Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2 04/14/20 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU,

TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

REGINALD

GEORGE,

LIONEL

TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL

PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS

ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO

GARNER,

BRADLEY

WINTERS,

KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES

HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity

as Governor of the State of Louisiana;

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES

LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary

of the Department of Safety and Corrections;

JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as

Medical Director of the Department of Safety

and

Corrections;

LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and

STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity

as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana

Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ENJOINING DEFENDANTS FROM TRANSFERRING COVID-19 CARRIERS TO LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY NOW INTO COURT COME Plaintiffs in the above-captioned matter, through
undersigned counsel, who move this Honorable Court to issue a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) in order to prevent Defendants from continuing the transfer of people who are COVID-19
carriers from state and local facilities across Louisiana to the Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”). In

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direct contravention of public health recommendations and plain common sense, Defendants are implementing a dangerous plan to transfer COVID-19 patients from every part of the State to the remote and notoriously inhumane Camp J at LSP. By crowding large numbers of COVID-19 patients into a facility far removed from hospitals and constitutionally adequate medical care but yet in dangerously close proximity to LSP’s medically vulnerable population, this deadly course of action promises to result in the preventable deaths of dozens—if not hundreds or thousands—of people, including Plaintiffs, putative class members, LSP staff, and people in the community.
As set forth in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of this motion, the evidence indisputably satisfies the four-factor test for a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining Defendants’ “Camp J Plan.” Defendants’ deliberate decision to isolate COVID-19 patients far from crucially needed adequate medical care and in close proximity to medically vulnerable patients at LSP subjects Plaintiffs and the putative class to a substantial and unconstitutional risk of serious harm. That substantial risk is exponentially compounded by pre-existing unconstitutional defects in LSP’s medical system as well as by serious and systemic deficiencies in Defendants’ overall COVID-19 plan. As a result, there can be no serious dispute that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm—and possibly preventable death—absent an immediate injunction. The public interest weighs heavily against a plan that would not only deprive COVID-19 patients with access to necessary medical care but also result in the spread of COVID-19 amongst LSP patients and staff as well as the community at large. And even assuming Defendants’ suffered some de minimis harm from an injunction, such hypothetical harm pales in comparison to the risks to the health and safety of Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court immediately restrain Defendants from transferring patients with COVID-19 to Camp J, and then issue a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer plan once the parties have fully briefed the issue.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that the Court should levy “security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Given that there are no costs or damages associated with the relief Plaintiffs request (simply restraining Defendants from transferring people to LSP), the “proper” amount is zero dollars.
If the Court does determine that a different amount would be proper, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court waive the bond requirement, given the obviousness of the risk to Plaintiffs’ health, their indigence, and the strong public interest involved.1 Furthermore, the requirement of a bond is contrary to the proposition that inadequate resources under no circumstances justify a prison’s deprivation of constitutional rights.2 Consistent with this well-established principle, this Court should not require Plaintiffs, who are indigent, to post a bond in order to protect their constitutional rights.
For the reasons in the attached memorandum, the Court should immediately issue an order temporarily restraining Defendants from transferring inmates with COVID-19 to LSP; and, after a hearing, preliminarily enjoin Defendants from doing so. Counsel for the Plaintiffs, Mercedes Montagnes, will be available by phone at the pleasure of the Court. She has called chambers to provide her cell phone number.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of April, 2020. /s/ Mercedes Montagnes Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287 Jamila Johnson, La. Bar No. 37953 Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415
1 See, e.g., Molton Co v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995) (approving waiver of bond given strength of case and “the strong public interest” involved); Campos v. INS, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (because plaintiffs were indigent and sought to vindicate their constitutional rights, consistent with the public interest, the court did not require a bond). 2 See, e.g., Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 1977) (inadequate resources can never be a justification for depriving an inmate of his constitutional rights).
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The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70117 Telephone: (504) 529-5955 Facsimile: (504) 595-8006 Email: mmontagnes@defendla.org Jared Davidson, La. Bar No. 37093 Southern Poverty Law Center 201 Saint Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone: (504) 486-8982 Facsimile: (504) 486-8947 Email: jared.davidson@splcenter.org Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Mercedes Montagnes, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 14, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system. I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Mercedes Montagnes Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287
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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-1 04/14/20 Page 1 of 30

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU,

TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

REGINALD

GEORGE,

LIONEL

TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL

PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS

ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO

GARNER,

BRADLEY

WINTERS,

KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES

HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity

as Governor of the State of Louisiana;

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES

LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary

of the Department of Safety and Corrections;

JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as

Medical Director of the Department of Safety

and

Corrections;

LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and

STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity

as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana

Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ENJOINING DEFENDANTS FROM
TRANSFERRING COVID-19 CARRIERS TO LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY The COVID-19 pandemic represents an unprecedented threat to the lives of Louisianans,
particularly those in the State’s poorly equipped prison system. At least 884 people have already perished in the State1—amongst the highest mortality rates in the world—and that number will grow
1 Coronavirus, La. Dep’t of Health, http://ldh.la.gov/Coronavirus/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-1 04/14/20 Page 2 of 30
exponentially larger with each passing day. There is no cure for this highly contagious and deadly virus. Instead, social distancing and ready access to adequate medical care are the only reliable methods of protection from the virus’s lethal consequences. While the majority of Louisianans shelter in place and enjoy the benefit of self-determination over their medical care, people in the State’s prisons remain sitting ducks in an increasingly perilous pond created by Defendants’ dangerous COVID-19 response.
In direct contravention of public health recommendations and plain common sense, Defendants are implementing a dangerous plan to transfer COVID-19 patients from every part of the State to the remote and notoriously inhumane Camp J at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”). By crowding large numbers of COVID-19 patients into a facility far removed from hospitals and constitutionally adequate medical care but yet in dangerously close proximity to LSP’s medically vulnerable population, this deadly course of action promises to result in the preventable deaths of dozens—if not hundreds or thousands—of people, including Plaintiffs, putative class members, LSP staff, and people in the community. Further, the very act of transporting confirmed cases of COVID-19 throughout the state creates innumerable unnecessary opportunities for spread.
As set forth below, the evidence indisputably satisfies the four-factor test for a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining Defendants’ “Camp J Plan.” Defendants’ deliberate decision to isolate COVID-19 patients far from crucially needed adequate medical care and in close proximity to medically vulnerable patients at LSP subjects Plaintiffs and the putative class to a substantial and unconstitutional risk of serious harm. That substantial risk is exponentially compounded by preexisting unconstitutional defects in LSP’s medical system as well as by serious and systemic deficiencies in Defendants’ overall COVID-19 plan. As a result, there can be no serious dispute that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm—and possibly preventable death—absent an immediate injunction. The public interest weighs heavily against a plan that would not only deprive COVID-19
2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-1 04/14/20 Page 3 of 30
patients with access to necessary medical care but also result in the spread of COVID-19 amongst
LSP patients and staff as well as the community at large. And even assuming Defendants’ suffered
some de minimis harm from an injunction, such hypothetical harm pales in comparison to the risks to
the health and safety of Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court
immediately restrain Defendants from transferring patients with COVID-19 to Camp J, and then
issue a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer plan once the parties have fully briefed the issue.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. COVID-19 Is a Serious and Deadly Disease That Has Caused a Global Pandemic. COVID-19 is a novel virus for which there is no established curative medical treatment and
no vaccine.2 It can cause pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, respiratory failure, heart
failure, sepsis, and other potentially fatal conditions.3 Lab testing and imaging is required to
appropriately evaluate and provide treatment to patients. One-fifth of all cases cause serious illness,
including respiratory damage that requires hospitalization and mechanical ventilation, and can
permanently harm those who survive.4 Treatment for severe cases of COVID-19 includes
respiratory isolation, oxygen, and mechanical ventilation.5 Symptoms can range from fever, cough,
chest pain, and headache to loss of smell, abdominal pain, rash, diarrhea, aches, and vomiting.6
Severe COVID-19 patients can suffer acute respiratory distress syndrome (“ARDS”), requiring
2 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 2. 3 Fei Zhou et al., Clinical Course and Risk Factors for Mortality of Adult Inpatients with COVID-19 in Wuhan, China: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 395 LANCET 1054 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30566-3/fulltext. 4 “While about 80% of cases manifest as a mild illness (i.e. non-pneumonia or mild pneumonia), approximately 20% progress to a more severe illness, with 6% requiring specialist medical care, including mechanical ventilation.” World Health Organization, Preparedness, Prevention And Control Of COVID-19 In Prisons And Other Places Of Detention: Interim Guidance, 10 (Mar. 15, 2020), http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/434026/Preparedness-prevention-andcontrol-of-COVID-19-in-prisons.pdf?ua=1. 5 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 13. 6 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 7.
3

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admission to an intensive care unit and invasive ventilation.7 The mortality rate for ARDS is 40%.8 The severity and sensation of ARDS for COVID-19 patients is similar to drowning.9
COVID-19 is highly transmissible. Recent estimates by the CDC suggest that, on average in community settings, each infected person transmits the virus to an additional 5.7 additional people.10 Only the influenza pandemic of 1918 is known to have higher infectivity.11 COVID-19 is transmitted by droplets of infected aerosol when people with the infection cough, which can survive in the air for up to three hours—and on surfaces such as plastic and stainless steel for up to 2-3 days.12 COVID-19 can also be transmitted into the air by aerosolized feces when a toilet is flushed.13
Many studies have shown the increased risk for serious complications in patients infected with COVID-19 who also suffer from comorbidities, including common health problems that afflict Plaintiffs like hypertension, diabetes, COPD, and cancer.14 Although advanced age and underlying illnesses or chronic medical conditions increase the risk of serious effects of COVID, younger patients ages 20-54 years old can also have serious complications, including hospital admission, admission to an intensive care unit, invasive ventilation, or death.15

7 Id. at ¶ 19.

8 Lizzie Presser, A Medical Worker Describes Terrifying Lung Failure From COVID-19 — Even in His

Young Patients, PROPUBLICA, (Mar. 21, 2020, 5 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/a-medical-

worker-describes--terrifying-lung-failure-from-covid19-even-in-his-young-patients.

9 Id.; see also Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 20.

10 Id. at ¶ 3.

11 Id.

12 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 6, Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 10.

13 Alexandra Sternlicht, Why You Should Flush with the Lid Down: Experts Warn of Fecal-Oral Transmission

of

COVID-19,

FORBES,

(Apr.

2,

4:59

PM),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandrasternlicht/2020/04/02/why-you-should-flush-with-the-

lid-down-virologist-warns-of-fecal-oral-transmission-of-covid-19/

14 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 19.

15 Id. at ¶ 9.

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People in carceral settings are among the most vulnerable populations for COVID-19 infection.16 It is typically not possible to isolate incarcerated people from the outside world (including from staff and vendors who may have been exposed to COVID-19), nor is it possible to meaningfully isolate them from one another. The transmission of COVID-19 in prisons can be likened to the transmission of TB, where social distancing practices are impossible with incarcerated people living in close quarters and lack of available means to ensure preventative hygiene practices.17 As a result, jails and prisons are known to be a breeding ground for infectious respiratory illness.18 The most vivid current example is the Cook County Jail, which currently has the highest outbreak numbers in the country.19
To reduce the risk of contracting COVID-19, the CDC advises all people—and particularly those at higher risk of severe illness—to “[w]ash your hands often with soap and water,” “[i]f soap and water are not readily available, use a hand sanitizer that contains at least 60% alcohol,” “[a]void close contact with people who are sick,” “[p]ut distance between yourself and other people,” and to “[c]over your mouth and nose with a cloth face cover when around others.” None of these recommended preventive measures is available to people who are incarcerated in Louisiana.20
Moreover, health profiles of incarcerated people show that they are significantly sicker and more vulnerable to COVID-19 than the population at large.21 Many have multiple comorbidities and are at a higher risk of complications, including ARDS.22 LSP has a particularly vulnerable population

16 Id. at ¶ 10.

17 Id.

18 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 8.

19 Timothy Williams & Danielle Ivory, Chicago’s Jail is Top U.S. Hot Spot as Virus Spreads Behind Bars,

NY TIMES, (April 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/us/coronavirus-cook-county-

jail-chicago.html

20 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 10.

21 Peter Wagner & Emily Widra, No need to wait for pandemics: The public health case for criminal justice

reform,

PRISON

POLICY

INITIATIVE,

(March

6,

2020),

https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/03/06/pandemic/

22 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 19.

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with over 50% of people over 50 years of age, many of whom have high risk medical conditions.23 The number of positive COVID-19 cases throughout Louisiana is climbing rapidly and the death rate per capita is the third highest in the country.24
II. The DOC Plans to Manage COVID-19 by Transferring Positive Cases to LSP’s Camp J.
According to the DOC, patients housed in DOC facilities or local parish prisons and jails who test positive for COVID-19 may be transported to LSP’s Camp J for medical isolation. As of April 11, 2020, at least 40 people had been transferred to Camp J.25 The DOC’s transfer plan has expanded swiftly and must be stopped before preventable harm—and even death—cannot be undone.
Kendrick Wilson is in pre-trial detention and was being held at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (“EBRPP”) until April 11, 2020, when the DOC transferred him to Camp J after he was told that he had tested positive for COVID-19.26 The two guards who woke Mr. Wilson to be transported told him that he would be transferred one way or another, whether willingly or unwillingly.27 He stated multiple times that he did not want to be taken to Camp J.28 Mr. Wilson is currently being held at Camp J in an open dorm with approximately 39 other people, none of whom are isolated from one another.29 Mr. Wilson would like to be near a hospital.30
Plaintiff Ernest Rogers is in pretrial detention and was being held at EBRPP.31 He was tested for COVID-19 at around 2 a.m. on April 9 and is suffering from a cough, sore throat, a fever, and
23 Id. at ¶ 11. 24 Id. at ¶ 5. 25 Ex. 3, Wilson Decl. at ¶ 11. 26 Id. at ¶¶ 4, 7, 10. 27 Id. at ¶ 8. 28 Id. 29 Id. at ¶ 11. 30 Id. at ¶¶ 17, 18. 31 Ex. 4, Rogers Decl. at ¶ 4.
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shortness of breath.32 Mr. Rogers is 65 years old and has hepatitis C, liver disease, and high blood pressure.33 The guards have told Mr. Rogers that he will be transferred to Camp J—voluntarily or non-voluntarily—if his test results are positive.34 Mr. Rogers was previously housed at Camp J while incarcerated at LSP in the 1980s, and he does not want to go back.35 Mr. Rogers would like to be held somewhere near a hospital.36
Plaintiff Julius Allen is in pretrial detention and was held at EBRPP.37 Like Mr. Rogers, he was tested for COVID-19 around 2 a.m. on April 9 and is suffering from a fever, severe body aches, difficulty breathing, weakness, disorientation, and diarrhea.38 He has had these symptoms for at least 5-7 days.39 Mr. Allen has several pre-existing medical conditions—diabetes, hypertension, high cholesterol, and a history of bronchitis40—some of which make him more vulnerable to severe symptoms of COVID-19.41 On April 9, Mr. Allen was taken from EBRPP to Our Lady of the Lake hospital in Baton Rouge.42 Medical staff at the hospital told Mr. Allen that there was a “10/10” chance that he was COVID-positive.43 Mr. Allen was sharing a cell with Kendrick Wilson when the guards came to transport Mr. Wilson.44 Mr. Allen watched the guards force Mr. Wilson out of the
32 Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. 33 Id. at ¶ 7. 34 Id. at ¶ 10. 35 Id. 36 Id. at ¶¶ 11-13. 37 Ex. 5, Allen Decl. at ¶ 4. 38 Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. 39 Id. at ¶ 6. 40 Id. at ¶ 7. 41 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 11 (“hypertension and diabetes [are] conditions that render patients vulnerable to severe COVID symptoms”). 42 Ex. 5, Allen Decl. at ¶ 8. 43 Id. 44 Id. at ¶ 10.
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cell and handcuff him when Mr. Wilson said that he did not want to be transferred.45 Mr. Allen
would like to be kept near a hospital.46
III.LSP Is Not Equipped to Treat COVID-19 Patients, and It Is Located Over One Hour’s Drive from a Hospital Capable of Providing Adequate Treatment for LifeThreatening Symptoms
LSP is not equipped to treat COVID-19 symptoms, especially if the symptoms become
severe—which can occur rapidly and unexpectedly. The care required to appropriately evaluate and
provide treatment to patients with COVID-19 includes lab testing, imaging, and treatment
individualized to the presentation of the patient.47 Treatment may require oxygen therapy by nasal
cannula, high flow oxygen masks, and intubation and ventilator assistance.48 Some patients develop
blood clots on the lungs and require anticoagulation.49 Some patients require intravenous fluid
therapy.50 Some patients require vasopressor treatment for low blood pressure, support for kidney
failure, and/or early antibiotics.51 Treatment requires staff that have experience using this equipment
and accurately assessing what is needed.52 The intensity of care and protracted length of care for
COVID-19 cannot be provided at LSP or any of the hospitals within an hour of LSP.53
Even if the DOC does not plan to attempt to treat severe COVID-19 symptoms at LSP,
there is no way to define or predict who will develop severe symptoms in the course of the illness
and require treatment and hospitalization.54 Nor does Camp J have sufficient staffing and equipment
to monitor the COVID-19 positive patients for clinical deterioration, including signs of hypoxia.55 It
45 Id. 46 Id. at ¶¶ 14-16. 47 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 7. 48 Id. 49 Id. 50 Id. 51 Id. at ¶ 16. 52 Id. 53 Id. 54 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 12. 55 Id.
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is critical that patients be within easy transportable distance of hospitals that can provide the
adequate level of care.56 The likelihood of Plaintiff Julius Allen’s symptoms continuing to be severe
and ultimately requiring hospitalization is high; Mr. Allen’s pre-existing medical conditions, including
diabetes, hypertension, and high cholesterol, make him especially vulnerable to COVID-19
complications.57 The likelihood of Plaintiff Ernest Roger’s symptoms continuing to be severe and
ultimately requiring hospitalization is high; Mr. Rogers is 65 years old and has a pre-existing medical
conditions, which makes him especially vulnerable to COVID-19 complications.58 If Plaintiffs’
COVID-19 cases become severe, they will require hospitalization; LSP does not have the medical
equipment or personnel necessary to treat severe COVID-19 symptoms.59
Although DOC has stated that if Plaintiffs’ COVID-19 cases become severe they will be
transported to a hospital, the nearest hospital capable of treating life-threatening COVID-19
symptoms is over one hour’s drive from LSP.60 Ambulance resources will be strained in the area; the
parish where LSP is located has only two ambulances, and ambulance personnel everywhere have
high rates of COVID-19 infection.61 The nearest hospital to LSP, West Feliciana Parish Hospital, is
not a reference hospital, meaning it is not equipped to accept patients who require a higher level of
care, and is not suitable for a patient requiring intubation.62 There are no ventilators at West
Feliciana Hospital.63 A patient requiring intubation would need to be sent to Baton Rouge or New
Orleans, a one-hour hour or three-hour drive from LSP, respectively.64
56 Id. at ¶ 7, 15. 57 Ex. 5, Allen Decl. at ¶ 7; Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl., ¶ 19. 58 Ex. 4, Rogers Decl. at ¶¶ 3, 7; Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl., ¶ 19. 59 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶¶ 7, 14, 16. 60Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. 585 at 7 (“If an offender housed at Camp J begins to exhibit severe symptoms, he will be transport [sic] to an outside hospital. Offenders transferred to Camp J will not be sent to the ATU or the treatment center at LSP.”); Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl., ¶ 16. 61 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 17. 62 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14, 18. 63 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 12. 64 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶¶ 14, 18.
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Equally alarming, symptoms can rapidly worsen, with people who appear to have mild cases quickly developing severe symptoms that require medical intervention and life-saving measures immediately upon arrival to the hospital.65 There are no lab tests that predict the course of a COVID patient’s illness.66 Some patients have adequate oxygen saturation for days and then deteriorate.67 There are no signs or symptoms that can be used to predict clinical deterioration.68 Given the lack of tell-tale signs or a timeline for subsequent deterioration, it is critical that patients who test positive or likely positive (known as persons under investigation) for COVID-19 or have been exposed and show symptoms, be within easy transportable distance of hospitals in the event that more critical care is necessary.69 Yet, the Camp J plan does not account for these dangerous realities.
Even if the DOC intends to provide limited medical care, rather than just provide isolation at Camp J—or changes its plan and provides more robust care—the medical care at LSP has long been unconstitutionally deficient. Physicians are not credentialed appropriately and do not provide medical care in line with national standards.70 Plaintiffs will not receive the medical attention needed to appropriately monitor their COVID-19 there and there are no plans for the DOC to staff Camp J with sufficient medical staff in order to monitor all patients for signs of clinical deterioration.71 Kendrick Wilson observed two nurses per shift caring for him and approximately 39 other COVID19 positive patients in an open dorm.72
65 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶¶ 7, 12. 66 Id. 67 Id. 68 Id. 69 Id. 70 Id. at ¶ 13. 71 Id. at ¶ 7; Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14.
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IV. LSP’s Camp J Is Notoriously Unfit for Housing even Healthy Individuals After more than 40 years as one of the most restrictive housing units within Louisiana’s
prison system, DOC closed Camp J in May 2018.73 At Camp J’s peak, it confined more than 400 individuals being disciplined in solitary cells for more than 23 hours a day.74 Defendant Secretary James LeBlanc himself said of Camp J in 2018, “It’s just not a good place to be.”75 The building is notorious for its lack of ventilation, heating, and cooling; people incarcerated in Camp J were forced out of necessity to “strip naked and lie on the cement floors to keep cool during the long, humid summer days; in the winter, the cells can be frigid.”76 Because Camp J’s buildings do not have proper ventilation, those facilities are extremely inappropriate for housing patients with COVID-19, an illness that causes severe respiratory symptoms. There are ceiling fans to help circulate air, but large fans blowing air are likely to spread aerosolized agents around the facility, making it more likely that staff at Camp J will breathe in contagions.77
V. Defendants’ Camp J Plan Threatens the Lives of LSP’s Medically Vulnerable Population.
It will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the DOC to prevent the spread of COVID-19 at LSP.78 For security purposes the prison has one entrance used by everyone. There is no indication that LSP intends to use a separate entrance for Covid-19 patients. While somewhat isolated on the LSP campus, Camp J is, and DOC has always treated it as, a part of the prison. Defendants’ plan for

72 Ex. 3, Wilson Decl. at ¶¶ 11, 14.

73 Grace Toohey, Angola Closes Its Notorious Camp J, “a Microcosm of a lot of Things that Are Wrong,” THE

ADVOCATE,

(May

13,

2018,

8:01

PM),

https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_b39f1e82-4d84-11e8-

bbc2-1ff70a3227e7.html.

74 Id.

75 Id.

76 Brooke Shelby Biggs, Camp J, Red Hats and the Hole: Inside Angola’s three circles of solitary-confinement

hell, MOTHER JONES, (March 5, 2009), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/03/camp-j-

red-hats-and-hole.

77 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 10.

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preventing staff from transmitting the virus is directly contrary to CDC guidelines. Defendants have
directed employees found to have a fever to be sent home, and then return to work as soon as 24
hours after they are fever-free without the use of fever medication.79 But the CDC recommends
returning to work no less than three days after resolution of the fever—and at least seven days after
symptoms first appeared (or after receiving multiple negative COVID-19 tests).80
LSP poses a particularly high risk of transmission. The CDC recommendations described
above are not possible in LSP.81 The majority of the people incarcerated at LSP live in dormitories
of up to 86 people, where social distancing is functionally impossible, as the distance between beds
is approximately 3 feet.82 Large fans blow air through the units which is likely to spread contagious
agents embedded in aerosol like COVID-19.83 As a result, LSP is an environment that could not be
more contrary to current public health recommendations and the President’s Task Force
recommendations.84 Indeed, LSP has worse living conditions and higher commingling of people
than cruise ships and nursing homes, where COVID-19 is known to easily spread and cause
significant death.85
78 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 11 (“Medical and custody staff are also at risk if they come into contact with infected transferred detainees and are likely to spread infection to the uninfected and vulnerable Angola population, no matter what measures are purportedly taken to isolate Camp J.”). 79 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. No. 580-4 at 31. 80 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 28 n.19; see also CDC, “What to Do If You Are Sick” (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/if-you-are-sick/steps-when-sick.html (under “How to discontinue home isolation”); CDC, “Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities” (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidancecorrectional-detention.html (advising that symptomatic correctional staff should follow the guidance in “What to Do If You Are Sick”). 81 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 7. 82 Id. at ¶ 10. 83 Id. 84 Id. 85 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 10.
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Because LSP houses a very large elderly population with significant chronic illnesses, spread
of the virus among these vulnerable populations would result in high rates of death.86
For example, Plaintiff Daniel Gumns is an LSP prisoner who lives in Falcon 1 dormitory at
Camp D with approximately 80 other people and cannot practice social distancing.87 There are only
four or five communal toilets and sinks for the whole dormitory and they are not cleaned every
day.88 He does not have a face mask, gloves, hand sanitizer, or bleach.89 Two people have been taken
out of his dormitory after developing COVID-19 symptoms, including coughing, fevers, and sore
throats, and Mr. Gumns has not seen them since.90 Mr. Gumns is an epileptic and suffers from
grand mal seizures.91 He has had three seizures since arriving at Angola on February 21, 2020.92 His
last seizure was approximately a week and a half ago.93 He also suffers from asthma, which is
triggered when he has seizures and sometimes leaves him unable to breathe without medical
support.94 Mr. Gumns’ asthma puts him at higher risk for severe illness if he contracts COVID-19.95
Plaintiff Ian Cazenave is an LSP prisoner who lives at Ash 2 dormitory at LSP main prison
with approximately 86 other people and cannot practice social distancing.96 Ash 2 is a dormitory in
part for people who are handicapped or have medical needs.97 There are approximately seven toilets,
five sinks, and five or six showers for the whole dorm.98 Mr. Cazenave has two face coverings made
86 Id. at ¶ 12. 87 Ex. 6, Gumns Decl. at ¶ 6. 88 Id. at 8, 9. 89 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 13. 90 Id. at ¶ 12. 91 Id. at ¶ 14. 92 Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. 93 Id. at ¶ 16. 94 Id. at ¶ 14. 95People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2020) (noting that people who have asthma are at higher risk for severe illness). 96 Ex. 7, Cazenave Decl., ¶ 6. 97 Id. at ¶ 5. 98 Id. at ¶ 8.
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out of t-shirt material but does not have gloves or hand sanitizer.99 The only soap available is the
homemade soap made at LSP.100 Ash 2 has been in lockdown for almost a month, but there are still
medical staff and correctional staff coming in and out of the dormitory.101 Not everyone is wearing
masks.102 Medical and correctional staff are also going back and forth between Camp J and other
places in Angola.103 One person has been taken out of the dormitory after developing COVID-19
symptoms and has not returned.104 Mr. Cazenave has sickle cell disease and a heart murmur.105 As a
result of the sickle cell disease, he has open wounds on his legs and feet that require daily dressing
changes.106 He would normally go to the hospital at LSP for his dressing changes, but now the
nurses are coming to the dorm.107 He asked the nurses if they were also going to Camp J but they
would not tell him.108 Mr. Cazenave is at higher risk for severe illness if he contracts COVID-19 as
respiratory viruses are known to cause severe complications – including higher rates of
hospitalization, acute chest syndrome, and need for mechanical ventilation – for people with sickle
cell disease.109
99 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 12. 100 Id. at ¶ 12. 101 Id. at ¶ 9. 102 Id. 103 Id. at ¶ 10. 104 Id. 105 Id. at ¶ 13. 106 Id. 107 Id. 108 Id. 109 Amy Sobota, COVID-19, Sickle Cell Disease, and a Critical Need, HEALTHCITY, (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.bmc.org/healthcity/population-health/covid-19-sickle-cell-disease-and-critical-need (“When a respiratory illness causes poor oxygenation in areas of the lungs, it causes more sickling, which impedes blood flow, which in turn causes low oxygen levels, which then leads to sickling… and so on. This, combined with the original respiratory infection in a person with sickle cell disease, is called acute chest syndrome, and is one of the leading causes of death in people with SCD.”).
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LEGAL STANDARD In order to obtain a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must establish: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public interest.”110 The Court may issue a temporary restraining order without awaiting for the adverse party’s response if it finds that “immediate and irreparable injury … will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.”111
ARGUMENT
This Court should grant Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order immediately restraining Defendants from transferring patients with COVID-19 to Camp J because Plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury absent emergency relief, and the equities and public interest weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.
I. Plaintiffs Have Established a Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims.
To show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiffs “must present a prima facie case but need not show that [they are] certain to win.”112 Here, however, the evidence indisputably shows that the Camp J plan violates the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs by exposing them to a substantial risk of serious harm in violation of both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
110 Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 595 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 18-cv-23-SDD-EWD, 2018 WL 4701849, at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 30, 2018) (standard for temporary restraining order same as standard for preliminary injunction). 111 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). 112 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, 11A Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.3 (2d ed. 1995); see also Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 595-96 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that plaintiffs are “not required to prove [their] entitlement to summary judgment” to show likelihood of success on the merits).
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To establish their entitlement to injunctive relief, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants
Camp J plan likely constitutes deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.113 This
inquiry consists of both an objective test and a subjective test. The objective test considers whether
Plaintiffs have been “expos[ed] to a substantial risk of serious harm” due to their serious medical
needs.114 The subjective test can be satisfied by showing that prison officials had requisite knowledge
of Plaintiffs’ risk of harm and either disregarded the risk or “fail[ed] to take reasonable measures to
abate it.”115 Here, the evidence plainly shows that Plaintiffs are likely to satisfy both tests and thereby
establish a constitutional violation warranting emergency injunctive relief.
A. Plaintiffs Satisfy the Objective Test Because COVID-19 Poses a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm.
There can be no serious dispute that COVID-19 poses a substantial—and lethal—risk of
harm to Plaintiffs. COVID-19 is a novel, highly infectious and deadly disease without a cure.116 “[I]t
is impossible to predict the course of the illness, who will do well, and who will not.”117 These
113 Here, Plaintiffs consist of people in pre-trial detention and also people who have been convicted of crimes. The Fourteenth Amendment’s “substantive due process” protections apply to medical claims brought by individuals in pre-trial detention, whereas the Eighth Amendment applies to people in prison pursuant to convictions. See Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 648-49 (5th Cir. 1996). However, the Fifth Circuit has held that the same subjective deliberate indifference standard applies to both and, therefore, the analysis infra proceeds pursuant to the Eighth Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” analysis. Id. The pre-trial Plaintiffs note that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hare is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). Following Kingsley, other circuits have held that a more protective “objective” deliberate indifference standard should apply to medical claims of individuals in pre-trial detention. See, e.g., Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 33-36 (2d Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, this Court need not resolve that tension here, because the pre-trial Plaintiffs can easily show that Defendants’ Camp J plan constitutes subjective deliberate indifference for the same reasons that the convicted Plaintiffs can show an Eighth Amendment violation. 114 Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2018). 115 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); see also, e.g., Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1250 (M.D. Ala. 2017) ((“To establish deliberate indifference, plaintiffs must show that defendants had subjective knowledge of the harm or risk of harm, and disregarded it or failed to act reasonably to alleviate it.”) 116 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ ¶ 2, 7; Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶¶ 2-6. 117 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 7.
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already substantial risks of COVID-19 are exponentially compounded for Plaintiffs and the rest of Louisiana’s prison population for numerous reasons including: social distancing is virtually impossible in prisons; the virus’s aerosol transmission promises rampant spread in prisons; the high number of medically vulnerable people in Louisiana’s prisons, especially LSP; and already inadequate medical resources that will be further strained by the virus.118
Plaintiffs themselves face a particularly acute risk as a result of COVID-19. Kendrick Wilson has already tested positive and been transported to Camp J;119 but his former cellmates Plaintiffs Ernest Rogers and Julius Allen are medically vulnerable to complications of the disease given their underlying conditions of age, hepatitis C, diabetes, and hypertension.120 In addition, although Plaintiffs Daniel Gumns and Ian Cazenave have not yet tested positive for COVID-19, the Camp J plan substantially threatens to expose them to COVID-19, because they are currently imprisoned at LSP and also suffer from various medical conditions—including asthma and sickle cell disease121— that make them highly vulnerable to complications and even death from COVID-19. In sum, the evidence easily establishes that Defendants’ Camp J plan threatens Plaintiffs with a substantial risk of serious harm in satisfaction of the Eighth Amendment’s objective test.
B. Plaintiffs Satisfy the Subjective Test for Deliberate Indifference, Because Defendants Are Aware of the Risks of COVID-19 and the Camp J Plan Constitutes a Medically Unreasonable Response to that Risk.
The evidence overwhelmingly shows that Defendants are not only subjectively aware of this substantial risk but also that the Camp J plan constitutes an unreasonable response to the COVID19 pandemic, thereby constituting deliberate indifference. In addition to the risks being obvious,122 there can be no question that Defendants are in fact aware of the significant risk of harm caused by
118 Id. at ¶¶ 10-14, 16-19; Puisis Dec at ¶¶ 13-14, 22. 119 Ex. 3, Wilson Decl. at ¶¶ 8-10. 120 Ex. 4, Rogers Decl. at ¶¶ 3, 7, 9, 11; Ex. 5, Allen Decl. at ¶¶ 7-9, 13. 121 Ex. 6, Gumns Decl. at ¶¶ 14-20; Ex. 7, Cazenave Decl. at ¶¶ 13-17.
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COVID-19.123 Indeed, Governor Edwards has issued a State of Emergency as a result of the
COVID-19 outbreak in Louisiana;124 the Louisiana Department of Health has publicly recognized
the risks of COVID-19 outbreaks in Louisiana’s prisons;125 and DOC Secretary James Le Blanc has
publicly observed that “we are all at risk to the virus” following infections of DOC employees.126
Accordingly, the sole remaining question is whether Defendants’ deliberate decision to isolate all
COVID-19 patients at Angola’s Camp J is a reasonable response. It is not.
The evidence shows that Defendants’ Camp J transfer plan is medically unreasonable,
contrary to public health recommendations, and dangerous both to COVID-19 patients and to other
LSP patients, staff, and the surrounding community.127 For example, in their attached declarations,
Plaintiffs medical experts Mike Puisis128 and Susi Vassallo129 detail the dangers of transferring
COVID-19 patients to a remote prison far removed from hospitals and necessary specialty care.
122 “[A] factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 2004). 123 See Letter to Governor John Bel Edwards re COVID 19 Prevention and Protection in Louisiana Facilities (with CC to, inter alia, DOC Secretary James Le Blanc and DOH Acting Secretary Steve Russo) (Mar. 16, 2020) (detailing COVID-19 risks in Louisiana prisons), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/coalition_letter_to_governor_edwards_re_covid_19_ prevention_and_protection_in_louisiana_facilities.pdf; 124 Office of the Governor, Gov. Edwards Declares Public Health Emergency in Response to COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm/newsroom/detail/2400. 125 LA Department of Health Memo to Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections re COVID-10; recommendations regarding prisons and juvenile detention centers (Apr. 8, 2020). 126 Two DOC employees test positive for COVID-19, KATC3 (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.katc.com/news/covering-louisiana/two-doc-employees-test-positive-for-covid-19. 127 Defendants have actual notice of substantial risks inherent in their plan as counsel for Plaintiffs raised them in a filing last week and Secretary LeBlanc and Dr. Morrison both issued defensive declarations. See Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. 585-1, 585-3. 128 Dr. Puisis is a doctor and expert in correctional medicine with over 35 years of experience. He has managed correctional systems across the country, drafted standards for the provision of correctional medicine, and is the editor of the only textbook on correctional medicine. Dr. Puisis is deeply familiar with medical care at LSP and evaluated the medical care system there between 2016 and 2018 in connection with systemic litigation. See Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 1. 129 Dr. Vassallo is a board-certified emergency room physician and medical toxicologist who works in the emergency room at Bellevue Hospital in New York City. Dr. Vassallo has substantial experience treating patients with COVID-19. She is also deeply familiar with the medical care system
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According to Dr. Vassallo and Dr. Puisis, COVID-19 patients require ready access to hospitals,
particularly because “severe COVID-19 disease is treated only with supportive care including
respiratory isolation, oxygen, and mechanical ventilation as a last resort.”130 Even if COVID-19
patients do not require immediate placement in the ICU, they may still require critical specialists and
specialized treatment not available, such as vasopressor treatment for low blood pressure,
intravenous fluid therapy, support for kidney failure, respiratory therapists, and/or early
antibiotics.131 Yet Camp J is located in a remote and rural area far from such specialized medical
services, and the closest adequate emergency room with numerous ventilators is over an hour away
in Baton Rouge.132 Plaintiffs’ experts’ conclusions in this regard are consistent with the guidance of
Defendant Department of Health, which itself noted that anyone expected to have COVID-19
should be transported to a healthcare facility.133
The evidence also establishes that Defendants’ plan to only transfer COVID-19 patients at
Camp J who are “not displaying serious symptoms”134 is based on fundamental misunderstandings
of COVID-19 and how it operates. As Dr. Vassallo notes, the DOC’s plan provides “no
information or medical criteria on how to identify patients as meeting that definition. In fact, at this
at LSP, and evaluated the medical care system there between 2016 and 2018 in connection with systemic litigation. See Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶¶ 1, 7, 11-14. 130 Ex. 1, Pusis Decl. at ¶ 13; Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶¶ 7, 16. 131 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 16. 132 Id. at ¶ 12; Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 20. 133 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 11. 134 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. 585 at 7 (“If an offender housed at Camp J begins to exhibit severe symptoms, he will be transport [sic] to an outside hospital. Offenders transferred to Camp J will not be sent to the ATU or the treatment center at LSP.”). Further, to the extent Defendants may contend that the majority of COVID-19 patients transported to Camp J will be young and healthy, this action is also medically unreasonable. As Dr. Vassallo notes, “the relatively young and healthy are also in the intensive care units and die. . . . [I]ncreasing evidence in the US has shown the dire risk that COVID-19 poses to younger patients. Young patients ages 20-54 years old can have serious complications from COVID-19 including hospital admission, admission to an intensive care unit, invasive ventilation, or death.” Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 9.
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time, there is no way to define who will do well and who will do poorly.”135 Moreover, this policy
wholly ignores that COVID-19 patients “can deteriorate very rapidly”136 and it is impossible to
“determine whether patients will abruptly need escalated medical care requiring hospitalization.”137
As Dr. Vassallo explains, “[g]iven the lack of tell-tale signs or a timeline for subsequent
deterioration, it is absolutely critical and necessary that patients who test positive or likely positive . .
. for COVID-19 or have been exposed and show symptoms, be within easy transportable distance of
hospitals in the event that more critical care is necessary.”138 Further, by crowding large numbers of
COVID-19 patients into a packed facility, Defendants’ plan substantially increases the likelihood
that COVID-19 patients at Camp J will have higher viral loads and thereby develop more serious
symptoms, thus requiring access to faraway hospitals.139 Making matters worse, in addition to the
long distance to adequate hospitals from Camp J, scarcities in access to ambulance services will make
transfer to faraway hospitals even more difficult—if not impossible.140
The evidence also shows that Camp J most lacks sufficient, qualified and competent medical
staff to provide necessary care to COVID19 patients. A “robust” number of medical staff are
needed to appropriately treat COVID-19.141 Yet, Angola has a history of insufficient medical staffing
and there is nothing in Defendants’ plans reflecting increased staffing.142 As Dr. Puisis notes, “[i]t is
not clear from a practical matter how they would provide sufficient medical personnel at Camp J,
who would have no contact with patients at the rest of LSP, without further diminishing the capacity
135 Vassallo Dec at ¶ 12. 136 Id. at ¶ 7. 137 Id. at ¶ 15. 138 Id. at ¶ 7. 139 James D. Walsh, Is ‘Viral Load’ Why Some People Get a Mild Case of COVID-19?, NY MAG (Mar. 27, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/03/is-viral-load-key-to-understandingcoronaviruss-severity.html. 140 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 17; see also Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 13 (“getting a patient to a hospital from LSP will be challenging under current circumstances.”). 141 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 20. 142 Id. at ¶ 11; Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14.
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of the already over-taxed LSP doctors and nurses.”143 In addition, LSP medical staff are not qualified or equipped to manage patients needing hospital-level care.144 Relatedly, the evidence also shows that LSP medical staff would be unable to consistently determine when patients are medically decompensating as a result of COVID-19; in fact, both Dr. Vassallo and Dr. Puisis previously observed LSP staff failing to recognize typical signs of respiratory decompensation and other “red flags”, which is critical for COVID-19 patients.145 These defects are ever further exacerbated by Defendants’ failure to adequately provide guidance when hospitalization of COVID-19 patients is warranted.146
The evidence further establishes that the present conditions at Camp J make it no place for the transfer of people with a highly infectious and deadly disease. The state’s plan and affidavits do not lay out adequate protocols for medical isolation of Camp J from the rest of LSP’s population, the majority of whom are elderly or otherwise at high risk because of their medical conditions.147 The state’s plan and affidavits also do not describe who will provide medical care for the population expected to be housed at Camp J; whether and how workers serving the population at Camp J will be separate from workers serving the remainder of the prison; what clinical monitoring will be provided; whether and how these known COVID-19 patients will receive hospital care if necessary; and where they will find medical staff and providers to care for the patients.148 Kendrick Wilson is being housed on an open dorm with approximately 39 other people who have tested positive for COVID-19, many of whom are coughing and some of whom have or had required fluid therapy or
143 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 19. 144 Id. at ¶ 13. 145 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 13; Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14. 146 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 18. 147 Id. at ¶ 14. 148 Id. at ¶P 15-20.
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oxygen.149 There are only two nurses per shift and a nurse checks on him approximately twice a
day.150 He has not seen any doctors or observed anyone being taken to the hospital.151
Although the evidence summarized above is alone sufficient to demonstrate that the Camp J
plan is medically unreasonable, the dangers of that plan are exponentially compounded by
indisputable evidence showing systemic and unconstitutional inadequacies in LSP’s overall medical
care, which would be treating COVID-19 patients. As detailed in their declarations, Dr. Vassallo and
Dr. Puisis have both comprehensively examined the medical care system at LSP and found it to be
wholly inadequate. Dr. Puisis summarizes some of these inadequacies as follows:
Physicians were not credentialed appropriately and did not perform consistent with existing standards of care. On record reviews, we noted failure to recognize indications for hospitalization which is critical in the COVID-19 population. There was failure to recognize typical signs of respiratory decompensation which is also critical for COVID-19 patients. There were delays in transfer of patients to a hospital when indicated. Both physicians and other staff (nurses and emergency medical technicians) failed to recognize “red flag” signs resulting in adverse events. Also, LSP is not set up to manage acutely ill patients.152 Consistent with these assessments of LSP’s inadequate medical system, this Court recently observed
that medical care at LSP is “unconstitutional in some respects.”153 Yet, Defendants are knowingly and
unreasonably placing additional strains on LSP’s already broken medical system by transferring
COVID-19 patients who require significant and complex levels of care. This dangerous course of
conduct will inevitably threaten the lives of not only COVID-19 patients but also of other people
149 Ex. 3, Wilson Decl. at ¶ 11. 150 Id. at ¶ 14. 151 Id. at ¶¶ 11, 14. 152 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14; see also Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶¶ 13-14. 153 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Docket No. 578 (Feb. 21, 2020 order directing parties to meet and confer).
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imprisoned at LSP, who were already suffering as a result of LSP’s constitutionally inadequate
medical system.154
In addition, the evidence further establishes the medical unreasonableness of Defendants’
Camp J plan given that the plan substantially threatens the health of LSP’s population—especially
medically vulnerable people. “[C]orrectional officials have an affirmative obligation to protect
inmates from infectious disease.”155 The Eighth Amendment “require[s] a remedy” where their
jailors knowingly expose them to a risk of contracting serious infectious diseases, even if “it was not
alleged that the likely harm would occur immediately and even though the possible infection might
not affect all of those exposed.”156 Here, the evidence shows that Defendants have failed to lay out
adequate protocols to ensure that COVID-19 is not transmitted from Camp J to the rest of LSP’s
population.157 Nor could they given the high likelihood that staff will intermingle between
facilities,158 and also that LSP has only a single entry which could serve as vector point even in the
unlikely event of separate staffing.159 The risk of further spreading COVID-19 at LSP is especially
dangerous to LSP’s medically vulnerable population.160 As Dr. Puisis explains, “LSP has a
particularly vulnerable population with over 50% of inmates over 50 years of age and many
vulnerable persons with high risk medical conditions.”161 As a result, increased spread of COVID-19
via the Camp J plan “would result in high rates of death” for LSP patients.162 Plaintiffs Daniel
Gumns and Ian Cazenave are currently imprisoned at LSP and suffer from various medical
154 See Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975) (finding that when systematic deficiencies in staffing, facilities or procedures make unnecessary suffering inevitable, a court will not hesitate to use its injunctive powers). 155 Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996). 156 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). 157 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 20; Ex. 2, Vassalo Decl. at ¶ 11. 158 Ex. 7, Cazenave Decl. at ¶ 10. 159 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. ¶ 11. 160 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶¶ 12, 14. 161 Id. at ¶ 14; see also Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 11. 162 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 12.
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conditions—including asthma and sickle cell disease163—that make them highly vulnerable to
complications and even death from COVID-19.164 Mr. Gumns and Mr. Cazenave are concerned that
transferring COVID-19 patients to Camp J will increase their risk of exposure.165 The Fifth Circuit
has repeatedly recognized that unreasonably subjecting detained people to infectious diseases
constitutes deliberate indifference.166
Finally, as the evidence makes clear, this is not a situation where Defendants have chosen a
medically reasonable alternative with which Plaintiffs merely disagree.167 Rather, the evidence
summarized supra and the attached declarations indisputably show that the Camp J plan is medically
unsound and poses a grave danger to Plaintiffs and the putative Class. Nor is this a situation where
there are simply no better precautionary measures that can be taken by the State. The State has taken
significant—and unprecedented—measures to ensure adequate treatment of people who are not
incarcerated—for example, by repurposing the New Orleans Convention Center168 and hotels169
into field hospitals in proximity to actual hospitals with ICUs. And yet, it is incarcerated people to
163 Ex. 6, Gumns Decl. at ¶¶ 14-20; Ex. 7, Cazenave Decl. at ¶¶ 13-17. 164 See People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2020). 165 FN 165: Ex. 6, Gumns Decl. at ¶¶ 11, 14-20; Ex. 7, Cazenave Decl. at ¶¶ 9-10, 17. 166 See, e.g., Gomez v. Warner, 39 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (prisoner alleged deliberate indifference by prison officials where the prison’s razor-swapping program created the mere “risk” of “possible spread” in the transmission of deadly “infectious diseases such as HIV, AIDS, and hepatitis.”); Johnson v. Epps, 479 F. App’x 583, 589-92 (5th Cir. 2012) (allegations that inmate was exposed to “serious, communicable diseases” and that prison officials were aware of the risk and did nothing to prevent it were sufficient to state a claim for violation of Eighth Amendment rights); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300-03 (5th Cir. 1974) (affirming district court’s holding that allowing “[s]ome inmates with serious contagious diseases . . . to mingle with the general prison population,” alongside maintaining a host of other unsanitary and inhumane conditions, “constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment”). 167 Compare Thompson v. Basse, 202 F. App’x 654 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpub.). 168 Josh Roberson, TODAY: New Orleans Convention Center accepting COVID-19 patients, FOX8 (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.fox8live.com/2020/04/06/today-new-orleans-convention-center-acceptingcovid-patients/.
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whom the State owes an affirmative constitutional obligation to provide adequate care during this COVID-19 pandemic.170 Therefore, as the evidence shows, the Camp J plan represents yet another dark chapter in the State’s long history of failing to fulfill that constitutional obligations to incarcerated people.171 Indeed, rather than providing a medically necessary and reasonable response to this crisis, Defendants are simply shipping COVID-19 patients to a remote out-camp—far removed from adequate and necessary medical care—as though they are mere afterthoughts or inconveniences in this deadly pandemic. For all these reasons, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their constitutional claims that Defendants’ conduct constitutes deliberate indifference.
II. Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Injury Absent an Emergency Injunction. The evidence also establishes that Plaintiffs and putative class members will suffer
irreparable injury—including severe infections, serious medical complications and even death— unless this court enjoins the Camp J plan. As detailed above, Defendants’ Camp J plan will result in COVID-19 patients being shipped to a remote facility far from necessary hospitals and adequate medical care for this deadly disease. In addition to threatening the lives of COVID-19 patients, the Camp J plan also threatens the health and safety of LSP’s medically vulnerable population. Plaintiffs need not await severe infections, complications or even outright denial of medical care in order to obtain an injunction. As the Supreme Court has long recognized, “[i]t would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the
169 Sheraton New Orleans to be used as coronavirus field hospital, report says, WWLTV (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.wwltv.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/sheraton-new-orleans-to-be-used-ascoronavirus-field-hospital/289-e1a61b70-d597-478d-96a7-1b2d07fb565d. 170 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (Incarcerated people “must rely on prison authorities to treat [their] medical needs” because “if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.”). 171 See generally Lynn v. Williams, 92-cv-001 (M.D. La.)
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ground that nothing yet had happened to them. . . . [A] remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event.”172
Nor can there be any question that the threatened harm is irreparable. Likely hundreds of putative Class members have risk factors making death or severe illness likely if they contract COVID-19. “It goes without saying that . . . death is an irreparable injury.”173 Even for those who recover—a touch-and-go proposition, given the demonstrated seriousness and spread of COVID19, particularly for vulnerable populations—the extreme suffering that they may experience during their illness and the possibility of long-term respiratory impairment could not be erased.
For these reasons, the evidence firmly establishes that the Camp J plan threatens Plaintiffs and the putative class with irreparable harm. An immediate injunction is the only way to abate that substantial and life-threatening risk.
III.The Equities and Public Interest Clearly Favor Plaintiffs. The third and fourth TRO factors, “harm to the opposing party and weighing the public
interest …[,] merge when the Government is the opposing party.”174 Here, those factors weigh heavily in favor of granting relief.
As an initial matter, the requested injunction would protect Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and “[i]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.”175 Because “confidence in the humane application of
172 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993); see also Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 2004) (“It is also important to note that [an] inmate need not show that death or serious illness has [already] occurred.”) 173 East v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of La., No. 14-cv-115-BAJ-RLB, 2014 WL 8332136, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 24, 2014); accord, e.g., Turner v. Epps, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1028 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (describing death as “the single most irreparable harm of all”). 174 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 175 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 458 n.9 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012)); accord, e.g., June Medical Servs., LLC v. Caldwell, No. 14cv-525-JWD-RLB, 2014 WL 4296679, at *8 (M.D. La. Aug. 31, 2014).
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the governing laws of the State must be in the public’s interest,”176 there is a clear public interest in
preventing Defendants from exposing Plaintiffs and putative class members to cruel and unusual
punishment in the form of inadequate medical care and willful exposure to a serious risk of severe
harm.
In addition to the public interest in protecting Plaintiffs and putative class members
themselves, minimizing risk of transmission of COVID-19 is inarguably in the public interest. As
already explained, the transfer plan is likely to spread COVID-19 to the staff of LSP and then to the
broader West Feliciana and central Louisiana community.177 “[A] COVID-19 outbreak at a detention
facility could quickly overwhelm” not only the facility’s medical system, but “surrounding
community hospitals” as well.178 The resulting effect on “public health and safety” would plainly
harm the public interest.179 Indeed, courts across the country have recognized the significant threat
to public safety that outbreaks in detention centers pose.180
By contrast, there is no substantial harm to Defendants in enjoining the transfer plan.
Defendants can have no interest in implementation of a plan that will expose not only Plaintiffs and
putative class members but hundreds of their own staff to COVID-19 as well as the public at large.
Moreover, Defendants have other, safer options than transferring persons with COVID-19 to a
176 Harris v. Johnson, 323 F. Supp. 2d 797, 810 (S.D. Tex. 2004). 177 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 18. 178 Coronel v. Decker, No. 20-cv-2472 AJN, 2020 WL 1487274, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2020). 179 Id. 180 See, e.g., Mays v. Thomas, 20-cv-2134, Dkt. No. 47 (N.D. Ill. April 9, 2020) (finding that “the interest of the public in containing the further spread of this highly contagious virus also favors granting relief to the plaintiffs”); Francisco Hernandez v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-617-TJH, Dkt. No. 17 (C.D. Cal., Apr. 1, 2020); Fraihat v. Wolf, No. 20-CV-590 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2020) (noting risk of asymptomatic spread and unsafe conditions in immigration detention mean "[t]he balance of equities tip sharply in [Fraihat's] favor" and thus ordering release); Thakker v. Doll, No. 1:20-cv-480-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2020) (granting TRO releasing high-risk immigration detainees from custody due to the dangers of COVID-19); Basank v. Decker, No. 20-cv-2518, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2020) (finding "[t]he nature of detention facilities makes exposure and spread of the [coronavirus] particularly harmful" so granting TRO and releasing high-risk plaintiffs); Castillo v. Barr, No. 20-cv-605-TJH-
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prison distinctly ill-suited to house and treat them, and to prevent transmission.181 And even if there were some harm to Defendants, it would be greatly outweighed by the catastrophic risk to Class members.
IV. The Court Should Immediately Enter a Temporary Restraining Order While It Adjudicates This Motion
Defendants have already begun transferring people with COVID-19 to LSP,182 threatening the lives of not only COVID-19 patients but also other LSP patients, staff and community members. Even on an expedited briefing schedule, by the time the Court can receive full briefing and hold a preliminary injunction hearing, Defendants’ Camp J plan may result in substantial spread of the virus at LSP and also severe infections, complications, and even death for Plaintiffs and putative class members. For this reason, “[a] hearing weeks from now may be no relief at all.”183
Plaintiffs are prepared to proceed to a preliminary injunction hearing as soon as Defendants and the Court are able. But in the interim, a temporary restraining order is the only way to ensure that Defendants’ dangerous plan does not threaten the lives of Plaintiffs and the putative class prior to a hearing.
V. The Court Should Waive the Security Bond. Plaintiffs also request that the Court exercise its broad discretion to waive any security bond
for issuance of the TRO. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that “[t]he court may issue a preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been
AFM, Dkt. No. 32 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2020); Ronal Umana Jovel v. Decker, 12-cv-308-GBD, Dkt. No. 27 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2020). 181 See Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶¶ 21-29; see also Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶¶ 1-8 (under “My recommendations for the DOC to mitigate the spread of the coronavirus among Louisiana’s incarcerated population are”); supra n.169. 182See Ex. 3, Wilson Decl. at ¶ 8-11. 183 Coronel, 2020 WL 1487274, at *7.
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wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” However, “[t]he amount of security required is a matter for the
discretion of the trial court; it may elect to require no security at all.”184
Here, Plaintiffs are incarcerated individuals who are seeking to vindicate their constitutional
rights. Furthermore, the requirement of a bond is contrary to the proposition that inadequate
resources under no circumstances justify a prison’s deprivation of constitutional rights.185 Under
these circumstances, waiver of the security bond is proper, and Plaintiffs therefore respectfully
request that the Court exercise its broad discretion to do so.186
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court immediately issue an order
temporarily restraining Defendants from transferring Plaintiffs and any patients with COVID-19 to
Camp J; and, after a hearing, preliminarily enjoin Defendants from doing so.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of April, 2020.
/s/ Mercedes Montagnes
Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287 Jamila Johnson, La. Bar No. 37953 Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415 The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70117 Telephone: (504) 529-5955 Facsimile: (504) 595-8006 Email: mmontagnes@defendla.org
Jared Davidson, La. Bar No. 37093
184 Corrigan Dispatch Co. v. Casa Guzman, S. A., 569 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). 185 See, e.g., Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 1977) (inadequate resources can never be a justification for depriving an inmate of his constitutional rights). See Ex. 7, Cazenave Decl. at ¶ 4 (declaring indigency); Ex. 6, Gumns Decl. at ¶ 4 (declaring indigency). 186 See, e.g., Molton Co v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995) (approving waiver of bond given strength of case and “the strong public interest” involved); Campos v. INS, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (because plaintiffs were indigent and sought to vindicate their constitutional rights, consistent with the public interest, the court did not require a bond).
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Southern Poverty Law Center 201 Saint Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone: (504) 486-8982 Facsimile: (504) 486-8947 Email: jared.davidson@splcenter.org Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Mercedes Montagnes, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 14, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system. I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Mercedes Montagnes Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287
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 Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-2 04/14/20 Page 1 of 10
DECLARATION OF DR. MICHAEL PUISIS CONCERNING THE RISK OF THE SPREAD OF COVID-19 IN THE LOUISIANA STATE PRISON (LSP) AT ANGOLA
1. Dr. Michael Puisis is an internist who has worked in correctional medicine for 35 years. He began working at the Cook County Jail as a physician in 1985 and became the Medical Director of Cook County Jail from 1991 to 1996 and Chief Operating Officer for the medical program at the Cook County Jail from 2009 to 2012. He has worked in and managed correctional medical programs in multiple state prisons including in Illinois and New Mexico. He has worked as a Monitor or Expert for Federal Courts on multiple cases and has worked as a Correctional Medical Expert for the Department of Justice on multiple cases. He has also participated in revisions of national standards for medical care for the National Commission on Correctional Health Care and for the American Public Health Association. He also participated in revision of tuberculosis standards for the Center for Disease Control. Dr. Puisis has edited the only textbook on correctional medicine, Clinical Practice in Correctional Medicine. Dr. Puisis evaluated the Louisiana State Prison at Angola for The Promise of Justice Initiative in 2016 (and also conducted records review in 2018) and previously monitored Louisiana State Prison at Angola for the Department of Justice.
2. Coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) is a viral pandemic. This is a novel virus for which there is no established curative medical treatment and no vaccine.
3. The number of cases of COVID-19 in the United States are rising rapidly. On April 13, 2020, Johns Hopkins reported that there were 572,587 reported COVID-19 infections in the U.S. The number of deaths is over 23,000 but both cases and deaths are rising rapidly so by the time this declaration is read the numbers of both cases and deaths will be significantly larger. The number of cases of COVID-19 is the highest number of reported cases of any country in the world.
4. Louisiana has a rapidly accelerating rate of COVID-19 infections. A study from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette reported that COVID-19 cases grew at a 67.8% rate, the highest rate in the U.S.1 The Louisiana Department of Health reported on April 13, 2020 that there were 21,016 cases of COVID-19 with 884 deaths. Louisiana has the third most deaths per capita of any state in the U.S.
5. UpToDate2 reports an overall case mortality rate from the disease of 2.3. Louisiana has 884 deaths for 21,016 cases; more than 4.2% of persons diagnosed with the infection in Louisiana die.
1 Coronavirus cases grew faster in Louisiana than anywhere else in the world: UL study, The Acadiana Advocate, Adam Daigle March 24, 2020, https://www.theadvocate.com/acadiana/news/coronavirus/article_94494420-6d4b-11ea-ac42ff7dd722c084.html. 2 UpToDate is an online medical reference widely used in hospitals, health organizations, and private physicians.
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6. COVID-19 is transmitted by droplets of infected aerosol when people with the infection cough. Droplets of respiratory secretions infected with the virus can survive as an aerosol for up to three hours.3 4 Droplets can be directly transmitted by inhalation to other individuals in close proximity. Droplets can land on surfaces and be picked up by the hands of another person who can then become infected by contacting a mucous membrane (eyes, mouth, or nose) with their hand. Infected droplets can remain viable on surfaces for variable lengths of time, ranging from up to 3 hours on copper, 24 hours on cardboard, and 2-3 days on plastic and stainless steel.5
7. Medical care for COVID-19 focuses on prevention, which emphasizes social distancing, handwashing, and respiratory hygiene. The current CDC recommendations for social distancing and frequent handwashing measures, which are the only measures available to protect against infection, are not possible in LSP. Furthermore, repeated sanitation of horizontal and touch surfaces in inmate living units and throughout LSP is not typically done based on our review and would be an overwhelming task. LSP has worse living conditions and higher comingling of people than cruise ships and nursing homes, where COVID-19 is known to have easily spread. Prevention of contact with an infected droplet is significantly more difficult in a prison than in the community.
8. With respect to transmission of disease by droplet inhalation, correctional environments, including LSP, actually promote spread of respiratory contagious disease. Jails and prisons are long known to be a breeding ground for infectious respiratory illness. Tuberculosis is a bacteria which is significantly less transmissible than COVID-19 yet has been responsible for numerous outbreaks of illness in prisons and jails over the years. Respiratory infectious disease like TB are thought to be made worse in prisons because of crowding and recirculated air. Because of transmissibility of TB in prisons the CDC still recommends screening for this condition in prisons. Proper screening for tuberculosis can control that disease in prison populations.
9. The COVID-19 virus is a different type of respiratory illness; its spread is rapid and it is more easily transmissible. Control through screening with a test as is done for TB in prisons would be optimal but current CDC guidance6 does not recommend a test as a screening method. Likely, this is due to a critical shortage of testing material. The method of control in an intake of a correctional facility is quarantine for up to 14 days.7 If testing material
3 National Institute of Health, available at https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/newcoronavirus-stable-hours-surfaces 4 Neeltje van Doremalen and Others, Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared with SARS-CoV-1, Correspondence in New England Journal of Medicine, March 17, 2020, https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc2004973?cid=DM88773_&bid=171021451 5 Id. 6 Evaluating and Testing Persons for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Centers for Disease Control as found at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/hcp/clinical-criteria.html 7 In their Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities guidance the CDC recommends “If possible, consider quarantining all new intakes for 14 days before they enter the facility’s general population
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becomes readily available, I would recommend testing and a quarantine until the test is complete.
10. Jails and prisons promote spread of respiratory illnesses because of crowded congregate housing arrangements. LSP is the largest maximum security prison in the U. S. and has a population of approximately 6000 individuals. The main unit of LSP contains 32 dormitories. The remote camps C and D have a combination of dormitories and cellblocks. Camp F is a minimum dormitory. I have visited multiple inmate dormitories. All dormitories I visited were filled to capacity and were crowded. The dormitories are not arranged to provide social distancing as the distance between beds is approximately 3 feet. Large fans blow air through the units which is likely to spread contagious agents embedded in aerosol like COVID-19. Washing areas are shared. There is no privacy and it is not possible to remain 6 feet apart as recommended. Infirmary beds are in dormitory style setting and are close together. If inmates with COVID-19 are housed on the infirmary rather than outside hospitals, the infection is likely to spread throughout this unit of compromised patients. Photos in our prior 2016 report8 show what some of these dormitories and showers look like.9 Notable in these pictures is that soap is not consistently present on sinks used by staff and in showers used by inmates. Currently the President’s Task Force on COVID-19 recommends limiting gatherings to no more than 10 persons. Inmates at LSP live in large dormitories with over 80 persons per dormitory. These dormitories are incapable of allowing inmates to follow current CDC recommendations regarding prevention against COVID-19. Officers guarding the inmates can carry the infection into the prison. One couldn’t devise a system more contrary to current public health recommendations and the President’s Task Force recommendations than a prison like LSP. The elderly and those with significant medical conditions are housed together in some of these dormitories creating a nursing home like environment; environments where COVID-19 is known to have rapidly spread. Dormitories with large numbers of persons with severe medical conditions are similar to nursing homes where COVID is known to have caused significant death.
11. There is a lack of information about what is occurring within LSP and testing is not being widely performed. A bullet point summary of the LSP COVID-19 plan states that “any LSP offender presenting with symptoms is given both a flu test and COVID-19 test.” A news report on March 26, 2020 stated that two employees at different state prisons tested positive for COVID-19 but that no inmates have tested positive. The newspaper reported that only 32 inmates in the entire Louisiana Department of Corrections have been tested and all have tested negative. On April 13, 2020, the Louisiana Department of Corrections reported that
(SEPARATELY from other individuals who are quarantined due to contact with a COVID-19 case). As found at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correctiondetention/guidance-correctional-detention.html 8 Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola; Health Care Evaluation Submitted October 3, 2016; Lewis et al v. Cain et al Class Action Complaint. United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana. Case No. 3:15-cv-00318-BAJ-RLB Document 133-1 10/14/16 9 Photos PX006.0279, PX006.0280, PX006.0277
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57 inmates in DOC custody and 45 staff members across the DOC had tested positive. One staff member at LSP had died. Currently, transfers into LSP have been suspended absent extenuating circumstances and if an inmate is transferred into LSP, they are supposed to be quarantined for a 14-day period. LSP screens visitors and new inmates with symptom screening and a temperature. These measures are consistent with recommendations of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) correctional guidelines.10 However, based on our review of this facility in 2018, we noted ineffective medical care with several unqualified physicians, insufficient nurse staff, no infection control nurse, and lack of supervision of front line medical staff. While CDC procedures are in place I question the ability to effectively carry out the procedures as stated.
12. An individual’s immune system is the primary defense against this infection. As a result, people over age 65 years of age and persons with impaired immunity may have a higher probability of death if they are infected. Age related risk is a result of impaired immunity with aging. The older a person is the greater the apparent risk. In LSP 90% of inmates are incarcerated for life and approximately 50% of inmates are over age 50. People on immunosuppressive medication, with diseases causing impaired immunity, or with significant cardiac or pulmonary medical conditions also are at increased risk of death. It has recently been reported that younger patients with cardiovascular disease or hypertension may have unappreciated risk for severe disease.11 This has significant implications for correctional facilities with high rates of hypertension. Persons with severe mental illness in prisons are also, in my opinion, at increased risk of acquiring and transmitting infection because they are unable to understand social distancing and hand hygiene and may be unable to communicate symptoms appropriately. Also, by classification, like other prison systems, LSP houses inmates who are elderly, have disabilities, are mentally ill or have severe chronic illness profiles in specific housing areas, making this population at great risk if one of them becomes infected. Because LSP has a very large elderly population with significant chronic illness spread of infection in LSP would result in high rates of death.
13. Based on our review of care at LSP through 2018, inmates lacked access to hospital care under ordinary circumstances; the COVID-19 pandemic will only make that worse. Currently, severe COVID-19 disease is treated only with supportive care including respiratory isolation, oxygen, and mechanical ventilation as a last resort. LSP is a remote prison which is also remote from hospitals. There are reports that Louisiana’s hospitals could be overwhelmed by COVID-19 cases.12 The reports of possible lack of hospital beds
10 Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention posted March 23, 2020 as found at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidancecorrectional-detention.html 11 ACE2 is the SARS-CoV-2 Receptor Required for Cell Entry, Summary, New England Journal of Medicine, March 18, 2020 Review of article of Hoffman, M et al in Cell 2020 Mar 5 12 Louisiana’s hospitals could be overwhelmed by COVID-19 virus in all but best scenario; Daily Adviser March 26, 2020 as found at
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would place LSP inmates in a dire predicament.13 Also, LSP is not set up to manage hospital level care including managing patients on ventilators. The infirmary is a dormitory and housing a COVID-19 patient on this unit would result in spread to other uninfected but medically compromised patients. There is therefore no place to treat an ill person with COVID-19 except in a general housing unit or on the infirmary, both of which would expose other patients to infection. The existing staff at LSP could not manage any hospitallevel patient and getting a patient to a hospital from LSP will be challenging under current circumstances. This will invariably place inmates at risk of death.
14. The state is proposing transferring detained individuals with COVID-19 from the state’s numerous jails to Angola. This would entail transportation of COVID-19 infected detainees to Angola for housing. It is my opinion that transferring detainees from jails to LSP for medical isolation and clinical management is not a good idea for multiple reasons. First, because the process for transporting COVID positive cases to a parish and a prison without cases—or with few cases—would increase the risk of transmission of positive cases to a location without cases or few cases, thereby increasing risk of spread including to West Feliciana Parish and the surrounding communities. Second, LSP has a particularly vulnerable population with over 50% of inmates over 50 years of age and many vulnerable persons with high risk medical conditions. Staffing deficiencies will likely result in medical and custody staff working with infected transferred detainees as well as LSP prisoners, which is likely to spread infection to the uninfected prisoners currently housed at LSP. This places them at significant risk. Third, medical care at LSP is not good and transferred inmates are unlikely to receive the medical attention needed to appropriately monitor their disease. LSP had insufficient staff in 2016 and was unable to adequately provide medical care such that officers and inmates were used to provide medical care.14 Introduction of a COVID-19 infected population into a system without adequate medical staff can only result in less attention being paid to both the existing LSP patients who have substantial medical needs as well as the newly transferred inmates who should be monitored multiple times daily. Additionally, the quality of care at LSP was substandard in 2016 when we produced a report of our investigation and again in 2018 based on selected record reviews. Physicians were not credentialed appropriately and did not perform consistent with existing standards of care. On record reviews, we noted failure to recognize indications for hospitalization which is critical in the COVID-19 population. There was failure to recognize typical signs of respiratory decompensation which is also critical for COVID-19 patients. There were delays in transfer of patients to a hospital when indicated. Both physicians and other staff (nurses and emergency medical technicians) failed to recognize “red flag” signs resulting in adverse events. Also, LSP is not set up to manage acutely ill patients. Laboratory services are only
https://www.theadvertiser.com/story/news/local/2020/03/26/coronavirus-louisiana-hospitalsoverwhelmed-under-all-covid-19-scenarios/2884019001/ 13 Who gets a ventilator? Hospitals facing coronavirus surge are preparing for life-or-death decisions. NBC News as found at https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/who-gets-ventilatorhospitals-facing-coronavirus-surge-are-preparing-life-n1162721 14 Officers passed medications on most units, and inmates assisted in providing some services to inmates on the infirmary during our 2016
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available weekdays during working-day-hours and not at all on weekends. Blood gas assessments, critical for managing acute respiratory distress are not available at LSP. Physician evaluations during evening and nights were mostly telephonic and inadequate for patient needs. Also, the higher-level-of-care infirmary houses many long-term ill patients. These patients are at very high risk of death in the event of COVID-19 making the infirmary not useable for COVID-19 patients who deteriorate. Further, the local hospital is not a reference hospital and patients requiring intubation would need to be sent to Baton Rouge or New Orleans, an hour to three hour ride, respectively, a long ride with a potentially decompensating patient. For these reasons, detainees involved in these transfers would not be transferred into a situation that would include improved medical services. Services would likely be worse. Fourth and last, there is no evidence that the Louisiana Department of Health was involved in this decision. This appears to be a custody decision without consultation during a pandemic crisis with the Louisiana Department of Health. I have listed multiple reasons why this decision make little sense from a medical perspective. It also is not a good decision from a public health perspective. Custody leadership should not be making a decision that is likely to have great impact on a public health crisis, both with respect to introduction of active COVID-19 cases into a naïve and vulnerable population, and because the impact on local hospital resources could overwhelm the local community and reduce availability of ICU beds to community residents. For all of these reasons, it is my opinion that this transfer is not a good idea and will worsen the impact of this pandemic.
15. I have reviewed the plan submitted by the state, as well as the affidavits of Secretary James M. LeBlanc, Tracy Falgout, and Dr. John E. Morrison.15 None of these documents changed in any way my opinion that using LSP as a statewide isolation unit, specifically at Camp J, will worsen the impact of the pandemic and poses a serious public health risk.
16. First, there is still no evidence that the Department of Health is involved in making the decision to use Camp J. This is a public health emergency, not a custody or other nonmedical emergency. For this reason, the Department of Health should be directing decisions around transfers between facilities rather than custody officials. While Dr. Morrison is a medical doctor, his specialty is in general surgery and advanced cardiac life support, not epidemiology, pulmonology, or emergency medicine, and he has no relevant expertise in correctional medicine. I noted that the affidavits do not reference a public health official in attendance at the daily phone meetings – Dr. Morrison simply claims that the DOC is in “direct contact” with the Department of Health. Lack of coordination with the Department of Health puts at risk the lives of patients at LSP or who will be transferred to LSP and who may need to be hospitalized at some point. The Department of Public Health should have been part of the development of this plan in conjunction with their other statewide decisionmaking and planning around COVID-19.16
15 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318 (M.D.La.), Docket No. 585. 16 On April 8, 2020, the Department of Health Office of Public Health issued recommendations regarding prisons and juvenile detention centers. These recommendations were rescinded without explanation on April 9, 2020.
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17. Second, the pandemic plan they reference in their plan and affidavits is dated and not consistent with requirements of COVID-19. For COVID-19, three distinct types of special housing are needed: quarantine, isolation for people with known COVID019, and isolation for persons under investigation (“PUI”). The PUI group are people who are symptomatic (fever, symptoms of cough, shortness of breath, etc.) but have not yet been tested or test results are pending. These three groups should be housed separately. The current plan does not address this.
18. Third, the state’s plan and affidavits do not address hospitalization. Specifically, they did not discuss how the PUI group or the COVID-19 positive groups would be monitored and, when and if they would be sent to a hospital, what arrangements would be made. Because LSP is so remote, an earlier admission is probably indicated due to the expected long distance they would have to travel to Baton Rouge or New Orleans if the patient required hospitalization or intubation. The West Feliciana Hospital does not support mechanical ventilation.
19. Fourth, the state’s plan and affidavits did not address the capacity of LSP to provide appropriate medical care, particularly while maintaining isolation and quarantine from the rest of LSP. It is not clear from a practical matter how they would provide sufficient medical personnel at Camp J, who would have no contact with patients at the rest of LSP, without further diminishing the capacity of the already over-taxed LSP doctors and nurses. Nor was there any indication how the state plans to monitor the patients at Camp J in any of the three groups mentioned above. If hospitalization becomes necessary the travel time to the hospital delays initiation of care with resultant risk. In my previous reviews of medical records documenting the quality of care at LSP, I noted the failure to recognize indications for hospitalization and typical signs of respiratory decompensation, both of which are critical for COVID-19 patients. There were also many examples of delays in transfer of patients to a hospital when indicated.
20. Finally, the state’s plan and affidavits do not lay out adequate protocols for medical isolation of Camp J from the rest of LSP’s population, the majority of whom are elderly or otherwise at high risk because of their medical conditions. The state’s plan and affidavits also do not describe who will provide medical care for the population expected to be housed at Camp J; whether and how workers serving the population at Camp J will be separate from workers serving the remainder of the prison; what the clinical monitoring will consist of; whether and how these known COVID-19 patients will receive hospital care if necessary; and where they will find medical staff and providers to care for the population. Most troubling in the state’s plan is the lack of coordination with the Louisiana Department of Health. Creating an isolation unit for COVID-19 in a remote rural area with few cases and with a lack of reference hospital resources risks increased transmission and increased risk for individuals transferred as well as risk of infecting the local LSP inmate population which is high risk because of age and disease burden. There is also the increased risk of spillover into the local civilian population. Further, even assuming Defendants ultimately utilized different staff at Camp J, that staff will be at high risk of infecting the community, including staff that serve the rest of LSP. Because this is a pandemic, the Louisiana Department of Health should
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approve of such a transfer as part of its broader effort to control the pandemic statewide. This is not something correctional officials should do without consultation and approval of the Department of Health.
Recommendations
21. Steps should be taken to release any inmate who is a low risk to the community. The additional risk to inmates by virtue of crowding in prisons and the risk of promoting spread of the infection to the inmate population, and thereby to the community, needs to be weighed against the reason for not releasing the inmate from incarceration. Release based on risk should prioritize inmates over 65 years of age, inmates with immune disorders, inmates with significant cardiac (including hypertension) or pulmonary conditions, or inmates with cognitive disorders. Keeping healthy individuals in prison for short sentences, or for parole violations or other marginal public safety reasons only promotes crowding. Crowding decreases the ability of maintaining distancing of prisoners which risks spread of the virus. Therefore, healthy prisoners with low risk sentences are best sent home as a preventive measure.
22. Because LSP is a maximum security prison with a 90% of inmates having a life sentence, depopulation of low risk inmates may not yield many inmates who can be released. Depopulating should be done at other Louisiana prisons to permit LSP to reassign inmates to other prisons that will permit appropriate distancing in dormitories. Such reassignment is permissible under CDC guideline on the basis of depopulation. Current dormitory arrangements are inconsistent with current public health and CDC recommendations regarding social distancing and if COVID-19 transmission penetrates the prison, the infection will spread widely.
23. If and when COVID-19 testing becomes readily available, expanded testing should be done.
24. All persons over 65, with severe mental illness, with immune disorders, with serious cardiac or pulmonary disease, or with any cognitive disorder should have daily symptom screening and temperature screening. Any positive symptom or temperature should require respiratory isolation and testing for COVID-19. Temperatures should be taken with infrared no-touch thermometers so that symptom screening and temperatures can be taken without touching the patient.
25. Persons suspicious for or known to be infected with COVID-19 should NOT be transferred to LSP.17 As of April 13, 2020, West Feliciana Parish only had 46 cases and 0 deaths. LSP had 24 cases between staff and inmates. To send patients infected with COVID-19 to a parish and correctional facility with few known cases risks spreading the disease further into Louisiana and has ramifications for the community at large. Furthermore, approximately
17 Louisiana plans to house local and state inmates with coronavirus at Angola and Allen Correctional; Emily Lane, WDSU News March 27, 2020; as found at https://www.wdsu.com/article/louisiana-plans-to-house-inmates-with-coronavirus-at-angola-andanother-prison/31960114
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50% of the LSP population is over age 50 with many high risk medical conditions and a majority of inmates live in dormitories. This increases risk of transmission into an uninfected population and increases risk of death.
26. The CDC recommends suspending all transfers between facilities or jurisdictions.18 LSP should enact this recommendation. However, if a transfer must be done, any person is transferred from one prison to another, they should have a negative COVID-19 test result or be quarantined for 14 days prior to transfer and known to not have COVID-19.
27. LSP needs to develop guidelines for when to send patients to a hospital. These should be developed with the reference hospital. Contact information with the reference hospital should be established as soon as possible. Criteria for hospital referral should be established in advance and posted so that all physicians, physician assistants and nurse practitioners are aware.
28. The current Pandemic Flu Plan (PFP) of LSP is a generic influenza-like-illness plan which is not consistent with guidance regarding COVID-1919 and should not be used. Instead, rather than re-writing a document at this late stage, I recommend the existing CDC guidelines should be used as a plan and appropriately adapted to LSP conditions. The adaptions and CDC guidelines should be widely distributed to health and custody staff.
29. A point of contact with the Louisiana Department of Health should be established and contact information shared with medical leadership. The Department of Health should have contact information of DOC and LSP medical leadership and an update conference call with the Department of Health should occur every few days or more frequently if needed.
18 In the Operations item of the Management section of the CDC correctional guidance, it states, “Suspend all transfers of incarcerated/detained persons to and from other jurisdictions and facilities (including work release where relevant), unless necessary for medical evaluation, medical isolation/quarantine, care, extenuating security concerns, or to prevent overcrowding”. LSP is not a location ideal for medical isolation or medical care due to poor service history, lack of nearby hospitals, and because the prison and surrounding area have no cases. Sending patients with COVID-19 to this facility risk spread and places them in a facility with less medical resources than a facility closer to a large city. 19 I give only one example. Item 4.a, of the Yellow/Orange Phase of the LSP plan states that “employees will complete a self-screening at roll call. Employees who state they are sick shall be triaged by medical staff or health trained staff, and if found to have a fever shall be sent home. Staff with ILI shall remain at home at least 24 hours after they are free of fever (100F) or signs of fever, without the use of fever medication”. This is incorrect information with respect to COVID-19 and could result in increased transmission of infection. The CDC recommends not returning to work until there is resolution of fever without use of medication and improvement of symptoms and negative COVID-19 tests on at least two consecutive occasions 24 hours apart OR at least 3 days since resolution of fever without use of medication and improvement of respiratory symptoms and at least 7 days have passed since symptoms first appeared.
9

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-2 04/14/20 Page 10 of 10 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed on April 13, 2020 in Chicago, Illinois.
/s/ Michael Puisis Michael Puisis D.O.
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DECLARATION OF DR. SUSI VASSALLO CONCERNING THE RISK OF COVID-19 IN THE LOUISIANA STATE PRISON AT ANGOLA
1. I am a board-certified emergency room physician and medical toxicologist. I practice as an attending physician in the emergency room of Bellevue Hospital, a large urban emergency department in New York City, and have practiced at various sites in Texas for many years. I am a Clinical Professor of Emergency Medicine at the New York University School of Medicine. I am certified as a correctional health professional by NCCHC and have evaluated correctional health care systems in nine states. I evaluated the Louisiana State Prison at Angola (“Angola”) for The Promise of Justice Initiative in 2016 (and also conducted records review in 2018). I have also been retained by the Department of Homeland Security to review medical care delivery at its detention facilities, and the Fifth Circuit and other courts have relied on my reports.
2. Coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) is a viral pandemic. This is a novel virus for which there is no established curative medical treatment and no vaccine. Severe pneumonia is one of the serious consequences of COVID-19 and the lungs become filled with fluid. I have had patients tell me “I can’t do this anymore” as they realize they can no longer keep up the work of breathing and require life saving interventions.
3. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that the reproduction rate of the virus, the R0, is 3.8-8.9-3.8, meaning that each newly infected person is estimated to infect on average 5.7 additional persons.1 This is highly infectious and only the great influenza pandemic of 1918 is thought to have higher infectivity. This is likely a function of all human populations currently being highly susceptible. The attack rate given an exposure is also high, estimated at 20-30% depending on community conditions, but may be as high as 80% in some settings and populations. The incubation period is thought to be 2-14 days, which is why isolation is generally 14 days.2 The long incubation period is particularly concerning for transmission rates given that so many people are asymptomatic and infectious.
4. The number of cases of COVID-19 in the United States are rising rapidly. On April 13, 2020, Johns Hopkins reported that there were 572,587 reported COVID-19 infections in the U.S. The number of deaths is over 23,000 but both cases and deaths are rising rapidly so by the time this declaration is read the numbers of both cases and deaths will be significantly larger. The number of cases of COVID-19 is the highest number of reported cases of any country in the world.
1 CDC, Emerging Infectious Diseases, High Contagiousness and Rapid Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronatvirus 2 (April 7, 2020), https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/7/200282_article 2 The Incubation Period of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) From Publicly Reported Confirmed Cases: Estimation and Application (March 10, 2020), https://annals.org/aim/fullarticle/2762808/incubation-period-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19from-publicly-reported

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5. Louisiana has a rapidly accelerating rate of COVID-19 infections. A study from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette reported that COVID-19 cases grew at a 67.8% rate, the highest rate in the U.S.3 The Louisiana Department of Health reported on April 13, 2020 that there were 21,016 cases of COVID-19 with 884 deaths. Louisiana has the third most deaths per capita of any state in the U.S.
6. UpToDate reports an overall case mortality rate from the disease of 2.3. Louisiana has 884 deaths for 21,016 cases; more than 4.2% of persons diagnosed with the infection in Louisiana die.
7. The symptoms of COVID-19 present variably from fever, cough, chest pain, and headache to symptoms of loss of smell, diarrhea, aches, and vomiting.4 At present, there are no markers identified nor signs or symptoms that would predict clinical deterioration. In at least one study, half of the patients admitted to the intensive care unit for COVID died on the first day.5 However, COVID patients may also present insidiously and it is impossible to predict the course of the illness, who will do well, and who will not. It is my experience treating patients in the emergency departments of NYU Langone Health and Bellevue Hospital Center that patients are not always aware of the degree of hypoxia (lack of oxygen) present in their bodies. Unlike the more common experience of holding one’s breath for as long as possible and then gasping for breath, these patients teeter on the edge of death with no gasping for breath or feeling their need for oxygen. This has been shocking to us working in Emergency Departments. Immediately upon arrival to the hospital, life-saving measures may be required. In some cases the patients code (suffer cardiac arrest) precipitously. In other experiences, some patients have adequate oxygen saturations for days and then deteriorate. To wit, the Prime Minister of England Boris Johnson was able to stay at home for 12 days before he was transferred to the hospital intensive care unit. In some cases, corrections staff and medical staff on the frontline may not be alarmed by a patient’s complaint or appearance. This is not a predictable illness with a predictable course. There is no lab test that predicts the patient’s course. In fact, the laboratory tests for COVID may give inaccurate results. Fifteen percent of patients who are tested for COVID have a false negative, meaning they do indeed have COVID but the test is negative. Given the lack of tell-tale signs or a timeline for subsequent deterioration, it is absolutely critical and necessary that patients who test positive or likely positive (known as person under investigation) for COVID-19 or have been exposed and show symptoms, be within easy transportable distance of hospitals in the event that more critical care is necessary. The care required to
3 Coronavirus cases grew faster in Louisiana than anywhere else in the world: UL study, The Acadiana Advocate, Adam Daigle March 24, 2020, https://www.theadvocate.com/acadiana/news/coronavirus/article_94494420-6d4b-11ea-ac42ff7dd722c084.html. 4 Breaking News: Update on Evaluation and Management for COVID-19 Patients – Updated 4/7/20, Emergency Medicine News (March 31, 2020), https://journals.lww.com/emnews/blog/breakingnews/pages/post.aspx?PostID=508. 5 Covid-19 in Critically Ill Patients in the Seattle Region — Case Series, The New England Journal of Medicine (March 30, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa2004500?articleTools=true

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appropriately evaluate and provide treatment to patients with COVID includes lab testing, imaging, and treatment individualized to the presentation of the patient. This may range from oxygen therapy by nasal cannula, or high flow oxygen, continuous positive pressure masks; to intubation of the trachea and ventilator assistance. These are difficulty decisions influenced by not only the level of oxygen in the blood to the all important work of breathing. This viral infection is showing a serious predisposition to hypercoaguopathy and patients have pulmonary emboli (blood clots in the lungs) necessitating anticoaguation. Some patients’ clinical course are complicated by superimposed bacterial infections of the lungs. Fluid therapy is complicated by dehydration due to fever and decreased fluid intake due to illness and the need to restrict the willy-nilly administration of IV fluids as the lungs are damaged by the virus and the attempts to oxygenated using positive pressure. Camp J is located in a remote prison that is lacking in these capabilities and technologies and is at least an hour from a facility that could provide them.
8. During this pandemic, patients with COVID often present with cough or fever or both. However, there are enormous numbers of patients with other symptoms and no cough and or fever. In one study of critically ill patients, only 88% presented with cough and only 50% had a fever.6 In this pandemic, fatigue alone, sore throats, body aches, ear aches, or congestion frequently prove to be COVID. Abdominal pain with or without fever and cough is COVID. Back pain is COVID, with or without fever or cough. In fact most of our trauma patients at Bellevue, appendicitis and any other problem are found to have COVID. Diarrhea is COVID. Rash may be COVID and can be mistaken for other illnesses. Because the ACE2 receptors are on the intestines and the lungs, diarrhea is a common presentation. Screening for cough and or fever is inadequate to exclude the possibility of infection from COVID. Moreover, many patients are asymptomatic and are infectious to others.
9. Although advanced age and underlying illnesses or chronic medical conditions increase the risk of serious effects of COVID, the relatively young and healthy are also in the intensive care units and die. While fatalities have been highest for older patients, increasing evidence in the US has shown the dire risk that COVID-19 poses to younger patients. Young patients ages 20-54 years old can have serious complications from COVID-19 including hospital admission, admission to an intensive care unit, invasive ventilation, or death. As of late March 2020, 38% of those individuals hospitalized in the US were between 20-54 years old.7 Of those admitted to the ICU, 12% were aged 20-44 years and 36% were age 45-64 years. These statistics highlight the significant risk younger people are at for serious complications due to coronavirus. A few days ago, at the hospital where I work, there were 482 patients in isolation and 209 patients on ventilators. Almost 50% of the COVID positive patients are less than 65 years old. 13 patients are on extracorporeal membrane oxygenation, 10 are on
6 Covid-19 in Critically Ill Patients in the Seattle Region — Case Series, The New England Journal of Medicine (March 30, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2004500 7 John Hopkins Medicine, Coronavirus and COVID-19: Younger Adults Are at Risk, Too, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/coronavirus-andcovid-19-younger-adults-are-at-risk-too (accessed April 9, 2020).

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continuous venovenous dialysis. Autopsy studies are demonstrating widespread tissue destruction due to the COVID virus. The numbers show that all types of people – healthy and unhealthy, young and old – are impacted by this virus, and we are learning more each day.
10. Those incarcerated in U.S. jails and prisons make up 2.2 million people of our U.S. population.8 This population is one the most vulnerable in society, with high rates of coinfection with hepatitis C, HIV, and tuberculosis (TB). More specifically, the World Health Organization has identified the level of TB in prisons to be 100 times higher than that of the civilian population, due to the hazardous combination of overcrowding, poor ventilation, and inadequate treatment and diagnosis.9 The transmission of COVID-19 in prisons can easily be likened to the transmission of TB, where “social distancing” practices are impossible with inmates living in close quarters and the lack of available measures to ensure proper handwashing, hygiene, and sanitation. What’s more, half of this vulnerable population of incarcerated individuals have at least one comorbid condition, increasing the risk of poor outcomes for those who also contract COVID-19. COVID-19 is likely to rampantly spread within jails and prisons given its droplet aerosol transmission that is stable for hours and can even last on cardboard and metal surfaces for hours per the National Institutes of Health.10 This has been the experience at the Cook County Jail, which now has the highest outbreak numbers in the country.11
11. The Department of Corrections plan is to allow for the transfer of detained individuals including people who have not been convicted of a crime - from the state’s over 100 numerous jails and prisons to Camp J at Angola. It is my opinion that transferring detainees who test positive for COVID from jails around the state to Camp J is a medically unsound plan and contrary to public health guidelines for multiple reasons. First, it is against the recommendation of the Louisiana Department of Health.12 The State Health Officer, Jimmy Guidry, issued recommendations to prisons and juvenile detention centers on April 8, 2020. In it he states that correctional and detention centers should “have a trained Emergency Medical Service/Emergency Medical Technician (EMS/EMT) assess and transport anyone you think might have COVID--19 to a healthcare facility.” Camp J is not a healthcare facility and the DOC plan goes against this guidance.13 This plan is also against the guidance
8 Flattening the Curve for Incarcerated Populations — Covid-19 in Jails and Prisons, The New England Journal of Medicine (April 2, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2005687?query=featured_coronavirus 9 World Health Organization, Tuberculosis in Prisons, https://www.who.int/tb/areas-ofwork/population-groups/prisons-facts/en/ (accessed April 9, 2020). 10 National Institutes of Health, New coronavirus stable for hours on surfaces (March 17, 2020), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/new-coronavirus-stable-hours-surfaces 11 Chicago’s Jail is Top U.S. Hot Spot as Virus Spreads Behind Bars, New York Times (April 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/us/coronavirus-cook-county-jail-chicago.html 12 Louisiana Department of Health, Office of Public Health, COVID-19; recommendations regarding prisons and juvenile detention centers (April 8, 2020). 13 Without any explanation, these recommendations were rescinded on April 9, 2020.

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of the CDC, which recommends that all transfers of incarcerated and detained people are suspended, unless necessary for medical evaluation, medical isolation/quarantine, care, extenuating security concerns, or to prevent overcrowding.14 Each facility should be able to provide isolation and quarantine services on-site. If not, release or repurposing of other unused spaces (dorms, hotels) is preferable to transfer. Even if up-to-date medical records are sent along with people who are transported to Angola, there is no indication that Angola is in a position to provide newly transferred detainees with any prescribed medications for underlying medical conditions, such as hypertension and diabetes; conditions that render patients vulnerable to severe COVID symptoms. The process of transporting COVID positive cases to a parish like West Feliciana with relatively fewer cases increases the risk of spread throughout that parish and the surrounding communities. Angola has a particularly vulnerable population with over 50% of people over 50 years of age, many of whom have high risk medical conditions and are vulnerable to serious medical complications if infected. Medical and custody staff are also at risk if they come into contact with infected transferred detainees and are likely to spread infection to the uninfected and vulnerable Angola population, no matter what measures are purportedly taken to isolate Camp J. Angola had insufficient staff when we reviewed in 2016 and there is no reason to believe they have seriously increased their staffing numbers since. Introduction of COVID-19 into the system will result in the existing Angola patients not having their substantial medical needs met.
12. The Department of Corrections has said that only people who have tested positive but are not displaying serious symptoms and who are not in medical distress are supposed to be sent to Camp J. There is no information or medical criteria on how to identify patients as meeting that definition. In fact, at this time, there is no way to define who will do well and who will do poorly. And nothing is said about what will happen if and when the medical conditions of those people deteriorate and medical intervention and hospitalization becomes necessary. As the other two medical experts in Lewis v. Cain and I noted in our review of care at Angola, the people incarcerated there lack access to hospital care across the board and this pandemic will only make it worse. Angola is remote from hospitals. The closest emergency room of any kind is at least 30 minutes away and it does not have a ventilator, and the space at that hospital is otherwise limited. The closest emergency room that can provide adequate services is in Baton Rouge, more than an hour away. Louisiana’s hospitals are already overwhelmed by COVID-19 cases, and transporting more people who have tested positive to a remote location with already-limited hospital beds puts those people at unnecessary risk. For example, people held in the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison who test positive are being transported more than an hour away to Camp J, putting staff who are transporting them at increased risk of transmission. And then transporting them back to Baton Rouge or New Orleans when they require hospitalization. People who test positive in the New Orleans jail could be taken three hours away to Camp J and then be transported to Baton Rouge or New Orleans when they require hospitalization. Angola is not set up to manage hospital level care including ventilation. Housing a COVID-19 patient on the
14 CDC, Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-detention.html

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infirmary where the most vulnerable, uninfected, medically compromised patients are housed all the patients and staff at risk.
13. Additionally, the quality of care at Angola was substandard in 2016 when we produced a report of our investigation and again in 2018 based on selected record reviews. Physicians were not credentialed appropriately and did not provide medical care in line with national standards. While reviewing records, we noted many examples of failure to recognize indications for hospitalization, including many cases of failure to recognize typical signs of respiratory decompensation which is critical for COVID-19 patients. There were delays in transfer of patients to a hospital when indicated. Physicians, nurses, and EMTs failed to recognize “red flag” signs resulting in adverse events.
14. From our review, we also found that medical care was substandard in other ways that would impact the care that the positive transported detainees and any COVID-19 positive Angola inmates would be provided, either at Camp J or at the infirmary. For example, laboratory services are only available on weekdays and blood gas assessments are not available at all.
15. The Director of the CDC has warned that as many as 25% of individuals infected with COVID-19 may be symptom-free, leading to the broadening of their criteria as to who should wear masks.15 With limiting testing performed on asymptomatic patients, we cannot confirm or negate the presence of COVID-19 in an individual. As such, incarcerated individuals and staff can be infected with the virus and unknowingly spread it throughout the already overcrowded prison. We further cannot determine whether patients will abruptly need escalated medical care requiring hospitalization. One precautionary measure that must be taken is that people who are COVID positive are not transferred to Camp J, which is more than an hour from the closest hospital able to provide appropriate medical intervention.
16. Patients with severe COVID-19 symptoms may require critical specialists even if not in the intensive care unit; ICU-level supplies and specialized treatment, including but not limited to invasive mechanical ventilation, vasopressor treatment for low blood pressure, intravenous fluid therapy, support for kidney failure, respiratory therapists, and/or early antibiotics.16 High flow oxygen administered in a hospital is tricky; continuous positive pressure ventilation is tricky; the need for a ventilator is unpredictable except at the point of respiratory arrest. Treatment requires staff that have experience in using this equipment. The intensity of care and the protracted length of this care with this illness can not be provided at Angola or at any of the hospitals within an hour from Angola. What’s more, highly specific airborne precautions with N95 respirators, face shields, and gowns for personal protective equipment are critical to prevent spread of the virus. On a national level,
15 Infected but Feeling Fine: The Unwitting Coronavirus Spreaders, New York Times (March 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/health/coronavirus-asymptomatictransmission.html 16 Care for Critically Ill Patients with COVID-19, JAMA Insights (March 11, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2762996

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these supplies and highly advanced and expensive equipment of ventilators are limited across the country. Angola is lacking in these capabilities and is not an appropriate site to manage patients with COVID-19
17. In my experience in New York City and from what I know is happening in the rest of the country, there are not enough resources to battle the COVID pandemic in the big cities, much less in rural areas like West Feliciana Parish that only have two ambulances as of my last review. Even without the influx of positive detained transferees to Angola, West Feliciana would be strained for resources like ambulances and ambulance personnel. Ambulance personnel are being infected daily and they transmit the infection widely. Transporting many COVID positive people to the parish will further strain what is already a strained system, at increased risk to both those patients and the surrounding community.
18. Anyone who comes into proximity to someone who is tested positive for COVID is at increased risk of infection. COVID-19 is a highly contagious respiratory virus that spreads through droplets created when an infected person coughs, sneezes or speaks. Normal breathing can spread the virus. The virus can also be transmitted through saliva or discharge from the nose. While the droplets generated by infected people only hang in the air for a short period of time, they can easily be breathed in by people within one meter of a person with COVID-19. Furthermore, the droplets generated will contaminate the surfaces they land on resulting in transmission of the virus if someone touches a contaminated surface and then touches their eyes, nose or mouth before washing their hands. In the close-quarters setting of a vehicle this means that even one infected person could easily spread the virus to everyone else in the vehicle. Additionally, reduced airflow in a transport vehicle could result in higher concentrations of contaminated droplets remaining in the air and on surfaces. Transport should be avoided unless necessary for hospitalization and then only having to travel a short distance to the hospital is the safest option. Staff at Angola may contract the virus as a result of its high infectivity and then spread the virus amongst the West Feliciana community. There are only 46 confirmed cases in West Feliciana as of April 12, 2020. The high concentration of infected persons at Angola would increase the likelihood of the virus spreading to West Feliciana community members via infected Angola medical and custodial staff who are exposed to those viral loads.
19. Many studies have shown the increased risk for serious complications in patients infected with COVID-19 that also suffer from comorbidities. Those comorbidities include common health problems like hypertension and diabetes, among others. Many people in jails and prisons have multiple comorbidities and are at an even higher risk of complications. The complications include development of serious illness such as acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) requiring admission to an intensive care unit, invasive ventilation or death. Studies found that COPD, diabetes, hypertension, cancer, and the presence of multiple comorbidities resulted in the highest increased risk of the above mentioned serious complications. 17 This puts the most vulnerable patient populations, including people in jails
17 Comorbidity and its impact on 1590 patients with Covid-19 in China: A Nationwide Analysis, European Respiratory Journal (March 26, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1183/13993003.00547-2020

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and prisons with chronic health problems, at increased risk for severe medical complications or death from COVID-19. If transferred to Camp J, transferred detainees – particularly those who had only been incarcerated for short periods of time and not sufficiently evaluated by medical staff – may also have difficulties or delays in getting any of their regular prescribed medications for conditions such as hypertension and diabetes, even if they are transported to Angola with their medical records.
20. COVID-19 can result in serious complications leading to death where people feel the same pain as if they were drowning because their lungs are so filled with fluid. In cases where people are suffering from life-limiting illness due to COVID-19 it is imperative that they have access to palliative care. Palliative care is a crucial part of any health care plan to ensure that patients do not suffer needlessly and that in the case of life-limiting illness the treatments needed to relieve suffering are available.18 Furthermore, a robust supply of medicines, equipment and trained medical professionals is required to appropriately treat and manage patients with COVID-19. The DOC plan (provision of Tylenol, Motrin, NS for IV flush, Imodium, and Insulin) is insufficient as a response to the needs of COVID-19 positive patients. The provision of morphine or other end-of-life drugs is crucial to manage pain and symptoms and to allow for a humane death. The pandemic has resulted in widespread shortages of the pharmaceuticals needed to treat COVID patients.
My recommendations for the DOC to mitigate the spread of the coronavirus among Louisiana’s incarcerated population are:
1. Transfer people who test negative for COVID-19 to Angola to free up space in the remaining DOC facilities so that the non-Angola incarcerated populations will be able to practice social distancing and will have space to provide appropriate quarantine and isolation areas for those who test positive or may be positive.
2. House COVID-19 patients in locations where they can reach a hospital—one that is equipped to treat severe COVID-19 symptoms—quickly. The illness progresses quickly and unpredictably; patients’ symptoms can worsen very suddenly, so it is not safe for them to be housed far from a hospital. To move COVID-19 patients farther from health care is anathema to the care of these patients. The emphasis must be on these patients being housed near to the care they need.
3. Protect the current Angola population—many of whom are elderly and chronically ill and therefore at greater risk of developing severe or deadly COVID-19 symptoms—from an increased risk of infection by not transferring any confirmed COVID-19 patients to Camp J or any other part of Angola.
4. Increase the chances of survival for COVID-19 patients by not transferring them to Angola, which is located in a parish where there are no ventilators. No one can predict whether a COVID-19 patient’s symptoms will progress to the point of respiratory distress such that
18 The Role of Palliative Care in a COVID-19 Pandemic, Shiley Institute for Palliative Care, https://csupalliativecare.org/palliative-care-and-covid-19/ (accessed April 9, 2020).

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the patient will require a ventilator; patients can deteriorate very rapidly. If a patient tests positive for COVID-19, that patient is at risk of requiring a ventilator and should not be housed in a location where there are none.
5. Involve the Department of Health in the development of any transport plans for medical isolation needs and follow the Department’s initially guidance and advice as well as the CDC’s guidance regarding transport.
6. Prepare for a widespread outbreak by streamlining medical power of authority.
7. Prepare for a widespread outbreak by developing adequate policies related to palliative care for incarcerated individuals who may die from COVID-19 complications.
8. Reduce the incarcerated population by allowing furlough for anyone who is 60 years of age or older and for anyone who has an underlying medical condition that puts him or her at greater risk of developing a severe case of COVID-19. This will allow incarcerated individuals to practice social distancing throughout the state and free up space for appropriate quarantine and isolation units at individual DOC facilities. All of these measures would reduce the risk of a widespread outbreak among the incarcerated population.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed on April 13, 2020 in New York, New York.
/s/ Susi Vassallo
Susi Vassallo

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DECLARATION OF KENDRICK WILSON: I, Kendrick Wilson, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Kendrick Wilson. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 20 years old. 4. Until April 11, 2020, I was pre-trial and being held in Unit A2 at East Baton Rouge Parish
Prison. 5. I was tested for COVID-19 around two o’clock in the morning on April 9. My temperature
before I was tested was 102.5 degrees. 6. I experienced symptoms of body pain, a cough, and congestion. 7. I was told that I tested positive for COVID on April 10 or 11 but was not shown my test
results. I did not talk to a nurse or doctor about my test results. 8. On April 11, around 5:00 p.m. I was asleep when two guards woke me up and said transport
was waiting for me and to pack my things. They said I would be transferred one way or another, whether willingly or not. The guards handcuffed and shackled me and said they couldn’t tell me where they were taking me. I said many times that I did not want to be taken to Camp J. 9. I was transported in a van with 3 other people and 2 correctional officers. 10. I am currently detained at Camp J at Louisiana State Penitentiary in an open dorm. I do not know the name of the dorm. 11. There are about 39 other people in the dorm with me. There is nothing isolating us from each other. A lot of people are coughing, and there were some people on IV machines or with oxygen masks. I have one face mask. They have not taken anyone to the hospital.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-4 04/14/20 Page 2 of 4
12. It is my understanding that putting a lot of people together who have tested positive for COVID increases the risk to me and to others.
13. There is no air conditioning and there are ceiling fans blowing the air around. 14. There are two nurses walking around the dorm. They checked on me twice on April 11 and
once on April 12. I haven’t seen any doctors. 15. I told a nurse my body was hurting and that I was congested and I was given some pain
medicine and sinus medicine. 16. I have been told that I will stay at Camp J for 5 days and then moved to another building for
5 more days. I don’t know what that other building is or where it is. I don’t know where I will go after that. I don’t know if they will take me to a hospital if I need to go to a hospital. 17. I would prefer to be home with my mother in Baton Rouge, recovering and staying away from other people who are also sick. I would like to be near a hospital. 18. If I can’t go home, I would prefer to go to a medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive who are incarcerated. It is my understanding that there are at least 900 beds available there. I would like to be near a hospital. 19. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-4 04/14/20 Page 3 of 4
20. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature: /s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Kendrick Wilson April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-4 04/14/20 Page 4 of 4
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Wilson. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I
signed the attached declaration on Kendrick Wilson’s behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Wilson is currently being held at Camp J at Louisiana State Penitentiary. The Secretary
of the Department of Corrections suspended all visitation at Louisiana’s eight state-run prisons on March 12, 2020. No attorney visits are being scheduled. 4. I spoke with Mr. Wilson over the phone. Mr. Wilson has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf as reflected in his declaration.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 13, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-5 04/14/20 Page 1 of 4
DECLARATION OF ERNEST ROGERS: I, Ernest Rogers, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Ernest Rogers. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 65 years old. 4. I am pre-trial and being held in Unit 2 at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. 5. I was tested for COVID around two o’clock in the morning on April 9. 6. I am suffering from a cough, a sore throat, a fever, and shortness of breath. 7. I have hepatitis C and would be able to get treatment through my health insurance if I were
not detained right now. I also have liver disease and high blood pressure. 8. I was told that I tested positive for COVID-19 on April 10 but was not shown my test
results. I did not talk to a nurse or doctor about my test results. I ask the nurse for my test results twice a day. 9. On April 11, two guards came in and told my cellmate Kendrick Wilson that transport was waiting for him. Mr. Wilson said he did not want to be transferred and the guards forced him out of the cell and handcuffed him and shackled him. Mr. Wilson was very upset. The guards told him they didn’t know where he was going but my understanding is they took him to Camp J at Angola. 10. The guards have told me that I will not be shown my test results but that I will be transferred to Camp J if they are positive, voluntarily or non-voluntarily. I do not want to go to Camp J. I was previously housed at Camp J when I was incarcerated at Angola. The last time I was at Camp J was in the 1980s and I do not want to go back there.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-5 04/14/20 Page 2 of 4
11. Because of my age and pre-existing medical conditions, I am worried that I will develop even worse symptoms and need to be hospitalized. I want to make sure I am close to a hospital in case that happens.
12. I would prefer to be home with my family in Baton Rouge, recovering and staying away from other people who are also sick. My family lives near a hospital.
13. If I can’t go home, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my understanding that there are at least 900 beds available there. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary.
14. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to prove them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff.
15. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of my criminal proceedings against me or others.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-5 04/14/20 Page 3 of 4
16. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so.
17. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature: /s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Ernest Rogers April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-5 04/14/20 Page 4 of 4
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Rogers. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I
signed the attached declaration on Ernest Rogers’ behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Rogers is currently being held at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. Visitation has been
suspended since March 19, 2020. No in-person attorney visits are being scheduled at East Baton Rouge Prison. 4. I spoke with Mr. Rogers over the phone. Mr. Rogers has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 13, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-6 04/14/20 Page 1 of 4
DECLARATION OF JULIUS ALLEN: I, Julius Allen, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Julius Allen. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 33 years old. 4. I am pre-trial and being held in Unit A2 at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. Before this, I
was being held in Unit Q11 and 12. I was moved to A2 on April 8, 2020. 5. I was tested for COVID-19 around two o’clock in the morning on April 9, 2020. 6. I am suffering from a fever, severe body aches, difficulty breathing, weakness, disorientation,
and diarrhea. I have been having these symptoms for at least 5-7 days. 7. I have pre-existing medical conditions, including diabetes, hypertension, high cholesterol,
and a history of bronchitis. I take medications for these conditions. 8. On April 9, I was taken from East Baton Rouge Parish Prison to Our Lady of the Lake
hospital in Baton Rouge in order to receive medical attention. The hospital told me there was a 10/10 chance I was COVID positive because I had the symptoms, including a fever. The hospital checked my oxygen and said it was good enough at that point and they could admit me if I later needed a ventilator. 9. I was told by a guard that I tested positive for COVID-19 on April 10 but was not shown my test results. I did not talk to a nurse or doctor about my test results. 10. On April 11, two guards came in and told my cellmate Kendrick Wilson that transport was waiting for him. Mr. Wilson said he did not want to be transferred and the guards forced him out of the cell and handcuffed him. It is my understanding that they took him to Camp J at Angola.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-6 04/14/20 Page 2 of 4
11. The guards have told me that I will not be shown my test results but that I will be transferred to Camp J if they are positive, voluntarily or non-voluntarily. I do not want to go to Camp J.
12. On April 12, 2020, at approximately 8:35 p.m., a nurse came and told me she needed to another nasal swab sample to do another COVID-19 test. I told her they had already done a test and would not share the results so I did not want to do another test at this time. I asked her what happened to the results of my first test and she said they had the results but weren’t going to give them to me.
13. Because of my pre-existing medical conditions, I am worried that I will develop even worse symptoms and need to be hospitalized. I have already been to the hospital once.
14. I would prefer to be home with my wife and three daughters in Baton Rouge, recovering and staying away from other people who are also sick.
15. If I can’t go home, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my understanding that there are at least 900 beds available there. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary.
16. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to provide them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-6 04/14/20 Page 3 of 4
attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff. 17. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class and subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings against me or others. 18. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. 19. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Julius Allen April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-6 04/14/20 Page 4 of 4
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Allen. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I
signed the attached declaration on Julius Allen’s behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Allen is currently being held at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. Visitation has been
suspended since March 19, 2020. No in-person attorney visits are being scheduled at East Baton Rouge Prison. 4. I spoke with Mr. Allen over the phone. Mr. Allen has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 13, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-7 04/14/20 Page 1 of 4
DECLARATION OF DANIEL GUMNS: I, Daniel Gumns, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Daniel Gumns. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 25 years old. 4. I am indigent. 5. I am in DOC custody and currently housed at Angola’s Camp D in the Falcon 1 dormitory. 6. I am housed in close quarters in the dormitory with approximately 80 other people. I am
unable to maintain 6 feet of space between me and other people. 7. I do not have a face mask or gloves. Only some of the guards have face masks and gloves. 8. There are 4 or 5 toilets, 4 or 5 sinks, and one communal shower in Falcon 1. 9. The dorm and bathroom are not cleaned every day. 10. Even though we are in quarantine, people come in and out of the dormitory, including two
guards per shift and two orderlies per shift. We can still go in and out of other dorms but cannot leave Camp D. 11. It is my understanding that medical and correctional staff are going back and forth between Camp J and other places at Angola. 12. Camp D has been in quarantine for 2 or 3 weeks. 2 people have been taken out of the dormitory by EMTs after they developed COVID-19 symptoms, such as coughing, fevers, and sore throats. I do not know their names. I have not seen them since and it is my understanding that they went to Camp J. 13. I purchased my own soap for $15-20 and I do not have any hand sanitizer. I do not have any bleach.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-7 04/14/20 Page 2 of 4
14. I have pre-existing conditions that put me at a high risk if I become infected with COVID19. I am epileptic and suffer from grand mal seizures. I also have asthma. My asthma is triggered when I have seizures and I sometimes need medical support to breath.
15. I take eight medications per day, including Keppra, Dilantin, and Xopenex. 16. I have been to the hospital at Angola three times since February 21, 2020, for seizures. My
last seizure was approximately a week and a half ago. I was taken to the Treatment Center at the main prison. 17. I have been to the hospital at Rapides Regional Medical Center three to five times in the past year for seizures. I was last released from the hospital on February 20, 2020 and was brought to Angola the next day. 18. In the past week, I have had symptoms including cold chills, headaches, cough, fatigue, and fever. I have had to use my inhaler for my asthma. 19. I have not been tested for COVID-19. 20. Because of my pre-existing medical conditions, I am concerned that bringing people who have already tested positive for COVID-19 to Camp J increases the risk that I will be exposed and have severe medical complications. I don’t know if they would take me to a hospital from Camp J in time to receive treatment if I got very sick or had another seizure. 21. If I test positive for COVID-19, I do not want to go to Camp J. I have 18-20 months left on my sentence and could be eligible for parole within the next year. I would prefer to go home to my family in New Orleans for medical isolation and to recover. 22. If I cannot go home to my family, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my understanding that there are at least 900 beds available there. It is my

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-7 04/14/20 Page 3 of 4
belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary or if I have a seizure. 23. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to provide them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff. 24. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class and subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings against me or others. 25. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. 26. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Daniel Gumns April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-7 04/14/20 Page 4 of 4
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Gumns. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic,
I signed the attached declaration on Michael Gumns’s behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Gumns is currently being held at Louisiana State Penitentiary. All in-person visitation
was cancelled effective March 12, 2020. 4. I spoke with Mr. Gumns over the phone. Mr. Gumns has confirmed that I can sign on his
behalf as reflected in his declaration.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 13, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-8 04/14/20 Page 1 of 4
DECLARATION OF IAN CAZENAVE: I, Ian Cazenave, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Ian Cazenave 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 54 years old. 4. I am indigent. 5. I am in DOC custody and currently housed at Angola’s Main Prison in the Ash 2 dormitory.
Ash 2 is in part a dormitory for people who are handicapped or have medical needs. 6. I am housed in close quarters in the dormitory with approximately 86 other people. I am
unable to maintain 6 feet of space between me and other people. 7. I have two face coverings made out of t-shirt material. I do not have gloves. 8. There are 7 toilets, 5 sinks, and 5-6 showers in Ash 2. 9. Even though we are on lockdown, people come in and out of the dormitory each day,
including 2-4 medical staff and 3-4 guards. Not everyone is wearing masks. 10. To my knowledge, medical and correctional staff are going back and forth between Camp J
and other places at Angola. 11. Ash 2 has been on lockdown for about a month. One person has been taken out of the
dormitory after they developed COVID-19 symptoms. I have not seen him since and I don’t know where he went. 12. I have access to soap that they make at LSP but I don’t have any other soap because it would cost money. I had some hand sanitizer left over from when I was at University Medical Center but I just ran out. They don’t sell hand sanitizer at the canteen. 13. I have pre-existing conditions that may put me at a high risk if I become infected with COVID-19, including sickle cell disease and resulting complications and a heart murmur. I

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-8 04/14/20 Page 2 of 4
need daily dressing changes for the open wounds on my feet and legs. Usually I would go to the hospital for my dressing changes but now the nurses are coming to the dorm. I asked the nurses if they were also going to Camp J but they would not tell me. 14. I last went to the hematologist around June of 2019. I last went to wound care in December of 2019. 15. I take around ten medications per day, including aspirin, ibuprofen, Tylenol, and Trental. 16. I have not been tested for COVID-19 nor am I experiencing any symptoms. 17. Because of my pre-existing medical conditions, I am concerned that bringing people who have already tested positive for COVID-19 to Camp J increases the risk that I will be exposed and have severe medical complications. I don’t know if they would take me to a hospital from Angola if I got sick. 18. If I test positive for COVID-19, I do not want to go to Camp J. I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my understanding that there are at least 900 beds available there. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary. 19. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to provide them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-8 04/14/20 Page 3 of 4
attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff. 20. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class and subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings against me or others. 21. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. 22. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Ian Cazenave April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-8 04/14/20 Page 4 of 4
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Cazenave. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19
pandemic, I signed the attached declaration on Ian Cazenave’s behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Cazenave is currently being held at Louisiana State Penitentiary. All in-person visitation was cancelled effective March 12, 2020. 4. I spoke with Mr. Cazenave over the phone. Mr. Cazenave has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf as reflected in his declaration.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 13, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-9 04/14/20 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU,

TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

REGINALD

GEORGE,

LIONEL

TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL

PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS

ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO

GARNER,

BRADLEY

WINTERS,

KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES

HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity

as Governor of the State of Louisiana;

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES

LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary

of the Department of Safety and Corrections;

JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as

Medical Director of the Department of Safety

and

Corrections;

LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and

STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity

as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana

Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

[PROPOSED] ORDER Considering the foregoing Emergency Motion to Restrain Defendants From Transferring COVID-19 Carriers to Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”), it is ordered that the motion is GRANTED IN PART and Defendants are temporarily restrained from transferring people with confirmed or suspected COVID-19 to LSP up until and including the time that this Court issues a decision on the preliminary injunction application, after a hearing.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 2-9 04/14/20 Page 2 of 2 The parties are directed to meet and confer within 24 hours of this order on the least burdensome means for the DOC to comply with this Order. A hearing in this matter will take place on _______________. Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this ___ day of ______________, 2020.
_______________________________ Judge
2

 
 Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 1 04/14/20 Page 1 of 73

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU,

TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

REGINALD

GEORGE,

LIONEL

TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL

PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS

ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO

GARNER,

BRADLEY

WINTERS,

KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES

HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity

as Governor of the State of Louisiana;

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES

LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary

of the Department of Safety and Corrections;

JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as

Medical Director of the Department of Safety

and

Corrections;

LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and

STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity

as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana

Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 1 04/14/20 Page 2 of 73

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 4

JURISDICTION AND VENUE ...................................................................................................................7

PARTIES ............................................................................................................................................................8

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS .......................................................................................................................18

I. COVID-19 Is a Serious and Deadly Global Pandemic That Threatens the Lives of Louisiana’s Incarcerated Population................................................................................................18

A. COVID-19 Is Particularly Severe in Louisiana and Has Caused a Public Health Emergency .............................................................................................................................22

B. Incarcerated People are Especially Vulnerable to COVID-19 ......................................23

C. DOC Is Ill-Prepared to Provide Adequate Treatment to Individuals with COVID-19, and LSP Especially So ...................................................................................27

II. The DOC’s Insufficient Response to COVID-19 Places the Putative Class at a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm by Increasing the Likelihood that COVID-19 Patients Will Not Receive Proper Treatment................................................................................................31

A. Defendants Have Either Sought to Obscure Their Plans for COVID-19 from the Public, Their Patients, and Advocacy Groups—or There Is No Comprehensive Plan ............................................................................................................31

B. The Skeletal Plans Provided by DOC, Including the Flu Regulation and Flu Coop Plans, Do Not Provide Appropriate Guidance to Louisiana Prisons................33

C. As A Result of Improper Guidance and Oversight, People Are Receiving Compromised Care and Are Living in Dangerous Conditions .....................................36

III. The DOC’s LSP Transfer Plan Places the Putative Class at a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm by Increasing the Likelihood that COVID-19 Patients Will Not Receive Proper Treatment and by Unnecessarily Subjecting the Vulnerable LSP Population to an Increased Risk of Transmission .......................................................................................................37

A. The DOC’s LSP Transfer Plan Increases the Likelihood that COVID-19 Patients Will Not Receive Proper Treatment ..................................................................................39

i.

LSP’s Remote Location Ensures that Patients Cannot Be Quickly

Transported to Hospitals .......................................................................................43

ii. LSP’s Camp J Is Notoriously Unfit for Housing even Healthy Individuals ..49

2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 1 04/14/20 Page 3 of 73
B. The DOC’s LSP Transfer Plan Unnecessarily Subjects A Vulnerable Population to an Increased Risk of Transmission ...............................................................................56
IV. Defendants’ Plans Place All Incarcerated Patients at Risk, Whether They Are Housed at DOC Facilities or Local Facilities and Whether They Are Pre-trial Detainees or PostTrial Prisoners.....................................................................................................................................60 A. Defendants Have Obligations to People Incarcerated in Parish Prisons and Jails.....60 B. Risk to People in Pre-Trial Detention ...............................................................................62
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................................................63 V. The Plaintiff Class and Subclasses ...................................................................................................63 VI. Rule 23(a) Factors ..............................................................................................................................64
C. Numerosity — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) .............................................................................64 D. Commonality — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)..........................................................................64 E. Typicality — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).................................................................................65 F. Adequacy — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).................................................................................66 G. Rule 23(b)(2)..........................................................................................................................66 H. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) ....................................................................................................................67 CLAIMS FOR RELIEF .................................................................................................................................68 I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deliberate Indifference to the Serious Risk of Harm Posed by COVID19 (Subclass I) (Eighth Amendment) (Defendants Edwards, DOC, LDH, LeBlanc, and Russo) ................................................................................................................................................... 68 II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deliberate Indifference to the Serious Risk of Harm Posed by COVID19 (Subclass II) (Fourteenth Amendment) (Defendants Edwards, LDH, and Russo)............69 III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deliberate Indifference to the Serious Risk of Harm Created by The DOC’s LSP Transfer Plan (Subclass II) (Fourteenth Amendment) (Defendants Edwards, DOC, LDH, LeBlanc and Russo)....................................................................................................70 PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................................................71
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On information and belief,

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION 1. COVID-19 is a deadly global pandemic caused by a novel coronavirus that has

infected over 1.8 million people and killed over 117,500 worldwide in the four months between

when it began to spread in Wuhan, China, and the date of this filing.1 Louisiana is among the hardest

hit states in the United States, with over 20,000 confirmed cases and nearly 1,000 deaths.

2. Prisons and jails are congregate settings where COVID-19 can spread rapidly. Within

the two weeks since the first positive COVID-19 case was identified in a Louisiana prison, 55

incarcerated individuals in six of the state’s eight prisons and 45 staff working in seven of those eight

prisons have tested positive for COVID-19, and one staff member has died. These numbers likely

represent just the tip of the iceberg in terms of infections given the lack of available testing and the

fact that many people are asymptomatic.

3. The Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) issued an Interim Guidance on

Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 in Correctional and Detention Facilities (“CDC Guidance”).2 The CDC Guidance provides, among other things, that correctional and detention

facilities should coordinate closely with their local public health departments, facilitate social

distancing wherever possible, and restrict transfer to and from other facilities or jurisdictions unless necessary. Individuals with COVID-19 must be carefully monitored and transferred to the nearest

hospital if they decompensate.

1 Coronavirus Resource Center, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, available at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2020). 2 CDC, “Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities” (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-detention.html (“CDC Guidance”).
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4. The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DOC”) has adopted and is implementing a COVID-19 management plan that is inconsistent with the CDC Guidance and places the lives and health of incarcerated individuals at substantial risk of serious harm.
5. The Louisiana Department of Health (“LDH”) is responsible for the development and provision of health and medical services for the prevention of diseases, such as COVID-19, for the residents of Louisiana, including the standards of health and decency for all prisons and jails.
6. Specifically, in the midst of this pandemic, the DOC is implementing a dangerous plan to transfer COVID-19 patients from prisons and jails in every part of the state and concentrate them at the remote and notoriously inhumane Camp J at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”).3 By crowding large numbers of COVID-19 patients into a facility far removed from hospitals and adequate medical staff and where social distancing is impossible, the DOC is implementing a deadly course of action that controverts not only public health recommendations but also basic common sense. If the DOC is permitted to carry out this LSP transfer plan, it will likely result in the death of dozens—if not hundreds or thousands—of people.
7. Perhaps even more disturbingly, the State of Louisiana through the LDH has set up the Medical Monitoring Station (MMS) with hundreds of beds ready and able to take non-acute COVID-19 patients. This facility has appropriate personal protective equipment, trained medical professionals of all qualifications, and appropriate quarantine facilities, yet the DOC has chosen not to move incarcerated patients there.
8. Over the past several weeks, the United States has experienced the onslaught of an unprecedented viral pandemic that has brought “business as usual” to a complete halt—confining people to their homes, shuttering businesses, emptying the streets, curtailing social gatherings, and overwhelming hospital systems. Following guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and, in
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many cases, orders from their state governments, many of the country’s residents wait isolated in their homes, leaving only for essential purposes, desperately hoping to avoid contracting the disease. Those who are unable to avoid exposure face the firsthand reality of a highly contagious respiratory illness for which there is no cure. As of April 13, 2020, 560,891 people in the United States had tested positive for COVID-19, and 22,861 had died from the illness. Both the number of confirmed cases and the number of deaths continue to rise rapidly.4
9. While the Louisiana government encourages people in most communities to promote and practice social isolation and heightened hygiene measures to protect themselves from the coronavirus and its potentially lethal symptoms, it affords its incarcerated communities no such option. Incarcerated individuals live in close and crowded quarters, have limited access to soap, are unable to augment the cleaning practices in their living environments of their own volition, and cannot make their own medical decisions. They are, in every sense, at the mercy of the State.
10. The DOC has over 31,600 within its immediate custody, and another 15,000 people are detained pretrial in Louisiana. All are at risk of being transferred to LSP under the DOC’s plan.5 This population is especially vulnerable to outbreaks and disproportionately likely to suffer severe cases of COVID-19 if infected. These risks are compounded by inadequacies in the DOC’s medical system overall and at LSP in particular. Nevertheless, the DOC has conceived and is implementing a plan to concentrate pre-trial and post-conviction COVID-19 patients from every part of the state at LSP, creating a substantial risk of serious harm both for the COVID-19 patients who are transferred and for the people already incarcerated at LSP. The DOC’s LSP transfer plan will place COVID-19 patients at a remote facility that is over an hour away from the nearest hospital capable of treating
3 In addition to the Camp J location, Patients are also set to be moved to Allen Correctional, and women who test positive are being moved to Elayn Hunt Correctional Facility. 4 Coronavirus Resource Center, supra n.1. 5 DOC Briefing Book at 18 (Dec. 31, 2019), available at https://doc.louisiana.gov/about-thedpsc/annual-statistics/.
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patients who need medical intervention of any kind, and LSP itself is indisputably incapable of providing such treatment. Moreover, a federal judge recently indicated that the medical care system at LSP is constitutionally deficient in at least some respects, and no injunctive remedies to alleviate its deficiencies in medical care, even without regard to a global pandemic, have yet been ordered. Under the circumstances, COVID-19 patients who develop life-threatening symptoms at LSP therefore face an unnecessarily increased risk of death.
11. Equally troubling, LSP has disproportionately high numbers of elderly people and people with chronic pre-existing conditions that make them especially at risk of developing serious COVID-19 symptoms and death. Thus, the LSP transfer plan needlessly exposes an extremely vulnerable population of people to a high risk of viral outbreak in a carceral setting where social distancing is impossible. In addition to exposing these vulnerable people to COVID-19, the addition of dozens and likely hundreds of COVID-19 patients will also strain LSP’s already broken medical system, and therefore impede the delivery of crucially needed health services to patients who are elderly and/or require treatment for chronic medical conditions that are unrelated to COVID-19. There is simply no way that LSP can adequately provide care to its current population while also dealing with an added concentration of COVID-19 patients from other facilities.
12. Defendants’ COVID-19 response constitutes deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm threatening Plaintiffs and similarly situated people. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the putative class they seek to represent, seek declaratory and injunctive relief against all Defendants to prevent the continued violation of their constitutional rights.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 13. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a). This Court has authority to grant declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
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14. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to the claims asserted in this complaint occurred in this judicial district.
PARTIES 15. Plaintiff Kendrick Wilson is a pretrial individual who was previously being held in isolation at East Baton Rouge Prison’s Unit 2. Mr. Wilson was tested for COVID-19 at approximately two o’clock in the morning on April 9. Before being tested, Mr. Wilson had a fever of 102.5 degrees. He has been suffering from body pains, a cough, and congestion. He was told he had tested positive on April 10 or April 11. He did not want to be transferred to Camp J at LSP because of the conditions and lack of access to medical treatment. Mr. Wilson was transferred against his will to Camp J on April 11 at approximately 5:00 p.m. in the evening. At Camp J he is being housed in an open dorm with approximately 39 other people. There is no physical isolation from the other patients. A lot of people are coughing and there are some patients hooked up to IVs or oxygen masks. There are two nurses who check on him once or twice a day. He was given Tylenol and sinus medication for his body pains and other symptoms. 16. Plaintiff Julius Allen is a pre-trial individual being held in isolation at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison’s Unit 2. Mr. Allen was tested for COVID-19 at approximately two o’clock in the morning on April 9 and is awaiting his results. Prison officials have informed him that he will not be told his test results but that he will be transferred to LSP if his test result is positive. He is suffering from fever, severe body aches, difficulty breathing, weakness, disorientation, and diarrhea. Mr. Allen also suffers from several pre-existing medical conditions, including diabetes, hypertension, bronchitis, and high cholesterol, and is therefore at a high risk of developing severe symptoms if he is in fact infected with the coronavirus, as noted by the CDC.6 Mr. Allen is concerned about his ability to access medical treatment if he is transferred to Camp J at LSP. Mr. Allen is only permitted
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to use the phone during limited periods of the day to update his wife and daughters on his medical condition. Mr. Allen is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
17. Plaintiff Alfoanso Garner is a federal inmate being held at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. He was tested for COVID-19 the morning of April 5, and his test came back positive on April 8. He was told that he was going to be transferred, although he was not told where. The other inmates he was being held with in medical isolation have been transferred to another facility but he does not know where. Mr. Garner is suffering from body aches, cold sweat, and a fever. He is concerned about his ability to access medical treatment if he is transferred to Camp J at LSP. Mr. Garner is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID19 policies and practices.
18. Plaintiff Ernest Rogers is a pre-trial individual being held in isolation at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison’s Unit 2. Mr. Rogers was tested for COVID-19 at approximately two o’clock in the morning on April 9 and is awaiting his results. He is 65 years old and has hepatitis C, liver disease, and high blood pressure, and is therefore at a high risk of developing severe symptoms if he is in fact infected with the coronavirus, as noted by the CDC.7 Mr. Rogers has been suffering from a cough, a sore throat, and a fever. He has previously been incarcerated at LSP and was housed at Camp J. He is desperate not to return there because of the terrible conditions and the lack of access to medical treatment. Mr. Rogers is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
19. Plaintiff Bradley Winters is a pre-trial individual being held in isolation at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison’s Unit 2. Mr. Winters was tested for COVID-19 on the afternoon of April 9
6 People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2020). 7 Id.
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and is awaiting his results. He was housed in a cell with people who had tested positive for COVID19 while he was waiting for his test results. He has had increasingly bad headaches and suffers from anemia and ADHD. He has not been told if he will be transferred to Camp J if his test results are positive, but he is concerned about being transported away from medical treatment that he may need. Mr. Winters is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
20. Plaintiff James Hughes is a pre-trial individual being held in quarantine at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. He had not yet been tested for COVID-19 as of April 9, 2020, but he has been suffering from a cough, and he has chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), an inflammatory lung disease that causes obstructed airflow from the lungs. Mr. Hughes has been in contact with three or four people who have since tested positive, including Mr. Shawn Freeman, who slept across from him and who was transferred to Camp J after testing positive and was soon thereafter taken back to Our Lady of the Lake Hospital in Baton Rouge to be put on a ventilator. Mr. Hughes does not know if Mr. Freeman is still at the hospital or if he has died. Mr. Hughes is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
21. Plaintiff Daniel Gumns is an individual in DOC custody housed at LSP’s Camp D in the Building 1 dormitory where he lives in close quarters with approximately 80 other people and cannot practice social distancing, as recommended by the CDC and other public health official authorities.8 Mr. Gumns is an epileptic and suffers from grand mal seizures. He also suffers from asthma,9 which is triggered when he has seizures and sometimes leaves him unable to breathe
8 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): How to Protect Yourself and Others, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2020). 9 People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CDC, supra n.6 (listing “People with Asthma” among those at higher risk).
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without medical support. He has had three seizures since being transferred to LSP on February 21, 2020. Mr. Gumns’ most recent seizure occurred in or around April 2, 2020. Mr. Gumns is concerned that bringing COVID-19 patients to Camp J increases the risk that he will be infected. Because of COVID-19’s effects on the lungs, Mr. Gumns fears that if he is infected, he will die or suffer from serious medical complications. He does not believe that Camp J will be prepared to meet his medical needs if he is taken there and does not think he will be taken to a hospital in time to receive treatment. Mr. Gumms has 18-20 months left in his sentence and could be eligible for probation within the next year. Mr. Gumns is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
22. Plaintiff Michael Videau is an individual in DOC custody housed at LSP’s Main Prison in the Spruce 4 dormitory in close quarters with approximately 80 other people and cannot practice social distancing. He has not been given soap or bleach and is unable to practice the hygiene and disinfectant measures recommended by the CDC. Mr. Videau is 63 years old and is therefore at a high risk of developing severe symptoms if he is infected with the coronavirus, as noted by the CDC and medical experts.10 He also suffers from a multitude of pre-existing conditions that put him at high risk if he contracts the virus, including leukemia, high blood pressure, diabetes, arthritis, and acute pneumonia.11 Mr. Videau takes at least eight different medications per day. He has had to be hospitalized approximately five times in the past nine years and required oxygen on at least one of those occasions. He is concerned that bringing people from across the state to Camp J increases the risk that he will be exposed to the coronavirus and potentially suffer severe complications or death if
10 How to Protect Yourself and Others, CDC, supra n.8 (noting that older adults are at higher risk for severe illness). 11 Groups at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/need-extra-precautions/groups-at-higher-risk.html (noting that “people of any age who have serious underlying medical conditions might be at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19”).
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he catches the virus. Mr. Videau is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
23. Plaintiff Lionel Tolbert is an individual in DOC custody housed at LSP’s Ash 3 dormitory in close quarters with approximately 80 other people and cannot practice social distancing. He has not been given soap or bleach and is unable to practice the hygiene and disinfectant measures recommended by the CDC.12 Mr. Tolbert is 64 years old and is therefore at a high risk of developing severe symptoms if he is infected with the coronavirus, as noted by the CDC and medical experts.13 Mr. Tolbert is very concerned that by transferring COVID-19 patients into Camp J, the DOC is putting him at risk, given his underlying health conditions of coronary artery disease and heart and vascular disease. He has a history of cardiovascular disease and saw a cardiologist most recently in late 2019. He expects that he will not be able to be transported for his regular medical check-ups to manage his multiple chronic medical conditions until the risk of COVID-19 subsides. Mr. Tolbert is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
24. Plaintiff Ian Cazenave is an individual in DOC custody housed at LSP’s Ash 2 dormitory, which is a medical dormitory partially reserved for persons with acute medical needs. Mr. Cazenave lives in close quarters with approximately 80 other people and cannot practice social distancing. Mr. Cazenave suffers from advanced sickle cell disease and has suffered from leg ulcers and other common complications related to sick cell disease, which may include heart disease, lung disease, retinal disease, and other illnesses. Mr. Cazenave is at higher risk for severe illness if he contracts COVID-19 as respiratory viruses are known to cause severe complications—including higher rates of hospitalization, acute chest syndrome, and need for mechanical ventilation— for people with sickle cell disease. Mr. Cazenave needs his dressings changed at least every other day.
12 Id. 12

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He ordinarily goes to the Acute Treatment Unit for this, but because of the pandemic, nurses have been coming to his dormitory amidst the lockdown from the hospital to change his dressings. Mr. Cazenave is worried about COVID-19 patients being housed at Camp J in part because any medical or custodial staff going back and forth between Camp J, or having any contact with the staff at Camp J, and then coming into dormitories exposes the population to the virus. Mr. Cazenave expects that he will not be able to be transported for his regular appointments to the wound clinic and hematology clinic, which are already overdue, until the risk of COVID-19 subsides. Mr. Cazenave has difficulties communicating the status of his healthcare needs with family members, his daughter in particular, during this time. Mr. Cazenave is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
25. Plaintiff Otto Barrera is an individual in DOC custody housed at LSP’s Ash 2 dormitory, which is a medical dormitory partially reserved for persons with acute medical needs. Mr. Barrera lives in close quarters with approximately 80 other people and cannot practice social distancing. He has a prescription for a mechanical soft diet and is worried about his ability to receive this diet until the risk of COVID-19 subsides. Mr. Barrera is worried about COVID-19 patients being housed at Camp J because of the high risk that he will become infected if someone in Ash 2 contracts the virus. Last year, there was an outbreak of a rash that may have been scabies in Ash 2 and a large percentage of people were infected. Mr. Barrera knows that once something contagious gets into the dorms, it is impossible to stop it from spreading widely. Mr. Barrera is eligible for release within the next year; his release date is in February 2021, with a work release date in August 2020. Mr. Barrera is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
13 People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CDC, supra n.6. 13

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26. Plaintiff Michael Robinson is an individual housed at LSP’s Ash 2 dormitory, which is a medical dormitory partially reserved for persons with acute medical needs. Mr. Robinson lives in close quarters with approximately 80 other people and cannot practice social distancing. He has had liver disease and hepatitis C for the past twenty years. Mr. Robinson was picked up on a parole violation in Morehouse Parish and put in jail there, where he then broke his hip and required medical treatment. He was taken to Glenwood Regional Medical Center for surgery and then transported to LSP upon release from the hospital, despite the fact that he has not yet been to court or been sentenced for his parole violation. When he was first brought to LSP, Mr. Robinson was quarantined on the hospital ward for approximately 14 days, where he could have exposed the other ward patients—many of whom are at-risk if they contract coronaviruses because they are elderly or acute care patients—to the coronavirus if he picked it up before his arrival at LSP. Mr. Robinson is worried about COVID-19 patients being housed at Camp J because of the high risk that he will become infected if someone in Ash 2 contracts the virus. Mr. Robinson is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
27. Plaintiff Kentrell Parker is an individual in DOC custody housed on LSP’s Nursing Unit 2, an infirmary for patients requiring long-term nursing care and hospice patients. Mr. Parker is a quadriplegic and has a catheter that requires regular care. Mr. Parker takes blood pressure medication and until recently used a tracheostomy tube to help with breathing. Mr. Parker requires assistance in every single activity of daily living, including but not limited to bathing, eating, taking medication, and being turned several times a day. Mr. Parker has a history of decubitus ulcers and is currently developing an ulcer and is need of medical attention. He is concerned that transferring COVID-19 patients to Camp J will prevent LSP from being able to meet his daily needs and need for medical treatment. Mr. Parker is also worried about COVID-19 patients being housed at Camp J in part because any medical or custodial staff going back and forth between Camp J, or having any
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contact with the staff at Camp J, and then coming onto the infirmary, exposes that vulnerable population to the virus. It is Mr. Parker’s understanding that the nurse practitioner who typically provides his medical care and the medical care for others at the infirmary is working at Camp J now. Mr. Parker is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
28. Plaintiff Reginald George is an individual in DOC custody housed in the cell blocks at LSP’s Transition Unit, which serves as a transitional housing area for individuals with severe mental illness or developmental disabilities, including patients like Mr. George who are in wheelchairs. Mr. George suffers from multiple chronic medical conditions, including hypertension, prostate cancer, hepatitis C, and HIV, and is therefore at a high risk of developing severe symptoms if he is infected with the coronavirus, as noted by the CDC and medical experts.14 Mr. George has had low CD4 counts in the past and is concerned that his counts are currently low and he will not be able to see a doctor until the risk of COVID-19 subsides. Mr. George has on occasion been housed at Camp J for disciplinary reasons and is concerned that he would have to return there if he tested positive for COVID-19. Mr. George is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
29. Plaintiff Trevon Wiley is an individual in DOC custody housed at LSP’s Cypress 3 dormitory. Mr. Wiley lives in close quarters with approximately 86 other people and cannot practice social distancing. Between January and February, Mr. Wiley was sick twice and received inadequate medical treatment. He had a high fever and other symptoms and was provided with treatment only after his family called LSP, and then he was only provided with Tylenol and Ibuprofen. He was finally provided with antibiotics and a steroid shot but remains congested. Mr. Wiley is concerned
14 People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CDC, supra n.6 (noting that “people of any age who have a serious underlying medical condition might be at higher risk for severe illness, including people who are immunocompromised.”).
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about his ability to timely obtain adequate treatment if he develops COVID-19 symptoms and/or tests positive for the virus. He is concerned that the transfer of COVID-19 patients to Camp J increases the risk of transmission because security staff is still coming and going between his dorm and other places at LSP, potentially including Camp J or places where the Camp J staff have also been. Mr. Wiley is subject to Defendants’ medical care policies and practices, including the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
30. Defendant Governor of Louisiana John Bel Edwards (“Governor Edwards”) has the responsibility to “support the constitution and laws of the state and of the United States and shall see that the laws are faithfully executed,” pursuant to the Louisiana Constitution, Article IV, § 5. Further, he is entrusted with the authority to act in times of emergency, pursuant to Louisiana R.S. § 29.724(D)(1), and has the ultimate authority for ensuring that all executive agencies, including the DOC and the DOH, function in compliance with state and federal laws. The Governor has personally been involved in the decision making regarding COVID-19 and the DOC, including discussions about the appropriateness of the transfer plan and ways to mitigate COVID-19 within facilities. Additionally, the Governor has failed to fulfill his duty to oversee the Secretary of Health and ensure that LDH is providing sufficient guidance to the DOC. The Governor has directed his staff to work with the DOC to come up with its responses to the pandemic. The Governor has the power to ensure that the DOC and the DOH implement adequate policies and procedures to protect Plaintiffs and the putative class from the harms of COVID-19. He can be served at 900 N. 3rd Street #4, Baton Rouge, LA 70802.
31. The DOC oversees the custody and care of adults in prison and includes adults under probation and parole supervision, pursuant to La. R.S. § 36:4. The domicile of the DOC and its divisions is the parish of East Baton Rouge, city of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, pursuant to R.S.
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15:821.1. Policies promulgated in response to the pandemic have been promulgated under the auspices of the DOC. The DOC can be served at 504 Mayflower Street, Baton Rouge, LA 70802.
32. Defendant Secretary James M. LeBlanc is responsible for the functioning and control of all programs within the DOC. He is appointed by the Louisiana Governor and is the chief executive officer for the DOC. He formulates rules and regulations and determines policy regarding management, personnel, and total operations. He leads and supports central office and field unit staff, which are charged with carrying out the work of the agency and protecting the constitutional rights of all persons held in DOC custody. At all relevant times, Secretary LeBlanc has acted under color of law and as the agent and official representative of the DOC. Secretary LeBlanc has personally been involved in the development of the COVID-19 planning and has approved all policies related to the DOC’s COVID-19 response. He can be served at 504 Mayflower Street, Baton Rouge, LA 70802.
33. Dr. John E. Morrison is the Medical Director for DOC. He was hired to oversee the operation of the DOC’s healthcare system. It is Dr. Morrison’s responsibility to provide medical support for the system’s COVID-19 response in conjunction the Louisiana Department of Health. Dr. Morrison has been involved in the DOC’s COVID-19 response at every stage and signed off on the transfer plan as medical authority. He can be served at 504 Mayflower Street, Baton Rouge, LA 70802. Plaintiffs have heard, but have been unable to confirm, that Dr. Morrison resigned last week. If this is true, Plaintiffs would seek to substitute whoever has taken his place as Medical Director.
34. The Louisiana Department of Health (LDH), through its Office of Public Health, has exclusive jurisdiction, control, and authority under R.S. § 40:5 to enact provisions regulating the standards of health and decency and building regulations of all prisons, jails, lock-ups, and camps where prisoners are detained or confined; to isolate or quarantine for the care and control of communicable disease with the state; to take such action as is necessary to accomplish the
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subsidence and suppression of diseases of all kinds in order to prevent their spread; over the regulation of the carriage and transportation of people as they may affect public health; and additional powers detailed therein. The LDH is responsible for the development and providing of health and medical services for the prevention of disease for the citizens of Louisiana.15 The domicile of the LDH and its divisions is the parish of East Baton Rouge, city of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, pursuant to R.S. § 36:251. The LDH can be served at 628 N. 4th Street, Baton Rouge, LA 70802.
35. Stephen R. Russo is the interim Secretary of the LDH, the state’s largest agency with a budget of $14 billion. As interim Secretary, he is responsible for the “administration, control, and operation of the functions, programs, and affairs” of the LDH.16 He also has power to effectuate the LDH’s oversight over health regulations affecting prisons, jails, and camps. His oversight responsibilities include, but are not limited to, public health and emergency preparedness. He can be served at 628 N. 4th Street, Baton Rouge, LA 70802.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS I. COVID-19 Is a Serious and Deadly Global Pandemic That Threatens the
Lives of Louisiana’s Incarcerated Population 36. The coronavirus (COVID-19) is a viral pandemic. It is a novel virus for which there is no established curative medical treatment and no vaccine.17 37. COVID-19 is an acute respiratory syndrome that can cause pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, respiratory failure, heart failure, sepsis, and other potentially fatal
15 R.S. § 36:251. 16 R.S. § 36:253; R.S. § 36:254. 17 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 2.
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conditions.18 Lab testing and imaging is required to appropriately evaluate and provide treatment to
patients with COVID-19. One-fifth of all confirmed cases cause serious illness, including respiratory
damage that requires hospitalization and mechanical ventilation, and can permanently harm those
who survive.19
38. Treatment for severe cases of COVID-19 includes respiratory isolation, oxygen, and
mechanical ventilation.20 Symptoms can range from fever, cough, chest pain, and headache to loss of
smell, abdominal pain, rash, diarrhea, aches, and vomiting.21 Screening for cough or fever is not
sufficient to exclude the possibility of infection from COVID-19.22 Even testing is not entirely
reliable; fifteen percent of patients who are tested for COVID-19 have a false negative, meaning
they do indeed have COVID-19 but the test is negative.23 Symptoms can rapidly worsen, with
people who appear to have mild cases quickly developing severe symptoms that require medical
intervention and life-saving measures immediately upon arrival to the hospital.24
39. There are no lab tests that predict the course of a COVID-19 patient’s illness.25
Some patients have adequate oxygen saturation for days and then deteriorate.26 There are no signs or
symptoms that can be used to predict clinical deterioration.27 Given the lack of tell-tale signs or a
18 Fei Zhou et al., Clinical Course and Risk Factors for Mortality of Adult Inpatients with COVID-19 in Wuhan, China: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 395 LANCET 1054 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30566-3/fulltext. 19 “While about 80% of cases manifest as a mild illness (i.e. non-pneumonia or mild pneumonia), approximately 20% progress to a more severe illness, with 6% requiring specialist medical care, including mechanical ventilation.” World Health Organization, Preparedness, Prevention And Control Of COVID-19 In Prisons And Other Places Of Detention: Interim Guidance, 10 (Mar. 15, 2020), http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/434026/Preparedness-prevention-andcontrol-of-COVID-19-in-prisons.pdf?ua=1. 20 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 13. 21 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 7. 22 Id. at ¶ 8. 23 Id. at ¶ 7. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Id. 27 Id.
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timeline for subsequent deterioration, it is critical that patients who test positive or likely positive (known as persons under investigation) for COVID-19 or have been exposed and show symptoms, be within easy transportable distance of hospitals in the event that more critical care is necessary.28 Uniquely, COVID-19 Patients are not always aware of the lack of oxygen in their bodies and can be on the edge of death without gasping for breath or feeling the need for oxygen.29
40. Severe COVID-19 patients can suffer acute respiratory distress syndrome (“ARDS”). The lungs fill with fluid, and the patient becomes extremely difficult to oxygenate. The only way to manage ARDS is to put the patient on a ventilator. The mortality rate for ARDS is 40%. COVID-19 patients can develop ARDS very quickly, and the severity and sensation of ARDS for COVID-19 patients is similar to drowning.30
41. COVID-19 is highly transmissible. Recent estimates by the CDC suggest that, on average in community settings, each infected person transmits the virus to an additional 5.7 additional people.31 If that figure is correct, only the influenza pandemic of 1918 is known to have higher infectivity.32 COVID-19 is transmitted by droplets of infected aerosol when people with the infection cough, which can survive in the air for up to three hours—and on surfaces such as plastic and stainless steel for up to 2-3 days.33 The virus can also be transmitted inter alia through saliva, fecal matter, or discharge from the nose.34 The intubation period is believed to be 2-14 days, which
28 Id. 29 Id. 30 Lizzie Presser, A Medical Worker Describes Terrifying Lung Failure From COVID-19 — Even in His Young Patients, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 21, 2020, 5 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/amedical-worker-describes--terrifying-lung-failure-from-covid19-even-in-his-young-patients. 31 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 3. 32 Id. 33 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 6, Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 10. 34 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 18.
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is particularly concerning for transmission rates given that so many people are asymptomatic and
infectious.35
42. The rapid spread of COVID-19 has created an unprecedented health emergency in
every part of the world. The World Health Organization (“WHO”) declared COVID-19 a
worldwide pandemic on March 11, 2020.36 Governor John Bel Edwards declared “a statewide public
health emergency” in Louisiana that same day.37 On March 13, 2020, President Trump declared a
national emergency.38
43. The number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the United States is rising rapidly.
As of April 13, 2020, WHO was reporting 524,514 confirmed cases in the United States with 20,444
deaths. Both the number of confirmed cases and the number of deaths continue to rise rapidly.39 In
fact, the United States has the highest number of reported cases of any country in the world. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) projects that without swift and effective
public health interventions, over 200 million people in the U.S. could be infected with COVID-19
over the course of the epidemic, with as many as 1.7 million deaths.40
35 Id. at ¶ 3. 36 WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/whodirector-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020. 37 Proclamation No. 25 JBE 2020 (Mar. 11, 2020), available at https://gov.louisiana.gov/assets/Proclamations/2020/modified/25-JBE-2020-Public-HealthEmergency-COVID-19.pdf. 38 Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak (Mar. 13, 2020), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19outbreak/. 39 Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) Situation Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, https://who.sprinklr.com/region/amro/country/us (last visited Apr. 13, 2020). 40 Sheri Fink, Worst-Case Estimates for U.S. Coronavirus Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/us/coronavirus-deaths-estimate.html.
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44. Many studies have shown the increased risk for serious complications in patients infected with COVID-19 that also suffer from comorbidities, including common health problems that afflict Plaintiffs like hypertension, diabetes, COPD, and cancer.41
45. Although advanced age and underlying illnesses or chronic medical conditions increase the risk of serious effects of COVID-19, younger patients ages 20-54 years old can also have serious complications, including hospital admission, admission to an intensive care unit, invasive ventilation, or death.42 Screening by age and prior medical history alone is not sufficient to determine who may develop serious complications and need medical intervention.
46. COVID-19 can result in serious medical complications leading to death and it is imperative that those patients have access to palliative care to ensure they do not suffer needlessly.43 The provision of morphine or other end-of-life drugs is crucial to manage pain and symptoms and allow for a humane death.44 The pandemic has resulted in widespread shortages of the pharmaceuticals needed to treat COVID-19 patients.45
47. Compared with past outbreaks of communicable diseases, the COVID-19 pandemic is of nearly unprecedented magnitude,46 and reliance on pre-existing influenza or infectious disease protocols simply is insufficient to respond to this novel and deadly disease.
A. COVID-19 Is Particularly Severe in Louisiana and Has Caused a Public Health Emergency
48. Louisiana is experiencing one of the worst COVID-19 outbreaks in the world. As of April 13, 2020, Louisiana had 21,016 confirmed cases of COVID-19, with at least 884 deaths.47
41 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 19. 42 Id. at ¶ 9. 43 Id. at ¶ 20. 44 Id. 45 Vanessa Taylor, Doctors ask state prisons to donate lethal injection drugs to help treat coronavirus, MIC, (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.mic.com/p/doctors-ask-state-prisons-to-donate-lethal-injection-drugs-tohelp-treat-coronavirus-22804253. 46 United States v. Martin, No. 19-cv-140-13, 2020 WL 1274857, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2020).
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49. A study from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette reported that confirmed COVID-19 cases grew by 67.8% in the two weeks after the first diagnosis on March 9, 2020, the highest rate in the United States.48
50. UpToDate49 reports an overall case mortality rate from the disease of 2.3%. Louisiana has 884 deaths for 21,016 confirmed cases; 4.2% of persons diagnosed with the infection in Louisiana die.50
51. Black people constitute approximately 32% of Louisiana’s population but 67.8% of the state’s prison population51 and over 70% of the deaths from COVID-19.52
52. New Orleans “is quickly becoming a coronavirus epicenter in the U.S.,”53 while “an equally alarming outbreak” is occurring in Shreveport.54
B. Incarcerated People are Especially Vulnerable to COVID-19 53. People in carceral settings are among the most vulnerable populations for COVID19 infection, as they have shown high rates of coinfection with hepatitis C, HIV, and tuberculosis

47 Coronavirus Updates in Louisiana, WDSU NEWS, https://www.wdsu.com/article/coronavirus-

updates-in-louisiana-3540-covid-19-cases-in-state-151-deaths-reported/31969586# (last visited Apr.

13, 2020).

48 Adam Daigle, Coronavirus Cases Grew Faster in Louisiana Than Anywhere Else in the World: UL Study,

THE

ACADIANA

ADVOCATE

(Mar.

24,

2020),

https://www.theadvocate.com/acadiana/news/coronavirus/article_94494420-6d4b-11ea-ac42-

ff7dd722c084.html.

49 UpToDate is an online medical reference widely used in hospitals, health organizations, and

private physicians.

50 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 5.

51 Ashley Neils, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons, THE SENTENCING

PROJECT (June 14, 2016) https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-justice-racial-

and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/.

52 Sam Karlin, John Bel Edwards: An Emotional Thought on Easter, a Call for Coronavirus Disparity Task

Force, THE ADVOCATE (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/

coronavirus/article_ec7691d8-7b5c-11ea-becd-132e7ab42c80.html.

53 Erika Edwards, Why New Orleans Is Quickly Becoming a Coronavirus Epicenter in the U.S., NBC NEWS

(Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/why-new-orleans-quickly-

becoming-coronavirus-epicenter-u-s-n1169376.

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(TB).55 They are at a significantly higher risk of spreading infectious diseases. For example, the World Health Organization has identified the level of TB in prisons to be 100 times higher than that of the general population, in part due to the hazardous combination of overcrowding and poor ventilation.56 It is typically not possible to isolate incarcerated people from the outside world (including from staff and vendors who may have been exposed to COVID-19), nor is it possible to isolate them from one another. The transmission of COVID-19 in prisons can be likened to the transmission of TB, where social distancing practices are impossible with inmates living in close quarters and lack of available means to ensure preventative hygiene practices.57 As a result, jails and prisons are known to be a breeding ground for infectious respiratory illness.58 The most vivid example is the Cook County Jail, which currently has the highest outbreak numbers in the country.59
54. Prisons are not closed environments. Staff enter and leave the prisons on a daily basis, and there is little ability to ensure that individual staff members are not carrying the virus in or out; a significant percentage of carriers are asymptomatic, or are presenting with less-known symptoms, and will not be caught by a screening for temperatures or coughs.60 When the COVID19 virus is introduced to a prison, all persons, staff and incarcerated people alike, are at heightened risk of contracting the virus and, in turn, spreading the virus to others with whom they live or come into contact in their own homes and neighborhoods.61

54 Kent Sepkowitz, The Alarming Message of Louisiana’s Sharp Rise in Covid-19 Cases, CNN (Mar. 29,

2020)

(https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/29/opinions/shreveport-louisiana-new-orleans-

coronavirus-kent-sepkowitz-opinion/index.html).

55 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 10.

56 Id.

57 Id.

58 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 8.

59 Timothy Williams and Danielle Ivory, Chicago’s Jail is Top U.S. Hot Spot as Virus Spreads Behind Bars,

NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/us/coronavirus-cook-

county-jail-chicago.html.

60 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 8.

61 Id. at ¶ 11.

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55. People in congregate environments, which are places where people live, eat, and sleep in close proximity, face increased danger of contracting COVID-19, as already evidenced by the rapid spread of the virus in cruise ships and nursing homes.
56. Similarly, jails and prisons promote the spread of respiratory illnesses because of their crowded congregate housing arrangements.62 Social distancing practices are impossible with inmates living in close quarters, and there is also a lack of available measures to ensure proper handwashing, hygiene, and sanitation.63
57. The risk of contracting an infectious disease is higher in correctional facilities in part because the facilities are not sanitary environments. People share toilets, sinks, and showers and often have limited access to soap, hand sanitizer, hot water, and other necessary hygiene items. Repeated sanitation of horizontal and touch surfaces in living units and throughout LSP, as recommended by the CDC, is not typically done.64
58. People who have been exposed to COVID-19 and are then screened for cough and/or fever could still by infected.65 Many patients are asymptomatic and infectious to others.66 The CDC advises people to “[r]emember that some people without symptoms may be able to spread virus,” that “[k]eeping distance from others is especially important for people who are at higher risk of getting very sick,” and that “[y]ou could spread COVID-19 to others even if you do not feel sick.”67 The Director of the CDC has warned that as many as 25% of individuals infected with COVID-19 may be symptom-free.68 With limited testing performed on asymptomatic patients, you
62 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 10. 63 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 10. 64 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 7. 65 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 8. 66 Id. 67 How to Protect Yourself and Others, CDC, supra n.8. 68 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 15.
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cannot confirm or negate the presence of COVID-19 in an individual.69 People who are incarcerated and prison and jail staff can be infected with the virus and unknowingly spread it through the already crowded prison.70 Screening for symptoms—such as fever checks—will not flag asymptomatic carriers.
59. To reduce the risk of contracting COVID-19, the CDC advises all people—and particularly those at higher risk of severe illness—to “[w]ash your hands often with soap and water,” “[i]f soap and water are not readily available, use a hand sanitizer that contains at least 60% alcohol,” “[a]void close contact with people who are sick,” “[p]ut distance between yourself and other people,” and to “[c]over your mouth and nose with a cloth face cover when around others.”71 None of these recommended preventive measures is available to people who are incarcerated.72
60. People who are incarcerated cannot always wash their hands often with soap and water because they have limited access to soap and often no access to hand sanitizer. Plaintiff Lionel Tolbert is given soap once a week in the Ash 3 dormitory at LSP. Plaintiff Trevon Wiley has no access to hand sanitizer in the Cypress 3 dormitory at LSP. Plaintiff Ian Cazenave only has access to the communal soap that they make at the prison. Plaintiff Daniel Gumns has to pay $15-20 to buy soap from commissary.
61. People who are incarcerated cannot always avoid contact with people who are sick, and they certainly cannot put distance between themselves and others. Plaintiffs Daniel Gumns, Michael Videau, Lionel Tolbert, Ian Cazenave, Otto Barrera, Michael Robinson, and Trevon Wiley are all housed in dormitories of 75-86 people, where it is impossible to practice social distancing. Plaintiff Kentrell Parker is housed on Nursing Unit 2 with between 20-24 other vulnerable patients
69 Id. 70 Id. 71 How to Protect Yourself and Others, CDC, supra n.8. 72 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 10.
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who are elderly or require long-term nursing care. No effort has been made to create physical barriers between the extremely vulnerable patients housed on the Nursing Units.
62. Health profiles of incarcerated people show that they are significantly sicker and more vulnerable to COVID-19 than the population at larger.73 Many have multiple comorbidities and are at a higher risk of complications, including ARDS.74

C. DOC Is Ill-Prepared to Provide Adequate Treatment to Individuals with COVID-19, and LSP Especially So
63. The DOC operates eight adult correctional facilities throughout the State of Louisiana. It has 31,600 people within its custody and control.75 Some of these people are housed in one of more than 100 local parish jails and prisons across 62 parishes, instead of at one of the state facilities, and the sheriffs are reimbursed by a per diem from the State. The DOC maintains control and ultimate constitutional responsibility for the care for all of these individuals, regardless of where they are housed.

73 Peter Wagner & Emily Widra, No need to wait for pandemics: The public health case for criminal justice

reform,

Prison

Policy

initiative

(Mar.

6,

2020),

https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/03/06/pandemic/.

74 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 19.

75 DOC Briefing Book, supra n.5, at 18.

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64. On December 31, 2019, DOC had capacity to house 15,410 people in its eight state
prisons76 and it held 15,042 people.77 Therefore, right before the COVID-19 crisis, the DOC’s
prisons were at 97% of 2019 operating capacity.
65. The DOC employs approximately 4,788 staff members, with around 3,883 of these
people working inside of its eight correctional facilities.78 DOC’s facilities are undeniably
understaffed; despite operating at 97% operational capacity, in February 2020, the agency had more
than 400 vacant positions (7% vacancy). 79
66. COVID-19 will severely exacerbate these pre-existing shortages of crucial staff,
especially medical staff. When staff become infected, they will not be able to come to work, leaving
essential positions open.80 On April 3, 2020, 282 staff stayed home due to COVID-19.
Approximately 140 of these staff members were security employees and 22 were medical employees.
67. As of April 4, 2020, based on the self-reporting data from DOC. the percentage of
the DOC employees with COVID-19 was roughly twice as high as the rate of COVID-19 in the
general Louisiana population.81
68. LSP has a particularly vulnerable population, with over 50% of people over 50 years
of age, many of whom have high-risk medical conditions.82 The many patients with ongoing medical
needs at LSP are already experiencing the decrease in available medical care. For instance, Plaintiff
76 Id. at 120. 77 Id. at 18. 78 Id. at 102. 79 Melinda Deslatte, Another $34M Sought to Fill Gaps in Louisiana Prisons Budget, THE ADVOCATE (Feb. 21, 2020, 6:22 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/legislature/article_6421eebe-5509-11ea883c-9f44d94bfcfe.html. 80 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 11. 81 According to the DOC, on April 4, 2020, it had 20 people working in facilities with COVID-19, showing a virus rate of 0.5 percent of its prison staff. On that same date, Louisiana had a rate COVID-19 rate pf 0.21 percent. 82 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 11.
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Kentrell Parker has developed a bed sore and is finding it difficult to get medical treatment because
the nurse practitioner who usually oversees the infirmary is overseeing Camp J.
69. In addition to staffing concerns, even under normal conditions, the DOC’s medical
system spends very little on patient care compared to other states and therefore has a very limited
infrastructure with which to provide medical services. The most recent report from Pew Charitable
Trusts on state by state medical spending shows the DOC’s health care spending per incarcerated
person was only $2,173, compared to $19,786 in California’s correctional system.83 In fact, the
DOC’s health care spending is the lowest correctional medical spending in the country.84
70. Considering the low spending on medical care for people incarcerated in Louisiana, it
is unsurprising that Louisiana prisons have the highest mortality rate in the country.85 According to a
Bureau of Justice Statistics report released in February 2020, Louisiana’s mortality rate per 100,000
prisoners is 817.86 The next highest mortality rate in the country—Alabama—is 497.87
71. Louisiana’s prison deaths are primarily related to medical conditions, rather than
accidents, homicides or suicide.88 While Louisiana has the highest prison mortality rates for cancer,
heart disease, and AIDS, it has relatively low rates of homicide, accident and suicide.89 Louisiana has
the third highest prison mortality rate for people dying from respiratory illnesses.90
72. An example of how low medical spending and staffing deficiencies impact care can
be seen at LSP, the state’s largest prison and the largest maximum security prison in the country. As
83 Prison Health Care Costs and Quality: How and why states strive for high performing systems, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/reports/2017/10/prison-health-care-costs-and-quality. 84 Id. 85 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Mortality in State and Federal Prisons, 2001-2016 (Feb. 2020), available at https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/msfp0116st.pdf. 86 Id. at 12. 87 Id. 88 Id. at 15-16. 89 Id.
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described above, LSP has a particularly vulnerable population.91 Despite this particularly high-risk
population, LSP is understaffed on an average day without the added medical pressures of a
pandemic.92 Additional systemic deficiencies show in the medical care at LSP:
 Physicians are not credentialed appropriately and did not provide medical care in line with national standards;93
 Patients at LSP lack appropriate access to hospital care;94  Physicians and other staff frequently fail to recognize indications for hospitalization,
including many cases of failure to recognize typical signs of respiratory decompensation which is critical for COVID-19 patients;95  Physicians, nurses, and EMTs fail to recognize “red flag” signs resulting in adverse events;96  Laboratory services are only available on weekdays and blood gas assessments are not available at all.97
73. On February 21, 2020, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana issued an order indicating that the Court had found “that the medical care at Angola State
Penitentiary is unconstitutional in some respects” and was preparing “to Order injunctive relief
addressing conditions which the Court finds unconstitutional.”98 This Order was issued after a
three-week trial held before the Court in October 2018 on behalf of a certified class of all individuals
incarcerated at LSP.
74. While the ruling and injunctive order are still pending, the Court’s February 21 Order
plainly indicates a finding that the DOC has acted with deliberate indifference to the medical needs
of the individuals detained at LSP and that all such individuals are incarcerated under conditions
90 Id. 91 See Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 11. 92 Id. 93 Id. at ¶ 13. 94 Id. 95 Id. 96 Id.; Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14. 97 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14.
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posing a substantial risk of serious harm. As yet, the Court has not ordered any remedy alleviating those unconstitutional conditions.
75. The pandemic threatens to further aggravate this situation for both those with COVID-19 who receive treatment at LSP and for those who depend on DOC for other medical care.99
II. The DOC’s Insufficient Response to COVID-19 Places the Putative Class at a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm by Increasing the Likelihood that COVID19 Patients Will Not Receive Proper Treatment
76. As detailed below, Defendants failed to proactively plan for the prevention and management of COVID-19 in DOC facilities.
A. Defendants Have Either Sought to Obscure Their Plans for COVID-19 from the Public, Their Patients, and Advocacy Groups—or There Is No Comprehensive Plan
77. On March 16, 2020, dozens of Louisiana-based organizations that advocate for the rights of individuals who are detained and imprisoned in Louisiana sent a letter requesting that Defendant Governor Edwards and Defendant DOC develop evidence-based and proactive plans for the prevention and management of COVID-19 in Louisiana’s prisons. This letter was also sent to Defendant LeBlanc and Defendant Russo. The letter included 26 recommendations and numerous resources to help in the development of these plans.
78. Defendants never responded. Instead, in response to a request by the plaintiffs in Lewis v. Cain, the DOC and the Governor’s Office provided
 Department Regulation No. HCP 26, concerning influenza,  Several continuing operation plans with skeletal guidance,  An instructional video produced for patients, and  A checklist for cleaning.
98 Lewis v. Cain, No. 3:15-cv-00318-SDD-RLB (M.D. La., Feb. 21, 2020) (order directing parties to meet and confer). 99 Id. at ¶ ¶ 12; 14.
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79. Similar letters and resources have been sent to Defendants from public health leaders, faith leaders, and organizations comprised of the formerly incarcerated.
80. Information has been sought by families of the incarcerated about the plans to protect incarcerated people. As Louisiana has the highest incarceration rate in the country, the lack of leadership on this issue has made national news. Nothing has been provided in response to these requests.
81. In short, it can be assumed that no comprehensive plan exists. The DOC has not even shared information about the number of COVID-19 tests it has administered.
82. The certified class of plaintiffs in Lewis v. Cain sought both formal and informal discovery of documents related to LSP’s COVID-19 response, and they were denied such information beyond the barebones documents listed above. In fact, on March 31, 2020, counsel for the DOC represented that “there are no imminent plans” to transfer individuals with COVID-19 to LSP.100
83. On April 1, 2020, Defendant LeBlanc and two other DOC officials signed declarations swearing that no one had been transferred to Camp J and that there were no inmates housed at LSP who had COVID-19.101
84. By April 2, 2020, however Camp J held at least one person from Iberville Parish and at least three other people from East Baton Rouge Parish, Union Parish, and Ouachita Parish—at least two of whom were serving sentences and in DOC custody.
85. As of the morning of April 9, 2020, eight people detained at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison had tested positive for COVID-19, four had been taken to Our Lady of the Lake Hospital in Baton Rouge, and 29 were awaiting test results. At least four people who tested positive for COVID-19 had been transferred from East Baton Rouge Parish Prison to Camp J.
100 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. 585-4. 32

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86. As of the evening of April 10, 2020, six people who were normally housed elsewhere at LSP were being housed at Camp J, presumably because they had tested positive for COVID-19. On April 11, 2020, at least four more people were transferred from East Baton Rouge Parish Prison, including Plaintiff Kendrick Wilson, who is a pre-trial individual and tried to refuse transport.
87. By April 11, 2020, at least 40 people had been transferred to the remote Camp J. The DOC’s transfer plan has expanded swiftly.
B. The Skeletal Plans Provided by DOC, Including the Flu Regulation and Flu Coop Plans, Do Not Provide Appropriate Guidance to Louisiana Prisons
88. The primary written plan in operation by the DOC for Louisiana’s eight prisons is Department Regulation No. HCP 26 (the “Flu Regulation”).
89. The Flu Regulation is 10 pages long, with one page of definitions. Only a few of the words in the definition section of the regulation appear anywhere else in the regulation. The remaining nine pages of the regulation are skeletal in nature, and reflective of the efficacy of the efforts in the prisons to protect the lives of incarcerated Louisianans.
90. The Flu Regulation requires that plans be made across the corrections system to address a pandemic, and details the subject matter of these plans, but provides almost no guidance as to the content of the plans, imposing virtually no standards in line with public health practices.
91. The eight state prison facilities have continuing operation plans (“Flu Coop Plans”) for the flu pandemic, and these are the only plans at these facilities for addressing COVID-19.
92. The Flu Regulation does not properly involve the LDH’s Office of Public Health or recommend appropriate levels of consultation with the LDH’s Office of Public Health, despite the fact that the LDH is the only entity that is statutorily tasked with pandemics, quarantine, and medical isolation in Louisiana.
101 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. 585-1 to 585-3. 33

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93. Instead, the Flu Regulation only requires that each prison establish a point of contact with the LDH. Some, if not all, Flu Coop Plans have no further coordination with the LDH than designating a person to be available if there is ever an order to contact the LDH.
94. During the course of the pandemic, the DOC’s Medical Director—who had no public health background—resigned, leaving the fate of a particularly at-risk population even more in peril.
95. Because the DOC’s guidance has been so skeletal, and because the LDH has been largely absent from pandemic oversight in Louisiana’s prisons, the individual wardens’ Flu Coop Plans lack the requisite focus on the medical and public health aspects of pandemic response.
96. For instances, LSP’s plan has the medical director coordinating with Homeland Security instead of the LDH, despite the LDH being the entity statutorily responsible for quarantine and medical isolation practices during a pandemic.
97. The Dixon Correctional Institute’s Flu Coop Plan does no more than set a contact point for the LDH’s Office of Public Health. Its focus is primarily on correctional staffing rather than medical response.
98. Belatedly, on April 8, 2020—more than 11 days after the first positive COVID-19 cases began spreading through the incarcerated population in Louisiana prisons— the LDH’s Office of Public Health issued guidance to be followed inside of prisons and jails in Louisiana. It included a number of recommendations that are not being followed or required of prisons by the DOC.
99. By a second memorandum dated April 8, 2020, the LDH rescinded its guidance and has not appeared to take any additional steps to provide oversite for quarantine, medical isolation, transportation, and hygiene practices in the state and local correctional systems.
100. In the few instances where the Flu Regulation does provide examples to guide the prisons, the guidance is cursory. For instance, the Flu Regulation requires wardens to “Develop a
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written plan identifying areas of quarantine and isolation for the offender population (dorm and cell blocks.) The unit shall consider ways to prevent cross contamination of staff and offenders assigned to work in affected areas, for example, employees/offenders assigned to work in isolation or quarantine areas should not be allowed to work in other areas. Offenders assigned to work in these areas should not be allowed to return to the general population.”
101. The Flu Regulation does not describe the CDC recommendations for how to create these spaces, physical preferences for these spaces (solid doors and access to isolated bathrooms), and the other specifics of medical isolation.102
102. The DOC policies lack any discussion of efforts to ensure that incarcerated people will be able to maintain six-foot distances from each other and lack a clear description of the special levels of quarantine and medical isolation recommended for COVID-19. There is further a lack of any description of how medical monitoring would be carried out or when patients should be sent to a hospital. There is no discussion of what is appropriate medical care, particularly for isolated and quarantined populations.103
103. These plans fail to delineate appropriate training of staff for the health and safety of patients and staff.
104. The plans fail to provide guidance about necessary personal protective equipment (“PPE”) requirements, the amount needed by facilities, and any other details necessary to provide either the facility or the staff a sense of how much is needed and how to prioritize its distribution.
105. Defendants’ COVID-19 response is knowingly and uselessly skeletal. As a result, the prisons are failing to accomplish appropriate social distancing, hygiene practices, return-to-work policies for the sick, quarantines, medical isolation, personal protective equipment practices, transfers to medical facilities, transportation, medical staffing ratios, training, and protection for
102 CDC Guidance, supra n.2. 35

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medically vulnerable populations. Defendants are therefore failing to abate the risk caused by COVID-19 and, in many circumstances, increasing that risk.
C. As A Result of Improper Guidance and Oversight, People Are Receiving Compromised Care and Are Living in Dangerous Conditions
106. Defendant Governor Edwards has failed to assert his authority over the Secretaries of the DOC or the LDH to protect Louisiana’s incarcerated population’s access to appropriate precautions to stop the spread of COVID-19, assure appropriate quarantine practices, and assure appropriate medical isolation practices. The lack of appropriate oversight, policies, and practices by Defendants has resulted in people with confirmed COVID-19 cases not getting the care recommended by the CDC.
107. For instance, the CDC recommends that medical isolation should end when the individual meets pre-established clinical and/or testing criteria for release from isolation, in consultation with clinical providers and public health officials, according to the CDC. Named Plaintiff Kendrick Wilson is confirmed to be COVID-19 positive and has been told he will be moved from medical isolation in 10 days, regardless of his medical symptoms.
108. Because there are no recommendations of the staffing and medical infrastructure for those in medical isolation, there is a shortage of qualified health professionals observing medical isolation. The ratio of nurses to patients at medical isolation facilities outside of Louisiana’s correctional system is 1:6, while at LSP’s Camp J medical isolation the ratio is 1:20.
109. The conditions for those in quarantine are equally concerning. There are reports in DOC facilities of quarantine being broken, no social distancing options in quarantine, and no masks for people in quarantine. The conditions for those not in quarantine similarly show very limited efforts to make accommodations to allow for social distancing. Numerous locations report a lack of soap, and/or insufficient soap, and a lack of hygienic practices to keep people safe.
103 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶¶ 16–20. 36

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110. “We are packed in like sardines,” Fate Winslow told a reporter from The Appeal about his living conditions in LSP. “Today all the guards showed up to work with masks on to protect themselves from us, when it is us that needs protection from them.”104
111. While not included within its health care regulation, the DOC has announced a plan to set medical isolation at LSP’s Camp J for people being held pre-trial, people in DOC custody at state-run facilities, and people in DOC custody being held in parish jails and prisons. This plan, described further below, is contrary to the recommendations of the CDC, and contrary to the LDH guidelines issued and rescinded on April 8, 2020. It is the direct result of the failure of Defendants to appropriately respond to this crisis and indicative of the lack of medical and public health considerations being made in the very clearly “correctional” response to a pandemic. It is putting all people in jails and prisons in Louisiana at risk.
III. The DOC’s LSP Transfer Plan Places the Putative Class at a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm by Increasing the Likelihood that COVID-19 Patients Will Not Receive Proper Treatment and by Unnecessarily Subjecting the Vulnerable LSP Population to an Increased Risk of Transmission
112. According to the DOC, patients housed in DOC facilities or local parish prisons and jails who test positive for COVID-19 will likely be transported to LSP’s Camp J for medical isolation unless they are so ill that they need to go directly to the hospital. This will include pre-trial and posttrial patients.
113. Defendants are treating the COVID-19 pandemic as if it were a hurricane—a crisis with which Defendants have far more experience. When a facility is impacted by a hurricane, it is important to find space where impacted people can be relocated. But COVID-19 is a global pandemic and a worldwide public health emergency, not a hurricane.
104 Tana Ganeva, Report from Inside Angola Prison Paints A Troubling Picture As Coronavirus Grips Louisiana, THE APPEAL (Apr. 10, 2020), https://theappeal.org/report-from-inside-angola-prisonpaints-a-troubling-picture-as-coronavirus-grips-
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114. In fact, the DOC’s LSP transfer plan contravenes the recommendations of the
LDH’s Office of Public Health issued on April 8, which included a recommendation that
“correctional and detention centers should . . . [h]ave a trained Emergency Medical
Service/Emergency Medical Technician (EMS/EMT) assess and transport anyone you think might
have COVID-19 to a healthcare facility.”105 Camp J is not a healthcare facility and the DOC plan
goes against this guidance.106
115. The CDC explicitly recommends halting transfers that are not made on the basis of
medical needs.107 The LDH guidance, although immediately rescinded,108 similarly states transfer
should be for medical treatment only. The movement of people across the state for medical isolation
is a policy built for the wrong disaster and lacks the appropriate understanding of the public health
crisis Louisiana’s prisons and jails are in today.
116. There is no evidence that the LDH was involved in making the decision to use Camp
J as a quarantine facility. The COVID-19 pandemic is a public health emergency, not a custody or
other non-medical emergency, but custody officials, rather than health officials, have been directing
decisions around transfers between facilities.109
louisiana/?fbclid=IwAR0lFKJHVLHzP1N7E18zC1KL-g1-iAeKTo7BzYtICOYYzETPno33otWyig. 105 Ex. 3, Memorandum from the LDH to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections and Office of Juvenile Justice (Apr. 8, 2020) (rescinded via Memorandum from the Louisiana Department of Health Office of Public Health to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections and Office of Juvenile Justice (Apr. 8, 2020) (on file with Plaintiffs’ counsel). The LDH rescinded its recommendation memorandum for reasons unrelated to the efficacy of the medical recommendations therein. 106 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 11. 107 CDC Guidance, supra n.2. 108 See Nicholas Chrastil, The Louisiana Department of Health issued recommendations on how to stop the spread of coronavirus in prisons – then rescinded them, THE LENS (Apr. 13, 2020), https://thelensnola.org/2020/04/13/the-louisiana-department-of-health-issued-recommendationson-how-to-stop-the-spread-of-coronavirus-in-prisons-then-rescinded-them/. 109 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 16.
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117. The DOC’s plan places the putative class at a risk of substantial risk of serious harm by increasing the likelihood that COVID-19 patients will not receive proper treatment and unnecessarily subjecting a vulnerable population to an increased risk of transmission. Transferring detainees who test positive for COVID-19 from facilities around the state to Camp J is against the initial guidance of the LDH, against the guidance of the CDC, puts at risk people who are incarcerated who have chronic medical conditions requiring treatment and/or medication, distances COVID-19 patients from hospitals with adequate services, and subjects patients to the medical care system at LSP that has already been found unconstitutional at least in part by a federal court.
A. The DOC’s LSP Transfer Plan Increases the Likelihood that COVID-19 Patients Will Not Receive Proper Treatment
118. The DOC’s LSP transfer plan ensures that COVID-19 patients will not receive proper treatment. While DOC stated that it does not intend to transport patients who test positive but are in need of immediate medical attention, there is no provision to ensure that patients’ cases are reviewed by a doctor prior to this determination. There are no clinical criteria regarding age or co-morbidities to determine who is appropriate for transfer.
119. Further, patients’ medical care needs will not be fully known at the moment of a positive COVID-19 test; COVID-19 patients can rapidly devolve into medical crisis. In at least one study, half of patients admitted to the intensive care unit for COVID-19 died on the first day.110 There are no tell-tall signs or a timeline for clinical deterioration, and is it crucial that patients who test positive or likely positive for COVID-19 be within easy transportable distance of hospitals in the event that more critical care is necessary.111 Age alone is not an adequate screening device—38%
110 Ex. 2, Vasall Decl. at ¶ 7. 111 Id.
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of individuals hospitalized in the United States in late March 2020 were between 20 and 54 years old.112
120. Named Plaintiff Kendrick Wilson to his knowledge was not medically evaluated before he was transferred to Camp J, and he was in fact experiencing symptoms.
121. As of April 12, 2020, Mr. Wilson and approximately 39 other people who had tested positive for COVID-19 were being housed on an open dorm at Camp J, without any isolation from one another. Many people have coughs or other symptoms, and some require IV machines or oxygen masks. There are only two nurses per shift to care for the COVID-19 patients. Mr. Wilson has been told he will be transferred two more times in the next 10 days. To his knowledge, he did not undergo any medical assessment regarding his fitness to be transferred, and his transfer to LSP’s Camp J was not done to meet any individualized need for specialized medical treatment that could not be obtained at the facility where he was held before LSP’s Camp J.
122. LSP is not equipped to treat COVID-19 symptoms, especially if the symptoms become severe. The care required to appropriately evaluate and provide treatment to patients with COVID-19 includes lab testing, imaging, and treatment individualized to the presentation of the patient.113 Treatment may require oxygen therapy by nasal cannula, high flow oxygen masks, and intubation and ventilator assistance.114 Some patients develop blood clots on the lungs and require anticoagulation.115 Some patients require intravenous fluid therapy.116 Some patients require vasopressor treatment for low blood pressure, support for kidney failure, and/or early antibiotics.117 Treatment requires staff that have experience using this equipment and accurately assessing what is
112 Id. at ¶ 9. 113 Id. at ¶ 7. 114 Id. 115 Id. 116 Id. 117 Id. at ¶ 16.
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needed.118 The intensity of care and protracted length of care for COVID-19 cannot be provided at LSP or any of the hospitals within an hour of LSP.119
123. Upon its representations, the DOC does not plan to attempt to treat severe symptoms at LSP. However, there is no way to define or predict who will develop severe symptoms in the course of the illness and require treatment and hospitalization.120 Nor is there any representation that Camp J has staffing and equipment to monitor the COVID-19 positive patients for clinical deterioration, including signs of hypoxia.121 It is critical that patients be within easy transportable distance of hospitals that can provide the adequate level of care.122
124. The DOC is not testing people for the virus unless they show symptoms.123 Therefore, all the COVID-19 patients being transferred to Camp J are at least symptomatic, not healthy or even seemingly healthy.
125. The likelihood of Plaintiff Julius Allen’s symptoms continuing to be severe and ultimately requiring hospitalization is high; Mr. Allen’s pre-existing medical conditions, including diabetes, hypertension, and high cholesterol, make him especially vulnerable to COVID-19 complications.124
126. The likelihood of Plaintiff Ernest Rogers’ symptoms continuing to be severe and ultimately requiring hospitalization is high; Mr. Rogers is 65 years old and has a pre-existing medical condition, which makes him especially vulnerable to COVID-19 complications.125
118 Id. 119 Id. 120 Id. at ¶ 12. 121 Id. 122 Id. 123 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. 585-1 at ¶ 20. 124 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶19. 125 Id.
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127. The likelihood of Plaintiff James Hughes developing severe symptoms is high; Mr. Hughes’ pre-existing medical condition, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, make him especially vulnerable to COVID-19 complications.126
128. The likelihood of Plaintiff Daniel Gumns developing severe symptoms is high; Mr. Gumns’ pre-existing medical conditions, epilepsy and asthma, make him especially vulnerable to COVID-19 complications. 127
129. The likelihood of Plaintiff Michael Videau developing severe symptoms is high; Mr. Videau is 63 years old, and his age plus his pre-existing medical conditions, including leukemia, high blood pressure, diabetes, and acute pneumonia, make him especially vulnerable to COVID-19 complications.128
130. The likelihood of Plaintiff Lionel Tolbert developing severe symptoms is high; Mr. Tolbert is 65 years old, and his age plus his pre-existing medical conditions, including coronary artery disease and heart and vascular disease, make him especially vulnerable to COVID-19 complications. 129
131. The likelihood of Plaintiff Ian Cazenave developing severe symptoms is high; Mr. Cazenave’s pre-existing medical conditions, including sickle cell and related heart complications, make him especially vulnerable to COVID-19 complications. 130
132. The likelihood of Plaintiff Ian Michael Robinson developing severe symptoms is high; Mr. Robinson’s age and pre-existing medical conditions, including liver disease and hepatitis C, make him especially vulnerable to COVID-19 complications. 131
126 Id. 127 Id. 128 Id. 129 Id. 130 Id. 131 Id.
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133. The likelihood of Plaintiff Kentrell Parker developing severe symptoms is high; Mr. Parker’s pre-existing medical conditions, including paralysis and hypertension, make him especially vulnerable to COVID-19 complications. 132
134. The likelihood of Plaintiff Reginald George developing severe symptoms is high; Mr. George’s pre-existing medical conditions, including hypertension, prostate cancer, hepatitis C, and HIV, make him especially vulnerable to COVID-19 complications. 133
135. People who are transferred to Camp J may also have difficulties or delays in getting their regularly prescribed medications, which could exacerbate their complications from COVID19.134
136. Additionally, medical staff worldwide have been acutely impacted by COVID-19, and new protocols previously not used have been implemented to protect medical staff. There is no requirement in the DOC’s plan that the medical staff at LSP receive any training in appropriate safety precautions for themselves or their patients.
137. COVID-19 is a new virus, and new information is becoming available daily for health care workers to better understand the disease. There is no requirement in the DOC’s plan that nursing staff receive any training about COVID-19 and the signs and symptoms associated with the virus.
138. No doctors are staffed to the facility in order to make determinations of when a patient might become acute or if a patient is ready to end isolation.
i. LSP’s Remote Location Ensures that Patients Cannot Be Quickly Transported to Hospitals
132 Id. 133 Id. 134 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 19.
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139. If Plaintiffs’ COVID-19 cases become severe, they will require hospitalization; LSP does not have the medical equipment or personnel necessary to treat severe COVID-19 symptoms.135
140. DOC has stated that if Plaintiffs’ COVID-19 cases become severe, they will be transported to a hospital. The DOC has said that they will not treat the Plaintiffs in the ATU or the treatment center at LSP.136
141. But symptoms can rapidly worsen, with people who appear to have mild cases quickly developing severe symptoms that require medical intervention and life-saving measures immediately upon arrival to the hospital.137 There are no lab tests that predict the course of a COVID-19 patient’s illness.138 Some patients have adequate oxygen saturation for days and then deteriorate.139 There are no signs or symptoms that can be used to predict clinical deterioration.140 Given the lack of tell-tale signs or a timeline for subsequent deterioration, it is critical that patients who test positive or likely positive (known as persons under investigation) for COVID-19 or have been exposed and show symptoms, be within easy transportable distance of hospitals in the event that more critical care is necessary.141 Uniquely, COVID-19 Patients are not always aware of the lack of oxygen in their bodies and can be on the edge of death without gasping for breath or feeling the need for oxygen.142
135 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14. 136Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. 585 at 7 (“If an offender housed at Camp J begins to exhibit severe symptoms, he will be transport [sic] to an outside hospital. Offenders transferred to Camp J will not be sent to the ATU or the treatment center at LSP.”) 137 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 7. 138 Id. 139 Id. 140 Id. 141 Id. 142 Id.
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142. LSP is approximately 150 miles from University Medical Center in New Orleans, 60 miles from Our Lady of the Lake Hospital in Baton Rouge, 50 miles from Lane Regional Medical Center in Zachary, and 25 miles from West Feliciana Parish Hospital in St. Francisville.
143. To illustrate one of the problems with the DOC’s plan to transfer COVID-19 patients to Camp J: Under the DOC’s plan, people incarcerated in the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison who test positive are being transported more than an hour away to Camp J, and then transported back to Baton Rouge or New Orleans when they require hospitalization.143 People incarcerated in the Orleans Justice Center in New Orleans could be transported more than three hours away to Camp J, and then transported to Baton Rouge or back to New Orleans when they require hospitalization.144 Furthermore, the MMS at the New Orleans Convention Center, for example, is ready and available to take the incarcerated population and is a much better-equipped and medically appropriate place to take symptomatic COVID-19 patients.
144. Any time a COVID-19 patient is transported, it puts the staff conducting the transport at unnecessary risk.145 In the close-quarters setting of a vehicle, even one infected person could easily spread the virus to everyone else in the vehicle.146 Additionally, reduced airflow in a transport vehicle could result in higher concentrations of contaminated droplets remaining in the air and on surfaces.147 Transport should be avoided unless necessary for hospitalization, and only having to travel a short distance to the hospital is the safest option.148 The DOC is therefore engaging in elective transfers that are discouraged by all public health guidance.
145. The nearest hospital to LSP, West Feliciana Parish Hospital, is not a reference hospital, meaning it is not equipped to accept patients who require a higher level of care, and is not
143 Id. at ¶ 12. 144 Id. 145 Id. 146 Id. 147 Id.
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suitable for a patient requiring intubation.149 There are no ventilators at West Feliciana Hospital.150 A patient requiring intubation would need to be sent to Baton Rouge or New Orleans, a one-hour hour or three-hour drive from LSP, respectively.151
146. West Feliciana Parish has approximately two ambulances.152 Even without the transfer of COVID-19 positive people to LSP, West Feliciana would be strained for resources like ambulances and ambulance personnel.153 Ambulance personnel are being infected daily and they transmit the infection widely.154 Transporting many COVID-19 positive people to the parish will further strain what is already a strained system, at increased risk to both those patients and the surrounding community.155
147. If a patient is admitted to West Feliciana Parish Hospital or another rural hospital without ventilator access, there is no guarantee that the hospital will be able to transfer the patient to a hospital with ventilators. Hospitals are not necessarily required to accept transfers of patients with suspected or confirmed COVID-19 from small or rural hospitals that lack sufficient isolation facilities or equipment to meet the current state or local CDC recommendations.156 While hospitals with capacity and the specialized capabilities needed for stabilizing treatment are required to accept

148 Id.

149 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14.

150 Id. at ¶ 18.

151 Id. at ¶¶ 14, 18.

152 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 17.

153 Id.

154 Id.

155 Id.

156 Louisiana Department of Health, Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA)

Requirements and Implications Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) (Revised) (Apr.

1,

2020)

available

at

http://ldh.la.gov/assets/medicaid/hss/docs/Coronavirus_2019/MEMO_HOSPITAL_CAH_EM

TALA_04012020.pdf.

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appropriate transfers from hospitals without the necessary capabilities, the receiving hospital may refuse the transfer if it does not have the capacity to provide the necessary care and services.157
148. This could potentially further disadvantage a patient held at Camp J when a medical emergency necessitates immediate hospitalization and that patient is taken to a closer—yet illequipped—hospital, but the patient’s COVID-19 progression later necessitates a transfer to a different hospital for ventilator access. In certain cases, the original jail or prison would have been in a better proximity to a hospital with ventilator access, and original admission at that hospital would have assured a better position to access a ventilator. The Camp J transfer plan inherently ignores the individual medical needs of COVID-19 patients and the proximity of equipped medical facilities to the correctional facilities in which patients are originally held.
149. LSP has demonstrated a tendency to delay in transferring patients to a hospital.158 Medical staff at LSP frequently fail to recognize indications for hospitalization, including many cases of failure to recognize typical signs of respiratory decompensation, which is critical for COVID-19 patients.159
150. Even if DOC intends to provide limited medical care, rather than just isolation at Camp J—or changes its plan and provides more robust care—the medical care at LSP has long been deficient.160 Plaintiffs will not receive the medical attention needed to appropriately monitor their COVID-19 there, and there are no plans for the DOC to staff Camp J with sufficient medical staff in order to monitor all patients for signs of clinical deterioration.161 Named Plaintiff Kendrick Wilson observed two nurses per shift caring for him and approximately 39 other COVID-19 positive patients in an open dorm.
157 Id. 158 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14. 159 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 13. 160 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14. 161 Id.
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151. Generally, LSP is not set up to manage acutely ill patients, and people incarcerated at LSP lack access to hospital care across the board. The pandemic will only make it worse.162 LSP lacks the necessary equipment and personnel to provide hospital-level care, for example, for patients in need of invasive mechanical ventilation or support for kidney failure.163 The facility is not set up to manage hospital-level care, including ventilation, and the LSP staff cannot manage hospital-level patients.164
152. While LSP uses its Acute Treatment Unit to provide emergency care, it lacks several diagnostic and treatment capabilities necessary in an emergency room, and often lacks qualified operators for some of the capabilities it does have. Emergency medical technicians, rather than physicians or nurses, are the principal medical providers in the Acute Treatment Unit outside of business hours.
153. Laboratory services are only available weekdays during working-day-hours and typically not available on weekends. Blood gas assessments, critical for managing acute respiratory distress, are not available at LSP.165 There are no ventilators at LSP.
154. The DOC’s LSP transfer plan exposes a relatively remote area to an outbreak. Most of LSP’s staff members do not live at LSP and must return to their home communities daily. This movement exposes LSP’s surrounding communities—where there is no hospital capable of treating severe symptoms—to the virus.166 As of April 13, 2020, 45 DOC staff members had tested positive for COVID-19. Additionally, the high concentration of infected persons at LSP would increase the
162 Id. at ¶ 14; Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 11. 163 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 16. 164 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 13. 165 Id. at ¶ 14. 166 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶¶ 18, 20; Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 18.
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likelihood of the virus spreading to West Feliciana community members via infected LSP medical and custodial staff who are exposed to those viral loads and further strain local resources.167
ii. LSP’s Camp J Is Notoriously Unfit for Housing even Healthy Individuals
155. LSP’s Camp J is notoriously unfit for housing even healthy individuals, let alone those suffering from COVID-19 symptoms. Completed in 1976, Camp J has four buildings, all connected through open-air walkways. One of the buildings is a dormitory-style housing facility, and the other three are closed-cell blocks. Defendant LeBlanc said of Camp J in 2018, “It’s just not a good place to be.”168
Figure 1Floor Plan for One of Closed-Cell Block Buildings at Camp J. 156. Camp J was constructed and designed to be a “punishment camp.” DOC used Camp J to discipline incarcerated people following alleged infractions of prison rules or for behavioral issues,169 and Camp J’s infrastructure and inherit conditions are particularly suited to those functions.
167 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 18. 168 Grace Toohey, Angola Closes Its Notorious Camp J, “a Microcosm of a lot of Things that Are Wrong,” THE ADVOCATE, (May 13, 2018, 8:01 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_b39f1e82-4d84-11e8bbc2-1ff70a3227e7.html. 169 Id.
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157. The building is notorious for its lack of ventilation, heating, and cooling. People incarcerated in Camp J were forced out of necessity to “strip naked and lie on the cement floors to keep cool during the long, humid summer days; in the winter, the cells can be frigid.”170 In 2000, death row inmate Abdullah Hakim El-Mumit sued the prison to be returned from Camp J to death row, saying conditions in the punishment camp were worse than in the death house and thereby unconstitutional.171
158. After more than 40 years as one of the most restrictive housing units within Louisiana’s prison system, DOC closed Camp J in May 2018.172 At Camp J’s peak, it confined more than 400 individuals being disciplined in solitary cells for more than 23 hours a day.173
159. At the time of the closure, prison officials cited the deterioration of the decades-old facility as the basis for the closure.174 Additionally, significant mold and flooding issue issues plagued the building.
170 Brooke Shelby Biggs, Camp J, Red Hats and the Hole: Inside Angola’s three circles of solitary-confinement hell, MOTHER JONES, (Mar. 5, 2009), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/03/camp-j-redhats-and-hole. 171 Id. 172 Grace Toohey, supra n.168. 173 Id. 174 Id.
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Figure 2: Photo of Mold in Camp J Shortly After Camp Closure.
Figure 3 Row Of Cells With Flooding Shortly After Camp J's Closure. 160. The locks for the cells in Camp J malfunctioned, sometimes opening on their own.175 A complicated procedure for locking the doors was required to prevent the doors from opening on their own and, even if the procedure was followed, there was no guarantee the doors would stay locked, leading to incredibly dangerous confinement conditions.
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Figure 4 Instructions posted in Camp J in 2018 near time of closure. 161. According to Defendants, COVID-19 patients will be under strict cell isolation, but that strict isolation may not be possible if the defects in the door mechanisms remain in place. 162. Because Camp J’s buildings do not have proper ventilation, those facilities are extremely inappropriate for housing patients with COVID-19, an illness that causes severe respiratory symptoms. There is no air conditioning at Camp J. There are ceiling fans to help circulate air, but large fans blowing air are likely to spread aerosolized agents around the facility, making it more likely that staff at Camp J will breathe in contagions.176 163. Moreover, holding COVID-19 patients in a concentrated environment with no ability for individual patients to self-isolate, and with fans blowing contagions around the facility,
175 Id. 176 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 10.
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may expose patients to higher viral loads and make them more vulnerable to more serious symptoms.177
164. The COVID-19 patients whom the DOC is transferring to Camp J are not asymptomatic; the DOC is not testing people in its custody for the virus unless they show symptoms.178 The patients being held at or transferred to Camp J are suffering at the very least mildto-moderate symptoms, which will only be exacerbated by an environment that was designed for maximum punishment, not medical isolation, and certainly not medical care or treatment. Neither the open bar cells nor the open dorm allows for complete medical isolation, as is recommended by the CDC.179
165. Kendrick Wilson was forcibly transferred to Camp J on the evening of April 11, 2020, despite the fact that he was suffering from body aches, a cough, congestion, and had a fever of 102.5 degrees before he was tested. He is not aware of any medical screening that was done before he was transported. At Camp J, he is housed in an open dormitory with approximately 40 other people, many of whom are coughing, and some of whom are hooked up to IVs or using oxygen masks. There is no physical isolation or barrier between him and the other patients.
166. Plaintiff Julius Allen has tested positive for COVID-19 and is facing transfer from medical isolation in Unit 2 at the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison to Camp J. He is at-risk for serious medical complications because of his diabetes and hypertension. He is already suffering from fever, severe body aches, difficulty breathing, weakness, disorientation, and diarrhea. These myriad
177 James D. Walsh, Is ‘Viral Load’ Why Some People Get a Mild Case of COVID-19?, NY MAG (Mar. 27, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/03/is-viral-load-key-to-understandingcoronaviruss-severity.html. 178 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. 585-1 at ¶ 20. 179 CDC Guidance, supra n.2 (“Medical isolation refers to confining a confirmed or suspected COVID-19 case (ideally to a single cell with solid walls and a solid door that closes), to prevent contact with others and to reduce the risk of transmission;” “Facilities should make every possible effort to place suspected and confirmed COVID-19 cases under medical isolation individually. Each isolated individual should be assigned their own housing space and bathroom where possible.”)
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symptoms alone will require at least some medical attention, and Camp J is not remotely equipped to
provide such attention.
167. Camp J does not have its own medical unit and was designed to house people with
disciplinary issues; it is entirely unfit to house those who are ill, suffering, and in need of medical
monitoring and treatment because of the lack of ventilation, inadequate temperature control, mold,
flooding issues, and faulty door locks.
168. The DOC’s plan for supplies at Camp J is also deficient. The DOC plans to provide
the following medical supplies to Camp J:
a. O2 b. O2 Mask (15 at each site) c. Suction machines and canisters (2 machines and 25 canisters) d. Yanker suctions with tubing (25) e. Thermometers and covers (3 at each area) f. B/P monitors (2 at each area) g. Stethoscopes (2) h. IV fluids (10) i. IV tubing (10) j. IV start kits (10) k. Tape (5 rolls) l. Gauze (1 case at each site) m. Wash basins (25) n. Disposable wash cloths (1 case at each site) o. Foley catheters (10) p. IV catheters (5 of each size 20G, 22G, 18G, 24G) q. Disposable gowns (1 case at each site) r. N 95 masks (2 boxes at each site) s. Bedpans (20 at each site) t. Crash cart fully supplied (1 at each site) u. Vacutainers (1 box at each site) v. Blood tubes (1 package of each type at each site) w. Butterfly needles (1 box at each site) x. Gloves (case of each size) y. Alcohol preps (5 boxes at each site) z. Hand sanitizers (6 bottles at each site) aa. Bleach with dispenser bottles (4 bottles at each site) bb. Tissue (1 case) cc. Diapers (1 case) dd. Blue pads (1 case) ee. Potty chairs (10) ff. Red bags (1 case)
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gg. Glucometer at each site hh. Syringes with needles (1 case at each site) ii. Medicine cups (1 case at each site) jj. Ice bags (1 case at each site) kk. IV poles (4 at each site) ll. Sharps containers (2 large at each site)
169. Moreover, taking a space designed specifically for solitary, disciplinary confinement
and repurposing it for medical isolation is inappropriate. Solitary Confinement is the practice of
isolating incarcerated people from the rest of the prison population while simultaneously imposing
punitive measures such as major restrictions on visitors, phone calls, recreation and outdoor time,
and access to personal property.180 Medical Isolation is the practice of isolating incarcerated people
from the rest of the prison population when they show signs or test positive for COVID-19 in order
to stem the risk of COVID-19 transmission throughout the prison.181
170. “Placing people in solitary confinement (punitive isolation) will worsen the COVID-
19 crisis. Many corrections officials lack guidance on how to humanely and effectively separate sick
or contagious individuals from the general population. At times, the most feasible and only available
housing units in jails and prisons for medical isolation or quarantine of sick patients are those used
for punitive solitary confinement in ‘normal’ times (single cells, solid cell doors rather than barred,
[housing areas] removed from the main center of the prison). Use of these units for medical
purposes…can run the risk of corrections officials falling back on regular policies and procedures
governing living conditions in these units that harm the health of those exposed.”182
171. Nationwide, there is significant concern that fear of being placed in solitary will deter
people from reporting symptoms to correctional staff. “Experts and advocates are deeply concerned
180 David Cloud, JD, MPH; Dallas Augustine, MA; Cyrus Ahalt, MPP; & Brie Williams, MD, MS, The Ethical Use of Medical Isolation—Not Solitary Confinement—to Reduce COVID-19 Transmission in Correctional Settings, AMEND (Apr. 9, 2020), https://amend.us/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/Medical-Isolation-vs-Solitary_Amend.pdf. 181 Id. 182 Id.
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that incarcerated people, many of whom will go to great pains to avoid solitary confinement due to well-established mental and physical health harms associated with the experience, will not come forward when they have symptoms of COVID-19 because they do not want to be placed in such conditions. This avoidance of reporting symptoms or illness will not only accelerate the spread of infection within facilities but also increase the likelihood of prisoner deaths due to lack of treatment.”183 Some individuals in DOC and pre-trial custody are avoiding coronavirus testing because they fear that they will test positive and be transferred to Camp J.
B. The DOC’s LSP Transfer Plan Unnecessarily Subjects A Vulnerable Population to an Increased Risk of Transmission
172. The DOC’s LSP transfer plan, which is reflective of its overall COVID-19 plan, unnecessarily subjects an extremely vulnerable population to an increased risk of transmission.
173. LSP’s provisions in its pandemic plan do not lay out adequate protocols for medical isolation of Camp J from the rest of LSP’s population, the majority of whom are elderly or otherwise at high risk because of their medical conditions.184
174. It will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the DOC to prevent the spread of COVID-19 at LSP.
175. On April 1, 2020, DOC officials signed declarations that there would be no mingling between staff working at Camp J and LSP’s sick and elderly population. But by April 3, 2020, at least one staff member who regularly comes into direct contact with the patients in LSP’s hospice program and on the medical wards was going back and forth from Camp J.
176. There is no way to access Camp J without entering through the main entrance at LSP and going through the facilities’ centralized security checkpoint, which is used daily by staff using
183 Id. 184 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 20.
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other parts of the prison. While somewhat isolated on the LSP campus, Camp J is, and the DOC has always treated it as, a part of the prison.
177. Defendants’ plan for preventing staff from transmitting the virus is directly contrary to CDC guidelines. Defendants have directed employees found to have a fever to be sent home, and then return to work as soon as 24 hours after they are fever-free without the use of fever medication.185 But the CDC recommends returning to work no less than three days after resolution of the fever—and at least seven days after symptoms first appeared (or after receiving multiple negative COVID-19 tests).186
178. LSP poses a particularly high risk of transmission. The CDC recommendations described above are not possible in LSP.187 The majority of the people incarcerated at LSP live in dormitories of up to 86 people, where social distancing is functionally impossible, as the distance between beds is approximately 3 feet.188 Large fans blow air through the units which is likely to spread contagious agents embedded in aerosol like COVID-19.189 As a result, LSP is an environment that could not be more contrary to current public health recommendations and the President’s Task Force recommendations.190 Indeed, LSP has worse living conditions and higher commingling of people than cruise ships and nursing homes, where COVID-19 is known to easily spread and cause significant death.191
179. LSP houses thousands of people who are at high risk of suffering severe or even fatal effects if they contract COVID-19 due to the aging and elderly population, as well as the
185 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. No. 580-4 at 31. 186 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 22 n.17; see also CDC, “What to Do If You Are Sick” (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/if-you-are-sick/steps-when-sick.html (under “How to discontinue home isolation”); CDC Guidance, supra n.2 (advising that symptomatic correctional staff should follow the guidance in “What to Do If You Are Sick”). 187 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 7. 188 Id. at ¶ 10. 189 Id. 190 Id.
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extremely high numbers of people suffering from chronic diseases. Spread of the virus among these vulnerable populations would result in high rates of death.192
180. By classification, LSP houses people who are elderly, have disabilities, are mentally ill or have severe chronic illness profiles in specific housing areas, making these populations extremely vulnerable to spread if the virus is introduced among them. Housing the elderly and medically vulnerable together in dormitories in this manner creates a nursing-home-like environment, an environment where COVID-19 is known to spread rapidly.193
181. The most vulnerable among the LSP population are the patients at the infirmaries in the R.E. Barrow Treatment Center (“Treatment Center”). Most if not all of these patients have one or more conditions that put them at high risk. Their beds are in dormitory style settings and are close together.194 The approximately 240 residents of the so-called “medical dormitories” are nearly as vulnerable: virtually all have risk factors for severe consequences from COVID-19, yet they live in dormitories that are incapable of allowing them to follow current CDC recommendations regarding prevention against COVID-19.195 Plaintiff Michael Videau is elderly and suffers from a multitude of pre-existing conditions that put him at high risk of developing severe COVID-19 symptoms. Mr. Videau has leukemia, high blood pressure, diabetes, arthritis, and has suffered from pneumonia. Last year, he needed to be put on oxygen on one occasion.
182. As discussed above, Defendants cannot constitutionally provide adequate medical care to COVID-19 patients at Camp J. If the DOC intends to provide treatment for even moderate cases of COVID-19, they will need to do so at the Treatment Center. In addition to housing the most vulnerable people at LSP in the infirmaries, the Treatment Center provides medical care to
191 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 10. 192 Id. at ¶ 12. 193 Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12. 194 Id. at ¶ 10. 195 Id.
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thousands of high-risk patients. Most if not all of these patients are at high risk of death or severe injury and suffering if COVID-19 spreads within the Treatment Center.
183. The Flu Regulation and the LSP Flu Coop Plan that LSP uses as its COVID-19 plan are not consistent with COVID-19 recommendations because three distinct types of special housing are recommended for COVID-19: quarantine, isolation for people with known COVID-19, and isolation for persons under investigation (“PUI”). The PUI group are people who are symptomatic (fever, cough, shortness of breath, etc.) but have not yet been tested or have test results pending. These three groups should be housed separately. Neither the Flu Regulation plan nor the LSP Flu Coop Plan includes these three separate groups, suggesting further vulnerability at this location.196
184. The LSP Flu Coop Plan does not address how the PUI group or the COVID-19positive groups will be monitored or what arrangements would be made when patients need to be transferred to the hospital.197
185. The LSP Flu Coop Plan does not address LSP’s capacity to provide appropriate medical care, particularly while maintaining isolation and quarantine for COVID-19 patients from the rest of LSP. The plan does not explain how the DOC will provide sufficient medical personnel at Camp J, who would have no contact with patients at the rest of LSP, without further diminishing the capacity of the already overtaxed LSP doctors and nurses.198
186. Even if Defendants could find a way to provide all medical care for the COVID-19 transferees at Camp J, Plaintiffs have reported that medical personnel and other correctional staff regularly move between Camp J and the Treatment Center, creating a high likelihood of transmission from Camp J to the rest of the prison.
196 Id. at ¶ 17. 197 Id. at ¶ 18. 198 Id. at ¶ 19.
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187. Plaintiff Daniel Gumns suffers from asthma, which puts him “at higher risk of getting very sick from COVID-19,” as the disease could “affect [his] respiratory tract (nose, throat, lungs), cause an asthma attack, and possibly lead to pneumonia and acute respiratory disease.”199 Mr. Gumns also recently suffered a cardiac arrest while hospitalized for a seizure. Many COVID-19 patients suffer heart damage, and some even die from heart failure.200
188. Plaintiff Michael Videau is elderly and suffers from a multitude of pre-existing conditions that put him at high risk of developing severe COVID-19 symptoms. Mr. Videau has leukemia, high blood pressure, diabetes, arthritis, and has suffered from pneumonia. Last year, he needed to be put on oxygen on one occasion.
189. Plaintiff Lionel Tolbert is 65 years old and suffers from cardiovascular disease, which puts him at high risk of developing severe COVID-19 symptoms. He saw a cardiologist most recently in late 2019.
190. Plaintiff Michael Robinson is elderly and suffers from liver disease and hepatitis C, which puts him at high risk of developing severe COVID-19 symptoms.
191. Plaintiff Reginald George is handicapped and suffers from a multitude of preexisting conditions that put him at high risk of developing severe COVID-19 symptoms. His chronic medical conditions include hypertension, prostate cancer, hepatitis C, and HIV.
IV. Defendants’ Plans Place All Incarcerated Patients at Risk, Whether They Are Housed at DOC Facilities or Local Facilities and Whether They Are Pre-trial Detainees or Post-Trial Prisoners
A. Defendants Have Obligations to People Incarcerated in Parish Prisons and Jails
199 People with Moderate to Severe Asthma, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/asthma.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2020). 200 Markian Hawryluk, Heart Damage in COVID-19 Patients Puzzles Doctors, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/heart-damage-in-covid-19-patientspuzzles-doctors/.
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192. Defendants’ obligations do not end with the people in the DOC’s eight facilities—all Defendants are also responsible for the care of the people being held in the parish prisons for compensation by the DOC. Presently, 52% of people in DOC custody are housed in local parish prisons and jails.201 The DOC is ultimately responsible for the constitutionality of the conditions of the confinement of people it has transferred to local jails.
193. The DOC has offered to hold at LSP’s Camp J people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are housed in local and state facilities, at the discretion of the facility where a person is being held. The DOC has offered no medical screening protocol to determine when someone at a local parish prison or jail should be sent to a hospital or medical facility and when that person should be sent to LSP’s Camp J.
194. The DOC has inspection and review authority of parish prisons and jails in Louisiana. As of December 2017, the DOC held people in well over 100 different parish prisons and jails and is believed to still house people in its control and custody within these facilities at similar rates.202 It does not appear that the DOC has sought to assess the capabilities of these facilities for proper hygiene, social distancing, appropriate quarantining, and medical isolation.
195. Because the LDH rescinded its guidance, no public health guidance has been issued to protect the people held in parish prisons and jails.
196. The Governor’s only activity has been to set a process for people within six months of their sentences, convicted of non-violent/non-sex crimes, over the age of 65, and with preexisting conditions, the opportunity to be considered for early release. No one has been released from a parish jail, parish prison, or state facility as of the date of filing under this program.
201 DOC Briefing Book, supra n.5, at 24. 202 2017 Status of State and Local Corrections Facilities and Program Report, Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, Apr. 1, 2018, http://lcle.la.gov/programs/uploads/2017_Status_of_State_and_Local_Corrections_Facilities_and _Program_Report.pdf.
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197. The inaction by Defendants requires court intervention on behalf of all Louisianans subject to unconstitutionally high risk during this pandemic.
B. Risk to People in Pre-Trial Detention 198. People detained while awaiting trial are also facing an unconstitutionally high risk of harm under Defendants’ COVID-19 response efforts. 199. The DOC is statutorily authorized to bring into its “temporary, constructive custody inmates evacuated” from a parish affected by an emergency or disaster declared under R.S. 29.721, even if “the inmates . . . are awaiting trial as a pretrial detainee.” 200. Governor Edwards declared an emergency under R.S. 29.721, and by implementing its Camp J transfer plan, the DOC is presumably taking into its constructive custody pretrial detainees and is therefore responsible for the care of those it transfers to state prisons. 201. Presently, significant numbers of people in East Baton Rouge Parish Prison—where several Named Plaintiffs are or were held—and other parish prisons are testing COVID-19 positive. Without appropriate public health instruction, some of these jails have been unable to properly implement social distancing, hygiene practices, and PPE distribution. Others have been unable to set up the appropriate levels of quarantine and medical isolation in their jails. 202. Both being held in such conditions and being transferred to LSP’s Camp J independently constitute improper punishment. 203. Notably, people who are detained pre-trial may have many avenues for release to medically isolate in their own homes or the homes of their families. Across the state, funds are being raised and motions are being submitted to raise and obtain bail for people who are at high risk for death if they contract COVID-19. 204. For some people, their release opportunities may be impacted negatively by the DOC’s transfer plan, and instead of being released from a jail in the parish where a person awaiting
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trial resides, that person will find him or herself in another DOC facility where loved ones may
struggle to find him or her.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 205. Named Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, to assert the claims alleged in this Complaint on a common basis.
206. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which named
Plaintiffs and unknown Class Members can challenge Defendants’ unconstitutional COVID-19
response.
207. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to
Rule 23(a)(l)–(4) and Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
V. The Plaintiff Class and Subclasses 208. Plaintiffs propose a declaratory and injunctive class defined as: All prisoners and pre-
trial detainees who are, or will in the future be, subjected to the medical care policies and practices of
the DOC, and subjected to the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices (the “Plaintiff Class”).
They seek declaratory and injunctive relief to terminate the ongoing course of conduct on the part of
Defendants that is creating a substantial risk of serious harm and depriving the named Plaintiffs and
the Plaintiff Class of their constitutional rights, and to enjoin the policies and practices adopted and
implemented by Defendants that result in the deprivation of those rights.203
203 Plaintiffs’ proposed Class consists of people in pre-trial detention and also people who have been convicted of crimes. The Fourteenth Amendment’s “substantive due process” protections apply to medical claims brought by individuals in pre-trial detention, whereas the Eighth Amendment applies to people in prison pursuant to convictions. See Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 648-49 (5th Cir. 1996). However, the Fifth Circuit has held that the same subjective deliberate indifference standard applies to both and, therefore, the analysis infra proceeds pursuant to the Eighth Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” analysis. Id. The pre-trial Plaintiffs note that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hare is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). Following Kingsley, other circuits have held that a more protective “objective” deliberate indifference standard should apply to medical claims of individuals in pre-trial detention. See, e.g., Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d
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209. Subclass I: Plaintiffs propose a declaratory and injunctive subclass of all incarcerated individuals who are, or will in the future be, subjected to the medical care policies and practices of the DOC, and subjected to the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
210. Subclass II: Plaintiffs propose a declaratory and injunctive subclass of all individuals being held in pre-trial detention who are, or will in the future be, subjected to the medical care policies and practices of the DOC, and subjected to the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices.
VI. Rule 23(a) Factors 211. The proposed class satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a). C. Numerosity — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 212. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The DOC has over 31,600 within its immediate custody, and another 15,000 people are detained pretrial in Louisiana. All are at risk of being transferred to LSP under the DOC’s plan, and all are dependent on Defendants during the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendants’ policies and practices put everyone in DOC’s custody at risk of contracting and dying of COVID-19 and receiving inadequate health care while in custody. 213. The Plaintiff Class members are identifiable using records maintained in the ordinary course of business by the DOC. D. Commonality — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 214. All members of the proposed Plaintiff Class are subject to the same systemic unconstitutional policies, practices, acts, and omissions on the part of Defendants described in this Complaint, and all are at risk of adverse impacts on their physical health resulting therefrom.
17, 33-36 (2d Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, this Court need not resolve that tension here, because the pre-trial Plaintiffs can easily show that Defendants’ COVID-19 response constitutes subjective
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215. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class.

216. Such common questions of law include, but are not limited to:

• Whether Plaintiffs, and the putative class they seek to represent, face a substantial risk of serious harm under the DOC’s COVID-19 response plan;
• Whether Plaintiffs, and the putative class they seek to represent, face a substantial risk of serious harm due to the COVID-19 pandemic; and
• Whether the DOC’s COVID-19 response plan amounts to deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ right and the right of the putative class members they seek to represent to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

217.

Such common questions of fact include, but are not limited to:

• Whether Defendants are aware of the substantial risk of serious harm Plaintiffs face under the DOC’s COVID-19 response plan;
• Whether Defendants have taken reasonable measures to abate the substantial risk of serious harm caused by the COVID-19 pandemic for the individuals who are within their custody;
• Whether Defendants have promulgated adequate policies to protect against the harms of COVID-19;
• Whether Defendants have ensured that prisons and jails have sufficient oversight, staffing, and resources to protect people from COVID-19;
• Whether COVID-19 patients housed at Camp J will have access to adequate medical care;
• Whether the DOC's plan to transfer COVID-19 patients to LSP's Camp J will further strain LSP's ability to provide medical care for its current population;
• Whether the DOC's plan to transfer COVID-19 patients to LSP's Camp J will increase the risk of COVID-19 transmission among the LSP population; and
• Whether the DOC’s COVID-19 response plan is consistent with CDC guidelines.

218. Defendants are expected to raise common defenses to these claims, including

denying that they are deliberately indifferent and denying that their actions violate the law.

E. Typicality — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 219. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the Plaintiff Class, as their claims arise from the same policies, practices, or courses of conduct, and their claims are based on the same theory of law as the class’s claims. Named Plaintiffs are all subjected to the inadequate policies and practices of Defendants. Named Plaintiffs and the proposed class they seek to represent have suffered injuries or

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a have a substantial risk of serious harm and will continue to be in this position due to Defendants’ unlawful and unconstitutional pattern and practice of transferring COVID-19 patients to LSP’s Camp J.
F. Adequacy — Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 220. Named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class because their interests in the vindication of the legal claims that they raise are entirely aligned with the interests of the other Class Members, who each have the same basic constitutional claims. They are members of the Class, and their interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the other Class Members. 221. There are no known conflicts of interest among Class Members, all of whom have a similar interest in vindicating their constitutional rights by halting the DOC’s LSP transfer plan. 222. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from the Promise of Justice Initiative and the Southern Poverty Law Center, who have experience in litigating complex civil rights matters related to prisoners’ rights in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of Louisiana’s prison system and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. 223. Class counsel have a detailed understanding of local law and practices as they relate to federal constitutional requirements.
G. Rule 23(b)(2) 224. Class action status is appropriate because Defendants have acted or will act in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all putative Class Members by enforcing a plan in which any person in DOC custody who tests positive for COVID-19 will likely be transferred to LSP.
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225. The Class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin Defendants from carrying out the LSP transfer plan. Because the putative Class challenges Defendants’ transfer plan as unconstitutional through declaratory and injunctive relief that would apply the same relief to every Class Member, Rule 23(b)(2) certification is appropriate and necessary.
226. Injunctive relief compelling Defendants to respect Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights will similarly protect each Class Member from being subjected to Defendants’ unlawful and dangerous plan. A declaration and injunction stating that Defendants cannot transfer COVID-19 patients to LSP would provide relief to every Class Member. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate.
H. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) 227. Class action status is appropriate because Defendants have acted or will act in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all putative Class Members by enforcing a plan in which any person in DOC custody who tests positive for COVID-19 will likely be transferred to LSP but there is a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class 228. The Class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin Defendants from carrying out the LSP transfer plan. Because the putative Class challenges Defendants’ transfer plan as unconstitutional through declaratory and injunctive relief that would apply the same relief to every Class Member, Rule 23(b)(1)(a) certification is appropriate and necessary. 229. Injunctive relief compelling Defendants to respect Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights will similarly impact all the parties. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate.
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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deliberate Indifference to the Serious Risk of Harm Posed by
COVID-19 (Subclass I) (Eighth Amendment) (Defendants Edwards, DOC, LDH, LeBlanc, and Russo) 230. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the proceeding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. 231. Named Plaintiffs who are incarcerated post-conviction (“State Plaintiffs”), and the putative class they seek to represent (“Subclass I”), face a substantial risk of serious harm from the actions and inactions of Defendants in response the COVID-19 pandemic. 232. The COVID-19 pandemic creates a substantial risk of serious harm for State Plaintiffs and Subclass I—a risk of which Defendants are well aware—and the Eighth Amendment requires that Defendants take reasonable measures to abate that risk for the individuals who are within the State’s custody. 233. Defendants have failed to take reasonable measures to abate that risk for people incarcerated in Louisiana. 234. State Plaintiffs and Subclass I have been deprived and continue to be deprived by the Defendants of their rights under the Eighth Amendment to reasonably safe living conditions. 235. Defendants are aware of the substantial risk of harm that COVID-19 poses to State Plaintiffs and Subclass I, and are further aware of the particular risks of severe illness and possible death that State Plaintiffs and Subclass I face as a result of the inherently congregate and unclean settings in incarceration. Despite this knowledge, Defendants have failed to take reasonable measures to mitigate these dangers. 236. Defendant DOC’s LSP transfer plan also creates a substantial risk of serious harm for State Plaintiffs and Subclass I. The transfer plan increases the substantial risk of serious harm created by the COVID-19 pandemic.
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237. Defendants are aware of the risks of transferring COVID-19 patients, of housing COVID-19 patients in concentrated environments in close contact with one another, of housing COVID-19 patients far from hospitals capable of treating life-threatening symptoms, and of increasing the exposure of the vulnerable LSP population to COVID-19.
238. The Eighth Amendment requires that Defendants not impose this heightened, and serious risk, for individuals who are incarcerated created both by the risk of being transferred to Camp J and the risk of being held in a facility being used as a hub for COVID-19 patients.
239. Defendants LDH and Russo are aware of the transfer plan and have not used their statutory authority to stop the transfer plan. To the extent Defendant Edwards denies participation in the transfer, Defendant Edwards is aware of the transfer plan and has not used the statutory authority and oversight to stop the transfer plan.
240. The transfer plan constitutes deliberate indifference to State Plaintiffs’ right and Subclass I’s right to represent to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
241. State Plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalf of Subclass I, seek injunctive and declaratory relief against all Defendants to prevent the continued violation of their constitutional rights as detailed herein.
II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deliberate Indifference to the Serious Risk of Harm Posed by COVID-19 (Subclass II) (Fourteenth Amendment) (Defendants Edwards, LDH, and Russo)
242. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the proceeding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count.
243. Kendrick Wilson, Julius Allen, Ernest Rogers, and Alfoanso Garner, (“Pre-Trial Plaintiffs”) and the putative class they seek to represent (Subclass II), face a substantial risk of serious harm from the actions and inactions of Defendants Edwards, LDH, and Russo in response the COVID-19 pandemic.
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244. The COVID-19 pandemic creates a substantial risk of serious harm for Pre-Trial Plaintiffs and Subclass II—a risk of which Defendants are well aware—and the Fourteenth Amendment requires that Defendants take reasonable measures to abate that risk for Pre-Trial Plaintiffs and Subclass II.
245. Defendants have failed to take reasonable measures to abate that risk. 246. Pre-Trial Plaintiffs and Subclass II have been deprived and continue to be deprived by Defendants Edwards, LDH, and Russo of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to reasonably safe living conditions. 247. Defendants Edwards, LDH, and Russo are aware of the substantial risk of harm that COVID-19 poses to all individuals, and are further aware of the particular risks of severe illness and possible death that these Plaintiffs face as a result of the inherently congregate and unclean settings in incarceration. Despite this knowledge, Defendants Edwards, LDH, and Russo have failed to take reasonable measures to mitigate these dangers. III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deliberate Indifference to the Serious Risk of Harm Created
by The DOC’s LSP Transfer Plan (Subclass II) (Fourteenth Amendment) (Defendants Edwards, DOC, LDH, LeBlanc and Russo) 248. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the proceeding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. 249. Defendant DOC’s LSP transfer plan also creates a substantial risk of serious harm for Pre-Trial Plaintiffs and Subclass II. The transfer plan increases the substantial risk of serious harm created by the COVID-19 pandemic. 250. Defendants are aware of the risks of transferring COVID-19 patients, of housing COVID-19 patients in concentrated environments in close contact with one another, and of housing COVID-19 patients far from hospitals capable of treating life-threatening symptoms.
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251. The 14th Amendment requires that Defendants not impose this heightened, and
serious risk, for the individuals who are detained pre-trial created by the risk of being transferred to
Camp J.
252. Defendants LDH and Russo are aware of the transfer plan and have not used their
statutory authority to stop the transfer plan. To the extent Defendant Edwards denies participation
in the transfer, Defendant Edwards is aware of the transfer plan and has not used the statutory
authority and oversight to stop the transfer plan.
253. The transfer plan constitutes deliberate indifference to Pre-Trial Plaintiffs’ right and
Subclass II’s right to represent to be free from punishment.
254. Pre-Trial Plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalf of Subclass II, seek injunctive
and declaratory relief against all Defendants to prevent the continued violation of their constitutional
rights as detailed herein.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the putative class they seek to represent,
request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendants and order the following
relief:
(a) An order and judgment declaring that Defendants’ policies and practices concerning COVID-19, in their totality, violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(b) An order and judgment declaring that the conditions, acts, omissions, policies, and practices described above are in violation of the rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of the Class and Subclasses they seek to represent, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(c) An order and judgment declaring that the suit is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(1)(A), and appointing the undersigned as Class Counsel;
(d) An order and judgment preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants, their subordinates, agents, employees, representatives, contractors, and all others acting or purporting to act in concert with them or on their behalf from 71

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subjecting Plaintiffs, and the Class and Subclasses Plaintiffs seek to represent, to the illegal and unconstitutional conditions, acts, omissions, policies, and practices set forth above;
(e) An order and judgment ordering Defendants to develop and implement, as soon as practicable, a plan to eliminate the substantial risk of serious harm that Plaintiffs, and all members of the Class and Subclasses Plaintiffs seek to represent, suffer due to the unlawful acts, omissions, conditions, and practices described in this Complaint. Defendants’ plan shall include, at a minimum, taking all necessary steps to ensure the following during the COVID-19 pandemic:
 That Defendants promulgate and implement adequate policies and procedures related to COVID-19 that ensure adequate staffing; resources; quality assurance; surveillance; auditing; data tracking; coordination with local, state, and federal health officials; education; clinical guidance; and training;
 That each COVID-19 patient in DOC custody is evaluated by a medical professional and that transfers of such patients are initiated only at the recommendation of the evaluating medical professional;
 That each DOC facility’s capacity to provide social distancing and the maximum number of inmates it can house safely under the CDC’s social distancing guidelines is evaluated; and
 That Defendant Russo and Defendant LDH assess and make recommendations regarding conditions of confinement in all Louisiana jails and prisons consistent with the CDC’s social distancing guidelines and that Defendants conform all policies and guidance in local parish prisons and parish jails that hold state prisoners to such recommendations.
(f) Retain jurisdiction of this case until Defendants have fully complied with the orders of this Court, and there is a reasonable assurance that Defendants will continue to comply in the future absent continuing jurisdiction;
(g) An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
(h) Any other relief this Court deems proper.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of April, 2020.
/s/ Mercedes Montagnes
Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287 Jamila Johnson, La. Bar No. 37953 Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415 The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue
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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 1 04/14/20 Page 73 of 73 New Orleans, LA 70117 Telephone: (504) 529-5955 Facsimile: (504) 595-8006 Email: mmontagnes@defendla.org Jared Davidson, La. Bar No. 37093 Southern Poverty Law Center 201 Saint Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone: (504) 486-8982 Facsimile: (504) 486-8947 Email: jared.davidson@splcenter.org Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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 Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 1-2 04/14/20 Page 1 of 10
DECLARATION OF DR. MICHAEL PUISIS CONCERNING THE RISK OF THE SPREAD OF COVID-19 IN THE LOUISIANA STATE PRISON (LSP) AT ANGOLA
1. Dr. Michael Puisis is an internist who has worked in correctional medicine for 35 years. He began working at the Cook County Jail as a physician in 1985 and became the Medical Director of Cook County Jail from 1991 to 1996 and Chief Operating Officer for the medical program at the Cook County Jail from 2009 to 2012. He has worked in and managed correctional medical programs in multiple state prisons including in Illinois and New Mexico. He has worked as a Monitor or Expert for Federal Courts on multiple cases and has worked as a Correctional Medical Expert for the Department of Justice on multiple cases. He has also participated in revisions of national standards for medical care for the National Commission on Correctional Health Care and for the American Public Health Association. He also participated in revision of tuberculosis standards for the Center for Disease Control. Dr. Puisis has edited the only textbook on correctional medicine, Clinical Practice in Correctional Medicine. Dr. Puisis evaluated the Louisiana State Prison at Angola for The Promise of Justice Initiative in 2016 (and also conducted records review in 2018) and previously monitored Louisiana State Prison at Angola for the Department of Justice.
2. Coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) is a viral pandemic. This is a novel virus for which there is no established curative medical treatment and no vaccine.
3. The number of cases of COVID-19 in the United States are rising rapidly. On April 13, 2020, Johns Hopkins reported that there were 572,587 reported COVID-19 infections in the U.S. The number of deaths is over 23,000 but both cases and deaths are rising rapidly so by the time this declaration is read the numbers of both cases and deaths will be significantly larger. The number of cases of COVID-19 is the highest number of reported cases of any country in the world.
4. Louisiana has a rapidly accelerating rate of COVID-19 infections. A study from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette reported that COVID-19 cases grew at a 67.8% rate, the highest rate in the U.S.1 The Louisiana Department of Health reported on April 13, 2020 that there were 21,016 cases of COVID-19 with 884 deaths. Louisiana has the third most deaths per capita of any state in the U.S.
5. UpToDate2 reports an overall case mortality rate from the disease of 2.3. Louisiana has 884 deaths for 21,016 cases; more than 4.2% of persons diagnosed with the infection in Louisiana die.
1 Coronavirus cases grew faster in Louisiana than anywhere else in the world: UL study, The Acadiana Advocate, Adam Daigle March 24, 2020, https://www.theadvocate.com/acadiana/news/coronavirus/article_94494420-6d4b-11ea-ac42ff7dd722c084.html. 2 UpToDate is an online medical reference widely used in hospitals, health organizations, and private physicians.
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6. COVID-19 is transmitted by droplets of infected aerosol when people with the infection cough. Droplets of respiratory secretions infected with the virus can survive as an aerosol for up to three hours.3 4 Droplets can be directly transmitted by inhalation to other individuals in close proximity. Droplets can land on surfaces and be picked up by the hands of another person who can then become infected by contacting a mucous membrane (eyes, mouth, or nose) with their hand. Infected droplets can remain viable on surfaces for variable lengths of time, ranging from up to 3 hours on copper, 24 hours on cardboard, and 2-3 days on plastic and stainless steel.5
7. Medical care for COVID-19 focuses on prevention, which emphasizes social distancing, handwashing, and respiratory hygiene. The current CDC recommendations for social distancing and frequent handwashing measures, which are the only measures available to protect against infection, are not possible in LSP. Furthermore, repeated sanitation of horizontal and touch surfaces in inmate living units and throughout LSP is not typically done based on our review and would be an overwhelming task. LSP has worse living conditions and higher comingling of people than cruise ships and nursing homes, where COVID-19 is known to have easily spread. Prevention of contact with an infected droplet is significantly more difficult in a prison than in the community.
8. With respect to transmission of disease by droplet inhalation, correctional environments, including LSP, actually promote spread of respiratory contagious disease. Jails and prisons are long known to be a breeding ground for infectious respiratory illness. Tuberculosis is a bacteria which is significantly less transmissible than COVID-19 yet has been responsible for numerous outbreaks of illness in prisons and jails over the years. Respiratory infectious disease like TB are thought to be made worse in prisons because of crowding and recirculated air. Because of transmissibility of TB in prisons the CDC still recommends screening for this condition in prisons. Proper screening for tuberculosis can control that disease in prison populations.
9. The COVID-19 virus is a different type of respiratory illness; its spread is rapid and it is more easily transmissible. Control through screening with a test as is done for TB in prisons would be optimal but current CDC guidance6 does not recommend a test as a screening method. Likely, this is due to a critical shortage of testing material. The method of control in an intake of a correctional facility is quarantine for up to 14 days.7 If testing material
3 National Institute of Health, available at https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/newcoronavirus-stable-hours-surfaces 4 Neeltje van Doremalen and Others, Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared with SARS-CoV-1, Correspondence in New England Journal of Medicine, March 17, 2020, https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc2004973?cid=DM88773_&bid=171021451 5 Id. 6 Evaluating and Testing Persons for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Centers for Disease Control as found at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/hcp/clinical-criteria.html 7 In their Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities guidance the CDC recommends “If possible, consider quarantining all new intakes for 14 days before they enter the facility’s general population
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becomes readily available, I would recommend testing and a quarantine until the test is complete.
10. Jails and prisons promote spread of respiratory illnesses because of crowded congregate housing arrangements. LSP is the largest maximum security prison in the U. S. and has a population of approximately 6000 individuals. The main unit of LSP contains 32 dormitories. The remote camps C and D have a combination of dormitories and cellblocks. Camp F is a minimum dormitory. I have visited multiple inmate dormitories. All dormitories I visited were filled to capacity and were crowded. The dormitories are not arranged to provide social distancing as the distance between beds is approximately 3 feet. Large fans blow air through the units which is likely to spread contagious agents embedded in aerosol like COVID-19. Washing areas are shared. There is no privacy and it is not possible to remain 6 feet apart as recommended. Infirmary beds are in dormitory style setting and are close together. If inmates with COVID-19 are housed on the infirmary rather than outside hospitals, the infection is likely to spread throughout this unit of compromised patients. Photos in our prior 2016 report8 show what some of these dormitories and showers look like.9 Notable in these pictures is that soap is not consistently present on sinks used by staff and in showers used by inmates. Currently the President’s Task Force on COVID-19 recommends limiting gatherings to no more than 10 persons. Inmates at LSP live in large dormitories with over 80 persons per dormitory. These dormitories are incapable of allowing inmates to follow current CDC recommendations regarding prevention against COVID-19. Officers guarding the inmates can carry the infection into the prison. One couldn’t devise a system more contrary to current public health recommendations and the President’s Task Force recommendations than a prison like LSP. The elderly and those with significant medical conditions are housed together in some of these dormitories creating a nursing home like environment; environments where COVID-19 is known to have rapidly spread. Dormitories with large numbers of persons with severe medical conditions are similar to nursing homes where COVID is known to have caused significant death.
11. There is a lack of information about what is occurring within LSP and testing is not being widely performed. A bullet point summary of the LSP COVID-19 plan states that “any LSP offender presenting with symptoms is given both a flu test and COVID-19 test.” A news report on March 26, 2020 stated that two employees at different state prisons tested positive for COVID-19 but that no inmates have tested positive. The newspaper reported that only 32 inmates in the entire Louisiana Department of Corrections have been tested and all have tested negative. On April 13, 2020, the Louisiana Department of Corrections reported that
(SEPARATELY from other individuals who are quarantined due to contact with a COVID-19 case). As found at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correctiondetention/guidance-correctional-detention.html 8 Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola; Health Care Evaluation Submitted October 3, 2016; Lewis et al v. Cain et al Class Action Complaint. United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana. Case No. 3:15-cv-00318-BAJ-RLB Document 133-1 10/14/16 9 Photos PX006.0279, PX006.0280, PX006.0277
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57 inmates in DOC custody and 45 staff members across the DOC had tested positive. One staff member at LSP had died. Currently, transfers into LSP have been suspended absent extenuating circumstances and if an inmate is transferred into LSP, they are supposed to be quarantined for a 14-day period. LSP screens visitors and new inmates with symptom screening and a temperature. These measures are consistent with recommendations of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) correctional guidelines.10 However, based on our review of this facility in 2018, we noted ineffective medical care with several unqualified physicians, insufficient nurse staff, no infection control nurse, and lack of supervision of front line medical staff. While CDC procedures are in place I question the ability to effectively carry out the procedures as stated.
12. An individual’s immune system is the primary defense against this infection. As a result, people over age 65 years of age and persons with impaired immunity may have a higher probability of death if they are infected. Age related risk is a result of impaired immunity with aging. The older a person is the greater the apparent risk. In LSP 90% of inmates are incarcerated for life and approximately 50% of inmates are over age 50. People on immunosuppressive medication, with diseases causing impaired immunity, or with significant cardiac or pulmonary medical conditions also are at increased risk of death. It has recently been reported that younger patients with cardiovascular disease or hypertension may have unappreciated risk for severe disease.11 This has significant implications for correctional facilities with high rates of hypertension. Persons with severe mental illness in prisons are also, in my opinion, at increased risk of acquiring and transmitting infection because they are unable to understand social distancing and hand hygiene and may be unable to communicate symptoms appropriately. Also, by classification, like other prison systems, LSP houses inmates who are elderly, have disabilities, are mentally ill or have severe chronic illness profiles in specific housing areas, making this population at great risk if one of them becomes infected. Because LSP has a very large elderly population with significant chronic illness spread of infection in LSP would result in high rates of death.
13. Based on our review of care at LSP through 2018, inmates lacked access to hospital care under ordinary circumstances; the COVID-19 pandemic will only make that worse. Currently, severe COVID-19 disease is treated only with supportive care including respiratory isolation, oxygen, and mechanical ventilation as a last resort. LSP is a remote prison which is also remote from hospitals. There are reports that Louisiana’s hospitals could be overwhelmed by COVID-19 cases.12 The reports of possible lack of hospital beds
10 Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention posted March 23, 2020 as found at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidancecorrectional-detention.html 11 ACE2 is the SARS-CoV-2 Receptor Required for Cell Entry, Summary, New England Journal of Medicine, March 18, 2020 Review of article of Hoffman, M et al in Cell 2020 Mar 5 12 Louisiana’s hospitals could be overwhelmed by COVID-19 virus in all but best scenario; Daily Adviser March 26, 2020 as found at
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would place LSP inmates in a dire predicament.13 Also, LSP is not set up to manage hospital level care including managing patients on ventilators. The infirmary is a dormitory and housing a COVID-19 patient on this unit would result in spread to other uninfected but medically compromised patients. There is therefore no place to treat an ill person with COVID-19 except in a general housing unit or on the infirmary, both of which would expose other patients to infection. The existing staff at LSP could not manage any hospitallevel patient and getting a patient to a hospital from LSP will be challenging under current circumstances. This will invariably place inmates at risk of death.
14. The state is proposing transferring detained individuals with COVID-19 from the state’s numerous jails to Angola. This would entail transportation of COVID-19 infected detainees to Angola for housing. It is my opinion that transferring detainees from jails to LSP for medical isolation and clinical management is not a good idea for multiple reasons. First, because the process for transporting COVID positive cases to a parish and a prison without cases—or with few cases—would increase the risk of transmission of positive cases to a location without cases or few cases, thereby increasing risk of spread including to West Feliciana Parish and the surrounding communities. Second, LSP has a particularly vulnerable population with over 50% of inmates over 50 years of age and many vulnerable persons with high risk medical conditions. Staffing deficiencies will likely result in medical and custody staff working with infected transferred detainees as well as LSP prisoners, which is likely to spread infection to the uninfected prisoners currently housed at LSP. This places them at significant risk. Third, medical care at LSP is not good and transferred inmates are unlikely to receive the medical attention needed to appropriately monitor their disease. LSP had insufficient staff in 2016 and was unable to adequately provide medical care such that officers and inmates were used to provide medical care.14 Introduction of a COVID-19 infected population into a system without adequate medical staff can only result in less attention being paid to both the existing LSP patients who have substantial medical needs as well as the newly transferred inmates who should be monitored multiple times daily. Additionally, the quality of care at LSP was substandard in 2016 when we produced a report of our investigation and again in 2018 based on selected record reviews. Physicians were not credentialed appropriately and did not perform consistent with existing standards of care. On record reviews, we noted failure to recognize indications for hospitalization which is critical in the COVID-19 population. There was failure to recognize typical signs of respiratory decompensation which is also critical for COVID-19 patients. There were delays in transfer of patients to a hospital when indicated. Both physicians and other staff (nurses and emergency medical technicians) failed to recognize “red flag” signs resulting in adverse events. Also, LSP is not set up to manage acutely ill patients. Laboratory services are only
https://www.theadvertiser.com/story/news/local/2020/03/26/coronavirus-louisiana-hospitalsoverwhelmed-under-all-covid-19-scenarios/2884019001/ 13 Who gets a ventilator? Hospitals facing coronavirus surge are preparing for life-or-death decisions. NBC News as found at https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/who-gets-ventilatorhospitals-facing-coronavirus-surge-are-preparing-life-n1162721 14 Officers passed medications on most units, and inmates assisted in providing some services to inmates on the infirmary during our 2016
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available weekdays during working-day-hours and not at all on weekends. Blood gas assessments, critical for managing acute respiratory distress are not available at LSP. Physician evaluations during evening and nights were mostly telephonic and inadequate for patient needs. Also, the higher-level-of-care infirmary houses many long-term ill patients. These patients are at very high risk of death in the event of COVID-19 making the infirmary not useable for COVID-19 patients who deteriorate. Further, the local hospital is not a reference hospital and patients requiring intubation would need to be sent to Baton Rouge or New Orleans, an hour to three hour ride, respectively, a long ride with a potentially decompensating patient. For these reasons, detainees involved in these transfers would not be transferred into a situation that would include improved medical services. Services would likely be worse. Fourth and last, there is no evidence that the Louisiana Department of Health was involved in this decision. This appears to be a custody decision without consultation during a pandemic crisis with the Louisiana Department of Health. I have listed multiple reasons why this decision make little sense from a medical perspective. It also is not a good decision from a public health perspective. Custody leadership should not be making a decision that is likely to have great impact on a public health crisis, both with respect to introduction of active COVID-19 cases into a naïve and vulnerable population, and because the impact on local hospital resources could overwhelm the local community and reduce availability of ICU beds to community residents. For all of these reasons, it is my opinion that this transfer is not a good idea and will worsen the impact of this pandemic.
15. I have reviewed the plan submitted by the state, as well as the affidavits of Secretary James M. LeBlanc, Tracy Falgout, and Dr. John E. Morrison.15 None of these documents changed in any way my opinion that using LSP as a statewide isolation unit, specifically at Camp J, will worsen the impact of the pandemic and poses a serious public health risk.
16. First, there is still no evidence that the Department of Health is involved in making the decision to use Camp J. This is a public health emergency, not a custody or other nonmedical emergency. For this reason, the Department of Health should be directing decisions around transfers between facilities rather than custody officials. While Dr. Morrison is a medical doctor, his specialty is in general surgery and advanced cardiac life support, not epidemiology, pulmonology, or emergency medicine, and he has no relevant expertise in correctional medicine. I noted that the affidavits do not reference a public health official in attendance at the daily phone meetings – Dr. Morrison simply claims that the DOC is in “direct contact” with the Department of Health. Lack of coordination with the Department of Health puts at risk the lives of patients at LSP or who will be transferred to LSP and who may need to be hospitalized at some point. The Department of Public Health should have been part of the development of this plan in conjunction with their other statewide decisionmaking and planning around COVID-19.16
15 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318 (M.D.La.), Docket No. 585. 16 On April 8, 2020, the Department of Health Office of Public Health issued recommendations regarding prisons and juvenile detention centers. These recommendations were rescinded without explanation on April 9, 2020.
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17. Second, the pandemic plan they reference in their plan and affidavits is dated and not consistent with requirements of COVID-19. For COVID-19, three distinct types of special housing are needed: quarantine, isolation for people with known COVID019, and isolation for persons under investigation (“PUI”). The PUI group are people who are symptomatic (fever, symptoms of cough, shortness of breath, etc.) but have not yet been tested or test results are pending. These three groups should be housed separately. The current plan does not address this.
18. Third, the state’s plan and affidavits do not address hospitalization. Specifically, they did not discuss how the PUI group or the COVID-19 positive groups would be monitored and, when and if they would be sent to a hospital, what arrangements would be made. Because LSP is so remote, an earlier admission is probably indicated due to the expected long distance they would have to travel to Baton Rouge or New Orleans if the patient required hospitalization or intubation. The West Feliciana Hospital does not support mechanical ventilation.
19. Fourth, the state’s plan and affidavits did not address the capacity of LSP to provide appropriate medical care, particularly while maintaining isolation and quarantine from the rest of LSP. It is not clear from a practical matter how they would provide sufficient medical personnel at Camp J, who would have no contact with patients at the rest of LSP, without further diminishing the capacity of the already over-taxed LSP doctors and nurses. Nor was there any indication how the state plans to monitor the patients at Camp J in any of the three groups mentioned above. If hospitalization becomes necessary the travel time to the hospital delays initiation of care with resultant risk. In my previous reviews of medical records documenting the quality of care at LSP, I noted the failure to recognize indications for hospitalization and typical signs of respiratory decompensation, both of which are critical for COVID-19 patients. There were also many examples of delays in transfer of patients to a hospital when indicated.
20. Finally, the state’s plan and affidavits do not lay out adequate protocols for medical isolation of Camp J from the rest of LSP’s population, the majority of whom are elderly or otherwise at high risk because of their medical conditions. The state’s plan and affidavits also do not describe who will provide medical care for the population expected to be housed at Camp J; whether and how workers serving the population at Camp J will be separate from workers serving the remainder of the prison; what the clinical monitoring will consist of; whether and how these known COVID-19 patients will receive hospital care if necessary; and where they will find medical staff and providers to care for the population. Most troubling in the state’s plan is the lack of coordination with the Louisiana Department of Health. Creating an isolation unit for COVID-19 in a remote rural area with few cases and with a lack of reference hospital resources risks increased transmission and increased risk for individuals transferred as well as risk of infecting the local LSP inmate population which is high risk because of age and disease burden. There is also the increased risk of spillover into the local civilian population. Further, even assuming Defendants ultimately utilized different staff at Camp J, that staff will be at high risk of infecting the community, including staff that serve the rest of LSP. Because this is a pandemic, the Louisiana Department of Health should
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approve of such a transfer as part of its broader effort to control the pandemic statewide. This is not something correctional officials should do without consultation and approval of the Department of Health.
Recommendations
21. Steps should be taken to release any inmate who is a low risk to the community. The additional risk to inmates by virtue of crowding in prisons and the risk of promoting spread of the infection to the inmate population, and thereby to the community, needs to be weighed against the reason for not releasing the inmate from incarceration. Release based on risk should prioritize inmates over 65 years of age, inmates with immune disorders, inmates with significant cardiac (including hypertension) or pulmonary conditions, or inmates with cognitive disorders. Keeping healthy individuals in prison for short sentences, or for parole violations or other marginal public safety reasons only promotes crowding. Crowding decreases the ability of maintaining distancing of prisoners which risks spread of the virus. Therefore, healthy prisoners with low risk sentences are best sent home as a preventive measure.
22. Because LSP is a maximum security prison with a 90% of inmates having a life sentence, depopulation of low risk inmates may not yield many inmates who can be released. Depopulating should be done at other Louisiana prisons to permit LSP to reassign inmates to other prisons that will permit appropriate distancing in dormitories. Such reassignment is permissible under CDC guideline on the basis of depopulation. Current dormitory arrangements are inconsistent with current public health and CDC recommendations regarding social distancing and if COVID-19 transmission penetrates the prison, the infection will spread widely.
23. If and when COVID-19 testing becomes readily available, expanded testing should be done.
24. All persons over 65, with severe mental illness, with immune disorders, with serious cardiac or pulmonary disease, or with any cognitive disorder should have daily symptom screening and temperature screening. Any positive symptom or temperature should require respiratory isolation and testing for COVID-19. Temperatures should be taken with infrared no-touch thermometers so that symptom screening and temperatures can be taken without touching the patient.
25. Persons suspicious for or known to be infected with COVID-19 should NOT be transferred to LSP.17 As of April 13, 2020, West Feliciana Parish only had 46 cases and 0 deaths. LSP had 24 cases between staff and inmates. To send patients infected with COVID-19 to a parish and correctional facility with few known cases risks spreading the disease further into Louisiana and has ramifications for the community at large. Furthermore, approximately
17 Louisiana plans to house local and state inmates with coronavirus at Angola and Allen Correctional; Emily Lane, WDSU News March 27, 2020; as found at https://www.wdsu.com/article/louisiana-plans-to-house-inmates-with-coronavirus-at-angola-andanother-prison/31960114
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50% of the LSP population is over age 50 with many high risk medical conditions and a majority of inmates live in dormitories. This increases risk of transmission into an uninfected population and increases risk of death.
26. The CDC recommends suspending all transfers between facilities or jurisdictions.18 LSP should enact this recommendation. However, if a transfer must be done, any person is transferred from one prison to another, they should have a negative COVID-19 test result or be quarantined for 14 days prior to transfer and known to not have COVID-19.
27. LSP needs to develop guidelines for when to send patients to a hospital. These should be developed with the reference hospital. Contact information with the reference hospital should be established as soon as possible. Criteria for hospital referral should be established in advance and posted so that all physicians, physician assistants and nurse practitioners are aware.
28. The current Pandemic Flu Plan (PFP) of LSP is a generic influenza-like-illness plan which is not consistent with guidance regarding COVID-1919 and should not be used. Instead, rather than re-writing a document at this late stage, I recommend the existing CDC guidelines should be used as a plan and appropriately adapted to LSP conditions. The adaptions and CDC guidelines should be widely distributed to health and custody staff.
29. A point of contact with the Louisiana Department of Health should be established and contact information shared with medical leadership. The Department of Health should have contact information of DOC and LSP medical leadership and an update conference call with the Department of Health should occur every few days or more frequently if needed.
18 In the Operations item of the Management section of the CDC correctional guidance, it states, “Suspend all transfers of incarcerated/detained persons to and from other jurisdictions and facilities (including work release where relevant), unless necessary for medical evaluation, medical isolation/quarantine, care, extenuating security concerns, or to prevent overcrowding”. LSP is not a location ideal for medical isolation or medical care due to poor service history, lack of nearby hospitals, and because the prison and surrounding area have no cases. Sending patients with COVID-19 to this facility risk spread and places them in a facility with less medical resources than a facility closer to a large city. 19 I give only one example. Item 4.a, of the Yellow/Orange Phase of the LSP plan states that “employees will complete a self-screening at roll call. Employees who state they are sick shall be triaged by medical staff or health trained staff, and if found to have a fever shall be sent home. Staff with ILI shall remain at home at least 24 hours after they are free of fever (100F) or signs of fever, without the use of fever medication”. This is incorrect information with respect to COVID-19 and could result in increased transmission of infection. The CDC recommends not returning to work until there is resolution of fever without use of medication and improvement of symptoms and negative COVID-19 tests on at least two consecutive occasions 24 hours apart OR at least 3 days since resolution of fever without use of medication and improvement of respiratory symptoms and at least 7 days have passed since symptoms first appeared.
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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 1-2 04/14/20 Page 10 of 10 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed on April 13, 2020 in Chicago, Illinois.
/s/ Michael Puisis Michael Puisis D.O.
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DECLARATION OF DR. SUSI VASSALLO CONCERNING THE RISK OF COVID-19 IN THE LOUISIANA STATE PRISON AT ANGOLA
1. I am a board-certified emergency room physician and medical toxicologist. I practice as an attending physician in the emergency room of Bellevue Hospital, a large urban emergency department in New York City, and have practiced at various sites in Texas for many years. I am a Clinical Professor of Emergency Medicine at the New York University School of Medicine. I am certified as a correctional health professional by NCCHC and have evaluated correctional health care systems in nine states. I evaluated the Louisiana State Prison at Angola (“Angola”) for The Promise of Justice Initiative in 2016 (and also conducted records review in 2018). I have also been retained by the Department of Homeland Security to review medical care delivery at its detention facilities, and the Fifth Circuit and other courts have relied on my reports.
2. Coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) is a viral pandemic. This is a novel virus for which there is no established curative medical treatment and no vaccine. Severe pneumonia is one of the serious consequences of COVID-19 and the lungs become filled with fluid. I have had patients tell me “I can’t do this anymore” as they realize they can no longer keep up the work of breathing and require life saving interventions.
3. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that the reproduction rate of the virus, the R0, is 3.8-8.9-3.8, meaning that each newly infected person is estimated to infect on average 5.7 additional persons.1 This is highly infectious and only the great influenza pandemic of 1918 is thought to have higher infectivity. This is likely a function of all human populations currently being highly susceptible. The attack rate given an exposure is also high, estimated at 20-30% depending on community conditions, but may be as high as 80% in some settings and populations. The incubation period is thought to be 2-14 days, which is why isolation is generally 14 days.2 The long incubation period is particularly concerning for transmission rates given that so many people are asymptomatic and infectious.
4. The number of cases of COVID-19 in the United States are rising rapidly. On April 13, 2020, Johns Hopkins reported that there were 572,587 reported COVID-19 infections in the U.S. The number of deaths is over 23,000 but both cases and deaths are rising rapidly so by the time this declaration is read the numbers of both cases and deaths will be significantly larger. The number of cases of COVID-19 is the highest number of reported cases of any country in the world.
1 CDC, Emerging Infectious Diseases, High Contagiousness and Rapid Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronatvirus 2 (April 7, 2020), https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/7/200282_article 2 The Incubation Period of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) From Publicly Reported Confirmed Cases: Estimation and Application (March 10, 2020), https://annals.org/aim/fullarticle/2762808/incubation-period-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19from-publicly-reported

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 1-3 04/14/20 Page 2 of 9
5. Louisiana has a rapidly accelerating rate of COVID-19 infections. A study from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette reported that COVID-19 cases grew at a 67.8% rate, the highest rate in the U.S.3 The Louisiana Department of Health reported on April 13, 2020 that there were 21,016 cases of COVID-19 with 884 deaths. Louisiana has the third most deaths per capita of any state in the U.S.
6. UpToDate reports an overall case mortality rate from the disease of 2.3. Louisiana has 884 deaths for 21,016 cases; more than 4.2% of persons diagnosed with the infection in Louisiana die.
7. The symptoms of COVID-19 present variably from fever, cough, chest pain, and headache to symptoms of loss of smell, diarrhea, aches, and vomiting.4 At present, there are no markers identified nor signs or symptoms that would predict clinical deterioration. In at least one study, half of the patients admitted to the intensive care unit for COVID died on the first day.5 However, COVID patients may also present insidiously and it is impossible to predict the course of the illness, who will do well, and who will not. It is my experience treating patients in the emergency departments of NYU Langone Health and Bellevue Hospital Center that patients are not always aware of the degree of hypoxia (lack of oxygen) present in their bodies. Unlike the more common experience of holding one’s breath for as long as possible and then gasping for breath, these patients teeter on the edge of death with no gasping for breath or feeling their need for oxygen. This has been shocking to us working in Emergency Departments. Immediately upon arrival to the hospital, life-saving measures may be required. In some cases the patients code (suffer cardiac arrest) precipitously. In other experiences, some patients have adequate oxygen saturations for days and then deteriorate. To wit, the Prime Minister of England Boris Johnson was able to stay at home for 12 days before he was transferred to the hospital intensive care unit. In some cases, corrections staff and medical staff on the frontline may not be alarmed by a patient’s complaint or appearance. This is not a predictable illness with a predictable course. There is no lab test that predicts the patient’s course. In fact, the laboratory tests for COVID may give inaccurate results. Fifteen percent of patients who are tested for COVID have a false negative, meaning they do indeed have COVID but the test is negative. Given the lack of tell-tale signs or a timeline for subsequent deterioration, it is absolutely critical and necessary that patients who test positive or likely positive (known as person under investigation) for COVID-19 or have been exposed and show symptoms, be within easy transportable distance of hospitals in the event that more critical care is necessary. The care required to
3 Coronavirus cases grew faster in Louisiana than anywhere else in the world: UL study, The Acadiana Advocate, Adam Daigle March 24, 2020, https://www.theadvocate.com/acadiana/news/coronavirus/article_94494420-6d4b-11ea-ac42ff7dd722c084.html. 4 Breaking News: Update on Evaluation and Management for COVID-19 Patients – Updated 4/7/20, Emergency Medicine News (March 31, 2020), https://journals.lww.com/emnews/blog/breakingnews/pages/post.aspx?PostID=508. 5 Covid-19 in Critically Ill Patients in the Seattle Region — Case Series, The New England Journal of Medicine (March 30, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa2004500?articleTools=true

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appropriately evaluate and provide treatment to patients with COVID includes lab testing, imaging, and treatment individualized to the presentation of the patient. This may range from oxygen therapy by nasal cannula, or high flow oxygen, continuous positive pressure masks; to intubation of the trachea and ventilator assistance. These are difficulty decisions influenced by not only the level of oxygen in the blood to the all important work of breathing. This viral infection is showing a serious predisposition to hypercoaguopathy and patients have pulmonary emboli (blood clots in the lungs) necessitating anticoaguation. Some patients’ clinical course are complicated by superimposed bacterial infections of the lungs. Fluid therapy is complicated by dehydration due to fever and decreased fluid intake due to illness and the need to restrict the willy-nilly administration of IV fluids as the lungs are damaged by the virus and the attempts to oxygenated using positive pressure. Camp J is located in a remote prison that is lacking in these capabilities and technologies and is at least an hour from a facility that could provide them.
8. During this pandemic, patients with COVID often present with cough or fever or both. However, there are enormous numbers of patients with other symptoms and no cough and or fever. In one study of critically ill patients, only 88% presented with cough and only 50% had a fever.6 In this pandemic, fatigue alone, sore throats, body aches, ear aches, or congestion frequently prove to be COVID. Abdominal pain with or without fever and cough is COVID. Back pain is COVID, with or without fever or cough. In fact most of our trauma patients at Bellevue, appendicitis and any other problem are found to have COVID. Diarrhea is COVID. Rash may be COVID and can be mistaken for other illnesses. Because the ACE2 receptors are on the intestines and the lungs, diarrhea is a common presentation. Screening for cough and or fever is inadequate to exclude the possibility of infection from COVID. Moreover, many patients are asymptomatic and are infectious to others.
9. Although advanced age and underlying illnesses or chronic medical conditions increase the risk of serious effects of COVID, the relatively young and healthy are also in the intensive care units and die. While fatalities have been highest for older patients, increasing evidence in the US has shown the dire risk that COVID-19 poses to younger patients. Young patients ages 20-54 years old can have serious complications from COVID-19 including hospital admission, admission to an intensive care unit, invasive ventilation, or death. As of late March 2020, 38% of those individuals hospitalized in the US were between 20-54 years old.7 Of those admitted to the ICU, 12% were aged 20-44 years and 36% were age 45-64 years. These statistics highlight the significant risk younger people are at for serious complications due to coronavirus. A few days ago, at the hospital where I work, there were 482 patients in isolation and 209 patients on ventilators. Almost 50% of the COVID positive patients are less than 65 years old. 13 patients are on extracorporeal membrane oxygenation, 10 are on
6 Covid-19 in Critically Ill Patients in the Seattle Region — Case Series, The New England Journal of Medicine (March 30, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2004500 7 John Hopkins Medicine, Coronavirus and COVID-19: Younger Adults Are at Risk, Too, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/coronavirus-andcovid-19-younger-adults-are-at-risk-too (accessed April 9, 2020).

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continuous venovenous dialysis. Autopsy studies are demonstrating widespread tissue destruction due to the COVID virus. The numbers show that all types of people – healthy and unhealthy, young and old – are impacted by this virus, and we are learning more each day.
10. Those incarcerated in U.S. jails and prisons make up 2.2 million people of our U.S. population.8 This population is one the most vulnerable in society, with high rates of coinfection with hepatitis C, HIV, and tuberculosis (TB). More specifically, the World Health Organization has identified the level of TB in prisons to be 100 times higher than that of the civilian population, due to the hazardous combination of overcrowding, poor ventilation, and inadequate treatment and diagnosis.9 The transmission of COVID-19 in prisons can easily be likened to the transmission of TB, where “social distancing” practices are impossible with inmates living in close quarters and the lack of available measures to ensure proper handwashing, hygiene, and sanitation. What’s more, half of this vulnerable population of incarcerated individuals have at least one comorbid condition, increasing the risk of poor outcomes for those who also contract COVID-19. COVID-19 is likely to rampantly spread within jails and prisons given its droplet aerosol transmission that is stable for hours and can even last on cardboard and metal surfaces for hours per the National Institutes of Health.10 This has been the experience at the Cook County Jail, which now has the highest outbreak numbers in the country.11
11. The Department of Corrections plan is to allow for the transfer of detained individuals including people who have not been convicted of a crime - from the state’s over 100 numerous jails and prisons to Camp J at Angola. It is my opinion that transferring detainees who test positive for COVID from jails around the state to Camp J is a medically unsound plan and contrary to public health guidelines for multiple reasons. First, it is against the recommendation of the Louisiana Department of Health.12 The State Health Officer, Jimmy Guidry, issued recommendations to prisons and juvenile detention centers on April 8, 2020. In it he states that correctional and detention centers should “have a trained Emergency Medical Service/Emergency Medical Technician (EMS/EMT) assess and transport anyone you think might have COVID--19 to a healthcare facility.” Camp J is not a healthcare facility and the DOC plan goes against this guidance.13 This plan is also against the guidance
8 Flattening the Curve for Incarcerated Populations — Covid-19 in Jails and Prisons, The New England Journal of Medicine (April 2, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2005687?query=featured_coronavirus 9 World Health Organization, Tuberculosis in Prisons, https://www.who.int/tb/areas-ofwork/population-groups/prisons-facts/en/ (accessed April 9, 2020). 10 National Institutes of Health, New coronavirus stable for hours on surfaces (March 17, 2020), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/new-coronavirus-stable-hours-surfaces 11 Chicago’s Jail is Top U.S. Hot Spot as Virus Spreads Behind Bars, New York Times (April 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/us/coronavirus-cook-county-jail-chicago.html 12 Louisiana Department of Health, Office of Public Health, COVID-19; recommendations regarding prisons and juvenile detention centers (April 8, 2020). 13 Without any explanation, these recommendations were rescinded on April 9, 2020.

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of the CDC, which recommends that all transfers of incarcerated and detained people are suspended, unless necessary for medical evaluation, medical isolation/quarantine, care, extenuating security concerns, or to prevent overcrowding.14 Each facility should be able to provide isolation and quarantine services on-site. If not, release or repurposing of other unused spaces (dorms, hotels) is preferable to transfer. Even if up-to-date medical records are sent along with people who are transported to Angola, there is no indication that Angola is in a position to provide newly transferred detainees with any prescribed medications for underlying medical conditions, such as hypertension and diabetes; conditions that render patients vulnerable to severe COVID symptoms. The process of transporting COVID positive cases to a parish like West Feliciana with relatively fewer cases increases the risk of spread throughout that parish and the surrounding communities. Angola has a particularly vulnerable population with over 50% of people over 50 years of age, many of whom have high risk medical conditions and are vulnerable to serious medical complications if infected. Medical and custody staff are also at risk if they come into contact with infected transferred detainees and are likely to spread infection to the uninfected and vulnerable Angola population, no matter what measures are purportedly taken to isolate Camp J. Angola had insufficient staff when we reviewed in 2016 and there is no reason to believe they have seriously increased their staffing numbers since. Introduction of COVID-19 into the system will result in the existing Angola patients not having their substantial medical needs met.
12. The Department of Corrections has said that only people who have tested positive but are not displaying serious symptoms and who are not in medical distress are supposed to be sent to Camp J. There is no information or medical criteria on how to identify patients as meeting that definition. In fact, at this time, there is no way to define who will do well and who will do poorly. And nothing is said about what will happen if and when the medical conditions of those people deteriorate and medical intervention and hospitalization becomes necessary. As the other two medical experts in Lewis v. Cain and I noted in our review of care at Angola, the people incarcerated there lack access to hospital care across the board and this pandemic will only make it worse. Angola is remote from hospitals. The closest emergency room of any kind is at least 30 minutes away and it does not have a ventilator, and the space at that hospital is otherwise limited. The closest emergency room that can provide adequate services is in Baton Rouge, more than an hour away. Louisiana’s hospitals are already overwhelmed by COVID-19 cases, and transporting more people who have tested positive to a remote location with already-limited hospital beds puts those people at unnecessary risk. For example, people held in the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison who test positive are being transported more than an hour away to Camp J, putting staff who are transporting them at increased risk of transmission. And then transporting them back to Baton Rouge or New Orleans when they require hospitalization. People who test positive in the New Orleans jail could be taken three hours away to Camp J and then be transported to Baton Rouge or New Orleans when they require hospitalization. Angola is not set up to manage hospital level care including ventilation. Housing a COVID-19 patient on the
14 CDC, Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-detention.html

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infirmary where the most vulnerable, uninfected, medically compromised patients are housed all the patients and staff at risk.
13. Additionally, the quality of care at Angola was substandard in 2016 when we produced a report of our investigation and again in 2018 based on selected record reviews. Physicians were not credentialed appropriately and did not provide medical care in line with national standards. While reviewing records, we noted many examples of failure to recognize indications for hospitalization, including many cases of failure to recognize typical signs of respiratory decompensation which is critical for COVID-19 patients. There were delays in transfer of patients to a hospital when indicated. Physicians, nurses, and EMTs failed to recognize “red flag” signs resulting in adverse events.
14. From our review, we also found that medical care was substandard in other ways that would impact the care that the positive transported detainees and any COVID-19 positive Angola inmates would be provided, either at Camp J or at the infirmary. For example, laboratory services are only available on weekdays and blood gas assessments are not available at all.
15. The Director of the CDC has warned that as many as 25% of individuals infected with COVID-19 may be symptom-free, leading to the broadening of their criteria as to who should wear masks.15 With limiting testing performed on asymptomatic patients, we cannot confirm or negate the presence of COVID-19 in an individual. As such, incarcerated individuals and staff can be infected with the virus and unknowingly spread it throughout the already overcrowded prison. We further cannot determine whether patients will abruptly need escalated medical care requiring hospitalization. One precautionary measure that must be taken is that people who are COVID positive are not transferred to Camp J, which is more than an hour from the closest hospital able to provide appropriate medical intervention.
16. Patients with severe COVID-19 symptoms may require critical specialists even if not in the intensive care unit; ICU-level supplies and specialized treatment, including but not limited to invasive mechanical ventilation, vasopressor treatment for low blood pressure, intravenous fluid therapy, support for kidney failure, respiratory therapists, and/or early antibiotics.16 High flow oxygen administered in a hospital is tricky; continuous positive pressure ventilation is tricky; the need for a ventilator is unpredictable except at the point of respiratory arrest. Treatment requires staff that have experience in using this equipment. The intensity of care and the protracted length of this care with this illness can not be provided at Angola or at any of the hospitals within an hour from Angola. What’s more, highly specific airborne precautions with N95 respirators, face shields, and gowns for personal protective equipment are critical to prevent spread of the virus. On a national level,
15 Infected but Feeling Fine: The Unwitting Coronavirus Spreaders, New York Times (March 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/health/coronavirus-asymptomatictransmission.html 16 Care for Critically Ill Patients with COVID-19, JAMA Insights (March 11, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2762996

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these supplies and highly advanced and expensive equipment of ventilators are limited across the country. Angola is lacking in these capabilities and is not an appropriate site to manage patients with COVID-19
17. In my experience in New York City and from what I know is happening in the rest of the country, there are not enough resources to battle the COVID pandemic in the big cities, much less in rural areas like West Feliciana Parish that only have two ambulances as of my last review. Even without the influx of positive detained transferees to Angola, West Feliciana would be strained for resources like ambulances and ambulance personnel. Ambulance personnel are being infected daily and they transmit the infection widely. Transporting many COVID positive people to the parish will further strain what is already a strained system, at increased risk to both those patients and the surrounding community.
18. Anyone who comes into proximity to someone who is tested positive for COVID is at increased risk of infection. COVID-19 is a highly contagious respiratory virus that spreads through droplets created when an infected person coughs, sneezes or speaks. Normal breathing can spread the virus. The virus can also be transmitted through saliva or discharge from the nose. While the droplets generated by infected people only hang in the air for a short period of time, they can easily be breathed in by people within one meter of a person with COVID-19. Furthermore, the droplets generated will contaminate the surfaces they land on resulting in transmission of the virus if someone touches a contaminated surface and then touches their eyes, nose or mouth before washing their hands. In the close-quarters setting of a vehicle this means that even one infected person could easily spread the virus to everyone else in the vehicle. Additionally, reduced airflow in a transport vehicle could result in higher concentrations of contaminated droplets remaining in the air and on surfaces. Transport should be avoided unless necessary for hospitalization and then only having to travel a short distance to the hospital is the safest option. Staff at Angola may contract the virus as a result of its high infectivity and then spread the virus amongst the West Feliciana community. There are only 46 confirmed cases in West Feliciana as of April 12, 2020. The high concentration of infected persons at Angola would increase the likelihood of the virus spreading to West Feliciana community members via infected Angola medical and custodial staff who are exposed to those viral loads.
19. Many studies have shown the increased risk for serious complications in patients infected with COVID-19 that also suffer from comorbidities. Those comorbidities include common health problems like hypertension and diabetes, among others. Many people in jails and prisons have multiple comorbidities and are at an even higher risk of complications. The complications include development of serious illness such as acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) requiring admission to an intensive care unit, invasive ventilation or death. Studies found that COPD, diabetes, hypertension, cancer, and the presence of multiple comorbidities resulted in the highest increased risk of the above mentioned serious complications. 17 This puts the most vulnerable patient populations, including people in jails
17 Comorbidity and its impact on 1590 patients with Covid-19 in China: A Nationwide Analysis, European Respiratory Journal (March 26, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1183/13993003.00547-2020

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and prisons with chronic health problems, at increased risk for severe medical complications or death from COVID-19. If transferred to Camp J, transferred detainees – particularly those who had only been incarcerated for short periods of time and not sufficiently evaluated by medical staff – may also have difficulties or delays in getting any of their regular prescribed medications for conditions such as hypertension and diabetes, even if they are transported to Angola with their medical records.
20. COVID-19 can result in serious complications leading to death where people feel the same pain as if they were drowning because their lungs are so filled with fluid. In cases where people are suffering from life-limiting illness due to COVID-19 it is imperative that they have access to palliative care. Palliative care is a crucial part of any health care plan to ensure that patients do not suffer needlessly and that in the case of life-limiting illness the treatments needed to relieve suffering are available.18 Furthermore, a robust supply of medicines, equipment and trained medical professionals is required to appropriately treat and manage patients with COVID-19. The DOC plan (provision of Tylenol, Motrin, NS for IV flush, Imodium, and Insulin) is insufficient as a response to the needs of COVID-19 positive patients. The provision of morphine or other end-of-life drugs is crucial to manage pain and symptoms and to allow for a humane death. The pandemic has resulted in widespread shortages of the pharmaceuticals needed to treat COVID patients.
My recommendations for the DOC to mitigate the spread of the coronavirus among Louisiana’s incarcerated population are:
1. Transfer people who test negative for COVID-19 to Angola to free up space in the remaining DOC facilities so that the non-Angola incarcerated populations will be able to practice social distancing and will have space to provide appropriate quarantine and isolation areas for those who test positive or may be positive.
2. House COVID-19 patients in locations where they can reach a hospital—one that is equipped to treat severe COVID-19 symptoms—quickly. The illness progresses quickly and unpredictably; patients’ symptoms can worsen very suddenly, so it is not safe for them to be housed far from a hospital. To move COVID-19 patients farther from health care is anathema to the care of these patients. The emphasis must be on these patients being housed near to the care they need.
3. Protect the current Angola population—many of whom are elderly and chronically ill and therefore at greater risk of developing severe or deadly COVID-19 symptoms—from an increased risk of infection by not transferring any confirmed COVID-19 patients to Camp J or any other part of Angola.
4. Increase the chances of survival for COVID-19 patients by not transferring them to Angola, which is located in a parish where there are no ventilators. No one can predict whether a COVID-19 patient’s symptoms will progress to the point of respiratory distress such that
18 The Role of Palliative Care in a COVID-19 Pandemic, Shiley Institute for Palliative Care, https://csupalliativecare.org/palliative-care-and-covid-19/ (accessed April 9, 2020).

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the patient will require a ventilator; patients can deteriorate very rapidly. If a patient tests positive for COVID-19, that patient is at risk of requiring a ventilator and should not be housed in a location where there are none.
5. Involve the Department of Health in the development of any transport plans for medical isolation needs and follow the Department’s initially guidance and advice as well as the CDC’s guidance regarding transport.
6. Prepare for a widespread outbreak by streamlining medical power of authority.
7. Prepare for a widespread outbreak by developing adequate policies related to palliative care for incarcerated individuals who may die from COVID-19 complications.
8. Reduce the incarcerated population by allowing furlough for anyone who is 60 years of age or older and for anyone who has an underlying medical condition that puts him or her at greater risk of developing a severe case of COVID-19. This will allow incarcerated individuals to practice social distancing throughout the state and free up space for appropriate quarantine and isolation units at individual DOC facilities. All of these measures would reduce the risk of a widespread outbreak among the incarcerated population.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed on April 13, 2020 in New York, New York.
/s/ Susi Vassallo
Susi Vassallo

 
 U.S. District Court Middle District of Louisiana (Baton Rouge) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB

Gumns et al v. Edwards et al Assigned to: Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick Referred to: Magistrate Judge Richard L. Bourgeois, Jr Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

Date Filed: 04/14/2020 Date Terminated: 06/11/2020 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
Daniel Gumns on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals

represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes Promise of Justice Promise of Justice 1024 Elysian Fields 7011 New Orleans, LA 70117 504-529-5955 Email: mmontagnes@defendla.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jamila Asha Johnson Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields New Orleans, LA 70117 504-312-2304 Email: jamila.johnson@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jared Fletcher Davidson Southern Poverty Law Center 1055 St. Charles Ave. Suite 505 New Orleans, LA 70130 504-486-8982 Email: jared.davidson@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lacey Lachelle Bangle Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP 405 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105 415-773-5603

Plaintiff
Michael Videau on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals

Email: lbangle@orrick.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP 405 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105-2669 415-773-5603 Fax: 415-773-5759 PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70117 504-529-5955 Email: nkumar@defendla.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP 405 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105-2669 415-773-5937 Fax: 415-773-5759 PRO HAC VICE
represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Trevon Wiley on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals
Plaintiff

Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Ian Cazenave on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals
Plaintiff Reginald George on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals

represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address)

Plaintiff Lionel Tolbert on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals
Plaintiff

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Otto Barrera on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals
Plaintiff Kentrell Parker on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals

represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address)

Plaintiff Julius Allen on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals
Plaintiff

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Ernest Rogers on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals
Plaintiff Alfoanso Garner on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals

represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address)

Plaintiff Bradley Winters on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals
Plaintiff

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Kendrick Wilson on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals
Plaintiff James Hughes on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals

represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address)

Plaintiff
Michael Robinson on behalf of themselves and all simiarly situated individuals

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
represented by Mercedes Hardy Montagnes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamila Asha Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jared Fletcher Davidson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lacey Lachelle Bangle (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda Haag (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Nishi Lal Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon E. Frase (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

V. Defendant John Bel Edwards in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana
Defendant Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections

represented by Michael Brent Hicks McGlinchey Stafford- B.R. One American Place 301 Main Street, 14th Floor Baton Rouge, LA 70801 225-383-9000 Fax: 225-343-3076 Email: bhicks@mcglinchey.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juston M. O'Brien McGlinchey Stafford PLLC One American Place 301 Main Street, 14th Floor Baton Rouge, LA 70801 225-383-9000 Fax: 225-343-3076 Email: jobrien@mcglinchey.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zelma M. Frederick McGlinchey Stafford- B.R. One American Place 301 Main Street, 14th Floor Baton Rouge, LA 70825 225-383-9000 Fax: 225-343-3076 Email: zfrederick@mcglinchey.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Julie Moffett McCall Bulter Snow LA 445 N. Blvd. Suite 300 Baton Rouge Baton Rouge, LA 70802 225-325-8734 Email: Julie.McCall@butlersnow.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant James LeBlanc in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Safety and Corrections
Defendant John Morrison in his official capacity as Medical Director of the Department of Safety and Corrections

Keith Fernandez Butler Snow 445 North Boulevard Suite 300 Baton Rouge Baton Rouge, LA 70802 225-325-8700 Email: keith.fernandez@butlersnow.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randal J. Robert Butler Snow P.O. Box 2997 Baton Rouge, LA 70821 225-325-8735 Fax: 225-343-0630 Email: Randy.Robert@butlersnow.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Julie Moffett McCall (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Keith Fernandez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randal J. Robert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Julie Moffett McCall (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Keith Fernandez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randal J. Robert

Defendant Louisiana Department of Health
Defendant Stephen R. Russo in his official capacity as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael Brent Hicks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David L. McCay La. Dept. of Health and Hospitals P.O. Box 3836 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-3836 225-342-1128 Fax: 342-2232 Email: david.mccay@la.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Juston M. O'Brien (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kimberly L. Humbles Louisiana Department of Health & Hospitals P.O. Box 3836 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-3836 225-342-2556 Fax: 225-342-2232 Email: Kimberly.Humbles@La.Gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zelma M. Frederick (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael Brent Hicks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David L. McCay (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Juston M. O'Brien (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kimberly L. Humbles (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zelma M. Frederick (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/14/2020
04/14/2020 04/14/2020 04/14/2020

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against John Bel Edwards, James M LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana Department of Health, John E Morrison, Stephen R. Russo ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number ALAMDC-2100965.), filed by Ernest Rogers, Otto Barrera, Michael Videau, Daniel Gumns, Bradley Winters, Lionel Tolbert, Trevon Wiley, Alfoanso Garner, James Hughes, Kendrick Wilson, Kentrell Parker, Ian Cazenave, Julius Allen, Reginald George, Michael Robinson. (Attachments: # 1 Complaint, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Attachment, # 5 Attachment, # 6 Attachment, # 7 Attachment, # 8 Attachment, # 9 Attachment, # 10 Attachment)(Montagnes, Mercedes) (Main Document 1 and attachment 1 replaced on 4/14/2020) (EDC). Modified on 4/14/2020 to flatten pages and to correct page orientation.(EDC). (Entered: 04/14/2020)
2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining Defendants from Transferring Covid-19 Carriers to Louisiana State Penitentiary by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Proposed Order)(Montagnes, Mercedes) Modified on 4/14/2020 to edit text. (EDC). (Entered: 04/14/2020)
3 NOTICE OF NON-COMPLIANCE with LR 7(g) as to 2 Motion for TRO,. REQUIRED CORRECTION: A combined Motion for Leave to Exceed the Page Limits and Motion to Substitute the Incorrect Pleading must filed within 24 hours of this notice. Otherwise, the original filing may be stricken by the Court without further notice. (EDC) (Entered: 04/14/2020)
4 Summons Issued as to James LeBlanc, John Morrison, Stephen R. Russo. (NOTICE: Counsel shall print and serve both the summons and all attachments in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.) (Attachments: # 1 summons, # 2 summons)(EDC) (Entered: 04/14/2020)

04/14/2020 04/14/2020 04/14/2020
04/14/2020 04/14/2020 04/16/2020 04/16/2020 04/17/2020
04/17/2020

5 Summons Issued as to John Bel Edwards. (NOTICE: Counsel shall print and serve both the summons and all attachments in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.) (EDC) (Entered: 04/14/2020)
6 Summons Not Issued: Counsel has requested issuance of summons for Department of Public Safety and Corrections and Department of Health. The named person/entity is not reflected on the docket sheet as a party in the case. Therefore, summons will not be issued. (EDC) (Entered: 04/14/2020)
7 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages and to Substitute the Incorrect Pleading by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading;, # 3 Proposed Pleading;, # 4 Exhibit 1, # 5 Exhibit 2, # 6 Exhibit 3, # 7 Exhibit 4, # 8 Exhibit 5, # 9 Exhibit 6, # 10 Exhibit 7, # 11 Attachment Proposed Order, # 12 Attachment Proposed Order)(Kumar, Nishi). Added MOTION to Substitute on 4/14/2020 (KMW). (Entered: 04/14/2020)
8 Summons Submitted (Attachments: # 1 Attachment, # 2 Attachment)(Kumar, Nishi) (Entered: 04/14/2020)
9 Summons Issued as to Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, Attorney General and Louisiana Department of Health. (NOTICE: Counsel shall print and serve both the summons and all attachments in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.) (ELW) (Entered: 04/14/2020)
10 MOTION for Immediate Status Conference by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Attachment Proposed Order)(Kumar, Nishi) (Entered: 04/16/2020)
11 MOTION for Expedited Hearing on 10 MOTION for Immediate Status Conference by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Attachment Proposed Order)(Kumar, Nishi) (Entered: 04/16/2020)
12 ORDER submitting 10 Motion for Conference. Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to identify and notify counsel for each Defendant of the subject Motion and provide the Court, by Notice filed in the record, with names and contact information for each counsel identified. The Court will set a telephone status conference upon filing of same. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 4/17/20. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (Dick, Shelly) (Entered: 04/17/2020)
13 ORDER granting 7 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages; granting 7 MOTION for Leave to Substitute the Incorrect Pleading filed by Ernest Rogers, Trevon Wiley, Michael Videau, Alfoanso Garner, Kentrell Parker, Michael Robinson, James Hughes, Bradley Winters, Lionel Tolbert, Daniel Gumns, Reginald George, Kendrick Wilson,

04/17/2020 04/17/2020
04/20/2020 04/20/2020 04/20/2020 04/20/2020 04/21/2020

Julius Allen, Otto Barrera, Ian Cazenave. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 4/17/2020. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 04/17/2020)
14 NOTICE of Opposing Counsel by Julius Allen, Otto Barrera, Ian Cazenave, Alfoanso Garner, Reginald George, Daniel Gumns, James Hughes, Kentrell Parker, Michael Robinson, Ernest Rogers, Lionel Tolbert, Michael Videau, Trevon Wiley, Kendrick Wilson, Bradley Winters (Kumar, Nishi) (Entered: 04/17/2020)
15 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining Defendants from Transferring COVID-19 Carriers to Louisiana State Penitentiary by Julius Allen, Otto Barrera, Ian Cazenave, Alfoanso Garner, Reginald George, Daniel Gumns, James Hughes, Kentrell Parker, Michael Robinson, Ernest Rogers, Lionel Tolbert, Michael Videau, Trevon Wiley, Kendrick Wilson, Bradley Winters.
(Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7)(KMW) (Attachment 1 replaced on 4/21/2020 to remove highlighted footnotes) (LT). (Entered: 04/20/2020)
16 ORDER granting 10 Motion for Conference. Telephone Conference set for 4/21/2020 at 10:00 AM in chambers before Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 4/20/2020. (EDC) (Entered: 04/20/2020)
17 MOTION for Melinda Haag to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $100.00, Receipt Number ALAMDC-2103527) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Declaration, # 2 Exhibit A.1 Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Attachment Proposed Order)(Kumar, Nishi) (Entered: 04/20/2020)
18 MOTION for Lacey Bangle to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $100.00, Receipt Number ALAMDC-2103528) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Declaration, # 2 Exhibit A.1 Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Attachment Proposed Order)(Kumar, Nishi) (Entered: 04/20/2020)
19 MOTION for Sharon E. Frase to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $100.00, Receipt Number ALAMDC-2103529) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Declaration, # 2 Exhibit A.1 Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Attachment Proposed Order)(Kumar, Nishi) (Entered: 04/20/2020)
20 ORDER dismissing as moot 11 Motion for Expedited Hearing on Motion for Telephone Status Conference. The Motion to expedite is Dismissed as Moot, the telephone status conference having been set. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 4/21/2020. (This is a TEXT

04/21/2020 04/21/2020 04/22/2020 04/23/2020 04/23/2020 04/24/2020
04/25/2020

ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (Dick, Shelly) (Entered: 04/21/2020)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 18 MOTION for Lacey Bangle to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $100.00, Receipt Number ALAMDC2103528), 19 MOTION for Sharon E. Frase to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $100.00, Receipt Number ALAMDC2103529), 17 MOTION for Melinda Haag to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $100.00, Receipt Number ALAMDC-2103527). This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (LT) (Entered: 04/21/2020)
21 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick: Telephone Conference held on 4/21/2020. Court and Counsel discuss posture of the case. Court orders no discovery on the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, however, responses to 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order are due by 4/24/2020. (Entered: 04/22/2020)
22 ORDER granting 17 , 18 , 19 Motions to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Attorneys Melinda Haag, Lacey Bangle, and Sharon E. Frase are enrolled as pro hac vice co-counsel for Plaintiffs. Signed by Magistrate Judge Richard L. Bourgeois, Jr. on 4/22/2020. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (SGO) (Entered: 04/22/2020)
23 In light of Rec. Doc. 15, ORDER finding as moot 2 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 4/23/2020. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 04/23/2020)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 15 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order. Responses due by 4/24/2020. (EDC) (Entered: 04/23/2020)
24 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 15 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by James LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, John Morrison. (Attachments: # 1
Exhibit 1 - Affidavit of James M. LeBlanc, # 2 Exhibit 2 -
Affidavit of Tracy Falgout, # 3 Exhibit 3 - Supplemental Exhibit of Tracy Falgout, # 4 Exhibit 4 - Affidavit of Dr John E. Morrison)(Robert, Randal) (Entered: 04/24/2020)
25 MOTION to Certify Class by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Attachment Declaration of Jamila Johnson, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Attachment Declaration of Mercedes Montagnes, # 8 Attachment

04/26/2020 04/27/2020 04/27/2020 04/27/2020 04/28/2020

Declaration of Jared Davidson, # 9 Attachment Declaration of Melinda Haag, # 10 Exhibit A)(Kumar, Nishi) (Entered: 04/25/2020)
26 MOTION for Leave to File Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining Defendants from Transferring COVID-19 Carriers to LSP by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading;, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit 9, # 12 Exhibit 10, # 13 Exhibit 11, # 14 Exhibit 12, # 15 Exhibit 13, # 16 Attachment Proposed Order)(Kumar, Nishi) (Entered: 04/26/2020)
27 ORDER granting 26 MOTION for Leave to File Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining Defendants from Transferring COVID-19 Carriers to LSP filed by Ernest Rogers, Trevon Wiley, Michael Videau, Alfoanso Garner, Kentrell Parker, Michael Robinson, James Hughes, Bradley Winters, Lionel Tolbert, Daniel Gumns, Reginald George, Kendrick Wilson, Julius Allen, Otto Barrera, Ian Cazenave. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 4/27/2020. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 04/27/2020)
28 Notice to Counsel: Telephone Status Conference before the District Judge set for 4/28/2020 at 11:30 AM before Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick. The Parties are to refer to the previous email instructions transmitted by the Courtroom Deputy and utilized in the previous Telephone Conference. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(BKA) (Entered: 04/27/2020)
29 NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 15 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction: Motion Hearing set for 4/30/2020 at 01:00 PM before Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick via Video Conference. Counsel will receive instructions via separate email from the Courtroom Deputy following the Telephone Status Conference set for 4/28/2020. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(BKA) (Entered: 04/27/2020)
30 Notice to Counsel Resetting Hearing TIME CHANGE ONLY: Due to a scheduling conflict, the Telephone Status Conference with Chief Judge Dick is hereby RESET to 1:00 PM today. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(BKA) (Entered: 04/28/2020)

04/28/2020 04/28/2020 04/28/2020
04/28/2020 04/28/2020 04/29/2020
04/29/2020
04/29/2020

31 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick: Telephone Status Conference held on 4/28/2020. (BKA) (Entered: 04/28/2020)
32 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 15 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Louisiana Department of Health, Stephen R. Russo. (Hicks, Michael) (Entered: 04/28/2020)
33 Witness List by Julius Allen, Otto Barrera, Ian Cazenave, Alfoanso Garner, Reginald George, Daniel Gumns, James Hughes, Kentrell Parker, Michael Robinson, Ernest Rogers, Lionel Tolbert, Michael Videau, Trevon Wiley, Kendrick Wilson, Bradley Winters. (For your free look at document, enter your Individual PACER login and pw to confirm your right to view). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kumar, Nishi) (Entered: 04/28/2020)
34 Witness List by James LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, John Morrison. (For your free look at document, enter your Individual PACER login and pw to confirm your right to view). (Fernandez, Keith) (Entered: 04/28/2020)
35 Witness List by Louisiana Department of Health, Stephen R. Russo. (For your free look at document, enter your Individual PACER login and pw to confirm your right to view). (Hicks, Michael) (Entered: 04/28/2020)
36 Notice to Counsel: At the request of defense counsel, a Telephone Conference is hereby set for 4/29/2020 at 02:00 PM before Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick. The Parties are to use the same dial-in instructions as the previous teleconferences.
Evidence, in electronic format, shall be provided in accordance with Local Rule 79 and Administrative Procedures.
(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(BKA) (Entered: 04/29/2020)
37 Notice to Counsel Resetting Hearing: Having been notified by Defense Counsel that the Telephone Conference set for today at 2:00 p.m. is no longer necessary, it is hereby CANCELED. The Parties will receive video conference and exhibit presentation instructions via separate email from the Courtroom Deputy. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 04/29/2020)
38 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 15 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by John Bel Edwards. (Hicks, Michael) (Entered: 04/29/2020)

04/29/2020 04/29/2020
04/30/2020 04/30/2020 04/30/2020 04/30/2020

39 Witness List by John Bel Edwards. (For your free look at document, enter your Individual PACER login and pw to confirm your right to view). (Hicks, Michael) (Entered: 04/29/2020)
40 Plaintiff's Revised Witness List for 4/30/2020 Hearing on 15
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order by Julius Allen, Otto Barrera, Ian Cazenave, Alfoanso Garner, Reginald George, Daniel Gumns, James Hughes, Kentrell Parker, Michael Robinson, Ernest Rogers, Lionel Tolbert, Michael Videau, Trevon Wiley, Kendrick Wilson, Bradley Winters. (For your free look at document, enter your Individual PACER login and pw to confirm your right to view). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kumar, Nishi) Modified on 4/30/2020 to edit text (LT). (Entered: 04/29/2020)
41 Proposed Statements of STIPULATED Facts re 15 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order Proposed Statement of Stipulated Facts by James LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, John Morrison. (Fernandez, Keith) Modified on 4/30/2020 to edit text (LT). (Entered: 04/30/2020)
42 MOTION to Enroll Kimberly Humbles and David L. McCay as Additional Attorney by Louisiana Department of Health, Stephen R. Russo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading; Order)(Hicks, Michael) (Entered: 04/30/2020)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 42 MOTION to Enroll Kimberly Humbles and David L. McCay as Additional Attorney . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (LT) (Entered: 04/30/2020)
43 Notice to Counsel: In reference to the Hearing on Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [Rec. Doc. 15] set via video conference before the Honorable Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick today 4/30/2020 at 1:00 p.m., the public may be permitted to access, to the fullest extent possible considering technological restraints, video or telephonic hearings by submitting a request to the chambers of the presiding judge. Contact information for District Court is available at http://www.lamd.uscourts.gov/. Members of the public and the media are strictly prohibited from recording or broadcasting any hearing, in whole or in part, in any fashion.
Evidence, in electronic format, shall be provided in accordance with Local Rule 79 and Administrative Procedures.
(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 04/30/2020)

04/30/2020
04/30/2020 05/04/2020 05/04/2020 05/04/2020 05/04/2020 05/04/2020 05/08/2020

44 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick:
Motion Hearing held on 4/30/2020 re 15 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Ernest Rogers, Trevon Wiley, Michael Videau, Alfoanso Garner, Kentrell Parker, Michael Robinson, James Hughes, Bradley Winters, Lionel Tolbert, Daniel Gumns, Reginald George, Kendrick Wilson, Julius Allen, Otto Barrera, Ian Cazenave. Simultaneous Post Trial Briefs, not to exceed 20 pages, are due by 5:00 p.m. May 4, 2020. (Court Reporter Shannon Thompson.) Pursuant to Local Rules, offering parties shall retain custody of exhibits..(BKA) (Entered: 05/01/2020)
50 ELECTRONIC EXHIBITS for hearing dated 4/30/2020.(EDC) (Entered: 05/06/2020)
45 ORDER granting 42 Motion to Enroll Additional Counsel. Attorneys Kimberly L. Humbles and David L. McCay are enrolled as co-counsel for defendants Louisiana Department of Health and Stephen R. Russo. Signed by Magistrate Judge Richard L. Bourgeois, Jr. on 5/4/2020. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (SGO) (Entered: 05/04/2020)
46 MOTION to Withdraw and Substitute DOC Defendants' Exhibit 43 by James LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, John Morrison. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Proposed Pleading; Order)(McCall, Julie. Added MOTION to Substitute on 5/4/2020 (KMW). (Entered: 05/04/2020)
47 Post-Trial Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's 15 Motion to Restrain Defendants from Transferring Covid-19 Carriers to Louisiana State Penitentiary by James LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, John Morrison. (Robert, Randal) Modified on 5/5/2020 to edit text (LT). (Entered: 05/04/2020)
48 Plaintiff's Post Hearing Memorandum in Suppoer of 15 Temporary Restraining Order by All Plaintiffs. (Kumar, Nishi) Modified on 5/5/2020 to edit text (LT). (Entered: 05/04/2020)
49 Post Hearing Brief 15 by John Bel Edwards, Louisiana Department of Health, Stephen R. Russo. (Hicks, Michael) Modified on 5/5/2020 to edit text (LT). (Entered: 05/04/2020)
51 Ex Parte MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiff's Complaint by John Bel Edwards, Louisiana Department of Health, Stephen R. Russo. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading; Order)(Hicks,

05/11/2020 05/11/2020 05/11/2020
05/12/2020
05/12/2020 05/14/2020 05/15/2020

Michael) Modified on 5/11/2020 to change event type (SGO). (Entered: 05/08/2020)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 51 Ex Parte MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiff's Complaint. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (KMW) (Entered: 05/11/2020)
52 ORDER granting 46 Motion to Withdraw and Substitute DOC Defendants' Exhibit 43 filed by John Morrison, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, James LeBlanc. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 5/11/2020. (KMW) (Entered: 05/11/2020)
53 ORDER granting 51 Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to Response to Plaintiffs' Complaint. Defendants John Bel Edwards, Louisiana Department of Health, and Stephen R. Russo are granted an extension of time until 6/2/2020 to file responsive pleadings. Signed by Magistrate Judge Richard L. Bourgeois, Jr. on 5/11/2020. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (SGO) (Entered: 05/11/2020)
54 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Ernest Rogers, Otto Barrera, Michael Videau, Daniel Gumns, Bradley Winters, Lionel Tolbert, Michael Robinson, Trevon Wiley, Alfoanso Garner, James Hughes, Kendrick Wilson, Kentrell Parker, Ian Cazenave, Julius Allen, Reginald George. James LeBlanc served on 4/28/2020, answer due 5/19/2020; Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections served on 4/28/2020, answer due 5/19/2020; Louisiana Department of Health served on 4/28/2020, answer due 6/2/2020; John Morrison served on 4/28/2020, answer due 5/19/2020; Stephen R. Russo served on 4/28/2020, answer due 6/2/2020. (Kumar, Nishi) (Entered: 05/12/2020)
55 Summons Returned Unexecuted by Ernest Rogers, Otto Barrera, Michael Videau, Daniel Gumns, Bradley Winters, Lionel Tolbert, Michael Robinson, Trevon Wiley, Alfoanso Garner, James Hughes, Kendrick Wilson, Kentrell Parker, Ian Cazenave, Julius Allen, Reginald George as to John Bel Edwards. (Kumar, Nishi) (Entered: 05/12/2020)
56 Ex Parte MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer to 1
Complaint,,, by James LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, John Morrison. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading; Order)(Robert, Randal) (Entered: 05/14/2020)
57 RULING denying 15 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining Defendants from Transferring COVID-19 Carriers to Louisiana State Penitentiary. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 05/15/2020. (NLT) (Entered: 05/15/2020)

05/15/2020 05/15/2020
05/18/2020 05/18/2020 05/21/2020
05/28/2020 06/01/2020
06/05/2020 06/11/2020 06/11/2020

MOTION(S) REFERRED: 56 Ex Parte MOTION for Extension of
Time to File Answer to 1 Complaint,,, . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (EDC) (Entered: 05/15/2020)
58 ORDER granting 56 Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Complaint. Defendants James LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, and John Morrison are granted an extension of time until 6/9/2020 to file responsive pleadings. Signed by Magistrate Judge Richard L. Bourgeois, Jr. on 5/15/2020. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (SGO) (Entered: 05/15/2020)
59 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 25 MOTION to Certify Class filed by James LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, John Morrison. (Robert, Randal) (Entered: 05/18/2020)
60 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 25 MOTION to Certify Class filed by John Bel Edwards, Louisiana Department of Health, Stephen R. Russo. (Hicks, Michael) (Entered: 05/18/2020)
61 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Julius Allen, Otto Barrera, Ian Cazenave, Alfoanso Garner, Reginald George, Daniel Gumns, James Hughes, Kentrell Parker, Michael Robinson, Ernest Rogers, Lionel Tolbert, Michael Videau, Trevon Wiley, Kendrick Wilson, Bradley Winters for proceedings held on 04/30/2020 before Judge Shelly D. Dick.. (Kumar, Nishi) (Entered: 05/21/2020)
62 There is no record document 62. Entered in error by the case administrator (KMW). (Entered: 05/28/2020)
63 Plaintiff's NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice by Julius Allen, Otto Barrera, Ian Cazenave, Alfoanso Garner, Reginald George, Daniel Gumns, James Hughes, Kentrell Parker, Michael Robinson, Ernest Rogers, Lionel Tolbert, Michael Videau, Trevon Wiley, Kendrick Wilson, Bradley Winters (Kumar, Nishi) Modified on 6/1/2020 to edit text (LT). (Entered: 06/01/2020)
64 ORDER finding as moot 25 Motion to Certify Class. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 6/5/2020. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 06/05/2020)
65 ORDER granting 63 Motion to Dismiss WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 06/11/2020. (ELW) (Entered: 06/11/2020)
66 GENERAL ORDER: All pleadings and other papers filed under seal in civil and criminal actions shall be maintained under seal for thirty days following final disposition of the action. After that time, all sealed

06/30/2020 06/30/2020 07/13/2020

pleadings and other papers shall be placed in the case record unless a District Judge or Magistrate Judge, upon motion and for good cause shown, orders that the pleading or other paper be maintained under seal.
The deadline for filing any motions regarding the unsealing of any document shall be within thirty days of the final disposition of any action and shall contain a concise statement of reasons for maintaining the pleading or other paper under seal.
ATTENTION: If a motion to retain documents under seal is NOT filed, all documents shall be placed in the public case record, unless specifically identified in the attached General Order
. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 07/08/2019. (ELW) (Entered: 06/11/2020)
67 MOTION to Maintain a Document Under Seal by James LeBlanc, Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections, John Morrison. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading; Order)(Robert, Randal) (Entered: 06/30/2020)
68 ORDER granting 67 Motion to Maintain a Documents Under Seal. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 6/30/2020. (LLH) (Entered: 06/30/2020)
69 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT: Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining Defendants from Transferring COVID-19 Carriers to Louisiana State Penitentiary before Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick held on 04/20/2020. Court Reporter: Shannon L. Thompson, CCR. Phone Number: 225-3893567.
NOTICE RE: REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.lamd.uscourts.gov.
Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER.. Redaction Request due 8/3/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/13/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/13/2020. (Thompson, Shannon) (Entered: 07/13/2020)

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 Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15 04/17/20 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU,

TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

REGINALD

GEORGE,

LIONEL

TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL

PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS

ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO

GARNER,

BRADLEY

WINTERS,

KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES

HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity

as Governor of the State of Louisiana;

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES

LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary

of the Department of Safety and Corrections;

JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as

Medical Director of the Department of Safety

and

Corrections;

LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and

STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity

as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana

Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ENJOINING DEFENDANTS FROM TRANSFERRING COVID-19 CARRIERS TO LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY NOW INTO COURT COME Plaintiffs in the above-captioned matter, through
undersigned counsel, who move this Honorable Court to issue a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) in order to prevent Defendants from continuing the transfer of people who are COVID-19
carriers from state and local facilities across Louisiana to the Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”). In

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15 04/17/20 Page 2 of 4
direct contravention of public health recommendations and plain common sense, Defendants are implementing a dangerous plan to transfer COVID-19 patients from every part of the State to the remote and notoriously inhumane Camp J at LSP. By crowding large numbers of COVID-19 patients into a facility far removed from hospitals and constitutionally adequate medical care but yet in dangerously close proximity to LSP’s medically vulnerable population, this deadly course of action promises to result in the preventable deaths of dozens—if not hundreds or thousands—of people, including Plaintiffs, putative class members, LSP staff, and people in the community.
As set forth in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of this motion, the evidence indisputably satisfies the four-factor test for a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining Defendants’ “Camp J Plan.” Defendants’ deliberate decision to isolate COVID-19 patients far from crucially needed adequate medical care and in close proximity to medically vulnerable patients at LSP subjects Plaintiffs and the putative class to a substantial and unconstitutional risk of serious harm. That substantial risk is exponentially compounded by pre-existing unconstitutional defects in LSP’s medical system as well as by serious and systemic deficiencies in Defendants’ overall COVID-19 plan. As a result, there can be no serious dispute that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm—and possibly preventable death—absent an immediate injunction. The public interest weighs heavily against a plan that would not only deprive COVID-19 patients with access to necessary medical care but also result in the spread of COVID-19 amongst LSP patients and staff as well as the community at large. And even assuming Defendants’ suffered some de minimis harm from an injunction, such hypothetical harm pales in comparison to the risks to the health and safety of Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court immediately restrain Defendants from transferring patients with COVID-19 to Camp J, and then issue a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer plan once the parties have fully briefed the issue.
2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15 04/17/20 Page 3 of 4
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that the Court should levy “security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Given that there are no costs or damages associated with the relief Plaintiffs request (simply restraining Defendants from transferring people to LSP), the “proper” amount is zero dollars.
If the Court does determine that a different amount would be proper, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court waive the bond requirement, given the obviousness of the risk to Plaintiffs’ health, their indigence, and the strong public interest involved.1 Furthermore, the requirement of a bond is contrary to the proposition that inadequate resources under no circumstances justify a prison’s deprivation of constitutional rights.2 Consistent with this well-established principle, this Court should not require Plaintiffs, who are indigent, to post a bond in order to protect their constitutional rights.
For the reasons in the attached memorandum, the Court should immediately issue an order temporarily restraining Defendants from transferring inmates with COVID-19 to LSP; and, after a hearing, preliminarily enjoin Defendants from doing so. Counsel for the Plaintiffs, Mercedes Montagnes, will be available by phone at the pleasure of the Court. She has called chambers to provide her cell phone number.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of April, 2020. /s/ Mercedes Montagnes Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287 Jamila Johnson, La. Bar No. 37953 Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415
1 See, e.g., Molton Co v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995) (approving waiver of bond given strength of case and “the strong public interest” involved); Campos v. INS, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (because plaintiffs were indigent and sought to vindicate their constitutional rights, consistent with the public interest, the court did not require a bond). 2 See, e.g., Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 1977) (inadequate resources can never be a justification for depriving an inmate of his constitutional rights).
3

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15 04/17/20 Page 4 of 4
The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70117 Telephone: (504) 529-5955 Facsimile: (504) 595-8006 Email: mmontagnes@defendla.org Jared Davidson, La. Bar No. 37093 Southern Poverty Law Center 201 Saint Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone: (504) 486-8982 Facsimile: (504) 486-8947 Email: jared.davidson@splcenter.org Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Mercedes Montagnes, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 14, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system. I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Mercedes Montagnes Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287
4

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-1 04/17/20 Page 1 of 30

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU,

TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

REGINALD

GEORGE,

LIONEL

TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL

PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS

ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO

GARNER,

BRADLEY

WINTERS,

KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES

HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity

as Governor of the State of Louisiana;

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES

LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary

of the Department of Safety and Corrections;

JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as

Medical Director of the Department of Safety

and

Corrections;

LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and

STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity

as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana

Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ENJOINING DEFENDANTS FROM
TRANSFERRING COVID-19 CARRIERS TO LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY The COVID-19 pandemic represents an unprecedented threat to the lives of Louisianans,
particularly those in the State’s poorly equipped prison system. At least 884 people have already perished in the State1—amongst the highest mortality rates in the world—and that number will grow
1 Coronavirus, La. Dep’t of Health, http://ldh.la.gov/Coronavirus/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-1 04/17/20 Page 2 of 30
exponentially larger with each passing day. There is no cure for this highly contagious and deadly virus. Instead, social distancing and ready access to adequate medical care are the only reliable methods of protection from the virus’s lethal consequences. While the majority of Louisianans shelter in place and enjoy the benefit of self-determination over their medical care, people in the State’s prisons remain sitting ducks in an increasingly perilous pond created by Defendants’ dangerous COVID-19 response.
In direct contravention of public health recommendations and plain common sense, Defendants are implementing a dangerous plan to transfer COVID-19 patients from every part of the State to the remote and notoriously inhumane Camp J at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”). By crowding large numbers of COVID-19 patients into a facility far removed from hospitals and constitutionally adequate medical care but yet in dangerously close proximity to LSP’s medically vulnerable population, this deadly course of action promises to result in the preventable deaths of dozens—if not hundreds or thousands—of people, including Plaintiffs, putative class members, LSP staff, and people in the community. Further, the very act of transporting confirmed cases of COVID-19 throughout the state creates innumerable unnecessary opportunities for spread.
As set forth below, the evidence indisputably satisfies the four-factor test for a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining Defendants’ “Camp J Plan.” Defendants’ deliberate decision to isolate COVID-19 patients far from crucially needed adequate medical care and in close proximity to medically vulnerable patients at LSP subjects Plaintiffs and the putative class to a substantial and unconstitutional risk of serious harm. That substantial risk is exponentially compounded by preexisting unconstitutional defects in LSP’s medical system as well as by serious and systemic deficiencies in Defendants’ overall COVID-19 plan. As a result, there can be no serious dispute that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm—and possibly preventable death—absent an immediate injunction. The public interest weighs heavily against a plan that would not only deprive COVID-19
2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-1 04/17/20 Page 3 of 30
patients with access to necessary medical care but also result in the spread of COVID-19 amongst
LSP patients and staff as well as the community at large. And even assuming Defendants’ suffered
some de minimis harm from an injunction, such hypothetical harm pales in comparison to the risks to
the health and safety of Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court
immediately restrain Defendants from transferring patients with COVID-19 to Camp J, and then
issue a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer plan once the parties have fully briefed the issue.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. COVID-19 Is a Serious and Deadly Disease That Has Caused a Global Pandemic. COVID-19 is a novel virus for which there is no established curative medical treatment and
no vaccine.2 It can cause pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, respiratory failure, heart
failure, sepsis, and other potentially fatal conditions.3 Lab testing and imaging is required to
appropriately evaluate and provide treatment to patients. One-fifth of all cases cause serious illness,
including respiratory damage that requires hospitalization and mechanical ventilation, and can
permanently harm those who survive.4 Treatment for severe cases of COVID-19 includes
respiratory isolation, oxygen, and mechanical ventilation.5 Symptoms can range from fever, cough,
chest pain, and headache to loss of smell, abdominal pain, rash, diarrhea, aches, and vomiting.6
Severe COVID-19 patients can suffer acute respiratory distress syndrome (“ARDS”), requiring
2 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 2. 3 Fei Zhou et al., Clinical Course and Risk Factors for Mortality of Adult Inpatients with COVID-19 in Wuhan, China: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 395 LANCET 1054 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30566-3/fulltext. 4 “While about 80% of cases manifest as a mild illness (i.e. non-pneumonia or mild pneumonia), approximately 20% progress to a more severe illness, with 6% requiring specialist medical care, including mechanical ventilation.” World Health Organization, Preparedness, Prevention And Control Of COVID-19 In Prisons And Other Places Of Detention: Interim Guidance, 10 (Mar. 15, 2020), http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/434026/Preparedness-prevention-andcontrol-of-COVID-19-in-prisons.pdf?ua=1. 5 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 13. 6 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 7.
3

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-1 04/17/20 Page 4 of 30
admission to an intensive care unit and invasive ventilation.7 The mortality rate for ARDS is 40%.8 The severity and sensation of ARDS for COVID-19 patients is similar to drowning.9
COVID-19 is highly transmissible. Recent estimates by the CDC suggest that, on average in community settings, each infected person transmits the virus to an additional 5.7 additional people.10 Only the influenza pandemic of 1918 is known to have higher infectivity.11 COVID-19 is transmitted by droplets of infected aerosol when people with the infection cough, which can survive in the air for up to three hours—and on surfaces such as plastic and stainless steel for up to 2-3 days.12 COVID-19 can also be transmitted into the air by aerosolized feces when a toilet is flushed.13
Many studies have shown the increased risk for serious complications in patients infected with COVID-19 who also suffer from comorbidities, including common health problems that afflict Plaintiffs like hypertension, diabetes, COPD, and cancer.14 Although advanced age and underlying illnesses or chronic medical conditions increase the risk of serious effects of COVID, younger patients ages 20-54 years old can also have serious complications, including hospital admission, admission to an intensive care unit, invasive ventilation, or death.15

7 Id. at ¶ 19.

8 Lizzie Presser, A Medical Worker Describes Terrifying Lung Failure From COVID-19 — Even in His

Young Patients, PROPUBLICA, (Mar. 21, 2020, 5 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/a-medical-

worker-describes--terrifying-lung-failure-from-covid19-even-in-his-young-patients.

9 Id.; see also Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 20.

10 Id. at ¶ 3.

11 Id.

12 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 6, Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 10.

13 Alexandra Sternlicht, Why You Should Flush with the Lid Down: Experts Warn of Fecal-Oral Transmission

of

COVID-19,

FORBES,

(Apr.

2,

4:59

PM),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandrasternlicht/2020/04/02/why-you-should-flush-with-the-

lid-down-virologist-warns-of-fecal-oral-transmission-of-covid-19/

14 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 19.

15 Id. at ¶ 9.

4

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-1 04/17/20 Page 5 of 30

People in carceral settings are among the most vulnerable populations for COVID-19 infection.16 It is typically not possible to isolate incarcerated people from the outside world (including from staff and vendors who may have been exposed to COVID-19), nor is it possible to meaningfully isolate them from one another. The transmission of COVID-19 in prisons can be likened to the transmission of TB, where social distancing practices are impossible with incarcerated people living in close quarters and lack of available means to ensure preventative hygiene practices.17 As a result, jails and prisons are known to be a breeding ground for infectious respiratory illness.18 The most vivid current example is the Cook County Jail, which currently has the highest outbreak numbers in the country.19
To reduce the risk of contracting COVID-19, the CDC advises all people—and particularly those at higher risk of severe illness—to “[w]ash your hands often with soap and water,” “[i]f soap and water are not readily available, use a hand sanitizer that contains at least 60% alcohol,” “[a]void close contact with people who are sick,” “[p]ut distance between yourself and other people,” and to “[c]over your mouth and nose with a cloth face cover when around others.” None of these recommended preventive measures is available to people who are incarcerated in Louisiana.20
Moreover, health profiles of incarcerated people show that they are significantly sicker and more vulnerable to COVID-19 than the population at large.21 Many have multiple comorbidities and are at a higher risk of complications, including ARDS.22 LSP has a particularly vulnerable population

16 Id. at ¶ 10.

17 Id.

18 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 8.

19 Timothy Williams & Danielle Ivory, Chicago’s Jail is Top U.S. Hot Spot as Virus Spreads Behind Bars,

NY TIMES, (April 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/us/coronavirus-cook-county-

jail-chicago.html

20 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 10.

21 Peter Wagner & Emily Widra, No need to wait for pandemics: The public health case for criminal justice

reform,

PRISON

POLICY

INITIATIVE,

(March

6,

2020),

https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/03/06/pandemic/

22 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 19.

5

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-1 04/17/20 Page 6 of 30
with over 50% of people over 50 years of age, many of whom have high risk medical conditions.23 The number of positive COVID-19 cases throughout Louisiana is climbing rapidly and the death rate per capita is the third highest in the country.24
II. The DOC Plans to Manage COVID-19 by Transferring Positive Cases to LSP’s Camp J.
According to the DOC, patients housed in DOC facilities or local parish prisons and jails who test positive for COVID-19 may be transported to LSP’s Camp J for medical isolation. As of April 11, 2020, at least 40 people had been transferred to Camp J.25 The DOC’s transfer plan has expanded swiftly and must be stopped before preventable harm—and even death—cannot be undone.
Kendrick Wilson is in pre-trial detention and was being held at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (“EBRPP”) until April 11, 2020, when the DOC transferred him to Camp J after he was told that he had tested positive for COVID-19.26 The two guards who woke Mr. Wilson to be transported told him that he would be transferred one way or another, whether willingly or unwillingly.27 He stated multiple times that he did not want to be taken to Camp J.28 Mr. Wilson is currently being held at Camp J in an open dorm with approximately 39 other people, none of whom are isolated from one another.29 Mr. Wilson would like to be near a hospital.30
Plaintiff Ernest Rogers is in pretrial detention and was being held at EBRPP.31 He was tested for COVID-19 at around 2 a.m. on April 9 and is suffering from a cough, sore throat, a fever, and
23 Id. at ¶ 11. 24 Id. at ¶ 5. 25 Ex. 3, Wilson Decl. at ¶ 11. 26 Id. at ¶¶ 4, 7, 10. 27 Id. at ¶ 8. 28 Id. 29 Id. at ¶ 11. 30 Id. at ¶¶ 17, 18. 31 Ex. 4, Rogers Decl. at ¶ 4.
6

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-1 04/17/20 Page 7 of 30
shortness of breath.32 Mr. Rogers is 65 years old and has hepatitis C, liver disease, and high blood pressure.33 The guards have told Mr. Rogers that he will be transferred to Camp J—voluntarily or non-voluntarily—if his test results are positive.34 Mr. Rogers was previously housed at Camp J while incarcerated at LSP in the 1980s, and he does not want to go back.35 Mr. Rogers would like to be held somewhere near a hospital.36
Plaintiff Julius Allen is in pretrial detention and was held at EBRPP.37 Like Mr. Rogers, he was tested for COVID-19 around 2 a.m. on April 9 and is suffering from a fever, severe body aches, difficulty breathing, weakness, disorientation, and diarrhea.38 He has had these symptoms for at least 5-7 days.39 Mr. Allen has several pre-existing medical conditions—diabetes, hypertension, high cholesterol, and a history of bronchitis40—some of which make him more vulnerable to severe symptoms of COVID-19.41 On April 9, Mr. Allen was taken from EBRPP to Our Lady of the Lake hospital in Baton Rouge.42 Medical staff at the hospital told Mr. Allen that there was a “10/10” chance that he was COVID-positive.43 Mr. Allen was sharing a cell with Kendrick Wilson when the guards came to transport Mr. Wilson.44 Mr. Allen watched the guards force Mr. Wilson out of the
32 Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. 33 Id. at ¶ 7. 34 Id. at ¶ 10. 35 Id. 36 Id. at ¶¶ 11-13. 37 Ex. 5, Allen Decl. at ¶ 4. 38 Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. 39 Id. at ¶ 6. 40 Id. at ¶ 7. 41 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 11 (“hypertension and diabetes [are] conditions that render patients vulnerable to severe COVID symptoms”). 42 Ex. 5, Allen Decl. at ¶ 8. 43 Id. 44 Id. at ¶ 10.
7

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-1 04/17/20 Page 8 of 30
cell and handcuff him when Mr. Wilson said that he did not want to be transferred.45 Mr. Allen
would like to be kept near a hospital.46
III.LSP Is Not Equipped to Treat COVID-19 Patients, and It Is Located Over One Hour’s Drive from a Hospital Capable of Providing Adequate Treatment for LifeThreatening Symptoms
LSP is not equipped to treat COVID-19 symptoms, especially if the symptoms become
severe—which can occur rapidly and unexpectedly. The care required to appropriately evaluate and
provide treatment to patients with COVID-19 includes lab testing, imaging, and treatment
individualized to the presentation of the patient.47 Treatment may require oxygen therapy by nasal
cannula, high flow oxygen masks, and intubation and ventilator assistance.48 Some patients develop
blood clots on the lungs and require anticoagulation.49 Some patients require intravenous fluid
therapy.50 Some patients require vasopressor treatment for low blood pressure, support for kidney
failure, and/or early antibiotics.51 Treatment requires staff that have experience using this equipment
and accurately assessing what is needed.52 The intensity of care and protracted length of care for
COVID-19 cannot be provided at LSP or any of the hospitals within an hour of LSP.53
Even if the DOC does not plan to attempt to treat severe COVID-19 symptoms at LSP,
there is no way to define or predict who will develop severe symptoms in the course of the illness
and require treatment and hospitalization.54 Nor does Camp J have sufficient staffing and equipment
to monitor the COVID-19 positive patients for clinical deterioration, including signs of hypoxia.55 It
45 Id. 46 Id. at ¶¶ 14-16. 47 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 7. 48 Id. 49 Id. 50 Id. 51 Id. at ¶ 16. 52 Id. 53 Id. 54 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 12. 55 Id.
8

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-1 04/17/20 Page 9 of 30
is critical that patients be within easy transportable distance of hospitals that can provide the
adequate level of care.56 The likelihood of Plaintiff Julius Allen’s symptoms continuing to be severe
and ultimately requiring hospitalization is high; Mr. Allen’s pre-existing medical conditions, including
diabetes, hypertension, and high cholesterol, make him especially vulnerable to COVID-19
complications.57 The likelihood of Plaintiff Ernest Roger’s symptoms continuing to be severe and
ultimately requiring hospitalization is high; Mr. Rogers is 65 years old and has a pre-existing medical
conditions, which makes him especially vulnerable to COVID-19 complications.58 If Plaintiffs’
COVID-19 cases become severe, they will require hospitalization; LSP does not have the medical
equipment or personnel necessary to treat severe COVID-19 symptoms.59
Although DOC has stated that if Plaintiffs’ COVID-19 cases become severe they will be
transported to a hospital, the nearest hospital capable of treating life-threatening COVID-19
symptoms is over one hour’s drive from LSP.60 Ambulance resources will be strained in the area; the
parish where LSP is located has only two ambulances, and ambulance personnel everywhere have
high rates of COVID-19 infection.61 The nearest hospital to LSP, West Feliciana Parish Hospital, is
not a reference hospital, meaning it is not equipped to accept patients who require a higher level of
care, and is not suitable for a patient requiring intubation.62 There are no ventilators at West
Feliciana Hospital.63 A patient requiring intubation would need to be sent to Baton Rouge or New
Orleans, a one-hour hour or three-hour drive from LSP, respectively.64
56 Id. at ¶ 7, 15. 57 Ex. 5, Allen Decl. at ¶ 7; Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl., ¶ 19. 58 Ex. 4, Rogers Decl. at ¶¶ 3, 7; Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl., ¶ 19. 59 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶¶ 7, 14, 16. 60Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. 585 at 7 (“If an offender housed at Camp J begins to exhibit severe symptoms, he will be transport [sic] to an outside hospital. Offenders transferred to Camp J will not be sent to the ATU or the treatment center at LSP.”); Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl., ¶ 16. 61 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 17. 62 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14, 18. 63 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 12. 64 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶¶ 14, 18.
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Equally alarming, symptoms can rapidly worsen, with people who appear to have mild cases quickly developing severe symptoms that require medical intervention and life-saving measures immediately upon arrival to the hospital.65 There are no lab tests that predict the course of a COVID patient’s illness.66 Some patients have adequate oxygen saturation for days and then deteriorate.67 There are no signs or symptoms that can be used to predict clinical deterioration.68 Given the lack of tell-tale signs or a timeline for subsequent deterioration, it is critical that patients who test positive or likely positive (known as persons under investigation) for COVID-19 or have been exposed and show symptoms, be within easy transportable distance of hospitals in the event that more critical care is necessary.69 Yet, the Camp J plan does not account for these dangerous realities.
Even if the DOC intends to provide limited medical care, rather than just provide isolation at Camp J—or changes its plan and provides more robust care—the medical care at LSP has long been unconstitutionally deficient. Physicians are not credentialed appropriately and do not provide medical care in line with national standards.70 Plaintiffs will not receive the medical attention needed to appropriately monitor their COVID-19 there and there are no plans for the DOC to staff Camp J with sufficient medical staff in order to monitor all patients for signs of clinical deterioration.71 Kendrick Wilson observed two nurses per shift caring for him and approximately 39 other COVID19 positive patients in an open dorm.72
65 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶¶ 7, 12. 66 Id. 67 Id. 68 Id. 69 Id. 70 Id. at ¶ 13. 71 Id. at ¶ 7; Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14.
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IV. LSP’s Camp J Is Notoriously Unfit for Housing even Healthy Individuals After more than 40 years as one of the most restrictive housing units within Louisiana’s
prison system, DOC closed Camp J in May 2018.73 At Camp J’s peak, it confined more than 400 individuals being disciplined in solitary cells for more than 23 hours a day.74 Defendant Secretary James LeBlanc himself said of Camp J in 2018, “It’s just not a good place to be.”75 The building is notorious for its lack of ventilation, heating, and cooling; people incarcerated in Camp J were forced out of necessity to “strip naked and lie on the cement floors to keep cool during the long, humid summer days; in the winter, the cells can be frigid.”76 Because Camp J’s buildings do not have proper ventilation, those facilities are extremely inappropriate for housing patients with COVID-19, an illness that causes severe respiratory symptoms. There are ceiling fans to help circulate air, but large fans blowing air are likely to spread aerosolized agents around the facility, making it more likely that staff at Camp J will breathe in contagions.77
V. Defendants’ Camp J Plan Threatens the Lives of LSP’s Medically Vulnerable Population.
It will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the DOC to prevent the spread of COVID-19 at LSP.78 For security purposes the prison has one entrance used by everyone. There is no indication that LSP intends to use a separate entrance for Covid-19 patients. While somewhat isolated on the LSP campus, Camp J is, and DOC has always treated it as, a part of the prison. Defendants’ plan for

72 Ex. 3, Wilson Decl. at ¶¶ 11, 14.

73 Grace Toohey, Angola Closes Its Notorious Camp J, “a Microcosm of a lot of Things that Are Wrong,” THE

ADVOCATE,

(May

13,

2018,

8:01

PM),

https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_b39f1e82-4d84-11e8-

bbc2-1ff70a3227e7.html.

74 Id.

75 Id.

76 Brooke Shelby Biggs, Camp J, Red Hats and the Hole: Inside Angola’s three circles of solitary-confinement

hell, MOTHER JONES, (March 5, 2009), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/03/camp-j-

red-hats-and-hole.

77 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 10.

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preventing staff from transmitting the virus is directly contrary to CDC guidelines. Defendants have
directed employees found to have a fever to be sent home, and then return to work as soon as 24
hours after they are fever-free without the use of fever medication.79 But the CDC recommends
returning to work no less than three days after resolution of the fever—and at least seven days after
symptoms first appeared (or after receiving multiple negative COVID-19 tests).80
LSP poses a particularly high risk of transmission. The CDC recommendations described
above are not possible in LSP.81 The majority of the people incarcerated at LSP live in dormitories
of up to 86 people, where social distancing is functionally impossible, as the distance between beds
is approximately 3 feet.82 Large fans blow air through the units which is likely to spread contagious
agents embedded in aerosol like COVID-19.83 As a result, LSP is an environment that could not be
more contrary to current public health recommendations and the President’s Task Force
recommendations.84 Indeed, LSP has worse living conditions and higher commingling of people
than cruise ships and nursing homes, where COVID-19 is known to easily spread and cause
significant death.85
78 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 11 (“Medical and custody staff are also at risk if they come into contact with infected transferred detainees and are likely to spread infection to the uninfected and vulnerable Angola population, no matter what measures are purportedly taken to isolate Camp J.”). 79 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. No. 580-4 at 31. 80 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 28 n.19; see also CDC, “What to Do If You Are Sick” (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/if-you-are-sick/steps-when-sick.html (under “How to discontinue home isolation”); CDC, “Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities” (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidancecorrectional-detention.html (advising that symptomatic correctional staff should follow the guidance in “What to Do If You Are Sick”). 81 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 7. 82 Id. at ¶ 10. 83 Id. 84 Id. 85 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 10.
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Because LSP houses a very large elderly population with significant chronic illnesses, spread
of the virus among these vulnerable populations would result in high rates of death.86
For example, Plaintiff Daniel Gumns is an LSP prisoner who lives in Falcon 1 dormitory at
Camp D with approximately 80 other people and cannot practice social distancing.87 There are only
four or five communal toilets and sinks for the whole dormitory and they are not cleaned every
day.88 He does not have a face mask, gloves, hand sanitizer, or bleach.89 Two people have been taken
out of his dormitory after developing COVID-19 symptoms, including coughing, fevers, and sore
throats, and Mr. Gumns has not seen them since.90 Mr. Gumns is an epileptic and suffers from
grand mal seizures.91 He has had three seizures since arriving at Angola on February 21, 2020.92 His
last seizure was approximately a week and a half ago.93 He also suffers from asthma, which is
triggered when he has seizures and sometimes leaves him unable to breathe without medical
support.94 Mr. Gumns’ asthma puts him at higher risk for severe illness if he contracts COVID-19.95
Plaintiff Ian Cazenave is an LSP prisoner who lives at Ash 2 dormitory at LSP main prison
with approximately 86 other people and cannot practice social distancing.96 Ash 2 is a dormitory in
part for people who are handicapped or have medical needs.97 There are approximately seven toilets,
five sinks, and five or six showers for the whole dorm.98 Mr. Cazenave has two face coverings made
86 Id. at ¶ 12. 87 Ex. 6, Gumns Decl. at ¶ 6. 88 Id. at 8, 9. 89 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 13. 90 Id. at ¶ 12. 91 Id. at ¶ 14. 92 Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. 93 Id. at ¶ 16. 94 Id. at ¶ 14. 95People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2020) (noting that people who have asthma are at higher risk for severe illness). 96 Ex. 7, Cazenave Decl., ¶ 6. 97 Id. at ¶ 5. 98 Id. at ¶ 8.
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out of t-shirt material but does not have gloves or hand sanitizer.99 The only soap available is the
homemade soap made at LSP.100 Ash 2 has been in lockdown for almost a month, but there are still
medical staff and correctional staff coming in and out of the dormitory.101 Not everyone is wearing
masks.102 Medical and correctional staff are also going back and forth between Camp J and other
places in Angola.103 One person has been taken out of the dormitory after developing COVID-19
symptoms and has not returned.104 Mr. Cazenave has sickle cell disease and a heart murmur.105 As a
result of the sickle cell disease, he has open wounds on his legs and feet that require daily dressing
changes.106 He would normally go to the hospital at LSP for his dressing changes, but now the
nurses are coming to the dorm.107 He asked the nurses if they were also going to Camp J but they
would not tell him.108 Mr. Cazenave is at higher risk for severe illness if he contracts COVID-19 as
respiratory viruses are known to cause severe complications – including higher rates of
hospitalization, acute chest syndrome, and need for mechanical ventilation – for people with sickle
cell disease.109
99 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 12. 100 Id. at ¶ 12. 101 Id. at ¶ 9. 102 Id. 103 Id. at ¶ 10. 104 Id. 105 Id. at ¶ 13. 106 Id. 107 Id. 108 Id. 109 Amy Sobota, COVID-19, Sickle Cell Disease, and a Critical Need, HEALTHCITY, (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.bmc.org/healthcity/population-health/covid-19-sickle-cell-disease-and-critical-need (“When a respiratory illness causes poor oxygenation in areas of the lungs, it causes more sickling, which impedes blood flow, which in turn causes low oxygen levels, which then leads to sickling… and so on. This, combined with the original respiratory infection in a person with sickle cell disease, is called acute chest syndrome, and is one of the leading causes of death in people with SCD.”).
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LEGAL STANDARD In order to obtain a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must establish: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public interest.”110 The Court may issue a temporary restraining order without awaiting for the adverse party’s response if it finds that “immediate and irreparable injury … will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.”111
ARGUMENT
This Court should grant Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order immediately restraining Defendants from transferring patients with COVID-19 to Camp J because Plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury absent emergency relief, and the equities and public interest weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.
I. Plaintiffs Have Established a Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims.
To show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiffs “must present a prima facie case but need not show that [they are] certain to win.”112 Here, however, the evidence indisputably shows that the Camp J plan violates the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs by exposing them to a substantial risk of serious harm in violation of both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
110 Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 595 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 18-cv-23-SDD-EWD, 2018 WL 4701849, at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 30, 2018) (standard for temporary restraining order same as standard for preliminary injunction). 111 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). 112 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, 11A Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.3 (2d ed. 1995); see also Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 595-96 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that plaintiffs are “not required to prove [their] entitlement to summary judgment” to show likelihood of success on the merits).
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To establish their entitlement to injunctive relief, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants
Camp J plan likely constitutes deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.113 This
inquiry consists of both an objective test and a subjective test. The objective test considers whether
Plaintiffs have been “expos[ed] to a substantial risk of serious harm” due to their serious medical
needs.114 The subjective test can be satisfied by showing that prison officials had requisite knowledge
of Plaintiffs’ risk of harm and either disregarded the risk or “fail[ed] to take reasonable measures to
abate it.”115 Here, the evidence plainly shows that Plaintiffs are likely to satisfy both tests and thereby
establish a constitutional violation warranting emergency injunctive relief.
A. Plaintiffs Satisfy the Objective Test Because COVID-19 Poses a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm.
There can be no serious dispute that COVID-19 poses a substantial—and lethal—risk of
harm to Plaintiffs. COVID-19 is a novel, highly infectious and deadly disease without a cure.116 “[I]t
is impossible to predict the course of the illness, who will do well, and who will not.”117 These
113 Here, Plaintiffs consist of people in pre-trial detention and also people who have been convicted of crimes. The Fourteenth Amendment’s “substantive due process” protections apply to medical claims brought by individuals in pre-trial detention, whereas the Eighth Amendment applies to people in prison pursuant to convictions. See Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 648-49 (5th Cir. 1996). However, the Fifth Circuit has held that the same subjective deliberate indifference standard applies to both and, therefore, the analysis infra proceeds pursuant to the Eighth Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” analysis. Id. The pre-trial Plaintiffs note that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hare is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). Following Kingsley, other circuits have held that a more protective “objective” deliberate indifference standard should apply to medical claims of individuals in pre-trial detention. See, e.g., Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 33-36 (2d Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, this Court need not resolve that tension here, because the pre-trial Plaintiffs can easily show that Defendants’ Camp J plan constitutes subjective deliberate indifference for the same reasons that the convicted Plaintiffs can show an Eighth Amendment violation. 114 Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2018). 115 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); see also, e.g., Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1250 (M.D. Ala. 2017) ((“To establish deliberate indifference, plaintiffs must show that defendants had subjective knowledge of the harm or risk of harm, and disregarded it or failed to act reasonably to alleviate it.”) 116 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ ¶ 2, 7; Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶¶ 2-6. 117 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 7.
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already substantial risks of COVID-19 are exponentially compounded for Plaintiffs and the rest of Louisiana’s prison population for numerous reasons including: social distancing is virtually impossible in prisons; the virus’s aerosol transmission promises rampant spread in prisons; the high number of medically vulnerable people in Louisiana’s prisons, especially LSP; and already inadequate medical resources that will be further strained by the virus.118
Plaintiffs themselves face a particularly acute risk as a result of COVID-19. Kendrick Wilson has already tested positive and been transported to Camp J;119 but his former cellmates Plaintiffs Ernest Rogers and Julius Allen are medically vulnerable to complications of the disease given their underlying conditions of age, hepatitis C, diabetes, and hypertension.120 In addition, although Plaintiffs Daniel Gumns and Ian Cazenave have not yet tested positive for COVID-19, the Camp J plan substantially threatens to expose them to COVID-19, because they are currently imprisoned at LSP and also suffer from various medical conditions—including asthma and sickle cell disease121— that make them highly vulnerable to complications and even death from COVID-19. In sum, the evidence easily establishes that Defendants’ Camp J plan threatens Plaintiffs with a substantial risk of serious harm in satisfaction of the Eighth Amendment’s objective test.
B. Plaintiffs Satisfy the Subjective Test for Deliberate Indifference, Because Defendants Are Aware of the Risks of COVID-19 and the Camp J Plan Constitutes a Medically Unreasonable Response to that Risk.
The evidence overwhelmingly shows that Defendants are not only subjectively aware of this substantial risk but also that the Camp J plan constitutes an unreasonable response to the COVID19 pandemic, thereby constituting deliberate indifference. In addition to the risks being obvious,122 there can be no question that Defendants are in fact aware of the significant risk of harm caused by
118 Id. at ¶¶ 10-14, 16-19; Puisis Dec at ¶¶ 13-14, 22. 119 Ex. 3, Wilson Decl. at ¶¶ 8-10. 120 Ex. 4, Rogers Decl. at ¶¶ 3, 7, 9, 11; Ex. 5, Allen Decl. at ¶¶ 7-9, 13. 121 Ex. 6, Gumns Decl. at ¶¶ 14-20; Ex. 7, Cazenave Decl. at ¶¶ 13-17.
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COVID-19.123 Indeed, Governor Edwards has issued a State of Emergency as a result of the
COVID-19 outbreak in Louisiana;124 the Louisiana Department of Health has publicly recognized
the risks of COVID-19 outbreaks in Louisiana’s prisons;125 and DOC Secretary James Le Blanc has
publicly observed that “we are all at risk to the virus” following infections of DOC employees.126
Accordingly, the sole remaining question is whether Defendants’ deliberate decision to isolate all
COVID-19 patients at Angola’s Camp J is a reasonable response. It is not.
The evidence shows that Defendants’ Camp J transfer plan is medically unreasonable,
contrary to public health recommendations, and dangerous both to COVID-19 patients and to other
LSP patients, staff, and the surrounding community.127 For example, in their attached declarations,
Plaintiffs medical experts Mike Puisis128 and Susi Vassallo129 detail the dangers of transferring
COVID-19 patients to a remote prison far removed from hospitals and necessary specialty care.
122 “[A] factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 2004). 123 See Letter to Governor John Bel Edwards re COVID 19 Prevention and Protection in Louisiana Facilities (with CC to, inter alia, DOC Secretary James Le Blanc and DOH Acting Secretary Steve Russo) (Mar. 16, 2020) (detailing COVID-19 risks in Louisiana prisons), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/coalition_letter_to_governor_edwards_re_covid_19_ prevention_and_protection_in_louisiana_facilities.pdf; 124 Office of the Governor, Gov. Edwards Declares Public Health Emergency in Response to COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm/newsroom/detail/2400. 125 LA Department of Health Memo to Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections re COVID-10; recommendations regarding prisons and juvenile detention centers (Apr. 8, 2020). 126 Two DOC employees test positive for COVID-19, KATC3 (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.katc.com/news/covering-louisiana/two-doc-employees-test-positive-for-covid-19. 127 Defendants have actual notice of substantial risks inherent in their plan as counsel for Plaintiffs raised them in a filing last week and Secretary LeBlanc and Dr. Morrison both issued defensive declarations. See Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. 585-1, 585-3. 128 Dr. Puisis is a doctor and expert in correctional medicine with over 35 years of experience. He has managed correctional systems across the country, drafted standards for the provision of correctional medicine, and is the editor of the only textbook on correctional medicine. Dr. Puisis is deeply familiar with medical care at LSP and evaluated the medical care system there between 2016 and 2018 in connection with systemic litigation. See Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 1. 129 Dr. Vassallo is a board-certified emergency room physician and medical toxicologist who works in the emergency room at Bellevue Hospital in New York City. Dr. Vassallo has substantial experience treating patients with COVID-19. She is also deeply familiar with the medical care system
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According to Dr. Vassallo and Dr. Puisis, COVID-19 patients require ready access to hospitals,
particularly because “severe COVID-19 disease is treated only with supportive care including
respiratory isolation, oxygen, and mechanical ventilation as a last resort.”130 Even if COVID-19
patients do not require immediate placement in the ICU, they may still require critical specialists and
specialized treatment not available, such as vasopressor treatment for low blood pressure,
intravenous fluid therapy, support for kidney failure, respiratory therapists, and/or early
antibiotics.131 Yet Camp J is located in a remote and rural area far from such specialized medical
services, and the closest adequate emergency room with numerous ventilators is over an hour away
in Baton Rouge.132 Plaintiffs’ experts’ conclusions in this regard are consistent with the guidance of
Defendant Department of Health, which itself noted that anyone expected to have COVID-19
should be transported to a healthcare facility.133
The evidence also establishes that Defendants’ plan to only transfer COVID-19 patients at
Camp J who are “not displaying serious symptoms”134 is based on fundamental misunderstandings
of COVID-19 and how it operates. As Dr. Vassallo notes, the DOC’s plan provides “no
information or medical criteria on how to identify patients as meeting that definition. In fact, at this
at LSP, and evaluated the medical care system there between 2016 and 2018 in connection with systemic litigation. See Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶¶ 1, 7, 11-14. 130 Ex. 1, Pusis Decl. at ¶ 13; Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶¶ 7, 16. 131 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 16. 132 Id. at ¶ 12; Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 20. 133 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 11. 134 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Rec. Doc. 585 at 7 (“If an offender housed at Camp J begins to exhibit severe symptoms, he will be transport [sic] to an outside hospital. Offenders transferred to Camp J will not be sent to the ATU or the treatment center at LSP.”). Further, to the extent Defendants may contend that the majority of COVID-19 patients transported to Camp J will be young and healthy, this action is also medically unreasonable. As Dr. Vassallo notes, “the relatively young and healthy are also in the intensive care units and die. . . . [I]ncreasing evidence in the US has shown the dire risk that COVID-19 poses to younger patients. Young patients ages 20-54 years old can have serious complications from COVID-19 including hospital admission, admission to an intensive care unit, invasive ventilation, or death.” Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 9.
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time, there is no way to define who will do well and who will do poorly.”135 Moreover, this policy
wholly ignores that COVID-19 patients “can deteriorate very rapidly”136 and it is impossible to
“determine whether patients will abruptly need escalated medical care requiring hospitalization.”137
As Dr. Vassallo explains, “[g]iven the lack of tell-tale signs or a timeline for subsequent
deterioration, it is absolutely critical and necessary that patients who test positive or likely positive . .
. for COVID-19 or have been exposed and show symptoms, be within easy transportable distance of
hospitals in the event that more critical care is necessary.”138 Further, by crowding large numbers of
COVID-19 patients into a packed facility, Defendants’ plan substantially increases the likelihood
that COVID-19 patients at Camp J will have higher viral loads and thereby develop more serious
symptoms, thus requiring access to faraway hospitals.139 Making matters worse, in addition to the
long distance to adequate hospitals from Camp J, scarcities in access to ambulance services will make
transfer to faraway hospitals even more difficult—if not impossible.140
The evidence also shows that Camp J most lacks sufficient, qualified and competent medical
staff to provide necessary care to COVID19 patients. A “robust” number of medical staff are
needed to appropriately treat COVID-19.141 Yet, Angola has a history of insufficient medical staffing
and there is nothing in Defendants’ plans reflecting increased staffing.142 As Dr. Puisis notes, “[i]t is
not clear from a practical matter how they would provide sufficient medical personnel at Camp J,
who would have no contact with patients at the rest of LSP, without further diminishing the capacity
135 Vassallo Dec at ¶ 12. 136 Id. at ¶ 7. 137 Id. at ¶ 15. 138 Id. at ¶ 7. 139 James D. Walsh, Is ‘Viral Load’ Why Some People Get a Mild Case of COVID-19?, NY MAG (Mar. 27, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/03/is-viral-load-key-to-understandingcoronaviruss-severity.html. 140 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 17; see also Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 13 (“getting a patient to a hospital from LSP will be challenging under current circumstances.”). 141 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 20. 142 Id. at ¶ 11; Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14.
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of the already over-taxed LSP doctors and nurses.”143 In addition, LSP medical staff are not qualified or equipped to manage patients needing hospital-level care.144 Relatedly, the evidence also shows that LSP medical staff would be unable to consistently determine when patients are medically decompensating as a result of COVID-19; in fact, both Dr. Vassallo and Dr. Puisis previously observed LSP staff failing to recognize typical signs of respiratory decompensation and other “red flags”, which is critical for COVID-19 patients.145 These defects are ever further exacerbated by Defendants’ failure to adequately provide guidance when hospitalization of COVID-19 patients is warranted.146
The evidence further establishes that the present conditions at Camp J make it no place for the transfer of people with a highly infectious and deadly disease. The state’s plan and affidavits do not lay out adequate protocols for medical isolation of Camp J from the rest of LSP’s population, the majority of whom are elderly or otherwise at high risk because of their medical conditions.147 The state’s plan and affidavits also do not describe who will provide medical care for the population expected to be housed at Camp J; whether and how workers serving the population at Camp J will be separate from workers serving the remainder of the prison; what clinical monitoring will be provided; whether and how these known COVID-19 patients will receive hospital care if necessary; and where they will find medical staff and providers to care for the patients.148 Kendrick Wilson is being housed on an open dorm with approximately 39 other people who have tested positive for COVID-19, many of whom are coughing and some of whom have or had required fluid therapy or
143 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 19. 144 Id. at ¶ 13. 145 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 13; Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14. 146 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 18. 147 Id. at ¶ 14. 148 Id. at ¶P 15-20.
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oxygen.149 There are only two nurses per shift and a nurse checks on him approximately twice a
day.150 He has not seen any doctors or observed anyone being taken to the hospital.151
Although the evidence summarized above is alone sufficient to demonstrate that the Camp J
plan is medically unreasonable, the dangers of that plan are exponentially compounded by
indisputable evidence showing systemic and unconstitutional inadequacies in LSP’s overall medical
care, which would be treating COVID-19 patients. As detailed in their declarations, Dr. Vassallo and
Dr. Puisis have both comprehensively examined the medical care system at LSP and found it to be
wholly inadequate. Dr. Puisis summarizes some of these inadequacies as follows:
Physicians were not credentialed appropriately and did not perform consistent with existing standards of care. On record reviews, we noted failure to recognize indications for hospitalization which is critical in the COVID-19 population. There was failure to recognize typical signs of respiratory decompensation which is also critical for COVID-19 patients. There were delays in transfer of patients to a hospital when indicated. Both physicians and other staff (nurses and emergency medical technicians) failed to recognize “red flag” signs resulting in adverse events. Also, LSP is not set up to manage acutely ill patients.152 Consistent with these assessments of LSP’s inadequate medical system, this Court recently observed
that medical care at LSP is “unconstitutional in some respects.”153 Yet, Defendants are knowingly and
unreasonably placing additional strains on LSP’s already broken medical system by transferring
COVID-19 patients who require significant and complex levels of care. This dangerous course of
conduct will inevitably threaten the lives of not only COVID-19 patients but also of other people
149 Ex. 3, Wilson Decl. at ¶ 11. 150 Id. at ¶ 14. 151 Id. at ¶¶ 11, 14. 152 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 14; see also Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶¶ 13-14. 153 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Docket No. 578 (Feb. 21, 2020 order directing parties to meet and confer).
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imprisoned at LSP, who were already suffering as a result of LSP’s constitutionally inadequate
medical system.154
In addition, the evidence further establishes the medical unreasonableness of Defendants’
Camp J plan given that the plan substantially threatens the health of LSP’s population—especially
medically vulnerable people. “[C]orrectional officials have an affirmative obligation to protect
inmates from infectious disease.”155 The Eighth Amendment “require[s] a remedy” where their
jailors knowingly expose them to a risk of contracting serious infectious diseases, even if “it was not
alleged that the likely harm would occur immediately and even though the possible infection might
not affect all of those exposed.”156 Here, the evidence shows that Defendants have failed to lay out
adequate protocols to ensure that COVID-19 is not transmitted from Camp J to the rest of LSP’s
population.157 Nor could they given the high likelihood that staff will intermingle between
facilities,158 and also that LSP has only a single entry which could serve as vector point even in the
unlikely event of separate staffing.159 The risk of further spreading COVID-19 at LSP is especially
dangerous to LSP’s medically vulnerable population.160 As Dr. Puisis explains, “LSP has a
particularly vulnerable population with over 50% of inmates over 50 years of age and many
vulnerable persons with high risk medical conditions.”161 As a result, increased spread of COVID-19
via the Camp J plan “would result in high rates of death” for LSP patients.162 Plaintiffs Daniel
Gumns and Ian Cazenave are currently imprisoned at LSP and suffer from various medical
154 See Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975) (finding that when systematic deficiencies in staffing, facilities or procedures make unnecessary suffering inevitable, a court will not hesitate to use its injunctive powers). 155 Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996). 156 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). 157 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 20; Ex. 2, Vassalo Decl. at ¶ 11. 158 Ex. 7, Cazenave Decl. at ¶ 10. 159 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. ¶ 11. 160 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶¶ 12, 14. 161 Id. at ¶ 14; see also Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 11. 162 Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 12.
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conditions—including asthma and sickle cell disease163—that make them highly vulnerable to
complications and even death from COVID-19.164 Mr. Gumns and Mr. Cazenave are concerned that
transferring COVID-19 patients to Camp J will increase their risk of exposure.165 The Fifth Circuit
has repeatedly recognized that unreasonably subjecting detained people to infectious diseases
constitutes deliberate indifference.166
Finally, as the evidence makes clear, this is not a situation where Defendants have chosen a
medically reasonable alternative with which Plaintiffs merely disagree.167 Rather, the evidence
summarized supra and the attached declarations indisputably show that the Camp J plan is medically
unsound and poses a grave danger to Plaintiffs and the putative Class. Nor is this a situation where
there are simply no better precautionary measures that can be taken by the State. The State has taken
significant—and unprecedented—measures to ensure adequate treatment of people who are not
incarcerated—for example, by repurposing the New Orleans Convention Center168 and hotels169
into field hospitals in proximity to actual hospitals with ICUs. And yet, it is incarcerated people to
163 Ex. 6, Gumns Decl. at ¶¶ 14-20; Ex. 7, Cazenave Decl. at ¶¶ 13-17. 164 See People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2020). 165 FN 165: Ex. 6, Gumns Decl. at ¶¶ 11, 14-20; Ex. 7, Cazenave Decl. at ¶¶ 9-10, 17. 166 See, e.g., Gomez v. Warner, 39 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (prisoner alleged deliberate indifference by prison officials where the prison’s razor-swapping program created the mere “risk” of “possible spread” in the transmission of deadly “infectious diseases such as HIV, AIDS, and hepatitis.”); Johnson v. Epps, 479 F. App’x 583, 589-92 (5th Cir. 2012) (allegations that inmate was exposed to “serious, communicable diseases” and that prison officials were aware of the risk and did nothing to prevent it were sufficient to state a claim for violation of Eighth Amendment rights); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300-03 (5th Cir. 1974) (affirming district court’s holding that allowing “[s]ome inmates with serious contagious diseases . . . to mingle with the general prison population,” alongside maintaining a host of other unsanitary and inhumane conditions, “constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment”). 167 Compare Thompson v. Basse, 202 F. App’x 654 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpub.). 168 Josh Roberson, TODAY: New Orleans Convention Center accepting COVID-19 patients, FOX8 (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.fox8live.com/2020/04/06/today-new-orleans-convention-center-acceptingcovid-patients/.
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whom the State owes an affirmative constitutional obligation to provide adequate care during this COVID-19 pandemic.170 Therefore, as the evidence shows, the Camp J plan represents yet another dark chapter in the State’s long history of failing to fulfill that constitutional obligations to incarcerated people.171 Indeed, rather than providing a medically necessary and reasonable response to this crisis, Defendants are simply shipping COVID-19 patients to a remote out-camp—far removed from adequate and necessary medical care—as though they are mere afterthoughts or inconveniences in this deadly pandemic. For all these reasons, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their constitutional claims that Defendants’ conduct constitutes deliberate indifference.
II. Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Injury Absent an Emergency Injunction. The evidence also establishes that Plaintiffs and putative class members will suffer
irreparable injury—including severe infections, serious medical complications and even death— unless this court enjoins the Camp J plan. As detailed above, Defendants’ Camp J plan will result in COVID-19 patients being shipped to a remote facility far from necessary hospitals and adequate medical care for this deadly disease. In addition to threatening the lives of COVID-19 patients, the Camp J plan also threatens the health and safety of LSP’s medically vulnerable population. Plaintiffs need not await severe infections, complications or even outright denial of medical care in order to obtain an injunction. As the Supreme Court has long recognized, “[i]t would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the
169 Sheraton New Orleans to be used as coronavirus field hospital, report says, WWLTV (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.wwltv.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/sheraton-new-orleans-to-be-used-ascoronavirus-field-hospital/289-e1a61b70-d597-478d-96a7-1b2d07fb565d. 170 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (Incarcerated people “must rely on prison authorities to treat [their] medical needs” because “if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.”). 171 See generally Lynn v. Williams, 92-cv-001 (M.D. La.)
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ground that nothing yet had happened to them. . . . [A] remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event.”172
Nor can there be any question that the threatened harm is irreparable. Likely hundreds of putative Class members have risk factors making death or severe illness likely if they contract COVID-19. “It goes without saying that . . . death is an irreparable injury.”173 Even for those who recover—a touch-and-go proposition, given the demonstrated seriousness and spread of COVID19, particularly for vulnerable populations—the extreme suffering that they may experience during their illness and the possibility of long-term respiratory impairment could not be erased.
For these reasons, the evidence firmly establishes that the Camp J plan threatens Plaintiffs and the putative class with irreparable harm. An immediate injunction is the only way to abate that substantial and life-threatening risk.
III.The Equities and Public Interest Clearly Favor Plaintiffs. The third and fourth TRO factors, “harm to the opposing party and weighing the public
interest …[,] merge when the Government is the opposing party.”174 Here, those factors weigh heavily in favor of granting relief.
As an initial matter, the requested injunction would protect Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and “[i]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.”175 Because “confidence in the humane application of
172 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993); see also Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 2004) (“It is also important to note that [an] inmate need not show that death or serious illness has [already] occurred.”) 173 East v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of La., No. 14-cv-115-BAJ-RLB, 2014 WL 8332136, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 24, 2014); accord, e.g., Turner v. Epps, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1028 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (describing death as “the single most irreparable harm of all”). 174 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 175 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 458 n.9 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012)); accord, e.g., June Medical Servs., LLC v. Caldwell, No. 14cv-525-JWD-RLB, 2014 WL 4296679, at *8 (M.D. La. Aug. 31, 2014).
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the governing laws of the State must be in the public’s interest,”176 there is a clear public interest in
preventing Defendants from exposing Plaintiffs and putative class members to cruel and unusual
punishment in the form of inadequate medical care and willful exposure to a serious risk of severe
harm.
In addition to the public interest in protecting Plaintiffs and putative class members
themselves, minimizing risk of transmission of COVID-19 is inarguably in the public interest. As
already explained, the transfer plan is likely to spread COVID-19 to the staff of LSP and then to the
broader West Feliciana and central Louisiana community.177 “[A] COVID-19 outbreak at a detention
facility could quickly overwhelm” not only the facility’s medical system, but “surrounding
community hospitals” as well.178 The resulting effect on “public health and safety” would plainly
harm the public interest.179 Indeed, courts across the country have recognized the significant threat
to public safety that outbreaks in detention centers pose.180
By contrast, there is no substantial harm to Defendants in enjoining the transfer plan.
Defendants can have no interest in implementation of a plan that will expose not only Plaintiffs and
putative class members but hundreds of their own staff to COVID-19 as well as the public at large.
Moreover, Defendants have other, safer options than transferring persons with COVID-19 to a
176 Harris v. Johnson, 323 F. Supp. 2d 797, 810 (S.D. Tex. 2004). 177 Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶ 18. 178 Coronel v. Decker, No. 20-cv-2472 AJN, 2020 WL 1487274, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2020). 179 Id. 180 See, e.g., Mays v. Thomas, 20-cv-2134, Dkt. No. 47 (N.D. Ill. April 9, 2020) (finding that “the interest of the public in containing the further spread of this highly contagious virus also favors granting relief to the plaintiffs”); Francisco Hernandez v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-617-TJH, Dkt. No. 17 (C.D. Cal., Apr. 1, 2020); Fraihat v. Wolf, No. 20-CV-590 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2020) (noting risk of asymptomatic spread and unsafe conditions in immigration detention mean "[t]he balance of equities tip sharply in [Fraihat's] favor" and thus ordering release); Thakker v. Doll, No. 1:20-cv-480-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2020) (granting TRO releasing high-risk immigration detainees from custody due to the dangers of COVID-19); Basank v. Decker, No. 20-cv-2518, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2020) (finding "[t]he nature of detention facilities makes exposure and spread of the [coronavirus] particularly harmful" so granting TRO and releasing high-risk plaintiffs); Castillo v. Barr, No. 20-cv-605-TJH-
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prison distinctly ill-suited to house and treat them, and to prevent transmission.181 And even if there were some harm to Defendants, it would be greatly outweighed by the catastrophic risk to Class members.
IV. The Court Should Immediately Enter a Temporary Restraining Order While It Adjudicates This Motion
Defendants have already begun transferring people with COVID-19 to LSP,182 threatening the lives of not only COVID-19 patients but also other LSP patients, staff and community members. Even on an expedited briefing schedule, by the time the Court can receive full briefing and hold a preliminary injunction hearing, Defendants’ Camp J plan may result in substantial spread of the virus at LSP and also severe infections, complications, and even death for Plaintiffs and putative class members. For this reason, “[a] hearing weeks from now may be no relief at all.”183
Plaintiffs are prepared to proceed to a preliminary injunction hearing as soon as Defendants and the Court are able. But in the interim, a temporary restraining order is the only way to ensure that Defendants’ dangerous plan does not threaten the lives of Plaintiffs and the putative class prior to a hearing.
V. The Court Should Waive the Security Bond. Plaintiffs also request that the Court exercise its broad discretion to waive any security bond
for issuance of the TRO. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that “[t]he court may issue a preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been
AFM, Dkt. No. 32 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2020); Ronal Umana Jovel v. Decker, 12-cv-308-GBD, Dkt. No. 27 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2020). 181 See Ex. 1, Puisis Decl. at ¶¶ 21-29; see also Ex. 2, Vassallo Decl. at ¶¶ 1-8 (under “My recommendations for the DOC to mitigate the spread of the coronavirus among Louisiana’s incarcerated population are”); supra n.169. 182See Ex. 3, Wilson Decl. at ¶ 8-11. 183 Coronel, 2020 WL 1487274, at *7.
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wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” However, “[t]he amount of security required is a matter for the
discretion of the trial court; it may elect to require no security at all.”184
Here, Plaintiffs are incarcerated individuals who are seeking to vindicate their constitutional
rights. Furthermore, the requirement of a bond is contrary to the proposition that inadequate
resources under no circumstances justify a prison’s deprivation of constitutional rights.185 Under
these circumstances, waiver of the security bond is proper, and Plaintiffs therefore respectfully
request that the Court exercise its broad discretion to do so.186
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court immediately issue an order
temporarily restraining Defendants from transferring Plaintiffs and any patients with COVID-19 to
Camp J; and, after a hearing, preliminarily enjoin Defendants from doing so.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of April, 2020.
/s/ Mercedes Montagnes
Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287 Jamila Johnson, La. Bar No. 37953 Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415 The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70117 Telephone: (504) 529-5955 Facsimile: (504) 595-8006 Email: mmontagnes@defendla.org
Jared Davidson, La. Bar No. 37093
184 Corrigan Dispatch Co. v. Casa Guzman, S. A., 569 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). 185 See, e.g., Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 1977) (inadequate resources can never be a justification for depriving an inmate of his constitutional rights). See Ex. 7, Cazenave Decl. at ¶ 4 (declaring indigency); Ex. 6, Gumns Decl. at ¶ 4 (declaring indigency). 186 See, e.g., Molton Co v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995) (approving waiver of bond given strength of case and “the strong public interest” involved); Campos v. INS, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (because plaintiffs were indigent and sought to vindicate their constitutional rights, consistent with the public interest, the court did not require a bond).
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Southern Poverty Law Center 201 Saint Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone: (504) 486-8982 Facsimile: (504) 486-8947 Email: jared.davidson@splcenter.org Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Mercedes Montagnes, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 14, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system. I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Mercedes Montagnes Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287
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DECLARATION OF DR. MICHAEL PUISIS CONCERNING THE RISK OF THE SPREAD OF COVID-19 IN THE LOUISIANA STATE PRISON (LSP) AT ANGOLA
1. Dr. Michael Puisis is an internist who has worked in correctional medicine for 35 years. He began working at the Cook County Jail as a physician in 1985 and became the Medical Director of Cook County Jail from 1991 to 1996 and Chief Operating Officer for the medical program at the Cook County Jail from 2009 to 2012. He has worked in and managed correctional medical programs in multiple state prisons including in Illinois and New Mexico. He has worked as a Monitor or Expert for Federal Courts on multiple cases and has worked as a Correctional Medical Expert for the Department of Justice on multiple cases. He has also participated in revisions of national standards for medical care for the National Commission on Correctional Health Care and for the American Public Health Association. He also participated in revision of tuberculosis standards for the Center for Disease Control. Dr. Puisis has edited the only textbook on correctional medicine, Clinical Practice in Correctional Medicine. Dr. Puisis evaluated the Louisiana State Prison at Angola for The Promise of Justice Initiative in 2016 (and also conducted records review in 2018) and previously monitored Louisiana State Prison at Angola for the Department of Justice.
2. Coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) is a viral pandemic. This is a novel virus for which there is no established curative medical treatment and no vaccine.
3. The number of cases of COVID-19 in the United States are rising rapidly. On April 13, 2020, Johns Hopkins reported that there were 572,587 reported COVID-19 infections in the U.S. The number of deaths is over 23,000 but both cases and deaths are rising rapidly so by the time this declaration is read the numbers of both cases and deaths will be significantly larger. The number of cases of COVID-19 is the highest number of reported cases of any country in the world.
4. Louisiana has a rapidly accelerating rate of COVID-19 infections. A study from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette reported that COVID-19 cases grew at a 67.8% rate, the highest rate in the U.S.1 The Louisiana Department of Health reported on April 13, 2020 that there were 21,016 cases of COVID-19 with 884 deaths. Louisiana has the third most deaths per capita of any state in the U.S.
5. UpToDate2 reports an overall case mortality rate from the disease of 2.3. Louisiana has 884 deaths for 21,016 cases; more than 4.2% of persons diagnosed with the infection in Louisiana die.
1 Coronavirus cases grew faster in Louisiana than anywhere else in the world: UL study, The Acadiana Advocate, Adam Daigle March 24, 2020, https://www.theadvocate.com/acadiana/news/coronavirus/article_94494420-6d4b-11ea-ac42ff7dd722c084.html. 2 UpToDate is an online medical reference widely used in hospitals, health organizations, and private physicians.
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6. COVID-19 is transmitted by droplets of infected aerosol when people with the infection cough. Droplets of respiratory secretions infected with the virus can survive as an aerosol for up to three hours.3 4 Droplets can be directly transmitted by inhalation to other individuals in close proximity. Droplets can land on surfaces and be picked up by the hands of another person who can then become infected by contacting a mucous membrane (eyes, mouth, or nose) with their hand. Infected droplets can remain viable on surfaces for variable lengths of time, ranging from up to 3 hours on copper, 24 hours on cardboard, and 2-3 days on plastic and stainless steel.5
7. Medical care for COVID-19 focuses on prevention, which emphasizes social distancing, handwashing, and respiratory hygiene. The current CDC recommendations for social distancing and frequent handwashing measures, which are the only measures available to protect against infection, are not possible in LSP. Furthermore, repeated sanitation of horizontal and touch surfaces in inmate living units and throughout LSP is not typically done based on our review and would be an overwhelming task. LSP has worse living conditions and higher comingling of people than cruise ships and nursing homes, where COVID-19 is known to have easily spread. Prevention of contact with an infected droplet is significantly more difficult in a prison than in the community.
8. With respect to transmission of disease by droplet inhalation, correctional environments, including LSP, actually promote spread of respiratory contagious disease. Jails and prisons are long known to be a breeding ground for infectious respiratory illness. Tuberculosis is a bacteria which is significantly less transmissible than COVID-19 yet has been responsible for numerous outbreaks of illness in prisons and jails over the years. Respiratory infectious disease like TB are thought to be made worse in prisons because of crowding and recirculated air. Because of transmissibility of TB in prisons the CDC still recommends screening for this condition in prisons. Proper screening for tuberculosis can control that disease in prison populations.
9. The COVID-19 virus is a different type of respiratory illness; its spread is rapid and it is more easily transmissible. Control through screening with a test as is done for TB in prisons would be optimal but current CDC guidance6 does not recommend a test as a screening method. Likely, this is due to a critical shortage of testing material. The method of control in an intake of a correctional facility is quarantine for up to 14 days.7 If testing material
3 National Institute of Health, available at https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/newcoronavirus-stable-hours-surfaces 4 Neeltje van Doremalen and Others, Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared with SARS-CoV-1, Correspondence in New England Journal of Medicine, March 17, 2020, https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc2004973?cid=DM88773_&bid=171021451 5 Id. 6 Evaluating and Testing Persons for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Centers for Disease Control as found at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/hcp/clinical-criteria.html 7 In their Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities guidance the CDC recommends “If possible, consider quarantining all new intakes for 14 days before they enter the facility’s general population
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becomes readily available, I would recommend testing and a quarantine until the test is complete.
10. Jails and prisons promote spread of respiratory illnesses because of crowded congregate housing arrangements. LSP is the largest maximum security prison in the U. S. and has a population of approximately 6000 individuals. The main unit of LSP contains 32 dormitories. The remote camps C and D have a combination of dormitories and cellblocks. Camp F is a minimum dormitory. I have visited multiple inmate dormitories. All dormitories I visited were filled to capacity and were crowded. The dormitories are not arranged to provide social distancing as the distance between beds is approximately 3 feet. Large fans blow air through the units which is likely to spread contagious agents embedded in aerosol like COVID-19. Washing areas are shared. There is no privacy and it is not possible to remain 6 feet apart as recommended. Infirmary beds are in dormitory style setting and are close together. If inmates with COVID-19 are housed on the infirmary rather than outside hospitals, the infection is likely to spread throughout this unit of compromised patients. Photos in our prior 2016 report8 show what some of these dormitories and showers look like.9 Notable in these pictures is that soap is not consistently present on sinks used by staff and in showers used by inmates. Currently the President’s Task Force on COVID-19 recommends limiting gatherings to no more than 10 persons. Inmates at LSP live in large dormitories with over 80 persons per dormitory. These dormitories are incapable of allowing inmates to follow current CDC recommendations regarding prevention against COVID-19. Officers guarding the inmates can carry the infection into the prison. One couldn’t devise a system more contrary to current public health recommendations and the President’s Task Force recommendations than a prison like LSP. The elderly and those with significant medical conditions are housed together in some of these dormitories creating a nursing home like environment; environments where COVID-19 is known to have rapidly spread. Dormitories with large numbers of persons with severe medical conditions are similar to nursing homes where COVID is known to have caused significant death.
11. There is a lack of information about what is occurring within LSP and testing is not being widely performed. A bullet point summary of the LSP COVID-19 plan states that “any LSP offender presenting with symptoms is given both a flu test and COVID-19 test.” A news report on March 26, 2020 stated that two employees at different state prisons tested positive for COVID-19 but that no inmates have tested positive. The newspaper reported that only 32 inmates in the entire Louisiana Department of Corrections have been tested and all have tested negative. On April 13, 2020, the Louisiana Department of Corrections reported that
(SEPARATELY from other individuals who are quarantined due to contact with a COVID-19 case). As found at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correctiondetention/guidance-correctional-detention.html 8 Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola; Health Care Evaluation Submitted October 3, 2016; Lewis et al v. Cain et al Class Action Complaint. United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana. Case No. 3:15-cv-00318-BAJ-RLB Document 133-1 10/14/16 9 Photos PX006.0279, PX006.0280, PX006.0277
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57 inmates in DOC custody and 45 staff members across the DOC had tested positive. One staff member at LSP had died. Currently, transfers into LSP have been suspended absent extenuating circumstances and if an inmate is transferred into LSP, they are supposed to be quarantined for a 14-day period. LSP screens visitors and new inmates with symptom screening and a temperature. These measures are consistent with recommendations of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) correctional guidelines.10 However, based on our review of this facility in 2018, we noted ineffective medical care with several unqualified physicians, insufficient nurse staff, no infection control nurse, and lack of supervision of front line medical staff. While CDC procedures are in place I question the ability to effectively carry out the procedures as stated.
12. An individual’s immune system is the primary defense against this infection. As a result, people over age 65 years of age and persons with impaired immunity may have a higher probability of death if they are infected. Age related risk is a result of impaired immunity with aging. The older a person is the greater the apparent risk. In LSP 90% of inmates are incarcerated for life and approximately 50% of inmates are over age 50. People on immunosuppressive medication, with diseases causing impaired immunity, or with significant cardiac or pulmonary medical conditions also are at increased risk of death. It has recently been reported that younger patients with cardiovascular disease or hypertension may have unappreciated risk for severe disease.11 This has significant implications for correctional facilities with high rates of hypertension. Persons with severe mental illness in prisons are also, in my opinion, at increased risk of acquiring and transmitting infection because they are unable to understand social distancing and hand hygiene and may be unable to communicate symptoms appropriately. Also, by classification, like other prison systems, LSP houses inmates who are elderly, have disabilities, are mentally ill or have severe chronic illness profiles in specific housing areas, making this population at great risk if one of them becomes infected. Because LSP has a very large elderly population with significant chronic illness spread of infection in LSP would result in high rates of death.
13. Based on our review of care at LSP through 2018, inmates lacked access to hospital care under ordinary circumstances; the COVID-19 pandemic will only make that worse. Currently, severe COVID-19 disease is treated only with supportive care including respiratory isolation, oxygen, and mechanical ventilation as a last resort. LSP is a remote prison which is also remote from hospitals. There are reports that Louisiana’s hospitals could be overwhelmed by COVID-19 cases.12 The reports of possible lack of hospital beds
10 Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention posted March 23, 2020 as found at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidancecorrectional-detention.html 11 ACE2 is the SARS-CoV-2 Receptor Required for Cell Entry, Summary, New England Journal of Medicine, March 18, 2020 Review of article of Hoffman, M et al in Cell 2020 Mar 5 12 Louisiana’s hospitals could be overwhelmed by COVID-19 virus in all but best scenario; Daily Adviser March 26, 2020 as found at
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would place LSP inmates in a dire predicament.13 Also, LSP is not set up to manage hospital level care including managing patients on ventilators. The infirmary is a dormitory and housing a COVID-19 patient on this unit would result in spread to other uninfected but medically compromised patients. There is therefore no place to treat an ill person with COVID-19 except in a general housing unit or on the infirmary, both of which would expose other patients to infection. The existing staff at LSP could not manage any hospitallevel patient and getting a patient to a hospital from LSP will be challenging under current circumstances. This will invariably place inmates at risk of death.
14. The state is proposing transferring detained individuals with COVID-19 from the state’s numerous jails to Angola. This would entail transportation of COVID-19 infected detainees to Angola for housing. It is my opinion that transferring detainees from jails to LSP for medical isolation and clinical management is not a good idea for multiple reasons. First, because the process for transporting COVID positive cases to a parish and a prison without cases—or with few cases—would increase the risk of transmission of positive cases to a location without cases or few cases, thereby increasing risk of spread including to West Feliciana Parish and the surrounding communities. Second, LSP has a particularly vulnerable population with over 50% of inmates over 50 years of age and many vulnerable persons with high risk medical conditions. Staffing deficiencies will likely result in medical and custody staff working with infected transferred detainees as well as LSP prisoners, which is likely to spread infection to the uninfected prisoners currently housed at LSP. This places them at significant risk. Third, medical care at LSP is not good and transferred inmates are unlikely to receive the medical attention needed to appropriately monitor their disease. LSP had insufficient staff in 2016 and was unable to adequately provide medical care such that officers and inmates were used to provide medical care.14 Introduction of a COVID-19 infected population into a system without adequate medical staff can only result in less attention being paid to both the existing LSP patients who have substantial medical needs as well as the newly transferred inmates who should be monitored multiple times daily. Additionally, the quality of care at LSP was substandard in 2016 when we produced a report of our investigation and again in 2018 based on selected record reviews. Physicians were not credentialed appropriately and did not perform consistent with existing standards of care. On record reviews, we noted failure to recognize indications for hospitalization which is critical in the COVID-19 population. There was failure to recognize typical signs of respiratory decompensation which is also critical for COVID-19 patients. There were delays in transfer of patients to a hospital when indicated. Both physicians and other staff (nurses and emergency medical technicians) failed to recognize “red flag” signs resulting in adverse events. Also, LSP is not set up to manage acutely ill patients. Laboratory services are only
https://www.theadvertiser.com/story/news/local/2020/03/26/coronavirus-louisiana-hospitalsoverwhelmed-under-all-covid-19-scenarios/2884019001/ 13 Who gets a ventilator? Hospitals facing coronavirus surge are preparing for life-or-death decisions. NBC News as found at https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/who-gets-ventilatorhospitals-facing-coronavirus-surge-are-preparing-life-n1162721 14 Officers passed medications on most units, and inmates assisted in providing some services to inmates on the infirmary during our 2016
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available weekdays during working-day-hours and not at all on weekends. Blood gas assessments, critical for managing acute respiratory distress are not available at LSP. Physician evaluations during evening and nights were mostly telephonic and inadequate for patient needs. Also, the higher-level-of-care infirmary houses many long-term ill patients. These patients are at very high risk of death in the event of COVID-19 making the infirmary not useable for COVID-19 patients who deteriorate. Further, the local hospital is not a reference hospital and patients requiring intubation would need to be sent to Baton Rouge or New Orleans, an hour to three hour ride, respectively, a long ride with a potentially decompensating patient. For these reasons, detainees involved in these transfers would not be transferred into a situation that would include improved medical services. Services would likely be worse. Fourth and last, there is no evidence that the Louisiana Department of Health was involved in this decision. This appears to be a custody decision without consultation during a pandemic crisis with the Louisiana Department of Health. I have listed multiple reasons why this decision make little sense from a medical perspective. It also is not a good decision from a public health perspective. Custody leadership should not be making a decision that is likely to have great impact on a public health crisis, both with respect to introduction of active COVID-19 cases into a naïve and vulnerable population, and because the impact on local hospital resources could overwhelm the local community and reduce availability of ICU beds to community residents. For all of these reasons, it is my opinion that this transfer is not a good idea and will worsen the impact of this pandemic.
15. I have reviewed the plan submitted by the state, as well as the affidavits of Secretary James M. LeBlanc, Tracy Falgout, and Dr. John E. Morrison.15 None of these documents changed in any way my opinion that using LSP as a statewide isolation unit, specifically at Camp J, will worsen the impact of the pandemic and poses a serious public health risk.
16. First, there is still no evidence that the Department of Health is involved in making the decision to use Camp J. This is a public health emergency, not a custody or other nonmedical emergency. For this reason, the Department of Health should be directing decisions around transfers between facilities rather than custody officials. While Dr. Morrison is a medical doctor, his specialty is in general surgery and advanced cardiac life support, not epidemiology, pulmonology, or emergency medicine, and he has no relevant expertise in correctional medicine. I noted that the affidavits do not reference a public health official in attendance at the daily phone meetings – Dr. Morrison simply claims that the DOC is in “direct contact” with the Department of Health. Lack of coordination with the Department of Health puts at risk the lives of patients at LSP or who will be transferred to LSP and who may need to be hospitalized at some point. The Department of Public Health should have been part of the development of this plan in conjunction with their other statewide decisionmaking and planning around COVID-19.16
15 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318 (M.D.La.), Docket No. 585. 16 On April 8, 2020, the Department of Health Office of Public Health issued recommendations regarding prisons and juvenile detention centers. These recommendations were rescinded without explanation on April 9, 2020.
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17. Second, the pandemic plan they reference in their plan and affidavits is dated and not consistent with requirements of COVID-19. For COVID-19, three distinct types of special housing are needed: quarantine, isolation for people with known COVID019, and isolation for persons under investigation (“PUI”). The PUI group are people who are symptomatic (fever, symptoms of cough, shortness of breath, etc.) but have not yet been tested or test results are pending. These three groups should be housed separately. The current plan does not address this.
18. Third, the state’s plan and affidavits do not address hospitalization. Specifically, they did not discuss how the PUI group or the COVID-19 positive groups would be monitored and, when and if they would be sent to a hospital, what arrangements would be made. Because LSP is so remote, an earlier admission is probably indicated due to the expected long distance they would have to travel to Baton Rouge or New Orleans if the patient required hospitalization or intubation. The West Feliciana Hospital does not support mechanical ventilation.
19. Fourth, the state’s plan and affidavits did not address the capacity of LSP to provide appropriate medical care, particularly while maintaining isolation and quarantine from the rest of LSP. It is not clear from a practical matter how they would provide sufficient medical personnel at Camp J, who would have no contact with patients at the rest of LSP, without further diminishing the capacity of the already over-taxed LSP doctors and nurses. Nor was there any indication how the state plans to monitor the patients at Camp J in any of the three groups mentioned above. If hospitalization becomes necessary the travel time to the hospital delays initiation of care with resultant risk. In my previous reviews of medical records documenting the quality of care at LSP, I noted the failure to recognize indications for hospitalization and typical signs of respiratory decompensation, both of which are critical for COVID-19 patients. There were also many examples of delays in transfer of patients to a hospital when indicated.
20. Finally, the state’s plan and affidavits do not lay out adequate protocols for medical isolation of Camp J from the rest of LSP’s population, the majority of whom are elderly or otherwise at high risk because of their medical conditions. The state’s plan and affidavits also do not describe who will provide medical care for the population expected to be housed at Camp J; whether and how workers serving the population at Camp J will be separate from workers serving the remainder of the prison; what the clinical monitoring will consist of; whether and how these known COVID-19 patients will receive hospital care if necessary; and where they will find medical staff and providers to care for the population. Most troubling in the state’s plan is the lack of coordination with the Louisiana Department of Health. Creating an isolation unit for COVID-19 in a remote rural area with few cases and with a lack of reference hospital resources risks increased transmission and increased risk for individuals transferred as well as risk of infecting the local LSP inmate population which is high risk because of age and disease burden. There is also the increased risk of spillover into the local civilian population. Further, even assuming Defendants ultimately utilized different staff at Camp J, that staff will be at high risk of infecting the community, including staff that serve the rest of LSP. Because this is a pandemic, the Louisiana Department of Health should
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approve of such a transfer as part of its broader effort to control the pandemic statewide. This is not something correctional officials should do without consultation and approval of the Department of Health.
Recommendations
21. Steps should be taken to release any inmate who is a low risk to the community. The additional risk to inmates by virtue of crowding in prisons and the risk of promoting spread of the infection to the inmate population, and thereby to the community, needs to be weighed against the reason for not releasing the inmate from incarceration. Release based on risk should prioritize inmates over 65 years of age, inmates with immune disorders, inmates with significant cardiac (including hypertension) or pulmonary conditions, or inmates with cognitive disorders. Keeping healthy individuals in prison for short sentences, or for parole violations or other marginal public safety reasons only promotes crowding. Crowding decreases the ability of maintaining distancing of prisoners which risks spread of the virus. Therefore, healthy prisoners with low risk sentences are best sent home as a preventive measure.
22. Because LSP is a maximum security prison with a 90% of inmates having a life sentence, depopulation of low risk inmates may not yield many inmates who can be released. Depopulating should be done at other Louisiana prisons to permit LSP to reassign inmates to other prisons that will permit appropriate distancing in dormitories. Such reassignment is permissible under CDC guideline on the basis of depopulation. Current dormitory arrangements are inconsistent with current public health and CDC recommendations regarding social distancing and if COVID-19 transmission penetrates the prison, the infection will spread widely.
23. If and when COVID-19 testing becomes readily available, expanded testing should be done.
24. All persons over 65, with severe mental illness, with immune disorders, with serious cardiac or pulmonary disease, or with any cognitive disorder should have daily symptom screening and temperature screening. Any positive symptom or temperature should require respiratory isolation and testing for COVID-19. Temperatures should be taken with infrared no-touch thermometers so that symptom screening and temperatures can be taken without touching the patient.
25. Persons suspicious for or known to be infected with COVID-19 should NOT be transferred to LSP.17 As of April 13, 2020, West Feliciana Parish only had 46 cases and 0 deaths. LSP had 24 cases between staff and inmates. To send patients infected with COVID-19 to a parish and correctional facility with few known cases risks spreading the disease further into Louisiana and has ramifications for the community at large. Furthermore, approximately
17 Louisiana plans to house local and state inmates with coronavirus at Angola and Allen Correctional; Emily Lane, WDSU News March 27, 2020; as found at https://www.wdsu.com/article/louisiana-plans-to-house-inmates-with-coronavirus-at-angola-andanother-prison/31960114
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50% of the LSP population is over age 50 with many high risk medical conditions and a majority of inmates live in dormitories. This increases risk of transmission into an uninfected population and increases risk of death.
26. The CDC recommends suspending all transfers between facilities or jurisdictions.18 LSP should enact this recommendation. However, if a transfer must be done, any person is transferred from one prison to another, they should have a negative COVID-19 test result or be quarantined for 14 days prior to transfer and known to not have COVID-19.
27. LSP needs to develop guidelines for when to send patients to a hospital. These should be developed with the reference hospital. Contact information with the reference hospital should be established as soon as possible. Criteria for hospital referral should be established in advance and posted so that all physicians, physician assistants and nurse practitioners are aware.
28. The current Pandemic Flu Plan (PFP) of LSP is a generic influenza-like-illness plan which is not consistent with guidance regarding COVID-1919 and should not be used. Instead, rather than re-writing a document at this late stage, I recommend the existing CDC guidelines should be used as a plan and appropriately adapted to LSP conditions. The adaptions and CDC guidelines should be widely distributed to health and custody staff.
29. A point of contact with the Louisiana Department of Health should be established and contact information shared with medical leadership. The Department of Health should have contact information of DOC and LSP medical leadership and an update conference call with the Department of Health should occur every few days or more frequently if needed.
18 In the Operations item of the Management section of the CDC correctional guidance, it states, “Suspend all transfers of incarcerated/detained persons to and from other jurisdictions and facilities (including work release where relevant), unless necessary for medical evaluation, medical isolation/quarantine, care, extenuating security concerns, or to prevent overcrowding”. LSP is not a location ideal for medical isolation or medical care due to poor service history, lack of nearby hospitals, and because the prison and surrounding area have no cases. Sending patients with COVID-19 to this facility risk spread and places them in a facility with less medical resources than a facility closer to a large city. 19 I give only one example. Item 4.a, of the Yellow/Orange Phase of the LSP plan states that “employees will complete a self-screening at roll call. Employees who state they are sick shall be triaged by medical staff or health trained staff, and if found to have a fever shall be sent home. Staff with ILI shall remain at home at least 24 hours after they are free of fever (100F) or signs of fever, without the use of fever medication”. This is incorrect information with respect to COVID-19 and could result in increased transmission of infection. The CDC recommends not returning to work until there is resolution of fever without use of medication and improvement of symptoms and negative COVID-19 tests on at least two consecutive occasions 24 hours apart OR at least 3 days since resolution of fever without use of medication and improvement of respiratory symptoms and at least 7 days have passed since symptoms first appeared.
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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-2 04/17/20 Page 10 of 10 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed on April 13, 2020 in Chicago, Illinois.
/s/ Michael Puisis Michael Puisis D.O.
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DECLARATION OF DR. SUSI VASSALLO CONCERNING THE RISK OF COVID-19 IN THE LOUISIANA STATE PRISON AT ANGOLA
1. I am a board-certified emergency room physician and medical toxicologist. I practice as an attending physician in the emergency room of Bellevue Hospital, a large urban emergency department in New York City, and have practiced at various sites in Texas for many years. I am a Clinical Professor of Emergency Medicine at the New York University School of Medicine. I am certified as a correctional health professional by NCCHC and have evaluated correctional health care systems in nine states. I evaluated the Louisiana State Prison at Angola (“Angola”) for The Promise of Justice Initiative in 2016 (and also conducted records review in 2018). I have also been retained by the Department of Homeland Security to review medical care delivery at its detention facilities, and the Fifth Circuit and other courts have relied on my reports.
2. Coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) is a viral pandemic. This is a novel virus for which there is no established curative medical treatment and no vaccine. Severe pneumonia is one of the serious consequences of COVID-19 and the lungs become filled with fluid. I have had patients tell me “I can’t do this anymore” as they realize they can no longer keep up the work of breathing and require life saving interventions.
3. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that the reproduction rate of the virus, the R0, is 3.8-8.9-3.8, meaning that each newly infected person is estimated to infect on average 5.7 additional persons.1 This is highly infectious and only the great influenza pandemic of 1918 is thought to have higher infectivity. This is likely a function of all human populations currently being highly susceptible. The attack rate given an exposure is also high, estimated at 20-30% depending on community conditions, but may be as high as 80% in some settings and populations. The incubation period is thought to be 2-14 days, which is why isolation is generally 14 days.2 The long incubation period is particularly concerning for transmission rates given that so many people are asymptomatic and infectious.
4. The number of cases of COVID-19 in the United States are rising rapidly. On April 13, 2020, Johns Hopkins reported that there were 572,587 reported COVID-19 infections in the U.S. The number of deaths is over 23,000 but both cases and deaths are rising rapidly so by the time this declaration is read the numbers of both cases and deaths will be significantly larger. The number of cases of COVID-19 is the highest number of reported cases of any country in the world.
1 CDC, Emerging Infectious Diseases, High Contagiousness and Rapid Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronatvirus 2 (April 7, 2020), https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/7/200282_article 2 The Incubation Period of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) From Publicly Reported Confirmed Cases: Estimation and Application (March 10, 2020), https://annals.org/aim/fullarticle/2762808/incubation-period-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19from-publicly-reported

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5. Louisiana has a rapidly accelerating rate of COVID-19 infections. A study from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette reported that COVID-19 cases grew at a 67.8% rate, the highest rate in the U.S.3 The Louisiana Department of Health reported on April 13, 2020 that there were 21,016 cases of COVID-19 with 884 deaths. Louisiana has the third most deaths per capita of any state in the U.S.
6. UpToDate reports an overall case mortality rate from the disease of 2.3. Louisiana has 884 deaths for 21,016 cases; more than 4.2% of persons diagnosed with the infection in Louisiana die.
7. The symptoms of COVID-19 present variably from fever, cough, chest pain, and headache to symptoms of loss of smell, diarrhea, aches, and vomiting.4 At present, there are no markers identified nor signs or symptoms that would predict clinical deterioration. In at least one study, half of the patients admitted to the intensive care unit for COVID died on the first day.5 However, COVID patients may also present insidiously and it is impossible to predict the course of the illness, who will do well, and who will not. It is my experience treating patients in the emergency departments of NYU Langone Health and Bellevue Hospital Center that patients are not always aware of the degree of hypoxia (lack of oxygen) present in their bodies. Unlike the more common experience of holding one’s breath for as long as possible and then gasping for breath, these patients teeter on the edge of death with no gasping for breath or feeling their need for oxygen. This has been shocking to us working in Emergency Departments. Immediately upon arrival to the hospital, life-saving measures may be required. In some cases the patients code (suffer cardiac arrest) precipitously. In other experiences, some patients have adequate oxygen saturations for days and then deteriorate. To wit, the Prime Minister of England Boris Johnson was able to stay at home for 12 days before he was transferred to the hospital intensive care unit. In some cases, corrections staff and medical staff on the frontline may not be alarmed by a patient’s complaint or appearance. This is not a predictable illness with a predictable course. There is no lab test that predicts the patient’s course. In fact, the laboratory tests for COVID may give inaccurate results. Fifteen percent of patients who are tested for COVID have a false negative, meaning they do indeed have COVID but the test is negative. Given the lack of tell-tale signs or a timeline for subsequent deterioration, it is absolutely critical and necessary that patients who test positive or likely positive (known as person under investigation) for COVID-19 or have been exposed and show symptoms, be within easy transportable distance of hospitals in the event that more critical care is necessary. The care required to
3 Coronavirus cases grew faster in Louisiana than anywhere else in the world: UL study, The Acadiana Advocate, Adam Daigle March 24, 2020, https://www.theadvocate.com/acadiana/news/coronavirus/article_94494420-6d4b-11ea-ac42ff7dd722c084.html. 4 Breaking News: Update on Evaluation and Management for COVID-19 Patients – Updated 4/7/20, Emergency Medicine News (March 31, 2020), https://journals.lww.com/emnews/blog/breakingnews/pages/post.aspx?PostID=508. 5 Covid-19 in Critically Ill Patients in the Seattle Region — Case Series, The New England Journal of Medicine (March 30, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa2004500?articleTools=true

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appropriately evaluate and provide treatment to patients with COVID includes lab testing, imaging, and treatment individualized to the presentation of the patient. This may range from oxygen therapy by nasal cannula, or high flow oxygen, continuous positive pressure masks; to intubation of the trachea and ventilator assistance. These are difficulty decisions influenced by not only the level of oxygen in the blood to the all important work of breathing. This viral infection is showing a serious predisposition to hypercoaguopathy and patients have pulmonary emboli (blood clots in the lungs) necessitating anticoaguation. Some patients’ clinical course are complicated by superimposed bacterial infections of the lungs. Fluid therapy is complicated by dehydration due to fever and decreased fluid intake due to illness and the need to restrict the willy-nilly administration of IV fluids as the lungs are damaged by the virus and the attempts to oxygenated using positive pressure. Camp J is located in a remote prison that is lacking in these capabilities and technologies and is at least an hour from a facility that could provide them.
8. During this pandemic, patients with COVID often present with cough or fever or both. However, there are enormous numbers of patients with other symptoms and no cough and or fever. In one study of critically ill patients, only 88% presented with cough and only 50% had a fever.6 In this pandemic, fatigue alone, sore throats, body aches, ear aches, or congestion frequently prove to be COVID. Abdominal pain with or without fever and cough is COVID. Back pain is COVID, with or without fever or cough. In fact most of our trauma patients at Bellevue, appendicitis and any other problem are found to have COVID. Diarrhea is COVID. Rash may be COVID and can be mistaken for other illnesses. Because the ACE2 receptors are on the intestines and the lungs, diarrhea is a common presentation. Screening for cough and or fever is inadequate to exclude the possibility of infection from COVID. Moreover, many patients are asymptomatic and are infectious to others.
9. Although advanced age and underlying illnesses or chronic medical conditions increase the risk of serious effects of COVID, the relatively young and healthy are also in the intensive care units and die. While fatalities have been highest for older patients, increasing evidence in the US has shown the dire risk that COVID-19 poses to younger patients. Young patients ages 20-54 years old can have serious complications from COVID-19 including hospital admission, admission to an intensive care unit, invasive ventilation, or death. As of late March 2020, 38% of those individuals hospitalized in the US were between 20-54 years old.7 Of those admitted to the ICU, 12% were aged 20-44 years and 36% were age 45-64 years. These statistics highlight the significant risk younger people are at for serious complications due to coronavirus. A few days ago, at the hospital where I work, there were 482 patients in isolation and 209 patients on ventilators. Almost 50% of the COVID positive patients are less than 65 years old. 13 patients are on extracorporeal membrane oxygenation, 10 are on
6 Covid-19 in Critically Ill Patients in the Seattle Region — Case Series, The New England Journal of Medicine (March 30, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2004500 7 John Hopkins Medicine, Coronavirus and COVID-19: Younger Adults Are at Risk, Too, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/coronavirus-andcovid-19-younger-adults-are-at-risk-too (accessed April 9, 2020).

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continuous venovenous dialysis. Autopsy studies are demonstrating widespread tissue destruction due to the COVID virus. The numbers show that all types of people – healthy and unhealthy, young and old – are impacted by this virus, and we are learning more each day.
10. Those incarcerated in U.S. jails and prisons make up 2.2 million people of our U.S. population.8 This population is one the most vulnerable in society, with high rates of coinfection with hepatitis C, HIV, and tuberculosis (TB). More specifically, the World Health Organization has identified the level of TB in prisons to be 100 times higher than that of the civilian population, due to the hazardous combination of overcrowding, poor ventilation, and inadequate treatment and diagnosis.9 The transmission of COVID-19 in prisons can easily be likened to the transmission of TB, where “social distancing” practices are impossible with inmates living in close quarters and the lack of available measures to ensure proper handwashing, hygiene, and sanitation. What’s more, half of this vulnerable population of incarcerated individuals have at least one comorbid condition, increasing the risk of poor outcomes for those who also contract COVID-19. COVID-19 is likely to rampantly spread within jails and prisons given its droplet aerosol transmission that is stable for hours and can even last on cardboard and metal surfaces for hours per the National Institutes of Health.10 This has been the experience at the Cook County Jail, which now has the highest outbreak numbers in the country.11
11. The Department of Corrections plan is to allow for the transfer of detained individuals including people who have not been convicted of a crime - from the state’s over 100 numerous jails and prisons to Camp J at Angola. It is my opinion that transferring detainees who test positive for COVID from jails around the state to Camp J is a medically unsound plan and contrary to public health guidelines for multiple reasons. First, it is against the recommendation of the Louisiana Department of Health.12 The State Health Officer, Jimmy Guidry, issued recommendations to prisons and juvenile detention centers on April 8, 2020. In it he states that correctional and detention centers should “have a trained Emergency Medical Service/Emergency Medical Technician (EMS/EMT) assess and transport anyone you think might have COVID--19 to a healthcare facility.” Camp J is not a healthcare facility and the DOC plan goes against this guidance.13 This plan is also against the guidance
8 Flattening the Curve for Incarcerated Populations — Covid-19 in Jails and Prisons, The New England Journal of Medicine (April 2, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2005687?query=featured_coronavirus 9 World Health Organization, Tuberculosis in Prisons, https://www.who.int/tb/areas-ofwork/population-groups/prisons-facts/en/ (accessed April 9, 2020). 10 National Institutes of Health, New coronavirus stable for hours on surfaces (March 17, 2020), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/new-coronavirus-stable-hours-surfaces 11 Chicago’s Jail is Top U.S. Hot Spot as Virus Spreads Behind Bars, New York Times (April 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/us/coronavirus-cook-county-jail-chicago.html 12 Louisiana Department of Health, Office of Public Health, COVID-19; recommendations regarding prisons and juvenile detention centers (April 8, 2020). 13 Without any explanation, these recommendations were rescinded on April 9, 2020.

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of the CDC, which recommends that all transfers of incarcerated and detained people are suspended, unless necessary for medical evaluation, medical isolation/quarantine, care, extenuating security concerns, or to prevent overcrowding.14 Each facility should be able to provide isolation and quarantine services on-site. If not, release or repurposing of other unused spaces (dorms, hotels) is preferable to transfer. Even if up-to-date medical records are sent along with people who are transported to Angola, there is no indication that Angola is in a position to provide newly transferred detainees with any prescribed medications for underlying medical conditions, such as hypertension and diabetes; conditions that render patients vulnerable to severe COVID symptoms. The process of transporting COVID positive cases to a parish like West Feliciana with relatively fewer cases increases the risk of spread throughout that parish and the surrounding communities. Angola has a particularly vulnerable population with over 50% of people over 50 years of age, many of whom have high risk medical conditions and are vulnerable to serious medical complications if infected. Medical and custody staff are also at risk if they come into contact with infected transferred detainees and are likely to spread infection to the uninfected and vulnerable Angola population, no matter what measures are purportedly taken to isolate Camp J. Angola had insufficient staff when we reviewed in 2016 and there is no reason to believe they have seriously increased their staffing numbers since. Introduction of COVID-19 into the system will result in the existing Angola patients not having their substantial medical needs met.
12. The Department of Corrections has said that only people who have tested positive but are not displaying serious symptoms and who are not in medical distress are supposed to be sent to Camp J. There is no information or medical criteria on how to identify patients as meeting that definition. In fact, at this time, there is no way to define who will do well and who will do poorly. And nothing is said about what will happen if and when the medical conditions of those people deteriorate and medical intervention and hospitalization becomes necessary. As the other two medical experts in Lewis v. Cain and I noted in our review of care at Angola, the people incarcerated there lack access to hospital care across the board and this pandemic will only make it worse. Angola is remote from hospitals. The closest emergency room of any kind is at least 30 minutes away and it does not have a ventilator, and the space at that hospital is otherwise limited. The closest emergency room that can provide adequate services is in Baton Rouge, more than an hour away. Louisiana’s hospitals are already overwhelmed by COVID-19 cases, and transporting more people who have tested positive to a remote location with already-limited hospital beds puts those people at unnecessary risk. For example, people held in the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison who test positive are being transported more than an hour away to Camp J, putting staff who are transporting them at increased risk of transmission. And then transporting them back to Baton Rouge or New Orleans when they require hospitalization. People who test positive in the New Orleans jail could be taken three hours away to Camp J and then be transported to Baton Rouge or New Orleans when they require hospitalization. Angola is not set up to manage hospital level care including ventilation. Housing a COVID-19 patient on the
14 CDC, Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-detention.html

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infirmary where the most vulnerable, uninfected, medically compromised patients are housed all the patients and staff at risk.
13. Additionally, the quality of care at Angola was substandard in 2016 when we produced a report of our investigation and again in 2018 based on selected record reviews. Physicians were not credentialed appropriately and did not provide medical care in line with national standards. While reviewing records, we noted many examples of failure to recognize indications for hospitalization, including many cases of failure to recognize typical signs of respiratory decompensation which is critical for COVID-19 patients. There were delays in transfer of patients to a hospital when indicated. Physicians, nurses, and EMTs failed to recognize “red flag” signs resulting in adverse events.
14. From our review, we also found that medical care was substandard in other ways that would impact the care that the positive transported detainees and any COVID-19 positive Angola inmates would be provided, either at Camp J or at the infirmary. For example, laboratory services are only available on weekdays and blood gas assessments are not available at all.
15. The Director of the CDC has warned that as many as 25% of individuals infected with COVID-19 may be symptom-free, leading to the broadening of their criteria as to who should wear masks.15 With limiting testing performed on asymptomatic patients, we cannot confirm or negate the presence of COVID-19 in an individual. As such, incarcerated individuals and staff can be infected with the virus and unknowingly spread it throughout the already overcrowded prison. We further cannot determine whether patients will abruptly need escalated medical care requiring hospitalization. One precautionary measure that must be taken is that people who are COVID positive are not transferred to Camp J, which is more than an hour from the closest hospital able to provide appropriate medical intervention.
16. Patients with severe COVID-19 symptoms may require critical specialists even if not in the intensive care unit; ICU-level supplies and specialized treatment, including but not limited to invasive mechanical ventilation, vasopressor treatment for low blood pressure, intravenous fluid therapy, support for kidney failure, respiratory therapists, and/or early antibiotics.16 High flow oxygen administered in a hospital is tricky; continuous positive pressure ventilation is tricky; the need for a ventilator is unpredictable except at the point of respiratory arrest. Treatment requires staff that have experience in using this equipment. The intensity of care and the protracted length of this care with this illness can not be provided at Angola or at any of the hospitals within an hour from Angola. What’s more, highly specific airborne precautions with N95 respirators, face shields, and gowns for personal protective equipment are critical to prevent spread of the virus. On a national level,
15 Infected but Feeling Fine: The Unwitting Coronavirus Spreaders, New York Times (March 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/health/coronavirus-asymptomatictransmission.html 16 Care for Critically Ill Patients with COVID-19, JAMA Insights (March 11, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2762996

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these supplies and highly advanced and expensive equipment of ventilators are limited across the country. Angola is lacking in these capabilities and is not an appropriate site to manage patients with COVID-19
17. In my experience in New York City and from what I know is happening in the rest of the country, there are not enough resources to battle the COVID pandemic in the big cities, much less in rural areas like West Feliciana Parish that only have two ambulances as of my last review. Even without the influx of positive detained transferees to Angola, West Feliciana would be strained for resources like ambulances and ambulance personnel. Ambulance personnel are being infected daily and they transmit the infection widely. Transporting many COVID positive people to the parish will further strain what is already a strained system, at increased risk to both those patients and the surrounding community.
18. Anyone who comes into proximity to someone who is tested positive for COVID is at increased risk of infection. COVID-19 is a highly contagious respiratory virus that spreads through droplets created when an infected person coughs, sneezes or speaks. Normal breathing can spread the virus. The virus can also be transmitted through saliva or discharge from the nose. While the droplets generated by infected people only hang in the air for a short period of time, they can easily be breathed in by people within one meter of a person with COVID-19. Furthermore, the droplets generated will contaminate the surfaces they land on resulting in transmission of the virus if someone touches a contaminated surface and then touches their eyes, nose or mouth before washing their hands. In the close-quarters setting of a vehicle this means that even one infected person could easily spread the virus to everyone else in the vehicle. Additionally, reduced airflow in a transport vehicle could result in higher concentrations of contaminated droplets remaining in the air and on surfaces. Transport should be avoided unless necessary for hospitalization and then only having to travel a short distance to the hospital is the safest option. Staff at Angola may contract the virus as a result of its high infectivity and then spread the virus amongst the West Feliciana community. There are only 46 confirmed cases in West Feliciana as of April 12, 2020. The high concentration of infected persons at Angola would increase the likelihood of the virus spreading to West Feliciana community members via infected Angola medical and custodial staff who are exposed to those viral loads.
19. Many studies have shown the increased risk for serious complications in patients infected with COVID-19 that also suffer from comorbidities. Those comorbidities include common health problems like hypertension and diabetes, among others. Many people in jails and prisons have multiple comorbidities and are at an even higher risk of complications. The complications include development of serious illness such as acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) requiring admission to an intensive care unit, invasive ventilation or death. Studies found that COPD, diabetes, hypertension, cancer, and the presence of multiple comorbidities resulted in the highest increased risk of the above mentioned serious complications. 17 This puts the most vulnerable patient populations, including people in jails
17 Comorbidity and its impact on 1590 patients with Covid-19 in China: A Nationwide Analysis, European Respiratory Journal (March 26, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1183/13993003.00547-2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-3 04/17/20 Page 8 of 9
and prisons with chronic health problems, at increased risk for severe medical complications or death from COVID-19. If transferred to Camp J, transferred detainees – particularly those who had only been incarcerated for short periods of time and not sufficiently evaluated by medical staff – may also have difficulties or delays in getting any of their regular prescribed medications for conditions such as hypertension and diabetes, even if they are transported to Angola with their medical records.
20. COVID-19 can result in serious complications leading to death where people feel the same pain as if they were drowning because their lungs are so filled with fluid. In cases where people are suffering from life-limiting illness due to COVID-19 it is imperative that they have access to palliative care. Palliative care is a crucial part of any health care plan to ensure that patients do not suffer needlessly and that in the case of life-limiting illness the treatments needed to relieve suffering are available.18 Furthermore, a robust supply of medicines, equipment and trained medical professionals is required to appropriately treat and manage patients with COVID-19. The DOC plan (provision of Tylenol, Motrin, NS for IV flush, Imodium, and Insulin) is insufficient as a response to the needs of COVID-19 positive patients. The provision of morphine or other end-of-life drugs is crucial to manage pain and symptoms and to allow for a humane death. The pandemic has resulted in widespread shortages of the pharmaceuticals needed to treat COVID patients.
My recommendations for the DOC to mitigate the spread of the coronavirus among Louisiana’s incarcerated population are:
1. Transfer people who test negative for COVID-19 to Angola to free up space in the remaining DOC facilities so that the non-Angola incarcerated populations will be able to practice social distancing and will have space to provide appropriate quarantine and isolation areas for those who test positive or may be positive.
2. House COVID-19 patients in locations where they can reach a hospital—one that is equipped to treat severe COVID-19 symptoms—quickly. The illness progresses quickly and unpredictably; patients’ symptoms can worsen very suddenly, so it is not safe for them to be housed far from a hospital. To move COVID-19 patients farther from health care is anathema to the care of these patients. The emphasis must be on these patients being housed near to the care they need.
3. Protect the current Angola population—many of whom are elderly and chronically ill and therefore at greater risk of developing severe or deadly COVID-19 symptoms—from an increased risk of infection by not transferring any confirmed COVID-19 patients to Camp J or any other part of Angola.
4. Increase the chances of survival for COVID-19 patients by not transferring them to Angola, which is located in a parish where there are no ventilators. No one can predict whether a COVID-19 patient’s symptoms will progress to the point of respiratory distress such that
18 The Role of Palliative Care in a COVID-19 Pandemic, Shiley Institute for Palliative Care, https://csupalliativecare.org/palliative-care-and-covid-19/ (accessed April 9, 2020).

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-3 04/17/20 Page 9 of 9
the patient will require a ventilator; patients can deteriorate very rapidly. If a patient tests positive for COVID-19, that patient is at risk of requiring a ventilator and should not be housed in a location where there are none.
5. Involve the Department of Health in the development of any transport plans for medical isolation needs and follow the Department’s initially guidance and advice as well as the CDC’s guidance regarding transport.
6. Prepare for a widespread outbreak by streamlining medical power of authority.
7. Prepare for a widespread outbreak by developing adequate policies related to palliative care for incarcerated individuals who may die from COVID-19 complications.
8. Reduce the incarcerated population by allowing furlough for anyone who is 60 years of age or older and for anyone who has an underlying medical condition that puts him or her at greater risk of developing a severe case of COVID-19. This will allow incarcerated individuals to practice social distancing throughout the state and free up space for appropriate quarantine and isolation units at individual DOC facilities. All of these measures would reduce the risk of a widespread outbreak among the incarcerated population.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed on April 13, 2020 in New York, New York.
/s/ Susi Vassallo
Susi Vassallo

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-4 04/17/20 Page 1 of 4
DECLARATION OF KENDRICK WILSON: I, Kendrick Wilson, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Kendrick Wilson. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 20 years old. 4. Until April 11, 2020, I was pre-trial and being held in Unit A2 at East Baton Rouge Parish
Prison. 5. I was tested for COVID-19 around two o’clock in the morning on April 9. My temperature
before I was tested was 102.5 degrees. 6. I experienced symptoms of body pain, a cough, and congestion. 7. I was told that I tested positive for COVID on April 10 or 11 but was not shown my test
results. I did not talk to a nurse or doctor about my test results. 8. On April 11, around 5:00 p.m. I was asleep when two guards woke me up and said transport
was waiting for me and to pack my things. They said I would be transferred one way or another, whether willingly or not. The guards handcuffed and shackled me and said they couldn’t tell me where they were taking me. I said many times that I did not want to be taken to Camp J. 9. I was transported in a van with 3 other people and 2 correctional officers. 10. I am currently detained at Camp J at Louisiana State Penitentiary in an open dorm. I do not know the name of the dorm. 11. There are about 39 other people in the dorm with me. There is nothing isolating us from each other. A lot of people are coughing, and there were some people on IV machines or with oxygen masks. I have one face mask. They have not taken anyone to the hospital.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-4 04/17/20 Page 2 of 4
12. It is my understanding that putting a lot of people together who have tested positive for COVID increases the risk to me and to others.
13. There is no air conditioning and there are ceiling fans blowing the air around. 14. There are two nurses walking around the dorm. They checked on me twice on April 11 and
once on April 12. I haven’t seen any doctors. 15. I told a nurse my body was hurting and that I was congested and I was given some pain
medicine and sinus medicine. 16. I have been told that I will stay at Camp J for 5 days and then moved to another building for
5 more days. I don’t know what that other building is or where it is. I don’t know where I will go after that. I don’t know if they will take me to a hospital if I need to go to a hospital. 17. I would prefer to be home with my mother in Baton Rouge, recovering and staying away from other people who are also sick. I would like to be near a hospital. 18. If I can’t go home, I would prefer to go to a medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive who are incarcerated. It is my understanding that there are at least 900 beds available there. I would like to be near a hospital. 19. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-4 04/17/20 Page 3 of 4
20. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature: /s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Kendrick Wilson April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-4 04/17/20 Page 4 of 4
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Wilson. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I
signed the attached declaration on Kendrick Wilson’s behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Wilson is currently being held at Camp J at Louisiana State Penitentiary. The Secretary
of the Department of Corrections suspended all visitation at Louisiana’s eight state-run prisons on March 12, 2020. No attorney visits are being scheduled. 4. I spoke with Mr. Wilson over the phone. Mr. Wilson has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf as reflected in his declaration.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 13, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-5 04/17/20 Page 1 of 4
DECLARATION OF ERNEST ROGERS: I, Ernest Rogers, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Ernest Rogers. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 65 years old. 4. I am pre-trial and being held in Unit 2 at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. 5. I was tested for COVID around two o’clock in the morning on April 9. 6. I am suffering from a cough, a sore throat, a fever, and shortness of breath. 7. I have hepatitis C and would be able to get treatment through my health insurance if I were
not detained right now. I also have liver disease and high blood pressure. 8. I was told that I tested positive for COVID-19 on April 10 but was not shown my test
results. I did not talk to a nurse or doctor about my test results. I ask the nurse for my test results twice a day. 9. On April 11, two guards came in and told my cellmate Kendrick Wilson that transport was waiting for him. Mr. Wilson said he did not want to be transferred and the guards forced him out of the cell and handcuffed him and shackled him. Mr. Wilson was very upset. The guards told him they didn’t know where he was going but my understanding is they took him to Camp J at Angola. 10. The guards have told me that I will not be shown my test results but that I will be transferred to Camp J if they are positive, voluntarily or non-voluntarily. I do not want to go to Camp J. I was previously housed at Camp J when I was incarcerated at Angola. The last time I was at Camp J was in the 1980s and I do not want to go back there.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-5 04/17/20 Page 2 of 4
11. Because of my age and pre-existing medical conditions, I am worried that I will develop even worse symptoms and need to be hospitalized. I want to make sure I am close to a hospital in case that happens.
12. I would prefer to be home with my family in Baton Rouge, recovering and staying away from other people who are also sick. My family lives near a hospital.
13. If I can’t go home, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my understanding that there are at least 900 beds available there. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary.
14. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to prove them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff.
15. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of my criminal proceedings against me or others.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-5 04/17/20 Page 3 of 4
16. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so.
17. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature: /s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Ernest Rogers April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-5 04/17/20 Page 4 of 4
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Rogers. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I
signed the attached declaration on Ernest Rogers’ behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Rogers is currently being held at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. Visitation has been
suspended since March 19, 2020. No in-person attorney visits are being scheduled at East Baton Rouge Prison. 4. I spoke with Mr. Rogers over the phone. Mr. Rogers has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 13, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-6 04/17/20 Page 1 of 4
DECLARATION OF JULIUS ALLEN: I, Julius Allen, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Julius Allen. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 33 years old. 4. I am pre-trial and being held in Unit A2 at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. Before this, I
was being held in Unit Q11 and 12. I was moved to A2 on April 8, 2020. 5. I was tested for COVID-19 around two o’clock in the morning on April 9, 2020. 6. I am suffering from a fever, severe body aches, difficulty breathing, weakness, disorientation,
and diarrhea. I have been having these symptoms for at least 5-7 days. 7. I have pre-existing medical conditions, including diabetes, hypertension, high cholesterol,
and a history of bronchitis. I take medications for these conditions. 8. On April 9, I was taken from East Baton Rouge Parish Prison to Our Lady of the Lake
hospital in Baton Rouge in order to receive medical attention. The hospital told me there was a 10/10 chance I was COVID positive because I had the symptoms, including a fever. The hospital checked my oxygen and said it was good enough at that point and they could admit me if I later needed a ventilator. 9. I was told by a guard that I tested positive for COVID-19 on April 10 but was not shown my test results. I did not talk to a nurse or doctor about my test results. 10. On April 11, two guards came in and told my cellmate Kendrick Wilson that transport was waiting for him. Mr. Wilson said he did not want to be transferred and the guards forced him out of the cell and handcuffed him. It is my understanding that they took him to Camp J at Angola.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-6 04/17/20 Page 2 of 4
11. The guards have told me that I will not be shown my test results but that I will be transferred to Camp J if they are positive, voluntarily or non-voluntarily. I do not want to go to Camp J.
12. On April 12, 2020, at approximately 8:35 p.m., a nurse came and told me she needed to another nasal swab sample to do another COVID-19 test. I told her they had already done a test and would not share the results so I did not want to do another test at this time. I asked her what happened to the results of my first test and she said they had the results but weren’t going to give them to me.
13. Because of my pre-existing medical conditions, I am worried that I will develop even worse symptoms and need to be hospitalized. I have already been to the hospital once.
14. I would prefer to be home with my wife and three daughters in Baton Rouge, recovering and staying away from other people who are also sick.
15. If I can’t go home, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my understanding that there are at least 900 beds available there. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary.
16. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to provide them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-6 04/17/20 Page 3 of 4
attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff. 17. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class and subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings against me or others. 18. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. 19. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Julius Allen April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-6 04/17/20 Page 4 of 4
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Allen. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I
signed the attached declaration on Julius Allen’s behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Allen is currently being held at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. Visitation has been
suspended since March 19, 2020. No in-person attorney visits are being scheduled at East Baton Rouge Prison. 4. I spoke with Mr. Allen over the phone. Mr. Allen has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 13, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-7 04/17/20 Page 1 of 4
DECLARATION OF DANIEL GUMNS: I, Daniel Gumns, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Daniel Gumns. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 25 years old. 4. I am indigent. 5. I am in DOC custody and currently housed at Angola’s Camp D in the Falcon 1 dormitory. 6. I am housed in close quarters in the dormitory with approximately 80 other people. I am
unable to maintain 6 feet of space between me and other people. 7. I do not have a face mask or gloves. Only some of the guards have face masks and gloves. 8. There are 4 or 5 toilets, 4 or 5 sinks, and one communal shower in Falcon 1. 9. The dorm and bathroom are not cleaned every day. 10. Even though we are in quarantine, people come in and out of the dormitory, including two
guards per shift and two orderlies per shift. We can still go in and out of other dorms but cannot leave Camp D. 11. It is my understanding that medical and correctional staff are going back and forth between Camp J and other places at Angola. 12. Camp D has been in quarantine for 2 or 3 weeks. 2 people have been taken out of the dormitory by EMTs after they developed COVID-19 symptoms, such as coughing, fevers, and sore throats. I do not know their names. I have not seen them since and it is my understanding that they went to Camp J. 13. I purchased my own soap for $15-20 and I do not have any hand sanitizer. I do not have any bleach.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-7 04/17/20 Page 2 of 4
14. I have pre-existing conditions that put me at a high risk if I become infected with COVID19. I am epileptic and suffer from grand mal seizures. I also have asthma. My asthma is triggered when I have seizures and I sometimes need medical support to breath.
15. I take eight medications per day, including Keppra, Dilantin, and Xopenex. 16. I have been to the hospital at Angola three times since February 21, 2020, for seizures. My
last seizure was approximately a week and a half ago. I was taken to the Treatment Center at the main prison. 17. I have been to the hospital at Rapides Regional Medical Center three to five times in the past year for seizures. I was last released from the hospital on February 20, 2020 and was brought to Angola the next day. 18. In the past week, I have had symptoms including cold chills, headaches, cough, fatigue, and fever. I have had to use my inhaler for my asthma. 19. I have not been tested for COVID-19. 20. Because of my pre-existing medical conditions, I am concerned that bringing people who have already tested positive for COVID-19 to Camp J increases the risk that I will be exposed and have severe medical complications. I don’t know if they would take me to a hospital from Camp J in time to receive treatment if I got very sick or had another seizure. 21. If I test positive for COVID-19, I do not want to go to Camp J. I have 18-20 months left on my sentence and could be eligible for parole within the next year. I would prefer to go home to my family in New Orleans for medical isolation and to recover. 22. If I cannot go home to my family, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my understanding that there are at least 900 beds available there. It is my

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-7 04/17/20 Page 3 of 4
belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary or if I have a seizure. 23. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to provide them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff. 24. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class and subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings against me or others. 25. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. 26. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Daniel Gumns April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-7 04/17/20 Page 4 of 4
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Gumns. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic,
I signed the attached declaration on Michael Gumns’s behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Gumns is currently being held at Louisiana State Penitentiary. All in-person visitation
was cancelled effective March 12, 2020. 4. I spoke with Mr. Gumns over the phone. Mr. Gumns has confirmed that I can sign on his
behalf as reflected in his declaration.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 13, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-8 04/17/20 Page 1 of 4
DECLARATION OF IAN CAZENAVE: I, Ian Cazenave, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Ian Cazenave 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 54 years old. 4. I am indigent. 5. I am in DOC custody and currently housed at Angola’s Main Prison in the Ash 2 dormitory.
Ash 2 is in part a dormitory for people who are handicapped or have medical needs. 6. I am housed in close quarters in the dormitory with approximately 86 other people. I am
unable to maintain 6 feet of space between me and other people. 7. I have two face coverings made out of t-shirt material. I do not have gloves. 8. There are 7 toilets, 5 sinks, and 5-6 showers in Ash 2. 9. Even though we are on lockdown, people come in and out of the dormitory each day,
including 2-4 medical staff and 3-4 guards. Not everyone is wearing masks. 10. To my knowledge, medical and correctional staff are going back and forth between Camp J
and other places at Angola. 11. Ash 2 has been on lockdown for about a month. One person has been taken out of the
dormitory after they developed COVID-19 symptoms. I have not seen him since and I don’t know where he went. 12. I have access to soap that they make at LSP but I don’t have any other soap because it would cost money. I had some hand sanitizer left over from when I was at University Medical Center but I just ran out. They don’t sell hand sanitizer at the canteen. 13. I have pre-existing conditions that may put me at a high risk if I become infected with COVID-19, including sickle cell disease and resulting complications and a heart murmur. I

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-8 04/17/20 Page 2 of 4
need daily dressing changes for the open wounds on my feet and legs. Usually I would go to the hospital for my dressing changes but now the nurses are coming to the dorm. I asked the nurses if they were also going to Camp J but they would not tell me. 14. I last went to the hematologist around June of 2019. I last went to wound care in December of 2019. 15. I take around ten medications per day, including aspirin, ibuprofen, Tylenol, and Trental. 16. I have not been tested for COVID-19 nor am I experiencing any symptoms. 17. Because of my pre-existing medical conditions, I am concerned that bringing people who have already tested positive for COVID-19 to Camp J increases the risk that I will be exposed and have severe medical complications. I don’t know if they would take me to a hospital from Angola if I got sick. 18. If I test positive for COVID-19, I do not want to go to Camp J. I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my understanding that there are at least 900 beds available there. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary. 19. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to provide them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-8 04/17/20 Page 3 of 4
attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff. 20. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class and subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings against me or others. 21. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. 22. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Ian Cazenave April 13, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 15-8 04/17/20 Page 4 of 4
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Cazenave. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19
pandemic, I signed the attached declaration on Ian Cazenave’s behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Cazenave is currently being held at Louisiana State Penitentiary. All in-person visitation was cancelled effective March 12, 2020. 4. I spoke with Mr. Cazenave over the phone. Mr. Cazenave has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf as reflected in his declaration.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 13, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 13, 2020

 
 Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26 04/26/20 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU,

TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

REGINALD

GEORGE,

LIONEL

TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL

PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS

ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO

GARNER,

BRADLEY

WINTERS,

KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES

HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity

as Governor of the State of Louisiana;

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES

LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary

of the Department of Safety and Corrections;

JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as

Medical Director of the Department of Safety

and

Corrections;

LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and

STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity

as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana

Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00231-SDDRLB
CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY MOTION TO RESTRAIN DEFENDANTS FROM TRANSFERRING COVID-19 CAR
TO LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY
NOW INTO COURT COME PLAINTIFFS, through undersigned counsel, who
respectfully request leave of the Court to file the attached Reply to Defendants’ Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Restrain Defendants from Transferring COVID-19 Carriers to Louisiana State
Penitentiary (Rec. Doc. 24).

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26 04/26/20 Page 2 of 3
Plaintiffs submit that the attached proposed pleading provides argument that will assist this
Court in ruling on Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Restrain Defendants from Transferring COVID-19
Carriers to Louisiana State Penitentiary (Rec. Doc. 15).
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of April, 2020.
Respectfully submitted by:
/s/ Mercedes Montagnes Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287 Jamila Johnson, La. Bar No. 37953 Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415 The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70117 Telephone: (504) 529-5955 Facsimile: (504) 595-8006 Email: mmontagnes@defendla.org
Jared Davidson, La. Bar No. 37093 Southern Poverty Law Center 201 Saint Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone: (504) 486-8982 Facsimile: (504) 486-8947 Email: jared.davidson@splcenter.org
Melinda Haag, Pro Hac Vice Sharon Frase, Pro Hac Vice Lacey Bangle, Pro Hac Vice Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP 405 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105-2669 Tel: (415) 773-5495 Fax: (415) 773-5759 Email: mhaag@orrick.com Email: sfrase@orrick.com Email: lbangle@orrick.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26 04/26/20 Page 3 of 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nishi Kumar, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 26, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system.
I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415
3

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-1 04/26/20 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU,

TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

REGINALD

GEORGE,

LIONEL

TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL

PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS

ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO

GARNER,

BRADLEY

WINTERS,

KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES

HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity

as Governor of the State of Louisiana;

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES

LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary

of the Department of Safety and Corrections;

JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as

Medical Director of the Department of Safety

and

Corrections;

LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and

STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity

as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana

Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00231-SDDRLB
CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY MOTION TO RESTRAIN DEFENDANTS FROM TRANSFERRING COVID-19 CARRIERS TO LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY
NOW INTO COURT COME PLAINTIFFS, through undersigned counsel, who
respectfully move this Court to grant this Motion for Leave to file a Reply in support of Plaintiffs’
Emergency Motion to Restrain Defendants from Transferring COVID-19 Carriers to Louisiana State Penitentiary
(Rec. Doc. 15). In support of their Motion for Leave, Plaintiffs file this Memorandum in Support.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-1 04/26/20 Page 2 of 3
Plaintiffs submit that the attached reply will materially assist this Court in ruling on Plaintiffs’
Emergency Motion by clarifying multiple factual issues and points of law.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of April, 2020.
Respectfully submitted by:
/s/ Mercedes Montagnes Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287 Jamila Johnson, La. Bar No. 37953 Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415 The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70117 Telephone: (504) 529-5955 Facsimile: (504) 595-8006 Email: mmontagnes@defendla.org
Jared Davidson, La. Bar No. 37093 Southern Poverty Law Center 201 Saint Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone: (504) 486-8982 Facsimile: (504) 486-8947 Email: jared.davidson@splcenter.org
Melinda Haag, Pro Hac Vice Sharon Frase, Pro Hac Vice Lacey Bangle, Pro Hac Vice Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP 405 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105-2669 Tel: (415) 773-5495 Fax: (415) 773-5759 Email: mhaag@orrick.com Email: sfrase@orrick.com Email: lbangle@orrick.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-1 04/26/20 Page 3 of 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nishi Kumar, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 26, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system.
I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415
3

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-2 04/26/20 Page 1 of 12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU,

TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

REGINALD

GEORGE,

LIONEL

TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL

PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS

ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO

GARNER,

BRADLEY

WINTERS,

KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES

HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity

as Governor of the State of Louisiana;

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES

LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary

of the Department of Safety and Corrections;

JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as

Medical Director of the Department of Safety

and

Corrections;

LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and

STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity

as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana

Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00231-SDDRLB
CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-2 04/26/20 Page 2 of 12
INTRODUCTION
Historically, being sent to Camp J symbolized a death sentence. Its remoteness from the main prison, its poor spatial ergonomics, its unsanitary conditions, and its indignity dehumanize people and deprive identity. Very few return from Camp J without deep emotional trauma. Repurposing Camp J as a COVID unit sends a similar message: you may never return, and you may die alone.1
“Camp J began accepting patients for isolation on or about April 2, 2020,”2 the same day this Court
denied—on procedural grounds—a motion for temporary restraining order to prevent the transfer
of patients to Camp J.3 As of April 25, 100 COVID-19 patients are being housed at Camp J,4 and
“Camp J plans to continue to accept offenders from local jails.”5
Defendants’ opposition is rife with vague, conclusory assertions as to the appropriateness of
their Camp J plan, “evidenced” only by vague, conclusory assertions in their own recycled affidavits,
none of which are based on first-hand knowledge of Camp J’s operations.6 There is no evidence to
support Defendants’ blustering. So far, Defendants have administered only 299 COVID-19 tests to
the state’s prison population, despite having received 600 tests.7 Of the 292 tests completed (seven
are pending), 122 have been positive, a rate of nearly 42 percent positive.8 In the three weeks since
Defendants began transfers to Camp J, over 30 new cases of COVID-19 have been confirmed
among LSP’s incarcerated population and at least 20 new confirmed cases among LSP’s staff.9 As
1 Ex. 1, MASS Design Group, The Role of Architecture in Fighting COVID-19: Prisons Case Study at 8. 2 Defs.’ Opp’n to TRO at 6. 3 This Court’s previous finding that the earlier motion in Lewis was based on speculation is not relevant to the instant motion. Defendants now freely admit that they have begun transferring COVID-19 patients to Camp J and will continue to do so. See, e.g., Defs.’ Opp’n to TRO at 10. 4 Situational Awareness Report, LA. BUSINESS EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER, https://www.labeoc.org/alerts/Alert_Details.aspx?id=1559 (last visited Apr. 26, 2020). 5 Defs.’ Opp’n to TRO at 10. 6 Both Secretary LeBlanc and Dr. Morrison’s declarations were signed before the Camp J plan went into effect. Tracy Falgout is a LSP employee and, by Defendants’ own admission, Camp J is being run “as an independent prison” from LSP. Defs.’ Opp’n to TRO at 7. 7 Situational Awareness Report, supra note 4. 8 Id. This does not include numbers from Louisiana jails, which report 187 positive tests so far (no information on total number of tests is provided). 9 Ex. 2, LSP COVID-19 Cases Chart. Women in the system are being centralized at the Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women (LCIW) at Elayn Hunt Correctional Center. The DOC reports that the number of positive cases at LCIW are now the highest out of the eight state facilities – 171 women have tested positive and 1 has died. DOC, COVID-19 Inmate Positives, https://doc.louisiana.gov/doc-covid-19-testing/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
1

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detailed below, Defendants’ conclusory claims that Camp J is now fit for patients and that it is isolated from LSP are false, and Defendants have failed to rebut Plaintiffs’ evidence—including two expert declarations—of the dangers of the Camp J plan. Moreover, Defendants hang the bulk of their legal argument on a case that is easily distinguishable from Plaintiffs’.10 Plaintiffs request that this Court issue a TRO because the Camp J plan creates a substantial risk of serious harm for every person facing transfer as well as for the existing LSP population.
I. Defendants Misstate the Standard for Deliberate Indifference Defendants’ reliance on Valentine v. Collier is misplaced. Valentine emphasized three key points that are wholly distinguishable from Plaintiffs’ motion: (1) the district court found that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s (“TDCJ”) COVID-19 response was in compliance with CDC guidelines, (2) the court’s injunction ordered the TDCJ to follow its own existing procedures, and (3) the court cited no evidence that Defendants were aware that their plan was inadequate.11 First, unlike in Valentine, Defendants’ Camp J transfers are not in compliance with CDC guidelines, which warn that transfers between facilities should be prevented “unless necessary for medical evaluation, medical isolation/quarantine, clinical care, extenuating security concerns, or to prevent overcrowding.”12 CDC guidelines also note that the DOC should “[a]ctively engage with the health department to understand in advance which entity has jurisdiction to implement public health control measures,”13 which the DOC cites no evidence of having done—Defendants have not even provided an affidavit from any public health official. Nor have Defendants provided any evidence
10 See Valentine v. Collier, Case No. 20-20207 (5th Cir., Apr. 22, 2020). 11 Id. at 1-8. 12 CDC, “Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities” at 9 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correctiondetention/guidance-correctional-detention.html (emphasis added). Defendants claim that transfers to Camp J are necessary for medical isolation, but this argument completely ignores the availability of the Medical Monitoring Station (“MMS”) at the Morial Convention Center in New Orleans, which is fully equipped to house incarcerated patients and has hundreds of empty beds. Situational Awareness Report, supra note 4 (“384 beds are available.). Defendants have unnecessarily opted to isolate patients over one hour’s drive from the nearest hospital, despite knowing that COVID-19 patients can decline quickly. Vassallo Decl., Dkt. 15-3 at ¶ 7.
2

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that their existing flu pandemic plan has been “revise[d] for COVID-19,” that they have “[p]lan[ned] for staff absences,” or that they have “[e]nsure[d] that staff and incarcerated/detained persons are trained to correctly don, doff, and dispose of PPE,” per CDC guidelines.14 Unlike in Valentine, Defendants have proffered no evidence that they are in compliance with CDC guidelines.15
Second, contrary to Fifth Circuit precedent, the district court in Valentine ordered the TDCJ to follow state law, since there was significant overlap between the TDCJ’s existing policies and the injunction.16 Plaintiffs are not requesting that this Court order Defendants to comply with their own existing policies; Plaintiffs are requesting that this Court enjoin further dangerous transfers.
Finally, Defendants had actual knowledge of the risks of the Camp J transfers. In Valentine, the district court cited no evidence that Defendants were aware that their plan was inadequate.17 Here, Defendants have been on notice that Camp J presents a substantial risk since before transfers began. Defendants cannot claim that they initiated their transfer plan in good faith, with no concerns about the risks, because advocates, news articles, medical experts, and Members of Plaintiffs’ putative Class have warned the DOC about the inevitable risks of the transfers and counseled against the plan, and even attempted to enjoin it, before and since transfers began.18 Further, this Court’s recognition that medical care at LSP is unconstitutional in some respects further puts Defendants on notice that moving patients to LSP not only risks the lives of those patients but also other vulnerable LSP patients who are now exposed to transmission via the Camp J plan. Thus, unlike in Valentine, Defendants have—and had—actual notice of the substantial risks created by the Camp J plan.
13 CDC Interim Guidance, supra note 12, at 5. 14 Id. at 6-8. 15 Defendants’ argument that Dr. Puisis states that they are compliant with CDC guidance is inappropriately overstated. Dr. Puisis indicated that one aspect of the DOC’s plan appeared to be compliant (with a caveat that it likely would not be compliant in practice). 16 Valentine, 20-20207 at 7. 17 Id. at 8. 18 See, e.g., Alice Speri and Akela Lacy, Louisiana’s Coronavirus Plan for Prisons Could Create Death Camps, THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 7, 2020, 1:49 PM), https://theintercept.com/2020/04/07/louisiana-coronavirus-prisons/; Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv318, Dkt. 582-1, 582-2 (M.D. La. Mar. 31, 2020) (Pls.’ memo. in support of motion for TRO).
3

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Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ claims of substantial risk of serious harm are based upon speculation and conjecture because there is (allegedly) no evidence that Camp J is causing the virus to spread at LSP is essentially a (meritless) ripeness argument. But under Defendants’ logic, there is never a proper time to request a TRO: If the harm has not yet occurred, no risk can be proven, and if the harm is already occurring, then it is too late for it to be enjoined. Defendants’ flawed logic reveals their misunderstanding of the law. As the Supreme Court has long recognized, it would “be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them.”19
II. The Camp J Transfer Plan Presents Both an Objective and a Subjective Substantial Risk of Serious Harm
A. Defendants’ Camp J Transfer Plan Creates a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm to Patients Because Camp J Is Not Fit to House COVID-19 Patients
Camp J presents an objective substantial risk of serious harm because it is an unsuitable living environment even for healthy individuals; it is unconscionable for Defendants to use the facility to house people who are sick. Defendants are aware of the risks therein because they are obvious:20 Camp J is a punitive facility that was shut down by the DOC due to health and safety concerns.
Many factors make Camp J unfit to house COVID-19 patients. Despite Defendants’ conclusory contention that Camp J has been updated, a “lack of equipment and power outlets[] and unsanitary conditions make it difficult to reconfigure Camp J as a medical unit.”21 Camp J’s buildings have inadequate natural ventilation, which means that the existing mechanical ventilation systems cannot “effectively disperse contaminated air and that the buildings pose a public health hazard to patients, staff, and medical personnel.”22 The cells are not compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act
19 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). 20 See Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[A] factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”). 21 Ex. 1, MASS Design Group, The Role of Architecture in Fighting COVID-19: Prisons Case Study at 8. 22 Id. at 6.
4

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or with the latest American Correctional Association standards.23 The lack of “unencumbered space” makes the cells “ergonomically unfit for medical treatment, let alone inhabitation.”24
Putative Class Member Paul Nash was transferred to Camp J on April 11 and reports that “only two” of the four toilets in his first Camp J dormitory (presumably “Bass”25) was working.26 The patients are responsible for keeping the facility clean, even though the majority are “really, really sick.’27 Contrary to Defendants’ glowing characterization of their preparations, Mr. Nash reports that “[t]he cells have not been cleaned and there is black mold everywhere.”28
Defendants’ description of the isolation procedures at Camp J are also inconsistent with what is occurring in practice. They claim that all Camp J arrivals go through a two-step isolation process: held at Bass for “approximately” seven days and then, if improving, transferred to Gar for another “approximately” seven days.29 Paul Nash arrived at Camp J on April 11 and was “moved to another part of Camp J” on April 15, only four days later—he believes he was moved not because his condition had improved, but rather “to make room for other people” being transferred.30 The nurses “used to come check on” the patients twice a day, but now only once per day.31
Even if all Camp J transfers were being isolated according to Defendants’ description, it would still be inadequate. Moving patients to “step down” status after only seven days does not account for the unpredictability of the disease, which can remain mild for much longer than seven days before worsening to the point of requiring hospitalization.32
23 Id. at 8. 24 Id. 25 See Defs.’ Opp’n to TRO at 7. 26 Ex. 3, Supp. Nash Decl. at ¶ 10. 27 Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. 28 Id. at ¶ 11. 29 Defs.’ Opp’n to TRO at 7-8. 30 Ex. 3, Supp. Nash Decl. at ¶ 11. 31 Id. 32 See Vassallo Decl., Dkt. 15-3 at ¶ 7.
5

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Defendants vaguely allude to “Camp J isolation criteria”33 but do not describe how determinations are made as to whether a person should remain at Camp J or be hospitalized. Mr. Nash observed at least one person with pneumonia at Camp J—but no one was taken to the hospital.34 Defendants admit that at least two individuals were sent to the hospital upon their arrival at Camp J because they did not meet the “criteria” and “should not have been sent to Camp J in the first instance.”35 This is evidence that sheriffs sending transfers to Camp J do not have adequate guidance on the transfer criteria.
No matter how much Defendants claim to have cleaned, the inhumanity of housing sick and suffering human beings at Camp J is obvious. Thus, Defendants are subjectively aware of the risk.
B. Defendants’ Camp J Transfer Plan Creates a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm Because It Increases the Risk of Transmission Among LSP’s Population
Defendants’ insistence that “[t]he offenders and employees assigned to Camp J do not have interaction with other employees or offenders of LSP so as to limit the potential for exposure to COVID-19” is inconsistent with reports from LSP inmates.36 Named Plaintiff Otto Barrera was taken to Camp J from LSP’s Nursing Ward 1 on April 22 for approximately two hours before being transported back to Ward 1—he was not told why.37 Mr. Barrera was taken to Camp J by an EMT in an ambulance that has been “going back and forth to every place in Angola.”38 Before his brief stay at Camp J, Mr. Barrera was taken to Our Lady of the Lake Hospital with a high fever on April 20, where he was tested for COVID-19 (but not told his results), and a doctor told him that he had fluid in both his lungs.39 He was taken from the hospital to Ward 1 for a few days, and then transferred to
33 Defs.’ Opp’n to TRO at 8. 34 Ex. 3, Supp. Nash Decl. at ¶ 9. One nurse told Mr. Nash, “this is [your] hospital.” Id. 35 Defs.’ Opp’n to TRO at 12 n.54. 36 Defs.’ Opp’n to TRO at 8; see also id. at 15, 16. 37 Ex. 4, Barrera Decl. at ¶¶ 13-15. 38 Id. at ¶ 13. 39 Id. at ¶¶ 10-12.
6

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Camp J.40 During his two hours at Camp J, he was held in Bass with “40-50 people,” including people who “were walking around” and “not staying six feet away from each other.”41
Mr. Barrera’s experience shows that Camp J’s isolation is at the very least inconsistent. Under Defendants’ description of Camp J’s policies, Mr. Barrera should have remained at Bass for seven days, with an additional seven days at Gar before being tested—only after testing negative should he have been transferred out of Camp J.42 By being transported back and forth between Ward 1 and Camp J, Mr. Barrera could have exposed everyone at Ward 1, a nursing ward, to infection.
Defendants’ insistence that Camp J is completely separate from LSP also conveniently ignores the fact that uninfected LSP residents are required to work at Camp J, which exposes them to transmission. John Tonnubbee is a resident of Camp F, and he is aware of at least four individuals from Camp F who are working at Camp J, including three people from his dorm.43 Patrick Courtney is a resident of Camp F who was disciplined for refusing to work at Camp J, and he knows of other Camp F residents who are working there.44 Mr. Courtney refuses to work at Camp J because he is still presumably COVID-negative, and he has pre-existing conditions that put him at high risk.45 By forcing COVID-negative LSP residents to work at Camp J, Defendants are creating a substantial risk of serious harm because they are knowingly exposing presumably virus-free inmates to the virus.
III.Plaintiffs’ Motion Is Not Moot Because the LSP Population Is Still at Risk of Exposure, and Thousands of Others Remain at Risk of Transfer
A. LSP Inmates Are Named Plaintiffs and Putative Class Members Who Are Put at Risk by the Transfer of COVID-19 Patients to Camp J
Plaintiffs’ motion is not moot because Named Plaintiffs and putative Class Members who are currently housed at LSP are put at risk by the Camp J transfer plan. “[C]orrectional officials have an
40 Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. 41 Id. at ¶ 14. 42 Defs.’ Opp’n to TRO at 7-8. 43 Ex. 5, Tonnubbee Decl. at ¶ 8. Mr. Tonnubbee also reports that “[u]ntil recently, the Camp F kitchen crew was working at Camp J while COVID-19 patients were already there.” Id. 44 Ex. 6, Courtney Decl. at ¶¶ 8, 9.
7

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affirmative obligation to protect inmates from infectious disease.”46 The Eighth Amendment
“require[s] a remedy” when their jailors knowingly expose them to a risk of contracting serious
infectious diseases, even if “it was not alleged that the likely harm would occur immediately and even
though the possible infection might not affect all of those exposed.”47
As discussed above, Camp J is not effectively isolated from LSP. Otto Barrera’s two-hour stay at
Camp J and transfer back to Ward 1 prove as much. Moreover, the residents of Camp F who are
required to work at Camp J are putative Class Members who are put at risk by being physically
present at Camp J, a purported medical isolation facility. Because “Camp J plans to continue to
accept offenders from local jails,”48 Plaintiffs’ TRO motion is not moot, as ongoing transfers will
increase the risk of spread to LSP and continue to overrun Camp J.49
B. Named Plaintiffs and Putative Class Members Still Face Imminent Risk of Transfer to Camp J
Plaintiffs’ motion is not moot because Named Plaintiffs Daniel Gumns and Ian Cazenave still
face transfer to Camp J if they contract the virus,50 and there are many confirmed patients in other
facilities who face imminent risk of transfer. Plaintiffs’ counsel have so far obtained sworn
declarations from six putative Class Members,51 four of whom have already tested positive and are
being held at Orleans Justice Center (“OJC”), where an officer announced on April 24 that “starting
45 Id. at ¶ 10, 11. 46 Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996). 47 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). 48 Defs.’ Opp’n to TRO at 10. 49 Defendants interestingly admit that if any cross-contamination was going to occur, it “has already occurred.” Id. at 12. But contamination is not a single-event occurrence; it can be mitigated, or it can be exacerbated. Indeed, for this reason, communities around the world tighten social isolation practices when the virus reaches them rather than abandoning precautions. 50 See Ex. 4, Barrera Decl. at ¶ 13; see also Defs.’ Opp’n to TRO at 7 (“Camp J is being operated as independent prison separate and apart from the rest of DOC and LSP.”). 51 See Ex. 7, Gallagher Decl. (OJC, confirmed positive Apr. 22); Ex. 8, Perkins Decl. (OJC, confirmed positive Apr. 19); Ex. 9, Curtis Decl. (OJC, confirmed positive Apr. 17); Ex. 10, Nathan Decl. (OJC, confirmed positive Apr. 23); Ex. 11, Cooks Decl. (Franklin Parish Correctional Center, 17 people are positive, has heard that they are being moved to Camp J); Ex. 12, Hymes Decl. (Franklin Parish Correctional Center, has heard about people being moved to Camp J).
8

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Monday, April 27,” confirmed patients from OJC would be moved to Camp J.52 These putative
Class Members face an imminent risk of serious harm if transferred.
Plaintiffs’ motion does not become moot once Named Plaintiffs are transferred.53 Plaintiffs have
moved for class certification, and their claims with respect to this TRO are “inherently transitory”
and therefore not mooted as soon as Named Plaintiffs’ “individual interest[s]” in the TRO
“expire[].”54 The time between a person testing positive and being transferred to Camp J is only a
few days. The risk of transfer is “fleeting [and] temporary in nature,” patients are “uncertain[]” of
the “duration” of the period of risk, “it is unlikely that any given individual [P]laintiff could see his
claim to fruition prior to” transfer, and Defendants’ continued transfers and the ongoing pandemic
assure that “there exists a constant group of people suffering the harm alleged by [Plaintiffs].”55
C. Individuals at EBR Still Face a Risk of Transfer to Camp J Because Defendants’ Stopping of Transfers from EBR Is Voluntary Cessation
Defendants’ assertion that transfers from East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (“EBR”) have
stopped does not moot Plaintiffs’ motion because it is textbook voluntary cessation.56 Plaintiffs’
motion with respect to EBR Class Members is not moot because the cessation of EBR transfers
does not make it “absolutely clear that the [transfers] could not reasonably be expected to recur.”57
While the “heavy burden” of showing that EBR transfers will not recur is somewhat lessened for
governmental cessations,58 Defendants have not met that burden. The only evidence they have
provided regarding EBR transfers is LSP Deputy Warden Falgout’s vague assertions.59 Mr. Falgout
is not an EBR official; Defendants have not provided testimony from any EBR official. Defendants
52 Ex. 7, Gallagher Decl. at ¶ 7. 53 Defendants’ additional argument that Plaintiffs’ TRO is moot because transfers have already begun is puzzling. Plaintiffs ask this Court to enjoin Defendants’ ongoing practice of transferring COVID-19 patients to Camp J. 54 United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 399 (1980). 55 Adickes v. Hellerstedt, 753 F. App'x 236, 242 (5th Cir. 2018). 56 Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is well settled that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.”) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)). 57 Id. 58 Id.
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offer no explanation of EBR’s new isolation arrangements, their capacity, or what will happen if that capacity is exceeded. Mr. Falgout does not state that EBR transfers have stopped as a matter of policy; he merely states that they have stopped. EBR transferred 18 people to Camp J before transfers ceased.60 Transfers from EBR stopped almost immediately after Plaintiffs’ motion for TRO was filed. Defendants have offered no evidence that transfers from EBR cannot recur.
IV. Plaintiffs Have Complied with the PLRA Plaintiffs have complied with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement because, unlike in Valentine,61 administrative remedies are not currently “available.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under the DOC’s flu pandemic plan, which is currently “activated to the highest level,”62 Administrative Remedy Procedures (“ARPs”) are “considered non-essential and suspended.”63 Nevertheless, at least two Named Plaintiffs and two class members at risk of being transferred to Camp J filed or attempted to file grievances.64 In any event, given the imminent risks of COVID-19 in Louisiana prisons, Plaintiffs cannot be expected to complete a lengthy exhaustion process.65
CONCLUSION For these reasons, Plaintiffs request that this Court immediately issue an order temporarily restraining Defendants from transferring Plaintiffs and any patients with COVID-19 to Camp J; and, after a hearing, preliminarily enjoin Defendants from doing so. Alternatively, Plaintiffs request that this Court hold an evidentiary hearing on the TRO motion to resolve the disputed facts. Respectfully submitted this 26th day of April, 2020.
Respectfully submitted by: /s/ Mercedes Montagnes
59 Supp. Aff. of Tracy Falgout, Dkt. 24-3 at ¶ 20. 60 Situational Awareness Report, supra note 4. 61 Valentine, 20-20207 at 11 (“All parties agree that the TDCJ administrative process is open for Plaintiffs’ use”). 62 Defs.’ Opp’n to TRO at 2-3. 63 Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Dkt. 580-4 at 42 (2020.03.20 LSP COOP Plan Attachment 8). 64 Ex. 4, Barrera Decl. at ¶ 19; Ex. 13, Supp. Allen Decl. at ¶ 13; Ex. 7, Gallagher Decl. at ¶ 9; Ex. 9, Curtis Decl. at ¶ 6. 65 See Marlowe v. LeBlanc, 18-cv-63-BAJ-EWD, Dkt. 115, at 6-7 (M.D. La. April 23, 2020).
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Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287 The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70117 Telephone: (504) 529-5955 Facsimile: (504) 595-8006 Email: mmontagnes@defendla.org Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Nishi Kumar, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 26, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system. I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415
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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-3 04/26/20 Page 1 of 10 The Role of Architecture in Fighting COVID-19
Prisons Case Study

April 23, 2020

“Jails are petri dishes,” rang the title of an article in the New York Times on March 30, 2020.
Carceral environments - Prisons, jails, and detention centers - are constrained, dense, overcrowded and poorly ventilated spaces with minimal access to the outdoors—design qualities that are counterproductive to infection control and which make social distancing difficult, if not physically impossible.
As cities, states, and countries sought to implement social distancing efforts--those working in the carceral system knew that social distancing in our country’s jails, prisons and detention centers would be a herculean, if not altogether impossible task
Unless drastic actions are taken to reduce the density and improve conditions within our correctional environments, these spaces will continue to pose a significant public health threat that will be felt throughout our communities.
Departments of corrections across the country are developing plans to release incarcerated populations, increase clarity of communication, implement social distancing strategies, stock medical and disinfectant equipment, and provide social and emotional support to staff, residents, and families. These plans are rightfully involving those outside of the prison walls, such as community partners working to address homelessness, to support released residents with appropriate housing and employment opportunities, being aware that many shelters and halfway houses are likewise overcrowded.
Andre Stancil, Deputy Director of Prison Operations, at the Colorado Department of Corrections, encourages us to remember that there does not need to be a tension between public health or public safety—in fact, public safety is threatened when health is threatened, and concerns about security needs do not mean we cannot be innovative in the rethinking of spaces of incarceration. Drastic and ill-planned response to the spread of COVID-19 can threaten fundamental human rights issues, whereas thoughtful interventions might bring the opportunity to promote health, wellness, and safety for staff, residents, family members, and the community. Amidst continuing uncertainty about the future of our public spaces, and the threat of regular outbreaks of infectious disease, our responses today must consider the long-term implications of each intervention.

About this document These rules of thumb draw upon MASS’s design experience with epidemic outbreaks as well as work within the incarceration system in partnership with the Vera Institute of Justice, MILPA Collective, Dr. Baz Dreisinger at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and the South Carolina, Connecticut, and Colorado Departments of Corrections. While there are no existing design standards or guidelines that have been created in response to coronavirus, our hope is to provide best practice mitigation strategies to further the continued spread of the disease. These rules of thumb can be used by administrators, wardens, correctional officers, politicians, advocates, and activists seeking to limit contagion while safeguarding those who live and work in prisons, jails, and detention centers. Please note that while these recommendations include suggestions to improve conditions of overcrowding, they are not intended to be an ideal design nor an implicit approval of the current conditions within correctional facilities.

As these plans take fruition, certain spatial strategies can be incorporated to help facilitate the achievement of safer spaces for our communities. This document presents the following design strategies:

Ensure adequate space for each person’s safety.
Sequence flows and segment populations.
Reconfigure medical facilities to control contagion and accommodate extended stays.

Make your spaces breathe better.

Design for people, not for lockdown.

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Ensure adequate space for each person’s safety.

Executive orders by the governor in Colorado (here and here) and Connecticut (link?) have accelerated this process in these states.
Additionally, the Vera Institute of Justice has released a set of recommendations for preventive measures in jails, prisons, immigration detention and youth facilities, which can be found here.

In common spaces and open dorms, 150 SF - 200 SF per person is recommended to provide social distancing and freedom of movement.
Reduce density The single most impactful and necessary action to prevent the spread of the Coronavirus in jails and prisons is to reduce density by immediately reducing the populations. A number of states and organizations have issued recommendations regarding early and compassionate releases, furloughs, and the cessation of new intakes. These policies focus on populations that do not pose an imminent threat: those who are elderly, ill, en route to parole or release within a year, in pretrial detention, awaiting sentencing, or are incarcerated on nonviolent charges, and make it possible for the spaces to achieve an ideal ratio of square foot per person needed to maintain social distance.

Convert existing spaces.
As the incarcerated population drops, the following opportunities become available to convert existing spaces to support a reduction in density:
• Convert double- and triple-bunked cells into single rooms.
• Convert empty cells into programmed spaces, including mediation room, exercise room, art studio, recording studio, libraries, and kitchenettes, among others.

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In dormitories People (and beds) should be separated by 6 ft (2 m) to minimize droplet transmission.
Where partitions are available, ensure that each person’s personal space is at least 9’x9’, with each bed placed alongside non-adjacent walls to prevent aerosolized transmission, and accessible to a corridor at least 12’ wide.
Where partitions are not available, ensure that each person’s personal space is at least 195 square feet (15’ x 13’) and immediately adjacent to a 12’ wide corridor.

In group congregation spaces Rearrange dining halls to accommodate more space between each person and use only one side of the table. Consider allowing small groups of people to eat outside where they can spread out more without experiencing isolation.
Communal spaces like hallways, dayrooms, cafeterias, and sally ports, are the most contagious because they’re where crowding occurs. Meet, interact, collect, connect outdoors if you can, and choose recreation spaces where people can spread out.

Consider how each unit can be selfsufficient by converting empty cells and buildings into recreational and programming spaces. Consider activities to support meditation, exercise, classes, and reading rooms, among others.

Reduce congestion and reliance on communal spaces where infectious and healthy people or where staff and incarcerated people mix and restrict recreation space usage to a single space per unit.

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Prisons Case Study

Sequence flows and segment populations.
Prisons, jails, and detention centers are confined spaces, which poses two implications on the spread of COVID-19.

The first implication is that staff members, who may interact with those carrying the virus in their homes and communities in between each shift, may unwittingly import the virus into prisons, jails, and detention centers. The second implication is that once COVID-19 enters the prison, it can rapidly spread and result in inhumane confinement where people are increasingly stressed, completely immobilized, and deprived of normalcy. Prisons, jails and detention centers can adopt the following strategies to control exposure:

Limit the number of contacts between staff and incarcerated people and segment staff by space and shift to eliminate overlaps.

Reduce the overlap of space to avoid cross-contamination and contain the spread of the virus.

Reconfigure medical facilities to control contagion and accommodate extended stays.
Not every correctional environment has a medical facility equipped to deal with coronavirus patients. Each facility should assess their medical capabilities, review protocols for dealing with disease outbreaks and exposure, and coordinate with state, local, tribal, or territorial health departments. Correctional institutions should take care to separate testing, suspected, confirmed, acute cases as well as those in recovery.

Just as patients must be triaged to prioritize those most in need of care; spaces must be triaged to protect healthy people from getting sick—including staff and incarcerated people with nonconfirmed cases. Prepare spaces for those infected with coronavirus with access to comfortable furnishings and personal belongings, a telephone, and programming, even if that programming is done via videoconference or another technology. Below are some additional strategies related to medical preparation:
Consider how a reduction in the institution’s overall capacity can open units to be used as quarantine wards for cases that require less intensive care.
Assign a room near each unit to for COVID-19 testing and evaluation to limit spread to other parts of the facility.
Sequence the flows of people to limit unnecessary overlaps.
Create clear thresholds for donning and doffing of personal protective equipment (PPE) before entering and exiting areas with individuals that have been confirmed or are suspected of having the coronavirus infection.

Make your spaces breathe better.
COVID-19 is mainly spread by droplets— produced by coughing, sneezing or even just talking—that can travel up to 6 ft (2 m). There is early evidence that smaller particles may be able to float even longer distances. In the latter situation, called airborne transmission, proper ventilation and simple airflows strategies can help.

To dilute and remove contaminated indoor air, open windows on opposite ends for cross ventilation (if appropriate, and if the space allows), or use exhaust fans or mechanical systems to pull air outside. Air cleansing strategies are also an effective option, such as Germicidal Ultraviolet (GUV) air disinfection units or air filters, which can be installed inside cells and throughout dayrooms and common spaces that are used by several different groups of people.
Regularly clean vents and replace air filters.
Introduce air-purifying plants (snake plant, spider plant, dracena, weeping fig, chinese evergreen, among others) in cells and

throughout the space, which can reduce harmful VOCs, ease irritation to eyes, ears, nose and throat, prevent coughing and congestion, and lower stress
Use outdoor spaces for programming activities where possible.
As these strategies are implemented, also consider how they might inform ventilation strategies over the long term to control airborne pathogens and maintain a healthy environment. Don’t be afraid to make permanent interventions to bring in more daylight, air, views, and access to nature, as these elements bring in additional positive health benefits to both staff and residents.

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Design for people, not for lockdown.
Even the best-intentioned plans will fail if they do not consider the needs of the individuals and communities– staff and residents–who will be affected. Options like lockdown, tent dorms, or converting gyms into warehouse dorms may seem like the easiest interventions to implement, but can result in increased fear, panic, and distress, and subsequently increased distrust, violence, vandalism, and recidivism. Keep in mind that the social and emotional needs of incarcerated people are different and often more severe than those who practice social distancing outside confined facilities. Sensitivity to an increased need for emotional and counseling support, transparency, and family connection should guide how correctional institutions balance social distancing with social connectivity. Below are some considerations for further limiting the spread of the virus while maintaining critical programming and rebuilding trust, hope, and solidarity in the public domain:

Although prisons, jails, and detention facilities are often seen as spaces of isolation, research has shown a correlation between communal programming and improved outcomes, including increased education and vocational skills that contribute to successful re-entry as well as reduced violence, vandalism, assault, and recidivism. Where possible, make every effort to facilitate access to these programming opportunities.
Classes should be sized for social distancing.
Prepare spaces with access to comfortable furnishings and personal belongings, a telephone, and programming, even if that programming is done via videoconference or another technology.
Acknowledge the reality of human emotions and honor those whose lives have been impacted or lost in the path of the virus. Consider how current spaces can be reimagined into spaces that support the grieving process, preserve memory, and offer comfort.
Look for opportunities to involve both staff and residents in the COVID-19 prevention efforts. It’s likely that they may be spending extended periods of time in a smaller area, and letting them define their spaces can help bring a sense of agency and control in a difficult situation.

Vandal-proof is not virus-proof.
It is believed that surfaces contaminated with infected droplets can transmit disease. Non-porous surfaces (e.g., stainless steel, plastic, composites) are proving to be materials where COVID-19 has been shown to live the longest and tend to be used on doors, handrails, and tables. Typical correctional furniture, and finishes feature surfaces that are made of metallic, hard, and nonporous materials (e.g., stainless steel, plastic, composites), on which the virus can survive for up to 72 hours, as research has shown. In addition, these nonporous surfaces require continuous cleaning, which can introduce harmful chemical fumes. In an environment with inadequate ventilation, this can significantly degrade interior air quality and pose a health risk to incarcerated people and staff working in these spaces.

Especially in conditions where there is a lack of supplies and materials to clean surfaces frequently, consider the introduction of softer, natural, and porous materials, including textiles and wood, on which early research has shown the virus has a shorter lifespan. These materials, along with couches and area rugs, evoke normalcy, comfort, and dignity, qualities that are not only increasingly crucial to everyone’s mental health during this time, but which have been shown to contribute to significantly lower rates of violence, vandalism, and verbal assault in correctional environments. In short, more normalized environments are healthier and safer for everyone.

Highlight high-touch surfaces (door handles, handrails, tabletops) with bright-colored paint, tape, and/or signage. Clearly identify spaces where masks and regular cleaning are required. Use language that conveys firm but encouraging reminders instead of an aggressive tone, which can add stress.

Take special care to routinely clean high-touch surfaces and non-porous surfaces, and consider creating no-touch surfaces where possible (i.e., leave doors open to reduce interaction with door handles or doors).

Place sanitizers or hand wash stations next to high-touch surfaces.

While you’re at it, build a sense of solidarity and accountability by engaging residents in creating signage, painting walls, doors, and furniture to design how they want their spaces to look like, especially during a time of dramatic change.

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Prisons Case Study

Case Study: The Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola

In spring 2018, the Louisiana State Penitentiary closed its most restrictive housing unit, Camp J, citing its deteriorating infrastructure and facilities. Described as a “dungeon” and a “microcosm of a lot of things that were wrong,” the closure of Camp J was seen by many activists as a symbolic victory against inhumane incarceration.
Despite these gains, Camp J soon reared its horrors again, this time during this year’s coronavirus pandemic. Disregarding the protests of incarcerated people, public health experts, and COVID-19 guidances issued by the Centers for Disease Control as well as correctional and advocacy organizations including the Vera Institute of Justice and Amend, the Louisiana Department of Corrections moved to re-open Camp J to house anyone in the state (whether in prison or jail) who tests positive for COVID-19. At the time of this publication, there are over 40 people housed at Camp J, many of whom were forced to relocate without a choice.

About Camp J Built in 1977 as mass incarceration began to skyrocket, Camp J is located approximately a mile from the main prison on the southwestern shore of Lake Killarney, and served over forty years as Angola’s disciplinary unit—the prison to the prison. Its grounds consist of five identical restrictive housing buildings, each totaling 104 cells—some of which were double-bunked—and a large, open-plan warehouse dorm known as the Bass Dorm that housed over a hundred at full capacity, 26 outdoor solitary-confinement “recreation” cages, and several smaller, auxiliary structures. At its peak, Camp J housed over 400 people in solitary cells 23 hours a day for 7 days a week.

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Ventilation

Although each of Camp J’s five restrictive buildings primarily rely on mechanical ventilation, the

resulting airflow is inadequate for infection control. Negative pressure spaces, which maintain

a continuous vacuum that draws in contaminated air and disperses it to the outdoors through

a mechanical ventilation system, are ideal in containing the spread of contaminants. However,

because of doors that open to the outdoors and operable jalousie windows, the space does

not form a seal, and as a result, air finds a way in, and airflow control is compromised, meaning

that the risk of airborne contamination is increased. In addition, the lack of sealed barriers

between each cell in the restrictive housing structures increases the likelihood of the virus being

suspended in air throughout these structures.

“Vandal-proof” fixtures

Exhaust Fan

Industrial metal bunk beds

Openings filled with louvers that are dirty and fixed in position

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11

11

1 ENTRY FOYER

2 LEGAL AID LIBRARY

3 POOL ROOM

4 LOUNGE/MESS HALL

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5 MULTIPURPOSE ROOM

6 102-BED DORM

7 DIRECT SUPERVISION STAFF DESK

8 RESTROOM

9 SHOWERS

10 TELEPHONES

11 STORAGE / MECH.

9

3

4

8

1

2

5 10

7

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1 BREEZEWAY 2 STAFF OBSERVATION ZONE 3 EXERCISE CORRIDOR 4 SOLITARY CELL 5 PIPE CHASE 6 RESTROOM 7 SHOWERS 8 VISITING 9 VISITING BOOTHS 10 STORAGE

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4

Cells are adjacent to pipe chases, offering no access to natural light or ventilation

32”x32” opening filled with louvers that are dirty and fixed in position

Long, dark corridor with three industrail fans to support air flow

“Vandal-proof” furniture & fixtures

The Bass Dorm, an open-plan dormitory, has just a single industrial-grade exhaust fan along one end of the building. Along its perimeter, there are jalousie windows that open only to a fixed amount of space between each slat, limiting the amount of natural ventilation that enters the space. To circulate air, ceiling fans are located throughout the dorm; however, they merely circulate contaminated air when the exhaust fan isn’t running. When it is running, the fan draws contaminated throughout the space, exposing everyone who stands in the path of air.
However, harnessing constant natural ventilation through contaminated spaces can effectively disperse the virus to the outdoors, where fresh air dilutes the virus. In addition, early studies suggest that the ultraviolet light of the sun can disinfect the contaminated air. However, the inadequacy of natural ventilation in both the Bass Dorm and the restrictive housing units at Camp J means that existing ventilation can’t effectively disperse contaminated air and that the buildings pose a public health hazard to patients, staff, and medical personnel.

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Inadequate ventilation served by just four exhaust fans in the pipe chase

Ducts disseminate mechanical air but the lack of air conditioning and natural ventilation creates overheating
Jalousie windows are shut and do not allow adequate natural ventilation when open.

Pipe chase
8x6x8 cells are not compliant to the americans with disabilities act nor to the latest american correctional association standards.

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Prisons Case Study

Cell Layout The narrowness of each cell, just six feet wide in the restrictive housing units, the location of the bed, bolted against the wall, and narrow cell openings make the space ergonomically unfit for medical treatment, let alone inhabitation. In fact, the current cell dimensions violate current American Correctional Association standards as they fail to provide seven feet of unencumbered space. In addition, the cells are not compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act, an important consideration as patients, especially those who are elderly or severely ill, experience reduced mobility and become more dependent on staff for mobility. With mobility inconvenienced, people are more likely to be left in cells 24 hours a day and 7 days a week for the duration of their illness.
Access to Healthcare Inadequate ventilation, lack of equipment and power outlets, and unsanitary conditions make it difficult to reconfigure Camp J as a medical unit. In addition, due to harsh sentencing laws, Angola currently houses a disproportionate number of elderly people and people with chronic pre-existing conditions who require regular or continuous medical care. However, in the event that the elderly and those with chronic pre-existing conditions contract COVID-19 and are moved to Camp J, the distance between Camp J and Angola’s limited medical facilities, located within the main prison, effectively isolates these people from critical medical care. Housing COVID-19 patients at Camp J puts them over an hour from the nearest hospital equipped to treat more acute medical needs. As a result, access to healthcare is exposed, and those with COVID-19 face increased medical risks, including death.
Emotional Destruction Dimly lit, poorly ventilated, and lacking a view to the outdoors, people housed in Camp J spend their days in extreme abnormality, staring at walls or ceilings, listening to a barrage of noises throughout the unit, and immobile on narrow, uncomfortable beds. Historically, being sent to Camp J symbolized a death sentence. Its remoteness from the main prison, its poor spatial ergonomics, its unsanitary conditions, and its indignity dehumanize people and deprive identity. Very few return from Camp J without deep emotional trauma. Repurposing Camp J as a COVID unit sends a similar message: you may never return, and you may die alone.

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Restrictive Housing Unit
Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola

Cell Doors
Cell doors are just two feet wide, making it difficult to move patients in and out of cells. As a result, patients are more likely to remain isolated within the cell for the entire duration of their treatment. If possible, doors should be left open so patients do not feel “trapped” even though they need to isolate themselves.

Unsanitary Waste
Management
Toilets do not have seat covers, meaning that contaminated droplets from human waste can escape the toilet after flushing, creating unsanitary and hazardous conditions.

Compromised
Airflow Control
With doors and vents directly adjacent to the outdoors, existing housing units don’t maintain a negative pressure, and don’t accommodate adequate natural ventilation to clear contaminated air from the space.

Spatial Ergonomics
Cells are designed for single-occupancy; however, when used for medical purposes, each room limits the care provider’s ability to comfortably treat the patient and move the patient as needed.
Lack of CrossVentilation
A double-loaded service wall hampers natural ventilation, and instead, exhaust air is drawn out through a small vent in each cell.

Don/Doff Zone
Consider assigning a controlled entry point where staff and providers don and doff their PPE.
Hot Zone
Create a physical seal between hot/cold thresholds to prevent contamination of staff and medical providers

Increase Natural
Ventilation
Open windows and doors to maximize natural ventilation to circulate contaminated air to the outdoors, where it can be diluted

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Additional resources for COVID-19 in prisons:
• The Centers for Disease Control guidance on the Management of COVID-19 in Correctional and Detention Facilities.
• Restoring Promise Webinar on COVID-19 in prisons • Staff guidelines from Amend • World Health Organization guidance on the Preparedness, prevention, anc control of
COVID-19 in prisons and other places of detention • National Commission on Correctional Health Care COVID-19 Weekly Roundtable For Law
Enforcement & Correctional Health Care Webinar • Holly Yan, CNN, Prisons and jails across the US are turning into ‘petri dishes’ for coronavirus.
Deputies are falling ill, too.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks to: • Alexandra Frank, Restoring Promise, Vera Institute of Justice • Juan Gomez, Restoring Promise, MILPA Collective • Scott Semple, Warden (ret.), Cheshire Correctional Institution, Connecticut • Andre Stancil, Colorado Department of Corrections • Richard Cho, CEO, Connecticut Coalition to End Homelessness • Baz Dreisinger, Prison to College Pipeline, John Jay College of Criminal Justice • Andrea Armstrong, Loyola University School of Law • David Cloud, Amend
Appendix
Calculating space per person In a 5,000 square-foot dayroom, the maximum allowable capacity is between 20 people (200 square feet per person) to 25 people (150 square feet per person). Anything less creates a “gridlock” where any movement will likely expose people to contamination. To calculate the capacity of a dayroom or common space:
Number of People = (Total Area - Circulation Area)/Area per Person With a typical circulation allocation equivalent to 30% the total area, the above equation can also be written as:
Number of People = (Total Area - (0.3*Total Area))/Area per Person

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Inmates

Staff

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SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF PAUL NASH: I, Paul Nash, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Paul Nash. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 42 years old. 4. I am pre-trial and was being held pending my trial in Bienville Parish Prison. 5. I was having symptoms and was tested for COVID on the night of April 8. I was told I
tested positive. 6. On April 11, 2020, I thought I was being brought to the hospital because I was having
breathing issues but I was instead brought to Camp J at Angola. I did not want to come to Camp J. 7. I am suffering from chills, aches, fever, and shortness of breath. I had a temperature of 101 degrees on April 15, 2020. I have no sense of taste or smell. 8. I have pre-existing medical conditions of asthma and kidney problems that put me at risk of medical complications. 9. I was in a dormitory at Camp J with 40-50 people. There were at least 30 people who are really, really sick. Some of them have respiratory issues. One person has pneumonia in his lungs. Nobody has been taken to the hospital. I was told by the nurse that “this is our hospital.” There are no doctors. 10. The dormitory has four toilets and six showers but only two of the toilets work. We are responsible for keeping everything clean. 11. On April 15, 2020, I was moved to another part of Camp J. I am now in Cellblock 3 along with seven other patients. The bars of the cell are open. The nurses used to come check on us at 6:00 am and 6:00 pm. As of April 24, 2020, the nurse only comes to check on us once a

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-5 04/26/20 Page 2 of 4
day. People are sick and coughing. The cells have not been cleaned and there is black mold everywhere. It is my understanding I was moved to the cell to make room for other people who are being transferred in to Camp J. 12. I am worried that I will develop even worse symptoms and need to be hospitalized. I want to make sure I am close to a hospital in case that happens. 13. I would prefer to be home with my family, recovering and staying away from other people who are also sick. My family lives near a hospital. 14. If I can’t go home, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary. 15. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to prove them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff. 16. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of my criminal proceedings against me or others.

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17. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so.
18. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature: /s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Paul Nash April 24, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-5 04/26/20 Page 4 of 4
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Nash. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I
signed the attached declaration on Mr. Nash’s behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Nash is currently being held at Louisiana State Penitentiary. Visitation has been
suspended since March 12, 2020 4. I spoke with Mr. Nash over the phone. Mr. Nash has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf
as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 24, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 24, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-6 04/26/20 Page 1 of 4
DECLARATION OF OTTO BARRERA: I, Otto Barrera, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Otto Barrera. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 54 years old. 4. I am indigent. 5. I am in DOC custody and was previously housed at Angola’s Main Prison in the Ash 2
dormitory. Ash 2 is in part a dormitory for people who are handicapped or have medical needs. 6. I was housed in close quarters in the dormitory with approximately 86 other people. I was unable to maintain 6 feet of space between me and other people. 7. Someone in my dorm got sick and was taken out of the dorm. I didn’t know where he was taken at the time. 8. I had a cough for four days and then developed a fever 9. On the night of April 19, 2020, I was feeling really bad and took ib profen. Nobody had told me not to take ib profen. 10. On April 20, 2020, I woke up and was told by a nurse that I had a high fever. My bones were also hurting. I think my fever was 103 degrees but I was pretty out of it. I was brought to the ATU. They did a flu test that came back negative. They did a COVID-19 test but did not tell me if it was positive or negative. 11. I was then put in a jumpsuit and shackles by two trip officers and an EMT in an ambulance to Our Lady of the Lake in Baton Rouge and they tested me there for COVID again. After dropping me off, the EMT picked up someone who had died from Our Lady of the Lake and drove the body back to Angola.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-6 04/26/20 Page 2 of 4
12. The doctor told me that I had fluid in both of my lungs. I was prescribed antibiotics. I was taken back to Angola Ward 1. The nurses check on me during their rounds and take my temperature. Those nurses are also treating the other patients on Ward 1.
13. On April 22, 2020, I was taken to Camp J by an EMT. The EMTs have been going back and forth between Camp J and the hospital wards. The ambulances and EMTs have been going back and forth to every place in Angola.
14. I was at Camp J for about two hours in the Bass dorm but they had not yet assigned me a bed. There were probably 40-50 people in the dorm and people were walking around. People were not staying six feet away from each other. I saw one nurse while I was there.
15. On April 22, 2020, the same EMT brought me back to Ward 1. They did not tell me why I was moved back. There is another person named Allen Thompson who was the first person to get sick in Ash 2 who is also on Ward 1.
16. I only have one face mask. I have had it on since I went to the hospital at Our Lady of the Lake.
17. I have pre-existing medical conditions including high blood pressure and high cholesterol that put me at risk of medical complications from COVID-19. I have been prescribed a mechanical soft diet.
18. I am currently experiencing symptoms of weakness and nausea. 19. On April 24, 2020, I tried to file an emergency grievance to not be transferred back to Camp
J. I was denied a grievance form. 20. My work release date is August 2020. My full release is in February of 2021. I would prefer
to go home to my family to rest and recover, away from other people who are also sick. 21. I do not want to go back to Camp J. I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the
convention center in New Orleans or in Baton Rouge. It is my belief that they have

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-6 04/26/20 Page 3 of 4
appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary. 22. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to provide them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff. 23. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class and subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings against me or others. 24. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. 25. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-6 04/26/20 Page 4 of 4
Nishi Kumar on behalf of Otto Barrera April 24, 2020
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Barrera. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I
signed the attached declaration on Ian Barrera’s behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Barrera is currently being held at Louisiana State Penitentiary. All in-person visitation
was cancelled effective March 12, 2020. 4. I spoke with Mr. Barrera over the phone. Mr. Barrera has confirmed that I can sign on his
behalf as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 24, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature: /s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 24, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-7 04/26/20 Page 1 of 3
DECLARATION OF JOHN TONNUBBEE: I, John Tonnubbee, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is John Tonnubbee. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 77 years old. 4. I am in DOC custody and currently housed at Camp F in Dorm 1. Camp A is for Class-A
Trustees. 5. I am housed in close quarters in the dormitory with approximately 40 and 50 other people. I
am unable to maintain 6 feet of space between me and other people. 6. I do not have gloves or hand sanitizer. They took away our bleach bottles a month ago. 7. There are 5 toilets, 5 sinks, and one open shower with 6 faucets in Dorm 1. 8. I know of at least four people from Camp F who are working at Camp J, including three
people from my dorm, Ronald Adams (DOC # 273974), Peter Davis (DOC # 090015), and Ardie Cole (DOC # 31589). I don’t know where they are staying. One is doing general maintenance and one is doing yardwork. One is likely working in the kitchen. Until recently, the Camp F kitchen crew was working at Camp J while COVID-19 patients were already there. 9. Patrick Courtney (DOC # 295356) was told to go work in the kitchen at Camp J and was put into disciplinary lockdown when he refused. 10. John Morott from Camp F went out on a work assignment on April 22, 2020, and got kicked by a horse so they took him to the Treatment Center where they have COVID-19 patients in both of the emergency rooms at the ATU. Then they brought him back to Camp F. I am worried that he brought the virus back to Camp F. They did not do anything to quarantine him. He is sleeping two beds from me.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-7 04/26/20 Page 2 of 3
11. I have pre-existing conditions that put me at a high risk if I become infected with COVID19, including high blood pressure, sinus trouble, and an enlarged prostate. I had a cardiac arrest on July 31, 2019 and they have still not determined the cause.
12. I have not been tested for COVID-19 nor am I experiencing any symptoms. 13. Because of my age and pre-existing medical conditions, I am concerned that bringing people
who have already tested positive for COVID-19 to Camp J increases the risk that I will be exposed and have severe medical complications. I don’t know if they would take me to a hospital from Angola if I got very sick. 14. If I test positive for COVID-19, I do not want to go to Camp J. I would prefer to go home to my family in Kentwood, Louisiana. I want to be near a hospital. I have a pending pardon application and have been granted a hearing but do not yet have a hearing date. 15. If I test positive for COVID-19 and cannot go home to my family, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary. I am a veteran of the United States air force and could be treated at the VA hospital in New Orleans. 16. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. 17. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-7 04/26/20 Page 3 of 3
Signature: Nishi Kumar on behalf of John Tonnubbee April 24, 2020
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Tonnubbee. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19
pandemic, I signed the attached declaration on John Tonnubbee behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Tonnubbee is currently being held at Louisiana State Penitentiary. All in-person visitation was cancelled effective March 12, 2020. 4. I spoke with Mr. Tonnubbee over the phone. Mr. Tonnubbee has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 24, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature: /s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 24, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-8 04/26/20 Page 1 of 3
DECLARATION OF PATRICK COURTNEY: I, Patrick Courtney, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Patrick Courtney. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 50 years old. 4. I am in DOC custody and currently housed at Camp F in Dorm 4. Camp F is for Class-A
Trustees. 5. I have very high blood pressure and am waiting for medication that has been prescribed for
me. 6. I am housed in close quarters in the dormitory with approximately 96 other people. I am
unable to maintain 6 feet of space between me and other people. 7. There are 5 toilets, 5-6 sinks, and 4 showers in Dorm 4. 8. I am a baker at Camp F. I was sleeping in the dorm on April 17, 2020, and the Warden came
and told me to pack my stuff to go to Camp J. He wanted me to move to Camp J to work. I told him I wouldn’t go and he wrote me up and locked up me and another person Leo Looney in a cell for refusing to go. I was there for five days. I lost my phone privileges for four days and was sentenced to 90 days suspended in the cell. 9. There are other people from Camp F who are working at Camp J. 10. I have pre-existing conditions that put me at a high risk if I become infected with COVID19, including high blood pressure. I do not want to go to Camp J. 11. I have not been tested for COVID-19 nor am I experiencing any symptoms. 12. Because of my pre-existing medical conditions, I am concerned that bringing people who have already tested positive for COVID-19 to Camp J increases the risk that I will be

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-8 04/26/20 Page 2 of 3
exposed and have severe medical complications. I don’t know if they would take me to a hospital from Angola if I got very sick. 13. If I test positive for COVID-19, I do not want to go to Camp J. I would prefer to go home to my family in St. Martinsville. I want to be near a hospital. 14. If I test positive for COVID-19 and cannot go home to my family, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans or in Baton Rouge. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary. 15. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. 16. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Patrick Courtney April 24, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-8 04/26/20 Page 3 of 3
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Courtney. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19
pandemic, I signed the attached declaration on Patrick Courtney behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Courtney is currently being held at Louisiana State Penitentiary. All in-person visitation was cancelled effective March 12, 2020. 4. I spoke with Mr. Courtney over the phone. Mr. Courtney has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf as reflected in his declaration.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 24, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 24, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-9 04/26/20 Page 1 of 3
DECLARATION OF ANTONIO GALLAGHER: I, Antonio Gallagher, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Antonio Gallagher. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 48 years old. 4. I am pre-trial and am being held in Orleans Parish Prison. I am currently housed a single cell
on 1C with around 30 other people who all appear to be COVID-positive. 5. I was tested for COVID on April 20, 2020. I was told I tested positive on April 22, 2020. A
doctor told me I would be getting multivitamins and Gatorade. The doctor also told me to exercise but I am in my cell for almost 24 hours a day. I am let out of my cell for 30 minutes to an hour each day to make phone calls or take a shower. 6. I have underlying medical conditions, including hypertension, diabetes, obesity, and a history of tobacco use. I take medication for my hypertension and diabetes. 7. On April 24, 2020, a ranking officer whose name I believe to be Lieutenant Blanchard came onto my tier and announced to everyone on my tier that, starting Monday, April 27, 2020, the jail would be moving us to Camp J at Angola. 8. I do not want to be moved to Camp J at Angola. 9. I filed an emergency grievance about not wanting to be moved to Camp J. 10. I am currently experiencing body aches and pains but no other symptoms. 11. I am worried that I will develop worse symptoms and need to be hospitalized. I want to make sure I am close to a hospital in case that happens. 12. I would prefer to be home with my family, recovering and staying away from other people who are also sick. My family lives near a hospital.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-9 04/26/20 Page 2 of 3
13. If I can’t go home, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary.
14. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to prove them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff.
15. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of my criminal proceedings against me or others.
16. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so.
17. This declaration was read to me in English over the phone and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-9 04/26/20 Page 3 of 3
Signature: /s/ Laura Bixby Laura Bixby on behalf of Antonio Gallagher April 25, 2020
I, Laura Bixby, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Gallagher. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19
pandemic, I signed the attached declaration on Mr. Gallagher’s behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Gallagher is currently being held at Orleans Parish Prison. In-person visitation has been suspended indefinitely. 4. I spoke with Mr. Gallagher over the phone. Mr. Gallagher has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 25, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Laura Bixby Laura Bixby April 25, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-10 04/26/20 Page 1 of 3
DECLARATION OF KENDRICK PERKINS: I, KENDRICK PERKINS, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Kendrick Perkins. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 20 years old. 4. I am pre-trial and being held in Tier 1A in the Orleans Justice Center. I was moved to that
tier on April 19, 2020 after testing positive for COVID-19. Prior to that I was being held on Tier 4C since February 24, 2020. 5. I was tested for COVID-19 sometime during the week of April 13. 6. On April 19, a deputy called me out of my cell and told me to pack up as I was being transferred to a different location within the Orleans Justice Center. The deputy called out maybe 5-7 other people as well. She said that some people had tested positive and they were being moved as a precaution. After I was moved to 1A, I was informed I had tested positive for COVID-19. I was not shown my test results. 7. I am suffering from headaches and stomach pain. I have lost my sense of smell and taste, and my nose is running. 8. I am worried that I will develop even worse symptoms and need to be hospitalized. 9. I would prefer to be home with my uncle in Kenner, recovering and staying away from other people who are also sick. 10. If I can’t go home, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-10 04/26/20 Page 2 of 3
11. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to provide them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff.
12. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class and subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings against me or others.
13. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the impossibility of arranging in person visitation due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so.
14. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Carrie Ellis Carrie Ellis on behalf of Kendrick Perkins April 23, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-10 04/26/20 Page 3 of 3
I, Carrie Ellis, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Perkins. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic,
I signed the attached declaration on Kendrick Perkins’ behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Perkins is currently being held at the Orleans Justice Center. Since March 20, 2020,
video visitation is the only visitation permitted. 4. I visited with Mr. Perkins via video. Mr. Perkins has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf
as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 23, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
/s/ Carrie Ellis Carrie Ellis April 23, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-11 04/26/20 Page 1 of 3
DECLARATION OF DIJON CURTIS: I, Dijon Curtis, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Dijon Curtis. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am pre-trial and am being held pending my trial in Orleans Parish Prison. I am currently
housed on D1. Before that, I was housed on 4E. 4. I was tested for COVID some time between April 14 and April 16. I was told I tested
positive for COVID-19 on April 17. I have been having body aches. I verbally requested Tylenol and haven’t yet received it. 5. I do not want to be moved to Camp J at Angola. 6. I tried to file an emergency grievance about not being transferred to Camp J but the kiosk for filing grievances that I have access to was broken. 7. I am worried that I will develop even worse symptoms and need to be hospitalized. I want to make sure I am close to a hospital in case that happens. 8. I would prefer to be home with my family, recovering and staying away from other people who are also sick. My family lives near a hospital. 9. If I can’t go home, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary. 10. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-11 04/26/20 Page 2 of 3
updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to prove them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff. 11. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of my criminal proceedings against me or others. 12. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. 13. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Jennifer Hull Jennifer Hull on behalf of Dijon Curtis April 24, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-11 04/26/20 Page 3 of 3
I, Jennifer Hull, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Curtis. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I
signed the attached declaration on Mr. Curtis’ behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Curtis is currently being held at Orleans Parish Prison. In-person visitation has been
suspended indefinitely. 4. I spoke with Mr. Curtis over video phone. Mr. Curtis has confirmed that I can sign on his
behalf as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 24, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Jennifer Hull Jennifer Hull April 24, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-12 04/26/20 Page 1 of 3
DECLARATION OF TRAVIS NATHAN: I, Travis Nathan, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Travis Nathan. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 54 years old. 4. I am pre-trial and am being held in Orleans Parish Prison. I have a pending hearing that was
scheduled for March and has not yet been rescheduled. I am currently housed on the first floor. Before that, I was housed on the second floor. 5. I was tested for COVID on April 15, 2020. I did not know I had tested positive until my attorney Jennifer Hull told me on April 23. 6. I have underlying medical conditions, including high blood pressure. I regularly take medication for my blood pressure and sometimes take Motrin for an old injury. My left arm is paralyzed. 7. I do not want to be moved to Camp J at Angola. 8. I am worried that I will develop worse symptoms and need to be hospitalized. I want to make sure I am close to a hospital in case that happens. 9. I would prefer to be home with my family, recovering and staying away from other people who are also sick. My family lives near a hospital. 10. If I can’t go home, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-12 04/26/20 Page 2 of 3
11. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to prove them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff.
12. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of my criminal proceedings against me or others.
13. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so.
14. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Jennifer Hull Jennifer Hull on behalf of Travis Nathan April 23, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-12 04/26/20 Page 3 of 3
I, Jennifer Hull, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Nathan. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic,
I signed the attached declaration on Mr. Nathan’s behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Nathan is currently being held at Orleans Parish Prison. In-person visitation has been
suspended indefinitely. 4. I spoke with Mr. Nathan over video phone. Mr. Nathan has confirmed that I can sign on his
behalf as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 23, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Jennifer Hull Jennifer Hull April 23, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-13 04/26/20 Page 1 of 3
DECLARATION OF JORDAN COOKS: I, Jordan Cooks, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Jordan Cooks. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am post-trial and am being held in Franklin Parish Correctional Center. It is my belief that
I had a non-unanimous jury. I am in a dorm with 68 people. We are in quarantine and can’t go to other parts of the jail. We have been in quarantine for about three weeks. 4. It is my belief that at least 17 people in the jail have tested positive for COVID. 5. I have heard that people are supposed to be moved to Camp J when they test positive for COVID-19. 6. I do not want to be moved to Camp J at Angola. 7. If I test positive, I want to make sure I am close to a hospital. 8. If I test positive, I would prefer to be home with my family, recovering and staying away from other people who are sick. My family lives near a hospital. 9. If I test positive and can’t go home, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans or the medical monitoring station in Baton Rouge. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary. 10. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to prove them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-13 04/26/20 Page 2 of 3
lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff. 11. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of my criminal proceedings against me or others. 12. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. 13. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Jordan Cooks April 24, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-13 04/26/20 Page 3 of 3
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Cooks. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I
signed the attached declaration on Mr. Cooks’ behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Cooks is currently being held at Franklin Parish Correctional Center. In-person
visitation has been suspended indefinitely. 4. I spoke with Mr. Cooks over the phone. Mr. Cooks has confirmed that I can sign on his
behalf as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 24, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 24, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-14 04/26/20 Page 1 of 3
DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER HYMES: I, Christopher Hymes, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Christopher Hymes. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am post-trial and am being held in Franklin Parish. It is my belief that I had a non-
unanimous jury. I am in a dorm with 50 people. We are locked down in the dorm for 23 hours a day. 4. I have heard about people being moved to Camp J when they test positive for COVID-19. 5. I do not want to be moved to Camp J at Angola. 6. If I test positive, I want to make sure I am close to a hospital. 7. If I test positive, I would prefer to be home with my family, recovering and staying away from other people who are sick. My family lives near a hospital. 8. If I test positive and can’t go home, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans or the medical monitoring station in Baton Rouge. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary. 9. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to prove them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-14 04/26/20 Page 2 of 3
attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff. 10. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of my criminal proceedings against me or others. 11. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. 12. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Christopher Hymes April 24, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-14 04/26/20 Page 3 of 3
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Hymes. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I
signed the attached declaration on Mr. Hymes’ behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Hymes is currently being held at Franklin Parish Correctional Center. In-person
visitation has been suspended indefinitely. 4. I spoke with Mr. Hymes over the phone. Mr. Hymes has confirmed that I can sign on his
behalf as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 24, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 24, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-15 04/26/20 Page 1 of 4
DECLARATION OF JULIUS ALLEN: I, Julius Allen, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Julius Allen. 2. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to make this declaration. 3. I am 33 years old. 4. I am pre-trial and being held in Unit A2 at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. Before this, I
was being held in Unit Q11 and 12. I was moved to A2 on April 8, 2020. 5. I was tested for COVID-19 around two o’clock in the morning on April 9, 2020. 6. I am suffering from a fever, severe body aches, difficulty breathing, weakness, disorientation,
and diarrhea. I have been having these symptoms for at least 5-7 days. 7. I have pre-existing medical conditions, including diabetes, hypertension, high cholesterol,
and a history of bronchitis. I take medications for these conditions. 8. On April 9, I was taken from East Baton Rouge Parish Prison to Our Lady of the Lake
hospital in Baton Rouge in order to receive medical attention. The hospital told me there was a 10/10 chance I was COVID positive because I had the symptoms, including a fever. The hospital checked my oxygen and said it was good enough at that point and they could admit me if I later needed a ventilator. 9. I was told by a guard that I tested positive for COVID-19 on April 10 but was not shown my test results. I did not talk to a nurse or doctor about my test results. 10. On April 11, two guards came in and told my cellmate Kendrick Wilson that transport was waiting for him. Mr. Wilson said he did not want to be transferred and the guards forced him out of the cell and handcuffed him. It is my understanding that they took him to Camp J at Angola.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-15 04/26/20 Page 2 of 4
11. The guards have told me that I will not be shown my test results but that I will be transferred to Camp J if they are positive, voluntarily or non-voluntarily. I do not want to go to Camp J.
12. On April 12, 2020, at approximately 8:35 p.m., a nurse came and told me she needed to another nasal swab sample to do another COVID-19 test. I told her they had already done a test and would not share the results so I did not want to do another test at this time. I asked her what happened to the results of my first test and she said they had the results but weren’t going to give them to me.
13. I have asked the guards for the paperwork at least ten times so that I could file an emergency grievance and they have refused to bring it to me. I was told that a superior guard said “that will have to be on hold for now,” in reference to my request. I was also told that they didn’t have any forms.
14. Because of my pre-existing medical conditions, I am worried that I will develop even worse symptoms and need to be hospitalized. I have already been to the hospital once.
15. I would prefer to be home with my wife and three daughters in Baton Rouge, recovering and staying away from other people who are also sick.
16. If I can’t go home, I would prefer to go to the medical facility at the convention center in New Orleans. It is my belief that they have appropriate staff, medical isolation, and the ability to house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 who are incarcerated. It is my belief that I can be transported easily from there to a hospital for treatment if it becomes necessary.
17. As a named plaintiff, to the best of my ability, I have been working with my lawyers to help them prepare and work on this case. I will continue to do so. I am available to them to assist with the case, and they are available to me to answer questions and to explain and keep me

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-15 04/26/20 Page 3 of 4
updated on the litigation. I regularly speak with my attorneys and their staff to provide them information in support of this lawsuit. I have responded and will continue to respond to the lawyers’ requests for information about adequate health care and other conditions of confinement to the best of my ability. I intend to continue working zealously with my attorneys on behalf of other individuals detained in Louisiana as long as I am a named plaintiff. 18. I seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class and subclass. I am not seeking monetary damages, and I understand this this civil case will not result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings against me or others. 19. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. 20. This declaration was read to me in English and I was able to make changes and corrections.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature:
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar on behalf of Julius Allen April 25, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-15 04/26/20 Page 4 of 4
I, Nishi Kumar, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in Louisiana. 2. I represent the declarant Mr. Allen. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I
signed the attached declaration on Julius Allen’s behalf with his express consent. 3. Mr. Allen is currently being held at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. Visitation has been
suspended since March 19, 2020. No in-person attorney visits are being scheduled at East Baton Rouge Prison. 4. I spoke with Mr. Allen over the phone. Mr. Allen has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was executed on April 25, 2020 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar April 25, 2020

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-16 04/26/20 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU,

TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

REGINALD

GEORGE,

LIONEL

TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL

PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS

ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO

GARNER,

BRADLEY

WINTERS,

KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES

HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity

as Governor of the State of Louisiana;

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES

LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary

of the Department of Safety and Corrections;

JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as

Medical Director of the Department of Safety

and

Corrections;

LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and

STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity

as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana

Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00231-SDDRLB
CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

[PROPOSED] ORDER Considering the foregoing Motion for Leave to File a Reply Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Their Motion may be filed. Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this ___ day of ______________, 2020.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 26-16 04/26/20 Page 2 of 2
_______________________________ CHIEF JUDGE SHELLY DICK
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Nishi Kumar, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 26, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system. I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415
2

 
 Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25 04/25/20 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU, TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE, REGINALD GEORGE, LIONEL TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO GARNER, BRADLEY WINTERS, KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Safety and Corrections; JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as Medical Director of the Department of Safety and Corrections; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00231-SDDRLB CLASS ACTION
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Plaintiffs respectfully request an order certifying Named Plaintiffs Daniel Gumns, Michael Videau, Trevon Wiley, Ian Cazenave, Reginald George, Lionel Tolbert, Otto Barrera, Kentrell Parker, Michael Robinson, Julius Allen, Ernest Rogers, Alfoanso Garner, Bradley Winters, Kendrick Wilson, and James Hughes to represent a class consisting of: (1) a subclass of all incarcerated individuals who are, or will in the future be, subject to

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25 04/25/20 Page 2 of 4
the medical care policies and practices of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and
Corrections (“DOC”), and subjected to DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices; and (2) a subclass
of all individuals being held in pre-trial detention who are, or will in the future be, subjected to the
medical care policies and practices of the DOC, and subjected to the DOC’s COVID-19 policies
and practices. Plaintiffs further request that the Court appoint the undersigned counsel as counsel
for the class and subclasses.
For the reasons set forth in the memorandum of law filed herewith, the proposed class
satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements of
Rule 23(a) and the requirements of both Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(1)(A). In addition, the
undersigned counsel are suitable for appointment as class counsel under Rule 23(g). Plaintiffs
proposed class and subclasses should be certified and undersigned counsel should be appointed as
counsel for the class and subclasses.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of April, 2020.
/s/ Mercedes Montagnes Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287 Jamila Johnson, La. Bar No. 37953 Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415 The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70117 Telephone: (504) 529-5955 Facsimile: (504) 595-8006 Email: mmontagnes@defendla.org
Jared Davidson, La. Bar No. 37093 Southern Poverty Law Center 201 Saint Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone: (504) 486-8982 Facsimile: (504) 486-8947 Email: jared.davidson@splcenter.org
Melinda Haag, Pro Hac Vice

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25 04/25/20 Page 3 of 4
Sharon Frase, Pro Hac Vice Lacey Bangle, Pro Hac Vice Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP 405 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105-2669 Tel: (415) 773-5495 Fax: (415) 773-5759 Email: mhaag@orrick.com Email: sfrase@orrick.com Email: lbangle@orrick.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25 04/25/20 Page 4 of 4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Nishi Kumar, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 25, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system. I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-1 04/25/20 Page 1 of 26

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU, TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE, REGINALD GEORGE, LIONEL TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO GARNER, BRADLEY WINTERS, KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Safety and Corrections; JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as Medical Director of the Department of Safety and Corrections; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00231-SDDRLB
CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

I.

INTRODUCTION

Without this Court’s intervention, the tens of thousands of individuals currently imprisoned

by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DOC”) or detained pre-trial in

Louisiana have little hope of enduring the current worldwide viral pandemic of COVID-19

unharmed. People in carceral settings already face a heightened risk from COVID-19 because they

1

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-1 04/25/20 Page 2 of 26
are not able to engage in social distancing and other life-saving measures that have become everyday practice in most communities.1 Despite COVID-19’s deadly risks and Defendants’ affirmative and non-delegable duty to keep detained people safe, Defendants have failed to implement medically necessary and adequate system-wide preventative measures to protect people from the substantial risk of harm stemming from COVID-19. Defendants’ inadequate plans and dangerous inactions promise to increase transmission, expose vulnerable populations to this deadly virus, and prevent patients from obtaining necessary medical care. System-wide declaratory and injunctive relief is imperative to protect Plaintiffs and all other detained persons who are or will be subjected to Defendants’ dangerously deficient response.
Named Plaintiffs seek this prospective relief on behalf of a Class defined as: “All prisoners and pretrial detainees who are, or will in the future be, subjected to Defendants’ COVID-19 policies, practices, and omissions.” Named Plaintiffs further seek to subdivide the Class defined above into two Subclasses defined as follows:
Subclass I: All incarcerated individuals who are, or will in the future be, subjected to Defendants’ COVID-19 policies, practices, and omissions. Subclass II: All individuals being held in pre-trial detention who are, or will in the future be, subjected Defendants’ COVID-19 policies, practices, and omissions. Both Subclasses easily satisfy the certification requirements of Rule 23. As detailed below, Defendants’ deficient COVID-19 response impacts the tens of thousands of class members in exactly the same way—all face a constitutionally intolerable risk of harm due to Defendants’ systemwide policies, practices, and omissions. Just as in this Court’s order certifying the Lewis Class, to
1 To help prevent transmission, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) urges that people stay apart, wash their hands frequently, cover their mouths and noses, stay at home if they can, and consult a doctor if their symptoms worsen. See CDC, How to Protect Yourself and Others, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2020); see also, CDC, What to Do if You Are Sick, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/if-you-are-sick/steps-when-sick.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-1 04/25/20 Page 3 of 26
remediate these common defects in Defendants’ COVID-19 response, this Court need not engage in any determinations regarding the individual circumstances of any particular class member; rather, the Court must only determine whether Defendants’ actions (and inactions) are sufficiently inadequate to warrant declaratory and injunctive relief. Further, because these systemic deficiencies generally apply to all members of the putative Class, all Class members will benefit from prospective relief that remediates these defects and thereby abates the substantial risk of harm stemming therefrom. Courts—including this one in Lewis—routinely certify such classes that seek to remediate systemic defects in prison system’s provision of medical care. Here, certification is not only proper but also crucially necessary to protect the health and safety of all Class members subjected to Defendants’ unconstitutional policies, practices and omissions.2 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. The COVID-19 Health Crisis is an Unprecedented Global Pandemic That Requires Swift and Dramatic Coordinated Action to Prevent Further Widespread Illness and Death, Particularly in Prisons
The people of Louisiana, and throughout the world, face an unprecedented threat to their lives. In the last four months, the COVID-19 pandemic has killed more than 184,000 people worldwide, at least 1,540 of them in Louisiana.3 COVID-19 is known to spread from person to person through respiratory droplets, close personal contact, and from contact with contaminated
2 See, e.g., Fraihat v. ICE, No. 5:19-cv-01546-JGB-SHK, Dkt. 133 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2020) (certifying nationwide class of medically vulnerable people in ICE custody in light of COVID-19 risks). 3 Coronavirus Map: Tracking the Global Outbreak, N.Y TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/world/coronavirus-maps.html#map (last visited Apr. 25, 2020); Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
3

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-1 04/25/20 Page 4 of 26
surfaces or objects.4 There is no cure for this highly contagious and deadly virus.5 Instead, social
distancing and ready access to adequate medical care are the only reliable ways to mitigate risk from
the virus’ lethal consequences. The calls for individuals and organizations throughout the world to
adopt these measures have been uniform, and have led to entire countries, states, and cities being
locked down, in an extraordinary and remarkable battle to stop the spread of this deadly virus.6
Indeed, the vast majority of the American population is under strict instructions to stay at home.7
While most Louisianans can shelter in place and self-determine their own medical care, the
men and women in the State’s prisons and jails are easy targets in the increasingly perilous
circumstances of their confinement, entirely dependent upon Defendants for protection.8
Congregate settings such as jails and prisons allow for rapid spread of infectious diseases that are
transmitted person to person, especially those like COVID-19 passed by droplets through coughing
4 CDC, Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients with Suspected or Confirmed Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Healthcare Settings, https://cutt.ly/VtYYiDG (last visited Apr. 24, 2020). 5 Declaration of Dr. Michael Puisis Concerning the Risk of the Spread of COVID-10 in the Louisiana State Prison (LSP) at Angola (“Puisis Decl.”), Dkt. 15-2 ¶ 2. 6 Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Conference (March 13, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarkspresident-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-conference-3/; Public Health Emergency – COVID-19, State of Louisiana, Exec. Dept. Proclamation No. 25 JBE 2020 (Mar. 11, 2020); Additional Measures for COVID-19: Stay at Home, State of Louisiana, Exec. Dept. Proclamation No. 33 JBE 2020; State of Emergency for COVID-19 – Elementary and Secondary Education, State of Louisiana, Exec. Dept. Proclamation No. 47 JBE 2020 (closing all public school systems in Louisiana for the remainder of the 2019-20 school year). 7 See Which States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2020). 8 The Justice Collaborative, Explainer: Prisons and Jails are Particularly Vulnerable to COVID-19 Outbreaks, https://thejusticecollaborative.com/ wp-content/uploads/2020/03/TJCVulnerabilityof PrisonsandJailstoCOVID19 Explainer.pdf. (“[B]ehind bars, some of the most basic disease prevention measures are against the rules or simply impossible. Separating sick people from well people to prevent the disease from spreading can be nearly impossible in prison, since prisoners are already grouped according to security and other logistical considerations. Even so-called social distancing can prove impossible. People in prisons and jails live every minute of the day in close proximity to each other.”).
4

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and sneezing.9 Jails and prisons house inmates in large numbers, in close quarters, often with
minimal bath facilities.10 Individuals in custody frequently suffer from chronic underlying health
conditions, like asthma, diabetes, hypertension, or HIV, that place them at elevated risk for
contracting serious COVID-19.11 Though age is another high-risk group for COVID-19 illness and
death, the DOC houses the elderly and those with significant medical conditions together—a recipe
for serious infection and death.12 As the morbid reports from cruise ships, nursing homes, and other
prison systems have made clear, the health risks Louisiana prisoners face from the COVID-19 crisis
are truly horrifying.13
Courts across the country are attempting to reduce these significant health risks—to inmates,
correctional staff, and the outside community at large—created by prison populations in the face of
the COVID-19 epidemic.14
9 Puisis Decl., Dkt. 15-2 ¶ 7; Declaration of Dr. Susan Vassallo Concerning the Risk of COVID-19 in the Louisiana State Prison at Angola (“Vassallo Decl”)., Dkt. 15-3 at ¶ 7. 10 Declaration of Daniel Gumns (“Gumns Decl.”), Dkt. 15-7 ¶¶ 5-8; Declaration of Ian Cazenave (“Cazenave Decl.”), Dkt. 15-8 ¶¶ 5-8. 11 Puisis Decl., Dkt. 15-2 ¶ 12; Vassallo Decl., Dkt. 15-3 ¶ 10; Laura M. Maruschak et al. (2015), Medical Problems of State and Federal Prisoners and Jail Inmates, 2011-12. NCJ 248491. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, available at https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mpsfpji1112.pdf. 12 Puisis Decl., Dkt 15-2 ¶¶ 10, 12. 13 CDC, COVID-19 and Cruise Ship Travel, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices/warning/coronavirus-cruise-ship (last visited Apr. 24, 2020); Los Angeles Times, Seattle-Area Nursing Home Deaths Jump to 13 with COVID-19 and 11 of Unknown Causes, (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-03-07/nursing-homecoronavirus-deaths; LEGAL AID SOCIETY, Analysis of COVID-19 Infection Rate in NYC Jails, (Apr. 4, 2020), available at https://cutt.ly/utD6u5F; Zi Yang, Cracks in the System: COVID-19 in Chinese Prisons, THE DIPLOMAT, (Mar. 9, 2020), available at https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/cracks-in-thesystem-covid-19-in-chinese-prisons/. 14 See, e.g., Savino v. Souza, No. 20-10617-WGY, 2020 WL 1703844 at *1 (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2020) (recognizing, in certifying a class action brought by ICE detainees addressing the conditions of confinement at that facility, the “especially grim moment” presented by the COVID-19 pandemic); see also Jimenez v. Cromen, No. 18-10225-MLW (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2020) (ordering release of immigrant detainee in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and noting that “[b]eing in a jail enhances risk” and that in jail “[s]ocial distancing is difficult or impossible”); United States v. Stephens, No. 15-cr-95-AJN, 2020 WL 1295155, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2020) (ordering the release of inmate in Federal Bureau of Prisons custody due, in part, to risk posed by COVID-19 in the facility);
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On March 23, 2020, the CDC issued Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (Covid-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities (the “Interim Guidance”),15 setting
forth various “Operational Preparedness” steps that it describes as “essential actions” that
correctional and detention facilities should take to plan and prepare for COVID-19.16 Defendants
have ignored and are violating the Interim Guidance each and every day putting the lives of Class
Members at an extremely high risk of serious harm, including death.17
In the Matter of Extradition of Alejandro Manrique, No. 19-mj-71055, 2020 WL 1307109, at *1 (N. D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020) (ordering change to conditions of bail for an individual to postpone incarceration, in part in light of risk of vulnerability to the coronavirus); United States v. Barkman, No. 3:19-cr-0052-RCJ-WGC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45628, at *3-9, *11 (D. Nev. Mar. 17, 2020) (suspending a parolee’s sentence of intermittent confinement in light of the pandemic). On March 22, 2020, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a consent order for the presumptive release of approximately 1,000 persons by March 26, 2020. 15 See CDC, Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correctiondetention/guidance-correctional-detention.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2020). 16 Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court take judicial notice of the CDC’s Interim Guidance, a publicly-released government document. See Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Kliebert, 141 F.Supp.3d 604, n.34 (M.D. La. 2015) (a court may “take judicial notice of publically-available [sic] documents and transcripts produced by a state or federal agency ‘which were matters of public record directly relevant to the issue at hand.”); see also Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 805 F.3d 516, 518-19 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2015) (taking judicial notice of public records available on state government website); Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao, 418 F.3d 453, 457 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2005) (taking judicial notice of an entity’s status as the collective bargaining representative based on public information regarding the entity’s history posted on a governmental agency website). 17 The CDC’s Interim Guidance includes, but is not limited to:: (a) creating and testing “communication plans to disseminate critical information to incarcerated/detained persons, staff, contractors, vendors, and visitors as the pandemic progresses;” (b) identifying physical locations (dedicated housing areas and bathrooms) to isolate confirmed COVID-19 cases and individuals displaying COVID-19 symptoms and to quarantine known close contacts of cases; (c) for facilities without onsite health care capacity, creating “a plan for how they will ensure that suspected COVID-19 cases will be isolated, evaluated, tested (if indicated) and provided necessary medical care;” (d) creating a “list of possible social distancing strategies that could be implemented as needed at different stages of transmission intensity; (e) exploring “strategies to prevent over-crowding of correctional and detention facilities during a community outbreak;” and (f) posting signage throughout the facility, in all appropriate languages, communicating the symptoms of COVID-19 and appropriate hand hygiene instructions.
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B. Defendants’ Policies, Practices and Omissions in Response to COVID-19 Expose Class Members to an Unreasonable Risk of Serious Harm
Defendants have wholly failed to implement adequate policies and procedures in response to the deadly COVID-19 pandemic. These failures, viewed in their totality, threaten all Class members18 with infection, life-altering complications, and even death.
On March 20, 2020, DOC reissued its existing Department Regulation No. HCP 26, “Influenza and Pandemic Viral Diseases: Preparedness, Response and Recovery” Regulation (“Pandemic Flu Plan”).19 Tellingly, this 10-page document does not even once reference COVID-19, and altogether fails to address medically necessary issues that are crucial for responding to COVID19 in correctional facilities according to the CDC and other authorities.
For example, the CDC outlines numerous responses that should be a part of any COVID-19 response plan in correctional systems, including but not limited to: following clinical guidance for COVID-19 treatment; how correctional facilities should modify housing arrangements; implementing social distancing procedures; coordination with public health authorities; implementation of disease surveillance; and implementation of procedures to protect individuals
18 Defendants’ dangerously inadequate responses applies generally to both the DOC and pre-trial Subclasses. For example, in addition to having custodial authority over convicted persons, the DOC is statutorily authorized to bring into its “temporary, constructive custody inmates evacuated” from a parish affected by an emergency or disaster declared under La. R.S. 29.721, even if “the inmates . . . are awaiting trial as a pretrial detainee.” Governor Edwards declared an emergency under La. R.S. 29.721, and by implementing its Camp J transfer plan, the DOC is taking into its constructive custody pretrial detainees and is therefore responsible for the care of those it transfers to state prisons. Likewise, Defendant DOH has “exclusive jurisdiction, control and authority” “[t]o enact provisions regulating the standards of health and decency and building regulations of all prisons, jails, lock-ups, and camps where prisoners are detained or confined.” La. R.S. 40:5(4). 19 Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court take judicial notice of the DOC’s Pandemic Flu Plan, a publicly-released government document, attached at Exhibit 3. See supra n.16.
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who are particularly medically vulnerable.20 DOC’s Pandemic Flu Plan fails to adequately address all of these issues—and to the extent they are mentioned at all, the guidance is altogether lacking.
As a direct consequence of DOC’s failure to promulgate adequate guidance, individual facilities’ Flu Plans also fail to address adequately these issues, and omit or inadequately addresses others. For example, Dr. Puisis reviewed a sample facility Flu Plan, and found it be “a generic influenza-like-illness plan which is not consistent with guidance regarding COVID-19 and should not be used.”21 The inadequacy of DOC’s Pandemic Flu Plan has clearly infected the facility Flu Plans. For instance, Dr. Puisis explained there are many ways in which the facility Flu Plan he reviewed is contrary to necessary guidance on COVID-19 by the CDC and “could result in increased transmission of infection.” One example he used related to LSP’s facility Flu Plan’s inadequate guidance on staff infections.22 The language in LSP’s facility Flu Plan23 is identical to the facility flu plan for Dixon Correctional Institute (“DCI”).24 Both are almost identical to the DOC Pandemic Flu Plan.25
The deficiencies in the LSP facility plan—such as the plan’s failure to address necessary isolation needs for people who are positive for COVID-19 or are under investigation; failure to provide hospitalization guidelines; and failure to ensure that pre-existing deficiencies in the provision of medical care are remediated so as to ensure that patients are adequately treated for COVID-19— exist across the facility plans and in the DOC Pandemic Flu Plan. Indeed, a simple comparison between the plans for LSP and DCI show how these plans likewise fail to adequately address the
20 See CDC, Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correctiondetention/guidance-correctional-detention.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2020). 21 Puisis Decl., Dkt. 15-02 ¶ 28. 22 Puisis Decl., Dkt. 15-02 at n.19. 23 See Declaration of Jamila Johnson (“Johnson Decl.”), Exhibit 1 (“LSP Flu Plan”), at 25-26. 24 Johnson Decl., Exhibit 2 (“DCI Flu Plan”), at 13. 25 Exhibit 3, Pandemic Flu Plan, at 9.
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issues prescribed by the CDC. 26 Not surprisingly then, DOC’s overall failure to provide adequate guidance to facilities has likewise resulted in dangerously inadequate conditions in facilities across the state.27
The CDC guidance also makes clear the need for robust and adequate testing of individuals who may be suspected of COVID-19.28 Yet, the evidence shows that Defendants have systematically failed to implement sufficient testing for Class members. As of April 23, Defendants had tested only 299 people out of the tens of thousands of people in DOC custody.29 More than a third of those tests resulted in positive cases.30 Given the Defendants’ failure to ensure adequate testing, these numbers likely represent just the tip of the iceberg in terms of overall positive cases in DOC facilities overall, meaning that countless COVID-19 positive persons are likely further spreading the infection.
Making matters worse, DOC has not only failed to follow the CDC’s guidance, but has also failed to even follow the (now rescinded) guidance of the Louisiana Department of Health (LDH).31 To provide but one example, the LDH guidance requires correctional facilities to ensure that proper social distancing of 6 feet is exercised by all detained people in order to reduce transmission; yet DOC’s guidance altogether fails to delineate or mandate social distancing procedures.32 And, the
26 Puisis Decl., Dkt. 15-02 ¶¶ 17-20; see generally Johnson Decl., Exhibit 2 (“DCI Flu Plan”); Exhibit 3, Pandemic Flu Plan. 27 See, e.g., Marlowe v. LeBlanc, 3:18-cv-00063-BAJ-EWD, Dkt. 115 at pp. 9-10 (detailing inadequate COVID-19 responses at Rayburn Correctional Center). 28 See CDC, Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correctiondetention/guidance-correctional-detention.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2020). 29 See Situational Awareness Report, LA. BUSINESS EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER, https://www.labeoc.org/alerts/Alert_Details.aspx?id=1559 (last visited Apr. 25, 2020). 30 Id. 31 Louisiana Department of Health, Office of Public Health, COVID-19; recommendations regarding prisons and juvenile detention centers (“LDH Guidance”) (Apr. 8, 2020). Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court take judicial notice of these recommendations, publicly-released government documents, attached at Exhibit 4. See supra n.16. 32 Compare id. at 3 with Exhibit 3, Pandemic Flu Plan.
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evidence shows that detained individuals are not able to exercise this crucially needed preventative measure.33
Defendant DOH has likewise failed to provide a constitutionally adequate response to COVID-19. Though it rescinded its guidance by memorandum, dated April 8, 2020, LDH has failed to promulgate anything new to guide DOC’s practices relating to the pandemic.34 LDH has failed to issue any steps to provide oversight for quarantine, medical isolation, transportation, and hygiene practices in the state and local correctional systems. This is particularly problematic when state law entrusts LDH with the “exclusive jurisdiction, control, and authority” over these activities.35 Defendants have not promulgated policies to ensure adequate staffing; resources; quality assurance; surveillance; auditing; data tracking; education; clinical guidance and training; or coordination with local, state, and federal health officials.36 They have not made arrangements for each COVID-19 patient in DOC custody to be evaluated by a medical professional and initiate transfers of such patients only at the recommendation of the evaluating medical professional.37 LDH has not assessed and made recommendations regarding conditions of confinement in all Louisiana jails and prisons consistent with the CDC’s social distancing guidelines.38 Defendants have not conformed all policies and guidance in local parish prisons and parish jails that hold state prisoners to such recommendations.39 These failures to take even the most basic precautions, including
33 See, e.g., Gumns Decl., Dkt. 15-08 ¶ 7 (housed in close quarters in a dorm with approximately 80 people); Cazenave Decl., Dkt. 15-08 ¶ 6 (housed in close quarters in a dorm with approximately 86 other people). 34 Nicholas Chrastil, The Louisiana Department of Health issued recommendations on how to stop the spread of coronavirus in prisons – then rescinded them, THE LENS NOLA (Apr. 13, 2020), available at https://thelensnola.org/2020/04/13/the-louisiana-department-of-health-issued-recommendationson-how-to-stop-the-spread-of-coronavirus-in-prisons-then-rescinded-them/ 35 La. R.S. § 40:5. 36 See generally Exhibit 3, Pandemic Flu Plan; Exhibit 4, LDH Guidance (rescinded Apr. 9, 2020). 37 Id. 38 Id. 39 Id.
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recommendations outlined in the CDC Guidance, have exposed the Class to an unreasonable risk of serious harm.
Another example of DOC’s poor response to COVID-19 is the Transfer Plan, under which patients housed in DOC facilities or local parish prisons and jails who test positive for COVID-19 may be transported to LSP’s Camp J and potentially one or two other State prisons for medical isolation.40 Yet the Transfer Plan flies in the face of current medical guidance and defies common sense. It exposes all Class members to an unreasonable risk of significant harm and must be immediately enjoined.41 It is indisputable that LSP is not equipped to treat COVID-19 patients, is medically understaffed, and lacks the necessary medical expertise.42 LSP is remote; the nearest hospital that can treat critical COVID patients is more than an hour’s drive away.43 Given the unpredictable and often rapid deterioration of COVID-19 patients who had only recently shown mild or no symptoms, these conditions expose Class Members to an unacceptable and unreasonable risk of serious harm.44 The Transfer Plan will also undoubtedly exacerbate the rise of COVID-19 among the already elderly and medically vulnerable population at LSP.45
40 Vasallo Decl., Dkt. 15-3 ¶ 11; Declaration of Julius Allen, Dkt. 15-05 ¶ 11; Declaration of Kendrick Wilson, Dkt. 15-4 ¶ 11. As of April 21, 2020, it was reported that 89 COVID-19-positive inmates had been transferred from local jails to Camp J, including 18 inmates from Baton Rouge, 10 inmates from Franklin Parish, 10 inmates from Caldwell Parish, and 9 inmates from Tammany Parish. See After expanded testing New Orleans jail sees spike in confirmed coronavirus cases, THE LENS NOLA (Apr. 22, 2020), available at https://thelensnola.org/2020/04/22/after-expanded-testing-neworleans-jail-sees-spike-in-confirmed-coronavirus-cases/. 41 Pls. Mem. Supp. TRO, Dkt. 15-01, at 17. 42 Vasallo Decl., Dkt. 15-3 ¶¶ 11, 13, 14. 43 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 12, 14, 16; see also Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318, Dkt. 585 at 7 (“If an offender housed at Camp J begins to exhibit severe symptoms, he will be transport [sic] to an outside hospital. Offenders transferred to Camp J will not be sent to the ATU or the treatment center at LSP.”). 44 Vasallo Decl., Dkt. 15-3, ¶¶ 7, 12. 45 Puisis Decl., Dkt. 15-2 ¶10.
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In short, Defendants’ deficient COVID-19 policies, practices, and omissions will result in numerous preventable deaths, produce unnecessary pain and suffering, and exacerbate the amount of medical complications throughout the state.
C. Defendants are Aware of the Risks That Their COVID-19 Policies and Practices Create
Defendants are well aware of the grave risks to the Class Members posed by COVID-19, as well as necessity for a sufficient COVID-19 management plan. On April 14, 2020, Defendants Edwards and LeBlanc publicly announced a plan to consider certain inmates for release under a set of restrictive conditions, recognizing the pressing need to reduce the overall prison population.46 As part of that plan, the DOC created an administrative review panel to consider a select group of state prison inmates for temporary medical release.47 As of Friday, April 17, only 11 people were cleared for release under this plan.
The DOH, through its offices and officers, is responsible for the development and providing of health and medical services for the prevention of disease for the citizens of Louisiana.48 DOH’s Secretary is responsible for the “administration, control, and operation of the functions, programs, and affairs.”49 The state health officer and the LDH has exclusive jurisdiction, control, and authority to enact provisions regulating the standards of health and decency and building regulations of all prisons, jails, lock-ups, and camps where prisoners are detained or confined. R.S. §
46 Edwards: Furloughs to be granted to some inmates, KATC3 (Apr. 14, 2020) available at https://www.katc.com/news/covering-louisiana/governor-to-hold-tuesday-press-briefing-on-covid19. 47 Lea Skene, Panel will meet behind closed doors to decide Louisiana inmate releases amid coronavirus threat, THE ADVOCATE (Apr. 17, 2020), available at https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/coronavirus/article_fd295732-80e2-11ea-9437cfac6cd49a20.html 48 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36:251. 49 Id. §§ 36:253, 36.254.
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40:5. The now-rescinded April 8, LDH guidance to DOC also reflects a clear understanding by
LDH officials and others of the threat COVID-19 poses to the state’s prisoners.50
Defendants are also well aware of the appalling conditions at Camp J and the lack of proper
medical staffing, expertise, supplies, and sanitation at LSP needed to combat this threat..51 Prior
reviews of LSP facilities have noted these inadequacies.52 Camp J, specifically, was so notoriously
unfit to house prisoners (even healthy ones), that it was shut down in May 2018.53
III. LEGAL STANDARD
To proceed as an injunctive Class, Plaintiffs must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b).54 Rule 23 does not require Plaintiffs to show that questions common
to the Class “will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.”55 “Rule 23 grants courts no
license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage. Merits questions may be
considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the
Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.”56 “The decision to certify is within the
broad discretion of” this Court.57
50 Nicholas Chrastil, The Louisiana Department of Health issued recommendations on how to stop the spread of coronavirus in prisons – then rescinded them, THE LENS (Apr. 13, 2020), available at https://thelensnola.org/2020/04/13/the-louisiana-department-of-health-issued-recommendationson-how-to-stop-the-spread-of-coronavirus-in-prisons-then-rescinded-them/ 51 Grace Toohey, Angola Closes Its Notorious Camp J, "a Microcosm of a lot of Things that are Wrong," THE ADVOCATE, (May 13, 2018), available at https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_b39f1e82-4d84-11e8bbc2-1ff70a3227e7.html (reporting that Defendant LeBlanc has said of Camp J, that “Defendant Secretary James LeBlanc has said of Camp J that “it's just not a good place to be”). 52 Puisis Decl., Dkt. 15-2 ¶ 11. 53 Grace Toohey, Angola Closes Its Notorious Camp J, “a Microcosm of a lot of Things that Are Wrong”, THE ADVOCATE, (May 13, 2018, 8:01 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_b39f1e82-4d84-11e8bbc2-1ff70a3227e7.html 54 M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 837 (5th Cir. 2012). 55 Cole v. Livingston, No. 4:14-CV-1698, 2016 WL 3258345, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 14, 2016) (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 459 (2013)). 56 Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013). 57 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1996).
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IV. ARGUMENT The proposed Class readily meets the requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b). The Class is
sufficiently numerous: approximately 46,600 individuals are currently in the DOC’s immediate custody or are currently detained pre-trial in Louisiana. All Class Members are bound together by common questions of law and fact: the class claims all arise out of Defendants’ inadequate and dangerous statewide COVID-19 response (or lack thereof). Named Plaintiffs are typical of the proposed Class: they are members of the Class, have suffered the same injuries as the proposed Class Members, and seek relief that will benefit the Class as a whole. Named Plaintiffs and their counsel will adequately and vigorously represent the Class. Finally, certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendants are creating and maintaining conditions that put the Class at imminent risk of contracting and dying from COVID-19, they have “acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class.” Alternatively, certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because individual adjudication of Class Members’ claims would risk creating inconsistent decisions that would establish varying standards to which Defendants would have to adhere in responding to COVID-19.
A. The proposed Class Satisfies the Numerosity, Commonality, Typicality, and Adequacy Requirements of Rule 23(a) 1. Numerosity
There can be no serious dispute that the proposed Class meets Rule 23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement. Joinder is impracticable for a number of reasons. First, the proposed Class consists of over 46,600 members, including approximately 31,600 individuals serving sentences in the DOC’s correctional facilities and parish jails, and another approximately 15,000 individuals held pretrial in parish jails that the DOC reimburses on a per-diem basis.58 Thus, the Class and Subclasses are too
58 Briefing Book, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (January 2020), available at https://s32082.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/0Z-Full-Jan-2020-BB-3.13.2020.pdf;
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numerous for joinder to be practicable, because classes of more than 40 members are generally large enough to warrant certification.59 Second, the proposed Class is fluid due to the ever-changing populations of prisons and jails, which “counsels in favor of including certification of all present and future members,”60 and the indeterminate number of future Class Members makes joinder impracticable.61 Third, the Class Members are “geographically dispersed” across the state in state prisons and parish jails, “further indicating that joinder is impracticable.”62 Finally, Class Members are incarcerated, rendering their ability to institute individual lawsuits limited, particularly in light of the DOC’s reduced or eliminated visitation and court closures in Louisiana instituted to address COVID-19 concerns. Accordingly, the numerosity requirement is easily satisfied.
2. Commonality The proposed Class and its named representatives share factual and legal issues more than adequate to satisfy commonality because Plaintiffs’ claims “depend upon a common contention” that “is capable of classwide resolution” such that “determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”63 The central question driving this case is whether Defendants’ statewide response, or lack thereof, to COVID-19 violates Plaintiffs’ rights. That is, “all members of the proposed class share [the] common claim” that
American Civil Liberties Union, Justice Can’t Wait: An Indictment of Louisiana’s Pretrial System (Mar. 2020) (estimating that on a given day there are 15,189 people jailed pretrial every day in Louisiana). Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court take judicial notice of the DOC Briefing Book, a publicly-released government document. See supra, n. 16. 59 See Lewis v. Cain, 324 F.R.D. 159, 168 (M.D. La. 2018); see also Braggs v. Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634, 654 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (class of approximately 3400 prisoners across multiple facilities “exceeds the customary numerosity threshold by a factor of 85”). 60 Lewis, 324 F.R.D. at 168. 61 See Nelson v. Constant, No. 17-14581, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164853, at *9 (E.D. La. Sep. 25, 2018). 62 Morrow v. Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172, 191 (E.D. Tex. 2011). 63 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
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Defendant’s COVID-19 response plan is inadequate and exposes all Class Members to a substantial
risk of serious harm—thus, commonality is satisfied.64
Named Plaintiffs satisfy the commonality requirement because Class Members have
numerous questions of fact and law in common, and “even a single common question” can satisfy
the commonality requirement.65 The Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit, and countless other courts
have recognized that common questions exist in cases, such as this, alleging systemic deficiencies in
the provision of medical care at prisons that expose class members to a risk of harm—even if that
harm does not ultimately manifest as to each class or where class members face differing levels of
risk.66 Here, the common questions of fact shared by all Class Members include, but are not limited
to:
 Whether Defendants are aware of the substantial risk of serious harm Class Members face under the DOC’s COVID-19 response plan;
 Whether Defendants have taken reasonable measures to abate the substantial risk of serious harm caused by the COVID-19 pandemic for the individuals who are within their custody;
 Whether Defendants have promulgated adequate policies to protect against the harms of COVID-19;
 Whether Defendants have ensured that prisons and jails have sufficient oversight, staffing, and resources to protect people from COVID-19; and
 Whether the DOC’s COVID-19 response plan is consistent with the appropriate standard of care, as evidence by the CDC guidelines.
The common questions of law shared by all Class Members include, but are not limited to:
 Whether Class Members face a constitutionally intolerable risk of serious harm under the DOC’s COVID-19 response plan; and
64 See Lewis, 324 F.R.D. at 169 (“Commonality requires showing that, in fact, all members of the proposed class share a common claim.”) (citations omitted). 65 See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359. 66 See, e.g., Plata, 563 U.S. at 506-08; M.D., 675 F.3d at 838-39; Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2004); Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 681 (9th Cir. 2014); Dockery v. Fischer, 253 F. Supp. 3d 832, 848 (S.D. Miss. 2015); Decoteau v. Raemisch, 304 F.R.D. 683, 688-89 (D. Colo. 2014); Redmond v. Bigelow, No. 13-CV-393, 2014 WL 2765469, at *4 (D. Utah June 18, 2014); Jones, 296 F.R.D. at 465; Butler v. Suffolk Cnty., 289 F.R.D. 80, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Henderson v. Thomas, 289 F.R.D. 506, 511(M.D. Ala. 2012); Olson v. Brown, 284 F.R.D. 398, 410-12 (N.D. 2012); Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 08-CV-1317, 2012 WL 6738517, at *18 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012).
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 Whether the DOC’s COVID-19 response plan amounts to deliberate indifference in violation of Class Members’ rights under the Constitution.
The answers to these common questions (and others) are central to all Class Members’ claims and— crucially—all these common questions “are amenable to a common answer.”67
Defendants’ deficient response to COVID-19 generally applies to all Class Members, and this Court need not engage in any individualized determinations to assess whether Defendants’ conduct is unconstitutional.68 And because all Class Members seek the same declaratory and injunctive relief, this Court’s determination of the legality of Defendant’s actions and inactions on one or more of the grounds the Class alleges will resolve all Class Members’ claims in “one stroke.”69 Thus, commonality is satisfied.
Just as in Lewis, Defendants cannot “negate the injury at the center of the Class’s claims: the exposure to an unreasonable risk of serious harm.”70 As this Court recognized, though “[i]t seems unlikely that any two inmates would have the exact same exposure to a substantial risk of serious harm, [] this should not destroy commonality.”71 Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations and evidence call into serious question the adequacy and appropriateness of Defendants’ response to COVID-19. As in Lewis, “Plaintiffs offer common complaints that Defendants’ policies pose a substantial risk of
67 Jones v. Gusman, 296 F.R.D. 416, 466 (E.D.L.A. 2013); see also Braggs, 317 F.R.D. at 655-61 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (commonality requirement and certification proper in statewide class action challenging state prison system’s medical care). 68 See Brown v. Plata¸563 U.S. 493, 505 n.3 (2011) (“Because plaintiffs do not base their case on deficiencies in care provided on any one occasion, this Court has no occasion to consider whether these instances of delay—or any other particular deficiency in medical care complained of by the plaintiffs—would violate the Constitution . . . if considered in isolation. Plaintiffs rely on systemwide deficiencies in the provision of medical and mental health care that, taken as a whole, subject sick and mentally ill prisoners . . . to “substantial risk of serious harm” and cause the delivery of care in the prisons to fall below the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 69 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). 70 Lewis, 324 F.R.D. 159, 170-71 (M.D. La. 2018). 71 Id. at 171.
17

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serious harm to the health of all inmates and argue Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to
this risk.”72 Accordingly, the proposed Class satisfies the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).
3. Typicality Named Plaintiffs satisfy the typicality requirement because they are members of the
proposed Class, and they share the same claims.73 Named Plaintiffs’ claims “arise from a similar
course of conduct and share the same legal theor[ies]” as Class Members’ and are therefore typical
of Class Members’ claims.74 Although Named Plaintiffs’ situations differ based on whether they are
currently COVID-positive, where they are currently in custody,75 or whether they fall into a high-risk
group,76 the basis of liability is not dependent upon their individual circumstances, but instead “the
denial of a system that would have the effect of ensuring that they and their fellow prisoners [or
detainees] are appropriately” protected from the risk posed by the COVID-19 pandemic—a system
which Defendants are legally obligated to provide.77 Because Named Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the
72 Id. 73 See id. at 169 (“Typicality requires showing that, in fact, the proposed representatives have that claim [that is shared by all members of the proposed class].”) (citations omitted). 74 Id. at 169 (quoting James v. City of Dall., 254 F.3d 551, 571 (5th Cir. 2001)). 75 Cf. Braggs, 317 F.R.D. at 661 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (rejecting argument that placement at different facilities destroyed commonality, explaining “[t]he claim in this case revolves around a prospective risk of harm; even if some aspect of the mental-health care at a particular facility is idiosyncratically better or worse, it is clear that numerous class members not currently housed at that facility are likely to be exposed to it in the future. . . . [Because] a prisoner is in ADOC custody [and] is subject to involuntary transfer at any time to another facility in the system, [he is] therefore subject to the risks of harm that attend placement at those other facilities”). 76 Cf. Savino v. Souza, No. CV 20-10617-WGY, 2020 WL 1703844, at *7-8 (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2020) (Rejecting argument that difference in risk to COVID-19 destroyed commonality, noting that “even perfectly healthy detainees are seriously threatened by COVID-19. To be sure, the harm of a COVID-19 infection will generally be more serious for some petitioners than for others. [But] . . . [t]he case law supports a finding of commonality for class claims against dangerous detention conditions, even when some detainees are more at risk than others.”); Yates v. Collier, 868 F.3d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 2017)). 77 See Lewis, 324 F.R.D. at 170.
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same course of conduct and share the same legal theories as Class Members’, Named Plaintiffs’ “factual differences [do] not defeat typicality.”78
Named Plaintiffs are members of the Class; their injuries arise from the same course of conduct—Defendants’ inadequate and misguided response to the COVID-19 pandemic which puts them at unreasonable risk of serious harm—and all seek the same relief as the Class. The common course of conduct Plaintiffs allege include the DOC’s inadequate oversight of its facilities’ medical care and failure to implement adequate precautionary measures and protocols. The failures to act are thus the same across the Class as a whole. The same is true of the legal injury: Named Plaintiffs’ claims and the claims of all other Class members concern whether Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the unreasonable risk of serious harm is unconstitutional.79
4. Adequacy Named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class because their interests in the vindication of the legal claims raised here are entirely aligned with the interests of the other Class Members, who each have the same basic constitutional claims. They are members of the Class, and their interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the other Class Members. Named Plaintiffs’ interests are not antagonistic to those of the Class. Named Plaintiffs and Class Members are suffering the same harms. They assert the same legal claims, seek the same litigation outcomes, and would benefit from the same declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Defendants to provide an adequate response to the dangers posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and
78 James v. City of Dallas, 254 F.3d 551, 571 (5th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by M.D., 675 F.3d 832 (quoting 5-23 Moore’s Federal Practice—Civil § 23.24). 79 Dockery, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 855 (“As the claims of each putative class and subclass member (1) arise from the same policy or practice, i.e. the prison officials’ alleged failure to take corrective action, and the same defect, i.e. the existence of inhumane conditions of confinement, and (2) are based on the same legal theory, i.e. the alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality commonality requirement with respect to the general EMCF Class and each of the subclass[es].”).
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halting the misguided and dangerous elements of the DOC’s current response plan. Moreover, Named Plaintiffs are not seeking monetary relief, so no financial conflict can arise between the claims of Named Plaintiffs and those of other Class Members. Named Plaintiffs are committed to a class-wide resolution, and they will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.80
B. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) Are Met “The claims at issue present a paradigmatic case for Rule 23(b)(2) relief.”81 Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate because “[Defendants] [have] acted [and] refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief [and] corresponding declaratory relief [are] appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”82 Moreover, all Class Members are “harmed in essentially the same way” and seek only “specific” injunctive relief.83 The same reasoning that establishes commonality, discussed above, satisfies the first requirement of Rule 23(b)(2)—that all Class Members are harmed in essentially the same way— because “[i]n establishing commonality [Named Plaintiffs] [] have identified a common practice or policy that is the source of the class members’ harm. So, if [Named Plaintiffs] prevail[] on the merits, a single injunction barring or modifying that course of that behavior will, in the ordinary course of things, provide relief to the members of the class.”84 Defendants’ challenged practices are not tailored to individual inmates or detainees, but apply to the population of prisoners and pre-trial detainees who are, or will in the future be, subject to the medical care policies and practices of the DOC as a whole. These practices apply to all Class Members simply by virtue of Class Members’ status as persons held in the State’s prisons and parish jails because they are now, or could become,
80 The qualifications of the proposed class counsel are discussed infra in Section IV.D. 81 Jones, 296 F.R.D. at 465. 82 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). 83 M.D., 675 F.3d at 845; see also, e.g., Dockery, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 855. 84 Dockery, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 839.
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subject to the DOC’s medical care policies and practices, without regard to the various circumstances of their criminal cases or any other differences among them. Because Defendants’ overall failures in responding adequately to the pandemic put all Class Members at a substantial risk of serious harm from COVID-19, a carefully crafted injunction would provide relief to all Members of the Class.
As incarcerated persons seeking injunctive relief from the conditions of their confinement, Named Plaintiffs need not prove that Defendants’ COVID-19 response plan has already resulted in actual injury to each Class Member; rather, the inquiry focuses on the unreasonable risk of harm.85 In Brown v. Plata, the Supreme Court implicitly reaffirmed that claims regarding the constitutionality of correctional health care systems are amenable to class treatment, affirming a grant of injunctive relief to a class of tens of thousands of prisoners in multiple prisons across California who alleged “systemwide deficiencies in the provision of medical and mental health care that, taken as a whole, subject sick and mentally ill prisoners in California to a substantial risk of serious harm and cause the delivery of care in the prisons to fall below the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”86
To the extent that differences between the constitutional standards applicable to pre-trial and post-conviction detainees could be relevant—although Plaintiffs contend that they are not—the proposed Subclasses would address that issue. As discussed in Plaintiffs’ memorandum in support of their application for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, pre-trial detainees are protected by the Fifth Amendment, while post-conviction detainees are protected by the Eighth Amendment, but the Fifth Circuit has held that the same subjective deliberate indifference standard
85 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); see also Jones, 296 F.R.D. at 465-66 (holding that to satisfy commonality in action challenging systemic defects, it is not necessary that the challenged defects “injure each class member”); Braggs, 317 F.R.D. at 656 (same). 86 563 U.S. at 505 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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applies to both.87 Because Defendants’ conduct here falls below the standard set by each Amendment, certification of a single Class would be appropriate. But even if the different legal standards lead to different determinations, the proposed Subclasses of post-conviction prisoners (Subclass I) and pre-trial detainees (Subclass II) provide an avenue for this Court to grant relief on a subclass-wide basis for each.88 Each Subclass satisfies all of Rule 23’s requirements, for the same reasons, explained above, that the main Class does.
As to the second requirement for Class Members seeking injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), that the injunctive relief sought be “specific,” “[t]he precise terms of the injunction need not be decided at class certification, only that the class members’ claim is such that a sufficiently specific injunction can be conceived . . . .”89 Named Plaintiffs satisfy this requirement because their claims are “susceptible to common, specific relief.”90
As this Court noted in Lewis, “[t]he Fifth Circuit has held that ‘class claims could conceivably be based on an allegation that the State engages in a pattern or practice of agency action or inaction—including a failure to correct a structural deficiency within the agency, such as insufficient staffing—‘with respect to the class,’ so long as declaratory or injunctive relief ‘settling the legality of the State’s behavior with respect to the class as a whole is appropriate.’”91 So too, here. The entire Class seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants violate Class Members’ constitutional rights by failing to adequately safeguard their health and safety in the midst of a pandemic of a deadly infectious disease and an injunction requiring Defendants to take the steps necessary to protect Class
87 Dkt. 15-01 at 16 n.113. 88 See, e.g., Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir.1998). 89 Dockery, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 851; accord, e.g., Morrow v. Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172, 198 (E.D. Tex. 2011). 90 Perry, 294 F.R.D. at, 47). 91 Lewis, 15-cv-318, Dkt. No. 394 at 21 (quoting Perry, 675 F.3d at 847-48).
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Members from suffering serious harm from the disease. Among other relief, Plaintiffs ask that this
Court order Defendants to:
 promulgate and implement adequate policies and procedures related to COVID-19 that ensure adequate staffing; resources; quality assurance; surveillance; auditing; data tracking; coordination with local, state, and federal health officials; education; clinical guidance; and training;
 ensure that each COVID-19 patient in DOC custody is evaluated by a medical professional and that transfers of such patients are initiated only at the recommendation of the evaluating medical professional;
 evaluate each DOC facility’s capacity to provide social distancing and evaluate the maximum number of inmates each facility can house safely under the CDC’s social distancing guidelines;
 assess and make recommendations regarding conditions of confinement in all Louisiana jails and prisons consistent with the CDC’s social distancing guidelines; and
 conform all policies and guidance in local parish prisons and parish jails that hold state prisoners to such recommendations.
This relief would apply equally to the entire Class and both Subclasses.92 Therefore, certification
under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate.
C. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(1)(A) Are Also Met
Named Plaintiffs’ claims easily satisfy the Rule 23(b)(1)(A) standard for certification because
they create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications if raised individually. Certification under
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) “is appropriate [because] the class seeks injunctive [and] declaratory relief to change
[Defendants’] alleged ongoing course of conduct that is . . . illegal as to all members of the class.”93
If each of the approximately 46,600 individual Class Members were to bring separate suits making
the allegations made in this case, the adjudication of these actions would risk creating inconsistent
92 See Dockery, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 856 (“As the types of injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs would not require that the Court adjudicate the individual class members’ needs or circumstances, . . . the injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs satisfies Rule 23(b)(2).”). 93Adair v. England, 209 F.R.D. 5, 12 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing 5 Moore’s Fed. Practice § 23.41[4] (3d ed. 2000)); see also Evans v. Sterling Chems. Inc., No. CV H-07-625, 2008 WL 11389418, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2008) (certification under 23(b)(1)(A) appropriate where injunction is the predominant relief sought and “there is a need to conclude or adjudicate all potential claims in one suit”).
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decisions that would establish varying standards to which Defendants would have to adhere.94 Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief that is applicable to all Class Members.95 Further, the urgent necessity of requiring Defendants to adequately respond to the COVID-19 crisis creates a need to conclude these adjudications quickly in one suit.96
D. Undersigned Counsel Should be Appointed Class Counsel Under Rule 23(g) Finally, the Court must appoint Class counsel, considering “(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (ii) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.”97 These factors strongly support appointing the Promise of Justice Initiative (“PJI”), the Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”), and Orrick, Herrington, & Sutcliffe LLP (“Orrick”). Plaintiffs’ counsel satisfy all four criteria. As reflected in the complaint and temporary restraining order papers filed in this matter, Plaintiffs’ counsel have already devoted substantial time investigating the factual and legal issues in this case and will continue do so throughout the pendency of the litigation. All Class counsel are experienced in handling class actions and other complex litigation. PJI and SPLC are dedicated to ensuring constitutional conditions for institutionalized individuals and are highly knowledgeable in the applicable law.98 Collectively, counsel has significant experience in the areas of criminal law, constitutional law, and class action litigation.99 Finally, the Court has seen firsthand the resources and acumen Plaintiffs’ counsel bring
94 See, e.g., Ashker v. Governor of the State of Cal., No. C 09-5796 CW, 2014 WL 2465191, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2014) (certifying class of inmates claiming prison policy violated the Eighth Amendment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) in light of the “significant risk” of inconsistent judgments if the hundreds of proposed class members filed separate actions). 95 See Evans, 2008 WL 11389418, at *6. 96 Id. 97 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g). 98 Montagnes Decl. ¶¶ 3-4; Davidson Decl. ¶¶ 3-4. 99 Montagnes Decl. ¶¶ 3-4; Davidson Decl. ¶¶ 3-4; Haag Decl ¶¶ 4-7.
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to this case. PJI previously litigated Ball v. LeBlanc, succeeding at trial and then continuing to fight for
their clients through the appeal and remedy phases, and are currently successfully litigating Lewis –
the facts of which are highly relevant here. They and their co-counsel have already committed many
hours to representing the Class in this case, and will continue to fight to make sure Class Members
are adequately protected from the COVID-19 pandemic.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court certify the proposed
Class and Subclasses and appoint the undersigned counsel as counsel for the Class and Subclasses.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of April, 2020.
/s/ Mercedes Montagnes Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287 Jamila Johnson, La. Bar No. 37953 Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415 The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70117 Telephone: (504) 529-5955 Facsimile: (504) 595-8006 Email: mmontagnes@defendla.org Jared Davidson, La. Bar No. 37093 Southern Poverty Law Center 201 Saint Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone: (504) 486-8982 Facsimile: (504) 486-8947 Email: jared.davidson@splcenter.org Melinda Haag, Pro Hac Vice Sharon E. Frase, Pro Hac Vice Lacey Bangle, Pro Hac Vice Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP 405 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105-2669 Tel: (415) 773-5495 Fax: (415) 773-5759 Email: mhaag@orrick.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
25

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-1 04/25/20 Page 26 of 26 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nishi Kumar, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 25, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system.
I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415
26

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-2 04/25/20 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU, TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE, REGINALD GEORGE, LIONEL TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO GARNER, BRADLEY WINTERS, KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Safety and Corrections; JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as Medical Director of the Department of Safety and Corrections; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00231-SDDRLB
CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF JAMILA A. JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

I, Jamila A. Johnson, declare as follows:

1.

I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Louisiana and am one of

the counsel of record for Plaintiffs in the above-captioned case. This declaration is based upon my

personal knowledge and is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-2 04/25/20 Page 2 of 3

2.

Attached at Exhibit 1 is a true and accurate copy of the Louisiana State Penitentiary

Pandemic Flu Plan, provided by counsel for the Department of Public Safety and Corrections in

March 2020.

3.

Attached at Exhibit 2 is a true and accurate copy of the Dixon Correctional Institute

COOP Plan: Influenza and Pandemic Viral Diseases: Preparedness, Response, and Recovery

provided by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections on March 21, 2020.

Respectfully submitted this 25th day of April, 2020.

/s/ Jamila A. Johnson
Jamila A. Johnson, La. Bar No. 37952 The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70117 Telephone: (504) 529-5955 Facsimile: (504) 595-8006 Email: jjohnson@defendla.org
Attorney for Plaintiffs

2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-2 04/25/20 Page 3 of 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nishi Kumar, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 25, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system.
I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415
3

COOP

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 1 of 48
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLAN
LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
Darrel Vannoy—Warden
March 2020

LouCisiaasnea D3e:2p0ar-tcmve-n0t0o2f 3P1u-bSlicDSDa-feRtyLBand CDororeccutmionesnt 25-3 04/25/20 Page 2 of 48
Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ______________________________________________________________________________________
THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ______________________________________________________________________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Concept of Operations

1

A. Phase I: Activation and Relocation

1

1. Decision Process

2. Alert, Notification, and Implementation Process

3. Leadership

B. Phase II: Alternate Facility Operations

5

1. Mission Critical Systems

2. Vital Files, Records, and Databases

C. Phase III: Reconstitution

5

1. Overview

2. Procedures

3. After-Action Review and Remedial Action Plans

II.

COOP Planning and Responsibilities

7

III.

Logistics

8

A. Alternate Location

B. Interoperable Communication

IV.

Testing Training and Exercise

9

V.

Multi-Year Strategy and Program Management Plan

10

VI.

COOP Plan Maintenance

11

Annex A: Alternate Location (Primary)

12

Annex B: Alternate Location (Secondary)

13

Annex C: Alternate Location (Tertiary)

14

Attachment 1 –LSP Organizational Chart

Attachment 2 – Orders of Succession Organizational Chart

Attachment 3 – Essential Functions

Attachment 4 – Evacuation Plan

Attachment 5 – EOP Annex 9 LSP Angola Mass Evacuation Plan

Attachment 6 – LSP Angola Evacuation Emergency Housing Action Plan

Attachment 7 – LSP Full Scale Evacuation Plan

Attachment 8 – Pandemic Flu Plan

Attachment 9 – Vehicle Roster

Attachment 10 – Approved Drivers List

Attachment 11 – Employee Telephone Listing

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK

MARCH 2020

1

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
I. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP) directs and controls emergency/disaster operations in accordance with Departmental Regulation No. OP-B-1 ”Incident Management Center,” through the Incident Management Center (IMC) located at Corrections Services Headquarters, 504 Mayflower, Baton Rouge, LA. Should the IMC become inoperative, isolated and/or unusable, the Secretary or his designee, shall issue relocation instructions to B. B. Rayburn Correctional Center (RCC) located at 27268 Highway 21 in Angie, Louisiana.
A. Phase I: Activation and Relocation
1. Decision Process
The necessity for activation of the COOP plan for LSP may come with or without warning. In instances where circumstances and time allows, the COOP activation decisions will be made by the Warden or his designee. In cases where circumstances or time does not allow for the activation to be made in this manner, the decision will be made by the senior chain of command authority available at that time. The decision will, as time and circumstances allow, be made in a logical risk assessment manner taking into account Situational Reports (SITREPs) from the IMC, Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Center (GHOSEP, EOC) or credible information from any other competent agency or authority such as parish or municipal emergency management, fire or law enforcement, industry incident alerts or similar credible information sources.
2. Alert, Notification, and Implementation Process
In the event of an alert to pending or possible COOP activations, Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP) Control Center will notify all Corrections Services Senior Staff (Regional Warden, Chief of Operations, Secretary) and LSP Staff according to Attachment 1 – LSP Organizational Chart of this plan via electronic, telephonic (First Alert System) or radio communication. Senior Staff will, utilizing all available contact / notification resources such as “calling trees,” e-mail groupings, or direct contact, make immediate notification to their respective staffs / personnel of the alert and relative information. All staff must be mindful that situational circumstances are very likely to preclude any opportunity to provide timely alert to COOP activation but rather result in COOP activation notification only.
Notification of COOP activation will likewise be issued in similar fashion, time and circumstances allowing. Event circumstances may require the use

MARCH 2020

2

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
of the most expedient or direct method of notification possible to maximize implementation/response while minimizing time. Notification of COOP activation requires immediate implementation. The scope of implementation will be dictated by the circumstances with the greatest potential risk or impact being assumed.
COOP plan implementation will begin immediately upon notification. Implementation will be supervised and coordinated through the chain of command with full communications not only vertically (up and down) through the chain of command but laterally as well to minimize miscommunication, dispel rumors/misinformation and facilitate efficient plan implementation (see Attachment 2 – Orders of Succession Organizational Chart and Attachment 7 – LSP Full Scale Evacuation).
3. Leadership
Orders of Succession
The following organizational chart outlines the chain of command or supersession within the Institution. Authority of each position may be delegated if required for the efficient management of the emergency event. Succession orders may be verbally conveyed by senior chain of command authority with instructions to assume the authority of that position should event circumstances necessitate such orders. Direct instructions for response or operations should accompany the instructions to assume authority. The LSP Orders of Succession organization chart is contained in this plan as Attachment 3.
LSP
1. Corrections Warden 5 2. Deputy Warden Security
x Asst. Warden Security o Asst. Warden Outcamps  Outcamp Asst. Wardens x Outcamp Colonels o Asst. Warden Main Prison  Main Prison Asst. Wardens x Main Prison Colonels o Asst. Warden Support Services  Asst. Warden Field Operations
3. Deputy Warden Operations x Asst. Warden Health Services
4. Deputy Warden Programming x Asst. Warden Programming x Asst. Warden Adminsitrative Services

MARCH 2020

3

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________

Delegations of Authority

The authorities for policy determinations and operational decisions will follow the LSP organizational chart (Attachment 1) or during times of COOP activation and implementation, the order as defined in the Essential Functions (Attachment 3) and Orders of Succession.

Operational authorities for certain functions, at the Warden’s discretion, may be pre-determined. Functions subject to pre-determination include:

•

Major medical/health incident management to be under the direction

of the Deputy Warden/Operations, LSP’s Medical Director and/or

the Department’s Medical Director

•

Major multiple tactical unit deployment management to be under the

direction of LSP’s Tactical Unit Coordinator and/or the Department’s

Tactical Unit Coordinator.

Emergency management operations to be under the command of the designated Incident Commander in compliance with National Incident Management System (NIMS) / Incident Command System (ICS) and Incident Management Center (IMC) operations to be under the direction of the IMC Director.

Additional delegations of authority may be designated by the appropriate command authority as necessary. Pre-determined delegations of authority may be cancelled by the appropriate command authority when circumstances or situational requirements dictate the appropriateness of such cancellations or the return to normal delegations of authority is warranted.

Devolution

LSP under a worst-case scenario where the Warden and command staff are unavailable or incapacitated will transfer command authority to the Chief of Operations or his designee.

The decision to implement the measures required under devolution scenario will be made by the highest-ranking available command authority. Essential functions, which have been identified and enumerated on a priority basis, are contained and located within this plan as Attachment 3.

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
B. Phase II: Alternate Facility Operations

1. Mission Critical Systems

SYSTEM NAME Offender Records Offender Banking Computer Servers Offender Medical Records Human Resource Employee Files Purchasing/Budgeting

CURRENT LOCATIONS LSP Admin Bldg LSP Admin Bldg LSP Admin Bldg/Infirmary/IT Building LSP Infirmary LSP Admin Bldg LSP Admin Bldg

EHCC HDQ HDQ EHCC HDQ HDQ

OTHER LOCATIONS

2. Vital Files, Records, and Databases

Records management policy is in accordance with Department Regulation

No. A-01-009 (AM-D-1), “Records Management” which incorporates the

requirements

mandated by the Division of Administration. Critical

Mission Data Systems as noted in the above matrix are replicated and

maintained at OIS HQ. The LSP server contains electronic copies of

Department emergency operations plans, COOP Plans, telephone rosters,

devolution contact list and legal authority contact. LSP provides the

Corrections Incident Management Center (IMC) with hardcopies of the

above items. The COOP plan will be updated annually, and is likewise

distributed and available to all LSP senior staff offices and personnel.

Vital File, Record, or Database
COOP Plan Phone Roster Devolution Contact List

Form of Record (e.g., hardcopy, electronic) Electronic/HARDCOPY Electronic/HARDCOPY Electronic/HARDCOPY

Pre-positioned at Alternate Site X X X

Hand carried to Alternate Facility
X X X

Backed up at Third Location

C. Phase III: Reconstitution
1. Overview
Initially, key senior and executive staff as well as critical support staff may be required to be “on-duty: either in person or by electronic means, 24/7. As the emergency event stabilizes and recovery steps are initiated, staff will be scaled back at the alternate work location as appropriate. Select key staff may be detailed to the event location so on-site decisions can be made to facilitate speed of recovery.
2. Procedures
Upon the emergency event being resolved or operationally under control, staff assigned to the alternate site location will be transitioned back to the primary work site as a group. The group move will preclude key staff being

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
at different locations, which inherently compound communication, and decision-making difficulties. At such time as the staff can be safely and securely returned to their primary work site, a date and time will be transmitted to all department staff.
3. After–Action Review and Remedial Action Plans
Within time frame guidelines established by the Secretary’s office, the emergency event and related responses will under go an After-Action Review and as necessary appropriate remedial action plans developed.

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
II. COOP Planning Responsibilities

RESPONSIBILITY

POSITION

Update COOP Annually

Warden, Deputy Warden Operations, DW Security, DW Programming, AW Admin. Services, and Security Warden, COOP Committee

Update Telephone Rosters Annually DW Programming

Review status of vital files, records, and OTS staff stationed at LSP

databases

Conduct alert and notification tests

Security Warden

Develop and lead COOP training

Security Warden

Plan COOP exercises

Security Warden

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
III. Logistics
A. Alternate Location
The primary alternate location, Corrections Services HDQ, is a fully resource facility with the necessary infrastructure and assets to support alternate location operations for LSP’s Command Staff for an extended period of time. DCI was selected as the secondary location upon risk assessment of all suitable sites.
B. Interoperable Communications
LSP’s communication interoperability is based on primary and redundant systems. Radio communication is maintained through the state’s truncated 700 MHz radio system with all Corrections Services facilities, divisions and command staff being suitably equipped. Telephone communications are augmented beyond the everyday land based systems with satellite telephone assets at each facility and command staff personnel. Cell phones, blackberry assets with text messaging capability are likewise appropriately deployed. Communications interoperability is maintained via electronic data systems and resources as well. Satellite platform based Internet Protocol (IP) assets have been successfully deployed to support operations when major infrastructure failures occur. Similar assets are available on a contingency basis.

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
IV. Testing Training and Exercise
Quarterly testing of all emergency management systems is conducted in conjunction with the Office of Information Services tests of data systems. Training of staff in emergency operations is coordinated through the Training Section as well as with the Incident Management Director. Table Top Exercises (TTX) are scheduled annually, generally in conjunction with those conducted by the IMC.

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
V. Multi-Year Strategy and Program Management Plan
MYSPMP is being developed under a separate document.

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
VI. COOP Plan Maintenance
LSP’s Emergency Operations and COOP plans under go a complete review on an annual basis with appropriate information or changes being updated. Input from key personnel is considered during this review process.

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX A – ALTERNATE LOCATION
PRIMARY MAP – Department of Public Safety and Corrections – Headquarters
PRIMARY: Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Headquarters 504 Mayflower St, Baton Rouge, LA
Headquarters 24 hour Contact Information: Telephone: 1-800-317-3117 Satellite Telephone: 254-204-7218 Radio Channel: A-DOC Fax Number: 225-219-0359
Driving Directions to Headquarters: From LSP: LA 66 south to US-61 south, merge onto I-110 south, take Exit 1A (Government St./LA-73) and turn right on Government St, turn left onto S 10th St, Turn Right onto Mayflower, Headquarters is on the left with appropriate signs.

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX B – ALTERNATE LOCATION
SECONDARY MAP – Dixon Correctional Institution (DCI)
SECONDARY: Dixon Correctional Institution (DCI) 5568 Highway 68 Jackson, LA 70748
DCI 24 hour Control Center Contact Information: Telephone: 225-634-1200 Satellite Telephone: 254-204-7266 Radio Channel: A-DOC Fax Number: 225-634-4149
Driving Directions to DCI: From LSP: LA 66 south, turn onto US-61 south, take left onto LA Hwy 10, follow LA Hwy 10 through the town of Jackson, LA. Turn right on LA Hwy 68, approximately .08 miles to DCI.

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX C – ALTERNATE LOCATION
TERTIARY MAP – B.B. Rayburn Correctional Center (RCC)
TERTIARY: B. B. Rayburn Correctional Center (RCC) 27268 Highway 21 Angie, Louisiana
RCC 24 hour Control Center Contact Information: Telephone: 985-661-6300 Fax Number: 985-661-6395
Driving Directions to RCC: From LSP: LA 66 south, turn onto US-61 south, merge onto I-110 south, go east to Interstate 12 to the second Convington exit. This will lead to HWY. 190. Go north on 190 approximately three miles. Merge to the right onto HWY 21. Go approximately 20 miles through Bush, LA. HWY 21 will dead-end. Turn left (north) through Sun, Bogalusa and Varnado. The facility’s entrance (large sign) will be approximately 1.5 miles on the right past Varnado.

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Louisiana State Penitentiary COOP ____________________________________________________________________________________
THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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Attachment 8 – Pandemic Flu Plan

OPERATIONAL PLAN

A. INCIDENT COMMAND TEAM

The institutional Incident Command Team (ICT) shall determine actions to be taken to prevent the spread of pandemic flu among staff, offenders, volunteers, visitors and other civilians. The team will consist of all wardens, medical director, director of nursing, infection control nurse, pharmacy director, information services, and administrative program director. The Deputy Warden/Operations will serve as the Pandemic Flu Coordinator and shall have the responsibility for pandemic influenza planning and preparedness.

B. ACTIVATION

The necessity for activation of the Pandemic Flu COOP will not come without prior warning. Causes of pandemic flu from around the world are constantly being monitored and information updated as need by organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO). Current information is also available from the United States Government Avian and Pandemic Flu website (www.pandemicflu.gov), the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ Center for Disease Control and Prevention Health Alert Network (www.cdc.gov/HAN/index.asp), and Louisiana Department of Health and Hospital website (www.flula.com). These sites will be monitored by LSP’s Medical Director. Updates concerning pandemic flu outbreaks will be provided through the Departments Medical/Mental Health Director, the IMC, the LSP Medical Director, and/or the ICT to staff and offenders as appropriate through such means as staff meetings, roll call, e-mails, KLSP TV and radio broadcasts, or as deemed appropriate under existent circumstances.

LSP shall use the following phases for pandemic flu alert as a guideline for activation of the COOP and the implementation of necessary actions. The three phases of pandemic alert increase the seriousness of the threat and the need to launch progressively more intense preparedness activities.

Phase Ready/Green (Watch)

World Health Organization (WHO) & United States Government (USG)
Pandemic Response Stages

Case Location

WHO Inter-Pandemic Period Phases 1-2; USG Stage 0

Anywhere Outside of the Continental United States and Bordering Countries (i.e. Canada and Mexico)

Yellow/Orange (Alert) WHO Pandemic Alert Period Phases First Human Case in the Mainland United States

3-5; USG Stages 0-2

(excluding Louisiana and Neighboring States)

Red (Pandemic)

WHO’s Pandemic Alert Period Phases 3-5; USG Stages 0-2

First Human Case in Louisiana or Neighboring States

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READY/GREEN PHASE
At this phase, pandemic flu is anywhere outside of the continental United States and bordering countries (i.e. Canada and Mexico). Staff listed in “Assignment of Responsibility” shall complete the following:
1. Maintain adequate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) supplies at all times and as directed by the Incident Command Team to include the following: a. Tissues; b. Gloves; c. Biohazard Bags; d. Hazard Receptacles; e. N-95 Respirator Masks; f. Surgical Masks; g. Waterless Hand Sanitizers; h. Colored Wristbands (Red, Blue and Green); i. "Ask for a Mask” Signs
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Health Services, Assistant Warden/Administrative Services, Medical Director and Central Supply.
2. Establish points of contact for influenza pandemic preparedness in the local and state health departments, local, regional or state agency preparedness groups and local hospitals. Maintain agreement with the Office of Public Health to be a point of dispensing and have required procedures in place.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Health Services and Medical Director.
3. Provide education and training regarding pandemic influenza to staff and offenders.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Deputy Warden/Programming and Training Director.
4. Ensure that all staff is familiar with the local Incident Command System (ICS) and understand the roles and persons assigned within that structure.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Deputy Warden/Programming, Training Director and Staff Supervisors.
5. Incorporate pandemic flu plan into unit emergency management planning and exercise.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Deputy Warden/Security and Medical Director.
6. Determine the potential impact of a pandemic on the unit by using multiple possible scenarios of varying severity relative to illness, absenteeism, supplies, availability of resources, access to legal system representatives, etc.

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ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: All Wardens and Medical Director.
7. Identify areas within LSP that could be used to create additional acute care beds for expanded health care capacity.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Deputy Wardens, Assistant Wardens, Medical Director, and Director of Nursing.
8. Institutional staff shall develop written policies and procedures for cohorting offenders with known or suspected pandemic influenza using one or more of the following strategies:
a. Confining ill and exposed offenders to their cells; b. Placing offenders with symptoms of pandemic influenza together in one
area of the facility, or closing off units that have symptomatic offenders; c. Create policies and protocols for restricting staff and offenders who are
assigned to work on affected units from working on other units to prevent cross contamination.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Deputy Wardens, Assistant Warden/Health Services, Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
9. Institutional staff shall also identify an area in the facility that can be used as a temporary morgue.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Health Services and Medical Director.
10. At the Incident Command Team’s discretion, healthcare clinicians will screen individuals who report pneumonia or respiratory infection according to the screening checklist to identify possible clusters or groups of ill individuals who may be linked.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: ICT, Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
11. Maintain a list of high risk offenders for seasonal influenza (based on current CDC guidelines) which should be updated quarterly for mass vaccination.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Health Services, Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
12. Ensure that health care personnel are updated with the latest CDC recommendations regarding ILI, such as symptoms/signs, diagnostic criteria, treatment protocols, indications of anti-viral medication use, etc.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Health Services, Medical Director and Director of Nursing.

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13. Classify all employee positions into one of the following three exposure risk categories.
a. High Exposure Risk: Staff with high potential for exposure to known or suspected sources of pandemic influenza virus, such as healthcare delivery and support staff, staff transporting known or suspected pandemic influenza infected patients, etc.
b. Medium Exposure Risk: Staff with high-frequency contact within six feet of the offender population, such as security staff, social workers, chaplains, etc. that work in dorms or cellblocks.
c. Lower Exposure Risk (caution): Staff that do not require routine contact with the offender population, such as administrative staff (i.e. institution Business Office, Human Resources, etc). Activities outside of the workplace shall be considered when classifying employees into low exposure risk, such as other employment that may involve routine contact with an offender population (part-time security.) Such risky activities outside of the workplace shall be discouraged for low risk staff in the event of a pandemic flu.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Deputy Warden/Operations, Assistant Warden/Human Resources, Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
14 Possible clusters shall be reported to the Headquarters Incident Management Center (IMC) at 1-800-317-3117. The IMC shall contact the State’s Infectious Disease Epidemiology Section at 1-800-256-2748.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Warden, Assistant Warden/Health Services, Medical Director and EMO.
14. Clusters may be defined as five or more clinically compatible individuals with the onset of symptoms less than 10 days apart (this may be altered as more information about the pandemic influenza strain becomes available). The Louisiana Office of Public Health will follow the Center for Disease Control's recommendations as they are released.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Health Services and Medical Director.
16. All staff, offenders, volunteers, visitors and civilians shall use droplet precautions with appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) within six feet of an ill individual for all contact with any individual who has a new cough and fever.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical Director.
17. Use Form B-06-004-A Entitled Level Ready Green as a guide for preparedness and response checklist purposes.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Warden and Medical Director.

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YELLOW/ORANGE PHASE
At this phase, pandemic flu has been confirmed in the mainland United States. In addition to the previous steps in the Green Phase, the following additional steps will be incorporated into pandemic flu preparedness activities:
1. Monitor: a. The Incident Command Team shall meet weekly or as directed by the Medical/Mental Health Director.
b. The Medical Director and Pandemic Flu Coordinator will monitor sick call reports and clinic visits in an effort to identify ILI in the offender population. Findings will be reported to the Warden.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: ICT, Deputy Warden/Operations and Medical Director.
2. Supplies: a. The Medical Director shall discuss with the Medical/Mental Health Director regarding stockpiling requirements of antibiotics and necessary medical supplies; b. A current list of stock of all Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) supplies (See Ready/Green Phase for specific PPE supplies) shall be sent to the Medical/Mental Health Director.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical Director, Director of Nursing, Infection Control Nurse and Central Supply.
3. Access/Control: a. The Secretary, Chief of Operations, Medical/Mental Health Director and Regional Wardens shall be notified, and any outside travel except medical/mental health emergencies and court trips will cease; b. Restrict vendors, visitors and conferences/group activities; c. At the Incident Command Team’s discretion, staff, offenders, visitors, volunteers and civilians may be required to wear identification wristbands designated by color at all times.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Warden, Deputy Warden/Security, Assistant Warden/Security and Medical Director.
d. Transfers within the Department may be suspended on a unit-by-unit basis or department-wide.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical/Mental Health Director and Warden.
4. Surveillance, Screening and Triage:

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a. Employees will complete a self screening at roll call. Employees who state they are sick shall be triaged by medical staff or health trained staff, and if found to have a fever shall be sent home. Staff with ILI shall remain at home at least 24 hours after they are free of fever (100° F), or signs of fever, without the use of fever reducing medications.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical/Mental Health Director and Warden will decide to take action. Medical Director, Director of Nursing, Unit Wardens, Department Heads and employees.
b. Screening of visitors/vendors may be initiated and visitors with symptoms of pandemic flu may be denied entry to LSP. Symptomatic vendors may be granted access based upon need and shall be required to wear a mask while on institutional grounds.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical/Mental Health Director and Warden will decide to take action. Medical Director, Director of Nursing and Unit Wardens.
c. “Ask for a Mask” signs shall be posted at all entrances and in all common areas. Posters shall include specific risk factors for the targeted infection to encourage all persons in the unit to self-screen for infection;
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
d. Persons who self-identify as at-risk via the screening checklist available throughout the institution will be seen by Medical 3 for further screening and instructions;
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
e. Encourage offenders to notify health care/security staff at the onset of symptoms of ILI. Offenders should be informed that early detection is vital to reduce the transmission of an influenza outbreak.
Healthcare personnel who suspect, after initial clinical evaluation, that an individual may have an Epidemic Respiratory Infection (ERI) shall immediately notify the Louisiana Office of Public Health (LOPH) and the Headquarters IMC At 1-800-317-3117;
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Warden, Unit Wardens, Assistant Warden/Health Services, Medical Director and EMO.
f. Staff traveling to designated high risk areas (as determined by the LOPH) or offenders who recently traveled in the last 10 days to a high risk area (as determined by the LOPH) may be required to register with the institution’s medical department and complete the screening checklist for five consecutive days. Healthcare staff shall review the checklist and maintain a list of those individuals under surveillance;

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ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
g. Staff members who have contact with suspected patients must report to the infection control department for direction recommended by the Incident Command Team.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Incident Command Team, Medical Director, Director of Nursing and employees.
h. On-site clinics may be allowed to operate on a case-by-case basis. Specialty clinics that can be accomplished via telemedicine will be strongly encouraged.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical/Mental Health Director and Warden will decide to take action. Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
5. Infection Control/Precautions: Institute Infection Control Precautions with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for any person screened as a possible Epidemic Respiratory Infection (ERI) case.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
6. Communication/Education/Preparedness: a. The unit shall use the mode of communication used most by staff and/or offenders to keep the unit's community informed and to provide education regarding prevention and symptom surveillance;
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Warden, Medical Director and Director of Nursing. KLSP TV and radio broadcasts, staff meetings.
b. The Incident Command Team shall meet daily to review the situation and alter strategies (such as housing re-assignments for isolation purposes or quarantine);
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: ICT
c. A situation report shall be forwarded to the Headquarters IMC daily.
Reporting requirements to the Secretary, Chief of Operations, Medical/Mental Health Director shall be in accordance with Department Regulation No. C-05-001. In addition, local, state, and federal agencies will be notified as appropriate.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: EMO
7. Use Form B-06-004-B entitled Level Yellow-Orange as a guide for preparedness and response checklist purposes.

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RED PHASE
At this phase, there is evidence of transmission of the Influenza Like Illness (ILI) in the unit or there is widespread human-to-human transmission in the region of the unit. Red indicates the highest level of alert, with restrictions on access to the unit, more active screening and a shift away from normal unit operations. In addition to the previous steps in the Green Phase and the Yellow/Orange Phase, the following additional steps will be incorporated into pandemic flu preparedness activities:
1. Access/Control: a. All entrances to the unit shall be locked except for the main entrance. Those that cannot be locked will be guarded by security personnel;
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Security.
b. Entry into the unit may be restricted to only staff with valid identification. Any others allowed into the unit must be screened via the screening checklist;
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Security and Medical Director.
c. Offender group activities may be suspended;
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Security.
d. Normal eating activities may be suspended. A plan shall exist for delivering meals to offenders if cafeteria or group-style dining is closed;
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Health Servies and Director of Nursing.
e. Pill call may be modified as necessary to reduce the risk of influenza transmission.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Director of Nursing.
f. The request to close the institution to further admissions may also be made as a means to prevent the further spread of an epidemic by the Incident Command Team. This request shall be approved by the Secretary or designee.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: ICT and Medical Director.
1. Surveillance, Screening and Triage:

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a. Vaccination/Antiviral medication priorities shall be determined and distributed.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical/Mental Health Director
b. Routine sick call shall be suspended. Offenders will have access to healthcare via emergency sick call. All non-emergent healthcare services shall be suspended; waive the health care co-payment fee for sick calls related to ILI.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
c. Offenders who are identified to have fever and/or cough will be instructed to don Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), use good hand washing techniques and will be sent to the medical department. Contact information will be updated in medical records;
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
d. The number of persons seen with the suspected ILI by healthcare staff will be recorded and reported weekly to the Chief of Operations and Medical/Mental Health Director;
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Warden, Assistant Warden/Health Services and EMO.
e. If the person warrants evaluation in a hospital setting, medical staff shall alert the referral hospital that a suspected or confirmed case needs evaluation so that the referral center can make arrangements for infection control precautions.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical Director.
3. Infection Control/Precautions: a. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and contact precautions are required for all staff having contact with any person who has fever and/or new cough (this includes staff conducting screenings at facility entrances);
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
b. Adequate supplies of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) shall be maintained at the facility;
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Administrative Services, Assistant Warden/Health Services, Medical Director and Central Supply.

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c. Everyone providing patient care will have access to appropriately fitting Personal Protective Equipment (PPE); surgical masks and gloves shall be worn by staff having director (within 6 feet) of offenders who have suspected or probable or confirmed influenza in the designated isolation areas; good hand washing must take place between patients contacts and glove changes. Surgical masks shall only be worn in the designated isolation areas. Offenders who become symptomatic and require movement shall don a mask prior to movement. Movement to and from isolation and quarantine areas shall be kept to a minimum and necessary services to the extent possible shall be delivered to these offenders in the isolation and quarantine areas.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Unit Wardens, Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
d. Recommendations shall be made for quarantine of non-ill contacts. Offenders who may have been exposed but are asymptomatic shall be quarantined. Arrangements shall be made to provide those quarantined with necessary daily items including meals, water and hygiene.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Unit Warden, Medical Director, and Director of Nursing.
e. Offenders with ILI symptoms shall be isolated. This can be done in a group setting as well, if multiple offenders rquire isolation. Arrangements shall be made to provide those isolated with necessary daily items including meals, water, and hygiene. All efforts shall be made to limit any movement of isolated offenders (bring meals, medications , etc. to them) but if offender requires to leave the isolation area then a proper mask shall be worn before leaving isolation area and the offender shall not be allowed to remove the mask until returned to the isolation area.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Unit Wardens, Medical Director and Director of Nursing.
f. Offenders diagnosed with ILI shall be monitored for early signs of complicating illnesses, i.e. pneumonia. Offenders who are at high risk for these complications or those who are sicker at presentation shall be admitted to the infirmary for closer observation.
If the suspected or confirmed case does not require hospitalization, housing needs (specific quarantine area) shall be assessed. Arrangements shall be made to provide the offenders with necessary daily items including meals, water and hygiene.
May consider instituting a standing order/treatment protocol for ILI.

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ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Security and Medical Director.
g. Phone Triage for Staff: Staff who have ILI symptoms or are ill may be triaged by phone. Triage shall be performed by medical staff or health trained staff. All absences related to ILI shall be tracked.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical Director, Director of Nursing and Assistant Warden/Human Resources.
h. With guidance from Headquarters, the institution will identify close contacts within the facility to a probable, suspected or confirmed case of the influenza. Contacts are typically defined as those who spent greater than 15 minutes within three feet of the case during the infectious period (two days before illness onset to five days after illness onset) or those who live in the same cellblock tier or housing area (dorm);
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Health Services and Medical Director.
i. Staff and offenders who have had contact with suspected patients may be required to register with the medical department and be screened daily utilizing the screening checklist for five consecutive days after last documented or suspected contact or for a period determined by the health authority;
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Deputy Wardens, Assistant Warden/Health Services and Medical Director.
j. With guidance from Headquarters, recommendations may be required for quarantine of non-ill contacts. Guidance shall be provided regarding details of quarantine, including cohorting of contacts, sites to use for quarantine and legal authority. As with a case in isolation, arrangements shall be made to provide those quarantined with necessary daily items including meals, water and hygiene.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Assistant Warden/Security and Medical Director.
4. Communication/Education:
a. The facility will provide daily or more frequent updates to staff and offenders as more information is obtained.
b. Provide education to employees and offenders on basic hygiene, respiratory etiquette, and high risk medical conditions.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Warden and Medical Director.

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 32 of 48
5. A situation report shall be forwarded to the Department’s Medical/Mental Health Director to include: the number of newly diagnosed cases (suspected or probable or confirmed); the number of offenders in isolation; the number of offenders quarantined; the number of staff absences security/medical; and deaths. The Department’s Medical/ Mental Health Director shall decide the frequency of this report for each unit.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Medical Director, Director of Nursing, and EMO.
6. Use Form B-06-004-C entitled Level Red as a guide for preparedness and response checklist.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY: Warden and Medical Director.

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 33 of 48

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 34 of 48
C. ISOLATION SITE
1. Camp J shall serve as the isolation area for ill staff and offenders on an as needed basis.
2. Minimum and medium custody offenders will be treated in Bass dormitory. Maximum custody offenders will be treated in cellblocks. Staff will be treated in the Chapel.
3. A decontamination area must be set up in each dorm/cellblock/chapel and needs:
a. privacy area b. shower c. soap dispensers d. paper towels e. plastic bags to double bag contaminated clothing to be sent to
laundry f. towels
4. Medical supplies needed at Camp J:
a. O2 b. O2 Mask (15 at each site) c. Suction machines and canisters (2 machines and 25 canisters) d. Yanker suctions with tubing (25) e. Thermometers and covers (3 at each area) f. B/P monitors (2at each area) g. Stethoscopes (2) h. IV fluids (10) i. IV tubing (10) j. IV start kits (10) k. Tape (5 rolls) l. Gauze (1 case at each site) m. Wash basins ( 25) n. Disposable wash cloths (1 case at each site) o. Foley catheters (10) p. IV catheters (5 of each size 20G, 22G, 18G, 24G) q. Disposable gowns (1 case at each site) r. N 95 masks (2 boxes at each site) s. Bedpans (20 at each site) t. Crash cart fully supplied (1 at each site) u. Vacutainers (1 box at each site) v. Blood tubes (1 package of each type at each site) w. Butterfly needles (1 box at each site) x. Gloves (case of each size) y. Alcohol preps (5 boxes at each site) z. Hand sanitizers (6 bottles at each site) aa. Bleach with dispenser bottles (4 bottles at each site)

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 35 of 48
bb. Tissue (1 case) cc. Diapers (1 case) dd. Blue pads (1 case) ee. Potty chairs (10) ff. Red bags (1 case) gg. Glucometer at each site hh. Syringes with needles (1 case at each site) ii. Medicine cups (1 case at each site) jj. Ice bags (1 case at each site) kk. IV poles (4 at each site) ll. Sharps containers (2 large at each site)
5. Medication needed at Camp J:
a. Tylenol b. Motrin c. NS for IV flush d. Immodium e. Insulin
Replenish supplies and when stock at each area goes down.
6. Staff and offender clothing will be laundered at Camp J.
D. FACILITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS
The essential functions listed in attachment 4 will be determined on an ongoing basis by the Incident Command Team.
1. The following essential facility operations will be maintained or enhanced:
a. Health Services b. Security Services
1) Unit manpower as indicated on Section E 2) Control Center 3) Armory 4) Angola Roving Security 5) BOQ 6) Camp A Laundry and Unit Laundries 7) Timekeeping 8) Investigative Services 9) Perimeter Gates c. Food Services d. Emergency Operations Center e. Information Services f. Safety g. Business Services 1) Accounting/Budget 2) Purchasing

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 36 of 48
3) Offender Banking 4) Cashiers Office h. Human Resources – Payroll i. 909 and 915 Warehouses j. Mail/Package Room k. Mental Health l. Public Relations m. Chaplains
2. The following facility operations will be considered non-essential and suspended:
a. Field operations b. Visiting c. Education d. Call outs (other than essential medical) e. Staff training f. Disciplinary boards g. Recreation h. Classification i. Offender Records j. Legal – ARP/Property Claims/Appeals k. Library (including law libraries) l. Maintenance (except for critical emergencies) m. Canteens n. Museum o. Accreditation p. Shakedown Teams q. K-9 Training r. Offender organization functions s. Hobbyshops t. Sick call (except for emergencies) u. Clinics v. Trips (funeral, hospital, court order must be pre-approved)
Staff from these operations will be reassigned to essential facility operations as needed.
3. Off duty staff will be housed in BOQ and Training Academy.
4. Tact team staff will be assigned to pick up and deliver items necessary for operations from outside resources/vendors.

E. MANPOWER AT OFFENDER HOUSING UNITS

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 37 of 48

CAMP C

Bear 1, 2, 3, 4 Bear Hall Wolf 1, 2, 3, 4 Wolf Hall Tiger 1, 2, 3, 4 Jaguar 1, 2, 3, 4 Kitchen Sallyport Medication Supervisors (Major, Captain)

TOTAL OFFICERS PER SHIFT

CAMP D

Eagle 1, 2, 3, 4 Eagle Hall Falcon 1, 2, 3, 4 Falcon Hall Hawk 1, 2, 3, 4 Raven 1, 2, 3, 4 Kitchen Sallyport Supervisors (Major, Captain)

TOTAL OFFICERS PER SHIFT

CAMP F

Dorm 1 & 2 Dorm 3 U & L Dorm 4 L & R Kitchen Supervisor (Lieutenant)

TOTAL OFFICERS PER SHIFT

CAMP J (currently closed) Gar 1, 2, 3, 4 Shark 1, 2, 3, 4 Cuda 1, 2, 3, 4 Gator 1, 2, 3, 4 Bass Dorm Kitchen Entrance Building Supervisors (Major, Captain)
TOTAL OFFICERS PER SHIFT

# of Officers Per Shift
4 1 4 1 4 4 1 1 1 2
23
# of Officers Per Shift
4 1 4 1 4 4 1 1 2
22
# of Officers Per Shift
1 1 1 1 1
5
# of Officers Per Shift
4 4 4 4 1 1 1 2
21

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 38 of 48

RC Currently housing female o offenders staffed by LCIW
Lower A & B Lower C Lower A, B, C Hall Upper A & B Upper C & d Upper Control Supervisor (Lieutenant)
TOTAL OFFICERS PER SHIFT

# of Officers Per Shift
2 1 1 2 1 1 1
9

DEATH ROW

H & A Tier B & C Tier D & E Tier F & G Tier Control Room Towers Supervisor (Lieutenant)

TOTAL OFFICERS PER SHIFT

MAIN PRISON EAST YARD Ash 1, 2, 3, 4 Ash Hall Magnolia 1, 2, 3, 4 Magnolia Hall Cypress 1, 2, 3, 4 Cypress Hall Spruce 1, 2, 3, 4 Spruce Hall A Building Kitchen MPO Medication Supervisor (Major, Captain)
TOTAL OFFICERS PER SHIFT

REBTC

Unit 1 Unit 2 Control Sallyport Supervisor (Lieutenant)

TOTAL OFFICERS PER SHIFT

# of Officers Per Shift
1 1 1 1 1 2 1
8
# of Officers Per Shift
4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 2
26 # of Officers Per Shift
1 1 1 1 1
5

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 39 of 48

MAIN PRISON WEST YARD Oak 1, 2, 3, 4 Oak Hall Pine 1, 2, 3, 4 Pine Hall Walnut 1, 2, 3, 4 Walnut Hall Hickory 1, 2, 3, 4 Hickory Hall CBA U & L CBB U & L CBC U & L CBC U & L Medication Supervisors (Major, Captain, Lt)
TOTAL OFFICERS PER SHIFT

# of Officers Per Shift
4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 2 2 2 2 1 3
32

TU Upper and Lower A & B Upper and Lower C & D Upper and Lower E & F Medication Supervisor (Lieutenant)
TOTAL OFFICERS PER SHIFT

# of Officers Per Shift
2 2 2 1 1
8

UNIT Camp C Camp D Camp F Camp J (currently closed) RC (currently closed) Death Row OUTCAMP TOTAL

# of Officers Per Shift
23 22
5 21
9 8
87

MPE REBTC MPW TU MAIN PRISON TOTAL

26 5
32 8 71

GRAND TOTAL # OF OFFICERS PER SHIFT

PERIMETER GATES

Front Gate Ferry Gate

TOTAL OFFICERS PER SHIFT

158
# of Officers Per Shift
2 1 3

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 40 of 48
INFECTION CONTROL PRECAUTIONS
PURPOSE:
To ensure the safety and welfare of employees, offenders and public, the Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP) establishes a procedure for pandemic preparation and response to pandemic events as they are identified.
RULE:
A. YELLOW/ORANGE PHASE
1. For the prevention of transmission of any infectious agent and to promote general facility and personal hygiene the medical department shall ensure the following practices are used in any secure facility by all offenders and employees and ensure the availability of adequate supplies. ALL EMPLOYEES AND OFFENDERS shall participate in the following activities:
a. Hand washing: 1) With soap and water; 2) Minimal duration of 20 seconds; 3) Frequency: a) Upon entry into a facility b) Upon entry into a housing, education, or medical unit; c) Before meals d) Handling food; e) After participation in activities to include work, and sports; and f) After toileting g) Other times as deemed appropriate. 4) Hand sanitizing with non-alcohol commercially available antibacterial solution is acceptable in the above circumstances when hand washing is not feasible. a) Dispensers and antibacterial solutions shall be made available at the appropriate locations if hand washing is not feasible. 5) Maximize access to alcohol based hand sanitizer in areas with high traffic flow auch as the kitchen and pill call. 6) Make soap dispensers or hand soap available in all employee and offender restrooms.
b. Utilization of general sick behavior etiquette:
1) Respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette: a) Cough or sneeze into the elbow, into the interior of clothing, or into a facial tissue;

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 41 of 48
b) Wear a surgical mask when sick with upper respiratory infection (URI) if symptoms include coughing or sneezing;
2) When sick, avoid close contact (within 6 feet) of others; 3) Avoid close contact (within 6 feet) with sick persons; 4) Employees should not report to work when ill
c. General facility cleanliness and sanitation: 1) Daily cleaning and disinfection of surfaces that are touched regularly, for example, door knobs and frames, counter tops, tables, chairs, keys, telephones, etc. 2) Use a cleaning solution that has both cleaning and antimicrobial properties. a) In emergency situations when no other acceptable options are available, an alternative is washing with a detergent based solution followed by disinfection with 10% bleach and 90% water solution.
d. Formal and informal education regarding the above shall be provided to employees and offenders that include but is not limited to: 1) Posters supplied by Homeland Security and approved by the medical director and his designee; 2) Presentations during orientation for employees and offenders. 3) Individual/ group instruction by the infection control department through use of LSP radio and TV.
e. Promotion of immunization against infectious diseases. 1) Encourage employees and offenders in getting the annual flu vaccine; 2) Vaccinations of offenders and staff shall occur in accordance with policy set up by Department of Corrections, Secretary of State.
2. The MEDICAL DIRECTOR OR DESIGNEE shall ensure Standard, Universal and droplet Precautions as outlined by the US Department of Health and Human services, Centers for disease Control and Prevention (www.cdc.gov) are used by all employees and offenders throughout LSP secure facilities in accordance with the Universal , Standard and Droplet Precautions.
3. MEDICAL DIRECTOR OR DESIGNEE shall ensure that:
a. Each unit has sufficient medical supplies to assist in the prevention and symptomatic treatment of any pandemic event.
b. Emergency medical supplies are:

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 42 of 48
1) Properly stored within the units in a secure designated area; (central supply)
2) Inventoried on a monthly basis; 3) Rotated as necessary to preserve freshness and function.
c. A reporting system is in place for informing LSP medical providers and the Regional Medical Director of patient symptoms that could indicate and infectious outbreak. 1) MEDICAL PROVIDERS may initiate confirmatory laboratory evaluations to ascertain if a infectious agent is responsible for the symptoms; 2) The infection control department shall notify the appropriate public health authorities and the regional medical director of positive confirmatory test results; 3) The infection control department at the direction of the medical director or his designee shall initiate the appropriate infection control measures when an outbreak is suspected or confirmed.
d. The Facilities Medical Director or his designee in conjunction with the homeland security coordinator shall ensure: 1) Adequate emergency supplies are maintained for both employees and offenders in a pandemic event to include but not limited to: a) Non- perishable food; b) Drinking water; c) Iv fluids d) Facial tissue e) Surgical mask for the patients f) Adequate supply of N-95 mask for all in direct contact with the infected patient. g) Paper towels h) Toilet paper i) Biohazard bags j) Trash bags k) Anti-bacterial soap; l) Anti-bacterial hand sanitizing agents and dispensers m) Cleaning solutions with both cleaning and antimicrobial properties n) Other supplies as deemed necessary.
2) Emergency supplies are stored in a secure ventilated area (central supply)
3) Emergency supplies are inventoried monthly and;
4) Emergency supplies are rotated as necessary to preserve freshness/function.

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 43 of 48
B. RED PHASE:
1. Medical Director and designees shall maintain the above inter-pandemic and Pandemic Alert Period standards at a minimum;
2. The Medical Director or Designee may:
a. Initiate screening for signs and symptoms of all personnel, offenders and visitors entering LSP. 1) Screening Criteria shall be developed utilizing current pandemic signs and symptoms.
b. Refuse entry to persons experiencing signs of infection.
c. Require symptomatic individuals who are granted access to wear surgical masks and adhere to other infection control requirements.
3. The Medical Director or Designee shall:
a. Initiate a tracking system to follow patients with new diagnosis of infection with the pandemic agent and follow patients in isolation and quarantine;
b. Perform patient triage as indicated;
c. Initiate separate patient waiting and treatment areas when feasible (use MPG as isolation/ treatment area)
d. Designate non-medical personnel to administer medications and treatment, if necessary due to absence of multiple medical personnel ill with the pandemic symptoms.
e. Direct the assessment and distribution of medications and medical supplies as deemed appropriate;
f. Designate isolation, quarantine, and morgue areas.
g. Work in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security through the regional medical director and other appropriate agencies for emergency management in response to the successive stages of the pandemic event;
h. Provide the necessary level of response efforts as practicable.
i. Advise the Medical Director or Designee of the following: 1) Isolation/quarantine of the affected population to include: a) Containment boundaries

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 44 of 48

b) Need for appropriate environmental adjustments to

include but not limited to :

i.

All windows, doors, fans, and heating/air

conditioning systems and any other opening

to the outside can be closed and secured if

directed to prevent air exchange.

ii.

Ordering, distributing, and rationing food

supplies and dietary supplements;

iii.

Health and safety issues

iv.

emergency release of personnel

v.

Other issues as appropriate.

4. The Medical Director, with advisement of the regional Medical Director, and the Regional Warden or his designee, shall be responsible for the internal operations and the activation of the appropriate level of response for a pandemic event for each affected secure facility.

5. The Medical Director, Regional Medical Director and the Regional Warden or his designee shall be responsible for the expanded internal level of response and the organization of employees in the Incident Management System to include:

a. Managing incident response functions;

b. Declaring a lockdown where normal programming ceases.

c. Requiring employees to function outside their normal area of expertise as needed

d. Ensuring the escalated level of response structure develops at a pace which stays ahead of the tactical deployment of personnel and resources;
e. Ensuring adequate personnel resources are available.

f. Not permitting any person to; 1) Respond to a crisis situation unless instructed to do so; or 2) Enter any secure unit if exhibiting any type of flu symptoms as stated above.

6. The Director and/or his designee shall ensure:

a. Appropriate levels of communication are established with the family members of the affected employees and offenders (RN Program Coordinator of Communications)

C. POST PANDEMIC PERIOD:

1. Medical practice will resume as in the Inter-pandemic Period Standards.

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 45 of 48
2. The Regional Warden or his designee in consultation with the Medical Director and the Regional Medical Director shall:
a. Arrange for debriefing to gather pertinent information that may be applied to future emergency response efforts.
b. Complete an after action report to include: a) Review incident; b) event analysis; c) Identify areas in need of improvement; d) Create a corrective action plan for future events to be used in the revision of this pandemic event protocol.

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 46 of 48
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY
H1N1 FLU

SCREENING CHECKLIST – EMPLOYEE/OFFENDER

Name:

DOC # (if applicable):

Employee Work Assignment or Offender Housing Assignment:

YES

NO

1.

Spent any time in the H1N1 flu affected areas within the past 7 days? 



2.

Spent any time with anyone from these areas within the past 7 days? 



3.

Did the offender arrive at this facility within the last 8 days?





4.

Does the employee/offender present any of the following signs?

 Temperature > than 100°





 Sore Throat





 Cough





 Shortness of breath, Dyspnea, Ļ 02 sats  Nasal congestion or drainage









 Vomiting





 Lethargy





5.

Does the employee/offender report any of these symptoms within the

past 24 hours?

 Body aches





 Unexplained fatigue or weakness





 Nausea/vomiting





 Diarrhea





COMMENTS:

________________________________ Signature of Medical Interviewer
________________________________ Signature of Reviewing Provider

________________________________ Date of Interview
________________________________ Date of Review

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 47 of 48
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY
H1N1 FLU

Name:

QUESTIONNAIRE – FRONT GATE
Company:

YES

NO

1.

Spent any time in the H1N1 flu affected areas within the past 7 days? 



2.

Spent any time with anyone from these areas within the past 7 days? 



3.

Over the past 24 hours, has the person had any of the following?

 Temperature > than 100°  Sore Throat









 Cough





 Shortness of breath





 Achy feeling/fatigue





 Runny or stuffy nose





 Nausea/vomiting





 Diarrhea





If the person answers yes to 2 or more, please notify medical.

________________________________ Signature of Interviewer

________________________________ Date of Interview

March 18, 2020

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-3 04/25/20 Page 48 of 48

March 18, 2020

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Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-4 04/25/20 Page 1 of 13

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS DIXON CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE
________________________________________________________________

POLICY AND PROCEDURE ____________________________________________________________________________________________
POLICY NUMBER: 3B-014
________________________________________________________________

SUBJECT: COOP Plan: Influenza and Pandemic Viral Diseases: Preparedness, Response and Recovery ________________________________________________________________

REFERENCES: Department Regulation IS-D-2-HCP26
________________________________________________________________

TO WHOM POLICY APPLIES: This policy applies to all staff and offenders at DCI.
________________________________________________________________

PURPOSE: To establish a formal policy defining the planning, preparation, and management of a pandemic flu.
________________________________________________________________

POLICY

It is the policy of DCI that during a pandemic flu, continuity of operations will be maintained by

sustaining and supporting critical infrastructure. To further this objective, guidelines specific for

preventive education, identification, surveillance, immunizations, and treatment have been

developed to control and contain the spread of the pandemic flu virus.

________________________________________________________________

PROCEDURE:

A.

Definitions

1.

Preparedness: Actions that involve a combination of planning, resources, training, exercise and

organizing to build, sustain and improve operational capabilities. This process includes identifying

personnel, training and equipment for delivering necessary resources when needed for an incident.

2.

Response: Immediate actions to save lives, to protect property, the environment and to meet basic

human needs. Response also includes the execution of emergency plans and actions to support short-

term recovery.

3.

Recovery: The development, coordination and execution of service and site-restoration plans; the

reconstitution of unit operations and services; long-term care and treatment of affected persons;

additional measures for social, environmental and economic restoration; evaluation of the incident

to identify lessons learned; post incident reporting; and developmental initiatives to mitigate the

effects of future incidents.

4.

Seasonal (or common) Flu: Respiratory illness that can be transmitted from person to person. Most

people have some immunity and a vaccine is available. This regulation does not apply to seasonal

or common flu outbreaks.

5.

Pandemic Flu: Human flu that causes a global outbreak, or pandemic, of serious illness. There is

little natural immunity. Therefore, healthy people may be at an increased risk for severe symptoms.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-4 04/25/20 Page 2 of 13

Serious complications are more frequent. The disease can spread easily from person to person. A pandemic flu occurs rarely but causes devastation across the continents.

6.

Influenza-like Illness (ILI): is defined as fever (temperature of 100°F or greater) and a cough and/or

a sore throat in the absence of a KNOWN cause other than influenza which occurs in the context of

circulating influenza in the community.

7.

Screening Checklist: A list to be used to identify offenders, employees, and visitors with ILI. This

list will be developed by the Department’s Medical/Mental Health Director based on the latest CDC

recommendations.

8.

Confirmed Case: A confirmed case of novel influenza A (H1N1) virus infection is defined as a

person with an ILI with laboratory confirmed novel influenza A (H1N1) virus infection by either

real time RT-PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction) or viral culture.

9.

Probable Case: A probable case of novel influenza A (H1N1) virus infection is defined as a person

with ILI who is positive for influenza A, but negative for human H1 and H3 by influenza RT-PCR.

10. Suspected Case: A suspected case of novel influenza A (H1N1) virus infection is defined as a person who does not meet the confirmed or probable case definition, and is not novel H1N1 test negative, and is/has been a previously healthy person < 65 years hospitalized for ILI or has been diagnosed with ILI and has an epidemiologic link in the past seven days to a confirmed case or probable case.

11. Close Contact: A person who has had direct exposure to respiratory secretions or body fluids of a person with confirmed influenza or has touched or talked to a person with probable, suspected or confirmed influenza within a distance of six feet. Time of contact also needs to be considered. For instance, a person who has cared for or lived with an influenza patient is considered a close contact, providing the contact was of a continuous period of time such as 30-60 minutes. Working in the same building, walking by or sitting across a room from a person with influenza is NOT considered a direct exposure and therefore is considered contact only.

12. Isolation: Separation and restriction of movement of employees, offenders, and visitors with an ILI to contain the spread of that illness to susceptible people. (Isolation may occur in group settings.)

13. Quarantine: Separation and restriction of asymptomatic individuals who may have been exposed to an infectious agent but are not yet ill. The purpose of quarantine is to separate offenders who may have been exposed from the remaining population of offenders.

14. Barrier Protection: items used to avoid direct contact with patient blood, body fluid, secretions, and non intact skin, e.g., mask or gloves.

15. Standard Precautions: A set of infection control practices used to prevent the transmission of diseases that can be acquired by contact with blood, body fluids, non intact skin and mucus membranes. These measures shall be applied routinely in all health care settings.

B.

The Institutional Incident Command Team (ICT) shall determine actions to be taken to prevent the spread of

pandemic influenza among staff, offenders, volunteers, visitors and other civilians. The team will consist of,

at a minimum, the Warden, Deputy Wardens, Assistant Wardens, Institutional Medical Director, Nursing

Director, Infection Control Nurse, Human Resources Manager, Business Manager, Classification Director,

ARDC Manager, and Information Services. Each member has a designated area of responsibility and will

have an assigned back up person should that team member become ill during the pandemic. Members of the

ICT will have seven day a week availability to respond to a potential outbreak of an Influenza-like Illness

(ILI).

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-4 04/25/20 Page 3 of 13

1.

The Warden shall be responsible for coordinating pandemic influenza preparedness planning and

for verifying command and control areas of responsibility and authority during a pandemic. The

Deputy Warden will take over this responsibility if the Warden becomes ill during a pandemic.

C.

Strategic goals for the management of a pandemic flu include:

1.

Ensuring continuity of unit operations while sustaining and supporting critical infrastructure. Note

that infrastructure includes not only associated physical plants, but also processes, systems and

information that supports that infrastructure.

2.

Taking necessary steps to slow down an outbreak so that the health care system is not overwhelmed,

e.g., education, heightened screening for early detection, steps to limit cross contamination, social

distancing etc.

3.

Limiting illness and mortality by identifying high risk offenders/staff, monitoring sick offenders

closely for early signs of complicating illnesses and providing timely intervention

D. Reporting requirements to the Secretary, Chief of Operations, Medical/Mental Health Director and Regional Wardens shall be in accordance with Department Regulation No. AM-I-4 (C-05-001) "Activity Reports/ Unusual Occurrence Reports Operational Units." The Executive Management Officer will make these notifications. In his/her absence the Director of Classification will report.

E.

Operational Staffing:

SECURITY

1.

To ensure that the security and safety of the institution is effectively maintained in the event of a

pandemic flu outbreak, every effort will be made to ensure adequate staffing. With 40% of staff

absenteeism estimated during a pandemic flu outbreak, DCI expects to have approximately 234

employees available to cover the critical posts. Security requires a minimum of 184 officers. These

posts are cellblocks, dormitories, towers, Control Center, Front Gate and Infirmary.

2.

DCI's plan to cover the functions of critical/essential job functions in case of prolonged absenteeism

during a pandemic include the following:

a.

Correctional officers who are assigned to the following crews will be utilized in all critical

posts as needed on all twelve hour shifts of the institution in the following priority:

 Field Crew  Outside Work Crew  Administrative Support  Contract Work Crews  Baton Rouge Janitorial Work Crew

b.

Outside trips will be decreased to only medical emergencies. There will be two (2) Trip

Officers available on every twelve hour shift.

c.

There will be a Warehouse officer available at all times, to accept and deliver needed

supplies.

d.

The Incident Management System will be manned around the clock utilizing four (4)

trained Administrative Support Officers.

e.

The maximum amount of overtime will be worked by all officers as needed.

f.

All leave previously granted will be cancelled with the exception of sickness and medical

emergencies.

g.

All rosters will be reviewed on a daily basis during this operation to see if or where

additional officers are needed.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-4 04/25/20 Page 4 of 13

MEDICAL

1.

Critical/Essential Job Functions

a.

Pharmacy - (provided by La. State Penitentiary pharmacy staff)

b.

Dialysis

c.

Nursing Services

d.

Radiology

e.

Mental Health Services

f.

Declared Self Emergencies

g.

Emergency Trips

h.

Nursing Unit

i.

Nursing Assessments required to control disease process

j.

Completion of Screening Checklist offender and staff

k.

Required reporting to Office Public Health and Incident Command Team

l.

Medication Administration

m. Physician services

n.

Emergency Laboratory Services

o.

Emergency Dental Services

p.

Emergency Psychiatry

q.

Administrative Assistant Duties

2.

Non Critical/Essential Functions

a.

Optometry

b.

Routine sick call

c.

Chronic Clinics including Discharge Clinic

d.

Routine Doctors Call

e.

Routine Psychiatry

f.

Routine Mental Health Services

g.

Routine Dental Services

h.

Routine off site clinic visits

i.

Routine segregation rounds

j.

Routine segregation assessments

k.

Telemedicine clinic visits

l.

Annual physicals

m.

Administrative Remedy Procedure & Offender correspondence

n.

Employee Hepatitis B Vaccinations

o.

Offender & Employee Annual Tuberculin Skin Testing

p.

Routine Laboratory Testing

q.

On site specialty clinics to include vascular, orthopedics, podiatry & ultrasound

Note: Medical services will be evaluated on a daily basis to determine if a change in level is required.

3.

In order to compensate for a 40% staff reduction, the medical department will utilize services of

four WAE nurses.

4.

Succession Plans for Critical/Essential Functions and staffing plan

a.

Director of Nursing – member of the Incident Command Team, monitors new

developments, gives direction to the health care staff and Department Heads. Ensures

implementation of new recommendations.

 Assistant Director of Nursing is cross trained and will be the replacement for the Director of Nursing if necessary.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-4 04/25/20 Page 5 of 13

b.

Assistant Director of Nursing – provides scheduling for 24 hour nursing coverage.

Serves as a resource for staff. Assists the Director and Infection Control Manager.

 The Infection Control Manager will be the replacement for the Assistant Director of Nursing if necessary.

c.

Infection Control Manager – provides coverage for screening check lists, reporting

requirements and maintaining continuity of infection control practices.

 The Quality Assurance Manager will be the replacement for the Infection Control Manager if necessary. Both Infection Control Manager and Quality Assurance Manager are cross trained.

d.

Pharmacist – Procuring medications, filling prescriptions and dispensing medication.

 Replacement services will be determined by LSP personnel.

e.

Nursing Unit – A minimum of one nurse per 12 hour day and night shifts is essential to

provide nursing care to offenders confined to the infirmary nursing unit.

f.

Out patient Nursing – A minimum of two nurses per day and night shifts are essential to

screen potential or identified contacts of ILI, and provide assessment and nursing care to

offenders who declare themselves an emergency. These nurses will also conduct

medication administration on the dorms and or segregated areas (insulin, INH, and

Controlled drugs).

g.

Cohorted offenders - A minimum of one nurse per 12 hour shift is essential to provide

required services to these offenders.

 Any available staff will be utilized as backup for the nursing unit, outpatient nursing and cohorted offenders. In addition, 4 WAE nurses will be utilized as replacements if necessary.

h.

Medication Administration – Administration of Insulin, INH and Controlled drugs in the

infirmary and in the segregated areas as well as scheduled 5 A.M., and 5 P.M. pill calls

conducted in the centralized pill call room.

 Nursing staff will continue to administer identified medications in the infirmary and in the segregated areas. These duties will be assigned to the outpatient nursing staff.

 Scheduled pill calls in the centralized pill call rooms will be conducted by pill call officers with officers trained in medication administration utilized as replacements if necessary.

i.

The Administrative staff’s essential functions will be purchasing, payroll, compiling data

and any other support for Nursing and Mental Health staff. Two staff members daily are

essential.

 The Dental Assistant will be the replacement for administrative staff if necessary.

j.

Mental Health professionals – Two Mental Health professionals are essential daily and on

call 24 hours a day to provide continuity of care for the offenders who require mental

health services. Emergency Psychiatric services will be provided by the contract

psychiatrist.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-4 04/25/20 Page 6 of 13

 One of the currently employed 4 Mental Health professionals will be the replacement for the Mental Health Staff if necessary.

k.

Physician services – provides professional medical care to the DCI offender population,

direction to the Nursing Staff and Department Heads in regards to implementing CDC

recommendations.

 Nurse Practitioner will provide backup if necessary.

l.

Dialysis – services are contracted by Fresenius and back up will be provided by Fresenius

staff.

m.

Radiology – one part-time radiologist technician – Two hours per day will be utilized as

on call should an offender require an x-ray either related to illness or injury.

n.

Medical Waste will be managed by contracted service provided by Stericycle.

o.

Acadian Ambulance Services or DCI van will be utilized to transport emergency trips.

Note: The maximum amount of overtime will be worked by all medical staff as needed. Cancel all leave previously granted and allow leave only for sickness and medical emergencies.

MAINTENANCE

1.

The Maintenance Department will make every effort to maintain all critical functions of the facility

during the event of a pandemic flu situation. We currently staff 10 Employees and based on the

estimated reduction of staff affected by the flu of 40%; that would leave an estimated 6 Employees

to carry out the critical functions. We have identified these functions, based on a Priority Level 1,

for the estimated full scale, 4 month recovery period. Cross Training of employees will take place

for all critical tasks required for each compound by employees who normally would not be familiar

in areas such as boilers, generators, filter change locations, laundry repairs, perimeter lighting, etc.

2.

The following are the essential functions for Maintenance:

a.

Work Order System – Reviewed daily based on Priority Level 1 related to Health and

Safety.

b.

Preventative Maintenance - Maintain equipment, primarily ventilation systems, with

better Merv Rated Filtration filters in critcal areas of the facility.

 Unit Maintenance and Welding - Concentrating primarily on ventilation system, Laundry Service, and Boiler System.
 HVAC - Concentrating primarily on ventilation system.  Plumbing - Ensure continued quality of water supply from water well & operation of
waste water system.  Electrician - Maintain Emergency Power System.  Automotive - Maintain integrity of Fleet.  Supervisor - Verify that needed maintenance is being performed to ensure proper
operation of facility.

c.

Adjust work schedule based on the level of the outbreak and affected staff.

d.

Cancel all leave previously granted and allow leave only for sickness and medical

emergencies.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-4 04/25/20 Page 7 of 13

e.

Facility Maintenance Managers will be available on 24 Hour Emergency Call

KITCHEN

1.

The Kitchen operation is a top priority and food preparation cannot suffer. Normal staffing

includes 1 Lt. and 3 Sgts. per shift, in addition to the Major and Captain. In the event of a 40%

reduction in staff, the Kitchen will operate with 3 officers per shift. The following steps will be

taken to ensure the Kitchen continues to operate at full capacity during the time period of the flu

outbreak:

a.

Menus are prepared by cycle, and meal planning will not be impacted in the event of a

40% shortage in staff. There are 6 menu cycles developed for a 12 month period, with

each cycle covering a 6 week time period. Recipes are automated, so that once the total

number of meals to be prepared is determined, quantities of ingredients and seasonings

are automatically calculated, eliminating any guesswork. Additionally, soup for sick

offenders will be on the daily menu.

b.

It is imperative that the number of offenders assigned to Kitchen duty remains constant.

The work roster has 60 offenders assigned to Kitchen duty. If 40% become ill and cannot

continue with their work assignment, then an additional 24 offenders will need to be

transferred to this job assignment.

c.

The Major and Captain in charge of Kitchen operations are currently cross-trained and

will provide leadership. Additionally, the Lt. assigned to the Kitchen will have the

knowledge to pull recipes and prepare pre-assigned menus.

d.

Offenders that are isolated due to illness will be served their meals in disposable

containers, including hinged trays, soup bowls, cups, utensils, etc. All trash will be

disposed of in the dumpster assigned to this area, and any “leftovers” will not be returned

to the Kitchen.

WAREHOUSE

1.

The Warehouse will play a vital role in keeping DCI supplied with essential supplies, including

food, medical, and cleaning supplies. There are 3 officers assigned to the Warehouse. In the event

of a 40% reduction in staff, the Warehouse can function with 2 employees.

a.

All employees are cross-trained to operate the fork lift, make deliveries, and monitor

inventory levels.

b.

Changes in Property Control have a 90 day limit for entry into the system. Should the

Property Control Coordinator become ill, she can make the appropriate entries upon

returning to work.

c.

Purchasing staff can provide backup to Warehouse personnel in the event of illness.

d.

Inventory levels of PPE supplies will be submitted daily during a pandemic threat or

ongoing pandemic, and as needed at other times.

2.

The following are the essential functions of the Warehouse at all risk levels:

a.

Property Control

b.

LaGov - Ordering/Receiving (Purchasing Office)

c.

LaGov - Inventory Reporting

d.

Issues/Deliveries

e.

Receiving

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-4 04/25/20 Page 8 of 13

f.

Inventory (Monitoring)

g.

Forklift (Operation)

h.

Purchasing (submitting RFPs to maintain operations/stock)

PURCHASING

1.

The Purchasing Office is the lifeline to keeping DCI supplied. Three non-security employees

work in this office, and it can operate with 2 employees in the event of a 40% reduction in staff.

a.

All employees in this office are cross-trained, and are needed to carry on the specialized

job responsibilities of the office.

b.

Desk procedures are available to assist any Business Office employee who may be called

upon to fill in during an emergency.

c.

A file of alternate, non-contract vendors is being compiled in the event of an emergency.

(see La eCat)

d.

If the Administrative Program Manager is out, supervision and approvals will be

provided by the Administrative Program Director or the Accountant.

2.

The following are the essential functions of Purchasing at all risk levels:

a.

Oversee purchasing aspects

b.

Oversee Canteen aspects

c.

Oversee Warehouse aspects

d.

Ensure Contract Orders/Bid Requests are completed at agency level

e.

Issue approved 156-B RFP numbers

f.

Input RFP numbers in Pulse2

g.

Input Receipts for orders in Pulse 2

h.

Enter orders over $5,000 in LaGov

i.

Enter Bids in LaGov

j.

Enter Visa purchases into WORKS

k.

Verify, document & post payments to Pulse 2

l.

Audit Visa statements and post to Pulse 2

m.

Gather, compile, edit & input bid specs with agency personnel

n.

Research/route invoices to all departments

o.

Research, document and finalize all "error" issues

BUSINESS OFFICE

1.

Other non-security employees in the Business Office have responsibility for budget control,

accounting, offender banking, and Canteen inventory functions. Three employees work in this

area, and a 40% reduction would leave 2 people to perform the duties required. If needed, these

employees can provide support to other areas, especially in the areas of purchasing and/or

inventory control.

a.

Offender banking employees are cross-trained, and can perform some of the functions of

the Accountant, such as writing checks, making deposits, etc. The Accountant and

Administrative Program Director are cross-trained in most areas. Headquarters staff will

be consulted to provide specialized assistance and direction, if necessary.

b.

Desk procedures are available to assist any Business Office employee who may be called

upon to fill in during an emergency.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-4 04/25/20 Page 9 of 13

c.

Canteen operations will cease at the discretion of the Warden, thereby allowing

additional time to assist in other areas.

d.

The Business Office and Records Office employees are working together to ensure that

discharge packets and checks are taken to the Control Center on time.

e.

In the event that the Administrative Program Director and Accountant are both out, the

Assistant Warden of Administration will provide supervision and approvals as needed.

2.

The following are the essential functions of the Business Service / Purchasing Office:

a.

Incentive Pay

b.

Discharges

c.

Offender Purchases

d.

Medical Co-Pays

e.

Offender Postage & Copies

f.

Canteen Holds

g.

Restitution

h.

Monthly Statements

i.

T & A

j.

Offender Movement

k.

Input Canteen Purchases

l.

Canteen Inventory

m. Canteen Transfers

n.

Daily Bank Deposits

o.

Offender Account Transfers

p.

W/E Tickets and Visiting

q.

Car Wash/Hobby Craft

r.

Head Quarter Mail

s.

Answer Offender Mail

t.

Cut Checks

u.

Monthly Billings

v.

Fuel Trac (Reconcile fuel payments)

w.

Pay Electric Bills

x.

Pay Dialysis Bill

y.

Pay Contractor Bills

z.

Post PULSE

aa. Run Credit Card Statements

bb. Pay Credit Card Bills

cc. Reconcile Bank Accounts

dd. Reports SGR/IAT/Rev/Disb

ee. Budget Monitoring/Projections ff.

Approvals-RFPs, LaGov, etc.

gg. Food Service Coordination

CLASSIFICATION

1.

During a pandemic flu epidemic all non-essential classification functions will cease in order to

contain/isolate those affected and maintain the integrity of the institution while ensuring public,

staff, and offender safety. Classification staff would be categorized as medium exposure risk due to

the nature of their job functions. Due to this level of exposure, it is expected that an absenteeism

rate of 30 – 40% will occur (3-4 employees). Classification requires a minimum of 2 employees to

maintain essential functions. In the event this happens, classification will redistribute duties as

follows:

a.

Classification Director – will assist the Wardens office with implementation of the

contingency plan (if unavailable, Asst. Director will assume duties)

b.

Asst. Classification Director – will manage all classification functions as dictated by

current situation (if unavailable, Classification Director will assume)

c.

Recreation coordinator – if available, will be reassigned to assist security

d.

Unit One Classification – will assist unit management and continue normal functions as

necessary (if unavailable, Cellblock Classification Officer will provide support as

necessary)

e.

Unit Two Classification – will assist unit management and continue normal functions as

necessary (if unavailable, Unit Three classification officer will assume duties)

f.

Unit Three Classification – will continue normal functions and assist Unit Two as

necessary (if unavailable, Unit Two classification will assume duties)

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-4 04/25/20 Page 10 of 13

g.

Cellblock Classification – will continue normal functions and assist Unit One as

necessary (if unavailable, Assistant Director will assume duties)

h.

Admin. Support. – if available, will be reassigned to assist security.

RECORDS OFFICE

1.

The Offender Records Office has 4 employees. During a flu epidemic the number of employees

could be reduced to 2 or 3. The Records Office can operate with a minimum of 2 employees. The

ARDC Manager will direct the office backed up by the ARDC Supervisor.

2.

The following are the essential functions of the Records Office:

a.

Discharges will be completed 30 days in advance. We will see the offenders in the non-

contact visiting room. Records for discharge will be cleared 60 days in advance.

b.

Transfer order and transferring records every Friday (if not cancelled).

c.

Admissions will be checked upon arrival to DCI & (within 2 months of being received)

and checked for Compound 3 (if not cancelled).

d.

Educational CTRP credit forms and forfeitures will be calculated according to offender’s

release date.

e.

General office duties.

f.

Any court documents received showing offender might be eligible for release will be

reviewed immediately.

F.

In the event that additional acute care beds for expanded healthcare capacity are needed the following moves

will be made.

1.

Offenders with confirmed cases of influenza shall be housed in the Infirmary or the Visiting Room.

2.

Dialysis offenders shall be housed in Dorm K.

3.

YOP offenders shall be moved from Dorm K to Dorm 7.

G.

DCI has classified the following employee positions into the indicated exposure risk categories.

1.

High Exposure Risk: (Occupations with high potential for exposure to known or suspected sources

of pandemic influenza virus) Healthcare Delivery and Support Staff, Trip Officers transporting

known or suspected pandemic influenza infected patients, Social Workers, Infirmary Security Staff,

Security Staff assigned to affected areas.

2.

Medium Exposure Risk: (Occupations with high-frequency contact within six feet of the offender

population) Security staff in unaffected areas, Chaplains, Classification.

3.

Lower Exposure Risk: (Occupations that do not require routine contact with the offender population)

Business Office, Human Resources, Records Office etc.). Risky activities outside of the workplace

shall be considered when classifying employees into low exposure risk, such as other employment

that may involve routine contact with an offender population (part-time security) or frequent visits

to nursing homes, etc. Such risky activities outside of the workplace shall be discouraged for low

risk staff in the event of a pandemic flu.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-4 04/25/20 Page 11 of 13

H. DCI maintains a Baseline Readiness (always ready state) as a guideline for necessary actions for pandemic flu alert as indicated:

1.

Maintain adequate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) supplies at all times and as directed by the

Institutional Incident Command Team to include the following:

a.

Tissues;

b.

Gloves;

c.

Biohazard Bags;

d.

Hazard Receptacles;

e.

Surgical Masks;

f.

Waterless Hand Sanitizers;

2.

DCI's points of contact for influenza pandemic preparedness are the Baton Rouge Office of Public

Health Region 2 and the East Feliciana Parish Health Unit.

3.

Provide education and training regarding pandemic influenza to staff and offenders during

orientation, inservice, when administering flu vaccines, and on closed circuit television.

4.

Ensure that all staff is familiar with the local Incident Command System (ICS) and understand the

roles and persons assigned within that structure.

5.

Incorporate pandemic influenza into unit emergency management planning and exercise.

6.

Determine the potential impact of a pandemic on the unit by using multiple possible scenarios of

varying severity relative to illness, absenteeism, supplies, availability of resources, access to legal

system representatives, etc.

7.

The following strategies will be used for offenders with known or suspected pandemic influenza:

a.

Confining ill and exposed offenders to their cells;

b.

Isolating offenders with symptoms of ILI in the Infirmary or the Visiting Room.

c.

Staff assigned to work in affected areas will not be assigned to work in unaffected areas.

8.

In the event that a temporary morgue becomes necessary, the cooler on Compound 2 will be used.

I.

In response to a pandemic threat or during an ongoing pandemic, DCI will take the following actions:

1.

The Institutional Incident Command Team shall meet weekly or as directed by the Department’s

Medical/Mental Health Director.

2.

The DCI Health Authority shall discuss with the Medical/Mental Health Director regarding

stockpiling requirements of antibiotics and necessary medical supplies.

3.

Provide a current list of all supplies which shall be sent to the Department's Medical/Mental Health

Director.

4.

The Nursing Director will monitor sick call reports and clinic visits in an effort to identify ILI in the

offender population. Findings will be reported to the Unit Head and Health Authority.

5.

Encourage offenders to notify health care/security staff at the onset of symptoms of ILI. Offenders

should be informed that early detection is vital to reduce the transmission of an influenza outbreak.

6.

Waive the health care co-payment fee for sick calls related to ILI.

7.

Provide education to employees and offenders on basic hygiene, respiratory etiquette and high risk

medical conditions.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-4 04/25/20 Page 12 of 13

8.

Ensure that health care personnel are updated with the latest CDC recommendations regarding ILI,

such as symptoms/signs, diagnostic criteria, treatment protocols, indications of anti-viral medication

use, etc.

9.

Infection Control/Precautions: Institute Infection Control Precautions as follows:

a.

Maximize access to alcohol based hand sanitizer in areas with high traffic flow such as the

kitchen and pill call;

b.

Make soap dispensers or hand soap available in all employee and offender restrooms;

c.

Emphasize frequent cleaning and disinfection of high touch areas, i.e. door knobs, keys

and telephones;

d.

Vaccination/Antiviral medication priorities shall be determined and distributed by the

Department’s Medical/Mental Health Director;

e.

Surgical masks and gloves shall be worn by staff having direct contact (within six feet) of

offenders who have suspected or probable or confirmed influenza in the designated

isolation areas. Good hand washing must take place between patient contacts and glove

changes. Surgical masks shall only be worn in the designated isolation areas. Offenders

who become symptomatic and require movement shall don a mask prior to movement.

Movement to and from isolation and quarantine areas shall be kept to a minimum and

necessary services to the extent possible shall be delivered to these offenders in the

isolation and quarantine areas.

f.

Recommendations shall be made for quarantine of non-ill contacts. Offenders who may

have been exposed but are asymptomatic shall be quarantined. Arrangements shall be made

to provide those quarantined with necessary daily items including meals, water and

hygiene.

g.

Offenders with ILI symptoms shall be isolated. This can be done in a group setting as well,

if multiple offenders require isolation. Arrangements shall be made to provide those

isolated with necessary daily items including meals, water and hygiene. All efforts shall be

made to limit any movement of isolated offenders (bring meals, medications, etc. to them)

but if offender requires to leave the isolation area then a proper mask shall be worn before

leaving isolation area and the offender shall not be allowed remove the mask until returned

to the isolation area.

h.

Offenders diagnosed with ILI shall be monitored for early signs of complicating illnesses,

i.e. pneumonia. Offenders who are at high risk for these complications or those who are

sicker at presentation shall be admitted to the infirmary for closer observation.

i.

May consider instituting a standing order/treatment protocol for ILI.

j.

Phone Triage for Staff: Staff who have ILI symptoms or are ill may be triaged by phone.

Triage shall be performed by medical staff or health trained staff. All absences related to

ILI shall be tracked.

k.

A situation report shall be forwarded to the Department’s Medical/Mental Health Director

to include: the number of newly diagnosed cases (suspected or probable or confirmed); the

number of offenders in isolation; the number of offenders quarantined; the number of staff

absences security/medical; and deaths. The Department’s Medical/ Mental Health Director

shall decide the frequency of this report for each unit.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-4 04/25/20 Page 13 of 13

J.

In response to a pandemic threat or during an ongoing pandemic, the Department’s Medical/Mental Health

Director, in collaboration with the Unit Head, shall decide to take any or all of following actions:

1.

Screening: Employees will complete a self screening at roll call. Employees who state they are sick

shall be triaged by medical staff or health trained staff, and if found to have a fever shall be sent

home. Staff with ILI shall remain at home at least 24 hours after they are free of fever (100 degrees

F), or signs of fever, without the use of fever reducing medications.

2.

To impose restrictions regarding outside travel with the exceptions of medical/mental health

emergencies and mandatory court trips.

3.

Transfers In/Out: Transfers within the Department may be suspended on a unit-by-unit basis or

department-wide.

4.

Visitors/Vendors: Screening of visitors/vendors may be initiated and visitors with symptoms of

pandemic flu may be denied entry to the unit. Symptomatic vendors may be granted access based

upon need and shall be required to wear a mask while on institutional grounds.

5.

Clinics: On-site clinics may be allowed to operate on a case-by-case basis. Specialty clinics that can

be accomplished via telemedicine will be strongly encouraged.

6.

Access/Control:

a.

Offender group activities may be suspended;

b.

Normal eating activities may be suspended. A plan shall exist for delivering meals to

offenders if cafeteria or group-style dining is closed;

c.

Pill call may be modified as necessary to reduce the risk of influenza transmission. The

Department's Medical/Mental Health Director may expand KOP list.

7.

Surveillance, Screening and Triage: Routine sick call may be suspended. Offenders will have access

to healthcare via emergency sick call.

________________________________________________________________

________________________ JASON KENT, WARDEN

EFFECTIVE DATE: _____________

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-5 04/25/20 Page 1 of 10
STATE OF LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
CORRECTIONS SERVICES

Department Regulation No. HCP26

10 March 2020

INSTITUTIONAL SERVICES / HEALTH CARE POLICIES Health Care Policy – Infection control
Influenza and Pandemic Viral Diseases: Preparedness, Response and Recovery
1. AUTHORITY: Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections as contained in Chapter 9 of Title 36.
2. REFERENCES: La. R.S. 15:831; 5-ACI-3D-08 “Protection from Harms,” 5-ACI6A-12 “Communicable Disease and Infection Control Program,” 5-ACI-6B-07 “Emergency Plans;” Department Regulations AM-I-4 “Activity Reports/Unusual Occurrence Reports Operational Units,” HCP21 "Communicable and Contagious Diseases and Infection Control Program," World Health Organization; Center for Disease Control and Prevention.
A. During a pandemic or an influenza outbreak, the following resources are available to provide up to date information.
1) World Health Organization (WHO) - guidelines can be found at www.who.int/en/;
2) The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) – guidelines can be found at www.cdc.gov;
3) The United States Department of Health and Human Services’ Center for Disease Control and Prevention Health Alert Network information can be found at https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/;
4) Louisiana Department of Health.
3. PURPOSE: This regulation provides a formal policy and procedure for the Department of Public Safety and Corrections (DPS&C) concerning the planning, preparation and management of a pandemic viral disease or an influenza as part of the Department’s infection control program. The DPS&C recognizes a pandemic or an influenza outbreak may or may not follow an expected course and may present new challenges. The Secretary or designee shall have the authority to waive the requirements of this regulation in exceptional situations. Strategic goals include:
A. Ensuring continuity of unit operations while sustaining and supporting critical infrastructure. Note: That infrastructure includes not only associated physical plants, but also processes, systems, and information supporting that infrastructure.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB
Department Regulation No. HCP26 10 March 2020 Page Two

Document 25-5 04/25/20 Page 2 of 10

B. Taking necessary steps to slow down an outbreak so the health care system is not overwhelmed, for example: education, heightened screening for early detection, steps to limit cross contamination, social distancing, etc.
C. Limiting illness and mortality by identifying high risk offenders/staff, closely monitoring sick offenders for early signs of complicating illnesses and providing timely intervention
4. APPLICABILITY: Deputy Secretary, Undersecretary, Chief of Operations, Department Medical Health Director, Department Mental Health Director, Department Nursing Director, Regional Wardens, Wardens, Facility Health Authorities, Director of Probation and Parole, and Director of Prison Enterprises.
5. POLICY: The Secretary’s policy is each Unit Head is responsible for ensuring appropriately written policies and procedures are in place to address pandemic and influenza preparedness, response, and recovery.
6. DEFINITIONS:
A. Barrier Protection: Items used to avoid direct contact with patient blood, body fluid, secretions, and non-intact skin, for example, masks or gloves.
B. Close Contact: A person who has had direct exposure to respiratory secretions or body fluids of a person with confirmed influenza or has touched or talked to a person with probable, suspected or confirmed influenza within a distance of six feet. Time of contact also needs to be considered. For instance, a person who has cared for or lived with an influenza patient is considered a close contact, providing the contact was of a continuous period of time such as 30-60 minutes. Working in the same building, walking by or sitting across a room from a person with influenza is NOT considered a direct exposure and therefore is considered contact only.
C. Communicable Disease: A disease which can be transmitted from person to person or from animal to person.
D. Confirmed Case: A person who tests positive for novel influenza A virus infection on an approved laboratory test. This may apply to other viral illnesses which may cause epidemic outbreaks as well.
E. Infection Control Program: A program designed to investigate, prevent, and control the spread of infections and communicable diseases.
F. Influenza: Influenza (flue) a contagious respiratory illness caused by influenza viruses that infect the nose, throat, and sometimes the lungs. It can cause mild to severe illness, and at times can lead to death.

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G. Influenza-like Illness (ILI): A fever (temperature of 100°F or greater) and a cough and/or a sore throat. This includes iillnesses having presentation similar to flu, such as coronavirus or other viral pathogens.
H. Isolation: Separation and restriction of movement of employees, offenders, and visitors with an ILI to contain the spread of that illness to susceptible people. Isolation may occur in group settings.
I. Pandemic: An epidemic of disease which has spread across a large region; for example: spread across multiple continents or worldwide.
J. Pandemic Influenza: An occurrence in which novel influenza virus spreads from person to person around the world and affects a very large number of people. In that case, there is little natural immunity. Therefore, healthy people may be at an increased risk for severe symptoms; and serious complications are more frequent. The disease can spread easily from person to person. A pandemic influenza occurs rarely, but it causes devastation across the continents when it occurs.
K. Preparations: Actions which involve a combination of planning, resources, training, exercise, and organizing to build, sustain, and improve operational capabilities. This process includes identifying personnel, training, and equipment for delivering necessary resources when needed for an incident.
L. Probable Case: A person who meets illness criteria for influenza (flu), but does not yet have laboratory confirmation or influenza virus infection. This applies to other viral illnesses which may result in infection by direct transmission and have potential for epidemic spread.
M. Quarantine: Separation and restriction of asymptomatic individuals who may have been exposed to an infectious agent but are not yet ill. The purpose of quarantine is to separate offenders who may have been exposed from the remaining population of offenders.
N. Recovery: Includes: the development, coordination and execution of service and site-restoration plans; the reconstitution of unit operations and services; long-term care and treatment of affected people; additional measures for social, environmental and economic restoration; evaluation of the incident to identify lessons learned; post-incident reporting; and developmental initiatives to mitigate the effects of future incidents.
O. Response: Immediate action(s) taken to save lives, to protect property, the environment, and to meet basic human needs. Response includes the execution of emergency plans and actions to support short-term recovery.
P. Screening Checklist: A list to be used to identify offenders, employees, contract employees, vendors, and visitors with ILI. This list shall be

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developed by the Department’s Medical/Mental Health Director based on the latest CDC recommendations.
Q. Seasonal (or common) Flu: Influenza A and B viruses which spread and cause illness in people during “flu season”. Most people have some immunity, and a vaccine is available. This regulation does not apply to seasonal or common flu outbreaks.
R. Standard Precautions: A set of infection control practices used to prevent the transmission of diseases which can be acquired by contact with blood, body fluids, non-intact skin, and mucus membranes. These measures shall be applied routinely in all health care settings.
S. Suspected Case/Case Under Investigation: A person who meets illness criteria for influenza (flu), but laboratory tests for influenza virus infection have not been performed. A case under investigation will have exposure history which shall prompt a health investigation.
7. PROCEDURES: Each unit's pandemic and flu plan shall include, at a minimum, the following:
A. Procedures for prevention, disinfection, education, identification, surveillance, immunization (when applicable), treatment, follow-up and medical isolation of infectious cases (when applicable). Reporting requirements to the Secretary, Chief of Operations, Medical/Mental Health Director and Regional Wardens shall be in accordance with Department Regulation No. AM-I-4 "Activity Reports/ Unusual Occurrence Reports Operational Units." In addition, local, state, and federal agencies shall be notified as appropriate.
B. Guidelines to restructure housing in order to decrease the possibility of an outbreak.
C. A Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) which includes, but is not limited to, the following:
1) Contingency plans for 30-40% employee absences possibly due to:
a. Personal illness;
b. Family member illness;
c. Community mitigation measures such as quarantines, business, childcare and school closures;
d. Public transportation disruptions;

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e. First responder, National Guard, or military reserve obligations.
2) Human Resources policies to allow alternate work scenarios.
3) Identification of critical/essential job functions and plans to cover those functions in case of prolonged absenteeism during a pandemic.
4) Succession plans for each critical/essential unit position to ensure the continued effective performance of the unit by identifying and training replacements for key personnel as necessary. These replacements shall be integrated into employee development activities and should include critical contracted services as well.
5) As necessary, plans for cross-training employees, use of auxiliary personnel and recent retirees, recruiting temporary personnel during a crisis, or establishing flexible worksite options (for example, telecommuting) and flexible work hours (for example, staggered shifts) if appropriate.
6) Staffing plan which specifies the minimum number and categories of personnel necessary to maintain the operation of the unit. This plan may be based on an offender census and the need to provide medical and nursing care in a safe manner.
7) Identification of areas within an institution which may be used to create additional acute care beds for expanded health care capacity.
8) The classification of all employee positions into one of the following three exposure risk categories. This classification shall be done to minimize the potential for cross contamination, thus slowing down the spread of illness in the unexposed population.
a. High Exposure Risk: Staff with high potential for exposure to known or suspected sources of pandemic influenza virus, such as healthcare delivery and support staff, staff transporting known or suspected pandemic influenza infected patients, etc.
b. Medium Exposure Risk: Staff with high-frequency contact within six feet of the offender population, such as security staff, social workers, chaplains, etc., who work in dorms or cellblocks.
c. Lower Exposure Risk (caution): Staff who do not require routine contact with the offender population, such as

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administrative staff (i.e. institution Business Office, Human Resources, etc.). Activities outside of the workplace shall be considered when classifying employees into low exposure risk, such as other employment which may involve routine contact with an offender population (part-time security.) Such risky activities outside of the workplace shall be discouraged for low risk staff in the event of a pandemic.
D. Baseline Readiness. Each institution shall:
1) Establish an Institutional Incident Command Team to determine actions which shall be taken to prevent the spread of pandemic viral diseases among staff, offenders, volunteers, visitors and other civilians. The team shall consist, at a minimum, of the Unit Head or designee, Facility Medical Director, Nursing Director, Infection Control Nurse (if applicable), Pharmacy Director (if applicable), representatives from Security, Human Resources, Business Office and Information Services, with seven-day-a-week availability to respond to a potential outbreak of a pandemic viral disease or ILI.
2) Designate a Pandemic Coordinator with the responsibility for pandemic planning and preparedness.
3) Maintain adequate medical supplies at all times to include the following:
a. Tissues;
b. Gloves;
c. Biohazard Bags;
d. Hazard Receptacles;
e. Masks (See attachment for appropriate use and need “Advantages and Disadvantages of Respirators and Facemasks”);
f. Waterless Hand Sanitizers (alcohol based.)
4) Establish points of contact for pandemic preparedness in the local and state health departments, local, regional or state agency preparedness groups and local hospitals. Maintain the unit’s agreement with the Office of Public Health to be a point of dispensing and have required procedures in place.

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5) Ensure all staff members are familiar with the unit Incident Command System (ICS) and understand the roles and people assigned within that structure.
6) Incorporate pandemic preparedness into unit emergency management planning and exercise.
7) Develop a written plan identifying areas of quarantine and isolation for the offender population (dorm and cell blocks.) The unit shall consider ways to prevent cross contamination of staff and offenders assigned to work in affected areas, for example, employees/offenders assigned to work in isolation or quarantine areas should not be allowed to work in other areas. Offenders assigned to work in these areas should not be allowed to return to general population.
8) Create and maintain list of high risk offenders for seasonal influenza (based on current CDC guidelines), which should be updated quarterly, and a plan for mass vaccination prior to exposure.
9) Ensure facility staff shall identify an area in the facility which can be used as a temporary morgue.
E. In response to a pandemic threat or during an ongoing pandemic, each unit and facility shall take following actions:
1) The Institutional Incident Command Team shall meet weekly or as directed by the Department’s Medical/Mental Health Director.
2) Facility Health Authorities shall coordinate with the Medical/Mental Health Director regarding stockpiling requirements of antibiotics and necessary medical supplies.
3) Facility Health Authorities shall provide a current list of all supplies, which shall be sent to the Department's Medical/Mental Health Director.
4) The Pandemic Coordinator shall monitor sick call reports and clinic visits in an effort to identify ILI in the offender population. Findings shall be reported to the Unit Head and Health Authority.
5) Encourage offenders to notify health care/security staff at the onset of symptoms of ILI. Offenders should be informed early detection is vital to reduce the transmission of a pandemic viral disease outbreak.
6) Waive the health care co-payment fee for sick calls related to ILI.

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7) Provide education to employees and offenders on basic hygiene, respiratory etiquette and high risk medical conditions.
8) Ensure health care personnel are updated with the latest CDC recommendations regarding ILI, such as symptoms/signs, diagnostic criteria, treatment protocols, indications of anti-viral medication use, etc.
9) Infection Control/Precautions: Institute Infection Control Precautions as follows:
a. Maximize access to alcohol based hand sanitizer in areas with high traffic flow such as the kitchen and pill call;
b. Make soap dispensers or hand soap available in all employee and offender restrooms;
c. Emphasize frequent cleaning and disinfection of high touch areas, such as door knobs, keys and telephones;
d. Vaccination/Antiviral medication priorities shall be determined and distributed to high risk individuals prior to outbreak by the Department’s Medical and Mental Health Directors;
e. N95 respirators and medical gloves shall be worn by staff having direct contact with (within six feet of) offenders who have suspected, probable, or confirmed influenza in the designated isolation areas. Good hand washing shall take place between patient contacts and glove changes. Surgical masks shall only be worn in the designated isolation areas. Offenders who become symptomatic and require movement shall wear a mask prior to movement. Movement to and from isolation and quarantine areas shall be kept to a minimum; and necessary services, to the extent possible, shall be delivered to these offenders in the isolation and quarantine areas.
f. Recommendations shall be made for quarantine of non-ill contacts. Offenders who may have been exposed, but are asymptomatic, shall be quarantined. Arrangements shall be made to provide those quarantined with necessary daily items including meals, water, and hygiene.
g. Offenders with ILI symptoms shall be isolated. This can be done in a group setting as well, if multiple offenders require isolation. Arrangements shall be made to provide those isolated with necessary daily items including meals, water and

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hygiene. All efforts shall be made to limit any movement of isolated offenders (bring meals, medications, etc., to them); but if an offender is required to leave the isolation area, then a proper mask shall be worn before leaving isolation area; and the offender shall not be allowed remove the mask until returned to the isolation area.
h. Offenders diagnosed with ILI shall be monitored for early signs of complicating illnesses, for example: pneumonia. Offenders who are at high risk for these complications, or those who require a higher level of care, shall be admitted to the infirmary for closer observation.
i. May consider instituting a standing order/treatment protocol for ILI.
j. Phone Triage for Staff: Staff who have ILI symptoms or are ill may be triaged by phone. Triage shall be performed by medical staff or health trained staff. All absences related to ILI shall be tracked.
k. A situation report shall be forwarded to the Department’s Medical Director to include: the number of newly diagnosed cases (suspected or probable or confirmed); the number of offenders in isolation; the number of offenders quarantined; and the number of staff absences security/medical; and deaths. The Department’s Medical/ Mental Health Director shall decide the frequency of this report for each unit.
F. In response to a pandemic threat or during an ongoing pandemic, the Department’s Medical/Mental Health Director, in collaboration with the Unit Head, shall take any or all of following actions:
1) Screening: Employees (contract and vendor) shall complete a selfscreening at roll call. Employees who state they are sick shall be triaged by medical staff or health trained staff and shall be sent home if found to have a fever. Staff with ILI shall remain at home at least 24 hours after they are free of fever (100.4 degrees F), or signs of fever, without the use of fever reducing medications.
2) Restrictions: Impose restrictions regarding outside travel with the exceptions of medical/mental health emergencies and mandatory court trips (in consultation with court).
3) Transfers In/Out: Transfers within the Department may be suspended on a unit-by-unit basis or department-wide.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-5 04/25/20 Page 10 of 10
Department Regulation No. HCP26 10 March 2020 Page Ten
4) Visitors/Vendors: Screening of visitors/vendors may be initiated and visitors with symptoms of ILI may be denied entry to the unit. Symptomatic vendors may be granted access based upon need and shall be required to wear a face mask while on facility grounds.
5) Clinics: On-site clinics may be allowed to operate on a case-by-case basis. Specialty clinics that can be accomplished via telemedicine shall be strongly encouraged.
6) Access/Control:
a. Offender group activities may be suspended;
b. Normal eating activities may be suspended. A plan shall be established for delivering meals to offenders if cafeteria or group-style dining is closed;
c. Pill call may be modified as necessary to reduce the risk of transmission of the pandemic viral disease. The Department's Medical/Mental Health Director may expand KOP list.
7) Surveillance, Screening and Triage: Routine sick call may be suspended. Offenders shall have access to healthcare via emergency sick call.

James M. LeBlanc Secretary

Attachment: Advantages and Disadvantages of Respirators and Facemasks

Form:

HCP26-A Coronavirus (COVID-19) Screening Checklist

This Regulation supersedes Department Regulation No. B-06-004 dated 11 September 2009.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-6 04/25/20 Page 1 of 3

John Bel Edwards
GOVERNOR

Stephen R. Russo, JD
INTERIM SECRETARY

State of Louisiana
Louisiana Department of Health
Office of Public Health

TO:

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS and

OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

FROM:
RE: DATE:

LDH OFFICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Jimmy Guidry, M.D. Jimmy Guidry, M.D.
State Health Officer
COVID-19; recommendations regarding prisons and juvenile detention centers
April 8, 2020

On January 30, 2020, the International Health Regulations Emergency Committee of the World Health Organization declared the COVID-19 outbreak a “public health emergency of international concern” (PHEIC). On January 31, 2020, Health and Human Services Secretary Alex M. Azar II declared a public health emergency (PHE) for the United States, effective January 27, 2020. Pursuant to the Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act, R.S. 29:760, et seq., a state of public health emergency resulting from the outbreak of “coronavirus disease 2019” (COVID-19) was declared to exist in the entire State of Louisiana by Proclamation Number 25 JBE 2020.
In the days since the referenced declaration of the state of the public health emergency in the state, the COVID-19 outbreak in Louisiana has expanded significantly. The number of reported cases and deaths is expected to rise significantly in the state in the coming weeks. Additional measures are necessary to protect the health and safety of the public. The measures recommended herein are in line with the best guidance and direction from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and are necessary because of the ability of the COVID-19 virus to spread via personal interactions and because of physical contamination of property due to its propensity to attach to surfaces for prolonged periods of time.
The Louisiana Department of Health - Office of Public Health (LDH-OPH) expressly finds that the measures recommended herein are necessary to help control and prevent further spread of COVID-19, a communicable, contagious, and infectious disease that represents a serious and imminent threat to the public health. If the following measures
Bienville Building ▪ 628 N. Fourth St. ▪ P.O. Box 4489 ▪ Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-4489 Phone: (225) 342-3417 ▪ Fax: (225) 342-7552 ▪ www.dhh.la.gov An Equal Opportunity Employer

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB
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are not taken, said infectious disease could spread within correctional and detention centers which would overwhelm the state’s medical facilities and which would cause further spread to the citizens of the State of Louisiana.
Pursuant to the powers vested in the State of Louisiana – Office of Public Health by L.R.S. 40:1 et seq., I do hereby make the following recommendations:
Correctional and detention centers should take safe and adequate measures to ensure that the COVID-19 coronavirus disease shall not spread within its facilities. Specifically, correctional and detention centers should:
• Practice proper hand hygiene. Wash hands with soap and water for at least 20 seconds.
• If soap and water are not readily available and illicit drugs are not suspected to be present, use an alcohol-based hand sanitizer with at least 60% alcohol; this protocol applies to all staff, visitors, and inmates.
• Refrain from touching faces with unwashed hands; this protocol applies to all staff, visitors, and inmates.
• Have a trained Emergency Medical Service/Emergency Medical Technician (EMS/EMT) assess and transport anyone you think might have COVID-19 to a healthcare facility.
• Ensure only trained personnel wearing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) have contact with individuals who have or may have COVID-19.
• Separate sick individuals from other individuals in the facility, this is known as isolation. Isolate a sick individual in a specific “sick room” if possible, and away from other individuals in the facility. Use a separate bathroom, if available.
• Wear a facemask when around sick individuals at the facility.
• Cover coughs and sneezes. Cover the mouth and nose with a tissue when coughing or sneezing. Throw used tissues in a lined trash can, then immediately wash hands with soap and water for at least 20 seconds.
• Wash hands often with soap and water for at least 20 seconds. This is especially important after blowing nose, coughing, or sneezing; going to the bathroom; and before eating or preparing food.

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• Avoid sharing personal items. Do not share dishes, drinking glasses, cups, eating utensils (after using these items, wash them thoroughly with soap and water or put in the dishwasher), towels, or bedding with other individuals in the facility.
• Clean high-touch surfaces in the isolation area (“sick room” and bathroom) every day while wearing a mask. Clean and disinfect high-touch surfaces in other areas of the facility every day. High-touch surfaces include, remote controls, counters, tabletops, doorknobs, bathroom fixtures, toilets phones, keyboards, and tablets.
• Immediately clean and disinfect areas that may have blood, stool, or body fluids on them with household cleaners and disinfectants: Clean the area or item with soap and water or another detergent if it is dirty. Then, use a household disinfectant. Be sure to follow the instructions on the label to ensure safe and effective use of the product. Many products recommend keeping the surface wet for several minutes to ensure germs are killed. Many also recommend precautions such as wearing gloves and making sure you have good ventilation during use of the product.
• Ensure that all inmates at correctional and detention centers, staff, and visitors maintain a distance of at least 6 feet from each other. If said distance cannot be maintained within the current prison population and if following all of the above referenced protocols does not protect correctional and detention staff, visitors, and inmates, then OPH recommends that correctional and detention centers work with the District Courts, the Public Defender’s Office, and District Attorney’s Office to reduce the size of the jail population of the least non-violent inmates in order to comply with this recommendation.
Thank you for that all that you are doing in this crisis to mitigate the spread of COVID19 throughout the State of Louisiana.
Sources: www.ldh.la.gov; www.cdc.gov

Sincerely,
Jimmy Guidry, M.D.
Jimmy Guidry, MD State Health Officer Louisiana Department of Health

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-7 04/25/20 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU, TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE, REGINALD GEORGE, LIONEL TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO GARNER, BRADLEY WINTERS, KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Safety and Corrections; JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as Medical Director of the Department of Safety and Corrections; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00231-SDDRLB
CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF MERCEDES MONTAGNES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

I, Mercedes Montagnes, declare as follows:

1.

I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Louisiana and am one of

the counsel of record for Plaintiffs in the above-captioned case. This declaration is based upon my

personal knowledge and is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-7 04/25/20 Page 2 of 3

2.

I am the Executive Director at the Promise of Justice Initiative (“PJI”). I am

Plaintiffs’ lead attorney on this matter. After graduating from Harvard Law School, I clerked for

Judge Carl Barbier in the Eastern District of Louisiana and Chief Judge Roger Gregory on the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

3.

I have litigated multiple prison conditions cases throughout Louisiana, including:

 I represented the plaintiffs in Ball v. LeBlanc, 13-cv-368 (M.D. La), challenging the

unconstitutional heat conditions for three plaintiffs on Louisiana State Penitentiary’s

(“LSP”) death row, succeeding at trial and then continuing to fight for clients

through appeal and remedy phases;

 I am currently co-lead counsel for the plaintiffs in Lewis v. Cain, 15-cv-318 (M.D. La),

a class action challenging inadequate medical care and failure to accommodate

disabilities at LSP;

 I currently represent the Plaintiff in Humphrey v. LeBlanc, 20-cv-233 (M.D. La),

alleging constitutional and state law claims arising from Plaintiffs’ overdetention

4.

The Promise of Justice Initiative (PJI) is a New Orleans based nonprofit that works

to create positive change for people in the criminal justice at the intersection of direct

services, impact litigation, and community engagement.

5.

PJI is committed to advocate vigorously on behalf of the Plaintiff class and

subclasses. PJI has the resources required to litigate this matter in a zealous and thorough manner.

PJI is also committed to working zealously, effectively, and collaboratively with the other proposed

class counsel.

6.

To my knowledge, PJI has no conflicts of interests that would prevent the

organization from providing zealous representation of the named Plaintiffs and the class.

2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-7 04/25/20 Page 3 of 3
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed in New Orleans, Louisiana on April 25, 2020.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of April, 2020.
/s/ Mercedes Montagnes Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287 The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70117 Telephone: (504) 529-5955 Facsimile: (504) 595-8006 Email: mmontagnes@defendla.org Attorney for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Nishi Kumar, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 25, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system. I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415
3

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-8 04/25/20 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU, TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE, REGINALD GEORGE, LIONEL TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO GARNER, BRADLEY WINTERS, KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Safety and Corrections; JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as Medical Director of the Department of Safety and Corrections; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00231-SDDRLB
CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF JARED DAVIDSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

I, Jared Davidson, declare as follows:

1.

I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Louisiana and am one of

the counsel of record for Plaintiffs in the above-captioned case. This declaration is based upon my

personal knowledge and is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-8 04/25/20 Page 2 of 4

2.

I am a Senior Staff Attorney at the Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”) and am

based in New Orleans. I oversee SPLC’s litigation team on this matter. Prior to my job at SPLC, I

clerked for two years on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for the Honorable James L.

Dennis. Prior to that, I worked as a litigation associate at Jenner & Block LLP in New York City. I

received my law degree with honors from NYU School of Law, and I received my undergraduate

degree with honors from Northwestern University in Evanston, IL.

3.

I have extensive experience in complex federal litigation and class actions, including

litigation concerning the rights of prisoners and other detained persons. I am currently counsel in

the following cases:

 Fraihat v. ICE, 5:19-cv-01546 (C.D. Cal.): nationwide putative class action challenging

inadequate health care, use of solitary confinement, and failure to accommodate

disabilities in ICE detention centers;

 SPLC v. DHS, No. 1:18-cv-00760 (D.D.C.): constitutional and statutory challenge to

barriers to accessing counsel in immigration detention centers in the Southeast;

 Lewis v. Cain, 3:15-cv-00318 (M.D. La.): class action challenging inadequate medical

care and failure to accommodate disabilities at the Louisiana State Penitentiary; and

 Allen v. Edwards, No. 655079 (La. 19th JDC): statewide class action seeking injunctive

relief to remediate systemic defects in Louisiana’s public defense system.

4.

SPLC itself has served as class counsel in more than 30 cases, many of which include

challenges to conditions of confinement. Some of the cases in which SPLC has served as class

counsel include: Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Paradise v. Allen, 480 U.S. 149 (1987);

Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Pugh v. Locke, 559 F.2d 283 (11th Cir. 1977); Smith v.

YMCA, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972); Braggs v. Dunn, 2:14cv601-MHT (M.D. Ala.); Dockery v. Fischer,

No. 3:13-cv-326, 2015 WL 5737608 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 29, 2015); Moodie v. Kfowah Island Inn Co., 309

2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-8 04/25/20 Page 3 of 4

F.R.D. 370 (D.S.C. 2015); P B. v. Pastorek, No. 2: 10-cv-04049 (E.D. La.); Wilson v. Gordon, No. 3-

14- 1492, 2014 WL 4347585 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 2, 2014); Hughes v. Judd, No. 8:12-CV-568, 2013 WL

1810808 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2013); J.W. v. Binningham Bd. of Educ., No. 2:10-CV-033140-AKK, 2012

WL 3849032 (Aug. 31, 2012); J.H. v. Hinds Cty., Miss., No. 3:11-cv-00327 (S.D. Miss.); DePriest v.

Epps, No. 3:10-cv-00663 (S.D. Miss.); Nunag- Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., No. LA CV 10-

01172-JAK (MLGx), 2011 WL 7095434 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2011); Perez-Benites v. Candy Brand, LLC,

267 F.R.D. 242, 248 (W.D. Ark. 2010); Troupe v. Barbour, No. 3: 10-cv-153 HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss.);

D. W. v. Harrison County, No. 1:09-cv-267 LG-RHN (S.D. Miss.); Rosiles-Perez v. Superior Forestry

Service, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 332, 344 (M.D. Tenn. 2008); Recinos Recinos v. Express Forestry, 233 F.R.D. 472

(E.D. La. 2006); De Leon Granados v. Eller and Sons Trees, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-1473-CC , 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 73781, at *43 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2006); Gaddis v. Campbell, No. 03-T-390-N (M.D. Ala.

2003); Baker v. Campbell, No. CV-03-1114-M (N.D. Ala. 2003); Brown v. James, No. 98-T-663-N (M.D.

Ala. 1998); Austin v. James, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Harris v. Janies, No. 94- 1422-N

(M.D. Ala. 1994); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Evans, 785 F. Supp. 1469 (M.D. Ala. 1992);

Bradley v. Haley, No. 92-A-70-N (M.D. Ala. 1992); R.C. v. Fuller, No. 88-D-1170-N (M.D. Ala.

1988); Nowak v. Foster, No. 84-0057-P (W.D. Ky. 1984); Wyatt v. Sawyer, No. CV-70-3195 (M.D.

Ala. 1970), and Nixon v. Brewer, No. CV-3017-N (M.D. Ala. 1970).

5.

SPLC is committed to advocate vigorously on behalf of the Plaintiff class and

subclasses. SPLC has the resources required to litigate this matter in a zealous and thorough

manner. SPLC is also committed to working zealously, effectively, and collaboratively with the other

proposed class counsel.

6.

To my knowledge, SPLC has no conflicts of interests that would prevent the

organization from providing zealous representation of the named Plaintiffs and the class.

3

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-8 04/25/20 Page 4 of 4
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed at New Orleans, Louisiana on April 25, 2020.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of April, 2020.
/s/ Jared Davidson Jared Davidson, La. Bar No. 37093 Southern Poverty Law Center 201 Saint Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone: (504) 486-8982 Facsimile: (504) 486-8947 Email: jared.davidson@splcenter.org Attorney for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Nishi Kumar, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 25, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system. I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415
4

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-9 04/25/20 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU, TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE, REGINALD GEORGE, LIONEL TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO GARNER, BRADLEY WINTERS, KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Safety and Corrections; JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as Medical Director of the Department of Safety and Corrections; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00231-SDDRLB
CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF MELINDA HAAG IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

I, Melinda Haag, declare as follows:

1.

I am a Partner in the San Francisco office of Orrick, Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP

(“Orrick”) and make this declaration in support of Orrick’s application to be named as co-counsel

for the Plaintiff Class in the above action. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this

4152-7535-9268.5

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-9 04/25/20 Page 2 of 4

declaration unless otherwise indicated below, and I could and would testify competently to these

facts if called as a witness.

2.

I graduated from the University of California, Berkeley School of Law in 1987. I

began my career as a litigation associate in private practice and then served as an Assistant United

States Attorney for the Central District of California in Los Angeles. I thereafter returned to private

practice and became a partner with a law firm in San Francisco. I then served as a supervisor in the

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California in San Francisco. After stepping

down from that office, I joined Orrick as a litigation partner in San Francisco. After being

nominated by President Barack Obama and unanimously confirmed by the United States Senate, I

served as U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California from August 2010 through

September 2015. I then returned to Orrick as a partner in the firm’s White Collar, Investigations,

Securities Litigation & Compliance practice group where I currently serve.

3.

I am admitted to practice in California and Washington D.C., before every federal

district court in California, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I have

been admitted to appear pro hac vice in specific cases by a number of state and local courts around the

country.

4.

I have extensive experience in complex criminal and civil litigation, and I have

experience litigating class actions and civil rights cases. I am a Fellow with the American College of

Trial Lawyers and have served as lead or co-lead counsel in more than 20 jury and bench trials,

including a number of complex criminal and civil rights cases. A true and correct copy of my

biography as it appears on Orrick’s website is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

5.

While serving as a supervisory Assisted United States Attorney for the Northern

District of California, I personally handled a criminal civil rights prosecution involving correctional

2
4152-7535-9268.5

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-9 04/25/20 Page 3 of 4

staff at Pelican Bay State Prison in California arising out of allegations that the staff targeted certain

inmates for stabbings and assaults. The correctional officers were convicted following a lengthy jury

trial. I also supervised all of the Office’s civil rights cases during that time and personally worked on

a number of them

6.

I am informed and believe that my colleagues at Orrick have extensive experience

representing plaintiffs in class actions. These include recent matters successfully obtaining injunctive

relief regarding conditions of confinement on a class-wide basis, such as:

a. Obtaining an order from Judge Gee of the United States District Court for the

Central District of California enforcing the Flores consent decree relating to the

confinement of children in immigration detention - currently on appeal;

b. Obtaining orders from Judge Bernal in Fraihat v. U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement on April 20, 2020, provisionally certifying classes of people in

immigration detention at risk from COVID-19 and granting a preliminary injunction

requiring that ICE take specific steps to protect people in its custody, also in the

Central District of California; and

c. A successful due process challenge to Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s

failure to provide detained immigrants with telephone access to attorneys in the

Northern District of California.

7.

In addition, the firm has regularly handled, and continues to handle, a substantial

volume of civil rights matters.

8.

Orrick and I are both committed to vigorously representing the Plaintiff Class and

subclasses and to working collaboratively and efficiently with other class counsel. Orrick has no

3
4152-7535-9268.5

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-9 04/25/20 Page 4 of 4
conflicts of interest that would prevent us from providing zealous representation to the named plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed at Berkeley, California on April 25, 2020.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of April, 2020.
/s/ Melinda Haag Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP 405 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105-2669 Tel: 415 773 5495 Fax: 415 773 5759 mhaag@orrick.com Attorney for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Nishi Kumar, an attorney, hereby certify that on April 25, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system. I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415
4
4152-7535-9268.5

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-10 04/25/20 Page 1 of 5
Exhibit A

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-10 04/25/20 Page 2 of 5

Practice Areas
● White Collar, Investigations, Securities Litigation & Compliance
● White Collar
● Trials
Honors
● Ranked by Chambers USA in 2019 and in six previous years as a leading lawyer in “California: White-Collar Crime & Corporate Investigations”
● Recognized three times by the San Francisco Business Times as one of the Most Influential Bay Area Women.
● Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers. As described on the College website: “Fellowship is extended only by invitation, after careful investigation, to those experienced trial lawyers who have mastered the art of advocacy and whose professional careers have been marked by the highest standards of ethical conduct, professionalism, civility

Melinda Haag
Partner
San Francisco
T +1 415 773 5700
E mhaag@orrick.com
...............................................................................................................
Melinda brings her leadership skill and experience to a new arena as a Partner in Orrick’s San Francisco office. She works with a team that litigates for a third of the Fortune 100 in some of the highest stakes cases in the country.
After being nominated by President Barack Obama and unanimously confirmed by the United States Senate, Melinda served as U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California from August 2010 through September 2015, overseeing the U.S. Department of Justice’s work in a district that is an epicenter for complex, cutting-edge investigations and prosecutions. She led a team of more than 130 criminal and civil Assistant U.S. Attorneys in handling a high volume of matters that involved export enforcement, computer intrusions and intellectual property theft, international corruption, digital currency issues, securities fraud, and economic crimes, health care fraud, national security, public integrity and civil rights violations, and organized crime, among other things. Melinda served as Co-Chair of the White-Collar Crime Subcommittee of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee and was a member of the Cybersecurity and Health Care Fraud Subcommittees, where she collaborated with U.S. Attorneys nationwide on the development and implementation of national policies and practices regarding the government’s approach to economic crimes and cybersecurity.
Melinda is an experienced trial lawyer and is a Fellow with the American College of Trial Lawyers. She has personally handled securities fraud, mail and wire fraud, bank fraud, antitrust, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, environmental, civil rights, defense contractor fraud, health care fraud, money laundering, narcotics trafficking, and child exploitation cases. Melinda has served as lead or co-lead counsel in more than 19 jury and bench trials, including a number of complex white-collar and civil rights cases. Among her most notable trial accomplishments, Melinda served as co-lead trial counsel representing the CFO of a publicly-traded pharmaceutical company who was charged with violating the federal criminal securities laws. The client was acquitted and completely vindicated following a lengthy trial. She also successfully defended at trial the former GC of a publicly-traded software company, who had been charged with federal criminal securities law violations. Following a three-week jury trial, all charges against her client were dismissed. While serving as an AUSA, Melinda led the federal government’s successful investigation and trial against a group of prison guards at Pelican Bay State Prison charged with violating the civil rights of inmates in their custody.
After earning her law degree from the University of California,

Orrick Biography: Melinda Haag

1

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-10 04/25/20 Page 3 of 5

and collegiality.” It is limited to two percent of the bar members in any state.
● Named seven times as among the top women litigators in California, Daily Journal.
● Selected twice as one of the top 100 lawyers in California, Daily Journal.
● Presented with the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Public Service Award, given in connection with her work as the Civil Rights Coordinator for the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and most notably the prosecution of former Pelican Bay State Prison guards.
● Included in Orrick's recognition among “A Distinguished Dozen” in The American Lawyer, described as a list of firms that made their mark in courtrooms across the country in the preceding 18 months (also specifically citing the defense of the above mentioned CFO).
● Referenced in Orrick's recognition on the “Defense Hot List” of The National Law Journal, a list of defense-oriented firms of singular achievement (announcement of award specifically cited the successful trial defense of a former CFO represented by Melinda and others at Orrick).

Berkeley School of Law in 1987, Melinda began her career as a litigation associate and then served as an Assistant United States Attorney for the Central District of California in Los Angeles. She thereafter worked as a partner in a San Francisco boutique law firm before being tapped by then U.S. Attorney Robert Mueller (who later served as FBI Director and is currently the Special Counsel investigating Russian interference in U.S. elections) to serve as a supervisor in the San Francisco U.S. Attorney’s Office. Melinda stepped down as the Chief of the White-Collar Section in 2003, joining Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe as a litigation partner in San Francisco.
Melinda has conducted and supervised countless complex investigations in connection with her work representing companies, boards of directors and the government. She typically first meets with the client to discuss and understand the facts and allegations, as well as context and culture, and then to agree on a focused, efficient investigative plan. Melinda understands that some investigations require a broad, exhaustive approach, and that some can be more narrowly tailored and conducted in a way that minimizes disruption. These investigations have involved allegations or concerns regarding the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, trade secret theft, antitrust enforcement, health care fraud, public corruption, securities fraud, and mail and wire fraud, among others.
Melinda also has significant experience representing high-level executives in connection with government investigations and cases, as well as in internal investigations. She is currently representing the General Counsel of a publicly-traded company; the founder and former CEO of a San Francisco-based tech company; the founders and principals of a health care company; a high-level executive with an international firm; members of the Board of Directors of a publicly-traded health care company; a senior executive with a tech company; and more. Melinda understands the special challenges her individual clients face and quickly gains their trust.
Melinda is called upon regularly to speak at conferences and law schools, as a keynote speaker, panelist, or moderator, on a wide range of legal and career-related subjects. She is also often asked by media outlets to provide information and commentary regarding issues ranging from the work of the Special Counsel to criminal justice reform.
Board Affiliations
During her recent service as United States Attorney, Melinda was limited by government and ethics rules in her ability to serve on boards and with community organizations. Before her time as U.S. Attorney, Melinda served in the following board and related capacities:
 Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers (inducted March 2008).
 Ninth Circuit Lawyer Representatives. This is a group of lawyers selected by the Northern District judges to assist in planning conferences and advising the Court regarding other matters. Ninth Circuit Lawyer Representatives are selected by the Court to serve three-year terms. Melinda was co-chair of the group in her second year.

Orrick Biography: Melinda Haag

2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-10 04/25/20 Page 4 of 5

● Named in 2018 and in a number of previous years as one of the Lawdragon 500 Leading Lawyers in America.
● Appointed by Senator Barbara Boxer to the Senator's Judicial Advisory Committee. Responsible for assisting the Senator in selecting federal judges, U.S. Attorneys, and U.S. Marshals for the Northern District of California (1997-1999)
● Named one of 35 California lawyers under the age of 35 who are “changing the way law is practiced.” 35 Young Lawyers to Keep an Eye On, Daily Journal, California Law Business (1995)
Education
● J.D., University of California, Berkeley School of Law, 1987
● B.A., Political Science , University of California, San Diego, 1983
Memberships
● State Bar of California
● District of Columbia State Bar

 Professional Responsibility Committee for the Northern District of California. This is a group of lawyers selected by the federal Northern District judges to assist in investigating and resolving ethics complaints lodged against counsel.
 Bar Association of San Francisco Judicial Appointments Committee. This is a group that evaluates state judicial candidates.
 Board Member, Bar Association of San Francisco.  Bar Association of San Francisco, Chair, Work-Life
Balance Committee.  Member of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights.  ACLU Lawyer’s Council.
Melinda currently serves on the Board of Governors of the Boys & Girls Club of San Francisco, and on the Board of the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence. She has also become active again as a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers.
Representative Engagements
● Some of Melinda's notable representations include:
 Represented at trial the Chief Financial Officer of a Fortune 100 health care company in a federal criminal securities fraud case. The client was acquitted on all counts following an eight-week trial in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.
 Defended at trial the General Counsel of an international, publicly-traded software company against charges of securities fraud, bank fraud and wire fraud. Following a three-week trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, all charges were dismissed after the jury declined to convict (the verdict was in favor of acquittal) and the court declared a mistrial.
 Conducted an independent investigation on behalf of a public university system concerning allegations that a University chancellor had engaged in misconduct. The Chancellor resigned following the investigation.
 Successfully represented the founders and principals of a health care company under investigation by the U.S. Attorney's Office. The investigation was closed without charges filed.
 Counsel for an executive currently under indictment on charges of wire fraud and conspiracy. Trial is scheduled in federal court in 2018.
 Counsel for numerous individuals, companies and audit committees in stock option backdating cases. No criminal charges were filed in any of these cases.
 Counsel for numerous individuals in connection with a criminal tax shelter investigation in the Southern District of New York. No criminal charges were filed against our clients.
 Counsel for a networking technologies executive facing criminal antitrust charges in the Northern District of California.
 Represented the General Counsel of a publicly-traded electronics manufacturer in connection with a civil enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission alleging securities fraud.
 Defended the General Counsel of a publicly-traded software company in connection with a civil enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning stock

Orrick Biography: Melinda Haag

3

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 25-10 04/25/20 Page 5 of 5
option grants (and related class and derivative actions).  Represented the former marketing director of a Fortune 100
biotechnology company in a Grand Jury investigation concerning off-label promotion. No criminal charges were filed against our client.  Represented a hedge fund in an investigation by the United States Attorney's Office and the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding market timing and late trading. No criminal charges were filed and the SEC declined to bring an enforcement action.  Represented an Internet search engine in connection with Grand Jury investigations related to online gambling and insider trading. No criminal charges were filed.  Represented the former chairman and Chief Executive Officer of a publicly-traded medical equipment manufacturer in connection with investigations by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning revenue recognition. No charges were filed.  Conducted an internal investigation for a company that suspected its Chief Executive Officer was, without authorization and for the benefit of himself and his girlfriend, diverting company funds to accounts in Asia. The evidence gathered proved the company's suspicions were true, and the CEO was terminated for cause.
Publications
 Co-author, “DOJ Telegraphs Top FCPA Priorities Under Trump Administration,” Law.com (July 17, 2017)
Admissions
● California
● District of Columbia
Court Admissions
● United States Courts of Appeals | Ninth Circuit
● United States District Courts | Northern District of California
● United States District Courts | Central District of California
● United States District Courts | Southern District of California
● United States District Courts | Eastern District of California
● United States District Courts | District of Columbia

Orrick Biography: Melinda Haag

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 Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24 04/24/20 Page 1 of 24

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU,

*

REVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

*

REGINALD GEORGE, LIONEL TOLBERT,

*

OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL PARKER

*

MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS ALLEN,

*

ERNEST ROERS, ALFOANSO GARNER,

*

BRADLEY WINTERS, KENDRICK WILSON *

JAMES HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all *

similarly situation individuals

*

*

Versus

*

*

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official

*

capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; *

LOUISIANA DEPARATMENT OF PUBLIC

*

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES LeBLANC, *

in his official capacity as Secretary of the

*

Department of Safety & Corrections; JOHN

*

MORRISON, in his official capacity as Medical *

Director of the Department of Public Safety & *

Corrections; LOUISIANA DEPARMENT OF

*

HEALTH; and Stephen R. RUSSO, in his official *

capacity as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana

*

Department of Health

*

NO. 3:20-cv-231 -SDD-RLB CLASS ACTION

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO RESTRAIN DEFENDANTS FROM TRANSFERRING
COVID-i9 CARRIERS TO LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24 04/24/20 Page 2 of 24

INDEX

I. INTRODUCTION

1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2

A. DOC’s coordination efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic

2

B. LSP’s coordination of efforts to respond the COVID-19 pandemic

5

C. Camp J

6

D. Status of the Named Plaintiffs and relationship with Camp J

9

III. ARGUMENT

11

A. The request for injunctive relief is moot both legally and factually

11

B. The request for injunctive relief should be denied on the merits

12

1. The Plaintiffs cannot show a substantial likelihood of success on the

merits

14

a. The Plaintiffs cannot show Camp J presents an objective substantial

risk of serious harm

15

b. The Plaintiffs cannot show Camp J presents a subjective substantial

risk of serious harm

16

2. The Plaintiffs cannot show a substantial threat of irreparable injury if

the injunction is not granted

17

3. The Plaintiffs cannot show that the threatened injury to Plaintiffs outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to Defendants and/or that granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest 17

4. The Plaintiffs have not shown compliance with the PLRA

20

IV. CONCLUSION

21

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MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:
The Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, James LeBlanc and John
Morrison (collectively the “Defendants” herein) respectfully request that the Court deny the
Plaintiffs’ motion to restrain Defendants from transferring COVID-19 carriers to Louisiana State
Penitentiary for the reasons given herein and based upon the recent decision of Valentine v.
Collier, 20-20207 (5th Cir. 4/22/20) and other authorities set forth below.
I. INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic is obviously a serious public health crisis, and Louisiana is
certainly one front in the nationwide fight against the pandemic. First responders are struggling
with capacity and are being exposed.1 The crisis has the capacity to overwhelm medical capacity
within the state.2 Personal protective equipment has been scarce.3 Consistent with these concerns,
the Louisiana Department of Health has ordered that any and all medical procedures shall be
postponed until further notice, except for emergency procedures, “to preserve Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) and to utilize hospital staffing, equipment, and bed capacity for the
transition to the COVID-19 emergency.”4
'Chris Finch, New Orleansfirst responders struggle as personnel exposed to COVID-19, some test positive, WAFB9 (updated March 25, 2020 at 9:49 am), https://www.wafb.com/2020/Q3/25/new-orleans-first-responders-strugglepersonnel-exposed-covid-some-test-positive: Jeff Adelson and Chad Calder, With 1 in 6 workers under quarantine, New Orleans EMS to run lower-level ambulances, THE NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE (March 24, 2020) https://www.nola.com/news/coronavirus/article f8440d22-6e3e-l Iea-a2d2-f3fae48a0854.html.. 2 New COVID-19 Forecasts: US Hospitals Could Be Overwhelmed in the Second Week ofApril by Demandfor ICU Beds, and US Deaths Could Total 81,000 by July, INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH METRICS AND EVALUATION (March 26, 2020) http://www.healthdata.org/news-release/new-covid-19-forecasts-us-hospitals-could-be-overwhelmed-secondweek-april-demand-icu. 3 Jeanne Whalen, Tony Romm, Aaron Gregg, and Tom Hamburger, Scramble for medical equipment descends into chaos as U.S. states and hospitals compete for rare supplies, THE WASHINGTON POST (March 24, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/Q3/24/scramble-medical-equipment-descends-into-chaos-us-stateshospitals-compete-rare-supplies/. 4 Healthcare Facility Notice/Order Notice #2020-COVID19-ALL-17 (available at http://ldh.la.gov/assets/medicaid/hss/docs/Coronavirus 2019/LDH Updated Medical Surgical Procedures 032120 20.pdf). Even cancer and heart surgeries are being delayed. Marilyn Marchione, Cancer, heart surgeries delayed as coronavirus alters care, CHRON (March 20, 2020) https://www.chron.com/news/medical/article/Cancer-heartsurgeries-delaved-as-coronavirus-15140536.php.
1

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With this background in place, the Louisiana Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”) have taken steps to protect both offenders and staff. Below is a detailed description of the efforts being coordinated Statewide to address this serious issue and to provide for the health and welfare of offenders at LSP and all DOC facilities. Plaintiffs have now filed two (2) virtually identical suits seeking to interfere with these efforts. The first such effort was filed in the matter entitled Lewis v. Cain, No. 3:15-cv-00318, United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana. That motion was dismissed by the Court on April 2, 2020 [R. Doc. 587 in the Lewis case].5 Plaintiffs have now filed this second action seeking injunctive relief based on affidavits by their own handpicked “experts” who spent all of two days at LSP some four (4) years ago. Like the first motion that was dismissed by this Court, Plaintiffs’ second motion is filled with pure speculation and conjecture and should likewise be dismissed by this Court. Moreover, given recent rulings by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Plaintiffs’ filings cannot meet the requisite Eight Amendment standard and should be dismissed as a matter of law.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. DOC’s coordination of efforts to respond to COVID-f9 pandemic In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, DOC has developed a plan to protect the health
and safety of all offenders within the DOC system.6 As part of its infection control program, DOC’s Influenza and Pandemic Viral Outbreaks regulation provides a formal policy and procedure concerning the planning, preparation, and management of a pandemic viral disease or an influenza outbreak. DOC recognized that a pandemic or an influenza outbreak may not follow an expected course and may present new challenges. DOC activated this regulation to the highest
5 In denying the motion in the Cain case, the Court found that “Plaintiffs’ motion is based primarily on speculation and conjecture.” [R. Doc. 587, p. 6] 6 Affidavit of Secretary James LeBlanc at para. 2, attached as Ex. 1.
2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24 04/24/20 Page 5 of 24
level, and DOC facility plans have been customized specifically to address COVID-19.7 Pursuant to the DOC regulation, each state prison has implemented a thorough and
detailed Continuity of Operations Plan (“COOP”), which have been reviewed by DOC Headquarters Medical/Operations.8 DOC is coordinating with the Governor’s office and other state agencies to stay up to date on all COVID-19 related issues, developments, and discussions.9 Secretary LeBlanc has engaged in daily phone calls with the Unified Command Group headed by the Governor. He, along with all other Cabinet Secretaries, participate in these phone calls.10 DOC is actively involved in the statewide management and response through the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness.11 Moreover, DOC leadership has conference calls every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday with all Wardens, Louisiana State Police, and the Louisiana Sheriffs Association. These phone calls discuss updates from each institution, medical reports and updates, institutional reports, and strategy for continued management related to COVID-19.12
In an effort to proactively deal with the COVID-19 pandemic and to protect the safety and welfare of offenders housed in DOC facilities, DOC has suspended visitation, volunteering, tours, transfers between prisons/routine transfers from local level, and postponed the Angola spring rodeo, all in effort to minimize movement.13 DOC has also limited new intakes to only those who must be housed in a state prison. Each intake is screened and assessed for symptoms, and then quarantined for 14 days before placed in general population.14 DOC has created a
7 Id. at para. 3. 8 Id. at para. 4. A copy of the COOP Plan for Angola and relevant amendments were provided to Plaintiffs’ counsel prior to their filing of this motion. See R. Doc. 580-4. 9 Id. at para. 5. 10 Id. at para. 6. 11 Id. at para. 7. 12 Id. at para. 8. 13 Id. at para. 9. 14 Id. at para. 10.
3

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COVID-19 webpage on its website and updates it frequently with the latest information. This has proven useful for staff and offenders’ families during this pandemic.15
In an effort to educate and assist offenders during this difficult time, DOC has created two COVID-19 informational videos for offenders. These videos include an introduction by the Secretary and the onsite physician at Angola, an overview of the Department’s response to the pandemic, and proactive ways offenders can reduce risk of infection. These videos are available in both English and Spanish. These videos are played on loop at all prisons and are also available on the Department’s website for families to view.16 DOC is also working in conjunction with Securus Technologies, Inc. to provide offenders in state-run prisons two (2) free 15-minute phone calls per week and two (2) free email stamps per week to allow offenders to maintain communication with family and friends during this event.17 DOC has suspended medical visit co­ payments in state prisons and has also ensured that ample hand sanitizer and anti-bacterial soap are readily available at all state prisons.18
DOC has been proactive in its fight against the COVID-19 pandemic and is following the guidelines of the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”).19 In addition to the CDC guidelines, DOC has instituted reverse isolation for the most vulnerable of the inmate population. DOC has identified offenders most at risk for infection and began reverse isolation of those offenders.20
DOC has obtained from the Louisiana Department of Health (“LDH”) COVID-19 test sample collection kits, which have been issued to all prison facilities.21 Inmate testing criteria
15 Id. at para. 11. 16 Id. at para. 12. 17 Id. at para. 13. 18 Id. at para. 14-16. 19 Id. at para. 17. 20 Id. at para. 18. 21 Id. at para. 19.
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guidelines have been issued to all state facilities, which are based upon the direction of LDH. The guidelines require that any inmate exhibiting symptoms of an influenza-like illness, such as fever or fever and a cough shall be tested for COVID-19 and influenza.22 Personal Protective Equipment (“PPE”) has been distributed to staff and offenders, as needed.23 DOC has issued COVID-19-specific guidelines and trained all state prisons regarding screening, isolation, quarantine, housing, proper use of PPE, and precautionary measures. These guidelines are revised and updated as the CDC issues new information.24 Each DOC facility has quarantine and isolation capabilities, which are used as needed.25 DOC has implemented daily tracking of all inmate influenza and COVID-19 testing at each facility and delivers the COVID-19 test samples to LDH for laboratory testing.26
B. LSP’s coordination of efforts to respond the COVID-19 pandemic LSP has coordinated its efforts to comply with the guidance and direction of DOC to
address the COVID-19 pandemic.27 LSP has implemented its COOP plan and COOP isolation plan.28 LSP is following the CDC guidelines. In addition to the CDC guidelines, LSP has instituted, per DOC directives, reverse isolation for the most vulnerable of the inmate population in order to protect those offenders from unnecessary exposure to staff. LSP has identified offenders most at risk for infection and began reverse isolation. LSP staff in these areas are required to wear masks and only make contact when absolutely necessary.29
LSP’s current procedures ensure that proper housing, housekeeping, nutrition, medical care, and sanitation requirements are met, despite the additional challenges to staff and the
22 Id, at para. 20. 23 Id. at para. 21. 24 Id. at para. 22. 25 Id. at para. 23. 26 Id. at para. 24. 27 See generally the Affidavit of Tracy Falgout, attached as Ex. 2. 28 Id. at para. 5. 29 Id. at para. 17-18.
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offender population. As the situation created by the pandemic evolves, LSP staff are prepared to adapt as necessary. LSP has restricted offender movement within the facility. LSP has suspended visitation, volunteering, tours, transfers between prisons, routine transfers from local level, most programming, and postponed the Angola spring rodeo, all in effort to minimize movement.30
DOC has limited new intakes to only those who must be housed in state prison and each intake sent to LSP is screened and assessed for symptoms, and then quarantined for 14 days before placed in general population.31 Any LSP offender presenting with symptoms of an influenza-like illness is given both an influenza test and a COVID-19 test. The offender is then sent to the appropriate isolation area. Once test results are obtained, the offender is treated per Healthcare Practitioners Orders.32 All employees entering the facility are screened daily through a series of questions regarding COVID-19 symptoms and recent travel. All staff entering the Treatment Center have their temperatures checked prior to entering.33
C. Camp J Camp J began accepting patients for isolation on or about April 2, 2020.34 Prior to the re­
occupancy of Camp J, the facility was thoroughly cleaned and equipped to serve as a COVID-19 occupational facility. Additionally, those parts of Camp J that will house inmates for isolation have been folly climate controlled with central air-conditioning purchased/leased by DOC for these purposes.35
Camp J is currently being used as an isolation facility to house offenders from local jails who test positive for COVID-19 and who cannot be safely isolated at the local facilities.36
30 Id. at para. 7-9. 31 Id. at para. 10. 32 Id. at para. 20, 33 Id. at para. 21. 34 Supplemental Affidavit of Tracy Falgout at para. 9; attached as Ex. 3 35 Id. at para. 13. 36 Id. at para. 9.
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Offenders housed at local facilities who test positive for COVID-19 are transported to Camp J for isolation, only if they cannot be isolated at the facility in which they are housed. Camp J also serves as an isolation facility for those offenders within the LSP population who test positive and require isolation from the general population at LSP.37
Camp J is a standalone facility located on LSP’s 1800-acre campus. Camp J is located at least a mile away from any other offender-occupied buildings located at LSP. Camp J is being operated as independent prison separate and apart from the rest of DOC and LSP as part of DOC’s current COVID-19 response plan. During this period, Camp J will not be considered part of Angola.38
Camp J is being used only as an isolation and monitoring facility. It does not act as a hospital and does not provide treatment to any Covid-19 patients that require ventilators, oxygen, or IV’s. Any patients showing serious medical symptoms beyond isolation monitoring are sent to an appropriate outside hospital (typically Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center in Baton Rouge) for any necessary medical care.39
Camp J is currently operating a two-prong isolation plan for inmates isolated there. All initial intakes are housed that the “Bass” unit for early isolation and monitoring. Inmates generally remain at the Bass unit for approximately seven (7) days during which time they are regularly monitored by staff that include one (1) nurse practitioner and two (2) to three (3) registered nurses. After this initial isolation period, those patients that continue to remain stable and show signs of improvement are moved to the “Gar” unit for “step-down” isolation for approximately an additional seven (7) days. In step down isolation, offenders are monitored daily by medical staff as they continue their recovery. Offenders are then tested after they complete the
37 Id. at para. 9-10. 38 Id at para. 11. 39/c/at para. 12.
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full 14-day isolation regimen. Those who test negative are then discharged and appropriate transport and placement is determined by DOC headquarters. These offenders are considered recovered upon this negative COVID-19 test result.40
The above referenced process has worked very well thus far. Nearly all of the patients admitted to Camp J have continued to improve and have not had any serious complications. No one who has been admitted to Camp J has died. Only two offenders who were sent to Camp J have required hospitalization. Both of those offenders were transported to OLOL immediately upon intake because their symptoms were more severe upon intake than those allowed by the Camp J isolation criteria. 41
The offenders and employees assigned to Camp J do not have interaction with other employees or offenders of LSP so as to limit the potential for exposure to COVID-19. Employees assigned to Camp J report directly to that facility daily for work. Healthcare workers who interact with offenders are given clothing to wear upon reporting for a shift. They change into this clothing, which they wear along with proper Personal Protective Equipment (“PPE”), while in contact with offenders. At the end of a given shift, employees then take a decontamination shower, leave behind the clothing provided so that it can be cleaned and sanitized, and then put on their personal clothing before leaving the facility. This practice has been implemented to take even further precautions to avoid any cross contamination while entering and leaving the facility.42 Camp J has its own ambulance that has been assigned as the designated transport for those offenders who are transported to or from the facility for COVID19 isolation.43 All offenders housed at Camp J are being provided with masks and are being
40 Id at para. 14. 41 Id at para. 15. 42 Id at para. 16. 43 Id at para. 17.
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encouraged to use them by staff.44 The then-medical director of DOC, Dr. Morrison was involved in the decision to use
Camp J in this fashion. In Dr. Morrison’s opinion, this course of action is both medically appropriate and the most prudent course of action available to ensure the health and safety of DOC offenders and staff.45
D. Status of the Named Plaintiffs and relationship with Camp J There are currently 15 named plaintiffs in this lawsuit. As set forth below, nearly all of
them are not and have not ever been to Camp J. Plaintiff, Kendrick Wilson is an offender who was transported from East Baton Rouge Parish prison (“EBR”) to Camp J on or about April 11, 2020. He has been at Camp J since that date and is currently in the “step-down” unit awaiting full recovery. Thereafter, he will be returned to EBR for continued incarceration.46 Plaintiff Ernest Rogers has not been transported to or housed at Camp J.47 Plaintiff Julius Allen has not been transported to or housed at Camp J.48 Plaintiff Daniel Gumns has not been transported to or housed at Camp J.49 Plaintiff Ian Cazenave has not been transported to or housed at Camp J.50
Although they have not submitted affidavits, named Plaintiffs, Michael Videau, Trevon Wiley, Reginald George, Lionel Tolbert, Otto Barrera, Kentrell Parker, Alfonso Gamer, Bradley Winters and James Hughes have also not been transported to or housed at Camp J.51 Additionally, although not listed as a plaintiff, Paul Nash (who submitted an affidavit) is currently at Camp J and he is stable and improving in “step down” isolation. Once retested (and receiving a negative result) he will be transported back to Bienville Parish where he was housed
44 Id at para. 18. 45 Affidavit of Dr. Morrison, attached as Ex. 4. 45 Supplemental affidavit of Tracy Falgout at para 19. 47 Id. 48 Id. 49 Id. 50 Id. 51 Id.
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prior to contracting COVID-19.52 5F3inally, while Camp J plans to continue to accept offenders from local jails, Camp J is no longer accepting offenders from EBR for isolation. Arrangements have been made by EBR officials to manage and maintain their own onsite isolation facility.33
As discussed below, Plaintiffs’ motion has no merit. It is nothing more than a vain effort to direct the response of the State, DOC and LSP, through the use of their hired gun litigation experts. The plaintiffs had Michael Puisis, D.O. submit an affidavit to allegedly support their motion. The affidavit is incredible in that it actually shows that DOC’s and LSP’s actions are in compliance with CDC guidelines and that no relief is necessary. Paragraph 11 of Dr. Puisis’ original affidavit acknowledges that:
transfers into LSP have been suspended absent extenuating circumstances and if an inmate is transferred into LSP, they are supposed to be quarantined for a 14day period. LSP screens visitors and new offenders with symptom screening and a temperature. These measures are consistent with recommendations of the Center for Disease Control (CDC) correctional guidelines. (Emphasis added.) After stating his litigation position that LSP provides ineffective medical care (which is denied in the strongest terms possible), Dr. Puisis states that: While CDC procedures are in place I question the ability to effectively carry out the procedures as stated. (Emphasis added.) Thus, plaintiffs’ own expert witness admits that DOC and LSP measures and procedures are consistent with CDC recommendations and procedures. Instead, he relies on conjecture that LSP is either unwilling or unable to implement the guidelines. In their most recent affidavits, Dr. Puisis and Dr. Vassallo give the opinion that movement of prisoners to Camp J is not prudent. The basis of these opinions is fraught with unsupported assumptions, speculation and just plain falsities. The opinions are not based on fact and do not even take into consideration DOC efforts to protect all offenders, not just those
52 Id. 53 Id. at para. 20.
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housed at LSP. Plaintiffs’ current filing is nothing more than an effort to usurp State powers and prohibit a plan that has been well thought out and vetted by Louisiana medical professionals who are doing everything in their power to safely respond to this crisis. III. ARGUMENT
The Plaintiffs seek solely to restrain the Defendants from transferring inmates with COVID-19 to Camp J at LSP. That is the sole issue presented by Plaintiffs’ emergency motion foraTRO. [Doc.15]
A. The Request for injunctive relief is moot both legally and factually. Plaintiffs generally seek injunctive relief to restrain Defendants from transferring DOC
offenders who test positive for COVID-19 to Camp J. It is well-settled law that a request for injunctive relief becomes moot upon the happening of the event sought to be enjoined. Harris v. City of Houston, 151 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998); see also, Cervantes v. Dixon, No. 5:13-CV205-C, 2014 WL 5285699, at 3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2014) (In case where inmate alleged unreasonable delay in provision of reference to a specialist and surgical procedure, the court found the request for injunctive relief moot because plaintiff was “examined by a specialist and underwent surgery” after filing of complaint). Such is the case here.
Plaintiff Kendrick Wilson has been at Camp J since on or about April 11, 2020 and is currently in the “step-down” unit awaiting full recovery, after which he will be returned to EBR for continued incarceration. Though not a named plaintiff, Paul Nash submitted an affidavit in support of the TRO. Like Kenrick Wilson, Nash is stable and improving in “step down” isolation unit. Upon being retested and receiving a negative result, he will be transported back to Bienville Parish where he was housed prior to contracting COVID-19. Thus, any request for injunctive relief relating to Wilson’s and Nash’s transfer to Camp J is moot.
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Camp J is no longer accepting offenders from EBR for isolation and arrangements have been made by EBR officials to manage and maintain their own onsite isolation facility. Defendants have also confirmed that Plaintiffs Rogers and Allen have not and will not be transferred to Camp J. Accordingly, any relief requested specific to Rogers and Allen is likewise moot.
The remaining plaintiffs are current inmates housed at LSP who argue that the transfer of COVID-19 positive offenders to Camp J threatens the health of the rest of LSP’s population. Defendants show that Camp J has been in operation since April 2, 2020. One of two things is true: either any cross-contamination that was going to occur has already occurred or, alternatively, the mitigation plan in connection with Camp J is working as intended. At this time, no one admitted to Camp J has died or even gotten worse.54 When intervening circumstances render the court no longer capable of providing meaningful relief the plaintiff, a request for injunctive relief is moot. See Harris, 151 F.3d at 189.
Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is therefore moot and should be dismissed based upon current conditions.
B. The request for injunctive relief should be denied on the merits. The United States Supreme Court in Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
24, 129 S. Ct. 365, 376-77 (2008) held that: A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. In each case, courts “must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” “In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.”
54 To be clear, two offenders were offenders who were transported to OLOL immediately upon intake because their symptoms were more severe upon intake than those allowed by the Camp J isolation criteria. Those two offenders should not have been sent to Camp J in the first instance.
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(Citations omitted.) Similar to the United States Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit has noted that an injunction is an extreme remedy:
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. It should only be granted if the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four Callaway prerequisites. The decision to grant a preliminary injunction is to be treated as the exception rather than the rule. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). “The grant of injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy which requires the movant to unequivocally demonstrate the need for its issuance.” Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1997). One district court captured the extraordinary nature of the remedy in stating that standard for granting an injunction “is a ‘difficult’ and ‘stringent’ standard for the movant to meet.” Humana Ins. Co. v. Tenet Health Sys., No. 3:16-CV-2919-B, 2016 WL 6893629, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2016 (citing Whitaker v. Livingston, 732 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2013) and Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 591, 595 (5th Cir. 2011)). Texas v. Ysleta del Snr Pueblo, No. EP-17-CV-179-PRM, 2018 WL 1566866, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2018). Courts “must balance the competing claims of injuiy and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24, 129 S. Ct .at 376-77. Indeed, courts should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Id. The Fifth Circuit in Canal Auth. ofState ofFla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974) set forth the prerequisites for issuance of injunctive as: (1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to defendant, and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.
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The Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Valentine v. Collier, 20-20207 (5th Cir. 4/22/20)
provides important guidance and is ultimately dispositive. In Valentine, the plaintiffs sought an
injunction against a prison for the elderly and the infirm, those particularly susceptible to
COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought and the district court entered a detailed injunction which
required the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) to undertake steps beyond those
required by the CDC. The defendants sought a stay of the injunction with the Fifth Circuit. In
considering whether to stay the preliminary injunction, the court considered four factors:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.
These four factors are essentially the same as the four factors required for issuance of an
injunction in the first instance. The Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the defendants and stayed the
injunction pending appeal.
Using Valentine as a guidepost, the plaintiffs cannot carry their burden of proving the
elements necessary for the Court to grant the extraordinary remedy of issuance of a TRO to
prevent the Defendants from transferring imnates with COVID-19 to LSP.
1. The Plaintiffs cannot show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
The Fifth Circuit in Valentine set forth the following applicable law:
In a constitutional claim alleging deliberate indifference to the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, the plaintiff must satisfy both the “subjective and objective requirements” of the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994). To satisfy the objective requirement, the plaintiff must show an “objectively intolerable risk of harm.” Ibid. To satisfy the subjective requirement, the plaintiff must show that the defendant: “(1) was ‘aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’; (2) subjectively ‘drjejw the inference’ that the risk existed; and (3) disregarded the risk.” Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The “incidence of diseases or infections, standing alone,” do not “imply unconstitutional confinement conditions, since any
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densely populated residence may be subject to outbreaks.” Shepherd v. Dallas Cty., 591 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir. 2009). Instead, the plaintiff must show a denial of “basic human needs.” Ibid. “Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.” Cadena v. El Paso Cty., 946 F.3d 717, 728 (5th Cir. 2020). Valentine, pp. 5-6. a. The Plaintiffs cannot show Camp J presents an objective substantial risk of
serious harm. The Plaintiffs have not proven that the use of Camp J presents a substantial risk of serious harm to their clients. The Plaintiffs’ counsel and their experts assume, without factual basis, that the use of Camp J will infect all offenders at LSP. According to the Plaintiffs, this alleged cross contamination presents an objective substantial risk of serious injury. However, just as this Court found in response to the first motion filed in the Lewis v. Cain litigation, these concerns are based primarily upon speculation and conjecture. [Lewis R. Doc. 587] The Plaintiffs have no evidence that Camp J has actually caused the spread of COVID-19 outside of Camp J. In addition, the Plaintiffs ignore the mitigation steps that the Defendants have undertaken in setting up and operating Camp J. Employees and offenders in Camp J do not interact with those outside of Camp J. Employees shower, decontaminate and change clothes prior to leaving Camp J. Camp J has its own dedicated ambulance. All of these steps mitigate against the substantial risk of harm. Indeed, Camp J has been in operation since April 2, 2020 with no known negative impacts to LSP to date. Considering all of the steps taken by Defendants to isolate Camp J and prevent the spread of COVID-19 outside of Camp J, the Plaintiffs cannot show an objective substantial risk of serious from the operation of Camp J. The Fifth Circuit in Valentine held that the TDCJ was likely to prevail on the merits of the appeal because after accounting for the protective measures TDCJ has taken, the plaintiffs
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had not shown a “substantial risk of serious harm” that amounted to “cruel and unusual punishment.” Valentine, p. 6. Similarly, here, the Court should find that the Plaintiffs have not shown a substantial risk of serious harm that amounts to cruel and unusual punishment as a result of the operation of Camp J.
b. The Plaintiffs cannot show Camp J presents a subjective substantial risk of serious harm.
Even assuming that there is a substantial risk of serious harm (which is denied), the Plaintiffs cannot show that the Defendants are subjectively deliberately indifferent to the risk from operation of Camp J. In response to the potential risk of transfer of COVID-19 outside of Camp J, the Defendants devised a plan which keeps Camp J as a separate facility to mitigate against spread of COVID-19 through LSP. Employees and offenders at Camp J do not interact with employees or offenders at LSP. Employees at Camp J decontaminate, shower and change clothes before leaving Camp J. The Defendants subjectively believe that the use of Camp J is working as shown by the facts that offenders are getting better at Camp J that there have been no known negative impacts to LSP from operation of Camp J. Thus, the Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the Defendants are subjectively indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm from the operation of Camp J.
Again, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Valentine is significant. The Fifth Circuit found that the defendants’ general awareness of the dangers posed by COVID-19 was insufficient since the plaintiffs presented no evidence that the defendants subjectively believed that the measures they were taking were inadequate. Valentine, at p. 8. Here, just as in Valentine, there is no evidence
\
that the Defendants believe that the measures that the Defendants are taking in setting up Camp J and in mitigating against cross contamination outside of Camp J are inadequate. Indeed, to the
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contrary, the Defendants believe that the State and the DOC are benefiting from the operation of Camp J. In short, Camp J is fulfilling its intended role in mitigating the spread of COVID-19.
The Plaintiffs cannot prove that the Defendants are subjectively deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm from operation of Camp J.
2. The Plaintiffs cannot show a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. Speculative injury is not a sufficient basis to grant an injunction; there must be more than
an unfounded fear on the part of the applicant. Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 111 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985).
As stated above, the Defendants have shown that Camp J will be a separate standalone facility with no interaction with LSP facilities. With these facts established, the Plaintiffs cannot show that they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted. The Court found in the Lewis v. Cain litigation, that the Plaintiffs’ concerns are based primarily upon speculation and conjecture. [Lewis R. Doc. 587]. The case remains that the Plaintiffs continue to present nothing more than a case of speculation and conjecture that Camp J will harm them. That unfounded fear is an insufficient basis to grant injunctive relief, particularly with the additional facts that Camp J has operated since April 2, 2020 with no known negative impacts on the Plaintiffs.
3. The Plaintiffs cannot show that the threatened injury to Plaintiffs outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to Defendants and/or that granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest. When the government is a defendant, the third factor (harm the injunction may do to
defendant) and the fourth factor (granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest) merge into one. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1762 (2009).
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The threat to the public if the injunction is not granted is significant. Camp J is being used to isolate offenders from locations which cannot safely isolate offenders. The Defendants have determined that the use of Camp J is medically necessary to mitigate the impact of COVID19 throughout the DOC facilities statewide. Without Camp J in operation, these other facilities throughout the state would be at an even greater risk of spread of COVID-19. In short, the use of Camp J is in furtherance of the public health. Plaintiffs did not address the serious risk posed by COVID-19 in other facilities or the overall public health concerns that the Defendants are attempting to address.
Individual states are vested with police powers, which allow states to enact reasonable regulations established to protect the public health and public safety of its citizens. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25, 25 S.Ct. 358, 361 (1905). States may also invest local bodies— such as the Department of Health or the Department of Corrections—with the authority to carry out such regulations and safeguard public health and safety.55 Id.
Response to infectious disease outbreaks and epidemics has long been recognized as a function of the state’s police power, and federal courts should not intervene in the state’s response unless the response is deemed to be arbitrary or in violation of clearly established Constitutional law. Morgan’s La. & T.R. & S.S. v. Bd. of Health of State of La., 118 U.S. 455, 464-65, 6 S. Ct. 1114, 1118-19 (1886); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28, 25 S. Ct. at 361; Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 594 (D.N.J. 2016). Indeed, the Supreme Court held that to intervene in the state’s disease control measures
would usurp the functions of another branch of government if it adjudged, as matter of law, that the mode adopted under the sanction of the state, to protect the people at large was arbitrary, and not justified by the necessities of the case. We say necessities of the case, because it might be that an acknowledged power of a
53 Granted, all state action taken under the guise of police powers must yield to Constitutional protections and provisions. Id.
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local community to protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28; 25 S. Ct. at 362. As to correctional institutions, the Supreme Court has held that it is “difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 94, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2388 (2006) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 49192, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1837 (1973); Valentine, pp. 8-9. Courts often find that “evaluation of penological objectives is committed to the considered judgment of prison administrators, who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution under examination.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987) (internal citations omitted). In addition, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85; 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259 (1987). “Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility of those branches, and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.” Id. Moreover, when a state penal system is involved, the federal court has an “additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.” Id. These longstanding principles of separation of powers and deference must not be ignored, especially in the current crisis.
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Louisiana has adopted administrative regulations advising the response to communicable diseases that may pose a serious threat to public health, including provisions for mandating isolation or quarantine of individuals who are suspected of being cases or carriers of disease. 51 La. Admin. Code 11:117. The Supreme Court recognized the “authority of states to enact quarantine and health laws of every description” as early as 1905. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25, 25 S. Ct. at 361. The Jacobson court has been cited approvingly, even as recently as 2016 during the Ebola outbreak. Hickox v. Christie, 205 F.Supp.3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016). Hickox quoted Jacobson for the proposition that state-enacted measures to protect public health “will not be struck down unless it ‘has no real or substantial relation to [that goal], or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights’ secured by the Constitution.” Hickox, 205 F.Supp.3d at 591 (quoting Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31).
The Plaintiffs’ concerns cannot override the public interest. In this case, the public interest is public health, probably the most serious concern there could be. Defendants’ decision to set up Camp J made in the interest of public health for the State and DOC outweigh Plaintiffs’ concerns.
4, The Plaintiffs have not shown compliance with the PLRA. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”) requires inmates to exhaust “such
administrative remedies as are available” before filing suit in federal court to challenge prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion obligation is mandatory—there are no “futility or other [judicially created] exceptions [to the] statutory exhaustion requirements . .. .” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). The Fifth Circuit in Valentine rejected the argument that the administrative process was too lengthy to provide timely relief under the special
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circumstances of the COVID-19 crisis. Valentine, pp. 11-12. Thus, Plaintiffs’ suit is premature since they have not shown that they have exhausted administrative remedies available.
The PLRA further mandates that “[preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). And the PLRA says courts “shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the
principles of comity set out in paragraph (1)(B) in tailoring any preliminary relief.” Id.; Valentine, pp. 13-14. The Defendants contend that the injunctive relief sought is not narrowly drawn, adversely impacts public safety, and would impede the principles of comity owed to the State of Louisiana. See, Valentine, at pp. 13-14 (“These may be salutary health measures. But that level of micromanagement, enforced upon threat of
contempt, does not reflect the principles of comity commanded by the PLRA.”). IV. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Valentine should control. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully ask the Court to deny the relief sought by Plaintiffs in the instant motion.
JEFF LANDRY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
Butler Snow LLP
445 North Boulevard, Suite 300 (70802) P. O. Box 2997 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-2997 Telephone: (225) 325-8700 Facsimile: (225) 325-8800 By: s/Randal J. Robert________________________
Randal J. Robert (#21840) Connell L. Archey (#20086)
21

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24 04/24/20 Page 24 of 24

Julie M. McCall (#29992) Keith J. Fernandez (#33124) Special Assistant Attorneys General Email: randy.robert@,butlersnow.com
connell .archey@,butlersnow. com iulie.mccall@butlersnow.com keith.femandez@butlersnow.com
Counsel for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 24th day of April, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing pleading with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic filing to all counsel of record.

52728850.vl

Is/ Randal J. Robert Randal J. Robert

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-1 04/24/20 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JOSEPH LEWIS, JR., KENTRELL PARKER, *

FARRELL SAMPIER, REGINALD

*

GEORGE, JOHN TONUBBEE, OTTO

*

BARRERA, CLYDE CARTER, CEDRIC *

EVANS, EDWARD GIOVANNI, RICKY D. *

DAVIS, LIONEL TOLBERT, and RUFUS *

WHITE, on behalf of themselves and all

*

others similarly situated,

*

*

VERSUS

*

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 3:15-cv-00318 JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
MAGISTRATE JUDGE RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS

BURL CAIN, Warden of the Louisiana State *

Penitentiary, in his official capacity;

*

STEPHANIE LEMARTINIERE, Assistant *

Warden for Health Services, in her official *

Capacity; JAMES M. LEBLANC, Secretary of *

THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

*

PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS * ***************>M>******’M‘**'M'M'**'M'M‘#*#*>l‘*****#***#>t"M'**‘Mt'M'***********iM‘****

AFFIDAVIT BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public qualified in the aforesaid state and parish, personally came and appeared:
JAMES M. LeBLANC who, after being duly sworn by me, did depose and state: 1. I have been employed by the State of Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DOC”) since 1973.1 have beat Secretary of DOC (“Secretary") from January 2008 through die present time. I served as Acting Chief of Operations for DOC for a period prior to that and as Warden of Dixon Correctional Institute for the preceding twelve (12) years. I have served in various capacities, including Undersecretary (1992 - 1995), as well as interim Director of Probation and Parole (1998 - 1999). I received a B.A. in Business Administration from Southeastern Louisiana University in December 1972, with minors in Marketing and Accounting.

l

EXHIBIT

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-1 04/24/20 Page 2 of 5

2.

With regards to DOC's ongoing response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, DOC has an

existing infectious disease and pandemic prevention and response plan in place to protect the safety

of all offenders within the DOC system.

3.

As part of its infection control program, DOC Influenza and Pandemic Viral Outbreaks

regulation provides a formal policy and procedure concerning the planning, preparation, and

management of a pandemic viral disease or an influenza outbreak. DOC recognizes that a

pandemic or an influenza outbreak may not follow an expected course and may present new

challenges. DOC has activated this regulation to the highest level, and DOC facility plans have

been customized specifically to address COVID-19.

4. Pursuant to the governing Department Regulation, each state prison has implemented a

thorough and detailed Continuity of Operations Plan (“COOP”), which have been reviewed by

DOC Headquarters Medical/Operations.

5. DOC is coordinating with the Governor’s office and other state agencies to stay up to date

on all COVID-19 related issues, developments, and discussions.

6. I have daily phone calls with the Unified Command Group headed by the Governor. I,

along with all other Cabinet Secretaries and other local and state leadership officials, participate

in these phone calls.

7. DOC is actively involved in the statewide management and response through the

Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness.

8. DOC has conference calls every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday that include all DOC

leadership, all Wardens, Louisiana State Police, and the Louisiana Sheriffs Association. These

phone calls discuss updates from each institution, medical reports and updates, institutional

reports, and strategy for continued management related to COVID-19.

2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-1 04/24/20 Page 3 of 5
9. DOC has suspended visitation, volunteering, tours, transfers between prisons/ routine transfers from local level, and postponed the Angola spring rodeo, all in effort to minimize movement. 10. DOC has limited new intakes to only those who must be housed in a state prison. Each intake is screened and assessed for symptoms, and then quarantined for 14 days before placed in general population. 11. DOC has created a COVID-19 webpage on its website and updates it frequently with the latest information. This has proven useful for staff and offenders’ families during this pandemic. 12. DOC has created two COVID-19 informational videos for offenders. These videos include an introduction by me and the onsite physician at Angola, an overview of DOC’s response to the pandemic, and proactive ways offenders can reduce risk of infection. These videos are available in both English and Spanish. These videos are played on loop at all prisons and are also available on DOC’s website for families to view. 13. DOC, together with Securus Technologies, Inc., is providing offenders in state-run prisons two (2) free 15-minute phone calls per week and two (2) free email stamps per week to allow offenders to maintain communication with family and friends during this crisis. 14. DOC has suspended medical visit co-payments in state prisons. 15. DOC has suspended the two-hundred and fifty dollar ($250) minimum account balance requirement on offender bank accounts in state prisons. 16. DOC has also required and ensured that ample hand sanitizer and soap are readily available at all state prisons. Offenders will be issued additional free bars of soap on an ongoing basis. 17. DOC is following the guidelines of the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”).
3

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-1 04/24/20 Page 4 of 5
18. In addition to the CDC guidelines, DOC has instituted reverse isolation for the most vulnerable of the offender population. Approximately two weeks ago, DOC identified offenders most at risk for infection and began reverse isolation of those offenders. 19. DOC has obtained from the Louisiana Department of Health (“LDH”) COVID-19 test sample collection kits, which have been issued to all prison facilities. 20. DOC has issued offender testing criteria guidelines to all state facilities, which are based upon the direction of LDH. The guidelines require that any offender exhibiting symptoms of an influenza-like illness, such as fever or fever and a cough shall be tested for COVID-19 and influenza. 21. DOC has provided Personal Protective Equipment (“PPE”) to staff and offenders, as needed. 22. DOC has issued COVID-19-specific guidelines and trained all state prisons regarding screening, isolation, quarantine, housing, proper use of PPE, and precautionary measures. These guidelines are revised and updated as the CDC issues new information. 23. Each DOC facility has quarantine and isolation capabilities, which are used as needed. 24. DOC implemented daily tracking of all offender influenza and COVID-19 testing at each facility and delivers the COVID-19 test samples to LDH for laboratory testing. 25. On March 16,2020, a “Call to Action” plan related to COVID-19 in Louisiana jails and prisons was initiated by The Promise of Justice Initiative, the ACLU of Louisiana, the Southern Poverty Law Center and other organizations. Mercedes Montagues, lead counsel for Plaintiffs, is the Executive Director of The Promise of Justice Initiative, and Plaintiffs are also represented by the ACLU of Louisiana and the Southern Poverty Law Center. This “Call to Action” publicly disseminated my email address, as well as the email addresses of DOC General Counsel Jonathan
4

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-1 04/24/20 Page 5 of 5
Vining, and the Governor’s Executive Counsel Matthew Block, among others. It encouraged persons to repeatedly forward an identical letter to the leadership of DOC and the State of Louisiana, which overwhelmed the email accounts of those employees. Instead of devoting all available time to the underlying emergency declaration, valuable resources have been devoted to receiving hundreds of email forwards of the same chain letter each day since March 16. 26. The foregoing is true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

_L, SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me, Notary, on the

day of

., 2020

52388214. vl

NOTARY PUBLIC
138785 BAR ROLL 35525
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COMMISSIONED fORL}F|

5

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-2 04/24/20 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JOSEPH I -F.WIS, JR., KENTREU. PARKER, *

FARRELL SAMPIER, REGINALD

*

GEORGE, JOHN TONUBBEE, OTTO

*

BARRERA, CLYDE CARTER, CEDRIC

EVANS, EDWARD GIOVANNI, RICKY D. *

DAVIS, LIONEL TOLBERT, and RUFUS *

WHITE, on behalf of themselves and all

*

others similarly situated,

*

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 3:15-cv-00318 JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
MAGISTRATE JUDGE RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS

VERSUS

*

*

BURL CAIN, Warden of the Louisiana State *

Penitentiary, in his official capacity;

*

STEPHANIE LEMARTINIERE, Assistant *

Warden for Health Services, in her official *

Capacity; JAMES M. LEBLANC, Secretary of *

THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

*

PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
,!m*!&*>|:>!i***>i>*****iti* + *>Mi#***l"i<>!'«n>******<i*i|>*:»*i|‘**!!nts*#***’»#***»'#**'t=i»******** ***#*♦#

AFFIDAVIT BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public qualified in the aforesaid state and parish, personally came and appeared:
TRACY FALGOUT who, after being duly sworn by me, did depose and state: 1. I have been employed by the State of Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DOC”) from November 20,2000 to present. Since August of 2019,1 have held the position of Deputy Warden - Operations at Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP" or “Angola”). My job duties include administrative oversight of the following departments: Health Services, Legal Programs, Training Academy, Religious Services, ACA, and ADA. I also serve as the facility ADA Coordinator. 2. I have been licensed as a Registered Nurse by the State of Louisiana since December of 1990.

l EXHIBIT

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-2 04/24/20 Page 2 of 5
3. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, DOC has a developed a plan to protect the health and safety of all offenders within the DOC system.
4. LSP is following DOC’s Influenza and Pandemic Viral Outbreaks regulation, which, as part of DOC's infection control program, provides a formal policy and procedure framework concerning the planning, preparation, and management of a pandemic viral disease or an influenza outbreak. DOC recognizes that a pandemic or an influenza outbreak may not follow an expected course and may present new challenges. DOC has activated this regulation to the highest level, and DOC facility plans have been customized specifically to address COVID-19.
5. LSP has also implemented its Continuity of Operations Plan (“COOP”) and COOP Isolation Plan. 6. LSP participates in conference calls every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday with Secretary
LeBlanc and all DOC leadership, all Wardens, Louisiana State Police, and the Louisiana Sheriffs Association. These phone calls discuss updates from each institution, medical reports and updates, institutional reports, and strategy for continued management related to COVID-19. 7. LSP’s current procedures ensure that proper housing, housekeeping, nutrition, medical care, and sanitation requirements are met, despite the additional challenges to staff and the offender population. As the pandemic situation evolves, LSP staff is prepared to adapt as necessary. 8. LSP has restricted offender movement within the facility. 9. LSP has suspended visitation, volunteering, tours, transfers between prisons, routine transfers from local level, most programming, and postponed the Angola spring rodeo, all in effort to minimize movement. 10. DOC has limited new intakes to only those who must be housed in state prison. Each intake sent to LSP is screened and assessed for symptoms, and then quarantined for 14 days before placed in general population.
2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-2 04/24/20 Page 3 of 5
11. DOC has created two COV1D-19 informational videos for offenders. These videos include an introduction from Secretary Le Blanc and the Medical Director at LSP and provide an overview of DOC’s response to the pandemic and proactive ways offenders can reduce risk of infection. The videos are available in English, Spanish, Closed Caption, and ASL versions. The videos are played on loop at LSP and are also available on the DOC website for families to view.
12. DOC, together with Securus Technologies, Inc., is providing offenders in state-run prisons, including LSP, two (2) free 15-minute phone calls per week and two (2) free email stamps per week to allow offenders to maintain communication with family and friends during this crisis. Additionally, at LSP, if an offender is placed in isolation, the offender will be provided with an additional free phone call if necessary.
13. DOC has required and ensured that ample hand sanitizer and anti-bacterial soap are readily available at all state prisons, including LSP. Offenders will be issued additional free bars of soap on an ongoing basis. LSP has also educated all offenders on the proper way to wash their hands.
14. At LSP, pill call lines have been alternated. Medicine is distributed unit-by-unit to ensure that offenders from different units do not come into contact with one another.
15. At LSP, mealtimes have been alternated to ensure that offenders from different units do not come into contact with one another. Dining facilities are cleaned and sanitized before and after mealtime for each unit.
16. At LSP, yard time is allocated on a unit-by-unit basis to ensure that offenders from different units do not come into contact with one another.
17. DOC, including LSP, is following the guidelines of the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”).
3

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-2 04/24/20 Page 4 of 5
IS. In addition to the CDC guidelines, DOC has instituted reverse isolation for the most vulnerable of the offender population in order to protect those offenders from unnecessary exposure to staff. Approximately two weeks ago, LSP identified offenders most at risk for infection and began reverse isolation. LSP staff in these areas are required to wear masks and only make contact when absolutely necessary.
19. Any LSP offender presenting with symptoms of an influenza-like illness is given both an influenza test and a COVED-19 test. The offender is then sent to the appropriate isolation area. Once test results are obtained, the offender is treated per Healthcare Practitioners Orders.
20. All employees entering the facility are screened daily through a series of questions regarding COVID-19 symptoms and recent travel. All staff entering the Treatment Center have their temperatures checked prior to entering.
21. At this time, DOC has not transferred anyone with COVID-19 to Angola. 22. Offenders housed at DOC facilities who test positive for COVID-19 will be isolated at the facility
in which they are housed. 23. Camp J at LSP will be used to isolate offenders only in the event that it becomes necessary. Camp
J is an isolated facility and is not located near any other Offender Housing at LSP. 24. Offenders housed in DOC facilities who test positive for COVID-19 will be transported to Camp
J for isolation, only if they cannot be isolated at the facility in which they are housed. 25. DOC offenders housed at local facilities who test positive for COVID-19 will be transported to
Camp J for isolation, only if they cannot be isolated at the facility in which they are housed. 26. Offenders from the local level who test positive for COVID-19 will be transported to Camp J for
isolation, only if they cannot be isolated at the facility in which they are housed.
4

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-2 04/24/20 Page 5 of 5

27. The staff providing care to COVID positive offenders at Camp J will follow the guidelines provided by the CDC and will use the proper Personal Protective Equipment (“PPE”) while in contact with offenders.
28. COVID positive offenders will be under strict cell isolation. Every other cell will be utilized in order to maintain proper distancing. All food will be served on disposable trays with disposable utensils. All personal hygiene items will be provided to offenders in their cell, and the items will be disposable.
29. As the COVID crisis presents new challenges daily, LSP’s response continues to evolve, and LSF staff is prepared to adapt as necessary.
30. The foregoing is true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

5238.S2UI.vl

the t *** day of
Notary Public
HEATHER HOOD #154621 Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana My Commission is for Life

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-3 04/24/20 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU,

*

REVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

*

REGINALD GEORGE, LIONEL TOLBERT, *

OTTO BARRERA, KBNTRELL PARKER

*

MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS ALLEN,

*

ERNEST ROERS, ALFOANSO GARNER,

*

BRADLEY WINTERS, KENDRICK WILSON *

JAMES HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all *

similarly situation individuals

*

*

Versus

*

*

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official

*

capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; *

LOUISIANA DEPARATMENT OF PUBLIC *

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES LeBLANC, *

in his official capacity as Secretary of the

*

Department of Safety & Corrections; JOHN

*

MORRISON, in his official capacity as Medical *

Director ofthe Department ofPublic Safety & *

Corrections; LOUISIANA DEPARMENT OF *

HEALTH; and Stephen R. RUSSO, in his official *

capacity as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana *

Department of Health

*

NO. 3:20-cv-231 -SDD-RLB CLASS ACTION

****************************************************************************** SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT BY TRACY FALGOUT
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public qualified in the aforesaid state and parish, personally came and appeared:
TRACYFALGOUT who, after being duly sworn by me, did depose and state:
1. Iam providing this Affidavit as a supplement to the one that I executed on or about April 2, 2020 in the matter entitled Lewis v. Cain, No. 3:15-cv-00318, United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana.

1
EXHIBIT

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-3 04/24/20 Page 2 of 6
2. I have been employed by the State of Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DOC”) from November 20, 2000 to present. Since August of 2019,1 have held the position of Deputy Warden - Operations at Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP” or “Angola”). My job duties include administrative oversight of the fallowing departments: Health Services, Legal Programs, Training Academy, Religious Services, ACA, and ADA. I also serve as the facility ADA Coordinator.
3. I have been licensed as a Registered Nurse by the State of Louisiana since December of 1990.
4. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, DOC has a developed a plan to protect the health and safety of all offenders within the DOC system.
5. LSP is following DOC’s Influenza and Pandemic Viral Outbreaks regulation, which, as part of DOC’s infection control program, provides a formal policy and procedure framework concerning the planning, preparation, and management of a pandemic viral disease or an influenza outbreak. DOC recognizes that a pandemic or an influenza outbreak may not follow an expected course and may present new challenges. DOC has activated this regulation to the highest level, and DOC facility plans have been customized specifically to address COVID-19.
6. LSP has also implemented its Continuity of Operations Plan (“COOP”) and COOP Isolation Plan.
7. LSP’s current procedures ensure that proper housing, housekeeping, nutrition, medical care, and sanitation requirements are met, despite the additional challenges to staff and the offender population. As the pandemic situation evolves, LSP staff is prepared to adapt as necessary.
2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-3 04/24/20 Page 3 of 6
8. LSP is following the guidelines of the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”).
9. Camp J at LSP is currently being used as an isolation facility to house offenders from local jails in who test positive for COVID-19 and who cannot be safely isolated at the local facilities. Camp J began accepting patients for isolation on or about April 2,2020. Camp J also serves as an isolation facility for those offenders within the LSP population who test positive and require isolation from the general population at LSP.
10. Offenders housed at local facilities who test positive for COVID-19 are transported to Camp J for isolation, only if they cannot be isolated at the facility in which they are housed. Camp J is an isolated facility and not located near any other offender housing unit at LSP.
11. Camp J is a standalone facility located on LSP’s 1800-acre campus. Camp J is located at least a mile away from any other offender occupied buildings located at LSP. Camp J is being operated as independent prison separate and apart from the rest of DOC and LSP as part of DOC’s current COVID-19 response plan. During this period, Camp J will not be considered part ofAngola.
12. Camp J is being used only as an isolation and monitoring facility. It does not act as a hospital and does not provide treatment to any Covid-19 patients that require ventilators, oxygen, or IV’s. Any patients showing serious medical symptoms beyond isolation monitoring are sent to an appropriate outside hospital (typically Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center in Baton Rouge) for any necessary medical care.
13. Prior to the re-occupancy of Camp J, the facility was thoroughly cleaned and equipped to serve as a COVID-19 occupational facility. Additionally, those parts of Camp J that
3

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-3 04/24/20 Page 4 of 6
will house inmates for isolation have been fully climate controlled with central airconditioning purchased/leased by DOC for these purposes. 14. Camp J is currently operating a two prong isolation plan for inmates isolated there. All initial intakes are housed that the “Bass” unit for early isolation and monitoring. Inmates generally remain at the Bass unit for approximately seven (7) days during which time they are regularly monitored by a staff that include one nurse practitioner and two (2) to three (3) registered nurses. After this initial isolation period, those patients that continue to remain stable and show signs of improvement are moved to the “Gar” unit for “step-down” isolation for approximately an additional seven (7) days. In step down isolation, offenders are monitored daily by medical staff as they continue their recovery. Offenders are then tested after they complete the full 14 day isolation regiment. Those who test negative are then discharged and appropriate transport and placement is determined by DOC headquarters. These offenders are considered recovered upon this negative COVID-19 test result. 15. The above referenced process has worked very well thus far. Nearly all of the patients admitted to Camp J have continued to improve and have not had any serious complications. No one who has been admitted to Camp J has died. Only two offenders who were sent to Camp J have required hospitalization. Both of those offenders were transported to OLOL immediately upon intake because their symptoms were more severe upon intake than those allowed by the Camp J isolation criteria. 16. The offenders and employees assigned to Camp J do not have interaction with other employees or offenders of LSP so as to limit the potential for exposure to COVID-19. Employees assigned to Camp J report directly to that facility daily for work. Healthcare
4

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-3 04/24/20 Page 5 of 6
workers who interact with offenders are given clothing to wear upon reporting for a shift. They change into this clothing, which they wear along with proper Personal Protective Equipment (“PPE”), while in contact with offenders. At the end of a given shift, employees then take a decontamination shower, leave behind the clothing provided so that it can be cleaned and sanitized, and then put on their personal clothing before leaving the facility. This practice has been implemented to take even further precautions to avoid any cross contamination while entering and leaving the facility. 17. Camp J has its own ambulance that has been assigned as the designated transport for those offenders who are transported to or from the facility for COVID-19 isolation. 18. All offenders housed at Camp J are being provided with masks and are being encouraged to use them by staff. 19.1 have reviewed the list of plaintiffs named in this suit and the affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs and have confirmed the following facts: (1) Kendrick Wilson is an offender who was transported from East Baton Rouge Parish prison (“EBR”) to Camp J on or about April 11,2020. He has been at Camp J since that date and is currently in the “step-down” unit awaiting full recovery. Thereafter, he will be returned to EBR for continued incarceration; (2) Ernest Rogers has not been transported to or housed at Camp J; (3) Julius Allen has not been transported to or housed at Camp J; (4) Daniel Gumns has not been transported to or housed at Camp J; (5) Ian Cazenave has not been transported to or housed at Camp J. Although they have not submitted affidavits, I have also confirmed that Michael Videau, Trevon Wiley, Reginald George, Lionel Tolbert, Otto Barrera, Kentrell Parker, Alfonso Gamer, Bradley Winters and James Hughes have not been transported to or housed at Camp J. Finally, although not listed
5

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-3 04/24/20 Page 6 of 6

as a plaintiff, I have reviewed the status of Paul Nash and have confirmed that he is stable and improving in “step down” isolation and that upon being retested (and receiving a negative result) will be transported back to Bienville Parish where he was housed prior to contracting COVID-19. 20. Additionally, while Camp J plans to continue to accept offenders from local jails, Camp J is no longer accepting offenders from EBR for isolation. Arrangements have been made by EBR officials to manage and maintain their own onsite isolation facility. 21. As the COVID crisis presents new challenges daily, LSP’s response continues to evolve, and LSP staff is prepared to adapt as necessary. 22. The foregoing is true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me, Notary, on

of

2020.

52388201,v2

JONATHAN R. VINING1
NOTARY PUBLIC State of Louisiana
LA Bar #30781 My Commission Expires at Death

6

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 1 of 33

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JOSEPH LEWIS, JR., KENTRELL PARKER, *

FARRELL SAMPIER, REGINALD

*

GEORGE, JOHN TONUBBEE, OTTO

*

BARRERA, CLYDE CARTER, CEDRIC

*

EVANS, EDWARD GIOVANNI, RICKY D. *

DAVIS, LIONEL TOLBERT, and RUFUS *

WHITE, on behalf of themselves and all

*

others similarly situated,

*

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-ev-00318
JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK MAGISTRATE JUDGE RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS

VERSUS

BURL CAIN, Warden of the Louisiana State *

Penitentiary, in his official capacity;

*

STEPHANIE LEMARTINIERE, Assistant *

Warden for Health Services, in her official *

Capacity; JAMES M. LEBLANC, Secretary of *

THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

*

PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS *

AFFIDAVIT BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public qualified in the aforesaid state and parish, personally came and appeared:
DR. JOHN E. MORRISON who, after being duly sworn by me, did depose and state:
1. Dr. Morrison has been employed by the state of Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DOC”) from April 2018 to present. He graduated from LSU Medical Center New Orleans in 1979 and has been double certified in general surgery and advanced cardiac life support for over 34 years. Dr. Morrison’s extensive medical career is detailed in the attached CV. He has a variety of medical rolls in his career from Medical Director at several hospitals, active surgeon at Touro Medical Center, attending surgeon at University Hospital in New Orleans, to the Medical Director at the Louisiana
l

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 2 of 33
Department of Corrections. Dr. Morrison is currently the Section Chief of General Surgery at LSU. Dr. Morrison was the Co-Director of Basic course in laparoscopy in conjunction with the Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons, he developed basic didactic lecture series on laparoscopy and complications in laparoscopy. The course is offered to surgical departments in developing and underserved areas. The course has been taught in China, Romania, Bulgaria and Puerto Rico. Currently, he coordinates the courses with European countries. He is Vice Chair of Resident Education and in conjunction with the Program Director, the Teaching Chief Residents, and the Chairman, a two-year rotating curriculum has been created for the education of the Surgery Residents. This involves the coordination of a clinical conference, didactic lectures, case presentations, grand rounds, basic science conference, and extra teaching materials. He also coordinates the topics for the ABSITE (American Board of Surgery in Training Exam) review material as developed by Dr. Jennifer Mooney. He has had 10 academic appointments at five different institutions. He has received 11 awards ranging from faculty awards to being selected to sit on an advisory committee. Dr. Morrison has had numerous appointments, awards and publications, on a local, national, and international level, which are all outlined in his attached CV. In the 40 years Dr. Morrison has been practicing medicine, he has given back to the community, furthered medical science in both research, action, and teaching, and has exhibited a passion for both medically and administratively furthering the community’s well-being. 2. DOC’s efforts to respond to the COVID-19 issue has been a massive undertaking and DOC has developed a plan to protect the health and safety of all offenders within the DOC system.
2

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 3 of 33
3. The DOC regulation addressing Influenza and Pandemic Viral Outbreaks provides a formal policy and procedure for DOC concerning the planning, preparation and management of a pandemic viral disease or an influenza outbreak as part of DOC’s infection control program. DOC recognizes a pandemic or an influenza outbreak may or may not follow an expected course and may present new challenges. DOC has activated this regulation to the highest level and facility plans have made customizations specific to addressing COVID-19.
4. There are currently no offenders housed at Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP) that have COVID-19.
5. Along with following DOC Regulation, LSP is also following its Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) Plan and COOP Isolation Plan.
6. DOC has suspended medical visit co-payments in state prisons. 7. DOC, including LSP is following the CDC guidelines, including the Interim Guidance
on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities. 8. In addition to the CDC guidelines, DOC has instituted reverse isolation for the most vulnerable population. DOC was pro-active and identified at risk offenders two weeks ago and began reverse isolation. Reverse isolation adds another level of security to prevent the spread of COVID-19. 9. Reverse isolation is being practiced with the most vulnerable population to protect those offenders from unnecessary exposure to staff. LSP staff in these areas are required to wear masks and gloves and only make contact when absolutely necessary. 10. DOC has obtained from the Louisiana Department of Health COVID-19 test sample
3

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 4 of 33
collection kits and issued to all prison facilities. 11. DOC has issued offender testing criteria guidelines to all state facilities (based upon
Louisiana Department of Health’s direction); any offender exhibiting an influenza-like illness (fever or fever and cough) shall be tested for COVID-IO and Influenza. 12. DOC has re-enforced healthy hygiene and gave instructions to offenders on how to properly wash their hands. 13. Any LSP offender presenting with symptoms is given both a flu test and COVID-19 test. 14. DOC is using infrared thermometers so that symptom screening and temperatures can be taken without touching the patient. 15. DOC has provided Personal Protective Equipment (“PPE”) to staff and offenders where needed and indicated. 16. DOC has sent out to all DOC facilities a contingency plan that includes CDC guidelines on alternatives to use in case of PPE shortages. 17. DOC has issued COVID-19 specific guidelines and trained all state prisons regarding screening/isolation/quarantine/housing/Proper Use of PPE/staff precautions. (Revising and updating on rolling basis as CDC issues new information). 18. Each facility has quarantine and Isolation capabilities which are being used as needed. 19. DOC tracks all Influenza and COVID-19 testing done at each facility daily. 20. DOC has suspended visitation, volunteering, tours, transfers between prisons/ routine transfers from local level, and postponed the Angola spring rodeo all in effort to minimize movement. 21. DOC has required and ensured that ample hand sanitizer and soap are readily available at every state prison and have issued additional free bars of soap to offenders in state
4

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prisons, (ongoing basis). 22. DOC has limited new intakes to only those who must be housed in a state prison. Each
intake is screened and assessed for symptoms, and then quarantined for 14 days before being placed in general population. 23. DOC has created a COVID-19 webpage on its website, and updates it frequently with the latest information. This has proven useful for staff and offenders’ families during this pandemic. 24. DOC has created two COVID-19 informational videos for offenders which include an introduction from Secretary LeBlanc and the Medical Director at LSP that gives an overview of DOC’s response and proactive ways offenders can reduce, risk of infection. (English, Spanish, Closed Caption, and ASL versions). One or both of these videos are played on loop at all prisons and are also available on the DOC website for families to view. 25. DOC and Securus are providing offenders in state-run prisons two (2) free 15-minute calls a week and two (2) free email stamps per week so that offenders can maintain communication with family and friends during this crisis. 26. DOC has suspended the $250 minimum account balance requirement on offender banking accounts in state prisons. 27. DOC has conference calls every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday that include all DOC leadership, all Wardens, Louisiana State Police, and the Louisiana Sheriffs Association. These phone calls discuss updates from each institution, medical reports and updates, institutional reports, and strategy for continued management related to COVID-19. 28. DOC is in direct contact with the Louisiana Department of Health.
5

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 6 of 33
29. DOC is doing everything it can to prevent the spread of COVID-19. We are following the recommendations by the CDC and have pro-actively instituted reverse isolation. Reverse isolation is going above and beyond the recommendations of the CDC. LSP in particular, instituted these practices over two weeks ago. LSP’s Medical Director and Staff are following all guidelines and have gone above and beyond what is recommended by the CDC.
30. If any offenders housed at DOC facilities test positive for COVID-19, they will be isolated at the facility in which they are housed. If any medical issues present that exceed the capabilities of DOC, the offender will be transported to a local hospital.
31. If a DOC offender housed at the local level tests positive for COVID-19 and there is no place to isolate them at the facility in which they are housed, they will be transported to Camp J at LSP for isolation.
32. Camp J will only be used for isolating offenders from the local level if there is no room for them.
33. Camp J will only be used for isolating offenders housed in a state run facility if the DOC institution where they are housed does not have room to isolate them.
34. Camp J will only be utilized if it becomes necessary. 35. Camp J is an isolated facility and not located near any other offender housing unit at
LSP. 36. If it becomes necessary to open Camp J, the facility will be operated as an independent
prison separate and apart from the rest of DOC and LSP. 37. During this period, Camp J will not be considered part of Angola. 38. The offenders and employees assigned to Camp J will not have interaction with other
6

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 7 of 33
employees or offenders of LSP so as to limit the potential for exposure to COVID-19. 39. The staff providing care to COVID positive offenders at Camp J will follow the
guidelines provided by the CDC and will use the proper PPE while in contact with offenders. 40. COVID positive offenders will be under strict cell isolation. Every other cell will be utilized in order to maintain proper distancing. All food will be served on disposable trays with disposable utensils. All personal hygiene items will be provided to offenders in their cell and the items will be disposable. 41. In my professional medical opinion, the utilization of Camp J to house local offenders both medically appropriate and the most prudent course of action available to ensure the health and safety of I

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me, Notary, on the
, 2020

52396510. vl

Notary Public
State of Louisiana My Commission is for Life

day of

7

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 8 of 33
LSUHealthNewOrleans
CURRICULUM VITAE
JOHN EDWARD MORRISON, JR, MD, FACS

Current Title:

Professor of Clinical Surgery

Business Address:

Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center School of Medicine Department of Surgery 1542 Tulane Avenue, Room 734 New Orleans, LA 70112

Business Telephone and Fax:

(504) 568-4750 p; (504) 568-4633 f

Business email Address: jmorr3@lsuhsc.edu

Home Address:

New Orleans, LA

Birthdate and Birthplace: April, 1953; New Orleans, LA

Spouse and Children:

Spouse - Janice Loueve Hudson, MD Child - Sigourney Elizabeth Morrison

Citizenship:

United States of America

Education

Undergraduate:

Bachelor of Science in Zoology Louisiana State University Baton Rouge, LA 09/1971 -05/1975

Graduate/Medical:

Medical Doctorate Louisiana State University Medical Center New Orleans, LA 09/1975-05/1979

Residency:

General Surgery Residency Charity Hospital System of Louisiana Louisiana State University Medical Center New Orleans, LA 7/1979-6/1983

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 9 of 33 John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS

Other:

Clinical Externship Mercy Hospital New Orleans, LA 1976-1977

Pathology Externship Charity Hospital System of Louisiana New Orleans, LA 1978

Clinical Rotation Department of Developmental Therapeutics MD Anderson Hospital Houston, Texas 9/1978

Certification: American Board of Surgery, General Surgery Certificate #029379, Certification: February 28, 1984 Recertification: October 22, 1993; October 18, 2002; December 2, 2013; Expiration: December 31, 2024

Certification Advanced Trauma Life Support, December 1985

Certification Advanced Cardiac Life Support, December 1985 - present

Licensure: Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, License #015184 June 14, 1979 - present

Alabama State Board of Medical Examiners, License #13240 March 25, 1987 - present

Academic, Professional, and Research Appointments Academic Appointments:

Clinical Instructor of Surgery, LSUHSC, Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, February 1983 - October 2007

Clinical Instructor, Community College, University of Alabama Medical School, Tuscaloosa, AL, May 1994 - October 2007

Associate Professor of Clinical Surgery, LSUHSC, Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, November 2007 - August 2017

Professor of Clinical Surgery, LSUHSC, Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, September 2017 - Present

Site Director, Medical Student Clerkship in General Surgery, Baton Rouge, LA, November 2009 - June 2012

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 10 of 33 John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS
Member of Residency Training Graduate Medical Education Strategy Group for Collaboration of LSU with Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Baton Rouge, LA, May 2010 - June 2012
Adjunct Associate Professor, Pennington Biomedical Research Center, Baton Rouge, LA, January 2012 - present
Vice Chair of Education, Department of Surgery LSUHSC, School of Medicine, New Orleans, LA, January 2012 - present
Cancer Liaison Person, Committee on Cancer, University Medical Center, New Orleans, LA, February 2013 - March 2016
Section Chief, General Surgery, Department of Surgery, LSUHSC, School of Medicine, New Orleans, LA, July 2013 - Present
Professional Appointments:
Chief of Surgery, Pointe Coupee General Hospital, New Roads, LA, August 1983 - August 1987
Solo Practice, General Surgery, New Roads, LA, August 1983 - September 1987
Intensive Care Unit Committee, Pointe Coupee General Hospital, New Roads, LA, December 1983 - August 1987
Pointe Coupee General Hospital, Chairman of committee (Planned and opened Intensive Care Unit), 1985
Pointe Coupee General Hospital, District Governing Board, member, New Roads, LA, August 1986 - August 1987
Intensive Care Unit Committee, Fayette County Hospital, Fayette, AL, September 1987 - September 1999
Solo Practice, General Surgery, Fayette, AL, September 1987 - October 2007
Chief of Surgery, Fayette Medical Center, Fayette, AL, September 1987 - October 2007
Chairman, Surgery and Blood Utilization Committee, Fayette Medical Center, Fayette, AL, September 1987 - October 2007
Medical Director, Advanced Cardiac Life Support, Fayette County Medical Center, 1988-1999
Quality Assurance Committee, Fayette County Hospital, Fayette, AL, September 1990 - September 1999

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 11 of 33 John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS
Medical Director, Respiratory Therapy Department, Fayette Medical Center, Fayette, AL, September 1990 - Oct. 2007
President Fayette County Medical Center, Medical Staff, 1990 -1993, 2001 -2002
Member, Think Tank on Rural Medicine and Surgery, University of South Alabama, Mobile, AL, 1991 -1994
Delegate to Alabama State Medical Association, 1991 -1998
Partner/Owner/Developer Ambulatory Surgical Center, Lamar Regional Health Center, Sulligent, AL, April 2000 - January 2005
Member of Board, Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2016-2019
Vice President: Society Laparoendoscopic Surgeons: September 2019
Head of Department of Minimally Invasive Surgery, Earl K Long Hospital, Baton Rouge, LA, November 2008 - June 2012
Editorial Board, Journal of the Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons, 2010 present
Advisory Council, Cohn-Rives Surgical Society, 2010 - present
Member of Surgery Committee, University Medical Center, New Orleans, LA, November 2012 - Present
Medical/Mental Health Director Department of Corrections State of Louisiana April 2018-Present
Member Louisiana Governor’s Drug Policy Board April 2018 - Present
Member HOPE (Heroin Opioid Prevention Education) Council April 2018-May 2019
Hospital Appointments:
Active Staff, full time, Pointe Coupee General Hospital, New Roads, LA August 1983 - August 1987
Active Staff, full time, Fayette County Medical Center, Fayette, AL September 1987 - November 2007
Associate staff member, Northwest Medical Center, Winfield, AL July 1992 - November 2007
Active Staff, full time, Earl K. Long Hospital, Baton Rouge, LA

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 12 of 33 John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS
November 2007 - June 2012
Active Staff, University Medical Center, New Orleans, LA July 2012 - Present
Active Staff, Touro Infirmary, New Orleans, LA July 2012-April 2018
Courtesy Staff, Touro Infirmary, New Orleans, LA April 2018 - Present

Membership in Professional Organizations:

Fellow

International College of Surgeons, October 1984 - present American College of Surgeons, October 1986 - present

Member

Louisiana State Medical Society, 1983 - 1987 Pointe Coupee Parish Medical Society, 1983 - 1987 Cohn-Rives Surgical Society, 1983 - present American Medical Association, 1983 -1998 Alabama State Medical Association, 1987 - present Southeast Surgical Congress, 1987 - present Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons, 1994 - present American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists,
1998-2013 Capital Area Medical Association, 2008 - present Southern Society of Clinical Surgeons, 2011 - 2015 Southern Surgical Association, 2012 - present

Awards and Honors:

Member Alpha Epsilon Delta Honorary Pre-Medical Society, 1975

Recipient - Good Guy Award, Presented by junior medical school class, Louisiana State University Medical School, 1981

Recipient - Outstanding Young Fayette Countian by Fayette Jaycees, 1987 - 1988

Recipient - Selected as one of two surgeons in the State of Alabama, Group of 100 Advisory Committee to the American College of Surgeons, February, 1995

Member of the Year - Fayette Area Chamber of Commerce, 1996

Recipient - Kurt Semm Award for Excellence in Pelviscopy, November, Awarded by the American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists, 1998

Southeast Surgeons Leadership Council, Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc, 2000

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 13 of 33
John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS
Honorable Mention, Gynecology Scientific Paper- Classic Intrafascial Supracervical Hysterectomy 11-year experience, by The Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons, New York, New York, October, 2004
Outstanding Faculty Member Award, Voted upon by Surgery Residents, LSUHSC, Department of Surgery, June 2009
Outstanding Faculty Teacher Award, Voted upon by Medical Students, LSUHSC, Department of Surgery, June 2010
President, Cohn-Rives Surgical Society, 2012
Outstanding Faculty Teaching Award, Voted upon by Medical Students, LSUHSC, Department of Surgery, June 2012
Outstanding Faculty Teaching Award, Voted upon by Medical Students, LSUHSC, Department of Surgery, June 2013
Paul Alan Wetter Award for Best Multispecialty Scientific Part. Minimally Invasive Surgery Week 2013, Annual Meeting and Endo Expo, Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons, August 28 - 31, 2013
Nominated for Aesculapean Award for Excellence in Teaching: Senior Medical Students, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016
Nominated for Copping Award for Teaching, Residents, 2014
Nominated for the Gold Humanism Society, 2015
Clinical Preceptor of the Year, LSUHSC MPAS Class of 2015
Excel Award Winner: Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons, September 2017
Honorary Member; Romanian Society of Minimally Invasive Surgery in Gynecology: Arad, Romania: May 31 - June 2, 2016
Honorary Member; Bulgarian Association of Minimally Invasive Gynecological Surgery: Pleven, Bulgaria: September 25, 2019
TEACHING EXPERIENCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Course/Clerkship/Residency or Fellowship/CME Directorships:
Oversee the CME for the Department of Surgery, General Surgery with annual evaluation of needs and goals and monitor the CME yearly and at weekly conference.
Basic course in laparoscopy in conjunction with the Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons - As Co-Director of the course I have developed basic didactic lecture series on laparoscopy and complications in laparoscopy. Course offered to surgical departments in developing and underserved areas. Course has been taught in China,

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 14 of 33
John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS
Romania, Bulgaria and Puerto Rico. Currently, I coordinate the courses with European countries.
Curriculum Development/Implementation:
General Surgery Residency Curriculum - As Director of Resident Education and in conjunction with the Program Director, the Teaching Chief Residents, and the Chairman, a two year rotating curriculum has been created for the education of the Surgery Residents. This involves the coordination of a clinical conference, didactic lectures, case presentations, grand rounds, basic science conference, and extra teaching materials. I also coordinate the topics for the ABSITE (American Board of Surgery in Training Exam) review material as developed by Dr. Jennifer Mooney.
Formal Course Responsibilities:
Prepare and disseminate the questions related to the surgical topic of the month for the three rotation sites (Baton Rouge, Lafayette, and New Orleans). Responsible for administering the questions, answers, and discussions in New Orleans; five hours/month
Surgical Intern Boot Camp - Created and developed three-day course (30 hours) for surgical interns consisting of didactics and skills relevant to the needs of a surgical intern. Coordinate the lectures, faculty participants, live animal skills lab, and cadaver labs. Give formal lectures on sutures, staplers, energy use in surgery, and laparoscopy. Course is mandatory for all surgical residents and includes integrated vascular and plastic surgical residents, Otolaryngology interns, and Ochsner Medical Center surgical residents; 60 hours/year.
Skills Course - Developed skills course for Family Medicine residents: One-day skills course consisting of basic suture, biopsy skills, and ultrasound skills. Coordinate curriculum and faculty participants; 10 hours/year.
Chair for Organizing Committee; Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons Annual Meeting, September 3-7, 2019; New Orleans, Louisiana. Organized academic day lectures, skills sessions and co-chair for plenary sessions at annual meeting.
Departmental/Interdisciplinary Teaching Conferences
Medical Student Skills Lab - Developed basic suture course for medical students in Baton Rouge. One day skills lab every six weeks, 11/2007 - 6/2012.
Biannual Live Pig Labs - Oversee, arrange curriculum, and supervise lower and upper level General Surgery residents and medical students, 11/2007 - present.
Grand Rounds - Oversee and coordinate faculty participation based on the established topic of the month. Attend weekly morbidity and mortality conference and actively monitor CME, 7/2012 - present.
Monthly “Topic of the Month” - Develop, administer questions, and discuss answers with General Surgery residents, 7/2012 - present.

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 15 of 33 John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS
Surgery Interest Group - Speak to interested medical students regarding surgery and our program here at LSUHSC on an annual basis, 7/2012 - present.
Quarterly Cadaver Labs - Participate in quarterly cadaver dissection labs with the General Surgery residents and medical students, 7/2012 - present.
Journal Club - Monthly participation in review and discussion of journal articles selected for monthly topic, 7/2012 - present.
Tumor Board - Weekly interdisciplinary cancer conference overseeing case presentations, discussions, and dispositions on presented patients, 7/2012 - present.
Teaching Awards:
Outstanding Faculty Member Award - Surgery Residents, Department of Surgery, 2009
Outstanding Faculty Teacher Award - Medical Students, Department of Surgery, 2010
Outstanding Faculty Teacher Award - Medical Students, Department of Surgery, 2012
Outstanding Faculty Teacher Award - Medical Students, Department of Surgery, 2013
Nominated for Aesculapian Award for Excellence in Teaching - Senior Medical Students, 2011
Nominated for the Copping Award for Teaching Residents - 2014
Nominated for Aesculapian Award for Excellence in Teaching - Senior Medical Students, 2014
Nominated for Aesculapian Award for Excellence in Teaching - Senior Medical Students, 2015
Nominated for Aesculapian Award for Excellence in Teaching - Senior Medical Students, 2016
Nominated for the Gold Humanism Award by the Medical Students - 2015
Clinical Preceptor of the Year, LSUHSC, MPAS Class of 2015
Undergraduate, Medical, or Graduate Students Trained:
Research Advisor, Volker Jacobs, MD, 1997 Intra-abdominal Temperature and Pressure Readings During Laparoscopy: Basic Research in Collaboration with Dr. Volker Jacobs Kiel, Germany, March December 1997
Research Advisor, Zuomin Chen, MD Basics in Laparoscopic Surgery, March - December 1997

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 16 of 33
John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS
Journal Publications
Refereed:
1. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR, Laparoscopy Assisted Endoscopic Bowel Anastomosis Stenosis Revision with Stapler. Report of 2 Cases. “Surg Laparosc Endosc 1998;8(3):211-214.
2. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR, Video-Thoracoscopy in a Community-based Hospital."Am Surg 1998;9:912.
3. Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr., Mettler L, Jonat W, Harder D: „Specific Resistance of Veress Needles, Disposable and Reusable Trocars Limiting C02 Gas Flow Performance in Pelviscopy and Laparoscopy. “ Min Invas Ther Allied Technol 1999;8(1):37-47.
4. Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr., Mettler L, Mundhenke C, Jonat W: Measurements of C02 Hypothermia during Laparoscopy and Pelviscopy: How Cold It Gets and How to Prevent It." J Am Assoc Gynecol Laparosc 1999;6(3):289-295.
5. Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr., Mundhenke C, Golombeck K, Jonat W: Jntraoperative Evaluation of Laparoscopic Insufflation Technique for Quality Control in the O.R.’’ J Soc Laparoendosc Surg 2000;4(3): 189-195.
6. Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr., Mundhenke C, Jonat W, Harder D: „Model to Determine Resistance and Leakage Depending Flow on Flow Performance of Laparoscopic Insufflators to Predict Gas Flow Rate of Cannulas. ” J Am Assoc Gynecol Laparosc 2000;7(3):331-337.
7. Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr.: „The Clinical Impact of Warmed Insufflation Carbon Dioxide Gas for Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy. “ Surg Endosc 2001; 15(10): 1247-1248.
8. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR: „437 Classic Supracervical Intrafascial Hysterectomies in 8 Years." J Am Assoc Gynecol Laparosc 2001;8(4):558-567.
9. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR: „ C/ass/c intrafascial supracervical hysterectomy. ” J Am Assoc Gynecol Laparosc 2002;9(3):397-398.
10. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR: Reduction or Elimination of Postoperative Pain Medication after Mastectomy through Use of a Temporarily Placed Local Anesthetic Pump vs. Control Group. “ Zbl Gynakol 2003; 125(1): 17-22.
11. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR: „Replacement of Expensive, Disposable Instruments With Cheap, Old-fashioned Surgical Techniques for Improved Costeffectiveness in Laparoscopic Hysterectomy. " JSLS 2004;8(2):201-206.
12. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR: „Outpatient Laparoscopic Hysterectomy in a Rural Ambulatory Surgery Center.” J Am Assoc Gynecol Laparosc 2004; 11(3):359-364.

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John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS
13. Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr., Kiechle M: „Twenty-Five Simple Ways to Improve Insufflation Performance and Patient Safety in Laparoscopy.” J Am Assoc Gynecol Laparosc 2004; 11 (3):410-423.
14. Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr., Paepke S, Kiechle M: „Body Piercing Affecting Laparoscopy: Perioperative Precautions.” J Am Assoc Gynecol Laparosc 2004; 11 (4):537-541.
15. Jacobs VR, Kiechle M, Morrison JE Jr.: „Carbon Dioxide Gas Heating Inside Laparoscopic Insufflators has no Effect.” JSLS 2005;9(2):208-212.
16. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR: „Classic Intrafascial Supracervical Hysterectomy (CISH): 10-Year Experience." JSLS 2006; 10(1 ):26-29.
17. Jacobs VR, Morrison Jr JE, Paepke S, Fischer T, Kiechle M: „ThreeDimensional Model for Gas Flow, Resistance and Leakage-Dependent Nominal Pressure Maintenance of Different Laparoscopic Insufflators." J Minim Invasive Gynecol 2006;13(3):225-230.
18. Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr.: „Application of a Locally Placed Anaesthesia Catheter to Reduce Postoperative Pain after Mastectomy for Breast Cancer. ” Int J Fertil Womens Med 2006;51(5):(in print).
19. Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr.: „The Real Intraabdominal Pressure during Laparoscopy: Comparison of Different Insufflators.” J Minim Invasive Gynecol 2007; 14(1): 103-107.
20. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR: „Rupture of Spleen with use of Harmonic Scalpel: Case report of an unexplained complication.“ JSLS 2007; 11(2): 268-271.
21. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR: „Laparoscopic Preperitoneal Inguinal Hernia Repair, using Preformed Polyester Mesh without Fixation: Prospective study with 1-year Follow-up results in a rural setting." Surgical Laparoscopy Endoscopy Percutaneous Techniques; Feb. 2008, Vol. 8 No. 1 33-39.
22. Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr: „Comparison of institutional costs for laparoscopic preperitoneal inguinal hernia vs. open repair and reimbursement in an ambulatory surgery center." Surgical Laparoscopy Endoscopy Percutaneous Techniques; Feb. 2008, Vol. 8 No.1 70-74.
23. Morrison, JE Jr, Hodgdon, I: “Laparoscopic Management of Obstructing Small Bowel GIST Tumor”. JSLS 2013; 17(4): 645-650.
24. Maul, L.V., Morrison, J.E., Schollmeyer, T., Alkatout, I., Mettler, L., “Surgical Therapy of Ovarian Endometrioma: Recurrance and Pregnancy Rates” JSLS; 2014; 18(3): 1-8.
Non-refereed:
1. Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr., Computer in the O.R. for Quality Control: Intraoperative Data Acquisition Model for Laparoscopy." In: Westwood JD,

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 18 of 33
John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS
Hoffman HM, Stredney D, Weghorst SJ (Hrsg.): Medicine Meets Virtual Reality. Art Science, Technology: Healthcare (R)Evolution. IOS Press, Amsterdam, Netherlands 1998, Stud Health Technol Inform 1998;50:359-360.
2. Morrison, JE Jr., “Letter to the Editor”: Journal of Minimally Invasive Gynecology; January/February 2010; Volume 17, No.1 .
3. Morrison, JE Jr., Jacobs, VR “Insufflation Safety” Outpatient Surgery Magazine; March 2011. pp. 24-25.
4. Morrison, J: Use of EEA Stapler in Endometriosis Resection: Monograph on Endometriosis; Publication: Storz Endoscopy 2016.
Book Chapters:
1. Morrison J, Jacobs V. Laparoscopic vaginal-sacral-culposuspension. Alternative technique for repair of cystocoeie, vaginal and uterine prolapse and incontinence”. In: Montori A, Lirici MM, Montori J: 6th World Congress of Endoscopic Surgery. Rome, Italy, 3.-6. June 1998. Oral Communications, Posters and Videos. Monduzzi Editore, Bologna, Italy 1998, 747-749.
2. Morrison J, Jacobs V. Laparoscopic repair of large (greater than 7 cm) and recurrent diaphragmatic hernia defect with bovine pericardium.” In: Montori A, Lirici MM, Montori J: 6th World Congress of Endoscopic Surgery. Rome, Italy, 3.-6. June 1998. Oral Communications, Posters and Videos. Monduzzi Editore, Bologna, Italy 1998, 957-959.
3. Morrison J, Jacobs V. Laparoscopically assisted endoscopic bowel anastomosis stenosis revision with stapler.” In: Montori A, Lirici MM, Montori J: 6th World Congress of Endoscopic Surgery. Rome, Italy, 3.-6. June 1998. Oral Communications, Posters and Videos. Monduzzi Editore, Bologna, Italy 1998, 809-811.
4. Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr., Mundhenke C, Golombeck K, Mettler L, Jonat W. QualMtssicherung durch Computer im OP: Intraoperatives Datenerfassungsmodell fur die laparoskopische Insufflationstechnik." In: Mettler L (Hrsg.): Endometriose 2000. PMI-Verlag, Frankfurt 2000, Seite 189-201.
5. Jacobs VR, Harder D, Morrison JE Jr., Mundhenke C, Mettler L, Jonat W. Einfluss von Stromungswiderstanden auf die Gasflussleistung in der Laparoskopie. “ In: Mettler L (Hrsg.): Endometriose 2000. PMI-Verlag, Frankfurt 2000, Seite 202-219.
6. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR. Langzeiterfahrungen mit 320 Classischen Intrafaszialen Supracervikalen Hysterektomien (CISH) am Fayette Medical Center, Alabama, USA" In: Mettler L (Hrsg.): Endometriose 2000. PMI-Verlag, Frankfurt 2000, Seite 309-322.
7. Morrison JE Jr. CISH Hysterectomy (15 Year Experience in Rural US)“ in: Mettler, L. Manual of New Hysterectomy Techniques. Jaypee Brothers 2007, New Delhi, India, Seite 102-107.

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John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS
8. Hasson, Harrith, Morrison, John E. “The Role of Simulation Training and Skill Evaluation in Maintenance of Certification” Prevention and Management of Laparoendoscopic Complications, 3rd Edition; Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons 2011.
9. Mettler, Lisolette, Morrison, John E. Classic Intrafascial Supracervical Hysterectomy (CISH Technique); Prevention and Management of Laparoendoscopic Complications, 3rd Edition; Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons 2011.
10. Morrison, John E. “General Surgery Conditions and Techniques for GyneEndoscopic Surgeons; Practical Manual for Laparoscopic and Hysteroscopic Gynecological Surgery; 2nd Edition; Kiel School of Gynecological Endoscopy 2013, Jaypee Brothers Medical Publishers; Pages 125-137
11. Morrison, John E. “General Surgery Conditions and Techniques for GyneEndoscopic Surgeons; Practical Manual for Laparoscopic and Hysteroscopic Gynecological Surgery; 3rd Edition; Kiel School of Gynecological Endoscopy 2019, Jaypee Brothers Medical publishers; Pages181-198
Scientific Exhibits:
1. The Society for Minimally Invasive Therapy (SMIT) 1998: Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr,, Mettler L, Jonat W: „Standard body temperature warming devices can prevent systemic hypothermia during laparoscopic procedures.“ 10th Annual International Meeting of the Society for Minimally Invasive Therapy (SMIT), London, England; 3.5. September 1998.
2. Jerome J. Hoffman-Award THE American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists (AAGL) 1998: Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr., Mettler L, Jonat W: Jntraoperative Measurements on Laparoscopic and Pelviscopic Hypothermia: How Cold Does It Get and How to Prevent lt.“ 27th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Gynecological Laparoscopists (AAGL), Atlanta, GA, USA, 10.-15. November 1998.
3. The American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists (AAGL) 1998: Jacobs VR, Harder D, Morrison JE Jr., Mettler L, Jonat W: „Technical Aspects of Pneumoperitoneum: Limiting Factors on Performance of Cannulas and Insufflators in Laparoscopy and Pelviscopy. “ Poster, 27th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Gynecological Laparoscopists (AAGL), Atlanta, GA, USA, 10.-15. November 1998.
4. THE American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists (AAGL) 1998: Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr., Mettler L, Jonat W: Jntraoperative Measurements on Laparoscopic and Pelviscopic Hypothermia: How Cold Does It Get and How to Prevent It. “ 27th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Gynecological Laparoscopists (AAGL), Atlanta, GA, USA, 10.-15. November 1998.
5. THE American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists (AAGL) 1999: Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr., Mundhenke C, Golombeck K, Jonat W, D Harder: „Modei to Determine Resistance and Leakage Depending Flow on Flow Performance of Insufflators to Predict Gas Flow Rate of Cannulas. ” 28th Annual Meeting of the

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American Association of Gynecological Laparoscopists (AAGL), Las Vegas, NV, USA, 7.-11. November 1999.
6. Poster Award of Distinction THE Society of American Gastroendoscopic Surgeons (SAGES) 2000: Jacobs VR, Morrison JE Jr., Mundhenke C, Maass N, Jonat W: „The Real Intraabdominal Pressure during Laparoscopy: How Reliable is Insufflation Technique?" SAGES 2000 Meeting, Atlanta, GA, USA, 28. March - 01. April 2000.
Electronic Media: Live Telesurgery broadcasted to national training courses:
Laparoscopic Nissen, 2000 Laparoscopic Colon Resection, 2000 Laparoscopic CISH Hysterectomy, 2001
Scientific Presentations
Local:
1. Care of Chest Tubes for Nurses, Southern Baptist Hospital, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1980.
2. Lung Cancer, Risks and Treatment: Health Fair, New Roads, LA, 1985.
3. State of The Art Laparoscopic Surgery, Fayette Progress Club, Fayette, AL, 1992.
4. I am Finished With My Residency, Now What?” Career planning for General Surgery; June 2, 2011.
5. Suture Basics; Suture Techniques and Knot Tying; Electrocautery Basics; First Year Intern Boot Camp, July 27, 28 2011 Earl K Long Hospital, Baton Rouge, LA.
6. “Surgical Intern Boot Camp”; Academy for the Advancement of Educational Scholarship, October 13, 2011; Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center, New Orleans, LA.
7. Stapling Basics; Intern Boot Camp: July 19, 2012; July 18, 2013, July 17, 2014; July 16, 2015, July 14, 2016, July 13, 2017, July 19, 2018, July 26, 2019
8. Energy in Surgery; Intern Boot Camp: July 20 2012, July 19, 2013, July 18, 2014, July 17, 2015, July 15, 2016, July 14, 2017, July 20, 2018, July 26, 2019
9. Laparoscopy Basics; Intern Boot Camp: July 21 2012, July 20, 2013, July 19, 2014, July 18, 2015, July 16, 2016, July 15, 2017, July 21, 2018, July 25, 2019
10. Knot Tying Techniques; Intern Boot Camp: July 16, 2015.
11. Chest tube basics; Intern Boot Camp: July 25, 2019
12. Endoscopy Basics/Conscious Sedation; Intern Boot Camp: July 26, 2019

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John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS
National:
1. Rural Surgery Overview, American Association of Family Physicians, Houston, TX, 1993.
2. Laparoscopic Hysterectomy: CISH Technique, Think Tank, University of South Alabama, Mobile, AL, 1994.
3. Laparoscopic CISH Hysterectomy, Downtown New York Hospital, Manhattan, NY, February 1996.
4. Forty Years of Surgery Past, Present and Future, Fayette Medical Center, Fayette, AL, 1998.
5. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR. Reduction or Elimination of Postoperative Pain Medication After Mastectomy through Use of a Temporarily Placed Local Anesthesia Pump vs. Control Group.” 34th Congress of the Society of Gynecologic Oncology (SGO), New Orleans, LA, USA, 31. January - 04. February 2003. Abstrakt in: Gynecol Oncol 2003;88:215-216.
6. Laparoscopic Preperitoneal Inguinal Hernia Repair using Preformed Polyester Mesh. Without Fixation, American Hernia Society, San Diego, CA, February 2005.
7. Evolution of Laparoscopic Hysterectomy: 2nd Euro-American Multispecialty Congress, Miami, FL, February 2005.
8. Bowel Injuries: Avoiding and Treating in Laparoscopic Surgery. Tripler Army Hospital; Honolulu, Hawaii; March 7-10, 2019
9. Synthetic Cannabinoids and Cathinones: Louisiana Correctional Association: Lake Charles, Louisiana; October 2018
10. Hepatitis C Elimination Project: Louisiana Correctional Association: Lake Charles, Louisiana; October 2019
International:
1. Laparoscopic and Thoracoscopic Surgery in the U.S. Guangzhou, China, 1996.
2. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR. Laparoscopy Assisted Endoscopic Bowel Anastomosis Stenosis Revision with Stapler.“ 6th World Congress of Endoscopic Surgery, Rome, Italy, 3.-6. June 1998. Abstrakt in: Surg Endosc 1998; 12:712 (P.213).
3. Alternative Technique for Cystocoele, vaginal and uterine Prolapse and Incontinence: Laparoscopic Vaginal-Sacral-Culpo Suspension." 6th World Congress of Endoscopic Surgery, Rome, Italy, 3-6 June 1998. Abstrakt in: Surg Endosc 1998; 12:639 (0.647).

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4. Closure of Large or Recurrent Diaphragm Hernias with Bovine Pericardium." 6th World Congress of Endoscopic Surgery, Rome, Italy, 3-6 June 1998. Abstrakt in: Surg Endosc 1998; 12:595 (0.437).
5. Classic Intrafascial Supracervical Hysterectomies in 9 Years.” Congress of Gynecological Endoscopy and Innovative Surgery (ISGE, ESGE, AGE), Berlin, Germany 26-28 April 2002.
6. Postoperative Pain Reduction after Mastectomy using Temporary Local Anesthetic Pump." World Meeting on Minimally Invasive Surgery in Gynecology, 2nd SEGI Meeting, Rome, Italy, 24-28 June 2003.
7. Outpatient Laparoscopic CISH Hysterectomy, Safety and Cost Effectiveness.” World Meeting on Minimally Invasive Surgery in Gynecology, 2nd SEGI Meeting, Rome, Italy, 24-28 June 2003.
8. Classic intrafascial supracervical hysterectomy (CISH)-10 year experience.” World Meeting on Minimally Invasive Surgery in Gynecology, 2nd SEGI Meeting, Rome, Italy, 24-28 June 2003.
9. CISH Hysterectomy in Rural U.S.A. 15 Year Experience” International Symposium on Hysterectomies Where do we go from here? Kiel School of Gynaecological Endoscopy, Kiel, Germany. June 7th to 10th; 2007.
10. “Subtotal Hysterectomy” 2008 Indo-German Training Course in Gynaecological Endoscopic Surgery, June 8th- 18th, 2008, Kiel, Germany.
11. “Outpatient CISH Hysterectomy” Annual Meeting of German Society of Gynaecological Endoscopy, June 13th-15th,2008 Bonn, Germany.
12. “Laparoscopy in Paediatrics” National Children’s Hospital, April 19th, 2010 Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
13. “Laparoscopy Update” Khmer Soviet Friendship Hospital, April 20th, 2010 Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
14. “Medical Education and Laparoscopy in the US” Kossomak Hospital, April 22nd, 2010 Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
15. “General Surgery Pearls for Gynaecologists” ISGE 19th Annual Congress , AGES XX Annual Scientific Meeting; May 26 - 29, 2010, Sydney, Australia,
16. “General Surgery Tips for Gynaecologists” Indo - German Training Course in Gynecological Endoscopic Surgery, June 8-18, 2010; Kiel, Germany
17. “General Surgery Issues for Gynaecologists” Indo - German Laparoscopic Training Course in Endoscopic Surgery, May 16th- 21st' 2011; Kiel, Germany.
18. General Surgery Issues in GYN Surgery: Abdominal Wall and Pelvis and Safety Issues; Third Global Conference of CPP and Minimally Invasive Surgery. May 19, 2012; Peking University Third Hospital, Beijing, China.

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19. General Surgery Issues in GYN Surgery: Abdominal Wall and Pelvis, Safety And Special Problems, Non-Gynecologic Pelvic Organs; Conference on Pelvic Pain Endoscopic Surgery and Surgical Skills in Gynaecology. May 24 - 27, 2012 Second Affiliated Teaching Hospital of Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an China.
20. General Surgery Issues for Gynaecologists, Indo - German Training Course in Endoscopic Surgery, June 4-8, 2012.
21. General Surgery Issues for Gynaecologists; Indo-German Training Course in Laparoscopy; Kiel School of Gynaecological Endoscopy; Kiel, Germany June 3-9, 2013.
22. General Surgery Issues for Gynaecologists; Indo-German Training Course in Laparoscopy; Kiel School of Gynaecological Endoscopy; Kiel, Germany, June 2 - 6, 2014.
23. General Surgery Issues for Gynaecologists; Indo-German Training Course in Laparoscopy; Kiel School of Gynaecological Endoscopy; Kiel, Germany, May 4-9, 2015.
24. Safe Entry techniques in Minimally Invasive Surgery; Preconference Course of Laparoscopic Surgery; University of Medicine and Pharmacy Victor Babes, Timisoara, Romania, September 21, 2015.
25. Energy Use in Laparoscopy; Preconference Course of Laparoscopic Surgery; University of Medicine and Pharmacy Victor Babes, Timisoara, Romania, September 21, 2015.
26. “Surgical Surprises” Preconference Course of Laparoscopic Surgery; University of Medicine and Pharmacy Victor Babes, Timisoara, Romania, September 23, 2015.
27. Adhesive Disease Surgical Approach; Preconference Course of Laparoscopic Surgery, University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Victor Babes, Timisoara, Romania, September 22, 2015.
28. Pelvic Pain: General Surgical Causes and Treatment; First Academic Conference Minimally Invasive Surgery; Huashan Hospital North; Fudan University, Shanghai, China; November 11, 2015.
29. Energy Use in Laparoscopy; SLS Experts Tips and Tricks in MIS; Escuela De Medicina, Universidad De Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 18, 2016.
30. Adhesions: Causes and Prevention; SLS Experts Tips and Tricks in MIS; Escuela De Medicina, Universidad De Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 18, 2016.
31. Adhesions: When to Cut!; SLS Experts Tips and Tricks in MIS; Escuela De Medicina, Universidad De Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 18, 2016.
32. Management of Complications in Laparoscopy; SLS Experts Tips and Tricks in MIS; Escuela De Medicina, Universidad De Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 18, 2016.

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33. SLS Tips and Tricks: Vascular and Bowel Injuries Recognition and Treatment; ISGE Annual Meeting, Opatija, Croatia, May 27, 2016.
34. SLS Tips and Tricks: Adhesions: When to Cut; AL lll-LEA Congress National de Chirurgie Minim Invaziva in Ginecologie, Timisoara, Romania, May 31,2016.
35. SLS Tips and Tricks: Vascular and Bowel Injuries Recognition and Treatment; AL lllLEA Congress National de Chirurgie Minim Invaziva in Ginecologie, Arad, Romania, June 1, 2016.
36. SLS Tips and Tricks: Vascular and Bowel Injuries Recognition and Treatment; Congresul National de Chirurgie, Sinaia, Romania, June 2, 2016.
37. General Surgery Issues for Gynaecologists; Indo-German Training Course in Laparoscopy; Kiel School of Gynaecological Endoscopy; Kiel, Germany, June 6-10, 2016.
38. Vascular Injury Recognition and Treatment; Beijing 2nd Huaxia Minimally Invasive Medical Forum; Beijing, China, October 22, 2016
39. Vascular Injury Recognition and Treatment; Hunan Provincial People’s Hospital; Hunan, China, October 25, 2016
40. Vascular Injury, Energy Use in Laparoscopy; China-American Multispecialty Summit Shenzhen, Guangdong, China, October 28,29 2016
41. Vascular Injury Recognition and Treatment; Fudan University Huashan North Hospital; Shanghai, China, April 14, 2017
42. Vascular Injury Recognition and Treatment; Nanjing Maternity and Child Hospital; Nanjing, China, April 15, 2017
43. General Surgery Issues for Gynaecologists; Indo-German Training Course in Laparoscopy; Kiel School of Gynaecological Endoscopy; Kiel, Germany, May 1-7, 2017
44. Energy Use in Laparoscopy, Vascular Injury Recognition and Treatment; AL IV-LEA Congress National de Chirurgie Minim Invaziva in Ginecologie, Timisoara, Romania, October 3, 2017.
45. General Surgery Issues for Gynecologists; Indo-German Training Course in Laparoscopyc; Kiel School of Gynaecological Endoscopy; Kiel, Germany, May 6-10, 2018
46. Bowel Injuries; Vascular Injuries; Troubleshooting in Laparoscopy; General Surgery Causes Pelvic Pain; University of Pleven; Pleven, Bulgaria, September 25-26, 2019
47. Bowel Injuries; Surgical Surprises; 11th Annual Meeting Society of European Robotic Gynaecologic Surgeons; Sofia, Bulgaria, September 26-28, 2019

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 25 of 33 John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS
CME (Local):
1. Grand Rounds LSUHSC Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, July 2012; Laparoscopic Inguinal Hernia Repair.
2. Grand Rounds LSUHSC Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, December 2012; Surgery of the Adrenal Gland.
3. Grand Rounds LSUHSC Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, June 2013: Gastro-Esophageal Reflux and Hiatal Hernia.
4. Grand Rounds LSUHSC Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, Complications of Gall Bladder Surgery, May 8, 2014.
5. Grand Rounds LSUHSC Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, Adrenal Mass Evaluation and Workup, December 18, 2014.
6. Grand Rounds, LSUHSC, Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, Sarcoma: Evaluation and Treatment; September 17, 2015.
7. Grand Rounds, LSUHSC, Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, Laparoscopic Hysterectomy, February 25, 2016.
8. Grand Rounds, LSUHSC, Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, Atypical Hernias and Mesh, July 28, 2016.
9. Grand Rounds, LSUHSC, Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, Parathyroid Gland, May 11, 2017
10. Grand Rounds, LSUHSC, Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, Practice Information, June 22, 2017
11. Grand Rounds, LSUHSC, Department of Surgery, New Orleans, LA, Complications In Laparoscopy, July 6, 2017
12. Cohn - Rives Society Lecture; Corrections Medicine, They Do What? March 22, 2019
CME (National):
1. Laparoscopic Vaginal-Sacral-Culpo Suspension. Alternative Technique for Cystocele, Vaginal and Uterine Prolapse and Incontinence." Endo Expo ‘97, 6th Annual Meeting of the Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgery (SLS), Orlando, FL, USA, 3-6 December 1997. Abstract in: J Soc Laparoendosc Surg (JSLS) 1997; 1(4):386-387.
2. Classic Intrafascial Semm Hysterectomy (C.I.S.H.). 5 Years Experience in a Community Hospital." Endo Expo ‘97, 6th Annual Meeting of the Society of

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Laparoendoscopic Surgeons (SLS), Orlando, FL, USA, 3-6 December 1997. Abstrakt in: J Soc Laparoendosc Surg (JSLS) 1997;1(4):386.
3. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR. Five Years Experience of Laparoscopic Hysterectomy (CISH) in a Community Hospital in Alabama. “ 66th Southeastern Surgical Congress (SESC), Atlanta, GA, USA, 2.-4. February 1998.
4. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR. Laparoscopic Vaginal-Sacral-Culpo Suspension (LVSCS): Alternative Procedure for Prolapse & Incontinence." 66th Southeastern Surgical Congress (SESC), Atlanta, GA, USA, 2.-4. February 1998.
5. Classic Intrafacial Supracervical Hysterectomy.“ 27th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Gynecological Laparoscopists (AAGL), Atlanta, GA, USA, 10-15 November 1998. Abstract in: J Am Assoc Gynecol Laparosc 1998;5(3) Suppl:S33
6. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR. Technical Aspects and Retrospective Evaluation of Classic Intrafascial Supracervical Hysterectomy after 277 Cases." Endo Expo ’98, 7th Annual Meeting of the Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons (SLS), San Diego, CA, USA, 9.-12. December 1998. Abstrakt in: J Soc Laparoendosc Surg 1998;2(4):350.
7. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR. New Procedure of Bowel Anastomosis Stenosis Revision with Stapler." Endo Expo ’98, 7th Annual Meeting of the Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons (SLS), San Diego, CA, USA, 9.-12. December 1998. Abstrakt in: J Soc Laparoendosc Surg 1998;2(4):374.
8. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR. Experience with more than 300 CISH Procedures.” 28th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Gynecological Laparoscopists (AAGL), Las Vegas, NV, USA, 7.-11. November 1999. Abstract in: J Am Assoc Gynecol Laparosc 1999;6(3)Suppl:S38-39.
9. Real Intraabdominal Pressure during Laparoscopy: Intraoperative Data-Acquisition Model for Quality Control Study.” 28th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Gynecological Laparoscopists (AAGL), Las Vegas, NV, USA, 7-1. November 1999. Abstract in: J Am Assoc Gynecol Laparosc 1999;6(3)Suppl:S39.
10. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR. New Method of Closure of Large or Recurrent Diaphragm Hernias with Bovine Pericardium (Periguard®). “ Endo Expo ’99, 8th Annual Meeting of the Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons (SLS), New York, NY, USA, 4.-7. December 1999. Abstrakt in: J Soc Laparoendosc Surg 2000;4(1):80 (P025).
11. Morrison JE Jr., Jacobs VR, Kiechle M. Measurements of Intraabdominal Pressure in Laparoscopy: Which Manipulations Do Effect the Pressure and How Much?” 10th Annual Congress of the International Society for Gynecologic Endoscopy (ISGE), Chicago, IL, USA, 28.-31. March 2001.
12. Operative Modifications of the Classic Intrafascial Supracervical Hysterectomy (MISH) for Improved Cost Effectiveness.” 11th Endo Expo 2002, 11th International Congress of the Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons (SLS), New Orleans, LA, USA, 10-14 September 2002. J Soc Laparoendosc Surg 2002;6(3):261-262.

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13. Outpatient Laparoscopic CISH Hysterectomy, Safety and Cost Effectiveness.'1 Global Congress of Gynecologic Endoscopy, 32nd Annual Meeting of the American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists (AAGL), Las Vegas, NV, USA, 19-22 November 2003. Abstract in: JAAGL 2003; 10(3 Suppl):S42.
14. Classic Intrafascial Supracervical Hysterectomy (CISH): 10 Years Experience." Global Congress of Gynecologic Endoscopy, 32nd Annual Meeting of the American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists (AAGL), Las Vegas, NV, USA, 19-22 November 2003.
15. CISH hysterectomy 11 year experience, 13th International Congress and Endo Expo 2004 and SLS Annual Meeting September 2004, New York, NY.
16. CISH hysterectomy 15 year perspective.” 15th International Congress and Endo Expo 2006 and SLS Annual Meeting, September 6-9, 2006, Boston, MA, USA. JSLS 2006; 10(3 Supp!):S27-28.
17. Laparoscopic preperitoneal inguinal hernia repair using performed polyester mesh without fixation, 4 year study.” 15th International Congress and Endo Expo 2006 and SLS Annual Meeting, September 6-9, 2006, Boston, MA, USA. JSLS 2006; 10(3 Suppl):S28-29.
18. “Harmonic Scalpel use in Thoracoscopy and Pulmonary Resection” 16th International Congress and Endo Expo 2007 and SLS Annual Meeting, September 5-8, 2007, San Francisco, CA, USA.
19. "Cervical Remnant in CISH Hysterectomy” 16th International Congress and Endo Expo 2007 and SLS Annual Meeting, September 5-8, 2007, San Francisco, CA, USA.
20. “Keys to A Successful Surgical Practice” 17th International Congress and Endo Expo 2008 and SLS Annual Meeting; Masters Class in Laparoscopic General Surgery, Joint Session: SLS and SAGES, September 17, 2008, Chicago, IL, USA.
21. “Pelvic and Lower Abdominal Pain, Adhesions, Bowels and Hernias” 17th International Congress and Endo Expo 2008 and SLS Annual Meeting; Masters Class in Treatment of Adhesions for the General Surgeon, Gynaecologist, and Urologist, Joint Session: SLS and IPPS, September 17, 2008, Chicago, IL, USA.
22. “Masters Class: A Hands On Course on Laparoscopic Suturing in The Vertical Zone” International Congress and Endo Expo 2008 and SLS Annual Meeting, September 17, 2008, Chicago, IL, USA.
23. “Masters Class: Hands on Course on Laparoscopic Suturing in The Vertical Zone” International Congress and Endo Expo 2009 and SLS Annual Meeting, September 9, 2009, Boston, MA, USA.
24. “Keys to a Successful Surgical Practice” 18th International Congress and Endo Expo 2009 and Annual Meeting, Masters Class in Laparoscopic General Surgery, Joint Session: SLS and SAGES, September 9, 2009, Boston, MA, USA.

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25. “Economic Impact of Surgical Decisions” 19th International Congress and Endo Expo Annual Meeting Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons; Master’s Class in Laparoscopic General Surgery; September 1, 2010; New York, NY, USA.
26. “Minimally Invasive Suturing Techniques” 19th International Congress and Endo Expo Annual Meeting Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons; Master’s Class in Laparoscopic Suturing; September 1, 2010; New York, NY, USA.
27. Surgical Intern Boot Camp; Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons, Reston, VA, August 30, 2013.
28. Complications and Avoidance of Stapling Devices: Annual meeting Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons; Las Vegas, NV, September 2014.
29. “Pre-emptive Strike” Complex Surgical Case; Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons Meeting; New York, NY, September 4, 2015.
30. Vascular Injuries Recognition and Treatment. Annual meeting Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons; Boston, MA, August 31,2016.
31. Bowel Injuries Recognition and Treatment. Annual meeting Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons; Boston, MA, August 31, 2016.
32. Energy Use In Laparoscopy: Monopolar Energy: Why I Use It; Annual Meeting Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons; San Francisco, CA, September?, 2017
33. Excel Award: Living The SLS Experience: Annual Meeting Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons; San Francisco, CA, September 9, 2017
Invited Presentations and Seminars
Visiting professorships or seminars:
1. Member of delegation of Laparoscopic Surgeons from Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons to People’s Republic of China, Lectured to surgeons in Beijing, Guanguzhou, China, October 6 - 20 1995
2. Participated in a study on Laparoscopic Semm Hysterectomy, Kiel, Germany 1995
3. Participated in International Meeting honoring Professor Kurt Semm; Kiel, Germany 1995
4. Scientific Moderator for the Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons, Endo Expo 2000, December 2000, Orlando, Florida
5. Scientific Moderator for the Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons, Endo Expo 2001, December 2001, New York, New York

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6. Scientific Moderator for International Congress of Gynecological Endoscopy and Innovative Surgery Pre-Congress Workshop, Kiel, Germany, April 2002
7. Scientific Moderator for the Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons, Endo Expo 2006, December 2006, Boston, MA
8. Member of delegation of General Surgeons from the American College of Surgeons To Vietnam, and Cambodia, December 2006
9. Moderator for International Symposium on Hysterectomies, Kiel School of Gynecologic Endoscopy, Kiel, Germany, June 10th 2007
10. Member of delegation of General Surgeons from the American College of Surgeons To Vietnam, and Cambodia, November 2008
11. International Surgical Mission Trip - Organized trip to Cambodia in 2010 with two surgical residents; visited hospitals in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap, district hospitals and village clinics where we assisted and performed surgery and lectured on minimally invasive surgery.
Editorial Posts and Activities
Reviewer status:
Manuscript review, Journal of the Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons, 2005 present
Manuscript review, International Journal of Medical Robotics and Computer Assisted Surgery, 2005 - present
SERVICE ACTIVITIES University/lnstitutional Service
School committees: International Travel Review Committee, reviewer and evaluator, 2008 - present
Hospital committees:
Committee on Cancer, clinical liaison, 2012 - 2016
Committee on Cancer, member, 2012 - present
Surgery Committee, member, 2013 - present
Gastrointestinal Committee, member, 2015 - present
Clinical Service

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In-patient service activities:
Attending surgeon, General Surgery service, Earl K. Long Medical Center, Baton Rouge, LA, November 2007 - June 2012
Attending surgeon, Endoscopy Clinic, weekly, performed the endoscopy and/or supervised residents, Earl K. Long Medical Center, Baton Rouge, LA, November 2007-June 2012
Attending surgeon, Endoscopy Clinic, weekly, performed the endoscopy and/or supervised residents, Interim LSU Hospital, New Orleans, LA, June 2012 - July 2015
Attending surgeon, General Surgery service, Interim LSU Hospital, New Orleans, LA, June 2012-July 2015
Active surgeon, General Surgery service, Touro Infirmary, New Orleans, LA, June 2012-April 2018
Consulting Staff, General Surgery Service Touro Infirmary, New Orleans, La. April 2018 - present
Active surgeon, Endoscopy Clinic, weekly, performed the endoscopy and/or supervised residents, Touro Infirmary, New Orleans, LA, June 2012 - present
Attending surgeon, General Surgery service, University Medical Center at New Orleans, New Orleans, LA, August 2015 - present
Attending surgeon, Endoscopy Clinic, weekly, performed the endoscopy and/or supervised residents, University Medical Center at New Orleans, New Orleans, LA, August 2015 - present
Clinic coverage
Attending surgeon, weekly, Earl K. Long Medical Center Clinic, Baton Rouge, LA, November 2007 - June 2012
Attending surgeon, weekly, Interim LSU Hospital Clinic, New Orleans, LA, June 2012-July 2015
Attending surgeon, General Surgery service, St. Charles General Clinic, New Orleans, LA, June 2012 - present
Attending surgeon, monthly, General Surgery Clinic, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola, LA, June 2012 - present
Attending surgeon, weekly, General Surgery service, University Medical Center at New Orleans Clinic, New Orleans, LA, August 2015 - present

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Attending surgeon, monthly, General Surgery Clinic, Developing the capability of performing surgery at the Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola, LA, with the Department of Corrections, May 2016 to present
Call:
Earl K. Long Medical Center, ten times per month, General Surgery service call, November 2007 - June 2012
Touro Infirmary, four times per month, un-referred emergency room call, June 2012 - present
Interim LSU Hospital, twenty times per month, General Surgery service call, June 2012-July 2015
University Medical Center at New Orleans, twenty times per month, General Surgery service call, August 2015 - present
Administrative Responsibilities
Departmental:
Co-director of animal lab laparoscopic suturing course; LSU Baton Rouge, LA April 2008
Organized Simulation Center and animal training program for Laparoscopic Training for Surgical Residents, LSUHSC, 2008 - Present
Assisted in Organizing and Overseeing CME Program for Cohn-Rives Conference; Annual Meeting, 2008 - present
Organize and Oversee CME for the LSU Surgery Department, New Orleans, Louisiana, 2012 - present
Member, Organizing Committee; Cohn Rives Surgical Society, 2010 - present
Year End Evaluation of Surgical Rotations - In conjunction with the residents and the faculty, evaluate each General Surgery surgical rotation on strengths, weaknesses, and potential changes, 2011 - present.
Organized and Ran First Year Intern “Boot Camp” consisting of basic surgical principles and techniques for first year surgical residents. 20 - 40 participants including didactics and hands-on lab with live animal models at the LSU Vet School.
Organized First Year “Boot Camp” for General Surgery Interns July 27-28, 2011 July 19-21, 2012 July 18-20, 2013 July 17-19, 2014 July 16-18, 2015

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July 14-16, 2016 July 13-15, 2017 July 19-21, 2018 July 25-26, 2019
General Surgery Residency Interview Committee - Comprised of eight to nine faculty members who participate in the interview process and provide recommendations for ranking of medical students for residency positions, 2014 present
Skills Laboratory for Family Practice Residents, April 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 Organized and coordinated suture and ultrasound skills lab for Family Medicine Residents
Clinical Compentency Committee (CCC) - Responsible for PGY1 and PGY 3 General Surgery residents ongoing evaluations of clinical compentencies with recommendations on promotion or remediation, June 2015 - present.
Annual Faculty Spring Retreat - Coordinator and moderator of the first annual faculty spring retreat, April 2016. Subsequent retreats 2017, 2019
LSUHSC:
LSU Health Care Network - Represent the Department of Surgery at monthly meeting with regards to monitoring any clinical issues at the Faculty Practice Clinic, January 2016 - present.
Department of Corrections:
As Medical/Mental Health Director of the Department of Corrections for the state of Louisiana, I oversee the delivery of medical care and mental health care for over 30,000 inmates. I also have been involved in the development and execution of an electronic health record for the department. I have also been directly involved in the Department of Corrections’ roll in the hepatitis c elimination plan for the state of Louisiana
Community Service Activities:
Member Mardi Gras Krewe of Endymion, New Orleans, LA, 1985 - Present
Member Chamber of Commerce, Fayette, AL, 1989 - October 2007
Member Steering Committee Fund Raising for Expansion, First United Methodist Church, Fayette, AL, 1992
President, Board of Directors, Fayette Academy School, Fayette, AL, 1993 - 1996
Keynote speaker for graduating class of Bevill State Community College School of Nursing, 1995
Mission trip: Honduras with First United Methodist Church, Fayette, AL, July 1999

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 24-4 04/24/20 Page 33 of 33 John E. Morrison, Jr, MD, FACS
Chaperone: Youth Mission Trip to Glide Memorial Methodist Church, San Francisco, CA, July 2001
Mission trip: Leiapaja, Latvia with First United Methodist Church, Fayette, AL, July 2006, June 2007 - June 2012, August 2014
Mentor Kid’s Hope USA; University Terrace School, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 2009 2011
Volunteer medical service: Marivich Assembly Center, Baton Rouge, LA, Hurricane Katrina evacuation, 2010
Keynote speaker for ovarian cancer and screening for the Sixth Baptist Church, New Orleans, LA, April 2016

 
 Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 32 04/28/20 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU, TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE, REGINALD GEORGE, LIONEL TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO GARNER, BRADLEY WINTERS, KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs,

VERSUS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00231SDD-RLB

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Safety and Corrections; JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as Medical Director of the Department of Safety and Corrections; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health,
Defendants,

CLASS ACTION

****************************************************************************

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, come Defendants, Louisiana

Department of Health (“LDH”) and Stephen R. Russo in his official capacity as Interim secretary

of DHH (“Russo”) (collectively, Defendants), which oppose the plaintiffs’ emergency motion to

restrain defendants from transferring COVID-19 carriers to Louisiana State Penitentiary. In

1570657.2

1

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 32 04/28/20 Page 2 of 2
support of this motion Defendants adopt and incorporate herein the opposition filed by the
Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, James LeBlanc and John Morrison. (R.
Doc 24)
For all of these reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court deny the relief
sought by the plaintiffs in the instant motion.
Respectfully Submitted:
MCGLINCHEY STAFFORD, PLLC
/s/M. Brent Hicks M. BRENT HICKS #23778 JUSTON M. O’BRIEN, #26447 ZELMA MURRAY FREDERICK, #31459 301 Main Street, 14th Floor Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801 Telephone: (225) 383-9000 Facsimile: (225) 343-3076 bhicks@mcglinchey.com jobrien@mcglinchey.com zfrederick@mcglinchey.com Attorneys for Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals and Stephen R. Russo, Interim Secretary for Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the above and foregoing was filed electronically with
the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. Notice of this filing will be sent to all counsel by
operation of the court’s electronic filing system.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 28th day of April, 2020.
/s/M. Brent Hicks M. Brent Hicks

1570657.2

2

 
 Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 48 05/04/20 Page 1 of 22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU,

TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

REGINALD

GEORGE,

LIONEL

TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL

PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS

ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO

GARNER,

BRADLEY

WINTERS,

KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES

HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity

as Governor of the State of Louisiana;

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES

LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary

of the Department of Safety and Corrections;

JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as

Medical Director of the Department of Safety

and

Corrections;

LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and

STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity

as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana

Department of Health,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00231-SDDRLB
CLASS ACTION

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 48 05/04/20 Page 2 of 22
INTRODUCTION On April 30, this Court held an evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order to halt transfers of COVID-19 patients to Louisiana State Penitentiary’s Camp J. Prior to the hearing, Plaintiffs had already submitted substantial evidence in support of the TRO, including the declarations of two medical experts, Dr. Michael Puisis and Dr. Susi Vassallo, detailing the dangers of the Camp J plan. At the hearing, in addition to documentary evidence, Plaintiffs presented the testimony of four Class Members at LSP—Paul Nash, Patrick Courtney, Duong Cao, and Otto Barrera—and Defendants presented the testimony of witnesses Dr. John Morrison, Secretary LeBlanc, and Nurse Practitioner Cindy Park. This Court accepted Plaintiffs’ rebuttal witness Dr. Vassallo as an expert in both correctional medicine and in the management and treatment of COVID-19. The Court then ordered post-hearing briefing. Based on the evidence before this Court, as detailed below, Plaintiffs move that Plaintiffs’ Motion for a TRO be granted. I. Summary of Undisputed Facts The parties have stipulated to the following (see generally Dkt. 41): LSP’s Camp J is currently being used as a medical isolation facility to house patients from jails and prisons who test positive for COVID-19, including patients within the LSP population who test positive. COVID-19 is a viral pandemic and is highly infectious. The symptoms of COVID-19 can include fever, cough, chest pain, headache, loss of smell, diarrhea, aches, vomiting, and difficulty breathing, and COVID-19 can also present with no symptoms. The virus can be deadly. People who are over the age of 65 or who have certain pre-existing medical conditions1 may be at higher risk of developing serious symptoms if they contract COVID-19. As of April 27, there were approximately 108 COVID-19 patients at Camp J, which has one nurse practitioner on staff and two to three registered nurses on site per shift. There are no
1

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ventilators, and there is only one ambulance. Bass, the unit where all initial intake patients are housed, is an open dormitory with no dividers between the beds. There are approximately 40 patients currently housed at Bass. In Gar, the cellblock where patients are held in “step down” isolation, there are no call buttons in the cells. Some residents from LSP’s Camp F are working at Camp J. The Camp J medical staff is not housed at Camp J. At least one LSP resident, Otto Barrera, was moved to Camp J and taken back to LSP’s Ward 1 that same day. LSP has only one entrance.
In evidence, the Parties agree that it would take millions of dollars to retrofit Camp J to make it appropriate for housing medically vulnerable people.
II. Plaintiffs’ Evidence Is More Credible than Defendants’ Plaintiffs’ evidence is more credible than Defendants’ because (A) most of Defendants’ witnesses lacked personal knowledge, and their testimony included numerous indications of a lack of credibility; (B) Defendants’ documentary evidence is largely irrelevant; and (C) Plaintiffs’ witnesses have credible firsthand knowledge and reliable medical expertise.
A. Defendants’ Witnesses Lack Personal Knowledge and Credibility Of Defendants’ four witnesses, only one, Cindy Park, had any personal knowledge of conditions at Camp J since it became the state’s hub for incarcerated COVID-19 patients. The other three witnesses—Dr. Morrison, Secretary LeBlanc, and Warden Falgout—testified in sweeping, conclusory statements regarding the effectiveness of the Camp J plan; most of their testimony is too vague and uninformed to be credible, and some is simply untrue.
i. Dr. John Morrison Defendants presented Dr. Morrison as both a percipient witness and a medical expert to support their Camp J plan.2 The hearing made clear that neither Dr. Morrison’s opinion as a medical expert nor his factual testimony is in any way reliable for the purposes of this TRO. Dr. Morrison is
1 Including chronic lung disease, asthma, heart conditions, immune deficiencies, severe obesity, diabetes, chronic kidney disease, liver disease, HIV/AIDS, prolonged use of corticosteroids, cancer, smoking, and marrow or organ transplant.
2

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not an expert in correctional medicine, as this Court concluded. Nor is he an impartial expert rendering an opinion regarding the Camp J plan; he admitted the plan was his own.3 Indeed many of Dr. Morrison’s opinions and interpretations regarding COVID-19 treatment is based on misunderstanding of the guidance and treatment—which will be discussed infra, Section III.A.
Moreover, many of the facts Dr. Morrison relied upon in rendering his opinion are demonstrably false, eroding his credibility even as a fact witness. For example, in his affidavit, Dr. Morrison declared that COVID-19 patients would be housed “under strict cell isolation,” and that “every other cell will be utilized in order to maintain proper distancing.”4 But he then admitted during the hearing that he did not know that Bass, the unit where all patients are initially held upon transfer to Camp J, is an open dormitory.5 Dr. Morrison further declared that the patients and employees at Camp J “will not have interaction with other employees or offenders of LSP so as to limit the potential for exposure to Covid-19.”6 That is not true either. Defendants admitted that at least one patient, Otto Barrera, was moved between Camp J and LSP’s Ward 1 and that some residents from LSP’s Camp F are working at Camp J.7 Nurse Park testified that one of the nurses working at Camp J lives with a member of the LSP staff, and Ms. Park was herself present in an LSP building, interacting with LSP staff, on the day of the hearing. These factual inaccuracies are unsurprising, since Dr. Morrison lacks firsthand knowledge of the day-to-day operations at Camp J.
Finally, Dr. Morrison’s testimony that the Camp J plan is “both medically appropriate and the most prudent course of action available to ensure the health and safety of DOC offenders and staff” is in tension with his admitted knowledge that architectural consultants found in 2018 that Camp J could not be used to safely house medically vulnerable people absent substantial renovations
2 Pls.’ Ex. 32, Morrison Decl. at ¶ 41. 3 See, e.g., Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 646 F. Supp. 1420, 1425 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (“[W]here an expert becomes an advocate for a cause, he therefore departs from the ranks of an objective expert witness.”). 4 Pls.’ Ex. 32, Morrison Decl. at ¶ 40. 5 Cf. Stipulated Facts, Dkt. 41 at ¶¶ 14, 21, 22.
3

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(that have not occurred). Further, the first Camp J transfers began only 12 days before Dr. Morrison left the DOC on April 14. He has no knowledge regarding over half of the time the Camp J plan has been in effect. Given this, together with his misunderstandings of fundamental aspects of how Camp J is being run, Dr. Morrison is not a reliable witness for the purposes of this TRO.
ii. James LeBlanc Most of the testimony Secretary LeBlanc provided at the hearing was either irrelevant, lacking credibility, or both. He primarily discussed the DOC’s broader response to the pandemic, not the Camp J plan. When the Secretary did refer to the Camp J plan, he was, at best, uninformed. For example, after misunderstanding Plaintiffs’ witness Patrick Courtney’s reference to renovations of the Camp F kitchen, Secretary LeBlanc testified that the kitchen had been remodeled at Camp J. Upon cross-examination, he admitted he had no personal knowledge of this renovation and had misheard Mr. Courtney; indeed, based on the information presented by Defendants, no such remodel has occurred. Secretary LeBlanc therefore testified to at least one (false) fact of which he had no personal knowledge. This calls the credibility of his testimony into question. The Secretary provided no explanation for his assertion that local sheriffs have nowhere else to send COVID-19 patients. Defendants provided no evidence to support this assertion. The Secretary testified that officers from the Louisiana Division of Probation and Parole are on site at the Medical Monitoring Station (“MMS”) in New Orleans. Other than claiming without explanation that the public probably would not “be happy” about moving prisoners to an MMS, Secretary LeBlanc offered no explanation for rejecting that option. Indeed, a simple scan of the FAQ from the MMS indicates that they anticipate receiving incarcerated people at the facility and that incarcerated people can be accommodated.8 The Secretary also failed to provide any detail on assessments of the
6 Pls.’ Ex. 32, Morrison Decl. at ¶ 38. 7 Stipulated Facts, Dkt. 41 at ¶¶ 31, 32. 8 Louisiana Department of Health, Medical Monitoring Stations, http://ldh.la.gov/index.cfm/page/3911 (last visited May 4, 2020).
4

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capacity to achieve proper medical isolation at jails and prisons across the state. Nor did he discuss any guidance to those facilities on how to make space for medical isolation.
Secretary LeBlanc was correct about two things: one, that he is responsible for all 31,600 inmates in the state, including those in parish jails and prisons; and two, that Mr. Courtney should not have been disciplined for refusing to work among the COVID-positive prisoners at Camp J. Beyond that, the Secretary offered only conclusory and unsupported assertions that the Camp J plan is working and the situation is under control, an assertion that was fatally undermined by Plaintiffs’ firsthand testimony about the dungeon-like conditions, rampant cross-contamination, and woefully insufficient medical treatment at Camp J. The Secretary has no firsthand knowledge of any of this, having testified that he has not even been to Camp J since the pandemic began.
iii. Tracy Falgout Warden Falgout’s testimony—presented by affidavit—is simply unreliable. Warden Falgout is not assigned to Camp J and lacks personal knowledge of conditions there. Yet he made a number of sweeping claims in his affidavit that are clearly untrue. For example, Warden Falgout claimed that “DOC, including LSP, is following the guidelines of the [CDC].”9 As explained infra in Section III.A, however, conditions at Camp J do not adhere to CDC guidance. In his April 23 affidavit, Warden Falgout claimed that “Camp J is being used only as an isolation and monitoring facility. It does . . . not provide treatment to any Covid-19 patients that require ventilators, oxygen, or IV’s.”10 This is plainly untrue. Ms. Park testified that patients at Camp J have been administered oxygen and IV fluids. Warden Falgout also claimed that “[a]ny patients showing serious medical symptoms beyond isolation monitoring are sent to an appropriate outside hospital . . . for any necessary medical care.”11 Yet, on April 22, a patient was taken from Camp J, not to a hospital, but to LSP’s Ward 1.12
9 Pls.’ Ex. 30, Falgout Aff. at ¶ 17. 10 Pls.’ Ex. 31, Falgoutt Supp. Aff. at ¶ 12. 11 Id. 12 Stipulated Facts, Dkt. 41 at ¶ 32.
5

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That fact also contradicts Warden Falgout’s claims that “Camp J is being operated as [an] independent prison, separate and apart from the rest of LSP” and that “offenders and employees assigned to Camp J do not have interaction with other employees or offenders of LSP.”13 It is clear that Warden Falgout does not understand the conditions at Camp J, and thus his statements cannot be credited.
B. Defendants’ Documentary Evidence Is Largely Irrelevant Like the testimony of Defendants’ witnesses, the documentary evidence—including 500 pages of previously undisclosed materials submitted on the eve of the hearing—have little to do with the Camp J plan. Only seven of Defendants’ 54 Exhibits even reference Camp J. Only four of Defendants’ Exhibits substantively discuss the suitability of Camp J for medical isolation.14 Defendants’ documentary evidence is therefore largely irrelevant. The four exhibits that do mention Camp J in any detail provide support for Plaintiffs’ claims that the use of Camp J puts the putative Class, as well as Defendants’ employees, at substantial risk of serious harm. For example, guidance to sheriffs regarding the transport of COVID-19 positive patients Camp J instructs correctional officers to wear PPE only if it does not limit access to their duty belt and gear.15 An April 9 update from the DOC falsely claims that “existing Angola inmates have no contact with the Camp J facility housing sick [sic] these sick inmates,”16 when in fact people at LSP had been moved Camp J to work. In an April 27 memo, DOC employees represent that the orderlies assigned to Camp J are placed in an area that is “totally isolated” from those with COVID19.17 But on April 30, Nurse Park testified that both orderlies and COVID-19 patients were being housed in Shark unit as of about one week earlier. The April 27 memo also reports that in addition to the food, clothing, hygiene products, and other necessities that COVID-19 patients are being
13 Pls.’ Ex. 31, Falgout Supp. Aff. at ¶¶ 11, 16. 14 Defs.’ Ex. 3, 21, 37, and 41. 15 Defs.’ Ex 21, Camp J Transportation Directions. 16 Defs.’ Ex. 37, Summary of COVID-19 Response 4/9/20 at 2.
6

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provided, as Defendants are constitutionally required to do, Defendants are providing the patients with games that contravene any social distancing measures that are taking place. Nurse Park testified that she has observed patients sitting on other patients’ beds in order to play cards.
C. Plaintiffs’ Witnesses Have Credible Firsthand Knowledge and Medical Expertise Plaintiffs’ witnesses at the hearing included reliable fact witnesses with firsthand knowledge of the facts to which they testified and a qualified medical expert. Plaintiffs presented live testimony of two putative Class Members, Paul Nash and Duong Cao, who had tested positive for COVID-19 and were being held at Camp J, in addition to testimony by declaration of Otto Barrera. These witnesses have firsthand knowledge of the conditions at Camp J. Plaintiffs also presented live testimony of Patrick Courtney, a resident of LSP who was disciplined for refusing to work at Camp J. Dr. Susi Vassallo testified as an expert in both correctional medicine and in the management and treatment of COVID-19, medical expertise that Defendants failed to rebut in any way. III.Plaintiffs Have Proven that Camp J Creates a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm A. There Is Ample Evidence to Show that the Conditions of Confinement at Camp J
Present a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm to Patients Housed There The hearing provided irrefutable evidence that, despite Defendants’ characterization of Camp J as only an isolation and monitoring facility, medical care is being provided there, and Plaintiffs’ medical expert testified that it does not meet the standard of care. Defendants represented to this Court in their opposition that “Camp J is being used only as an isolation and monitoring facility. It does not act as a hospital and does not provide treatment to any COVID-19 patients that require ventilators, oxygen, or IV’s.”18 This statement is false. There are no ventilators at Camp J, but there are patients receiving oxygen and IV treatment. Through his declaration, Otto Barrera, a COVID-19 patient diagnosed with pneumonia, testified that he is “being given supplemental oxygen” at Camp J and that he is aware of at least one other Camp J patient who
17 Defs.’ Ex. 41.
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is receiving oxygen.19 Paul Nash also testified that people at Camp J are receiving oxygen and that some are on IVs. Even Nurse Park testified that “three or four” patients at Camp J have been on IVs and that there are patients receiving oxygen at Camp J. Patients who are receiving oxygen and IVs are not merely being isolated and monitored—they are being treated. Dr. Susi Vassallo, who has treated hundreds of patients with COVID-19, testified that the medical care being provided to COVID-19 patients at Camp J falls short of the community standard in various ways.
First, Dr. Vassallo testified that the ratio of nurses to patients at Camp J is insufficient. Nurse Park testified that there are “two to three” nurses per shift, and Defendants have admitted that as of April 27, there were 108 patients housed at Camp J.20 The reasons for ensuring an appropriate ratio of medical staff to patients are obvious; if there are not enough nurses to monitor patients, a patient’s distress or decompensation may be caught too late. Indeed, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Camp J’s inadequate ratio is already causing harm. For example, Paul Nash testified that he and the other patients witnessed a man in distress, and it took them at least ten minutes of yelling to get the attention of the staff and another ten minutes for a nurse to come. Dr. Vassallo testified that COVID-19 patients decompensate rapidly and unpredictably; even patients do not always know the extent to which their bodies may be lacking in oxygen, and thus may be very sick even if they are not complaining.21 It is essential for such patients to be monitored closely, and Camp J does not have sufficient medical staff to ensure close monitoring. This is particularly true where the patients in Camp J cannot decide for themselves to go to the hospital.
Second, Dr. Vassallo testified that the medical records provided by Defendants indicated a failure to meet community standards for COVID-19 patients. Dr. Vassallo testified that Defendants failed to properly manage Otto Barrera’s oxygen saturation and recognize indicators that he needed
18 Dkt. 24 at 7. 19 Pls.’ Ex. 49, Supp. Barrera Decl. at ¶ 18. 20 Stipulated Facts, Dkt. 41 at ¶ 25.
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hospitalization for five days. Although Mr. Barrera was finally taken to the hospital the morning of April 30, Dr. Vassallo explained that, based on his medical records, his oxygen saturation levels had been at levels indicating a need for hospitalization for many days prior. Dr. Vassallo described the skill and intense monitoring required to administer oxygen to COVID-19 patients, which Secretary LeBlanc had erroneously characterized as “basic.” Dr. Vassallo also explained that fever checks, which Class Member witnesses testified is the only regular monitoring they receive, is not sufficient to meet the standard of care for COVID-19 patients.22
Third, the evidence shows that Defendants are not appropriately accommodating COVID19 patients at Camp J who are at higher risk of severe symptoms. The CDC guidance specifies that if confirmed COVID-19 patients cannot be medically isolated individually, it is important to “be especially mindful of cases who are at higher risk of severe illness from COVID-19.”23
Ideally, they should not be cohorted with other infected individuals. If cohorting is unavoidable, make all possible accommodations to prevent transmission of other infectious diseases to the higher-risk individual. (For example, allocate more space for a higher-risk individual within a shared medical isolation space.)24 Despite this warning, Nurse Park testified that Camp J’s medical staff has no additional policies or procedures in place for patients with comorbidities that put them at higher risk of developing severe cases of COVID-19, such as Mr. Barrera and Mr. Nash. Finally, Dr. Vassallo testified that Defendants’ decision to isolate many COVID-19 patients together at Camp J is contrary to CDC guidance. Dr. Morrison attempted to establish that concentrating patients at Camp J is consistent with the CDC’s description of “cohorting” confirmed
21 See, e.g., Pls.’ Ex. 25, Vassallo Suppl. Decl. at ¶ 7. 22 Not only is this contrary to CDC guidance, which takes into consideration both fever and other symptoms such as cough and shortness of breath (Pls.’ Ex. 34 at 17), but it also is not in line with the DOC’s own guidelines for assessment and monitoring of COVID-19 patients. Defs.’ Ex. 43 at 7 (“Each inmate in COVID Positive Unit shall have Temperature readings and Sp02 every 6 hours and as needed.”) (emphasis added). 23 Pls.’ Ex. 34 at 16. 24 Id. (emphases added).
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COVID-19 cases.25 But Dr. Vassallo testified that Dr. Morrison’s understanding of cohorting is inaccurate. The concept of “cohorting” does not mean that housing many infected patients in a single, open-air dormitory is in line with the standard of care. As an initial matter, the CDC makes clear that all possible steps should be taken to medically isolate COVID-19 patients in individual cells, even when cohorting. Only as a last resort should individuals be cohorted in a group space and, even then, cohorts should be no larger than ten patients: “Cohorts should be no larger than could be cared for by the facility and/or surrounding healthcare systems should every member of a cohort be infected. . . very few correctional facilities, if any, have access to sufficient healthcare resources to allow for cohorts of larger than 10 people.”26 There are currently 40 patients being housed in Bass, an open dorm.27 Social distancing of six feet between all individuals, as recommended by the CDC guidance when cohorting is necessary,28 is impossible. Although Nurse Park testified that the beds were placed six feet apart at least initially, patients are not confined to their beds and must come get closer to each other to use the restroom and to clean. Also, Nurse Park testified that not all patients are wearing masks, and are not required to, which is contrary to CDC guidance for cohorting.29 Even in Gar, a cellblock, Defendants are not implementing cohorting appropriately. Although the patients are being housed individually in single cells, the “airflow between cells essentially makes it a cohort arrangement in the context of COVID-19,”30 and there is not an empty cell between each occupied cell, per CDC guidance.31
25 Even if Camp J’s cohorting did comport with CDC guidance, the CDC guidance itself does not establish the standard of care that Defendants are constitutionally required to provide. 26 AMEND and Berkeley Public Health, Limiting COVID-19 Transmission and Mitigating the Adverse Consequences of a COVID-19 Outbreak in Correctional Settings: RELEASE · COHORT · TEST at 3 (Apr. 26, 2020), available at https://amend.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Cohorting-Guidance.Amend_.UCB_.pdf. 27 Stipulated Facts, Dkt. 41 at ¶ 15. 28 Pls.’ Ex. 34 at 11, 15-16. 29 Id. at 16 (“if cohorting is necessary . . . [e]nsure that cohorted cases wear face masks at all times.”). 30 Id. at 16. 31 Id.
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Moreover, under the CDC guidance, cohorting is meant to be an absolute last resort. The guidelines state that “[f]acilities should make every possible effort to place suspected and confirmed COVID-19 cases under medical isolation individually. Each isolated individual should be assigned their own housing space and bathroom where possible. Cohorting should only be practiced if there are no other available options.”32 Defendants are aware of at least one “other available option,” as Secretary LeBlanc testified that there are Probation and Parole officers currently staffed at the MMS in New Orleans. Secretary LeBlanc is therefore aware that the MMS, a facility that is specifically set up for medical isolation and would allow for appropriate physical divisions between patients, is equipped to house incarcerated individuals.
Dr. Vassallo’s expert testimony shows that Defendants are providing medical care inconsistent with the community standard for medical treatment, isolation, and monitoring of COVID-19 patients. Paul Nash and Duong Cao provided a firsthand account of the experience of living at Camp J as COVID-19 patients and the unsanitary and unsafe conditions there.
Mr. Nash and Mr. Cao have both been housed in Bass and testified that the dormitory was dilapidated and the conditions there were unhealthy. They testified that, when they were there, Bass had about 40 patients, some of whom were on IVs or receiving oxygen. The patients are responsible for cleaning the dorm and the bathrooms. Patients walk around, not all wearing masks and not keeping six feet apart. When Mr. Nash was in Bass, only two of the four toilets were working— particularly concerning because diarrhea and vomiting are symptoms of COVID-19, and fecal matter can be a source of transmission.33 Mr. Cao said he did not even want to use the bathrooms.
32 Id. at 15 (emphases added). 33 Alexandra Sternlicht, Why You Should Flush with the Lid Down: Experts Warn of Fecal-Oral Transmission of COVID-19, FORBES, (Apr. 2, 2020, 4:59 PM), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandrasternlicht/2020/04/02/why-you-should-flush-with-thelid-down-virologistwarns-of-fecal-oral-transmission-of-covid-19/#7540cef34b0e
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Mr. Nash and Mr. Cao also described in detail the conditions in the Gar cellblock, which is being used as a “step down” unit. The bars at the front of the cells are open. The ventilation system is not working and there is no air circulation—Mr. Cao described it as a “dungeon.” The air quality is poor. People are coughing and the droplets are remaining in the air, increasing the risk of transmission to staff, as well as COVID-negative Class Members who are working at Camp J.34 The cells have rust and mold, which can cause respiratory issues even for healthy people. Mr. Nash testified that he is confined to his cell 23 hours a day. The water is discolored and brown. The patients clean their own cells. There are rats and spiders coming in and out of the cells.
Both Mr. Nash and Mr. Cao indicated that the medical monitoring and care being provided at Camp J is inadequate. The nurses do fever checks once a day, and there is otherwise very little monitoring. Mr. Nash described an incident where a patient was in distress, and Mr. Nash and the other patients had to repeatedly yell for security to come, which took at least ten minutes. It took another ten minutes for the nurse to come. The nurse initially said there was nothing wrong. When the symptoms continued, she finally took his vital signs before taking him out on a stretcher.
Nurse Park was either unconcerned about the conditions and medical care or does not possess the training and experience to understand why both are lacking. She equated Camp J with self-quarantining at home and denied that the facility was accepting any seriously ill or decompensating patients. Most patients who are self-isolating at home have the ability to decide for themselves when they need to go to the hospital, are not sharing space with dozens of other patients, have access to clean water, and are not sleeping with mold and rats. Ms. Park was unfamiliar with the cleaning and sanitation procedures, did not know whether the orderlies at Camp J were able to properly decontaminate after their shifts, and seemed unconcerned that all she and her team were doing was checking temperatures and blood pressure and monitoring self-reported
34 See Pls.’ Ex. 24, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 6.
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breathing issues (practices which Dr. Vassallo testified were utterly insufficient for COVID patients). Ms. Park’s suggestion that the patient who observed mold “should clean his cell,” was similarly cavalier, and only serves to underscore the absurdity and inhumanity of the Camp J plan. Ms. Park’s attitude may have been influenced by the fact that she was testifying in the presence of her supervisors and other officials high up in the DOC, and she may have felt pressure to be helpful to them. When asked whether her job overseeing 108 patients in the midst of a pandemic, while simultaneously managing intake and discharge, was hard, Ms. Park told the Court it was not.
B. Plaintiffs Have Presented Ample Evidence to Show that the Camp J Plan Exposes LSP to an Increased Risk of Transmission.
The Camp J plan revolves around the faulty premise that it is somehow possible to isolate Camp J from the rest of LSP.35 Plaintiffs’ evidence and Defendants’ own testimony have shown that that is not the case. Defendants have been on notice since before transfers even began that the use of Camp J to house COVID-19 patients increases the risk of transmission to LSP’s vulnerable population. LSP houses far more people who are at risk of serious medical complications if they become infected—due to age or other medical conditions—than any other facility in the state.36
Defendants’ own testimony and evidence established that cross-contamination between Camp J and the rest of LSP is already occurring. Defendants admitted that Otto Barrera, who had tested positive for COVID-19, was taken from Hospital Ward 1 at LSP’s Treatment Center to Camp J and then back to Ward 1 that same day.37 Defendants’ witnesses confirmed that no separate facility in which to treat COVID-19 patients (for example the portables which are currently set up just outside the hospital) has been set up; instead, COVID-19 patients are placed in the middle of the hospital ward with the sickest residents, creating innumerable opportunities for cross contamination.
35 See, e.g., Pls.’ Ex. 31, Supp. Falgout Aff. at ¶ 11 (“Camp J is being operated as [sic] independent prison separate and apart from the rest of DOC and LSP as part of DOC’s current COVID-19 response plan. During this period, Camp J will not be considered part of Angola.”) 36 Pls.’ Ex. 24, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 12. 37 Stipulated Facts, Dkt. 41 at ¶ 32; Defs.’ Ex. 46 at 29.
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Nurse Park provided testimony at the April 30 hearing from the administration building near the entrance to LSP. She was in the same room as Warden Falgout, who is presumably interacting with staff and providing treatment to LSP patients outside Camp J. This disproves Defendants’ assertion that “offenders and employees assigned to Camp J do not have interaction with other employees or offenders of LSP so as to limit the potential for exposure to COVID-19.”38 Medical staff at Camp J are not being housed at Camp J.39 Nurse Park testified that at least one nurse working at Camp J is married to a nurse who works elsewhere at LSP. Medical staff at Camp J, including Nurse Park, who lives on LSP grounds, are taking their clothes home with them from Camp J to wash.40 Per CDC guidance, dirty laundry should be handled by someone wearing gloves and can disperse the virus through the air if shaken.41
Defendants’ use of Camp J also creates a substantial risk of serious harm for the COVIDnegative Class Members who were previously housed at Camp F and were moved to Camp J to work. The Court heard testimony from Patrick Courtney, who is held at Camp F and works as a baker. Mr. Courtney testified that on April 17, he was told he was moving to Camp J for a new work assignment. Mr. Courtney testified that he feared COVID-19 exposure because he has high blood pressure, so he refused. As a result, Mr. Courtney was disciplined for the first time in 15 years (his last infraction was for taking too many cinnamon rolls from the kitchen) and held in administrative segregation for five days. He also had his phone privileges taken for four days and was sentenced to a 90-day suspended cell sentence.42 This put Mr. Courtney—who has a pardon pending on the governor’s desk—at risk of losing his parole and pardon board clemency recommendation.
38 Pls.’ Ex. 31, Supp. Falgout Aff. at ¶ 16. 39 Stipulated Facts, Dkt. 41 at ¶ 26. 40 Nurse Park testified to this fact in direct contradiction to Defendants’ previous representations that employees were leaving their clothes at Camp J to be washed there as an additional precaution. Pls.’ Ex. 31, Supp. Falgout Aff. at ¶ 16. 41 Pls. Ex. 34 at 18-19. 42 Mr. Courtney’s board-approved pardon application is awaiting Defendant Governor John Bel Edwards’ approval, and the disciplinary write up would have affected his chances of clemency. Mr. Courtney’s appeal was pending for
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At least three other Class Members from Camp F are currently working at Camp J. The fact that the Secretary apologized for jeopardizing Mr. Courtney’s clemency chances is irrelevant.43 It is also not relevant that one of the four Camp F residents at Camp J says he volunteered. Moving Class Members to Camp J knowingly puts them at substantial risk of serious harm, regardless of whether they volunteered. Moreover, when that Class Member volunteered, Defendants’ written representation stated that they would have separate housing and no contact with COVID-19 patients,44 which has since been proven false. Nurse Park testified that both COVID-19 patients and orderlies are staying in the Shark cellblocks, which share a single, inadequate ventilation system.45 Duong Cao also testified that a worker from LSP came into Bass to fix the toilet.46
Since transfers to Camp J began on April 2, the number of COVID-19 cases at LSP has gone from zero to 67 (which does not include the patients at Camp J who were transferred from other facilities).47 And these numbers are artificially low, as discussed further below. Three LSP patients have died.48 33 staff members at LSP have tested positive, and one has died.49 These numbers are likely to increase significantly in the next few weeks even as the numbers across the rest of the state flatten. The infection is likely to rapidly spread through the large dormitories, which hold more than 80 people and do not allow for social distancing.50 Defendants’ attempt to establish at the hearing that Mr. Barrera contracted the infection in Ash 2 before being brought to Camp J simply reinforces Plaintiffs’ contention that the infection has already begun to spread throughout the rest of
approximately 9 days. After Plaintiffs listed Mr. Courtney as a witness, LSP employees informed him the day before the TRO hearing that they would remove the write up from his record. 43 See, e.g., Defs.’ Ex. 18. 44 See Defs.’ Ex. 48. 45 Pls.’ Ex. 27, MASS Report at 6. 46 That exposure places that Class Member at particular risk as COVID-19 can be transmitted into the air by aerosolized feces when a toilet is flushed. See Alexandra Sternlicht, supra note 33. 47 COVID-19 Positive Inmates, LA DPS&C, https://doc.louisiana.gov/doc-covid-19-testing/ (last visited May 4, 2020). 48 Id. 49 Id. 50 Pls.’ Ex. 24, Puisis Decl. at ¶ 10.
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LSP, straining the already substandard healthcare system. Any additional transfers to Camp J must be halted immediately to prevent further spread.
C. Defendants’ Celebration of the “Success” of Camp J Is Both Premature and Unwarranted
As in their opposition memorandum, Defendants attempted at the hearing to present their COVID-19 response as a glowing example of unique success among correctional institutions across the country—but there is no evidence to support this bloviation. Secretary LeBlanc emphasized that “look[ing] at our numbers statewide” shows the “very positive mitigating effect” of the Camp J plan. He also insisted that “[the DOC’s] numbers [of confirmed COVID-19 cases] compared to what’s happening in our nursing homes, what’s happening in our mental health facilities, what’s happening in our federal prisons [are much better].” There is little evidence to support this self-congratulation.
One reason Defendants are able to present an inflated image of their success is the low rate of testing. Secretary LeBlanc testified that everyone who ends up at Camp J has symptoms; the DOC is “not testing anybody that’s asymptomatic.” He did not indicate that these testing criteria would be changed in the near future, even though other correctional systems around the country are moving to mass testing.51 But Dr. Vassallo testified that many COVID-19 cases present with no symptoms; limiting testing only to symptomatic individuals necessarily undercounts the number of confirmed cases. Indeed, while it is true that only 278 individuals within the state prison population had tested positive as of April 30, the DOC had tested only 523.52 Undertesting keeps the number of confirmed cases low, and Defendants are only too proud to flaunt those low numbers.
Moreover, Defendants obscure the true number of confirmed COVID-19 cases among the state prison population by only publishing numbers from its eight state-run facilities on their
51 See Cary Aspinwall and Joseph Neff, These Prisons Are Doing Mass Testing For COVID-19—And Finding Mass Infections, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 24, 2020, 5:32 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/24/these-prisonsare-doing-mass-testing-for-covid-19-and-finding-mass-infections. 52 Situational Awareness Report, LA. BUSINESS EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER, https://www.labeoc.org/alerts/Alert_Details.aspx?id=1575 (last visited May 1, 2020).
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website. Of the roughly 31,600 in DOC custody, more than half are housed in local jails that the
DOC pays to hold people on the state’s behalf.53 Secretary LeBlanc testified at the hearing that he is
responsible for these jail-housed inmates as well as those in state facilities. But the DOC does not
report on its website the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases among its jail-housed population—
which comprises putative Class Members at risk of being transferred to Camp J if they contract the
virus. Nor does the DOC website report the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases at Camp J.54
IV. Plaintiffs Have Proven that Defendants Are Deliberately Indifferent to the Substantial Risk of Serious Harm Created by the Camp J Plan
A. Defendants Had Actual Knowledge55 that Camp J Was Not Suitable for Housing Medically-Vulnerable People
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Defendants had actual knowledge that Camp J was not
suitable for housing medically-vulnerable people.56 First, Dr. Morrison testified that he knew that
architects had said Camp J was unsuitable for medically vulnerable populations and made a number
of recommendations. Although he was unsure what those specific recommendations were, he knew
that there had been professional advice to the DOC that the building would be unhealthy and
unsuitable for people who were medically vulnerable.
Secretary LeBlanc also testified that he was aware that the building’s physical infrastructure is
unsuitable for housing medically vulnerable people. He knew the recommendations from the
architects brought in by Vera—the DOC’s grant partner—but explained that appropriately
rehabilitating Camp J would have cost “millions” of dollars. He admits being instrumental in the
53 Jerry Iannelli, Louisiana’s Data on Coronavirus Infections Among Prisoners Is Troubled and Lacks Transparency, THE APPEAL (May 1, 2020), https://theappeal.org/louisiana-doc-covid-19-data/. 54 COVID-19 Positive Inmates, LA DPS&C, https://doc.louisiana.gov/doc-covid-19-testing/ (last visited May 2, 2020). 55 Although the evidence below makes clear that Defendants did have direct knowledge of Camp J’s dangers, Plaintiffs need not provide direct evidence that Defendants had knowledge of the dangers of the Camp J plan. As the Fifth Circuit has held, “[w]hether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 2004). 56 Defendants’ knowledge of the risks of the Camp J plan meets the standard for deliberate indifference. See Pls.’ Memo. in Support of TRO, Dkt. 15-1 at 16-25; see also Pls.’ TRO Reply, Dkt. 26-2 at 2-4.
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decision to use Camp J for COVID-19 patients, despite those recommendations. He also admitted to having previously called Camp J, “not a good place to be.”
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 27 is a document prepared by MASS Design Group, the architects who advised the DOC on the unsuitability of Camp J for holding medically vulnerable people. That document—the admissibility of which Defendants did not challenge—provides some of the many reasons that the conditions at Camp J are unsuitable.57 For instance,“[a]lthough each of Camp J’s five restrictive buildings primarily rely on mechanical ventilation, the resulting airflow is inadequate for infection control” and “the lack of sealed barriers between each cell in the restrictive housing structures increases the likelihood of the virus being suspended in air throughout these structures.”58 The report walks through a number of ventilation and dorm structure issues. “Early studies suggest that the ultraviolet light of the sun can disinfect the contaminated air. However, the inadequacy of natural ventilation in both Bass and the cellblocks at Camp J means that existing ventilation can’t effectively disperse contaminated air and that the buildings pose a public health hazard to patients, staff, and medical personnel.”59
B. Defendants Have Presented No Evidence that They Relied on Appropriate Medical Expertise to Inform Their Use of the Camp J Plan as a Response to COVID-19
Dr. Morrison is not an expert in correctional medicine, infectious disease, or public health; nor is he impartial. Defendants produced over 100 pages from Dr. Morrison’s emails, which prove that, to the extent he discussed Camp J with Department of Health officials, the officials advised against the plan. The Bureau of Health Services Financing for Medicaid in an email explained that
57 The Court excluded the affidavit of Mr. Mansfield explaining that MASS Design Group relayed these concerns and more to the DOC, as well as the final draft of the Report. 58 See Pls.’ Ex. 27. 59 Id. Defendants claim that rented air conditioning fixed the ventilation. Air conditioning alone would not fix the ventilation problems, but on top of that, Nurse Park, Paul Nash, and Duong Cao all testified that there is no air conditioning at Camp J.
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“planning for more than one center (other than Angola) would be good . . . [s]preading out patients and building in some redundancy are helpful here in the event of a very serious outbreak.”60
V. There Are Alternatives to the Camp J Plan Secretary LeBlanc offered testimony that transferring people to Camp J was the only
alternative to leaving COVID-19 patients in local jails and prisons that were incapable of providing medical isolation and/or medical treatment. As Plaintiffs have repeatedly informed Defendants since before transfers even began, that is simply not the case. Setting aside the patients at Camp J who should be receiving supplemental oxygen and other treatment at a hospital, there are other options for isolation and monitoring of patients with less severe symptoms. Defendants have instructed the local jails and prisons to transport their confirmed cases to Camp J only if patients cannot be isolated at the local facility, but the DOC has presented no evidence that the local facilities have received any guidance on setting up such isolation capabilities or held accountable for efforts to do so. There is little incentive for facilities to attempt isolation on their own when the Camp J option is available. EBR transferred 18 patients to Camp J until transfers stopped shortly after this TRO was requested. If EBR was able to create its own isolation capability, certainly it is possible that other similar facilities could do the same.
The MMS in New Orleans is also available. This would be particularly appropriate for the patients who are hospitalized and then discharged—they could be discharged to the MMS and in close proximity to a hospital. There are 387 beds available at the MMS as of April 30.61 At the hearing, Secretary LeBlanc brushed off a question regarding the use of the MMS due to supposed public safety concerns, but, as he is well-aware, there are already 20 total DOC parole and probation correctional officers staffing the MMS, along with the Louisiana State Police officers. Four DOC
60 Defs.’ Ex. 50 at 92. 61 Situational Awareness Report, supra note 52.
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parole and probation officers are similarly providing security services at Camp J and could be reassigned if operations there were ceased.
VI. Plaintiffs Have Met the Requirements of the PLRA62 Defendants appeared to concede at the hearing that Administrative Remedy Procedures
(“ARPs”) are “considered non-essential and suspended,”63 but later represented that the ARP process itself had not been suspended, only the deadlines for Defendants to respond. Plaintiffs agree with this Court’s understanding of the plain language of the plan to indicate that the process is suspended and thus unavailable, but indeterminate suspension of Defendants’ deadline to respond similarly makes the process unavailable.
CONCLUSION For these reasons, Plaintiffs request that this Court immediately enjoin Defendants from transfers to Camp J, require a site inspection of Camp J, and require an assessment of medically appropriate isolation spaces. In the alternative, Plaintiffs request an injunction requiring Defendants to staff Camp J adequately, issue policies to ensure social distancing, ensure cleaning and PPE procedures at Camp J consistent with CDC guidance, and prohibit all cross-contamination between Camp J and the rest of LSP, including by LSP staff and patients. Should the Court decline to issue an injunction, Plaintiffs would move for accelerated discovery, including a site inspection pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(2). In either instance, Plaintiffs request that the DOC engage in active widespread testing of Class Members consistent with CDC guidance.
Respectfully submitted by: /s/ Mercedes Montagnes Mercedes Montagnes, La. Bar No. 33287 The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70117
62 See Pls.’ TRO Reply, Dkt. 26-2 at 10. 63 Defs.’ Ex. 3 at 36.
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Telephone: (504) 529-5955 Facsimile: (504) 595-8006 Email: mmontagnes@defendla.org Attorney for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Nishi Kumar, an attorney, hereby certify that on May 4, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system. I further certify that I, or another one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, will promptly electronically serve a copy of the same, along with all other pleadings and papers filed in the action to date to the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the General Counsel for the Louisiana Governor, and the General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Health, as well as the Louisiana Department of Justice Director of Litigation via email.
/s/ Nishi Kumar Nishi Kumar, La. Bar No. 37415
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 Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 59 05/18/20 Page 1 of 21

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU, *

TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE,

*

REGINALD GEORGE, LIONEL TOLBERT, *

OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL PARKER *

MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS ALLEN, *

ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO GARNER, *

BRADLEY WINTERS, KENDRICK

*

WILSON, JAMES HUGHES, on behalf of *

themselves and all similarly situated individuals*

*

VERSUS

*

NO. 3:20-cv-231 -SDD-RLB

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official

*

capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; *

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC *

SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES

*

Le BLANC, in his official capacity as

*

Secretary of the Department of Safety &

*

Corrections; JOHN MORRISON, in his

*

official capacity as Medical Director of the *

Department of Public Safety & Corrections; *

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; *

and Stephen R. RUSSO, in his official capacity *

as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana

*

Department of Health

*

CLASS ACTION

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS ACTION

Now come defendants the LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

AND CORRECTIONS, JAMES M. LEBLANC, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of

Public Safety and Corrections, and DR. JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as

Medical Director of the Department of Public Safety & Corrections (collectively the “DOC »
Defendants”) who, file this opposition to the motion for class certification [R. Doc. 25.]

(the “Motion”) filed by plaintiffs Daniel Gumns, Michael Videau, Trevon Wiley, Ian

Cazenave, Reginald George, Lionel Tolbert, Otto Barrera, Kentrell Parker, Michael

Case 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB Document 59 05/18/20 Page 2 of 21
Robinson, Julius Allen, Ernest Rogers, Alfoanso Garner, Bradley Winters, Kendrick Wilson, and James Hughes (the “Plaintiffs”). The Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of “tens of thousands of individuals” that they claim will be harmed by the DOC Defendants’ COVID-19 response plan. For the reasons more fully set forth herein, the Motion should be denied.
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND The instant matter is a putative class action, the allegations of which revolve around the DOC Defendants’ response to COVID-19. In short, the Plaintiffs allege that offenders, system-wide, have been subjected to violations of the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment as a result of the alleged actions or inactions of the Defendants related to COVID-19. The Plaintiffs seek to define their class and subclasses as follows: All prisoners and pretrial detainees who are, or will in the future be, subjected to Defendants’ COVID-19 policies, practices, and omissions. Subclass I: All incarcerated individuals who are, or will in the future be, subjected to Defendants’ COVID-19 policies, practices, and omissions. Subclass II: All individuals being held in pre-trial detention who are, or will in the future be, subjected Defendants’ COVID-19 policies, practices, and omissions. [R. Doc. 25 at 2.] Plaintiffs have brought this action even though the Defendants prepared proactively early in the development of the global pandemic, the Governor declared a public health emergency to respond to COVID-19, and the Defendants have implemented and executed an effective response that complies with CDC guidelines. [See the evidence adduced at the April 30, 2020 hearing and R. Doc. 47 for the details of the Defendants’ response and plan.] The nine correctional facilities
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operated by the Department of Corrections are safely isolating COVID-19 positive patients at each respective facility.1
Plaintiffs Kendrick Wilson, Julius Allen, Alfoanso Garner, Ernest Rogers, Bradley Winters, and James Hughes are being detained at a non-DOC facility—-East Baton Rouge Prison—which is isolating its own COVID-19 positive offenders. Plaintiffs Daniel Gumns, Michael Videau, Lionel Tolbert, Ian Cazenave, Otto Barrera, Michael Robinson, Kentrell Parker, Reginald George, and Trevon Wiley are all housed at Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”).
The Plaintiffs seek a broad and baseless order from this Court to declare the Defendants’ COVID-19 policies and practices violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment “in their totality” and restraining the Defendants from utilizing any part of its response plan at any of the facilities it operates. [R. Doc. 1 at 71.] Further, the Plaintiffs seek to impose conditions which may have dire consequences upon non-joined parish correctional facilities. Id.
II. LAW AND ARGUMENT Plaintiffs seek class certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(l)-(4) and Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(1)(A). Defendants respectfully submit that Plaintiffs are not entitled to class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and, additionally, because this action is moot. Plaintiffs cannot meet the four requirements of Rule 23(a) for class certification as the proposed class lacks commonality, typicality, adequacy of representation of the class, and inherent conflicts exist within the proposed class. The proposed class will pertain to nine DOC facilities2 (“DOC facilities”) and all local parish and municipal jails (“local jails”) in Louisiana. At present, there are no named plaintiffs from any local jail that is transferring patients to Camp
1 This Court has acknowledged that the Camp J transfer plan “appears to be working” [R. Doc. 57 at 24] and that “the overall success of the plan thus far undermines Plaintiffs’ claims.” [Id. at 30.] 2 Allen Correctional Center; B.B. Rayburn Correctional Center; David Wade Correctional Center; Dixon Correctional Institute; Elayn Hunt Correctional Center; Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women - Hunt; Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women - Jetson; Louisiana State Penitentiary; and Raymond Laborde Correctional Center.
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J, and there are no offenders housed at any DOC facilities other than LSP. Given the undisputed facts presented, the myriad of conflicts involving the proposed class become patently obvious. Plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the interest of prisoners at the DOC facilities that have had zero COVID-19 positive cases. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ attempt to close Camp J at LSP further shows how the interest of the various members of the proposed class diverge. The plan to transfer COVID-19 positive individuals from local jails to Camp J may well be averse to the interest of COVID-19 negative individuals at the local jails where the local jails lack the ability to safely isolate or quarantine COVID-19 positive prisoners. Moreover, individuals at local prisons that test positive may well prefer to transfer to Camp J where appropriate medical monitoring takes place with a staff that has been monitoring COVID-19 patients, as opposed to remaining at local jails with limited resources. The Plaintiffs are advancing their own specific interests viewed through the lens of LSP (e.g., concerns over cross contamination) without consideration that the interest of individuals at other facilities may differ. In addition, the proposed class as to the local jails creates problems of non-joinder of appropriate representatives of those local jails as defendants in this case.
The proposed class fails the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) as the proposed class is broad with conflicting interests as noted above. Moreover, the request sought is non­ specific and overbroad. The proposed class further fails the test of Rule 23(b)(1) as the systemwide relief pits the interests of offenders at different DOC facilities against each other, to say nothing of the interests of those housed at local jails run by non-joined parties. Finally, considering the nature of the COVID-19 crises, this Motion is moot. As discussed in detail below, the motion for class certification should be denied.
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A. Class Certification Requirements To obtain class certification, parties must satisfy Rule 23(a)’s four threshold
requirements. In addition to each of the Rule 23(a) requirements, one Rule 23(b) requirement must be met for a class to be certified. Ward v. Hellerstedt, 2018 WL 5045675 at *5 (5th Cir. 2018); Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 493 F.3d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613-14, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997)). The Plaintiffs, as the parties seeking certification, bear the burden of proof to establish that the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23. Ward, 2018 WL 5045675 at *5; Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 320 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2003); M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 837 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011) (“Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.”) (emphasis in original).
The requirements of Rule 23(a) are: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(1)(A). Thus, if the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a), the Plaintiffs must also establish that either “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
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declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole” or “prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), 23(b)(1)(A); MD. ex rel. Stukenberg, 675 F.3d at 837.
It is well-established that “[a] district court must conduct a rigorous analysis of the [R]ule 23 prerequisites before certifying a class.” Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982)); MD. ex rel. Stukenberg, 675 F.3d at 837; Ward v. Hellerstedt, 2018 WL 5045675 at *5 (5th Cir. 2018). The Fifth Circuit has construed this directive to require district courts to, inter alia, “look beyond the pleadings to ‘understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.” McManus v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 320 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Castano, 84 F.3d at 744); M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg, 675 F.3d at 837. In light of this imperative, the Fifth Circuit has held that “when certifying a class, a district court must detail with sufficient specificity how the plaintiff has met the requirements of Rule 23.” Ward, 2018 WL 5045675 at *5 (citing Vizena v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 360 F.3d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Notably, the obligation of a district court to conduct a rigorous analysis of Rule 23’s requirements, as evidenced by written reasons for classification, is not dispensed with by the parties’ stipulation to certification or failure to contest one or more of Rule 23’s requirements, since “the court [is] bound to conduct its own thorough . . . inquiry.” Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 563 n.7 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). Such independent
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analysis is necessary to “protect unknown or unnamed potential class members [who], . . . by definition ... do not and cannot participate in any stipulations concocted by the named parties.” Id. However, merits questions may only be considered to the extent “that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466,133 S.Ct. 1184, 185 L.Ed.2d308 (2013).
Plaintiffs do not meet the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a), 23(b)(2), or 23(b)(1)(A). B. Rule 23(a)
1. Numerosity To establish the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1), Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the class is so numerous as to render joinder of all members impracticable. To satisfy this requirement, Plaintiffs must produce some evidence or otherwise establish by reasonable estimate the number of class members who may be involved. See Rex v. Owens ex rel. Okla., 585 F.2d 432, 436 (10th Cir. 1978). The question of numerosity is a fact-specific inquiry within the broad discretion of the district court. See id. Additionally, courts “need not blindly rely on conclusory allegations which parrot Rule 23 and may consider the legal and factual issues presented by plaintiffs’ complaint.” Shook v. El Paso Cty., 386 F.3d 963, 968 (10th Cir. 2004). The Plaintiff bears the burden of showing impracticability and mere speculation as to the number of parties involved is not sufficient to satisfy the numerosity requirement. 7A C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 1762 (3rd ed.). Rule 23(a)(1) “requires examination of the specific facts of each case and
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imposes no absolute limitations.” General Tel. Co. of the NW, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980). Courts must consider “the geographical dispersion of the class, the ease with which class members may be identified, the nature of the action, and the size of each plaintiffs claim.” Zeidman v. JRay McDermott & Co., Inc., 651 F.2d 1030, 1038 (5th Cir. 1981). When the court finds that the class members are widely dispersed geographically, then their joinder may be deemed impracticable, whereas, depending on the numbers, class members located in a compact geographic location may not meet the requirement. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980) (numerosity requirement not met where identity and addresses of putative class members were readily ascertainable, and they all lived in a compact geographical area). The fact that an unknown party needs to be represented to have that interest protected does not mean that a class action is proper. Parties with remote or contingent interests in the subject matter of the dispute may have their rights protected by the doctrine of virtual representation, which allows one person whose interests are similar to those of the unascertained absentees to represent the group. Matthies v. Seymour Manufacturing Company, 270 F.2d 365, 370-71 (2nd Cir. 1959). That representative, however, should be counted as only one class member for purposes of satisfying Rule 23(a)(1). 7A C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 1762 (3rd ed.).
Plaintiffs do not satisfy the numerosity requirement in this case. The Plaintiffs make the broad claim that the class “consists of’ over 46,600 individuals, including approximately 31,600 individuals serving sentences in the DOCs correctional facilities and parish jails, and another approximately 15,000 individuals held pretrial in parish jails.” [R. Doc. 25-1 at 14.] This claim, however, does not survive even minimal scrutiny.
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First, as to offenders housed at the DOC facilities (plaintiff claims approximately 31,600 such offenders), offenders who test positive for COVID-19 are not being moved to another facility. Instead, those offenders are being isolated at DOC facilities where they are currently housed. The only named plaintiffs in this matter that are in DOC’s custody are all being housed at LSP. No named plaintiffs are housed at any of the other eight DOC facilities. As this Court noted, the DOC Defendants are “not charged solely with the protection of inmates at LSP; rather, the DOC is responsible for the care and safety of all prisoners in the custody of the DOC throughout the State of Louisiana.” [R. Doc. 57 at 31.]
Second, individuals held in local jails awaiting trial (plaintiffs claim approximately 15,000 such detainees) are not in the custody of DOC. Parish jails are not under the control of the DOC. La. R.S. § 33:4715 provides that “[t]he police jury of each parish shall provide a good and sufficient court-house, with rooms for jurors, and a good and sufficient jail, at such place as they may deem most convenient for the parish at large .. .”
The parish government is charged with a local jail’s physical maintenance. La. R.S. § 15:702. The duty to administer and operate a local jail falls on the sheriff of each parish. La. R.S. § 15:704. The office of sheriff is constitutionally created office in Louisiana, existing separately from the parish government. La. Const. Art. 5 § 27; see Langley v. City ofMonroe, 582 So.2d 367, 368 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1991) (The parish could not be liable for injuries attributed to the sheriff). “Each sheriff shall be keeper of the public jail of his parish and shall preserve the peace and apprehend public offenders.” La. R.S. § 13:5539(C). The entities responsible for those facilities are not before this Honorable Court. See Wetzel v. St. Tammany Par. Jail, 610 F. Supp. 2d 545, 549 (E.D. La. 2009). Thus, these local jails have their own plans, and where available, they are isolating and quarantining their own detainees
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at the local level. This is true of East Baton Rouge Prison—the correctional facility housing all of the detainees who are named plaintiffs—which is isolating its own detainees at its facility.3 The mere possibility that the class of potential plaintiffs might be so large that joinder would be impracticable is not the same as proof of such numerosity. See Anderson v. Donovan, No. CIV .A. 06-3298, 2011 WL 798118, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2011).
The Plaintiffs’ proposed class is designed to be broad and sweeping, but, as a result, the class definition is over inclusive, inappropriate, and not represented by the named plaintiffs as will be further described herein. As such, the Plaintiffs have not made an appropriate showing regarding numerosity.
2. Commonality To satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement, “the putative class members’ claims must depend upon a common contention,” which “must be of such a nature that it is capable of class-wide resolution.” Ward v. Hellerstedt, 2018 WL 5045675 at *6 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Yates v. Collier, 868 F.3d 354, 361 (5th Cir. 2017) and quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011)). Determining whether such “common contention” is true or false must allow for “resol [ution of] an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. The commonality requirement demands more than the presentation of questions that are common to the class because “any competently crafted class complaint literally raises common questions.” MD. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 2012). Further, the members of a proposed class do not establish that “their claims can productively be litigated at once,” merely by alleging a violation of the same legal provision by the same
3 The same is true for Orleans Parish. Plaintiffs submitted several affidavits by non-named putative plaintiffs who are housed in Orleans Parish, but that facility is not transferring its COV1D-19 positive patients to DOC facilities.
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defendant. Id. What is significant with respect to a commonality determination is “not the raising of
common questions—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Ward, 2018 WL 5045675 (citing Yates, 868 F.3d at 361). Similarly, to establish commonality, the plaintiff(s) must show that “the class members have suffered the same injury.” Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349, 131 S.Ct. 2541). A key issue is whether dissimilarities between the claims may impede a common resolution. Further, in order to determine whether that standard is met, it is necessary to go behind the pleadings and engage in a rigorous analysis that may require “some overlap with the merits of the plaintiffs underlying claim.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 351; see also 1A C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 1763 (3rd ed.). Rule 23(a)(2) is not met when the decision regarding the propriety of injunctive or declaratory relief turns on a consideration of the individual circumstances of each class member or when the defendant has not engaged in a common course of conduct toward them. See, e.g., Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2016) (pretrial jail detainees’ claims of deliberate indifference to their dental care needs, based on delays in receiving face-to-face evaluation by a registered nurse or in receiving “return to clinic” appointments, did not satisfy the commonality requirement for class certification, in a § 1983 action asserting due-process claims against the county and county sheriff as the constitutionality of the delays depended on a variety of individual circumstances which could be answered only by looking at the unique facts of each detainee’s case); see also 7A C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 1763 (3rd ed.).
A simple review of Plaintiffs’ Complaint readily demonstrates that the commonality
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requirement is lacking in this case. The Plaintiffs seek system-wide relief over nine DOC facilities and non-joined local jails, each with a different plan for dealing with COVID-19. Additionally, because the Plaintiffs seek to nullify all policies and practices of the Defendants [R. Doc. 1 at 71], each policy and practice—from how health care is provided to how drugs are administrated (and everything in between)—becomes an issue that requires an examination of each individual to determine how each policy or practice impacts each person and the facility at which he is housed.
Further, the Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the class members have been harmed in essentially the same way. The Plaintiffs point to the generalized risks posed by the virus, but rely on individual offenders being older and others being sick. [See, e.g., R. Doc. 1 at ^[*| 11, 26, 61, 173, 179, & 180.] In reality, the Plaintiffs’ purported class is not limited to offenders that are elderly or sick, but it extends to all offenders regardless of age or medical infirmity. Further, Plaintiffs cannot show that all of the class members’ claims depend on a common issue of law or fact whose resolution “will resolve an issue that is central that to the validity of each one of the class members’ claims in one stroke.” MD. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Peny, 675 F.3d 832, 841 (5* Cir. 2012). The Plaintiffs focus on the “transfer plan” but fail to note that the nine DOC facilities are not transferring COVID-19 patients. Restraining all of the policies and practices of the Defendants would impact offenders in different facilities in different ways. Finally, Plaintiffs’ broad assertions of “systematic deficiencies” do not in themselves meet the commonality requirement. Similar contentions have been rejected by the Fifth Circuit. See id.
Recently, a district court in Illinois denied the request of prisoners for class certification in an injunction action related to the risks of COVID-19 for lack of commonality. In Money v.
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Pritzker, No. 20-CV-2093, 2020 WL 1820660, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2020), the court noted that, while there are common questions relevant to the putative class members, none of those questions “is likely to drive the resolution of the case.” Id. Further, the court noted that public interest analysis that must occur to grant injunctive relief “mandates individualized consideration” of each inmate’s particular circumstance. Id. Those individual concerns are many and include: (1) the inmate’s age and individualized health condition; (2) the inmate’s risk of contracting COVID-19; (3) the ability to safely isolate positive inmates at a given facility; and (4) the public’s safety.
Those individualized concerns are also present in this case. Because of the lack of uniformity, this action is not appropriate for class certification.
3. Typicality and Adequacy of Representation The Rule 23(a) requirements of typicality and adequacy of representation are “closely related” in that “demanding typicality on the part of the representative helps ensure his adequacy as a representative.” Ward, 2018 WL 5045675 at *8 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 485 n.27 (5th Cir. 1982)). To demonstrate typicality, the parties seeking certification need not show “a complete identity of claims.” Id. (citing Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Rather, “the critical inquiry is whether the class representative’s claims have the same essential characteristics of those of the putative class.” Id. Moreover, the typicality inquiry is not concerned so much with the “strengths of the named and unnamed plaintiffs’ cases” as with the “similarity of legal and remedial theories behind their claims.” Id. (citing Ibe v. Jones, 836 F.3d 516, 528-29 (5th Cir. 2016)). Adequacy, in the Rule 23(a) context, concerns “class representatives, their counsel,
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and the relationship between the two.” Id. (citing Stirman, 280 F.3d at 563). Adequacy encompasses the following three inquiries: “(1) the zeal and competence of the representatives’ counsel; (2) the willingness and ability of the representatives to take an active role in and control the litigation and to protect the interests of absentees; and (3) the risk of conflicts of interest between the named plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent.” Id. (citing Slade v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., 856 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 2017)).
Since “absent class members are conclusively bound by the judgment in any class action brought on their behalf, the court must be especially vigilant to ensure that the due process rights of all class members are safeguarded through adequate representation at all times.” Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985)). Thus, to satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement, “the class representatives [must] possess a sufficient level of knowledge and understanding to be capable of‘controlling’ or ‘prosecuting’ the litigation.” Ibe v. Jones, 836 F.3d 516, 529 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Merger, 257 F.3d at 482-83).
A finding of commonality does not excuse a district court from appropriately analyzing whether typicality and adequacy of representation exist. Moreover, such analysis must be conducted with respect to "the representative parties.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis added). A district court can only appropriately assess such factors as “the willingness and ability of the representatives to . . . control the litigation and to protect the interests of absentees” with reference to one or more specific claimants, as opposed to any claimant that could fall within the putative class. Ward, 2018 WL 5045675 at *9.
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the named plaintiffs have the same
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characteristics of those of the putative class. The named plaintiffs in this case consist only of offenders at LSP or detainees at East Baton Rouge Prison. None of the named plaintiffs are housed at any of the other eight DOC facilities or any other local jail in Louisiana. The Plaintiffs have further failed to join representative defendants of the local jails that they seek to restrain.4 As previously discussed, Plaintiffs seek a broad class of all DOC offenders no matter where housed and all non-DOC detainees awaiting trial at local jails. The Plaintiffs’ claims may—and clearly will—conflict with the desires of offenders housed at facilities other than LSP. A disruption of policies that have clearly worked at David Wade Correction Center, Allen Correctional Center, and Dixon Correctional Institute, for instance, may harm those offenders. They have no representation in this matter. Moreover, detainees at local jails would likely prefer that COVID-19 positive patients be moved somewhere where they can be safely housed, without presenting an infection risk to others.
Courts are authorized to strike overbroad class allegations when the putative class members are not similarly situated. See Holt v. XTO Energy, Inc., No. MO:16-CV-00162RAJ, 2016 WL 11083342, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2016) (court struck overbroad class allegations when the plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts to show that they are similarly situated to all independent contractors employed by Defendant). The Plaintiffs’ proposed class and subclasses would require this Court to determine whether and to what extent a class member has been subject to a policy that is alleged to be unconstitutional.
The named plaintiffs are also advancing personal interests above that of the putative class as clearly shown by the declarations they have furnished in this matter. The named plaintiffs seek to either keep COVID-19 patients from isolating at Camp J at LSP or to not themselves be transferred to LSP because they would prefer a release or other arrangement.
4 In fact, all of the pre-trial detainee named plaintiffs are at a facility that is not transferring patients to LSP. 15

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Such personal considerations being predominate demonstrate that the Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of adequacy. See Anderson v. Donovan, No. CIV.A. 06-3298, 2011 WL 798118, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2011.)
As for adequacy of representation, proposed class counsel has clearly favored its regular clients at LSP over those in the class at other facilities. This action is an extension of counsel’s crusade against medical care at LSP; thus, it is not surprising that they would favor those at LSP over others in the class. If one doubts this contention, one need simply recognize that counsel filed this action in the submitted Lewis v. Cain, No. CIV.A. 15—318— SDD-RLB, M.D. La.) case before arriving before the Court in this action.5 C. Rule 23fbR2)
In addition to satisfying the four Rule 23(a) prerequisites, the party seeking certification must show that one of the three Rule 23(b) requirements is fulfilled. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Satisfaction of any of the Rule 23(b) requirements is contingent on satisfaction of each of the Rule 23(a) requirements in that a criterion for maintaining a class action under any of the Rule 23(b) requirements is compliance with Rule 23(a). See id. (providing that “[a] class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied” and if one of the three Rule 23(b) requirements is met).
Plaintiffs seek class classification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) in this case. Rule 23(b)(2) allows a class action to be maintained when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” The Fifth Circuit has interpreted this language to create two relevant requirements when a proposed class seeks class-wide injunctive relief: (1) the “class members must have been harmed in
5 See R. Doc. 582. 16

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essentially the same way,” MD. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 845 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 493 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 2007) & Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 975 (5th Cir. 2000)), and (2) “the injunctive relief sought must be specific.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)); see also Casa Orlando Apartments, Ltd. v. Fed. Nat 7 Mortg. Ass’n, 624 F.3d 185, 198 (5th Cir. 2010).
The Supreme Court has stated that “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011) (“The key to the (b)(2) class is ‘the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.”). For a class certified under Rule 23(b)(2), “the relief sought must perforce affect the entire class at once.” Id. at 361-62.
With respect to the requirement that the injunctive relief sought be specific, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that plaintiffs must “give content to the injunctive relief they seek so that final injunctive relief may be crafted to describe in reasonable detail the acts required.” Ward v. Hellerstedt, 2018 WL 5045675 at *10 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Yates v. Collier, 868 F.3d, 354, 367 (5th Cir. 2018) and MD. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 848 (5th Cir. 2012)) (emphasis in original). In order to comply with Rule 23(b)(2), plaintiffs must, at a minimum describe in some kind of detail from what actions or inactions of Defendant should be restrained. A general request that Defendant be restrained from violating the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights is insufficient. See id.
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Plaintiffs’ Motion fails under both requirements cited above. As discussed above, the class members have not been purportedly harmed in “essentially the same way.” In fact, the injunction sought would favor offenders at LSP over the concerns and interests of those housed at other DOC facilities and local jails (who are also putative class members). The Complaint also asks for restraining every policy and procedure DOC (and non-joined local facility juridical entities) are using to combat COVID-19, while seeking to impose so-called “adequate” policies and procedures. The Plaintiffs also seek to make non-joined local jails comply with their approved steps. [R. Doc. 1 at 72(e).] These non-specific and contradictory mandates cannot be uniformly imposed by injunctive relief so as to grant all putative class members relief. Those housed at LSP are the only priority in this case. Further, this Court has already found that the Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits, evidencing a belief at this stage that no one is being harmed under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment, much less being harmed in “essentially the same way.” [R. Doc 57 at 9-30.]
Finally, the requested injunctive relief is of the broad and general nature that was expressly proscribed by the Fifth Circuit in its decision in Ward v. Hellerstedt, 2018 WL 5045675 (5th Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs have asked this Court to “[e]nter injunctive relief enjoining Defendants and their agents from subjecting Plaintiffs to the illegal and unconstitutional conditions, act, omissions, policies and practices set forth above.” This request is a far cry from the specificity necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). D. Rule 23(b¥l¥a)
Rule 23(b)(1) covers cases in which separate actions by or against individual class members would risk establishing “incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.” Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2245, 138 L. Ed. 2d
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689 (1997). Here, proceeding as a class does not alleviate this concern, it exacerbates it. The system-wide relief pits the interests of offenders at different facilities against each other, to say nothing of the interests of those housed at local jails run by non-joined parties.
Offenders at the nine DOC facilities are benefitting from the Defendants’ plan, including reverse isolation, medical isolation, and quarantine. Enjoining these policies at the nine DOC facilities would harm non-represented offenders.6 Enjoining transfers to Camp J from facilities that cannot safely isolate offenders in their existing plant will harm all offenders housed at that non-joined local jails. The Defendants will be forced to stop policies that are mitigating the effect of COVID-19 to placate a preferred subset of class members at LSP. The Defendants and non-joined local jails will then incur liability for the ceasing of medically sound mitigation policies. The Plaintiffs have no response to this very real concern, which the Court has noted. [R. Doc. 57 at 31.] The Court should be wary of picking winners and losers in the fight against COVID-19 in Louisiana correctional facilities. E. Mootness
Finally, class certification should be denied as this action is moot. Mootness in this context is “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 1069 n.22, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (quoting United States Parole Comm. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). A controversy is mooted when there are no longer adverse parties with sufficient legal interests to maintain the litigation. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Traillour Oil Co., 987 F.2d 1138, 1153 (5th Cir. 1993). A moot case presents no Article III case or controversy, and a court has no constitutional jurisdiction to resolve the issues it presents. See
6 This Court, after a review of evidence, has noted the “overall success of the plan thus far.” [R. Doc. 30.] 19

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Hogan v. Mississippi University for Women, 646 F.2d 1116, 1117 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1981.); see also Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 717-18 (5th Cir. 1999.)
Mootness can occur when relief is clearly impossible. See Injunctions, Declaratory Judgments, Other Specific Relief, 13C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3533.3.1 (3d ed.) “[W]hen it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party,” a case is moot and must be dismissed. Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013.)
Defendants have been responding to the threat of COVID-19 since February. In or about March of 2020, DOC began reverse isolating at-risk offenders in its custody. On March 28, 2020, DOC announced its first offender tested positive for COVID-19. On April 2, 2020, Dr. Morrison approved the first transfer of a COVID-19 positive patient to Camp J at LSP. The DOC Defendants have been responding to and updating their plans continuously to present. The Defendants submit that returning to the status quo would be impossible at this time. The Defendants’ medically sound plan has mitigated the impact of COVID-19 on the offenders in its custody. Transfers to Camp J have mitigated issues within non-joined local jails. The Plaintiffs’ claims for relief in the form of an injunction cannot turn back the clock on the response. COVID-19 has, unfortunately, infected citizens of Louisiana, including those who are incarcerated. Injunctive relief cannot stop what Mother Nature has wrought. Respectfully, this action is moot.
III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully ask the Court to deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification in this case.
JEFF LANDRY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
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Butler Snow LLP 445 North Boulevard, Suite 300 (70802) P. O. Box 2997 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-2997 Telephone: (225) 325-8700 Facsimile: (225) 325-8800 By: Is/ Randal,/. Robert________________
Randal J. Robert (#21840) Connell L. Archey (#20086) Julie M. McCall (#29992) Keith J. Fernandez (#33124) Aliena W. McCain (#38830) Special Assistant Attorneys General Email: randv.robert@butlersnow.com
connell.archev@butlersnow.com iulie.mccall@butlersnow.com keith.fernandez@butlersnow.com allena.mccain@butlersnow.com Counsel for Defendants the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Sec. James Le Blanc, and Dr. John Morrison
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 18th day of May 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing pleading with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic filing to all counsel of record.
______Is/ Randal J. Robert________ Randal J. Robert
53024468. vl
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL GUMNS, MICHAEL VIDEAU, TREVON WILEY, IAN CAZENAVE, REGINALD GEORGE, LIONEL TOLBERT, OTTO BARRERA, KENTRELL PARKER, MICHAEL ROBINSON, JULIUS ALLEN, ERNEST ROGERS, ALFOANSO GARNER, BRADLEY WINTERS, KENDRICK WILSON, and JAMES HUGHES, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs,

VERSUS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00231SDD-RLB

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS; JAMES LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Safety and Corrections; JOHN MORRISON, in his official capacity as Medical Director of the Department of Safety and Corrections; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and STEPHEN R. RUSSO, in his official capacity as Interim Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health,
Defendants,

CLASS ACTION

****************************************************************************

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, come Defendants, John Bel Edwards

in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana (“Governor Edward”), Louisiana

Department of Health (“LDH”) and Stephen R. Russo in his official capacity as Interim secretary

of LDH (“Russo”) (collectively, Defendants), which oppose the plaintiffs’ motion for class

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certification. In support of this motion Defendants adopt and incorporate herein the opposition
filed by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, James LeBlanc and John
Morrison. (R. Doc. 59).
For all of these reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court deny the plaintiffs’
Motion for Class Certification in this case.
Respectfully Submitted:
MCGLINCHEY STAFFORD, PLLC
/s/M. Brent Hicks M. BRENT HICKS #23778 JUSTON M. O’BRIEN, #26447 ZELMA MURRAY FREDERICK, #31459 301 Main Street, 14th Floor Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801 Telephone: (225) 383-9000 Facsimile: (225) 343-3076 bhicks@mcglinchey.com jobrien@mcglinchey.com zfrederick@mcglinchey.com Attorneys for John Bel Edwards in his official capacity as Governor for the State of Louisiana, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals and Stephen R. Russo, Interim Secretary for Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals
and
KIMBERLY HUMBLES #24465 DAVID L. McCAY #23527 Louisiana Department of Health Bureau of Legal Services 628 N. 4th Street (Bienville Building), Rm. 865 (P. O. Box 3836 (70821-3836) Baton Rouge, LA 70802 Telephone: (225) 342-2556 kimberly.humbles@la.gov david.mccay@la.gov Attorneys for Louisiana Department of Health and Stephen R. Russo, Interim Secretary for Louisiana Department of Health

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the above and foregoing was filed electronically with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. Notice of this filing will be sent to all counsel by operation of the court’s electronic filing system. Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 18th day of May, 2020.
/s/M. Brent Hicks M. Brent Hicks

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