APPEAL,EFILE,FOLDER,PRISSCAN
U.S. District Court District of Connecticut (New Haven) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:13−cv−01465−SRU

Reynolds v. Arnone et al Assigned to: Judge Stefan R. Underhill Referred to: Judge William I. Garfinkel (Settlement) Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 10/04/2013 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Richard Reynolds

represented by Brett Dignam Morningside Heights Legal Services, Inc. 435 West 116th Street − Room 831 New York, NY 10027 212−854−4291 Fax: 212−854−3554 Email: bdigna@law.columbia.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Leo Arnone Commissioner CT D.O.C., Individual Capacity
Defendant Angel Quiros Regional Warden N.C.I., Official and Individual Capacity

represented by Madeline A. Melchionne Attorney General's Office Public Safety & Special Revenue MacKenzie Hall, 110 Sherman St. Hartford, CT 06105 860−808−5450 Fax: 860−808−5591 Email: madeline.melchionne@ct.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Martone Office of the Attorney General−−Sherman 110 Sherman Street Hartford, CT 06105 860−808−5450 Fax: 860−808−5591 Email: michael.martone@ct.gov TERMINATED: 02/27/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven R. Strom Office of the Attorney General 110 Sherman Street Hartford, CT 06105 860−808−5450 Fax: 860−808−5591 Email: steven.strom@ct.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Madeline A. Melchionne (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Martone (See above for address)

Defendant Edward Maldonado Warden N.C.I., Individual Capacity
Defendant Gerard Gayne Psychiatrist N.C.I., Official and Individual Capacity
Defendant Mark Frayne Psychologist N.C.I., Official and Individual Capacity
Defendant John Doe CT Dept of Corr, Official and Individual Capacity TERMINATED: 06/29/2017 Defendant Jane Doe fCT Dept of Corr, Official and Individual Capacity

TERMINATED: 02/27/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven R. Strom (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Madeline A. Melchionne (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Martone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/27/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven R. Strom (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Madeline A. Melchionne (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Martone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/27/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven R. Strom (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Madeline A. Melchionne (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Martone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/27/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven R. Strom (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

TERMINATED: 06/29/2017 Defendant Jason Cahill Captn at N.C.I., Official and Individual Capacity TERMINATED: 11/12/2013 Defendant Scott Semple Commissioner of Correction, Official and Individual Capacity
Defendant William Faneuff Warden N.C.I., Official and Individual Capacity

represented by Madeline A. Melchionne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Martone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/27/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven R. Strom (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Madeline A. Melchionne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Martone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/27/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven R. Strom (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 10/04/2013
10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013
10/04/2013

# Docket Text
1 PRISCS − COMPLAINT against Leo Arnone, Jason Cahill, Jane Doe, John Doe, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, filed by Richard Reynolds. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−E, # 2 Exhibit G−H, # 3 Exhibit I, # 4 Exhibit J, # 5 Exhibit K−N, # 6 Exhibit O−P, # 7 Exhibit Q−R)(Fazekas, J.) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/8/2013: # 8 Exhibit F) (Fazekas, J.). (Entered: 10/07/2013)
2 PRISCS − MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis by Richard Reynolds. (Fazekas, J.) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
3 PRISCS − MOTION for Joinder by Richard Reynolds. (Fazekas, J.) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
4 PRISCS − STANDING PROTECTIVE ORDER Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 10/4/2013.(Fazekas, J.) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
5 PRISCS − ELECTRONIC FILING ORDER − PLEASE ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH COURTESY COPY REQUIREMENTS IN THIS ORDER Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 10/4/2013.(Fazekas, J.) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
6 PRISCS − STANDING ORDER ON PRISONER ELECTRONIC FILING PROGRAM Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 10/4/2013.(Fazekas, J.) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
7 PRISCS − PRISONER LITIGATION UNIT NOTICE: This case has been selected for the District of Connecticut's Prisoner Litigation Scanning Project. All Notice of

10/09/2013
10/15/2013 10/15/2013 11/12/2013 11/21/2013
12/03/2013 12/09/2013
12/09/2013 12/09/2013 12/16/2013 12/18/2013 12/23/2013 12/23/2013 01/02/2014

Electronic Filings (NEFs) generated in this case will be transmitted to a designated DOC email box to be distributed to you, letting you know a filing has occurred in your case. If a document is associated with the NEF, it will be mailed to you in hard copy via U.S. Mail either by the court or the opposing party. You may also submit your documents for filing to a prison official who will scan and then transmit them to the court for filing on your case by the Clerk of Court for the District of Connecticut. When your documents have been filed by the Clerk, you will receive an NEF indicating your documents have been entered on the docket of your case Signed by Clerk on 10/4/2013.(Fazekas, J.) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
8 PRISCS−ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. If you change your address at any time during the litigation of this case, Local Rule 83.1(c)2 provides that you must notify the court. Failure to do so can result in dismissal of your case. Signed by Judge Holly B. Fitzsimmons on 10/9/2013. (Payton, R.) (Entered: 10/09/2013)
9 PRISCS− INITIAL REVIEW ORDER denying 3 Motion for Joinder. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 10/15/2013. (Payton, R.) (Entered: 10/16/2013)
Set Deadlines: Amended Complaint due by 11/15/2013 (Payton, R.) (Entered: 10/16/2013)
10 PRISCS−AMENDED COMPLAINT against Leo Arnone, Jane Doe, John Doe, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, filed by Richard Reynolds. (Attachments: # 1 Part 2, # 2 Part 3, # 3 Part 4, # 4 Part 5, # 5 Part 6, # 6 Part 7, # 7 Part 8, # 8 Part 9)(Payton, R.) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
11 PRISCS−INITIAL REVIEW ORDER, Answer deadline updated for Leo Arnone to 1/30/2014; Mark Frayne to 1/30/2014; Gerard Ganye to 1/30/2014; Edward Maldonado to 1/30/2014; Angel Quiros to 1/30/2014., ( Discovery due by 6/23/2014, Dispositive Motions due by 7/22/2014) Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 11/21/2013.(Payton, R.) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
12 PRISCS− MOTION for Friend of Court Amicus Brief by Richard Reynolds.Responses due by 12/24/2013 (Payton, R.) (Entered: 12/05/2013)
13 ELECTRONIC SUMMONS ISSUED in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 and LR 4 as to *Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros* with answer to complaint due within *21* days. Attorney *Richard Reynolds #219460* *NORTHERN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION* *287 Bilton Road, P.O. Box 665* *Somers, CT 06071*. (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
REQUEST FOR WAIVER of Service sent to Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros on 12/9/2013 by Richard Reynolds. Waiver of Service due by 1/13/2014 (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
USM 285 forms together with Summons, Amended Complaint, IRO, Order granting IFP reviewed and sent to USM for service on defendant(s).Marshals Return of Service on Summons due by 12/29/2013 (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
14 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to Edward Maldonado waiver sent on 12/6/2013, answer due 2/4/2014. filed by Richard Reynolds. (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 12/17/2013)
15 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by Richard Reynolds. (Ghilardi, K.) (Entered: 12/18/2013)
16 PRISCS − WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to Mark Frayne waiver sent on 12/6/2013, answer due 2/4/2014. filed by Richard Reynolds. (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 12/26/2013)
17 PRISCS − WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to Leo Arnone waiver sent on 12/6/2013, answer due 2/4/2014. filed by Richard Reynolds. (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 12/26/2013)
18 ORDER denying 12 Motion. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 1/2/14. (Sbalbi, B.) (Entered: 01/02/2014)

01/02/2014 01/09/2014 01/21/2014 01/21/2014
01/27/2014 01/30/2014 02/21/2014 06/05/2014 06/17/2014 06/17/2014 06/19/2014 08/06/2014 08/27/2014 08/27/2014 12/19/2014 12/30/2014 12/30/2014 02/05/2015 02/06/2015

19 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge William I. Garfinkel for settlement conference Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 1/2/14.(Sbalbi, B.) (Entered: 01/02/2014)
20 ORDER vacating 19 Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 1/9/14.(Sbalbi, B.) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
21 NOTICE of Appearance by Madeline A. Melchionne on behalf of Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 01/21/2014)
22 MOTION for Extension of Time until February 21, 2014 to respond to the allegations contained in plaintiff's pro se 10 amended complaint by Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros. (Melchionne, Madeline) Modified on 1/22/2014 TO LINK TO DOC #10 (Oliver, T.). (Entered: 01/21/2014)
23 ORDER granting 22 Motion for Extension of Time to 2/21/14 to respond to 10 Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 1/27/14. (Sbalbi, B.) (Entered: 01/27/2014)
24 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE Executed c/o Attorney General on 1/22/2014 filed by Richard Reynolds. (Gutierrez, Y.) (Entered: 02/04/2014)
25 ANSWER to 10 Amended Complaint, with Affirmative Defenses. by Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros.(Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 02/21/2014)
26 MOTION for Extension of Time until June 12, 2014 to respond to plaintiff's First Request for Production of Documents by Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros. (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
27 ORDER granting 26 Motion for Extension of Time until June 12, 2014 to respond to plaintiff's First Request for Production of Documents. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 6/17/2014. (Jaiman, R.) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
28 MOTION for Extension of Time (90) days for Discovery by Richard Reynolds. (Payton, R.) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
29 ORDER granting 28 Motion for Extension of Time to 9/23/14 to complete discovery. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 6/19/14. (Sbalbi, B.) (Entered: 06/19/2014)
30 MOTION to Compel by Richard Reynolds. Responses due by 8/27/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A−G, # 3 Exhibit H−J) (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 08/07/2014)
31 OBJECTION re 30 MOTION to Compel filed by Leo Arnone, Jane Doe, John Doe, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros. (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 08/27/2014)
32 Memorandum in Support re 30 MOTION to Compel filed by Leo Arnone, Jane Doe, John Doe, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros. (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 08/27/2014)
33 MOTION for Extension of Time until February 11, 2015 to file motion for summary judgment by Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros. (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
34 ORDER granting 33 Motion for Extension of Time until February 11, 2015 to file motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 12/30/2014. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 12/30/2014)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Dispositive Motions due by 2/11/2015 (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 12/30/2014)
35 MOTION for Extension of Time until February 27, 2015 to file summary judgment by Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros. (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 02/05/2015)
36 ORDER granting 35 Motion for Extension of Time until February 27, 2015 to file motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 2/6/2015.

02/06/2015 02/09/2015 02/27/2015 02/27/2015 02/27/2015 02/27/2015
02/27/2015 03/03/2015
03/05/2015 03/13/2015 03/14/2015 03/20/2015 03/29/2015 04/02/2015

(Pollack, R.) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Dispositive Motions due by 2/27/2015. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
37 ORDER denying in substantial part 30 Motion to Compel. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 2/9/15. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
38 MOTION for Extension of Time until March 3, 2015 to file motion for summary judgment by Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros. (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
39 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros. (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
40 MOTION to submit the unsigned affidavit of Deputy Warden William Mulligan as Exhibit 1 by Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros.Responses due by 3/20/2015 (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
41 ORDER granting 38 Motion for Extension of Time until March 3, 2015 to file motion for summary judgment; granting 39 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages; granting 40 Motion to submit the unsigned affidavit of Deputy Warden William Mulligan, to be replaced or supplemented with the signed affidavit as soon as it becomes available. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 2/27/2015. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Dispositive Motions due by 3/3/2015. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
42 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros.Responses due by 3/24/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Affidavit Exhibit 1 Affidavit of Deputy Warden William Mulligan, # 3 Affidavit Exhibit 2 Affidavit of James Barton, # 4 Affidavit Exhibit 3 Affidavit of Andrew Cameron, # 5 Affidavit Exhibit 4 Affidavit of Anthony J Bruno, # 6 Affidavit Exhibit 5 Affidavit of Thomas Wright, # 7 Affidavit Exhibit 6 Affidavit of Dr Mark Frayne, # 8 Affidavit Exhibit 7 Affidavit of Dr Gerard Gagne, # 9 Exhibit 8 Administrative Directive 10.6 Inmate Visits, # 10 Exhibit 9 Administrative Directive 10.8 Religious Services, # 11 Exhibit 10 Administrative Directive 6.10 Inmate Property, # 12 Affidavit Exhibit 12 Affidavit of Michelle DeVeau, # 13 Exhibit 13 Judgment Mittimus dated August 13, 1995, # 14 Statement of Material Facts Attachment, # 15 Attachment, # 16 Attachment)(Melchionne, Madeline) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/2/2015: # 17 REPLACEMENT PDF − Affidavit of Deputy Warden William Mulligan) (Oliver, T.). (Entered: 03/03/2015)
43 EXHIBIT 11 by Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros re: 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Basha, D.) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
44 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment for 90 days by Richard Reynolds. (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
45 ORDER granting 44 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Responses due by 6/22/2015. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 3/14/2015. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 03/14/2015)
46 MOTION to the substitution of the unsigned affidavit of Deputy Warden William Mulligan by Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros.Responses due by 4/10/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
47 ORDER granting 46 Motion to substitute unsigned affidavit. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 3/29/2015. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 03/29/2015)
48 Docket Entry Correction re 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment MODIFIED TO ADD REPLACEMENT PDF OF THE Affidavit of Deputy Warden William Mulligan TO THE DOCKET ENTRY PURSUANT TO ORDER 47 (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 04/02/2015)

04/08/2015 05/27/2015 06/17/2015 06/29/2015 07/01/2015
07/02/2015
07/02/2015 07/07/2015 09/25/2015
10/01/2015 10/01/2015 11/16/2015 11/20/2015 11/20/2015 01/29/2016 02/10/2016 02/10/2016 03/28/2016

49 NOTICE of Appearance by Brett Dignam on behalf of Richard Reynolds (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
50 MOTION to Appoint Counsel Pursuant to Local Rule 83.10 by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 05/27/2015)
51 MOTION for Status Conference by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 06/17/2015)
52 ORDER granting 50 Motion to Appoint Counsel; granting 51 Motion for Conference. The parties will be contacted to schedule a conference. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 6/26/2015. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 06/29/2015)
53 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE.
Telephone Conference set for 7/2/2015, 04:30 PM before Judge Stefan R. Underhill. The telephone number to connect to the conference is 888.636.3807; when prompted, enter the access code 6508043 followed by #. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
54 Minute Entry and Order. Proceedings held before Judge Stefan R. Underhill: Telephone Status Conference held on 7/2/2015. Order denying without prejudice as moot 42 Motion for Summary Judgment; an amended complaint shall be filed by 9/30/2015. Total Time: 0 hours and 20 minutes(Court Reporter Susan Catucci.) (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 07/02/2015)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Amended Pleadings due by 9/30/2015; Fact Discovery due by 4/15/2016; Dispositive Motions due by 10/1/2016. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 07/02/2015)
55 MEMORANDUM of Telephone Conference and ORDER. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 7/7/2015.(Pollack, R.) (Entered: 07/07/2015)
56 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time until November 20, 2015 Time to File Second Amended Complaint 55 Memorandum of Conference, Order by Richard Reynolds. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Santiago Motion for Argument, # 2 Appendix Santiago Motion to Strike Portions of Majority Opinion, # 3 Appendix Santiago Motion to Strike Concurring Opinion, # 4 Appendix Peeler Motion for Supplemental Briefing and Argument)(Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 09/25/2015)
57 ORDER granting 56 Motion for Extension of Time until November 20, 2015 to File Second Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 9/30/2015. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 10/01/2015)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Amended Pleadings due by 11/20/2015. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 10/01/2015)
58 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until January 31, 2016 Filing Second Amended Complaint by Richard Reynolds. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 11/16/2015)
59 ORDER granting 58 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 11/20/2015. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 11/20/2015)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Amended Pleadings due by 1/31/2016. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 11/20/2015)
60 MOTION for Extension of Time until 03−31−16 To file an amended complaint by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 01/29/2016)
61 ORDER granting 60 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 2/10/2016. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Amended Pleadings due by 3/31/2016. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
62 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time until April 30, 2016 Second Amended Complaint Set Deadlines/Hearings by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 03/28/2016)

03/30/2016 03/30/2016 04/27/2016 05/04/2016 01/19/2017
02/16/2017 02/16/2017 03/03/2017
04/26/2017 05/04/2017 05/04/2017 06/29/2017 06/30/2017 07/18/2017 07/18/2017 07/18/2017
07/18/2017

63 ORDER granting 62 Motion for Extension of Time until April 30, 2016 to file Second Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 3/30/2016. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Amended Pleadings due by 4/30/2016 (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
64 Fifth MOTION for Extension of Time until 30 days after Peeler decisionfor parties' joint status report 63 Order on Motion for Extension of Time by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
65 ORDER granting 64 Motion for Extension of Time until 30 days after Peeler decision for parties' joint status report. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 5/4/2016. (Pollack, R.) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
66 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. Telephone Status Conference set for February 16, 2017 at 1:00 p.m. before Judge Stefan R. Underhill. The call−in for the conference is (888) 636−3807; when prompted for the access code, dial 650−8043 followed by #. (If asked whether to join the conference as the host, bypass that option by dialing #.) (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 01/19/2017)
67 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Stefan R. Underhill: Telephone Status Conference held on February 16, 2017. Total Time: 0 hours and 10 minutes (Court Reporter Sharon Masse). (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 02/16/2017)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Amended Pleadings due by April 28, 2017. (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 02/16/2017)
68 NOTICE of Appearance by Steven R. Strom on behalf of Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne, Gerard Ganye, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros in their individual and official capacities, in addition to the appearance already on file (Strom, Steven) (Entered: 03/03/2017)
69 Fourth MOTION for Extension of Time until June 30, 2017to File Amended Complaint Set Deadlines/Hearings by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 04/26/2017)
70 ORDER granting 69 MOTION for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 05/04/2017. (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 05/04/2017)
Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Amended Pleadings due by June 30, 2017. (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 05/04/2017)
71 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Richard Reynolds.(Dignam, Brett) (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/30/2017: # 1 REPLACEMENT PDF) (Oliver, T.). (Entered: 06/29/2017)
72 Docket Entry Correction re 71 Amended Complaint MODIFIED TO ADD REPLACEMENT PDF TO THE DOCKET ENTRY (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 06/30/2017)
Request for Clerk to issue summons as to William Faneuff. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 07/18/2017)
Request for Clerk to issue summons as to Scott Semple. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 07/18/2017)
73 ELECTRONIC SUMMONS ISSUED in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 and LR 4 as to *William Faneuff* with answer to complaint due within *21* days. Attorney *Brett Dignam* *Morningside Heights Legal Services, Inc.* *435 West 116th Street − Room 831* *New York, NY 10027*. (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 07/18/2017)
74 ELECTRONIC SUMMONS ISSUED in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 and LR 4 as to *Scott Semple* with answer to complaint due within *21* days. Attorney *Brett Dignam* *Morningside Heights Legal Services, Inc.* *435 West 116th Street − Room 831* *New York, NY 10027*. (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 07/18/2017)

08/08/2017 08/15/2017
08/22/2017 08/22/2017 08/24/2017 09/18/2017
09/18/2017 09/19/2017
11/05/2017 11/21/2017 11/21/2017
12/14/2017 12/21/2017 02/13/2018 02/14/2018 04/12/2018
04/17/2018

75 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to Scott Semple waiver sent on 7/19/2017, answer due 9/17/2017 filed by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
76 MOTION for Extension of Time until September 17, 2017 within which to respond to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on behalf of all of the defendants by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 08/15/2017)
77 ORDER granting 76 MOTION for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 08/22/2017. (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 08/22/2017)
Answer deadline updated for All Defendants to September 17, 2017. (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 08/22/2017)
78 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to William Faneuff waiver sent on 7/19/2017, answer due 9/17/2017 filed by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 08/24/2017)
79 DEFENDANTS' ANSWER to 71 Amended Complaint with Affirmative Defenses. AND JURY DEMAND by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple.(Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
80 NOTICE of Appearance by Steven R. Strom on behalf of William Faneuff, Scott Semple , in their individual and official capacity (Strom, Steven) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
81 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael A. Martone on behalf of Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple in addition to the appearances already on file (Martone, Michael) (Entered: 09/19/2017)
82 First MOTION for Status Conference and Case Scheduling Order by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 11/05/2017)
83 ORDER granting 82 MOTION for Scheduling Conference. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 11/21/2017. (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 11/21/2017)
84 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. Telephone Scheduling Conference set for December 14, 2017 at 4:00 p.m. before Judge Stefan R. Underhill. The call−in for the conference is (888) 636−3807; when prompted for the access code, dial 650−8043 followed by #. (If asked whether to join the conference as the host, bypass that option by dialing #.) (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 11/21/2017)
85 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Stefan R. Underhill: Telephone Scheduling Conference held on December 14, 2017. Total Time: 0 hours and 15 minutes. (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 12/14/2017)
86 MEMORANDUM of Status Conference, SCHEDULING ORDER: Discovery due by 3/1/2018, Dispositive Motions due by 9/7/2018. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 12/21/17. (Kaas, E.) (Entered: 12/21/2017)
87 First MOTION for Extension of Time until As set forth in the motion. Discovery deadlines. 86 Memorandum of Conference, Scheduling Order by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
88 ORDER granting 87 MOTION for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 02/14/2018. (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 02/14/2018)
89 MOTION for Extension of Time until 9/4/18 and 11/20/18 Disclosing Defendants' Experts by 9/4/18 and filing dispositive motions by 11/20/18 by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Strom, Steven) (Entered: 04/12/2018)
90 RESPONSE re 89 MOTION for Extension of Time until 9/4/18 and 11/20/18 Disclosing Defendants' Experts by 9/4/18 and filing dispositive motions by 11/20/18 filed by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 04/17/2018)

04/18/2018 04/30/2018 05/03/2018

91 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. Telephone Status Conference set for May 3, 2018 at 2:30 p.m. before Judge Stefan R. Underhill. The call−in for the conference is (888) 636−3807; when prompted for the access code, dial 650−8043 followed by #. (If asked whether to join the conference as the host, bypass that option by dialing #.) (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
92 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time until May 30, 2018 to file Objections and/or Response to Requests for Production by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Strom, Steven) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
93 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Stefan R. Underhill: Status Telephone Status Conference held on May 3, 2018. Total Time: 0 hours and 30 minutes.

05/11/2018

As stated during the conference, ORDER granting in part and denying in part 89 MOTION for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 05/03/2018. (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
94 MEMORANDUM of Telephone Status Conference and ORDER granting 92 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Discovery. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 05/11/2018.

06/22/2018 06/25/2018 06/25/2018 06/25/2018 06/25/2018 06/28/2018 06/28/2018

Expert Disclosures due by July 15, 2018; Expert Depositions due by August 15, 2018; Dispositive Motions due by September 7, 2018. (Jamieson, K) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
95 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time until August 10, 2018 FOR LEAVE TO DEPOSE PLAINTIFF A PERSON CONFINED IN PRISON by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Strom, Steven) (Entered: 06/22/2018)
96 MOTION for to Compel Plaintiff to Participate in Mental Evaluation Pursuant to Rule 35 Fed. R. Civ. P. Order by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Saathoff, # 2 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Order to Compel Mental Evaluation)(Strom, Steven) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
97 MOTION for to Compel Plaintiff to Participate in a Mental Health Evaluation pursuant to Rule 35 Fed. R. Civ. P. Order by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order to Compel Plaintiff to Participate in a Mental Health Evaluation Pursuant to Rule 35 Fed. R. Civ. P.)(Strom, Steven) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
98 Consent MOTION for to Pay Dr. Stuart Grassian for deposition pursuant to Rule 26 (b)(4) (E) Fed. R. Civ. P. Order by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Invoice of Stuart Grassian, MD, # 2 Text of Proposed Order to pay Dr. Stuart Grassian pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E))(Strom, Steven) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
99 Consent MOTION for Order to Pay Martin Horn for deposition time pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E) Order by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Invoice of Martin Horn, # 2 Text of Proposed Order to pay Martin Horn pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E))(Strom, Steven) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
100 First OBJECTION re 97 MOTION for to Compel Plaintiff to Participate in a Mental Health Evaluation pursuant to Rule 35 Fed. R. Civ. P. Order, 96 MOTION for to Compel Plaintiff to Participate in Mental Evaluation Pursuant to Rule 35 Fed. R. Civ. P. Order Plaintiff's Opposition filed by Richard Reynolds. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Grassian expert report, # 2 Exhibit Grassian deposition transcript)(Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 06/28/2018)
101 First Memorandum in Opposition re 97 MOTION for to Compel Plaintiff to Participate in a Mental Health Evaluation pursuant to Rule 35 Fed. R. Civ. P. Order, 96 MOTION for to Compel Plaintiff to Participate in Mental Evaluation Pursuant to Rule 35 Fed. R. Civ. P. Order filed by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 06/28/2018)

06/29/2018 07/30/2018 08/30/2018 08/30/2018
09/05/2018 09/05/2018 09/05/2018 10/12/2018 10/15/2018 10/15/2018 11/06/2018 11/06/2018 11/07/2018 11/07/2018 11/09/2018 11/09/2018

102 ORDER granting 95 Motion for Extension of Time to Depose Plaintiff. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 6/29/18. (Kaas, E.) (Entered: 06/29/2018)
103 ORDER granting 98 Motion for Order to Pay Dr. Stuart Grassian for Deposition Time; granting 99 Motion for Order to Pay Martin Horn for Deposition Time. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 7/30/18. (Kaas, E.) (Entered: 07/30/2018)
104 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time until October 19, 2018 File Dispositive Motion 86 Memorandum of Conference, Scheduling Order by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 08/30/2018)
105 ORDER denying 96 Motion for Order to Compel Plaintiff to Participate in Mental Evaluation; denying 97 Motion for Order to Compel Plaintiff to Participate in Mental Evaluation. The motion is denied substantially for the reasons set forth in in the plaintiffs opposition memorandum, notably that the expert will not testify about Reynolds current psychological condition and has not conducted a forensic evaluation, and because the motion is quite untimely, the amended complaint having been filed on June 29, 2017, and the discovery cut−off date having passed on March 30, 2018. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 8/30/2018. (Pincus, A) (Entered: 08/30/2018)
106 ORDER granting 104 Motion for Extension of Time to File Dispositive Motion until October 19, 2018. Signed by District Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 9/5/2018 (Pincus, A). (Entered: 09/05/2018)
107 ENTERED IN ERROR. NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. Dispositive Motions due by 10/19/2018 (Pincus, A). Modified on 9/6/2018 (Jaiman, R.). INCORRECT EVENT USED. (Entered: 09/05/2018)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Dispositive Motions due by 10/19/2018 (Jaiman, R.) (Entered: 09/06/2018)
108 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until November 9, 2018for the parties' filing of dispositive motions and related deadlines 106 Order on Motion for Extension of Time by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 10/12/2018)
109 ORDER granting 108 Second MOTION for Extension of Time until November 9, 2018 for the parties' filing of dispositive motions and related deadlines. Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 10/15/2018. (Smith, E) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
110 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. Dispositive Motions due by 11/9/2018. (Smith, E) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
111 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment and also a Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Strom, Steven) (Entered: 11/06/2018)
112 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages Consented to by Both Parties to File Briefs in Excess of 40 pages and Rule 56 (a)(1) Statements in excess of 12 pages by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Strom, Steven) (Entered: 11/06/2018)
113 ORDER granting 112 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 11/7/2018. (Smith, E) (Entered: 11/07/2018)
114 ORDER denying as moot 111 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 11/7/2018. (Smith, E) (Entered: 11/07/2018)
115 MOTION to Seal Exhibit 11, Plaintiff's Medical Records by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 11/09/2018)
116 Sealed Document: Exhibit 11, Plaintiff's Medical Records by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple re 115 MOTION to Seal Exhibit 11, Plaintiff's Medical Records . (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 11/09/2018)

11/09/2018
11/09/2018 11/09/2018 11/09/2018 11/09/2018
11/09/2018 11/26/2018 12/06/2018 12/18/2018 12/21/2018 12/21/2018 12/26/2018

117 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple.Responses due by 11/30/2018 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Memorandum in Support, # 27 Statement of Material Facts)(Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 11/09/2018)
118 NOTICE of Related Case by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 11/09/2018)
119 First MOTION for Summary Judgment (Responses due by 11/30/2018, ) by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) Modified on 1/3/2019 TO REMOVE ADDITIONAL MOTION RELIEF INFORMATION (Oliver, T.). (Entered: 11/09/2018)
120 Joint Statement of Material Facts re 119 MOTION to Take Deposition First MOTION for Summary Judgment for the parties' filed by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 11/09/2018)
121 OBJECTION re 119 MOTION to Take Deposition First MOTION for Summary Judgment statement of undisputed fact filed by Richard Reynolds. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Table of Contents, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit Exhibit 12, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit 13, # 15 Exhibit Exhibit 14, # 16 Exhibit Exhibit 15, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit 16, # 18 Exhibit Exhibit 17, # 19 Exhibit Exhibit 18, # 20 Exhibit Exhibit 19, # 21 Exhibit Exhibit 20, # 22 Exhibit Exhibit 21, # 23 Exhibit Exhibit 22, # 24 Exhibit Exhibit 23, # 25 Exhibit Exhibit 24, # 26 Exhibit Exhibit 25, # 27 Exhibit Exhibit 26, # 28 Exhibit Exhibit 27, # 29 Exhibit Exhibit 28, # 30 Exhibit Exhibit 29, # 31 Exhibit Exhibit 30, # 32 Exhibit Exhibit 31, # 33 Exhibit Exhibit 32, # 34 Exhibit Exhibit 33, # 35 Exhibit Exhibit 34, # 36 Exhibit Exhibit 35, # 37 Exhibit Exhibit 36, # 38 Exhibit Exhibit 37, # 39 Exhibit Exhibit 38, # 40 Exhibit Exhibit 39, # 41 Exhibit Exhibit 40, # 42 Exhibit Exhibit 41, # 43 Exhibit Exhibit 42, # 44 Exhibit Exhibit 43, # 45 Exhibit Exhibit 44)(Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 11/09/2018)
122 Memorandum in Support re 119 MOTION to Take Deposition First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 11/09/2018)
123 MOTION for Extension of Time until December 21, 2018 for the parties to respond to the cross motions for summary judgment filed in this matter by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 11/26/2018)
124 ORDER granting 123 Motion for Extension of Time until 12/21/2018 to respond to cross motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 12/6/2018. (Smith, E) (Entered: 12/06/2018)
125 MOTION for Extension of Time until January 4, 2019 for the parties to respond to the cross motions for summary judgment filed in this matter by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Strom, Steven) (Entered: 12/18/2018)
126 ORDER granting 125 Motion for Extension of Time until January 4, 2019 for the parties to respond to the cross motions for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 12/21/2018. (Smith, E) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
Reset Deadline as to 117 MOTION for Summary Judgment . Responses due by 1/4/2019 (Gould, K.) (Entered: 12/26/2018)
127 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Set/Reset Deadlines as to 117 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 119 MOTION to Take Deposition First MOTION for Summary Judgment. (Motion Hearing set for 4/17/2019 10:00 AM in

01/02/2019 01/04/2019
01/04/2019 01/04/2019 01/04/2019 01/28/2019 02/01/2019 02/01/2019 02/01/2019
02/01/2019 02/20/2019 02/27/2019 03/29/2019
04/11/2019

Courtroom One, 915 Lafayette Blvd., Bridgeport, CT before Judge Stefan R Underhill) (Caldero, M.) (Entered: 12/26/2018)
128 ORDER granting 115 Motion to Seal Plaintiff's Medical Records. Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 1/2/2019. (Smith, E) (Entered: 01/02/2019)
129 OBJECTION re 119 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Memorandum in Support)(Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 01/04/2019)
130 Memorandum in Opposition re 117 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 01/04/2019)
131 RESPONSE re 120 Statement of Material Facts filed by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 01/04/2019)
132 Supplemental Statement of Material Facts re 117 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Richard Reynolds. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit)(Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 01/04/2019)
133 MOTION for AAG Michael A. Martone to Withdraw as Attorney by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Martone, Michael) (Entered: 01/28/2019)
134 MOTION to Seal Exhibit 10 Pages of Plaintiff's Medical Records by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 02/01/2019)
135 Sealed Document: Exhibit 10 Plaintiff's Medical Records by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple re 134 MOTION to Seal Exhibit 10 Pages of Plaintiff's Medical Records . (Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 02/01/2019)
136 REPLY to Response to 119 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Memorandum in Support, # 12 Statement of Material Facts)(Melchionne, Madeline) (Entered: 02/01/2019)
137 REPLY to Response to 119 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Richard Reynolds. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Santiago Classification Documents)(Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 02/01/2019)
138 ORDER granting 134 Motion to Seal. Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 2/20/2019. (Jaiman, R.) (Entered: 02/20/2019)
139 ORDER granting 133 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Michael A. Martone terminated. Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 2/27/2019. (Smith, E) (Entered: 02/27/2019)
140 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. RESET FROM 4/17/2019 at 10:00am, Set/Reset Deadlines as to 117 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Motion Hearing set for 4/18/2019 11:00 AM in Courtroom One, 915 Lafayette Blvd., Bridgeport, CT before Judge Stefan R Underhill) (Smith, E) (Entered: 03/29/2019)
141 First MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply by Richard Reynolds. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Sur−reply Memorandum)(Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 04/11/2019)

04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/17/2019 04/17/2019 04/17/2019 04/17/2019 04/17/2019 04/18/2019 04/18/2019
05/02/2019 05/29/2019
06/07/2019
08/27/2019

142 ORDER granting 141 First MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply. Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 4/12/2019. (Smith, E) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
143 Final RESPONSE re 142 Order on Motion for Leave to File Sur−Reply filed by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
144 Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum Issued as to Richard Reynolds for 4/18/19 at 11am. Original writ faxed to the records center at Northern CI. (Gould, K.) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
145 MOTION for Leave to Appear Law Student Appearance Hayley Malcolm Attorney Brett Dignam. by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 04/17/2019)
146 MOTION for Leave to Appear Law Student Sarah Hong Attorney Brett Dignam. by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 04/17/2019)
147 MOTION for Leave to Appear Law Student Appearance Caleb King Attorney Brett Dignam. by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 04/17/2019)
148 MOTION for Leave to Appear Law Student Appearance Tyler Finn Attorney Brett Dignam. by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 04/17/2019)
149 MOTION for Leave to Appear Law Student Appearance Mary Marshall Attorney Brett Dignam. by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 04/17/2019)
150 ORDER granting 145 Motion to Appear ; granting 146 Motion to Appear ; granting 147 Motion to Appear ; granting 148 Motion to Appear ; granting 149 Motion to Appear. Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 4/18/19. (Caldero, M.) (Entered: 04/18/2019)
151 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Judge Stefan R Underhill: Motion Hearing held on 4/18/2019taking under advisement 117 Motion for Summary Judgment; taking under advisement 119 Motion for Summary Judgment; re 119 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Richard Reynolds, 117 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Gerard Gayne, Scott Semple, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, William Faneuff, Leo Arnone, Mark Frayne. Total Time: 1 hours and 50 minutes(Court Reporter Masse, S.) (Jaiman, R.) (Entered: 04/18/2019)
152 Standing Order re: Initial Discovery Disclosures. Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 5/2/2019. (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 05/02/2019)
153 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings: Type of Hearing: Motion Hearing. Held on 4−18−2019 before Judge Stefan R. Underhill. Court Reporter: Sharon Masse. IMPORTANT NOTICE − REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: To remove personal identifier information from the transcript, a party must electronically file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction with the Clerk's Office within seven (7) calendar days of this date. If no such Notice is filed, the court will assume redaction of personal identifiers is not necessary and the transcript will be made available through PACER without redaction 90 days from today's date. The transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. The policy governing the redaction of personal information is located on the court website at www.ctd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 6/19/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/29/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/27/2019. (Masse, S.) (Entered: 05/29/2019)
154 PROPOSED ORDER re 121 Objection,,,,, 143 Response, 122 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 132 Statement of Material Facts, 129 Objection,, 136 Reply to Response to Motion, 119 First MOTION for Summary Judgment , 117 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 153 Transcript,,,, 130 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 131 Response, 137 Reply to Response to Motion, 120 Statement of Material Facts by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 06/07/2019)
155 ORDER denying 117 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 119 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 8/27/2019. (Smith, E) (Entered: 08/27/2019)

08/27/2019 08/30/2019 09/03/2019 09/04/2019 09/09/2019 09/09/2019
09/20/2019

156 PERMANENT INJUNCTION ORDER Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 8/27/2019.(Jaiman, R.) (Entered: 08/27/2019)
157 MOTION to Stay re 156 Order by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple.Responses due by 9/20/2019 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Affidavit)(Strom, Steven) (Entered: 08/30/2019)
158 First Memorandum in Opposition re 157 MOTION to Stay re 156 Order filed by Richard Reynolds. (Dignam, Brett) (Entered: 09/03/2019)
159 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 157 Motion to Stay. Signed by Judge Stefan R Underhill on 9/4/2019. (Smith, E) (Entered: 09/04/2019)
160 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 156 Order, 155 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number ACTDC−5431131. (Strom, Steven) (Entered: 09/09/2019)
161 CLERK'S CERTIFICATE RE: INDEX AND RECORD ON APPEAL re: 160 Notice of Appeal,. The attached docket sheet is hereby certified as the entire Index/Record on Appeal in this matter and electronically sent to the Court of Appeals, with the exception of any manually filed documents as noted below. Robin D. Tabora, Clerk. Documents manually filed not included in this transmission: none (Oliver, T.) (Entered: 09/10/2019)
162 MOTION to Stay re 156 Order Pending Appeal by Leo Arnone, William Faneuff, Mark Frayne, Gerard Gayne, Edward Maldonado, Angel Quiros, Scott Semple.Responses due by 10/11/2019 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit 1)(Strom, Steven) (Entered: 09/20/2019)

 
 Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 1 of 36

'V\t=hl'-\t\ t(: :
\(\ c1~ ~NO\<i~

\/

.'

b~kNdA-Nt-s b~
Ltc Aa..NDN e -
A~\~,,\ OwR,~-

: ~~+-~4tf. ;02013>
CoMtY\tcz:>'&i't¥\JeQ. tT \).0,<:''\(~ID~A\ w'fu'ld~\l N~1-

E.crw'fH<.l MA-LdoNAl'u - W)T(lJ.~ N,(:L

CreRft,M CntN ie... ?S'IChlll-titlS ~ N I c.,L

fY\f\{L\( F({~YN €-

e$ycho)o{~)o )\J, ( .T_

johN 4 jlrN€'" 'boe.\s - 1.))-ept of- w(l(( ll..'\'\\ AchlrN

d. &WV.fAl l()
j {tCSDl'l ~lth; l\ - Qffp-tN A-t NIe.-T.

,~ /I cle {-eN dAN-I-s a I- eN f'e-1{WItNt-,-jymes wU2~ ccA'1Vj ,l,tNet.e.R. ~/or of sl(.}+e. JSIA) JrNd M(e. be4Nf Sue&. rN i-Re1r officl~\ Utp(tct1'1 {n>~ YNd~vfdLtc,J CAp/l&~VJ

I),L c.. ifl)(Y)s IN iRIs frchol''' Afl-e.... beii,-!,\ -K Jed UNdu<. , lA·~.L \q~3 /tYU1 UNd~r "The-ihnarfM/Vs £Al/-A J)Y5llbjlrh/ Ae+-.
t 'YCL€A) CN\~ lftvvcsw K~Jakl in iRt'> ca 6ed
e-t- ~)~~N()\~~ V. {n\.MLph\,1 A\ ~ 3', \~ '.c..y- 00'3\10 SRL\
~~6..6~~o\L\- ~\'=>~~c.\- ~~\-} rr\e&- Ol~ 3J/~ /:;'01 ~

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 2 of 36

.\X>/\d-

~ ~lcl"Jtu.\ us€- of It{AV21~\~)rVQ.0\Q:3 Ub ~ f- rf,()Mr -

Ivrs)JNrl '~tJl-k ?If)~ D- IU)-\-ciiu\- &~ wytRo.lt -

c\v.t. p~) C\W°'d.\ of- ~t\lAcA.~ ~kchoN, c..oU~lr"e flu\J-

ishmwt; .~wutt:} l ((.~tA \~~1100) ~eJlY Ir~-h1U( ~~

Se4~~ lot ~~2 \ pR.ope.(2.ty.

_

tl) ~Se.. S1\ Il ~c\; ~J A-N +rc.1' pI1te DDhlcLt.a. wy tR.s ftc11Cl1'1.

1\1 AA u.(t~ "f-- c. as€.

"TArs CAse 0..uN~I(j\{S 4{e.., -p\ffi'Nt1V - CoNcl1,v11b~
Dt CoN-R~VV\~kS1- '\ ~ 'M2L otJ~I.)?~\ J\..)6... ~uilJlA. ,"'" ~'C~ ?&\{Cho\~~'CA \ hf)i2.rV\) rNft~r~UJ)\.k fV\~-J1nl
~1*-hLe.'d\1V\e~Jdea\I~(t\ 0 ~~~'o I~L of-~
O~(l ~D~~-Ol\W "~S\A.es \~k.ci UvN~ ~fV\p\A J
w~+RjVv~~ _
7f,.;:/ C/1,s /fJsoH+lIs UNdUL tRe.. /fyneIlrCIIN wyf-R drst+--
btjth~<s fJcJ-. ?)fWl)-h~~ S\Af{eAZ'5 ~'{V\ \=>15 ~. ?htJ..~IL
Ii 'IllS ~ N'~''l::--" he., hfts he.e.N ~~Nfe.J '8tN~ pfLo6(l.~
* \ b(l "~·hn€/s\-. ThIs de~~'B\ 0 M?u~Rfu1\ /-hz.ea.t·m~J1-­
Cu~p:>v~cl w~ Y+ y(lS D ~o \1h· ~~ en",HNe..~
JY\€N1- hAS bNl, \.eel To h\~ w \ dt,t~Rfoffi1foN .

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 3 of 36

G.~ f11fl1~d: "'11 tb 0l"'~ erooN(l

e. I]

77rr~ r~ AvrvrJ
-Iei-J(8fLAJ+;).-eU-V. srz.ts
trblA'"t~ON oJ

'RrJhts
to J9R~J3 FI
~ 'OJ--t2.+

J1CkD~ -RJ.€c( by I<lchltf(cL I , VN dfl ~e fWdr/~tLW h'V~fletf,

oJct sl
ffJl/cl.

}/<Qtl.,/\ cl€lvIf/I 0 F -t)u~ H2c .:) ~ JtV

NH< fiJYJ.eukeN -/1) IKe. GNslrfu:lrlJU

ANd CnNRNetn~/,f YN 0 : s~ '- 1fli~~!L J~ yfls rN Vl0/flf-fo)( Df fI{(L

4 . ~ - RD~~~s t \ '\A.~~ o'f e.. i1)UR+~ +1, FlrneN{.trneNt-,-+o i-R~

CN51l ;t)uN .lhL pi S'Nl1Ff21J J&:;, nJ/~e.s. ~ '2:.( 0 -

I

\-.e"c;\fcN IN Vr I(.r/~ N b tk.e. i-c f2.-h~e.N+h fl·fYl -Nk>fJ.J.f- ~ ~~e..

CNS\Yru1fD\\l~ 7J,~ vnrNh"/f f)ko IJII-eJes G,JIec1rve- RLiJ!shft)~

w'hI~\ W 'S C\! ~~-\aw(' _,'0 l'\ e- :eN€.\I C.ONv.e.1'dl' N r,~ J949
Itl~ rN VJ ()/A-If()~ 6 ~U< -Ib (d-~th (JP1 eN~lj./ ~ .~~ ~A(S'

-\fk"o~ ./he.. pln1'Atltff Ii/k;;~ S J-Nvrd:Dl1S "Dts /YW,vn+roN If\{

V~()IAtf6N 0 f 1{~llXA-R..+{l~~ ArtW}JJM €Nt- h) +R~ CNstr'I--u-h~o'''-I­

'7'k.-P//h¥AI1" '1A/S\-J j) /~5e s (kNeRfi / 7?elnll;rlrciv ~IV t/.OMIrOf\J,;
' of~*~ -,Jh Fh-n€Aldfl1eAi +o4?- _drlu.-tro", fiVd. {efJA- -

'~(l.y+e-e - ~- IN V'lO/fJ~ OJ\{ of' +/i.e., 8 ),fh /lmeNJneNJ- ·fo

_ _ Di~~~o '

;).) 7}e- Ce;urc1--- hltsJVo(l,sdrdroN O\J'€£t ~ p\Ai'NttftSc.Jft1j)1~ of-
0+ ,vloIA1roN te.d€/2fd C/:NsffJu:lrof'lfJ I R5hfs GlNd-e ( l./:J. U.S,C.
*A rs ,S§ 133 J IN t '+hI ~ \~ ~ Q.'\~r\ f\' 1)1)N AAfS1 u,)J <uc. +k~
~S-f)k-\iON of~~ \lN1~-e~ ~~+~

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 4 of 36

1a 11,L3/ Sir.>femf--Nt

~) UN fllMc.h Iqgs- ~ t- ~\fT5N-h'ff w'A'S Mo\J~cl~Y\I\ ~ruz+~~~
·Cdze.eck o~ CeNtu. -\" ~[~ C,RlZe.d'fcNA ( XAJsHb+-€- COlLf0C to fnA-'i ~N ~ Sek...JeNe£... b f- d.eJ}tR,

5) No(L~N ~llec-h[0AI7Nshhtte wY\\ he12e.af~ be... t'e-F~((­
eJ. -h 11~ Ne,I ¥1V\I1~.

) b);NQl fu~~)( hruse.s I 6mtNroiwt-hve. SejlZ ~ lfuN I Dvt+R Jk~
·Secw<~~( fZ\'s\L G~ ~Rc0)~ C) ~ N.eelS A ~ 0J\RbNic.- 1Jise-
'fp\'fNe.

1)i~ 1'b bpWlNs NCr ~~)< \J-I\\S deGt0NeA hlL~r<Sh­
:f1)eNt k ~ ~.e, ANJ kyON~ it{A+ of NORmAI'p0SDN )fie [soc
. ~m~J- A )A

iJI-IS ~N fA> 5 c~lni&A·eJ-h> by syehtllwd-
)fJ ~ ON I~ '1-9 ~ ~ A'Ncl J~¥-eR e.. ~NmAhz.s 'cu;\-- to dl~
di2"v~ Wii~ hu w Jum~ s A,~&.+Rei"- 1ful'lyly ~n utsr"hw-
N~ -t er~ bteA.oN€s .
,
'~~d\tlVJhJl. M~(tCf)frct..t 'At N~heRN CoNSists of'A- M;W'/t,;j
t b,F . v-RA I Nrtu ~D b ~ 'i/Vl$ N ~'"('j N\ oAolo~ Ii
S ~ N N ~ IN ~ N Q,o~(WONYN \,~. Herms C' s d,~I(-
'1Vn-~~ON dQs,~<\tJ (I ,£ I ~~~ UNt+-)aeltj 1l<el(f)py) albNj ~ d-k'
~~fUl- l ottfe.ct Nr~\A. s,

1~'7k phrNltff1J/1e:)f!.S ..;/(e~e I-echN?fJ. MiL <;, Wfty +Rey If/(e

Ichs:)u1 &be ?N ~ ~J Nyftl ~ ,"'& w\Ld~ fh~1 o~phr9A I MR-

·fQ.. o{- ~Q.\t~frON f'rNt\ ~\JeN ·t\\.errz

*~ N~rA6eR~ ttw-\- .ft,R. C) Nd

RsJ)L~) ~'

Uu?k
f1fG

N\a.\~s\ Qp RitNd
N~~~s ~~J
ext 0 \-\~ \-\h

'

Qi V?oolf~+e
tducfl'-HbtI

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 5 of 36

.J;£)~t

/tNd ~JeJ ~rzi5
I ~ 6t~ ItN \ ~tl

~~\elNC~YMeerNvIhswYo1'~~'+R~€-~UM.Se, CNoNs·h·rltfrO~(N)+raoNNJ..·t-Re-

Iv IP7J~ pJII'tNkff /rrts No (l"'ecoUllSer k/fll~ IV C.I.s Suf~~Y
:wh~ \JL lMJ~ a beN4eN c,e., v FJ'€fitR.

I~ ~iY\ j~1~ -h c/;;fe., p/;Jr).lfrf+ hf)S ~ kVJ~j ltv /ldm/JI/lsf.
Jlfj-hve ~ ~\I e..~at~ a/h ~j f,lYI),}JrJ-eS wAQfV'I (!. rn ., jJ7J l:P ~
·h 0~N.mJ'1 ~)'rl;tN.

J~TJIh'Vhff- )Jow sufJeRs ~M psyclw!o5YC/lJ/JAIl '£,na/roNk/
I.? bl-em 5 du.. ~I" ~ ~t~ J ft1v l ~or~I ~ 0 f Df/?,efl.. IlJrn':fllJi -
'5 J1enAve .jflk.akJ, ~ lflllY-l.Q.j> ec'1- ~ bBcl[ fa
~ ~fll) / DplA J,Ll ~CN o st hOf1\-e. ~

J0 PlttftthFI hll s r-eln/liweJ rdk liNd ecwffJJeJ·ft, hls . ' f:I>1n JI :Ce/l hrL c?-~hOLA1LS a day, day 8~ d~-[:,a.. Ii' yKS.
I
Is)Plfh"Nfrffi cell 15 eNhl?eJy /00 SIl}/JI/ 10 CoN!YNe,!tNy livclrlllJllIIl ,hfl... So JDlVj' a !rIYJe, w'(M olv/y ONe. hDUR cletB/lW.e.

10 /A.IL Ivnp f(jJ luR.~ nV);/nflJ-hv!+s' cell VJ1lly -eaxcessyv.e/11
wh~ .,+50 he ou-l-s.'td.e. {Rel~ 0 preess~ve. hea.t-'tNstd-e.. VtNo.
\}.)\\q>J \'\-S ~\c\. oU:\-sl'd ~ We... heAts NoN €4?5h"f\!,S YNsrd-e..

) ~~ p/mw-h{f~ If y/2f oN c!.f/t!l?7bw 1tJ- N,C.I SIAPfWYJllX ~e.
IhftSW-evet<. ~ -a ~((.e.. dill Jt.

)~~,c6.:N4s. \~~~ \~WcR ~~~Dh'oNI}J I\N~ ?h~0fcA\ W~\\ b€XNj o~ ~\ftfr·d~.

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 6 of 36

~
I~ 1fl11',-/i.F+s rlod-e./l/l'dj»>; wIk oJ/M.. AUfifIlN WNj~ 1'::, Not-
Sllftt I N1- 1l1f1S . ~ ~i :) V. TS.\:J.

i~)Jk,e~ a~~ No ecL~CII-It~1+ I oft w~'(LI~·t<5\litti\s ~vltdab!~ 81:N.Q.I Sl.\.FlV}fN HJ \jlo\A-Ko\\l of c..1 s~\aw t~5. 1<6-10p

J~7Ae, pJIWNIrPf f-s Nvl- pe121n-rfkJ. -oQeeSs ·10 d':J~~~ KoofY).

~ 7X~ plMp;.;h~lf hils No-/- ~ ~Mrfkci ac.~ ·10 USe, 1R.e.-
. rrYfYINflS'fU/Vl 'iN A/5 )r y/Z5 I f l l i e . I SLtpellmfJ-X,

~17u-l/mw'61f ~e(cr5.e.. ~ lt fuNP/re.s a /z-€.. ~)1Vf{n1J ~ oNCe p-
'iN(?Q.,IC fuR. 2- hR. )~Je(.~v do/s [2 IN SNow skI- 01( S~/,N-e
,ou.~ <otde J ~h.Q.N ~\I'Y\ {.~\A-·Lpt~'Y\e"Jt- '~ b~'()U0\'t-- ~l;.JI\.f.

~ 1~ pJtnl./-IrH~ tveNl/~ shllhjhl- yl25 ~ rll?(!)JJfhvcJ4f~ Cw-h~/

, d.de~ckrIs (,UU!.J/lssueci #({hrI as .j~/2fIJ of. r-e/r;j'}JffoN fofL

.wT#! ,8NOWefL ,tJfYlftfes behlhl'lDR:A/ F")~V)

CIJPh.J CS~ W

J. ,)J:

~~ 'T/,~fIihNlrf~ Ys ~~Srdeptd(/eJ f)Ocess Ack'Uy 01irs ~III
'Ii.. JrY( I1dlY<?Nlr~eJ!., 1l++Mt/I\.;-j--}3 Re.t~1s/GYl/ evANce-,)

J91k fltmv/rlfts )Vai- a/lowed lRe-oP?QR..fw.t,Uht /J(( CcivS~ ~ i-eJ
r-e./; 'Jbt4S S f(vlC.. ~ 1+ fUNlSbfYJ&vf re.sef(JJ.(?C 'h>fL fI/hl/N'skdJ..
lVe '> ts~ 8 -b"'~ 8~1ui;tufYlAk~.~ fi-ft ~
:fl)T4-p/fJ)Nl-tff rs be:~\ d(Vv:ed t,.J//Ie ·s·h CnPJ,-J;~f
~ (Yl ~ - \ o\)J ~ J \c,S.-rw"\\ . tA-t- A .~ .~I O\D ) "J)'fi5 te61 :\. ,{\ v..0 Q,t-H- ~~(\l .0\ k ~fNl,shzw1fu~ ·~5e.~
~'011b """\ rtv.S IrV I¥\A ks ,

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 7 of 36

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 8 of 36

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 9 of 36

M
rth(pfMI ~\ch I \q b ~.1~ at '3~~ - q'~

\t-u. :3~~h~'lT(U1 ~ll%tJ-e.~ ll\.l NOiUvvA-\ ~ ~\.)~tk-t)NS M
obS"' A~s l's ~\\utl2- SLtf..tfcieN1- cl.epoch..a.e., ttvt'V\ iR(..
odtN,f\{/.V YNidlWf-s cJ-ptd~"-I \'I'k- +.: ~W'~ p((v('£-
d.~A--\ clUL.. fAU>('R..~.4 'PR.~~CN lANk ~~N' ~ rs No pefcY~ 9-A/~ to .1~8~ ~~.
\)el(Ji,/ 0 ~ ~/rtiu~ PI- J,.trrM& A~ ) hu-t ~ ~ 5bLcl
'bclf.eNe.... ~+- L:)he/2.e..\leIL It(, b-i)"i)6\l l,oN-e.- rs I.k/+{'-
,,~{),kit dillt;">N{J fh.;I~-"j 0I1.e.fL3 (,,s- days Sfi'h-s·fh..c.
iKe. 8~dfHZOt,

01,) 1k-fJa~iJ kl+ h/l-S ~ fNC!/}(LC€IlA--lel A-t- N, C..I
3~{UY\4ty TN SD.J?~ CJJtJ~NemeN+-~fL OVeJ( I~ yllS
..f{Lo~ fYJfNleh }99r- -f.o da-b -'

3V7k R' .J/XJtr ~ cCClAS~S sartl d.e:~d~~~ of. dek~k

rN~~~eNc€t J -R~t- b~ \J1i))A1fD0 hf~ IIShl- +0 he·k

.t + {'~ ~ ~Yve Nt> r"&~ . 71.R- da~ room AJ.SUeN~ ~ c.eil

~~S -;l~3 J:lS" - J;l3 MA-\Ut.o 'C Co\.JS

JfQ),\it"?\ ND~~e

thw\- ~fI\eo ~ 1~ V~/~(lL ~ CN-* su,(l. 1Ahftt ~b

CIl\I~ ;L~/7 ~h\ch cJl.~R.M h\,S I"'~~'O d~iUlJ')~

~1~ o · ~\'Uf a~ w<:.H ~S ~\J~ ?\'c3tL)~++- 0£:~~y~

~ ps~dlo\Oj,~ \ ~~ c\

~ 'U,CUl.clv1 N f£~

tNflte~ ~N W\~ ~c>\~~tGA \ 0M+rHc;:th'o~ ~N vro}/t-

.t'm-J t) p\AiN-H+-f-S ~ tl 1tineN<ime,N,L ,..rshls .~ee nH-- L)

~)7k J0Jfh~trft ~~ d~~ of d.e1~w·k i'Nd-
\~f(.~L"(!t,i((je~NC~\<1'b~'I(LS~(b,-\~~~ ~5~~ft!t O~U\)t4-\~t-\~-~dU'~?'R.y~j~) ~~ ~o -l\

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 10 of 36

kk
3~ TAI0 P/w,JJkU

Set f--kRS

hlcj\'\ 7 TS"t . Jt+&L,L<.\J.

slocK. 4k Ccwitt-s (X"i-)""c-few<:.L10 ~\i'e.ue.., fW.tSvN.e.RS

ON d.e.o.-\-R rO v.:> h.e~.l YN 'ooltk,/ ~N h-NO"vJt W()\Cld

NO~ \"o'i,Q.$s, 't>ome., I'V\WI-o \ Y\\N.tSS /tNcL -H<-a:l- g.:l ha.~ '<L

+e.. da~ Q.oN A-Ne.f7leiVt- ItNcl \-a.clL ot- 'eN,! rcal ~al r"'feR-
U¥lCl''{ WDul&N'~ e.,(11-c.~b-a -\-l{-at-- l'\eNtn I dll\le.~ .

'10 771t.. p,!c,;N H+ hAS ['ST-l-N~ OI\Jt.. Itokw+e.er-- ~)lecuho·

N A·NcL.NlMVl~O\.l!' otRw. d..e..o..tl tow j'vMf.\m MeJJ~1

,10 d e.Wfo~affcN . NItfi1e~ JIA.Q~ rue.N~li [h..SIM:l+- I?,~k .;loB
I\l-;).:~olTn ~r"\L ~\:'b \:e.ll ~d..:l3 .::1,.,. g.::lS-

tv r -rk. ('I\/It./ 1I'IW\1I1I'1 S'->ttp~ '4. 'Ml b b(U,~'i~/-cL,UD
~ med:Ml.l-tt.. t-Jwuji.<lD>") ~ 141L~'1l'.¥~da0 MWA3

it... au}. o.f:.kxs fI''(vcl'<l,\ot''-l ON

J611.. &s\«it-9013 {h,~

-h, h~~ ~f)S N<>t- I'~.e.l {\u,lV\ ~ \tU f'IIfN~1 kAl.i.l

\1..,1~ fh,l tL UflS +k ttrltb.. \'{UJI IL cL,wN _L w}"e..r"ed. ,

4U IkJL+e.vJ.ON1s vIDh-kJ \l""b\(~k.J, plU>k~j."' A· 1
..,~cl.stJ..s of- CfhL~. ~a.. +I<e.. ?a.."s,:NS 9WN -pR.l>uclv..a..e.s -R,(Lf'IIeA~ CA I e..~ +fuII. i)l,.;,N 1>tA-...xkMd..}/pR.oc.u1..£es
pQ.oU1d.t.. Q,.rRCwv\~~1'l1 e»'itLwCR-+R4+~ f~SAN 'hell Il-h Cf\Q..e.. .'\ck ICu~S. d.e.~~~,:> ~c\. 1..Jfl't0yt..; Mlli-t.. ~ It; ~\)~dfu\Je\:)I:>~ (N~~-I-o k.IIM.J.. ..'" cl;s(!.o~~V ILr-.ltw l:)-P c. S\Lbstf.h..)-Ke'\ d&\C. 0+ ~ldi)us.
,hlWM ~ -tRos.e. fN~~-\.eJ. f\J-N,(.I- kvel s ~
~ klo"') ~o~ ot-kh\~' ~~ ,.U"J.~,+c. )

q~ 7lIL phJlNk# rrli!O~;,> tRt.. cldeAJdltVts Rn-/ed 1", full~ f~T()Ij1}1 sta-..,~ flS ~\\ ttS pIU&i:)\l {i\~rCA \ ~ ~(Wk\s (',~ A~>.)s.ki'l'",)) ck\~~-k-rNdttfcR~' Net.., -rh~1Z... 0\>.)10 ~AM.As. fru&.: pl!.tsbla-fl.l'.....wrd.lWClt.

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 11 of 36

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 12 of 36

~6~ )~L ~

p\ ." ~f+- b~.\lW-G6 ~ F~~

tNC-~ 1'1+

. . +R~ 1:.1'4k_,Y'f JC..uoc,)\.eJ~ a...,

t-'~poNS.Q; oa...I'lUk ~tt D' ::)a rmd ~\ fL rNdrorJulJl.

~Io) -)Tih-e~-fpYl\~I;N0rh~"W~lt+-Ah~1sI.e0h.elotveD., VdW~\-*oN~<QPfBtu&tt~1~~~yRd.S ~N lA'JWfYv\t.N.Qt)oZoN~
rtN~ t-~\L\t£.s. ciy~~~~ 0+ plAi0kf-fs t"fshl:S I p~~tC41
·FtN6.. V¥\{AJkl d~}-eJLfQf2J+fft)N ftN.J.. p'S~~\\;)~r~ \ dJtm,flS~
1j'fMS of scAvhw.V CoI,rf}N~+ lAI~l l'" l-l.o+ ON fl~...,­ -kf..f-:

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 13 of 36

1jq)

MMI?\\>.Il)l.~l\e.,Ak~U\f~--a&f.\ A'd1I.cI0-~-Sk(O.oU.

~~ ski f\At-- \CLp~
'dS LA.> . II

~\i''j ~ Io"j w +Re-
~s --I-R1.eiL.. o1'M"(;+1'1~1\~:eMflr~(l),N--l'l-j<~WJ.

~-\~~1~\J~ ?\MJish~ 5lt~ka..etl \.oi t~ p) iu+r#

+R oV.e,fL

y.wa.s ~ 0 ~ cL.,e.K6~ ~ 0 •

50) ON :kbVv{ZAlLLI g.~lJtl \C\Q7 ~tR \Lol,J ~~l0f2.0~P
~~l)iJl ~SSrs~m.W\-

~1I) ~N msy 141L Iqq7 k+R 120~ 'G~ 01U>L<f r-e.cJ2~
·-\iON,

f:2) DN j)'fL 'db~tA,-\- \f\B.~ \4~ ltil) 7 J-td-k. ~ H~ ~fUu.p

R'fL M~~ls j 0 ~cb~ d~ I(){)M

~cl ~cLo\1NNer-.

6"~Dt N()V~ )S+-J99f tA:;f{l!t+-k fV}j~/72"S.3 c,+~-kJ 6lAicjcLe.J IN h~S c.-e-1I J -abJ.e, ON ~RA. BM-P-I- 'e()~1t;'\\.e­
~~ n;O\)PM' ·-rk N~,,-I- d~~y ~,/ j'tk'f a,cA~I/I"Iif..6
~?~A..

S"0@D\~~o\~JVV~ lbe1~ l..& 1\)+4.t!Al·tq'J~lt·kGt) M~+~){-(HhtIMNJ~'t)Wl-~+i0O(l)~bpr.rloflCh.-~J 4
N()1Ur\A \ SoON.

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 14 of 36

5~PI\l ~W qu..l<l%' 'P\Il"i..J~p~"d.S~I'" -;,r\))Ut, ~

V0th"Lb C~(L~j k,y ~ +'ov.,(L 0 ~ h'-f,y rh~ ~~.3 to)d

6 WtTlUltN
~(L bMoN

+

OTt>
ks

(V\~"3
-trfT

ffRtNiNcSl&M"~t"SOoIL6~rv6let.&.+o0N.4N/co.lfl,M+-r0:JJ)

W)4) ~
4k

?O\Y1i'CAl e..l'?~~~~ l,J II bi bi :krl u'4L +u \Lo-ss 5> ~u,c.\Jde

M~pt-) ·

51) ON .I-{b~~ ISI-I~~' "1J~C2.0"jlV\>l4~eJLf .~ IV\-u~ ks oJh

Cei\t\Je;tCSi~~ Wl~
m~G\JiL ~dP~A tel

~ c- NW ~ W~MW~+GO1o)1tV\e.3~\lJl.~ecr lGIMGl

.e ~ Lft(l,(l,Y rrty.tR.S

'S~ DN ie1VJ(UW4/ 7#-- J~9't J-NmAk ~ J Ge16 ~
~ b'j W~ ~I ~,.eiLS (hv~ ~SSi\)
N~ ~tJhN -:5 Aiuns-ha~ of- pJo+l ":'\ aN ~cA .
~~ (.dl~J~kr seve.-, ~ ,~ kL~ ~ \awV.e1l,

L,~: ON (Ylftlck Jll{ J~~? ~/~Nft,* 5p~J& ~ /YlfbClrL l7~m~
~ 1hutl fi11ljO{L fY},lkl /JrJ·oie. fhucLw~~ HB8~J )~WeL£..No+- )ost~ 'CWy~. ci~ .h, I01l14J-k i..>eU:s
ftvJ.~'o"i5 I

0G~~~ I\- \">u'\L ot: In ~Nve,l'C ~o wAR 'bo~

MIt)()R.,D
S(lbM

d.e.o.,t-R
~ f"-J

b\L\)ew~

W~So

sR-+.mup-Pe--&a'Jt~clyfhh)&,:\\:U.dI~"fy

dr.·""1
io M

U,'1~ \..0~~ ~~'Sf0fV)WT~ ~l~ c.o\l~cA{~

?~~~~~ - ~ N.o cl~p\Loc...~ ~

~~ ,c,qq ~d~ f''&fo1r~~ ~'~QA~ k-hLeJlJeJ
.t¥s f\N. ?~~ &e.~~e:\iv~ 10~~~1..J ~u\~ J
~ . &~

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 15 of 36

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 16 of 36

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 17 of 36

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 18 of 36

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 19 of 36

·
7~~.~C\fo)N1Ni-kF~

hf~lNo~. f~

{( ~
af:-ali·tu

do

wY+-k

S'ar~rl\J(JJdeN+-~

7~fJ (!-ere. ~ /oo/cj,uIvN/sAHkedut0A/ W~ ovd , p)elN Ir 1 oA'~
~J'ItR (y~ d£a.t.R I ~ rNlhl}t~ we,(Z.Q--:puJ ()~ ff-J~eI~Nrt
~W~/,-}h. CbUt6-kve.., ~tsh fn0Jt DV--+ l-a~_~.c _l· ~ L CrefJt-
VA- ~V-tN froN. JI.f ~/frrJ.eJJJm~Nf Vto /1} hVoN,

7~) ~ 11~'( 1 ?J ~-I... G-O} 0 , ~ k -- f\- I~;( ~e .\Q.\~M ·N~.r ) a.c

cl~N - W 4-h Cv~ ecJ~et). . \)\ . 1Ji~V~ - ON ~IL
QQ.:h+\\j"{}(LY Me.tLS~-1U.alf2eht/~-e.-Jrt>I\j ~J ON-t. fL f[,ra,~ 0

'0.DNH:'CAk l ~~+y ~ch S~ VII CroM{\'~iSSh..,e_t I-N C:t,

:~ ~.ft)l ,9/sG:1 /rleJ} CN'Itbl J,AJltt/* ~.IJ.-fl-a foam a5J{,~

~N W~ A~ 1I1YJ ) QutJ20S G/.ekvM,dj -j~ 'fpfttrM ~ )~A f .§rbk..

,-e SDl\.J
'Cftp1N

WeR -\~A53iN6 (1h ,)/~~-re-NdnN1

fR~N D4I4At. +~ ~ r--e/lJ
~~_e.. ltl+fJchme,ub F)

It

11l>N

by +ReI'!

7V :Ov- fYJny?:/A.QoIO btJ~ ()~"WftNceS ~ cb1e.d

%~dny w~~tJk f2x6~f-k,1lfr eN 9bo / ·{bfL ~rssli:j /YJ;~n3TNeS L.-1eR.L
bir~ JDO t A. fNh, [s~ /ff-!.uc6/IJw/- (})
'69.DN {Y}ny ~Js~d.oI D It/d fV<; /eJv'el;) ~fjeveNce5 Aft f(eh)r .
t4 1J-ky_JY)€C(St4l.tUJ/I2eIJ)/;IJ/tay A~ fLLSftllh"Nfs.l firII o)/(€ ~fl.
'CMf&(!g~ )~ f{UJf'dl/y ~
~~)ICNjlAN€-/5'fe2o)O ':;1 ,~[lJWIfN~ O~ Ikt /-rrIUw f~7
lullS dwruf CS~ ~f-.k'c.hlnetVl F)

~ .()V~jwve-;;:)tvc(O-u)~ fYvI/ SR.t€JIHNCJL tva... f2~j1Ji(phDN t M0h~Ni5 wtr.S d~'f,<-J.C'5~lt-ffl~lYleA/f F)

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 20 of 36
cQ)~d:
'60~tk 0~fWt)N . hf'{ve... ~ ~klt~&kJ b~ pJfWN~ ~ rM lie 01'2-
.dA-Nee.- ~\-\..R \IN<<~tu.K l>, OL. f \~ ~ ltv 'brfL.eC.*V~S
.l,J,tk No ~h~~ ~ 1t~J.It\~ ) ~~~ P1fhL h~9tt901o 1 d plJ\"'N-k ' ~1P3 hAd No hM6lJj
IDlLrruvikrJ.s h) k p)m'~u'5 w~~ 'f>\ffitJ1r~~ )"'5 DN 0eShun~Jt­ ~-ks ~l,.;~ h~~ fe~t0 \~Rm ;I II Lu S +lfluN. Nt> dU<L
, ,?~~.
/f ~~~~ ?\fWNh ~t- ~ ~ 6N +rd~f-·k .~(L ~ 12 YflS paAD«- -t'" ~ I~cr d-€A...\1-s ~l\ ~w odLdow N •.
b-p'Y) ~NI>H i2€Cerl/<!d. a k ICeI- /.iL M.tJ'j ~H- 0 t/l.e-CoId hMd
Iphi)N.e... wr~ ) t'tv wlv --" II e.s h/}(,('fium be!v'/UL bel'j bflVk,j/vI- J...,
NI C,I- S'vtp.tRfo-lh/, ~) PlIh~/rfl5 "AIle- f.,.jflS mtt:f~ of WfPeK wlwVI $'I:11r:d 6e;~
~ 110 ~ (vvlJ q{)\s wn~~e-rc.ythJj \y~. .{fbe4LqJhes.
~~'fJFtfAJ~4F ~~ sf))cl~\ee., ~1L t>VeJ( lD yes. (hJJcWeveLfG.ecetllec{
. ~y 1\cJ(Q,15 ~ y+- d~":SNLuY\~1AAJ shttJ~wN
q~V\ffiN1tf+ A\I~'e.s all f2-.?1pe£+y I \AS 0'- of ~~~$J )DS,S ff'l
Qe.\l ~\f)'fS~ ~f)ffL J ~wI )\/ tDlA-o Mf)-~!Y"'N ~ I ,II sb ~~\
. ,"")'\'d:11' J-t/ ~.} 'A1vCLy MeM~~ C~, fZtltJ I;A-M "* 4/low c\\' ;J by c.oIbiw. ~I .t-m«?j\j+. AI pLJJ I~ pJ~y ~ I-R<b ILv 9~(),Y
B .G WIl. ~ ~,."fe. ,.cfA::tl ) d:~fWfl~ 11+().c/)e~ '('e.~ckJ~A d~p htt ",f.
JR.'" t'CA..J f/-S ll~~LlQ.f\.)tJ ~~~ ChiII G.~ I vdlMJ ~.
q~ n~ p//hwkfl tN~re.. ~ ~ ~+ '1~S ~f1S. h\)&' ~(~ ~~~s ~J
'?~\j~I~ Q. o+tL~'Pp.eJ ~ ~+- W ON ~ ~~+u jLl~<\. h\M

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 21 of 36

Cwt-
!lAid flWfs slr)/ i}F£d~-J -io I}tl 0#0- Lwei i /iVfY}t}tes.

~71,4. plAMtftff fl//-fJ~ #111 IRnf (1wrsklu!es c£ue/ /tAl UNilS,uitl
f pJJNfs/7!YltN

9~.HAr,\j. /-Iff Ii J'~e5> ~\J-HNLt£(L ISu JA-h°()'P11N r;h~Nlsfll}kv~ %12~a-huo
N~(t I~ yllS JS MueJ fhvd LU\J u&iA# I ?kNI0A/YIe~\j+:

q~ \ lAiNIr Aj/0.f!5> S IrlMy (l"rffNe.tneNf-IJr<. IFyefl{lS IS cRuel
liNd UNUSlL(J'( ? liNlohmeN/-:

/0 '~i!he...pJlI'tfth-f+ !1
*, tSiffZKM1 Jest

J'"

df~~tt'f5tW/cJ.iellrl~

/Ci;w rNlYlllfes /IV Ii Leve/ 1)
flJeIh5LvRes .tmv _/hJ

r 5 bJ;oN<:{ +11111- 0 NWfI1/J / pflJ5 Jy W1 M~ !YJeIiNS 0 0l!i11

ofr t> f/dmfN~~~Ve tS~1 esc1tVN & 1'-fuleS (J£uel/hJd

l,WUSLUJ I plANro)v)1rw/-:

~0:77Je p/;rt),fh!+ (J//f(5(>s ~-/--fR, -,Pkei~ 0 FalJjcNe.. o N /JJ/YJ.
r,vlskurirve. S~'\j2Qc~{)N )JvdeHMDJeIy //\/IINy level 6S'fell..
r -(YJ/tx WDl-lld chu,{J/!.., 'R~-bJe rnwkJl fiNe! F~sych/)/CQf(!/) J
dftmft e. CJvel kJo.lAJ.tcl al IiNr lel~ co)vs-hkk CfCI.- eil97t.)
UAJUS.U4 / ?UNts/)/n.eNi-.

'l~7X;-lj~-A;fif, . /l-JJe 'l!S ~ A-f ~ ''S~/e,. 1sw<'yDrkuimufs'OVJe1
pJfl-.NlrFF ~)~.offct Pr~ ~hj~_&~~~. .fi\ &Do \\ .
N.QI . .((IVlfH. ~~ -- ~Ilee::l~v,e.s Q·4, \.:.; 3.b· 5 qor~ .\DD~1i

f}ssf)NmeNfs: 11Th fflk oF?~ Xr~Sh{) J/ 'k sef- nfwD£JC Le.vel a.

tN I1CJCo(lC{/uve.e,.w'i!h !Jdm,,;vlsfr<A.live-D't.fledyv 1011 7 Nmlfl-e.

'0. Ass (j~meNf hN - 'fOypJftN~ (see.... r~ \~Q. C f.3 '1)l)Q~-hv~

q'~i I . 'Sea A+ , H . y~,v~

~~6')

I

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 22 of 36
: C'hN~
q~rY\ "If; '()\\ ~r:, ~ "'\- ~ Do\)I ltW~hloj-e.- fAIN{l.J "-"If ,:)l-A
A::/j\J~yDe-+eNM ,:S ~o\Jwl ~i1Y\ ~I\, \.~~\ d-- (Yy +0
~t0l 3 ~J(tRo\)J oo~ NO~~ o~ 'OtS~ ~pf2-0~,
'l'l)'VwU\\\h,vi\s yalcl ~ I,Ill"A~ X7 "$ '?.'> fI- wu.IC Xy Wf.C1G, H ,=- $ DSQQ fl- JYloN'+R XI;l. [»{)Ni-RS =$ 4;)0°0 If ye/JiL ,~ ~ ILS)-
C>IlC ~'j 199[; Iv ()ob l .
I~~\ffll\t~t~ ~f\~ ~N frnc\.$ IboO A-MOl\1~ y. y~ ~Ot0\ks =# J~eoo ./} yeflrl.-~iL.. fK~ pN:A--fd-. yemzS. QODI /0 Jofe,
hfl /01) ~ 1/?Q...-. p»6f- J;).. ljellilS plIlfN/ff{ WbU,I<L Ve, MAck ~ IJ;OI./()""
YNskAl ~S ei+f(}J.e1·71 d)bo~ fJ- JrPheNc/~ of $ al<6'60~~
1r41h.e- plitIJIrf!. stnt i&"Sfnk A;-,mcy\) hNdMls" OW~ hllYl
1(1hJl'.i.J/,.1,~~~O1ID),Ir(l.7..~- IJv\~){€Y/j.yj})kb~J -/eJblLSlL6fi(YibCVS!!pIi1NaeN/yYfMTIf"NJ,J-ttLf~FIoycy(<Pp~dk)&tw-1,I.rN.(fsv«s)-hljml-frJhhm.v9Q~.·.D4rJ·~~/fIC.~,­~
)O~1o(L I~ yRS lAN(~a.... i· ~ CbW(lY~ol\iS of CbNiYNeJ'll.eNi-" ~h~ ~11t" ot IN~ff be-\f,t~e) ~\:) shou~c sho<Y\L -H<.Q.., CoI\LSCI"eNOC W~oNe.
0'10 7he.Ii1wk(·!-I)/I~5~ 'furL JK' Y!2S A.e1J I ')'\( d~)~L~ f!1~cJf /}/e IYN Ci)/lfNech tJ:__b. O.C- prdwze. · a~'2rt{)') . /he ?Ruj?fhn ?;S )./0+ -I::rc 'at Used IV.C'.15 04fefCfitfrX pUI'JFr}rv N~9J!'IS. 7hfLp)fHN' /rfl ls Nol- hcuSecL c:t )/·('.I JUf~((')~A-,K' furL H(e- pUvA-JrV~ ~'8IfSo;ys -fAA!- OIilR4CS Me s . f hef(€.

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 23 of 36

CoN +

J05"+~\Rfefl-N~-kffTt{-LcAh\~\~~~~Oh'I(~O30A6

W'A~ 1'A \~ ~iem~0 ~'fV'\
Il6((CIJ"h'04 ~+W~ Ii-J~'~

bfh)~{.,\ kbb Vlvcl ol~~cl30+- CA-p-hv CAhl'JI

It 3~ CiU.Dv~~ hb~~ 1,J~+ p~ ~1\I1\J-tc;-h'ou;J­

S~ ~ C-.Cr.~ '~-Ioa

lA~ 41-S~-Wu~ a J,u..L rrLD~ h0~ +- i~t-·{S

I~~ iS~ Ol\J A- ~·kkCll.~hl LtbUCfy rlVkAr.ut ~~lSOl\JeI( f'\~+ ~~'A·bkoh +RA.f-...JRe., S~k}~5

YN fr;et- Cf~ suA Co trb-€{l;~ rNk;l~t

Jo~ ll-.e..pJaj,v Mis /rraJ<. o f. Il CI!.eA6.,fo -liie ,:;1/ c,,/YIm, S 'I1Ilf
tktVlS, ~ A--h/pl~cAl {tNJ 'b~•.R-ffCkNt httd.sk(p {IV
.rejp-#DN lo Od'NlHty )Nctdurl-s '#--pfliS\:i')J 1,\,Jk ~
r JJf.- C!n\uv?f j~vvClchAse hYSeN 0 C '(~ 5v-clL As h,MR..
~fI..R..co...iJ-e- liM n&. ('))1" ~i'Clh\j) c>,,:!>Me..)7rlUi<. (Vi.()1-;'fwt'3
r J~ hl1if{. ot 1/ dN~' 7 JO$S stro,u..6/-Doo -e.e\ I hM'1l. blltts~
~d- . -...l-h w()u.tl k ON.e...~j -b h Ve::'f." d..o w'rMod-
8:&1~ ybs ~ .1.. yR.lH<-) bU,+- JNcld'(kJ'I~e~ r~ a6'Su,(Ld

~eA,;" EXh-aus1:loN

lo~ R+~~ h~+0 \c> cluC,lMY\€f\t ht-WoN CrtJMAte..., C~IWaNtt
-h,ilJY\ Lt.AJ~( 1- ~cl ~) -to d€J'f\Ott ~h2Ak pJm:#J11Ft:s d)~ft;aNce,
w'\\R ~h'a~~)ol~ rLAI~ a~ 'alz;kcu/a+-d 'N j2rCJM'iZ5XbON
\1, CommTSSIoNf'R, f.T Q JJ 27 CcNN'/Iff' ~b/ &b3 A'~ 75~
(20bS)

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 24 of 36

·The- tdrtJNS of' d~.0b.~k J fIam~'i COM,,,,,,,s~fD"'f.IL, If;)..

toe.. /flays (~ ~N) ~ ~ J I

~J\)\)~ , - Lj :) ~, ~ ;> ~~If)J P- th~

j ~N Do ~~) b ~:~ \Cv..f ~~. (l!~)~7'6 h"l ~ Jb )

,\.<6 jl)hN~ ;> ~~ ~ ~q j~~N '~ QApt~) -#-1 N2~ wfl2det0

*'1\::\1 -j()\,tU l>o~_Jl~'\)\)fL) I \ 0bhN x ftYfL)- f~ j~N ~~ ~ A~
I~ G. ~ Vt+NNi .DIY)i:'~{w il~~ !\CIS- ~Ol" \( 1il-~ij\J( ~1i .t0 Jl: (, /1J~) ~Q1\cl.NaN ~ . ()\)(L it:" n 3thN ):)Oe:..&\I\)D 0{t \t JohN~'e..- ~~ -tJ:. f(

lA~P V' ~\i,e ~ ~jAicte0 .~ emil;' C(Y-)ks ~/iJ{)r0:J ;11 ORrsJtN~

Wv\~<k. . ~(~) ~ \\\~ "'\)A \ Lf-\)\) e..~~ a.),ij: :;l3 j hN .ve.

;0f\pt0#~ \ IlJt?-I2etS/f- UJflJh ~1\mrS&f()N-e ) 1:l:.Q C)u)'N s lL~

i~
\..,.)

t\~JeN\*~b W.deN) ~

j

Lyt~flrt.

X~MeGLrtIhl~l)4(€d1.ei,~1U2'AAv~ve\NfrJ7

)2o~er~\A
9 - .Ii'/), s>

;"~,3Mf~('e~)

· ~ rlj~e! \.tit ~ (Wfll2~~~ ~t:o\ 1rt~ e,(l. d pWf)fJ.eJ0-~ ~ L.

~J~R~~.e ~ ~leNJ ~, ~6DN Cflh,J} ~\ #-3~, L 0.ArmoNe.

;Cw)Mi$1Q1jt~ ~:\:-65" Edwft{ll n}pJdDN Ida (~AaJ;N) . 010 err( dep

Wf\£d..eN)· -31 IV\Vw\\\0~ d~ w L£l~ 4F 38 \. ~ 01lp-JiJ.) ~m

If'l fr; dn-tc. hfJve- showN /J. de/i/JeRfik 'INdrf{f,.lleNCe -/0 pllflNfJrr

5 w \\ bt1N~. I~\- \)\0\ -W&l 0 \ . N11fis ~ ~k. A~e f2.f:J,I-.

A). "TAe, gebdltNk fcku~~~cl It--) \JAQA~AJ?h AbtAlewyll ~eie..ati-erL
.k ~~~R.~~~ \\~ ~~ 0tAte A~e;\Jc( -be~~dJtNtS.

B), Ih€.- ~DN~ 0\- i-R~ ~~-\-e, AS~c~)) ~eNdl)~,r\:s" ~R-eAhl C0Ndt~NS of- Qou\lN~ftI~l-J~' -h>\L \~ ~«5 ~t e.ot\lsh~+€5> ceuei
·fuv6. OvJU'alft\ ~ii>hff\0-Jt YN \lfol(rff'()~ ot- t>\ITINf)'{i-s ~ tk f\p'\eN-
.dmeNt ·R\~hts.

C) A& A ~lA\\- 0 1 CL f(~~~ e.. J\StNc~"De N~Nts'l WAN~\)N \ ~ c\(-
,,~'i>S c\i~~\J~~ \:J \ "t-r\11f f'N hI S h~h . ()\J~R. , . s- \~ '1e.~
~ hAS v\l~~tl c.\\J.;Q.. ~ ~..;) ~A~Wo"'~ 0 ~~N~eNt-

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 25 of 36

tVl'.)\:
b ~~ ~C:D\~\M) 't1c\C ot {Y\~hi \ h<Ui \+h CAR~ J C'AlA'6l~
.~(2.(2,~fLJt'6k- meNm\ .~lJ ~ ,0\\0\ 8Q11 \ C\PI 1\\iL ~ ~·tA te... A~.r~ ~. <w~~~J..~' QlLV-~\ f\ ~ ~\J.bU~ '\ ~+-.)ichrt\-eN+. ~ ~

C,\\1<m ~(L1e\i~t
1Rers L~A l ~1'0\\l lq~ /kJeNJm~j\(1-

ty 7J..e.. .(;yiu.R<?.- of '$+nk Aj ~Ct/' . k"'MO>lh~' 1 - IWJ;Q.J\(j\'J\'1f
\.v~*, It 1t1..J'aIf A.l~eAJJr6 C.~i "" i VoiAtl'tlN 0 hll:; I J fiNd
14tl /trtl€NdmeNf %.h

~ -rAe- fB,.,lu{? t- f 1'0J)i As,fN YlJ~o.Nd(INtsI, -k p0DvtJe.. t!,wNJr{f
h~~ Ui\t -p2u,~4 ro'N oFiRe.-/{tw by' deNtJJoN~ Jlr/VI CDry0IlQ~ 'f"-re.I\)C.olA.S '5eRV10 S 'iN \)YDIA-JrO of hr5 /~f lfMd Itlll/bYJeNdMeN+
t-\&T)ts .

c.) IA~ pJMN-h-t+- Ai1-'b 6 diA-jlJosel £.; i/R P7s,··I).
nil- ~ tfSfRk. Al eNcyD~f€NM-Arl-s.'l/}cirDNs A!}s Jed j/?f-p)fh frr{. ~y.d\.OIDb" I A~ .et1'lO'froN4) f'Wb\eM~ dl.\ 40 ~iNj i6a.IA ~ 1(\\,(>", ,,~~ 0.oN{iN.e~ ~~ hllllRS (\ dA·/ -h l& yRS, ~h'ich CW-ffi.\.es j:\Yv~~e.ti \I\t0c\ 8~?-WCJtN+- hm-zisktp ON 'Sffld ~ffiN1) r", ,~~A-\)o~ \b\R~_ o~b~f\l(y \t\Jcrd-e.J.l+s of. . R3~DN \.l e..

f) -rhe.:rStHk.. AeN~ \)~f'eN~ts-, RnIt.U2~ ~ CoMp\{w,\R. tRe-
ce«)~ ~ b. ~"D c.\IC~-e Df-1R~\ 4~ AmtWJm~+-. cJef}{ll~ de-
f'f'cN ~~f\.k~ ".+NV?J1b.tS d.~&Q.ilrmYNA-h'ON. f\J'lc\ Kt~ 11'A·ky +ReA .('4)e,N f-,

~) ~~S 0 f "~k A,seNCY})e\eJ'\6J:wls' -\-1II£1'-1.s '(1w~ ~\MJ'

cut 1'l-\\~ ~f\\ - IZJ) fUf{.: I ~I

S t a h€.f\R:( l\J f 6vlLQ.. 't t) OJ(

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 26 of 36

(£A,A~
,~N\~e,s 'Ccl~OMS f~\\3 wv~eR ~eRA-\ ~*l\-\,a~~()i'l nvcl
r e.v\~\;,,~ ~I~:~h lV\Q,Nt 0 \J1\)O\~+r~\\l ot ,?\fflt-l hffs 5~, 8' fJ.~J
li-l ~ ~J.ft\QNJ t"'fOhts.

r.) ]he-"S~k A-seNC{D~' t",dAJ s ' i eft. \,l" 0 Qe.hlI'l'1 ~
'w11S ~'\rK~N \ 1 \ft)J'~ht D~ (NdthN'fk t-'e6~ i\th shlt~s ft&m
\V\~h 9c>\D~ ~)W"(~\- 'C ,~ \) ot-.l l~ d~()l0~:J62A+eS
~~ej Re~\~~ ~ ~~t'N TN \ttbJAtrDN of h15 5 t7?ftt-JPJ J~tIi
Am€Nkn~'Jt i<,~h r CI?J?fi-h~ (i€/ibefllli-e..llvdrff.eiZeNc.e )tnfJ-/rcIDI1S
A-N~ 5f)JYsHe- /Nkvf) d<fRfvnffolV of hi ~ i2(shh 0 b...J,"li /JI;eRhj; /tNd A~ft '#///'N,d £jNrf/ccHNi-hlltJshtp.

to H)1Je- ~/u ~ I- 'SlnkA eNCj; b~ \
10 )Nvr'drOtA5 drsO-rzY/)1Y/'#lIf'CN ~'(flftl'Wftl.f dk

-/vp fl?er~ !v's h ,tN

0"1 dtelJtk f20w by ~1-rA..-5 Min /J-.. If !dJWJ./I k;;k~e...

·sesf2...e.s -frDkJ jftJtniJ-fe- wh~", hes VrO /II,kJ No .O .Q.. RM,\ :S

che.ectYlI.eS DYL po\yc,L( tu k fka~ D~ r",d~.w"dk ~jAltshuJ.jyV

.e. 3e5Clfl-huD)'I sk-hts .

I):TAe.., 110tn)Ns, f ~h1fe, A!:lNC,! t~~~fs \r-etno~ I 0 :5fli>';:-f
N G) ~((blvf CQJ, \f.0 rtiD a~(\. ~~ c\'('-.). ~ \ (\lA; -to L
;k S 0 8.tv H<t..(L \\5 IlNduc <:u\\.,e,c.1'rVe ' v..-~rshrY)€.J'ff-. ~h4 i - ou~ \~~\ / tR~ G-e.Ne>J4 (1NveNi'f~ fhJG\. A\)~bJA+rM~
~ \.~\t{"\ ECO\M \ r\Uf~t> ~r~)h~5·a ef) vtDIA-h°oN of Ars
,l A't-.)b.. \Lj ~ (ht\£NMvI€N1- RfS% .

CItnt\') h f "K" \i€ t· \ XlR.-XRn0o- 1'1 fi./lmeAJ(fmPlvt Riyt$

A) 7f,<L'~ w~~It"'+s' flCW()I\\ O\l\'R.. \"6 VI<S <Ul0'I+4
a (\.e.P"\JA1\l>N (9 e.. ~\A"(I\\1'i'fts bb€{Gtv IN+de.&t.

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 27 of 36

~ 7j,.e.. f)C:troNS, 0 ~ "Sk-/e-. AS.eN<-;t -:De e!'Idt,...rls " !'N ~ P'I~ -p\A:JN ts .ON tMd~N->~e IJclmrNt~li2fJ,fj'\le, SeStZ~a:JtcJN S~lQ \e&ecr
Ihtfl' -to,A-fyptcn I ANd Sr~/fiCftwl-h/ft2Js/Jtf PfL If YRS which
'C£) str+w+e s c.f2u~J IINd1WuSUA I 'P~lAl fshfl)€N-r 1S JIJ Vli}/II1tDI''' of
hts 'It-/. /1WJ )¥M /JrtJ.eNdfIJeNf i25/)

c.) n r''b~k ASfNcy~bJAX+s" ~k..R~ -\0 SV.f.. rlltrl~flfF a j)J-
JMII,'skJkve &S/2€-.S"21rolJ hemci~.J. r dr5 18' yR5 .+- Ai C·L
S~.f(m~ IS '"IN Y"hlA-tfDN of his dwz..- p~ :.. I~ ·~( /17I'l€.NJ-
rf't'l.eN.J- f 'ohtS .

'b) "the."S},;k Aj,f?I'I XWe",.k..fs" k.r.d p/IltNh{{- Ar5>,1ue..,,~6

.e.S$ ishis /t"Fh~.ed ArM by Nol- ~bli5ht~\ wAy.- !JI.'S I.~~kf

smk r: L.- f)·ul. 0l2PlAf cl 6Jr5 ,VJl1 ~ kRmYNJlt-ed , ~fY\ f!1~ch j99J~

./1; c/~~ }J9. J.leM.J~ . '\N\wr ~'t~ ~\tnNhF ch, ">f<-

ASeNcy

\:)efeNdimh1 ~ 0\)/.)-h't:, -»{et it v:oIAffNj i'Mf J~ j.f.. !1mfNiMeNf tej h7-s.

s z;) I ~k Asehcy\)~~~ {fflJUllf., -J."Sve.. pJR1I'Jlrf'f aheAd'5 ~fV1 /f/jflcJ, f).olo fo d-afe &k{2. p/(3;;je/IJeNl-ow r-esfl(Jh'Nf ~·fnJu5 VfDJ/ffy~~V due p£oce~ I2Islrls ILjIf.f}p~'jYJ/!PIf.

f) 'dS~k !iseN0Y'tx+eJ\JJlmkf ~If(lj( d~RfVe E,/IH}J~vfl- ()f
icJNY (tJe;w.s of Ocm1i5 off of /JJn,rAJJ5~1Y SeS~ yrltDN
-f1rlus.Ji.I l/IO/l}h'tJN of?Jinrw/r{1S duefRoc~s /J~EDu/J / P{tes/ec,/JbN WMPtNd J'IM/hnt!vd;n-eNi- P-tshb

G-) 1h.e.. !/d",k of ''Ski A,seNcy'behrwilwJs"·-/D tlb.v J/t;{l.

owN !Jimllvlsktiile dy£ dwe. L4./Il-pDjrCtj q,ij./ If/b ~ Ke-s+~

/DePc+ rH'b1~Ve

\(o~ '-->-h1-hJ.~ i QW . e.A \-\-

<:'ooerJ-. I/,.ei/(

'&J.p

SQfL,."C- ~ I QbNd~'fuNS ~~~~Ndi~~ ,·f 'fNMflks

ir-eml11N oN r-~sk1cl)\J~ h~N s~t~~ ~~oNd. 7:JJ d~s

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 28 of 36

f:: n-H"ch. ~N1-L ?~~ , ~drv"--­ e.eAj oN d.eaV< f2cl;>
~Dl).<t(~.\ N\:t,U g(L ,~~«S Pt( I.ve N~~efl. ~N '~\\-etL oLd-·~(L 2Ny
. l'lleN~r h~ Hh J2w ~. U)7kikluRQ 0 _"Sht-k Asm~~h'it, ~I/:,w -iRe;rz ilwN
~ltJ1~-h".e..byaRd,\! S \0,\ /1hl&-~'N)'6~-h"e tx\l~t\le6
~\\C~CJ~ ~ Q.4. \.:tt- 3,lJ. ~qi) L{ W()R,\( rtaotsNr eN~: I(/he, ~.e of-
rPnf ~" kse} 8+- {2\L LvJe\ ~JIN A iulft·f\l ~ Lv'{~ A-JmiNt
hi 'f<~(Led ve.- 10,\ J~~+~ h()t-HneNt-~\Bt ·p\fu{.ls~
~hJYl~""} c.. ~ ~-b) (~ ~1-\-. \+ ~~ \0)

)&k\iAthW /BJlec,live.·/1.l.tJ,,>hmtWt

A)A~ hZ<~lA.\~ of "S-\Ak- At~CA.( . ' ~ - , A.t. j~ .\1 ·,~:1) '60 J. AIU\S ' ~

\O\I~~(~c~..G.:Mp~~\l\ k;JSleVtN0JRI-l)=,Jibl:-

IJd
. rh

Gllr~;.VhIlNNN'/~Gtv/Y~\:n~&/tt'-ll',f0),A·~)o,i

l

f1l51~Lllo~RA-tIJ'iRIJ-

1r~e ~It'~;tf \~ ~t>hN'tn G"ftN) '?WN-h\ I,c>s-~ h, ~ ~ :.dl·

rn lel r.-tL :SCM NelSe.:s {fc;/Sz>N ~ . i(' hi d:,:;,S SL,jti' r+!JeM/,

~ !Js!+ re5u 1+ of- r(S-ht-fe ~~ N&fD ,r-e~/cf;n~Is(j~it:ij J11V jl fJrunsk·
tA'4i~ CCPJVlfYlt S·DN 1L) Ii- ~'4 (jio~flNN( Cbm J. (~ Nl.(leNJ;#-/52 IV )(IZJ). -
0 j Nih IC.G1M\bil.\:11:If.:. ,--y~l ~m -&ivll-N m~\) J4/: J") )nJDN/} Jd ~Jlrj r9J
-il=lf j h;JSl>~ CllpJJJ) pll1iNhj: 10sl- hJS s~~ (I fYlt!I1.1s iN CJ1.!
1i:>OfYI elu 1-0 Soy>') e.. ISf s f)c;ffo'f...IS, (Sitivle...kS n v

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 29 of 36

~ Jh A ,",ocl (~ l Aec ,b . ~-h"fF.ijblwj, /J@I~j
~~~TJi\J~~' Iq ~y fYlyeR.S~ft{a e~;#Olo / k)MIt5 ~A b &!1'[JO~/
fII~1 ChR'lS/rN (J,r&fJ JYJIJjt,yt))IF~:J.. mrchl1ei LAfoY") &nt(jtJn.),-# ;1.3
'r<JRb~ 3 (<!jIpIN) ?\fl]lVfi ' 1,,1, \t. 1M ot ~\::, Yt - .111 I
(~f2.t.L 4RcH-I; 4K(l~i)dlA.L~ ~l>M~ N e, Ls '- u tr i\l (SfhYJ M ~&V~

s) A~ AIlu>lCH- of ifSbk A)NCYDJe;~d~':/fj JJJAI.j,1km5k,~)
(CofVIl'l't5~{)Net<)JF/rIJ/A(~Y; 1ffy~;e5Cw¥d~ dJ:cJ.o 7!WIIIIr Co/Jks (n1I!Joi;J;
::!to''! . ~ '/ohM- LuhrcIJ.etV 0J1Jv~#:J:J.. lllcMel ~ l)t.e' ~11J fL),#;;J.3
l::o.te.l~1A .) (e.4fh,,) \,\I\~~tf la&~ ,j\)-""f WMI. '(. ASO?8.)/Y)e..rls •

o/J f} ~ 1),,/1- qSkk- AJ,wc't~efe~"iU-'1 7luuws# bhds

'. ~MJnrsStoP,Le..t ,it=Q 5' lvl!(IV e r~orlYsJty ~nrJe-JJ) ::J1c :Je~y fYlcG-

,1r/t/'J~9I ~p~w1~1 U}5)'(,!)IlFI'p)l'07

' ,R~~
p)f)'N fff

f

3~(;'fJiftWlnl:f/lJJe'Crj)'le/I,StS;;t//0{

Lyff.- Q-efW/h2<Jd;
frlmmr::'SJ}{lY

y-Jo" $ dlAL +0 SD'M~<- e1 el.s cfrD~lS .

o yD Asj-} fUj ,, /f 0 f'strle.AseN €NiIJNI~' =IF __~ 7lie16 S4 Lttuh.

m r{.omfY!,
#3)..

#3 ssfou ·f:.

0

L.?otA:.~(hr(S (d

£;f7vwOm.eJ7eQNu)JiR-o/1S-3. (3;Ijt-2JeJNrJ(l}:JOAJr/J

(.A.chl?/l
~'I1fh0

~lefl~!})
Y/J 'Ph--FI

Losl Atl-t.fl1 ilolJ.S 'fX2up'lrzty / IIV &lil'/m;/I'c ch~;ej/lJl) /J3lN .s ffi,lcl

pJftCQ. 6/'1 :JVde.h~rk- .:. -Jwh';.l s~~ lvrtl~~ Ny ~~/itZJj; cl~

'-kv /JNDM~s '6eJs~~"f5 . I . /'ltti'u (:i-pJfiD~ S ~JZ" ·l pr1 (2-it
S ry~(.l NO p€NDj o~TCA l f""k.ec; tv SH.fr;:/y /TNc I..J../2Wy. JIM)

te.-f¥:I·/rA-h-()J0 ,aN' CiJU.ec1rv, p-t:vu.t.s!lmeNf

U) Asa t-w v..\ <> (i'G~klt~c..c1 ~~ . C="" SS\oNU'"

~bhN jJ.f0ns~~\ t'f\.O\r~ ~.~~ rcw ftofY\ SOMers

~ N,c'·l L~~\ s-s~~ v io lf.)~e<l tR ~- pos+

~c-h>
~

A If\1l- ' fTN~ <i c.hbF~tdJ.,~:+!4\(~i+~R~N'nS-~~\0rk~y Os,e).J.rJ~-W!)eeNJ~-

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 30 of 36
I
I
1 ,

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 31 of 36

'ke~~~~ k{'~t-eJ

WHfK £FOR~/?\A1N h~~ t'e~W-x.>t- ~A-\- ~~ ~\L((tS2AN+-~e..
, hHOl..JT~

A. ~e. t'\-c\ec\~r(\\-n~,( ~~~{'~eN\ stl"l-hiIJj ttiAh

\- STAt-e.. A~cy t.eNdAN ~ .( .{)wI~ ~ vrolA-kcl ~~ plfnNkffs

~){.,s't\\1.s \~N'\

CD.N1fJ..lUC~\\(-\01A\JSP.D~\?

te..
i+<

.

hF~ ~\A~)Nf~K~ )

R~h UNJ~
ill)eWcJMeN h

~~ ~,JhJ ~~·tes \.oNUlrh~1}~N .

'cil . .l~( 3~te.. ~JJcy feNdA~ ~~rN~\~1 \JfoIA+ecL+he. f,lfPN.tj~rS
~hts ~(,.~~ , 1M Cc\\~h've. ?UN1Shmervt trRAh ~N
ct't,\Aw " b~ th~ ' f)I~ GNVeN1'1cN. IN 11'1'1) r~/ vtDJ1'~'bN ,oF
+\ <L 04£:t~eN h A NJmeN+,.Jo -Hie, 1lv1'~eJ SJnte.s CtNs'~+cr~~.
3.'sm~ A:selJ y .~'NclANts~ KIJC fi.,~~'/ Vf0h~.eJ..).f{ JI»' :hfts rl,j'TS bI '5*I~~ \ BiN+rft~ J:NvdP-wsD1S~'(Nl1ffl
It{ \/ibiA1>bN t), tk rOu.R: eN t~ A}IIv-tkNl--/.o fA~ ~~ teA
0~'~es (1N~-tY1ufr(]'J "
~ ~ f{S~}lte, A\eNcyD ~NJANkl' K;Jowf~\l.'L /tO/AW thL ifflNitff;
h~hts by d<2fMV;~\ h"f'/\ b fuM'1 VQot,ed~D\\l l;\.NAett ~~ 1oel'
r--rQNth ~N~ Nt ·n, l'!~lki}ed. bh~)+es CDMS-/J/vdrcN. S'-"S\wh~- Jbw Y,J:>e.: I-IdflN ~' ).\Sl~ Vf~)A~ +he piMNM(s
tic ~ts b~ fub~~\lN \ hllY) ~. GeNe f-) J J(e-bJ, ~1r(JM "IX v1olnltn1
i ~C'Sh-~h Rm~clmeN+-+O +R~ ~~ J. SlJltes l~)ht-/)DN. t..."S-ltt . t~ov~tetidflNfs~ ~~~ 9y V10 IRkA.#I~pilb~~fI'5
n ,\~ b~ :s~!~-r\tN ~1f't\ " \(~ Vrt~~y ,i2e1m~ ~ \J?Djl1·h~()N
o e.. . & th fim.eNdJ'i\.QN t+, -rr~~, c\ ~l\~~ ~sfiMltJ.

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 32 of 36

it> D,

r
1-

~.~"-A- fIN

1"KI-\w,yC\ 1~fuN~

od-~mAti~"~'S7ttAk.kr!Nt.ste:N;' )kri~tNvhe..."-~tv:'

116-

N p\Nl~\ h~fV\ DN '::J) ~ ~ Pf~\A-\1oN I(stA v..~ I w'11 tt6o'

; YDN. (;) \l f'&\-S ftN~~V.Q,~ '::, TV\~t~l~ .

~- \2Q&-k~ry\ff\I'l1)fh V-a\{ ~"\) Lw~l ~.

'3 - ,{(e-kl\l 'd ~l \:ra-e\L ~(i~e-6 ~ \?\8fN\-)f~ eAllN~'~ ~l 1L> ~-o\-e.... appl2..0~ ~ ~~<6'O -to d~£.--

7- 'POol4tde J"Liay ik1'feAJ1rsf-C/.ePjY !h.;12/ID~ j!2vuf 12e)'{jJDt.w
S~R.uree.S _

,5'- ~ ~\\ 'ylffir-.lhfts '~c~N'AI '~~~cht.

eM , to· "Ketw<.N 0~\,0e R.eL- IfNi. rV\e,4l~ jt\l J~ RooIY"I t+~AceNf-+"

c\.eA~ \Cuv~

ot- ~ll-ktf\e IN d&f ~Y0·

l~ K~€.- p\fl)I\lh'f~ f~ 1€,6~J stAtus.

~~ o~ ~~\ \iBf\\~\~,~lffi\4U')~~f\~w\\-k N.C..I th,\~ ~{t.i)~tS q.\.j. \ H&:\ \~ A-ss~tneNt~~ ItH~meJ

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 33 of 36
0+ CtO Nt
\0 - r--~tv~ ~1WJ0~rf-s 60 b (';,ltv+ CJL\\ .
11- ~\U;ok~(.;~ ~m~ls~f-\{L~ \Va;luiJ~.e-o J'(I~ Lwe"I
'j If$ f /1/) j..;·h~ff OJ"u AfiJ, 11.- Co",/rrcf hrrnrIf A;1VJ~'eNds: V(sft- LII~ dell/l,
row ~ whfl€. a/- SC:mel(~ ~vtiJf,y.
I~ - o-h>p tR'e. eull.e4tve f~wl~s)Jtn-eNf-af N, C..Ls ~~. j! TAe- r-e.;/-WtN 0 f !N ce ~ Inskc... C-hHiJ(L . /Js--i. lA.AJ.e.. -10 h fA-rAi I AI wh, . ~ JA.JtnlJ-i-e 130£ 131l8d.o,V airlLhM~
-Wt I$'- PtluVlcl.e. ~ prcM(LF'0~{(fifYI af N,~.L 'fulL p//HIl/'
ftPl- aNd of/?eK.S Nof n~e pUN/I-hVe $liNchbA/ I/" ~ 'i2emoved·~ ~ '3 ~rt a d&j I- Ct)N·RNetneN
'R·efwtili SiDif r-{C ()IA--I-sfk IN rUe yltild Ii - oS+·tRuQp)1( RJe-u-,Jdkr.rs-owv~..JrNY~/vkPoJN/Jk'.assrftls-/-pJfhvp.rfr{ff
0~ i/(~ r-ekJ'ta-ftv/-J as-e1IVsf- plaiN/i"PI- f.o(L oiAeil
~ beh/t-tl ~()l(aJ pRdJems . fhtyl-Aj~ ~l:,\Lt o+- ~t2;ts) ~s ~\~0-h~~ <!.D••r\.e.Js ~\- h'\s Ci>~+<~w1 ~~,"-~eNf ·a+- NJ~ J... S.L.f
eAUv\ft~ JtN& A-~3W €.¥t~~ ON ktrY\ t"jDul&

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 34 of 36

CAut--
Co u-h' 10\A~ -h
·11)b~r/.-v~ h1lV\. b t ~'" IY~t'/ ru~+ ~'l'l-\oLuLvt- k p1Zo~ O+- ,. w.
B) S~-\- h,'( M-to ~\ ~cl U-NlAal,vA I pUN'iE:h-
meAlt.
e)~~ M/VI {t)I.\9..\ fllok.c.-h'Ol\( of. law, p ~) 't-eNy hrs .1iiU.~ o~ "'&r.ue..h Ih.J t,dyS oN
£3 C!..~~ h\'CV\ ~ ~\\~ p~~~\\3\c\\~ l da-M CS~
F)&I1~bA-k }"\~5> ~OWN f\IV~~( dL\I~ss

~~- -xf t-~\'~.+ ~~u~\- (V\~A- d.~ ~ 1\\. ~,J.
drR..echv~)~Qo~~\s ; ~t-1 +Rm ~oVA-1 ofd.eA+K ~LV +0 'd.Iul) ~R~ ltvs1YhdfoN +R~t Vi f
'6 . ~da+-e. Lw.e.1 ~ ~~\YN.u WOl<-\cl ~
-a~fllO"~\ ~. A~pRo~~'R\-e....

C. Aw'A~ Ci:>M peNOC-h,~~ Ja(vra~e~ YN. iRe, f" II~Wl ~ 'OfYbtvJis
,. ANy fh\{cl n)1 t-eIH!.f 1RA ~ ~y~ hONOiNfllJbJe CoL~ d.e.ems JWor
"'P((.u i- ftNc,l ~tvv1+Itbl e...

"!>

A~ ~frt~ \' A-Nl.llhvrL 1+//

lfJreN..I.J/<c\J'(CYflIfAr0l et-Sel~iN'eftl.J?-R~,4~t UJKoWtsf~M~cltdZnhobJ~e-'.

Cu(M'2~

c1UJV\$ j ,wor foR. l'i y~5 i~+s ~~~ PNl ~u;'hlb)e.,

o.

f It 0~ -Ja;~1 ON p/I rsst-J.es faJ/lbJ.e.. by JiM0f-

~
F PiihNlrffs Cus+ fN #;:s CDw·f:

Ct 11N~ muJ.. Iffl tn/dr/roN/J./ ,eJ,tl-e f ~-I- t{Js hoNDWltbLe CuLNR-f~'~ff\~.jVJO'\-1 ~~~ ~<l ~\A~b\~.

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 35 of 36

1(jt1ita.J.j(~N DIJ-s

~J~Il\lV sLcb~1f-kl

•

\L\ch~~~"'v\~s <I:b.;).IQ4('o

N()1'2.t~~N Q;R£- ~~d-­

0" :J.n6t)hl\{ ~A-o..
SOiY1eiSJ C-l 07/

•
• I

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 1 Filed 10/04/13 Page 36 of 36
VERIET (tA1I bN
j
1

 
 Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 1 of 33

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

RICHARD REYNOLDS,

:

:

Plaintiff

:

:

v.

:

:

LEO ARNONE

:

Commissioner CT D.O.C.,

:

Individual Capacity

:

:

SCOTT SEMPLE

:

Commissioner of Correction,

:

Official and Individual Capacity :

:

ANGEL QUIROS

:

Regional Warden N.C.I., Official :

and Individual Capacity

:

:

EDWARD MALDONADO

:

Warden N.C.I., Individual Capacity :

:

WILLIAM FANEUFF

:

Warden N.C.I., Official

:

and Individual Capacity

:

:

GERARD GAYNE

:

Psychiatrist N.C.I, Official

:

and Individual Capacity

:

:

MARK FRAYNE

:

Psychologist N.C.I., Official

:

and Individual Capacity

:

:

:

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 13CV1465 (SRU)

Defendants

:

June 28, 2017

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 2 of 33
INTRODUCTION 1. Plaintiff Richard Reynolds has been held in solitary confinement that is both severe and harmful for 22 years at Northern Correctional Institution (“NCI”). During that time, he has always lived in an austere cell that is roughly the size of a burial plot. It has concrete walls, metal furniture, fluorescent lighting, and a 3 inch wide window that affords little natural light. The building was designed and intended to be harsh and to impose conditions that were far more punitive than those of typical prison life on people who could not live lawfully in other prisons. It is constructed from material that amplifies rather than absorbs sound and that creates an environment where it is impossible to control internal temperatures. A cacophony of noise -- including the banging of metal doors and food slots, and the screaming of individuals with unmet special needs -- echoes and reverberates. Mr. Reynolds never has more than one hour a day of fresh air and exposure to sunlight; many days he has none at all. It is now clear that Defendants intend to confine him in these conditions of extreme, debilitating and punitive isolation for the rest of his life. 2. The conditions of his confinement constitute extreme social isolation that Defendants have made more severe in reaction to the conduct of other people in his housing unit, conduct in which Mr. Reynolds was not involved. For 22 years, he has been fed through a slot in the door and had recreation alone. When he leaves his cell for infrequent legal or medical visits, he is in full restraints. Although other NCI residents were evaluated, reviewed and released, Defendants have never meaningfully reviewed Mr. Reynolds’ classification or his conditions of confinement, despite prison administrative directives and policies that required such review. Defendants have also
2

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 3 of 33
deprived Mr. Reynolds of social interaction and mental stimulation that is necessary for healthy adults. 3. On April 25, 2012, Connecticut became an outlier, the first and only state to enact legislation that requires devastating and permanent solitary confinement for a clearly identified group of people. Legislators specifically identified Mr. Reynolds as a target of this vindictive statute that was designed to impose punishment on him in addition to that authorized at the time of his crime. Connecticut is alone in mandating permanent solitary confinement and extreme social isolation based solely on a previous crime and the identity of the inmate, rather than on his prison disciplinary history. 4. Since Mr. Reynolds was re-sentenced on April 21, 2017, Defendants have unconstitutionally considered his conditions to be governed exclusively by C.G.S. § 1810b, a statute that provides for permanent solitary confinement without any review of the severity of, or the security justifications for, conditions of extreme social isolation and sensory deprivation. Despite a virtually pristine disciplinary record, Mr. Reynolds is subjected to at least 22 hours a day of complete isolation in conditions that are permanent and more punitive than those imposed on people who have killed while in custody. 5. Defendants’ permanent confinement of Mr. Reynolds in these severe conditions violates the United States Constitution. First, these conditions present a known and scientifically documented risk of physical and mental harm that constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Second, the complete absence of meaningful review and assessment of these conditions violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Third, the imposition of permanent solitary confinement on Mr. Reynolds when similarly situated individuals are treated
3

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 4 of 33
differently lacks rational justification and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fourth, the permanent nature of this extreme isolation constitutes additional punishment that was imposed legislatively in 2012, well after the crime for which Mr. Reynolds was convicted, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Fifth, the legislative enactment of permanent solitary confinement, which was vindictive and targeted both Mr. Reynolds and an identifiable group of people, constitutes an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 6. Plaintiff Richard Reynolds brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution, as well as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 7. This Court has jurisdiction of Mr. Reynolds’ claims that Defendants violated his constitutional rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 8. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1321(d) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to these claims herein occurred in the District of Connecticut.
PARTIES 9. Richard Reynolds is a 48 year old Jamaican man who has a mother, two sisters, a brother, two sons, one daughter and two grandchildren. He is a Seventh Day Adventist who has been held at NCI since March 30, 1995. Although originally sentenced to death, he was re-sentenced to life without release on April 21, 2017, pursuant to the decision in State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 10 (2015) which held that prospective repeal of the death penalty violated the Connecticut state constitution.
4

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 5 of 33
10. Defendant Leo C. Arnone was Commissioner of Connecticut’s Department of Correction (“DOC”) from 2010-2013. At all relevant times, he acted under color of state law. He was personally involved in authorizing, and maintaining policies and customs challenged by Mr. Reynolds and is sued in his individual capacity for damages. 11. Scott Semple is the current Commissioner of Correction and was automatically substituted as a defendant, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), on claims originally brought against Defendant Arnone in his official capacity. In this capacity, he is responsible for protecting the constitutional rights of all individuals in DOC custody, including Mr. Reynolds. Defendant Semple has final policy-making and supervisory authority within the DOC and has been personally involved in authorizing and maintaining policies and customs challenged by Mr. Reynolds. He directly and proximately caused the constitutional violations set forth below. At all relevant times, he was acting under color of state law. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief and in his individual capacity for damages. 12. Angel Quiros is the Regional Warden of NCI. He has final policy-making and supervisory authority within the region that includes NCI. He was and is personally involved in authorizing and maintaining policies and customs challenged by Mr. Reynolds. He repeatedly corresponded and met directly with Mr. Reynolds about conditions on Death Row. At all relevant times, he acted under color of state law. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief and in his individual capacity for damages. 13. Edward Maldonado was the warden of NCI from 2011 to 2014. At all relevant times, he acted under color of state law. He was personally involved in authorizing and
5

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 6 of 33
maintaining policies and customs challenged by Mr. Reynolds, including Northern Correctional Unit Directive 9.4.1 (effective 9/01/2011), and received grievances directly from Mr. Reynolds about conditions on Death Row. He is sued in his individual capacity for damages. 14. William Faneuff is the current warden of NCI and was automatically substituted as a defendant, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), on claims originally brought against Defendant Maldonado in his official capacity. Warden Faneuff has final policy-making and supervisory authority within NCI and is personally involved in authorizing and maintaining policies and customs challenged by Mr. Reynolds. He directly and proximately caused the constitutional violations set forth below. At all relevant times, he was acting under color of state law. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief and in his individual capacity for damages. 15. Gerard Gayne is the psychiatrist who has supervisory responsibility for mental health treatment and mental health care policy at NCI and is personally involved in authorizing and maintaining policies and customs challenged by Mr. Reynolds. At all relevant times, he was acting under color of state law. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief and in his individual capacity for damages. 16. Mark Frayne is a supervising psychologist who is responsible for assessing mental health needs, for delivering mental health treatment and for implementing mental health policy at NCI. He is personally involved in authorizing and maintaining policies and customs challenged by Mr. Reynolds. At all relevant times, he was acting under color of state law. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief and in his individual capacity for damages.
6

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 7 of 33
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 17. Defendants have classified and permanently placed Mr. Reynolds in “special circumstances high security” conditions at NCI, the only maximum security facility in Connecticut. An extensive body of scientific research and literature has documented the devastating effects of long term extreme social isolation and sensory deprivation. It causes neurological and physical damage. The unreviewable and permanent nature of the punitive conditions in which Defendants have confined and continue to confine Mr. Reynolds cannot be justified by any legitimate security concern.
Death Row and Special Circumstances High Security Confinement at Northern Correctional Facility
18. Shortly before it opened in January, 1995, NCI was described as Connecticut’s only maximum security facility that would seal people for 23 hours a day inside cement cells. A slot in each solid metal door allows in-cell feeding. Each cell measures 7 by 12 feet and has a metal bed, a metal toilet and sink, and a 36 x 18 inch stainless steel desk with an attached metal stool. A window that is 3 inches wide and 34 inches long looks out at three layers of fencing. 19. Death Row at NCI, where Mr. Reynolds has lived for 22 years, consists of twotiered circular housing pods, visiting stalls with concrete stools for visitors, a cinder block and cement room for professional visits and phone calls, a day room with a monitored phone, metal tables and stools that are soldered to the floor, and a control room from which correctional staff manage the unit. Walls of reflective glass separate the control room and professional visit rooms from the housing area, causing visual disorientation. 20. The hard cement, metal and glass surfaces reflect rather than absorb sound. A constant droning noise in the day room adjacent to the cells deprives Mr. Reynolds of
7

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 8 of 33
sleep. The exterior cinder block walls make it impossible to regulate the heat. It is often so cold during both summer and winter that staff wear thick, winter jackets inside the units. At other times, it is excessively hot inside the cells. The plumbing is also frequently broken and causes excrement to back up into cell toilets. It has taken days to fix such plumbing issues. 21. Mr. Reynolds has extremely limited access to commissary and is not able to buy products available to inmates who have acted out and been placed in Administrative Segregation. Defendants have denied him access to educational and other programming. 22. Mr. Reynolds has never had more than one hour a day of outside recreation. He now spends that time alone in a small fenced cage within a concrete area. It is the only time that he has access to fresh air and sunlight. The space is too small to run and the filthy concrete floor is often coated with bird feces, urine and other unsanitary elements precluding other forms of rigorous exercise. Defendants count time spent in the day room as “passive” recreation but that space is not designed or suitable for physical exercise. 23. Mr. Reynolds has not had a contact visit with anyone other than a medical or legal professional for 22 years. He has not touched his mother or any other relative since 1995. Social visits at NCI take place by telephone through a plexiglass screen. The telephones do not work properly and visitors must sit on cement stools during the visit. Because there is no “picture program” at NCI, his family has not seen a picture of him in 22 years. 24. Despite repeated requests by Mr. Reynolds and his counsel, he has been unable to practice his religion or develop his faith. Defendants have denied a confidential visit with a Seventh Day Adventist minister and have denied congregate religious services which are available to those in Administrative Segregation.
8

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 9 of 33
25. Defendants have not given Mr. Reynolds a meaningful review of his classification or a hearing, as required by written DOC and NCI policy, during the 22 years that he has been in extreme isolation.
Defendants Punish Mr. Reynolds for the Conduct of Others 26. During the 22 years that Mr. Reynolds has been on Death Row at NCI, he has had very few disciplinary infractions and not one has involved violence. Nevertheless, Defendants have confined him in conditions that have only increased in severity and isolation, due to the conduct of others. 27. In 1998, Michael Ross, another resident of death row, attempted suicide. Although subsequent investigation determined that he acted alone, Defendants limited recreation and imposed new levels of restraints on Mr. Reynolds. These restrictions violated the standards Defendants had announced in governing policy set forth in the Death Row Handbook. 28. In 1999, Daniel Webb, another resident of Death Row, was accused of planning an escape. Although there was no evidence that Mr. Reynolds knew of or had any involvement in this plan, Defendants increased Mr. Reynolds’ social isolation and limited him to individual recreation. 29. In reaction to these incidents and conduct of other Death Row residents, Defendants have deprived Mr. Reynolds of any meaningful social interaction, including group meals and recreation, for more than 17 years. 30. In 2010, Mr. Webb had a physical altercation with correctional staff. Although there was also no evidence that Mr. Reynolds knew of or had any involvement in that incident, and one of the officers involved in subduing Mr. Webb was disciplined,
9

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 10 of 33
Defendants once again imposed additional restraints and more severe conditions on Mr. Reynolds. In addition, staff vindictively locked down and swept the entire housing unit, searched and unconstitutionally seized property from Mr. Reynolds. After vague, nonsubstantive responses, by Defendant Quiros and others, to extensive and repeated grievances for the return of his property, Defendants advised Mr. Reynolds that his property had not been inventoried, as policy required, and could not be found. As part of the aggressive response to this incident, Mr. Reynolds was given three minor disciplinary infractions, after a twelve-year period without one misconduct infraction. 31. Following the misconduct of others, Defendants have subjected Mr. Reynolds to the restrictions imposed on inmates held on “high security” status as that term was defined by DOC Administrative Directive 9.4(14) (effective 1/1/2010), despite the fact that he met none of the articulated criteria for placement on that status. Defendant Maldonado issued Northern Correctional Institution Unit Directive 9.4.1 (effective 9/01/2011) that explicitly established this policy for Death Row inmates, including Mr. Reynolds. That directive defined “High Security” as: “A designation which provides for increased supervision of inmates who pose a threat to the safety and security of the facility, staff, inmates or the public.” A.D. 9.4.1 (3)(I) (emphasis added). Neither of these directives nor Defendants provided either notice or a hearing on the evidence that would justify Mr. Reynolds’ placement on that status, nor did Defendants give him a decision stating the reasons for his placement. Defendants never reviewed his placement on that status despite the fact that DOC and NCI policy requires inmates placed on high security status to be reviewed every six (6) months. A.D. 9.4(14) (H); N.C.I. Unit Directive 9.4.1 (14).
10

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 11 of 33
32. Mr. Reynolds has been unable to attend professional visits, move to the shower or recreation yard without being placed in restraints. Those restraints include ankle cuffs and handcuffs through a waist level belly chain every time he leaves the unit, including for professional visits. Requests to remove handcuffs were denied until 2015 when his hands were uncuffed during professional visits but Defendants began to tether his ankle cuffs to a metal flange in the floor during those visits. These restraints make it extremely difficult to review papers, have a thorough medical examination or concentrate for sustained periods of time. Tethering the sharp metal ankle cuffs has caused lacerations and scaring.
Imposition of Additional Punishment after the Date of the Crime 33. The punitive conditions Defendants imposed on Mr. Reynolds after he was resentenced constitute punishment in addition to that authorized on the date of the crime for which he was convicted. 34. Richard Reynolds was charged with one count of capital felony in violation of Connecticut General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a–54b (1) and one count of murder in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a–54a (a) for killing William Walters on December 18, 1992. He was found guilty of both counts in the fall of 1994 and sentenced to death on April 13, 1995. 35. The procedure for imposing a death sentence and the definition of the alternative penalty of life without the possibility of release that governed Mr. Reynolds’ sentence were set forth in Public Act 85-366. Section 3 provided, in relevant part:
A sentence of imprisonment for life shall mean a definite sentence of sixty years, UNLESS THE SENTENCE IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF RELEASE, IMPOSED PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION (f) OF SECTION 53a-46a, AS AMENDED BY
11

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 12 of 33
SECTION 1 OF THIS ACT, IN WHICH CASE THE SENTENCE SHALL BE IMPRISONMENT FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE DEFENDANT'S NATURAL LIFE. That statute did not impose special circumstances high security status or any other limitations on the conditions of confinement during a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. 36. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed both Mr. Reynolds’ conviction and his sentence of death. 264 Conn. 1 (2003). 37. On March 11, 2004, Mr. Reynolds filed a state habeas petition challenging both his conviction and the sentence of death. On June 28, 2011, that petition was denied in a written decision. 2011 WL 3200300 (June 28, 2011). On August 8, 2011, Mr. Reynolds appealed that decision. While that appeal was pending, three significant events occurred that affected Mr. Reynolds and others sentenced to death for capital crimes committed in Connecticut before April 25, 2012. 38. First, the Connecticut legislature enacted a prospective repeal of the death penalty, effective April 25, 2012. Public Act 12-5. Amendment A to that act, now codified as C.G.S. § 18-10b, imposed additional punishment in the form of new, mandatory and permanent conditions of extreme isolation on specific, identifiable people, including Mr. Reynolds, who had been convicted of a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012. 39. In relevant part, Section 18-10b provides: (a) The Commissioner of Correction shall place an inmate on special circumstances high security status and house the inmate in administrative segregation until a reclassification process is completed under subsection (b) of this section, if . . .
12

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 13 of 33
(2) the inmate is in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction for a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, for which a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a and such inmate's sentence is (A) reduced to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (B) commuted to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
(b) The commissioner shall establish a reclassification process for the purposes of this section. The reclassification process shall include an assessment of the risk an inmate described in subsection (a) of this section poses to staff and other inmates, and an assessment of whether such risk requires the inmate's placement in administrative segregation or protective custody. If the commissioner places such inmate in administrative segregation pursuant to such assessment, the commissioner shall require the inmate to complete the administrative segregation program operated by the commissioner.
(c) (1) The commissioner shall place such inmate in a housing unit for the maximum security population if, after completion of such reclassification process, the commissioner determines such placement is appropriate, provided the commissioner (A) maintains the inmate on special circumstances high security status, (B) houses the inmate separate from inmates who are not on special circumstances high security status, and (C) imposes conditions of confinement on such inmate which shall include, but not be limited to, conditions that require (i) that the inmate's movements be escorted or monitored, (ii) movement of the inmate to a new cell at least every ninety days, (iii) at least two searches of the inmate's cell each week, (iv) that no contact be permitted during the inmate's social visits, (v) that the inmate be assigned to work assignments that are within the assigned housing unit, and (vi) that the inmate be allowed no more than two hours of recreational activity per day.
C.G.S. § 18-10b (emphasis added). The minimum conditions set forth in the italicized
language constitute solitary confinement and require extreme social isolation, elements
that were not included as part of the statutory penalty when the crime occurred in 1992.
The legislative history of the statute documents that legislators vindictively intended to
impose additional “enhanced” punishment that was “tougher than administrative
segregation” on a targeted and specific group of people. The new punishment was
understood to be “different and harsher than existed on death row.”
13

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 14 of 33
40. On February 27, 2013, Mr. Reynolds filed a Motion for Permission to Address for the First Time on Appeal the Impact of Public Act 12-5 on Petitioner’s Death Sentence or, in the Alternative For a Remand in his pending state habeas appeal. In that motion, counsel identified various constitutional challenges to the statute that he sought permission to argue in supplemental briefing. 41. On April 18, 2013, the Court denied that motion without prejudice to renewal after a decision had been issued in State v. Santiago, a case in which the Connecticut Supreme Court reconsidered its remand of Eduardo Santiago’s case for new penalty phase proceedings, in light of his argument that prospective repeal of the death penalty authorized by Public Act 12-5 was unconstitutional. 42. In June 2012, less than two months after Public Act 12-5 became effective, the Connecticut Supreme Court vacated Mr. Santiago’s death sentence and remanded the case for new penalty phase proceedings. Shortly after the remand, Defendants transferred him from NCI to a lower security Connecticut prison, where he remains and is not subject to Special Circumstances High Security conditions. 43. On information and belief, Defendants also transferred Terry Johnson from NCI to a lower security Connecticut prison following the invalidation of his death sentence by the Connecticut Supreme Court. 44. Second, on August 25, 2015, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that “execution of those offenders who committed capital felonies prior to April 25, 2012, would violate the state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment” in State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 10 (2015). The court reasoned that, “following its prospective abolition, this state’s death penalty no longer comports with contemporary standards of
14

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 15 of 33
decency and no longer serves any legitimate penological purpose. For these reasons, execution of those offenders who committed capital felonies prior to April 25, 2012, would violate the state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. On March 8, 2016, that decision was reaffirmed in State v. Peeler, 321 Conn. 375 (2016). 45. Third, on June 16, 2016, Defendant Semple approved Administrative Directive 9.4 governing Restrictive Status. Echoing and invoking C.G.S. § 18-10b, that directive identified a new “special circumstances status” category. Attachment B to that directive is the revised Restrictive Housing Status Matrix. It documents the permanence of that status by noting that “approval authority for release” is “not applicable in accordance with CGS 18-10(b)” and that “authorized length of confinement” is “indefinite.” 46. On June 28, 2016, the Connecticut Supreme Court decided Mr. Reynolds’ habeas appeal, rejecting the culpability phase issues and declining to address penalty phase issues in light of Santiago and Peeler. 321 Conn. 750 (2016). 47. On July 8, 2016, Mr. Reynolds filed a Motion For Reconsideration asking the Court to decide the penalty phase issues raised in the habeas appeal, as resolution of those issues could place him in the same position as Mr. Santiago and other people whose death sentences had been invalidated, releasing them to general population. In the alternative, the motion requested remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing so that he could demonstrate how resolution of the penalty phase issues would affect how he would spend the rest of his life. The Court denied that motion. 48. On January 25, 2017, counsel filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence with the sentencing court. The motion was brought in two parts. First, it sought to vacate the
15

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 16 of 33
illegal sentence of death and to correct it to a sentence of life without the possibility of release. Second, it sought a finding by the court that the conditions articulated in C.G.S. § 18-10b are unconstitutional. On April 24, 2017, Judge Fasano re-sentenced Mr. Reynolds to life without possibility of release. He denied the second part of the motion, finding that he had no jurisdiction to decide those issues. 49. On May 18, 2017, Defendants notified Mr. Reynolds that his “reclassification process” had determined that he did not pose a risk to staff and other inmates that would require placement in administrative segregation or punitive custody. He was further notified that the “Commissioner has determined that you will be maintained on Special Circumstances High Security status and managed in accordance with guidelines set forth in CGS Sec. 18-10b (c) (1).” Defendants Semple and Faneuff received copies of that notice which confirms that Defendants have imposed lifelong solitary confinement and extreme social isolation on Mr. Reynolds. 50. Defendants also posted a restraint policy dated June 1, 2017 on his cell door that confirms he will be subject to handcuffed movement inside the unit; handcuffs, leg-irons and tethering to the floor during legal visits; and full restraints any time he moves out of the unit. 51. Mr. Reynolds’ new lifetime punishment of solitary confinement creates an identifiable risk of rapid physical and psychological deterioration and irreversible harm. Despite a documented history of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that was presented in state habeas proceedings and is therefore known to Defendants, Mr. Reynolds has never been treated for this disorder. Mr. Reynolds has witnessed the mental deterioration and breakdown of other residents on Death Row. Such deterioration is
16

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 17 of 33
consistent with scientific literature that documents the devastating effect of extreme isolation. 52. Although relevant prison policy requires regular mental health evaluations, mental health staff have never personally interviewed Mr. Reynolds or noted his mental health status by creating a meaningful record. Defendants Frayne and Gayne pass by Mr. Reynolds’ cell door and ask if he is good. Neither of them has ever conducted a confidential interview or conducted psychological testing. It is impossible to have a private conversation about mental health under these circumstances as other residents of the housing unit can hear any words spoken by the psychologist and by Mr. Reynolds. Defendants have not conducted a mental health evaluation of Mr. Reynolds in 22 years.
Prolonged Solitary Confinement Causes Severe Harm 53. Prolonged solitary confinement indisputably causes painful, severe and at times irreversible harm. The physical and psychological harm of prolonged solitary confinement has been well-documented for decades. Indeed, there is a substantial body of literature that has documented distinctive and inescapable patterns of negative physiological and psychological harm when individuals are placed in long-term solitary confinement. Spanning as far back as the 1960s, studies on the effects of solitary confinement have reported observable negative effects among prisoners subject to such conditions. 54. By definition, solitary confinement isolates prisoners from social interactions, restricts their environmental stimulation and affords them no control over their daily life. This combination of factors results in a series of harmful psychiatric effects, including hypersensitivity to external stimuli, perception distortions, claustrophobia, delusions,
17

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 18 of 33
hallucinations and panic attacks. Minimal social and environmental stimulation has serious effects on an individual’s mental functioning. Prisoners housed in solitary confinement report difficulty with thinking, concentration and memory, intrusive obsessional thoughts, increased anxiety and nervousness, overt paranoia, severe and chronic depression and problems with impulse control. 55. Senior researchers at renowned institutes have found that physiological effects may be directly caused by the prisoners’ physical state of confinement. For example, lower levels of brain function as a result of solitary confinement, including a decline of electroencephalogram activities after only seven days in solitary confinement, have been observed. Additionally, prisoners complain of abdominal pains, as well as muscle pains in the neck and back, which may be caused by the long periods of inactivity. Further, many researchers conclude that some adverse consequences of solitary confinement are a direct result of sensory deprivation. This sensory deprivation often leads to an increased oversensitivity to normal stimuli; for example, for someone experiencing this kind of deprivation, a closing door could be something that could lead to sleeping difficulties. 56. Studies have also shown that depriving individuals of social interactions by placing them in solitary confinement over a long period of time can destroy their ability to function normally. Additionally, studies have found that many individuals in solitary confinement will suffer permanent harm as a result of their confinement, even upon its termination. 57. Recognizing the dangers associated with prolonged solitary confinement, numerous major legal and medical organizations have issued statements opposing longterm solitary confinement. For example, the American Bar Association (ABA) mandates
18

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 19 of 33
that “[s]egregated housing should be for the briefest term and under the least restrictive conditions practicable.” Similarly, a bipartisan Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons commissioned by the Vera Institute of Justice recommended that correctional facilities “[e]nd conditions of isolation,” calling solitary confinement “expensive and soul-destroying.” Members of the Commission included a former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a former Attorney General of the United States, a former Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights, a former prisoner and a former federal prison warden.
Requiring Mr. Reynolds to be Housed in Solitary Confinement Does Not Promote Safety and Security and is Inconsistent with Correctional Best-Practices 58. The Special Circumstances High Security status described in C.G.S. § 18-10b, and that Defendants’ policy and practice requires, guarantees that Mr. Reynolds will be held in solitary confinement for the rest of his life. 59. As set forth above, placement in solitary confinement is due to Defendants’ blanket policy rather than the result of disciplinary violations or individualized considerations of Mr. Reynolds’ behavior. At NCI, Death Row and Special Circumstances High Security prisoners are separately housed in solitary confinement merely because of the timing of their conviction and sentence. 60. A 2016 report by the DOJ concerning the use of restrictive housing recommends that, “[c]orrectional systems should always be able to clearly articulate the specific reason(s) for an inmate’s placement and retention in restrictive housing.” The reason(s) should be supported by objective evidence. Additionally, the report observes that “[r]estrictive housing should always serve a specific penological purpose.”
19

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 20 of 33
61. Defendants’ policy of housing all Death Row and Special Circumstances High Security prisoners in solitary confinement serves no penological purpose. A report by the National Institute of Justice of the DOJ found that “almost no literature documents the utility of [administrative segregation] or demonstrates that the use of [restrictive housing] has achieved specific aims in demonstrable ways . . . . [I]t is virtually impossible to find empirical evidence supporting its utility or efficacy.” 62. Defendants’ blanket policy is inconsistent with accepted correctional practices. Studies show prisoners convicted of murder are not more violent and are no more of a security risk than prisoners convicted of other crimes. Additionally, their rates of violent or assaultive rule infractions have been found below or near the mean for the entire inmate cohort. 63. Best correctional practices dictate that individualized assessment and classification is appropriate rather than blanket assignment, due to the significant dangers of solitary confinement. Corrections directors and administrators, including former directors of several state prison systems around the country, have cited evidence showing that individualized assessment and classification based on objective factors, such as age and disciplinary history, is more predictive for security purposes than classifications based on conviction status. The premise of reclassification is that “errors” can be made at the initial classification stage and should be fixed based on the prisoner’s current behavior. 64. The Association of State Correctional Administrators issued a report calling prolonged isolation of inmates in jails and prisons “a grave problem in the United States.” That report analyzes the use of solitary confinement across the country and notes
20

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 21 of 33
nationwide efforts to improve restrictive housing conditions, focusing specifically on jurisdictions revising the criteria for being placed in solitary confinement. Special Circumstances High Security Confinement Violates International Norms 65. The United States is a party to international conventions bearing on the issue of prolonged solitary confinement. The United States has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (ratified by the United States in 1992) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT) (ratified by the United States in 1994), both of which prohibit torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment. Both have been interpreted to prohibit the use of prolonged solitary confinement. 66. Article 10 of the ICCPR mandates that “the penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation.” The United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) has clarified that the ICCPR’s prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment under international law includes physical as well as mental pain and asserted “that prolonged solitary confinement” may violate this prohibition. 67. Article 1 of the CAT defines torture as: [A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as . . . punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 68. In a 2011 report to the General Assembly, the United Nations’ (U.N.) Special Rapporteur on torture, Juan Mendez, stated that prolonged solitary confinement was prohibited by the ICCPR and CAT. He further concluded that the assessment of whether
21

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 22 of 33
solitary confinement amounts to torture should be conducted in light of the totality of the circumstances and on a case-by-case basis. Mendez wrote, “No prisoner, including those serving life sentence and prisoners on death row, shall be held in solitary confinement merely because of the gravity of the crime.” 69. For special circumstances high security confinement at NCI, no factor other than the sentence of the prisoners is taken into consideration and the indefinite nature of their confinement is in direct violation of the ICCPR and CAT. 70. Additionally, in 2015, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, known as the “Nelson Mandela Rules.” The Rules specifically prohibit the practice of solitary confinement that is “indefinite” or “[p]rolonged,” which they define as a “period in excess of [fifteen] consecutive days,” and emphasize that solitary confinement should be used only as a last resort, for the shortest amount of time possible and should be subject to independent review by a competent authority. 71. Solitary confinement is defined by the Nelson Mandela Rules as “confinement of prisoners for hours or more a day without meaningful human contact,” and “prolonged solitary confinement” is defined as “a time period in excess of 15 consecutive days.” 72. Additionally, in its Periodic Report to the U.N. Committee Against Torture, the United States confirmed that persons with a “serious mental illness” cannot be held in solitary confinement because it violates the Eighth Amendment’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. It further confirmed that subjecting a prisoner to solitary confinement without an administrative hearing is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.
22

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 23 of 33
73. As a result, the Committee Against Torture has stated, “The [United States] should . . . [l]imit the use of solitary confinement as a measure of last resort, for as short [a] time as possible, under strict supervision and with the possibility of judicial review.” 74. Additionally, the IACHR has reiterated its concerns about the use of solitary confinement by stating that “Member States must adopt strong, concrete measures to eliminate the use of prolonged or indefinite isolation under all circumstances.” The Commission has specifically stated that the use of solitary confinement “should be absolutely prohibited . . . for persons with mental disabilities, and for death row and lifesentenced prisoners by virtue of their sentence.”
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF First Cause of Action: Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
(Cruel and Unusual Punishment) 75. Mr. Reynolds incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 76. By their policies and practices described herein, Defendants have deprived and intend to continue indefinitely to deprive Mr. Reynolds of the minimum civilized measure of life’s necessities, and have violated his basic human dignity and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. A. Deprivation of Basic Human Need 77. First, the cumulative effect of prolonged and now permanent confinement, along with denial of the possibility of re-classification or relocation from NCI, the deprivation of adequate medical and mental health care, the denial of sunlight and exercise, and the extreme social isolation at NCI constitute deprivation of basic human needs, including
23

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 24 of 33
but not limited to, normal human contact, environmental and sensory stimulation, mental and physical health, adequate physical exercise, sleep and meaningful activity. B. Imposition of Serious Psychological and Physical Injury, Pain and Suffering 78. Second, extremely prolonged exposure to these deprivations of basic human needs is currently imposing serious psychological pain and suffering and permanent psychological and physical injury on Mr. Reynolds. 79. The permanence of these conditions, imposed both by legislation and by Defendants’ prison policies and practices, creates an identifiable and substantial risk of further debilitating mental illness and physical harm. C. Mr. Reynolds’s Conditions Cannot be Justified by the Conduct of Others 80. Third, Defendants’ imposition of punitive conditions on Mr. Reynolds is not legitimately related to security. Depriving Mr. Reynolds of basic human needs in reaction to the conduct of others, when Mr. Reynolds has demonstrated exemplary behavior, is not rationally related to any legitimate penological goal. D. Disproportionate, Arbitrary and Capricious Punishment 81. Fourth, Defendants’ policy of permanent confinement in damaging and extreme social isolation imposes disproportionate punishment on Mr. Reynolds. Defendants have no legitimate penological interest in retaining Mr. Reynolds permanently in the debilitating conditions at NCI simply based on the nature and timing of the crime for which he was convicted, in the absence of serious disciplinary infractions that justify placement in such punitive conditions. 82. This policy is also arbitrary and capricious in light of the fact that at least two individuals – Eduardo Santiago and Terry Johnson – were convicted of a capital felony,
24

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 25 of 33
sentenced to death and housed on Death Row but are not subject to these conditions because they were transferred to general population after their sentences of death were invalidated by the Connecticut Supreme Court. Mr. Reynolds sought and was denied the opportunity to challenge his sentence of death by the Connecticut Supreme Court. There is no rational reason to deny Mr. Reynolds the treatment accorded to those who had their penalty claims fully adjudicated prior to the decision in State v. Santiago. E. Permanent Deprivation of Human Dignity Violates Contemporary Standards of
Human Decency 83. Finally, Defendants’ permanent placement of Mr. Reynolds in the severe conditions of solitary confinement at NCI strips him of his human dignity and humanity in violation of contemporary standards of human decency and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 84. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ constitutional violations, Mr. Reynolds will be irreparably injured. He has no adequate remedy at law for Defendants’ actions and will suffer irreparable harm to his constitutional rights unless Defendants are enjoined from continuing their unlawful policies, practices and/or customs which have directly and proximately caused these constitutional abuses. 85. Additionally, an actual controversy exists regarding the constitutionality of Defendants’ practices and policies that govern Mr. Reynolds’ placement in Special Circumstances High Security confinement. A declaration on this issue will resolve that portion of the controversy between the parties, and the Court’s determination of the issues will guide Defendants’ actions.
25

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 26 of 33
Second Cause of Action: Fourteenth Amendment (Procedural Due Process)
86. Mr. Reynolds incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 87. Defendants, acting within the scope of their employment and under the color of state law, deprived and continue to deprive Mr. Reynolds of his right to procedural due process of law. Defendants’ actions and omissions violate Mr. Reynolds’ right to procedural due process, as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 88. The conditions and the duration of Defendants’ confinement deprive Mr. Reynolds of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in that they constitute an atypical and significant hardship as compared with the ordinary incidents of prison life. Specifically, a liberty interest is created by: (a) the exceedingly harsh and isolating conditions at NCI; (b) the lengthy and now permanent duration of confinement at NCI; and (c) the complete absence of any ability to obtain review of or release from these conditions of confinement. A. Death Row and Special Circumstances High Security Conditions at NCI 89. The conditions Defendants imposed on Mr. Reynolds while he was on Death Row and the Special Circumstances High Security conditions they continue to impose at NCI were and are unjustifiably severe. He continues to live almost entirely alone in a cement and stainless steel cell with virtually no natural light, excessive noise and extremes of both hot and cold temperature. His job is cleaning his cell, he continues to have no educational or religious programming and no more than one hour a day of outside exposure to sunlight and fresh air. He has minimal human interaction with people who
26

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 27 of 33
are not DOC employees. He is shackled, monitored and escorted every time he leaves his cell. B. Duration of Death Row and Special Circumstances High Security Confinement
at NCI 90. Mr. Reynolds has been confined at NCI in substantially similar conditions for more than 22 years. He is 48 years old, which gives him a life expectancy of 30 more years. Defendants intend to confine him in Special Circumstances High Security housing for the rest of his life. His interactions will be restricted to DOC staff and people who committed a capital felony prior to April 25, 2012. C. Lack of Meaningful Process 91. Defendants failed entirely to conduct personal classification interviews and did not even pretend to complete written evaluations of Mr. Reynolds for years at a time. The rote and mechanical reviews they did prepare are inaccurate and inconsistent. By failing to consider accurate, readily-available information and objections from Mr. Reynolds, Defendants have denied him the substantive, legitimate, and meaningful periodic reviews that were required to support his continued confinement in Restrictive Housing. 92. Mr. Reynolds is provided no notice of what he can do to be removed from solitary confinement and his placement is not given any form of review to decide whether he requires continued confinement in complete isolation. No evidence suggests that this policy promotes safety and security of the prison and its staff. 93. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ constitutional violations, Mr. Reynolds will be irreparably injured. He has no adequate remedy at law for Defendants’ actions and will suffer irreparable harm to his constitutional rights unless Defendants are
27

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 28 of 33
enjoined from continuing their unlawful policies, practices and/or customs which have directly and proximately caused these constitutional abuses. 94. Additionally, an actual controversy exists regarding the constitutionality of Defendants’ practices and policies that govern Mr. Reynolds’ placement in Special Circumstances High Security confinement. A declaration on this issue will resolve that portion of the controversy between the parties, and the Court’s determination of the issues will guide Defendants’ actions.
Third Cause of Action: Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection)
95. Mr. Reynolds incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 96. Mr. Reynolds is similarly situated to at least two individuals – Eduardo Santiago and Terry Johnson – who were convicted of a capital felony before April 25, 2012, sentenced to death and were housed on Death Row but who are not subject to Special Circumstances High Security conditions. Defendants transferred those individuals out of NCI to a lower security Connecticut prison after their sentences of death were invalidated by the Connecticut Supreme Court. 97. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied Mr. Reynolds the opportunity to challenge his death sentence on the ground that it was invalid in light of State v. Santiago. There is no rational reason to deny Mr. Reynolds the treatment accorded to those who had their death sentences invalidated prior to the decision in State v. Santiago. 98. This disparate and unjustified treatment denies Mr. Reynolds equal protection of the law in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
28

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 29 of 33
99. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ constitutional violations, Mr. Reynolds will be irreparably injured. He has no adequate remedy at law for Defendants’ actions and will suffer irreparable harm to his constitutional rights unless Defendants are enjoined from continuing their unlawful policies, practices and/or customs which have directly and proximately caused these constitutional abuses. 100. Additionally, an actual controversy exists regarding the constitutionality of Defendants’ practices and policies that govern Mr. Reynolds’ placement in Special Circumstances High Security confinement. A declaration on this issue will resolve that portion of the controversy between the parties, and the Court’s determination of the issues will guide Defendants’ actions.
Fourth Cause of Action: Article I, Section 10 United States Constitution (Ex Post Facto)
101. Mr. Reynolds incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 102. In 1992, when the crime for which Mr. Reynolds was convicted occurred, the only penalties for a capital offense were death and life without the possibility of release. Pursuant to statute and governing prison policy, inmates sentenced to death or to life without the possibility of release were housed in general population, had jobs, went to recreation and ate with other inmates unless they had been found guilty of serious disciplinary infractions which could trigger placement in restrictive housing after notice and a hearing. Placement in restricted housing for those inmates was subject to periodic review. 103. On April 25, 2012, the Connecticut legislature enacted Public Act 12-5, a law that repealed the death penalty. It did so prospectively so that the eleven men then on death
29

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 30 of 33
row, including Mr. Reynolds, could be executed. Aware of the questionable constitutionality of prospective repeal, the legislature also enacted Amendment A, subsequently codified as C.G.S. § 18-10b, a statute that imposed substantial and permanent additional punishment on those who had been sentenced to death for a crime committed before that date but whose sentence had been either “reduced” or “commuted.” 104. Defendants have implemented C.G.S. § 18-10b, a statute that was enacted as a means of retribution against Mr. Reynolds and other members of an identifiable and unpopular group of individuals, by imposing permanent and severe punishment in addition to that imposed in 1992 for a capital offense sentence of life without the possibility of release. 105. Enactment of C.G.S. § 18-10b and Defendants’ imposition of its punishment on Mr. Reynolds violated and continues to violate the ex post facto clause found in Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution. 106. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ constitutional violations, Mr. Reynolds will be irreparably injured. He has no adequate remedy at law for Defendants’ actions and will suffer irreparable harm to his constitutional rights unless Defendants are enjoined from continuing their unlawful policies, practices and/or customs which have directly and proximately caused these constitutional abuses. 107. Additionally, an actual controversy exists regarding the constitutionality of Defendants’ practices and policies that govern Mr. Reynolds’ placement in Special Circumstances High Security confinement. A declaration on this issue will resolve that
30

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 31 of 33
portion of the controversy between the parties, and the Court’s determination of the issues will guide Defendants’ actions.
Fifth Cause of Action: Article I, Section 10 United States Constitution (Bill of Attainder)
108. Mr. Reynolds incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 109. By enacting C.G.S. § 18-10b, the Connecticut legislature intended to and did inflict retributive punishment on Mr. Reynolds which constituted a bill of pain and penalties. In so doing, it usurped the traditional judicial role of fixing a degree of punishment, in accordance with its own notions of the enormity of Mr. Reynolds’ offense. 110. Legislative history documents that the legislators both named Mr. Reynolds individually and directed the act against an identifiable closed class of people. 111. Defendants’ application of C.G.S. § 18-10b to inflict permanent punishment on Mr. Reynolds, without first allowing him to contest or challenge the infliction of that punishment, constitutes a bill of attainder in violation of his rights under Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution. 112. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ constitutional violations, Mr. Reynolds will be irreparably injured. He has no adequate remedy at law for Defendants’ actions and will suffer irreparable harm to his constitutional rights unless Defendants are enjoined from continuing their unlawful policies, practices and/or customs which have directly and proximately caused these constitutional abuses.
31

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 32 of 33
113. Additionally, an actual controversy exists regarding the constitutionality of Defendants’ practices and policies that govern Mr. Reynolds’ placement in Special Circumstances High Security confinement. A declaration on this issue will resolve that portion of the controversy between the parties, and the Court’s determination of the issues will guide Defendants’ actions.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Mr. Reynolds prays for judgment against the Defendants:
(a) Declaring that Defendants’ policies and practices of confining Mr. Reynolds to permanent confinement in Special Circumstances High Security status pursuant to C.G.S. § 18-10b without opportunity for review violates Article 1, Section 10, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (b) Granting permanent injunctive relief enjoining Defendants and their predecessors, successors, present or former agents, representatives, those acting in privity and concert with them, or on their behalf, from violating Article 1, Section 10, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (c) Granting permanent injunctive relief requiring Defendants to present a plan to the Court within 30 days that provides for:
i. the release of Mr. Reynolds from Special Circumstances High Security confinement and meaningful consideration of him for placement in either (a) a general population unit, or (b) in a modified general population unit, in which the prisoners segregated from the general population have the same privileges as do prisoners in general population;
32

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 72 Filed 06/30/17 Page 33 of 33
ii. modification of the conditions of confinement so that he is no longer incarcerated under conditions of isolation, sensory deprivation and lack of social and physical human contact; iii. mandatory physical exams, mental health treatment and other necessary rehabilitation and medical treatment that accord with the relevant and appropriate standards of practice; iv. meaningful review of the need for solitary confinement; and v. all other relief to which Mr. Reynolds is entitled; (d) Awarding Mr. Reynolds the compensatory damages he has sustained as a consequence of Defendants’ constitutional violations; (e) Awarding Mr. Reynolds punitive and nominal damages; (f) Awarding Mr. Reynolds costs and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; (g) Granting Mr. Reynolds prejudgment and post judgment interest; and (h) Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
____/s/_____________________ Brett Dignam, ct 00283 Attorney for Plaintiff Richard Reynolds Morningside Heights Legal Services Inc. 435 West 116th Street - Room 831 New York, NY 10027 212-854-4291 bdigna@law.columbia.edu
33

 
 Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 1 of 57

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

RICHARD REYNOLDS, Plaintiff,
v.
LEO ARNONE, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:13-cv-1465 (SRU)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION Richard Reynolds has spent the past twenty-three years in solitary confinement. Reynolds’ conditions of confinement are the most restrictive available in the Connecticut prison system. As the result of state legislation directed against him, Reynolds has no genuine opportunity to have his conditions relaxed for the remainder of his life sentence. Reynolds has moved for summary judgment on his claim that the punishment meted out by the State of Connecticut violates the Constitution’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. For the reasons that follow, Reynolds’ motion is granted.

I. Introduction Reynolds committed a heinous crime – he murdered a law enforcement officer. Reynolds
was sentenced to death and awaited execution for twenty-one years. When the death penalty was abolished retroactively in Connecticut, Reynolds was resentenced to life without the possibility of release.
The fact that people commit inhumane crimes does not give the state the right to treat them inhumanely. Solitary confinement is an extreme form of punishment with a long history in American penal systems. Since its origins at Pennsylvania’s Eastern State Penitentiary in the 1800s, the anguish of those held in complete isolation has been well-documented.

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 2 of 57
[V]ery few men are capable of estimating the immense amount of torture and agony which this dreadful punishment, prolonged for years, inflicts upon the sufferers . . . . I hold this slow and daily tampering with the mysteries of the brain to be immeasurably worse than any torture of the body . . . because its wounds are not upon the surface, and it extorts few cries that human ears can hear. C. Dickens, American Notes for General Circulation 123–24 (Paris, Baudry’s European Library, 1842). Today, an estimated 61,000 prisoners are held in solitary confinement in American prisons.1 See Reforming Restrictive Housing: The 2018 ASCA-Liman Nationwide Survey of Time-in-Cell, Yale Law School 2018 (hereinafter “ASCA-Liman Report”) at 10.2 Those inmates are separated from the general population and are held in their cells for twenty-two hours or more per day. See id. at 4. An abundance of clinical literature regarding the psychiatric effects of solitary confinement supports a near-universal conclusion: “The restriction of environmental stimulation and social isolation associated with confinement in solitary are strikingly toxic to mental functioning.” Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 325, 354 (2006). As the mental effects of solitary confinement garner national attention, calls to abolish or reform its use are increasing nationwide. See, e.g., Editorial Board, Solitary confinement is torture. Will the Bureau of Prisons finally stop using it?, Wash. Post, July 15, 2017; Joe Hernandez, New Jersey considers restricting the use of solitary confinement, The Phila. Tribune, June 7, 2019. “As of the spring of 2018, legislation to eliminate or to limit restrictive housing for subpopulations had been enacted in California, Colorado, Washington, D.C., and Tennessee, and proposed in several other jurisdictions, including Connecticut, Hawaii, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia.” ASCA-Liman Report at 88.
1 Also referred to as “restrictive housing”, “special housing”, or “administrative segregation.” 2 That estimate excludes jails, juvenile facilities, as well as immigration and military detention centers. See ASCALiman Report at 9.
2

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 3 of 57
Despite the growing consensus among the scientific community that solitary confinement
inflicts severe harm on prisoners, a select group of “special circumstances high security” inmates
in Connecticut are all-but-certain to be housed in prolonged isolation for the rest of their lives.
Other than two daily hours of recreation and two 15-minute breaks to eat lunch and dinner, each
such inmate is effectively condemned to spend the rest of his life in a cell roughly the size of a
parking space.
II. Background Reynolds was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.3 In 2017, he was re-
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release, following the judicial abolition of
the death penalty in Connecticut in 2015. See Mem in Supp. Defs’ Mot. for Summary Judgment
(“Defs’ Mot.”) (Doc. No. 117-26) at 1. Reynolds has been confined at Northern Correctional
Institution (“Northern”), a level 5 maximum security prison, for the past twenty-three years.
Mem. in Supp. Pl’s Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Pl’s Mot.”) (Doc. No. 122) at 1. Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes Section 18-10b (“Section 18-10b”),4 Reynolds is classified as a
“special circumstances high security” inmate. See id. at 4. As an inmate on special
3 Reynolds was convicted of murdering Waterbury Police Officer Walter Williams in December 1992. The facts of his case are set forth in State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 (2003). 4 Section 18-10b is a statute enacted by the Connecticut legislature prior to the Connecticut Supreme Court’s retroactive abolition of the death penalty in State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1 (2015). It states in part,
(a) The Commissioner of Correction shall place an inmate on special circumstances high security status and house the inmate in administrative segregation until a reclassification process is completed under subsection (b) of this section, if (1) the inmate is convicted of the class A felony of murder with special circumstances committed on or after April 25, 2012, under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect on or after April 25, 2012, and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release, or (2) the inmate is in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction for a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, for which a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a and such inmate's sentence is (A) reduced to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (B) commuted to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-10b.
3

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 4 of 57
circumstances status, he lives alone in a 12 foot by 7 foot cell. See Joint Smt. of Undisputed Facts (“JSUF”) (Doc. No. 120) ¶¶ 33–34. His cell is enclosed by concrete walls, a metal door, and a three-inch wide window. Id. ¶¶ 34, 37–38.
Reynolds is allowed out of his cell for two fifteen-minute periods to eat lunch and dinner. He is allowed to take one fifteen-minute shower each day. See Defs’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt., (Doc. No. 117-27) ¶¶ 142, 294. He is allotted two hours of recreation each day for six days a week and two hours of weekly indoor gym recreation. See Robles Decl. (Doc. No. 117-6) ¶¶ 61– 67. Reynolds may, upon request, receive visits from clergy, attorneys, or prison medical staff. Defs’ Mot. at 57. Other than those periods, Reynolds remains isolated with no contact with anyone but the six other inmates on special circumstances status. See PL’s Mot. at 4; JSUF ¶ 28. Although he is allowed social visits with family members, no physical contact is permitted during those visits, which occur through Plexiglass. Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. (Doc. No. 121) ¶ 84. Reynolds’ conditions of confinement are more restrictive than any other form of incarceration available within the State of Connecticut prison system.
On or about October 4, 2013, Reynolds filed his original pro se complaint challenging his conditions of confinement. Doc. No. 1. On June 29, 2015, I granted Reynolds’ request for appointment of counsel. Doc. No. 52. About a month later, on August 25, 2015, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the prospective repeal of the death penalty enacted by the Connecticut State Legislature in 2012 violated the state Constitution and ordered that individuals on death row be re-sentenced to life without the possibility of release. See State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1 (2015). Accordingly, Reynolds was resentenced on April 21, 2017. On June 29, 2017, Reynolds filed his second amended complaint, which now serves as the operative complaint. Doc. No. 711.
4

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 5 of 57
Reynolds has sued former Connecticut Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Commissioner Leo Arnone and various prisoner officials at Northern Correctional Institution (“Defendants”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief; as well as damages.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on November 9, 2018. In his motion, Reynolds contends that his conditions offend multiple constitutional protections as well as basic principles of human decency. Pl’s Mot. at 2–3. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 58. Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because there “is no clearly established law either in the U.S. Supreme Court or the Second Circuit regarding the management of inmates on death row/special circumstances.” Defs’ Mot. at 1. In addition, Defendants state that Reynolds’ claims are unripe because he failed to exhaust his state habeas court remedies regarding Section 18-10b. Id. at 2. I held oral argument on April 18, 2019, at which time I took the motions under advisement. See Doc. No. 151. For the following reasons, I grant Reynolds’ motion and deny the Defendants’ motion.
III. Standard of Review A. Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must construe the facts of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all
5

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 6 of 57
reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970); see also Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1992) (court is required to “resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party”). In the context of cross-motions for summary judgment, the same standard is applied. See Scholastic, Inc. v. Harris, 259 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2001). However, in deciding each motion, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
“Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper.” Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir. 1992). If the nonmoving party submits evidence that is “merely colorable,” or is not “significantly probative,” summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50.
The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. Id. at 247–48. To present a “genuine” issue of material fact, there must be contradictory evidence “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. at 248. If the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof at trial, then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In such a situation, “there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an
6

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 7 of 57
essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 322–23; accord Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (movant’s burden satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of nonmoving party’s claim). In short, if there is no genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment may enter. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
B. Injunctive Relief The party requesting permanent injunctive relief must demonstrate (1) that he will be
irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction and (2) actual success on the merits. Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 182 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). To demonstrate irreparable harm, a plaintiff must show an “injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent and that cannot be remedied by an award of monetary damages.” Forest City Daly Housing, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 162 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998)). The standard for a permanent injunction is essentially the same as for a preliminary injunction with the exception that a plaintiff must show actual success on the merits for permanent injunctive relief rather than a likelihood of success on the merits for preliminary injunctive relief. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. Of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987).
IV. Discussion A. Reynolds’ Conditions of Confinement Violate the Eighth Amendment Reynolds claims his conditions of confinement violate of the Eighth Amendment. The
Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments” on those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim, Reynolds must prove “both an objective element—that the prison officials’ transgression was
7

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 8 of 57
‘sufficiently serious’—and a subjective element—that the official acted, or omitted to act, with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’ i.e., with ‘deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.’” Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). A condition is objectively serious if it deprives Reynolds of “basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.” Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ultimately, to establish the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must prove that the conditions of his confinement violate contemporary standards of decency.” Id.
To meet the subjective component, Reynolds must show that prison officials knew “of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,” that is, that they were “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and . . . dr[e]w the inference.” Id. at 185–86 (internal citation omitted). The requisite knowledge of risk may be inferred “from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825); see also Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brook v. Wright, 315 F. 3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Evidence that a risk was ‘obvious or otherwise must have been known to a defendant’ may be sufficient for a fact finder to conclude that the defendant was actually aware of the risk.”). The Supreme Court has also stated that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, although not physically barbarous, involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are totally without penological justification.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
8

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 9 of 57
1. Objective Element Reynolds argues that his “inhumane” conditions of confinement establish the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim, noting that his “extreme social isolation offends contemporary standards of decency.” Pl’s Mot. at 9. First, he states that “[a]n overwhelming body of scientific research confirms that prolonged, extreme social isolation is inconsistent with ‘evolving standards of decency.’” Id. at 13; see also Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 325, 327 (2006) (The confinement of a “prisoner alone in a cell for all, or nearly all, of the day with minimal environmental stimulation and minimal opportunity for social interaction – can cause severe psychiatric harm.”). Reynolds notes that many states are severely limiting the use of solitary confinement. See id. at 10. For example, Idaho’s short-term restrictive housing is capped at fifteen days. See ASCA-Liman Report at 69–71. Colorado also limits the use of restrictive housing to fifteen days. Id. at 67–68. In North Dakota, an inmate’s average stay in solitary confinement is between thirty and sixty days. Id. at 72. In 2014, the Nebraska legislature adopted a law that limits the use of solitary confinement. See JoAnne Young, New Rules on Solitary Confinement in Nebraska Prisons to Take Effect Friday, Lincoln Journal Star (June 26, 2016). The Wisconsin state legislature also approved reforms for the use of solitary confinement, including alternative punishment for behavior in general population and DOC review after 120 days in the restrictive housing unit. See Dee J. Hall, State Changing Solitary Confinement Policy, Wisconsin Center for Investigative Journalism (Aug. 23, 2015). Reynolds argues that his ongoing confinement in near-total isolation poses a serious risk of future harm to his mental health. See Pl’s Mot. at 14. “Defendants severely limit the amount of meaningful social interaction [Reynolds] has with other inmates . . . . Although Defendants now allow congregate meals during lunch and dinner, the 15–20 minutes allotted for meals
9

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 10 of 57
barely allow for some very modicum of social interaction [over] eating and talking.” Id. at 15 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Reynolds is only allowed to interact with other special circumstances inmates. Id. He is unable to interact with staff in any meaningful way and he is not allowed to have physical contract with his guests during social visits. See Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 84.
Reynolds relies on the expert testimony of Dr. Stuart Grassian, who described special circumstances inmates’ confinement as “psychologically toxic, cruel, ineffective and counterproductive.” Grassian Expert Report (Doc. No. 100-1) at 11.5 Dr. Grassian noted that an inmate like Reynolds who does not have a pre-existing mental illness, is placed at great risk of psychiatric decompensation in solitary confinement, leading to self-harm and suicidal tendencies.
Although it has become widely accepted that mentally ill individuals are at severe risk of psychiatric decompensation in solitary, such decompensation is not limited to those with pre-existent mental illness. After controlling for the presence of mental illness, there remains overwhelming evidence that solitary confinement causes many inmates to become suicidal and self-destructive, on average demonstrating that such acts are about seven times as prevalent among those housed in solitary as they are among those housed in general population. Id. at 14–15. Furthermore, Reynolds contends that the Defendants continue to deny his basic need for adequate shelter. See Pl’s Mot. at 17. “Plumbing problems are endemic at Northern; wastewater and fecal matter regularly back up into adjacent cells, causing the entire unit to smell strongly of feces.” Id. at 18. “On multiple occasions, [Reynolds’] genitals were submerged in his neighbor’s wastewater and fecal matter because another inmate had flushed the adjacent cell’s toilet while [Reynolds] was using the toilet in his cell.” Id.; Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 58.
5 Defendants oppose Dr. Grassian’s expert report on multiple fronts. They contend that Dr. Grassian’s opinions are based primarily on observations of other institutions and are not rooted in any first-hand knowledge of Reynolds or Northern. See Defs’ Opp. at 17–20. Those arguments are addressed below. See infra Section IV. A. 3.
10

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 11 of 57
In addition, Reynolds notes that the temperatures and noise levels inside Northern can vary, causing him to experience “extreme” temperatures and “chaotic, noisy conditions, which further deprive [him] of adequate shelter.” Pl’s Mot. at 19–20.
In response, Defendants argue that Reynolds’ complaints about his conditions of confinement do not amount to a constitutional violation. “[Reynolds] fails to allege a sufficiently serious deprivation; he does not lack, shelter, medical care or reasonable safety. Instead, [Reynolds] has a modern well-furnished cell with TV, radio, video games, heating, cooling, lighting, hot and cold water, and is relatively comfortable in his single-cell.” Id. at 29. In addition, Defendants avow that “many allegations [] are either wholly untrue, inaccurately exaggerated or misrepresentative of the true facts of this case . . . . Many more of [Reynolds’] allegations were completely and wholly raised for the first time in his affidavit, and Rule 56(a)(1) statement.” Defs’ Opp. (Doc. No. 129-21) at 1.
Moreover, Defendants note that Reynolds and other special circumstances inmates can engage in “unlimited social correspondence” with family and friends. Defs’ Mot. at 81. Inmates can talk to one another “through the vents and crevices in the walls” and during their outdoor recreation period. Id. They have opportunities to visit with family and friends and can make multiple phone calls daily. Id. A special circumstances inmate may request to have a professional visit with a clergyperson from the community, if that clergyperson is the same religion as the inmate. Id. at 71.
Defendants rely on the expert report of Dr. Gregory Saathoff, who opined that based upon his own experience and a visit with officials at Northern, the conditions of confinement for special circumstances inmates do not constitute “solitary confinement conditions.” Saathoff Decl. (Doc. No. 117-10) ¶ 11. Although Dr. Saathoff agrees with Dr. Grassian regarding the
11

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 12 of 57
detrimental effects than can be caused by solitary confinement, he states that Reynolds does not
exhibit the serious symptoms described by Dr. Grassian.
Because the serious symptoms described by Dr. Grassian that are a consequence of long term solitary confinement are not evident in Mr. Reynolds, it supports a determination that the special circumstances unit as it is designed and implemented does not constitute solitary confinement.
Id. ¶16. Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity6 because their behavior
was objectively reasonable considering the lack of any clearly established law or evidence that
Reynolds suffered either a physical or emotional injury.
The defendants have acted reasonably and professionally and did not take any action with any knowledge of any [of Reynolds’] clearly established rights being violated. [Defendants] acted in an objectively lawful manner and without knowledge of any injury to [Reynolds], whether physical, emotion or legal. In fact, [Reynolds] suffered no injury whatsoever . . . . [Reynolds] can point to no clearly established legal rights of which the defendants should have been aware with regard to the management of death row.
Defs’ Mot. at 16.
Other courts have held similar conditions inconsistent with contemporary standards of
human decency. Recently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed an Eastern District of Virginia ruling that
the conditions of confinement for Virginia’s death row inmates violated the Eighth Amendment.
See Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (May 6, 2019).
The challenged conditions of confinement on Virginia’s death row—under which Plaintiffs spent, for years, between 23 and 24 hours a day alone, in a small . . . cell with no access to congregate religious, educational, or social programming—pose a substantial risk of serious psychological and emotional harm.
Id. at 357 (internal quotations marks omitted). The Porter Court’s ruling was based on
“[n]umerous studies [that] reveal that prolonged detention of inmates in conditions akin to those
Plaintiffs faced on Virginia’s death row also leads to psychological deterioration, including
6 The Defendants’ qualified immunity argument is addressed in Section IV. D. 3.
12

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 13 of 57
declines in mental functioning . . . difficulties in thinking, concentration and memory problems,
and problems with impulse control.” Id. at 356 (internal quotations marks omitted).
The plaintiffs in Porter were inmates on Virginia’s death row who were housed in
conditions analogous to Reynolds’. Like special circumstances inmates, Virginia death row
inmates “could keep a television and compact disc player in their cell and borrow approved
publications and library materials.” Id. at 354. Two inmates, “were allowed out of their cells to perform institutional jobs,” like special circumstances inmates in Connecticut.7 Id.; Mulligan
Decl. (Doc. No. 117-1) ¶ 84. Despite the Porter defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs were
not held in “solitary” confinement because they were not “subject to prolonged isolation of lack of stimulation,”8 the Fourth Circuit noted that “[d]efendants do not dispute–nor could they– that
the challenged procedures and regulations restricted death row inmates to their cells for between
23 and 24 hours a day.” Id. at 359.
The Third Circuit, in Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., reached a similar conclusion.
848 F.3d 549 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Farnan, 138 S. Ct. 357 (2017), and
cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. Wetzel, 138 S. Ct. 357 (2017). In Williams, Pennsylvania
death row inmates who were granted resentencing hearings challenged their placement in solitary
confinement without meaningful review. Id. at 552. They argued that their indefinite detention in socially isolating conditions violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process.9 Id.
7 “Inmates on death row [in Connecticut] are given jobs as janitors. This job requires that each inmate keeps his cell clean and that he cleans up after himself when he uses the showers and dayroom.” Defs’ Mot. at 40. 8 Defendants in Porter, like the Defendants here, argued that the plaintiffs were not held in social isolation because death row inmates “had interaction with prison staff, including mental health counselors, and could have essentially unlimited contact visitation with their attorneys.” See Porter v. Clarke, 290 F. Supp. 3d 518, 523 (E.D. Va. 2018), aff’d but criticized, 923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (May 6, 2019). 9 In Williams, inmates were also subjected to conditions analogous to Reynolds’. Plaintiff Craig Williams was confined in a cell for twenty-two hours a day after his death sentence was vacated. 848 F.3d at 555. “During the short intervals that Williams was not in his cell, but in the prison yard, law library, or shower, he was held inside a small locked cage that continued to restrict his movement and freedom of association . . . . He was only permitted non-contact visits.” Id.
13

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 14 of 57
at 553. After reviewing the “robust body of scientific research on the effects of solitary confinement” the Third Circuit held that “the deprivations of protracted solitary confinement so exceed the typical deprivations of imprisonment as to be the kind of atypical, significant deprivation . . . . which [can] create a liberty interest.” Id. at 566. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, Reynolds has spent nearly half his life alone in a concrete cell. When considering the average male life expectancy, he still has 34.3 years remaining in those conditions. See Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 113. Each passing year, he faces the risk of deteriorating psychological health. Defendants concede that, under current policy, as a former death row inmate Reynolds has no genuine opportunity to enter the general inmate population. See, e.g., Defs’ Mot. at 78 (“Death row inmates are a special class of prisoners . . . . They have nothing to lose in committing assaults or attempting to escape. It is eminently rational to conclude that death row inmates constitute the biggest escape risk should they be housed in general population.”). Under the Defendants’ current policies, Reynolds will never interact with inmates who were not previously on death row, never touch a friend or loved one, and never have another opportunity for meaningful social interaction for the rest of his life.
Although Reynolds may recreate with other special circumstances inmates, the Defendants cannot dispute that Reynolds is detained in his 12 foot by 7-foot cell for nearly twenty-two hours a day. Nor have the Defendants’ experts challenged the scholarly studies regarding the risks of developing disturbing mental health conditions in prolonged isolation. The fact that Reynolds may not currently exhibit any devastating effects of his confinement does not defeat the claim that the Defendants’ behavior was “sufficiently serious” to meet the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim. See Phelps, 308 F.3d at 185. There is every indication
14

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 15 of 57
that Reynolds’ conditions of confinement would “pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.” McKinney, 509 U.S. at 35.
To the extent that the Defendants argue that Reynolds’ conditions of confinement do not constitute “solitary confinement,”10 that notion is contrary to both the vast array of literature discussing the harmful effects of prolonged periods of isolation and the undisputed facts of this case. Reynolds is confined to his cell an average of 21 to 22 hours a day. See Defs’ Mot. at 84. He is unable to interact with other inmates in general population. See id. at 78. He is unable to physically embrace his visitors. See Defs’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 111. Other than his limited recreation time, professional or medical visits, and short fifteen-minute increments to eat and shower, Reynolds will spend the remainder of his life alone in a small cell.
Those types of conditions give rise to the harmful effects described by the growing body of research on social isolation and mental health. See, e.g., Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 49 Crime & Delinquency 124, 132 (2003) (emphasis added) (“[T]here is not a single published study of solitary or supermax-like confinement in which nonvoluntary confinement lasted for longer than 10 days, where participants were unable to terminate their isolation at will, that failed to result in negative psychological effects.”); McClary v. Kelly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 195, 208 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[a] conclusion . . . that prolonged isolation from social and environmental stimulation increases the risk of developing mental illness does not strike this Court as rocket science.”).
Based on the evidence in the record, I conclude that Reynolds has established the objective element of his Eighth Amendment claim. An overwhelming body of scientific research
10 See, e.g., Defs’ Mot. at 84 (“There is no ‘solitary confinement’ . . . . [Special circumstances] inmates eat collectively, and go to the day room and gymnasium for group recreational activities. The time out of cell is about three hours per day, when counting two-one hour recreation periods, meals, and possible visits, medical appointments, and other out-of-cell opportunities.”).
15

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 16 of 57
supports the conclusion that prolonged isolation presents dangerous risks to an inmate’s physical and mental health.
2. Subjective Element Reynolds also contends that the Defendants’ deliberate indifference to his conditions of confinement satisfies the subjective element of his Eighth Amendment claim. “The risks of harm from the conditions of [Reynolds’] confinement are obvious; Northern’s own policies and the Defendants’ own testimony reflect an understanding of the mental health risks of prolonged social isolation. The undisputed facts show not only that Defendants knew the risks posed by the conditions of [Reynolds’] confinement but that they failed to respond to those risks.” Pl’s Mot. at 21–22. Reynolds asserts that the risks inherent in subjecting a person to over twenty-three years of social isolation are so “obvious” that no reasonable person could claim to be unaware of them. Id. at 22. Specifically, he argues that the Defendants’ awareness of those risks is evident in Northern’s own internal policies and directives. DOC’s Restrictive Housing Unit Matrix requires special circumstances inmates to be reviewed “[b]y a mental health professional after 30 days of initial placement” and then reviewed again “every 90 days thereafter.” Doc. No. 121-23 at 1. In addition, Reynolds argues that DOC officials knew about the mental health consequences of social isolation. Defendant Mark Frayne, a former psychologist at Northern, stated that the scientific literature regarding the effects of solitary confinement reflects, “[t]hat there is a propensity for solitary confinement to adversely affect [a person’s] mental health.” Frayne Dep. (Doc. No. 121-8) at 8. Despite the Defendants’ knowledge of those risks, Reynolds notes that DOC officials continue to house him in social isolation for an indefinite period.
16

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 17 of 57
“There is no evidence that [Defendants] have taken any action to order an evaluation or otherwise inquire into the effects of this isolation on [Reynolds’] mental health.” Pl’s Mot. at 23.
Reynolds also cites the Defendants’ own testimony to show that his conditions of confinement lack a penological justification. “Defendants themselves acknowledge that there is no security justification for the extreme conditions of [Reynolds’] confinement. Defendants Frayne and Semple, and Dr. Saathoff, all testified that [Reynolds] can be managed safely in general population.” Id. at 24.
In response Defendants argue that “any and all claims regarding alleged deleterious effects on [Reynolds’] mental health must be dismissed because [Reynolds] has no such deleterious mental health effects.” Defs’ Mot. at 2. “[Reynolds] [has] never asked for mental health assistance and has been determined to have no mental health issues. He certainly never exhausted his mental health claims, and thus, this court is without any power to review them.” Id. at 16. Reynolds never reported to a DOC official that he was suffering from any mental instability deterioration.
[Reynolds] never wrote or spoke to me concerning his mental health nor was I ever advised by any other staff member that he was in any way suffering from mental instability or deterioration of any kind . . . . If anything, he seemed to be relatively satisfied with having a single cell, with all of his property and being able to remain on single-cell status, which death row allowed him to do. Maldonado Decl. (Doc. No. 117-3) ¶ 18. Here, Reynolds has demonstrated that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm by continuing to house him in social isolation. There is no dispute that prison officials at Northern were aware of the mental health risks associated with prolonged isolation. Indeed, Defendant Frayne, the former managing mental health provider at Northern, testified that he was familiar with the detrimental effects of solitary confinement. The
17

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 18 of 57
Defendants’ knowledge of the health risks of solitary confinement is apparent through DOC’s own policies, which mandate that special circumstances inmates be assessed by a mental health professional one month after their initial placement and every three months thereafter. Additionally, a psychiatrist remained on-call during second and third shifts at Northern to assist special circumstances inmates. See Defs’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 410. Medical staff and social workers toured the death row housing unit multiple times a day. Id. ¶¶ 427, 435. The Defendants implemented those policies because they were aware of the disturbing mental health consequences of solitary confinement. It is immaterial to the Eighth Amendment analysis that Reynolds has yet to display symptoms of a mental disease.11
Furthermore, the Defendants’ description of Reynolds’ stable behavior supports a finding that there is no penological purpose for his severe conditions. Indeed, Defendant Maldonado, the District Administrator for DOC, characterized Reynolds as “respectful and professional.” Maldonado Decl. ¶ 17. Based on his observations, Reynolds appeared to be “relatively welladjusted” to prison life. Id. Hipolito Rodriguez, former Warden of Northern, found that Reynolds “is articulate and able to communicate well.” Rodriguez Decl. (Doc. No. 117-5) ¶ 20. Defendant Frayne stated that Reynolds “continues a very favorable adjustment considering his correctional title.” Frayne Decl. (Doc. No. 117-9) ¶ 72. Even the Defendants’ own expert, Dr. Saathoff, opined that Reynolds is “a thoughtful, articulate and disciplined individual.” Saathoff Decl. ¶ 12.
[Reynolds] continues to serve as the barber for the special circumstances population . . . . Because a prison barber is in a unique position to harm others when they are at their most vulnerable, it is incumbent upon the institution to allow only someone who has the requisite and appropriate interpersonal, cognitive and emotional stability to accomplish this important role – the most intimate job that any prisoner can be assigned. That
11 The fact that Reynolds has not yet shown any symptoms of mental health injury does not defeat his claim. Prison officials could not avoid the subjective element of an Eighth Amendment claim if they confined an inmate in a cell exposed to PCBs or other cancer-causing chemicals only as long as the inmate showed no symptoms of disease.
18

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 19 of 57
[Reynolds] performs this job with exceptional skill in the dayroom according to correctional staff and is fully accepted in this role by other inmates as well as security and administrative staff and leadership is a testament to his mental and emotional stability. Id. ¶ 17. The individual that Dr. Saathoff describes is a far cry from the impulsive death row inmate who has “nothing to lose in committing assaults or attempting to escape.” See Defs’ Mot. at 78. The Defendants’ attempt to justify Reynolds’ current conditions based on his underlying state murder conviction12 (which occurred in 1992) is without merit. See Defs’ Opp. at 3–6. Despite the Defendants’ objection to Reynolds’ characterization as a “model inmate,” Reynolds’ most recent disciplinary citation occurred in 2013. See id. at 4 n. 3. As noted above, the Defendants’ sworn testimony indicates that Reynolds does not exhibit “paranoid rage” nor “compulsive behaviors” and has adjusted “relatively well” to prison life. Saathoff Decl. ¶ 16; Maldonado Decl. ¶ 17. There is no evidence in the record that there is any penological justification for Reynolds’ current conditions of confinement. Based on the evidence in the record, I conclude that Reynolds has established the subjective element of his Eighth Amendment claim. The Defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the serious risks of harm to Reynolds from his conditions of confinement; their failure to ameliorate those conditions reflects deliberate indifference. Thus, Reynolds has shown that his conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
12 The Fourth Circuit in Porter rejected a similar argument. “[T]he Five Percenters were placed in segregation based on their in-prison conduct and were removed from segregation if they renounced their membership with the group. By contrast, the challenged Virginia procedures and regulations place death row inmates in solitary confinement based on their sentence alone and do not provide death row inmates with an avenue for removing themselves from segregation.” Porter, 923 F.3d at 359 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
19

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 20 of 57
3. Daubert Analysis Defendants move to preclude the opinions of Dr. Stuart Grassian, 13 arguing that his report fails the admissibly test for expert opinions set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses testimony to be provided by experts. The Rule provides:
If the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, [a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if] (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 702 “establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability,” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, and “requires a valid . . . connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.” Id. at 592; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). In determining the admissibility of expert testimony, whether based on “scientific,” “technical,” or “other specialized knowledge,” the Supreme Court has adopted a two-step inquiry under which trial judges must determine “whether the reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93; see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141. Specifically, the Federal Rules of Evidence “assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; see also Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 2004)
13 Defendants also move to preclude the export report of former Commissioner Martin Horn. Reynolds in his motion, however, relies almost exclusively on the expert opinions of Dr. Grassian.
20

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 21 of 57
(instructing that “the district court must consider both the reliability and relevance of the proffered testimony”).
In assessing the reliability of a proffered expert’s testimony, a district court’s inquiry under Daubert must focus, not on the substance of the expert’s conclusions, but on whether those conclusions were generated by a reliable methodology. See id. at 590; see also Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 137 F. Supp. 2d 147, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). In Daubert, the Supreme Court set out a list of non-exclusive factors the trial court may consider in determining whether an expert’s reasoning or methodology is reliable: (1) whether the theory or technique on which the expert relies has been tested – that is, whether the expert’s theory can be challenged in an objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique when applied; (4) the existence of standards controlling the technique’s operation; and (5) whether the method has been generally accepted by the scientific community. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593– 94.
Those factors are not a definitive checklist, however. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150. A court applying the Daubert factors must look at “the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony,” and “consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.” Id. at 150– 52. In short, “the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.” Id. at 152.
The Defendants focus their objection on the reliability of Dr. Grassian’s methods. See Defs’ Opp. at 17–21. They contend that Dr. Grassian’s conclusions regarding Reynolds’
21

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 22 of 57
conditions at Northern are inadmissible because he did not visit Northern and did not interview Reynolds prior to producing his expert report.14 “Dr. Grassian’s opinions had been pre-judged and pre-determined before he ever became involved in this case, and not only did he simply copy and paste from other reports, he blindly adhered to the same viewpoints that he held in his first article which was essentially a literature review.” Id. at 20.
In response, Reynolds notes that Dr. Grassian did not believe a personal visit to Northern was necessary in order to opine on the potential psychiatric effects of social isolation at Northern. “[Dr. Grassian] had access to a wealth of material about the physical conditions at Northern, out-of-cell time and the social interaction available to [Reynolds]. Dr. Grassian has done a considerable amount of academic and scientific research that focuses on the possible psychiatric effects of near total isolation.” Pl’s Reply (Doc. No. 137) at 8.
Dr. Grassian’s expert testimony is admissible under Daubert. Notably, Reynolds does not rely on Dr. Grassian to demonstrate that he is currently suffering from deteriorating mental illness as a result of his conditions of confinement. Instead Reynolds relies on Dr. Grassian to show that he is at risk of the detrimental health effects commonly associated with prolonged confinement in social isolation. See, e.g., Pl’s Mot. at 14. Dr. Grassian bases his opinions on his own research, which has been subject to peer review. See, e.g., Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 11 (1983); see also Effects of Sensory Deprivation in Psychiatric Seclusion and Solitary Confinement, 8 Int’l J. Law & Psychiatry (1986). His research is also generally accepted by the scientific community, including the Defendants’ own expert Dr. Gregory Saathoff. See, e.g, Saathoff Decl. ¶ 15. (“I agree with Dr. Grassian about detrimental effects that can occur in conditions of solitary
14 Defendants do not dispute Dr. Grassian’s expert qualifications.
22

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 23 of 57
confinement. I have referred my students and residents to Dr. Grassian’s writings and other psychiatric literature and research that details the consequences of what is known as solitary confinement.”). Therefore, I find Dr. Grassian’s testimony both relevant and admissible.
B. Reynolds’ Conditions of Confinement Violate His Rights Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Reynolds also argues that Defendants have violated his rights under the Due Process
Clause by depriving him of a protected liberty interest without any meaningful review. To assert a due process claim in connection with a classification decision, Reynolds must
show that he had a protected liberty interest in remaining free from the classification and, if he had such an interest, that the Defendants deprived him of the interest without affording him due process of law. See Walker v. Fischer, 523 F. App’x 43, 44 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (citing Giano v. Selsky, 238 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2001)).
In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court reexamined the circumstances under which state prison regulations afford inmates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 474. The Court explained that for prisoners, a liberty interest warranting due process protection “will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (internal citations omitted).
Whether restraint constitutes an “atypical and significant hardship” depends on the totality of the circumstances, particularly the severity and the duration of the deprivation. See, e.g., Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 1999). Hardship is atypical and significant in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life based on a comparison of the frequency and
23

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 24 of 57
duration of similar conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 230–32 (2d Cir. 2000). Atypicality should be measured against the conditions afforded to the general population within a given prison system, as well as those in routine administrative confinement. See Welch v. Bartlett, 196 F.3d 389, 393 (2d Cir. 1999). Whether conditions constitute an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” is a matter of law. Colon, 215 F. 3d at 230.
1. Liberty Interest Reynolds alleges that he has a protected liberty interest in freedom from the extreme social isolation imposed by the Defendants. See Pl’s Mot. at 26. Regarding atypicality, Reynolds states that his conditions at Northern are a “significant departure from the hardships normally attendant to incarceration in Connecticut [and] that he has a liberty interest in not being made to endure them indefinitely.” Id. at 30. Moreover, because of its indefinite duration and lack of meaningful review, Reynolds argues that special circumstances confinement is even more restrictive than administrative segregation. See id. at 31. Reynolds’ conditions apply only to himself and six other inmates on special circumstances status. Id. at 32. “Defendants have imposed those [conditions] without regard to misconduct and with no rehabilitative goal. There is no better indicator of atypicality.” Id. The Defendants respond by noting that there is no caselaw to support Reynolds’ contention that he has a liberty interest to be free from restraints as a death row inmate. See Defs’ Mot. at 21. In addition, Defendants argue that Reynolds has no constitutional right to be housed in general population, to live in a certain cell, nor be housed in a particular prison. See Defs’ Opp. at 8 (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983) (“[Just as] an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he
24

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 25 of 57
has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State.”) (footnote omitted)).
All parties cite Wilkinson v. Austin, where the Supreme Court held that there may be a state-created liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement. 545 U.S. 209, 221–22 (2005). In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court considered a due process claim regarding the classification of Ohio inmates to the state’s high security “Supermax” prison for non-disciplinary reasons. Conditions at the Ohio State Penitentiary (“OSP”) were more restrictive than any other prison facility in Ohio, including its death row and administrative control units. See id. at 214. Inmates were held in “extreme isolation” in 7 foot by 14 foot cells for twenty-three hours a day. Id. During the one hour per day that an inmate could leave his cell, access was limited to one of two indoor recreation cells. Id. Opportunities for social visits were rare and conducted through glass walls. Id. “Aside from the severity of the conditions, placement at OSP [was] for an indefinite period of time, limited only by an inmate’s sentence. For an inmate serving a life sentence, there [was] no indication how long he may be incarcerated at OSP once assigned there.” Id. at 214–15.
The Court applied the Sandin analysis to determine whether inmates had a liberty interest in avoiding indefinite confinement in the restrictive high-security prison. Id. at 223 (“After Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of the regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484).
Applying that analysis, the Court held that inmates had a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in avoiding assignment to OSP.
25

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 26 of 57
For an inmate placed in OSP, almost all human contact is prohibited, even to the point that conversation is not permitted from cell to cell; the light, though it may be dimmed, is on for 24 hours; exercise is for 1 hour per day, but only in a small indoor room. Save perhaps for the especially severe limitations on all human contact, these conditions likely would apply to most solitary confinement facilities, but here there are two added components. First is the duration. Unlike the 30–day placement in Sandin, placement at OSP is indefinite and, after an initial 30–day review, is reviewed just annually. Second is that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration . . . . While any of these conditions standing alone might not be sufficient to create a liberty interest, taken together they impose an atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context. It follows that respondents have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP. Id. at 223–24 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). Reynolds contends that his conditions of confinement are analogous to the “extreme” conditions imposed on inmates at OSP. See Pl’s Mot. at 30–32. He notes that his cell is smaller15 than the cells in Wilkinson and that he is only allowed to interact with other inmates on special circumstances status. Id. at 30. In addition, “[i]nmates at Ohio’s supermax retained some opportunity to leave the facility, either through the termination of their sentence, or through an annual review process. By contrast, Defendants have imposed permanent social isolation on [Reynolds] that he must endure until the day he dies.” Id. Defendants do not contest that the conditions imposed on special circumstances inmates are far more restrictive than other forms of incarceration available in Connecticut prisons. Northern is a level 5 maximum security facility. JSUF ¶ 31. Unlike special circumstances inmates, prisoners in general population in Connecticut have access to open-air outdoor activities with natural light. See Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 187. Inmates in general population are permitted to have social visits where physical contact is permitted. See id. ¶¶ 183, 217.
15 Reynolds’ cell measures 12 feet by 7 feet in size. JSUF ¶ 34. By contrast, cells in Ohio’s Supermax facility were 14 feet by 7 feet. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214.
26

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 27 of 57
Reynolds asserts that his conditions of confinement “differ significantly from routine prison conditions in Connecticut state institutions.” Pl’s Mot. at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In response, the Defendants argue that the prison conditions at issue in Wilkinson were far more extreme than the conditions imposed on special circumstances inmates at Northern. See Defs’ Mot. at 81. Unlike the inmates in Wilkinson who were detained in their cells for twentythree hours a day, special circumstances inmates are allowed “out of their cells nearly three full hours per day, which could be more if they have a job, medical or mental health appointment, or a social or legal visit.” Id. Though inmates in Wilkinson were not allowed to communicate from cell to cell, special circumstance inmates may “communicate with other inmates through the vents and crevices in the walls” and during their outdoor recreation period. Id.
The Defendants’ attempts to distinguish Reynolds’ conditions of confinement from the conditions at issue in Wilkinson are unconvincing. Reynolds spends (at best) only one to two additional hours outside of his cell compared to the inmates at OSP. He returns to a cell that is even smaller than those at Ohio’s Supermax facility. Like the plaintiffs in Wilkinson, Reynolds is not allowed to physically embrace his visitors when he is allowed a social visit. If Reynolds does not have a scheduled visit, he is only allowed to interact with the other six inmates on special circumstances status. Those conditions are “synonymous with extreme isolation.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214.
More troubling, however, is the permanent nature of Reynolds’ classification. Special circumstance inmates at Northern are ineligible for parole and are held in social isolation for the remainder of their life sentences. See DOC Restrictive Housing Unit Matrix at 1. Special circumstances confinement is even more restrictive when compared to other forms of administrative segregation. Inmates housed in “Administrative Segregation” are classified based
27

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 28 of 57
on disciplinary history while in DOC custody. Id. Those inmates require a hearing prior to their placement in isolation to determine whether they are a threat to the facility, to staff, or to other inmates. An inmate in “Interval I” or “Interval II” of the “Chronic Discipline” program is placed on restrictive status to “prepare [the] inmate for return to general population.” Id. Reynolds, however, received no administrative hearing prior to his placement on special circumstances status. He has an “[i]ndefinite” authorized length of confinement and is not eligible for release to the general population. Id. “While any of these conditions standing alone might not be sufficient to create a liberty interest, taken together they impose an atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224; see also Williams, 848 F. 3d at 562 (internal citation and footnotes omitted) (“This indefiniteness contrasts sharply with other common forms of solitary confinement . . . . The duration of the deprivations that follow from that seclusion is often predetermined and fixed unless the inmate’s behavior is thought to require an additional period of segregation.”).
Accordingly, Reynolds has a protected liberty interest in remaining free from the conditions imposed due to his classification as a special circumstances inmate.
2. Procedural Protections Reynolds further argues that because he has a liberty interest in freedom from his conditions, the Defendants violated his due process rights by failing to provide him procedural protections before placing him on special circumstances status. See Pl’s Mot. at 34. “Defendants have done nothing beyond perfunctory ‘classification reviews’ that afford [Reynolds] no notice and no opportunity to plead his case. In practice, these reviews are meaningless exercises. There is no provision for release from special circumstances status.” Id. at 34–35.
28

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 29 of 57
The review offered by Defendants regarding special circumstances status is governed by Section 18-10b, which directs the Commissioner of Correction to establish a “reclassification process” that includes “an assessment of the risk an inmate” and “an assessment of whether such risk requires the inmate’s placement in administrative segregation or protective custody.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-10b(b). The statute further directs the Commissioner to “conduct an annual review of such inmate’s conditions of confinement within such housing unit,” permitting the Commissioner “for compelling correctional management or safety reasons” to “modify any condition of confinement,” subject to the stringent requirements of the statute. Id. § 18.10b(c)(2).
Although the Defendants have completed several “reclassification reviews” regarding his placement on special circumstances status, Reynolds argues that prison officials have never provided him with advance notice of those reviews, nor given him an opportunity to be heard. See Pl’s Mot. at 36.
On May 18, 2017, Defendants sent [Reynolds] a letter notifying him that the “reclassification review process has been completed” and that the commissioner had “determined” that [Reynolds] would be maintained on Special Circumstances High Security status. [Reynolds] has subsequently received the results of similar classification reviews, but had no opportunity to participate. On each occasion, Defendants mechanically classified [Reynolds] as a level 5 security risk based on the length of his confinement. In practice, these reviews are meaningless exercises. Id. (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, Reynolds notes that the Defendants have never made an individualized determination finding that he presents a risk that requires indefinite placement in restrictive housing. Id. at 35–36. To the contrary, the Defendants consider Reynolds to be a “respectful and professional” inmate who “continues a very favorable adjustment considering his correctional title.” Maldonado Decl. ¶ 17; Frayne Decl. ¶ 72.
29

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 30 of 57
The Defendants admit that “there would be no point to a due process hearing” because Reynolds’ classification is inherently tied to his initial death sentence issued by the state trial court. Defs’ Mot. at 19. Additionally, the Defendants proclaim that “[t]here were ample and abundant due process procedures with innumerable habeas corpus opportunities in connection with [Reynolds’] conviction and sentence. It is absurd to claim [Reynolds] did not receive due process.” Id. at. 20
In Hewitt v. Helms, the Supreme Court held that prison officials must provide an inmate with at least an informal hearing “within a reasonable time after confining him to administrative segregation.” 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). In addition, an inmate must at least “receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views [orally or in writing] to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation.” Id. at 476. So long as those two requirements are met “and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and then-available evidence against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied.” Id. (footnote omitted). In Wilkinson, the Court noted the “informal, nonadversary procedures set forth in . . . [Hewitt]” are the appropriate procedural safeguards for inmates faced with indefinite confinement.” 545 U.S. at 229.
Defendants have failed to meet even that minimal requirement. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Reynolds was provided any advance notice or an opportunity to be heard during his reclassification process pursuant to Section 18-10b.16 Defendants acknowledge
16 Defendants assert that Reynolds declined to meet with Dr. Craig Burns, whose duties included reviewing medical records as part of the reclassification process. See Burns Decl. (Doc. No. 136-4) ¶¶ 8–9. Defendants have not stated how Reynolds’ decision not to speak with Dr. Burns adversely affected review of his special circumstances classification.
30

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 31 of 57
that Reynolds’ participation in any hearing would be futile.17 They claim that their burden for providing Reynolds an informal hearing was satisfied by his 1994 criminal trial and his April 21, 2017 resentencing. “There can be no doubt that [Reynolds] knew he was facing the death penalty and that if sentenced to death, would be confined on death row, now reduced to special circumstances.” Defs’ Mot. at 84.
The Defendants’ reliance on Reynolds’ original conviction to satisfy their constitutional obligations fails. As an initial matter, special circumstances status did not exist when Reynolds was initially convicted of murder. It was impossible for Reynolds’ to dispute his current classification during his original trial and sentencing. More importantly, Section 18-10b is not a penal statute, but is rather a directive to the Commissioner of DOC. See, e.g, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-10b(a) (“The Commissioner of Correction shall place an inmate on special circumstances high security status.”) (emphasis added). It is not a directive to a sentencing judge. Contrary to the Defendants’ view, Reynolds’ conditions of confinement were not part of his underlying criminal sentence. Thus, any due process hearing concerning Section 18-10b is beyond the scope of the judicial proceedings that resulted in Reynolds’ underlying conviction. In short, neither his original death sentence nor Section 18-10b can trump Reynolds’ federal due process rights.
For the reasons stated above, Reynolds was deprived of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
17 Indeed, when Reynolds protested his restraint status through the administrative grievance system, Defendant Maldonado responded that “[n]o hearing needed to be held for your restraint status. You are managed as a Death Row inmate.” See Maldonado Dep. (Doc. No. 121-12) at 7–8.
31

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 32 of 57
C. Reynolds’ Conditions of Confinement Violate His Rights Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Reynolds also argues that his treatment compared to other similarly situated prisoners in
DOC custody violates his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Equal Protection Clause protects prisoners from invidious discrimination. The provision does not mandate identical treatment for each individual; rather it requires that similarly situated persons be treated the same. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1985). To prevail on an Equal Protection claim, Reynolds must prove that he was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals and the reason for the different treatment was based on “impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.” Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 609–10 (2d Cir. 1980)).
Reynolds does not allege that the Defendants treated him differently because of his membership in a protected class. He does, however, allege an equal protection violation under the “class of one” theory. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Under that theory, Reynolds must allege that “[He] has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Id. To support a class-of-one claim, Reynolds must allege an “extremely high degree of similarity” with the person to whom he compares himself. Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.). Reynolds’ circumstances and the other person’s circumstances must be “prima facie identical.” Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Appel v. Spiridon, 531
32

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 33 of 57
F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008). “A government official’s decision ‘can be considered irrational only when [the official] acts with no legitimate reason for [his or her] decision.’” Harvey v. Mark, 352 F. Supp. 2d 285, 290 (D. Conn. 2005) (quoting Harlen Associates v. The Incorporated Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 500 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Reynolds identifies two inmates, Eduardo Santiago (“Santiago”) and Terry Johnson (“Johnson”), who were both convicted of capital crimes prior to the prospective repeal of the death penalty and the enactment of Section 18-10b. He contends that both inmates, who have worse disciplinary records, are housed in “substantially more humane level 4 facilities.” Pl’s Mot. at 38.
1. Eduardo Santiago Santiago and Reynolds were both sentenced to death after being convicted of capital murder.18 Santiago was initially sentenced to death in 2004 and was housed on Connecticut’s death row at Northern from 2004 to 2013. Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 165. While at Northern, Santiago was housed in the same unit as Reynolds under the same conditions. See Santiago Decl. (Doc. No. 121-3) at ¶ 3. Between 1998 and 2010, Santiago received eight disciplinary infractions. Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 168. During that time, Reynolds received zero. Id. ¶ 2. In 2001, Santiago received disciplinary infractions for threatening a doctor and for flagrant disobedience, including resisting handcuffing by officers. Id. ¶ 169. Reynolds has never received an infraction for violent conduct during his incarceration. Id. ¶ 3.
18 The background facts underlying Santiago’s original conviction are set forth in State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101, 121 (2012), judgment set aside, opinion not vacated (Aug. 25, 2015), opinion supplemented on reconsideration, 318 Conn. 1 (2015).
33

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 34 of 57
Despite his disciplinary history, Santiago was transferred from Northern to general population at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution (“MacDougall”) in June 2014. Santiago Decl. ¶ 4. He is currently housed at MacDougall, a level 4 facility. See Pl’s Mot. at 38; Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 166. Reynolds notes that as an inmate at MacDougall, Santiago is afforded far more social interaction and programming opportunities. See Pl’s Mot. at 41. At MacDougall, Santiago spends eight hours outside his cell during a normal week day. Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 173. At Northern, Reynolds is allowed at most three hours a day outside his cell. See Defs’ Mot. at 84. As an inmate in general population at MacDougall, Santiago has access to extensive programming opportunities, including art, drama, age-specific wellness groups, poetry, and a college program organized by Yale University. Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 181. Reynolds has no access to such programming. See Pl’s Mot. at 42. Santiago makes approximately $80 per month as a stocker in the commissary warehouse. Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 182. By comparison, Reynolds earns $0.75 per day as the barber for other special circumstances inmates. Id. ¶ 79; JSUF ¶ 45. Lastly, Santiago can physically embrace his social guests who visit him at MacDougall. Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 183. Reynolds has not had any human contact with anyone aside from health providers, lawyers, and prison staff for twenty-three years. Id. ¶ 87.
2. Terry Johnson Terry Johnson received a death sentence after the murder of a Connecticut police officer in 1991.19 See Pl’s Mot. at 40. Johnson was housed at Northern from June 1995 until his death sentence was overturned by the Connecticut Supreme Court in 2000.20 While at Northern,
19 The history of Johnson’s criminal case is set forth in State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1 (2000). 20 Johnson’s death sentence was overturned because the court held that there was insufficient evidence of the existence of an aggravating factor. Johnson, 253 Conn. at 56. When Johnson was originally sentenced, the murder
34

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 35 of 57
Johnson was housed under the same conditions as Reynolds. Johnson Decl. (Doc. No. 121-4) at ¶ 3. Throughout his incarceration, Johnson has received multiple disciplinary citations for fighting with other inmates. In 1998, Johnson was cited for fighting another inmate at Northern. Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 197. Between 2003 and 2011, Johnson was cited for fighting on three separate occasions. Id. ¶¶ 198–200. Johnson has been placed in punitive segregation twenty-two times. Id. ¶ 201. Reynolds has never been cited for fighting during his twenty-three years of incarceration. See id. ¶ 3.
Notwithstanding his history of fighting, Johnson has lived in general population at MacDougall since the summer of 2013. Johnson Decl. ¶ 4. He has access to the same programming and social opportunities as Santiago. Johnson currently plays on the intramural volleyball team at MacDougall and eats lunch and dinner in the dayroom with about 50 other inmates. Id. ¶¶ 23–24. He has access to institutional jobs such as maintenance, commissary, and food service, which pay between $ 0.75 to $1.25 a day. Id. ¶ 37. He can enroll in vocational education programs including electronics, welding, and a Certified Nursing Assistant program. Id. Johnson is also afforded weekend long family visits three to four times a year. Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 218. At Northern, Reynolds may only recreate and eat with the other six special circumstances inmates. See Pl’s Mot. at 4; Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 73. He does not have access to the jobs or vocational training offered at MacDougall and he may not have weekend family visits.
of a police officer was not a statutory aggravating factor under Connecticut’s death penalty statute. See Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 194. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for resentencing to impose a life sentence without the possibility of release. Johnson, 253 Conn. at 56.
35

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 36 of 57
3. Reynolds is Similarly Situated to Santiago and Johnson Defendants’ attempts to justify Reynolds’ different conditions are almost entirely based on Reynolds’ underlying conviction. “[Reynolds] consciously made a decision to murder Officer Williams . . . . [Those] heinous facts make [Reynolds] not only violent and dangerous but also wholly distinguishes his case from the cases of both Terry Johnson and Eduardo Santiago.”21 Defs’ Opp. at 4. Defendants contend that Reynolds’ crime makes him more of a hazard than both Santiago and Johnson, who were also sentenced to death and who have a history of fighting staff and other inmates.22 Based on the facts presented, Reynolds exhibits a “extremely high degree of similarity” to Santiago and Johnson. See Clubside, Inc., 468 F.3d at 159. Reynolds, Santiago, and Johnson were all sentenced to death after being convicted of murder. All three inmates had their initial death sentences vacated by the Connecticut Supreme Court and are now serving life sentences without the possibility of release. Santiago and Johnson both served time with Reynolds at Northern and were released to general population at MacDougall, despite having more violent disciplinary histories. The facts of Reynolds’ criminal conviction compared to Santiago’s and Johnson’s are irrelevant to the Equal Protection analysis. Based on this record, a reasonable fact finder would have to conclude that Reynolds is sufficiently “similarly situated” to Santiago and Johnson to provide a basis for an Equal Protection “class of one” claim.
21 Defendants also argue that Reynolds is not similarly situated to Johnson because Johnson’s death sentence was vacated in 2000 due to insufficient evidence of the existence of an aggravating factor. See Defs’ Opp. at 5. Their crimes, however, were identical; they both murdered law enforcement officers. Moreover, Defendants’ argument that Johnson was never given a valid death sentences is trivial, considering that Reynolds’ death sentence was also vacated after the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in Santiago, 318 Conn. at 1. 22 Ironically, Public Act 01-151, which modified the Connecticut Death Penalty Statute to include murder of a police officer as an aggravating factor, was passed in part due to Johnson’s death sentences being vacated. See Conn. J. Standing Comm. Hearing, Jud. Pt. 13, 2001 Sess. p. 4529 (statement of Rep. Ward) (“The state Supreme Court’s opinion last spring overturning the death sentence of Terry Johnson for the killing of Trooper Russell Bagshaw is reason enough to make killing a police officer an aggravating factor.”).
36

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 37 of 57
4. No Rational Basis for Reynolds’ Differential Treatment There is no rational basis for Reynolds’ more restrictive conditions. Although Reynolds, Santiago, and Johnson all received death sentences, Reynolds is classified as a level 5 inmate and Santiago and Johnson are classified as level 4. See Pl’s Mot. at 43. Inmates in DOC custody are routinely evaluated on seven categories to determine their classification level. DOC Classification Manual (Doc. No. 121-24) at 3. Those categories include: escape profile, severity/violence of the current offense, history of violence, length of sentence, presentence of pending charges and/or detainers, disciplinary history, and security risk group membership. Id. Each inmate is assigned a score from 1 to 5 for each category, with 1 being the lowest score, and 5 being the highest score. Id. at 7. After each category is ranked, an overall “Risk Level” is established. Id. “Risk Levels primarily reflect the structural constraints or security required to house the inmate.” Id. at 3. Reynolds is classified at a Level 5 Risk Level, despite receiving a “1” in every category except for “length of sentence” and “severity/violence of the current offense,” where he received a “5” and “4” respectively. See Reynolds’ Classification Review Sheet (Doc. No. 121-25) at 1.23 The only difference between Reynolds’ classification score and Santiago’s and Johnson’s is the “4” that Santiago and Johnson receive for the “length of sentence” category. See Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶¶ 221, 224. The Defendants classify inmates who have a sentence of more than ten years but less than death as a “level 4” for length of sentence. DOC Classification Manual at 20. To justify that score, the Defendants state that the “[l]enth of sentence is rated since an
23 Reynolds Classification Review Sheet dated April 24, 2018 states: “Escape 1, Length of Confinement 5, Discipline 1, Sev/Viol Offense 4, Detainers 1, Security Risk Group 1, Violence History 1, Overall 5.” Doc. No. 121-25 at 1.
37

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 38 of 57
inmate facing a long period of confinement may attempt an escape at some point during incarceration.”24 Id. at 20.
Even though Reynolds is serving the same sentence of life without the possibility of release as Santiago and Johnson, they are given a score of “4” for their “length of sentence” classification, but Reynolds arbitrarily receives a score of “5.” That scoring difference allows Santiago and Johnson to obtain an overall Level 4 Risk Level, which enables them to live among the general population at MacDougall and avoid the harsh conditions that Reynolds endures at Northern. The Defendants attempt to explain Reynolds’ Level 5 classification by noting that he “may attempt an escape at some point” during his incarnation. See id. Yet in his own classification review, Reynolds’ escape risk is scored a “1,” the lowest possible score. Reynolds’ Classification Review Sheet at 1. Scoring Reynolds as a “5” for length of sentence is an irrational classification serving no legitimate purpose. See Harvey, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 290.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the Defendants have violated Reynolds’ rights afforded under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
D. The Defendants’ Arguments in Opposition The Defendants present a number of defenses to liability and damages that they contend
prevent entry of summary judgment in favor of Reynolds. Each is discussed below.
1. Prison Litigation Reform Act Defendants also defend Reynolds’ claims by relying on the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which places limitations on inmates’ requests for prospective relief.25 18 U.S.C. §
24 Notably, “[t]here are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances for [the length of sentence] factor.” DOC Classification Manual at 20. 25 The statute states in relevant part:
38

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 39 of 57
3626. Defendants argue that the PLRA bars the relief sought because (1) Reynolds’ claim does not involve an ongoing constitutional violation and (2) Reynolds’ claim for injunctive relief is not “narrowly drawn.” Defs’ Mot. at 9.
Reynolds complaint involves not one, but multiple ongoing constitutional violations. He has demonstrated that his conditions of confinement and his classification as a special circumstances inmate violate his rights afforded by both the Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, Defendants do not identify how Reynolds’ request for injunctive relief is not “narrowly drawn.” In their motion, Defendants state that Reynolds’ request for injunctive relief is “not narrowly drawn, extend[s] further than necessary, and [is] not the least intrusive means of addressing [his] allegations.” Id. Defendants, however, offer no legal or factual support for that assertion.
Here, Reynolds requests an order enjoining the Defendants from placing him in the special circumstances conditions of confinement. He seeks to enjoin any Defendant from imposing high security restraints on him for a period exceeding seven days without providing for individualized meaningful review of those restraints, in accordance with Administrative
(1) Prospective relief.--(A) Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief. (B) The court shall not order any prospective relief that requires or permits a government official to exceed his or her authority under State or local law or otherwise violates State or local law, unless-(i) Federal law requires such relief to be ordered in violation of State or local law; (ii) the relief is necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right; and (iii) no other relief will correct the violation of the Federal right . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3626.
39

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 40 of 57
Directive (“A.D.”) 9.4.26 See Pl’s Proposed Order (Doc. No. 154) at 1–3. He also seeks to enjoin the use of the restrictive conditions of confinement that give rise to his liberty interest. Id.
I hold that Reynolds’ requested relief is “narrowly drawn” to remedy the constitutional violations. See Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 346 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Although the PLRA’s requirement that relief be narrowly drawn and necessary to correct the violation might at first glance seem to equate permissible remedies with [legal] minimums, a remedy may require more than the bare minimum [federal law] would permit and yet still be necessary and narrowly drawn to correct the violation. A remedy may be deemed to be properly drawn if it provides a practicable means of effectuati[on] even if such relief is over-inclusive.” (Internal citations and quotations marks omitted)). Contrary to the Defendants’ argument, Reynolds does not seek his release from DOC custody, nor the right to “unmonitored movement.” See Defs’ Opp. at p. 7.
Defendants also contend that Reynolds failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA, in connection with two aspects of his constitutional claims: (1) his mental health claims and (2) his classification as a special circumstances inmate in accordance with Section 18-10b. See Defs’ Mot. at 2. The Supreme Court has held that inmates must exhaust administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court, “regardless of the relief offered through [those] administrative procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (footnote omitted). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, however, is excused if remedies are in fact unavailable. See Ross, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016). “[A]n
26 Administrative Directive 9.4 is the DOC Administrative Directive regarding “Restrictive Status.” See A.D. 9.4 “Restrictive Status” available at https://portal.ct.gov/DOC/AD/AD-Chapter-9. From 2010 to 2017, From 2010 to 2017, Reynolds was not allowed out of his cell without full restraints, including handcuffs and ankle chains. See Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶¶ 21–24. The Defendants discontinued the restraints policy in September 2017. Id. at ¶ 21.
40

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 41 of 57
administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.” Id. at 1859.
First, the Defendants contend that Reynolds failed to exhaust his mental health claims. “It is completely disingenuous for [Reynolds] to assert mental health claims when he has never complained about any mental health symptoms, nor filed a grievance regarding alleged lack of mental health care by either Dr. Frayne or Dr. Gagne, or indeed by anyone.”27 Defs’ Mot. at 26. Secondly, the Defendants assert that Reynolds also failed to exhaust his remedies regarding Section 18-10b. “[Reynolds] admits he did not exhaust . . . any of his claims with regard to § 18-10b prior to filing this action.” Defs’ Reply. Br. (Doc. No. 136-11) at 1 (citing Williams v. Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2016)).
Although the Defendants indicate that Reynolds has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, they have not demonstrated that remedies were in fact “available” to Reynolds. Defendants argue that the exhaustion process set forth in DOC Administrative Directive (“A.D.”) 9.6, is readily “available” for Reynolds to grieve his conditions of confinement. Id. at 3. Indeed, Reynolds used A.D. 9.6 to contest his classification as a level 5 inmate. See Doc. No. 121-30.
The Supreme Court recently declared in Ross that an administrative remedy is “unavailable” when officers are incapable of providing relief. 136 S. Ct. at 1859. “Suppose, for example, that a prison handbook directs inmates to submit their grievances to a particular administrative office—but in practice that office disclaims the capacity to consider those petitions. The procedure is not then ‘capable of use’ for the pertinent purpose.” Id. (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 738).
27 Reynolds does not complain about a lack of mental health care. He complains that the extreme conditions of his confinement pose a severe risk to his mental health.
41

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 42 of 57
That is precisely the case here. Section 1 of A.D. 9.6 sets forth the “Policy” purpose of
DOC’s Administrative Remedy Process. “The Department of Correction shall provide a means
for an inmate to seek formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of an inmate’s confinement
that is subject to the Commissioner’s authority.” A.D. 9.6 “Inmate Administrative Remedies”
available at https://portal.ct.gov/DOC/AD/AD-Chapter-9. Similarly, Section 6(B), which
explains the “Grievable Matters” for the “Inmate Grievance Procedure” provides that, “[a]ll
matters subject to the Commissioner’s authority for which another remedy is not provided are
grievable.” Id. But it is undisputed that the Defendants interpret the language of Section 18-10b,
which governs Reynolds’ classification, as depriving the Commissioner of authority to alter
Reynolds’ conditions of confinement. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-10b (“The Commissioner of
Correction shall place an inmate on special circumstances high security status and house the inmate in administrative segregation until a reclassification process is completed.”).28 Although
Reynolds grieved his level 5 classification to a unit supervisor on August 4, 2014, Supervisor
Bachman responded that the matter was out of DOC’s control. “[Y]our classification cannot be
changed unless your sentence is overturned by the courts. Your placement at Northern is due to
your Death Row Status.” See Doc. No. 121-30 at 5. Thus, Reynolds’ failure to exhaust is excused because his administrative remedies were in practice “unavailable.”29
28 As discussed above, the Defendants failed to provide Reynolds with any meaningful review in regard to his reclassification status. Nor is there evidence that any special circumstances prisoner has ever been reclassified. See, e.g., Defs’ Response to Pl’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. (Doc. No. 131) ¶ 158 (“The defendants are obliged to follow the mandate of Conn. Gen. Stat. §18-10b and there is no provision in the statute for an inmate to be released from this classification.). 29 Defendants’ argument that “futility” is not an exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is based on the Court’s decision in Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6 (2001) (“[W]e will not read futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements where Congress has provided otherwise.”). The Booth Court also noted that the ordinary meaning of the word “available” is “capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose,” and that which “is accessible or may be obtained.” Id. at 737 (internal citation and quotations marks omitted). That definition served the basis for the Court’s holding in Ross. See 136 S. Ct. at 1859. Here, Reynolds’ grieved his classification to the Commissioner of DOC, and was told the Commissioner is incapable of effectuating any requested remedy. Under Section 18-10b, as interpreted by the Defendants, Reynolds’ conditions are a mandate from the state legislature and therefore out of the Commissioner’s authority.
42

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 43 of 57
2. Writ of Habeas Corpus Defendants argue that a writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy available to Reynolds because he is ultimately “seeking release from his confinement” at Northern. Defs’ Mot. at 87. Because Reynolds’ challenge of Section 18-10b implicates “important state policy interests,” Defendants avow that a state habeas petition is the appropriate method for Reynolds to present his claims. Id. at 93. Defendants cite State v. Campbell, where the Connecticut Supreme Court opined that “because the defendant’s argument centers on a potential challenge to conditions of confinement, the proper vehicle for those claims is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” 328 Conn. 444, 463 (2018). Defendants note that Reynolds did file a separate state habeas petition on November 2, 2017.30 Defs’ Reply Br. at 7. In that petition, Reynolds does not challenge the constitutionality of his current conditions of confinement under Section 1810b. See Doc. No. 117-18 at 5 (“In this petition [Reynolds] does not challenge the constitutionality of C.G.S. § 18-10b or the constitutionality of the conditions mandated by C.G.S. § 18-10b, but only the suitability of the statute’s application to him.). Moreover, Defendants rely on Preiser v. Rodriguez for the proposition that Reynolds’ sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus, after he fully exhausts his state court habeas remedies. 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”).
30 See Reynolds v. Commissioner of Correction, Judicial District of Tolland, CV-18-4009203 (Doc. No. 117-18). In his pending state habeas petition, Reynolds challenges his underlying criminal conviction and argues that Section 18-10b should not apply to him because his death sentence was illegally imposed.
43

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 44 of 57
The Defendants’ argument fails for two reasons. First, this case is factually and procedurally distinguishable from the Campbell case. The Campbell Court concluded that a state habeas petition was the appropriate way to address the defendant’s challenges to Section 18-10b because his claims were unripe. The Connecticut Supreme Court opined that the habeas court was in a better position to adjudicate the defendant’s penalty phase claims (including the defendant’s challenges to Section 18-10(b)) because the record presented to the Connecticut Supreme Court was limited.
[T]he record is insufficient to resolve the defendant’s claim that he will be subjected to more severe conditions of confinement . . . . There is no evidence in the record as to whether the commissioner has established a reclassification process pursuant to § 18– 10b, or, if such a process has been established, of what it is comprised . . . . [T]he record is devoid of any information as to whether there are other inmates who are similarly situated to the defendant and, if so, under what conditions they are confined and how those conditions differ, if at all, from the defendant’s conditions of confinement . . . . In the habeas court, the defendant will have the opportunity to present any and all evidence that is relevant to his claim. That court is empowered to make factual findings on that evidence. This court is not. Campbell, 328 Conn. at 464–66 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, the record is much more developed. The parties have engaged in voluminous discovery concerning Reynolds’ conditions of confinement. Defendants have testified about the reclassification process. Reynolds has brought an Equal Protection claim relying on discovery regarding other similarly situated inmates. In this case, I am able to decide summary judgment based on a voluminous record. Secondly, Preiser does not apply here. In that case, prisoners brought a Section 1983 suit alleging that the defendants acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of good time credits, which would have resulted in their immediate release from custody. The Court held that a federal habeas petition was the exclusive remedy for those circumstances because the prisoners were “challenging the very fact” of their physical imprisonment. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. The
44

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 45 of 57
Court in Preiser expressly noted that a Section 1983 action is “a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.” Id. at 500. As an example of a permissible Section 1983 action, the Court cited Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), where a prisoner claimed that prison officials acted unconstitutionally by placing him in solitary confinement. Id. at 498–99. In Haines, the prisoner’s claims related solely to the State’s alleged unconstitutional treatment of him while in confinement. The prisoner did not seek to challenge the very fact or duration of his confinement. See id.
In this action, Reynolds is not challenging “the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment,” but is rather seeking an order that enjoins the Defendants from placing him on special circumstances high security status. See Pl’s Proposed Order at 1–3. He is not asking to be released from prison, to have his sentenced shortened, or to be transferred to another institution. Thus, a Section 1983 claim is a proper method for Reynolds to present his claims.
3. Qualified Immunity The Defendants argue that, even if Reynolds’ conditions of confinement violate a constitutionally protected right, they are entitled to qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity, if proven, protects an individual defendant from a claim for money damages; it does not bar injunctive relief. The Defendants have the burden of proving the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment or at trial. See Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir. 2013). Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
45

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 46 of 57
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A governmental official is entitled to qualified immunity either where (1) his conduct did not violate a constitutional right or (2) where the right at issue was not “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id. at 232. The Supreme Court has held that district courts have the discretion to choose which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity standard to decide first, in view of the particular circumstances surrounding the case to be decided. See id. at 236.
Under the second prong, a right is clearly established if, “at the time of the challenged conduct ... every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). There is no requirement that a right be “clearly established” through a binding decision directly on point, “but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. “[A] broad general proposition” does not constitute a clearly established right. See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the constitutional right allegedly violated must be established “in a ‘particularized’ sense so that the ‘contours’ of the right are clear to a reasonable official.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).
For the reasons discussed above, Reynolds has sufficiently shown that the Defendants’ conduct violated Reynolds’ constitutional rights, satisfying the first prong of the inquiry.31 Regarding the second prong, when Reynolds was initially classified and placed in solitary confinement, it was clearly established that inmates have a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in avoiding prison conditions that impose an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224
31 See supra, Sections IV. A. 2., IV. B. 2., and IV. C. 4.
46

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 47 of 57
(citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483). Those conditions included limited human interaction, no contact social visits, and indefinite duration of assignment. See id. at 214–15.
Although there is no case that provides a bright-line rule on how long an inmate may be held in administrative segregation, the Second Circuit held in 2000 that 305 days of confinement in segregated housing was a “sufficient departure from the ordinary incidents of prison life to require procedural due process protections under Sandin.” Colon, 215 F.3d at 231. “There are no precise calipers to measure the severity of SHU [segregated housing unit] hardship, but we believe that wherever the durational line is ultimately drawn, 305 days satisfies the standard.” Id. Thus, both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have made clear that inmates have a clearly established right to due process protections to avoid indefinite assignment to administrative segregation.
Defendants argue that their actions were objectively reasonable given the lack of controlling precedent dictating how inmates are to be housed on death row. “A healthy number of Second Circuit opinions address the due process analysis related to atypical conditions of confinement that impose substantial hardship, but only in the context of administrative segregation. None of them discuss death row. Death is different.” Defs’ Mot. at 17 n. 3. They contend that the cases holding that inmates have due process protections in avoiding solitary confinement are distinguishable because none of those cases concern death row inmates who were subject to automatic maximum-security classification. See id.
Defendants, however, have failed to demonstrate why the housing conditions of special circumstances inmates do not impose “an atypical and significant hardship” compared to ordinary prison life in Connecticut. Moreover, the Defendants’ conclusory statement that “death is different” is unavailing, especially considering that Reynolds is no longer a death row inmate.
47

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 48 of 57
See JSUF ¶ 64. Moreover, even if death is different as a form of punishment, it does not follow that death row – or former death row – is “different” with respect to a conditions of confinement claim. Given the holdings in Wilkinson and Colon no reasonable official could believe that placing an inmate in administrative segregation indefinitely without a meaningful hearing could be lawful. The conditions of confinement, social isolation, and length of assignment in those cases closely mirror Reynolds’.
Accordingly, the Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
E. Connecticut General Statutes Section 18-10b is an Unconstitutional Bill of Attainder Reynolds also contends that Section 18-10b, which mandates that former death row
inmates in Connecticut be placed under “special circumstances” status, is an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder.
Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution declares “[n]o State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder [or] ex post facto Law.” U.S. Const. art I. § 10, cl. 1 “Briefly stated, a constitutionally proscribed bill of attainder is ‘a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.’” Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 388, 346 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977)). In other words, the Constitution bars the imposition of punishment resulting from “trial by legislature.” United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
The Supreme Court has stated that to determine “whether a particular statute is a bill of attainder, the analysis necessarily requires an inquiry into whether the three definitional elements—[1] specificity in identification, [2] punishment, and [3] lack of a judicial trial— are contained in the statute.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 n.30 (1968); see
48

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 49 of 57
also ACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2010) (identifying the same three elements).
1. Specificity in Identification Section 18-10b applies to any inmate “convicted of the class A felony of murder with special circumstances committed on or after April 25, 2012 . . . and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of life imprisonment without the possibility of release” as well as any inmate “in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction for a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012 . . . for which a sentence of death is imposed . . . and such inmate’s sentence is (A) reduced to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (B) commuted to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-10b(a). Prior to the passage of Section 18-10b, the eleven inmates sentenced to death prior to April 25, 2012 were a known group, and the legislature specifically identified that group as the target of the statute during debate in the Judiciary Committee. “The bill that we have before us has yet to be determined whether or not it’s constitutional. But you see here is the rub. Many people are making their decision on whether or not to vote for this because they are trusting that even if they -- it passes, those 11 animals on death row will die -- to go to bed, rest easy, think about that.” 55 H.R. Proc., Pt. 4, 2012 Sess., p. 87 (statement of Rep. Cafero) (emphasis added); see also id., p. 281 (statement of Sen. Kane) (“Because these 11 individuals, according to this bill, will still get the death penalty or so we believe . . . . ”). It undisputed that Reynolds was specifically mentioned by name throughout the legislative debate of Public Act 12-5 entitled “AN ACT REVISING THE PENALTY FOR CAPITAL FELONIES,” later codified as Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-10b(a). For example,
49

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 50 of 57
Representative Adinolfi mentioned Reynolds during the March 14, 2012 Joint Standing Committee Hearings.
But I think I could bend, although I don’t want to, if we gave them solitary confinement for life. That is, stay in death row just where they are and change the name. Don’t give them all the recreation. Let’s punish them for their crimes . . . . You have Richard Reynolds, who is [convicted of] murdering Waterbury Police Office Walter T. Williams. Conn. J. Standing Comm. Hearing, Jud. Pt. 8, 2012 Sess. p. 62 (statement of Rep. Adinolfi). Similarly, Representative Davis, in an April 11, 2012 speech during the General Assembly proceedings, specifically identifies Reynolds as a “New York City crack dealer.” But before I finish, I’d like to bring attention to one particular inmate on death row. And the Representative from Waterbury was very eloquent in his discussion of this particular case that of New York City crack dealer Richard Reynolds. Richard Reynolds murdered a Waterbury police officer named Walter Williams in cold blood on the streets of Waterbury. Now, this is something that is very personal to me. 55 H.R. Proc., Pt. 4, 2012 Sess., pp. 224–25 (statement of Rep. Davis). There is no doubt that the specificity in identification element is met.
2. Punishment Reynolds argues that the “punishment” element is satisfied because legislators described in detail the punitive nature of the proposed conditions the statute would impose on special circumstances high security inmates. Courts consider three factors in determining whether a statute inflicts “punishment” on specified individuals: “(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment (historical test of punishment); (2) whether the statute, ‘viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes’ (functional test of punishment); and (3) whether the legislative record ‘evinces a [legislative] intent to punish’ (motivational test of punishment).” ACORN, 618 F.3d at 136 (quoting Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 852
50

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 51 of 57
(1984)). All three factors do not need to be satisfied to prove that a particular law constitutes “punishment.” Id. Instead, the three factors are weighed together when analyzing a bill of attainder claim. Id.
a. Historical Test of Punishment “The Supreme Court has recognized that certain types of punishment are ‘so disproportionately severe and so inappropriate to nonpunitive ends that they unquestionably have been held to fall within the proscription of the [Bill of Attainder Clause].” ACORN, 618 F.3d at 136 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473). “The classic example is death, but others include imprisonment, banishment, the punitive confiscation of property, and prohibition of designated individuals or groups from participation in specified employments or vocations.” Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co., 292 F.3d at 351). The conditions of confinement set forth in Section 18-10b undoubtedly constitute a traditional form of punishment that is “considered to be punitive per se.” Consol. Edison Co., 292 F.3d at 351. The statute directs the DOC Commissioner to “house [special circumstances] inmate[s] in administrative segregation” until a classification process is completed. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-10b(a). Those inmates are subjected to the most restrictive form of incarceration available within the State of Connecticut. As discussed above, special circumstances inmates are also banned from certain prison employment, intramural recreational opportunities, and contact social visits. The historical test easily weighs in Reynolds’ favor.
b. Functional Test of Punishment Under the functional test, the court considers whether the challenged statute “viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475–76 (footnote omitted). “It is not the severity of a
51

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 52 of 57
statutory burden in absolute terms that demonstrates punitiveness so much as the magnitude of the burden relative to the purported nonpunitive purposes of the statute.” Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2003). “Where a statute establishing a punishment declares and imposes that punishment on an identifiable party . . . we look beyond simply a rational relationship of the statute to a legitimate public purpose for less burdensome alternatives by which the legislature could have achieved its legitimate nonpunitive objectives.” ACORN, 618 F.3d at 138 (quoting Consol. Edison Co., 292 F.3d at 350).
Section 18-10b does not have a nonpunitive purpose. It was expressly created to punish inmates on Connecticut’s death row for their underlying crimes. To the extent that the Defendants argue that Section 18-10b is a “reduction” in punishment to individuals who were previously facing the death penalty, that argument is contrary to Section 18-10b’s legislative history. See Defs’ Mot. at 86. Section 18-10b was enacted to keep death row inmates in administrative segregation indefinitely, if they were ever resentenced to life without the possibly of release.
So the underlying amendment [Section 18-10b] and what this amendment does is say, “Well, if we’re going to take away the sword of Damocles hanging over your head, the notion that you can wake up at any given day and your appeals have run out and you’re going to take a walk to the death chamber, in exchange for that, knowing that as long as God wills you to be alive you will exist on this earth, then your time in corrections is going to be a little harder as an appropriate punishment for the time[] that you are served.” 55 S. Proc., Pt. 3, 2012 Sess., p. 154 (statement of Sen. Kissel). Therefore, I find that the functional test of punishment weighs in Reynolds’ favor.
c. Motivational Test of Punishment “The legislative record by itself is insufficient evidence for classifying a statute as a bill of attainder unless the record reflects overwhelmingly a clear legislative intent to punish.”
52

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 53 of 57
ACORN, 618 F.3d at 141. Statements by only a “smattering of legislators” will not establish
evidence of punitive intent by the legislature. Id. Rather, “only the clearest proof could suffice
to establish the unconstitutionality of a statute on such a ground.” Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 617 (1960).
The legislature record of Section 18-10b offers much more than a “smattering” of
punitive intent. The extensive legislative history establishes unequivocally that Section 18-10b
was intended to punish the eleven inmates who were on Connecticut’s death row by subjecting
them to the harshest conditions available. For example, Senator Looney in his address to the
Joint Standing Committee made it crystal clear that Section 18-10b was intended to inflict
additional punishment for the inmates on death row who were resentenced to life. “I think that
someone serving a sentence without the possibility of release should be subject to the harshest
possible constitutional conditions that could be imposed on someone.” Conn. J. Standing
Comm. Hearing, Jud. Pt. 8, 2012 Sess., p. 93 (statement of Sen. Looney).
[I]n anticipation of a change in the circumstance of the 11 people currently on death row . . . . what this language in this amendment provides for is that . . . for those people, they will not be returned to the general prison population, but will in fact be subject to the new conditions that are being designated in this bill with the amendment . . . [W]hat we are trying to provide for in the bill and the amendment [Section 18-10b] is a more restrictive set of circumstances for those in the future who will be serving the maximum sentence in Connecticut.
Id. at 79–80.
Several of Senator Looney’s colleagues joined in explaining the punitive nature of
Section 18-10b.
The death penalty doesn’t bring back the victims of their crimes. And we certainly can punish criminals and protect the public safety without it. But people don’t get me wrong, these people have committed horrible crimes and they deserve to be punished. And with the amendment that was offered at the beginning of this debate [Section 18-10b], we will have a very severe punishment, a punishment so horrible at least one person chose to die instead.
53

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 54 of 57
55 S. Proc., Pt. 3, 2012 Sess., p. 154 (statement of Sen. Slossberg).
I did go to Northern and saw death row and saw how horrible it is there and spending life in prison without the possibility of parole on death row in a situation that is just like death row is very, very, very, severe punishment. So – and that was our Amendment [Section 18-10b].
55 S. Proc., Pt. 3, 2012 Sess., p. 296 (statement of Sen. Prague).
And while some would say doing this bill may be soft on crime, I’d just like to remind those, you know, those of you about Northern Prison, death row. To me, that is hell on earth. How one retains his sanity in an environment like that is incomprehensible. And the amendment that we approve tonight [Section 18-10b] . . . really presents to us, I believe, the right way to go.
55 S. Proc., Pt. 3, 2012 Sess., p. 306 (statement of Sen. Crisco).
Madam Speaker, we’ve heard a lot of very eloquent debate today. And part of the conversation around the argument for the abolishment of the death penalty is that, one, life and imprison -- life in prison is actually worse or even more punitive than being put to death. But, for me, these individuals are the most vile in our society and because of their choices and their behaviors, they will have received Connecticut’s maximum sentencing for prison[.]
55 H.R. Proc., 2012 Sess., p. 162 (statement of Rep. Hovey).
I have got to tell you, the mere fact of walking outside and looking up to the sky and feeling air on your face, the mere fact that even through maybe six inches of glass you could look at a loved one and watch them grow is a privilege. It’s a privilege, and I’m not sure it’s one people convicted of the kind of crimes we define are entitled to.
55 H.R. Proc., 2012 Sess., p. 90 (statement of Rep. Cafero).
The above statements exemplify a record that reflects “overwhelmingly a clear legislative
intent to punish” death row inmates through more restrictive conditions. ACORN, 618 F.3d at
141. The motivational purpose test also favors Reynolds.
3. Lack of a Judicial Trial The final element of a bill of attainder claim is the lack of a judicial trial. See O’Brien,
391 U.S. at 383 n.30. Here, Reynolds argues that he was never afforded a judicial proceeding
54

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 55 of 57
before being subjected to the punishment mandated by Section 18-10b. See Pl’s Mot. at 56–57. In response, the Defendants state that Reynolds’ initial criminal trial served as an adequate judicial forum to adjudicate his rights regarding Section 18-10b. See Defs’ Mot at 95. “It is undisputed that [Reynolds] was found guilty after a two-part trial . . . . [Reynolds] cannot reasonably argue that he was legislatively found guilty without the benefit of a judicial trial.” Id.
There is no language in the text of Section 18-10b that affords Reynolds a judicial proceeding. Defendants’ argument fails because Section 18-10b is not a penal statute, but a directive from the state legislature to the DOC. During Reynolds criminal trial he was found guilty of “one count of capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) Section 53a–54b (1) 32 and one count of murder in violation of General Statutes Section 53a–54a (a).33 State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 15 (2003). He was neither convicted nor sentenced pursuant to Section 18-10b because Section 18-10b did not exist. It was enacted in 2012, well after Reynolds’ original criminal trial. Quite simply, Reynolds was not afforded a judicial trial regarding the punishment inflicted by Section 18-10b.
32 General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) Section 53a–54b provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of a capital felony who is convicted of . . . (1) [m]urder of a member of the division of state police within the department of public safety or of any local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the division of criminal justice, a sheriff or deputy sheriff, a constable who performs criminal law enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29–18, an official of the department of correction authorized by the commissioner of correction to make arrests in a correctional institution or facility, or of any fireman ... while such victim was acting within the scope of his duties. . . . . ” 33 General Statutes Section 53a–54a (a) provides: “A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.”
55

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 56 of 57
For the reasons stated above, I declare that Connecticut General Statutes Section 18-10b is an unconstitutional bill of attainder. 34 Because I conclude that Section 18-10b is an unconstitutional bill of attainder, I do not reach the issue of whether Section 18-10b also violates the Ex-Post Facto Clause.
F. Reynolds is Entitled to Injunctive Relief Lastly, Reynolds has proven that he is entitled to permanent injunctive relief. 1. Irreparable Harm Reynolds’ current condition of confinement poses a serious, continuing risk of harm to
his mental health. The Defendants deprive him of contact social visits and meaningful social interaction. He is unable to engage in numerous educational and recreational programming that is offered to other inmates under the custody of DOC. He is placed in those conditions indefinitely without any meaningful reclassification hearing. Money damages are wholly inadequate to address those harms. Without injunctive relief, he will continue to be subjected to severe, atypical, and unconstitutional conditions.
2. Actual Success on the Merits As discussed above, Reynolds succeeds on the merits on multiple constitutional claims. His conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants do not offer him procedural protections in violation of his due process
34 I recognize that, as a general rule, federal courts should avoid reading state statutes concerning public safety in a manner that renders them unconstitutional. See Vizio, Inc. v. Klee, 2016 WL 1305116, at *6 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2016) (“In particular, ‘regulations that touch upon safety . . . are those that the [Supreme] Court has been most reluctant to invalidate.’”) (quoting Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981)). In this case, however, state legislators passed Section 18-10b recognizing that it might not pass constitutional scrutiny. See 55 H.R. Proc., Pt. 4, 2012 Sess., p. 187 (statement of Rep. Cafero) (“But as it stands right, now [the death penalty is] constitutional. The bill that we have before [Section 18-10b] us has yet to be determined whether or not it’s constitutional.”). Because the statute manifestly constitutes a bill of attainder, I feel compelled to hold that it is unconstitutional.
56

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 155 Filed 08/27/19 Page 57 of 57
rights afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment. His confinement compared to other similarly situated prisoners violates his rights under the Equal Protection clause. Finally, the statute that directs the DOC Commission to impose those onerous conditions on Reynolds is an unconstitutional bill of attainder. V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, I grant Reynolds’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 119) and deny the Defendants’ (Doc. No. 117). Reynolds is entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. A separate injunction order shall issue. A hearing in damages will follow to determine the scope and amount of liability of each defendant.
So ordered. Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 27th day of August 2019.
/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL Stefan R. Underhill United States District Judge
57

 
 Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 156 Filed 08/27/19 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

RICHARD REYNOLDS, Plaintiff,
v
LEO ARNONE, et al., Defendants.

No.3:13-cv-1465 (SRU)

PERMANENT INJUNCTION ORDER The conditions of confinement in the Special Circumstances High Security Unit at Northern Correctional Institution constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Defendants' placement of Richard Re¡molds ("Reynolds") in the conditions set forth in Connecticut General Statutes Section 18-10b without a meaningful hearing constitutes an atypical and significant hardship and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Defendants' confinement of Reynolds in special circumstances high security status while Defendants confine similarly situated individuals in general population with no rational basis for the difference in treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lastly, Connecticut General Statutes Section 18-10b is a Bill of Affainder in violation of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is hereby ordered that the Defendants, their successors in office, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys and those in active concert and participation with any of the foregoing who receive actual notice of this Order are permanently enjoined as follows: (1) From placing Reynolds in special circumstance high security status;

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 156 Filed 08/27/19 Page 2 of 2
(2) From imposing on Reynolds the conditions of more than twenty-one hours per day alone in his cell, segregation from inmates who are not on special circumstances high security status, limitation of recreational activity to a maximum of two hours per day, and no-contact visitation;
(3) From enforcing Connecticut General Statutes Section 18-10b against any current or future inmate;
(4) They shall immed iately,and at least every six months thereafter, provide Reynolds with a meaningful individualized classification determination using procedures that are the same or substantially similar to the procedures used for general population inmates;and
(5) They shall house Reynolds in conditions that are similar to those of Eduardo Santiago and Terry Johnson at the time this Order issued.
Within 30 days, the Defendants shall submit to the court a status report detailing how they have complied with the foregoing.
So ordered. Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 27th day of August 2019.
/s/Stefan R. Underhill S R. Underhill United States District Judge
2

 
 Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 159 Filed 09/04/19 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

RICHARD REYNOLDS, Plaintiff,
v.
LEO ARNONE, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:13-cv-1465 (SRU)

RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE STAY The Defendants, all former or present officials of the Connecticut Department of Correction, have moved for a temporary stay of the Permanent Injunction Order (“PIO”) entered on August 27, 2019. See Doc. No. 156. The PIO, among other things, permanently enjoined the Defendants from placing the Plaintiff Richard Reynolds (“Reynolds”) in special circumstance high security status and from enforcing Connecticut General Statutes Section 18-10b against any current or future inmate. The PIO ordered the Defendants to submit a status report within 30 days detailing how they have complied with the Order. The Defendants’ motion (doc. no. 157) is grounded on Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and requests a 30-day stay to “ensure that the PIO can be implemented in a manner that avoids significant operational disruption and ensures inmate safety.” Mot. to Stay at 3. Reynolds opposes the motion (doc. no 158), stating that any further delay beyond the 30 days provided in the PIO will subject Reynolds to additional harm. See Pl’s Opp. at 2. For the reasons that follow, the Defendants’ motion is denied in substantial part. The Defendants’ argue that an additional 30 days is warranted because transferring special circumstances inmates requires “consideration of identifying, classifying and determining how and in what manner to classify and assign an inmate, which cannot be done

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 159 Filed 09/04/19 Page 2 of 3
instantaneously.” Mot. to Stay at 3. Specifically, the Defendants note that the inmate classification process “involves collecting and evaluating information about each inmate to determine the inmate’s risk and need level for appropriate confinement location, treatment, programs, and employment assignment.” Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Stay (Doc. No. 157-1) at 2. The Defendants’ argument is unavailing.
The Defendants have previously completed a risk assessment for Reynolds. See, e.g., Mem. of Decision (Doc. No. 155) at 37 (“Reynolds is classified at a Level 5 Risk Level, despite receiving a ‘1’ in every category except for ‘length of sentence’ and ‘severity/violence of the current offense,’ where he received a ‘5’ and ‘4’ respectively.”) (citing Reynolds’ Classification Review Sheet (Doc. No. 121-25) at 1). The Defendants do not need additional time to classify Reynolds because it is clear from the record that his classification has already been performed. The “length of sentence” factor can be changed from a “5” to “4” without much trouble or delay. Decisions regarding his appropriate placement can certainly be made in the 30 days permitted by the PIO. Potential issues of inmate separation are unlikely to pose much difficulty; Reynolds is not a member of a security risk group (i.e., gang), see id. (security risk group rating of “1”), and he has been in solitary confinement for 23 years, where he was quite unlikely to have developed an antagonistic relationship with any other inmate.
The request for a stay of the PIO is granted to the extent that it enjoins the Defendants from enforcing Connecticut General Statutes Section 18-10b against any current or future inmate other than Reynolds. The record does not include the security classification review sheets for the other inmates affected by the statute. It may, therefore, take the Department of Correction longer to evaluate the appropriate placement of those inmates. That portion of the PIO is stayed for an additional 30 days.
2

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 159 Filed 09/04/19 Page 3 of 3 The Defendants’ motion for an immediate stay is therefore granted in part and denied in part. So ordered. Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 4th day of September 2019.
/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL Stefan R. Underhill United States District Judge
3

 
 Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 165 Filed 09/25/19 Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

RICHARD REYNOLDS

CIVIL NO. 3:13-CV-01465 (SRU)

v.

LEO ARNONE, ET AL.

SEPTEMBER 25, 2019

DEFENDANTS' STATUS REPORT

Pursuant to this Court's Permanent Injunction Order (Doc. #156) (PIO) which

requires, in part, "a status report detailing how they have complied with the foregoing," the

defendants respectfully submit the Declaration of Warden Mudano which sets forth what

detailed steps have been taken in response to the Court's PIO. As part of this status report

and incorporated herein, is also the Declaration of Dr. Craig Burns, which outlines the

present transition plans for the plaintiff, for when he may be transferred to general

population, in the event that the motions· for stay pending appeal are denied.

DEFENDANTS Leo Arnone, Et AI:
WILLIAM TONG ATTORNEY GENERAL
CLARE KINDALL SOLICITOR GENERAL
BY: /s/ Madeline A. Melchionne Madeline A. Melchionne Assistant Attoiney Geneial 11 0 Sherman Street Hartford, CT 06105 Tel.: (860) 808-5450 Fax: (860) 808-5591 E-mail: madeline.melchionne@ct.gov Federal Bar No. #ct02029

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 165 Filed 09/25/19 Page 2 of 11
BY: Is/ Steven R. Strom
Steven R. Strom Assistant Attorney General 11 0 Sherman Street Hartford, CT 06105 Tel.: (860) 808-5450 Fax: (860) 808-5591 E-mail: steven.strom@ct.gov Federal Bar #ct01211 CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that on September 25, 2019, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court's system.
/s/ Steven R. Strom Steven R. Strom Assistant Attorney General
2

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 165 Filed 09/25/19 Page 3 of 11

RICHARD REYNOLDS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT CIVIL NO. 3:13-CV-01465 (SRU)

v.

LEO ARNONE, ET AL.

SEPTEMBER 25, 2019

DECLARATION OF GIULIANA MUDANO

I, Giuliana Mudano, hereby declare that:

1. I am over eighteen years of age and believe in the obligation of an oath.

2. I have been employed by the Connecticut Department of Correction, in various

capacities, since April, 1999.

3. I began my career as a Counselor Trainee. I have also served as a Counselor,

Counselor Supervisor, and Deputy Warden and Warden.

4. I currently serve as the Warden of Northern Correction Institution (hereinafter "NCI").

5. I base this Declaration upon my personal knowledge and years of correctional

experience.

6. I have been made aware of the decision issued in this matter that states that the

defendants are permanently enjoined from imposing on inmate Reynolds the

conditions of more than twenty-one hours per day alone in his cell, segregation

from inmates who are not on special circumstances high security status,

limitation of recreational activity to a maximum of two hours per day, and no-

contact visitation; and that they shall house inmate Reynolds in conditions that are

similar to those of inmates Eduardo Santiago and Terry Johnson at the time the

Order issued.

1

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 165 Filed 09/25/19 Page 4 of 11
7. I am also aware of the Court's Permanent Injunction order which requires a status report detailing how DOC staff have complied with the foregoing, and this Declaration is the defendants' status report in compliance with the court's order.
8. I have attached the present recreation/program schedule with the dates when additional programs and out-of-cell time for Special Circumstances inmates at Northern Cl were added. Exhibit A.
9. Friday Skills Building in the gym is new and began 9/6/19. 10. Sunday recreation is new for all 3 time slots and began 9/8/19. 11. An extra ~ hour of recreation was added to second shift recreation and this started
8/28/19. 12. Strength- Group is new and has been offered beginning 9/17/19. (No one has been
interested in going to this group as of yet, but it is being offered.) 13. This additional programming gives the Special Circumstances inmates 4 and ~
hours per day out of cell time. 14.1n addition a number of confidential meetings/phone conferences occurred,
including confidential attorney-client meetings and communications, on the following dates: 8/28/19; 8/29/19- 9/4/19; 9/9/19, 9/13/19, 9/18/19, 9/24/19, and 9/25/19. 15. Dr. Burns, the Chief of Psychiatry for the DOC, arranged to have the Northern Cl mental health clinician, Eleanor Fritz APRN, PhD, evaluate Mr. Reynolds, to be ready to provide for a safe, durable transition to General Population, if appropriate, for the individuals in custody currently on the status of Special Circumstances. 16. Another goal of the present assessment and transition process is to identify and mitigate risks for custody staff, health services staff, and other general population
2

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 165 Filed 09/25/19 Page 5 of 11
inmates who will be in contact Mr. Reynolds, and to identify and reduce risks to Mr. Reynolds himself. 17. We are doing everything we can to be prepared for transitioning inmates with a thoughtful and deliberative process, in light of the court's ruling and order which has caused some confusion, anxiety and disruption of the previous schedules as well as some misunderstandings and expectations on the part of inmates that are classified to Special Circumstances. 18.1t is anticipated we will be ready to transition Mr. Reynolds once all of the Court's decisions regarding the stays of the orders have been decided, as it would be extremely upsetting and unreasonable to move Mr. Reynolds out, and then have to move him back again shortly thereafter, in the event that a stay may be granted or denied as the case may be.

Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §1-24a and 28 U.S.C. §1746, I declare under the pains and penalties of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Date

Giuliana Mudano \/Varden

3

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 165 Filed 09/25/19 Page 6 of 11

Specia I Circumstance Recreation and Program Schedule

Day of the week Outside

Strength Group

: Skills Building .. Day Room & ~ Day Room &

·-

r.: ~

'

' ~

t~ 'h

Monday

Rec r e a t i o n

~

'::

8am-9am

Tuesday

8am-9am

Wednesday

8am-9am

Thursday

8am-9am

Friday

8am-9am

Saturday

8am-9am

Sunday

8am-9am

' "''!<,,:;

• 4l ~~

j

..
..

I
11:15am-I1 2:1Spm

GYM 12:45pm-1:45pm

Resource Center l 5t Shift 10:fl:"$~;m-11 :45a m ·.<~J;)~~45:a m-11:45a m

Resource Center

:}.!

f"'<{;

2nd shift

6:30pm-8pm

6:30pm-8pm

I

12:4Spm-1:45pm.;:~- ,:0:~:q:)15a m-11 :45a m 6:30pm-8pm

I

::;::E·::: ~~:'io:"4:$~{n~11:4Sam 6:30pm-8pm

I

12:4Spm-t4$.pm 10:45arlj~J"~_:45a m 6:30pm-8pm

I I

. .~t:;:{\::•:;
.. .¥·~·,· ~r·····

10:45a m~it~~:t?a m 6:30pm-8pm 10:4Sam -1 1':1fs~~m 6:30pm-8pm

I

···<·:•·G:._

. .~:¥-.._

' :~<)i:t~ ·:-::-,

l I
I

'·"'::gf:;-,, ){j:~~&~t?·

{.ft;:~: >·~···

····',"<-:;~~··· IR~t:W?

~i~~~;;::~'i;;;; t:::;ttl~f-:'t¥~\tc

··<·i::_Alh.,
':::::l?>

- .. -· ... - .... ·'

~ I~ ~ .'' .••.' S.-. :_.

I A

.dif:0@~Y''' .fx•:::::::·~:.;:~~~-::. .

Sunday recreation is new for all 3 time slot~:~~.iPd wip begitG9./8/19.

·.;-:.':"i~;t~~:~t> '·.
·.-::.:_:;:.:::;;:::::::::

" ...
··"·

9/4/19

DEFENDANT'S b EXHIBIT
I A__

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 165 Filed 09/25/19 Page 7 of 11
UNITED STA.TES DiSTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONN:ECTIClJT CIVIt NO, 3:13-CV-01465 (SRU)
ARNONE, ETAL.
The undersigned declarant pursuant 28 U.S.C, §1746~ under pen~1ty of 1. I am psychiatrist I arn the Chief ~J\ental Health Officer of the
3.. On Sept~mber 10~ 20191 Or. Fritz conducted the mental health 1

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 165 Filed 09/25/19 Page 8 of 11 2

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 165 Filed 09/25/19 Page 9 of 11 9. ~,~r. Reynolds has had a lengthy stay within the Connecl~cut
Papulation, 1.0. Through a coltaboration betvveen Health Services and Cw;stody·, the
'J,Vfth the same, eva~uation offered ·to aU of the individuals trnnsitioning to Special

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 165 Filed 09/25/19 Page 10 of 11

vvas cornpleted on Septertnber 1Ol 2019. The evaluation vkfas intended to 'identify any

e~ements a;f vulnerability andlor resilience that should be kept in rnir.1d as rv1 r~.

Reynolds tra.r1sitions. to Gtff{n~ral Popuhation,

'12, fvtL Reyno1ds Pv1antal HeaJfh Cl~ssifiictdlon 'L:n,_,!.J~!l;~ <t>f '1 (one) rt3:mains unchanged. 13. ~Jt:r, ReynoldS; win be offered an ~~exit interview" in the ne;(t several days~

providing him with a pr~view ofwhat t~l expect as he moves from Northern to the

faeiHty that win be receiv«ng him f, vt~he,never that wnl be.

'14 i The present plan i3 that Mr~ Reyno~ds v,til! be monitored by r~.~~otaJ H~~ith v~.•·hen

rnakes the transition\ with de:creasing freq u~nef;y for tt1e, first six

of his

transition~ and insure that he lknO'vll~ hO'W to access supports.

durable

15. The plan aIso :Jndudes that after si;x months~ f!J1r~ Reynolds v1m be offered to

contlrtU(l having ll''!Ot1thty sessions vttith a .~Jb~nt~; H<%llth staff m;ember to dis,1::uss

experience of' tra.nsftio.n~ tertllinating a year

of trStns!tion, H~

w \ijlirl also gi".ten the opportunity' to opt out of a:ny further schr::dul~d meethng$

\'lith a mental health provider .afterthe first six rnonths. rt he chooses the option of

o~J.ti~g ·• out of an~t additional meetings} he ;..vm be r:emit1ded how to acoos,s a

r1Aental HeaUh provider in the way that an Genem~ Popuiatloo persons in custody

do~

16. Lastly~ the CUTr~nt p~an is fur r~~r. R<t~yrtoids to be given three f:l"Jonths to select~.

cen partner from the 1ndividuals he will be interacting ·with at hf:s new location,

Dur]ng those three n1onth$~ he iNHJ be all~ to have a single celt At the end of

those three month'S, ~vtr. Reyno4ds will jdentif'l severafi individuals, '~Nhorr1 he

4.

Case 3:13-cv-01465-SRU Document 165 Filed 09/25/19 Page 11 of 11
·1 ~' Craig G" ~ums, Mo