IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

FILED
MAY - 4 1995

COLUMBIA DIVISION

LARRY 'POPES. CLERK

HARRY PLYLER, et al.,

Civil Action No.:82-876-2

Plaintiffs,

vs.

ORDER

MICHAEL W. MOORE, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections,

Defendant.

This matter comes before the court on defendant's petition filed May 13, 1994, for a ruling that the South Carolina Department of Corrections' (hereinafter "SCDC") policies and practices regarding four-point restraints are consistent with the 1985 Consent Decree (hereinafter "Nelson Decree" or "Decree"); and for a modification of the Decree to allow SCDC the discretion to use four-point restraints for inmate control, so long as no unconstitutional use of the device is made.
It appears to the court the parties have resolved this matter by "Memorandum Agreement To Modify Decree," dated May 1, 1995. (See attached). The parties wish to add paragraphs (A) - (E) to section III, P(4) of the Nelson Decree and incorporate same into the Decree by reference. The proposed addition is:
(A) Subject to the conditions listed below in paragraphs, P(4)(BE), and the determination that use of Four-point-restraints will not threaten the health of the inmate, four-point-restraints may be used in the
Plyler v. Leeke

PC-SC-002-010

75"

event that an inmate throws urine or feces at correctional staff. In any instance in which four-point-restraint is used, the substance thrown by the inmate must be reasonably determined to contain urine or feces by the unit supervisor, or by a deputy warden or higher official if the unit supervisor was the victim of the assault.

(B) In every instance in which an inmate throws human waste and is subject to sanction under this Modification Agreement, the inmate must be offered social work counseling to determine the reason for the inmate's actions. If, in the opinion of the social worker, the actions of the inmate were occasioned by misconduct of the correctional staff, an investigation by the Ombudsman or Internal Affairs will be initiated into the staff conduct and appropriate disciplinary action taken by the agency. The results of such investigation, whether founded or unfounded, shall be reduced to writing and provided to Plaintiffs' counsel.

(C) On the first occasion in which an individual inmate throws human waste, the security staff will use less intrusive punishment measures such as window flap closure and cup restrictions.

(D) In the event that the staff has complied with A-C above, four point restraints may be used in the following manner:

Second event

Four point restraints authorized for 2 hours immediately following the throwing of human waste

Third and subsequent events

Four point restraints authorized for up to four hours immediately following the throwing of human waste

(E) In the event that nursing staff is not on duty to observe and evaluate the restrained inmate at fifteen (15) minute intervals as required, and the lack of such staff does not violate the other terms of the Consent Decree, correctional staff with written certification of training by the medical staff in performing this function will be responsible for such observation and evaluation.

The General Principles section of the Nelson Decree allow for modification of the decree

on petition of any party with court approval. Nelson Decree §(II B). Furthermore, Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 23 (e) requires notice of the proposed compromise to be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs as well as court approval.
Therefore, notice shall be given to the members of the plaintiff class in the following particulars to wit:
(1) The "Memorandum Agreement To Modify Decree" shall be prominently posted in all institutions of the South Carolina Department of Corrections in areas which the inmates have access.
(2) The "Memorandum Agreement To Modify Decree" shall be published in The State Newspaper at least once a week for three consecutive weeks, commencing on or about May 15, 1995.
(3) The defendant shall bear the costs associated with providing notice to the plaintiff class.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

C. WESTON HOUCK CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

May 4,1995 Florence, South Carolina

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA COLUMBIA DIVISION

OR'dlNAL FILED
vruuii *nu MAY 2 -1995
„ _, CDU, LARRY W.PROPES, CLERK
FLORENCE. S.C.

HARRY PLYLER, etal.,
PLAINTIFFS,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections,
DEFENDANT.

) ) Civil Action No. 82-876-2 )
) )
) ) MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT ) TO MODIFY DECREE ) ) )

The parties hereby agree to modify the terms of Section m , P(4) of the Consent Decree by adding the following at the end of Section P(4):
(A) Subject to the conditions listed below in paragraphs, P(4)(B-E), and the determination that use of Four-point-restraints will not threaten the health of the inmate, four-point-restraints may be used in the event that an inmate throws urine or feces at correctional staff. In any instance in which four-point-restraint is used, the substance thrown by the inmate must be reasonably determined to contain urine or feces by the unit supervisor, or by a deputy warden or higher official if the unit supervisor was the victim of the assault.
(B) In every instance in which an inmate throws human waste and is subject to sanction under diis Modification Agreement, the inmate must be offered social work counseling to determine the reason for the inmate's actions. If, in the opinion of the social

1

worker, the actions of the inmate were occasioned by misconduct of the correctional staff,

an investigation by the Ombudsman or Internal Affairs will be initiated into the staff conduct

and appropriate disciplinary action taken by the agency. The results of such investigation,

whether founded or unfounded, shall be reduced to writing and provided to Plaintiffs'

counsel.

(C) On the first occasion in which an individual inmate throws human waste,

the security staff will use less intrusive punishment measures such as window flap closure

and cup restrictions.

(D) In the event that the staff has complied with A-C above, four point

restraints may be used in the following manner:

Second event
Third and subsequent events

Four point restraints authorized for 2 hours immediately following the throwing of human waste
Four point restraints authorized for up to four hours immediately
following the throwing of human waste

(E) In the event that nursing staff is not on duty to observe and evaluate the

restrained inmate at fifteen (15) minute intervals as required, and the lack of such staff does

not violate the other terms of the Consent Decree, correctional staff with written certification

of training by the medical staff in performing this function will be responsible for such

observation and evaluation.

(F) The parties agree that this is the full extent of the modification of Section

HI, P and that the Defendant shall, in all instances other than the throwing of feces and

urine, vigorously enforce the original provisions of P(4) to ensure that four-point-restraint is only used for medical purposes, and not for punishment of inmate misconduct.
\Signed this the 1st day of May, 1995, in Columbia, South Carolina.

Moore Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections
JL
Larry Ct Batson] General jCounsel, South Carolina Department of Corrections
(d o. iff
Kenneth P. Woodington Senior Assistant Attorney General
FOR THE DEFENDANT

W. Gaston Fairey Plaintiff Class Counsel
FOR THE PLAINTIFF CLASS

 
 I LED
OCTfl6l«J í

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA DIVISION

HARRY PLYLER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PARKER EVATT, Commissioner, south Carolina Department of Corrections, and Members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections,
Defendants.

) Civil Action No.:
) ) ) )
)
) ORDER ) ) ) ) )
)
) )

82-876-2

Following a Motion to Modify the Classification

section of the Consent Decree in 1992, the parties to the above-

captioned case have notified this Court that the matter has been

resolved by a Compromise Agreement to Modify the Decree.

Pursuant to the General Principles (IIB) of the

Consent Decree the Decree may be modified upon petition of any

party and pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, any compromise in a class action must be submitted to

the Court for approval and notice of the proposed compromise

shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the

Court directs:

The parties to this action pursuant to Rule 23 (e) have

submitted the attached Compromise Agreement to Modify the Decree

and an addendum letter dated August 18, 1993 to the court to

n^N f^^% 7>2Vs% A " " I I I I I I m i l m i l in

prescribe the proper manner for giving notice of the proposed settlement to the members of the class and to determine whether it constitutes a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement of this action.
THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED: 1. That notice be given to the members of the class in the form attached hereto as "Compromise Agreement to Modify the Decree" and an addendum letter from Plaintiffs1 counsel to Defendants dated August 18, 1993, in the following manner. (a) That the Compromise Agreement to Modify the Decree and the Addendum letter of August 18, 1993, shall be prominently posted in all institutions of the South Carolina Department of Corrections to include all bulletin boards and conspicuously posted in each living area of each facility housing members of the Plaintiff Class. (b) That the Compromise Agreement and Addendum letter shall be published in The State Newspaper at least once each week« for four consecutive weeks, commencing on or about
2. That by agreement the Defendants pay the cost of giving notice to the members of the Class in the manner prescribed above.
3. That a hearing shall be held before this Court after the Court has had an opportunity to review all comments submitted in response to the Notice, and all counsel of record

will be given notice of the time and place for the hearing, during or following which the Court will decide whether to take later testimony from any party or other person who has submitted comments about the proposed settlement of this action, to enable the Court to finally determine whether the Compromise Agreement and addendum letter provide a fair, reasonable, and adeguate resolution of the matter.
This the JP day of ^ w y^[/^^m•> 1993, in Columbia, South Carolina.
C. WESTON HOUCK f UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA DIVISION

HARRY PLYLER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PARKER EVATT, commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections,

) Civil Action No.: 82-876-2

) )

) )

)

) NOTICE OF COMPROMISE

) AGREEMENT TO MODIFY THE

)

CONSENT DECREE

)

)

)

Defendants.

NOTICE AND STATEMENT PROPOSED COMPROMISE AGREEMENT TO MODIFY THE

CLASSIFICATION SECTION OF CONSENT DECREE IN CLASS ACTION.

TO:

ALL PERSONS IMPRISONED IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

IN RE:

MODIFICATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION SECTION OF THE CONSENT DECREE OF 1985.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING:

By an Order of United States District Judge c. Weston

Houck in an action entitled Plyler v. Evatt. et al.. (formerly

Nelson v. Leeke). Civil Action Number 82-876-2, in the United

States District Court for the District of South Carolina, the

Court has directed that notice of the plan for Modification of

this Decree be given to those who may be members of the

Plaintiff Class. This Notice relates to a Consent Decree

involving conditions within all institutions operated by the

4

South Carolina Department of Corrections and specifically the Classification Section of the said Consent Decree.
In late 1991, the Defendants implemented changes to the existing classification system (known as Phase III) to which counsel for the Plaintiff Class objected. Pursuant to the original Decree in this case the Defendants moved for modification of the Decree in September of 1992. During the litigation process on the modification motion the attorneys for the Plaintiff Class and the Defendants have prepared the attached settlement for the Court's approval.
A copy of the proposed Compromise Agreement can be obtained for the cost of copying and mailing same by writing to the undersigned at the address stated below. Any person confined in any institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections will have access to a copy of the Agreement where he is confined, pursuant to the Agreement between the parties.
Any member of the class may submit written comments or objections to the proposed settlement of this action. All objections heretofore received have been filed, and will be considered by the Court. All further comments or objections must be supported by specific facts and specify specific sections of the Consent Agreement; for the Court cannot evaluate, and will not consider, general or unsupported objections, or wholly conclusory statements objecting to the entirety of the proposed settlement. The comments or objections
5

should be mailed to Ann Birch, Clerk, United States District

Court, 1845 Assentoly Street,

Columbia, South Carolina, 292Ol.

The Court, in its discretion, may later receive testimony from

representative members of the class (or others) who submit

written comments or objections which are legible and specific

enough to be meaningful to the Court. All comments and

objections will be available for review in the Clerk's Office by

all counsel who have appeared in this action.

The named Plaintiffs are represented by W. Gaston

Fairey, FAIREY, PARISE & MILLS, P.A., Post Office Box 8443,

Columbia, South Carolina, 29202; Alvin Bronstein, Director,

National Prison Project, 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite

1031, Washington, DC 20036. The Defendants are represented by

Larry C. Batson, General Counsel, Department of Corrections,

Post Office Box 211Bl, Columbia, South Carolina 29221-1787; and

Kenneth P. Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney General, State

of South Carolina, Post Office Box 11549, Columbia, South

Carolina 29211.

y\

Any comments received by / w f l C x v . 1993, will be

considered by the Court in determining the fairness, adequacy,

and propriety of the proposed settlement. Comments received

after that date will not be considered.

If the Court determines after reviewing the Compromise

Agreement to Modify the Consent Decree, together with all

comments and objections submitted by class members, that the

6

Agreement constitutes an appropriate resolution of the dispute

over the classification section of the Decree it will approve

the Consent Decree. All class members will be bound by this

judgment and will not be permitted to bring another action for

the same relief.

^h,

This the ¿? day of (¯>^Z¿¾*g*i^ , 1993, in Columbia,

South Carolina.

ANN BIRCH CLERK OF COURT United States District Court

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

JAN 1 11988
a,... .. BIRCH, CLERK
COLUMBIA, S. C

HARRY PLYLER, ET AL.,

(formerly GARY WAYNE

NELSON, ET A L . ) ,

)

Plaintiffs, )

vs.

)

)

WILLIAM D. LEEKE,

)

COMMISSIONER; SOUTH CAROLINA )

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;

)

and MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH

)

CAROLINA BOARD OF CORRECTIONS, )

)

Defendants. )

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:82-0876-2
H/-
ORDER

On January 8, 1985, the parties to this case agreed on a settlement, and that settlement was approved by the court in a consent decree signed March 26, 1986.1 In July 1986, the state defendants sought a modification of said decree to permit certain double and triple-celling of inmates, which was in violation of the decree, to continue until the prisoner early-release program of the Omnibus Crime Act, Act 462 of 1986, became effective and operative in early 1987. The defendants had, by their own admission, been in violation of the settlement decree since at

1 The defendants, with the advice, counsel and presence of the South Carolina Attorney General, agreed with the plaintiffs to settle this case; also, the South Carolina General Assembly specifically authorized negotiations and approved the settlement. Appropriations Act, Part III, Section IV, 1984 S.C. Acts 2177, ,3107.
Plyler v. Leeke

« 1 _

••

•• •• • • ™ *

PC-SC-002-001

least March 1986. Since the defendants had failed to attain
compliance voluntarily, this court proceeded to enforce the
settlement decree. On July 22, 1986, the court ordered the South
Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) to attain complete
compliance with the consent decree within sixty days, which was
simply requiring the defendants to do what they had agreed to do
when they settled the case.
The matter now comes before the court again on
defendants ' motion for modification of the consent decree^ and
their motion, in the alternative, to approve a new construction
variance in space allocations.3 Defendants explain that they
make both motions because the evidence in support of their motion
2 Defendants originally requested that section III(A)(3) of the decree be modified by adding a new second paragraph, as follows:
In new institutions opening on or after June 1, 1986, where the cells are at least 73-square feet in size, general population inmates may be double-celled as necessary to accommodate the number of inmates in custody. Inmates double-celled pursuant to this paragraph shall be entitled to the full range of p r o g r a m s , services, etc. as provided for in this Decree.
In an amended motion for modification filed September 11, 1987, defendants moved to make a "technical correction" in the proposed paragraph to permit double-celling in cells 69-square feet in size instead of 73-square feet. The court considers defendants' motion as amended. As of now, the new correctional institutions that would be affected by defendants' motion include Lieber, McCormick, Broad River, Marlboro, and Allendale.
3 The alternative motion for a "new construction variance" is made pursuant to section III(A)(4) of the decree and only applies to the Broad River, Marlboro, and Allendale Correctional Institutions, which were not already planned or under construction as of the date of the decree.
-2-

for modification also supports their motion for a variance for future institutions.4 Under either motion, defendants seek
permission to double-cell inmates in new institutions in cells of
69-square feet when the settlement decree requires that,
effective no later than January 8, 1988,5 inmates in new
institutions receive at least 100-square feet when double-celled.
The court scheduled a hearing on this matter in
Columbia, South Carolina for August 26, 1987, but was unable to
hear the motion because, at the time, the court was still
involved in the trial of a large criminal anti-trust case in
Charleston, South Carolina. Consequently, the hearing was held
before United States Magistrate Charles W. Gambrell, who has
submitted a report and recommendation to the court, in accordance
with 28 United States Code section 636(b). In addition, the
court has received the complete transcript of the hearing and
reviewed the matter de novo.
4 In determining whether to permit a variance under section III(A)(4) of the decree, the court "shall make a determination as to the reasonableness of or necessity for said variance, in light of but not limited to the requirements of this Decree and the totality of the conditions ..." Defendants submit that the showing required under section III(A)(4) is the same as the showing required to obtain a modification, but if there is any difference, it is probably that a lesser showing is required under section III(A)(4). Defendants' Memorandum In Support of Motion In the Alternative To approve Variance In Space Allocations at 5.
5 Under section III(E)(2)(c) of the decree, "plaintiffs assigned to medium or maximum security institutions ... shall receive the sleeping space required by this Decree ... no later than within thirty-six (36) months from the signing of this Decree by the parties." Thirty-six months from said signing is January 8, 1988.
-3-

Defendants argue that an unexpected high increase in
the inmate population makes compliance with the decree impossible
and, further, that said increase constitutes a substantial change
in circumstances thereby permitting modification of the decree
under Nelson y., Collins, 659 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1981) (en bane).
Defendants describe the changed circumstances as follows:
The Defendants, using previously-reliable projections, entered the agreement with an understanding that the number of inmates would increase by 30 to 50 per month. Decree, § III(E)(1)(c). Without these figures to rely on, Defendants never would have consented to the Decree. Defendants undertook a construction schedule which would have accommodated this rate of increase through 1990. During the first nine months of the Decree (January-September, 1985), the rate of increase, 40 per month, was within the anticipated range. In the next nine months, through June, 1986, the average rose to 110 per month, causing substantial noncompliance which led to the issuance of a remedial Order by this Court. In the nine months from July, 1986 through March, 1987, the rate of increase has remained high (83 per month) and would have been 100 per month absent the Court's early release of 149 inmates in August,, 1986. However, no noncompliance has occurred (with one very minor exception) since the effective date (September 20, 1986) of this Court's remedial Order. The continuation of the rise in the rate of increase demonstrates that Defendants are still operating under changed circumstances.
Defendants' Memorandum In Support of Motion for Modification at
4-5.
Defendants also argue that double-celling will not
unconstitutionally harm the plaintiffs because double-celling in
63-square foot cells has been permitted previously, see Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), and the primary objective of the
decree is not to provide single cells, but to provide housing
that is in accord with the Eighth Amendment. Without the relief
-4-

of modification of the decree to permit double-celling in new cells of 69-square feet, defendants estimate that they will be out of compliance by approximately 979 inmates6 when the threeyear deadline for compliance expires on January 8, 1988.
Plaintiffs respond that defendants make the same argument now as they did in their motion for modification in July 1986; SCDC has known that earlier projections were inaccurate and, in fact, has been projecting an increasing population for three years now, but no attempt has been made to alter construction plans accordingly. Plaintiffs argue that defendants chose to construct 69-square foot cells when they knew that the decree required that each plaintiff be allotted at least 50square feet of space for double-celling within medium security institutions.
It is the plaintiffs' position that the increased population is directly attributable to actions taken by the State of South Carolina and the failure of the State to take advantage of the release mechanisms available to control inmate population. Specifically, plaintiffs charge that the primary cause for the increase in inmate population has been a series of bills passed by the South Carolina General Assembly subsequent to the settlement.
The consent decree itself provides for its modification by the court upon petition of any party and "under the applicable
6 This was the defendants' estimate as of• August 21, 1987. See Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum In Support of Defendants' Motion for Modification at 2.
-5-

law pertaining to modification of Consent Decrees." Decree at § II(T).7 The applicable law in the Fourth Circuit is Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d at 420 which "teaches us that a decree such as this [a continuing decree directed to events to come] is subject to modification under appropriate circumstances." Plyler v. Leeke, No. 86-7654, slip op. at 6 (4th Cir. Nov. 12, 1986). The court in Nelson described appropriate circumstances as where "despite a good faith effort at compliance, circumstances largely beyond the defendants' control and not contemplated by the court or the parties ... put achievement of the ... timetable . .. beyond reach." 659 F.2d at 424 quoting Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org'n v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1121 (3rd Cir. 1979). The question of whether to allow modification becomes "whether there have been, since the entry of the original Decree ... changes either in operative facts or laws which cast a new light upon the facts or law as originally ruled on." Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d at 424. The law now is the same in this case as when the decree was originally entered into by the parties. The contention made by the defendants here is that there has been a change in the operative facts because of the increase in the
7 Section II(T) of the decree reads in full: This Consent Decree may be modified in the
future by mutual and joint petition of the parties or their successors, or upon petition of any party. Said petition shall be made to the Court and approved by the Court, after notice and hearing, by an Order amending the Consent Decree. Any disputed petition for modification shall be reviewed by the Court under the applicable law pertaining to modification of Consent Decrees.
-6-

prison population. Clearly, there has been a substantial increase in the
number of inmates reporting to SCDC for admission since this settlement decree was signed, and that probably does constitute a "change in the operative facts" as that term is used in Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d at 424. Before permitting any modification, however, the court must go further than simply finding that there has been a change in the f a c t s ; it must c o n s i d e r the circumstances and the equities of the situation. The court must carefully weigh the interests of the plaintiffs and the need for the decree on the one hand and, on the other hand, the hardships suffered by the defendants and the public if the decree is enforced without modification. "That inquiry is sensitive to specific facts and requires a fresh balancing of interests each time a modification request is made." Plyler v. Leeke, No. 867654, slip op. at 8.
On the side of the plaintiffs, the court should first look at the right of the plaintiffs to have the benefits of this settlement. In this instance, plaintiffs agreed to wait three years from the time of settlement for the benefit of having double cells of 100-square feet in new institutions. This space allotment was meant not only to provide the individual plaintiffs with adequate space, but also to limit the number of inmates within an institution so that appropriate levels of services and programs could be maintained.8 Further, in looking at the need
8 For example, certain inmates can work in prison jobs and acquire earned-work credits that shorten their sentences. The testimony of Deputy Commissioner William D. Catoe was that the number of jobs originally planned for at Lieber, for example, cannot be increased commensurate with the increase in the prison
-7-

for the decree, it is obvious that proper management of a prison
becomes more difficult as the inmate population increases,^
particularly when the population increase is beyond the prison's
originally designed capacity.10 Both sides would also agree that
population there caused by double-celling.
Q. When Lieber wasoriginally designed, it was designed for a certain number to do certain jobs and that was basically to keep those inmates occupied—
A. That's correct. Among other things.
Q. — w i t h a meaningful job?
A. Yes.
Q. If youdouble thenumber --There's no way of doubling the number of jobs at Lieber?
A. No, sir.
Transcript of Hearing, at 193, 11.9-17. Elsewhere, Deputy Commissioner Catoe expressed the opinion that SCDC would be able to provide the programs and work required by the decree if Lieber were double-celled, see Transcript of Hearing at 156-57.
9 Although at the hearing Deputy Commissioner Catoe was uncertain whether the discussion about c e l l size in the new prisons involved reducing the planned 73-square foot cells to 50square feet or increasing them to 100-square feet, see Transcript of Hearing at 178, 11.16-22., he did not dispute his deposition testimony regarding prison management, as follows:
There was a reluctance to substantially increase the numbers of inmates that we have in institutions because of manageability c o n c e r n s . The f a c t t h a t as i n s t i t u t i o n s get bigger, they tend to become more d i f f i c u l t to manage - - bigger in terms of inmate population . . . . [T]here's a generally accepted position on the part of people who run i n s t i t u t i o n s that as an i n s t i t u t i o n gets bigger, as the inmate population i n c r e a s e s , t h e management of t h a t institution becomes more difficult.
Deposition of William Douglas Catoe, July 14, 1987, at 47, 11.1923; 48, 11.8-12.
1 0 Lieber, McCormick and Broad River were each designed to house 504 general population inmates in single cells and 96 inmates in "lock-up," for a total of 600 inmates in each institution. Thegeneral population cells at Lieber are 73-
-8-

prison overcrowding creates the potential for greater
v i o l e n c e , "11 which is another serious consideration in
determining whether to impose the strict terms of this
settlement.
Turning to the side of the defendants, the primary
consideration is public safety. Should the decree not be
modified, defendants will have to rely on early-release programs
to reduce prison overcrowding; these include the Supervised
Furlough program, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 24-13-710, 740 (1976) and the
former and present Emergency Powers Act programs [EPA I and EPA
I I ] , S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-1110, et seq. (1976). Defendants
argue that the numbers and types of inmates who would need to be
released would result in a threat to public safety. Presumably,
inmates receiving early releases would commit crimes against the
public. The record shows, however, that releases made under the
old Emergency Powers Act have been carefully screened, properly
supervised, and the mediator, Allen Breed, reports that
recidivism rates have been better under that program than for
those inmates released through the regular parole process.
Mediator's Second Report on Findings of Fact and Recommendations
at 17. Of the 6,883 inmates released early since September 1983,
square feet and at McCormick and Broad River, the cells are 69square feet. Defendants propose that these general population cells be double-celled to house 1008 general population inmates at each institution, for a total of 1104 inmates in each. The designs for Allendale and Marlboro have been revised to expand the cell size of 208 of the 504 general population cells to 100square feet to allow for double occupancy.
H Deputy Commissioner Catoe did express the opinion, however, that after six months of double-celling at Lieber, he did not think the statistics showed a "disproportionate increase in violence" a f that institution. Transcript of Hearing at 158, 11. 9-15.
-9-

only 90 individuals (1.3% of the total) were returned to prison for having committed a violent crime. Stipulation of Facts, ^3. Further, there is nothing in the record to tell the court why crimes are more likely to be committed if the prisoners are released now than if they remain confined until they would normally be released a few months hence. Consequently, the court is not persuaded that public safety would be substantially lessened by the employment of these early release mechanisms.
Of course, the public also has an interest in punishing criminals by having them serve their sentences, but the early release mechanisms generally do not greatly abbreviate the time served. For example, in compliance with the court's previous order of July 22, 1986, SCDC released under parole supervision 149 non-violent inmates 26 days before their scheduled release. Further, public interest in preventing prison violence is enhanced by the prevention of prison overcrowding.
Another factor in considering the equities of the situation is whether the change in circumstances about which the defendants complain was "largely beyond the defendants' control." Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d at 424. In this instance, the record shows that most,12 if not all,13 of the increases in population
1 2 Dr. Lorraine T. Fowler, Director of Resource and Information Management for SCDC, estimated that at least 50% of the increases were a direct result of legislation passed by the South Carolina General Assembly. See Transcript of Hearing at _ 299-300.
X J M r . Breed explained the causes for the population increases, as follows:
One is, that this increase in population was not something that was not within the control of the State of South Carolina.
Now, there will be three things I can think
-10-

are attributed to actions by the South Carolina General Assembly
or by the South Carolina Probation, Parole and Pardon Board, and
that the legislature had been warned^4 that their legislative or
policy changes would increase the prison population beyond SCDC's
ability to remain in compliance. The mediator summarized his
findings and recommendation to the court, as follows:
I would urge the court, then, to deny the modification on the basis that a contract was entered into and that there have been no uncontrollable events
of real quickly that wouldn't be within their control. If one of their prisons burned down and they lost 500 beds, that's not within their control.
They can't control the crime rate, and they can't control the arrest rate, and they really can't control what the courts send to them either.
But you look over the period from 1983-'84, whichever period you want, and carry it up to the current d a t e , arrest rates in the state have not increased. Crime rates have not increased.
So, it means that what has occurred have been changes in policy or legislation which was within the basic control of the State of South Carolina.
The defendants predicted that admissions would stay constant over the entire period of the consent decree. And, of course, the legislature saw to it that that didn't come out by passing legislation that changed the admission rate level.
Secondly, the parole board began to revoke far more than it had historically which changed the number that are coming in. So, those two things alone changed dramatically the admission rate into the system.
The second area was that, early on, the Department decided that the release rate from prison would also remain constant over this period of the consent decree. That didn't turn out right either as we found that the number of inmates actually released on parole decreased by 27% during this period.
So, what we find then is that both of these events are a policy decision that have been made by various agencies within the State of South Carolina.
Transcript of Hearing at 317, 1.25,; 318, 11.1-25; 319, 11.1-9.
14 Dr. Fowler testified that her department did a population impact analysis for each proposed bill. Transcript of Hearing at 297-98; see also Deposition of Lorraine T. Fowler, July 14, 1987, at 27-28?
-11-

which have affected population, that the population has increased because of direct acts on the part of the legislature and on the part of the parole board, and that both groups were warned on frequent occasions that their action would bring Department of Corrections out of compliance with the consent decree.
T r a n s c r i p t of Hearing at 330, 11.12-20. Consequently,
defendants' changed circumstances were not largely beyond their
own control.
In balancing the equities of the present situation, the
court has considered "the requirements of this Decree and the
totality of the conditions," § III(A)(4), and, for the reasons
stated above, finds that it would be inequitable for this court
to grant either of defendants' motions. The need for the decree
far outweighs the harm that will result to the defendants or the
public if the decree is not modified. This court remains
convinced that the public interest is best served by requiring
the State of South Carolina to perform the promises it made to
its citizens and others in this matter.
Plaintiffs have also raised an issue for present
consideration'^ by the court concerning certain provisions in the
decree governing the reception and evaluation (R&E) centers.16
15 other issues were originally raised by both parties, but have since been withdrawn and are not presently before the court. Defendants' motion for modification had also moved for permission to-double-cell in R&E centers as a suicide-prevention measure, but defendants later abandoned that portion of the motion. Objections of Defendants to Magistrate's Report and Recommendation at 2, n.l. Plaintiffs had also asked that the court consider the mediator's recommendation that SCDC limit its inmate population to 95% capacity, but in light of the overcrowding crisis, decided to wait and possibly renew this request at a later time. Objections of Plaintiff Class to Report of Magistrate at 8.
16 The specific provision at issue are sections III(S)(l)(d), III(S)(l)(h), and lll(S)(l)(i).
-12-

Plaintiffs argue that the clear language of the decree requires the defendants to transfer inmates out of the R&E centers after 14 days. Plaintiffs' position is that holding an inmate in R&E longer than 14 days is not only prohibited by the decree, but also, it further exacerbates the overcrowding problem because it tends to extend the time that an inmate will be at SCDC, since an inmate cannot acquire earned-work credits while in R&E.
Defendants respond that they are in compliance regarding the R&E centers. Sections III(S)(l)(d) and III(S)(l)(h) do provide that inmates housed in the old Midlands R&E Center and in the Perry R&E Center shall be confined there no longer than 14 days, but section III(S)(l)(i) makes it clear that those sections are not a complete prohibition. Section III(S)(1)(i) provides that "[a]ny Plaintiff confined in a reception and evaluation center for more than fourteen (14) days shall have the right to the visitation and recreation provided by this Decree." It is not contested that defendants are providing said visitation and recreation privileges to the inmates confined for over 14 days.17
The provisions in question here fall under Section III(S) of the decree, entitled "Closing of Institutions." At the time of the decree, the existing R&E centers included Midlands R&E, the Midlands Annex, and the R&E at Perry. There were also two R&E centers that were already planned and included in Appendix F of the decree, New Lieber R&E and an unnamed center
17 In the vast majority of cases, inmates are kept in R&E centers longer than 14 days because there is no bed space available for them at their designated institutions. Deposition of William D. Catoe at 17, 11.22-25; 18, 11.1-4.
-13-

referred to simply as "new R&E."
Section III(S)(1) required the defendants to close the
Midlands Annex within one year from the signing of the decree and
to close Midlands R&E within three years. As of this date, both
of the facilities are, in fact, closed. Sections III(S)(l)(a)
through (c) set the population reduction schedules for said
centers prior to their closing. The first provision at issue
here is then section III(S)(1)(d), which reads in pertinent part,
as follows:
From the signing of this Decree by the parties and thereafter, no Plaintiffs other than the prisoner-staff shall be confined at the Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center or Annex for longer than fourteen (14) days, except those Plaintiffs confined pursuant to South Carolina Code Section 24-1050(b) [youthful offenders for observation and evaluation prior to sentencing] and such Plaintiffs shall be housed in singe cells in Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center or may be double-celled at Perry Correctional Institution Reception and Evaluation Center ...
As previously noted, both Midlands R&E and Annex are
now closed; the issue which arises is that the new R&E replacing
these centers is called the new Midlands R&E or, simply, Midlands
R&E. The new Midlands R&E is apparently the center that was
planned and referred to in Appendix F as "new R&E." Plaintiffs'
position is that section III(S)(l)(d) applies to the new Midlands
R&E. In construing this provision within the context of sections
III(S)(l)(a) through (d) and Appendix F, h o w e v e r , the
u n a m b i g u o u s , p l a i n meaning of the language in section
III(S)(l)(d) is that the then-existing Midlands R&E and Annex
were not to confine inmates longer than 14 days. It was known at
the time of the decree that other R&E centers were planned, but
these centers were not addressed or included in section
-14-

Similarly, section III(S)(l)(h) speaks only to the

Perry R&E Center, as follows, "[f]rom September 1, 1985, and

thereafter, no Plaintiffs shall be confined at the Perry

Correctional Institution Reception and Evaluation Center for

longer than fourteen (14) days." Plainly, this provision also

does not include the new R&E centers contained in Appendix F.

Further, in order to give any meaning to the next

provision, section III(S)(1)(i), sections III(S)(l)(d) and (h)

must be read literally. Section III(S)(l)(i) provides that

"[a]ny Plaintiff confined in a reception and evaluation center

for more than fourteen (14) days shall have the right to the

visitation and recreation provided by this Decree." To make

sense, this provision must address R&E centers other than those

clearly prohibited by sections III(S)(l)(d) and (h) from keeping

inmates longer than 14 days; otherwise, section III(S)(l)(i) is

meaningless. Other R&E centers were those listed in Appendix F

of the decree.

There are now three R&E centers in SCDC: Perry R&E,

New Lieber, and New Midlands. Section III(S)(l)(h) prohibits

only Perry R&E from holding inmates longer than 14 days.

Furthermore, for the reasons stated above, the

defendants' motions are denied, and defendants are hereby ordered

to obtain compliance with the terms of the settlement decree

through all of the early-release mechanisms available to them, as

well as by any other appropriate means.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED. I K O COPY
Anjn. A. BJi-ph, CJerfc DATED: At Florenc January
m _ -15-

DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUr.T FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAr.CLIKA

Gary Wayne Nelson, e t a l . ,
(Enter above the f u l l name of the plaintiff in this action.)
v. . William D. Leeke, Commissioner,
South Carolina Dept. of Corrections
Members, S. Carolina Board of'Corrections (Enter above t h e f u l l name of the defendant or defendants in
. this action.)

C 0 M J> I / A I N T
Civil Action No. (To oe£cr._lete: by Clerk)

I. Previous Lawsuits
A. Have you begun other lawsuits in state or federal court dealing with thesame facts involved in this action orotherwise relati. to your imprisonment? Yesfxxx) No ( }
B. Ifyour answer toA is yes, describe thelawsuit in thespace below. (If there is more than one lawsuit, describe the additional lawsuits on another piece of paper, using the sane outline.)
1. Parties to this previous lawsuit
Plaintiffs Charles Richard Kinsey, Gary Wayne Ni/'son, et al. vs.

De'er.dants

S°utn Carolina Board of Corrections

2. Court (if federal court, name the d i s t r i c t ; if stete court, name the county) U.S.District Court, District of South Carolina

3 . Docket number 8 1 - 1 6 0 6 - 9

.

4. Kame of judge t o whom case was assigned unknown

5. Disposition (for example: Wasthe case dismisses? v.";s i* appealed? Is it still pending?

.Still Pending'

6. Approximate date of filing lawsuit July 30. 1981

7. Approximate date of disposition

N/A

Plyler v. Leeke

PC-SC-002-002

f.

I I . Place of Present Confinement Central Correctional Institution

Address 1515 Gist Street, Columbia, S.C. 29202

A. I s there a prisoner grievance procsd'-re in this i n s t i t u t i o n ? Yes (xx ) No ( )

B. Did you present the facts r e l a t i n g to your cor.pleir.t in the

y

prisoner grievance procedure? Yes ( ) No x x x x )

C. IIff yyoouurr aannsswweerr ii ss YYEESS,,

/

1. What steps did you take? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^

2. Khat was" the r e s u l t ?

D. If your answer i s HO, explain why not Grievance mechanism is totally ineffective and unable to deal with the nature of this n r n h w
E. If there i s no prison grievance procedure in the i n s t i t u t i o n , you complain to prison a u t h o r i t i e s ? Yes (xxx) No ( }
F. I f your answer i s YES, n/a
1. Khat steps did you take?

2. Khat was the r e s u l t ?

I I I . (In item A belcv;, piece your nane in the f i r s t .blar.'; and place \ present address in the second; blank. Do the sans for s.z.ii-Lzr.5.. p l a i n t i f f s , if any.)

A. Name of P l a i n t i f f

Gary Wayne Nelson

^ c 1515 Gist Street, Columbia, South Carolina 29202

•
(In item B b&low, place the full name of the defendant in the f blank, his o f f i c i a l position in the second blank, and his place employment in the third blank. Use item C for the names, ?£si-and places of employment of any additional defendants.)

B. DefendantMi11iamD- L e e k e

i s employed aSommissjfone

South Carolina Department of Corrections a t 4444 Broad River Road

C. A d d i t i o n a l Defendants Members of the South Carolina RnarH Corrections are employed by the South Carolina Board nf 4444 Broad River Road, Columbia. South Carolina ?q?in

- 2-

IV. Statement of Claim

(State here as briefly as possible the facts of your : : s c . Do;;-. hew ecch defendant is involved. Include ai-co thl r.ir.-IE of other persons involved, d a t e s , and places. Do not give cr.y leru"i a::;->_ or c i t e er.y cases or s t a t u t e s . If you intend to allece a r.urjjcr c •related claims, nurrber end s e t forth each claim in a scsarsie paragraph. Use as much space as you need. Attach extra rhec-t if necessary.)

That the South Carolina Department of Corrections, as a whole, i s tremendously

overcrowded, to the degree that when considered in i t s t o t a l i t y . the rnnHH-inn«j

v i o l a t e the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as madP

_

"applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment tn t h PUnited <;t*tp<: _

Constitution, and that I , as a prisoner incarcerated w i t h i n tho 9n..i-h

Carolina Department of Corrections, am heina ^nhiprtpH tn th-ic overcrowding here at Central Correctional Institution as well as being

subjected to possible transfer to other f a c i l i t i e s operated by the Defendants

where I would also be subjected to these Eighth Amendment violations.

- 3-

Relief ( c t J * o t r i e f l v exactly v:h a t you v:ant the court to do f?r y;u. Hake "no lecal^arcumsnts. Cite no cases or : : c f ; : : - : j
Declatory and Injunctive relief against the Defendants to include a temporary

restraining order forbidding the Defendants from accepting any additional

'prisoners at any of their f a c i l i t i e s until this overcrowding is eliminatedand

the conditions at these f a c i l i t i e s operated by the Defendants arebrought in

line- with constitutional standards. Such other relief as this court deems

proper and necessary.

*

__

Signed t h i s '*~1' dayof. April

(Signature of Plaintiff;

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing i s true and correct.

April j , 1982

(Da-e)

'

•' (Signature o* ?lair.ti£:)

- 4-

 
 Educatio,. »erms and Funding Sources

ADM - Average Daily Membership

DEC0 7

ADA - Average Daily Attendance

(LEGAll 9F7TI Ciar

ABE - Adult Basic Education

""

AE - Adult Education

DMP - Defined Minimum Program

EFA - Education Finance Act

EIA - Education

Improvement Act

ECIA - (Chapter I) Education Consolidation Improvement Act

JTPA - Job Training Partnership Act

P.L. 94-142 - Public Law 94-142 (Handicapped Children)

VEA - Vocational Education Act

Plyler v. Leeke PC-SC-002-003

12-7-84

APPENDIX D
Defendant's Educational Programs
1. AIKEN YOUTH CORRECTIONAL CENTER (AYCC) Route 4, Box 494-B Aiken, South Carolina 29801 School Telephone: 648-2326
Staff; 1 Principal (State) 1 Secretary (H JTPA, h EFA) 1 Class Teacher-English (EFA) 1 Class Teacher-Math (h EFA, % Chapterl) 1 Class Teacher- Reading/English (Chapter I) 1 Class Teacher-Adult Education (County ABE) 1 Classroom Teacher (EFA) 1 Special Education Teacher (EFA) 1 Classroom Teacher-Transition (JTPA) 1 Counselor-Transition (JTPA)
3/4 Guidance Counselor {% EFA, h Chapterl) 1 Auto Mechanics Instructor (JTPA) 1 Masonry Instructor (JTPA) 1 Welding Instructor (JTPA)
1/4 Librarian-Bookmobile (Chapter I)
Course of Study: (School is open 6 hours daily, 5 days weekly)
Adult Education (all ages) Chapter I (Counseling, English, Math) (Under 21) Special Education (Under 21) Transition and Career Services (Under 22) Vocational Education (Auto Mechanics, Welding, Brick-
masonry) (All ages) Library Services—Bookmobile (Under 21)
Student Enrollment Slots: Academic 175 Special Education 32 Career Education 4 8 Vocational 42
2. CENTRAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION (CCI) 1515 Gist Street - Post Office Box 11159 Capitol Station A Columbia, South Carolina 29211 School Telephone: 758-5330
Staff: 1 Principal (State) 1 Classroom Teacher-Adult (State) 1 Classroom Teacher-Adult (State) 1 Classroom Teacher-Adult (State)
9/4 0 Classroom Teacher-Adult (ABE) 9/40 Classroom Teacher-Adult (ABE)
• M

1 Barbering Instructor (State) 1 Welding Instructor (JTPA) 1 Auto Mechanics Instructor (State/VEA) 3/40 Food Service Instructor-(Apprenticeship) 3/40 Sheet Metal Instructor-(Apprenticeship) 1 Librarian (State) 8 Part-Time Instructors (USC) 1 Part-Time Coordinator (USC)

Course of Study: (6 hours daily, 5 days weekly)

Adult Education (All ages) Vocational Education (Auto Mechanics, Barbering,
Welding, Food. Services, Sheet Metal) (All Ages) Post-Secondary Education (USC) Library Services (All Ages) Night Classes (3 nights-3hours)

Student Enrollment Slots: Academic 100 day, 100 night Vocational - 45 Regular, 24 Apprenticeship Post-Secondary 30
3. CROSS ANCHOR CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION (CACI) Route 1, Box 322-C Enoree, South Carolina 29335 School Telephone: 758-2376

Staff:

1 Principal (State) 1 Classroom Teacher-Adult (State) 1 Classroom Teacher-Adult (State) 1 Auto Body Repair Instructor (State) 1 Auto Mechanics Instructor (State) 1 Librarian (State)

Course of Study: Adult Education (All Ages) Vocational Education (Auto Body Repair, Auto Mechanics, Library)
Student Enrollment Slots: Academic 80 Vocational 30
4. DUTCHMAN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION (DCI) Route 1, Box 323 Enoree, South Carolina 29335 School Telephone: 596-1600 (Ext. 260)

Staff: 1 Principal (State)
3/4 Classroom Teacher (State) 1 Classroom Teacher 3/4 State, 1/4 EFA 1 Classroom Teacher 3/4 Chapter I, 1/4 State
1/4 Guidance Counselor (EFA) 1 Carpentry Instructor (EFA/VEA)

•->;-•

••>!-•••. _ 1 ; -

1 Brickmasonary Instructor (EFA/VEA) 1 Librarian (STATE) 1 Part-Time Instructor (Spartanburg Methodist College)
Course of Study: (6 hours daily, 5 days weekly)
Adult Education (All Ages) Vocational Education (Brickmasonry and Carpentry)(All Ages) Post-Secondary Education (All Ages)
Student Enrollment Slots: Academic 100 Vocational 30 Post Secondary 25
5. GIVENS YOUTH CORRECTION CENTER (GYCC) Route 3, Box 32 Simpsonville, South Carolina 29681 School Telephone: 963-4431
Staff: 1 Principal (State) 3/4 Classroom Teacher (1/2 ABE, 1/4 EFA) 3/4 Classroom Teacher (EFA) 1 Classroom Teacher-Math (1/2 EFA, 1/2 Chapter I) 1/2 Classroom Teacher-Reading/English (Chapter I) 1 Special Education Teacher (EFA, PL-94-142) 1/4 Guidance Counselor (EFA) 1 Classroom Teacher-Transition (JTPA) 1 Carpentry Instructor (State/EFA) 1 Masonary Instructor (EFA) 1 Welding Instructor (State/EFA) 1/4 Librarian-Bookmobile (EFA)
Course of Study: (6 hours daily, 5 days weekly)
Adult Education (All Ages) Chapter I (Language Arts and Math) (Under 21) Transition and Career Services (Under 22) Vocational Education (Carpentry, Brickmasonry, Welding)(All Ag Library Services (Bookmobile) (Under 21)
Student Enrollment Slots: Academic 110 Special Education' 32 Vocational 45
6. GREENWOOD CORRECTIONAL CENTER (GCC) Route 2, Box 472-C Greenwood, South Carolina 29646 School Telephone: 229-5906
Staff: 1 Carpentry Instructor (State VEA)
Course of Study: (4 days, 1 night/weekly)
Vocational Education-Carpentry (State/VEA)

Student Enrollment Slots: Vocational 15

7. KIRKLAND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION (KCI) 4344 Broad River Road Columbia, South Carolina 29210 School Telephone: 758-6302

Staff: 1 Principal (State) 1 Classroom Teacher (1/2 ABE, 1/2 State) 1 Classroom Teacher (1/2 ABE, 1/2 State) 1 Classroom Teacher (ABE)
3/40 Classroom Teacher (County ABE) 3/4 0 Classroom Teacher (County ABE) 4/40 Classroom Teacher (County ABE) 2/40 Classroom Teacher (County ABE) 4/40 Classroom Teacher (County ABE)
1 Electricity Instructor (State/VEA) 1 Masonry Instructor (State) 1 Plumbing Instructor (State) 1 Carpentry Instructor (JTPA) 1 Librarian (State) 6 Part-Time Instructors (Midlands TEC)

Course of Study: (6 hours daily, 5 days/week)

Adult Education (Day, Evening) Vocational Education (Brickmasonry, Carpentry, Plumbing,
Electricity) (All Ages) Library Services (All Ages) Night Classes (3 nights, 2 hours/week) Post-Secondary

Student Enrollment Slots: Academic 100 Day / 60 Night

Vocational 75

Post Secondary 45

/

MACDOUGALL YOUTH CORRECTION CENTER (MYCC) Route 2, Box 178 Ridgeville, South Carolina 29472 School Telephone: 688-5251

Staff: 1 Classroom Teacher-English (EFA) 1 Classroom Teacher-Math & Adult Ed. (1/2 EFA, 1/2 ABE) 1 Classroom Teacher-Reading/English (Chapter I) 1 Classroom Teacher-Adult Education (County - 9 months)
2/5 Classroom Teacher-Adult Education (County - 6 months) 1 Special Education Teacher (EFA)
1/4 Guidance Counselor (EFA)
1 Classroom Teacher-Transition (JTPA) 1 Carpentry Instructor (State/EFA) 1 Horticulture Instructor (State) 1/4 Librarian (EFA)

Course of Study: (6 hours daily, 5 days weekly)

Adult Education (All Ages) .. Chapter I (Language Arts & Math) (Under 21)
Transition Services (Under 22) Special Education (Under 21) Vocational Education (Carpentry, Horticulture) Library Services-Bookmobile (Under 21)

(All Ages)

Student Enrollment Slots: Academic 14 6
Special Education 32 Career Education 32 Vocational Education 30

MANNING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION 502 Beckman Road Post Office Box 3173 Columbia, South Carolina 29203 School Telephone: 758-4722

(MCI)

Staff: 1 Principal (State)

1/2 Classroom Teacher-Adult (State)

1/2 Classroom Teacher-English(EFA)

1 Classroom Teacher-English/Reading (Chapter I)

1 Classroom Teacher-Math (EFA)

1 Classroom Teacher-Adult Ed.)(ABE)

5/4 0 Classroom Teacher-Adult (County)

5/4 0 Classroom Teacher-Adult (County)

4/40 Classroom Teacher-Adult (County)

4/40 Classroom Teacher-Adult (County)

1 Special Education Teacher (EFA)

1/2 Guidance Counselor (State)

1 Classroom Teacher (JTPA)

. . . _.,

1 Horticulture Instructor (State)

1 Masonry Instructor (State)

3/4 0 Food Apprenticeship (Apprenticeship)

3/4 0 Stationary Engineering (Apprenticeship)

1/2 Librarian (EFA)

6 Part-Time Instructors (Midlands TEC)

Course of Study: (6 hours daily, 5 days weekly)

Adult Education (Day, Evening) Chapter I (Language Arts and Math) (Under 21) Transition and Career Services (Under 22) Special Education (Under 21)
Vocational Education (Brickmasonry, Food Services, Horticulti: Stationary Engineering) (All Ages)
Night Classes (3 Nights, 2 hours/ night) Post-Secondary

Student Enrollment Slots:

Academic 160 Day / 60 Night
Special Ed. 32 Career Ed. 32 Vocational 30 Regular, 24 Apprenticeship Post-Secondary 50

10. PERRY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION (PCI) Route 3, Box 194 Pelzer, South Carolina 29669 School Telephone: 243-4700

Staff: 1 Principal (State) 1 Classroom Teacher-Adult (State) 1 Classroom Teacher-Adult (State)
1/4 Classroom Teacher-Adult (County.1 1 Electricity Instructor (State) 1 Plumbing Instructor (State) 1 Masonry Instructor (State) 1 Librarian (State)

Course of Study: (6 Hours Daily/ 5 Days Weekly)

Basic Education (All Ages) Vocational Education (Electricity, Masonry, Plumbing/
Pipe Fitting) (All Ages)

Student Enrollment Slots: Academic 125 Vocational 45

11. STEVENSON CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION 4 54 6 Broad River Road Columbia, South Carolina 29219 School Telephone: 758-6707

Staff: 1 Classroom Teacher-Adult (ABE) 6/4 0 Classroom Teacher-Adult (County) 1 Special Education Teacher (State) 3/4 Small Engine Repair Instructor (State at WCI) 4 Part-Time Instructors (Midlands TEC) Librarian-Bookmobile (State)

Course of Study: (6 Hours Daily, 5 Days Weekly)

Adult Education (Day, Evening) (All Ages) Small Engine Repair (At Walden C.J.) Post-Secondary Special Education Student Enrollment Slots; Academic 55
Special Education 32 Vocational 15 Post-Secondary 40

12, WATEREE RIVER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION (WRCI) Route 1, Box 144 Rembert, South Carolina 29129 School Telephone: 758-0123
Staff: 1 Principal (State) 1 Classroom Teacher-Adult (State) 1 Classroom Teacher-Adult (ABE)
8/40 Classroom Teacher-Adult (County) 8/40 Classroom Teacher-Adult (ABE)
1 Radio/T.V. Repair Instructor (State) 1 Auto Body Repair Instructor (State) 1 Plumbing Instructor (State) 1 Heavy Equipment Repair Instructor (State) 1 Heavy Equipment Operator Instructor (State)
Course of Study: (6 Hours Daily, 5 Days Weekly)
Basic Education (All Ages) Vocational Education (Radio/TV Repair, Plumbing, Auto Body
Repair, Heavy Equipment Operation, Heavy Equipment Mechanics)(Night School)
Student Enrollment Slots: Academics 80 Day, 4 0 Night Vocational 70
13, WATKINS PRE-RELEASE CENTER (WPRC) 1700 St. Andrews Terrace Columbia, South Carolina 29210 School Telephone: 758-6524
Staff: 8/4 0 Classroom Teacher-Adult (County) 3 Employment Counselors (JTPA) Bookvan (State)
Course of Study: Adult Education, Linkage
Student Enrollment Slots: Academic Ed. 21, Career Ed. 50
14, WOMEN'S CORRECTIONAL CENTER (WCC) 44 50 Broad River Road Columbia, South Carolina 29210 School Telephone: 758-6171
Staff: 1 Principal (State) 1 Classroom Teacher-Adult (State) 1 Classroom Teacher-Reading/English/Math)
3/4 Classroom Teacher-Transition (State) 1/4 Guidance Counselor (State)
1 Dental Lab Instructor (State/VEA) 1 Welding Instructor (State/VEA) 1 Part-Time Office Skills Instructor (State) Librarian-Bookvan (State)

Course of Study; (6 Hours Daily, 5 Days Weekly)
Basic Education (All Ages) Transition Services Vocational Education (Welding, Office Skills, Dental Lab
Technology) (All Ages) Library Services Night Classes (6 Hours Weekly)
Student Enrollment Slots; Academic 60 Career Ed. 15 Vocational 4 0
15. PALMETTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 (CENTRAL OFFICE) South Carolina Department of Corrections 4444 Broad River Road P. O. Box 21787 Columbia, South Carolina 29221 Telephone; 758-6412 / 758-6132
Mr. H. Layne Coleman, Chief, Educational Services Branch
1 Academic/Title I Section Supervisor (1/2 State, 1/2 Title I) 1 Vocational Education Section Supervisor (State) 1 JTPA Coordinator Section Supervisor (JTPA) 1 Special Education Section Supervisor (State) 1 Library Services Section Supervisor (State) 1 Adult Education Coordinator (Adult Education) 1 Liaison Curriculum Specialist (1/2 State, 1/2 Chapter I) 1 Staff Assistant (State) 1 Staff Assistant (JTPA) 1 Secretary (Title I) 1/2 Reading Specialist (Chapter I) 1 Media Specialist (Chapter I) 2 Library Technicians (1/2 Chapter I, 1/2 State) 2 Job Placement Coordinators (Regional Positions)

 
 r

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA DIVISION

GARY WAYNE NELSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Civil Action No. 82-876-2

WILLIAM D. LEEKE,
Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Members of South Carolina Board of Corrections,

Consent Decree

Defendants.

Plyler v. Leeke
PC-SC-002-004

i
J

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

I. Definitions

~

3

II. General Principles

.5

III. Specific Terms of Settlement

A. Cell Housing

12

B. Wards/Cubicles

13

C. Other Housing

14

D. Temporary Structures

15

E. Phased-In Compliance with Housing Standards

16

F. Construction and Renovation Schedule

21

G. Capacities

22

H. Staffing

24

I. Health Services

31

J. Programs

35

K. Fire Safety

39

L. Discipline

40

M. Classifiation

43

N. Women's Institutions

47

0. Visitation

48

P. Physical Restraints

49

Q. Food Service

51

R. Environmental Sanitation

56

S. Closing of Institutions

;

63

T. Effective Date

65

U. Compliance

65

V. Attorneys' Fees

68

IV. Appendices

A. Medical Health Care Standards, (2nd Edition, 1981; as

' revised, 1983), Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions,

? American Correctional Association

70

B. Standards for Psychological Services in Adult Jails

and Prisons (1979 Edition), American Association of Correc-

tional Psychologists

89

C. Standards for Adult Community Facilities, American

Correctional Association, regarding Health Services

104

D. Educational Programs Available 1/25/84 & 9/6/84 . . . 107

E. Standards for Adult Community Facilities, American

Correctional Association, regarding Food Services

122

F. Sleeping Space and Capacities of Defendants'

Institutions

124

G. Reports and Recommendations Regarding Staffing,

January 1984, National Institute of Corrections

130

V. Signatures

167

2

I. Definitions A. "Plaintiffs" refers to all' persons sentenced or con-
fined at present or in the future to the legal custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, except those voluntarily confined in designated facilities as defined in South Carolina Code 24-3-20.
B. "Defendants" refers to the present and any future Commissioner and members of the Board of Corrections of the South Carolina Department of Corrections.
C. "Institutions" refers to all buildings, offices and facilities at present and in the future under the control and supervision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and used to provide housing or services to Plaintiffs.
D. "Temporary structure" refers to any type of enclosed space or facility, of any type of material, in which it is proposed to place any Plaintiffs overnight, and which is not affixed to the ground with a permanent foundation.
E. "Emergency" refers to any sudden unforeseen event which is not within the control or causation of Defendants or any other branch of the South Carolina state government, including but without limitation to riots, fire, and other natural disasters.
F. "Health services" includes services for medical, dental and mental health needs of Plaintiffs.
G. "Segregation", unless otherwise designated, refers to any form of restricted, lock-down confinement, including admini-

strative and disciplinary segregation, investigative segrega-'

tion, protective custody, death row, mental health units, and

maximum security units.

H. "Full-time, meaningful programs" refers to organized,

supervised programs, including but not limited to exercise, voca-

tional training, education courses, work assignments, work re-

lease and prison industries, which allow opportunity for five

hours per day participation and engagement in i n t e l l e c t u a l or

i*r.- physical activity. I. "Cubicle" r e f e r s to any non-secure housing area

characterized by walls that do not reach the ceiling and having

open doorways.

J. "Sleeping space" refers to a space set aside for sleep-

'••'<*

ing purposes.

X,

!•/•*••
W It?

Ill
![>•/' •' fp::<:'"
^ W i , ' ' • • '"i
Jj''.' ''• ' • -v. •
•"•*?.'

I I . General Principles A. The Defendants s h a l l withi'n s i x (6) months from t h e
date of e n t r y of t h i s Decree submit t o t h i s Court a w r i t t e n report s e t t i n g forth any timetable not included in t h i s Decree, to f u l l y implement the p r o p o s a l s made in t h e Decree. P l a i n t i f f s shall have sixty (60) days to object to this report.
B. For any plans discussed in this Decree, the parties shall make a reasonable effort toresolve any issue in controversy through negotiation, butif the parties are unable to resolve the controversy through this process the plan shall be submitted tothe Court fora hearing ontheissues. In any event, all plans shall be submitted to the Court for approval and, upon approval, shall beincorporated into this Decree by reference.
C. The Court shall retain jurisdiction in this caseto ensure that the Decree andall plans incorporated herein are fully implemented.
D. Counsel forPlaintiffs shall have access toand may receive copies of documents which effectuate the implementation of this Decree. Counsel for Plaintiffs shall have access to all Plaintiffs at reasonable times and under reasonable circumstances. Plaintiff's counsel shall have access toall staffand institutions, upon reasonable notice to Defendants' counsel. Defendants' counsel may be present at any meetings between Plaintiffs' counsel andDefendants' staff.
E. Defendants shall immediately explain the terms of this

w

Decree to all of their agents, servants, representatives, and

employees, including institutional staff, correctional officers

I

and other personnel, in order to assure their understanding of the

t ;

requirements of this decree and the necessity for strict

compliance therewith. Defendants shall require strict compliance

with this Decree by said persons. Defendants shall require

continued training of all staff regarding this Decree.

F. Defendants shall provide continuous notice of this

Decree's terms to all members of the Plaintiff class by:

(1) publishing, within ten (10) days of the signing of

this Decree by the Court, an agreed-upon synopsis of this Decree

in the SCDC publication "The Intercom" and hereafter incorporating

the agreed-upon synopsis into all future printings of the

Inmate Guide;

(2) posting, within ten (10) days of the signing of

this Decree by the Court and continuously thereafter, copies of

this Decree in all housing units;

(3) making ten copies of this Decree available, within

ten (10) days of the signing of this Decree and continuously

thereafter, in all institutional libraries; and

(4) providing a copy of this Decree to each Plaintiff,

within ten (10) days of the signing of this Decree and

continuously thereafter, upon written request by such Plaintiff

class member.

G. Members of the Plaintiff class shall have the right to

individually submit written objections to the Court, within forty

days of the submission of this Decree to the Court, under such terms and conditions as required by the Court.
H. This Decree shall be deemed to serve as settlement of claims for injunctive relief concerning the conditions of confinement discussed herein applicable to more than the individual circumstances of a particular plaintiff class member. This Decree does not affect the right of an individual to pursue individual claims for monetary relief. If a Plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, he/she may do so, as long as such lawsuit does not pertain to those conditions of confinement throughout an institution(s) addressed in this Decree. As to conditions of confinement discussed herein, throughout an institution(s), the operation of the prison system at any level at or under the capacities set forth herein and operation of any single institution or housing facility at or under the capacities set forth herein, shall be a defense to any claim for equitable relief regarding overcrowding of any such institutions.
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, as to those conditions of confinement, throughout an institution(s) addressed in this Decree, the operation of such institutions in compliance with this Decree shall be a complete defense to any equitable claim based upon such conditions. This Decree shall not resolve any issues involving use of long-term segregation, inmate pay in the future, or increases in costs of hygiene supplies.
I. Unless specific provision for extension is otherwise made in this Decree, any timetable proposed in this Decree may

be subject to extension by the Court upon a showing of reasonable

I

grounds for such extension by the Defendants so long as the need

i

for delay is not caused by the neglect or dereliction or actions

of Defendants. If the Defendants lack resources or funding to

meet a requirement set out herein, the Court may grant up to

an additional sixty (60) days in which Defendants may obtain

funding; however, if a recognized need for additional funding

occurs while the General Assembly is not in session, the Court

may grant up to sixty (60) days extension from the date the

General Assembly convenes. Plaintiffs reserve the right to ob-

ject in good faith, and oppose any requests for extensions of

time by the Defendants.

J. Upon any motion for supplemental relief pertaining to 9

this Decree, that Motion shall take priority and the Court will

hear said Motion no later than thirty (30) days after the filing

of such Motion and the Court will rule on such Motion no later

than forty-five (45) days from completion of the hearing. Such

time limits may be extended by the Court in order to substantial-

ly further the interests of the parties.

K. If any institution or part thereof is not brought into

compliance with the requirements of this Decree and such non-

0

compliance constitutes a substantial threat to the health, safety

and w e l f a r e of m e m b e r s of the Plaintiff c l a s s , such

institution(s) or part thereof shall not be used to house

9

Plaintiffs.

L. In the event of an emergency, as defined in Part I-

8

I
Section E above, which Defendants in good faith believe to require the temporary waiver of any of the provisions of this Decree, Defendants shall notify the Court and Plaintiffs' counsel of the emergency and need for waiver within twenty-four (24) hours of the onset of emergency. Such notice shall identify the emergency, the specific provisions of this Decree which Defendants believe must be temporarily waived, the reason necessitating the waiver, the exhaustion of other alternatives to waiver, and the anticipated duration of the waiver. If Plaintiffs have a good faith disagreement with the proposed waiver or its duration, the controversy shall be submitted to the Court for hearing and determination.
M. The parties agree that this Decree establishes minimum standards by which Defendants shall maintain and .operate their institutions and that it is not intended to prevent Defendants from implementing new programs or changes in physical conditions which benefit Plaintiffs; nor is the Decree intended to, and it shall not, have the effect of decreasing or abrogating the rights, programs or conditions which existed prior to this Decree pursuant to Defendants' policies, procedures or other lawsuit settlements; nor to abrogate any substantive rights or procedural protection Plaintiffs may now have or hereafter acquire under state or federal statutes. The parties agree that this Decree represents the entire intent of the parties and shall not be modified except as stated within this Decree. The Defendants shall catty out every provision of this Decree in good faith.

I
N. All parties agree that this action is appropriate for certification as a class action as herein defined, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
O. The parties expressly agree that this Agreement is not an admission of constitutional violations, nor does this Agreement establish constitutional minimum or maximum standards with respect to the claim of "overcrowding". The parties have entered into this Agreement solely as a means to put a reasonable end to the controversy, to avoid the costs, time and risks which litigation would involve for both parties, and this Agreement should not be construed in any manner as establishing constitutional standards, minimums or maximums or thresholds of constitutional harm to Plaintiffs. Neither this Agreement nor the Judgment that may follow from this Agreement, nor anything contained herein or therein, shall constitute or be construed as evidence or as an admission or adjudication with respect to any fact or conclusion of law with respect to any matter alleged in or arising out of the complaint or of any wrongdoing or misconduct on the part of the Defendants.
P. Except to the extent Defendants agree to be bound by and subject to the enforcement of the specific terms of this Decree, Defendants do not herein waive any defense available to them or any agency or agent of the State of South Carolina now or in the future. In particular, Defendants do not by entering upon this Agreement waive the defense of the Eleventh Amendment or any immunity on behalf of themselves or any agent or agency of the
10

State of South Carolina. Q. This Decree is solely enforceable by the Plaintiff
class and through the Plaintiff class with class remedies. R. Violation of this Decree shall not serve as the basis
of liability of the Defendants to any individual Plaintiff, absent proof of proximate cause and damage.
S. The parties agree that concurrently with the approval of this Decree by the Court, the Court shall enter an Order of Settlement dismissing the Complaint with prejudice and retaining jurisdiction for enforcement of this Decree.
T. This Consent Decree may be modified in the future by mutual and joint petition of the parties or their successors, or upon petition of any party. Said petition shall be made to the Court and approved by the Court, after notice and hearing, by an Order amending the Consent Decree. Any disputed petition for modification shall be reviewed by the Court under the applicable law pertaining to modification of Consent Decrees.
U. No remedial action, including sanctions, shall be taken against the named Defendants in their individual capacities unless the Court specifically finds, following a hearing, that those Defendants, or any of them, have acted in bad faith. For purposes of this paragraph, no Defendant shall be deemed to have acted in bad faith if budgetary constraints are the reason for his or her failure to satisfy the terms of this Decree, so long as that individual has made good faith effort to obtain the necessary funding.
11

III. Specific Terms of Settlement
r
A. Cell Housing Defendants agree that the following arrangements shall
apply to all housing of Plaintiffs: 1. In no event shall a cell or cubicle be used to
confine more than two prisoners, except as provided herein. 2. Any Plaintiff confined to a cell more than twelve
(12) hours per day shall be single-celled, in a cell containing at least forty (40) square feet of sleeping space in present institutions and fifty (50) square feet of sleeping space in any future institutions. This includes, but is not limited to, Plaintiffs classified as protective custody, mentally ill, or in administrative segregation, investigative segregation or disciplinary segregation. However, Plaintiffs assigned to Protective Custody may voluntarily request and receive a cell-mate for double-celling, subject to the criteria established pursuant to paragraph one (1) of section III M.
3. A Plaintiff in general population who is confined to a cell less than twelve (12) hours per day may be doublecelled but shall be provided with at least fifty (50) square feet of sleeping space per person. However, up to one-half of the cells presently used for general population in the following present buildings may be double-celled:
Perry Correctional Institution, (Dorms 1,2,3,4); Central Correctional Institution, (CB-3 Only); Kirkland Correctional Institution, (five of seven presently existing sixty-four-cell dorms);
12

MacDougall Youth Correction Center, (Dorms 1,2,3,4,5); Women's Correctional Center (five of the seven presently existing forty-eight cell cottages). If there is available bed space (other than short term) at other institutions of comparable classification, Defendants shall make good faith effort to reasonably and rationally use such bed space, to minimize double-celling at each of the institutions listed above. Not more than one-half of any institution's general population shall be double-celled, except as provided above, unless the double-cells are at least 100 square feet.
4. In the event the Defendants wish to construct new facilities in addition to those institutions listed in Appendix F- of this Decree, not already planned or under construction as of the date of this Decree,'which vary from the space allocations discussed herein, Defendants shall submit the plans for such facilities to Plaintiffs' counsel and the Court. If Plaintiffs object to the plans, then the Court shall make a determination as to the reasonableness of or necessity for said variance, in light of but not limited to the requirements of this Decree and the totality of the conditions, and shall determine whether or not said variance shall be permitted. The parties agree that the process for variance described in this sub-section applies solely to new construction.
B. Wards/Cubicles 1. Each Plaintiff confined to a ward, or cubicle, or
to a room in a pre-release or work release center shall be
13

provided with at least forty-five (45) square feet of sleeping space per person, except that Plaintiffs confined in wards at medium/maximum security institutions such as Central Correctional Institution and Manning Correctional Institution shall each be accorded fifty (50) square feet of sleeping space per person. There shall be no double-bunking in the wards.
2. Each Plaintiff confined to a cubicle less than twelve (12) hours per day may be required to share the cubicle with one other person, but there shall be at least forty-five (45) square feet of sleeping space per person in such cubicles.
3. No future institutions used to house Plaintiffs classified at medium or maximum security levels shall include ward or cubicle-style housing. Any future minimum security institution which includes wards or cubicle-style housing shall house no more than fifty (50) Plaintiffs per ward or cubicle-dorm.
C. Other Housing 1. No Plaintiff shall be confined or housed in an area
of an institution not designed, for or suitable for housing (for example, hallways, dayrooms, classrooms, gyms, storerooms shall not be used for temporary housing or sleeping assignments).
2. No Plaintiff shall be confined in a county or local detention facility, once sentenced to the custody of Defendants, for longer than thirty (30) days, without his/her voluntary, written consent, except pursuant to lawful detainer, lawful sum-
14

mons for trial, or pending lawful extradition, or for temporary detention not exceeding seventy-two (72) hours pending transfer between Defendants' institutions.
D. Temporary Structures 1. Temporary structures shall be used for housing
Plaintiffs only after Defendants have certified to the Court and Plaintiffs1 counsel: (a) all other legislated alternatives which have been considered and used to the extent reasonable (including but not limited to the Prison Overcrowding Powers Act, 1983 Act No. 123, and the Corrections Reform Act, 1981 Act No. 100) and (b) the present need for use of temporary structures.
2. Plaintiffs shall be permitted the opportunity to respond and object to any use of temporary structures and to submit this controversy to the Court for hearing.
3. In the event that temporary structures are used by Defendants to house or confine Plaintiffs, their use shall comply with the following conditions:
a. The structures shall comply with applicable state and national fire safety standards, including the National Fire Protection Association Code (Document 101, 1981) and National Fire Protection Association Standards 102 and 701.
b. The structures shall be adequately staffed to provide safety and security to Plaintiffs and to Defendants;
c. The structures shall comply with American Corrections Association Standard 2-4131 (2nd ed., 1981) relating
15

to provisions of toilets, hot and cold running water, tempera-

m

•

•

ture, lighting, ventilation and noise.

d. Plaintiffs assigned to the structures shall

£

have the same access to dayrooms, activity areas and programs as

all other Plaintiffs.

e. Plaintiffs assigned to the structures shall

£

not be so assigned beyond ninety (90) days, unless Plaintiffs so

assigned indicate in writing their voluntary willingness to con-

tinue in the assignment.

0

f. No double-bunks shall be used in the struc-

tures.

g. At least forty-five (45) square feet of

©

sleeping space shall be provided to each Plaintiff assigned to

the structures.

h. All other provisions of this Decree shall be

3

applicable to Plaintiffs assigned to the structures.

E. Phased-In Compliance with Housing Standards

1. Statement of Understanding

The parties acknowledge that the following factors will

affect the achievement of compliance with the sleeping space

allotments required by this Decree:

a. Defendants cannot effectively operate insti-

tutions which have an actual count of more than approximately

^

ninety-five (95) percent of the required capacity, because of the

need for flexibility in having some available space at all insti-

16

tutions at all times.

'

b. Based on the sleeping space figures furnished

by Defendants and included in Appendix F, the housing units now

existing shall house no more than seven thousand ninety-four

(7,094) persons and, with planned renovations no more than seven

thousand three hundred eighty-five (7,385) persons, within five

(5) years of the signing of this Decree by the parties, which

will require a reduction in existing institutions, based on June

21, 1984 count figures of eight thousand two hundred sixty-one

(8,261) prisoners.

c. Defendants anticipate an average net increase of

thirty (30) to fifty (50) prisoners per month, over the next five

years.

d. Defendants plan to construct at least

three (3) new institutions (Lieber, McCormick, New Midlands Re-

ception and Evaluation Center), in order to reduce the present

base population of eight thousand two hundred sixty-one (8,261)

at existing institutions.

e. Defendants anticipate that all presently

planned new construction and structural increases in the capaci-

ties of existing institutions will be completed within thirty-six

(36) months of the signing of this Decree by the parties.

f. Plaintiffs are concerned that Plaintiffs not

be housed in institutions which do not meet the sleeping space,

fire safety, health services, food services, and environmental

17

sanitation standards established in this Decree. g. Notwithstanding the figures given in sub-
sections l(b) and l(d) of this section and in Appendix Ff the sleeping space requirements of this Decree, parts IIIA-D shall govern, pursuant to time schedules established in this Decree.
2. . Compliance Stecs Therefore, Defendants shall achieve compliance with the space allocations required by this Decree according to the following priorities:
a. All triple-celling and assignment of more than two prisoners to cells and cubicles measuring less than one hundred fifty (150) square feet shall immediately cease. However, present triple-celling may continue at Campbell and Lower Savannah Work Release Centers for eighteen months, in order for the Defendants to find appropriate and necessary space for a comparable number of work release prisoners within that time. Further, all present triple-celling at Northside or Wateree shall end within twelve (12) months from the signing of this Decree by the parties and no additional Plaintiff shall be triple-celled in Northside or Wateree after the signing of this Decree by the parties. The Defendants shall make all reasonable efforts to end all such triple-celling as soon as possible.
b. Plaintiffs confined to their housing units for more than twelve (12) hours per day shall receive the sleeping space required by this Decree within twelve (12) months of
18

the signing of this Decree by the parties. c. Plaintiffs assigned to medium or maximum
security institutions or housing units shall receive the sleeping space required by this Decree within six (6) months from the completion of Lieber and McCormick but no later than within thirtysix (36) months from the signing of this Decree by the parties and all double-bunking shall be eliminated. Until that time, where double-bunking occurs in medium/maximum security institutions, any double-bunks shall be placed against the walls.
d. All other Plaintiffs, i.e. those not housed in medium or maximum security institutions shall receive the sleeping space required by this Decree within five (5) years of the signing of this Decree by the parties and double-bunks shall be eliminated at that time. In the meantime, any additional double-bunks in the wards shall be placed against the walls.
e. Compliance as outlined in paragraphs (c) and (d) above shall be achieved in the following way:
(1) From the date of the signing of this Decree by the parties, for a period of thirty-six (36) months, prisoner population at each such institution and housing unit may fluctuate above the count established at the date of the signing of this Decree and the maximum count which may be reached within five (5) years of the signing of this Decree, provided that Defendants give Plaintiffs1 counsel and the Court notice and proof every six (6) months of:
(a) Compliance with the schedules for construction, renovation, fire safety and environmental sanitation established in Section 1II-F, I1I-K arid II1-R below, and
(b) Accuracy of Defendants' predic-
19 9

tions of the overall population increases for that time.

(2) If proof of compliance with (a) and (b)

above is not or cannot be provided, then the parties agree that

the Court shall order immediate relief, which may include

population reductions, release or transfer of prisoners

(providing such transfer does not violate other provisions of

this Decree), or other appropriate relief, at each of Defendants'

institutions which do not meet the standards established in this

Decree.

(3) From the date of three (3) years after the

signing of this Decree until five (5) years after the signing of

this Decree, the prisoner population at each such institution

and housing units as described in (d) above shall be reduced in

equal percentage increments of twenty-five (25) percent every six

(6) months for such prisoner population over the capacities set

forth in this Decree, except that if Defendants provide proof of

good cause for a delay in reaching the six (6) month goal at a

particular institution, then they may have an additional thirty

(30) days in which to reach the required population at that

institution.

(4)

Defendants shall, to the extent authorised

by law and statute make maximum use of community-based alterna-

tives to incarceration, including Special Furloughs and Work Re-

lease programs, in order to decrease the number of Plaintiffs

incarcerated.

20

F. Construction and Renovation Schedule

1. The schedule for the construction and renovation, required for the Defendants to reach the housing capacities established by the standards stated in this Decree, shall be determined by the following specific dates, for the completion of each of the following tasks as may be necessary, at each of the following institutions:

Institutions: CCI

CCI MCI

WCC CCI New

New

New

DC I

Guards Stoney Lock-up Dorm MSC Lieber McCorm. P&E

Sec

Tasks

1) Site Selection By SCDC SCDC SCDC SCDC SCDC Compl. 4/16/84 7/23/84

2) Land surveys

Compl. 4/23/84 9/23/84

3) Soil boring

Compl. 5/14/84 9/10/84

4) Purchase prop.

Compl. 8/13/84 N/A

5)Advertise for A&E firm
6) Evaluate bids

Compl. 6/4/84

11/18/84

Compl. 6/25/84 12/9/84

7) Select A&E firm
8) Site drawings completed
9) Site work completed
10) Constn.

Compl. 8/1/84 Compl. 6/14/85 Compl. 7/15/85 Compl. 11/4/85

12/17/84 8/12/85 2/27/85 N/A 6/10/85 N/A
11/25/85 9/2/85

drawings compld. 11) Solicit constn. "

Compl. 1/1/86 12/ 2/85 9/16/85

bids

12) Select Constn. "

Compl. 2/15/86 2/17/86 12/2/85

Contractor

13) Begin Constn.

12/15/84 2/18/85 7/1/85 1/15/85 7/1/85 10/25/84 3/3/86 3/3/86 176/86

-—

,

14) Completed^_I2/15/&5 6/30/85 12/30/85 12/31/85 9/30/86 7/1/86 10/3/87 1

2. All facilities constructed by or used by Defendants, now and in the future, shall meet Defendants1 and Plaintiffs1 classification needs and housing facilities shall not be constructed which do not meet such classification needs at the time of construction.
3. Progress reports from the contractors or construction supervisors on each of the projects listed in (1) above shall be provided quarterly to Plaintiffs' counsel. Defendants shall require that for any such report which indicates that a construction project is behind schedule, said report shall also include a plan, for "catching up" and meeting the required construction schedule before the date of the following quarterly report.
G. Capacities 1. Each institution shall have a maximum prescribed popu-
lation established by the criteria contained in this Decree. In the event Defendants are not able to maintain the required population for any particular institution's housing units at any given time, Defendants may be in non-compliance with the required population no more than five percent (5%) over the required figure in such institutions containing two hundred (200) or more prisoners and no more than ten per cent (10%) over the required figure in institutions containing less than two hundred (200) prisoners, so long as the populations of all of Defendants' institutions do not exceed one hundred percent (100%) of the
22

O

combined t o t a l s of a l l maximum capacities for such i n s t i t u t i o n s

established by t h i s Decree and no individual P l a i n t i f f has been

improperly housed for more than s i x t y (60) days in any one

9

calendar year. Upon notice that an individual Plaintiff has been

improperly housed for up to fifty (50) days within one calendar

year, Defendants may have up to ten (10) days to correct said

•

P l a i n t i f f ' s housing. As a general p r i n c i p l e , the p a r t i e s agree

that i t is not the intent of t h i s paragraph to' authorize the

Defendants to continually exceed the capacity established by this

®

Decree at any given i n s t i t u t i o n for an extended period of time,

but i t i s the intent to provide the f l e x i b i l i t y required to

achieve compliance.

**

2. If at any point, proof of compliance with paragraph

(1) is not or cannot be provided, the Court shall order immediate

r e l i e f , which may include population reductions including r e -

lease, or transfer of prisoners or other relief as the Court deems

appropriate, at each of Defendants' i n s t i t u t i o n s which do not

meet the standards established in this Decree, provided that any

such transfers' do not violate provisions of this Decree.

3. The sixty-day l i m i t a t i o n above shall not be

subject to any extension, including as set forth in part II-I of

this Decree.

23

H. Staffing

1. Deployment

a. Within ninety (90) days of the signing of

this Decree by the parties, Defendants shall submit a plan to

Plaintiffs and the Court for the employment and assignment of

adequate numbers of staff, to ensure Plaintiffs reasonable safety

and security and compliance with this Decree.

b. If approved, said plan shall be implemented

within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by the par-

ties.

c. In no event shall staff numbers and prisoner-

/staff ratios at medium and maximum security institutions de-

crease below the level of January 25, 1983. Defendants agree

that adequate deployment of correctional staff shall include

assignment of officers to the inside of each ward and cellblock

on each shift within medium and maximum security institutions.

Defendants agree that post assignments and staffing patterns at

all institutions will be created in line with the general princi-

ples recommended by the NIC study for all institutions described

in (3) below and attached in the Appendix to this Decree. All

officers shall be stationed so that they have visual observation

~

or voice contact with all of the Plaintiffs in the given -cell-

block or ward at all times, except at pre-release centers or work

release centers, or during unforeseeable emergencies which would

~

require an officer to.temporarily leave his or her post.

d. Defendants shall not assign or permit

24

prisoners to exercise authority over other prisoners in any aspect of the administration of Defendants1 institutions or programs, including the areas of discipline, job assignment, housing assignment, income, access to medical care, access to confidential or institutional information concerning inmates; provided that the foregoing does not preclude the use of prisoner work supervisors at employment within the Department of Corrections who do not discipline, hire, retain, fire, determine, pay or evaluate performance, or the use of clerk runners who do not have access to inmate records.
2. Training a. Defendants shall provide training to all
staff in compliance with the following standards of the American Correctional Association (2nd ed. 1981), Standards 2-4079 through 2-4101, including 1983 revisions by the ACA, provided that, for Sections 2-4090, 2-4091, 2-4092 and 2-4093, Defendants shall have three years to phase-in full compliance with the requirement that employees receive "an additional 40 hours of training each subsequent year of employment":
2-4079. Written policy and procedure provide that the institution's training programs for all employees are specifically planned, coordinated, and supervised by a qualified employee at the supervisory level, and reviewed annually.
2-4080. The individual coordinating the training and staff development program has received specialized training for that position. At a minimum, full-time training personnel should
25

have completed a 40 hour training-for-trainers course. 2-4081. There is an advisory training committee composed of
the i n s t i t u t i o n ' s training officer and representatives from various institution departments. The committee develops a training plan for the i n s t i t u t i o n , meets at least quarterly to review progress and resolve problems, maintains a written record of its deliberations, and reports to the warden/superintendent. (Revised, 1983)
2-4082. (Deleted, 1983) 2-4083. The institution's training and staff development plan provides for an ongoing formal evaluation of all pre-service, in-service, and specialized training programs, with a written .report prepared annually. 2-4084. Library and reference services areavailable to complement the training and staff development program. 2-4085. The training and staff development program usesthe resources of other public and private agencies, private industry, colleges, and libraries. 2-4086. Space and equipment required for the training and staff development program is available. 2-4087. The budget includes funds for reimbursing staff for additional time spent in training or forreplacement personnel required when regular personnel are off duty for training purposes. 2-4088. Written policy and procedure provide that all new full-time employees receive 40 hours of orientation/training
26

prior to being independently assigned to a particular job. This

orientation/training is to include, at a minimum, orientation to

the purpose, goals, policies and pro-cedures of the institution

and parent agency; working conditions and regulations; resoonsi-

bilities and rights of employees; and an overview of the correc-

tional field. Depending upon the employee(s) and the require-

ments of the particular job, the orientation/training may include

some preparatory instruction related to the ' particular job.

There are provisions for acknowledging and giving credit for

prior training received.
i
2-4089. Written policy and procedure provide that all

clerical/support employees who have minimal contact with inmates

receive an additional 16 hours of training during the first year

of employment or within one (1) year after the signing of this

Decree by the parties and 16 hours of training each year there-

after. [Modified]

2-4090. Written policy and procedure provide that all

support employees who have regular or daily inmate contact re-

^

. ceive an additional 40 hours of training during their first year

of employment and an additional 40 hours of training each subse-

quent year of employment.

O

2-4091. Written policy and procedure provide that all

professional specialists employees who have inmate contact re-

ceive an additional 40 hours of training each subsequent year of

O

employment.

'2-4092. Written policy and procedure provide that all new

27

correctional officers receive an additional 120 hours of training during their first year of employment and an additional 40 hours of training each subsequent year of employment. At a minimum this training covers thefollowing areas:
a) Security procedures b) Supervision of inmates c) Use of force regulations and tactics d) Report writing e) Inmate rules and regulations f) Rights and responsibilities of inmates g) Fire andemergency procedures h) Firearms training i) Key control j) Interpersonal relations k) Social/cultural life styles of theinmate population 1) Communication skills m) First aid 2-4093. Written policy and procedure provide that a l l administrative and managerial staff receive an additional 40 hours of training during their f i r s t year of employment, and an additional 40 hours of training each subsequent year of employment. This training covers the following areas, at a minimum: general management and related subjects; labor law; employeemanagement relations; the interaction of elements of the criminal justice system; and relationships with other service agencies. 2-4094. When there is an emergency unit, written policy and
28

procedure provide that a l l assigned officers have one year of experience as a correctional officer, which includes 160 hours of training, that they receive 40 hours of relevant emergency unit training prior to assignment, which may be part of the first year training (160 hours), and that at least 16 hours of the 40 hours of annual training be specifically related to emergency unit assignment.
2-4095. All part-time staff receive formal orientation appropriate to their assignments and additional training as needed.
2-4096. Prior to assignment to a post involving possible use of a firearm, a l l personnel authorized to use firearms receive appropriate firearm training; this training covers the use, safety, care, and constraints involved in the use of f i r e arms. All authorized personnel are required to demonstrate competency on at least an annual basis.
2-4097. All personnel authorized to use chemical agents are thoroughly trained in their use and in the treatment of individuals exposed to the chemical agent.
2-4098. All security personnel are trained in approved methods of self-defense and the use of force as a l a s t resort to control inmates. [Modified]
2-4099. Written policy and procedure encourage employees to continue their education.
2-4100. (Deleted, 1983) 2-4101. The institution encourages and provides administrative leave and/or reimbursement for employees.,attending ap-
29

proved professional meetings, seminars and/or similar work-reft
lated activities. (Revised, 1983) 3. Recommendations a. The report of the staffing study of
ft defendant's institutions conducted by the National Institution of Corrections in January 1984 shall be attached and included in the Appendix to this Decree. b. Defendants shall submit a plan for the reasonably prompt implementation of all recommendations made in the National Institute of Corrections' study of the staffing in Defendants' institutions, within ninety (90) days of the signing of this Decree by the parties unless Defendants show good cause for finding that particular NIC recommendations are inappropriate. Any disputes shall be submitted to the Court, per Section II of this Decree.
30

I. Health Services

1. Services

a. Defendants shall comply with Standards 2-2120

through 2-2134 (as modified) and 2-4271 through 2-4322 of the

American Correctional Association (2nd ed., 1981, including 1983

revisions by the ACA), as appropriate. These standards are

included as Appendices A and C to this Decree.

b. Defendants shall provide notice to each

Plaintiff at the time of his/her admission to Defendants'

institutions and in posted notices at each institution, that

Plaintiffs shall have access to over-the-counter non-prescription

medications such as aspirin, anti-acid and laxatives, during non-

sick call hours on weekends and in the evenings. 9
c. Recognizing the need to enable Plaintiffs

to purchase hygiene supplies, Defendants have agreed, beginning

with the start of fiscal year 1984-1985 and based on negotiations

with Plaintiffs regarding this Decree, to increase each Plain-

tiff's inmate pay by $1.00 per pay period. Defendants further

agree to provide hygiene supplies (including soap, toothbrush,

toothpaste, deodorant, washcloth and towel, shampoo, shaving

equipment and personal hygiene products) to each Plaintiff

m

within the Special Learning Unit or to other Plaintiffs whom a

Warden determines to require such supplies due to special circum-

stances at the time of his/her request for such items. Denial

^

of any such individual requests may be the subject of

grievance within Defendants' established grievance system. 31

d. Defendants agree that at least one staff

person on each shift at each i n s t i t u t i o n shall be trained in

f i r s t aid and c e r t i f i e d in CPR techniques; that appropriate

equipment (including crash c a r t s , ambulances, oxygen and

d e f i b r i l l a t o r s ) shall be readily available at each of the

existing institutions identified by the review and recommenda-

tions described in (2) below and at a l l new i n s t i t u t i o n s except

work release centers; that each such institution shall have staff

available who are properly trained to utilize such equipment in

an emergency, and that all other institutions shall develop and

submit a plan for providing emergency medical treatment with

outside f a c i l i t i e s , within three (3) months from the completion

of the study described in (2) below.

e. Defendants agree t h a t the r e f u s a l of h e a l t h

evaluation or health services by any individual P l a i n t i f f ,

regarding non-life-threatening or non-contagious conditions,

shall not be the subject of discipline or punishment or result in

confinement in segregation.

'

2. Recommendations

a. Defendants and P l a i n t i f f s shall agree upon

certain medical consultants, at least one of whom shall be a

physician and one a mental health and pscyhological services

expert, and the Defendants shall contract with said mutuallyagreed-upon medical consultants, for a review of the Defendants1

procedures, resources, staff training and staffing for medical

emergencies, h e a l t h s e r v i c e s , and mental h e a l t h and

32

psychological services. The study shall include a review of nine

items which were recommended by a previous health care system

evaluation but were not adopted by Defendants and consideration

of application of the standards regarding mental health services

found in Appendix B, as well as other standards deemed

appropriate. Defendants shall submit this review to the parties

and the Court and, within three (3) months from the completion of

the study, shall submit a plan for the reasonably prompt

implementation of each of the review's suggested changes.

b. Implementation of these recommendations

described in (a) above shall begin on July 1, 1985, except for

those recommendations related to critical medical needs. Such

critical needs, if any, shall be addressed immediately following

the receipt of said recommendations and shall be implemented no

later than within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by

the parties.

c. Where necessary, funds appropriated in FY

1984-85 for additional security guards shall be diverted to

address such critical medical needs. Any disputes shall be

submitted to the Court, per Section II of this Decree.

d. The nine items referred to above, on which

the review described in (a)
4
recommendations, are as follows:

above

shall

also

make

(1) Employment of an RN at MSC,

(2) Attaining membership in the Association

of Risk Managers,

33

(3) Increasing nurse staffing at the KCI Infirmary/
(4) Installing one more X-ray illuminator at the KCI Infirmary,
(5) Obtaining portable whirlpool baths, (6) Replacing some heart monitors, (7) Replacing some beds at the KCI infirma(8) Installing one more ceiling spotlight,
for suturing, at the KCI Infirmary, (9) Obtaining portable sitz baths.
34

J. Programs 1. General Population a. Defendants shall provide all Plaintiffs
assigned to general population with the opportunity for a fulltime, meaningful work or program assignment, for not less than five (5) hours per day, five (5) days per week;
b. Defendants shall provide all Plaintiffs assigned to general population with the opportunity for meaningful and appropriate vocational training and Defendants shall not decrease the present level of education courses, including vocational.
c. Defendants shall continue to offer programs of no less variety, opportunity and state-funding level as those available at the present, as established by the list contained in Appendix D to this Decree. Defendants shall make a good faith effort to maintain those programs which are not supported by state funding appropriated to the South Carolina Department of Corrections.
d. Defendants shall provide access for all Plaintiffs to educational programs at least two evenings per week.
e. Plaintiffs shall be assigned to or offered all work and programs assignments according to an equitable, rational system, which does not discriminate on the basis of race or sex. Consistent with security needs, Defendants recognize the availability of transfers in order to offer full variety of
35

programs to all Plaintiffs. f. Any Plaintiff who is required to attend any
court proceeding shall not suffer any loss of prison industries bonus pay, so long as such absence does not exceed seven (7) calendar days in any calendar year.
2. Segregation a. Defendants shall provide all Plaintiffs as-
signed to any form of segregation (including protective custody units) with the opportunity for at least five (5) hours per week, five (5) days per week of actual outdoor exercise (weather permiting) and if future staffing ratios increase, pursuant to the ratio established in Sec. III-H or due to any other cause, Defendants shall reasonably consider and attempt to increase the exercise provided to seven (7) days per week. In the event of an extended period of inclement weather, Defendants shall guarantee make-up days sufficient to provide that the total of hours of outside exercise amounts to at least fifteen (15) hours exercise per month.
b. Defendants shall submit to Plaintiffs' counsel and the Court, within six (6) months from the signing of this Decree, and shall implement, a plan for the reasonably prompt phasing-in of increased programs and out-of-cell time for Plaintiffs who have been in Protective Custody for more than ninety (90) days, until Defendants are providing the opportunity for at least five (5) hours per day on five days per week of full-time, meaningful programs.
36

v

c. Defendants shall review all existing

regulations pertaining to possession of personal property by

Plaintiffs in segregation, and shall develop and submit, within

six (6) months from the signing of this Decree by the parties, to

the Plaintiffs and the Court, a plan for the rational and uniform

provisions of personal property, consistent with safety and

security among all populations at all institutions.

3. Libraries

a. Defendants agree that all prison libraries,

including law libraries, shall be available to Plaintiffs a

minimum of five (5) days per week, including at least two even-

ings per week for at least three (3) hours after all normal work

assignments conclude, for a total of thirty-seven and one-half

(37 1/2) hours per week.

b. Defendants agree that access to the courts

and law libraries shall comply with the requirements set out in

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1976) and Defendants shall submit

to the Plaintiffs and the Court, within six (6) months from the

signing of this Decree, a comprehensive plan for the provision

of such access to all Plaintiffs.

c. Defendants agree to provide comparable access

to all prison libraries, including law libraries, to all Plain-

tiffs, regardless of custody classification or housing assign-

ment. For those Plaintiffs who are involved in other work or

program activities during the operating hours of the institu-

tional library, the Defendants agree to allow said Plaintiffs to

37

obtain a pass to use the law library when one is requested with-

0

out being penalized for leaving the( work or program activity,

where such Plaintiffs can demonstrate a court deadline.

d. Within ninety (90) days from the signing of

3

this Decree by the parties, Defendants agree to make complete,

current copies of all institutional and departmental policies and

procedures available in each institutional library, excluding

•

those policies and procedures which the parties agree pertain to

emergency and security provisions.

4. Work Credits

•

Defendants agree to make all good faith efforts,

including attempting to obtain the passage of any necessary

legislation, to provide Earned Work Credits or the equivalent to

•

Plaintiffs for any time spent in vocational training or educa-

tional courses, on a basis comparable to Earned Work Credits

awarded for work assignments.

5. Grievance Procedure

a. Within ninety (90) days from the signing

of this Decree by the parties, Defendants shall review the

presently established time limits for each stage of the SCDC

grievance procedure including times by which appeals must be

reviewed and determined. Defendants shall establish that the

grievance automatically proceeds to the next step of the

grievance process when the response to the grievance exceeds the

established time limits, unless a continuance for a specific

period of time is granted by the grievant.. Defendants shall

38

establish and implement procedures for enforcing grievances which are granted and shall implement theSCDC Inmate Grievance Procedure, at all of Defendants1 institutions.
b. Complaints that any grievance clerk has not properly pursued, or has improperly refused to pursue a grievance, may be referred by the grievant to Inmate Relations for investigation. Appropriate action shall be taken.
c. Defendants shall include a description of the grievance procedure within all future printings of the Inmate Guide.
K. Fire Safety 1; Defendants s h a l l ensure t h a t each i n s t i t u t i o n
which i s used to house P l a i n t i f f s is in compliance with the Life Safety Code and Life Safety Code Handbook of the National Fire Protection Association Code 101 ("NFPA") and the Fire Protection Standards of the American C o r r e c t i o n a l Association, 2-4162 through 2-4175 and r e l a t e d p r o v i s i o n s , including the 1983 revision to ACA 2-4163, and including the 1981 edition of 2-4165 ("ACA"). Where the ACA standards and NFPA standards c o n f l i c t , the NFPA shall govern.
2. Within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by the p a r t i e s , Defendants shall submit a schedule relating to each i n s t i t u t i o n , for t h e r e a s o n a b l y prompt completi-on of a l l construction and capital improvements necessary to accomplish said compliance.
3. Said schedules shall include the following improve-
39

ments, in accord with requirements of NFPA Code 101: a. All smoke detectors and fire alarms shall
t
be on contract within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by the parties;
b. Adequate and safe gang door releases, emergency exits and escape ladders shall be on contract within two (2) years from the signing of this Decree;
c. Sprinkler systems and/or smoke evacuation systems (or a combination thereof, whichever gives the greater probability of preserving life) shall be under contract within five (5) years from the signing of this Decree by the parties.
All such contracts shall be reasonably and promptly executed and completed.
L. Discipline Defendants agree that, within thirty (30) days of the
signing of this Decree by the parties, Defendants' Inmate Guide shall be rewritten and re-distributed to all Plaintiffs, to reflect the following:
1. Each Plaintiff who has been adjudicated and convicted of a violation of institutional rules shall be sentenced to the minimum disciplinary sentence as set out in the Innate Guide, except for those Plaintiffs whose disciplinary offenses have been found to include identified aggrav-ating circumstances; each sentenced Plaintiff shall have his/her sentence reviewed after serving one-third (1/3) of the sentence and,-if there has been no additional disciplinary offense adjudicated,
40

he/she shall be released at that time. This provision shall not preclude initial suspension or probation of sentence.
2. Where lock-up time is determined to be the appropriate punishment for commission of the following institutional rules violations, the minimum sentence provisions of (1) above do not apply and the maximum sentence shall be no more than thirty (30) days. Except for those Plaintiffs'whose commission of the following disciplinary offenses have been found to include identified aggravating circumstances, each sentenced Plaintiff shall have his/her sentence reviewed after serving one-half (1/2) of the sentence and, if there has been no additional disciplinary offense adjudicated, he/she shall be released at that time. If identified aggravating circumstances have been found, there shall be no such review, but the maximum sentence shall not exceed thirty (30) days. This provision shall not preclude initial suspension or probation of sentence. Any accumulated sentence of over sixty (60) days imposed at one time for multiple offenses shall be reviewed after one-third (1/3) has been served:
4.8 (L) Refusing to Obey Promptly and Properly a Direct Order
4.8 (M) Out of Place 4.8 (N) Disorderly Conduct or Fighting 4.8 (0) Interfering with the Duties of any Person 4.8 (P) False Identification 4.9 (C) Refusal to Work or Failure to Return to Work 4.9 (D) Abuse of Privileges
41

4.9 (J) Telephone Abuse 4.9 (K) Obscene Correspondence upon complaint by
recipient of the correspondence 4.9 (L) Disrespect 4.9 (M) Abuse of Institutional Passes 4.9 (N) Excess Money 4.9 (0) Homosexual sexual activity 4.9 (P) Unauthorized Sales and Purchases 3. Aggravating circumstances mentioned in (1) and (2) above shall be identified and defined in the Inmate Guide. 4. Any Plaintiff sentenced to administrative or disciplinary segregation for any disciplinary offense and subsequently convicted of an offense listed in (2) above without any identified aggravating circumstances,-may thereafter serve up to the remainder of the sentence for the original offense or an additional thirty (30) days on the original, after the date of eligibility for early release, whichever is less, as well as receiving an additional sentence for the subsequent offense.
42

M. Classification 1. The Defendants with assistance from qualified
consultants, shall within twelve (12) months from the signing of this Decree develop and submit to Plaintiffs1 counsel and the Court a comprehensive classification system for assignment of Plaintiffs to institutions, including criteria for initial classification, reclassification and internal institutional classification. This classification plan shall also contain criteria, procedures and programs for identification and treatment of Plaintiffs with special needs such as drug and alcohol abusers, mentally ill Plaintiffs, mentally retarded Plaintiffs, and protectiye_cus_to£y Plantiffs. The plan shall include provision for its reasonably prompt implementation, and shall include classification procedures which shall separate violent from non-violent prisoners at each institution. Within one (1) year of the signing of this Decree by the parties, the Defendants shall submit a plan for a rational and equitable system of internal classification for making the institutional housing assignments of those Plaintiffs who may be safely double-celled. This classification system shall be based upon the following criteria: prisoner preference (for those Plaintiffs who desire to share a cell), length of time double-celled, age, prior criminal and institutional misconduct, assaultive behavior and mental health history. As a general principle, Plaintiffs who have been double-celled the longest will be given first priority for single celling in the general population, but this principle shall not be deemed to prevail
43

over other factors listed above relating to prisoner safety. 2. Defendants agree that such security classification
shall be guided by rational, objective, criteria derived from behavioral observations. Plaintiffs shall not be disqualified from any custody or security classification solely by virtue of any single criteria such as detainers, length of sentence, consecutive sentence, date until parole or the fact of a disciplinary conviction, except that all detainers may be considered as the sole determing factor for no longer than one-hundred-eighty (180) days from the date of the lodging of the detainer. Classification shall be based upon an evaluation of the accumulation of identified, relevant and rational factors and standards. Defendants shall not discriminate in the provision of institutional assignments, programs, services, facilities or housing on the basis of race, religion, sex, creed or national origin except that women and men may be housed in separate institutions.
3. The classification system employed must be validated.
4. No Plaintiff shall be classified under a more restrictive security designation or confined under more restrictive conditions than is required by legitimate security requirements.
5. Each Plaintiff shal^ be allowed maximum involvement in the classification process to be implemented under this section, which shall include an opportunity to know in writing the reasons with specification for the classification and an
44

opportunity to respond in person. Each Plaintiff shall be given written notice forty-eight (48) hours jprior to the classification hearing and access to those portions of his/her file which are considered by the Classifications Committee, except that mental health or psychiatric records may be withheld. Each Plaintiff shall be carefully screened upon commitment to the Department and shall be regularly evaluated thereafter. Each Plaintiff shall participate in assessing his/her needs and in selecting programs to meet those needs. Classification decisions shall not be based upon confidential information which a Plaintiff has no reasonable opportunity to rebut, except that confidential information from the community may be considered for determining a custody status which would return that Plaintiff to that community unsupervised. Any Plaintiff who has sought and twice been denied the same classification request by the institutional head shall have the right to appeal such denial through the appropriate Regional Administrator with final appeal to the Deputy Commissioner for Operations and each such appeal shall be acted upon within thirty (30) days.
6. The classification (custody and program) of each Plaintiff shall be reviewed at least every six (6) months and Defendants shall make a reasonable, good faith attempt to review the classification of each Plaintiff who is serving a sentence of less than five years at least every ninety (90) days. Reviews shall be based on behavioral observations and analysis over a reasonable time period. Rational criteria and procedures consis-
45

tent with the other general principles in this agreement shall be developed and implemented with reasonable promptness. Plaintiffs shall be allowed to initiate inquiries regarding their progress, status and programming and such inquiries shall be acted upon within thirty (30) days of the request. If a Plaintiff can demonstrate a substantial error in his review which affects his classification, then the classification officer or counselor shall initiate a new review within thirty (30) days.
7. Plaintiffs may not be required to participate in programs with the exception of work assignments; provided however, that this paragraph shall not prohibit the statutory requirements applicable to members of the Plaintiff class sentenced pursuant to the South Carolina Youthful Offenders Act, 24-19-10, et seq., Code of Laws of South Carolina,1976.
8. Jobs, program assignments, housing and services shall be distributed in a rational, fair and equitable manner.
46

N. Women's Institution

1. Discipline

1

r

Defendants agree that all women Plaintiffs shall

receive discipline, if any, under equal procedures, conditions,

and sentences as men Plaintiffs with comparable institutional

offenses.

2. Movement

Defendants agree that all women Plaintiffs shall

have freedom ofmovement equal tothat provided tomen Plain-

tiffs at the same level of security.

3. Programs

Defendants agree that all women Plaintiffs shall

have opportunity to participate in the same programs, including

exercise, dress codes, v i s i t a t i o n , vocational training,

educational courses, work assignments, pre-release programs,

work release and prison i n d u s t r i e s , equivalent or comparable

to the opportunity provided to men P l a i n t i f f s at the same

level of security.

47

0. Visitation 1. Contact Visits Defendants agree that each Plaintiff shall receive
contact visits, unless there has been a written, individualized determination that the Plaintiff constitutes a "substantiated security risk." Such determination may be made by the appropriate supervisor and shall be reviewed by the institutional administrator or his/her designate before the end of the next working day. Any Plaintiff so designated shall have the opportunity to appeal the designation through the Defendants' classification and appeal procedures. Defendants may phase-in such contact visitation at Kirkland, Perry, Maximum Security Center, Dutchman and Cross Anchor to allow time for structural changes, within one (1) year from the signing.of this Decree by all parties.
2. Scheduling Defendants shall provide all Plaintiffs regardless
of classification, housing assignment or institutional offenses, equal opportunity for personal visits, except as described herein. However, the scheduling time of visitation for various classifications, institutions, or housing assignments shall remain within Defendants' reasonable administrative discretion. When it can be determined that a visitor legitimately cannot visit during the regularly-scheduled time, special arrangements shall be made on a case-by-case, single-visit basis. Plaintiffs in Protective Custody shall be permitted to receive at least four
48

r
visits per month, up to two hours in length. Plaintiffs in administrative and disciplinary segregation shall be permitted to receive at least two visits per month up to two hours in length.
P. Physical Pestraints 1. No Plaintiff in general population or protective
custody shall be shackled or handcuffed or physically restrained while inside an institution unless there has been a written, individualized determination that the prisoner himself constitutes a "substantiated security risk" to himself, other prisoners or staff. For Plaintiffs other than those in general population or protective custody, only handcuffs may be used to physically restrain such Plaintiffs while inside an institution, unless there has been a written, individualized determination that the prisoner himself constitutes a "substantiated security risk" to himself, other prisoners or staff. When transporting prisoners outside, the institution, or between institutions, or to medical care or court-related appearances, Defendants may use ankle-shackles, hand-cuffs and belt hand-cuffs ("belly chains"), but all such restraints shall be removed once the prisoner is inside his or her destination and no belt-handcuffs shall be kept on the prisoner unless such destination is a non-secured area or there has been a written individualized determination by a shift supervisor, which is reviewed by the institional administrator on the next working day, that the prisoner himself constitutes a "substantiated security risk" to other persons in that setting or to themselves. Any Plaintiff so designated shall have the
49

opportunity to appeal such decision of the institutional administrator through the RegionalfAdministrator and to the Deputy Commissioner of Operations. The provisions of this section do not apply to those Plaintiffs in "double-A" custody who are being transported outside their institutions, unless they are designated as "substantiated security risks".
2. However, Defendants may temporarily use handcuffs when separating Plaintiffs involved in fights or when there is a present threat of violent or physically disruptive activity, for up to one hour or until the Plaintiffs are confined to single cells, whichever is first.
3. Defendants may shackle Plaintiffs assigned to Administrative Segregation or Disciplinary Segregation during transport to their visits, but must unshackle them during the visits, at the request of the visitor, unless the Plaintiff has been designated as a "substantiated security risk" as defined above and such visit is occurring in the physical presence of other Plaintiffs and their visitors. Defendants shall make a reasonable effort to provide unshackled visitation.
4. The use of four-point-restraints (patient immobilization) shall not be used except upon the order of a physician. Four point restraint shall be used only as a last resort to prevent harm or physical danger to self and others.. Under no circumstances shall such restraints be applied to enhance security of the facility or prevent escape, or punish the inmate. Restraints shall be used no longer than the condition prevails
50

and the use of restraints beyond a period of four (4) hours must be approved by the chief medical doctotr for the Department or his medical staff designee. In addition to review by the prescribing physician, any Plaintiff so restrained shall be the subject of continuous observation during the period of restraint and the need for restraint shall be reevaluated at fifteen (15) minute intervals. A medical and observation log of such evaluations shall be maintained. All use of four point restraints shall be reported to the institutional warden and the Department's legal office and shall comply with all other provisions of this Decree.
5. There shall be no shackling or chaining of any prisoner to any solid object, except as provided in (4) above.
Q. Food Service 1. Within six (6) months from the signing of this
Decree by the parties, Defendants shall submit to the Plaintiffs and the Court a proposed plan for the provision of food services, including the procedures, equipment and personnel to be used, for those Plaintiffs confined in each form of segregation at each of the Defendants' institutions, in order to ensure the provision of safe, healthful and nutritious food and compliance with the Standards of this Decree.
2. Within ninety (90) days of the signing of this Decree by the parties, all SCDC institutions which provide food service to the Plaintiff class shall be in compliance with the food service standards established by the South Carolina
51

Department of Health and Environmental Control and shall also meet ACA Standards 2-4238 through 2-4254, including 1983 revisions by the ACA and as modified below. Appropriate ACA standards 2-2110 through 2-2119 will be used for pre-release and work release centers, as stated in Appendix E of this Decree.
2-4238. There is documentation that the nationally recommended dietary allowance is reviewed by a registered dietician on at least an annual basis to ensure that the food allowances required for basic nutrition are met. Menu evaluations are conducted at least quarterly by institution food service supervisory staff to verify adherence to the established basic daily servings.
2-4239. . When required by,statute, food products that are grown or produced within the system are inspected and approved by the appropriate government agency; there is a distribution system that ensures prompt delivery of foodstuff to institution kitchens.
2-4240. Written policy and procedure require that food service staff develop advanced, planned menus and substantially follow the schedule; and that in the planning and preparation of all meals, food flavor, texture, temperature, appearance and palatability are taken into consideration.
2-4241. At each institution, written policy and procedure provide that special diets as prescribed by appropriate medical or dental personnel shall be provided to Plaintiffs requiring such diets who are assigned to that institution. [Mo-
52

dified] 2-4242. Written policy and procedure shall provide,
within six (6) months of the signing of this Decree, special diets for Plaintiffs whose religious beliefs require the adherence to religious dietary laws, and this procedure shall be implemented within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by all parties. {Modified]
2-4243. A full-time staff member, experienced in food service management, supervises food service operations.
2-4244. Written policy and procedure provide for adequate health protection for all inmates and staff in the institution, and inmates snd other persons working in the food service with the following requirements:
(1) By July 1, 1985, a preassignment medical examination of all persons involved in the preparation of food, and periodic examinations thereafter, is conducted to ensure freedom from diarrhea, skin infections and other illnesses transmissible by food or utensils; all are conducted in accordance with local requirements regarding restaurant and food service employees in the community. [Modified]
(2) When the institution's food services are provided by an outside agency or individual, the institution has written verification that the outside provider complies with the state and local regulations regarding food service.
(3) All food handlers are instructed to wash their hands upon reporting to duty and after using toilet faci-
53

l i t i e s . (The p a r t i e s agree that t h i s provision applies to a l l institutions.)
2-4245. Toilet and wash basin f a c i l i t i e s are available to food service personnel and inmates in the v i c i n i t y of the food preparation area.
2-4246. There is documentation by an independent, outside source that food service f a c i l i t i e s and equipment meet established governmental health and safety codes; corrective action is taken on deficiencies, if any.
2-4247. There are sanitary, temperature-controlled storage f a c i l i t i e s for the storage of a l l foods, except nonr e f r i g e r a t e d foods which s h a l l be maintained pursuant to applicable state standards. [Modified.]
2-4248. Written policy and procedure require weekly inspections of all food service areas including dining and food preparation areas, and equipment. Refrigerator and water temperatures are checked on a daily basis by administrative, medical or dietary personnel.
2-4 2 4 9. Written policy and procedure provide that meals are served under conditions that minimize regimentation, although there should be direct supervision by staff members.
2-4250. Space is provided for group dining except when security or safety considerations justify otherwise.
2-4251. Written policy requires that at least three meals, of which two are hot meals, are provided at regular meal times during each 24 hour period, with no more than 14 hours
54

between the evening meal and breakfast. 2-4252. Written policy precludes the use of food as a
disciplinary measure. 2-4253. Written policy and procedure require that
accurate records are maintained of a l l meals served. 2-4254. The food service operation uses budgeting,
purchasing, and accounting p r a c t i c e s that include, but are not limited to the following systems:
(1) Food expenditure cost accounting designed to determine cost per meal per inmate;
(2) Estimation of food service requirements; (3) Purchase of supplies at wholesale p r i c e s
and under other-favorable conditions, when possible; (4) Determination of and responsiveness to inmate eating preferences; (5) Refrigeration and storage of food, with specific storage periods.
55

R. Environmental Sanitation

•

1. All institutions shall be maintained in com-

pliance with applicable state standards, including those esta-

blished for jails and prisons by the South Carolina Statutes, and

•

the regulations of the South Carolina Department of Health and

Environmenal Control including DHEC R. 61-55, and with Standards

2-4130 through 2-4132 and 2-4255 through 2-4270, of the American

:

Correctional Association (2nd ed. 1981), including 1983 revi-

sions, as modified below:

2-4130. Each room or cell has, at a minimum, the

following facilities and conditions:

(1) Sanitation facilities, including access to:

(a) Toilet above floor level which is avail-

able for use without staff assistance 24

hours a day, and

(b) Wash basin with hot and cold running

•

water;

(2) A bed at above floor level, a chair or

stool, a mirror, appropriate writing surfaces upon request, and

v

storage facilities in the cell for personal belongings. All of

these items shall be maintained in a reasonably sanitary, good

condition. [Modified];

(3) Natural l i g h t ;

(4) L i g h t i n g i s a t l e a s t 20 f o o t c a n d l e s a t desk

leveland in the personal grooming a r e a .

[Modified];

56

fc r
(5) Circulation is at least 10 cubic feet of outside or re-circulated filtered air per minute per human occupant. [Modified];
(6) Temperatures are appropriate to maintain health and safety year-round, provided that this Decree shall not require air-conditioning except where medically necessary [Modified] ; and
(7) Reasonable noise levels shall be maintained [Modified].
2-4131. [Modified] Where used, multiple occupancy wards shall house the number of Plaintiffs established by the sleeping space requirements of this Decree, who are screened for suitability to group living prior to admission, subject to the provisions of the section of this Decree relating to classifications. Multiple occupancy rooms have continuous sight or sound observation by staff pursuant to Section III-H of this Decree. Multiple occupancy rooms provide the following facilities and conditions:
(1) A minimum floor are of 45 square feet per occupant in the sleeping area, except where otherwise provided in this Decree, and a clear floor to ceiling height of not less than eight feet. [Modified]
(2) Toilet and shower facilities at a minimum of one operable toilet and shower for every
57

eight occupants; (3) One operable wash basin with hot and cold
running water for every six occupants; (4) Single beds only, subject tothe provisions
of the sections of this Decree pertaining to compliance with housing capacities and with mattresses insanitary condition; (5) Access toa mirror and a locker or p r i vate storage space for each occupant; (6) Natural light; (7) Lighting isat least 20 footcandles at desk level and in the personal grooming area [Modified] ; (8) Circulation is at least 10 cubic feet of outside or recirculated filtered air per minute per occupant [Modified]; (9) Temperatures meet any applicable State standards and areappropriate to maintain health and safety year-round, provided that this Decree shall not require air-conditioning except where medically necessary [Modified]; and (10) Reasonable noise levels shall be maintained
[Modified]. 2-4132. [Modified] When minimum security institutions or minimum security areas within larger institutions
58

provide individual rooms, they provide key control shared by the occupants and s t a f f , or continuous access to t o i l e t and shower f a c i l i t i e s and hot and cold running water, including drinking water. Rooms also provide the following f a c i l i t i e s and conditions:
(1) Sleeping space as set forth in this Decree; (2) Furnishings as set forth in 2-4130(2) above; (3) Natural l i g h t ; (4) Lighting at l e a s t 20 footcandles at desk
level and in the personal grooming area; (5) Circulation at least 10 cubic feet of outside
or r e c i r c u l a t e d f i l t e r e d a i r per minute per occupant; (6) Temperatures as s e t forth in 2-4130(6) above; and (7) Reasonable noise levels shall be maintained. (Revised, 1983) [Modified]. 2-4255. Written policy and procedure require weekly sanitation inspections of all institution areas by a designated administrative staff member; at least annual inspections by federal, state, and/or local sanitation, and health officials, or other qualified person(s); and, compliance with all applicable laws and regulations of the governing jurisdiction. There is documentation byan independent, outside source that deficiencies, if any, have been corrected. 2-4256. The institution's potable water source
59

and supply, whether owned and operated by the public water department or the institution, is certified by an independent, outside source to be in compliance with jurisdictional laws and regulations.
2-4257. A written housekeeping plan for all areas of the facilility's physical plant provides for daily housekeeping and regular maintenance by assigning specific duties and responsibilities to staff and inmates.
2-4258. The institution provides for the control of vermin and pests.
2-4259. The institution provides for waste disposal. 2-4260. Written policy and procedure provide for the issue of suitable clothing to all inmates, which is properly fitted, climatically suitable, durable, and presentable. 2-4261. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, written policy and procedure require that articles necessary for maintaining proper personal hygiene are provided to all inmates. 2-4262. Written policy and procedure provide for the issue of special and, when appropriate, protective clothing and -equipment to inmates assigned to food service, hospital, farm, garage, institution physical plant maintenance shops, and other special work. 2-4263. Written policy and procedure provide for the issue of suitable, clean bedding, and linen, including two sheets, pillow and pillowcase, one mattress and sufficient
60

blankets to provide comfort under existing temperature controls. There is provision for linen exchange or cleaning, including towels, on at least a weekly basis. (Revised, 1983)
2-4264. Written policy specifies accountability for state-issued inmate clothing and bedding. [Modified]
2-4265. The store of clothing (for that portion of the institution's population who are issued clothing), linen, and bedding exceeds that required for the facility's inmate population.
2-4266. The institution provides for the thorough cleaning and, when necessary, disinfecting of inmate personal clothing before storage or before allowing the inmate to keep and wear personal clothing.
2-4267. An opportunity for cleaning clothes and towels is provided to all inmates a minimum of three times per week, except where institutions provide and allow seven sets of clothing to each prisoner, then said opportunity need only be provided once per week to those prisoners who possess such seven sets of clothing. [Modified]
2-4268. There are sufficient bathing facilities in the housing areas to' permit inmates to shower at least three times per week. [Modified]
2z.i.2 JLjl« Water for showers is thermostatically controlled to ensure the safety of the inmates.
2-4270., There are hair care services available to inmates which comply with applicable health requirements.
61

2. Defendants shall prepare a study concerning compliance with the above stated conditions within sixty (60) days from the signing of this Decree by the parties a n d — a s to standards 2-4130, 2-4131 and 2-4132—within seven (7) months from the signing of this Decree by the parties, and shall develop and submit to the parties and the Court both the studies and a plan for the reasonably prompt implementation of each of the abovestated conditions.
3. Defendants shall employ a sufficient number of trained, competent environmental and health inspectors to do the following:
a. make a semi-annual evaluation of each institution;
b. monitor Defendants' compliance at each institution periodically roughout the year, with applicable state codes and the standards identified in Q and R herein;
c. make said reports to Plaintiffs and the Court; and
d. make follow-up evaluations and reports within three (3) months on any deficiencies and non-comoliance found.
62

S. Closing of Institutions 1. Defendants agree that the Annex of the Midlands
Reception and Evaluation Center shall be closed within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by all parties, and that the Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center itself shall be closed within three (3) years from the signing of this Decree by all parties. In the interim, the parties agree as follows:
a. The population at the Annex shall be reduced to comply with the standards enunciated in this Decree within six (6) months from the signing of this Decree by all parties;
b. From July 1, 1985, and thereafter, the population at the Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center itself shall be reduced such that no Plaintiff confined there shall be triple-celled;
c. From August 1, 1986, and thereafter until the institution is closed, the population at Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center itself shall be reduced so that all Plaintiffs confined therein are confined according to the standards enunciated in this Decree;
d. From the signing of this Decree by the parties and thereafter, no Plaintiffs other than the prisonerstaff shall be confined at the Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center or Annex for longer than fourteen (14) days, except those Plaintiffs confined pursuant to South Carolina Code Section 24-19-50(b), and such Plaintiffs shall be housed in single cells in Midlands
63

Reception and Evaluation Center or may be double-celled at Perry Correctional Institution Reception and Evaluation Center (and this provision shall apply to any Plaintiff so confined, within thirty (30) days from the signing of this Decree by the parties);
e. From September 1, 1985 through August 1, 1986, up to fifty cells at the Perry Correctional Institution Reception and Evaluation Center may be triple-celled;
f. From August 1, 1986 until July 1, 1987, Plaintiffs confined at the Perry Correctional Institution Reception and Evaluation Center may be double-celled, but after July 1, 1987 all such Plaintiffs must be single-celled;
g. From the signing of this Decree by the parties until September 1, 1985, no Plaintiffs shall be confined at the Perry Correctional Institution Reception and Evaluation Center for longer than thirty (30) days;
h. From September 1, 1985 and thereafter, no Plaintiffs shall be confined at the Perry Correctional Institution Reception and Evaluation Center for longer than fourteen (14) days;
i. Any Plaintiff confined in a reception and evaluation Center for more than fourteen (14) days shall have the right to the visitation and recreation provided by this Decree.
2. Defendants agree to make all good faith efforts to close Central Correctional Institution, including requesting the closing of Central Correctional Institution in their ten year plan to the legislature, until said institution is closed.
64

3. Defendants agree that all lock-down, maximum secu-

rity use of the Maximum Security Center shall end within one (1)

year from the signing of this Decree by the parties.

4. These time limits shall not be subject to any

extension, including as set forth in II-I of this Decree.

T. Effective Date

•> •

1. . This Decree is intended to be an agreement between

the named Defendants, in their official capacities, and the

Plaintiffs, individually and as representatives of the class of

all persons described ink section I-A of this Decree.

Accordingly, this Decree shall not be enforceable unless and

until this action is certified by the Court as a class action

with plaintiffs as representatives of the aforementioned class.

2. Unless otherwise noted, all provisions of this

Decree shall take effect within thirty (30) days of the signing

of this Decree by all parties. All parties shall attempt in good

faith to obtain judicial approval of this Decree. However, the

parties shall not be obligated to continue implementing this

Decree if judicial approval is denied.

U. Compliance

1. Defendants shall provide Plaintiffs' counsel, the

Court, the Budget and Control Board, and each institution li-

brary, with detailed quarterly reports and supporting documen-

tation, where appropriate, indicating for each subsection of the

Decree whether the Defendants are in compliance or not as to each

institution. Such reports shall state the source(s) of the

65

information relied upon (including documents, types of documents, and personnel consulted), and the specific steps taken to achieve compliance. For areas in which the Defendants are not in compliance, the reports shall state and explain the reasons why Defendants are not in compliance, when compliance can be expected and what steps have been taken and will be taken to achieve compliance. This requirement is in addition to other sections of this Decree regarding compliance and enforcement. Reasonable additional or supporting documentation, if needed, shall be furnished to Plaintiffs1 counsel upon request, as provided in other sections of this Decree.
2. Defendants shall provide copies of all departmental and institutional manuals, policies and procedures, as they are issued, to Plaintiffs1 counsel.
3. Any dispute arising between the parties concerning this Decree may be submitted to the Court. However, either party, in the event of a substantial dispute concerning the Decree or its enforcement, may request the services of a mediator who shall attempt to mediate the dispute prior to submitting the matter to the Court. As used herein, "substantial dispute" shall be deemed to refer to matters neither minor nor isolated. The mediator shall be mutually agreed upon by the parties and shall be subject to dismissal only upon written agreement of the parties or by the Court, upon motion of one of the parties for good cause shown. The parties have agreed that Allen Breed, the former Director of the National Institute of Corrections, shall
66

serve as the mediator to fill this position. The mediator shall make the initial detemination as to whether or not a dispute requires his or her involvement. In addition to mediating, the mediator shall attempt to resolve the dispute by making written findings of facts and recommendations to the parties.
4. If the mediator's recommendations are accepted by the parties, they shall be incorporated into this Decree by reference. If the mediator's recommendations are not acceptable to one or both of the parties, either party may submit the controversy to the Court for resolution. In that event, the mediator's written findings of fact and recommendations may be introduced into evidence and the mediator may be called to testify as an expert witness by either party or the Court. In the event that the mediator is not available, does not act within a reasonable time, or if the dispute requires immediate action, either party may submit a dispute directly to the Court.
5. Once a request for the mediator's involvement has been made, the mediator shall have complete, unimpeded and confidential access to all staff, prisoners, institutions and documents relevant to the dispute.
6. The mediator may use assistants or experts where needed. The Defendants shall pay, in a timely manner, reasonable costs and fees of the mediator and any assistants and experts used by the mediator.
7. Ten years after the entry of this Decree, either party may move the court for the abrogation of this decree in whole or in part, upon a showing of satisfactory and sustained
67

compliance with the provisions of this Decree. Subsequently, either party may move the Court for reinstatement of this Decree or any portion thereof, upon a showing of a likelihood of noncompliance .
V. Costs and Attorneys' Fees Defendants shall pay Plaintiffs' counsel all costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred during the course of this litigation through the entry of this Decree by the Court and, upon submission of statements, incurred during Plaintiffs' monitoring of enforcement and compliance with this Decree. Plaintiffs' costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the submission of any dispute to the Court following the entry of this Decree shall be paid by Defendants upon the Court's determination that Plaintiffs are entitled to costs and fees'.
68

IV. APPENDICES

A. Medical and Health Care Services Standards of the

American Correctional Association Standards for Adult Correc-

tional Institutions (2nd edition, 1981), for reference in car-

rying out the requirements of Part III, Section I of this De-

cree.

B. Standards for Psychological Services in Adult Jails and

Prisons of the American Association of Correctional Psychologists

(1979 edition), for reference in carrying out the requirements of

Part III, Section I of this Decree.

C. Standards for Adult Community Facilities, American

Correctional Association, regarding Health Services. D. Defendants1 Educational Programs available as of Jan-

uary 25, 1984, for reference in carrying out the requirements of

Part III, Section J of this Decree.

E. Standards for Adult Community Facilities, American

Correctional Association, regarding Food Services.

F.

Sleeping Space and capacities of Defendants1

Institutions.

G. Report and Recommendations on Staffing, January 1984,

by National Institute of Corrections consultant, for reference in

carrying out the requirements of Part III, Section H of this

Decree.

69

APPENDIX A Medical and Health Care Services Standards, of the American Correctional Association Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions (2nd ed.f 1981; as revised, 1983). 2-4271. The institution has a designated health authority with responsibility for health care services pursuant to a written agreement, contract, or job description. The health authority may be a physician, health administrator, or health .agency. When this authority is other than a physician, final medical judgments rest with a single designated physician. 2-4272. Medical, including psychiatric, and dental matters involving medical judgment are the sole province of the responsible physician and dentist respectively; however, security regulations applicable to facility personnel also apply to health personnel. 2-4273. The health authority meets with the warden/superintendent at least quarterly and submits to him/her annual statistical summaries and quarterly reports on the health care delivery system and health environment. 2-4274. Each policy, procedure, and program in the health care delivery system is reviewed at least annually by the appropriate health care authority and revised if necessary. Each
70

document bears the date of the most recent review or revision and

signature of the reviewer.

2-4275. An adequately equipped medical f a c i l i t y , which

meets the legal requirements for a licensed general hospital with

respect to the services i t offers, is available to a l l inmates.

2-4276. Written policy and procedures provide for infirmary

care, to include the following:

(1) Definition of the scope of infirmary care

services available;

(2) A physician on call 24 hours per day;

(3) Nursing service under the d i r e c t i o n of a

physician's a s s i s t a n t or a r e g i s t e r e d nurse

on a full-time basis;

(4) Health care personnel on duty 24 hours per

day;

(5) All i n m a t e s / p a t i e n t s within sight or sound

of a staff person;

(6) A manual of nursing care procedures;

(7) A separate and complete medical record for

each inmate;

(8) Compliance with applicable state statutes and

local licensing requirements.

2-4277. Space, equipment, supplies, and materialsfor

health services are provided and maintained as determined by the

:

health authority.

2-4278. First aid kits are available in designated areas of

71

the facility based on need. 2-4279. Written policy and procedures provide for 24-hour
emergency medical anddental care availability as outlined ina written plan which includes arrangements for the following:
(1) Onsite emergency first aid; (2) E m e r g e n c y e v a c u a t i o n of the inmate from the
facility; (3) Use of an emergency medical vehicle;
(4) Use of one or more designated hospital emergency rooms or other appropriate health facilities;
(5) Emergency on-call physician and dentist services when the emergency health facility is not located in a nearby community;
(6) Security procedures providing for the immediate transfer of inmates when appropriate.
2-4280. In i n s t i t u t i o n s without f u l l - t i m e , qualified h e a l t h - t r a i n e d personnel, a h e a l t h - t r a i n e d staff member coordinates the health delivery services in the institution under the j o i n t supervision of the responsible health authority and warden/superintendent.
2-4281. The institution health authority systematically determines health care personnel requirements in a l l categories in order to provide inmate access to health care staff and s e r vices. (Deleted, 1983)
72.

2-4282. Arrangements are made with health care specialists

in advance of need.
r
2-4283. Written policy and procedure specify the provision

of mental health services for inmates in need of such services

to include, but not limited to, services provided by qualified

mental health professionals who meet educational and licen-

sure/certification criteria specified by their respective profes-

sional discipline, i.e., psychiatric nursing, psychiatry, psycho-

logy, and social work.

2-4284. Appropriate state and federal licensure, certi-

fication or registration requirements and restrictions apply to

personnel who provide health care services to inmates. The

duties and responsibilities of such personnel are governed by

written job descriptions approved by the health authority. Veri-

fication of current credentials and job descriptions are on file

in the facility.

2-4285. Written policy and procedure provide that cor-

rectional and other personnel are trained to respond to health-

related situations within a four minute response time. A train-

ing program is established by the responsible health authority in

cooperation with the facility administrator, which includes the

following:

(1) Recognition of signs and symptoms, and

knowledge of action required in potential

emergency situations;

(2) Administration of first aid and cardiopul-

73

monary resuscitation (CPR); (3) Methods ofobtaining assistance;
t
(4) Signs and symptoms of mental i l l n e s s , r e t a r dation, and chemical dependency;
(5) Procedures for p a t i e n t t r a n s f e r s to approp r i a t e medical f a c i l i t i e s or health care providers.
2-4286. Treatment by health care personnel other than a p h y s i c i a n , d e n t i s t , p s y c h o l o g i s t , o p t o m e t r i s t , p o d i a t r i s t or other independent providers is performed pursuant to written standing or direct orders by personnel authorized by law to give such o r d e r s . Nurse p r a c t i o n e r s and p h y s i c i a n ' s a s s i s t a n t s may practice within the limits of applicable laws and regulations.
2-4287. When the i n s t i t u t i o n uses students or i n t e r n s in health care delivery, written policy and procedure provide for work experience under direct staff supervision, commensurate with their level of training. •
2-4288. Written policy provides that inmates are not used for the following duties:
(1) Performing direct patient care services; (2) Scheduling health care appointments; (3) Determining access of other inmates to health
care services; (4) Handling or having access to:
(a) Surgical instruments, (b) Syringes,
74

(c) Needles, (d) Medications,
r
(e) Health records, (5) Operating equipment for which they are not
trained. 2-4289. Written policy and procedure require medical screening to be performed by health-trained or qualified health care personnel on all inmates, excluding intrasystem transfers, upon inmates' arrival at thefacility with all findings recorded on a printed screening form approved bythe health authority. The screening includes atleast the following:
(1) Inquiry into: (a) Current illness and health problems, including dental problems, venereal diseases andother infectious diseases, (b) Dental problems, (c) Use ofalcohol and other drugs which includes types of drugs used, mode of use, amounts used, frequency used, date ortime oflast use, anda history of problems which may have occurred after ceasing use (e.g., convulsions), (d) Past and present treatment or hospitalization for mental disturbance or s u i cide, (e) Other health problems designated by the
75

responsible physician;

(2) Observation of:

f

t

(a) Behavior, which includes state of con-

sciousness, mental status, appearance,

conduct, tremor and sweating,

(b) Body deformities, ease of movement,

etc. ,

(c) Condition of skin, including trauma

markings, bruises, lesions, jaundice,

rashes and infestations, and needle

marks or other indications of drug

abuse;

(3) Disposition of inmate:

I

(a) General population,

(b) General population and prompt referral

to appropriate health care service onan

;

emergency basis.

2-4290. Written policy and procedure require medical

screening by health-trained or qualified health care personnel

;

immediately upon arrival at the institution for all intrasystem

transfers with allfindings recorded on a printed screening form

approved by thehealth authority. The screening includes, at a

minimum, the following:

(1) Inquiry into:

(a) Whether the inmate is being treated for

v

a medical or dental problem,

76

(b) Whether the inmate is presently on medication,
(c) Whether the inmate has a current medical or dental complaint;
(2) Observation of: (a) General appearance and behavior, (b) Physical deformities, evidence of abuse and/or trauma;
(3) Disposition of inmate: (a) General population, (b) General population and prompt referral to appropriate health care service, (c) Referral to appropriate health care service on an emergency basis.
2-4291. Written policy and procedure require that health appraisal for each inmate, excluding intrasystem transfers, is completed Within 14 days after arrival at the facility. In the case of an inmate who has documented evidence of a health appraisal within the previous 90 days, a new health appraisal is not required except as determined by the designated health authority. Health appraisal includes the following:
(1) Review of the earlier receiving screening; (2) Collection of additional data to complete the
medical, dental, mental health and . immunization histories; (3) Laboratory and/or diagnostic tests to detect
77.

communicable disease, including venerealdisease and tuberculosis;
> (4) Recording of height, w e i g h t , pulse, blood
pressure and temperature; (5) Other tests and examinations as appropriate; (6) Medical examination, including review of
mental and dental status; (7) Review of the results of the medical
examination, tests, andidentification of problems by a physician or other qualified health care personnel, if such is authorized in the medical practice act; (8) Initiation of therapy when appropriate;(9) Development and implementation of treatment plan including recommendations concerning housing, job assignment, and program participation. 2-4292. Written policy and procedure for the collection and recording of health appraisal data call for these requirements: (1) The process is completed ina uniform manner as determined bythe health authority; (2) Health history and vital signs are collected by health-trained or qualified health personnel; (3) Collection of all other health appraisal data is p e r f o r m e d only by qualified health
78

personnel. 2-4293, Written policy and procedure, approved by the health authority, provide for comprehensive individual mental health evaluation on specially referred inmates by a multidisciplinary mental health team. The evaluation is completed within 14 days after the date of referral, and includes at least the following:
(1) Review of mental health screening and appraisal data;
(2) Collection and review of additional data from staff observation, individual diagnostic interviews and tests assessing intellect and coping abilities;
(3) Compilation of individual's mental health history;
(4) Development of an overall treatment/management plan with appropriate referral.
2-4294. Written policy and procedure, approved by the appropriate mental health authority, provide for all activities carried out by mental health service personnel.
2-4295. Written policy and procedure require that routine and emergency dental care is provided to each inmate under the direction and supervision of a dentist with appropriate state or federal licensure. The individualized treatment plan includes the following:
(1) Dental screening, unless completed within the
79

previous six months, conducted on initial intake with instruction on hygiene; (2) Dental examinations within three months,
supported by x-rays if necessary, based on information from intake screening; (3) A defined charting system which identifies the oral health condition and specifies the priorities of treatment by category; (4) Consultation with referral to recognized specialists in dentistry. 2-4296. Inmates who are severely disturbed and/or mentally retarded are referred for placement in either appropriate noncorrectional facilities or in specially designated units for handling this type of individual. 2-4297. Transfers which result in inmates being placed in other non-correctional institutions or in special units within the facility, which are specifically designated for the care and treatment of the severely mentally ill or retarded, follow due process procedures as specified in law prior to the move being effected. In emergency situations, a hearing is held as soon as possible after transfer. 2-4298. Written policy requires that except in emergency situations there shall be joint consultation between the warden /superintendent and the responsible physician or their designees prior to taking action regarding the identified mentally ill or retarded patients in the following areas:
30

(1) Housing assignments; (2) Program assignments; (3) Disciplinary measures; (4) Transfers to other institutions. When an emergency action has been required, this consultation occurs as soon as possible, but no later than on the next work day so as to review the appropriateness of the action. 2-4299. Written policy and procedure require continuity of care from admission to discharge from the facility, including referral to community care when indicated. 2-4300. Written policy and procedure provide for unimpeded access to health care and for a system for processing complaints regarding health care. These policies are communicated orally and in writing to the inmates upon arrival in the facility and are put in a language clearly understood by each inmate.
81

2-4301. Written policy and procedure require that sick call, conducted by a physician and/or other qualified health personnel, is available to each inmate, at a minimum, as follows:
(1) In facilities of less than 100 inmates, sick call is held one day per week at a minimum;
(2) In facilities of 100 to 300 inmates, sick call is held three days per week at a minimum;
(3) In facilities of over 300 inmates, sick call is held four days per week at a minimum;
(4) if an inmate's custody status precludes attendance at sick call, arrangements are made to provide sick call services in the place of the inmate's detention.
2-4302. Written policy and procedure specify the conditions for periodic health examinations for inmates.
2-4303. Written policy and procedure provide that a program of health education is provided to inmates of the facility.
2-4304. Written policy and procedure provide for a special health program for inmates requiring close medical supervision. A written, individual treatment plan, which includes directions to health care and other personnel regarding their roles in the care and supervision of these patients, is developed for each inmate by the appropriate physician, dentist, or qualified mental health practitioner.
2-4305. Written policy and procedure make available chronic and convalescent care to inmates of the facility.
82 .

2-4306. Written policy and procedure require that gradual detoxification from alcohol, opiates, hypnotics, other stimulants, and sedative hypnotic drugs is effected as follows:
(1) When performed at the facility, it is under medical supervision; and
(2) When not performed in- the facility, a r rangements are made forit to be conducted in a hospital or community detoxification center.
2-4307. Written policy andprocedure guide the clinical management of chemically dependent inmates with the following requirements:
(1) Diagnosis of chemical dependency by a physician;
(2) Determination by a physician as to whether an individual requires nonpharmacologically or pharmacologically supported care;
(3) Individualized treatment plans which are developed and implemented by a multidisciplinary team;
(4) Referrals to specified community resources upon release when appropriate.
2-4308. Written policy and procedure require that medical and dental prostheses and orthodontic devices are provided when the health of the inmate/patient would otherwise be adversely affected, as determined by the responsible physician or den-
83

tist. 2-4309. Written policy and procedure govern the use of
elective surgery. 2-4310. Written policy and procedure require that patients
who need health care beyond the resources available in the facility, as determined by the responsible physician, are transferred under appropriate security provisions to a facility where such care is available.
2-4311. Written policy and procedure provide that prior to transfer to another facility, or other substantial travel, either the inmates or their records be evaluated by health care personnel to assess suitability for travel. When travel is approved, pertinent data, including medication, other treatment or special requirements for observation and management during travel, are documented in a manner readily accessible and easily understood by transportation staff, or others who may be called upon to attend inmates during travel and upon reception at the receiving institution. Medications or other special treatment required enroute along with specific written instructions for administration, are furnished to transportation staff.
2-4312. Written policy and procedure govern the use of restraints for medical and psychiatric purposes.
2-4313. Written policy and procedure provide that all informed consent standards in the jurisdiction are observed and documented for inmate care. In the case of minors, the informed consent of parent, guardian or legal custodian applies when
84

required by law. When health care is rendered against the patient's w i l l , it is in accord with 'state and federal laws and regulations.
2-4314. Written policy prohibits the use of inmates for medical, pharmaceutical, or cosmetic experiments. This policy does not preclude individual treatment of an inmate based oh his or her need for a specific medical procedure which is not generally available.
2-4315. Written policy and procedure specify the process by which those individuals so designated by the inmate are notified in case of serious illness or injury. Permission for notification is obtained from the inmate prior to need, if possible.
2-4316. Written policy and procedure specify actions to be taken in the event of an inmate death.
2-4317. Written policy and procedure provide for the proper management of Pharmaceuticals, and addresses the following subjects:
(1) A formulary specifically developed for the facility;
(2) Prescription practices which require that: (a) Psychotropic medications are prescribed only when clinically indicated as one facet of a program of therapy, (b) "Stop order" time periods are required for all medications,
85

(c) The prescribing provider reevaluates a prescription'prior to its renewal;
(3) Procedures for medication receipt, storage, dispensing and administration or distribution;
(4) Maximum security storage andperiodic inventory of allcontrolled substances, syringes and needles;
(5) Dispensing of medicine in conformance with appropriate federal andstate law;
(6) Administration of medication which is carried out by persons properly trained and under thesupervision of thehealth authority and facility administrator or designee;
(7) Accountability for administering or d i s t r i buting medications in a timely manner, according to physician orders.
2-4318. The health record f i l e contains the following i tems:
(1) The completed receiving screening form; (2) Health appraisal data forms; (3) Allfindings, diagnoses, treatments, disposi-
tions; (4) Prescribed medications and their administra-
tion; (5) Laboratory, x-ray anddiagnostic studies; (6) Signature and title of documentor;
86

(7) Consent and refusal forms; (8) Release of informa'tion forms; (9) Place, date, and time of health encounters; (10) Health service reports, e.g., dental, mental
health and consultations; (11) Treatment plan, including nursing care plan; (12) 'Progress notes; (13) Discharge summary of hospitalization and
other termination summaries. The method of recording entries in the records, the form and format of the records, and the procedures for their maintenance and safekeeping are approved by the health authority.
2-4319. Written policy and procedure uphold the principle of confidentiality of the health record and support these requirements:
(1) The active health record is maintained separately from the confinement record;
(2) Access to the health record is controlled by the health authority;
(3)The health authority shares with the superintendent/warden information regarding an inmate's medical management, security, and ability to participate in programs.
2-4320. Written policy and procedure regarding the transfer of health records require that:
(1) S u m m a r i e s , originals, or copies of the
87

health record accompany the inmate to the facility to which'he/she is transferred; and, (2) Health record information is also transmitted to specific and designated physicians or medical facilities in the community upon the written authorization of the inmate. 2-4321. Written policy and procedure require that inactive health record files are retained as permanent records in compliance with legal requirements of the jurisdiction. 2-4322. Psychotropic drugs, such as antipsychotics, antidepressants and drugs requiring parenteral administration are prescribed only by a physician or authorized health provider by agreement with the physician, following a physical examination of the inmate by the health provider, and are administered by the responsible physician, qualified health personnel, or healthtrained personnel under the direction of the health authority.
88

APPENDIX B
STANDARDS FOR PSYCHOLOGY SERVICES IN ADULT JAILS AND PRISONS, OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF CORRECTIONAL PSYCHOLOGISTS
(September 1979 edition)
01. The mission of psychological services and the work of its personnel is governed by a current written statement of objectives and job descriptions approved by the facility's administration in conformity with professional guidelines established by the American Psychological Association (and the headquarters staff person responsible for psychology services in multi-institution systems). 02. All aspects of psychological services conform to applicable state and federal laws and regulations. Specifically, state licensure and/or certification requirements are applicable and verification of these credentials is on file in the facility (or in multi-institutional systems at the central headquarters level). 03. At the facility (and in multi-institutional systems at the headquarters level) there is at least one person "responsible for psychological services who has a doctorate degree from a regionally accredited university or professional school in a program that is primarily psychological, and who also has approp-
89

riate training experience.

NOTE:

For the purpose of transition, persons who meet all the

following criteria on or before the date of adoption of these

standards shall also be considered qualified psychologists:

(a) A masters degree from a program primarily psychological

in content from a regionally accredited university or profes-

sional school;

(b) appropriate training and experience;

(c) a license or certificate in the state in which they

practice, conferred by a state board of psychological

examiners, or the endorsement of the state psychologi-

cal association through voluntary certification.

04. There is a current formal table of organization which shows

psychological services as a separate entity and details lines of

authority in the chain of command. Such an organizational chart

exists and is implemented at the institutional (and in multi-

institutional systems at the central headquarters level) level

and shows a full and qualified psychiatrist as the individual

person responsible in a prison setting for overseeing

psychological services and in a jail setting this individual may

be less than full time.

05. The psychologists, and the staff activities for which these

individuals are responsible, have professional autonomy regarding

psychological services, within the constraints of appropriate

security regulations applicable to all institutional personnel,

such regulations being in conformity with the written directives

90

of institutions and/or headquarters. 06. When psychological services are provided in the facility, adequate space, equipment, supplies, funds and materials, as determined by the chief psychologist (in accord with headquarters directives in multi-instituion-systems) are provided for the delivery of those services. There also will be adequate secretarial support. 07. At least monthly, administrative meetings are held which include the chief psychologist and the facility administrator (and, preferably, other institutional heads of departments) in order to provide a forum for general discussion, including the operation of psychological services. 08. There is a periodic report (at least quarterly) on the psychological services delivery system and an annual summary, both provided to the facility's administration and other interested management personnel in the system. In addition to workload figures, this report includes a narrative concerning issues of importance. 09. The quality of psychological services are reviewed at least annually and the results reported in writing. The chief psychologist is responsible for overseeing this internal quality assurance program at the institutional level (pursuant to policies and procedures established at a headquarters level in multiinstitution systems). 10. A formal documented annual review (with subsequent report to the facility's chief executive and copies to the chief psycholo-
91

gist and other appropriate headquarters staff) is conducted by an outside agent to monitor conformity to these standards and established policies. 11. The facility has a designated qualified psychologist with responsibility for the organization and operation of psychological services pursuant to a current written agreement, contract, or job description; Similar documentation exists describing the duties of other psychological services personnel. 12. The ratio of staff to inmates is at least one full time psychologist for every 200-250 prisoners. In specialized units (e.g., drug treatment) the minimally acceptable ratio is one full time psychologist for every 100-125 inmates. Additionally, staff shall be reflective of ethnic, racial and linguistic characteristics of their clients, to the degree possible.
(a) Average daily population less than ten — psychologist on call
(b) Average daily population between 10 and 75 — contract psychologist in facility at least 8 hours per week
(c) Average daily population between 76 and 125 — contract psychologist in facility at least 16 hours per week
(d) Average daily population over 125 — at least one fulltime psychologist
13. A written plan, approved by the chief psychologist, exists and is implemented (in accordance with headquarters policies, in multi-facility systems) and requires psychology staff to receive orientation training and regular continuing education appropriate
92

to their activities. Documentation of these training experiences will be maintained. 14. All psychological examinations, treatments and procedures affected by the principle of informed consent in the jurisdiction are likewise observed for inmate care. (In the case of minors, the informed consent of parent, guardian, or legal custodian applies where required by law.) 15. Written policies and procedures exist and are implemented which outline the provision of involuntary treatment in accordance with state and federal laws and regulations applicable to the jurisdiction. These are approved by the chief psychologist and are in conformity with professional ethics and principles promulgated by the American Psychological Association (and the policies established by headquarters staff in a multi-facility system). The decision to apply such techniques shall be documented and based on (or, if time pressure precludes this, followed by) interdisciplinary review. ' Psychologists refuse to participate in practices inconsistent with legal, moral and ethical standards regarding the treatment of clients. 16. A written policy exists and is implemented which outlines the degree to which confidentiality of information can be assured. 17. Psychologists shall limit their functioning to their demonstrated areas of professional competence. 18. Psychologists function as members of multi-disciplinary decision-making teams. Psychological resources are used only
93

for psychologically appropriate treatment. 19. Written standard operating procedures approved by the chief psychologist (and in accordance with headquarters guidelines in a multi-facility system) exist and are implemented for all activities carried out by psychological services personnel. 20. At least one person per shift within sight or sound of all inmates, has training in receiving screening, including the recognition of symptoms of mental disturbance most common to the facility. 21. At the time of admission to the facility, inmates receive a
written communication explaining the procedures for gaining access to psychological and mental health services. 22. There is a written, implemented policy approved by the chief psychologist (and in accordance with headquarters guidelines in a multifacility system) regarding access to psychological services for (1) postadmission inmates with emergency p r o b l e m s and for (2) daily referrals of n o n e m e r g e n c y problems covering both scheduled and unscheduled care. 23. Receiving screening is performed on all inmates upon admission to facility before being placed in the general population or housing area. The findings are recorded on a printed screening form. Inmates identified as having mental problems are referred for a more comprehensive inquiry into: (1) past and present history of mental disturbance, and (2) current mental state, including behavioral observations. 24. In a prison setting, all newly committed inmates with
94

sentences over one year shall be given a psychological evaluation within one month of admission. Such routine evaluations are brief and include (but are not necessarily limited to) behavioral observation, a records review, group testing to screen for emotional and intellectual abnormalities, and a written report of initial findings; referral for more intensive, individual assessment is made when appropriate. 25. Collection of psychological evaluation data is performed only by psychological services staff personnel or facility staff trained by them. Review of and written reports based on the results of the examination, testing and developing a plan of treatment is done by, or under the supervision of, a qualified psychologist. All such information is recorded on data forms approved by the chief psychologist and in accordance with headquarters policy in multi-facility systems. At no time is the responsibility for test administration, scoring or the filing of psychological data given to inmate workers. 26. The individual assessment of all inmates referred for a special comprehensive psychological appraisal is completed within 1A days after the date of the referral. As applied in a jail, this includes:
(a) Reviewing earlier screening information. (b) Contacting prior psychotherapists or the individual's
family physician regarding any history of mental symptomology. (c) Conducting an extensive diagnostic interview.
95

(d) "Writing and filing a brief report, (e) If evidence of mental disturbance is found, placing the
individual in a separate area where closer supervision is possible and either (f) Referring the individual to an appropriate mental health resource or to his or her family physician (if indicated and when release is imminent), or (g) Beginning appropriate care in the jail by staff members of the psychological and or psychiatric services. This standard as applied in a prison setting includes: (a) Reviewing earlier screening information and psychological evaluation data. (b) Collecting and reviewing any additional data to complete the individual's mental health history. (c) Collecting behavior data from observations by correctional staff. (d) Administering tests which assess levels of cognitive and emotional functioning and the adequacy of coping mechanisms. (e) Writing a report describing the results of the assessment procedures, including an outline of a recommended plan of treatment which mentions any indication by the inmate of a desire for help. (f) Communicating results to referral source and (g) Writing and filing a report of findings and recommendations.
96

27. Crisis evaluations should be conducted as soon as possible/ but not later than 24 hours after tire staff member has been notified subsequently. A report of the session(s) is written and appropriately filed. 28. Diagnostic and treatment services are provided to inmates of the facility as part of the institution's total program. 29. If mental disturbance is identified in pretrial and/or presentenced detainee the court and/or the inmate's attorney are notified according to a written policy or procedure approved by the facility's chief executive (in conformity with headquarters directives in a mult ifacility system). Such notifications are documented.
97

30. Inmates awaiting emergency evaluation and/or treatment are
r
housed in a specially designated area with close-staff or trained-volunteer supervision and sufficient security to protect these individuals. 31. A written treatment plan exists for all inmates requiring psychological services. This is developed by a psychologist in collaboration with other personnel and includes directions for non-psychological services personnel regarding their roles in the care and supervision of these prisoners. 32. Acute, chronic and convalescent care are provided to inmates at the facility, or, if inappropriate due to resource constraints, by referring such individuals to a more appropriate institution. 33. Prison systems will have their own resources for handling severely disturbed inmates, either in a separate facility or specially designated unit(s). 34. Transfers which result in inmates being placed in either facilities (or special units within institutions) which are specifically designated for the care and treatment of the severely mentally disturbed shall follow due process procedures as specified in state/federal statutes, prior to the move being effected. 35. There are written and implemented policy and procedure which require that the responsible psychologist be consulted prior to taking the following actions with respect to
98

emotionally disturbed inmates: housing assignment changes,
t
program assignment changes, disciplinary sanctions, transfers in and out of the facility. 36. Inmates who are mentally retarded are referred to available resources according to a written plan approved by the chief psychologist (and in accordance with headquarters policy in multi-facility systems). 37. Only those treatment methodologies accepted by the state psychology community (andnot specifically prohibited by headquarters policies in multi-institutional systems)are employed in the facility. Further, the facility will provide a multiplicity of appropriate programs. 38. There is a written, implemented procedure which provides for the orderly discharge of inmate clients from treatment. • It includes (butis not limited to) the writing and filing of a treatment summary report within one month after treatment terminates. 39. There are written, implemented policies and procedures which require psychological services personnel to ensure that provisions are made for post-release follow-up care where appropriate. 40. There are implemented written policy and procedures which require formal evaluation of the effectiveness of psychological services treatment programs. ( 41. A written policy exists and is implemented outlining the
99

purposes and procedures for hiring contract, part-time and
r
consultant staff and it requires these individuals to participate in an appropriate documented orientation session conducted by the chief psychologist. 42. The psychological services staff coordinates and consults on a regular basis with: the facility's advisory committee (if any), appropriate headquarters staff in multi-institutional systems, and with other professional administrative, and technical groups both within and outside the facility. 43. The psychological services staff coordinates and consults with other facility staff regarding referrals and care of ihmates. 44. Written standard operating procedures are implemented which provide for and require psychological services to participate in training facility staff with respect to the following: types of potential psychological emergency situations, signs and symptoms of various mental disturbances, procedures for making referrals to psychological services and program areas (i.e., drug treatment, counseling). 45. Psychological services personnel utilize volunteers in a variety of programs under the supervision of the chief psychologist. The implemented written policies and procedures include a system for selection, training and for specifying term of service, level of supervision, definition of tasks, responsibilities, and level of authority. Docu
100

mentation is required which will indicate the volunteer has participated in an appropriate orientation session conducted by the chief psychologist. 46. The psychological services staff participate in the preparation and implementation of facility-wide planning, e.g., the institution's master plan, facility design, disaster plan and so on. 47. There is written, implemented policy approved by the chief psychologist (which, in multi-facility systems, is in accordance with headquarters directives) that specifies which psychological reports are placed in the inmate's central file. Additionally, it specifies which reports m a terials are maintained in other secured files. 48. Psychological files containing test and interview data on pretrial detainees are destroyed if the individual involved is subsequently adjudicated as being "not guilty." 49. The psychological record (excluding raw data) is part of the inmate's central file. It contains the completed receiving screening form, all findings, diagnoses, treatments, dispositions, and terminations from long or short-term psychological treatment. The uniform method of recording entries and the the form and format of the psychological record are approved by the chief psychologist (and in conformity with headquarters policy in multi-facility systems). 50. Psychological test protocols and other "raw data" are main-
101

tained separately from the confinement record, are kept in a secured file controlled by the chief psychologist, and are not made available to untrained laymen or to any inmate. 51. Written authorization by the inmate is necessary for transfer of psychological record information to any third party, unless otherwise.provided for by law or administrative regulation having the force and effect of law. 52. The inmate client in a therapeutic relationship is made aware of what is being reported to any decision-making third party and is given the opportunity to refute the information contained in such reports. 53. Implemented, written policies and procedures approved by the chief psychologist and in conformity with headquarters policy in multi-institutional systems require the transfer of psychological records and summaries within a multi-facility system whenever an inmate is transferred. 54. When mentally disturbed inmates are transferred, the least restrictive restraints should be used, consistent with the client's current mental state and background, to maintain human dignity. If the individual is to be transported to another facility, the prisoner's record arrives at the receiving institution either before or with the inmate, and the individual is accompanied by a trained staff member. 55. Psychological services personnel are encouraged, and oppor-
102

tunities are provided, to conduct applied and or basic research which will improve the delivery of psychological services and contribute to the development of theory and practice as relates to correctional psychology. 56. Psychological research in correctional facilities should conform to the ethical standards proposed by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects. 57. Written procedures exist and are implemented for processing research proposals. These are in accordance with institutional policies (and with headquarters policies in multifacility systems) and, at a minimum, require prior approval by a research advisory committee before any study is undertaken. Psychological services are represented (preferably by the chief psychologist) on that committee.
103

APPENDIX C MEDICAL CARE AND HEALTH SERVICES STANDARDS 0F_ THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION STANDARDS
FOR ADULT COMMUNITY FACILITIES
2-2120. The facility has a written agreement with a licensed general hospital, clinic or physician to provide residents with routine medical services. 2-2121. The facility has a written agreement with a licensed general hospital, clinic, or physician to provide emergency services on a 24-hour a day basis. 2-2122. The facility provides access to dental care and mental health care. (Modified). 2-2123. State licensing and certification requirements apply to health care personnel working in the facility to the same extent as they apply to equivalent personnel in the community. 2-2124. At least one staff member present on each shift of the residential facility is trained in emergency first aid procedures, including cardio-pulmonary resuscitation. 2-2125. The facility has written emergency medical back-up plans which are communicated to all employees and residents. 2-2126. The facility has available at all times first aid equipment approved by a recognized health authority. 2-2127. Written policy and procedure provide that the facility implements an inventory system of first aid supplies and equipment, and continually replenishes the supply.
104

2-2128. Each newly admitted resi'dent undergoes a medical examination within 14 days of admission unless there is documentation that the resident has had an examination within three (3) months prior to admission to the facility. (Modified) 2-2129. At the time of a resident's admission, staff inquire about any physical problems which might require medical attention. 2-2130. Written policy and procedure provide for the medical examination of any employee or resident suspected of having a communicable disease or a debilitating condition, such as diabetes, heart disease, or epilepsy. 2-2131. When a urine surveillance program is in effect, there is a written policy for the collection of samples and interpretation of results. 2-2132. There is a written policy regarding the possession and use of controlled substances, prescribed medications, and overthe-counter drugs. The policy stipulates that prescribed medications are administered according to the directions of the prescribing physician. 2-2133. There is written policy and procedure which specify that records of all medications distributed by facility staff are maintained and audited monthly, and include the date, time and name of the resident receiving medication, and the name of staff distributing it. 2-2134. Written policy and procedure provide for the prompt
105

notification of resident's next to kin in case of serious
t
i l l n e s s , surgery, death or injury. Any death in the program is reported immediately to the proper officials.
106

APPENDIX D The parties shall submit an agreed-upon list of programs (educational and vocational) to the Court, for incorporation in this Decree, within thirty (30) days from the signing of this Decree by the parties. Said list shall be included at pages 107 through 121 of this Decree.
107

APPENDIX E
r
FOOD SERVICE STANDARDS OF THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR ADULT COMMUNITY FACILITIES

2-2110, When the facility contracts for food service, a

registered dietician or physician annually approves the

nutritional value of the contractor's menu.

2-2111. When the facility constracts for food service, the

contractor complies with all sanitation and health codes enacted

by state or local authorities.

2-2112. When food service is provided at the facility, food

service staff develop advanced planned menus and follow the

schedule.

2-2113. When food service is provided at the facility, the

advanced planned menus are reviewed and approved by a registered

dietician or physician.

•

2-2114. When food service is provided at the facility, there is

a single menu for staff and clients.

2-2115. When food service is provided at the facility, special

diets are prepared which meet the medical needs of residents.

^JL-LLUL* When food service is provided at the facility,

provisions are made to meet the religious dietary needs of

residents.

2-2117. When food service is provided at the facility, it

complies with all sanitation and health codes enacted by state or

local authorities.

122

2-2118. When food service is provided at the f a c i l i t y , a l l foods are properly stored at the completion of each meal. 2-2119. When food service is provided at the f a c i l i t y / the kitchen and dining area are ventilated, properly furnished, and clean.
123

APPENDIX F SLEEPING SPACE AND CAPACITIES OP DEFENDANTS1 INSTITUTIONS

Institution

Space

N./S&R Space N. Capacity 6/21/84 Pop. 10/1/84 Pop,

Blue Ridge P.R. Center

164

174

172

Pre-Release Dorm 2400 sq.ft

53/45.28 sq.ft.

Work-Release Dorm 5000 sq.ft. 111/45.05 sq.ft.

Catawba W.R. Center

96

83

75

Wards 1-7

647 sq.ft. 77/58.80 sq.ft. ( 7)

Ward 8

825 sq.ft. 15/55.0 sq.ft.

Drivers1 Ward

207 sq.ft.

4/51.8 sq.ft.

Cross Anchor C.I.

528

483

457

Dorms 1 - 5

100 sq/48rm. 480/50.0 sq.ft. (96)

Admin.Seg.

80.50/48rm. 48/80.5 . sq.ft.

Dutchman C.I.

528

488

451

Dorms 1 - 5

100 sq/48rm. 480/50.0 sq.ft. (96)

Admin.Seg.

80.50/48rm. 48/80.5 sq.ft.

Givens Youth C.C.

70

121

104

Dorm A

66.0sq/15cu. 15/66.0 sq.ft.

Dorm B

58.5sq/15cu. 15/58.5 sq. f t.

Dorm C

63.9sq/12cu. 12/63.9 sq.ft.

Dorm D

60.7sq/12cu. 12/60.7 sq.ft.

Dorm E

74.4sq/14cu. 14/74.4 sq.ft.

Staff Room

152.25 sq.ft. 2/76.13 sq.ft.

124

Greenwood C.C. Ward A Ward B Ward C
Livesay W.R. Center Dorms A & B
Northside C.C. Dorms 1 - 3 Ward 1
NEW McCormick C.I. Med. Sec. Lock-Up
Perry C.I. Dorms 1 - 4
Dorms A&B (R&E) Dorms C&D (seg)
Aiken Youth C.C. Dorm 1 Dorms 2,3,5 Dorm 4 Dorm 6

1115 sq.ft. 1100 sq.ft.
692 sq.ft.
90sq/24cu.

63 24/46.46 sq.ft. 24/45.83 sq.ft. 15/46.13 sq.ft.
96 96/45.0 sq.ft. (48)

90.25sq/24cu 144/45.13sq.ft. (48) 1420 sq.ft. 31/45.81 sq.ft.

73.0sq/504 80.0sq/96

600* 504/73.0 sq.ft.
96/80.0 sq.ft.

60.5sq/96rm. 192/60.5 384/30.25
80.5sq/48rm. 96/80.5 80.5sq/48rm. 96/80.5

768 (48) (96) (48) (48)

3774 sq.ft. 1931 sq.ft.
997 sq.ft. 992 sq.ft.

253 83/45.47 sq.ft, 126/45.98 sq.ft. (42) 22/45.32 sq.ft. 22/45.09 sq.ft.

125

92 94 265 0 950
232

90 93 247 0 1021
242

A).

CCI CB-1 CB-2 CB-3
Wards 1 - 1 0 Ward 11

1165
41.12/255C. 255/41.12 sq.ft. 53.74/108c. 108/53.74 sq.ft. 56.36/108C. 54/56.36 sq.ft. (162)
108/28.18 sq.ft. 2710 sq.ft. 540/50.19 sq.ft. (54) 5885.70 sq. 100/58.85 sq.ft.

RENOV. CCI Guards Qtr.s 168.0sq/5c. 336.0sq/8c.

(66* 10/84.0 sq.ft. (2) 56/48.0 sq.ft. (7)

RENOV. CCI Stoney Bldg.

48*

l61.0sq/18c. 36/80.5 sq.ft. (2)

85.17sq/12 12/85.17 sq.ft.

RENOV. MSC

77* 54.0sq/59c. 59/54.0 sq.ft. 84.0sq/18c. 18/84.0 sq.ft.

Campbell W.R. Center East & West Wings

100 90.0 /24rm. 100/45.0 sq.ft. (50)

Goodman C.I. Bldg. 1 Bldg. 2 Bldg. 3 Bldg. 4
Kirkland C.I. Two Dorms Five GP Dorms
psych, unit

59.02/49cu. 53.05/42cu. 52.90/46cu. 58.90/50cu.

187 49/59.02 sq.ft. 42/53.05 sq.ft. 46/52.9 sq.ft. 50/58.9 sq.ft.

-\
67.4/ 64rm. 128/67.4 67.4/ 64rm. 160/67.4
320/33.7 83.0/ 96rm. 96/83.0

608 sq.ft. (64)
sq.ft. (32) sq.ft. (64) sq.ft.

126

1118
0
0 164 232 805

1168
0 165 264 789

/Lower Savannah W.R. Center

Dorm A

777.0 sq.

Dorm B

467.0 sq.

Dorms C&D

545.0 sq,

Dorm E

131.0 sq.

Dorm F

272.0 sq,

59 17/45.71 sq.ft. 10/46.70 sq.ft. 24/45.42 sq.ft. (12)
2/65.5 sq.ft. 6/45.33 sq.ft.

Manning C.I. Wards 1 - 6 Trusty Area Cell Block RENOV. cell block

364
2797.5 sq. 330/50.86 sq.ft. (55) 161.0/ 12rm. 24/80.50 sq.ft. 54.0/ 10c. 10/54.0 sq.ft. ? / 10c. 10/ ? sq.ft. 10*

Maximum Security Center

Admi n.Seg.

54.0/ 59c.

Admi n.Sep.

84.0/ 10c.

0* 59/54.0 sq ft. 18/84.0 sq ft.

Midlands R&E A - D Blocks E & F Blocks G & H Blocks Trusty Area Annex
/ Stevenson C.I.

35. 0/ 8cells 32/35.

48. 0/ 6c. 12/48.

42. 0/ 3c.

48.

2/ 7cu. 0/lOc.

6/42. 7/48. 20/72.

144,

0* sq ft, 8) sq ft, 6) sq ft, 3) sq ft. sq ft,
127?

FORMER Admin.Seg,

648 sq.ft. 12/54.0 sq.ft.

58

73

498

500

73

75

194

183

132

142
**•';

127

«•••'

State Park C.I.

158?

125

141

Work Release Area 126—306/14rm. 87—63sqft

(76)

Women's Ger.

173—307/4rm 76.25—86.5 (12)

Men's Ger.(occ.)

143—316/19rm 65.0—101.5 (54)

Men's Ger.(unocc) 184—328/6rm 82.0—99.5

(16)

Men's Ger.(constn) 16—314/23rm 65.0—101.5 (64)*

Men's Ger.(cohstn)

?sq ft/12cu?

(24)?*

Holding cells

?sq ft/2

(2)?*

Walden C.I.

160

229

228

Ward A

499 sq.ft. 11/45.36 sq.ft.

Ward B

1601 sq.ft. 35/45.74 sq.ft.

Ward C

1195 sq.ft. 26/45.96 sq.ft.

Ward D

1652 sq.ft. 36/45.88 sq.ft.

Dorm 1

100sq/26rm. 52/50.0 sq.ft.

Wateree River C.I.

486

615

611

Wards 1 - 6 Dorms 1 & 2

2231 sq.ft. 294/45.53 sq.ft, (49) 100sq/48rm. 192/50.0 sq.ft. (96)

Watkins P.R. Center

144

127

109

Dorms 1 - 3

90sq/24rm. 144/45.0 sq.ft. (48)

Women's Corr. Center

233

307

287

Five GP Cottages

83sq/24rm. 60/83.0 sq.ft. (12)

120/41.5 sq.ft, (24)

Two Cottages

83sq/24rm. 48/83.0 sq.ft. (24)

Detention

74sq/5cells 5/74.0 sq.ft.

NEW WOMEN'S DORM

96*

0

100sq/48rm. 96/50.0 sq.ft,

128

NEW R & E
Coastal W.R. Center Dorm 1
Dorms 2 & 3
NEW LIEBER C.I. Med. Sec. Lock-Up R &E
MacDougall Youth C.C, Dorms 1,2,3,5
Dorm 4
Palmer W.R. Center (one dorm)

192* 80.0sg/l92c. 192/80.0 sq.ft.

158 • 89.9sq/27cu. 54/44.95 sq.ft. (62) 102.2sq/ 4cu. 8/51.10 sq.ft. 90 sq./24rm. 96/45.0 sq.ft. (48)

73sq/504c. 80sq/96c. 80sq/96c.

504/73.0 96/80.0 96/80.0

696* sq.ft. sq.ft. sq.ft.

80sq/ 48rm. 96/80.0 192/40.0
80sq/ 44rm. 22/80.0 44/40.0

354 sq.ft. (24) sq.ft. (48) sq.ft. sq.ft.

50 72.25sq/50cu. 50/72.25 sq.ft,

TOTAL:

present buildings renovations new buildings

7094 291* 1584*

129

112
400 90
8261

117
381 92?

APPENDIX G REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON STAFFING, JANUARY 1984, BY THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS
130

JAMES D. HENDERSON

CORRECnONAL CONSULTANT

140 1 South 16th Street Laaverrwonn. Kansas. 66048

^ 3 7 1334

(913)682-0183

j COMMISSIONER ?
Februar j . 4 » I 7O4

Mr. William D. Leeke, Commissioner South Carolina Department of Corrections LULU Broad River Road P.O. Box 21787 Columbia, South Carolina 29221

Dear Bill,
Inclosed is the report on ny recent staffing analysis conducted in your Department. I sincerely appreciate the cooperation and responsiveness of everyone representing the Department of Corrections.
If there are any questions regarding this study, I would be pleased to respond to them. It was good to see you and look forward to seeing you in San Antonic at the A.C.A. Conference.
Sincerely,

D. HENDERSON M . C . Consultant

131

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DEPARTMENT OF CG".=EC7I0::S SOUTH .CAROLINA NIC TAS3-4.C2 BY
t< i Lf 1'Uio.uL..-..!.

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132

I1 FTC
NIC T/A //83-402

- U.S. Department of Justice : -
National Institute of Corrections
• •*.
n. DC. 20ii*

*

This technical assistance activity was funded by the Prisons Division of the National

(

Institute of Corrections. The Institute is a federal agency established to provide assistance

. to strengthen state and local correctional agencies by creating more effective, humane,

}

safe, and just correctional services.

•

The resource person(s) who provided the on-site technical assistance did so on a contractual

basts, at the request of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and through the

1

coordination of the National Institute of Corrections. The direct on-site assistance and this

*

subsecuent report are intended to assist the South Carolina Department of Corrections to

address the issue(s) outlined in the original request and in efforts to enhance the

"•

effectiveness of the agency.

The contents of this document reflect the views of Mr. James D. Henderson. The contents do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy ^ f the National I n s t i t u t e of Corrections.

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133

I?£FAi\TMEX7* 07 CG==.£CTICKS SOUTH CAROLINA i;iC TA 83-.402

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]

The present administration of the 3cu:r. Carclir.a latart-rr.t cf Corrections requested Uaticnal lus/r. i"ut = cf Corrections that a staffing review be conducted at institutions identified by the department. The staffing assessment is connected.to the Kelson Suit and is also for the purpose of assisting the Department of Corrections in preparing a report to the Legislature in early February.
• • Ms. Mary LouCommiso, NICTechnical Assistance Manager,
contracted the consultant•in late November andarrangements were made.for the technical assistance to occur during theweek of January 16-20, 1951. The time alloted to the project was restrictive, however, '•'.£. Commiscwas able to arrange for advance materials to be made available to the consultant which were valuable in preparing fcr the study. Those materials consisted of plot rims , current staffing information, special prcgrams requiring additional staffing, etc. and these materials were fcrvarded through the efforts of Mr. Dave seidin*, Legal Counsel.

1

Mr. Stephen Key, National Prison Project ar.d Ms. Cristir.e

;reensn, Southern Prison Ccalitirr. sor.tactrr. the :or.sul-.ar.:'

[_

and sucge?ted attention alsc be directed tc the fcllcv:ir.t •

areas: (1) Use of inmates (V.'ard fleecers)', (2) Staff

coverage of inmates permitting sound or visual supervision;

Fage two

•

f

(3) Out of cell activity for protective custody inmates

(3rd shift); (i) Staff required if restraints were not

utilized in protective custody escort; (5) Staffinz resuired

if ir.mates in segregation were permitted open visiting; ar.d,

(6) Zxercise schedules in segregation.

The consultant .will address these issues with staffing implications, but will not comment on administrative or management prerogatives. Ms. Freeman requested permission to accompany the consultant on portions of the staffing analysis. After contacting Kr. Bill VJilkey, NIC Prison Chief, the decision was cade to limit this study to the consultant and those knowledgeable of Operations current •" staffing at the institutions. Legal Counsel of the South Carolina Department of Corrections were not involved in the on-site studies.

The. consultant collected the needed data to establish the relief factor. The South Carolina Department computes the relief factor on a department-wide basic. The relief factor- is the figure used to deterrr.ir.e- the number of oersor.r.si to staff ail functions required on a }bf day, 21 hour basis. The relief factor computation is reflected on the following page.
135

DS?ART:-:EI;T OF CORRECTIONS SOUTH CAROLINA KIC TA 83-iC2 rage three

SHIFT RELIEF FACT:?.

CU?.=E::T DATA

1 . Uur.ber cf days per year that the agency is closed: i.e., r.o • =ervi:e£ offered.

2. Number of agency work davs per year ecuals 365

365-

"

.

3. Kunber of regular days off per ecpioyee per vear (usually 5?- weeks/yr X 2 days

'off/week) = 10£.

"

10Z..00

•

4.. Nuaber of vacation days off per employee

vfl

•

per year.

'* *

10.17

I

5. Number of holidays off per enplcyee per

"year.

"

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12.00

6. Number of sick days off per ecpioyee per

year (should be aciuai average*for the

jail staff).

—

l.lc -

7. Number of other days off per employee per

year (this includes tiite off fcr injury

^1

on the job, filling vacancies, -ilitary leave, funeral leave, unexcused absences,

disciplinary time off, special assign-

rents, etc.

5«c*i

S. Kunber of training days per year

11.53

9. Total number of davs off per employee rer vear equals (c) +(d) + (e) + (f} + Xg) "+ (h) '

1:1.07

10. Nur.ber of actual work davs-per employee per year equals 365 - ( O
11. Lunches and breaks (j) X .0625 dc-.:r.
tize factor

213.93
13.37

136

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12'. Actual'work days 1-year" • (J; -'(>) ""•:'-.':'S''- 200.56 •

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...;...•..-•. ••

..... -^. • . • : , •

13. Shift relief factor = (b) -.(I;

.. ~;;-:: +:;..:,.. ' . ••-•;•*
• •" " s -:- 1 . S2 ... ;--

(I;u"ber of employees for 1 sirhi " h o u r •*••>•'.''.'-....•

.-^-.^

shift, 5 days'a week)

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365 days x 2£ hours per day - 8,760 hours per year

M .

200.56 days x 8 hours per day = 1,60£.£8 hours

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3
C

. 8,760 '- 1,60^.^8 = 5.^5 employees

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for 21 hour

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coverage

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7 Day P O S L One Shift

1.82 'Relief Factor

* . 5 Day Pest One Shift

' 1.3 Relief Factor

. 2 Day Post One Shift

.51 Relief Factor

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137

viV^
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r •

it — W i ^ « » ^ — H w & .'• • • • • • ...

c9.«

f i v p — • •'«••••' -"'•'•" * *•• '

•^ *• • '-v» . ^.- -J'-» - • • .. " . "*"",' *••• .'-"'•.

•:. - » • : » . . „ • . . • ; , ; . • • -

. •• S * •*.'*.'

On arriving 'in South .Carolina''the. consultant met with

Commissioner Uillias Leeke and his Executive Staff.''-- '

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During the week he also net with the belcv listed staff

of the South Carolina Decartment of Corrections.

Kr. Bill Leeke

Connissioner

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Mr. Hugh Clements

Deputy Comnissioner', Administration

Mr. Charles Leath

Deputy Coccissioner, Operations

Mr. Paul Weldon.

Deputy Commissioner, Programs

• Mr. Doug Catoe "Mr. Jin Harvey Mr. Larry Batson Mr. Dave Belding

Assistant -Deputy Commissioner,

Institutions

• *

•

Regional Administrator, Midlands

* Region

Legal Advisor

. • : .'

. • .•„....

»-

Legal Counsel

. . . . . . +.:....- - ^ / > - . . - . •••—
" ;;

\ Kr. Joe Martin

Director of Security . •'•'''• '. ...: "

Mr. James Aiken

V;arden, Central Correctional Institution

Mr. VJilliaa V.'eston

Chief Ccrrectior.al Supervisor, C.C.I.

.Mr. Fred Thompson

Chief Correctional Supervisor,' Maximum Security Center

Mr. John Carmichael

Warden, Vateree River Correc-

tional Institution -

• •

Mr. Ricky Harrison

Associate VJarden, V.'ateree River Correctional Institution

Mr. Robert W. Donlin V.'arden, 'dcrr.ai'S ' Correctional Center

Mr. Glenn T. Davis

Warden, Dutchman Correctional Institution

- 138

p a,g.e..:s:'iV;x'->J;z---.:£vVpC:^?,tv&.•~•;',*:.'•'•<•r>: -

•:Mr. Bob Rice .... '•-rir. Jerry Maxwell
lir. Frank Korton Mr. Doug Taylor 'Mr. Claude Gillian

....:--•*

Chief Correcticns.1 Supervisor, .v-.-.%•-vrpp: • ' Dutch-an Correctional :•'." "'• n' ".v

Institution

•

. ..-

Warden, Perry Correctional • '.".. "..ii-.viw

Institution •

-- _ ' " ' . "' " "'•••'

Associate Warden, Perry . . • . .-. '•: .; .-.Correctional Institution v.-..'-: ''. .'••.•;-.:

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Chief Correctional Supervisor, "• '""•';;i--.

Ferry'Correctional institution .

The five institutions- selected for the staffing analysis

were the Central Correctional Institution, Wateree

Correctional Institution* Wocens' Correctional Center,

•Dutchman Correctional Institution, ancT"the Perry Correc-•-

tional Institution. -The consultant added the Maxizuc . :

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Security Unit of Central Correctional Institution to this

analysis.

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Commissioner Leeke assigned Mr. Joe Martin, Director cf

Securitv, to coordinate the visits to the various facilities

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His knowledge, experience and expertise were, invaluable to

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the consultant throughout the technical'assistance project

During the week the -consultant reviewed staffing rosters, selected post orders,-and staffing proposals prepared cy

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.'. • : -.-.-i .tv

4

-.•.•.•.-.• -. . 1 3 9 •. .

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''.>•'•

prison administrators for submission -o the'Cer;iral Ofrite ." .'FH':«

Also, theOrganisational Charts for ".he .Derartrarit."of ^vvv-Vv^-^

Corrections and individual instit-t i: r.s "were reviewed.

"-''•

Physical plant, security levels", mission, programs, and ' .special,management inmates were factors considered in "••'.".'*• 'arriving at staffing recommendations. .' '•'. ..:".,... ""•'.-'.. -.. 'Vy^;

At each facilityttr.Martin andthe constultant, accompanied-' -'9

by the Warden and-other staff members, thoroughly toured

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...... ^ . ^. ^. .„

the institutions. Random interviews with staff and •'.'./•.'.'.":-'./'

inmates were held. Programs and operations were observed. ;.ii:hj

"~_ At theconclusion the consultant 'devexope'd''staffing' z~Z^y^~<5git.

'•••recommendations andoffered suggestions'for alternative •:-'^-*^i&.

,\

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-t.-.\"

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» — — - \-

. r />•• — . - . • - . . . > •

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....

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•••»•:

1 -"i .-.

• • • "_»^.

-. apcroaches to manpower u t i l i z a t i o n and r o s t e r management. '"•V"-.'1'*^^

These w i l l be discussed in the r.ECO^-TirDATIOII section of ::.^:?

' this report.
••..-.,' .' •' ..- ^... • . . . . • . - . .
THE WELSO?? SUIT

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. • • ••\f*W

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" . . * • ' -u. •'•• s •.-•i-T.»**--. • • * * — • • • • « • £ » — - ' - • . • » •".'S.*.;vrfi-'.'*"Y''~?

'

'•"::r"::';:- •••;;'.-.-_ i;"' -S • ry/•$$

The staffing asrecommended will cor ply with Mr.' Key' s '•'::\:. :'

'concerns instaff coverage of livir.r units and permitting "V'^jV.

additional exercise in secre-aticr..

. _.,... . ..*... ir...----"~

.'V;ard Keepers' roles have diminished and key" -staff members ^.r deny they have anyauthority over other inmates .":-.Therev -;^

P £ 6 e e i g h t _. * \ : V - v : j " J i ••' .' ..•T.f..->*'V/*.T-!rv-.li.."r' .

.'are,' however, seme syTiptbr.s~of a r<ini~al rolel -"The aini- •

canteen? in charters operated by'the V.'ard Keepers (a. ,,V ••

legalised loan business)',"the maintenance cf thebed "'' assignment log and the unlocked quarters door of the V.rard

Keeper are indica-tors that this tradition has not been '"•• '

.completely eliminated. There are very positive signs that

• administrators.are making 'every effort to direct staff.at

operational levels that .Ward Keepers are responsible only

for sanitation and house'keeping of the general area in

quarters. Each individual is responsible for his own
0

O T *O 9

.-... •"

'. * i * " - • • " . . . - • • •

•

•

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^rjl-.V,-...

out-of-ceil activity for •protecti\"e' custody inaates-on"

• -'-the 3rd shift" oust renain'a managesent decision. '•-It 'h'}'::,

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' •_presents aany ramifications that effect operational

security. The 3rd shift traditionally has the least . .

staff and other services would be impractical. There

.are other alternatives more effective and aore realistic

which were discussed with appropriate staff.

.-V;
"•v

To handcuff or- not to handcuff inr.ates and controlled visiting are'management decisions. Staff would be available if contact visiting were authorized._ _ There would be a need for physical plant modification? to perr.i" this.
•:', •1*. -' •• iC:... • w . -.

}~/y..-~ vVi-i^T-•'•l~:,"l'1 • '" •'

The following staffing analyses' are designed for the

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institutions designated. It is'the consultant's' opinion

.that the assignments as designated would provide adequate .

•supervision internally and on the perimeter. " Program .".-•••

. additions and institution utilization could very well

impact these staffing levels. For example, if unit manage-

ment becomes a reality in the Department, a reassessment

. of positions would be required.

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f ing "levels ''of niniauz 'security are " richer -than a—•

:\-7.fiHr-:Mj?':-'J•.••-•* • • > ' .•••' ..• ••• •-• -';- •••• *;' •-•.'; •' "..•"•.•" :
: x ' t r a d i t i o n a l ainiaus security f a c i l i t y . ;.The mission of •./;•.,•

•*. - y . ' ' i - - . ' :

•."'.'

' "•

• •

,'.-•;•••..•

•••'.

••;these institutions has been altered because of overcrcvding

•-and higher level security designations made there. It is

unusual for a ninizus security facility zc have a perimeter

"•detection system, razor ribbon, perimeter patrols, and

•housing unit control rooss. Also, only four inmates are permitted to work outside.the perimeter. The staffing

will correspond to present.utilization of these facilities.

Following are theconsultant's staffing reccr.r.sndaticns .*

.(See cages 10 through 29)

-[•LI

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<,/3T*-V
iv.
•»">

.'.;:-: .;'-v^V• CEKTr.AL COHRZCTIGKAt "IN3TITU7IC!: ",-N"V"; •

Sever. lav Pos

.;..

.

arlv Late- Shift •• •£?.!:""

Shift Supervisor

1

Cell Block jf'1 (Gaze)

V

Cell'Block #1 (PC; • •. •

Cell Block #1 (AS)

1

1

Cell"Block 71 Floors'1-2-3 Cell Block M (-Activities) " Cell Block.|2 (Gate) Cell Block. [82 (Ranges) Cell Block 82 (Shakedown) Cell Block 82 (Activities).

1 2 1 2 1 2

Cell Block 82 (Cage)

..

Cell Block 83 ••;• -

.1

Wards 1-10 . . . •

".10 v 1

•..Building" #4. T u n n e l K e y .-•';•

V." Officer.',.- . •

Kitchen Officer "\ - "•

Dining Roea Officer .

Hospital Officer

Admission/Orientation

Transititonal Unit

• .

Stoney Building

Vehicle Gate ••" •••••;_•

Towers #1 - 7*6 •

Central Control

Corridor Gate

Sr:all ".ecreation Field

Control Booth

1

1

1

"»

6

6'

1

2

1

1

1

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1

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2

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1 2.

6 2
1

143

§•""••

Seven Dav Post ( c c r . t ' d ) Early''••'M_at«"'' '' S h i f t ^ S h i f - ' ^ ' ^ h i f - ' ^ t ? ^ ^

I

J • •'•'• • • • • V ' - - A : ' . T ••••'•••:."••. - " • •-.: i ' • . ' > • ' • • • ' ; : 5 r - • - ' • • - ;

^•":-'^v^-"'•-v-"^-:v^S

"•*••• . V
%

- ^ T u n n e l D o o r , • •." . " . - • • . • • • . - i . • . • . • ; • • - ' ' . ' " . V v . v / ' . "

V i s i t i n g Room S h a i : e d o v n '*-; •

'

Hospital Securitv

.

Activities Officers

' • "• ". .

'

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^.'•••^'•'•••'^'^'•^y-'

K': - 1

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fe , ; . - . .

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Total seven day post = 1 3 0

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130 X ' 1 . S 2 R e l i e f F a c t o r = 236.6 p o s i t i o n s

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144

1

d e p u t y :;arder. ( S e c u r i t y )

:-:"-• •'•I*-*

- V ^ V * : *•*.•?
•..5rd.">'-^-'ist" •' • .2r.d 'S\:-V 3'r.ift ' S h i f t - - S h i f t I':';!^

.

1

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V . -.•j^. _•., .
V-f

C h i e f C o r r e c t i o n a l . • ..'.._ . . •

' Supervisor

. • •'

• '.. \ •• * " ' • •

Operations Sucervisor •

-

• -\- '.'• •.-.~. / • \" ' I" --;

:-7:.

2

.'•: • " . ' . p - ".- •

-' 1 .-.:.'••

:'-.:•..• • -.• Cell Block #1 Supervisor

..".'.•'

•. . 1 -.'••:>••..•.; ^

sC-.?.:-v. • B u i l d i n g i?^S u p e r v i s o r . :'* •:.'•""';v ".•'"•-. ' - . V; \V/-\;-p'.'^'Vi,

'!'*"';• •

Yard Supervisor

.

1

' . • ...'"

\T?-~--' '
?L~
'.-f^'•s?T-

Training Supervisor •
Inside Front Gate Supervisor
Cell Block 82 Sunervisor

•'

. . . . 1 .. '-• •' -

P-
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I
7
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Assistant Sucervisor

.

" . . ."-'"-•

CB Hi * . • •

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B u i l d i n g Hi A s s i s t a n t

• . . ..

•• ;/v. , •'./:• m • ;c ,.-.—:>;::

v-..^.. ...,..: . Supervisor . -•.•••• •-.'*•• r ; ; > ; ' - " ; '*"*. ••"-:?:": ^ ' I': "vr':'r":~"* = ^ ^ ^ t

A s s i s t a n t S u c e r v i s o r • ' .- '.•'• ..••'' • -:- '..':.'•"'•' •• '.'>•••*'• ' . '

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CB y

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Assistant Sucervisor

.

* •• . •'•-.;: - •..'..•'.

(Cafeteria) . . ': Assistant Supervisor

1 "

. _ * '' ::'•".

(Inside Front Gate)

1

Assistant Supervisor

2

2 •••'•'•'

•»-••••

Assistant Sucervisor

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( P e r s o n n e l ) '. • ' '• .

' .• '•-' '1 :. • ' ^ " v

,# A s s i s t a n t S u c e r v i s o r

....

•_ ,""••'

'--•'•.—r.}

(Transportation)

.

" ••..-•- 1 .....' — . .

Assistant Supervisor

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(Training)" •

•

2

Assistant Supervisor

(Yard) *

2

Assistant Sucervisor

(Fire ".arshal)

.

Assistant Supervisor

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1

• " ""~"~ "

**J"r

(Central Control)

.•

.'•'•- -j

./.-"—•

. -•

145

•

. ...•.:•.•

• -:- :.-.:>

..Chapel ;•>*.•;. • •
;••' >
Rear Gate *

Library

School . ' • .' •

Visiting Roon

. .Personnel Office

«

. Count Officer .' ' • •

"S,'»l WLV-'

Operations Officer Transportation Officer Conmissary Officer

Truck Escort

.. Property Control

Prison Industry-

'Maintenance

\_ Laundry ^^.-^,- ..7 --L.>:.«•/1-: .-••^Prison 'industry (Gate)

Xg:i«
m* "?*§:-

"Total five day post - 53 " •• --*'' "•' ' 53 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 63.9 Fcsiticr.f

• •1
- '1
1 •1
;•"••. 2

146

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» •

0 / 2 V i s i t i n g . G a t e .. ...•;.,.._,......: ;;;...^:.;;^1 ;.;:_; •] ...,v ^ ;••;&.?.
V i s i ti n g " R ec='*"''• y~: '••' • '•.'•'•':• '•"-•'""'^'.-.•."."•••;. j .-V; ^.'.^•j^v/i " ^.._•'"'_".'*• '•'/-• •"&

.Visitir.gr.ccr. (Gate) . £ ; v < . P o s t # 1 0( V i s i t i n g ) ^••.- '

. ' • •••'•:••• -•• • - • - • • • • 1 • - ••' ; •- - / v £ g .

^ * •;\ ;"•-.«A

.. .T« ot>al

t w o d .

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y

p o s t .

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-

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

-

-

•

.

•

.

A x .51 Relief Factor - 2.01Positions ^".. ERi- - 7 Day Posts' •"• 236.6 * ' ' • •

5 DayPosts .• 68.9

2. Day Posts ':.... 2.0Z, '"".•'•.-''..•"•.';... '".•"-.
• •..v:-...:':.."V:../;r;;; . 307.5il o r 3 0 S reconaended authorized security"-. Jtrir .;r:

*-..»

•

•

•

.

»

•

r_tv-~-T"-'-'VJ*:/-5*"'-•*

• - " * , ' : . ' ' • - .- • > .•••'' * • *

•

. JT» - . -?.«

: ^ . * •-,»••
..'. ' •' t •* • •

'• : . . ' ( > .

• " ' •. • . .

.: . ?*... Sever. Tav Post '•••
Gate * .Cat Walk .•Recreation Key Control
. .Ranges ;••. ..>

Earlv ;'L=-:? •Shift "-'-Shif- '•'• £::lf• .:*7.?£.

..."

.

* *

...--*.<•

4»

* : * » ^ " t * » '"

• 1

•

-••*

3
. Total seven, day post = 13 -.—-.- -- -•.-
' ."13 x 1.82 Relief Factor's .'23.66 Positions

•••••"•••••••6

*

. Five Day Post

3rd . 1 s t i-.-.2nd Early ..Late Shift Sfaifi

Superviso Canteen/Transfers Legal Library

j3 .

:-'-.

1

' '1

...

•'

•*•••.-

•• ••'•jr ••

V

7

Total five day pest = 11

' .' .

. . .. ..

11 x 1.3 R e l i e f F a c t o r » U . 3 7 Days Posts 23.66 ' -, '"

••••••

_• • •• . .: .

• .• " "

•5 Days'-Posts 1L.,3 •• • • • ••••••••

. . . ":.l*: .":.;•. ..- r

*•/;'"•.*•;''•;'.'•"•' 3 7 . 9 6 o r 38 r e c c - . - e n d e d a u t h o r i s e d c o - p i e : . s n - c .

143

Shift Supervisor

.Assistant Supervisor

Cottages .1-2-3-6-"7

C o t t a g e A - -,-".- •:.• -'•*•.-:
Detention ;:^^^:-^^

Transportation """*.'"

Control Center -

lard Officers ' " ":

.

.

.

.

•

•

•

Cottage 5

Cafeteria ,„-...

•Cottage 2 ";;"•;', ".•*:.;..

1.

• 1

1

1*..:.'. : . . • , . : 2

5 '.;•

5

1 "••- •V-.; 2

•

i

1 ^•;"•''•, . ' 1 •'• . - ^ . , 1

'-

'1 •

1

1. ' 1

1

2 •' 2

1

1

1

1

. 1

1

1

-.12

18

15

••• ••••i-<:-.

h l ^ & l v -*ii5 x::''ii;; 8 2 R e l i e f f a c t o r * 8 1 . 9 P o s i t i o n s - - ^ V c : : . :>: •••; V ^ . V . I;*-; - : ^

149

'-.

' •-•••;.>;.•

i*A%: .

• - . • > • • . . . • . • V " . ' . " - - ; * ? " " " - - •' " " ' • • • • * • • .•••••.;•.-..• . %••^ ^ £ ' ^ ^ r . . v ^ " . . . : ; ' . i . v . - - - . * . :••••' ; . - ? V " . : t ; r •

• '•*.. - •. •.-••:r.. •••^••••.iv--c<--i..:.voMEi:ls C O R R E C T I O N A L T - : ?

v-:r..->v--.. •-;••.-• ••-.:^:,

9
r ».-
1 T
k-< "^"^
. -«••
'*£

TTsy Posts

Chief"Correctional

• -•Supervisor ": •'•

Record Office . '

• H a i l Room -A; •"

•

• •• -

t.-.-..

•••

••;

-••

...•••»"•

•Transportation' . .'

Apparel Plant (PI)

School" .- ..." . .,. '.' :

Early Lai

Shi'"1:
. ?
*•••-•:••-•••'•; T .
......a

Total five day post « 7 7 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 9.1 Positions
5 x 1.82 Relief Factory .:81.9 5 DayPosts *'"'• 7 x'1.3 Relief Factor '="' ''9.1

• • * '• - t i ;
/
« 'iji J •

positions are -resonrended for authorized socrlersnT.. •

*

"

*

•...-.."....

150

W

I I-Sfi

^e e i g h t e e n .•.•.:•

• • * • ' ' • . ' ' • • ' • • ' " • " ••'••••• •':'"'

" \ : ."•;•••' ••''•:^'*y.\.''--{-::'\'•'••'/

Seven t*av Posts

Zarl"*" li"?

Correctional Supervisor Assistant Shift Supervisor Operations Office , •_ Operations/Activities Control Center' . ; J.' Shakedown •" . Tunnel (South) (Quarters) Tunnel (North) (Quarters) Tunnel (Center) (Quarters) Cafeteria • • Transportation Back Gate Officer
. " F r o n t G a t e ••••:•••"•••**•' t'"--"
-.Yard Patrol' '• [ -.•./-.' ..; ' building Detail ." .: '.-.
Dormitory #1 Dornitory #2

'3rd'.-; -ist Shift Shif*
.1 1 1
•

1

1

•1

1

1

1

1

1
i

1

1 7."

1 \-

-2r.d
i
1 i
n
i 1 i 1
V
mm-
•"1.
v ':. • ? .
, - -> •* -
1
1

Total seven day posts = £0 x 1.S2 Relief Factor. =-72.8 Positions

151

•£>;;'
•Si .•

• •'•;;'' ' ''J^WATEHEZ RIVZH COHHrCTro;::-"'T:-T — T - ^ Q ; V '%? ^V~,:W^ rv

'•* "'

... . KIKIKUM SZCUr.Ilv

-.--••• '

•

•

-

'

^—.-.•...

•

•;

•:;•/

•.••-••:••••*-^'•••••

'Five 'Dav'Post's

Earlv

•V;:.

Chief. "Correctional

"Supervisor . •' Operations Supervisor •Training. Officer Inmate Payroll ' ' •

i • • .*•

.»** ' "

1 .1 1

» . . v • •:••*"•" - '

••

••'•-,

"

Total five day posts- = I i x 1.3 Relief Factor = 5.2 Positions

^fc"»..,":''"•••

. '"• - • • • _ • • * : » • -:-

- . ^ . ' - r ....

•• ••- • • • • • • ._.•—••.•-.-•.-•

:• .-

•. _ .'1 • .
152

••'. "<••!-•• - i
» .• . . " u " • J

vo Dav rests

Early LET

^ 2nd Shif- Shifw Shift

Visiting 3uilding _.: •• •;-^Family Visiting Center "•'•'•'

•

>

•

•

# »

••.

...

•

•

•••

2

Total two day posts = 2 -•-' • ' ' '"•.' '.''-•' -• ; :'#:' •• 2 x .51 Relief Factor « 1.02 .'...*.'•.".

7 Day Posts £0 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 72.8

5 Day Posts I x 1.3' Relief Factor = 5 . 2 - .

2. Day Posts : 2 x ,51 Relief Factor a 1.02

:.

. •.:• L:;^".."."•'."';.."*;."' \-•'-•/'• -•..•.•-::•''.'•..-;•.'•.'/"• . 7 9 . 0 2 o r 7 9 s e c u r i t y

i

4 „.

. *'•»

a..
I'M!?
% •
•f^;
i **£;*.
5*1 ~*. ••,
4>

.." [."'Sever/ Day Posts ' ' • ' *Efcrlv ": l a t e
Shift-Supervisor Shift Assistant Supervisor Control Center .Gate Officer/Periceter ^."••Visiting Room -;-.••••P1 through P5 (Quarters) •Victor #1 (Ferineter.) "••-Victor #2 (Perimeter) A/S Wing Cafeteria "Yard Patrol '•'_:_.. ""-.'^Segregation Control . ^ _

' Shif~ *:v- Shifr: : "S^if t "^--T*

1

1

1

•i 'i?:

1

1

5

5 -f^

1

1

3

2 •"••

1 1

952 v
IPS '" • 1^ •

/'^.Total seven day posts * ^7 •."-'-r; • * '; :^"v" a 1.82 Relief Factor'- "85.5-4 Positions

t-.'. r -

•• . • - ^ •

:r' ' .- .

.-- .-.*'<.»

^11fe^•••: &^,^ i s > -
m y>. ^^1•%••••••••
k-r-1

- f<;)V-

••••••
";•"•*.,'*-••• 0-'-Oi'. ••],',

-..:-. 154

\
^ -*'%u

Five tav rests

Earlv'" Lat=- ' cr.ifv •'Tr.if-

Chief Correctional Supervisor
Operations Supervisor Transportation Supervisor Transportation Assistant •Supervisor *;. •'-.' *":*-' Operations Assistant
" Supervisor ..• . • Segregation Assistant •
Supervisor Training Officer Programs Officer Transportation • •• • •'• Education Building/
;.V Patrol ,• ^ ^ , ^ . . , ^ ^ > J '
Maintenance Shop ;':: • ' "* Segregation-Visiting—
Total five day posts = .12 12 x 1.3 Relief Factor =15.6

1 1
1
.1
1 1 1 1

• •

•_-•»-

12

• - ••.. 155

if"
I*.

:
••Two g&y Fcsts
Gate -
Visiting'Rocn Outside Visit

l a r l v ' " * * * ;'- if* Sr.if*

•t • .*•

2

1

"1

Shif*.

Total two'day posts - k

"

. I x..51 Relief Factor * 2.04. .-

." •

* .".:

v y:

/ ; ';:'"jy"'.

. .
^v?^.*™
3R
TV-".; '.

^"i

•; -

7 Day Posts Ulx.1.*82 Relief Factor « 85.54

5 Day Posts 12x 1.3 Relief Factor = 1 5 . 6

* -••

2 Day Posts L, x .51 Relief Factor = 2.0Z. " •• .-* • \-'\

. , '-.' .*'.'•

' • ';

103.18 or103 security"::--

. . positions are reconnended'f or authorized ^jf-

.

'

• :..•-"-•••••'••'.••.':„•'.::.. . . • • - .

. •

•":-••••'-••••*-

".:.-•"•

-'\~-:..

.:•:?:*:•'

*K;;.----.::•-:'••.:-i.---•••••••.

:r

•••':-.

••::;.-••:.••

•

^

l
£
156
w
"3T—

I
* %
I
I--:

• — -'-11 •• c r "•; • ; 7 ~ v

•

»••

•

• .. .•>v;"'"'•'~ ••*.••• ;

•

•

-'•' • - • . • • "

••-

••"

Sever. Zzy Posts

larlv Is.~s 3*-.if" ' Shift

•.

>•

Correctional Supervisor

Assistant Supervisors

Delta (Ferineter Patrols)

Front Gate

Lobby

• ; ; '• "'

Visitation •• .

Shakedown (Visiting)

Kain Control

. •

Cafeteria

Dornitories Control

Yard Officers

' •

lard Tower

Dorsitory (Inside)

1

1

1

.1

I

• •

1

i

. Y

i.

. •• 1
1 2

I

I

I

I

1

I

•8

2 -VV21

Total seven day posx * 75 . ' * •-•• " 7^ x -1182 Relief Factor » 136.5 Positions

P •••"

.• • . •

\

157

KIC TA ss

i

^g^Z:

K

..Page t w e n t y f i v e ; '. . ; •'•;:p;-^-^./..- -.. •... .' ^ ^ - j ^ H ^ : : •. •••'. • %>

EHRY CORRECTIONAL' IITSTITU:::::

Tive Day Posts

Early late 3::ift Shift :hlf~

-•l-

Chief Corrections Supervisor (Medium)
Chief Corrections •

.. .' • " •

.

• .V

1

'

• •-. ,

r •'

. .Supervisor (Medium)

. •

1 \ .•'

Operations Supervisor ' • ' ' •. ' ' ." 1

"". . •.

I[ '

Transportation Supervisor

.

1

Training Supervisor.

"-

1

!>

^ Armory

"

•

1

•

I

Oosrations

•

'

•

1

*•;:' ' Programs Building I ;,}\ '• Education
•^••/ * . .Prison Industries
fZi'.-r." • - --Tool Control — /;
• •.Grounds Supervisor
Disciplinary Clerk •'

.
.' •
.-.,.'
• •;.. .;_--- -• ••
. •••'•_ "•.' '
.

1

1

. 1

:. .,.'.-.

•.. — -. •;•.-' :*-1••• ":St*T

•'•• .'• 1 "•

•

1

5w^V. • •

Contraband

.1

[^»"

Transportation

.

6

!

Visiting Coordinator

1

Property

1

Sewage Treatment Dormitory Officer

m

.

.1 .1

Vehicle Maintenance'

.

.2

•

Legal Library

" 1

Escort

.

•

281

Total "five day pests = 25

. HIC TA 83 'Pace twenty six

• •:*. •,-?,••''.; • :f*- •• V' •;•/ •• : . V ; '

Tv.-c ~av Posts
Transportation Visiting Roon Front Gare.
Lobby

1st

2r.d

• 2 1 1

Total two day posts = 5 5 x .51 Relief Factor = 2.5 Positions

7 Day Posts .Day Posts
2 Day Posts

= 136.5
« 36
s 2.'5
.175.4 or 175 positions recosnended as .••;i.-..; =••
• authorized^security. cocplement'

tt.

I-KL. .

159

IS:: -•

Fare 'tv.-er.ty seven

..•••'/.•'••?•&.'*'•'.'.•'•

. :'•-.;i.\yT riyJ*? •'•.{••*•.: -•'•.••?"•.;:''.';/.'

••'v

'

••'"•

••

"'l'k: ''•; PERRY CORRECTIONAL"Y.zZ: * f . *

• ..•• •:•. ; •

KAXI:'.TJ:: S I C : - : T T•

'.
"

r a v p-,et« .

- r t«

: 1ST. 2nd

Earlv La*5

Shift Supervisor

• ••'.".

1

Assistant Supervisor

'

3

' .A Dornitory (PC-Youth) • \ • .' •

• "
(>*'*.- •'

. . C o n t r o l Center
' Wing Officers

; .. 1

1

3

-;: -..'

B Doroitory (R & E) .

^

Control Center"

I,.-

Wing Officers

1 **

•

\ .J

^1.', IS--: .' 5§~." : ;

C Dornitory (AS) ..Control Center .
Wing Officers ._D Doraitory (Long Tern

-1

1

' 1 •_L

,..-.; r-.- - — • ..--; "

•Control Center / •

1• 1

%-- Wing Officers • .

1

• 3

Reception & Evaluation

Control Center

_ J '. 1

1

1

12

21

Total seven day posts = 19 x 1.32 Relief Factor =89.18 Positions

1

160s«

SOUTH CAROLINA '. •.. • • ICIC TA 8 3 - 4 0 2 --:>•-.;;. : P^ge t w e n t y . e i g h t v ••
. - ' • " - - ' ^" ! w * * 1 - " . . • < • ' • ' • t - '.•'•""•"'

•:..,>•—A.....;
< •~^-^-''.?-••

',.":•.. - V - 1 ' ' '. . '

oirAt i;:g?:r.:7io:
KAXI::UK S!:'U?-:TY

Five

?csts

Earlv Laze-

Shift

1st . 2r.d Shift • Shift

Chief'Corrections

•Supervisor

1

Assistant Supervisor (R4E)

1

Processing Officers

7

Visiting Room (Contact)

3

Visiting Escort (Contact)

1

'»*'••

Total five day posts = 1 3 • 13 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 16.9 Positions

7 Day Posts^ A9 x 1.82 Relief F a c t o r * 8 9 . 1 8

. -.

5 Day P o s t s 13 x 1.3 Relief F a c t o r *~l 6 . 9

•'- '• * -

".•-,•"•. *...••'

'

.

106.OS o r 106 s e c u r i t y

\

•"."'

' -positions are recbcsended for authorized

-f-

"...••

•.

coaDleeent.

"

.

'

I.-*- . •

Perry Medium Security Perry Haxisua Security

175
106
281 * Total positicr-s recorsended for authorized cor.rlesent.

161

-v-5£raS2:

Hi-;. -
•&?• ...

SOUTH CAROLINA '••• -

- "r .*;--

NIC TA S3-^02 :•$%': • "•""•;—:,:'•
Page twenty nine ,/.: • . • ^.y;',--^

i

'

.

'

•

'

•

'

'*

" ' . ••

'"

••

R E C A P I T U L A T I O I I •.'">.

.

•

•

!' ..•fc':*/''"-: -•

• .'

... -:.:.;'. *

• Prese Au~hcrired
Secjr

Central Correctional

Institution

255

Maxiaua Security (CCI)

(30

Wonen's Correctional Institution

Wateree River Correctional

Institution # '

51

Dutchnan Correctional

Institution

83

Perry Correctional

Institution

. •

*

•

"•,

: >

*

ReiCT.r.er.ded ..Total . \' Authorized
^e-'jritv Sta

30S
•• CJ&
r-'9l -
79
103 281

53
8 .-';.
25 28 •
20 •
57 -':

T0T>r R2CO;-:M£1IDSD IKCRZAS2 .-

L> 1 '

•

••;*>

162

SOUTH CAr.OLIKA'-'*• •-• " N I C T A S3-.4O2 vi;- -'v '
F a c e t h i r t y •*'?.I"rr;,",.

••.'•-»••-v;r. ;• • ' V / . ; ^ r V . '' : .. •:^;-;v-{^v- ' - •-v.<v,r. ^ :_ .,-.,.

f -,^,;-...
..
I
i «•
1 •..-•
»..-.

•

••

•••.•••.- • • "

I . RZCO":-:;NDATIO?V

Develop centralized system of roster- management.throughout

the Department of "Corrections.

DISCUSSION: Roster and security staff manage-

ment is fragmented. Security staff are assigned to

shifts and zones rather than a centralized position

control system. This does not permit maximum

• . utilization of positions nor is it cost effective.

• *

•

•

• : ' The consultant was advised that State Personnel •

'•".'• '^r" ^Regulations donot permit shift-to-shift reassign" y '' •' ments and as-a result ineffective staff manage-

*

•

•"

•

ment was apparent. For example, one shift or zone

- ' could have excessive staff available and yet

another,shift could have reduced or.insufficient

'- staffing. " . ' • . - •

,V.,' ' •A'V

II. RECO?!HENDATIQN .

•'•

Discontinue use ofControl Centers inmedium and rainisum

security housing units.

-.'. . *.•...

. . . - DISCUSSION:' Kousinr Control Centers in regular
'• -units are an ineffective utilization of *

I

TA
ge thirty y^;"^...

-i'.'••-

.-•-

• . •'•

-•'.•.:•:

T+.

•••;.•

•-:•-'• ^ .-.-•.

.:-Kr.^;'^. .. '
.--•.:•*:•.•..::;•-•-..•.:., •;•'-• • " ; . ] ; . • . • ••••

v

•

—

:

[M

Develoo centralised systes 6f roster- aanagec'ent. throu5ghout

the Department of'Corrections.

'*;••• . .- "

DISCUSSION; Roster and security staff nanage-

l ;.-••• .•

•

-Bent is fragmented. Security staff are assigned to

£<-••• v • ••

•• *•

'

•

.

.

\i~'•

•

shifts and zones rather than .a centralized position

;&£.•

control systec. This does not pernit aaxiaun

f ^v*
«. * . •

**

•

• .• utilization*of positions nor is it cost effective.

>+;-• . • . '

•

"

*

.

.

-

-

• ;' "

"

The

consultant

was advis" ed

tha• t

State

Personnel

•

.^.jv." '*. ';"•'• ':--...'''••Regulations do not perait shift-to-shift reassign^

pt;: .•.•';• ''^' . ' ments and as-a result ineffective staff manage-

;*:: •'. .

'

ment was apparent. For exanple, one shiftor zone

u •

-' could have excessive staff available and yet

;";•'.
L
....'. .."•'•.

•VV

•

another shift could have reduced or. insufficient

•

•

•

'•s t a f f i n g . " . . ' • . •

;

•

ty, - ' I I . R E C O M M E N D A T I O N .

'•

•V-

Discontinue use of Control Centers in nediun and minisun

•r.

.>'•

security housing units.

\- ~ DISCUSSION; Kousinr Control Cer.Lers in regular • -units are an ineffective utilization of personnel,

SOUTH CAROLINA
NIC TA 83-102
P a g e t h i r t y o n e £*v:.'.

'-..«"•"' •• = •--;':'•«:••

•"•. ";• V : . v.>

It defeats thehealthy, interacts r. of staff

and inmates and only serves as a false sense

'

•

.

.

.

*

•

-

.

*

•

.

of security for staff. Personnel cannot properly

supervise or utilize their interpersonal skills

in their day-to-day contact with ir.aates.

—" ' •*„ .

' III.. RECOMMEITDATION

•' •

Roster assignments should accurately reflect preponderence

• of duties. •

"'. •

. DISCUSSION: Many"roster assignnents do not

•

•

•

*

•

•

•

'?

' reflect actual duties. Because ofstaff

f

•

•

...-•-.

• ..• .

•

•

.

.

.

.

.

.

- •

•

-

^u. ;• . ••: '.."• shortages, managers have established posts that

»•••>•

.

•

-;'1;-' i

'

•

•

•

•

•

.

•

-

*

•

"

\

donotreflect actual responsibilities. The

<*'<>' • •

' consultant discussed this vith f?riiri

trator at each critiaue.

IV. RECOMMENDATION Increase supervisory relief positions.

J r."

'

DISCUSSION: Supervisory staff have .traditions ]

. «/•

- been assigned on a five-day pcs* basis. Full

• {••-

"

supervisory personnel positions nre critical

jjj""

' "for relief. The consultant included this

ij£.

factor in establishing recoir.nended cor.pler.ents

•-. . J;-. . KIC TA 8 3 - 4 0 2 . ^ ; : ^ : . :

•<< ^ : : v

• ; . ^ » f e , ^ > • . .*:

. . . , ^ ; . - Pare t h i r t y t w o / ^ ; , . - ' V # f c ^ £ ' - - ' ' •" - - ^ ^ f ^ , ^ i :'"-" ^

^: •

^

•

-

•

"

••';.*.'. . •.

v . r . ; c o r - : M z y D A ? i o K . -.•.•.;:.. -'•. • :.•"•••• '•'•'•::?;::/.•:•:''.

-:

'

~~-

•

;••••••

:•

•

'••.',-•

•'

• " • •...-•

•

•*'.". ^

; -

• • •. •

•.

:

:

/V-

'

. E l i m i n a t e W a r d K e e p e r s ' t r a d i t i o n a l - r o l e . :"" -*•-••• '.'^fv-' '•''•-:'"•

".'•

DISCUSSIOII: The-officiels of the* South ' •• :.

Car-oliria Depart cent of Corrections have already

directed efforts in "correcting this tradition. •

,

Inadequate staffing probably created this inmate

status assignnent, but'it will scon be part of

the history. Ward Keepers' roles in naintain-

ing bed carts and mini-canteens are question-

able roles. One innate should never have ...

authority or supervisory responsibility over ,.. .

..'another. These are clearly staff r o l e s . .,.;..;..'•'•.'•••

VI. • "RECOMMENDATION Establish annual leave/vacation schedules.

'" * .

^

•

DISCUSSION: Equal-nuabers of"staff on •;-^-"

. vacation schedules are required for effective

L

. ' •

.roster management.' The relief factor can
• only be an effective management and cost
' / effective instrument when organized schedules
• • • are maintained. Leave/vacation schedules
must be organized over a 12 nonuh period for" •"•••'•

• •

proper utilization'of staff. . .*.'.' '••":.1 i'-"'• •• •' •

*V~' ' "' DEPARTMENT 0? CORRECTIONS ~'"----':-- '

' ".. • • T - - • ' • ' • * . • .-.'

••I*' .-''• S O U T H C A R O L I N A : •

• S';..-..- .

•-.-.•••..;•-.••.. '

8 -;-". N I C T A 8 3 - 4 0 2 . • '

' •• '.^iV^1 '

' '. '• '-'^.y'- .

r ...T

P a e e "thirty t h r e e # . .-.:,: *•••.:».--.;

.

-

*

•

• '. v/J,":::'.': • ", '

JJ

VII. RECOMMENDATION

' •/•• ;

.;•'••.

_
1

#Conduct staffing analysis of other institutions in the

system.

* ••'•.'

.DISCUSSION: ' The-current staffing levels at- •.

H

'•

**

*: # •" ..

| "

• • institutions covered in this report are

.'

'

_

inadequate. There were not sufficient posi-

tions to effectively carry out functions as -

outlined on security rosters. Some security
I

•• •

posts"Were vacated or" assignment i n c o n s i s t e n t l y

("." .

;: ' •

"

. manned because of s t a f f i n g l e v e l s . Reviews of a l l i n s t i t u t i o n s by Mr. Joe Martin ofthe"

j . ." ••-." "

South Carolina Department or?" C o r r e c t i o n s

' —

. .

'•

would further identify staffing requirements.-•

»

.

•. .

'

.

.

"•.

'

•

.

*

•

'

The Wardens and staff a t . a l l institutions were extremely

cooperative and helpful. The t i r e frame for conducting

these staffing proposals was very limited and without the

assistance of Mr. Martin and the., administrators , the .'-.

study would have been impossible.

The consultant believes the staffing levels' recoinaended .are

. consistent' with other facrlities around the country and

will establish proper security coverage for operations and

programs.'

•

.•.-'-..

'.' V "

V. Signatures

The following parties certify that they have read the

foregoing Consent Decree and that it is an accurate record of

their agreement in this action:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

Steve N e y C 7 American Civil Liberties Union National Prison Project 1346 Connecticut Av., N.W.
Suite 1031 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500

LJ

—W—^

W. Gaston Fairey

Fairey & Parise

P.O. Box 1637

Columbia, S.C. 29202

103) 252-7606

Larrv/Batson / General Counsel South Carolina Department of Corrections P.O. Box 21787 Columbia, S.C. 29221-1787 (803) 758-6342
Kenneth P. Woodington S.enior A s s ' t Attorney General P.O. Box 11549 Columbia, S.C. 29211 ((803) 758-8667

ine A. fre'eman Southern Prisoners Defense Committee 600 Healey Building 57 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA. 30303 (404) 688-1202

COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS

COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS

Loretta Sanders, Prisoner Women's Correctional Center

\ William D. Leeke, Commissioner S.C. Department of Corrections

h
Harry H. Plyler, 'Prisoner Campbell Work Release Center

Eugei$fe~N7 Zeigle'rV Chairman S.C.yBoard of G a r r e c t l o n s

\
Philip H\j Therrien, Prisoner Central Correctional Institution PLAINTIFFS

Go^etz B. Eaton, Vice Chairman S.C. Board of Corrections DEFENDANTS

167

^pe^r Buchanan, Prisoner Central Correctional Institution
Ernie DuBeau, Prisoner Walden Correctional Ii -tution

Norman Kirkland, Secretary oard of Corrections
j
harles C. Moore, M'ember S.C. Board of Corrections

A. Godwin, soner Kirkland Correction; Institution
r,
Lawrence ADdul Ali, Prisoner Kirkland Correctional Institution

Clarence E. Watkins, Member S.C. Board of Corrections
!'//•-' Betty M. Condon, Member S.C. Board of Corrections

Dennis Underwood, Prisoner
Kirkland Correctional Institution
V ^ c\
Suzanne^yjwens, Prisoner
Women's Correctional Center

larles v. waters, Prisoner Goodman Correctional Institution

Murph falter*; Prisoner Goodman Correctional T

tion

C. Patrick Leopold,'^Prisoner^] Stevenson Correctional Institution

Robert F. Diaz; Prisoner " /^J Water.ee River Correctional Institution

Kevin H. Gritfin, Prisoner

i

Correctional Institution

PriG soner

168

BoLin.^-Cross Anchor Correctional Institution Stewart K.Bucftartah,Dutchman Correctional Institution liillie Joe Foster„> Dutchman Correctional Institution
Barryy//--OOnnappene,/i?erry correctional Institution
aivin k. MatfcispnT/ijerry/Correctional Institution /cooper, yferry correctional Institution

PLAINTIFFS

DEFENDANTS 169

 
 IN THE UNITEb STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

GARY WAYNE NELSON, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

WILLIAM D. LEEKE, et al., )

)

Defendants.

)

.Civil Action No. 82-876
JOINT MOTION TO ENTER CONSENT DECREE

Come the Plaintiffs and Defendants, by counsel and pursuant

to Federal Rule, of Civil Procedure 23(e), and move this Court to

enter the attached Consent Decree, as an Order of this Court in

compromise and settlement of this action. In support of this

Motion, the parties state as follows:

1. This action was filed pro se as a class action in June

1982, by a prisoner in the custody of the Defendants; the initial

Complaint sought remedies for the entire class of South Carolina

prisoners for overcrowding and a totality of conditions alleged

to constitute violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United

States Constitution.

2. Following the initial filing of this action, Defendants

filed a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed pro se motions for

appointment of counsel and to certify the class and to amend the

complaint, and numerous additional Plaintiffs filed petitions to

intervene; although these motions have not been decided, the
Plyler v. Leeke
Illlllllllllll

1

PC-SC-002-005

parties have subsequently filed a joint motion to certify this action as a class action.
3. In late 1982, Plaintiffs obtained volunteer counsel and, with Plaintiffs' permission, these counsel entered into discussions of possible c o m p r o m i s e with counsel for the Defendants.
4. The Consent Decree submitted with this Motion is the result of over twenty separate compromise discussions, which were conducted over a twenty-month period in consultation with Plaintiffs and individual Defendants and which covered over fifteen different aspects of prison over-crowding, including the following: crowded cells and wards, time-spent-in-cell, use of alternatives to cells and wards, construction and renovation of additional housing space, determination of total capacity of each institution, assignment of security staff, provision of health services, provision of meaningful activity, fire safety, timespent-in-lock-up, classification of prisoners to housing and programs, differentiation between men and women's institutions, maintenance of family ties, use of physical restraints during transport, provision of food services, environmental sanitation, and out-moded facilities.
5. Each of the above-listed aspects of prison over-crowding is addressed in the submitted Consent Decree, with remedies which the Parties believe to present fair, adequate and reasonable compromises of the important constitutional claims addressed in the Complaint, Amended Complaint and petitions to intervene filed in this action; moreover, the Consent Decree, by (a) identifying

specific standards, (b) requiring periodic submissions to all

parties and to this Court, and (c) requiring approval of specific

portions of these future remedies, sets forth measureable

guidelines for both compliance with these remedies and continued

supervision of compliance by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the parties respectfully request the following:

1. That the Consent Decree be deemed submitted as a

proposed compromise of this action;

2. That the Notice to the Class required by F.R.C.P. 23(e)

be given, per the attached proposed Notice and Order; and

3. That> following the appropriate comment period and this

Court's consideration of all submitted comments and the Consent

Decree, the Consent Decree be entered as an Order of this Court

in compromise and resolution of this action.

Respectfully submitted this

day of February, 1985.

Steven Ney A.C.L.U. National Prison Project 1346 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Suite 1031 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500
W. Gaston Fairey Fairey & Parise P.O. Box 1637 Columbia, S.C. 29202 (803) 252-7606

Larry Batson General Counsel South Carolina Department of Corrections P.O. Box 21787 Columbia, S.C. 29221-1787 (803) 758-6342
Kenneth P. Woodington Senior Ass't Attorney General P.O. Box 11549 Columbia, S.C. 29211 (803) 758-8667

Christine A. Freeman Southern Prisoners Defense Comm. 600 Healey Building
57 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Ga. 30303 (404) 688-1202

BY: COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS

' BY:
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

GARY WAYNE NELSON, et al. , )

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

)\

WILLIAM D. LEEKE, et al.,

) )

Defendants.

)

Civil Action No. 82-876
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION TO ENTER CONSENT DECREE

INTRODUCTION • This is a class action, brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec.1983,
challenging alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution by various conditions caused by overcrowding throughout the prison facilities of the South Carolina Department of Corrections.
Plaintiffs and Defendants to this action, by counsel, have submitted a joint motion, asking this Court to give notice to the class regarding, and to enter as an Order of this Court, a Consent Decree proposed as a compromise of the claims raised in this action. This Memorandum is submitted in support of that joint motion.
This case centers on a claim that the overcrowding of South Carolina's state prison facilities has fostered a variety of problems which, when viewed in their totality, render conditions

in the state prisons unconstitutional, in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and arbitrary punishment. The United States Supreme Court has approved this approach to constitutional review of prison overcrowding and has held the totality of conditions created by overcrowding to be an appropriate subject for relief. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 2408.
PROPOSED COMPROMISE The Consent Decree submitted by j o i n t motion proposes to
address the problems of overcrowding by addressing approximately fifteen different aspects of overcrowding, including c e l l and ward space, temporary housing, construction and renovation, population caps for each institution, security staffing, health s e r v i c e s , programs for p r i s o n e r s , f i r e safety, time spent on lock-down, classification, racial and sexual discrimination in institutions and programs, family and community t i e s , physical restraints, food service, and environmental sanitation. Each of these areas are generally linked to the dangers to safety and health posed by severe overcrowding.
Each of these aspects has also individually been held to present an appropriate subject for r e l i e f by the courts. See, e.g., Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F.Supp. 435 (N.D. Ind. 1981) (thirty-seven-foot c e l l s unacceptable for prisoners locked in twenty-three-and-one-half hours per day); Finney v. Mabry, 534 F.Supp. 1026 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (overcrowding in b a r r a c k s unconstitutional because prevented security surveillance);

Ruiz v. E s t e l l e , 679 F.2d 1115, 1140-41 (5th C i r . 1982) ( d e f i c i e n c i e s i n s t a f f i n g may c o n t r i b u t e t o u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l e n c e ) ; LaReau v. Hanson, 651 F.2d 96, 109 (2d C i r . 1981) (medical examinations r e q u i r e d on i n t a k e ) ; Bowrinq v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 ( 4 t h C i r . 1977) ( r e a s o n a b l e p s y c h i a t r i c c a r e may be r e q u i r e d ) ; Newman v. A l a b a m a , 559 F.2d 2 8 3 , 291 ( 5 t h C i r . 1977) ( r e h a b i l i t a t i v e programs r e q u i r e d as p a r t of remedy for o v e r a l l u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s ) ; French v. Owens, 538 F.Supp. 910 (S.D. I n d . 1982) ( i n a d e q u a t e f i r e p r o t e c t i o n v i o l a t e s Eighth Amendment); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) ( l i m i t on t i m e s p e n t in i s o l a t i o n u p h e l d b e c a u s e of poor c o n d i t i o n s of c o n f i n e m e n t ) ; W i t h e r s v. L e v i n e , 449 F.Supp. 4 7 3 , 477 (D.Md. 1978), aff'd 615 F.2d 158 (4th C i r . 1980) (improvements in inadequate classification system required); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.22d 189 (9th C i r . 1979) ( l i m i t s on p h y s i c a l r e s t r a i n t s ) .
STANDARD FOR REVIEW This Court's primary task, in determining whether or not to
enter a proposed compromise of a c l a s s a c t i o n , i s to determine whether or not the proposed settlement is f a i r , adequate and reasonable, in light of the respective p a r t i e s ' probabilities of success in a t r i a l on the merits of the claims in the a c t i o n . Flinn v. FMC Corporation, 528 F.2d 1169, 1172 (4th Cir. 1975), c e r t . den. 96 S.Ct. 1462 (1976). where the l i t i g a t i o n involves important constitutional rights, this Court must also ensure that the proposed compromise does not "undercut" those r i g h t s .

Flinn v. FMC Corporation, 528 F.2d at 1174; Armstrong v. Board of School D i r e c t o r s , 616 F.2d 305, 319 (7th C i r . 1980). If appropriate, the Court may propose modification of the proposed compromise. Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326 (5th C i r . 1983).
DISCUSSION The p a r t i e s are confident that the standards and procedures
proposed for these problems f a l l well within the remedies which could r e a s o n a b l y be ordered by a c o u r t f o l l o w i n g a t r i a l on t h e m e r i t s of t h e s e c l a i m s . F u r t h e r m o r e , a r a f t of g u i d e l i n e s and "checks and balances" included in the Decree ensure that compliance may be closely monitored both for accuracy and for effectiveness. These safety measures include specific standards, a series of time l i m i t s , regular reports to the p a r t i e s and the courts, continuing discovery power throughout enforcement, use of review and recommendations of various experts, and separate approval of many of the individual compliance plans by the parties and the Court.
NOTICE TO THE CLASS The j o i n t motion a l s o asks t h i s Court t o i s s u e t h e a t t a c h e d
n o t i c e of the proposed compromise t o the c l a s s members in t h i s a c t i o n . Generally, the n o t i c e of a proposed s e t t l e m e n t of a class action must be reasonably calculated to inform interested p a r t i e s of the pendancy of the a c t i o n , the general c o n t e n t s of the p r o p o s a l , and c l a s s members' o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t o b j e c t i o n s . Mendoza v. Tucson School D i s t r i c t No. 1, 623 F.2d

1338 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. den. 450 U.S. 912 (198 ); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 864 (197 ). The notice proposed in this action meets these criteria: it gives an accurate general summary of this litigation and the proposed compromise, specific details to how members of the class may easily obtain the proposal itself, and specific details as to how members may submit their comments and objections.
On the basis of the foregoing, and the grounds stated in the parties' joint motion, the parties respectfully request that their joint motion be granted.

Respectfully submitted this

day of February, 1985.

Steven Ney A.C.L.U. National Prison Project 1346 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Suite 1031 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500
W. Gaston Fairey Fairey & Parise P.O. Box 1637 Columbia, S.C. 29202 (803) 252-7606

Larry Batson General Counsel South Carolina Department of Corrections P.O. Box 21787 Columbia, S.C. 29221-1787 (803) 758-6342
Kenneth P. Woodington Senior Ass't Attorney General P.O. Box 11549 Columbia, S.C. 29211 (803) 758-8667

Christine A. Freeman Southern Prisoners Defense Comm. 600 Healey Building 57 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Ga. 30303
(404) 688-1202

BY: FOR THE PLAINTIFFS

FOR THE DEFENDANTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

GARY WAYNE NELSON, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

WILLIAM D. LEEKE, et al., )

)

Defendants.

)

Civil Action No. 82-876 ORDER

The parties to this action having, by counsel, submitted joint motions to certify this action as a class action and to enter a Consent Decree in compromise of this class action, and this Court having considered the Motions and being sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. That this action be and hereby is certified as a class action, with the class of Plaintiffs to consist of all persons sentenced or confined at present or in the future in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections; 2. That notice of the proposed compromise Consent Decree be shall given to members of the class, including all persons presently confined in institutions of the South Carolina Department of Corrections; 3. That said notice shall consist of the attached document, "Notice of Consent Decree", and the following procedures:

a. Prominent posting and display of the "Notice of

Consent Decree" and the Consent Decree itself, in all living

areas and institutional libraries of each institution of the

South Carolina Department of Corrections, beginning on the

following date:

and continuing for at least forty

days thereafter;

b. Publication of the "Notice of Consent Decree" in

The State Newspaper and Intercom, at least once each week for

four weeks, commencing on the following date:

;

c. Provision of a copy of the Consent Decree to any prisoner/member of the class who submits, to a Warden of the South Carolina Department of Corrections or to Richard Stroker, a written request for a copy;

d. Payment by the Defendants of all costs associated

with the foregoing notice procedures.

4. That a hearing shall be held before this Court, for the

review of all comments submitted pursuant to the foregoing Notice

and for the determination of whether or not the Consent Decree

provides a fair, adequate and reasonable compromise of the

contested claims of this action and should be entered as an Order of this Court.

5. That said hearing shall be held before this Court on the

day of

, 1985 at the hour of : ,

in Courtroom

, United States Courthouse, Assembly Street,

Columbia, South Carolina. IT IS SO ORDERED this

day of

, 1985.

United States District Court Judge 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOP THE DISTRICT CF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

GARY WAYNE NELSON, et al., )

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

)

) WILLIAM D. LEEKE, et al., )

Defendants.

)

Civil Action No. 82-876
NOTICE OF CONSENT DECREE

TO: ALL PERSONS NOW OR IN THE FUTURE SENTENCED OR CONFINED IN THE CUSTODY OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OR IMPRISONED IN THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING:

Proposed Compromise A Consent Decree has been proposed as a compromise of the
claims raised in the class action lawsuit Nelson v. Leeke (Civil Action No. 82-876, filed in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Columbia Division).
By an Order of the United States District Court, Hon. Judge C. Weston Houck, the Court has directed that notice of the Consent Decree proposed as resolution of this action be given to all members of the class potentially affected by this lawsuit,

including all persons now imprisoned in institutions of the South Carolina Department of Corrections.
Description of this case This lawsuit was filed in 1982 by prisoners at the Central
Correctional Institution in Columbia, South Carolina. The Complaint filed in this action alleged that the South Carolina Department of Corrections as a whole is overcrowded, that this overcrowding exists to such an extent that the conditions in the Department of Corrections violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the Plaintiff was subject to this overcrowding at Central Correctional Institution a n d — through possible transfer— at other institutions as well.
An Amended Complaint submitted in this action alleged that the action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and that the overcrowding in the prisons of the South Carolina Department of Corrections results in cruel and unusual conditions. The Amended Complaint listed sixty different examples of the allegedly unconstitutional conditions resulting from overcrowding. These sixty examples are generally listed below:
(1) Failure to provide the basic necessities for personal hygiene, (2) failure to provide adequate clothing, (3) failure to provide adequate laundry services, (4) failure to provide necessary cleaning supplies, (5) failure to provide adequate medical services, (6) failure to provide certain medicinal items, (7) forcing prisoners to engage in illicit acts in order to obtain funds to purchase said items, (8) housing of prisoners

with i n f e c t i o u s d i s e a s e s w i t h i n the g e n e r a l p o p u l a t i o n , (9) r e i g n s of t e r r o r due to i n a d e q u a t e s t a f f and s e c u r i t y , (10) i n a d e q u a t e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s y s t e m s , (11) d e n i a l of e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n , (12) c o n t r o l of p r i s o n e r s by o t h e r p r i s o n e r s , (13) housing p r i s o n e r s in i n s t i t u t i o n s with unsafebuildings.
(14) I n s u f f i c i e n t l i v i n g space, (15) i n s u f f i c i e n t p e r s o n a l s t o r a g e s p a c e , (16) i n s u f f i c i e n t v e n t i l a t i o n and h e a t , (17) i n s u f f i c i e n t t r e a t m e n t for p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y i l l p r i s o n e r s , (18) h o u s i n g of p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y i l l p r i s o n e r s w i t h i n g e n e r a l p o p u l a t i o n , (19) f a i l u r e to p r o t e c t other p r i s o n e r s from v i o l e n c e by p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y i l l p r i s o n e r s , (20) l a c k of m e a n i n g f u l j o b s , (21) lack of meaningful v o c a t i o n a l programs, (22) unsafe p r i s o n s .
(23) I n a d e q u a t e law l i b r a r y f a c i l i t i e s , (24) l a c k of a s s i s t a n c e in the p r e p a r a t i o n and f i l i n g of l e g a l documents, (25) f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e l e g a l s u p p l i e s , (26) i n a d e q u a t e h o u r s of o p e r a t i o n of law l i b r a r i e s , (27) i n e f f e c t i v e r o d e n t and p e s t c o n t r o l , (28) inadequate l i g h t i n g , (29) inadequate accomodations for handicapped p r i s o n e r r , (30) inadequate mail d e l i v e r y , (31) insufficient security for property.
(32) Unhealthy food p r e p a r a t i o n environment, (33) inadequate food p r e p a r a t i o n t r a i n i n g , (34) i n a d e q u a t e medical s c r e e n i n g of food p r e p a r a t i o n workers, (35) unwholesome and unappetizing food, (36) overburdened physical p l a n t s , (37) forcing p r i s o n e r s to pay
i
for maintenance services and repairs, (38) unclean environment for meals, (39) unclean food utensils, (40) unclean drinking cups, (41) inadequate foods and liquids, (42) inadequate

counseling programs, (43) i n e f f e c t i v e grievance mechanism, (44) r e t a l i a t i o n against p r i s o n e r s who f i l e g r i e v a n c e s .
F i n a l l y , the f o l l o w i n g a r e t h e r e m a i n i n g examples of a l l e g e d l y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s i d e n t i f i e d in the Amended Complaint as being caused by overcrowding: (45) - (48) promotion of homosexual a g g r e s s i o n , (49) i n a d e q u a t e n o i s e c o n t r o l , (50) (52) o p e r a t i o n of e x p l o i t i v e c a n t e e n s , (53) p r i s o n e r s in a u t h o r i t y over o t h e r p r i s o n e r s , (54) d e n i a l of a c c e s s to k n o w l e d g e of t h e r u l e s and p o l i c i e s g o v e r n i n g p r i s o n e r s 1 a c t i v i t i e s , (55) i n s u f f i c i e n t i n c e n t i v e pay, (56) r a c i a l s e g r e g a t i o n and v i o l a t i o n of e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n , (57) lack of d e n t a l c a r e , (58) i n f l i c t i o n of unnecessary and wanton p a i n , (59) d e p r i v a t i o n s of b a s i c human n e e d s , and (60) o v e r c r o w d i n g in v i o l a t i o n of the Eighth Amendment.
The Amended Complaint asked the Court to i s s u e i n j u n c t i o n s and temporary r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r s a g a i n s t the abuses i d e n t i f i e d above and a l s o asked "that t h i s Court grant the necessary s h o r t term and long-term r e l i e f i t deems proper and necessary".
The course of the lawsuit The P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d motions for a p p o i n t m e n t of c o u n s e l ,
c e r t i f i c a t i o n of t h e c a s e as a c l a s s a c t i o n , t e m p o r a r y r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r s , and to amend t h e c o m p l a i n t (as d e s c r i b e d above). The Defendants f i l e d a motion to d i s m i s s the case. None of these motions have been decided by t h i s Court, except t h a t the Court has g r a n t e d a r e c e n t j o i n t motion by t h e p a r t i e s t o c e r t i f y

this case as a class action. In the beginning of 1983, volunteer attorneys for the
P l a i n t i f f s , with the direction and permission of the named Plaintiffs and with direction and consultation of other members of the P l a i n t i f f c l a s s , began to meet with attorneys for the Defendants, to discuss possible compromise and resolution of the claims raised in t h i s action. Over a period of twenty months and in over twenty separate meetings, counsel for the p a r t i e s discussed a l l aspects of prison over-crowding and possible remedies for these problems.
Description of the Consent Decree On January 8, 1985, the parties signed a one-hundred-sixty-
nine-page Consent Decree which proposes remedies for over fifteen aspects of the problems of over-crowding, including: crowded cells and wards, time-spent-in-cell, use of alternatives to cells and wards, construction and renovation of additional housing space, determination of t o t a l capacity of each i n s t i t u t i o n , assignment of security staff, provision of clothes and supplies, provision of medical-mental-and-dental health services, provision of meaningful activity, access to the courts and to policies and procedures, grievance procedure, fire safety, time-spent-in-lockup, c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of p r i s o n e r s to housing and programs, d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between men and women's i n s t i t u t i o n s , maintenance of family t i e s , use of physical r e s t r a i n t s during t r a n s p o r t , p r o v i s i o n of food s e r v i c e s , environmental sanitation, environmental and physical conditions

and inspection and repair of living space, and out-moded facilities.
The remedies contained in the Consent Decree each involve separate time limits, varying from thirty days to five years.
The Consent Decree (a) identifies specific standards for regulating each of these areas, including various standards adopted by the American Correctional Association and National Fire Protection Code-, (b) requires periodic submissions to all parties and to this Court regarding progress toward the timetables set out in the Decree, and (c) requires approval of specific plans to be submitted for portions of these future remedies.
Effect on other lawsuits The Consent Decree would not foreclose any individual member
of the class from bringing an action for money damages relating to injuries experienced by that individual. The Consent Decree would preclude members of the class from bringing different class actions seeking injunctions concerning any of the conditions specifically identified and addressed in the Consent Decree. Items not identified or addressed in the Consent Decree may be the subject of other class actions. The Consent Decree also does not resolve any issues concerning use of long-term segregation, inmate pay in the future, or increases in costs of hygiene supplies.
Obtaining copies of the Consent Decree

Copies of the Consent Decree are to be posted and displayed in all living areas and institutional libraries in institutions of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. In addition, any prisoner in the South Carolina Department of Corrections may obtain an individual copy of the Consent Decree by submitting a written request to any Warden or to Richard Stroker, P.O. Box 21787, Columbia, B.C. 29211-1787.
Comments on' or objections to the Consent Decree Any member of the class may submit written comments or
objections to the Consent Decree proposed as compromise of this action. All comments or objections must be supported by specific facts, for the Court cannot evaluate and will not consider either general, unsupported objections or conclusory statements objecting to the entirety of the Consent Decree.
All comments or objections should be mailed to John W. Williams, Clerk, United States District Court, P.O. Box 867, Columbia, South Carolina 29202 no later than the following date:
. Any comments received by that date, which contain the specific details required, will be considered by the Court. Comments received after that date will not be considered by the Court. All comments received will be available in the Clerk's office, for review by all counsel and the public.
Review by the Court The Court, in its discretion, may decide later to receive
testimony from persons who have submitted written comments which

are legible and specific enough to be meaningful to the Court. If the Court determines, after reviewing the Consent Decree
and all comments and objections submitted, that the Consent Decree constitutes a fair, adequate and reasonable compromise of the claims set forth in this action, the Consent Decree shall be approved and adopted as an Order of this Court. All class members will be bound by the judgment in this action.
Attorneys for the Plaintiff Class In addition, any member of the Plaintiff/prisoner class may
contact the attorneys for the Plaintiffs by writing or calling them at the following addresses and phone numbers:
Steve Ney A.C.L.U. National Prison Project 1346 Connecticut Av., N.W., #1031 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500
W. Gaston Fairey Fairey & Parise P.O. Box 1637 Columbia, S.C. 29202 {(803) 252-7606
Christine A. Freeman Southern Prisoners Defense Committee 600 Healey Building 57 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Ga. 30303 (404) 688-1202
This Notice has been issued by this Court pursuant to
F.R.C.P. 23(3) and the Joint Motion to Enter Consent Decree,

filed by the parties to this action.

This

day of

, 1985.

United States District Judge

 
 ran- OFFICE BOX M7

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA IMS ASSEMBLY STREET
COLUMBIA 29202

(•03) 7*5-5*I« (FTS>»T7-5»16

Gary wayne Nelson -vs-

Civil Action No. Coluzbia Division

William D. Leeke Commissioner S. C. Department of Corrections and Members of the S. C. Board of Corrections

3:82-0876-2K

NOTICE OF FILING
Please take notice that I have this date f i l e d t h e O r d e r of t h e Honorable C. Weston Houck that action be certified as a class action. Certified copies of Order enclosed.

JOHN W. WILLIAMS, CLERK

DAIE: February 8, 1985

By; &a\i vj- Ol/GK~lii
¥. 'JULD
Deputy Clerk

TO:

W. Gaston Fairey, Esquire vSfteven Ney, Esquire Christine Freeman, Esquire Larry C. Batson, Esquire Kenneth P. Woodington, Esquire Gary Nelson

Plyler v. Leeke

^ •(

•• • • • • • • •

!•••••• ^ '

PC-SC-002-006

ENTERED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

F" 1 L. E D

COLUMBIA DIVISION

GARY WAYNE NELSON, et al.,

) 82-CA-876-2 JOHN VH

)

COLUMBIA. S.

Plaintiffs,

)

VS.

) ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS

WILLIAM D. LEEKE, et a l .

)

Defendants.

)

This is an order certifying the members of a class in this action, a civil rights action seeking, inter alia, declaratory injunctive relief against officials at the South Carolina Department of Corrections.
Class relief is based only on claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as this action does not seek individual monetary relief.
The parties to this action have informed this Court that they have arrived at a proposed settlement which would dispose of the declaratory and injunctive relief, in this action.
As an element of the settlement agreement, the parties have agreed upoa certification of the class and its membership. The parties agree, and this Court finds, that the requisite elements of certification as a class are present, based upon the following considerations.

1. Numerosity: The class is comprised of all adults who are presently or may be confined in the Department of Corrections. Though no numerical formula is required for class certification, it is clear that the number of adult citizens who potentially face confinement to the Department of Corrections1 facilities under such circumstances is considerable.
Moreover, adults involved with the Department of Corrections are transitory for the most part; they move in and out of custody of the Department of Corrections and in and out of the facilities of the Department. Such rotation of the class membership makes joinder so impractical as to require certification as a class. See, e.g., Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 72 F.R.D. 619, (E.D.Pa. 1976).
2. Commonality of claims: Rule 23(a)(2) of the Federal Court Rules of Civil Procedure requires common questions of law or fact for certification of the class. Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982); Taliaferro y_^ State Council of Higher Education, 372 F.Supp. 1378 (E.D.Va. 1974).
The Plaintiffs allege that as a group, identified as adult offenders incarcerated in the Department of Corrections, they were treated differently from other adult citizens in the State of South Carolina and subjected to a course of conduct common to them as members of that group;

claiming their confinement under such circumstances as

alleged in their Complaint was legally and constitutionally

improper. Thus there are questions of law and fact common,

to the group, represented by these named Plaintiffs. The

fact that individual differences may exist between

individual class members is not controlling. Martarella v.

Kelley, 349 F.Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).

3. Typical claims: Rule 23(a)(3) requires as an

element of class certification that the claims of the named

plaintiffs be typical of the class. This requirement is met

if the claims of the class representatives and class members

are based on the same legal theory. 7 Wright and Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure, §1764 at 90 (Supp. 1975).

It is apparent that the complaints alleged against

the Department of Corrections have as their nexus the

Department's treatment of citizens convicted of criminal

conduct. It is therefore likely that any alleged improper

policies or practices, if the evidence supports a finding

that the Department's policies or practices were improper,

t3

or any remedial measures undertaken as a result of this suit, will typically affect adult citizens adjudicated guilty of criminal conduct and confined within the

Mi. Department. Thus the requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) are

satisfied. See, e.g. Santiago v._ City of Philadelphia,

supra, 72 F.R.D. at 625.

4. Representative protection of the interests of the class: Rule 23(a)(4) requires as an element of class certification that the representative parties demonstrate their ability to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
The purpose of the rule is to insure that the scope of the interests of the representatives of the class are as broad as the interests of the class as a whole, and that they will vigorously pursue the litigation. There are principally two considerations in making such a determination: first, the qualifications, experience, and ability of the plaintiffs' attorneys to conduct the litigation; and second, whether the named plaintiffs' interests are antagonistic to the interests of other members of the class. Barrett v^ W^ T_^ Grant Company, 518 F.2d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 1975).
The Plaintiffs' attorneys are experienced in litigating such matters. The American Civil Liberties Union National Prison Project is a non-profit organization devoted to representation of individuals in civil rights actions dealing with the rights of confined citizens. The Southern Prisoner's Defense Committee is a public interest law firm specializing in litigation on behalf of incarcerated adults. The American Civil Liberties Union of South Carolina is also a non-profit organization devoted to representation of

r

individuals in civil rights actions. All these organizations have adequate resources available to pursue this action on behalf of the named Plaintiffs and the class, especially in the aggregate.
The interests of the named Plaintiffs are not antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the class, for the reasons stated above. The named Plaintiffs allege that they have been subjected to the same practices, policies, acts and omissions of the Defendants as the other members of the class.
5. Appropriateness of declaratory and injunctive relief in relation to the parties opposite the class: Rule 23(b)(2) requires as an element of class certification a demonstration that the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.
This rule provides a vehicle for members of a class to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief from violations of civil and constitutional rights resulting from action or inaction affecting the class. See, Chisholm v. United States Postal Service, 665 F.2d 482, 492 (4th Cir. 1981)'. Its primary focus is whether the actions of the opposing party are "generally applicable" to the class. 3B Moore's

Federal Practice, S23.40 at 23-651 (1969). Here, the Complaint alleges that the Plaintiffs
have been injured by the practices, policies, acts and omissions of the Defendants. All class members were potentially exposed to these conditions, patterns and practices. Therefore, the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) have been met.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action be certified as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class shall be comprised of adult prisoners committed to the South Carolina Department of Corrections, those who are presently committed to the Department, or those who would be committed to the Department in the future.
This the / ^day of February 1985, at Florence,/ South Carolina.

WE SO MOVE:

C. WESTON HOUCK, JUflGE
United §tr|tffcpistrict Court
For the S Z T C B of South Carolina
WE CONSENT:

W. GASTON FAIREY, "ESOtfTRE For American Civil ifeierties
Union of South Carolina Post Office Box 8443 Columbia, SC 29202

Legal Counsel S. C. Department of Corrections Post Office Box 21787 Columbia, SC 29221

STEVEN NEY, ESQUIRE Chief Staff Counsel National Prison Project

KENNETH P. WOODINGTON, ESQUIRE Senior Assistant Attorney General AttpifBgsy cGpperal • s Office for
Attest: John W. Williams, Clerk

Deputy Clerk

1346 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1031 Washington, D.C. 20036

the State of South Carolina Post Office Box 11549 Columbia, South Carolina 29211

CHRISTINE FREEMAN, ESQUIRE Southern Prisoner's Defense Committee Suite 600, Healey Building 57 Forsyth Street, NW Atlanta, GA 30303

 
 SOUTHERN PRISONERS' DEFENSE COMMITTEE
6OO HEALEY BUILDING, 57 FORSYTH STREET. N.W.. ATLANTA. GA 3 O 3 O 3 (4O4) 688-I3O2
February 22, 1935 Richard Stroker South Carolina Dept. of Corrections P.O. Box 21737 Columbia, S.C. 29211-1737
Dear Richard: Enclosed is the signed Stipulation, altering the completion
date for the .Women's dorm. I assume you will take care of filing this with the Court, possibly with a Motion to Amend(?).

caf/ cc-. Gaston Fairey
Steve Ney
enclosure

eeman
Attorney at Law
Plyler v. Leeke 3C-SC-002-007

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Gary Wayne Nelson, et al.,

vs .

Plaintiffs,

William D. Leeke, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections and Members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections,

Civil Action No. 82-876-2
Stipulation to Alteration of Consent Decree

Defendants. The parties, by their undersigned counsel, stipulate that Section III F.,

paragraph 1, establishing the construction and renovation projects to be accomplished by

Defendants, should be altered so as to reflect that the date accompanying Task 14 of the

project entitled "WCC Dorm" be shown to be "12/31/86," due to the fact that the

listed date for that task of "12/31/85" incorrectly reflects the agreement of counsel

on this point.

This stipulation is being submitted to the court so as to correct the

aforesaid error.

For Plaintiffs:
STEVEN NEY National Prison Project
W. GASTON FAIREY Fairey and Parise
CHRISTINE A. FREEMAN SoutJ\erfn Prisoners Defense Committee

For Defendants:
KENNETH P. W00DINGT0N Senior Assistant Attorney General
LARRY C. BATSON General Counsel South Carolina Department of Corrections

BY: Christine A. iYeeman Southern Prisoners Defense Committee 600 Healey Building 57 Forsyth Street, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303
DATE:

BY:., C. BatsojK^^General Counsel
Scrtfth C a r o l i n a Department of Corrections
Post Office Box 21787 Columbia, South Carolina 29221-1787
DATE: 4_Jy tr&t*^* i

 
 K M T OFFICE BOX KT

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT or SOUTH CAKOUN A IMS ASSEMBLY STREET
COLUMBIA 29202

<M3)7tS-S*I« (ITS) *T7-S«1S

Gary Wayne Nelson, et al -vs-
William D. Leeke, et al

Civil Action No. 82-876 Colinfcia Division

NOTICE OF FILING Please take notice that I have this date filed theOrder of the Honorable C. Weston Houck in theabove captioned case. Certified copies ofOrder with attachment is enclosed.
Plyler v. Leeke
•Illlllill

JOHN W. WILLIAMS, CLERK

. March 27, 1985

Deputy Clerk

W. Gaston Fairey, Esquire FAIREY & PARISE,P.A. Post Office Box 8443 Colunbia, SC 29202
Christine A. Freeman Southern Prisoner's Defense Committee 600 Healey Building 57 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Sjteven Ney, Chief Staff Counsel Rational Prison Project
1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Larry C. Batson Legal Advisor Department of Corrections Post Office Box 21787 Columbia, SC 29221-1787
Kenneth P. Woodington Senior Assistant Attorney Gene State of South Carolina Post Office Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA DIVISION

Gary Wayne Nelson, et al., ) Civil Action No. 82-876-2

*

Plaintiffs, )

5

vs.

)

ORDER

I

William D. Leeke,

)

Commissioner, South Carolina )

Department of Corrections, and)

Members of the South Carolina )

Board of Corrections,

)

Defendants.

)

Following a status hearing held in this case before the Honorable Charles Gambrell, United States Magistrate, on March 6, 1985, the Magistrate recommended that the attached Consent Decree presented to the Court in 1985 by the attorneys for the parties and not hitherto acted on by the Court, should be reviewed by the Court at this time pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court concurs in this recommendation.
Rule 23 (e) requires this Court to prescribe the proper manner for giving notice of the proposed settlement to the member 3 of the class, and to review the Compromise Agreement to determine whether it constitutes a fair, reasonable, and adequate settlement of this action.
THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED:

1. That notice be given to the members of the class

in the form attached hereto as Appendix B in the following

manner:

(a) That it, along with an agreed

upon summary of the Consent Order

(Appendix A) shall be prominently posted

in all institutions of the South Carolina

Department of Corrections where they

should be prominently posted in all

living areas;

(b) That the Notice (Appendix B)

shall be published in The State Newspaper

at least once each week for four (4)

consecutive weeks, commencing on or about

March ±5, 1985. ^ C ^ p f

2. That by agreement the Defendants pay the cost of

giving notice to the members of the class in the manner

prescribed above.

3. That a hearing shall be held before this Court

after the Court has had an opportunity to review all

comments submitted in response to the Notice (Appendix B ) f

and all counsel of record will be given notice of the time

»W

and place for the hearing, during or following which the

Court will decide whether to take later testimony from any

party, or other person, who has submitted comments about the

proposed settlement of this action, to enable the Court to

finally determine whether the Consent Order (Appendix A)

provides a fair, reasonable, and adequate settlement of this

action. This the

«4 /

Florence

day of March, 1985, i

South Carolina.

C?~WESTON United States District Judge

A TRUE COPY Attest: John W. W i l l i e s , Clerk
Deputy ClHrk

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA DIVISION

Gary Wayne Nelson, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

VS.

)

)

William D. Leeke,

)

Commissioner-, South Carolina )

Department of Corrections, and)

Members of the South Carolina )

Board of Corrections,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Civil Action No. 82-876-2
NOTICE OF COMPROMISE - AGREEMENT

NOTICE AND STATEMENT OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF CLASS SUIT

TO:

ALL PERSONS IMPRISONED IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

IN RE:

CONDITIONS OF IMPRISONMENT WITHIN ALL INSTITUTIONS OPERATED BY THE SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING:

By an Order of

United States District Judge C.

Weston Houck in an action entitled Gary Wayne Nelson, et

al. vs. William D. Leeke, et al.. Civil Action Number

82-876-2, in the United States District Court for the

District of South Carolina, the Court has directed that

notice of the plan for settlement of this action be given to

those who may be members of the class by the attorneys for

the parties.

This Notice relates to a civil action involving conditions within all institutions operated by the South Carolina Department of Corrections.
The proposed Consent Decree in this action signed by all parties on January 8r 1985, involves conditions of incarceration for all inmates under the authority of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. The areas covered by such Decree include:

1. Cell Housing - Providing that

there be certain minimum space

requirements to be provided to each

inmate depending upon the manner of

housing of such inmate, and setting forth

a five (5) year timetable to enable the

Department to institute the housing

provisions.

Additionally, certain

maximum capacity figures are agreed upon

for each institution at the end of the

five (5) year period.

(2) Staffing - The Decree provides

for the implementation of recommendations

for an increase in the number of staff

persons to ensure the inmates' reasonable

safety and security. Additionally, there

are provisions which set up certain

minimum standards of training for staff

members and limit the use of inmates in

authority positions.

(3) Health Services - The Decree

provides for the upgrading of medical

services to all inmates pursuant to

several studies agreed upon by the

parties.

Adequate medical staff or

immediate availability of outside medical

personnel is to be provided for each

institution for emergency medical

problems, and one (1) staff person on

each shift at each institution will be

trained in first aid and CPR techniques.

(4) Programs - The Decree provides for a

variety of educational, work and

vocational programs to be maintained by

the Department of Corrections with the

goal of providing all inmates the

opportunity to work or further their

education or vocational training.

Inmates are also to be given access to

prison libraries on a comparable basis.

(5) Fire Safety - The Decree

provides for the Department to initiate a

program of upgradable fire safety and protection of inmates to be in compliance with applicable fire safety codes. This provision also contains a timetable to allow the Department to reach compliance.
(6) Discipline - The Decree provides for some changes in the maximum length and rational use of disciplinary lock-up.
(7) Classification - The Decree provides for the development of a system-wide classification plan with a primary goal of separating violent from non-violent inmates.
(8) Women's Institutions - The Decree provides that women inmates shall be provided equal or comparable conditions and privileges as men inmates.
(9) Visitation - The Decree provides for equal opportunity and conditions for all inmates to visitation with certain exceptions for those inmates designated "substantial security risks."
(10) Physical Restraints - The Decree provides for use of physical

restraints outside of secured institutions. Physical restraints are to be used within secured institutions only for "substantial security risk" inmates.
(11) Food Service - The Decree provides for all food services within the Department to meet South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control Standards and certain agreed upon standards maintained by the American Correctional Association.
(12) Environmental Sanitation - The Decree provides for institutions to be maintained in compliance with applicable State standards including those set forth by South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control and certain agreed upon standards of the American Correctional Association.
(13) Closing of Institutions - The Decree provides for the closing of the annex of the Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center within one (1) year of the signing of the Decree (January 8, 1986); and the closing of the Midlands

Reception and Evaluation Center within three (3) years of the signing of the Decree and the end of the use of the Maximum Security Center by January 8r 1986. The Department also agreed to make all good faith efforts to close the Central Correctional Institution until such institution is closed.
. (14) Compliance - The Decree provides for quarterly reports from the Department as to compliance with the provisions of the Decree. Additionally, any substantial disputes concerning enforcement of the Decree may be referred to a mutually agreed upon mediator for resolution. Intensive negotiations for settlement were engaged in among the attorneys for the parties, and these negotiations resulted in a proposed Consent Decree. A copy of the Proposed Consent Decree can be obtained for the cost of copying and mailing same by writing to the undersigned at the address stated below. Any person confined in any institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections will have access to a copy of the Agreement where he is confined, pursuant to the Agreement between the parties.

In certifying the class in this case this Court has not made any determination as to the merits of the case.
Any member of the class may submit written comments or objections to the proposed settlement of this action. All objections heretofore received have been filed, and will be considered by the Court. All further comments or objections must be supported by specific facts and specify specific sections of the Consent Agreement; for the Court cannot evaluate, and will not consider, general or unsupported objections, or wholly conclusory statements objecting to the entirety of the proposed settlement. The comments or objections should be mailed to John W. Williams, Clerk, United States District Court, Post Office Box 867, Columbia, South Carolina 29202. The Court, in its discretion, may later receive testimony from representative members of the class (or others) who submit written comments or objections which are legible and specific enough to be meaningful to the Court. All comments and objections will be available for review in the Clerk's Office by all counsel who have appeared in this action.
The named Plaintiffs are represented by W. Gaston Fairey, FAIREY & PARISE, P. A., Post Office Box 8443, Columbia, South Carolina 29202; Christine A. Freeman, Southern Prisoner's Defense Committee, 600 Healey Building, 57 Forsyth Street, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30303; and Steven

Ney, Chief Staff Counsel, National Prison Project, 1346

Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1031, Washington, DC 20036.

The Defendants are represented by Larry C. Batson, Legal

Advisor, Department of Corrections, Post Office Box 21787,

Columbia, South Carolina 29221-1787; and Kenneth P.

Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney General, State of

South Carolina, Post Office Box 11549, Columbia, South

Carolina 29211.

vy}

30^ Any comments received by May 2S, 1985, will be

considered by the Court in determining the fairness,

adequacy, and propriety of the proposed settlement.

Comments received after that date will not be considered.

If the Court determines after reviewing the Consent

Decree, together with all comments and objections submitted

by class members, that the Decree constitutes an appropriate

settlement of the claims set forth in the amended Complaint,

it will approve the Consent Decree. All class members will

be bound by this judgment and will not be permitted to bring

another action for the same relief.

This the &^\ ~^day of March, 1985, in Columbia, South

Carolina.

s>\ JOHN W. WILLIAMS
JOHN W. WILLIAMS Clerk of Court United States District Court Post Office Box 867 Columbia, South Carolina 29202

8

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA COLUMBIA DIVISION

FILED,
FFB 1 6 19901
ANN A. BIRCH, CLERK
COLUMBIA,^ C.

HARRY PLYLER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
-vs-
PARKER EVATT, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Members of the South Carolina Board' of Corrections,
Defendants.

C/A No. 82-876-2
ORDER PERMITTING SUPPLEMENTAL STIPULATION

In order to supplement the record to reflect events
which have occurred since the September 21, 1989, hearing in this
matter, it is hereby ordered that the attached Supplemental Stipulation be filed as part of the record in this caj

1990
WE CONSENT:
C
KENNETH P. WOODlNGTON
UL
JLARRYl C. BATSON Attorneys :or Defendants

C. WESTON HOUCK United States District Judge
W. GASTON FA] Attorney for Plaj
Plyler v. Leeke PC-SC-002-009

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FEB 1 6 t990j
A nt cntt
ANN A. BIRCH, CLERK

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA. 8. C.

COLUMBIA DIVISION

HARRY PLYLER, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

-vs-

)

)

PARKER EVATT, Commissioner, )

South Carolina Department of )

Corrections, and Members of )

the South Carolina Board of }

Corrections,

)

)

Defendants. )

C/A No. 82-876-2 SUPPLEMENTAL STIPULATION

The parties hereto, through their undersigned counsel, hereby stipulate that under present populations and projections, and with a delay in the construction of the Lower Savannah Work Center housing facilities for females, the earliest date on which the Department of Corrections could cease to use the TV rooms for housing would be March, 1990, rather than February, 1990, as had been stated in the SCDC August 1, 1989, Report. While the TV rooms have remained occupied, the Department has not had to use the gym for housing since shortly after the Greenwood female facility opened in early September. Except as noted above, other female housing conditions are similar to those at the time of the September hearing.
/

STIPULATED this xi** day of January, 1990.

^GASTON FA1 Attorney for Plaintiffs

KENNETH P. WOODINGTON
J.ARRV C. BATSON
Attorneys :or Defendants

 
 IN THEUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THEDISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

FILED f ^ y j <\ jggj

HARRY PLYLER, et al.

COLUMBIA DIVISION

LAfiHY W. PHOP68, CLERK
^ ?0LUM?AlSC*

)

C/A 3:82-876-2

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

) NOTICE OF COMPROMISE

) AGREEMENT TO MODIFY THE

MICHAEL W. MOORE, Director, ) CONSENT DECREE

South Carolina Department of

)

Corrections,

)

Defendant.

)

NOTICE AND STATEMENT PROPOSED COMPROMISE AGREEMENT TO MODIFY THE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS SECTION OF THE CONSENT DECREE IN THE CLASS ACTION.

TO:

ALL PERSONS IMPRISONED IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

IN RE:

MODIFICATION OF THE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS SECTION OF THE CONSENT DECREE OF 1985.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING:

By an order of the United States District Judge C. Weston Houck in an action entitled

Plyler. et al. v. Moore (formerly Plyler v. Evatt and Nelson v. Leekel. Civil Action Number

82-876-2, in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, the Court has

directed that notice of the "Memorandum Agreement to Modify Decree" be given to those who

may be members of the Plaintiff Class. This Notice relates to a Consent Decree involving

conditions within all institutions operated by the South Carolina Department of Corrections and

••piiinii 1

Plyler v. Leeke

specifically the Physical Restraints Section of the said Consent Decree. A copy of the proposed Compromise Agreement can be obtained for the cost of copying
and mailing same by writing to the undersigned at the address stated below. Any person confined in any institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections will have access to a copy of the Agreement where he is confined, pursuant to the court order of May 4, 1995.
Any member of the class may submit written comments or objections to the proposed settlement of this action. All objections heretofore received have been filed, and will be considered by the Court. All further comments or objections must be supported by specific facts and specify specific sections of the Consent Agreement; for the Court cannot evaluate, and will not consider, general or unsupported objections, or wholly conclusory statements objecting to the entirety of the proposed settlement. The comments or objections should be mailed to Larry Propes, Clerk, United States District Court, 1845 Assembly St., Columbia, South Carolina, 29201-2431. The Court, in its discretion, may later receive testimony from representative members of the class (or others) who must submit written comments or objections which are legible and specific enough to be meaningful to the Court. All comments and objections will be available for review in the Clerk's Office by all counsel who have appeared in this action.
The named Plaintiffs are represented by W. Gaston Fairey, FAIREY, PARISE & MILLS, P.A., Post Office Box 8443, Columbia, South Carolina, 29202. The Defendant is represented by Larry C. Batson, General Counsel, South Carolina Department of Corrections, Post Office Box 21787, Columbia, South Carolina, 29221-1787; and Kenneth P. Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney General, State of South Carolina, Post Office Box 11549, Columbia, South Carolina, 29211.

Any comments received by July 24, 1995, will be considered by the Court in determining the fairness, adequacy, and propriety of the proposed settlement. Comments received after that date will not be considered.
If the Court determines after reviewing the "Memorandum Agreement to Modify Decree", together with all comments and objections submitted by class members, that the Agreement constitutes an appropriate resolution of the dispute over the Four-point restraints section of the Decree it will approve the Consent agreement. All class members will be bound by this judgment and will not be permitted to bring another action for the same relief.
This the 12th day of May, 1995, in Columbia, South Carolina.
Larry W. Propes, CLERK OF COURT United States District Court By: P.A. Mullaly, Deputy Clerk

 
 Plyler v. Leeke

PC-SC-002-012 IK TH* UNITED STATXS DISTRICT COURT TOR THX DISTRICT QT SOUTH CA&OLZKA
COLUMBIA DZVZSZOV

FILED
W2Q

PLYLSR, a t

CIVIL ACTXOW NO. f2-a76-2j

vs.

OROtR

MZCSjipBL W. MOORE, Director,

PO$fo&P Fw NolC

7871

8outg Carolina Oapartaant

.of Corrections, •;

<*.

™

P«fan4ant.

net**
fu*C2i2)Th2-Ua}%

THifl is a class i action lawsuit instituted by inaates held in

the Ijpxisoa* maintained by the South Carolina Oepartaent of

Corrections to challenge the conditions existing in said

institutions: as constituting cruel and inhuaan punishaent in

violitien of the Sigtith Aaendaent to the Constitution of the United

States- On January t, 19«5, the parties signed a consent decree

settling virtually all of the issues raised in the case. On March

i

•

.

2«, ;jJ»9«6# this court entered an order approving said consent

decree, and the prikons of this state have operated thereunder

since1 that tiae.

ii

.

•.'•

•On April 26, 1996, the President of the United States signed

into effect F.L. 104-134, and the defendant on Kay 8, 1596, moved

pursuant thereto for the court to terainats the consent decree

T approved by this court on March 26, 1916. The plaintiff* oppoee
that;aotion. After receiving aeaoranda froa all parties supporting

tneir positions and hearing oral arguaents, on June 4, 1996, the

'A

court granted" the defendant'a motion and ordered that the ooaaant decree in. this casefcaimmediately terminated. The plaintiffs have appealed that order to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and now •ova, pursuant to Rule M ( c ) ox the federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order staying the effect thereof pending a decision on said appeal. Thedefendant has filed his opposition to the stay, and the court has given careful consideration to the position of both parties. The setter is ripe for decision.
Xule 62 (c) provides in pertinent part that: When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final :judgment granting, dissolving, or denying, an injunction, the court in its discretion say suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such t e n s as to bond or . otherwise : as it considers proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party...
The case or* Vi.ygijii.>jPetrolaua Jofa._^Aaa.*ii v. r^deyal Powtw Con^w.
259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1951), is recognized as the leading authority on theapplication of Hula 62 (c), andtheFourth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the legal principles espoused therein am the lavof this circuit, T ^ M V- gnhin»nfi_ 432F.2d977 (1970). in doing so thecourt said that a party seeXing a stay under said rule must show the following*
(1) that he will liXely prevail on the merits of the appeal (2) that he vill suffer irreparable injury if the stay is denied, (3) that; other partiee will not be substantially harmed by the stay, and

(4> that the public intar«st vill be served by granting the stay.
979.
Oespite the clarity irith which the rul« is stated there has b««n confusion as to its application. Both fc*»g and Virginia p have been interpreted as requiring a party Seeking a stay under Rule 62 (c) to first u k t a strong shoving of probable success on appeal. Zt now teens clear, however, that said "strong shewing" yule ia the appellatie rule and net the one to be applied by this court. The Fourth circuit Court of Appeals case of
Turwiture Co. v. Sailio Manufacturing Co.. 550 F.2d 1S9 (4th Cir.
1977), involved an appeal frea e district court order refusing to grant a preliminary, injunction under Rule <S(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure. Zt reversed because thedistrict court in applying the four prong test quoted hereinabova "reasoned that a single adverse determination on any of the four questions would be fatal to the movant." 14. *t 193. In its opinion the court referred' to LSQS *• setting forth an appellate rule to be applied on appeal of a district court ruling on a motion to stay pending appeal. Zt then enunciated the proper district court test for consideration of a Rule 63 (a) motion for preliminary injunction. The strong, if not Inescapable, inference therefrom is that the Fourth Circuit held not only that XattUl ••ta forth an appellate rule but that the proper district court standard for deciding a motion to stay pending appeal is thebalance-cf-hardship test outlined in
The court appeared to reaffirm that position inft.
Tne. v. jnm*«». 5<4 frld 1119 (4th Cir. 1977),

where it aade tha following statement:

Bla

tlso holds that tha tast is

di•fffarant vhan a reviewing court is askad to

stay a daeision of a district court ...

panding review on tha merits. Tha principal

diffaranea- is tha naad of tha applicant to

sudce a strong shoving that ha islikely to

prevail O R tha merits.

at 1124 H.7.

Tha rulo applieabla to tha inquiry now bafora this court applias

th« sea« four factors as Lena but shifts tha initial focus from

"likelihood of success" to a comparison of tha likelihood of

irreparable harm totha plaintiff if tha stay is denied and tha

likelihood of harm to tha defendant if tha stay is granted. Next,

the court, considers as the third factor tha likelinooa: that the

plaintiff will succeed on the merits with the importance given to

that, consideration • being directly related to thaanount of

irreparable h a m to, be suffered by.the plaintiff. Lastly, tha

court veighs the public interest.
.4 of Irraflarahla Harm tea fch* P l a i n t i f f

i t Tha

Whan tha settlement eabodied in the consent decree was agreed

upon, tha plaintiff class and representatives of tha State of south

Carolina both expressed their opinion that tha agreeaent was fair.

As tha years have passed, however, it has become more and more

evident that tha dafandant thinks it made abad deal. Xn addition,

the court has become convinced that the benefits obtained by tha

plaintiffs in tha consent decree probably exceed what the

constitution guarantiees.

The- consent decree hae now been terminated, and the protection it has provided plaintiffs for more than ten years are, atleast for the tiae being, gone. The defendant ia free to roll beck all of the beneficial improvement* that plaintiffs have received as a result of the decree; Mo one but defendant knows exactly what his plans are, but itia very unlikely that conditions at the prisons will remain the *«me. It aeema almost inevitable that change will be aade and that the saae will in aany instances worsen the living conditions now endured by plaintiffs. For every such change aany of the plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed. It is true that they can sue, but that itself islass desirable than simply recsiving the benefits provided by the consent decree without having to bring another lawsuit. Xn addition, it would take years to obtain injunctive relief, and, to the extent that the consent decree provides greater benefits than the Constitution, the difference is irreparably loat to plaintiffa. As for money daaagas, the ehancaa of the plaintiffs' recovery of the saae at soae later date is very questionable. The state of South Carolina is iaaune from the same, and any individual defendants sued would probably be successful in asserting a defense of qualified immunity. Under the circumstances, therefore, this court is clearly convinced that ita failure to grant the plaintiffs' notion for a stay will cause aany of the plaintiffs to. suffer irreparable harm.
of Ifana fen ttirn TimfmnAmnt i f tha Stav i s
The defendant asserts that be has a strong desire to have the prisons of the state, of South Carolina accredited by the American

Correctional Association and plans to make a number of improvements to the .operations and adainistration of the prison system. He claims that a stay, will postpone said actions and cause him substantial harm. The nature and extent of that haxm is not described, but it is clear to the court that any harm suffered by the defendant because of the type delay envisioned here, is, at best, ainiaal. when balanced against the likelihood of irreparable harm to be suffered by the plaintiffs if the stay is denied a decided imbalance of hardship in favor of the plaintiffs exists.

TAVallhnod »hat the Plaintiff Wi,ll Sueeaad on th« Merjfra

11 the court applies this prong of the test literally, it must

be decided against the plaintiffs* The court remains convinced

that its June 4, 1996, decision to terminate the consent decree vas

a sound one that will not. be overturned on appeal. Under existing

cave lav, however, the court is not required to apply a literal

test.' Instead, the rule as stated by the Fourth Circuit on page

195 of »i*rftwid«*» is as follows:

... if a decided imbalance of hardship should :*• appear in plaintiff's favor, then the ;

lUcelihood«of-success test is displaced by

Judge Jerome Frank's famous formulation:

i

tl]t will ordinarily be enough that the .•

plaintiff has raised questions going to the

merits so serious, substantial, difficult and

doubtful, <as to make them fair ground for

litigation and thus for more deliberate

investigation.

Though. the court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs vill

probably not prevail on appeal, they have raised questions therein

sufficient to meet the likelihood of success test applicable la

this case*

Public

It is very difficult to clearly define what is in the public

interest in this case. The argument aade by the defendant in his

memorandum appears at first blush to be very sensible. Ke asserts

that, because of its representative capacity, when Congress speaks

it expresses the public interest. In passing the lav pursuant to

which this court terminated the consent decree Congress, therefore,

expressed the public's desire to do away with such consent decrees

as expeditiously as possible.

There can be no: question but that Congress has expressed the

desire to do away with consent decrees in cases such as this, but

that is not the only time Congress has spoken to this court, its

passage of the speedy Trial Act and its adoption of the United

States Sentencing Guidelines and almost all of toe procedural rules

of this court are just three examples of the clear expression of

Congress' deeire for the fair and expeditious administration of

justice within the federal court system. In determining what the

public interest is in this matter we must be sure to listen to Congress' expression of the same, but ve wist be certain1 that we

not listen to one of Congress' statements to the detriment ;of other

statements of equal importance^

i

In considering this prong of the test it appears to the court

that the best approach is to look at the matter from a practical

standpoint and examine what the real impact of tha termination of

the eonsant decree is outsida the valla of South Carolina's

prisons, whan va do that, v* s«« clearly that tha oajor impact is

on tha courts of this stats. :

Ovarerovding has raeaivad aoat of tha media attention, but tha

eonsant daeraa daals with aany othar important araaa of confinement

such 43, health services, visitation, physical reetraints,

libraries, fire safety and classification. it determines toe

rights of «om« I7,ooq, inaatee within the categories covered by its

terns. It has eausodf systems to develop to process conplaints and

to monitor compliance. It requires inmates to pursue their

complaints within the framework of the consent decree and carries

a strong prohibition against instituting suits for injunctive

relief independent of the plaintiff class, in effect, it relieves

this court of being burdened by aany claims that innate* assert

that their constitutional rights, as covered by the consent decree,

are being violated.

;

Nhen the consent decree is terminated, the structure that it

ha* given in the areas that it covers will no longer exist. Each

inmate will then have the right to sue separately for any

constitutional violation he claims the State of South Carolina ia

guilty of. Tha affect of that change on our federal court system in South Carolina will in all probability be monumental.1 It could

1Nhen the defendant recently j changed the hair policy in the South Carolina prisons, 104 inmates belonging to various religious sects sued in this court claiming their Constitutional rights were being violated by the new clean shaven, short hair policy.

drastically effect our ability to properly proeees ether eases -r criminal and civil, within our jurisdiction, and thereby undermine

the public's concern for. the fair and expeditious disposition of

litigation. It, therefore, appears to this court that it is in the

public interest to delay the effect of this court's termination of

the consent decree until the fourth circuit Court of Appeals and,
i
possibly, the United Statee Supreme Court have an opportunity to

rule on the issues raised by the appeal of the plaintiffs from the

court's order of June 4, 1994, and determine with a greater degree

of finality the ultimata fate of the consent decree.

Having applied the a^agiwraidftf balance-of-hardship test to the

i

facts of this case, the court concludes that ths motion of the

t

j

plaintiffs to stay Its order of June 4, 1996, should be granted.

IT IS SO 01

June 19,. .Florence, south Carolina

C. W8ST0M HOUCX QMXTEO STATIS OISTSZCT JUDG5

 
 1993
¾NN A 8lHi;n, OLütir

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

HARRY PLYLER/ ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS,
-vsPARKER EVATT, COMMISSIONER,
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, AND MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA BOARD OF CORRECTIONS,
DEFENDANTS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 82-876-2 COMPROMISE AGREEMENT TO MODIFY THE DECREE

Nelson v. Leeke P¯C-SC-Ö02-014

NOW COME the parties to this case and enter into a compromise agreement to modify the Decree (Consent Decree, Dated January 8, 1985) in the areas of classification and programming. This agreement comes as a resolution to the Pending Motion for Modification, filed by the Defendants in August of 1992. The terms of the agreement are as follows:
1. All plaintiffs sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility in 30 years or without eligibility for parole shall be eligible for AL3 custody with all privileges of that custody level after service of 10 years. These plaintiffs will remain in AL3 custody until they are within 5 years of parole eligibility.
2. All plaintiffs sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility in 20 years shall be eligible for AL3 custody with all privileges of that custody level after service of 7¾ years. These plaintiffs will remain in AL3 custody until they are within 5 years of parole eligibility.
3. All plaintiffs sentenced to life imprisonment or to sentences in excess of 30 years with parole eligibility in 10 years shall be eligible for AL3 custody with all privileges of the custody level after service of 3 years. These plaintiffs will remain in AL3 custody until they are within 5 years of parole eligibility.
4. All plaintiffs sentenced to non-parolable sentences of 25 years or more shall be eligible for AL3 custody with all privileges of that custody level after service of 4 years and shall remain in AL3 custody until they are within 5 years of max-out of *¯he sentence.
5. When the plaintiffs meet their minimum time for advancement, pursuant to paragraphs 1 through 4 above, he/she may request that a classification review be conducted at that time even if the six month review is not due at that time. The defendants agree to conduct the early review on this one occasion. The defendants may exercise discretionary overrides to advance a plaintiff's custody level earlier than the time periods as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 4 above so long as the overrides are exercised in a non-discriminatory fashion and based upon the good behavior of the individual plaintiff.

The parties agree that at the present time there is insufficient bedspace at AL3 institutions to provide sufficient beds to place qualifying inmates into A custody. These qualifying inmates will be placed in "restricted A" custody and shall be given priority in awaiting bedspace at AL3 institutions. While awaiting AL3 bedspace those inmates in "restricted A" custody shall not be entitled to the additional privileges of A custody, but the Defendants shall notify the parole board of such custody change. The Defendants shall make a good faith effort to provide qualifying inmates with bedspace in AL3 institutions as soon as such bedspace becomes available.
6. Disciplinary convictions shall not serve as a policy override reason under the classification system except as follows: The defendants may override an advancement to A custody if the individual plaintiff has been convicted of a major disciplinary infraction, if the said infraction occurred within 12 months of the date of classification review. Additionally, the defendants may override advancement to A custody if the plaintiff has been convicted of disrespect or failure to obey an order in connection with some other disciplinary infraction, if the said infractions occurred within 12 months of the classification review. The parties agree that disciplinary convictions may serve as a reason to reduce custody level for any plaintiff if the conviction causes plaintiff's score on the re-classification to fall below the level of the plaintiff's existing custody level. If a plaintiff is the subject of an Adjustment Committee adjudication which includes a recommendation of a reduction in custody level and the plaintiff's classification score would not indicate the need to reduce custody level then a discretionary override may be used if such override is approved by the deputy regional administrator and provides articulable and reasonable reasons for the override. Similarly, if the Classification Division determines that a discretionary override is appropriate because of a disciplinary conviction this override shall include a statement setting forth articulable and reasonable reasons for such override. Any discretionary overrides based upon disciplinary conviction by either the Adjustment Committee action or

the Classification Division shall be immediately provided to plaintiffs' counsel.
Should the defendants wish to change the scoring level for disciplinary convictions at any point in the future, such change must be based upon appropriate validation principles generally acknowledged in the field of internal classification system, and such change must be provided to plaintiffs' counsel for comment or objection prior to the implementation of such changes. If the plaintiffs' counsel objects to the change in scoring the parties agree that the issue would be submitted to an agreed upon 3rd party to determine the issue. In this regard it is specifically agreed that any changes in scoring for disciplinary convictions shall not be based upon any data other than the success/failure rates of the scoring system for disciplinary convictions presently being used by the defendants. The defendants further agree that under no circumstance shall the scoring of disciplinary convictions ever be such that the fact of the conviction alone would serve to reduce the custody level of a plaintiff.
7. The defendants shall amend the present policy override as to escape history to provide for the following: Any plaintiff who escapes from a fenced institution shall not be eligible for A custody during the remainder of the sentence being served at the time of the escape. Any plaintiff with a history of escape from a fenced institution in a prior conviction and incarceration shall be eligible for placement in an AL3 institution pursuant to the scoring instruments (initial and reclassification). Escapes and out-of-place convictions, other than those listed above, shall not automatically preclude an inmate from being assigned to an AL3 institution, however, inmates may be reviewed and may be denied on a case-by-case basis as a discretionary override. The defendants may make use of discretionary overrides to place plaintiffs in less secure facilities than called for in this paragraph so long as the overrides are exercised in a non-discriminatory manner and relate to the good behavior and adjustment of the individual plaintiff.

8. Other than that which is set forth below, the defendants agree that no disciplinary action of any nature shall be used against any plaintiff for refusal to cooperate in any program offered by the defendants other than job assignments. The parties agree, however, that for the first 120 days of a plaintiff's confinement in the Department of Corrections after completion of the Reception and Evaluation process, if the plaintiff does not meet the educational requirements set forth below, the plaintiff may be compelled to attend educational programming as a job assignment. For this 120 days, the plaintiff will qualify for earned work credits and pay. If the plaintiff refuses to cooperate for this 120 days, the plaintiff may be disciplined for refusal to comply with an order to attend to his/her job assignment. Additionally, except for participation in the c-STAR program for sex offenders and the educational programming as set out below, the failure to participate in recommended programming shall not be an override reason in the classification process. Specifically, except as set forth above, the education program shall not be compelled through the disciplinary process.
Upon entry into SCDC, every plaintiff shall be tested for educational level to determine if the plaintiff can read and write at the 8th grade level. If the plaintiff is unable to function at this educational level, the defendants will determine if this condition is caused by lack of educational training or some learning disability. Upon determining the cause of the educational dysfunction of the plaintiff, the defendants shall develop a plan for the individual inmate to correct the deficiency. The plaintiff will be informed of the plan and that he/she will not be advanced in custody level above the custody level determined by the initial classification review and the plaintiff may be denied certain other benefits if he/she refuses to participate in the educational plan. The educational plan shall take into consideration the work schedule of the individual plaintiff

and shall only require sufficient improvement to meet the 8th grade

level goal. Those plaintiffs with learning disabilities which would

prevent achievement of this goal shall only be required to

participate in appropriate learning programs for a period of 18

months. If the plaintiff is participating and making a good faith

effort to progress in the educational program, he/she qualifies for

advancement in custody level. Additionally, the defendants agree to

provide additional positive points to any plaintiff in each

classification review for his/her educational progress made in the

program.

9. Every plaintiff shall have a classification review

every 6 months regardless of the time he/she has been in the

institution. If the defendants have had insufficient time to gather

information for classification review due to the short time the

plaintiff has been at the institution, the defendants*agree to

communicate with classification workers at the plaintiff's last

institutional placement for this information. The defendants agree

to cease using the override reason of "Insufficient Time in

Institution for Accurate Evaluation" (#8).
MADE this the I3V-^ day of flu.¢><^sj' 1993, in
Columbia, South Carolina.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS

'ARKER EVATL· COMMISSIONER
South Carolina Department of Corrections
WILL¯T¾rín¯ CATOE
Deputy Commissioner for Operations South Carolina Department
of Corrections

W. GA5TON F A I R E Y ^
Attorney for the Plaintiff Class

M1LION )KIMP5OP
Deputy/commissioner for Progam Services
South Carolina Department of Corrections

 
 W C`,ASFON FAIRHY SANDRA R PARISE J. CHRISTOPHER MILLS TIFFANY FiROOME HEBF.RT

FAIREY, PARISE & MILLS, P . A .
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
TOST
August 18, 1993

• RECEIVED

AUG r.O 1993

¡ DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

·

OPWV\TIOI¾

1722 MAIN'STREET, SUITE W OFFICE BOX 8113
COLUMBIA. SOUTH CAROLINA 29202 (COS) 252·7<¯,or,
_ _

John Norris Legal Settlements and Compliance S. C. Department of Corrections Post Office Box 21787
Columbia, South Carolina 29221

'•' • ( " '
*>``> ` ¯ ' y"-`` CCL'"' iA ' C¯

In•Re: Compromise Classification Agreement

======

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Dear John: This letter is meant to supplement the compromise
agreement in two areas. Upon reviewing the final document I noticed that I had failed to specify that other than the specific override areas listed in the Compromise Agreement and in the original Consent Decree, the Department agrees that there will b e no mandatory override criteria, written or unwritten, in the classification process. All other overrides would b*> discretionary in nature and based upon the present or pn.<=:t¯ behavior of the inmate.
earlier ofAfdedrittioona"ltliyg,htIenn"egulepcttehde tdoefiinnciltuidoen thoef D"eMpaanratgmeemnetnt'- r· Concern". I have reviewed the definition in my copy of th^> Classification book and believe that a new definition needs t-¯> be adopted to ensure that only behavioral reasons are used fnr overrides. I would propose the following definition:

:

Management concern - This code may be used

{

to override a recommendation for a less

:

restrictive custody, or place into a more

restrictive custody, any inmate whose past

or present behavior indicates that he\she

will be a threat to the safety or security^ ov -f^ -v.*,:,_ of the institution.— If this override is

used, the reason for the override must be clearly articulated which specifically

` "i^r/ •' r*

identifies the past or present conduct of

the inmate that requires placement in a more

secure institution. Examples of such

conduct are a history of assaults upon other

inmates or staff, excessive disciplinary

infractions, and a history of disruptive

behavior.

If the Department agrees to the intent of the part¯i<`··

John Norris August 18, 1993

Page Two

as to mandatory overrides and the definition of "management concern" I will immediately sign the agreement and file it with the Court. We will then begin the process of publication to the class and allowing for objections. If the Department agrees please have Doug Catoe sign below my signature and let me know.
Thank you for your help with this.
Sincerely,
FAIREY, PARISE & MILLS, P.A.

W. Gaston Fairey
The Department of Corrections agrees to this letter and agrees that it will be part of the Compromise Agreement to Modify the Decree on classification! of/ Í993.
WrLLIAH D. CATOE Deputy Commissioner for Operations South Carolina Department of Corrections

 
 CM/ECF - scd - Docket Report

Page 1 of 17

U.S. District Court District of South Carolina (Columbia) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:82-cv-00876-CWH

CLOSED

Plyler, et al v. Moore, et al Assigned to: Judge C Weston Houck Demand: $0 Plaintiff Gary Wayne Nelson
Plaintiff Les Williams Plaintiff Gary Slezak Plaintiff Harry Allen Plyler

Date Filed: 05/05/1982 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by W Gaston Fairey 1722 Main Street Suite 300 Columbia, SC 29201 803-252-7606 Fax: 803-254-5759 Email: gfairey@sc.rr.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alvin Bronstein National Prison Project American Civil Liberties Union 1875 Connecticut Avenue NW Suite 410 Washington, DC 20009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Les Williams PRO SE
represented by Gary Slezak PRO SE
represented by Rochelle Romosca McKim Fairey Parise and Mills PO Box 8443 Columbia, SC 29202 803-252-7606 Fax: 803-790-1946 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

https://ecf.scd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?800669942486774-L_923_0-1

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CM/ECF - scd - Docket Report

Page 2 of 17

V. Defendant William D Leeke
Defendant Board Of Corrections

W Gaston Fairey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Donald John Zelenka SC Attorney General's Office PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211 803-734-6305 Fax: 803-734-4035 Email: agdzelenka@ag.state.sc.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth Paul Woodington Davidson Morrison and Lindemann PO Box 8568 Columbia, SC 29202-8568 803-806-8222 Fax: 803-806-8855 Email: kwoodington@dml-law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Larry C Batson, Sr SC Department of Corrections 4444 Broad River Road Columbia, SC 29221-1787 803-896-1943 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Donald John Zelenka (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth Paul Woodington (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Larry C Batson, Sr (See above for address)

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Defendant Michael Moore Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections
V. Movant James E Ellison

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Molony Condon Office of Attorney General PO Box 11949 Columbia, SC 29211 843-884-8146 Fax: 843-884-6595 Email: charliecondon@comcast.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth Paul Woodington (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Larry C Batson, Sr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Treva G Ashworth PO Box 691 Columbia, SC 29202 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James E Ellison 116536 Allendale Correctional Institution PO Box 1151 Fairfax, SC 29827 PRO SE

Date Filed 02/25/1991
04/27/1993

#

Docket Text

1 MEMORANDUM by William D. Leeke, Board Of Corrections in opposition to petition for increse of attys fees. (former empl) (Entered: 03/07/1991)

2 MOTION by plaintiff Gary Wayne Nelson In Re: Jasper Buchanan to show cause for Disqualification of Atty. Gaston Fairey and assigned monitor J. Shupper. (bwil) (Entered: 07/08/1993)

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06/23/1993 07/06/1993 07/08/1993 07/26/1993
07/28/1993 08/04/1993 08/25/1993 09/13/1993 09/24/1993 10/06/1993

3 ORDER denying [2-1] motion In Re: Jasper Buchanan to show cause for Disqualification of Atty. Gaston Fairey and assigned monitor J. Shupper. ( signed by Judge C. W. Houck ) (bwil) (Entered: 07/08/1993)
4 NOTICE OF APPEAL from CWH Order filed 6/23/93 by plaintiff Gary Wayne Nelson, In. RE: Jasper Buchanan, McCormick Corr. Inst., Rt. 2, Box 100, F-4, McCormick, SC 29899. Fee Status: IFP. (bwil) (Entered: 07/08/1993)
Notice of appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: [4-1] appeal by Gary Wayne Nelson, In Re: Jasper Buchanan. (bwil) (Entered: 07/08/1993)
5 MOTION by notice only Leonard . Crosby, notice only David E. Harig, notice only David . Ford, notice only Charles . Mabry, notice only Richard R. Valenti, notice only Samuel L. Wodke, notice only James R. Odom, notice only Johnny . Patterson, notice only Terry . Moore, notice only Harold . McKeivey as members of plaintiff class for order to show cause as to proposals to alleviate prison overcrowding in SCDC. (bwil) (Entered: 08/03/1993)
NOTICE of Docketing ROA from USCA Re: [4-1] appeal by Gary Wayne Nelson; IN RE: Jasper Buchanan; USCA NUMBER: 93-6751 (Case Manager: Pamela K. Stump) (bwil) (Entered: 09/24/1993)
6 MOTION by class representative plaintiff Les Williams for a Rule 60 Replacement of Counsel and Arrest of Judgment (several signature pages attached - class action members) (former empl) (Entered: 08/05/1993)
7 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Gary Slezak in opposition to defendants' motion to modify certain provisions of the consent decree (this pleading is entitled motion to dismiss defendants' motion; forwarded to 2012 on 825-93 (former empl) (Entered: 08/25/1993)
8 CLASS MOTION by plaintiff Gary Slezak to enforce/contempt motion of certain provisions of the consent decree (former empl) (Entered: 09/15/1993)
Certified and transmitted record on appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals: [41] appeal by Gary Wayne Nelson, IN RE: Jasper Buchanan. Only documents #2,3,4 sent per request on 9/23/93 by 4CCA. (bwil) (Entered: 09/24/1993)
9 ORDER, directing notice be effected to the parties in this action of the proposed Compromise Agreement to Modify the Decree in the following manner: the Compromise Agreement to Modify the Decree and the Addendum letter of August 18, 1993 shall be prominently posted in all institutions of the South Carolina Dept.of corrections to include all bulletin boards and in each living area of each facility housing members of the plaintiff class; the 'Agreement' and 'addendum letter' shall be published in The State Newspaper at least once each week for four consecutive weeks commencing on or about October 20, 1993; by agreement, the defendants pay the cost of giving notice to the members of

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10/06/1993
10/13/1993 10/13/1993 10/13/1993 10/19/1993 10/26/1993 10/26/1993 10/26/1993 10/27/1993 10/27/1993

the class in the manner prescribed above. A hearing shall be held after the Court reviews all comments submitted in response to the Notice. (signed by Judge C. W. Houck) (former empl) (Entered: 10/07/1993)
10 NOTICE of COMPROMISE AGREEMENT TO MODIFY THE CONSENT DECREE: (copy of Compromise Agreement attached) this notice is to those who may be members of the plaintiff's class; a copy of the proposed Compromise Agreement (attached to this Notice) can be obtained for the cost of copying and mailing same by written request to the Clerk of Court; members of the class may submit written comments/objections to the Clerk in Columbia; comments submitted by the parties prior to 12/20/93 will be considered by the Court; all comments/objections will be available for review in the Clerk's Office by all counsel who have appeared in this action; if the Court determines the agreement to be an appropriate resolution of the dispute over the classification section of the Decree, it will approve the Consent Decree. (former empl) (Entered: 10/07/1993)
Deadline updated; ORAL ARGUMENTS re: population control issue and S.C.D.C.'s motion to withdraw agreement before Chief Judge C. W. Houck set for 10/28/93 at 2:30 p.m. in Florence (former empl) (Entered: 10/26/1993)
11 MOTION by defendant S.C.D.C. to withdraw agreement to proposed copromise agreement to modify the decree (former empl) (Entered: 10/26/1993)
12 MEMORANDUM by defendant S.C.D.C. in support of [11-1] motion to withdraw agreement to proposed copromise agreement to modify the decree (former empl) (Entered: 10/26/1993)
16 REQUEST FOR HEARING in this case by plaintiff class member Les Williams. (This document not docketed as a "motio"; a hearing has been scheduled for 10/28/93). (former empl) (Entered: 10/27/1993)
13 RESPONSE in opposition by plaintiff class representative Gary Wayne Nelson to defendant S.C.D.C.'s [11-1] motion to withdraw agreement to proposed copromise agreement to modify the decree (former empl) (Entered: 10/26/1993)
14 MOTION by defendant William D. Leeke, defendant Board Of Corrections to extend time to comply with population levels set forth in the decree (former empl) (Entered: 10/26/1993)
15 MEMORANDUM by defendant William D. Leeke, defendant Board Of Corrections in support of [14-1] motion to extend time to comply with population levels set forth in the decree (former empl) (Entered: 10/26/1993)
17 MEMORANDUM of Law by plaintiff class on issue of overcrowding (former empl) (Entered: 11/05/1993)
18 RESPONSE by objector James A. Clinkscale in opposition to [10-1]

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10/28/1993
10/29/1993 11/03/1993 11/04/1993 11/04/1993 11/05/1993 11/05/1993 11/10/1993 11/12/1993 11/16/1993 11/16/1993 11/18/1993 11/22/1993 11/24/1993

notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
Minute entry: Motion Hearing before Chief Judge C. W. Houck Witnesses/exhibits; [14-1] motion to extend time to comply with population levels set forth in the decree, [11-1] motion to withdraw agreement to proposed compromise agreement to modify the decree granting [14-1] motion to extend time to comply to time already extended; Plaintiff's oral motion to require compliance within 90 days denied; status conference to be scheduled during the week of Jan. 3, 1994 at which time defendants to give court a status of how stands, what plan has been devised and how plans to implement; defendant S.C.D.C.'s motion to with draw agreement held in abeyance at this time. Counsel to be notified of date and time of status conference. decree (former empl) (Entered: 11/05/1993)
19 RESPONSE by objector Randy Poindexter in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
20 RESPONSE by plaintiff Gary Slezak in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify the consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
21 RESPONSE by objector Tammy R. Warrington in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify the consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
22 RESPONSE by objector Bryon Keith Lockhart in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
23 RESPONSE by objector Daniel McNair in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
24 RESPONSE by objector Katherine Blakely in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
25 RESPONSE by objector James Russell Odom, objector Douglas A. Mycko in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
26 RESPONSE by objector Eunice McAllister in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
27 RESPONSE by objector David M. Garcia in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
28 RESPONSE by objector William C. McCracken in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
29 RESPONSE by objector Charles Eugene Carpenter in opposition to [101] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
30 RESPONSE by objector Robert H. Owens in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
31 RESPONSE by objector Thomas Mize in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)

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12/01/1993 12/13/1993 12/14/1993 12/16/1993 12/17/1993 12/20/1993 12/20/1993 12/22/1993 01/10/1994 01/10/1994 02/09/1994
02/24/1994 03/03/1994 03/22/1994
03/23/1994

32 RESPONSE by objector Kristopher S. Kollyns in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
33 RESPONSE by objector Frederick Belcher in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
34 RESPONSE by objector David M. Miller in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
35 RESPONSE by objector Robert Mason Hendrick in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. [Note: the packet from this objector includes several motions.] (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
36 RESPONSE by objector Christopher Horlbeck in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
37 RESPONSE by objector Timothy L. Evans Sr. in opposition to [10-1] notice to modify consent decree. (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1993)
38 RESPONSE by objector Gerald Reaves in support of proposed modified consent decree (former empl) (Entered: 12/23/1993)
39 RESPONSE by objector Booker T. Williams in opposition to the proposed modified consent decree (former empl) Modified on 12/23/1993 (Entered: 12/22/1993)
39 "36th Quarterly Report on Complaince" submitted by the defendants (S.C.D.C. Executive Assistant for Legal Settlements and Compliance, John G. Norris) (former empl) (Entered: 01/10/1994)
40 MOTION by plaintiff class, through counsel Gaston Fairey, for a Hearing on the issue of overcrowding (former empl) (Entered: 01/11/1994)
Status conference held before Chief Judge C. W. Houck defendant given until 2/18 to mail brief on issues of whether defendant had authority to withdraw from agreement and whether settlement was properly entered into. Plaintiffs have 5 days to respond; hearing for defendants to present proposed plan tentatively scheduled for 4/11/94 with defendants' brief due by 4/4/94. Will take approximately 1/2 - 1 day. Court to review schedule and let counsel know definite date. Court Reporter: Vince Rolland (former empl) (Entered: 02/11/1994)
41 MEMORANDUM by defendant William D. Leeke in support of [11-1] motion to withdraw agreement to proposed copromise agreement to modify the decree (former empl) (Entered: 02/24/1994)
42 BRIEF by plaintiffs re: Compromise Agreement (former empl) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
Minute entry: mooting [5-1] motion as members of plaintiff class for order to show cause as to proposals to alleviate prison overcrowding in SCDC pursuant to oral direction of Judge Houck (through law clerk Jack Barnes) (former empl) (Entered: 03/22/1994)
43 Transcript of 2/9/94 hearing before Hon. C. Weston Houck, Chief U.S.

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03/28/1994 03/31/1994
03/31/1994 03/31/1994 05/13/1994 05/13/1994 05/27/1994 07/08/1994 08/18/1994 08/18/1994 08/31/1994 10/13/1994 10/14/1994 10/14/1994 10/21/1994

District Judge (bwil) (Entered: 03/31/1994)
44 AFFIDAVIT OF EUNICE McALLISTER, CHAIRPERSON OF SC CURE Re: mentally-ill prisoners. (bwil) (Entered: 03/31/1994)
Minute entry: denying [8-1] motion to enforce/contempt motion of certain provisions of the consent decree, denying [6-1] motion for a Rule 60 Replacement of Counsel and Arrest of Judgment; written order is being sent from Judge Houck (former empl) (Entered: 03/31/1994)
45 ORDER denying [6-1] motion for a Rule 60 Replacement of Counsel and Arrest of Judgment ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck) (mld to parties by law clerk) (former empl) (Entered: 04/01/1994)
46 ORDER denying [8-1] motion to enforce/contempt motion of certain provisions of the consent decree ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck) (copies mld to parties by law clerk) (former empl) (Entered: 04/01/1994)
47 MOTION/PETITION by defendant Board Of Corrections for Ruling concerning Four-Point Restraints. (former empl) (Entered: 05/24/1994)
48 MEMORANDUM by defendant Board Of Corrections in support of [471] motion for Ruling concerning Four-Point Restraints. (former empl) (Entered: 05/24/1994)
49 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Gary Wayne Nelson, et al in opposition to [47-1] motion for Ruling concerning Four-Point Restraints. (former empl) (Entered: 06/03/1994)
50 MOTION to intervene by James E.. Ellison. Original document [50-1] forwarded to Judge Houck to associate with original file. (former empl) (Entered: 07/09/1994)
51 MOTION by Isiah James, II, Ex parte Movant for order(s) of contempt (former empl) Modified on 08/22/1994 (Entered: 08/22/1994)
52 MEMORANDUM in support of [51-1] motion for order(s) of contempt by Isiah James, Jr., ex parte movant (former empl) (Entered: 08/22/1994)
53 Supplemental complaint received from Donald Lawing in the abovereferenced matter. (former empl) (Entered: 09/08/1994)
56 Opinion of the 4th Circuit re: Writ of Mandamus filed by Les Williams; petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. (former empl) (Entered: 10/18/1994)
54 MOTION by Parker Evatt for modification pursuant to 18:3626 or in the alternative, for dismissal of this action (former empl) (Entered: 10/14/1994)
55 MEMORANDUM in support of [54-1] motion for modification pursuant to 18:3626 or in the alternative, for dismissal of this action (former empl) (Entered: 10/14/1994)
57 NOTICE by Michael F. Dehoney to the Court, re: 39 th Quarterly Report

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10/25/1994 11/02/1994 11/04/1994 11/08/1994 11/28/1994 11/30/1994 12/05/1994 12/16/1994 12/21/1994 01/05/1995
02/24/1995 02/24/1995 02/24/1995

filed by the defendants. (former empl) (Entered: 10/22/1994)
58 AMENDED NOTICE of Michael F. Dehoney, re: 39th Quarterly Report. (former empl) (Entered: 10/31/1994)
59 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Gary Slezak, plaintiff Les Williams, plaintiff Gary Wayne Nelson as to the applicability of Title 18 USC 3626. (former empl) (Entered: 11/03/1994)
60 Opinion of the 4th Circuit re: [4-1] appeal by Gary Wayne Nelson (former empl) (Entered: 11/07/1994)
61 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by plaintiff Gary Slezak, plaintiff Les Williams, plaintiff Gary Wayne Nelson (plaintiff class) of service of Plaintiff's Memorandum as to Applicability of 18:3626 on Mr. Harpootlian on 11/3/94 by mail. (former empl) (Entered: 11/09/1994)
62 JUDGMENT OF USCA (certified copy) Re: [4-1] appeal by Gary Wayne Nelson is that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismisses the appeal. (former empl) (Entered: 12/04/1994)
Record on Appeal returned from U.S. Court of Appeals: [4-1] appeal in one volume. (former empl) (Entered: 12/04/1994)
63 MEMORANDUM by defendant William D. Leeke, defendant Board Of Corrections in support of [54-1] motion for modification pursuant to 18:3626 or in the alternative, for dismissal of this action (former empl) (Entered: 12/06/1994)
64 AMICUS CURAE BRIEF by Michael F. DeHoney. (former empl) (Entered: 12/16/1994)
65 MOTION and Affidavit by movant James E.. Ellison for motion pursuant to Rule 60 , and for preliminary injunction , motion for reliefs, and for Evidentiary Hearing (former empl) Modified on 12/29/1994 (Entered: 12/29/1994)
Minute entry:, Motion Hearing before Chief Judge C. W. Houck [54-1] motion for modification pursuant to 18:3626 or in the alternative, for dismissal of this action, [11-1] motion to withdraw agreement to proposed copromise agreement to modify the decree [54-1] motion for modification pursuant to 18:3626 or in the alternative, for dismissal of this action taken under advisement, [11-1] motion to withdraw agreement to proposed copromise agreement to modify the decree taken under advisement, Court to issue written order Vince Rolland Court Reporter (former empl) (Entered: 01/10/1995)
66 MOTION/PETITION by W. Gaston Fairey for increase in attorney fees (former empl) (Entered: 02/27/1995)
67 MEMORANDUM in support of [66-1] motion for increase in attorney fees (former empl) (Entered: 02/27/1995)
68 AFFIDAVIT by Rochelle Romosca in support of Re: [66-1] motion for

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02/24/1995 02/24/1995 03/02/1995 03/17/1995 03/27/1995 04/25/1995 05/02/1995 05/02/1995
05/04/1995
05/12/1995 06/12/1995

increase in attorney fees (former empl) (Entered: 02/27/1995)
69 AFFIDAVIT of W. Gaston Fairey in support of Re: [66-1] motion for increase in attorney fees (former empl) (Entered: 02/27/1995)
70 AFFIDAVIT of Tammie Pope Re: [66-1] motion for increase in attorney fees (former empl) (Entered: 02/27/1995)
71 MOTION by William Henley for a court order directing the defendants to provide plaintiff with psychological services/programs while he's incarcerated at Lee Correctional Institution (former empl) (Entered: 03/10/1995)
72 RESPONSE by defendant William D. Leeke, defendant Board Of Corrections to [66-1] motion for increase in attorney fees (former empl) (Entered: 03/20/1995)
Minute entry: mooting [40-1] motion for a Hearing on the issue of overcrowding; motions hearing held 1/95. Per CWH's law clerk, this is moot. (former empl) (Entered: 03/27/1995)
74 MOTION by plaintiff Gary Slezak for contempt and enforcement. (former empl) (Entered: 05/02/1995)
73 MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT TO MODIFY DECREE by plaintiff Gary Slezak, plaintiff Les Williams, plaintiff Gary Wayne Nelson, defendant William D. Leeke, defendant Board Of Corrections (tsin) (Entered: 05/02/1995)
Bench trial held to hear evidence and determine class plan that should be placed in operation before Chief Judge C. W. Houck; exhibits marked for ID; Defendants have until November 1 to devise a plan and present to plaintiff and implement by a pilot program; Defendants have 60 days or until January 1, 1996 to fine tune program and make any adjustments and give plan to Plaintiff; Plaintiff then has 30 days or until February 1, 1996 to file objections to plan or consent to plan; Court Reporter: Vince Rolland (tsin) (Entered: 05/03/1995)
75 ORDER mooting [47-1] motion for Ruling concerning Four-Point Restraints because the parties have resolved this matter by Memorandum Agreement to Modify Decree (see attached to order). The parties wish to add additions to the Nelson decree (see additions for orders). In addition, FRCP 23(e) requires notice of the proposed compromise to be given to all members of the class (notification instructions in order). ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) eod 5/9/95 (former empl) (Entered: 05/09/1995)
76 NOTICE of Compromise Agreement to Modify the Consent Decree. (former empl) (Entered: 05/12/1995)
77 ORDER, amending [60-1] opinion appeal as follows: on the cover sheet, section 3 -- the district court number, C A-92-876-2, is added to the section (by Clerk of Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals) (former empl) (Entered: 06/14/1995)

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06/12/1995 06/19/1995 06/27/1995 07/03/1995
07/20/1995 07/25/1995 07/26/1995 07/31/1995
07/31/1995
07/31/1995
07/31/1995 07/31/1995
07/31/1995 07/31/1995 07/31/1995 07/31/1995 07/31/1995

78 Opinion of the 4th Circuit re: amendment adding District Court case number to section 3. (former empl) (Entered: 06/14/1995)
79 REPLY by Tahrim Supreme C. Jihad in opposition to [73-1] memorandum (former empl) (Entered: 06/22/1995)
80 REPLY by Shaka Machumba Zulu X to [73-1] memorandum (former empl) (Entered: 06/28/1995)
81 REPLY by Michael Montgomery, Johnny Padgett, Antwine Anderson, Bo Hall, Roosevelt Issac, Kahill Thorpe, and Vincent Little to [73-1] memorandum (former empl) (Entered: 07/10/1995)
82 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Gary Slezak in opposition to [73-1] memorandum (former empl) (Entered: 07/20/1995)
83 Letter received from Timothy L. Evans, Jr. to Judge Houck; letter sent to CWH on 8/1/95. (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
84 Letter received From L.J. Allen to Inmate Lampkin for Judge Houck's review; sent to CWH on 8/1/95. (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
85 MOTION by John Arnold, John Ray, Robert Nance, Luke Williams, James Charping, and Mitchell Sims for Mr. Fairey to withdraw as attorney (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
86 MEMORANDUM by John Arnold, John Ray, Robert Nance, Luke Williams, James Charping, and Mitchell Sims in support of [85-1] motion for Mr. Fairey to withdraw as attorney (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
87 AFFIDAVIT of John Arnold in support of Re: [85-1] motion for Mr. Fairey to withdraw as attorney w/Attachments. (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
88 AFFIDAVIT of Robert Nance in support of Re: [85-1] motion for Mr. Fairey to withdraw as attorney (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
89 AFFIDAVIT of LeRoy Drayton in support of Re: [85-1] motion for Mr. Fairey to withdraw as attorney w/attachments. (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
90 AFFIDAVIT of Luke Williams, III in support of Re: [85-1] motion for Mr. Fairey to withdraw as attorney (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
91 AFFIDAVIT of Ernest Riddle in support of Re: [85-1] motion for Mr. Fairey to withdraw as attorney (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
92 AFFIDAVIT of Shawn P. Humphries in support of Re: [85-1] motion for Mr. Fairey to withdraw as attorney (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
93 AFFIDAVIT of Shawn P. Humphries in support of Re: [85-1] motion for Mr. Fairey to withdraw as attorney (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
94 AFFIDAVIT of Dallas Ferrell in support of Re: [85-1] motion for Mr.

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07/31/1995 07/31/1995 09/29/1995 09/29/1995 09/29/1995
09/29/1995
10/16/1995 10/16/1995
10/16/1995 10/16/1995
10/16/1995 10/16/1995 10/16/1995 10/16/1995

Fairey to withdraw as attorney (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
95 AFFIDAVIT of Fred H. Kornharens in support of Re: [85-1] motion for Mr. Fairey to withdraw as attorney w/attachments. (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
96 AFFIDAVIT of D. Cecil Lucas in support of Re: [85-1] motion for Mr. Fairey to withdraw as attorney w/attachments. (former empl) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
97 ORDER denying [50-1] motion to intervene by James E.. Ellison. ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) eod and mld 10/2/95 (former empl) (Entered: 10/02/1995)
98 ORDER denying [51-1] motion for order(s) of contempt ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) eod and mld 10/2/95 (former empl) (Entered: 10/02/1995)
99 ORDER denying [65-1] motion for motion pursuant to Rule 60, denying [65-2] motion for preliminary injunction, denying [65-3] motion for Evidentiary Hearing ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) eod and mld 10/2/95 (former empl) (Entered: 10/02/1995)
100 ORDER denying [71-1] motion for a court order directing the defendants to provide plaintiff with psychological services/programs while he's incarcerated at Lee Correctional Institution ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) eod and mld 10/2/95 (former empl) (Entered: 10/02/1995)
101 MOTION by John D. Arnold that the defendants be held in contempt of court (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
102 MOTION by John D. Arnold requesting the issuance of an order directing the respondents to serve plaintiffs copies of any and all pleadings in response to plaintiff's pleadings (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
103 MOTION by John D. Arnold for evidentiary Hearing , or in the alternative for an appointment of an investigator (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
104 MEMORANDUM by John D. Arnold, Jr., John B. Ray, Robert L. Nance, James M. Charping, Luke Williams, III, and Mitchell Sims in support of [86-1] support memorandum, [85-1] motion for Mr. Fairey to withdraw as attorney (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
105 AFFIDAVIT of Robert Lee Nance Re: [104-1] support memorandum (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
106 AFFIDAVIT Ernest Riddle Re: [104-1] support memorandum (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
107 AFFIDAVIT of Johnathan Chaffe Re: [104-1] support memorandum (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
108 AFFIDAVIT of Dallas Ferrell Re: [104-1] support memorandum (former

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10/16/1995 10/16/1995 10/16/1995 10/16/1995 10/16/1995 10/16/1995 10/16/1995 10/26/1995 11/06/1995
11/06/1995
01/24/1996 01/31/1996 01/31/1996 03/29/1996 03/29/1996

empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
109 AFFIDAVIT by John D. Arnold Re: [104-1] support memorandum (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
110 AFFIDAVIT of John D. Arnold Re: [104-1] support memorandum (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
111 AFFIDAVIT John D. Arnold Re: [104-1] support memorandum with attachments. (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
112 AFFIDAVIT of Shawn P. Humphries Re: [104-1] support memorandum (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
113 AFFIDAVIT of Fred Kornahrens Re: [104-1] support memorandum (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
114 AFFIDAVIT of Fred Kornahrens Re: [104-1] support memorandum (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
115 AFFIDAVIT of Fred Kornahrens Re: [104-1] support memorandum (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
116 MOTION by Adam Pugh request for reasoning behind processing of Nelson complaints (former empl) (Entered: 10/27/1995)
117 ORDER granting [66-1] motion for increase in attorney fees to $175.00 per hour, effective as of Feb. 24, 1995; Ms. Romosca is awarded $85.00 per hour and Ms. Pope is awarded $50.00 per hour as paralegals working on this action; and Mr. Shupper, the class monitor, is awarded a $25.00 per hour rate for paralegal hours effective 2/24/95, the date of this petition (effetive for all fees listed in order). ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) eod and mld 11/9/95 (former empl) (Entered: 11/09/1995)
118 ORDER that the court finds the the consent agreement modifying the Decree is fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of the matter. The court approves the Modification of the Decree and incorporates its order of 5/4/95 herein (see order for listing of modifications). denying [11-1] motion to withdraw agreement to proposed copromise agreement to modify the decree ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) eod and mld 11/9/95 (former empl) (Entered: 11/09/1995)
119 MOTION/COMPLAINT contempt of court, re: lack of enforcement of the Nelson decree (former empl) (Entered: 02/02/1996)
120 MOTION by Mitchell Key for enforcement of the Nelson/Plyler decree (former empl) (Entered: 02/02/1996)
121 MEMORANDUM by Key in support of [120-1] motion for enforcement of the Nelson/Plyler decree (former empl) (Entered: 02/02/1996)
122 ORDER denying [85-1] motion for Mr. Fairey to withdraw as attorney ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) (mflo) (Entered: 04/01/1996)
123 ORDER denying [74-1] motion for contempt and enforcement. ( signed

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05/06/1996 05/08/1996 05/08/1996
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06/03/1996 06/03/1996 06/04/1996
06/04/1996 06/05/1996

by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) (mflo) (Entered: 04/01/1996)
124 NOTICE of Non-compliance Issues filed by Bernard Bagley (former empl) (Entered: 05/13/1996)
125 MOTION by defendant William D Leeke, defendant Board Of Corrections to terminate consent decree pursuant to 1996 amendments to 18:3626 (former empl) (Entered: 05/13/1996)
126 MEMORANDUM by defendant William D Leeke, defendant Board Of Corrections in support of [125-1] motion to terminate consent decree pursuant to 1996 amendments to 18:3626 (former empl) (Entered: 05/13/1996)
127 RESPONSE by plaintiff Gary Slezak, plaintiff Les Williams, plaintiff Gary Wayne Nelson in opposition to [125-1] motion to terminate consent decree pursuant to 1996 amendments to 18:3626 (former empl) (Entered: 05/21/1996)
128 MOTION by objector Randy Poindexter for contempt and enforcement (attachments) (former empl) (Entered: 05/21/1996)
129 AFFIDAVIT by objector Randy Poindexter in support of [128-1] motion for contempt and enforcement (attachments) (former empl) (Entered: 05/21/1996)
130 MOTION by objector Randy Poindexter for production of documents (former empl) (Entered: 05/21/1996)
131 MEMORANDUM by defendant William D Leeke, defendant Board Of Corrections in support of [125-1] motion to terminate consent decree pursuant to 1996 amendments to 18:3626 (former empl) (Entered: 06/02/1996)
WITHDRAWAL of terminating [54-1] motion for modification pursuant to 18:3626 or in the alternative, for dismissal of this action (former empl) (Entered: 06/04/1996)
132 Letter withdrawing Motion of the defendant filed 10/14/94. (former empl) (Entered: 06/04/1996)
Motion hearing before Chief Judge C. Weston Houck re: [125-1] motion to terminate consent decree pursuant to 1996 amendments to 18:3626; motion granted and Consent Decree of 3/26/86 is immediately terminated. Court Reporter: Vince Rolland (mcam) (Entered: 06/04/1996)
133 Minute order: granting [125-1] motion to terminate consent decree pursuant to 1996 amendments to 18:3626; Consent Decree of 3/26/86 is immediately terminated (mcam) (Entered: 06/04/1996)
134 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff Gary Slezak, plaintiff Les Williams, plaintiff Gary Wayne Nelson, plaintiff Harry Allen Plyler . Fee Status: paid (former empl) (Entered: 06/05/1996)

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06/05/1996
06/05/1996 06/06/1996
06/10/1996 06/10/1996 06/14/1996
06/20/1996 07/30/1996 08/26/1996 09/25/1996 09/25/1996 09/25/1996
09/25/1996

Filing Fee Paid by plaintiff Gary Slezak, plaintiff Les Williams, plaintiff Gary Wayne Nelson, plaintiff Harry Allen Plyler, re: appeal ; FILING FEE $ 105.00 RECEIPT # 300 9709 (former empl) (Entered: 06/05/1996)
Notice of appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: [134-1] appeal by Harry Allen Plyler, Gary Wayne Nelson, Les Williams, Gary Slezak (former empl) (Entered: 06/05/1996)
135 MOTION and MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Harry Allen Plyler, plaintiff Gary Wayne Nelson, plaintiff Les Williams, plaintiff Gary Slezak to stay judgment pending appeal (former empl) (Entered: 06/10/1996)
136 MEMORANDUM by defendant Michael Moore in opposition to [135-1] motion to stay judgment pending appeal (former empl) (Entered: 06/12/1996)
137 AFFIDAVIT by defendant Michael Moore Re: [136-1] opposition memorandum (former empl) Modified on 06/12/1996 (Entered: 06/12/1996)
NOTICE of Docketing ROA from USCA Re: [134-1] appeal by Harry Allen Plyler, Gary Wayne Nelson, Les Williams, Gary Slezak; USCA NUMBER: 96-6884, Yevone Jeffreys (former empl) (Entered: 06/14/1996)
138 ORDER granting [135-1] motion to stay judgment pending appeal ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) eod mld (former empl) (Entered: 06/21/1996)
139 Certificate that the Record on Appeal is Complete for [134-1] appeal by Harry Allen Plyler, Gary Wayne Nelson, Les Williams, Gary Slezak (former empl) (Entered: 07/30/1996)
140 Transcript of Motion hearing of June 4, 1996 by court reporter Vince Rolland. (former empl) (Entered: 08/29/1996)
Bench trial concluded (to correct 6 month report) (mcam) (Entered: 09/25/1996)
141 ORDER denying [101-1] motion by plaintiffs John D. Arnold, et al. that the defendants be held in contempt of court ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/1996)
142 ORDER denying [102-1] motion requesting the issuance of an order directing the respondents to serve plaintiffs copies of any and all pleadings in response to plaintiff's pleadings ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/1996)
143 ORDER denying [103-2] motion for an appointment of an investigator ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/1996)

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09/25/1996 09/25/1996
09/25/1996
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143 ORDER denying [103-1] motion for evidentiary Hearing ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/1996)
144 ORDER denying [116-1] motion request for reasoning behind processing of Nelson complaints ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/1996)
145 ORDER denying [119-1] motion contempt of court, re: lack of enforcement of the Nelson decree ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/1996)
146 ORDER denying [120-1] motion for enforcement of the Nelson/Plyler decree ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/1996)
147 Opinion of the 4th Circuit AFFIRMED; re: [134-1] appeal by Harry Allen Plyler, Gary Wayne Nelson, Les Williams, Gary Slezak (former empl) (Entered: 11/21/1996)
148 4CCA ORDER that the petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing in banc are denied. (former empl) (Entered: 01/14/1997)
149 JUDGMENT OF USCA (certified copy) affirms the judgment of the district court; Re: [134-1] appeal by Harry Allen Plyler, Gary Wayne Nelson, Les Williams, Gary Slezak (former empl) (Entered: 01/30/1997)
150 ORDER denying [130-1] motion for production of documents ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) mld (kbos) (Entered: 02/25/1997)
151 ORDER denying [128-1] motion for contempt and enforcement (attachments) ( signed by Chief Judge C. W. Houck ) mld (kbos) (Entered: 02/25/1997)
Case closed (admin) (Entered: 04/12/1999)
152 MOTION by plaintiff Gary Wayne Nelson for sanctions (ahen) (Entered: 08/14/2002)
153 NOTICE ofbeing improperly housed by plaintiff Gary Wayne Nelson (ahen) (Entered: 08/14/2002)
154 LETTER of John P Brown Re: [152-1] motion for sanctions and response from SCDC (ahen) (Entered: 08/28/2002)

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 100 F.3d 365 (1996)
Harry PLYLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, and
Gary Wayne Nelson; Les Williams; Gary Slezak, Plaintiffs, v.
Michael MOORE, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, DefendantAppellee, and
United States of America, Intervenor, and
William D. Leeke; Board of Corrections of the State of Virginia, Defendants. The Legal Aid Society of the City of New York; The Youth Law Center; Human Rights
Watch; National Women's Law Center, Amici Curiae.
No. 96-6884.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued September 26, 1996. Decided November 14, 1996.
36678 *366 *367 *368 ARGUED: W. Gaston Fairey, Fairey, Parise & Mills, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Kenneth Paul Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Robert Mark Loeb, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department Of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor. ON BRIEF: Rochelle Romosca McKim, Fairey, Parise & Mills, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Charles Molony Condon, Attorney General, Treva Ashworth, Deputy Attorney General, Reginald I. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina; Larry C. Batson, General Counsel, South Carolina Department Of Corrections, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Margaret B. Seymour, United States Attorney, Barbara L. Herwig, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department Of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor. Daniel L. Greenberg, John Boston, Sarah Kerr, Dori A. Lewis, Marta Nelson, Prisoners' Rights Project, The Legal Aid Society, New York, New York; Mark Soler, Youth Law Center, Washington, D.C.; Kenneth Roth, Juan Mendez, Joanne Mariner, Regan Ralph, Human Rights Watch, New York, New York; Deborah Brake, Brenda V. Smith, Joanna Grossman, National Women's Law Center, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.
Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILKINS wrote the opinion, in which Judge WILLIAMS and Judge MOTZ joined.
OPINION
WILKINS, Circuit Judge:
A class of South Carolina prison inmates (the Inmates) appeals an order of the district court terminating, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(2) (West Supp.1996), as amended by Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, § 802(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-68 (1996), a consent decree pertaining to conditions in South Carolina prisons. The Inmates principally maintain that to the extent the district court correctly interpreted § 3626(b)(2) to require termination of the consent decree, the provision is unconstitutional in that it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, denies them equal protection of the laws, and deprives them of property without due process of law. Concluding that none of the Inmates' arguments have merit, we affirm.

I.
369 Because the lengthy history of this litigation is largely irrelevant to the questions we *369 address today, we recount it only briefly. This action was initiated in 1982 pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994), challenging various conditions of confinement in South Carolina prisons. The Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and the members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections (collectively, "the State") were named as defendants to the suit. The parties subsequently agreed to the terms of a consent decree, and the district court approved the settlement in March 1986. Although the consent decree is primarily concerned with measures to be taken to alleviate overcrowding, it also contains detailed provisions relating to, inter alia, health services, educational programs, vocational training, food service, and visitation. Additionally, the decree provides for continued supervision by the district court, stipulating that "[t]he Court shall retain jurisdiction in this case to ensure that the Decree and all plans incorporated herein are fully implemented." J.A. 79. Since approval of the consent decree, the State has availed itself of the continuing supervisory jurisdiction of the district court on three occasions to request modification of the decree due to unanticipated increases in the prison population. See Plyler v. Evatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 1323 (4th Cir.1991); Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208, 211 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 897, 109 S.Ct. 241, 102 L.Ed.2d 230 (1988); Plyler v. Leeke, No. 86-7654, 804 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. Nov.12, 1986) (per curiam).
Shortly after enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) on April 26, 1996, the State filed a motion to terminate the consent decree pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(2). The Inmates opposed the motion, asserting that § 3626(b)(2) did not require termination of the consent decree and, alternatively, that if termination of the consent decree was required, the statutory provision was unconstitutional. The district court rejected these arguments and granted the motion to terminate, leading to this appeal.[1]
II.
The PLRA is intended to "provid[e] reasonable limits on the remedies available in" lawsuits concerning prison conditions. See H.R.Rep. No. 21, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1995). It accomplishes this goal, in part, by providing that "[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A); see also H.R.Rep. No. 21, at 24 n. 2 (noting that this "provision stops judges from imposing remedies intended to effect an overall modernization of local prison systems or provide an overall improvement in prison conditions" by "limit[ing] remedies to those necessary to remedy the proven violation of federal rights"). The PLRA also provides an avenue for states to end their obligations under consent decrees providing for greater prospective relief than that required by federal law:
IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE RELIEF. 0907 In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(2). However, a court is prohibited from terminating prospective relief if it determines that "prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C.A. § 370 3626(b)(3). A state may seek termination of prospective relief under § 3626(b)(2) even if the relief was approved *370 before enactment of the PLRA. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, § 802(b)(1), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-70 (1996) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (note)).

III.
The Inmates first maintain that the district court improperly construed § 3626(b)(2) to require termination of the consent decree to the extent that it provided for prospective relief greater than that necessary to correct a violation of a federal right. The Inmates urge us, instead, to construe the term "Federal right" to include rights conferred by consent decrees. See Gates v. Gomez, No. 9-87-1536 (E.D.Cal. July 22, 1996) (denying a motion for termination of an order entered pursuant to a previously approved consent decree on the basis that approval of the consent decree created a federal right, so that the subsequent order constituted a determination that the defendant had violated the plaintiffs' federal rights, thereby satisfying the requirements for prospective relief under § 3626(a)(1)(A)). The Inmates maintain that such a construction of § 3626(b)(2) would render termination of the consent decree unnecessary, thereby obviating the need to consider the constitutional issues presented by this appeal. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 296-97, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932) (noting the duty of this court to construe a statute in a manner that avoids constitutional questions whenever such a construction is "fairly possible").
The Inmates would have us construe the term "Federal right" to include prospective relief contained in a consent decree. Under the Inmates' proposed interpretation of the term "Federal right," § 3626(b)(2) would provide that the district court is required to terminate prospective relief if it was approved in the absence of a finding "that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the [prospective relief], and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the [prospective relief]." Obviously, such a reading renders the provision nonsensical because under it, the district court would never be able to terminate a consent decree. Consequently, the Inmates' proposed reading of the statute is at odds with Congress' purpose in enacting the PLRA, namely, to relieve states of the onerous burden of complying with consent decrees that often reach far beyond the dictates of federal law. See H.R.Rep. No. 21, at 8-9. Our duty to construe statutes so as to avoid constitutional problems does not require us to adopt a construction that renders the statute meaningless or nonsensical, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 1452, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995), nor does it require us to interpret a statute in a manner clearly contrary to congressional intent, see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 1397-98, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988). Accordingly, we conclude that the term "Federal right" as used in § 3626 (b)(2) does not include rights conferred by consent decrees providing relief greater than that required by federal law. Thus, having determined that a construction of the statute by which constitutional issues might be avoided is not reasonably possible, we now turn to consider the Inmates' constitutional challenges to the statute.
IV.
The Inmates next contend that § 3626(b)(2) offends the doctrine of separation of powers. Although the separation-of-powers doctrine is not explicitly stated in the Constitution, it nevertheless is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590-91, 69 S.Ct. 1173, 1176-77, 93 L.Ed. 1556 (1949) (Jackson, J.). As the Supreme Court has noted, the separation of powers "is not merely a matter of convenience.... Its object is basic and vital, namely, to preclude a commingling of these essentially different powers of government in the same hands." O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530, 53 S.Ct. 740, 743, 77 L.Ed. 1356 (1933) (citation omitted); see also In re Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718, 25 L.Ed. 496 (1878) (noting that "[t]he safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance 371 of th[e] salutary rule" that "[o]ne branch of the government cannot encroach *371 on the domain of another without danger"). Thus, the separation-of-powers doctrine "is a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict." Plaut, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1463.
The Inmates argue that § 3626(b)(2) violates the separation-of-powers doctrine in two ways. First, the Inmates assert that § 3626(b)(2) requires courts to reopen judgments that have long since become final, thereby violating the rule that Congress may not interfere with the final judgments of Article III courts. See Plaut, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1453. The Inmates also argue that § 3626(b)(2) mandates the result in particular cases without

changing the applicable law, another violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871). Neither of these contentions is persuasive.
A.
The Inmates first maintain that § 3626(b)(2) requires the court to reopen a final judgment in violation of the separation-of-powers principles recently enunciated in Plaut. See Plaut, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1453. In Plaut, the Court declared 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa-1(b) (West Supp.1996), unconstitutional as a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. Plaut, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1453. Section 78aa-1(b) required courts to reopen securities fraud cases that had been dismissed on statute-of-limitations grounds following the decision of the Court in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991) (adopting uniform limitations period for civil actions under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act), regardless of the fact that the cases were no longer pending on direct review. Plaut, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1451. Noting that Article III "gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy," the Court concluded that § 78aa-1(b) violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by interfering with the "judicial Power ... to render dispositive judgments." Id. at ___, 115 S.Ct. 1447 at 1453 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Inmates argue that § 3626 (b)(2) is unconstitutional under Plaut because it mandates the reopening of final judgments by requiring district courts to terminate consent decrees that were approved before the passage of the PLRA.
The Inmates' argument fails because the consent decree at issue here was not a final judgment for separation-ofpowers purposes. Of course, a judgment at law is immune to subsequent changes in the law. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431, 15 L.Ed. 435 (1855) (noting that a judgment for damages is "beyond the reach of the power of congress"). Thus, as made clear by the Court in Plaut, an attempt to alter legislatively a legal judgment violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. A judgment providing for injunctive relief, however, remains subject to subsequent changes in the law. See System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651-52, 81 S.Ct. 368, 373-74, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961); Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431-32;[2]see also Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 379, 112 S.Ct. 748, 758, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (noting distinction between "`restraints that give protection to rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially impervious to change, and those that involve the supervision of changing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative'") (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114, 52 S.Ct. 460, 462, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932)). These principles apply equally to consent decrees and litigated judgments. See System Fed'n No. 91, 364 U.S. at 650-51, 81 S.Ct. at 372-73; Rufo, 502 U.S. at 379-80, 112 S.Ct. at 757-58.
As the Inmates readily acknowledge, the consent decree at issue here provides for prospective relief and is 372 subject to the continuing *372 supervisory jurisdiction of the district court. As such, the judgment approving the
decree is not similar to a judgment for money damages. Rather, it is akin to a final judgment granting injunctive relief, and thus it is subject to subsequent changes in the law. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388, 112 S.Ct. at 762 ("A consent decree must of course be modified if, as it later turns out, one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties has become impermissible under federal law.").[3] Accordingly, we conclude that § 3626(b)(2) does not mandate the reopening of final judgments in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine.
B.
The Inmates also maintain that § 3626(b)(2) violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by prescribing a rule of decision without changing the underlying law. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-47. In Klein, the Court considered the constitutionality of legislation providing that a presidential pardon constituted conclusive evidence that the pardoned individual had been disloyal to the United States. Id. at 143-44. The act also provided that a pardon could not be used as evidence of loyalty in a suit to recover confiscated property and directed the Court to dismiss all cases pending on appeal in which property or proceeds had been recovered based on a pardon. Id. The Court declared the statute unconstitutional because it amounted to an attempt to prescribe a rule of decision for pending cases in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. Id. at 147. Relying on Klein, the Inmates

assert that § 3626(b)(2) mandates a rule of decision by requiring a district court to terminate a consent decree upon determining that the decree grants relief greater than that required by federal law.
While the Court has never determined the precise scope of Klein, at the very least it is clear that Congress does not mandate a rule of decision when it amends the law underlying a pending case. See Plaut, ___ U.S. at ______, 115 S.Ct. at 1452-53; see also Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 1414-15, 118 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992) (declining to decide whether an act of Congress was unconstitutional under Klein because the act amended applicable law). The Inmates maintain that this principle does not save the PLRA because § 3626(b)(2) does not change the applicable law, namely, the Eighth Amendment. Since Congress lacks power to change the Eighth Amendment, or in any event has not done so here, the Inmates argue, § 3626(b)(2) is unconstitutional under Klein.
The Inmates fail to understand that the applicable law is not the Eighth Amendment, but rather is the authority of the district court to award relief greater than that required by federal law. The consent decree approved by the district court indisputably provides for prospective relief greater than that required by the Eighth Amendment. See Plyler v. Evatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 1327 (4th Cir.1991). That being the case, it is the authority of the district court to approve relief greater than that required by the Eighth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment itself, that is at stake. In enacting the PLRA, Congress has deprived district courts of this authority, and in so doing has unquestionably amended the law applicable to this case.
Moreover, even if § 3626(b)(2) did not amend the applicable law, the Inmates would be unable to persuade us that it mandates a rule of decision. While § 3626(b)(2) requires a district court to terminate prospective relief that was approved in the absence of a finding that the relief is no greater than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, it does not purport to state how much relief is more than necessary. In short, § 3626(b)(2) provides only the standard to which district courts must adhere, not the result they must reach. Accordingly, because § 3626(b)(2) amends the applicable law and does not dictate a rule of decision, we conclude that it is not unconstitutional under Klein.
373 *373 V.
The Inmates further argue that § 3626(b)(2) violates the equal protection principles encompassed by the Fifth Amendment. See Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 182 n. 1, 97 S.Ct. 431, 432 n. 1, 50 L.Ed.2d 389 (1976) (explaining that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment "encompasses equal protection principles"). In considering an equal protection challenge, we generally will presume the legislation at issue to be valid and will uphold the statute if the classification it draws is rationally related to a legitimate purpose. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254-55, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). If, however, the statute employs a suspect class or burdens the exercise of a constitutional right, we exercise strict scrutiny review, upholding the statute only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. Here, the Inmates argue that § 3626(b)(2) singles out the class of prison inmates and burdens their fundamental right of access to the courts.[4] Accordingly, the Inmates claim, the provision is subject to strict scrutiny.
The Inmates are correct, of course, that the right of access to the courts is fundamental, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 578-79, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2985-86, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), and that burdens upon that right therefore must survive the most exacting constitutional review, see City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254-55. However, by its terms § 3626(b)(2) neither prohibits prisoners from filing civil suits challenging the conditions of their confinement nor impedes their ability to do so.[5] Undeterred, the Inmates maintain that they possess a fundamental right "to enforce the successful result" of a civil suit, Appellants' Br. 32, and argue that § 3626(b)(2) burdens that right by prohibiting them from enforcing the terms of the consent decree.
We are unpersuaded. The right of access to the courts is the "right to bring to court a grievance that the inmate wished to present," and violations of that right occur only when an inmate is "hindered [in] his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Lewis v. Casey, ___ U.S. ___, ___ - ___, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2180-81, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). We have little trouble accepting the proposition that the right of access to the courts necessarily includes the right to enforce a judgment once it is obtained. But, § 3626(b)(2) does not burden this right; it merely limits the

substantive relief to which the Inmates are entitled. Simply put, the Inmates have confused the right of access to the courts with the scope of the available substantive relief. Under the PLRA, the Inmates remain free to bring civil rights actions challenging the constitutionality of conditions in South Carolina prisons and are entitled to enforce judgments rendered on those claims. The limitation imposed by § 3626(b)(2) on the relief available in such suits does nothing to burden this right. Accordingly, we conclude that § 3626(b)(2) does not burden a fundamental right and hence is subject only to rational-basis review. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2100-01, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).
Legislation that neither employs a suspect class nor burdens a fundamental right "is accorded a strong presumption of validity," Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993), and "must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification," Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct. at 2101. Moreover, the burden rests on the one challenging the legislation to disprove the existence of "every conceivable basis which might support it." Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 374 S.Ct. 1001, 1006, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rational *374 basis review is thus "a paradigm of judicial restraint," Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 314, 113 S.Ct. at 2101, prohibiting us from "sit[ting] as a super-legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations" underlying the legislation, City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-17, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (per curiam). Once we have determined that there exists a plausible reason for the congressional action 0907 and regardless of whether that reasoning actually motivated Congress 0907 our inquiry is at an end. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 461-62, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980).
The Inmates concede, and we agree, that Congress has a legitimate interest in preserving state sovereignty by protecting states from overzealous supervision by the federal courts in the area of prison conditions litigation. Moreover, § 3626(b)(2) is an eminently rational means of accomplishing this congressional purpose. Section 3626(b)(2) addresses the problem of overbearing court supervision by forbidding courts to intrude to any degree greater than that required by federal law. Whether Congress has made a wise choice is beyond our purview; our concern is only whether the method employed is rationally related to a legitimate purpose. Section 3626(b)(2) satisfies this standard.
VI.
The Inmates' final challenge to the constitutionality of § 3626(b)(2) consists of an assertion that the provision violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...."). The Inmates raise two due process challenges, which we address seriatim.
A.
The Inmates claim that § 3626(b)(2) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in that it deprives them of a property interest 0907 the rights afforded by the consent decree 0907 without due process of law. Due process includes both procedural and substantive components. See Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 122 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 64, 133 L.Ed.2d 27 (1995). In order to prevail on a procedural due process claim, the Inmates must show that they have a property interest in the consent decree of which they have been deprived without due process of law. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 826 (4th Cir.1995). Substantive due process is far narrower in scope than procedural due process, see Love, 47 F.3d at 122, and requires the Inmates to show not only that they have been deprived of a property interest, but also that the action causing the deprivation "falls so far beyond the outer limits of legitimate governmental action that no process could cure the deficiency," Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 827. The Inmates have not troubled themselves to specify whether their due process claim is procedural or substantive in nature, but in the end it makes no difference because both tests require a showing that the Inmates cannot make 0907 that they have a property interest in the rights conferred by the consent decree.

The Inmates' assertion of a property right in the consent decree rests on the vested-rights doctrine, which provides that "[i]t is not within the power of a legislature to take away rights which have been once vested by a judgment." McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123, 19 S.Ct. 134, 142, 43 L.Ed. 382 (1898). The vested-rights doctrine is analogous to the separation-of-powers rule that Congress may not mandate the reopening of final judgments; importantly, both rules apply only when a final judgment has been rendered. See Axel Johnson Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 6 F.3d 78, 83-84 (2d Cir.1993). And, just as a judgment approving prospective relief is not a final judgment for purposes of the separation-of-powers analysis, neither is it a final judgment for purposes of the vested-rights doctrine. See Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107, 67 S.Ct. 1140, 1144, 91 L.Ed. 1368 (1947) (holding that "[f]ederal regulation of future action based upon rights previously acquired ... is not prohibited by the 375 Constitution"); cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, *375 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1501, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (noting that an injunction "operates in futuro" and that a plaintiff has no vested rights in an injunctive decree) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that the Inmates had no property right in the continued enforcement of a decree granting prospective relief.
B.
The Inmates next raise a due process challenge to § 3626(b)(2) on the basis that it operates retroactively. The Inmates rely on the rule set forth in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984), that retroactive application of legislation must pass a due process test not required for legislation having only future effects, namely, "that the retroactive application of the legislation [must be] justified by a rational legislative purpose." Id. at 730, 104 S.Ct. at 2718 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892-93, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976)). The Inmates assert that, regardless of whether the prospective application of § 3626(b)(2) passes constitutional muster, there is no rational legislative purpose justifying the retroactive application of § 3626(b)(2).
The simple response to this argument is found in Landgraf, in which the Court noted the well-settled principle that "[w]hen the ... statute authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective relief, application of the new provision is not retroactive." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273, 114 S.Ct. at 1501 (citing American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 201, 42 S.Ct. 72, 75-76, 66 L.Ed. 189 (1921)). That is precisely the case here.
VII.
In sum, we hold that 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(2), as amended by the PLRA, offends neither the separation-ofpowers doctrine, Fifth Amendment equal protection principles, nor the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We also hold that the term "Federal right" as used in § 3626(b)(2) does not include rights conferred by consent decrees to the extent those rights rise above the requirements of federal law. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court terminating the consent decree.
AFFIRMED.
[1] The Inmates' position with respect to the constitutionality of § 3626(b)(2) is supported by a joint brief of amici curiae filed by the Legal Aid Society of the City of New York, the Youth Law Center, Human Rights Watch, and the National Women's Law Center. The United States, which has intervened in the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2403(a) (West 1994) (permitting the United States to intervene in any action in which the constitutionality of an act of Congress affecting the public interest is questioned), has filed a brief arguing that § 3626(b)(2) passes constitutional muster.
[2] Indeed, the Court noted in Plaut that "nothing in our holding today calls ... into question" the decision in Plaut, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1459.
[3] Indeed, the consent decree recognizes this principle by providing that "[a]ny disputed petition for modification shall be reviewed by the Court under the applicable law pertaining to modification of Consent Decrees." J.A. 85.

[4] Inmates do not contend that they are members of a suspect class. See Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 689-90 (4th Cir.1989). [5] In making this statement, we note that other provisions of the PLRA impose certain limitations upon prisoners' ability to pursue civil rights claims. Those provisions are not before us in this appeal, and accordingly we do not consider whether they burden the right of access to the courts.
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 846 F.2d 208 (1988)
Harry PLYLER, et al., (formerly Gary Wayne Nelson, et al.), Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Parker EVATT, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections; Members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 88-7511.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued February 3, 1988. Decided April 27, 1988.
209 *209 T. Travis Medlock, Atty. Gen., Kenneth Paul Woodington, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbia, S.C. (Larry C. Batson, Columbia, S.C., Legal Advisor, S.C. Dept. of Corrections on brief), for defendants-appellants.
W. Gaston Fairey (Fairey & Parise, P.A., Columbia, S.C., Nat. Prison Project, American Civ. Liberties Union, Southern Prisoner's Defense Committee on brief), for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before PHILLIPS and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge.
WILKINS, Circuit Judge:
The Commissioner of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and the members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections (Department of Corrections) appeal from the denial of a motion for modification of a consent decree regarding correctional facilities. The Department of Corrections also appeals from a recent court-ordered plan requiring early release of approximately 700 prisoners. We vacate the orders and remand for modification of the consent decree consistent with this opinion.
I.
This action was initiated in 1982 when a class of inmates filed suit against the Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1981), complaining of overcrowded conditions in state prisons. The State of South Carolina, acting through the General Assembly, authorized negotiations, expressing intent "by legislation and appropriations to implement a reasonable settlement of the issues." H.Cong.Res. No. 3054, 1983, S.C. House J. 2837. The General Assembly approved a general agreement reached by the parties in 1984 and simultaneously appropriated funds for capital improvements. Appropriations Act, Act No. 512, Part III, § IV, 1984 S.C. Acts 2176, 3107. A proposed settlement agreement was signed in January 1985 by then Commissioner William D. Leeke, all active members of the Board of Corrections, a representative of the Attorney General, counsel for the inmates, and 26 representatives of the inmate class. The Department of Corrections began immediate implementation of the settlement agreement. Subsequently, the district court orally approved the agreement in November 1985 and by written consent decree in March 1986. Among many other things, the consent decree placed certain requirements on new construction and renovation. It provided that new cells housing a single inmate contain at least 50 square feet and new cells housing two inmates contain at least 100 square feet. The decree further 210 mandated increased staffing, improved medical care, and expansion of educational, vocational *210 and recreational programs. Implementation of the provisions was scheduled to take place in stages over a period of five years.
After the agreement was reached, the Department of Corrections began to experience an unanticipated growth in inmate population which made it impossible to comply with some of the housing provisions of the consent decree. As a result, in July 1986 the Department of Corrections sought a temporary delay in compliance pending implementation of a State early-release program. The district court refused to grant an extension and ordered

compliance. Although the Department of Corrections appealed, it achieved compliance in the interim, and the issue was mooted. Plyler v. Leeke, 804 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir.1986) (per curiam).
In May 1987, because of the unanticipated increase in inmate population, the Department of Corrections moved for a permanent modification of the consent decree to allow double-celling in five new facilities. Prior to the motion reaching the district court for disposition, a mediator and a United States Magistrate conducted hearings and made recommendations. The mediator recommended that temporary double-celling be allowed in 50% of the new cells. The magistrate recommended that double-celling be permitted in new cells for two years. Rejecting these recommendations in January 1988, the district court refused the modification request and ordered immediate compliance through early-release programs or other appropriate means. The district court then required the Department of Corrections to submit a plan which would have provided for the early release of approximately 700 inmates over the next three months. The district court orders were stayed pending this appeal.
II.
Under the consent decree, inmates in the general population in new facilities who are confined to a cell less than 12 hours per day may be double-celled if the cells contain at least 100 square feet. The Department of Corrections seeks a permanent modification of this provision to allow double-celling at five new medium security facilities in cells which provide 69 to 73 square feet, depending on the facility. Two of these facilities, Lieber and McCormick, are now open, and the others, Broad River, Allendale and Marlboro, are in various stages of construction. Construction schedules call for Broad River to open in April 1988, and Allendale and Marlboro to open in early 1989.
Lieber contains 504 cells of 73 square feet each, and McCormick and Broad River have 504 cells of 69 square feet each.[1] The plans for Allendale and Marlboro were altered in May 1987 to provide for 296 cells of 69 square feet each and 208 cells of 100 square feet each.[2] The design plans for these five new facilities are based on the plans used for construction of the Federal Correctional Institution in Phoenix, Arizona which represents state of the art in correctional facilities. The cells are individual rooms constructed of painted concrete block with tile floors, each with a window and door. Each room is furnished with a sink and toilet, lockers, a desk and chair, and bunk beds. The inmates are allowed to have personal items, such as radios and televisions. They are confined to their rooms only from 11:30 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. All cells are centrally heated and air-conditioned.
These new facilities also provide a variety of amenities. For example, Lieber offers vocational programs in 211 plumbing, carpentry, horticulture and automotive repair. The academic programs include high school *211
equivalency and college classes. The prison industry employs inmates in automotive refurbishing. A variety of recreational activities is provided, including sports, crafts, and music. Dayrooms, visiting areas, and a cafeteria dining room are also provided.
III.
The consent decree allows for modification by mutual and joint petition of the parties, and "[a]ny disputed petition for modification shall be reviewed by the Court under the applicable law pertaining to modification of Consent Decrees." The consent decree further provides a procedure by which the Department of Corrections may obtain variances from the space allotments in new construction not specifically addressed in the consent decree, such as Broad River, Allendale and Marlboro. In the event of a dispute, the court is empowered to "make a determination as to the reasonableness of or necessity for said variance, in light of but not limited to the requirements of this Decree and the totality of the conditions, and shall determine whether or not said variance shall be permitted."
The Department of Corrections seeks modification because of an unanticipated increase in prison population. As specified in the consent decree, it anticipated an average net increase of no less than 30, but no more than 50 prisoners per month from 1985 to 1990. In the past, official predictions had been fairly accurate. However, in the past several years actual increases in the number of inmates housed in Department of Corrections facilities have

substantially exceeded the estimates. Statistics stipulated to by the parties show that monthly increases for 1985 reached a high of 212 in October with a yearly average of 74 per month. In 1986, highs of 233 occurred in March and September with a yearly average of 84 per month. The high for 1987 was 158 in October and the yearly average was 59 per month.
Pursuant to the decree the parties agreed that if the predictions proved to be inaccurate, "the Court shall order immediate relief, which may include population reductions, release or transfer of prisoners ... or other appropriate relief." We find that the appropriate remedy is modification of the decree to allow double-celling in the five new facilities.
IV.
Generally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) provides that the court may modify an order if "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Under Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 424 (4th Cir.1981) (en banc), a consent decree may be modified in response to material changes in operative law or facts. As found by the district court, the unanticipated increase in population clearly is a change in operative facts which meets this predicate for modification. In addition, the court must balance the competing interests of the prisoners, the Department of Corrections, and the public. "[T]he interests of the prisoners in immediate and strict enforcement of the consent decree" must be weighed against the Department of Corrections' interest "in the orderly administration of the corrections system" and the public interest "in having lawful sentences carried out and in not having parolees put at large without sufficient supervision." Plyler v. Leeke, No. 86-7654, slip op. at 7 (4th Cir. Nov. 12, 1986) [804 F.2d 1251 (table)] (per curiam).
The dissent maintains that the State must demonstrate oppression and that modification should only be allowed "upon a strong showing of near compulsion to grant relief." Infra at 216 (citing Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 645 F.2d 239, 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053, 102 S.Ct. 597, 70 L.Ed.2d 588 (1981); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119, 52 S.Ct. 460, 464, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803, 813 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905, 89 S.Ct. 1745, 23 L.Ed.2d 218 (1969)).[3] Although 212 these cases may *212 set a strict standard for modification of consent decrees between private parties, this standard is inappropriate in institutional reform litigation for "the unique nature and demands of institutional reform litigation necessitate a more flexible approach to modification." Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 860-61 (5th Cir.1987) (footnote omitted) (citing New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 970 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915, 104 S.Ct. 277, 78 L.Ed.2d 257 (1983)).
The Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, but it does not specifically address prison conditions. For this reason, federal courts have traditionally adopted a policy of judicial restraint in the problematic area of prison administration. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 759 (7th Cir.1985). Federal courts do intervene when prison conditions offend fundamental constitutional guarantees, Procunier, 416 U.S. at 405-06, 94 S.Ct. at 1807, but "the threat and constitutional value that occasions the intervention can never be defined with great precision.... [Therefore,] revision is justified if the remedy is not working effectively or is unnecessarily burdensome." Carey, 706 F.2d at 970 (quoting Fiss, The Supreme Court 0907 1978 Term 0907 Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 49 (1979)).
The district court here followed the flexible approaches utilized by this court in Nelson v. Collins and the earlier appeal in Plyler v. Leeke, finding that:
The need for the decree far outweighs the harm that will result to the defendants or the public if the decree is not modified. This court remains convinced that the public interest is best served by requiring the State of South Carolina to perform the promises it made to its citizens and others in this matter.
Plyler v. Leeke, No. 3:82-0876-2, slip op. at 12 (D.S.C. Jan. 11, 1988). Under the proper standard of judicial review, the district court's balancing of the competing interests will not be set aside except for an abuse of discretion. Plyler v. Leeke, No. 86-7654, slip op. at 11 (4th Cir. Nov. 12, 1986) [804 F.2d 1251 (table)] (per

curiam); Duran, 760 F.2d at 762. In assessing the district court's exercise of discretion, its findings of fact are subject to the clearly erroneous standard. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). We find that the district court clearly erred in assessing the degree of potential harm to the inmates as contrasted with the risks to the public and it abused its discretion in denying the current request for modification.
A.
First, the district court erred in assessing the right of the prisoners to the benefits of the settlement. As the Second Circuit recognized in Carey, consent decrees such as this in institutional reform cases "are not so much peremptory commands to be obeyed in terms, as they are future-oriented plans designed to achieve broad public policy objectives in a complex, ongoing fact situation." 706 F.2d at 970 n. 17 (quoting Chayes, The Supreme Court 0907 1981 Term 0907 Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 Harv.L.Rev. 4, 56 (1982)). The court here failed to recognize that the central goal of the decree is to provide constitutional prison conditions, and instead focused inappropriately on the double-celling provision.
Although double-celling will be contrary to a specific term of the consent decree, the prisoners have received the 213 essence of their bargain. Not only have all of the many terms of the agreement, except double-celling *213 in five
new facilities, been met, but also the general conditions of confinement now not only meet, but exceed constitutional requirements. In the balance, compelling the State to achieve compliance through the early release of massive numbers of inmates would create substantial dangers which are unjustified in view of the State's good faith efforts to adhere to the consent decree.
B.
The State has embarked on an aggressive agenda of new prison construction, expending more than one hundred million dollars on capital improvements over the past few years. The State forged ahead with construction of Lieber even before a final settlement was reached. And, the facilities at Broad River, Allendale and Marlboro are under construction even though not specifically required by the agreed upon construction and renovation schedule. The General Assembly appropriated $155,000,000.00 in capital improvement financing for the Department of Corrections for 1984 to 1987 which includes the new construction costs at an average of $41,000.00 per cell. Under no circumstances can it be argued that the State has been miserly or dilatory.
We accept the district court's finding that the increases in inmate population were, to some extent, within the State's control, but we disagree with the dissent that we must accept the implicit finding that the State has not made a good faith effort to comply with the decree. Even accepting the finding that the increases were in part due to criminal laws enacted after the consent decree and to new parole policies, this finding is not conclusive on the issue of good faith. The district court failed to distinguish the State's indirect control from the direct cause of the increases 0907 the commission of crimes. Further, enactment of stricter criminal laws should not be considered bad faith. It is not disputed that the State is meeting its responsibility to provide constitutional prison conditions. It need not allow those convicted of crimes to go unpunished in order to comply with a single, arbitrary provision governing the size of prison cells.
C.
While proceeding with new construction, the State also instituted early-release programs to alleviate prison overcrowding. Prison Overcrowding Powers Act, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 24-3-1110, et seq. (Law. Co-op. Supp.1987) (also known as the Emergency Powers Act; EPA I, EPA II); Supervised Furlough Program, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 24-13-710, et seq. (Law. Co-op. Supp.1987). Approximately 7,000 inmates were released under these programs from September 1983 to August 1987. Of these 7,000, 18.8% returned to prison after the commission of new crimes, 1.3% for violent crimes and 17.5% for nonviolent crimes. As the district court found, the recidivism rate for inmates released under these programs was lower than for inmates released through the normal parole process. Based on these statistics, the district court was "not persuaded that public safety would be substantially lessened by the employment of these early release mechanisms." Slip op. at 10.

However, the district court failed to consider additional evidence which clearly demonstrates that the continued effectiveness of these programs has been impaired because their extensive use has depleted the pool of inmates who can be released with a relative degree of safety to the public.[4] As of August 1, 1987, shortly prior to the evidentiary hearing held by the magistrate, 880 inmates were statutorily eligible for early release under EPA II. Of these 880 inmates, 30 were classified as low risk, 157 as moderate risk, and 693 as high risk. Low risk inmates 214 have a 7.6% failure rate upon release.[5] In comparison, the failure *214 rates for moderate and high risk inmates are 22.6% and 44.7%, respectively.
The district court failed to consider other potential dangers from the early release of high risk inmates in addition to the threat to public safety. Under the court-ordered plan inmates would be released from minimum security prisons, and medium security inmates then would be transferred to the minimum security facilities. This would create a potential danger to the remaining minimum security inmates and Department of Corrections personnel. There would also be an increased risk to the general public due to a greater potential for escapes from the minimum security facilities, some of which are not enclosed by a single fence.
These dangers far outweigh any imposition on the inmates from double-celling. It is undisputed that doublecelling in these modern, air-conditioned facilities does not fall below constitutional standards. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Interestingly, the consent agreement allows continued partial double-celling at older Department of Corrections facilities such as Central Correctional Institution, Perry Correctional Institution, and Kirkland Correctional Institution in cells of 56.36, 60.5, and 67.4 square feet, respectively. The total environment of these new facilities is without question superior to that of the older facilities.
D.
The district court found that prison overcrowding creates the potential for greater violence and makes proper management more difficult, relying on the testimony of Deputy Commissioner Catoe that "there's a generally accepted position on the part of people who run institutions that as an institution gets bigger, as the inmate population increases, the management of that institution becomes more difficult." The court's finding based on such a general statement is clearly erroneous when measured against contradictory objective evidence of the actual incidences of violence and Commissioner Catoe's inconsistent opinion that the statistics did not show a "disproportionate increase in violence." See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) ("Documents or objective evidence may contradict the witness' story; or the story itself may be so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it. Where such factors are present, the court of appeals may well find clear error....").
Lieber is the only new facility at which double-celling has yet occurred. From the time double-celling began in February 1987 through July 1987, there were seven assaults without weapons and five with weapons.[6] In contrast, from its opening in June 1986 through January 1987, when inmates were single-celled, there were twelve assaults without weapons and five with weapons. And while Commissioner Catoe stated generally that increased population complicates management, he assured the court that the State would be able to provide the programs and opportunities required by the decree if Lieber were double-celled.
V.
While prison overcrowding has been an increasing problem nationwide, remedial measures are now being taken under numerous court orders and consent decrees. However, correctional authorities attempting to comply with these orders and decrees are faced with the prevalent problem of increased prison populations. As a result the courts are, with increasing frequency, addressing requests for modification. The modification granted here is consistent with decisions rendered by this court and others under similar requests.
In Nelson v. Collins we reversed the district court's refusal to approve double-celling at a modern, new facility in 215 order to *215 alleviate overcrowding at older facilities. 659 F.2d at 429. There, the Maryland State Prison System

was directed by court order to relieve unconstitutional double-celling at two facilities and had entered into a consent decree regarding another facility. Subsequent to these decrees, the Supreme Court issued its decisions in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), clarifying the requirements of the eighth amendment as applied to correctional facilities. In addition, there were substantial changes in the conditions in the Maryland prison system. As here, Maryland had begun new construction in a concerted, good faith effort to meet the deadlines imposed by the decrees. But at the same time, Maryland also was faced with an unanticipated increase in its prison population. Taking into consideration the changed circumstances, this court found that the state was entitled to a modification in view of its good faith efforts and the clearly constitutional standards maintained at the new facility. 659 F.2d at 429.
Similarly, in Duran v. Elrod, the Seventh Circuit granted modification of a consent decree to allow double-celling in a county jail, reversing the district court's refusal to do so. 760 F.2d at 763. Although the county had been dilatory in renovation and expansion of the jail, the court still found the modification reasonable in light of an "unremitting" increase in jail population and the potential harm to the citizens of the county. Id. at 761-62.
In contrast, modification of a consent decree regarding overcrowding in Texas prisons was refused in Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856 (5th Cir.1987). The court found that a foreseeable and ordinary increase in prison population did not justify modification. Id. at 862. Further, the requested modification would have allowed housing of inmates at facilities which did not meet other standards for basic services and conditions. See id. at n. 10. The conditions existing in the Texas prison system which supported the Fifth Circuit's refusal to allow modification are not present in the case before us. Unlike Texas, the increase in prison population was unanticipated. In addition, except for double-celling at five new facilities, all terms and conditions of the consent decree as well as all constitutional standards are being met by the State of South Carolina.
VI.
The State of South Carolina voluntarily entered into a consent decree agreeing to certain terms and obligations and there is an initial inclination to hold the State to the letter of their agreement, as the district court did. However, this is not an ordinary contract between private parties to be strictly enforced. It is a compromise between the State and its inmates aimed at providing constitutionally adequate prison conditions. And, a flexible approach must be taken in addressing requests for modification.
The Department of Corrections and the General Assembly have demonstrated considerable good faith in attempting to attain total compliance. But, they have faced an unanticipated increase in inmate population, a problem common to prison systems across the nation. For example, the state-of-the-art prototype federal facility at Phoenix, on which the State institutions are modeled, was intended to provide single-celling, but within the first year of its opening, all inmates were double-celled. And despite the increases in population, the State has achieved the central goal of the decree 0907 constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement.
Further, any solution to the problem not only affects the inmates and the Department of Corrections, but also the general public. Strict compliance would impose on the citizens of South Carolina a system which would increase the risk of danger to the general public if inmates who had not completed lawfully imposed sentences were prematurely discharged. Again, this risk far outweighs any imposition on inmates as a result of double-celling in the five new facilities described above.
216 The order of compliance is vacated and the case is remanded to the district court *216 for modification of the consent decree to allow double-celling at the five new facilities. The district court will retain jurisdiction with the authority to provide appropriate remedies should the double-celling result in unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
VACATED and REMANDED with instructions.
JAMES DICKSON PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

In a matter of this much public importance, it is particularly desirable that our decisions be, if at all possible, unanimous. For that reason I have more than the ordinary regret that I cannot join the majority decision here. I cannot, however, because I believe that under the standards of appellate review that constrain us 0907 and whose integrity, along with the authority of the district courts that they protect, are also of great and ongoing public importance 0907 we cannot properly reverse the district court's carefully reasoned and supported decision. That decision 0907 that the requested modification of the consent decree by wholly abrogating its double-celling provision was not warranted 0907 seems to me unassailable on the facts of record, the controlling equitable principles and the applicable standards of review. For that reason, I would affirm the district court's decision to deny the modification and hold the state to compliance (though with the grace period allowed by the district court).
I
The essential factual and procedural background of this appeal is adequately outlined in the majority opinion. I emphasize a few elements that are particularly relevant to my view that the district court should be affirmed, and that point up the importance of the standards that should govern our review.
The first point is that the modification requested, and now ordered by this court, was complete revocation of the critical double-celling provision of the consent decree, not just a modification of the timetable for compliance with that provision. The next point is the centrality and independent nature of the double-celling provision. While that provision was only one among several others with which the SCDC has complied 0907 a point much emphasized by the majority opinion 0907 there is no question that the double-celling provision was among the most critical and important 0907 to both sides. The modification sought was therefore one having the ultimate effect of total abrogation of a fundamental and independent provision of the consent decree, not one dealing only with peripheral matters not central to the bargained agreement.
The basis upon which modification was sought by the state defendants was simple in essence: "unanticipated increase in inmate population" over the projections upon which the state relied in entering into the agreement originally.
The equitable principles which guide an injunction court's first instance decision whether to grant such a modification are clear though undoubtedly frequently difficult to apply. Modification may be allowed when, as a threshold matter, "changes either in operative facts or laws ... cast a new light upon the facts or law originally ruled on." Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420 (1981), but then only when the change in circumstances has been largely beyond the moving party's control, was not foreseeable either by the parties or the court, and has put compliance in accordance with the decree beyond effective reach despite a good faith effort by the moving party to comply, id. at 424, and finally, when, in light of the changed circumstances and its cause and consequences, a balancing of the interests of the opposing parties and the public requires modification in the interests of equity. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115-19, 52 S.Ct. 460, 462-64, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932).
This power to modify derives ultimately from the inherent powers of equity courts and is now directly expressed in Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5). See generally 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2863. It is a 217 power which, for obvious reasons, is to be exercised cautiously, and only upon a strong showing of *217 near compulsion to grant relief. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 645 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.1981) (movant must demonstrate "oppression," citing United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119, 52 S.Ct. 460, 464, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932)); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803, 813 (8th Cir.1969) (Blackmun, J.) ("caution, substantial change, unforeseeness, oppressive hardship, and a clear showing are the requirements").[1] At stake is the finality and stability of judicial decrees confirming solemn agreements between parties.
Though in its final balancing process the judicial decision whether to modify is a "discretionary" one, that balancing must necessarily be based upon the factual predicates implicit in the modification standard. These will necessarily include whether substantial change has actually occurred; whether the changes were actually beyond the moving party's control and were unforeseeable; whether the movant has made a good faith effort at compliance; and the factual nature of the harms threatened to the parties and to the public by granting or denying the requested modification.

To the extent any of these predicate facts have been in dispute, they, like all factually disputed issues, must of course be resolved in the first instance by the injunction court. As so resolved, they must then be treated as findings of fact and accorded appellate deference under the clearly erroneous standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). For though findings of fact may not be specifically required in conjunction with motions to modify, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (a), there is obviously no reason to treat findings actually made on such a motion differently for this purpose from those found on the much less critical motions for preliminary injunctive relief, as to which findings are specifically required and protected by the clearly erroneous standard under Rule 52(a). The courts, including this one, have so treated them. See Holiday Inns, Inc., 645 F.2d at 242; id. at 247 (dissenting opinion); Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 861-62 (5th Cir.1987); and see generally 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2575, p. 694 (findings per Rule 52(a) "desirable and ought to be made" "whenever decision of a matter requires the court to resolve conflicting versions of the facts").
The point of all this is that to the extent the district court's ultimate "discretionary" decision to deny modification here was based upon factual predicates established, on conflicting evidence, by the fact-finding process, we owe those underlying findings the deference generally owed judicial fact findings on the merits, and for the same 218 reasons. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75, 105 S.Ct. *218 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1984) (deference based both on superiority of district court's vantage point and on need to avoid duplication of fact-finding process at appellate level). And this, in turn, means that in assessing whether the ultimate discretionary decision to deny modification here was an abuse of discretion we must assess that decision in light of the district court's factual predicates, unless we can reject those predicates as clearly erroneous. That is to say, we may no more disregard critical fact findings in this context than in any other in which they provide the factual predicates for ultimate decisions 0907 whether of law, fact, or discretion. Cf. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir.1986) (decision whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions is composite of discretionary, fact-finding and legal rulings, and must be reviewed accordingly).
II
Reviewed on this basis, the district court's ultimate decision to deny the requested modification should be affirmed. Its critical factual predicates, either undisputed or as found on conflicting evidence, are not clearly erroneous. If, as is proper, those predicates are accepted, the court's ultimate decision to deny modification cannot properly be rejected as an abuse of discretion; in fact it reflects an eminently sound exercise of discretion.
A helpful way to demonstrate this is by focussing on the factual predicates upon which the district court largely rested its decision, but which are either disregarded, discounted, or supplanted with conflicting findings by this court sitting in review.
Take first the critical question whether the state defendants had sought in good faith to achieve compliance with the double-celling provision, and the closely related question whether the changes urged as cause for modification were beyond these defendants' effective control. The district court found that "most, if not all, of the increases in population" were within the defendants' control.[2] In support, the court properly pointed to irrefutable evidence that despite specific warnings by state officials of the adverse effect on the state's ability to comply with the decree, the state legislature nevertheless had enacted legislation that directly increased the inmate population beyond the level that uncontrollable factors would have produced. The court also pointed to policy changes by the state Parole Board that had the same effect.
On the intertwined question of the state defendant's good faith effort to comply, the district court pointed to the stark fact that the defendants had knowingly, and without any explanation, baldly violated the decree by constructing double-occupancy cells smaller than the decree required. No more than the reference was required to support the district court's obvious skepticism about the quality of the defendant's effort.[3]
219 Take next the question whether the change upon which defendants relied 0907 the *219 increase in inmate population 0907 was both substantial and unforeseen at the time the consent decree was entered. The district court of course recognized that increases amounting to "changes in the operative facts" had occurred, and at least

implicitly found that they were substantial enough to warrant consideration.[4] But the court rightly questioned whether, as a factual matter, they were actually unforeseen by all involved 0907 in particular, by the state defendants. This is completely supported by the fact that the decree itself expressly recognized that the inmate population projections might be on the low side. From this it was fairly inferable that in undertaking the decree's obligations the state defendants knowingly accepted the resulting risks that planning and budgetary adjustments might later be required to reach compliance; that is, that the changes were not only not unforeseen but expressly contemplated.
Turn to the critical question of the nature and degree of harms threatened to the interests of the parties and the public. As to the plaintiffs, the district court found that to permit the double-celling requested would pose substantial risks of increased violence and other harms resulting from the crowding of facilities that this would permit. Specifically, the court found that to permit the requested double-celling would result in a prison with a design capacity for 504 inmates being permitted to house over 1,000. And, relying directly on the testimony of Deputy Commissioner Catoe, the court found that this in turn would result in numerous problems of prison management, including increased threats of violence, a lack of sufficient jobs for inmates, and inadequate general facilities, service and programs.[5]
Finally, in assessing the threat of harm to the interests of the state defendants and the public if modification were not granted, the district court appropriately measured this by considering the impact of forced compliance through the early release of 700 inmates over a four-month period. In this connection, the court found specifically that under various early release mechanisms expressly provided by the state legislature, 6,883 inmates had already been released between September 1983 and August 1987, and that of these only 90, or 1.3%, had been returned to prison for commission of violent crimes. Relying on this data and the testimony and findings of fact by Allen Breed, the mediator provided for in the consent decree, the court concluded that the overall recidivism rate for 220 inmates *220 given early release pursuant to state law was actually less than that of inmates released in regular course through the parole process. On that basis, the court concluded that ordering a specific early release of 700 of those inmates generally qualified under extant state law would pose no substantial threat to the public safety, the interest primarily asserted by defendants.[6]
As indicated, all of these critical findings are either disregarded, discounted, or rejected outright by the majority in reversing the district court's order. Concededly, there is evidence in the record which, if accepted, would support some of the conflicting findings either explicitly or implicitly adopted by the majority in its analysis of the evidence. But if we are faithful to our highly deferential review function in such matters, we cannot reject findings simply because we disagree with them and can find support in the evidence for our disagreement. We cannot properly reject any but clearly erroneous findings, and "[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous." Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. at 1511. Indeed we may not properly reject any "account of the evidence that is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety," id., and the mere fact that the critical findings here on the questions of good faith, foreseeability, and threatened harms are ultimate, evaluative findings based upon inference rather than raw, historical findings based on direct evidence does not diminish the deference we are directed to give them. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982).
Here, with all respect, I do not see how we could say of the critical findings above summarized that they were not, at a minimum, "plausible accounts of the evidence," or at least one of the "permissible views of the evidence." Accordingly, I would consider this court bound by them; and being so bound, would conclude that the district court was well within its discretion in denying, on their basis, the requested modification. I would therefore affirm its order designed to bring the defendants into compliance with the original decree within the grace period provided.
III
This is a hard case. The problem presented for the state by the rigor of the double-celling restrictions and the increase in inmate population is real and substantial. But so are the problems presented by allowing the state on the record in this case to be wholly relieved of an obligation solemnly undertaken by its highest executive officials

and specifically endorsed by its legislature. The district court, which had lived intimately with the problem over a long period of time, was satisfied after a scrupulously fair evidentiary airing that the state had not established its 221 entitlement to the drastic relief it sought. I *221 believe that the district court correctly applied the appropriate equitable principles to the critical facts it quite properly had found in reaching that decision. I think we err and send dangerous signals about the integrity of this sort of institutional consent decree and the fact-finding and discretionary authority of our base-line courts when we decline to affirm that decision.
A major concern in considering motions to modify injunctive decrees, whether consensual or court-imposed, is that the procedure not be used to re-examine the basis of the original decree rather than the equity of its modification. Care must be taken not to "impeach" the injunction "in its application to the conditions that existed at its making" while ostensibly considering whether to modify it because the conditions have changed; courts may not properly "reverse under the guise of readjusting." United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119, 52 S.Ct. 460, 464, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932) (Cardozo, J.). Yet I fear that this is essentially what has now been done here. The state has not hesitated both in the district court and here to suggest, while primarily pressing the legally appropriate changed circumstances theory, that the real cause of its problem is the improvidence of those of its former officials who under a previous administration made the original undertaking. We were told on oral argument by counsel for the state that the projections at that time were "incompetent" and were due to "inadvertence." This is obviously not an argument that a judicially approved undertaking, fair and sound in its inception has been made "oppressive" by unforeseeable and uncontrollable extrinsic developments, but that the original undertaking was not soundly based, and should on that basis be "impeached" or nullified. Such a theory obviously could not be accepted as the specific basis for equitable relief from such consent decrees. The effect would be to make judicially approved institutional undertakings by one generation of state officials always subject to possible nullification by the second-guessing of their successors.
The district court was obviously aware of this subsidiary argument and rightly gave it no credence. While the majority here does not give this as a basis for its decision, the remedy it gives is perfectly compatible with that theory. For the remedy is utterly to abrogate the specific consensual obligation of the state respecting doublecelling, thereby relegating the inmate-plaintiffs to unproven and possibly unprovable constitutional overcrowding claims. By this draconian remedy the majority has effectively treated the undertaking as a nullity from its inception, not as one whose unforeseen rigors might be adjusted on some equitable basis while retaining its essence. Cf. Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d at 862-63 (distinguishing impermissible "modification" which completely vitiates "original obligations" from permissible one which merely alters duties under original decree).
By this means the state's gamble in violating its solemn obligation has been vindicated, and that, I submit, is not the sort of equity at which the injunction modification principles are aimed.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
[1] The five new facilities also contain segregation cells which house only one inmate and for which no modification is requested.
[2] Contrary to the assertion of the dissent, the State did not "baldly violate" the decree by constructing double cells smaller than the decree required. Infra at 218. It is undisputed that the cells were intended as single cells. But, it has never been satisfactorily explained to the court why, in the face of an agreement which required single cells to contain 50 square feet and double cells to contain 100 square feet, the Department of Corrections approved plans for single cells to contain 69 or 73 square feet.
[3] Judge Phillips argued against such an "overly rigid standard for relief" in his dissent in Holiday Inns, urging a flexible standard "greatly dependent upon the particular facts of the case." 645 F.2d at 244, 245. He read Swift & Co. "simply as a description of the proper exercise of those powers in the particular context of the case before that Court rather than as a general prescription for their exercise in all cases." Id. at 245. We agree that the general teaching of Swift & Co. "is merely that harm and continuing need must always be weighed in the balance in deciding whether continued enforcement of any injunctive decree is equitable in the light of specific changed circumstances." Id. As Judge Phillips further noted, and as evidenced in Nelson v. Collins, this court has "been

properly selective and flexible in our application of the Swift & Co. standard, depending upon the nature of the litigation, the injunction at issue and the scope of the relief sought." Id.
[4] This is shown by statistics compiled by the South Carolina Department of Parole and Community Corrections.
[5] This failure rate refers to inmates returned to the custody of the Department of Corrections for convictions on new offenses with sentences of more than 90 days. This rate does not include revocations for technical parole violations.
[6] These incidents reported from February 1987 through July 1987 represent only those assaults committed by general population inmates who are the only ones double-celled at Lieber.
[1] The majority suggests that in "institutional reform" consent decree cases of this type, a more flexible approach to modification than that espoused in United States v. Swift & Co. for the run of cases is warranted, and rightly points out that in Holiday Inns, a purely private party action, I myself urged, in dissent, a more flexible approach to modification than that taken in that case by the majority in reliance upon the Swift & Co. standards. For the proposition that a more flexible standard in general is warranted in the instant type case, the majority cites principally to Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 860-61 (5th Cir.1987), which had recognized, without adopting, such an approach in New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 970 (2d Cir.1983).
A study of these decisions, and indeed of our own decision in Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420 (4th Cir.1981) (en banc), whose authority I of course recognize, reveals that to the extent they espouse greater flexibility as a general proposition in this type case, it is only as a matter of degree that undoubtedly reflects the need to pay particularly close attention to the heightened public interest inherent in such cases. Ruiz, for example, recognized that those courts espousing in general a more flexible approach "still adher[ed] to the Swift principles that a modification should not vitiate the decree," 811 F.2d at 861. And New York State Assoc.'s greater flexibility involved only relaxing the requirement that the changed circumstances be "unforeseen," with the movant still required to show change and a good faith effort to comply in order to secure a modification limited to alteration of duties under the original obligations without completely vitiating them. 706 F.2d at 969-70.
I completely agree that even under the Swift principles, rightly understood, such a degree of flexibility is appropriate in the ultimate balancing process required in deciding whether modification of such decrees is warranted. My analysis of the district court's decisional process here assumes that such "flexibility" necessarily existed.
[2] In assessing whether the changes were beyond the power of the moving party to control, the court rightly looked to the power of the state as a whole rather than just the state Department of Corrections and its commissioners as the nominal moving parties. The Department of Corrections obviously could not in equity be allowed to assert that only its unaided power to comply should be taken into account. Aside from the fact that its party status is obviously that of an "arm of the state," the state legislature had both authorized and then endorsed the consent decree which was effectively negotiated by officials of the state Attorney General's Department. The decree is therefore one to which the state itself is fully bound in law and equity as well as consensually, with all that implies for funding by the legislative branch and implementation by the executive.
[3] Significantly, the majority can only observe of this remarkable conduct that it "has never been satisfactorily explained." Slip op. 210, n. 2. That is certainly the case, but it hardly addresses the serious legal problem thereby raised. As moving party, the state had the burden to establish its good faith effort at compliance as one of the essential predicates for modification. Its failure even to attempt explanation of conduct that so obviously draws its good faith in question certainly supports the minimal inference that the true explanation would not have been helpful. Whatever the undisclosed basis for the conduct, its effect was to present the court with an awkward fait accompli that made compliance now more costly than it need have been. Surely equity would not be served by weighing this fait accompli in the state's favor, whatever it says about good faith.
The majority finds in the general excellence of the new facilities being constructed and in the overall sums being expended to upgrade the whole correctional system the good faith efforts that the district court rightly questioned. Without questioning the facts on which the majority relies, they are, with all respect, largely irrelevant to the specific question whether there has been a good faith effort to comply with the double-celling provision. And

without minimizing the overall financial burden being borne by the state in upgrading the whole system, it must in fairness be noted that this has to be ascribed in major part to the constitutional compulsion to do so that undoubtedly underlay the state's original entry into the consent decree.
[4] Later developments, not fully before the district court, may raise a question about the substantiality of the "change" over the longer haul. On oral argument we were given a party stipulation which revealed that in 1987 the monthly average increases in inmate population had significantly dropped from the 1985 and 1986 levels upon which the defendants heavily relied. In 1985 the figure was 74; in 1986 it had peaked at 84. But in 1987, it dropped to 59, just 9 above the originally projected figure of 50 per month.
It appears that the state may well have been released from an obligation not nearly as onerous over time as the short-term figures suggested.
[5] The majority essentially rejects this factual determination of the district court by substituting its own assessment which discounts the threat of increased violence and management problems from increased crowding. There is undoubtedly evidence in the record to support the majority's conflicting factual assessment. There had not to date been any appreciable increase in violence in the affected facilities, and some prison officials gave the opinion, at odds with Commissioner Catoe's, that even with the greater inmate populations resulting from double-celling, the facilities would be adequate to provide general services and programs.
While the majority's view is undoubtedly a permissible one on the conflicting evidence, so is the district court's, and in such a situation, we have been directly admonished to defer to the fact-finding court's assessment. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. at 1511.
[6] Here again, the majority essentially rejects this factual determination of the district court 0907 probably the most critical in the balance of interests 0907 by substituting its own conflicting assessment of a much greater threat to public safety and internal order from the early releases required to bring the state into compliance. The district court had, however, carefully assessed the data, heard the testimony, and responsibly considered the actual threat posed. Critical to that assessment were the fundamental facts that the 700 inmates to be released would come from the group generally qualified under extant state law for consideration; that they would be released at intervals over time and not all at once en masse; and that they would in any event all be released in normal course in a relatively short additional time.
While the majority does not of course directly reject these irrefutable facts of the matter, its assessment seems basically to accept the specter raised by the state of a sudden release of 700 potentially violent inmates who otherwise would remain incarcerated indefinitely.
This is based in large part on the state's unsupported assertion that the conceded effectiveness and safety of the early release program has now been compromised by a reduction of the number of eligible inmates who can be released "with a relative degree of safety to the public." This in turn is based upon the fact that of the 880 inmates statutorily eligible for early release consideration, 693 recently have been reclassified by the current administration as "high risk" or as posing a 44.7% failure rate. The problem with this is that there is no evidence that these "high risk" inmates in the statutorily approved pool are any different in risk terms from those being "safely" released before the new risk assessment program. The majority simply accepts the state's estimate, rather than the district court's.
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 902 F.2d 273 (1990)
Harry PLYLER, et al., (Formerly Gary Wayne Nelson, et al.), Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Parker EVATT, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections; Members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections, Defendants-Appellants.
Harry PLYLER, et al., (Formerly Gary Wayne Nelson, et al.), Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Parker EVATT, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections; Members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections, Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 88-7763, 89-7601.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued December 7, 1989. Decided May 7, 1990.
2745 *274 *275 Edwin Eugene Evans, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. (Kenneth P. Woodington, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief), Columbia, S.C., for defendants-appellants.
Mary Malissa Burnette (Cynthia Hall Ouzts, on brief), Gergel, Burnette, Nickles, Grant & Ouzts, for plaintiffsappellees.
Before PHILLIPS and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and SPENCER, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge:
The Commissioner of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections (hereinafter collectively "SCDC") appeal from several rulings of the district court relating to an award of attorneys' fees in a class action suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, SCDC challenges (1) the hourly rates set for five of the twelve attorneys who represented the plaintiff class of prisoners; (2) the award of fees to plaintiffs' attorneys in some post-decree litigation, a portion of which the plaintiffs lost on appeal, see Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208 (4th Cir.1988) (hereinafter Plyler I); and (3) the district court's refusal to rule on whether to adjust downward the rates for attorney hours spent on "monitoring" activities. Finding no error in the district court's rulings, we affirm the award of attorneys' fees.
276 *276 I
In 1982, a class of South Carolina inmates brought a class action against SCDC under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining of overcrowded conditions in South Carolina prisons. In 1984, the State of South Carolina, through its General Assembly, sought to negotiate a settlement, citing its willingness to take necessary legislative action to appropriate funds for improvements to the prison system. In January 1985, a settlement agreement among all interested parties was signed, and the district court orally approved the agreement in November. In March 1986, the court issued a 167-page consent decree, outlining comprehensive reforms of South Carolina's prison system, to take effect in stages over the following five years. The decree covered virtually all aspects of prison conditions and life, providing among other things for improvements in staffing, medical care, and educational, vocational, and recreational programs. It further established requirements for construction of new prisons and renovation, and set minimum space requirements for single- and double-inmate cells.
Among its many provisions, the consent decree expressly provided that appellants pay all costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred during the litigation to date, in the subsequent monitoring of the decree, and 0907 upon

determination by the court 0907 in post-decree litigation.[1] In August 1985, after the parties had reached their settlement agreement, the district court ordered an interim payment of fees in the amount of $100,000. As plaintiffs had not yet submitted their final fee request, the court reserved for later determination the question of the total fee award. Finally, during 1988, the court held three days of evidentiary hearings on plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees.
In an August 16, 1988, order, the court set out detailed findings on the fee and expense issues and awarded the plaintiffs' attorneys $414,721.91, less the $100,000 already paid. In computing the award, the court accepted some of SCDC's arguments for adjustments in the number of hours billed and largely applied the hourly rates for the plaintiffs' attorneys recommended by SCDC: five of the twelve lawyers received $65/hour, within the $50-$75/ hour range urged by SCDC, and two lawyers received no fees at all. The court, however, awarded five of plaintiffs' lawyers hourly rates above the $50-$75/hour range. Two of those lawyers, Mary McClymont and Malissa Burnette, received $90/hour. Two others, Gaston Fairey and Steven Ney, received $100/hour. The fifth lawyer, Alvin Bronstein, received $150/hour.
Included in the court's award were fees for the attorneys' work in the post-decree litigation that led to Plyler I. That litigation arose when SCDC made a motion to modify the consent decree to accommodate an increase in prison population by allowing "double-celling" of inmates at some new prison facilities, in violation of express terms of the decree. The district court, rejecting the recommendations of a mediator and a federal magistrate, had denied the requested modifications and ordered immediate compliance with the decree. SCDC appealed some aspects of the district court's order, and we reversed. See Plyler I, 846 F.2d 208. We held (one judge dissenting) that the district court had abused its discretion in denying the modification and had clearly erred in finding that the harm to the prisoners of modifying the double-celling provision outweighed the risk to the public of a massive early release of prisoners. See id. at 212. We reasoned that "[a]lthough double-celling will be contrary 277 to a specific term of the consent decree, the prisoners have received the essence *277 of their bargain" because all other terms of the decree had been met, and, more significantly, "the general conditions of confinement now not only meet, but exceed constitutional requirements." Id. at 212-13. Plyler I was decided in April 1988. In its August 1988 attorneys' fees order, the district court allowed fees for the work on Plyler I, notwithstanding that the plaintiffs had not prevailed on the appeal of the double-celling issue, because the litigation was necessary to protect rights originally vindicated in the consent decree and involved issues "inextricably intermingled with the original claims in the lawsuit." Joint Appendix at 109 (quoting Willie M. v. Hunt, 732 F.2d 383, 386 (4th Cir.1984)).
In addition to setting the fee award, the district court's August 16 order declined to address whether the fees and costs for monitoring activities should be treated differently. In a February 21, 1989, order, it denied SCDC's motion to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the August order to adjust fees and costs for monitoring. The court stated that it had "chose[n] not to change the existing procedure of processing fees for monitoring ... and felt it could not deal with that matter fairly at this time [and] that after more experience with the present system is had the issues in question may be revisited by the court upon the request of any of the parties." J.A. at 135-36.
SCDC then appealed both from the order awarding attorney's fees, specifically challenging the findings on five of the attorneys' hourly rates and the award of fees for work on Plyler I, and from the order denying its motion to amend the findings.
II
We address first the two challenges to the award of fees.
A
At the outset, we review briefly the relevant legal principles governing an award of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that in federal civil rights actions "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." In calculating a reasonable fee under § 1988, a court starts by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent on the litigation

times a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). As in this case, determination of the hourly rate will generally be the critical inquiry in setting the "reasonable fee," and the burden rests with the fee applicant to establish the reasonableness of a requested rate. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547-48 n. 11, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). In addition to the attorney's own affidavits, the fee applicant must produce satisfactory "specific evidence of the `prevailing market rates in the relevant community' for the type of work for which he seeks an award." Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 (4th Cir.1987) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, 104 S.Ct. at 1547). Although the determination of a "market rate" in the legal profession is inherently problematic, as wide variations in skill and reputation render the usual laws of supply and demand largely inapplicable, see Blum, 465 U.S. at 895-96 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 1547-48 n. 11, the Court has nonetheless emphasized that market rate should guide the fee inquiry. Id.[2] Our 278 review of the district *278 court's award is sharply circumscribed; we have recognized that because a district court has "close and intimate knowledge of the efforts expended and the value of the services rendered, [the fee award] must not be overturned unless it is `clearly wrong.'" McManama v. Lukhard, 616 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir.1980) (quoting Barber, 577 F.2d at 226), quoted in Spell, 824 F.2d at 1401.
SCDC challenges as clearly erroneous the hourly rates of five of the attorneys, claiming that these rates were not supported by evidence of customary or prevailing rates for civil rights and prison litigation in South Carolina, and hence did not reflect "market rates." In support of this argument, SCDC contends that the court failed to give adequate consideration to an affidavit identifying 145 cases in which civil rights attorneys in South Carolina were retained for between $50-75/hour and to a study by a state Advisory Committee on Associate Counsel that recommended rates of $50-65/hour when the state retains private counsel. The fee applicants, on the other hand, produced affidavits testifying to their own rates, experience, and skills as well as affidavits of South Carolina lawyers who were familiar both with the skills of some of the applicants and more generally with civil rights litigation in South Carolina. Though the evidence was conflicting, there was sufficient evidence of the prevailing market rates to support the hourly rates fixed by the district court for each of these five attorneys.[3] We review some of this evidence below.
Alvin Bronstein served in a limited consulting role in the litigation and his fee was based on a $150/hour rate. Bronstein has been Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union's National Prison Project since 1982 and is nationally and internationally recognized as a leading expert and practitioner in prison litigation. The district court did not err in fixing his rate at $150/hour in light of his vast experience and expertise, his testimony (and evidence of other fee awards showing) that his normal rate was $200, and the affidavit of John Harper, II, an expert on voting rights litigation in South Carolina, who testified that the prevailing rate for lawyers of his "qualifications and experience in comparable complex litigation range from $100 to $250" in South Carolina.
Gaston Fairey served as lead local counsel in the case beginning in 1982. He testified that during the pendency of the lawsuit, he billed other clients at a rate of $100/hour. In support of Fairey's application, D. Cravens Ravenel testified that he was familiar with litigation under § 1983 in South Carolina and with Fairey's work, and he opined that an appropriate hourly rate in this case would be $125. Similarly, Terrell Glenn, a past president of both the Richland County and South Carolina bars, testified that based on his familiarity with prevailing rates in South Carolina, Fairey's rate should be at least $125, and "more likely" $150. In view of this evidence, the district court's determination that Fairey was entitled to $100/hour was not clearly erroneous.
Steven Ney served as lead counsel for the National Prison Project since 1981 and was, at the time of the case, Chief Staff Counsel for that organization. The district court awarded Ney $100/hour for his extensive work coordinating strategy among all lawyers, preparing complaints, conducting discovery, negotiating the settlement, and so on. Ney's own affidavit contained ample evidence of his wide experience in civil rights and prison litigation. In light of Ney's apparent expertise and the prevailing market rates as testified in the Ravenel and Glenn affidavits, the district court's rate for Ney was not clear error.
279 Malissa Burnette represented the attorneys in their motion for fees and was *279 awarded $90/hour for this work. Her affidavit stated that at the time her customary billing rate was $90/hour and that that rate was in line with prevailing rates in South Carolina for partners' time. Burnette also produced the affidavits of Ann Furr and Jay Bender, lawyers in Columbia, South Carolina, who testified that based on their knowledge of prevailing rates in the community and of Burnette's work, an appropriate rate for Burnette's work in this case would be $90-$100/

hour (Furr) or $90-$125/hour (Bender). In view of this evidence, we cannot say that the district court's $90/hour rate for Burnette was clearly erroneous.
Finally, Mary McClymont, a staff attorney with the National Prison Project, was also awarded $90/hour for her work, which began in 1986 and involved participation in counsel strategy meetings and negotiation over classification issues. Her affidavit testimony was that the National Prison Project regularly billed her work at $125/ hour. Her affidavit also supports an inference that her experience and expertise in prison litigation was comparable to that of Steven Ney and that an hourly rate in the same range as his would be appropriate. In view of her qualifications and the other affidavits establishing the $90/hour rate she received as within market rates, we find no clear error as to the district court's award for McClymont.
In sum, we find no clear error in the district court's determinations of the five hourly rates challenged on appeal.
B
SCDC next challenges the district court's award of fees for the attorneys' work in opposing SCDC's motion to modify the original consent decree to permit "double-celling" in undersized cells at certain prison facilities. SCDC contends that the plaintiff class was not a "prevailing party" in that post-decree litigation, and hence was not entitled to a fee award for the 182 hours spent on that litigation.[4] As noted above, though plaintiffs successfully opposed the motion to modify the decree in district court, we reversed the district court on those aspects of the court order that SCDC appealed. See Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208 (4th Cir.1988) (Plyler I). In addition, plaintiffs' petitions for rehearing by this court and for certioriari in the Supreme Court were both denied. SCDC does not dispute the plaintiffs' status as "prevailing party" in the underlying litigation that led to the 1986 consent decree; indeed, the decree itself embodied that basic entitlement to fees for that litigation. Nor does SCDC challenge plaintiffs' entitlement to reasonable monitoring fees, also provided for in the decree. Rather, SCDC contends that the litigation concerning the motion to modify, though obviously related to the underlying litigation, was so distinct and severable from it that a separate analysis of "prevailing party" under § 1988 is warranted.
SCDC bases its argument on Willie M. v. Hunt, 732 F.2d 383 (4th Cir.1984). In Willie M., a class action brought on behalf of involuntarily committed, emotionally disturbed children resulted in a settlement that specified improvements in treatment and education programs at the facilities where the children were committed. During the implementation of the settlement's terms, two questions were raised about the scope of the plaintiff class. The parties could not resolve the dispute and litigation ensued. Both questions were ultimately answered adversely to the plaintiffs, one by an unappealed ruling of the district court, another by our reversal of a ruling favorable to the plaintiffs. See Willie M. v. Hunt, 657 F.2d 55 (4th Cir.1981). Though the attorneys for the plaintiffs had already received a fee award for work leading to the original settlement, they sought a second award for their ultimately unsuccessful work concerning the scope of the plaintiff class.
280 *280 Reversing the district court, we denied this second fee award, reasoning that the litigation of the class definition questions involved issues and claims "distinctly different from" those in the original civil rights litigation. Willie M., 732 F.2d at 386. Our analysis was guided by the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-35, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939-40, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983):
In some cases a plaintiff may present in one lawsuit distinctly different claims for relief that are based on different facts and legal theories. In such a suit, even where the claims are brought against the same defendants 0907 often an institution and its officers ... 0907 counsel's work on one claim will be unrelated to his work on another claim.... The congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties requires that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim.
The questions of the scope of the plaintiff class as embodied in the settlement presented issues essentially of contract interpretation that were "not inextricably intermingled with the original claims in the lawsuit." Willie M., 732 F.2d at 386. We rejected the notion that the plaintiffs' attorneys had an ethical obligation to establish through litigation the scope of the plaintiff class, observing that "[a]ny duty to litigate arose ... from a failure on the part of counsel to formulate a consent judgment that clearly and unambiguously defined the plaintiff class." Id. at 386-87.

Had the lawyers in Willie M. been "effective in formulating language that was self-executing," the litigation on which they did not prevail would never have arisen. Id. at 387.
As noted, SCDC does not dispute that at least as to work preceding the entry of the decree the plaintiffs had achieved "prevailing party" status; in other words, it is conceded that the plaintiffs had crossed the "threshold to a fee award of some kind" by effecting a "material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute." Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, ___, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1493, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989). The question is whether the nature of the post-decree litigation warrants a separate analysis of the otherwise established "prevailing party" status. As our application of Hensley in Willie M. demonstrates, entitlement to fees for one aspect of a protracted litigation does not turn narrowly on whether the party prevailed on that particular matter, but whether a separate claim or, as here, a separate proceeding is so unrelated as to justify treating it as a "separate lawsuit[]." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. If treatment as a separate lawsuit is appropriate, then a party who may have "crossed the threshold" to become the "prevailing party" in the main action would in essence lose that status with respect to the separate claims or proceedings. The Supreme Court has directed district courts not to draw overly fine distinctions in making this determination. Certainly, where the issues presented in the later proceedings or in separate claims involve the same common core of facts or related legal theories, the case "cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. Instead the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation." Id. Ultimately, determinations of relatedness of claims and the quality of the overall results are not reached through application of any precise rules or formulae, but rather through an equitable judgment of the district court exercising discretion in light of the concerns expressed in Hensley. Id. at 436-37, 103 S.Ct. at 1941-42.
Here the district court acted within its discretion in ruling that the issues of Plyler I were so "inextricably intermingled with the original claims in the lawsuit," Willie M., 732 F.2d at 386, that severing those proceedings for a separate analysis of "prevailing party" status was not justified. As the district court noted, the plaintiffs' work in Plyler I was directed toward the protection of rights originally and unambigously vindicated in the consent 281 decree. Cf. Turner v. Orr, 785 F.2d 1498, *281 1504 (11th Cir.1986) (attorneys' fees for litigation of some unsuccessful claims of violation of previously entered consent judgment recoverable under "prevailing party" language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5k in Title VII case). In Plyler I, SCDC had moved to modify an unambiguous provision prohibiting double-celling in cells of less than 100 feet, citing an unanticipated increase in the prison population. This modification pertained only to double-celling at five new facilities and did not challenge other aspects of the decree. Nonetheless, in holding that the modification should be allowed, we found it necessary to review and evaluate the full range of related reforms that were the objects of the original suit and were finally implemented by the terms of the consent decree. Our decision permitting the modification rested substantially on a judgment that the plaintiffs had received "the essence of their bargain" in that the general conditions now exceeded constitutional standards. Plyler I, 846 F.2d at 212-13.
In contrast to Willie M., where we found that certain deficiencies in the work-product of plaintiffs' counsel had necessitated their later unsuccessful effort to cure the deficiencies, the situation here is almost the exact opposite; here, plaintiffs' counsel, obviously successful in negotiating the consent decree, are not seeking to cure its revealed deficiencies, but to preserve its fruits. Plaintiff class had no option but to incur the related costs; plaintiffs' counsel were under clear obligation to make the defensive effort. See Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 990 (7th Cir.1988) (civil rights plaintiff was entitled to fees in connection with largely unsuccessful appellate defense because "he had no choice but to incur them or forfeit his victory in district court"). To deny attorney fees for such an effort, whether successful in detail or not, would obviously thwart the underlying purpose of the attorney fee provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. For that reason and because the litigation in Plyler I involved comprehensive inquiry into "the significance of the overall relief claimed," Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940, the district court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law in concluding that the matters at issue in Plyler I were so intertwined with the original claims that attorneys' fees for work on those proceedings should be awarded as to a still "prevailing party."
Our holding should not be construed as guaranteeing attorneys' fees after resolution of every dispute involving the consent decree. The initial status of "prevailing party" does not entitle appellees to compensation when

resistance to modification is unsuccessful and the position taken was not essential to the preservation of the integrity of the consent decree as a whole.
III
Finally, SCDC also challenges a February 21, 1989, order of the district court denying SCDC's motion to amend or supplement the findings and conclusions and to alter the judgment. Among other things, SCDC requested the court to rule that the attorney billing rate for monitoring activities should be limited to $60/hour. In its order denying SCDC's motion, the court stated that it had "chose[n] not to change the existing procedure of processing fees for monitoring[, that it] felt it could not deal with that matter fairly at this time[, and] that after more experience with the present system is had the issues in question may be revisited by the court upon the request of any of the parties." J.A. at 109. SCDC contends that the record before the court was sufficiently extensive to justify a ruling, and as that record is now before us, that we should rule on these matters in the first instance. We, however, find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of SCDC's motion and decline to address the merits of this question before the district court sees fit to do so.
IV
The appellees have requested a determination that they are entitled to recover fees for their defense of this appeal. They are so entitled. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2574, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) ; McManama v. Lukhard, 616 F.2d 727, 730 (4th Cir.1980); Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 990 (7th Cir.1988). Because related proceedings are pending in the district court, we remand the fee determination to the district 282 court, *282 see McManama, 616 F.2d at 730, rather than assess those fees ourselves, see Ustrak, 851 F.2d at 990.
V
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the district court are affirmed.
AFFIRMED
[1] Part III, Section V of the decree stated:
Defendants shall pay Plaintiffs' counsel all costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred during the course of this litigation through the entry of this Decree by the Court and, upon submission of statements, incurred during Plaintiffs' monitoring of enforcement and compliance with this Decree. Plaintiffs' costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the submission of any dispute to the Court following the entry of this Decree shall be paid by Defendants upon the Court's determination that Plaintiffs are entitled to costs and fees.
[2] This court and others have endorsed a multi-factored test of reasonableness, taking account of:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fee awards in similar cases.
Spell, 824 F.2d at 1402 n. 18 (citing Barber v. Kimbrell's, 577 F.2d 216, 226 n. 28 (4th Cir.1978)); see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974). Ultimately, though, a fee justified under this test might still be unreasonable if out of line with "market rates." Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, 104 S.Ct. at 1547.

[3] It is noteworthy that the district court set the rates for five of the twelve attorneys within the $50-$75/hour range urged by SCDC, and awarded no fees for two of the attorneys' work. Those rulings are not before us.
[4] The entitlement to a fee award in post-decree litigation is governed by Part III, § V of the consent decree, which states in relevant part: "Plaintiffs' costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the submission of any dispute to the Court following the entry of this Decree shall be paid by Defendants upon the Court's determination that Plaintiffs are entitled to costs and fees." As all agree, this language subsumes decisional law construing "prevailing party" under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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 924 F.2d 1321 (1991)
Harry PLYLER (Formerly Gary Wayne Nelson, et al.), Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Parker EVATT, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections; Members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 90-6789.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 6, 1990. Decided January 23, 1991. As Amended February 12, 1991.
1322 *1322 Kenneth Paul Woodington, argued, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants. (T. Travis Medlock, Atty. Gen., Charles W. Gambrell, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Henry J. White, Staff Atty., Larry C. Batson, Legal Advisor, on brief), South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, Columbia, S.C., for defendants-appellants.
W. Gaston Fairey, argued, Fairey & Parise, P.A., Columbia, S.C. (Al Bronstein, National Prison Project, American Civil Liberties Union, Washington, D.C.; John Morris, Southern Prisoner's Defense Committee, Atlanta, Georgia, on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, SPROUSE and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge:
The Commissioner of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and the members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections (collectively, SCDC or the state) appeal an order of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denying their motion for modification of a consent decree relating to the design, construction and operation of state prison facilities. Because we conclude that the court erred in declining to give the state any relief by modification of the decree, we vacate the order and remand with instructions for reconsideration of the motion.
I
This case is a reprise of Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208 (4th Cir.1988) (Plyler I), in which this court reversed the district court's refusal to modify the consent decree in other particulars, and remanded with directions permanently to modify the decree as requested by the state. The general background leading to entry of the consent decree and the ensuing difficulties that arose in its implementation are extensively developed in the Plyler I opinion and need not be fully laid out again here. A brief summary of that background suffices.
The consent decree, signed by the parties in January 1985, settled a class action brought in 1982 by state prison inmates against state officials, claiming unconstitutional conditions of confinement in various state prison facilities. The decree effected a comprehensive settlement dealing with all facets of state prison administration as that bore upon conditions of confinement within the system. The gist of the settlement was an agreement by the state to improve prison conditions in specifically detailed ways in return for the inmates' agreement to forego any claims they might have as a class for monetary or other relief because of the state's maintenance of any provable unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The district court approved entry of the consent decree in March of 1986, after careful review of its details, and after specifically finding that it was knowingly and willingly entered into by the prisoner class and by responsible officials of the state. Because the class action was settled, the claim of unconstitutional conditions has never been adjudicated.
Although, as indicated, the decree swept broadly, its central provisions were those concerned with avoiding overcrowding and its attendant ills by laying down minimum space requirements principally expressed in terms of

cell space per inmate. Timetables for achieving compliance in stages were provided. New and renovated facilities were subjected to specific space requirements for single and double cells. Old, existing facilities were subjected both to specific space requirements and to other, more flexible requirements designed to accommodate the practical constraints which their construction imposed on efforts to avoid overcrowding. Critical to this appeal were the restrictions for the then existing Womens' Correctional Center (WCC), a facility built in 1973, which was one of three facilities that then housed women prisoners. At WCC the decree permitted the state originally to double-cell no more than one-half of the cells then being used for general population in five of the seven then 1323 existing forty-eight cell cottages and required *1323 the state to construct additional cottage space to house 96 inmates by December 31, 1985.
Following entry of the consent decree, the state succeeded in meeting most of its obligations, with the notable exception of those pertaining to cell space. As to those central obligations, it has had difficulty from the outset due to an increase in prison population that quickly and substantially exceeded the projections upon which the state officials relied when the consent decree was signed. Indeed the state was already out of compliance with this critical aspect of the decree at the time of its entry in March of 1986.
Failure of the state to achieve compliance with various of the space requirements has led to a series of efforts by the inmate class to secure enforcement orders from the court, and responsive efforts by the state to obtain extensions of time to comply and, eventually, permanent modifications of the decree.
In July of 1986 the court granted a motion to enforce, and denied a countering motion to modify with respect to certain cell-space requirements. The state's appeal from this order was dismissed as moot when the state achieved compliance with the requirements while the appeal was pending. Plyler v. Leeke, 804 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir.1986).
Again in May of 1987, when the inmate class sought an enforcement order, the state countered with a motion for permanent modification of the decree to permit it to continue non-complying double-celling of male inmates in certain newly constructed facilities. When the district court again refused to modify and instead ordered compliance, the state again appealed. This led to this court's reversal in Plyler I.
The present appeal originated with a set of countering motions filed in early 1989 respecting the decree's space requirements for women inmates at WCC. The inmate class had moved for an enforcement order; the state soon countered with a motion to modify the decree either temporarily through early January 1991, or permanently, to relieve it of its alleged noncompliance. It was undisputed at the time these motions were heard that the state was not in compliance as to the WCC requirements. Specifically, TV rooms in old cottages 1 through 7 were being used to house inmates although the decree specifically forbade this. More critically, all the cottages, 1 through 7, in existence when the decree was signed, were being fully double-celled, although the decree permitted doublecelling of no more than fifty percent of five of these facilities. Finally, inmates in two cottages constructed after the consent decree, cottages 8 and 9, were fully double-celled in cells of approximately 73 square feet, although the decree required that in these newly constructed facilities only single-celling should occur unless at least 100 square feet of cell space was provided.
In May 1989, the district court granted the state temporary relief from compliance with these provisions and set a hearing for August 1, 1989, to consider a more permanent solution. In the interval, the state was directed to submit alternative methods for achieving compliance. Following the requested submissions, the court conducted a hearing in September of 1989, and on February 15, 1990, entered an order which (1) denied the state's motion for modification, either temporarily or permanently, and (2) required the state to "place the Womens' Correctional Center in full compliance with the Consent Decree no later than April 2, 1990," and provided that the state was "free to take whatever steps they deem advisable to gain such compliance."
The state then took this appeal, and the district court's order was stayed by this court pending the appeal.
II

A
The general principles guiding the district court's consideration of the state's motion to modify the consent decree and those guiding our review of its denial of that motion are well-settled. Plyler I, dealing with the same type 1324 issues raised in this case, recently restated those principles as *1324 they apply to such issues, and we summarize them again here briefly.
Under its inherent equity powers, as now expressed in Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5), a district court may modify a judgment if "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Plyler I, 846 F.2d at 211. In exercise of that power, consent decrees such as that here in issue may be modified in appropriate cases on the basis of material changes in operative law or facts. Id. (citing Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 424 (4th Cir.1981) (en banc)). While underlying principles of finality and repose dictate great caution in modifying consent decrees on no other basis than material changes in law or fact, "the unique nature and demands of institutional reform litigation necessitate a more flexible approach to modification" than may be appropriate with respect to consent decrees between private parties. Id. at 212 (citing Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 860-61 (5th Cir.1987)) (citing New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 970 (2d Cir.1983)). The "uniqueness" of institutional reform litigation lies in the fact that it is necessarily aimed at achieving "broad public policy objectives in a complex, ongoing fact situation," with the consequence that consent decrees settling such litigation must be viewed as embodying "not so much peremptory commands to be obeyed in terms, as ... futureoriented plans designed to achieve [those] objectives." Id. (citing Carey, 706 F.2d at 970 n. 17).
Prison reform litigation, and consent decrees settling such litigation, present particularly sensitive problems for courts asked by prison officials to modify decrees because of material changes in the "complex, ongoing fact situation" that inevitably underlies such decrees. For in this area there comes into play, as a counterweight to the general principle of restraint in modifying any judicial decree, the Supreme Court's admonition of cautious deference to the judgment of government officials charged with the sensitive task of prison administration. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807-08, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); see also Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 759 (7th Cir.1985). In this particular realm of institutional reform, therefore, the general need for flexibility in considering requests for modification of complex decrees may be particularly acute.
In specific applications of these general equitable principles, more specific ones come into play. In general, modification should be granted only when the change of circumstances urged by the movant was largely beyond that party's control, and when compliance has been put beyond effective reach despite a good faith effort by the movant to comply. Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 424 (4th Cir.1981) (en banc). And in the end, the question whether equity requires modification is one committed to the district court's discretion to be exercised through the familiar process of balancing the interests of the opposing parties and the public in light of relevant substantive principles. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115-19, 52 S.Ct. 460, 462-64, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932); Plyler I, 846 F.2d at 211.
In reviewing a district court's ultimate decision on a motion for modification, we apply an abuse of discretion standard shaped by the above principles and in doing so we accept any predicate findings of fact made by the court that are not clearly erroneous. Plyler I, 846 F.2d at 212.
B
The modification requested here, like that requested in Plyler I, would, if granted, effectively have relieved the state, either permanently or at least through early 1991, of its obligations under the consent decree respecting, in this case, cell space requirements at WCC. The specific relief sought was permission to double-cell inmates in 165 general population cells of 73 to 83 square feet.[1] As indicated, this was prohibited by the consent decree. 1325 The sole *1325 basis for the requested relief by modification was, as in Plyler I, "unanticipated increases in prison population."

Applying the equitable principles above summarized, the district court denied the motion for either temporary or permanent modification and instead ordered early compliance, specifically leaving the means of compliance to the state. We summarize the court's reasoning, as reflected in its denial order.
On the fundamental question of the state's noncompliance, a condition conceded by the state, the court found that it had long existed and that it had resulted in serious overcrowding at all the women's facilities, including WCC. As of the date of the court's order, the state was housing somewhere between 331 and 334 more inmates at WCC than allowed by the decree. On current best projections respecting the addition of new and shifted facilities, the state would remain out of compliance until January 1991. At that time, if a new 384-bed facility at Greenwood comes on line as planned, compliance could be achieved, but on present projections of inmate population trends, this would only last for two months. In the face of these facts, the state had not at the time of the court's hearing appropriated any funds for additional facilities, though it was represented that the 1990 session of the General Assembly would consider an SCDC request for such funds.
The court next observed that in response to its direction that it suggest means for coming into compliance, the state had rejected as unacceptable the alternative of early release of a sufficient number of women inmates. The state had proposed instead that four 96-bed male work release centers then under construction be made available for women inmates, and that WCC be fully double-celled and that inmates be housed in TV rooms and the gymnasium at that facility. The court noted that this would apparently provide around 37 square feet of space for inmates double-celled in the existing cottage cells, around 23 square feet for inmates in the TV rooms, and would take the gymnasium out of use as a gymnasium.
The court then addressed the state's contention that the requested modification was justified by the unanticipated, substantial increase in the female inmate population at WCC since the consent decree was entered. The court found that the increase indisputably had been substantial, to the point that the actual population projected for December 31, 1989, 790, was 60% greater than the projected figure, 493, on which the state acted in signing the consent decree in January 1985. Whether the increase fairly could be viewed as "unanticipated," however, was thought doubtful in view of the early development of the trend. Irrespective of that, the court found that there had been a substantial change of operative facts which satisfied that predicate for relief by modification.
Turning to the balancing process, the court looked first to the interest of the plaintiff class. As to this, the court noted its understanding that Plyler I had held, with binding effect for this case, that the interest properly to be considered was not entitlement to the specific benefit of every term of the decree, but only the attainment of overall constitutional conditions of confinement 0907 that being the "essence of their bargain." The court recognized that double-celling is only one such condition, and that it is not, standing alone, unconstitutional. Hence, the court concluded that in order to find any harm to a cognizable interest of the plaintiff class resulting from modification of the decree, it would be necessary to find that the existing double-celling, when considered in conjunction with all other conditions at WCC, would lead to unconstitutional conditions overall.
As to whether this could be found here, the court noted the difficulty that unconstitutionality overall had never been adjudicated, nor had an evidentiary basis for making the determination at this point been developed. The court observed, however, that the burden here was on the state as movant to show entitlement to relief, which 1326 would include proof that allowing double-celling by modifying the decree would not *1326 tip the constitutional balance. Because the state had failed to carry that burden by failing to offer any evidence as to the general conditions at WCC, the court concluded that unconstitutionality overall had been established by the state's failure to disprove it. From this it followed in the court's reasoning that modification to permit continued double-celling would cause constitutional harm to the plaintiff class and necessarily deny it the "essence of the bargain" as that had been defined in Plyler I.
Turning to the state's interest, the court recognized it as the obvious one of having the lawful sentences of its criminal courts fully carried out. Against this interest, however, the court thought it proper to weigh the state's failure to make a good faith effort to comply with the consent decree provisions here in issue. This was found on the basis that despite unmistakable signs soon after the consent decree was entered that the state's projections were heavily flawed, adequate responsive adjustments have never been made. Furthermore, the failure of the

state to explain its opposition to early releases as a means of compliance, and to explain the effect on other provisions of the decree that would result from adoption of its proposal to convert male work release centers to female use, suggested to the court a present lack of good faith on the state's part in seeking to comply with the decree.
The court then identified the principal interest of the public as lying in its protection from the risk of criminal conduct by the inmates presently confined in WCC. That required consideration by the court of the effect on this interest of the state's being required to effect compliance through early releases of a sufficient number of inmates to make modification of the decree unnecessary. On this, the court found from the evidence of record concerning the number of inmates presently qualified for early release, that without any court order the state "could release enough nonviolent inmates from WCC to gain compliance with the Consent Decree without increasing the danger to the public in any significant degree."
On balance, the court concluded that the competing interests of the parties and the public "overwhelmingly weigh against the [state]." For this reason the modification sought was deemed by the court not to be warranted.
C
Turning now to review of the district court's ruling and its supporting rationale, we note at the outset that our earlier decision in Plyler I looms large over this case and substantially constrains its resolution through principles of res judicata and stare decisis. That case arose from comparable opposing efforts by the plaintiff class to hold the state to the letter of this consent decree and by the state to be relieved of the letter of the decree by having it modified to permit non-complying conditions to continue. While the specific provisions at issue in that case related to housing at other facilities within the prison system, a number of common or closely related issues of fact and law were necessarily and finally decided by this court in reversing the district court's refusal to modify the decree in the respect there sought.
The district court in this case was of course well aware of the general precedential effect of our decision in Plyler I, but misperceived that effect in at least two critical respects. Because these are important to a proper resolution of this case, we identify them at this point, noting that they cut in opposite directions.
First, as indicated, the district court read Plyler I as having identified the interest of (hence threatened harm to) the plaintiff class, for balancing purposes, as going only to "the attainment of constitutional prison conditions through the receipt of the `essence of their bargain' made in the consent decree." In other words, the court apparently thought that Plyler I allowed it to find cognizable harm to the plaintiff class resulting from modification of the decree only if it could determine that the modification would result in unconstitutional conditions 0907 a matter that, as the court noted, had never been adjudicated.
1327 *1327 This was much too draconian a reading of Plyler I's holding on that point. As a moment's reflection will show, so to read that decision would necessarily imply that the only legally enforceable obligation assumed by the state under the consent decree was that of ultimately achieving minimal constitutional prison standards. For the practical effect would be that every effort by the plaintiff class to enforce specific provisions of the decree could be effectively countered by a motion by the state to modify so long as the modification did not generate unconstitutional conditions overall. Substantively, this would do violence to the obvious intention of the parties that the decretal obligations assumed by the state were not confined to meeting minimal constitutional requirements. Procedurally, it would make necessary, as this case illustrates, a constitutional decision every time an effort was made either to enforce or modify the decree by judicial action. The district court avoided that procedural quagmire here by the awkward device of invoking the burden of proof against the state as movant for its failure to disprove unconstitutionality. But that simply cannot suffice in constitutional adjudication. Both the substantive and procedural implications of such a drastic reading of Plyler I are simply unacceptable.
Properly read, Plyler I's discussion of the nature of the plaintiff class's interest for balancing purposes has much less drastic implications. The point being made in Plyler I was simply that in assessing the risk, and degree, of harm to the plaintiff class from the modification proposed there, attention should not be confined to the indisputable fact that modification would necessarily abrogate a specific benefit conferred by the decree. It must

also take into account the extent to which the benefits still retained insured that the "broad public-policy objectives" of the decree were not at risk from the proposed modification. See Plyler I, 846 F.2d at 212-13.
The court's other misperception of the effect of Plyler I was more critical, for it led the court into error in its crucial finding that the state must be charged with a lack of good faith in its failed efforts to comply with the WCC provisions of the decree. As indicated, this finding was central to the court's conclusion that the state was not entitled to modification of the decree.
We believe that this lack of good faith finding, one of mixed law and fact, is foreclosed by our decision in Plyler I. The state's good faith in its failed efforts to comply with the comparable cell-space provisions there in issue was a central issue in that case as it is here. See Plyler I, 846 F.2d at 213. In Plyler I, as here, the state based its request for modification on the simple fact that unanticipated increases in the prison population had made it impossible, despite its good faith efforts, to comply with the decree, and that this change in circumstances warranted relief by modification of the decree. In Plyler I, as here, the district court had rejected the state's critical claim that its failure to comply reflected a circumstance effectively beyond its control, and found instead, by necessary implication, that the state had not made a sufficiently good faith effort to warrant equitable relief. See id. On the state's appeal, based on a detailed review of the state's efforts to comply and the circumstances which had prevented compliance, we flatly rejected the district court's crucial conclusion of a lack of good faith effort on the state's part. We held instead that the state had made "good faith efforts to adhere to the consent decree," and that the "direct cause" of the increase in prison population, hence of the state's inability to comply with the decree, lay not in the state's failure to control a controllable situation, but in the increased commission of crime, a factor that lay beyond its control. Id.
It is of course true that the cell-space provisions at issue here, hence the nature of the state's specific obligations, are different from those at issue in Plyler I. Certainly it is theoretically possible that the state could have sought in good faith to comply with the provisions at issue in Plyler I, but not those at issue here. The district court, possibly 1328 seeking to avoid the precedential effect of the Plyler I decision, *1328 indeed suggested that this was the case 0907 that while good faith may earlier have driven the state's efforts, it had more recently faded and that this tended to explain the failure to comply as to the WCC provisions, if not those earlier at issue.
We do not believe that the precedential and preclusive effect of Plyler I properly can be avoided by that means. On any fair reading of that decision, it rejects as factually unsupported any finding that the state has not acted in good faith in its general efforts to comply with the cell-space provisions of the consent decree in the face of unanticipated increases in prison population. We think that any decision which purported now to find a lack of good faith on the part of the state in its efforts to comply with the specific WCC cell-space provisions would necessarily conflict to a significant degree with the broad findings of good faith made in Plyler I. That, of course, cannot be allowed, and we therefore must reject on this basis[2] the district court's crucial finding of a lack of good faith on the state's part here.
With that crucial finding rejected, the district court's balancing of interests, in which the state's lack of good faith played a critical part, is also undercut. Here again, we think that Plyler I's balancing analysis, in which the state's essential good faith is accepted, controls decision here. That analysis led to the conclusion in Plyler I that modification of the decree was warranted. We think the same analysis compels a comparable conclusion here.
In sum, we read Plyler I as having established as the law of this case the broad proposition that the general increase in all segments of the prison population in South Carolina since entry of the consent decree must be considered to have been reasonably unanticipated by the state, and that the state's failure to achieve compliance with the various cell-space provisions of the consent decree must in fairness be attributed to this unanticipated and uncontrollable development rather than to any lack of good faith effort on the state's part. From this necessarily follows the further proposition, which we also must accept as the law of this case, that strict compliance, on schedule, with the various cell-space provisions of the consent decree has now been revealed to be unachievable for reasons beyond the state's control and that those reasons warrant appropriate equitable relief upon proper request by the state. This means that general entitlement to some measure of equitable relief from these particular provisions of the consent decree should not be subject to continuous relitigation in this ongoing matter; general entitlement has been settled, barring drastic new developments not yet shown. But the

question of what may be appropriate equitable relief from particular cell-space provisions of course must remain a matter for the discretionary judgment of the injunction court. Obviously, Plyler I did not establish that appropriate relief is in every case the total, permanent abrogation of a specific obligation that was found appropriate in that case.[3] Instead specific relief must be shaped by the general equitable considerations 1329 peculiar to institutional reform litigation that we noted in Part II-A, *1329 and of course by practical considerations related to the particular provision at issue and the ability of the state to achieve compliance with any modified obligation that can be constructed.
III
It remains now to identify the precise error we find in the court's denial of the state's motion for modification, and to shape a proper mandate for correction of the error on remand.
The specific error we find is the court's refusal to give any relief from the cell-space requirements at issue. As indicated, the state sought either permanent abrogation of the particular cell-space provisions which prevented double-celling in 165 general population cells at WCC, or temporary relief from the provisions through January 1991. The district court declined to give either form of relief and instead ordered immediate, strict compliance by whatever means the state chose.
As we have held, Plyler I effectively established the state's entitlement to some form of appropriate relief from strict compliance with these cell-space provisions. On remand, the district court must therefore set its hand to devising that form of relief which will best insure continued progress toward achievement of the broad public policy objective of relieving over-crowding that underlies the cell-space requirements of the decree, while accommodating the present impossibility of achieving that objective by the originally intended means of constructing additional facilities on a specific timetable.
In seeking the appropriate accommodation, the court may of course continue to consider the alternative of early release of inmates as a device for achieving in whole or part the ultimate objectives at which the cell-space requirements are aimed. But for reasons specifically addressed in Plyler I, see 846 F.2d at 213-14, that alternative must be considered the accommodation of last resort, in view of the essentially unmeasurable but profound public interests which it implicates. See id. We note, however, that nothing said on the subject of early releases in Plyler I rules out the possibility that this draconian last alternative might properly be employed by the court on a sufficient showing of newly arisen bad faith on the state's part.
Obviously, the court on remand must also take into account any relevant developments in the interval since its order was entered. Of particular relevance would be any legislation addressing the general problem and the advent or imminent prospect of new facilities becoming available.[4]
In conclusion, we offer these observations for general guidance of the district court in the ongoing process of monitoring compliance with this consent decree in response to recurring and conflicting requests for cell-space relief by the parties. It is obvious to this court from its review of a succession of orders by the district court respecting the state's failure to achieve compliance with various cell-space requirements, that the district court has been and remains concerned with the bona fides of the state's efforts. This obviously has led the district court to feel that only by ordering strict compliance with these requirements (and denying any sought modification) may the objectives of the consent decree and fairness to the plaintiff class be achieved. In short, it is manifest that the district court has been convinced that the state is deliberately dragging its feet in this matter and has declined to do what it could and should in equity do to achieve compliance with the critical cell-space requirements of the consent decree. What must be accepted now, however, is that this view has been forcefully contested and defended in this court by skilled and dedicated counsel and by this court rejected. That the rejection was by a 1330 split panel *1330 decision attests that the question was a close and difficult one whose resolution implied no reproach to the district court's professional judgment, but simply the imposition of a conflicting judgment by a reviewing court. Nevertheless, as our decision in this case has emphasized, this basic view of the lack of bona fides of the state's efforts has now been authoritatively rejected and the contrary view imposed as the law of this case.

This means that the guiding principle for the district court from this point on in dealing with comparable issues must be to accept the necessity to make appropriate accommodations to what has now been determined to be a situation brought on, at least to this point in time, by factors beyond the state's effective control. This of course assumes that there shall not have been any supervening events after the date of this decision which draw in issue the continuing bona fides of the state. And it assumes the continuing obligation of the court to make only those accommodations which do not jeopardize achievement of the consent decree's ultimate objectives, including in particular those related to the provision of humane living space. In sum, the watchword must be flexibility in keeping such pressure on as is necessary to insure continued good faith efforts to comply while accommodating the reality of present inability to meet particular cell-space requirements.
For the reasons given, we vacate the district court's order denying the state's motion for modification, and remand for reconsideration of the motion in accordance with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
[1] The state originally also requested modification to permit continued use of day and TV rooms to house inmates, but this request has been dropped as moot.
[2] The state has attacked the court's lack-of-good-faith finding directly, on the basis that it is clearly erroneous. In support of this contention the state has pointed with considerable cogency to evidence of continued substantial capital funding of additional prison facilities by the legislature since Plyler I and down through 1989, and to further evidence of full compliance with all other terms of the decree respecting conditions at WCC. Appellant's Br. 12, 13. As the state correctly notes, neither of these factors bearing on the state's good faith was alluded to in the district court's memorandum opinion. See id. We of course have no way of knowing whether they nevertheless entered into the court's analysis.
As indicated in text, we think that the broad finding in Plyler I of the state's essential good faith in attempting to comply with cell-space requirements precludes the court's contrary finding here, and we rest decision on that basis.
[3] It is important to note that the only modification practically available in Plyler I was total and permanent abrogation, because it was sought to accommodate a fait accompli 0907 already constructed undersize cells. In most situations, including that presented here, less than total and permanent modification will be possible.
[4] Both of these possibilities were advanced by the state as reasons for the court to grant the requested modification. It was suggested that the legislature might, during the summer of 1990, act favorably on the state's request for additional prison facility funding. And it is undisputed that a major facility at Greenwood was scheduled to come on line in January of 1991.
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 305 S.C. 488 (1991) 409 S.E.2d 416
Harry PLYLER, for and on Behalf of the Plaintiff Class in Plyler, et al. v.
Evatt, et al. United States District Court Number C/A 82-876-2, as their representative, Respondent v.
Parker EVATT, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Michael Cavanaugh, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon
Services, Appellants.
23484
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard July 1, 1991. Decided September 24, 1991.
Attorney General T. Travis Medlock, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen. Kenneth P. Woodington, Legal Advisor Larry C. Batson, 489 of S.C. Dept. of Corrections, and Chief Legal Counsel Carl N. *489 Lundberg, of S.C. Dept. of Probation, Parole
and Pardon Services, Columbia, for appellants.
W. Gaston Fairey, Columbia, for respondent.
Heard July 1, 1991.
Decided Sept. 24, 1991.
GREGORY, Chief Justice:
This is an action for declaratory judgment seeking a judicial interpretation of S.C. Code Ann. §§ 24-13-710 and -720 (1989) concerning the eligibility of inmates for the supervised furlough program administered by appellants (Agencies). We affirm as modified.
Section 24-13-710 charges Agencies with the joint implementation of a supervised furlough program permitting release prior to parole eligibility for
carefully screened and selected inmates who have served the mandatory minimum sentence as required by law or have not committed a violent crime as defined in § 16-1-60 nor committed the crime of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree as defined in § 16-3-654 or the crime of committing or attempting a lewd act upon a child under the age of fourteen years as defined in § 16-15-140....
An inmate who meets this qualification must also meet certain "eligibility criteria" under § 24-13-710:
Eligibility criteria for the program include, but are not limited to, all of the following requirements:
(1) maintain a clear disciplinary record for at least six months prior to consideration for placement on the program;
(2) demonstrate to Department of Corrections' officials a general desire to become a law-abiding member of society;
(3) satisfy any other reasonable requirements imposed upon him by the Department of Corrections;

(4) have an identifiable need for and willingness to participate in authorized community-based programs and rehabilitative services;

490

*490 (5) have been committed to the State Department of Corrections with a total sentence of five

years or less as the first or second adult commitment for a criminal offense for which the inmate

received a sentence of one year or more.

The second statute in question, § 24-13-720, provides:

Unless sentenced to life imprisonment, an inmate under the jurisdiction or control of the Department of Corrections shall, within six months of the expiration of his sentence, be placed with the program provided for in § 24-13-710 and shall be subject to every rule, regulation, and condition of such programs. No inmate otherwise eligible under the provisions of this section for placement with the program under § 24-13-710 may be so placed unless he has maintained a clear disciplinary record for at least six months prior to eligibility for placement with such program. (Emphasis added.)

In administering the supervised furlough program, Agencies have interpreted § 24-13-720 to restrict furlough under § 24-13-710 by allowing early release only when an inmate is within six months of expiration of his sentence even if the inmate otherwise meets the requirements of § 24-13-710. Respondent commenced this action alleging Agencies' interpretation contravenes § 24-13-710. The trial judge held § 24-13-720 does not affect an inmate's eligibility for furlough under § 24-13-710.

On appeal, Agencies rely on the fact they have been interpreting § 24-13-710 in the same manner since 1982.[1] Although § 24-13-710 has never required that an inmate be within six months of expiration of sentence, in May 1982 Agencies implemented a program under the authority of § 24-13-710 which did include this six-month limitation. Agencies argue the enactment of § 24-13-720 in 1983 merely codified their existing practice of requiring that an inmate be within six months of expiration of sentence.

491 *491 We find this interpretation of legislative intent unpersuasive. Section 24-13-720 clearly contemplates a different class of inmates being considered for furlough, i.e. those within six months of expiration of sentence who do not qualify under § 24-13-710. This construction is supported by the fact that § 24-13-720 repeats the same eligibility requirement of § 24-13-710 regarding a clear six-month disciplinary record. Read in context with § 24-13-710, § 24-13-720 governs furlough eligibility for inmates whose total sentences exceed five years or who have committed a third offense for which they have received a sentence of at least one year since these inmates are not eligible for furlough under § 24-13-710(5). We therefore agree with the trial judge's ruling that § 24-13-720 is a separate furlough provision which does not affect the eligibility of inmates under § 24-13-710.

Having harmonized these two statutes, however, we find the pivotal issue is whether § 24-13-710 itself empowers Agencies to add the requirement that an inmate be within six months of expiration of sentence as an eligibility criterion. We conclude that it does.

Contrary to respondent's position, § 24-13-710 does not require furlough eligibility before eligibility for parole, it merely permits it. Agencies are expressly authorized under § 24-13-710 to develop policies, procedures, and guidelines for the furlough program. Further, § 24-13-710 states: "Eligibility criteria for the [supervised furlough] program shall include, but are not limited to, all of the following requirements...." Construing this language, we hold that under § 24-13-710 Agencies have the discretion to impose additional criteria for furlough eligibility. Agencies may therefore require an inmate to be within six months of the expiration of sentence before being eligible for furlough under § 24-13-710.

Affirmed as modified.

HARWELL, CHANDLER, FINNEY and TOAL, JJ., concur.

[1] The first version of § 24-13-710 was enacted in 1981 and was essentially the same as it is now except without eligibility criteria (4) and (5) and without the mandatory service provision. Changes have also been made from time to time regarding which crimes will disqualify an inmate for furlough.
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 438 S.E.2d 244 (1993)
Harry PLYLER, for and on behalf of the Plaintiff Class in Plyler, et al. v. Evatt, et al., United States District Court Number C/A 82-876-2, as their representative, Respondent, v.
Parker EVATT, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Michael Cavanaugh, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon
Services, Appellants.
No. 23928.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard June 8, 1993. Refiled November 8, 1993.
245 *245 Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen. Kenneth P. Woodington, Legal Advisor Larry C. Batson, of S.C. Dept. of Corrections, Chief Legal Counsel Carl N. Lundberg, of S.C. Dept. of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, Columbia, for appellants.
W. Gaston Fairey, Columbia, for respondent.
ORDER
We grant appellants' petition for rehearing. The original opinion is withdrawn and the following substituted therefor.
FINNEY, Justice:
This is a declaratory judgment action construing S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-720 (1989) prior to its 1993 amendment. The circuit court held the statute entitled all prisoners within six months expiration of their sentence, except those serving a life sentence or with recent disciplinary infractions, to participate in a Supervised Furlough Program (Program). The Commissioners of the Corrections Department and the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (the State) appeal. We affirm the circuit court's order and hold the 1993 amendment constituted a change in the law. All persons meeting the statutory requirements prior to the 1993 amendment are entitled to participate in the Program.[1]
South Carolina Code Ann. § 24-13-710 (1989) mandates the creation of a Supervised Furlough Program for "carefully screened and selected inmates who have served the mandatory minimum sentence as required by law" and who have not committed certain enumerated offenses.[2] The statute places five additional explicit conditions on eligibility, and permits the responsible agencies to create additional criteria for participation. Id.
Before its amendment, § 24-13-720 read, in pertinent part:
Unless sentenced to life imprisonment, an inmate ... shall, within six months of the expiration of his sentence, be placed with the program provided for in § 24-13-710 and shall be subject to every rule, regulation, and condition of such program. No inmate otherwise eligible for ... the program... may be so placed unless he has maintained a clear disciplinary record for at least six months prior to eligibility for [such] placement....
The circuit court held that § 710 and § 720 referred to the separate classes of inmates with different criteria for participation in the Program.
The State argues that the circuit court erred in failing to hold that an inmate eligible under § 720 must also meet 246 the eligibility *246 criteria found in § 710, as well as the additional criteria created under that statute's authority

before he can participate in the Program. This interpretation of § 720 has been consistently applied by the State since the statute's enactment in 1983.
While we give great weight to an agency's long-standing construction of a statute, such a construction is not dispositive. Gilstrap v. South Carolina Budget and Control Bd., ___ S.C. ___, 423 S.E.2d 101 (1992). We agree with the circuit court that the two statutes refer to two different classes of inmates and that the conditions for participation created by § 710 are not implied in § 720. Further, the primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Gilstrap v. South Carolina Budget and Control Bd., supra. We agree with the circuit court that the Legislature enacted § 720 to ensure a supervised transition period for inmates returning to society after an extended period of incarceration.
In 1993, § 24-13-720 was significantly amended. The changes are reflected below, with the added language underlined and the deleted language lined out:
Unless sentenced to life imprisonment, an inmate ... who has not been convicted of a violent crime under the provisions of Section 16-1-60 shall may, within six months of the expiration of his sentence, be placed with the program provided for in § 24-13-710 and shall be is subject to every rule, regulation, and condition of such the program. No inmate otherwise eligible under the provisions of this section for placement with the program under Section 24-13-710... may be so placed unless he has qualified under the selection criteria and process authorized by the provisions of Section 24-13-710. He must also have maintained a clear disciplinary record for at least six months prior to eligibility for such the placement. . . .
We are asked to decide whether this statutory amendment was a clarification of the original statute and thus indicative of the legislature's original intent, or whether it is a change in the law. We find the amendment made material changes from the original statute and thus is a departure from the original statute and not a clarification of it. See North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264 (1964). Therefore, the trial court's construction of the pre-amendment statutory language is
AFFIRMED.
HARWELL, C.J., and CHANDLER, TOAL and MOORE, JJ., concur.
[1] Thus individuals who were not eligible for release prior to June 14, 1993, may participate in the Program only if qualified under the amended statute. There is no ex post facto violation in applying the amended statute's criteria to individuals who committed offenses before its effective date because the Program is not part of the defendant's sentence. See Gunter v. State, 298 S.C. 113, 378 S.E.2d 443 (1989), overruled in part, Griffin v. State, ___ S.C. ___, 433 S.E.2d 862 (1993).
[2] Violent crimes as defined in S.C.Code Ann. § 16-1-60 (1985); third degree criminal sexual conduct under S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-654 (1985); and attempting or committing a lewd action on a child in violation of S.C.Code Ann. § 16-15-140 (1985).
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 Plyler v. Leeke, 804 F.2d 1251 (1986)
804 F.2d 1251 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. See CTA4 Rule 32.1. United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. Harry PLYLER, et al., (formerly Gary Wayne Nelson, et al.), Appellees,
v. William D. LEEKE, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Members of the South
Carolina Board of Corrections, Appellants. No. 86-7654. | Argued Oct. 9, 1986. | Decided Nov. 12, 1986.
D.S.C.
AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. C. Weston Houck, District Judge. (C/A 82-876)
Before PHILLIPS and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Kenneth Paul Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney General (T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General; Larry C. Batson, Legal Advisor, South Carolina Department of Corrections, on brief), for appellants.
W. Gaston Fairey (Fairey & Parise, P.A.; Steven Ney; National Prison Project, American Civil Liberties Union; Julie I. Edelson; Southern Prisoner’s Defense Committee, on brief), for appellees.
Opinion
PER CURIAM:
W. Gaston Fairey (Fairey & Parise, P.A.; Steven Ney; National Prison Project, American Civil Liberties Union; julie I. Edelson; Southern Prisoner’s Defense Committee, on brief), for appellees.
PER CURIAM:
*1 This appeal arises from a partial denial of cross motions to enforce and to amend a consent order containing detailed standards for the housing and care of prisoners in South Carolina’s correctional system. In large part, the appeal is moot and is not subject to review under the principle that it is subject to repetition while evading review. To the extent that the case is not moot, the order below is affirmed. Any new or continuing matters are left to the district judge for handling under the flexible discretion vested in him.
I.
A class action was filed on behalf of prisoners in South Carolina’s correctional system complaining of the conditions of their confinement. After considerable maneuvering, the parties entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement which was embodied in a consent decree.1 That decree addressed not only problems of overcrowding but other matters affecting the quality of the life of prison inmates.
1

Plyler v. Leeke, 804 F.2d 1251 (1986)
For the purpose of remedying overcrowded conditions, South Carolina embarked upon an ambitious program of prison construction and renovation. The settlement agreement contemplated that restrictions upon double celling and triple celling prisoners would be phased in as new facilities became available for use. The judge approved the decree by written order in March 1986.2
At about the time the written order was issued, the prison system began to experience extraordinary growth in its prison population. Growth had been anticipated at an average of some 30 to 50 prisoners per month. In the past, experience had conformed with official prediction, but in the spring of 1986 the system began to experience increases at more than twice the predicted rate. The consequence was that by late July 1986 there were approximately 530 non-conforming beds scattered through eleven separate facilities.
The district court held a hearing on July 21 and 22.
At the hearing, the state defendants sought a modification of the decree to permit the overcrowded conditions to continue until the prisoner early release program of the Omnibus Crime Act, Act 462 of 1986, becomes effective and operative in early 1987. That Act authorizes the early release of non-violent prisoners by the state parole board at the rate of 200 each month. The statute envisions the employment and training of additional parole officers to provide parole supervision for those additional parolees.
The district court did not grant the defendants’ requested relief, but it declined to order immediate strict compliance with the terms of the consent decree. It ordered the defendants to reduce the number of non-conforming beds by 200 within fifteen days, and to eliminate the remaining non-conforming beds by September 20.
The defendants complied with the order. Compliance required the early release of 149 prisoners on August 5 and 6, 1986, the average advance in their release dates being 26 days. There were no additional early releases of prisoners on September 20 because the opening of additional facilities had permitted the state to eliminate all non-conforming beds.
*2 The defendants had informed the judge that, though the state brought itself into compliance with the decree in September, it anticipated that heavy increases in the prison population might again create problems later in the fall of 1986. The district court did not foreclose further relief if the overcrowdedness problem recurred in the late fall of 1986. It informed the parties that a status conference would be held, upon request, at which further consideration would be given to the potential overcrowding problems, when they were better defined after September 20.
II.
Insofar as the July order required the elimination of 530 non-conforming beds by September 20, the appeal is clearly moot. By the early release of 149 prisoners in early August and by the transfer of prisoners to new facilities, the defendants brought themselves into complete compliance with the order by September 20.
The July order did not purport to deal with the defendants’ anticipation that an overcrowding problem would again arise later this year. The district court said it would hold a status conference and consider that question after September 20. As to that, there is no final order from which to appeal.
In July the district court declined the defendants’ request that they be required to do nothing about the 530 non-conforming beds until South Carolina’s Omnibus Crime Act was fully in place in January 1987. It did give them up to sixty days within which to achieve that elimination, and, as it turned out, compliance required the early release of no more than 149 non-violent prisoners.
From those circumstances, however, we can find no implicit rejection of the same request by the defendants in the context of an overcrowded condition arising late in 1986. As the effectiveness of the Omnibus Crime Act draws nearer, the stronger will grow the defendants’ argument that a federal court should defer to the state’s own self-correcting devices. There is some force in the defendants’ argument that court ordered early releases before the planned reenforcement of the state’s parole officers is undesirable. No one doubts that the defendants have striven manfully to bring and keep themselves within the requirements of the consent decree, and the district judge has demonstrated his willingness to give them time within which to
2

Plyler v. Leeke, 804 F.2d 1251 (1986)
eliminate non-conforming conditions.
The decree itself provides for its modification by the court upon petition of any party, and Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420 (4th Cir.1981) (en banc), teaches us that a decree such as this is subject to modification under appropriate circumstances. The district court adopted the Nelson approach. It struck a balance between the interests of the prisoners and those of the defendants and the public. It allowed the defendants up to sixty days to eliminate all of the 530 non-conforming beds, and it authorized the defendants to continue to house prisoners in the former guards’ quarters at the Central Correctional Institution and in temporary facilities at Manning.
*3 What the district court did is a strong indication that the court did not think the immediate elimination of every non-conformity with the consent decree is a constitutional imperative. We attach no importance to a chance remark of the judge that the decree itself was constitutionally required. The underlying class action was based upon allegations of constitutional violations, but the terms of the decree seem optimal, not constitutional imperatives. It is well settled in this circuit, of course, that every overcrowding of prisoners, double celling or triple celling, is not a violation of the federal Constitution. Crowe v. Leeke, 540 F.2d 740 (4th Cir.1976), West v. Edwards, 439 F.Supp. 722 (D.S.C.1977). Surely the district court knows those cases, and we construe his mention of the constitutional requirements as no more than a reference to the constitutional genesis of the consent decree.
In short, there is no reason to doubt that if overcrowding again occurs during the last quarter of this year and as implementation of South Carolina’s Omnibus Crime Act approaches, the district court will consider a requested modification of the order with the same flexibility with which it approached the July request, weighing the interests of the prisoners in immediate and strict enforcement of the consent decree against the interests of the defendants in the orderly administration of the corrections system and of the public in having lawful sentences carried out and in not having parolees put at large without sufficient supervision.
It should be apparent from the foregoing that the July order does not present an issue “capable of repetition yet evading review.” The issue was whether the district court should modify the consent decree and, if so, to what extent. That inquiry is sensitive to specific facts and requires a fresh balancing of interests each time a modification request is made. With respect to the 530 non-conforming beds in July, the district court decided to modify the decree, though not to the extent requested by the defendants. It appropriately refrained from ruling whether, or to what extent, it would order a modification of the decree if the overcrowding problem recurred after September 20 and before the new state statute is in full operation. Such a recurrence was predicted by the defendants, though, in July, its scope and dimension were ill defined. The balancing process could be more appropriately performed later when the factual situation is subject to more confident appraisal. At that later date, however, the equation will have changed, and the defendants’ contention that the remedy should be left to operation of the new state statute will have become stronger.
Moreover, this court has demonstrated a capability of hearing appeals in appropriate cases with great expedition.
III.
One aspect of the July order is final and is challenged on appeal.
Among the temporary facilities constructed by South Carolina to meet the overcrowding problem is a temporary facility inside the Manning Correctional Institution. Manning is a medium custody institution with ward-type housing. The temporary facility inside the Manning Institution also provides ward-type housing for 96 prisoners, and no one may be held there for more than 90 days without his consent. Consent is readily obtainable, however, for the new facility provides a more pleasant environment than the old.
*4 The consent decree, however, contains a provision that no “new institution” used to house prisoners at medium or maximum security levels shall include ward or cubicle style housing. The definitional section of the decree contains a broad definition of “institution” to include any building or facility operated by the Department of Corrections and used to house or serve prisoners.
The defendants contend that, in the context of the provision against future ward-type housing for medium and maximum security prisoners, the word “institution” means a prison complex and not individual buildings or facilities. The complex at
3

Plyler v. Leeke, 804 F.2d 1251 (1986)
Manning is called the Manning Correctional Institution, and other complexes are similarly styled. This contention is reenforced by reference in other sections of the decree where the words structures or enclosed spaces and facilities are used to describe temporary units.
The argument is not without weight, but we think the district court was warranted in accepting and applying the formal definition of the word institution in the decree. It is reasonable to suppose that the parties intended, at least, that ward-type housing in a temporary structure not be introduced into a medium or maximum security prison which does not already have that kind of housing.
While rejecting the defendants’ construction of this ambiguous portion of the consent decree, the district judge did authorize its continued use for six months from July 1986. There is no reason to suppose that he will not give consideration to a request for further extensions of that permissive use, a use that does not now appear to threaten any constitutionally protected right.
The “temporary” facility inside the Manning complex is not temporary in the sense that it is easily dismantled and discarded. It has a reenforced concrete base, twenty year warranted roof and all the necessary amenities. It provides an environment which the prisoners find more desirable than the facilities in the older portion of the complex. Its elimination would reduce the capacity of the correctional system by 96 persons and, conceivably, would create or exacerbate overcrowded conditions elsewhere.
The district court has the discretion to consider all of these things and, when it is called upon to consider the matter, will carefully balance the needs of the prisoners involved and those of the correctional system and of the public in deciding whether to extend the permissive use of this facility for an additional short or extended period. It has demonstrated that approach in the past, and the matter is best left to a proper exercise of its discretion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.

Parallel Citations

1986 WL 18030 (C.A.4 (S.C.))

Footnotes

1

The South Carolina General Assembly specifically authorized negotiations and approved the settlement. Appropriations Act, Part

III, Section IV, 1984 S.C. Acts 2177, 3107.

2

The parties began acting under the settlement agreement in January 1985. The judge orally approved the decree in court in

November 1985.

4

 
 Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
1986 WL 84459 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. South Carolina.
Harry PLYLER, et al. (Formerly Gary Wayne Nelson, et al.), Plaintiffs, v.
William D. LEEKE, Commissioner; South Carolina Department of Corrections; and Members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections, Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 3:82–0876–2. | March 26, 1986.
Opinion
HOUCK, District Judge.
*1 This cause is before the court for approval of the settlement agreement, as embodied in the Consent Decree submitted by the parties in February 1985. (See Appendix 1). 1
Notice of the proposed settlement, pursuant to the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), was given to the members of the plaintiff class, and they were permitted to file written objections or comments. Of the approximate nine thousand (9,000) inmates included in the plaintiff class, only seven (7) prepared and filed written objections to and/or comments on the proposed settlement agreement. One plaintiff, Jasper Buchanan, filed with the court an objection reportedly signed by sixty (60) other plaintiff-class members. Mr. Buchanan, an original signatory to the proposed Consent Decree, raised general objections to conditions of incarceration and specific complaints about the use of chemicals at a license tag facility located within the South Carolina Department of Corrections (hereinafter SCDC). The written objections were reviewed by the Honorable Charles W. Gambrell, United States Magistrate, who presented a report to this court on June 6, 1985. (See Appendix 3).
The court has thoroughly reviewed the terms of the proposed settlement agreement, the exceptions taken by some members of the plaintiff class, and the report filed by Magistrate Gambrell, as well as the law relating to the issues of overcrowding and prison conditions, see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), to determine whether or not the agreement is fair and reasonable and in the best interest of all those who will be affected by it. Based upon this input, the court now makes the following findings:
(1) This case began on May 5, 1982, when a complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Columbia Division, alleging that conditions within the SCDC were overcrowded and intolerable and in violation of the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution.
(2) Pursuant to motion of both parties, the court, on February 7, 1985, issued an order certifying the class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In so ordering, the court found that the class was composed of adult prisoners committed to the SCDC and those who would be committed in the future. Notice to class members was given in accordance with the court's order of March 26, 1985. Notice was also provided by counsel for the plaintiffs, who have visited all institutions operated by the SCDC, to meet with inmates and to answer any questions regarding the settlement proposal. The court finds the notice which was given to be reasonable and adequate under FED.R.CIV.P. 23(e).
1

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
(3) The proposed settlement agreement comes before this court after extensive negotiations have taken place between the parties. These negotiations occupied a period of two and one-half (2 ½) years and resulted in the proposed settlement being signed on January 8, 1985, by the attorneys for the plaintiffs and defendants, all defendants, 2 and certain members of the plaintiff class. 3
*2 (4) Beginning with the 1984–1985 General Appropriation's Act of the South Carolina Legislature, the legislature approved the proposed settlement agreement and appropriated considerable funds toward its implementation, as is more fully set forth in the stipulations of fact presented to this court on August 9, 1985. (See Appendix 4).
(5) The terms of the settlement agreement provide generally for a maximum number of inmates to be assigned to each of the existing institutions and certain minimum space requirements to be provided each of them in their housing assignments. Additionally, the settlement agreement provides for increased staffing, modernization and upgrading of medical facilities and staff, expansion of programs available to the inmates, and assurances that facilities operated by the defendants will be in compliance with applicable state fire and safety codes. Furthermore, the defendants are required by this agreement to provide for the development of a systemwide classification plan, the primary goal of which is the separation of violent and nonviolent offenders. The proposed settlement agreement also provides that all food services within the SCDC meet the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (hereinafter DHEC) standards and certain agreed-upon standards maintained by the American Correctional Association; that institutions be maintained in compliance with applicable state standards, including those set forth by DHEC and certain agreed-upon standards of the American Correctional Association as it deals with environmental sanitation; and that certain institutions within the SCDC be closed. In return for these provisions, the settlement agreement provides that the members of the plaintiff class release the defendants from any liability or damages arising out of the allegations of the complaint, that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice, and that this court retain jurisdiction for the enforcement of the agreement.
(6) When the terms of the proposed settlement agreement are considered as a whole and in light of the prevailing law on the issues of overcrowding and prison conditions, the settlement agreement is fair and reasonable. It is unlikely that further litigation of these issues would result in imposing substantially different requirements upon the defendants.
(7) The settlement agreement is in the best interest of those who are subject to it, and there is absolutely no evidence or intimation of collusion between any parties to the agreement. Further, protracted litigation of the issues involved in this lawsuit would not serve the interests of any of the parties hereto.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1. That the proposed Consent Decree is approved and incorporated by reference in this order; and
2. That the complaint is dismissed with prejudice, PROVIDED this court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for the enforcement of the provisions of the Consent Decree.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA COLUMBIA DIVISION
GARY WAYNE NELSON, et al., Plaintiffs,
2

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

vs.

WILLIAM D. LEEKE, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Members of South Carolina Board of Corrections, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 82–876–2

LATOE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Consent Decree

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. Definitions....................................................................................................................

II. General Principles........................................................................................................

III. Specific Terms of Settlement......................................................................................

A. Cell Housing..........................................................................................................................................

12

B. Wards/Cubicles......................................................................................................................................

13

C. Other Housing.......................................................................................................................................

14

D. Temporary Structures............................................................................................................................

15

E. Phased–In Compliance with Housing Standards..................................................................................

16

F. Construction and Renovation Schedule................................................................................................

21

G. Capacities...............................................................................................................................................

H. Staffing...................................................................................................................................................

24

I. Health Services......................................................................................................................................

31

J. Programs................................................................................................................................................

35

K. Fire Safety.............................................................................................................................................

39

L. Discipline...............................................................................................................................................

40

M. Classification.......................................................................................................................................... 43

N. Women's Institutions.............................................................................................................................

47

3

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

O. Visitation................................................................................................................................................

48

P. Physical Restraints.................................................................................................................................

49

Q. Food Service..........................................................................................................................................

51

R. Environmental Sanitation......................................................................................................................

56

S. Closing of Institutions...........................................................................................................................

63

T. Effective Date........................................................................................................................................

65

U. Compliance............................................................................................................................................

65

V. Attorneys' Fees......................................................................................................................................

68

IV. Appendices...................................................................................................................

A. Medical Health Care Standards, (2nd Edition, 1981; as revised, 1983), Standards for Adult

70

Correctional Institutions, American Correctional Association......................................................

B. Standards for Psychological Services in Adult Jails and Prisons (1979 Edition), American

89

Association of Correctional Psychologists.....................................................................................

C. Standards for Adult Community Facilities, American Correctional Association, regarding

104

Health Services...............................................................................................................................

Educational Programs Available 1/25/84 & 9/6/84.......................................................................

107

E. Standards for Adult Community Facilities, American Correctional Association, regarding Food

122

Services...........................................................................................................................................

F. Sleeping Space and Capacities of Defendants' Institutions...........................................................

124

G. Reports and Recommendations Regarding Staffing, January 1984, National Institute of

130

Corrections......................................................................................................................................

V. Signatures.....................................................................................................................

Page I. Definitions ........................................................... 3 II. General Principles .................................................... 5III. Specific Terms of Settlement A. Cell Housing ................................................... 12 B. Wards/Cubicles ................................................. 13 C. Other Housing .................................................. 14 D. Temporary Structures ........................................... 15 E. Phased“In Compliance with Housing Standards .................... 16 F. Construction and Renovation Schedule ........................... 21 G. Capacities H. Staffing ....................................................... 24 I. Health Services ................................................ 31 J. Programs ....................................................... 35 K. Fire Safety .................................................... 39 L. Discipline ..................................................... 40 M. Classification ................................................. 43 N. Women's Institutions ........................................... 47 O. Visitation ..................................................... 48 P. Physical Restraints ............................................ 49 Q. Food Service ................................................... 51 R. Environmental Sanitation ....................................... 56 S. Closing of Institutions ........................................ 63 T. Effective Date ................................................. 65 U. Compliance ..................................................... 65 V. Attorneys' Fees ................................................ 68 IV. Appendices A. Medical Health Care Standards, (2nd Edition, 1981; as revised, 1983), Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, American Correctional Association ............................ 70 B.

4

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
Standards for Psychological Services in Adult Jails and Prisons (1979 Edition), American Association of Correctional Psychologists ................................................ 89 C. Standards for Adult Community Facilities, American Correctional Association, regarding Health Services ......... 104 Educational Programs Available 1/25/84 & 9/6/84 ............... 107 E. Standards for Adult Community Facilities, American Correctional Association, regarding Food Services ........... 122 F. Sleeping Space and Capacities of Defendants' Institutions ..... 124 G. Reports and Recommendations Regarding Staffing, January 1984, National Institute of Corrections ........................... 130 V. Signatures .......................................................... 167
I. Definitions *3 A. “Plaintiffs” refers to all persons sentenced or confined at present or in the future to the legal custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, except those voluntarily confined in designated facilities as defined in South Carolina Code 24–3–20.
B. “Defendants” refers to the present and any future Commissioner and members of the Board of Corrections of the South Carolina Department of Corrections.
C. “Institutions” refers to all buildings, offices and facilities at present and in the future under the control and supervision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and used to provide housing or services to Plaintiffs.
D. “Temporary structure” refers to any type of enclosed space or facility, of any type of material, in which it is proposed to place any Plaintiffs overnight, and which is not affixed to the ground with a permanent foundation.
E. “Emergency” refers to any sudden unforeseen event which is not within the control or causation of Defendants or any other branch of the South Carolina state government, including but without limitation to riots, fire, and other natural disasters.
F. “Health services” includes services for medical, dental and mental health needs of Plaintiffs.
G. “Segregation”, unless otherwise designated, refers to any form of restricted, lock-down confinement, including administrative and disciplinary segregation, investigative segregation, protective custody, death row, mental health units, and maximum security units.
H. “Full-time, meaningful programs” refers to organized, supervised programs, including but not limited to exercise, vocational training, education courses, work assignments, work release and prison industries, which allow opportunity for five hours per day participation and engagement in intellectual or physical activity.
I. “Cubicle” refers to any non-secure housing area characterized by walls that do not reach the ceiling and having open doorways.
J. “Sleeping space” refers to a space set aside for sleeping purposes.
II. General Principles A. The Defendants shall within six (6) months from the date of entry of this Decree submit to this Court a written report setting forth any timetable not included in this Decree, to fully implement the proposals made in the Decree. Plaintiffs shall have sixty (60) days to object to this report.
B. For any plans discussed in this Decree, the parties shall make a reasonable effort to resolve any issue in controversy through negotiation, but if the parties are unable to resolve the controversy through this process the plan shall be submitted to the Court
5

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
for a hearing on the issues. In any event, all plans shall be submitted to the Court for approval and, upon approval, shall be incorporated into this Decree by reference.
C. The Court shall retain jurisdiction in this case to ensure that the Decree and all plans incorporated herein are fully implemented.
D. Counsel for Plaintiffs shall have access to and may receive copies of documents which effectuate the implementation of this Decree. Counsel for Plaintiffs shall have access to all Plaintiffs at reasonable times and under reasonable circumstances. Plaintiff's counsel shall have access to all staff and institutions, upon reasonable notice to Defendants' counsel. Defendants' counsel may be present at any meetings between Plaintiffs' counsel and Defendants' staff.
*4 E. Defendants shall immediately explain the terms of this Decree to all of their agents, servants, representatives, and employees, including institutional staff, correctional officers and other personnel, in order to assure their understanding of the requirements of this decree and the necessity for strict compliance therewith. Defendants shall require strict compliance with this Decree by said persons. Defendants shall require continued training of all staff regarding this Decree.
F. Defendants shall provide continuous notice of this Decree's terms to all members of the Plaintiff class by:
(1) publishing, within ten (10) days of the signing of this Decree by the Court, an agreed-upon synopsis of this Decree in the SCDC publication “The Intercom” and hereafter incorporating the agreed-upon synopsis into all future printings of the Inmate Guide;
(2) posting, within ten (10) days of the signing of this Decree by the Court and continuously thereafter, copies of this Decree in all housing units;
(3) making ten copies of this Decree available, within ten (10) days of the signing of this Decree and continuously thereafter, in all institutional libraries; and
(4) providing a copy of this Decree to each Plaintiff, within ten (10) days of the signing of this Decree and continuously thereafter, upon written request by such Plaintiff class member.
G. Members of the Plaintiff class shall have the right to individually submit written objections to the Court, within forty days of the submission of this Decree to the Court, under such terms and conditions as required by the Court.
H. This Decree shall be deemed to serve as settlement of claims for injunctive relief concerning the conditions of confinement discussed herein applicable to more than the individual circumstances of a particular plaintiff class member. This Decree does not affect the right of an individual to pursue individual claims for monetary relief. If a Plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, he/she may do so, as long as such lawsuit does not pertain to those conditions of confinement throughout an institution(s) addressed in this Decree. As to conditions of confinement discussed herein, throughout an institution(s), the operation of the prison system at any level at or under the capacities set forth herein and operation of any single institution or housing facility at or under the capacities set forth herein, shall be a defense to any claim for equitable relief regarding overcrowding of any such institutions.
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, as to those conditions of confinement, throughout an institution(s) addressed in this Decree, the operation of such institutions in compliance with this Decree shall be a complete defense to any equitable claim based upon such conditions. This Decree shall not resolve any issues involving use of long-term segregation, inmate pay in the future, or increases in costs of hygiene supplies.
6

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
*5 I. Unless specific provision for extension is otherwise made in this Decree, any timetable proposed in this Decree may be subject to extension by the Court upon a showing of reasonable grounds for such extension by the Defendants so long as the need for delay is not caused by the neglect or dereliction or actions of Defendants. If the Defendants lack resources or funding to meet a requirement set out herein, the Court may grant up to an additional sixty (60) days in which Defendants may obtain funding; however, if a recognized need for additional funding occurs while the General Assembly is not in session, the Court may grant up to sixty (60) days extension from the date the General Assembly convenes. Plaintiffs reserve the right to object in good faith, and oppose any requests for extensions of time by the Defendants.
J. Upon any motion for supplemental relief pertaining to this Decree, that Motion shall take priority and the Court will hear said Motion no later than thirty (30) days after the filing of such Motion and the Court will rule on such Motion no later than forty-five (45) days from completion of the hearing. Such time limits may be extended by the Court in order to substantially further the interests of the parties.
K. If any institution or part thereof is not brought into compliance with the requirements of this Decree and such non-compliance constitutes a substantial threat to the health, safety and welfare of members of the Plaintiff class, such institution(s) or part thereof shall not be used to house Plaintiffs.
L. In the event of an emergency, as defined in Part I—Section E above, which Defendants in good faith believe to require the temporary waiver of any of the provisions of this Decree, Defendants shall notify the Court and Plaintiffs' counsel of the emergency and need for waiver within twenty-four (24) hours of the onset of emergency. Such notice shall identify the emergency, the specific provisions of this Decree which Defendants believe must be temporarily waived, the reason necessitating the waiver, the exhaustion of other alternatives to waiver, and the anticipated duration of the waiver. If Plaintiffs have a good faith disagreement with the proposed waiver or its duration, the controversy shall be submitted to the Court for hearing and determination.
M. The parties agree that this Decree establishes minimum standards by which Defendants shall maintain and operate their institutions and that it is not intended to prevent Defendants from implementing new programs or changes in physical conditions which benefit Plaintiffs; nor is the Decree intended to, and it shall not, have the effect of decreasing or abrogating the rights, programs or conditions which existed prior to this Decree pursuant to Defendants' policies, procedures or other lawsuit settlements; nor to abrogate any substantive rights or procedural protection Plaintiffs may now have or hereafter acquire under state or federal statutes. The parties agree that this Decree represents the entire intent of the parties and shall not be modified except as stated within this Decree. The Defendants shall carry out every provision of this Decree in good faith.
*6 N. All parties agree that this action is appropriate for certification as a class action as herein defined, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
O. The parties expressly agree that this Agreement is not an admission of constitutional violations, nor does this Agreement establish constitutional minimum or maximum standards with respect to the claim of “overcrowding”. The parties have entered into this Agreement solely as a means to put a reasonable end to the controversy, to avoid the costs, time and risks which litigation would involve for both parties, and this Agreement should not be construed in any manner as establishing constitutional standards, minimums or maximums or thresholds of constitutional harm to Plaintiffs. Neither this Agreement nor the Judgment that may follow from this Agreement, nor anything contained herein or therein, shall constitute or be construed as evidence or as an admission or adjudication with respect to any fact or conclusion of law with respect to any matter alleged in or arising out of the complaint or of any wrongdoing or misconduct on the part of the Defendants.
7

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
P. Except to the extent Defendants agree to be bound by and subject to the enforcement of the specific terms of this Decree, Defendants do not herein waive any defense available to them or any agency or agent of the State of South Carolina now or in the future. In particular, Defendants do not by entering upon this Agreement waive the defense of the Eleventh Amendment or any immunity on behalf of themselves or any agent or agency of the State of South Carolina.
Q. This Decree is solely enforceable by the Plaintiff class and through the Plaintiff class with class remedies.
R. Violation of this Decree shall not serve as the basis of liability of the Defendants to any individual Plaintiff, absent proof of proximate cause and damage.
S. The parties agree that concurrently with the approval of this Decree by the Court, the Court shall enter an Order of Settlement dismissing the Complaint with prejudice and retaining jurisdiction for enforcement of this Decree.
T. This Consent Decree may be modified in the future by mutual and joint petition of the parties or their successors, or upon petition of any party. Said petition shall be made to the Court and approved by the Court, after notice and hearing, by an Order amending the Consent Decree. Any disputed petition for modification shall be reviewed by the Court under the applicable law pertaining to modification of Consent Decrees.
U. No remedial action, including sanctions, shall be taken against the named Defendants in their individual capacities unless the Court specifically finds, following a hearing, that those Defendants, or any of them, have acted in bad faith. For purposes of this paragraph, no Defendant shall be deemed to have acted in bad faith if budgetary constraints are the reason for his or her failure to satisfy the terms of this Decree, so long as that individual has made good faith effort to obtain the necessary funding.
III. Specific Terms of Settlement
A. Cell Housing *7 Defendants agree that the following arrangements shall apply to all housing of Plaintiffs:
1. In no event shall a cell or cubicle be used to confine more than two prisoners, except as provided herein.
2. Any Plaintiff confined to a cell more than twelve (12) hours per day shall be single-celled, in a cell containing at least forty (40) square feet of sleeping space in present institutions and fifty (50) square feet of sleeping space in any future institutions. This includes, but is not limited to, Plaintiffs classified as protective custody, mentally ill, or in administrative segregation, investigative segregation or disciplinary segregation. However, Plaintiffs assigned to Protective Custody may voluntarily request and receive a cell-mate for double-celling, subject to the criteria established pursuant to paragraph one (1) of section III M.
3. A Plaintiff in general population who is confined to a cell less than twelve (12) hours per day may be double-celled but shall be provided with at least fifty (50) square feet of sleeping space per person. However, up to one-half of the cells presently used for general population in the following present buildings may be double-celled:
Perry Correctional Institution, (Dorms 1, 2, 3, 4); Central Correctional Institution, (CB–3 Only); Kirkland Correctional Institution, (five of seven presently existing sixty-four-cell dorms); MacDougall Youth Correction Center, (Dorms 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); Women's Correctional Center (five of the seven presently existing forty-eight cell cottages).
8

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
If there is available bed space (other than short term) at other institutions of comparable classification, Defendants shall make good faith effort to reasonably and rationally use such bed space, to minimize double-celling at each of the institutions listed above. Not more than one-half of any institution's general population shall be double-celled, except as provided above, unless the double-cells are at least 100 square feet.
4. In the event the Defendants wish to construct new facilities in addition to those institutions listed in Appendix F of this Decree, not already planned or under construction as of the date of this Decree, which vary from the space allocations discussed herein, Defendants shall submit the plans for such facilities to Plaintiffs' counsel and the Court. If Plaintiffs object to the plans, then the Court shall make a determination as to the reasonableness of or necessity for said variance, in light of but not limited to the requirements of this Decree and the totality of the conditions, and shall determine whether or not said variance shall be permitted. The parties agree that the process for variance described in this sub-section applies solely to new construction.
B. Wards/Cubicles 1. Each Plaintiff confined to a ward, or cubicle, or to a room in a pre-release or work release center shall be provided with at least forty-five (45) square feet of sleeping space per person, except that Plaintiffs confined in wards at medium/maximum security institutions such as Central Correctional Institution and Manning Correctional Institution shall each be accorded fifty (50) square feet of sleeping space per person. There shall be no double-bunking in the wards.
*8 2. Each Plaintiff confined to a cubicle less than twelve (12) hours per day may be required to share the cubicle with one other person, but there shall be at least forty-five (45) square feet of sleeping space per person in such cubicles.
3. No future institutions used to house Plaintiffs classified at medium or maximum security levels shall include ward or cubiclestyle housing. Any future minimum security institution which includes wards or cubicle-style housing shall house no more than fifty (50) Plaintiffs per ward or cubicle-dorm.
C. Other Housing 1. No Plaintiff shall be confined or housed in an area of an institution not designed for or suitable for housing (for example, hallways, dayrooms, classrooms, gyms, storerooms shall not be used for temporary housing or sleeping assignments).
2. No Plaintiff shall be confined in a county or local detention facility, once sentenced to the custody of Defendants, for longer than thirty (30) days, without his/her voluntary, written consent, except pursuant to lawful detainer, lawful summons for trial, or pending lawful extradition, or for temporary detention not exceeding seventy-two (72) hours pending transfer between Defendants' institutions.
D. Temporary Structures 1. Temporary structures shall be used for housing Plaintiffs only after Defendants have certified to the Court and Plaintiffs' counsel: (a) all other legislated alternatives which have been considered and used to the extent reasonable (including but not limited to the Prison Overcrowding Powers Act, 1983 Act No. 123, and the Corrections Reform Act, 1981 Act No. 100) and (b) the present need for use of temporary structures.
2. Plaintiffs shall be permitted the opportunity to respond and object to any use of temporary structures and to submit this controversy to the Court for hearing.
9

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
3. In the event that temporary structures are used by Defendants to house or confine Plaintiffs, their use shall comply with the following conditions:
a. The structures shall comply with applicable state and national fire safety standards, including the National Fire Protection Association Code (Document 101, 1981) and National Fire Protection Association Standards 102 and 701.
b. The structures shall be adequately staffed to provide safety and security to Plaintiffs and to Defendants;
c. The structures shall comply with American Corrections Association Standard 2–4131 (2nd ed., 1981) relating to provisions of toilets, hot and cold running water, temperature, lighting, ventilation and noise.
d. Plaintiffs assigned to the structures shall have the same access to dayrooms, activity areas and programs as all other Plaintiffs.
e. Plaintiffs assigned to the structures shall not be so assigned beyond ninety (90) days, unless Plaintiffs so assigned indicate in writing their voluntary willingness to continue in the assignment.
f. No double-bunks shall be used in the structures.
g. At least forty-five (45) square feet of sleeping space shall be provided to each Plaintiff assigned to the structures.
*9 h. All other provisions of this Decree shall be applicable to Plaintiffs assigned to the structures.
E. Phased–In Compliance with Housing Standards 1. Statement of Understanding The parties acknowledge that the following factors will affect the achievement of compliance with the sleeping space allotments required by this Decree:
a. Defendants cannot effectively operate institutions which have an actual count of more than approximately ninety-five (95) percent of the required capacity, because of the need for flexibility in having some available space at all institutions at all times.
b. Based on the sleeping space figures furnished by Defendants and included in Appendix F, the housing units now existing shall house no more than seven thousand ninety-four (7,094) persons and, with planned renovations no more than seven thousand three hundred eighty-five (7,385) persons, within five (5) years of the signing of this Decree by the parties, which will require a reduction in existing institutions, based on June 21, 1984 count figures of eight thousand two hundred sixty-one (8,261) prisoners.
c. Defendants anticipate an average net increase of thirty (30) to fifty (50) prisoners per month, over the next five years.
d. Defendants plan to construct at least three (3) new institutions (Lieber, McCormick, New Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center), in order to reduce the present base population of eight thousand two hundred sixty-one (8,261) at existing institutions.
e. Defendants anticipate that all presently planned new construction and structural increases in the capacities of existing institutions will be completed within thirty-six (36) months of the signing of this Decree by the parties.
10

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
f. Plaintiffs are concerned that Plaintiffs not be housed in institutions which do not meet the sleeping space, fire safety, health services, food services, and environmental sanitation standards established in this Decree.
g. Notwithstanding the figures given in subsections 1(b) and 1(d) of this section and in Appendix F, the sleeping space requirements of this Decree, parts IIIA–D shall govern, pursuant to time schedules established in this Decree.
2. Compliance Steps Therefore, Defendants shall achieve compliance with the space allocations required by this Decree according to the following priorities:
a. All triple-celling and assignment of more than two prisoners to cells and cubicles measuring less than one hundred fifty (150) square feet shall immediately cease. However, present triple-celling may continue at Campbell and Lower Savannah Work Release Centers for eighteen months, in order for the Defendants to find appropriate and necessary space for a comparable number of work release prisoners within that time. Further, all present triple-celling at Northside or Wateree shall end within twelve (12) months from the signing of this Decree by the parties and no additional Plaintiff shall be triple-celled in Northside or Wateree after the signing of this Decree by the parties. The Defendants shall make all reasonable efforts to end all such triple-celling as soon as possible.
*10 b. Plaintiffs confined to their housing units for more than twelve (12) hours per day shall receive the sleeping space required by this Decree within twelve (12) months of the signing of this Decree by the parties.
c. Plaintiffs assigned to medium or maximum security institutions or housing units shall receive the sleeping space required by this Decree within six (6) months from the completion of Lieber and McCormick but no later than within thirty-six (36) months from the signing of this Decree by the parties and all double-bunking shall be eliminated. Until that time, where double-bunking occurs in medium/maximum security institutions, any double-bunks shall be placed against the walls.
d. All other Plaintiffs, i.e. those not housed in medium or maximum security institutions shall receive the sleeping space required by this Decree within five (5) years of the signing of this Decree by the parties and double-bunks shall be eliminated at that time. In the meantime, any additional double-bunks in the wards shall be placed against the walls.
e. Compliance as outlined in paragraphs (c) and (d) above shall be achieved in the following way:
(1) From the date of the signing of this Decree by the parties, for a period of thirty-six (36) months, prisoner population at each such institution and housing unit may fluctuate above the count established at the date of the signing of this Decree and the maximum count which may be reached within five (5) years of the signing of this Decree, provided that Defendants give Plaintiffs' counsel and the Court notice and proof every six (6) months of:
(a) Compliance with the schedules for construction, renovation, fire safety and environmental sanitation established in Section III–F, III–K and III–R below, and
(b) Accuracy of Defendants' predictions of the overall population increases for that time.
(2) If proof of compliance with (a) and (b) above is not or cannot be provided, then the parties agree that the Court shall order immediate relief, which may include population reductions, release or transfer of prisoners (providing such transfer does not violate other provisions of this Decree), or other appropriate relief, at each of Defendants' institutions which do not meet the standards established in this Decree.
11

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

(3) From the date of three (3) years after the signing of this Decree until five (5) years after the signing of this Decree, the prisoner population at each such institution and housing units as described in (d) above shall be reduced in equal percentage increments of twenty-five (25) percent every six (6) months for such prisoner population over the capacities set forth in this Decree, except that if Defendants provide proof of good cause for a delay in reaching the six (6) month goal at a particular institution, then they may have an additional thirty (30) days in which to reach the required population at that institution.
(4) Defendants shall, to the extent authorised by law and statute make maximum use of community-based alternatives to incarceration, including Special Furloughs and Work Release programs, in order to decrease the number of Plaintiffs incarcerated.

F. Construction and Renovation Schedule *11 1. The schedule for the construction and renovation, required for the Defendants to reach the housing capacities established by the standards stated in this Decree, shall be determined by the following specific dates, for the completion of each of the following tasks as may be necessary, at each of the following institutions:

Institutions:

CCI Guards

CCI Stoney

MCI Lock-up

WCC Dorm

CCI MSC

Tasks

1) Site Selection

By SCDC

SCDC

SCDC

SCDC

SCDC

2) Land surveys

#

#

#

#

#

3) Soil boring

#

#

#

#

#

4) Purchase prop.

#

#

#

#

#

5) Advertise for A & E firm

#

#

#

#

#

6) Evaluate bids

#

#

#

#

#

7) Select A & E firm

#

#

#

#

#

8) Site drawings completed

#

#

#

#

#

9) Site work completed

#

#

#

#

#

10) Constn. drawings compld.## 11) Solicit constn. bids

#

#

#

#

#

#

#

#

#

12) Select Constn. Contractor

#

#

#

#

#

13) Begin Constn.

12/15/84

2/18/85

7/1/85

1/15/85

7/1/85

14) Completed

12/15/85

6/30/85

12/30/85

12/31/85

9/30/86

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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

New

New

New

DCI

Lieber

McCorm.

R & E

Sec.

Compl.

4/16/84

7/23/84

–––

Compl.

4/23/84

9/23/84

–––

Compl.

5/14/84

9/10/84

–––

Compl.

3/13/84

N/A

–––

Compl.

6/4/84

11/18/84

–––

Compl.

6/25/84

12/9/84

–––

Compl.

8/1/84

12/17/84

8/12/85

Compl.

6/14/85

2/27/85

N/A

Compl.

7/15/85

6/10/85

N/A

Compl.

11/4/85

11/25/85

9/2/85

Compl.

1/1/86

12/2/85

9/16/85

Compl.

2/15/86

2/17/86

12/2/85

10/25/84

3/3/86

3/3/86

1/6/86

7/1/86

10/3/87

10/30/87

10/30/87

2. All facilities constructed by or used by Defendants, now and in the future, shall meet Defendants' and Plaintiffs' classification needs and housing facilities shall not be constructed which do not meet such classification needs at the time of construction.

3. Progress reports from the contractors or construction supervisors on each of the projects listed in (1) above shall be provided quarterly to Plaintiffs' counsel. Defendants shall require that for any such report which indicates that a construction project is behind schedule, said report shall also include a plan, for “catching up” and meeting the required construction schedule before the date of the following quarterly report.

G. Capacities *12 1. Each institution shall have a maximum prescribed population established by the criteria contained in this Decree. In the event Defendants are not able to maintain the required population for any particular institution's housing units at any given time, Defendants may be in non-compliance with the required population no more than five percent (5%) over the required figure in such institutions containing two hundred (200) or more prisoners and no more than ten per cent (10%) over the required figure in institutions containing less than two hundred (200) prisoners, so long as the populations of all of Defendants' institutions do not exceed one hundred percent (100%) of the combined totals of all maximum capacities for such institutions established by this Decree and no individual Plaintiff has been improperly housed for more than sixty (60) days in any one calendar year. Upon notice that an individual Plaintiff has been improperly housed for up to fifty (50) days within one calendar year, Defendants may have up to ten (10) days to correct said Plaintiff's housing. As a general principle, the parties agree that it is not the intent of
13

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
this paragraph to authorize the Defendants to continually exceed the capacity established by this Decree at any given institution for an extended period of time, but it is the intent to provide the flexibility required to achieve compliance.
2. If at any point, proof of compliance with paragraph (1) is not or cannot be provided, the Court shall order immediate relief, which may include population reductions including release, or transfer of prisoners or other relief as the Court deems appropriate, at each of Defendants' institutions which do not meet the standards established in this Decree, provided that any such transfers do not violate provisions of this Decree.
3. The sixty-day limitation above shall not be subject to any extension, including as set forth in part II–I of this Decree.
H. Staffing
1. Deployment a. Within ninety (90) days of the signing of this Decree by the parties, Defendants shall submit a plan to Plaintiffs and the Court for the employment and assignment of adequate numbers of staff, to ensure Plaintiffs reasonable safety and security and compliance with this Decree.
b. If approved, said plan shall be implemented within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by the parties.
c. In no event shall staff numbers and prisoner/staff ratios at medium and maximum security institutions decrease below the level of January 25, 1983. Defendants agree that adequate deployment of correctional staff shall include assignment of officers to the inside of each ward and cellblock on each shift within medium and maximum security institutions. Defendants agree that post assignments and staffing patterns at all institutions will be created in line with the general principles recommended by the NIC study for all institutions described in (3) below and attached in the Appendix to this Decree. All officers shall be stationed so that they have visual observation or voice contact with all of the Plaintiffs in the given cell-block or ward at all times, except at pre-release centers or work release centers, or during unforeseeable emergencies which would require an officer to temporarily leave his or her post.
*13 d. Defendants shall not assign or permit prisoners to exercise authority over other prisoners in any aspect of the administration of Defendants' institutions or programs, including the areas of discipline, job assignment, housing assignment, income, access to medical care, access to confidential or institutional information concerning inmates; provided that the foregoing does not preclude the use of prisoner work supervisors at employment within the Department of Corrections who do not discipline, hire, retain, fire, determine, pay or evaluate performance, or the use of clerk runners who do not have access to inmate records.
2. Training a. Defendants shall provide training to all staff in compliance with the following standards of the American Correctional Association (2nd ed. 1981), Standards 2–4079 through 2–4101, including 1983 revisions by the ACA, provided that, for Sections 2–4090, 2–4091, 2–4092 and 2–4093, Defendants shall have three years to phase-in full compliance with the requirement that employees receive “an additional 40 hours of training each subsequent year of employment”:
2–4079. Written policy and procedure provide that the institution's training programs for all employees are specifically planned, coordinated, and supervised by a qualified employee at the supervisory level, and reviewed annually.
14

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
2–4080. The individual coordinating the training and staff development program has received specialized training for that position. At a minimum, full-time training personnel should have completed a 40 hour training-for-trainers course.
2–4081. There is an advisory training committee composed of the institution's training officer and representatives from various institution departments. The committee develops a training plan for the institution, meets at least quarterly to review progress and resolve problems, maintains a written record of its deliberations, and reports to the warden/superintendent. (Revised, 1983)
2–4082. (Deleted, 1983)
2–4083. The institution's training and staff development plan provides for an ongoing formal evaluation of all pre-service, inservice, and specialized training programs, with a written report prepared annually.
2–4084. Library and reference services are available to complement the training and staff development program.
2–4085. The training and staff development program uses the resources of other public and private agencies, private industry, colleges, and libraries.
2–4086. Space and equipment required for the training and staff development program is available.
2–4087. The budget includes funds for reimbursing staff for additional time spent in training or for replacement personnel required when regular personnel are off duty for training purposes.
2–4088. Written policy and procedure provide that all new full-time employees receive 40 hours of orientation/training prior to being independently assigned to a particular job. This orientation/training is to include, at a minimu, orientation to the purpose, goals, policies and pro-cedures of the institution and parent agency; working conditions and regulations; responsibilities and rights of employees; and an overview of the correctional field. Depending upon the employee(s) and the requirements of the particular job, the orientation/training may include some preparatory instruction related to the particular job. There are provisions for acknowledging and giving credit for prior training received.
*14 2–4089. Written policy and procedure provide that all clerical/support employees who have minimal contact with inmates receive an additional 16 hours of training during the first year of employment or within one (1) year after the signing of this Decree by the parties and 16 hours of training each year thereafter. [Modified]
2–4090. Written policy and procedure provide that all support employees who have regular or daily inmate contact receive an additional 40 hours of training during their first year of employment and an additional 40 hours of training each subsequent year of employment.
2–4091. Written policy and procedure provide that all professional specialists employees who have inmate contact receive an additional 40 hours of training each subsequent year of employment.
2–4092. Written policy and procedure provide that all new correctional officers receive an additional 120 hours of training during their first year of employment and an additional 40 hours of training each subsequent year of employment. At a minimum this training covers the following areas:
a) Security procedures
b) Supervision of inmates
15

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
c) Use of force regulations and tactics d) Report writing e) Inmate rules and regulations f) Rights and responsibilities of inmates g) Fire and emergency procedures h) Firearms training i) Key control j) Interpersonal relations k) Social/cultural life styles of the inmate population l) Communication skills m) First aid 2–4093. Written policy and procedure provide that all administrative and managerial staff receive an additional 40 hours of training during their first year of employment, and an additional 40 hours of training each subsequent year of employment. This training covers the following areas, at a minimum: general management and related subjects; labor law; employee-management relations; the interaction of elements of the criminal justice system; and relationships with other service agencies. 2–4094. When there is an emergency unit, written policy and procedure provide that all assigned officers have one year of experience as a correctional officer, which includes 160 hours of training, that they receive 40 hours of relevant emergency unit training prior to assignment, which may be part of the first year training (160 hours), and that at least 16 hours of the 40 hours of annual training be specifically related to emergency unit assignment. 2–4095. All part-time staff receive formal orientation appropriate to their assignments and additional training as needed. 2–4096. Prior to assignment to a post involving possible use of a firearm, all pesonnel authorized to use firearms receive appropriate firearm training; this training covers the use, safety, care, and constraints involved in the use of firearms. All authorized personnel are required to demonstrate competency on at least an annual basis. 2–4097. All personnel authorized to use chemical agents are thoroughly trained in their use and in the treatment of individuals exposed to the chemical agent. *15 2–4098. All security personnel are trained in approved methods of self-defense and the use of force as a last resort to control inmates. [Modified] 2–4099. Written policy and procedure encourage employees to continue their education.
16

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
2–4100. (Deleted, 1983)
2–4101. The institution encourages and provides administrative leave and/or reimbursement for employees attending approved professional meetings, seminars and/or similar work-related activities. (Revised, 1983)
3. Recommendations a. The report of the staffing study of defendant's institutions conducted by the National Institution of Corrections in January 1984 shall be attached and included in the Appendix to this Decree.
b. Defendants shall submit a plan for the reasonably prompt implementation of all recommendations made in the National Institute of Corrections' study of the staffing in Defendants' institutions, within ninety (90) days of the signing of this Decree by the parties unless Defendants show good cause for finding that particular NIC recommendations are inappropriate. Any disputes shall be submitted to the Court, per Section II of this Decree.
I. Health Services
1. Services a. Defendants shall comply with Standards 2–2120 through 2–2134 (as modified) and 2–4271 through 2–4322 of the American Correctional Association (2nd ed., 1981, including 1983 revisions by the ACA), as appropriate. These standards are included as Appendices A and C to this Decree.
b. Defendants shall provide notice to each Plaintiff at the time of his/her admission to Defendants' institutions and in posted notices at each institution, that Plaintiffs shall have access to over-the-counter non-prescription medications such as aspirin, anti-acid and laxatives, during non-sick call hours on weekends and in the evenings.
c. Recognizing the need to enable Plaintiffs to purchase hygiene supplies, Defendants have agreed, beginning with the start of fiscal year 1984–1985 and based on negotiations with Plaintiffs regarding this Decree, to increase each Plaintiff's inmate pay by $1.00 per pay period. Defendants further agree to provide hygiene supplies (including soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, deodorant, washcloth and towel, shampoo, shaving equipment and personal hygiene products) to each Plaintiff within the Special Learning Unit or to other Plaintiffs whom a Warden determines to require such supplies due to special circumstances at the time of his/her request for such items. Denial of any such individual requests may be the subject of grievance within Defendants' established grievance system.
d. Defendants agree that at least one staff person on each shift at each institution shall be trained in first aid and certified in CPR techniques; that appropriate equipment (including crash carts, ambulances, oxygen and defibrillators) shall be readily available at each of the existing institutions identified by the review and recommendations described in (2) below and at all new institutions except work release centers; that each such institution shall have staff available who are properly trained to utilize such equipment in an emergency, and that all other institutions shall develop and submit a plan for providing emergency medical treatment with outside facilities, within three (3) months from the completion of the study described in (2) below.
*16 e. Defendants agree that the refusal of health evaluation or health services by any individual Plaintiff, regarding nonlife-threatening or non-contagious conditions, shall not be the subject of discipline or punishment or result in confinement in segregation.
2. Recommendations
17

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
a. Defendants and Plaintiffs shall agree upon certain medical consultants, at least one of whom shall be a physician and one a mental health and pscyhological services expert, and the Defendants shall contract with said mutually-agreed-upon medical consultants, for a review of the Defendants' procedures, resources, staff training and staffing for medical emergencies, health services, and mental health and psychological services. The study shall include a review of nine items which were recommended by a previous health care system evaluation but were not adopted by Defendants and consideration of application of the standards regarding mental health services found in Appendix B, as well as other standards deemed appropriate. Defendants shall submit this review to the parties and the Court and, within three (3) months from the completion of the study, shall submit a plan for the reasonably prompt implementation of each of the review's suggested changes.
b. Implementation of these recommendations described in (a) above shall begin on July 1, 1985, except for those recommendations related to critical medical needs. Such critical needs, if any, shall be addressed immediately following the receipt of said recommendations and shall be implemented no later than within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by the parties.
c. Where necessary, funds appropriated in FY 1984–85 for additional security guards shall be diverted to address such critical medical needs. Any disputes shall be submitted to the Court, per Section II of this Decree.
d. The nine items referred to above, on which the review described in (a) above shall also make recommendations, are as follows:
(1) Employment of an RN at MSC,
(2) Attaining membership in the Association of Risk Managers,
(3) Increasing nurse staffing at the KCI Infirmary,
(4) Installing one more X-ray illuminator at the KCI Infirmary,
(5) Obtaining portable whirlpool baths,
(6) Replacing some heart monitors,
(7) Replacing some beds at the KCI Infirmary,
(8) Installing one more ceiling spotlight, for suturing, at the KCI Infirmary,
(9) Obtaining portable sitz baths.
J. Programs 1. General Population a. Defendants shall provide all Plaintiffs assigned to general population with the opportunity for a full-time, meaningful work or program assignment, for not less than five (5) hours per day, five (5) days per week;
b. Defendants shall provide all Plaintiffs assigned to general population with the opportunity for meaningful and appropriate vocational training and Defendants shall not decrease the present level of education courses, including vocational.
18

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
*17 c. Defendants shall continue to offer programs of no less variety, opportunity and state-funding level as those available at the present, as established by the list contained in Appendix D to this Decree. Defendants shall make a good faith effort to maintain those programs which are not supported by state funding appropriated to the South Carolina Department of Corrections.
d. Defendants shall provide access for all Plaintiffs to educational programs at least two evenings per week.
e. Plaintiffs shall be assigned to or offered all work and programs assignments according to an equitable, rational system, which does not discriminate on the basis of race or sex. Consistent with security needs, Defendants recognize the availability of transfers in order to offer full variety of programs to all Plaintiffs.
f. Any Plaintiff who is required to attend any court proceeding shall not suffer any loss of prison industries bonus pay, so long as such absence does not exceed seven (7) calendar days in any calendar year.
2. Segregation a. Defendants shall provide all Plaintiffs assigned to any form of segregation (including protective custody units) with the opportunity for at least five (5) hours per week, five (5) days per week of actual outdoor exercise (weather permiting) and if future staffing ratios increase, pursuant to the ratio established in Sec. III–H or due to any other cause, Defendants shall reasonably consider and attempt to increase the exercise provided to seven (7) days per week. In the event of an extended period of inclement weather, Defendants shall guarantee make-up days sufficient to provide that the total of hours of outside exercise amounts to at least fifteen (15) hours exercise per month.
b. Defendants shall submit to Plaintiffs' counsel and the Court, within six (6) months from the signing of this Decree, and shall implement, a plan for the reasonably prompt phasing-in of increased programs and out-of-cell time for Plaintiffs who have been in Protective Custody for more than ninety (90) days, until Defendants are providing the opportunity for at least five (5) hours per day on five days per week of full-time, meaningful programs.
c. Defendants shall review all existing regulations pertaining to possession of personal property by Plaintiffs in segregation, and shall develop and submit, within six (6) months from the signing of this Decree by the parties, to the Plaintiffs and the Court, a plan for the rational and uniform provisions of personal property, consistent with safety and security among all populations at all institutions.
3. Libraries a. Defendants agree that all prison libraries, including law libraries, shall be available to Plaintiffs a minimum of five (5) days per week, including at least two evenings per week for at least three (3) hours after all normal work assignments conclude, for a total of thirty-seven and one-half (37 ½) hours per week.
b. Defendants agree that access to the courts and law libraries shall comply with the requirements set out in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1976) and Defendants shall submit to the Plaintiffs and the Court, within six (6) months from the signing of this Decree, a comprehensive plan for the provision of such access to all Plaintiffs.
*18 c. Defendants agree to provide comparable access to all prison libraries, including law libraries, to all Plaintiffs, regardless of custody classification or housing assignment. For those Plaintiffs who are involved in other work or program activities during the operating hours of the institutional library, the Defendants agree to allow said Plaintiffs to obtain a pass to use the law library when one is requested without being penalized for leaving the work or program activity, where such Plaintiffs can demonstrate a court deadline.
19

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
d. Within ninety (90) days from the signing of this Decree by the parties, Defendants agree to make complete, current copies of all institutional and departmental policies and procedures available in each institutional library, excluding those policies and procedures which the parties agree pertain to emergency and security provisions.
4. Work Credits Defendants agree to make all good faith efforts, including attempting to obtain the passage of any necessary legislation, to provide Earned Work Credits or the equivalent to Plaintiffs for any time spent in vocational training or educational courses, on a basis comparable to Earned Work Credits awarded for work assignments.
5. Grievance Procedure a. Within ninety (90) days from the signing of this Decree by the parties, Defendants shall review the presently established time limits for each stage of the SCDC grievance procedure including times by which appeals must be reviewed and determined. Defendants shall establish that the grievance automatically proceeds to the next step of the grievance process when the response to the grievance exceeds the established time limits, unless a continuance for a specific period of time is granted by the grievant. Defendants shall establish and implement procedures for enforcing grievances which are granted and shall implement the SCDC Inmate Grievance Procedure, at all of Defendants' institutions.
b. Complaints that any grievance clerk has not properly pursued, or has improperly refused to pursue a grievance, may be referred by the grievant to Inmate Relations for investigation. Appropriate action shall be taken.
c. Defendants shall include a description of the grievance procedure within all future printings of the Inmate Guide.
K. Fire Safety 1. Defendants shall ensure that each institution which is used to house Plaintiffs is in compliance with the Life Safety Code and Life Safety Code Handbook of the National Fire Protection Association Code 101 (“NFPA”) and the Fire Protection Standards of the American Correctional Association, 2–4162 through 2–4175 and related provisions, including the 1983 revision to ACA 2–4163, and including the 1981 edition of 2–4165 (“ACA”). Where the ACA standards and NFPA standards conflict, the NFPA shall govern.
2. Within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by the parties, Defendants shall submit a schedule relating to each institution, for the reasonably prompt completion of all construction and capital improvements necessary to accomplish said compliance.
*19 3. Said schedules shall include the following improvements, in accord with requirements of NFPA Code 101:
a. All smoke detectors and fire alarms shall be on contract within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by the parties;
b. Adequate and safe gang door releases, emergency exists and escape ladders shall be on contract within two (2) years from the signing of this Decree;
c. Sprinkler systems and/or smoke evacuation systems (or a combination thereof, whichever gives the greater probability of preserving life) shall be under contract within five (5) years from the signing of this Decree by the parties.
20

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
All such contracts shall be reasonably and promptly executed and completed.
L. Discipline Defendants agree that, within thirty (30) days of the signing of this Decree by the parties, Defendants' Inmate Guide shall be rewritten and re-distributed to all Plaintiffs, to reflect the following:
1. Each Plaintiff who has been adjudicated and convicted of a violation of institutional rules shall be sentenced to the minimum disciplinary sentence as set out in the Inmate Guide, except for those Plaintiffs whose disciplinary offenses have been found to include identified aggravating circumstances; each sentenced Plaintiff shall have his/her sentence reviewed after serving onethird (#) of the sentence and, if there has been no additional disciplinary offense adjudicated, he/she shall be released at that time. This provision shall not preclude initial suspension or probation of sentence.
2. Where lock-up time is determined to be the appropriate punishment for commission of the following institutional rules violations, the minimum sentence provisions of (1) above do not apply and the maximum sentence shall be no more than thirty (30) days. Except for those Plaintiffs whose commission of the following disciplinary offenses have been found to include identified aggravating circumstances, each sentenced Plaintiff shall have his/her sentence reviewed after serving one-half (½) of the sentence and, if there has been no additional disciplinary offense adjudicated, he/she shall be released at that time. If identified aggravating circumstances have been found, there shall be no such review, but the maximum sentence shall not exceed thirty (30) days. This provision shall not preclude initial suspension or probation of sentence. Any accumulated sentence of over sixty (60) days imposed at one time for multiple offenses shall be reviewed after one-third (#) has been served:
4.8 (L) Refusing to Obey Promptly and Properly a Direct Order
4.8 (M) Out of Place
4.8 (N) Disorderly Conduct or Fighting
4.8 (O) Interfering with the Duties of any Person
4.8 (P) False Identification
4.9 (C) Refusal to Work or Failure to Return to Work
4.9 (D) Abuse of Privileges
4.9 (J) Telephone Abuse
4.9 (K) Obscene Correspondence upon complaint by recipient of the correspondence
*20 4.9 (L) Disrespect
4.9 (M) Abuse of Institutional Passes
4.9 (N) Excess Money
4.9 (O) Homosexual sexual activity
21

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
4.9 (P) Unauthorized Sales and Purchases
3. Aggravating circumstances mentioned in (1) and (2) above shall be identified and defined in the Inmate Guide.
4. Any Plaintiff sentenced to administrative or disciplinary segregation for any disciplinary offense and subsequently convicted of an offense listed in (2) above without any identified aggravating circumstances, may thereafter serve up to the remainder of the sentence for the original offense or an additional thirty (30) days on the original, after the date of eligibility for early release, whichever is less, as well as receiving an additional sentence for the subsequent offense.
M. Classification 1. The Defendants with assistance from qualified consultants, shall within twelve (12) months from the signing of this Decree develop and submit to Plaintiffs' counsel and the Court a comprehensive classification system for assignment of Plaintiffs to institutions, including criteria for initial classification, reclassification and internal institutional classification. This classification plan shall also contain criteria, procedures and programs for identification and treatment of Plaintiffs with special needs such as drug and alcohol abusers, mentally ill Plaintiffs, mentally retarded Plaintiffs, and protective custody Plaintiffs. The plan shall include provision for its reasonably prompt implementation, and shall include classification procedures which shall separate violent from non-violent prisoners at each institution. Within one (1) year of the signing of this Decree by the parties, the Defendants shall submit a plan for a rational and equitable system of internal classification for making the institutional housing assignments of those Plaintiffs who may be safely double-celled. This classification system shall be based upon the following criteria: prisoner preference (for those Plaintiffs who desire to share a cell), length of time double-celled, age, prior criminal and institutional misconduct, assaultive behavior and mental health history. As a general principle, Plaintiffs who have been double-celled the longest will be given first priority for single celling in the general population, but this principle shall not be deemed to prevail over other factors listed above relating to prisoner safety.
2. Defendants agree that such security classification shall be guided by rational, objective, criteria derived from behavioral observations. Plaintiffs shall not be disqualified from any custody or security classification solely by virtue of any single criteria such as detainers, length of sentence, consecutive sentence, date until parole or the fact of a disciplinary conviction, except that all detainers may be considered as the sole determing factor for no longer than one-hundred-eighty (180) days from the date of the lodging of the detainer. Classification shall be based upon an evaluation of the accumulation of identified, relevant and rational factors and standards. Defendants shall not discriminate in the provision of institutional assignments, programs, services, facilities or housing on the basis of race, religion, sex, creed or national origin except that women and men may be housed in separate institutions.
*21 3. The classification system employed must be validated.
4. No Plaintiff shall be classified under a more restrictive security designation or confined under more restrictive conditions than is required by legitimate security requirements.
5. Each Plaintiff shall be allowed maximum involvement in the classification process to be implemented under this section, which shall include an opportunity to know in writing the reasons with specification for the classification and an opportunity to respond in person. Each Plaintiff shall be given written notice forty-eight (48) hours prior to the classification hearing and access to those portions of his/her file which are considered by the Classifications Committee, except that mental health or psychiatric records may be withheld. Each Plaintiff shall be carefully screened upon commitment to the Department and shall be regularly evaluated thereafter. Each Plaintiff shall participate in assessing his/her needs and in selecting programs to meet those needs. Classification decisions shall not be based upon confidential information which a Plaintiff has no reasonable opportunity to
22

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
rebut, except that confidential information from the community may be considered for determining a custody status which would return that Plaintiff to that community unsupervised. Any Plaintiff who has sought and twice been denied the same classification request by the institutional head shall have the right to appeal such denial through the appropriate Regional Administrator with final appeal to the Deputy Commissioner for Operations and each such appeal shall be acted upon within thirty (30) days.
6. The classification (custody and program) of each Plaintiff shall be reviewed at least every six (6) months and Defendants shall make a reasonable, good faith attempt to review the classification of each Plaintiff who is serving a sentence of less than five years at least every ninety (90) days. Reviews shall be based on behavioral observations and analysis over a reasonable time period. Rational criteria and procedures consistent with the other general principles in this agreement shall be developed and implemented with reasonable promptness. Plaintiffs shall be allowed to initiate inquiries regarding their progress, status and programming and such inquiries shall be acted upon within thirty (30) days of the request. If a Plaintiff can demonstrate a substantial error in his review which affects his classification, then the classification officer or counselor shall initiate a new review within thirty (30) days.
7. Plaintiffs may not be required to participate in programs with the exception of work assignments; provided however, that this paragraph shall not prohibit the statutory requirements applicable to members of the Plaintiff class sentenced pursuant to the South Carolina Youthful Offenders Act, 24–19–10, et seq., Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976.
8. Jobs, program assignments, housing and services shall be distributed in a rational, fair and equitable manner.
N. Women's Institution
1. Discipline *22 Defendants agree that all women Plaintiffs shall receive discipline, if any, under equal procedures, conditions, and sentences as men Plaintiffs with comparable institutional offenses.
2. Movement Defendants agree that all women Plaintiffs shall have freedom of movement equal to that provided to men Plaintiffs at the same level of security.
3. Programs Defendants agree that all women Plaintiffs shall have opportunity to participate in the same programs, including exercise, dress codes, visitation, vocational training, educational courses, work assignments, pre-release programs, work release and prison industries, equivalent or comparable to the opportunity provided to men Plaintiffs at the same level of security.
O. Visitation
1. Contact Visits Defendants agree that each Plaintiff shall receive contact visits, unless there has been a written, individualized determination that the Plaintiff constitutes a “substantiated security risk.” Such determination may be made by the appropriate supervisor and shall be reviewed by the institutional administrator or his/her designate before the end of the next working day. Any Plaintiff so designated shall have the opportunity to appeal the designation through the Defendants' classification and appeal procedures. Defendants may phase-in such contact visitation at Kirkland, Perry, Maximum Security Center, Dutchman and Cross Anchor to allow time for structural changes, within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by all parties.
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
2. Scheduling Defendants shall provide all Plaintiffs regardless of classification, housing assignment or institutional offenses, equal opportunity for personal visits, except as described herein. However, the scheduling time of visitation for various classifications, institutions, or housing assignments shall remain within Defendants' reasonable administrative discretion. When it can be determined that a visitor legitimately cannot visit during the regularly-scheduled time, special arrangements shall be made on a case-by-case, single-visit basis. Plaintiffs in Protective Custody shall be permitted to receive at least four visits per month, up to two hours in length. Plaintiffs in administrative and disciplinary segregation shall be permitted to receive at least two visits per month up to two hours in length.
P. Physical Restraints 1. No Plaintiff in general population or protective custody shall be shackled or handcuffed or physically restrained while inside an institution unless there has been a written, individualized determination that the prisoner himself constitutes a “substantiated security risk” to himself, other prisoners or staff. For Plaintiffs other than those in general population or protective custody, only handcuffs may be used to physically restrain such Plaintiffs while inside an institution, unless there has been a written, individualized determination that the prisoner himself constitutes a “substantiated security risk” to himself, other prisoners or staff. When transporting prisoners outside the institution, or between institutions, or to medical care or court-related appearances, Defendants may use ankle-shackles, hand-cuffs and belt hand-cuffs (“belly chains”), but all such restraints shall be removed once the prisoner is inside his or her destination and no belt-handcuffs shall be kept on the prisoner unless such destination is a non-secured area or there has been a written individualized determination by a shift supervisor, which is reviewed by the institional administrator on the next working day, that the prisoner himself constitutes a “substantiated security risk” to other persons in that setting or to themselves. Any Plaintiff so designated shall have the opportunity to appeal such decision of the institutional administrator through the Regional Administrator and to the Deputy Commissioner of Operations. The provisions of this section do not apply to those Plaintiffs in “double-A” custody who are being transported outside their institutions, unless they are designated as “substantiated security risks”.
*23 2. However, Defendants may temporarily use handcuffs when separating Plaintiffs involved in fights or when there is a present threat of violent or physically disruptive activity, for up to one hour or until the Plaintiffs are confined to single cells, whichever is first.
3. Defendants may shackle Plaintiffs assigned to Administrative Segregation or Disciplinary Segregation during transport to their visits, but must unshackle them during the visits, at the request of the visitor, unless the Plaintiff has been designated as a “substantiated security risk” as defined above and such visit is occurring in the physical presence of other Plaintiffs and their visitors. Defendants shall make a reasonable effort to provide unshackled visitation.
4. The use of four-point-restraints (patient immobilization) shall not be used except upon the order of a physician. Four point restraint shall be used only as a last resort to prevent harm or physical danger to self and others. Under no circumstances shall such restraints be applied to enhance security of the facility or prevent escape, or punish the inmate. Restraints shall be used no longer than the condition prevails and the use of restraints beyond a period of four (4) hours must be approved by the chief medical doctor for the Department or his medical staff designee. In addition to review by the prescribing physician, any Plaintiff so restrained shall be the subject of continuous observation during the period of restraint and the need for restraint shall be reevaluated at fifteen (15) minute intervals. A medical and observation log of such evaluations shall be maintained. All use of four point restraints shall be reported to the institutional warden and the Department's legal office and shall comply with all other provisions of this Decree.
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
5. There shall be no shackling or chaining of any prisoner to any solid object, except as provided in (4) above.
Q. Food Service 1. Within six (6) months from the signing of this Decree by the parties, Defendants shall submit to the Plaintiffs and the Court a proposed plan for the provision of food services, including the procedures, equipment and personnel to be used, for those Plaintiffs confined in each form of segregation at each of the Defendants' institutions, in order to ensure the provision of safe, healthful and nutritious food and compliance with the Standards of this Decree.
2. Within ninety (90) days of the signing of this Decree by the parties, all SCDC institutions which provide food service to the Plaintiff class shall be in compliance with the food service standards established by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control and shall also meet ACA Standards 2–4238 through 2–4254, including 1983 revisions by the ACA and as modified below. Appropriate ACA standards 2–2110 through 2–2119 will be used for pre-release and work release centers, as stated in Appendix E of this Decree.
2–4238. There is documentation that the nationally recommended dietary allowance is reviewed by a registered dietician on at least an annual basis to ensure that the food allowances required for basic nutrition are met. Menu evaluations are conducted at least quarterly by institution food service supervisory staff to verify adherence to the established basic daily servings.
*24 2–4239. When required by statute, food products that are grown or produced within the system are inspected and approved by the appropriate government agency; there is a distribution system that ensures prompt delivery of foodstuff to institution kitchens.
2–4240. Written policy and procedure require that food service staff develop advanced, planned menus and substantially follow the schedule; and that in the planning and preparation of all meals, food flavor, texture, temperature, appearance and palatability are taken into consideration.
2–4241. At each institution, written policy and procedure provide that special diets as prescribed by appropriate medical or dental personnel shall be provided to Plaintiffs requiring such diets who are assigned to that institution. [Modified]
2–4242. Written policy and procedure shall provide, within six (6) months of the signing of this Decree, special diets for Plaintiffs whose religious beliefs require the adherence to religious dietary laws, and this procedure shall be implemented within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by all parties. [Modified]
2–4243. A full-time staff member, experienced in food service management, supervises food service operations.
2–4244. Written policy and procedure provide for adequate health protection for all inmates and staff in the institution, and inmates and other persons working in the food service with the following requirements:
(1) By July 1, 1985, a preassignment medical examination of all persons involved in the preparation of food, and periodic examinations thereafter, is conducted to ensure freedom from diarrhea, skin infections and other illnesses transmissible by food or utensils; all are conducted in accordance with local requirements regarding restaurant and food service employees in the community. [Modified]
(2) When the institution's food services are provided by an outside agency or individual, the institution has written verification that the outside provider complies with the state and local regulations regarding food service.
25

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
(3) All food handlers are instructed to wash their hands upon reporting to duty and after using toilet facilities. (The parties agree that this provision applies to all institutions.)
2–4245. Toilet and wash basin facilities are available to food service personnel and inmates in the vicinity of the food preparation area.
2–4246. There is documentation by an independent, outside source that food service facilities and equipment meet established governmental health and safety codes; corrective action is taken on deficiencies, if any.
2–4247. There are sanitary, temperature-controlled storage facilities for the storage of all foods, except non-refrigerated foods which shall be maintained pursuant to applicable state standards. [Modified.]
2–4248. Written policy and procedure require weekly inspections of all food service areas including dining and food preparation areas, and equipment. Refrigerator and water temperatures are checked on a daily basis by administrative, medical or dietary personnel.
*25 2–4249. Written policy and procedure provide that meals are served under conditions that minimize regimentation, although there should be direct supervision by staff members.
2–4250. Space is provided for group dining except when security or safety considerations justify otherwise.
2–4251. Written policy requires that at least three meals, of which two are hot meals, are provided at regular meal times during each 24 hour period, with no more than 14 hours between the evening meal and breakfast.
2–4252. Written policy precludes the use of food as a disciplinary measure.
2–4253. Written policy and procedure require that accurate records are maintained of all meals served.
2–4254. The food service operation uses budgeting, purchasing, and accounting practices that include, but are not limited to the following systems:
(1) Food expenditure cost accounting designed to determine cost per meal per inmate;
(2) Estimation of food service requirements;
(3) Purchase of supplies at wholesale prices and under other favorable conditions, when possible;
(4) Determination of and responsiveness to inmate eating preferences;
(5) Refrigeration and storage of food, with specific storage periods.
R. Environmental Sanitation 1. All institutions shall be maintained in compliance with applicable state standards, including those established for jails and prisons by the South Carolina Statutes, and the regulations of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmenal Control including DHEC R. 61–55, and with Standards 2–4130 through 2–4132 and 2–4255 through 2–4270, of the American Correctional Association (2nd ed. 1981), including 1983 revisions, as modified below:
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
2–4130. Each room or cell has, at a minimum, the following facilities and conditions: (1) Sanitation facilities, including access to: (a) Toilet above floor level which is available for use without staff assistance 24 hours a day, and (b) Wash basin with hot and cold running water; (2) A bed at above floor level, a chair or stool, a mirror, appropriate writing surfaces upon request, and storage facilities in the cell for personal belongings. All of these items shall be maintained in a reasonably sanitary, good condition. [Modified]; (3) Natural light; (4) Lighting is at least 20 footcandles at desk level and in the personal grooming area. [Modified]; (5) Circulation is at least 10 cubic feet of outside or re-circulated filtered air per minute per human occupant. [Modified]; (6) Temperatures are appropriate to maintain health and safety year-round, provided that this Decree shall not require airconditioning except where medically necessary [Modified]; and (7) Reasonable noise levels shall be maintained [Modified]. 2–4131. [Modified] Where used, multiple occupancy wards shall house the number of Plaintiffs established by the sleeping space requirements of this Decree, who are screened for suitability to group living prior to admission, subject to the provisions of the section of this Decree relating to classifications. Multiple occupancy rooms have continuous sight or sound observation by staff pursuant to Section III–H of this Decree. Multiple occupancy rooms provide the following facilities and conditions: *26 (1) A minimum floor are of 45 square feet per occupant in the sleeping area, except where otherwise provided in this Decree, and a clear floor to ceiling height of not less than eight feet. [Modified] (2) Toilet and shower facilities at a minimum of one operable toilet and shower for every eight occupants; (3) One operable wash basin with hot and cold running water for every six occupants; (4) Single beds only, subject to the provisions of the sections of this Decree pertaining to compliance with housing capacities and with mattresses in sanitary condition; (5) Access to a mirror and a locker or private storage space for each occupant; (6) Natural light; (7) Lighting is at least 20 footcandles at desk level and in the personal grooming area [Modified]; (8) Circulation is at least 10 cubic feet of outside or recirculated filtered air per minute per occupant [Modified];
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
(9) Temperatures meet any applicable State standards and are appropriate to maintain health and safety year-round, provided that this Decree shall not require air-conditioning except where medically necessary [Modified]; and
(10) Reasonable noise levels shall be maintained [Modified].
2–4132. [Modified] When minimum security institutions or minimum security areas within larger institutions provide individual rooms, they provide key control shared by the occupants and staff, or continuous access to toilet and shower facilities and hot and cold running water, including drinking water. Rooms also provide the following facilities and conditions:
(1) Sleeping space as set forth in this Decree;
(2) Furnishings as set forth in 2–4130(2) above;
(3) Natural light;
(4) Lighting at least 20 footcandles at desk level and in the personal grooming area;
(5) Circulation at least 10 cubic feet of outside or recirculated filtered air per minute per occupant;
(6) Temperatures as set forth in 2–4130(6) above; and
(7) Reasonable noise levels shall be maintained. (Revised, 1983) [Modified].
2–4255. Written policy and procedure require weekly sanitation inspections of all institution areas by a designated administrative staff member; at least annual inspections by federal, state, and/or local sanitation, and health officials, or other qualified person(s); and, compliance with all applicable laws and regulations of the governing jurisdiction. There is documentation by an independent, outside source that deficiencies, if any, have been corrected.
2–4256. The institution's potable water source and supply, whether owned and operated by the public water department or the institution, is certified by an independent, outside source to be in compliance with jurisdictional laws and regulations.
2–4257. A written housekeeping plan for all areas of the facilility's physical plant provides for daily housekeeping and regular maintenance by assigning specific duties and responsibilities to staff and inmates.
2–4258. The institution provides for the control of vermin and pests.
*27 2–4259. The institution provides for waste disposal.
2–4260. Written policy and procedure provide for the issue of suitable clothing to all inmates, which is properly fitted, climatically suitable, durable, and presentable.
2–4261. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, written policy and procedure require that articles necessary for maintaining proper personal hygiene are provided to all inmates.
2–4262. Written policy and procedure provide for the issue of special and, when appropriate, protective clothing and equipment to inmates assigned to food service, hospital, farm, garage, institution physical plant maintenance shops, and other special work.
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
2–4263. Written policy and procedure provide for the issue of suitable, clean bedding, and linen, including two sheets, pillow and pillowcase, one mattress and sufficient blankets to provide comfort under existing temperature controls. There is provision for linen exchange or cleaning, including towels, on at least a weekly basis. (Revised, 1983)
2–4264. Written policy specifies accountability for state-issued inmate clothing and bedding. [Modified]
2–4265. The store of clothing (for that portion of the institution's population who are issued clothing), linen, and bedding exceeds that required for the facility's inmate population.
2–4266. The institution provides for the thorough cleaning and, when necessary, disinfecting of inmate personal clothing before storage or before allowing the inmate to keep and wear personal clothing.
2–4267. An opportunity for cleaning clothes and towels is provided to all inmates a minimum of three times per week, except where institutions provide and allow seven sets of clothing to each prisoner, then said opportunity need only be provided once per week to those prisoners who possess such seven sets of clothing. [Modified]
2–4268. There are sufficient bathing facilities in the housing areas to permit inmates to shower at least three times per week. [Modified]
2–4269. Water for showers is thermostatically controlled to ensure the safety of the inmates.
2–4270. There are hair care services available to inmates which comply with applicable health requirements.
2. Defendants shall prepare a study concerning compliance with the above stated conditions within sixty (60) days from the signing of this Decree by the parties and—as to standards 2–4130, 2–4131 and 2–4132—within seven (7) months from the signing of this Decree by the parties, and shall develop and submit to the parties and the Court both the studies and a plan for the reasonably prompt implementation of each of the above-stated conditions.
3. Defendants shall employ a sufficient number of trained, competent environmental and health inspectors to do the following:
a. make a semi-annual evaluation of each institution;
b. monitor Defendants' compliance at each institution periodically roughout the year, with applicable state codes and the standards identified in Q and R herein;
*28 c. make said reports to Plaintiffs and the Court; and
d. make follow-up evaluations and reports within three (3) months on any deficiencies and non-compliance found.
S. Closing of Institutions 1. Defendants agree that the Annex of the Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center shall be closed within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by all parties, and that the Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center itself shall be closed within three (3) years from the signing of this Decree by all parties. In the interim, the parties agree as follows:
a. The population at the Annex shall be reduced to comply with the standards enunciated in this Decree within six (6) months from the signing of this Decree by all parties;
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
b. From July 1, 1985, and thereafter, the population at the Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center itself shall be reduced such that no Plaintiff confined there shall be triple-celled;
c. From August 1, 1986, and thereafter until the institution is closed, the population at Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center itself shall be reduced so that all Plaintiffs confined therein are confined according to the standards enunciated in this Decree;
d. From the signing of this Decree by the parties and thereafter, no Plaintiffs other than the prisoner-staff shall be confined at the Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center or Annex for longer than fourteen (14) days, except those Plaintiffs confined pursuant to South Carolina Code Section 24–19–50(b), and such Plaintiffs shall be housed in single cells in Midlands Reception and Evaluation Center or may be double-celled at Perry Correctional Institution Reception and Evaluation Center (and this provision shall apply to any Plaintiff so confined, within thirty (30) days from the signing of this Decree by the parties);
e. From September 1, 1985 through August 1, 1986, up to fifty cells at the Perry Correctional Institution Reception and Evaluation Center may be triple-celled;
f. From August 1, 1986 until July 1, 1987, Plaintiffs confined at the Perry Correctional Institution Reception and Evaluation Center may be double-celled, but after July 1, 1987 all such Plaintiffs must be single-celled;
g. From the signing of this Decree by the parties until September 1, 1985, no Plaintiffs shall be confined at the Perry Correctional Institution Reception and Evaluation Center for longer than thirty (30) days;
h. From September 1, 1985 and thereafter, no Plaintiffs shall be confined at the Perry Correctional Institution Reception and Evaluation Center for longer than fourteen (14) days;
i. Any Plaintiff confined in a reception and evaluation Center for more than fourteen (14) days shall have the right to the visitation and recreation provided by this Decree.
2. Defendants agree to make all good faith efforts to close Central Correctional Institution, including requesting the closing of Central Correctional Institution in their ten year plan to the legislature, until said institution is closed.
*29 3. Defendants agree that all lock-down, maximum security use of the Maximum Security Center shall end within one (1) year from the signing of this Decree by the parties.
4. These time limits shall not be subject to any extension, including as set forth in II–I of this Decree.
T. Effective Date 1. This Decree is intended to be an agreement between the named Defendants, in their official capacities, and the Plaintiffs, individually and as representatives of the class of all persons described in section I–A of this Decree. Accordingly, this Decree shall not be enforceable unless and until this action is certified by the Court as a class action with plaintiffs as representatives of the aforementioned class.
2. Unless otherwise noted, all provisions of this Decree shall take effect within thirty (30) days of the signing of this Decree by all parties. All parties shall attempt in good faith to obtain judicial approval of this Decree. However, the parties shall not be obligated to continue implementing this Decree if judicial approval is denied.
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
U. Compliance 1. Defendants shall provide Plaintiffs' counsel, the Court, the Budget and Control Board, and each institution library, with detailed quarterly reports and supporting documentation, where appropriate, indicating for each subsection of the Decree whether the Defendants are in compliance or not as to each institution. Such reports shall state the source(s) of the information relied upon (including documents, types of documents, and personnel consulted), and the specific steps taken to achieve compliance. For areas in which the Defendants are not in compliance, the reports shall state and explain the reasons why Defendants are not in compliance, when compliance can be expected and what steps have been taken and will be taken to achieve compliance. This requirement is in addition to other sections of this Decree regarding compliance and enforcement. Reasonable additional or supporting documentation, if needed, shall be furnished to Plaintiffs' counsel upon request, as provided in other sections of this Decree.
2. Defendants shall provide copies of all departmental and institutional manuals, policies and procedures, as they are issued, to Plaintiffs' counsel.
3. Any dispute arising between the parties concerning this Decree may be submitted to the Court. However, either party, in the event of a substantial dispute concerning the Decree or its enforcement, may request the services of a mediator who shall attempt to mediate the dispute prior to submitting the matter to the Court. As used herein, “substantial dispute” shall be deemed to refer to matters neither minor nor isolated. The mediator shall be mutually agreed upon by the parties and shall be subject to dismissal only upon written agreement of the parties or by the Court, upon motion of one of the parties for good cause shown. The parties have agreed that Allen Breed, the former Director of the National Institute of Corrections, shall serve as the mediator to fill this position. The mediator shall make the initial detemination as to whether or not a dispute requires his or her involvement. In addition to mediating, the mediator shall attempt to resolve the dispute by making written findings of facts and recommendations to the parties.
*30 4. If the mediator's recommendations are accepted by the parties, they shall be incorporated into this Decree by reference. If the mediator's recommendations are not acceptable to one or both of the parties, either party may submit the controversy to the Court for resolution. In that event, the mediator's written findings of fact and recommendations may be introduced into evidence and the mediator may be called to testify as an expert witness by either party or the Court. In the event that the mediator is not available, does not act within a reasonable time, or if the dispute requires immediate action, either party may submit a dispute directly to the Court.
5. Once a request for the mediator's involvement has been made, the mediator shall have complete, unimpeded and confidential access to all staff, prisoners, institutions and documents relevant to the dispute.
6. The mediator may use assistants or experts where needed. The Defendants shall pay, in a timely manner, reasonable costs and fees of the mediator and any assistants and experts used by the mediator.
7. Ten years after the entry of this Decree, either party may move the court for the abrogation of this decree in whole or in part, upon a showing of satisfactory and sustained compliance with the provisions of this Decree. Subsequently, either party may move the Court for reinstatement of this Decree or any portion thereof, upon a showing of a likelihood of non-compliance.
V. Costs and Attorneys' Fees Defendants shall pay Plaintiffs' counsel all costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred during the course of this litigation through the entry of this Decree by the Court and, upon submission of statements, incurred during Plaintiffs' monitoring of enforcement and compliance with this Decree. Plaintiffs' costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the submission of any dispute
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
to the Court following the entry of this Decree shall be paid by Defendants upon the Court's determination that Plaintiffs are entitled to costs and fees.
IV. APPENDICES A. Medical and Health Care Services Standards of the American Correctional Association Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions (2nd edition, 1981), for reference in carrying out the requirements of Part III, Section I of this Decree.
B. Standards for Psychological Services in Adult Jails and Prisons of the American Association of Correctional Psychologists (1979 edition), for reference in carrying out the requirements of Part III, Section I of this Decree.
C. Standards for Adult Community Facilities, American Correctional Association, regarding Health Services.
D. Defendants' Educational Programs available as of January 25, 1984, for reference in carrying out the requirements of Part III, Section J of this Decree.
E. Standards for Adult Community Facilities, American Correctional Association, regarding Food Services.
F. Sleeping Space and capacities of Defendants' Institutions.
G. Report and Recommendations on Staffing, January 1984, by National Institute of Corrections consultant, for reference in carrying out the requirements of Part III, Section H of this Decree.
APPENDIX A Medical and Health Care Services Standards, of the American Correctional Association Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions (2nd ed., 1981; as revised, 1983). *31 2–4271. The institution has a designated health authority with responsibility for health care services pursuant to a written agreement, contract, or job description. The Health authority may be a physician, health administrator, or health agency. When this authority is other than a physician, final medical judgment rest with a single designated physician.
2–4272. Medical, including psychiatric, and dental matters involving medical judgment are the sole province of the responsible physician and dentist respectively; however, security regulations applicable to facility personnel also apply to health personnel.
2–4273. The health authority meets with the warden/superintendent at least quarterly and submits to him/her annual statistical summaries and quarterly reports on the health care delivery system and health environment.
2–4274. Each policy, procedure, and program in the health care delivery system is reviewed at least annually by the appropriate health care authority and revised if necessary. Each document bears the date of the most recent review or revision and signature of the reviewer.
2–4275. An adequately equipped medical facility, which meets the legal requirements for a licensed general hospital with respect to the services it offers, is available to all inmates.
2–4276. Written policy and procedures provide for infirmary care, to include the following:
32

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986) (1) Definition of the scope of infirmary care services available; (2) A physician on call 24 hours per day; (3) Nursing service under the direction of a physician's assistant or a registered nurse on a full-time basis; (4) Health care personnel on duty 24 hours per day; (5) All inmates/patients within sight or sound of a staff person; (6) A manual of nursing care procedures; (7) A separate and complete medical record for each inmate; (8) Compliance with applicable state statutes and local licensing requirements. 2–4277. Space, equipment, supplies, and materials for health services are provided and maintained as determined by the health authority. 2–4278. First aid kits are available in designated areas of the facility based on need. 2–4279. Written policy and procedures provide for 24–hour emergency medical and dental care availability as outlined in a written plan which includes arrangements for the following: (1) Onsite emergency first aid; (2) Emergency evacuation of the inmate from the facility; (3) Use of an emergency medical vehicle; (4) Use of one or more designated hospital emergency rooms or other appropriate health facilities; (5) Emergency on-call physician and dentist services when the emergency health facility is not located in a nearby community; (6) Security procedures providing for the immediate transfer of inmates when appropriate. 2–4280. In institutions without full-time, qualified health-trained personnel, a health-trained staff member coordinates the health delivery services in the institution under the joint supervision of the responsible health authority and warden/superintendent. *32 2–4281. The institution health authority systematically determines health care personnel requirements in all categories in order to provide inmate access to health care staff and services. (Deleted, 1983) 2–4282. Arrangements are made with health care specialists in advance of need. 2–4283. Written policy and procedure specify the provision of mental health services for inmates in need of such services to include, but not limited to, services provided by qualified mental health professionals who meet educational and licensure/
33

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986) certification criteria specified by their respective professional discipline, i.e., psychiatric nursing, psychiatry, psychology, and social work. 2–4284. Appropriate state and federal licensure, certification or registration requirements and restrictions apply to personnel who provide health care services to inmates. The duties and responsibilities of such personnel are governed by written job descriptions approved by the health authority. Verification of current credentials and job descriptions are on file in the facility. 2–4285. Written policy and procedure provide that correctional and other personnel are trained to respond to health-related situations within a four minute response time. A training program is established by the responsible health authority in cooperation with the facility administrator, which includes the following: (1) Recognition of signs and symptoms, and knowledge of action required in potential emergency situations; (2) Administration of first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR); (3) Methods of obtaining assistance; (4) Signs and symptoms of mental illness, retardation, and chemical dependency; (5) Procedures for patient transfers to appropriate medical facilities or health care providers. 2–4286. Treatment by health care personnel other than a physician, dentist, psychologist, optometrist, podiatrist or other independent providers is performed pursuant to written standing or direct orders by personnel authorized by law to give such orders. Nurse practioners and physician's assistants may practice within the limits of applicable laws and regulations. 2–4287. When the institution uses students or interns in health care delivery, written policy and procedure provide for work experience under direct staff supervision, commensurate with their level of training. 2–4288. Written policy provides that inmates are not used for the following duties: (1) Performing direct patient care services; (2) Scheduling health care appointments; (3) Determining access of other inmates to health care services; (4) Handling or having access to: (a) Surgical instruments, (b) Syringes, (c) Needles, (d) Medications, (e) Health records,
34

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
(5) Operating equipment for which they are not trained. 2–4289. Written policy and procedure require medical screening to be performed by health-trained or qualified health care personnel on all inmates, excluding intrasystem transfers, upon inmates' arrival at the facility with all findings recorded on a printed screening form approved by the health authority. The screening includes at least the following: *33 (1) Inquiry into: (a) Current illness and health problems, including dental problems, venereal diseases and other infectious diseases, (b) Dental problems, (c) Use of alcohol and other drugs which includes types of drugs used, mode of use, amounts used, frequency used, date or time of last use, and a history of problems which may have occurred after ceasing use (e.g., convulsions), (d) Past and present treatment or hospitalization for mental disturbance or suicide, (e) Other health problems designated by the responsible physician; (2) Observation of: (a) Behavior, which includes state of consciousness, mental status, appearance, conduct, tremor and sweating, (b) Body deformities, ease of movement, etc., (c) Condition of skin, including trauma markings, bruises, lesions, jaundice, rashes and infestations, and needle marks or other indications of drug abuse; (3) Disposition of inmate: (a) General population, (b) General population and prompt referral to appropriate health care service on an emergency basis. 2–4290. Written policy and procedure require medical screening by health-trained or qualified health care personnel immediately upon arrival at the institution for all intrasystem transfers with all findings recorded on a printed screening form approved by the health authority. The screening includes, at a minimum, the following: (1) Inquiry into: (a) Whether the inmate is being treated for a medical or dental problem, (b) Whether the inmate is presently on medication, (c) Whether the inmate has a current medical or dental complaint;
35

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986) (2) Observation of: (a) General appearance and behavior, (b) Physical deformities, evidence of abuse and/or trauma; (3) Disposition of inmate: (a) General population, (b) General population and prompt referral to appropriate health care service, (c) Referral to appropriate health care service on an emergency basis. 2–4291. Written policy and procedure require that health appraisal for each inmate, excluding intrasystem transfers, is completed within 14 days after arrival at the facility. In the case of an inmate who has documented evidence of a health appraisal within the previous 90 days, a new health appraisal is not required except as determined by the designated health authority. Health appraisal includes the following: (1) Review of the earlier receiving screening; (2) Collection of additional data to complete the medical, dental, mental health and immunization histories; (3) Laboratory and/or diagnostic tests to detect communicable disease, including venerealdisease and tuberculosis; (4) Recording of height, weight, pulse, blood pressure and temperature; (5) Other tests and examinations as appropriate; (6) Medical examination, including review of mental and dental status; (7) Review of the results of the medical examination, tests, and identification of problems by a physician or other qualified health care personnel, if such is authorized in the medical practice act; *34 (8) Initiation of therapy when appropriate; (9) Development and implementation of treatment plan including recommendations concerning housing, job assignment, and program participation. 2–4292. Written policy and procedure for the collection and recording of health appraisal data call for these requirements: (1) The process is completed in a uniform manner as determined by the health authority; (2) Health history and vital signs are collected by health-trained or qualified health personnel; (3) Collection of all other health appraisal data is performed only by qualified health personnel.
36

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
2–4293. Written policy and procedure, approved by the health authority, provide for comprehensive individual mental health evaluation on specially referred inmates by a multidisciplinary mental health team. The evaluation is completed within 14 days after the date of referral, and includes at least the following:
(1) Review of mental health screening and appraisal data;
(2) Collection and review of additional data from staff observation, individual diagnostic interviews and tests assessing intellect and coping abilities;
(3) Compilation of individual's mental health history;
(4) Development of an overall treatment/management plan with appropriate referral.
2–4294. Written policy and procedure, approved by the appropriate mental health authority, provide for all activities carried out by mental health service personnel.
2–4295. Written policy and procedure require that routine and emergency dental care is provided to each inmate under the direction and supervision of a dentist with appropriate state or federal licensure. The individualized treatment plan includes the following:
(1) Dental screening, unless completed within the previous six months, conducted on initial intake with instruction on hygiene;
(2) Dental examinations within three months, supported by x-rays if necessary, based on information from intake screening;
(3) A defined charting system which identifies the oral health condition and specifies the priorities of treatment by category;
(4) Consultation with referral to recognized specialists in dentistry.
2–4296. Inmates who are severely disturbed and/or mentally retarded are referred for placement in either appropriate noncorrectional facilities or in specially designated units for handling this type of individual.
2–4297. Transfers which result in inmates being placed in other non-correctional institutions or in special units within the facility, which are specifically designated for the care and treatment of the severely mentally ill or retarded, follow due process procedures as specified in law prior to the move being effected. In emergency situations, a hearing is held as soon as possible after transfer.
2–4298. Written policy requires that except in emergency situations there shall be joint consultation between the warden/ superintendent and the responsible physician or their designees prior to taking action regarding the identified mentally ill or retarded patients in the following areas:
*35 (1) Housing assignments;
(2) Program assignments;
(3) Disciplinary measures;
(4) Transfers to other institutions.
37

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
When an emergency action has been required, this consultation occurs as soon as possible, but no later than on the next work day so as to review the appropriateness of the action.
2–4299. Written policy and procedure require continuity of care from admission to discharge from the facility, including referral to community care when indicated.
2–4300. Written policy and procedure provide for unimpeded access to health care and for a system for processing complaints regarding health care. These policies are communicated orally and in writing to the inmates upon arrival in the facility and are put in a language clearly understood by each inmate.
2–4301. Written policy and procedure require that sick call, conducted by a physician and/or other qualified health personnel, is available to each inmate, at a minimum, as follows:
(1) In facilities of less than 100 inmates, sick call is held one day per week at a minimum;
(2) In facilities of 100 to 300 inmates, sick call is held three days per week at a minimum;
(3) In facilities of over 300 inmates, sick call is held four days per week at a minimum;
(4) If an inmate's custody status precludes attendance at sick call, arrangements are made to provide sick call services in the place of the inmate's detention.
2–4302. Written policy and procedure specify the conditions for periodic health examinations for inmates.
2–4303. Written policy and procedure provide that a program of health education is provided to inmates of the facility.
2–4304. Written policy and procedure provide for a special health program for inmates requiring close medical supervision. A written, individual treatment plan, which includes directions to health care and other personnel regarding their roles in the care and supervision of these patients, is developed for each inmate by the appropriate physician, dentist, or qualified mental health practitioner.
2–4305. Written policy and procedure make available chronic and convalescent care to inmates of the facility.
2–4306. Written policy and procedure require that gradual detoxification from alcohol, opiates, hypnotics, other stimulants, and sedative hypnotic drugs is effected as follows:
(1) When performed at the facility, it is under medical supervision; and
(2) When not performed in the facility, arrangements are made for it to be conducted in a hospital or community detoxification center.
2–4307. Written policy and procedure guide the clinical management of chemically dependent inmates with the following requirements:
(1) Diagnosis of chemical dependency by a physician;
38

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
(2) Determination by a physician as to whether an individual requires nonpharmacologically or pharmacologically supported care;
(3) Individualized treatment plans which are developed and implemented by a multidisciplinary team;
*36 (4) Referrals to specified community resources upon release when appropriate.
2–4308. Written policy and procedure require that medical and dental prostheses and orthodontic devices are provided when the health of the inmate/patient would otherwise be adversely affected, as determined by the responsible physician or dentist.
2–4309. Written policy and procedure govern the use of elective surgery.
2–4310. Written policy and procedure require that patients who need health care beyond the resources available in the facility, as determined by the responsible physician, are transferred under appropriate security provisions to a facility where such care is available.
2–4311. Written policy and procedure provide that prior to transfer to another facility, or other substantial travel, either the inmates or their records be evaluated by health care personnel to assess suitability for travel. When travel is approved, pertinent data, including medication, other treatment or special requirements for observation and management during travel, are documented in a manner readily accessible and easily understood by transportation staff, or others who may be called upon to attend inmates during travel and upon reception at the receiving institution. Medications or other special treatment required enroute along with specific written instructions for administration, are furnished to transportation staff.
2–4312. Written policy and procedure govern the use of restraints for medical and psychiatric purposes.
2–4313. Written policy and procedure provide that all informed consent standards in the jurisdiction are observed and documented for inmate care. In the case of minors, the informed consent of parent, guardian or legal custodian applies when required by law. When health care is rendered against the patient's will, it is in accord with state and federal laws and regulations.
2–4314. Written policy prohibits the use of inmates for medical, pharmaceutical, or cosmetic experiments. This policy does not preclude individual treatment of an inmate based on his or her need for a specific medical procedure which is not generally available.
2–4315. Written policy and procedure specify the process by which those individuals so designated by the inmate are notified in case of serious illness or injury. Permission for notification is obtained from the inmate prior to need, if possible.
2–4316. Written policy and procedure specify actions to be taken in the event of an inmate death.
2–4317. Written policy and procedure provide for the proper management of pharmaceuticals, and addresses the following subjects:
(1) A formulary specifically developed for the facility;
(2) Prescription practices which require that:
(a) Psychotropic medications are prescribed only when clinically indicated as one facet of a program of therapy,
39

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986) (b) “Stop order” time periods are required for all medications, *37 (c) The prescribing provider reevaluates a prescription prior to its renewal; (3) Procedures for medication receipt, storage, dispensing and administration or distribution; (4) Maximum security storage and periodic inventory of all controlled substances, syringes and needles; (5) Dispensing of medicine in conformance with appropriate federal and state law; (6) Administration of medication which is carried out by persons properly trained and under the supervision of the health authority and facility administrator or designee; (7) Accountability for administering or distributing medications in a timely manner, according to physician orders. 2–4318. The health record file contains the following items: (1) The completed receiving screening form; (2) Health appraisal data forms; (3) All findings, diagnoses, treatments, dispositions; (4) Prescribed medications and their administration; (5) Laboratory, x-ray and diagnostic studies; (6) Signature and title of documentor; (7) Consent and refusal forms; (8) Release of information forms; (9) Place, date, and time of health encounters; (10) Health service reports, e.g., dental, mental health and consultations; (11) Treatment plan, including nursing care plan; (12) Progress notes; (13) Discharge summary of hospitalization and other termination summaries. The method of recording entries in the records, the form and format of the records, and the procedures for their maintenance and safekeeping are approved by the health authority. 2–4319. Written policy and procedure uphold the principle of confidentiality of the health record and support these requirements:
40

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
(1) The active health record is maintained separately from the confinement record;
(2) Access to the health record is controlled by the health authority;
(3) The health authority shares with the superintendent/warden information regarding an inmate's medical management, security, and ability to participate in programs.
2–4320. Written policy and procedure regarding the transfer of health records require that:
(1) Summaries, originals, or copies of the health record accompany the inmate to the facility to which he/she is transferred; and,
(2) Health record information is also transmitted to specific and designated physicians or medical facilities in the community upon the written authorization of the inmate.
2–4321. Written policy and procedure require that inactive health record files are retained as permanent records in compliance with legal requirements of the jurisdiction.
2–4322. Psychotropic drugs, such as antipsychotics, anti-depressants and drugs requiring parenteral administration are prescribed only by a physician or authorized health provider by agreement with the physician, following a physical examination of the inmate by the health provider, and are administered by the responsible physician, qualified health personnel, or healthtrained personnel under the direction of the health authority.
APPENDIX B
STANDARDS FOR PSYCHOLOGY SERVICES IN ADULT JAILS AND PRISONS, OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
CORRECTIONAL PSYCHOLOGISTS
(September 1979 edition) *38 01. The mission of psychological services and the work of its personnel is governed by a current written statement of objectives and job descriptions approved by the facility's administration in conformity with professional guidelines established by the American Psychological Association (and the headquarters staff person responsible for psychology services in multiinstitution systems).
02. All aspects of psychological services conform to applicable state and federal laws and regulations. Specifically, state licensure and/or certification requirements are applicable and verification of these credentials is on file in the facility (or in multi-institutional systems at the central headquarters level).
03. At the facility (and in multi-institutional systems at the headquarters level) there is at least one person responsible for psychological services who has a doctorate degree from a regionally accredited university or professional school in a program that is primarily psychological, and who also has appropriate training experience.
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
NOTE: For the purpose of transition, persons who meet all the following criteria on or before the date of adoption of these following criteria on or before the date of adoption of these standards shall also be considered qualified psychologists: (a) A masters degree from a program primarily psychological in content from a regionally accredited university or professional school;
(b) appropriate training and experience;
(c) a license or certificate in the state in which they practice, conferred by a state board of psychological examiners, or the endorsement of the state psychological association through voluntary certification.
04. There is a current formal table of organization which shows psychological services as a separate entity and details lines of authority in the chain of command. Such an organizational chart exists and is implemented at the institutional (and in multiinstitutional systems at the central headquarters level) level and shows a full and qualified psychiatrist as the individual person responsible in a prison setting for overseeing psychological services and in a jail setting this individual may be less than full time.
05. The psychologists, and the staff activities for which these individuals are responsible, have professional autonomy regarding psychological services, within the constraints of appropriate security regulations applicable to all institutional personnel, such regulations being in conformity with the written directives of institutions and/or headquarters.
06. When psychological services are provided in the facility, adequate space, equipment, supplies, funds and materials, as determined by the chief psychologist (in accord with headquarters directives in multi-institution systems) are provided for the delivery of those services. There also will be adequate secretarial support.
07. At least monthly, administrative meetings are held which include the chief psychologist and the facility administrator (and, preferably, other institutional heads of departments) in order to provide a forum for general discussion, including the operation of psychological services.
*39 08. There is a periodic report (at least quarterly) on the psychological services delivery system and an annual summary, both provided to the facility's administration and other interested management personnel in the system. In addition to workload figures, this report includes a narrative concerning issues of importance.
09. The quality of psychological services are reviewed at least annually and the results reported in writing. The chief psychologist is responsible for overseeing this internal quality assurance program at the institutional level (pursuant to policies and procedures established at a headquarters level in multi-institution systems).
10. A formal documented annual review (with subsequent report to the facility's chief executive and copies to the chief psychologist and other appropriate headquarters staff) is conducted by an outside agent to monitor conformity to these standards and established policies.
11. The facility has a designated qualified psychologist with responsibility for the organization and operation of psychological services pursuant to a current written agreement, contract, or job description; Similar documentation exists describing the duties of other psychological services personnel.
12. The ratio of staff to inmates is at least one full time psychologist for every 200–250 prisoners. In specialized units (e.g., drug treatment) the minimally acceptable ratio is one full time psychologist for every 100–125 inmates. Additionally, staff shall be reflective of ethnic, racial and linguistic characteristics of their clients, to the degree possible.
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
(a) Average daily population less than ten—psychologist on call
(b) Average daily population between 10 and 75—contract psychologist in facility at least 8 hours per week
(c) Average daily population between 76 and 125—contract psychologist in facility at least 16 hours per week
(d) Average daily population over 125—at least one full-time psychologist
13. A written plan, approved by the chief psychologist, exists and is implemented (in accordance with headquarters policies, in multi-facility systems) and requires psychology staff to receive orientation training and regular continuing education appropriate to their activities. Documentation of these training experiences will be maintained.
14. All psychological examinations, treatments and procedures affected by the principle of informed consent in the jurisdiction are likewise observed for inmate care. (In the case of minors, the informed consent of parent, guardian, or legal custodian applies where required by law.)
15. Written policies and procedures exist and are implemented which outline the provision of involuntary treatment in accordance with state and federal laws and regulations applicable to the jurisdiction. These are approved by the chief psychologist and are in conformity with professional ethics and principles promulgated by the American Psychological Association (and the policies established by headquarters staff in a multi-facility system). The decision to apply such techniques shall be documented and based on (or, if time pressure precludes this, followed by) interdisciplinary review. Psychologists refuse to participate in practices inconsistent with legal, moral and ethical standards regarding the treatment of clients.
*40 16. A written policy exists and is implemented which outlines the degree to which confidentiality of information can be assured.
17. Psychologists shall limit their functioning to their demonstrated areas of professional competence.
18. Psychologists function as members of multi-disciplinary decision-making teams. Psychological resources are used only for psychologically appropriate treatment.
19. Written standard operating procedures approved by the chief psychologist (and in accordance with headquarters guidelines in a multi-facility system) exist and are implemented for all activities carried out by psychological services personnel.
20. At least one person per shift within sight or sound of all inmates, has training in receiving screening, including the recognition of symptoms of mental disturbance most common to the facility.
21. At the time of admission to the facility, inmates receive a written communication explaining the procedures for gaining access to psychological and mental health services.
22. There is a written, implemented policy approved by the chief psychologist (and in accordance with headquarters guidelines in a multifacility system) regarding access to psychological services for (1) postadmission inmates with emergency problems and for (2) daily referrals of nonemergency problems covering both scheduled and unscheduled care.
23. Receiving screening is performed on all inmates upon admission to facility before being placed in the general population or housing area. The findings are recorded on a printed screening form. Inmates identified as having mental problems are referred
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
for a more comprehensive inquiry into: (1) past and present history of mental disturbance, and (2) current mental state, including behavioral observations.
24. In a prison setting, all newly committed inmates with sentences over one year shall be given a psychological evaluation within one month of admission. Such routine evaluations are brief and include (but are not necessarily limited to) behavioral observation, a records review, group testing to screen for emotional and intellectual abnormalities, and a written report of initial findings; referral for more intensive, individual assessment is made when appropriate.
25. Collection of psychological evaluation data is performed only by psychological services staff personnel or facility staff trained by them. Review of and written reports based on the results of the examination, testing and developing a plan of treatment is done by, or under the supervision of, a qualified psychologist. All such information is recorded on data forms approved by the chief psychologist and in accordance with headquarters policy in multi-facility systems. At no time is the responsibility for test administration, scoring or the filing of psychological data given to inmate workers.
26. The individual assessment of all inmates referred for a special comprehensive psychological appraisal is completed within 14 days after the date of the referral. As applied in a jail, this includes:
*41 (a) Reviewing earlier screening information.
(b) Contacting prior psychotherapists or the individual's family physician regarding any history of mental symptomology.
(c) Conducting an extensive diagnostic interview.
(d) Writing and filing a brief report,
(e) If evidence of mental disturbance is found, placing the individual in a separate area where closer supervision is possible and either
(f) Referring the individual to an appropriate mental health resource or to his or her family physician (if indicated and when release is imminent), or
(g) Beginning appropriate care in the jail by staff members of the psychological and or psychiatric services.
This standard as applied in a prison setting includes:
(a) Reviewing earlier screening information and psychological evaluation data.
(b) Collecting and reviewing any additional data to complete the individual's mental health history.
(c) Collecting behavior data from observations by correctional staff.
(d) Administering tests which assess levels of cognitive and emotional functioning and the adequacy of coping mechanisms.
(e) Writing a report describing the results of the assessment procedures, including an outline of a recommended plan of treatment which mentions any indication by the inmate of a desire for help.
(f) Communicating results to referral source and
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
(g) Writing and filing a report of findings and recommendations.
27. Crisis evaluations should be conducted as soon as possible, but not later than 24 hours after the staff member has been notified subsequently. A report of the session(s) is written and appropriately filed.
28. Diagnostic and treatment services are provided to inmates of the facility as part of the institution's total program.
29. If mental disturbance is identified in pretrial and/or presentenced detainee the court and/or the inmate's attorney are notified according to a written policy or procedure approved by the facility's chief executive (in conformity with headquarters directives in a multifacility system). Such notifications are documented.
30. Inmates awaiting emergency evaluation and/or treatment are housed in a specially designated area with close-staff or trainedvolunteer supervision and sufficient security to protect these individuals.
31. A written treatment plan exists for all inmates requiring psychological services. This is developed by a psychologist in collaboration with other personnel and includes directions for non-psychological services personnel regarding their roles in the care and supervision of these prisoners.
32. Acute, chronic and convalescent care are provided to inmates at the facility, or, if inappropriate due to resource constraints, by referring such individuals to a more appropriate institution.
33. Prison systems will have their own resources for handling severely disturbed inmates, either in a separate facility or specially designated unit(s).
34. Transfers which result in inmates being placed in either facilities (or special units within institutions) which are specifically designated for the care and treatment of the severely mentally disturbed shall follow due process procedures as specified in state/federal statutes, prior to the move being effected.
*42 35. There are written and implemented policy and procedure which require that the responsible psychologist be consulted prior to taking the following actions with respect to emotionally disturbed inmates: housing assignment changes, program assignment changes, disciplinary sanctions, transfers in and out of the facility.
36. Inmates who are mentally retarded are referred to available resources according to a written plan approved by the chief psychologist (and in accordance with headquarters policy in multi-facility systems).
37. Only those treatment methodologies accepted by the state psychology community (and not specifically prohibited by headquarters policies in multi-institutional systems) are employed in the facility. Further, the facility will provide a multiplicity of appropriate programs.
38. There is a written, implemented procedure which provides for the orderly discharge of inmate clients from treatment. It includes (but is not limited to) the writing and filing of a treatment summary report within one month after treatment terminates.
39. There are written, implemented policies and procedures which require psychological services personnel to ensure that provisions are made for post-release follow-up care where appropriate.
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
40. There are implemented written policy and procedures which require formal evaluation of the effectiveness of psychological services treatment programs.
41. A written policy exists and is implemented outlining the purposes and procedures for hiring contract, part-time and consultant staff and it requires these individuals to participate in an appropriate documented orientation session conducted by the chief psychologist.
42. The psychological services staff coordinates and consults on a regular basis with: the facility's advisory committee (if any), appropriate headquarters staff in multi-institutional systems, and with other professional administrative, and technical groups both within and outside the facility.
43. The psychological services staff coordinates and consults with other facility staff regarding referrals and care of inmates.
44. Written standard operating procedures are implemented which provide for and require psychological services to participate in training facility staff with respect to the following: types of potential psychological emergency situations, signs and symptoms of various mental disturbances, procedures for making referrals to psychological services and program areas (i.e., drug treatment, counseling).
45. Psychological services personnel utilize volunteers in a variety of programs under the supervision of the chief psychologist. The implemented written policies and procedures include a system for selection, training and for specifying term of service, level of supervision, definition of tasks, responsibilities, and level of authority. Documentation is required which will indicate the volunteer has participated in an appropriate orientation session conducted by the chief psychologist.
*43 46. The psychological services staff participate in the preparation and implementation of facility-wide planning, e.g., the institution's master plan, facility design, disaster plan and so on.
47. There is written, implemented policy approved by the chief psychologist (which, in multi-facility systems, is in accordance with headquarters directives) that specifies which psychological reports are placed in the inmate's central file. Additionally, it specifies which reports materials are maintained in other secured files.
48. Psychological files containing test and interview data on pretrial detainees are destroyed if the individual involved is subsequently adjudicated as being “not guilty.”
49. The psychological record (excluding raw data) is part of the inmate's central file. It contains the completed receiving screening form, all findings, diagnoses, treatments, dispositions, and terminations from long or short-term psychological treatment. The uniform method of recording entries and the the form and format of the psychological record are approved by the chief psychologist (and in conformity with headquarters policy in multi-facility systems).
50. Psychological test protocols and other “raw data” are maintained separately from the confinement record, are kept in a secured file controlled by the chief psychologist, and are not made available to untrained laymen or to any inmate.
51. Written authorization by the inmate is necessary for transfer of psychological record information to any third party, unless otherwise provided for by law or administrative regulation having the force and effect of law.
52. The inmate client in a therapeutic relationship is made aware of what is being reported to any decision-making third party and is given the opportunity to refute the information contained in such reports.
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
53. Implemented, written policies and procedures approved by the chief psychologist and in conformity with headquarters policy in multi-institutional systems require the transfer of psychological records and summaries within a multi-facility system whenever an inmate is transferred.
54. When mentally disturbed inmates are transferred, the least restrictive restraints should be used, consistent with the client's current mental state and background, to maintain human dignity. If the individual is to be transported to another facility, the prisoner's record arrives at the receiving institution either before or with the inmate, and the individual is accompanied by a trained staff member.
55. Psychological services personnel are encouraged, and opportunities are provided, to conduct applied and or basic research which will improve the delivery of psychological services and contribute to the development of theory and practice as relates to correctional psychology.
56. Psychological research in correctional facilities should conform to the ethical standards proposed by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects.
*44 57. Written procedures exist and are implemented for processing research proposals. These are in accordance with institutional policies (and with headquarters policies in multi-facility systems) and, at a minimum, require prior approval by a research advisory committee before any study is undertaken. Psychological services are represented (preferably by the chief psychologist) on that committee.
APPENDIX C
MEDICAL CARE AND HEALTH SERVICES STANDARDS
OF THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION STANDARDS
FOR ADULT COMMUNITY FACILITIES 2–2120. The facility has a written agreement with a licensed general hospital, clinic or physician to provide residents with routine medical services. 2–2121. The facility has a written agreement with a licensed general hospital, clinic, or physician to provide emergency services on a 24–hour a day basis. 2–2122. The facility provides access to dental care and mental health care. (Modified). 2–2123. State licensing and certification requirements apply to health care personnel working in the facility to the same extent as they apply to equivalent personnel in the community. 2–2124. At least one staff member present on each shift of the residential facility is trained in emergency first aid procedures, including cardio-pulmonary resuscitation. 2–2125. The facility has written emergency medical back-up plans which are communicated to all employees and residents. 2–2126. The facility has available at all times first aid equipment approved by a recognized health authority.
47

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
2–2127. Written policy and procedure provide that the facility implements an inventory system of first aid supplies and equipment, and continually replenishes the supply. 2–2128. Each newly admitted resident undergoes a medical examination within 14 days of admission unless there is documentation that the resident has had an examination within three (3) months prior to admission to the facility. (Modified) 2–2129. At the time of a resident's admission, staff inquire about any physical problems which might require medical attention. 2–2130. Written policy and procedure provide for the medical examination of any employee or resident suspected of having a communicable disease or a debilitating condition, such as diabetes, heart disease, or epilepsy. 2–2131. When a urine surveillance program is in effect, there is a written policy for the collection of samples and interpretation of results. 2–2132. There is a written policy regarding the possession and use of controlled substances, prescribed medications, and over-the-counter drugs. The policy stipulates that prescribed medications are administered according to the directions of the prescribing physician. 2–2133. There is written policy and procedure which specify that records of all medications distributed by facility staff are maintained and audited monthly, and include the date, time and name of the resident receiving medication, and the name of staff distributing it. *45 2–2134. Written policy and procedure provide for the prompt notification of resident's next to kin in case of serious illness, surgery, death or injury. Any death in the program is reported immediately to the proper officials.
APPENDIX D The parties shall submit an agreed-upon list of programs (educational and vocational) to the Court, for incorporation in this Decree, within thirty (30) days from the signing of this Decree by the parties.
APPENDIX E
FOOD SERVICE STANDARDS OF THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR ADULT COMMUNITY FACILITIES 2–2110. When the facility contracts for food service, a registered dietician or physician annually approves the nutritional value of the contractor's menu. 2–2111. When the facility constracts for food service, the contractor complies with all sanitation and health codes enacted by state or local authorities. 2–2112. When food service is provided at the facility, food service staff develop advanced planned menus and follow the schedule.
48

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

2–2113. When food service is provided at the facility, the advanced planned menus are reviewed and approved by a registered dietician or physician. 2–2114. When food service is provided at the facility, there is a single menu for staff and clients. 2–2115. When food service is provided at the facility, special diets are prepared which meet the medical needs of residents. 2–2116. When food service is provided at the facility, provisions are made to meet the religious dietary needs of residents. 2–2117. When food service is provided at the facility, it complies with all sanitation and health codes enacted by state or local authorities. 2–2118. When food service is provided at the facility, all foods are properly stored at the completion of each meal. 2–2119. When food service is provided at the facility, the kitchen and dining area are ventilated, properly furnished, and clean.

APPENDIX F

SLEEPING SPACE AND CAPACITIES OF DEFENDANTS' INSTITUTIONS

Institution

Space

N./S & R Space

N. Capacity

6/21/84 Pop.

Blue Ridge P.R. Center

164

174

Pre–Release Dorm

2400 sq. ft

53/45.28 sq. ft.

Work–Release Dorm

5000 sq. ft.

111/45.05 sq. ft.

Catawba W.R. Center

96

83

Wards 1–7

647 sq. ft.

77/58.80 sq. ft.

( 7)

Ward 8

825 sq. ft.

15/55.0 sq. ft.

Drivers' Ward

207 sq. ft.

4/51.8 sq. ft.

Cross Anchor C.I.

528

483

Dorms 1–5

100 sq/48 rm.

480/50.0 sq. ft.

(96)

Admin.Seg.

80.50/48 rm.

48/80.5 sq. ft.

Dutchman C.I.

528

488

Dorms 1–5

100 sq/48 rm.

480/50.0 sq. ft.

(96)

Admin.Seg.

80.50/48 rm.

48/80.5 sq. ft.

Givens Youth C.C.

70

121

Dorm A

66.0 sq/15 cu.

15/66.0 sq. ft.

10/1/84 Pop 172 75
457 451 104

49

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

Dorm B

58.5 sq/15 cu.

15/58.5 sq. ft.

Dorm C

63.9 sq/12 cu.

12/63.9 sq. ft.

Dorm D

60.7 sq/12 cu.

12/60.7 sq. ft.

Dorm E

74.4 sq/14 cu.

14/74.4 sq. ft.

Staff Room

152.25 sq. ft.

2/76.13 sq. ft.

Greenwood C.C.

63

92

Ward A

1115 sq. ft.

24/46.46 sq. ft.

Ward B

1100 sq. ft.

24/45.83 sq. ft.

Ward C

692 sq. ft.

15/46.13 sq. ft.

Livesay W.R. Center

96

94

Dorms A & B

90 sq/24 cu.

96/45.0 sq. ft.

(48)

Northside C.C.

175

265

Dorms 1–3

90.25 sq/24 cu

144/45.13 sq. ft.

(48)

Ward 1

1420 sq. ft.

31/45.81 sq. ft.

NEW McCormick C.I.

600 *

0

Med.Sec.

73.0 sq/504

504/73.0 sq. ft.

Lock–Up

80.0 sq/96

96/80.0 sq. ft.

Perry C.I.

768

950

Dorms 1–4

60.5 sq/96 rm.

192/60.5

(48)

384/30.25

(96)

Dorms A & B (R & E)

80.5 sq/48 rm.

96/80.5

(48)

Dorms C & D (seg)

80.5 sq/48 rm.

96/80.5

(48)

Aiken Youth C.C.

253

232

Dorm 1

3774 sq. ft.

83/45.47 sq. ft.

Dorms 2, 3, 5

1931 sq. ft.

126/45.98 sq. ft.

(42)

Dorm 4

997 sq. ft.

22/45.32 sq. ft.

Dorm 6

992 sq. ft.

22/45.09 sq. ft.

90 93 247 0 1021
242
50

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

CCI CB–1 CB–2 CB–3

41.12/255c. 53.74/108c. 56.36/108c.

Wards 1–10 Ward 11 RENOV. CCI Guards Qtr.s
RENOV. CCI Stoney Bldg.
RENOV. MSC
Campbell W.R. Center East & West Wings Goodman C.I. Bldg. 1 Bldg. 2 Bldg. 3 Bldg. 4 Kirkland C.I. Two Dorms Five GP Dorms

2710 sq. ft. 5885.70 sq.
168.0sq/5c. 336.0sq/8c.
161.0sq/18c. 85.17sq/12
54.0sq/59c. 84.0sq/18c.
90.0/24rm.
59.02/49cu. 53.05/42cu. 52.90/46cu. 58.90/50cu.
67.4/64rm. 67.4/64rm.

psych. unit

83.0/96rm.

255/41.12 sq. ft. 108/53.74 sq. ft. 54/56.36 sq. ft. 108/28.18 540/50.19 sq. ft. 100/58.85 sq.ft.
10/84.0 sq. ft. 56/48.0 sq. ft.
36/80.5 sq. ft. 12/85.17
59/54.0 sq. ft. 18/84.0 sq. ft.
100/45.0 sq. ft.
49/59.02 sq. ft. 42/53.05 sq. ft. 46/52.9 sq. ft. 50/58.9 sq. ft.
128/67.4 sq. ft. 160/67.4 sq. ft. 320/33.7 sq. ft. 96/83.0 sq. ft.

1165

1118

(162) sq. ft. (54)

66*

(2)

(7)

48*

0

(2)

sq. ft.

77*

0

100

164

(50)

187

232

608

805

(64)

(32)

(64)

1168
0 0 0 165 264 789
51

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

Lower Savannah W.R. Center

59

58

Dorm A

777.0 sq.

17/45.71 sq. ft.

Dorm B

467.0 sq.

10/46.70 sq. ft.

Dorms C & D

545.0 sq.

24/45.42 sq. ft.

(12)

Dorm E

131.0 sq.

2/65.5 sq. ft.

Dorm F

272.0 sq.

6/45.33 sq. ft.

Manning C.I.

364

498

Wards 1–6

2797.5 sq.

330/50.86 sq. ft.

(55)

Trusty Area

161.0/12rm.

24/80.50 sq. ft.

Cell Block

54.0/10c.

10/54.0 sq. ft.

RENOV. cell block

? /10c.

10/? sq. ft.

10*

Maximum Security Center

0*

73

Admin.Seg.

54.0/59c.

59/54.0 sq. ft.

Admin.Sep.

84.0/18c.

18/84.0 sq. ft.

Midlands R & E

0*

194

A–D Blocks

35.0/8 cells

32/35.0 sq. ft.

(8)

E & F Blocks

48.0/6c.

12/48.0 sq. ft.

(6)

G & H Blocks

42.0/3c.

6/42.0 sq. ft.

(3)

Trusty Area

48.2/7cu.

7/48.2 sq. ft.

Annex

144.0/10c.

20/72.0 sq. ft.

Stevenson C.I.

127?

132

?

FORMER Admin.Seg.

648 sq. ft.

12/54.0 sq. ft.

State Park C.I.

158?

125

Work Release Area

126–306/14 rm.

87–63 sq ft

(76)

Women's Ger.

173–307/4 rm

76.25–86.5

(12)

Men's Ger. (occ.)

143–316/19 rm

65.0–101.5

(54)

73
500 75 183
142 141
52

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

Men's Ger. (unocc) Men's Ger. (constn)

184–328/6 rm 16–314/23 rm

82.0–99.5 65.0–101.5

Men's Ger. (constn)

? sq ft/12 cu?

Holding cells

?sq ft/2

Walden C.I. Ward A Ward B Ward C Ward D Dorm 1 Wateree River C.I. Wards 1–6 Dorms 1 & 2 Watkins P.R. Center Dorms 1–3 Women's Corr. Center Five GP Cottages

499 sq. ft. 1601 sq. ft. 1195 sq. ft. 1652 sq. ft. 100 sq/26 rm.
2231 sq. ft. 100 sq/48 rm.
90 sq/24 rm.
83 sq/24 rm.

Two Cottages Detention NEW WOMEN'S DORM

83 sq/24 rm. 74 sq/5cells

11/45.36 sq. ft. 35/45.74 sq. ft. 26/45.96 sq. ft. 36/45.88 sq. ft. 52/50.0 sq. ft.
294/45.53 sq. ft. 192/50.0 sq. ft.
144/45.0 sq. ft.
60/83.0 sq. ft. 120/41.5 sq. ft. 48/83.0 sq. ft. 5/74.0 sq. ft.

NEW R & E

100sq/48 rm.

96/50.0 sq. ft.

Coastal W.R. Center Dorm 1

80.0 sq/192 c.
89.9 sq/27 cu. 102.2 sq/4 cu.

192/80.0 sq. ft.
54/44.95 sq. ft. 8/51.10 sq. ft.

(16)

(64) *

(24)? *

(2)? *

160

229

486

615

(49)

(96)

144

127

(48)

233

307

(12)

(24)

(24)

96 *

0

192 *

?

158

112

(62)

228
611 109 287
0 ? 117
53

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

Dorms 2 & 3 NEW LIEBER C.I.

90 sq./24 rm.

96/45.0 sq. ft.

Med.Sec. Lock–Up R & E MacDougall Youth C.C. Dorms 1, 2, 3, 5
Dorm 4
Palmer W.R. Center (one dorm) TOTAL:

73 sq/504 c. 80 sq/96c. 80 sq/96c.

504/73.0 sq. ft. 96/80.0 sq. ft. 96/80.0 sq. ft.

80 sq/48 rm. 80 sq/44 rm.

96/80.0 sq. ft. 192/40.0 sq. ft. 22/80.0 sq. ft. 44/40.0 sq. ft.

72.25 sq/50 cu.

50/72.25 sq. ft.

present buildings

renovations

new buildings

(48) 696 *
354 (24) (48)
50 7094 291 * 1584 *

0

0

400

381

90

92?

8261

APPENDIX G REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
STAFFING, JANUARY 1984, BY THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS
JAMES D. HENDERSON CORRECTIONAL CONSULTANT
1401 South 16th Street Leavenworth, Kansas 66048

54

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
(913) 682–0183 *46 February 4, 1984 Mr. William D. Leeke, Commissioner South Carolina Department of Corrections 4444 Broad River Road P.O. Box 21787 Columbia, South Carolina 29221 Dear Bill, Inclosed is the report on my recent staffing analysis conducted in your Department. I sincerely appreciate the cooperation and responsiveness of everyone representing the Department of Corrections. If there are any questions regarding this study, I would be pleased to respond to them. It was good to see you and look forward to seeing you in San Antonio at the A.C.A. Conference. Sincerely, /s/ J.D. HENDERSON N.I.C. Consultant
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS SOUTH CAROLINA NIC TA83–402 BY NIC CONSULTANT
JAMES D. HENDERSON JANUARY 16–20, 1984
U.S. Department of Justice
55

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
National Institute of Corrections
Washington, D.C. 20534
NIC T/A # 83–402
This technical assistance activity was funded by the Prisons Division of the National Institute of Corrections. The Institute is a federal agency established to provide assistance to strengthen state and local correctional agencies by creating more effective, humane, safe, and just correctional services.
The resource person(s) who provided the on-site technical assistance did so on a contractual basis, at the request of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and through the coordination of the National Institute of Corrections. The direct on-site assistance and this subsequent report are intended to assist the South Carolina Department of Corrections to address the issue(s) outlined in the original request and in efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the agency.
The contents of this document reflect the views of Mr. James D. Henderson. The contents do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy of the National Institute of Corrections.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
SOUTH CAROLINA
NIC TA 83–402
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REQUEST The present administration of the South Carolina Department of Corrections requested National Institute of Corrections that a staffing review be conducted at a sampling of five institutions identified by the Department. The staffing assessment is connected to the Nelson Suit and is also for the purpose of assisting the Department of Corrections in preparing a report to the Legislature in early February.
Ms. Mary Lou Commiso, NIC Technical Assistance Manager, contracted the consultant in late November and arrangements were made for the technical assistance to occur during the week of January 16–20, 1984. The time alloted to the project was restrictive, however, Ms. Commiso was able to arrange for advance materials to be made available to the consultant which were valuable in preparing for the study. Those materials consisted of plot plans, current staffing information, special programs requiring additional staffing, etc. and these materials were forwarded through the efforts of Mr. Dave Belding, Legal Counsel.
*47 Mr. Stephen Ney, National Prison Project and Ms. Cristine Freeman, Southern Prison Coalition contacted the consultant and suggested attention also be directed to the following areas: (1) Use of inmates (Ward Keepers); (2) Staff coverage of inmates permitting sound or visual supervision; (3) Out of cell activity for protective custody inmates (3rd shift); (4) Staff required if restraints were not utilized in protective custody escort; (5) Staffing required if inmates in segregation were permitted open visiting; and, (6) Exercise schedules in segregation.
The consultant will address these issues with staffing implications, but will not comment on administrative or management prerogatives. Ms. Freeman requested permission to accompany the consultant on portions of the staffing analysis. After contacting Mr. Bill Wilkey, NIC Prison Chief, the decision was made to limit this study to the consultant and those knowledgeable of operations current staffing at the institutions. Legal Counsel of the South Carolina Department of Corrections were not involved in the on-site studies.
56

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

METHODOLOGY The consultant collected the needed data to establish the relief factor. The South Carolina Department computes the relief factor on a department-wide basis. The relief factor is the figure used to determine the number of personnel to staff all functions required on a 365 day, 24 hour basis. The relief factor computation is reflected on the following page.

SHIFT RELIEF FACTOR
1. Number of days per year that the agency is closed: i.e., no services offered.
2. Number of agency work days per year equals 365. 3. Number of regular days off per employee per year (usually 52 weeks/
yr x 2 days off/week) = 104. 4. Number of vacation days off per employee per year. 5. Number of holidays off per employee per year. 6. Number of sick days off per employee per year (should be actual
average for the jail staff). 7. Number of other days off per employee per year (this includes
time off for injury on the job, filling vacancies, military leave, funeral leave, unexcused absences, disciplinary time off, special assignments, etc. 8. Number of training days per year 9. Total number of days off per employee per year equals (c) + (d) + (e) + (f) + (g) + (h) 10. Number of actual work days per employee per year equals 365–(i) 11. Lunches and breaks (j) x .0625 down time factor 12. Actual work days 1–year (j)–(k) 13. Shift relief factor = (b) ÷ (__) (Number of employees for 1 sight hour shift, 5 days a week) 365 days x 24 hours per day = 8,760 hours per year 200.56 days x 8 hours per day = 1,604,48 hours

CURRENT DATA CY 1983 0
365 104.00
10.17 12.00 7.46
5.61
11.83 151.07
213.93 13.37 200.56 1.82

57

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

8,760 ÷ 1,604.48 = 5.45 employees for 24 hour coverage

7 Day Post One Shift

1.82 Relief Factor

5 Day Post One Shift

1.3 Relief Factor

2 Day Post One Shift

.51 Relief Factor

*48 On arriving in South Carolina the consultant met with Commissioner William Leeke and his Executive Staff. During the week he also met with the below listed staff of the South Carolina Department of Corrections.

Mr. Bill Leeke Mr. Hugh Clements Mr. Charles Leath Mr. Paul Weldon Mr. Doug Catoe Mr. Jim Harvey Mr. Larry Batson Mr. Dave Belding Mr. Joe Martin Mr. James Aiken Mr. William Weston Mr. Fred Thompson Mr. John Carmichael Mr. Ricky Harrison Mr. Robert W. Donlin Mr. Glenn T. Davis Mr. Bob Rice Mr. Jerry Maxwell
Mr. Frank Horton Mr. Doug Taylor Mr. Claude Gilliam

Commissioner Deputy Commissioner, Administration Deputy Commissioner, Operations Deputy Commissioner, Programs Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Institutions Regional Administrator, Midlands Region Legal Advisor Legal Counsel Director of Security Warden, Central Correctional Institution Chief Correctional Supervisor, C.C.I. Chief Correctional Supervisor, Maximum Security Center Warden, Wateree River Correctional Institution Associate Warden, Wateree River Correctional Institution Warden, Womens' Correctional Center Warden, Dutchman Correctional Institution Associate Warden, Dutchman Correctional Institution Chief Correctional Supervisor, Dutchman Correctional Institution Warden, Perry Correctional Institution Associate Warden, Perry Correctional Institution Chief Correctional Supervisor, Perry Correctional Institution

58

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
The five institutions selected for the staffing analysis were the Central Correctional Institution, Wateree Correctional Institution, Womens' Correctional Center, Dutchman Correctional Institution, and the Perry Correctional Institution. The consultant added the Maximum Security Unit of Central Correctional Institution to this analysis.
Commissioner Leeke assigned Mr. Joe Martin, Director of Security, to coordinate the visits to the various facilities. His knowledge, experience and expertise were invaluable to the consultant throughout the technical assistance project.
GENERAL During the week the consultant reviewed staffing rosters, selected post orders, and staffing proposals prepared by prison administrators for submission to the Central Office. Also, the Organizational Charts for the Department of Corrections and individual institutions were reviewed.
Physical plant, security levels, mission, programs, and special management inmates were factors considered in arriving at staffing recommendations.
At each facility Mr. Martin and the consultant, accompanied by the Warden and other staff members, thoroughly toured the institutions. Random interviews with staff and inmates were held. Programs and operations were observed. At the conclusion the consultant developed staffing recommendations and offered suggestions for alternative approaches to manpower utilization and roster management. These will be discussed in the RECOMMENDATION section of this report.
THE NELSON SUIT *49 The staffing as recommended will comply with Mr. Ney's concerns in staff coverage of living units and permitting additional exercise in segregation.
Ward Keepers' roles have diminished and key staff members deny they have any authority over other inmates. There are, however, some symptoms of a minimal role. The mini-canteens in quarters operated by the Ward Keepers (a legalized loan business), the maintenance of the bed assignment log and the unlocked quarters door of the Ward Keeper are indicators that this tradition has not been completely eliminated. There are very positive signs that administrators are making every effort to direct staff at operational levels that Ward Keepers are responsible only for sanitation and house keeping of the general area in quarters. Each individual is responsible for his own area.
The out-of-cell activity for protective custody inmates on the 3rd shift must remain a management decision. It presents many ramifications that effect operational security. The 3rd shift traditionally has the least staff and other services would be impractical. There are other alternatives more effective and more realistic which were discussed with appropriate staff.
To handcuff or not to handcuff inmates and controlled visiting are management decisions. Staff would be available if contact visiting were authorized. There would be a need for physical plant modifications to permit this, but the consultant would not recommend discontinuing all controlled visitation.
The following staffing analyses are designed for the institutions designated. It is the consultant's opinion that the assignments as designated would provide adequate supervision internally and on the perimeter. Program additions and institution utilization could very well impact these staffing levels. For example, if unit management becomes a reality in the Department, a reassessment of positions would be required.
59

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
The staffing levels of minimum security are richer than a traditional minimum security facility. The mission of these institutions has been altered because of overcrowding and higher level security designations made there. It is unusual for a minimum security facility to have a perimeter detection system, razor ribbon, perimeter patrols, and housing unit control rooms. Also, only four inmates are permitted to work outside the perimeter. The staffing will correspond to present utilization of these facilities. Following are the consultant's staffing recommendations.

Seven Day Post Shift Supervisor Cell Block # 1 (Gate) Cell Block # 1 (PC) Cell Block # 1 (AS) Cell Block # 1 Floors 1–2–3 Cell Block # 1 (Activities) Cell Block # 2 (Gate) Cell Block # 2 (Ranges) Cell Block # 2 (Shakedown) Cell Block # 2 (Activities) Cell Block # 2 (Cage) Cell Block # 3 Wards 1–10 Ward 11 Building # 4 Tunnel Key Officer Kitchen Officer Dining Room Officer Hospital Officer Admission/Orientation

CENTRAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

3rd

1st

2nd

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

2

2

2

1

2

1

1

1

2

2

10

10

10

1

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

60

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
Transititonal Unit Stoney Building Vehicle Gate Towers # 1–# 6 Central Control Corridor Gate Small Recreation Field Control Booth Tunnel Door Visiting Room Shakedown Hospital Security Activities Officers
Total seven day post = 130 130 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 236.6 positions

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

6

6

6

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

34

48

44

Five Day Post Deputy Warden (Security) Chief Correctional Supervisor Operations Supervisor Cell Block # 1 Supervisor Building # 4 Supervisor Yard Supervisor Training Supervisor Inside Front Gate Supervisor Cell Block # 2 Supervisor

CENTRAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

3rd

1st

2nd

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

61

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
Assistant Supervisor CB # 1 Building # 4 Assistant Supervisor Assistant Supervisor CB # 2 Assistant Supervisor (Cafeteria) Assistant Supervisor (Inside Front Gate) Assistant Supervisor Assistant Supervisor (Personnel) Assistant Supervisor (Transportation) Assistant Supervisor (Training) Assistant Supervisor (Yard) Assistant Supervisor (Fire Marshal) Assistant Supervisor (Central Control) Chapel Rear Gate Library School Visiting Room Personnel Office Count Officer Operations Officer Transportation Officer Commissary Officer Truck Escort Property Control Prison Industry Maintenance Laundry

1

1

2

1

1

2

2

1

1

2

2

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

4

3

1

1

1

1

3

1

62

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
Prison Industry (Gate)
Total five day post = 53 53 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 68.9 Positions

2

2

48

3

CENTRAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

3rd

1st

2nd

Two Day Post

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift

O/B Visiting Gate

1

Visiting Room

1

Visiting Room (Gate)

1

Post # 10 (Visiting)

1

4
Total two day post = 4 4 x .51 Relief Factor = 2.04 Positions

7 Day Posts

236.6

5 Day Posts

68.9

2 Day Posts

2.04

307.54 or 308 recommended authorized security complement

Seven Day Post Gate Cat Walk Recreation Key Control Ranges

MAXIMUM SECURITY CENTER CENTRAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

3rd

1st

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2nd Shift
1 1
1 1
63

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

Total seven day post = 13 13 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 23.66 Positions
Five Day Post Chief Correctional Supervisor Supervisor Assistant Supervisors Canteen/Transfers Legal Library
Total five day post = 11 11 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 14.3 7 Days Posts 5 Days Posts

3

6

4

3rd

1st

2nd

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift

1

1

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

2

7

2

3rd 1st 2ndSeven Day Post Early Late Shift Shift Shift-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gate 1 1 1Cat Walk 1 1 1Recreation 1Key Control 1 1Ranges 1 2 1 ------------------------------------------------ 3 6

4Total seven day post = 1313 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 23.66 Positions 3rd 1st 2ndFive Day Post Early Late Shift

Shift Shift-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Chief Correctional Supervisor 1Supervisor 1 1

1Assistant Supervisors 1 3 1Canteen/Transfers 1Legal Library 1 ------------------------------------------------ 2 7 2Total five day

post = 1111 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 14.37 Days Posts 23.665 Days Posts 14.3 ----- 37.96 or 38 recommended authorized

complement.

3rd

1st

2nd

Seven Day Posts

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift

Shift Supervisor

1

1

1

Assistant Supervisor

1

2

1

Cottages 1–2–3–6–7

5

5

5

Cottage 4

1

2

1

Detention

1

1

1

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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
Transportation Control Center Yard Officers Cottage 5 Cafeteria Cottage 2
Total seven day post = 45 45 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 81.9 Positions
Five Day Posts Chief Correctional Supervisor Record Office Mail Room Transportation Apparel Plant (PI) School
Total five day post = 7 7 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 9.1 Positions 7 Day Posts 45 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 5 Day Posts 7 x 1.3 Relief Factor =

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

12

18

15

3rd

1st

2nd

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

6

1

3rd 1st 2ndFive Day Posts Early Late Shift Shift Shift------------------------------------------------------------------------------Chief Correctional Supervisor 1Record Office 1Mail Room 1Transportation 1Apparel Plant (PI) 1School 1 1 ------------------------------------------------ 6 1Total five day post = 77 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 9.1 Positions7 Day Posts 45 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 81.95 Day Posts 7 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 9.1 91.0 Security positions are recommended for authorized complement.
WATEREE RIVER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

MINIMUM SECURITY

3rd

1st

2nd

Seven Day Posts

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift

Correctional Supervisor

1

1

1

Assistant Shift Supervisor

1

1

1

Operations Office

1

Operations/Activities

1

Control Center

1

1

1

Shakedown

1

1

Tunnel (South) (Quarters)

1

1

1

Tunnel (North) (Quarters)

1

1

1

Tunnel (Center) (Quarters)

1

1

1

Cafeteria

1

1

Transportation

1

1

Back Gate Officer

1

1

1

Front Gate

1

1

1

Yard Patrol

1

Building Detail

1

Dormitory # 1

1

1

1

Dormitory # 2

1

1

1

Total seven day posts = 40 40 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 72.8 Positions

11

15

14

WATEREE RIVER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION MINIMUM SECURITY

66

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
Five Day Posts Chief Correctional Supervisor Operations Supervisor Training Officer Inmate Payroll

3rd

Early

Late

Shift

Total five day posts = 4 4 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 5.2 Positions

Two Day Posts Visiting Building Family Visiting Center

WATEREE RIVER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

MINIMUM SECURITY

3rd

Early

Late

Shift

Total two day posts = 2 2 x .51 Relief Factor = 1.02
7 Day Posts 40 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 5 Day Posts 4 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 2 Day Posts 2 x .51 Relief Factor =

72.8 5.2 1.02 79.02

DUTCHMAN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
3rd

1st

2nd

Shift

Shift

1

1

1

1

1

1st

2nd

Shift

Shift

1

1

2

or 79 security positions are recommended for authorized complement.

1st

2nd

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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
Seven Day Posts Shift Supervisor Shift Assistant Supervisor Control Center Gate Officer/Perimeter Visiting Room P1 through P5 (Quarters) Victor # 1 (Perimeter) Victor # 2 (Perimeter) A/S Wing Cafeteria Yard Patrol Segregation Control
Total seven day posts = 47 47 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 85.54 Positions

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

5

5

5

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

2

1

1

2

1

1

1

13

18

16

DUTCHMAN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

3rd

1st

2nd

Five Day Posts

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift

Chief Correctional Supervisor

1

Operations Supervisor

1

Transportation Supervisor

1

Transportation Assistant Supervisor

1

Operations Assistant Supervisor

1

Segregation Assistant Supervisor

1

Training Officer

1

Programs Officer

1

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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

Transportation

1

Education Building/

Patrol

1

Maintenance Shop

1

A/S Segregation–Visiting

1

12
Total five day posts = 12 12 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 15.6

Two Day Posts Gate Visiting Room Outside Visit

DUTCHMAN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

3rd

Eary

Late

Shift

Total two day posts = 4 4 x .51 Relief Factor = 2.04
7 Day Posts 47 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 85.54 5 Day Posts 12 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 15.6 2 Day Posts 4 x .51 Relief Factor = 2.04

103.18

1st

2nd

Shift

Shift

2

1

1

4

or 103 security positions are recommended for authorized complement.

PERRY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

MEDIUM SECURITY

3rd

1st

2nd

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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
Seven Day Posts Correctional Supervisor Assistant Supervisors Delta (Perimeter Patrols) Front Gate Lobby Visitation Shakedown (Visiting) Main Control Cafeteria Dormitories Control Yard Officers Yard Tower Dormitory (Inside)
Total seven day post = 75 7.5 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 136.5 Positions

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift

1

1

1

1

1

1

4

4

4

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

1

4

4

4

4

4

4

1

4

4

8

2

2

21

25

25

PERRY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

Five Day Posts Chief Corrections Supervisor (Medium) Chief Corrections Supervisor (Medium) Operations Supervisor Transportation Supervisor Training Supervisor

MEDIUM SECURITY

3rd

1st

2nd

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift

1

1

1

1

1

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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

Armory

1

Operations

1

Programs Building

1

Education

1

Prison Industries

1

Tool Control

1

Grounds Supervisor

1

Disciplinary Clerk

1

Contraband

1

Transportation

6

Visiting Coordinator

1

Property

1

Sewage Treatment

1

Dormitory Officer

1

Vehicle Maintenance

2

Legal Library

1

Escort

1

28
Total five day posts = 28 28 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 36.4 Positions

Two Day Posts Transportation Visiting Room Front Gate

PERRY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION MEDIUM SECURITY

3rd

1st

2nd

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift

2

1

1

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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

Lobby

1

5
Total two day posts = 5 5 x .51 Relief Factor = 2.5 Positions 7 Day Posts = 5 Day Posts = 2 Day Posts =

3rd 1st 2ndTwo Day Posts Early Late Shift Shift Shift------------------------------------------------------------------------------Transportation 2Visiting Room 1Front Gate 1Lobby 1 --------------------------------------------------------------- 5Total two day posts = 55 x .51 Relief Factor = 2.5 Positions7 Day Posts = 136.55 Day Posts = 36.42 Day Posts = 2.5 ----- 175.4 or 175 positions recommended as authorized security complement.

PERRY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION MAXIMUM SECURITY

3rd

1st

Seven Day Posts

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift Supervisor

1

Assistant Supervisor

3

A Dormitory (PC–Youth)

Control Center

Wing Officers

B Dormitory (R & E)

Control Center

$Wing Officers

C Dormitory (AS)

Control Center

Wing Officers

D Dormitory (Long Term Maximum)

Control Center

Wing Officers

2nd Shift 1 3

1

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

1

1

4

2

1

1

1

1

3

2

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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

Reception & Evaluation

Control Center

1

1

1

12

21

14

Total seven day posts = 49 49 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 89.18 Positions

3rd 1st 2nd Seven Day Posts Early Late Shift Shift Shift------------------------------------------------------------------Shift Supervisor 1 1 1Assistant Supervisor 3 3 3A Dormitory (PC“Youth) Control Center 1 1 1 Wing Officers 1 3 1B Dormitory (R & E) Control Center 1 1 1 $Wing Officers 1 3 1C Dormitory (AS) Control Center 1 1 1 Wing Officers 1 4 2D Dormitory (Long Term Maximum) Control Center 1 1 1 Wing Officers 1 3 2Reception & EvaluationControl Center 1 --------------------------------------------------------------- 1 1 12 21 14Total seven day posts = 4949 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 89.18 Positions

PERRY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

Five Day Posts Chief Corrections Supervisor Assistant Supervisor (R & E)
Processing Officers Visiting Room (Contact) Visiting Escort (Contact)
Total five day posts = 13 13 x 1.3 Relief Factor = 16.9 Positions 7 Day Posts 49 x 1.82 Relief Factor = 5 Day Posts 13 x 1.3 Relief Factor =
Perry Medium Security Perry Maximum Security

MAXIMUM SECURITY

3rd

1st

2nd

Early

Late

Shift

Shift

Shift

1

1

7

3

1

13

89.18 16.9 106.08 or 106 security positions are recommended for
authorized complement. $175 106

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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

281 Total positions recommended for authorized complement.

RECAPITULATION

Present

Recommended

Total

Authorized

Authorized

Recommended

Security Staff

Security Staff

Increase

Central Correctional

Institution

255

308

53

Maximum Security (CCI)

30

38

8

Women's Correctional

Institution

66

91

25

Wateree River Correctional

Institution

51

79

28

Dutchman Correctional

Institution

83

103

20

Perry Correctional

Institution

224

281

57

TOTAL RECOMMENDED

INCREASE

RECAPITULATION Present Recommended Total Authorized Authorized Recommended Security Staff Security Staff Increase -------------------------------------------Central Correctional Institution 255 308 53Maximum Security (CCI) 30 38 8Women's Correctional Institution 66 91 25Wateree River Correctional Institution 51 79 28Dutchman Correctional Institution 83 103 20Perry Correctional Institution 224 281 57 ----------- TOTAL RECOMMENDED 191 INCREASE

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
I. RECOMMENDATION
*50 Develop centralized system of roster management throughout the Department of Corrections.
DISCUSSION: Roster and security staff management is fragmented. Security staff are assigned to shifts and zones rather than a centralized position control system. This does not permit maximum utilization of positions nor is it cost effective. The consultant was advised that State Personnel Regulations do not permit shift-to-shift reassignments and as a result ineffective

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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
staff management was apparent. For example, one shift or zone could have excessive staff available and yet another shift could have reduced or insufficient staffing.
II. RECOMMENDATION Discontinue use of Control Centers in medium and minimum security housing units.
DISCUSSION: Housing Control Centers in regular units are an ineffective utilization of personnel. It defeats the healthy interaction of staff and inmates and only serves as a false sense of security for staff. Personnel cannot properly supervise or utilize their interpersonal skills in their day-to-day contact with inmates.
III. RECOMMENDATION Roster assignments should accurately reflect preponderence of duties.
DISCUSSION: Many roster assignments do not reflect actual duties. Because of staff shortages, managers have established posts that do not reflect actual responsibilities. The consultant discussed this with each administrator at each critique.
IV. RECOMMENDATION Increase supervisory relief positions.
DISCUSSION: Supervisory staff have traditionally been assigned on a five-day post basis. Full supervisory personnel positions are critical for relief. The consultant included this factor in establishing recommended complements.
V. RECOMMENDATION Eliminate Ward Keepers' traditional role.
Discussion: The officials of the South Carolina Department of Corrections have already directed efforts in correcting this tradition. Inadequate staffing probably created this inmate status assignment, but it will soon be part of the history. Ward Keepers' roles in maintaining bed carts and mini-canteens are questionable roles. One inmate should never have authority or supervisory responsibility over another. These are clearly staff roles.
VI. RECOMMENDATION Establish annual leave/vacation schedules.
DISCUSSION: Equal numbers of staff on vacation schedules are required for effective roster management. The relief factor can only be an effective management and cost effective instrument when organized schedules are maintained. Leave/vacation schedules must be organized over a 12 month period for proper utilization of staff.
VII. RECOMMENDATION Conduct staffing analysis of other institutions in the system.
DISCUSSION: The current staffing levels at institutions covered in this report are inadequate. There were not sufficient positions to effectively carry out functions as outlined on security rosters. Some security posts were vacated or assignment inconsistently manned because of staffing levels. Reviews of all institutions by Mr. Joe Martin of the South Carolina Department of Corrections would further identify staffing requirements.
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
*51 The Wardens and staff at all institutions were extremely cooperative and helpful. The time frame for conducting these staffing proposals was very limited and without the assistance of Mr. Martin and the administrators, the study would have been impossible. The consultant believes the staffing levels recommended are consistent with other facilities around the country and will establish proper security coverage for operations and programs. V. Signatures The following parties certify that they have read the foregoing Consent Decree and that it is an accurate record of their agreement in this action: /s/Steve Ney American Civil Liberties Union National Prison Project 1346 Connecticut Av., N.W. Suite 1031 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331–0500 /s/W. Gaston Fairey Fairey & Parise P.O. Box 1637 Columbia, S.C. 29202 (803) 252–7606 /s/Christine A. Freeman Southern Prisoners Defense Committee 600 Healey Building 57 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA. 30303 (404) 688–1202, for plaintiffs. /s/Larry Batson General Counsel
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
South Carolina Department of Corrections P.O. Box 21787 Columbia, S.C. 29221–1787 (803) 758–6342 /s/Kenneth P. Woodington Senior Ass't Attorney General P.O. Box 11549 Columbia, S.C. 29211 ((803) 758–8667, for defendants. /s/Loretta Sanders, Prisoner Women's Correctional Center /s/Harry H. Plyler, Prisoner Campbell Work Release Center /s/Philip H. Therrien, Prisoner Central Correctional Institution, counsel for plaintiffs. /s/William D. Leeke, Commissioner S.C. Department of Corrections /s/Eugene N. Zeigler, Chairman S.C. Board of Corrections /s/Goetz B. Eaton, Vice Chairman S.C. Board of Corrections, Counsel for defendants.
Defendants
/s/Norman Kirkland, Secretary
S.C. Board of Corrections
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
/s/Charles C. Moore, Member S.C. Board of Corrections
/s/Clarence E. Watkins, Member S.C. Board of Corrections
/s/Betty M. Condon, Member S.C. Board of Corrections Plaintiffs
/s/Jasper Buchanan, Prisoner Central Correctional Institution
/s/Ernie DuBeau, Prisoner Walden Correctional Institution /s/Michael A. Godwin, Prisoner Kirkland Correctional Institution /s/Lawrence Abdul Ali, Prisoner Kirkland Correctional Institution /s/Dennis Underwood, Prisoner Kirkland Correctional Institution
/s/Suzanne Owens, Prisoner
78

Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
Women's Correctional Center /s/Charles V. Waters, Prisoner Goodman Correctional Institution
/s/Murph Salter, Prisoner Goodman Correctional Institution
/s/C. Patrick Leopold, Prisoner Stevenson Correctional Institution
/s/Robert F. Diaz, Prisoner Wateree River Correctional Institution
/s/Kevin H. Griffin, Prisoner Wateree River Correctional Institution
/s/Billy Rice, Prisoner Wateree River Correctional Institution
/s/Bobby D. Bolin, Cross Anchor Correctional Institution
/s/Stewart R. Buchanan, Dutchman Correctional Institution
/s/Billie Joe Foster,
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
Dutchman Correctional Institution /s/Barry Chappelle,
Perry Correctional Institution /s/Calvin R. Mattison,
Perry Correctional Institution /s/Tyrone Cooper,
Perry Correctional Institution APPENDIX 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION Harry Plyler, et al. (formerly) Gary Wayne Nelson, et al.,), Plaintiffs,
vs. William D. Leeke, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections,
and Members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections, Defendants. Civil Action No. 82–876–2
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT *52 NOW COME the parties to this lawsuit by and through their undersigned attorneys and present to this Court the following amendments and additions to the proposed Consent Decree signed by the parties on January 8, 1985. 1. At the end of Paragraph 3 in Section U on page 67 of the Consent Decree, add the following paragraph:
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
Should Alan Breed no longer be able to serve as mediator pursuant to provisions of this Decree, the parties will submit to the Court another mutually agreed upon mediator. If the parties are unable to agree upon a mediator, each party shall submit to the Court two (2) names with resumes for consideration of the Court for appointment of a mediator. The Court will exercise its independent judgment in naming any future mediator if the parties are unable to mutually agree.
2. In Section J, Page 8, amend the entire paragraph to read as follows: Upon any motion for supplemental relief pertaining to this Decree, the Court may exercise its discretion to advance such motion before all others pending before it and give it such expeditious handling as it deems appropriate.
3. On Page 11 at the end of General Principles section, add the following: V. In the event that either party submits to the Court a controversy concerning the enforcement, interpretation or implimentation of this Decree, the standard of review by the Court shall be the intent of the parties as set forth in this Decree, but if the intent of the parties cannot be determined by the Court from the Decree, the Court shall have the power and discretion to fashion such relief as disposes of all issues raised in such controversy in a manner consistent with the other provisions of the settlement.
Made this the 1st day of November, 1985, in Columbia, South Carolina. /s/W. Gaston Fairey Fairey & Parise, P.A. Post Office Box 8443 Columbia, South Carolina 29202 Christine Freeman Southern Prisoner's Defense Committee Suite 600, Healey Building 57 Forsyth Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Steven Ney National Prison Project 1346 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1031 Washington, DC 20036
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs. /s/Kenneth P. Woodington Senior Assistant Attorney General Attorney General's Office for The State of South Carolina Post Office Box 11549 Columbia, South Carolina 29211 Larry C. Batson Legal Advisor Department of Corrections Post office Box 21787 Columbia, South Carolina 29221–1787 Attorneys for the Defendants.

APPENDIX 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE

COLUMBIA 29202

PHONE 803–765–5424

CHARLES W. GAMBRELL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE The Honorable C. Weston Houck
United States District Judge

JUNE 6, 1985

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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
Post Office Box 2260
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Re: Nelson, et al., v. Leeke, et al.
Civil Action No. 82–876–2
[Class Action] *53 Dear Judge Houck: The time for filing comments on the proposed consent decree in the above prison conditions case expired on May 30, 1985. On that date, six prisoners had submitted comments of objections. One prisoner (Harry E. Lewis) missed the deadline, and his comments (“Complaint”) were filed on June 3, 1985. The Clerk's office sent the file to me, and I have carefully reviewed all the material filed in response to the Notice you ordered posted and published by your Order filed on March 27, 1985.
Jasper Buchanan, an inmate at Kirkland, and Robert Gibson, an inmate at Goodman, each submitted two separate statements of objections. Other prisoners who have commented are Robert Williams (at Wateree), John Sims (at the Youth Center in Aiken), Patrick C. Lynn (at Enoree), and Franklin J. Loftis and Harry E. Lewis (both at Central). One of Buchanan's two filings is signed by sixty-one other Kirkland inmates, so if these additional signers intended to endorse Buchanan as their spokesman, you have sixty-eight prison inmates who have responded to the proposed consent decree. To the best of my knowledge, no member of the so-called general public has filed any comments.
I will attempt to outline for you the comments contained in the material received from these prisoners. Several matters discussed by them relate to purely personal alleged grievances, as you will see. With only one possible exception, I do not believe that any of the comments would justify calling any of these prisoners to any hearing you propose to have, but counsel for the classplaintiffs and the defendants may disagree. [I am sending Messrs. Fairey, Woodington, and Batson copies of this letter, and asking Mr. Fairey to distribute the extra copies he will receive to all other attorneys representing the plaintiffs. Unless you direct otherwise, copies of this letter will not go to the prison inmates whose comments have been filed.] The possible exception is a matter of whether toxic materials are being used under unsafe conditions on job sites at two prison institutions. The proposed decree touches on work assignments, but it does not encompass any particular standards for work safety that might be enforced by federal or state agencies.
Jasper Buchanan In his comments filed on April 11, 1985, Buchanan asks to be appointed as a representative of a class so he can personally appear and argue his opposition to the proposed decree. He protests general housing conditions at Central and at Kirkland, and he expresses his objection to his transfer from Central to Kirkland. Buchanan does raise one new matter. He states that “hazardous toxic material” is present at both institutions. He does not define the nature of such material, but he seems to be claiming he was transferred from Central to Kirkland because he blew the whistle about the presence of the hazardous material at Central.
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
In his comments filed on April 19, 1985, Buchanan fixes the locations of the allegedly hazardous material as the plants of the Prison Industries at both Central and Kirkland Institutions. He states that “difference kinds” [sic ] of what he describes as “Hazardous toxic waste Liquid Material” are on the sites, and that the proposed decree should be addressed to this issue so it can be resolved.
*54 Buchanan then generally criticizes conditions at Central, but his comments largely relate to matters the consent decree adequately addresses. Buchanan claims the disciplinary and classification procedures at the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) impede favorable parole releases, an impediment he equates with “double jeopardy.” He also argues that prisoners whose funds are placed in the trust fund account of SCDC should draw interest on their deposits, but there is no constitutional requirement for this to be done. He then contends that the SCDC grievance procedures whereunder complaints by inmates against correctional personnel are aired fail to produce meaningful results, and he is generally critical of the sanitation measures employed at the Central cafeteria.
Robert Williams
Robert Williams, a Wateree inmate, contends that “programs” and the legal research facilities at Wateree are inadequate. He does not again refer to what “programs” he has in mind, but he suggests in a purported copy of a letter he sent to attorney Christine A. Freeman on April 1, 1985, that his friend, inmate Gerald Martin, would file about a matter he discussed with her other than access to a law library. [Martin has not filed any comments about the proposed decree.]
Williams, who was a prolific writwriter when he was earlier confined in a South Carolina prison, see, e.g., Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911 (1979), contends that he faces untried charges in Charleston County, and has a direct appeal of his forgery conviction pending before the South Carolina Supreme Court. He writes that he is “participating in said appeal per Farretta v. California [sic], 422 U.S. 806 (1975),” but he does not know the docket number of his appeal. He claims a right under Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), to be sent to a prison unit that has an adequate law library. Attached to his objections is a letter Williams received from attorney Larry C. Batson, dated April 4, 1985, in which Mr. Batson said the Warden at Wateree was being asked to arrange for Williams to be sent to either Central or Kirkland (which have law libraries) to complete his legal research. Williams contended that as of April 15, 1985, the transfer had not been effected.
Robert Gibson
Robert Gibson, a Goodman inmate, has seemingly interpreted the Notice about the proposed consent decree as a license to voice his long pent-up resentment over the way Goodman is operated. He first submitted a statement containing a lengthy narrative of criticisms, which was filed on April 29, 1985. He followed this up with another (“Notice of Compromise Agreement”), filed on May 6, 1985, which contains various general criticisms of the proposed settlement agreement.
Gibson's objections can be said to bear upon discipline and security, housekeeping by inmates, recreation, food service, canteen operations, fire safety measures, job assignments for inmates, inmate mail, and the classification of inmates. His objections to the consent decree provisions are rather vague, and he states the United States Government should take over and operate SCDC.
*55 Gibson is highly critical of correctional personnel for being too lenient in enforcing rules about noise, gambling, and housekeeping in the living areas at Goodman. He believes officials are too permissive in overlooking cooking utensils and food in living areas, blaring television sets and radios, “bootleg” canteens operated by unauthorized inmates, and inattentive correctional officers who allegedly spend their time on duty watches reading magazines and listening to radios and tape players.
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
This inmate believes he should be permitted to fish in the Broad River, and not be confined to fishing in a pond set aside for use by inmates. He also wants seating arrangements in the cafeteria revised to permit small numbers of inmates to dine in quieter and more intimate surroundings than the existing dining arrangements will permit. He contends that cafeteria workers steal food, and that inmates who are authorized by dietary requirements to receive canned beverages sell the beverages to others. He wants the clandestine thievery and illegal sales to be terminated by effective correctional action so the profits of the official SCDC canteen operations (which are earmarked for the inmates' welfare) will not be diminished because of the illegal competition.
Gibson also wants inmate mail to not be handled by inmates other than addressees of such mail. He urges that correctional officers should require strict compliance with safety rules governing the use of hobby materials in living areas. He implies that careless and inattentive officers allow the illegal consumption of alcohol and drugs by prisoners, and permit gambling to flourish, and he does not believe the proposed decree contains strong enough provisions for the enforcement of disciplinary rules against offenders who exploit correctional apathy and/or indifference. He expresses nonspecific and general opposition to proposed inmate population goals and correctional officer quotas, as well as the SCDC classification proposals, and he argues that favoritism is shown when prison job assignments are handed out to inmates. He does not relate the alleged favoritism to religion, race, or sex.
John Sims The comments of this prisoner, filed on May 7, 1985, are not responsive at all to the Notice about the proposed consent decree. Therefore, the comments may be disregarded.
Patrick C. Lynn This Enoree inmate complains only about a disciplinary proceeding in which he was allegedly deprived of an opportunity to be confronted by his “accuser.” He contends that the schedule of disciplinary procedures set out in the SCDC publication distributed to inmates [The Inmate Guide] is unfair. Since the comments filed on May 22, 1985 do not respond properly to the Notice, Lynn's objections may also be disregarded.
Franklin J. Loftis This Central Institution inmate protests existing over-crowding at CCI. He wants correctional officers stationed inside all living areas around the clock. He believes there should be required:
*56 (1) More complete health facilities; (2) More adequate dining facilities; (3) A quiet area where inmates can do legal research and typing; (4) Regular fire drills and more fire prevention measures; (5) Guards on duty at all times in all living areas; (6) Stronger disciplinary action against all troublemakers;
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Plyler v. Leeke, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)
(7) Better pest control measures;
(8) Better plumbing facilities;
(9) A larger soap allotment for showers;
(10) Frequent unannounced shakedowns to look for foodstuffs stolen from cafeteria;
(11) A closing of both the R & E Center (immediately) and CCI;
(12) Oversight by United States Government of all measures provided for by the consent decree.
A close reading of this inmate's “Comment and Complaint,” filed on May 29, 1985, will reveal that he is not satisfied generally with the proposed consent decree. However, his list of demands are addressed by the consent decree, for the most part, and to the extent that his list contains matters not contemplated by that decree, he wants changes that are not mandated by the Constitution under cases decided by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. For these reasons, Loftis's comments would not justify his presence at any hearing set by the court.
Harry E. Lewis
The “Complaint” of Lewis is the invited comment earlier mentioned that was filed out of time (on June 3, 1985, but not even dated until after the deadline expired). However, even if the prisoner had responded seasonably to the Notice, the response would not be persuasive as to the need for a hearing. Contrary to inmate Loftis, Lewis does not want officers locked inside closed wards. He also wants ward-keepers and authorized ward canteens to be retained. He dislikes the SCDC system of classifying inmates, and states that he does not want to be compelled to leave Central Institution against his own wishes. No liberty interest, however, would prevent orderly transfers under the proposed decree. Lewis also protests lockdowns at night, and he believes that inmates should be allowed a daily early evening period of free visitation with other inmates all over the CCI compound, but security considerations would obviously take precedence over this wish.
Comments of Magistrate
Several matters mentioned by the commenting inmates are matters that are not subject to resolution in a class action, either by a consent decree or by an unsolicited fiat. These matters would remain possible subjects of individual cases prisoners can bring under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to seek redress individually. Other matters which are so general and vague as to be largely meaningless should be ignored, for the Notice approved in your Order required greater specificity than the general objections employ.
Inmates Buchanan and Williams, both of whom have tried in the past to be “jailhouse lawyers,” may have misconstrued judicial tolerance of writwriting in the past as a license for them to serve as lay advocates. No such license exists, as you know. Buchanan cannot represent others in this case. Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir.1975). If the concern of Buchanan about allegedly toxic materials being used by the Prison Industries under unsafe conditions is a matter you feel this class action should embrace, the attorneys representing the plaintiffs-classes are wholly competent to explore that issue. See United States v. Lucas, No. 83–1540 (4th Cir., May 31, 1985), where the Court of Appeals stated [in a Sixth Amendment context], “The Constitution does not provide the right of representation by a lay person.” If you have not seen the eight cases from six districts that were decided out in Texas in 1976 by Judge Garza that go into a right of lay representation in both criminal and civil cases, as affected by 28 U.S.C. § 1654, you may want to scan them. The cases are reported as Turner v. American Bar Association, 407 F.Supp.
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451, two of which were appealed and affirmed in Taylor v. Montgomery, 539 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.1976), and in Pilla v. American Bar Association, 542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir.1976). Judge Garza's discussion of the counsel question is at 407 F.Supp. 475–499.
*57 Although Robert Williams does not make his status clear where he says he is “participating” in his direct appeal under Faretta, if he has appellate counsel, nothing in Bounds v. Smith mandates that he have access on demand to a law library. See Williams v. Leeke, cited earlier. If he has waived counsel, either for an appeal or on any untried charges, he has no right to demand access to a law library. See United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir.1978). In any event, since the SCDC Legal Advisor has told Williams arrangements have been made for him to go to a prison that has an adequate law library, all Williams needs to do to assure compliance with the legal officer's request is contact him, and if an error has occurred in not transferring Williams, that error will be corrected forthwith.
If any recipients of copies of this letter feel that the foregoing comments are in error, I am suggesting that they write directly to you, with a copy of each such letter to me, so as to save time.
If I can add a parenthetical comment, since inmate Nelson has been transferred away from South Carolina, I believe the style of this case should be changed. You will notice a motion to this effect was filed on March 27, 1985, signed by Mr. Fairey and Mr. Batson. If you want a proposed Order to accomplish this, please let me know. In the meantime, I will await further instructions from you if you want me to do anything else on this case that might possibly assist you.
Respectfully, /s/Charles W. Gambrell United States Magistrate
CWG:jw See next page for copies cc: John W. Williams, Esquire Clerk, United States District Court District of South Carolina P.O. Box 867 Columbia, South Carolina 29202 W. Gaston Fairey, Esquire P.O. Box 8443 Columbia, South Carolina 29202 Kenneth P. Wooding, Esquire Assistant Attorney General
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State of South Carolina P.O. Box 11549 Columbia, South Carolina 29211 Larry C. Batson, Esquire Legal Counsel South Carolina Department of Corrections P.O. Box 21787 Columbia, South Carolina 29221
APPENDIX 4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Harry Plyler, et al. (formerly Gary Wayne Nelson, et al.,), Plaintiffs,
vs.
William D. Leeke, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 82–876–2
STIPULATIONS OF FACT NOW COME the parties in this case and present to this Honorable Court the following stipulations of fact as they relate to this lawsuit. 1. On May 5, 1982, a Complaint was filed in the District Court of South Carolina entitled Gary Wayne Nelson versus William D. Leeke, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections and Members of the South Carolina Board of Corrections. The Complaint alleged that the South Carolina Department of Corrections' institutions were overcrowded and that the conditions of incarceration violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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*58 2. On June 23, 1982, the Defendants, through their attorneys, filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Make More Definite and Certain as to the Complaint filed by Mr. Nelson on May 5, 1982.
3. On August 4, 1982, the Plaintiff filed an amended Complaint alleging similar allegations as in the original Complaint by designating his lawsuit as a class action.
4. The Plaintiff requested the assistance of the American Civil Liberties Union of South Carolina who agreed to assist him in his class action and the ACLU of South Carolina asked Attorney W. Gaston Fairey to act as local counsel. Mr. Fairey was cocounsel with Stephen Ney of the National Prison Project of the ACLU of Washington, D.C., and Ms. Christine Freeman of the Southern Prisoners Defense Committee of Atlanta, Georgia. Ms. Freeman and Mr. Ney had been assisting the Plaintiffs for a period of time in preparation of the suit.
5. On October 28, 1982, a meeting was held between the parties to discuss the pending lawsuit.
6. On April 28, 1983, a second meeting was held between the parties at which time it was agreed that the parties would enter into settlement negotiations to determine if there was a possibility of reaching a compromise agreement in the lawsuit.
7. In May of 1983, the Budget and Control Board of South Carolina authorized the South Carolina Department of Corrections (hereinafter SCDC) and the State Attorney General's Office to enter into negotiations with the Plaintiffs to explore the possibility of settlement.
8. Subsequently, in May of 1983, the General Assembly of South Carolina passed a concurrent resolution authorizing SCDC and the South Carolina Attorney General's Office to engage in settlement negotiations with the Plaintiffs. (See Appendix A).
9. Between June of 1983 and February 10, 1984, there were eight (8) settlement negotiation meetings which resulted in an Agreement in Principle which was reached at a meeting on February 10, 1984.
10. Subsequently, SCDC and the Attorney General's Office presented the terms of the proposed Agreement in Principle to a session of the Budget and Control Board, the Speaker of the House and other key Legislators.
11. The Board passed a resolution recommending the South Carolina General Assembly approve the settlement in principle reached by the parties. A similar presentation was made to legislative staff members of various committees which would be involved in the implementation of any settlement.
12. As part of the 1984–1985 General Appropriations Act, the General Assembly concluded as follows:
a. A lawsuit, captioned Nelson, et al. v. Leeke, et al., (Civil Action Number 82–876–2), is presently pending in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina involving all institutions of the SCDC, and the parties have entered into extensive negotiations involving the settlement of this lawsuit. The General Assembly has, by concurrent Resolution H.3054 (May 12, 1983), approved negotiation of the settlement of this lawsuit and has expressed its intention to implement by legislation and appropriation a reasonably expeditious settlement of the issues. The parties have reached a proposed settlement of the lawsuit and the named Defendants are unable to affect the settlement without the support and authorization of the General Assembly.
*59 b. The General Assembly finds that the proposed consent agreement, agreed to in principle by the SCDC in February of 1984, is in the best interest of the State of South Carolina, and the named Defendants in the lawsuit are authorized to enter into the proposed consent agreement.
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c. The General Assembly further finds that it is presently necessary to authorize a portion of the additional capital financing by providing funds through Part IV of this Act (supplemental appropriations from surplus). The funding will provide in part for the construction necessary to meet the most immediate future needs which will arise under the standards set forth in the proposed consent agreement. The General Assembly recognizes, however, that projected prison population growth, coupled with the mandatory nature of the consent agreement, will require that the General Assembly provide substantial additional funding in the near future or provide other remedies in the near future for escalating prison populations. (See Appendix B).
d. In the same Act, the General Assembly appropriated $16 million for capital improvements and $5,299,452.00 Dollars of additional operating expenses necessary to comply with the proposed settlement agreement.
13. In addition, the General Assembly enacted a Bond Bill (R574) in which the General Assembly reiterated its finding that the proposed settlement agreement was in the best interest of the State and authorized the issuance of $44 million in capital improvement bonds to comply with the terms of the proposed settlement.
14. Between July of 1984 and January 6, 1985, there were approximately thirteen (13) meetings between the parties to refine the terms and to settle issues as to interpretation and specific provisions to be contained in the final agreement.
15. On January 8, 1985, at a meeting of the SCDC Board, the members of the Board signed the proposed Consent Decree. Subsequently, the parties to the lawsuit, through their attorneys, also signed the Decree, along with Commissioner William D. Leeke, and twenty-six (26) representatives of the Plaintiff class representing various institutions from around the State of South Carolina.
16. Pursuant to a motion of both parties, the Court, on February 7, 1985, issued an Order certifying the class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In so ordering, the Court found that the class “shall be comprised of adult prisoners committed to the South Carolina Department of Corrections, those who are presently committed to the Department, or those who would be committed to the Department in the future.”
17. On March 6, 1985, a hearing was held before the Honorable Charles W. Gambrell, United States Magistrate. This status hearing was to discuss the manner of notice to be provided to the Plaintiff class and to the public-at-large. Subsequent to this hearing, the Magistrate made a recommendation to the Court that the Consent Decree be presented to and reviewed by the Court pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
*60 18. On March 26, 1985, the Court signed an Order directing that the proposed settlement be posted in an appropriate manner and that notice be given to the public-at-large as to the proposed settlement agreement. Pursuant to this Order, notice was provided to all Plaintiff class members as provided by the Consent Decree and the Order of the Court of March 26, 1985, and public notice was made through The State newspaper for four (4) consecutive weeks commencing on March 30, 1985, and continuing until April 20, 1985. (See Appendix C). The comment period continued until May 30, 1985.
19. Attorneys for the Plaintiff class, subsequent to the notice of the proposed settlement, went to each of the institutions affected by the settlement and had announced open meetings for any Plaintiff who desired to attend and ask questions or make complaints about the proposed settlement. As the Plaintiffs' attorneys met with the individual Plaintiffs in the individual institutions, there would be meetings between the attorneys for the parties to discuss complaints and suggestions made by the Plaintiff members and various changes were made in the Decree or in the implementation of the Decree to deal with concerns of the individual Plaintiffs.
20. During the course of negotiations, the parties agreed to various studies to be conducted as to:
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a. Security staffing, and b. Delivery of medical services and mental health.
21. Additionally, the Plaintiffs' attorneys consulted with various experts to deal with problems pertaining to classification, sanitation, food services and general correctional management problems. The findings of these experts were, to some extent, relied upon by both parties.
22. Pursuant to the consent agreement, the Defendants have, to date, filed two (2) timely reports detailing their compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree. The Plaintiffs have, in addition, filed one (1) response to the first compliance report and there have been various meetings between the parties to discuss the report and issues raised during the initial compliance.
23. During the notice period, various objections were received by the Clerk of Court which were reviewed by Magistrate Gambrell. (See Magistrate Gambrell's report of June 6, 1985). Subsequent to the notification of the Plaintiffs' attorneys of the objections, each of the individual Plaintiffs was contacted by the Plaintiffs' attorneys and their objections were discussed.
This the ____ day of January, 1986, in Columbia, South Carolina. /s/W. Gaston Fairey Fairey & Parise, P.A. Post Office Box 8443 Columbia, South Carolina 29202 For all Plaintiffs Christine Freeman Southern Prisoner's Defense Committee Suite 600, Healey Building 57 Forsyth Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Steven Ney National Prison Project 1346 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1031 Washington, DC 20036 Attorneys For The Plaintiffs. *61 /s/Larry C. Batson
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Legal Advisor Department of Corrections Post office Box 21787 Columbia, South Carolina 29221–1787 for all defendants Kenneth P. Woodington Senior Assistant Attorney General Attorney General's Office for The State of South Carolina Post Office Box 11549 Columbia, South Carolina 29211 Attorneys for the Defendants.

1

The Consent Decree submitted in February 1985 was modified in three particulars by a supplemental agreement signed on November

1, 1985. (See Appendix 2). Any reference in this order to the Consent Decree includes the supplemental agreement.

2

Defendant William D. Leeke signed the Consent Decree in his individual capacity and as a representative of the defendant SCDC of

which he is commissioner. See S.C.Code Ann. §§ 24–1–100 and –130. All members of the Board of Corrections, except the governor,

who is an ex officio member thereof, also signed the Consent Decree. Their signatures are representative of the Board itself and of

the SCDC, which the Board governs. See S.C.Code Ann. §§ 24–1–40 and –130.

3

The Consent Decree is signed by twenty-one (21) members of the plaintiff class from eleven different institutions within the SCDC.

These signatories include all ten plaintiffs named as representatives of the class in the amended style of the action filed on March 27,

1985. The court is informed by counsel for the plaintiffs that the other members of the plaintiff class who signed the Consent Decree

are individuals selected by the inmates at the respective institutions to be their spokes-persons vis-a-vis the plaintiffs' attorneys.

However, the SCDC has not recognized these spokespersons as having any specific authority.

The signatures of the defendants and of the representative members of the class convince the court that there has been a meeting

of the minds of the parties on the settlement agreement. The signatures of certain other members of the class, though they may be

unofficial spokespersons for the inmates, are mere icing on the cake. It is the court's duty to protect the interests of the unnamed

members of the class, see FED.R.CIV.P. 23(e), and the court believes it has done so in approving the settlement agreement.

End of Document

© 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

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 Plyler v. Evatt, Not Reported in S.E.2d (1993)
KeyCite Red Flag - Severe Negative Treatment Opinion Withdrawn and Superseded on Rehearing by Plyler v. Evatt, S.C., November 8, 1993
1993 WL 335152 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Harry PLYLER, for and on behalf of the Plaintiff Class in Plyler, et al. v. Evatt, et al., United States
District Court Number C/A 82-876-2, as their representative, Respondent, v.
Parker EVATT, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Michael
Cavanaugh, Commissioner, South Carolina

Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, Appellants.
No. 23928. | Heard June 8, 1993. | Decided Aug. 26, 1993. | Opinion Withdrawn on Grant of Rehearing
Nov. 8, 1993.
Opinion
For Superseding Opinion, see 1993 WL 460791.

1

 
 Plyler v. Evatt, 488 U.S. 897 (1988)
109 S.Ct. 241 Supreme Court of the United States Harry PLYLER, et al., petitioners,
v. Parker EVATT, Commissioner, South Carolina
Department of Corrections, et al No. 88-5359 | October 11, 1988
Case below, 846 F.2d 208.

Opinion Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Denied.
Parallel Citations 109 S.Ct. 241 (Mem), 102 L.Ed.2d 230
	  

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 Plyler v. Moore, 520 U.S. 1277 (1997)
117 S.Ct. 2460 Supreme Court of the United States
Harry PLYLER, petitioner, v.
Michael W. MOORE, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections. No. 96-8596. | June 16, 1997.
Case below, 100 F.3d 365.

Opinion *2460 Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
Parallel Citations 117 S.Ct. 2460 (Mem), 138 L.Ed.2d 217, 65 USLW 3825
	  

1