners punched and pummeled Plaintiff about the face and body. Plaintiff sustained physical injuries as a result of the jailhouse beating he suffered while being detained by Defendant after his acquittal. Plaintiff
4

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did not report the beating to Defendant because he was afraid he would somehow be charged in connection with being beaten in the bullpen.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 19. Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individually and as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23. The class Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as:
All male inmates who while being detained by the Cook County Sheriff’s Office were found not guilty, were acquitted, had charges brought against them dismissed or otherwise received a judicial determination requiring their release and for whom the Sheriff’s Office no longer had any legal right to detain from April 27, 2010 through the present. Excluded from the class are Defendants’ legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, and members of their immediate families, and any Judge who may preside over this case and his or her immediate family. 20. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of class members is unknown at this time but can be determined through discovery. Defendant has already admitted in discovery that a subset of the class includes hundreds of individuals. On information and belief, Plaintiff believes there are thousands, if not tens of thousands, of members of the class. Additionally, because Defendant’s unconstitutional policies or practices are continuing, there are new class members every day. 21. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including, but not limited to: (a) whether Defendant maintains a policy or practice of detaining male citizens who were found not guilty, were acquitted, had charges brought against them dismissed or otherwise received a judicial determination requiring their release by
5

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seizing and handcuffing them, detaining and transporting them in the same holding cells as the other regular inmates, processing them back into the general prison population and continuing to hold them until running a check for outstanding warrants; (b) whether Defendant lacked policies and procedures that acknowledge a male inmate’s right to freedom that he acquires by virtue of an acquittal or other favorable disposition of the charges brought against him; (c) whether Defendant’s policy or practice is to treat similarly situated female acquittees differently than male acquittees; (c) whether such policies or practices are so widespread, permanent, and well settled that they constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (d) whether such policies or practices were carried out under color of custom or usage of State law and whether Plaintiff’s and class members’ constitutional rights were violated under the color of State law; and (e) whether such policies or practices violate Plaintiff’s and putative class members’ constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 22. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of all members of the class. Plaintiff’s claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class; namely, Plaintiff and class members were all subjected to and damaged by Defendant’s unconstitutional policy or practice as described above. 23. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. Plaintiff’s interests and the interests of class members do not conflict. Plaintiff’s interests in pursuing this matter are aligned with the interests of the class members. Plaintiff is willing to actively
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prosecute the class claims at issue in this case and has retained counsel experienced in and capable of handling class action lawsuits.
24. Resolving this controversy as a class action is also superior to other methods. Because this case involves similar, if not identical, claims of thousands of individuals against the same defendants, class certification provides greater efficiency and consistency than piecemeal litigation of nearly identical individual cases. Class treatment will minimize the costs of discovery, motions, and trial and prevent a multiplicity of cases addressing identical issues that would unduly and unnecessarily congest the judicial system.
25. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. Plaintiff is currently being detained by Defendant and therefore faces a real and immediate danger that he will again be subjected to Defendant’s unconstitutional policies or practices.
COUNT I (Unlawful Detention in Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution via 42 U.S.C. § 1983) 26. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 27. Defendant maintains a policy or practice of detaining, holding in custody and imprisoning male inmates in an unreasonable manner with deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights following a trial or other court appearance where the individual is found not guilty, is acquitted, obtains a dismissal of the charges brought against him or otherwise receives a judicial determination requiring his release.
7

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28. The aforementioned policy or practice deprived Plaintiff and the putative class of liberty without due process, in violation of their constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
29. The aforementioned policy or practice deprived Plaintiff and the putative class of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
30. The aforementioned policy or practice was carried out under color of custom or usage of State law and Plaintiff’s and class members’ constitutional rights were violated under the color of State law.
31. Defendant’s conduct is intentional, deliberate, willful, and conducted with disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff and the class. In fact, Defendant has been sued on at least two prior occasions for, among other things, the specific and unreasonable detention procedures and common conditions to which it subjects inmates after they are found not-guilty or otherwise acquitted. See Watson v. Sheahan, et al., Case No. 94-cv-6891 (N.D. Ill.) and Bullock v. Dart, et al., Case No. 04-cv-1051 (N.D. Ill.). Despite being put on notice of its unconstitutional policies or practices and paying millions of dollars to settle prior class actions challenging those policies or practices, Defendant continues to adhere to the same unlawful policies or practices.
32. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s policies or practices, Plaintiff and the class have suffered harm, including actual damages, emotional distress damages and other damages.
8

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COUNT II (Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution via 42 U.S.C. § 1983) 33. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 34. As set forth above, Defendant maintains a post-acquittal detention policy or practice that discriminates against male inmates based on gender. 35. The aforementioned policy or practice deprived Plaintiff and the putative class of equal protection in violation of their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 36. The aforementioned policy or practice deprived Plaintiff and the putative class of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 37. The aforementioned policy or practice was carried out under color of custom or usage of State law and Plaintiff’s and class members’ constitutional rights were violated under the color of State law. 38. Defendant’s conduct is intentional, deliberate, willful, and conducted with disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff and the class. In fact, Defendants have been sued on at least one prior occasion for, among other things, treating male inmates differently than similarly situated female inmates who were found not guilty, were acquitted, obtained a dismissal of the charges brought against them or otherwise received a judicial determination requiring their release. See Bullock v. Dart, et al., Case No. 04-cv-1051 (N.D. Ill.). Despite being put on notice of its unconstitutional policy or practice and paying millions of dollars to settle a prior class action challenging that policy or practice, Defendant continues to adhere to the same unlawful
9

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policy or practice. 39. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s policy or practice of
discriminating against male inmates based on gender, Plaintiff and the class have suffered harm, including actual damages, emotional distress damages and other damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court: A. Certify this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, designate Plaintiff as representative of the class and counsel of record as class counsel; B. Declare that the policies or practices challenged herein are illegal and violative of the Constitutional rights secured to Plaintiff and the class; C. Enter a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants and their officers, owners, agents, successors, employees, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with them, from engaging in any further unlawful practices, policies, customs and usages as set forth herein; D. Enter an Order requiring the Defendants to initiate and implement programs that: (1) do not violate the Constitutional rights of free citizens who were acquitted or otherwise obtained a favorable disposition of the charges brought against them; (2) remedy the effects of the Defendant’s past and present unlawful practices; and (3) eliminate the continuing effects of the unlawful practices described herein above; E. Award damages sufficient to compensate Plaintiff and the class for their injuries; F. Award punitive damages; G. Award Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of this action; H. Award pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;
10

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I. Enter a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the class and against Defendants, jointly and

severally, for the amounts set forth in Paragraphs E-H above; and

J. Order any and all other relief that this Court may deem just and equitable.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues set forth herein.

Dated: January 15, 2014

Respectfully Submitted,

BRIAN OTERO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Myron M. Cherry Jacie C. Zolna MYRON M. CHERRY & ASSOCIATES, LLC 30 North LaSalle Street, Suite 2300 Chicago, Illinois 60602

By: _ __ _/s/ Jacie C. Zolna________ One of the Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class

Robert M. Foote Kathleen Currie Chavez Peter Lawrence Currie Matthew J. Herman FOOTE, MIELKE, CHAVEZ & O’NEIL LLC 10 West State Street, Suite 200 Geneva, Illinois 60134

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class

11

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that he served the foregoing Amended Complaint upon: Anthony Zecchin Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office 50 West Washington Street, Room 500 Chicago, Illinois 60602 anthony.zecchin@cookcountyil.gov via the electronic filing system on this 15th day of January, 2014.
_ __ _/s/ Jacie C. Zolna________

 
 Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 286 Filed: 08/11/16 Page 1 of 11 PageID #:5846

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

BRIAN OTERO, individually and

)

on behalf of a class of similarly situated )

individuals,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

v.

)

)

THOMAS J. DART,

)

SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, and )

COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

Case No. 12 C 3148 Judge Amy J. St. Eve

ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL & DISMISSAL OF LAWSUIT

The Plaintiff, Brian Otero, for himself and on behalf of the Class, having appeared before

the Court on August 11, 2016, for a hearing on final approval of the class action settlement in the

above-captioned matter, the Court having reviewed the Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of

Class Action Settlement and other related materials submitted by the Parties, as well as the

Parties’ presentation at the hearing on final approval and otherwise being fully informed in the

premises:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and over all

Parties to this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, including all members of the Class which was

certified, prior to settlement, after a contested hearing by Order dated September 22, 2014 (ECF

No. 92), and defined as follows:

All male inmates who while being detained by the Cook County Sheriff’s Office were found not guilty, were acquitted, or had charges brought against them dismissed, and for whom the Sheriff’s Office no longer had any legal right to detain from April 27, 2010 through the present.

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2. The Court reaffirms its approval of Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC (“KCC”) located at 3301 Kemer Boulevard, San Rafael, California, as the “Class Administrator.”
3. The Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Class Notice”) sent to the Class by the Class Administrator via First Class Mail at the addresses they provided to the Cook County Sheriff’s office adequately informed Class Members of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, their anticipated recovery if the Settlement was approved, the process available to them to obtain monetary relief, their right to request exclusion from the Settlement and pursue their own remedies, and their opportunity to file written objections and to appear and be heard at the final approval hearing regarding approval of the Settlement Agreement. The Class Notice also adequately informed Class Members of the telephone number and email address for Class Counsel and for the Class Administrator. A summary of the notice was also posted at the Cook County Department of Corrections (“CCDOC”) in an area (or areas) where male detainees are housed or frequently held. The settlement administrator also developed and has maintained a website that contains a copy of the notice, information about the settlement and a mechanism through which Class Members can submit claims online. The Court finds that the Class Notice satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and Rule 23(e)(1).
4. The Court hereby approves the proposed Settlement Agreement and finds that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to all Class Members. “To evaluate the fairness of a settlement, a court must consider ‘the strength of plaintiffs’ case compared to the amount of defendants’ settlement offer, an assessment of the likely complexity, length and expense of the litigation, an evaluation of the amount of opposition to settlement among affected parties, the opinion of competent counsel, and the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed at the time of settlement.’” In re AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Servs.

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Sales Tax Litig., 789 F.Supp.2d 935, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (quoting Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 653 (7th Cir.2006)). Each of the five factors favors approval of the settlement reached here and supports the Court’s finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate:
I. Strength of Plaintiff’s case: Because the Court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, the merits of the case ultimately would have been decided by a jury, the outcome of which was far from certain for either side. The terms of the settlement, on the other hand, provide full injunctive relief, as well as cash payments in line with settlements of other similar cases. See Bullock v. Sheahan, Case No. 04-cv-1051 (N.D. Ill.) at Doc. 466 (approving settlement providing no injunctive relief and payments of between $100-$200 to each class member in class action alleging over detention that included unlawful strip search); Watson v. Sheahan, 94cv-6891, 1998 WL 708803, *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1998) (referencing approval of settlement “on behalf of a class of individuals who were allegedly detained for an unconstitutional period of time after their legal release from custody” under which “defendants agreed to pay each class claimant $90”); see also Donovan v. Sheriff, 3:11-cv-133, 2015 WL 7738035 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 1, 2015) (approving settlement providing class members with a payment of $51.15 per hour of over detention); Bickel v. Sheriff of Whitley Cty., No. 08-cv-102, 2015 WL 1402018 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2015) (approving settlement providing class members with a payment of $43 per hour of over detention). In short, the settlement provides comprehensive and meaningful relief for hotly-contested claims. Indeed, the relief afforded to class members in this settlement very well could be greater than what they would have been entitled to even

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had Plaintiff prevailed at trial. For these reasons, the first factor clearly weighs in favor of final approval of the settlement.
II. The likely complexity, length and expense of continued litigation: It goes without saying that trying a class action lawsuit to conclusion would have been a complex, lengthy and expensive endeavor. The trial in and of itself would have been a lengthy and complicated process. In fact, several trial issues were still left unresolved prior to the settlement, such as how damages would be tried and whether subsequent individual hearings would be necessary, which, if so, could have taken years to complete. This is especially true where, as here, at least 6,995 valid claims were submitted to the Claims Administrator. Because of the important constitutional issues raised in this suit, appeals almost certainly would have also followed any judgment. The second factor, therefore, also favors final approval of the settlement.
III. Opposition to the settlement by class members: There was virtually no opposition to the settlement amongst Class Members. The Court finds that of the 33,134 eligible Class Members, only nine Class Member requested exclusion from the Class, only two Class Members objected to the Settlement Agreement and 6,995 valid claims were submitted to the Class Administrator. In other words, 99.9% of the Class chose to remain members of the Class and be bound by the settlement and over 21% submitted timely claims. This robust response rate further evidences that the settlement was received favorably by class members, particularly considering that “‘claims made’ settlements regularly yield response rates of 10 percent or less.” Sylvester v. CIGNA Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52 (D. Me. 2005). Significantly, there

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were only two objections to the settlement lodged by class members. See Doc. 277; Doc. 278. One of these objections is based on a misunderstanding as to what case this settlement is resolving as it refers to a prior “original agreement” in an unrelated suit for malicious prosecution, wrongful arrest and exposure to toxic asbestos. See Doc. 278 (referencing case numbers of unrelated litigation). The other objection only took issue with the amount of the monetary payment made available to class members, but lacked any substantive explanation or basis. See Doc. 277. The monetary amount made available to class members was fair, reasonable and in line with settlements of similar over-detentions cases. The lack of any substantive opposition to the settlement, therefore, favors final approval.
IV. The settlement is supported by the opinion of competent counsel: In connection with the fourth factor – the opinion of competent counsel – the Court has reviewed the Declaration of Class Counsel Myron M. Cherry, a lawyer with over 50 years of experience in complex and class action litigation; the declaration of Edward T. Joyce, a seasoned and experienced complex civil litigation lawyer who did not represent any of the parties to this suit, and the declaration of Rob Warden, the Executive Director of the Bluhm Legal Clinic, Center on Wrongful Convictions. Mr. Warden also has no connection to or involvement in this litigation. The Court finds that these declarations support the conclusion that the non-monetary aspects of the settlement provide real and meaningful changes to the Sheriff’s release policies and practices and are commensurate with the allegations of the suit, the monetary payments available to Class Members provide further tangible relief and are in line with settlements of other similar cases, and that the settlement as a whole is fair,

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 286 Filed: 08/11/16 Page 6 of 11 PageID #:5851
reasonable and adequate. V. The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery
completed at the time of settlement: The case settled on the eve of trial and only after the Parties engaged in substantial discovery, took numerous depositions, conducted two separate tours of the Cook County Jail and Criminal Court system, completed all fact and expert discovery, fully briefed several motions in limine and submitted a detailed final pre-trial order, proposed jury instructions and voir dire questions. Due to the extensive investigation and discovery that occurred, both Parties were in position to fully assess the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses in negotiating this settlement. Accordingly, the advanced stage of the proceedings weighs heavily in favor of approving the settlement.
5. The Court approves the Class Relief as provided in Section II of Settlement Agreement as follows:
I. Non-Monetary Relief: The Sheriff will make modifications to his release policies and practices to provide the following:
a. A mechanism for promptly identifying Potential Male Court Discharges after their court appearance. For purposes of this Order, a “Potential Male Court Discharge” shall refer to a male detainee who while being detained by the Sheriff was found not guilty, was acquitted or otherwise had the charges brought against him dismissed in court. The Parties understand and acknowledge that in order for Potential Male Court Discharges to be identified, the Circuit Court must issue and the Clerk of the Circuit Court process and provide to Defendants a mittimus which includes

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the Court’s order. Delays in the issuance and disclosure of the mittimus are not in the control of Defendant Cook County Sheriff.
b. Upon identification of a Potential Male Court Discharge as set forth in Paragraph 5.I.a. above, a procedure under which all individuals so identified are segregated in the RCDC from other inmates returning from court as is currently done for potential female court discharges.
c. A procedure under which individuals identified as Potential Male Court Discharges are not required to return to the general jail population.
d. A policy in the Records Division of the Cook County Department of Corrections (the “CCDOC”) under which the administrative steps necessary to release a detainee whose situation would define him as a member of the class as defined in Paragraph 5.I.a.are given priority over processing the paperwork of other inmates returning from court back to the CCDOC who are not subject to release.
e. A policy in the Records Division of the CCDOC under which the administrative steps necessary to release a detainee after a finding of not guilty, an acquittal or other dismissal of charges in court are undertaken in a gender-neutral manner (i.e., females subject to release will not be given priority or preferential treatment over males subject to release). II. Timing and Enforcement of Non-Monetary Relief: The modifications necessary to effectuate these policies and practices shall be implemented no later than ninety (90) days after the entry of this Order. Within

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ninety (90) days after the entry of this Order, Defendants shall also file with the Court a status report setting forth in detail the modifications the Sheriff undertook to effectuate the policies and practices set forth in Paragraph 5.I. above. The District Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to the implementation and enforcement of the policies and practices set forth in Paragraph 1 above for nine months. Additional time may be sought by Defendants to implement the modifications upon a motion to the Court or by agreement of the Parties.
III. Monetary Payment to Class Members: In addition to the injunctive relief set forth above, Defendants, through the Claims Administrator, will also pay one-hundred dollars ($100) to each Class Member who submitted a claim (the “Class Member Payments”).
IV. Timing of Class Member Payments: Defendants, through the Claims Administrator, shall within twenty-one (21) days after the Final Settlement Date mail the Class Member Payments to those Class Members who submitted a valid and timely claim. “Final Settlement Date” means the date in which either of the following events has occurred: (a) if there is no appeal from this Order, thirty-one (31) days after the Court enters this Order and provides any objector notice that the Court entered this Final Approval Order, or (b) if an appeal is taken from this Final Approval Order, seven (7) days after a reviewing court either affirms this Final Approval Order or denies review and either all avenues of appeal have been exhausted or the time for seeking further appeals has expired.
6. The Court finds Class Representative Brian Otero in prosecuting the case on behalf of the Class made a substantial contribution to its outcome, and is therefore deserving

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of a service award in recognition of his effort. Plaintiff took the initiative to be named in the lawsuit, assisted in the case investigation and stayed actively involved in the litigation for four years, including responding to discovery, being deposed, routinely communicating with Class Counsel and reviewing pleadings, depositions and other materials. A Service Award in the amount of $15,000.00 is therefore approved for Plaintiff Brian Otero.
7. The Court finds the requested attorneys’ fees and costs are fair and reasonable considering the excellent value of the settlement, the benefits conferred on the Class and Class Counsel’s knowledge and experience. In determining the reasonableness of an award of attorneys’ fees, the Court may use either the lodestar or percentage-of-fund method. Under the circumstances of this case and the nature of the relief obtained, the lodestar method is the most appropriate way for determining Class Counsel’s fees. See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 90 F.3d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The ‘lodestar’ method … is the most appropriate starting point” under civil rights fee statute.”). Attorney fees under the lodestar method are determined by “multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Small v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 264 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2001). “A reasonable hourly rate should reflect the attorney’s market rate, defined as ‘the rate that lawyers of similar ability and experience in the community normally charge their paying clients for the type of work in question.’” Id. (quoting Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd., 176 F.3d 399, 407 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court has reviewed Class Counsel’s submissions including detailed summaries of their billing records reflecting the amount of time expended on this matter, by whom and the hourly rate for such services and the declaration of Edward T. Joyce attesting to the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees requested by Class Counsel. The Court finds Class Counsel’s hourly rates are

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consistent with the fair market rate for attorneys of comparable experience, skill and reputation in the Chicago legal market and comparable markets nationwide, and are the rates at which the attorneys have been retained by other paying clients. The amount of time expended by Class Counsel is reasonable given the nature of the services performed and the complexity of the case. Indeed, this case involved novel questions, extensive discovery, exhaustive investigative efforts, two rounds of class certification briefing, three experts and extensive preparation for trial. For over four years, Class Counsel dedicated substantial time and incurred substantial out-of-pocket costs in litigating this case on a contingency basis with no guarantee of payment. Perhaps most importantly, Class Counsel achieved an excellent settlement that not only provides unprecedented reforms and changes to the challenged practices, but also substantive monetary payments to class members. Furthermore, while the lodestar in class actions is typically increased by applying a multiplier due to the contingent nature of the undertaking, the attorneys’ fees requested here are actually substantially less than Class Counsel’s lodestar amount. Lastly, the costs incurred by Class Counsel were also reasonable and necessary, the most significant amount of which was for Plaintiffs’ experts who prepared several detailed and substantive reports, conducted two tours of the Cook County Jail and court system and had their depositions taken, which took place in Cleveland, Ohio and San Jose, California. Other significant costs were expended on depositions of Defendants’ representative, all of which were used extensively during summary judgment briefing and necessary for trial preparation. The Court approves fees and costs to Class Counsel in the sum of $2,000,000.00, and Orders such attorney’s fees and costs be paid within 35 days of entry of this Order, as set forth in the settlement agreement.
8. This Court hereby dismisses all claims released in the Settlement Agreement on

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the merits and with prejudice and without awarding costs to any of the Parties as against any other settling Party, except as provided in the Settlement Agreement.
9. The Court orders that all Plaintiff and Class Members release and discharge the “Released Claims” arising during the Class Period against Defendants as reflected in the Settlement Agreement.
10. The Court denies the two objections filed by class members. Doc. 277; Doc. 278. 11. The Court grants final approval of the Settlement. This matter is dismissed with prejudice. 12. This Court retains jurisdiction solely for the purpose of interpreting, implementing, and enforcing the Settlement Agreement consistent with its terms.

ORDERED.
Dated: August 11, 2016

______________________________ AMY J. ST. EVE United States District Court Judge

 
 Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 282 Filed: 07/20/16 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:5760

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

BRIAN OTERO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v.
THOMAS J. DART, SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

) ) ) Case No. 1:12-cv-3148 ) ) ) Hon. Amy J. St. Eve ) ) ) ) )

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

Plaintiff moves for final approval of the settlement of this class action lawsuit. In support

of this motion, Plaintiff states as follows

I. INTRODUCTION

After four years of litigation, the parties reached a settlement that provides Plaintiff and

the class with the full injunctive relief sought at the outset of the litigation. More specifically,

Defendants have agreed to implement policies and procedures that will promptly identify

potential male court discharges, segregate them from other inmates returning from court, allow

them to remain outside of the general jail population awaiting their release and ensure that all

court discharges are conducted in a gender-neutral fashion. In addition to implementing these

new policies and procedures, Defendants have also agreed to create a fund available for all class

members to claim a cash award of up to $100 each.

In short, the settlement provides both comprehensive injunctive relief, as well as

substantive monetary relief to affected class members. It is worth noting that Defendants have

been sued on at least two prior occasions for similar practices, both of which settled on monetary

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terms similar to this case, but neither of which accomplished changing the practices at issue. For this reason, and those that follow, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to grant final approval to this substantial and unprecedented settlement.
II. BACKGROUND This lawsuit challenged the Cook County Sheriff’s Office’s “policy or practice of detaining … male inmates in an unreasonable manner with deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights following a trial or other court appearance where the individual is found not guilty … or otherwise receives a judicial determination requiring his release.” Amended Complaint (Doc. 56), ¶ 27. More specifically, Plaintiff claimed that the Sheriff’s Office had no procedures in place that acknowledge an acquittal and right to freedom and, consequently, he and other class members were treated like every other inmate returning from court, including being transported back into and detained within the general jail population. Plaintiff also brought an Equal Protection claim based on the Sheriff’s Office practice of “treating male inmates differently than similarly situated female inmates who were found not guilty … or otherwise received a judicial determination requiring their release.” Id., ¶ 38. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on April 27, 2012. After surviving a motion to dismiss and engaging in preliminary discovery, the Court denied Plaintiff’s initial motion for class certification. See Doc. 52. Plaintiff thereafter amended his complaint, which, among other things, clarified his original claims and added an Equal Protection claim. See Doc. 56. Plaintiff filed a renewed motion for class certification, which was granted by the Court on September 2, 2014. See Doc. 92. The Court certified the following class: All male inmates who while being detained by the Cook County Sheriff’s Office were found not guilty, were acquitted, or had charges brought against them dismissed, and for whom the Sheriff’s Office no longer had any legal right to detain from April 27, 2010 through the present.
2

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Id. Over the past several years, the parties engaged in substantial discovery, vigorously
investigated the claims and defenses, took a dozen depositions and conducted two separate tours of the Cook County Jail and Criminal Court system. The parties also collectively engaged three experts, exchanged a number of expert reports and completed all expert discovery. Class member lists disclosed by Defendants revealed that the class has in excess of 44,000 members. After the data was analyzed by the claims administrator and duplicates were removed, the class ultimately was comprised of approximately 33,000 members.1
On October 30, 2015, both parties filed motions for summary judgment, which involved a substantial amount of evidence and extensive briefing over the next several months. On January 7, 2016, the Court entered an order denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim, Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim and Equal Protection claim and granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. See Doc. 224. The Court also denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Equal Protection claim. Id. For the better part of the past year, the parties have been vigorously preparing for the trial of this matter, which was scheduled to commence March 7, 2016, a significant undertaking given the nature of the case and the complexities of trying a class action. The parties fully briefed a number of motions in limine, most of which the Court ruled on, and submitted a detailed final pretrial order, proposed jury instructions and voir dire questions.
The parties have informally met and conferred on numerous occasions over the past several years in an effort to reach a settlement. On January 21, 2016, the parties participated in a
1 This figure has been revised from the initial estimate of approximately 36,000 class members as set forth in Plaintiff’s Petition for Attorneys’’ Fees and Costs and Incentive Award.
3

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settlement conference before Magistrate Michael T. Mason in which a variety of settlement possibilities were discussed and considered. The parties thereafter continued to discuss settlement possibilities, which ultimately resulted in reaching a settlement. That settlement, however, was initially rejected by the County Board, requiring the parties to recommence their trial preparation.
On February 18, 2016, literally days before the trial was scheduled to commence, the parties participated in another settlement conference before this Court. With the Court’s assistance and recommendations, the parties were able to reach agreement on all material terms of the settlement. After confirming the terms of the settlement on the record, the Court expressed its belief that it was a “fair and appropriate settlement.” See February 18, 2016 Transcript at 8:7-8, attached hereto as Ex. A. The parties thereafter negotiated the language of a final settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”), a copy of which is attached hereto as Ex. B. The County Board formally approved the settlement on March 2, 2016.
III. SUMMARY OF SETTLEMENT TERMS As noted above, the settlement provides both comprehensive injunctive relief, as well as monetary payments to individual class members. With respect to injunctive relief, Defendants have agreed to implement (i) a mechanism for promptly identifying potential male court discharges, (ii) a procedure under which all individuals so identified are segregated in the RCDC from other inmates returning from court as is currently done for potential female court discharges, (iii) a procedure under which individuals so identified are not required to return to the general jail population, (iv) a policy under which priority review in the Records Division is given to individuals identified as potential court discharges, and (v) a policy under which the administrative steps necessary to release a detainee after a finding of not guilty, an acquittal or
4

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other dismissal of charges in court are undertaken in a gender-neutral manner. See Settlement Agreement at ¶ 1 (Ex. B). Defendants are required to report the details of these modifications to the Court, which will retain jurisdiction over the implementation and enforcement of these new policies and procedures for a period of six months to one year. Id. at ¶ 2.
In addition to injunctive relief, Defendants will also pay $100 to each class member who submits a claim up to a total of $1,104,250. Id. at ¶ 3. If the total amount of claims exceeds this amount then class member payments will be reduced on a pro-rated basis. Id. Plaintiff will also seek an incentive award of $15,000 for his service as a class representative, which will be paid separately by Defendants. Id. at ¶ 14. Class Counsel will seek an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, also to be paid separately by Defendants, in an amount of $2,000,000. Id. at ¶ 15. Class Counsel will file their petition supporting its request for attorneys’ fees and costs no later than 21 days prior to the deadline for class members to object to the settlement. Id.
The parties retained of KCC, LLC to administer the notice and claims administration process. Id. at ¶ 5. Class members received notice by mail at the addresses they provided to the Cook County Sheriff’s Office. Id. at ¶ 6. A summary of the notice was also posted at the Cook County Department of Corrections (“CCDOC”) in an area (or areas) where male detainees are housed or frequently held. Id. at ¶ 8. The settlement administrator also developed and has maintained a website that contains a copy of the notice, information about the settlement and a mechanism though which class members can submit claims online. Id. at ¶ 9. Defendants shall pay all fees and costs incurred for the administration of the settlement up to $95,000. Id. at ¶ 12. Any administration fees or costs in excess of this amount will be incurred by Class Counsel. Id.
Class members had the option of excluding themselves from the class and the settlement by sending a written request for exclusion to the claims administrator no later than 77 days after
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the entry of an order preliminarily approving the settlement. Id. at ¶ 16. Within this same amount of time, class members who do not opt-out had the right to object to the proposed settlement and/or the attorneys’ fees and costs requested by Class Counsel by filing a written objection with the Court and delivering a copy of the objection to Class Counsel and counsel for Defendants. Id. at ¶ 17.
The settlement administrator performed all of the functions required of it as set forth in the Settlement Agreement, including mailing the notice and claim form to class members, sending CAFA notices to the appropriate authorities, establishing a toll-free helpline and developing and maintaining a settlement website. See Declaration of Corinne Kirmil (“Kirmil Decl.”), attached hereto as Ex. C. The settlement administrator also monitored exclusion requests and verified and processed claims. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 15.
IV. ARGUMENT It is well established that settlements are the preferred means of resolving litigation, particularly in class actions where substantial resources can be conserved by avoiding the time, cost and rigor of prolonged litigation. See Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir.1996) (“Federal courts naturally favor the settlement of class action litigation.”); Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee, 616 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir.1980), overruled on other grounds by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Settlement of the complex disputes often involved in class actions minimizes the litigation expenses of both parties and also reduces the strain such litigation imposes upon already scarce judicial resources.”). A district court should approve a class action settlement “if it determines after a hearing that the proposed settlement is ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’” In re AT & T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., 789 F. Supp. 2d 935, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
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23(e)(3)). “To evaluate the fairness of a settlement, a court must consider ‘the strength of plaintiffs’ case compared to the amount of defendants’ settlement offer, an assessment of the likely complexity, length and expense of the litigation, an evaluation of the amount of opposition to settlement among affected parties, the opinion of competent counsel, and the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed at the time of settlement.’” Id. (quoting Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 653 (7th Cir.2006)). Because each of these factors favors approval of the settlement reached here, the Court should find the settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate and grant final approval. A. The terms of the settlement are commensurate with the strength of Plaintiff’s
claims. The first, and most important, factor favors approval because the terms of the settlement are commensurate with the strength of Plaintiff’s claims. See In re AT & T Mobility, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 958 (quoting Synfuel, 463 F.3d at 653) (“The ‘most important factor relevant to the fairness of a class action settlement’ is the first one listed: ‘the strength of plaintiff’s case on the merits balanced against the amount offered in the settlement.’”). While Plaintiff believes strongly in the merits of his case, Defendants vigorously contested both liability and the ability of Plaintiff and class members to recover damages.2 Because the Court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, the merits of the case ultimately would have been decided by a jury, the outcome of which was far from certain for either side. The terms of the settlement, on the other hand, provide full injunctive relief, as well as cash payments in line with settlements of other similar cases. See Bullock v. Sheahan,
2 For example, one outstanding issue that had yet to be decided by the Court was Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff could recover, at most, nominal damages of $1 per class member for the class-wide injury alleged. See, e.g., Final Pretrial Order (Doc. 252) at 91, 138-141 (stating Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiff’s proposed damage instruction and offering alternative instruction on nominal damages). Had Defendants prevailed on this issue at the jury instruction conference, it would have been difficult for Plaintiff to recover any damages for the class.
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Case No. 04-cv-1051 (N.D. Ill.) at Doc. 466 (approving settlement providing no injunctive relief and payments of between $100-$200 to each class member in class action alleging over detention that included unlawful strip search); Watson v. Sheahan, 94-cv-6891, 1998 WL 708803, *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1998) (referencing approval of settlement “on behalf of a class of individuals who were allegedly detained for an unconstitutional period of time after their legal release from custody” under which “defendants agreed to pay each class claimant $90”); see also Donovan v. Sheriff, 3:11-cv-133, 2015 WL 7738035 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 1, 2015) (approving settlement providing class members with a payment of $51.15 per hour of over detention); Bickel v. Sheriff of Whitley Cty., No. 08-cv-102, 2015 WL 1402018 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2015) (approving settlement providing class members with a payment of $43 per hour of over detention).
In short, the settlement provides comprehensive and meaningful relief for hotly-contested claims. Indeed, the relief afforded to class members in this settlement very well could be greater than what they would have been entitled to even had Plaintiff prevailed at trial. For these reasons, the first factor clearly weighs in favor of final approval of the settlement. B. The likely complexity, length and expense of continued litigation supports final
approval of the settlement. It goes without saying that trying a class action lawsuit to conclusion would have been a complex, lengthy and expensive endeavor. The trial in and of itself would have been a lengthy and complicated process. In fact, several trial issues were still left unresolved prior to the settlement, such as how damages would be tried and whether subsequent individual hearings would be necessary, which, if so, could have taken years to complete. Because of the important constitutional issues raised in this suit, appeals almost certainly would have also followed any judgment. The second factor, therefore, also favors final approval of the settlement.
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C. There was scant opposition to the settlement by class members. There was virtually no opposition to the settlement amongst class members. Of the
approximately 33,000 class members to whom notice was sent, only eight timely opted out. See Kirmil Decl. at ¶ 13, (Ex. C).3 In other words, 99.9% of the class chose to remain members of the class and be bound by the settlement.
More significantly, there were only two objections to the settlement lodged by class members. See Doc. 277; Doc. 278. At least one of these objections is based on a misunderstanding as to what case this settlement is resolving as it refers to a prior “original agreement” in an unrelated suit for malicious prosecution, wrongful arrest and exposure to toxic asbestos. See Doc. 278 (referencing case numbers of unrelated litigation). The other objection only took issue with the amount of the monetary payment made available to class members, but lacked any substantive explanation or basis. See Doc. 277. As noted above, the monetary amount made available to class members was fair, reasonable and in line with settlements of similar over-detentions cases.4
The lack of any substantive opposition to the settlement, therefore, favors final approval of the settlement. See Isby, 75 F.3d at 1200 (affirming approval of class action settlement of prisoner suit despite the fact that 13% of the class submitted written objections to the settlement); see also Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. ACE INA Holdings, Inc., 07-cv-2898, 2012 WL 651727, *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2012) (holding that 3 objectors out of 1,300 class members “indicates that the class members consider the settlement to be in their best interest.”); In re Mexico Money Transfer
3 One more class member, Enos Taplin, Jr., submitted an untimely request for exclusion. See Kirmil Decl. at ¶ 13 and Ex. 4. The parties have no opposition to honoring Mr. Taplin’s untimely request for exclusion. 4 Neither of these objections challenged the non-monetary aspects of the settlement, nor did they take issue with the requested attorneys’ fees and costs or incentive award.
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Litig. (W. Union & Valuta), 164 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1021 (N.D. Ill. 2000), aff’d sub nom. In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2001) (“99.9% of class members have neither opted out nor filed objections to the proposed settlements. This acceptance rate is strong circumstantial evidence in favor of the settlements.”).5 D. The settlement is supported by the opinion of competent counsel.
In connection with the fourth factor – the opinion of competent counsel – Plaintiff submits the Declaration of Myron M. Cherry, a lawyer with over 50 years of experience in complex and class action litigation. See Declaration of Myron M. Cherry (“Cherry Decl.”), attached hereto as Ex. D. Based on his extensive experience, Mr. Cherry opines that the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate and provides a significant benefit to the class. Id. at ¶ 5; see also Schulte v. Fifth Third Bank, 805 F. Supp. 2d 560, 586-87 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (concluding that class counsel’s opinion that settlement was fair supported approval of the proposed settlement where counsel had extensive experience in class actions and complex litigation); Vought v. Bank of Am., N.A., 901 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1096 (C.D. Ill. 2012) (considering declarations of class counsel expressing their opinions that the proposed settlement was fair, reasonable and adequate); Clesceri v. Beach City Investigations & Protective Servs., Inc., 10-cv3873, 2011 WL 320998 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011) (“Courts give weight to counsels’ opinions regarding the fairness of a settlement, when it is negotiated by experienced counsel.”).
Plaintiff also submits the declaration of Edward T. Joyce, a seasoned and experienced lawyer who did not represent any of the parties to this suit. See Declaration of Edward T. Joyce,
5 In contrast to the virtually non-existent opposition to the settlement, thousands of class members affirmatively participated in the settlement by submitting a claim for payment. See Kirmil Decl. at ¶ 15 (Ex. C) (stating that 6,995 of the approximately 33,000 class members submitted a claim for a monetary payment, as well as hundreds of other potential claims that are still being verified). This robust response rate further evidences that the settlement was received favorably by class members, particularly considering that “‘claims made’ settlements regularly yield response rates of 10 percent or less.” Sylvester v. CIGNA Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52 (D. Me. 2005).
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attached hereto as Ex. E. Mr. Joyce similarly opines that the non-monetary aspects of the settlement provide real and meaningful changes to the Sheriff’s release policies and practices and are commensurate with the allegations of the suit, the monetary payments available to class members provide further tangible relief and are in line with settlements of other similar cases and the settlement as a whole is more than fair, reasonable and adequate. Id. at p. 4.
Lastly, Plaintiff submits the declaration of Rob Warden, the Executive Director of the Bluhm Legal Clinic, Center on Wrongful Convictions. Mr. Warden, who also has no connection to or involvement in this litigation, similarly opines that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and provides important and meaningful relief to the class. See Declaration of Rob Warden, attached hereto as Ex. F.
The opinion of Class Counsel, coupled with the independent opinions of other reputable members of the legal community, provide considerable support to the final approval of the settlement. E. The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed at the time of
settlement support final approval. The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed at the time of settlement clearly weighs in favor of final approval. The case settled on the eve of trial and only after the parties engaged in substantial discovery, took numerous depositions, conducted two separate tours of the Cook County Jail and Criminal Court system, completed all fact and expert discovery, fully briefed several motions in limine and submitted a detailed final pre-trial order, proposed jury instructions and voir dire questions. See Cherry Decl. at ¶ 6 (Ex. D). Due to the extensive investigation and discovery that occurred, both parties were in position to fully assess the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses in negotiating this settlement. Accordingly, “the advanced stage of the proceedings weighs heavily in favor of
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approving the settlement.” Hispanics United of DuPage Cty. v. Vill. of Addison, Ill., 988 F.

Supp. 1130, 1170-71 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (approving settlement reached “after the completion of

massive discovery, various legal and evidentiary pretrial rulings, complete briefing on a motion

for partial summary judgment, [] submission of a detailed final pretrial order *** and after trial

preparation was virtually complete”); see also Am. Int’l Grp., 2012 WL 651727, *8 (approving

settlement that was reached “after over three years of vigorous litigation [and] substantial

discovery had been completed”).

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the Court to enter an order finding that the settlement

of this matter is fair, reasonable and adequate and granting final approval of the settlement.

Dated: July 20, 2016

Respectfully Submitted,

BRIAN OTERO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Myron M. Cherry Jacie C. Zolna MYRON M. CHERRY & ASSOCIATES, LLC 30 North LaSalle Street, Suite 2300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 Phone: (312) 372-2100

By: ______/s/ Jacie C. Zolna_______ One of the Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class

Robert M. Foote Kathleen Currie Chavez Peter Lawrence Currie Craig S. Mielke Matthew J. Herman FOOTE, MIELKE, CHAVEZ & O’NEIL LLC 10 West State Street, Suite 200 Geneva, Illinois 60134 Phone: (630) 232-7450 Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class

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 Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 2 of 25 PageID #:5495

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE

THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE (the "Agreement") is made and entered into between Brian Otero ("Plaintiff' or "Otero"), individually and in his representative capacity on behalf of the Class (as defined below), and defendants Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook County (the "Sheriff'), in his official capacity, and Cook County, Illinois ("Cook County") (the Sheriff and Cook County shall collectively be referred to herein as "Defendants"). Plaintiff and Defendants are sometimes individually referred to herein as a "Party" and collectively as the "Parties."

I.

RECITALS

WHEREAS, on April 27, 2012, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated individuals, filed suit against Defendants in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, entitled Otero v. Dart, et al., Case No. 1:12-cv-03148 (the "Lawsuit") alleging that the Sheriff maintained a "policy or practice of unlawfully detaining, holding in custody or imprisoning free citizens following a trial or other proceeding at which the citizen is found not-guilty or otherwise acquitted" in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and an Amended Complaint was filed on January 15, 2014, alleging substantially the same allegations, but adding a claim alleging that the Sheriff treats "male inmates differently than similarly situated female inmates who were found not guilty ... or otherwise received a judicial determination requiring their release."

WHEREAS, on September 2, 2014, the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve certified the Lawsuit as a class action and defined the class as "[a]ll male inmates who while being detained by the Cook County Sheriffs Office were found not guilty, were acquitted, or had charges brought against them dismissed, and for whom the Sheriffs Office no longer had any legal right to detain from April27, 2010 through the present" (the "Class") (each individual meeting the definition of the Class shall be referred to herein as a "Class Member"). The Court also designated Brian Otero as the class representative and appointed Myron M. Cherry and Jacie C. Zolna of Myron M. Cherry & Associates, LLC and Robert M. Foote of Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil, LLC as class counsel (the law firms of Myron M. Cherry & Associates, LLC and of Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil, LLC shall collectively be referred to herein as "Class Counsel");

WHEREAS, on January 7, 2016, the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve entered an order denying Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim, Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim and Equal Protection claim and granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim;

WHEREAS, the Parties have completed fact and expert discovery and the trial of this matter was scheduled to commence on March 7, 20 16;

WHEREAS, the parties have met and conferred on numerous occasions over the past several years in an effort to reach a settlement of the Lawsuit. On February 18, 2016, the

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 3 of 25 PageID #:5496
Honorable Amy J. St. Eve held a settlement conference with the Parties, which ultimately resulted in the settlement set forth herein;
WHEREAS, the terms and conditions of the settlement set forth herein were reached after extensive, bona fide, arm's length negotiations among the Parties by their respective attorneys;
WHEREAS, the Parties acknowledge that settlement of the Lawsuit is not an admission of liability, nor of unconstitutional or unlawful conduct by, or on the part of Defendants;
WHEREAS, the Parties have investigated the facts and have analyzed the relevant legal issues with regard to the claims and defenses asserted in the Lawsuit. Based on these investigations, Plaintiff believes the Lawsuit has merit while Defendants believe the Lawsuit has no merit. The Parties have also each looked at the uncertainties of trial and the benefits to be obtained under the proposed settlement, and have considered the costs, risks, and delays associated with the continued prosecution of this complex litigation, and the likely appeals of any rulings in favor of either Plaintiff or Defendants. After undertaking this investigation and analysis, Class Counsel believes that it is in the best interest of the Class to enter into this Agreement;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the representations, covenants and promises contained in this Agreement and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby confessed and acknowledged as evidenced by the execution of this Agreement, the Parties agree as follows:
II. CLASS RELIEF
1. Non-Monetary Relief: The Sheriff will make modifications to his release policies and practices to provide the following:
a. A mechanism for promptly identifying Potential Male Court Discharges after their court appearance. For purposes of this Agreement, a "Potential Male Court Discharge" shall refer to a male detainee who while being detained by the Sheriff was found not guilty, was acquitted or otherwise had the charges brought against him dismissed in court. The Parties understand and acknowledge that in order for Potential Male Court Discharges to be identified, the Circuit Court must issue and the Clerk of the Circuit Court process and provide to Defendants a mittimus which includes the Court's order. Delays in the issuance and disclosure of the mittimus is not in the control of Defendant Cook County Sheriff.
b. Upon identification of a Potential Male Court Discharge as set forth in Paragraph l .a. above, a procedure under which all individuals so identified are segregated in the RCDC from other inmates returning from court as is currently done for potential female court discharges.
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c. A procedure under which individuals identified as Potential Male Court Discharges are not required to return to the general jail population.
d. A policy in the Records Division of the Cook County Department of Corrections (the "CCDOC") under which the administrative steps necessary to release a detainee whose situation would define him as a member of the class as defined in paragraph 1(a) are given priority over processing the paperwork of other inmates returning from court back to the CCDOC who are not subject to release.
e. A policy in the Records Division of the CCDOC under which the administrative steps necessary to release a detainee after a finding of not guilty, an acquittal or other dismissal of charges in court are undertaken in a gender-neutral manner (i.e., females subject to release will not be given priority or preferential treatment over males subject to release).
2. Timing and Enforcement of Non-Monetary Relief: The modifications necessary to effectuate these policies and practices shall be implemented no later than ninety (90) days after the entry of a final and appealable order and/or judgment approving the settlement of this Lawsuit and the award of Class Counsel's fees and costs (the "Final Approval Order"). Within ninety (90) days after the entry of the Final Approval Order, Defendants shall also file with the Court a status report setting forth in detail the modifications the Sheriff undertook to effectuate the policies and practices set forth in Paragraph 1 above. The District Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to the implementation and enforcement of the policies and practices set forth in Paragraph 1 above for a period of time to be determined by the Court, which shall be at least six months and no more than one year from the date of filing of the status report referenced in this Paragraph. Additional time may be sought by Defendants to implement the modifications upon a motion to the Court or by agreement of the Parties.
3. Monetary Payment to Class Members: In addition to the injunctive relief set forth above, Defendants will also pay one-hundred dollars ($1 00) to each Class Member who submits a claim (the "Class Member Payments"). Defendants will pay all Class Member Payments up to a total of one-million one-hundred four thousand two-hundred fifty dollars ($1, 104,250). If the total amount of claims exceeds this amount then Class Member Payments will be reduced on a pro-rated basis, such that the total amount of all Class Member Payments shall not exceed one-million one-hundred four thousand two-hundred fifty dollars ($1, 104,250).
4. Timing of Class Member Payments: If the Court enters the Final Approval Order, Defendants, through the Claims Administrator, shall within twenty-one (21) days after the Final Settlement Date mail the Class Member Payments to those Class Members who submitted a valid and timely claim. "Final Settlement Date" shall mean the date in which either of the following events has occurred: (a) if there is no appeal from the Final Approval Order, thirty-one (31) days after the Court enters the Final Approval Order and provides any objector notice that the Court entered the Final Approval Order, or (b) if an appeal is taken from the Final Approval Order, seven (7) days after a reviewing court either affirms the Final Approval Order or denies
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review and either all avenues of appeal have been exhausted or the time for seeking further appeals has expired.
III. CLASS NOTICE AND CLAIMS ADMINISTRATION
5. Retention of Claims Administrator: The Parties agree to the retention of KCC, LLC (the "Claims Administrator") to administer the notice and claims administration process.
6. Class Notice: Within twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of an order granting preliminary approval of the settlement ofthis Lawsuit and the award of Class Counsel's fees and costs (the "Preliminary Approval Order"), Class Counsel shall, through the Claims Administrator, send notice of this settlement to the Class in the form attached hereto as Ex. A (the "Notice"). Within fourteen (14) days after the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, Defendants shall provide Class Counsel with a list of all individuals who meet the class definition and who were released from the CCDOC from January 22, 2016 through and including the date that the Preliminary Approval Order was entered. The Notice shall be sent to all individuals on said list, as well as to all individuals identified on the class member lists Defendants produced to Class Counsel on January 25, 2016, which lists cover the time period of April27, 2010 through January 21,2016 and identify approximately 44,170 class members. The Notice shall also include a claim form in the form attached hereto as Ex. B (the "Claim Form"), as well as a pre-paid, self-addressed return envelope that Class Members can use to mail their Claim Form to the Claims Administrator. The Notice, Claim Form and return envelope shall be sent by U.S. Mail to the last known address of each Class Member.
7. Vacated Release Category: Within seven (7) days after the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, Defendants shall provide Class Counsel with a list of all male detainees released from the CCDOC and whose discharge status was listed as "vacated" from April 27, 2010 through and including the date that the Preliminary Approval Order was entered. These individuals will also be sent the Notice and Claim Form set forth in Paragraph 6 above. Any such individual who submits a claim as provided in Paragraph 10 below shall be entitled to a Class Member Payment unless Defendants object to his status as a Class Member and provide the grounds for said objection in writing to Class Counsel within seven (7) days after receipt of the certification set forth in Paragraph 11 below. If Class Counsel disagrees with Defendants' objection, the Parties shall meet and confer in an effort to resolve the dispute. If the Parties are unable to resolve the dispute within seven (7) days of Class Counsel's receipt of Defendants' objection, the Parties shall submit the dispute to the Court, which will resolve the issue of whether the individual falls within the definition of the Class and, therefore, is entitled to a Class Member Payment.
8. Posting of Notice at the CCDOC: The Sheriff shall also post notice of this settlement on the premises of the CCDOC in an area where male detainees are housed or frequently held and in a conspicuous manner so that it is readily viewable by male detainees at the CCDOC. If no such area exists that would allow all male detainees at the CCDOC to readily access and view said notice, then the Sheriff shall post the notice in as many locations as is necessary so that it is readily accessible to and viewable by all male detainees at the CCDOC. This Notice shall be in the form attached hereto as Ex. C (the "Posting Notice"). The Sheriff
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shall post the Posting Notice no later than seven (7) days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order and it shall remain posted until the entry of the Final Approval Order.
9. Claims Administration Website: Within twenty-eight (28) days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, the Claims Administrator will develop and activate a website that will generally describe the nature of the Lawsuit and provide a general outline of the terms of the proposed settlement. The website will also post a copy of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 56 in the Lawsuit), the Notice and this Agreement and shall be designed and constructed to accept electronic Claim Form submissions from Class Members. The website will be active until seventy-seven (77) days after the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order. The website may describe the allegations of the lawsuit, including, but not limited to, that constitutional violations were alleged, but shall not otherwise disparage Defendants or suggest that the Defendants have violated the constitutional rights of class members beyond the allegations as set forth in the Amended Complaint.
10. Claims Administration: To be eligible for a Class Member Payment, a Class Member must either (i) mail a signed Claim Form to the Claims Administrator, which must be postmarked no later than seventy-seven (77) days after the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, or (ii) submit a claim online through the website created by the Claims Administrator within seventy-seven (77) days after the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order. A Class Member is eligible for a Class Member Payment for each separate occurrence in which he was released from the CCDOC after being found not guilty, being acquitted or otherwise having the charges brought against him dismissed in court (i.e., if a Class Member was found not guilty and released from the CCDOC on May 1, 2012 and was also released on a subsequent occasion after being found not guilty on a different charge on January 15, 2016, he is eligible for two Class Member Payments of $100 each).
11. Confirmation of Claims and Opt-Outs: Within one-hundred two (102) days after the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order (i.e., twenty-five (25) days after the deadline for submitting claims and/or opting-out), the Claims Administrator shall provide Defendants, with a copy to Class Counsel, a certification setting forth (i) the total number of valid and timely claims that were submitted by Class Members, (ii) the total dollar amount of Class Member Payments for all valid and timely claims (the "Total Class Payment"), (iii) the name and Inmate ID of all Class Members who opted-out of the Class pursuant to Paragraph 16 below, and (iv) the name and Inmate ID of any individuals who submitted a valid and timely claim whose discharge status was listed as "vacated" on the list provided by Defendants pursuant to Paragraph 7 above.
12. Cost of Claims Administration: Defendants shall pay all fees and costs incurred for the administration of the settlement up to ninety-five thousand dollars ($95,000), including, but not limited to: (i) preparing, mailing and monitoring all necessary notices, claim forms and related documents; (ii) developing, maintaining and operating a website specifically created for the settlement of the Lawsuit and the submission of claims by Class Members; (iii) communicating with and responding to Class Members; (iv) computing settlement payments for Class Members; (v) establishing or maintaining an account for Class Member Payments; (vi) distributing payments to Class Members, and (vii) other fees and costs reasonably incurred in administering the settlement contemplated herein (collectively, the "Claims Administration
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Costs"). All Claims Administration Costs in excess of ninety-five thousand dollars ($95,000) shall be incurred by Class Counsel, which amounts shall be recoverable as costs pursuant to Paragraph 15 below.
13. Funding of Settlement: Within twenty-one (21) days after the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, Defendants shall remit to the Claims Administrator: (i) $1,104,250 for Class Member Payments; (ii) $95,000 for Claims Administration Costs; and (iii) $15,000 for Brian Otero as the named Plaintiffs incentive award ($15,000). Within thirty-five (35) days after the entry of the Final Approval Order, Defendants shall remit to Myron M. Cherry & Associates, LLC the entire amount of Class Counsel attorneys' fees and costs in accordance with Paragraph 15 below. If the Total Class Payments are less than one-million one-hundred four thousand twohundred fifty dollars ($1,104,250), the Claims Administrator shall remit to Defendant Cook County within twenty-one (21) days after the Final Settlement Date the difference between $1,104,250 and the Total Class Payments. If the Claims Administration Costs are less than ninety-five thousand dollars ($95,000), the Claims Administrator shall remit to Defendant Cook County within twenty-one (21) days after the Final Settlement Date the difference between $95,000 and the Claims Administration Costs.
IV. INCENTIVE AWARD AND CLASS COUNSEL'S FEES AND COSTS
14. Named Plaintiff's Incentive Award: Subject to the Court's approval, Defendants shall pay Brian Otero an incentive award of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), which payment shall be remitted to Brian Otero with within twenty-one (21) days after the Final Settlement Date.
15. Class Counsel's Attorneys' Fees and Costs: Subject to the Court's approval, Defendants shall pay Class Counsel attorneys' fees and costs in an amount of up to two-million dollars ($2,000,000). Class Counsel shall file its motion or petition supporting its request for attorneys' fees and costs with the Court no later than twenty-one (21) days prior to the deadline for Class Members to object to the Settlement as set forth below. Defendants will not oppose this request to the extent fees and costs do not exceed two-million dollars ($2,000,000). The attorneys' fees and costs awarded to Class Counsel shall be made payable and be remitted to Myron M. Cherry & Associates, LLC within thirty-five (35) days after the entry of the Final Approval Order, notwithstanding the existence of any timely filed objections thereto, or potential for appeal therefrom, or collateral attack on this Agreement or any part thereof, subject to Class Counsel's obligation to make appropriate refunds or repayments to the Defendants if and when, as a result of any appeal and/or further proceedings on remand, or successful collateral attack, the attorneys' fees or cost award is reduced or reversed.
V. RIGHT TO 0PT-0UT OR OBJECT
16. Exclusion/Opt-Out Requests: Class Members may elect not to be part of the Class and not to be bound by this Agreement (i.e., "opt-out"). To make this election, Class Members must mail a written request to the Claims Administrator stating: (a) the name and case number ofthe Lawsuit: Otero v. Dart, No. 12-cv-3148; (b) the full name, address and telephone number of the person requesting exclusion; and (c) a statement that he wishes to be excluded
6

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 8 of 25 PageID #:5501
from the Class and does not wish to participate in the settlement. Opt-out requests must be postmarked no later than seventy-seven (77) days after the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order.
17. Objections. Any Class Member who has not submitted a timely written exclusion request pursuant to Paragraph 16 above and who wishes to object to the fairness, reasonableness or adequacy of the Agreement and the proposed settlement or to the attorneys' fees and costs requested by Class Counsel, must do so by filing a written objection with the Court and delivering a copy of the objection to Class Counsel and Defendants' counsel no later than seventy-seven (77) days after the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order. It shall be the objector's responsibility to ensure receipt of any objection by the Court, Class Counsel and Defendants' counsel. To be considered by the Court, the objection must include: (a) the name and case number of the Lawsuit: Otero v. Dart, No. 12-cv-3148; (b) the Class Member's name, address and telephone number; (c) a statement of each objection and the relief that the Class Member is requesting; and (d) a statement of whether the Class Member intends to appear, either in person or through counsel, at the final approval hearing. Any Class Member who files and serves a written objection, as described in this Paragraph, has the option to appear at the final approval hearing, either in person or through personal counsel hired at the Class Member's expense, to object to the fairness, reasonableness or adequacy of this Agreement and the proposed settlement or to the attorneys' fees and costs requested by Class Counsel. However, Class Members or their attorneys intending to make an appearance at the final approval hearing must include a statement of intention to appear in the written objection filed with the Court and delivered to Class Counsel and Defendants' counsel, and only those Class Members who include such a statement may speak at the final approval hearing. If a Class Member makes an objection or appears at the final approval hearing through an attorney, the Class Member will be responsible for his personal attorney's fees and costs.
VI. RELEASE
18. Plaintiff and Class Member Release: Upon entry of the Final Approval Order, Plaintiff and all Class Members who do not validly and timely request to be excluded from the proposed settlement, and each of their respective successors, assigns, legatees, heirs and personal representatives release and forever discharge Defendants and each of their respective officers, employees, agents, representatives, attorneys, insurers, and all persons acting by, through, under or in concert with them, or any of them, from all manner of action, causes of action, claims, demands, rights, suits, obligations, debts, contracts, agreements, promises, liabilities, damages, charges, penalties, losses, costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees, of any nature whatsoever, known or unknown, in law or equity, fixed or contingent, which they have or may have arising out of or relating to any of the conduct that was the subject of this Lawsuit, including any claimed (i) unlawful detention or over-detention by the Sheriff after being found not guilty, being acquitted or otherwise receiving a dismissal of the charges brought against him in court, or (ii) unequal treatment in the manner or processing of their court-ordered release in relation to similarly situated female detainees.
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Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 9 of 25 PageID #:5502
VII. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
19. Final Approval Hearing: In connection with his motion for preliminary approval of this Agreement and the settlement of this Lawsuit, Plaintiff shall request that a final approval hearing be held between one-hundred nineteen (119) and one-hundred forty (140) days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, subject to the Court's availability. Prior to the final approval hearing, Class Counsel shall file with the Court a complete list of all Class Members who validly and timely excluded themselves from the Class.
20. Status of Lawsuit If Settlement Is Not Approved: This Agreement is being entered into for settlement purposes only. If the Court conditions its approval of either the Preliminary Approval Order or the Final Approval Order on any modifications of this Agreement (other than modifications to the time periods and dates described herein) that are not acceptable to all Parties, if the Court does not approve this Agreement or enter the Final Approval Order, or if the Final Settlement Date does not occur for any reason, then this Agreement will be deemed null and void ab initio.
21. Judgment and Enforcement: The Parties agree that should the Court enter the Final Approval Order, it shall include a provision for the retention of the Court's jurisdiction over the Parties to enforce the terms of this Agreement.
22. Change of Time Periods: All time periods and dates described in this Agreement are subject to the Court's approval. These time periods and dates may be changed by the Court or by the Parties' written agreement without notice to the Class.
23. Binding on Successors: This Agreement binds and benefits the Parties' respective successors, assigns, legatees, heirs, and personal representatives.
24. Entire Agreement: This Agreement and the attached exhibits contain the entire agreement between the Parties and constitute the complete, final and exclusive embodiment of their agreement with respect to the settlement of the Lawsuit. This Agreement and the attached exhibits supersede any and all prior agreements, arrangements or understandings, whether written or oral, express or implied, between them relating to the subject matter hereof. The Parties agree that there are no understandings, written, oral, express, implied or otherwise, except as set forth in this Agreement and the attached exhibits, and that in entering into this Agreement, no Party has relied, or is entitled to rely, upon any promise, inducement, representation, statement, assurance or expectation unless it is contained herein in writing.
25. Exhibits: The exhibits to this Agreement are integral parts ofthe Agreement and are incorporated into this Agreement as though fully set forth herein.
26. Recitals: The Recitals are incorporated by this reference and are part of this Agreement.
27. Modifications and Amendments: No amendment, change or modification to this Agreement will be valid unless in writing signed by the Parties or their counsel.
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Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 10 of 25 PageID #:5503
28. Construction and Interpretation: Neither the Parties nor any of the Parties' respective attorneys will be deemed the drafter of this Agreement for purposes of interpreting any provision in this Agreement in any judicial or other proceeding that may arise between them. This Agreement has been, and must be construed to have been, drafted by all the Parties to it, so that any rule that construes ambiguities against the drafter will have no force or affect.
29. Counterparts: This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which constitutes an original, but all of which together constitutes one and the same instrument. Several signature pages may be collected and annexed to one or more documents to form a complete counterpart. Photocopies or PDF copies of executed copies of this Agreement shall be treated as originals.
30. Severability: If any provision of this Agreement is declared by the Court to be invalid, void or unenforceable, the remaining provisions of this Agreement will continue in full force and effect.
31. Waiver: No delay on the part of either Party in the exercise of any right, power or remedy shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any single or partial exercise of any right, power or remedy preclude the further exercise thereof, or the exercise of any other right, power or remedy.
32. Governing Law: This Agreement shall be governed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Illinois and without regard to conflict of laws principles.
33. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: Other than the payment by Defendants of administration costs and Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and costs in accordance with Paragraphs 12 and 15 above, each Party shall bear their own attorneys' fees and costs relating in any way to the Lawsuit or this Agreement, or the subject matter of any of them.
34. Settlement of Disputed Claims: This Agreement reflects the Parties' compromise and settlement of disputed claims. The provisions of this Agreement, and all related drafts, communications and discussions, cannot be construed as or deemed to be evidence of an admission or concession of any point of fact or law by any Party. To the extent permitted by law, neither this Agreement, nor any of its terms or provisions, nor any of the negotiations or proceedings connected with it, shall be admissible as evidence in any pending or future civil, criminal or administrative action or proceeding to establish liability or admission by any Party, except in any proceeding brought to enforce this Agreement.
35. Parties Represented by Counsel: The Parties acknowledge that: (a) the Plaintiff has been represented by independent counsel of his own choosing, and that the class has been represented by court-appointed counsel, during the negotiation and preparation of this Agreement; (b) the Defendants have been represented by the Cook County State's Attorney's Office; (c) they have read this Agreement and are fully aware of its contents; and (d) their respective counsel fully explained to them the Agreement and its legal effect. The Parties executed this Agreement voluntarily and without duress or undue influence.
9

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 11 of 25 PageID #:5504
36. No Admission of Liability: Defendants are entering into this Agreement in order to compromise and resolve disputed claims that they believe are of doubtful validity so as to avoid further litigation given the current posture of the case. Defendants, by entering into this Agreement, do not admit liability and in fact expressly deny liability. It is further understood that the consideration set forth in Section II above is not an admission of liability on the part of Defendants.
37. Authorization: Each of the Parties represents that it has all necessary power and authority to enter into this Agreement and to carry out such Party's obligations hereunder. This Agreement has been presented to and approved by the Cook County Board of Commissioners. Each signatory below represents that he or she is fully entitled and duly authorized to enter into this Agreement on whose behalf he or she is signing.
38. Cooperation to Obtain Court Approval: The Parties agree to cooperate fully to execute any documents and take all additional actions which are consistent with and which may be necessary or appropriate to secure the Court's preliminary and final approval of this Agreement.
The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank.
10

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 12 of 25 PageID #:5505

Dated: March 25,2016 Dated: March 25,2016

f%L:W~ Brian Otero, Individually and in his Representative Capacity APPOINTED CLASS COUNSEL
Myron M. Cherry, as Class Counsel
Jacie C. Zolna, as Class Counsel

Dated: March 25,2016

Robert M. Foote, as Class Counsel
COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

By: Nicholas Scouffas Title: General Counsel, Cook County Sheriffs Office

11

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 13 of 25 PageID #:5506

Dated: March 25, 2016 Dated: March 25,2016

BRIAN OTERO
Brian Otero, Individually and in his Representative Capacity
APPOINTED CLASS COUNSEL

Dated: March 25,2016

COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
By: Nicholas Scouffas Title: General Counsel, Cook County Sheriff's Office

11

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 14 of 25 PageID #:5507

Dated: March 25.2016 Dated: March 25, 2016

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Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 15 of 25 PageID #:5508
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Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 16 of 25 PageID #:5509
Ex. A

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 17 of 25 PageID #:5510

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

BRIAN OTERO, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS J. DART, SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

) ) ) Case No. 1:12-cv-03148 ) ) ) Honorable Amy J. St. Eve ) )
) NOTICE OF PROPOSED CLASS ACTION ) SETTLEMENT ) )

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY. IT RELATES TO THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF A CLASS ACTION AND CONTAINS IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS.

You are eligible for a settlement payment of up to $100 ifyou sign the enclosed claim form and return it in the self-addressed, pre-paid return envelope provided herein or if you submit a claim online at
[INSERT WEBSITE ADDRESS].

I.

What is this notice about?

This Notice is being sent to notify you of a settlement of a class action lawsuit against the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois (the "Lawsuit"). The Lawsuit challenges the Sheriffs policy or practice of detaining male inmates in an unreasonable and unconstitutional manner following a trial or other court appearance where they are found not guilty or otherwise had the charges against them dismissed. The Lawsuit also brought an Equal Protection claim based on the Sheriffs practice of treating male inmates differently than similarly situated female inmates who were found not guilty or otherwise had the charges against them dismissed.

On [INSERT DATE], 2016, the Court preliminarily approved a settlement of the Lawsuit, which provides both non-monetary relief and monetary payments to class members. The purpose of this Notice is to inform you of the Lawsuit and the proposed settlement. In addition, this Notice will advise you of what to do if you want to remain a part of the Lawsuit, what to do if you want to exclude yourself from the Lawsuit and how joining or not joining the Lawsuit may affect your legal rights.

II. What is a class action lawsuit?

A class action lawsuit is a legal action in which one or more people represent a large group, or class of people. The purpose of a class action lawsuit is to resolve at one time similar legal claims of the members of the group.

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 18 of 25 PageID #:5511
ill. Who is in the class?
On September 2, 2014, the Court certified this case as a class action and defined the class as:
"All male inmates who while being detained by the Cook County Sheriff's Office were found not guilty, were acquitted, or had charges brought against them dismissed, and for whom the Sheriff's Office no longer had any legal right to detain from April27, 2010 through the present."
IV. What are the terms of the proposed settlement?
The settlement provides that Defendants will Ray $100 to each Class Member who submits the enclosed claim form, or submits a claim online at [lliSERT WEBSITE ADDRESS], up to a total of $1, I04,250. If the total amount of claims exceeds that amount then individual payments to Class Members who submit a claim will be reduced on a pro-rated basis.
The settlement agreement also provides for non-monetary relief, including modifications to the release policies and practices at the Cook County Department of Corrections that will provide (i) a mechanism for promptly identifying potential male court discharges, (ii) a procedure under which all individuals so identified are segregated in the RCDC from other inmates returning from court, (iii) a procedure under which individuals so identified are not required to return to the general jail population, (iv) a policy under which priority review in the Records Division is given to individuals identified as potential court discharges, and (v) a policy under which the administrative steps necessary to release a detainee after a finding of not guilty, an acquittal or other dismissal of charges in court are undertaken in a gender-neutral manner.
Defendants will pay claims administration fees and costs up to $95,000, as well as an incentive award of$15,000 to the named Plaintiff for his service as class representative. Defendants will also pay a Court-approved amount for Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and costs.
V. How do I receive a settlement payment?
In order to receive the $100 payment described in this Notice you must sign the enclosed claim form and mail it to the claims administrator by [INSERT DATE]. A self-addressed, pre-paid return envelope is provided herein that you can use to mail in your claim form.
You can also submit your claim online through the settlement website at [INSERT WEBSITE ADDRESS].
Regardless of whether you mail in the claim form or submit a claim online, you must do so by [INSERT DATE] in order to be eligible to receive a settlement payment. Settlement payments will only be issued if the proposed settlement is granted final approval by the Court.
VI. Why is there a proposed settlement?
The Court has not decided in favor of either side in the Lawsuit. Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe the claims have merit. Defendants deny all allegations of wrongdoing or liability against them whatsoever and further contend that their conduct was lawful at all times. Defendants are settling to avoid the expense, inconvenience and inherent risk of litigation. Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe that the proposed settlement is in the best interest of the Class because it provides appropriate recovery and other relief for Class Members now while avoiding the risk, expense and delay of pursuing the case through trial and any appeals, including the possibility of no recovery or relief for the Class whatsoever.
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Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 19 of 25 PageID #:5512

Vll. When and where is the final approval hearing?

The final approval hearing has been set for [INSERT DATE AND TIME] before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve in Courtroom 1241 of the Everett McKinley Dirksen Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604. The Court will hear any comments from the parties or objections concerning the fairness of the proposed settlement at the final approval hearing, including the amount requested for the named Plaintiffs incentive award and attorneys' fees and costs.

You do not need to attend the final approval hearing to remain a Class Member or to obtain any benefits under the proposed settlement. You or your own personal attorney may attend the hearing if you wish, at your own expense. You do not need to attend this hearing to have a properly filed and served written objection considered by the Court.

Vill. How can I exclude myself from the class and the settlement?

Any Class Member has the right to be excluded from the Class by written request. If you wish to be excluded from the Class you must mail a written request to the Claims Administrator stating that you want to be excluded from the class. All exclusion requests must include (a) the name and case number of the Lawsuit: Otero v. Dart, No. 12-cv-3148; (b) your full name, address and telephone number; and (c) a statement that you wish to be excluded from the Class and do not want to participate in the settlement. A Class Member's exclusion request must be must be postmarked no later than [INSERT DATE] and sent to the Claims Administrator at the following address: [INSERT ADDRESS].

If you properly and timely request to exclude yourself from the Class, you will not have any rights as a member of the Class pursuant to the proposed settlement, you will not be eligible to receive the monetary payment described in this Notice, will not be bound by any further orders or the judgment entered in the Lawsuit and will remain able to pursue any claims alleged in the Lawsuit against Defendants on your own and at your own expense and with your own counsel. If you proceed on an individual basis after excluding yourself from the Class you may receive more, or less, of a benefit than you would otherwise receive under this proposed settlement or no benefit at all.

IX. How can I object to the settlement?

If you do not exclude yourself from the Class, you can comment in opposition to the settlement, including the amount requested for the named Plaintiffs incentive award and attorneys' fees and costs, which is known as an objection, and you have the right to appear before the Court to express your opposition. Your written objection in opposition to the settlement must be submitted in writing and filed with the Court by [INSERT DATE]. The address for the Clerk of the Court is: Everett McKinley Dirksen Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604. You must also send copies of your written objection to the attorneys for the parties at the following addresses:

Class Counsel:

Counsel for Defendants:

Myron M. Cherry Jacie C. Zolna Myron M. Cherry & Associates, LLC 30 North LaSalle Street, Suite 2300 Chicago, Illinois 60602

Anthony E. Zecchin Assistant State's Attorney Cook County State's Attorney's Office 500 Daley Center Chicago, Illinois 60602

3

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 20 of 25 PageID #:5513
Robert M. Foote Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC I0 West State Street, Suite 200 Geneva, Illinois 60134
To be valid and considered by the Court, any such written objection must include the following information: (I) a reference to Otero v. Dart, No. 12-cv-3148; (2) your name, address and telephone number; (3) a statement of each objection you are making and the relief that you are requesting; and (4) a statement of whether you intend to appear, either in person or through counsel, at the final approval hearing. You may, but need not, file and serve your objection through counsel of your choice and you may appear at the final approval hearing either in person or through personal counsel hired at your expense. If you make your objection or appearance at the final approval hearing through an attorney, you will be responsible for your personal attorney's fees and costs. Also, if you intend to appear at the final approval hearing through personal counsel hired at your expense, you must identify the counsel's name, address and telephone number in your written objection.
If you do not submit a written objection to the proposed settlement or the amount requested for the named Plaintiff's incentive award and attorneys' fees and costs in accordance with the deadline and procedure set forth above, you will waive your right to be heard at the final approval hearing.
If you do not object as described above and you do not exclude yourself from the Class, you will be deemed to have consented to the Court's jurisdiction over the Class, and to have released the claims at issue against Defendants as explained below and will otherwise be bound by the proposed settlement.
X. What is the effect of final settlement approval?
If the Court approves the proposed settlement after the final approval hearing, it will enter a judgment dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice and releasing all related legal claims against the Defendants based on the allegations in the Lawsuit. If you do not exclude yourself from the Class, the proposed settlement will be your sole mechanism for obtaining any relief.
All Class Members who do not validly and timely request to be excluded from the proposed settlement, and each of their respective successors, assigns, legatees, heirs and personal representatives will release and forever discharge Defendants and each of their respective officers, employees, agents, representatives, attorneys, insurers, and all persons acting by, through, under or in concert with them, or any of them, from all manner of action, causes of action, claims, demands, rights, suits, obligations, debts, contracts, agreements, promises, liabilities, damages, charges, penalties, losses, costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees, of any nature whatsoever, known or unknown, in law or equity, fixed or contingent, which they have or may have arising out of or relating to any of the conduct that was the subject of this Lawsuit, including any claimed (i) unlawful detention or over-detention by the Sheriff after being found not guilty or otherwise having the charges brought against them dismissed, or (ii) unequal treatment in the manner or processing of their court-ordered release in relation to similarly situated female detainees.
If the proposed settlement is not approved, the case will proceed as if no settlement had been reached. There can be no assurance that if the settlement is not approved and the case resumes that Class Members will recover more than what is provided for under the settlement or will recover anything at all.
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Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 21 of 25 PageID #:5514

XI. Who represents the class?

The Court appointed the following lawyers ("Class Counsel") as counsel for the Class:

Myron M. Cherry mcherry@cherry-law .com Jacie C. Zolna jzolna@cherry-law.com Myron M. Cherry & Associates, LLC 30 North LaSalle Street, Suite 2300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 372-2100 (telephone) (312) 853-0279 (facsimile)

Robert M. Foote rmf@fmcolaw.com Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC 10 West State Street, Suite 200 Geneva, Illinois 60134 (630) 492-1846 (telephone) (630) 232-7452 (facsimile)

From the beginning of the case in 2012 to the present, Class Counsel has not received any payment for their services in prosecuting this case or in obtaining this proposed settlement, nor have they been reimbursed for any out-of-pocket costs they have incurred. Class Counsel will apply to the Court for an award of attorneys' fees and costs in a total amount of up to, and not more than, $2 Million. If the Court approves Class Counsel's motion or petition for fees and costs, it will be paid by the Defendants. Class Members will not have to pay anything toward the fees or costs of Class Counsel. You do not need to hire your own lawyer because Class Counsel is working on your behalf and will seek final approval of the settlement on behalf of the Class Members. You may hire your own lawyer to represent you in this case if you wish, but it will be at your own expense.

Xll. Where can I get more information about the Lawsuit and the proposed settlement?

This notice provides only a summary of the matters relating to the settlement. More detailed information is provided in the settlement agreement. You can view the settlement agreement and obtain more information about the settlement at [INSERT WEBSITE ADDRESS]. In order to see the complete case file, including the settlement agreement and all other pleadings and papers filed in the Lawsuit, you may also examine the court file at the office of the Clerk of the Court in the Everett McKinley Dirksen Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT (INCLUDING THE CLERK OF THE COURT OR THE JUDGE) OR DEFENDANTS WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT OR THE LAWSUIT

PLEASE ADDRESS ANY FURTHER CONTACT TO THE CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR AT:

[INSERT NAME, ADDRESS AND EMAIL ADDRESS]

Dated: [INSERT DATE]

BY ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 22 of 25 PageID #:5515
Ex.B

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 23 of 25 PageID #:5516
CLAIM FORM
Otero v. Dart, et a/. Case No. 1:12-cv-03148 United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
«Barcode»
Claim#: «ClaimiD»-«MailRec» «Firstl » «Lastl » «CO» «Addr2» «Addrl» «City», «St» «Zip» «Country»
INSTRUCTIONS: Please sign below and return this claim form in the enclosed, self-addressed pre-paid envelope or mail it to: [rnSERT NAME AND ADDRESS OF CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR].
In order to receive your settlement payment, you must submit your claim no later than [INSERT DATE] by mailing this claim form to the claims administrator or by submitting a claim online at [INSERT WEBSITE ADDRESS].

Dated:_ _ _ _ _ _ __

Signahrre: ____________________

Mail this claim form on or before [INSERT DATE] (postmark deadline).
By submitting this claim form, you will be included as a member of the class identified in the Class Notice, and thereby will be releasing Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook County and Cook
County, Illinois from all claims as provided in the Settlement Agreement and the Class Notice. If
you also submit a request for exclusion from the class and settlement in addition to this claim form, the request for exclusion will be deemed invalid.

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 24 of 25 PageID #:5517
Ex. C

Case: 1:12-cv-03148 Document #: 273-2 Filed: 03/25/16 Page 25 of 25 PageID #:5518
NOTICE OF PROPOSED CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
Otero v. Dart, et al. Case No. 1:12-cv-03148 United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
If you are a male who, while being detained at the Cook County Department of Corrections, was found not guilty or otherwise had the charges brought against you dismissed in court from April 27, 2010 through [INSERT DATE] you may be a class member in a lawsuit that was filed against the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois (the "Lawsuit").
The Lawsuit alleges that the Sheriff maintains a policy or practice of detaining male inmates in an unreasonable and unconstitutional manner following a trial or other court appearance where they are found not guilty or otherwise had the charges against them dismissed. The Lawsuit also claims that the Sheriff treats male detainees differently than similarly situated female detainees in terms of processing their court-ordered release. On September 2, 2014, the Court certified the Lawsuit as a class action and defined the class as:
All male inmates who while being detained by the Cook County Sheriffs Office were found not guilty, were acquitted, or had charges brought against them dismissed, and for whom the Sheriffs Office no longer had any legal right to detain from April27, 2010 through the present.
On [INSERT DATE], 2016, the Court preliminarily approved a settlement of the Lawsuit, which provides both non-monetary relief and monetary payments to class members. If you meet the class definition set forth above you should receive by a mail a Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement (the "Notice"), which will explain your rights and options, as well as give you instructions on how you can claim a payment from the settlement. In order to receive a payment under the terms of the proposed settlement you must submit a claim no later than [INSERT DATE]. If you did not receive the Notice and believe you are a member of the class, you can obtain the Notice from the claims administrator at: [INSERT NAME, ADDRESS AND !EMAIL ADDRESS].
More information about the Lawsuit and the proposed settlement, as well as a copy of the Notice, can also be found at [INSERT WEBSITE ADDRESS].
A final approval hearing has been set for [INSERT DATE AND THvfE] before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve in Courtroom 1241 of the Everett McKinley Dirksen Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604.
Dated: [INSERT DATE]
BY ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 
 Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 1 of 24
MASON,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:12−cv−03148

Otero v. Thomas J. Dart et al Assigned to: Honorable Amy J. St. Eve Demand: $9,999,000 Case in other court: 16−03169 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
Brian Otero individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals

Date Filed: 04/27/2012 Date Terminated: 08/11/2016 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Jacie C Zolna Myron M. Cherry & Associates 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 372−2100 Email: jzolna@cherry−law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Myron Milton Cherry Myron M. Cherry & Associates 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 372−2100 Email: mcherry@cherry−law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert M. Foote Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC 10 West State Street #200 Geneva, IL 60134 (630) 232−7450 Email: rmf@fmcolaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexandra Leigh Nickow Myron M. Cherry & Associates 30 N. Lasalle St. 2300 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 372−2100 Email: anickow@cherry−law.com TERMINATED: 06/16/2015
Christopher J Werner OutCold, LLC 2848 W Chicago Avenue Unit B Chicago, IL 60622 3123394984 Email: cwerner@outcold.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig S. Mielke Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC 10 W. State Street

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 2 of 24
Suite 200 Geneva, IL 60134 (630) 232−7450 Email: csm@fmcolaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dario Dzananovic Myron M. Cherry & Associates 30 N. Lasalle St Ste 2300 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 372−2100 Email: ddzananovic@cherry−law.com TERMINATED: 12/22/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen Currie Chavez Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC 10 West State Street Suite 200 Geneva, IL 60134 (630) 232−4480 Email: kcc@fmcolaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Herman Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC 10 West State Street Suite 200 Geneva, IL 60134 (630) 232−7450 Email: mjh@fmcolaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter Lawrence Currie Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil, LLC 10 West State Street Suite 200 Geneva, IL 60134 (630) 232−7450 Email: plc@fmcolaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Thomas J. Dart Sheriff of Cook County

represented by Andrea Lynn Huff Cook County State's Attorney's Office Richard J. Daley Center 50 W. Washington Street, Room 500 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−3473 Email: andrea.huff@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony E. Zecchin Cook County State's Attorney's Office 500 Daley Center 50 West Washington Chicago, IL 60602 312 603 3373 Email: anthony.zecchin@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Charles Pullos

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 3 of 24

Law Offices of Edward J. Kozel 333 S. Wabash Ave 25th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 822−4857 Email: james.pullos@cna.com TERMINATED: 09/29/2015

John Power Cook County State's Attorney's Office Richard J. Daley Center, Fifth Floor Chicago, IL 60602 312−603−4370 Email: John.Power@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Joseph Rock Rock Fusco & Connelly, LLC 321 North Clark Street Suite 2200 Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 494−1000 Email: jrock@rockfuscoconnelly.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Gallagher Burke, Wise, Morrissey & Kaveny 161 N. Clark Street Suite 3200 Chicago, IL 60601 (312)580−2040 Email: mlg@bwmklaw.com TERMINATED: 09/02/2015

Stacy Ann Benjamin Rock Fusco & Connelly, LLC 321 North Clark Street Suite 2200 Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 494−1000 Email: sbenjamin@rockfuscoconnelly.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Cook County Illinois

represented by Andrea Lynn Huff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anthony E. Zecchin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Charles Pullos (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/29/2015

John Power (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Joseph Rock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 4 of 24
Michael L. Gallagher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2015
Stacy Ann Benjamin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/27/2012 04/27/2012 04/27/2012 04/30/2012 04/30/2012 04/30/2012 04/30/2012 05/01/2012 05/01/2012 05/01/2012
05/02/2012 05/11/2012 05/11/2012 05/11/2012
05/11/2012 05/14/2012
05/14/2012 07/09/2012

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Brian Otero; Jury Demand. Filing fee $ 350, receipt number 0752−7096348.(Foote, Robert) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Brian Otero by Robert M. Foote (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Michael T. Mason. (mh, ) (Entered: 04/30/2012)
4 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Brian Otero by Kathleen Currie Chavez (Chavez, Kathleen) (Entered: 04/30/2012)
5 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Brian Otero by Peter Lawrence Currie (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 04/30/2012)
6 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Brian Otero by Matthew J. Herman (Herman, Matthew) (Entered: 04/30/2012)
7 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Brian Otero by Myron Milton Cherry (Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 05/01/2012)
8 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Brian Otero by Jacie C Zolna (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 05/01/2012)
9 MINUTE entry before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Initial status hearing set for 6/11/12 at 8:30 a.m. in courtroom 1241. Parties should refer to Judge St. Eve's web page at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov and file a joint status report by 6/6/12 as set forth in the Initial Status Conferences procedure.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 05/01/2012)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendants Cook County Illinois & Thomas J. Dart. (tlm) (Entered: 05/02/2012)
10 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart by Anthony E. Zecchin (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
11 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart for extension of time to file answer regarding complaint 1 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
12 NOTICE of Motion by Anthony E. Zecchin for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer, motion for relief 11 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 5/16/2012 at 08:30 AM. (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
13 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart by James Charles Pullos (Pullos, James) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
14 MINUTE entry before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendants' motion for extension of time 11 is granted. Defendants should answer or otherwise plead by 7/9/12. Joint status report should be filed by 7/9/12. Status hearing set for 6/11/12 is stricken and reset to 7/12/12 at 8:30 a.m. No appearance is required on the 5/16/12 notice date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 05/14/2012)
15 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Brian Otero by Christopher J Werner (Werner, Christopher) (Entered: 05/14/2012)
16 First MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIMand/or Strike Plaintiff's Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Complaint)(Pullos, James) (Entered: 07/09/2012)

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07/09/2012 07/09/2012 07/09/2012 07/12/2012
08/02/2012
08/16/2012 09/18/2012 10/18/2012
10/18/2012 10/25/2012
11/01/2012 11/15/2012 11/15/2012 12/20/2012
01/24/2013 01/24/2013

17 NOTICE of Motion by James Charles Pullos for presentment of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 16 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 7/12/2012 at 08:30 AM. (Pullos, James) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
18 STATUS Report − Joint Initial Status Report by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Pullos, James) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to strike. (Omitted relief from document 16 .) (kj, ) (Entered: 07/10/2012)
19 MINUTE entry before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 7/12/2012 and continued to 10/25/2012 at 08:30 AM. Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures by 9/10/12. Defendants' motion to dismiss and/or strike plaintiff's complaint 16 is entered. Response shall be filed by 8/2/12. Reply by 8/16/12. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
20 RESPONSE by Brian Oteroin Opposition to First MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIMand/or Strike Plaintiff's Complaint 16 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Plaintiff's Complaint, # 2 Certificate of Service Certificate of Service for Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Plaintiff's Complaint)(Werner, Christopher) (Entered: 08/02/2012)
21 REPLY by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 16 , response in opposition to motion, 20 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Pullos, James) (Entered: 08/16/2012)
22 NOTICE by Peter Lawrence Currie of Change of Address (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 09/18/2012)
23 MINUTE entry before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: The Court grants in part and denies in part Cook County Illinois and Thomas J. Dart's motion to dismiss or strike 16 . Specifically, the Court denies the motion to dismiss Count I, but grants the motion to the extent that the Complaint asserts substantive claims against Cook County. The Court also grants the motion to strike Plaintiff's requests for equitable relief. [For further details see separate Memorandum Opinion and Order.]Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 10/18/2012)
24 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 10/18/2012:Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 10/18/2012)
25 MINUTE entry before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 10/25/2012 and continued to 12/20/2012 at 08:30 AM. Defendants shall answer by 11/15/12. Written discovery shall be issued by 11/15/12. Parties shall submit a proposed discovery and class certification schedule by 11/1/12. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 10/25/2012)
26 Proposed Joint Initial Discovery Schedule by Brian Otero and Defendants (Werner, Christopher) (Entered: 11/01/2012)
27 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart(Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 11/15/2012)
28 NOTICE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart re answer to complaint 27 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 11/15/2012)
29 MINUTE entry before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 12/20/2012 and continued to 2/21/2013 at 08:30 AM. Parties shall answer written discovery by 1/14/13. Plaintiff's deposition and Rule 30(b)(6) depositions shall be completed by 3/15/13. Plaintiff's motion for class certification shall be filed by 5/15/13. Response by 6/17/13. Reply by 7/1/13. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 12/20/2012)
30 NOTICE by Robert M. Foote of Change of Address and Change of Firm Name (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 01/24/2013)
31 NOTICE by Matthew J. Herman of Change of Address and Change of Firm Name (Herman, Matthew) (Entered: 01/24/2013)

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 6 of 24

01/30/2013 02/04/2013 02/07/2013 02/21/2013 04/18/2013
06/11/2013 06/11/2013 06/18/2013
06/27/2013 07/19/2013
07/23/2013
07/23/2013
08/23/2013
08/23/2013 09/06/2013
10/28/2013 10/28/2013

32 NOTICE by Peter Lawrence Currie of Change of Address (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 01/30/2013)
33 NOTICE by Kathleen Currie Chavez of Change of Address And of Firm Name Change (Chavez, Kathleen) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
34 NOTICE by Brian Otero of Withdrawl of Appearance of Christopher J Werner as counsel for Plaintiff (Werner, Christopher) (Entered: 02/07/2013)
35 MINUTE entry before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 2/21/2013 and continued to 4/18/2013 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/21/2013)
36 MINUTE entry before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 4/18/2013 and continued to 6/27/2013 at 08:30 AM. Motion for class certification shall be filed by 6/26/13. Response by 7/26/13. Reply by 8/9/13. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 04/18/2013)
37 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart for extension of time (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 06/11/2013)
38 NOTICE of Motion by Anthony E. Zecchin for presentment of extension of time 37 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 6/18/2013 at 08:30 AM. (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 06/11/2013)
39 MINUTE entry before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Motion hearing held on 6/18/2013. Defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time for discovery 37 is granted. The Rule 30(b)(6) deposition shall take place by 6/27/13. Plaintiff's motion for class certification shall be filed by 7/19/13. Response by 8/16/13. Reply by 8/30/13. Status hearing set for 6/27/13 is stricken and reset to 7/23/13 at 8:30 a.m. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 06/18/2013)
40 NOTICE by Peter Lawrence Currie of Change of Address (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 06/27/2013)
41 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to certify class and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof Responses due by 8/16/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−E, # 2 Exhibit F, # 3 Exhibit G, # 4 Appendix of Authorities Cited in Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification That are Only Published on an Electronic Database, # 5 Exhibit 1−8 to Appendix)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 07/19/2013)
42 MINUTE entry before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 7/23/2013 and continued to 11/4/2013 at 08:30 AM. Plaintiff failed to appear. Failure to appear at future hearings may result in dismissal for failure to prosecute. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
43 MINUTE entry before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendants' oral motion for an extension of time is granted. Defendants' response to the motion for class certification 41 shall be filed by 8/23/13. Reply by 9/6/13. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 07/24/2013)
44 RESPONSE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to certify class and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof 41 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiff's deposition, # 2 Exhibit Holmes deposition, # 3 Exhibit Interrogatory excerpt, # 4 Appendix Unpublished cases)(Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 08/23/2013)
45 NOTICE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart re response in opposition to motion, 44 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 08/23/2013)
46 REPLY by Plaintiff Brian Otero to response in opposition to motion, 44 , motion to certify class, 41 (Attachments: # 1 Appendix of Authorities Cited in Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification That are Only Published on an Electronic Database, # 2 Exhibit 1−6 to Appendix)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 09/06/2013)
47 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to compel Responses to Second Set of Discovery Requests (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−D)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 10/28/2013)
48 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion to compel 47 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 11/4/2013 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered:

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11/04/2013
12/16/2013 12/20/2013
12/20/2013 01/08/2014 01/08/2014 01/15/2014
01/15/2014 01/28/2014 01/28/2014 01/29/2014
01/30/2014
01/31/2014 02/11/2014

10/28/2013)
49 MINUTE entry before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Status hearing held on 11/4/2013 and continued to 12/16/2013 at 08:30 AM. Plaintiff's motion to compel 47 is denied as moot in light of defendants' agreement to produce the documents. Defendant shall answer the second set of document requests by 11/8/13. Defendants shall answer the second set of interrogatories by 11/18/13. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 11/04/2013)
50 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 12/16/2013 and continued to 1/15/2014 at 08:30 AM. Parties are directed to meet and confer regarding remaining discovery issues once the class certification ruling is issued. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 12/16/2013)
51 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: The Court denies Plaintiff's motion for class certification 41 with prejudice to the extent Plaintiff seeks to certify a class based on the alleged unreasonableness of the delay in releasing acquitted detainees from Cook County Jail, and without prejudice to the extent Plaintiff seeks to certify a class challenging one or more specific detention procedures applied to acquitted detainees held at Cook County Jail. [For further details, see separate Memorandum Opinion and Order.] Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
52 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 12/20/2013:Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
53 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero for leave to file Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit (Proposed Amended Complaint))(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 01/08/2014)
54 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion for leave to file 53 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 1/15/2014 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 01/08/2014)
55 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Status hearing held on 1/15/2014 and continued to 2/6/2014 at 08:30 AM. Plaintiff's motion for leave to file amended complaint 53 is granted. Counsel shall separately file the amended complaint upon receipt of this order. Defendants shall answer or otherwise plead by 2/5/14. Plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification shall be filed by 1/31/14. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/15/2014)
56 AMENDED complaint by Brian Otero against Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 01/15/2014)
57 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart for extension of time to file answer regarding amended complaint 56 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 01/28/2014)
58 NOTICE of Motion by Anthony E. Zecchin for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer, motion for relief 57 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 2/3/2014 at 08:30 AM. (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 01/28/2014)
59 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendants' motion for extension of time 57 is granted. Defendants shall answer or otherwise plead by 2/19/14. Status hearing set for 2/6/14 is stricken and reset to 2/24/14 at 8:30 a.m. No appearance is required on the 2/3/14 notice date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/29/2014)
60 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to certify class (Renewed) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Appendix of Authorities Cited in Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Class Certification That are Only Published on an Electronic Database, # 8 Exhibit 1−11 to Appendix)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 01/30/2014)
61 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification 60 is entered. Response by 2/21/14. Reply by 3/7/14. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/31/2014)
62 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion to certify class, 60 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 02/11/2014)

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02/11/2014 02/12/2014 02/19/2014 02/19/2014 02/24/2014
03/07/2014 03/07/2014 03/10/2014
03/20/2014 03/20/2014 03/21/2014 03/25/2014 03/26/2014
03/28/2014 04/07/2014 04/07/2014

63 NOTICE of Motion by Anthony E. Zecchin for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 62 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 2/18/2014 at 08:30 AM. (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 02/11/2014)
64 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time 62 is granted. Defendants' response to plaintiff's motion for class certification 60 shall be filed by 3/14/14. Reply by 4/4/14. No appearance is required on the 2/18/14 notice date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
65 ANSWER to amended complaint by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart(Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
66 NOTICE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart re answer to amended complaint 65 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
67 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 2/24/2014 and continued to 6/10/2014 at 08:30 AM. Defendants are given leave to file a response brief up to 25 pages. Parties are directed to meet and confer pursuant to Rule 26(f) and exhaust all settlement possibilities prior to the next status hearing. Parties are directed to contact the courtroom deputy, 312/435−5879, by 3/14/14 to inform the court whether or not there is interest in participating in a settlement conference. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/24/2014)
68 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion to certify class, 60 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 03/07/2014)
69 NOTICE of Motion by Anthony E. Zecchin for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 68 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 3/12/2014 at 01:30 PM. (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 03/07/2014)
70 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendants' motion for extension of time 68 is granted. Defendants' response to plaintiff's motion for class certification 60 shall be filed by 3/28/14. Reply by 4/25/14. Status hearing set for 6/10/14 is stricken and reset to 6/30/14 at 8:30 a.m. No appearance is required on the 3/12/14 notice date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 03/10/2014)
71 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to stay (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 03/20/2014)
72 NOTICE of Motion by Anthony E. Zecchin for presentment of motion to stay 71 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 3/25/2014 at 08:30 AM. (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 03/20/2014)
73 RESPONSE by Brian Oteroin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to stay 71 Class Certification (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 03/21/2014)
74 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Motion hearing held on 3/25/2014. Defendants' motion to stay class certification 71 is entered and taken under advisement. Defendants' response to plaintiff's motion for class certification 60 shall be filed by 4/10/14. Reply by 5/1/14. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 03/25/2014)
75 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendant's motion to stay class certification 71 is denied. The Court is not persuaded that Defendant needs the additional discovery to respond to the pending motion for class certification as opposed to addressing the merits of the underlying action. In addition, much of the noted discovery is in Defendant's possession.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
76 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart by Michael L. Gallagher (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
77 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart for leave to file excess pages (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 04/07/2014)
78 NOTICE of Motion by Anthony E. Zecchin for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 77 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 4/10/2014 at 08:30 AM. (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 04/07/2014)

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 9 of 24

04/07/2014
04/10/2014
04/10/2014 04/11/2014 04/16/2014 04/16/2014 04/17/2014 04/18/2014 04/28/2014 04/30/2014 06/30/2014 08/11/2014 09/02/2014
09/02/2014 09/03/2014
09/05/2014 09/16/2014 10/10/2014

79 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendants' motion for leave to file excess pages 77 is granted. Defendants are given leave to file a response brief of up to 40 pages to plaintiff's motion for class certification. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 04/07/2014)
80 RESPONSE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to certify class (Renewed) 60 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Interrogatory response, # 2 Exhibit Dep. of Holmes, # 3 Exhibit Luna declaration, # 4 Exhibit Giunta affidavit, # 5 Exhibit Patel declaration, # 6 Exhibit Jones declaration, # 7 Exhibit Dep. of Plainiff, # 8 Exhibit Plaintiff's convictions)(Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
81 NOTICE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart re response in opposition to motion, 80 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
82 APPENDIX of Unpublished Cases (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
83 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero for leave to file excess pages (Unopposed) (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 04/16/2014)
84 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 83 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 4/22/2014 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 04/16/2014)
85 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiff's motion for leave to file excess pages 83 is granted. No appearance is required on the 4/22/14 notice date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 04/17/2014)
86 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Brian Otero by Alexandra Leigh Nickow (Nickow, Alexandra) (Entered: 04/18/2014)
87 REPLY by Plaintiff Brian Otero to response in opposition to motion, 80 , motion to certify class, 60 (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 04/28/2014)
88 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Status hearing set for 6/30/14 is stricken and reset to 7/2/2014 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
89 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Status hearing set for 7/2/14 is stricken and reset to 8/13/2014 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
90 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Status hearing set for 8/13/14 is stricken and reset to 9/3/2014 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 08/11/2014)
91 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification 60 is granted with a modification of the class definition. [For further details, see separate Memorandum Opinion and Order.] Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 09/02/2014)
92 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 9/2/2014:Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 09/02/2014)
93 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 9/3/2014 and continued to 10/21/2014 at 08:30 AM. Fact discovery shall be completed by 1/9/15. Parties are directed to contact the courtroom deputy, 312/435−5879, by 9/23/14 to inform the court whether or not they are interested in participating in a settlement conference. Parties are directed to meet and confer pursuant to Rule 26(f) and exhaust all settlement possibilities prior to the next status hearing. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 09/03/2014)
94 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Status hearing set for 10/21/14 is stricken and reset to 10/24/2014 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
95 Defendant Dart's Rule 23(f) Petition for permission to appeal by Thomas J. Dart. (smm) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
96 CERTIFIED Copy of ORDER from USCA, 7th Circuit, Case no. 14−8024: 1. DEFENDANT DART'S RULE 23(f) PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL, filed on September 16, 2014, by counsel for the petitioner. 2. PLAINTIFF'S

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 10 of 24

10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/21/2014 10/24/2014
10/24/2014 12/08/2014 12/08/2014 12/11/2014 12/17/2014 01/06/2015
01/20/2015

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DART'S RULE 23(f) PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL, filed on September 29, 2014, by counsel for the respondent. IT IS ORDERED that the petition is DENIED. (sxw) (Entered: 10/14/2014)
97 MOTION by Petitioner Annette Bell to reassign case Bell v. Dart, 14−cv−8059 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
98 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to reassign case 97 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 10/24/2014 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
99 ATTORNEY Appearance for Petitioner Annette Bell by Kenneth N Flaxman (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
100 MOTION by Petitioner Annette Bell to reassign case [amended to attach complaint in 14−cv−8059] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
101 RESPONSE by Brian Oteroin Opposition to MOTION by Petitioner Annette Bell to reassign case [amended to attach complaint in 14−cv−8059] 100 (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
102 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Status hearing held on 10/24/2014 and continued to 12/11/2014 at 08:30 AM. Plaintiff Bell's motion for reassignment of related case 100 is denied for the reasons stated in open court. Defendants shall complete production regarding class members by 11/24/14. Parties are directed to meet and confer pursuant to Rule 26(f) and exhaust all settlement possibilities prior to the next status hearing. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
103 ORDER: Movant's motion for reassignment 100 having been denied, the Clerk's Office is directed to remove Petitioner Annette Bell and her counsel, Kenneth Flaxman, from the docket of this case. Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 10/24/2014. Mailed notice (sxw) (Entered: 10/27/2014)
104 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero for sanctions , MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to compel Court−Ordered Discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 12/08/2014)
105 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion for sanctions, motion to compel 104 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 12/11/2014 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 12/08/2014)
106 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 12/11/2014 and continued to 12/17/14 at 1:30 p.m. (as opposed to the 12/18/14 date given in open court). Plaintiff's motion to compel and for sanctions 104 is entered and continued to 12/17/14 at 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 12/11/2014)
107 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: At plaintiff's request, status hearing set for 12/17/14 is stricken and reset to 1/6/15 at 8:30 a.m. Plaintiff's motion to compel and for sanctions 104 is continued to 1/6/15 at 8:30 a.m. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 12/17/2014)
108 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Status hearing held on 1/6/2015 and continued to 1/20/2015 at 08:30 AM. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions and to compel 104 is denied as moot in light of the parties' agreement. Defendants shall produce the list of detainees by category by 1/9/15. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/06/2015)
109 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 1/20/2015 and continued to 3/18/2015 at 08:30 AM. Fact discovery cutoff is extended to 4/24/15. Burden of proof expert disclosures by 6/23/15. Rebuttal expert disclosures by 7/31/15. All expert discovery shall be completed by 9/4/15. Defendants' settlement offer shall be submitted to plaintiff by 2/3/15. By 2/17/15, parties shall meet in person to discuss settlement. Parties are directed to contact the courtroom deputy, 312/435−5879, by 2/20/15 to inform the court whether or not the parties are interested in participating in a settlement conference. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/20/2015)

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 11 of 24

02/12/2015 02/12/2015 02/17/2015 02/17/2015 02/18/2015 03/04/2015 03/04/2015 03/09/2015
03/18/2015
04/01/2015 04/16/2015 04/16/2015 04/23/2015
05/07/2015 05/07/2015 05/08/2015

110 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero for rule to show cause , MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to enforce the Courts January 20, 2015 Order (Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 02/12/2015)
111 NOTICE of Motion by Myron Milton Cherry for presentment of motion for rule to show cause, motion to enforce 110 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 2/18/2015 at 01:30 PM. (Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 02/12/2015)
112 RESPONSE by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to motion for rule to show cause, motion to enforce 110 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
113 NOTICE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart re Response 112 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
114 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiff's motion for rule to show cause and to enforce 110 is denied. No appearance is required on the 2/18/15 notice date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
115 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to Set Deadlines and to Order Defendants Compliance With Discovery Obligations (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 03/04/2015)
116 NOTICE of Motion by Myron Milton Cherry for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 115 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 3/9/2015 at 08:30 AM. (Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 03/04/2015)
117 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Motion hearing held on 3/9/2015. Plaintiff's motion to set deadlines and to order defendants' compliance 115 is granted without objection. Defendants shall identify Rule 20(b)(6) witnesses by 3/13/15. Parties shall meet and confer to resolve which additional release categories to include in the class lists by 3/13/15. Defendant shall comply with all outstanding discovery requests by 3/25/15. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
118 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 3/18/2015 and continued to 4/23/2015 at 08:30 AM. Any potentially dispositive motions, with supporting memoranda, shall be filed by 10/2/15. Parties are directed to meet and confer pursuant to Rule 26(f) and exhaust all settlement possibilities prior to the next status hearing. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 03/18/2015)
119 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart by Andrea Lynn Huff (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 04/01/2015)
120 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to Include Individuals Whose Charges Were Vacated Within the Class (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 04/16/2015)
121 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 120 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 4/23/2015 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 04/16/2015)
122 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 4/23/2015 and continued to 6/11/15 at 8:30 a.m. Plaintiff's motion to include individuals whose charges were vacated within the class 120 is entered. Response by 5/7/15. Reply by 5/14/15. Fact discovery cutoff is extended to 5/8/15. Burden of proof expert reports by 7/7/15. Rebuttal expert reports by 8/14/15. All expert discovery shall be completed by 9/18/15. Any potentially dispositive motions, with supporting memoranda, shall be filed by 10/16/15. Parties are directed to continue settlement discussions among themselves. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 04/23/2015)
123 RESPONSE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to Include Individuals Whose Charges Were Vacated Within the Class 120 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 05/07/2015)
124 NOTICE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart re response in opposition to motion 123 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 05/07/2015)
125 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to file instanter (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 05/08/2015)

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 12 of 24

05/08/2015 05/11/2015
05/11/2015 05/11/2015 05/13/2015 05/20/2015 05/20/2015 05/21/2015
06/03/2015
06/16/2015 06/16/2015 06/16/2015
06/25/2015 07/01/2015
07/10/2015

126 NOTICE of Motion by Anthony E. Zecchin for presentment of motion to file instanter 125 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 5/13/2015 at 01:00 PM. (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 05/08/2015)
127 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendants Dart and Cook County's motion for leave to file their correct response to plaintiff's motion to include individuals whose charges were vacated within the class instanter 125 is granted. No appearance is required on the 5/13/15 notice date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 05/11/2015)
128 RESPONSE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to Include Individuals Whose Charges Were Vacated Within the Class 120 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 05/11/2015)
129 NOTICE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart re response to motion 128 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 05/11/2015)
130 REPLY by Brian Otero to MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to Include Individuals Whose Charges Were Vacated Within the Class 120 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−C)(Nickow, Alexandra) (Entered: 05/13/2015)
131 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart for leave to file sur−reply (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 05/20/2015)
132 NOTICE of Motion by Anthony E. Zecchin for presentment of motion for leave to file 131 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 5/26/2015 at 08:30 AM. (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 05/20/2015)
133 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendants' motion for leave to file sur−reply 131 is denied without prejudice. Defendants' alternative motion for a status hearing 131 is granted. Status hearing set for 6/3/15 at 1:00 p.m. Parties are ordered to meet and confer IN PERSON regarding the issue of "Vacated" before coming in for the status hearing. No appearance is required on the 5/26/15 notice date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
134 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Motion hearing held on 6/3/2015. Plaintiff's motion to include individuals whose charges were vacated within the class 120 is granted in part as stated in open court. Defendants must make "vacated" documents available by 6/24/15. Status hearing set for 6/11/15 is stricken and reset to 6/26/15 at 8:30 a.m. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 06/03/2015)
135 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiff Brian Otero to withdraw as attorney (Nickow, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/16/2015)
136 NOTICE of Motion by Alexandra Leigh Nickow for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 135 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 6/25/2015 at 08:30 AM. (Nickow, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/16/2015)
137 ORDER: Motion for leave to withdraw as counsel 135 is granted. Alexandra Nickow is given leave to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff. The Clerk's Office is directed to remove her from the service list. Notice motion date of 6/25/15 is stricken. Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 6/16/2015. Mailed notice. (as, ) (Entered: 06/17/2015)
138 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: At defendants' unopposed request, Status hearing set for 6/26/15 is stricken and reset to 7/1/2015 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 06/25/2015)
139 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 7/1/2015 and continued to 9/10/2015 at 08:30 AM. Fact discovery cutoff is extended to 7/24/15. Burden of proof expert disclosures by 8/7/15. Rebuttal expert disclosures by 9/4/15. All expert discovery shall be completed by 10/2/15. Any potentially dispositive motion, with supporting memorandum, shall be filed by 10/30/15. Parties are directed to meet and confer in person pursuant to Rule 26(f) and exhaust all settlement possibilities prior to 8/28/15. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
140 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to compel Discovery and Deposition (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 07/10/2015)

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 13 of 24

07/10/2015 07/15/2015
07/21/2015 07/21/2015 07/23/2015 07/24/2015 08/06/2015 08/06/2015 08/06/2015 08/11/2015 08/13/2015
08/24/2015 08/25/2015 08/26/2015

141 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion to compel 140 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 7/15/2015 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 07/10/2015)
142 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Motion hearing held on 7/15/15. Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery and deposition 140 is granted in part, denied in part and entered and continued as to the last category in the motion. Spt. Johnsen's deposition shall take place on 7/22/15 at 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff's request for reports contained in category b of the motion to compel is denied. Defendants shall produce the items contained in category c of the motion by 7/21/15. Defendants' response to inmate data (category d) shall be filed by 7/21/15. Reply by 7/24/15. Status hearing set for 8/6/15 at 1:30 p.m. The parties are reminded of their requirement to attempt in good faith to work out discovery issues in advance. Defendant is directed to respond to Plaintiff's inquiries in advance of coming into court. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 07/15/2015)
143 RESPONSE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to compel Discovery and Deposition 140 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 07/21/2015)
144 NOTICE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart re response in opposition to motion 143 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 07/21/2015)
145 REPLY by Plaintiff Brian Otero to motion to compel 140 , response in opposition to motion 143 (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 07/23/2015)
146 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 7/24/2015: The Court, in its discretion, grants Plaintiff's motion to compel regarding inmate data 140 . [For further details, see Order.] Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 07/24/2015)
147 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero for rule to show cause for Defendants' Violation of the Court's July 24, 2015 Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−B)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 08/06/2015)
148 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion for rule to show cause 147 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 8/11/2015 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 08/06/2015)
149 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 8/6/2015. Burden of proof expert disclosures by 8/13/15. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 08/06/2015)
150 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Motion hearing held on 8/11/2015. Plaintiff's motion for rule to show cause 147 is entered and continued to 8/13/15 at 8:30 a.m. Defendants shall produce one more month of incident reports (April of 2013). Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 08/11/2015)
151 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Motion hearing on plaintiff's motion for rule to show cause 147 held on 8/13/15 and continued to 8/26/15 at 9:15 a.m. Defendants shall produce courthouse holding cell incident reports for the Cook County Jail located at 26th and California for all incidents involving 1) inmate on inmate violence and 2) use of force for the months of 9/12, 3/11, 7/11, 3/12, 6/13, 8/14, 3/15, 4/13, 1/13 and 11/11. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 08/14/2015)
152 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Brian Otero by Dario Dzananovic (Dzananovic, Dario) (Entered: 08/24/2015)
153 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Motion hearing on plaintiff's motion for rule to show cause 147 set for 8/26/15 is reset from 9:15 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 08/25/2015)
154 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Motion hearing held on 8/26/2015. Plaintiff's continued motion for rule to show cause 147 is denied. Parties' agreed expert deposition schedule shall be filed by 9/1/15. Rebuttal expert disclosures by 9/11/15. All expert discovery shall be completed by 10/2/15. Any potentially dispositive motion, with supporting memorandum, shall be filed by 10/30/15. Status hearing set for 9/10/15 is stricken and reset to 11/3/15 at 8:30 a.m. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 08/26/2015)

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 14 of 24

09/01/2015 09/01/2015 09/01/2015 09/01/2015 09/02/2015 09/03/2015
09/03/2015 09/04/2015
09/08/2015 09/11/2015

155 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to strike and Exclude Defendants Expert Witness and to Strike Expert Report of Gary W. DeLand (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−G)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
156 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion to strike 155 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 9/3/2015 at 08:00 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
157 MOTION by Attorney Michael L. Gallagher to withdraw as attorney for Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart. No party information provided (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
158 NOTICE of Motion by Anthony E. Zecchin for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 157 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 9/9/2015 at 01:00 PM. (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
159 ORDER: Motion to withdraw as counsel 157 is granted. Michael Gallagher is given leave to withdraw his appearance on behalf of defendants. Notice motion date of 9/9/15 is stricken. Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 9/2/2015. Mailed notice (lf, ) (Entered: 09/03/2015)
160 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Motion hearing held on 9/3/15. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and Exclude Defendants' Expert Witness and to Strike Expert Report of Gary W. DeLand 155 is granted in part, denied in part, and entered and continued to 9/4/15 at 9:00 a.m. The Court directs Defendants to identify the earliest date that Mr. DeLand is available for a deposition by no later than 9/4/15 at 9:00 a.m. The Court orders Defendants to produce Mr. DeLand on a weekday in Chicago at Defendants' cost. Mr. DeLand is prohibited from supplementing his expert report of August 4, 2015 with opinions outside those disclosed in his report and from testifying about additional bases for his opinions that he did not disclose. Mr. DeLand is also prevented from relying on any information that Defendants have not disclosed, as of 9/3/15, as a basis for Mr. DeLand's opinions. The Court denies Plaintiff's motion as to the request to strike Mr. DeLands Expert Report without prejudice. The Court further directs the parties to depose Plaintiff's expert Dr. Jeffrey A. Schwartz (Plaintiff's liability expert) on 10/1/15 and Dr. Harvey Rosen (Plaintiff's damage expert) on 9/29/15. These depositions must occur on the specified dates and cannot be rescheduled without a Court order. The dispositive motion deadline of 10/30/15 stands. The parties are reminded of their professional obligations and of the requirement to attempt in good faith to work out discovery issues in advance.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 09/03/2015)
163 DECLARATION of Gary Deland (jc, ) (Entered: 09/11/2015)
161 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Motion hearing held on 9/4/15. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and Exclude Defendants' Expert Witness and to Strike Expert Report of Gary W. DeLand 155 is denied as to the request to preclude Mr. DeLand's deposition. Defendants shall produce Mr. DeLand for a deposition on 10/20/15 and Defendants bear all associated costs. Mr. DeLand's deposition will occur at a Chicago location of Plaintiff's choice. Defendants bear all costs associated with immediate delivery of an expedited deposition transcript to Plaintiff. Mr. DeLand's deposition must occur by 10/20/15 to avoid the Court striking his report and precluding him from testifying in this case. Plaintiff is awarded costs and fees related to the filing of his motion 155 and is directed to file its motion for costs by 9/14/15. Plaintiff declined an extension for his summary judgment motion. Accordingly, all dispositive motions are due by 10/30/15. Further, all expert challenges under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) are due on or before 11/6/15. No further extensions as stated in open court. Status hearing remains set for 11/3/15 at 8:30 a.m.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 09/04/2015)
162 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Jury Trial (2 weeks) set for 3/7/2016 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
164 PETITION for Fees in Connection with the Courts September 4, 2015 Order (Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 09/11/2015)

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 15 of 24

09/14/2015 09/18/2015 09/18/2015 09/22/2015 09/28/2015 09/28/2015 09/29/2015 09/29/2015 10/15/2015 10/15/2015 10/20/2015 10/20/2015
10/26/2015 10/26/2015 10/27/2015
10/30/2015

165 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiff's petition for fees 164 is entered. Any response/objections shall be filed by 9/18/15. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 09/14/2015)
166 RESPONSE by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to petition 164 (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 09/18/2015)
167 NOTICE by All Defendants re Response 166 (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 09/18/2015)
168 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 9/22/2015: The Court sustains Defendants objections to the fee petition in part and overrules them in part. Plaintiff is hereby awarded $3,425 in fees. Defendant must pay this amount on or before October 16, 2015. [For further details, see Order.] Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 09/22/2015)
169 MOTION by Attorney James C. Pullos to withdraw as attorney for Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart. No party information provided (Pullos, James) (Entered: 09/28/2015)
170 NOTICE of Motion by James Charles Pullos for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 169 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 10/1/2015 at 08:30 AM. (Pullos, James) (Entered: 09/28/2015)
171 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Final pretrial order and agreed jury instructions shall be filed by 1/8/16. Motions in limine shall be filed by 1/8/16. Responses to motions in limine shall be filed by 1/22/16. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
172 ORDER: Motion to withdraw as counsel 169 is granted. James Pullos is given leave to withdraw as counsel for defendants. Notice motion date of 10/1/15 is stricken. Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 9/29/2015. Mailed notice. (kp, ) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
173 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to vacate order, 168 Awarding Fees to Plaintiff, MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to strike order, 168 Awarding Fees to Plaintiff (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 10/15/2015)
174 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion to vacate, motion to strike, motion for relief, 173 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 10/20/2015 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 10/15/2015)
176 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Having been entered in error, doc. 175 is stricken. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 10/20/2015)
177 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Motion hearing held on 10/20/15. Plaintiff's unopposed motion to vacate and strike 9/22/15 order awarding fees to plaintiff 173 is granted in part. The Court vacates the 9/22/15 award of fees to plaintiff. The Court will consider striking the 9/22/15 order at the completion of this case if Mr. Zolna can conduct himself professionally through the remainder of the proceedings. Parties are given leave to file oversized briefs, up to 35 pages, and 100 statements of facts in support of their summary judgment motions. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 10/20/2015)
178 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero for extension of time to file Summary Judgment and Daubert motions (Joint) (Dzananovic, Dario) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
179 NOTICE of Motion by Dario Dzananovic for presentment of extension of time 178 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 10/29/2015 at 08:30 AM. (Dzananovic, Dario) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
180 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: The Court denies Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to file summary judgment and Daubert motions 178 . As stated in open court on 9/4/15, all dispositive motions are due by 10/30/15 and all expert challenges under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert are due on or before 11/6/15. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
181 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero for summary judgment (Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 10/30/2015)

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 16 of 24

10/30/2015 10/30/2015 10/30/2015 10/30/2015
10/30/2015 10/30/2015 11/03/2015 11/03/2015
11/05/2015
11/06/2015 11/06/2015 11/06/2015 11/06/2015 11/10/2015

182 Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts STATEMENT by Brian Otero in Support of His Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−E, # 2 Exhibit F−J, # 3 Exhibit K−P, # 4 Exhibit Q, # 5 Exhibit R−DD)(Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
183 NOTICE of Motion by Myron Milton Cherry for presentment of motion for summary judgment 181 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 11/3/2015 at 08:30 AM. (Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
184 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart for summary judgment (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
185 RULE 56.1(a)(3) Statement by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart regarding motion for summary judgment 184 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amended Complaint, # 2 Errata Otero deposition, # 3 Exhibit Queen declaration, # 4 Exhibit Giunta deposition, # 5 Exhibit Giunta declaration, # 6 Exhibit Johnsen deposition, # 7 Exhibit Luna declaration, # 8 Exhibit McGee deposition, # 9 Exhibit Holmes deposition, # 10 Exhibit King deposition, # 11 Exhibit LoPresti deposition)(Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
186 MEMORANDUM by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart in support of motion for summary judgment 184 (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
187 NOTICE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart re Rule 56 statement,, 185 , memorandum in support of motion 186 , MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart for summary judgment 184 (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
188 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Honorable Michael T. Mason for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: settlement conference.(kef, )Mailed notice. (Entered: 11/03/2015)
189 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 11/3/2015 and continued to 2/4/16 at 8:30 a.m. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment 181 and defendants' motion for summary judgment 184 are entered. Responses by 12/4/15. Replies by 12/23/15. Final pretrial order and jury instructions shall be filed by 1/29/16. Motion in limine deadline remains set for 1/8/16. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 11/03/2015)
190 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Michael T. Mason:This case has been referred to Magistrate Judge Mason to conduct a settlement conference. Status hearing set for 11/10/2015 at 09:00 a.m. in courtroom 2266. Counsel shall contact the courtroom deputy, (312) 435−6051 prior to 11/10/15 to obtain the Court's available settlement conference dates. (rbf, ) (Entered: 11/05/2015)
191 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to bar Partial Opinion to Dr. Rosen (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Rosen declaration, # 2 Exhibit Rosen deposition)(Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
192 NOTICE of Motion by Andrea Lynn Huff for presentment of motion to bar 191 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 11/12/2015 at 08:30 AM. (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
193 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to bar Testimony of Defendants Expert Witness , MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to strike the Expert Reports of Gary W. DeLand (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−B, # 2 Exhibit C, # 3 Exhibit D−G)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
194 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion to bar,, motion to strike, 193 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 11/12/2015 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
195 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Michael T. Mason:Status hearing held. Defendants' counsel reported they are unavailable for a settlement conference in December. Settlement conference set for 1/21/16 at 1:30 p.m. in courtroom 2266. Parties shall strictly abide by this Court's Standing Order for settlement conference. Plaintiff's counsel shall submit copies of both plaintiff's settlement demand letter as well as defendants' response letter to chambers, room 2270, by 1/18/16. (rbf, )

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 17 of 24

11/12/2015
11/16/2015 12/04/2015 12/04/2015 12/04/2015 12/04/2015
12/04/2015 12/04/2015 12/11/2015 12/11/2015 12/11/2015 12/17/2015 12/17/2015 12/22/2015 12/22/2015

(Entered: 11/10/2015)
196 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Motion hearing held on 11/12/2015. Defendant's motion to bar 191 and Plaintiff's motion to strike 193 are entered. Responses to both motions are due by 12/11/15; Replies are due by 12/23/15. Plaintiff's oral motion to submit up to 35 pages in his response to the pending summary judgment motion is granted. Defendant may also have up to 35 pages in its response to the pending summary judgment motion. Replies for the pending summary judgment motions may be up to 20 pages. The revised class list shall be turned over by 1/8/2016. Status hearing set for 2/4/2016 to stand. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
197 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Daubert hearing on defendants' motion to bar 191 set for 2/5/2016 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 11/16/2015)
198 56.1 Statement of Additional Material Facts in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment STATEMENT by Brian Otero (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−D, # 2 Exhibit E−K, # 3 Exhibit L−X)(Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
199 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Brian Otero to Rule 56 statement,, 185 of Material Facts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−G)(Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
200 RESPONSE by Brian Oteroin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart for summary judgment 184 (Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
201 RESPONSE by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to statement, 182 to Plaintiff's 56.1 and Additional Facts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit Queen declaration, # 3 Exhibit Giunta deposition, # 4 Exhibit Giunta declaration, # 5 Exhibit Johnsen deposition, # 6 Exhibit McGee deposition, # 7 Exhibit King deposition, # 8 Exhibit Homes deposition)(Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
202 RESPONSE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero for summary judgment 181 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
203 NOTICE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart re response in opposition to motion 202 , Response, 201 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
204 RESPONSE by Brian Oteroin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to bar Partial Opinion to Dr. Rosen 191 (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 12/11/2015)
205 RESPONSE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to bar Testimony of Defendants Expert Witness MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to strike the Expert Reports of Gary W. DeLand 193 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Rosen report)(Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 12/11/2015)
206 NOTICE by All Defendants re response in opposition to motion, 205 (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 12/11/2015)
207 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Plaintiff must file on the docket a legible copy of the entire July 22, 2015 deposition transcript of Superintendent Jeff Johnsen by no later than December 21, 2015.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 12/17/2015)
208 July 22, 2015 Deposition Transcript of Superintendent Jeff Johnsen by Brian Otero (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit July 22, 2015 Deposition Transcript of Superintendent Jeff Johnsen, # 2 Exhibit Exhibits to July 22, 2015 Deposition Transcript of Superintendent Jeff Johnsen)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 12/17/2015)
209 MOTION by Attorney Dario Dzananovic to withdraw as attorney for Brian Otero. No party information provided (Dzananovic, Dario) (Entered: 12/22/2015)
210 NOTICE of Motion by Dario Dzananovic for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 209 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 1/5/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Dzananovic, Dario) (Entered: 12/22/2015)

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 18 of 24

12/22/2015
12/23/2015 12/23/2015 12/23/2015 12/23/2015 12/23/2015 12/23/2015 12/23/2015 12/23/2015 01/05/2016 01/06/2016 01/06/2016 01/07/2016
01/07/2016 01/08/2016 01/08/2016 01/08/2016 01/08/2016 01/08/2016 01/14/2016

211 ORDER: Motion for leave to withdraw as counsel 209 is granted. Dario Dzananovic is given leave to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff. Notice motion date of 1/5/16 is stricken. Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 12/22/2015. Mailed notice (aee, ) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
212 REPLY by Plaintiff Brian Otero to motion to bar,, motion to strike, 193 , response in opposition to motion, 205 to Strike and Exclude Defendants Expert Witness and to Strike the Expert Reports of Gary W. DeLand (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
213 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Brian Otero to Response, 201 to Defendants Statement of Additional Facts (Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
214 REPLY by Plaintiff Brian Otero to motion for summary judgment 181 , response in opposition to motion 202 in Further Support of His Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−D)(Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
215 REPLY by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to response in opposition to motion 204 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
216 NOTICE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart re reply to response to motion 215 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
217 REPLY by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to reply to response to motion 215 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
218 RESPONSE by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to statement 198 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
219 NOTICE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart re reply to response to motion 217 , Response 218 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
220 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Daubert hearing for Defendant's expert witness Gary DeLand set for 2/22/2016 at 01:00 PM.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/05/2016)
221 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to Approve Class Notice (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Class Notice)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 01/06/2016)
222 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 221 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 1/14/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 01/06/2016)
223 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment 184 and denies Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment 181 . [For further details, see separate Memorandum Opinion and Order.] Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/07/2016)
224 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 1/7/2016:Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 01/07/2016)
225 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Brian Otero by Craig S. Mielke (Mielke, Craig) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
226 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Oteroin limine to Exclude His Past Criminal History (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
227 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion in limine 226 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 1/14/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
228 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dartin limine 1−9 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures, # 2 Exhibit Interrogatory Answers)(Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
229 NOTICE of Motion by Andrea Lynn Huff for presentment of motion in limine 228 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 1/14/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
230 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Motion hearing held on 1/14/2016. Plaintiff's unopposed motion to approve class notice 221 is granted.

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 19 of 24

01/21/2016 01/21/2016 01/22/2016
01/22/2016 01/22/2016 01/25/2016 01/25/2016
01/25/2016 01/26/2016 01/26/2016 01/27/2016
01/29/2016 01/29/2016

Defendants shall turn over the list of class members by 1/20/16. Status hearing set for 1/22/2016 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/14/2016)
231 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart by John M. Power (Power, John) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
232 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Michael T. Mason:Settlement conference held. Status hearing scheduled for 1/28/16 at 9:00 a.m. at which time parties are to provide a status on continued settlement discussions. (rbf, ) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
233 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 1/22/2016. Final Pretrial Conference and Jury Instruction Conference set for 3/1/2016 at 10:30 AM. All counsel trying the case should be present on 3/1/16. Status hearing set for 2/4/16 is stricken. Exhibits for the Rosen Daubert hearing shall be submitted by 2/1/16. Exhibits for the DeLand Daubert Hearing shall be submitted by 2/15/16. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
234 RESPONSE by Brian Oteroin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dartin limine 1−9 228 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−D)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
235 RESPONSE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart to MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Oteroin limine to Exclude His Past Criminal History 226 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Power, John) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
236 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: The Court grants Defendants' motion in limine #4 barring all non−party witnesses from the courtroom for opening statements and during trial testimony as unopposed. Defendants should identify on or before February 29, 2016 who will be their representative at trial. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/25/2016)
237 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: The Court, in its discretion, grants Defendants' motion in limine # 5 because statements regarding "sending a message" implicate punitive damages, which Plaintiff cannot recover from Defendants. See 745 ILCS 10/2102; Betts v. City of Chicago, 784 F.Supp.2d 1020, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Christmas v. City of Chicago, 691 F.Supp.2d 811, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2010).Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 01/25/2016)
238 REPLY by Plaintiff Brian Otero to motion in limine 226 to Exclude His Past Criminal History (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 01/25/2016)
239 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 1/26/2016: The Court, in its discretion, denies Defendants' motions in limine #1 and #6 and grants in part Defendants' motion in limine #3. [For further details, see Order.] Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 01/26/2016)
240 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 1/26/2016: The Court, in its discretion, grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion in limine #2 and grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff's motion in limine #1 226 . [For further details, see Order.] Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 01/26/2016)
241 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Michael T. Mason: Counsel jointly contacted this Court and reported that they were unable to reach a settlement agreement and did not feel that further settlement discussions would be fruitful at this time. Accordingly, the 1/28/16 status hearing is stricken; no appearance is necessary on that date. All matters relating to the referral of this case having been completed, the referral is closed and the case is returned to the assigned judge. Judge Michael T. Mason no longer referred to the case. (rbf, ) (Entered: 01/27/2016)
242 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to bar Defendants from modifying Plaintiffs proposed final pre−trial order and jury instructions and for other relief (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiff's Proposed Final Pre−Trial Order, # 2 Exhibit Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instructions)(Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 01/29/2016)
243 NOTICE of Motion by Myron Milton Cherry for presentment of motion to bar, 242 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 2/2/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 01/29/2016)

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 20 of 24

01/29/2016 01/29/2016 01/30/2016 02/01/2016
02/01/2016 02/01/2016 02/02/2016 02/02/2016
02/02/2016 02/03/2016 02/03/2016 02/03/2016 02/03/2016 02/03/2016
02/04/2016

244 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart for extension of time to file Final Pretrial Order (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 01/29/2016)
245 NOTICE of Motion by Andrea Lynn Huff for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 244 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 2/2/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 01/29/2016)
246 Exhibits to Deft. Motion for Extension PTO by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Pltf proposed jury instrucitons, # 2 Exhibit Defendants' proposed jury instructions)(Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 01/30/2016)
247 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendants' motion for extension of time 244 is granted and plaintiff's motion to bar 242 is denied. The parties are directed to meet and confer and file their JOINT Final Pretrial Order on or before 2/2/12. No appearance is required on the 2/2/16 notice motion date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/01/2016)
248 STATUS Report (JOINT) by Brian Otero (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Expert Report of Dr. Harvey S. Rosen, # 2 Exhibit Deposition of Dr. Harvey S. Rosen)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 02/01/2016)
249 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Daubert hearing as to Dr. Rosen set for 2/5/16 is reset from 9:00 a.m. to 8:45 a.m. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/01/2016)
250 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 2/2/2016: The Court, in its discretion, grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion in limine #8 and Defendants' motion in limine #9. [For further details, see Order.] Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 02/02/2016)
251 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Defendants must file a sur−reply to Plaintiff's motion to strike and exclude Defendants' expert witness Gary W. DeLand 193 specifically addressing Plaintiff's arguments, including (1) Plaintiff's assertion that portions of Mr. DeLand's opinions are actually undisputed facts, (2) explaining what Mr. DeLand relied upon in formulating each opinion, and (3) why certain opinions expressed by Mr. DeLand are not subjective. Defendants' sur−reply is due on or before 2/12/16. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/02/2016)
252 PROPOSED Pretrial Order (with Exhibits A−E) (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 02/02/2016)
253 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to withdraw the Portion of Dr. Harvey Rosens Expert Report Without Prejudice to Plaintiffs Ability to Seek These Damages at Trial, MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to strike the February 5, 2016 Daubert Hearing (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 02/03/2016)
254 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion to withdraw,, motion to strike, 253 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 2/4/2016 at 01:30 PM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 02/03/2016)
255 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero for reconsideration regarding order, 250 on Defendants Motion In Limine No. 8 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−F)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 02/03/2016)
256 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion for reconsideration, motion for relief 255 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 2/9/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 02/03/2016)
257 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 2/3/2016: The Court, in its discretion, grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion in limine #7. 228 . Plaintiff's sur−reply to Defendants' motion in limine #7 as discussed in this order is due on 2/12/16. Plaintiff's deposition designations are due on or before 2/15/16. Along with the deposition designations, Plaintiff must explain why each witness is unavailable under Rule 32(a)(4), as explained in this ruling. Defendants' objections to Plaintiff's deposition designations are due on or before 2/22/16. [For further details, see Order.] Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 02/03/2016)
258 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Motion hearing held on 2/4/2016. Plaintiff's unopposed motion to withdraw the portion of Dr. Rosen's expert report pertaining to the survey of loss of liberty damages without prejudice to

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 21 of 24

02/08/2016 02/08/2016 02/08/2016 02/10/2016 02/10/2016 02/10/2016
02/12/2016 02/15/2016
02/16/2016 02/16/2016

plaintiff's ability to seek these damages at trial and to strike the 2/5/16 Daubert hearing 253 is granted. Defendants' motion to bar partial opinion to Dr. Rosen 191 is denied as moot and the 2/5/16 Daubert hearing is stricken. Plaintiff's motion regarding loss of liberty damages shall be filed by 2/11/16. Response by 2/18/16. Defendants' memorandum in support regarding the causation issue, as stated in open court, shall be filed by 2/11/16. Plaintiff's motion to reconsider 255 is denied without prejudice. Plaintiff is directed to address the issue in his Rule 404(b) motion which shall be filed on 2/12/16. Response by 2/19/16. Defendants' motion to strike defendant Dart from plaintiff's witness list shall be filed by 2/8/16. Response by 2/12/16. Notice motion date of 2/9/16 is stricken. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/04/2016)
259 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dartin limine No. 10 (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 02/08/2016)
260 NOTICE by Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart re MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dartin limine No. 10 259 (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 02/08/2016)
261 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 2/8/2016 and continued to 2/10/2016 at 01:30 PM.Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/08/2016)
262 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart by Stacy Ann Benjamin (Benjamin, Stacy) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
263 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dart by John Joseph Rock (Rock, John) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
264 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Status hearing held on 2/10/16. Settlement conference set for 2/18/16 at 3:00 p.m. Someone with settlement authority from the Sheriff's Office must be present. Parties are ordered to meet and confer in person before the settlement conference. Defendant's sur−reply to Plaintiff's motion to strike 193 shall be filed by noon on 2/19/16. Plaintiff's sur−reply to Defendants' motion in limine #7 shall be filed on 2/19/16. Plaintiff's motion regarding loss of liberty damages shall be filed by 2/19/16. Response by 2/26/16. Plaintiff's Rule 404(b) motion shall be filed on 2/19/16. Response by 2/26/16. Plaintiff's response to defendants' motion in limine no. 10 259 shall be filed on 2/19/16. Plaintiff's deposition designations are due on or before 2/22/16. Along with the deposition designations, Plaintiff must explain why each witness is unavailable under Rule 32(a)(4). Defendants' objections to Plaintiff's deposition designations are due on or before 2/29/16. Jury trial date of 3/7/16 stands. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/11/2016)
265 RESPONSE by Brian Oteroin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Cook County Illinois, Thomas J. Dartin limine No. 10 259 (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
266 STATUS Report (Joint) for February 22, 2016 Daubert Hearing by Brian Otero (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Initial Expert Report of Gary W. DeLand, # 2 Exhibit Rebuttal Report of Gary W. DeLand, # 3 Exhibit Declaration of Gary DeLand, # 4 Exhibit Deposition of Gary DeLand (1 of 2), # 5 Exhibit Deposition of Gary DeLand (2 of 2))(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 02/15/2016)
267 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Settlement Conference set for 2/18/2016 is reset from 3:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/16/2016)
268 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 2/8/16 before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve. Court Reporter Contact Information: Joseph Rickhoff, 312−435−5562, joseph_rickhoff@ilnd.uscourts.gov. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 3/8/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/18/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/16/2016. (Rickhoff, Joseph) (Entered: 02/16/2016)

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 22 of 24

02/16/2016
02/18/2016 02/18/2016
03/17/2016 03/25/2016 03/25/2016 04/04/2016
05/27/2016 06/16/2016 06/17/2016 06/22/2016 07/06/2016 07/15/2016 07/20/2016 07/20/2016 08/08/2016

269 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 2/10/16 before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve. Court Reporter Contact Information: Joseph Rickhoff, 312−435−5562, joseph_rickhoff@ilnd.uscourts.gov. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 3/8/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/18/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/16/2016. (Rickhoff, Joseph) (Entered: 02/16/2016)
270 SUR−REPLY by Plaintiff Brian Otero to motion in limine 228 No. 7 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−C, # 2 Exhibit D−H, # 3 Exhibit I−Y)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 02/18/2016)
271 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Settlement conference held on 2/18/16. Case settled subject to approval as noted on the record. In light of the settlement, the Court strikes the 3/1/16 final pretrial conference, the 3/7/16 trial date and the 2/22/16 Daubert hearing. The Court denies all pending motions as moot in light of the settlement and strikes all deadlines for supplemental filings. Status hearing set for 3/17/16 at 8:30 a.m. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/19/2016)
272 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 3/17/2016 and continued to 4/4/2016 at 08:30 AM. Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval shall be filed by 3/24/16. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 03/17/2016)
273 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
274 NOTICE of Motion by Myron Milton Cherry for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 273 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 4/4/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
275 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve:Status hearing held on 4/4/2016. Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement 273 is granted without objection. The Court grants preliminary approval of the settlement, award of attorneys fees and costs and the named Plaintiff's incentive award. Notice and claim form shall be sent out in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. A final approval hearing is set for 8/11/16 at 8:30 a.m. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
276 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero for attorney fees and Cost and Incentive Award (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H)(Cherry, Myron) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
277 OBJECTION by Lloyd Dearmond. (nsf, ) (Entered: 06/20/2016)
278 MOTION by Unknown Larry Oruta For Objections To Class Settlement. (nsf, ) (Entered: 06/20/2016)
279 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Responses to objections 277 278 shall be filed by 7/8/16. Responses to any future objections shall be filed two weeks after the objections are docketed. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 06/22/2016)
280 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Brian Otero to motion for miscellaneous relief 278 , objections 277 to Class Action Settlement (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 07/06/2016)
281 OBJECTION to the amount granted by plaintiff counsel. (mc, ) (Entered: 07/18/2016)
282 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−F)(Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 07/20/2016)
283 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 282 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 8/11/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 07/20/2016)
284 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 8/8/2016: The Court denies both motions objecting to the proposed class action settlement. 277 278 . [For further

Case: 1:12-cv-3148 As of: 08/29/2017 09:39 PM CDT 23 of 24

08/11/2016
08/11/2016 08/11/2016 08/11/2016 08/11/2016 08/12/2016 08/12/2016 08/15/2016 08/15/2016 08/17/2016 08/17/2016 08/30/2016 08/30/2016 08/31/2016 08/31/2016 08/31/2016
11/02/2016
11/09/2016 11/09/2016

details, see Order.] Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 08/08/2016)
285 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Final approval hearing held on 8/11/16. Plaintiff's petition for attorneys' fees and costs and incentive award 276 and motion for final approval of class action settlement 282 are granted. This case is hereby dismissed with prejudice. All pending dates and deadlines are stricken. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 08/11/2016)
286 ORDER Granting Final Approval & Dismissal of Lawsuit Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 8/11/2016:Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 08/11/2016)
287 NOTICE of appeal by Larry Oruta regarding orders 286 , 284 , 285 . (FEE DUE) (smm) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
288 DOCKETING Statement by Larry Oruta regarding notice of appeal 287 . (smm) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
289 MOTION by Unknown Larry Orutato waive fees pursuant Fed.R. 24, Court having waived fees as indigent previously. (smm) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
290 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record regarding notice of appeal 287 . (smm) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
291 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 287 . Notified counsel (smm) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
294 ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 287 ; USCA Case No. 16−3169 (tg, ) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
295 CIRCUIT Rule 3(b) Fee Notice (tg, ) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
292 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 8/17/2016: The Court denies Larry Oruta's second objection 281 . [For further details, see Order.] Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
293 Motion 289 is denied; ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 8/17/2016: The Court denies Larry Oruta's motion to waive fees 289 . [For further details, see Order.] Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
296 NOTICE to Transmit Record on Appeal regarding notice of appeal 287 ; USCA Case No. 16−3169. (eg,) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
297 CIRCUIT RULE 3(b) FEE NOTICE. (eg,) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
298 CERTIFIED and transmitted to the USCA for the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal 287 (USCA no. 16−3169). (smm) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
299 USCA RECEIVED on 8/31/16 the long record regarding notice of appeal 287 . (smm) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
300 ORDER dated 8/30/2016 from the 7th Circuit regarding notice of appeal 287 ; Appellate case no. : 16−3169. Upon consideration of the MOTION TO STAY CLASS SETTLEMENT JUDGMENT ORDER, filed on August 19, 2016, by the pro se appellant, IT IS ORDERED that appellant's motion to stay the class settlement judgment order is DENIED. (sxn, ) Modified on 9/2/2016 (sxn, ). (Entered: 09/01/2016)
301 ORDER dated 11/2/2016 from the 7th Circuit regarding notice of appeal 287 ; Appellate case no. : 16−3169: Upon consideration of the PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW ANY FURTHER EXTENSIONS OF TIME FOR OBJECTOR TO PAY APPELLATE FILING FEE, filed on November 1, 2016, by counsel for the plaintiffs, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED to the extent that no further extensions of time to pay the filing fee will be allowed. (kp, ) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
302 STATUS Report by Thomas J. Dart (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
303 NOTICE by Thomas J. Dart re status report 302 (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 11/09/2016)

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307 LETTER from Jeffrey Levin dated 10/30/2016. (sxn, ) (Entered: 11/28/2016)
304 MANDATE of USCA dated 11/15/2016 regarding notice of appeal 287 ;USCA No.16−3169 ; No record to be returned. (sxn, ) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
305 CERTIFIED copy of order dated 11/15/2016 from the 7th Circuit regarding notice of appeal 287 ; Appellate case no. : 16−3169. IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss appeal is GRANTED. This appeal is DISMISSED for failure to prosecute pursuant to Circuit Rule 3(b). (sxn, ) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
306 LETTER from Rickey R. Bivins. (sxn, ) (Entered: 11/22/2016)
308 LETTER from Tremain Johnson. (sxn, ) (Entered: 12/08/2016)
309 MOTION by Plaintiff Brian Otero to Approve Plan to Finalize and Close Settlement (Agreed) (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
310 NOTICE of Motion by Jacie C Zolna for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 309 before Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 8/10/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Zolna, Jacie) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
311 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve: Agreed motion to approve plan to finalize and close settlement 309 is granted. No appearance is required on the 8/10/17 notice motion date. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
312 ORDER Approving Plan to Finalize and Close Settlement Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 8/7/2017:Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 08/07/2017)