Case 1:12-cv-00128-RMC-DST-RLW Document 1 Filed 01/24/12 Page 1 of 23
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

STATE OF TEXAS c/o Attorney General Greg Abbott 209 West 14th Street Austin, Texas 78701
Plaintiff, vs. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20530
. Defendant.
EXPEDITED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 1. The State of Texas brings this suit under section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c ("section 5"), and under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 'seeks a declaratory judgment that its recently enacted Voter-ID Law, also known as Senate Bill 14, neither has the purpose nor WIll have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, nor will it deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote' because he is a member of Ii language minority group.
I. THE PARTIES 2. The plaintiff is the State of Texas.
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3. The defendant, United States Attorney General Eric Holder acting in his official capacity, has his office in the District of Columbia.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and venue under 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
III. THREE-JUDGE COURT, 5. ,The State of Texas requests the appointment of a three-judge court under 42 U.S.C. § 1973b and 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
IV. FACTS AND BACKGROUND 6. On May 27, 2011, the Governor of Texas signed into law Senate Bill 14, which requires most voters to present a government-issued photo identification when appearing to vote at the polls. Voters who suffer from a documented disability as determined by the United States Social Security Administration or the Department of Veteran Affairs are exempt from this requirement. See SB 14 § 1. (Ex. 1). The Texas Election Code also permits voters over the age of 65, as well as disabled voters, to vote by mail, and those , who vote by mail are not required to obtain or present photo identification when voting. See TEX. ELECTION CODE §§ 82.002-82.003. 7. Voters who lack a government-issued photo identification may obtain from the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) an "election identification certificate," which is issued free of charge and satisfies the' photo-identification requirements of Senate Bill 14. See SB 14 § 20.
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8. Under Senate Bill 14, voters who fail to bring a governmentissued photo identification may still cast a provisional ballot at the polls. Those ballots will be accepted if the voter presents a government-issued photo identification to the voter registrar within six days after the election, or if the voter executes an affidavit stating that the voter has a religious objection to being photographed or that he has lost his photo identification in a natural disaster that occurred within 45 days of the election. See SB 14 §§ 17-18.
9. Senate Bill 14 resembles the Indiana Voter-ID Law that the Supreme Court of the United States upheld as constitutional in Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). Indiana's law was allowed . to go into effect upon enactment, because Indiana is not a "covered jurisdiction" under the Voting Rights Act. Other States, such as Wisconsin and Kansas, have enacted photo-identification requirements in 2011 and are permitted to immediately enforce their laws regardless of whether DOJ may object to those laws.
10. Senate Bill 14 also resembles the Voter-ID Law in Georgia that the Department of Justice precleared in 2005.
11. Section 5 prohibits a State subject to section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b), from enforcing "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting ... different from that in force andeffect on November 1, 1964" unless the State either obtains a declaratory judgment from the
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United States District Court for the District of Columbia that its election law "neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," or obtains approval for its law from the Attorney General ofthe United States. Id. § 1973c(a).
12. Because Texas is a "covered jurisdiction" under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, it is not permitted to implement Senate Bill 14 unless the State obtains preclearance from either the Department of Justice or a threejudge panel of this Court. On July 25, 2011, the State of Texas submitted Senate Bill 14 to the Department of Justice for preclearance. Submission Letter, A. McGeehan to T. Herren (July 25,2011) (Ex. 2)~
13. On September 23, 2011, exactly 60 days after Texas had submitted Senate Bill 14 for administrative preclearance, and on the last possible day forDOJ to respond, the Department of Justice sent a letter to the Texas Director of Elections, stating that the information provided in the State's preclearance submission was "insufficient to enable us to determine that the proposed changes have neither the purpose nor will have the effect of . denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group." Letter, T. Herren to A. McGeehan (Sept. 23, 2011) (Ex. 3). DOJ's response to the State requested, among other things, that Texas provide:
"a. The number of registered voters in Texas, by race and Spanish surname within county of residence, who currently possess a Texas driver's license or other form of photo identification issued by DPS that is current or has expired
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within sixty days. 'Please include a description of the manner in which you calculated these numbers; "b.. For the 605,576 registered voters who the State has advised do not have a Texas driver's license or personal identification card, please provide the number of such persons by Spanish surname, as well as an estimated number by race, within county of residence; and "c. Describe any and all efforts, other than the requirements outlined in Section 5 of Chapter 123, to provide notice to these individuals of the requirements of S.B. 14 and the availability of a free DPS-issued identification." ld. at 2-3. 14. On October 4, 2011, Texas responded to DOJ in a letter that answered. DOJ's questions and attached the data that Texas was capable of providing. Because Texas does not record the race of voters when they register to vote, the State explained that it was unable to determine the racial makeup of registered voters who lack' DPS-issued identification. Indeed, the very reason Texas refuses to maintain racial and ethnic data on its list of registered voters is to facilitate a colorblind electoral process, and Texas adopted this race-blind voter-registration policy shortly after the enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. In addition, until 2009, the DPS did not maintain a separate Hispanic category for driver's license holders to check when providing their racial or ethnic background-which further crimped the State's ability to calculate racial or ethnic breakdown of those who have (or do not have) DPS-issued photo-identification cards.
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15. On November 16, 2011, DOJ responded to Texas's submission of additional information in a letter yet again claiming that the supplemental information provided by the State was "incomplete" and "does not enable us to determine that the proposed changes have neither the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color or membership in a language minority group." Letter, T. Herren to A. McGeehan (Nov. 16, 2011) (Ex. 4). This time, DOJ demanded that the State provide a racial breakdown of each county of voters that possess DPS;.issued identification, which would then be used to extrapolate the racial makeup of that group as compared to the general population.
16. On January 12, 2012, Texas provided the data that DOJ requested along. with a letter explaining the State's concerns about the relevance of that data to the law's impact on minority voters. Letter, K. Ingram to T. Herren (Jan. 12, 2012) (Ex. 5).
17. On December 23, 2011, the Department of Justice announced that it denied preclearance to South Carolina's recently enacted Voter-ID Law-notwithstanding the Department of Justice's earlier decision to preclear a similar Voter-ID law in Georgia. In a letter explaining its decision, the Department of Justice cited data showing that 8.4% of white registered voters in South Carolina did not possess a photo identification issued by the State's Department of Motor Vehicles, while 10.0% of "non-white" registered voters in South Carolina did not possess this type of DMV-issued photo
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identification. See Letter, T. Perez to C. Jones (Dec. 23, 2011), at 2 (Ex. 6). The Department of Justice concluded this 1.6% "racial disparit[y]"
compelled it to deny preclearance on the ground that South Carolina had "failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that [its Voter:ID law] will not have a retrogressive effect." See DOJ Letter to S.C. at 4-5. The Department of Justice rejected South Carolina's Voter-ID law notwithstanding the fact that South Carolina's law, like Texas's, provides free photo-identification to voters who lack the identification needed to vote, and permits voters who do not possess government~issued photo identification to cast provisional ballots on Election Day, which will be counted if the voter brings a valid and current photo identification to the county board of registration and elections before certification of the election.
18. Further, the Department of Justice's letter rejecting South Carolina's preclearance submission does not make a serious effort to reconcile its decision with the Supreme Court's ruling in Crawford-which not only upheld Indiana's Voter-ID law as constitutional, but also made clear that photo-identification requirements are "nondiscriminatory" election regulations. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (upholding Indiana's photo-identification requirement· as "a neutral, nondiscriminatory regulation of voting procedure."); id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (The Indiana photo-identification law is a "generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation.").
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19. Similarly, the Department of Justice's letter to South Carolina officials does not acknowledge the serious constitutional questions that arise from DOJ's decision to interpret section 5 in a manner that would preclude covered jurisdictions from enforcing the same type of electionMfraud prevention measures that the Supreme Court has upheld as constitutional­ and that fall within the States' reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. See generally Northwest Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009);
20. The Department of Justice's letter to South Carolina officials also fails to acknowledge its own previous decision to preclear the VoterMID law in Georgia, and does not attempt to reconcile the Department's refusal to preclear South Carolina's VoterMID law with its earlier preclearance rulings.
21. Now, six months after· DOJ received Texas's preclearance submission for Senate Bill 14, and after multiple attempts to satis:(y DOJ's demands for additional information, the State is still awaiting a preclearance decision from the Department of Justice.
22. In filing this complaint in this Court at this time, Texas assumes that DOJ will apply the same legal analysis and. standards that it applied to South Carolina's VoterMID law. Instead of waiting almost 60 more days, only to meet with further delays and demands from DOJ, and the seeming probability of an eventual rejection of Senate Bill 14 by DOJ, Texas files this complaint seeking judicial preclearance.
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V. CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
 The State of Texas is entitled to a declaratory judgment granting preclearance to Senate Bill 14 under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because Senate Bill 14 has neither the purpose nor the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority and otherwise fully complies with section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 23. The allegations in paragraphs 6 - 22 are reincorporated herein. A. Senate Bill 14 does not "deny or abrldge" the right to vote. 24. The State of Texas respectfully requests a declaration from this Court that Senate Bill 14 does not "deny or abridge" the right to vote within the meaning of section 5, nor was it enacted with this purpose. Section 5 does not preclude covered jurisdictions from enacting generally applicable fraud~prevention laws, such as Senate Bill 14, that entail minor inconveniences on exercising the right to vote-especially when the covered jurisdiction mitigates those inconveniences through the mechanisms of free photo-ID cards and provisional ballots. For example, laws requiring that citizens register to vote prior to election day impose inconveniences that are similar to the one required by Senate Bill 14. But neither of these laws "denies" or "abridges" the right to vote. 25. Laws requiring voters to present proper identification at polling places are common. At the time of this complaint, no fewer than 31 States require voters to present some type of identification when voting at the polis. See http://www.ncsl.orgllegislatures~elections/elections-campaignslvoter-id-
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state-requirements.aspx. Further, 15 States have enacted laws that require voters to present a photo identification. Id.
26. These laws do not "deny" or "abridge" anyone's right to vote-a voter needs only to bring identification to the polls, and, in Texas, if a voter fails to bring the required government-issued photo identification to the polls then he can cast a provisional ballot that will be counted if the voter presents the required identification to the voter registrar within six days of the election. In addition, voters can obtain photo identification free of charge at any time, at their convenience, before the election--or after casting a provisional ballot-if they lack an acceptable form of government-issued identification.
27. DOJ's letter to South Carolina reflects a belief that any law that imposes even the slightest inconvenience on one's ability to vote represents a "denial" or "abridgement" of the right to vote-even when the State accommodates those who do not possess a photo identification by offering photo identification free of charge and by allowing voters without photo identification to cast provisional ballots. That is not a tenable construction of the Voting Rights Act, and it cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's ruling in Crawford. See 553 U.S. at 198 (opinion of Stevens, J.) ("[T]he inconvenience of making a trip to the DMV, gathering the required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase
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over the usual burdens of voting.") (emphasis added); idA at 209 (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment) ("The universally applicable requirements of Indiana's voter-identification law are eminently reasonable. The burden of acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo identification is simply not· . severe, because it does not "even represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting." And the State's interests are sufficient to sustain that minimal burden.") (internal citations omitted).
28. The Supreme Court's ruling in Crawford also recognizes that allowing voters to cast provisional ballots mitigates any "burdens" that photo­ identification requirements might otherwise impose on the right to vote. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 199 ("The severity of that burden is, of course, mitigated by the fact that, if eligible, voters without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that will ultimately be counted."). Sections 17 and 18 of Senate Bill 14 allow voters who appear at the polls without the required identification to cast provisional ballots, an allowance that defeats any claim that the photo-identification requirement "denies" or "abridges" anyone's right to vote. Unlike many other voting changes that may actually prevent someone from participating in an election, Senate Bill 14's requirements will affect only the ballots of those who choose not to obtain the required identification that the State offers free of charge--either before the election or (for those who cast provisional ballots) in the six-day window following the election.
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B. Senate Bill 14 does not deny or abridge the right to vote "on account of race or color."
29. The State of Texas respectfUlly requests a declaration from this Court that Senate Bill 14 does not deny or abridge the right to vote "on account of race or color," and that it was not enacted with that purpose. As the Supreme Court recognized in Crawford, photo-identification laws are "nondiscriminatory"; they apply to all voters regardless of race and they affect only those voters who choose not to obtain a photo identification (which the State offers free of charge) and present it either at the polls or to the voting registrar after casting a provisional ballot.
30. Even if minorities may be statistically less likely than whites to currently possess a government-issued photo identification (as DOJ asserts in its letter to South Carolina), that does not establish a section 5 violation. Section 5 precludes covered jurisdictions from enforcing those laws that have the "purpose" or "effect" of "denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." See § 1973c(a) (emphasis added). Even if DOJ contends that Senate Bill 14 has the unintended effect of "denying" or "abridging" the voting rights of those Who do not possess a government-issued photo identification, it does not do so on account of their race or color-it does so on account of their decision not to obtain the identification that the State offers free ofcharge.
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3LThe Department of Justice's Letter to South Carolina asserts that section 5 jurisdictions are forbidden to enforce any Voter-ID law that will "lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective· exercise of the electoral franchise." See DOJ Letter at 1 (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976». This approach is irreconcilable with the language of section 5, which protects persons of all races from new voting laws that have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. Nothing in section 5 authorizes the Department ofJustice or this Court to withhold preclearance from a neutral, nondiscriminatory voter-identification law simply because DOJ believes the law may have a disparate impact on minority voters--or white voters. The existing patterns of photo-ID possession will always vary somewhat by race, so these laws will always have a temporary differential effect on some race.
32. Section 5 does allow DOJ or this Court to withhold preclearance from voting qualifications that were enacted with the purpose of denying or abridging the voting rights of a particular race, or facially neutral voting qualifications that may have been enacted with benign motivations but that are administered by racially biased election officials who selectively enforce these laws to deny blacks the right to vote on account of their race. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 312-13 (1966). But Texas's Voter-ID law was not enacted with the purpose of disenfranchising minority
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voters, and there is not even a suggestion that the State would administer those laws in a racially biased manner.
33. Beer's "nonretrogression" construction of section 5 arose from a case involving legislative reapportionment and must be limited to that context. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 ("It is thus apparent that a legislative reapportionment that enhances the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise can hardly have the 'effect'. of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of § 5."); see also Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 329 (2000) ("In Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), this Court addressed the meaning of the no-effect requirement in the context of an allegation of vote dilution.") (emphasis added). The inherently unique nature of the reapportionment process is such that redistricting is fundamentally distinct from laws that govern the administration of elections or ballot-box integrity.
34. Extending "retrogressive effects" analysis to Voter-ID laws, by denying preclearance to any voter requirement that has an unintended disparate impact on minority voters, would present serious constitutional questions. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits only voting restrictions that are motivated by racial discrimination. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) ("[R]acially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation."). If the Department of Justice's
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apparent construction of section 5 operated to block Texas's Voter-ID law . solely because it may have a disparate impact on racial minorities, then this
Court will have to confront whether this interpretation of section 5 represents a permissible exercise of Congress's enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). Courts must adopt any reasonably permissible construction of section 5 that will avoid these constitutional concerns. See Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2511­
14. To do that, this Court must cabin the "nonretrogressive effects" test to
the context oflegislative redistricting. 35. Even if non-retrogression extends beyond redistricting, it still
should not extend to a law that imposes a temporary inconvenience no greater than the inherent inconvenience of voting. Whatever the initial disproportionate impact based on a snapshot of current patterns of photo-iD possession, those patterns are easily changed and cannot be the basis for a finding of disproportionate or retrogressive impact.
C. The Court must interpret section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to permit preclearance of Senate Bill 14 in order to avoid the grave constitutional question whether section 5 exceeds Congress's enforcement power under section 2 ofthe Fifteenth Amendment.
36. Any construction of section 5 that precludes Texas from implementing its Voter-ID Law will exceed Congress's enforcement power
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under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, or will at the very least present grave constitutional questions that this Court must avoid. A finding that covered jurisdictions cannot adopt a commonsense voting change already found to be non-di&criminatory by the Supreme Court would highlight the constitutional difficulties with section 5. Accordingly, this Court must interpret section 5 in a manner that authorizes preclearance in this case. See Nw. Austin, 129S. Ct. at 2511-14.
37. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment empowers Congress to "enforce" the Fifteenth Amendment with "appropriate" legislation. This enforcement prerogative might permit Congress to enact laws that empower DOJ or this Court to deny preclearance to state laws that actually violate the Fifteenth Amendment. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966) ("The Act suspends new voting regulations pending scrutiny by federal authorities to determine whether their use would violate the Fifteenth .Amendment.") (emphasis added). But, as the Supreme Court recognized in South Carolina, placing the States under this form of administrative receivership pushes the constitutional boundaries of Congress's enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment. Id.
38. The Texas Voter-ID law does not violate the Fifteenth Amendment because it was not enacted with a racially, discriminatory purpose. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980). In addition, the Supreme Court has explicitly upheld photo-identification laws against
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constitutional challenges, declaring that these laws represent "nondiscriminatory" regulations of elections. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203 (opinion of Stevens, J.); id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). It is tenuous enough for a federal court or the Department of Justice to deny preclearance to a voting qualification. that does not violate the Fifteenth Amendment; these constitutional concerns are further aggravated when preclearance is withheld from a law that the Supreme Court of the United States has explicitly upheld as constitutional.
39. Although the State of Texas does not deny that the Constitution may empower Congress to enact prophylactic legislation that extends beyond the self-executing right established in section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, any attempt by Congress to invoke its powers in this prophylactic manner necessarily raises serious constitutional questions. That is nowhere more obvious than in the case of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which represents an enormous intrusion into state sovereignty by reversing the bedrock assumption that duly enacted (and constitutional) state laws may take immediate effect. Accordingly, Congress is required to state its extra­ constitutional prohibitions in clear and explicit language and justify this prophylaxis with legislative findings. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding a congressional prohibition on literacy tests only after noting "evidence suggesting that prejudice played a prominent role in the enactment of the [literacy-test] requirement"); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
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u.s. 112 (1970) (opinion of Black, J) (upholding a federal ban on literacy tests
that was based on a congressional finding that "literacy tests have been used to discriminate against voters on account of their color."). See also Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S~ 356 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.$. 62 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The language of section 5 falls far short of the clear statement needed for this Court to even consider denying preclearance to the perfectly constitutional Voter-ID law that Texas has enacted.
40. The interpretation of section 5 that the Department "of Justice adopted in its letter to South Carolina will establish a preclearance obstacle that sweeps far beyond what is necessary to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. Both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments prohibit only "those voting restrictions that are motivated by racial discrimination. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). To the extent that section 5 blocks laws that are free from racially discriminatory motives, it can survive only if its prophylactic scope satisfies the "congruent" and "proportional" test of City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507(1997). Congress enacted the VRA 'to make the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment finally a reality for all citizens,' Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969), not to empower the Department of Justice to block States from enacting laws that do not violate the Fifteenth Amendment and that the Supreme Court has expressly upheld as constitutional.
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41. There is no conceivable justification for construing section 5 in a manner that would enable DOJ or the federal courts to deny administrative preclearance to a law that the Supreme Court has already determined is non­ discriminatory. Nor is there any justification for requiring Texas and South Carolina to wait for permission from DOJ (or a federal district court) before implementing their photo-identification laws., Crawford shows that litigants can bring immediate challenges to new voting requirements that are believed to disproportionately affect minorities, by invoking the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and section 2 of the VRA. And a district court can promptly issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction if the plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.
D. The Court must interpret section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to permit preclearance of Senate Bill 14 in order to avoid the grave constitutional questionwhether section 5 violates the Tenth Amendment.
42. .Any construction of section 5 that precludes Texas from implementing its Voter-ID Law will 'violate the Tenth Amendment by denying covered jurisdictions the powers reserved to them under that amendment, or will at the very least present grave constitutional questions that this Court must avoid by interpreting section 5 to allow for preclearance in this case.
43. Although the Supreme Court in Crawford did not directly address the Tenth Amendment, by upholding Indiana's Voter-ID law the
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Court effectively recognized that the States enjoy a reserved power under the Tenth Amendment to require voters to present photo identification at the· polls-at least when appearing to vote for state and local officials. Congress therefore has no power to enact legislation to nullify Indiana's Voter-ID law for state and local elections. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.) ("No function is more essential to the separate and independent existence of the States and their governments than the power to determine within the limits of the Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery for filling local public offices."). It follows that Congress cannot empower the Department of Justice or the federal courts to block Texas from requiring photo identification when conducting elections for state and local officials.
E. The Court should interpret section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in a manner that permits preclearance of Senate Bill 14 in order to avoid the grave constitutional guestion whether section 5 violates Texas's right to "egual sovereignty."
44. Section 5, if interpreted to forbid Texas to enforce its Voter-ID law, violates constitutional principles of federalism and state sovereignty by depriving Texas of equal sovereignty with other States.
45. Other States, such as Indiana, Kansas, and Wisconsin, have been able to enact and enforce similar laws without interference from DOJ.
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Yet Texas is denied that ability to implement election-fraud prevention laws. This creates a two-tracked system of sovereignty, in which States such as Indiana, Kansas, and Wisconsin can enforce their photo-identification requirements, but Texas and South Carolina cannot, even though all of these state laws comply with the Constitution. As Justice Kennedy has aptly noted, "Texas is at a tremendous disadvantage" as result of the fact that "section 5 applies only to some States and not others." Oral Argument Transcript, Perry v. Perez, No. 11-713, at 38 Tr. 5-11 (Jan. 9, 2012). Worse, under DOJ's interpretation of section 5, Georgia can enforce its photo­ identification requirements simply because it was fortuitous enough to seek administrative preclearance during a previous Administration.
46. Section 5, if interpreted to preclude preclearance of Senate Bill 14, relegates Texas to a diminished tier of sovereignty by disabling Texas from implementing a legitimate election fraud-prevention device. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181, 196 (2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.) ("There is no question about the legitimacy or importance of the State's interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters. Moreover, the interest in orderly administration and accurate recordkeeping provides a sufficient justification for carefully identifying all voters participating in the election process."); id. at 196-197 ("[T]he fact of inflated voter rolls does provide a neutral and nondiscriminatory reason supporting the State's decision to require photo identification."). "Non-retrogression" cannot be invoked to
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prohibit covered jurisdictions (such as Texas and South Carolina) from enacting constitutional fraud-prevention devices that non-covered jurisdictions (such as Indiana, Kansas, and Wisconsin) may implement.
VI. DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT The State of Texas respectfully requests the following relief from the Court:
A. A declaratory judgment that Senate Bill 14 may take effect immediately because it neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, nor will it deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote because he is a member of a language minority group.
E. All other relief to which the State of Texas may show itself to be entitled.
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Respectfully submitted. GREG ABBOTT Attorney General of Texas DANIEL T. HODGE First Assistant.Attorney General
ADAM W. ASTON ARTHUR C. D'ANDREA JAMES P. SULLIVAN Assistant Solicitors General 209 West 14th Street P.O. Box 12548 Austin, Texas 70711-2548 (512) 936-1695 Dated: Jan. 23, 2012
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE OF TEXAS
Plaintiff,
vs.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
Defendant.

Case No. 1:12-cv-00128 RMC-DST-RLW

FIRST AMENDED EXPEDITED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
1. The State of Texas brings this suit under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (“section 5”), and under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and seeks a declaratory judgment that its recently enacted Voter-ID Law, also known as Senate Bill 14, neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, nor will it deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote because he is a member of a language minority group.
2. In the alternative, the State of Texas seeks a declaration that section 5, as most recently amended and reauthorized by the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, exceeds the enumerated

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powers of Congress and conflicts with Article IV of the Constitution and the Tenth Amendment.
I. THE PARTIES 3. The plaintiff is the State of Texas. 4. The defendant, United States Attorney General Eric Holder acting in his official capacity, has his office in the District of Columbia.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and venue under 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
III. THREE-JUDGE COURT 6. The State of Texas requests the appointment of a three-judge court under 42 U.S.C. § 1973b and 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
IV. FACTS AND BACKGROUND 7. On May 27, 2011, the Governor of Texas signed into law Senate Bill 14, which requires most voters to present a government-issued photo identification when appearing to vote at the polls. Voters who suffer from a documented disability as determined by the United States Social Security Administration or the Department of Veteran Affairs are exempt from this requirement. See SB 14 § 1. (Ex. 1). The Texas Election Code also permits voters over the age of 65, as well as disabled voters, to vote by mail, and those who vote by mail are not required to obtain or present photo identification when voting. See TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 82.002–82.003.
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8. Voters who lack a government-issued photo identification may obtain from the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) an “election identification certificate,” which is issued free of charge and satisfies the photo-identification requirements of Senate Bill 14. See SB 14 § 20.
9. Under Senate Bill 14, voters who fail to bring a governmentissued photo identification may still cast a provisional ballot at the polls. Those ballots will be accepted if the voter presents a government-issued photo identification to the voter registrar within six days after the election, or if the voter executes an affidavit stating that the voter has a religious objection to being photographed or that he has lost his photo identification in a natural disaster that occurred within 45 days of the election. See SB 14 §§ 17-18.
10. Senate Bill 14 resembles the Indiana Voter-ID Law that the Supreme Court of the United States upheld as constitutional in Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). Indiana’s law was allowed to go into effect upon enactment, because Indiana is not a “covered jurisdiction” under the Voting Rights Act. Other States, such as Wisconsin and Kansas, have enacted photo-identification requirements in 2011 and are permitted to enforce their laws regardless of whether DOJ may object to those laws.
11. Senate Bill 14 also resembles the Voter-ID Law in Georgia that the Department of Justice precleared in 2005.
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12. Section 5 prohibits a State subject to section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b), from enforcing “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting . . . different from that in force and effect on November 1, 1964” unless the State either obtains a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that its election law “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” or because of membership in a language minority group, or else obtains approval for its law from the Attorney General of the United States. Id. § 1973c(a).
13. Because Texas is a “covered jurisdiction” under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, it is not permitted to implement Senate Bill 14 unless the State obtains preclearance from either the Department of Justice or a threejudge panel of this Court. On July 25, 2011, the State of Texas submitted Senate Bill 14 to the Department of Justice for preclearance. Submission Letter, A. McGeehan to T. Herren (July 25, 2011) (Ex. 2).
14. On September 23, 2011, exactly 60 days after Texas had submitted Senate Bill 14 for administrative preclearance, and on the last possible day for DOJ to respond, the Department of Justice sent a letter to the Texas Director of Elections, stating that the information provided in the State’s preclearance submission was “insufficient to enable us to determine that the proposed changes have neither the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or
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membership in a language minority group.” Letter, T. Herren to A.
McGeehan (Sept. 23, 2011) (Ex. 3). DOJ’s response to the State requested,
among other things, that Texas provide:
“a. The number of registered voters in Texas, by race and Spanish surname within county of residence, who currently possess a Texas driver’s license or other form of photo identification issued by DPS that is current or has expired within sixty days. Please include a description of the manner in which you calculated these numbers;
“b. For the 605,576 registered voters who the State has advised do not have a Texas driver’s license or personal identification card, please provide the number of such persons by Spanish surname, as well as an estimated number by race, within county of residence; and
“c. Describe any and all efforts, other than the requirements outlined in Section 5 of Chapter 123, to provide notice to these individuals of the requirements of S.B. 14 and the availability of a free DPS-issued identification.”
Id. at 2-3.
15. On October 4, 2011, Texas responded to DOJ in a letter that
answered DOJ’s questions and attached the data that Texas was capable of
providing. Because Texas does not record the race of voters when they
register to vote, the State explained that it was unable to determine the
racial makeup of registered voters who lack DPS-issued identification.
Indeed, the very reason Texas refuses to maintain racial and ethnic data on
its list of registered voters is to facilitate a colorblind electoral process, and
Texas adopted this race-blind voter-registration policy shortly after the
enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. In addition, until 2009, the DPS
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did not maintain a separate Hispanic category for driver’s license holders to check when providing their racial or ethnic background—which further crimped the State’s ability to calculate racial or ethnic breakdown of those who have (or do not have) DPS-issued photo-identification cards.
16. On November 16, 2011, DOJ responded to Texas’s submission of additional information in a letter yet again claiming that the supplemental information provided by the State was “incomplete” and “does not enable us to determine that the proposed changes have neither the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color or membership in a language minority group.” Letter, T. Herren to A. McGeehan (Nov. 16, 2011) (Ex. 4). This time, DOJ demanded that the State provide a racial breakdown of each county of voters that possess DPS-issued identification, which would then be used to extrapolate the racial makeup of that group as compared to the general population.
17. On January 12, 2012, Texas provided the data that DOJ requested along with a letter explaining the State’s concerns about the relevance of that data to the law’s impact on minority voters. Letter, K. Ingram to T. Herren (Jan. 12, 2012) (Ex. 5).
18. On December 23, 2011, the Department of Justice announced that it denied preclearance to South Carolina’s recently enacted Voter-ID Law—notwithstanding the Department of Justice’s earlier decision to preclear a similar Voter-ID law in Georgia. In a letter explaining its decision,
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the Department of Justice cited data showing that 8.4% of white registered voters in South Carolina did not possess a photo identification issued by the State’s Department of Motor Vehicles, while 10.0% of “non-white” registered voters in South Carolina did not possess this type of DMV-issued photo identification. See Letter, T. Perez to C. Jones (Dec. 23, 2011), at 2 (Ex. 6).
19. The Department of Justice concluded this 1.6% “racial disparit[y]” compelled it to deny preclearance on the ground that South Carolina had “failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that [its Voter-ID law] will not have a retrogressive effect.” See DOJ Letter to S.C. at 4-5. The Department of Justice rejected South Carolina’s Voter-ID law notwithstanding the fact that South Carolina’s law, like Texas’s, provides free photo-identification to voters who lack the identification needed to vote, and permits voters who do not possess government-issued photo identification to cast provisional ballots on Election Day, which will be counted if the voter brings a valid and current photo identification to the county board of registration and elections before certification of the election.
18. On March 12, 2012, exactly 60 days after Texas had answered DOJ’s latest request for additional data, and on the last possible day for DOJ to respond, the Department of Justice announced its decision denying preclearance to Senate Bill 14. In a letter explaining its decision, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights stated that he “cannot conclude
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that the state has sustained its burden under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.” See Letter, T. Perez to K. Ingram (March 12, 2012), at 2 (Ex. 7).
18. The Department of Justice’s letter to Texas expressly recognized the State’s interests in preventing voter fraud and safeguarding voter confidence. Further, it did not deny the existence of in-person voter impersonation that Senate Bill 14 was enacted to detect and deter. The Department of Justice asserted, however, that the State’s submission “did not include evidence of significant in-person voter impersonation not already addressed by the state’s existing laws.” See Letter, T. Perez to K. Ingram (March 12, 2012), at 2 (Ex. 7) (emphasis added). The Department of Justice apparently believes that section 5 prevents a State from deterring and detecting election fraud—which undermines all citizens’ voting rights—if the State’s generally applicable voter-fraud-prevention laws happen to impact various types of voters in different ways. The Department also seems to believe that it has the authority to unilaterally determine what constitutes “significant” fraud, despite the fact that local elections, in particular, can turn on a handful of votes. And despite the Department’s repeated requests for information from the State, it never asked the State to submit evidence of election fraud. Nonetheless, the Department now attempts to support its decision by noting that the State did not include evidence of “significant” voter impersonation.
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19. The Department of Justice’s letter to Texas claims that the State must prove that the percentage of Hispanic registered voters who currently possess a photo identification equals or exceeds the percentage of nonHispanic registered voters who currently possess photo identification. But Texas does not record the race of voters when they register to vote, and until 2009 DPS did not maintain a separate Hispanic category on driver’s licenses. The Department of Justice purports to derive the number of “Hispanic” and “non-Hispanic” registered voters and holders of driver’s licenses from the State’s data by using Spanish surname as a proxy for Hispanic ethnicity. This approach fails to account for the large number of Hispanics who lack Spanish surnames, and discriminates between Hispanic men and women who choose to marry someone of a different race or ethnicity. See Rodriguez v. Bexar County, 385 F.3d 853, 866 n.18 (5th Cir. 2004) (criticizing Spanishsurname data as a “highly problematic” and “disfavored” method of measuring Hispanic ethnicity).
20. The Department of Justice’s letter to Texas cites data showing that registered voters with Spanish surnames are more likely to currently lack a driver’s license than voters without Spanish surnames. See Letter, T. Perez to K. Ingram (March 12, 2012), at 2-3 (Ex. 7). The Department of Justice concluded this “disparit[y]” compelled it to deny preclearance on the ground of retrogressive effect. See Letter, T. Perez to K. Ingram (March 12, 2012), at 3 (Ex. 7). The Department of Justice rejected Texas’s Voter-ID law
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notwithstanding the fact that Texas’s law offers photo-identification free of charge to voters who lack the identification needed to vote, and permits voters who do not possess government-issued photo identification to cast provisional ballots on Election Day, which will be counted if the voter brings a valid and current photo identification to the county board of registration and elections within six days of the election.
19. The Department of Justice’s letter rejecting Texas’s preclearance submission does not make a serious effort to reconcile its administrativepreclearance decision with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford—which not only upheld Indiana’s Voter-ID law as constitutional, but also made clear that photo-identification requirements are “nondiscriminatory” election regulations. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (upholding Indiana’s photo-identification requirement as “a neutral, nondiscriminatory regulation of voting procedure.”) (emphasis added); id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (The Indiana photo-identification law is a “generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation.”) (emphasis added).
20. Similarly, the Department of Justice’s letter to Texas does not acknowledge the serious constitutional questions that arise from DOJ’s decision to interpret section 5 in a manner that would preclude covered jurisdictions from enforcing the same type of election-fraud prevention measures that the Supreme Court has upheld as constitutional—and that fall
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within the States’ reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. See generally Northwest Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
21. The Department of Justice’s letter to Texas also fails to acknowledge its own previous decision to preclear the Voter-ID law in Georgia, and does not attempt to reconcile the Department’s refusal to preclear Texas’s Voter-ID law with its earlier preclearance rulings.
V. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF CLAIM ONE:
The State of Texas is entitled to a declaratory judgment granting preclearance to Senate Bill 14 under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because Senate Bill 14 has neither the purpose nor the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or because of membership in a language minority, and otherwise fully complies with section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
24. The allegations in paragraphs 7 – 23 are reincorporated herein. A. Senate Bill 14 does not “deny or abridge” the right to vote. 25. The State of Texas respectfully requests a declaration from this Court that Senate Bill 14 does not “deny or abridge” the right to vote within the meaning of section 5, nor was it enacted with this purpose. Section 5 does not preclude covered jurisdictions from enacting generally applicable fraud-prevention laws, such as Senate Bill 14, that entail minor inconveniences on exercising the right to vote—especially when the covered jurisdiction mitigates those inconveniences through the mechanisms of free photo-ID cards and provisional ballots. For example, laws requiring that
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citizens register to vote prior to election day impose inconveniences that are similar to the one required by Senate Bill 14. But neither of these laws “denies” or “abridges” the right to vote.
26. Laws requiring voters to present proper identification at polling places are common. At the time of this complaint, no fewer than 31 States require voters to present some type of identification when voting at the polls. See http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections-campaigns/voter-idstate-requirements.aspx. Further, 15 States have enacted laws that require voters to present a photo identification. Id.
27. These laws do not “deny” or “abridge” anyone’s right to vote—a voter needs only to bring identification to the polls, and, in Texas, if a voter fails to bring the required government-issued photo identification to the polls then he can cast a provisional ballot that will be counted if the voter presents the required identification to the voter registrar within six days of the election. In addition, voters can obtain photo identification free of charge at any time, at their convenience, before the election—or after casting a provisional ballot—if they lack an acceptable form of government-issued identification.
28. DOJ’s letter to Texas reflects a belief that any law that imposes even the slightest inconvenience on one’s ability to vote represents a “denial” or “abridgement” of the right to vote—even when the State accommodates those who do not possess a photo identification by offering photo
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identification free of charge and by allowing voters without photo identification to cast provisional ballots. That is not a tenable construction of the Voting Rights Act, and it cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford. See 553 U.S. at 198 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“[T]he inconvenience of making a trip to the DMV, gathering the required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting.”) (emphasis added); id. at 209 (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment) (“The universally applicable requirements of Indiana’s voter-identification law are eminently reasonable. The burden of acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo identification is simply not severe, because it does not ‘even represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting.’” And the State’s interests are sufficient to sustain that minimal burden.”) (internal citations omitted).
29. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford also recognizes that allowing voters to cast provisional ballots mitigates any “burdens” that photoidentification requirements might otherwise impose on the right to vote. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 199 (“The severity of that burden is, of course, mitigated by the fact that, if eligible, voters without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that will ultimately be counted.”). Sections 17 and 18 of Senate Bill 14 allow voters who appear at the polls without the required identification to cast provisional ballots, an allowance that defeats any claim
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that the photo-identification requirement “denies” or “abridges” anyone’s right to vote. Unlike many other voting changes that may actually prevent someone from participating in an election, Senate Bill 14’s requirements will affect only the ballots of those who choose not to obtain the required identification that the State offers free of charge—either before the election or (for those who cast provisional ballots) in the six-day window following the election.
B. Senate Bill 14 does not deny or abridge the right to vote “on account of race or color,” or “because” of one’s membership in a “language minority group.”
30. The State of Texas respectfully requests a declaration from this Court that Senate Bill 14 does not deny or abridge the right to vote “on account of race or color,” or “because” of one’s membership in a “language minority group,” and that it was not enacted with those purposes. As the Supreme Court recognized in Crawford, photo-identification laws are “nondiscriminatory”; they apply to all voters regardless of race and language abilities, and they affect only those voters who choose not to obtain a photo identification (which the State offers free of charge) and present it either at the polls or to the voting registrar after casting a provisional ballot.
31. Even if racial or language minorities may be statistically less likely than others to currently possess a government-issued photo identification (as DOJ asserts in its letter), that does not establish a section 5
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violation. Section 5 precludes covered jurisdictions from enforcing those laws that have the “purpose” or “effect” of “denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” or “deny[ing] or abridg[ing] the right of any citizen of the United States to vote because he is a member of a language minority group.” See § 1973c(a) (emphasis added); § 1973b(f)(2) (emphasis added). Even if DOJ contends that Senate Bill 14 has the unintended effect of “denying” or “abridging” the voting rights of those who do not possess a government-issued photo identification, it does not do so on account of their race or color, or because of their membership in a language minority group. It would do so on account of their decision not to obtain the identification that the State offers free of charge.
32. The Department of Justice’s letter to Texas asserts that section 5 jurisdictions are forbidden to enforce any Voter-ID law that will “lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” See DOJ Letter at 2 (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)). This approach is irreconcilable with the language of section 5, which protects persons of all races from new voting laws that have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. Nothing in section 5 authorizes the Department of Justice or this Court to withhold preclearance from a neutral, nondiscriminatory voteridentification law simply because DOJ believes the law may have a disparate impact on minority voters—or white voters. The existing patterns of photo-
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ID possession will always vary somewhat by race, so these laws will always have a temporary differential effect on some racial group.
33. Section 5 does allow DOJ or this Court to withhold preclearance from voting qualifications that were enacted with the purpose of denying or abridging the voting rights of a particular race, or facially neutral voting qualifications that may have been enacted with benign motivations but that are administered by racially biased election officials who selectively enforce these laws to deny minorities the right to vote on account of their race. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 312-13 (1966). But Texas’s Voter-ID law was not enacted with the purpose of disenfranchising minority voters, and there is not even a suggestion that the State would administer those laws in a racially biased manner. Nor is there any evidence that Texas would administer this law in a manner that would abridge the voting rights of language minorities because of their membership in a language minority group.
34. Beer’s “nonretrogression” construction of section 5 arose from a case involving legislative reapportionment and must be limited to that context. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 (“It is thus apparent that a legislative reapportionment that enhances the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise can hardly have the ‘effect’ of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of § 5.”); see also Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U.S. 320,
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329 (2000) (“In Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), this Court addressed the meaning of the no-effect requirement in the context of an allegation of vote dilution.”) (emphasis added). The inherently unique nature of the reapportionment process is such that redistricting is fundamentally distinct from laws that govern the administration of elections or ballot-box integrity.
35. Extending “retrogressive effects” analysis to Voter-ID laws, by denying preclearance to any voter requirement that has an unintended disparate impact on racial or language minorities, would present serious constitutional questions. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits only voting restrictions that are motivated by racial discrimination. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (“[R]acially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation.”). If the Department of Justice’s apparent construction of section 5 operated to block Texas’s Voter-ID law solely because it may have a disparate impact on racial minorities (or “language minorities”), then this Court will have to confront whether this interpretation of section 5 represents a permissible exercise of Congress’s enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). Courts must adopt any reasonably permissible construction of section 5 that will avoid these constitutional concerns. See Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2511-14. To do that,
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this Court must cabin the “nonretrogressive effects” test to the context of legislative redistricting.
36. Even if non-retrogression extends beyond redistricting, it still should not extend to a law that imposes a temporary inconvenience no greater than the inherent inconvenience of voting. Whatever the initial disproportionate impact based on a snapshot of current patterns of photo-ID possession, those patterns are easily changed and cannot be the basis for a finding of disproportionate or retrogressive impact.
C. The Court must interpret section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to permit preclearance of Senate Bill 14 in order to avoid the grave constitutional question whether section 5 exceeds Congress’s enforcement power under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.
37. Any construction of section 5 that precludes Texas from implementing its Voter-ID Law will exceed Congress’s enforcement power under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, or will at the very least present grave constitutional questions that this Court must avoid. A finding that covered jurisdictions cannot adopt a commonsense voting change already found to be non-discriminatory by the Supreme Court would highlight the constitutional difficulties with section 5. Accordingly, this Court must interpret section 5 in a manner that authorizes preclearance in this case. See Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2511-14.
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38. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment empowers Congress to “enforce” the Fifteenth Amendment with “appropriate” legislation. This enforcement prerogative might permit Congress to enact laws that empower DOJ or this Court to deny preclearance to state laws that actually violate the Fifteenth Amendment. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966) (“The Act suspends new voting regulations pending scrutiny by federal authorities to determine whether their use would violate the Fifteenth Amendment.”) (emphasis added). But, as the Supreme Court recognized in South Carolina, placing the States under this form of administrative receivership pushes the constitutional boundaries of Congress’s enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment. Id.
39. The Texas Voter-ID law does not violate the Fifteenth Amendment because it was not enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980). In addition, the Supreme Court has explicitly upheld photo-identification laws against constitutional challenges, declaring that these laws represent “nondiscriminatory” regulations of elections. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203 (opinion of Stevens, J.); id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). It is tenuous enough for a federal court or the Department of Justice to deny preclearance to a voting qualification that does not violate the Fifteenth Amendment; these constitutional concerns are further aggravated when
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preclearance is withheld from a law that the Supreme Court of the United States has explicitly upheld as constitutional.
40. Even if the Constitution is properly construed to empower Congress to enact prophylactic legislation that extends beyond the selfexecuting right established in section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, any attempt by Congress to invoke its powers in this prophylactic manner will raise serious constitutional questions. That is nowhere more obvious than in the case of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which represents an enormous intrusion into state sovereignty by reversing the bedrock assumption that duly enacted (and constitutional) state laws may take immediate effect. Accordingly, Congress is required to state its extra-constitutional prohibitions in clear and explicit language and justify this prophylaxis with legislative findings. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding a congressional prohibition on literacy tests only after noting “evidence suggesting that prejudice played a prominent role in the enactment of the [literacy-test] requirement”); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (opinion of Black, J) (upholding a federal ban on literacy tests that was based on a congressional finding that “literacy tests have been used to discriminate against voters on account of their color.”). See also Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The language of section 5 falls far short of the clear statement needed for this
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Court to even consider denying preclearance to the perfectly constitutional Voter-ID law that Texas has enacted.
41. The interpretation of section 5 that the Department of Justice adopted in its letter to Texas will establish a preclearance obstacle that sweeps far beyond what is necessary to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. Both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments prohibit only those voting restrictions that are motivated by racial discrimination. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). To the extent that section 5 blocks laws that are free from racially discriminatory motives, it can survive only if its prophylactic scope satisfies the “congruent” and “proportional” test of City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Congress enacted the VRA “to make the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment finally a reality for all citizens,” Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969), not to empower the Department of Justice to block States from enacting laws that do not violate the Fifteenth Amendment and that the Supreme Court has expressly upheld as constitutional.
42. There is no conceivable justification for construing section 5 in a manner that would enable DOJ or the federal courts to deny administrative preclearance to a law that the Supreme Court has already determined is nondiscriminatory. Nor is there any justification for requiring Texas to wait for permission from DOJ (or a federal district court) before implementing its photo-identification laws. Crawford shows that litigants can bring
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immediate challenges to new voting requirements that are believed to disproportionately affect minorities by invoking the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and section 2 of the VRA. And a district court can promptly issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction if the plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.
D. The Court must interpret section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to permit preclearance of Senate Bill 14 in order to avoid the grave constitutional question whether section 5 violates the Tenth Amendment.
43. Any construction of section 5 that precludes Texas from implementing its Voter-ID Law will violate the Tenth Amendment by denying covered jurisdictions the powers reserved to them under that amendment, or will at the very least present grave constitutional questions that this Court must avoid by interpreting section 5 to allow for preclearance in this case.
44. Although the Supreme Court in Crawford did not directly address the Tenth Amendment, by upholding Indiana’s Voter-ID law the Court effectively recognized that the States enjoy a reserved power under the Tenth Amendment to require voters to present photo identification at the polls—at least when appearing to vote for state and local officials. Congress therefore has no power to enact legislation to nullify Indiana’s Voter-ID law for state and local elections. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.) (“No function is more essential to the separate
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and independent existence of the States and their governments than the power to determine within the limits of the Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery for filling local public offices.”). It follows that Congress cannot empower the Department of Justice or the federal courts to block Texas from requiring photo identification when conducting elections for state and local officials.
E. The Court must interpret section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to permit preclearance of Senate Bill 14 in order to avoid the grave constitutional question that section 5 violates the Republican Form of Government Clause.
45. Any construction of section 5 that precludes Texas from implementing its Voter-ID Law will violate the Constitution’s Republican Form of Government Clause by giving federal officials an arbitrary veto power over a democratically enacted, constitutional state law, or will at the very least present grave constitutional questions that this Court must avoid by interpreting section 5 to allow for preclearance in this case.
46. Senate Bill 14 was modeled on the Voter-ID legislation that the Supreme Court approved in Crawford and that the Department of Justice precleared in 2005. It passed with overwhelming majorities in both Houses of the Texas Legislature. To deny preclearance will allow the Attorney General or a panel of federal judges to thwart the will of Texas’s elected
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representatives and block state officials from implementing a democratically enacted, constitutional state law. Federal courts may of course enjoin state officials from implementing unconstitutional statutes, and Congress may pass legislation to preempt state law consistent with its enumerated constitutional powers. But Congress cannot establish a regime that permits unelected officials at the Department of Justice to arbitrarily deny preclearance to a constitutional Voter-ID law enacted by a State’s democratically enacted legislature—especially when preclearance has already been granted to a materially similar Voter-ID law in Georgia.
47. Section 5, if interpreted to preclude preclearance of Senate Bill 14, further violates the Republican Form of Government Clause by disabling the State of Texas from implementing a constitutionally legitimate election fraud-prevention device. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181, 196-197 (2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.).
F. The Court should interpret section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in a manner that permits preclearance of Senate Bill 14 in order to avoid the grave constitutional question whether section 5 violates Texas’s right to “equal sovereignty.”
48. Section 5, if interpreted to forbid Texas to enforce its Voter-ID law, violates constitutional principles of federalism and state sovereignty by depriving Texas of equal sovereignty with other States.
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49. Other States, such as Indiana, Kansas, and Wisconsin, have been able to enact and enforce similar laws without interference from DOJ. Yet Texas is denied that ability to implement election-fraud prevention laws. This creates a two-tracked system of sovereignty, in which States such as Indiana, Kansas, and Wisconsin can enforce their photo-identification requirements, but Texas and South Carolina cannot, even though all of these state laws comply with the Constitution. As Justice Kennedy has aptly noted, “Texas is at a tremendous disadvantage” as result of the fact that “section 5 applies only to some States and not others.” Oral Argument Transcript, Perry v. Perez, No. 11-713, at 38 Tr. 5-11 (Jan. 9, 2012). Worse, under DOJ’s interpretation of section 5, Georgia can enforce its photoidentification requirements simply because it was fortuitous enough to seek administrative preclearance during a previous Administration.
50. Section 5, if interpreted to preclude preclearance of Senate Bill 14, relegates Texas to a diminished tier of sovereignty by disabling Texas from implementing a legitimate election fraud-prevention device. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181, 196 (2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“There is no question about the legitimacy or importance of the State’s interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters. Moreover, the interest in orderly administration and accurate recordkeeping provides a sufficient justification for carefully identifying all voters participating in the election process.”); id. at 196-197 (“[T]he fact of inflated voter rolls does provide a
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neutral and nondiscriminatory reason supporting the State’s decision to require photo identification.”). “Non-retrogression” cannot be invoked to prohibit covered jurisdictions (such as Texas and South Carolina) from enacting constitutional fraud-prevention devices that non-covered jurisdictions (such as Indiana, Kansas, and Wisconsin) may implement. CLAIM TWO:
The State of Texas is entitled to a declaratory judgment authorizing the immediate implementation of Senate Bill 14 because section 5 of the Voting Rights Act violates the Constitution.
51. The allegations in paragraphs 7 – 50 are reincorporated herein. 52. The 2006 reauthorization of section 5 is unconstitutional on its face for the reasons provided in Northwest Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2511-14.
VI. DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT The State of Texas respectfully requests the following relief from the Court:
A. A declaratory judgment that Senate Bill 14 may take effect immediately because it neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, nor will it deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote because he is a member of a language minority group.
B. A declaratory judgment that section 5, as most recently amended and reauthorized by the Voting Rights Act
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Case 1:12-cv-00128-RMC-DST-RLW Document 16-1 Filed 03/12/12 Page 27 of 28 Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, exceeds the enumerated powers of Congress and conflicts with Article IV of the Constitution as well as the Tenth Amendment.
C. All other relief to which the State of Texas may show itself to be entitled.
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Respectfully submitted. GREG ABBOTT Attorney General of Texas DANIEL T. HODGE First Assistant Attorney General /s/ Jonathan F. Mitchell JONATHAN F. MITCHELL Solicitor General ADAM W. ASTON ARTHUR C. D’ANDREA JAMES P. SULLIVAN Assistant Solicitors General 209 West 14th Street P.O. Box 12548 Austin, Texas 70711-2548 (512) 936-1695 Dated: March 12, 2012
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE OF TEXAS, Plaintiff,
v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 12-cv-128

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(DST, RMC, RLW)

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Opinion

Before: TATEL, Circuit Judge, and COLLYER and WILKINS, District Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Texas seeks a declaratory judgment that Senate Bill 14 (SB 14), a newly-enacted law requiring inperson voters to present a photo ID, “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color,” or “member[ship] [in] a language minority group.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c(a), 1973b(f)(2). To satisfy section 5’s effect requirement, Texas must demonstrate that SB 14 will not “lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we find that Texas has failed to make this showing—in fact, record evidence demonstrates that, if implemented, SB 14 will likely have a retrogressive effect. Given this, we have no need to consider whether Texas has satisfied section 5’s purpose element. Accordingly, we deny the state’s request for a declaratory judgment.
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I. Under Texas’s current election code, i.e., pre-SB 14, any Texan who wishes to vote must file a registration application with the county elections registrar. That application must include the voter’s name, date of birth, and a sworn affirmation of U.S. citizenship. Tex. Elec. Code § 13.002. If the application is approved, the registrar delivers a “voter registration certificate” to the applicant, either in person or via U.S. mail. Id. §§ 13.142, 13.144. This “certificate”— actually a paper postcard—has no photograph, but does include a voter’s name, gender, year of birth, and a unique voter ID number. When presented at the polls, a voter registration certificate entitles the registrant to cast an in-person ballot. Registered voters who fail to present a voter registration certificate may nonetheless cast an in-person ballot if they (1) execute an affidavit stating that they do not have their certificate, and (2) present an alternate “acceptable” form of identification. Id. §§ 63.008, 63.0101. In addition to a voter registration certificate, Texas’s current election code recognizes eight broad categories of documents as “acceptable” voter ID. These include birth certificates, expired and non-expired driver’s licenses, U.S. passports, U.S. citizenship papers, utility bills, “official mail addressed to the person . . . from a governmental entity,” any “form of identification containing the person’s photograph that establishes the person’s identity,” and “any other form of identification prescribed by the secretary of state.” Id. § 63.0101. All in-person voters are subject to these ID requirements regardless of age or physical condition. But certain voters—including those who are 65 or older, disabled, or expect to be absent or in jail on Election Day—may choose to vote by mail without presenting identification. Id. §§ 82.001-004.
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Senate Bill 14, enacted in 2011, is more stringent than existing Texas law. If implemented, SB 14 will require in-person voters to identify themselves at the polls using one of five forms of government-issued photo identification, two state and three federal: (1) a driver’s license or personal ID card issued by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS); (2) a license to carry a concealed handgun, also issued by DPS; (3) a U.S. military ID card; (4) a U.S. citizenship certificate with photograph; or (5) a U.S. passport. Tex. Elec. Code § 63.0101 (January 1, 2012). Unlike Texas’s current code, which allows voters to present either photographic or non-photographic ID, SB 14 requires every form of acceptable ID to include a photograph of the voter. Also unlike the current code, SB 14 prohibits the use of IDs that have expired more “than 60 days before the date of presentation” at the polls. Id. Finally, SB 14 will prohibit voters from identifying themselves using only the pictureless “voter registration certificate” issued by a county registrar.
Prospective voters lacking one of the forms of photo ID listed in SB 14 will be able to obtain a photographic “election identification certificate” (EIC) for use at the polls. A pocketsized card “similar in form to . . . a driver’s license,” Tex. Transp. Code § 521A.001(e), an EIC, like a driver’s license, will be distributed through the DPS, and prospective voters will have to visit a DPS office to get one.
Although SB 14 prohibits DPS from “collect[ing] a fee for an [EIC],” id. § 521A.001(b), EICs will not be costless. Not only will prospective voters have to expend time and resources traveling to a DPS office, but once there they will have to verify their identity by providing “satisfactory” documentation to DPS officials. Specifically, prospective voters will need to provide (1) one piece of “primary identification,” (2) two pieces of “secondary identification,” or (3) one piece of “secondary identification” plus two pieces of “supporting identification” in order
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to receive an EIC. 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 15.182. A “primary” identification is an expired Texas driver’s license or personal identification card that has been expired for at least 60 days but not more than two years. Id. § 15.182(2). A “secondary” identification is one of the following:
• an original or certified copy of a birth certificate; • an original or certified copy of a court order indicating an official change of name and/or
gender; or • U.S. citizenship or naturalization papers without an identifiable photo. Id. § 15.182(3). A wide array of documents qualify as “supporting identification,” including school records, Social Security cards, pilot’s licenses, and out-of-state driver’s licenses. Id. § 15.182(4).
In sum, SB 14 will require every EIC applicant to present DPS officials with at least one of the following underlying forms of identification:
• an expired Texas driver’s license or personal ID card; • an original or certified copy of a birth certificate; • U.S. citizenship or naturalization papers; or • a court order indicating a change of name and/or gender.
Importantly, it costs money to obtain any of these documents. This means that EIC applicants—i.e., would-be voters—who possess none of these underlying forms of identification will have to bear out-of-pocket costs. For Texas-born voters who have changed neither their name nor gender, the cheapest way to obtain the required documentation will be to order a certified copy of their birth certificate from the Texas Bureau of Vital Statistics at a cost of $22. See Advisory Regarding Election Identification Certificates, ECF No. 308, at 2. (A copy of a
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court order indicating a change of name and/or gender costs $5 for the records search, plus $1 per page for the court order. Actually obtaining a legal change of name and/or gender costs far more—at least $152. See Attorney General’s Response to the State’s Advisory Regarding Election Identification Certificates, ECF No. 330, at 2-3.) More expensive options exist as well, ranging from $30 for an “expedited” birth certificate order all the way up to $354 for a copy of U.S. citizenship or naturalization papers. See, e.g., Advisory Regarding Election Identification Certificates, ECF No. 308, at 2.
SB 14 largely retains Texas’s existing rules for elderly and disabled voters. Voters over age 65 will still be able to vote by mail, although they will have to present an SB 14-qualifying photo ID if they choose to vote at the polls. Disabled voters, too, will be able to continue voting by mail, and those who choose to vote at the polls will still be able to identify themselves using the photoless postcard “voter registration certificate” issued by county elections registrars. To obtain this latter exemption, however, disabled Texans will need to provide written documentation of disability from either the Social Security Administration or Department of Veterans Affairs. Tex. Elec. Code § 13.002(i).
Texas Governor Rick Perry signed SB 14 into law on May 27, 2011. The law, however, has yet to take effect because, as a jurisdiction covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 App., Texas may not implement any change in its voting procedures without first obtaining “preclearance” from either the United States Attorney General or a threejudge panel of this court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). To obtain preclearance, Texas must demonstrate that SB 14 “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color,” or “member[ship] [in] a language minority group.” Id. §§ 1973c(a), 1973b(f)(2).
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Texas filed a preclearance application with the Attorney General on July 25, 2011. Under the Voting Rights Act, the Attorney General has sixty days to “interpose[] an objection” to a changed voting procedure. Id. § 1973c(a). But here that process was delayed by the Attorney General’s requests for additional information as to (1) the number of voters who lack a DPSissued driver’s license or personal ID card, and (2) the percentage of those voters who are minorities. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.37(b), 51.39(a)(1) (stating that when supplemental submissions are provided “the 60-day period for the pending submission will be recalculated from the Attorney General’s receipt of the supplementary information.”). Nearly six months after filing its initial preclearance request, on January 12, 2012, Texas submitted to the Attorney General a computer-generated list of 795,955 registered voters it was unable to match with corresponding entries in DPS’s driver’s license and personal ID database. This “no-match” list consisted of “304,389 voters (38.2%) who are Hispanic and 491,566 (61.8%) who are non-Hispanic.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 25 Ex. 7 at 2. But Texas warned that it had “reservations about the reliability of [its] data.” Compl., ECF No. 1 Ex. 5 at 1. Specifically, Texas explained that its DPS database and its voter registration list “were not designed to be merged,” and that “name changes [and] inconsistent use of nicknames or initials” between the two lists could cause “numerous incorrect ‘no-match’ results.” Id. at 2. Moreover, pointing out that it had used Spanish surnames as a proxy for Hispanic voters—“an imprecise substitute for accurate racial data”—Texas explained that its no-match list constituted an unreliable estimate of ID possession rates among Hispanic voters. Id.
On March 12, 2012, the Attorney General denied preclearance, concluding that Texas had failed to show that SB 14 will not have “the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race”—i.e., that it will not have a retrogressive effect. Am. Compl., ECF No. 25
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Ex. 7 at 1-2 (citing Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); 28 C.F.R. § 51.52). The Attorney General gave two reasons for the denial. First, without responding to Texas’s concerns about the reliability of its no-match list, the Attorney General concluded that Texas’s data showed that “Hispanic registered voters are more than twice as likely as non-Hispanic registered voters to lack” a DPS-issued driver’s license or ID card. Id. at 2. Second, Texas had failed to show that the availability of a purportedly “free” EIC would mitigate the “impact of S.B. 14 on Hispanic registered voters.” Id. at 3. The Attorney General pointed out that if a prospective voter lacks the documents needed to obtain an EIC, “the least expensive option will be to spend $22 on a copy of the voter’s birth certificate.” Id. Furthermore, “an applicant for an [EIC] will have to travel to a driver’s license office,” yet “in 81 of the state’s 254 counties, there are no operational driver’s license offices,” and many of those offices have limited hours of operation. Id. at 4. These constraints, the Attorney General concluded, could impose additional burdens on prospective voters who need an EIC—particularly on those without a car. Id. Moreover, Texas had “failed to propose, much less adopt, any program for individuals who have to travel a significant distance to a DPS office, who have limited access to transportation, or who are unable to get to a DPS office during their hours of operation.” Id. at 5. Given all this, the Attorney General concluded that Texas “has not met its burden of proving that . . . the proposed requirement will not have a retrogressive effect, or that any specific features of the proposed law will prevent or mitigate that retrogression.” Id. Although the Attorney General’s denial rested on the potential retrogressive effect of SB 14 on Hispanic voters, he noted that Texas had “provided no data on whether African American or Asian registered voters are also disproportionately affected by S.B. 14.” Id. at 3.
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Finally, the Attorney General declined to determine whether SB 14 had been enacted with a discriminatory purpose—an independent reason for denying preclearance. Because Texas “failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the proposed law will not have a retrogressive effect,” the Attorney General explained, he had no need to “make any determination as to whether the state has established that the proposed changes were adopted with no discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 5.
In the meantime, while the Attorney General was considering SB 14, he denied preclearance to South Carolina’s new voter ID law. Shortly thereafter, on January 24, Texas, noting the South Carolina denial and the “seeming probability of an eventual rejection of Senate Bill 14 by DOJ,” filed this request for judicial preclearance. See Compl., ECF. No. 1 at 8. Although Texas’s initial complaint sought only a declaratory judgment of preclearance, the state later added a claim that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, as reauthorized in 2006, “exceeds the enumerated powers of Congress and conflicts with Article IV of the Constitution and the Tenth Amendment.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 25 at 1-2.
The Attorney General of the United States was listed as the named defendant. (For the sake of clarity, we hereinafter refer to the party-defendant in this case as the “United States,” and refer to the “Attorney General” only when discussing administrative preclearance decisions). In addition, we later granted motions to intervene filed by several voting rights groups, as well as a number of organizations representing racial minorities in Texas. See Minute Order, 04/13/2012. These included the Texas Legislative Black Caucus, the League of Women Voters of Texas, the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project, and the Mexican American Caucus of the Texas House of Representatives. We also granted motions to intervene filed by several individual
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Texas voters. In order to reduce the litigation burden on Texas, we directed all intervenors to consolidate their briefing and argument. See id.
Following the Attorney General’s March 12 denial of preclearance, this litigation took on obvious urgency, as it represented Texas’s only chance of implementing SB 14 before the November 2012 elections. Although the D.C. Circuit recently affirmed the facial constitutionality of section 5, Shelby County v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), we remain cognizant of the Supreme Court’s holding in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder that section 5 imposes “substantial federalism costs,” 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, on March 27, before the United States had even filed an answer to Texas’s amended complaint, we granted Texas’s request for an expedited litigation schedule. In doing so, we rejected the United States’s contention that a trial was infeasible before the end of the summer, scheduled a one-week trial on the judicial preclearance issue to begin on July 9, and promised to issue our decision by August 31—the date on which Texas needed a decision in order to implement SB 14 in time for the November election. See Order, ECF No. 107 at 1. As we explained, it would “raise serious constitutional questions” if Texas were prevented from implementing SB 14 merely because the United States was too busy to prepare for trial. See Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 204. These federalism concerns are particularly acute in the voter ID context. After all, states not covered by section 5 have successfully implemented voter ID laws to “deter[ ] and detect[ ] voter fraud . . . . improve and modernize election procedures . . . . [and] safeguard[] voter confidence.” Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008). Thus, given our “historic tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty,’” Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (citation omitted), we thought it essential to ensure that Texas had every possible opportunity to show that its own
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voter ID law could be implemented in time for the November elections. With the consent of the parties, we deferred consideration of Texas’s constitutional challenge, explaining that this claim “shall not be addressed unless the Court denies judicial preclearance of [SB 14].” Initial Scheduling Order, ECF No. 43 at 1. We then set an accelerated discovery and briefing schedule. Id.
Similar federalism concerns influenced our resolution of several discovery disputes. For example, seeking to show that SB 14 was motivated by discriminatory purpose, the United States moved to compel the production of testimony and documents from Texas state legislators. See Order, ECF No. 167. Texas sought to withhold this evidence, arguing that its production would violate legislative privilege. Cognizant that “federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking” imposes “substantial federalism costs,” Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 202, and guided by Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., we largely sided with Texas. See 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977) (recognizing a testimonial and evidentiary privilege for “members of [a] decisionmaking body”). We shielded all evidence relating to “legislative acts” or “a legislator’s motivations with respect to a bill.” Order, ECF No. 167 at 11. We also allowed Texas to withhold certain communications between legislators and executive agencies. Id. at 9. Finally, we shielded most, though not all, evidence in the possession of Texas Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst. See Order, ECF No. 154. This latter issue was complicated by the fact that the Texas lieutenant governor serves both as a member of the executive branch and as President of the Senate, so the degree to which he qualifies as a “legislator” is unclear. Id. at 4. Describing this as a “very close call,” and believing ourselves “obliged to apply the Voting Rights Act in a manner that minimizes federal intrusion,” we erred on the side of shielding evidence in the lieutenant governor’s possession. Id. at 6 (quotation omitted).
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Our efforts to accelerate this litigation, however, were often undermined by Texas’s failure to act with diligence or a proper sense of urgency. As memorialized in our May 7, 2012 order, Texas “repeatedly ignored or violated directives and orders of this Court that were designed to expedite discovery.” Order, ECF No. 107 at 2. Most significantly, Texas failed to produce its voter registry, DPS ID, and license-to-carry databases to the United States until 35 days after the established discovery deadline. Id. Production of these databases to DefendantIntervenors took place even later—40 days after the initial deadline—and was further complicated by data-accessibility errors. See Notice Concerning Database Discovery, ECF No. 119 at 2. These errors seriously hindered Defendant-Intervenors’ ability to prepare and proffer expert testimony based on this data. See Order, ECF No. 137 at 2-4. Citing these delays, the United States again moved to postpone trial. We denied this motion, explaining that “[d]espite the fact that patience and equity do not count in Texas’[s] favor when considering discovery and scheduling issues, the statute requires our best efforts for an early trial date.” Id. at 2-3. After all, we emphasized, “[t]he questions under the Voting Rights Act presented here are too important to let even Texas’[s] missed discovery . . . force a change to the July 9 trial date.” Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
Although Texas was able to maintain the July 9 trial date, its dilatory approach to discovery prevented it from obtaining one potentially crucial piece of evidence. Nearly a month after discovery commenced, Texas served the Attorney General with a discovery request seeking data regarding the three types of federal ID permitted by SB 14: U.S. passports, military ID cards, and citizenship certificates. Memo. in Support of Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 130-1 at 1-2. Texas sought access to this federal data to determine the number of Texas voters who lack any form of SB 14-qualifying ID. In response, the Attorney General informed Texas that because
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federal identification databases are outside his “possession, custody or control,” he was unable to produce them. See Order, ECF No. 179 at 2. He advised Texas to serve subpoenas on the three U.S. agencies who physically control the databases—the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Defense. See id. at 2-3. Inexplicably, however, Texas never served these subpoenas. Indeed, for thirty days Texas failed to take any action at all vis-à-vis the federal databases. Texas finally filed a motion to compel the Attorney General’s production of the federal databases on May 21—the last possible day to file such a motion. Order, ECF No. 137 at 4. We ultimately denied this motion, explaining that Texas had failed to establish that the Attorney General maintains control over the databases. Order, ECF No. 179 at 4. And because Texas had mysteriously failed to serve subpoenas on the agencies in physical possession of the databases, we concluded that “[a]ny prejudice to Texas from the failure to obtain this information is assignable solely to Texas.” Id. at 5.
Nevertheless, mindful that the federal databases could prove crucial to Texas’s case, we asked the state to decide: would it rather (1) commence trial on July 9, 2012 without federal data, or (2) delay trial, potentially obtain access to the databases, but risk an inability to implement SB 14 for the November 2012 elections? Texas responded clearly and unequivocally: it preferred to go ahead with the July 9 trial date, even without access to the federal databases. Id. at 6-7. Texas’s counsel even downplayed the importance of federal data, stating: “I don’t want to give the impression that if we can’t get [information on federal IDs], we don’t think we can prove our case.” Id.
As Texas requested, trial commenced on July 9. Over the course of the week-long trial, we heard live testimony from 20 witnesses, including election lawyers; Texas state legislators; civil rights leaders; and experts in history, political science, and statistics. The parties also
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submitted thousands of pages of deposition testimony, expert reports, scholarly articles, and other paper evidence. The trial concluded with three-and-a-half hours of closing arguments.
Based on this extensive record, Texas argues that SB 14 was enacted to prevent voter fraud, and denies that race was a motivating factor. Texas also argues that record evidence affirmatively proves that SB 14 will have no discriminatory effect. For their part, the United States and Defendant-Intervenors argue that the specter of in-person voter fraud is a chimera meant to mask the discriminatory purpose behind SB 14. According to these parties, the record contains virtually no evidence of in-person voter fraud in Texas and this, combined with certain procedural irregularities that occurred during the passage of SB 14, the state’s history of racial discrimination, and other evidence, proves that the bill’s purpose was to disenfranchise minorities. Moreover, the United States and Defendant-Intervenors argue that SB 14 will have a discriminatory effect—that is, it will “lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
In resolving these legal issues, we do not review the Attorney General’s denial of preclearance, but determine for ourselves whether SB 14 has the purpose or effect “of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color,” or “member[ship] [in] a language minority group.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c(a), 1973b(f)(2); see 28 C.F.R. § 51.49 (“The decision of the Attorney General not to object to a submitted change or to withdraw an objection [under section 5] is not reviewable.”). We do so in the following opinion, which “shall constitute the Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as required by the Federal Rules.” City of Rome, Ga. v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221, 223 (D.D.C. 1979) (three-judge court); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 Advisory Notes 1946 (stating that findings of fact “should be a part of the judge’s opinion and decision, either stated therein or stated separately”).
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II. Before examining the evidence, we set forth the legal framework that governs this case.
A. As the Supreme Court has “often reiterated[,] . . . voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979). Indeed, the right to vote free from racial discrimination is expressly protected by the Constitution. The Fifteenth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. Const. amend. XV. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from “deny[ing] to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, applies to voting. As the Court has explained, “once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966). Adopted in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, these two amendments were aimed at protecting the rights and liberties of freed slaves in the former Confederacy. Despite these Constitutional safeguards, “the blight of racial discrimination in voting . . . infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). Following Reconstruction, many Southern states began enacting ballot access measures which were “specifically designed to prevent Negroes from voting.” Id. at 310. “Among the most notorious devices were poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and property qualifications.” Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 853. Though race-
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neutral on their face, such measures were deliberately calculated to reduce the number of African Americans able to vote. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 311 (noting that when literacy tests were enacted, “more than two-thirds of the adult Negroes were illiterate while less than one-quarter of the adult whites were unable to read or write”); id. at 311 n.9 (quoting South Carolina Senator Ben Tillman as stating, “The only thing we can do as patriots and as statesmen is to take from the ‘ignorant blacks’ every ballot that we can under the laws of our national government.”) (alterations omitted). The Supreme Court ultimately invalidated many of these laws on the grounds that they violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 311-12 (collecting cases). Nevertheless, states were able to stay one step ahead of the courts “ ‘by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck down.’ ” Beer, 425 U.S. at 140 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-196, at 57-58 (1975)).
It was against this backdrop of “unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution” that Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309. Enacted pursuant to Congress’s authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment “by appropriate legislation,” U.S. Const. amend. XV, the Act was intended to eliminate the “insidious and pervasive evil” of racial discrimination in voting. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309. As relevant here, section 5 of the 1965 Act required certain “covered jurisdictions” to “preclear” every proposed change in their voting procedures with either the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of this court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). Only if a covered jurisdiction can demonstrate that a proposed change “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color” will that change take effect. Id. Thus, by requiring a covered jurisdiction to preclear a change before implementing it, section 5 “shift[ed] the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.” Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328.
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Under the 1965 Act, a jurisdiction was “covered” by section 5 if it “maintained a voting test or device as of November 1, 1964, and had less than 50% voter registration or turnout in the 1964 presidential election.” Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(b), 79 Stat. 437, 438. In crafting this formula, “Congress chose [its] criteria carefully.” Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 855. “It knew precisely which states it sought to cover”—those with the worst legacy of racial discrimination in voting—“and crafted the criteria to capture those jurisdictions.” Id. “Unsurprisingly, then, the jurisdictions originally covered in their entirety, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia, were those southern states with the worst historical record of racial discrimination in voting.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Although section 5 was enacted as a temporary provision, Congress has consistently renewed it: in 1970 (for five years), in 1975 (for seven years), in 1982 (for twenty-five years), and in 2006 (for twenty-five years). Since its enactment, the relevant portions of the Voting Rights Act have largely remained the same, with one exception of particular significance to this case. In 1975, Congress expanded the coverage formula to include jurisdictions that had substantial non-English-speaking populations but provided English-only voting materials at the polls. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 203, 89 Stat. 400, 401–02 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(3)). It was this change that brought Texas within the scope of Section 5’s coverage. 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 App.
One final point bears particular emphasis: under section 5, the covered jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. This means that a covered jurisdiction must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a proposed voting change lacks both (1) discriminatory purpose and (2) retrogressive effect. As the Supreme Court has recognized, this is a “difficult burden,” for “[a]s a
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practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative.” Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (“Bossier Parish I”), 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997) (quoting, in part, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960)). Nevertheless, the burden of proof in section 5 cases is both “well established,” Georgia, 411 U.S. at 538, and uncontested by Texas.
B. At the outset, Texas makes two arguments that, if correct, would allow it to prevail as a matter of law. We consider each in turn. First, Texas argues that application of section 5’s effect element to voter ID laws is inappropriate because such laws can never “deny[ ] or abridg[e] the right to vote.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). According to Texas, voter ID requirements are, at worst, a “minor inconvenience[],” analogous to “laws requiring citizens to register to vote.” Proposed Findings of Fact by State of Texas (“Texas Proposed Findings”), ECF No. 202 at 42. Of course, “many citizens decide that the benefits of voting are not worth the burdens associated with registering to vote.” Id. But this, Texas contends, is precisely the point: would-be voters who refuse to countenance “minor inconveniences,” like registration requirements, have chosen not to vote. Similarly, Texas contends that voters who opt to go without photo ID and decline to obtain one prior to the election have eschewed their right to vote. In either case, Texas concludes, the choice lies with prospective voters, so voting rights can hardly be considered to have been “denied” or “abridged” by the state. Id. at 43. This argument completely misses the point of section 5. As explained above, covered jurisdictions must prove that any change in voting procedures would not “deny[] or abridge the right to vote.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). This is true “no matter how small” the change. Allen v.
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State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 568 (1969). But in an attempt to advance its own definition of “deny” and “abridge”—one that would essentially exempt voter ID laws from section 5 preclearance—Texas ignores what the Supreme Court has said these terms mean. We thus repeat it here: in order to meet their burden, covered jurisdictions must show that none of their “votingprocedure changes . . . would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. In other words, covered jurisdictions must show that any change in voting procedures will not “worsen the position of minority voters” compared to the general populace. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (“Bossier Parish II”), 528 U.S. 320, 324 (2000). And while it is true that some voter ID laws impose only “minor inconvenience” and present little threat to the “effective exercise of the electoral franchise”—and would thus be easily precleared under section 5—this cannot be the case for all potential voter ID laws. If, for example, a state charged $500 for acceptable forms of voter ID, obtaining that ID would impose more than a “minor inconvenience.” The same would be true if voters were forced to travel to a distant and inaccessible state capital to obtain an ID. Again, we emphasize that Texas bears the burden of proof. Accordingly, if, as Texas argues, SB 14 imposes only a “minor inconvenience” on voters, the consequence of that argument is not that SB 14 would be exempt from section 5, but rather that it could easily be precleared because it would not undermine minorities’ “effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
Our rejection of Texas’s unqualified assertion that laws are immune from section 5 so long as they can be tied to “voter choice” should come as little surprise, for another three-judge district court recently rejected a similar argument advanced by none other than the State of Texas. In Texas v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court), the
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court denied Texas’s motion for summary judgment requesting preclearance of its redistricting plan. Along the way, the court rejected Texas’s contention that if Hispanic voters would only choose to vote at the same rate as whites, a legislative district with a 50.1% Hispanic citizen voting-age population would provide Hispanics the ability to elect their preferred candidates. Id. at 262-66. The court noted that “educational and economic conditions [are] such that mere attainment of citizen voting-age status might have no real effect on [Hispanics’] ability to elect representatives of choice.” Id. at 264. The court thus concluded that it was required to perform “a more complicated retrogression analysis than Texas wants this court to approve.” Id.
Comparable logic applies here. Just as educational and economic conditions might affect whether minorities “choose” to vote, those conditions could also affect whether minorities “choose” to obtain photo ID. Poorer people, for example, may be disproportionately unable to pay the costs associated with obtaining SB 14-qualifying ID. Thus, cognizant of the decision of our sister court and fully persuaded by its reasoning, we decline Texas’s recycled invitation to collapse the entire retrogression analysis into a question of voter “choice.”
Texas’s second argument rests on the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board. There, the Court upheld Indiana’s voter ID law, holding that it “imposes only a limited burden on voters’ rights” under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 553 U.S. at 202-03. In some respects, the Indiana law is similar to SB 14, requiring in-person voters to present photo ID at the polls, while also requiring Indiana driver’s license offices to provide free photo ID. Id. at 185-86. Moreover, like Texas, Indiana’s chief justification for its ID law was the prevention of in-person voter fraud. Id. at 191, 194-96. Given these similarities, Texas contends that Crawford controls this case, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that infringement on the “equal sovereignty” of states raises “serious constitutional questions.”
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Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203-04. After all, Texas argues, if Indiana can implement a photo ID law to protect against voter fraud, why can’t Texas do the same?
By contrast, the United States argues that Crawford is largely irrelevant to this litigation. It points out that Crawford involved a First and Fourteenth Amendment facial challenge to a voter ID law enacted by a state not covered by section 5. As such, the Crawford plaintiffs, who sought to have the law invalidated, bore a “heavy burden of persuasion,” requiring them to show that the law was invalid “in all its applications.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200 (emphasis added). Here, however, Texas bears the burden of proving that SB 14 lacks discriminatory purpose and retrogressive effect. Georgia, 411 U.S. at 538. Thus, the United States concludes, Crawford is essentially inapplicable to the issues before us.
In our view, the correct answer lies somewhere between these two positions. Contrary to Texas’s argument, Crawford does not control this case. In Crawford itself, the Court noted that it was “consider[ing] only the statute’s broad application to all Indiana voters.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 202-03 (emphases added). Here, not only do we face different questions—does SB 14 have discriminatory purpose or retrogressive effect?—but we focus on the limited subset of voters who are racial and language minorities. And unlike Indiana in Crawford, Texas bears the burden of proof.
Contrary to the position taken by the United States, however, Crawford informs our analysis of SB 14 in two important ways. The first goes to purpose. It is crucial, we think, that the Court held in Crawford that Indiana could act to prevent in-person voter fraud despite the fact that “[t]he record contains no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.” Id. at 194 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court emphatically held that “[t]here is no question about the legitimacy or importance of” this interest. Id. at 202-03
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(emphasis added). After all, “the ‘electoral system cannot inspire public confidence if no safeguards exist to deter or detect fraud or to confirm the identity of voters.’ ” Id. at 197 (quoting Jimmy Carter and James A. Baker III, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections § 2.5 (Sept. 2005)). Given this, we reject the argument, urged by the United States at trial, that the absence of documented voter fraud in Texas somehow suggests that Texas’s interests in protecting its ballot box and safeguarding voter confidence were “pretext.” A state interest that is unquestionably legitimate for Indiana—without any concrete evidence of a problem—is unquestionably legitimate for Texas as well. As Texas points out, holding otherwise would, notwithstanding section 5’s facial validity, seriously threaten the “equal sovereignty” of states. Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203. The inquiry into whether SB 14 was enacted with discriminatory purpose thus cannot hinge on whether Texas can cite documented instances of in-person voter fraud— although, of course, other evidence, such as the types of circumstantial evidence discussed in Arlington Heights, could nonetheless suggest that Texas invoked the specter of voter fraud as pretext for racial discrimination. See Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 489 (“Other considerations relevant to the purpose inquiry include, among other things, ‘the historical background of the [jurisdiction's] decision’; ‘[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision’; ‘[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence’; and ‘[t]he legislative or administrative history, especially . . . [any] contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body.’ ” (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268) (alterations in original)); see also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 (noting that, in order to prove discriminatory intent, a plaintiff need not “prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes” (emphasis added)).
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Our second point relates to section 5’s effect element. In Crawford, the Court thought it critical that “the photo identification cards issued by Indiana’s [Bureau of Motor Vehicles] are . . . free.” 553 U.S. at 198. Rejecting an argument that obtaining free photo ID cards imposed an undue burden on would-be voters, the Court explained:
For most voters who need them, the inconvenience of making a trip to the BMV, gathering the required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting. Id. This holding, though made in the context of a constitutional challenge, has obvious ramifications for this section 5 case. If in most instances the “inconvenience of making a trip to the BMV . . . does not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote,” id., we fail to see how that same inconvenience could, absent more, undermine the “effective exercise of the electoral franchise” for minority voters. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. In other words, according to Crawford, there are certain responsibilities and inconveniences that citizens must bear in order to exercise their right to vote, and a one-time trip to the driver’s license office is, in most situations, simply one of those responsibilities. It is important to bear in mind, however, that Crawford involved a facial challenge to the ID law’s effects on “all Indiana voters.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203. The Court was therefore discussing the burden of “making a trip to the BMV” generally. Indeed, the Court expressly held only that the burdens associated with obtaining a photo ID were insubstantial “[f]or most voters.” Id. at 198 (emphasis added). Obviously, “most” is different from “all.” Crawford thus cannot be read as holding that a trip to the BMV can never “qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote.” Id. And logically so. After all, would-be voters who must take a day off work to travel to a distant driver’s license office have most certainly been exposed to burdens beyond those usually associated with voting. The same is likely true if prospective voters must pay a substantial
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amount of money to obtain a photo ID or wait in line for hours to get one. In some circumstances these heavy burdens could well discourage citizens from voting at all. And if such burdens fall disproportionately on racial or language minorities, they would have retrogressive effect “with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
The upshot of all of this is that Texas can prove that SB 14 lacks retrogressive effect even if a disproportionate number of minority voters in the state currently lack photo ID. But to do so, Texas must prove that these would-be voters could easily obtain SB 14-qualifying ID without cost or major inconvenience.
III. With these principles in mind, we turn to the record. Because “courts have no need to find discriminatory intent once they find [retrogressive] effect,” Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 869, and because evidence that a law which “bears more heavily on one race than another”—i.e., has disproportionate effect—is itself “the important starting point for assessing discriminatory intent,” Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 489 (internal quotations and citations omitted), we begin with section 5’s effect element. This discussion proceeds as follows. We begin with Texas’s argument that, as a general proposition, voter ID laws have little effect on turnout—an argument that relies on social science literature and the experiences of Georgia and Indiana following enactment of their photo ID laws. Next, we consider evidence submitted by Texas, the United States, and DefendantIntervenors analyzing whether minorities disproportionately lack the forms of ID permitted by SB 14. For the reasons given below, we reject all of this evidence and, because Texas has submitted nothing more, conclude that the state has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating
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that SB 14 lacks retrogressive effect. As we shall explain, however, this case does not hinge solely on the burden of proof. Undisputed record evidence demonstrates that racial minorities in Texas are disproportionally likely to live in poverty and, because SB 14 will weigh more heavily on the poor, the law will likely have retrogressive effect.
A. Texas begins with a broad argument: that social science evidence demonstrates voter turnout is generally unaffected by the stringency of a state’s voter ID laws. In other words, Texas contends that voters vote regardless of the identification requirements imposed on them at the polls and that SB 14 will thus have “no significant effect at all.” Texas Proposed Findings, ECF No. 202 at 9. And because ID requirements have no bearing on whether voters—minorities or otherwise—turn out on Election Day, Texas concludes that SB 14 will have no retrogressive effect. We are unable to credit this line of argument because the effect of voter ID laws on turnout remains a matter of dispute among social scientists. Texas relies heavily on a 2009 paper by Dr. Stephen Ansolabehere, a Harvard political scientist who (as discussed infra) happens to be one of the United States’s expert witnesses in this case. In his paper, Dr. Ansolabehere concludes, based on a telephone survey of eligible voters nationwide, that “almost no one . . . stay[s] away from the polls for want of appropriate identification.” TA 1475. But the United States introduced into evidence a 2011 paper by Dr. Michael Alvarez of the California Institute of Technology which reaches precisely the opposite conclusion. Applying a statistical regression model to voting data from all 50 states, Dr. Alvarez concludes that photo ID requirements impose “significant negative burdens on voters.” U.S. Ex. 551 at 29. The Alvarez study predicts
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that imposition of a photo ID requirement in any given state will depress overall voter turnout by approximately 10%. Id. Texas—which bears the burden of proof—has failed to produce any evidence undermining the validity of the Alvarez study. Instead, it focuses entirely on Dr. Ansolabehere’s 2009 paper. Yet Dr. Ansolabehere himself testified that “other published research disagrees with me,” Trial Tr. 7/12/2012 (PM) 33:6, specifically pointing out that Dr. Alvarez’s study found that some photo ID laws have “quite a big effect” on turnout. Id. 102:1718. We thus have no basis for finding that Dr. Ansolabehere’s 2009 paper represents any sort of academic consensus about the impact of voter ID laws.
Turning from national studies to state-specific data, Texas next focuses on the experiences of Indiana and Georgia—two states that recently implemented photo ID laws. Relying on expert testimony from University of Texas political scientist Daron Shaw, Texas argues that its population is demographically “similar to” Georgia’s and Indiana’s, and that these states’ experiences with photo ID requirements suggest that SB 14 will have “no significant effect at all” on turnout in Texas. Texas Proposed Findings, ECF No. 202 at 9. At trial, Dr. Shaw testified that survey data from the 2008 Presidential primaries showed that virtually no Georgia or Indiana voters reported being turned away from the polls because of a lack of photo ID. Trial Tr. 7/11/2012 (AM) 24:6-19. Moreover, this finding remained constant across racial lines: in Indiana “0 percent of whites, 0 percent of blacks, 0 percent of Hispanics report that they were not allowed to vote”; in Georgia, “0 percent of whites, 1 percent of blacks, 0 percent of Hispanics said they were not allowed to vote” because they lacked photo ID. Id. 25:2-7. These figures were particularly notable, Dr. Shaw emphasized, because social scientists had previously concluded that “there were [disparate ID] possession rates by race” in both Georgia and Indiana. Id. 25:1718. From this, Texas urges us to draw three conclusions: (1) photo ID laws ultimately prevent
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very few people from voting; (2) photo ID laws have no disproportionate effect on racial minorities; and (3) disparate ID possession rates have little effect on turnout. We reject these proposed findings because the circumstances in Georgia and Indiana are significantly different from those in Texas.
First, and most important, SB 14 is far stricter than either Indiana’s or Georgia’s voter ID laws. Indiana allows voters to use any photo ID that has “expired after the date of the most recent general election.” Ind. Code Ann. § 3-5-2-40.5(a)(3). Georgia allows voters to present any expired driver’s license at the polls. Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-417(a)(1); see also Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia Voter Identification Requirements, available online at http://sos.georgia.gov/Gaphotoid/ (last visited August 28, 2012) (listing as “acceptable” voter ID “[a] Georgia Driver’s License, even if expired”). By contrast, SB 14 prohibits the use of an ID which has expired “more than 60 days before the date of presentation” at the polls. Tex. Elec. Code § 63.0101 (January 1, 2012).
Moreover, the burdens associated with obtaining a purportedly “free” voter ID card will be heavier under SB 14 than under either Indiana or Georgia law. This is true for at least two reasons. The first relates to out-of-pocket cost. Under SB 14, EIC applicants will have to present DPS officials with a government-issued form of ID, the cheapest of which, a certified copy of a birth certificate, costs $22. By contrast, Georgia residents may present a wide range of documents to obtain a voter ID card, including a student ID, paycheck stub, Medicare or Medicaid statement, or certified school transcript. See Ga. Elec. Code § 183-1-20-.01. The diverse range of documents accepted by Georgia (24 categories in all) means that few voters are likely to incur out-of-pocket costs to obtain a voter ID. And although Indiana law, like SB 14, requires voters to present a government-issued document (such as a birth certificate) to obtain a
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“free” photo ID, in Indiana the “fee for obtaining a copy of one’s birth certificate” is significantly lower than in Texas, ranging from $3 to $12, depending on the county. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198 n.17.
The second cost SB 14 will impose on EIC applicants is the burden associated with traveling to a DPS office. The United States submitted unrebutted evidence showing that “81 Texas counties have no [DPS] office, and 34 additional counties have [DPS] offices open two days per week or less.” Proposed Findings of Fact by Eric Himpton Holder, Jr. (“U.S. Proposed Findings”) Doc. 223 at 6, see also Am. Compl., ECF No. 25 Ex. 7 at 4. This means that in at least one-third of Texas’s counties, would-be voters will have to travel out-of-county merely to apply for an EIC. Georgia and Indiana voters face no such burdens. Indeed, Georgia law requires each county to “provide at least one place in the county at which it shall accept applications for and issue [free] Georgia voter identification cards.” Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-417.1(a). Similarly, every Indiana county has a BMV office that is required by law to disperse “free” photo IDs. See Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Branch Locations and Hours, available online at http://www.in.gov/bmv/2337.htm (last visited August 28, 2012).
Given all this, we have little trouble finding that SB 14 will be far more burdensome than either Indiana’s or Georgia’s voter ID laws. And because the laws are so different, we place very little stock in Dr. Shaw’s comparisons among these three states.
We briefly note two additional, independent reasons to reject Dr. Shaw’s conclusions. First, Dr. Shaw’s expert report concludes that “Indiana and Georgia provide . . . relevant comparisons” to Texas because both states, like Texas “have substantial minority populations.” TA 931. But these minority populations are different. As Dr. Shaw himself notes, although Indiana and Georgia both have “a sizable black population,” neither state has “Hispanic
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populations on the order of those in Texas.” Id. at n.3. Of course, different minority groups have different cultural and historical experiences, and may accordingly be affected differently by similar laws. Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized the unique position of Texas’s Hispanic community, explaining that the “political, social, and economic legacy of past discrimination for Latinos in Texas may well hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process.” LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). We thus find it completely inappropriate to compare Hispanics in Texas with African Americans in Indiana or Georgia.
Second, Dr. Shaw failed to conduct any further demographic comparisons among the three states. For example, nothing in Dr. Shaw’s expert report or in his trial testimony speaks to poverty rates in Indiana or Georgia, much less whether such poverty rates break down along racial lines. As we explain below, record evidence in this case demonstrates that poverty rates in Texas do in fact break down along racial lines. Thus, without more, we have no basis for concluding that Indiana and Georgia are “relevant comparisons” to Texas. TA 931.
Finally, and quite apart from the methodological flaws in Dr. Shaw’s study, his conclusion that voter ID laws do not depress voter turnout suffers from an additional weakness. Although Dr. Shaw’s expert report suggests that very few voters in Indiana and Georgia were turned away at the polls, his report does indicate that photo ID laws might dissuade some voters from attempting to cast a ballot in the first place. In the 2008 survey of Indiana voters relied upon by Dr. Shaw, 7% of eligible voters who failed to vote gave “I did not have the correct form of identification” as at least one of their reasons for not voting. See TA 933. (By way of comparison, only 2% of Texas non-voters in 2008 gave that answer. Id.). Asked about this statistic at trial, Dr. Shaw testified only that “it’s not clear to me how to treat” this response. Trial
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Tr. 7/11/2012 (AM) 107:15-16. “[F]or instance,” Dr. Shaw testified, “if someone says I wasn’t registered to vote, and then says [as an additional reason], and I lacked proper identification, it’s not clear to me how to treat those as a cumulative estimate of the effect of photo ID.” Id. 107:1720. We take this point, but reiterate once again that Texas has the burden of proof, and if Indiana’s voter ID law might have discouraged up to 7% of eligible non-voters from even going to the polls, we cannot accept Texas’s proposed finding that “generally . . . photo ID laws do not decrease voter turnout.” Texas Proposed Findings, ECF No. 202 at 7.
B. We turn next to Texas’s second major line of evidence: ID possession rates. Relying largely on telephone surveys of voters, Texas contends that Hispanics, African Americans, and whites in Texas all possess photo ID at roughly the same rates and that SB 14 will thus impose equal burdens on all voters. In response, the United States argues that Texas’s studies are defective. It further offers a study of its own, which it claims shows that Hispanic and African American registered voters are in fact nearly twice as likely as white registered voters to lack photo ID. This discussion proceeds in four parts. In subsection 1 we describe Texas’s first survey, which allegedly shows no racial disparity in ID possession rates. In subsection 2 we summarize the United States’s study of ID possession rates, not just because the United States offers it as affirmative evidence, but also because Texas uses the study as a starting point for its second set of surveys, which, in turn, we discuss in subsection 3. Finally, in subsection 4 we address an analysis submitted by Defendant-Intervenors. For reasons explained in detail below, we find none of these studies reliable.
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1. The first relevant attempt to determine the number of Texas voters who lack photo ID came in January 2012 when Texas submitted to the Attorney General a computer-generated list of 795,955 voters it was unable to “match” with entries in the DPS ID database. As mentioned earlier, supra Part I, this “no-match” list provided a partial basis for the Attorney General’s denial of preclearance because it suggested that “Hispanic registered voters are more than twice as likely as non-Hispanic registered voters to lack” a DPS-issued driver’s license or ID card. Am. Compl., ECF No. 25 Ex. 7 at 2. After the Attorney General denied preclearance, Texas retained Dr. Shaw (the University of Texas political science professor) to survey the individuals on the January no-match list and determine whether they actually lacked valid photo ID. Contacted by telephone, survey respondents were asked questions about their race, whether they were registered to vote, whether they possessed any form of identification required by SB 14, and whether they were disabled. TA 937. Because “certain kinds of people—those of higher socio-economic status, especially— are more likely to actually respond to poll-takers,” Dr. Shaw “weighted” his results. TA 937 & n.5. “Weighting” involves applying a statistical formula to the final data to correct for “response bias.” As Dr. Shaw explained, “Weighting allows groups who are less likely to respond to pollsters to be properly represented in the poll.” TA 937 n.5. In relevant part, Dr. Shaw’s report concluded that, contrary to the Attorney General’s conclusions, Hispanic respondents lacked “any form of identification necessary for voting” at “the same rate as for white respondents,” i.e. “5% of the time (un-weighted), or 6% of the time (weighted).” TA 940. Dr. Shaw further reported that just over 9% of African Americans in the
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general sample (18 of 196 voters) “do not have an acceptable form of voter ID as per SB 14.” TA 941. Seeking to minimize the disparity between white and African American ID possession rates, Dr. Shaw noted that
[t]en of those 18 are over 65 years of age, however, and thus qualify for absentee ballots. And another four of the remaining eight self-identify as disabled, and thus also qualify for absentee ballots. In short, four out of 196 African Americans [or approximately 2%] reputedly ‘at risk’ due to Texas’s new voter ID law could potentially be affected by SB 14. TA 941. Based in part on Dr. Shaw’s survey results, Texas argues that “SB 14’s photo identification requirement will not have a disparate impact on Hispanic or African-American voters in Texas.” Texas Proposed Findings, ECF No. 202 at 13. The reliability of Dr. Shaw’s study, however, is seriously undermined by his surveys’ extraordinarily low response rates. Just over 2% of the individuals Dr. Shaw attempted to contact ultimately responded to his questions. TA 967-68. As explained in greater detail in Part III.B.3, infra, uncontested record evidence suggests that such low response rates render telephone surveys scientifically invalid. We thus find that Dr. Shaw’s survey of those on the January nomatch list is methodologically unsound and therefore unreliable. Dr. Shaw’s study suffers from at least one additional defect. At first blush, his survey suggests that African Americans in Texas are disproportionately likely to lack photo ID: over 9% of African American respondents reported lacking ID, compared to 5-6% of the general population. In fact, the actual disparity may be even larger since Dr. Shaw reported only unweighted numbers—not the weighted percentage—for African Americans. In response to this disparity, Dr. Shaw attempted to reduce the African American figure by removing disabled people and those over 65. But disabled voters and those over 65 will not be “exempt” from SB 14. Although they will be able to vote by mail without a photo ID, SB 14 imposes obligations on
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such voters who choose to vote in-person. Specifically, voters over the age of 65 who want to vote in person will have to present acceptable photo ID. And disabled voters who wish to identify themselves using their pictureless voter ID certificate will first have to obtain written documentation of disability from either the Social Security Administration or the Department of Veterans Affairs. Tex. Elec. Code § 13.002(i). Moreover, although Dr. Shaw removed these voters from the pool of African American voters, he failed to perform any similar reductions for the Hispanic or general samples, thus making cross-racial comparisons impossible. Dr. Shaw’s selective reduction was therefore both inappropriate and methodologically unsound.
2. The second data set at issue is a computer-generated “no-match” list compiled in May, 2012 by the United States’s expert, Harvard political scientist Stephen Ansolabehere. Much like Texas’s January no-match list, Dr. Ansolabehere’s list attempts to show the number of Texas voters who lack state-issued photo ID. Dr. Ansolabehere compiled his list by cross-referencing Texas’s voter registry with (1) the DPS ID database (which contains both state-issued driver’s licenses and personal ID cards), and (2) Texas’s license-to-carry database. Prior to cross-referencing these databases, Dr. Ansolabehere “cleaned” the driver’s license and license-to-carry-databases to remove duplicative and immaterial entries. Specifically, Dr. Ansolabehere removed from these databases all entries with identical social security numbers. He also removed records for driver’s licenses that were either expired or belonged to somebody marked “deceased.” U.S. Ex. 544 11-13. As Dr. Ansolabehere explained: [Driver’s license] records that correspond to deceased persons, expired licenses, and other cases may very well match to individuals on the [voter registry]. They should not be considered valid matches as they are not valid voters or do not have a valid state
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identification for purposes of voter identification. Keeping these cases in the matching process would create false positives in the match and lead to “too many" matches. Id. at 13. Dr. Ansolabehere also performed a parallel “cleaning” of the voter registry list to remove duplicate entries, although (and we shall say more about this later) he failed to remove voters who had been designated “deceased.” Id. at 11-12.
Dr. Ansolabehere then began constructing his no-match list. He defined a “matched” voter—i.e., a voter who presumably possesses state-issued ID—as “any [voter] on the Voter Registration database with the same identifying information . . . on the Drivers’ License or License to Carry Database.” Id. at 5. “Same identifying information,” for the purposes of Dr. Ansolabehere’s study, constituted one of two things: a full 9-digit social security number match; or an identical first name, last name, and date of birth. Id. at 15.
Through this process, Dr. Ansolabehere constructed a no-match list consisting of nearly 1.9 million voters who apparently lacked Texas-issued photo ID. Almost 20% of these nomatches were marked by Dr. Ansolabehere as “ambiguous.” This meant one of two things. First, the no-match could be a voter with a very common name who had been matched to a state ID but without “high probabilities of certainty.” Id. (The State of Texas, for example, could well contain multiple people named “Michael Jones” born on January 6, 1981, so it would be unclear whether a “match” would be for the right Michael Jones). Second, the no-match could be a voter with a driver’s license marked “Not Eligible” to drive. As Dr. Ansolabehere noted, it is “unclear” how the “Not Eligible” notation “affects the validity of the identification for purposes of voting” under SB 14. Id. at 14.
Because Texas does not track voters by race, Dr. Ansolabehere cross-referenced his nomatch list with a database provided by Catalist, LLC. A private vendor specializing in voter registration data, Catalist attempts to determine voters’ race by applying a predictive algorithm
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that uses “name dictionaries and residential area information.” Id. at 6, 8. As Dr. Ansolabehere explains in his expert report:
A name dictionary would identify someone named Greg Jones as 60% likely to be White based on the frequency with which that name is used in the population. Someone named Greg Bernard Jones who lives in an area that is 31% Black has an 83% probability of being Black. The combination of name information and local area information, then, sharpens the algorithm for identifying race considerably. Id. at 8. After cross-referencing his no-match list with Catalist’s database, and thus assigning a racial classification to every individual on the no-match list, Dr. Ansolabehere reached two conclusions: 1) If ambiguous cases are treated as no-matches, 20.71% of registered African American voters, 17.49% of registered Hispanic voters, and 10.85% of registered white voters cannot be matched with IDs in the Texas databases; 2) If ambiguous cases are treated as matches, 15.97% of registered African American voters, 14.32% of registered Hispanic voters, and 9.65% of registered white voters cannot be matched with IDs in the Texas databases. Id. at 31. In either event, the United States contends, Dr. Ansolabehere’s data conclusively shows that registered African American and Hispanic voters in Texas are disproportionately likely to lack photo ID. For several reasons, we find that Dr. Ansolabehere’s study cannot support this conclusion. First, Dr. Ansolabehere’s study, even were it methodologically flawless, is of limited value because it fails to examine all SB 14-qualifying ID. Recall that SB 14 permits in-person voters to present one of five types of photo ID. Two are issued by the state: a DPS-issued driver’s license or ID card, or a license to carry a concealed handgun. Three are issued by the
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federal government: a passport, military ID, or citizenship certificate with photograph. Tex. Elec. Code § 63.0101 (January 1, 2012). Yet Dr. Ansolabehere limited his study to the two state forms of ID. This limitation is significant because the United States relies on Dr. Ansolabehere’s study to support its broad conclusion that there exists “a substantial racial disparity in the possession of identification required by SB 14.” U.S. Proposed Findings, ECF No. 223 at 11 (emphasis added, some capitalization altered). But for this to be true, Dr. Ansolabehere’s study would have to have considered all forms of “identification required by SB 14,” not just the two state-issued qualifying forms. Yet despite the fact that Dr. Ansolabehere was retained by the United States and expressly asked for access to the databases regarding the three forms of federal ID, Trial Tr. 7/12/2012 (AM) 98:13-21, his expert report states that “[n]o federal lists were provided to me for the sake of this analysis,” U.S. Ex. 544 at 9-10. Unless the United States is able to present a full picture of precisely who lacks any form of SB 14-approved ID, it has no basis for asking us to affirmatively find that SB 14 will discriminate against anyone—at least not on the basis of disparate ID possession rates.
The failure to analyze federal data is not the only problem with Dr. Ansolabehere’s study. It is also plagued by several methodological flaws that make it impossible to rely on it even for the more limited proposition that there exists a racial disparity in the possession of state-issued ID. First, concerned that his algorithm might result in “ ‘too many’ matches,” Dr. Ansolabehere “cleaned” the DPS database by removing 779,918 deceased drivers prior to creating his nomatch list. U.S. Ex. 544 at 13. But Dr. Ansolabehere failed to remove nearly 50,000 of those exact same individuals from the voter rolls, thus virtually ensuring that these deceased voters would be included on the no-match list. We can think of no good reason for their inclusion. After all, Lyndon Johnson’s 1948 Senate race notwithstanding, the dead cannot vote in Texas. See
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Robert Caro, Means to an Ascent 329 (First Vintage Books 1991). True, nothing in the record suggests that the dead voters on Dr. Ansolabehere’s no-match list were disproportionately minorities. But his failure to remove them means, at the very least, that his no-match list overstates SB 14’s effect.
Second, we have serious doubts as to whether Catalist’s algorithm accurately identified the racial composition of voters in this case. Although Dr. Ansolabehere’s expert report states that Catalist is an industry leader in “identifying races based on names and Census data,” placed second in a “Multi-Cultural Name Matching Challenge,” and has been used in several academic studies, U.S. Ex. 544 at 8-9, the record contains no direct evidence as to the accuracy of Catalist’s algorithm. To the contrary, record evidence suggests—albeit not conclusively—that Catalist’s error rate in this case may be quite high. When cross-examining Dr. Ansolabehere, Texas’s counsel demonstrated anecdotally that a number of voters on his no-match list do, in fact, possess state-issued photo ID, and further showed that the race listed on many of those voters’ IDs differed from Catalist’s racial classification. See Trial Tr. 7/12/2012 (PM) 57:2458:5; 83:4-21; 84:11-85:7. Moreover, when Texas’s expert Dr. Shaw conducted a follow-up survey of voters on Dr. Ansolabehere’s no-match list, only 68% of respondents identified as “black” by Catalist actually self-identified as “black.” TA 973. As discussed in more detail below, see infra Section III.B.3, we have serious qualms about the methodological rigor of Dr. Shaw’s surveys and so cannot conclude that this 68% figure is accurate. Nevertheless, this number raises a red flag. In litigation like this, which depends largely on accurate racial classification, even the possibility that 32% of those classifications are wrong is simply too high.
Finally, at trial Texas demonstrated how Dr. Ansolabehere’s name matching algorithm, which requires an exact match, could lead to a number of false no-matches. For example, under
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Dr. Ansolabehere’s algorithm, a “Bob Thomas” on the voter registry cannot be matched with an ID for “Robert Thomas.” Nor can Juan Gonzalez be matched with Juan Gonzales. And any woman who changes her last name at marriage is a no-match if her voter registration remains in her maiden name. Importantly, however, SB 14 will permit voters to cast a ballot if the “name on the documentation is substantially similar to . . . the name on the list.” Tex. Elec. Code § 63.001 (January 1, 2012) (emphasis added). Given this, Dr. Ansolabehere’s failure to match voters to state-issued IDs with “substantially similar” names undermines his conclusions. This is especially true given that English spellings of Spanish names often vary slightly (Gonzalez vs. Gonzales; Delacruz vs. De la Cruz)—which, in this context, would lead to a disproportionate number of no-matches for Hispanics. And notably, some of these false no-matches could probably have been eliminated. Dr. Ansolabehere testified that it is possible to employ a “fuzzy matching” subroutine, “where you take a list of potential nicknames and so forth and try to match on the basis of those, or initials and things like that.” Trial Tr. 7/12/2012 (PM) 50:18-21.
To sum up, Dr. Ansolabehere’s study excludes federal forms of ID and uses an uncertain racial classification algorithm. Moreover, his no-match list is inflated: it includes both deceased voters and voters who may have ID under a “substantially similar” name. We therefore find Dr. Ansolabehere’s study unreliable.
3. Texas’s final study of ID possession rates rests on yet another set of telephone surveys undertaken by Dr. Shaw. Following the submission of Dr. Ansolabehere’s expert report, Texas retained Dr. Shaw to perform a second set of surveys—this time of the individuals on Dr. Ansolabehere’s no-match list. Dr. Shaw conducted three surveys: (1) a general sample of 1,000
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individuals from the no-match list; (2) a sample of 600 individuals Catalist identified as African American; and (3) a sample of 600 individuals Catalist identified as Hispanic. TA 973. As in Dr. Shaw’s first survey, respondents were asked whether they possessed any form of ID required by SB 14—both state and federal—as well as questions about their race, voting habits, disability status, and opinions on voter ID laws. TA 978-82.
Although Dr. Shaw’s second round of surveys resembled his first, two methodological features are worth highlighting. First, as mentioned above, Dr. Shaw concluded that Catalist’s racial identification algorithm was largely inaccurate. TA 973. As a result, Dr. Shaw categorized respondents based on their self-identified race—i.e., how they answered the question “[w]hat would you say is your main race?”—rather than how they were classified by Catalist. Id.; see also TA 981. Second, unlike in his first study, Dr. Shaw “did not report weighted survey results” to the court, although he testified that he “[had] in fact, weighted” his results on his own. Trial Tr. 7/11/2012 (AM) 81:19-22.
Based on this second round of surveys, Dr. Shaw concluded that “there is no statistically significant difference in ID possession rates amongst whites, blacks, and Hispanics when the appropriate universe of ID types is accounted for.” TA 976-77. Specifically, Dr. Shaw reported that in his general sample, 9.38% of whites lacked any of the forms of ID listed in SB 14, compared with 9.30% of African Americans, and 6.18% of Hispanics. TA 976. Asking about federal forms of ID apparently made a difference: Dr. Shaw reported that “amongst Hispanics, possession of a valid passport or citizenship certificate is higher than that for the Anglo population.” TA 975. Overall, though, Dr. Shaw testified that in the general sample, race-based “difference between these rates of [ID] possession” is statistically insignificant. Trial Tr. 7/11/2012 (AM) 35:21-36:2. Moreover, Dr. Shaw noted that “[i]f we rely on data from the
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Hispanic and black surveys (respectively), 6.72% of Hispanics and 7.64% of blacks do not possess one or more of the photo IDs identified in SB 14.” TA 976. Both of these rates are lower than the percentage of whites who reported lacking ID in the general sample. Id.
Again, however, Dr. Shaw’s surveys were plagued by low response rates. His survey of the general sample from Dr. Ansolabehere’s list had a response rate of only 2.0%, meaning that just one out of every 50 voters he attempted to reach actually answered his questions. TA 983. Response rates for the African American and Hispanic surveys were hardly any better—just 2.5% and 2.1%, respectively. TA 984-85. Significantly, Dr. Shaw conceded that he had never obtained such low response rates during any of the live interview telephone surveys he conducted over the course of his career. Trial Tr. 7/11/2012 (AM) 71:21-25. A low response rate, he testified, is “always a concern for surveys.” Id. at 44:6. Dr. Shaw explained:
There’s always the possibility that the people you contacted are systematically different from the people you couldn’t contact either because you couldn’t reach them or because you reached them and they didn’t want to participate in the survey. This is broadly referred to as non-response bias. Id. 44:1-5. In other words, a low response rate increases the probability that the people who actually responded are in some relevant way different than the target population. This is hardly an ancillary concern. After all, the entire point of a telephone survey in this context is to obtain a representative sample of a target population.
Here, Dr. Shaw’s concerns are well justified. Response rates of 2.0, 2.1, and 2.5% fall far short of anything deemed acceptable in the polling industry. True, as Dr. Shaw testified, the Pew Research Center recently concluded that telephone surveys with response rates as low as 9% may be deemed reliable in some circumstances. See Pew Research Center, Assessing the Representativeness of Public Opinion Surveys, (May 15, 2012) at 8-10, available online at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Assessing%20the%20Representativeness%20of%
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20Public%20Opinion%20Surveys.pdf (“Pew Study”) (last visited August 28, 2012). But a 9% response rate, while low, is far higher than the response rates obtained by Dr. Shaw—4.5 times the rates he achieved for the general sample. Moreover, the Pew study, the validity of which is unquestioned by Texas, sets the industry floor: neither Dr. Shaw nor any other witness cited a single study that suggests that a response rate any lower than 9% is satisfactory. To the contrary, Dr. David Marker, a statistician who performs surveys for the federal government, testified that a 2% response rate is “exceedingly low,” and “out of bounds with the surveys that are requested and used by the government.” Trial Tr. 7/11/2012 (PM) 108:6-8. Dr. Marker further testified that “I don’t believe a two percent survey can provide statistically valid estimates,” id. 116:5-6, because such estimates “will not at all reflect the underlying true overall population estimates that you’re trying to understand.” Id. 108:21-23. The results of surveys with such low response rates, Dr. Marker bluntly concluded, are “really irrelevant.” Id. 108:20-21. Thus, taking our cues from the polling industry itself, we have little trouble finding that Dr. Shaw’s response rates fall well short of acceptable.
In any event, even had Dr. Shaw obtained an adequate response rate, his survey would still lack certain hallmarks of reliability. The 2012 Pew study, for example, concluded that “telephone surveys that [1] include landlines and cell phones and [2] are weighted to match the demographic composition of the population . . . provide accurate data.” Pew Study at 1 (emphasis added); see also Trial Tr. 7/11/2012 (PM) 113:21-22 (Dr. Marker testifying as to the fact that the Pew study “uses cell phones and land lines”). Dr. Shaw himself testified that these are “protocols that Pew assumes and that need to be in place in order to get that sort of quality.” Trial Tr. 7/11/2012 (AM) 127:10-11 (emphasis added). Despite this, Dr. Shaw failed to include any cell phone numbers; instead, he contacted only individuals with landline phones. Id. 127:12-
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17. Nor did Dr. Shaw produce any “weighted results of the survey to the Court.” Id. 127:24-25. Given that these “protocols . . . need to be in place” to ensure quality, Dr. Shaw’s failure to abide by them further undermines the validity of his surveys. Id. 71:21-25 (emphasis added).
At trial, Dr. Shaw sought to assure us that his weighted surveys, had they been submitted as evidence, would “look[] much the same” as the non-weighted surveys. Id. 130:20. Dr. Shaw testified that his survey found that groups that are harder to contact—“younger groups . . . people with lower income, et cetera”—tend to possess ID at the same rate as easier-to-contact groups. Id. 40:20-41:1. Thus, Dr. Shaw testified, weighting for age or socioeconomic status “simply would have replaced a group with 90 percent identification rates with another group with 90 percent identification rates.” Id. 40:23-25. As Dr. Shaw put it:
[I]n that sense the discussion, the conversation about response rates . . . w hile it’s important and while it’s interesting, I mean, ultimately the proof is in the pudding. . . . .[I]f we were to [weight], what you’re going to find is no c hange. I mean, these are 90 percent possession rates. The 90 percent possession rates, self-professed possession rates occur across a lot of different groups. Id. 130:21-131:5.
This point merits two responses. First, we are unable to accept Dr. Shaw’s vague representations about weighted data—representations that were not presented to the court and subjected to cross-examination. Second, even if ID possession rates are broadly the same across different age and socioeconomic groups, Dr. Shaw still has no basis for concluding that he obtained a representative sample within those groups. As Dr. Marker explained:
[Weighting] only goes so far. The issue is, are the young people who responded, the two percent, are they like all of the other young people? Are the elderly who responded like the elderly who didn't? Are the blacks who responded like the typical blacks? And that doesn't get help by weighting. Trial Tr. 7/11/2012 (PM) 112:22-113:1.
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To take but one example of this point, Dr. Shaw surveyed only people with landline phones. And though it may be true that 18-to-29-year-old landline users have photo ID at the same rates as other landline users, it may also be true that 18-to-29-year-olds who use only cell phones are disproportionately likely to lack photo ID. For that matter, it may be that 65-to-80year-old Hispanic women who use only cell phones are also disproportionately likely to lack photo ID. Because Dr. Shaw declined to survey these individuals, he simply has no way of knowing.
One final note. The Pew study concluded that “[o]ne significant area of potential nonresponse bias . . . is that survey participants tend to be significantly more engaged in civic activity than those who do not participate.” Pew Study at 2. Notably, this is true even at the 9% response level deemed acceptable by Pew. See id. It thus seems probable that, as the Pew report suggests, the voters who responded to Dr. Shaw’s survey were “significantly more” civically engaged than the general population. And it may also be that civically engaged voters of all races and income levels are significantly more likely to report possession of state-issued photo ID. This might be because the civically engaged are more likely to travel internationally (and thus have a passport); volunteer in their community (which often requires a car and driver’s license); or simply renew their existing ID on time. Or it could be, as Dr. Shaw suggested at trial, that those who care about what their neighbors think “would be embarrassed to say they don’t have a driver’s license,” even if they actually lack one. Trial Tr. 7/11/2012 (AM) 111:18-19.
True, all of this is speculative and uncertain. But that is precisely the point. We cannot tell from Dr. Shaw’s surveys precisely who he contacted, if they were representative of the target population, and whether their answers were skewed. As Dr. Shaw himself testified, this is the inherent danger in low response rates. See id. 44:1-5. Because Dr. Shaw failed to achieve a
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minimally acceptable response rate and to apply the polling industry’s standard practices, we find his study unreliable.
4. Defendant-Intervenors point out that, effective January 1, 2004, Texas’s voter registration form includes a field where voters are asked to write down their driver’s license or personal ID number. Texas Elec. Code § 13.002(c)(8)(A). “[I]f the applicant has not been issued [such] a number,” the applicant instead must provide “the last four digits of the applicant’s social security number.” Id. § 13.002(c)(8)(B). If the applicant lacks a driver’s license number, personal ID number, and a social security number, the applicant then must include “a statement . . . that the applicant has not been issued [any such] number.” Id. at § 13.002(c)(8)(C). According to the record, 56.4% of Texas voters were registered on or after January 1, 2004, and those registered voters were thus required to use this voter registration form. Trial Tr. 7/13/2012 106:20-107:1-3. As Defendant-Intervenors point out, 9.7% of those voters with Spanish surnames failed to provide a driver’s license or personal ID number on their registration form, compared with 7.5% of the general population. Id. 107:21-108:1. Relying on this “very substantial facial difference,” Defendant-Intervenors argue that Hispanic voters in Texas disproportionately lack photo ID. Id. 108:1. We cannot infer from this data anything of the sort. The first problem is the same one that plagued Dr. Ansolabehere’s no-match list: voters who lack a driver’s license or personal ID card may nonetheless possess one of the three federal forms of identification acceptable under SB 14. Indeed, Defendant-Intervenors’ dataset is even more limited than Dr. Ansolabehere’s. For all its problems, at least Dr. Ansolabehere’s no-match list purported to cover the entire voter registry. By contrast, Defendant-Intervenors’ data covers
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just 56.4% of Texas voters. Furthermore, unlike Dr. Ansolabehere’s study, DefendantIntervenors’ data fails to reflect the possibility that a voter may possess a license to carry a handgun.
In any event, faced with a registration form requesting either an 8-digit driver’s license/personal ID number or the last four digits of a social security number, even voters who possess a driver’s license may opt to provide a social security number. After all, four digits are easier to write than eight. Furthermore, many voters likely memorize their social security number but not their driver’s license number. Thus, what voters write on their registration form is barely probative of whether they actually possess a state-issued ID card—much less whether they possess any SB-14 approved form of ID.
C. We pause to summarize the evidentiary findings we have made so far. Contrary to Texas’s contentions, nothing in existing social science literature speaks conclusively to the effect of photo ID requirements on voter turnout. Moreover, scant lessons, if any, can be drawn from Indiana and Georgia, largely because SB 14 is more restrictive than the photo ID laws adopted by either of those states. Finally, no party has submitted reliable evidence as to the number of Texas voters who lack photo ID, much less the rate of ID possession among different racial groups. Given this, we could end our inquiry here. Texas bears the burden of proving that nothing in SB 14 “would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. Because all of Texas’s
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evidence on retrogression is some combination of invalid, irrelevant, and unreliable, we have little trouble concluding that Texas has failed to carry its burden.
Significantly, however, this case does not hinge merely on Texas’s failure to “prove a negative.” See Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, record evidence suggests that SB 14, if implemented, would in fact have a retrogressive effect on Hispanic and African American voters. This conclusion flows from three basic facts: (1) a substantial subgroup of Texas voters, many of whom are African American or Hispanic, lack photo ID; (2) the burdens associated with obtaining ID will weigh most heavily on the poor; and (3) racial minorities in Texas are disproportionately likely to live in poverty. Accordingly, SB 14 will likely “lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
The first of these facts—that there exists a subgroup of registered voters, including minorities, who lack SB 14-approved photo ID—is undisputed by Texas and finds support in its own expert’s study. Although we are unable to conclude that the individuals Dr. Shaw surveyed were representative of the target population, he did find—and this finding is unaffected by the flaws in his study—a subset of Texas voters who have none of the SB 14-qualifying IDs, neither state nor federal. Moreover, as Dr. Shaw testified, his surveys revealed that the race-based “difference between these rates of [ID] possession” is statistically insignificant. Trial Tr. 7/11/2012 (AM) 35:21-36:2. Citing Dr. Shaw’s surveys, Texas itself urges us to conclude that “there is no racial or ethnic disparity among the group of registered voters who currently lack a photo ID and would be required to obtain one under SB 14.” Texas Proposed Findings, ECF No. 202 at 19 (emphasis added). And during closing arguments, Texas’s counsel conceded that “[t]he record does tell us that there is a subset of registered voters who lack the ID,” and that “there’s a
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significant percentage of . . . minorities and Anglos who don’t have SB 14 qualifying IDs.” See Trial Tr. 7/13/2012 (AM) 24:3-6, 25:2-6. Thus, based on Texas’s own evidence, we find that there is a subset of Texas voters who lack SB 14-approved ID—again, both state and federal— and that, at minimum, racial minorities are proportionately represented within this subgroup.
Equally uncontested is the proposition that, for members of this subgroup to cast a regular in-person ballot under SB 14, they will have to obtain an acceptable form of photo ID, and that the cheapest option is an EIC. In order to obtain an EIC, would-be voters will need to present one of several underlying documents, and as Texas concedes, the least expensive option for most prospective voters who lack supporting identification will be a certified copy of their birth certificate—which costs at least $22. See Advisory Regarding Election Identification Certificates, ECF No. 308 at 2.
But this is not all. Recall that would-be voters will need to apply for an EIC at a DPS office, and that almost one-third of Texas’s counties (81 of 254) lack one. Supra Part I at 7. This means that many would-be voters who need to obtain an EIC—individuals who by definition have no valid driver’s license—will have to find some way to travel long distances to obtain one. This is hardly an insignificant concern, especially given that “everything is bigger in Texas.” See, e.g., Rick Perry, Amid a Dim National Economy Texas Remains in the Spotlight, October 31, 2008, available at http://www.tradeandindustrydev.com/region/texas/amid-a-dim-nationaleconomy-texas-remains-spotlight-554 (last visited August 28, 2012).
Reinforcing this proposition, Texas Representative Trey Martinez Fischer, who represents a district which includes the city of San Antonio and its outskirts, testified that “you will not find a DPS office from downtown San Antonio to the western boundary, which is heavily concentrated with African-Americans, and particularly Hispanics.” Trial Tr. 7/10/2012
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(AM) 119:23-25. State Senator Carlos Uresti echoed this concern, testifying that in his district— which is “70 percent Hispanic, about 5 percent African American”—“[t]here are some towns . . . where the nearest DPS office is about a 100 to 125 mile[] one way” trip away. Trial Tr. 7/12/2012 (AM) 7:16-8:1. And far from disputing the long travel times imposed by the dearth of DPS offices, Texas’s counsel told us that “I don’t think that the facts of the geographic distances [between DPS offices] are necessarily contested.” Trial Tr. 7/13/2012 52:4-5.
Of course, we remain cognizant of the Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford that “for most voters . . . the inconvenience of making a trip to the BMV . . . does not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198. But Crawford was a facial challenge, and this general principle yields when the closest office is 100 to 125 miles away. Even the most committed citizen, we think, would agree that a 200 to 250 mile round trip— especially for would-be voters having no driver’s license—constitutes a “substantial burden” on the right to vote. Our own Federal Rules of Civil Procedure support this conclusion, specifying that witnesses are unavailable to testify if they must travel more than 100 miles to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3).
Significantly, these burdens will fall most heavily on the poor. Like any fixed cost, the $22 (minimum) EIC applicants will have to pay to obtain prerequisite documentation weighs disproportionately on those living in poverty. Moreover, while a 200 to 250 mile trip to and from a DPS office would be a heavy burden for any prospective voter, such a journey would be especially daunting for the working poor. Poorer citizens, especially those working for hourly wages, will likely be less able to take time off work to travel to a DPS office—a problem exacerbated by the fact that wait times in DPS offices can be as long as three hours during busy months of the year. US Ex. 10 at 1. This concern is especially serious given that none of Texas’s
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DPS offices are open on weekends or past 6:00 PM, eliminating for many working people the option of obtaining an EIC on their own time. See U.S. Ex. 361. A law that forces poorer citizens to choose between their wages and their franchise unquestionably denies or abridges their right to vote. The same is true when a law imposes an implicit fee for the privilege of casting a ballot, like the $22 many would-be voters who lack the required underlying documentation will have to pay to obtain an EIC. “[W]ealth or fee paying has . . . no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.” Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.
To be sure, a section 5 case cannot turn on wealth alone. In Texas, however, the poor are disproportionately racial minorities. According to undisputed U.S. Census data, the poverty rate in Texas is 25.8% for Hispanics and 23.3% for African Americans, compared to just 8.8% for whites. Mot. to take Judicial Notice of Census Data, ECF No. 219 Ex. 4 at 7, 16. This means that the burdens of obtaining an EIC will almost certainly fall more heavily on minorities, a concern well recognized by those who work in minority communities. Lydia Camarillo, a Texas voter education specialist who has worked for over 35 years in the Hispanic community, testified that because “Latinos are often among the working poor[,] . . . Latinos struggling to afford groceries, rent, and child care may not be able to afford . . . a copy of a birth certificate in order to get a voter ID.” Defendant-Intervenors Ex. 9 at 224. Moreover, Camarillo testified, “[f]or working class Latinos, the requirement of travelling to the DPS during regular business hours may prevent them from obtaining ID because their work hours are not flexible.” Id.
Again, this is not all. Undisputed census data shows that in Texas, 13.1% of African Americans and 7.3% of Hispanics live in households without access to a motor vehicle, compared with only 3.8% of whites. Mot. to take Judicial Notice of Census Data, ECF No. 219
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Ex. 4 at 8, 17. If traveling over 200 miles constitutes a substantial burden on people without driver’s licenses who can nonetheless find a ride to a DPS office, supra at 47-48, imagine the burden for the predominantly minority population whose households lack access to any car at all. In fact, in some places it may be impossible to get to a DPS office without a car. State Senator Rodney Ellis testified that in his “inner city district” in Houston, DPS offices are not “easily accessible by public transportation.” Trial Tr. 7/11/2012 (PM) 34:8-12. If DPS offices are inaccessible by public transportation in Houston, Texas’s largest city, we seriously doubt their accessibility in rural areas—which, presumably, are less likely to have public transportation infrastructure. Unfortunately, we are left to wonder. Texas, which bears the burden of proof, submitted absolutely nothing to counter this testimony or to show whether its DPS offices are reachable via public transportation.
None of the burdens associated with obtaining an EIC has ever before been imposed on Texas voters. Based on the record evidence before us, it is virtually certain that these burdens will disproportionately affect racial minorities. Simply put, many Hispanics and African Americans who voted in the last election will, because of the burdens imposed by SB 14, likely be unable to vote in the next election. This is retrogression. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 324.
Significantly, Texas disputes none of the facts underlying this conclusion—not the $22 cost for a birth certificate, not the distance between DPS offices, not the poverty rates for minorities in Texas, not the disproportionate vehicle access rates. Instead, in a hodgepodge of arguments, Texas seeks to downplay SB 14’s impact, contending, in essence, that the law’s retrogressive effect will not be particularly severe. In addition, Texas insists that courts may not
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legally consider nonracial factors like poverty when determining whether a law warrants section 5 preclearance. We address each argument in turn.
In support of its assertion that the burdens imposed by SB 14 are less onerous than they may seem, Texas contends that because disabled voters and those over the age of 65 will be able to vote absentee, they are “[un]affected by SB 14’s photo ID requirement.” Texas Proposed Findings, ECF No. 202 at 18. Texas also points out that the $22 fee for a birth certificate will only affect voters who lack the underlying documentation needed for an EIC. And, the state assures us, Texans will not really mind traveling long distances to obtain an EIC. For “the people who choose to live in that part of Texas,” Texas’s counsel stated during closing arguments, “it’s just a reality of life that they have to drive long distances.” Trial Tr. 7/13/2012 52:16-18.
These arguments lack merit. To begin with, voters eligible for absentee ballots will not be “exempt” from SB 14. See supra at part III.B.1. Some voters over age 65 will undoubtedly prefer to cast their ballots at the polls—perhaps out of habit, a sense of civic pride, or simply because they wish to follow the news all the way up to Election Day before selecting a candidate. Reverend Peter Johnson, an African American clergyman and a leader in Texas’s civil rights community testified:
I have a group of African-American senior citizen women, they want to go to the voting polls and stand in line and vote at the voting polls. There’s a certain degree of dignity for them to do this . . . . Because these people appreciate this sacred right to vote, and they’re not going to vote absentee. Trial Tr. 7/11/2012 (PM) 6:1-9. If these “senior citizen women”—or any other voters over 65— wish to cast an in-person ballot, they will not be permitted to do so unless they can produce an SB 14-qualifying photo ID.
In any event, even if, as Texas asserts, this so-called “allowance” for elderly voters, together with SB 14’s special procedures for disabled voters, were to reduce the overall number
50

of people affected by the law, we have no reason to believe that they would mitigate SB 14’s disproportionate effect on racial minorities. To the contrary, at least with respect to voters over 65, record evidence indicates that any “benefit” will disproportionately accrue to white Texans. Undisputed census data shows that 19.4% of the white voting age population in Texas is over 65, compared to just 10.6% of African Americans and 8.7% of Hispanics. Defendant-Intervenors’ Ex. 118. This suggests that far more white voters than minorities will be eligible to cast absentee ballots. Texas offers nothing to counter this evidence, much less provides any reason to believe that SB 14’s absentee provisions will mitigate its retrogressive effect on minorities.
Texas’s failure to support its factual assertions dooms its other claims as well. If the state believes that only a few Texans lack certified copies of their birth certificate, it should have produced evidence to that effect. The same is true with respect to its claim that Texans are preternaturally unperturbed by the prospect of traveling 200 to 250 miles. And for either of these propositions to have been relevant to the issue before us, Texas would have to have provided evidence that they mitigate SB 14’s retrogressive effect on minority voters. Because Texas has offered no record evidence for either the truth of its contentions or their effect on racial minorities, we give no credence to this line of argument.
This brings us to Texas’s second—and primary—argument. Relying on the literal language of section 5, which prohibits states from “denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” or “because [a voter] is a member of a language minority group,” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c(a), 1973b(f)(2) (emphasis added), Texas argues:
The “effects” prong of section 5 does not extend to laws that merely have a disparate impact on the races. It allows courts to deny preclearance only if the effect of SB 14 is to deny or abridge the right to vote “on account of” race or color, or “because of” one’s membership in a language minority group.
51

Texas Proposed Findings, ECF No. 202 at 44. According to Texas, if SB 14 denies or abridges the right to vote at all, it does so “on account of” factors like poverty or lack of vehicular access. To be sure, these factors may correlate with racial minority status, but because disenfranchisement is proximately caused by something other than race, Texas contends, this court may not deny preclearance under section 5’s effect element. Indeed, Texas believes that its reading of section 5 is constitutionally compelled because “the Constitution does not allow . . . federal officials to deny preclearance to State laws that do not violate the Fifteenth Amendment”—i.e., that do not directly discriminate on the basis of race. Texas Proposed Findings, ECF No. 202 at 46. “At the very least,” Texas concludes, “Northwest Austin compels courts to construe section 5 to avoid this grave constitutional question absent specific and unambiguous statutory language to the contrary.” Id.
For several reasons, we find this argument entirely unpersuasive. To begin with, as explained above, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act precisely to prohibit election devices proximately based on something other than race—“notorious devices” such as “poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and property qualifications.” Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 853; see also Allen, 393 U.S. at 565 (holding that the purpose of the Voting Rights Act was to eliminate “the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race”). In fact, the very point of such devices was that they were supposedly “race neutral,” thus giving states an end-run around the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on racial discrimination in voting. Yet under Texas’s interpretation, section 5’s effect element could not have reached any of these laws. As Texas’s counsel stated, “certainly I’m not promoting a literacy test, but if the evidence was that it didn’t deny or abridge the right to vote on account of color and there was no racially discriminatory purpose . . . you
52

could have no violation under [section 5’s] standards.” Trial Tr. 7/13/2012 30:15-20. We cannot accept an interpretation of section 5 that would so severely constrain courts’ ability to block precisely the type of “evil” that the Voting Rights Act was meant to address. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328.
Moreover, Texas’s reading of section 5 collapses its effect element into its purpose element. After all, any law that would deny or abridge the right to vote directly on account of race—e.g., a law that disenfranchises African Americans because they are African Americans— would have been enacted with a discriminatory purpose. And, to be clear, this is the only type of law Texas thinks section 5’s effect element reaches, thus rendering the purpose and effect elements coterminous. But section 5 quite clearly has two separate and distinct requirements: covered states must prove that a change in voting procedures “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, “[w]e must have regard to all the words used by Congress, and as far as possible give effect to them.” United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 (2007) (quoting Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 475 (1911)). Interpreting “ purpose” and “effect” as synonymous would run afoul of this principle. The Supreme Court has said as much, emphasizing that “Congress plainly intended that a voting practice not be precleared unless both discriminatory purpose and effect are absent.” City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172 (1980) (first emphasis added).
Finally—and unsurprisingly given both the purpose of the Voting Rights Act and section 5’s plain text—Texas cites no authority for its novel reading of the statute. For decades, courts have applied the Supreme Court’s longstanding interpretation of section 5’s effect element,
53

requiring covered states to prove that none of their “voting-procedure changes . . . would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. Never has a court excused “retrogression in the position of racial minorities” because that retrogression was proximately caused by something other than race.
As we have indicated throughout this opinion, we are sensitive to the concerns raised in Northwest Austin. See supra Part I at 9-11, Part II at 19-23. But to hold, as Texas urges, that section 5 applies only to voting changes that themselves violate the Fifteenth Amendment would require us to ignore section 5’s purpose and structure, as well as decades of Supreme Court decisions interpreting its language. We see nothing in Northwest Austin that would permit, much less require, this “inferior” court to undertake such a dramatic departure from well-established law.
IV. To sum everything up: section 5 prohibits covered states from implementing voting laws that will have a retrogressive effect on racial minorities. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. Texas, seeking to implement its voter ID law, bears the burden of proof and must therefore show that SB 14 lacks retrogressive effect. Georgia, 411 U.S. at 538. But as we have found, everything Texas has submitted as affirmative evidence is unpersuasive, invalid, or both. Moreover, uncontested record evidence conclusively shows that the implicit costs of obtaining SB 14qualifying ID will fall most heavily on the poor and that a disproportionately high percentage of African Americans and Hispanics in Texas live in poverty. We therefore conclude that SB 14 is likely to lead to “retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective
54

exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. Given this, and given that Texas must show that SB 14 lacks both discriminatory purpose and effect, we have no need to examine whether the law was enacted with discriminatory purpose. Accordingly, we shall deny Texas’s request for declaratory relief.
In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize the narrowness of this opinion. Specifically, we have decided nothing more than that, in this particular litigation and on this particular record, Texas has failed to demonstrate that its particular voter ID law lacks retrogressive effect. Nothing in this opinion remotely suggests that section 5 bars all covered jurisdictions from implementing photo ID laws. To the contrary, under our reasoning today, such laws might well be precleared if they ensure (1) that all prospective voters can easily obtain free photo ID, and (2) that any underlying documents required to obtain that ID are truly free of charge. Indeed, Georgia’s voter ID law was precleared by the Attorney General—and probably for good reason. Unlike SB 14, the Georgia law requires each county to provide free election IDs, and further allows voters to present a wide range of documents to obtain those IDs. Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2417.1(a); Ga. Elec. Code 183-1-20-.01. The contrast with Senate Bill 14 could hardly be more stark.
Finally, during closing arguments, Texas’s counsel complained that they had been shouldered with an “impossible burden” in this litigation. Trial Tr. 7/13/2012 27:14. This may well be correct, but Texas’s lawyers have only their client to blame. The State of Texas enacted a voter ID law that—at least to our knowledge—is the most stringent in the country. That law will almost certainly have retrogressive effect: it imposes strict, unforgiving burdens on the poor, and racial minorities in Texas are disproportionately likely to live in poverty. And crucially, the Texas legislature defeated several amendments that could have made this a far closer case.
55

Ignoring warnings that SB 14, as written, would disenfranchise minorities and the poor, see, e.g., JA 1300-03; 1329, the legislature tabled or defeated amendments that would have:
• waived all fees for indigent persons who needed the underlying documents to obtain an EIC, Trial Tr. 7/12/2012 (AM) 30:17-31:7, 33:23-24;
• reimbursed impoverished Texans for EIC-related travel costs, JA 2139-42; • expanded the range of identifications acceptable under SB 14 by allowing voters
to present student or Medicare ID cards at the polls, Trial Tr. 7/12/2012 (AM) 34:21-24; JA 1246-47; • required DPS offices to remain open in the evening and on weekends, JA 1337; and • allowed indigent persons to cast provisional ballots without photo ID. Trial Tr. 7/12/2012 (AM) 35:3-37:1. Put another way, if counsel faced an “impossible burden,” it was because of the law Texas enacted—nothing more, nothing less.
V. For the foregoing reasons, we deny Texas’s request for a declaratory judgment. The parties are hereby ordered to meet and confer as to a schedule to govern the constitutional issue and to file an advisory within 14 days with a proposed schedule. A separate order has been filed on this date.
56

 
 Case 1:12-cv-00128-RMC-DST-RLW Document 365 Filed 12/17/12 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

STATE OF TEXAS,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his Official )

Capacity as Attorney General, et al., )

)

Defendants.

)

)

Civil Action No. 12-128 (DST, RMC, RLW)

ORDER

On August 30, 2012, the Court denied Texas’s request for judicial preclearance of

Senate Bill 14 under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. See

Opinion [Dkt. 340] & Order [Dkt. 341]. The Court ruled that Texas had failed to prove “that

nothing in SB 14 ‘would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to

their effective exercise of the electoral franchise’” and thus had not met its burden of proof on Claim One of the Amended Complaint.1 Opinion at 44 (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S.

130, 141 (1976)).

The parties briefed the issues presented by Claim Two of the Amended

Complaint, in which Texas asserts that Section 5 is unconstitutional. Briefing was completed on

November 13, 2012. On November 9, 2012, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari

in Case No. 12-96, Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General, et al., which also

presents the issue of whether Section 5 is unconstitutional. The Court thus ordered the parties to

1 By agreement of the parties, the Court bifurcated the two claims of the Amended Complaint to conduct a trial as to Claim One as expeditiously as possible. Even if Texas raised any informal opposition to bifurcation, it waived any objection by not formally raising it and preserving it on the record.

Case 1:12-cv-00128-RMC-DST-RLW Document 365 Filed 12/17/12 Page 2 of 3

meet and confer and show cause why this case should not be stayed until the Supreme Court rules in Shelby County. Order [Dkt. 357]. The United States, Dkt. 359, and the DefendantIntervenors, Dkt. 360, agree that the case should be stayed, but Texas opposes a stay, Dkt. 361. In the event that the Court defers ruling on Claim Two, however, Texas asks the Court to enter final judgment on Claim One so that it can appeal the Court’s denial of preclearance to the Supreme Court immediately. See Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Entry Final J. [Dkt. 362-1] at 5–6. The United States accedes to that request, Dkt. 364, but the Defendant-Intervenors do not, Dkt. 363.
After careful consideration of the parties’ positions, the Court concludes that, in the interest of efficiency and judicial economy, it will defer ruling on Claim Two until the Supreme Court decides Shelby County. It further concludes that entry of judgment as to Claim One is appropriate because “there is no just reason for delay.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), FINAL JUDGMENT is ENTERED on Claim One of the Amended Complaint in favor of Eric Himpton Holder, Junior, Attorney General, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s Opinion and Order dated August 30, 2012; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the case is STAYED until the Supreme Court decides Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General, et al., Case No. 12-96. Within thirty days of a final ruling, the parties shall file a joint notice with the Court.
SO ORDERED.

Date: December 17, 2012

/s/ DAVID S. TATEL United States Circuit Judge

Case 1:12-cv-00128-RMC-DST-RLW Document 365 Filed 12/17/12 Page 3 of 3
/s/ ROSEMARY M. COLLYER United States District Judge
/s/ ROBERT L. WILKINS United States District Judge

 
 Case 1:12-cv-00128-RMC-DST-RLW Document 365 Filed 12/17/12 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

STATE OF TEXAS,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his Official )

Capacity as Attorney General, et al., )

)

Defendants.

)

)

Civil Action No. 12-128 (DST, RMC, RLW)

ORDER

On August 30, 2012, the Court denied Texas’s request for judicial preclearance of

Senate Bill 14 under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. See

Opinion [Dkt. 340] & Order [Dkt. 341]. The Court ruled that Texas had failed to prove “that

nothing in SB 14 ‘would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to

their effective exercise of the electoral franchise’” and thus had not met its burden of proof on Claim One of the Amended Complaint.1 Opinion at 44 (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S.

130, 141 (1976)).

The parties briefed the issues presented by Claim Two of the Amended

Complaint, in which Texas asserts that Section 5 is unconstitutional. Briefing was completed on

November 13, 2012. On November 9, 2012, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari

in Case No. 12-96, Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General, et al., which also

presents the issue of whether Section 5 is unconstitutional. The Court thus ordered the parties to

1 By agreement of the parties, the Court bifurcated the two claims of the Amended Complaint to conduct a trial as to Claim One as expeditiously as possible. Even if Texas raised any informal opposition to bifurcation, it waived any objection by not formally raising it and preserving it on the record.

Case 1:12-cv-00128-RMC-DST-RLW Document 365 Filed 12/17/12 Page 2 of 3

meet and confer and show cause why this case should not be stayed until the Supreme Court rules in Shelby County. Order [Dkt. 357]. The United States, Dkt. 359, and the DefendantIntervenors, Dkt. 360, agree that the case should be stayed, but Texas opposes a stay, Dkt. 361. In the event that the Court defers ruling on Claim Two, however, Texas asks the Court to enter final judgment on Claim One so that it can appeal the Court’s denial of preclearance to the Supreme Court immediately. See Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Entry Final J. [Dkt. 362-1] at 5–6. The United States accedes to that request, Dkt. 364, but the Defendant-Intervenors do not, Dkt. 363.
After careful consideration of the parties’ positions, the Court concludes that, in the interest of efficiency and judicial economy, it will defer ruling on Claim Two until the Supreme Court decides Shelby County. It further concludes that entry of judgment as to Claim One is appropriate because “there is no just reason for delay.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), FINAL JUDGMENT is ENTERED on Claim One of the Amended Complaint in favor of Eric Himpton Holder, Junior, Attorney General, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s Opinion and Order dated August 30, 2012; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the case is STAYED until the Supreme Court decides Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General, et al., Case No. 12-96. Within thirty days of a final ruling, the parties shall file a joint notice with the Court.
SO ORDERED.

Date: December 17, 2012

/s/ DAVID S. TATEL United States Circuit Judge

Case 1:12-cv-00128-RMC-DST-RLW Document 365 Filed 12/17/12 Page 3 of 3
/s/ ROSEMARY M. COLLYER United States District Judge
/s/ ROBERT L. WILKINS United States District Judge

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE OF TEXAS, Plaintiff, v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States,
Defendant, and ERIC KENNIE, et al.,
Defendant-Intervenors.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 12-128 (RMC) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

OPINION In 2012, the U.S. Attorney General and thirty-one Defendant-Intervenors

challenged Texas’s proposed voter identification law and momentarily prevailed before a three-

judge panel. Defendant-Intervenors now seek an award of attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs,

despite the subsequent vacatur of the three-judge panel’s opinion by the Supreme Court. This

Court previously decided a similar case, Texas v. United States, which awarded attorneys’ fees to

Defendant-Intervenors who successfully challenged Texas’s redistricting maps in Voting Rights

Act litigation before a three-judge panel, even though the Supreme Court later vacated the three-

judge panel’s opinion as moot. But the Court arrives at a different result here. While the

redistricting dispute eventually became moot, in this case, Texas simply kept appealing until the

Supreme Court vacated the three-judge panel’s opinion. Because the voter identification law is

now in effect and because Texas maintained its position throughout this litigation, the Court will

1

deny the requested fees and costs. I. FACTS
The parties in this litigation disputed whether Texas’s photo identification law could be implemented consistent with the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, see U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq. On May 27, 2011, Governor Rick Perry signed into law Senate Bill 14 (SB 14), which required registered Texas voters to identify themselves at the polls with one of the following forms of government-issued photo identification: (1) a driver’s license or personal identification card issued by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS); (2) a license to carry a concealed handgun issued by DPS; (3) a U.S. military identification card; (4) a U.S. citizenship certificate with photograph; or (5) a U.S. passport. Tex. Elec. Code § 63.0101 (Jan. 1, 2012).
SB 14 represented a striking departure from then-existing Texas law. Unlike preceding enactments, SB 14 required voters to present photo identification at the polls, prohibited the use of identification that had expired more than sixty days before the date of voting, and banned the use of pictureless voter registration certificates commonly issued by Texas county registrars. See id. Voters who lacked a government-issued photo identification could obtain an election identification certificate from DPS free of charge. See SB 14, § 20. The voter identification law preserved an exemption for voters with documented disabilities and voters over the age of sixty-five, as well as disabled voters, to vote by mail without obtaining or presenting photo identification when voting.
Because Texas was a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 of the VRA, 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 App., it could not implement SB 14 without obtaining “preclearance” from either the U.S. Attorney General or a three-judge panel of this Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). To secure
2

preclearance, Texas was required to demonstrate that SB 14 “neither ha[d] the purpose nor [would] have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color,” or “member[ship] [in] a language minority group.” Id. §§ 1973c(a).1 Therefore, on July 25, 2011, Texas submitted SB 14 to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for preclearance. Compl. ¶ 12; id., Ex. 2 (Jul. 25, 2011 McGeehan Letter) [Dkt. 1-3].
Under the VRA, the Attorney General was required to “interpose[] an objection within sixty days” of the State’s request for preclearance. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). Texas, wanting to implement the photo-ID bill before the 2012 presidential election, requested expedited consideration of its submission, with a proposed decision date of August 20, 2011. See Jul. 25, 2011 McGeehan Letter at 1 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 51.34). The Attorney General did not accede to this timeline. Instead, on September 23, 2011, DOJ informed the Texas Director of Elections that the information provided in the State’s preclearance submission was “insufficient to enable [it] to determine that the proposed changes have neither the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group, as required under Section 5” of the VRA. Compl., Ex. 3 (Sept. 23, 2011 Herren Letter) [Dkt. 1-4] at 1. Accordingly, DOJ requested additional information concerning the number of registered Texas voters who might be required to secure additional forms of voter identification under SB 14.2 Id. Texas responded to DOJ’s requests on October 4, 2011, see
1 In 1975, Congress extended the VRA to cover members of language minority groups. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2); see also id. § 1973l(c)(3) (defining the terms “language minorities” and “language minority groups”). 2 Specifically, DOJ requested information related to:
a. The number of registered voters in Texas, by race and Spanish surname within county of residence, who currently possess a Texas driver’s license or other form of photo identification issued by DPS that is current or has expired within sixty days.
3

Compl. ¶ 14, the Attorney General requested further supplementation, see id. ¶ 15, and the preclearance record was completed on January 12, 2012, see id. ¶ 16.
In the meantime, while the Attorney General was considering SB 14, DOJ denied preclearance to a newly-enacted voter identification law in South Carolina. Id. ¶ 17. DOJ concluded that the South Carolina law—which was, in many respects, identical to SB 14—would have a differential impact on non-white registered voters. In other words, DOJ concluded that South Carolina had “failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that [the photo identification law] [would] not have a retrogressive effect.” Compl., Ex. 6 (DOJ Letter to South Carolina) [Dkt. 17] at 4–5. Texas filed a Complaint against the Attorney General in this Court on January 24, 2012,3 on the assumption that DOJ would apply the same reasoning to deny Texas’s application. See Compl. ¶¶ 21–22.
On March 12, 2012, the Attorney General denied preclearance to SB 14, finding that the State had failed to show that SB 14 would not have “the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race.” Am. Compl. [Dkt. 25], Ex. 7 (Mar. 12, 2012 DOJ Letter) [Dkt. 25-7] at 1–2 (citing Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); 28 C.F.R. § 51.52). In
. . . b. For the 605,576 registered voters who the State has advised do
not have a Texas driver’s license or personal identification card, . . . the number of such persons by Spanish surname, as well as an estimated number by race, within county of residence; and c. Describe any and all efforts . . . to provide notice to these individuals of the requirements of S.B. 14 and the availability of a free DPS-issued identification. Sept. 23, 2011 Herron Letter at 2–3. 3 The case was assigned to a three-judge Court, which included Circuit Judge David S. Tatel and District Judges Rosemary M. Collyer and Robert L. Wilkins.
4

his decision, the Attorney General concluded that the data submitted by Texas showed that
registered Hispanic voters were more than twice as likely as registered non-Hispanic voters to
lack an approved form of photo identification. Id. at 2. The Attorney General also expressed
concern that the free Election Identification Certificate (EIC) would not mitigate the financial
burden of SB 14 on Hispanic voters. Id. at 3. Thereafter, Texas filed an Amended Complaint in
this Court, which included a claim that Section 5 of the VRA, as reauthorized in 2006,
“exceed[ed] the enumerated powers of Congress and conflict[ed] with Article IV of the
Constitution and the Tenth Amendment.” Am. Compl. at 1–2.
The three-judge Court received several motions to intervene on behalf of
individual voters, elected representatives, and civil rights advocacy groups. The first such
motion was filed by Eric Kennie, Anna Burns, Michael Montez, Penny Pope, Marc Veasy, Jane
Hamilton, David De La Fuente, Lorraine Birabil, Daniel Clayton, and Sergio Deleon (collectively, the Kennie Intervenors),4 and the Court granted their motion to intervene on March
15, 2012. See Mar. 15, 2012 Order [Dkt. 17] at 2. Defendant-Intervenors were directed to
“avoid duplication of efforts” and to consolidate their briefing and argument. See Apr. 13, 2012
Minute Order. The Court also imposed an expedited schedule, as this litigation represented
Texas’s only chance of implementing SB 14 before the November 2012 elections.
4 The Court also received and granted four motions to intervene on behalf of the following Defendant-Intervenors: (1) the Texas State Conference of NAACP Branches and the Mexican American Legislative Caucus, see Mar. 12, 2012 Mot. to Intervene [Dkt. 15]; (2) the Texas Legislative Black Caucus, the League of Women Voters of Texas, the Justice Seekers, Reverend Peter Johnson, Reverend Ronald Wright, and Donald Wright, see Mar. 22, 2012 Mot. to Intervene [Dkt. 38]; (3) Victoria Rodriguez, Nicole Rodriguez, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project, and Mi Familia Vota Education Fund, see Mar. 23, 2012 Mot. to Intervene [Dkt. 42]; and (4) the Southwest Workers Union and La Union Del Pueblo Entero, see Apr. 4, 2012 Mot. to Intervene [Dkt. 64]. See Mar. 15, 2012 Order [Dkt. 17] at 2; Apr. 13, 2012 Minute Order. These Defendant-Intervenors have not submitted motions for attorneys’ fees. As such, this Opinion focuses solely on the Kennie Intervenors.
5

After expedited discovery, the three-judge Court held a one-week bench trial that commenced on July 9, 2012. DOJ and Defendant-Intervenors presented evidence at trial and argued against preclearance. Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2012). Specifically, Defendant-Intervenors relied on data from Texas voter registration forms to argue that Hispanic voters were disproportionately likely to lack photo identification. Id. at 137–38. The Kennie Intervenors also called four witnesses at trial: Texas State Senator Wendy Davis, Texas State Senator Rodney Ellis, expert witness Dr. Allan Lichtman, and election law expert Randall Buck Wood. See Mot. for Fees [Dkt. 383] at 5–10. These witnesses testified as to various efforts to mitigate the burden of SB 14 on indigent persons, the hidden costs of SB 14 for indigent persons lacking qualifying voter identification, and the empirical flaws in Texas’s expert testimony regarding the impact of SB 14 on voter turnout.
From this record, the Court found that Texas had offered faulty data and unreliable testimony concerning whether minorities disproportionately lacked the necessary identification under SB 14. Texas, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 127. Because Texas submitted nothing more, the Court concluded that “the state [] failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that SB 14 lacks retrogressive effect.” Id. The Court also considered the undisputed record evidence and found that “racial minorities in Texas [were] disproportionately likely to live in poverty and, because SB 14 will weigh more heavily on the poor, the law will likely have retrogressive effect.” Id. Accordingly, the Court denied Claim One, i.e., Texas’s request to pre-clear SB 14 under Section 5 of the VRA, and stayed Claim Two, i.e., Texas’s claim that Section 5 of the VRA is unconstitutional, pending the parties’ submission of a joint proposed briefing schedule. Texas appealed this Court’s decision on Claim One to the Supreme Court.
Before the Supreme Court ruled on Texas’s appeal, however, it decided Shelby
6

County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Shelby County involved a constitutional challenge to, inter alia, Section 4 of the VRA. The Supreme Court held that because the coverage formula in Section 4(b) was based on stale data, it distinguished among the States in an unconstitutional manner, and it could “no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.” Id. at 2631. Thereafter, on June 27, 2013, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the threejudge panel’s decision denying preclearance to Texas for SB 14.
After the Supreme Court issued judgment on Texas’s appeal, see July 29, 2013 S. Ct. Judgment [Dkt. 377], the three-judge panel dismissed all claims based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shelby County. Defendant-Intervenors requested that the Court retain jurisdiction to hear any motions for attorneys’ fees and costs, and expressed their intention to file motions for attorneys’ fees within fourteen days of the three-judge panel’s entry of judgment. Defendant-Intervenors’ Response to Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)).
The Kennie Intervenors now move for attorneys’ fees and costs.5 They contend that they are prevailing parties and are entitled to fees and costs under the VRA, seeking a total reimbursement of $353,150.97. Mot. for Fees [Dkt. 383] at 27.
Texas has not filed a brief in opposition to the pending motion. Instead, Texas filed a three-page “Advisory” that begins and ends with Shelby County. See Advisory [Dkt. 384]. Texas writes that the Shelby County decision means that the State was wrongly subjected to preclearance in the first place. Thus, Texas contends, the participation of Defendant-Intervenors in this VRA litigation only served to “impose[] significant 5 The Kennie Intervenors have timely filed their motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d), which provides that a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs must be filed “no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i). The three-judge Court’s December 21, 2012 Minute Order did not alter the deadlines set by the Federal Rules, as the Court’s Order merely held in abeyance Defendant-Intervenors’ motions for attorneys’ fees pending appeal without imposing alternate deadlines. See Dec. 21, 2012 Minute Order.
7

unconstitutional burdens on the State, including that for more than a year, Texas was unable to implement an election-integrity measure that numerous States continue to enact and implement . . . .” Id. at 2. Texas adds that “the only basis upon which the Kennie Intervenors could have conceivably claimed prevailing-party status” was the three-judge Court’s denial of preclearance, which the Supreme Court vacated on appeal. Id.
II. ANALYSIS This case was tried on the merits to a three-judge Court under the VRA, and that Court fulfilled its mandate when it entered its judgment. Section 5 of the VRA requires matters to be “heard and determined by a court of three judges” only to the extent required by 28 U.S.C. § 2284, see 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). Section 2284, in turn, permits “[a] single judge . . . [to] conduct all proceedings except the trial, and enter all orders permitted by the rules of civil procedure except as [otherwise] provided . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(3). Here, the three-judge panel fulfilled its statutory purpose. The question of fees and costs is an ancillary matter and is properly resolved by the district court judge to whom the case was assigned initially. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo. v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 312 U.S. 621, 625 (1941) (noting that a single district judge, rather than a three-judge panel, should have resolved a motion for damages that was filed after the three-judge panel had ruled on an injunction application for which the three-judge panel had been convened); Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, 161 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that a single judge could decide an ancillary issue because the three-judge court had issued its judgment and therefore “had fulfilled the statutory purpose for which the two additional judges had been called”); Allen v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., Va., 249 F.2d 462, 464 (4th Cir. 1957) (finding post-judgment motion requesting deadline for compliance with three-judge court’s desegregation order was properly resolved by single district court
8

judge). At the outset, the Court notes that parties in the United States ordinarily bear their
own attorneys’ fees regardless of the outcome of the litigation. Fresh Kist Produce, LLC v. Choi Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 118, 125 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602–03 (2001), superseded in part by statute, Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (2009))). There are exceptions, however, to this so-called “American Rule.” For instance, the American Rule does not apply where there is an explicit statutory basis for awarding fees. Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 4(d), 114 Stat. 803, 804 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000))).
If a party establishes that it is entitled to attorneys’ fees, then the question becomes whether the fees sought are reasonable. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 795–805 (2002). The standard metric for determining the reasonableness of a fee request is the “lodestar method.”6 Such a calculation “produces an award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a comparable case.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010).
A. Kennie Intervenors’ Request for Fees and Costs The Kennie Intervenors contend that statutory fee shifting provisions apply here.
6 The “lodestar” approach to fee awards was established by the Supreme Court in Hensley, and is the approach followed by the federal courts in most fee award disputes. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 802.
9

Specifically, they seek attorneys’ fees under § 1973l(e) of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e), and subsection (b) of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Both provisions contain similar language and identical legislative purposes. See Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 245 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The former states that “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, reasonable expert fees, and other reasonable litigation expenses as part of the costs,” 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e), while the latter permits a court, “in its discretion, . . . [to] allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs,” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Both provisions are designed to “encourag[e] private litigants to act as ‘private attorneys general’ in seeking to vindicate the civil rights laws.” Donnell, 682 F.2d at 245. As a result, the two provisions are construed consistently. Id. at 245 n.7 (citing Riddell v. Nat’l Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 1980)); see also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 n.4 (recognizing that § 1973l(e) and § 1988(b) have been interpreted in a consistent manner).
Requests for attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 1973l(e) and § 1988(b) generally implicate two questions of law. The first is whether the party seeking recovery of attorneys’ fees is a prevailing party. If so, then a fee award ordinarily should be granted. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 89 n.1 (1989) (observing that a party that prevails in § 1988 litigation “ordinarily” is entitled to attorneys’ fees (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Donnell, 682 F.2d at 245 (“[T]he legislative history [of § 1973l(e)] makes clear that a prevailing party usually should recover fees.”). The second is whether a court should exercise its discretion not to award attorneys’ fees because there are “special circumstances [that] would render such an award unjust.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
10

1. Prevailing Party Precedent The phrase “prevailing party” is a legal term of art, Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603, which has been addressed by the Supreme Court in multiple decisions. See, e.g., Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791 (1989) (“A prevailing party must be one who has succeeded on any significant claim affording it some of the relief sought, either pendent lite or at the conclusion of the litigation.”); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987) (“[P]laintiff [must] receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail.”). The Supreme Court most recently addressed the concept in Buckhannon. Interpreting the fee-shifting provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12205,7 the Supreme Court required a “prevailing party” to be “one who has been awarded some relief by the court,” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603, resulting in a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,” id. at 605. Buckhannon excluded from its definition instances in which the objective of a lawsuit is achieved because a defendant voluntarily changes its conduct. Thus, the “catalyst theory” of fee recovery, id. at 601, which is dependent on voluntary action, is not connected to the clear meaning of “prevailing party,” id. at 605. Neither the legislative history of similar feeshifting provisions, such as the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act, id. at 607, nor the Court’s precedents supported a “holding that the term ‘prevailing party’ authorizes an award of attorney’s fees without a corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of the parties,” id. at 7 The fee-shifting provisions of both statutes are similar to 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), under which Defendant-Intervenors seek fees. The Fair Housing Amendments Act provides that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs,” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), while the ADA states that “the court . . . , in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and costs,” 42 U.S.C. § 12205.
11

605. The Supreme Court also was troubled because the catalyst theory permits litigants to
recover attorneys’ fees for “nonfrivolous but nonetheless potentially meritless lawsuit[s].” Id. at
606. Not only are such recoveries without “the necessary judicial imprimatur,” id. at 605, but
they discourage voluntary changes in conduct, id. at 608. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held
that voluntary changes in conduct disassociated from judicial action are similar to a “reversal of
a directed verdict,” a finding of constitutional infirmity “unaccompanied by judicial relief,” and
other nonjudicial modifications of actual conditions, none of which permits recovery of
attorneys’ fees.8 Id. at 605–06 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Since Buckhannon, the D.C. Circuit has adopted a three-part test for adjudicating
prevailing-party status; that test requires “(1) . . . a court-ordered change in the legal relationship
of the parties; (2) [a] judgment . . . in favor of the party seeking the fees; and (3) [a] judicial
pronouncement . . . accompanied by judicial relief.” Green Aviation Mgmt. Co. v. FAA, 676
F.3d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Notably, only
the latter two prongs are relevant when a defendant is the party seeking attorneys’ fees.9 Id. at
204.
8 Through the Open Government Act of 2007, Congress superseded Buckhannon and reinstated the catalyst theory of attorney fee recovery only for fee awards under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. See Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 9 In Oil, Chemical, & Atomic Workers International Union v. Department of Energy, 288 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 2002), superseded by statute on other grounds, Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524, as recognized in Summers v. Department of Justice, 569 F.3d 500, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the D.C. Circuit ruled that when interpreting a fee-shifting provision courts should give the phrase “prevailing party” the same construction as it does in other fee-shifting provisions “unless there is some good reason for doing otherwise,” id. at 455. Overcoming this presumption is difficult. Green Aviation, 676 F.3d at 202 (explaining that this Circuit “has joined other circuits in acknowledging that the burden of establishing good reason not to apply Buckhannon is not easily met” (internal alterations, citation, and quotations omitted)). Neither Texas nor the Kennie Intervenors argue that Buckhannon should not control the meaning of “prevailing party” in 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) or 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
12

Buckhannon expressly recognized only two appropriate bases for awarding attorneys’ fees––judgments on the merits and settlements enforced through consent decrees. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 (“We have only awarded attorney’s fees where the plaintiff has received a judgment on the merits, or obtained a court-ordered consent decree.” (internal citations omitted)). Prevailing-party status in this jurisdiction, however, is not so limited. Under the D.C. Circuit’s construction of Buckhannon, a litigant in this jurisdiction need only establish that he or she received “some form of judicial relief, not necessarily a court-ordered consent decree or a judgment on the merits.” Turner v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 608 F.3d 12, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The D.C. Circuit has recognized that, under certain circumstances, prevailing-party status may result from a favorable jurisdictional ruling, a grant of preliminary injunction, or even a judicially-sanctioned stipulation. Id. (citing with approval District of Columbia v. Jeppsen ex rel. Jeppsen, 514 F.3d 1287, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Select Milk Producers, Inc. v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Carbonell v. INS, 429 F.3d 894, 895–96, 899 (9th Cir. 2005)).
2. Kennie Intervenors’ Arguments The Kennie Intervenors state that they joined the litigation to oppose preclearance of SB 14. The Attorney General first denied preclearance to Texas on March 12, 2012, with the result that Texas was, for at least a time, prevented from implementing its voter identification law. Following a trial before the three-judge panel of this Court at which all parties presented demonstrative evidence, expert reports, and testimony, the panel found that SB 14 violated the VRA. Therefore, it, too, denied preclearance. The Kennie Intervenors argue that this Court’s judgment provided a substantial benefit, as it prevented Texas from applying the voter identification law during the November 2012 elections. Moreover, the Kennie Intervenors
13

emphasize that this case had a real-world impact because, absent the Court’s judgment, certain Kennie Intervenors would have been denied the right to vote based on SB 14’s requirements.10
Texas responds only with its Advisory, which posits that the three-judge Court’s
denial of preclearance is “the only basis upon which the Kennie Intervenors could [] conceivably
. . . claim[] prevailing-party status,” Advisory at 2, but that the decision does not support a fee
award because it “was vacated on appeal,” id. Texas asserts that Shelby County must be given
full retroactive effect and that this Court has no choice but to deny the Kennie Intervenors’
motion for fees and costs. Id. at 2–3 (citations omitted).
3. Are Kennie Intervenors Prevailing Parties?
In its Advisory, Texas’s main contention is that the Supreme Court, as a matter of
fact and law, erased the three-judge Court’s opinion, and, consequently, the Kennie Intervenors’ successes before that Court.11 Texas believes that Shelby County establishes that the entirety of
the preclearance process, including this Court’s denial of preclearance, was a constitutional
nullity. Texas does not address the Kennie Intervenors’ argument that they achieved the relief
they sought because Texas was prohibited from implementing SB 14 before the November 2012
elections.
10 The Kennie Intervenors also rely on Commissioners Court of Medina County, Texas v. United States, 683 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1982), in arguing their prevailing-party status. The Kennie Intervenors contend that a judgment denying preclearance gives rise to a presumption that any defendants who intervened are prevailing parties. Medina County, however, is a “catalyst theory” fee award case that predates Buckhannon. See Medina Cnty., 683 F.2d at 440 (describing the applicable test for prevailing party status as whether “the party . . . substantially received the relief sought, and . . . [whether] the lawsuit . . . [was] a catalytic, necessary, or substantial factor in attaining the relief” (emphasis added)). Although neither the Supreme Court nor the D.C. Circuit has overruled Medina County explicitly, its continuing validity in light of Buckhannon is uncertain, and here, immaterial to the Court’s determination of the Kennie Intervenors’ prevailing-party status. 11 Texas mentions that SB 14 is currently in effect to contest Defendant-Intervenors’ prevailing party status. This contention is further discussed below, see infra.
14

In Texas v. United States, 2014 WL 2758597 (D.D.C. June 18, 2014), this Court found that the State of Texas had effectively conceded those Defendant-Intervenors’ arguments by filing a nearly-identical two-page Advisory and refusing to challenge specific arguments in Defendant-Intervenors’ motions for attorneys’ fees. Id. at *7 (citing D.D.C. Local Civil Rule 7(b)). Of relevance here, the Court found that Texas had not disputed that Defendant-Intervenors were prevailing parties prior to the Supreme Court’s issuance of Shelby County and its subsequent vacatur of the three-judge Court’s opinion as moot. Id.
So, too, here. Texas does not dispute that the Kennie Intervenors were prevailing parties prior to the Supreme Court’s issuance of Shelby County and subsequent vacatur of this Court’s opinion denying preclearance to SB 14. Thus, the Court finds that Texas has waived any argument as to the prevailing party status of the Kennie Intervenors prior to Shelby County. See Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 238 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2002) (“It is well understood in this Circuit that when a [non-movant] files an opposition to a motion . . . addressing only certain arguments raised by the [movant], a court may treat those arguments that the [non-movant] failed to address as conceded.” (citing FDIC v. Bender, 127 F.3d 58, 67–68 (D.C. Cir. 1997))); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins., Co., 82 F.3d 478, 482–83 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (explaining that the Circuit “honors . . . [a district court’s] enforcement of the rule” that “absence of a response [is] . . . a basis for treating the motion as conceded”).
But while Texas concedes that the Kennie Intervenors were prevailing parties prior to Shelby County, it argues against an award of fees and costs on the ground that Shelby County effectively stripped the Kennie Intervenors of their victory. In Texas v. United States, this Court considered and rejected the same argument based on National Black Police
15

Association v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics, 168 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1999) and Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See Texas v. United States, 2014 WL 2758597, at *8. Therefore, as it did in Texas v. United States, the Court considers the impact of those cases on the matter at hand.
In National Black Police Association, various plaintiffs sought an injunction against campaign contribution limits for certain local elections. 168 F.3d at 526–27. The district court enjoined the initiative as violative of the First Amendment, and fifty-two days later, the D.C. City Council repealed the challenged contribution limits. Id. at 527. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit deemed the matter moot in light of the Council’s repeal and vacated the district court’s judgment. The district court then awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs, holding that “despite the eventual mootness of the case . . . . the injunction changed the legal relationship of the parties, and contributors were able to make substantial contributions that otherwise would not have been legal.” Id. The D.C. Circuit agreed. “The fact that the case was moot by the time of the appeal [did] not alter the fact that the injunction altered the legal relationship between the parties when it was issued . . . .” Id. at 528. It was of no moment to the D.C. Circuit that the plaintiffs would have realized their goal fifty-two days later when the Council repealed the initiative. “The plaintiffs secured a real-world vindication of their First Amendment rights” regardless of subsequent events. Id. Accordingly, the “district court properly found that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties because at the time judgment was entered, the injunction altered the legal relationship between the parties.” Id. at 529.
Similarly, in Grano, plaintiffs obtained an injunction that delayed the demolition of an historical site pending a public referendum. 783 F.2d at 1107–08. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties despite the fact that
16

the vote to preserve the site was invalidated. Id. at 1109. The Circuit reasoned that the public referendum would have had no chance to preserve the building at all if the building were razed before the election. In other words, the Grano plaintiffs “faced two hurdles[:] [t]hey successfully surmounted the first by holding off the demolition until the election . . . . [and] [a]lthough their goal of ensuring that the result of the election would have legal effect was subsequently blocked in another court, they nonetheless succeeded in the aspect of their claims that brought them into federal court . . . .” Id. Significantly, the D.C. Circuit subsequently has observed that “[t]he injunction [in Grano] produced a lasting change in the parties’ legal circumstances and gave the plaintiffs the precise relief that they had sought.” Thomas v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 330 F.3d 486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
In Texas v. United States, the Fee Applicants challenged three proposed redistricting maps before a three-judge panel. The panel denied preclearance for the redistricting maps, and Texas appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. While the three-judge Court’s opinion and Shelby County remained pending before the Supreme Court, the Texas Legislature passed three statutes that redrew the State’s voting districts and abandoned the proposed redistricting maps that had been challenged before the three-judge panel. Thereafter, the Supreme Court issued Shelby County, vacated the three-judge panel’s decision to deny preclearance to Texas for the proposed redistricting maps, and directed the panel to consider whether the controversy had been mooted by Texas’s legislative action. On remand, the threejudge panel found that “both Shelby County and Texas’s enactment of superseding redistricting plans mooted the controversy.” 2014 WL 2758597, at *3. Upon consideration of the motions for attorneys’ fees, this Court explained that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court ultimately vacated [the three-judge panel’s] opinion, neither Shelby County nor the vacatur erased the real-world
17

vindication that Defendant-Intervenors had achieved,” i.e., the judicial bar to implementation of Texas’s proposed redistricting maps. Id. at *8. Therefore, “[i]n line with this Circuit’s precedents and those in other courts of appeals,” the Court found that “Defendant-Intervenors did not lose prevailing-party status due to subsequent mootness.” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The procedural posture of this fee application presents a different question. Unlike Texas v. United States, the legal controversy surrounding SB 14 was not rendered moot by action of the Texas legislature. Texas did not withdraw its voter identification law after a loss in VRA litigation. To the contrary, Texas maintained its position that it was entitled to implement SB 14 as a reasonable measure to protect against voter fraud.
Admittedly, the prevailing-party precedent includes language that is capacious enough to find prevailing-party status even where the initial decision is vacated on appeal. See, e.g., Nat’l Black Police Ass’n, 168 F.3d at 528 (“‘In short, a plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the [prevailing party].’” (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992))); id. at 529 (“[T]he district court properly found that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties because at the time the judgment was entered, the injunction altered the legal relationship between the parties.”); Turner, 608 F.3d at 15 (noting that a prevailing party “need receive only some form of judicial relief, not necessarily a court-ordered consent decree or a judgment on the merits”); Grano, 783 F.2d at 1109 (“While partial versus complete success is a consideration in assessing the amount of fees, the critical question in evaluating the availability of fees is whether fee claimants have received any benefit at all.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
18

It cannot be denied that the Kennie Intervenors received some benefit from the three-judge panel’s ruling. As they explain:
[i]f imposed in 2012, the photo ID law would have resulted in some of the Kennie Intervenors being denied the right to vote. For example, as Intervenor Kennie explained in his deposition testimony, he lacks a valid photo ID that would permit him to cast a ballot under SB 14. Kennie, who is indigent, [also] cannot obtain a photo ID from any Texas DPS office . . . . Since he lacks photo ID, this Court’s decision provided Defendant Intervenor Kennie with a substantial benefit: he remained eligible to vote in the 2012 election. Mot. for Fees at 12. Thus, while certain Kennie Intervenors may be required to present voter identification at the polls today, the delayed imposition of SB 14 and the ability to cast ballots during the November 2012 elections were meaningful events that, at least for a time, altered the legal relationship between the parties. Nonetheless, while the prevailing-party precedents include language that could cover the instant matter, none extends beyond the procedural posture of subsequent mootness on appeal. See, e.g., Grano, 783 F.2d at 1109 (“The mootness of the subsequent appeal . . . emphasizes, rather than detracts from, the practical substance of [the plaintiffs’] victory.”). Put differently, no court has held that a litigant maintains its prevailing party status after vacatur on appeal. There is a sound basis for enforcing this procedural distinction. For instance, in Texas v. United States, the prevailing-party status of Defendant-Intervenors comported with a commonsense determination of what it means to “prevail”: Defendant-Intervenors challenged Texas’s proposed redistricting maps and, both immediately after the three-judge Court’s decision and today, those redistricting maps are not in force. By contrast, this case did not become moot and Texas never changed its endorsement of SB 14. The State of Texas simply appealed until it
19

won and the three-judge panel decision barring SB 14 was vacated. The Court concludes that the Kennie Intervenors’ prevailing-party status did not survive the Supreme Court’s vacatur of the three-judge panel’s decision denying preclearance.
III. CONCLUSION While the Court recognizes the apparent similarities between Texas v. United States and Texas v. Holder, the different postures of these cases compel different results. Even with Texas’s threadbare Advisory, on view of the whole record, the Court finds that the Kennie Intervenors are not entitled to the requested attorneys’ fees and costs for want of prevailing-party status. The Court will deny the Kennie Intervenors’ request for $353,150.97 in fees and costs. A memorializing Order accompanies this Opinion.

Date: August 11, 2014

/s/ ROSEMARY M. COLLYER United States District Judge

20

 
 Case 1:12-cv-00128-RMC-DST-RLW Document 377 Filed 07/29/13 Page 1 of 3

Supreme Court of the United States Office of the Clerk
Washington, DC 20543-0001

July 29, 2013

William K. Suter Clerk of the Court (202) 479-3011

Clerk United States District Court
for the District of Columbia 333 Constitution Avenue, Northwest Washington, DC 20001

Re: Texas v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General No. 12-1028 (Your docket No. 12-128)

Dear Clerk:
Attached please find a certified copy of the judgment of this Court in the above-entitled case.

Sincerely, WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk

By
Elizabeth Brown Judgments/Mandates Clerk

Enc. cc: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Esq.
Mark A. Posner, Esq.

Nina Perales, Esq. Solicitor General

Case 1:12-cv-00128-RMC-DST-RLW Document 377 Filed 07/29/13 Page 2 of 3

Supreme Court of the United States Office of the Clerk
Washington, DC 20543-0001

July 29, 2013

William K. Suter Clerk of the Court (202) 479-3011

Mr. Jonathan F. Mitchell Solicitor General P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Austin, TX 78711-2548

Re: Texas v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General No. 12-1028

Dear Mr. Mitchell:

Today, a certified copy of the judgment of this Court in the above-entitled case was emailed to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

The appellant is given recovery of costs in this Court as follows:

Clerk’s costs:

$300.00

This amount may be collected from the appellee.

Sincerely, WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk

By
Elizabeth Brown Judgments/Mandates Clerk

cc: Nina Perales, Esq. Clerk, USDC for the District of Columbia (Your docket No. 12-128)

Mark A. Posner, Esq. Solicitor General

Case 1:12-cv-00128-RMC-DST-RLW Document 377 Filed 07/29/13 Page 3 of 3

Supreme Court of the United States

No.

12-1028

TEXAS, v.

Appellant

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON APPEAL FROM the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. THIS CAUSE having been submitted on the statement as to jurisdiction and the motions to affirm. ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the above court is vacated with costs, and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for further consideration in light of Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. ___ (2013). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appellant Texas recover from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) for costs herein expended.

June 27, 2013

Clerk’s costs:

$300.00

 
 Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 1 of 63
3JUD−PANEL,CLOSED,STAYED,TYPE−N
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:12−cv−00128−RMC−DST−RLW

STATE OF TEXAS v. HOLDER Panel: Judge Rosemary M. Collyer
Circuit Judge David S. Tatel Judge Robert L. Wilkins Cause: 42:1973 Voting Rights Act
Plaintiff
STATE OF TEXAS

Date Filed: 01/24/2012 Date Terminated: 08/28/2013 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 441 Voting Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant
represented by Adam W. Aston OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Solicitor General Division 209 West 14th Street 7th Floor (MC−059) Austin, TX 78701 (512) 936−0596 Fax: (512) 474−2697 Email: adam.aston@oag.state.tx.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Asha L.I. Spencer BARTLIT BECK HERMAN PALENCHAR & SCOTT LLP 54 West Hubbard Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 494−4400 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John William McKenzie OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 209 W 14th Street 8th Floor Austin, TX 78701 (512) 936−2155 Email: john.mckenzie@oag.state.tx.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Hamilton Frederick OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Office of the Solicitor General P.O. Box 12548 209 W 14th Street 7th Floor Austin, TX 78701 (512) 936−6407 Fax: (512) 474−2697 Email: matthew.frederick@texasattorneygeneral.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick Kinney Sweeten TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL 300 West 15th Street 9th Floor

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 2 of 63
Austin, TX 78701 (512) 936−1307 Email: patrick.sweeten@texasattorneygeneral.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reynolds B. Brissenden OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GERNERAL/TX 300 West 15th Street 9th Floor Austin, TX 78701 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam K Mortara BARTLIT BECK HERMAN PALENCHAR & SCOTT LLP 54 West Hubbard Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 494−4469 Fax: (312) 494−4440 Email: adam.mortara@bartlit−beck.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John M Hughes BARTLIT BECK HERMAN PALENCHAR & SCOTT LLP 1899 Wynkoop Street 8th Floor Denver, CO 80202 (303) 592−3113 Email: john.hughes@bartlit−beck.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan F. Mitchell 11505 Georgian Oaks Dr. Austin, TX 78739 (703) 314−9276 Email: jfmitchell@mac.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR. Attorney General of the United States

represented by Elizabeth Stewart Westfall U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Rights Division, Voting Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW NWB−Room 7202 Washington, DC 20530 (202) 305−7766 Fax: (202) 307−3961 Email: elizabeth.westfall@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Colangelo U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 3 of 63
Room 5637 Washington, DC 20530 (202) 514−5441 Email: matthew.colangelo@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith E.B. Bell−Platts UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Voting Section Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Room 7259, NWB Washington, DC 20530 (202) 307−2767 Fax: (202) 307−3961 Email: Meredith.Bell−Platts@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce I. Gear U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 7th Floor Washington, DC 20530 (202) 353−0419 Email: bruce.gear@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bryan L. Sells U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Room RWB 7264 Washington, DC 20530 (202) 353−0792 Email: bryan.sells@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel J. Freeman U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Voting Section, Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW NWB Room 7203 Washington, DC 20530 (202) 305−4355 Email: daniel.freeman@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Lynn Maranzano U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 305−0185 Email: jennifer.maranzano@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Alan Dellheim U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 305−1734 Fax: (202) 307−3961 Email: richard.dellheim@usdoj.gov

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 4 of 63
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Risa Berkower U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 305−0150 Fax: (202) 307−3961 Email: risa.berkower@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 11/28/2012
Spencer R. Fisher U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Voting Section, Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 305−0015 Email: spencer.fisher@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Intervenor Defendant ERIC KENNIE

represented by Chad W. Dunn BRAZIL & DUNN 4201 Cypress Creek Parkway Suite 530 Houston, TX 77068 (281) 580−6310 Fax: (281) 580−6362 Email: chad@brazilanddunn.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Gerald Hebert LAW OFFICES OF JOSEPH GERALD HEBERT 191 Somervelle Street Suite 405 Alexandria, VA 22304 (703) 628−4673 Fax: (202) 736−2222 Email: hebert@voterlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Hart Yeary DECHERT LLP 902 Carnegie Center Suite 500 Princeton, NJ 08540−6531 (609) 955−3277 Fax: (609) 955−3259 Email: michelle.yeary@dechert.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kembel Scott Brazil BRAZIL & DUNN 4201 Cypress Creek Parkway Suite 530 Houston, TX 77068 (281) 580−6310

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 5 of 63

Fax: (281) 580−6362 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant ANNA BURNS

represented by Chad W. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Gerald Hebert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kembel Scott Brazil (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant MICHAEL MONTEZ

represented by Chad W. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Gerald Hebert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kembel Scott Brazil (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant PENNY POPE

represented by Chad W. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Gerald Hebert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kembel Scott Brazil

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 6 of 63

(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant MARC VEASY

represented by Chad W. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Gerald Hebert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kembel Scott Brazil (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant JANE HAMILTON

represented by Chad W. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Gerald Hebert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kembel Scott Brazil (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant DAVID DE LA FUENTE

represented by Chad W. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Gerald Hebert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kembel Scott Brazil

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 7 of 63

(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant LORRAINE BIRABIL

represented by Chad W. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Gerald Hebert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kembel Scott Brazil (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant DANIEL CLAYTON

represented by Chad W. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Gerald Hebert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kembel Scott Brazil (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant SERGIO DELEON

represented by Chad W. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Gerald Hebert (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kembel Scott Brazil

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 8 of 63

(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant
TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES

represented by Mark A. Posner LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 1401 New York Avenue, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 662−8389 Fax: (202) 783−0857 Email: mposner@lawyerscommittee.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ezra David Rosenberg LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 1401 New York Avenue, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 662−8345 Fax: (202) 628−2858 Email: erosenberg@lawyerscommittee.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gary L. Bledsoe LAW OFFICE OF GARY L. BLEDSOE AND ASSOCIATES 316 West 12th Street Suite 307 Austin, TX 78701 (512) 322−9992 Fax: (512) 322−0840 Email: garybledsoe@sbcglobal.net PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ian Arthur Vandewalker THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU LAW SCHOOL 161 Avenue of the Americas Floor 12 New York, NY 10013−1205 (646) 292−8362 Fax: (212) 463−7308 Email: ian.vandewalker@nyu.edu PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon M. Greenbaum LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 1401 New York Avenue, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 662−8325 Email: jgreenbaum@lawyerscommittee.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 9 of 63

(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Myrna Perez THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU LAW SCHOOL 161 Avenue of the Americas Floor 12 New York, NY 10013−1205 (646) 292−8329 Fax: (212) 463−7308 Email: myrna.perez@nyu.edu PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Stephen Notzon LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT S. NOTZON 1502 West Avenue Austin, TX 78701 (512) 474−7563 Fax: (512) 852−4788 Email: robert@notzonlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wendy Robin Weiser THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU LAW SCHOOL 161 Avenue of the Americas Floor 12 New York, NY 10013−1205 (646) 292−8318 Fax: (212) 463−7308 Email: wendy.weiser@nyu.edu PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant
MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

represented by Mark A. Posner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ezra David Rosenberg (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ian Arthur Vandewalker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon M. Greenbaum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Myrna Perez (See above for address)

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 10 of 63

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wendy Robin Weiser (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant
TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND

represented by Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam M. Harris FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON LLP One New York Plaza 24th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212) 859−8953 Email: Adam.Harris@ropesgray.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dale E. Ho AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212) 549−2693 Fax: (212) 549−2649 Email: dale.ho@aclu.org TERMINATED: 04/24/2013

Debo P. Adegbile NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 99 Hudson Street Suite 1600 New York, NY 10013 (212) 965−2249 Fax: (212) 226−7592 Email: dadegbile@naacpldf.org TERMINATED: 05/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas H. Flaum FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON LLP One New York Plaza 24th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212) 318−6259 Fax: (212) 230−7759 Email: douglasflaum@paulhastings.com TERMINATED: 07/12/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Elise C. Boddie NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 99 Hudson Street

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 11 of 63
Suite 1600 New York, NY 10013 (212) 965−2200 Fax: (212) 226−7592 TERMINATED: 05/15/2013 PRO HAC VICE
John Payton NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 99 Hudson Street Suite 1600 New York, NY 10013 (212) 965−2200 Email: jpayton@naacpldf.org TERMINATED: 03/28/2012
Leah C. Aden NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INCORPORATED 40 Rector Street 5th Floor New York, NY 10006 (212) 965−2200 Fax: (212) 226−7592 Email: laden@naacpldf.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Birney de Leeuw FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON LLP One New York Plaza 24th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212) 859−8247 Email: michael.deleeuw@friedfrank.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Natasha Korgaonkar NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 40 Rector Street 5th Floor New York, NY 10006 (212) 965−2200 Fax: (212) 226−7592 Email: nkorgaonkar@naacpldf.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan P. Haygood NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 99 Hudson Street Suite 1600 New York, NY 10013 (212) 965−2200 Fax: (212) 226−7592 Email: rhaygood@naacpldf.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Intervenor Defendant

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 12 of 63

IMANI CLARK

represented by Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam M. Harris (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dale E. Ho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/24/2013

Debo P. Adegbile (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas H. Flaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/12/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Elise C. Boddie (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2013 PRO HAC VICE

John Payton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/28/2012

Leah C. Aden (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Birney de Leeuw (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Natasha Korgaonkar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan P. Haygood (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant KIESSENCE CULBREATH

represented by Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam M. Harris (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dale E. Ho

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 13 of 63

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/24/2013

Debo P. Adegbile (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas H. Flaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/12/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Elise C. Boddie (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2013 PRO HAC VICE

John Payton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/28/2012

Leah C. Aden (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Birney de Leeuw (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Natasha Korgaonkar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan P. Haygood (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant DEMARIANO HILL

represented by Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam M. Harris (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dale E. Ho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/24/2013

Debo P. Adegbile (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas H. Flaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/12/2013

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 14 of 63

PRO HAC VICE

Elise C. Boddie (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2013 PRO HAC VICE

John Payton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/28/2012

Leah C. Aden (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Birney de Leeuw (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Natasha Korgaonkar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan P. Haygood (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant
FELICIA JOHNSON TERMINATED: 06/27/2012

represented by Adam M. Harris (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dale E. Ho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/24/2013

Debo P. Adegbile (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas H. Flaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/12/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Elise C. Boddie (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2013 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Payton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/28/2012

Leah C. Aden (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 15 of 63

Intervenor Defendant DOMINIQUE MONDAY

Michael Birney de Leeuw (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Natasha Korgaonkar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan P. Haygood (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam M. Harris (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E. Ho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/24/2013
Debo P. Adegbile (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Douglas H. Flaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/12/2013 PRO HAC VICE
Elise C. Boddie (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2013 PRO HAC VICE
John Payton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/28/2012
Leah C. Aden (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Birney de Leeuw (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Natasha Korgaonkar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 16 of 63

Ryan P. Haygood (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant
BRIANNA WILLIAMS TERMINATED: 06/27/2012

represented by Adam M. Harris (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dale E. Ho (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/24/2013

Debo P. Adegbile (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas H. Flaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/12/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Elise C. Boddie (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2013 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Payton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/28/2012

Leah C. Aden (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Birney de Leeuw (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Natasha Korgaonkar (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan P. Haygood (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant
TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS

represented by John Kent Tanner 3743 Military Road, NW Washington, DC 20015 (202) 503−7696 Email: john.k.tanner@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address)

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 17 of 63
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Abudu AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION INC 230 Peachtree Street NW Suite 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 523−2721 Fax: (404) 653−0331 Email: nabudu@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL 4301 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 434 Washington, DC 20008 (202) 457−0800 x1004 Fax: (202) 457−0805 Email: artspitzer@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donita Judge ADVANCEMENT PROJECT 1220 L Street, NW Suite 850 Washington, DC 20015 (202) 728−9557 Fax: (202) 728−9558 Email: djudge@advancementproject.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katie O'Connor AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION INC 230 Peachtree Street NW Suite 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303 404−523−2721 Fax: 404−653−0331 Email: koconnor@advancementproject.org TERMINATED: 07/09/2012 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Moffatt Laughlin McDonald AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 229 Peachtree Street, N.E. 2700 International Tower Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 500−1235 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Gbana Abudu AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION INC 230 Peachtree Street NW Suite 1440

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 18 of 63

Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 523−2721 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca Lynn Robertson ACLU FOUNDATION OF TEXAS 1500 McGowen Site 250 Houston, TX 77288 (173) 942−8146 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS

represented by John Kent Tanner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Abudu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donita Judge (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katie O'Connor (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2012 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Moffatt Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Gbana Abudu (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca Lynn Robertson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant JUSTICE SEEKERS

represented by John Kent Tanner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 19 of 63

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Abudu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donita Judge (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katie O'Connor (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2012 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Moffatt Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Gbana Abudu (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca Lynn Robertson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant
PETER JOHNSON Reverend

represented by John Kent Tanner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Abudu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donita Judge (See above for address)

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 20 of 63

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katie O'Connor (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2012 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Moffatt Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Gbana Abudu (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca Lynn Robertson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant
RONALD WRIGHT Reverend

represented by John Kent Tanner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Abudu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donita Judge (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katie O'Connor (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2012 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Moffatt Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Gbana Abudu (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 21 of 63

Intervenor Defendant DONALD WRIGHT
Intervenor Defendant VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ

represented by John Kent Tanner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Abudu (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donita Judge (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katie O'Connor (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2012 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Gbana Abudu (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Luis O. Figueroa MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway Suite 300 San Antonio, TX 78205 (210) 224−5476 Fax: (210) 224−5382 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 110 Broadway Suite 300 San Antonio, TX 78205 (210) 224−5476 Fax: 210−224−5382 Email: nperales@maldef.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas A. Saenz

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 22 of 63

MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 South Spring Street 11th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90014 (213) 629−2512 Fax: (213) 629−8016 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street, NW Unit 100 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 293−2828 Fax: (202) 735−6585 Email: apedersen@maldef.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karolina J. Lyznik MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway Suite 300 San Antonio, TX 78205 (210) 224−5476 Email: klyznik@maldef.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca McNeill Couto MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway Suite 300 San Antonio, TX 78205 (210) 224−5476 Fax: (210) 224−5382 Email: rcouto@maldef.org TERMINATED: 02/08/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Intervenor Defendant NICOLE RODRIGUEZ

represented by Luis O. Figueroa (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nina Perales (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas A. Saenz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 23 of 63

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karolina J. Lyznik (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca McNeill Couto (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/08/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Intervenor Defendant
SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT

represented by Luis O. Figueroa (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nina Perales (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas A. Saenz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karolina J. Lyznik (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca McNeill Couto (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/08/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Intervenor Defendant
MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND

represented by Luis O. Figueroa (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nina Perales (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas A. Saenz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 24 of 63

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karolina J. Lyznik (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca McNeill Couto (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/08/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Intervenor Defendant SOUTHWEST WORKERS UNION

represented by Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donita Judge (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca Lynn Robertson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant LA UNION DEL PUEBLO ENTERO

represented by Michelle Hart Yeary (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 01/24/2012
01/24/2012 01/24/2012 01/26/2012 01/27/2012
02/01/2012

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against ERIC H. HOLDER, JR ( Filing fee $ 350, receipt number 4616045513) filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(rdj) (Main Document 1 replaced on 1/27/2012) (jf, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/27/2012: # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6) (zjf, ). Modified on 1/27/2012 (jf, ). (Entered: 01/26/2012)
SUMMONS (2) Issued as to ERIC H. HOLDER, JR, U.S. Attorney General and U.S. Attorney (rdj) (Entered: 01/26/2012)
2 MOTION to Convene Three−Judge Court by STATE OF TEXAS (rdj) (Entered: 01/26/2012)
3 ORDER granting 2 Motion to Convene Three−Judge Court. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 1/26/2012. (tth) (Entered: 01/26/2012)
4 USCA ORDER filed in USCA on January 27, 2012 FOR DESIGNATION OF JUDGES TO SERVE ON THREE−JUDGE DISTRICT COURT;designating Circuit Judge David S. Tatel and Judge Robert L. Wilkins to hear and determine this case to serve with District Court Judge Rosemary M. Collyer. The U.S. Circuit Court Judge to preside over this case. (jeb, ) (Entered: 01/27/2012)
5 MOTION to Intervene as Defendants by ERIC KENNIE, ANNA BURNS, MICHAEL MONTEZ, PENNY POPE, MARC VEASY, JANE HAMILTON, DAVID DE LA

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02/08/2012 02/09/2012
02/15/2012 02/16/2012 02/23/2012
02/23/2012 02/24/2012 03/07/2012
03/12/2012 03/12/2012 03/12/2012 03/12/2012 03/12/2012 03/12/2012

FUENTE, LORRAINE BIRABIL, DANIEL CLAYTON, SERGIO DELEON (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(znmw, ) (Entered: 02/01/2012)
NOTICE of Hearing: A Telephone Conference is set for 2/9/2012 at 4:45 PM before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer. (cdw) (Entered: 02/08/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins: Telephone Conference held on 2/9/2012. A further Telephone Conference is set for 3/14/2012 at 4:30 PM in Courtroom 8 before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer (Court Reporter: Rebecca Stonestreet) (cdw) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
6 RESPONSE re 5 MOTION to Intervene filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Maranzano, Jennifer) (Entered: 02/15/2012)
7 Memorandum in opposition to re 5 MOTION to Intervene filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 02/16/2012)
8 ENTERED IN ERROR..... ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by LORRAINE BIRABIL, ANNA BURNS, DANIEL CLAYTON, DAVID DE LA FUENTE, SERGIO DELEON, JANE HAMILTON, ERIC KENNIE, MICHAEL MONTEZ, PENNY POPE, MARC VEASY.(Dunn, Chad) Modified on 2/24/2012 (znmw, ). (Entered: 02/23/2012)
9 REPLY re 5 MOTION to Intervene filed by LORRAINE BIRABIL, ANNA BURNS, DANIEL CLAYTON, DAVID DE LA FUENTE, SERGIO DELEON, JANE HAMILTON, ERIC KENNIE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit "A")(Dunn, Chad) (Entered: 02/23/2012)
NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Docket Entry 8 Answer to Complaint was entered in error as a separate docket entry and will be refiled if/when the Motion to Intervene is granted. The proposed Answer remains as an exhibit to Docket Entry 9 Reply re 5 Motion to Intervene. (znmw, ) (Entered: 02/24/2012)
10 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on United States Attorney General. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney General 2/8/12., RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the United States Attorney. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney on 2/9/2012. ( Answer due for ALL FEDERAL DEFENDANTS by 4/9/2012.) (rdj) (Entered: 03/08/2012)
11 NOTICE of Determination by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Maranzano, Jennifer) (Entered: 03/12/2012)
12 ENTERED IN ERROR.....NOTICE of Appearance by Jennifer Lynn Maranzano on behalf of ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Maranzano, Jennifer) Modified on 3/12/2012 (rdj). (Entered: 03/12/2012)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by Jennifer Lynn Maranzano on behalf of ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Maranzano, Jennifer) (Entered: 03/12/2012)
NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: re 12 Notice of Appearance was entered in error and counsel is instructed to refile said pleading using their assigned password/login. ( Refer to LCvR 5.4(b) )(rdj) (Entered: 03/12/2012)
14 NOTICE of Appearance by Elizabeth Stewart Westfall on behalf of ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 03/12/2012)
15 MOTION to Intervene as Defendants by TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES, MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Complaint, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Proposed Answer, # 3 Memorandum in Support, # 4 Exhibit A, # 5 Exhibit B, # 6 Exhibit C, # 7 Text of Proposed Order, # 8 Certificate of Disclosure)(znmw, ) (Entered: 03/12/2012)

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03/12/2012
03/13/2012 03/14/2012 03/15/2012
03/15/2012 03/15/2012 03/15/2012 03/16/2012
03/19/2012 03/19/2012 03/19/2012
03/20/2012 03/20/2012 03/21/2012

16 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 1 to Amended Complaint, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 2 to Amended Complaint, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 3 to Amended Complaint, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 4 to Amended Complaint, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 5 to Amended Complaint, # 7 Exhibit Ex. 6 to Amended Complaint, # 8 Exhibit Ex. 7 to Amended Complaint, # 9 Text of Proposed Order Proposed order)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/12/2012)
NOTICE of Hearing: A Telephone Conference is set for 3/14/2012 at 4:30 PM before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 03/13/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins: Telephone Conference held on 3/14/2012. A further Telephone Conference is set for 3/21/2012 at 4:30 PM. (Court Reporter: Rebecca Stonestreet) (cdw) (Entered: 03/16/2012)
17 ORDER granting 5 Motion to Intervene; granting 15 Motion to Intervene; granting 16 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint; setting a telephone conference for March 21, 2012 at 4:30 p.m.; mandating that discovery regarding discriminatory purpose be completed by April 16, 2012; and setting forth a briefing schedule on the privilege issue. See order for further details. Signed by Judges David S. Tatel, Rosemary M. Collyer, and Robert L. Wilkins on 3/15/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 03/15/2012)
23 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by LORRAINE BIRABIL, ANNA BURNS, DANIEL CLAYTON, DAVID DE LA FUENTE, SERGIO DELEON, JANE HAMILTON, ERIC KENNIE, MICHAEL MONTEZ, PENNY POPE, MARC VEASY.(rdj) (Entered: 03/20/2012)
24 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES.(rdj) (Entered: 03/20/2012)
25 AMENDED COMPLAINT against ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7)(rdj) (Entered: 03/20/2012)
18 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Ezra D. Rosenberg, :Firm− Dechert LLP, :Address− 902 Carnegie Center, Suite 500, Princeton, NJ 08540. Phone No. − 609.955.3200. Fax No. − 609.955.3259 by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Ezra Rosenberg)(Posner, Mark) (Entered: 03/16/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 18 Motion for Leave for Ezra D. Rosenberg to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 3/19/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 03/19/2012)
19 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel J. Freeman on behalf of ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 03/19/2012)
21 MOTION to Intervene as Defendants by TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, BRIANNA WILLIAMS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Proposed Answer, # 4 Corporate Disclosure Statement)(znmw, ) (Entered: 03/20/2012)
20 NOTICE of Appearance by Bruce I. Gear on behalf of ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Gear, Bruce) (Entered: 03/20/2012)
22 NOTICE of Appearance by John Payton on behalf of IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, BRIANNA WILLIAMS (Payton, John) (Entered: 03/20/2012)
26 NOTICE of Joint Proposed Scheduling Order by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Joint Scheduling Order)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 03/21/2012)

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03/21/2012 03/21/2012
03/21/2012 03/21/2012 03/21/2012 03/22/2012 03/22/2012 03/22/2012
03/22/2012 03/22/2012 03/22/2012 03/22/2012 03/23/2012
03/23/2012

27 NOTICE of Appearance by Joseph Gerald Hebert on behalf of LORRAINE BIRABIL, ANNA BURNS, DANIEL CLAYTON, DAVID DE LA FUENTE, SERGIO DELEON, JANE HAMILTON, ERIC KENNIE, MICHAEL MONTEZ, PENNY POPE, MARC VEASY (Hebert, Joseph) (Entered: 03/21/2012)
28 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− RYAN P. HAYGOOD, NATASHA M. KORGAONKAR, and LEAH C. ADEN, :Firm− NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., :Address− 99 Hudson St., Suite 1600, New York, NY 10013. Phone No. − 212.965.2200. Fax No. − 212.226.7592 by IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, BRIANNA WILLIAMS (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Ryan P. Haygood, # 2 Declaration of Natasha M. Korgaonkar, # 3 Declaration of Leah C. Aden, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Payton, John) (Entered: 03/21/2012)
29 STATUS REPORT by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 03/21/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. A telephone conference is scheduled for April 3, 2012 at 2:00 p.m. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 3/21/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 03/21/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer: Telephone Conference held on 3/21/2012. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 03/23/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 21 Motion to Intervene and granting 28 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. The Intervenor−Defendants are permitted to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 3/22/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 03/22/2012)
30 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew Hamilton Frederick on behalf of STATE OF TEXAS (Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 03/22/2012)
31 ANSWER to 25 Amended Complaint by IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, BRIANNA WILLIAMS. Related document: 25 Amended Complaint filed by STATE OF TEXAS.(rdj) (Entered: 03/22/2012)
32 NOTICE of Appearance by Adam W. Aston on behalf of STATE OF TEXAS (Aston, Adam) (Entered: 03/22/2012)
33 NOTICE of ESI Agreement by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit ESI Agreement)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 03/22/2012)
34 MOTION for Protective Order by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition Letter, # 2 Exhibit RFPs, # 3 Exhibit ROGs, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/22/2012)
38 MOTION to Intervene as Defendants by TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS, JUSTICE SEEKERS, PETER JOHNSON, RONALD WRIGHT, DONALD WRIGHT (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(znmw, ) (Entered: 03/23/2012)
35 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Wendy Weiser, :Firm− The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School, :Address− 161 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 12, New York, NY 10013−1205. Phone No. − (646) 292−8318. Fax No. − (212) 463−7308 by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Declaration)(Posner, Mark) (Entered: 03/23/2012)
36 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Myrna Perez, :Firm− THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU LAW SCHOOL, :Address− 161 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 12, New York, NY 10013−1205. Phone No. − (646) 292−8329. Fax No. − (212) 463−7308 by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Declaration)(Posner,

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03/23/2012
03/23/2012 03/23/2012 03/23/2012 03/26/2012 03/27/2012 03/27/2012 03/27/2012
03/27/2012 03/27/2012 03/27/2012 03/27/2012 03/27/2012

Mark) (Entered: 03/23/2012)
37 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Ian Arthur Vandewalker, :Firm− The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School, :Address− 161 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 12, New York, NY 10013−1205. Phone No. − (646) 292−8362. Fax No. − (212) 463−7308 by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Declaration)(Posner, Mark) (Entered: 03/23/2012)
39 NOTICE by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 03/23/2012)
40 NOTICE of Filing by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Keith Ingram)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 03/23/2012)
42 MOTION to Intervene as Defendants by VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT, MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Proposed Answer, # 4 Corporate Disclosure Statement)(znmw, ) (Entered: 03/26/2012)
41 Memorandum in opposition to re 38 MOTION to Intervene filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit U.S.'s First Interrogatories, # 2 Exhibit Intervenors' First Interrogatories)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/26/2012)
43 SCHEDULING ORDER. Trial in this case is set for July 9, 2012. Fact discovery shall be completed by June 15, 2012. A pretrial conference is set for June 28, 2012 at 2:00 p.m. See order for further details. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 3/27/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 03/27/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 35 Motion for Leave for Wendy Weiser to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 36 Motion for Leave for Myrna Perez to Appear Pro Hac Vice; and granting 37 Motion for Leave for Ian Arthur Vandewalker to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 3/27/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 03/27/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. Pursuant to the telephone conference held today, the United States shall file a notice today with the relevant case law supporting its position that Texas law does not prohibit the disclosure of the database information it is seeking from Texas. Texas shall respond to this notice by 12:00 p.m. EST March 30, 2012. Additionally, by no later than 12:00 p.m. EST on March 29, 2012, Texas shall file a notice with the Court identifying each and every database for which it contends it cannot disclose relevant data. As part of this identification, Texas shall identify each field of data contained within the database (e.g., name, address, SSN, etc.) and which of these specific fields it contends it cannot disclose. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 3/27/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 03/27/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Fact Discovery closes6/15/2012. Bench Trial set for 7/9/2012 at 9:30 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins. Pretrial Conference set for 6/28/2012 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 8 before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins. (cdw) (Entered: 03/27/2012)
44 MOTION for Protective Order by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Protective Order, # 2 Exhibit Memorandum of Understanding)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 03/27/2012)
45 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Katie O'Connor, :Firm− ACLLU Foundation, :Address− 230 Peachtree St NW, Atlanta GA 30303. Phone No. − 404−523−2721. Fax No. − 404−653−0331 by TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS (Tanner, John) (Entered: 03/27/2012)
46 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Nancy G. Abudu, :Firm− ACLU Foundation, :Address− 230 Peachtree St NW Atlanta GA 30303. Phone No. − 404−523−2721. Fax No. − 404−653=0331 by TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS (Tanner, John) (Entered: 03/27/2012)
47 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− M. Laughlin McDonald, :Firm− ACLU Foundation, :Address− 230 Peachtree St. NW Atlanta GA

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03/27/2012 03/28/2012
03/28/2012 03/28/2012 03/28/2012 03/29/2012 03/29/2012 03/29/2012 03/29/2012
03/29/2012 03/29/2012 03/29/2012
03/29/2012 03/30/2012

30303. Phone No. − 404−523−2721. Fax No. − 404−653−0331 by TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS (Tanner, John) (Entered: 03/27/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer: Telephone Conference held on 3/27/2012. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 03/28/2012)
48 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Michelle Hart Yeary, :Firm− Dechert LLP, :Address− 902 Carnegie Center Suite 500 Princeton, NJ 08540. Phone No. − 609 955−3200. Fax No. − 609 955−3295 by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Attachments: # 1 Declaration)(Posner, Mark) (Entered: 03/28/2012)
49 RULE 26a1 STATEMENT. (Korgaonkar, Natasha) (Entered: 03/28/2012)
50 NOTICE OF DEATH OF COUNSEL by IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, BRIANNA WILLIAMS (Haygood, Ryan) (Entered: 03/28/2012)
51 REPLY to opposition to motion re 38 MOTION to Intervene filed by TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS. (Tanner, John) (Entered: 03/28/2012)
52 NOTICE of confidential database information by STATE OF TEXAS (Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
53 ANSWER to 25 Amended Complaint by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. Related document: 25 Amended Complaint filed by STATE OF TEXAS.(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
54 Memorandum in opposition to re 44 MOTION for Protective Order filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Kennie Criminal History)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
55 Memorandum in opposition to re 34 MOTION for Protective Order filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
56 NOTICE of Appearance by Meredith E.B. Bell−Platts on behalf of ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Bell−Platts, Meredith) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
57 Memorandum in opposition to re 34 MOTION for Protective Order filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
58 MEMORANDUM in Support re 44 MOTION for Protective Order, and in Opposition re 52 NOTICE of confidential database information filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Rosenberg, Ezra) Modified to add link on 3/30/2012 (znmw, ). (Entered: 03/29/2012)
59 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Reply Memorandum)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
MINUTE ORDER re 44 MOTION for Protective Order filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. The Court will enter the protective order proposed by the United States with the following insertion: A producing party may elect to identify Confidential Information as "eyes only" or similarly to restrict its use to attorneys of record, their associates, staff and assistants working on this litigation, and their experts and experts' staffs. Information, documents, and databases so marked shall be returned, including all copies, to the producing party at the end of the litigation including appeals if any. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 3/30/2012. (lcrmc2, ) (Entered: 03/30/2012)

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 30 of 63

03/30/2012
03/30/2012 03/30/2012
03/30/2012 03/30/2012 04/02/2012
04/02/2012 04/03/2012
04/03/2012 04/03/2012 04/03/2012 04/04/2012 04/04/2012

MINUTE ORDER. The United States and Texas shall be prepared for oral argumentation on Texas's 34 Motion for Protective Order at the April 3, 2012 telephone conference. It is not anticipated, unless the panel has specific questions for the Defendant−Intervenors, that the Court will hear argumentation from the Defendant−Intervenors. The telephone conference is scheduled for one hour. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 3/30/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 03/30/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. The State of Texas is directed and ordered to turn over the full social security numbers to the Department of Justice with its Driver's License database today, March 30, 2012. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 3/30/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 03/30/2012)
MINUTE ORDER superseding prior MINUTE ORDER. Per the telephone conference, Texas is directed and ordered to produce to the United States Attorney's Office in Austin, TX the full social security numbers along with the other information produced in the Driver's License database on April 2, 2012 by no later than the hour identified by the United States Attorney's Office for overnight courier delivery to Washington, D.C. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 3/30/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 03/30/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer: Telephone Conference held on 3/30/2012. (cdw) (Entered: 04/02/2012)
65 PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins on March 30, 2012. (cdw) (Entered: 04/04/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 45 Motion for Leave for Katie O'Connor to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 46 Motion for Leave for Nancy G. Abudu to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 47 Motion for Leave for M. Laughlin McDonald to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 48 Motion for Leave for Michelle Hart Yeary to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Mr. McDonald has appeared five times before this Court pro hac vice within the past five years. He is directed to submit an application to become a member of the bar forthwith. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/2/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/02/2012)
60 REPLY to opposition to motion re 34 MOTION for Protective Order filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Letter to DOJ)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/02/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. At oral argument on 34 Texas's motion for protective order, the United States indicated that it can submit information that provides a factual basis in support of its request for discovery from Texas legislators. The United States is ordered to submit, by no later than April 10, 2012, such information. Texas may respond no later than April 13, 2012. In light of these deadlines, the April 9, 2012 deadline requiring depositions to commence and the April 20, 2012 deadline for the United States to inform the Court whether it intends to assert discriminatory purpose (set forth in the Court's 17 and 43 Scheduling Orders) are VACATED. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/3/2012. (lcrmc2, ) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
61 MOTION for Leave to File document under seal by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
62 NOTICE OF FILING REDACTED DOCUMENT by STATE OF TEXAS (The original PDF Document contained privacy information and was restricted pursuant to the E−Government Act.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Redacted Kennie Arrest Record)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins: Telephone Conference held on 4/3/2012. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 04/04/2012)
63 ERRATA by STATE OF TEXAS 25 Amended Complaint filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Errata Amended Complaint)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/04/2012)
64 Amended MOTION to Intervene by PETER JOHNSON, JUSTICE SEEKERS, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, DONALD WRIGHT, RONALD WRIGHT (Attachments: # 1 Text of

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04/05/2012 04/05/2012 04/05/2012 04/05/2012 04/09/2012 04/10/2012 04/10/2012
04/10/2012 04/11/2012 04/11/2012 04/11/2012 04/12/2012
04/12/2012

Proposed Order)(Abudu, Nancy) (Entered: 04/04/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 61 Motion for Leave to seal document. Exhibit 1 to 44 Opposition to Motion for Protective Order shall be sealed. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/5/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
ORDER denying as moot 59 Motion for Leave to File Reply. The Court has entered, with minor changes, the protective order requested by the United States. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/5/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
66 NOTICE of Appearance by Dale E. Ho on behalf of IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, BRIANNA WILLIAMS (Ho, Dale) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
67 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Gary L. Bledsoe, :Firm− Law Office of Gary L. Bledsoe and Associates, :Address− 316 W. 12th Street, #307, Austin, TX 78701. Phone No. − 5123229992. Fax No. − 5123220840 by TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Notzon, Robert) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
68 ANSWER to 25 Amended Complaint by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. Related document: 25 Amended Complaint filed by STATE OF TEXAS.(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 04/09/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. A telephone conference regarding the parties' discovery dispute is set for 3:00 p.m. this afternoon. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/10/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/10/2012)
69 MEMORANDUM re Telephone Conference by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit, # 20 Exhibit, # 21 Exhibit, # 22 Exhibit, # 23 Exhibit, # 24 Exhibit, # 25 Exhibit, # 26 Exhibit, # 27 Exhibit, # 28 Exhibit, # 29 Exhibit, # 30 Exhibit, # 31 Exhibit, # 32 Exhibit, # 33 Exhibit, # 34 Exhibit, # 35 Exhibit, # 36 Exhibit)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 04/10/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer: Telephone Conference held on 4/10/2012. A further Telephone Conference is set for 4/16/2012 at 12:30 PM before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 04/16/2012)
70 NOTICE Regarding Production of Legislative History by STATE OF TEXAS (Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 04/11/2012)
71 NOTICE of Appearance by Debo P. Adegbile on behalf of IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, BRIANNA WILLIAMS (Adegbile, Debo) (Entered: 04/11/2012)
72 NOTICE of Appearance by Jon M. Greenbaum on behalf of MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Greenbaum, Jon) (Entered: 04/11/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. To memorialize the Order issued by the Court at the telephonic hearing in this matter on April 10, 2012, the State of Texas shall turn over all relevant fields in the driver's license database and the concealed handgun database to the intervenors in the same manner they were turned over to the United States except that the social security numbers in each database shall be limited to the last four digits. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/12/12. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/12/2012)
73 NOTICE Advisory Regarding Motion to Intervene by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT (Perales, Nina) (Entered: 04/12/2012)

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04/13/2012
04/13/2012 04/13/2012 04/13/2012 04/13/2012 04/13/2012
04/13/2012 04/16/2012 04/16/2012 04/17/2012 04/17/2012 04/17/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 38 Motion to Intervene; granting 42 Motion to Intervene; granting 64 Motion to Intervene. The intervenors are bound by the Court's scheduling and other orders (including the combined limitation on interrogatories). All intervenors in this case shall identify a single attorney to examine a deponent at any deposition. The questioning at trial will likewise be limited. Furthermore, the intervenors shall appoint a single attorney to be the administrative contact point with the Court and all briefing done by the intervenors shall be consolidated. The intervenors are cautioned to avoid duplication of efforts. Should preclearance be denied, the Court will not grant fee requests for duplicative work. Finally, given the expedited nature of this case and the fact that it was filed nearly three months ago, the Court is unlikely to grant further requests to intervene. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/13/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
74 ANSWER to 25 Amended Complaint by PETER JOHNSON, JUSTICE SEEKERS, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, DONALD WRIGHT, RONALD WRIGHT. Related document: 25 Amended Complaint filed by STATE OF TEXAS.(Abudu, Nancy) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
75 ANSWER to 25 Amended Complaint by PETER JOHNSON, JUSTICE SEEKERS, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, DONALD WRIGHT, RONALD WRIGHT. Related document: 25 Amended Complaint filed by STATE OF TEXAS.(rdj) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
76 LCvR 7.1 CERTIFICATE OF DISCLOSURE of Corporate Affiliations and Financial Interests by JUSTICE SEEKERS, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS identifying Corporate Parent NONE for JUSTICE SEEKERS, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS. (rdj) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
77 ANSWER to 25 Amended Complaint by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT. Related document: 25 Amended Complaint filed by STATE OF TEXAS.(rdj) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
78 LCvR 7.1 CERTIFICATE OF DISCLOSURE of Corporate Affiliations and Financial Interests by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT identifying Corporate Parent NONE for MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ. (rdj) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
79 REPLY filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer: Telephone Conference held on 4/16/2012. A further Telephone Conference is set for 4/17/2012 at 12:30 PM before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 04/16/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer: Telephone Conference held on 4/16/2012. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 04/24/2012)
MINUTE ORDER denying without prejudice 67 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. No affidavit was attached to the motion demonstrating compliance with the local rules. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/17/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/17/2012)
80 NOTICE of Disputed Discovery Issues by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Maranzano, Jennifer) (Entered: 04/17/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. The United States shall, by no later than April 23, 2012, file its motion with the Court regarding "clarification" of the present July 9, 2012 trial date. Texas may respond no later than April 26, 2012. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/17/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/17/2012)

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04/17/2012 04/17/2012 04/19/2012 04/19/2012
04/20/2012 04/20/2012 04/20/2012 04/23/2012 04/23/2012
04/23/2012 04/23/2012 04/24/2012 04/24/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Motion re clarification due by 4/23/2012. Response due by 4/26/2012. (cdw) (Entered: 04/18/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer: Telephone Conference held on 4/17/2012. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 04/24/2012)
81 ANSWER to 25 Amended Complaint by LORRAINE BIRABIL, ANNA BURNS, DANIEL CLAYTON, DAVID DE LA FUENTE, SERGIO DELEON, JANE HAMILTON, ERIC KENNIE, MICHAEL MONTEZ, PENNY POPE, MARC VEASY. Related document: 25 Amended Complaint filed by STATE OF TEXAS.(Dunn, Chad) (Entered: 04/19/2012)
82 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Elise C. Boddie, :Firm− NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., :Address− 99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600. Phone No. − 212−965−2200. Fax No. − 212−226−7592 by IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, BRIANNA WILLIAMS (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Elise C. Boddie, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Ho, Dale) (Entered: 04/19/2012)
83 NOTICE Regarding Subpoena by STATE OF TEXAS (Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 82 Motion for Leave for Elise C. Boddie to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/20/2012. (lcrmc2) Modified on 4/23/2012 (ztnr, ). (Entered: 04/20/2012)
84 ORDER denying 34 Motion for Protective Order without prejudice. See order for further details. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/20/212. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
85 MOTION to Clarify Trial Schedule by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 04/23/2012)
86 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Douglas H. Flaum, Michael B. de Leeuw, Adam M. Harris, :Firm− Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, :Address− One New York Plaza, 24th Floor, New York, NY 10004. Phone No. − 212−859−8259. by IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, BRIANNA WILLIAMS (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Douglas H. Flaum, # 2 Declaration of Michael B. de Leeuw, # 3 Declaration of Adam M. Harris, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Ho, Dale) (Entered: 04/23/2012)
87 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Gary L. Bledsoe, :Firm− Law Office of Gary L. Bledsoe and Associates, :Address− 316 W. 12th Street, #307, Austin, TX 78701. Phone No. − 5123229992. Fax No. − 5123220840 by TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Notzon, Robert) (Entered: 04/23/2012)
88 MOTION to Clarify Schedule by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit)(Maranzano, Jennifer) (Entered: 04/24/2012)
ORDER granting 86 Motion for Leave for Douglas H. Flaum, Michael B. de Leeuw, and Adam M. Harris to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 87 Motion for Leave for Gary L. Bledsoe to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/24/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/24/2012)
89 NOTICE of Legislative Privilege Assertion by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit March 30, 2012 Ltr from from Mitchell to Westfall)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/24/2012)

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04/25/2012 04/25/2012
04/25/2012 04/25/2012 04/25/2012

90 NOTICE Amended Notice of Legislative Privilege Assertion by STATE OF TEXAS re 89 Notice (Other) (Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 04/25/2012)
91 NOTICE of Appearance by Arthur B. Spitzer on behalf of PETER JOHNSON, JUSTICE SEEKERS, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, DONALD WRIGHT, RONALD WRIGHT (Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 04/25/2012)
ENTERED IN ERROR............Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Answer to the Complaint due by 6/12/2012. (cdw) Modified on 4/25/2012 (cdw, ). (Entered: 04/25/2012)
NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Answer deadline was entered in error, please disregard. (cdw) (Entered: 04/25/2012)
92 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer held on 4/16/12; Page Numbers: 109. Date of Issuance:4/17/12. Court Reporter/Transcriber Crystal M. Pilgrim, Telephone number 202.354.3127, Court Reporter Email Address : crystalpilgrim@aol.com.

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.

04/25/2012 04/26/2012 04/27/2012
04/27/2012 04/27/2012 04/30/2012
04/30/2012

Redaction Request due 5/16/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/26/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/24/2012.(Pilgrim, Crystal) (Entered: 04/25/2012)
93 MOTION to Compel the Production of Documents and Privilege Logs by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Text of Proposed Order, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 04/25/2012)
94 NOTICE Concerning Federal Databases by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Maranzano, Jennifer) (Entered: 04/26/2012)
95 RESPONSE re 88 MOTION to Clarify Schedule, 85 MOTION to Clarify Trial Schedule filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 8)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
96 NOTICE of Appearance by Patrick Kinney Sweeten on behalf of STATE OF TEXAS (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
97 RESPONSE re 94 Notice (Other) Advisory Regarding Discovery filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. As stated at the telephone conference today, Texas is ORDERED to turn over to Defendants the eight fields of data identified by the parties in the concealed handgun license database, i.e. (1) Hispanic/nonHispanic, (2) citizenship, (3) driver's license, (4) expired license to carry, (5) license rescinded/withdrawn/suspended, (6) deceased, (7) license application status, and (8) gender. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/30/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/30/2012)
98 RESPONSE re 93 MOTION to Compel the Production of Documents and Privilege Logs filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Jeff Archer, # 2 Declaration Sen. Thomas Williams, # 3 Declaration Rep. Dennis Bonnen, # 4 Declaration Rep. David Simpson, # 5 Declaration David S. Morales, # 6 Declaration

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04/30/2012 05/01/2012 05/01/2012 05/01/2012
05/02/2012 05/03/2012
05/03/2012 05/03/2012 05/03/2012 05/03/2012 05/03/2012 05/04/2012 05/04/2012
05/04/2012

Rep. Patricia Harless)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/30/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer: Telephone Conference held on 4/30/2012. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 05/01/2012)
99 ORDER requiring the parties to attend a status conference on May 3, 2012 at 3:00 p.m. See order for further details. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/1/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/01/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference set for 5/3/2012 at 3:00 PM in Courtroom 8 before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins. (cdw) (Entered: 05/01/2012)
100 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Amy Pedersen, :Firm− MALDEF, :Address− 1016 16th Street NW, #100, Washington, DC 20036. Phone No. − (202) 293−2828. Fax No. − (202) 735−6585 by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Amy Pedersen, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Perales, Nina) (Entered: 05/01/2012)
101 NOTICE Advisory on Database Production by STATE OF TEXAS (Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 05/02/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. Texas shall, by May 4, 2012, provide to Defendants the following additional fields in its T.E.A.M. database: (1) residential/home address, (2) mailing address, (3) assigned voting precinct, (4) language code, (5) registration date, (6) effective date of registration, (7) gender information as to cancellation of registration and reason for cancellation, (8) source code information, (9) voting history as set for in TX's May 3, 2012 Advisory. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/3/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 100 Motion for Leave for Amy Pedersen to Appear Pro Hac Vice while her application to the bar of this Court is pending. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/3/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/03/2012)
102 NOTICE of Appearance by Risa Berkower on behalf of ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 05/03/2012)
103 MOTION for Protective Order by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 05/03/2012)
104 REPLY to opposition to motion re 93 MOTION to Compel the Production of Documents and Privilege Logs filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3−16−12 Transcript, # 2 Exhibit TLC Privilege Log, # 3 Exhibit Hanna Email)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 05/03/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins: Status Conference held on 5/3/2012. Witness: Keith Ingram. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
105 NOTICE of Database Production Status by STATE OF TEXAS (Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
MINUTE ORDER: The parties are hereby ORDERED to file a joint report no later than 5:00 p.m. EST Tuesday, May 8, 2012, advising the Court of the status of database discovery. If any Defendants or Defendant−Intervenors contend that the databases produced are incomplete, in an incorrect format, or otherwise non−compliant, that party shall submit an affidavit from their expert witness(es) no later than 5:00 p.m. EST Tuesday, May 8, 2012, setting forth in detail: 1) why the production was inadequate or non−compliant; and 2) what steps need to be taken to cure the deficiency so that the expert witness is able to conduct his/her analysis. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/4/2012. (lcrmc1) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Joint Report due by 5/8/2012. (cdw) (Entered: 05/07/2012)

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05/07/2012 05/07/2012 05/07/2012 05/07/2012 05/08/2012 05/09/2012
05/09/2012 05/09/2012 05/09/2012 05/09/2012 05/09/2012 05/10/2012

Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 5/8/2012 at 3:15 PM before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer. (cdw) (Entered: 05/07/2012)
106 NOTICE Concerning Federal Non−Party Databases by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 05/07/2012)
107 ORDER regarding discovery and pre−trial deadlines. See order for full details. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 5/7/2012.(lcrlw2) (Entered: 05/07/2012)
108 NOTICE Advisory Regarding Database Production by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 05/07/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins: Telephone Conference held on 5/8/2012. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 05/09/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court's Order to file a joint report on databases is continued to May 11, 2012 at 5:00 p.m. If any Defendant or Defendant−Intervenor contends that the databases produced by Texas are incomplete, in an incorrect format, or otherwise non−compliant, that party shall submit an affidavit from its expert witness(es) no later than 5:00 p.m. EST May 11, 2012, setting forth in detail: 1) why the production was inadequate or non−compliant; and 2) what steps need to be taken to cure the deficiency so that the expert witness is able to conduct his/her analysis. It is further ordered that Texas shall produce the databases it has failed to produce forthwith. By no later than May 8, 2012, Texas shall produce to the Defendant−Intervenors the drivers license database and concealed handgun database with the relevant fields and truncated SSNs as previously ordered. By no later than May 9, 2012, Texas shall produce to the United States an updated voter registration database with full SSNs and shall produce to the Defendant−Intervenors the voter registration database with truncated SSNs as previously ordered. By no later than May 9, 2012 at 5:00 p.m., Texas shall notify the Defendants of the number of Texas registered voters it has identified who do not appear to have a requisite photographic identification. The United States shall, as soon as practicable and by no later than May 11, 2012, canvas the relevant federal agencies to determine what protective order(s) may be necessary to allow release of information requested by Texas and provide same to the Court and parties; coordinate consultations between agency IT personnel and Texas IT personnel; and inform Texas to whom to send Rule 45 subpoenas. Additionally, by no later than May 15, 2012, the United States shall file a notice indicating how long it will take each relevant agency to produce the requested information from the federal databases according to the number of persons identified by Texas for whom it seeks information. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/9/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/09/2012)
109 NOTICE of filing under seal by STATE OF TEXAS (Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 05/09/2012)
110 MOTION for Leave to File document under seal by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 05/09/2012)
111 MOTION for Extension of Time to RESPOND TO THE COURTS ORDER REGARDING TRIAL SCHEDULE AND DEADLINES by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 05/09/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 111 Motion for Extension of Time. Texas shall respond to the Court's ordering regarding a certification no later than May 9, 2012 at 8:00 p.m. EST. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/9/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/09/2012)
112 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 107 Order Regarding Scheduling filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 05/09/2012)
113 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− K. Scott Brazil, :Firm− Brazil & Dunn, :Address− 4201 Cypress Creek Parkway, Ste. 530, Houston, TX 77068. Phone No. − 281−580−6310. Fax No. − 281−680−6362 by LORRAINE BIRABIL, ANNA BURNS, DANIEL CLAYTON, DAVID DE LA FUENTE, SERGIO DELEON, JANE HAMILTON, ERIC KENNIE, MICHAEL MONTEZ, PENNY POPE, MARC VEASY (Attachments: # 1 Declaration)(Dunn, Chad) (Entered: 05/10/2012)

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05/10/2012 05/10/2012
05/11/2012
05/11/2012 05/11/2012 05/11/2012 05/11/2012 05/11/2012 05/15/2012 05/16/2012 05/17/2012 05/17/2012 05/17/2012 05/18/2012
05/18/2012

114 MOTION for Leave to File Opposition Under Seal by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 05/10/2012)
115 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Rebecca Robertson, :Firm− ACLU Foundation of Texas, :Address− 1500 McGowen, Suite 250, Houston, TX 77288. Phone No. − 173−942−8146 ex 116. by LA UNION DEL PUEBLO ENTERO, PETER JOHNSON, JUSTICE SEEKERS, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS, SOUTHWEST WORKERS UNION, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, DONALD WRIGHT, RONALD WRIGHT (McDonald, Laughlin) (Entered: 05/10/2012)
116 MOTION to Appoint Counsel, MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Karolina J. Lyznik, :Firm− MALDEF, :Address− 110 Broadway, Suite 300, San Antonio, TX 78205. Phone No. − (210) 224−5476. Fax No. − (210) 224−5382 by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Karolina Lyznik, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Perales, Nina) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
117 RESPONSE re 103 MOTION for Protective Order filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 113 Motion for Leave for Scott Brazil to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 115 Motion for Leave for Rebecca Robertson to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 116 Motion for Leave for Karolina J. Lyznik to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/11/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
118 NOTICE of Filing by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Gary King)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
119 NOTICE Concerning Database Discovery by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 107 Order (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
120 NOTICE Concerning Non−Party Federal Agency Databases by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 05/11/2012)
121 NOTICE Concerning Federal Non−Party Databases (Fourth) by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 05/15/2012)
Minute Entry: Status Conference held on 5/16/2012 before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer: Order forthcoming. (Court Reporter Crystal Pilgrim) (tb, ) (Entered: 05/17/2012)
122 ORDER resolving discovery dispute between the United States and Texas regarding questioning of Texas legislators. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 5/17/2012. (Wilkins, Robert) (Entered: 05/17/2012)
123 ORDER setting telephonic status conference for 5/18/12 at 9:45 a.m. in Courtroom 8. See Order for full details. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 5/17/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 05/17/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 5/18/2012 at 9:45 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins. (cdw) (Entered: 05/17/2012)
124 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− John M. Hughes, :Firm− Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP, :Address− 1899 Wynkoop Street, 8th Floor, Denver, CO 80202. Phone No. − (303) 592−3113. by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 05/18/2012)
125 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Adam Karl Mortara, :Firm− Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP, :Address− 54 West Hubbard Street, Suite 300, Chicago, IL 60654. Phone No. − (312) 494−4400. by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Mitchell,

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05/18/2012 05/18/2012 05/18/2012 05/21/2012 05/21/2012 05/21/2012 05/21/2012 05/21/2012 05/21/2012 05/21/2012 05/21/2012
05/21/2012 05/21/2012
05/22/2012

Jonathan) (Entered: 05/18/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins: Telephone Conference held on 5/18/2012. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 05/18/2012)
126 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 122 Order Texas Advisory Concerning Discovery Requests filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 05/18/2012)
127 REPLY to opposition to motion re 103 MOTION for Protective Order filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 05/18/2012)
128 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 93 Motion to Compel. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/21/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/21/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 124 Motion for Leave for John M. Hughes to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 125 Motion for Leave for Adam Karl Mortara to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/21/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/21/2012)
129 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 05/21/2012)
130 MOTION to Compel by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit 9, # 12 Exhibit 10, # 13 Exhibit 11)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 05/21/2012)
131 NOTICE Advisory to the Court Regarding Defendants' Defective notice of Deposition of Lt. Governor Dewhurst by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 05/21/2012)
132 MOTION for Protective Order by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 05/21/2012)
133 MOTION for Protective Order Concerning Non−Party Deposition by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 2)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2012)
134 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Deposition Testimony by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 05/21/2012)
135 MOTION to Clarify and Re−set Date by Which Defendant−Intervenors' Expert Reports Are Due by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 05/21/2012)
136 MOTION to Compel by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit 1: Beuck Deposition, # 4 Exhibit 2: Fraser Deposition, # 5 Exhibit 3: Harless Deposition, # 6 Exhibit 4: McCoy Deposition, # 7 Exhibit 5: US RFPs, # 8 Exhibit 6: Tex RFP Response, # 9 Exhibit 7: May 11 Privilege Log, # 10 Exhibit 8: Harless Docs, # 11 Exhibit 9: Dewhurst Docs, # 12 Exhibit 10: Objection Letter, # 13 Exhibit 11: Busbee Docket, # 14 Exhibit 12: Busbee Order, # 15 Exhibit 13: Contested Privilege Index, # 16 Exhibit 14: Waivers, # 17 Exhibit 15: Sweeten Email, # 18 Exhibit 16: Tex ROG Response, # 19 Exhibit 17: Dewhurst Release)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2012)
137 ORDER denying 85 Motion to Clarify and denying 88 Motion to Clarify to the extent said motions sought to continue July 9, 2012 trial date. See attached Order for full details. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 5/22/2012. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 05/22/2012)

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05/22/2012 05/23/2012 05/23/2012
05/23/2012 05/23/2012 05/24/2012 05/24/2012 05/24/2012 05/24/2012 05/24/2012 05/24/2012 05/24/2012 05/24/2012 05/24/2012
05/24/2012

ORDER denying 135 Motion to Clarify for the reasons stated in the Court's Order located at Docket No. 137. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 5/22/2012. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 05/22/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 129 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/23/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/23/2012)
MINUTE ORDER denying 110 Motion for Leave to File Document under Seal; denying 114 Motion for Leave to File Opposition under Seal. To the extent that non−responsive information was inadvertently disclosed in the database productions (e.g., data from fields that were not requested), that information shall be treated as confidential and is protected under the Courts current 65 protective order. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/23/2012. (lcrmc2, ) (Entered: 05/23/2012)
138 MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Order Regarding Privilege Logs by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 05/23/2012)
139 NOTICE Advisory Regarding Updated Privilege Logs by STATE OF TEXAS re 128 Order on Motion to Compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Office of the Governor Privilege Log, # 2 Exhibit Texas Legislative Council Privilege Log)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 05/23/2012)
140 NOTICE Concerning Deposition of Representative Berman by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 132 MOTION for Protective Order (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
141 ORDER granting 103 Motion for Protective Order. See order for further details. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/24/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. In light of the Attorney General's 140 notice advising that he has withdrawn his notice to depose Representative Berman, the Court denies Texas's 132 Motion for Protective Order as moot. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/24/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
142 NOTICE of Appearance by Douglas H. Flaum on behalf of IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, BRIANNA WILLIAMS (Flaum, Douglas) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
143 NOTICE of Appearance by Adam M. Harris on behalf of IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, BRIANNA WILLIAMS (Harris, Adam) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
144 NOTICE of Appearance by Amy Pedersen on behalf of MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT (Pedersen, Amy) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting, nunc pro tunc, Texas's 138 Motion for Extension of Time to produce updated privilege logs. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/24/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
145 NOTICE Concerning Email Privilege Log by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 136 MOTION to Compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − May 22 Email, # 2 Exhibit Supp Log Pt 1, # 3 Exhibit Supp Log Pt 2, # 4 Exhibit Supp Index)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
146 RESPONSE re 130 MOTION to Compel and Cross−Motion for Protective Order filed by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Perales, Nina) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
147 Memorandum in opposition to re 130 MOTION to Compel filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − May 23 Email)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 05/24/2012)

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05/24/2012 05/24/2012 05/25/2012 05/25/2012 05/25/2012
05/25/2012 05/25/2012 05/26/2012 05/28/2012 05/29/2012 05/29/2012
05/29/2012 05/29/2012 05/29/2012

148 RESPONSE re 136 MOTION to Compel filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
150 MOTION for Protective Order by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT (See Docket Entry 146 to view document. Counsel is instructed to docket the motion as a separate docket entry in the future)(rdj) (Entered: 05/25/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting, as conceded, 133 Motion for Protective Order. Texas failed to file an opposition by the May 24, 2012 deadline set forth in this Court's 107 & 137 Orders. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/25/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/25/2012)
149 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael Birney de Leeuw on behalf of IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, BRIANNA WILLIAMS (de Leeuw, Michael) (Entered: 05/25/2012)
MINUTE ORDER: The United States is hereby ORDERED to file and serve on the State of Texas by 9:00 p.m. EST today (May 25, 2012) a list of every contested document at issue in the specific privilege dispute the United States raised with the Court on May 25, 2012. The State of Texas is hereby ORDERED to submit a copy of all the documents in the United States' list under seal and ex parte no later than 1:00 p.m. EST on Saturday, May 26, 2012 for in camera review. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 5/25/2012. (lcrlw2, ) (Entered: 05/25/2012)
151 NOTICE of Compliance with Minute Order by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Contested Document Index)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 05/25/2012)
152 MOTION to Compel by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit 1 − OOG Log, # 4 Exhibit 2 − TLC Log, # 5 Exhibit 3 − OOG Index, # 6 Exhibit 4 − TLC Index)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 05/25/2012)
153 NOTICE of Compliance with the Court's May 25, 2012 Minute Order by STATE OF TEXAS (Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 05/26/2012)
154 ORDER regarding Lieutenant Governor Privilege Discovery Dispute. See Order for full details. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 5/28/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit) (lcrlw2) (Entered: 05/28/2012)
155 REPLY to opposition to motion re 134 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents and Deposition Testimony filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 05/29/2012)
156 REPLY to opposition to motion re 136 MOTION to Compel filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Tex. v. U.S. Tr., # 2 Exhibit 2 − Election Code Cases(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.), # 3 Exhibit 3 − Harless Website, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Al Dia Article, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Texas Watchdog Article, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Texas GOP Interview)(Freeman, Daniel) Modified on 5/30/2012 (rdj). (Entered: 05/29/2012)
157 RESPONSE re 152 MOTION to Compel filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Privilege log, # 2 Exhibit Privilege log, # 3 Exhibit Privilege log, # 4 Exhibit Governor updated privilege log, # 5 Declaration Archer Declaration, # 6 Affidavit Geren Affidavit, # 7 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 05/29/2012)
158 RESPONSE re 145 Notice (Other) filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Email from Mckenzie to Freeman & Rosenberg, # 2 Exhibit Privilege log, # 3 Exhibit Privilege log, # 4 Exhibit Privilege log)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 05/29/2012)
159 REPLY to opposition to motion re 130 MOTION to Compel filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 05/29/2012)

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05/29/2012 05/29/2012 05/30/2012 05/30/2012 05/30/2012 05/31/2012 06/01/2012
06/05/2012
06/05/2012 06/05/2012
06/05/2012
06/05/2012 06/05/2012 06/06/2012 06/06/2012 06/06/2012 06/07/2012

160 REPLY to opposition to motion re 130 MOTION to Compel by Defendant−Intervenors filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 05/29/2012)
161 MOTION to Modify : Seal Exhibit by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 05/29/2012)
162 NOTICE of Appearance by John William McKenzie on behalf of STATE OF TEXAS (McKenzie, John) (Entered: 05/30/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 161 Motion to Modify. Exhibit # 2 to 156 Reply is sealed. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/30/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/30/2012)
163 REPLY to opposition to motion re 152 MOTION to Compel filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 05/30/2012)
164 MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 05/31/2012)
165 Memorandum in opposition to re 164 MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 06/01/2012)
166 MOTION to Compel by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit 9, # 12 Exhibit 10, # 13 Exhibit 11, # 14 Exhibit 12)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 06/05/2012)
167 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 134 Motion to Compel; granting in part and denying in part 136 Motion to Compel. See Order for further details. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/5/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/05/2012)
168 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− DONITA JUDGE, :Firm− Advancement Project, :Address− 1220 L Street, NW, Suite 850 Washington, DC 20005. Phone No. − (202) 728−9557. Fax No. − (202) 728−9558 by LA UNION DEL PUEBLO ENTERO, PETER JOHNSON, JUSTICE SEEKERS, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS, SOUTHWEST WORKERS UNION, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, DONALD WRIGHT, RONALD WRIGHT (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Donita Judge, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Haygood, Ryan) (Entered: 06/05/2012)
MINUTE ORDER: The State of Texas is hereby ORDERED to submit a copy of the following documents listed in the revised Governors Office privilege log [Dkt. 152−3] under seal and ex parte no later than noon EST on Wednesday, June 6, 2012, for in camera review: TX_00057456−TX_00057475; TX_00057699−TX_00057718; TX_00057719−TX_00057743; TX_00057744−TX_00057746. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/5/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/05/2012)
169 RESPONSE re 164 MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/05/2012)
170 MOTION to Modify the Court's May 7, 2012 Scheduling Order by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/05/2012)
MINUTE ORDER: The State of Texas is hereby ORDERED to respond to the United States' Motion to Compel at Dkt. No. 166 no later than 5:00 p.m. EST on June 7, 2012. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 6/6/2012. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 06/06/2012)
171 Joint MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 06/06/2012)
172 NOTICE of Correction by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 166 MOTION to Compel (Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/06/2012)
173 RESPONSE re 170 MOTION to Modify the Court's May 7, 2012 Scheduling Order filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 42 of 63

06/07/2012 06/07/2012 06/07/2012 06/07/2012
06/07/2012
06/08/2012 06/08/2012
06/08/2012 06/08/2012 06/08/2012 06/11/2012 06/11/2012
06/13/2012 06/13/2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 06/07/2012)
174 Joint MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 06/07/2012)
175 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 152 Motion to Compel. Signed by Circuit Judge David S. Tatel on 6/7/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/07/2012)
176 RESPONSE re 166 MOTION to Compel filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 06/07/2012)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 174 Joint MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order filed by TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES, MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. It is hereby ORDERED that the Scheduling Order is modified to extend the deadline for service of any expert rebuttal reports from June 8, 2012 to June 11, 2012 at 11:59 PM EST. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 6/7/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 06/07/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 171 Joint Motion to Modify Scheduling Order. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Scheduling Order is hereby modified to extend the close of expert discovery to June 25, 2012. It is FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall file any supplemental findings of fact related to expert discovery no later than July 2, 2012. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 6/7/2012. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 06/07/2012)
177 REPLY to opposition to motion re 166 MOTION to Compel filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 06/08/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. Having been advised of a discovery dispute, the Court Orders that the deposition of Rep. Harless be reopened for a period not to exceed one hour and be limited to questions about contacts with constituents and other members of the public. The deposition shall also be taken in accord with this Court's 167 Order on Motion to Compel. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/8/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/08/2012)
MINUTE ORDER provisionally granting 168 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice and directing Ms. Judge to file an application to join the Bar of this Court forthwith. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/8/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/08/2012)
178 RESPONSE re 170 MOTION to Modify the Court's May 7, 2012 Scheduling Order filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/08/2012)
179 ORDER denying 130 Motion to Compel; finding as moot 150 Motion for Protective Order. See Order for details. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 6/08/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 06/08/2012)
180 REPLY re 170 MOTION to Modify the Court's May 7, 2012 Scheduling Order filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Revised Proposed Order)(Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
181 MOTION to Withdraw BRIANNA WILLIAMS AS DEFENDANT−INTERVENOR by IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, BRIANNA WILLIAMS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Korgaonkar, Natasha) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
182 MOTION Protective Order by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/13/2012)
183 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 164 Motion to Modify; granting in part and denying in part 170 Motion to Modify. See Order for further details. Signed by

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06/13/2012 06/13/2012 06/14/2012
06/14/2012 06/14/2012 06/15/2012 06/18/2012
06/18/2012 06/18/2012
06/19/2012
06/19/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012

Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/13/12. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/13/2012)
184 NOTICE of Appearance by Spencer R. Fisher on behalf of ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Fisher, Spencer) (Entered: 06/13/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Fact Discovery closes by 6/15/2012. Exhibit Lists due by 7/2/2012. Witness Lists due by 6/20/2012. Motions in Limine due by 6/20/2012. Responses due by 6/25/2012. Replies due by 6/29/2012. (cdw) Modified on 6/14/2012 (zcdw). (Entered: 06/14/2012)
185 Memorandum in opposition to re 182 MOTION Protective Order filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: McGeehan Dep., # 2 Exhibit B: Ingram Dep., # 3 Exhibit C: Germaine Martinez Dep., # 4 Exhibit D: Gloria Martinez Dep., # 5 Exhibit E: Johnson−Lawson Dep.)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 06/14/2012)
186 ORDER denying 166 Motion to Compel. See Order for details. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 6/14/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 06/14/2012)
187 REPLY to opposition to motion re 182 MOTION Protective Order filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Deposition of Keith Ingram, # 2 Exhibit B−Deposition of Ann McGeehan)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/14/2012)
188 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 182 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/15/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/15/2012)
189 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Rebecca M. Couto, :Firm− MALDEF, :Address− 110 Broadway, Suite 300, San Antonio, TX 78205. Phone No. − (210) 224−5476. Fax No. − (210) 224−5382 by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Rebecca M. Couto, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Perales, Nina) (Entered: 06/18/2012)
190 Unopposed MOTION to Modify Order on Texas's Motion for Protective Order by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/18/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. Texas shall produce a witness and documents in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Attorney General's June 5, 2012 30(b)(6) notice of deposition with respect to the analysis performed in early 2011. Signed by Judges David S. Tatel, Robert L. Wilkins, and Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/18/12. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/18/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 190 Motion to Modify Order. Texas shall have until Thursday, June 21, 2012 to present its designated witness for deposition on topics 10 and 12 of the United States Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Deposition. The United States shall have until June 22, 2012 to file a motion in limine, if it so chooses, as to those topics. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/19/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/19/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 189 Motion for Leave for Rebecca M. Couto to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/19/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/19/2012)
191 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
192 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Testimony Protected by Legislative Privilege by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
193 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Testimony by the Texas League of Young Voters's Newly Disclosed Witnesses by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)

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06/20/2012 06/20/2012
06/20/2012 06/20/2012
06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012

194 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Allan J. Lichtman by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
195 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Evidence, Argument, and Testimony Suggesting an Adverse Inference Based on Texas Legislators' Assertion of Legislative Privilege by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
196 NOTICE of Plaintiff's Live Witness List by STATE OF TEXAS (Mortara, Adam) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
197 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Evidence, Argument, or Reference to the Subjective Intent of Individual Legislators by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
198 NOTICE of Intended Witness Testimony by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
199 Proposed Findings of Fact by STATE OF TEXAS. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
200 NOTICE of Trial Witnesses by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
201 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony of J. Morgan Kousser by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
202 Proposed Findings of Fact by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix State of Texas Appendix, # 2 Exhibit 1)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
203 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) by STATE OF TEXAS 202 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3, # 2 Exhibit 4)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
204 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) by STATE OF TEXAS 202 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 6, # 2 Exhibit 7)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
205 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) by STATE OF TEXAS 202 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 9)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
206 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) Joint Appendix by STATE OF TEXAS 202 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
207 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) by STATE OF TEXAS 202 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 5, # 2 Exhibit 6, # 3 Exhibit 7)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
208 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) by STATE OF TEXAS 202 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 9, # 2 Exhibit 10, # 3 Exhibit 11, # 4 Exhibit 12)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
209 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) by STATE OF TEXAS 202 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 14, # 2 Exhibit 15, # 3 Exhibit 16)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
210 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) by STATE OF TEXAS 202 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 18, # 2 Exhibit 19, # 3 Exhibit 20)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
211 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) by STATE OF TEXAS 202 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 22, # 2 Exhibit 23, # 3 Exhibit 24)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)

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06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/20/2012 06/21/2012 06/22/2012
06/23/2012 06/25/2012
06/25/2012 06/25/2012 06/25/2012

212 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) by STATE OF TEXAS 202 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 26, # 2 Exhibit 27, # 3 Exhibit 28)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
213 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) by STATE OF TEXAS 202 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 30, # 2 Exhibit 31, # 3 Exhibit 32, # 4 Exhibit 33)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
214 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) by STATE OF TEXAS 202 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 35, # 2 Exhibit 36, # 3 Exhibit 37)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
215 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) by STATE OF TEXAS 202 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 39, # 2 Exhibit 40, # 3 Exhibit 41, # 4 Exhibit 42, # 5 Exhibit 43)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
216 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion in Limine by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Frederick Email, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Guyette Depo, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Mendoza Email)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
217 MOTION in Limine by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit 9)(Fisher, Spencer) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
218 NOTICE of Plaintiff's Affirmative Deposition Designations by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Mortara, Adam) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
219 MOTION to Take Judicial Notice of Census Data by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − 1990 Census Data, # 2 Exhibit 2 − 2000 Census Data, # 3 Exhibit 3 − ACS Data pt 1, # 4 Exhibit 4 − ACS Data pt 2, # 5 Exhibit 5 − 2010 Census Data)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 06/21/2012)
220 MOTION to Withdraw FELICIA JOHNSON AS DEFENDANT−INTERVENOR by IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, FELICIA JOHNSON, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, BRIANNA WILLIAMS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Korgaonkar, Natasha) (Entered: 06/22/2012)
221 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit 9)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 06/23/2012)
222 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Jorge Sanchez, :Firm− MALDEF, :Address− 11 East Adams, Suite 700, Chicago, IL 60603. Phone No. − 312−427−0701, ext. 409. Fax No. − 312−427−0691 by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Jorge Sanchez, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Perales, Nina) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
223 Proposed Findings of Fact by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
224 NOTICE of Exhibit Index by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 223 Proposed Findings of Fact (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
225 Memorandum in opposition to re 194 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Allan J. Lichtman filed by LORRAINE BIRABIL, ANNA BURNS, DANIEL CLAYTON, DAVID DE LA FUENTE, SERGIO DELEON, JANE HAMILTON, ERIC KENNIE, MICHAEL MONTEZ, PENNY POPE, MARC VEASY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits A, B and C to Kennie Intervenors' Opposition to Texas Motion in Limine)(Hebert, Joseph) (Entered: 06/25/2012)

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06/25/2012 06/25/2012
06/25/2012 06/25/2012 06/25/2012
06/25/2012 06/25/2012 06/25/2012 06/25/2012
06/25/2012 06/25/2012 06/25/2012 06/26/2012

MINUTE ORDER clarifying that the pretrial conference scheduled for June 28, 2012 was VACATED by the Court. See 137 Order dated May 22, 2012 for further details. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/25/2012. (lcrmc1) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
226 Memorandum in opposition to re 195 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Evidence, Argument, and Testimony Suggesting an Adverse Inference Based on Texas Legislators' Assertion of Legislative Privilege filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
227 Memorandum in opposition to re 192 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Testimony Protected by Legislative Privilege filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
228 Memorandum in opposition to re 197 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Evidence, Argument, or Reference to the Subjective Intent of Individual Legislators filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
229 Memorandum in opposition to re 217 MOTION in Limine TO EXCLUDE MAJOR MITCHELLS TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTS RELATING TO VOTER FRAUD filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
230 NOTICE of Filing of Supplemental Appendix by STATE OF TEXAS re 202 Proposed Findings of Fact (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Supplemental Appendix)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
231 Memorandum in opposition to re 195 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Evidence, Argument, and Testimony Suggesting an Adverse Inference Based on Texas Legislators' Assertion of Legislative Privilege filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
232 Memorandum in opposition to re 197 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Evidence, Argument, or Reference to the Subjective Intent of Individual Legislators filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
233 Memorandum in opposition to re 193 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Testimony by the Texas League of Young Voters's Newly Disclosed Witnesses filed by IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Declaration of Adam M. Harris, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 4)(Harris, Adam) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
234 Memorandum in opposition to re 192 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Testimony Protected by Legislative Privilege filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
235 NOTICE of Deposition Designations by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
236 Memorandum in opposition to re 201 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony of J. Morgan Kousser filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
237 NOTICE of Removal of Dorothy Tates from Defendant−Intervenors' Proposed Witness List by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 06/26/2012)

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06/27/2012 06/27/2012 06/27/2012
06/27/2012 06/27/2012
06/27/2012 06/27/2012 06/27/2012
06/27/2012 06/28/2012
06/28/2012 06/29/2012 06/29/2012 06/29/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 181 Motion to Withdraw Brianna Williams as Defendant−Intervenor. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/27/12. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/27/2012)
238 NOTICE of Agreement Between Parties by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 221 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 06/27/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 216 Motion for Extension of Time to File Motions in Limine. Texas shall respond to 221 Motion to Exclude Testimony of Dr. Sager by June 30, 2012. The Attorney General may file a reply memorandum on orbefore July 3, 2012. The Attorney General may file a motion to preclude the testimony of Dr. Daron Shaw by June 27, 2012. The State of Texas may file a memorandum in opposition by June 30, 2012, and the Attorney General may file a reply memorandum by July 3, 2012. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/27/12. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/27/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: The Attorney General's Motion to Preclude due by 6/27/2012. Response due by 6/30/2012. Reply due by 7/3/2012. (cdw) (Entered: 06/27/2012)
239 MOTION to Take Judicial Notice by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 06/27/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 220 Motion to Withdraw Felicia Johnson as a Defendant−Intervenor. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/27/12. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/27/2012)
240 Proposed Findings of Fact by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 06/27/2012)
241 Proposed Findings of Fact by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 06/27/2012)
242 NOTICE of Deposition Designations by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 06/27/2012)
243 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Asha L.I. Spencer, :Firm− Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP, :Address− 54 W Hubbard St., Ste. 300. Phone No. − 312−494−4400. Fax No. − 312−494−4440 by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/28/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 243 Motion for Leave for Asha L.I. Spencer to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 222 Motion for Leave for Jorge Sanchez to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/28/12. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/28/2012)
MINUTE ORDER directing the Attorney General to electronically file the exhibits to 223 Proposed Findings of Fact. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 6/29/12. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
244 NOTICE of Erratum by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 223 Proposed Findings of Fact (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − FoF/CoL Corrected)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
245 NOTICE of Stipulation by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 221 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Stipulation)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 06/29/2012)

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06/29/2012 06/29/2012 06/29/2012 06/29/2012 06/29/2012 06/29/2012 06/29/2012
06/29/2012 06/29/2012 06/30/2012 06/30/2012
06/30/2012
06/30/2012

246 REPLY to opposition to motion re 197 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Evidence, Argument, or Reference to the Subjective Intent of Individual Legislators filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
247 REPLY to opposition to motion re 193 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Testimony by the Texas League of Young Voters's Newly Disclosed Witnesses filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
248 REPLY to opposition to motion re 195 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Evidence, Argument, and Testimony Suggesting an Adverse Inference Based on Texas Legislators' Assertion of Legislative Privilege filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
249 REPLY to opposition to motion re 192 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Testimony Protected by Legislative Privilege filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
250 REPLY to opposition to motion re 201 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony of J. Morgan Kousser filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
251 REPLY to opposition to motion re 194 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Allan J. Lichtman filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
252 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Luis O. Figueroa, :Firm− MALDEF, :Address− 110 Broadway, Suite 300, San Antonio, TX 78205. Phone No. − 210−224−5476. Fax No. − 210−224−5382 by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Luis O. Figueroa, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Perales, Nina) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
253 REPLY to opposition to motion re 217 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Documents Related to Fraud and Testimony by Major Forrest Mitchell filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Fisher, Spencer) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
254 NOTICE of Counter Designations & Objections by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Errata A)(Mortara, Adam) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
255 NOTICE of Correction by STATE OF TEXAS re 254 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Mortara, Adam) (Entered: 06/30/2012)
256 NOTICE of Filing of Trial Exhibits by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 224 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit AG Appx Att 01 − Exs 1−41, # 2 Exhibit AG Appx Att 02 − Exs 42−58, # 3 Exhibit AG Appx Att 03 − Exs 59−85, # 4 Exhibit AG Appx Att 04 − Ex 86a, # 5 Exhibit AG Appx Att 04 − Ex 86a, # 6 Exhibit AG Appx Att 06 − Ex 86c, # 7 Exhibit AG Appx Att 07 − Ex 86d, # 8 Exhibit AG Appx Att 08 − Exs 87−93, # 9 Exhibit AG Appx Att 09 − Exs 94−96a, # 10 Exhibit AG Appx Att 10 − Exs 96b−98)(Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/30/2012)
257 NOTICE of Filing of Trial Exhibits by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 224 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit AG Appx Att 11 − Exs 99−102a, # 2 Exhibit AG Appx Att 12 − Exs 102b−107, # 3 Exhibit AG Appx Att 13 − Exs 108−162, # 4 Exhibit AG Appx Att 14 − Exs 163−216, # 5 Exhibit AG Appx Att 15 − Exs 217−234, # 6 Exhibit AG Appx Att 16 − Exs 235−263, # 7 Exhibit AG Appx Att 17 − Exs 264−286, # 8 Exhibit AG Appx Att 18 − Ex 287a, # 9 Exhibit AG Appx Att 19 − Ex 287b, # 10 Exhibit AG Appx Att 20 − Exs 288−306)(Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/30/2012)
258 NOTICE of Filing of Trial Exhibits by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 224 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit AG Appx Att 21 − Exs 307−326, # 2 Exhibit AG Appx Att 22 − Exs 327−348, # 3 Exhibit AG Appx Att 23 − Exs 349−367, # 4 Exhibit AG Appx Att 24 − Ex 368, # 5 Exhibit AG Appx Att 25 − Exs 369−372, # 6 Exhibit AG Appx Att 26 − Exs 373−383, # 7 Exhibit AG Appx Att 27 − Ex 384, # 8 Exhibit AG Appx Att 28 − Exs 385−389, # 9 Exhibit AG Appx Att 29 − Exs 390−395, # 10 Exhibit AG Appx Att 30 − Exs 396−403)(Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/30/2012)

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06/30/2012
06/30/2012
06/30/2012 06/30/2012 07/01/2012 07/01/2012 07/01/2012
07/02/2012 07/02/2012 07/02/2012 07/02/2012 07/02/2012

259 NOTICE of Filing of Trial Exhibits by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 224 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit AG Appx Att 31 − Ex 404, # 2 Exhibit AG Appx Att 32 − Exs 405−406, # 3 Exhibit AG Appx Att 33 − Exs 407−413, # 4 Exhibit AG Appx Att 34 − Exs 414−430, # 5 Exhibit AG Appx Att 35 − Exs 431−436, # 6 Exhibit AG Appx Att 36 − Exs 437−441, # 7 Exhibit AG Appx Att 37 − Exs 442−450, # 8 Exhibit AG Appx Att 38 − Exs 451−459, # 9 Exhibit AG Appx Att 39 − Exs 460−473, # 10 Exhibit AG Appx Att 40 − Exs 474−497)(Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/30/2012)
260 NOTICE of Filing of Trial Exhibits by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 224 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit AG Appx Att 41 − Exs 498−505, # 2 Exhibit AG Appx Att 42 − Exs 506−512, # 3 Exhibit AG Appx Att 43 − Exs 513−516, # 4 Exhibit AG Appx Att 44 − Exs 517−530, # 5 Exhibit AG Appx Att 45 − Exs 531−538, # 6 Exhibit AG Appx Att 46 − Exs 539−543, # 7 Exhibit AG Appx Att 47 − Exs 544−547, # 8 Exhibit AG Appx Att 48 − Exs 548−550, # 9 Exhibit AG Appx Att 49 − Exs 551−553, # 10 Exhibit AG Appx Att 50 − Ex 554a)(Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/30/2012)
261 NOTICE of Filing of Trial Exhibits by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 224 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit AG Appx Att 51 − Ex 554b, # 2 Exhibit AG Appx Att 52 − Ex 554c, # 3 Exhibit AG Appx Att 53 − Exs 555−559, # 4 Exhibit AG Appx Att 54 − Exs 560−565, # 5 Exhibit AG Appx Att 55 − Exs 566−570, # 6 AG Appx Att 56 − Exhibit Index)(Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/30/2012)
262 NOTICE of Errata by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 06/30/2012)
263 RESPONSE re 241 Proposed Findings of Fact, 240 Proposed Findings of Fact Plaintiff's Response to Defendant−Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/01/2012)
264 REPLY re 223 Proposed Findings of Fact, 202 Proposed Findings of Fact AND REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/01/2012)
265 LARGE ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT(S) by STATE OF TEXAS 264 Reply to Document filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment A−1, # 2 Exhibit Attachment A−2, # 3 Exhibit Attachment B−1, # 4 Exhibit Attachment B−2, # 5 Exhibit Attachment C−1, # 6 Exhibit Attachment C−2, # 7 Exhibit Attachment D−1, # 8 Exhibit Attachment D−2, # 9 Exhibit Attachment E−1, # 10 Exhibit Attachment E−2)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/01/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 252 Motion for Leave for Luis O. Figueroa to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 7/2/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
266 MOTION for Immediate Relief Concerning Plaintiff's Response to the Attorney General's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
267 Exhibit List by STATE OF TEXAS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
268 NOTICE regarding Stipulation by STATE OF TEXAS re 245 Notice (Other) (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
269 NOTICE Advisory Concerning Stricken Portions of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Pursuant to June 29, 2012 Stipulation by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Revised Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)(Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/02/2012)

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270 Proposed Findings of Fact by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
271 NOTICE of Expert Deposition Designations by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Expert Deposition Designations, # 2 Exhibit Ansolabehere, # 3 Exhibit Flores, # 4 Exhibit Kousser, # 5 Exhibit Marker, # 6 Exhibit Sager part A, # 7 Exhibit Sager part B, # 8 Exhibit Shaw)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
272 NOTICE of Trial Exhibits by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
273 NOTICE of Trial Exhibit List by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Trial Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit 571, # 3 Exhibit 572, # 4 Exhibit 573, # 5 Exhibit 574, # 6 Exhibit 575, # 7 Exhibit 576, # 8 Exhibit 577, # 9 Exhibit 578)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
274 RESPONSE re 266 MOTION for Immediate Relief Concerning Plaintiff's Response to the Attorney General's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
275 NOTICE of Errata by STATE OF TEXAS re 264 Reply to Document (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
276 MOTION to Appoint Counsel , MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Thomas A. Saenz, :Firm− MALDEF, :Address− 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Fl., Los Angeles, CA 90014. Phone No. − 213−629−2512. Fax No. − 213−629−8016 by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Thomas A. Saenz, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Perales, Nina) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
277 NOTICE of Clarification of List of Trial Exhibits by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
278 NOTICE of Filing Supplement to Texas Joint Appendix by STATE OF TEXAS re 206 Large Additional Attachment(s) (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Table of Contents, # 2 Appendix)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
279 MOTION to Allow the Testimony of Lydia Camarillo by Declaration or, in the Alternative, to Grant Leave to Amend Witness List to Present Her Testimony Live by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 191 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/3/12.(lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
280 MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Seal Document by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER finding as moot 221 Motion in Limine. Pursuant to the Stipulation filed by the parties [Dkt. No. 245] on June 29, 2012, Defendant Attorney General has withdrawn this Motion. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/3/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER denying 266 Defendant Attorney General's Motion for Immediate Relief Concerning Plaintiff's Response to the Attorney General's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Any facts that Texas has set forth in its initial briefing that it did not "reply to or oppose" are not deemed conceded or waived simply because Texas did not reply to them paragraph by paragraph in its Reply. Moreover, to the

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extent Texas raises any additional facts in a Reply, the Attorney General is free to respond to those facts in its July 5, 2012 brief. The Attorney General has failed to show any prejudice which would warrant granting its Motion. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/3/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER denying without prejudice 195 Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence, Argument and Testimony Suggesting an Adverse Inference Based on Texas Legislators' Assertion of Legislative Privilege. The Motion is premature, there is no prejudice to allowing such evidence or argument given that this will be a bench trial, and the Motion raises a question of law upon which the Court is able to rule at any time. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/3/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 193 Motion in Limine to Preclude Testimony by the Texas League of Young Voters' Newly Disclosed Witnesses. The Texas League of Young Voters fails to give good cause for its late notice of the two witnesses, and there has been no substantial justification shown for the failure to previously disclose the witnesses. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/3/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 219 Motion to Take Judicial Notice of Census Data. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/3/12.(lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER denying without prejudice 192 Motion in Limine to Preclude Witness Testimony on Matters That Are Protected by the Legislative Privilege. Any ruling on this Motion is premature, as the Court is able to rule on any objections as appropriate at trial. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/3/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER denying 194 Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Allan J. Lichtman. Professor Lichtman does not, as Texas argues, attempt to opine on the individual intentions of legislators. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/3/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER denying 201 Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of J. Morgan Kousser. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/3/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER denying 217 Motion in Limine to Exclude Documents Related to Fraud and Testimony by Major Forrest Mitchell. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/3/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER denying without prejudice 197 Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence, Argument, or Reference to the Subjective Intent of Individual Legislators. Any ruling on this Motion is premature, there is no prejudice to allowing such evidence or argument given that this will be a bench trial, and the Motion raises a question of law upon which the Court is able to rule at any time. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/3/12.(lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
281 NOTICE Advisory Regarding Deposition Designations by STATE OF TEXAS (Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
282 MOTION to Take Judicial Notice of Senate Rules by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit)(Fisher, Spencer) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
MINUTE ORDER: Pursuant to the Court's May 7, 2012 Order [Dkt. 107], the parties were required to submit versions of their proposed findings of fact/conclusions of law (FoF/CoL) containing hyperlinks "to the precise page of the appendix or relevant legal authority cited." Defendant Attorney General's submission, however, contains hyperlinks that only link to the first page of a cited exhibit or authority. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant Attorney General shall deliver, no later than 4:00 p.m. on July 5, 2012, 6 corrected copies of discs containing its submissions with hyperlinks to the precise page of the appendix or legal authority cited. These discs should be hand delivered to the clerk's office, and addressed to the Chambers of Judge Robert L. Wilkins. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/3/2012. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/03/2012)

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283 NOTICE of Appearance by Richard Alan Dellheim on behalf of ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Dellheim, Richard) (Entered: 07/04/2012)
284 NOTICE of Appearance by Bryan L. Sells on behalf of ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Sells, Bryan) (Entered: 07/04/2012)
285 REPLY re 223 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
286 REPLY re 241 Proposed Findings of Fact, 240 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Supplemental Appendix, # 2 Exhibit Supp. App. Exhibits 119−123, # 3 Exhibit Supp. App. Exhibits 124−128)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
287 NOTICE of Filing of Supplement to Reply Appendix by STATE OF TEXAS re 264 Reply to Document (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Table of Contents, # 2 Appendix)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
MINUTE ORDER: A telephonic status conference is hereby set for 2:00 p.m. Eastern Time, July 6, 2012 in Courtroom 17. No later than noon EST on July 6, 2012, one representative of the parties shall contact the chambers of Judge Wilkins (202−354−3480) to provide a joint call−in number for the call. In their respective witness lists submitted on June 20, 2012, Defendant Attorney General and Defendant−Intervenors indicated that there were some witnesses whose testimony they intended to present live while there were other witnesses whose testimony they intended to present by "trial deposition" or "declaration." The parties are hereby ordered to meet and confer with respect to their witness lists and be prepared to report at the status conference: which witnesses will appear live; which witnesses, if any, will appear by trial deposition or declaration; and whether there is any objection to any party's final witness list. The Court also needs to raise some scheduling issues during the status conference. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/5/2012. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
288 REPLY re 254 Notice (Other) of Plaintiff's Objections and Counter Designations filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
MINUTE ORDER: Pursuant to Texas' request, and the consent of all parties, the telephonic status conference scheduled for July 6, 2012, will be held at 3:00 p.m. EST rather than 2:00 p.m. EST. All other aspects of this Court's Minute Order of this date remain in effect. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/5/12. (lcrlw2) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
289 REPLY re 254 Notice (Other) of Attorney General's Deposition Designations in Reply filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit)(Fisher, Spencer) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 7/6/2012 at 3:00 PM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Robert L. Wilkins. (tcb) (Entered: 07/06/2012)
290 NOTICE of Clarification of Reply in Support of Proposed Findings of Fact by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 07/06/2012)
291 ORDER granting 280 MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Seal Document; For the reasons set forth in the State of Texass motion, the Court hereby GRANTS State of Texass motion to seal. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/6/2012. (tcb) . (Entered: 07/06/2012)
292 ORDER granting 279 MOTION to Allow the Testimony of Lydia Camarillo by Declaration or, in the Alternative, to Grant Leave to Amend Witness List to Present Her Testimony Live. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/6/2012. (tcb) (Entered: 07/06/2012)

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MINUTE ORDER granting 282 Motion to Take Judicial Notice. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/6/2012. (tcb) (Entered: 07/06/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 276 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Thomas A. Saenz. Mr. Saenz is admitted pro hac vice to appear in this matter on behalf of Intervenor− Defendant MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ and SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 7/6/2012. (tcb) (Entered: 07/06/2012)
293 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Respond to the Court's Order Regarding the Joint Request for Judicial Notice by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/06/2012)
294 RESPONSE re 239 MOTION to Take Judicial Notice filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Mortara, Adam) (Entered: 07/06/2012)
295 NOTICE Identifying Order of Witnesses by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/06/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert L. Wilkins: Telephone Conference held and concluded on 7/6/2012. (Court Reporter Crystal Pilgrim) (tcb) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
300 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew Colangelo on behalf of ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (znmw, ) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
NOTICE of Ruling. MINUTE ORDER: The Attorney General has requested to present a witness' live testimony and also have this Court rely on the deposition designations for that same witness. The Attorney General claims that, given the time constraints, it will present truncated live testimony that will be supplemented by the deposition designations. Texas opposes this request. According to Texas, a witness should either be presented live or through deposition testimony, but not both. The Court overrules Texas' objection. The Court finds that the scheduling difficulties and strict time constraints for the presentation of evidence in this three−judge trial constitute an "exceptional circumstance" within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)(E), so that the Attorney General may proceed in this fashion, and Texas and the Defendant−Intervenors may cross−examine the witness in court and/or cross−designate portions of the witness' deposition testimony as they deem appropriate and as their scheduling priorities direct. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 76 F.R.D. 214, 216 n.2 (D. Conn. 1977) ("[i]f some brief portions of the deposition concern relatively non−controversial matters, as to which an opportunity to assess credibility by observing the witness is not important, such portions may be admissible under provision (E) of Rule 32(a)(3) [now see Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)], since the length of this trial is itself an 'exceptional circumstance' justifying such use 'in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court' ")(quoting the Rule). (Wilkins, Robert) (Entered: 07/08/2012)
296 REPLY to opposition to motion re 239 MOTION to Take Judicial Notice filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
297 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Reynolds B. Brissenden, :Firm− Office of the Attorney General, :Address− 300 West 15th Street, 9th Floor. Phone No. − 512−936−2158. Fax No. − 512−499−0712 by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Reynolds B. Brissenden, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
298 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by PETER JOHNSON, JUSTICE SEEKERS, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, DONALD WRIGHT, RONALD WRIGHT (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(O'Connor, Katie) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
299 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew Colangelo on behalf of ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (jeb, ) (Entered: 07/09/2012)

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ORDER granting 297 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Reynolds Brissenden may appear pro hac vice on behalf of the State of Texas. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 7/9/2012. (KD) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 298 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Katie O'Connor terminated. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 7/9/2012. (KD) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
301 NOTICE of Senator Uresti's Deposition Designations by STATE OF TEXAS (Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins: Bench Trial held on 7/9/2012. Plaintiff's Witnesses: Brian Keith Ingram, Representative Jose Aliseda, Major Forrest Mitchell, Senator Thomas Williams, and Professor Thomas Sager. Bench Trial continued to 7/10/2012 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins. (Court Reporters: Crystal Pilgrim (AM) & Rebecca Stonestreet (PM)) (cdw) (Entered: 07/10/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 239 Motion to Take Judicial Notice; granting 293 Motion for Extension of Time to File. The Court will take judicial notice of the facts set forth in the Defendant−Intervenor's 296 Reply. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 7/10/12. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 07/10/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins: Bench Trial held on 7/10/2012. Plaintiff's Witness: Professor Thomas Sager. Defendant/Intervenor Witnesses: Representative Trey Martinez Fischer, Representative Rafael Anchia, Professor Morgan Kousser, and Victoria Rodriguez. Bench Trial continued to 7/11/2012 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins. (Court Reporters: Crystal Pilgrim (AM) & Rebecca Stonestreet (PM)) (cdw) (Entered: 07/11/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins: Bench Trial held on 7/11/2012. Plaintiff's Witnesses: Professor Daron Shaw. Oral Motion by the Plaintiff to admit Professor Daron Shaw as an expert in the areas of Political Science elections, public opinion voting behavior, and survey research, heard and granted. Defendant/Intervenor Witnesses: Victoria Rodriguez, Lydia Camarillo, Reverend Peter Jackson, Senator Rodney Ellis, Randall "Buck" Wood, Professor Henry Flores, Dr. David Marker, and Senator Carlos Uresti (via video deposition). Oral Motion by the Intervenor Defendants to offer Dr. David Marker as an expert in survey work, survey research, sampling methodology, survey response rates, survey evaluation, and data analysis, heard and granted. Bench Trial continued to 7/12/2012 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins. (Court Reporters: Crystal Pilgrim (AM) & Rebecca Stonestreet (PM)) (cdw) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
302 NOTICE of Counter Expert Deposition Designations by STATE OF TEXAS re 271 Notice (Other), (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Mortara, Adam) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
303 NOTICE of Filing Amended List of Trial Exhibits and Second Supplemental Appendix by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amended Index of Trial Exhibits, # 2 Appendix Index to the Second Supplemental Appendix, # 3 Appendix Second Supplemental Appendix)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
304 NOTICE of Reply Designations for Sen. Carlos Uresti by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
305 NOTICE Concerning Unpublished Opinion by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1: Apache County HSD No. 90 v. United States)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
306 NOTICE of Reply Designations for Expert Witnesses by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 07/12/2012)

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307 NOTICE of Corrections to the Supplemental Declaration of Dr. Thomas Sager by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Mortara, Adam) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins: Bench Trial held on 7/12/2012. Defendant/Intervenor Witnesses: Senator Carlos Uresti (via video deposition), Senator Wendy Davis, Dr. Allan Lichtman, and Professor Stephen Ansolabehere. Oral Motion by the Intervenor Defendants to offer Dr. Lichtman as an expert in the fields of political history, political analysis, historical methodologies, statistical methodologies, and voting rights, heard and granted. Oral Motion by the parties to offer Dr. Ansolabehere as an expert in American electoral politics, public opinion, statistical methods in political science, and the analysis of the effect of voting changes and voting laws, heard and granted. Bench Trial continued to 7/13/2012 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom 8 before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins. (Court Reporters: Crystal Pilgrim (AM) & Rebecca Stonestreet (PM)). (cdw) (Entered: 07/18/2012)
308 NOTICE of Advisory Regarding Election Identification Certificates by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Mortara, Adam) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
309 NOTICE of Advisory to the Court Clarifying the Underlying Documents Needed to Obtain an Election Identification Certificate by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT (Perales, Nina) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
310 NOTICE of Objections to State of Texas's Trial Exhibits by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
311 NOTICE of Revised Trial Exhibit List by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judges Rosemary M. Collyer, David S. Tatel, and Robert L. Wilkins: Bench Trial held and concluded on 7/13/2012. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (cdw) (Entered: 07/18/2012)
312 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Trial Exhibits by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 07/16/2012)
313 NOTICE of Filing Trial Exhibits by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 311 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit DE 579, # 2 Exhibit DE 580, # 3 Exhibit DE 581, # 4 Exhibit DE 582, # 5 Exhibit DE 583, # 6 Exhibit DE 584, # 7 Exhibit DE 585, # 8 Exhibit DE586, # 9 Exhibit DE 587, # 10 Exhibit DE 588, # 11 Exhibit DE 589)(Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/17/2012)
314 NOTICE of Filing Trial Exhibits by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 311 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit DE 590, # 2 Exhibit DE 591, # 3 Exhibit DE 592, # 4 Exhibit DE 593, # 5 Exhibit DE 594, # 6 Exhibit DE 595, # 7 Exhibit DE 596, # 8 Exhibit DE 597, # 9 Exhibit DE 598)(Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/17/2012)
315 NOTICE Regarding VRNID and DPS Data by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/17/2012)
316 NOTICE of Filing Under Seal Exhibit B to Notice Re VRNID and DPS Data by STATE OF TEXAS re 315 Notice (Other) (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/17/2012)
317 NOTICE of Filing of Obbjections to Def−In tervenors' Trial Exhibits by STATE OF TEXAS re 303 Notice (Other), (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Objections to Def−Intervenors' Trial Exhibits)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/17/2012)
318 NOTICE of Filing Objections to U.S. Trial Exhibits by STATE OF TEXAS re 314 Notice (Other), (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Objections to US Trial Exhibits)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/17/2012)
319 NOTICE Regarding Objection to State of Texas's Trial Exhibits by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 07/17/2012)

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320 NOTICE of Errata by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 07/17/2012)
321 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibit B to Notice Re VRNID and DPS Data Under Seal by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(rdj) (Entered: 07/18/2012)
322 NOTICE of Filing of State of Texas's Revised Trial Exhibit List by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit State's Trial Exhibit List)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/18/2012)
323 NOTICE of Filing Trial Exhibits by STATE OF TEXAS re 322 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit PX 106, # 2 Exhibit PX 400, # 3 Exhibit PX 401, # 4 Exhibit PX 402, # 5 Exhibit PX 404, # 6 Exhibit PX 506, # 7 Exhibit PX 509, # 8 Exhibit PX 513, # 9 Exhibit PX 518, # 10 Exhibit PX 526, # 11 Exhibit PX 530, # 12 Exhibit PX 531, # 13 Exhibit PX 532, # 14 Exhibit PX 538, # 15 Exhibit PX 543, # 16 Exhibit PX 547, # 17 Exhibit PX 548, # 18 Exhibit PX 558, # 19 Exhibit PX 576)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/18/2012)
324 NOTICE of Filing Under Seal by STATE OF TEXAS re 322 Notice (Other) (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/18/2012)
325 MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Seal Exhibits Exhibits PX1−Ellis1, PX1−Ellis2, PX539, PX540, PX600, PX601, PX602, PX604, PX605, PX607, PX609, PX700, PX711, PX712, PX713, PX714, PX715, PX716, PX717, PX718, PX751, PX752, PX759, PX760, PX788, PX789, PX790, PX791 by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/19/2012)
326 RESPONSE re 317 Notice (Other) regarding objections to Defendant−Intervenors' Trial Exhibits filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 07/19/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 321 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal; granting 325 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 7/23/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 07/23/2012)
327 SEALED Exhibit B to Notice Re VRNID and DPS Data Under filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zrdj) (Entered: 07/23/2012)
328 SEALED Exhibits filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(PX539) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit PX540, # 2 Exhibit PX600, # 3 Exhibit PX601, # 4 Exhibit PX602, # 5 Exhibit PX604, # 6 Exhibit PX605, # 7 Exhibit PX607, # 8 Exhibit PX609, # 9 Exhibit PX700, # 10 Exhibit PX711, # 11 Exhibit PX712, # 12 Exhibit PX713, # 13 Exhibit PX714, # 14 Exhibit PX715, # 15 Exhibit PX716, # 16 Exhibit PX717, # 17 Exhibit PX718, # 18 Exhibit PX751, # 19 Exhibit PX752, # 20 Exhibit PX759, # 21 Exhibit PX760, # 22 Exhibit PX788, # 23 Exhibit PX789, # 24 Exhibit PX790, # 25 Exhibit PX791, # 26 Exhibit PX1−ELLIS1, # 27 Exhibit PX1−ELLIS2)(zrdj) (Entered: 07/23/2012)
329 RESPONSE re 318 Notice (Other) of Objections to Defendant's Trial Exhibits filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Maranzano, Jennifer) (Entered: 07/26/2012)
330 RESPONSE re 308 Notice (Other) Regarding Election Identification Certificates filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/26/2012)
331 NOTICE of Recent Opinion Regarding Voter ID by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 08/03/2012)
332 NOTICE of Recent District Court Decision Regarding Restrictions On Third−Party Voter Registration Activity In Texas by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE

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08/12/2012

CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 08/03/2012)
333 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer held on 5/3/12; Page Numbers: 1−134. Date of Issuance:8/12/12. Court Reporter/Transcriber Crystal M. Pilgrim, Telephone number 202.354.3127, Court Reporter Email Address : crystalpilgrim@aol.com.

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.

08/12/2012

Redaction Request due 9/2/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/12/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/10/2012.(Pilgrim, Crystal) (Entered: 08/12/2012)
334 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer held on 7/9/12 am; Page Numbers: 1−189. Date of Issuance:8/12/12. Court Reporter/Transcriber Crystal M. Pilgrim, Telephone number 202..354.3127, Court Reporter Email Address : crystalpilgrim@aol.com.

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.

08/12/2012

Redaction Request due 9/2/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/12/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/10/2012.(Pilgrim, Crystal) (Entered: 08/12/2012)
335 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer held on 7/10/12 am; Page Numbers: 1−173. Date of Issuance:8/12/12. Court Reporter/Transcriber Crystal M. Pilgrim, Telephone number 202.354.3127, Court Reporter Email Address : crystalpilgrim@aol.com.

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.

Redaction Request due 9/2/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/12/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/10/2012.(Pilgrim, Crystal) (Entered: 08/12/2012)

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 58 of 63

08/12/2012

336 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer held on 7/11/12 am; Page Numbers: 1−187. Date of Issuance:8/12/12. Court Reporter/Transcriber Crystal M. Pilgrim, Telephone number 202.354.3127, Court Reporter Email Address : crystalpilgrim@aol.com.

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.

08/12/2012

Redaction Request due 9/2/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/12/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/10/2012.(Pilgrim, Crystal) (Entered: 08/12/2012)
337 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer held on 7/12/12 am; Page Numbers: 1−168. Date of Issuance:8/12/12. Court Reporter/Transcriber Crystal M. Pilgrim, Telephone number 202.354.3127, Court Reporter Email Address : crystalpilgrim@aol.com.

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.

08/20/2012 08/27/2012

Redaction Request due 9/2/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/12/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/10/2012.(Pilgrim, Crystal) (Entered: 08/12/2012)
338 NOTICE of Filing Section 5 Determination by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment 1)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 08/20/2012)
339 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Rosemary M. Collyer held on April 30, 2012; Page Numbers: 1−58. Date of Issuance:August 27, 2012. Court Reporter/Transcriber Crystal M. Pilgrim, Telephone number 202.354.3127, Court Reporter Email Address : crystalpilgrim@aol.com.

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.

Redaction Request due 9/17/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/27/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/25/2012.(Pilgrim, Crystal) (Entered: 08/27/2012)

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08/30/2012 08/30/2012
08/30/2012 09/05/2012 09/12/2012 09/12/2012 09/14/2012
09/14/2012
09/21/2012 09/24/2012 09/24/2012 10/01/2012 10/22/2012
10/22/2012
10/22/2012

340 THREE JUDGE OPINION. Signed by Judges David S. Tatel, Rosemary M. Collyer, and Robert L. Wilkins on 8/30/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 08/30/2012)
341 ORDER denying Texas's request for judicial preclearance of Senate Bill 14 and ordering the parties to submit a joint proposed schedule on Claim Two of Texas's Amended Complaint by September 13, 2012. See Order for further details. Signed by Judges David S. Tatel, Rosemary M. Collyer, and Robert L. Wilkins on 8/30/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 08/30/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Joint proposed schedule due by 9/12/2012. (cdw) (Entered: 08/30/2012)
342 NOTICE of Section 5 Determination by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Section 5 Determination)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 09/05/2012)
343 NOTICE Regarding Proposed Schedule for Claim II by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 09/12/2012)
344 NOTICE of Filing of No−Determination Letter by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit No−Determination Letter)(Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 09/12/2012)
345 SCHEDULING ORDER. Texas's motion for summary judgment is due October 1, 2012; the Attorney General's and Defendant−Intervenors' cross motions and oppositions are due October 22, 2012; Texas's reply and opposition is due November 1, 2012; and the Attorney General's and Defendant−Intervenors' replies are due November 12, 2012. See order for further details. Signed by Judges David S. Tatel, Rosemary M. Collyer, and Robert L. Wilkins on 9/14/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Texas's Summary Judgment motion due by 10/1/2012. Response to Motion for Summary Judgment due by 10/22/2012. Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment due by 11/1/2012. Defendant−Intervenors' Cross Motion due by 10/22/2012. Response to Cross Motion due by 11/1/2012. Reply to Cross Motion due by 11/12/2012. (cdw) (Entered: 09/17/2012)
346 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 09/21/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 346 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. The Defendants shall file their replies by 5:00 p.m. EST November 13, 2012. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 9/24/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 09/24/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Defendant's Reply due by 11/13/2012 at 5:00 PM. (cdw) (Entered: 09/25/2012)
347 MOTION for Summary Judgment by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/01/2012)
348 Memorandum in opposition to re 347 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 10/22/2012)
349 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Facts, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 10/22/2012)
350 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Facts Statement of Material Facts, # 3 Exhibit 1−Berman Declaration, # 4 Exhibit 1−A, # 5 Exhibit 1−B, # 6 Exhibit 1−C, # 7 Exhibit 1−D, # 8 Exhibit 2−McCrary Declaration, # 9 Exhibit 2−A, # 10 Exhibit 2−B, # 11 Statement of Facts Statement of Genuine Issues)(Fisher,

Case: 1:12-cv-128 As of: 03/15/2016 10:22 PM EDT 60 of 63

10/31/2012
10/31/2012 11/01/2012 11/01/2012 11/13/2012
11/13/2012 11/13/2012
11/13/2012 11/14/2012
11/16/2012
11/16/2012 11/28/2012 11/28/2012 11/29/2012 11/29/2012 11/29/2012

Spencer) (Entered: 10/22/2012)
MINUTE ORDER. The telephone request of the State of Texas to file a single sixty−page brief instead of two thirty−page briefs as set forth in the Scheduling Order 345 dated September 14, 2012, is granted. No later than November 1, 2012, the State of Texas shall file a single brief, not to exceed sixty pages, that (1) serves as its reply in support of its motion for summary judgment and (2) addresses the Attorney General's and Defendant−Intervenors' cross−motions for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 10/31/2012.(lcrmc2) (Entered: 10/31/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: State of Texas Brief due by 11/1/2012. (cdw) (Entered: 10/31/2012)
351 Memorandum in opposition to re 349 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment , 350 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Mitchell, Jonathan) Modified on 11/14/2012 to correct event (rdj). (Entered: 11/01/2012)
355 REPLY to opposition to motion re 347 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (See docket entry 351 to view document)(rdj) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
352 REPLY to opposition to motion re 349 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 11/13/2012)
353 REPLY to opposition to motion re 350 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 11/13/2012)
354 Memorandum in opposition to re 347 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (See docket entry 352 to view document)(rdj) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
356 Memorandum in opposition to re 347 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (See docket entry 353 to view document)(rdj) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
NOTICE OF ERROR re 352 Reply to opposition to Motion; emailed to ezra.rosenberg@dechert.com, cc'd 76 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Two−part docket entry, 2. Counsel is reminded memorandum in opposition is a seperate event in the future. NO action required (zrdj, ) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
357 ORDER. The parties shall meet and confer and show cause no later than November 29, 2012, why the Court should not defer action until after the Supreme Court decides Shelby County v. Holder. Signed by Judges David S. Tatel, Rosemary M. Collyer, and Robert L. Wilkins on 11/16/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 11/16/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Response to Show Cause Order due by 11/29/2012. (cdw) (Entered: 11/19/2012)
358 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Risa Berkower by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Berkower, Risa) (Entered: 11/28/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 358 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney by Risa Berkower. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 11/28/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 11/28/2012)
359 NOTICE by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR re 357 Order, (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 11/29/2012)
360 NOTICE by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES re 357 Order, (Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 11/29/2012)
361 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 357 Order, Response to Show Cause Order filed by STATE OF TEXAS. (Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 11/29/2012)

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11/30/2012 12/14/2012
12/14/2012 12/17/2012
12/17/2012 12/19/2012 12/21/2012
12/21/2012
02/08/2013 02/08/2013 02/22/2013 04/24/2013 04/24/2013 05/14/2013 05/15/2013

362 MOTION for Entry of Final Judgment as to Claim One by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Frederick, Matthew) (Entered: 11/30/2012)
363 Memorandum in opposition to re 362 MOTION for Entry of Final Judgment as to Claim One filed by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 12/14/2012)
364 RESPONSE re 362 MOTION for Entry of Final Judgment as to Claim One filed by ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR. (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 12/14/2012)
365 ORDER. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), final judgment is entered in favor of Eric Himpton Holder, Junior, Attorney General, on Claim I of the Amended Complaint. The case is stayed until the United States Supreme Court issues a final ruling in Shelby County v. Holder, No. 12−96. See order for further details. Signed by Judges David S. Tatel, Rosemary M. Collyer, and Robert L. Wilkins on 12/17/2012.(lcrmc2) (Entered: 12/17/2012)
Case Stayed (cdw) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
366 NOTICE of Appeal to the United States Supreme Court by STATE OF TEXAS (Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 12/19/2012)
367 Unopposed MOTION to Hold in Abeyance Filings of Motions For Attorneys' Fees, Expenses and Costs by MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rosenberg, Ezra) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 367 Unopposed Motion to Hold in Abeyance. Defendant−Intervenors' obligation to file a motion requesting attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs shall be held in abeyance until ten days following a final ruling on Texas's appeal to the Supreme Court with respect to Claim One. The parties shall meet and confer and submit to the Court a schedule for filing any motions for attorneys' fees, expenses and costs. Signed by Judges David S. Tatel, Rosemary M. Collyer, and Robert L. Wilkins on 12/21/2012. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
368 MOTION to Withdraw Attorney Rebecca Couto by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Perales, Nina) (Entered: 02/08/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 368 Motion to Withdraw as to Attorney Rebecca M. Couto. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 2/8/2013. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 02/08/2013)
369 NOTICE from the Supreme Court of the United States (rdj) (Entered: 02/26/2013)
370 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney DALE E. HO by IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Ho, Dale) (Entered: 04/24/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 370 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney as to Attorney Dale E. Ho. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 4/24/2013. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 04/24/2013)
371 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ELISE C. BODDIE by IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Haygood, Ryan) (Entered: 05/14/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 371 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney as to Attorney Elise C. Boddie. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/15/2013. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/15/2013)

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05/15/2013 05/16/2013 05/31/2013 06/28/2013 07/11/2013 07/12/2013 07/25/2013 07/29/2013 08/08/2013 08/22/2013 08/22/2013
08/22/2013 08/27/2013 09/10/2013

372 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney DEBO P. ADEGBILE by IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Haygood, Ryan) (Entered: 05/15/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 372 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney as to Attorney Debo P. Adegbile. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/16/2013. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 05/16/2013)
373 LEAVE TO FILE DENIED− Letter to the Court from Robert Allensworth. "Leave to file DENIED", Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 5/31/2013. This document is unavailable as the Court denied its filing. (zrdj) (Entered: 06/03/2013)
375 NOTICE from the Supreme Court of the United States (rdj) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
374 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Motion to Withdraw the Appearance of Douglas H. Flaum as Counsel) by IMANI CLARK, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DEMARIANO HILL, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND (Harris, Adam) (Entered: 07/11/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 374 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney as to Attorney Douglas H. Flaum. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 7/12/2013. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 07/12/2013)
376 NOTICE Concerning Shelby County by ERIC H. HOLDER, JR (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Shelby County v. Holder opinion)(Westfall, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/25/2013)
377 SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT (certified copy) as to 366 NOTICE of Appeal to the United States Supreme Court (rdj) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
378 MOTION to Dismiss by STATE OF TEXAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
379 RESPONSE re 378 MOTION to Dismiss filed by ERIC H. HOLDER, JR. (Freeman, Daniel) (Entered: 08/22/2013)
380 RESPONSE re 378 MOTION to Dismiss filed by LA UNION DEL PUEBLO ENTERO, LORRAINE BIRABIL, ANNA BURNS, IMANI CLARK, DANIEL CLAYTON, KIESSENCE CULBREATH, DAVID DE LA FUENTE, SERGIO DELEON, JANE HAMILTON, DEMARIANO HILL, PETER JOHNSON, JUSTICE SEEKERS, ERIC KENNIE, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS, MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS OF THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DOMINIQUE MONDAY, MICHAEL MONTEZ, PENNY POPE, SOUTHWEST WORKERS UNION, TEXAS LEAGUE OF YOUNG VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES, MARC VEASY, DONALD WRIGHT, RONALD WRIGHT. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Yeary, Michelle) (Entered: 08/22/2013)
381 RESPONSE re 378 MOTION to Dismiss filed by MI FAMILIA VOTA EDUCATION FUND, NICOLE RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT. (Perales, Nina) (Entered: 08/22/2013)
382 ORDER granting 378 Motion to Dismiss. This case is closed. Signed by Judges David S. Tatel, Rosemary M. Collyer, and Robert L. Wilkins on 8/27/2013. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 08/27/2013)
383 MOTION for Attorney Fees by Kennie Defendant Intervenors by LORRAINE BIRABIL, ANNA BURNS, DANIEL CLAYTON, DAVID DE LA FUENTE, SERGIO DELEON, JANE HAMILTON, ERIC KENNIE, MICHAEL MONTEZ, PENNY POPE, MARC VEASY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Hebert Declaration, # 2 Exhibit B−Hebert Timesheets, # 3 Exhibit C−Hebert Listing of Cases Handled 1973−2013, # 4 Exhibit D−Dunn Declaration, # 5 Exhibit E−Dunn Curriculum Vitae, # 6 Exhibit F−−Brazil & Dunn Timesheets, # 7 Exhibit F−2 Lichtman Invoice, # 8 Exhibit F−3 Wood Invoice, # 9 Exhibit G−Brazil Declaration, # 10 Exhibit H−Bruce Spiva Declaration, # 11 Exhibit I−−Brenda Wright Declaration, # 12 Exhibit J−Steve Pershing Declaration, # 13 Exhibit K−Updated Laffey Matrix, # 14 Exhibit L−Federal Case Weights Study)(Hebert, Joseph) (Entered: 09/10/2013)

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09/12/2013 05/30/2014
08/11/2014 08/11/2014

384 NOTICE Advisory by STATE OF TEXAS re 383 MOTION for Attorney Fees by Kennie Defendant Intervenors (Mitchell, Jonathan) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
385 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by LORRAINE BIRABIL, ANNA BURNS, DANIEL CLAYTON, DAVID DE LA FUENTE, SERGIO DELEON, JANE HAMILTON, ERIC KENNIE, MICHAEL MONTEZ, PENNY POPE, MARC VEASY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Hebert, Joseph) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
386 MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 8/11/2014. (lcrmc1) (Entered: 08/11/2014)
387 ORDER denying 383 Kennie−Intervenors' Motion for Attorneys' Fees. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 8/11/2014. (lcrmc1) (Entered: 08/11/2014)