Case 5:10-cv-01186-M Document 1 Filed 11/04/10 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MUNEERAWAD

c V-IO-IlS6

Plaintiff I Petitioner

CASE NO.:

v.

HON.:

PAUL ZIRlAX, Agency Head, Oklahoma State Board of Elections

THOMAS PRINCE, Chairman of the Board, Oklahoma State Board of Elections
RAMON WATKINS, Board Member, Oklahoma State Board ofElections;
SUSAN TURPEN, Board Member, Oklahoma State Board of Elections

FILED
NOV 042010
U.S.DIST.
BY

COMPLAINT SEEKING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, Plaintiff, Muneer Awad, hereby moves the court for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjOInIng Defendants from certifYing the election results for State Question 755. Plaintiff's motion is supported by the Complaint filed with court and a Memorandum of Law submitted to the Court.
Respectfully submitted,
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Case 5:10-cv-01186-M Document 1 Filed 11/04/10 Page 2 of 8
JURISDICTION Jurisdiction in this Court is pursuant to 28 V.S.C Section § 1331 based on the presence of a federal question.
PARTIES 1. Plaintiff, Mr. Muneer Awad, is a resident of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma where he lives with his wife 2. Plaintiff is Executive Director of the Council on American Islamic RelationsOklahoma ("CAIR-OK). In this capacity, Plaintiff works to empower Oklahoma's Muslims to become politically involved, enhance the understanding and acceptance of Islam, and defend the civil rights of Muslims and aggrieved persons. 3. Plaintiff has followed closely developments and media reports regarding State Question 755 which, if certified, would forbid courts from considering, among other things, "shariah law." He has directly encountered the amended text State Question 755 would enact repeatedly as well as media reports that comment on the amended text. 4. Defendants Thomas Prince, Ramon Watkins, and Susan Turpen are the entire membership of the Board for Oklahoma's State Board of Elections. Defendants Prince, Watkins, and Turpen have the legal authority to vote to certifY an election. Election results have no legal effect until the aforementioned Defendants certifY an election.
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Case 5:10-cv-01186-M Document 1 Filed 11/04/10 Page 3 of 8
5. Defendant Paul Ziriax is the Agency Head for Oklahoma's State Board of Elections. Defendant Ziriax has day to day control over the operations of the Board of Elections.
PLAINTIFF'S FAITH 6. Plaintiff is a practicing Muslim. Plaintiff relies upon the two core sources of insight into his faith: the Quran and the recorded teachings of Islam's prophet.
7. Plaintiffs faith is the motivation for much of what he does. From greeting others with a smile to waking for the customary prayer at dawn, Plaintiff avails himself of the millennia of the evolving Islamic traditions grounded upon the Quran and Islam's prophetic teachings.
8. Plaintiffs faith informs the character and content of his personal and professional relationships. The Quran and Islam's prophetic teachings allow Plaintiff access to the practical morality contained therein regarding prescribed and proscribed conduct in innumberable circumstances. Thus, when Plaintiff scrupulously attends to fairness in his business dealings, he acts from faith, having taken to heart guidance in Islam's prophetic teachings.
9. Plaintiff believes that his life is made richer through his adherence to Islam and that the lives of others are made no worse.
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Case 5:10-cv-01186-M Document 1 Filed 11/04/10 Page 4 of 8
BACKGROUND 10. Oklahoma's Constitution provides a mechanism through which a resolution passing by majority vote in both the State House of Representatives and the State Senate can be referred to the Secretary of State for placement on the ballot of the next election. Oklahoma refers to these ballot initiatives as state questions. 11. Subsequent to election day, ifthe State Board of Elections certifies that a majority of the votes cast on the state question were in favor of it being adopted, the contents of the state question become legally effective.
12. For state questions proposing amendments to Oklahoma's constitution, the certification of the election results by the State Board of Elections is the moment at which the amendment becomes a part of the constitution.
STATE QUESTION 755 13. State Question 755 amends Article 7, Section I of Oklahoma's constitution. The initiative was described on the ballot to voters as a directive to state courts to "rely on federal and state law when deciding cases." The description states that the amendment would "forbid courts from considering or using intemationallaw." It would also "forbid courts from considering or using Sharia Law." 14. The ballot's explanation of what the amendment means when it excludes "Sharia Law" from state courts indicates that the intention of the phrase was to demarcate a religious tradition. "Sharia law" says State Question 755 is "Islamic law." While State
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Case 5:10-cv-01186-M Document 1 Filed 11/04/10 Page 5 of 8
Question 755 described what "Sharia Law" is based on-the "Koran and the teaching of Mohammed"-it did not suggest what the actual content of the initiave's operative phrase, "Shariah Law," identified. 15. The text that State Question 755 places in Oklahoma's constitution forbids courts from considering Shariah Law twice. First, it forbids state courts from applying the law of other states, even when otherwise appropriate, if that law "inc1ude[s] Sharia Law." Second, the text uses broad language to forbid courts from "consider[ing] Sharia Law." No other religious tradition is mentioned. 16. State Question 755's chief proponents have repeatedly characterized the restriction it places on Shariah Law as a necessary bulwark against the invidious religious tradition it contains. The initiative's architects have variously referred to State Question 755 as a preemptive strike, a response to a looming threat, and as a much needed legal reinforcement to the Oklahoma's Judeo-Christian values. 17. Preliminary election results suggest that voters approved State Question 755. State Question 755 (hereinafter "Shariah Ban") will become a part of the constitution if the State Board of Elections certifies the results at its scheduled meeting on Tuesday, November 9,2010.
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COUNT I: THE SHARIAH BAN WILL VIOLATE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO POSSESS HIS FAITH FREE FROM A GOVERNMENT THAT CONDEMNS IT 18. Plaintiff fully incorporates by reference as though fully rewritten the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs. 19. Once the Shariah Ban becomes a part of Oklahoma's constitution, Plaintiff will suffer official disapproval of his faith communicated to him by Oklahoma through the document that organizes the state's existence: the constitution 20. The Shariah Ban, because the text only mentions and restricts the religious traditions upon which Plaintiff draws his faith, will imply to Oklahomans that there is something especially nefarious about the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed that justifies its exclusion from state courts. 21. According to its creators, the Shariah Ban had a sectarian purpose and the illicit effect of discrediting Plaintiff's faith. 22. Implementation of the Shariah Ban will force state courts to take positions with respect to the religious doctrines pertinent to Plaintiffs faith. In order to exclude Shariah Law, a court must determine what that phrase does and does not include. This produces an excessive entanglement in spheres the Establishment Clause preserves for the Plaintiff.
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COUNT II: THE SHARIAH BAN IMPERMISSIBLY CONSTRAINS PLAINTIFF'S ABILITY TO EXERCISE HIS FAITH WITH RESPECT TO HIS ESTATE
23. Plaintiff fully incorporates by reference as though fully rewritten the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs.
24. Plaintiff has a validly executed last will and testament. The will has several provisions regarding bequests, burial instructions, and the division and assignment of Plaintiffs estate. Many of these provisions direct the testator to specific verses in books that document the teaching of Mohammed. In his will Plaintiff directs the testator of his estate to perfonn tasks, deliver bequests, and divide his estate in accordance with the guidance contained in the prophetic teachings to which he refers. 25. Before November 9, 2010, Plaintiff could trust a court to ensure that the executor of his estate acts in accordance with his directions. Courts regularly incorporate documents into a will when the reference and the documents satisfY certain rudimentary criteria. 26. After November 9, 2010, no state court in Oklahoma will incorporate in the will the documents to which Plaintiff referred. This is because those documents are "Shariah Law." To incorporate into a will verses from a compendium of the teachings of Mohammed would surely require a judge to "consider... Shariah Law" which will soon be forbidden.
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27. Because Plaintiff cannot know beforehand when he will die, the near certainty that, in a few ddays, no court will be willing to probate his will creates the imminent injury of dying intestate rather than with a valid, enforceable will. The apprehension of this uncertainty is an injury itself. 28. Furthermore, Plaintiff no longer can have his will reflect his faith. Any subsequent will, to be enforceable in state court, would have to eliminate not only the references to verses that might be subsumed by the phrase "Shariah Law" but also the neutral language that reflects the religious guidance on inheritance shares, bequests, and burial instructions.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff requests that the Court in the proposed form submitted by Plaintiff, schedule a hearing on Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction at the earliest possible date, and after that hearing, enter a preliminary injunction in the form proposed by Plaintiff.
Muneer Awad
101 NE 53rd Street, #3514 Oklahoma City, OK 73105 405-415-6851
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MUNEER AWAD,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

)

)

PAUL ZIRIAX, Agency Head, Oklahoma )

State Board of Elections;

)

THOMAS PRINCE, Chairman of the

)

Board, Oklahoma State Board of Elections; )

RAMON WATKINS, Board Member,

)

Oklahoma State Board of Elections;

)

SUSAN TURPEN, Board Member,

)

Oklahoma State Board of Elections,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. CIV-10-1186-M

ORDER

This order addresses issues that go to the very foundation of our country, our Constitution,

and particularly, the Bill of Rights. Throughout the course of our country’s history, the will of the

“majority” has on occasion conflicted with the c onstitutional rights of individuals, an occurrence

which our founders foresaw and provided for thr ough the Bill of Rights. As the United States

Supreme Court has stated:

The very purpose ofa Bill ofRights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of m ajorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).

Before the Court is plaintif f’s Com plaint Seeking a Tem porary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction, filed Novem ber 4, 2010. On Novem ber 16, 2010, defendant s filed their
Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On that same date, amicus curiae United
States Border Control, United States Border Control Foundation, Lincoln Institute for Research and
Education, and Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund filed an Amicus Curiae Brief in
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. On
November 18, 2010, plaintiff filedhis reply. On November 22, 2010,the Court conducted a hearing
on plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Based upon the pleadings that have been filed
and the evidence submitted at the hearing1, the Court makes its determination.
I. Introduction
State Question 755, which was on Oklahoma’s November 2, 2010 ballot, provides:
This measure amends t he State Constitution. It changes a section that deals with the courts ofthis state. It would amend Article 7, Section 1. It m akes c ourts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases. It forbids courts from considering or using international law. It forbids courts from considering or using Sharia Law.
International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals with the conduct of international organizations and independent nations, such as countries, states and tribes. It deals wi th t heir relationship with each other. It also deals with some of t heir relationships with persons.
The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations. Sources of international law also include international agreements, as well as treaties.
Sharia La w is Islam ic law. It is based on two principal sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.
1At the hearing, the Court reserved its ruling as to whether pl aintiff’s exhibit 3 would be admitted. Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the case law, the Court finds that plaintiff’s exhibit 3 should not be admitted.
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State Question 755 was put on the ballot through the legislative adoption of Enrolled House
Joint Resolution 1056. Said resolution proposes toamend Section 1 of Article VII of the Oklahoma
Constitution by adding the following section:
C. The Courts provi ded for in subsection A of this section when exercising their judicial authority,shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States Constitution, t he Oklahom a Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, established com mon law, the Oklahom a Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in m aking judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal percepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not lim ited t o, cases of first impression.
Enr. H. J. R. No. 1056 at 2. Additionally, said resolution provides that the above section shall be
known as the “Save Our State Amendment”. Id.
Election results show that 70.08 per cent of the voters approved State Question 755. Once
the Oklahoma State Board of Elections certifies the election results, the amendment set forth above
will become a part of the Oklahoma Constitution.
On November 4, 2010, plaintiff filed the instant action, challenging the constitutionality of
State Question 755’s amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that
the ban on the state courts’ use and considerationof Sharia Law violates the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Am endment to the United States Constitution. In his
complaint, plaintiff, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, m oves the Court to enter a
preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from certifying the election results for State Question
755 until this Court rules on the merits of plaintiff’s claims.
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II. Standing Under Article III, federal courts have jurisdiction only to decide “Cases” and
“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Anessential part of the case-or-controversy requirement is the concept that a plaintiff must have standing.
A party has standing to pursue a claim in federal court only if: (1) it suffered an “injury in fact” – an inva sion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant rather than some third party not before the court; and (3) that injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agenc,y608 F.3d 1131, 1144 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In their response, defendants assert that plai ntiff has not suffered an “injury in fact” and, therefore, lacks standing to bring this action. 2 Specifically, defendants assert that plaintiff has suffered no harm and will s uffer no harm if defendants certify the election results. D efendants contend that plaintiff will be able to engage inthe same daily activities after the certification of the election results as he is able to engage in today. Further, defendants contend that plaintiff’s claim that the pr oposed am endment condem ns his religion is a personal opinion, rather than a legal argument and that his claim that the am endment will invalidate his last will and testam ent is speculation. “For purposes of the standing inquiry, the questoi n is not whether the alleged injury rises to the level of a constitutional violation. That is the issue on the m erits. For standing purposes,
2In their response, defendants do not addressthe second and third requirements of standing. The Court, therefore, finds that defendants have confessed that plaintiff meets these requirements.
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[courts] ask only if there was an injury in fact, caused by the challenged action and redressable in

court.” Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. Walker , 450 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10 th Cir. 2006). In

determining whether a plaintiff has standing, the Court must assume plaintiff’s claim has legal

validity. Id. at 1093. Further, the Tenth Circuit hasercognized “that a chilling effect on the exercise

of a plaintiff’s First Amendment rights may amount to a judicially cognizable injury in fact, as long

as it arise[s] from an objectively justified fear of real consequences.” Id. at 1088. Additionally,

“[i]n its interpretation of the ‘injury in f act’ requirem ent, the Suprem e Court has repeatedly

emphasized that a showing of noneconom ic injury is sufficient to confer standing.” Am. Civil

Liberties Union of Ga. v. Rabon County Chamber of Commerce, Inc,.678 F.2d 1379, 1384-85 (11th

Cir. 1982).

Having carefully reviewe d t he br iefs on this issue, and having heard the evidence and

arguments presented at the hearing, the Court finds that plaintiff has shown that he will suffer an

injury in fact, specifically, an invasion of his First Am

endment rights which is c oncrete,

particularized and imminent. First, plaintiff claims that the moment the Oklahoma Constitution is

amended, his First Amendment rights will be violated by Oklahoma’s official condemnation of his

religion/faith as reflected through the amendment’s ban of the state courts’ use or consideration of

Sharia Law and that said official condem nation will result in a stigm a at taching t o his person,

relegating him to an ineffectual position within the political community, and causing him injury.

A “psychological consequence” doe s not suffice as concrete harm

where it is produced merely by “observation of conduct with which

one disagrees.” But it does constitute concrete harm where the

“psychological consequence” is produced by governm

ent

condemnation of one’s own religion or endorsement of another’s in

one’s own c ommunity. . . . W hat distinguishes the cases is that in

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Valley Forge 3, the psychological consequence was me

rely

disagreement with the government, but in the others, for which t he

Court identified a sufficiently concrete injury, the psychological

consequence was exclusion or denigration on a religious basis within

the political community.

Catholic League for Religious and CivilRights v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 06-17328,

2010 WL 4138432, at *4 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2010).

In the case at bar, the Court finds that plaintiff’s alleged condemnation injury is sufficiently

concrete, particularized and imminent. Plaintiff has sufficiently set forth a personal stake in this

action by alleging that he lives in Oklahoma, is a Muslim, that the amendment conveys an official

government message of disapproval and hostility toward his religious beliefs, that sends a clear

message he is an outsider, not a uf ll member of the political community, thereby chilling his access

to the government and forcing himto curtail his political and religious activities. Further, the Court

finds the consequences – the condemnation – thatplaintiff believes will result fromthe amendment

are objectively justified. Finally, the Court woul d note that it would be incomprehensible if, as

plaintiff alleges, Oklahoma could condem n the religion of its Muslim citizens, yet one of those

citizens could not defend himself in court against his government’s preferment of other religious

views.

Second, plaintiff claims that his First Amendment rights will be violated by the invalidation

of his last will and testam ent which incorporates various teachings of Moham med. Specifically,

plaintiff asserts that because Oklahom a courts will be banned from considering Sharia Law, an

Oklahoma court would not be able to probate his last will and testament because it would be

3Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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required to consider Sharia Law. The Court findsthat plaintiff is objectively justified in believing that said consequences would result rfom the amendment. Specifically, the article in plaintif’s will which addresses the distribution of certain of plaintiff’s assets to charity is specifically linked to a teaching of Mohammed – what the amendment would clearly consider Sharia Law – and, thus, it would appear that any Oklahom a court probating plaintiff’s last will and testam ent would be required to consider Sharia Law when it issued its order approving the distribution of plaintiff’s assets and, because it would be banned from considering Sharia Law, it, thus, would be precluded from probating plaintif f’s will. The Court f urther f inds that as a result, plaintif f will suf fer a concrete, particularized, and imminent injury in that his last will and testament will likely be unable to be probated and, therefore, be unenforceable.
Finally, the Court finds, and as defendants have conceded, that plaintiff has shown that his alleged injuries are fairly traceable to the ch allenged act ion of defendants and are likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Accordingly, theCourt finds that plaintiff has standing to bring the instant action. III. Ripeness
In order for a claimto be justiciable under Article III, it also must present a live controversy, ripe for determination, advanced in a “clean-cut and concrete form.” Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 322 (1991). A court’s ripeness inquiry“focuses not on whether the plaintiff was in fact harmed, but rather whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention. In short, [r]ipeness doctrine addresses a timing question: when in time is it appropriate for a court to take up the asserted claim.” Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1116 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Generally, a court “evaluate[s] the fitness
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of the issue for j udicial resolution and the ha rdship to the parties of withholding judicial consideration.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Further, in evaluating whether a case is “ripe”, “the central focus is on whether the casienvolves uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, orindeed may not occur at all.” Initiative and Referendum Inst., 450 F.3d at 1097 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Having carefully reviewed the briefs on this issue, and having heard the e vidence a nd arguments presented at the hearing, the Court finds that the instant action is ripe for determination. Specifically, the Court finds that plaintiff’s claims are fit for judicial resolution. Election results show that voters approved State Question 755, and, ht us, only certification of the election results is required for the amendment to take effect. Once the amendment is in place, any alleged violation of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights would occur. The Court further finds plaintiff would suffer significant hardship if judicial consideration of plaintiff’s claims were withheld.
Additionally, the Court finds that plaintiff’salleged injury does not depend on any uncertain, contingent future events; all that is rem aining is the ministerial task of defendants certifying the election results, which no party contends will not occur once any injunction is lifted by the Court. In fact, t he Agenda for the Oklahom a State Election Board Meeting which was to occur on November 22, 2010 included an item regarding the certification of the election results for State Question 755. See Agenda for Oklahoma State Election Board Meeting, plaintiff’s hearing Exhibit 7. Finally, the Court finds that because plaintiff is making a facial challenge to the amendment at issue, there is no need for the Court to wait for any Oklahoma court to interpret said amendment. Nothing will be gained by allowing the issues in this case to develop further.
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IV. Preliminary Injunction A movant seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of success
on the m erits; (2) irreparable injury to the m ovant if the injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the party opposing the preliminary injunction; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interesDt. ominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 269 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10 th Cir. 2001). “Because a prelim inary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the movant’s right to relief mus t be clear and unequivocal.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Whether to grant a preliminary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 191 F.3d 1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999).
If, however, a m ovant is seeking a disfavored prelim inary i njunction – prelim inary injunctions that alter the status quo, mandatory preliminary injunctions, or preliminary injunctions that afford the movant all the reliefthat it could recover at the conclusion ofa full trial on the merits – the movant must satisfy a heightened burden. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 975 (10th Cir. 2004). “[A]ny preliminary injunction fitting within one of the disfavored categories must be more closely scrutinized to assure that the exigencies of the case support the granting of a rem edy that is extraordinary even in the norm al cours e.” Id. at 975. Specifically, “a party seeking such an injunction must make a strong showing both with regard to the likelihood of success on the merits and with regard to the balance of harms”. Id. at 976.
As set forth above, plaintiff r equests the Cour t to enjoin defendants from certifying the election results for State Question 755. Because this requested prelim inary injunction alters the status quo and affords plaintiff all the relief that hecould recover at the conclusion of a full trial on
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the merits, the Court finds that it is a disfavored preliminary injunction and plaintiff must satisfy a heightened burden.
A. Likelihood of success on the merits As set forth above, plaintiff asserts that State Question 755’s amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution violates the First Am endment’s Establishm ent Clause. W hen a claim asserting a violation of the Establishm ent Clause has been m ade, “[ t]o pass constitutional m uster, the governmental action (1) must have a secular legislative purpose, (2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it m ust not foster an exce ssive government entanglement with religion.” Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, N.M., 541 F.3d 1017, 1030 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, for plaintiff to prevail on this claim, the amendment must fail to meet at least one of these three prongs. The purpose and effect prongs of the test ar e interpreted i n l ight of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test. “Under the ‘endorsement test,’ the government impermissibly endorses religion if its conduct has either (1) the purpose or (2) the effect of conveying a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, “[u]nder the [endorsem ent] tes t, the purpose prong of the . . . test asks whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapporve of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.” Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir. 2010). Having carefully reviewed the briefs on this issue, and having h eard the evidence and arguments presented at the hearing, the Cour t finds plaintiff has m ade a strong showing of a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of hisclaim asserting a violation of the Establishment
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Clause. Specifically, the Court finds that plaintiff has made a strong showing that State Question 755’s amendment’s primary effect inhibits religion and that the am endment fosters an excessive government entanglement with religion. While defendants contend that the amendment is merely a choice of law provision that bans state courts form applying the law of other nations and cultures, regardless of what faith they m ay be based on, if any, the actual language of the am endment reasonably, and perhaps more reasonably, may be viewed as specifically singling out Sharia Law, conveying a message of disapproval of plaintiff’s faith. The amendment creates two independent restrictions on use/consideration of Sharia Law: (1) the amendment requires that Oklahoma courts “shall not consider . . . Sharia Law”, and (2) thaemendment allows Oklahoma courts to use/consider the law of another st ate of the United States but only if “the other state does not include Sharia Law”. No other “legal precepts of other nations or cultures” is similarly restricted with respect to the law of another state.
Furthermore, plaintiff has presented testimony that “Sharia Law” is not actually “law”, but is religious traditions that provide guidance to plaintiff and other Muslims regarding the exercise of their faith. Plaintiff has presented testimony that the obligations that “Sharia Law” imposes are not legal obligations but are obligations of a personal and private nature dictated by faith. Plaintiff also testified that “Sharia Law” differs depending on the count ry in which the individual Muslim resides. For example, plaintiff stated that marrying more than one wife is permissible in Islam but in the United States, where that is illegal, Muslims do not marry more than one wife because Sharia in the United States mandates Muslims to abide by the law of the land and respect the law of their land. Based upon this testimony, the Court finds thatplaintiff has shown “Sharia Law” lacks a legal character, and, thus, plaintiff’s religious traditions and faith are the only non-legal content subject
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to the judicial exclusion set forth in the amendment. As a result, the Court finds plaintiff has made a strong showing that the am endment conveys a me ssage of disapproval of plaintiff’s faith and, consequently, has the effect of inhibiting plaintiff’s religion.
Additionally, the Court finds that plaintiff has made a strong showing that the amendment will foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Because, as set forth above, Sharia Law is not “law” but is religious traditions thatdiffer among Muslims, the Court finds that plaintiff has shown that to comply with the amendment, Oklahoma courts will be faced with determining the content of Sharia Law, and, thus, the content of plaintiff’s religious doctrines. The United States Supreme Court has held: “[i]t is well established . . . that courtsshould refrain from trolling through a person’s or institution’s religious beliefs.” Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000).
Plaintiff also asserts that State Question 755’s am endment to the Oklahom a Constitution violates the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. “At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discrim inates against som e or all religious belief s or regulates or prohibits conduct because itis undertaken for religious reasons.”Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993). Further, “[a]lthough a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never perm issible, if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a com pelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Id. at 533 (internal citations omitted). However, “a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a com pelling governm ental i nterest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Id. at 531.
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Having carefully reviewed the briefs on t his i ssue, and having heard the evidence and arguments presented a t the hearing, the Court fi nds plaintiff has m ade a strong showing of a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of hisclaim asserting a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. As set forth above , pl aintiff has s hown that the actual language of the am endment reasonably, and perhaps more reasonably, may be viewed as specifically singling out Sharia Law (plaintiff’s faith) and, thus, is not facially neutral. Additionally, as set forth above, the Court finds that plaintiff has shown that there is a reasonable probability that the am endment would prevent plaintiff’s will from being fully probated by a state court in Oklahoma because it incorporates by reference specific elements of the Islam ic prophetic traditions. Further, plaintif f has presented evidence that there is a reasonable probability that Muslims, including plaintiff, will be unable to bring actions in Oklahoma state courts for violations of the Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act and for violations of their rights under the United Staet s Constitution if those violations are based upon their religion. Fina lly, the Court finds that de fendants have presented no evidence which would show that the amendment is justified by any compelling interest or is narrowly tailored.
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has m ade a strong showing of a substant ial likelihood of success on the merits.
B. Irreparable injury Plaintiff contends that he will be irreparabl y injured because he will suffer the loss of his First Amendment freedoms at the moment defendants certify State Question 755’s election results. “The loss of First Am endment freedom s, for eve n mi nimal periods of tim e, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has shown thathe will suffer irreparable injuryin the absence ofinjunctive relief.
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C. Balance of harms A movant seeking a prelim inary injunction m ust show that the threatened injury t o him outweighs the injury to the party opposing the preliminary injunction. In the case at bar, plaintiff, therefore, must show that the alleged loss of his First Amendment freedoms outweighs any injury that would occur from delaying the will of the voters being carried out by certif ying the election results. As set f orth at the beginning of this Order, the Bill of Rights protects certain individual rights from being taken away by the will of the majority. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. at 638. Based upon this constitutional ranking of interests,the Court finds that the weighing of the harms involved in this case clearly would favorprotecting plaintiff’s First Amendment rights over the will ofthe voters. The Court alsoifnds thatany harm that would result from a delay in certifying the election results is further minimized in light of the undisputed fact that the amendment at issue was to be a preventative m easure and t hat the concern that it seeks to address has yet to occur. Specifically, when questioned at the hearing, defendants’ counsel stated that he was not aware of any Oklahoma court who had used the precepts of other nations or cultures and was not aware of any situation where Sharia Law has been applied in an Oklahoma court. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff ha s made a strong showing that the threatened injury to him outweighs the injury to the party opposing the preliminary injunction. D. Public interest Finally, a movant seeking a preliminary injunction must show that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Having carefully reviewed the briefs on this issue, and having heard the evidence and argum ents presented at the hearing, the Court finds that entry of a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from certifying the election results for State Question
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755 would not be adverse to the public interest. While the public has an interest in the will of the voters being carried out, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the public has a more profound and long-term interest in upholding an i ndividual’s constitutional rights. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, “[i]t is always in the public i nterest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994). Furthe r, Okl ahoma has enacted the Oklahom a Religious Freedom Act, which provides that “no governmental entity shall substantially burden a perosn’s free exercise of religion”. Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 253 (A). The Court finds that the enactment of this Act further indicates that it is in the public interest to uphold an individual’s constitutional right to freedom of religion.
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff hsashown that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. V. Conclusion
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction and ENJOINS defendants from certifying the election results for Stat e Question 755 until this Court rules on the merits of plaintiff’s claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of November, 2010.
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 Case 5:10-cv-01186-M Document 46 Filed 07/29/12 Page 1 of 33

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

(1) MUNEER AWAD,

)

(2) ADAM SOLTANI,

)

(3) IMAD ENCHASSI,

)

(4) DOUGLAS MOCK, and

)

(5) PATRICIA SCHWAGMEYER,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

-vs-

) No. CIV-10-1186-M

)

(1) PAUL ZIRIAX, Secretary of the Oklahoma State )

Election Board;

)

(2) STEVE CURRY, Chairman of the Oklahoma )

State Election Board;

)

(3) TOM MONTGOMERY, Vice-Chairman of the )

Oklahoma State Election Board;

)

(4) VACANT POSITION, Member of the Oklahoma )

State Election Board; and

)

)

Other persons who receive actual notice of an )

order including alternate members of the

)

Oklahoma State Election Board, the parties, the )

parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and )

attorneys; as well as other persons who are in )

active concert or participation with anyone

)

described in Fed.Rul.Civ.Pro. 65(d)(2)(A) or (B) )

)

Defendants.

)

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

(Violation of Establishment and Free Exercies Clauses of the First Amendment, Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Supremacy Clause in Art. VI, cl. 2 of the Constitution of the United States)

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I. -Preliminary Statement-
1. On November 2, 2010, Oklahoma voters approved State Question 755 (“SQ755”), which would add the “Save Our State Amendment” to the Oklahoma Constitution. SQ755 forbids Oklahoma courts and other adjudicative bodies from considering “Sharia Law.” The ballot title presented to voters defined “Sharia Law” as “Islamic law” and stated that Sharia is “based on two principal sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.” SQ755’s sponsors and supporters touted the amendment as a preemptive strike necessary to protect Oklahoma’s judicial system from being infiltrated and taken over by Sharia law, andpresumably, Muslims. It was a solution in search of a problem. As the U.S. Coutr of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit observed in upholding this Court’s preliminary injunction against certification: The State could not identify “even a single instance where an Oklahom a court had applied Sharia law or used the legal precepts of other nations or cultures, let alone that such applications or uses had resulted in concrete problems in Oklahoma.” Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1130 (10th Cir. 2012).
2. Because SQ755 singles out Sharia law and Islam ic religious teachings for official disapproval and rejection, its certification by Defendant members of the Oklahoma State Election Board would have the immediate effect of stigmatizing and marginalizing Islam and its adherents, including Plaintiffs Muneer Awad, Adam Soltani, and Imad Enchassi, who would thereby suffer immediate and concrete condemnation injury to their religious beliefs. In condemning Plaintiffs’ faith in this m anner, SQ755, if allowed to take effect, woul d r elegate these Plaintiffs and all Oklahoman Muslims to second-class citizenship on the basis of their religion.
3. By disfavoring Islam, SQ755, if certified, also would engender imminent injury by depriving Plaintiffs Awad, Sol tani, and Enchassi of access to state courts and other adjudicative
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bodies on the sam e term s as every other citizen. It would im pose on these Pla intiffs special disabilities and burdens not faced by Oklahomans of any other faith: Upon certification, Muslims seeking relief from a state adjudicative body would be required to ensure that their legal c laims, defenses, evidence, and arguments are scrubbed of all references to their faith – even where relevant – because “Sharia Law” m ay not be considered at all under SQ755. W here Plaintiffs’ and other Muslims’ religion is essential to an adjudicative m atter, SQ755 would further unduly burden the practice of Islam because it is Islam ic, and the ma tter would effectively becom e non-justiciable. SQ755’s treatment of Sharia Law and Islam, therefore, violates both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
4. SQ755 also instructs Oklahoma courts and other adjudicative agencies to disregard the “legal precepts of other nations or cultures” and “international law.”
5. If SQ755 is certified by these Defe ndants, these additional provisions of SQ755 would harm Oklahoma residents married in a foreign country, including Plaintiffs Douglas Mock and Patricia Schwagmeyer, who were wed in Scotland, as well as persons binding them selves to other contracts under, or involving, foreign law. Specifically, SQ755 would effectively pr event adjudicative bodies from recognizing marriages solemnized under foreign law, violating both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of t he Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
6. Under SQ755, Plaintiffs Mock and Schwagm eyer woul d be forced to assum e substantial additional burdens to prove the existence of their marriage within the State of Oklahoma and would be denied the right to pr ove a foreign m arriage by reference to the foreign law under which it was solemnized, or by use of international law conventions to authenticate foreign legal
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documents evidencing such m arriages within countries signatory to the Hague Convention of October 5, 1961. As a result, SQ755 could significantly impede Plaintiffs’ ability to defend their marital status and relationship for various benefits, such as qualification for benefits through the Oklahoma Teacher Retirement System (“OTRS”) where a spouse must execute a spousal consent form before a m ember’s retirem ent becom es effective. See OTRS Regulation 715:10-15-12. Spousal Consent. Both Pl aintiffs Mock and Schwagm eyer are nearing retirem ent and will be required to prove their marital relationship and status.
7. If certified, SQ755 would also command its judges to ignore international law and conventions which other states are bound not only to consider but to enforce. Such rejection of international law contravenes the Supremacy Clause which declares “. . . all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States . . . the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
8. Oklahoma cannot reject all international law. The Supreme Court has held that “a narrow class of international norm s” rem ains enforceable in dom estic courts. Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737 (2004). “[B]ecause some international law is part of the federal law that state judges and justices are bound to enforce,” e.g., treaties and customary international law, SQ755 would make Oklahoma adjudicators scofflaws and deny persons with controversies before them justice under the supreme law of the land.See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and m ust be ascertained and adm inistered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction . . .”); see also First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622-23 (1983).
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9. Plaintiffs show a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the m erits of t his action opposing the grave constitutional infirmities of SQ755and are entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining its certification by the Defendant members of the State Election Board.
10. If certified, SQ755 will irreparably harm Plaintiffs’ ba sic fundam ental rights of religion, marriage, and equal protection and the application of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
II. -Jurisdiction and Venue-
11. Jurisdiction is conferred by: 28 U.S.C. §1343 (civil rights violations); 28 U.S.C. §1331 (federal questions) which provides for original jurisdiction of this Court in suits that ari se under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States; 28 U.S.C. §2201 (declaratory relief); and 28 U.S.C. §2202 (further relief).
12. Plaintiffs’ causes of action arise under 42 U.S.C. §1983 to redress the deprivation under color of State law of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United St ates and laws. These claim s are predi cated on violations of the First and Fourteent h Amendments, and the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, cl. 2) of the Constitution of the United States.
13. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prevents the establishment of religion and protects free exercise.
14. The Fourteenth Amendment provides for due process and equal protection of the laws and also makes the First Amendment applicable to state actors such as the Defendants through its due process clause.
15. The Supremacy Clause declares “. . . all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States . . . the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
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shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any St ate to the contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
16. Plaintiffs also assert a fee entitlement for a prevailing party pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
17. Venue is proper in this Cour t pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) in that at least one Defendant(s) resides in this District, has an office located in this District, and receives mail in this District. On information and belief, this Court has jurisdiction overthe subject matter of this action and can acquire in personam jurisdiction over D efendants named in this action, any additional defendants who might be named, or any persons subject to injunctive relief pur suant to Fed. Rul. Civ. Pro. 65.
18. Plaintiff Awad is the subject of a prelim inary i njunction granted by this Court enjoining election certification of SQ755 therebystaying its effectiveness. (Doc. 020, 11/29/2010), affirmed, Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10 th Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs in addition to Muneer Awad seek all equivalent and necessary forms of declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin certification of SQ755 including a tem porary restraining order, a prelim inary injunction, and a perm anent injunction all as provided by Fed.Rul.Civ.Pro. 65.
III. -Plaintiffs-
19. All factual allegations contained in thepreceding paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set out in full.
20. Plaintiff Muneer Awad is a U.S. citizenborn in Ann Arbor, Michigan, who has lived in the State of Oklahoma and has been an employee of the Council on American Islamic RelationsOklahoma (“CAIR-OK”) for the duration of this litigation. He is a devout adherent of the Muslim
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faith. Plaintiff Awad’s purpose and that of CAI-ROK and CAIR nationwide is to empower Muslims in Oklahoma and other states to become politically involved so as to enhance the understanding and acceptance of Islam, and to defend the civil rights of Muslims in Oklahoma and the United States. To advance that purpose Awad is moving to New York to accept a position with a CAIR affiliate there while continuing to m aintain strong ties to Oklahom a and CAIR-OK. Plaintiff Awad will remain an Assistant Executive Director f or CAIR-OK and will also consult with CAIR-OK on various issues. Plaintiff Awad will be required to return to Oklahoma on an occasional basis over the next several months and on other occasions beyond that.
21. Plaintiff Adam Sol tani is a U.S. citizen born in the United States who resides in Oklahoma and is also an employee of CAIR-OK. He is a devout adherent of the Muslimfaith and shares the purposes of Plaintiff Awad to enhance the understanding and acceptance of Islamand to defend the civil rights of Muslims.
22. Plaintiff Imad Enchassi is a U.S. citizen who resides in Oklahoma. He is a devout adherent of the Muslim faith. He is the Im am of the Islamic Society of Greater Oklahoma City (“ISGOC”). As Imam, Enchassi leads prayer and worship at the mosque, provides guidance in the tenets of Islam and worship to Muslimadherentsin Oklahoma, and provideseducational information regarding Islam to nonadherents. He also carries out a wide r ange of religious clerical duties, including solemnizing marriages. Enchassi has studied the Islamic religion in several of rmal Islamic educational settings, earned academic degrees in Islam ic studies from educational institutions in Lebanon and other certif ications of his traini ng and education under the law of Lebanon. The validity, authentication, and acceptance of his degreesand religious credentials in the United States depend upon consideration of foreign law.
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23. Plaintiff Douglas Mock and Pl aintiff Patricia Schwagmeyer are U.S. citizens who reside in Oklahoma. They are both tenured faculty members at a state university in Oklahoma. Dr. Mock is a Research Professor ofBiology. Dr. Schwagmeyer is a Professor of Biology. They were married in Scotland in 1983 in compliance with thelaws of Scotland. Their marriage has never been solemnized within the United States and the only form al docum entary evidence of their 1983 marriage is an official certified record containing anextract fromthe Register of Marriages fromthe Scottish District where the marriage was performed. The authentication ofthis marriage certificate and validity of this ceremonial marriage within the United States and the State of Oklahoma depend upon consideration of an international law convention on the authentication of foreign documents and consideration of foreign laws.
IV. -Defendants-
24. All factual allegations contained in thepreceding paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set out in full.
25. Defendant Paul Ziriax is the Secret ary of t he Oklahom a State Election Board. Oklahoma statutes provide that the Secretary of the Senate is also Secretary of the Oklahoma State Election Board. 26 O kla. §2-101.6. The O klahoma Constitution authorizes the O klahoma State Legislature to create an Election Board. Okl a. Const., Art. III, §2. The Oklahom a State Election Board consists of three (3) members and two (2)alternate members appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. An alternate serves on the Board at any m eeting which the member for whom the person is an alternate is unable to attend. 26 Okla. Stat. §2-101.
26. Defendant Steve Curry is the Chairman of the Oklahoma State Election Board. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman are elected every four years. 26 Okla. Stat. §2-107.7.
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27. Defendant Tom Montgomery is the Vice-Chairman of the Election Board. 28. The third position on the Election Board is presentl y vacant as the previously appointed member, Jim Roth, was not confirmed by the Oklahoma State Senate. 29. There are two alternate members of theElection Board, Jerry Buchanan and Dr. Tim Mauldin. One of these persons will serve as amember of the Election Board until a new appointee to the Board by the Governor is confirmed by the Senate. 30. There may be other persons who receive acutal notice of an order, including alternate members of the Oklahoma State Election Board, the parties, the parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; as well as other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2)(A) or (B ) who are subject to the authority of injunctions issued by this Court. It isthe intention of these Plaintiffs that such persons be bound by the existing preliminary injunction enjoining certification and by any further orders of this Court, and Plaintiffs respectfully ask that anysuch persons be joined as party defendants to this action as may appear proper to the Court.
IV. ADDITIONAL FACTS
31. All factual allegations contained in thepreceding paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set out in full. Although allegations may be identified with regard to particular Plaintiffs and Defendants, it is intended that, if any allegation m ay be applied to other Plaintiffs or Defe ndants, the allegation should be construed to apply to them. A. PASSAGE OF SQ755.
32. On January 10, 2010, Rep. Rex Dunc an introduced House Joint Resolution 1056 (“HJR 1056 ”) in the Oklahoma State House. Sen. Anthony Sykes sponsored the same measure in
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the State Senate. 33. As introduced, HJ R 1056 expressly singled out “Sharia Law.” The m easure was
amended to include a second reference that allowed courts to consider the law of other U.S. states, “provided [that] the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law.”
34. On May 18, 2010, the House voted to approve HJR 1056. The Senate followed suit on May 24, 2010. HJR 1056 eventually became State Question 755.
35. The resolution approved placing a state question on the next electoral ballot seeking voter approval of a constitutional amendment entitled the “Save Our State Amendment.” Section C of the Resolution declared that:
The Courts provided for in subsection A otfhis section when exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as pr ovided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, establishedcommon law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States provided the law of the othe r state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal pr ecepts of other nations or cultures. Specif ically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first impression. 36. Under Section A, SQ755 would apply to nearly all adjudicative bodies in the state, including the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment; the Oklahoma Supreme Court; the Court of Criminal Appeals; the Court on the Judiciar y; the State Industrial (W orkers’ Compensation) Court; the Court of Bank Review; the Court of Tax Review; intermediate appellate courts; district courts; m unicipal courts; and such boards, agencies, and com missions created by the St ate Constitution or established by statute that exerci se adjudicative authority or render decisions in individual proceedings. 37. Defendants a dmit that there is no evidence that any Oklahom a body has ever
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improperly im posed “Sharia Law” in its pr oceedings. Nevertheless, the resolution’s prim ary sponsors claimed, without any support or explana tion, that SQ755 was necessary t o preempt the threat posed by Sharia law to what they view as America’s Judeo-Christian heritage. While HJR 1056 included provisions relating to foreign and international law, the anti-Sharia provisions were key to its passage, and legislators would not have approved it without them.
38. Joint resolutions for state questions generally include a proposed ballot title. When a resolution is passed by both houses , it is sent to the Secretary of State who m ust forward the resolution to the Attorney General of r a review asto the legal sufficiency of the ballot title. 34 Okla. Stat. §9(C) (2009). Section 9(C)(1) requires th at the Attorney General notify, i n writing, “the Secretary of State, the President Pro Tem pore of t he Se nate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives whether or not the proposed ballot title complies with applicable laws” and “state with specificity any and all defects found.” 34 Okla. Stat. §9(C)(1) (2009).
39. “The Attorney General shall . . . within ten (10) business days of determining that the proposed ballot title is defective, prepare a preliminary ballot title which complies with the law and furnish a copy of such ballot title to the Secretary of State, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Attorney General may consider any comments m ade by the President Pro Tem pore of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives and shall file a final ballot title with the Secretary of State no sooner than ten (10) business days and no later than fifteen (15) business days after furnishing the prelim inary ballot title.” 34 Okla. Stat. §9(C)(1) (2009).
40. After passing HJR 1056, the Legislature sent it to the Attorney General for the review required by 34 Okla. Stat. §9(C)(1)(2009). Dete rmining that t he pr oposed ballot title did not
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“adequately explain the effect of the proposition” because it failed to define “what either Sharia law or international law is,” the Attorney General prepared a revised ballot title, which provided:
This measure amends the State Constitution. It changes a section that deals with the courts of this state. It would am end Article 7, Section 1. It m akes courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases. Iftorbids courts fromconsidering or using international law. It forbids courts from considering or using Sharia Law. International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals with the conduct of international organizations and independent nations, such as countries, states and tribes. It deals with their relationship with each other. It also deals with som e of their relationships with persons. The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations. Sources of international law also include international agreements, as well as treaties. Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed. Shall the proposal be approved? 41. After the Attorney General subm itted this revised prelim inary ballot title to the Secretary of State, Senate President Pro Tempore, and House Speaker for review, it was placed on the ballot as State Question No. 755. There is no evidence that legislative leaders objected to or expressed any concerns about the proposed revisionsto the ballot title. The Attorney General made no further changes to the prelim inary ballot title, finalized its language, a nd r eturned it to the Secretary of State. 42. Because the title is the only reference to the amendment seen by the voters on their ballots, under Oklahoma law, “. . . when construing a constitutional amendment that was proposed by the Legislature,” courts must “read the ballot title together with the text of the measure, even if the text of the m easure contains no am biguities or absurdities.” Southwestern B ell T el. C o. v. Oklahoma State Bd. of Equalization, 231 P.3d 638, 642 (Okla. 2009).
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43. On November 2, 2010, just over 70% of Oklahomans who voted approved SQ755. However, the amendment will not officially take effect until after the Defendant Oklahoma State Election Board certifies the results of the election and, as a ministerial act, the Governor proclaims the measure “approved by the people.” 34 Okla. Stat. §5 (1992).
44. Like state legislators, voters understood themeasure to be a preemptive strike against Sharia Law and would not have approved the m easure without i ts a nti-Sharia provisions. On information and belief, in the m onths lead ing up t o t he e lection, robocalls supporting SQ755 concentrated solely on i ts anti-Sharia provisions, and media coverage emphasized the measure’s focus on Sharia and Islam. SQ755’s international and foreign law provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and incapable of being executed in accordance with the intent of the Legislature and voters.
45. SQ755’s specific, emphatic rejection of “Sharia Law” means that if certified it will discriminate among religions in violation of the Establishment Clause and can survive only if it is “closely fitted to the furtherance of any compelling interest asserted.” “Strict scrutiny is required when laws discriminate among religions because “[n]eutral treatment of religions [is] ‘the clearest command of the Establishment Clause.’” “The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion.... The State m ay not adopt progr ams or practices ... which aid or oppose any religion.... This prohibition is absol ute.” Awad v. Ziriax , 670 F.3d at 1127 quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, 246, 255 (1982). SQ755 fails the test of strict scrutiny.
B. SQ755's HARMFUL IMPACT ON PLAI NTIFFS AWAD, ENCHASSI, SOLTANI, AND OTHER MUSLIMS. 46. Plaintiffs Awad, Enchassi, and Soltani live their lives in accordance with a set of
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religious principles set forth in the Quran, theMuslim Holy Book, and the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed, which are collected in religious guidescalled “Hadiths.” Such teachings and Quranic dictates comprise the foundation from which many clergy and believers have derived the content of their religious obligations. Plaintif fs Awad, Soltani, and Enchassi ref er to these religious obligations collectively as “Sharia law” and it servesas a guide for themand other Muslims to apply and practice their faith in everyday life, covering topics that include even mundane matters such as dress, grooming, and social interactions.
47. Plaintiff Enchassi solemnizes marriages within the Islamic faith in accordance with what SQ755 describes as “Sharia law” and records that solemnization on marriage licenses issued by court clerks within the State of Oklahom a. Those licenses are returned to the Court Cl erk for recording as public records of new marriage relationships.
48. While Sharia law is defined by reference to certain primary sources, it does not exist in a uniform, monolithic state. There is no singledocument that exhaustively contains Sharia law. Rather, the m eaning and requirem ents of Sharia law are subject to individual and com munal interpretations and thus differ from region to region, across denominations, and among individual Muslims. One central tenet of Sharia – that Muslims live in accordance with the law of the nation in which they reside – provides for such differecnes. Thus, as PlaintiffsAwad, Enchassi, and Soltani practice their religion, following U.S. and Oklahoma law is paramount to living a virtuous and faithabiding life.
49. Upon learning about the “Save Our StateAmendment,” Plaintiff Awad immediately became concerned that it “was basically going to forbid the consideration of I slam in our courtrooms, and in the process enshrine Islam in a negative light in our S tate’s Constitution.”
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Specifically, Awad was disturbed that the m easure’s sponsors seemed “to go out of their way to specifically isolate Sharia,” which he observed was the “only religious faith mentioned” in SQ755 and ballot title. Awad feels that SQ755 denigrates his faith – characterized by SQ755 proponents “as a threat to the State of Oklahoma” – and, if certified, will effectively erect a wall between him and his own state legislators. He believes that SQ755 would “shine a negative, condemning and demonizing light on my faith” and that, “as Muslims in this community, we felt somewhat attacked by our own politicians.” Awad objects to and is offended by this official disapproval of his faith.
50. Moreover, Awad is disturbed that the propoesd amendment purports to define, or asks Oklahoma courts to define, what constitutes “Sharia Law,” which, as noted above, is a religious practice that varies by geography, denomination, and individual adherent. Awad has stated, “I don’t think it’s the place of the court to define what as pects of my religion are Sharia and which par ts aren’t.”
51. Similarly, Plaintiff Soltani followed the coverage of SQ755 and saw how the ballot initiative and its proponents stigmatized and attached disabilities to his religious beliefs. Plaintiff Soltani experienced directly how consideration of SQ755 cast Islam in a negative and denigrating light, how it would isolate and m arginalize Muslims such as the Plaintiffs and their beliefs as a matter of Oklahom a law, encouraged a ttacks on Islam by others, and designated him and other Muslims as “outsiders” within their own State. Plaintiff Soltani’s colleagues questioned himabout the contents of his faith, having been influe nced by the me ssage of condem nation that SQ755 broadcasts about Islam. Soltani objects to and is offended by this official disapproval of his faith.
52. Plaintiff Enchassi likewise believes that SQ755 denigrates and condemns his faith. This condemnation makes him feel like a political outsider in Oklahom a. He believes that, once
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certified, SQ755 will isolate and marginalize Muslims, encourage attacks on Islam by others, and designate Muslim s as political “outsiders” within their own State. Enchassi objects to and is offended by this official disapproval of his faith.
53. In addition, Plaintiff Awad is deeply concerned that SQ755, once certified, could disable a court from probating his last will and testament, which incorporates by reference aspects of what SQ755 defines as Sharia law. Awad believes that Sharia imposes requirements on “every aspect of a Muslim’s life, even up until death.”
54. In drafting his will, Plaintiff Awad specifically wanted to incorporate aspects ofhis faith that he felt were appropriate with respect to how he would be buried and also with respect to how to devise his property after death.
55. Plaintiff Awad’s will directs the executor todonate portions of his estate to “charities that advance the civil liberties of Muslim s in a m anner that does not e xceed t he proscribed limitations found in Sahih Bukhari, Volum e 4, Book 51, Num ber 7. Awad explains that he incorporated by reference this element of Sharia law because, “in line with my faith, I wish to give a significant am ount of m y property to charity upon m y death,” noting that “[i]n Islam , it i s mandated how one can give to charity upon his death.There are certain rules. One should not give too much; one shouldn’t neglect their family.”
56. Awad’s will also requests that, after death, his body should be prepared in a manner that “comports precisely with the Hadith enumerated in Sahih Bukhari, Volume 2, Book 23, Number 345.” It further requests that, “i[]n compliance with my Islamic faith, the Executor shall also arrange for a burial plot that allows my body to be interned [sic] with my head pointed in the direction of Mecca,” and that a prayer be organized “in accordance with Sahih Al-Bukhari, Chapter 28, Section
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LIII, Number 1255 and the first paragraph of Section LV.” 57. Plaintiff Awad incorporated these provisions into his will as part of his religious
exercise because he believes that Sharia law requires funerals and burials to be conducted in a specific way and because he chooses to live his life in the example that the prophet set for his followers. Awad considers it a m atter of his religious exercise to choose how to be buried upon death.
58. Plaintiff Soltani is also deeply concerned that SQ755, once certified, could disable a court from probating his last will and testament, which incorporates by reference aspects of what SQ755 defines as Sharia law.
59. In drafting his will, Plaintiff Soltani specifically wanted to incorporate aspects ofhis faith that he felt were appropriate with respect to how he would be buried, how his grave is to be marked, and also with respect to how to devise his property after death.
60. Plaintiff Soltani’s will directs the execu tor to donate portions of hi s estate to “charities that advance the civil liberties ofMuslims in a manner that does not exceed the proscribed limitations found in Sahih Bukhari, Volume 4, Book 51, Number 7.”
61. Plaintiff Soltani’s will also directs that, after death, his body should be prepared in a manner that described in “Sahih Bukhari, Volum e 2, Book 23, Num ber 357.” He directs no autopsy or embalming to be done on his body, thathis grave site face Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and that his grave, if it must be marked, to be marked with a simple rock.
62. Plaintiff Awad attended college at the Univ ersity of Georgia, a public e ducational institution in Athens, Georgia, where he took various classes in Islamic studies from Dr. Kenneth Honerkamp. Awad took further classes in Isla mic studies in Morocco under the aegis of the
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University of Georgia and Dr. Honerkamp, and other classes in Islamic studies at local Moroccan universities as a part of this “study abroad” program. Each of these classes involved teachings of the prophet Muham mad, the Quran, and the exam ples of the life of the prophet and are part of Sharia. If SQ755 is certified, Plaintiff Awad, or any other person who completes classes in Islamic studies or Sharia outside the State of Oklahoma would be unable to transfer such study c redits to public schools including colleges and universities withinthe State of Oklahoma in that such transfer would require an adjudicative evaluation of coursceontent that considers Sharia and Islamic studies, consideration forbidden by SQ755.
63. On November 29, 2010, this Court issued apreliminary injunction based on Plaintiff Awad’s Establishment Clause and Free Exercise claim s recited in the original Com plaint in this cause. (Doc . 020, 11/29/2010). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirm ed that decision and upheld the injunction. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
64. Plaintiff Enchassi has earned a Bachelors degree, a Masters degree, and a doctoral degree from the University Institute of Vocation for Islamic Studies in Lebanon. The University Institute is a public education institution credentialed by the Departm ent of Higher Educati on of Lebanon. His degrees in Islam ic studies involve the study of Islam ic law and the tea chings of Mohammed including the Hadiths and Sharia. Plaintiff Enchassi’s degrees are issued under the law of Lebanon and authenticated by the Lebanese Government. The degree documents have also been authenticated by the United States Embassy in Lebanon for use within the United States.
65. Plaintiff Enchassi has used these authenticated credentials in Oklahoma for various registrations as an Im am or religious person. If SQ755 becom es law, each tim e that Plaintiff Enchassi’s credentials are subject to review byan Oklahoma court or adjudicative body, they must
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be rejected because SQ755 requires that a court oradjudicative body “not consider . . . Sharia Law” or the “. . . legal precepts of other nations or cultures.”
66. For exam ple, Pla intiff Enchassi regularly perform s m arriages in Oklahom a solemnized under Sharia and Islamic law. Duringhis service in Oklahoma, Enchassi has performed at least 1,000 such marriages. It is a regular religious exercise performed as a part of his duties as Imam. Like clerics of other religions, Enchassi has complied with state law regarding marriages. Oklahoma law requires that “[a]ll marriages must be contracted by a formal ceremony performed or solemnized by . . . an ordained or authorized preacher or minister of the Gospel, priest or other ecclesiastical dignitary of any denomination who has been duly authorized by the church to which he or she belongs to preach the Gospel, or a rabbi and who is at least eighteen (18) years of age.” 43 Okla. Stat. §7(A). “The preacher , minister, priest, rabbi, or ecclesiastical dignitary who is a resident of this state shall have filed, in the officeof the court clerk of thecounty in which he or she resides, a copy of the credentials or authority from his or her church or synagogue authorizing him or her to solemnize marriages.” 43 Okla. Stat. §7(B)(2).
67. Each tim e Enchassi performs such a m arriage, he is obligated to com plete the marriage license issued by the court clerk of the state district court. See 43 Okla. Stat. §43. The solemnization of the marriage performed by Enchassi is in accordance with Islamic law. When a marriage license is returned to a court clerk or judge who issued the certificate, the state official receiving the com pleted form m ust ascertain whether the returned certificate com plies wi th Oklahoma law. This would appear to include a reveiw of whether Enchassi is authorized to perform marriage solem nization in Okl ahoma based upon his previously filed credentials issued in accordance with Islamic law and a review of compliance of completion and return of the Marriage
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License. 68. If SQ755 is certified by Defendants, a court clerk woul d be forbidden from
“considering” Sharia law a nd therefore would be required to refuse to acknowledge Enchassi’s credentials or recognize a marriage solemnized by him in accordance with Sharia Law. Because it imposes an obligatory prohibition against consider ation of Sharia Law, if SQ755 is c ertified by Defendants, persons marrying within the State of Oklahoma in accordance with Sharia Law would be unable to have their marriage registered upon the return of the license to the court clerk.
69. SQ755, if certified, would also interfere with other activities Enchassi performs as a cleric. Title 12 Okla. Stat. §2505(B)authorizes an evidentiary privilege “to refuse to disclose and prevent another from disclosing his confidential communications made to a clergyman acting in his professional capacity.” Subsection (C) provides, “Thecleric is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the communicant.”
70. Subsection A(1) provides that a “cleric” is a “. . . minister, priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science practitioner or other sim ilar f unctionary of a religious organization, or any individual reasonably believed to be a cleric by the person consulting with the cleric.” Subsection A(2) provides that a “. . . communications is ‘confidential’ if made privately and not intended for further disclosure except to other persons pr esent in furtherance of the purpose of the communications.”
71. In the performance of his duties as Imam, Plaintiff Enchassi frequently counsels with jail and prison inmates on religious issues and other matters of a personal and confidential nature. He also provides religious counseling to members of the ISGOC and others. However, if SQ755 is certified by Defendants, a court or adjudicativebody would not be permitted to consider Plaintiff
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Enchassi’s credentials as an Im am because they are based upon Sharia Law, and t he evidentiary privilege could, therefore, be abrogated. Indeed, evenif Enchassi were never called to testiyf in any proceeding, the mere uncertainty that SQ755 would create over the privilege would significantly hinder Enchassi’s ability to provide religious counsleing to others while clerics of all other religions would be able to provide privileged counseling.
72. As an Imam, Enchassi is also personally authorized to seek certain tax exemptions ordinarily available to priests, ministers, or other religious personnel within the State of Oklahoma, but which would be unavailable to himif SQ755 iscertified because eligibility for such exemptions would involve consideration of Sharia law.
73. For example, the Okl ahoma Tax Commission (“OTC”) is authorized to “exercise adjudicative authority or render decisions in individual proceedings” relating to income, expenses, and deductions taken by Oklahom a taxpayers or other statutory m atters a ssigned to the OTC. Plaintiff Enchassi is an Oklahom a taxpayer a nd receives com pensation or rem uneration for the performance of his official duties as Imam. Oklahoma law exempts from the definition of “wages” “. . . remuneration paid . . . for services performed by a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his m inistry or by a m ember of a religi ous or der i n t he exercise of duties required by such order.” 68 Okla. Stat §2385.1(e)(5).
74. A determination by the OTC of compensation or “remuneration” received by Plaintiff Enchassi requires consideration of aspects of Sharia Law in order to determine whether Enchassi’s activities are related to the “exercise of his ministry” or the “exercise of duties required by such order” and, as such, determine whether Plaintiff Enchassi may properly exclude such remuneration from his “wages.”
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75. If SQ755 is certified by Defendants, the OCT could not “consider” Sharia Law in any individual determ ination of Enchassi’s right to exclude such rem uneration from wages. Consequently, Enchassi would be denied the bene fit of this tax exem ption because his religious beliefs are disfavored by the Statein violation of the First Amendment. Enchassi would be treated differently from other “duly ordained, com missioned, or licensed m inister[s] of a c hurch in the exercise of his ministry or . . . member[s] of a religious order in the exercise of duties required by such order” in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
76. As an agent and representative of the ISGOC, Enchassi is also responsible for various financial and social transactions ofthe local mosque. He is authorized to seek and procure eligibility for various tax exemptions ordinarily accorded to religious institutions under Oklahoma law.
77. Oklahoma maintains a property tax system known as an “ad valorem tax.” An ad valorem tax is a tax levied in proportion t o t he value of the thing(s) being taxed. Exclusive of exemptions, use-value assessment laws, and the like, the property tax is an ad valorem tax.
78. Oklahoma law also allows certain exemptions from the ad valoremtax which include “all property used exclusively and directly for fraternal or religious purposes within this state.” 68 Okla. Stat. §2887(7). Such exemption would ordinarily exclude fromthe ad valoremtax all property maintained by ISGOC for religious purposes incl uding it s M osque. Plaintiff Enchassi, as a representative of the ISGOC, is involved in securing this exepmtion from ad valoremtax based upon the religious activities conducted by the ISGOC.
79. Oklahoma law also allows an exem ption from t axation by ad valorem of “[a]ll libraries and office equipment of ministers of the Gospel actively engaged in ministerial work in the State of Oklahoma where said libraries and office equipment are being used by said m inisters in
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their ministerial work” which property is “deemed to be used exclusively for religious purposes.” 68 Okla. Stat. §2887(11). The com mon understanding of the term “Gospel” is an a ccount, often written, that describes the life of Jesus of Nazareht. The most widely-known examples of gospel are the four canonical gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.
80. Plaintiff Enchassi possesses libraries and office equipm ent used in his m inisterial work, although he is an Imam and not a minister of the Gospel as that termis commonly understood, but such property should otherwise be entitle d t o a n a d va lorem tax exem ption if used for “ministerial purposes.”
81. A determination by the OTC or other state taxing authorities that “exercise adjudicative authority or render decisions in individual proceedings” requires consideration of the “religious purposes” or “ministerial work” to which such real or personal property is put to use as a condition of the exem ption. As to Plaintiff Enchassi and ISGOC, such a determ ination of “religious purpose” or “m inisterial work” would require consideration of Sharia law in order to determine its eligibility for exemption.
82. If SQ755 is certified by Defendants and becomes law, a taxpayer, the Oklahoma Tax Commission, and other state taxing authorities could notconsider Sharia Law in the deterination of eligibility for exemption from ad valorem tax by ISGOC, Enchassi, or any other taxpayer.
C. SQ755’s IMPACT ON FOREIGN MARRIAGES 83. Plaintiffs Mock and Schwagmeyer are husband and wife. 84. Plaintiffs Mock and Schwagmeyer were married in Scotland in 1983 under Scottish
law. The solemnization of their marriage is evidenced by a document containing an extract of an entry in a Register of Marriages in the Distri ct of Canongate and Portobello and certified by the
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Registrar of the District as provided by the law of Scotland. 85. A foreign document such as this certified copy of the extract of entry of the Registrar
of M arriages m ay be authenticated under a convention of the Hague Conference. The Hague Conference on Private International Law is “a global intergovernmental” organization that “develops and services m ultilateral legal instruments.” 1 Leser v. Berridge , 668 F.3d 1202, 1204 (10 th Cir. 2011).
86. Documents from foreign countries such as the docum ent extract of entry of the Register of Marriages of Pl aintiffs Mock and Schwagmeyer are authenticated for use in other countries by Hague Convention 12 entitled “C onvention of 5 October 1961 Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents.”2 The certification of a document from one of the signatory countries permits its use for legal purposes in all the other signatory states and is known as an “apostille” (from the French: “certification”). This Convention is also known as the “Apostille Convention” or the “Apostille Treaty.” The United States and Scotland are both signatories to the Hague Apostille Convention.
87. For various purposes, Plaintiffs Mock and Schwagmeyer must establish and be able to prove that they are married to one another. They must do so to establish eligibility of r and obtain certain benefits and privileges afforded to m arried persons and their spouses by the State of Oklahoma and by their employer, a state university,including property interests in vested retirement and death benefits adjudicated and adm inistered by the Oklahom a Teachers Retirem ent System
1 See <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=26> last visited 7/21/2012. 2 See < http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=41> last visited 7/21/2012.
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(“OTRS”), a state agency.
88. If SQ755 is certified by the Defendants, however, Plaintiffs Mock and Schwagmeyer
will be unable to prove the existence of their certificated ceremonial marriage before courts and
adjudicative agencies in the State of Oklahoma because their marriage in Scotland relies upon “legal
precepts of other nations or cultures” and its proof in the U nited States relies upon the Hague
Conference Apostille Convention. SQ755 fobrids consideration of “international law” and the “legal
precepts of other nations or cultures” by any court or adjudicative agency.
89. Instead, if SQ755 is certified by the Defendants, Plaintiffs Mock and Schwagmeyer
will be required to assume special burdens to prove that they are married under Oklahoma law and
will be denied the right to prove the existence of their m arriage as solemnized in Scotland and
evidenced by the documentary extract of record from the Registrar of Records.
90. Plaintiffs Mock and Schwagmeyer are both nearing the time of retirement and will
be entitled to benefits under OTRS . As a part of their applica tion for retirem ent, they will be required to execute spousal consent forms before retirement becomes effective.3 The OTRS is an
3 See OTRS Regulation 715:10-15-12. Spousal Consent:
When selecting a retirem ent option, a TRS Acknowledgment of Spousal Consent Form shall be com pleted. If the m ember is married at the tim e of retirement, the retiring member's spouse must complete Part A, acknowledging that the retirement options available to the member have been explained to the spouse and the spouse concurs with the retirement option selected by the retiring member. If the member is unmarried at the time of retirement, the member must complete Part B, certifying that he or she is unmarried or that at the time of retirement the whereabouts of the spouse is unknown and cannot be located. The Spousal Consent form is an integral part of the application for retirement and must be filed with the retirement contract before the member's retirement becomes effective. [Source: Amended at 16 Ok Reg 743, eff 10-5-98 through 7-14-99 (em ergency)1; Amended at 17 Ok Reg 204, eff 9-8-99 (emergency); Amended at 16 Ok Reg 3567, eff 9-13-99; Amended at 17 Ok
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adjudicative agency that decides grievances and complaints. See OTRS Reg. 715:1-1-10. Grievances and complaints. Certification of SQ755 by Defnedants would require both Mock and Schwagmeyer to assume special burdens to prove the existence of a marriage since they will be unable to prove marriage by certificate under the laws of Scotland.
91. SQ755 will burden fundamental rights of marriage of persons including Plaintiffs Mock and Schwagmeyer who have formalized or choose to formalize their marital relations under the law of a foreign country and who seek to bring proof of that marriage to the State of Oklahoma in the form of a certification granted under the Apostille Convention. Such persons will be required to assume special burdens to prove an existence of a marriage within the State of Oklahoma when they would otherwise rely upon marriage solemnizations performed in a foreign country.
92. If SQ755 i s certified by Defendants, Plaintiffs Mock and Schwagm eyer will be subject to unequal treatment and denial of due process involving their fundamental right to marry when their ceremonial marriage was performed in accordance with the law of Scotland. SQ755 will deny Plaintiffs Mock and Schwagmeyer the same status and relationship as others who are married ceremonially in another state or in Oklahoma. D. FACTORS ENTITLING PLAINTIFFS TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
93. STATUS QUO. A grant of injunctive relie f will preserve the pre-litigation status quo. Even if this were a mandatory injunction, Plaintiffs satisfy a heightened standard for injunctive relief.
94. IRREPARABLE HARM. If SQ755 is certifiedby Defendants, those Plaintiffs of the
3(...continued) Reg 3071, eff 7-13-00]
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Islamic faith will suffer irreparable harm to First Amendment rights. “The loss ofFirst Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976);see also, e.g., Pacific Frontier v. Pleasant Grove Cit,y414 F.3d 1221, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting presumption of irreparable harm where First Amendment rights are implicated). “A plaintiff suffers i rreparable injury when the court would be unable to grant an effective monetary remedy after a full trial because such damages would be inadequate or difficult to ascertain.” Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp. , 269 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, “[w]hen an alleged constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of rireparable injury is necessary.”Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 963 (10th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs Mock and Schw agmeyer will suffer irreparable harm to their fundamental right to marry. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
95. BALANCE OF HARM. The balance of harm as to irreparable injury to Plaintiffs in comparison to the “harm” to Defendants weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor. When a law that voters wish to enact is likely unconstitutional, their interests do not outweigh those of the Plaintiffs in having their constitutional rights protected. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d at 1132 citing Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 1997).
96. PUBLIC INTEREST. The granting of preliminary and perm anent relief and declaratory judgment will be in the public interest in that there is alw ays a public interest in the protection of constitutional rights, especially funda mental rights. “[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation ofa party's constitutional rights.” Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d at 1132 quoting G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994).( “While the public has an interest in the will of the voters being carried out. . . the public has a more
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profound and long-term interest in upholding an individual’s constitutional rights.” Id.; see also Cate v. Oldham , 707 F.2d 1176, 1190 (10th Cir. 1983) (noti ng “[t]he strong publ ic i nterest in protecting First Amendment values”)). Additionally, such relief will be in the public inte rest by preserving the status quo in many other respects that underpin social and commercial activities in Oklahoma. For example, if SQ755 is certified:
A. contracts ( e.g., for goods, servic es, insurance) that incorporate foreign law or international lawmay not be considered by Oklahoma courts and adjudicative agencies. Foreign compani es that execute contracts (including reinsurance contracts) consistent with the law of their domicile will shun Oklahoma;
B. documents authenticated or which or iginate in a foreign country, including but not limited to marriage licenses and certificates, birth and death certificates, academ ic credentials, foreign passpor ts, powers of attorney, wills, court records ( e.g., adoption and divorce decrees, judgments), and negotiable instruments issued under the law of a foreign country or transactoins based upon international law may not be considered by Oklahoma courts and adjudicative agencies;
C. records of ownership that incorporate or depend upon foreign law or international law (e.g., deeds, bills of sale, corporate stock) may not be considered by Oklahoma courts and adjudicative agencies.
97. NO ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDY. Plaintiffshave no adequate remedy at law for the denial of their fundamental constitutional rights.
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VI. -Claims-
Plaintiffs come before the Court and incorporate the allegations previously stated and make the following claims against these Defendants: A. Establishment Clause Violation (42 U.S.C. §1983)
1. SQ755 violates the Plaintiffs’ rights under the Establishm ent Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
2. By singling out Islam and its adherents, S Q755 facially discrim inates am ong religions. Because the amendment is not narrowly tailored or closely fitted to, and does not serve, a compelling governmental interest, this facial discrimination violates the Establishment Clause. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
3. SQ755 also improperly conveys and endorses a message of disapproval for one faith, Islam, in violation of the Establishment Clause. A reasonable, objective observer, f amiliar with SQ755’s history and text, as well as the context in which it was passed, would conclude that it broadcasts a message of official condemnation of Islam. See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir. 2010).
4. SQ755, in addition, has the impermissible primary purpose and effect of inhibiting religion, namely, the exercise of Isla m. I t also excessively entangles the State with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5. Unless restrained by this Court, Defendants will certify SQ755, causing the law to take immediate effect. As a result, Plaintiffs Awad, Soltani, and Enchassi will be irreparably injured by the official condem nation of their religious beliefs. If certified, SQ755 also will subject Plaintiffs to disfavored and unequal treatment under Oklahoma law by imposing on them special
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disabilities and legal burdens that are not faced by non-Muslim citizens. 6. Plaintiffs ha ve no a dequate rem edy at law for the denial of their fundam ental
Establishment Clause rights. B. Free Exercise Clause Violation (42 U.S.C. §1983)
7. SQ755 violates the Plaintiffs rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
8. SQ755 is not neutral. It expressly targest and discriminates against Islamic religious doctrine and beliefs. Because the amendment is not narrowly tailored or closely fitted to, and does not serve, a compelling governmental interest, this facial discrimination violates the Free Exercise Clause. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
9. Unless restrained by this Court, Defendants will certify SQ755, causing the law to take immediate effect. As a result, Plaintiffs Awad, Soltani, and Enchass will be unable to freely exercise their faith and will be irreparably injured due to the disfavored and unequal treatment, and special disabilities and legal burdens, imposed on them by SQ755.
10. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law for the denial of their fundamental Free Exercise rights. C. Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses Violation (42 U.S.C. §1983)
11. SQ755 violates due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as to the fundamental right to marriage. If SQ755 is certified by Defendants, Plaintiffs Mock and Schwagmeyer will be subject to unequal treatm ent and denial of due process involving their fundamental right to marry when their ceremonial marriage was performed in accordance with the law of Scotland. SQ755 will deny Plaintiffs Mo ck and Sc hwagmeyer the sam e status and
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relationship as others who are married ceremonially in another state or in Oklahoma and will require them to assume special burdens to prove the existence of their marriage under Oklahoma law. D. Supremacy Clause Violation (42 U.S.C. §1983)
12. SQ755 violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. IfSQ755 is certified by Defendants, Plaintiffs Mock and Schwagmeyer will be unable to rely uponthe Apostille Convention of the Hague Conference to prove the authenticity of their marriage certificate and its validity in Scotland and will also be denied the normal aspects of comity under customary international law.
VII. -Prayer for Relief-
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations previously stat ed a nd m ake the following prayer for relief from this Court:
1. Assume jurisdiction ofthe cause to determine this controversy and set this case down promptly for hearing.
2. Grant Pl aintiffs prelim inary and perm anent injunctive relief on all claim s. On November 29, 2010, this Court issued a prelim inary injunction bas ed on Plaintiff Awad’s Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clauseclaims. (Doc. 020, 11/29/2010). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision and upheld the injunction.Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012). As alleged above , t he anti-Sharia language was integral to SQ755, and neither the Legislature nor the voterswould have passed SQ755 without the anti-Sharia language. Ac cordingly, SQ755’s foreign and inte rnational law provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and incapable of being executed in acco rdance with intent of the Legislature and the voters. As a result, the am endment is not severable and Plaintif fs are entitled to a perm anent injunction barring certification of the entire amendment, including the Sharia Law, of reign law, and
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international Law provisions. In the event that Defendants contend and the Court determ ines, however, that the am endment is severable, Plai ntiffs are entitled to and request (a) perm anent injunctive relief enjoining certification of the Sharia Law provision of SQ 755 and (b) preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining the certification of the foreign law and international law provisions of SQ755 based on the additional claims asserted herein.
3. Declare, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2201- 02 and Fed.Rul.Civ.Pro. 57, that SQ755 is unconstitutional as provided herein.
4. Pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure and 42 U.S.C. §1988, Plaintiffs should be allowed their costs and attorney fees herein against Defendants as permitted by law.
5. Any and all such other and further relief as this Court deem s just and e quitable against appropriate parties.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHEAL SALEM (OBA #7876) Salem Law Office 101 East Gray, Suite C Norman, Oklahoma 73069 Telephone: (405) 366-1234 Telefax: (405) 366-8329 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS MUNEER AWAD ADAM SOLTANI IMAD ENCHASSI DOUGLAS MOCK and PATRICIA SCHWAGMEYER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I electronically transmitted the above and foregoing document to which this certification is attached and any attached e xhibits to the Clerk of t he Court using the ECF System for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following ECF Registrants:
Patrick Wyrick
Solicitor General Oklahoma Attorney General’s Office 313 N.E.21st Street Oklahoma City, Oklahoma City, 73105
this 29th day of JULY, 2012.
MICHEAL SALEM (OBA #7876)
D:\WP51\SQ755-Islamic Law\Complaint\2012-07-24 First Amended SQ755 Complaint vjl-6.wpd
33

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MUNEER AWAD, ADAM SOLTANI, )

IMAD ENCHASSI, DOUGLAS MOCK, )

PATRICIA SCHWAGMEYER,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

PAUL ZIRIAX, Secretary; STEVE

)

CURRY, Chairman; TOM

)

MONTGOMERY, DIANE SPURLOCK, )

members of the Oklahoma State Election )

Board,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. CIV-10-1186-M

ORDER

Before the Court are pl aintiffs’ Motion for Sum mary Judgm ent and defendants’ Cross

Motion for Sum mary Judgm ent. The ma tter has been fully briefed. Based upon the parties’

submissions, the Court makes its determination.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 18, 2010, the Oklahom a House of Representatives voted to approve House Joint

Resolution 1056 (“HJR 1056”), and the Oklahoma Senate followed suit on May 24, 2010. The joint

resolution m andated t hat a proposed constituti onal am endment, entitled the “Save Our State

Amendment,” be placed on the next ele ctoral ballot for a vote of the people. The proposed

constitutional amendment provided:

The Courts . . . when exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States Constitution, the Okl ahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another staet of the United States provided the law of the other state does not inculde Sharia Law, in making judicial

decisions. The courts shall not look to the lega l precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not c onsider international law or Sharia Law. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.
HJR 1056 at 3. During conference, teh legislators added the language “provided the law of the other
state does not include Sharia Law” to the provision allowing courts to consider the law of another
state of the United States.
The proposed ballot title stated:
This m easure am ends the State Constitution. It would change a section that deals with courts ofthis state. It would make courts rely on federal and state laws when decdiing cases. It would forbid courts from looking at international law orSharia Law when deciding cases. SHALL THE PROPOSAL BE APPROVED?
HJR 1056 at 4.
After passage of HJR 1056, the Secretary of Sat te forwarded the proposed ballot title to the
Attorney General for review, as required by law. Determining that the proposed ballot title did not
adequately explain the effect of the proposed am endment because it failed to define what either
Sharia Law or international law is, the Attorney General revised it to read:
This measure amends the State Constitution. It changes a section that deals with the courts of this state. It would amend Article 7, Section 1. It makes courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases. It forbids courts from considering or using international la w. It forbids courts from considering or using Sharia Law.
International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals with the conduct of international organizations and independent nations, such as countries, states and tribes. It deals with their relationship with each other. It also deals w ith some of their relationships with persons.
2

The la w of nations is form ed by the general assent of civilized nations. Sources of international law also include inter national agreements, as well as treaties. Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed. SHALL THE PROPOSAL BE APPROVED? FOR THE PROPOSAL – YES AGAINST THE PROPOSAL – NO Final Ballot Title [docket no. 17-1, p. 13-14]. The Attorney General then submitted the revisedballot title to the Secretary ofState, Senate President Pro Tempore, and House Speaker for their review. No objections or concerns about the proposed revisions to the ballot title w ere expressed, and with no objections, the ballot title was finalized and placed on the ballot as Oklahoma State Question 755 (“SQ 755”). On November 2, 2010, 70.08% of Oklahom ans who voted approved SQ 755. Onc e the Oklahoma State Board of Elections certifies the election results, the amendment will become a part of the Oklahoma Constitution. II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On Novem ber 4, 2010, plaintiff Mune er Awad filed this action, challenging the constitutionality of SQ 755’s amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution and seeking to enjoin the certification of the election results for SQ 755. Plaintiff Awa d alleged that SQ 755 violated the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clau se of the First Am endment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff Awad is an American citizen born in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and a devout, lifelong Muslim. At the time of SQ 755’s passage, plaintiff Awad wasthe executive director of the
3

Oklahoma Chapter of the Council on Ame rican-Islamic Relations (“CAIR-OK”) and resided in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
On November 8, 2010, a hearingon plaintiff Awad’s motion for a temporary injunction was held, and t his Court orally granted a tem porary restraining order, see docket no. 6, and issued a written opinion one day later, see docket no. 7. On November 22, 2010, a preliminary injunction hearing was held. On Novem ber 29, 2010, the C ourt granted the preliminary injunction, finding plaintiff Awad had standing, his claim s were ripe, SQ 755 likely violated both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, the balance of harms weighed strongly in favor of plai ntiff Awad, the alleged violation of plaintiff Awad’s First Am endment rights constituted irreparable injury, and the public interest demanded protection of these rights. See November 29, 2010 Order [docket no. 20]. Defendants filed a timely notice of appeal on December 1, 2010. On January 10, 2012, the Tenth Circuit issued its ruling, affirming this Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
On July 29, 2012, the First Amended Complaint wasfiled in this case, joining AdamSoltani, Imad Enchassi, Douglas Mock, and Patricia Schwagmeyer as additional plaintiffs. Plaintiffs Awad, Soltani, and Enchassi assert claims under the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, and plaintiffs Mock and Schwagmeyer assert claims under the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Suprem acy Clause. Plain tiff Soltani is an Ameri can citizen born in the United States, is a devout, lifelong Muslim, and is currently employed by CAIR-OK as Executive Director. Plaintiff Enchassi isan American citizen, a lifelong Muslim, and the Imam for the Islamic Society of Greater Oklahoma City. Plaintiffs Mock and Schwagmeyer are faculty members at the University of Oklahoma in the Department of Biology, who were married in Scotland on January
4

8, 1983. On August 1, 2012, plaintiff Awad m oved to New York City to accept a position with
another CAIR affiliate.
III. DISCUSSION
The parties have now cross-moved for summary judgment on the sole issue in this case –
whether defendants should be permanently enjoined from certifying the election results for SQ 755.
For a party to obtain a permanent injunction, it must prove: (1) actual success on the m erits; (2) irreparable harm unless the injunction is issued; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction, if issued, will not adversely affect the public interest.
Sw. Stainless, L P v. Sappington , 582 F.3d 1176, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
A. Actual Success On The Merits1
1. Establishment Clause claim
a. Standing
The Tenth Circuit found that plaintiff Awad had standing to bring his Establishment Clause
claim. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit held:
Mr. Awad’s allegation – that the proposed state aemndment expressly condemns his religion and exposes him and other Mus lims in Oklahoma to disfavored treatment – suffices to establish the kind of direct i njury-in-fact necessary to create Establishm ent Clause standing.
1Because this Court finds that plaintiffs Soltani and Enchassi succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim, that the Sharia lawprovisions in the amendment cannot be severed, and that the amendment should be enjoined in its entirety, the Court declines to address the standing of plaintiffs Awad, Mock, and Schwagmeyer or the merits of the Free Exercise Clause claim, the Equal Protection Clause claim, the Due Process Clause claim, or the Supremacy Clause claim.
5

Awad, 670 F.3d at 1123 (emphasis in original). The Tenht Circuit further held that the injury alleged by plaintiff Awad is imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical. Id. Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that plaintiff Awad “has shown that his alleged injuries are fairly traceable to the challenged action of defendants and are likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 1124 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
In their response and cross motion for summary judgment, defendants state as follows: while we disagree with the Tenth Circuit’s holding on [Awa d’s] standing to bring his Establishment Clause claim. . . we acknowledge that the Tenth Circuit found that Awad had standing. And whi le Awad’s having m oved out of s tate ha s likely deprived him of standing, Pla intiffs Enchassi, and Soltani standing allegations for purposes of the Establishm ent Clause are substantially sim ilar to those considered by the Tenth Circuit.
Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support at 3, n.1.
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons set of rth in the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, the Court finds plaintiffs Enchassi and Soltani have standing to bring their Establishment Clause claim.
b. Merits The Tenth Circuit has held that the Larson2 test applies to plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim because the proposed amendment discriminates among religions. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1128. Further, the Tenth Circuit found that “[t]his cas e presents even stronger ‘explicit and deliberate distinctions’ among religions than the provision that warranted strict scrutiny in Larson.” Id.
2Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 6

“To survive strict scrutiny under Larson, [defendants] m ust show (1) a com pelling
government interest, and (2) that the amendment is ‘closely fitted’ to that compelling interest.” Id.
at 1129. “For an interest to be sufficiently compelling to justify a law that discriminates among
religions, the interest must address an identified problem that the discrimination seeks to remedy.”
Id. Regarding the “compelling state interest” element, the Tenth Circuit found as follows:
[Defendants] provided only one sentence on com pelling interest. They sim ply assert that “Oklahom a certainly has a com pelling interest in determining what law is applied in Oklahoma courts.”
Oklahoma’s asserted interest is a valid state concern. But this general statement alone is not sufficient to est ablish a compelling interest for purposes of this case. [Defendants] do not identify any actual problem the challenged am endment seeks to solve. Indeed, they admitted at the preliminary injunction hearing that they did not know of even a single instance where an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law or used the legal precepts of other nations or cultures, let alone that such applications or uess had resulted in concrete problems in Oklahoma.
Given the lack of evidence oaf ny concrete problem, any harm [defendants] seek to rem edy with the propose d am endment is speculative at best and cannot support a com pelling interest. “To sacrifice First Amendment protections for so speculative a gain is not warranted. . . .”
Because [defendants] have failed to assert a com pelling interest, they have failed to satisfy strict scrutiny.
Id. at 1130 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Further, “[w]ithout a compelling interest based on an actual problem, the second step of the
strict scrutiny analysis – whether there is a closefit with a compelling state interest – is unnecessary
and not feasible.” Id. In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit made the following observations regarding
the “closely fitted” element:
7

The proposed amendment goes further than preventing courts from “applying” Sharia law. The am endment forbids state cour ts from “considering” those laws. Even ifthe state could identify and support a r eason to single out and restrict Sharia law in its courts, the amendment’s complete ban of Sharia law is hardly an exercise of narrow tailoring. [Defendants] havenot carried their burden to show why the proposed am endment is “cl osely f itted” to a com pelling interest.
Id. at 1131.
In their response and cross-m otion for summary judgment, defendants have submitted no
additional evidence of a “compelling state interest.” Further, in their response and cross-motion,
defendants effectively concede that t he Tenth Circu it has held that the ref erences to Sharia law
violated the Establishment Clause. Having carefullyreviewed the parties’ submissions, and for the
same reasons set forth by the Tenth Circuit, the Court finds that defendants have failed to assert a
compelling state interest and have, therefore, failed to satisfy strict scrutiny. Because defendants
have failed to satisfy strict scrutiny, the Court finds that the proposed amendment’s references to
Sharia law violate the Establishm ent Clause. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs have
proven actual success on the merits.
c. Severability
In their r esponse and cross-m otion, defendants alternatively assert that if this Court
ultimately finds that SQ 755 violates the Establhisment Clause, this Court should sever the offending
portions of SQ 755, leaving as much of the amendment intact as possible. Defendants then suggest
that SQ 755 could be parsed as follows:
The Courts . . . when exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahom a Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and
8

if necessary the law of another staet of the United States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look t o the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.
Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment and Brief in Support at 20-21.
“A severability analysis is necessary when some, but not all, provisions of an enactment are
to be condemned as unconstitutional and hence void.” Liddell v. Heavner, 180 P.3d 1191, 1203-04
(Okla. 2008). Oklahoma’s severability statute provides, in pertinent part:
In the construction of the statutes of this state, the f ollowing rules shall be observed: 1. For any a ct enacted on or after July 1, 1989, unless there is a provision in the act that the act or any portion the reof or the application of the act shall not be severable, the provisions of every act or application of the act shall be severable . If any provision or application of the act is found to be unconstitutional and void, t he remaining provisions or applicati ons of the act shall rem ain valid, unless the court finds:
a. the valid provisions or appli cation of the act are so essentially a nd i nseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provisions that the c ourt cannot presume the Legislature would have enacted the remaining valid provisions without the void one; or
b. the remaining valid provisions or applications of the act standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accord ance with the legislative intent.
Okla. Stat. tit. 75, § 11a. This sat tute requires that a court determine the following: (1) whether the
purpose of the statute would be significantly altreed by severing the offending language; (2) whether
the Legislature would have enacted the remainder of the statute without the offending language; and
9

(3) whether the non-offending languageis capable of standing alone. See Okla. Corr. Prof’l Ass’n,
Inc. v. Jackson, 280 P.3d 959, 965 (Okla. 2012).
Additionally,
[w]hen construing a constitutional amendment that was proposed by the Legislature pursuant to Okla.Const. art. 24, § 1 and 34 O.S.2001 § 9(C), [a] Court will read the ballottitle together with the text ofthe measure, even if the text of the measure contains no ambiguities or absurdities. [A] Court will do so because t hose who fram ed and adopted the am endment considered the text of the m easure and its ballot title togethe r. The understanding of the Legislature as the framers and of the electorate as the adopters of the constitutional amendment is the best guide for determ ining an am endment’s meaning and scope, and such understanding is ref lected in the language used in the measure and the ballot title.
Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Okla. State Bd. of Equalizatio,n231 P.3d 638, 642 (Okla. 2009) (internal citation
omitted). Further, because the proposed am endment to the Oklahom a Constitution was a ballot
initiative submitted to the Oklahoma voters, the amendment is not severable if plaintiffs can show
that the voters would not have approved the amendment without the unconstitutional provisions.
“[T]he intention of the voter is to be ascertained from the language of his ballot interpreted in the
light of the circumstances of a public nature surrounding the election.” North v. McMahan, 110 P.
1115, 1119 (Okla. 1910).
Having carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that the unconstitutional
Sharia law provisions a re not severable from the remainder of the proposed am endment and the
whole amendment must fall. Specifically, the Coutr finds that the purpose of the amendment would
be significantly altered by severing the offending language and that the Legislature would not have
enacted the rem ainder of the am endment without the offending language. Having r eviewed the
numerous statements by the legislators who authoredthe amendment, it is abundantly clear that the
10

primary purpose of the amendment was to specifically target and outlaw Sharia law and to act as a preemptive strike against Sharia law to protect Oklahoma from a perceived “threat” of Sharia law being utilized in Oklahoma courts. That specifically banning Sharia law was the primary purpose of the amendment is further shown by the fact thatin conference, Oklahoma legislators inserted an additional Sharia law provision allowing courts to consider the law of another state of the United States only if “the law of the other state does not include Sharia La w.” By contrast, no sim ilar restriction was added limiting the use of other states’ law where it includes international law or the “legal precepts of other nations or cultures.”
Furthermore, the Court finds that plaint iffs have shown that the voters would not have approved the amendment without the unconstitutional provisions. Having carefully reviewed the evidence submitted in support of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the Court finds that the public debate, public discussions, articles, radio ads and robocalls regarding SQ 755 all primarily, and overwhelmingly, focused on the Sharia law provisions of the amendment. Given this context, the Court finds any reasonable voter would haveperceived SQ 755 as a referendumon Sharia law.
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the issue of “legal precepts of other nations or cultures” was not included in the ballot title. Th erefore, whether the Oklahoma courts should be barred from looking to the “legal precepts of other nations or cultures” was not considered by the voters when casting their vote on SQ 755. Thus, onyl the Oklahoma Legislature voted on the issue of “legal precepts of other nati ons or culture.” The Court finds that severing the am endment to include a prohibition of only the “legal precepts of other nations or cultures” would result i n a violation of Article 24, Section 1 of the Okla homa Constitution. The Court further finds that severing the Sharia law provisions from the amendment, and leaving only the prohibition of
11

considering “legal precepts of other nations or cul tures,” would result in an am endment to the Oklahoma Constitution by implication – the intent ofthe voters to approve the amendment with the “legal precepts of other nations or culture” langua ge would have to be im plied. H owever, it is against Oklahoma law to amend the Oklahoma Constitution by implication. See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 897 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Okla. 1995).
Therefore, the Court finds that severance of the unconstitutional provisions of the amendment is not proper.
B. Irreparable Harm “When an alleged constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable i njury i s necessary.” Awad, 670 F.3d at 1131 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Further, the United States Suprem e C ourt has held “[t]he loss of First Am endment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) . Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs have shown that they will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief. C. Balance Of Harms The Tenth Circuit has he ld t hat “when the law that voters wish to enact is likely unconstitutional, their interests do not outweigh Mr. Awad’s in having his constitutional rights protected.” Awad, 670 F.3d at 1131. Because the Court has found that the Sharia law provisions of the amendment are unconstitutional, the Court finds that the balance ofharms weighs even more in favor of plaintiffs’ having their constitutionalrights protected. Additionally, the Court ifnds that any harm that would result from permanently enjoining the certification of the election results is
12

further mi nimized i n l ight of the undisputed f act that the am endment at issue was to be a preventative measure and that the concern that it seeks to address has yet to occur.3
Accordingly, the Court finds the threatened inju ry to plaintiffs outweighs the harm that a permanent injunction may cause defendants.
D. Public Interest Finally, the Court finds that entry of a pe rmanent injunction enjoining defendants from certifying the election results for SQ 755 would not be adverse to the public interest. W hile the public has an interest in the will of the voters being carried out, the Court finds that the public has a more profound and long-term interest in upholding an individual’s constitutional rights. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, “[ i]t is always in the pub lic interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” G&V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’,n23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs have shown that a perm anent injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.
3Defendants admitted at the preliminary injunction hearing that they did not know of any instance where an Oklahoma court had applied Sharialaw or used the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.
13

IV. CONCLUSION Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS plaint iffs’ M otion for
Summary Judgment [docket no. 72], DENIES defendants’ Cross Motion for Sum mary Judgment [docket no. 78], and FINDS that defendants should be perm anently enjoined from certifying the election results for SQ 755.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th day of August, 2013.
14

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MUNEER AWAD, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. PAUL ZIRIAX, Secretary of the Oklahoma Election Board, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. CIV-10-1186-M

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER

Before the Court is plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees and Non-Taxable Expenses, filed

December 1, 2013. On January 15, 2014, defendantsfiled their response, and on January 22, 2014,

plaintiffs filed their reply. Based upon the parties’ submissions, the Court makes its determination.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1988(b), Federal Ruleof Civil Procedure 54(b)(1), and Local Civil

Rule 54.1, plaintiffs m ove this Court to award a ttorney fees and non-taxable expenses. Title 42

U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides: “In anyaction or proceeding to enforcea provision of sections . . . 1983

. . ., the court , in its discretion, m ay allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a

reasonable attorney’s fee as part ofthe costs . . . .” “[T]he prevailing party should ordinarily recover

an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Dahlem v. Bd.

of Educ. of Denver Pub. Sch. , 901 F.2d 1508, 1510 ( 10th Ci r. 1990) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). “In any fee request under § 1988(b, )a claimant must prove two elements: (1) that

the claimant was the ‘prevailing party’ in the proceeding; and (2) that the claimant’s fee request is

‘reasonable.’” Robinson v. City of Edmond , 160 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 1998). Further, the

United States Supreme Court has recently held that the lodestar method1 is the preferred method to

use when determining an award of attorney fees. See Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542 (2010).

In their response, defendants do not dispute

that plaintiffs are prevailing par ties.

Additionally, defendants do not dispute the hourly rates sought by plaintiffs’ counsel. Defendants

only m ake two objections: (1) the fil ing fe e reported in Gadeir Abbas’ declaration should be

removed as it is already represented in plaintiffs’ motion for recovery of costs, and (2) plaintiffs’

request should be r educed to reflect a reasonable am ount of tim e spent by each of the seven

attorneys on editing and reviewing briefs.

Having carefully reviewed plaintiffs’ submissions, the Court finds that the filing fee was not

duplicated in the bill of costs and the attorney feaepplication. In their Motoi n for Attorney Fees and

Non-Taxable Expenses, the filing fee is specifica lly deducted from Mr. Abbas’ expense request.

See Plaintif fs’ Motion f or Attorney Fees and N on-Taxable Expenses [ docket no. 95] at 5, n.1.

Accordingly, the Court overrules defendants’ first objection.

Defendants also object to the amount of time spent by plaintiffs’ attorneys reviewing, editing,

and submitting comments on the dispositive briefs in this case. Defendants specifically assert that

while reviewing and editing improves one’s writing, theinclusion of seven attorneys in this process,

as well as the number of revisions per brief, was excessive and unnecessary. Defendants further

contend that the number of hours should be reducedto reflect a more reasonable allocation of time

and defendants should only have to pay, at m ost, for one reviewer to edit and com ment on each

brief.

1Under the lodestar method, the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigat ion is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.
2

Plaintiffs assert that there were six or fewer participants in the preparation of several of the critical documents and the hours of review signi ficantly varied from document to document and attorney to attorney. Plaintiffs further contend that ten revisions of a brief or docum ent are not unusual in the context of legal writing, and the ac t of m ultiple revisions is a hallm ark of good writing. A dditionally, plaintif fs contend review ing draf ts of court f ilings is a m ethod of familiarizing counsel with the record and com ments regarding that review ge nerally inure to the benefit of the litigation. Finally, plaintiffs note taht their counsel have already demonstrated “billing judgment” by very significant deductions of hoursfrom the fee application even though those hours may not really be characterized as “duplicative” or “excessive,” and the remaining hours included in the fee request are reasonable.
Having carefully reviewed the par ties’ submissions, and particularly the tim e records of plaintiffs’ counsel, the Court finds that the amount of time spent by plaintiffs’ attorneys reviewing, editing, and submitting comments on the dispositive briefs is reasonable. The Court further finds the number of revisions and attorneys involved in each revision is not per se unreasonable. The amount of time spent reviewing and editing significantly varied from document to document and attorney to attorney, with several of the attorneys only spending a very f ew hours reviewing and editing. Additionally, due to the nature of this caes, and the complex issues briefed, the Court finds the multiple revisions were not only reasonable but an exam ple of good brief writing practices. Finally, the Court finds that the significant de ductions of hours from the fee application that plaintiffs’ counsel have already m ade fur ther support the Court’s finding of reasonableness. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to the full amount of attorney fees that they are requesting.
3

Finally, in their bill of costs, plaintiffs sought costs for thepro hac vice fees they paid in this case. The Clerk of Court denied these costs, andthis Court denied plaintiffs’ motion to review the clerk’s denial. In their motion to review, plaintiffs, in the alternative, requested that thepro hac vice fees be recovered as non-taxable expenses in relation to their Motion for Attorney Fees and NonTaxable Expenses. “Items that are normally itemized and billed in addition to the hourly rate should be included in fee allowances in civil rights cases if reasonable in amount.” Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 559 (10th Cir. 1983),overruled on other grounds, Penn. v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 725 (1987). Becausepro hac vicefees are normally itemized and billed to the client, the Court finds that plaintiffs should recover thepro hac vicefees they paid in this case.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ Mo tion for Attorne y Fees and Non-Taxable Expenses [docket no. 95] and AW ARDS plaintiffs attorney fees and non-taxable expenses in the amount of $303,333.49.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of April, 2014.
4

 
 Appellate Case: 10-6273

Document: 01018774570
PUBLISH

Date Filed: 01/10/2012 Page: 1
FILED United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 10, 2012

TENTH CIRCUIT

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court

MUNEER AWAD,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

PAUL ZIRIAX, Agency Head, Oklahoma State Board of Elections, THOMAS PRINCE, Chairman of the Board, Oklahoma State Board of Elections, STEVE CURRY, Board Member, Oklahoma State Board of Elections, and JIM ROTH, Board Member, Oklahoma State Board of Elections,

Defendants - Appellants.

---------------------------FOUNDATION OF MORAL LAW; THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK; THE ISLAMIC LAW COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, THE ANTIDEFAMATION LEAGUE, THE BAPTIST JOINT COMMITTEE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, THE CENTER FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM, INTERFAITH ALLIANCE, AND THE

No. 10-6273

Appellate Case: 10-6273 Document: 01018774570 Date Filed: 01/10/2012 Page: 2
UNION FOR REFORM JUDAISM,
Amici Curiae.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA (D.C. NO. 5:10-CV-01186-M)
Patrick R. Wyrick, Solicitor General (Scott D. Boughton and Janis Wood Preslar, Assistant Attorneys General, on the briefs), Office of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, appearing for Appellant.
Micheal Salem, Salem Law Offices, Norman, Oklahoma (Joseph Thai, Norman, Oklahoma; Gadeir Abbas, Council of American Islamic Relations, Washington, DC; and Daniel Mach and Heather L. Weaver, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Washington, DC, with him on the briefs), appearing for Appellee.
Roy S. Moore, Benjamin D. DuPre, and John Allen Eidsmoe, Montgomery, Alabama, filed an Amicus Curiae brief on behalf of the Foundation of Moral Law.
Robert E. Michael, Robert E. Michael & Associates, PLLC, New York, New York, filed an Amicus Curiae brief on behalf of Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the Islamic Law Committee of the American Branch of the International Law Association.
Craig C. Martin, Jenner & Block, LLP, Chicago, Illinois, and Joshua M. Segal, Jenner & Block, LLP, Washington, DC, filed an Amicus Curiae brief on behalf of American Jewish Committee; Americans United for Separation of Church and State; AntiDefamation League; Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty; Center for Islamic Pluralism; Interfaith Alliance; and Union for Reform Judaism.
Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
-2-

Appellate Case: 10-6273 Document: 01018774570 Date Filed: 01/10/2012 Page: 3
On November 2, 2010, Oklahoma voters approved a proposed constitutional
amendment that would prevent Oklahoma state courts from considering or using Sharia
law. Before the amendment can become effective, the Oklahoma State Election Board
must certify this election result. The Board members have asked us to review whether a
federal district court abused its discretion when it granted a preliminary injunction to
prevent them from certifying the result. We conclude there was no abuse of discretion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Amendments in Oklahoma
We start with an explanation of the constitutional amendment process in
Oklahoma and how its courts construe such amendments. The state constitution can be
amended in several ways. See Okla. Const. art. 24. We focus on the process used in this case. Under article 24, section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution,1 the state legislature may
1This provision of the Oklahoma Constitution states:
Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either bra nch of the Legislature, and if t he same shall be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each of the two (2) houses, su ch proposed amendm ent or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be e ntered in their journals and r eferred by the Secretary of State to the people for their appr oval or re jection, at the ne xt r egular general election, except when the Legislature, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of each house, shall order a special election for that purpose. If a majority of a ll the electors voting on any proposed am endment at such election shall vote in favor thereof, it shall thereby become a part of this Constitution.
Continued . . .
-3-

Appellate Case: 10-6273 Document: 01018774570 Date Filed: 01/10/2012 Page: 4
pass a proposed constitutional amendment. The legislature also drafts a ballot title that
explains the proposed amendment to voters. See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Okla. State Bd. of
Equal., 231 P.3d 638, 642 (Okla. 2009).
The proposed amendment and ballot title are submitted to the Attorney General to
ensure legal compliance. Id. The Attorney General must specify any defects “and, if
necessary, . . . prepare a preliminary ballot title which complies with the law.” 34 Okla.
Stat. tit. 34, § 9(C) (2009).2 Once certified by the Attorney General, the Secretary of
______________________________________ Cont.
No proposal for the amendmen t or alteration of this Constitution which is submitted to the voters shall embrace more than one ge neral subject and the voters shall vot e separately for or against each proposal submitted; provided, however, that in the subm ission of pr oposals for the amendment of this Constitutio n by articles, which embrace one general subject, each pr oposed article shall be deemed a single proposal or proposition. Okla. Const. art. 24, § 1.
2This law was amended slightly in 2011. We refer to the 2009 version of the law, which was in effect for the 2010 election. It stated in pertinent part:
When a measure is proposed as a constitutional amendment by the Legislature or whe n the Legislature proposes a statute conditioned upon approval by the people:
1. After final passage of a m easure, the S ecretary of State shall submit the proposed ballot title to the Attorney General for review as to legal correct ness. Within five (5) business days, the Attorney General sh all, in writing, notify the Secretary of State, the Presid ent Pro Tem pore of the S enate and the S peaker of the House of Representatives whether or
Continued . . .
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State transmits the proposed measure and ballot title to the Election Board. Sw. Bell, 231
P.3d at 642.
A proposed constitutional amendment therefore “consist[s] of two substantive
parts—the measure and the ballot title.” Id. (quotations omitted). When the Oklahoma
Supreme Court interprets a state constitutional amendment’s meaning, it reads these parts
together, regardless of whether there are “ambiguities or absurdities.” Id. It considers
the amendment’s text and the ballot title together because “those who framed and
adopted the amendment considered” both substantive parts. Id. “The understanding of
______________________________________ Cont.
not the proposed ballot title co mplies with applicable laws. The Attorney General shall stat e with specificity any and all defects found and, if necessary, within ten ( 10) business days of determining that the propos ed ballot title is defective, prepare a preliminary ballot title which complies with the law and fur nish a copy of such ba llot title to the Secretary of State, the President Pro Temp ore of t he Senate a nd the Speaker of the Hous e of Re presentatives. The Attorney General m ay consider any c omments m ade by t he Pres ident Pro Tempore of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives and s hall file a final ballot title with the Secretary of State no sooner th an ten (10) busi ness days and no later than fifteen ( 15) busine ss days aft er furnishi ng the preliminary ballot title; and
2. After receipt of the measure and the official ballot title, as certified by the Attorney General, the Secretary of State shall within five (5) days transmit to the Secretary of the State Election Board an attested copy of the measure, including the official ballot title.
34 Okla. Stat. tit. 34, § 9(C) (2009).
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the Legislature as the framers and of the electorate as the adopters of the constitutional
amendment is the best guide for determining an amendment’s meaning and scope, and
such understanding is reflected in the language used in the measure and the ballot title.”
Id.
Oklahoma law provides that the Election Board must certify election results before
a constitutional amendment can take effect. See Okla. Const. art. 5, § 3; Okla. Stat. tit.
26, §§ 7-136, 12-118; Fent v. Henry, 257 P.3d 984, 986 (Okla. 2011). The State Election
Board Rules provide that “[t]he State Election Board meets at 5 p.m. on Tuesday next
following an election involving . . . state questions to certify the final election results.”
§ 230:35-3-91(c).
B. The Proposed “Save Our State” Constitutional Amendment
On May 25, 2010, the Oklahoma House of Representatives and Senate passed
House Joint Resolution 1056 (“HJR 1056”). The resolution directed “the Secretary of
State to refer to the people for their approval or rejection a proposed amendment to
Section 1 of Article VII of the [Oklahoma] Constitution . . . [known as] the Save Our
State Amendment.” Aplt. App. Vol. 1 at 167. The proposed amendment states:
The Courts provided for in subs ection A of this section, when exercising their judicial author ity, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the Un ited States Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations prom ulgated purs uant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Stat utes and rules prom ulgated pursuant thereto, and i f necessary the law of another st ate of the United States provided the law of the ot her state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts
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shall not look to t he legal precepts of other nations or

cultures. Specifically, the courts

shall not consider

international law or Sharia Law . The provisions of this

subsection shall apply to all case s before the respective courts

including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.

Id. at 168 (emphases added).

HJR 1056 also provided that the ballot title should state:

This measure amends the State Constitution. It would change a section that deals with courts of this state. It woul d make courts rely on fe deral and state laws when deciding cas es. It would forbid courts from looking at international law or Sharia Law when deciding cases.

SHALL THE PROPOSAL BE APPROVED?

Id. at 169 (italic emphasis added).

The Oklahoma Attorney General determined that the proposed ballot title did “not

comply with applicable laws.” Id. at 175. It did “not adequately explain the effect of the

proposition because it [did] not explain what either Sharia Law or international law is.”

Id. The Attorney General prepared a revised ballot title, which states:

This measure amends the State Constitution. It changes a section that deals with the cour ts of this state. It would amend Arti cle 7, Secti on 1. It m akes courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cas es. It forbids courts from considering or using international law. It forbids courts from considering or using Sharia Law.

International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals

with the conduct of intern

ational orga nizations and

independent nations, s uch as coun tries, states and tribes. It

deals with their relations hip with each other. It also deals

with some of their relationships with persons.

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The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations. Sources of intern ational law also include international agreements, as well as treaties. Sharia L aw is Islam ic law. It is based on tw o pri ncipal sources, the Koran and the teachings of Mohammed.3 SHALL THE PROPOSAL BE APPROVED? Id. at 178-79 (italic emphases added). The Attorney General refrained from giving any opinion “on the merits or constitutionality of the underlying proposed changes in the law, [or] on the ability of federal law to preempt the changes in the law.” Id. at 178. This revised ballot title was placed on the ballot as State Question 755 (“SQ 755”). On November 2, 2010, just over 70 percent of Oklahoma voters approved SQ 755. Without intervention, the proposed amendment would likely have been certified on November 9, 2010. See Okla. State Board Election Rule § 230:35-3-91(c). C. Procedural History On November 4, 2010, Muneer Awad sued the members of the Oklahoma Election Board (collectively the “Appellants”). He sought to prevent certification of the SQ 755 election results. Mr. Awad, an American citizen residing in Oklahoma, is the executive director of the Oklahoma Chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations. As a Muslim, he adheres to the religious principles from the Koran and the teachings of Mohammed.
3Various spellings have been used for “Sharia,” “Koran,” and “Mohammed.” We use the spellings adopted in the ballot title to avoid confusion.
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Mr. Awad alleges that the Save Our State Amendment violates his rights under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. He objects to the amendment’s singling out his religion for negative treatment. He claims the amendment’s implementation would cause multiple adverse consequences, such as stigmatizing him and others who practice the Muslim faith, inhibiting the practice of Islam, disabling a court from probating his last will and testament (which contains references to Sharia law), limiting the relief Muslims can obtain from Oklahoma state courts, and fostering excessive entanglement between the government and his religion.
The district court granted a temporary restraining order on November 9, 2010. On November 22, 2010, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding Mr. Awad’s request for a preliminary injunction. It granted the preliminary injunction one week later. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (W.D. Okla. 2010). Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on December 1, 2010.
Oral argument occurred before this panel on September 12, 2011. Following oral argument, the parties were asked to file simultaneous supplemental briefs to answer the following questions:
1. Should the test set fo rth in Larson v. Vale nte, 456 U .S. 228 (1982), govern t he Establishment Clause issue in this case? See also Hernandez v. Com missioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Colorado Christian Universit y v. Weaver , 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008). Why or why not?
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2. How should the Establishment Clause issue be analyzed and decide d under t he Larson test, assu ming it does apply?
The parties filed supplemental briefs on November 2, 2011. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which authorizes appellate
review of a district court’s interlocutory order granting a preliminary injunction. II. DISCUSSION
Appellants challenge the preliminary injunction. First, they argue that Mr. Awad’s claims are not justiciable. Second, they argue that, even if Mr. Awad’s Establishment or Free Exercise Clause claim is justiciable, each claim fails to meet preliminary injunction requirements.
We hold that Mr. Awad’s Establishment Clause claim is justiciable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction based on that claim. Because Mr. Awad’s Establishment Clause claim provides sufficient grounds to uphold the preliminary injunction, we affirm without reaching Mr. Awad’s Free Exercise claim.
A. Justiciability Appellants argue that Mr. Awad lacks standing and that his claims are not ripe for
review. They have not distinguished between the justiciability of his Establishment and Free Exercise claims. Because we do not reach the Free Exercise claim, we address only the justiciability of Mr. Awad’s Establishment Clause claim. “We review questions of
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justiciability de novo.” Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1114 (10th Cir. 2008).
1. Mr. Awad Has Standing to Bring His Establishment Clause Claim To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he or she has “suffered an injury in fact;” (2) that the injury is “‘fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;” and, (3) that it is “likely” that “the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011) (quotations omitted); see also Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir. 2011). “At bottom, the gist of the question of standing is whether petitioners have such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination.” Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quotations omitted). As in all standing analyses, we must begin by determining whether Mr. Awad has alleged an injury in fact. To satisfy this requirement, plaintiffs must allege they “have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1442 (quotations omitted). Appellants argue that Mr. Awad does not have standing because he has not
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suffered an actual or imminent injury.4 They contend that because the amendment has not taken effect or been interpreted by any Oklahoma court, Mr. Awad’s alleged injuries are necessarily speculative. They further contend that Mr. Awad’s assertion that he will suffer official condemnation of his religion is “personal opinion.” Aplt. Br. at 14.
Mr. Awad claims that the amendment threatens to injure him in several ways, such as condemning his Muslim faith, inhibiting the practice of Islam, disabling a court from probating his will (which contains references to Sharia law), and limiting the relief he and other Muslims can obtain from Oklahoma state courts.
Determining whether a plaintiff has alleged a sufficient injury in fact is often not difficult. But “the concept of injury for standing purposes is particularly elusive in Establishment Clause cases.” Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 504-05 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted); see also Suhre v. Haywood Cnty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1085 (4th Cir. 1997) (same quote); Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1230 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Standing is of course always necessary in an Establishment Clause case, and it is sometimes a difficult issue.”).
The Supreme Court discussed this issue in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). In Valley Forge, a group of plaintiffs dedicated to the separation of church and state attempted to challenge the transfer of surplus federal property to an educational institution affiliated
4Appellants have not challenged the causation or redressability elements of Mr. Awad’s standing.
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with a particular religious order. The plaintiffs learned about the conveyance through a

press release. None of them lived in or near Pennsylvania, the site of the property at

issue. The Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they failed to

identify a personal injury resulting from the allegedly unconstitutional transfer. The

Court noted that it was not enough for litigants to claim a constitutional violation.

Rather, plaintiffs must “identify a[] personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of

the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably

produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.” Id. at 485 (emphasis in

original). The Court noted that it was “not retreat[ing] from [its] earlier holdings that standing may be predicated on noneconomic injury.” Id. at 486. 5

Since

Valley Forge, the Supreme Court has not provided clear and explicit

guidance on the difference between psychological consequence from disagreement with government conduct and noneconomic injury that is sufficient to confer standing.6 Our

5This is consistent with our longstanding view that in Establishment Clause cases, “standing is clearly conferred by non-economic religious values.” Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 31 (10th Cir. 1973) superseded on other grounds by Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). See Soc’y of Separationists v. Pleasant Grove City, 416 F.3d 1239, 1241 n.1 (10th Cir. 2005).
6We have some direction, however, from the numerous cases in which the Court has addressed the merits of Establishment Clause claims alleging exposure to unwelcome government-sponsored religious messages.
Summarized in recent Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit opinions, these cases involved “a crèche in a county courthouse, a crèche in a public park, the Ten Commandments displayed on the grounds of a state capitol, the Ten Commandments
Continued . . .
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court has addressed standing in the Establishment Clause context in several cases. For
example, in O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2005), plaintiffs, a
college faculty member and a student, claimed their unwelcome exposure to a statue on
their campus that was allegedly hostile to their Catholic religion violated the
Establishment Clause. We held the plaintiffs had standing. We noted that “[i]n the
context of alleged violations of the Establishment Clause, this court has held that standing
is clearly conferred by non-economic religious values.” Id. at 1222 (quotations omitted).
We explained, however, that “plaintiffs alleging non-economic injury must be ‘directly
affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints are directed.’” Id. at
1222-23 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 n.22). We then concluded that
“[a]llegations of personal contact with a state-sponsored [religious] image suffice to
demonstrate this kind of direct injury.” Id. at 1223.
______________________________________ Cont.
displayed at a courthouse, a cross displayed in a national park, prayer in a football game, school prayer, a moment of silence at school, Bible reading at a public school, and a religious invocation at graduation.” Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Obama, 641 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2011) (Williams, J., concurring); Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011).
The Supreme Court recently cautioned that “[w]hen a potential jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the proposition that no defect existed.” Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1448 (2011). Nonetheless, the volume and content of Supreme Court merits decisions in Establishment Clause religious display and expression cases involving noneconomic injury is instructive.
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Our most recent Establishment Clause case to address standing was American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010). In that case, plaintiffs challenged the placement of crosses on government property in remembrance of fallen highway patrol troopers. We concluded that the plaintiffs suffered an Establishment Clause standing injury because they encountered an unwelcome government-sponsored religious symbol. We stated: “[A]llegations of personal contact with a state-sponsored image suffice to demonstrate . . . direct injury” for standing purposes in Establishment Clause cases. Id. at 1113 (quotations omitted).
As in many Establishment Clause cases, the American Atheists plaintiffs did not suffer physical or economic injury. Their alleged injury was “personal and unwelcome contact with the crosses.” Id. (quotations omitted). We said “these allegations establish standing.” Id. This basis for standing was the same as in other cases in which plaintiffs have challenged government-sponsored religious symbols. See, e.g., Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1490-91 (10th Cir. 1989).
Although standing remains difficult to define precisely in the Establishment Clause context, several key principles can be distilled from the above-referenced cases. First, “[i]n the context of alleged violations of the Establishment Clause, . . . standing is clearly conferred by non-economic religious values.” O’Connor, 416 F.3d at 1222 (quotations omitted). Second, it is not enough for litigants to claim a constitutional violation. They must also “identify a[] personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence
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presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485 (emphasis in original). Finally, alleging only “personal and unwelcome contact” with government-sponsored religious symbols is sufficient to establish standing. American Atheists, 637 F.3d at 1113 (quotations omitted). 7
As in other Establishment Clause cases, Mr. Awad alleges that the amendment threatens him with noneconomic injuries. In some respects, Mr. Awad’s alleged injuries are similar to those found sufficient to confer standing in our religious symbol Establishment Clause cases. Like the plaintiffs who challenged the highway crosses in American Atheists, Mr. Awad suffers a form of “personal and unwelcome contact” with an amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution that would target his religion for disfavored treatment. As a Muslim and citizen of Oklahoma, Mr. Awad is “directly affected by the law[] . . . against which [his] complaints are directed.” See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 487 n.22 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963)). As further spelled out below, that is enough to confer standing. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9.
Mr. Awad alleges injuries beyond the “personal and unwelcome contact” that suffices for standing with religious symbols. He alleges that the amendment condemns his religious faith and exposes him to disfavored treatment. Such condemnation was not
7One of the American Atheists plaintiffs alleged that he was forced to alter his travel route to avoid contact with the crosses. We said that such an allegation was not necessary for standing but further supported his standing. 637 F.3d at 1113 (quoting O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10thCir. 2005)).
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present in the religious symbol cases. The plaintiffs in those cases certainly may have
felt that a religious display conflicted with their religious beliefs or non-belief, but those
symbols did not expressly target and condemn a specific religion. Mr. Awad alleges that
the amendment condemns his religion and prohibits him from relying on his religion’s
legal precepts in Oklahoma courts, while not prohibiting people of all other faiths to rely on the legal precepts of their religions.8
Mr. Awad’s alleged injury goes significantly beyond a “psychological
consequence” from disagreement with observed government conduct, see Valley Forge,
454 U.S. at 485, “hurt feelings” from a presidential proclamation requesting citizens to
pray, Freedom from Religion Found. Inc. v. Obama, 641 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2011),
or “a person’s deep and genuine offense to a defendant’s actions,” Catholic League for
8In a case that did not involve the Establishment Clause, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), plaintiffs, parents of black school children, sued the Internal Revenue Service for failure to enforce a law to deny tax-exempt status to private schools that discriminated on the basis of race. The Court denied that the plaintiffs’ claim of a stigmatizing injury suffered by all members of a racial group was sufficient for standing because the injury was too generalized and did not allege personal denial of equal treatment:
There can be no doubt that this sort of n oneconomic injury is one of t he m ost serious cons equences of discrim inatory government action and is sufficient in s ome circumstances to support standing. Our cases make clear, however, that such injury accords a basis for standi ng only to thos e persons who are personally denied equal treatm ent by the challenge d discriminatory conduct.
Id. at 755 (quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis added). Here, Mr. Awad’s injury is personal and concrete.
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Religious and Civil Rights v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Graber, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011). The harm alleged by Mr. Awad stems from a constitutional directive of exclusion and disfavored treatment of a particular religious legal tradition.
The district court seemed to rely in part on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Catholic League to confer standing on Mr. Awad. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1303. We do not rely on Catholic League, although our standing holding is consistent with that case, and the contrast between the two cases illustrates the strength of Mr. Awad’s standing. In Catholic League, the court upheld plaintiffs’ standing to challenge a non-binding San Francisco Board of Supervisors resolution denouncing a Catholic Church position on homosexual adoptions. 624 F.3d at 1046-53. In this case, the Oklahoma Legislature did not simply adopt a non-binding resolution opposing the consideration or use of Sharia law in state courts, it proposed and the electorate agreed to enshrine such a prohibition in the state’s constitution. Mr. Awad is facing the consequences of a statewide election approving a constitutional measure that would disfavor his religion relative to others. The non-binding city resolution in Catholic League conveyed “a government message,” 624 F.3d at 1048. The Oklahoma amendment conveys more than a message; it would impose a constitutional command.
We conclude that Mr. Awad’s allegation—that the proposed state amendment expressly condemns his religion and exposes him and other Muslims in Oklahoma to disfavored treatment—suffices to establish the kind of direct injury-in-fact necessary to
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create Establishment Clause standing. Because the amendment would likely have been certified a week after it was
passed, we further conclude that the injury alleged by Mr. Awad is imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical. See Okla. State Election Board Rule § 230:35-3-91(c) (noting that the State Election Board meets on the Tuesday following an election to certify final election results on state questions); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 345 (2006) (defining “imminent” injury as one that is “certainly impending” (quotations omitted)).
Additionally, we agree with the district court that “plaintiff has shown that his alleged injuries are fairly traceable to the challenged action of defendants and are likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1304. Mr. Awad therefore has standing to bring his Establishment Clause claim.9
2. The Establishment Clause Claim Is Ripe For Review We also conclude that Mr. Awad’s Establishment Clause claim is ripe for review. The ripeness doctrine aims to prevent courts “from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements” by avoiding “premature adjudication.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). “Ripeness reflects constitutional considerations that implicate Article III
9Appellants have not challenged Mr. Awad’s prudential standing, nor do we discern any issues on that ground. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004).
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limitations on judicial power, as well as prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2 (2010) (quotations omitted). Our ripeness analysis focuses on “whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention.” Stout, 519 F.3d at 1116 (quotations omitted).
“‘[I]f a threatened injury is sufficiently “imminent” to establish standing, the constitutional requirements of the ripeness doctrine will necessarily be satisfied.’” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Thus, for the reasons discussed in our injury-in-fact standing analysis, we hold that Mr. Awad meets the constitutional ripeness requirement.
Appellants challenge whether Mr. Awad’s claims are prudentially ripe. We analyze prudential ripeness by “examining both the fitness of the issues raised . . . for judicial review and the hardship to the parties from withholding review.” United States v. Vaquera-Juanes, 638 F.3d 734, 736-37 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 315 (2011).
First, on fitness, we “focus[] on whether determination of the merits turns upon strictly legal issues or requires facts that may not yet be sufficiently developed.” Stout, 519 F.3d at 1118. We must decide if “prudential limitations . . . require us to stay our hand until the issues in the case have become more fully developed.” Initiative and Referendum Institute v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1098 (10th Cir. 2006).
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Mr. Awad challenges the facial validity of the proposed amendment under the First Amendment. Such claims are generally considered to be strictly legal questions that do “not involve the application of [the law] in a specific factual setting.” Stout, 519 F.3d at 1118 (quotations omitted); see also ACORN v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 835 F.2d 735, 740 (10th Cir. 1987) (“In determining the facial validity of a statute or ordinance the court does not consider any specific type of conduct. Rather, the facial validity of a statute is decided by reference to all of the conduct that is proscribed by the statute.”). The constitutional validity of the proposed amendment in this case does not require us to evaluate specific factual context. Further factual development is therefore unnecessary to our resolution of the preliminary injunction factors. This matter is fit for judicial review.
Second, as for hardship from withholding judicial review, we ask “whether the challenged action creates a direct and immediate dilemma for the parties.” New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted). Appellants plainly suffer no hardship from withholding review. But Mr. Awad has shown he faces an immediate and concrete condemnation injury if we withhold review and the measure is certified. Mr. Awad thus faces a “direct and immediate dilemma” and has established the necessary hardship to overcome prudential ripeness concerns. Id.
We conclude this matter is ripe for review. Because Mr. Awad also has standing, we hold that his Establishment Clause claim is justiciable.
B. Preliminary Injunction
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Having concluded that Mr. Awad’s claim is justiciable, we now address whether the district court abused its discretion by granting the preliminary injunction. See Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003). “An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court bases its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no rational basis in the evidence for the ruling.” Wilderness Workshop v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted).
To obtain a preliminary injunction, Mr. Awad must show that four factors weigh in his favor: “(1) [he] is substantially likely to succeed on the merits; (2) [he] will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) [his] threatened injury outweighs the injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
Appellants argue that Mr. Awad is seeking a disfavored type of injunction and that he should therefore be subject to a more strenuous preliminary injunction test. There are three types of disfavored injunctions:
(1) prelim inary inj unctions th at alter the status quo; (2) mandatory prelim inary inj unctions; and (3) preliminary injunctions that afford the movant all the relief that it could recover at the conclusion of a full trial on the merits. When a preliminary injunction falls into one of the se categories, it must be more closely scrutinized to assure that the exigencies of the ca se support the gr anting of a rem edy that is
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extraordinary even in the normal course. A district court may not gra nt a prelim inary injunction unless the m oving party makes a strong s howing both with regard t o the likelihood of success on the merits and with regard to the balance of harms. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1048-49 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (quotations omitted); see also O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 975-76 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc), aff’d and remanded by, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). The district court applied the heightened standard because it found the preliminary injunction altered the status quo and afforded all the relief Mr. Awad could recover after a merits trial. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1305. Although Mr. Awad argues on appeal that the district court should have applied the less demanding traditional standard, we need not decide that issue because we affirm that Mr. Awad meets the heightened standard. The following therefore reviews the preliminary injunction under that standard, which calls for Mr. Awad to make “a strong showing both with regard to the likelihood of success on the merits and with regard to the balance of harms.” Summum, 483 F.3d at 1049. The heightened standard does not affect the analysis of the other two preliminary injunction factors: irreparable injury and public interest. See id. Mr. Awad need only show that those two factors weigh in his favor. We examine each preliminary injunction factor. 1. A Strong Showing of Likelihood of Success on the Merits
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The first factor is likelihood of success on the merits. Under the heightened
standard, Mr. Awad must make a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on his
Establishment Clause claim. We first determine the proper Establishment Clause test and
then apply it to the facts to see if Mr. Awad has satisfied this burden.
a. Determining the Proper Legal Test
The First Amendment provides in part that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Like other First
Amendment provisions, the Establishment Clause is applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Com’rs, 563 F.3d 784, 796 (10th Cir.
2009).
To decide whether the district court abused its discretion in holding that Mr. Awad
is likely to prevail on the merits, we must first determine the proper Establishment Clause test. There are two possibilities—the Lemon or Larson test.10 See Larson v. Valente, 456
10“Although the Supreme Court is sharply divided” on whether Lemon remains valid law, this court “has recently affirmed that the touchstone for Establishment Clause analysis remains the tripartite test set out in Lemon.” Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1117 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011); see also Green, 568 F.3d at 798 n.8. An important distinction between American Atheists and this case is that the former involved religious symbols and not a law discriminating among religions. See Am. Atheists, 637 F.3d at 1112.
To withstand an Establishment Clause challenge under the Lemon test, a provision must (1) “have a secular legislative purpose;” (2) have a “primary effect” that “neither
Continued . . .
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U.S. 228, 255 (1982); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Supreme Court instructs that Lemon applies to “laws affording uniform benefit to all religions, and not to provisions . . . that discriminate among religions.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 252 (emphases in original).
The Larson test provides that if a law discriminates among religions, it can survive only if it is “closely fitted to the furtherance of any compelling interest asserted.” Id. at 255. 11 Strict scrutiny is required when laws discriminate among religions because “[n]eutral treatment of religions [is] ‘the clearest command of the Establishment Clause.’” Colorado Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 244)). “The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion . . . . The State may not adopt programs or practices . . . which aid or oppose any religion . . . . This prohibition is absolute.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 (quotations omitted).
Appellants argue that Larson is either no longer valid or does not fit the facts of
______________________________________ Cont.
advances or inhibits religion;” and (3) “not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quotations omitted).
11In Larson, the court found the appellants failed to demonstrate that the provision at issue was closely fitted to further a compelling governmental interest. Larson, 456 U.S. at 251. It then considered the provision under Lemon, but asserted that step was unnecessary: “Although application of the Lemon tests is not necessary to the disposition of the case before us, those tests do reflect the same concerns that warranted the application of strict scrutiny.” Id. at 252.
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this case. We disagree on both counts. Appellants surmise that Larson is no longer good law in part because it has been used infrequently. But the Supreme Court has never overturned it. Moreover, Larson’s rare use likely reflects that legislatures seldom pass laws that make “explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations” as contemplated in Larson. Id. at 247 n.23; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523 (1993) (“The principle that government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice is so well understood that few violations are recorded in our opinions.”).
The Supreme Court and various circuits, including this one, have referenced or applied the Larson test. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989) (Larson teaches that . . . the initial inquiry is whether the law facially discriminates among religions. If no such facial preference exists, we proceed to apply the . . . [Lemon test].”); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (“But Larson indicates that laws discriminating among religions are subject to strict scrutiny.” (emphasis in original)); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 n.13 (1984); Colorado Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1266; Sklar v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 549 F.3d 1252, 1257 n.3, 126567 (9th Cir. 2008); Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d 1084, 1090 (8th Cir. 2000); Koenick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259, 264 (4th Cir. 1999); Wilson
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v. N.L.R.B., 920 F.2d 1282, 1286-87 (6th Cir. 1990).12 In Colorado Christian University,
we stated: “statutes involving discrimination on the basis of religion, including
interdenominational discrimination, are subject to heightened scrutiny . . . under the . . .
Establishment Clause.” 534 F.3d at 1266 (citing Larson, 456 U.S. at 246).13
Because the district court applied Lemon without determining if Larson should
apply, see Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1305-06, we asked for supplemental briefing on this
issue and on the appropriate outcome under Larson. Having considered the parties’
arguments and the record, we conclude that Larson is the proper test for determining if
the proposed amendment violates the Establishment Clause.14
12The Larson test can be seen as “the Establishment Clause counterpart to the rule against content discrimination . . . in free speech law . . . [both requiring] strict scrutiny.” John H. Garvey, The Architecture of the Establishment Clause, 43 Wayne L. Rev. 1451, 1463 (1997). The Larson test can also be seen as an Establishment Clause counterpart to the Equal Protection Clause in that both “provide[] constitutional protection against religious discrimination.” Fred Mark Gedicks, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief in the United States, 19 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1187, 1189-90 (2005); see also, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951) (“The right to equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of those freedoms of speech and religion protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, has a firmer foundation than the whims of personal opinions of a local governing body.”).
13In Colorado Christian University, we acknowledged uncertainty as to what level of scrutiny should apply when discriminatory funding is at issue, see id. at 1267, but the proposed Save Our State Amendment is not about funding.
14Although the district court applied Lemon instead of Larson, we need not remand when, as here, the record is sufficiently developed to allow us to determine whether Mr. Awad has met his burden under the four preliminary injunction factors. See Summum, 483 F.3d at 1049 (“[T]he District Court abused its discretion by analyzing Summum’s First Amendment claim under the incorrect legal standard. But rather than
Continued . . .
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The Larson test applies because the proposed amendment discriminates among
religions. This case presents even stronger “explicit and deliberate distinctions” among
religions than the provision that warranted strict scrutiny in Larson. See Larson, 456
U.S. at 247 n.23. Larson involved a Minnesota statute that imposed certain registration
and reporting requirements upon only those religious organizations that solicited more
than 50 percent of their funds from nonmembers. Id. at 230. Unlike the provision in
Larson, the Oklahoma amendment specifically names the target of its discrimination.
The only religious law mentioned in the amendment is Sharia law, which is defined in SQ
755 in religious terms: “Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources,
the Koran and the teachings of Mohammed.” Aplt. App. Vol. 1 at 179.
Appellants argue there is no discrimination because the amendment bans all
religious laws from Oklahoma courts and Sharia law is named only as an example. But
that argument conflicts with the amendment’s plain language, which mentions Sharia law
in two places.
First, the amendment instructs Oklahoma courts to “uphold and adhere to . . . if
______________________________________ Cont.
remanding to the District Court for the appropriate analysis, we find the record sufficiently developed to allow us to determine whether Summum has met its burden under the four factors necessary to prevail on its motion.” (citing Schrier v. Univ. of Colorado, 427 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005); Utah Licensed Beverage Ass’n v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1075-76 (10th Cir. 2001))). “[W]e are free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court.” Herman v. Pollock, 586 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted).
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necessary the law of another state of the United States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions.” Id. at 168 (emphasis added). This language prohibits Oklahoma courts from upholding and adhering to laws of other states that include Sharia law but does not prohibit Oklahoma courts from upholding and adhering to laws of other states that include the laws of any other religion. On this basis alone, application of Larson strict scrutiny is warranted.
Second, the amendment states that Oklahoma “courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.” Id. (emphasis added). Appellants argue that the word “cultures” should be read to include religious groups, and that the amendment therefore “plainly prohibits the consideration of legal precepts associated with all religious denominations.” Aplt. Supp. Br. at 7. We disagree.
The amendment bans only one form of religious law—Sharia law. Even if we accept Appellants’ argument that we should interpret “cultures” to include “religions,” the text does not ban all religious laws. The word “other” in the amendment modifies both “nations” and “cultures.” Therefore, if we substituted the word “religions” for “cultures,” the amendment would prohibit Oklahoma courts from “look[ing] to the legal precepts of other . . . religions.” The word “other” implies that whatever religions the legislature considered to be part of domestic or Oklahoma culture would not have their legal precepts prohibited from consideration, while all others would. Thus, the second portion of the amendment that mentions Sharia law also discriminates among religions.
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Because the amendment discriminates among religions, it is “suspect,” and “we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 246.
b. Applying Larson’s Strict Scrutiny To survive strict scrutiny under Larson, Appellants must show (1) a compelling government interest, and (2) that the amendment is “closely fitted” to that compelling interest. See id. at 246-47. We pause here to clarify the burdens each party carries at this stage in the litigation. To succeed in his quest for a preliminary injunction under the heightened standard, Mr. Awad assumes the burden of making a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits. See Summum, 483 F.3d at 1049. However, “burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial.” O Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. at 429 (“[A]s the Government bears the burden of proof on the ultimate question of the challenged Act’s constitutionality . . . the movants must be deemed likely to prevail unless the Government has shown that [the strict scrutiny test is met].” (quotations omitted)). Therefore, if Appellants fail to carry their burden of showing a compelling interest and closely fitted means, Mr. Awad will have succeeded in carrying his burden of making a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits.
i. Compelling State Interest We first consider whether Appellants have asserted a compelling interest. For an interest to be sufficiently compelling to justify a law that discriminates among religions, the interest must address an identified problem that the discrimination seeks to remedy.
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See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). Appellants must identify an actual concrete problem—“[m]ere speculation of harm does not constitute a compelling state interest.” Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 543 (1980); see also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 644 (1994) (plurality) (“[The government] must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”).
Supreme Court case law instructs that overly general statements of abstract principles do not satisfy the government’s burden to articulate a compelling interest. For example, in Brown, the Supreme Court insisted that “[t]he State must specifically identify an actual problem in need of solving . . . .” 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (quotations omitted). Similarly, in Watchtower Bible Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Strauss, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), the Court rejected the government’s asserted general interest of crime prevention in part because “there is an absence of any evidence of a special crime problem related to [the challenged discriminatory law] in the record before us.” Id. at 169.
The supplemental briefing order asked how the Establishment Clause issue should be analyzed and decided under the Larson test. Appellants provided only one sentence on compelling interest. They simply assert that “Oklahoma certainly has a compelling interest in determining what law is applied in Oklahoma courts.” Aplt. Supp. Br. at 16.
Oklahoma’s asserted interest is a valid state concern. But this general statement
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alone is not sufficient to establish a compelling interest for purposes of this case. Appellants do not identify any actual problem the challenged amendment seeks to solve. Indeed, they admitted at the preliminary injunction hearing that they did not know of even a single instance where an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law or used the legal precepts of other nations or cultures, let alone that such applications or uses had resulted in concrete problems in Oklahoma. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1308; Aplt. App. Vol. 1 at 67-68.
Given the lack of evidence of any concrete problem, any harm Appellants seek to remedy with the proposed amendment is speculative at best and cannot support a compelling interest.15 “To sacrifice First Amendment protections for so speculative a gain is not warranted . . . .” Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Co., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973).
Because Appellants have failed to assert a compelling interest, they have failed to satisfy strict scrutiny. Mr. Awad has therefore made a strong showing that he is likely to prevail in a trial on the merits.
15Even if Appellants could identify a problem of sufficient importance to constitute a compelling interest, under strict scrutiny they still must demonstrate that their stated justification is the actual purpose for the proposed amendment and not a “rationalization[] for actions in fact differently grounded.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535-36 (1996) (citing Weisenburger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975)). Indeed, this court has emphasized that “[w]e cannot and will not uphold a statute that abridges an enumerated constitutional right on the basis of a factitious governmental interest found nowhere but in the defendants’ litigating papers.” Colorado Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1268-69.
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ii. “Closely Fitted” Without a compelling interest based on an actual problem, the second step of the strict scrutiny analysis—whether there is a close fit with a compelling state interest—is unnecessary and not feasible. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 246-47. It is unnecessary because both a compelling interest and a close fit are required to survive strict scrutiny. See id. It is not feasible because we have no concrete problem or compelling interest to try to fit with the Save Our State Amendment. One cannot try on a glove to see if it fits when the glove is missing. Nonetheless, we make the following observation about the “close-fit” or “narrowly tailored” step of strict scrutiny. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (explaining that strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement measures whether there is a close fit between the means chosen and the compelling interest). The proposed amendment goes further than preventing courts from “applying” Sharia law. The amendment forbids state courts from “considering” those laws. See Aplt. App. Vol. 1 at 168. Even if the state could identify and support a reason to single out and restrict Sharia law in its courts, the amendment’s complete ban of Sharia law is hardly an exercise of narrow tailoring. Appellants have not carried their burden to show why the proposed amendment is “closely fitted” to a compelling interest. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (explaining that the government assumes the burden to demonstrate a restriction “is narrowly drawn to serve” a compelling interest). Mr. Awad therefore has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits.
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2. Mr. Awad Has Shown He Will Suffer Irreparable Injury If the Injunction Is Denied
The second factor is whether irreparable injury is likely without the injunction. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. For the same reasons presented in the standing portion of this opinion, we disagree with the Appellants’ argument that Mr. Awad faces no injury if the injunction is denied. However, the question here is not just whether Mr. Awad faces a concrete and imminent injury, but whether such an injury will be irreparable without the injunction.
“A plaintiff suffers irreparable injury when the court would be unable to grant an effective monetary remedy after a full trial because such damages would be inadequate or difficult to ascertain.” Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 269 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, “[w]hen an alleged constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 963 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted).
“Damages would be inadequate or difficult to ascertain,” Dominion Video Satellite, 269 F.3d at 1156, for a claim of government condemnation of one’s religion. Mr. Awad has alleged that if the Oklahoma amendment takes effect, he will suffer such a condemnation injury in violation of constitutional rights. The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Mr. Awad is likely to face irreparable injury absent an injunction. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
3. Mr. Awad Has Made a Strong Showing that his Threatened Injury Outweighs the Injury the Appellants Will Suffer Under the Injunction
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The third factor concerns the balance of harms. Under the heightened standard of review, Mr. Awad must make a strong showing that his threatened injury outweighs any injury to Appellants caused by granting the injunction. See Summum, 483 F.3d at 1049. Appellants argue that the balance weighs in their favor because Oklahoma voters have a strong interest in having their politically expressed will enacted, a will manifested by a large margin at the polls. But when the law that voters wish to enact is likely unconstitutional, their interests do not outweigh Mr. Awad’s in having his constitutional rights protected. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 1997)
As the Ninth Circuit explained, when a law that voters have approved “affronts the federal Constitution—the Constitution which the people of the United States themselves ordained and established—the court merely reminds the people that they must govern themselves in accordance with the principles of their choosing.” Id.; see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (“[T]he Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress or the States specific power to legislate in certain areas; these granted powers are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution.”).
Appellants admitted at the preliminary injunction hearing that they did not know of any instance where an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law or used the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1308; Aplt. App. 15758. Delayed implementation of a measure that does not appear to address any immediate
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problem will generally not cause material harm, even if the measure were eventually found to be constitutional and enforceable.
We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that Mr. Awad made a strong showing that his threatened injury outweighed any potential harm to Appellants in granting the injunction. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.
4. Mr. Awad Has Shown the Injunction Would Not Be Adverse to the Public Interest
The last factor is whether the preliminary injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. See Beltronics, 562 F.3d at 1070. Appellants argue that the preliminary injunction interferes with Oklahomans’ fundamental right to vote, prevents enactment of the voters’ will, and “discourages the voters from participating in the election process.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 14.
Federal courts should be wary of interfering with the voting process, but we agree with the district court and the Sixth Circuit that “‘it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.’” Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 (quoting G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994)). “While the public has an interest in the will of the voters being carried out . . . the public has a more profound and long-term interest in upholding an individual’s constitutional rights.” Id.; see also Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1190 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting “[t]he strong public interest in protecting First Amendment values”).
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We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the preliminary injunction was not adverse to the public interest. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.
*** We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that each of the preliminary injunction factors weighed in favor of Mr. Awad’s request and that he made a strong showing on the substantial likelihood and balance-of-harms factors as the heightened standard requires. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.16
III. CONCLUSION Because Mr. Awad has at least one justiciable claim and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, we affirm.
16Appellants raised the issue of severability of the Sharia law portions of the amendment for the first time to this court in post-oral argument supplemental briefing. Their argument consisted of one sentence and cited no authority, stating that if this court decides the Sharia law provisions in the amendment render the amendment invalid, “the court should simply treat the explicatory example as surplusage, and strike it.” Because this issue has not been adequately briefed, we do not address it. See United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011) (“It is well-settled that arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived.” (quotations omitted)).
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Appellate Case: 10-6273 Document: 01018774571 Date Filed: 01/10/2012 Page: 1

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Byron White United States Courthouse 1823 Stout Street
Denver, Colorado 80257 (303) 844-3157
January 10, 2012

Douglas E. Cressler Chief Deputy Clerk

Mr. Patrick Wyrick Office of the Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma 313 N.E. 21st Street Oklahoma City, OK 73105
RE: 10-6273, Awad v. Ziriax, et al Dist/Ag docket: 5:10-CV-01186-M
Dear Counsel:
Enclosed is a copy of the opinion of the court issued today in this matter. The court has entered judgment on the docket pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. Rule 36.
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. Rule 40, any petition for rehearing must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. Please note, however, that if the appeal is a civil case in which the United States or its officer or agency is a party, any petition for rehearing must be filed within 45 days after entry of judgment. Parties should consult both the Federal Rules and local rules of this court with regard to applicable standards and requirements. In particular, petitions for rehearing may not exceed 15 pages in length, and no answer is permitted unless the court enters an order requiring a response. If requesting rehearing en banc, the requesting party must file 18 paper copies with the clerk, in addition to satisfying all Electronic Case Filing requirements. See Fed. R. App. P. Rules 35 and 40, and 10th Cir. R. 35 and 40 for further information governing petitions for rehearing.
Please contact this office if you have questions.
Sincerely,

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of the Court

Appellate Case: 10-6273 Document: 01018774571
cc: John Allen Eidsmoe Daniel Mach Craig C. Martin Robert Eli Michael Micheal Salem Joshua Segal Heather L. Weaver

Date Filed: 01/10/2012

Page: 2

EAS/lg

2

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MUNEER AWAD,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

)

)

PAUL ZIRIAX, Agency Head, Oklahoma )

State Board of Elections;

)

THOMAS PRINCE, Chairman of the

)

Board, Oklahoma State Board of Elections; )

RAMON WATKINS, Board Member,

)

Oklahoma State Board of Elections;

)

SUSAN TURPEN, Board Member,

)

Oklahoma State Board of Elections,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. CIV-10-1186-M

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

On November 4, 2010, plaintiff filed a Complaint Seeking a Temporary Restraining Order

and Preliminary Injunction. On Novem ber 8, 2010, the Court conducted a hearing on plaintiff’s

request for a temporary restraining order. Based upon the pleadings submitted and the argument of

plaintiff and counsel for defendants at the hearing, the Court makes its determination.

I. Introduction

State Question No. 755, which was on Oklahoma’s November 2, 2010 ballot, provides:

This measure amends the State Constitution. It changes a section that deals with the courts of this state. It would amend Article 7, Section 1. It makes courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases. It forbids courts from considering or using international law. It forbids courts from considering or using Sharia Law.

International law is also known as the law of na tions. It deals with the conduct of international organizations and independent nations, such as countries, states and tribes. It deals with their relationship with each other. It also deals w ith some of their relationships with persons.

The la w of nations is form ed by the general assent of civilized nations. Sources of international law also include inter national agreements, as well as treaties.

Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.

Election results show that voters approved State Question 755. Once the Oklahoma State Board of

Elections certifies the election results, the amendment set forth in State Question 755 will become

a part of Oklahoma’s constitution. The Oklahoma State Board of Elections has a scheduled meeting

on November 9, 2010 to certify the November 2, 2010 election results.

On November 4, 2010, plaintiff filed the instant action, challenging the constitutionality of

State Question 755. Specifically, plaintiff assert s that the ba n on t he s tate courts’ use and

consideration of Sharia Law violates the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the

First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In his complaint, plaintiff, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 65, moves the Court for a temporary restraining order enjoining defendants

from certifying the election results for State Question 755.

II. Standing

Under Article III, federal courts have jurisdiction only to deci

de “Cases” and

“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Anessential part of the case-or-controversy requirement

is the concept that a plaintiff must have standing.

A party has standing to pursue a claim in federal court only if: (1) it suffered an “injury in fa ct” – an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that injury is fa irly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant rather than some third party not bef ore the court; and (3) that injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.

2

Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agenc,y608 F.3d 1131, 1144 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal

quotations and citation omitted).

Plaintiff asserts that State Question 755’s amendment to Oklahoma’s constitution violates

the First Am endment’s Free Exercise Clause and Establishm ent Clause. Specificall y, plaintiff

asserts that the moment Oklahoma’s constitution is amended, his First Amendment rights will be

violated: (1) by Oklahom a’s official condem nation of his religion/faith as reflected through the

amendment to Oklahoma’s constitution banning state courts’ use or consideration of Sharia Law,

(2) by the invalidation of his last will and testam ent which incorporates various teachings of

Mohammed, and (3) by the excessive entanglement of the state courts with religion that would result

from the amendment as the state courts in implementing the amendment would have to determine

what is and is not encompassed in Sharia Law.

Having reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and memorandum, and having heard the arguments

presented at the hearing, the Court finds that plaintiff has made a preliminary showing that he will

suffer an injury in fact. Specificlaly, the Court finds that plaintiff hsa alleged an invasion of his First

Amendment rights – legally protected interests – which is both particularized and im minent.

Additionally, the Court finds that pal intiff has shown that his allegedinjury is fairly traceable to the

challenged action of defendants. In fact, plaintfif specifically contends that once defendants certify

the election results, Oklahoma’s constitution will be amended and his First Amendment rights will

be violated. Finally, the Court finds that plainti ff’s alleged injur y is likely to be redressed by a

favorable decision. A finding by tihs Court that the amendment to Oklahoma’s constitution set forth

in State Question 755 is unconstitutional would clearly redress plaintiff’s all

eged injury.

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has standing to bring the instant action.

3

III. Ripeness

In order for a claimto be justiciable under Article III, it also must present a live controversy,

ripe for determination, advanced in a “clean-cut and concrete form.” Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312,

322 (1991). A court’s ripeness inquiry “focuses noot n whether the plaintiff was in fact harmed, but

rather whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention. In short,

[r]ipeness doctrine addresses a timing question: when in time is it appropriate for a court to take up

the asserted claim.” Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1116 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal

quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Generally, a court “evaluate[s] the fitness

of the issue for judicial resolution and the ha rdship to the pa rties of withholding judicial

consideration.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Having reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and memorandum, and having heard the arguments

presented at the hearing, the Court finds that the instant action is ripe for de

termination.

Specifically, the Court finds that plaintiff’s claim s are fit for judi cial resolution. Election results

show that voters approved State Question 755, and, ht us, only certification of the election results is

required for the amendment to take effect. Once the amendment is in place, any alleged violation

of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights would occur. The Court further finds plaintiff would suffer

significant hardship if judicial consideration of plaintiff’s claims were withheld.

IV. Temporary Restraining Order

A party seeking a temporary restraining order must demonstrate: (1) there is a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he will suffer irreparable injuryin the absence of injunctive

relief; (3) the alleged injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the party opposing the motion;

and (4) the injunctive relief would not be adverse to the publ ic i nterest. See Dominion Video

4

Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp. , 269 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10 th Cir. 2001). Because a temporary restraining order “is an extraordinary remedy, the movant’s right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” Id.
A. Likelihood of success on the merits As set forth above , plaintiff asserts that State Question 755’s am endment to Oklahoma’s constitution v iolates th e F irst A mendment’s E stablishment C lause. W hen a c laim a sserting a violation of the Establishm ent Clause has been m ade, “[ t]o pass constitutional m uster, the governmental action (1) must have a secular legislative purpose, (2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it m ust not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, N.M., 541 F.3d 1017, 1030 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citationsomitted). The purpose and effect prongs of the test are interpreted in light of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test. “Under the ‘endorsement test,’ the government impermissibly endorses religion if its conduct has either (1) the purpose or (2) the e ffect of conveying a m essage that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, “[u]nder the [endorsement] test, the purpose prong of the . . . test asks whether governm ent’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whehter, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys amessage of endorsement or disapproval.” Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff contends that State Question 755’s amendment to Oklahoma’s constitution violates the Est ablishment Clause because it has a purpose and effect that is sectarian and because it necessitates excessive religious entanglem ent. Sp ecifically, plaintiff asserts that State Question
5

755’s origins establish that the amendment’s actual purpose is to disapprove of plaintiff’s faith. In support, plaintiff cites to one of the authors of State Question 755, Representative Rex Duncan’s, statement that “America was founded on Judeo-Christian principles” and the amendment’s purpose was to ensure that Oklahoma’s courts are not used to “undermine those founding principles,” and Representative Duncan’s further statement that the purpose of the measure was to establish a legal impediment against the “looming threat” of Sharia Law in the United States.
Plaintiff further contends that because the amendment directs Oklahoma’s state courts to make intrusive judgm ents re garding contested questions of religious belief or practice, the amendment excessively entangles Oklahom a in plaintiff’s faith. Specifically, the am endment forbids state courts from considering Sharia Law in any of its proceedings. Plaintiff asserts that there is no single religious text that all Muslims accept as the exclusive source for what constitutes Sharia Law and, consequently, to com ply w ith the amendment, state c ourts will be f aced w ith determining the content of Sharia Law.
Having reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and memorandum, and having heard the arguments presented at the hearing, the Court finds plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim asserting a violation of the Establishment Clause. Specifically, the Court finds that plaintiff has made a preliminary showing that State Question 755’s amendment does not have a secular purpose, that its primary purpose inhibits religion, and that it fosters an excessive government entanglement with religion.
Additionally, plaintiff a sserts that Stat e Question 755’s am endment to Oklahom a’s constitution violates the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. “At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discrim inates against some or all religious
6

beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993). Further, “[a]lthough a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible, if the object ofa law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious m otivation, the law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Id. at 533 (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff contends State Question 755’s am endment is not facially neutral in that it uses language that is unequivocally a nd exclusively wedded to plaintiff’s faith and on its face treats Islamic religious practices differently than any other religion. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the amendment burdens adherents of no other religion with the inability to admit evidence pertaining to religious practice into state court in a context where such evidence would otherwise be relevant, and that the amendment would prevent plaintiff’s will from being fully probated by a state court in Oklahoma because it incorporates by reference specfic elements of the Islamic prophetic traditions. Plaintiff further contends the am endment is not justified by any com pelling interest and is not narrowly tailored.
Having reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and memorandum, and having heard the arguments presented at the hearing, the Court finds plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim asserting a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Specifically, the Court finds that plaintif f has m ade a prelim inary showing that S tate Question 755’s am endment is not facially neutral, discriminates against a specific religious belief, and prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons. Additionally, the Court finds that plaintiff has made a preliminary
7

showing that State Question 755’s amendment is neither justified by any compelling interest nor narrowly tailored.
B. Irreparable injury Plaintiff contends that he will be irreparabl y injured because he will suffer the loss of his First Amendment freedoms at the moment defendants certify State Question 755’s election results. “The loss of First Am endment freedom s, for even mi nimal periods of tim e, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has shown that he will sufer irreparable injury in the absence ofinjunctive relief. C. Balance of harms Having reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and memorandum, and having heard the arguments presented at the hearing, the Court finds that the alleged injury to plaintiff outweighs any injury to defendants. While the Court recognizes the importance of the will of the voters being carried out, the Court finds that any harm that would result from a slight delay in certifying the election results is minimal in comparison to the irreparable injurythat occurs when an individual suffers the loss of his constitutional rights. D. Public interest Finally, having reviewed plaintiff’s com plaint and m emorandum, and having heard the arguments presented at the hearing, the Court finds that entr y of a tem porary restraining order enjoining defendants from certifying the electi on results for State Question 755 would not be adverse to the public interest. While the public hasan interest in the will ofthe voters being carried out, the Court finds that the publ ic has a more profound and long-term interest in upholding an individual’s constitutional rights. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, “[i]t is always in the public
8

interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994). V. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order. TheCourt, therefore, ENJOINS defendants fromcertifying the election results for State Quest ion 755. This Tem porary Restraining Order shall be in effect through the conclusion of the hearing on plaintiff’s request for a prelim inary injunction set for M onday, November 22, 2010 at 10:00 a.m.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of November, 2010.
9

 
 Case: 5:10-cv-1186 As of: 09/19/2014 06:25 PM CDT 1 of 14
CLOSED,CONV,PROSE,ROBERTS,_LDF
U.S. District Court Western District of Oklahoma[LIVE] (Oklahoma City)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 5:10−cv−01186−M

Awad v. Ziriax et al Assigned to: Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange Case in other court: Tenth Circuit, 10−06273 Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 11/04/2010 Date Terminated: 08/15/2013 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Muneer Awad

represented by Chandra S Bhatnagar American Civil Liberties Union Fnd 125 Broad St 17th Fl New York, NY 10004 212−519−7840 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: cbhatnagar@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Mach American Civil Liberties Union − DC 915 15th Street NW 6th Floof Washington, DC 20005 202−675−2330 Fax: 202−546−0738 Email: dmach@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Weaver American Civil Liberties Union − DC 915 15th Street NW 6th Floof Washington, DC 20005 202−675−2330 Fax: 202−546−0738 Email: hweaver@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Micheal C Salem Salem Law Offices 101 E Gray St Suite C Norman, OK 73069 405−366−1234 Fax: 405−366−8329 Email: msalem@msalemlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Adam Soltani

represented by Chandra S Bhatnagar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Mach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Weaver (See above for address)

Case: 5:10-cv-1186 As of: 09/19/2014 06:25 PM CDT 2 of 14

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Micheal C Salem (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Patricia Schwagmeyer

represented by Chandra S Bhatnagar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Mach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Weaver (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Micheal C Salem (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Imad Enchassi

represented by Chandra S Bhatnagar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Mach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Weaver (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Micheal C Salem (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Douglas Mock

represented by Chandra S Bhatnagar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Mach (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Weaver (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Micheal C Salem (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Paul Ziriax Secretary of the Oklahoma State Election

represented by Janis W Preslar Attorney General's Ofc−LINCOLN−OKC

Case: 5:10-cv-1186 As of: 09/19/2014 06:25 PM CDT 3 of 14

Board

4545 N Lincoln Blvd Suite 260 Oklahoma City, OK 73105−3498 405−522−4387 Fax: 405−528−1867 Email: jan.preslar@oag.ok.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick R Wyrick Gable &Gotwals−OKC 211 N Robinson Ave 15th Fl Oklahoma City, OK 73102 405−235−5500 Fax: 405−235−2875 Email: fc_docket@oag.state.ok.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah A Greenwalt Attorney General's Ofc−OKC 313 NE 21st St Oklahoma City, OK 73105 405−522−1961 Email: fc.docket@oag.ok.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott D Boughton Attorney General's Ofc−LINCOLN−OKC General Counsel−Litigation Division 4545 N Lincoln Blvd Suite 260 Oklahoma City, OK 73105−3498 405−521−4274 Fax: 405−528−1867 Email: Scott.Boughton@omes.ok.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Thomas Prince Chairman of the Board, Oklahoma State Board of Elections TERMINATED: 07/29/2012

represented by Janis W Preslar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick R Wyrick (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott D Boughton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Ramon Watkins Board Member, Oklahoma State Board of Elections TERMINATED: 07/29/2012

represented by Janis W Preslar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick R Wyrick (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott D Boughton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:10-cv-1186 As of: 09/19/2014 06:25 PM CDT 4 of 14

Defendant
Susan Turpen Board Member, Oklahoma State Board of Elections TERMINATED: 07/29/2012

represented by Janis W Preslar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick R Wyrick (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott D Boughton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Steve Curry Chairman of the Oklahoma State Election Board

represented by Janis W Preslar (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott D Boughton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick R Wyrick (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah A Greenwalt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Tom Montgomery Vice−Chairman of the Oklahoma State Election Board

represented by Janis W Preslar (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott D Boughton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick R Wyrick (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah A Greenwalt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Vacant Position Member of the Oklahoma State Election Board TERMINATED: 11/14/2012

represented by Patrick R Wyrick (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Diane Spurlock Member of the Oklahoma State Election Board

represented by Janis W Preslar (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:10-cv-1186 As of: 09/19/2014 06:25 PM CDT 5 of 14

Movant US Border Control
Movant US Border Control Foundation
Movant Lincoln Institute for Research and Education The Movant Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund
Movant John K Mooney

Patrick R Wyrick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott D Boughton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah A Greenwalt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kevin J Calvey Kevin J Calvey PC P O Box 20443 Oklahoma City, OK 73156 405−808−−0041 Email: kevincalvey@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kevin J Calvey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kevin J Calvey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kevin J Calvey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 11/04/2010
11/04/2010 11/04/2010 11/04/2010
11/08/2010

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Thomas Prince, Susan Turpen, Ramon Watkins, Paul Ziriax filed by Muneer Awad. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet) (njr) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
2 MEMORANDUM in Support re 1 Complaint filed by Muneer Awad. (njr) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
3 Receipt for Money Received from Muneer Awad in the amount of $350.00, receipt number OKW500013112 regarding 1 Complaint. (njr) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
4 MINUTE ORDER setting a hearing on 1 plaintiff's complaint seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction for November 8, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 11/4/2010. (ks) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
5 ENTRY of Appearance by Scott D Boughton on behalf of Thomas Prince, Susan Turpen, Ramon Watkins, Paul Ziriax (Boughton, Scott) (Entered: 11/08/2010)

Case: 5:10-cv-1186 As of: 09/19/2014 06:25 PM CDT 6 of 14

11/08/2010
11/09/2010
11/16/2010 11/16/2010 11/16/2010
11/16/2010 11/16/2010
11/16/2010 11/18/2010 11/19/2010 11/22/2010 11/22/2010

6 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange: Hearing on motion for temporary restraining order held on 11/8/2010. TheCourt finds that the plaintiff has met the factors for this Court to enter a Temporary Restraining Order and the Court will issue an order as soon as possible. The Court sets a hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction on November 22, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. (Court Reporter Lynn Lee) (ks) (Entered: 11/08/2010)
7 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER granting plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order. The Court, therefore, enjoins defendants from certifying the election results for State Question 755. This Temporary Restraining Order shall be in effect through the conclusion of the hearing on plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction set for Monday, November 22, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. (as more fully set out in Order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 11/9/2010. (ks) (Entered: 11/09/2010)
8 MOTION to File Amicus Brief for Hearing on Preliminary Injunction by U.S. Border Control, U.S. Border Control Foundation, The Lincoln Institute for Research and Education, and Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment, # 2 Attachment, # 3 Attachment)(Calvey, Kevin) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
9 RESPONSE re 1 Complaint to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Thomas Prince, Susan Turpen, Ramon Watkins, Paul Ziriax. (Boughton, Scott) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
10 ORDER striking 8 MOTION to File Amicus Brief for Hearing on Preliminary Injunction filed by U.S. Border Control, U.S. Border Control Foundation, The Lincoln Institute for Research and Education, and Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund (document not signed); Motions terminated: 8 MOTION to File Amicus Brief for Hearing on Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 11/16/2010. (ks) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
11 SECOND MOTION to File Amicus Brief for Hearing on Preliminary Injunction by U.S. Border Control, U.S. Border Control Foundation, The Lincoln Institute for Research and Education, and Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment, # 2 Attachment, # 3 Attachment)(Calvey, Kevin) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
12 ORDER granting 11 the motion for leave to file Amicus Curiae brief in support of defendants. The U.S. Border Control, U.S. Border Control Foundation, The Lincoln Institute for Research and Education, and Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund shall file said amicus curiae brief by Wednesday, November 17, 2010 at 8:00 a.m. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 11/16/2010. (ks) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
13 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Amicus Curiae Opposition to Preliminary Injunction by U.S. Border Control, U.S. Border Control Foundation, The Lincoln Institute for Research and Education, and Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Certificate of Service)(Calvey, Kevin) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
14 REPLY by Plaintiff Muneer Awad re 9 Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Muneer Awad. (njr) (Entered: 11/18/2010)
15 ENTRY of Appearance by Janis W Preslar on behalf of Thomas Prince, Susan Turpen, Ramon Watkins, Paul Ziriax (Preslar, Janis) (Entered: 11/19/2010)
16 ENTRY of Appearance by Micheal C Salem on behalf of Muneer Awad (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 11/22/2010)
17 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange: Preliminary Injunction Hearing held on 11/22/2010. The Court takes the matter under advisement and orders that the expiration of the Temporary Restraining Order be extended to no later than Monday, November 29, 2010. (Court Reporter Lynn Lee) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 4, # 4 Exhibit 5, # 5 Exhibit 6, # 6 Exhibit 7, # 7 Exhibit 8, # 8 Exhibit 9, # 9 Exhibit 10, # 10 Exhibit 11, # 11 Exhibit 12, # 12 Exhibit 13, # 13 Exhibit 14) (ks) (Entered: 11/23/2010)

Case: 5:10-cv-1186 As of: 09/19/2014 06:25 PM CDT 7 of 14

11/23/2010 11/24/2010
11/29/2010
12/01/2010 12/02/2010 12/02/2010 12/02/2010 12/07/2010 12/07/2010 12/07/2010 12/07/2010 12/09/2010
01/31/2011 02/04/2011 02/14/2011

18 UNOPPOSED MOTION to Seal Document Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 [Doc. 017−08] by Muneer Awad. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 11/23/2010)
19 ORDER granting 18 Motion to Seal Exhibit. The Court Clerk is directed to seal plaintiff's Exhibit 8 [docket no. 17−7], the Last Will of Muneer Awad, introduced at the hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 11/24/2010. (njr) (Entered: 11/24/2010)
20 ORDER granting plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction and enjoining defendants from certifying the election results for State Question 755 until this Court rules on the merits of plaintiff's claims (as more fully set out in Order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 11/29/2010. (ks) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
21 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 20 Order, by Thomas Prince, Susan Turpen, Ramon Watkins, Paul Ziriax. Filing fee $ 455. (Boughton, Scott) (Entered: 12/01/2010)
22 PRELIMINARY RECORD LETTER − Electronic Transmission of Notice of Appeal with Preliminary Record sent to Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals re 21 Notice of Appeal. (njr) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
23 Tenth Circuit USCA Case Number 10−6273 for 21 Notice of Appeal filed by Thomas Prince, Ramon Watkins, Susan Turpen, Paul Ziriax. (njr) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
24 USCA Appeal Fee received in the amount of $ 455, receipt number OKW500013609, re 21 Notice of Appeal filed by Thomas Prince, Ramon Watkins, Susan Turpen, Paul Ziriax. (njr) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
25 TRANSCRIPT Order Form by Thomas Prince, Susan Turpen, Ramon Watkins, Paul Ziriax that transcripts are necessary. See order form for dates and proceedings. (Boughton, Scott) (Entered: 12/07/2010)
26 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Gadeir Abbas by Muneer Awad. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Application for Pro Hoc Vice)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/07/2010)
27 TRANSCRIPT Order Form filed by Lynn L Lee indicating that transcript of proceedings of 11/22/10 is necessary. See order form for dates and proceedings. Estimated completion date February 6, 2011. (lhl, ) (Entered: 12/07/2010)
28 Receipt for Money Received from Muneer Awad in the amount of $50.00, receipt number OKW500013722 regarding 26 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Gadeir Abbas. (njr) (Entered: 12/08/2010)
29 ORDER granting 26 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice requesting the admission of Gadeir Ibrahim Abbas pro hac vice for the limited purpose of participating in this case on behalf of plaintiff, provided he submits an ECF registration form and files an entry of appearance, consistent with LCvR 83.4. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 12/9/2010. (ks) (Entered: 12/09/2010)
30 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief by John K Mooney. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1 − Proposed Order) (njr) (Entered: 01/31/2011)
31 ORDER denying 30 John K. Mooney's "Motion for Request to File: Amiable Brief, Friend of the Court" (as more fully set out in Order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 2/4/2011. (ks) (Entered: 02/04/2011)
32 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of proceedings of November 22, 2010, Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, before Judge Vicki Miles−LaGrange, re 21 Notice of Appeal Court Reporter Lynn L. Lee, Telephone number 405−609−5403. Transcript of: Hearing on Preliminary Injunction Volume: 1 of 1. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 3/7/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/17/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/16/2011. (lhl, ) (Entered: 02/14/2011)

Case: 5:10-cv-1186 As of: 09/19/2014 06:25 PM CDT 8 of 14

02/15/2011 02/25/2011 11/29/2011 11/30/2011 12/01/2011 12/01/2011
01/10/2012 01/10/2012 02/01/2012 02/10/2012 02/10/2012 07/20/2012 07/24/2012 07/29/2012 08/07/2012 08/16/2012 09/17/2012 10/10/2012
10/29/2012

33 TRANSCRIPT LETTER advising transcripts have been electronically filed re 21 Notice of Appeal filed by Thomas Prince, Ramon Watkins, Susan Turpen, Paul Ziriax. The record is ready for appeal purposes. (njr) (Entered: 02/15/2011)
34 LETTER from John K. Mooney. (njr) (Entered: 02/25/2011)
35 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Chandra Shekhara Bhatnagar by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Certificate of Good Standing − New York)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 11/29/2011)
36 Receipt for Money Received from All Plaintiffs in the amount of $50.00, receipt number OKW500021130 regarding 35 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Chandra Shekhara Bhatnagar. (njr) (Entered: 11/30/2011)
37 ENTRY of Appearance by Patrick R Wyrick on behalf of All Defendants (Wyrick, Patrick) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
38 ORDER granting 35 the motion for admission pro hac vice requesting the admission of Chandra Shekhara Bhatnagar pro hac vice provided counsel submits an ECF registration form and files an entry of appearance, consistent with LCvR 83.4. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 12/1/2011. (ks) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
39 USCA OPINION as to 21 Notice of Appeal filed by Thomas Prince, Ramon Watkins, Susan Turpen, Paul Ziriax. Affirmed; terminated on the merits after oral hearing. Mandate to issue. (njr) (Entered: 01/10/2012)
40 USCA JUDGMENT as to 21 Notice of Appeal filed by Thomas Prince, Ramon Watkins, Susan Turpen, Paul Ziriax. (njr) (Entered: 01/10/2012)
41 MANDATE ISSUED From USCA as to 21 Notice of Appeal filed by Thomas Prince, Ramon Watkins, Susan Turpen, Paul Ziriax. (njr) (Entered: 02/01/2012)
42 Statement of Costs in the amount of $175.02 as to 21 Notice of Appeal filed by Thomas Prince, Ramon Watkins, Susan Turpen, Paul Ziriax. (njr) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
43 SUPPLEMENT to MANDATE From USCA as to 21 Notice of Appeal filed by Thomas Prince, Ramon Watkins, Susan Turpen, Paul Ziriax. (njr) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
44 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Brief in Support by Muneer Awad. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 07/20/2012)
45 ORDER granting 44 plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend. Plaintiff shall file his amended complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 7/24/2012. (njr) (Entered: 07/24/2012)
46 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Paul Ziriax, Steve Curry, Tom Montgomery filed by All Plaintiffs.(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 07/29/2012)
47 ENTRY of Appearance by Chandra S Bhatnagar on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Bhatnagar, Chandra) (Entered: 08/07/2012)
48 ANSWER to 46 Amended Complaint by Steve Curry, Tom Montgomery, Vacant Position, Paul Ziriax.(Wyrick, Patrick) (Entered: 08/16/2012)
49 NOVMEBER STATUS &SCHEDULING CONFERENCE DOCKET: Scheduling Conference set for 11/6/2012 03:10 PM in Chambers before Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange. Status Report due by 10/30/2012. (ks) (Entered: 09/17/2012)
50 AMENDED NOVEMBER STATUS &SCHEDULING CONFERENCE DOCKET: Scheduling Conference set for 11/6/2012 03:20 PM in Chambers before Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange. Status Report due by 10/30/2012. (ks) (Entered: 10/10/2012)
51 STATUS REPORT − JOINT by Plaintiffs Muneer Awad, Imad Enchassi, Douglas Mock, Patricia Schwagmeyer, Adam Soltani, Defendants Steve Curry, Tom Montgomery, Paul Ziriax. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 10/29/2012)

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11/02/2012 11/02/2012 11/02/2012 11/06/2012 11/06/2012 11/06/2012
11/06/2012 11/06/2012 11/08/2012 11/09/2012 11/14/2012
11/14/2012 11/14/2012 12/28/2012 01/02/2013
01/18/2013 01/22/2013

52 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Daniel Mach by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Request for Admission Pro Hac Vice − Daniel Mach)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 11/02/2012)
53 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Heather Weaver by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Request for Admission Pro Hac Vice − Heather Weaver)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 11/02/2012)
54 MOTION for Order to Appear by Phone at Status Conference by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 11/02/2012)
55 Receipt for Money Received from All Plaintiffs in the amount of $50.00, receipt number OKW500028602 regarding 52 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Daniel Mach. (njr) (Entered: 11/06/2012)
56 Receipt for Money Received from All Plaintiffs in the amount of $50.00, receipt number OKW500028603 regarding 53 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Heather Weaver. (njr) (Entered: 11/06/2012)
57 ORDER granting 52 and 53 Motions to Appear Pro Hac Vice; Daniel Mach and Heather L. Weaver are admitted to practice before this Court for the limited purpose of participating in this case on behalf of plaintiffs, provided counsel submit an ECF registration form and file an entry of appearance, consistent with LCvR 83.4. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 11/6/2012. (ks) (Entered: 11/06/2012)
58 ORDER granting 54 plaintiffs' Motion to Appear at Status Conference by Phone. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 11/6/2012. (ks) (Entered: 11/06/2012)
59 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange: Scheduling Conference held on 11/6/2012. The Court will enter an order setting a discovery deadline and briefing schedule. (ks) (Entered: 11/07/2012)
60 ORDER setting briefing schedule (as more fully set out in order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 11/8/2012. (ks) (Entered: 11/08/2012)
61 MOTION to Substitute Party Defendants in their Official Capacity Pursuant to Fed.Rul.Civ.P. 25(d) by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 11/09/2012)
62 ORDER granting 61 plaintiffs' Motion to Substitute Party Defendants Pursuant to Fed.Rul.Civ.Pro. 25(d), and ordering that Diane Spurlock, Member of the Oklahoma State Election Board, be substituted for defendant Vacant Position, Member of the Oklahoma State Election Board. Diane Spurlock added. Vacant Position (Member of the Oklahoma State Election Board) terminated. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 11/14/2012. (ks) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
63 ENTRY of Appearance by Daniel Mach on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Mach, Daniel) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
64 ENTRY of Appearance by Heather L Weaver on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Weaver, Heather) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
65 MOTION for Extension of Time to Extend Briefing Schedule Deadlines by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/28/2012)
66 ORDER granting 65 plaintiff's motion to extend briefing schedule as follows: 1) Plaintiffs to file their motion for summary judgment by January 25, 2013; 2) Defendants to file their response/cross motion for summary judgment by March 11, 2013; 3) Plaintiffs to file their reply/response to cross motion for summary judgment by April 25, 2013; and 4) Defendants to file their reply by May 15, 2013. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 1/2/2013. (ks) (Entered: 01/02/2013)
67 SECOND MOTION for Extension of Time To Extend Briefing Schedule by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 01/18/2013)
68 ORDER granting 67 plaintiffs' second motion to extend briefing schedule and extending the briefing schedule as follows: 1) Plaintiffs to file their motion for

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02/06/2013 02/06/2013 02/08/2013
02/08/2013 02/08/2013

summary judgment by February 8, 2013; 2) Defendants to file their response/cross motion for summary judgment by March 25, 2013; 3) Plaintiffs to file their reply/response to cross motion for summary judgment by May 9, 2013; and 4) Defendants to file their reply by May 29, 2013. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 1/22/2013. (ks) (Entered: 01/22/2013)
69 UNOPPOSED MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages on Brief for Motion for Summary Judment by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 02/06/2013)
70 UNOPPOSED MOTION for Leave To Excuse Electronic Filing and Allow Conventional Filing Out of Time by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 02/06/2013)
71 ORDER granting 69 plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Oversized Brief; Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a single brief in support of their motion for summary judgment not to exceed 65 pages; and granting 70 plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Excuse Electronic Filing and Allow Conventional Filing Out of Time; Plaintiffs are granted leave to conventionally file certain exhibits as part of their motion for summary judgment out of time and by Monday, February 11, 2013. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 2/8/2013. (ks) (Entered: 02/08/2013)
72 MOTION for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunctive Relief as to Constitutionality of Oklahoma State Questions 755 by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 02/08/2013)
73 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 72 MOTION for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunctive Relief as to Constitutionality of Oklahoma State Questions 755 by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 01−00 − Muneer Awad Declaration, # 2 Attachment 01−01 − Ex. 01− CAIR−OK Board Meeting Minutes, # 3 Attachment 01−02 − Ex. 02 − 916 Trip to OKC, # 4 Attachment 01−03 − Ex. 03 − 0921 Trip to Tulsa, # 5 Attachment 01−04 − Ex. 04 Young Dem Invite, # 6 Attachment 02−00 Adam Soltani Declaration, # 7 Attachment 02−01 − Ex. 01 − Adam Soltani Employment Letter, # 8 Attachment 02−02 − Ex. 02 − Adam Soltani Executive Committee Appointment, # 9 Attachment 02−03 − Ex. 03 Adam Soltani Will − Redacted, # 10 Attachment 03−00 − Imad Enchassi Declaration, # 11 Attachment 03−01 −Ex. 01 − Enchassi − Islamic Society Contract, # 12 Attachment 03−02 − Ex. 02 − Imad Enchassi − Bachelor &Sworn Translation, # 13 Attachment 03−03 − Ex. 03 Imad Enchassi − Masters &Sworn Translation, # 14 Attachment 03−04 − Ex. 04 − Imad Enchassi − Doctorate &Sworn Translation, # 15 Attachment 03−05 − Ex. 05 − Sample Marriage License Certification, # 16 Attachment 03−06 − Ex. 06 − Imad Enchassi DOC ID, # 17 Attachment 03−07 − Ex. 07 − Premarital−Counseling−Disclosure−Form, # 18 Attachment 04−00 − Doug Mock Declaration, # 19 Attachment 04−01 − Ex. 01 − Mock−Schwagmeyer Apostille, # 20 Attachment 05−00 − Patricial Schwagmeyer Declaration, # 21 Attachment 05−01 − Ex. 01 Mock−Schwagmeyer Apostille, # 22 Attachment 06−00 Awad v. Ziriax Hearing on Prel Inj 11−22−10, # 23 Attachment 07−00 Awad_v Ziriax − Oral Argument− Transcipt − Tenth Circuit, # 24 Attachment 08−00 Doc. 9852634 − Appellant−Petitioner's brief filed by Mr. Thomas Prince, Ms. Susan Turpen, Mr. Ramon Watkins and Mr. Paul Ziriax, # 25 Attachment 09−00 − Declaration of Heather Weaver (with Exhibits), # 26 Attachment 09−01 − Ex. 01 − Video of The Sykes Update 05−06−10 − Conventional Filing, # 27 Attachment 09−02 − Ex. 02− Facebook of Sykes Timeline post 05−07−10, # 28 Attachment 09−03 − Ex. 03 Facebook of Sykes Timeline post 05−07−10 with Bowen comments, # 29 Attachment 09−04 − Twitter of Sykes post 05−07−10, # 30 Attachment 09−05 − Video of Rep Duncan 05−25−10 interview, # 31 Attachment 09−06 − Video of The Sykes Update for 05−26−10, # 32 Attachment 09−07 − Facebook of Sykes Timeline post 05−27−10 with comments, # 33 Attachment 09−08 − Twitter of Sykes post 05−27−10, # 34 Attachment 09−09 − News article by Schlachtenhaufen posted 06−04−10, # 35 Attachment 09−10 − Video of Rep Duncan 06−11−10 interview on MSNBC, # 36 Attachment 09−11 − Video of Rep Duncan 06−16−10 interview on Fox News, # 37 Attachment 09−12 − Video of Rep Duncan 06−18−10 interview on Hannity segment of Fox News, # 38 Attachment 09−13 − Twitter of Murphey post 06−18−10, # 39 Attachment 09−14 − Twitter of Schwartz post 06−18−10, # 40 Attachment 09−15 − Twitter of Sykes post 06−20−10, # 41 Attachment 09−16 − Video of Rep Duncan 06−25−10 interview Fox News, # 42 Attachment 09−17 − News article by Kennedy posted 06−25−10, # 43 Attachment

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02/11/2013 02/11/2013 03/19/2013 03/19/2013 04/08/2013 05/21/2013 05/21/2013

09−18 − Audio of Rep Duncan 07−15−10 interview on America Akbar Radio, # 44 Attachment 09−19 − Website page of The Gadi Adelman Show containing Bio, # 45 Attachment 09−20 − News article by Hagerty posted 09−08−10, # 46 Attachment 09−21 − News article by Schlachtenhaufen posted on 09−24−10, # 47 Attachment 09−22 − News article by Brown posted 09−24−10, # 48 Attachment 09−23 − News article by Osborn posted 09−27−10, # 49 Attachment 09−24 − Video of Rep Duncan &Mohammed on KRMG News Talk Radio, # 50 Attachment 09−25 − Audio of Rep Duncan 10−6−10 interview on OKTEA, # 51 Attachment 09−26 − Video of Hashimi &Rep. Duncan 10−07−10 comments on KJRH News Ch 2, # 52 Attachment 09−27 − News article by Carter posted 10−07−10, # 53 Attachment 09−28 − Facebook of Brogdon Timeline post 10−07−10, # 54 Attachment 09−29 − Video of Rep Wesselhoft 10−17−10 comments on OK Politics &You, # 55 Attachment 09−30 − News article by Mitchell posted 10−18−10, # 56 Attachment 09−31 − Audio ad of ACT! For America, # 57 Attachment 09−32 − News article by Clark posted 10−20−10 on Fox News, # 58 Attachment 09−33 − News article by Ure posted 11−01−10, # 59 Attachment 09−34 − Website page of Act! for America posted 11−03−10, # 60 Attachment 09−35 − News article by Gabriel &Losawyer posted 10−16−10, # 61 Attachment 09−36 − Video Hashimi &Duncan 10−23−10 comments on Fox 23 News, # 62 Attachment 09−37 − News Article by Douglas Clark of Fox 23 posted 10−21−10, # 63 Attachment 09−38 − News article by Toensing posted 10−26−10 on ICTMN, # 64 Attachment 09−39 − Video of Sen. Sykes 11−01−10 interview on CNN, # 65 Attachment 09−40 − Video of Rep Moore &Awad 11−23−10 comments on Ch 4 News, # 66 Attachment 09−41 − Transcript of 12−02−10 Chris Matthews on NBC News, # 67 Attachment 09−42 − Article from Oklahoma State Senate Press Release on 01−10−12 with Sykes comments, # 68 Attachment 09−43 − Website page of Newberry posted 06−21−12, # 69 Attachment 09−44 − Website post by Clark Jolley for Oklahoma, # 70 Attachment 09−45 − News Content Analysis Spreadsheet)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 02/08/2013)
74 NOTICE of Conventional Filing of Video and Audio Attachment Exhibits to Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 073] by Micheal C Salem on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 02/11/2013)
75 EXHIBITS CONVENTIONALLY FILED re: 73 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 72 MOTION for Summary Judgment: Attachments 09−01, 09−05, 09−06, 09−10, 09−11, 09−12, 09−16, 09−18, 09−24, 09−25, 09−26, 09−29, 09−31, 09−36, 09−39, 09−40 by Plaintiffs Muneer Awad, Imad Enchassi, Douglas Mock, Patricia Schwagmeyer, Adam Soltani. (njr) (Entered: 02/11/2013)
76 UNOPPOSED MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 72 MOTION for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunctive Relief as to Constitutionality of Oklahoma State Questions 755 by Steve Curry, Tom Montgomery, Diane Spurlock, Paul Ziriax. (Wyrick, Patrick) (Entered: 03/19/2013)
77 ORDER granting 76 defendants' Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to File Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (as more fully set out in order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 3/19/2013. (njr) (Entered: 03/19/2013)
78 RESPONSE in Opposition re 72 MOTION for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunctive Relief as to Constitutionality of Oklahoma State Questions 755 Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support filed by Steve Curry, Tom Montgomery, Diane Spurlock, Paul Ziriax. (Wyrick, Patrick) (Entered: 04/08/2013)
79 THIRD MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 05/21/2013)
80 ORDER granting 79 plaintiffs' Third Motion to Extend Briefing Schedule and extending the briefing schedule as follows: 1) Plaintiffs to file their reply/response to cross motion for summary judgment by June 6, 2013; and 2) Defendants to file their reply to cross motion for summary judgment by June 26, 2013. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 5/21/2013. (ks) (Entered: 05/21/2013)

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06/06/2013 06/06/2013 06/06/2013
08/07/2013 08/15/2013
08/15/2013
08/21/2013 08/22/2013
09/22/2013 09/23/2013 10/16/2013 10/17/2013
12/01/2013 12/01/2013

81 REPLY to Response to Motion re 72 MOTION for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunctive Relief as to Constitutionality of Oklahoma State Questions 755 filed by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 06/06/2013)
82 RESPONSE to Motion re 72 MOTION for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunctive Relief as to Constitutionality of Oklahoma State Questions 755 (All Plaintiffs' Response to all Defendants' Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment 78 ) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 06/06/2013)
83 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 81 Reply to Response to Motion, 82 Response to Motion, Combined Brief to Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 72 and Response to all Defendants' Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment 78 by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 10 − Okla HB1060)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 06/06/2013)
84 NOTICE (other) by Douglas Mock, Patricia Schwagmeyer re 73 Brief,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment − Statement of Material Facts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Email − 2013−06−19)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 08/07/2013)
85 ORDER granting 72 plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, denying defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, and finding that defendants should be permanently enjoined from certifying the election results for SQ 755 (as more fully set out in order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 8/15/2013. (ks) (Entered: 08/15/2013)
86 JUDGMENT in favor of plaintiffs Adam Soltani, Douglas Mock, Imad Enchassi, Muneer Awad, and Patricia Schwagmeyer and against defendants Diane Spurlock, Paul Ziriax, Steve Curry, and Tom Montgomery, memebers of the Oklahoma State Election Board. Additionally, this Court permanently enjoins defendants fromcertifying the election results for State Question 755. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 8/15/2013. (ks) (Entered: 08/15/2013)
87 UNOPPOSED MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Bill of Costs, and Supporting Briefs by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 08/21/2013)
88 ORDER granting 87 plaintiffs' unopposed motion to extend deadline to file motion for attorneys' fees, bill of costs, and supporting briefs. Plaintiffs shall file their motion for attorneys' fees, bill of costs, and supporting briefs on or before October 1, 2013. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 8/22/2013. (ks) (Entered: 08/22/2013)
89 SECOND MOTION for Extension of Time To File Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Bill of Costs, and Supporting Briefs by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 09/22/2013)
90 ORDER granting 89 plaintiffs' unopposed motion to extend deadline. Plaintiffs shall file their motion for attorneys' fees, bill of costs, and supporting briefs on or before November 1, 2013. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 9/23/2013. (ks) (Entered: 09/23/2013)
91 THIRD MOTION for Extension of Time to file Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Bill of Costs, and Supporting Brief by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 10/16/2013)
92 ORDER granting 91 plaintiffs' unopposed motion to extend deadline to file motion for attorneys' fees, bill of costs and supporting briefs. Plaintiffs shall file their motion for attorneys' fees, bill of costs, and supportingbriefs on or before December 1, 2013. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 10/17/2013. (ks) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
93 BILL OF COSTS by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Itemization of Bill of Costs)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/01/2013)
94 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Bill of Costs by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/01/2013)

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12/01/2013 12/01/2013 12/01/2013
12/01/2013 12/01/2013 12/01/2013 12/01/2013 12/01/2013 12/01/2013 12/01/2013 12/01/2013 12/02/2013 12/02/2013 12/02/2013 12/11/2013 12/11/2013
12/11/2013
12/11/2013

95 MOTION for Attorney Fees by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/01/2013)
96 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/01/2013)
97 DECLARATION by All Plaintiffs of Micheal Salem in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Time Records of Micheal Salem, # 2 Exhibit B − Litigation Expenses)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/01/2013)
98 DECLARATION by All Plaintiffs of Daniel Mach in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees and Expenses. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Time Records of Daniel Mach)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/01/2013)
99 DECLARATION by All Plaintiffs of Heather Weaver in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Time Records of Heather Weaver)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/01/2013)
100 DECLARATION by All Plaintiffs of Joseph Thai in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Time Records of Joseph Thai)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/01/2013)
101 DECLARATION by All Plaintiffs of Chandra Bhatnagar in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Time Records of Chandra Bhatnagar)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/01/2013)
102 DECLARATION by All Plaintiffs of Vincent Liesenfeld in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Time Records of Vincent Liesenfeld)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/01/2013)
103 DECLARATION by All Plaintiffs of Gadeir Abbas in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Time Records of Gadeir Abbas)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/01/2013)
104 DECLARATION by All Plaintiffs of Jimmy Goodman. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/01/2013)
105 DECLARATION by All Plaintiffs of Richard Wilkinson. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
106 DECLARATION by All Plaintiffs of Terry Ragsdale. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
107 DECLARATION by All Plaintiffs of Randy Calvert. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
108 NOTICE OF BILL OF COSTS HEARING: Bill of Costs Hearing set for 1/16/2014 11:00 AM in Court Clerk's Office. (njr) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
109 ENTRY of Appearance by Sarah A Greenwalt on behalf of Steve Curry, Tom Montgomery, Diane Spurlock, Paul Ziriax (Greenwalt, Sarah) (Entered: 12/11/2013)
110 UNOPPOSED MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 95 MOTION for Attorney Fees , 94 Brief −Motion for REcovery of Costs and Motion to Continue Hearing by Steve Curry, Tom Montgomery, Diane Spurlock, Paul Ziriax. (Greenwalt, Sarah) (Entered: 12/11/2013)
111 ORDER granting 110 defendants' Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motions for Recovery of Costs and Attorneys' Fees and Motion to Reset Bill of Costs Hearing. Defendants shall file their responses to plaintiffs' motions for recovery of costs and attorneys' fees on or before January 15, 2014. The bill of costs hearing is stricken, to be reset in light of the new deadline for defendants to file their responses. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 12/11/2013. (ks) (Entered: 12/11/2013)
112 NOTICE OF BILL OF COSTS HEARING: Bill of Costs Hearing rescheduled for 2/13/2014 09:00 AM in Court Clerk's Office. (njr) (Entered: 12/11/2013)

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01/15/2014 01/15/2014 01/22/2014
01/22/2014 02/05/2014 02/05/2014
02/06/2014 02/12/2014 02/14/2014 04/17/2014 04/25/2014 05/08/2014 05/14/2014 09/08/2014

113 RESPONSE in Opposition re 95 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Steve Curry, Tom Montgomery, Diane Spurlock, Paul Ziriax. (Greenwalt, Sarah) (Entered: 01/15/2014)
114 RESPONSE re 93 Bill of Costs filed by Steve Curry, Tom Montgomery, Diane Spurlock, Paul Ziriax. (Greenwalt, Sarah) (Entered: 01/15/2014)
115 REPLY to Response to Motion re 95 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Response to Motion for Recovery of Costs and Brief in Support 114 Re Bill of Costs 93 filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Doc. 156−ORDER by Court Clerk taxing costs, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Doc. 142 − MOTION for Costs Bill of Costs)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 01/22/2014)
116 REPLY to Response to Motion re 95 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − MCC v. IBC, 2010_WL_3824169)(Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 01/22/2014)
117 UNOPPOSED MOTION to Strike Hearing on Costs and make a determination of costs at the earliest convenience of the Clerk by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 02/05/2014)
118 ORDER granting 117 plaintiffs' unopposed motion to strike hearing on bill of costs and allow clerk to decide costs without delay and directing the Court Clerk to strike the hearing on the Bill of Costs and to enter its determination of costs at its earliest convenient time. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 2/5/2014. (ks) (Entered: 02/05/2014)
119 Costs Taxed in amount of $ 664.67 against all defendants (pw) (Entered: 02/06/2014)
120 MOTION to Review Taxation of Costs by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
121 RESPONSE in Opposition re 120 MOTION to Review Taxation of Costs filed by Steve Curry, Tom Montgomery, Diane Spurlock, Paul Ziriax. (Greenwalt, Sarah) (Entered: 02/14/2014)
122 ORDER denying 120 plaintiffs' motion to review action of clerk in taxing costs (as more fully set out in order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 4/17/2014. (ks) (Entered: 04/17/2014)
123 ORDER granting 95 plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Non−Taxable Expenses (as more fully set out in order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 4/25/2014. (ks) (Entered: 04/25/2014)
124 MOTION for Judgment on Attorney Fees, Costs, and Non−Taxable Expenses and Brief in Support by All Plaintiffs. (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
125 ORDER granting 124 Plaintiffs for Entry of Judgment on Attorney Fees, Costs, and Non−Taxable Expenses (as more fully set out). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles−LaGrange on 5/14/2014. (ks) (Entered: 05/14/2014)
126 NOTICE (other) by All Plaintiffs and Consent and Authorization to Execute Receipt and Release of Judgment for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Litigation Expenses (Salem, Micheal) (Entered: 09/08/2014)