McCoy v. Belmont, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)
2000 WL 1050911 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Connecticut.
Leo McCOY et al v.
Michael BELMONT et al
No. 3:85 CV 465(JGM). | March 14, 2000.
Opinion
RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
MARGOLIS, Magistrate J.
*1 Although familiarity with the complex legal and procedural history of this protracted litigation is presumed, a summary of facts relevant to this request follows. Absent objection from either party, on June 22, 1998, this Magistrate Judge issued an Order of Reference appointing Professor Edward Skarnulis as a Special Master for twelve (12) months to report periodically on the status of the implementation of the Consent Decree which was entered into by the parties on March 10, 1992. (Dkt.# 217). On May 18, 1999, Professor Skarnulis filed his report and recommendations. (Dkt.# 262). The Court extended Professor Skarnulis’ appointment to November 15, 1999 or to such other date as established by the Court. (See Dkt. # 297).
On July 7, 1999, new counsel filed an appearance for plaintiffs and the prior attorney of record filed a motion for withdrawal, which the Court granted. (Dkts.272–73). By letter, plaintiffs have expressed their dissatisfaction with numerous conclusions and recommendations proposed by the Special Master Skarnulis. (Letter to Court dated July 26, 1999). A lengthy settlement/status conference was held before this Magistrate Judge on July 28, 1999, extending the deadline by which the parties were to file formal objections to the Special Master’s report to September 3, 1999. (See Dkts.263, 271 & 278).
On August 11, 1999, defendants filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment with brief in support. (Dkts.282–83). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(e)(2), the Court also scheduled an evidentiary hearing on whether it should adopt Professor Skarnulis’ recommendations, to commence on September 27, 1999. (See Dkt. # 278). On that day, plaintiffs’ counsel stated that they were not prepared to go forward with the hearing, which was then

rescheduled to November 15, 1999. (See Dkt. # 296). The hearing commenced on November 15 and adjourned on November 18, 1999. (See Dkts.302–07).1 Pursuant to the Court’s scheduling order filed on January 19, 2000 (Dkt.# 310), defendants filed a post hearing memorandum on February 8, 2000 (Dkt.# 315) and plaintiffs filed their post hearing brief on February 22, 2000 (Dkt.# 316).
I. DISCUSSION
In their post hearing brief, defendants put forth two arguments. First, they argue that if the Court adopts any of the Special Master’s recommendations, it must adopt them all because “[e]ach component of his recommendations ... is dependant upon the others; the removal of one would greatly reduce any chance of success.” (Dkt. # 315 at 2). The Special Master proposes, inter alia, reduced staff support and removal of the guardian/parents from the McCoy home on the grounds of the Southbury Training School [hereinafter “STS”]. (Dkt. # 262 at 8–9). Defendants cite the cross-examination testimony of plaintiffs’ witness, Sister Barbara Eirich, that plaintiffs’ staffing demands exceed the staffing levels in programs she administers for individuals with needs similar to the McCoy men. (Dkt. # 315 at 3; 11/16/99 Tr. at 131–34, 135–36). Defendants also contend that the proposed transfer of administration of the McCoy program from the guardian/parents to the State is necessary because of the well-documented acrimony and mistrust between the parties and would eliminate STS’ present role. (Dkt. # 315 at 3 & 5).
*2 Second, defendants urge the Court to exercise its discretion and to grant relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). (Dkt. # 315 at 4 & 6–7). Defendants point to the testimony of plaintiffs’ witness Kathy Hanewitz, Case Manager, who recommends a family directed model of support, as the two current models cannot “mesh.” (Id. at 5; 11/17/99 Tr. at 48–49, 52, 54–56, 60, 61–64, 68–69). Defendants contend that this model is the better approach given the lengthy and acrimonious relationship between the parties, noting that it has been used successfully here in Connecticut. (Dkt. # 315 at 7–8).
In opposition, plaintiffs cite numerous reasons why the Court should deny defendants’ motion and should enforce the Consent Decree including: defendants are culpable for the suffering of the men; defendants must live up to their obligations under the Consent Decree which they entered into voluntarily; and the family support model is inappropriate in this case given the men’s elderly parents. (Dkt. # 316 at 2–3). Plaintiffs then detail many of the Special Master’s criticisms of defendants’ management of
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McCoy v. Belmont, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)
the McCoy program. (Id. at 4–7). Next, plaintiffs enumerate the Special Master’s recommendations, agreeing to some of them and requesting modification to the Consent Decree. (Id. at 8–16).
The threshold issue before the Court is whether it should grant defendants’ motion. If that motion is denied, the next step is whether to implement some or all of the Special Master’s recommendations.
Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons ... any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time .... A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C. § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court....
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).
“There is no suggestion ... that a consent decree is not subject to Rule 60(b). A consent decree no doubt embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual in nature. But it is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992) (citation omitted). “A party seeking modification of a consent decree may meet its initial burden by showing either a significant change either in factual conditions or in law.” Id. at 384.
*3 In the present case, defendants have failed to meet this burden. The parties entered into the Consent Decree on March 10, 1992. (Dkt.# 110). Defendants concede that there has been no sudden change in the facts or applicable law since that time. (Dkt. # 283 at 9 & Dkt. # 315 at 6). The obstacles and difficulties of implementation have

been ongoing and defendants acknowledge that staff turnover and the attendant issues of training and continuity of care has been an ongoing problem since the Fall of 1995. (Dkt. # 283 at 4).2 The family support model which defendants propose as an alternative is not a unique one. (Id. at 9–10 & Dkt. # 315 at 7–8). Moreover, the advancing age of the McCoy parents militates against use of this model. (See Dkt. # 316 at 2). Therefore, the Court denies defendants’ Motion for Relief from Judgment.
The next issue is whether the Court should adopt in whole or in part the Special Master’s recommendations. (See Dkt. # 262). The Federal Rules provide that “[i]n an action to be tried without a jury the court shall accept the master’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous....” FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e)(2). See also Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 118–19 (2d Cir.) (special master’s findings in a consensual reference are presumptively correct and subject to review when there has been manifest error), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); McCarthy v. Bronson, 906 F.2d 835, 838–40 (2d Cir.1990)(same), aff’d on other grounds, 500 U.S. 136 (1991).
Neither party has established that the Special Master’s findings are clearly erroneous. In fact, defendants did not file any objections to the Special Master’s recommendations. (Dkt. # 315 at 1). While plaintiffs have objected to some of the recommendations, their brief does not cite any case law nor have they provided any supporting documentary evidence or affidavits sufficient to meet the “clearly erroneous” standard.3
In conclusion, the Court adopts the Special Master’s recommendations contained in his report filed on May 18, 1999. (See Dkt. # 262). As detailed in his report filed, the Special Master had numerous conversations and consultations, with both parties, their counsel, medical and support staff at STS, administrators from the Department of Mental Retardation, and outside consultants in the field of developmental disabilities. As Professor Skarnulis forcefully testified, the “hybrid” model created by defendants either permitting or forcing Mr. and Mrs. McCoy to become the “de facto supervisors” of the McCoy Home simply cannot function effectively. (11/15/99 Tr. at 44, 58–59, 60–62, 81, 83–84, 85–87, 88–90, 104–05, 107–08, 110–13, 116–19, 122–23. See also 11/17/99 Tr. at 48–49, 52, 54–56, 60, 61–64). Professor Skarnulis remains hopeful that with the imposition of a new administration, the Consent Decree can be effectively implemented. (11/15/99 Tr. at 50–56, 66–70, 106–07, 120–22. See also Dkt. # 243). Because of the breadth of his familiarity with this case, the Court hereby extends Professor Skarnulis’ appointment to September 30, 2000 to ensure the orderly implementation of his recommendations.
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McCoy v. Belmont, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

II. CONCLUSION
*4 In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, defendants’ Motion for Relief from Judgment (Dkt.# 282) is denied and the Court adopts the Special Master’s

recommendations contained in his report, filed May 18, 1999. (See Dkt. # 262).
	  

Footnotes

1

Plaintiffs called eleven witnesses: Valerie Grush, an occupational therapist; Dr. Skarnulis; Susan Gannon, Kathleen Tessitore,

Pauline Polozhania, Carol Gary, Danwell Arnini, and Doreen DePaiva, all of whom work at the McCoy home; Sister Barbara

Eirich, plaintiff’s expert; Kathleen Hanewicz, case manager for plaintiffs; and Dr. Robert McDonald, plaintiffs’ physician.

Defendants called only one witness, Thomas Harris, personnel manager for the Southbury Training School.

The four transcripts were filed on March 13, 2000. (Dkt.318–21).

2

As before, the McCoy men are blessed to have the services of a few “core staff” members, see note 1 supra, who appear to have

unwavering loyalty to Mr. and Mrs. McCoy, to the detriment and exclusion of new employees. (See also Dkts.187 & 195).

Virtually all the witnesses agreed that “pulling” employees from STS to help at the McCoy home was not helpful to plaintiffs or

the core staff.

And as before, the turnover rate of staff is staggering—of the 108 employees hired since fall 1995, ninety-two have discontinued

their employment, leaving a core staff of seven and nine per diem employees. (11/17/99 Tr. at 75–76). As plaintiffs’

occupational therapist, Valerie Grush, acknowledged on cross-examination, she has trained ten to twelve staff members,

including registered nurses, of whom only two to four remain in the McCoy home. (11/15/99 Tr. at 27).

No one would dispute the “critical link” that Mrs. McCoy performs in maintaining her sons’ health. (11/18/99 Tr. at 5–6).

However, it is also abundantly clear that Esther and Leo McCoy, Sr. cannot remain as the sole administrators of this home.

3

The Court notes that at the evidentiary hearing on November 15, 1999, plaintiffs called Dr. Skarnulis as a witness. (Dkt. # 318, at

38–123). He testified extensively as to his methodologies, evidence and his recommendations. Both parties had ample opportunity

to examine Dr. Skarnulis. Neither party moved for his withdrawal.

	  

3

 
 Case 3:85-cv-00465-EBB Document 510 Filed 09/12/05 Page 1 of 24

MCCOY
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BELMONT

SEPTEMBER 9,2005

PLAINTIFF'S POST-HEARING BRIEF

A. Procedural History

This dispute arises from litigation initiated two decades ago to assure that Leo

McCoy, Jr., and his brother, William McCoy, were provided adequate medical care to

address the catastrophic physical and psychological disabilities afflicting each man.

Both require round-the-clock care and both were, at the time litigation began, residents

of the Southbury Training School, a facility operated by the Department of Mental

Retardation. Notwithstanding the mens' residence in the training facility, their parents have remained their legal guardians throughout the Iitigation.1 Esther McCoy, the mens'

mother, remains their legal guardian to this very day.

The initial litigation was resolved by way of a consent decree between the

Department of Mental Retardation and the mens' legal guardians on March 10, 1992.

The decree called for the creation of a special living arrangement in a home known as

Staff House 2 to serve only Leo and William. The facility required separate staffing by

a core staff of at least fifteen persons and accommodations tailored to meet the mens'

unique needs. The District Court retained jurisdiction over enforcement of the consent

decree, and considerable resources have been devoted to the parties' respective

IMr. McCoy died after a long illness during the summer of 2004. 1

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Case 3:85-cv-00465-EBB Document 510 Filed 09/12/05 Page 2 of 24
claims since the time the consent decree was entered into. In 2001, the trial court heard evidence from November 19, 2001 to December 13,
2001, on the plaintiffs' motion for contempt and the defendants' motion for relief from judgment. On July 15, 2002, the District Court issued a ruling denying the defendants' motion for relief from judgment and granting in part, and denying in part the plaintiffs' contempt motion. Central to the court's decision in this ruling is its finding that "the McCoys must relinquish control and allow people whom they may not know very well to care for their sons. If the McCoys are not prepared to live with this reality, then a Staterun program may not be the best choice for them." Ruling, p. 34. The defendants sought, by way of relief from judgment, an order requiring the McCoy parents to
establish a family-directed program for their sons. lQ.", p. 32.
As of 2002, the District Court observed that "[t]he requirements of the Consent Decree [had] never been achieved." The Court noted that fault for this was the responsibility of both the parents and the defendants. In significant part this failure was due, in the Court's view, to the "controlling" presence of Mr. And Mrs. McCoy in Staff House 2, as the couple had lived their with their sons for a number of years. The Court ordered that the home be given necessary renovations and that the parents move out, leaving to the defendants' the task of providing day-today care for William and Leo and for managing the institution. The Court noted the right of Mr. And Mrs. McCoy to have approval of staff necessary to provide a "core staff," but ordered that such approval not be unreasonably withheld. Finally, because the consent decree called for the appointment of an advocate, and the defendants had not yet appointed one, the Court
ordered appointment of an advocate. lQ.", pp. 32-33. The McCoys took an appeal from
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the District Court ruling denying certain of their contempt claims.2 The Second Circuit upheld the trial court by way of Summary Order on August 27, 2003, and a Mandate issued on September 12, 2003.
While the appeal was pending before the Second Circuit new contempt motions were filed by both parties in 2002. The defendants also sought modification or clarification of the Consent Decree. The issues framed by these pleadings are as follows:
1. Whether the Mr. And Mrs. McCoy are in contempt of the Consent Decree due to their continuing harassment, intimidation and otherwise inappropriate conduct toward the staff; whether Mr. And Mrs. McCoy have refused to cooperate in the process of hiring additional staff; and, whether Mr. And Mrs. McCoy continue to attempt to "usurp control" of the program.
2. Whether the terms of the Consent Decree permit the defendants to use the second floor of Staff House 2 for staff-related use or whether the current use of the second floor is in contempt of the decree.
3. Whether the decree permits the imposition of reasonable restrictions on Mr. And Mrs. McCoy's right to visit their children.3
'The McCoys' also appealed the trial court's decision to preclude the testimony of Dr. Leslie Rubin their counsel had failed to provide notice of his prospective use as an expert witness.
3The pleadings also refer to a third issue: the use of video cameras in the house. That issue appears to have been abandoned given the lack of evidence on the topic in the most recent round of hearings.
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4. Whether the defendants have refused adequately to staff the house with registered nurses.
5. Whether the current advocate, Sister Barbara Ehrlich should be replaced as she lacks sufficient independence of Ms. McCoy to act in the best interest of William and Leo McCoy.
After attempts to settle the dispute between the parties failed, and after numerous requests for continuances submitted by both parties, the Court heard evidence on five days in 2005 on the cross-motions for contempt and on an additional issue only recently raised, to wit: whether the advocate currently appointed for William and Leo McCoy, Sister Barbara Ehrlich, should be replaced. Mrs. McCoy submits this post-hearing brief in support of her motion for contempt and in opposition to the defendants' motions.
B. Legal Standard for a Finding of Contempt A finding of contempt must be supported by the proof of three elements: (1) the order violated was clear and unambiguous; (2) clear and convincing evidence of noncompliance: and (3) no reasonable diligence by the contemnor to comply. United States v. Local 1804-1, Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 44 F.3d 1091, 1096 (2d Cir.1995). C. Argument This is a heart-breaking case of seemingly unending difficulty. On the one hand, Mrs. McCoy, how herself advanced in years, seeks to remain active in the lives of her profoundly impaired sons and to satisfy her legal responsibilities as guardian of the
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men. Distrustful of the defendants and their staff after years of bitter litigation, she often consults with physicians and specialists off the grounds of the defendants' facility, and seeks to make the sorts of decisions she believes she has a right to make as guardian about the manner and means by which her sons' medical needs are met. She has come to rely upon an expert of her own choosing, Dr. Leslie Rubin, for medical advice about such contested issues as hand-in-mouth behavior and footwear, and she seeks to remain active on a daily basis in the lives of her sons, not unreasonably believing that after almost five decades, she knows the manner and means of their communication better than the intermittent strangers upon whom the men rely for most of their care. In the face of conflict with the defendants about the scope of the her role as guardian, Mrs. McCoy petitioned the Southbury Probate Court for a hearing. That court deferred action pending the outcome of these proceedings.
Mrs. McCoy's belief that she has rights as legal guardian to make decisions about the day-to-day care of her son places her in apparent conflict with the crosscutting imperatives of the defendants, who are seeking to care not just for the men, but to provide care for many other impaired persons within the care of the State and who believe that Mrs. McCoy's rights as a guardian are far less expansive than the role Ms. McCoy envisions. Although Ms. McCoy has herself gone to the Probate Court to obtain clarification of her role as guardian, the defendants have apparently never challenged her role, nor sought the guidance of a court of competent jurisdiction about what a guardian can and cannot do. Instead, the parties find themselves in the United States District Court arguing issues and concerns that arise under a contract entered between the two of them freely and voluntarily.
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This Court sh reject the defendants' motion for contempt as there is no clear and convincing proof of a violation of the decree; additionally, the plaintiff, Mrs. McCoy, cannot on the facts before this Court fairly be said to have failed to use reasonable diligence to comply with the terms of the decree.
1. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Mr. McCoy And Need Not Consider The Defendants' Claims As To Him
Although Mr. McCoy is dead, and has been so since the summer of 2004, the defendants in this action insisted upon putting on evidence of his acts and omissions. Counsel for Mrs. McCoy objected on the grounds of relevance and because of the potential for prejudice. First, she contended that any contempt findings as to Mr. McCoy would be moot given his demise. Additionally, Mrs. McCoy contended that there can be no joint responsibility on which to base a finding of contempt. Evidence of Mr. McCoy's conduct, even of conduct of his taking place in the presence of Mrs. McCoy, could serve but one purpose, to wit: prejudicing the Court by fouling the record with the alleged bad acts of another. Mrs. McCoy requests that this Court make no findings as to Mr. McCoy and parse carefully those claims arising from his conduct.
2. Mrs. McCoy's Interactions With Staff At Staff House Two Do Not Rise To The Level Of Contempt, Rather She Is Merely Trying To Assure That She Fulfills Her Responsibility As Legal Guardian To Her Sons, A Role The Defendants Do Not Challenge, And She Did Not Unreasonably Impede The Hiring Of Staff
There is be no dispute that William and Leo McCoy are catastrophically impaired psychologically and physically and that both men require round-the-clock care. At issue in this case are several related factors: How shall the care be financed? Who has the right to make decisions about the care offered the men? How shall disputes as to final
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decision-making be resolved? The consent decree gives the responsibility to pay to the defendants. It does not address issues as to who shall make decisions as that is apparently a matter best left to state law. Finally, the decree is silent as to how disputes shall be resolved. The lack of clarity and the inherent ambiguity of these latter two issues militate against a finding of contempt.
Ms. McCoy testified that one of her principal objectives in launching this litigation in 1985 was to assure home-based care for her two sons. Trial Transcript, hereinafter "TT," July 5, 2005, p.4. Although she and her husband did live in the house with her sons for an extended period, they left the home in compliance with an order of this Court in 2002. Id., p.5.
Since 1985, Mrs. McCoy has relied upon the recommendations of outside medical consultants to provide care for her sons, including Dr. Leslie Rubin. Id., p.6. After her husband's death, Mrs. McCoy became the sale legal guardian for her sons. Id., p.7. Although the staff at the Southbury Training School had previously respected Mrs. McCoy's role as legal guardian for her sons, that began to change after this Court's ruling on the parties' cross-contempt motions in 2002. Id., pp.7-8. The principal change is that she is no longer consulted on issues arising from the day-to-day care of her sons. Id., p.8. In particular, Mrs. McCoy believes her rights as legal guardian give her standing to object to anything that places her sons into harm. Id. Given the fact that she was being ignored by the staff, Mrs. McCoy turned to the Probate Court to enforce her right to be consulted and have decisions about care honored. Id., p.9.
Among the issues on which Mrs. McCoy has sought to intervene was the defendants' abrupt decision to forbid the use of crushed ice in William's drinks, Id.,
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Case 3:85-cv-00465-EBB Document 510 Filed 09/12/05 Page 8 of 24
pp.9-10. Mrs. McCoy contends that the use of such ice to thicken his drinks is appropriate; the defendants disagree. Mrs. McCoy relies in part upon the advice of Kim Winters, a speech pathologist at the Hospital for Special Needs and on the advice of Dr. Rubin, both of whom supported the use of crushed ice in his drinks. Id., pp. 10-15.
Mrs. McCoy has also sought to intervene to modify the defendants' program to prevent her son William from engaging in hand-to-mouth behavior. She was not consulted before the program to accomplish this behavioral change was implemented, and is concerned that it will impede William's ability to communicate distress. Id., pp. 16-21. Once again, Mrs. McCoy relied upon the advice of physicians, in this case Dr. Erickson and Dr. Schleiter, in reaching the conclusion that William should have some freedom with the use of his hand. Id., pp.24-27. In particular, while Dr. Schleiter recognized the risks of permitting William to put his hand in his mouth, he also recognized that it was an important quality of life issue for William, Id., pp.26-27. Quality of life for her sons remains a principal concern of Mrs. McCoy's. Id., p.14. This concern has been heightened by periodic unexplained injuries to her sons, as was the case when Leo had an unexplained arm fracture in 2004. Id., p..27-28. Mrs. McCoy was later told that Leo injured his arm himself, striking the table with it, something he had never done before in 48 years. Id., p.30.
In apparent response to the arm fracture, staff at the house once again made a change in the manner in which Leo was cared for, this time placing a blue pad on the table to serve as an apparent cushing device. Mrs. McCoy testified that the use of his pad would compound problems with her son's ability to see and detect items on the table before him, a consequence of his decreasing vision, and that she had been able
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successfully to manage the risk of injury from Leo's hitting the table simply by turning him away from the table. The staff ignored her concerns. Id., pp. 31-32. Mrs. McCoy views the decision about use of the pad as one she is entitled to make as her son's legal guardian. Id., p. 33. The staff disagree.
In 2004, Mrs. McCoy became concerned about the manner in which Leo was cleansed after using the restroom. She told the staff she did not believe enough people were used to move him safely or to accomplish the necessary cleansing without serious risk of injury to Leo. Her concern was reinforced by a physician at the Hospital for Special Needs who requested of the defendants' staff be retrained on how to transfer Leo. Id., pp. 35-36.
Additionally, Mrs. McCoy became aware of a unilateral order from a staff physician that Leo be required to wear shoes at all times, despite a demonstrated history of her son's ability to ambulate effectively in stocking feet. After an initial meeting with a staff doctor, Leo was permitted to wear "stocking slippers" - socks with rubber soles. This lasted for two weeks when the order requiring shoes was reinstated without consultation or explanation. As a result, Mrs. McCoy has noticed a decreasing ability of her son to walk. Id., pp. 37-40. Her objection to this change has been ignored by the staff.
Mrs. McCoy described at trial a pervasive sense of being excluded from decisions and information regarding the day-to-day care of her sons. She was not conSUlted, for example, regarding a change in William's dietary regime, involving chocolate milk and ice cream. Id., pp. 40-44. Her son Leo suffered an unexplained fracture to his nose in 2003. Id., p. 45. She has discovered medication errors involving
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her sons. Id., p. 47. Her sons are not adequately monitored by staff during such critical periods as meal time. Id., pp. 50-51.
She has sought the advice and counsel of non-staff medical persons to determine how best to respond to these issues. Id., 99. 51-52. She has also noticed changes in the attitude of her son's primary care physician, Dr. McDonald, since she and her husband moved out of the home, with communication now characterized as "very poor." Id., pp. 54-55. Although Mrs. McCoy has the right to attend weekly staff meetings regarding the care and treatment of her sons, in recent years she noticed that the staff rarely heeds her. She could think of few instances in which the staff followed one her recommendations, or even did much of anything other than respond in a patronizing manner. Id., p.59.
Although the consent decree calls for a core staff of fifteen persons, Mrs. McCoy observed that since 2002 there has not been a permanent staff in the house, resulting in poorly trained and unskilled personnel caring for her sons' special needs. Id., pp. 6063. On the third shift at Staff House 2, the defendants have even ceased providing a staff nurse on site. Id., pp. 63-65.
Mrs. McCoy was last consulted about hiring staff about three years ago. Id., p. 66. Notwithstanding this inadequate staff coverage for her sons, staff have in recent years begun to use the second floor of the house as a break room and office, depriving the men of the care and attention of the staff. Mrs. McCoy was not consulted about this change either. Id., pp.68-69.
The defendants presented a number of witnesses to testify as to difficulties they have had with Mr. and Mrs. McCoy since 2002. Without summarizing the evidence of
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the defendants, the defendants' case appears to come down to the following: During the transition period following this Court's orderrequiring the McCoys to move from Staff House 2, the staff was cooperative and willing, ready and able to accept the help and suggestions of the parents regarding how best to care for the men. Thus, at or about the time that Mr. and Mrs. McCoy moved out, staff accepted and largely adopted the McCoy's "routines" in place for caring for the men. As time passed, the staff became more familiar with the day-to-day needs of the men, and the contributions of Mr. and Mrs. McCoy were less appreciated. What was once a family home supported by the state and assisted by state workers increasingly became an institutional setting in which the contributions of the men's legal guardians came to be regarded as an imposition.
Seemingly senseless issues were made over such things as chocolate milk, the placing of ice cream in a microwave to soften it and whether shoe, sock or rubber-soled shoes were preferable. On those occasions when Ms. McCoy had an opportunity to meet with staff to discuss concerns about the treatment of her sons, she was largely ignored, as was her advocate. As her husband neared death, Ms. McCoy attended to him and was absent from the home far more than was customary. Upon her return, staff were less accommodating to her, and she sought the guidance of the Probate Court for clarification of her legal rights and responsibilities. Those issues remain unaddressed, and Mrs. McCoy continues to rely upon the advice and counsel of health-care professionals outside the home as the climate of mistrust has made it difficult for her to trust that her son's are getting the care to which they are entitled under the consent decree. In particular, Ms. McCoy relies heavily upon the advice of Dr. Leslie Rubin, an
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expert who testified in the latest round of hearings. n, May 13, 2005, pp. 129-196.
Dr. Rubin testified that he first became familiar with William and Leo in 1985. Id., p. 133. He testified that crushed ice was acceptable means of thickening William's drinks. Id., p. 145, a position taken by Mrs. McCoy, and he informed Mrs. McCoy that such a means of thickening liquids was acceptable. Id., p. 148. The doctor did not think a blanket prohibition of the behavior was appropriate, but that goal of gradual reduction was reasonable. He thinks he may have discussed this issue with Mrs. McCoy. Id., pp. 151-152. In sum, the doctor's opinion supports the contention that in the many areas in which there has been conflict between the staff and the men's legal guardians, there are a range of medically reasonable responses possible to address the men's needs. Id., p. 156. Put another way, the defendants' insistence that care be provided only as the staff dictates look like something less than medical necessity and more like a struggle for power with the mens' guardian.
Mrs. McCoy is a determined advocate for her son, and her sons' unchallenged legal guardians. Notwithstanding the testimony at the recent hearing about the medical need for some of the choices made by the defendants and their agents and the concern that Mrs. McCoy's interventions harm the men, the defendants have not sought to challenge Mrs. McCoy's role as guardian. Instead, they seek a finding of contempt and a modification of the consent decree that would result in something less than what the parties bargained for long ago. This Court should not hold Mrs. McCoy in contempt as her conduct, though at times seemingly difficult, is explicable in terms of her lifelong commitment to assure the best possible care for two sons disabled in some of the most cruel ways imaginable. Her reliance on medical professionals who happen to disagree
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with the defendants is not contemptuous or unreasonable. 3. Mrs. McCoy Has Not Unreasonably Refused To Cooperate In The Hiring Of Staff Notwithstanding the testimony of the defendants regarding Mrs. McCoy's lack of
approval for certain staff, there is no evidence to suggest that the house is understaffed, save for the defendants' decision to deprive the men of nursing coverage during the third shift. As a result, this Court should not find Mrs. McCoy in contempt as the conduct complained of causes no harm either to the defendants or to the men. If Mrs. McCoy has in any sense waived her right to participate in staff selection decisions she ought not to be held in contempt. Mrs. McCoy has had in recent years to contend with the protracted and fatal illness of her husband. That she has not had the stamina to participate fully in staffing decisions is not contempt. Indeed, since her husband's death there does not appear to be an issue about staff hiring at all.
4. Far From Attempting To "Usurp Control" Of Staff House 2, Mrs. McCoy Is Merely Trying To Prevent The Transformation Of The Home Into The Sort Of Institutional Setting The Consent Decree Prohibits
Mrs. McCoy's testimony at the recent hearings made clear her fear about what is becoming of the home for her sons. "It's not a home any longer; it's an institution .... My sons lived in the institution across the street, and that's what we were trying to get away from .... [Ilt's not a home anymore." TT, June 14, 2005, pp. 69-70.
Several disputes illustrate that the tension in the home flows in both directions. The dispute over the use of the "privacy-screen" purchased for the men by Mrs. McCoy illustrates the petty vindictiveness that sometimes characterizes staff attitudes toward Mrs. McCoy. Rather than use a screen that she purchased to assure privacy for the
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men, the staff refuse to use it, saying it does not provide enough privacy for the men at such times as when they are changed in the living room area. Rather than use Ms. McCoy's screen, the staff placed it in the basement. Id., p.70. From whom where the staff trying to protect the men, their mother? Is it seriously contended that the staff care more for the mens' dignity than does Mrs. McCoy? The issue is trifling yet the psychic cost to Mrs. McCoy, and potentially to her sons, is dear. She has been deemed somehow unfit to assure the dignity of her sons and her attempt to fill the home with things of her choosing is turned against her as a weapon. Why? Perhaps because it is the staff, and not Mrs. McCoy, who has issues with control of Staff House 2.
When Mrs. McCoy raises an issue whether the hot meals served to her sons are, in fact, permitted to grow cold, she is held out to be a scold. Yet when the home was created, it was created with a kitchen. The decision of the defendants to prepare meals across the street from the home confirms rather than undermines Mrs. McCoy's fear that her sons are being constructively returned to the very sort of institutional care that led to their neglect and abuse in the first place. She settled a law suit to escape what the defendants are seeking to reimpose.
5. The Decree Cannot Fairly Be Read In Such A Manner As To Limit The
Access Of The Men's Legal Guardian To Periods Of Reasonable Visitation The Consent Decree Paragraph 18 of the Consent Decree gives to Mrs. McCoy the right to "visit any residence developed for the plaintiffs under this Consent Decree at any time, unannounced." Para. 18. The defendants seek a modification of the decree, requiring, in effect, that the legal guardian for the men be given limited visiting hours. This would
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have the practical effect of relegating Mrs. McCoy to the status of visitor to an institution housing her sons. She seeks the rights of a mother and legal guardian to care for men who are unable to care for themselves to the full extent of her ability to do so. The decree should not be modified in this regard as the defendants have shown no compelling necessity for such a change in the regime now in place. Indeed, limitations on access to her son in the face of this record would not permit the men's legal guardian any effective means to determine whether the men's heretofore unexplained injuries were the result of the sort of abuse that made this litigation necessary in the first place.
Admittedly, relations between staff and Mrs. McCoy are tense. However, on this record the Court may well infer that the cause of that tension is not solely Mrs. McCoy. The Court may well infer what common sense dictates: The staff and administrators caring for William and Leo McCoy are dedicated health-care professionals. They care for William and Leo, and they care for others. Yet only William and Leo are given the extraordinary treatment required by the Consent Decree. William and Leo have a parent who even into her seventies is energetic and committed enough to be an aggressive and seemingly tireless advocate for her sons. Does it strain reason to conclude that the staff also harbors some resentment that Leo and William are given treatment other equally deserving men and women do not get? Does it strain reason to conclude that the staff would prefer not to have Mrs. McCoy as guardian in the home? It would be far easier, after all, to work unobserved.
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6. The Defendants Have Failed, Refused And Neglected To Provide Adequate Nursing Coverage Of The Home In Violation Of The Consent Decree
Paragraph two of the consent decree requires that "[nJursing services shall be available at all times" in Staff House 2. Unaccountably, and without notice to Mrs. McCoy, the defendants now refuse to staff the house with nurses during the third shift. The defendants contend that having nurses on duty across the street at the Southbury Training School makes nurses available, as a nurse can be redirected to Staff House 2 as needed. This convenient reading of the decree eviscerates one of the decree's principal objectives, as stated in the first paragraph of the decree: "the defendants shall develop a living arrangement, to serve only Leo and William, ... " Para. 2, Consent Decree.
The decree speaks in broad terms of the exclusive character of William and Leo's home, yet the behavior of the staff reflects a desire to undermine this exclusivity. Whereas the decree calls for "[sJpecial arrangements ... to ensure that the food for William and Leo is prepared by trained kitchen staff," the defendants now require the food to be prepared across the street and brought to the men. Whereas the decree calls for the home to meet or exceed "ICFMR certification requirements in all respects," the staff routinely settles for something less, blaming first Mr. and Mrs. McCoy and now Mrs. McCoy alone for their failure. The retreat from the nursing coverage required by the decree is but another example of the war of attrition waged by the staff to undo the decree.
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7. The Defendants' Transformation Of Parts Of The Home To StaffAreas Is In Violation Of The Decree
The transformation of the second floor of Staff House 2 into staff areas, used both as a "break room" and as a no office frustrates the very purpose of the Consent Decree. Paragraph three of the decree calls for core staff of fifteen persons specially trained to meet the needs of the McCoy men. "The individual needs of Leo and William shall determine the staff rations within the living arrangement." Para. Three. Among other requirements of the decree is that the Case Manager assigned to the house have a caseload of no more than 1:40. Para. Eight. Additionally, the "defendants shall maintain 1 to 1 staff to resident ratios on all three shifts in the residence." Para. 12.
The decree contemplates a regime in which the men will not be left unattended. It further contemplates direct round-the-clock care by competent staff specially trained to meet the men's special needs. Permitting the staff to be segregated from the men for significant period of time during the day increases the likelihood that an untoward medical event will occur.
At the hearing, the defendants did not put on evidence that would permit this Court to conclude that the second floor of the home can be converted to staff use while at the same time assuring the level of care called for by the decree. For example, should the Court permit the use of the second floor, what becomes of the 1: 1 requirement at all times? Will staff be said to attending the men's needs when they are upstairs taking a break or doing clerical work?
What was intended to be a home for men with special needs increasingly looks like the very institution the decree forbade. Nurses are off sight; the food is prepared off
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Case 3:85-cv-00465-EBB Document 510 Filed 09/12/05 Page 18 of 24
site; now staff assigned to provide 1: 1 care is apparently relieved of that very responsibility. Simply put, the defendants have failed to show that the decree can be honored with this modification. The fact that they have converted the second floor to their use without first seeking Court approval is an implicit acknowledgment of their contempt of the decree. What is requested is judicial blessing of a practice unjustified under the decree. Mrs. McCoy requests that the defendants be held in contempt
D. The Motion To Oust The Current Advocate Should Be Denied As Sister Barbara, The Current Advocate, Has Long Known Leo And William And Has The Confidence Of The Men's Legal Guardian
The defendants moved, years after filing the contempt motions returning this case to Court, for replacement of the current advocate with another person. They argue, essentially, that the current advocate is a mere tool or alter ego of Mrs. McCoy. The court should reject the suggestion that the advocate is not capable of protecting the interests of Leo and William McCoy. That the defendants have difficult with the very concept of an advocate for the men is clear. It took a prior finding of contemp against the defendants to compel them to honor the consent decree's requirement than an advocate be appointed and funded. Merely agreeing with Mrs. McCoy that the defendants and staff attending the McCoy men could do a better job of caring for them is an insufficient reason for her removal.
Sister Barbara Eirich is a Franciscan nun and an employee of an entity called WeCAHR; she is also a registered nurse with a master's degree in social work. She specializes in the care of persons with developmental disabilities. TT, June 8, 2005, pp.158-160. Sister Barbara has worked with the McCoy family for more than two
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decades, beginning her work with them prior to the filing of the Complaint that spawned this litigation. She has developed great familiarity with the medical condition and needs of the men. Sister Barbara became the men's advocate in 2003; the McCoy case is the only one in which she has served as a court-appointed or court-recognized advocate. Id., pp.160-162.
Sister Barbara tries to spend about eight hours each week with the men. Id., pp. 163-164. She understood her role initially to be to observe the men on a regular, consistent basis, to document her visits and to write summaries of her observations. Id., pp. 165-166. She initially attended periodic administrative meetings regarding planning of care for the men. Id. P. 167. Since becoming advocate, she has noticed the defendants and their staff take a more aggressive role in management of the home. Id., pp.168-169. Mrs. McCoy has expressed concerns about her sons' care to Sister Barbara; the defendants and their staff, however, have never expressed concerns to Sister Barbara about Mrs. McCoy. Id., p.169. Aware of growing tension at the home, Sister Barbara has discussed the issues with Mrs. McCoy. Id., p.170.
Relations between the Mrs. McCoy and the defendants and their staff reached a turning point at about the time the crushed-ice issue surfaced. Sister Barbara questioned why the prohibition on crushed ice was mandated, as nothing had happened in William's life to require such a change. Id., pp.170-171 She expressed her concerns about this change at a staff meeting. Id., p.173. When Sister Barbara raised a question at the staff meeting about the rights and responsibilities of the men's legal guardian, Mrs. McCoy, no one answered her. Id., p.174-175. She met a similar reaction when she discussed her concerns that changing William's hand-to-mouth behavior
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could undermine his will to live. Id., pp.176-177. She learned that the communication between the William's treating physician and staff was sometimes poor, resulting in too draconian an effort to modify William's hand-to-mouth behavior. Id.,p. 179. Additionally, she observed no consultation either with herself or with Mrs. McCoy on the need to require that Leo's footwear be changed. Id.,p.180-181.
Far from being Mrs. McCoy's alter ego, Sister Barbara has disagreed with Mrs. McCoy. In particular, the two disagreed about the program to modify hand-to-mouth behavior. While Mrs. McCoy opposed it in general, Sister Barbara supported it so long as the staff implementing it were well-trained and sufficiently monitored. Id.,pp.184-185.
When Sister Barbara observed the staff ignore Mrs. McCoy's questions about the rights and responsibilities of a guardian she became uncomfortable. Once Mrs. McCoy turned to the Probate Court for relief, Sister Barbara ceased attending staff meetings, waiting for the Probate Court to rule. Sister Barbara discussed this course of conduct with a supervisor at WeCAHR. Id.,pp.189-191 She continued to visit the men at their home for approximately eight hours per week during this period, although she did not attend staff meetings. Id., p.191. Sister Barbara returned to the periodic staff meetings when asked to do so by her supervisor at WeCAHR. Id.,p.193.
Sister Barbara has attempted to discuss with the defendants and their staff her concerns about inadequate staffing and inadequate nursing coverage at the home. She fears that inadequate nursing coverage places both men at risk. Id.,pp.193-194. Sister Barbara's concerns have not apparently been addressed any better than have those of Mrs. McCoy.
Nothing in the record before this Court supports a finding that Sister Barbara is a 20

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mere tool of Mrs. McCoy's. The Sister has long known the men and their parents. She is a trained health-care professional with expertise in the care of the developmentally disabled. While she shares some of the same concerns as Mrs. McCoy, she does disagree with Mrs. McCoy from time to time. While her decision not to attend staff meetings while awaiting rulings from the Probate Court may be questionable, it is defensible given the undisputed fact that in this case Esther McCoy is the men's legal guardian and that Mrs. McCoy had gone to court for relief she could not get from the defendants.. Sister Barbara and Mrs. McCoy share a legal unity of interest in the welfare of the men. The defendants have not sough the replacement of Mrs. McCoy as guardian, which would be their right and responsibility if they believed that she was harming her sons. Neither have they claimed that Sister Barbara's performance of her duties has harmed the men. Simply put, the defendants appear to dislike the fact that when it comes to such issues as crushed ice, shoes versus socks with rubber soles and hand-to-mouth behavior, Sister Barbara does not always agree with the defendants. Neither, apparently, does Dr,. Rubin, the physician in whom Mrs. McCoy has placed her trust. Should Dr. Rubin be banned from the premised because he disagrees with staff?
E. Conclusion In 1992, the defendants and the parents for Leo and William McCoy entered into a consent decree on the eve of jury selection in which the plaintiffs were poised to prove that two profoundly retarded men were poorly. To avoid the risk and embarrassment of trial, the defendants entered into a consent decree, providing that the men be cared for outside an institutional setting, in a home designed and maintained for their benefit. The defendants were under no obligation to enter into such
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an agreement. It turns out that the care offered the McCoy men exceeds that offered others in
the care and custody of Southbury Training School. On several occasions during trial, counsel for the defendants asked witnesses whether they were aware of similar care and expense being devoted to others. The answer was always "no."
Has the contempt motion been filed by the defendants because of concern for the health of Leo and William McCoy? The only conceivable answer is no. If there were a serious concern about Mrs. McCoy's intervention on her son's behalf, the defendants would undoubtedly have turned to the Probate Court to oust Mrs. McCoy as guardian. No such move has been made. Instead, the defendants contend that they and staff cannot work with Mrs. McCoy. Yet history belies this assertion. For more than an uneasy decade Mrs. McCoy, her sons and staff have existed in a tense and mutually unsatisfying marriage. The lack of ease is less a function of the fault of Mrs. McCoy than it is that she has refused to abandoned her sons to the care of strangers and has fought every battle necessary to assure that they be treated well and with human dignity. No court should expect a mother to do less; and this Court should not hold Mrs. McCoy in contempt for giving her life to two men apparently destined to enjoy far less of a life than the rest of us take for granted.
Many of the issues resulting in this latest round of hearings seem sadly unnecessary. Having won the right to remove Mrs. McCoy from the home, the defendants seem almost eager to create issues designed to offend Mrs. McCoy, engaging in a passive-aggressive battle for control. Shoes versus socks, crushed ice or not, chocolate milk or not. If these are medical issues at all, the evidence shows that
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they are issues on which reasonable medical minds may, and do, disagree. What the

defendants appear to object to is Mrs. McCoy desire to have Staff House 2 operate as it

was intended to operate: as a home for two men in need.

It is expensive to run Staff House 2. But the defendants knew it would be when

they signed the consent decree. Modification of the decree should not be ordered

simply because William and Leo McCoy have had the good fortune to outlive

everyone's expectations. The defendants' contempt motions, indeed, the defendants,

course of conduct in recent years, is less about what is good for Leo and William

McCoy than it is what is convenient for a busy and harried staff. Mrs. McCoy urges this

Court not to hold her in contempt and not to modify the consent decree. Leo and

William McCoy are entitled to their legal guardian's and mother's best efforts to provide

care. She should not be faulted for fighting efforts to return her sons by fiat to

institutional care.

THE PLAINTIFFS, William McCoy and Leo McCoy Jr.

.... BY_~/l"""",~ /~A/i",-~.a..:-· Norm~n

A.

A
Pattis

""""'Y="--

ct13120

Law Offices of Norman A. Pattis LLC

649 Amity Road, P.O. Box 280

Bethany, CT 06524

Tel: (203)393-3017

Fax: (203)393-9745

Plaintiffs Attorney

-23-

Case 3:85-cv-00465-EBB Document 510 Filed 09/12/05 Page 24 of 24 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the forgoing Appearance was mailed on this date to the
following: 1/1/0 r
Thomas B. York Dilworth Paxson 112 Market Street 8th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17101
-24-

 
 Case 3:85-cv-00465-EBB Document 518 Filed 07/10/07 Page 1 of 83

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

LEO McCOY, JR. AND WILLIAM McCOY
v.
MICHAEL BELMONT, ET. AL

: : : : No. 3:85cv465(EBB) : :

Ruling on Defendants’ Motions for a Finding of Contempt and for Clarification or Modification of the Consent Decree,
Defendants’ Motion for Authorization to Appoint a New Advocate and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt, Enforcement and Other Relief

On July 15, 2002, this Court issued its Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt and Defendants’ Motion for Relief from Judgment [Doc. No. 423] (“2002 Ruling”). The Ruling attempted to change the untenable paradigm in place and ordered the parties to live up to the terms of the Consent Decree. The Defendants were ordered, inter alia, to take responsibility for administering all aspects of the home, to repair the downstairs bathroom, to hire such additional employees as needed to reach the minimum core-staff level of fifteen, to appoint an advocate for both Leo McCoy, Jr. (“Leo”) and William McCoy (“Bill or Billy”) (collectively, “the McCoy men” or “the McCoy sons”), to design a day program for Leo, and to provide a visible and accountable manager to oversee the home, adequate supervision on each shift, and competency-based training for all employees. The McCoy parents were ordered not to interfere with the Defendants and to vacate Staff House Two, and were cautioned that parental approval of staff selection shall not

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be unreasonably withheld1 and that, although they are members of the Interdisciplinary Team (IDT), that status does not permit them to exercise absolute control over training and services.2 This Court noted in conclusion that “[i]n order for this home to function under the direction of the State, the McCoys must relinquish control and allow people whom they may not know very well to care for their sons.” 2002 Ruling at 34.
Within a few months of the 2002 Ruling, the parties again found themselves at odds over the implementation of the Consent Decree. Defendants filed their Motion for a Finding of Contempt and for Clarification or Modification of the Consent Decree [Doc. No. 433] less than four months after this Court’s 2002 Ruling. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Contempt, Enforcement and Other Relief on November 26, 2002 [Doc. No. 445]. Defendants filed their Motion for the Enforcement of the July 15, 2002 Ruling Pending Appeal3 and for a Finding of Contempt and for Clarification or Modification of the Consent Decree on June 23, 2003 [Doc. No. 450]. The parties engaged in a settlement conference with Magistrate
1Paragraph Three of the Consent Decree provides that “Adequate arrangements for ensuring a competent core group [of staff] shall be developed, including parental approval of staff selected for the core group.”
2Paragraph Eleven of the Consent Decree allows the McCoy parents to "obtain the services of specific consultants" to aid in assessments, aid in developing interventions, aid in scheduling services and to provide training and on-site supervision.
3The McCoy’s appeal of the 2002 Ruling was denied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Skarnulis v. Belmont, 74 Fed. Appx. 92 (2d Cir. 2003). Thus, this Ruling will not address the arguments related to the appeal or this Court’s jurisdiction during its pendency.
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Judge Garfinkel in February 2004 which proved unfruitful. Finally, Defendants filed their Motion for Authorization to Appoint an Independent Advocate for Leo McCoy, Jr. and William McCoy [Doc. No. 462] on October 28, 2004. This Court granted the motion to appoint an independent advocate, no response having been filed by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider this Court’s granting of Defendants’ motion for an independent advocate on February 18, 2005, and this Court granted reconsideration. Evidentiary hearings originally scheduled for the fall of 2004 were rescheduled to the spring of 2005 at the parties’ request. Evidentiary hearings took place over five days on May 12-13, June 7-8 and June 14, 2005. In their post-hearing brief, Defendants again moved this Court for authorization to appoint a new advocate [Doc. No. 509]. This ruling addresses Defendants’ Motions for Contempt, Clarification or Modification [Doc. Nos. 433 and 450], Defendants’ Motion for Authorization to Appoint a New Advocate [Doc. No. 509] and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt [Doc. No. 445]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motions for Contempt, Clarification or Modification are GRANTED IN PART, Defendants’ Motion to Appoint an Advocate is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND
On September 30, 1985, Leo McCoy, Sr. and Esther McCoy (“the McCoys”) filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of
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their adult sons, Leo and Bill, regarding the treatment the McCoy men received at the Southbury Training School (“Southbury” or “STS”). Shortly before this action was to have gone to trial and after numerous settlement conferences before Magistrate Judge Margolis, the Parties entered into a twelve-page Consent Decree4 [Doc. No. 110]. The Consent Decree stipulated that, among other things, STS would provide the McCoy men with a living arrangement that would serve them alone, Staff House No. 2 (“Staff House Two"). Many controversies have arisen, numerous motions have been filed, and many bitter words have been uttered regarding the implementation of the Consent Decree. Magistrate Judge Margolis offers a detailed summary of some of the history of the litigation in this “heart-breaking case of seemingly unending difficulty”5 in her Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate Referral and on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Recuse [Doc. No. 378], in which she granted the Plaintiffs’ request to vacate the referral to the Magistrate and transferred the case to this Judge. Familiarity with the history of this action, as outlined in Magistrate Margolis’s ruling and this Judge’s 2002 Ruling is assumed.
4The Consent Decree consists of 12 pages plus a two-page attachment – a schematic drawing of proposed renovations to SH-2 and a list entitled “Requirements for SH-2 Renovation.”
5This is the description offered by Plaintiffs’ counsel of record during the 2005 hearings.
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II. FINDINGS OF FACT6 A. Staffing
Harassment & inappropriate conduct The abuse and intimidation of staff by the McCoys, detailed in this Court’s July 15, 2002 Ruling and many previous rulings by Magistrate Margolis, did not cease after this Court issued its July 2002 Ruling. Nor did the abuse and intimidation of staff cease after the McCoy parents moved from Staff House Two in September of 2002. Nor did the abuse and intimidation of staff cease when Mr. McCoy died. Josephine Colangelo, Staff House Two House Manager, testified that the working conditions and environment of Staff House Two have not improved at all since Mr. McCoy passed away. 6/07/05 Tr. at 84. Ginger Singletary, Program Supervisor, testified that the only difference after Mr. McCoy passed away was that disputes involved one less person. 5/13/05 Tr. at 89-90. Jo Ann Brown, R.N., testified that the McCoys tried to intimidate staff in various ways. Mr. McCoy would come up to people and “write everything down on a piece of paper, or a piece of toilet tissue or whatever he could get his hands on at the time, with a red ink pen.” He would say “Oh, my lawyer would love to hear this” or “I need to write this down in case we go to court.” Defendants’ Exh. 13 at 11, 25, 30. When two staff members were trying to get the
6The Court takes into consideration testimony regarding Mr. McCoy’s behavior to get an overall picture of the atmosphere at Staff House Two but will focus on the evidence of Mrs. McCoy's behavior alone in determining contempt, as Mr. McCoy passed away during the summer of 2004.
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McCoy sons into the family’s private van, the McCoys told them not to touch the van. Defendants’ Exh. 13 at 22-23. Ms. Brown saw staff crying and with shaking hands when the McCoys were present. These staff would later quit and tell Ms. Brown they could not take the stress. Defendants’ Exh. 13 at 27-28. Angela Papale had administered the McCoy program for almost four years at the time of the 2002 Ruling. Following the 2002 Ruling, she received a letter from Mr. McCoy copied to the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Retardation (“DMR”) and the Hartford Courant, claiming that the move to Cottage Two7 was “cruel” because STS was the origin of the abuse and neglect suffered by the men, and that Ms. Papale was “inhumane and incompetent.” Ms. Papale was so offended by this after years of “trying to do the best [she] could” for the McCoy sons that she resigned from her position at the McCoy home in October 2002. 5/12/05 Tr. at 6-8, 20, 41.
The physical therapist, Maureen Boyd, felt very intimidated by Mrs. McCoy because Mrs. McCoy would redirect staff after Ms. Boyd had given them direction. 5/12/05 Tr. at 38.
The supervisor of the contract staff nurses, Christine Marek, testified that her nurses often felt threatened when they were at Staff House Two when the family requested them to do things that the nurses felt were not professionally acceptable. 5/12/05 Tr. at
7Cottage two was temporary housing necessitated by the order from this Court to Defendants in the 2002 Ruling to repair the downstairs bathroom in Staff House Two.
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171-72. Although the nurses typically agreed to a 13-week term, some quit before their term was over, citing those instances or instances where they felt they were personally assaulted by the McCoys with regard to their race or sexual orientation. 5/12/05 Tr. at 173-74.
Phyllis Zimmer, occupational therapist and rehabilitation therapy supervisor, testified that Mr. McCoy was very aggressive and could be very insulting, and made things very difficult for the staff. 6/07/05 Tr. at 31-33.8 On one occasion, Mr. McCoy hung a photograph in the living room depicting Leo, Jr. with a black eye. When she arrived at the home and saw the picture, the Nurse Supervisor at the time, Anita Shmigelsky, removed it from the wall and called the manager on duty and Mr. Harvey, then the administrator of Staff House Two. They told her to give it to Mr. McCoy when he returned. She did so, and Mr. McCoy immediately hung it on the wall again, telling her that he put it there for her and Ms. Singletary because they felt that the McCoy sons had too much and he wanted them to know why his sons had what they had.9 5/12/05 Tr. at 295-96.
8“Mr. McCoy said to me that if Hitler had lived, you wouldn’t be here right now doing this to my boys.” 6/07/05 Tr. at 32-33.
9She testified that his comment may have stemmed from her comment to Mr. McCoy that the sons were very fortunate that they received great care from compassionate staff, and that the McCoys should be grateful for what their sons had because it was far better than what other people were able to have. 5/12/05 Tr. at 295-96.
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Two staff members testified about an occasion where Mr. McCoy was driving his personal van in a reckless and erratic manner. Jo Ann Brown stated that he was speeding, driving on the wrong side of the white line at one point, failing to stop at stop signs or for an oncoming ambulance. At one point he moved the van with “the lift down, doors open and Leo in the back.” Defendants’ Exh. 13 at 31-45, and Exh. JB thereto at 3-6 (Written statement of Jo Ann Brown dated 9/22/02). Maize Mitchell, a direct care worker, testified that she was left with bruises from the trip because Mr. McCoy exceeded the speed limit, did not stop at stop signs and did not pull over for an emergency vehicle. She felt that because she reported the incident it made matters worse in terms of the treatment she received from Mr. McCoy. 5/12/05 Tr. at 245.
Jo Ann Brown testified about two separate incidents where Mr. McCoy intentionally bumped and pushed her, which she had documented. Defendants’ Exh. 13 at 49-52. She testified that she “wanted to paint a picture of what has been going on . . . [for] whoever was going to do anything about it.” She also documented the incident because she wanted it to be clear that she was doing her job, despite the fact that the McCoys told her “constantly” that she was not doing her job. Defendants’ Exh. 13 at 55.
Beverly Butler, appointed as one of the administrators of Staff House Two after the 2002 Ruling, described a report she received from monitors that Mr. McCoy had shoved the director of
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psychology with a privacy screen; she went to Staff House Two and told Mr. McCoy never to touch the staff. He got angry and started to say something but Mrs. McCoy told him to go home and he got up and left. 5/13/05 Tr. at 211-213.
Ms. Butler also testified that the Nurse Supervisor Anita Shmigelsky spent a lot of time coming to her office crying. On one occasion, Ms. Shmigelsky called her frantically to say Mrs. McCoy was screaming at her because one of her sons was not ready to go out for a medical appointment. Ms. Butler heard Mrs. McCoy screaming through the telephone. 5/13/05 Tr. at 206-08. Mrs. McCoy testified that she did not think she ever raised her voice to staff or confronted them over the various issues with which she disagreed. 6/14/05 Tr. at 110-11. In addition, the McCoys would give inconsistent orders to staff which left them feeling nervous and intimidated.10
Although the 2002 Ruling mandated the use of monitors for two months, Defendants kept monitors in the home until March of 2003. 5/12/05 Tr. at 90. Once monitors were discontinued staff reported extreme anxiety in that they felt threatened and intimidated by Mr. and Mrs. McCoy. 5/12/05 Tr. at 90. Staff told the House Manager
10For example, Mr. McCoy showed Ms. Brown how to brush Leo's teeth, and later when she followed that method, Mrs. McCoy told her she wasn't brushing Leo's teeth correctly. Mr. McCoy came in and said "Yes, she is. I showed her how." Mrs. McCoy got upset and left the room. Another time Mr. McCoy showed her how to hold Bill's hand so as to not restrain it. She was implementing this method when Mr. McCoy saw her and told Mrs. McCoy and the nurse supervisor Anita that Ms. Brown was restraining Bill's hand. Mrs. McCoy came into the room, looked and said that Ms. Brown's method was fine. Defendants' Exh. 13 at 29.
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Donna Josephson that they were nervous to come to work and were nervous when they saw the McCoys. Ms. Josephson recounted one particular episode where a second shift staff person was attempting to feed one of the men, but Mrs. McCoy was standing right over her shoulder, commenting that she hoped he would not choke, and commenting about malpractice suits and wrongful death suits. The staff person told Ms. Josephson her blood pressure became extremely high during the episode; one of the nurses on duty took her pressure and confirmed that it was indeed very high. 5/12/05 Tr. at 100-101. After this episode was reported to her, Ms. Josephson asked to have monitors reinstated because she felt that continued tension in the home could compromise the program for both Leo and Bill and detract from the home-like environment they were trying to provide. STS reinstated the monitors in August 2003 by using a manager-on-duty (“MOD”) system. 5/12/05 Tr. at 87, 90-91. Initially the program was designed so that the MOD was called if there was a problem, but this did not protect staff adequately, so STS set up a system whereby the moment either parent arrived at the home the staff would call the MOD to come to Staff House Two. The MOD would remain there until the McCoys left. 6/08/05 Tr. at 7071. Even with the MOD system, Eugene Harvey testified that he has received reports from staff about intimidation and harassment for the last few years, and that just about every staff person has reported a problem. African American staff have complained of
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prejudice, that Mrs. McCoy calls black and African American staff “you people” and that she does not use that phrase with white staff. 6/08/05 Tr. at 76-77. Maize Mitchell, who was born in Jamaica, testified that Mr. McCoy would tell her that she needed to go back where she came from. 5/12/05 Tr. at 245-46. Alicia Provonost, a direct care worker at Staff House Two, testified that she observed Mrs. McCoy treat staff badly many times: she raised her voice, she referred to African American staff as “you people” in a derogatory tone, and she belittled staff in a way that, Ms. Provonost noted, suggested that Bill and Leo were her children and no one else knew enough. 5/12/05 Tr. at 273. LPN Elisabet DaSilva testified that she felt the environment was hostile on a daily basis and that she felt abused by Mr. and Mrs. McCoy every day. 5/12/05 Tr. at 241. Mrs. McCoy referred to Ms. DaSilva as a “nobody.” 5/12/05 Tr. at 241. Mental Retardation Worker Deborah Kezelevich testified that the work environment was uncomfortable and stressful, the interference by Mrs. McCoy while Ms. Kezelevich fed Billy made her feel sick to her stomach, and ninety percent of the time Mrs. McCoy came into the home she did not acknowledge that Ms. Kezelevich was even there. 5/12/05 Tr. at 197-200. On one occasion when Mrs. McCoy disagreed with the personal hygiene procedure for Billy, she raised her fist and asked Ms. Kezelevich if she wanted to fight, and said “I’m ready for a fight today.” 5/12/05 Tr. at 203. Beverly Butler testified that several staff
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threatened to resign because they felt they were mistreated, and she “literally begged them to stay.” 6/13/05 Tr. at 223, 226.
Finally, the Defendants presented evidence that Mrs. McCoy has made a number of allegations of abuse and neglect to the Office of Protection and Advocacy when staff are following procedures and protocols put in place by the IDT with which she disagrees. Defendants perceive this as harassing. Genevieve SanAngelo, Program Manager for the STS Human Rights Office, testified that there had been 15 allegations of abuse and neglect filed pertaining to Billy or Leo from October 2002, when the McCoy men moved back into Staff House Two, until the hearings in the spring of 2005. During that same time frame, there were 100 such allegations for the entire STS population (approximately 600 residents). Ms. SanAngelo thought the number of allegations concerning Billy and Leo were high, since they were 15% of the total. 5/12/05 Tr. at 312, 315-316. None of the allegations filed by the McCoys was substantiated. 5/12/05 Tr. at 315-17. The only allegations regarding Bill or Leo that were substantiated were two filed by other staff against a nurse, Margaret Mayo, who was suspended and then terminated. 5/12/05 Tr. at 316-17; 5/14/05 Tr. at 130-31. Of the 15 allegations of abuse and neglect filed concerning Billy or Leo from October 2002 until the spring of 2005, five were classified by the Office of Protection and Advocacy (“OPA”) as “Do Not Take,” meaning the alleged incident gives no reasonable cause
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to suspect abuse or neglect affecting the health and safety of an individual.11 5/12/05 Tr. at 317-18. From 1998 to the time of the hearings in the spring of 2005 there were a total of 34 allegations for the entire STS population classified as “Do Not Take” by the office of Protection and Advocacy; of that total number, almost one-third (10) have been related to Billy or Leo McCoy. 5/12/05 Tr. at 317-318; Defendants’ Exh. 7a-7e.
Efforts to Hire Staff As this Court found in its 2002 Ruling, Defendants have struggled to maintain the core staff level of 15 required under the Consent Decree. See 2002 Ruling at 3-8. As noted above, numerous employees detailed the abuse and harassment of staff meted out by the McCoys which has contributed to the difficulties in recruiting and retaining a core staff for Staff House Two. Following the 2002 Ruling, Defendants held a series of interviews and, by the time the McCoy men were moved to temporary housing at Cottage Two, eight new staff had been screened, interviewed and approved by the administration to begin working with the McCoy men. 5/12/05 Tr. at 28-29. The McCoys neither interviewed nor approved any of these candidates. At that time there were also three male staff working at STS that were interested in working with the McCoy men, but the McCoy parents refused to approve male staff, citing Leo and Billy’s
11The reports classified as “Do Not Take” centered on claims by Mrs. McCoy or Sister Barbara Eirich of insufficient nursing, alleged restraint of Billy’s hand, and claims that Bill had not received correct doses of his medication. Defendants’ Exh. 7a-7e and 5/12/05 Tr. at 328-31.
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history with male staff.12 Additionally, there were two people
hired who quit within two days. 5/12/05 Tr. at 29. In the fall of
2002, Eugene Harvey and Beverly Butler arranged interviews with 35
additional candidates for positions at Staff House Two. Ms. Butler
and John Ayre interviewed and approved 18 of the 35 candidates;
Mrs. McCoy sat in on the interviews and approved only two of the 35
candidates. 5/13/05 Tr. at 214-16. Mrs. McCoy testified that she
rejected the other candidates because “in my judgment they probably
weren’t the type that we would need to be taking care of” Leo and
Billy. 6/14/05 Tr. at 119-20. Of those two she approved, only one
was available for hire. Defendants were then forced to hire
employees on a temporary basis to meet the core staff requirements.
In the spring of 2003 Mr. Harvey was involved in posting LPN and
direct care openings for Staff House Two. When he explained the
working situation to one potential applicant there was no interest.
He received applications for the direct care positions from two
12The parties did not address the issue of hiring of male staff in their post-hearing briefs. The Court notes that Mrs. McCoy testified that Leo was sexually assaulted three times “across the street” (at STS) and although no one knows by whom, Leo has shown fear with men. 6/14/05 Tr. at 64. In Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition to Defendants’ 2002 motion for contempt, they argue that traditionally STS had agreed that male staff would not be hired to work with Leo because of his documented history of abuse at the hands of male staff. See Doc. No. 438 at 8. They cite a memo from Bill Ale at STS to all managers on duty from 1998 noting that only female staff may be used as “pulls” from STS to work at Staff House Two. Defendants argue that this memo is one which refers to a temporary program used during a staffing shortage whereby temporary staff were “pulled” from STS to work at Staff House Two, and that it is not evidence of any larger agreement for gender preference in hiring staff to work with Leo. Furthermore, Defendants note that Exhibits 35 and 36 from the 2001 hearings showed that sexual abuse was not substantiated. Exhibits 35 and 36 included Connecticut State Police investigations of two instances where bruising was discovered on Leo’s private parts in 1991, all of which investigations concluded that sexual abuse was not substantiated, although the occurrence of the bruises was deemed suspicious.
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individuals who had been working with Leo and Billy for six months temporarily and had done a good job. They were interviewed by Mr. Harvey and Mrs. McCoy but she refused to approve either applicant. She testified that she withheld approval because “I didn’t think they were appropriate.” At the time of the hearings in the spring of 2005, two years later, they were still working at Staff House “temporarily” because Mrs. McCoy withheld approval, and still doing a good job. 6/08/05 Tr. at 64-66; 6/14/05 Tr. at 67. To meet staffing needs, some staff were also transferred from STS on a temporary basis. 6/08/05 Tr. at 67. At the time of the hearings, Mr. Harvey testified that STS had maintained the full complement of 15 staff until recently when one staff person left. 6/08/05 Tr. at 69.
Both permanent and temporary staff were trained in the specific programs and treatments applicable to the McCoy men, but when Ms. Butler arranged for staff to attend specific training programs, the McCoys would state that staff “were just shirking their responsibilities.” 6/8/05 Tr. at 69; 5/13/05 Tr. at 220.
Defendants attempted to hire nurses for Staff House Two by placing advertisements in newspapers, posting jobs on-line and through STS and other DMR agencies, and holding job fairs. 5/13/05 Tr. at 216-18; Defendants’ Exh. 3. There was a shortage of nurses in Connecticut, and the nurses that Ms. Butler and Mr. Harvey interviewed were not interested in the positions, so STS used a
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contract nurse agency, Code Blue. 5/13/05 Tr. at 216; 5/12/05 Tr. at 166-67. Code Blue (now Richards Health Care) nurses agreed to 13-week placements at Staff House Two which were renewable based on need. 5/12/05 Tr. at 167. As noted above, many of the contract nurses did not last through their 13-week assignments because they felt threatened by the McCoy family and were concerned that their nursing license would be in jeopardy.
In the spring of 2004, Defendants determined that, because nursing supervisors were available every night at the STS main campus, it was unnecessary to continue having nurses physically present in Staff House Two during the third shift. 6/08/05 Tr. at 69-70. Mrs. McCoy testified that she believes the Consent Decree requires nurses in Staff House Two around the clock. 6/14/05 Tr. at 64-65. B. Interference with Program Administration and Implementation
The evidence at the hearings demonstrated excessive interference by Mr. and Mrs. McCoy with the Defendants’ efforts to take responsibility for administering all aspects of the home.
Refusal to vacate home and let the McCoy men be moved This Court’s 2002 Ruling ordered that Leo and Billy be transferred from Staff House Two to another facility capable of temporarily housing them while repairs were made to the downstairs bathroom of Staff House Two and ordered the parents to vacate the home as soon as their sons moved to temporary housing. Defendants
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immediately began making plans for the move of the McCoy men to temporary housing at Cottage 2, but the McCoys filed a motion to stay. That motion was denied by this Court on September 3, 2002, and Defendants then informed the McCoy parents that the move of their sons would occur on September 5, 2002. Mrs. McCoy told Angela Papale, then the administrator of the McCoy program, “I could call Judge Burns, I could call the Commissioner, I could call the President of the country, but neither she nor her boys were going to move because there were locks on the doors at Cottage 2 . . . and that Billy was not feeling well. 5/12/05 Tr. at 13-14. However, after speaking with Dr. McDonald, Ms. Papale determined the men could be moved on September 5, 2002, and the move did occur that date after some further delay by the McCoys. 5/12/05 Tr. at 13-14, 20. The McCoy parents still had some of their personal items on the second floor of Staff House Two after October 3, 2002, when the McCoy sons were moved back to Staff House Two. 5/12/05 Tr. at 21-22.13
Food and meal-time issues The State presented copious evidence of the McCoys’ interference with meal-time routines and Mrs. McCoy’s refusal to follow protocols regarding the feeding of her sons. Following this Court’s 2002 Ruling, Phyllis Zimmer developed feeding guidelines
13The Consent Decree does not authorize the McCoy parents to live in the home developed for the McCoy sons.
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and trained all staff in feeding Bill and Leo. 5/12/05 Tr. at 1213. She testified that, immediately after the July 2002 Ruling, she began visiting Staff House Two for all three meals to inservice the staff, but due to the constant interference from Mrs. McCoy, by September 2002 she had only been able to train four people to feed Bill and two to feed Leo. 6/07/05 Tr. at 24-25. There were no fixed routines at the house, so it was difficult to determine when meal-times would begin. Mrs. McCoy would ask her not to come, telling her the men did not have a good night, or if she came, would ask her to leave. Even after she managed to train staff, sometimes Mrs. McCoy and the staff would refuse to acknowledge completion of the in-servicing if there were only a few teaspoons of food left on a plate. 6/07/05 Tr. at 24-25. By the date of the hearings in May 2005, Ms. Zimmer had used competencybased training to train or in-service 42 staff in feeding Bill. As required in Paragraph Three of the Consent Decree, each person must show competency three times before they are deemed able to feed Bill McCoy. Once staff have been trained in feeding Bill, she monitors their work frequently, and Billy and Leo’s feeding is monitored once a month by the therapist and once a month by a rehabilitation therapy assistant. 6/07/05 Tr. at 12; Defendants’ Exh. 13 at 9. Ms. Zimmer personally monitored Bill and Leo’s feeding about 75 times in 2003 and 2004. 6/07/05 Tr. at 12. She stopped in-servicing staff during the second shift, 3:00 p.m -
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11:00 p.m, because Mrs. McCoy was always at Staff House Two during the second shift and there were a lot of “bad vibes.” She testified that her attempts to in-service the staff during that shift were a “nightmare” because, due to Mrs. McCoy’s interference, everything would take a long time, and the men would smell their food but not really be able to eat it. Ms. Zimmer tries to inservice second-shift staff on weekends or other times. 6/07/05 Tr. at 35.
Although Mrs. McCoy is usually at Staff House Two during the dinner hour, she normally does not have a meal with her sons when she comes. 6/08/05 Tr. at 140.
Ms. Zimmer also testified about the feeding program for Bill McCoy. The primary goals are to enhance lip closure for intake of food and drink, minimize the amount of food that goes in to assure proper swallowing with head control, and making sure his posture is upright. 6/07/05 Tr. at 8. A further challenge is keeping Bill’s hand out of his mouth to assure safety and that the intake is correct. 6/07/05 Tr. at 9.
She further testified that during meals a rhythm to the intake gets established, which is what is needed for someone with an oral motor problem so that the process is safe and the person does not fatigue. Mrs. McCoy will interrupt this rhythm to discuss the temperature of the food, the consistency of the food, how much food is on the spoon, how much time is taken between spoonfuls,
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positioning of the feeder, etc. 6/07/05 Tr. at 10-11. A 45-minute meal can turn into an hour and a half-long meal. 6/07/05 Tr. at 11. Mrs. McCoy would also fight with Ms. Zimmer about ice, the temperature of Leo’s tea, the meal plan, etc. 6/07/05 Tr. at 29.14
Ms. Zimmer further testified that Leo is capable of feeding himself with various levels of assistance, and the McCoy parents have blocked her attempts to foster his independence. She opined that he has lost a lot of skills over the last couple of year, so she developed a protocol for his spoon biting, and currently Leo’s feeding program includes prompts and assistance so he brings the food up to his mouth himself. 6/07/05 Tr. at 22-23.
Alicia Provonost testified that when she feeds Billy, Mrs. McCoy “is trying to give a lot of direction instead of just letting us do what we’re supposed to do.” The interference from Mrs. McCoy is constant. Mrs. McCoy will sometimes try to change the time dinner is served, or will complain that there is too much food on the spoon or too little, that Ms. Provonost is feeding too fast or too slow, that the food is too hot or too cold, or that there is too much food on the plate, or too little. 5/12/05 Tr. at 266-68. Maize Mitchell testified that Mr. McCoy would interfere when she was feeding Leo, Jr. On one occasion Mr. McCoy kept coming around her while she was feeding Leo, saying “Don’t worry, Champ, don’t
14“We would fight over how long Leo should be able to hold his cup and drink because shouldn’t he be eating. But then if we stopped that, then we would have a discussion on why weren’t we letting him drink when he wanted to.” 6/07/05 Tr. at 29.
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worry. Daddy’s here. Everything is going to be all right. You eat up. . . . You don’t need to be afraid.” 5/12/05 Tr. at 246-47. Other staff testified to the “nonstop interfering” from Mrs. McCoy during mealtimes. 5/12/05 Tr. at 199-201.
When the McCoy men were moved back to Staff House Two after the repairs, in October of 2002, Mrs. McCoy wanted a cook15 and wanted food purchased from the local grocery store rather than having the men eat food prepared at STS because she felt that her sons would choke on the food from STS. 5/12/05 Tr. at 29-30. STS decided to prepare the food for the McCoy men at the STS campus as it does for 600 other residents.
One particular area of contention is Mrs. McCoy’s refusal to follow the protocol developed for giving drinks to Bill. Mrs. McCoy insists on using ice in his drinks; the Medical Director of STS, Dr. McDonald, has determined that ice in drinks is contraindicated for someone with aspiration issues, and wrote an order to that effect. 6/07/05 Tr. at 17, 200-203. Defendants have developed a protocol to keep the drink cool and restrict the flow without risking aspiration by using a chilled martini shaker and pouring out two to three sips of cooled fluid into a nosey cup. 6/07/05 Tr. at 17-20, 201. Once the decision was made to eliminate ice from his drinks, only staff that had been personally in-
15Mrs. McCoy wanted a cook notwithstanding Magistrate Judge Margolis’s 1995 ruling stating that the Consent Decree does not require that the McCoy men have their own in-house chef. See Ruling on Joint Statement of Disputed Provisions at 6 [Doc. No. 162].
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serviced by Ms. Zimmer in how to give Bill drinks without ice were allowed to give Bill liquids. The in-servicing process occurred over a couple of weeks. 6/15/05 Tr. at 185-86.
Mrs. McCoy’s view is that crushed ice in Bill’s drink keeps it cool and helps regulate the flow of liquid into his mouth to aid in swallowing. 6/14/05 Tr. at 89-90. Initially she told staff that the ice was to keep the drink cold, but more recently she told staff that the ice served as a dam blocking the flow of fluid. 6/07/05 Tr. at 18. Mrs. McCoy used a Styrofoam cup with whole ice cubes, and once Staff House Two had a refrigerator equipped with an ice crusher, she used crushed ice of varying sizes. 5/12/05 Tr. at 180, 6/07/05 Tr. at 18, 200-201. Mrs. McCoy testified that she is very careful when she gives ice to Billy. 6/14/05 Tr. at 94. Mrs. McCoy told Dr. McDonald he need not worry about Bill aspirating because Bill spits out any smaller pieces of ice he gets into his mouth. 6/07/05 Tr. at 201. This did not allay Dr. McDonald’s concerns regarding Bill’s aspiration risk because it meant that pieces of ice were indeed getting into Bill’s mouth.
Defendants presented testimony from two experts in speech language pathology and dysphagia to support their decision to eliminate ice from Bill’s drinks. Both experts recommended that, due to his poor motor control and the risk of aspiration, Bill should not be given ice in his drinks, crushed or otherwise. 5/13/05 Tr. at 6, 9-10, 17, 251-252; 6/07/05 Tr. at 55-61.
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Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Leslie Rubin, testified that he thought Mrs. McCoy used the ice in Bill’s drinks to thicken them to aid in swallowing. He agreed that it would not be appropriate to use crushed ice simply to keep Bill’s drinks cool as there are other ways to accomplish that goal. 5/13/05 Tr. at 176. Mrs. McCoy also acknowledged that there are ways to cool drinks other than using ice. 6/14/07 Tr. at 92.
Mrs. McCoy testified that she has been concerned with how and what Defendants feed Bill, and that she feels the staff have not been properly trained to feed Bill and that, when she resided at Staff House Two, Bill was almost never hospitalized for aspiration pneumonia. It is her concern, she maintains, that prompts her to question staff during feedings. When asked on cross-examination if she had ever told anyone that Bill had no hospitalizations for aspiration pneumonia during the years the McCoys lived in Staff House Two, she replied “not intentionally,” and acknowledged that he had indeed been hospitalized more than once. 6/14/05 Tr. at 140-41.
Dr. McDonald testified that during the period from January 1996 until September 2002, when the McCoy parents lived in Staff House Two, Bill had 12 hospital admissions, five of which were for pneumonia. During the same period, Bill was treated for pneumonia 10 times at STS without being sent to the hospital. 6/07/05 Tr. at 193-94 and Defendants’ Exh. 10.
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Mrs. McCoy also ignores the protocol for using a gel pad under Leo’s plate and cup when he is dining. 5/13/05 Tr. at 69; 5/12/05 Tr. at 181-82. STS developed the protocol after a hairline fracture to Leo’s arm in April of 2004. 6/07/05 Tr. at 44; 5/12/05 Tr. at 334. The STS Office of Human Rights determined that a likely cause was Leo’s banging his arm much more forcefully than usual on the dining table during an argument between Mrs. McCoy and the staff, although an exact cause was not determined. 5/12/05 Tr. at 334-35. A protective services plan was developed by the Office of Protection and Advocacy which includes using a thick gel pad under his plate and cup while Leo, Jr. eats. 5/12/05 Tr. at 33436; 6/07/05 Tr. at 45; Defendants’ Exh. 6. This pad maintains a level of stability so a cup and plate can be placed upon it. 6/07/05 Tr. at 45. Elisabet DaSilva, LPN, testified that Leo bangs on the table in an angry or aggressive manner when he get upset, pounding hard enough to get his arm or wrist red. Often, this occurred when Mrs. McCoy would visit during meal-times and cause an interruption or exchange words with staff. 6/14/05 Tr. at 164-65. Ginger Singletary would remind Mrs. McCoy that she needed to use the gel pad, and other staff would have to ask the manager on duty to intercede when Mrs. McCoy was not using the gel pad because Leo was banging his arm so violently on the table they worried he would hurt himself. 5/13/05 Tr. at 69; 5/12/05 Tr. at 182. During one incident in September of 2004, Eugene Harvey, the manager-on-duty,
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asked Mrs. McCoy several times to use the gel pad for Leo’s protection because he was banging his hand on the table. Mrs. McCoy suggested Mr. Harvey call the police, as she refused to use the pad. Mr. Harvey asked her repeatedly to use the pad. Eventually Mrs. McCoy pulled Leo’s chair away from the table so he could not reach it to bang his arm. 6/08/05 Tr. at 73-74. Mr. Harvey referred this incident to the OPA, which investigated and concluded that Mrs. McCoy’s refusal to use the gel pad constituted neglect of Leo. After that incident a protective services plan was instituted whereby staff were instructed to call OPA if Mrs. McCoy refused to use the gel pad while Leo was dining at the table. There were six further occasions where Mrs. McCoy refused to use the gel pad; at the time of the hearings Mr. Harvey had not had any recent reports that she continued to refuse to use the pad. 6/08/05 Tr. at 75.
Mrs. McCoy recognizes that Leo hits his arm on the table but she took the gel pad off the table, claiming it caused Leo to spill his drinks. 6/07/05 Tr. at 45; 6/14/05 Tr. at 31-32. Mrs. McCoy testified that she felt it was more useful to just move Leo from the table when he began to hit the table hard rather than using the gel pad, and that the protocol for using the gel pad was the sort of “treatment” she had the right to refuse as guardian. 6/14/05 Tr. at 31-32. Ms. Zimmer testified that Leo did not spill his drinks any more frequently with the gel pad in place than he did
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before the plan was instated. 6/14/05 Tr. at 187. Bill’s Hand-in-mouth Behavior Plan As noted in the Consent Decree itself, Bill’s hand-in-mouth
behavior is a serious medical issue. Mrs. McCoy continues to oppose the behavior plan developed to lessen the frequency Bill mouths his hand. As Phyllis Zimmer noted, Bill’s hand-in-mouth behavior increases during meals. Witnesses testified that he sometimes sticks his whole hand deep into his mouth and into his throat, causing gagging and choking. 5/12/05 Tr. at 218; 5/13/05 Tr. at 87; 6/08/05 Tr. at 222. Dr. McDonald explained that it can lead to increased saliva and aspiration of saliva, lacerations in the mouth, maceration of his hand, and softening of his nails with an accompanying fungal infection. 6/07/05 Tr. at 203-204.
Defendants attempted to work with Mrs. McCoy to develop a behavior plan for Bill to no avail. In October 2003, the Director of Psychology requested that George Skidd, a behavior modification program specialist, develop a plan to address the hand-in-mouth behavior. Mr. Skidd visited Staff House Two and developed a plan which he presented at the IDT meeting, which included alternative sensory experiences for Bill and getting him more directly involved in his daily routine. He met with Mrs. McCoy but she did not like some of the plan components. He reformulated the plan and submitted it again but Mrs. McCoy never approved it. 6/07/05 Tr. at 97-101. Nothing further occurred until May 2004 when the
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director of psychology again asked Mr. Skidd to do something due to the deteriorating condition of Bill’s hand.16 6/07/05 Tr. at 95, 97-101. Mr. Skidd developed a written behavior support plan, integrating sensory experiences, enhancing his social interaction with the staff and providing other pleasurable experiences with the rationale of crowding out and decreasing the frequency with which Bill places his hand in his mouth. 6/07/05 Tr. at 101-107. The plan calls for gentle redirection, choice, object cueing and praise. Defendants’ Exh. 1; 6/07/05 Tr. at 103-105. Mr. Skidd perceived the hand-in-mouth behavior as primarily sensory in nature, and noted that Bill has many other types of sensory pleasures – “he loves staff attention; he likes being caressed . . . hand-holding; he likes tactile interaction, he likes water, he loves his bath.” 6/07/05 Tr. at 108. The plan developed in conjunction with the ID Team was approved by Dr. Weinberg, a boardcertified behavior analyst, Dr. Pollack, the head of psychology, and Dr. McDonald, the Medical Director at STS. 6/07/05 Tr. at 105106; 6/08/05 Tr. at 37. Mrs. McCoy has not approved this plan, but it has been implemented. 6/07/05 Tr. at 106; 6/08/05 Tr. at 72. She told Mr. Skidd when they met to discuss the revised plan that it was too aggressive, and that she wanted Bill to have his hand to suck on sometimes. 6/07/05 Tr. at 106, 122. Mr. Skidd testified
16“[Bill’s hand] was getting to the point where he could possibly need to have a restraint applied. And nobody on the team, including myself, wanted to see that happen.” 6/07/05 Tr. at 101.
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that, having first worked with Bill and Leo in the early 1980s, and based on his observations and experience with Bill, Bill enjoys many things other than putting his hand in his mouth, including physical contact, and that Bill feels love, and he noted that he has seen him smile and express joy under certain circumstances, such as having the wind on his face. 6/07/05 Tr. at 109-110. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Rubin, stated that the limitation of the hand-in-mouth behavior was appropriate if the hand was becoming injured through excess moisture. 6/13/05 Tr. at 152-53.
Mrs. McCoy allows Bill to put his hand in his mouth whenever he attempts to do so, ignoring the behavior program goal of reducing the frequency of the behavior. 6/08/05 Tr. at 72; 5/12/05 Tr. at 181. Even at times when Bill has his hand up to his wrist in his mouth while eating, Mrs. McCoy has told staff to leave the hand alone. 5/12/05 Tr. at 219. She also believes he should be allowed to put his hand in his mouth during a bowel movement, even though the nurse supervisor Ms. Frigon has found that to be counter-indicated because he then tends to stop the process once he has his hand in his mouth. 6/14/05 Tr. at 159. When she observes staff following the behavior support plan and redirecting Bill’s hand, Mrs. McCoy accuses them of attempting to restrain Bill.17
17During one incident, Mrs. McCoy alleged Bill’s hand was being restrained by a terrycloth towel in “the worst form of abuse that she had seen.” The manager on duty, Tim Braziel, assessed the situation and tried to calm Mrs. McCoy, and reported the incident to the Human Rights Office. Though a towel had been placed over Bill’s hand, no abuse or neglect or restraining was substantiated as a result of the investigation. 5/12/05 Tr. at 305-308.
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5/12/05 Tr. at 272. She has filed three reports of alleged abuse

with the OPA, claiming that Bill’s hand was restrained. Two of

those reports were classified as “Do Not Take” and the other was

unsubstantiated following an investigation. 5/12/05 Tr. at 328-

333; Defendants’ Exh. 5, 7d, 7e.

After one of these

investigations, the OPA noted in its investigative report that

there was a program to help Bill keep his hand out of his mouth and

that the complaint “was more of a programmatic concern” and that

Mrs. McCoy should pursue her concerns through the administrative

process. 5/12/05 Tr. at 331; Defendants’ Exh. 7d. Plaintiffs’

expert, Dr. Rubin, observed the behavior support plan in action as

the staff gently restrained Bill’s hand, and then, when Bill

overrode the restraint at times, they gently prompted him to remove

the hand from his mouth. At no time did Dr. Rubin see staff

pulling on the hand or otherwise handling Bill roughly. 5/13/05

Tr. at 185.

Dr. McDonald testified that although medically it would be

best for Bill to not have his hand in his mouth at all, he

understands and accept the behavior support plan’s goals of a

gradual reduction in the hand-in-mouth behavior. 6/07/05 Tr. at

236-37. As Dr. McDonald noted, a behavior program aims for a

consistent response to a stimulus, and if Bill were allowed to

“have his hand” on occasion as Mrs. McCoy has insisted, it would

make the implementation of the plan impossible. 6/08/05 Tr. at 37-

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38. Other medical, hygiene and therapeutic issues The state presented evidence of Mrs. McCoy’s unrelenting
interference with their administrative procedures and protocols which leads to medical concerns for Defendants. The evidence established that both Mr. and Mrs. McCoy argued with staff about the time medications were given, whether they were the correct medications, and whether the nurses were competent. 5/12/05 Tr. at 108. Jo Ann Brown testified that Mrs. McCoy would constantly interfere when she was preparing and giving medications to the men. Mrs. McCoy would ask to see the medications, touch them, compare them to the medication book and ask if they were the correct medications. Defendants’ Exh. 13 at 14-15, 91. Ms. Brown would tell her that she should not even be in the room when medications were being prepared and given, but Mrs. McCoy would ignore her. Defendants’ Exh. 13 at 90-93. Ms. Zimmer testified that Mrs. McCoy would poke around in the medication cups, sometimes with a tongue depressor and sometimes with her fingers. She would tell staff that the pills were not cut the right way, or were not the right amount, or didn’t look right, or they would get into a discussion about the amount of applesauce needed to coat the pills and the time frame for giving the pills. 6/07/05 Tr. at 38-39. When STS assumed responsibility for the day-to-day administration of Staff House Two, medications were prepared in the kitchen. Donna Josephson,
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administrator of Staff House Two until October 2003, attempted to lessen Mrs. McCoy’s interference by asking that no one but the nurse and the individual receiving medication be in the kitchen while medications were being poured. Mrs. McCoy continued to enter the kitchen as before, so Ms. Josephson arranged for the first floor staff bathroom to be converted into a medication room. The McCoys objected to the use of the bathroom as a medication room. 5/12/05 Tr. at 91-93.
The director of staffing for Richards Health Care (formerly Code Blue), the agency which supplied contract nurses to Staff House Two, testified that she received telephone calls on many occasions from her nurses, concerned that their nursing license would be in jeopardy if they followed the McCoy parents’ request. 5/12/05 Tr. at 171-72.
Defendants also presented testimony regarding the interruptions to the McCoy mens’ medication schedules. The McCoys would either come to the home to take the men out on a trip without notice as to what time they would leave or return, or Mrs. McCoy would come to the home late in the evening and want to sit on the couch and visit with Leo right at the time he needed to have his medication and whirlpool treatment. Staff had to change the routines to accommodate the McCoys, and this often led to delayed medication times. Defendants’ Exh. 13 at 17-18; 5/12/05 Tr. at 179-180, 269. Ms. Brown testified that she had to write medication
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errors on herself because medication times would have to be pushed back. Defendants Exh. 13 at 18. Ms. DaSilva testified that the nurses would have to either rush to dispense the medications or get new orders from the doctor approving a changed dosage time. 5/12/05 Tr. at 224. When Ms. DaSilva told Mrs. McCoy that policies had to be followed, Mrs. McCoy’s response was that “she was the mother and. . . she knew her sons better than anybody, and she would do what she felt was better, not what was in the procedure.” 5/12/05 Tr. at 225.
Additionally, the McCoys would take either Leo or Bill out and not return with them until well after the scheduled dinner time. If only one of the men had gone out, they still had to postpone dinner as late as 8:30 p.m. for both men because Mrs. McCoy felt the men should have their dinner together. 5/12/05 Tr. at 74.
When the McCoys lived in the home, personal hygiene was performed on mats on the living room floor with privacy screens purchased by the McCoys which the staff felt were inadequate. On occasion Mr. McCoy would remove a privacy screen or place it at the door of the living room so that he could see the television set, or he would peer underneath the screen to observe what was going on. Defendants first tried to accommodate the parents’ system, and supplied a larger screen and tried to work with that. However, staff felt performing personal hygiene in the living room was a significant violation of the McCoy sons’ right to privacy.
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Defendants decided to perform the personal hygiene duties in the bedroom instead to protect the privacy and dignity of the men and to provide better body mechanics for the staff performing those duties. The McCoys objected strenuously. 5/12/05 Tr. at 97-98; 6/07/05 Tr. at 36-38. Ms. Zimmer developed procedures for hand washing and universal precautions but the staff would not follow the precautions. Staff would not wear gloves during tooth-brushing or personal hygiene care of the men. One staff person was observed checking to see if Leo has soiled himself by using her bare hand. Staff would not wear shoes in the home because Mrs. McCoy did not want dirt in the home. When Ms. Zimmer asked staff why they were not following the protocols they stated that Mrs. McCoy told them not to.18 6/07/05 Tr. at 26-28.
The evidence also illustrated the confusion and difficulty Defendants have when the McCoys took their sons to outside medical consultants without prior notice, or without any notice. Difficulties arose with preparing the men for their journey on short notice, rescheduling meals and medication dosage times to accommodate them if they returned late, as noted above, and a lack of communication among the consultants, Mrs. McCoy and the medical staff at STS. Anita Shmigelsky, the nurse supervisor, testified about the difficulty in following through on medical care for the McCoy men when Mrs. McCoy refused to communicate about the care
18However, Mrs. McCoy wanted the staff to wear scrubs. 6/07/05 Tr. at 29.
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given by outside doctors and the timing of outside medical appointments. 5/12/05 Tr. at 293, 297. Mrs. McCoy insisted on coordinating the men’s outside medical care, and did not give any information regarding outside appointments to Anita Shmigelsky, the previous nurse supervisor. 5/12/05 Tr. at 293-97. The current nurse supervisor, Katie Frigon, usually does not receive advance notice about outside consultations from Mrs. McCoy and Mrs. McCoy does not permit her to communicate with the doctors consulted outside STS. 6/07/05 Tr. at 145. Dr. McDonald still does not receive reports from all of the outside medical consultants. Defendants presented medical reports from two physicians at Brigham and Women’s Hospital which were addressed to a Dr. William McDonald, Southbury Training School, at “47 Evergreen Drive.” The Evergreen Drive address is the McCoy parents’ home address. Dr. McDonald testified that his father’s name was William, and prior to the hearings when he reviewed those medical reports, he had never seen them. 6/07/05 Tr. at 177-81; Defendants’ Exh. 19. Dr. McDonald testified that having had the reports at the time they were made would have helped him in coordinating care for the McCoy men. Dr. McDonald further testified that he has never received any evaluations or reports from Mrs. McCoy’s expert physician, Dr. Rubin. 6/07/05 Tr. at 185; 6/08/05 Tr. at 35. Dr. Rubin testified that he had not spoken to Dr. McDonald in years and believed Mrs. McCoy had informed Dr. McDonald about his visits and had provided
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his reports to him. 5/13/05 Tr. at 159, 164. Mrs. McCoy interfered with the medical care of the men in
other ways as well. She wanted a particular fungus cream to be used on Bill’s fingernails, even though Dr. McDonald told her it was contra-indicated due to Bill’s lung infiltration (which he believed may have been due to lipoid pneumonia, a condition caused by oils which the body cannot absorb or release). Mrs. McCoy claimed that other doctors disagreed with Dr. McDonald; once she found a water-soluble gel to use Dr. McDonald approved the regimen. 6/07/05 Tr. at 213-14. Additionally, Mrs. McCoy would give Leo an extra dose of Milk of Magnesia on occasion to get his bowels moving. When Dr. McDonald checked Leo he found he had toxic levels of magnesium in his system and told Mrs. McCoy to stop the Milk of Magnesia. She did not believe his diagnosis and wanted to continue with the regimen. 6/07/05 Tr. at 205-207. Finally, Ginger Singletary testified that one evening when the McCoys brought Bill and Leo back late from an outing, Mrs. McCoy demanded that Bill be put directly to bed after eating, notwithstanding Ms. Singletary’s statement that they could not put him to bed because of Bill’s aspiration precautions. Mrs. McCoy threatened to leave with Bill and lay him down at home until Ms. Singletary stated she would call the manager-on-duty because of the serious risk to Bill’s health. 5/13/05 Tr. at 67-68.
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Mrs. McCoy also opposes the Defendants’ program for ambulating Leo while he wears shoes. Dr. McDonald felt that Leo needed to walk more for physical therapy and cardiovascular health. He had ordered that Leo be ambulated with either sneakers or shoes for safety and support reasons, but the order had not been implemented during the McCoy parents’ years in Staff House Two. 6/08/05 Tr. at 18-19. Mrs. McCoy wanted Leo ambulated in his slippers or socks. 6/07/05 Tr. at 43. Once the state took over control of the house, Leo was fitted by a shoe orthotist, and Ms. Zimmer purchased a pair of sneakers and a pair of walking shoes for him. Mrs. McCoy did not like the shoes. 6/07/05 Tr. at 43-44.
Additionally, the evidence showed that Mrs. McCoy adamantly opposed Defendants’ efforts to develop a new wheelchair for Bill. As Ms. Zimmer testified, Bill’s then-current wheelchair was very old, unsafe, and the men at the STS wheelchair shop found it impossible to fix. The McCoys had purchased other wheelchairs over the years but they were worse than the old chair, even with all its problems. 6/07/05 Tr. at 39-40. Defendants gave Bill a new tilt space wheelchair with a custom-molded back-trunk support and removable arm rest that Ms. Zimmer stated has been working much better. 6/07/05 Tr. at 41-42. Mrs. McCoy opposed the use of the chair and told Ms. Zimmer that the Hospital for Special Care in Connecticut was working on another chair. Ms. Zimmer requested contact information for the therapists working on the new chair;
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Mrs. McCoy did not provide the information but stated that she would have them contact Ms. Zimmer. No one has contacted Ms. Zimmer regarding the chair. 6/07/05 Tr. at 42.
Full-day Program for Leo This Court’s 2002 Ruling found Defendants in contempt for not providing a day program for Leo and mandated that Defendants develop such a program immediately. Defendants developed a halfday program for Leo which he began attending in October 2002. 5/12/05 Tr. at 80-81. After Leo’s OPS was conducted that winter, it was recommended that the length of the program be expanded because Leo was enjoying the program. This suggestion was made to Mrs. McCoy but she said she needed time to think about it. Mrs. McCoy then opposed the full-day program, saying that Leo was either too sick or tired to attend for the full day and she wanted him home to eat lunch with his brother. 5/12/05 Tr. at 84; 5/13/05 Tr. at 85; 6/8/05 Tr. at 54-55. The ID Team decided to expand the program to a full day over her objections. 5/13/05 Tr. at 85-86. Refusal to follow administrative protocols or participate in the IDT process The evidence at the hearings also showed that Mrs. McCoy refuses to follow administrative protocols set up by Defendants in their efforts to effectively manage Staff House Two. Mrs. McCoy has interfered with staff when they follow the procedure for making entries in the logbooks at Staff House Two. These logs are used to provide shift-to-shift communication to ensure continuity of care.
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Mrs. McCoy has asked staff not to write about incidents in which she was involved and has questioned why the staff must write about things that happen in Staff House Two that she perceives are personal. 5/12/05 Tr. at 182-83. On one occasion Mrs. McCoy was arguing loudly with a staff member about an entry in the logbook and, as the argument escalated, Leo began to get upset and bang his arm on the table. Staff have on occasion not made entries in the logbook as protocol requires because they were concerned that the McCoys would get upset. 6/07/05 Tr. at 80-81.
Mrs. McCoy raises her concerns and questions most often by directly confronting employees she feels are not doing a proper job. She has been repeatedly told by the nurse supervisor, manager-on-duty or administrators to bring her concerns to them directly. Sometimes she makes complaints after the fact to the supervisory personnel but will not give the name of the staff member about whom she is complaining. 6/08/05 Tr. at 83, 143. She has been informed by various staff and administrators of her right to appeal a programmatic decision with which she disagrees through the Program Administrative Review process (PAR). A parent applies for a meeting with the regional director through this process, and ultimately the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Retardation, at which meetings the parent can voice their opinion regarding programs they feel are not appropriate. Mrs. McCoy has never availed herself of her right to this process to resolve
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programmatic disputes. 5/13/05 Tr. at 41-42; 6/07/05 Tr. at 164; 6/08/05 Tr. at 80-81; 6/14/05 Tr. at 139. She has instead gone to the Connecticut Probate Court to clarify her rights as guardian, or has filed complaints with the Office of Protection and Advocacy alleging abuse or neglect. None of the allegations made by the McCoys was substantiated. 6/14/05 Tr. at 122-26, 130, 139; 6/08/05 Tr. at 80-81, 91-92.
Mrs. McCoy did not attend any of the IDT meetings from February 2004 until October 2004. 6/14/05 Tr. at 100. The Consent Decree states that she and Mr. McCoy “shall be considered as comembers of the Interdisciplinary Team (IDT), and as such enter into decisions on behalf of their sons.” She testified that the team has never accepted one idea from her, and since this Court’s 2002 ruling the ID Team has not included her in any decision-making. 6/14/05 Tr. at 7-8, 44-45, 59. She understands the Consent Decree to mean that any treatment of her sons must meet her approval. 6/14/05 Tr. at 8. She testified that she sought Probate Court intervention in March 2004 to clarify her rights as guardian after STS determined “out of the blue” that Billy could no longer have crushed ice in his drinks. She complained to the nurse supervisor Katie Frigon that staff couldn’t give Billy a drink without ice without being in-serviced because Billy had been accustomed to ice in his drink for the seven years Mrs. McCoy lived in Staff House Two. 6/14/05 Tr. at 9-11; 122-23, 126. As noted above, Phyllis
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Zimmer personally in-serviced every care provider for Bill over a period of a few weeks after the ID Team determined that they would effectuate Dr. McDonald’s order that Bill not be given ice in his drinks.
Dr. McDonald testified that he has never performed a medical procedure on Bill or Leo McCoy that required the parents’ informed consent. Routine medical treatment necessary to maintain general health or prevent the spread of disease does not require informed consent. 6/08/05 Tr. at 34-35. Mr. Harvey testified that typically, under ICF/MR guidelines,19 approval from a guardian is required for procedures or programs which involve surgery, nonroutine medical treatments, restraints or other invasive or intrusive procedures. Approval is not needed for programmatic changes. 6/08/05 Tr. at 86-87, 89-90.
Donna Josephson testified that when the State assumed the daily administration of Staff House Two, she worked with Mrs. McCoy to incorporate the daily routines which Mrs. McCoy had developed for Billy and Leo. The parents’ routines were incorporated into the new schedules, save Leo’s bath time, which staff determined worked better in the afternoon when he had more energy, rather than in the evening, the time Mrs. McCoy favored. 5/12/05 Tr. at 69-74;
19See 42 C.F.R. § 440.150 and 42 C.F.R. § 483.400 et seq. for a description of Intermediate Care Facilities for Persons with Mental Retardation (“ICF/MR”).
The Court recognizes that a facility housing less than four (4) persons cannot become ICF/MR certified. See Consent Decree Paragraph Four.
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6/14/05 Tr. at 167; Defendants’ Exh. 17, 18. Mrs. McCoy’s perception is that the Team took nothing from her routines because they changed the times of the activities. 6/14/05 Tr. at 81-87.
The staff and administration have worked to accommodate Mrs. McCoy’s wishes in other ways as well. Mrs. McCoy favored the use of Depends rather than state-issued diapers for her sons, and the staff agreed to use the Depends as long as she supplies them. They also agreed to use bibs for the McCoy men at Mrs. McCoy’s request. 6/14/05 Tr. at 103, 106. Dr. McDonald even agreed to measure and weigh the McCoy mens’ diaper changes to accommodate Mrs. McCoy and ease disputes between staff and Mrs. McCoy as to whether her sons were having sufficient bowel movements after she and Mr. McCoy moved out of the house. Once Dr. McDonald determined that staff estimates were reliable against the evidence, the weighing of the soiled diapers was stopped. 6/07/05 Tr. at 207-09. Furthermore, there was testimony regarding weekly music sessions for Bill which the ID Team arranged after Mrs. McCoy spoke with the STS chaplain and mentioned that she thought it might be beneficial. 6/14/05 Tr. at 104-05.
Finally, Mrs. McCoy has stalled the process for realizing STS’s goal of making Staff House Two ICF/MR compliant. The ID Team sought for over 1 ½ years to schedule meetings with Mrs. McCoy to develop an updated Overall Plan of Service (OPS) for Leo and Bill, but Mrs. McCoy did not make herself available to meet and
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constantly put them off by saying she would have to check her calendar. 6/08/05 Tr. at 79. A current OPS is a requirement for ICF/MR compliance and certification. During the last round of hearings in this litigation, Plaintiffs complained that Staff House Two was not ICF/MR compliant. C. Defendants’ Use of the Second Floor
In their 2002 Motion for Contempt, Enforcement and Other Relief, Defendants stated their intent to begin using the second floor of Staff House Two for a nurse’s office, nurse supervisor’s office, records area and staff break room to effectuate the Court’s order that they take control of the home. See Doc. No. 433 at 1011. STS administrators testified that the second floor has an office with a computer for the managers and administrators of Staff House Two and a room for storing staff records, training records, policy books, and “all the things that any other cottage has.” The second floor also has a staff bathroom and an area in which staff can take their breaks and have meals. 5/13/05 Tr. at 221-22; 6/08/05 Tr. at 75-76. Mr. Harvey testified that it would not be appropriate for the staff to use the McCoy son’s bathroom downstairs, and Beverly Butler testified that staff couldn’t have their meals in the dining room, living room or kitchen downstairs. 5/13/05 Tr. at 221. LPN Elisabet DaSilva testified that, when the McCoy parents lived in Staff House Two, staff were not allowed to eat in any other place but the basement, or on the basement stairs.
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The basement housed the washing machine, heater and boiler, nothing more. 6/14/05 Tr. at 165-66. D. Advocate
This Court’s 2002 Ruling ordered Defendants to appoint an advocate for Billy and Leo McCoy. Advocacy services were secured by September 29, 2002 through a contract between OPA and the Western Connecticut Association for Human Rights (“WeCAHR”), and Dale Brown was appointed advocate. Mr. Brown served in that capacity for approximately one year. 5/12/05 Tr. at 35; 6/08/05 Tr. at 56-57, 252-54. The contract between OPA and WeCAHR states, inter alia, the following duties for the advocate: “Representation of William and Leo McCoy’s interests at Interdisciplinary Team meetings, and where necessary, at other routine administrative meetings . . . When appropriate, pursuit of administrative and legal remedies, including DMR Programmatic Administrative Reviews, residency transfer hearings, and hearings to contest medication and programming practices.” Defendants’ Exh. 11, 12. In the fall of 2003, Mrs. McCoy asked Jean Bowen, the manager of WeCAHR, to replace Mr. Brown with Sr. Barbara Eirich, and WeCAHR did so. 6/14/05 Tr. at 126; 6/08/05 Tr. at 56, 162. Ms. Bowen testified that she had been satisfied with the performance of Mr. Brown. 6/08/05 Tr. at 260. Ms. Bowen did not notify OPA that Sr. Barbara was appointed to replace Mr. Brown as advocate for the McCoy men, nor did she discuss the decision with the Department of Mental
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Retardation. 6/08/05 Tr. at 262, 266. Sr. Barbara has a Bachelor’s Degree in Psychology, has been a Registered Nurse since 1951 and received a Master’s Degree in Social Work in 1971. 6/08/05 Tr. at 160. Sr. Barbara had never served formally as an advocate prior to her appointment as such by WeCAHR. 6/08/05 Tr. at 205.
The head of OPA, James McGaughey, contacted Ms. Bowen when he learned of Sr. Barbara’s appointment because he had concerns about “Southbury’s perception of her as a previous expert witness” and their ability to see her as an independent advocate. 6/08/05 Tr. at 262. Sr. Barbara has worked as a paid consultant to the McCoy parents since the mid-1980s, and worked as a consultant for them without pay for most of the year preceding her appointment as advocate for Billy and Leo. 6/08/05 Tr. at 160-61, 206-07. She has testified on behalf of the McCoy parents over the years regarding this litigation, and gave written advice to the McCoys on how to respond to one of the motions at issue in the hearings, Defendants’ 2002 Motion for Enforcement, Contempt and Clarification or Modification of the Consent Decree [Doc. No. 433].20 6/08/05 Tr. at 207-08; Defendants’ Exh. 14. Sr. Barbara considers herself a close friend of Mrs. McCoy, eats dinner with her and stays with Mrs. McCoy when she is in town. She testified that when she became
20Sr. Barbara testified that this document was indeed written advice she provided to the McCoys. 6/08/05 Tr. at 207-08. However, Mrs. McCoy testified that she did not think that Sr. Barbara was advising her and that she “didn’t take it that way.” 6/14/05 Tr. at 129-30.
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an advocate for Leo and Billy her interactions with the McCoy parents continued in the same way they always had. 6/08/05 Tr. at 207.
Members of the Interdisciplinary Team wrote a memorandum to the OPA in June of 2004 detailing various instances during which they felt Sr. Barbara’s advocacy failed and requesting that she be removed from her position because her services as advocate were inadequate. The ID Team requested that a “truly independent advocate” be hired for Leo and Billy McCoy. 6/08/05 Tr. at 58-59; Defendants’ Exh. 15. Mr. Harvey testified that Sr. Barbara has difficulty separating her role as a friend of Mrs. McCoy from her role as advocate. 6/08/05 Tr. at 59. The ID Team was greatly concerned with Sr. Barbara’s refusal to attend the weekly Tuesday afternoon meetings with ID Team members from February 2004 until October 2004, especially when, upon her appointment as advocate, she stated to Mr. Harvey that communication was the key to trying to reduce the friction between the McCoy parents and the ID Team. 6/08/05 Tr. at 60-61; 5/13/05 Tr. at 38-39. Mrs. McCoy did not attend the weekly meetings during the same time period. 5/13/05 Tr. at 36-37. Joanne Waranowicz, the case manager for Leo and Bill, testified that the IDT meetings for Leo and Bill occur weekly to keep open the lines of communication, review Bill and Leo’s needs, go over new assessments and recommendations, and follow through on implementation of the recommendations. Because of these
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weekly meetings, the McCoy men do not have formal quarterly meetings. Other residents at STS only receive quarterly IDT meetings. 5/13/05 Tr. at 34-36.
Sr. Barbara stated in her affidavit and at the hearings that she did not attend the IDT meetings from February 2004 until October 2004 because she did not see any importance in being there to hear what was being discussed about the McCoy sons’ care, she did not consider the weekly meetings to be formal IDT meetings, she did not think missing a few meetings would make much difference and she was waiting for clarification of the rights of the McCoy parents as guardians. 6/08/05 Tr. at 160, 216; Doc. No. 471-2 [Affidavit of Sr. Barbara Eirich]. She acknowledged that the weekly meetings with members of the ID Team, if not formal IDT meetings per her definition, were “other routine administrative meetings” as per the contract between OPA and WeCAHR. 6/08/05 Tr. at 215-16. She also stated that she believed Mrs. McCoy was being ignored at the weekly meetings and therefore it was hard to perform as the advocate when the guardian was being ignored. 6/08/05 Tr. at 160.
In August of 2004, Jean Bowen and Sr. Barbara met with James McGaughey after OPA representatives contacted Sr. Barbara to express concern regarding her lack of attendance at the weekly meetings with the members of the ID Team. Sr. Barbara agreed to start attending the meetings only after this meeting. 6/08/05 Tr.
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at 217-18, 262-64. Sr. Barbara has been present and did not act when Mrs. McCoy
gave foods of the wrong consistency to Bill and when Mrs. McCoy gave Bill ice in his drink after being told Dr. McDonald ordered that he should not have ice. 6/08/05 Tr. at 61-62; 5/13/05 Tr. at 63. Ginger Singletary called the manager of WeCAHR, Ms. Bowen, to state her dismay that Sr. Barbara did not do anything to intervene when she saw Mrs. McCoy giving Bill ice against doctor’s orders. 5/13/05 Tr. at 64-65. Sr. Barbara testified that she supports Mrs. McCoy’s position with regard to giving ice to Billy in his drinks. 6/08/05 Tr. at 232.21 Sr. Barbara also supported Mrs. McCoy’s opposition to a full-day program for Leo. 6/08/05 Tr. at 58. She also has supported Mrs. McCoy’s refusal to follow the protocol for using the gel pad while Leo is dining. 6/08/05 Tr. at 232. Additionally, Sr. Barbara has not intervened when she has seen Mrs. McCoy allow Bill to “have his hand,” even when she observed that his hand was severely macerated and “raw” in the spring of 2004. 6/08/05 Tr. at 223, 231. Sr. Barbara testified that she did not believe that allowing Bill to have his hand in his mouth periodically is harmful, and that on at least one occasion she let
21In her Affidavit, Sr. Barbara stated that she fully agreed with the McCoy parents’ decision not to approve the elimination of ice, because Bill had received fluids with ice for the 7-8 years the parents lived in Staff House Two and “did not have a single episode of aspiration pneumonia during this time,” while, since the ice had been removed, he had numerous episodes of coughing and choking and 3-4 emergency room admissions for aspiration pneumonia during the year the ice was removed.” Doc. No. 471-2 ¶ 7. Testimony from Dr. McDonald and Mrs. McCoy show this belief to be mistaken. Sr. Barbara did not state the basis for her belief.
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Bill “have his hand for a little while” after eating. 6/08/05 Tr. at 229, 231-32. She agreed with Mrs. McCoy’s position that the behavior modification program to reduce Bill’s hand-in-mouth behavior was too aggressive. 6/07/05 Tr. at 121. Furthermore, she testified that the behavior modification program coupled with other programmatic changes without options might cause Bill to give up the will to live. 6/08/05 Tr. at 176-77. However, Sr. Barbara acknowledged during the hearings that, in the year since the plan had been implemented, Bill had not given up his will to live. 6/08/05 Tr. at 237.
Although Sr. Barbara disagreed with many of the programs implemented by Defendants, and voiced her objections over issues such as Defendants’ decision not to staff the house with a nurse on the third shift, the hand-in-mouth behavior modification plan, Leo’s ambulation with shoes and the decision to remove ice from Bill’s drinks to individual staff and at some of the weekly meetings of the ID team members, no evidence was presented that she voiced her concerns through the PAR process. She testified that she has never recommended a course of action that differed from that supported by the McCoy parents, and that the only time she ever took a position contrary to Mrs. McCoy was in accepting the behavior modification plan regarding Bill’s hand-in-mouth behavior, which she approved of as long as staff were sufficiently trained to understand that the program did not prohibit Bill from ever putting
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his hand in his mouth. 6/08/05 Tr. at 179, 184-85, 210-13. III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendants’ Motions for Contempt Defendants argue that this Court should find Mrs. McCoy in contempt of the 2002 Ruling with regard to: 1) Mrs. McCoy’s unreasonable refusal to interview candidates for staff positions at Staff House Two or approve those candidates screened favorably by Defendants; and 2) the McCoy parents’ and, after Mr. McCoy’s death, Mrs. McCoy’s continuing interference with Defendants’ attempts to manage Staff House Two and implement programs and routines for Leo, Jr. and Bill and the unabated abuse and harassment of staff by the McCoys and Mrs. McCoy alone. A district court has the inherent power to hold a party in civil contempt in order to enforce compliance with an order of the court. Powell v. Ward, 643 F.2d 924, 931 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981). A finding of civil contempt is appropriate when “1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous; 2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing; and 3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner.” Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, LTDA v. GE Medical Systems Information Technologies, Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 655 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995)). The actions of the contemnor need not be willful for the Court to find contempt.
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Id. (citing Donovan v. Sovereign Sec. Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 59 (2d
Cir. 1984)). 1. Clear and Unambiguous Order22
This Court’s 2002 Ruling ordered the Defendants to take
responsibility for administering all aspects of the home, to repair
the downstairs bathroom, to hire such additional employees as
needed to reach the minimum core-staff level of fifteen, to appoint
an advocate for both Leo and Billy, to design a day program for Leo
and to provide a visible and accountable manager to oversee the
home, adequate supervision on each shift, and competency-based
training for all employees. The McCoy parents were ordered not to
interfere with the Defendants and to vacate Staff House Two, and
were cautioned that parental approval of staff selection shall not
be unreasonably withheld and that their status as co-members of the
Interdisciplinary Team does not permit them to exercise absolute
control over training and services. This Court further ordered
that “the McCoys must relinquish control and allow people whom they
22Plaintiffs’ former counsel (Attorney Philpot) argued on their behalf that to determine whether contempt of the 2002 Ruling exists, the Court must necessarily look at the Ruling in conjunction with the Consent Decree. This Court agrees that referencing the Decree is important to a fuller understanding of the issues, but notes that the 2002 Ruling is clear and unambiguous and contempt is judged based upon the Court’s Ruling and the Plaintiffs’ attempts to comply with the Ruling.
Plaintiffs’ other former counsel (Attorney Pattis, the attorney of record during these hearings) argued in Plaintiffs’ post-hearing brief that the “lack of clarity and inherent ambiguity” in the Consent Decree with regard to who has decision-making authority about the care offered the McCoy men and how disputes are to be resolved militate against a finding of contempt. As the Court noted above, the issue before this Court is whether the McCoy parents, and now Mrs. McCoy alone, are in contempt of this Court’s 2002 Ruling, not the Consent Decree.
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may not know very well to care for their sons.” 2002 Ruling at 34. “A clear and unambiguous order is one that leaves no uncertainty in the minds of those to whom it is addressed, . . . who must be able to ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden.” King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court finds that there was no ambiguity in the orders set forth in the July 15, 2002 Ruling.
2. Clear and Convincing Proof Defendants argue that they have put forth extensive evidence of Mrs. McCoy’s contumacious behavior with regard to this Court’s 2002 Ruling. Plaintiffs argue that there is no clear and convincing proof that they have violated the 2002 Ruling.23 This Court finds that clear and convincing evidence of Mrs. McCoy’s contumacious behavior was presented during the hearings. 3. Not Diligent in Compliance Defendants argue that the McCoy parents, and Mrs. McCoy alone have not diligently attempted in a reasonable manner to comply with
23In Plaintiffs’ Post-hearing Brief [Doc. No. 510], filed by Plaintiffs’ former attorney Mr. Pattis, Plaintiffs argue that no evidence was presented that Plaintiffs are in contempt of the Consent Decree, and that Mrs. McCoy cannot have been said to have failed to use reasonable diligence to comply with the terms of the Decree. In Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ 2002 Motion for Contempt and Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ 2003 Motion for Contempt, filed by Plaintiffs’ other former attorney Mr. Philpot, Plaintiffs argue against a finding that the McCoys are in contempt of the 2002 Ruling. This Court assumes that the arguments in Plaintiffs’ most recent briefing, arguing against a finding of contempt of the Consent Decree, were typographical errors or perhaps confusion due to the multiplicity of attorneys who have worked for the McCoys and that Plaintiffs meant to reference the 2002 Ruling.
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this Court’s 2002 Ruling. Mrs. McCoy argues that her actions are reasonable in light of the facts.
a. Abuse and Intimidation/Staffing Defendants argue that Mrs. McCoy’s continued abuse and intimidation of staff has led to retention problems and low morale, and that she has unreasonably withheld approval of staff selected for hire by Defendants. Mrs. McCoy argues that Plaintiffs are not the cause of the low morale in Staff House Two. Furthermore, she argues in her post-hearing brief that she should not be found in contempt because her conduct causes no harm to the McCoy sons or the Defendants since “there is no evidence to suggest that the house is understaffed, save for the defendants’ decision to deprive the men of nursing coverage during the third shift”. See Doc. No. 510 at 13. Extensive evidence presented at the hearings belies Mrs. McCoy’s assertions that she is not the cause of the low morale in Staff House Two. Mrs. McCoy is remarkably obtuse when it comes to understanding the effects of her and her husband’s interference and treatment of staff at Staff House Two, even after this Court’s 2002 Ruling and numerous rulings from Magistrate Margolis detailed specific instances of abusive and unacceptable conduct.24 For
24Magistrate Margolis detailed the abusive manner in which the McCoys had treated staff as far back as 1993. See Certification of Contempt [Doc. No. 187] at 35-42, 92-96. In 1996, Magistrate Margolis warned the McCoys that the staff were not their personal slaves. See Ruling on Remedies Following Certification of Contempt [Doc. No. 195] at 2-5.
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example, testimony established that the contract nurses hired for Staff House Two often quit before their 13-week assignment ended, reporting to their supervisor that they felt threatened and pressured to do things by the McCoy parents that were not in keeping with nursing protocol and felt that their license would be in jeopardy if they followed the McCoys’ requests. Mrs. McCoy’s counterpoint to this is to argue through counsel that, if nurses or other staff quit before their contract ended, it only reflects poorly on that person’s professionalism and the judgment of the administration at STS who had chosen that person for the job. See Doc. No. 453 at 6. She offers no reasonable explanation for her poor and disrespectful treatment of staff or her interference with their professional duties in violation of this Court’s order. Although testimony established that many of the most inappropriate incidents of coarse conduct and abuse were carried out by the late Mr. McCoy, numerous staff members and administrators attested to the intimidating and abusive behavior meted out by Mrs. McCoy, including screaming at staff, redirecting staff after professionals had given them orders, commenting about malpractice and wrongful death suits while staff fed one of her sons, referring to African American staff as “you people,” and raising her fist and stating that she was ready for a fight because she disagreed with a procedure being carried out by a staff person. The Court heard testimony from the staff that they felt abused every day and that
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staff have quit because they cannot take the stress. From October 2002 until the time of the hearings in the spring of 2005, the McCoys filed numerous allegations of abuse and neglect against staff at Staff House Two. One third of all the allegations concerning Billy or Leo were classified as “Do Not Take” by OPA, and none of the allegations made by the McCoys was substantiated. Reports concerning only Billy or Leo made up 15% of the total reports at STS, which had a population of approximately 600 residents. Staff perceive these reports as harassing, and in some cases OPA noted that the report involved programmatic disputes which should be handled through the PAR process. The Court finds Mrs. McCoy has continued to harass and intimidate staff, which compounds Defendants’ difficulties in hiring and retaining a core staff for Staff House Two.
Furthermore, the evidence bears out Defendants’ assertions that Mrs. McCoy has unreasonably withheld parental approval of staff selected by Defendants for hire. Defendants presented evidence that, since this Court’s 2002 Ruling, they had interviewed and approved a total of 26 staff to work in Staff House Two; Mrs. McCoy approved only two. Mrs. McCoy argues that she was ill for a while in 2002 and could not participate in interviews. She further argues that she had not been consulted about hiring staff for 3 years, although she acknowledges in her hearing testimony that, along with Mr. Harvey, she did interview the two people from STS
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who had applied in the spring of 2003. Her only explanation for not giving approval for the hiring of those two individuals was that she “didn’t think they were appropriate.” 6/14/05 Tr. at 68. Mr. Harvey attested then and attested at the hearings that those two individuals, who are still “temporarily” working at Staff House Two, were then and are now doing a good job.
Mrs. McCoy argues that there is no permanent staff in the house, “resulting in poorly trained and unskilled personnel caring for her sons’ special needs.” See Plaintiffs’ Post-hearing Brief at 10 [Doc. No. 510]. This claim is not borne out by the evidence. In fact, the evidence shows that Mrs. McCoy accuses staff of “shirking their responsibilities” when they participate in training regimens, unreasonably refuses to approve the hiring of permanent staff approved by STS and, when staff are indeed trained, she orders them to disregard protocols and procedures and take instruction from her. In sum, this Court finds Mrs. McCoy has not demonstrated a diligent attempt to comply with this Court’s order that parental approval of staff selection not be unreasonably withheld. Defendants’ Motions for Contempt are GRANTED with respect to Mrs. McCoy’s unreasonable withholding of her approval of staff selected for hire by Defendants.
b. Interference with Program Implementation and Administration
The 2002 Ruling was clear: the McCoys were ordered to relinquish control and not to interfere with the Defendants. The
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gist of Mrs. McCoy’s argument is that she is a parent and guardian attempting to exercise her parental rights to determine what methods are the best for caring for her sons, and her actions in consulting with Dr. Rubin and other providers and in opposing some of the actions of the ID Team were reasonable given 1) her many decades of experience in caring for her sons; 2) that medical opinions can differ with regard to treatment and it is therefore not unreasonable for her to follow the advice of a consultant which may differ from the recommendations of the STS staff; and 3) that under the Consent Decree she has the right to make final determinations regarding all aspects of her sons’ care. She argues that "the intent of the Consent Decree was to include and fully integrate the McCoys into the daily regime of the McCoy men. Hence, when issues relating to the care, safety and overall psychological and/or physical well-being of the McCoy men are concerned, notwithstanding the Court's directive that they ‘not interfere,’ the McCoys have every right under the Consent Decree to let their sons' voices be heard so that their interests, if not fully protected, are at least clearly articulated." See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Contempt at 2 [Doc. No. 453].
This Court stated in its July 2002 Ruling that "the Consent Decree calls for the McCoys' enhanced involvement in the lives of their sons; however it does not allow them to wield absolute
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control over the lives of their sons." 2002 Ruling at 31. This Court directed the McCoys that they must not interfere and must let the State and its employees to do their jobs. Notwithstanding Mrs. McCoy’s belief that she should have veto power regarding every situation (which she does not, see below), she could have ascertained from the four corners of the 2002 Ruling that her actions constituted interference, and that such interference was forbidden. The Consent Decree does not give her the right to defy this Court’s orders.
This Court finds that Mrs. McCoy has been unwilling to loosen her hold and that her interference pervades every aspect of the care Defendants attempt to provide. If Mrs. McCoy wishes to “clearly articulate” her sons’ interests, the appropriate avenue is the PAR process, the Interdisciplinary Team meetings or other administrative remedies, not defiance of this Court’s orders. She has never used the PAR process, preferring instead to call the OPA, petition the Probate Court or simply state to staff when refusing to follow a protocol or procedure that “she was the mother . . . and would do what she felt was better, not what was in the procedure.” This Court finds this unacceptable.
Mrs. McCoy argues that her main concern regarding the routines and procedures implemented for Billy and Leo in the wake of this Court’s 2002 Ruling is that “the McCoy men’s waking hours are now being spent by and large in bed,” and that the men are
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unable to distinguish day from night because they no longer have their personal hygiene performed on mats in the living room, as was the procedure when the parents lived in Staff House Two. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Contempt at 8 (¶ 17) [Doc. No. 453]. This does not explain her refusal to support a full-day program for Leo, Jr., her refusal to support the behavior program to decrease the frequency with which Billy mouths his hand, her objection to the use of shoes and sneakers when Leo is ambulating, her refusal to follow the protocol for using a gel pad while Leo dines or the protocol for eliminating ice in Billy’s drinks, or her refusal to support the use of a new wheelchair for Billy. Nor does it explain why she pokes her fingers or a tongue depressor into the cups holding her sons’ medications and quizzes the nurses as to the appropriateness of the dosage, or why she gives orders to nurses or therapists that are not in keeping with medical protocol, or why she orders to staff at Staff House Two to disregard universal precautions when helping her sons with their hygiene. Furthermore, it is evident that due to the extensive scheduling and programming implemented by the staff and administration, the McCoy men are not largely spending their waking hours in bed.
Furthermore, her alleged reliance on outside doctors, particularly Dr. Rubin, also fails to explain her resistance to just about every program and procedure developed by defendants.
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She argues that the state needs to be flexible when extenuating circumstances make it impractical or insensitive to adhere to the schedule, but testimony established that, since July 2002, the extenuating circumstances have been largely caused by the McCoy parents. Mrs. McCoy believes that it is reasonable for her to rely upon the advice of Dr. Rubin in making decisions or going against decisions made by Defendants, and that it is reasonable to assume she knows best how to care for her sons, having done so for more than 50 years.25 This is evident when the Court reviews one of the greatest sources of friction between the McCoys and Defendants – meal-times and the feeding regimens developed by Defendants for the McCoy men. Mrs. McCoy argues that the quality of the medical care provided, particularly to Billy, has not been very good since the parents were ordered out of the house, and she notes Billy’s hospitalizations for pneumonia after October 2002. She also argued that she feels staff are not properly trained to feed Billy. The evidence shows her claims to be patently untrue. When asked on cross-examination if she had ever told anyone Billy had not been hospitalized with pneumonia while she lived in Staff House Two, she responded “not intentionally” and acknowledged that Billy had suffered a couple of episodes of pneumonia while she and her
25Only Dr. Rubin testified on Mrs. McCoy's behalf; none of the other doctors she references in her post-hearing brief on whom she allegedly relied in forming her opinions or to whom she vaguely referred during the hearings were present to testify and be cross-examined, so this Court can only consider the reasonableness of her actions in light of Dr. Rubin's testimony.
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husband lived at Staff House Two. 6/14/05 Tr. at 140-41. Dr. McDonald testified that during the period from January 1996 until September 2002, during which time the McCoy parents resided at Staff House Two, Billy had five hospital admissions for pneumonia and, additionally, during this same period was treated for pneumonia 10 times at STS without being sent to the hospital. Thus, in the 6 ½ years the McCoy parents were in the residence, Billy was treated for aspiration pneumonia at least 15 times. Therefore, it is unreasonable for Mrs. McCoy to interfere with feeding routines, eating regimens and training for the feeding of Billy and then argue that her efforts (i.e. interference) are meant to stem the episodes of aspiration pneumonia endured by her son when such episodes occurred, on average, twice per year when she and her husband were in control of the home. Furthermore, Defendants put forth much evidence on the careful manner in which they have approached the training and in-servicing of staff regarding the feeding of both men.
Additionally, because civil contempt is a sanction to enforce compliance with an order of the Court, Mrs. McCoy’s alleged reliance on outside medical consultants is irrelevant, as “it matters not with what intent [Mrs. McCoy] did the prohibited act.” McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949). “An act does not cease to be a violation of a law and of a decree merely because it may have been done innocently.” Id.
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Additionally, her refusal to comply because she believed her rights as guardian trumped this Court’s order not to interfere cannot be justified because “persons subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the order.” Paramedics Electro., 369 F.3d at 656.26
Mrs. McCoy argues that disagreements with staff and the administration at STS are largely Defendants’ “passive aggressive struggles for control” as she tries to prevent her sons from being returned to some form of institutional care.27 There really is no place for a struggle for control: the McCoy parents voluntarily placed their sons in the care of the Department of Mental Retardation many years ago. Under the Connecticut General Statutes, they ceded day-to-day decision-making regarding their sons’ routine care to the State, which has the right and legal obligation to provide programmatic and other services to the individuals “placed or treated under the direction of the Commissioner of Mental Retardation.” See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-
26And, this Court’s 2002 Ruling was affirmed. See Skarnulis v. Belmont, 74 Fed. Appx. 92 (2d Cir. 2003).
27The Court notes the subtext underlying all of Mrs. McCoys arguments for why she should not be found to have failed to comply with the Court’s order in a diligent manner: her allusions to the sexual abuse Leo allegedly suffered at STS. As noted above in footnote 12, investigations conducted after suspicious bruising of Leo’s private parts did not find criminal activity or sexual abuse, although the bruising was deemed suspicious. Even if Leo, Jr. was abused, this alone is not enough to explain why Mrs. McCoy disapproves of virtually every program or procedure instituted for the care of her sons.
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238(b).28 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-677(i) provides that a plenary or
limited guardian of a person with mental retardation “shall be the
primary decision maker with respect to programs needed by such
person and policies and practices affecting the well-being of such
person within the authority granted by the court pursuant to this
section, provided any such decision does not conflict with the
requirements of section 17a-238.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-677(i)
(emphasis added). Section 17a-238(f) provides in relevant part as
follows:
The Commissioner of Mental Retardation shall require the attending physician of any person placed or treated under the direction of the commissioner to obtain informed written consent from the following persons prior to authorizing any surgical procedure or any medical treatment, excluding routine medical treatment which is necessary to maintain the general health of a resident or to prevent the spread of any communicable disease:. . . (3) the legal guardian or conservator of a resident of any age who is adjudicated unable to make informed decisions about matters relating to such resident's medical care. The person whose consent is required shall be informed of the nature and consequences of the particular treatment or surgical procedure, the reasonable risks, benefits and purpose of such treatment or surgical procedure and any alternative treatment or surgical procedures which are available. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-238(f) (emphasis added).
Dr. McDonald testified that he has never performed a procedure on
either McCoy son which required informed consent. As for the
28“Each person placed or treated under the direction of the Commissioner of Mental Retardation in any public or private facility shall be protected from harm and receive humane and dignified treatment which is adequate for such person’s needs and for the development of such person’s full potential at all times, with full respect for such person’s personal dignity and right to privacy consistent wit such person’s treatment plan as determined by the commissioner. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-238(b).
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programming and protocols developed by Defendants under orders from this Court to take responsibility for administering all aspects of the home, parents or guardians need not be consulted for routine matters or programming (including, but not limited to, the daily schedules, meal-time routines including the gel pad protocol for Leo, the order to eliminate ice from Billy’s drinks and the temperature and consistency of the food served, the behavioral support plan to decrease the frequency of Billy’s hand-in-mouth behavior, recreational trips, the use of shoes when Leo is ambulating, food being prepared at the STS main facility and then being brought over to Staff House Two.) CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a238(f). The Consent Decree does not override the statutes; it simply provides a framework within which, as co-members of the Interdisciplinary Team, the McCoys can be involved in decisionmaking regarding the care Defendants provide for their sons. If Mrs. McCoy disagrees with a particular program or protocol approved by the ID Team, she can proceed through the PAR process and the State can still continue to provide the services as it is legally charged to do, Leo and Billy having been placed in the care of the Department of Mental Retardation, under the custody and control of the director of STS.
Although Staff House Two cannot become ICF/MR certified because it houses less than four persons, Defendants have sought to make it compliant with the ICF/MR regulations as contemplated by
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the parties in the Consent Decree. The regulations for
Intermediate Care Facilities for Persons with Mental Retardation
governing the conditions of participation by State facilities for
the mentally retarded state the following:
(a) Standard: Protection of clients' rights. The facility must ensure the rights of all clients. Therefore, the facility must-(2) Inform each client, parent (if the client is a minor), or legal guardian, of the client's medical condition, developmental and behavioral status, attendant risks of treatment, and of the right to refuse treatment. 42 C.F.R. § 483.420(a)(2).
The Interpretive Guidelines issued by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services for this subsection note that
The term “attendant risks of treatment” refers to all treatment, including medical treatment. An individual who refuses a particular treatment (e.g., a behavior control, seizure control medication or a particular intervention strategy) must be offered information about acceptable alternatives to the treatment being refused, if acceptable alternatives are available. The individual’s preference about alternatives should be elicited and considered in deciding on the course of treatment. If the individual also refuses the alternative treatment, or if no alternative exists to the treatment refused, the facility must consider the effect this refusal may have on other individuals, the individual himself or herself and the facility, and if it can continue to treat the individual consistent with these regulations. Thus, every effort must be made to assist the individual to understand and cooperate in the legitimate exercise of the IPP. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, State Operations Manual, Appendix J - Guidance to Surveyors: Intermediate Care Facilities for Persons With Mental Retardation (2004), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Manuals/IOM/list.asp (emphasis added).
Even with regard to an invasive or non-routine matter, these
regulations do not give absolute decision-making power to a
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guardian. Furthermore, with regard to parent participation, the
ICF/MR regulations state:
The facility must-(1) Promote participation of parents (if the client is a minor) and legal guardians in the process of providing active treatment to a client unless their participation is unobtainable or inappropriate. 42 C.F.R. § 483.420(c)(1)
The Interpretive Guidelines state as follows:
“Unobtainable,” as used in this standard, means that the facility has made a bonafide effort to seek parental or guardian participation in the process, even though the effort may ultimately be unsuccessful (for example, the parent may be impossible to locate or may prove unwilling or unable to participate). “Inappropriate” as used in this standard means that the parent or legal guardian’s behavior is so disruptive or uncooperative that others cannot effectively participate; the individual does not wish his or her parent to participate, and the individual is competent to make this decision; or there is strong evidence that the parent or guardian is not acting on the individual’s behalf or in the individual’s best interest. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, State Operations Manual, Appendix J - Guidance to Surveyors: Intermediate Care Facilities for Persons With Mental Retardation (2004), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Manuals/IOM/list.asp (emphasis added).
Defendants argue that Mrs. McCoy meets the definition of
“inappropriate” under these guidelines. Clearly, Mrs. McCoy’s
behavior is uncooperative and she has been unwilling to participate
in the process at times.29 However, the ID Team’s consideration of
Mrs. McCoy’s preferences with regard to routine programming and
care of her sons is in keeping with the letter and spirit of the
regulations covering the care of individuals with mental
29This Court declines to opine as to whether she acts in her sons' best interests, and leaves that determination to the Probate Court.
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retardation. In sum, Mrs. McCoy had not demonstrated a diligent attempt to
comply in a reasonable manner with the Court’s order that the McCoy parents not interfere with Defendants’ attempts to administer all aspects of the home. Defendants’ Motions for Contempt are GRANTED with respect to Mrs. McCoy’s interference with Defendants attempts to administer all aspects of Staff House Two. B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt
Plaintiffs argue that this Court should find Defendants in contempt of the Consent Decree 1) because nurse staffing appears inadequate and Defendants have decided to eliminate nurses on the third shift, and 2) because Defendants’ use of the second floor of Staff House Two violates the Consent Decree.
Although consent decrees are judicial orders, because they “embody a compromise between parties who have waived their rights to litigation, ‘they should be construed basically as contracts.’” United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 275 F.3d 168, 175 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 (1975)). It is well established that “the language of a consent decree must dictate what a party is required to do and what it must refrain from doing.” Perez v. Danbury Hospital, 347 F.3d 419, 424 (2d Cir. 2003). “The scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it.” United
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States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971). Additionally, “a court may not replace the terms of a consent decree with its own, no matter how much of an improvement it would make in effectuating the decree’s goals.” Perez, 347 F.3d at 424 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As noted in Section III. A. above, a finding of civil contempt is appropriate when 1) the order that allegedly was not complied with is clear and unambiguous; 2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing; and 3) the party has not diligently attempted in a reasonable manner to comply. 369 F.3d at 655.
Nursing Services Mrs. McCoy argues in her Motion for Contempt that Defendants “do not appear to be pursuing, in good faith, the hiring of competent, qualified nurses.” The evidence presented to this Court established that Defendants have spent an inordinate amount of time advertising and recruiting for nurses for the core staff at Staff House Two, and have had to resort to the use of contract nurses to keep the home adequately staffed. Even using contract nurses has been fraught with difficulty for Defendants, as many contract nurses quit before their 13-week contract ended, citing threats from Mrs. McCoy and concern that their nursing license would be in jeopardy if they acceded to her requests. This Court finds that Defendants have diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner with the Consent Decree’s mandate regarding the hiring of
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nurses for the core staff. Additionally, Mrs. McCoy argues that Defendants’ refusal to provide nurses for the third shift is a “convenient reading of the [Consent Decree]” which is “but another example of the war of attrition waged by the staff to undo the decree.” See Plaintiffs’ Post-hearing Brief at 16 [Doc. No. 510]. Defendants’ decision is a diligent attempt to comply in a reasonable manner with the requirements of the Consent Decree in light of the fact that Magistrate Margolis ruled in 1995 that, under the Consent Decree, nurses were required to be available, not necessarily present. See Ruling on Joint Statement of Disputed Provisions at 7 [Doc. No. 162].30 The evidence showed that nurses were available during the third shift on the STS main campus. Thus, Plaintiffs’ motion for contempt is DENIED with regard to nursing services.
Defendants’ Use of the Second Floor of Staff House Two Mrs. McCoy argues in her Motion for Contempt that Defendants have recklessly disregarded the Consent Decree by using the second floor of Staff House Two. Mrs. McCoy’s argument has shifted somewhat from her assertions in Plaintiffs’ 2002 Motion for Contempt that the “intent of the prohibition against the use of the second floor was to avoid unnecessary maligering within the house”
30"[T]he Consent Decree provides that ‘[n]ursing services . . . be available,' not that nurses be present at all times. To the greatest extent possible, defendants shall, however, attempt to have nurses in the house during the daytime shifts." Ruling on Joint Statement of Disputed Provisions at 7 [Doc. No. 162].
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and in which she asserted that the Consent Decree’s provisions confer permanent entitlements to the Plaintiffs, including that the second floor would be closed off to staff. Her evidence for this is her affidavit to Plaintiffs’ Motion in Opposition to Defendants’ 2002 Motion for Contempt [Doc. No. 438, Exhibit A, ¶ 11] in which she avers, “[i]n agreeing to the Consent Decree in March of 1992, the parties specifically discussed and ultimately the defendants acquiesced, to our reasonable request that the second floor be sealed off to all staff working within Staff House No. 2.” However, in her post-hearing brief Mrs. McCoy asserts that Defendants’ use of the second floor “frustrates the purpose of the Consent Decree” because, she intimates, by staff taking breaks on the second floor and using the second floor for an office area, the one to one coverage mandated by the Decree suffers and the likelihood that an untoward medical event will occur increases. It is not clear whether the McCoys object only to the use of the second floor for staff breaks, or also to the fact that staff indeed take breaks. Mrs. McCoy asked rhetorically through counsel “[w]ill staff be said to [be] attending the men’s needs when they are upstairs taking a break or doing clerical work?” State labor laws mandate staff breaks, and Ms. DaSilva testified at the hearings that staff took breaks when the McCoys lived in Staff House Two but they had to sit outside or in the basement.
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Defendants argue that no agreement was ever reached with the McCoys concerning the prohibition of staff on the second floor of Staff House Two. They argue that the reference to closing off the second floor was to prevent the McCoy sons from trying to navigate the stairs to the second floor.
The parol evidence rule generally prohibits admission of “extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements to explain the meaning of a contract that parties have reduced to unambiguous integrated writing. Such extrinsic evidence may not be used to modify, explain, vary or supplement the written integrated contract.” Gualandi v. Adams, 385 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 2004). And, “deference is to be paid to the plain meaning of the language of a decree and the normal usage of the terms selected.” Broadcast Music, 275 F.3d at 175. Thus, this Court examines the provisions of the writing itself with regard to the second floor of Staff House Two.
Paragraph Two of the Consent Decree provides that “[t]he renovations and repairs listed on exhibit A shall be made.” Exhibit A consists of a diagram of the layout of Staff House Two labeled “SH-2 Renovation” with various handwritten notations regarding the renovations, and a typed list entitled “Requirements for SH-2 Renovation” with various proposed improvements listed and hand-written notes modifying items on the typed list. The list is clearly not one of “permanent entitlements” as characterized by
70

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Mrs. McCoy, and includes items such as “Laundry room requested” and “Bedrooms: Need (2) bedrooms, would like to see plan for building of same. Requesting Patio Door installed for exit.” Additionally, it states “Access to second floor closed off.” It does not elaborate.
This Court finds that the Consent Decree does not forbid the Defendants’ use of the second floor to aid in the administration of the home. A reasonable interpretation of the Consent Decree’s terms, discerned from within its four corners, is that the notation “Access to second floor closed off” meant that during the renovation process something had to be done so as to effectively circumscribe the movements of the McCoy sons, who cannot safely negotiate stairs. There are no references in Exhibit A or indeed anywhere in the Consent Decree to areas of the house which would be off limits to STS staff. The McCoy parents themselves lived on the second floor during their years at Staff House Two, something they could not have done had access indeed been closed off for anyone other than Billy or Leo. Thus, Defendants are not in violation of the terms of the Consent Decree with regard to their use of the second floor of Staff House Two to support the administration of the home, and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt is DENIED as to this ground. C. Modification or Clarification of the Consent Decree Due to
Changed Circumstances/Extraordinary Circumstances In their post-hearing brief, Defendants argue that two of
71

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their requests for relief would require modification of the Consent Decree: precluding Mrs. McCoy from visiting Staff House Two during meal-times (currently 7:30 a.m. - 8:30 a.m., 12:00 p.m - 1:30 p.m, and 5:00 p.m. - 6:30 p.m.) conflicts with Paragraph Eighteen of the Decree, which states “[t]he parents shall have the right to visit any residence developed for the plaintiffs under this Consent Decree at any time, unannounced;” and removing Mrs. McCoy from the process of hiring staff conflicts with Paragraph Three, which states “[a]dequate arrangements for ensuring a competent core group shall be developed, including parental approval of staff selected for the core group.” Defendants argue that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), “changed circumstances” would warrant modification of the Consent Decree, or alternatively that the “extraordinary circumstances” in this case justify modification of the Decree under Rule 60(b)(6).
Under Rule 60(b), “upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (5) . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. ” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, the Supreme Court declared that under Rule 60(b)(5), relief from judgment is appropriate “when ‘it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
72

Case 3:85-cv-00465-EBB Document 518 Filed 07/10/07 Page 73 of 83
prospective application,’ not when it is no longer convenient to live with the terms of a consent decree.” 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992). “[A] party seeking modification of a consent decree bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree.” Id. Modification of a consent decree is appropriate 1) “when changed factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous;” 2) “when a decree proves to be unworkable because of unforseen obstacles;” or 3) “when enforcement of the decree without modification would be detrimental to the public interest.” Id. at 384. Additionally, emphasizing the need for a flexible standard because consent decrees remain in effect for extended periods of time, the Court noted that “[l]itigants are not required to anticipate every exigency that could conceivably arise during the life of a consent decree.” Id. at 380, 385. Once a court has determined that the moving party has met its burden, the court should consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance. Id. at 383. A proposed modification 1) “must not create or perpetuate a constitutional violation;” and 2) “should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor.” Id. at 391. Finally, the district court should “defer to local government administrators . . . to resolve the intricacies of implementing a decree modification.” Id. at 392.
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Defendants argue that Mrs. McCoy’s unyielding interference and intimidation were not envisioned when the Decree was signed, and continue to impede the full effectiveness of the Consent Decree. Thus, they argue, relief under Rule 60(b)(5) is appropriate. Alternatively, if relief is not warranted under Rule 60(b)(5), Defendants argue that the Court should grant modification of the Consent Decree under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) due to the “extraordinary circumstances” in this case. Rule 60(b)(6) “grants federal courts broad authority to relieve a party from a final judgment upon such terms as are just, provided that the motion is made within a reasonable time and is not premised on one of the grounds for relief enumerated in clauses (b)(1) through (b)(5).” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 86364 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such relief should ordinarily be applied only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 864 (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). This Court agrees that Mrs. McCoy’s interference and attempts at wielding absolute control over the lives of her sons is extraordinary. However, because this Court believes the Consent Decree as it stands has proven to be unworkable due to unforseen obstacles, relief is appropriate under Rule 60(b)(5) and therefore this Court cannot and need not explore relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
This Court finds modification of the Consent Decree is appropriate under Rule 60(b)(5) because Defendants have met their
74

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burden in establishing a “significant change in circumstances.” Defendants complied with this Court’s 2002 Ruling to live up to the terms of the Consent Decree and take control of Staff House Two. They have struggled to maintain control even as Mrs. McCoy has flouted this Court’s order not to interfere with Defendants. Furthermore, this Court finds that Defendants’ proposed modifications are suitably “tailored to resolve the problems created by the change in circumstances.” 502 U.S. at 391. However, “the standard [] set forth [only] applies when a party seeks modification of a term of a consent decree that arguably relates to the vindication of a constitutional right. Such a showing is not necessary to implement minor changes in extraneous details that may have been included in a decree . . . but are unrelated to remedying the underlying constitutional violation. Ordinarily, the parties should consent to modifying a decree to allow such changes. If a party refuses to consent and the moving party has a reasonable basis for its request, the court should modify the decree.” Id. at 383 n.7. Although relief is appropriate under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5), this Court finds that Defendants’ proposed modifications to the Consent Decree involve details that are unrelated to remedying the underlying constitutional violation. Modification of the Consent Decree to preclude Mrs. McCoy from visiting Staff House Two during her sons’ meal-times and removing her from the staff selection process does
75

Case 3:85-cv-00465-EBB Document 518 Filed 07/10/07 Page 76 of 83
not implicate constitutional rights, and this Court will order such modifications. Furthermore, the Court finds, sua sponte, other modifications are necessary, also unrelated to remedying the underlying constitutional violation, to effectuate the intent of the Decree and make it workable. See Section IV. below. D. Motion for Authorization to Appoint a New Advocate
Defendants put forth sufficient evidence for this Court to conclude that it is in the best interests of Leo and Bill McCoy that an advocate be appointed other than Sr. Barbara Eirich. Sr. Barbara stated in her affidavit that her failure to attend the ID Team meetings from February 2004 until October 2004 “did not sit well,” with Defendants, which of course it would not because she was under contract to attend IDT meetings and “other routine administrative meetings.” As advocate she would have known that the ID Team met weekly to discuss Leo and Billy’s programming, rather than quarterly as it would for other residents at STS. To state, as she did at the hearings, that she did not consider the weekly meetings to be IDT meetings and that she did not see any importance in being there to hear what was being discussed is extraordinary considering that her contract required her to attend such meetings as the advocate for the McCoy sons, irrespective of what legal avenues were being explored by Mrs. McCoy with regard to her guardianship rights.
76

Case 3:85-cv-00465-EBB Document 518 Filed 07/10/07 Page 77 of 83
As Mrs. McCoy alleged in her post-hearing brief, when she met with staff to discuss concerns about the treatment of her sons, “she was largely ignored, as was her advocate” (Sr. Barbara). Sr. Barbara has provided advice to the McCoys on how to respond to one of the motions for contempt at issue in this ruling, she has testified on behalf of the McCoy parents over the years regarding this litigation, and she worked as an unpaid consultant to the McCoys for most of the year preceding her appointment as advocate to the McCoy sons.
Plaintiffs argue that Sr. Barbara is not Mrs. McCoy’s “alter ego” and has in fact disagreed with her. The only evidence of this is her testimony that she supports the behavior modification plan for Bill’s hand-in-mouth behavior as long as staff are trained to realize the plan does not mean he cannot ever put his hand in his mouth. However, in practice, any time Mrs. McCoy wanted Billy to “have his hand” Sr. Barbara thought it was fine. There was no evidence that Sr. Barbara was interested in having Billy actually modify his behavior, and she told staff he might lose the will to live if he was not allowed his hand whenever he wanted it. In her affidavit, Sr. Barbara chides the care-givers at Staff House Two by noting, inter alia, the “closed-mindedness” of the ID Team, “most of whom received their education more than 20 years ago.” Sr. Barbara has been a Registered Nurse since 1951 and received her Master’s Degree in 1971. She has not intervened when Mrs. McCoy
77

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fails to follow the gel pad protocol for Leo, or when Mrs. McCoy gives Billy ice in his drinks against Dr. McDonald’s orders. Her advocacy seems to center on supporting Mrs. McCoy’s misguided belief that she is the primary decision-maker with regard to the “care, safety and overall psychological and/or physical well-being of the McCoy men.” As this Court noted above, the State is responsible for the routine treatment and programming concerning the McCoy men, and an advocate for the men must be charged with protecting the rights of the men within this framework, independently of both the McCoy parents and the State, to assure that the McCoy men receive “services including assistance and guidance from staff who are trained to administer services adequately, skillfully, safely and humanely” and that “the plaintiffs [are] treated with dignity and respect at all times.” See Consent Decree ¶ 5, 22. Sr. Barbara is not that advocate. Accordingly, although Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration was granted, see Doc. No. 470, the relief requested is DENIED, and Defendants’ Motion for Authorization to Appoint a New Advocate [Doc. No. 509] is GRANTED. IV. REMEDIES
This Judge’s initial inclination after reviewing the evidence was to declare the Consent Decree unworkable and void. However, Defendants have lived up to their end of the bargain following this Court’s 2002 Ruling, investing a great amount of time, resources
78

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and care in developing the living arrangements for Bill and Leo McCoy and this Court seeks to preserve their current living situation if at all possible. Defendants had previously sought and this Court had previously declined to impose a family-directed model on the McCoys in light of their opposition. Defendants do not now seek to impose such a model, and the Court is loathe to change the current model of service. However, having previously cautioned the McCoys that the consent decree does not allow for them to wield absolute control over the lives of their sons, and finding such caution to have been ineffective, this Court hesitates to only caution Mrs. McCoy again. The Decree as it was written has proven to be unworkable due to the extraordinary level of Mrs. McCoy’s interference and attempts at micro-management. As Eugene Harvey noted, if STS had to devote as much time and effort to managing the concerns of all the parents and guardians of the residents of STS as has been done with the McCoy parents, the institution would be “crippled.” This Court is aware, obviously, that it is only Bill and Leo, Jr. who have a consent decree specifically designed to meet their needs in a safe and appropriate way with dignity and respect, but the Consent Decree does not override the statutory rights and responsibilities shouldered by Defendants in having Bill and Leo placed in their care voluntarily by the McCoy parents. Because the Consent Decree as it stands is unworkable, this Court believes that a few carefully tailored
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modifications to the Decree in conjunction with the orders set forth in this section will resolve the problems caused by Mrs. McCoy’s contumacious behavior. If they do not, this Court may revisit the issue of appropriate sanctions against Mrs. McCoy, or of vacating the Consent Decree.
Paragraph Three of the Consent Decree is hereby modified to delete the following phrase: “including parental approval of staff selected for the core group.” Mrs. McCoy is hereby removed from the staff selection process, as Defendants have spent an inordinate amount of time and resources struggling to meet the core staffing level of 15 and Mrs. McCoy was not diligent in reasonably attempting to comply with this Court’s order that parental approval of staff selection shall not be unreasonably withheld.
Paragraph Nine of the Consent Decree is hereby modified as follows: “The parents shall have the right to remove the advocate if he/she does not adequately discharge his/her duties under this Decree subject to approval by the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Retardation.” This Court was given no reasonable explanation for why Dale Brown was removed as advocate and Sr. Barbara appointed in his place, and there was no discussion between the contracting agency (WeCAHR) and OPA when the change occurred. The Court believes it is very important for the McCoy men to have advocacy services independent of both Defendants and Mrs. McCoy.
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Paragraph Fourteen of the Consent Decree is hereby modified to include the following two sentences after the last sentence in Paragraph Fourteen: Mrs. McCoy must inform the Medical Director at STS at least 48 hours in advance of any medical procedure to be completed outside of Southbury Training School for William and Leo McCoy, Jr., and must give STS administrators at least twenty-four hours notice of her intention to bring her sons to medical appointments. In addition, the administrators of Staff House Two must know the specific location of the medical appointment before staff and the McCoy men leave Southbury Training School.
Paragraph Eighteen of the Consent Decree is modified as follows: The parents shall have the right to visit any residence developed for the plaintiffs under this Consent Decree at any time, unannounced, other than during plaintiffs’ meal-times, i.e. other than 7:30 a.m. - 8:30 a.m., 12:00 p.m. - 1:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m 6:30 p.m. If meal-times are delayed, for whatever reason, or changed due to scheduling needs of the McCoy men, then Mrs. McCoy shall not be present during meal-times, whenever they may occur.
It is not appropriate for Mrs. McCoy to be present when staff are preparing or dispensing medications to her sons, and she is not to be present or to interfere when these processes occur.
Furthermore, Mrs. McCoy is not to be present in the bathroom or bedroom when staff are providing personal hygienic care to William or Leo, Jr.
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Mrs. McCoy, having given over the day-to-day care of her sons to the state, must not interfere with procedures, protocols and routines established for the care of her sons. This includes, but is not limited to, the daily schedules, dietary restrictions, mealtime protocols, the behavioral support plan to decrease the frequency of Billy’s hand-in-mouth behavior, recreational trips, the use of shoes when Leo is ambulating, Leo’s full day program, etc. If she has concerns regarding the quality of care, she must follow proper administrative procedures, and bring her concerns immediately to the staff person in charge of the shift or the Manager on Duty. If she has programmatic concerns, she must discuss her concerns in the Interdisciplinary Team meetings or pursue the Program Administrative Review process.
If Mrs. McCoy plans to take her sons on a recreational trip, she must give STS staff at least 24 hours notice of the location of the trip.
Finally, Defendants are directed to arrange, through the Office of Protection and Advocacy, for the appointment of an advocate for Bill and Leo, Jr. independent of both Defendants and Mrs. McCoy. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for a Finding of Contempt and for Clarification or Modification of the Consent Decree [Doc. No. 433] is GRANTED in PART, Defendants’ Motion for
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the Enforcement of the July 15, 2002 Ruling Pending Appeal and for a Finding of Contempt and for Clarification or Modification of the Consent Decree [Doc. No. 450] is GRANTED IN PART, Defendants’ Motion for Authorization to Appoint a New Advocate [Doc. No. 509] is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt, Enforcement and Other Relief [Doc. No. 445] is DENIED.31
SO ORDERED. _________________________ ELLEN BREE BURNS SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this

day of July, 2007.

31Defendants’ 2002 Motion [Doc. No. 433] also sought permission for the placement of video cameras in Staff House Two. The issue was not briefed in either party’s post-hearing memoranda and did not arise at the hearings, so the Court finds the issue abandoned. Furthermore, Defendants’ 2003 Motion [Doc. No. 450] also sought to enforce this Court’s 2002 Ruling pending the McCoys’ appeal; this Court’s 2002 Ruling was upheld on appeal, so that issue is now moot.
83

 
 •
07-3405-CV McCoy v. Belmont

Case 3:85-cv-00465-EBB Document 522 Filed 09/04/08 Page 1 of 3

____T l) .. ) o-vell 15 t:.::> .... GV - L} to 5

1
2

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUIflS
1 CU:\'l ke,\

3

4

SUMMARY ORDER

5

6

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMARY

7

ORDERS FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT'S LOCAL

8

RULE 32.1 AND FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A BRIEF OR OTHER PAPER IN

9

WHICH A LITIGANT CITES A SUMMARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS,

10

AT LEAST ONE CITATION MUST EITHER BE TO THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE

11

NOTATION: "(SUMMARY ORDER)." A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COpy OF THAT

12

SUMMARY ORDER TOGETHER WITH THE PAPER IN WHICH THE SUMMARY ORDER IS CITED ON ANY

13

PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS THE SUMMARY ORDER IS AVAILABLE IN AN

14

ELECTRONIC DATABASE WHICH IS PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEE (SUCH AS THE

15

DATABASE AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.CA2.USCOURTS.GOVI). IF NO COPY IS SERVED BY REASON OF

16

THE AVAILABILITY OF THE ORDER ON SUCH A DATABASE, THE CITATION MUST INCLUDE REFERENCE

17

TO THAT DATABASE AND THE DOCKET NUMBER OF THE CASE IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS ENTERED.

18

19

At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the

20 Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City ofNew York,

21

on the 30th day of July, two thousand and eight.

22

23

PRESENT:

24

25

HaN. GUII)O CALABRESI,

26

HaN. CHESTER J. STRAUB,

27

HON. B

GTON D. P

R,

28

Circuit Judges.

JUL 30.2008

29

"'

.

'"

,

. "'

"" '

'"

30

31

LEO McCOY, by parent and guardian ESTHER McCOY,

32

WILLIAM McCOY, by parent and guardian ESTHER McCOY,

33

34

P laintifJs-Appellants,

35

36

ESTHER McCOY,

37

38

Plaintiff,

39

-v~-

No.07-3403-cv

40

41

MICHAEL BELMONT, Supt., Southbury Training School, I/O, JEAN GINO, M.D., Med.

42

Director, Southbury Training School, I/O, B

LENSINK, Comm. Ct Dept of Mental

43

Retardation, OFELIA TEE KING, M.D., PHILADELPO GUEV

, M.D., PAUL BRUCH,

44

45

Defendants-Appellees. *

46

47

48 ~\, as

SEP - 4 2008

*We direct the Clerk of the Court to amend the official caption as noted.

-1-

•

•

•

Case 3:85-cv-00465-EBB Document 522 Filed 09/04/08 Page 2 of 3

1 For Plaintiffs-Appellants:

ER L. ZITO, Law Offices of Jennifer L. Zito,

2

Meriden, Conn.

3

4 For Defendants-Appellees:

THOMAS B. YORK, The York Legal Group, LLC,

5

Harrisburg, Pa.

~

,""

,,- --

8

9

AFTER ARGUMENT AND UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of the appeal from the United

10

States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Bums, J.) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

11

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the ruling of the district court is AFFIRMED.

13

" ""

--

"

14

15

Plaintiffs-Appellants, two disabled adults represented by their mother, appeal a ruling of

16

the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Bums, J.) modifying the parties'

•
17 consent decree and authorizing Defendants-Appellees to appoint a new independent advocate for

18

Appellants. On appeal, Appellants assert that that the District Court (1) used the wrong standard

19 to deteImine whether the modifications were proper, (2) erred in finding under the standard it

20 used that the modifications were warranted, and (3) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to

21

authorize the Appellees to remove the advocate. We assume the parties' familiarity with the

22

facts and procedural history of the case.

23

We conclude that the District Court did not err on any of the grounds Appellants raise.

24

The consent decree provides that the District Court "shall retain jurisdiction over this dispute to

25

oversee implementation of this Consent Decree, to enforce its provisions and to enter such other

26

and further orders as the court deems necessary." Given the plain language ofthe consent decree,

27

the District Court was authorized to grant the Appellees' motion to appoint a new advocate. We

28

need not decide which standard is appropriate for modifying consent decrees under the

29 circumstances of this case because the uncontested facts established by the District Court indicate

30 that the modifications would have been appropriate under any ofthe standards suggested by the

31

parties.

•
-2-

•

• •

•

Case 3:85-cv-00465-EBB Document 522 Filed 09/04/08 Page 3 of 3

1

We have considered all of Appellants' claims, and we find them to be without merit.

2 Accordingly, the ruling of the District Comt is AFFIRMED.

3

4

5

FOR THE COURT:

6

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of the Court

7

8

,A"

, "m",;;,"' ">,,.-

, "

,
-3-

 
 Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 1 of 35
CLOSED,REFCNF,WIG
U.S. District Court United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (New Haven)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:85−cv−00465−EBB

McCoy, et al v. Belmont, et al Assigned to: Judge Ellen Bree Burns Referred to: Judge William I. Garfinkel (Settlement) Demand: $0 Case in other court: 00−07435
00−07435 00−07435 02−09170 02−09170 Cause: No cause code entered Special Master
Edward Skarnulis

Date Filed: 09/30/1985 Date Terminated: 03/10/1992 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
Leo McCoy by parents &guardians Leo &Ester

represented by Jennifer Lynn Zito Law Offices of Jennifer L. Zito 204 E. Main St., PO Box 2455 Meriden, CT 06450−1529 203−238−0808 Fax: 203−630−1133 Email: jenzito@yahoo.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katrena K. Engstrom John R. Williams and Associates, LLP 51 Elm St. Ste. 409 New Haven, CT 06510 203−562−9931 Fax: 203−776−9494 Email: kengstrom@johnrwilliams.com TERMINATED: 05/18/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marc L. Glenn Law Offices of W. Martyn Philpot, Jr., LLC 409 Orange St. New Haven, CT 06511−6406 203−624−4666 Fax: 203−624−5050 Email: lawoffice@philpotlaw.net TERMINATED: 09/05/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael S. Lottman 1003 Richardson Dr. Raleigh, Nc 27603 TERMINATED: 12/20/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 2 of 35

Norman A. Pattis The Pattis Law Firm, LLC 649 Amity Rd. Bethany, CT 06524 203−393−3017 Fax: 203−393−9745 Email: normpattis@gmail.com TERMINATED: 06/09/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

W. Martyn Philpot , Jr. Law Offices of W. Martyn Philpot, Jr., LLC 409 Orange St. New Haven, CT 06511−6406 203−624−4666 Fax: 203−624−5050 Email: lawoffice@philpotlaw.net TERMINATED: 09/05/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Sylvester Palmieri Law Offices of William S. Palmieri, LLC 129 Church Street Suite 405 New Haven, CT 06510 203−562−3100 Fax: 203−909−6006 Email: wpalmieri@hotmail.com TERMINATED: 06/29/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
William McCoy by parents &guardians Leo &Ester

represented by Jennifer Lynn Zito (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katrena K. Engstrom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/18/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marc L. Glenn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael S. Lottman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Norman A. Pattis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/09/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 3 of 35

William Sylvester Palmieri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/29/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Esther McCoy

represented by Katrena K. Engstrom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/18/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marc L. Glenn (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/05/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael S. Lottman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/20/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Norman A. Pattis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

W. Martyn Philpot , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/05/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Sylvester Palmieri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/29/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Michael Belmont Supt., Southbury Training School, I/O

represented by James P. Welsh Director−Legal &Govt Affairs Dept. of Mental Retardation 460 Capitol Ave. Hartford, CT 06106 860−418−6085 Fax: 860−418−6009 Email: james.welsh@po.state.ct.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurie A. Deane Attorney General's Office 55 Elm St. Hartford, CT 06106 860−808−5330 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 4 of 35

Defendant Jean Gino M.D., Med. Director, Southbury Training School, I/O
Defendant Brian Lensink Comm. Ct Dept of Mental Retardation
Defendant Ofelia Tee King MD
Defendant Philadelpo Guevarra MD

Thomas B. York York Legal Group LLC 6 Sentry Point Road Lemoyne, PA 17043 717−236−9675 Fax: 717−707−0104 Email: tyork@yorklegalgroup.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James P. Welsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurie A. Deane (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas B. York (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James P. Welsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurie A. Deane (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas B. York (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James P. Welsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurie A. Deane (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas B. York (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James P. Welsh (See above for address)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 5 of 35

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laurie A. Deane (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas B. York (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Paul Bruch

represented by James P. Welsh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laurie A. Deane (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas B. York (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Notice US Court of Appeals

represented by US Court of Appeals Office of the Clerk US Courthouse Foley Square New York, NY 10007 212−857−8500 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 05/27/1988
11/08/1991 11/15/1991 11/18/1991
01/22/1992 01/22/1992
01/23/1992

# Docket Text
263 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Extend Time until 7/8/99 to file objection to 5/17/99 Recommendation of Special Master (Former Employee) (Entered: 05/28/1999)
96 Statement Regarding Proposed Dismissal Pursuant to Local Rule l6. (Former Employee) (Entered: 11/08/1991)
97 FINAL PRETRIAL ORDER filed, ( signed by Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
ENDORSEMENT granting [96−1] remark. The Clerk shall continue this case on the docket. It is so ordered. ( signed by Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 11/18/1991)
Docket call held ( JAC) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/11/1992)
MINUTE Entry: Jury Selection on 2/25/92 at 10:00 a.m. Trial to begin immediately after N−87−138 Acampora or on 48 hour's notice. By 2/21/92 counsel shall submit Prposed Voir Dire and Jury Instructions and Exhibits shall be pre−marked with the Clerk.( JAC) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/11/1992)
98 ORDER referring case to Magistrate Judge Joan G. Margolis for the purpose of settlement discussions (signed by Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Former Employee)

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01/28/1992
01/29/1992
02/18/1992 02/20/1992 02/20/1992 02/20/1992 02/20/1992
02/21/1992 02/24/1992 02/24/1992 02/24/1992
02/25/1992 02/25/1992
02/25/1992 02/25/1992
02/25/1992 02/25/1992

(Entered: 01/28/1992)
Telephone Status Conference held. Plaintiff's counsel requests the jury selection date of 2/25/92 be postponed − Decision Reserved. Plaintiff's counsel shall file a status report re: settlement on 2/4/92 and 2/11/92. (JAC) (Former Employee) (Entered: 01/30/1992)
99 ORDER: For the duration of this Magistrate Judge's involvement with this file, and in accordance with LR 9(a)2, courtesy copies of all filings should be forwarded to her Chambers. ( signed by Magistrate Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 01/31/1992)
100 PROPOSED Voir Dire Questions by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/19/1992)
101 MOTION by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont in Limine (Brief Due 3/12/92 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/20/1992)
102 MEMORANDUM by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont in support of [101−1] motion in Limine by defendant (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/20/1992)
103 MOTION by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy to Video Tape Deposition of Michael B. Millis, M. D. and to Admit Video Deposition into Evidence. (Brief Due 3/12/92 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/20/1992)
104 MEMORANDUM by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy in support of [103−1] motion to Video Tape Deposition of Michael B. Millis, M. D. and to Admit Video Deposition into Evidence. by Esther McCoy, McCoy, McCoy (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/20/1992)
106 MOTION by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont to Modify Final Pretrial Order. (Brief Due 3/13/92 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/26/1992)
105 SECOND SET OF OBJECTIONS by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont re: Plaintiff's Proposed Exhibits. (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/26/1992)
107 MOTION by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont for Protective Order (Brief Due 3/16/92 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/26/1992)
107 MEMORANDUM by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont in opposition to [103−1] motion to Video Tape Deposition of Michael B. Millis, M. D. and to Admit Video Deposition into Evidence. by Esther McCoy, McCoy, McCoy (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/26/1992)
ENDORSEMENT denying [101−1] motion in Limine without prejudice to renewal at trial pursuant to the ruling on the record today. ( signed by Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/26/1992)
ENDORSEMENT granting in part [103−1] motion to Video Tape Deposition of Michael B. Millis, M. D. and to Admit Video Deposition into Evidence in accordance with the colloquy on the record today.. ( signed by Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/26/1992)
Pre−Trial Conference held ( JAC) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/28/1992)
MINUTE Entry: denying [107−1] motion for Protective Order, [105−1] objection under advisement, granting [103−1] motion to Video Tape Deposition of Michael B. Millis, M. D. and to Admit Video Deposition into Evidence., denying [101−1] motion in Limine without prejudice, granting platf's motion to substitute defense witnesses( JAC) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/28/1992)
JURY Selection held ( JAC) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/28/1992)
MINUTE Entry: 10 jurors excused for cause. Clerk draws panel of 18. Counsel sxercises challenges. Trial shall commence on 3/10/92 at 10:00 a.m. The Jury panel will be sworn prior to commencement of evidence on 3/10/92. (JAC) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/28/1992)

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02/26/1992
02/26/1992
03/02/1992 03/02/1992 03/06/1992 03/10/1992 03/10/1992
03/10/1992
03/10/1992
03/10/1992
03/10/1992 03/10/1992 11/02/1992 11/02/1992 11/02/1992
11/06/1992
11/06/1992
11/20/1992 12/07/1992 12/07/1992

ENDORSEMENT granting [103−1] motion to Video Tape Deposition of Michael B. Millis, M. D. and to Admit Video Deposition into Evidence absent objectiob pursuant to oral ruling on the record today. ( signed by Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/26/1992)
ENDORSEMENT denying [107−1] motion for Protective Order pursuant to the oral ruling on the record on 2/25/92. ( signed by Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/26/1992)
108 APPEARANCE of Attorney for Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont −− Laurie A. Deane (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/03/1992)
Settlement Conference held ( jgm) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/05/1992)
109 PROPOSED JURY Instructions (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/10/1992)
Pre−Trial Conference held ( JAC) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/11/1992)
MINUTE Entry: Pltfs. present. Counsel report to the Court that this case is settled. Pltf. witness, Esther McCoy, sworn and testified. Pltf. witness Leo McCoy, sworn and testified. Consent Decreee filed and Approved by the Court. Stipulation re: Atty's fees. The Clerk shall close this case forthwith. The Court orders counsel to retrieve their exhibits from the Clerk.( (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/11/1992)
110 CONSENT JUDGMENT/DECREE by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy, Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont ( signed by Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/13/1992)
ENDORSEMENT granting [110−1] judgment order. So ordered pursuant to a colloquy with counsel and plaintiffs' representatives today on the record. ( signed by Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/13/1992)
111 STIPULATION by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy, Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont re: Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/13/1992)
ENDORSEMENT granting [111−1] stipulation ( signed by Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/13/1992)
Case closed (Graham, T.) (Entered: 03/19/1992)
112 MOTION by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont for Approval of Residence Design (Jefferson, V.) (Entered: 11/04/1992)
113 MEMORANDUM in support of [112−1] motion for Approval of Residence Design by defendant (Jefferson, V.) (Entered: 11/04/1992)
114 MOTION by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont REFERRING case for the purpose of for Approval of Resid. Design (Jefferson, V.) (Entered: 11/04/1992)
ENDORSEMENT granting [114−1] motion REFERRING case for the purpose of for Approval of Resid. Design (docu #112) ( signed by Chief Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Moore, P.) (Entered: 11/06/1992)
Deadline updated; REFERRING MOTION [112−1] motion for Approval of Residence Design referred to Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis (see endorsement of document #114 entered this date (Graham, T.) (Entered: 11/09/1992)
Motion hearing re: [112−1] motion for Approval of Residence Design by defendant set at 2:00 12/9/92 ( JGM) (Former Employee) (Entered: 11/20/1992)
115 APPEARANCE of Attorney for McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy −− Michael S. Lottman (Jefferson, V.) (Entered: 12/08/1992)
116 RESPONSE by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy to [114−1] motion REFERRING case for the purpose of for Approval of Resid. Design by defendant, [112−1] motion for Approval of Residence Design by defendant (Jefferson, V.) (Entered: 12/08/1992)

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12/07/1992 12/07/1992 12/11/1992 01/25/1993 01/25/1993 02/04/1993 06/14/1993 06/14/1993 06/14/1993 06/14/1993 06/14/1993 06/18/1993 06/23/1993 06/23/1993 07/14/1993
08/24/1993 08/27/1993
09/13/1993 10/06/1993

117 MEMORANDUM by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy in opposition to [112−1] motion for Approval of Residence Design by defendant (Jefferson, V.) (Entered: 12/08/1992)
118 MOTION by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy for David Shaw to Withdraw as Attorney (Jefferson, V.) (Entered: 12/08/1992)
ENDORSEMENT granting [118−1] motion for David Shaw to Withdraw as Attorney for pltfs William and Leo McCoy. (Terminated David Shaw) (Signed Chief Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 12/11/1992)
119 MOTION by Belmont to Withdraw [112−1] motion for Approval of Residence Design by defendant (Jefferson, V.) (Entered: 02/03/1993)
120 MOTION by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont to Withdraw [112−1] motion for Approval of Residence Design by defendant (Brief Due 2/15/93 ) (Kunofsky, L.) (Entered: 02/03/1993)
ENDORSEMENT granting [119−1] motion to Withdraw [112−1] motion for Approval of Residence Design by defendant ( signed by Chief Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (admin) (Entered: 02/06/1993)
121 MOTION by Leo McCoy, William McCoy for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree (Brief Due 7/5/93 ) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 06/15/1993)
122 MEMORANDUM in support of [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by Leo McCoy, William McCoy (Smith, S.) (Entered: 06/15/1993)
123 AFFIDAVIT of Sister Barbara Eirich Re [121−1] motion for Contempt/enforcement of consent decree by Leo McCoy, William McCoy (Smith, S.) (Entered: 06/15/1993)
124 AFFIDAVIT of Esther McCoy Re [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by Leo McCoy, William McCoy (Smith, S.) (Entered: 06/15/1993)
125 MOTION by Leo McCoy, William McCoy for referral to Magistrate Margolis (Smith, S.) (Entered: 06/15/1993)
ENDORSEMENT granting [125−1] motion for referral to Magistrate Margolis, abs obj ( signed by Chief Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 06/18/1993)
CASE reassigned to Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis (admin) (Entered: 02/17/2000)
126 ORDER referring: [121−1] motion for Contempt/enforcement of consent decree referred to Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis (signed by Chief Judge Jose A. Cabranes) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 06/23/1993)
127 MEMORANDUM of status Conference held on 7/13/93, Brief Deadline set for 8/23/93 [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree . Parties shall submit a stipulation of facts by 10/4/93. Evidentiary hearing set for 10/12/93 at 10:00am before JGM/Bpt. ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 07/15/1993)
128 MOTION by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to Extend Time to respond to motion for contempt, to 9/11/93 (Smith, S.) (Entered: 08/26/1993)
ENDORSEMENT granting [128−1] motion to Extend Time to respond to motion for contempt, to 9/11/93, Brief Deadline set for 9/13/93 [121−1] motion for Contempt/enforcement of consent decree ( signed by Chief Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 08/27/1993)
129 MEMORANDUM by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont in opposition to [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by Leo McCoy, William McCoy (Smith, S.) (Entered: 09/15/1993)
130 STIPULATION re pending motion for contempt, enforcement, &further relief, by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy, Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont (Smith, S.) (Entered: 10/07/1993)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 9 of 35

10/13/1993 10/13/1993 10/14/1993 10/14/1993
10/28/1993 10/28/1993 11/01/1993 11/10/1993 11/22/1993 11/29/1993 12/03/1993 12/08/1993 12/13/1993 02/28/1994 05/06/1994 05/18/1994
05/18/1994

Motion hearing held re: [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by McCoy, McCoy ( JGM) (Depino, F.) (Entered: 10/15/1993)
MINUTE Entry:3 Pltf Wtn's sExhb. 1−16 marked as full exhibits. Court 10:05a.m.−4:30p.m.. ( JGM) (Depino, F.) (Entered: 10/15/1993)
Motion hearing held re: [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by McCoy, McCoy ( JGM) (Depino, F.) (Entered: 10/15/1993)
MINUTE Entry: [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree under advisement, One pltf. wtn. resumes stand for cont'd testimony. Defts' Exhbs A−P,Q. One pltf. wtn. sPltf exhb's 18−21 marked as full. Pltf rests at 2:57p.m.. 2 Deft. Wtn. SDeft. Exhb R,S,T,U,V1−21,W all marked as full. Deft. Rests at 4:25p.m.. One rebuttal wtn. SPltf &deft rest once again at 4:30pm. Simultaneous briefs due by 11/8/93. ( JGM) (Depino, F.) (Entered: 10/15/1993)
131 TRANSCRIPT for dates of Oct. 12, 1993 (Evidentiary hearing) (Court reporter: Cunningham) (Former Employee) (Entered: 10/28/1993)
132 TRANSCRIPT for dates of Oct. 13, 1993 (Evidentiary hearing) (Court reporter: Cunningham) (Former Employee) (Entered: 10/28/1993)
133 MOTION by Leo McCoy, William McCoy, Esther McCoy to Extend Time to submit post−trial briefs, to 11/22/93 (Smith, S.) (Entered: 11/03/1993)
ENDORSEMENT granting abs obj [133−1] motion to Extend Time to submit post−trial briefs, to 11/22/93 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 11/15/1993)
134 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont in opposition to [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by Leo McCoy, William McCoy (Smith, S.) (Entered: 11/30/1993)
135 MEMORANDUM in support of [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by Leo McCoy, William McCoy, Esther McCoy (Smith, S.) (Entered: 12/02/1993)
136 MOTION by Leo McCoy, William McCoy, Esther McCoy for Leave to file reply brief in response to defts' trial memo (Smith, S.) (Entered: 12/07/1993)
ENDORSEMENT granting [136−1] motion for Leave to file reply brief in response to defts' trial memo−−by 12/14/93. (signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis) (Smith, S.) (Entered: 12/10/1993)
137 REPLY MEMORANDUM to response to [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by Leo McCoy, William McCoy, Esther McCoy (Smith, S.) (Entered: 12/15/1993)
138 MOTION by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy for Interim Order re; practical nurse Joanne Parkhurst of Southbury Training School and her being prohibited contact with plaintiffs (Brief Due 3/21/94 ) (Depino, F.) (Entered: 03/02/1994)
139 MOTION by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy for Expedited Relief (Grady, B.) (Entered: 05/09/1994)
ENDORSEMENT by agreement of counsel during the telephonic status conference held today, the pending motion may be denied without prejudice as moot, L.P.N. Parkhurst having been transferred from the STS health care unit, and defense counsel agreeing that pltfs' counsel shall have prior notice before Parkhurst is reassigned to pltfs' unit [138−1] motion for Interim Order re; practical nurse Joanne Parkhurst of Southbury Training School and her being prohibited contact with plaintiffs ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Grady, B.) (Entered: 05/20/1994)
140 MEMORANDUM of Status Conference held on 5/18/94. Defts shall file their brief in opposition on or before 6/10/94. Evidentiary hearing will be held on 6/28/94 at 10:00 a.m. ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Grady, B.) (Entered: 05/23/1994)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 10 of 35

06/13/1994 06/17/1994 06/20/1994 06/23/1994 08/12/1994 08/12/1994 08/18/1994 08/26/1994 09/19/1994 09/29/1994 10/14/1994 12/20/1994 01/18/1995 02/10/1995
02/10/1995
04/25/1995 05/10/1995 05/10/1995 05/25/1995

141 MOTION by Michael Belmont, et al to Extend Time until 6/17/94 to file a pleading (Grady, B.) (Entered: 06/14/1994)
142 RESPONSE by Belmont, et al to [139−1] motion for Expedited Relief by Esther McCoy, McCoy, McCoy (Grady, B.) (Entered: 06/20/1994)
ENDORSEMENT granted absent objection, nunc pro tunc [141−1] motion to Extend Time until 6/17/94 to file a pleading ( signed by Chief Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Grady, B.) (Entered: 06/21/1994)
Motion hearing re: [139−1] motion for Expedited Relief by Esther McCoy, McCoy, McCoy set at 10:00 7/6/94 ( JGM) (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/23/1994)
143 APPEARANCE of Attorney for McCoy, McCoy −− Jennifer Lynn Zito (Grady, B.) (Entered: 08/15/1994)
144 MOTION by McCoy, McCoy to Withdraw [139−1] motion for Expedited Relief by Esther McCoy, McCoy, McCoy (Grady, B.) (Entered: 08/16/1994)
ENDORSEMENT granted [144−1] motion to Withdraw [139−1] motion for Expedited Relief by Esther McCoy, McCoy, McCoy ( signed by Judge Jose A. Cabranes ) (Grady, B.) (Entered: 08/18/1994)
145 MOTION by McCoy, McCoy to Compel Withdrawal of Counsel (Grady, B.) (Entered: 08/31/1994)
146 MEMORANDUM/DECLARATION IN RESPONSE by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy to [145−1] motion to Compel Withdrawal of Counsel by McCoy, McCoy (Grady, B.) (Entered: 09/26/1994)
147 REPLY by McCoy Leo, McCoy William to Attorney Lottman's 9/15/94 response to [145−1] motion to Compel Withdrawal of Counsel by McCoy, McCoy (Grady, B.) (Entered: 09/30/1994)
148 REPLY by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy to response to [145−1] motion to Compel Withdrawal of Counsel by McCoy, McCoy (Former Employee) (Entered: 10/21/1994)
Motion hearing held re: granting [145−1] motion to Compel Withdrawal of Counsel by McCoy, McCoy ( TPS) (Former Employee) (Entered: 12/27/1994)
149 Request by William McCoy, Leo McCoy for Oral Argument re: motion for Contempt (doc. # 121) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 01/18/1995)
ENDORSEMENT − Moot. Argumrnt has been held before Judge Margolis, who will act on the pending matters when she is able to, See memorandum and order of this date. [149−1] motion for Oral Argument re: motion for Contempt (doc. # 121) ( signed by Mag. Judge Thomas P. Smith ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/14/1995)
150 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER − that the parties shall submit to the undersigned before 2/17/95 a proposed order setting for those dates ... see for complete details ( signed by Mag. Judge Thomas P. Smith ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/14/1995)
151 TRANSCRIPT for dates of 3/10/92 (Court reporter: Paul Collard) (Montgomery, C.) (Entered: 04/28/1995)
Motion hearing re: [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by McCoy, McCoy set at 10:00 6/2/95 ( TPS) (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 05/11/1995)
152 Settlement Conference held ( TPS) (D'Onofrio, B.) (Entered: 05/15/1995)
153 JOINT STATEMENT of DISPUTED PROVISIONS by McCoy, McCoy, Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont regarding [121−1] for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by McCoy, McCoy (Gothers, M.) (Entered: 05/25/1995)

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06/27/1995 06/29/1995 06/30/1995 06/30/1995
07/11/1995
07/12/1995 07/13/1995 07/13/1995 07/18/1995 08/07/1995 08/09/1995
11/01/1995 11/01/1995 11/01/1995 11/02/1995 11/03/1995 11/03/1995 11/06/1995 11/07/1995 11/08/1995

154 Motion hearing off re: [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by McCoy, McCoy ( TPS) (Johnson, D.) (Entered: 06/27/1995)
156 STATUS REPORT by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy (Jefferson, V.) (Entered: 07/05/1995)
155 Status Conference held (JGM) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 06/30/1995)
157 MEMORANDUM of Status Conference held on 06/30/95. Hearing set for 3:00 pm on 7/13/95 for [153−1] facts statement; Hearing set for 9:30 am on 8/31/95 for [121−1] motion for Contempt/enforcement of consent decree ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 07/10/1995)
158 MEMORANDUM by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont Concerning their [153−1] facts statement to [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by McCoy, McCoy (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 07/12/1995)
159 MEMORANDUM by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy in support of their Interpretation re: [153−1] facts statement of defendants &plaintiff re: their [110−1] approved judgment order (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 07/14/1995)
160 Motion hearing held re: [153−1] Joint Statement of Disputed Provisions re: [121−1] motion for Contempt/enforcement of consent decree by McCoy, McCoy (JGM) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 07/14/1995)
161 APPEARANCE of Attorney for Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont −− James P. Welsh (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 07/14/1995)
162 RULING granting in part, denying in part [153−1] facts statement. SEE RULING FOR DETAILS ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 07/18/1995)
163 MOTION by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy to Extend Time from 8/31/95 until Oct. 16, 1995 to continue hearing on plaintiffs' motion for contempt (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 08/07/1995)
ENDORSEMENT granting [163−1] motion to Extend Time from 8/31/95 until Oct. 16, 1995 to continue hearing on plaintiffs' motion for contempt, Motion Hearing set for 10/16/95 for [121−1] motion for Contempt/enforcement of consent decree ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 08/10/1995)
164 Motion hearing held re: [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by McCoy, McCoy ( JGM) (Jefferson, V.) (Entered: 11/02/1995)
166 SUPPLEMENT by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy for Contempt (Brief Due 11/22/95) to [121−1] motion for Contempt/enforcement of consent decree (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/03/1995)
186 MOTION by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy for Attorney Fees &Costs (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 03/06/1996)
165 Motion hearing continued [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by McCoy, McCoy (JGM) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/03/1995)
167 Motion hearing continued [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by McCoy, McCoy (JGM) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/03/1995)
Motion hearing re: [121−1] motion for Contempt/enforcement of consent decree by McCoy, McCoy set at 9:30 11/6/95 (JGM) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/03/1995)
168 COURT Trial held. Trial continued until 11/7/95 @ 9:30am (JGM) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/07/1995)
169 COURT Trial held. Trial continued until 11/8/95 @ 9:30am (JGM) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/07/1995)
170 Motion hearing continued re: [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by McCoy, McCoy (JGM) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/08/1995)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 12 of 35

11/08/1995 11/08/1995 11/08/1995 11/08/1995 11/08/1995 12/06/1995 12/07/1995 12/07/1995 12/08/1995 12/08/1995 12/08/1995 12/08/1995 12/08/1995 12/11/1995 12/13/1995 12/13/1995 12/13/1995 03/28/1996
04/26/1996

MINUTE Entry: [121−1] motion for Contempt/enforcement of consent decree UNDER ADVISEMENT, Brief Deadline set for 12/6/95 [121−1] motion for Contempt/enforcement of consent decree (JGM) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
171 Marked Exhibit List as to McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
172 Marked Witness List as to McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
173 Marked Exhibit List as to Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
174 Marked Witness List as to Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
176 Post−Trial Brief by McCoy, Esther McCoy in support of their [166−1] supplemental amended motion for Contempt (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/08/1995)
175 Trial Memorandum of Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont to [121−1] motion for Contempt/ enforcement of consent decree by McCoy (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/08/1995)
182 MOTION by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont to Extend Time 1 day to file their post−trial brief (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/08/1995)
177 TRANSCRIPT for date of 11/01/95 (Court reporter: Post Reporting Service, Inc) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/08/1995)
178 TRANSCRIPT for date of 11/02/95 (Court reporter: Post Reporting Service, Inc) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/08/1995)
179 TRANSCRIPT for date of 11/03/95 (Court reporter: Post Reporting Service, Inc) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/08/1995)
180 TRANSCRIPT for date of 11/06/95 (Court reporter: Post Reporting Service, Inc) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/08/1995)
181 TRANSCRIPT for date of 11/07/95 (Court reporter: Post Reporting Service, Inc) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/08/1995)
ENDORSEMENT granting nunc pro tunc [182−1] motion to Extend Time 1 day to file their post−trial brief ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/12/1995)
183 TRANSCRIPT for date of 11/08/95 (Court reporter: Post Reporting Svc, Inc) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
184 Amended MOTION by Leo McCoy, William McCoy, Esther McCoy for Award of Attorney's Fees , and Costs (Brief Due 1/3/96) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/14/1995)
185 REPLY Brief by Leo McCoy, William McCoy, Esther McCoy to defendants' trial memorandum re their [121−1] motion for Contempt/enforcement of consent decree (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/14/1995)
187 CERTIFICATION OF CONTEMPT granting [121−1] motion for Contempt/enforcement of consent decree, with respect to plaintiffs' claims re: lack of adequate programming, lack of adequate medical care &abuse/neglect &failure to report same...Pursuant to 28:636(e), the Magistrate Judge hereby certifies defendants to be in contempt of court to such extent...motion is denied with respect to plaintiff's claims regarding Staff House 2, the hiring of the "core group" &other staffing issues, the men's lack of attendance at the afternoon sessions of the day programs, the case manager's performance, recreational activities, the IDT process, advocacy services &the other claimed instances of abuse or neglect; granting in the amount of $56,046.97 [184−1] motion for Award of Attorney's Fees, granting [184−2] motion Costs SEE RULING FOR DETAILS (113 pgs.) ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 03/28/1996)
188 Supplemental Memorandum by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy to [187−1] ruling re: Remedies (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 04/26/1996)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 13 of 35

04/26/1996 05/01/1996
05/03/1996 05/10/1996 06/05/1996 06/05/1996 06/05/1996 06/20/1996
07/19/1996 07/26/1996 08/06/1996 08/15/1996 08/20/1996 08/27/1996 11/04/1996 11/04/1996 11/04/1996 11/25/1996 11/25/1996

189 MOTION by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont to Extend Time until May 3, 1996 to file Supplemental Brief &Status Report required by the Court's Ruling of 03/28/96 (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 04/29/1996)
ENDORSEMENT granting [189−1] motion to Extend Time until May 3, 1996 to file Supplemental Brief &Status Report required by the Court's Ruling of 03/28/96, setting Status Report deadline to 5/3/96 also setting response to ruling of 03/28/96, doc. 187 due by May 3, 1996 (signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 05/01/1996)
190 Summary of Post−Trial Events &Supplemental Memorandum of Law by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont re: [187−1] ruling (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 05/06/1996)
191 Reply by McCoy, McCoy, Esther McCoy to [190−1] defendants response re: [187−1] order (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 05/10/1996)
192 Submission of Affidavits &Staffing Update by Lensink, King, Guevarra, Gino, Paul Bruch, Belmont (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 06/05/1996)
193 AFFIDAVIT of Staffing Update by Jessica Gracy (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 06/05/1996)
194 AFFIDAVIT of Staffing Update by Karen Lewis (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 06/05/1996)
195 REMEDIES FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION OF CONTEMPT re: [121−1] motion for Contempt/Enforcement of consent decree...The following remedies are imposed..a compensatory fine of $50,000, in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section II.A. supra &the submission of monthly compliance reports, in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section II.B. supra. See Order for Details ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 06/20/1996)
196 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to Extend Time until 07/26/96 to file their schedule of compliance (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 07/22/1996)
197 Defendants' Proposed Schedule of Compliance (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 07/29/1996)
ENDORSEMENT granting nunc pro tunc [196−1] motion to Extend Time until 07/26/96 to file their schedule of compliance ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 08/06/1996)
198 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Extend Time until 08/28/96 to submit a schedule of compliance (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 08/16/1996)
ENDORSEMENT granting [198−1] motion to Extend Time until 08/28/96 to submit a schedule of compliance ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 08/21/1996)
199 Plaintiffs' Proposed Schedule of Compliance (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 08/28/1996)
200 Defendants' 2nd Proposed Schedule of Compliance (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/04/1996)
201 MEMORANDUM by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont in support of [200−1] 2nd proposed schedule of compliance (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/04/1996)
202 Compliance STATUS REPORT by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/04/1996)
203 Plaintiffs' 2nd Proposed Schedule of Compliance; Reply to defendants' compliance report (Part 1 of 2) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
203 Plaintiffs' 2nd Propsed Schedule of Compliance; Reply by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to [202−1] compliance status report of defendants (Part 2 of 2) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/03/1996)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 14 of 35

12/11/1996 12/12/1996
03/10/1997 01/09/1998 01/09/1998 02/06/1998 02/10/1998
02/17/1998 02/17/1998 03/09/1998 03/17/1998
03/17/1998 03/18/1998 03/18/1998 05/08/1998 06/22/1998
07/16/1998 07/24/1998

204 Status Conference held ( JGM) (Former Employee) (Entered: 12/12/1996)
205 ORDER re Compliance: by 2/28/97, a joint schedule of compliance w/respect to those matters about which they agree. To the extent that there are issues which remain unresolved, they will file spearate proposed schedules of compliances re such issues by 2/28/97. Defendants will make a decision re an advocate by 2/28/97. SEE for further details( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Jefferson, V.) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
206 Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Joint Schedule of Compliance (Inferrera, L.) (Entered: 03/12/1997)
207 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont for Relief from Judgment (Brief Due 1/30/98) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 01/13/1998)
208 STATUS REPORT by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 01/13/1998)
209 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Extend Time to file responsive pleadings to defendants'status report and Relief from Judgment and Proposed order (Depino, F.) (Entered: 02/06/1998)
ENDORSEMENT granting [209−1] motion to Extend Time to file responsive pleadings to defendants'status report and Relief from Judgment and Proposed order, Brief Deadline set for 2/17/98 [207−1] motion for Relief from Judgment (signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 02/12/1998)
210 OBJECTIONS by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to [207−1] motion for Relief from Judgment by defendant; Reply to Status Report (Part 1 of 2) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 02/18/1998)
210 Objection to Motion for Relief from Judgment; Reply by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to [208−1] status report of defendant (Part 2 of 2) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 02/18/1998)
211 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Contempt, Enforcement &Further Relief re: Order of 6/20/96 (Brief Due 3/30/98) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 03/10/1998)
212 AMENDED 2nd MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Contempt, Enforcement &further relief (Brief Due 4/7/98) referring to: [211−1] motion for Contempt, Enforcement &Further Relief re: Order of 6/20/96 by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy, William McCoy (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 03/19/1998)
213 Supplemental Reply by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to [208−1] status report of defendant (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 03/19/1998)
214 Status Conference held (JGM) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 03/19/1998)
215 MEMORANDUM of Status Conference held on 03/18/98 (signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 03/19/1998)
216 Status Conference held (JGM) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 05/11/1998)
217 ORDER of Reference..Professor Edward Skarnulis is appointed Special Master to a term of 12 months beginning on the date of this Order and to report periodically..to this court re: the status of implementation of the 3/10/92 consent decree..defendants shall pay the special master a reasonable fee plus expenses..not to exceed $155,390 for the initial term of appointment...within 10 days of this order defendants shall deposit with the Clerk of the Court a sum of $12,950...(signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 06/30/1998)
218 Special Master surety BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 filed by James P. Welsj, AAG. State of Ct. NH# 161198. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 07/20/1998)
ENDORSEMENT denying without prejudice to renewal [207−1] motion for Relief from Judgment (signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 07/27/1998)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 15 of 35

07/24/1998
07/24/1998
07/24/1998 07/24/1998
07/27/1998 07/31/1998 07/31/1998 08/03/1998
08/05/1998 09/08/1998 09/08/1998 09/11/1998 09/11/1998 10/08/1998 10/08/1998 10/15/1998 10/15/1998
10/16/1998 11/06/1998 11/09/1998 11/09/1998
11/10/1998

ENDORSEMENT denying without prejudice to renewal [211−1] motion for Contempt, Enforcement &Further Relief re: Order of 6/20/96 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 07/27/1998)
ENDORSEMENT denying without prejudice to renewal [212−1] amended 2nd motion for Contempt, Enforcement &further relief ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 07/27/1998)
220 Special Master Edward Skarnulis Statement for Fees &Services from 6/28 − 7/1/98 in the amount of $8,256.13 (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 07/27/1998)
ENDORSEMENT granting [220−1] Statement for Fees &Services from 6/28 − 7/1/98 in the amount of $8,256.13 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 07/27/1998)
219 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 8,256.13 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to dated 06/24/98 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 07/27/1998)
223 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 08/05/1998)
ENDORSEMENT approving [223−1] motion for Costs and Fees (signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 08/05/1998)
221 BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 by State of CT. receipt #161335 NH. for Special Master Edward Skarnulis, PhD. Skarnulis (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 08/04/1998)
222 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 9,242.81 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to dated 07/27/98 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 08/05/1998)
224 Statement by Edward Skarnulis for Fees &Services from 8/1 − 8/31/98 (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 09/09/1998)
ENDORSEMENT granting [224−1] motion for Fees &Services from 8/1−8/31/98 (signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 09/09/1998)
225 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 Filed by James P. Welsh, Sate of Ct., REC# 161697. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 09/11/1998)
226 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 10,832.13 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 09/08/98 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 09/11/1998)
227 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 filed by the State of Connecticut. Rec. # 161933. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 10/09/1998)
228 First Quarterly REPORT by Edward Skarnulis (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 10/09/1998)
229 Motion by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees in the amount of $2,215.05 (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 10/15/1998)
ENDORSEMENT granting [229−1] motion for Costs and Fees in the amount of $2,215.05 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 10/15/1998)
230 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 2,215.05 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 10/15/98 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 10/16/1998)
231 BOND ( Special Master Bond) in the amount of $ 12,950.00 from State of Ct. Receipt # 000027 NH. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 11/06/1998)
232 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees from 10/1−10/31/98 (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
ENDORSEMENT granting [232−1] motion for Costs and Fees from 10/1−10/31/98 (signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
233 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 9,718.55 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 11/06/98 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 11/10/1998)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 16 of 35

12/03/1998
12/03/1998
12/09/1998 12/15/1998 12/16/1998
12/16/1998 12/22/1998 01/19/1999 01/25/1999 01/25/1999
01/26/1999 01/29/1999 02/03/1999
02/04/1999
02/05/1999 02/26/1999
02/26/1999
03/01/1999 03/01/1999
03/02/1999 03/02/1999

234 STIPULATION re: attorneys' fees to the plaintiff in the amount of $22,497.50 by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/03/1998)
ENDORSEMENT approving [234−1] stipulation of attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs in the amount of $22,497.50 (signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis) (Lopez, B.) (Entered: 12/03/1998)
235 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 filed by James P. Welsh, State of Connecticut. Rec. # 000316 NH. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 12/09/1998)
236 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees from 11/23/98 to 11/25/98 in the amount of $8,888.94 (Former Employee) (Entered: 12/16/1998)
ENDORSEMENT granting [236−1] motion for Costs and Fees from 11/23/98 to 11/25/98 in the amount of $8,888.94 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 12/16/1998)
237 Status Conference held ( JGM) (Former Employee) (Entered: 12/17/1998)
238 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 8,888.94 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 12/16/98 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 12/22/1998)
239 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 Filed by State of CT. Rec. # 000629 NH. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 01/19/1999)
240 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees from 1/1/99 to 1/15/99 for $9,254.54 (Former Employee) (Entered: 01/26/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [240−1] motion for Costs and Fees from 1/1/99 to 1/15/99 for $9,254.54 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 01/26/1999)
241 Status Conference held ( JGM) (Former Employee) (Entered: 01/27/1999)
242 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 9,254.54 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 01/25/99 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 01/29/1999)
243 ORDER confirming selection of Transition Manager Rosemary Geraci to assist Special Master ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/04/1999)
244 OBJECTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy re: [243−1] order appointing Rosemary Geraci as Transition Manager (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/05/1999)
245 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00,filed by State of Connecticut,James P. Welch. Rec. #000786 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 02/11/1999)
246 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees for the period of 1/16/99 to 2/8/99 for $7,919 (Brief Due 3/19/99 )(Former Employee) Modified on 03/01/1999 (Entered: 03/01/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [246−1] motion for Costs and Fees for the period of 1/16/99 to 2/8/99 for $7,919 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/01/1999)
247 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees for the period of 12/1/98 to 12/31/98 for $9,102.90 (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/02/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [247−1] motion for Costs and Fees for the period of 12/1/98 to 12/31/98 for $9,102.90 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/02/1999)
ENDORSEMENT overruling [244−1] objection ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/03/1999)
248 Letter MOTION by Edward Skarnulis to Extend Time until 7/1/99 to file six month status report (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/03/1999)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 17 of 35

03/02/1999 03/03/1999 03/03/1999 03/16/1999 03/23/1999
03/23/1999 03/24/1999 03/24/1999 03/31/1999 04/09/1999 04/13/1999 04/26/1999 04/26/1999 04/29/1999 05/17/1999 05/18/1999 05/18/1999
05/18/1999 05/18/1999 06/02/1999

ENDORSEMENT granting [248−1] motion to Extend Time until 7/1/99 to file six month status report, resetting Status Report deadline to 7/1/99 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/03/1999)
249 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 9,102.90 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 03/01/99 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 03/03/1999)
250 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 7,919.96 to Edward Skarulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 02/26/99 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 03/03/1999)
251 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 filed by State of Ct., James P. Welsh, AAG. Receipt # 001120 NH. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 03/16/1999)
252 STIPULATION AND ORDER regarding attorney's fees for 11/1/98 through 1/31/99; defendants pay $7,788.50 by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont (Former Employee) Modified on 03/24/1999 (Entered: 03/24/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [252−1] stipulation re: attorney's fees for $7,788.50 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/24/1999)
253 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees in the amount of $8223.85 (Brief Due 4/14/99 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/24/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [253−1] motion for Costs and Fees in the amount of $8223.85 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/24/1999)
254 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 8,223.85 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 03/23/99 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 03/31/1999)
255 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 filed by ST. of CT. James P. Welsh, Asst. Atty. Gen. REC #001317 NH. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 04/09/1999)
256 ORDER; parties shall attend status conference 5/17/99 2:00 p.m. rm. 309 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/13/1999)
257 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees for the period 3/4/99 through 4/2/99 for $11,197.85 (Brief Due 5/17/99 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/26/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [257−1] motion for Costs and Fees for the period 3/4/99 through 4/2/99 for $11,197.85 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/26/1999)
258 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 11,197.85 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 04/26/99 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 04/29/1999)
260 Status Conference held ( JGM) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 05/19/1999)
259 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00, filed by State of Connecticut, James P. Welsh. Rec. # 001624 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 05/18/1999)
261 STIPULATION regarding plaintiff's request for attorney's fees for 2/1/99 through 4/30/99 by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont (Former Employee) (Entered: 05/19/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [261−1] stipulation re: attorney's fees; defendants shall pay $3,922.00 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 05/19/1999)
262 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Special Master Re: 6/19/98 Order of Reference (Former Employee) (Entered: 05/19/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [263−1] motion to Extend Time until 7/8/99 to file objection to 5/17/99 Recommendation of Special Master ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/03/1999)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 18 of 35

06/03/1999
06/03/1999
06/04/1999 06/15/1999
06/15/1999
06/17/1999 06/17/1999 06/17/1999 06/18/1999
07/07/1999
07/07/1999 07/07/1999 07/14/1999
07/15/1999 07/16/1999
07/21/1999 07/21/1999
07/22/1999 07/28/1999 07/29/1999

264 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees from 4/3/99 through 4/30/99 in the amount of $4,814.17 (Brief Due 6/24/99 ) (Former Employee) Modified on 06/03/1999 (Entered: 06/03/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [264−1] motion for Costs and Fees from 4/3/99 through 4/30/99 in the amount of $4,814.17 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/03/1999)
265 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 4,814.17 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 06/03/99 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 06/04/1999)
266 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees for 5/1/99 through 5/24/99 in the amount of $6,200 (Brief Due 7/6/99 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/15/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [266−1] motion for Costs and Fees for 5/1/99 through 5/24/99 in the amount of $6,200 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/15/1999)
267 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 6,200.00 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 06/15/99 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 06/17/1999)
268 Telephone Status Conference held ( JGM) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 06/21/1999)
270 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 led by State of COnnecticut , James P. Welsh, AAG. Rec. # 001906 NH. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 06/21/1999)
269 ORDER extending appointment of Edward Skarnulis until 7/30/99; hearing re objections scheduled 7/28/99 9:30 a.m. ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/21/1999)
271 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy to Extend Time until 8/7/99 to file objections to special master's report and hearing on objections (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 07/08/1999)
272 APPEARANCE of Attorney for William McCoy, Leo McCoy −− Norman A. Pattis (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 07/08/1999)
273 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Jennifer L. Zito to Withdraw as Attorney (Former Employee) (Entered: 07/08/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [273−1] motion for Jennifer L. Zito to Withdraw as Attorney (Terminated attorney Jennifer Lynn Zito for Leo McCoy and William McCoy ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 07/14/1999)
274 Status Conference held ( JGM) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 07/16/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting in part [271−1] motion to Extend Time to 7/26/99 to file informal objections to special master's report ; Settlement conference set 7/28/99 @ 9:30 AM ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Brown, S.) (Entered: 07/19/1999)
275 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees in the amount of $3,664.75 (Brief Due 8/11/99 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 07/21/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [275−1] motion for Costs and Fees in the amount of $3,664.75 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 07/21/1999)
276 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 3,664.75 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 07/21/99 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 07/23/1999)
277 Settlement Conference held ( JGM) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 07/29/1999)
278 MEMORANDUM of status Conference held on 7/28/99 Case Reported not settled; evidentiary hearing scheduled for 9/27/99 9:30 ( signed by Clerk ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 07/29/1999)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 19 of 35

08/06/1999 08/06/1999
08/10/1999 08/11/1999 08/11/1999 08/16/1999 08/17/1999 08/24/1999 08/24/1999 08/26/1999 08/27/1999 09/01/1999 09/01/1999 09/01/1999 09/02/1999 09/22/1999 09/22/1999 09/23/1999 09/23/1999 09/27/1999

279 MEMORANDUM regarding discovery permitted under FRCP 53(e) by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to [262−1] report and recommendations (Former Employee) (Entered: 08/09/1999)
280 MEMORANDUM re: nature and scope of discovery relative to objections by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to [262−1] report and recommendations (Former Employee) (Entered: 08/09/1999)
281 RULING denying [279−1] Request for Discovery from Special Master ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) 4 Page(s) (Former Employee) (Entered: 08/10/1999)
282 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont for relief from judgment (Former Employee) (Entered: 08/19/1999)
283 MEMORANDUM by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont in support of [282−1] motion for relief from judgment (Former Employee) (Entered: 08/19/1999)
284 OBJECTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy re: special masters statement for fees and services (Former Employee) (Entered: 08/19/1999)
286 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 filed by State of Connecticut, James P. Welsh. Rec. #002415 NH. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 08/25/1999)
285 STIPULATION regarding attorney's fees by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont (Former Employee) (Entered: 08/25/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [285−1] stipulation of attorneys fees in the amount of $5,966.25 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 08/25/1999)
287 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Stay Motion for Relief from Judgment (Brief Due 9/16/99 ) (Brown, S.) (Entered: 08/30/1999)
288 MEMORANDUM by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont in support of [275−1] motion for Costs and Fees in the amount of $3,664.75 (Brown, S.) (Entered: 08/30/1999)
289 RULING overruling [284−1] objection ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) 2 Page(s) (Former Employee) (Entered: 09/01/1999)
290 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees from 6/27/99 to 7/31/99 in the amount of $11,273.80 (Former Employee) (Entered: 09/01/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [290−1] motion for Costs and Fees from 6/27/99 to 7/31/99 in the amount of $11,273.80 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 09/01/1999)
291 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 11,273.80 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 09/01/99 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 09/02/1999)
292 Response by William McCoy, Leo McCoy to [262−1] special master's recommendations (Former Employee) (Entered: 09/22/1999)
293 Telephone Status Conference held ( JGM) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 09/23/1999)
294 APPEARANCE of Attorney for William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy −− Katrena K. Engstrom (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 09/23/1999)
295 Proposed supplemental Witness list by William McCoy (Former Employee) (Entered: 09/24/1999)
296 Evidentiary Hearing held. Hearing continued until 11/15/99 @9:30 a.m. ( JGM) (Moore, P.) (Entered: 09/27/1999)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 20 of 35

09/30/1999 11/02/1999
11/02/1999
11/04/1999 11/10/1999 11/10/1999 11/15/1999 11/16/1999 11/17/1999 11/18/1999 11/18/1999 11/18/1999 12/15/1999 12/15/1999
12/17/1999 01/19/2000
01/19/2000 01/24/2000 01/27/2000
02/01/2000 02/08/2000
02/08/2000

297 ORDER appointing Edward Skarnulis as special master until 11/15/99 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 10/01/1999)
298 STATEMENT by Edward Skarnulis for Fees and Services for 8/1/99 through 9/28/99 for $12,988.83 (Brief Due 11/23/99 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 11/02/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [298−1]Statement for Fees and Services for 8/1/99 through 9/28/99 for $12,988.83 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 11/02/1999)
299 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 12,988.83 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 11/2/99 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 11/04/1999)
301 APPEARANCE of Attorney for William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy −− William Sylvester Palmieri (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 11/15/1999)
300 Proposed Witness list by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy (Brown, S.) (Entered: 12/01/1999)
302 Evidentiary Hearing held, continued to 11/16/99 @ 9:30 a.m. ( JGM) (Moore, P.) (Entered: 11/16/1999)
303 Evidentiary Hearing held. Hearing continued to 11/17/99 @ 9:30 a.m. ( JGM) (Moore, P.) (Entered: 11/16/1999)
304 Evidentiary Hearing held, continued to 11/18/99 @ 9:30 a.m. ( JGM) (Moore, P.) (Entered: 11/17/1999)
305 Evidentiary Hearing held, continued until 11/99 (specific date to be set) ( JGM) (Moore, P.) (Entered: 11/22/1999)
306 Marked exhibit List as to defendants' Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont (Moore, P.) (Entered: 11/22/1999)
307 Marked exhibit and witness List as to plaintiffs' William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy (Moore, P.) (Entered: 11/22/1999)
308 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees from 9/29/99 to 11/19/99 for $8,187.65 (Brief Due 1/5/00 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 12/16/1999)
ENDORSEMENT granting [308−1] motion for Costs and Fees from 9/29/99 to 11/19/99 for $8,187.65 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 12/16/1999)
309 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 8,187.65 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 12/15/99 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 12/17/1999)
310 ORDER directing filing of post−trial briefs re:status report by 2/4/00; response by 2/18/00 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 01/20/2000)
Deadline updated; setting Status Report deadline to 2/4/00 (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/04/2000)
311 MOTION by Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Reopen hearing (Depino, F.) (Entered: 01/26/2000)
312 OBJECTIONS by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to [311−1] motion to Reopen hearing by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy (Former Employee) (Entered: 01/27/2000)
313 RULING denying [311−1] motion to Reopen hearing ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) 2 Page(s) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/02/2000)
314 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to Extend Time until 2/8/00 to allow for mail delivery (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 02/09/2000)
315 POST−HEARING MEMORANDUM by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont (Former Employee)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 21 of 35

02/10/2000
02/22/2000 02/22/2000 02/24/2000
03/07/2000
03/13/2000 03/13/2000 03/13/2000 03/13/2000 03/14/2000
04/13/2000
04/14/2000 05/08/2000 05/08/2000 05/08/2000 05/09/2000
05/23/2000 05/23/2000
05/24/2000 05/24/2000

(Entered: 02/10/2000)
ENDORSEMENT granting nunc pro tunc [314−1] motion to Extend Time until 2/8/00 to allow for mail delivery ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/11/2000)
316 POST−HEARING BRIEF by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy(Former Employee) Modified on 02/22/2000 (Entered: 02/22/2000)
317 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Extend Time until 2/22/00 to file a brief (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 02/23/2000)
ENDORSEMENT granting nunc pro tunc [317−1] motion to Extend Time until 2/22/00 to file a brief ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 02/25/2000)
ENDORSEMENT denying as moot [287−1] motion to Stay Motion for Relief from Judgment ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Depino, F.) (Entered: 03/07/2000)
318 TRANSCRIPT for date of 11/15/99 (Court reporter: Stephen Bowles) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/13/2000)
319 TRANSCRIPT for date of 11/16/99 (Court reporter: Stephen Bowles) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/13/2000)
320 TRANSCRIPT for date of 11/17/99 (Court reporter: Stephen Bowles) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/13/2000)
321 TRANSCRIPT for date of 11/18/99 (Court reporter: Stephen Bowles) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/13/2000)
322 RULING denying [282−1] motion for relief from judgment, approving and adopting [262−1] report and recommendations ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) 6 Page(s) (Former Employee) (Entered: 03/15/2000)
323 NOTICE OF APPEAL of [322−1] order by Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy FILING FEE $ 150.00 RECEIPT # N000177 Certified Copy of Appeal and Docket mailed to USCA (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 04/14/2000)
324 APPEARANCE of Attorney for Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy −− W. Martyn Philpot Jr. (Former Employee) (Entered: 04/14/2000)
325 Scheduling Order from USCA regarding [323−1] appeal by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy USCA Number: 00−7435 (Depino, F.) (Entered: 05/08/2000)
326 MOTION by Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Stay ruling of 3/14/00 (Brief Due 5/29/00 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 05/09/2000)
327 MEMORANDUM by Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy in support of [326−1] motion to Stay ruling of 3/14/00 (Former Employee) (Entered: 05/09/2000)
328 ORDER re courtesy copies: copies of all filings should be forwarded to Special Master Edward Skarnulis; 24075 Lofton Avenue, Chisago City, MN 55013 ( Signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 05/09/2000)
329 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees for $8,922.68 (Brief Due 6/13/00 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 05/23/2000)
ENDORSEMENT granting [329−1] motion for Costs and Fees for $8,922.68 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 05/23/2000)
330 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 8,922.68 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 05/23/00 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 05/24/2000)
331 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 by Michael Belmont, State of Ct., James P. Welsh, AAG. Rec. # R000034 NH. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 05/25/2000)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 22 of 35

05/30/2000 06/01/2000 06/01/2000 06/06/2000 06/07/2000 06/08/2000 06/08/2000 06/09/2000
06/12/2000 06/15/2000 06/15/2000 06/19/2000 06/19/2000 06/20/2000 06/23/2000 06/29/2000
07/19/2000 07/19/2000 07/26/2000 07/28/2000

332 OBJECTIONS by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to [326−1] motion to Stay ruling of 3/14/00 by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy (Brown, S.) (Entered: 05/31/2000)
333 Statement by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees for period from 11/19/99 through 4/18/00 (Inferrera, L.) (Entered: 06/02/2000)
ENDORSEMENT granting [333−1] motion for Costs and Fees for period from 11/19/99 through 4/18/00 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Inferrera, L.) (Entered: 06/02/2000)
334 RULING granting in part, denying in part [326−1] motion to Stay ruling of 3/14/00 SEE FOR DETAILS ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) 4 Page(s) (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/06/2000)
335 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Norman A. Pattis to Withdraw as Attorney (Torday, B.) (Entered: 06/08/2000)
336 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 2,502.83 to Edward Skarnulis pursuant to [0−0] order dated 05/31/00 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 06/08/2000)
INDEX to Record on Appeal mailed to USCA: [323−1] appeal by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 06/12/2000)
ENDORSEMENT granting [335−1] motion for Norman A. Pattis to Withdraw as Attorney (Terminated attorney Norman A. Pattis for Leo McCoy, William McCoy ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/12/2000)
SUPPLEMENTAL Index to Record on Appeal mailed to USCA re: [323−1] appeal by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 06/12/2000)
337 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees from 5/6/00 through 5/25/00 for $7,643.46 (Brief Due 7/6/00 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/19/2000)
ENDORSEMENT granting [337−1] motion for Costs and Fees from 5/6/00 through 5/25/00 for $7,643.46 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/19/2000)
339 ACKNOWLEDGED receipt of Index to Record on Appeal at USCA on 6/15/00 received re: [323−1] appeal by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy USCA Number: 00−7435 (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 06/21/2000)
340 ACKNOWLEDGED receipt of Supplemental Index to Record on Appeal at USCA on 6/15/00 received re: [323−1] appeal by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy USCA Number: 00−7435 (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 06/21/2000)
338 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 7643.46 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 06/15/00 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 06/21/2000)
341 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for William S. Palmieri to Withdraw as Attorney (Warren, C.) (Entered: 06/27/2000)
ENDORSEMENT granting [341−1] motion for William S. Palmieri to Withdraw as Attorney (Terminated attorney William Sylvester Palmieri for Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy, William McCoy ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 06/30/2000)
342 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees from 5/26/00 to 6/30/00 (Brief Due 8/9/00 ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 07/20/2000)
ENDORSEMENT granting [342−1] motion for Costs and Fees from 5/26/00 to 6/30/00 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Former Employee) (Entered: 07/20/2000)
343 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 by State of Connecticut, James P. Welsh, AAG. Rec. # R000062 (NH). (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 07/27/2000)
344 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 5,775.89 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 07/19/00 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 07/28/2000)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 23 of 35

08/28/2000
08/28/2000
08/29/2000 09/18/2000 09/18/2000
09/22/2000 10/02/2000 10/27/2000 10/27/2000
11/06/2000 11/14/2000
11/21/2000 11/21/2000 11/22/2000 12/12/2000 01/05/2001
01/05/2001
01/05/2001 01/12/2001 01/23/2001 01/23/2001

345 MOTION by Special Master, Edward Skarnulis for Disbursement of Funds for Fees and Services rendered (Brown, S.) Modified on 08/29/2000 (Entered: 08/29/2000)
ENDORSEMENT granting [345−1] motion for Disbursement of Funds for Fees and Services rendered ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Brown, S.) (Entered: 08/29/2000)
346 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 5,932.42 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 08/28/00 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 08/29/2000)
347 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees for period from 7/21 through 8/31/00 (Inferrera, L.) (Entered: 09/18/2000)
ENDORSEMENT granting [347−1] motion for Costs and Fees for period from 7/21 through 8/31/00 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Inferrera, L.) (Entered: 09/18/2000)
348 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 10,455.35 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 09/18/00 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 09/22/2000)
349 ORDER extending the appointment of Professor Edward Skamulis ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Villano, P.) (Entered: 10/03/2000)
350 MOTION by Special Master Edward Skarnulis for Disbursement of Funds for fees and services rendered (Brown, S.) (Entered: 10/27/2000)
ENDORSEMENT granting [350−1] motion for Disbursement of Funds for fees and services rendered ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Brown, S.) (Entered: 10/27/2000)
351 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 9,609.80 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 10/27/00 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 11/06/2000)
352 Speical Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 Receipt # R000101. Filed by James P. Welsh, AAG and State of Connecticut. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 11/14/2000)
353 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for payment of Special Masters Fees (Torday, B.) (Entered: 11/22/2000)
ENDORSEMENT approving[353−1] motion for payment of Special Masters Fees ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Torday, B.) (Entered: 11/22/2000)
354 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 7,810.33 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 11/21/00 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 11/22/2000)
355 Status Conference held ( JGM) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 12/14/2000)
356 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis to Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis for the purpose of Statement for Fees and Services Period:From 11/8/00 through 12/19/00 (Basile, F.) (Entered: 01/08/2001)
ENDORSEMENT granting [356−1] motion to Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis for the purpose of Statement for Fees and Services Period:From 11/8/00 through 12/19/00 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 01/08/2001)
357 MANDATE OF USCA (certified copy) dated 12/20/00 dismissing [323−1] appeal ( Roseann Mackechnie) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 01/11/2001)
358 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 3,443.69 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 01/05/01 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 01/12/2001)
359 MOTION by Special Master, Edward Skarnulis for fees and Services from 12/17/00 −1/7/01 (Basile, F.) Modified on 01/29/2001 (Entered: 01/24/2001)
ENDORSEMENT approving and adopting [359−1] motion for Costs and Fees ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 01/24/2001)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 24 of 35

02/02/2001 02/02/2001 02/06/2001 02/06/2001 02/14/2001 02/23/2001 02/23/2001 03/09/2001 03/12/2001
03/23/2001 03/23/2001 03/26/2001 03/30/2001 04/02/2001
04/02/2001 04/10/2001

360 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to Vacate [110−1] judgment order (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 02/05/2001)
361 MEMORANDUM by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont in support of [360−1] motion to Vacate [110−1] judgment order (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 02/05/2001)
362 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 Receipt # R000136, filed by State of Connecticut, James P. Welsh, AAG. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 02/06/2001)
363 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 5,221.32 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 01/23/01 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 02/06/2001)
364 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Vacate Endorsement order re: [114−1] motion REFERRING case for the purpose for Approval of Resid. Design by defendants, and [112−1] motion for Approval of Residence Design by defendants (Brief Due 3/7/01 ) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 02/15/2001)
365 OBJECTIONS by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to [360−1] motion to Vacate [110−1] judgment order by defendants and motion for contempt enforcement and other relief (part 1 of 2) (Basile, F.) Modified on 04/18/2001 (Entered: 02/27/2001)
365 MEMORANUM in opposition to [360−1] motion for relief from judgment and MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Contempt, enforcement and other relief (Brief Due 3/16/01 ) (part 2 of 2) (Basile, F.) Modified on 04/18/2001 (Entered: 04/18/2001)
366 MOTION by Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to Extend Time to 4/2/01 to Vacate Reference &to file Opposition to Motion for Relief from Judgment &Contempt (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
ENDORSEMENT granting [366−1] motion to Extend Time to 4/2/01 to Vacate Reference &to file Opposition to Motion for Relief from Judgment &Contempt, Brief Deadline set for 4/2/01 [364−1] motion to Vacate Endorsement order re: [114−1] motion REFERRING case for the purpose for Approval of Resid. Design by defendants, and [112−1] motion for Approval of Residence Design by defendants, set for 4/2/01 [360−1] motion to Vacate [110−1] judgment order ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 03/13/2001)
367 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis for Costs and Fees by Special Master for the period of 1/8/01 through 3/11/01 (Basile, F.) (Entered: 03/26/2001)
ENDORSEMENT granting [367−1] motion for Costs and Fees by Special Master for the period of 1/8/01 through 3/11/01 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 03/26/2001)
368 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 1,467.95 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 03/23/01 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 03/26/2001)
369 ORDER of Transfer ( signed by Clerk ) to Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns (Inferrera, L.) (Entered: 03/30/2001)
370 MEMORANDUM by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont in opposition to [364−1] motion to Vacate Endorsement order re: [114−1] motion REFERRING case for the purpose for Approval of Resid. Design by defendants, and [112−1] motion for Approval of Residence Design by defendants by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy, William McCoy (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 04/03/2001)
371 MEMORANDUM by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont in opposition to Motion for Contempt (not yet filed) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 04/05/2001)
372 ORDER referring: [364−1] motion to Vacate Endorsement order re: [114−1] motion REFERRING case for the purpose for Approval of Resid. Design by defendants, and [112−1] motion for Approval of Residence Design by defendants

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 25 of 35

04/17/2001 05/02/2001 05/17/2001 05/18/2001
05/21/2001 05/23/2001 06/04/2001
06/21/2001 06/28/2001 06/28/2001 06/28/2001 06/29/2001 08/09/2001 08/09/2001 08/23/2001 09/25/2001
10/09/2001

referred to Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis, [360−1] motion to Vacate [110−1] judgment order referred to Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis (signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 04/10/2001)
373 ORDER referring: [365−1] motion for Contempt, enforcement and other relief referred to Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis (signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 04/18/2001)
374 Settlement Conference held ( JGM) (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 05/04/2001)
375 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Katrena Engstrom to Withdraw as Attorney (Inferrera, L.) (Entered: 05/17/2001)
ENDORSEMENT granting [375−1] motion for Katrena Engstrom to Withdraw as Attorney (Terminated attorney Katrena K. Engstrom for Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy and William McCoy (signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Inferrera, L.) (Entered: 05/18/2001)
376 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Preliminary Injunction (Brief Due 6/11/01 ) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 05/22/2001)
377 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to request USMJ Margolis to recuse herself from case (Brief Due 6/13/01 ) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 05/24/2001)
378 RULING denying [377−1] motion to request USMJ Margolis to recuse herself from case, granting [364−1] motion to Vacate Endorsement order re: [114−1] motion REFERRING case for the purpose for Approval of Resid. Design by defendants, and referring [112−1] motion for Approval of Residence Design by defendants ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) 9 Page(s) SEE Ruling for details (Brown, S.) (Entered: 06/05/2001)
379 ORDER: Accordingly, the Court orders Defendants to comply with paragraph 9 of the Consent Decree and provide plaintiffs with advocacy services ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 06/21/2001)
380 MOTION by Edward Skarnulis Statment for Fees and Services for a period 6/12/01 −6/22/01 (Basile, F.) (Entered: 06/29/2001)
ENDORSEMENT so ordered [380−1] motion Statment for Fees and Services for a period 6/12/01 −6/22/01 ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 06/29/2001)
382 Special Master BOND in the amount of $ 12,950.00 Receipt # R000204, filed by State of Connecticut, James P. Welsh, AAG. (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 07/09/2001)
381 Clerk's disbursement of funds in the amount of $ 12,113.89 to Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D. pursuant to [0−0] order dated 06/28/01 (Carfora, C.) (Entered: 06/29/2001)
383 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont for continuance of hearing (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 08/09/2001)
ENDORSEMENT granting [383−1] motion for continuance of 8/14/01 hearing; hearing reset to 9/12/01 ( signed by Mag. Judge Joan G. Margolis ) (Brown, S.) Modified on 08/09/2001 (Entered: 08/09/2001)
384 APPEARANCE of Attorney for William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy −− Marc L. Glenn (Warner, R.) (Entered: 08/23/2001)
385 Response by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to requests for production of documents pursuant to notices of depositions (Sherman, M.) Modified on 09/26/2001 (Entered: 09/26/2001)
386 ORDER: Court orders the parties to complete all depositions in preparation for this hearing 11/12/01 ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Basile, F.) (Entered: 10/10/2001)

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11/16/2001
11/16/2001
11/16/2001 11/19/2001 11/20/2001 11/21/2001 12/05/2001 12/06/2001 12/07/2001 12/10/2001 12/11/2001 12/12/2001 12/13/2001 12/13/2001
12/27/2001 12/27/2001 12/31/2001 01/02/2002 01/03/2002 01/04/2002 01/07/2002
01/07/2002

387 MEMORANDUM by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy in opposition to [360−1] motion to Vacate [110−1] judgment order by defendants (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 11/20/2001)
387 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Contempt, enforcement and other relief part 2 of 2 (Brief Due 12/7/01 ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 11/20/2001)
390 Pre−hearing lists of witness and Exhibits by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 11/20/2001)
388 Contempt hearing held ( EBB) Reporter: Falzarano (Torday, B.) (Entered: 11/20/2001)
389 Contempt hearing held ( EBB) Reporter: Falzarano (Torday, B.) (Entered: 11/20/2001)
391 Evidentiary Hearing held Reporter/ECRO: Ms. Proehl ( EBB) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 11/26/2001)
392 Contempt hearing held (EBB) Reporter: Tracey Costello (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 12/06/2001)
393 Contempt hearing held (EBB) Reporter: Tracey Costello (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 12/06/2001)
394 Contempt hearing held (EBB) Reporter: Falzarano Court Reporters (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 12/07/2001)
395 Contempt hearing held (EBB) Reporter: Tracey Costello Hearing continued 10:00 12/11/01 (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 12/11/2001)
396 Contempt hearing held (EBB) Reporter: Cheryl Poehls Hearing continued until 10:00 12/12/01 (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 12/12/2001)
397 Contempt hearing held ( EBB) Reporter: Barbara Scott Hearing continued until 9:00 12/13/01 (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 12/12/2001)
398 Contempt hearing held (EBB) Reporter: Ellen Szamier (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 12/13/2001)
Deadline updated; Brief Deadline set for 2/11/02 [387−1] motion for Contempt, enforcement and other relief, set for 2/11/02 [365−1] motion for Contempt, enforcement and other relief (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 12/13/2001)
399 TRANSCRIPT (volume 1) for date of 11/19/01 (Court reporter: Falzarano Court Reporters) (Warner, R.) (Entered: 12/27/2001)
400 TRANSCRIPT (volume 2) for date of 11/20/01 (Court reporter: Falzarano Court Reporters) (Warner, R.) (Entered: 12/27/2001)
401 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Examine and/or Inspect Staff House No. 2 (Brief Due 1/21/02 ) (Villano, P.) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
402 TRANSCRIPT for date of 12/12/01 (Court reporter: Barbara−Anne V. Scott, LSR) (Warner, R.) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
403 TRANSCRIPT (Volume 10) for date of 12/13/01 (Court reporter: FALZARANO COURT REPORTER) (Jefferson, V.) (Entered: 01/03/2002)
404 TRANSCRIPT for date of 12/7/01 (Court reporter: Sandra V. Semevolos) (Warner, R.) Modified on 01/08/2002 (Entered: 01/04/2002)
406 Marked witness List as to Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont (Sherman, M.) Modified on 01/08/2002 (Entered: 01/08/2002)
405 Marked exhibit List as to William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont (Sherman, M.) Modified on 01/08/2002 (Entered: 01/08/2002)

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01/08/2002 01/08/2002 01/08/2002 01/11/2002 01/17/2002 01/17/2002 01/23/2002 01/23/2002 02/01/2002 02/05/2002 02/11/2002 02/11/2002 02/12/2002 02/12/2002 02/12/2002 03/04/2002 03/04/2002 03/06/2002 03/06/2002 03/06/2002

407 TRANSCRIPT for date of 12/5/01 (Court reporter: Tracy K. Costello) (Warner, R.) (Entered: 01/08/2002)
408 TRANSCRIPT for date of 12/6/01 (Court reporter: Tracy K. Costello) (Warner, R.) (Entered: 01/08/2002)
409 TRANSCRIPT for date of 12/10/01 (Court reporter: Tracy K. Costello) (Warner, R.) (Entered: 01/08/2002)
ENDORSEMENT granting [401−1] motion to Examine and/or Inspect Staff House No. 2 ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 01/11/2002)
410 TRANSCRIPT for date of 12/10/01 (Court reporter: Poehls) (Depino, F.) (Entered: 01/18/2002)
411 TRANSCRIPT for date of 11/21/01 (Court reporter: Poehls) (Depino, F.) (Entered: 01/18/2002)
412 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to Extend Time until 2/4/02 to file post−hearing briefs (Warner, R.) (Entered: 01/23/2002)
ENDORSEMENT granting [412−1] motion to Extend Time until 2/4/02 to file post−hearing briefs ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 01/23/2002)
413 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Extend Time until 2/8/02 to file post−trial brief (Warner, R.) (Entered: 02/01/2002)
ENDORSEMENT granting [413−1] motion to Extend Time until 2/8/02 to file post−trial brief ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 02/05/2002)
414 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for permission to file post−trial brief in excess of 40 pages (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 02/12/2002)
417 Post Hearing BRIEF by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 02/14/2002)
415 APPEARANCE of Attorney for Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont −− Thomas B. York (Warner, R.) (Entered: 02/13/2002)
416 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to Extend Time until 2/11/02 to file post−trial briefs (Warner, R.) (Entered: 02/13/2002)
ENDORSEMENT granting [416−1] motion to Extend Time until 2/11/02 to file post−trial briefs ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 02/13/2002)
418 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Leave to File Reply to Post−Hearing Brief in excess of 10 pgs (Brown, S.) Modified on 03/04/2002 (Entered: 03/04/2002)
420 Reply by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to [419−1] post−hearing brief by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy, William McCoy (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 03/06/2002)
ENDORSEMENT granting [418−1] motion for Leave to File Reply to Post−Hearing Brief in excess of 10 pgs ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 03/06/2002)
ENDORSEMENT granting [414−1] motion for permission to file post−trial brief in excess of 40 pages ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 03/06/2002)
419 Post−Hearing BRIEF by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 03/06/2002)

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03/06/2002 05/14/2002 07/15/2002 07/26/2002 07/26/2002 08/09/2002 08/19/2002 08/23/2002 09/03/2002 09/04/2002 09/18/2002 09/27/2002 10/08/2002 10/08/2002 10/08/2002 10/08/2002

421 Reply by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to [417−1] post−hearing brief by defendants (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 03/06/2002)
422 ORDER that the State shall fill the three current vacancies within forty−eight hours ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 05/15/2002)
423 RULING denying [360−1] motion to Vacate [110−1] judgment order, granting in part, denying in part [387−1] motion for Contempt, enforcement and other relief, denying [376−1] motion for Preliminary Injunction ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) 35 Page(s) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 07/15/2002)
424 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Reconsideration of [423−1] ruling dated 7/15/02 denying [360−1] motion to Vacate [110−1] judgment order (Brief Due 8/16/02 ) (Brown, S.) (Entered: 07/26/2002)
425 MEMORANDUM by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy in support of [424−1] motion for Reconsideration of [423−1] ruling dated 7/15/02 denying [360−1] motion to Vacate [110−1] judgment order (Brown, S.) (Entered: 07/26/2002)
426 ORDER for [424−1] motion for Reconsideration, the Court hereby extends time to file a notice of appeal until 30 days from date of the Court's future ruling on Motion for Reconsideration. Order under advisement ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Warner, R.) (Entered: 08/12/2002)
427 RESPONSE by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to [424−1] motion for Reconsideration of [423−1] ruling dated 7/15/02 denying [360−1] motion to Vacate [110−1] judgment order by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy, William McCoy (Warner, R.) (Entered: 08/19/2002)
428 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Stay Ruling on Motions for Contempt and Relief from Judgment (Brief Due 9/13/02 ) (Brown, S.) (Entered: 08/23/2002)
429 RESPONSE by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to [428−1] motion to Stay Ruling on Motions for Contempt and Relief from Judgment by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy, William McCoy (Depino, F.) (Entered: 09/03/2002)
430 RULING denying [428−1] motion to Stay Ruling on Motions for Contempt and Relief from Judgment ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) 1 Page(s) (Depino, F.) (Entered: 09/04/2002)
431 RULING granting [424−1] motion for Reconsideration, and, after consideration, the relief requested is denied ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) 1 Page(s) (Warner, R.) (Entered: 09/18/2002)
432 NOTICE OF APPEAL of 7/15/02 [431−1] order by Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy FILING FEE $ 150.00 RECEIPT # N007611 Certified Copy of Appeal and Docket mailed to USCA (Brown, S.) (Entered: 10/03/2002)
433 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont for a finding of Contempt and for Clarification or modification of [110−1] the consent decree (Brief Due 10/29/02 ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 10/09/2002)
434 MEMORANDUM by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont in support of [433−1] motion for a finding of Contempt, [433−2] motion for Clarification or modification of [110−1] the consent decree (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 10/09/2002)
435 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont for Expedited determination of docket number 433 (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 10/09/2002)
436 ORDER granting [435−1] motion for Expedited determination of docket number 433 ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 10/09/2002)

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10/10/2002 10/15/2002 10/25/2002
11/04/2002 11/04/2002 11/06/2002 11/06/2002 11/06/2002
11/15/2002
11/22/2002 11/26/2002 11/26/2002 11/27/2002 12/02/2002 12/04/2002 12/16/2002
02/03/2003 03/18/2003 04/04/2003

437 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Extend Time until 10/25/02 to respond to Motion for Contempt (Rodko, R.) (Entered: 10/10/2002)
ENDORSEMENT granting [437−1] motion to Extend Time until 10/25/02 to respond to Motion for Contempt ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 10/15/2002)
438 MEMORANDUM by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy in opposition to [433−1] motion for a finding of Contempt by defendants, [433−2] motion for Clarification or modification of [110−1] the consent decree by defendants (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 10/25/2002)
439 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Leave to File sur−reply (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 11/05/2002)
440 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont for Leave to File reply brief in excess of page limit (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 11/05/2002)
ENDORSEMENT granting [440−1] motion for Leave to File reply brief in excess of page limit ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 11/06/2002)
ENDORSEMENT denying [439−1] motion for Leave to File sur−reply ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 11/06/2002)
441 REPLY by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to response to [433−1] motion for a finding of Contempt by defendants, [433−2] motion for Clarification or modification of [110−1] the consent decree by defendants (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 11/14/2002)
442 ORDER Motion Hearing set for 12/4/02 for [433−1] motion for a finding of Contempt, [433−2] motion for Clarification or modification of [110−1] the consent decree ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 11/15/2002)
443 MOTION by Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Quash Subpoena (Brief Due 12/13/02 ) (Falcone, K.) (Entered: 11/25/2002)
444 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for expedited Hearing (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 11/26/2002)
445 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Contempt, enforcement and other relief (Brief Due 12/17/02 ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 11/26/2002)
446 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Continuance of hearing regarding motions for contempt until after 1/1/03 (Falcone, K.) (Entered: 12/02/2002)
ENDORSEMENT granting [444−1] motion for expedited Hearing ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 12/02/2002)
ENDORSEMENT denying [446−1] motion for Continuance of hearing until 1/1/03 ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Sherman, M.) (Entered: 12/04/2002)
447 RESPONSE by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont to [445−1] motion for Contempt, enforcement and other relief by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy, William McCoy (Falcone, K.) (Entered: 12/18/2002)
448 Scheduling Order from USCA regarding [432−1] appeal by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy USCA Number: 02−9170 (Depino, F.) (Entered: 02/04/2003)
INDEX to Record on Appeal Received on 3/18/03 Mailed to USCA: [432−1] appeal by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy (Depino, F.) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
449 ACKNOWLEDGED receipt of Index to Record on Appeal at USCA on 3/31/03 received re: [432−1] appeal by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy USCA Number: 02−9170 (Warner, R.) (Entered: 04/07/2003)

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06/23/2003
06/23/2003
07/01/2003 07/09/2003 07/28/2003
09/02/2003 09/02/2003 09/05/2003
09/05/2003
09/08/2003 09/29/2003 11/18/2003 11/21/2003 01/14/2004
02/11/2004 09/30/2004

450 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont for the Enforcement of the 7/15/02 ruling pending appeal , and for Contempt , and for Clarification of [110−1] judgment order , and to Modify [110−1] judgment order (Brief Due 7/14/03 ) (Depino, F.) (Entered: 06/23/2003)
451 MEMORANDUM by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont in support of [450−1] motion for the Enforcement of the 7/15/02 ruling pending appeal, [450−2] motion for Contempt, [450−3] motion for Clarification of [110−1] judgment order, [450−4] motion to Modify [110−1] judgment order (Depino, F.) (Entered: 06/23/2003)
452 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to Extend Time until 8/10/03 to respond to motion for enforcement of 7/15/02 ruling (Warner, R.) (Entered: 07/02/2003)
ENDORSEMENT granting [452−1] motion to Extend Time until 7/28/03 to respond to motion for enforcement of 7/15/02 ruling ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Falcone, K.) (Entered: 07/10/2003)
453 OBJECTIONS by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy to [450−1] motion for the Enforcement of the 7/15/02 ruling pending appeal by defendants, [450−2] motion for Contempt by defendants, [450−3] motion for Clarification of [110−1] judgment order by defendants (Depino, F.) (Entered: 07/29/2003)
454 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for W. Martyn Philpot, Jr. to Withdraw as Attorney (Rodko, R.) (Entered: 09/03/2003)
455 MOTION by William McCoy, Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy for Marc L. Glenn to Withdraw as Attorney (Rodko, R.) (Entered: 09/03/2003)
ENDORSEMENT granting [454−1] motion for W. Martyn Philpot, Jr. to Withdraw as Attorney (Terminated attorney W. Martyn Philpot for Esther McCoy, attorney W. Martyn Philpot for Leo McCoy ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Brown, S.) (Entered: 09/08/2003)
ENDORSEMENT granting [455−1] motion for Marc L. Glenn to Withdraw as Attorney (Terminated attorney Marc L. Glenn for Esther McCoy, attorney Marc L. Glenn for Leo McCoy ( signed by Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns ) (Brown, S.) (Entered: 09/08/2003)
456 APPEARANCE of Attorney for Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy −− Norman A. Pattis (Villano, P.) (Entered: 09/08/2003)
457 MANDATE OF USCA (certified copy) dated 9/17/03 affirming judgment re; [432−1] appeal ( Roseann MacKechnie) (Brown, S.) (Entered: 10/01/2003)
ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge William I. Garfinkel for settlement conference. Signed by Judge Ellen Bree Burns on 11/18/03. (Depino, F.) Additional attachment(s) added on 11/19/2003 (Depino, F.). (Entered: 11/19/2003)
Document # 458 assigned to Order referring case to Magistrate Garfinkel forSettlement Conference (Depino, F.) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
458 ORDER Settlement Conference set for 1/21/2004 12:30 PM at the United States District Court, 141 Church Street, Room 226 New Haven, CT before William I. Garfinkel.. Signed by Judge William I. Garfinkel on 1/14/04. (Simpson, T.) (Entered: 01/15/2004)
459 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William I. Garfinkel : Amended (from 1/21/04) Settlement Conference held on 2/11/2004. (Simpson, T.) (Entered: 02/12/2004)
460 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR Hearing on Pending Motions set for 10/18/2004 09:00 AM in Courtroom Three − New Haven before Judge Ellen Bree Burns. THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE (Corbett, P.) (Entered: 09/30/2004)

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10/13/2004 10/28/2004 11/22/2004 11/30/2004 12/02/2004 12/02/2004
02/10/2005 02/18/2005 02/18/2005 03/02/2005 03/23/2005 03/23/2005 03/30/2005
04/04/2005 04/04/2005 04/06/2005

461 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR Evidentiary Hearing set for 12/6/2004 09:00 AM in Courtroom Three − New Haven before Judge Ellen Bree Burns. THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE (Corbett, P.) (Entered: 10/13/2004)
462 MOTION to Appoint Independent Advocate by Michael Belmont, Paul Bruch, Jean Gino, Philadelpo Guevarra, Ofelia Tee King, Brian Lensink. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 10/28/2004)
463 NOTICE of Appearance by Katrena K. Engstrom on behalf of Esther McCoy (Depino, F.) (Entered: 11/23/2004)
464 MOTION to Continue Hearing on Pending Motions by Michael Belmont, Paul Bruch, Jean Gino, Philadelpo Guevarra, Ofelia Tee King, Brian Lensink. (Inferrera, L.) (Entered: 12/01/2004)
465 NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 464 Motion to Continue Hearing on Pending Motions until March 1 and 2, 2005, at 10:00 A.M. THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Signed by Judge Ellen Bree Burns on 12/2/04. (Corbett, P.) (Entered: 12/02/2004)
466 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE.ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Hearing re. pending motions set for 3/1/2005 and 3/2/2005, at 10:00 AM in Courtroom Three − New Haven before Judge Ellen Bree Burns. (Corbett, P.) (Entered: 12/02/2004)
467 ENDORSEMENT ORDER granting 462 Motion to Appoint Advocate ad Litem. . Signed by Judge Ellen Bree Burns on 2/10/05. (Depino, F.) (Entered: 02/11/2005)
468 MOTION for Reconsideration re 462 to Appoint Independent Advocate by Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy.Responses due by 3/11/2005 (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
469 Memorandum in Support of 468 MOTION for Reconsideration re 462 to Appoint Independent Advocate filed by Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(Pesta, J.) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
470 NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 468 Motion for Reconsideration. THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE . Signed by Judge Ellen Bree Burns on 3/2/05. (Corbett, P.) (Entered: 03/02/2005)
471 Objection to 462 MOTION to Appoint Independent Advocate ad Litem filed by Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Sister Barbara Eirich)(Inferrera, L.) (Entered: 03/24/2005)
472 MOTION for Hearing re 462 motion to appoint independent advocate by Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Sister Barbara Eirich)(Inferrera, L.) (Entered: 03/24/2005)
473 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE.ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Hearing set for 5/12/2005 09:00 AM in Courtroom Three, 141 Church St., New Haven, CT before Judge Ellen Bree Burns. (Corbett, P.) (Entered: 03/30/2005)
474 MOTION to Compel by Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont, Jean Gino, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra.Responses due by 4/25/2005 (Depino, F.) (Entered: 04/04/2005)
475 Memorandum in Support re 474 MOTION to Compel filed by Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont, Jean Gino, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra. (Depino, F.) (Entered: 04/04/2005)
477 RESPONSE re 474 MOTION to Compel, 475 Memorandum in Support of Motion filed by Leo McCoy, William McCoy, Esther McCoy. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Depino, F.) (Entered: 04/07/2005)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 32 of 35

04/07/2005 04/12/2005 04/14/2005 04/14/2005 04/15/2005 04/20/2005 04/22/2005 04/22/2005 04/26/2005 04/27/2005 04/27/2005
04/28/2005 05/04/2005
05/09/2005
05/12/2005

476 REPLY to Response to 472 MOTION to Appoint Independent Advocate filed by Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont, Jean Gino, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra. (Depino, F.) Modified on 4/12/2005 (Depino, F.). (Entered: 04/07/2005)
Docket Entry Correction re 476 Reply to Response to Motion Created proper link (Depino, F.) (Entered: 04/12/2005)
478 MOTION for permission to make alternative arrangement for testimony of certain witnesses by Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont, Jean Gino, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra.Responses due by 5/5/2005 (Depino, F.) (Entered: 04/14/2005)
479 Memorandum in Opposition re 478 MOTION for permission to make alternative arrangement for testimony of certain witnesses filed by Leo McCoy, William McCoy. (Depino, F.) (Entered: 04/14/2005)
480 ORDER The parties are to file a final list of witnesses by 4/22/05. Signed by Judge Ellen Bree Burns on 4/14/05. (Depino, F.) (Entered: 04/15/2005)
481 REPLY to Response to 478 MOTION for permission to make alternative arrangement for testimony of certain witnesses filed by Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont, Jean Gino, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra. (Depino, F.) (Entered: 04/21/2005)
482 Pre−Hearing Witness List by Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont, Jean Gino, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra. (Depino, F.) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
483 MOTION for Protective Order by Leo McCoy, William McCoy, Esther McCoy.Responses due by 5/13/2005 (Depino, F.) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
484 ORDER denying as moot 474 Motion to Compel . Signed by Judge Ellen Bree Burns on 4/25/05. (Depino, F.) (Entered: 04/26/2005)
485 RESPONSE re 483 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont, Jean Gino, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra. (Depino, F.) (Entered: 04/27/2005)
486 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE.ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Evidentiary Hearing set for 6/3/2005 09:00 AM in Courtroom Three, 141 Church St., New Haven, CT before Judge Ellen Bree Burns. (Corbett, P.) (Entered: 04/27/2005)
487 ORDER denying in part 483 Motion for Protective Order . Signed by Judge Ellen Bree Burns on 4/27/05. (Depino, F.) (Entered: 04/28/2005)
488 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE.ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Evidentiary Hearing set for 6/2/2005 10:00 AM − NOTE NEW TIME!! − in Courtroom Three, 141 Church St., New Haven, CT before Judge Ellen Bree Burns. (Corbett, P.) (Entered: 05/04/2005)
489 NOTICE OF E−FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE.ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Evidentiary Hearing set for 6/3/2005 09:00 AM in Courtroom Three, 141 Church St., New Haven, CT before Judge Ellen Bree Burns. (Corbett, P.) (Entered: 05/09/2005)
490 SUPPLEMENTAL Memorandum in Support re 450 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont for the Enforcement of the 7/15/02 ruling pending appeal, and for Contempt, and for Clarification of [110−1] judgment order, and to Modify [110−1] judgment order 433 MOTION by Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra, Jean Gino, Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont for a finding of Contempt and for Clarification or modification of [110−1] the consent decree filed by Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont, Jean Gino, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 05/12/2005)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 33 of 35

05/12/2005 05/13/2005
05/16/2005 06/07/2005 06/08/2005 06/14/2005 06/14/2005
06/15/2005 06/15/2005 06/15/2005 06/20/2005 06/20/2005 07/06/2005 07/06/2005 08/15/2005 08/15/2005 09/06/2005 09/06/2005

491 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen Bree Burns : Evidentiary Hearing held on 5/12/2005. Hearing continued until 5/13/05 @ 10:00am (Court Reporter Paradis/Falzarano.) (Rodko, B.) (Entered: 05/12/2005)
492 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen Bree Burns : Evidentiary Hearing held on 5/13/2005. Hearing continued until 6/7/05 @ 10:00a.m. (Court Reporter Granfield/Paradis(Falzarano). (Rodko, B.) odified on 5/16/2005 (Rodko, B.). (Entered: 05/13/2005)
Docket Entry Correction re 492 Evidentiary Hearing; hearing continued until 6/7/05 @ 10:00am (Rodko, B.) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
493 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen Bree Burns : Evidentiary Hearing held on 6/7/2005. (Court Reporter K.Paradise(Falzarano).) (Rodko, B.) (Entered: 06/07/2005)
494 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen Bree Burns : Evidentiary Hearing held on 6/8/2005. (Court Reporter K. Paradis(Falzarano).) (Rodko, B.) (Entered: 06/08/2005)
495 TRANSCRIPT of Evidentiary Hearing held on 5/13/05 before Judge Ellen Bree Burns. Court Reporter: Falzarano Court Reporters. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 06/15/2005)
496 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ellen Bree Burns : Evidentiary Hearing held on 6/14/2005. Simultaneous briefs due 9/6/05, responses due 9/20/05 (Court Reporter C. Paradis/Falzarano Court Reporters.) (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 06/15/2005)
497 Marked Witness List by Paul Bruch, Leo McCoy, William McCoy, Esther McCoy, Michael Belmont, Jean Gino, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra. (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 06/20/2005)
498 Marked Exhibit List by Leo McCoy, William McCoy, Esther McCoy. (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 06/20/2005)
499 Marked Exhibit List by Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont, Jean Gino, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra. (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 06/20/2005)
500 TRANSCRIPT of Evidentiary Hearing (Part II) held on 5/12/05 before Judge Ellen Bree Burns. Court Reporter: Falzarrano Court Reporters. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 06/21/2005)
501 TRANSCRIPT of Evidentiary Hearing (Part I of II) held on 5/12/05 before Judge Ellen Bree Burns. Court Reporter: Falzarrano Court Reporters. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 06/21/2005)
502 TRANSCRIPT of Evidentiary Hearing held on 6/8/05 before Judge Ellen Bree Burns. Court Reporter: Falzarano Court Reporters. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 07/06/2005)
503 TRANSCRIPT of Evidentiary Hearing held on 6/14/05 before Judge Ellen Bree Burns. Court Reporter: Falzarano Court Reporters. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 07/06/2005)
504 ORDER granting, nunc pro tunc, Plaintiff's Motion for Hearing on Defendant's Request to Appoint an Independent Advocate 472 . Signed by Judge Ellen Bree Burns on 08/15/05. (Conneely, E.) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
505 ORDER finding as moot 478 Motion for Permission to Make Alternative Arrangements for Testimony of Certain Witnesses . Signed by Judge Ellen Bree Burns on 8/15/05. (Conneely, E.) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
506 MOTION for Extension of Time for one week to file post−hearing briefs by Leo McCoy, William McCoy, Esther McCoy. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 09/06/2005)
507 NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 506 Motion for Extension of Time to File Post−Hearing Briefs. Briefs are now due September 13, 2005. THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE. Signed by Judge Ellen Bree Burns on 9/6/05. (Corbett, P.) (Entered: 09/06/2005)

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 34 of 35

09/12/2005 09/13/2005
09/13/2005 10/07/2005 10/24/2005 11/16/2006 11/20/2006 01/26/2007 01/31/2007 03/02/2007 07/10/2007
08/06/2007
10/01/2007

510 Post Hearing Brief by Leo McCoy, William McCoy, Esther McCoy. (Ghilardi, K.) (Entered: 09/14/2005)
508 RESPONSE to 433 MOTION for a finding of Contempt and for Clarification or modification of [110−1] the consent decree, 445 Motion for for Contempt, enforcement and other relief &450 Motion for for the Enforcement of the 7/15/02 ruling pending appeal, and for Contempt, and for Clarification of [110−1] judgment order filed by Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont, Jean Gino, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 09/13/2005)
509 MOTION to appoint new advocate by Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont, Jean Gino, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 09/13/2005)
511 ORDER finding as moot 443 Motion to Quash. Signed by Judge Ellen Bree Burns on 10/7/05. (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 10/07/2005)
512 Corrected Reply to 510 Post Hearing Brief filed by Paul Bruch, Michael Belmont, Jean Gino, Brian Lensink, Ofelia Tee King, Philadelpo Guevarra. (Rodko, B.) (Entered: 10/25/2005)
513 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William I. Garfinkel : Follow−up Status/Settlement Conference discussion held on 11/16/2006. Total Time: 2 hours and 30 minutes (Urbano, G.) (Entered: 11/16/2006)
514 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 6/7/05 Evidentiary Hearing before Judge Ellen Burns. Court Reporter: K. Paradis/Falzarano Court Reporters. (Ruocco, M.) (Entered: 11/20/2006)
515 MOTION for Norman A. Pattis to Withdraw as Attorney by Esther McCoy. (Malone, P.) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
516 ORDER granting 515 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Norman A. Pattis terminated effective upon filing of an appearance for plaintiff. Signed by Judge Ellen Bree Burns on 1/31/07. (Corbett, P.) (Entered: 01/31/2007)
517 NOTICE of Appearance by Jennifer Lynn Zito on behalf of Leo McCoy, William McCoy (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 03/05/2007)
518 RULING granting in part 433 Motion for a Finding of Contempt 433 Motion for Clarification or Modification of Consent Decree; denying 445 Motion for Contempt, Enforcement and Other Relief; granting in part 450 Motion for the Enforcement of the 7/15/02 Ruling Pending Appeal and for a Finding of Contempt and for Clarification or Modification of the Consent Decree; granting 509 Motion for Authorization to Appoint a New Advocate. Signed by Judge Ellen Bree Burns on 7/10/07. (Inferrera, L.) (Entered: 07/10/2007)
519 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 518 Order on Motion for Contempt,, Order on Motion for Clarification,,,, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,,,,,, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct,, Order on Motion to Appoint Custodian, by Leo McCoy, Esther McCoy. Filing fee $ 455, receipt number N022009. (Attachments: # 1 RULING on Defendant's Motions)(Malone, P.) (Entered: 08/08/2007)
520 Index to Record on Appeal by Leo McCoy, William McCoy re 519 Notice of Appeal, 505 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, 497 Witness List, 503 Transcript, 493 Evidentiary Hearing, 479 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 514 Transcript, 477 Response, 472 MOTION for Hearing, 516 Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, 513 Settlement Conference, 509 MOTION to Appoint Custodian, 501 Transcript, 467 Order on Motion to Appoint Guardian/Attorney ad Litem, 496 Evidentiary Hearing, 511 Order on Motion to Quash, 459 Settlement Conference, 510 Trial Memo, 475 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 491 Evidentiary Hearing, 469 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 490 Memorandum in Support of Motion,, 471 Response, 515 MOTION for Norman A. Pattis to Withdraw as Attorney, 494 Evidentiary Hearing, 506 MOTION for Extension of Time until for one week to file post−hearing briefs, 474 MOTION to Compel, 476 Reply to Response to Motion, 498 Exhibit List, 512 Response, 502 Transcript, 478 MOTION for permission to make alternative arrangement for testimony of certain witnesses, 492 Evidentiary Hearing, 495 Transcript, 462 MOTION to Appoint

Case: 3:85-cv-00465-EBB As of: 07/11/2014 11:32 AM EDT 35 of 35

10/09/2007 01/04/2008 01/14/2008 06/23/2008 06/23/2008 06/30/2008 09/04/2008 07/13/2009 04/19/2010 05/17/2010 08/31/2010

Independent Advocate ad Litem, 504 Order on Motion for Hearing, 458 Order, Set Deadlines/Hearings, 500 Transcript, 518 Order on Motion for Contempt,, Order on Motion for Clarification,,,, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,,,,,, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct,, Order on Motion to Appoint Custodian, 499 Exhibit List, 507 Order on Motion for Extension of Time, 517 Notice of Appearance, 508 Response, 468 MOTION for Reconsideration re 462 MOTION to Appoint Independent Advocate ad Litem, 470 Order on Motion for Reconsideration. For docket entries without a hyperlink, contact the court to arrange for the document(s) to be made available to you. (Malone, P.) (Entered: 10/02/2007)
Acknowledged Receipt of Index at USCA on 10/2/07 re 519 Notice of Appeal, : USCA Number: 07−3403 (Malone, P.) (Entered: 10/10/2007)
Request from Richard Alcantara @USCA for Record on Appeal Made Via email re 519 Notice of Appeal : (Brown, S.) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
521 Supplemental Record on Appeal shipped to US Court of Appeals via UPS Consisting of 5 Paper Transcripts, Documents 500−503 and 514 re 519 Notice of Appeal, (Brown, S.) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
Request from USCA for Record on Appeal Made Via E−Mail re 519 Notice of Appeal, : Requesting paper documents #434, 438 (Malone, P.) (Entered: 06/23/2008)
Certified and Transmitted Record on Appeal Consisting of Paper Documents 434 and 438 to US Court of Appeals re 519 Notice of Appeal,. USCA Number: 07−3403 (Malone, P.) (Entered: 06/23/2008)
Appeal Record Returned: Consisting of 5 paper transcripts, documents 500−503 and 514 re 519 Notice of Appeal, (Malone, P.) (Entered: 07/14/2008)
522 MANDATE of USCA dated 9/4/08 Affirming USDC Ruling re 519 Notice of Appeal, filed by Esther McCoy, Leo McCoy (Brown, S.) (Entered: 09/05/2008)
Appeal Record Returned: 519 Notice of Appeal, Consisting copies of paper documents # 434 and # 438 (Malone, P.) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
523 Acknowledgment of Receipt of notice to pick up defendant's exhibits from hearings on 5/12/05−5/13/05− 6/7/05−6/8/05, 6/14/05 by 4/23/10. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 04/21/2010)
524 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SERVICE by Thomas York of Defendants exhibits from hearing on 5/12/05−5/13/05, 6/7/05−6/8/05, 6/14/05. (Falcone, K.) (Entered: 05/18/2010)
525 Acknowledgment of Receipt of plaintiffs exhibits from hearings in 2005 signed by Attorney Jennifer Zito. (Pesta, J.) (Entered: 08/31/2010)

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

LEO McCOY and WILLIAM McCOY,

¯

Plaintiffs,

¯

VJ

MICHAEL BELMONT, et aI.,

¯

Defendants.

CIVIL NO. N-8.~ (JAC)
June ~, 1993

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND ENFORCEMENT This action on behalf of two severely handicapped residents of the Southbur) Training School (STS), operated through the defendants by the Connecticut Depanrtent of Mental Retardation, was filed in 1985 and resolved by Consent Decree on March 1(1992. In the 14 months since entry of the decree, essentially nothing has been done to cotr with the decree or to end the inadequate and harmful conditions and treatment toh~ich the plaintiffs, Leo McCoy, Jr. and William McCoy, have been and continue to be s~ujleeted. Plaintiffs therefore ask that the defendants be held in civil contempt and that certaii specific measures be ordered to ensure the plaintiffs’ well-being and the proper implementation of the Decree.
I. DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DECREE¯
According to the Consent Decree (McCoy Declaration, Ex. 1), Leo McCoy, J and William McCoy are to be provided with "consistent care from appropriately trained ;taft’ in an appropriate living environment (paragraph 1). Programs and services for the pla ntiffs are to meet Federal standards for intermediate care facilities (paragraph 4), includh Lg active treatment provided in accordance with individual plans of care, 42 C.F.R. 483.440, and are to be provided by sufficient numbers of staff "trained to administer services

adequately, skillfully, safely, and humanely" (paragraph 5). The plaintiffs are to be given balanced, nutritious meals (paragraph 6), which must be fed to them in a safe and consistent manner. Leo Jr. and William McCoy are also entitled to a modicum of adequate programming, including appropriate day activities (paragraph 7) and special attention to their particular individual needs -- especially Leo Jr.’s ambulation and health problems and William’s eating difficulties (paragraph 10). And of course, the plaintiffs are entitled to adequate medical care (paragraph 14).
Most of the basic entitlements set forth in the Consent Decree -- adequate food, decent living environment, proper medical care, safety, and at least a maintenance level of programming -- are available to all residents of State mental retardation facilities as a matter of constitutional right. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Leo Jr. and William McCoy’s entitlement is more specific and more immediate because of the existence of their own Consent Decree and because of the history of injury and deprivation that the decree is intended to remediate. Yet as the declarations of Esther McCoy, the plaintiffs’ mother, and Sister Barbara Eirich, their expert consultant, indicate, almost nothing has been done by the defendants in the past 14 months to provide the plaintiffs with adequate care and treatment or to end the neglectful and injurious practices of the past.
Under the Consent Decree, a new and separate residence was supposed to be developed for Leo Jr. and William McCoy in a former staff home across the street from the Southbury Training School campus no later than September 1, 1992. Care and services were to be provided by a specially trained "core staff’ whose members were to be approved by Leo Jr.’s and William’s parents (paragraphs 2-3). Eight months after the deadline, the new residence is still not ready for occupancy and the core staff is still incomplete (McCoy Declaration, para. 6-7, 9). Some small portion of this delay may be due to Leo Jr.’s and William’s parents; but though they may not always have been immediately available or

agreeable, they have also been sent on their share of fools’ errands that seemed designed to cause further delay (McCoy Declaration, para. 8).
Without question, however, the primary problem has been the defendants’ inability or unwillingness to honor the requirement for parental, approval of core staff for the plaintiffs’ new home, because of apparent conflict between this requirement and the State’s collective bargaining agreements (McCoy Declaration, para. 9-10). Whatever the scope of this problem, it was or should have been known to the defendants when the Consent Decree was being negotiated, and thus it cannot now be relied upon as a justification for noncompliance. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 365, 371 (1966); United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030-1031 (2d. Cir. 1978). The defendants’ resulting method of staff selection has limited the choices available to Mr. and Mrs. McCoy, and effectively made it impossible for them to reject applicants who have attained a certain level of seniority. Thus several core staff positions, including that of the lead worker, remain unfilled to this day (McCoy Declaration, para. 9).
Meanwhile, Leo Jr.’s and William’s entitlements and needs have gone and continue to go unmet, placing them at serious risk of harm. To some extent, the defendants have identified the services plaintiffs require in their overall plans of service and daily activity schedules (McCoy Declaration, para. 28 and Ex. 9; Eirich Declaration, Ex. 2); but these plans are not being implemented and the needed services are not being provided. As a result, both plaintiffs are as much at risk today as they were before the decree was entered (McCoy Declaration, para. 4; Eirich Declaration, p. 2-3). According to Sister Barbara Eirich, who has been in constant contact with the plaintiffs since entry of the decree and who has worked with the plaintiffs for eight years, "[t]here is overwhelming evidence of an inability for Southbury Training School to provide the most basic life preserving services" -an incapacity which places Leo Jr. and William McCoy "at extreme risk of very serious health problems" (Eirich Declaration, Ex. 2, p. 1, 4).
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Leo McCoy, Jr.’s most significant need is for ambulation and other physical activity which will help to preserve his limited walking and toileting skills and to reduce the risk of serious cardiac complications. Yet there is no ambulation program for Leo Jr., no plan for therapeutic positioning, and no apparent training for staff in this important area (McCoy Declaration, para. 22-24 and Ex. 5-6; Eirich Declaration, Ex. 2, p. 2). Even assignment of a physical therapist to Leo Jr. has not been a priority for the defendants (McCoy Declaration, Ex. 6). When STS finally contracted with an outside therapist in March, 1993, it allocated only two hours per week for this therapist to work with both Leo Jr. and William, develop programs for them, and train staff in the proper techniques. This level of service cannot possibly be sufficient and leaves Leo Jr., especially, at serious physical risk (McCoy Declaration, para. 23; Eirich Declaration, Ex. 2, p. 2-3).
For William McCoy, the issue of life and death relates to his feeding program. As everyone recognizes, he cannot feed himself and must be fed slowly, with very small portions, while in a proper upright position o- all according to a plan in which participating staff are fully trained. If not -- as happened in June, 1992, and again, with nearly fatal results, in January of 1993 -- he will aspirate his food or drink, i.e., ingest it in his lungs, and develop aspiration pneumonia (McCoy Declaration, para. 2, 15, 35-40). Yet there has not been a systematic plan at STS for addressing William McCoy’s eating difficulties and related problems (Eirich Declaration, Ex. 2, p. 3-4). He is still fed improperly on many occasions by staff who have not been adequately trained (McCoy Declaration, para. 15, 3540), and now the latest attempt to take an organized approach to this vital area has been derailed by the apparent abdication of the responsible therapist (id, para. 40). William’s risk of contracting pneumonia is probably greater than ever (Eirich Declaration, Ex. 2, p. 3).
In addition these specific failures to keep the plaintiffs physically safe and well and to meet their most basic physical, medical, and nutritional needs, the defendants have continued to deny Leo Jr. and William McCoy more than a few minutes a day of
-4-

therapeutic or stimulating activity (McCoy Declaration, para. 24-26). The hiring and entry on duty of some of the required "core" staff has not affected the plaintiffs’ isolation and inactivity, because meaningful programs have not been written and the staff have not been properly trained. Using time with Leo Jr. and William to catch up on one’s light reading continues to be a substitute for interaction and stimulation (/d, para. 10, 25-26).
Finally, Leo Jr. in particular has been subjected to continued battering whose cause is seldom if ever determined but which is frequently blamed on his parents. These episodes include a back broken in three places and systematically inflicted injuries to Leo Jr.’s arm, as well as other less serious but troubling incidents and lapses in care or supervision (McCoy Declaration, para. 13-14, 16-21, 31-32, 34, 41-44). Even at this basic level, the defendants have been unable to protect Leo Jr. and William from harm.
II. THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE HELD IN CIVIL CONTEMPT AND SUBJECTED TO ORDERS FOR ENFORCEMENT.~..
The above described failure by the defendants to take any meaningful action to implement major portions of a 14-month-old Consent Decree, whether willful or not, deserves to be recognized and condemned for the contumacious behavior it is. McC~mb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949); NLRB v. Local 282, Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 428 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1970); NAACP, Jefferson County Branch v. Brock, 619 F.Supp. 846 (D.D.C. 1985); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 533 F.Supp. 631 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affd 673 F. 2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. den. 465 U.S. 1038 (1984). This court has inherent power to enforce its order, the Consent Decree, through civil contempt sanctions, Shillitani v. United States, supra, at 370 (1966); NAACP, Jefferson County Branch v. Brock, supra, at 549, and such coercive sanctions may include fines or imprisonment. Penfield Co. of California v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947); Firemen’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Myers, 439 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1971).
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Plaintiffs do not seek any enrichment of themselves by this motion, since the defendants are already responsible for providing them with all required services; but plaintiffs believe that their suggested initial and continuing fines of $10,000 per day per plaintiff (P1. Motion, p. 2-3) are justified by whatever measure of damages may apply, e.g., Quinter v. Volkswagen of Arnerica, 676 F.2d 969, 975 (3d Cir. 1982), and that they are sufficiently coercive to capture the defendants’ attention. Plaintiffs also ask for orders specifically addressing the defendants’ most obvious failures, i.e., provision of services called for in the plaintiffs plans and activity schedules; ambulation and physical therapy services for Leo McCoy, Jr., and a proper feeding program for William; and timely development of the residential alternative to which plaintiffs are entitled (P1. Motion, p. 2-3).
Given the clear possibility that STS may never be able to comply with these requirements, plaintiff suggests that the defendants be given the option of proposing an alternative provider of services. Plaintiffs also seek appointment of a qualified independent professional who can spend up to six hours per day ensuring that the plaintiffs are being protected and the Court’s orders are being implemented. The requested relief, taken all together, is reasonably calculated to ensure vindication of plaintiffs’ entitlements under the Consent Decree while protecting them from further deprivation and reducing their level of risk.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs request that the defendant State officials responsible for operation of STS be held in civil contempt for failing to implement the Consent Decree and for continuing the unconstitutional acts and practices the decree was
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designed to redress. Plaintiffs further request that the Court grant them the specific relief set forth in their motion for contempt, enforcement, and further relief (p. 2-3), as well as such other remedies or enforcement measures which may be reasonable and appropriate.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated: June 1~, 199~

MICHAEL . 182) 1003 Richardson Drive Raleigh, North Carolina 27603 (919) 733-1070
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following in accordance with Rule 5(b), F.R.Civ.P., this’~h day of June, 1993:
James P. Welsh, Esq. Assistant Attorney General 110 Sherman Street Hartford, Connecticut 06105
MICHAEL S,~" (~ 06182)

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES-DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

LEO McCOY and WILLIAM McCOY :

by their parents and

:

guardians Leo & Esther McCoy :

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

:

:

MICHAEL BELMONT, individually:

and as Superintendent,

:

Southbury Training School;

:

:

JEAN GINO, M.D., individually:

and as Medical Director of

Southbury Training School;

CIV. NO. ~[~-85--~,465 (JAC)

OFELIA TEE KING, M.D., individually;

PHILADELPO GUEVARRA, M.D. individually;

BRIAN LENSINK, Commissioner Connecticut Department of
Mental Retardation;

PAUL BRUCH, M.D., individually,

~JUNE9, 1988

Defendants

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. JURISDICTION

i. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States and seeks a declaratory judgment,

preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and money damages

to redress the deprivation under color of State law of rights

secured to plaintiffs by the First, Ninth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and by Federal laws, in particular 42 U.S.C. Section 1396 e_~t se_9_q~. The amount in controversy exceeds Ten Thousand ($i0,000.00) Dollars exclusive of interest and costs.
2. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331, 1343, 2201, 2202; 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988. II. FACTS
3. Plaintiffs Leo McCoy, Jr., and William McCoy were, at the time of the filing of this lawsuit, twenty-nine-years old and twenty-six-years old respectively and lived at Southbury Training School, Southbury,~.9onnecticut. They have lived at Southbury Training School since about July 22, 1968.
4. Leo and William lived at home with their parents until approximately ages twelve and nine respectively. Their parents strove to keep them at home even though a free public special education or other programs to support the family were unavailable.
5. Because defendants offered no community programs, no support services to the family, no homemaker services, no respite care, no visiting therapists, and no small community residences, the McCoys had no alternative but to allow their sons’ placement at Southbury Training School.
6. At all times relevant to these proceedings the plaintiffs have been incapable of managing their own affairs,
-2-

incapable of making informed choices about their care and treatment, unable to initiate legal actions on their own behalf and have been or should have been declared legally incompetent by a Connecticut Probate Court.
7. On or about May 5, 1976, the Southbury Probate Court determined that plaintiff Leo McCoy was incompetent and appointed his parents, Leo and Esther McCoy as guardians. On or about June 16, 1977, the Southbury Probate Court determined that plaintiff William McCoy was incompetent and appointed Mr. and Mrs. McCoy as guardians.
8. During the last seventeen years the plaintiffs have lived in the same cottage at Southbur~. Training School (Cottage 34). This cottage is certifed by State and Federal officials as a facility that meets the program and facility requirements of an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded (ICFMR) under 42 C.F.R. Section 442.400 et se_~_q~. ~ifty percent of the cost of care of the plaintiffs is reimbursed under this ICFMR program by the Federal Government.
9. During their stay at Southbury Training School, plaintiffs have received no effective program, and have spent their days sitting or lying on the floor idly with nothing to do.
10. During this period the plaintiffs have been subjected to physical restraint.

11. No programs were available during this period to teach them affirmative skills and appropriate behaviors.
12. As a result of the lack of programs and inadequate supervision by untrained staff, they have received numerous contusions, lacerations, fractures and have regressed and continue to regress in a number of skill areas and to deteriorate physically. Further, the plaintiffs have learned no new affirmative skills.
13. Despite repeated complaints by the parents about inadequate conditions and the lack of programs and services necessary to meet the health and safety needs of their sons to State and Federal officials, defen~nts have taken no action to provide the decent care and programs their sons so desperately need.
14. The State has not provided plaintiffs with effective specialized services or programs during their stay at Southbury. Such effective programs can be provided only if the state develops the small group homes or other community residences with appropriate staffing and support. To this date the state has failed to develop the necessary community programs.
15. Defendant Michael Belmont, is the former Superintendent of Southbury Training School. He was Superintendent up until after this lawsuit was filed. His successor in office and present Superintendent of Southbury
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Training School is Stephen Staugaitis. He is responsible for:
a) the operation and administration of the Training School, and for the custody, control, and provision of adequate care and treatment to all persons admitted to the Training School;
b) authorizing transfers into and out of the Training School from or to another state or private facility for the mentally retarded;
c) placing any mentally retarded person committed or admitted to the Training School in a private boarding home, group home or other residential facil~ty. The Superintendent remains responsible for exercising control over the person after the transfer and for exercising the power to return such a person to the Training School.
16. Defendant Jean Gino, M.D. is the director of Medical Care at the Southbury Training School. As such, she is responsible for ensuring that each resident of Southbury Training School receives medical care comparable to the available to citizens in the community. In the face of these responsibilities Dr. Gino failed to assign physicians and design medical care responsibilities in a way that would ensure that medical problems of residents were appropriately diagnosed and treated. Dr. Gino has also provided medical care and treatment to each of the named plaintiffs on various
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occasions. 17. Ofelia Tee King, M.D. is a practicing physician at
Southbury Training School and was assigned to provide medical care to the plaintiffs from 1983 through the present. During this period of time Dr. Tee King took no action to diagnose or treat Leo McCoy’s scoliosis or William McCoy’s hearing and vision problems or medical problems associated with his feeding, bowels and hand-in-mouth behavior. Dr. Tee King is sued in her individual capacity only.
18. Philadelpo Guevarra, is a resident of Southbury, Connecticut and was assigned to provide medical care to the plaintiffs from 1978 - 1983. During t~is time period Dr. Guevarra took no action.to diagnose or treat Leo McCoy’s scoliosis or William McCoy’s medical problems associated with his vision, hearing, feeding, bowels and hand-in-mouth behavior.
19. Paul Bruch, M.D. was a practicing physician at the Southbury Training School during the period November 1960 through 1986. During this period of time orthopedic medical issues were referred to him for resolution. Other physicians at the Training School routinely referred ali orthopedic problems in the Training School to Dr. Bruch and would rely on him to resolve those problems. Pursuant to this practice, Leo McCoy’s scoliosis was referred to Dr. Bruch for resolution in 1975 or 1976. Other physicians took no action
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to address Leo’s orthopedic problems in light of this referral. Although Dr. Bruch became aware of Leo’s scoliosis and substantial spinal curvature he took no action to refer Leo to an orthopedic specialist or to provide medical or other necessary specialized interventions to treat Leo’s spine or to curtail or halt the progression of his spinal curvature.
20. Defendant Brian Lensink is the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Retardation for the State of Connecticut. He is responsible for:
a) the planning and development of a complete, comprehensive and integrated statewid~..program for the mentally retarded;
b) the implementation of said program; c) the coordination of efforts of the Department of Mental Retardation with other state departments and agencies, municipal governments, and private agencies concerned with and providing services for the mentally retarded; d) the administration and operation of the state training schools, regional centers, and all state operated community and residential facilities established for diagnosis, care and training of the retarded; e) the development of criteria as to the eligibility of any retarded person for residential care in any public or state supported private institution;
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f) after considering the recommendation of a properly designated diagnostic agency, he may assign a retarded person to a public or state supported private institution. He may transfer such persons from one institution to another when necessary or desirable for his welfare;
g) Under Connecticut law Commissioner Lensink is properly sued in his official capacity for negligent acts of Department of Mental Retardation (DMR) employees (Connecticut General Statutes Section 19a-24).
21. Southbury Training School is located on the outskirts of Southbury, Connecticut, a small rural community in western Connecticut.
22. Southbury’s isolation precludes the use of community resources as an integral part of a training program, to meet health needs, to provide employment or recreation, or as aids in the development of those diversified activities which citizens living in society take for granted.
23. Living and activity space in cottage 34 at Southbury Training School is inadequate in design, insufficient in area and inappropriate in setting. The building is not functional for modern needs. It is dirty and unsanitary, exposing plaintiffs to physical health hazards in addition to occasional odors. Further, there is no natural sunlight in the day hall where plaintiffs spend most of their
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waking hours. 24. Cottage 34 at Southbury was designed for mass
management and custodial convenience. Plaintiffs spend almost all of their time in large groups in multi-function rooms, which allow no separation of activities, such as would be found in private or group homes or in normal work or recreation places. Plaintiffs are not given the opportunity to experience a variety of environments during the day, as are community members.
25. The physical layout and furnishings of.Cottage 34 are devoid of warmth, individuality, or dignity. The living area is sparsely furnished and is without the lamps, sofas, rugs, comfortable chairs, pictures, magazines, and other ageappropriate furnishings associated with normal living. Plaintiffs are denied the developmental, sensory and intellectual stimulation, comfort and pleasure community residents obtain from the usual physical accoutrements in homes, schools, restaurants, workplaces, and recreational facilities.
26. The physical setting in Cottage 34 does not allow privacy, individuality, or freedom of association to plaintiffs. They spend their days in a large "day room".
27. Plaintiffs are deprived of their freedom to choose or reject their associates and to determine when and in what way they relate to their friends.
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28. Because of the shortage of staff and the lack of facilities for storage of personal items, the few belongings. which plaintiffs own are usually lost, stolen or destroyed within a short period of time. These conditions deprive plaintiffs of their dignity and identity, and also fail to help them develop the self-respect, consideration for others, and understanding of property relationships necessary to functioning in the community.
29. Toilet facilities are inadequate. The Cottage at times has a definite stench of urine.
30. Plaintiffs’ personal clothing is routinely lost, and plaintiffs are frequently require~..to wear improper fitting clothes and underclothes. Plaintiffs are deprived of the personal development, comfort and satisfaction that accompany the tight to choose among a selection of appropriate, clean, fitting, seasonable, and attractive personal, clothing and to present an appearance similar to other c~tizens.
31. Staff-resident ratios and staff training are inadequate to provide care, let alone to evoke development an habilitation or to protect plaintiffs from harm. The staffing requirements of recognized authoritative minimum standards are not met.
32. Plaintiffs are not provided with the services, stimulation, and attention necessary to prevent deterioration
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of and injury.to their physical condition, psychological

well-being, and personal development. As a result, plaintiffs regression and physical deterioration continue.

33. Staff-patient ratios and the gross scale of

institutional living operate to discourage personal,

intimate, primary relationships like those enjoyed in normal living.
34. Defendants have failed torecruit, employ and train

direct care and professional personnel in sufficient numbers

and have failed to place personnel in an environment where it

is possible for them to stimulate and assist in the daily

life activities of plaintiffs.

I--

35. Adequate evaluations of plaintiffs’ physical,

social, psychological, and personal development are not made.

Individualized habilitation plans and programs that conform

to recognized professional standards are not provided. 36. Defendants have failed to provide periodic review

of the effectiveness of said plan or program.

37. Defendants have failed to provide necessary services, including medical and dental care and treatment,

nursing care, psychological services, personal care, protectfve and social work services, physical and

occupational therapy, speech pathology and audiology

services, recreation, vocational and rehabilitative training.

38. Defendants have failed to provide for each

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plaintiff an individualized ~exit plan for placement in a less restrictive integrated community setting.
39. Plaintiffs spend most of their time in a day room adjoining their sleeping quarters without planned activity, often sitting or lying alone. Rarely are they taken outside unless by their parents during home visits. There is very little interaction between staff and classmembers on the wards. Age-appropriate activities are unavailable.
40. Activities such as eating, toileting, and bathing are often conduced en masse, at predetermined and unchanging times chosen for the convenience of the facility. This regimentation deprives plaintiffs of t~e normally experienced freedom and dignity of choosing when to attend to their individual daily tasks and interests, and arranging their appearances according to their personal taste.
41. The behaviorof plaintiffs may differ from those of other persons, but those differences can be diminished.
42. Plaintiffs, like other persons, vary in their needs, wishes, and abilities, and at different points of life, different activities and environments are appropriate to each person.
43. Southbury Training School has classified plaintiffs once and in the gross, based on a few salient characteristics, with little opportunity for re-evaluation or
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change. 44. In Cottage 34 plaintiffs are, by reason of their
placement, segregated and isolated from the rest of society. Defendants’ actions deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity to interac£ with non-retared people in non-custodial relationships and in normal community settings.
45. Plaintiffs are denied the experience of observing how other people behave and interact and of learning to carry out age-appropriate and acceptable social behavior and of experiencing the dignity and freedom of living in the community as normally as they may.
46. Plaintiffs are human beings ~o have feelings, needs, and motivations like other people. They have, to varying degrees, the potential for growth, development, and achievement of self-care and self support. They are capable of benefiting from treatment and habilitative care to maximize their potential and to satisfy their social, emotional and economic needs. For neither of them is institutionalization necessary, either for their habilitation, treatment or care.
47. Plaintiffs could be discharged, given adequate alternative living arrangements with access to appropriate back-up-services.
48. Defendants, by their acts and omissions set out more specifically in paragraphs 1 through 47 above have,
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through substantial departures from accepted standards for providing care and services to the individual plaintiffs, directly, proximately, knowingly and intentionally, harmed plaintiffs, and deprived them of their civil rights in one or more of the following respects:
a) Plaintiffs have suffered physical, and emotional .harm including, but not limited to, broken bones, lacerations, contusions, muscle contractures, increased curvature of plaintiff Leo McCoy’s spine and related damage to internal organs and systems, pain and suffering, hearing loss, poor dental care, loss of skills due to lack of program and decreased life span;
b) plaintiffs have been deprived of their rights to adequate clothing, freedom from harm, to decent, safe, sanitary and humane living conditions, to adequate programming to prevent deterioration and regression and to develop new skills, and loss of First Amendment freedoms;
c) plaintiffs have been deprived of the right to work and participate in society.
49. These injuries have occurred and continue to occur despite the continuous complaints of.parents and investigations by state and federal authorities. Significantly, these complaints, and formal findings of the United States Justice Department reveal that conditions at Southbury fail to satisfy the minimum requirements of the
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United States Constitution. These complaints are often met by retaliation by officers at Southbury rather than by effective corrective action.
50. Monetary damages and other remedies at law, in and of themselves, are inadequate to remedy all the conditions described above. Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be irreparably harmed by the defendants’ conduct described in paragraphs 1 - 49 above.
III. CLAIMS COUNT i: EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM
51. By segregating plaintiffs from society, the defendants have violated plaintiffs rights secured by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. COUNT II: DU__~E PROCESS CLAIMS
52. The acts and omissions of the defendants constitute such a substantial departure from minimum acceptable professional standards as to indicate that no professional judgment was exercised. As such they deny plaintiffs their constitutional rights secured by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution:
a) to the habilitation necessary to enable plaintiffs to communicate, associate, and assemble with others of their choice and otherwise to exercise their rights under the First Amendment;
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b) to privacy, liberty, dignity, and family integrity under the First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments;
c) to an individualized habilitation plan and program; d) to the opportunity to be heard on the appropriateness of the plan, program and environment of treatment; e) to protection from harm, freedom from restraint, to reasonably safe conditions, to individualized treatment and habilitation to preserve and develop skills in the least restrictive environment under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. COUNT III: SOCIAL SECURITY ACT CLAIM 53. Defendants have violated plaintiffs’ rights secured by the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1396 et seq~ and the regulations promulgated thereunder by not providing them necessary treatment, therapies, programs and services to maximize plaintiffs’ potential. COUNT IV: PENDENT STATE CLAIM AS TO DEFENDANTS
GINO, TEE KIN_~GGUEVARRAAND BRUCH 54. As a direct and proximate result of the improper diagnosis and treatment of plaintiffs, no effective treatment or follow-up care for William McCoy’s deafness, blindness, feeding, hand-in-mouth and bowel problems or Leo McCoy’s scoliosis was obtained. 55. The injuries and losses sustained by the plaintiffs were caused by the failure of the defendants Gino, Tee King,
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Guevarra and Bruch to excercise that degree of skill, care and diligence expected of physicians in one or more of the following ways:
a) they failed to properly monitor plaintiffs’ physical
status;
b) they failed to ensure that plaintiffs received
adequate medical treatment; c) they failed to provide adequate diagnosis in
accordance with medical standards accepted in the community; d) they failed to request proper medical consultations. 56. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence
of defendants Gino, Tee King, Guevarra~~nd Bruch the plaintiffs have suffered extreme anxiety, pain and permanent physical, mental and emotional damages. Virtually all of their physical and mental processes were weakened, their capacity to carry on and enjoy life’s activities and their earning capacity were all substantially destroyed. Further, as a result of the negligence of these defendants, plaintiff Leo McC0y’s life expectancy has been substantially shortened.
57. The failure of these defendants to exercise reasonable medical care on behalf of the plaintiffs increased the risk of harm to them.
58. The failure to exercise reasonable medical care by these defendants on behalf of the plaintiffs deprived them of the opportunity to obtain timely and appropriate care.
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59. As a consequence of these injuries, plaintiffs have

spent monies for hospitalization, physical care, medication

and medical care, and will be forced to incur substantial medical costs in the future and they have lost earning

capacity.

V. RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this

Court: i. Permanently enjoin defendants to provide each

plaintiff effective services in the least separate, most

integrated, least restrictive community setting appropriate

to their needs.

~"

2. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendants from

transferring plaintiffs from Southbury Training School,

Cottage 34, (in William McCoy’s case - the infirmary) unless

such transfer is to the least separate, most integrated,

least restrictive community setting appropriated to their

needs, ancillary and necessary services provided.

3. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendants to

make available in advance of that time and with dispatch the

necessary alternative residential facilities and services in

the community.

4. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendants to

develop written individualized habilitation and exit plans

for each plaintiff and to provide an individualized

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habilitation program for each. 5. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendants to
make available a friend-advocate to each plaintiff to assist each in securing the substantive and procedural propections aforesaid.
6. Award monetary damages to plaintiffs. 7. Award exemplary and punitive damages to plaintiffs. 8. Award plaintiffs costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. 9. Award plaintiffs such other relief as is necessary ~to effectuate their rights to effective services in an integrated community setting.
Respectfully submitted,
.../i,., I
David C. Shaw Trowbridge, Ide, Courtney & Mansfield, P.C. 207 Main Street Hartford, Ct 06106
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 Recommendations of theSpecial McCov v. Belmont May 17, 1999

BACKGROUND The June 19, 1998 Order of Reference appointing the Special Master in ~:.M~y Belmont case includes, in part, the following statement of duties and responsibilities:

"4, This Special Master is directed to:

(1) Conduct an immediate and thorough review of all aspects of the

Defendants’ care and treatment of the plaintiffs covered by the

March 10, 1992 Consent Decree to determine the changes

needed to meet the Decree’s desired ends;

(2) formulate specific methods, strategies, and approaches to

implement the March 10, 1992 Consent Decree as soon as

possible .....

"5.

(1) To examine in detail and to evaluate defendants’ compliance.., and

any barriers to full implementation of the Court Decree.

(2) To develop within six (6) months of this appointment, with as much

consensus of the parties as is possible, a comprehensive plan, using such input from

consultants, experts, the parties and others as this Special Master deems appropriate,

to assure the delivery of programs and services called for in the March 10, 1992 Consent

Decree and subsequent orders of the Court, and to othePwise satisfy the

requirements of such orders. At the Special Master’s request, and

for good cause shown, the date for the plan may be extended upon

approval of the Court. In developing the comprehensive plan, the Special Master

shall, to the extent possible, include but not limit his plan to the following:

a. develop a managerial plan for implementation of the

Consent Decree ....

b. develop an internal plan for the management of Staff

House II on a daily basis, including designating

recommended positions and duties;

c. examine and review thoroughly the hiring process and staff turnover problem with proposed recommendations

for hiring, training and retaining staff;

d. evaluate and make recommendations with respect to the

plaintiffs’ needs, including, but not limited to, staffing needs;

e. make recommendations for minimizing disputes and

tensions between the parties.

(3) To monitor implementation by defendants of the orders of the Court

and make recommendations as to any supplemental remedial orders;

(4) To report periodically, at least quarterly, to this Court regarding the

status of implementation .... to recommend to this Court such

modifications and alterations in the remedial orders or plans as appear

necessary and proper ..... " (pgs. 2-4)

A written quarterly report was submitted in September. In addition to numerous telephone contacts and conference calls I have met with Magistrate Margolis and members of her staff on a monthly basis to keep her informed of the status of the

Special Master’s work and the activities of the Parties. An extension for the six months report was requested in order to gain more information, and toward that end, as permitted under paragraph 5, Number 2 above, Ms. Rosemary Geraci, a State Employee, was temporarily assigned to assist my office in gathering additional information for this report.
The September Special Master’s Report contained a number of recommendations and observations, some which continue to be valid in their entirety and some which require modification. I concluded in that report that the continued administration of this home by Southbury Training School was not producing the desired results and a new administration was needed. That continues to be accurate, and remains the most urgent and pressing action that needs to be taken.
It was recommended that a different house be located, one which would be wheelchair accessible, provide a bedroom for each man, and would be free of the negative relationship that has developed between Mr. and Mrs. McCoy and the employees of the Southbury Campus. That recommendation, while less urgent than the change in administration, is also one which needs to be implemented.
The Report also included the following conclusion: "While meeting with people I was open to discussions about "who’s to blame?", however I tried to move beyond that question to "where should we go from here?" I believe little is to be gained by continuing to dwell on what has happened and why (emphasis added). The court has had numerous hearings on the subject, and the parties have written extensively about their respective points of view. The McCoys continue to believe that there is an ongoing effort by some people to undermine the welfare of their sons and deprive them of what was promised in their consent decree.
Conversely, State administrative, professional, and union employees continue to believe that it has been interference by the McCoys in the operation of the home that has caused the problems that exist. Neither point of view is likely to change, and for that reason this report does not address those issues."
Not fixing responsibility for the problems which have developed was a mistake for the following reasons:
1) We are poised to try one more time to make the spirit of the Consent Decree become a reality. There is agreement that a new administration needs to take over. That administration must be given every chance to succeed. But, as the philosopher Santayana notes, "Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it." If the new administrative team does not avoid the mistakes of their predecessors, and if they are interfered with in their work by others, as has occurred in the past, we will find ourselves having gone full circle and be back where we started.
2) There is a need for a healing process to begin. But human beings have difficulty putting real or imagined injuries behind them. It won’t be easy to move from an adversarial relationship to a trusting one. Merely introducing new players into the
2

equation is not going to accomplish anything if everyone involved isn’t willing to let down their defenses and begin trusting one another. That means that people on both sides have to be willing to accept responsibility for their role in creating the current impasse.
Given my thirty five years as a parent advocate, my personal experience living with a family member who had severe medical problems (my stepson Michael), and my knowledge as a former state official of how screwed up bureaucracies can be, I was initially inclined to see the Defendants as the sole source of many of the problems that have developed. This point of view was strengthened after meeting and talking with Mrs. McCoy and Leo McCoy and Staff at the house. They gave a seemingly endless list of examples of bad decisions (or worse, no decisions) that had been made by Southbury Administrators. They also cited innumerable examples of behavior exhibited by employees from Southbury that were evidence of an apparent disregard for the men and the staff who serve them. They told of repeated cases of what could only be described as orchestrated rudeness or outright hostility emanating from line level and supervisory staff at the facility. And what I found supported those allegations.
But, it would be simplistic to conclude that this is a battle being waged by one side only. There are numerous examples of equally bad decisions, hostility, and abusive behavior coming from Mr. and Mrs. McCoy. There must be a cessation of hostility if the quality of life for the two men is to be improved. When South Africa moved from the oppression of an apartheid system, its leaders .... headed by.President Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu...created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. A similar process is needed in this case. People need to own their responsibility for creating and perpetuating this destructive, adversarial condition.
Southbury Administration
I have concluded that a culture ha__._~s developed among the employees at STS, both direct service staff and line level supervisors, that at best tolerates, and at worst encourages, undermining of the efforts to provide adequate numbers of competent, trained, staff. I have also concluded that there has been an abdication of responsibility by upper level administrators of their responsibility to assure quality services for these two men. That abdication of responsibility has also resulted in a failure to protect the rights of employees to enjoy a humane, civilized, respectful work environment. I find the argument that the McCoys "usurped" authority of the administration to be less than compelling. It was given away, not taken. Nor is the excuse given by STS administrators to former employees who contacted me, that the Federal Court intervention "caused" administrators to take a hands off attitude, a compelling one.
There were actions that could be taken to safeguard the administrative integrity and authority of this program. Few, if any, were. Indeed, there is clear evidence that charges and counter-charges made by the McCoys and the Staff at the home fell on

deaf ears. Employees who were ready to resign because of maltreatment were told that nothing could be done. Employees accused of misbehavior were not investigated. When I met with the Director of the Training School he told me that he had taken a "hands off" attitude toward the McCoy home, leaving the problem-solving to George Moore and others. While I understood his desire not to micro-manage, it struck me as incomprehensible that a problem as recalcitrant, costly, and high profile as this one would not demand the personal attention of administrators at every level, including the Commissioner himself. It was painfully obvious that it wasn’t being solved by the people in charge at the time.
When Ms. Papale and Ms. Geraci began to develop a transition process we met for an hour with the STS administrators, and were given assurances that they would do everything in their power to keep the home adequately staffed and supervised until the transition was completed. They have failed to do so. There have been repeated shifts which were not adequately covered. Pull employees who arrived at the McCoy home coughing and wheezing were sent back to the administrator who sent them to the home. Instead of being relieved of their duties, they were allowed to resume work on the main campus (and infect many more people?). The response to these concerns by Mr. Moore was that "The McCoys have generally used a higher standard than is used across the facility." But Mr. Moore did not become personally involved in an attempt to resolve the differences and the problem has continued to fester. The result, as Mr. McCoy noted in his memo regarding these incidents, is that the only ones hurt by these failures to resolve problems, are Bill and Leo.
Employees working without current CPR certification, highly paid registered nurses being expected to do custodial work, the case management supervisor having to cover a shift because Mrs. McCoy wouldn’t accept the assigned staff, lack of staff training and a training program for Leo, little or no data collection .t..h..ese are not just the responsibility of the McCoys.
There are six basic responsibilities in personnel administration: 1. Recruit 2. Screen, interview and hire 3. Train and educate 4. Support, monitor, evaluate and reinforce appropriate behavior 5. Promote or discipline 6. Terminate Few of these responsibilities are being carried out by Southbury Administrators. Certainly the most critical ones, hiring and firing, are perceived to be the prerogative of Mrs. McCoy. Employees are almost never given regular evaluations. Training is virtually non-existent. Employees who have felt that their rights were abrogated have found no one willing to advocate on their behalf.
4

McCoy Administration If these functions, for whatever reason, have been abdicated by Southbury, what has happened? The McCoys have argued that they constantly filled voids left by STS because their sons’ safety and well-being was at stake. Thus, if sufficient staff were not available to work a shift, there was no one but them to perform that function. If no one else would do the personnel administration, what else was there for them to do but step in and do it? The end result has been that Mrs. McCoy is viewed as the administrator of the home. Leo McCoy has said that "My attorney refers to this as chaos but it isn’t chaos. When Esther took it over it was a mess, but now it runs like a fine-tuned watch."
Mrs. McCoy has written ads to recruit people, and, given the number of people who applied, they must have been reasonably well written. Bill Ale is reported to have said that Mrs. McCoy does a good job helping to screen and interview candidates. Even those who have subsequently resigned because of disagreements with her were impressed with how warm and gracious Mrs. McCoy was in the interview session, seeking their opinions and thoughts on problems. Several people said it was her charm and sensitivity that convinced them to take the job.
There is certainly a supportive response from the "core" staff who have been at the home for some time. When meeting with the McCoys at the house it was commonplace for them to be called into the room by the McCoys to support a particular position. Letters of support have been received by the Court from Rosemary Strauss, Pauline Polozhani,e~nd Doreen DePaiva. Ms. Polozhania requested a meeting with the Special Master to share her views regarding the McCoys. It was held on January 12th in the main lobby of the Heritage Inn. She brought Ms. DePaiva with her. Both women fiercely defended the McCoys and were very critical of ex-employees who were unhappy with the McCoy’s actions. The meeting lasted nearly two hours and it struck me as strange that during that entire time, while both women could recount numerous examples of misbehavior on the part of others, neither mentioned anything the McCoy’s might have done that could have caused the problems. I shared that observation with them, and asked if Mrs. McCoy or her husband had ever made a mistake of any kind. They seemed genuinely perplexed that I would even ask the question. Their response was a resounding "no, never!"
So, what’s the problem? If the home runs like a fine-tuned watch why have over 80 .people resigned or been terminated since 1995? Why, if Ms. Geraci’s figures are correct, is there an 800% turnover rate? Why have some former employees characterized the way in which they were treated as "dehumanizing," "All of the people who resigned were themselves at fault?
Why, in all of the meetings I’ve attended at which the McCoys were present, and in all of the correspondence generated by them, has there never been a single admission by them of responsibility for any of the problems? While one applauds the loyalty of their core staff and, perhaps, their desire to protect Mr. and Mrs. McCoy, it nevertheless strains credibility to believe that no mistake was ever made. Conversely, while I cannot
5

recall a single example of the McCoys admitting errors in their judgment or behavior, and accepting responsibility for the same, there have been many instances of state representatives (Linda Goldfarb, Tom Harris, Jim Welsh, and Bill Ale come to mine) admitting that mistakes were made from time to time.
What has been the response of the McCoys when told that current or former employees have expressed concern about dehumanizing conditions? Was there acknowledgment that there might be some legitimacy to the person’s concerns? That they mi..~t be responsible for causing the problems? Was there a willingness to sit down in a sincere and respectful way, as equals with those who criticize, and try to get at the root of the problem to avoid its recurrence? Too often the response when told that current or former employees expressed feelings of anger, disappointment, or hurt at the way that they were treated was to attack the accusers. Attack the validity of those feelings, or question the truthfulness and sincerity of the person, or challenge their professional competency or willingness to work. Or, at the extreme end of the spectrum, to threaten lawsuits or exposure in the media.
Such responses defy common sense. We live in an imperfect world. People make mistakes and, if we’re lucky, we learn from mistakes.
"It is interesting that this particular approach--admitting a mistake--usually provokes an important discussion among supervisors. Many say they have felt that to be effective, they should not admit to having faults. They view it as exposing a weakness that would lower their status in the eyes of workers. But when asked to think about important authority figures in their lives, most realize that this kind of honesty made these people seem more real, less like cardboard figures, more vulnerable, and less threatening. In fact, workers are relieved when supervisors make and admit mistakes. Indeed, it is the supervisor who always seems to be perfect, in control, and never flustered who is hard to live with." (Shulman, Lawrence, Interactional Supervision, pg. 55 4th edition, 1998, NASW Press)
What has been commented on by many of the people who are involved in this undertaking is the lack of laughter in the house, an absence of good-natured joking, a feeling of high morale among all staff. People are deadly serious, intense. Why? Because they work harder than the employees across the street and don’t have time to enjoy themselves? Because they’re more dedicated than others doing similar work? Ms. Geraci and others have described an "us and them" mentality. The McCoys and the core group versus new staff who haven’t proven themselves yet, pulls from across the street, the union, administrators at STS or others. It has been argued that this defensiveness, this "circling the wagons" reaction came from years of abuse of the McCoys and their sons. Perhaps. But developing a program for Bill and Leo is a human undertaking involving ordinary human beings. While it is true that Bill and Leo have been the victims of physical and emotional abuse, and thus deserve special consideration, it is no less true that employees who serve them have a right to freedom from emotional abuse. There have been too many reports of employees in tears or

claiming to be scarred because of the way they have been treated not to believe that there is some validity to their concerns. Just as there is a culture of negativism among the STS employees and administrators, there is a culture of denial among the core staff and the McCoys. Freedom to speak is felt only as freedom to agree with the McCoys. There is "selective sharing" of information among staff. Certain staff are told what’s going on, others aren’t. This is unfortunate in that productivity increases with increased interaction between staff. It is not true that what people don’t know won’t hurt them. They can’t perform effectively if they don’t know what’s going on.
Recommendations There are two categories of recommendations, as follows:
A) Recommendations which require immediate action and are, in my opinion, absolutely essential for the successful transition of administration from STS to the new administrative group, but which do not require the Court’s modification of the Consent Decree; B) Recommendations which involve either a re-wording of the Consent Decree or the Court’s clarification as to its intent;
A) Recommendations which do not require modification of the Decree
1) A line item budget for the program which clearly identifies the level of funding required to implement the proposed program mushbe provided to the court. Commissioner O’Meara must make it clear that Ms. Papale and the Manager of the home have authority to administer those funds.
2) The Department of Mental Retardation’s Quality Assurance Division must begin immediately to include the home as one which they are responsible for monitoring. The Consent Decree (p. 2) clearly requires this but it has not been done.
3) In order to assure that the program is being implemented as envisioned the Commissioner should provide the Court with regular written quarterly reports until such time as the new management is in place and operating properly and the men are settled in a new home appropriate to their requirements.
4) The Manager needs three other supervisory level staff, one for each shift. These three supervisors and the Manager will provide coverage for each other during vacations, sickness, training, etc. The Manager must report directly to Ms. Papale.
The Manager and Ms. Papale need positive, constructive assistance from all lev.els of the Department. Commissioner O’Meara must make it clear to central office staff that this project has his personal support, and that he expects every employee to do everything they can to expedite requests for assistance. I recently learned that, despite explicit instructions by then Deputy Commissioner Linda Goldfarb to establish a petty cash fund for the home, that fund has still not been established. It has been at least six months since this reasonable request was made. I can think of no other
"7

reason for this failure than that someone is engaged in bureaucratic obstructionism. The Commissioner needs to make it clear that such behavior is unacceptable.
5) A residence supported by shift staff is not the same as "in home support" in a person’s natural home. Under the current arrangement the level of involvement by the parents makes it impossible for a manager to operate and run this program. It is essential for a new administrative team to be successful that a clear, unambiguous message is sent to all employees that a different management team is now in charge. As long as the McCoys continue to reside in the current residence such a message will not be sent. It is imperative that they move back to their own home immediately. Further, if staff are to be clear about the new chain of command, there must be a clear understanding that the McCoys do not supervise staff and that must be reinforced by the words and behavior of the McCoys themselves. There will be a natural tendency for existing employees to turn to the McCoys for direction, however they need to be instructed to talk to the Manager or the person supervising their shift. Similarly, if the McCoys have concerns they too must direct those to the Manager or the person designated by the Manager to be in charge of the home at the time.
6) The new management team must have not only the responsibility, but the authority, to Recruit, Screen, Interview, Hire, Train, Support, Evaluate, Monitor, Discipline, Promote, and, if necessary, Terminate. The most basic element of such authority is the ability to control how employee time is used~-- The authority to decide how staff time will be used must rest with the Manager and no one else. If the McCoys, for example, want to take their sons home, it is imperative that the Manager be told as far in advance as possible so staff can be scheduled efficiently. If the McCoys need help from a staff person during a home visit, or want to schedule staff to support a clinic or hospital visit, the Manager must give the final approval. Hopefully such arrangements can be worked out in an informal, uncomplicated manner, but it is important that the final control over staff time be clearly in the hands of the Manager.
6) Open systems are healthier than closed ones. There must be an opening up of this home if the program is to be successful. All employee meetings should be held weekly, and staff should both be expected to be there and be given time off or other compensation to make their attendance possible. The meetings should be open and people should feel free to criticize or praise what goes on in the home, without fear of recrimination. New employees, in particular, should be encouraged to express their views, to make suggestions for improving the way that things are done. Often they are the ones with a fresh way of looking at things that have become routine for everyone else but are not working well. Ms. Geraci’s note regarding Leo being given warm tea just before bedtime while programs are developed to try and help Leo stop wetting the bed at night is a good example of how. established routines can work at crosspurposes. All Employees should know what’s going on. Employees were not given a copy of the Order appointing the Special Master and therefore had no idea what his function was. Some of the statements made by employees who wrote letters of support clearly indicate they do not understand the role of the Special Master. They
8

were not given a copy of the Master’s Quarterly Report, nor was it discussed with them. I am convinced that if Ms. Geraci, Ms. Papale, and I had not brought copies of the Order appointing the Transition Manager, they would not have received copies of that document as well. There needs to be free, open, undefended, communication between all who work in the home if a true sense of teamwork is to develop.
While there is evidence that pulls from STS have often behaved inappropriately, there is also evidence that the existing staff have not been as welcoming to new people as they should have been. The new administration must meet with each existing staff member and be very clear with them about how new employees are to be treated in the future. Staff who cannot accept the importance of treating others respectfully should be encouraged to look for other employment opportunities.
7) One of the conspicuous things lacking in the past has been clear accountability for getting things done. The meetings that were held previously with Ms. Goldfarb were productive because follow up meetings were scheduled to review progress, and no action step was proposed without someone being assigned specific responsibility for its completion. While I support the recommendations outlined by Ms. Geraci, I would be remiss if I did not make the point that each of them needs to be restated in a way in which it is clear: 1) who will do it?; 2) when will it be done?; 3) how will it be done (what should it look like?)?; 4) where?; 5) what resources are needed to get it done and who will obtain them?; and 6) who will monitor to see that the objective was met, and met satisfactorily? Too often in this case there have been meetings in which many things were discussed but they never got done. Similarly, there have been no consequences for failure to complete assigned tasks.
For example, "All positions must be filled..." Who is responsible for doing this? By what date? Who will monitor to see that it gets done? "Immediate training of all current staff..." Who is responsible for assuring that this be done? The Manager? Ms. Papale? Someone at Central Office? By what date certain must it be done? Who will provide staff coverage so employees can be released?
8) Many of the problems which exist are related to supervision of nursing staff. The following recommendations must be implemented immediately by state administrators: -nurses must be held accountable for training staff in the proper practice of Infection Control/Universal Precautions, and must use those practices themselves; -nurses must take medically-related orders ~from licensed medical practitioners, must follow those orders as prescribed, and must assure that all medical records are current and maintained in a manner consistent with good medical practice; -the Manager of the home and the McCoys must meet regularly and the two must communicate information regarding the status of health-related matters with each other. Diagnostic information provided by consultants must be recorded in the medical records of each man and be maintained at the home.

9) Statements like "this is Billy and Leo’s home" have been used as a justification for a double standard in the way that employees are treated as contrasted with the way in which the McCoy men are treated. Thus, employees are not allowed to sit at the dining room table at mealtime and be treated as part of the family, take their break in the house .... perhaps enjoying a cup of coffee in the living room while watching television, or feel as though they can relax in the home. I cannot believe that when such tension exists, when some employees are treated simply as indentured servants and not as part of a family, that Bill and Leo don’t sense it. If this is to be a warm, inviting, comfortable, home, the artificial distinctions between "trusted" staff and new ones, have to be eliminated. Ideally, staff and Bill and Leo should have meals together. At the very least, staff must be allowed to use the dining room and living room for meals and breaks.
10) The McCoys have said that their vision of the future when the Consent Decree was signed was one that allowed them to feel that their sons’ needs were being met, but also one that included their own ability to enjoy a more normal life. That has not happened. However, in order for them to experience the kind of lives they had hoped for, certain support services are going to have to be put in place. One reality that we all face is that none of us will live forever. And when we have sons or daughters who have severe medical needs, we have to figure out how those needs can be met when we’re gone. Who will coordinate the health care for Leo and Bill when Mrs. McCoy and Leo are no longer able to do so? Dr. McDonald is currently the primary care physician but he is contemplating retirement himself. Who will replace him when he decides he can’t continue in that capacity? Dr. Rubin attempted to raise this question. The nursing staff in the home, the Manager, and someone designated to be the primary care physician for the men needs to be identified, if not now, soon. This should be a high priority when the new management team is in place.
In the meantime, it must be clear that if Dr. McDonald is to continue to coordinate health care, he needs to have full authority to do so and his costs should be reflected in the program’s budget. And, as noted above, the nurses at the McCoy home need to be able to relate directly to Dr. McDonald for their supervision. Similarly, Dr. McDonald and the Parents need to communicate all changes in the medical status of the men to the residence Manager in order to assure appropriate documentation. As the Manager and his staff increase in their understanding of the men’s’ needs, the Parents need to increasingly allow the Manager and nursing staff the authority to make decisions and provide the care they are trained and licensed to provide.
1 1) In addition to Dr. McDonald, what other services can/should be continued with the new administrative structure? To begin with, it must be noted that community services have been successfully provided for individuals whose needs are as severe as Bill’s or Leo’s for more than thirty years now. The field has grown and developed in ways we never envisioned so that virtually any service that could be provided in an institution can and is being provided every bit as well in community programs. The
10

future of large institutions like STS is not bright. It would be a mistake to maintain dependency on that facility.
Ms. Papale’s transition plan will allow a level of independence from the institution that will enable this program to be self-standing. Again, if we are genuinely concerned with the ability of this program to exist long after the rest of us are no longer around, it must be self-sustaining. I support her proposed transfer process and assume that she will monitor those activities to assure specific people are assigned responsibilities for its implementation, and that things happen within the time frames stated.
12) An individualized day program must be initiated immediately for each man.
13) The Draft Stipulation prepared by the State’s Attorney should be reviewed by the Parties, finalized and presented to the Court for consideration. It contains the plan for development of a new home for the men.
B. Recommendations which may require modification of the Consent Decree:
1) The Consent Decree gives the McCoys the authority to approve the hiring of line level staff. As noted earlier, Mrs. McCoy has been described by Bill Ale and Tom Harris as very helpful in the interview process. It is anticipated that the McCoys will continue to cooperate with the new Manager in this work, however if that cooperation does not continue, and the manager’s ability to hire is interfered with, the Consent Decree should be modified to allow the Administration to do their job.
2) The requirement that a home be within 5 minutes driving distance from the home (p. 8) may severely limit the ability of the State to locate a lot for a home, or an existing home which meets the requirements of the men. I assume the objective of that requirement was to assure that the McCoys have regular and frequent contact with their sons not only now, but when they themselves become aged and, perhaps, medically fragile. A more reasonable requirement might be to require that the home be located in the same city in which the Parents reside and, if the Parents are unable to drive to visit their sons, the state be required to provide transportation for them.
3) Page 9 of the Decree should be re-worded to assure life use of the home for the men and the requirement that other residents be allowed should be dropped.
4) The allocation of $10,000 (p. 10) for hiring of consultants needs to be a specific line item in the Budget for the home. It is understood that this was an element of the Decree that guaranteed the Parents would have resources to enhance their Sons’ lives. This is in no way intended to change the intent of the Decree or limit the McCoys free access to those funds. However, by including it in the Budget for the home as a specific line item, it assures that those resources will be available if the men outlive their parents.

Summmary This is a pivotal moment in the lives of Bill and Leo McCoy. A new group of
people are being put together to form a team who will build on the past work of Mr. and Mrs. McCoy and the existing staff members. The result could be a home of their own which they can enjoy for the rest of their lives. It can be a full complement of dedicated and trained employees who are commiitted to helping each man achieve his potential at the highest level possible.
It is also a pivotal moment for their Parents, Mr. and Mrs. McCoy. They have an opportunity to begin to experience the security of knowing that no matter what happens to them their sons will be taken care of by people who are dedicated to providing the best possible care. This is what all parents want, regardless of whether their children have a disability or not. They can be involved in the process of creating that future.
But, as happens with the life cycle of all human beings, there comes a time when parents need to allow their offspring to develop other relationships, to allow their children to be dependent on significant people other than their parents---friends, partners, co-workers, and others. One of the most important roles as a parent is to help your children transition from dependency on parental safety and security to allowing others to provide that support and security. With the current arrangement the McCoys are the center of their sons’ universe. While the core staff care deeply for the men it is the parents who currently make virtually all decisions affecting the welfare of these men. Unless the circle of people who are responsible for overseeing the welfare of these men is expanded, at the time of the parents incal£..acitation or death, their sons will be totally devastated, not knowing who to look to for their needs. Now is the time to begin to gradually establish other relationships with a team of people who can provide continuity of care over time.
This will require making other adjustments as well. It means that Mr. and Mrs. McCoy will need to begin to find other interests to focus on, to spend less time in close proximity to their sons. With more time available to spend together their own relationship with one another will change. Trusting others to carry out what has been done by you alone involves risk. There will be moments of doubt and anxiety. There will be comparisons made about the way others do things versus one’s own way of doing things. All of this will be unsettling, but is a normal part of life. I would strongly recommend that Mr. and Mrs. McCoy get professional assistance during this time. They need someone they can talk to, a family therapist or counselor, who will give them opportunities to express their feelings and move beyond the past.
Respectfully submitted,
Edward R. Skarnulis, Ph.D.

 
 1988 WL 1098718
1988 WL 1098718 (D.Conn.) (Trial Pleading) United States District Court, D. Connecticut.
Leo MCCOY and William McCoy by their parents and guardians Leo & Esther McCoy, Plaintiffs, v.
Michael BELMONT, individually: and as Superintendent, Southbury Training School; Jean Gino, M.D., individually: and as Medical Director of Southbury Training School; Ofelia Tee King, M.D., individually; Philadelpo Guevarra, M.D. individually; Brian Lensink, Commissioner Connecticut Department of Mental
Retardation; Paul Bruch, M.D., individually, Defendants.
Civ. No. H-85-465 (JAC). September 13, 1988.
ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF DEFENDANTS TO THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT Taken from 1988 WL 1098718
1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are denied.
2. Paragraph 3 is admitted.
3. The first sentence of paragraph 4 is admitted. Defendants are without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the remainder of paragraph 4.
4. Paragraph 5 is denied.
5. Paragraphs 6 and 7 are admitted only to the extent they allege that the plaintiffs have been judicially declared incapable of performing functions assigned to their parents as guardians, appointed in 1976 and 1977. The remainder of paragraphs 6 and 7 are is denied.
6. Paragraph 8 is admitted insofar as it relates to the plaintiff Leo McCoy. It is admitted as to the plaintiff William McCoy only for the time period ending with the commencement of this action. The remainder of paragraph 8 is denied.
7. Paragraph 9 is denied.
8. Paragraph 10 is denied as alleged.
9. Paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 are denied.
10. Paragraph 15 is admitted to the extent of the allegations concerning Michael Belmont. Paragraph 15 is admitted to the extent it alleges that Stephen Staugaitis is the Director of the Southbury Training School and to the extent it enumerates responsibilities set forth in Section 19a-447 of the General Statutes of Connecticut. The remainder of paragraph 15 is denied.
11. Paragraph 16 is admitted to the extent it alleges that Dr. Gino is the Medical Director at the Southbury Training School and, at times, has provided medical care to the plaintiffs. The remainder of paragraph 16 is denied.
12. Paragraph 17 is admitted to the extent it alleges that Dr. Tee King is a physician at the Southbury Training School and that she was assigned to provide routine medical care to the residents of Cottage 34 from 1983 through 1986. The remainder of paragraph 17 is denied.
13. Paragraph 18 is admitted to the extent it alleges that Dr. Guevarra is a physician at the Southbury Training School and that he was assigned to provide routine medical care to the residents of Cottage 34 from approximately 1978 through 1983. The remainder of paragraph 18 is denied.
14. Paragraph 19 is admitted to the extent it alleges that Dr. Bruch was a physician at the Southbury Training School from, approximately 1960 through 1986, and to the extent it alleges that Dr. Bruch had a special interest in orthopedic problems of

1988 WL 1098718
residents of the Southbury Training School. The remainder of paragraph 19 is denied. 15. Paragraph 20 is admitted to the extent it alleges that Brian Lensink is the Commissioner of Mental Retardation for the State of Connecticut and to the extent it alleges his responsibilities as set forth in the Connecticut General Statutes. The remainder of paragraph 20 is denied. 16. Paragraph 21 is admitted to the extent it alleges that the Southbury Training School is located in the Town of Southbury in western Connecticut. The remainder of paragraph 21 is denied. 17. Paragraphs 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39 are denied. 18. Paragraph 40 is admitted only to the extent it alleges that some activities for residents of Cottage 34 are conducted with a group of residents. The remainder of paragraph 40 is denied. 19. The Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or meaning of the allegations in paragraph 41. 20. Paragraph 42 is admitted to the extent is alleges that the plaintiffs have varying needs, wishes, and abilities. The remainder of paragraph 42 is denied. 21. Paragraphs 43, 44 and 45 are denied. 22. Paragraph 46 is admitted: (1) to the extent it alleges that the plaintiffs are human beings who have feelings, needs and motivations and varying degrees of potential for growth, development and achievement of self-care and self-support; (2) to the extent it alleges that the plaintiffs are capable of benefiting from programs. The remainder of paragraph 46 is denied as alleged. 23. Paragraphs 47, 48(a), (b) and (c), 49, 50, 51, 52(a)-(e), 53, 54, 55(a)-(e), 56, 57, 58 and 59 are denied.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE At all times mentioned in this lawsuit, the defendants acted within the scope of their duties as officers/employees of the State of Connecticut and acted with good faith belief that their actions were lawful, and therefore they are entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Insofar as this action seeks money damages from the State of Connecticut, or officials of the State of Connecticut in their official capacities, it is barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE To the extent that allegations in the Complaint relate to claims for which applicable statutes of limitation have run, such claims are barred.

1988 WL 1098718
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE The Court should decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the State law claims expressed or which may be construed from the Third Amended Complaint because such claims would unnecessarily complicate an already complex litigation through the introduction of many state law issues.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Any and all state law claims expressed or which may be construed from the Third Amended Complaint are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE The defendants claim a statutory set-off in the amount of the plaintiffs’ liability for their cost of care against any judgment based on the state law tort claims expressed or which may be construed from the Complaint.

 
 McCoy v. Belmont, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)
2000 WL 303222 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Connecticut.
Leo McCOY et al., v.
Michael BELMONT et al.
No. 3:85CV465(JGM). | March 1, 2000.
Opinion
RULING ON PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST TO REOPEN HEARING
MARGOLIS.
*1 Although familiarity with the complex legal and procedural history of this protracted litigation is presumed, a summary of facts relevant to this request follows. On July 7, 1999, new counsel filed an appearance for plaintiffs and the prior attorney of record filed a motion for withdrawal, which the Court granted. (Dkts. 272–73.) By letter, plaintiffs have expressed their dissatisfaction with numerous conclusions and recommendations proposed by the Special Master, Professor Skarnulis. (Letter to Court, dated July 26, 1999.) A lengthy settlement/status conference was held before this Magistrate Judge on July 28, 1999, extending the deadline by which the parties were to file formal objections to the Special Master’s report to September 3, 1999. (See Dkts. 263, 271 & 278.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(e)(2), the Court also scheduled an evidentiary hearing on whether it should adopt Professor Skarnulis’ recommendations, to commence on September 27, 1999. (See Dkt. # 278.) On that day, plaintiffs’ counsel stated that they were not prepared to go forward with the hearing, which was then rescheduled to November 15, 1999. (See Dkt. # 296.) The hearing instead commenced on November 15 and adjourned on November 18, 1999. (See Dkts. 302–07.) At

that time, plaintiffs’ counsel orally requested another continuance because one of their proposed witnesses, Dr. Leslie Rubin, was not available. The Court provided four dates in December on which it could hear Dr. Rubin’s testimony.
On January 19, 2000, the Court issued an Order, deeming the hearing closed because plaintiffs had not contacted either the Court or defendants regarding the scheduling of Dr. Rubin’s testimony. (See Dkts. 310 & 312 at 2.) On January 24, 2000, plaintiffs filed the pending Request to Reopen Hearing, seeking to schedule Dr. Rubin’s testimony for February 23, 2000 (Dkt. # 311) to which defendants filed an objection (Dkt. # 312).
I. DISCUSSION In their motion, plaintiffs indicate that Dr. Rubin’s testimony will take approximately two (2) hours and is necessary for the “fair adjudication of the [ ] case.” (Dkt. # 311 at 1–2.) In opposition, defendants counter that plaintiffs have already received numerous extensions, that the present record is sufficient, and that Dr. Rubin’s testimony “would likely be cumulative and does not justify the reopening of this hearing.” (Dkt. # 312 at 2.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) permits the Court to hear additional testimony at its discretion. As detailed above, plaintiffs have received numerous extensions and postponements. There was ample opportunity to schedule Dr. Rubin’s testimony in December. In the interests of justice and the McCoy men, whose pressing health and daily care needs are at issue in this litigation, the Court denies plaintiffs’ request. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule outlined in the Court’s Order dated January 19, 2000. (See Dkt. # 310.)
II. CONCLUSION *2 In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ Request to Reopen Hearing (Dkt.# 311) is denied.
	  

1

 
 McCoy v. Belmont, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999)
1999 WL 33117446 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Connecticut.
Leo McCOY v.
Michael BELMONT No. 3:85 CV 465(JGM). | Aug. 9, 1999.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Katrena K. Engstrom, William Sylvester Palmieri, Williams & Pattis, Norman A. Pattis, Williams & Pattis, W. Martyn Philpot, Jr., Law Office of Martyn Philpot, New Haven, Jennifer Lynn Zito, Law Offices of Jennifer L. Zito, Meriden, for Leo McCoy, by parents & guardians Leo & Ester, William McCoy, by parents & guardians Leo & Ester, Esther McCoy, plaintiffs.
James P. Welsh, Laurie A. Deane, Attorney General’s Office, Hartford, for Michael Belmont, Supt., Southbury Training School, I/O, Jean Gino, M.D., Med. Director, Southbury Training School, I/O, Brian Lensink, Comm. Ct Dept of Mental Retardation, Ofelia Tee King, Md, Philadelpo Guevarra, MD, Paul Bruch, defendants.
Opinion
RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY FROM SPECIAL MASTER
MARGOLIS, Magistrate J.
*1 Although familiarity with the complex legal and procedural history of this protracted litigation is presumed, a brief summary of facts relevant to this motion follows. Absent objection from either party, on June 22, 1998, this Magistrate Judge issued an Order of Reference appointing Professor Edward Skarnulis as a Special Master for twelve (12) months to report periodically on the status of the implementation of the Consent Decree which was entered into by the parties on March 10, 1992. (Dkt.# 217). On May 18, 1999, Professor Skarnulis filed his report and recommendations. (Dkt.# 262). The Court extended Professor Skarnulis’ appointment to September 27, 1999 or to such other date as established by the Court. (See Dkts.269 & 278).
On July 7, 1999, new counsel filed an appearance for plaintiff and the prior attorney of record filed a motion for withdrawal, which the Court granted. (Dkts.272 & 273). By letter, plaintiff has expressed his dissatisfaction with

numerous conclusions and recommendations proposed by Professor Skarnulis. (Letter to Court dated July 26, 1999). A lengthy settlement/status conference was held before this Magistrate Judge on July 28, 1999, at which time plaintiff’s new counsel orally requested the opportunity to seek discovery from the Special Master, including taking his deposition, to which defense counsel objected; counsel were ordered to file briefs on this issue by August 6, 1999. (Dkt.277–78). The deadline by which the parties may file formal objections to the Special Master’s report has been extended to September 3, 1999. (See Dkts. 263, 271 & 278). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(e)(2), the Court also scheduled an evidentiary hearing on whether it should adopt Professor Skarnulis’ recommendations, commencing on September 27, 1999. (See Dkt. # 278).
On August 6, 1999, counsel filed their briefs on this issue. (Dkts.279 & 280). Plaintiff concedes that there is no case law permitting him to conduct discovery from the Special Master. (Dkt. # 279 at 3). However, plaintiff “fails to see how he can attack the validity of the master’s report without information about how the report [was] produced.” (Id.). In opposition, defendant maintains that deposition or other discovery of the Special Master should not be permitted and that the documents and records upon which the Special Master relied are already in the custody, possession and control of the plaintiff. (Dkt. # 280 at 7). Defendant contends that if the Court does permit discovery, it should be limited to documents not already in plaintiff’s possession; documents likely to lead to evidence relevant to the factual bases of the Special Master’s recommendations; and must not compromise the confidential communications to which the Special Master was entitled through the Order of Reference. (Id. at 8). For the reasons stated below, the Court will not permit plaintiff to depose the Special Master or serve discovery requests on him. Therefore, plaintiff’s request is denied.
I. DISCUSSION
*2 It is well settled that a judge is not subject to examination of the process by which he or she reaches his or her conclusions. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); Feller v. Board of Education, 583 F.Supp. 1526, 1528 (D.Conn.1984). “Although judicial officials do not enjoy immunity from subpoena and can be subjected to discovery requests, it is clear that such officials while performing their decision-making processes are not generally subject to discovery.” Beam v. Department of the Air Force, 169 F.R.D. 309, 310 (D.Md.1996) (citation omitted). “In many instances, the party seeking the discovery has access to the sought after information through alternative sources. In other
1

McCoy v. Belmont, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999)
instances, the information is cumulative, unnecessary, or does not lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. “Should a judge be vulnerable to subpoena as to the basis of every action taken by him [or her], the judiciary would be open to frivolous attacks upon its dignity and integrity, and interruption of its ordinary and proper functioning.” United States v. Dowdy, 440 F.Supp. 894, 896 (W.D.Va.1977) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). Thus, “courts have refused to issue subpoenas for oral testimony of the decision-makers as to the basis for their opinions absent extreme and extraordinary circumstances.” Id. (numerous citations omitted). Mere allegations of bias “will not justify intrusion into the mental processes of a hearing officer.” McGoldrick v. Koch, 110 F.R.D. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citations omitted). “[A] party must present a more specific evidentiary basis.” Id.
Applying these principles, as Special Master, Professor Skarnulis serves in a judicial capacity and it is inappropriate to subject him to an examination of his mental processes. See Gary W. v. State of Louisiana,

Department of Health and Human Resources, 861 F.2d 1366, 1369 (5th Cir.1988). Plaintiff has failed to provide the required evidentiary basis constituting “extreme and extraordinary circumstances.” The dignity and integrity of the Special Master shall not be impugned because of a recent change in plaintiff’s counsel. New counsel may consult with prior counsel, who worked closely with Professor Skarnulis from the time of his appointment until her withdrawal from the case. Additional information is available from state records, employees and the plaintiffs themselves.
II. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s request (Dkt.# 279) is denied.
	  

2