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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

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COMMISSION,

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FED EX EXPRESS CORPORATION, a subsidiary of Fed Ex Corporation,

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D JURY TRIAL DEMAN:I5t~

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NATURE OF THE ACTION

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This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex, female, and to

provide appropriate relief to the Charging Party, Marion Shaub, who was adversely affected by

such practices. The Commission alleges that Ms. Shaub, who was employed as a tractor-trailer

driver, was subjected to a hostile work environment and to different terms and conditions of

employment due to her gender. The unlawful behavior took the form of anti-female remarks,

threats and vehicle tampering by male co-workers, who also failed to assist her in loading her truck

and threatened to take over her driving routes. Ms. Shaub notified management of the hostile

behavior and working conditions and the vehicle tampering, but management failed to take prompt

effective corrective action. The Commission also alleges that one of Ms. Shaub's driving routes

was reclassified and awarded to one of the male harassers, who boasted openly about taking Ms.

Shaub's route. Because she had become traumatized by the threats, sabotage to her vehicle, and

hostile work environment, Ms. Shaub transferred to an office position. After the transfer, male \ \ ~
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co-workers disparaged Ms. Shaub and treated her in a condescending manner and she was not given the necessary equipment to perform her office duties. These factors, coupled with the cumulative effect of the hostile work environment and vehicle sabotage, caused Ms. Shaub to be constructively discharged.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to § 706(f) (1) and (3) of Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S. C. "§ 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3)" ("Title VII") and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981A. 2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f) (1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, Defendant, FedEx Express Corporation ("Fed Ex") has continuously been and is now a Delaware corporation doing business in the State of Pennsylvania, and the City of Middletown, and has continuously had at least fifteen (15) employees. 5. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
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STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Charging Party Marion Shaub filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Employer. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 7. Since at least December, 1997, Defendant Employer has engaged unlawful employment practices at its Middletown, Pennsylvania facility in violation of Sections 703(a) (1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) and 2000 (e)-3 (a) (1), by subjecting Ms. Shaub to a sexually hostile work environment and to discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment, due to her gender. The unlawful employment practices included, but were not limited to, the following: (A) As early as the winter of 1997, male co-worker Gordon Bowen complained about Ms. Shaub's hours, stating that she had better watch out or her "boat might sink." Ramp Agent Frank DeScehire told Ms. Shaub that women should be "barefoot and pregnant", and other male co-workers complained about Ms. Shaub's route and made anti-female remarks about Ms. Shaub as a tractor-trailer driver. The anti-female remarks continued throughout 1997 and 1998. (B) Ms. Shaub complained to management about the co-workers' remarks in May, 1999. (C) In the winter of 1999, male co-worker Steve Crumling made a series of sexually hostile remarks to Ms. Shaub. He told her that when she removed her glasses she "looked like a porn star", and, when she commented that the ground was slippery, he stated "that's what my wife said last night." He also told Ms. Shaub that if" [she] were his daughter he would abort her", and referred to her as a "damn broad" to other workers. (D) Ms. Shaub informed management about Crumling's remarks in or about January, 2000.
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(E) After Crumling learned that Ms. Shaub had complained about his conduct, he responded by thanking Ms. Shaub for "getting him in trouble" and proceeded to refuse to help Ms. Shaub load her trucks. Further, he instructed his subordinate employees to refuse to give her assistance, even though the loading was a duty of Crumling and his team to help the drivers load their trucks.
(F) In or about February 2000, Ms. Shaub reported to management that Crumling and his team were refusing to help her load her trucks.
(G) On January 25, 2000, the brake line in Ms. Shaub's truck failed, causing a safety hazard. One of her male co-workers then warned her to "be careful" and "watch out for sabotage."
(H) On February 3, 2000, Ms. Shaub became wedged between two one-ton cans that were being loaded on a truck. Her male co-workers stated that the can was pushed or "let go" in her direction, intending to harm her. Ms. Shaub reported the incident to management.
(I) On February 18, 2000, Ms. Shaub found dirt in her truck's brake line, and the line was cut. She filed a Vehicle Incident Report, a police report, and also reported the incident to management. Defendant's mechanic admitted that the type of damage to Ms. Shaub's vehicle "would not happen by coincidence", and that someone "could have introduced something" into the line.
(J) On March 24, 2000, Ms. Shaub experienced another brake failure and submitted a Vehicle Incident Report. Also, March, 2000, Ms. Shaub found the mail in her slot ripped up and had to ask management for another copy of a company vacation schedule.
(K) Ms. Shaub filed a formal written complaint on March 28,2000, alleging that she had been threatened, her vehicle had been sabotaged, and she had been physically injured, and did not feel safe driving, despite the fact that she had already reported the hostile environment and work
Page -4-

problems to management several times. (1) Shaub's brakes failed again on April 27, 2000 and a Vehicle Incident Report was made. (J) On April 13, 2000, the truck normally driven by Ms. Shaub was taken out by a co-
worker who found that a brake part had been pulled away. A Vehicle Incident Report was made. The co-worker stated that management tried to blame the broken line on him, but he stated that "the line broke on me. "
(K) Ms. Shaub's male co-worker, Mike Pankake, had threatened to take Ms. Shaub's driving route. In or about April, 2000, her part-time route was reclassified as full-time, and was awarded to Pankake. After Pankake was awarded the route, he boasted to co-workers that he was responsible for having the route re-classified and Ms. Shaub removed, and that since he had the route, the harassment of Ms. Shaub would stop.
(L) After making repeated complaints to Defendant about the sexist comments, sabotage to her truck, and threats made by male co-workers, Ms. Shaub transferred to an office position. Thereafter, the male drivers spoke to her in a condescending and disparaging manner. Moreover, she was not given the necessary equipment to do the job. As a result of the hostile work environment created by her male workers, and Defendant's failure to take any remedial action, Ms. Shaub became emotionally and psychologically devastated by FedEx's course of conduct. Accordingly, Ms. Shaub was constructively discharged from her employment in September, 2000.
8. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph 7 (A-L) above, has been to deprive Ms. Shaub of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect her status as an employee because of her sex.
9. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7 were intentional. 10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7 were done with
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malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Marion Shaub. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant Employer, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in sex discrimination, sexual harassment and any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis of sex. B. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for employees regardless of sex, which prohibit sexual harassment in the workplace, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices. C. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Marion Shaub by providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to rightful-place reinstatement or front pay. D. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Marion Shaub by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in paragraph 7, including but not limited to out-of-pocket losses in amounts to be determined at trial. E. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Marion Shaub by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraph 7, including pain and suffering, humiliation, anxiety, depression, trauma, and loss of life's pleasures, in amounts to be determined at trial.
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F. Order Defendant Employer to pay Marion Shaub punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraph 7, in amounts to be determined at trial.
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
H. Award the Commission its costs of this action.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
Gwendolyn Young Reams Associate General Counsel EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
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DAVID INGRAM // Acting Regional Attorn,
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Supervisory Trial Attorney
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EQUALEMWLOYMENTOPPORTUMITY COMMISSION, And MARION SHAUB, plaintiffintervenor
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: NO: 02-CV-984
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FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION

A subsidiary of Fed Ex Corporation;

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defendant

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COMPI,i\INT OF INTERVENOR MARION SHAUB

I.

PRELDfiNARYSTATE~NT

1. In this action, Plaintiff, MARION SHAUB, hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff"

and/or "Ms. Shaub", seeks declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief; liquidated compensatory,

. and punitive damages; and costs and attorney's fees for the sex discrimination, harassment,

retaliation for complaining about sex discrimination, physical injury, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress by Defendant, FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, hereinafter referred

to as "Defendant" and/or "FedEx".

n. JURISDICTION
2. This action arises under Title VIT, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42
U.S.C., §2000e, .e1..s.e4.; the; the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (pHRA), 43 P.S.§951, etseq.;
the Constitution ofthe Commonwealth ofPennsylvania and the common law ofthe

Commonwealth ofPennsylvania.
3. Jurisdiction over the federal claims is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1343 (4) and 29 U.S.C. §216 (b) and over the state law claims pursuant to the doctrine ofpendent jurisdiction.
4. Jurisdiction over the additional claims of sex discrimination is appropriate because on or about November 1, 2000 Plaintiff's Complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was filed and time-stamped and was timely cross-filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) regarding her treatment by FedEx. On or about February 28, 2002, the EEOC filed a complaint and demand for a jury trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff, Marion Shaub, seeks to intervene in that action to assert her state and common law claims.
5. Declaratory and injunctive relief is sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2001 and 2002
and Title vn, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by the EEOC; and Marion Shaub seeks
such relief under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (pHRA), 43 P.S. §962; and Article 1 section 28 ofthe Pennsylvania Constitution.
6. Compensatory and punitive damages are available under the Civil Rights Act of 1991; the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (pHRA), 43 P.S. .et.seq.; and under the pendent state claims; and other damages are sought, including, but not limited to, back pay and front pay and
other lost benefits under Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Pennsylvania

Human Relations Act (pHRA), 43 P.S. §951, .eLseq, and the common law ofthe Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

7.

Costs and attorney's fees may be awarded pursuant to Title vn, as amended by the

Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C.§. 2000e-5 (k); Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (pHRA), 43 P .S. §962 (c.2).

ffi. VENUE

8. This action properly lies in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§1391 (b) because the claim arose in Pennsylvania and was filed by the EEOC in this district.

IV. PARTIES

9. Plaintiff, MARION SHAUB, is a female adult individual who resides at 35 Amanda Lane, Wrightsville, PA 17368.

10. Defendant, FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, (Fed Ex) has continuously
been and is now doing business in the State. of Pennsylvania, engages in an industry affecting interstate commerce, and employs more than fiftef;m (15) regular employees.

v. FACTS
11. The plaintiff, MARION SHAUB, incorporates by reference all facts pled in the Complaint filed by the EEOC in this case.
12. Plaintiff, MARION SHAUB, was first employed by Defendant, FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, in October 1995 as a courier. In July 1997 she was promoted to a ramp transport driver. From 1997 to September 2000, Ms. Shaub worked out of the Middletown, Pennsylvania ramp. She was the only female tractor-trailer driver with FedEx who was assigned to Middletown.
13. Throughout Plaintiffs employment with FedEx in Middletown, PA, she was continuously subjected to poor work assignments because ofher sex, subjected to constant pressure to quit her job because she was a woman, subjected to sexual innuendo and harassment, and subjected to physical damages and intimidation because the male drivers did not want to work with a female. Many internal complaints (both formal written and verbal) of sex discrimination were filed with FedEx throughout Ms. Shaub's employment.
14. Plaintiff initially was assigned to work on a route called the IPT route in November 1997. In what was to become a familiar discriminatory scenario, a male tractor-trailer driver, Brian Kaufman, wanted that route. He approached management who upgraded Ms. Shuab's route to full time and reassigned the route to Mr. Kaufman. There were four times during the next three years in which Ms. Shaub was removed from a favorable route so that the position could be given to a male truck driver, the last time occurring in August 2000.

15. By the summer of 1999, the plaintiff was suffering under a continuing level of hostility and anger towards her from the male employees because of her sex. She complained to senior management about the hostility and anger she was suffering from the other drivers.
16. Steve Crumbling, the deck captain in charge of loading freight into her truck, repeatedly referred to her as pom star, a damn broad and in January 2000 told her " if you were my daughter, I'd have had you aborted". This was immediately reported to management.
17. Other tractor-trailer drivers began acting distant from the plaintiff after this report. The male drivers were obviously upset when the plaintiff was assigned a newer tractor that they had. ill January 2000, shortly after she complained about the sexual comments from Crumbling, she discovered a hole in the brake hose under the hood ofher assigned tractor.
18. ill February 2000, The deck captain purposefully ignored the need to load her truck. The plaintiff was severely physically injured while attempting to load freight without the help of the deck captain. The incident was iminediately reported to Senior Manager Bob Flynn on February 3, 2000.
19. Ms. Shaub told Flynn that she was the focus of anger because of her sex and that Crumbling refused to load her truck causing her injury. She was told to make sure that she didn't work too many hours, so that the men would not resent her so much.
20. By January 2000, unknown male employees of Federal Express purposefully

sabotaged the brake lines on Ms. Shaub's truck. The actual sabotage to her truck occurred over atld over again. The sabotage happened on January 25,2000, February 18, 2000, March 24, 2000 April l3, 2000, and Apri127, 2000 She was so shaken that she telephoned to the Managing Director in Baltimore for the help that she could not get from Senior Manager Flynn at the 8.ll-port. She reCeived no answer. The male drivers met together and decided that Ms Shaub should not have a new tractor. Then Terry Igenfritz asked to switch tractors with her, but when she warned him that someone was tampering with the brakes, he decided not take that truck.
21. By the 19th of February, she was scared to be alone at the ramp, a driver turning a corridor filled her with fear. Ms. Shaub received anonymous note in her mail slot warning her about hiding the keys at other times her mail was purposefully destroyed. On several occasions, she went outside of Fed Ex to report the brake sabotage to the state police. The male drivers told plaintiff that they thought she was planning on taking their routes
22. Throughout her employment in Allentown, certain tractor-trailer drivers, employees of defendant, have made constant sexually offensive and threatening statements to Plaintiff. These employees referred to Plaintiff as a porn star.
23. Plaintiff complained to her supervisors at the Middletown ramp about the sexual. language and abuse and the physically threatening behavior, which she was experiencing. Plaintiff's supervisors knew of her prior reports of discrimination and refused to help her although she was so fearful ofher intimidators that she had asked the local police for help.

24. Defendant did nothing to stop the sexual harassment, which Plaintiff was experiencing, but instead, allowed the perpetrators to know of Plaintiffs complaints which increased the threats to her person.
25. Plaintiff was warned of potential sabotage her truck, which could cause her serious injury. In February 2000 and again in March 1, 2000 the plaintiff was threatened by her fellow workers pushing heavy freight in her direction iri an attempt to physically harm her. Her supervisors refused to believe that the intimidation was intentional.
26. Although the threats and physical acts of intimidation were reported to Defendant, Defendant took no action and allowed retaliation against Plaintiff in the form ofharassment and threats against Plaintiffby employees and supervisors of Defendant.
27. The working environment became one of such hostility that no reasonable woman would have been expected to continue to remain employed.
28. By August 2000, the plaintiffs last route had been deliberately taken away from her and assigned to a man (whom she was forced to train.) The plaintiff only wanted to be able to driver a tractor-trailer. In September 2000 she gave notice, unable to work under the severe stress she was experiencing on the job.
29. On four different occasions, the·Plaintiff discovered that whether her brake lines had been deliberately cut or dirt had been lnserted into them to cause brake· failure. Each act of

vandalism and intllnidation was reported to management and on two occasions to the police.

30.

Plaintiff knew that the damage was deliberate because it was exactly the sort of

sabotage, which her fellow employees had warned her of and had been previously reported to

management. In addition, male employees bragged about the harassment which they subjected her

to.

31. . Plaintiffs mental health suffered greatly because of the Defendant's actions. She

was too terrified to continue her employment at Defendant's ramp. She then tried to work for a

second trucking concern and found that she was too terrified to continue as a truck driver

32. The actions ofFedEx and its employees by threatening Plaintiffs life and person were specifically and intentionally designed to cause Plaintiff intense emotional distress.

33. Fed Ex knew .of the actions of its employees acting during the course of their employment, which were designed to cause Ms. Shaub extreme emotional distress and make her quit her job. FedEx refused to protect the plaintiff from the abuse ofher co-employees.

34. On information and belief, Defendant practiced a continuing course of conduct of discriminati6ll against Ms. Shaub as the only female employee at the Middletown ramp.

35. The plaintiff reluctantly was forced to resign from her position because Federal Express refused to afford her atmosphere free of degrading and insulting language and· physical threats to her safety.

36. By the actions of its employees and supervisors, Defendant berated Plaintiff, treated her differently than the male employees, pressured her to quit her job, failed to protect her from physical danger and threats and otherwise carried out and condoned a systematic attack on her selfesteem, all of which caused Plaintiff extreme emotional distress, great disruption to her family life and monetary loss.
37. The defendant knew that the plaintiffs life was in danger from the sabotage to her truck and the incidents involving the loading of heavy freight. Management at Federal Express had had prior reports of this sort of sabotage to female truck drivers and maliciously, intentionally and purposefullyrefused to help Ms. Shaub.
VI. CAUSES OF ACTION
A FIRST CAlISE OF ACTION
(Sex Discrimination Under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. 2000)
38. Plaintiff, MARION SHAUB, hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1-37 as if more fully set forth herein.
38. By the actions of its employees and management which are set forth in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint, Defendant Unlawfully harassed and discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiffon the basis of gender/sex, in violation of Title VII.

39. Defendant maliciously, intentionally and with extreme indifference to the civil rights of the plaintiff allowed its employees to act in such a manner when it knew, or should have know, that such actions would discriminate against the plaintiff because of her sex and create a hostile working environment for Plaintiff.
40. The Defendant on the basis of gender/sex discrimination against Plaintiff in work assignments and pay.
B SECOND CAJISE OF ACTION
(Sex'Discrimination Under 43 P.S. §955(a)
41. Plaintiff, MARION SHAUB, hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1-40 as if more fully set forth herein.
42. By the actions of its employees and management which are set forth in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint, Defendant unlawfully harassed and discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of gender/sex, and retaliated against her for her complaints in violation of 43 P.S.§953, 955(a) and 955(d).
43., Defendant knew, or should have known, that such actions would create a hostile working environment for Plaintiff.
44. Such harassing and discriminatory actions by Defendant on the basis of gender/sex

created a hostile work environment for Plaintiff and repeatedly reassigned her driving position to male employees, ultimately forcing her from her job.
C TlURD CAJISE OF ACTION
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)
45. Plaintiff, MARION SHAUB, hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1-44 as ifmore fully set forth herein.
46. Defendant, by the actions alleged above, perpetrated by itself and its agents and employees, and has intentionally or recklessly inflicted great emotional distress upon Plaintiff.
47. The behavior of FedEx's employees, by physically threatening and hurting the plaintiff, by deliberately sabotaging her truck brake lines thereby threatening her life and intimidating and ignoring the plaintiff within the scope of their employment exceeded all bounds tolerated by a decent society. The perpetrators were motivated by personal malice towards the plaintiff. FedEx knew of its employees' conduct, in fact it knew of similar incidents involving other women truck drivers. Federal Express maliciously did nothing to provide the plaintiff with a safe working environment.
48. Plaintiff continues to seek medical help for her mental health. Plaintiffhas suffered, and will continue to suffer, mental anguish, physical trauma and severe emotional distress, the full

amount of which is notyet known, all because of the Defendant's actions.
49. As a result of the actions ofDefendant, Plaintiffhas, and will continue in the future, to expend large amounts of money to cure herself
E FIFm CAlISE OF ACTION
(Retaliation under Title VII act)
50. Plaintiff, MARION SHAUB, hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1-49 as ifmore fully set forth herein.

F. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (pennsylvania Constitution Article 1 § 28)
54. Plaintiff, MARION SHAUB, hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1-53 as if more fully set forth herein.
55. By the actions of its employees and management which are set forth in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint, Defendant unlawfully harassed and discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of gender/sex, and retaliated against her for her complaints and for other protected activity in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution Article 1 § 28.
VIT. PRAYERFORRELIEF
56. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, MARION SHAUB, respectfully requests that this Honorable Court:
(a) Declare Defendant Federal Express Corporation's conduct to be in violation ofPlaintiffs rights;
(b) enjoin Defendant Federal Express Corporation from engaging in such conduct in the future;
(c) restore Plaintiff to her rightful place as a tractor-trailer driver at the Allentown ramp.
(d) award Plaintiff equitable relief of back pay and benefits up to the date of reinstatement and front pay and benefits accrual;

(e) award Plaintiff compensatory damages to which she is entitled for past an( future pecuniary losses, emotional pain and suffering, physical pain and suffering inconvenience loss of enjoyment of life, damages for breach of contract, and any other compensatory damages;
(f) award Plaintiffpunitive damages to which she proves herself entitle; (g) award Plaintiff attorney's fees and costs; and . (h) grant such other relief as it may deem just and proper.
VIll. JURy DEMAND
55. Plaintiff, MARION SHAUB, demands a jury to try all claims triable by a jury.

Dated: .1·'·\ )/'-I'"y/t2
'-' I I

RESPECtFuLLY SUBMITTED l
Martha Sperling, Esquir / . Attorney for Plaintiff SILVER & SPERLING 179 North Broad Street Doylestown, PA 18901 (215) 348-1666·

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and MARION SHAUB,
Plaintiffs
v.
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant

: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:CV-02-1194 : : : : (Judge Kane) : : : :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Before the Court are several motions filed in the above captioned case. Each motion will be disposed of as follows.

I. Plaintiff’s and Intervener’s Motion to Extend Discovery for Additional Depositions (Doc. No. 31). Although discovery closed on May 30, 2003, Plaintiff EEOC and Intervener Shaub
request permission to depose two witnesses whose importance to this litigation was not learned until late in discovery. These witnesses are Mr. Hovis and a man named “Rich.”
Mr. Hovis is a supervisor in the Federal Express security department. Plaintiff and Intervener assert that on May 27, 2003 in the deposition of Mr. Lind, a former security officer at Federal Express, they learned that Mr. Hovis received various emails and other information relevant to Ms. Shaub’s claims in this matter. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Intervener assert that importance of Mr. Hovis’s testimony was not learned until the deposition of Mr. Lind. According to Plaintiff and Intervener, “Rich” is a Federal Express employee who has registered complaints with Federal Express’s management concerning sexually inappropriate behavior of Steve

Crumblings. Ms. Shaub asserts that she also registered complaints against Steve Crumblings and therefore, the testimony of “Rich” is relevant to her claims.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff and Intervener knew of these two witnesses well before the close of discovery and failed to depose them within the time allotted. Therefore, argues Defendant, discovery should not be reopened to allow Plaintiff and Intervener an opportunity to depose these parties. This argument is unpersuasive. Discovery in Title VII cases should not be unnecessarily limited. Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F. 3d 724, 734 (3d Cir. 1995). Defendant has not provided this court with a sufficient explanation as to how allowing these deposition will prejudice its case. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Intervener’s motion will be granted. II. Plaintiff’s and Intervener’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses (Doc. No. 32).
Plaintiff and Intervener seek, among other things, sanctions against Defendant and challenge the sufficiency of Defendant’s answers to certain requests for admissions (“RFAs”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36. Plaintiff and Intervener also seek to prohibit Defendant from using testimony from certain witnesses since the late disclosure of these witnesses presents undue prejudice and surprise.
A. RFAs Rule 36(a) is used “to narrow the issues for trial to those which are genuinely contested.” United Coal Co. v. Powell Const. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 967-68 (3d Cir. 1988). A denial “is a perfectly reasonable response” when a disputed issue is the subject of a request for admission. Id. Moreover, a Rule 36 request for admission should be “in simple and concise terms in order that it can be denied or admitted with an absolute minimum of explanation or qualification.” Id. “Rule 36 should not be used unless the statement of fact sought to be admitted is phrased so that it can
2

be admitted or denied without explanation.” Id. The Court finds that Defendant’s answers to RFAs 5, 6, 7, 9, and 14 comply with the
requirements of Rule 36. Accordingly, this Court will not compel Defendant to answer these RFAs in more detail. Additionally, Defendant’s answer to RFA 1 is inadequate. The disclosure of the requested information for the ten year period requested by Plaintiff may lead to admissible evidence. Defendant shall also respond to RFAs 2, 3, 4 and 13. Defendant’s answers to these RFAs are inadequate. Each of these RFAs requests Defendant to answer questions concerning the case of Loraine Metz, a similarly situated plaintiff who recently settled a similar Title VII action with Defendant. Instead of admitting or denying each of these RFAs, Defendant objects to the relevance of these requests. Defendant’s objections are based on the assertions that the Metz matter is not pending before this Court, the Metz matter is not relevant to the present claim and the Metz matter is unlikely to lead to admissible evidence. This Court, however, has previously ruled that information regarding the Metz matter is discoverable as it is likely to lead to evidence relevant to the present matter. Accordingly, Defendant’s objections based on relevancy will be overruled and Defendant will be compelled to answer RFAs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 13.
B. Late Disclosure of Witnesses Plaintiff and Intervener argue that Defendant has violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 in that it failed to disclose the names of several potential witnesses until May 27, 2003, three days before the close of discovery. These witness include: Aaron Williams, Tracey Krasevic, Cindy Smiley, Brenda Hammer, Scott Glinnick, Williams Moser, Brandon Cole, Terry Ilgenfritz, Jay Stoner, Jeff Noel, Matt Callahan, Charles Keim, Mike Houtz, Doyle Hendricks, Kimberly Althouse, Jack Poole, James Steffen, Marc Clark and other Ramp Truck Driver personnel from
3

the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania location to be used as rebuttal witnesses. Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff and Intervener with the addresses or telephone numbers of any of these witnesses. Moreover, Defendant has failed to provide Plaintiff and Intervener with any information concerning the potential testimony of these witnesses.
Of these witnesses, Defendant does not contest that Jack Poole, James Steffen and Marc Clark were not previously mentioned in depositions. Moreover, some of these witness are management officials of Federal Express. Finally, Plaintiff and Intervener contend that Defendant exhibited bad faith by expressly advising Tracey Krasevic, assistant to Robert Flynn, Federal Express’s Senior Manager, not to speak to attorneys from the opposing parties.
Plaintiff and Intervener request that this Court sanction Defendant, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, by prohibiting the introduction of testimony from any of these witnesses. Rule 37(c) states, in relevant part:
A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed. A party’s misconduct is harmless if it involves an honest mistake, coupled with sufficient knowledge by the other party of the material that has not been produced. Tolerico v. Home Depot, 205 F.R.D. 169, 176 (M.D. Pa. 2002). Moreover, “even under Rule 37, [t]he imposition of sanctions for abuse of discovery . . . is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1995). In considering whether to exclude evidence as a sanction under Rule 37, this Court must consider: (1) the prejudice or surprise of the party against whom the excluded evidence would have been admitted; (2) the
4

ability of the party to cure that prejudice; (3) the extent to which allowing the evidence would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case or other cases in the court; and (4) bad faith or wilfulness in failing to comply with a court order or discovery obligation. Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 148 (3d Cir. 2000).
Defendant argues that many of the witnesses disclosed on May 27, 2003 were known to Plaintiff and Intervener. Specifically, Defendant asserts that all but Jack Poole, James Steffen and Marc Clark were known to Plaintiff and Intervener well before the close of discovery as their names were mentioned during various depositions. Moreover, Defendant asserts that these three witnesses only became relevant when Defendant was researching a response to Plaintiff and Intervener’s expert report on May 21, 2003. Finally, Defendant argues that Tracy Krasevic, as the assistant to Robert Flynn, relayed litigation related information to the Senior Manager of Federal Express and is therefore an agent of Defense Counsel whose testimony is protected by the attorney-client privilege.
On the record before this Court, it is clear that there is some prejudice to Plaintiff and Intervener in the admission of at least Jack Poole, James Steffen and Marc Clark. Moreover, Plaintiff correctly argues that they are unable to cure this prejudice as discovery has closed. Finally, because Defendant has not provided contact information for these witness, Plaintiff and Intervener assert that they cannot initiate depositions. However, considering that this Court is compelled to amend the deadlines established in the case management order in order to facilitate the resolution of other discovery disputes, admission of these witnesses will not disrupt trial in this matter. Accordingly, this court will order Defendant to supply Plaintiff and Intervener with the addresses and telephone numbers of all witnesses on its disclosure list and all individuals disclosed
5

pursuant to this Court’s order, dated April 26, 2003 (Doc. No. 26). Moreover, Defendant will be ordered to disclose to Plaintiff and Intervener, within ten days of this order, the substance of the testimony for any witnesses it anticipates calling at trial. Finally, Defendant will be ordered to cooperate in scheduling any depositions Plaintiff and Intervener wish to conduct so as to allow for discovery to be completed within the deadlines of the amended case management order. Should Defendant fail to comply with these mandates, the Court will determine an appropriate sanction.
C. Miscellaneous Discovery Disputes. Plaintiff and Intervener also assert in their motion that Defendant has not produced computer generated reports summarizing hours worked by employees during the relevant time frame (“FAMIS report”). Defendant claims it did not produce these documents because Plaintiff and Intervener never properly requested FAMIS reports, but rather requested all time cards for the relevant time period, which defendant supplied. This is the second time this Court has addressed these records. In a telephone conference held April 25, 2003, Defense counsel advised this Court that no computer generated reports existed and that the only means of disclosing this information was by producing the actual time cards of the relevant employees. Thus, counsel was directed to disclose the time cards. Remarkably, now counsel would decline to produce those reports, now that their existence is confirmed, alleging that Plaintiff’s and Intervener’s request only asked for time cards. Counsel’s clever “cat and mouse” approach to discovery borders on contemptuous. Defendant will be ordered to produce all relevant FAMIS reports within ten days of this order. Should Defendant fail to comply with this order, the Court will determine an appropriate sanction. Finally, the parties dispute who should furnish copies of depositions previously taken in
6

the Metz matter. Although Plaintiff and Intervener are entitled to discovery of these materials, they must request all copies of deposition transcripts, at their expense, from the court reporting service that transcribed them. III. Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File a Sur-Reply Brief (Doc. No. 49).
On June 30, 2003, pursuant to Local Rule 7.7, Defendant requested permission to file a sur-reply brief in relation to the Plaintiff and Intervener’s motion to compel discovery responses. However, in violation of Local Rule 7.7, Defendant filed its sur-reply brief on July 2, 2003, before this Court ruled on his motion requesting permission to do so. This Court does not require additional briefing on this matter in order to resolve these discovery disputes. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for leave to file a response (Doc. No. 49) will be denied and Defendant’s SurReply Brief (Doc. No. 51) will be stricken from the record. IV. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 44).
On June 30, 2003, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 44). As the Court has determined that a limited extension of discovery is appropriate in this matter, this motion will be denied as moot, and Defendant may re-file its motion according to the amended case management order. As the motion for summary judgment is denied, the briefs filed in relation that motion shall be stricken from the record. Moreover, because these briefs will be stricken, all motions filed in an attempt to cure defects in the briefs related to the summary judgment motion will be denied as moot (Doc. Nos. 66, 67 & 68).
The Court notes that every party’s brief filed in relation to this motion for summary judgment violated the local rules of this court. Not one of the parties included a statement of facts in their briefs, rather each party attempted to incorporate by reference the facts contained in
7

their statements of undisputed facts. Local Rule 7.8 provides, in relevant part: No brief may incorporate by reference all or any portion of any other brief . . . . The brief of the moving party shall contain a procedural history of the case, a statement of facts, a statement of questions involved, and argument. The Brief of the opposing party may contain a counter statement of facts and of the questions involved and a counter history of the case. If counter statements of facts or questions involved are not filed, the statements of the moving party will be deemed adopted . . . A brief may address only one motion, except in the case of cross motions for summary judgment.
LR 7.8. The court also notes that all of the parties violated this rule upon filing their briefs related to discovery motions. Each party filed a combined brief addressing several motions in direct violation of Local Rule 7.8's clear mandate that “[A] brief may address only one motion.” This Court encourages the parties to familiarize themselves with the local rules before re-filing any motions or submitting any additional briefs. The Court also advises that failure to comply with the requirements of the local rules may serve as a basis to strike a party’s filing or deny a motion, or may warrant an order requiring that local counsel participate directly in legal representation.
8

V. Order
AND NOW, this 8th day of September, 2003, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s and Intervener’s Motion for Extension of Time to Extend Discovery for Additional Depositions (Doc. No. 31) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff’s and Intervener’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses (Doc. No. 32) is GRANTED in part as follows:
a. Defendant’s objections to Requests for Admissions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 13 are OVERRULED. Defendant is ORDERED to respond to the Requests for Admissions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 13 within 10 days of this Order;
b. Defendant is ORDERED, within 10 days of this order, to supply Plaintiff and Intervener with the addresses and telephone numbers of all witness on its disclosure list and all individuals disclosed pursuant to this Court’s order, dated April 26, 2003 (Doc. No. 26);
c. Defendant is ORDERED to disclose to Plaintiff and Intervener, within 10 days of this order, the substance of the testimony for any witness it anticipates calling at trial;
d. Defendant is ORDERED to cooperate in scheduling any depositions Plaintiff and Intervener wish to conduct so as to allow for discovery to be completed within the deadlines of the amended case management order;
e. Defendant is ORDERED to produce all relevant FAMIS reports within 10 days of this order.
f. Should Defendant fail to comply with these mandates, the Court will determine an appropriate sanction.
g. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s and Intervener’s request for sanctions is DENIED.
3. Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File a Response to Plaintiff and Intervener’s Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions (Doc. No. 49) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant’s Sur-Reply Brief (Doc. No. 51) is STRICKEN from the record.
9

4. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 44) is DENIED without prejudice to re-file in accordance with the amended case management deadlines.
5. The briefs associated with the motion for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 45, 56, 57, 63) are STRICKEN from the record.
6. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Add Additional Exhibits to its Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 66) is DENIED as moot.
7. Intervener’s Motion for Permission to File Sur-Reply Brief (Doc. No. 67) is DENIED as moot. It is further ordered that the proposed sur-reply brief (Doc. No. 68) is STRICKEN from the record.
8. An Amended Case Management Order will follow.

Dated: September 9, 2003.

S/ Yvette Kane Yvette Kane United States District Judge

10

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and
MARION SHAUB, Plaintiff-Intervener
v.
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant

: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:CV-02-1194 : : (Judge Kane) : : : : : : : :

ORDER

AND NOW, on this 2nd day of February, 2004, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 105) is DENIED.

S/ Yvette Kane Yvette Kane United States District Judge

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:CV-02-1194 (Judge Kane)

MARION SHAUB, Plaintiff-Intervener
v.
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant
VERDICT
Count I: Violations of Title VII

(,SOlL&@
24Zoo4 c. 'ANDREA. ct.airc
HaG, PA DEPUTY 9U:AK.

Question 1: Was Ms. Shaub subjected to unlawful discrimination on the basis of her gender?

Yes

No

,/

Question 2: Is Federal Express liable to Plaintiff for a hostile work environment?

Yes

/

No

Question 3: Is Federal Express liable for retaliation against Marion Shaub?

Yes

/

No

If.voll answer Yes to at least one question above. please complete the damqges sections on the
next pages. Ifyou answer No to Questions 1. 2, and 3, proceed to Count ij

Page 1 of 4

Damages for Count I lonlYI
Ms. Shaub is entitled to receive back pay damages in the amount of:

Ms. Shaub is entitled to receive front pay damages in the amount of:
s 29 C COo 7

IfYOli find for Plaintiff on Count I, YOli mllst also complete the sections on compensatory and punitive damages on the next pages.

Count II: Intentionallntliction of Emotional Distress

Question 1: Is Federal Express liable to Ms. Shaub for the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress?

Yes

/

No

[(.rOll (l/}s\\'cr Yes, please complete the damages section he/ow Ifroll ([ns\\'er No, your verdict is for Dcfcnd([1Jt on this claim and you should complete the damages section all the IIext pages only (fyoillo/llulfor Plailltiffs all COUllt I.

Page 2 of 4

Compensatory Damages (Counts I & II) Ms. Shaub is entitled to receive damages for emotional pain and distress she has suffered and is likely to suffer in the future in the amount of:
$ 350]000
Please state tile percentage of this award that is attributable to each of Plaintiffs claims:
Count I: LcD ~
Count II: 4D o/c
You should fill in a zero on the appropriate line if you found for Defendant on either claim. The total should equal 100%.
Please continue to the next page.
Page 3 of 4

Punitive Damages [Counts I & II]

Question 1: Has Ms. Shaub proved entitlement to punitive damages on her claims for violations of Title VII?

Yes

/

No

Question 2: Has Ms. Shaub proved entitlement to punitive damages on her claim Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress?

Yes

/

No

Complete the next section only ifyou answered Yes to either Question 1 or Question 2 or both. If
you answer No to both Questions 1 and 2, stop.

Ms. Shaub is entitled to receive punitive damages in the amount of:

Please state the percentage of this award that is attributable to each of Plaintiffs claims:
Count I: stYe
Count II: S"t"'ID

You should fill in a zero if you found for Defendant on either claim or if you found that Plaintiff did not prove entitlement to punitive damages on either claim. The total should equal 100%.

Stop. Have the foreperson sign and date the verdict form and alert the courtroom deputy you

have arrived at a verdict.

~- .. _

Dated: February .t~/, 2004

Page 4 of 4

 
 AO 450 (Rev. 5/85) Judgment in a Civil Case
United States District Court
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & Marion Shaub
Judge Yvette Kane

v. Federal Express Corporation

CASE NUMBER: 1:02-CV-1194

X Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried
and the jury has rendered its verdict.
9 Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been
tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment be and is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on the Title VII Violation claim in the amount of $391,400. IT IS ALSO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment be and is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim. IN ADDITION, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded $350,000 in Compensatory Damages and $2,500,000 in Punitive Damages for both claims.

Date: February 26, 2004

Mary E. D’Andrea, Clerk of Court
(By) Shawna L. Cihak, Deputy Clerk

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and
MARION SHAUB, Plaintiff-Intervenor
v.
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant

: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:CV-02-1194 : : (Judge Kane) : : : : : : : :

ORDER

Before this Court is Defendant’s partially concurred in motion for stay of judgment. (Doc.

No. 251). Defendant seeks a stay of judgment pending resolution of post-trial motions and

appellate review pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(b). Intervernor concurs that the

judgment may be stayed pending resolution of the post-trial motions but does not concur in a stay

pending appellate review. Plaintiff EEOC was unable to provide a definitive response at the time

of Defendant’s filing.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(b) provides that “In its discretion and on such

conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the execution of

or any proceedings to enforce a judgment pending the disposition of a motion . . . to alter or

amend a judgment made pursuant to Rule 59 . . . or of a motion for judgment in accordance with

a motion for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50 . . . .”

Defendant has filed a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59. (Doc.

No. 249). Additionally, Defendant “will be filing imminently a renewed motion for judgment as a

matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.” (Doc. No. 251 at 2). The Court, therefore, will

stay the judgment pending resolution of post-trial motions. Defendant also requests that the Court stay the judgment pending appeal. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 62(d) provides “When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay subject to the exceptions contained in subdivision (a) of this rule. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing the notice of appeal or of procuring the order allowing the appeal, as the case may be.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d). Defendant has not filed a notice of appeal or procured an order allowing an appeal. Defendant, therefore, has not fulfilled the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d). Thus, the Court will not stay judgment pending appellate review at this time.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant’s partially concurred in motion for stay of judgment will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Judgment is hereby STAYED pending resolution of the post-trial motions only. The motion to stay judgment pending appeal is DENIED without prejudice to refile. Defendant may renew its motion to stay judgment pending appellate review in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d).

Date: March 4, 2004

S/ Yvette Kane Yvette Kane United States District Judge

2

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

:

COMMISSION and MARION SHAUB,

:

Civil Action No. 1:02-CV-1194

:

Plaintiff/Intervenor

:

(Judge Kane)

:

v.

:

:

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,

:

:

Defendant

:

AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court are the following post-trial motions filed in the above-captioned case: (1)

Defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (Doc. No. 257); (2) Defendant’s motion

to alter or amend judgment (Doc. No. 249); (3) Intervenor’s motion to amend judgment to include pre-

judgment interest (Doc. No. 266); (4) Intervenor’s motion to amend judgment to account for negative

tax consequences (Doc. No. 264); (5) Intervenor’s motion to amend judgment (Doc. No. 303); and

(6) Intervenor’s petition for attorneys’ fees and costs (Doc. Nos. 260 and 271). Each motion will be

addressed in turn.

I. Background

On February 25, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) brought

suit against Defendant on behalf of Marion Shaub in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania, alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). On March 7, 2002, Ms.

Shaub (“Intervenor”) moved to intervene in the action, which request was granted on April 5, 2002.

On that same day, Intervenor filed an intervening complaint against Defendant, alleging employment

discrimination on the basis of sex in violation Title VII, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. C.S. § 951 et seq. (“PHRA”), and the common law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, together with a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Subsequently, pursuant to an Order dated June 6, 2002, the case was transferred to this Court.
Intervenor’s claims were tried to a jury in a trial commencing on February 9, 2004. On February 24, 2004, the jury returned a verdict for Intervenor finding that although Intervenor was not subjected to unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex, Defendant was liable to Intervenor for a hostile working environment and was also liable to Intervenor for retaliation, all in violation of Title VII. In addition, the jury found that Defendant was liable to Intervenor for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress (“IIED”).
The jury found that Intervenor was entitled to receive back pay damages in the amount of $101,400 and front pay damages in the amount of $290,000 for the Title VII violations. The jury further awarded Intervenor $350,000 in compensation for emotional pain and distress, apportioned 60% for the Title VII violations and 40% for the IIED claim. Finally, the jury awarded Intervenor punitive damages in the amount of $2.5 million, apportioned 50% to the Title VII claim and 50% to the IIED claim. II. Discussion
A. Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. No. 257) Defendant argues that contrary to the jury verdict, judgment should be entered in its favor because (1) the jury’s decision was based on irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony of a former employee, Lorraine Metz; (2) Intervenor failed to present evidence demonstrating that she was
2

subjected to a hostile work environment because of her gender; (3) Intervenor failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation; (4) Intervenor’s IIED claim is statutorily barred under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act and because Intervenor failed to establish that Defendant’s conduct was extreme or outrageous; and (5) the punitive damage award should be set aside because the evidence did not demonstrate that Defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference.
A motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted only if, “viewing all the evidence which has been tendered and should have been admitted in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, no jury could decide in that party’s favor.” Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993). “The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is directed, but whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for that party.” Id. (quoting Patzig v. O’Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir. 1978)). The Third Circuit has held that denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law will be upheld where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is a “minimum quantum of evidence” from which a jury could reach a verdict for that party. Keith v. Truck Stops Corp., 909 F.2d 743, 745 (3d Cir. 1990)(citations omitted). Judgment as a matter of law should be granted sparingly, although a “scintilla of evidence” is insufficient to sustain a verdict of liability. Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc. , 307 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2002)(citation omitted). The Court will address in seriatim Defendant’s five arguments in support of its motion.
3

i. Testimony of Lorraine Metz Was Relevant and Not Unfairly Prejudicial Defendant first contends that “the jury’s decision was based on irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence from a former employee, Cynthia Metz.” 1 (Doc. No. 258, at 5.) Defendant’s argument in this regard is conclusory and unsupported by legal authority. Moreover, Defendant’s challenge to the relevance of Ms. Metz’ testimony to Intervenor’s claims rings hollow. In a recitation of her own experience of a hostile work environment and intentional discrimination at Federal Express, Ms. Metz testified that, like Intervenor, she was the only female Ramp Transport Driver at her facility. Like Intervenor, she was supervised by Robert Flynn. Like Intervenor, she endured constant and unrelenting verbal abuse. Like Intervenor, she complained. Like Intervenor, following her complaints the abuse escalated and the brake lines on her tractor trailer were sabotaged. Like Intervenor, Ms. Metz received inadequate managerial responses to her claims of discrimination and sabotage. Like Intervenor, Ms. Metz was “driven out” of Federal Express. The testimony of Ms. Metz was linked to evidence that three members of Defendant’s management who were aware of Ms. Metz’s allegations of harassment were involved with the investigation of Intervenor’s claims of sexual harassment. Accordingly, Ms. Metz’s testimony was highly relevant to establish that Defendant was on notice regarding conditions of significant sexual harassment present in the workplace. Her testimony bears on the issue of Federal Express’ liability for sex discrimination and on Intervenor’s claim for punitive damages.

1

The Court believes Defendant is referring to Lorraine Metz, a former employee of

Defendant who testified during trial regarding her own experience of employment sexual harassment

while working as a tractor trailer driver for Defendant in eastern Pennsylvania.

4

Defendant further complains that even if Ms. Metz’s testimony was relevant to establish notice, the testimony was nevertheless unfairly prejudicial to Defendant and that “but for” this testimony, Defendant “would not have been unfairly prejudiced.” (Doc. No. 258, at 6.) Again, Defendant’s contention is conclusory and not supported by any legal authority. Under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the balance of whether to admit relevant information should be struck in favor of admissibility. Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 453 (3d Cir. 1994). Moreover, the Court is charged with weighing the probative value of evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. Here, where Intervenor presents a virtual carbon copy of discrimination she endured, the questioned evidence is most relevant. The prejudice to Defendant is real, but not unfair in light of the unusually high probative value of the evidence.
Finally, Defendant seems to suggest, speculatively, that the verdict in favor of Intervenor is based entirely on the Lorraine Metz testimony. Nothing could be further from the fact. Intervenor’s testimony alone supports the jury’s verdict, and that testimony was bolstered by numerous witnesses who supported her claim. Substantial testimony was taken during the trial in support of the jury’s verdict as to each claim. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the testimony of Ms. Metz.
ii. Evidence Supported the Jury’s Finding that Intervenor Was Subject to a Hostile Work Environment Based on Sex
As Defendant correctly notes, sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII and the PHRA if sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. Meritor Sav. Bank FSB v.
5

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1297 (3d Cir. 1997); Bishop v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663-64 (E.D. Pa. 1999). In order to prove a case of co-worker sexual harassment and the existence of a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must prove: (1) she suffered intentional discrimination because of her sex; (2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable woman in the same position; and (5) the existence of respondent superior liability. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia , 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990).
Defendant contends that Intervenor “did not suffer intentional discrimination because of her sex.” (Doc. No. 258, at 7.) Defendant also claims that Intervenor failed to prove that the discrimination was pervasive and regular, concluding that Intervenor’s testimony indicated the “statements and actions” to which Intervenor was subjected were “sporadic and made over a four-year period” and the workplace was not, therefore, sufficiently hostile to support Intervenor’s claims. ( Id., at 8.) Defendant also argued that there was “no detrimental affect [sic]” resulting from the hostile work environment. (Id.) Apparently in support of this contention, Defendant notes that Intervenor “was not subject to any offensive touching or sexual demands.” ( Id.) Defendant further asserts that a “substantial” number of the offensive comments complained of “were not related to sex.” ( Id.) Additionally, Defendant claims that Intervenor did not suffer any “tangible” employment action. ( Id.) Finally, Defendant interprets Intervenor’s complaint as merely “one of disagreement experienced between employees while in the workplace.” ( Id.)
Defendant’s arguments mock the severe and invidious discrimination to which Intervenor attested. Intervenor established that her co-worker Steve Crumbling, regularly used sexually crude,
6

vile, and offensive language in front of her and that Crumbling grabbed his genitals in front of Intervenor, as did another male employee. Witnesses testified that Mr. Crumbling referred to Intervenor in vulgar and sexually offensive and derogatory terms. Evidence was presented that Mr. Crumbling told Intervenor that she looked like a porn star, spoke in Intervenor’s presence about having sexual relations with his wife, and talked about potentially having sex with Intervenor. Further testimony indicated that Mr. Crumbling used similarly vulgar and offensive language to describe females generally, and made other comments about women and their sex lives in front of Intervenor and other employees.
Intervenor also presented testimony that she and other employees reported Mr. Crumbling’s behavior to Defendant’s management. Lorraine Metz testified that she had reported sexually offensive and derogatory language used by male drivers, and also testified that she reported that she suspected her brakes were being sabotaged by her male co-workers. There was also testimony from a male employee, David Staiger, who reported to management regarding Mr. Crumbling’s treatment of Intervenor. There was further testimony that Defendant’s management took limited action in response to these reports.
Moreover, Intervenor testified that after complaining to management, her brakes were tampered with, and that her reports of such tampering were insufficiently acted upon by management. On the basis of this evidence, the jury had a reasonable basis for finding that Intervenor was subjected to a hostile working environment on the basis of her sex. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on this ground.
iii. Intervenor Presented Evidence Supporting Her Claim of Retaliation In order to maintain a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove: (1)
7

she engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer subsequently took adverse action against her; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the employer’s adverse action. Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 201 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1022 (1994). In this case, Defendant argues that Intervenor cannot succeed on her retaliation claim because she failed to present evidence that she was subject to any adverse employment action. 2
In response, Intervenor argues that she was subjected to adverse employment action in three ways. First, Intervenor claims that she suffered a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of her employment because Defendant knew about, but failed to take action to abate, retaliatory harassment inflicted by Intervenor’s co-workers. (Doc. No. 280, at 9.) Second, Intervenor argues that she suffered adverse employment action because Defendant removed Intervenor from her driving route and her wages were downgraded $2 per hour and, after her route was reassigned to a male driver, she was no longer permitted to drive a delivery truck. ( Id., at 11-12.) Finally, Intervenor asserts the evidence demonstrated that she was constructively discharged when she was no longer permitted to perform the duties required by her job. ( Id., at 13.)
With respect to Intervenor’s first argument, several circuit courts have indicated that an employee may suffer an adverse employment action where her employer knew about, but failed to take action to abate, retaliatory harassment inflicted by co-workers. See, e.g., Manero v. Goya of Puerto

2

It appears that Defendant is conceding that Intervenor engaged in protected activity.

Regardless, the Court notes that the record contained evidence that Intervenor made formal complaints

to Defendant’s management regarding the sexually offensive and harassing comments she was

subjected to by Mr. Crumbling, thereby satisfying the requirement that she in fact engaged in protected

activity.

8

Rico, 304 F.3d 7, 26 (1st Cir. 2002)(“Just as an employer will be liable for discrimination if it tolerates a racially or sexually hostile work environment, it will be liable for retaliation if it tolerates severe or pervasive harassment motivated by the Intervenor’s protected conduct”); Richardson v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999)(“an employee could suffer a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of her employment if her employer knew about but failed to take action to abate retaliatory harassment inflicted by co-workers”); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998)(holding that an employer may be liable for retaliation based upon co-worker harassment if supervisory or management personnel either (1) orchestrate the harassment or (2) acquiesce in the harassment in such a manner as to condone and encourage such conduct); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996)(“No one would question the retaliatory effect of many actions that put the complainant in a more unfriendly working environment . . . Nothing indicates why a different form of retaliation – namely, retaliating against a complainant by permitting her fellow employees to punish her for invoking her rights under Title VII – does not fall under the statute”).
In contrast, other circuits have held that co-worker harassment alone cannot constitute retaliation for Title VII purposes. See, e.g., Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. , 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997)(requiring “tangible change in duties or working conditions that constituted a material employment disadvantage”); Munday v. Waste Management of North America , 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)(holding that employer’s instructions to co-workers to ignore or spy on an employee who engaged in protected activity do not constitute adverse employment action absent evidence that terms, conditions or benefits of employment were adversely affected); and Mattern v. Eastman Kodak
9

Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)(requiring employer action be in the nature of “an ultimate employment decision” such as those concerning “hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating”).
Neither Intervenor nor Defendant has cited to any binding authority holding whether or not an employee suffers an “adverse employment action” where the employee is subjected to retaliatory harassment after engaging in protected conduct, and where the employer’s supervisors or managers were aware of the harassment. In Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997), the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that after she filed an EEOC complaint she was subjected to restricted job duties, reassignment, oral reprimands, and forced to work with an alleged harasser who, after plaintiff rebuffed his advances, “sometimes would not talk to her, or would make unnecessary derogatory comments to her.” 120 F.3d at 1300. The Third Circuit found that such treatment did not constitute retaliation under Title VII. Id. (“The alleged ‘unsubstantiated oral reprimands’ and ‘unnecessary derogatory comments’ suffered by [plaintiff] following her complaint do not rise to the level of what our cases have described as ‘adverse employment action.’”). The Third Circuit explained:
Retaliatory conduct other than discharge or refusal to rehire is thus proscribed by Title VII only if it alters the employee’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” deprives him or her of “employment opportunities,” or “adversely affects [his or her] status as an employee.” It follows that “not everything that makes an employee unhappy” qualifies as retaliation, for “otherwise, minor and even trivial employment actions that “an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit.” Id. Accordingly, in order to discern whether an employee has adequately demonstrated that he or she has been subjected to “adverse employment action” the Third Circuit found:
10

Courts have operationalized the principle that retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment into the doctrinal requirement that the alleged retaliation constitute “adverse employment action.” Accordingly, just as we concluded that a quid pro quo plaintiff must show a “quo” that is serious enough to alter his or her “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges” of employment, we hold that the “adverse employment action” element of a retaliation plaintiff’s prima facie case incorporates the same requirement that the retaliatory conduct rise to the level of a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) or (2).
Id. at 1300-1301.3
Comparing the evidence taken in the instant case with that of Robinson, the Court finds that
there was sufficient testimony from which a jury could have concluded that Defendant’s management
responded inadequately to the hostile environment complained of by Intervenor and that Intervenor was
subjected to retaliatory harassment that substantially altered her working conditions and her status as an
employee. Evidence was presented from which a jury could have found that Intervenor was not merely
subjected to silent treatment by Mr. Crumbling, but that the conditions of her employment were
compromised in that her truck was no longer being loaded, her truck and its brake lines were being
sabotaged, and she was subjected to a violent and hostile workplace atmosphere. Although Robinson

3

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) makes it an “unlawful employment practice”

to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or such privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . or to limit, segregate or classify his employees . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s . . . sex[.]
11

clearly requires that an “adverse employment action” be serious and have a genuine adverse affect on an employee’s employment status, the Court finds that the allegations and evidence demonstrating retaliatory harassment in the instant case were severe enough to constitute an “adverse employment action” under Title VII by altering significantly Intervenor’s employment conditions and her ability to perform her job duties.
However, even if the harassing and dangerous atmosphere in which Intervenor worked following her complaints were found not to be “adverse employment action,” Intervenor also presented evidence that she was effectively removed from her driving route and subjected to a different work assignment at a lower wage. Such a change in Intervenor’s work responsibilities and wage constitutes an adverse employment action, and evidence was presented by which the jury could find that Intervenor had been subject to such an adverse action shortly after engaging in protected activity. Intervenor testified that shortly after she complained to management about Mr. Crumbling’s and others’ harassment of her in late January 2000, her driving route was put up for bid in May 2000. Shortly thereafter, Intervenor was no longer driving a truck for Defendant and was performing other duties for lower pay. Upon such evidence, the jury could have found that Intervenor had engaged in protected activity, had suffered an adverse employment action shortly thereafter, and that the adverse action was causally related to the protected activity.
Defendant argues that Intervenor cannot demonstrate retaliation because the harassment Intervenor experienced after her complaints to management was identical to the harassment she experienced before she complained. In support of this proposition, Defendant relies exclusively upon Waite v. Blair, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d 79 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1996) for the
12

proposition that “retaliatory conduct must represent retaliation for engaging in protected activity . . . , the retaliatory conduct cannot be both the cause of the . . . complaints and their effect at the same time.” Id. at 470. However, Defendant ignores Intervenors testimony that the subsequent harassment Intervenor endured was different in both form and degree from that suffered prior to her complaints. (Doc. No. 280, at 14.) For example, testimony was presented that following her complaints to management, Mr. Crumbling refused to assist her in loading her truck (thereby compromising her ability to perform her job functions), and that Intervenor was subjected to physical harassment on the job. Moreover, Intervenor testified that following her complaints, her vehicle and equipment were being sabotaged by employees. Because the record contains evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find that Intervenor was subject to retaliation following her complaints to management, the Court must deny Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on this ground.
iv. Intervenor Presented Sufficient Evidence to Establish Her IIED Claim Defendant contends that Intervenor failed to establish a claim for IIED because (1) Intervenor failed to demonstrate that Defendant’s conduct was extreme or outrageous and (2) such claim is barred by the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 1 et seq. (“PWCA”). IIED is a state law tort, “the gravamen [of which] . . . is outrageous conduct on the part of the tortfeasor.” Clark v. Township of Falls , 890 F.2d 611, 623 (3d Cir. 1989)(quoting Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, Inc., 515 Pa. 183, 190 (1987)). It is for the Court to determine initially whether a defendant’s conduct is so extreme as to permit recovery. Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1988). The Third Circuit has noted that Pennsylvania courts have been “chary to declare conduct ‘outrageous’ so as to permit recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
13

have allowed recovery ‘only in limited circumstances where the conduct has been clearly outrageous.’” Id. (quoting Krushinski v. Roadway Express, 627 F. Supp. 934, 938 (M.D. Pa. 1985)). Moreover, “it is extremely rare to find conduct in the employment context that will rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, in a number of employment contexts, courts have been unwilling to find a basis for an IIED claim. See, e.g., Clark, 890 F.2d at 624 (forwarding charges about employee to district attorney, providing disparaging reports about employee to public, and depriving employment privileges were “deplorable” acts but did not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct under Pennsylvania law); Cox, 861 F.2d at 394-96 (firing an employee the day he returned to work following triple bypass surgery not outrageous); Briek v. Harbison-Walker Refractories, 624 F. Supp. 363, 367 (W.D. Pa. 1985)(dismissal alone insufficient to maintain IIED claim); Madreperla v. Williard Co., 606 F. Supp. 874, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1985)(premeditated plan to harass an employee into resigning not adequate for IIED claim); Cautilli v. GAF Corp., 531 F. Supp. 71, 74 (E.D. Pa. 1982)(tricking employee into foregoing other employment not outrageous).
Notwithstanding the difficulty of advancing a viable IIED claim in the employment context, the Third Circuit has noted that “the only instances in which courts applying Pennsylvania law have found conduct outrageous in the employment context is where an employer engaged in both sexual harassment and other retaliatory behavior against an employee.” Cox, 861 F.2d at 395. For example, the Third Circuit referenced Bowersox v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 677 F. Supp. 307, 311 (M.D. Pa. 1988) in which:
plaintiff alleged that her employer not only sexually harassed her but 14

withheld information from her which she needed to perform her job, forbade her from talking to anyone in her office, prohibited her from answering the phone, refused to talk to her and followed her throughout the plant. Id. at 396. In Bowersox, the district court noted “[t]hat a supervisor would subject his female employee to highly offensive speech and conduct in a close working environment and then, as a result of her negative reaction to that conduct, make the employee’s job impossible to perform” could cause “an average member of the community” to find the conduct outrageous. 677 F. Supp. at 311. Although it is clear that a plaintiff bears a heavy burden of demonstrating the requisite extreme and outrageous conduct needed to maintain an IIED claim, the Court concludes that Intervenor has met her burden in the case at bar. The jury was presented with evidence by which it could have found Intervenor was regularly subjected to rude and offensive language and displays of physical vulgarity motivated by sex. Intervenor presented evidence that male co-workers spoke about having sex with her and advised her that women should remain barefoot and pregnant. After Intervenor complained to management about the sexual hostility she experienced in the work environment, evidence indicated that co-workers refused to load her truck, refused to speak with her, assaulted her with heavy freight, and sabotaged her truck. The jury heard testimony that would have supported a finding that Defendant’s management responded inadequately to Intervenor’s and others’ reports of a sexually hostile work environment, effectively allowing the harassing conduct to continue and worsen. Intervenor plead for management intervention and her cries for help were ignored. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Intervenor adduced evidence of conduct sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support liability on Intervenor’s IIED claim.
15

Defendant’s additional arguments that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Intervenor’s IIED claim may be disposed of quickly. First, Defendant asserts that Intervenor’s claims are barred by the PWCA, apparently because Intervenor was harassed in the workplace. The PWCA provides that:
The liability of the employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employees . . . or to anyone else entitled to damages in any action at law . . . . 77 P.S. § 481 (2004). The PWCA defines injuries for which workers’ compensation is the exclusive relief available to include “an injury to an employee . . . arising in the course of his employment and related thereto . . . .” 77 P.S. § 411(1). However, the PWCA contains the following exception to the rule: The term “injury arising in the course of employment” . . . shall not include an injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employee or because of his employment; but shall include all other injuries sustained while the employee is actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer[.] Id. Pennsylvania courts and courts within this district have interpreted these provisions as excluding IIED claims arising from sexual harassment in the workplace from the preclusive effect of the PWCA. Garvey v. Dickinson College , 761 F. Supp. 1175, 1191 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Schweitzer v. Rockwell Int’l, 586 A.2d 383, 391 (Pa. Super. 1990). Accordingly, the Court finds that the PWCA does not operate to bar Intervenor’s IIED claim based upon her allegations of sexual harassment. Finally, Defendant argues that even if Intervenor did establish the fundamental requirements of an IIED claim, Defendant is not liable for the intentional or criminal acts of its employees. In support of
16

this proposition, Defendant relies on cases holding that an employer will be held liable for the intentional or criminal acts of its employee only if the wrongful acts are committed within the scope of the employee’s employment. Defendant’s argument in this regard is unpersuasive and not supported by the evidence presented at trial. Defendant would appear to be likening this case to one where an employee or employees perpetrate criminal outlier acts so far outside the scope of their employment that they cannot be imputed to the employer. The evidence in this case suggested that Defendant was aware of the outrageous conduct and dangerous atmosphere polluting one of its facilities, and that it chose to ignore the problem, allowing the sexual harassment and retaliatory conduct to exist and, indeed, to worsen. Moreover, Intervenor presented evidence suggesting that many of the actions (or inactions) taken with respect to Intervenor were perpetrated during working hours, in connection with daily responsibilities. The allegations and evidence suggested that the actions taken by Defendant’s employees to create a hostile work environment and to retaliate against Intervenor were all workrelated. Although the Court acknowledges the difficulty of presenting an IIED claim in the employment context, under the facts presented at trial, the Court finds that Intervenor presented sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s finding on the IIED claim.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (Doc. No. 257) will be denied.
B. Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Intervenor’s Motion to Amend the Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. Nos. 249 and 303)
In its motion to alter or amend judgment (Doc. No. 249), Defendant argues that judgment for Intervenor should be reduced by $1,160,000 in accordance with the statutory cap on damages
17

mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Intervenor opposes Defendant’s request, asserting that the jury’s
verdict should be apportioned among Intervenor’s various claims in order to honor the intention of the
jury’s verdict. Intervenor has also filed a motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 303.) Because both motions to amend the judgment
concern the same issues, the Court will consider the motions together.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) provides in relevant part that:
In an action brought by a complaining party under [Title VII] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination . . . prohibited under [Title VII] . . . the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) . . . from the respondent.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1). The statute also contains the following applicable limitation on the recovery
of such damages:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party–
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).4 Pursuant to these statutory provisions, Defendant contends that
the jury verdict in the instant case must be reduced.

4
3.)

Defendant acknowledges that it employs more than 500 employees. (Doc. No. 250, at 18

Intervenor’s claims were grouped into employment discrimination claims and tort claims on the verdict form. The jury was properly instructed on each of Intervenor’s claims, including the claim for sexual harassment under Title VII and the PHRA, and the Pennsylvania Constitution, (Doc. No. 304 and Exhibit thereto.), and on Intervenor’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The special verdict form tendered to the jury contained only two separate counts, one labeled “Title VII” and the other denominated “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.”
The jury found for Intervenor as to both categories of claims, finding discrimination on the basis of hostile work environment and tortious conduct. The jury awarded Intervenor the following damages for the claim denominated as “Title VII” on the special verdict form: (1) $101,400 for “back pay;” (2) $290,000 for “front pay;” (3) $210,000 in compensatory damages; and (4) $1.25 million in punitive damages. Defendant does not seek reduction of the jury’s $391,400 award for “front pay” and “back pay,” but argues that the remaining award of $1,460,000 for compensatory and punitive damages must be reduced to $300,000 in accordance with the limitations set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)(D).
In response, Intervenor contends that the damages awarded by the jury should be allocated between the various claims in such a manner as to maximize the jury’s award. Moreover, Intervenor asserts that the judgment should not be reduced by any amount because damages for claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution are not subject to any limitations.
In Gagliardo v. Connaught Laboratories, Inc., 311 F.3d 565 (3d Cir. 2002), the Third Circuit held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a “does not prevent a claimant from recovering greater damages under a state law claim that is virtually identical to a capped federal claim.” Id. at 570. In that case, the plaintiff brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and under the
19

PHRA. The Court noted that:
the PHRA, with its similar language and applicability, clearly provides a cause of action nearly identical to that of the ADA. The fact that the PHRA does not contain a damages cap further indicates that it was intended to provide a remedy beyond its federal counterpart, the ADA. As [other courts have] recognized, subjecting such state law claims to the federal cap would effectively limit a state’s ability to provide for greater recovery than allowed under the corresponding federal law.
Id. at 570-71. Therefore, the Court concluded that:
given the similarity of the claims and the jury’s unapportioned award of damages, it is reasonable to infer that the jury intended to award its entire verdict to Gagliardo. Because there is no cap under the PHRA, it was entirely reasonable for the trial court to apportion the damages so as to allow Gagliardo to recover the entire jury award, as reduced by the district court.
Id. at 571.
The instant case is analogous to Gagliardo with regard to the similarity between Intervenor’s
causes of action under Title VII and the PHRA. However, unlike Gagliardo, the special verdict form
tendered to the jury in the instant case did not contain any reference to the PHRA or the Pennsylvania
Constitution, instead labeling Intervenor’s claims only under the headings of “Title VII” and “Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress.” Because the verdict form did not explicitly require a finding from the
jury for Intervenor’s PHRA and Pennsylvania Constitution claims, Defendant argues that to now
allocate damages for such claims would be “tantamount to rewriting the jury’s verdict.” (Doc. No.
289, at 6.) Intervenor counters that equity dictates that the damages be apportioned among the claims
20

in order to maximize the award “where applicable federal and state claims are symmetrical.” 5 (Doc. No. 272.)
Notwithstanding the labels used on the special verdict form in this case, the jury was in fact instructed that Intervenor’s claims of sexual harassment were predicated on the PHRA and the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as Title VII. During the charging conference, Intervenor’s counsel reminded Defendant’s counsel and the Court as to Intervenor’s PHRA and Pennsylvania Constitution claims, and Defendant offered no objection or comment. (Transcript of February 23, 2004 Charging Conference, at 40.) Indeed, Intervenor’s state law claims were the subject of discussion among the parties and the Court in determining how to structure the special verdict form that ultimately was used. Intervenor’s counsel advised the Court and Defendant that the instructions for the PHRA and Title VII claims were essentially identical. ( Id., at 41.) Again, Defendant’s counsel did not object to this assertion. Subsequently, the Court advised the jury that Intervenor was suing Defendant for sexual harassment under Title VII, the PHRA and the Pennsylvania Constitution. Thereafter, the Court instructed the jury on the law of sexual harassment but, in accordance with the jury instructions tendered by the parties, the Court did not offer different instructions for Title VII, PHRA and Pennsylvania Constitution.6

5

The Third Circuit has found that the analysis regarding claims brought under the PHRA

and Title VII is identical. Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Medical, Inc. , 228 F.3d 313, 317 n.3 (3d

Cir. 2000).

6

In its opposition to Intervenor’s motion to amend the judgment, Defendant selectively

cites to one instance during the jury charge regarding an instruction that in order to award punitive

damages the jury needed to find that Defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference to

Intervenor’s “federally protected rights.” (Doc. No. 313, at 6.) Defendant’s selectivity in this regard

ignores the totality of the instructions given and, in any event, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion

21

Considering the jury charge as a whole and the facts in support of the jury’s verdict, the Court concludes that implicit in the jury’s verdict is a finding on each of Intervenor’s Title VII, PHRA and constitutional claims. This is so because despite the factual complexities of this case that required nearly three weeks of trial testimony, the essential basis of Intervenor’s claims under each of the statutes is the same. The jury was called upon to review the same evidence and to determine the truth of Intervenor’s claim of sexual harassment and retaliation opposed to Defendant’s denial of wrongdoing by its employees and managers. The jury believed Intervenor and signified that fact by marking the verdict form in Intervenor’s favor on the “Title VII claim”. In so doing, the jury must also have found in Intervenor’s favor with respect to the constitutional claim and the PHRA claims to render a consistent verdict. That is, had the jury been afforded a place on the verdict slip to address the remaining claims individually, the verdict could only be for Intervenor as the same facts and same elements apply to each of the remaining claims. Any other verdict would be stricken as inconsistent with the jury’s verdict on the Title VII claim. The jury was instructed that the Intervenor’s suit was brought under each such law and then instructed about the law of sexual harassment generally, without regard to the particular statute or constitutional provision on which Intervenor based her claims. Thus, the inadvertent use of a verdict form that failed to specify each of Intervenor’s bases for recovery cannot deprive Intervenor of the jury’s intended award. Accordingly, the Court finds that the proper means of respecting the jury’s intended verdict while at the same time complying with federal and state law regarding damage caps is to allocate $300,000 of the punitive damage award to Intervenor’s Title VII claim and allocate the
that the punitive damage award was necessarily predicated exclusively on Intervenor’s Title VII claim. 22

$210,000 award for compensatory damages to Intervenor’s PHRA claim. Defendant opposes the allocation of any award amount to Intervenor’s claim under the Equal
Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pennsylvania Constitution, Art. 1, § 28 (“PERA”), on the grounds that there is no private right of action for sexual harassment. In support of its argument, Defendant cites to a number of decisions from courts within this circuit holding that the PERA does not provide for a private right of action for damages under the state constitution. See, e.g., Ryan v. General Machine Prod., 277 F. Supp. 2d 585, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F. Supp. 2d 391, 405 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Dooley v. City of Philadelphia , 153 F. Supp. 2d 628, 663 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Indeed, this conclusion was reached recently in EEOC v. Dan Lepore & Sons Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1943 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2004), where the court denied an intervenor’s request to assert a claim under the PERA because “the Pennsylvania Constitution does not create” a private cause of action for damages under the PERA. Id. at *14. A contrary result was reached in Imboden v. Chowns Communications, 182 F. Supp. 2d 453, 458 (E.D. Pa. 2002) and in Kemether v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 15 F. Supp. 2d 740, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
Although the Third Circuit has not yet directly addressed the issue, Intervenor cites Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990) in support of her argument that the PERA allows a private right of action. There the Court addressed in dicta the private right of action under PERA: “We are of the view that a private right of action is available for cases of gender discrimination under the Pennsylvania ERA.” Id. at 789 (citing Bartholomew on Behalf of Bartholomew v. Foster, 541 A.2d 393 (Pa. Commw. 1988), aff’d, 563 A.2d 1390 (Pa. 1989); Welsch v. Aetna Ins. Co., 494 A.2d 409 (Pa. Super. 1985)).
23

This Court is likewise persuaded by state decisions on the issue that Pennsylvania law does permit a private action to enforce the rights guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution. Accordingly, the Court finds that the remaining $950,000 of the punitive damages awarded is properly allocated to Intervenor’s PERA claim.
24

C. Intervenor’s Motion to Amend the Judgment to Provide for Pre-Judgment Interest (Doc. No. 266)
Intervenor requests entry of an order pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure amending the judgment in this case to provide for post-judgment interest in the amount of $3,495. Defendant contends the amount of such interest should total no more than $1,277.64.
In the event of a verdict for a plaintiff, there is a strong presumption in favor of awarding prejudgment interest. Booker v. Taylor Milk Co., Inc., 64 F.3d 860, 868 (3d Cir. 1995). In this circuit, pre-judgment interest is typically calculated using either of two methods: (1) Internal Revenue Service rates or (2) the rates used in 28 U.S.C. § 1961, the post-judgment statute. O’Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 445 (E.D. Pa. 2000)(citing cases applying each method). The parties agree that the pre-judgment interest in this case should be calculated using the post-judgment interest rates set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). However, the parties differ in their calculations of the amount of pre-judgment interest due in this case, apparently because they utilize differing interest rates and differing periods over which pre-judgment interest accrued.
The Court concludes that Intervenor’s calculation accurately reflects the amount of prejudgment interest due in this case. Intervenor calculated pre-judgment interest dating from September 2000 (the date her employment terminated) through February 24, 2004 (the date of the jury’s verdict). Intervenor’s financial consultant multiplied Intervenor’s back pay award against prevailing one-year Treasury bill rates in effect in the years in which the back pay would have been earned over a period of 3.43 years, thereby compounding the interest yearly based upon the amount of earnings Intervenor would have collected in each successive year of employment, plus all preceding years. ( See Doc. No.
25

293 and attached Verzilli supplemental report dated April 14, 2004.) In contrast, Defendant simply took the 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield for the week ended February 20, 2004 and multiplied the rate against the total back pay award. The Court finds that Intervenor’s proposed calculation more accurately serves the purpose of making Intervenor whole for the back pay she would have received had she remained employed by Defendant. See O’Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 445 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (discussing proper method of calculating pre-judgment interest). Accordingly, Intervenor’s motion for an award of pre-judgment interest in the amount of $3,495 will be granted.
D. Intervenor’s Motion to Amend the Judgment to Include an Award to Account for Negative Tax Consequences of a Lump Sum Payment of Back Pay and Front Pay (Doc. No. 264)
Intervenor seeks entry of an order pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure amending the judgment in this case to include a “gross-up” of the verdict to account for alleged negative tax consequences that would attend the lump sum payment of back pay and front pay. Defendant objects to Intervenor’s request, arguing that such a tax enhancement award would be speculative. Moreover, Defendant argues that amending judgments to account for enhanced tax liability is unsupported under the law.
No decision of the Third Circuit authorizes the amendment of a judgment to account for negative tax consequences that result from a lump sum award of front or back pay. Courts within the circuit are divided on the issue. Compare O’Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 448 (E.D. Pa. 2000)(finding award appropriate, and noting plaintiff supported her request with testimony from financial consultant) with Anderson v. Conrail, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15978 at *14-15
26

(E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2000)(refusing to adjust award to account for tax consequences because such amendment would be speculative, noting plaintiff had not supported her request with any evidence) and Shovlin v. Timemed Labeling Sys., Inc. , 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2350 at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1997)(same).
In support of her argument in favor of amending the judgment, Intervenor submitted two letters and sets of calculations from Verzilli & Verzilli & Consultants, Inc. (“Verzilli”) ( See exhibits attached to Doc. Nos. 265 and 294.) In the Verzilli letter dated April 14, 2004, Intervenor’s financial consultants set forth a detailed calculation that estimated Intervenor’s tax liability by taking into account (1) 2003 IRS tax tables, (2) Intervenor’s and her husband’s income tax returns, and (3) the aggregate back pay and front pay award of $391,400. The April 14, 2004 letter also indicates that Verzilli considered Intervenor’s husband’s 2002 W-2 earnings and the 2002 Schedule A itemized deductions, and three personal exemptions in reaching its calculations. Under the Verzilli analysis, as a result of the lump sum payment from the judgment in this case, Intervenor and her husband would have gross earnings in 2004 of $422,938. After backing out itemized deductions ($9,024) and personal exemptions ($9,000), Intervenor’s total taxable income was estimated to be $404,914. Based on this taxable income, Verzilli calculated Intervenor would owe $116,926 in taxes and would have an effective tax rate of 27.65%.
In contrast, in an allegedly normal year, Intervenor and her husband would have total gross earnings of $69,853 and total taxable income of $51,829. Intervenor would have owed an estimated $7,074 in taxes and would have an effective tax rate of $10.13%. Verzilli then multiplied the difference in the two effective tax rates (17.52%) against the $391,400 award to calculate a negative tax consequence of approximately $68,600.
27

The Court recognizes, on the one hand, that Intervenor will face a significant tax burden in the current year as the result of the judgment. However, amending the judgment to account for negative tax consequences attending the award for a lump sum payment of future earnings necessarily requires a significant degree of speculation. Intervenor has offered calculations from a financial specialist that attempt to quantify the negative tax consequences, thereby minimizing the speculative nature of the proposed adjustment. However, Intervenor offers insufficient support to justify the unusual and extraordinary form of relief she requests. The Court is aware of only one other court in this circuit that has found it appropriate to modify a jury’s award to account for negative tax consequences on the basis of an economic expert’s opinion and calculations. O’Neill, 108 F. Supp. at 448. In Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry, 749 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed an order amending judgment to account for negative tax consequences of receiving 17 years earnings in one lump sum. However, in doing so, the court noted that such awards may not be appropriate in a typical Title VII case. The Court agrees and concludes that enhancing the jury’s award to account for alleged negative tax implications in this case would be too speculative and without adequate legal support. Accordingly, the Court will deny Intervenor’s motion to amend the judgment to account for alleged negative tax consequences of receiving a lump sum payment of back pay and front pay.
E. Intervenor’s Motions for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc. Nos. 260 and 271) Intervenor submitted a petition and supporting brief for attorneys’ fees on March 10, 2004. (Doc. No. 260.) Intervenor requests fees in the amount of $482,416, representing 1,868.40 hours of services rendered and expenses incurred in connection with the litigation, as well as $34,383.42 in legal
28

expenses. Defendant filed an opposition to the petition on March 30, 2004 (Doc. No. 285), arguing that: (1) certain of the hours claimed are excessive, redundant or unnecessary; (2) the billing entries were insufficiently documented; (3) certain expenses claimed are not permitted by law or are unrelated to the prosecution of this case; and (4) the hourly rates requested by Intervenor’s counsel are not reasonable. Subsequently, Intervenor supplemented the petition to revise downward her request for reimbursement of expert expenses. Defendant did not file any further responsive pleadings.
1. Standard for Attorneys’ Fees An award of attorneys’ fees for the prevailing party in a Title VII action is provided by in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).7 The PHRA contains a similar fee-shifting provision at 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 962(c)(4)(c.2).8 This Court finds that Intervenor was the prevailing party as demonstrated by the jury verdict in her favor. Therefore, the Court must determine reasonable attorneys’ fees. The accepted method of determining statutory attorneys’ fees is the “lodestar” method. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). The lodestar amount is calculated by taking the amount of time reasonably expended by counsel for the prevailing party on the litigation and compensating that time as a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Brytus v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 2000). The lodestar presumably yields a

7

The statute provides: “In any action or proceeding under this subchapter, the court, in

its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a

reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission and the

United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

8

The statute provides: “If, after a trial held pursuant to subsection (c), the court of

common pleas finds that a defendant engaged in or is engaging in any unlawful discriminatory practice

as defined in this act, the court may award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff.”

29

reasonable fee. Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas , 89 F.3d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1996).
The party seeking attorneys’ fees bears the initial burden of proving that the requested fees are reasonable. Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183. To meet this burden, the fee petition must “submit evidence supporting the hours worked and the rates claimed.” Hensley, 461 at 433. The party opposing the fee award then has the burden to challenge the reasonableness of the requested fee, by affidavit or brief with sufficient specificity to give the fee applicant notice of the objection. Id.; Bell v. United Princeton Props., Inc., 884 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1989). Once the adverse party raises objections to the fee request, the district court has considerable discretion to adjust the award in light of those objections. Id. at 721; Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183.
Defendant argues that Intervenor has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that the requested fees are reasonable. Specifically, Defendant contends that (1) certain of the hours claimed are excessive, redundant or unnecessary; (2) the billing entries were insufficiently documented; (3) certain expenses claimed are not permitted by law or are unrelated to the prosecution of this case; and (4) the hourly rates requested by Intervenor’s counsel are not reasonable. The Court will address Defendant’s arguments below, beginning with a discussion regarding counsel’s requested hourly rate of compensation.
2. Hourly Rate A reasonable hourly rate is generally calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); see also Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. AT&T Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436, 1448 (3d Cir. 1988) (adopting the community
30

market rule). The “starting point in determining a reasonable hourly rate is the attorneys’ usual billing rate[.]” Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Windall , 51 F.3d 1179, 1185 (3d Cir. 1995).
In support of the fee application, Attorney Sperling and Attorney Lamar each submitted affidavits regarding their stated current hourly rates of $350 and $275, respectively, and setting forth details regarding their skill and expertise in litigation similar to the instant case. In addition, Attorneys Sperling and Lamar have submitted affidavits from four attorneys practicing in either Philadelphia or the Harrisburg area in the field of employment law. Each affiant attested to the reasonableness of the fees requested and the challenges faced by practitioners representing plaintiffs in employment cases.
Defendant objects to the hourly rates claimed by Intervenor’s counsel, and suggests that the Community Legal Services, Inc. (“CLS”) survey of attorneys’ fees in the Philadelphia area dictates lower rates than those sought in the fee application and are presumptively reasonable. Moldanado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2001)(noting reasonableness of CLS fees). Although it may have been appropriate to focus exclusively on the prevailing market rates in the Harrisburg area, Defendant has suggested that reference to the CLS survey of rates charged in the Philadelphia area is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will determine a reasonable hourly rate by considering the CLS survey, as well as the affidavits submitted in support of the fee application.
Attorney Sperling was admitted to practice in Pennsylvania in October 1979. Thus, when this case commenced in 2002, Attorney Sperling had approximately 22 years of experience. When the case concluded, Attorney Sperling had been practicing for more than 24 years. The CLS provides that the range of hourly rates for attorneys with between 21 and 25 years of experience is between $270
31

and $310 per hour.9 The affidavits submitted in support of the fee application attest to Attorney Sperling’s substantial expertise and success in the area of employment litigation, and support the reasonableness of Attorney Sperling’s asserted billing rate. The affidavits also attest to the significant risks undertaken by counsel in representing litigants in sexual harassment cases on a contingency basis and indicate the difficulty litigants often face in engaging competent legal counsel in similar cases.
Considering the suggested CLS rates against Attorney Sperling’s asserted rate and the affidavits filed in support of the fee application, the Court finds the asserted billing rate of $350 per hour to be reasonable and a fair rate for this litigation. Attorney Sperling demonstrated exceptional skill and expertise in employment law and is a seasoned trial practitioner uniquely qualified to advance Intervenor’s factually and legally complex claims. Her representation of Intervenor in this action was undertaken on a contingency basis and subject to substantial risk, a factor not accounted for in the CLS rates offered by Defendant. Furthermore, Intervenor endeavored to obtain suitable counsel in the Harrisburg area and was unsuccessful, at least in part due to the challenges and difficulties presented by the litigation. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Attorney Sperling is entitled to be compensated at a rate of $350 per hour for the services rendered in connection with this matter.
Attorney Lamar was admitted to practice in 1990 and, accordingly, had approximately 14 years of experience at the conclusion of this case. 10 The CLS provides that attorneys with between 11 and 15 years of experience generally bill at a rate between $220 and $260 per hour. Based upon the

9

Defendant did not attach an exhibit setting forth the alleged CLS fees for the

Philadelphia area. The fee schedule is provided at the CLS website, www.clsphila.org.

10 Attorney Lamar apparently began representing Intervenor in January 2003 and continued as Attorney Sperling’s co-counsel through conclusion of trial in February 2004.

32

suggested CLS rates, together with consideration of the affidavits filed in support of the fee application,

the Court finds the requested billing rate of $275 to be a fair and representative rate for this type of

litigation given Attorney Lamar’s experience, the skill Mr. Lamar demonstrated during the course of this

litigation, and the contingent nature of the representation.

3. Unreasonable, Excessive or Otherwise Unnecessary Fees

In addition to its specific arguments regarding discrete aspects of Intervenor’s fee application,

Defendant argues generally that Intervenor’s requested fees are unreasonable because the EEOC

actually commenced the litigation and Intervenor’s counsel worked in concert with EEOC’s attorney

during much of the litigation. Moreover, Defendant contends that Intervenor has not provided

Defendant with a copy of her written agreement with her attorneys and that this has prejudiced

Defendant’s ability to argue for a further reduction in the claimed fees. Finally, Defendant asserts that

any fees recovered should be reduced because Intervenor failed to prevail on one of her four claims.

Defendant also offers the following objections relating to specific periods and amount of time

incurred by Intervenor’s counsel:

•

four hours for fees incurred before representation of Intervenor commenced in

October 2001;

•

more than 75 hours spent before EEOC filed the complaint commencing this

litigation;

•

more than 13 hours of time which does not explicitly appear to be related to the

litigation and for time incurred responding to the media;

•

9.2 hours for time spent opposing Defendant’s motion to transfer venue;

•

.87 hours for time spent placing unanswered telephone calls;

33

•

more than 5 hours for clerical activities that allegedly could have been assigned

to paralegals or associates;

•

130 hours for time spent responding to Defendant’s two motions for summary

judgment;

•

30 hours for the preparation and argument of seven motions in limine; and

•

40 hours spent during 125 conferences among Intervenor’s counsel and EEOC

“for which no subject of conversation” is included, suggesting to Defendant that

the conversations indicate duplication of effort.

A district court should exclude hours from the lodestar calculation that are not reasonably

expended. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Hours are not reasonably expended if they are excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Id. at 437.

The Court does not agree with Defendant’s unsupported argument that the hours spent in

advance of this trial are not properly compensable. Attorney Sperling began her representation of

Intervenor in March 2000 and was engaged in presenting Intervenor’s case to the EEOC and preparing

for and commencing this litigation. In New York Gas Light Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980),

the Supreme Court noted that a court could properly award attorneys’ fees for services rendered in

connection with administrative proceedings to enforce Title VII. Id. at 66. The Court finds that the

legal services Attorney Sperling rendered in such administrative and pretrial proceedings were directly

related to the instant case. Accordingly, the Court will not reduce the fee award on the grounds that

certain of Attorney Sperling’s services were rendered in advance of the litigation in this Court.

The Court does agree, in part, with Defendant’s assertion that Intervenor is not entitled to be

reimbursed for attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with public relations and dealing with the media,

which accounted for 4.4 hours. (Doc. No. 285, Ex. B.) Defendant also objects to 8.6 hours of

34

services which Defendant claims are not related to this litigation. However, despite the exacting scrutiny with which its counsel reviewed Intervenor’s proposed attorneys’ fees, Defendant failed to note that Intervenor’s counsel rendered these remaining 8.6 hours of services free of charge. (Doc. No. 268, Ex. 1 at 4.) Accordingly, the objected-to charges for 8.6 hours were never billed, Defendant’s objection to the uncharged fees is meritless, and no reduction is warranted.
The Court also agrees in part with Defendant that certain of Intervenor’s requested fees related to clerical tasks not properly charged to Defendant. For example, certain such tasks include: (1) copying and faxing letters; (2) preparing and mailing deposition notices; (3) placing tabs on depositions; and (4) setting up telephone conferences. (Doc. No. 285, Ex. E.) Such clerical work is not properly billed at the rate of a senior attorney commanded by Attorney Sperling. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 49 F.3d 939, 942 (3d Cir. 1995)(it is not appropriate to allow “the wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to non-professionals”); Jordan v. CCH, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 603, 612 (E.D. Pa. 2002)(excluding hours from fee petition that did not require attorney’s legal knowledge and training). In this case, Defendant has objected to five hours of Attorney Sperling’s time. (Doc. No. 285, Ex. E.) The Court finds that four of these hours are clerical in nature, but finds the additional hour appears to be for preparing discovery requests, which the Court does not find to be clerical work. Accordingly, the Court will reduce the fee award by four hours of Attorney Sperling’s time spent on clerical activities.
Finally, the Court is constrained to agree with Defendant that Intervenor’s de minimis time spent placing unanswered telephone calls is not compensable. Accordingly, the Court will further reduce Attorney Sperling’s fees by .87 hours, as requested by Defendant.
35

The Court does not agree with Defendant’s further specific objections regarding the reasonableness of the time spent in representing Intervenor in this action. Defendant complains that Intervenor’s counsel spent approximately 130 hours responding to two motions for summary judgment that were substantially similar in nature. Defendant argues that the motions for summary judgment did not present novel issues of law. Defendant presumes that the “majority of the time charged for responding to the motions presumably was spent on legal research, which would normally require the work of an associate, not a twenty-year lawyer[.]” (Doc. No. 285, at 8.). Moreover, in Defendant’s judgment, “the final work products did not reflect 140 plus hours of work.” 11 (Doc. No. 285, at 8-9.) Accordingly, Defendant proclaims that “the time and amount of fees attributable to these responses should . . . be substantially reduced.” ( Id., at 9).
The Court agrees that it is generally inappropriate for an attorney to charge a rate demonstrating substantial experience, and at the same time incur an inordinately high number of hours researching issues with which the attorney presumably is familiar. See Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 677 (3d Cir. 1983)(“Routine tasks, if performed by senior partners in large firms, should not be billed at their usual rates”). However, as an initial matter, the Court does not agree with Defendant’s unsupported presumption that the majority of counsel’s time was spent on legal research. Indeed, a cursory review of counsel’s time records relating to this work indicates that only a modest amount of time was spent on research alone. ( See Doc. No. 285, Ex. F.)
11 Defendant complains that Intervenor’s counsel spent approximately 90 hours responding to the first motion, and 40 hours responding to the second motion. The Court presumes Defendant simply miscalculated the total hours spent on these matters.
36

More fundamentally, the Court notes that it was Defendant who elected to file two motions for summary judgment, to which Intervenor was required to respond. It is somewhat disingenuous to litigate aggressively and then complain that the opposing party fought vigorously to defeat motions adverse to its interests. In this case the stakes were high, the issues moderately complex, and the litigation contentious. The Court finds that counsel rendered necessary and valuable services in responding to and defeating Defendant’s efforts to dispose of this litigation before trial. The Court further finds that the amount of time spent responding to Defendant’s motions in this regard was reasonable.
Similarly, the Court finds that the 9.2 hours counsel spent contesting Defendant’s motion to transfer venue was reasonable under the circumstances. Notwithstanding that EEOC did not contest the transfer motion, and notwithstanding Defendant’s allegation that “Intervenor opposed the motion to transfer solely for the convenience of her counsel,” the Court does not conclude that the time incurred was unreasonable. The fact that the litigation was transferred to this district caused Intervenor’s counsel greater difficulty and expense, all of which was borne by Intervenor’s counsel, who were engaged throughout this litigation on a contingency basis. It was not necessarily unreasonable for Intervenor to oppose transfer from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where the case had been pending for several months, in order to allow the litigation to be conducted more efficiently and cost effectively. Ironically, Defendant’s success in transferring the case to this Court necessarily resulted in Intervenor’s counsel incurring substantially higher costs, some or all of which will now be charged to Defendant. The Court finds that the time spent opposing the motion to transfer venue was reasonable and will not reduce the requested fees on this basis.
37

The Court also disagrees with Defendant that counsel’s time spent preparing and advancing motions in limine should be reduced or excluded. Defendant argues that only one of Intervenor’s motions in limine was actually granted, the time Intervenor’s counsel spent on the motions was excessive, and Intervenor’s counsel seeks fees for time spent refiling motions originally stricken for failure to comply with the local rules. However, the time entries Defendant focuses on do not support its arguments and, in several instances, flatly undercut Defendant’s position. For example, Defendant complains about 12 hours of time described as follows: “Work on file; prepare for trial; work on abstracts from depositions.” (Doc. No. 285, Ex. G.) It is not clear that any of these particular services related to Intervenor’s motions in limine. Another entry reads 2 hours for: “Work on Answer to Motion in Limine.” (Id.)(emphasis added) Rather than relating to Intervenor’s own motions in limine, this time appears to have been spent objecting to Defendant’s motion in limine ( See Doc. Nos. 64, 73.) Another large block of time is described as 8 hours for: “Answer and file Motions, Daubert and Motions in Limine.” (Doc. No. 285, Ex. G.) Such services do not appear to concern exclusively unsuccessful motions in limine, but instead appear to relate to other pretrial activity as well. Excluding the foregoing entries, it would appear that Intervenor’s counsel spent at least 8 hours relating exclusively or almost entirely to seven motions in limine. 12 The Court does not find that it was unreasonable for counsel to prepare and advance motions in limine in an effort to exclude potentially prejudicial evidence and to narrow the issues for trial, particularly in light of the complexity and contentiousness of the
12 The Court recognizes that certain of the remaining complained-of entries also relate in part to motions in limine, but Defendant’s argument that counsel’s time was devoted exclusively to motions in limine is not supported by the entries highlighted on Defendant’s exhibits. (Doc. No. 285, Ex. G.)
38

litigation in this case. That Intervenor had limited success on the motions does not persuade the Court
that the time spent was unreasonable or excessive, and the fee award will not be reduced on this basis.
Finally, the Court does not agree with Defendant that it is necessary to reduce Intervenor’s fee
award on the basis of 125 conferences between and among Attorneys Sperling and Lamar, and
counsel to the EEOC. Defendant complains that the conferences represent 40 hours of time expended
on this case for which there is insufficient description. Defendant contends that the conversations
“indicate duplication between the attorneys.” Although the Court notes that it is important for a fee
applicant to provide sufficient description regarding the services rendered, the Court does not find that
counsel need be unflaggingly meticulous in describing the precise nature of each conference billed. The
Third Circuit has instructed as follows:
On several occasions, this Court has considered the proper degree of specificity required of a party seeking attorneys’ fees. In particular, we recently undertook such a review in Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1990). We explained that specificity should only be required to the extent necessary for the district court “to determine if the hours claimed are unreasonable for the work performed.” [citations omitted.] . . . Specifically, a fee petition should include “some fairly definite information as to the hours devoted to various general activities, e.g., pretrial discovery, settlement negotiations, and the hours spent by various classes of attorneys, e.g., senior partners, junior partners, associates.” However, “it is not necessary to know the exact number of minutes spent nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted nor the specific attainments of each attorney.”
Washington v. Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas , 89 F.3d 1031, 1037-38 (3d Cir. 1996).
Applying this guidance to the fee application in this case, the Court does not conclude that the
time entries about which Defendant complains are so devoid of detail as to be unreasonable. The time
entries indicate communication, both written and oral, between and among counsel working together on
39

a complex case. The Court also notes that many of complained-of entries relate to conferences that were brief in duration. The Court does not find it unreasonable for counsel to provide limited specificity regarding relatively brief, if frequent, communications relating to this case.
Defendant merely alleges, without any substantiation, that conferences among attorneys is tantamount to duplication. The Court does not agree. Although excessive conferences may in some instances be questionable, the Court finds that the regular conferences billed in this case were both reasonable and expected given the nature of the litigation. Additionally, the Court does not agree with Defendant that conferences inherently suggest duplication of effort among counsel. Furthermore, with respect to specificity and detail, each of the complained-of entries indicates the parties to the conference, who in all instances were counsel of record in this case. Accordingly, the Court finds that the complained-of entries listed in Exhibit H to Defendant’s opposition (Doc. No. 285) were reasonable, and the Court will not reduce the requested attorneys’ fees on this ground.
In sum, the Court will reduce the fee award by 9.27 hours of Attorney Sperling’s time for the reasons discussed above.
4. Specificity Defendant also objects that certain time entries lack specificity and should be reduced. “Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.at 433. More specifically, “[a] fee petition is required to be specific enough to allow the district court to determine if the hours claimed are unreasonable for the work performed.” Keenan v. City of Philadelphia , 983 F.2d 459, 493 (3d Cir. 1992)(internal citations and quotations omitted).
40

The hours objected to by Defendant includes such entries as:

Date

Task

Hours

2/23/01

Tele. conf. w/witness

.83

4/2/02

o/c

.10

6/6/03

Review faxes

.10

12/1/03

Review letter

.10

1/3/04

EFC [sic] and Westlaw Research from January 3, 2004 through February 1, 2004

20.00

The Court agrees that such time entries lack specificity and, in many instances, lack any detail

regarding the services rendered. None of the complained-of entries provide enough detail to suggest

the services relate exclusively or even in part to the case at bar. The Court will, therefore, reduce the

fee award accordingly by the 24.67 hours specified in Exhibit I to Defendant’s opposition. (Doc. No.

285, Ex. I.)

41

5. Unspecified Communication With EEOC Defendant also complains that 2.7 hours Intervenor’s counsel have described only as various conferences with the EEOC should be disallowed. Defendant contends such entries are not compensable, as they lack specificity and may potentially be in reference to matters and cases unrelated to this litigation. Although the Court presumes that the entries relate to the case at bar, the Court agrees with Defendant that the time entries are too vague and generalized to permit recovery. Aside from one entry in which Intervenor’s counsel references a certain “Yvonne” at the EEOC, the time entries do not reflect the identity of the party or parties with whom counsel was conferring. Although the Court does not find that counsel’s records must be slavishly precise in order to be compensable, the Court finds that the entries listed in Exhibit K to Defendant’s opposition are simply too general to permit recovery. Accordingly, the fee award will be reduced by 2.7 hours of Attorney Sperling’s time relating to general discussions with the EEOC. 6. General or Unrecoverable Charges Defendant objects to Intervenor’s request that she be reimbursed for $950 for “Westlaw research throughout the case” billed on March 9, 2004 because Intervenor’s counsel does not identify the research conducted, the person who conducted the research, or the purpose of the research with respect to the issues in this case. Defendant also suggests that “the even amount of the charge suggests that it is estimated or apportioned,” and apparently believes the charge should be disallowed on this ground as well. Subsequently, Intervenor produced itemized documentation regarding Westlaw and ECF charges. Accordingly, the Court will not reduce the fees and expenses awarded on this basis. Defendant also objects to a submitted charge in the amount of $310.00 for “Compu-Weather
42

weather report” billed on October 14, 2003. Intervenor’s counsel subsequently advised the Court that this particular charge was incurred in order to obtain information regarding the weather in Middletown, Pennsylvania on the day Intervenor claimed her brake lines were slit. The Court therefore finds this expense relates to this case and was incurred reasonably.
In addition, Defendant relies on West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991) for the proposition that Intervenor may not recover expert fees incurred in this case because 42 U.S.C. § 1988 conveys no authority to shift expert fees . Defendant fails to acknowledge that Intervenor has moved for attorneys’ fees and costs not only under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but also under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the PHRA. Indeed, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides explicitly that expert fees are recoverable:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee ( including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)(emphasis added). In addition, it appears that the limit on recovery of expert fees discussed in Casey has been effectively overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Greenwood v. Stone, 136 F. Supp. 2d 368, 370 (W.D. Pa. 1992). Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant’s argument in this regard to be meritless and shall award Intervenor expert fees in the claimed amount of $18,634.02.13 Finally, Defendant objects that Intervenor should not be reimbursed for $182.73 in
13 Intervenor originally requested reimbursement of $21,971.02 in expert fees, but subsequently requested that this amount be revised downward by $3,337.00.
43

miscellaneous expenses for which there was insufficient description. (Doc. No. 285, Ex. L.) Defendant contends that entries reading as nothing more than “postage” and “phone calls” should not be reimbursed. Although the amount in question is negligible, the Court must disagree with Defendant. The Court does not find it reasonable to require in all instances that a fee petitioner include a heightened level of description regarding the most basic of overhead expenses incurred during the course of representation. The expenses challenged in this case are limited in amount and are the kinds of expenses ordinarily incurred during litigation. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s objection in this regard.
7. Lodestar Reduction The lodestar is presumed to yield a reasonable fee; however, it may be reduced to account for “results obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. This reduction may be used to account for time spent litigating wholly or partially unsuccessful claims that are related to the litigation of successful claims. Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183. The party seeking the adjustment bears the burden of proving that an adjustment is necessary. Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court has instructed district courts to “focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation. Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Defendant argues that the lodestar should be reduced in this case because Intervenor prevailed on only three of her four claims, the jury having found for Defendant on Intervenor’s claim of gender discrimination. However, the Supreme Court has instructed that where a “plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims , the hours spent on the unsuccessful
44

claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440

(emphasis added). In this case, Intervenor’s actions and theories of recovery were substantially

interrelated and can hardly be considered “distinct in all respects.” Id. Therefore, the Court does not

find it is necessary or appropriate to reduce the fee award in this case.

8. Costs

Intervenor seeks payment of costs in the amount of $7,794.70 as reflected in the bill of costs

submitted by Intervenor on March 22, 2004. (Doc. No. 271.) Defendant objects to the following

such costs:

•

$430 for displaying videotaped deposition of Leonard Buckman;

•

$823.53 for duplicate deposition transcripts;

•

$478.59 for enlargements of exhibits greater than 8" x 10" used at trial instead

of utilizing the Court’s projector system;

•

$550.75 for costs invoiced by G&S Process Serving Division for “Investigative

Services” in connection with serving a witness, Branden Ehrhart, who ultimately

never testified at trial; and

•

Finance charges of $11.99 and $23.98 for late payment.

In response, Intervenor concedes that she should not be reimbursed for the $823.53 charge for

duplication transcripts, and further agreed that Defendant should not be assessed finance charges in the

aggregate amount of $35.97. However, Intervenor argues that the costs incurred for displaying the

Buckman deposition were necessitated by Defendant’s own late objections to certain testimony.

Additionally, Intervenor requests permission to assess as taxable the charge for enlarging exhibits

because the jury had difficulty viewing the exhibits over the Court’s projection system. Finally,

45

Intervenor contends that it is permissible to tax Defendant with the costs associated with serving a

witness who ultimately failed to appear.

The Court finds that it is inappropriate to tax Defendant with the costs of enlarging exhibits for

use at trial, as there were other means available of publishing such exhibits to the jury. Defendant need

not bear the cost for all of Intervenor’s tactical decisions regarding the manner in which to present

evidence at trial. Similarly, the Court finds that Defendant should not bear the cost of serving a witness

who never in fact testified at trial. However, the Court does find it reasonable to assess Defendant with

the cost of displaying the Buckman deposition, as it appears Defendant bears at minimum some

responsibility for necessitating this expense.

Accordingly, after removing the excluded costs discussed above, the Court finds that

Defendants shall pay $5,905.86 in litigation costs.

9. Calculation

To summarize, the attorneys’ fees and expenses awarded to Intervenor in this case are

calculated as follows:

1114.96 Hours minus 36.64 Hours
1078.32 Hours

Hours Claimed by Attorney Sperling Reduction in Allowed Hours Total Compensable Attorney Sperling Hours

1078.32 times $350.00
$377,412

Allowed Attorney Sperling Hours Attorney Sperling’s Allowed Hourly Rate Subtotal of Attorney Sperling’s Allowed Fees

324.0 times $275.00
$89,100

Hours Claimed by Attorney Lamar Attorney Lamar’s Allowed Hourly Rate Subtotal of Attorney Lamar’s Allowed Fees

$377,412

Subtotal of Attorney Sperling’s Allowed Fees

46

plus $ 89,100 $466,512

Subtotal of Attorney Lamar’s Allowed Fees Total Allowed Attorneys’ Fees

$29,637.17 plus $ 1,409.25
$31,046.42

Allowed Expenses Incurred by Attorney Sperling Allowed Expenses Incurred by Attorney Lamar Total Allowed Expenses

$466,512.00 plus $ 31,046.42
$497,558.42

Total Attorneys’ Fees Total Allowed Expenses Total Fee Award

Accordingly, Intervenor is awarded $497,558.42 in attorneys’ fees and expenses. In

addition, Defendant shall be assessed litigation costs in the reduced amount of $5,905.86.

47

G. Order
And now, this 18th day of January 2005, in consideration of the foregoing, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. No. 257) is DENIED.
2. Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Doc. No. 249) is DENIED and Intervenor’s Motion to Amend the Judgment (Doc. No. 303) is GRANTED. The judgment will be amended to provide an award of $300,000 for punitive damages under Title VII and $210,000 for compensatory damages under the PHRA. The judgment will be further amended to provide that the remaining $950,000 in punitive damages awarded for Intervenor’s hostile work environment claim shall be allowed and allocated to Intervenor’s claims under the PERA. Intervenor’s award of $101,400 for back pay and $290,000 for front pay are unaffected by this Order. In addition, Intervenor’s award of $1,390,000 for compensatory and punitive damages relating to her IIED claim is unaffected by this Order.
3. Intervenor’s Motion to Amend the Judgment to Include Pre-Judgment Interest (Doc. No. 266) is GRANTED. The judgment is hereby amended to provide Intervenor $3,495 in pre-judgment interest.
4. Intervenor’s Motion to Amend the Judgment to Account for Negative Tax Consequences (Doc. No. 264) is DENIED.
5. Intervenor’s Petition for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. No. 260) and Petition for Costs (Doc. No. 271) are GRANTED in part as follows:
a. Defendant shall pay Intervenor $466,512 in attorneys’ fees and $31,046.42 in expenses.
b. Defendant shall pay Intervenor $5,905.86 in litigation costs.
S/ Yvette Kane Yvette Kane United States District Judge
48

 
 AO 450 (Rev. 5/85) Judgment in a Civil Case
United States District Court
- - - - - - - - M I D D L E DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA - - - - - - - -
AMENDED JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & Marion Shaub
Judge Yvette Kane

v.
Federal Express Corporation

CASE NUMBER: 1:02-CV-1194

X Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried
and the jury has rendered its verdict. D Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been
tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment be and is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on Count I of Plaintiffs Claims under Title VII. the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act C'PHRA") and the Equal Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution ("PERA") apportioned as follows:$391 ,400 for front and back pay and $300,000 for punitive damages under Title VII; $210,000 for compensatory damages under the PHRA; and $950,000 for punitive damages under the PERA. IT IS ALSO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment be and is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on Count II of plaintiffs claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress apportioned as follows: $140,000 for compensatory damages and $1,250,000 for punitive damages.

Date: January 18, 2005

Mary E. D'Andrea, Clerk of Court

()}j~Q if~~

(By) Kevin J. Nea.s" Deputy Clerk

-j-

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUALE~LOYMENTOPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, Plaintiff,
and MARION SHAUB,
Interveror,
v.
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. l:CV)02-1194 ) Hon. Yvette Kane ) ELECTRONICALLY ) FILED ) ) )

CONSENT DECREE

INTRODUCTION

This Consent Decree is entered into by Plaintiff United States Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "the Commission") and Federal Express

Corporation.

On February 26. 2002. the Commission filed this action to enforce the provisions of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. ("Title

VII"), and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1981A. The Commission

alleged that Marion Shaub, who was employed as a tractor-trailer driver at Defendant's

Middletown, Pennsylvania location, was subjected to a hostile work environment based on

her gender and was constructively discharged from her employment. Marion Shaub

intervened in this action on April 5,2002. adding a retaliation claim under Title VII and state

law claims. Federal Express denied the allegations. A jury trial was conducted before

Case 1:02-cv-01194-YK Document 351 Filed 04/15/2005 Page 2 of 8

Honorable Yvette Kane and on February 24, 2004, the jury entered a verdict awarding

damages for EEOC and Intervenor Shaub. On February 26, 2004, the court entered

judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and modified it on January 18, 2005. Federal

Express filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

On March 9, 2004, the Commission filed a Motlon for Equitable Relief, which was

opposed by Defendant Federal Express. In order to resolve the issues regarding injunctive

relief raised in this Motion, the Commission and Defendant now enter into this Consent

Decree.

CONSENT DECREE

This Decree is final and binding between the Commission and Defendant as to all

issues raised in the Commission's Motion for Equitable Relief filed in this action. In

resolution of this Motion, the Commission and Defendant hereby agree as follows:

1. This Decree is entered into in compromise to avoid the expense and

inconvenience of continued post-trial litigation on the Commission's Motion.

2. The Commission is the agency of the United States govemment authorized

by Congress to investigate allegations of unlawful employment discrimination based upon

gender, to bring civil actions based upon these allegations of unlawful practices, and to

seek relief for individuals affected by such practices.

3. Pursuant to Title VII, the parties acknowledge the jurisdiction of the United

States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania over the subject matter and

parties to this case.

4. Although Defendant disputes the underlying claims. the jury verdict, and the

orders of the court, the parties agree that this Decree is entered Into only to resolve the

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Case 1:02-cv-01194-YK Document 351 Filed 04/15/2005 Page 3 of 8
EEOC's Motion for Equitable Relief and Defendant's agreement to this Decree is not an admission of liability, and cannot be used as an admission of liability by the Commission.
TRAINING 5. Defendant will provide training to all employees (management and nonmanagement) who conduct investigations into allegations of employment discrimination and retaliation made by employees in the Allentown and Middletown, Pennsylvania locations of Defendant. This training will include how to conduct prompt and effective investigations into allegations or complaints of employment discrimination and how to recognize allegations of sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation made by employees. It will include discussion of the substantive laws and principles of employment discrimination and retaliation, when appropriate. The training will also discuss methods of discipline in harassment, discrimination and retaliation cases. This training will take place within six months of the filing of this Consent Decree and will be a full eight-hour day of training. 6. Defendant agrees to provide three training sessions to all employees and managers in its Allentown and Middletown, Pennsylvania locations in sex diSCrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. This training will also be provided to any temporary workers employed at the time. These sessions will take place in five-month intervals and will be conducted by the Defendant. The training will emphasize what constitutes unlawful harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation in the work place and how to keep the company free from any such forms of discrimination. Defendant shall provide the first training within thirty (30) calendar days of the entry of this Consent Decree. 7. The training sessions described in Paragraph Numbers 5 and 6 will be
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Case 1:02-cv-01194-YK Document 351 Filed 04/15/2005 Page 4 of 8
conducted by a Human Resources Manager or Human Resources Managing Directorfrom Defendant's national headquarters. Federal Express will notify EEOC of the Manager or Managing Director who will provide each training by sending a curriculum vitae or biographical sketch to EEOC for its review at least fourteen (14) days prior the training session the Manager or Managing Director will conduct.
8. For the training sessions referenced in Paragraph Numbers 5 and 6, Federal Express will use the training materials that have been submitted to and approved by the Commission in March 2005.
9. Defendant shall certify to the Commission in writing within fIVe (5) business days after the training sessions required by Paragraphs 5 and 6, that each training has taken place and that the required employees have attended. This certification shall include: (i) the date, location and duration of the session; (Ii) a copy of the registry of attendance, including the name and position of each employee/manager who attended, and (iii) a listing of all current employees, including temporary employees, on the date of the training.
DISSEMINATION OF STATEMENT 10. Within fourteen (14) business days of the entry of this Consent Decree, Defendant shall mail to each employee and manager in the Allentown and Middletown locations, a statement which announces that Defendant takes its legal obligation to provide its employees with a working atmosphere which is free from discrimination, harassment, and retaliation with the utmost seriousness. This announcement will clarify the reporting procedures for sexual harassment, sex discrimination and retaliation complaints and strongly state that employees who report these claims will be protected from acts of retaliation by co-workers, supervisors or managers. The statement will also clarify that
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Defendant has a responsibility to investigate verbal as well as written complaints of sex discrimination, sexual harassment and retaliation and will inform all recipients that Defendant will take action against anyone who retaliates against an employee for reporting discrimination, harassment or retaliation. The statement will clarify that Defendant has a zero tolerance policy for these violations and offenders will be disciplined. The statement will contain a signature line for the recipient to sign and return to Defendant within five (5) days. Within fourteen (14) business days of the mailing of this statement, Defendant will provide the Commission with a list of the persons to whom it was mailed, a list of those who retumed the signed document, and a list of all current employees, supervisors and managers. This statement is attached to this Decree as Exhibit A.
POSTING OF NOTICE 11. Exhibit A will be posted at Defendant I s Middletown, Pennsylvania and Allentown, Pennsylvania facilities on the bulietin boards where notices are usually and customarily posted for the benefit of all employees. Exhibit A must be posted where it can be seen by tractor trailer drivers for Defendant. Exhibit A will remain posted for a period of two years. Defendant shall replace Exhibit A with legible copies, if it is defaced, removed, or marred in any way. Within ten (10) business days of the postings of Exhibit A, Defendant will inform the Commission of the date and location of the postings.
REPORTING 12. Defendant agrees that, as soon as the Consent Decree is entered, every five months during the eighteen-month duration of the Decree, it will provide a written report to the Commission listing ali employee complaints from its Allentown or Middletown, Pennsylvania locations (whetherverbal or written) of sex diScrimination, sexual harassment
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Case 1:02-cv-01194-YK Document 351 Filed 04/15/2005 Page 6 of 8
or retaliation (protected activities involving sex discrimination or sexual harassment) that were received by a manager, a member of human resources, or through the on-line GFT/EEO process during the preceding five months. Defendant will also provide copies of the complaints to the Commission.
POLICY ON COORDINATED INVESTIGATIONS 13. One Human Resources Manager will be designated by Defendant to oversee and coordinate the investigations of any sex diSCrimination, sexual harassment or retaliation complaints or reports that are made by employees in the Allentown or Middletown locations. This manager will receive the training referenced in Paragraph No.
5.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 14. In the event of any dispute or question between the Plaintiff and Defendant as to the interpretation or implementation of this Decree, the parties shall attempt to resolve such question informally within thirty (30) days. if the parties are unable to resolve their differences, the issue shall be submitted to the Court for final decision.
MISCELLANEOUS 15. The parties agree that the Court shall retain jurisdiction over this Decree until for a period of eighteen months after the filing of the Decree in order to enforce its provisions, should this become necessary. 16. This Decree shall be filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 17. EEOC and Defendant shall bear their own costs and attomey' s fees.
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Case 1:02-cv-01194-YK Document 351 Filed 04/15/2005 Page 7 of 8

For EEOC:
Eric S. Drelband General Counsel
James L. Lee Deputy General Counsel
Gwendolyn Young Reams Associate General Counsel

rederlck L. ouglas t.I/I{O!>-
Senior Counsel/Litigation Federal Express Corp.
3620 Hacks Cross Road Building B, 3rd Floor
Memphis, TN 38125 (901) 434-8519

Jacqueline H. McNair Regional Attorney
~~, D/~4dithA:o:Boyie Supervisory Trial Attorney
thia A. Locke lal Attorney Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 21 S. 5th Street, Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 440·2683 APPROVED AND SO ORDERED:
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Case 1:02-cv-01194-YK Document 351 Filed 04/15/2005 Page 8 of 8
\i'W.TrJ(~~
Date: 4/rx,s/o:;

Case 1:02-cv-01194-YK Document 351 Filed 04/15/2005 Page 1 of 1

EXHIBIT A

NOTICE

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 mandates that FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION (FEDERAL EXPRESS) provide its employees with a working atmosphere that is free from sexual discrimination, sexual harassment. and retaliation against employees who engage in protected activity such as reporting sexual harassment or discrimination, filing a charge, or participating in an investigation of discrimination claims or charges.

Title VII prohibits discrimination against employees and applicants for employment based upon their race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. Title VII further prohibits retaliation against employees or applicants who avail themselves oftheir rights under Title VII by engaging in protected activities, such as filing a charge of discrimination or testifying or participating in an EEOC investigation. THE EoUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC) is the federal agency which investigates charges ofdiscrimination and, ifnecessary, brings lawsuits in the federal district courts to enforce Title VII.

FEDERAL EXPRESS fully supports and will comply with Title VII in all respects. As part of this obligation under Title VII, FEDERAL EXPRESS has a zero tolerance policy for actions or statements reflective of discrimination, bias, or retaliation and a zero tolerance policy for sexual harassment. FEDERAL EXPRESS recognizes its obligation to thoroughly investigate allegations of sexual harassment. and to take prompt effective remedial measures when warranted. Furthermore, in accordance with Title Vll, FEDERAL EXPRESS will not take any action against any employee or applicant for employment because he or she has exercised any right under Title VII, including the filing of a charge of discrimination or the reporting of harassment.

If you believe that you have been subjected to sexual harassment, sex discrimination, or retaliation, contact your manager, anyone in the human resources department, or me a GFT/EEO complaint on line with Federal Express. Federal Express will investigate verbal as well as written complaints or reports of sexual harassment, sex discrimination or retaliation made to any of these individuals.

This Notice will be posted at FEDERAL EXPRESS' facilities in Middletown and Allentown, Pennsylvania, for two years on all bulletin boards where announcements are normally posted for the benefit of employees. This Notice demonstrates that FEDERAL EXPRESS has a continued interest in maintaining a workplace free of discrimination and harassment.

THIS NOTICE MUST NOT BE DEFACED OR REMOVED AND MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR THREE YEARS FROM THE DATE SET FORTH BELOW.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

FEDERAL EXPRESS

Date Posted: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-', 200S

 
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CLOSED, STANDARD
United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:02-cv-00984-SD

EEOC v. FED EX EXPRESS CORP. Assigned to: JUDGE STEWART DALZELL Demand: $0 Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)
Plaintiff EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Date Filed: 02/25/2002 Date Terminated: 06/06/2002 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by CYNTHIA A. LOCKE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 21 S. 5TH ST STE 400 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 215-440-2683 Email: cynthia.locke@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
DAVID INGRAM EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 21 S. 5th STREET SUITE 400 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 TEL 215-440-2683 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JUDITH A. O'BOYLE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 21 S. 5TH ST STE 400 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 215-440-2687 Email: judith.oboyle@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant

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FED EX EXPRESS CORPORATION A SUBSIDIARY OF FED EX CORPORATION
Intervenor Plaintiff MARION SHAUB

represented by SEAN MCDEVITT PEPPER HAMILTON, L.L.P. 899 CASSATT ROAD 400 BERWYN PARK BERWYN, PA 19312 610-640-7856 Email: mcdevitts@pepperlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by MARTHA SPERLING SILVER SPERLING & COLLIER 148 EAST STATE STREET DOYLESTOWN, PA 18901 215-348-1666 Fax: 215-348-5168 Email: silversperlingandcollier@verizon.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/25/2002 02/26/2002 02/26/2002 02/26/2002 03/07/2002
04/04/2002
04/05/2002
04/05/2002

#

Docket Text

1 Complaint. (tj) (Entered: 02/26/2002)
Summons(es) 1 issued. Mailed to counsel on 2/26/02. (tj) (Entered: 02/26/2002)
Demand for jury trial by PLAINTIFF EEOC. (tj) (Entered: 02/26/2002)
Standard Case Management Track. (tj) (Entered: 02/26/2002)
2 MOTION TO INTERVENE AS PARTY PLAINTIFF FILED BY MARION SHAUB PUSUANT TO F.R.C.P. 24(a) , CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. (COMPLAINT ATTACHED). (rv) (Entered: 03/12/2002)
3 Affidavit of: BILL TONER re: served summons and complaint upon Sandy Solomaon for DEFENDANT FED EX EXPRESS CORP. c/o CT CORPORATION. Served by: PERSONAL SERVICE on 4/1/02. (rv) (Entered: 04/05/2002)
4 ORDER THAT (1)THE MOTION TO INTERVENE IS GRANTED; AND (2)THE CLERK SHALL FILE THE COMPLAINT ATTACHED TO MOTION. ( SIGNED BY JUDGE STEWART DALZELL ) 4/5/02 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND FAXED BY CHAMBERS ON 4/4/02. (rv) (Entered: 04/05/2002)
5 Intervenor's complaint by INTERVENOR-PLAINTIFF MARION SHAUB against DEFENDANT FED EX EXPRESS CORP. (rv) (Entered: 04/05/2002)

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04/22/2002 04/22/2002 04/22/2002 04/24/2002 04/24/2002 05/06/2002 05/20/2002 06/06/2002 06/06/2002
06/06/2002 07/10/2002 07/18/2002

6 Affidavit of: BILL TONER re: served summons and complaint upon DEFENDANT FED EX EXPRESS CORP., c/o CT CORPORATION. Served by: PERSONAL SERVICE on 4/1/02 . (rv) (Entered: 04/22/2002)
7 Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Complaint by DEFENDANT FED EX EXPRESS CORP. (Attorney SEAN P. MC DEVITT), Certificate of Service. (rv) (Entered: 04/22/2002)
ISSUE JOINED. (rv) (Entered: 04/22/2002)
8 MOTION by DEFENDANT FED EX EXPRESS CORP. FOR TRANSFER OF VENUE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. SEC 1404(a) , MEMORANDUM, , DECLARATION, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. (rv) (Entered: 04/24/2002)
9 Answer and Affirmative Defenses by FED EX EXPRESS CORP. to intervenor complaint, Certificate of Service. (rv) (Entered: 04/24/2002)
10 Answer by INTERVENOR-PLAINTIFF MARION SHAUB to DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF VENUE, Memorandum, Certificate of Service. (rv) (Entered: 05/06/2002)
11 Sur-Reply by INTERVENOR-PLAINTIFF MARION SHAUB to DEFENDANT'S Reply to the Intervenor's Answer to DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, Certificate of Service. (rv) (Entered: 05/20/2002)
12 Reply by DEFENDANT FED EX EXPRESS CORP. to the Intervenor's Answer to DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR TRANSFER VENUE, Certificate of Service. (rv) (Entered: 06/06/2002)
13 ORDER THAT (1) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF VENUE IS GRANTED; (2) THE CLERK SHALL TRANSFER THIS CASE TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA; AND (3) THE CLERK SHALL CLOSE THIS CASE STATISTICALLY. ( SIGNED BY JUDGE STEWART DALZELL ) 6/6/02 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND FAXED BY CHAMBERS ON 6/5/02. (rv) (Entered: 06/06/2002)
Case closed (kv) (Entered: 06/12/2002)
Original record together with certified copy of docket entries forwarded to The Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to Order dated 6/6/02 and signed by Judge Dalzell. (rv) (Entered: 07/10/2002)
14 Letter re: Receipt of Original Record in the USDC for the District of Pennsylvania on 7/16/02 (rv) (Entered: 07/18/2002)

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Description:

Docket Report

Billable Pages: 2

Search Criteria:
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2:02-cv-00984-SD 0.16

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CLOSED, HBG, SPADM, STANDARD
U.S. District Court United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:02-cv-01194-YK

Equal Employment Opp v. Fed Ex Express Corpo Assigned to: Judge Yvette Kane Demand: $0 Case in other court: Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 05-01418
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 05-01565 Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

Date Filed: 07/12/2002 Date Terminated: 02/26/2004 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Cynthia A. Locke Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Philadelphia District Office The Bourse, 21 South 5th Street Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19106 215-440-2683 Fax: 215-440-2848 Email: cynthia.locke@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Ingram Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 21 S. 5th Street Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19106 215-440-2683 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martha Sperling Silver Sperling and Collier 148 East State Street Doylestown, PA 18901 215-348-1666 Fax: 12153485168 Email: silversperlingandcollier@verizon.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff

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Marion Shaub
V. Defendant Fed Ex Express Corporation a subsidiary of Fed Ex Corporation
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represented by Martha Sperling (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ralph E. Lamar, IV Ralph E. Lamar, IV, Esq. 141 Spruce Lane Collegeville, PA 19426 610-831-5181 Fax: 610-831-0680 Email: ralph.lamar@verizon.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cynthia A. Locke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexandra Makosky Pepper, Hamilton LLP North Fron & Market Streets P.O. Box 1181 200 One Keystone Plaza Harrisburg, PA 17108-1181 717-255-1155 Email: makoskya@pepperlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Frederick L. Douglas Federal Express Corporation 3620 Hacks Cross Road Building B, 3rd Floor Memphis, TN 38125 901-434-8519 Fax: 19014349271 Email: frederick.douglas@fedex.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeana M. Littrell Federal Express Corporation 3620 Hacks Cross Building B, 3rd. Floor Memphis, TN 38125 (901) 434-8561
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LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean P. McDevitt Pepper Hamilton LLP 400 Berwyn Park 899 Cassatt Road Berwyn, PA 19312-1183 610-640-7800 Email: mcdevitts@pepperlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/12/2002
07/16/2002 07/16/2002 07/16/2002 07/17/2002 07/19/2002
07/22/2002 07/22/2002 07/29/2002
07/29/2002

#

Docket Text

1 ORIGINAL FILE, CERTIFIED COPY OF TRANSFER ORDER AND DOCKET SHEET received from Eastern District of PA 7/12/02. Complaint originally filed in E.D. of PA; with attachments of docs #1-13. (rb) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM sent to attorney: Cynthia Locke. (rb) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM sent to attorney: Sean P. McDevitt. (rb) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM sent to attorney: David Ingram. (rb) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM sent to attorney: Frederick L. Douglas. (rb) (Entered: 07/17/2002)
2 ORDER by Judge Yvette Kane - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 1)A Scheduling conf will be conducted by the court at 10:00am on 9/5/02 . 5)Cnsl shall file a Joint Case Mgmt Plan on or before 7/30/02. See order. (cc: cnsl, ct, ctrm dpty) (sc) (Entered: 07/19/2002)
3 LETTER - from Court to cnsl. dated 7/18/02 re: case assignment and procedure. (jc) (Entered: 07/22/2002)
4 AMENDED ORDER by Judge Yvette Kane Scheduling conf SET 10:00 a.m. on 9/5/02 "JOINT CM PLAN" due 8/30/02. (cc: all counsel, court) (jk) (Entered: 07/22/2002)
5 MAIL RETURNED addressed to Cynthia A. Locke, Esq., Equal Employment Opp Comm, containing transfer ltr and sp adm form, marked "Not Deliverable As Addressed - Unable To Forward." Remailed to: Ms. Locke, EEOC, 21 S. 5th St, Suite 400, Phila, PA. (vg) (Entered: 07/31/2002)
6 MAIL RETURNED addressed to Cynthia A. Locke, Esquire of EEOC containing order dtd 7/22/02. Remailed to EEOC 21 S. 5th Street, Ste 400, Philadelphia, PA 19102. (sc) (Entered: 07/31/2002)

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07/30/2002 07/30/2002 08/08/2002 08/27/2002 08/30/2002 09/09/2002 09/10/2002
01/02/2003
01/14/2003
01/14/2003 01/16/2003 01/28/2003 03/19/2003

7 MAIL RETURNED addressed to Cynthia Locke at EEOC containing letter dtd 7/18/02. Mail re-sent to 21 S. 5th Street Ste 400, Phila., PA 19102. (sc) (Entered: 07/31/2002)
8 MAIL RETURNED addressed to Cynthia Locke at EEOC containing Order issued 7/19/02. Order re-sent to 21 S. 5th Street Suite 400 in Phila, PA 19102. (sc) (Entered: 07/31/2002)
ATTORNEY SPECIAL ADMISSION form received from: Frederick L. Douglas forwarded to judge for approval. Receipt #: 111 136974 Amt: $25.00 (vg) (Entered: 08/09/2002)
9 REQUEST OF ATTORNEY FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION to practice on behalf of Fed Ex Express Corp by Frederick Douglas, Esq. approved by court. (jk) (Entered: 08/27/2002)
10 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN returned and signed by cnsl for all parties. No consent to proceed before a MJ. (sc) (Entered: 09/03/2002)
11 MINUTE SHEET of case mgmt. conf. held by Judge Yvette Kane on 9/5/02. CM Order to issue. term ddl (jk) (Entered: 09/09/2002)
12 CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER by Judge Yvette Kane: Close of Fact Discovery: 3/28/03; Pretrial Memorandum due: 8/15/03; Pretrial and Settlement Conference: 2:00 p.m., 8/21/03; Jury selection and Trial: 9:30 a.m., 9/8/03. Case placed on STANDARD Case Mgmt. Track. See order for further details. (cc: all counsel court, Ctrm. Dep, Ctrptr, Jury Clerk) (vg) (Entered: 09/10/2002)
13 STIPULATION by and between Martha Sperling, Esq., representing intervenor Marion Shaub, Cynthia Locke, Esq., representing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Frederick Douglass, Esq., representing the Federal Express Corporations, that parties request from Court extension of all ddls for a period of 60 days. (vg) (Entered: 01/03/2003)
14 ORDER by Judge Yvette Kane - upon consideration of the parties' Stipulation filed 1/2/03, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the case management deadlines are EXTENDED as follows: Jury trial RESCHEDULED 10/6/03; Jury selection SET 9:30 a.m. on 10/6/03; Discovery EXTENDED UNTIL 5/7/03; Pretrial conference SET 10:00 a.m. on 9/26/03; Pretrial memorandum DUE 9/17/03 (cc: all counsel, court) (jk) (Entered: 01/14/2003)
15 ORDER by Judge Yvette Kane - IT IS ORDERED THAT the Case Management Order is amended to permit 15 depositions to be taken by each side. (cc: all counsel, court) (jk) (Entered: 01/14/2003)
16 MINUTE SHEET - of TC held by J. Kane on 2/14/03. Dispute over number of depositions to be held. Order to issue. (jk) (Entered: 01/16/2003)
17 MAIL RETURNED addressed to cnsl for Fed Ex Express Corp, Sean P. McDevitt. Envelope marked: Forwarding Time Expired. Return to Sender. Per call to office, they will submit change of address in writing. Order remailed. (sc) (Entered: 01/29/2003)
18 REQUEST for Production of Documents filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Marion Shaub; with c/s. (sc) (Entered: 03/20/2003)

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04/07/2003 04/10/2003 04/25/2003
04/25/2003
06/06/2003 06/06/2003 06/06/2003

19 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(sc) (Entered: 03/20/2003)
20 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of 19 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by Marion Shaub; with c/s. Brief in Opposition due by 4/7/2003 (sc) (Entered: 03/20/2003)
DELETED Doc #21 - Motion to Compel Discovery because it was docketed 2 times. The entry was a duplicate of Document #19. (sc) (Entered: 03/21/2003)
21 MOTION to Strike pltf's 19 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation; with c/s.(sc) (Entered: 03/27/2003)
22 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1)Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Motion to Compel for Noncompliance w/ the Case Management Order is DENIED. 2)Defendant shall file a response brief to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel on or before 4/7/03. 3)Plaintiff may file a reply brief on or beofer 4/11/03. 21 Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 4/1/03 (jk, ) (Entered: 04/01/2003)
23 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION to pltf's 19 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation; with c/s. Reply Brief due by 4/24/2003. (sc) (Entered: 04/08/2003)
24 Letter from Martha Sperling, Esquire o/b/o Plaintiff, dtd 4/7/03, regarding the dfts' Response to the intervenors' Mtn to Compel Discovery. (sc) (Entered: 04/11/2003)
26 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED THAT Intervener's Motion to Compel Discovery is GRANTED. Defendant IS ORDERED to produce documents in response to the "Pltf-Intervenor EEOC and Marion Shaub's First Response for Production of Documents Addressed to Dft, Federal Express Corp." as follows: REQUEST Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10. 19 Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 4/25/03 (jk, ) (Entered: 04/25/2003)
27 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED THAT the case management deadlines are EXTENDED as follows: 1)Close of Fact Discovery - 5/30/03; 2)Dispositive Motions and Supporting Briefs Due - 6/30/03. All other case management deadlines remain as indicated in this Court's order dated 1/14/03. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 4/25/03. (jk, ) (Entered: 04/25/2003)
29 MOTION to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions by pltf Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & Intervenor Marion Shaub; with c/s. (Attachments: # 1 Cert. of Non-conc.# 2 Proposed Order)(sc) Additional attachment(s) added on 7/2/2003 (jk, ). (Entered: 06/09/2003)
30 MOTION (to Compel Discovery) and for Sanctions by pltf Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & intervenor Marion Shaub; with c/s. (Attachments: # 1 Cert. of Non-Conc.# 2 Proposed Order)(sc) Additional attachment(s) added on 7/2/2003 (jk, ). (Entered: 06/09/2003)
31 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery for Additional Depositions filed by pltf Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & Intervenor Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(sc) (Entered: 06/09/2003)

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06/16/2003
06/16/2003 06/16/2003 06/16/2003 06/16/2003
06/25/2003 06/26/2003 06/27/2003 06/30/2003

32 MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses by pltf Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & Intervenor Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(sc) (Entered: 06/09/2003)
33 Letter from Martha Sperling, Esquire to Court RE: all outstanding discovery issues. (jk, ) (Entered: 06/09/2003)
34 Letter from Alexandra Makosky, Esquire to Court RE: discovery issues. (jk, ) (Entered: 06/12/2003)
35 MOTION to Compel Discovery (and for Sanctions) filed by pltf Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & intervenor Marion Shaub.(sc) STRICKEN PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER DATED 7/2/03. (sc) (Entered: 06/17/2003)
36 MOTION (to Compel Discovery and) for Sanctions filed by pltf Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & intervenor Marion Shaub.(sc) STRICKEN PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER DATED 7/2/03. (sc). (Entered: 06/17/2003)
37 EXHIBITS in Support of the Mtn to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions filed by pltf Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & intervenor Marion Shaub.. (sc) (Entered: 06/17/2003)
38 MOTION for Extension of Time to Extend Discovery for Additional Depositions filed by pltf Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & intervenor Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(sc) (Entered: 06/17/2003)
39 MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses filed by pltf Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & intervenor Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(sc) (Entered: 06/17/2003)
40 COMBINED RESPONSE filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation to 36 MOTION to Compel Disc and for Sanctions 38 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery, 39 MOTION to Compel Discovery; with c/s. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(sc) Modified on 7/1/2003 (sc). (Entered: 06/17/2003)
41 RESPONSE by plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and intervenor Marion Shaub to 40 deft's response to their mtn to compel discovery and for sanctions with exhs. attached. (jc) (Entered: 06/27/2003)
43 REPLY by Intervenor Marion Shaub to 40 Dfts' Response to pltf and intervenor's Mtn to Compel Disc and for Sanctions; with c/s. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(sc) (Entered: 07/01/2003)
42 CERTIFICATE of Service filed by the Intervenor Marion Shaub to her Reply to Dft FedEx Express Corporations' Response to Pltf/Intervenor's Mtn for Sanctions and Compel of Discovery 41. (sc) (Entered: 06/30/2003)
44 MOTION for Summary Judgment by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation; with c/s. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order # 2 Cert. of Length of Brief)(sc) (Entered: 07/01/2003)

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07/02/2003 07/03/2003 07/18/2003 07/18/2003 07/18/2003 07/18/2003 07/18/2003

45 (MEMORANDUM OF LAW) BRIEF IN SUPPORT of the 44 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation; with c/s. Brief in Opposition due by 7/18/2003 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(sc) (Entered: 07/01/2003)
46 STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS in support of the 44 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation; with c/s. (sc) (Entered: 07/01/2003)
47 EXHIBITS (APPENDIX - PART I OF II) filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation to Stmt of Mat Facts in support of the Mtn for Sumjgm. (Attachments: # 1 Part 2# 2 Part 3)(sc) (Entered: 07/01/2003)
48 EXHIBITS (APPENDIX - PART II OF II) filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation to the Stmt of Facts in support of the Mtn for Sumjgm. (Not scanned - too voluminous and double sided). (sc) (Entered: 07/01/2003)
49 MOTION for Leave to File a Response to pltf and Intervenors' Reply in support of Mtn to comp disc and for sanctions filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation; with c/s. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(sc) (Entered: 07/01/2003)
50 ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1)Plaintiff and Intervenor's Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and Motion to Extend Discovery for Additional Depositions filed 6/16/03 (docs 37 & 38) are STRICKEN as duplicative. 2)Plaintiff & Intervenor's Motions to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions (docs 35 & 36) are STRICKEN. However, the Clerk of Court is directed to attach the exhibits from Docs. #35 & 36 to Docs. #29 & 30. 29303839 Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 6/30/03 (jk, ) (Entered: 07/02/2003)
51 SUR REPLY BRIEF in Response to 35 MOTION to Compel Discovery & 36 for Sanctions filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation ; with c/s and exhibits. (sc) (Entered: 07/03/2003)
52 Praecipe to Substitute Exhibit - Exhibit A for the Exhibit A that was att'd to Sur-Rply Br of Fed Ex Corp in Response to Mtn to Comp Disc and for Sanctions; with c/s. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(sc) (Entered: 07/07/2003)
53 RESPONSE by Pltf and Intervenor to dft's 44 MOTION for Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(sc) (Entered: 07/21/2003)
54 RESPONSE AND OBJECTIONS filed by Pltf and Intervenor to dft's 46 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts; with c/s. (sc) (Entered: 07/21/2003)
55 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS filed by the Pltf and Intervenor 46. (sc) (Entered: 07/21/2003)
56 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION to the dfts' 44 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by pltf Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Reply Brief due by 8/4/2003. (Attachments: # 1 Certification of Length of Brief)(sc) (Entered: 07/21/2003)
57 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION to the dfts' 44 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Marion Shaub (Captioned: Memorandum in support of her Mtn to Deny SumJgm). Reply Brief due by 8/4/2003. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(sc) (Entered: 07/21/2003)

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07/30/2003 08/01/2003 08/01/2003 08/08/2003 08/08/2003 08/08/2003 08/18/2003 08/18/2003

58 APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS to Pltf's & Intervenor's Response and Objections to dft's Stmt of "Undisputed Material Facts". Not Scanned - Too Voluminous. (sc) (Entered: 07/21/2003)
59 APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS to Pltf's and Intervenor's Response and Objections to dfts' Stmt of Undisputed Material Facts. (sc) (Entered: 07/21/2003)
60 CERTIFICATE of Service filed by pltf and intervenor that the 54 Objections to Stmt of Facts, 55 CounterStatement of Facts, 56 Brief in Opposition, 57 Brief in Opposition, 58 Exhibits 59 were served on dft by UPS on 7/17/03. (sc) (Entered: 07/21/2003)
61 Letter from Martha Sperling, Esquire, dtd 7/24/03. "Enclosed for filing w/ your office please find the original of Exh 19-Afdt of Branden Ehrhart which I would ask you to attach to pltf's and intervenor's Response and Objs to Dft's Stmt of Undisputed Material Facts originally filed w/ your office on 7/17/03." (sc) (Entered: 07/29/2003)
62 Letter from Martha Sperling, Esquire, dtd 7/22/03. "While reviewing Intervenor's Mem in Sup of her Mnt to Deny SumJgm, I realized that a second page 4 was inserted where page 6 should be. Therefore, please accept page 6 enclosed to be attached to Intervenor's Mem in Support of her Mtn to Deny SumJgm." (sc) (Entered: 07/29/2003)
63 REPLY BRIEF to 44 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by defendant Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 Exhibit(s))(jc) (Entered: 07/31/2003)
64 MOTION in Limine to prohibit certain testimony and related docs by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation; C/S(vg, ) (Entered: 08/04/2003)
65 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 64 MOTION in Limine filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation. C/S Brief in Opposition due by 8/19/2003 (vg, ) (Entered: 08/04/2003)
66 MOTION by Plaintiff for Leave to Add Additional Exhibits to its Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. C/S. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(ct) (Entered: 08/11/2003)
67 MOTION for Permission to File Surreply Brief filed by Intervenor Marion Shaub. C/S. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Surreply Brief # 2 Proposed Order # 3 Proposed Order)(ct) (Entered: 08/11/2003)
68 PROPOSED DOCUMENT re: Proposed Attachments to Intervenor's Proposed Surreply in response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 67. (Attachments: # 1 Part 2)(ct). (Entered: 08/11/2003)
69 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 67 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply Brief filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. C/S. Reply Brief due by 9/4/2003. (ct) (Entered: 08/19/2003)
70 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION filed by Defendant Fed Ex Express Corporation re 66 MOTION for Leave to File an Additional Exhibit. Reply Brief due by 9/4/2003. (ct) (Entered: 08/19/2003)

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08/19/2003 08/19/2003 08/22/2003 08/25/2003 08/25/2003 08/28/2003 08/29/2003 09/02/2003
09/03/2003 09/03/2003 09/08/2003 09/08/2003

71 RESPONSE AND OBJECTIONS to Defendant's 64 MOTION in Limine filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Reply Brief due by 9/5/2003. (ct) (Entered: 08/20/2003)
72 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 64 to defendant's MOTION in Limine. Reply Brief due by 9/5/2003. (Attachments: # 1 Cert of NonConc# 2 Proposed Order)(ct) (Entered: 08/20/2003)
73 RESPONSE filed by Marion Shaub in OPPOSITION to 64 Defendant's MOTION in Limine. Reply Brief due by 9/5/2003. (ct) (Entered: 08/20/2003)
74 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION filed by Marion Shaub re 64 defendant's MOTION in Limine. Reply Brief due by 9/5/2003. (ct) (Entered: 08/20/2003)
75 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION filed by Intervenor, Marion Shaub re 64 Defendant's MOTION in Limine. Reply Brief due by 9/8/2003. (Attachments: # 1 Cert of Nonconc)(ct) (Entered: 08/25/2003)
76 MOTION filed for permission to allow Ralph E. Lamar, IV, Esquire to Appear Pro Hac Vice in this litigation as co-counsel for Intervenor Marion Shaub. C/S. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(ct) (Entered: 08/26/2003)
77 CERTIFICATE of Non Concurrence filed by Intervenor Marion Shaub re 67 Intervenor's MOTION for Leave to File a Sur Reply Brief. (ct) (Entered: 08/27/2003)
78 MOTION filed by Plaintiff for an Extension of Time to conduct a Rule 16.3 conference (9/5/03). C/S. (Attachments: # 1 Cert of Conc.# 2 Proposed Order)(ct) (Entered: 08/29/2003)
79 MOTION for Extension of trial date by defendant Fed Ex Express Corporation and c of s. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(jc) (Entered: 09/02/2003)
80 ORDER - Upon consideration of the 76 Motion of Martha Sperling, Esquire for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Ralph E. Lamar, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Ralph E. Lamar, IV, is admitted to practice pro hac vice in the above captioned matter.Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on August 29, 2003. (sc) (Entered: 09/02/2003)
82 EXHIBIT WITNESS LIST by defendant Fed Ex Express Corporation. DOCUMENT NOT SCANNED. ORIGINAL IN OSFR IN HBG. (jc) (Entered: 09/04/2003)
83 EXHIBIT LIST by defendant Fed Express Corporation and c of s. (jc) (Entered: 09/04/2003)
85 MOTION by Intervenor Marion Shaub in Limine to exclude evidence that Martha Sperling represented Lorraine Metz in her lawsuit against defendant. C/S. (ct) (Entered: 09/09/2003)
86 MOTION by Intervenor Marion Shaub in Limine to exclude evidence that Ernard Robinson lost his route when it was upgraded to full-time. C/S. (ct) (Entered: 09/09/2003)

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09/19/2003

87 MOTION by Intervenor Marion Shaub in Limine to exclude expert testimony presented through lay witnesses. C/S. (ct) (Entered: 09/09/2003)
88 MOTION by Intervenor Marion Shaub in Limine to exclude evidence by managment employees of the number of hours worked by drivers and the basis for its decisions to upgrade part-time driving routes to full-time driving routes. C/S.(ct) (Entered: 09/09/2003)
89 MOTION by Intervenor Marion Shaub in Limine to exclude evidence of the date that she retained her counsel, the fact that she filled out the EEO complaint in her lawyer's office and that her counsel called the police department on her behalf. C/S. (ct) (Entered: 09/09/2003)
90 MOTION by Marion Shaub in Limine to exclude that Martha Sperling provided confidential information to plaintiff. C/S. (ct) (Entered: 09/09/2003)
91 MOTION in Limine by Intervenor Marion Shaub to exclude testimony from witnesses identified late or not at all. C/S. (ct) (Entered: 09/09/2003)
Deleted Doc. #81 filed 8/22/2003. Refiled as Doc. #76. (vg, ) (Entered: 09/09/2003)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Document 86 deleted and redocketed as Document 86 due to clerical error. (ct) (Entered: 09/09/2003)
92 ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1)Pltf and Intervenor's 31 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery is GRANTED. 2)Pltfs and Intervenors 32 Motion to Compel Discovery is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as broken down in the order. 3)Dft's Mtn 49 for leave to file a response to pltf and Intvr Rply in support of the mtn to compel disc. and for sanctions is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT dft's Sur-Rply Brief is STRICKEN from the record. 4) Dft's 44 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED w/o prej to refile. 5)Brief associated with mtn for sumjgm are STRICKEN from the record. 6)Pltf's 66 Motion for Leave to Add add'l exhibts is DENIED AS MOOT. 7) Intvnr 67 Motion for Permission to file sur-reply br is DENIED AS MOOT. The proposed sur-rply br is STRICKEN from the record. 8) An amended case mgmt order will follow. Discovery due by 10/10/2003. See order for details.Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on September 9, 2003.(sc) (Entered: 09/09/2003)
93 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Close of Disc and Depo of Experts shall be completed by 10/10/03. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Case Mgmt Orders dtd 1/14/03 and 4/25/03 are further AMENDED as follows: Jury Selection and Trial are set for 12/1/2003 at 09:30 AM in Harrisburg - Courtroom #4 before Honorable Yvette Kane. Pretrial Memo is due 11/14/03. Pretrial Conference set for 11/21/2003 at 09:30 AM in Harrisburg - Courtroom #4 before Honorable Yvette Kane. See order for more details.Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on September 9, 2003. (sc) 7879 (Entered: 09/09/2003)
94 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION to Pltf/Intvnr Marion Shaub's 85 MOTION in Limine regarding Martha Sperling's representation of Lorraine Metz filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation. Reply Brief due by 10/6/2003. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(sc) (Entered: 09/22/2003)

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09/19/2003
09/19/2003 09/30/2003 10/03/2003 10/07/2003
10/07/2003 10/14/2003
10/16/2003 10/16/2003 10/16/2003 10/16/2003

95 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION to the 86 MOTION in Limine regarding Enard Robinson's Lost Route filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation. Reply Brief due by 10/6/2003. (sc) (Entered: 09/22/2003)
96 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION to the 87 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony presented through Lay Witnesses filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation; with c/s. Reply Brief due by 10/6/2003. (sc) (Entered: 09/22/2003)
97 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION to the 88 MOTION in Limine regarding Management Testimony on Hours Worked filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation; with c/s. Reply Brief due by 10/6/2003. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(sc) (Entered: 09/22/2003)
98 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION to the 89 MOTION in Limine regarding Martha Sperling's Involvement in Intervenor's Claims filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation; with c/s. Reply Brief due by 10/6/2003. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(sc) (Entered: 09/22/2003)
99 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION to the 91 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony from Witnesses Identified Late or Not at All filed by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation; with c/s. Reply Brief due by 10/6/2003. (sc) (Entered: 09/22/2003)
100 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgmetn filed by Defendant, Fed Ex Express Corporation. C/S. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(ct) (Entered: 10/01/2003)
101 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) from Jeana M. Littrell ( Filing fee $25, Receipt Number 111 139628). (jc) (Entered: 10/06/2003)
102 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 100 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Dft. may file a Br. in Sup. of a Mot. for Sum. Jdg. not to exceed 20 pgs. with lettering or typeface not smaller than 14 point word processing. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 10/7/03 (pw, ) (Entered: 10/07/2003)
103 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Jeana M. Littrell.Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 10/6/03. (pw, ) (Entered: 10/07/2003)
104 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for memorandum in support of answer to mtn for summary judgment; cs by pltfs Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(pm, ) (Entered: 10/15/2003)
105 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Fed Ex Express Corporation. C/S. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(ct) (Entered: 10/17/2003)
106 BRIEF IN SUPPORT filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation re 105 MOTION for Summary Judgment. C/S. Brief in Opposition due by 11/3/2003.(ct) (Entered: 10/17/2003)
107 CERTIFICATE of Length of Brief filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation re 106 Brief in Support of motion for summary judgment. c/s. (ct) (Entered: 10/17/2003)
108 STATEMENT OF FACTS filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation re 105 MOTION for Summary Judgment. C/S. (too large to scan, original sent to chambers). (ct) (Entered: 10/17/2003)

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109 ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Pltf EEOC's and Intervenor, Marion Shaub's 104 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages for Memorandum in Support of answer to mtn for sumjgm is GRANTED. Pltf and Intervenor may file their brief not to exceed 20 pages w/ lettering or typeface not smaller than 14 point word processing. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on October 17, 2003. (sc) (Entered: 10/17/2003)
110 RESPONSE by plaintiff EEOC and intervenor plaintiff Marion Shaub to 105 deft's MOTION for Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(jc) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
111 CERTIFICATION of Length of Brief by plaintiff EEOC and c of s. (jc) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
112 RESPONSE and Objections by plaintiff EEOC and intervenor plaintiff Marion Shaub to 108 deft's Amended Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. (jc) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
113 STATEMENT OF FACTS by intervenor plaintiff Marion Shaub. 108 (jc) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
114 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION to deft's 105 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Reply Brief due by 11/10/2003. (jc) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
115 EXHIBITS by plaintiff EEOC to their response to deft's mtn for S/J. TOO VOLUMINOUS, NOT SCANNED. ORIGINAL IN OSFR IN HBG. (jc) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
116 EXHIBITS by plaintiff EEOC to their response to deft's mtn for S/J. TOO VOLUMINOUS, NOT SCANNED. ORIGINAL IN OSFR IN HBG. (jc) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
117 CERTIFICATE of SERVICE by intervenor plaintiff Marion Shaub stating that a true and correct copy ot Intervenor's Statement of Facts, Intervenor's Memorandum of Law in Opp. to deft's mtn for S/J, Appendix I and Appendix II of Exhs. to pltf's & intervenor's response to deft's mtn for S/J were served upon Frederick L. Douglas, Esquire. 114 115 116 112 113 (jc) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
118 ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all parties are to show cause to this Court why they are not in compliance with our Standing Order on Electronic Case Filings by Nov. 18, 2003.Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on Nov. 4, 2003. (sc) (Entered: 11/04/2003)
119 MOTION in Limine (Settlement of Claims) by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/14/2003)
120 Supplement by Fed Ex Express Corporation. to 65 Brief in Support, 64 MOTION in Limine on Expert Testimony of Leonard C. Buckman. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Attachments 1 and 2)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/14/2003)
128 PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibits A-D)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/14/2003)

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Documents 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133 and 134 filed 11/14/03 deleted due to lack of signatures, duplications and incorrect events being selected. (jc) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
129 RESPONSE by Fed Ex Express Corporation to 118 Order of November 4, 2003. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
130 PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) # 2 Exhibit(s) 1-A# 3 Exhibit(s) 3# 4 Exhibit(s) 4# 5 Exhibit(s) 2 - Trial Exhibits)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
131 MOTION in Limine by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Non-Concurrence by Defendant# 2 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Concurrence - Defendant# 3 Proposed Order)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
132 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Motion to Exclude Evidence of Route Changes of other Drivers re 131 MOTION in Limine filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Brief in Opposition due by 12/5/2003 (Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
133 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Concurrence and Non-Concurrence)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
134 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 133 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Brief in Opposition due by 12/5/2003 (Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
135 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Questions Insinuating that Shaub Sabotaged Vehicle or Filed False Claims by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Non-Concurrence by Defendant and Concurrence by Intervenor)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
136 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 135 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Questions Insinuating that Shaub Sabotaged Vehicle or Filed False Claims filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Brief in Opposition due by 12/5/2003 (Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
137 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Marion Shaub's Prior Employment by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Non-Conccurrence by Defendant and Concurrence by Intervenor)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
138 EXHIBIT Deposition Excerpts by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.. (Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 11/18/2003)
139 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1)The following motions in limine are deemed WITHDRAWN for failure to comply w/ Local Rule 7.5 which requires the moving party to file a brsup w/i 10 days of filing this motion. 85 86 87 88 89 90 91. 2)Pltf/Intvnr Shaub may re-file any of the w/drawn mtns along w/ briefs in sup of these mtns on or before 11/21/03. 3)Pltf/Intvnr Shaub shall show cause by 11/26/03 why she should not be required to retain local cnsl. 4)On 12/5/03 at 9:30am, this court will hold a Daubert hearing. 5)The scheduling order of 9/9/03

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is AMENDED as follows: Pretrial Conf is set for 1/22/04. Jury Selection and Trial is set for 2/2/04. See order for more details. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on November 19, 2003. (sc) (Entered: 11/19/2003)
Set/Reset Hearings: Daubert Hearing set for 12/5/2003 at 09:30 AM in Harrisburg - Courtroom #4 before Honorable Yvette Kane. Jury Selection and Trial are rescheduled for 2/2/2004 at 09:30 AM in Harrisburg - Courtroom #4 before Honorable Yvette Kane. Pretrial Conference set for 1/22/2004 in Harrisburg - Courtroom #4 before Honorable Yvette Kane. (sc) (Entered: 11/19/2003)
Document 140 filed 11/20/03 deleted due to lack of signature. Document to be resubmitted. (jc) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
140 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence that Ernard Robinson Lost his Route by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2# 2 Exhibit 1)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
141 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 140 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence that Ernard Robinson Lost his Route filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 12/9/2003 (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
142 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Sperling provided Confidential Information by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order# 2 certificate of service# 3 Exhibit A# 4 Exhibit A)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
143 MOTION in Limine to exclude testimony by managmeent employees by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
144 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 143 MOTION in Limine to exclude testimony by managmeent employees filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 12/9/2003 (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
147 MOTION in Limine of date she retained counsel by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
148 MOTION in Limine to exclude witnesses by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
149 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 148 MOTION in Limine to exclude witnesses filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 12/9/2003 (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
150 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 142 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Sperling provided Confidential Information filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 12/9/2003 (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
151 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 147 MOTION in Limine of date she retained counsel filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 12/9/2003 (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
152 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Evidence that Ms. Sperling represented Metz by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 cert of service# 3 Exhibit A# 4 Exhibit A. p. 1# 5 p.3# 6 p.4# 7 # 8 # 9 exhibit c# 10 Exhibit C p. 2# 11 Exhibit D# 12 Exhibit D p. 2# 13 D continued# 14 D continued# 15 Exhibit D continued# 16

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Exhibit D cont.# 17 end of Exhibit D)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
153 MOTION in Limine to exclude expert testimony by lay witnesses by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 cert of service)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
154 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 153 MOTION in Limine to exclude expert testimony by lay witnesses filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 12/9/2003 (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
155 MOTION in Limine by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order# 2 # 3 Exhibit A# 4 Exhibit A p. 2# 5 Exhibit A p. 3# 6 Exhibit A. p. 4# 7 Exhibit A p. 5# 8 Exhibit B# 9 Exhibit C p. 1# 10 Exhibit C p. 2# 11 Exhibit D Order p. 1# 12 Exhibit D Order p. 2)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
156 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 155 MOTION in Limine filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 12/9/2003 (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
Documents 145 and 146 deleted due to incorrect entry. Counsel has re-filed correctly. (sc) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
157 RESPONSE by Marion Shaub to the Court's Rule to Show Cause. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
158 REPLY BRIEF re 152 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Evidence that Ms. Sperling represented Metz filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
159 EXHIBIT to Response of Defendant in Opposition to Intervernor's Motion In Limine Regarding Martha Sperling's Representation of Lorraine Metz in Her Lawsuit Against Defendant by Fed Ex Express Corporation.. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
160 REPLY BRIEF re 142 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Sperling provided Confidential Information to Plaintiff filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
161 REPLY BRIEF re 148 MOTION in Limine to exclude witnesses identified late or not at all filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
162 REPLY BRIEF re 147 MOTION in Limine of date she retained counsel , the fact that she filled out the EEOC Complaint in her lawyer's office and that her counsel called the police department on her behalf filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
163 REPLY BRIEF re 131 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence (Route Changes) filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
164 REPLY BRIEF re 140 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence that Ernard Robinson Lost his Route filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
165 REPLY BRIEF re 137 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Marion Shaub's Prior Employment Prior to Working for Federal Express filed by Fed Ex

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Express Corporation. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
166 REPLY BRIEF re 153 MOTION in Limine to exclude expert testimony by lay witnesses filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
167 EXHIBIT to Response of Def. in Opposition to Motion In Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony Presented Through Lay Witnesses by Fed Ex Express Corporation.. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
168 REPLY BRIEF re 133 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony from Liam Lynch, Marc Clark, Jack Poole and James Steffen filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
169 EXHIBIT to Response of Defendant Federal Express Corporation in Opposition to Plaintiff/Intervenor's Motion In Limine to Exclude Testimony from Liam Lynch, Marc Clark, Jack Poole and James Steffen by Fed Ex Express Corporation.. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
170 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 119 MOTION in Limine (Settlement of Claims) filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. Brief in Opposition due by 12/15/2003 (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
171 EXHIBIT to Brief of Defendant Federal Express Corporation in Support of Its Motion in Limine (Settlement of Claims) by Fed Ex Express Corporation.. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
172 REPLY BRIEF re 135 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Questions Insinuating that Shaub Sabotaged Vehicle or Filed False Claims filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
173 EXHIBIT to Response of Federal Express Corporation in Opposition to Plaintiff/Intervenor's Motion In Limine to Exclude Questions [Regarding self-sabotage] by Fed Ex Express Corporation.. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
174 REPLY BRIEF re 143 MOTION in Limine to exclude testimony by managmeent employees on hours worked and basis of upgrading routes filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
175 EXHIBIT to Response of Defendant Federal Express Corporation in Opposition to Intervenor's Motion in Limine Regarding Management Testimony on Hours Worked and Basis of Upgrading of Routes by Fed Ex Express Corporation.. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
176 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 120 MOTION in Limine relating to Leonard Buckman filed by Marion Shaub. Reply Brief due by 12/18/2003. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 12/01/2003)
177 EXHIBIT A- Buckman Deposition Pages by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.. (Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 12/02/2003)
178 EXHIBIT B - Thompe Deposition Pages by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.. (Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 12/02/2003)

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181 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 183 MOTION to Continue Daubert Hearing filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. Reply Brief due by 12/19/2003. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 12/02/2003)
182 ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 183 Motion to Continue the Daubert Hearing is GRANTED. A telephone conference will be held on 12/5/03 at 10:00am to set a new date for the Daubert Hearing. The Intervenor's counsel shall initiate the call. See order. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on December 2, 2003. (sc) Modified on 12/4/2003 (jc). (Entered: 12/02/2003)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 12/5/2003 at 10:00 AM in Harrisburg - Courtroom #4 before Honorable Yvette Kane. Daubert Hearing cancelled for the same date. (sc) (Entered: 12/02/2003)
Document 180 filed 12/2/03 deleted and replaced with document 181. (jc) (Entered: 12/03/2003)
Document 179 (Motion to Continue Daubert Hearing) to be refiled with memorandum in support docketed as a separate document and not attached to the motion. Motion and memorandum to be refiled. (jc) (Entered: 12/03/2003)
183 MOTION to Continue Daubert Hearing by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 Exhibit(s))(Sperling, Martha) Modified on 12/4/2003 (jc). (Entered: 12/04/2003)
184 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 183 MOTION to Continue Daubert Hearing filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 12/22/2003 (Attachments: # 1)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 12/04/2003)
Document 179 refiled and replaced by documents 183 & 184. Document 182 (Order) terminated document 183(Motion). (jc) (Entered: 12/04/2003)
185 REPLY BRIEF re 155 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence that Martha Sperling Respresented Lorraine Metz filed by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 12/04/2003)
186 REPLY BRIEF re 135 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Questions Insinuating that Shaub Sabotaged Vehicle or Filed False Claims filed by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) p.1# 2 Exhibit(s) p.2# 3 Exhibit(s) p.3)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 12/04/2003)
Document 187 filed 12/4/03 docketed incorrectly as a motion instead of a brief in support. Document to be refiled. (jc) (Entered: 12/04/2003)
Document 187 (Brief in Support of Motion in Limine) to be refiled due to lack of signature. (jc) (Entered: 12/05/2003)
189 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of re 137 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Marion Shaub's Prior Employment filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Brief in Opposition due by 12/23/2003 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 12/05/2003)
Document 187 filed 12/4/03 deleted and replaced by document 189 filed 12/5/03. (jc) (Entered: 12/08/2003)

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190 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 119 MOTION in Limine (Settlement of Claims) filed by Marion Shaub. Reply Brief due by 12/29/2003. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibit 1)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 12/11/2003)
191 Proposed Voir Dire by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 01/19/2004)
192 Proposed Jury Instructions by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 01/19/2004)
193 MOTION for Leave to File Request to Exceed Specified Number of Jury Instructions by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1# 2 Proposed Order)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 01/19/2004)
194 Proposed Voir Dire by Marion Shaub. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 01/21/2004)
195 OBJECTIONS by Marion Shaub. to 192 Proposed Jury Instructions. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
196 OBJECTIONS by Marion Shaub. To Designation of Portions of Buckman Deposition. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
199 ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, upon review by the Court, of Motion of Federal Express Corp 193 for Leave of Court to Exceed the Specified Number of Jury Instructions, the motion is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on January 23, 2004 (sc) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
202 Proposed Jury Instructions by Marion Shaub. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
Clerk notified by cnsl. for intervenor that documents 197 & 198 filed 1/23/04 were docketed incorrectly and will be resubmitted. Upon resubmission of the above documents the clerk will delete documents 197 & 198. (jc) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
203 OBJECTIONS by Fed Ex Express Corporation. to 208 Proposed Jury Instructions, 202 Proposed Jury Instructions. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
205 MOTION for Hearing for a pre-trial determination of chain of custody by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order# 2 Certificate of Service)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
206 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 205 MOTION for Hearing for a pre-trial determination of chain of custody filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 2/10/2004 (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
208 Proposed Jury Instructions by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
209 SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES. (Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
Documents 197 & 198 (Motion & Brief in Support re: for Hearing for Pre-trial Hearing on Chain of Custody) filed 1/23/04 deleted and replaced by documents 205 & 206 filed 1/23/04. (jc) (Entered: 01/26/2004)

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Documents 201 & 204 filed 1/23/04 (Proposed Jury Instructions) deleted and replaced by document 208 filed 1/23/04. (jc) (Entered: 01/26/2004)
Document 207 (Special Interrogatories) filed 1/23/04 deleted and replaced by document 209 filed 1/23/04. (jc) (Entered: 01/26/2004)
211 ORDER - AND NOW, upon consideration of the proposed voir dire questions submitted by the parties in this matter, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. Plfs.' proposed voir dire questions 194 numbered 3, 6-14, and 16-22 are APPROVED. 2. Plfs.' proposed voir dire questions numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 15, 23, 25-28 and 30 are DISAPPROVED. 3. Plfs.' proposed voir dire questions numbered 24 and 29 are APPROVED IN PART and DISAPPROVED IN PART, as follows: The first sentence of question 24 is APPROVED, but the second is DISAPPROVED; the first sentence of question 29 is APPROVED, but the remaining portion is DISAPPROVED. 4. Deft.'s proposed voir dire questions 191 numbered 1-29, 31-42, 49, 51-55, 59 and 60 are APPROVED. 5. Deft.'s proposed voir dire questions numbered 30, 43-48, 50, 56-58 and 61-64 are DISAPPROVED. cc: all counsel, Crt. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 02/02/04. (am) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
212 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED THAT Dft's 105 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on February 2, 2004 (sc) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
213 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED THAT Intervenors Motion in limine to exclude evidence that Martha Sperling represented Lorraine Metz in her lawsuit against dft is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Doc #152 is STRICKEN as duplicative. 152 155Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on February 2, 2004. (sc) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
214 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED THAT Intervenor's 148 Motion in Limine to exclude testimony of all witnesses identified late or not at all is DENIED. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on February 2, 2004. (sc) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
215 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED that Intervenor's 147 Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of the date that she retained her counsel, the fact that she filled out the EEO cmplt in her lawyers' office and that her cnsl called the police dpmt on her behalf, is DENIED. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on Feb. 2, 2004. (sc) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
216 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED THAT Intervenors' 143 Motion in Limine to exclude evidence by mgmt employees of the number of hours worked by drivers and the basis for its decisions to upgrade part-time driving routes to full-time driving routes is DENIED. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 2/2/04. (sc) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
217 ORDER - Intervenor's 142 Motion in Limine is DENIED AS MOOT. See order for details. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 2/2/04. (sc) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
218 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED THAT Intervenor's 140 Motion in Limine to exclude evidence that Ernard Robinson lost his route when it was upgraded to full time is DENIED. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 2/2/04. (sc) (Entered: 02/02/2004)

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219 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED THAT Pltf's 137 Motion in Limine to exclude her prior work history is GRANTED. See order. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 2/2/04. (sc) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
220 ORDER - For all of the reasons discussed above, Pltf's Intervenors' 135 Motion in Limine to exclude questions from Fed Ex of any witness that Marion Shaub sabotaged her own brake lines or falsely made any clms of harrassment is DENIED. See order for details. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 2/2/04. (sc) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
221 ORDER - Pltf's 133 Motion in Limineto exclude testimony of Fed Ex employees Liam Lynch, Mark Clark, Jack Poole, and James Steffen and Intervenors Mtn 153 to exclude expert testimony presented through lay witnesses are GRANTED. See order for details. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 2/2/04. (sc) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
222 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED THAT Pltf's 131 Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of other Federal Express drivers whose routes were changed or removed for reasons other than re-classification from part-time to full-time status is DENIED. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 2/2/04. (sc) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
223 ORDER - Dft's 119 Motion in Limine is GRANTED. Testimony and evidence of the fact and amount of prior settlements is excluded. Should pltf introduce High's 12/13/00 email for another purpose - see order for necessary redactions.Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 2/2/04. (sc) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
224 ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT dft's 64 Motion in Limine to exclude certain broad categories of evidence is DENIED. See order for details. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 2/2/04. (sc) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
228 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Fed Ex Express Corporation IN OPPOSITION TO DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF AARON WILLIAMS AND ROBERT BROWN. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 02/11/2004)
232 ORDER Re: Objections to the Deposition of Leonard C. Buckman SEE ORDER FOR THE COURT'S RULINGSSigned by Judge Yvette Kane on 2/16/04. (jc) (Entered: 02/17/2004)
236 ORDER - RE: Objections to the Deposition of Ribert Lind. The following Defendant's objections are overruled: Page 87, Lines 6-8; Page 88, Lines 1-2, 17-21; Page 89, Lines 1-2; Page 90, Lines 6-11; Page 94, Lines 19-21; Page 95, Lines 1-6. The following objections are sustained: Page 86, Lines 12-16.Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 2/18/04. (pw, ) (Entered: 02/23/2004)
233 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Fed Ex Express Corporation TO COURT'S ORDER TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE. (Attachments: # 1 Attachments A-1 and A-2)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 02/19/2004)
235 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by defendant Fed Ex Express Corporation IN SUPPORT of motion for Judicial Notice. (jc) (Entered: 02/23/2004)
234 Offers of Proof of Defendant Federal Express Corporation for Its Witnesses Liam Lynch, James Steffen, Jack Poole, and Marc Clark. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1# 2 Attachment 2# 3 Attachment 3# 4 Attachment 4)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 02/23/2004)

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244 Jury Question #1 - Would it be possible to see the flip chart? No. The flip chart was not admitted as an exhibit in the case. (sc) (Entered: 02/26/2004)
245 Exhibit List by plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & pltf/intvnr Marion Shaub. (sc) (Entered: 02/26/2004)
246 Exhibit List by dft Fed Ex Express Corporation.. (sc) (Entered: 02/26/2004)
247 JURY VERDICT. (sc) (Entered: 02/26/2004)
237 ORDER finding as moot 205 Motion for pre-trial determination of the chain of custody of the air line secured by intervenor on April 12, 2000. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on 2/25/04 (pw, ) (Entered: 02/25/2004)
248 JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff, EEOC & Plaintiff Intervenor, Marion Shaub and against Defendant, Federal Express Corporation on the Title VII Violation clm in the amt of $391,400. Jgm is also found in favor of pltf & agnst dft on IIED claim. Pltf is awarded $350,000 in Compensatory damages and $2,500,000 in Punitive damages. (sc) (Entered: 02/26/2004)
***Civil Case Terminated. (sc) (Entered: 02/27/2004)
249 MOTION to Alter Judgment or Amend by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/02/2004)
250 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 249 MOTION to Alter Judgment or Amend filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. Brief in Opposition due by 3/22/2004 (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/02/2004)
251 MOTION to Stay re 248 Judgment, Partially Concurred In by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/03/2004)
252 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED THAT Dft's partially concurred in 251 Motion to Stay Judgment will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Jgm is STAYED pending resolution of the post-trial motions only. The motion to stay judgment pending appeal is DENIED w/o prejudice to refile. Dft may renew its mtn to stay jgm pending appellate review in compliance w/ FRCP 62(d). See order.Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on March 4, 2004 (sc) (Entered: 03/04/2004)
253 TRANSCRIPT - of Jury Trial Proceedings of Testimony of Patrick Hanratty held on 2/13/04 before Judge Yvette Kane. Court Reporter: Monica L. Zamiska, RPR. (1st page only scanned - ORIGINAL PLACED IN THE CASE FILE). (am) (Entered: 03/05/2004)
254 TRANSCRIPT - of Jury Trial Proceedings of Testimony of Patrick Hanratty held on 2/23/04 before Judge Yvette Kane. Court Reporter: Monica L. Zamiska, RPR. (1st page only scanned - ORIGINAL PLACED IN THE CASE FILE). (am) (Entered: 03/05/2004)
255 TRANSCRIPT - of Closing Arguments from Jury Trial Proceedings held on 2/24/04 before Judge Yvette Kane. Court Reporter: Monica L. Zamiska, RPR. (1st page only scanned - ORIGINAL IN CASE FILE). (am) (Entered: 03/05/2004)

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03/11/2004 03/11/2004 03/11/2004
03/12/2004 03/12/2004

256 MOTION to Enforce Judgment by Ordering Equitable Relief by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order for Equitable Relief)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
257 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law RENEWED by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
258 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 257 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law RENEWED filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. Brief in Opposition due by 3/29/2004 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A-C)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
259 CERTIFICATE of Non-Concurrence by Defendant, Concurrence by Plaintiff-Intervenor by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 256 MOTION to Enforce Judgment by Ordering Equitable Relief. (Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
260 MOTION for Attorney Fees Exhibits to be filed in hard copy by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
261 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 260 MOTION for Attorney Fees Exhibits to be filed in hard copy filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 3/29/2004 (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
264 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, To Account for Negative Tax Consequences by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 03/11/2004)
265 BRIEF IN SUPPORT Motion to Amend to Account for Negative Tax Consequences re 264 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, To Account for Negative Tax Consequences filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 3/29/2004 (Attachments: # 1 Verzilli report)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 03/11/2004)
266 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, for Prejudgement Interest by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 03/11/2004)
267 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 266 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, for Prejudgement Interest filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 3/29/2004 (Attachments: # 1 Verzilli report)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 03/11/2004)
Counsel is advised to refile "Certificate of Non-Concurrence by Marion Shaub re: Motion for Atty. Fees" efiled on 3/11/04 to include the CASE NUMBER and CAPTION of the case. ALSO, Counsel is advised to refile "Certificate of Service by Marion Shaub re: Motion for Atty. Fees" efiled on 3/11/04 to include the CASE NUMBER, CAPTION and DATE. (am) (Entered: 03/11/2004)
268 EXHIBIT(s) by Marion Shaub to petition for atty's fees 260 (voluminous - 1st page only scanned - original in HBG OSF) (vg, ) (Entered: 03/12/2004)
269 CERTIFICATE of Nonconcurrence by Marion Shaub re 260 MOTION for Attorney Fees Exhibits to be filed in hard copy. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered:

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03/29/2004 03/29/2004
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03/12/2004)
270 CERTIFICATE of Service by Marion Shaub re 260 MOTION for Attorney Fees Exhibits to be filed in hard copy. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 03/12/2004)
Deleted Doc. Nos. 262 & 263, efiled on 3/11/04. Documents lacked both the caption and case number. Counsel refiled as Doc. Nos. 269 & 270. (am) (Entered: 03/12/2004)
271 BILL OF COSTS by Marion Shaub. Taxation of Costs due by 4/6/2004. (Attachments: # 1 Proof of costs)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 03/22/2004)
272 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 249 MOTION to Alter Judgment or Amend filed by Marion Shaub. Reply Brief due by 4/8/2004. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 03/22/2004)
273 Letter from Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Support of Intervenor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Federal Express Corporation's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (Docket No. 272). (Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 03/22/2004)
274 DOCUMENT - Original signature page to the Declaration of William H. Ewing in support of pltf intervenor's mtn for attorney's fees and expenses. (jc) (Entered: 03/25/2004)
275 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 03/26/2004)
276 ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Intervenor is GRANTED permission to file a brief in response to Federal Express Corporation's Renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law which exceeds the page limitation of LR 7.8, up to 30 pages. 275Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on March 29, 2004. (sc) (Entered: 03/29/2004)
277 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 266 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, for Prejudgement Interest filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. Reply Brief due by 4/15/2004. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/29/2004)
278 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 264 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, To Account for Negative Tax Consequences filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. Reply Brief due by 4/15/2004. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A and B)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/29/2004)
279 OBJECTIONS TO BILL OF COSTS by Fed Ex Express Corporation. to 271 Bill of Costs. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/29/2004)
280 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 257 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law RENEWED filed by Marion Shaub. Reply Brief due by 4/15/2004. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 03/29/2004)
281 EXHIBIT B by Marion Shaub.. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 03/29/2004)
282 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 257 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law RENEWED filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Reply Brief due by 4/15/2004. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order Denying Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment As A Matter of Law)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered:

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04/05/2004 04/07/2004
04/07/2004
04/07/2004 04/13/2004 04/14/2004 04/14/2004 04/15/2004 04/15/2004 04/16/2004 04/19/2004

03/29/2004)
283 EXHIBIT A by Marion Shaub.. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 03/30/2004)
284 EXHIBIT A by Marion Shaub.. (Lamar, Ralph) (Entered: 03/30/2004)
285 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 260 MOTION for Attorney Fees Exhibits to be filed in hard copy And Costs filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. Reply Brief due by 4/16/2004. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A-Q)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/30/2004)
286 REPLY by Marion Shaub. to 279 Objections to Bill of Costs. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 04/05/2004)
287 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief# 2 Certificate of Concurrence)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
288 ORDER - Upon consideration of Pltf EEOC's 287 Motion for Extension of Time to File Post Trial Brief, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. EEOC's Brief in Support of its 256 MOTION to Enforce Judgment by Ordering Equitable Relief is due to be filed on 4/13/2004.Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on April 7, 2004. (sc) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
289 REPLY BRIEF re 249 MOTION to Alter Judgment or Amend IN SUPPORT OF ITS filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A E)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
290 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 256 MOTION to Enforce Judgment by Ordering Equitable Relief filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Brief in Opposition due by 5/3/2004 (Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 04/13/2004)
291 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to Reply Brief of Federal Express Corp. in Support of its Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 04/14/2004)
292 RESPONSE by Fed Ex Express Corporation to 291 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to Reply Brief of Federal Express Corp. in Support of its Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. (Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 04/14/2004)
293 REPLY BRIEF re 266 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, for Prejudgement Interest filed by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Lamar, Ralph) (Entered: 04/15/2004)
294 REPLY BRIEF re 264 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, To Account for Negative Tax Consequences filed by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Lamar, Ralph) (Entered: 04/15/2004)
295 REPLY BRIEF re 260 MOTION for Attorney Fees Exhibits to be filed in hard copy filed by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) CLS Schedule# 2 Exhibit(s) Westlaw and ECF charges)(Lamar, Ralph) (Entered: 04/16/2004)
296 APPENDIX by Marion Shaub. to 295 Reply Brief Westlaw cases and correction of cite. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 04/19/2004)

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04/23/2004 04/26/2004 04/26/2004 04/27/2004 04/27/2004 04/28/2004 04/28/2004
05/03/2004

297 TRANSCRIPT of in Chambers Conference held on 2/23/04 CTR: Monica ZamiskaNOT SCANNED ORIGINAL IN OSFR IN HARRISBURG (jc) (Entered: 04/21/2004)
298 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings in Chambers Conference Jury Trial held on 2/23/04, CTR Monica Zamiska, ORIGINAL IN OSFR IN HARRISBURG (jc) (Entered: 04/21/2004)
299 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED THAT this case is referred to Magistrate Judge J. Andrew Smyser for a settlement conference. A scheduling order will issue from the Magistrate Judge. MJ Smyser shall file a report with the undersigned judge on or before 5/24/04, regarding the status of this case. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on April 21, 2004. (sc) (Entered: 04/21/2004)
300 ORDER re 299 Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge, A telephone conference is set for 2:30 p.m., on Tuesday, April 27, 2004.Signed by Judge J. Andrew Smyser on 4/23/04. (pw, ) (Entered: 04/26/2004)
301 ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the intervenor may file a Surreply to the dft's reply brief in support of its mtn to amend the jgm w/i 7 days after the transcript of the charge conference is rec'd. 291 Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on April 26, 2004. (sc) (Entered: 04/26/2004)
302 Supplement by Marion Shaub. to 260 MOTION for Attorney Fees Exhibits to be filed in hard copy. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of service)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 04/26/2004)
303 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order Granting Intervenor's Rule 60 Motion# 2 Proposed Order Order Granting Intervenor's Motion to File Late Rule 59 Motion)(Lamar, Ralph) (Entered: 04/27/2004)
304 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 303 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 5/17/2004 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Charging Conference transcript# 2 Exhibit(s) Jury Charge)(Lamar, Ralph) (Entered: 04/27/2004)
306 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief to 290 Brief in Support, 256 MOTION to Enforce Judgment by Ordering Equitable Relief CONCURRED IN filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 04/28/2004)
307 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED that a Settlement Conference is set for 5/18/2004 at 1:30 PM, in Chambers, Room 1110, Eleventh Floor, Federal Building, Third and Walnut Streets, Harrisburg, PA. Cnsl shall attend along with clients and/or persons with full settlement authority. Settlement memoranda may be filed, but are not required. (cc: all cnsl, Ct) Signed by Mag. Judge J. Andrew Smyser on 04/28/04. (rw ) (Entered: 04/28/2004)
308 ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 306 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response is GRANTED. FedEx's brief in response to the mtn of EEOC for equitable relief is due to be filed on or before 5/11/04. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on May 3, 2004 (sc) (Entered: 05/03/2004)

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05/04/2004 05/11/2004 05/12/2004 05/13/2004 05/13/2004
05/17/2004 05/21/2004 06/03/2004 07/26/2004 07/26/2004 07/26/2004 07/26/2004 11/10/2004

309 SUR REPLY to REPLY to Response to Motion re 249 MOTION to Alter Judgment or Amend filed by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits# 2 Westlaw cases)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
310 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 256 MOTION to Enforce Judgment by Ordering Equitable Relief filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. Reply Brief due by 5/28/2004. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A and B)(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 05/11/2004)
312 LETTER - from Frederick L. Douglas, Esquire o/b/o FedEx to Court requesting that the mediation scheduled for 5/18/04 at 1:30 p.m. be canceled. (jc) (Entered: 05/17/2004)
311 ORDER - IT IS ORDERED that the settlement conference scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on May 18, 2004 is CANCELLED. (cc: all cnsl, Ct) Signed by Mag. Judge J. Andrew Smyser on 05/13/04. (rw ) (Entered: 05/13/2004)
Motions No Longer Referred: 256 MOTION to Enforce Judgment by Ordering Equitable Relief, 257 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law RENEWED, 249 MOTION to Alter Judgment or Amend, 264 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, To Account for Negative Tax Consequences, 260 MOTION for Attorney Fees Exhibits to be filed in hard copy, 266 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, for Prejudgement Interest, 303 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, (jw, ) (Entered: 10/25/2004)
313 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 303 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. Reply Brief due by 6/3/2004. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Makosky, Alexandra) (Entered: 05/17/2004)
314 REPLY BRIEF re 256 MOTION to Enforce Judgment by Ordering Equitable Relief filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 05/21/2004)
315 REPLY BRIEF re 303 MOTION to Amend/Correct 248 Judgment, filed by Marion Shaub. (Lamar, Ralph) (Entered: 06/03/2004)
316 STENO NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS - filed by Monica Zamiska (1 of 4) Jury Selection held on 2/2/04; Jury Trial held on 2/9/04 thru 2/11/04. (NOTES PLACED IN BOX HN-164) (am) (Entered: 07/26/2004)
317 STENO NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS - filed by Monica Zamiska (2 of 4) Jury Trial held on 2/12/04; 2/13/04 & 2/17/04. (NOTES PLACED IN BOX HN-164). (am) (Entered: 07/26/2004)
318 STENO NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS - filed by Monica Zamiska (3 of 4) Jury Trial held on 2/19/04 - 2/20/04. (NOTES PLACED IN BOX HN-164). (am) (Entered: 07/26/2004)
319 STENO NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS - filed by Monica Zamiska (4 of 4) Jury Trial held on 2/23 - 2/24/04. (NOTES PLACED IN BOX HN-164). (am) (Entered: 07/26/2004)
320 TRANSCRIPT of Jury trial and charge held on 2/24/04. CTR: Monica Zamiska ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT IN CLOSED FILE ROOM IN HBG. (jc) (Entered: 11/12/2004)

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01/18/2005

321 ORDER - AND NOW, this 14th day of January, 2005, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT a hearing shall be held on Plaintiff EEOC's Motion for Equitable Relief (Doc. No. 256). Said hearing shall be held on February 23, 2005, at 1:30 p.m., in Courtroom No. 4, Eight Floor, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on January 14, 2005. (kjn ) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
322 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - And now, this 14th day of January 2005, in consideration of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1) Dft's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. No. 257) is DENIED. 2) Dft's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Doc No. 249) is DENIED and Intervenor's Motion to Amend the Judgment (Doc. No. 303) is GRANTED. The judgment will be amended to provide an award of $300,00 for punitive damages under Title VII and $210,000 for compensatory damages under the PHRA. The judgment will be further amended to provide that the remaining $900,000 in punitive damages awarded for the Intervenor's hostile work environment claim shall be allowed and allocated to the Intervenor's claims under the PERA. Intervenor's award of $101,400 for back pay and $290,000 for front pay are unaffected by this Order. In addition, Intervenor's award of $1,390,000 for compensatory and punitive damages relating to her IIED claim is unaffected by this Order. 3) Intervenor's Motion to Amend the Judgment to Include Pre-Judgment Interest (Doc. No. 266) is GRANTED. The judgement is hereby amended to provide Intervenor $3,495 in pre-judgment interest. 4) Intervenor's Motion to Amend the Judgment to Account for Negative Tax Consequences (Doc. No. 264) is DENIED. 5) Intervenor's Petition for Attorneys' Fees (Doc. No. 260) and Petition for Costs (Doc. No. 271) are GRANTED in part as follows: a. Dft shall pay Intervenor $466,512 in attorneys' fees and $31,046.42 in expenses. b. Dft shall pay Intervenor $5,905.86 in litigation costs. See Memorandum and Order for more details.Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on January 14, 2005. (kjn ) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
323 AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - And now, this 18th day of January 2005, in consideration of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1) Dft's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. No. 257) is DENIED. 2) Dft's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Doc No. 249) is DENIED and Intervenor's Motion to Amend the Judgment (Doc. No. 303) is GRANTED. The judgment will be amended to provide an award of $300,00 for punitive damages under Title VII and $210,000 for compensatory damages under the PHRA. The judgment will be further amended to provide that the remaining $950,000 in punitive damages awarded for the Intervenor's hostile work environment claim shall be allowed and allocated to the Intervenor's claims under the PERA. Intervenor's award of $101,400 for back pay and $290,000 for front pay are unaffected by this Order. In addition, Intervenor's award of $1,390,000 for compensatory and punitive damages relating to her IIED claim is unaffected by this Order. 3) Intervenor's Motion to Amend the Judgment to Include Pre-Judgment Interest (Doc. No. 266) is GRANTED. The judgement is hereby amended to provide Intervenor $3,495 in pre-judgment interest. 4) Intervenor's Motion to Amend the Judgment to Account for Negative Tax Consequences (Doc. No. 264) is DENIED. 5) Intervenor's Petition for Attorneys' Fees (Doc. No. 260) and Petition for Costs (Doc. No. 271) are GRANTED in part as follows: a. Dft shall pay Intervenor $466,512 in attorneys' fees and $31,046.42 in expenses. b. Dft shall pay Intervenor $5,905.86 in litigation costs. See Memorandum and

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02/09/2005 02/09/2005

Order for more details.Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on January 18, 2005. (kjn ) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
324 AMENDED JUDGEMENT IN A CIVIL CASE.Signed by Deputy Clerk on January 18, 2005. (kjn ) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
325 Supplemental MOTION for Attorney Fees and costs by Marion Shaub. (Attachments: # 1 proposed order)(Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 02/01/2005)
326 EXHIBIT Sperling Affidavit by Marion Shaub.. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 02/01/2005)
327 EXHIBIT Lamar affidavit by Marion Shaub.. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 02/01/2005)
328 EXHIBIT post trial attorney time by Marion Shaub.. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 02/01/2005)
329 EXHIBIT post trial Ralph Lamar attorney time by Marion Shaub.. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 02/01/2005)
330 EXHIBIT post trial expenses by Marion Shaub.. (Sperling, Martha) (Entered: 02/01/2005)
Counsel is advised that docs. 326 & 327 are to be filed as Affidavit or Declaration id this is not an exhibit. Docs. 328-330 should be filed as "Doc. filed w/ description" if these are not exhibits. (crh, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
Counsel need not to refile docs. 326-330. (crh, ) (Entered: 02/04/2005)
331 MOTION to Stay of Execution of Judgment and Prodceedings on Attorneys' Fees by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Makoskya, Alexandra) (Entered: 02/08/2005)
332 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 331 MOTION to Stay of Execution of Judgment and Prodceedings on Attorneys' Fees filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation. Brief in Opposition due by 2/28/2005 (Makoskya, Alexandra) (Entered: 02/08/2005)
333 NOTICE OF APPEAL in NON-PRISONER Case as to Order filed 2/2/04 212; Judgment filed 2/26/04 248; Memorandum & Order filed 1/14/05 322; Amended Memorandum & Order filed 1/18/05 323; Amended Judgment filed 1/18/05 [324}, (SEE NOTICE OF APPEAL FOR FURTHER ORDERS) by defendant Fed Ex Express Corporation. Filing Fee and Docket Fee PAID. ( Filing fee $255, Receipt Number 111 142690). Court Reporter Monica Zamiska & Wesley Armstrong. The Clerk's Office hereby certifies the record and the docket sheet available through ECF to be the certified list in lieu of the record and/or the certified copy of the docket entries. (jc) (Entered: 02/09/2005)
TPO (TRANSCRIPT PURCHASE ORDER) SENT to Frederick L. Douglas, Esquire re: NOA 333 (jc) (Entered: 02/09/2005)
334 MOTION for Extension of Time to Prepare for Hearing on Injunctive Relief by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 02/09/2005)

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02/24/2005 02/24/2005 02/25/2005

335 APPEAL BOND BOND in the amount of $ 3,241,400.00 posted by defendant Fed Ex Express Corporation. ORIGINAL BOND IN HBG. VAULT (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A) (jc) (Entered: 02/10/2005)
336 CERTIFICATE of by Fed Ex Express Corporation re 331 MOTION to Stay of Execution of Judgment and Prodceedings on Attorneys' Fees OF PARTIAL CONCURRENCE. (Makoskya, Alexandra) (Entered: 02/11/2005)
337 ORDER - AND NOW, on this 15th day of February, 2005, upon consideration of Pltf's Motion for Continuance of Hearing, and any responses filed by Dft, it is HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED that the Motion is granted. A pre-hearing conference will be conducted by telephone on 2/23/05 at 1:30 pm, at which time discovery issues will be discussed. The hearing on EEOC's Motion for Equitable Relief will be conducted on 3/15/05 at 1:30 p.m.Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on February 15, 2005 (kjn ) (Entered: 02/15/2005)
338 USCA Case Number 05-1418 for 333 Notice of Appeal,, filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation,. USCA Case Manager Phyllis Ruffin (DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED AND CAN ONLY BE VIEWED BY COURT STAFF). (Ruffin, Phyllis) (Entered: 02/16/2005)
340 TRANSCRIPT PURCHASE ORDER filed by Frederick L. Douglas, Esquire o/b/o defendant Federal Express Corp. requesting a transcript of the entire case: opening statements of plaintiff & defendant; closing arguments of plaintiff & defendant and jury instructions. 333 (jc) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
339 MOTION to Continue CONDITIONALLY CONCURRED IN OF HEARING ON EEOC'S MOTION FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF by Fed Ex Express Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Makoskya, Alexandra) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
341 NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL as to 322 Order on Motion to Alter Judgment,,,,,,,, Order on Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law,,,,,,,, Order on Motion for Attorney Fees,,,,,,,, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, by Marion Shaub. Filing fee $ 255. (Lamar, Ralph) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
342 ORDER re 339 Motion to Continue - AND NOW, on this 23rd day of February, 2005, upon consideration of the Motion of Dft Federal Express Corporation for Continuance of Hearing on EEOC's Motion for Equitable Relief, the motion is granted. The hearing on EEOC's Motion for Equitable Relief will be held on March 23, 2005 in Courtroom No. 4, Eighth Floor, at 9:30 a.m. Objections to R&R due by 3/9/2005 Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on February 23, 2005 (kjn ) (Entered: 02/23/2005)
344 USCA Case Number 05-1565 for 341 Notice of Cross Appeal, filed by Marion Shaub,. USCA Case Manager Phyllis Ruffin (DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED AND CAN ONLY BE VIEWED BY COURT STAFF). (Ruffin, Phyllis) (Entered: 02/24/2005)
345 APPEAL FILING FEE RECEIVED - Filing fee: $ 255.00, receipt number 333 100546 (ao, ) (Entered: 02/24/2005)
346 ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT on or before March 11, 2005, Dft shall provide Pltf EEOC with (1) any written training materials relating to sexual harassment (2) copies of any written materials Dft used or disseminated in

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02/28/2005 03/04/2005
03/22/2005
04/15/2005 04/15/2005 04/15/2005 04/15/2005 04/15/2005 04/15/2005

connection w/ sexual harassment training conducted subsequent to February 26, 2004 (3) a list setting forth the names and titles of all female employees (4) copies of any and all written complaints or claims receeived by Dft since February 26, 2004 (5) summaries of any and all verbal complaints or claims regarding sexual harassment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT parties shall, not later than March 11, 2005 exchange (1) written lists setting forth the names of any witnesses who may be called at the March 23, 2005 hearing on this matter; (2) a written offer of proof regardin the proposed testimony of such witnesses; and (3) copies of any documents that the parties intend to introduce during the hearin. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Dft shall be accompanied by local counsel during the March 23, 2005 hearing. See Order for complete details.Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on February 25, 2005. (kjn ) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
347 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 325 Supplemental MOTION for Attorney Fees and costs filed by Marion Shaub. Brief in Opposition due by 3/18/2005 (Lamar, Ralph) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
348 ORDER - Upon consideration of the 331 Motion to Stay the Execution of Final Judgment and Proceedings on Atty's Fees, the mtn is GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED that all proceedings to enforce a jgm are stayed pending resolution of Dfts' appeals. It is further ordered that all proceedings relating to attys fees are also stayed pending resolution of Dfts' appeals. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on March 4, 2005. (sc) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
349 ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the hearing on Pltf EEOC's 256 MOTION to Enforce Judgment by Ordering Equitable Relief scheduled for 3/23/05 is CANCELLED. Cnsl shall contact the Ct on 3/23/05 to indicate if said mtn has been resolved. A new hearing shall be set if no resolution is reached. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on March 22, 2005. (sc) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
351 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Consent Decree Re:EEOC's Motion for Equitable Relief by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 04/15/2005)
352 TRANSCRIPT of Jury Selection Proceedings held on February 2, 2004 before Judge Kane. Court Reporter: Monica L. Zamiska. (kjn ) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
353 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings (Jury Trial) held on February 9, 2004 before Judge Kane. Court Reporter: M. Zamiska. (Attachments: # (1) Part 2# (2) Part 3) (ctm) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
354 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings (Jury Trial) held on February 10, 2005 before Judge Kane. Court Reporter: M. Zamiska. (Attachments: # (1) Part 2) (ctm) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
355 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings (Jury Trial) held on February 11, 2005 before Judge Kane. Court Reporter: M. Zamiska. (Attachments: # (1) part 2# (2) part 3) (ctm) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
356 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings (Jury Trial) held on February 12, 2005 before Judge Kane. Court Reporter: M. Zamiska. (Attachments: # (1) part 2) (ctm) (Entered: 04/22/2005)

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04/15/2005 04/15/2005 04/15/2005 04/15/2005 04/15/2005 04/15/2005 04/15/2005
04/25/2005 12/22/2005 12/22/2005 12/23/2005 03/03/2006 03/31/2006 04/28/2006

357 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings (Jury Trial) held on February 13, 2004 before Judge Kane. Court Reporter: M. Zamiska. (Attachments: # (1) Part 2) (ctm) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
358 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings (Jury Trial) held on February 17, 2004 before Judge Kane. Court Reporter: M. Zamiska. (Attachments: # (1) Part 2) (ctm) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
359 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings (Jury Trial) held on February 18, 2004 before Judge Kane. Court Reporter: M. Zamiska. (Attachments: # (1) Part 2# (2) Part 3) (ctm) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
360 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings (Jury Trial) held on February 19, 2004 before Judge Kane. Court Reporter: M. Zamiska. (Attachments: # (1) Part 2# (2) Part 3) (ctm) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
361 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings (Jury Trial) held on February 20, 2004 before Judge Kane. Court Reporter: M. Zamiska. (Attachments: # (1) Part 2) (ctm) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
362 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings (Jury Trial) held on February 23, 2004 and February 24, 2004 before Judge Kane. Court Reporter: M. Zamiska. (ctm) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
Supplemental Record on Appeal transmitted to US Court of Appeals (Transcript Volumes 1-10) Documents and Docket Sheet available through ECF. The Clerk's Office hereby certifies the record and the docket sheet available through ECF to be the certified list in lieu of the record and/or the certified copy of the docket entries. (ctm) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
363 CONSENT DECREE 351 Settlement Agreement filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, signed by all parties and APPROVED by the Judge. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on April 25, 2005. (sc) (Entered: 04/29/2005)
365 MOTION to Approve the Establishment of the Shaub Trust by all parties. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1 - Declaration of the Shaub Trust# 2 Exhibit(s) 2 Trustee Compensation Schedule)(sc) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
367 UNREDACTED COPY of Document #366 - Order Approving the Petition and Establishing the Shaub Trust. (sc) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
366 ORDER granting the 365 Motion to Approve the Establishment of the Shaub Trust. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on December 22, 2005. (sc) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
368 ORDER of USCA as to 341 Notice of Cross Appeal filed by Marion Shaub and 333 Notice of Appeal filed by Fed Ex Express Corporation granting stipulation by the parties for dismissal of the appeals. (Lopez, Lynn) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
369 ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the 325 Motion for Attorney Fees is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Yvette Kane on March 31, 2006. (sc) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
Pursuant to a telephone call to Martha Sperling, the court's copies of plaintiffs Trial Exhibits may be destroyed/thrown away. Exhibits discarded this date. (sc) (Entered: 04/28/2006)

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 USCA3 Docket Sheet for 05-1418

http://pacer.ca3.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/dktrpt.pl?CASENUM=05-1418&p...

General Docket
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Court of Appeals Docket #: 05-1418

Filed: 2/15/05

Nsuit: 1442 Civil Rights: Jobs

EEOC v. Fed Express Corp

Appeal from: U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Lower court information:

District: 0314-1 : 02-cv-01194 Trial Judge: Yvette Kane, District Judge Court Reporter: Monica L. Zamiska Date Filed: 7/12/02 Date order/judgment: 1/18/05 Date NOA filed: 2/8/05 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Fee status: paid

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Prior cases:

None

Current cases:

Lead

Member

Start

End

Cross-appeal:

05- 1418 05- 1565 2/24/05 3/3/06

Docket as of March 4, 2006 6:03 pm

Page 1

05-1418 EEOC v. Fed Express Corp

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Appellee

Susan R. Oxford FAX 202-663-7090 202-663-4791 [COR NTC gvt] Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1801 L Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20507

v.
FED EXPRESS CORP, a subsidiary of Fed Ex Corporation
Appellant

Jeana M. Littrell FAX 901-434-9279 901-434-8561 [COR NTC ret] Federal Express Corporation 3620 Hacks Cross Road Building B, 3rd Floor Memphis, TN 38125

------------------------MARION SHAUB

Martha Sperling

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Appellee

FAX 215-348-5168 215-348-1666 Suite 101 [COR NTC ret] Silver & Sperling 107 North Broad Street Doylestown, PA 18901
Ralph E. Lamar, IV FAX 610-831-0680 610-831-5181 [COR NTC ret] 141 Spruce Lane Collegeville, PA 19426

Docket as of March 4, 2006 6:03 pm

Page 2

05-1418 EEOC v. Fed Express Corp EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Appellee

v. FED EXPRESS CORP, a subsidiary of Fed Ex Corporation
Appellant

------------------------MARION SHAUB
Appellee

Docket as of March 4, 2006 6:03 pm

Page 3

05-1418 EEOC v. Fed Express Corp

2/15/05

CIVIL CASE DOCKETED. Notice filed by Fed Express Corp. (par) [05-1418]

2/15/05

RECORD available on District Court CM/ECF. (par) [05-1418]

2/17/05

TRANSCRIPT PURCHASE ORDER (Part I), ordering a transcript of the proceedings, filed. (par) [05-1418]

2/17/05

ORDER to Monica L. Zamiska directing transcript, ordered on 2/16/05, to be filed by 3/21/05, filed. (par) [05-1418]

2/22/05

TRANSCRIPT PURCHASE ORDER (Part II) filed by Monica L. Zamiska, filed. (par) [05-1418]

2/23/05

APPEARANCE from Attorney Martha Sperling on behalf of Appellee Marion Shaub, filed. (par) [05-1418]

2/24/05

APPEARANCE from Attorney Ralph E. Lamar on behalf of

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Appellee Marion Shaub, filed. (par) [05-1418]

2/25/05

APPEARANCE from Attorney Jeana M. Littrell on behalf of Appellant Fed Express Corp, filed. (par) [05-1418]

2/25/05

(POSITIVE) DISCLOSURE STATEMENT filed on behalf of Appellant Fed Express Corp. (par) [05-1418]

2/25/05

INFORMATION STATEMENT on behalf of Appellant Fed Express Corp, received. (par) [05-1418]

2/25/05

CONCISE SUMMARY OF CASE on behalf of Appellant Fed Express Corp, received. (par) [05-1418]

3/1/05

APPEARANCE from Attorney Susan R. Oxford on behalf of Appellee EEOC, filed. (par) [05-1418]

3/9/05

TRANSCRIPT PURCHASE ORDER (Appellee, EEOC), ordering a transcript of the proceedings, filed. (par) [05-1418]

3/16/05

ORDER to Monica L. Zamiska directing transcript, ordered on 3/7/05, to be filed by 4/11/05, filed. (par) [05-1418]

3/21/05

TRANSCRIPT PURCHASE ORDER (Part II) filed by Monica L. Zamiska, filed. (par) [05-1418]

3/21/05

MOTION by Court Reporter Monica L. Zamiska for three(3) week extension of time to file transcript, filed. (par) [05-1418]

3/30/05

ORDER (Clerk) granting motion for extension of time to file transcript by Court Reporter, Monica L. Zamiska. The transcript shall be filed on or before 5/2/05, filed. (par)

Docket as of March 4, 2006 6:03 pm

Page 4

05-1418 EEOC v. Fed Express Corp

[05-1418]

4/14/05

TRANSCRIPT PURCHASE ORDER (Part III) notifying transcript by Monica L. Zamiska in 05-1418 filed in D.C., filed. (par) [05-1418]

4/14/05

TRANSCRIPT PURCHASE ORDER (Part III) notifying transcript by Monica L. Zamiska in 05-1418 filed in D.C., filed. (par) [05-1418]

4/22/05

RECORD available on District Court CM/ECF updated on 4/22/05. (par) [05-1418 05-1565]

3/2/06

MOTION by the parties to dismiss pursuant to FRAP 42(b), filed. Certificate of Service 3/1/06. (lml) [05-1418 05-1565]

3/3/06

ORDER (Clerk) granting motion by the parties to dismiss pursuant FRAP 42(b), filed. Procedurally Terminated Without Judicial Action; F.R.A.P. 42. (lml) [05-1418 05-1565]

3/3/06

Certified copy of order to Lower Court. (lml) [05-1418 05-1565]

Docket as of March 4, 2006 6:03 pm

Page 5

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PACER Service Center

Transaction Receipt

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dkt report

Billable Pages: 5

Case Number:
Cost:

eeoc 05-1418 0.40

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 USCA3 Docket Sheet for 05-1565

http://pacer.ca3.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/dktrpt.pl?CASENUM=05-1565&p...

General Docket
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Court of Appeals Docket #: 05-1565

Filed: 2/24/05

Nsuit: 1442 Civil Rights: Jobs

EEOC v. Fed Express Corp

Appeal from: U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Lower court information:

District: 0314-1 : 02-cv-01194 Trial Judge: Yvette Kane, District Judge Date Filed: 7/12/02 Date order/judgment: 1/18/05 Date NOA filed: 2/22/05 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Fee status: paid

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Prior cases:

None

Current cases:

Lead

Member

Start

End

Cross-appeal:

05- 1418 05- 1565 2/24/05 3/3/06

Docket as of March 4, 2006 6:03 pm

Page 1

05-1565 EEOC v. Fed Express Corp

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Appellee

Susan R. Oxford FAX 202-663-7090 202-663-4791 [COR NTC gvt] Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1801 L Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20507

v.
FED EXPRESS CORP, a subsidiary of Fed Ex Corporation
Appellee

Jeana M. Littrell FAX 901-434-9279 901-434-8561 [COR NTC ret] Federal Express Corporation 3620 Hacks Cross Road Building B, 3rd Floor Memphis, TN 38125

-------------------------
MARION SHAUB Appellant

Martha Sperling FAX 215-348-5168

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215-348-1666 Suite 101 [COR NTC ret] Silver & Sperling 107 North Broad Street Doylestown, PA 18901
Ralph E. Lamar, IV FAX 610-831-0680 610-831-5181 [COR NTC ret] 141 Spruce Lane Collegeville, PA 19426

Docket as of March 4, 2006 6:03 pm

Page 2

05-1565 EEOC v. Fed Express Corp EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Appellee

v. FED EXPRESS CORP, a subsidiary of Fed Ex Corporation
Appellee

------------------------MARION SHAUB
Appellant

Docket as of March 4, 2006 6:03 pm

Page 3

05-1565 EEOC v. Fed Express Corp

2/24/05

CIVIL CASE DOCKETED. Notice filed by Marion Shaub. (par) [05-1565]

2/24/05

RECORD available on District Court CM/ECF. (par) [05-1565]

2/28/05

APPEARANCE from Attorney Ralph E. Lamar on behalf of Appellant Marion Shaub, filed. (par) [05-1565]

3/4/05

TRANSCRIPT PURCHASE ORDER (Part I), unnecessary for appeal purposes, filed. (par) [05-1565]

3/4/05

CONCISE SUMMARY OF CASE on behalf of Appellant Marion Shaub, received. (par) [05-1565]

3/4/05

INFORMATION STATEMENT on behalf of Appellant Marion Shaub in 05-1565, received. (par) [05-1565]

3/15/05

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT on behalf of Appellant Marion Shaub, filed. (par) [05-1565]

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3/16/05 3/21/05
3/31/05 4/5/05 4/5/05 4/22/05 3/2/06 3/3/06
3/3/06

APPEARANCE from Attorney Martha Sperling on behalf of Appellant Marion Shaub, filed. (par) [05-1565]
FOLLOW UP LETTER to Jeana M. Littrell, Cynthia A. Locke requesting the following documents: **Appearance Form **Disclosure Statement (par) [05-1565]
APPEARANCE from Attorney Susan R. Oxford on behalf of Appellee EEOC, filed. (par) [05-1565]
APPEARANCE from Attorney Jeana M. Littrell on behalf of Appellee Fed Express Corp, filed. (par) [05-1565]
(POSITIVE) DISCLOSURE STATEMENT filed on behalf of Appellee Fed Express Corp. (par) [05-1565]
RECORD available on District Court CM/ECF updated on 4/22/05. (par) [05-1418 05-1565]
MOTION by the parties to dismiss pursuant to FRAP 42(b), filed. Certificate of Service 3/1/06. (lml) [05-1418 05-1565]
ORDER (Clerk) granting motion by the parties to dismiss pursuant FRAP 42(b), filed. Procedurally Terminated Without Judicial Action; F.R.A.P. 42. (lml) [05-1418 05-1565]
Certified copy of order to Lower Court. (lml) [05-1418 05-1565]

Docket as of March 4, 2006 6:03 pm

Page 4

PACER Service Center

Transaction Receipt

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 Federal Express to Pay over $3.2 Million to Female Truck Driver for Se...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/2-25-04.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE February 25, 2004
For Marion Shaub: Martha Sperling, Esq. (215) 348-1666 and Ralph Lamar, Esq. (610) 831-5181

CONTACT: Jacqueline McNair Regional Attorney (215) 440-2666 Edward McCaffrey Program Analyst (215) 440-2671
TTY: (215) 440-2610

Federal Express to Pay over $3.2 Million to Female Truck Driver for Sex Discrimination, Retaliation
EEOC and Plaintiff's counsel score trial Victory 'for every woman' at Fedex
PHILADELPHIA - A federal jury late yesterday returned a multi-million dollar verdict in favor of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and Marion Shaub of Wrightstown, Pa., in their lawsuit against Memphis, Tenn.-based shipping giant Federal Express Corporation for violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the intentional infliction of emotional distress to Ms. Shaub.
The jury found Federal Express liable for a sex-based hostile work environment and retaliation and awarded Ms. Shaub $391,400 in back pay and front pay, $350,000 in compensatory damages for emotional pain and distress, and $2.5 million dollars in punitive damages.
"I always believed the truth would prevail and it has," said Shaub after the verdict was announced. "This is a victory for every woman who works at Federal Express and those who will work there in the future."
The lawsuit (Case 02-cv-1194, Middle District Pennsylvania) filed in February 2002, alleged that the company violated Title VII when it subjected Shaub, at the time the only female tractor-trailer driver at the company's Middletown facility, to a hostile work environment based on her sex and retaliated against her when she complained about the treatment.
According to the lawsuit, prior to her termination in October 2000, Shaub was constantly subjected to anti-female remarks and threats from male co-workers. EEOC and Shaub further alleged that, after she made numerous complaints about the gender-based hostility in her work environment, her truck brakes were sabotaged and she was refused help with the loading of her truck in retaliation for her complaints.
"This verdict sends employers a loud and clear message that sex discrimination and retaliation are simply unacceptable," said EEOC Philadelphia Regional Attorney Jacqueline McNair. "The EEOC, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court, have consistently pointed out to employers the benefits of adopting and enforcing an effective policy opposing harassment in the workplace. It is the employer's responsibility to demonstrate that such conduct is inappropriate and will not be tolerated."
Private counsel Martha Spurling who, along with attorney Ralph Lamar, joined with EEOC to represent Ms. Shaub's interests in this matter, said: "Ms. Shaub is pleased with this verdict and hopes that she is the last Federal Express worker male or female who has to go through this kind of horrific, perilous ordeal."
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act requires that employers provide each employee a working environment free of harassment based on their race, color, sex, religion or national origin. It also prohibits an employer from taking adverse action against an individual for exercising his or her right to complain about behavior reasonably believed to violate Title VII.
In addition to enforcing Title VII, the EEOC enforces the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which protects workers age 40 and older from discrimination based on age; the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which prohibits sex-based wage discrimination; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits employment discrimination against people with disabilities in the federal sector; Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits employment discrimination against people with disabilities in the private sector and state and local governments; and sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Further information about the Commission is available on the agency's web site at www.eeoc.gov.

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