IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ,,

TAMPA DIVISION

" ’~

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, INC. d/b/a FASHION CENTS
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO.

:01- c
COMPLAINT

2. & £/Y3"

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT

NATURE OF THE ACTION This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practiees on the basis of retaliation, and to provide appropriate relief to Glermda Herring who was adversely affected by such practices. As stated with greater particularity in paragraph 7, the Commission alleges that the Defendant Employer retaliated against Mrs. Herring, when she complained to management about the sexual harassment of certain females on her job, by terminating her employment with Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc., d/b/a Fashion Cents.
.JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant tO Section 706(0(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) ("Title VII"), and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981A.

2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the

jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division.

PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and

enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action pursuant to Section

706(0(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc., d/b/a Fashion Cents
("Defendant"), has continuously been doing business in the State of Florida in the City of Tampa, and has continuously maintained at least 15 employees.

5. At all relevant times Defendant has continuously been an employer engaged in an

industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42

U.S.C. §§2000e(b), (g) and (h). STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Glennda Herring filed

a charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant. All conditions

precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.

7. Since at least May of 1999, Defendant Employer engaged in unlawful employment

practices at its Tampa, Florida location in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

§2000e-3(a).
a.

On March 9, 1999, Defendant hired Glennda Herring as Store Manager for Defendant’s Fashion Cents store at Tampa Bay Center.

bo

On or about May 5, 1999, Defendant hired Ricardo Moyers as a Store

2

Manager for Fashion Cents and placed Mr. Moyers at the Tampa Bay Center store to train under Glennda Herring. c. Immediately following Mr. Moyers’ employment at the Fashion Cents store at Tampa Bay Center, certain female employees at the store complained to Glennda Herring that Mr. Moyers was engaging in unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature which made the female employees feel uncomfortable about working at Fashion Cents. d. Ms. Hewing reasonably believed Mr. Moyers’ conduct to be unlawful sexual harassment and thereby opposed such conduct by complaining to Defendant’s District Manager, Monica Ban’. e. OnMay 27, 1999, aRer complaining to District Manager, Monica Burr, about Mr. Moyers’ sexual harassment of certain female employees at the Fashion Cents store, Glennda Herring was discharged from her employment. 8. The effect of the conduct complained of in paragraph 7 above, has been to deprive Glennda Herring of equal employment opportunities and to otherwise adversely affect her status as an employee b~cause of her good faith opposition to what she reasonably believed to be an unlawful employment practice. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7 above were intentional. 10. The unlawful employment practices compl.ajned of in paragraph 7 above were committed with malice and/or with reckless indifference to the federally protected fights of Glennda Herring.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with the Defendant, from engaging in any employment practice which discriminates on the basis of an employee’s opposition to an unlawful employment practice. B. Order Defendant to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which eradicate the effects of its past unlawful employment practices. C. Order Defendant to make whole Glennda Herring by providing her with appropriate back pay including prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and afford any other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of Defendant’s unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to reinstatement of Glennda Herring and rightful place promotion and/or fi’ont pay. D. Order Defendant to make whole Glennda Herring by providing her with compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in paragraph 7 above, including but not limited to out of pocket losses in amounts to be determined at trial. E. Order Defendant to make whole Glennda Herring by providing her with compensation for past and future nonpeetmiary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraph 7 above, including but not limited to emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, humiliation, and loss o f enjoyment of life, in’amounts to be determined at trial. F. order Defendant to pay Glennda Herring punitive damages for the malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraph 7 above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
4

Go

Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public

interest.

H. Award the Commission its costs of this action.

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.

GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel
DELNER FRANKLIN-THOMAS Regional Attorney
MICHAEL J. FARRELL Supervisory Trial Attomey

PAMELA PRIDE-CHAVIES Senior Trial Attorney FL Bar No. 0497010 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION MIAMI DISTRICT OFFICE One Biscayne Tower 2 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 2700 Miami, Florida 33131
Tel. (305) 530-6008 Fax (305) 536-4494

 
 FILED

CL~K~ U.S. D~~ ~T ~ D~~ (~ ~A
T~

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

EQUAL EPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, INC. 26EAJ

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO 8:01-cv-379-T-

Defendant,

COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFF INTERVENOR

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Glenda Herring, who sues defendant NORSTAN APPARELL,INC. and alleges:
INTRODUCTION 1 .The plaintiff is a white, college educated, female who has held substantial retail managerial positions. The plaintiff was wrongfully terminated from a management position by the defendant, Norstan Apparel, Inc. a New York based apparel conglomerate, who operates retail clothing stores located in malls in Tampa, Florida, and throughout the United States called Fashion Cents.
2

2.Plaintiff, Glenda Herring, and her husband reported to upper management at Norstan Apparel incidents of sexual harassment that she personally witnessed and other incidents that were reported to her by young employees at the retail store. Management retaliated against Mrs. Herring for making the reports of sexual harassment by wrongfully terminating her employment.
JURISDICTION 3.This action is one for Intervention as of right granted by Federal Statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1), 4.This action asserts claims of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title 1 of the Civil Rights act of 1991 and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, F.S. 760.01-760.11 and F.S. 509.092. 5.The Plaintiff has complied with the conditions precedent required, and exhausted her Federal and State administrative remedies. 6.The Florida state claims in this action are brought under this Court’s authority to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims asserted herein.
VENUE 7.The Plaintiff at the time of the action was a citizen of Hillsborough County, Florida and submits herself to the jurisdiction of this Court. 8.The plaintiff Glenda Herring at all times relevant to this matter resided in the state of Florida and submits herself to the pendent jurisdiction of this court
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
3

COUNT 1 9.The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-8 as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 10.The intervenor adopts and incorporates by reference the following sections of the Plaintiffs Complaint in the original action attached hereto as Exhibit A: 11. Paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,7a-e,8,9,10, C,D,E,F,G.
COUNT TWO CONSPIRACY 12. The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-11 as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 13. Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy existed between local and regional Managers of Norstan. Two or more persons collaborated and acted together to intentionally misrepresent the facts surrounding the plaintiff’s employment record with Norstan. 14. Under information and belief at least two Norstan managers collaborated and acted in concert to further the plan to accomplish and coerce a legal act by illegal means. 15. Alternatively, at least two Norstan managers conspired to commit an illegal act intended to harm the plaintiff. 16. The act of conspiracy against the plaintiff was done with malice and reckless indifference to the plaintiffs legal rights.
4

17. The conspiracy existed to coerce the plaintiff to do an act that would be detrimental to the plaintiff and beneficial to the corporation.
18. The two conspired to intimidate the plaintiff, lock the plaintiff in, and coerce the plaintiff into resigning, dropping all sexual harassment charges or signing false documents that exonerated the corporation of any wrong doing.
19. This was done by developingplans to exert undue influence and use duress to influence the plaintiff.
20. The conspiracy was committed for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff, directly or indirectly of equal protection under the law or of equal privileges and immunities under the law.
22. The conspiracy was done for the purpose of eliciting a false statement from the plaintiff exonerating the Corporation and managers of wrongful employment practices.
23. The plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of the conspiracy.
COUNT THREE CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 24.The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-23 as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 25. Management who held a fiduciary position of trust as plaintiff’s supervisors, intentionally coerced the plaintiff by means of deception to sign false statements regarding her employment history.
5

26. Plaintiff who relied on the managers position of authority and trust was coerced under duress into signing statements known to her to be false accounts.
27. The plaintiff was disturbed by the threat to terminated her employment or force her resignation while held against her will in the locked managers office. Plaintiff became excessively nervous and distraught at the false accusations levied at her.
28. The plaintiff alleges unequal bargaining power and duress in the inducement and undue influence in obtaining a fraudulent employment termination report.
COUNT FOUR FALSE IMPRISONMENT 29.The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-28 as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 30. Norstan managers completely confined the plaintiff when the managers compelled the plaintiff to accompany them for a personnel interrogation. 31. Three Norstan managers, two regional managers, who came into Tampa to visit the plaintiff and set her up for the interrogation, were acting in their capacity of agent of Norstan Corp. Inc. 32. Such was the procedure they adopted on behalf of the employer to either secure a resignation, or if that failed, to terminate the plaintiff’s employment.
6

33. The three managers ordered the plaintiff to leave the sales floor, and forced the plaintiff employee to go through the back stock room and into the manager’s office in the rear of the store.
34. After the plaintiff entered the office the three Norstan managers immediately locked the door, the only exit to the room.
35. The plaintiff did not want to be locked in a room with the three managers. She was very intimidated by them and became frightened.
36. The managers tried to coerce the plaintiff to resign her employment as store manager.
37. They maligned her, insulted her, and intentionally intimidated her, and reduced her to tears.
38. They indicated that after she resigned she would be free to leave the store.
39. The plaintiff was unlawfully held against her will. The three managers detained the plaintiff for an excessive time.
40. The plaintiff once asked to leave to go to the bathroom, but the managers refused to let her leave the room alone.
41. One manager accompanied the plaintiff to the restroom and waited outside the until the plaintiff opened the bathroom door, then escorted the plaintiff back into the interrogation room.
42. After a lengthy time in the locked room, the managers fired the plaintiff.
7

43. The Norstan managers asked the plaintiff to fill out an employee termination report. The plaintiff did so.
44. When the managers read the plaintiff’s report, which included her claims of a sexual harassment, they tore the report up, threw it in the trash and wrote their own version.
45. They demanded the plaintiff sign the report the managers drafted. 46. The plaintiff’s release from the room was contingent upon her signing
the termination documents prepared by the Norstan Managers. Immediately after the plaintiff signed the document the managers released her.
COUNT FIVE DEFAMATION 47.The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-46 as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 48.Manager Monica Barr, an agent and employee of the corporate defendant, while acting within the scope of her employment, made false and defamatory statements regarding the plaintiffs work or business practices that were published to others. 49.Publication was by written word and verbal communication. 50.The remarks were prejudicial to the plaintiff in her profession and trade.

51. Others relied upon the false statements about the plaintiff’s work and acted in a manner detrimental to the plaintiff.
52.The Norstan managers had a business relationship with the plaintiff and gave notice to third parties of the dissolution of the relationship and that notice contained false and misleading information designed to impugn the reputation of the plaintiff and injuriously affected the plaintiff.
53.Such charges falsely imply that the plaintiff was unfit for the retail managers profession either by innuendo or directly.
54.The plaintiff suffered damage to her reputation and suffered mental anguish as a proximate cause of the defendants malicious acts.
55.Such acts were done with the intent to do harm to the plaintiff, and with reckless disregard for the truth.
56.Any privilege which may have applied to some of the statements is forfeited by the Defendants whose motives were actuated by common law malice.
COUNT SIX NEGLIGENT HIRING AND TRAINING 57.The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-56 as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 58.The defendant, a large national apparel company, had an implied and express duty to provide its employees a work place free of discriminatory employment practice.
9

59.Defendant’s duty requires hiring qualified and properly trained supervisor’s to uphold the state, and federal employment and civil rights laws. Defendant negligently breached that duty to hire and train qualified employees. 60. Defendant’s management training program is inadequate. 61. Hiring of former bar tenders without adequate training to manage minor sales clerks is a breach of that duty of care that a reasonable person would expect. 62oThe defendant’s negligent hiring and training caused injury to the plaintiff who seeks relief as a result of the breach of duty.
COUNT SEVEN NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION 63.The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-62 as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 64.Defendant had a duty to propedy supervise its employees to prevent discriminatory employment practices. 65. Defendant failed to supervise its managers and supervisors in the proper handling of employment discrimination complaints. 66. As a result of defendants negligence the plaintiff suffered damage and seeks relief. 67. Defendant had a duty to take prompt and effective remedial action to eliminate discriminatory employment practices.
10

68. Defendant failed to take effective remedial action to eliminate the discriminatory employment practices against the plaintiff or the coworkers who were minors working under the supervision of the plaintiff.
69. As a result the plaintiff was injured and seeks relief from this Court.
COUNT EIGHT NEGLIGENT RETENTION 70. The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-69 as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 71. Employer had a duty to keep the work place in compliance with Federal and State law. 72. The employer however, failed in that duty when it continued the employment of Rick Moyers and Monica Barr after Monica Barr ignored several complaints concerning the inappropriate sexual touching and comments from her manager trainee Ricardo Moyers. 73. The known harasser, Ricardo Moyers, was not reprimanded for sexual harassment, but promoted to a full managers position.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 74. Plaintiff demands judgment for damages against the defendant and thereby request the Court:
11

a. declare the Defendants actions were discriminatory and retaliatory, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended,
b. declare that the Defendant violated Florida Civil Right Act of 1992 and other laws of the state of Florida.
c. order defendant to pay the Plaintiff damages in an amount to be proven in this action to compensate plaintiff for harm suffered in accordance with the time table that would have operated but for the retaliation and violations of applicable law to present day; order damages to include, interest, and include not be limited to, lost wages, lost opportunity, lost retirement benefits, lost vacation benefits, lost medical expenses, severe emotional distress and other damages available for willful and intentional misconduct.
d. Grant such other legal and equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. e. maintain jurisdiction over this matter until all remedial action has been taken
by defendant. f. Order defendant to pay a reasonable attorney’s fee, and cost for this action
and for expenses at the administrative level.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PLAINTIFF demands a TRIAL BY JURY., ~/~~~) /
MarLgaJ~’t Laney Florida Bar # 0064018 550 N Reo Street, Suite 300 Tampa, Florida 33609
12

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this motion and complaint of intervention has been furnished to the attorneys on the attached list by regular mail on June 27, 2001.
Laney Law Firm LLC 550 N. Reo Street, Suite 300 Tampa, Florida 33609
Pamela Pride Chavez, Esq. EEOC Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower, Suite 2700 Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 and JoAnn B. Lambert, Esq. Jackson Lewis Schnitzler and Krupman 390 N Orange Avenue, Suite 1285 Orlando, Florida 32802
13

INTERVENING PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT A: Attached complaint in Civil Action # 8:01 CV 379 T 26 EAT
18

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DMSION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

)

)

NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, hNC.

)

d/b/a FASHION CENTS

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

CIVIL ACTION NO.
~t~Y TRLM~ D~~D ~U~~ ~L~ SOUGHT

NATURE OF TH~ ACTION This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct urdaw’f~ employment practices on the basis of retaliation, and to provide appropriate relief to Glcnnda Hemug who was adversely affected by such practices. A~ stated with greater particularity in paragraph 7, the Commission alleges that the Defendant Employer retaliated against Mrs. Herring, when she complained to management about the sexual harassment of certain females on her job, by terminating her employment with Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc., d/b/a Fashion Cent.
J-~D!~TFION ~ VI~_~ I. Jurisdictiou of this Cou~t is iavoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This ~ction is authorized aad ia.~tituted pursuant to Section 700(0(I) ~d (3) of Title VII of the Civil RiBhts Act of I~)4, as ameuded, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e=5(f)(1) ~ad (3) (’Titlo VII"), and Section 102 of’the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 19~IA.

The employment practices alleged to be unlawful w¢re committed w/thin the jurisdiction or’the United States Distri~ Court For the Middle District of’ Florida, Tampa Division.

3. Pla/ntiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (th© "Com~ssion’), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and
enforcement of Title VlJ, and is exlm:ssly authorized to bring this action pursuant to Section

706(0(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 LI.S.C. § 2000e-$(f)(l) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc., d/b/a Fashion Cents

("l~fendant’3, has continuously been doing business in the State of Florida in the City of Tampa, and has continuously maintained at least 15 employees.

5. At all relevant times Defendant has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII,
u.s.¢. §§20¢0e(b), (g) and (h).

$TATEMENTOFCLAIMS 6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Glennda Herring flied a charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant, All condition precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.

7. Since at least May of 1999, Defendant Employer engaged in unlawful employment

practices at its Tampa, Florida location in violatioa of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

§2000e-3(a).

On March 9, 1999, Defendant hired Glennda Herring as Store Manager for Defendant’s Fashion Cents store at Tampa Bay Cente¢. On or about May 5, 1999, Defendant hire~ Ricardo Moyers as a Store

Manager for Fashion Cents and placed Mr. Moyers at the Tampa Bay Center store to train under Glermda Heron& ¢. Immediately following Mr. Moyers’ employment at the Fashion Cents store at Tampa Bay Center, certain female employees at the store complained to Glennda Herring that Mr. Moyers was engaging in unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature which made the female employees foel uncomfortable about working at Fashion Cents. d. Ms. Herring reasonably believed Mr. Moyers’ conduct to be unlawful sexual harassment and thereby opposed such condtmt by complaining to Defendant’s District Manager, Monica Ban-. e. On May 27, 1999, after complaining to District Manager, Monica Ban’, about Mr. Moyers’ sexual harassment of certain female employees at the Fashion Cents store, Glennda Herring was discharged from her employment. 8. The effect of the conduct coinplained of/n paragraph 7 above, has been to deprive Glermda Herring of equal employment opportunities and to otherwise adversely affect her statu~ as an employee because of her good faith opposition ~o what she reasonably bei/eved to be an unlawful cmploymcnt practice. The ualawfid employment pract/ce~ complained of in paragr~h 7 above were intentional. 10. The unlawful employment practic¢~ complained of in paragraph 7 above were committed with malice and/or with r~Jdess indifference to the federally protected fights of Glcanda Herring.

PI ’ R :oR
Wherefore, the Co~i~ion ~t~lly ~ues~ ~a~ ~s Co~: A. G~t a pe~ent inj~ion enjoi~ng ~fcnd~t, its office~, su~¢sso~, ~si~s, ~d all ~ns in ~tive conc~ or ~cipafon ~ ~e ~fend~t, ~om ~gaging in ~y ~plo~t p~c¢ w~ch ~~ on ~ b~is of~ ~pioy~’s o~sifion to ~ ~law~l ~plo~t p~fce. B. ~ ~f~t ~ ~fi~e ~ ~ out ~fici~, p~fi~, ~ p~~ w~ch ~~ ~ eff~ of i~ ~ ~la~ ~p~t p~fi~. C. ~ ~f~t ~ m~e ~le GI~ H~g by p~g h~ ~ ~p~ b~k pay ~1~ p~ud~t ~t~ ~ ~~ to ~ d~~ ~ ~, ~ ~ ~y o~ a~afive ~liefn~~ to ~clu~g but not l~t~ to ~tat~ ofGl~ H~g ~d ~ pl~¢ promotion ~or ~m pay. D. ~ Def~t to ~e whole GIe~ H~g by pm~g h~ wi~ comp~fion for p~ ~d ~e p~~ 1o~ ~t~g ~m ~e ~a~ ~plo~t p~tic~ d~fi~ ~ p~h 7 ~ve, dete~ at ~. E. ~ ~f~t ~m~on for p~ compl~ of ~ p~h 7 a~ve, ~lud~g but not ~t~ ~ ~ofio~ p~ suff~g, ~conv~ce, h~fi~o~ ~ 1o~ ofmjo~t of ~fe, ~ ~o~ m ~ d~ ~ ~. F. ~ ~f~t to pay Gi~ H~g p~five ~g~ for ~e ~icio~ ~d ~ conduct d~~

interest.

Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper tn the public

Award the Commission its costs of this action.,

J’L~Y TR/~L DEMAND The Commission requvsts a jury trial on all questions offa~t raised by its complaint.

GWENDOLY’N YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel
DELNER FR.M’qKL.IN-THOMAS Regional Attorney
MICHAEL J. FARRELL Supervisory Trial Attorney

PAMELA PRIDE.CHAVIES Sen/or Trial Attorney FL Bar No. 0497010 E~UAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION MIAMI DISTRICT OFFICE
One Bisca~e Tower 2 South Bis~a~e Boulevard, Suite 2700 Miami, Florida 33 ! 3 I Tel. (305) 530-6008 Fax (305) 536.4494

 
 WILLIAM R. TAMAYO, REGIONAL ATTORNEY 1 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 2 SAN FRANCISCO DISTRICT OFFICE
350 THE EMBARCADERO, SUITE 500 3 SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94105-1260

4 KATHRYN OLSON, SUPERVISORY TRIAL ATTORNEY CARMEN FLORES, SENIOR.TRIAL ATTORNEY
5 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 6 909 FIRST AVENUE, SUITE 400
SEATTLE, WA 98104 7 TEL: (206) 220-6920

8 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
9

10

11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

12

13
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

14 COMMISSION,

CIVIL ACTION NO. CV05-329-S-LMB

and

15 IDAHO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

on behalf of 16 AUDREY POWERS,

AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMAND

17

Plaintiffs

18

v.

19

20 THE BURRITO SHOPPE LLC, dba SQUEEZERS GIANT BURGERS and
21 ALLIED FOODSERVICE INC. dba SQUEEZERS,
22
Defendants.
23

24
NATURE OF THE ACTION
25

AMENDED COMPLAINT- Page 1 of 6

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITYCOMMISSION
Seattle District Office 909 First Avenue, Suite 400 Seattle, Washington 98104-1061 Telephone: (206) 220-6883
Facsimile: (206) 220-6911 TDD: (206) 220-6882

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil
1
2 Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex and to provide 3 appropriate relief to Audrey Powers (“Ms. Powers”). The Equal Employment Opportunity

4 Commission and the Idaho Human Rights Commission allege that defendants subjected Ms.
5 Powers and a class of similarly situated females to discrimination when they subjected them to
6
harassment on the basis of their sex. The sexual harassment resulted in Ms. Powers’ constructive
7
discharge. Plaintiffs seek monetary relief, including pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensatory
8
and punitive damages, and injunctive relief, on behalf of Ms. Powers and a class of similarly
9
10 situated females.

11

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

12

1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§451, 1331, 1337,

13 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to sections 706(f)(1) and (3) of

14
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. sections 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3)
15
("Title VII"), and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1981a.
16

17

2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the

18 jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho.

19

PARTIES

20

3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is

21
the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and
22
enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(f)(1) of
23
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1).
24

25

AMENDED COMPLAINT- Page 2 of 6

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITYCOMMISSION
Seattle District Office 909 First Avenue, Suite 400 Seattle, Washington 98104-1061 Telephone: (206) 220-6883
Facsimile: (206) 220-6911 TDD: (206) 220-6882

4. Defendant the Burrito Shoppe LLC, dba Squeezers Giant Burgers (“Squeezers
1
2 Giant Burgers”) has been a corporation continuously doing business in the State of Idaho and has 3 continuously had at least 15 employees.

4

5. Defendant Squeezers Giant Burgers has continuously been an employer engaged

5 in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title
6
VII, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-(b), (g) and (h).
7
6. Defendant, Allied Food service, Inc., dba Squee zers (“Squeezers”) has been a
8
corporation continuously doing business in the State of Id aho since March 2006 and has
9
10 continuously had 15 employees.

11

7. In March 2006, Jam es Dorsey, the sole member of Defendant, T he Burrito

12 Shoppe LLC, dissolved the lim ited liability company, and acting as the incorporator, form ed the

13 second Defendant, Allied Foodservice Inc. Mr. Dorsey changed the corporate for m of the

14
restaurant business f rom a lim ited liability comp any to an S corporation on the advice of an
15
accountant.
16

17

8. In March 2006, Mr. Dorsey acting on behalf of Defendant, The Burrito Shoppe

18 LLC, cancelled its Certificate of Assum ed Business Name for Squeezers Giant Burgers. Mr.

19 Dorsey acting on behalf of De fendant, Allied F oodservice Inc., filed a Certificate of Assum ed

20 Business Name for Squeezers.
21
9. Defendant, Allied Foodservice Inc. dba Squeezers, is the continuation of the
22
business previously operated by Defendant, The Burrito Shoppe LLC dba Squeezers Giant
23
Burgers, at the same locations, with the substantially the same employees, equipment and
24
25 supervisors, performing substantially the same jobs, in same line of work, fast food restaurant.

AMENDED COMPLAINT- Page 3 of 6

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITYCOMMISSION
Seattle District Office 909 First Avenue, Suite 400 Seattle, Washington 98104-1061 Telephone: (206) 220-6883
Facsimile: (206) 220-6911 TDD: (206) 220-6882

10. Defendant Squeezers has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry
1
2 affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b),(g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 3 §§2000e-(b),(g) and (h).

4

STATEMENT OF CLAIMS

5

11. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Ms. Powers filed a

6
charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by defendant Squeezers Giant
7
Burgers. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.
8
12. Beginning on or about August 2003, defendant Squeezers Giant Burgers engaged
9

10 in unlawful employment practices at its Nampa, Idaho facility in violation of §§ 703(a) of Title

11 VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a). The practices include sexual harassment and constructive

12 discharge.

13

13. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph 12 above has been to

14
deprive Ms. Powers and a class of similarly situated females of equal employment opportunities.
15
14. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 12 above were
16

17 intentional.

18

15. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 12 above were

19 done with malice or with reckless indifference to Ms. Powers’ and the class of similarly situated

20 females’ federally protected rights.
21
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
22
Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court:
23

24

25

AMENDED COMPLAINT- Page 4 of 6

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITYCOMMISSION
Seattle District Office 909 First Avenue, Suite 400 Seattle, Washington 98104-1061 Telephone: (206) 220-6883
Facsimile: (206) 220-6911 TDD: (206) 220-6882

A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining defendants, their officers, successors,
1
2 agents, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in any 3 employment practices which discriminate.

4

B. Order defendants to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs

5 which provide equal employment opportunities for all employees, and which eradicate the
6
effects of their past and present unlawful employment practices.
7
C. Order defendants to make whole Ms. Powers and the class of similarly situated
8
females by providing appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be
9
10 determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of their

11 unlawful employment practices.

12

D. Order defendants to make whole Ms. Powers and the class of similarly situated

13 females by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the

14
unlawful employment practices described in paragraph 12 above, including past and future out-
15
of-pocket expenses, in amounts to be determined at trial.
16

17

E. Order defendants to make whole Ms. Powers and a class of similarly situated

18 females by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the

19 unlawful practices complained of in paragraph 12 above, including without limitation emotional

20 pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life, in amounts to be determined at trial.
21
F. Order defendants to pay Ms. Powers and the class of similarly situated females
22
punitive damages for their malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraph 12 above, in
23
amounts to be determined at trial.
24

25

AMENDED COMPLAINT- Page 5 of 6

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITYCOMMISSION
Seattle District Office 909 First Avenue, Suite 400 Seattle, Washington 98104-1061 Telephone: (206) 220-6883
Facsimile: (206) 220-6911 TDD: (206) 220-6882

G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public
1
2 interest.

3

H. Award the Commission its costs of this action.

4

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

5

The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.

6
DATED this 12th day of September, 2006.
7

8 WILLIAM R. TAMAYO

RONALD

9 Regional Attorney

General

San Francisco District Office

10 350 The Embarcadero, Suite 500

San Francisco, CA 94105-1260
11

S. COOPER Counsel

12 KATHRYN OLSON Supervisory Trial Attorney

JAMES Deputy

L. LEE General Counsel

13

CARMEN FLORES

GW

14 Senior Trial Attorney

ENDOLYN Y. REAMS Associate General Counsel

15

16 BY: /s/ William R. Tamayo____________ EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
17 COMMISSION Seattle Field Office
18 909 First Avenue, Suite 400 Seattle, Washington 98104
19 Telephone (206) 220-6920

Office of the General Counsel 1801 “L” Street NW Washington, D.C. 20507

20
Attorneys for Plaintiff
21

22

23

24

25

AMENDED COMPLAINT- Page 6 of 6

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITYCOMMISSION
Seattle District Office 909 First Avenue, Suite 400 Seattle, Washington 98104-1061 Telephone: (206) 220-6883
Facsimile: (206) 220-6911 TDD: (206) 220-6882

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

OI SE?

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, and GLENDA HERRING, INTERVENOR

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION

NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, INC.

FILE NO 8:01-cv-379-T-26EAJ

Defendant,

PLAINTIFF INTERVENOR’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
COMES NOW Plaintiff Intervenor (Plaintiff, hereafter), Glenda Herring, who amends her complaint against defendant NORSTAN APPARELL,INC. as follows:
INTRODUCTION 1. The plaintiff is a white, college educated, female who has held substantial
retail managerial positions. The plaintiff was wrongfully terminated from a management position by the defendant, Norstan Apparel, Inc. a New York based apparel conglomerate, who operates retail clothing stores located in malls in Tampa, Florida, and throughout the United States called Fashion Cents. 2. Plaintiff, Glenda Herring, and her husband reported to upper management at Norstan Apparel incidents of sexual harassment that were reported to her by young employees at the retail store.

3. Management retaliated against Mrs. Herring for making the reports of sexual harassment by wrongfully terminating her employment. JURISDICTION
4. This action is one for Intervention as of right granted by Federal Statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1),
5. This action asserts claims of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title 1 of the Civil Rights act of 1991 and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, F.S. 760.01-760.11 and F.S. 509.092.
6. The Plaintiff has complied with the conditions precedent required, and exhausted her Federal and State administrative remedies.
7_=T.he Florida state claims in this action are brought under this Court’s authority to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims asserted herein.
8. The Plaintiff at the time of the action was a citizen of Hillsborough County, Florida and submits herself to the jurisdiction of this Court.
9. The plaintiff Glenda Herring at all times relevant to this matter resided in the state of Florida and submits herself to the pendent jurisdiction of this court. STATEMENT OF CLAIMS COUNT ONE
10. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all paragraphs asserted above as if fully asserted herein, and adopts by reference the allegations contained in E.E.O.C.v. NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, INC. Civil Action 8:01-cv-379-T26EAJ previously filed with the Court by Plaintiff, E.E.O.C and by Plaintiff Intervenor.
2

COUNT TWO CONSPIRACY 11 .The plaintiff incorporates by reference all paragraphs asserted above as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 12. Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy existed between local and regional Managers of Norstan. Two or more persons collaborated and acted together to intentionally misrepresent the facts surrounding the plaintiff’s employment record with Norstan. 13. Under information and belief at least two Norstan managers collaborated and acted in concert to further the plan to accomplish and coerce a legal act by illegal means. 14.Alternatively, at least two Norstan managers conspired to commit an illegal act intended to harm the plaintiff. 15. The act of conspiracy against the plaintiff was done with malice and reckless indifference to the plaintiffs legal rights. 16.The conspiracy existed to coerce the plaintiff to do an act that would be detrimental to the plaintiff and beneficial to the corporation. 17. The two conspired to intimidate the plaintiff, locked the plaintiff in, and coerce the plaintiff into either resigning, and dropping all sexual harassment charges or signing false documents that exonerated the corporation of any wrong doing.
3

18.This was accomplished by acting together and developing plans to exert undue influence and use duress to influence the plaintiff.
19. The conspiracy was committed for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff, directly or indirectly of equal protection under the law or of equal privileges and immunities under the law.
20. The conspiracy was done for the purpose of eliciting a false statement from the plaintiff exonerating the Corporation and managers of wrongful employment practices.
21 .The plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of the conspiracy. 22. The Defendant’s agent was self dealing to further her own interest in
intentionally or negligently formulating the conspiracy. 23. Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s agent, Monica Bar, took unconscionable
advantage of the plaintiff to serve her own purpose. Monica Barr wielded the disproportionate power created by her position as manager and confidant over the plaintiff to defame, defraud, imprison, fire, violate the human rights of the plaintiff employee. 24. Plaintiff alleges that two or more persons, employees and agents of Norstan Apparel, Inc., Monica Barr, Stephanie Roper and another Norstan Apparel, Inc. manager whose name is currently unknown, met together on at least two separate occasions at or around Fashion Cents a Norstan Apparel Inc. a retail store located at Tampa Bay Mall on or around May 28, 1999 and
4

negligently, recklessly, or intentionally agreed to act to conspire to do wrong acts. 25.At least two managers were present and negligently or recklessly or
intentionally conspired together and breached their duty of reasonable care not to harm the plaintiff when they falsely imprisoned, defrauded, defamed and wrongfully terminated the plaintiff. Their breach proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer injury 26. Plaintiff alleges that two or more managers employed by the defendant Norstan Apparel, Inc. and acting as agents for said defendant agreed to act together in furtherance of perpetrating a conspiracy to commit torts and other wrongs against the plaintiff for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of her of her_civil rights under the United States Constitution providing equal protection of the law and equal privileges and immunities under the law under Title 42 U.S.C. section1985(3). 27. The manager’s committed acts in furtherance of the conspiracy when they agreed to tear up and did, in the presence of the plaintiff, tear up the plaintiffs own hand written employment termination statement that included the plaintiff’s claims that she had notified the employer on several occasions of continuing violations of Title VII including sexual harassment and discriminatory actives in the work place by Rick Moyers, a Norstan Apparel Inc. employee. 28. Monica Barr tore up the plaintiff’s own handwritten termination of employment statement and substituted a statement dictated by one of the co conspirators,
5

and forced the plaintiff to sign it while all three managers concurred in the action. 29.The three Norstan Apparel Inc. managers further conspired and agreed to falsely imprison the plaintiff until the plaintiff agreed to sign an employment termination report. Plaintiff alleges that two or more Norstan employees agreed and acted in furtherance of the conspiracy to act together at the same time, on or around May 28, 1999 in the same office at Fashion Cents in Tampa Bay Mall, and falsely imprisoned the plaintiff. Together they refused, and thereby tacitly agreed they would not allow the plaintiff to leave the office until she agreed under duress to sign a fraudulent employment statement dictated by Monica Barr. 30. The Norstan Managers conspired to commit fraud against the plaintiff. Two or more Norstan Managers, Monica Barr and Stephanie agreed to act, and acted in furtherance of the conspiracy when they jointly and intentionally participated at the same time, in the same office, to intentionally, negligently or recklessly, misrepresent by concealment, material facts written for the plaintiff’s employment file which misrepresented the real facts of the plaintiff’s employment performance. 31.__=The two Norstan Managers conspired to defame the plaintiff when they knowingly agreed, and did act in furtherance of that agreement, published the intentionally misrepresented facts written on the plaintiff’s employee termination report. The two or more employees agreed and acted in
6

furtherance of the conspiracy when they placed the falsified documents into the plaintiffs employment file for others to see. 32___=The conspiracy and acts in furtherance of the conspiracy caused the plaintiff damage and to suffer physical injury, including but not limited to, stomach disorder, headaches, backaches, sever weight loss, nervous tension, hysteria.
COUNT THREE CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 33. The plaintiff incorporates by reference all paragraphs asserted above as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 34. The defendant through its agent Monica Barr had a confidential relationship with the plaintiff. 35.The plaintiff alleges that the manager Monica Barr abused their confidential relationship. 36. Monica Barr acting as an agent of the defendant corporation, had a duty to deal in good faith and to deal fairly with the plaintiff. The plaintiff had trusted Monica Barr as her manager and confidant. The plaintiff confided in her supervisor and relied and trusted her when she reported embarrassing graphic sexual acts to her manager. The plaintiff assumed that the two were working as a team to avoid discriminatory practice in the work place and the plaintiff believed that the two women had a developed a trusting and confidential relationship.
7

37. Management who held a fiduciary position of trust as plaintiff’s supervisors, intentionally coerced the plaintiff by means of deception to sign false statements regarding her employment history.
38. Monica Barr wielded the disproportionate power created by her position as manager and confidant over the plaintiff to defame, defraud, imprison, fire, violate the human rights of the plaintiff employee.
39. Plaintiff who relied on the managers position of authority and trust was coerced under duress into signing statements known to her to be false accounts.
40.The plaintiff was disturbed by a threat to terminate her employment or force her resignation while held against her will in the locked managers office. Plaintiff became excessively nervous and distraught at the false accusations levied at her.
41 .The plaintiff alleges unequal bargaining power and duress in the inducement and undue influence in obtaining a fraudulent employment termination report.
42. On or around May 28, 1999, the plaintiff an employee of Norstan Apparel Inc., was managing the Fashion Cents store in Tampa Florida located in Tampa Bay Mall. That afternoon the plaintiffs supervisor, Monica Barr and Monica Barr’s supervisor, Jean Roper, and another female employee of Norstan, unknown to the plaintiff, arrived back at the store after having earlier met with Rick Moyers and the plaintiff regarding Rick Moyers continuing acts of sexual harassment toward the employees at the store.
8

managers began, for the first time since the plaintiff’s employment ,to criticize the appearance of the store. 43. The three manages instructed the plaintiff to leave the retail floor and at least
two managers escorted the plaintiff to a small back room office in the stock area in the rear of the store. They entered the room, and one of the managers shut the door. 44. The manager, Monica Barr informed the plaintiff that she could either resign and submit a letter of resignation, or if not, the managers would terminate her employment forthwith. The plaintiff told them they would have to terminate her. She would not resign. 45.The plaintiff alleges that the corporate defendant is vicariously liable for the acts of its employees who at all times during the facts alleged in this complaint were working the line and scope of their employment, during regular business hours, in the employers place of business and in the furtherance of the employers purpose hire people to sell its products. 46. The plaintiff, after enduring insulting, falseattacks on her job performance by the defendant’s agents, while confined against her will, in a locked room, agreed, after asked to do so by Monica Barr, to write a letter stating the terms of her employment history and now termination. The plaintiff, right there in the room, in the presence of at least two Norstan Managers, Monica Barr and Stephanie Roper, wrote in her own hand, an explanation of the plaintiff’s recent reports of sexual harassment toward her and other employees at that store to Norstan Management through Monica Barr.
9

47.The plaintiff indicated in her writing that she reported the sexual harassment on several occasions orally and in writing to management and management did nothing in response to her report. After Monica Barr and the others in the room read the plaintiff’s statement, they tore her paper apart ,and threw it in the trash, an overt act of concealment and fraud.
48. Monica Barr then ordered the plaintiff to write a different employee termination letter that Monica Barr, along with the others managers in the room, dictated to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was crying. The plaintiff wrote what Monica Barr dictated under duress.
49. Monica Barr informed the plaintiff at that time that the plaintiff’s husband, Tom Herring, had reported Rick Moyers continuing acts of unwelcome sexual behavior to the district or regional offices of Norstan Apparel., Inc. Monica Barr threatened to sue the plaintiff’s husband for slander.
50. The plaintiff feared that if she did not sign the paper Monica Barr insisted upon, Monica Barr would sue her husband.
51 .The defendant corporation owed a duty of reasonable care not to negligently or recklessly cause harm its employees. The defendant corporation, by and through their agent employee supervisors named herein, breached their duty to of reasonable care to the plaintiff when they misrepresented, and concealed material facts regarding the plaintiffs employment termination.
52. Monica Barr intended for statements that she dictated and demanded the plaintiff to write on her termination report to be misrepresented as the plaintiff’s own statement. The statement Monica Barr dictated and therefor
10

made, was intentionally false and knowingly misrepresented the truth of the circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs employment history. 53.The statement intentionally concealed the truth that the plaintiff had just begun, just a few weeks prior to this termination meeting, a steady stream of written and oral reports to Monica Barr of sexual harassment by Rick Moyers at the Fashion cents store. 54. The managers intentionally concealed and misrepresented the material facts of the nature of the plaintiffs job performance in the writing they forced the plaintiff to write and sign in that small office that afternoon. 55.The managers knew the information they forced the plaintiff to write was false and misrepresented the truth of the matter asserted. 56.The managers intentionally concealed the egregious facts surrounding their own tortuous and unconscionable acts against the plaintiff while conspiring to accomplish the wrongful termination. 57.The managers intended others to rely on the misrepresentations they made regarding the employees poor performance making false and misleading. allegations of late store openings, based on store alarm records containing misleading information known by all managers to be an unreliable indication of the managers true arrival time, and creating first time false allegations of substandard job performance, such as the store is messy and your shoes are not nice enough to wear in the store. 58. Others negligently or recklessly relied on the false information and agreed to terminate the employment of a former star employee.
11

59. The acts were done during the scope of employment and in the furtherance of the employers purpose to employ personnel to sell its products for a profit.
60. The plaintiff was injured and suffered damage as a result of the defendant’s acts, by and through their agents, of negligent, reckless, and intentional fraudulent concealment. COUNT FOUR FALSE IMPRISONMENT
61 .The plaintiff incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges:
62. Norstan managers completely confined the plaintiff when the managers compelled the plaintiff to accompany them for a personnel interrogation.
63. Three Norstan managers, two regional managers, who came into Tampa to visit the plaintiff and set her up for the interrogation, were acting in their capacity of agent of Norstan Corp. Inc.
64. Such was the procedure they adopted on behalf of the employer to either secure a resignation, or if that failed, to terminate the plaintiff’s employment.
65. The three managers ordered the plaintiff to leave the sales floor, and forced the plaintiff employee to go through the back stock room and into the manager’s office in the rear of the store.
66.After the plaintiff entered the office the three Norstan managers immediately locked the door, the only exit to the room.
67.The plaintiff did not want to be locked in a room with the three managers. She was very intimidated by them and became frightened.
12

68. The managers tried to coerce the plaintiff to resign her employment as store manager.
69.They maligned her, insulted her, and intentionally intimidated her, and reduced her to tears.
70. They indicated that after she resigned she would be free to leave the store. 71 .The plaintiff was unlawfully held against her will. The three managers
detained the plaintiff for an excessive time. 72. The plaintiff once asked to leave to go to the bathroom, but the managers
refused to let her leave the room alone. 73. One manager accompanied the plaintiff to the restroom and waited outside
until the plaintiff opened the bathroom door, then escorted the plaintiff back into the interrogation room. 74.After a lengthy time in the locked room, the managers fired the plaintiff. 75.The Norstan managers asked the plaintiff to fill out an employee termination report. The plaintiff did so. 76.When the managers read the plaintiff’s report, which included her claims of a sexual harassment, they tore the report up, threw it in the trash and wrote their own version. 77.They demanded the plaintiff sign the report the managers drafted. 78.The plaintiff’s release from the room was contingent upon her signing the termination documents prepared by the Norstan Managers. Immediately after the plaintiff signed the document the managers released her.
13

COUNT FIVE DEFAMATION 79. The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-46 as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 80. Manager Monica Barr, an agent and employee of the corporate defendant, while acting within the scope of her employment, made false and defamatory statements regarding the plaintiffs work or business practices that were published to others. 81. Publication was by written word and verbal communication. 82. The remarks were prejudicial to the plaintiff in her profession and trade. 83. Others relied upon the false statements about the plaintiff’s work and acted in a manner detrimental to the plaintiff. 84. The Norstan managers had a business relationship with the plaintiff and gave notice to third parties of the dissolution of the relationship and that notice contained false and misleading information designed to impugn the reputation of the plaintiff and injuriously affected the plaintiff. 85. Such charges falsely imply that the plaintiff was unfit for the retail managers profession either by innuendo or directly. 86. The plaintiff suffered damage to her reputation and suffered mental anguish as a proximate cause of the defendants malicious acts. 87. Such acts were done with the intent to do harm to the plaintiff, and with reckless disregard for the truth.
14

88.Any privilege which may have applied to some of the statements is forfeited by the Defendant~ whose motives were actuated by common law malicex
89. Monica Barr, the plaintiff’s supervisor and agent of the defendant corporation, made defamatory oral statements and made defamatory written statements which were placed in the plaintiff’s employee termination report and thereby, published to a third party, in the employees personnel file. The statement were published to third parties, including but not limited to Norstan supervisors Stephanie Roper, Jean Aldige and others whose names are currently unknown.
90. The above managers made defamatory statements regarding the plaintiffs poor job performance to other subordinate employees and co employees and friends of the plaintiff working at Fashion Cents and by information and belief, to others working in the Tampa Bay Mall. It is upon information and belief that plaintiff (alleges and additional discovery will reveal) that agents of the corporate defendant Rick Moyer and Monica Barr and other Norstan employees made defamatory remarks about the plaintiff’s ineptness to properly perform her employment task ,prior to and subsequent to her termination on or around May 29, 1999, to coworkers and acquaintances of the plaintiff. Thereby the false and defamatory remarks were published to third parties.
91. Plaintiff alleges, by information and belief, that defendant corporation made defamatory untrue statements to subsequent employer Dillard’s Department
15

store and prospective employers that plaintiff employee was terminated due to tardiness, keeping a messy store, and poor work performance. 92. Plaintiff alleges that the statement is false, and intentionally misleading, made with the improper purpose of concealing the defendants retaliatory motives and wrongful termination. 93. Plaintiff alleges the defendant owed a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff not top publish false information about the plaintiff, the defendant negligently, recklessly or intentionally breached their duty and as a proximate cause plaintiff suffered injury to her reputation as it relates to her profession and is actionable per se. 94. The defendant’s defamatory statements made by and through their agents, in the scope of their employment caused injury to the plaintiff. 95. Plaintiff alleges the defendant is vicariously liable for the acts of their agents. 96. Defendants false statement was made with malice, and intentional misrepresentation of the facts surrounding the plaintiffs employment and reasons for her wrongful employment termination. 97.A defamatory publication was made by agents of the defendant in connection with performance of duties and responsibilities of the plaintiffs job performance and is actionable per se and there is a presumption of damage. 98.Alternatively plaintiff claims special damages proximately resulted from the defamation including injury to reputation, personal humiliation and mental anguish.
16

88.Any privilege which may have applied is forfeited by the Defendant’s defamatory statements whose motives were actuated by common law malice.
89. Monica Barr, the plaintiff’s supervisor and agent of the defendant corporation, made defamatory oral statements and made defamatory written statements which were placed in the plaintiff’s employee termination report and thereby, published to a third party, in the employees personnel file. The statement were published to third parties, including but not limited to Norstan supervisors Stephanie Roper, Jean Aldige and others whose names are currently unknown.
90.The above managers made defamatory statements regarding the plaintiffs poor job performance to other subordinate employees and co employees and friends of the plaintiff working at Fashion Cents and by information and belief, to others working in the Tampa Bay Mall. It is upon information and belief that plaintiff (alleges and additional discovery will reveal) that agents of the corporate defendant Rick Moyer and Monica Barr and other Norstan employees made defamatory remarks about the plaintiff’s ineptness to properly perform her employment task ,prior to and subsequent to her termination on or around May 29, 1999, to coworkers and acquaintances of the plaintiff. Thereby the false and defamatory remarks were published to third parties.
91. Plaintiff alleges, by information and belief, that defendant corporation made defamatory untrue statements to subsequent employer Dillard’s Department
15

COUNT SIX NEGLIGENT HIRING AND TRAINING 99. The plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every paragraph above as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 100.The defendant, a large national apparel company, had an implied and express duty to provide its employees a work place free of discriminatory employment practice. 101 .Defendant’s duty requires hiring qualified and propedy trained supervisor’s to uphold the state, and federal employment and civil rights laws. Defendant negligently breached that duty to hire and train qualified employees. 102.Defendant’s management training program is inadequate. 103.Hiring of former bar tenders without adequate training to manage minor sales clerks is a breach of that duty of care that a reasonable person would expect. 104.The defendant’s negligent hiring and training caused injury to the plaintiff who seeks relief as a result of the breach of duty. 105.Plaintiff alleges the Employer is liable under Florida law independent of a claim under respondeat superior, for the willful torts of his employee, committed against third person, if he knew or should have known the employee was a threat to others. 104.Plaintiff alleges that the defendant owed a reasonable, if not a special duty of care, to the plaintiff and other employees to hire suitable supervisors to manage young female employees who are not the age of majority.
17

105.The plaintiff alleges the employers had a duty to properly investigate the background and character of its managers who would be direct supervisors of young female employees who in fact were not the age of majority.
106.The defendant owed a duty to hire persons suitable for managing innocent young girls, girls still in high school. The defendant breached that duty when it hired Rick Moyers.
107.The defendant knew or should have known that Rick Moyers former employment experience was not as a supervisor of young women in a retail store but, as a bar tender.
108.The defendant breached its duty to evaluate the suitability of Rick Moyers as a supervisor of minority age females based upon lack of actual employment experience in any similar job.
109.Plaintiff alleges that the defendant breached the duty of reasonable care to hire a suitable manager for retail work around young women including the plaintiff and as a proximate and foreseeable cause of the defendant breach the plaintiff suffered physical injury causing damage.
110.The plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s negligent hiring suffered the torts of false imprisonment, defamation, fraud.
111 .The plaintiff suffered damaging physical injury, including but not limited to, severe headaches, physical tremors, and serious weight loss as a proximate cause of the torts committed against her. COUNT SEVEN
18

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION 112.The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-62 as if the same were
fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 113.Defendant had a duty to properly supervise its employees to prevent
discriminatory employment practices. 114.Defendant failed to supervise its managers and supervisors in the proper
handling of employment discrimination complaints. 115. As a result of defendants negligence the plaintiff suffered damage and
seeks relief. 116. Defendant had a duty to take prompt and effective remedial action to
eliminate discriminatory employment practices. 117.Defendant failed to take effective remedial action to eliminate the
discriminatory employment practices against the plaintiff or the coworkers who were minors working under the supervision of the plaintiff. 118.As a result the plaintiff was injured and seeks relief from this Court. 119.A cause of action for negligent retention and supervision exist under Florida law Case¥ v. Wal Mart Stores Inc. 8 F. Supp.2d 1330, affirmed 190 F. 3d 541__..~ Plaintiff alleges the Employer is liable under Florida law independent of a claim under respondeat superior, for the willful torts of his employee, committed against third person if he knew or should have known the employee was a threat to others.
19

120.Employer, by and through his agents, had actual or constructive knowledge of sexual harassment at Fashion Cents. Plaintiff reported the unwelcome activity to Monica Barr, her supervisor, orally and in writing.
121.Rick Moyers, openly during the course of his employment and while working for the defendant selling clothes at the Tampa Bay Mall uttered frequent sexual references to the young ladies working there.
122.The defendant acted negligently by not properly training or supervising managers Monica Barr and Stephanie Roper, regarding proper handling of employment discrimination, proper actions for terminating and supervising employees.
123.Plaintiff received complaints from the employees at the store that Rick Moyers was touching them, and they did not like it; and the plaintiff reported the complaints to Monica Barr, her supervisor, agent of the defendant employer.
124.The defendant has a duty to supervise its employees and prevent unwanted touching. The defendant breached its duty of care and negligently supervised its employees.
125.Rick Moyers, Monica Barr, Stephanie Roper, and Jean Aldrige negligently failed to supervise employees, and acted with reckless disregard for the sensitivity and rights of the minor children who worked with Rick Moyers and the plaintiff.
126.As a result of the defendant’s breach of its duty of care, the plaintiff suffered damage and physical injury.
20

COUNT EIGHT NEGLIGENT RETENTION 127.The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-69 as if the same were fully set out herein and in addition alleges: 128.Employer had a duty to keep the work place in compliance with Federal and State law. 129.The employer however, failed in that duty when it continued the employment of Rick Moyers and Monica Barr after Monica Barr ignored several complaints concerning the inappropriate sexual touching and comments from her manager trainee Ricardo Moyers. 130.The known harasser, Ricardo Moyers, was not reprimanded for sexual harassment, but promoted to a full managers position. 131 .A cause of action for negligent retention and supervision exist under Florida law, Casey v. Wal Mart Stores INc. 8 F. Supp.2d 1330 affirmed 190 F. 3d 541. 132.Under Florida law a claim for negligent hiring or retention allows for recovery against employer for acts of employee committed outside the scope and course of employment when an employer has somehow been responsible for bringing third person into contact with an employee, whom employer knows or should have known is predisposed to committing wrong under circumstance that create opportunity or enticement to commit such wrong. Gillis v. Sports Authority, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 611.
21

133.Negligent retention occurred under Florida law when during the course of Rick Moyers’ employment, the employer had actual or constructive notice from several employees and was therefore aware that minor female employees and the plaintiff were experiencing problems with employee Rick Moyers of an unwelcome and offensive sexual nature that indicated his unfitness for supervising young girls.
134.The defendant, a private employer has a duty, by and through its agents, supervisors, and Human Resources Departmen ,who hire retain or supervise employees, to manage employees whose negligence or intentional acts in positions of employment can foreseeable cause injuries to third parties. Battista v. Cannon, 934 F. Supp. 400.
135oThe defendant breached that duty when, after having notice of misconduct, it negligently failed to take further action. The defendant did not conduct a proper and meaningful or effective investigation, of the complaints, and did not discharge the perpetrator nor reassign personnel.
136.As a result of the breach of duty to investigate or take proper remedial action, the plaintiff suffered foreseeable damage. She properly reported the misconduct, to her supervisor, and her regional manager, as a result of defendant’s breach of its duty, plaintiff suffered damage. She was falsely imprisoned, defamed, defrauded, harassed, maligned, denigrated by those who took the plaintiff’s report.
137.Plaintiff suffered physical injury as a proximate cause of the defendant’s breach of duty.
22

COUNT NINE ASSAULT AND BATTERY 138.Plaintiff incorporates by reference all paragraphs asserted above as if fully set out herein and further alleges: 139.Defendant by and through its agent, employee Rick Moyer intentionally touched the plaintiff in an offensive manner. Moyers without permission began massaging the plaintiff’s body while she was on the sales floor. 140.The plaintiff told him not to touch her or anyone else in the store. The plaintiff did not know if this behavior rose to a claim of sexual harassment, but she did know that the touching was offensive. 141 .Plaintiff was placed in fear of further harmful or offensive touching as a result of the intentional act by Rick Moyers on the plaintiff and the touching of other women employees in the store that the plaintiff knew of. 142.Plaintiff, was offended by the touching, and as a result of the intentional act and as a proximate cause of the defendant’s act the plaintiff suffered harm to her personal dignity, became nervous and agitated about going to work, was plagued by anxiety, suffered head aches, and physical tremors, suffered from nervous stomach problems while at work. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 143.Plaintiff demands judgment for damages against the defendant and thereby request the Court: a. declare the Defendants actions were discriminatory and retaliatory, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended,
23

b. declare that the Defendant violated Florida Civil Right Act of 1992 and other laws of the state of Florida.
c. order defendant to pay the Plaintiff damages in an amount to be proven in this action to compensate plaintiff for harm suffered in accordance with the time table that would have operated but for the retaliation and violations of applicable law to present day; order damages to include, interest, and include, but not be limited to, lost wages, lost opportunity, lost retirement benefits, lost vacation benefits, lost medical expenses, severe emotional distress, damage to reputation, physical pain and suffering and other damages available for willful and intentional misconduct.
d. Grant such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems appropriate. e. Maintain jurisdiction over this matter until all remedial action has been taken
by defendant. f. Order defendant to pay a reasonable attorney’s fee, and cost for this action
and for expenses at the administrative level.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PLAINTIFF demands a TRIAL BY JURY.
~an~y~aw Firm, ~.L.~. Margaret Laney Attorney for Plaintiff
24

Atlanta, Georgia 30305 1-888-222-1991

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and cgrr~ct copy of the Amended

Complaint has been served by regular mail on ~_ IL/ ,,~o ! to the

following:

~ !

" ’ ~

Kristine Kennedy, Esq.. Jackson Lewis Schnitzler 390 N. Orange Avenue, SuRe 1285 Orlando, Florida 32801
Pamela Pride Chavez, Esq. Miami EEOC One Biscayne Tower 2 South Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, Florida 33131

Laney Laney Law Firm, LLC

25

PLAINTIFF INTERVENOR’S EXHIBIT A_ IS ATTACHED HERETO AS REFERRED TO IN COUNT ONE OF PLAINTIFF INTERVENOR’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT file # 8:01-cv-379-T-26EAJ

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DMSION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
PlaintilI,

CML ACTION NO.

NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, INC. d/bla FASHION CENTS
Defendant.

J~jRY TPJ~L D~F,.D

NATU’REOF THE ACTION This is an a~tion under Title VII oft.he Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of retaliation, and to provide appropriate relief to Glemuh Herring who was adversely affected by such practices. As stated with greater particularity ~n paragraph 7, the Commissiogt alleges that the Defendant Employer retafiated against Mrs. Herring, wheu she complained to management about the ~xual harassment ofcertain females on her job, by tennina~g her employment with Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc., d/b/a Fasl~ion Cents.
~JRISDICTION~d~D VE .l~J~ I. ~ur~[iction ofthis Court is invoked p~t to 28 U.S.C. §§ ~$I, 1331, 1337, 1343 md 1345. This ac:fio~ is ~uthori~d ~ in~imted pm’s~ant to Section 706(f)(I) ~d (3) of Tifle VII ofthe Civil Right~ Act of 1964, ~ ameaded, 42 U.S.C. § 2000eoS(i~l) md (3) ("Tiff VII"), Sectiou [02 ot~he Civil KiBh~ Ac~ o[ [991, 42 U.S.C. § 19~IA.

2. TI~ employment pr~ic~s alleged to be unlawf~l were committed w/thin the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division.
3. Pia/nt/ff, the Equal En~loyment Opportun/ty Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the adrnirfistration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VH, and is expressly authorized to bring th/s act/on pursu,~nt to Section
~o~0(I) and (3) of Title V~. ,~2 U.$.¢. § 200Ce-5(0(l) and (3).
4. At all relevant times, No~u Apparel Shops, Inc., d/b/a Fashion Cents CDcfendant"), bas continuously been doing business in the State of Florida in the City of Tampa, and has continuously maintained at lmst 15 employees.
5. At a/i relevant /rues Dcf’endan~ has continuously been an employer engaged/n an industry aff~tin8 commerce with/n the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII,
u.s.¢. §§2000e0,), (g) and STATEMENt__ OF
6. More than ~ days prior to the/nstitution of this lawsuit., Glcnnda Herring filed a charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defez~tant. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled,
7. Since at least May of 1999, Defendant Employer engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Tampa, Florida Iocat/on/n v/olat~on of Sect/on 704(a) of Title VH, ,~2 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a).
On March 9, 1999, Defendant hired Glennda Herring as Store Mmmger for De£’endant’s Fashion Cents store at Tampa Bay Center. On or about May 5, 1999, Defendant hired Ricardo Moyers as a Store

Manager for Fashion Cents and placed Mr. Moyers at the Tampa Bay Center store to train under Glennda Hen’in& c, hr.mediately following Mr. Moyer~’ employment at the Fashion Cents store at Tampa Bay Center, certain female employees at the store complained to Glennda Herring that Mr. Moyers was engaging in unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature which made the female employees feet uncomfortable about working at Fashion Cents. d. Ms. Herdng reasonably believed Mr. Moye~" conduct to be unlawful sexual harassment and thereby opposed such conduct by complaining to Defendant’s District Manager, Monica Bart. e. On May 27, 1999, a~er complah3.in$ to District Manager, Monica Barr, abom Mr, Moye~’ sexual harassment ofcemcin female employees at the Fashion Cents store, Glennda Herring was discharged from her employment. The effect of the conduct o~nplained of in paragraph 7 above, has been to deprive Glennda Herring of equal employment opportunities and to otherwise adversely affect her status as an employee because ot’h~ good faith opposition to w/xat she reasonably be~icvo~ ~o be an un~aw~ employment practi~e. 9. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7 above were ~tenfonal. 10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7 above were committed with malice and/or with rer, kle~ indifference to the federally protected rights of Glennda Herring.

PRAYER FOR KEL[EF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court:

A. Grant a permanent injun~ion enjoi~ng Defendant, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with the Defendant, ~rom engaging in any

employment practice which di~,~min~,~’~ on the basis of an employe~’s oppos/t/on to an unlawful ~-rnployment practice.
B. Order Defc~ndant to institute and carry out policies, practices, and program~ which

eradicate the effect~ ofit~ pa..~t unlawful employment practice~.

C. Order Defendant to make whole Glennda Herring by providing her with appropriate back pay including prejudgment intere~ in amoun~ to be determined at Hal, and afford any other affirmative rcliefncc~ to eradicate the effocts ofDe~’endant’s unlawful employment practice~,

including but not limited to reinstatement of Gletmda Herring and rightful pla~e promotion and/or front pay.

D. Order Defendant to make whole Gletmda Herring by providing her with otnpensation for past and future pecuniary Iosse~ resulting from the tmlawful employment practices described in paragraph 7 above, including but not limited to out of pocket ]o~es in a~ounts to b~

determined at trial.

~

E. Order I:)ef~ndant to make whole Gicnnda Herring by providing her with

ompensation for past and futm’e nonp~tmiary lo~e~ resulting from the unlawful pr’~ti¢os

complained of in paragraph 7 above, ixgluding but not limited to emotional pain, suffering,

inconvenience, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life, in amount~ to be determined at trial.

F. Order Defcmdant to pay Gletmda Herring puait~ve damages for the malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraph 7 above, in amom:tt~ to b¢ determined at trial.
4

Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public
int~’¢sL
H. Aw. ard the Commission its costs of this action.
_~[~rRy TR,JAL DEMAND
The Commission requests ajury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
GWENDOLYN YOUNG I~AMS Associatc G~eral Counsel
DELNER FRANKLIn.THOMAS Regional Attorney
MICHAEL J. FARRELL Supervisory Trial Attorney
PAMELA PRIDE-CH.AVIES Senior Trial Attorney FL Bar No. 0~97010 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION MIAMI DISTRICT OFFICE One Biscay, Tower 2 South Bis~’.ayn¢ Boulevard, Suite 2700 Miami, Florida 3313 l Tel, (305) 530-6005 Fax (305) 536-4494

 
 Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 24 Filed 09/06/2001 Page 1 of 2
r iLtu

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION
EQUALENWLOYMffiNTOPPOR~TY
COMMISSION and GLENDA HERRING,

1612-
-5 '-: ~'~I' Ui II: 42
i • '- .... ....'1\ - ":. :),', .:~, - ,- rLORIOA
Ihi .j'", t"lGrduA

Plaintiffs,
v.

CASE NO: 8:01-cv-379-T-26EAJ

NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, INC., d/b/a FASmON CENTS,

Defendant.
----------------------------,/
ORDER

Upon due consideration of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts II, III, VI, VII, VIII,

and IX ofPlaintiff-Intervenor's First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 22) and Plaintiff Intervenor's

Response in Opposition (Dkt. 23), it is ordered and adjudged that the motion is denied in part

and granted in part. The allegations are sufficient to avoid dismissal at this stage of the

proceedings. To alleviate the confusion and cumbersomeness of looking to more than one

document to ascertain the operative claims, however, Plaintiff-Intervenor shall file one

amended complaint which encompasses all claims without incorporation of portions from any

other pleading, document or paper. Plaintiff-Intervenor shall have up to and including

September 17, 2001, to file the above-referenced Second Amended Complaint setting forth all

claims against Defendant.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on September 6,2001.

COPIES FURNISHED TO: Counsel of Record

....".~~.ARA
TES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Date Printed: 09/07/2001

DFocIumLenEt 24 COFilPed Y09/06/2001

Page 2 of 2

Notice sent to:

-01- c V ~ 37cr

Pamela Pride-Chavies, Esq.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Joanne Braddock Lambert, Esq. Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman 390 N. Orange Ave., Suite 1285
P.O. Box 3389 Orlando, FL 32802-3389

Margaret Alverson Laney, Esq. Laney and Associates Law Firm LLC 550 N. Reo St., Suite 300 Tampa, FL 33209

 
 Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 29 Filed 11/07/2001 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

-0150-
j ;:= '; -"7 ;,:; 10: I 9

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

CASE NO: 8:01-cv-379-T-26EAJ

NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, INC.,

Defendant.
--------------------------------------------~/
ORDER

Upon due consideration, it is ordered and adjudged that the Plaintiffs Motion to Quash,

to Rule Evidence Inadmissible, to Tax Costs and Attorney Fees, or, Alternatively to Grant

Additional Time, and to Issue Order to Show Cause (Dkt. 28) is denied without prejudice for

failure to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 3.01(g).

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on November 7, 2001.

4c~ --~.--

.-.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Counsel of Record

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Date Printed: 11/08/2001

DFocI umLeEnt 29 COFPiledY11/07/2001

Page 2 of 2

Notice sent to:

Q\ - CV - 37Gf

Carla J. Von Greiff, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Tampa Area Office 501 E. Polk St., Suite 1020
Tampa, FL 33602

Delner-Franklin Thomas, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Joanne Braddock Lambert, Esq. Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman 390 N. Orange Ave., Suite 1285
P.O. Box 3389 Orlando, FL 32802-3389

Margaret Alverson Laney, Esq. Laney and Associates Law Firm LLC 550 N. Reo St., Suite 300 Tampa, FL 33209

 
 Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 41 Filed 03/25/2002 Page 1 of 5
rILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

. . . .." ,~- C,,'

c" l t FL'O- '-H_I' D,AI

TMk.-~. i LOilJi)A

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and GLENNDA HERRING,

Plaintiff,

v.

CASE NO: 8:01-cv-379-T-26EAl

NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, INC., d/b/a FASHION CENTS,

Defendant.
--------------------------~/

ORDER The Court has for its consideration submissions from the Plaintiff, the Defendant, and the Intervenor relating to the Defendant's request that this Court compel the Intervenor to undergo an extensive mental examination pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35. Although the parties have exhaustively briefed the substantive issues involved, the Court need not reach those issues in light of the fact that the Court concludes under the circumstances presented that to grant the Defendant's request would disrupt the timetable established in this case by this Court's prior scheduling orders. On May 25,2001, this Court entered a Case Management and Scheduling Order. See docket 8. The Court based the order on the parties' Case Management Report. See docket 6. The Court, consistent with the parties Report, directed the parties in the order

~(

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 41 Filed 03/25/2002 Page 2 of 5
to disclose expert witness reports by February 4,2002. On December 17,2001, the Court, by endorsed order, granted the parties joint motion to extend the expert witness disclosure deadline until March 18,2002. See docket 30. The Court granted the extension because the parties represented in the motion that "[t]he amended deadline will still allow for sufficient time to depose experts prior to the discovery cut-off date of May 6,2002." See id., page 3. As of the date of the entry of this order, the extended expert disclosure deadline has now expired.
Against this backdrop, the Court notes that it is clear from the parties' submissions that on January 11,2002, Defendant's counsel advised Plaintiffs and Intervenor's counsel that because time was of the essence she wanted the Intervenor to undergo an independent psychological evaluation (IPE) by mid-February so that her expert could complete his expert witness report by the March 18 deadline. See docket 39, Exhibit C, page 2. Defendant's counsel further advised that if the parties could not agree on an IPE then the Defendant "will need to file a motion with the Court by the end of next week in order to obtain a timely ruling." See id. Although the Defendant was advised three days later that the Plaintiff and Intervenor would not agree to an IPE, the Defendant for some unexplained reason did not file its motion to compel such an examination until March 5, 2002, less than two weeks before the expiration of the expert witness disclosure deadline.
-2-

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 41 Filed 03/25/2002 Page 3 of 5
See docket 31.1 In view of the foregoing facts, the Court agrees with the Plaintiffs contention that
if the Defendant's motion is granted, the Court will have to extend the deadline for disclosure of experts, as well as the discovery cut-off date, to accommodate not only the needs of the Defendant but also the needs of the Plaintiff and the Intervenor. See id., pages 8-9. Such an extension of the discovery process, as the Plaintiff points out, "will most likely be both costly and time consuming[,]" see id., page 9, as well as have the domino effect of causing a continuance of the pretrial conference scheduled for August 27, 2002, and the trial scheduled for the term commencing September 30, 2002.
Eleventh Circuit precedent affords this Court broad discretion in controlling the pace of litigation and managing its cases to ensure that those cases "move to a reasonably timely and orderly conclusion." Chrysler International COlI'. v. Chemaly, 280 F. 3d 1358, 1360 (11 th Cir. 2002). In light of this broad grant of discretionary authority and the circumstances just recited, this Court concludes that the Defendant's motion to compel must be denied because to grant it would result in a disruption of the time lines established by this Court for completing discovery and for ensuring that this case is tried as scheduled.
1 Under Local Rule 3.01(b), the Plaintiff and the Intervenor had 10 days after being served with the motion to file briefs or legal memorandum in opposition. Thus, this Court was unable to rule on the Defendant's motion until after the expert disclosure deadline had expired.
-3-

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 41 Filed 03/25/2002 Page 4 of 5
Accordingly, it is ordered and adjudged as follows: 1) The Defendant's Motion to Compel Mental Examination (Dkt. 31) is
denied. 2) The Intervenor's Motion for Protective Order, Alternative Motion for
Limited Mental Examination, and Motion for Fees and Costs (Dkt. 36) are denied as moot. 3) The Intervenor's Motion to Seal (Dkt. 38) is granted. The Clerk is directed to seal Exhibits A, B, E, and F to the Intervenor's Opposition to Motion to Compel.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on Marc

COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Counsel of Record

RICHARD 1\. LAZZARA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-4-

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Date Printed: 03/26/2002

FDoIcuLmeEnt 41COFPiledY03/25/2002

Page 5 of 5

Notice sent to:

Carla J. Von Greiff, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Tampa Area Office 501 E. Polk St., Suite 1020 Tampa, FL 33602

Delner-Franklin Thomas, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Joanne Braddock Lambert, Esq. Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman 390 N. Orange Ave., Suite 1285
P.O. Box 3389 Orlando, FL 32801-3389

Margaret Alverson Laney, Esq. Laney and Associates Law Firm LLC 550 N. Reo St., Suite 300 Tampa, FL 33209

Mary A. Lau Lau, Lane, Pieper, Conley & McCreadie, 100 S. Ashley Dr., Suite 1700 P.O. Box 838 Tampa, FL 33601-0838

P.A.

 
 Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 1 of 17
fiLED
02JUN-P~~ UNITED STATBS DISTRICT COURT ~DDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

BQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and GLENDA HERRING,

Plaintiffs,
vs.
NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, INC., d/b/a FASHION CENTS,

Case No.: 8:01-CV-379-T-27EAJ

Defendant.
__________________________ 1
ORDBR Before this court are Plaintiff/Intervenor's Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Request for Attorney's Fees and Sanctions (Dkt. 42), and Defendant's response in opposition (Dkt. 43) •
BACKGROUND This action originated when the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit on behalf of Glenda Herring, claiming retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC alleges that Defendant illegally terminated

1
75

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 2 of 17
Herring from her position as manager of Fashion Cents1 clothing store at the Tampa Bay Mall in retaliation for her reports that another manager, Ricardo Moyers, was sexually harassing store employees. Initially, Ricardo Moyers worked with Plaintiff at Defendant's Tampa Bay Mall store. Later, he worked at Defendant's University Square Mall store. 2
Herring (hereinafter "Plaintiff") intervened in this action, adopting the EEOC's retaliation claim and adding eight state law tort claims: conspiracy, constructive fraud, false imprisonment, defamation, negligent hiring and training, negligent supervision, negligent retention, and assault and battery.
Plaintiff now seeks an order compelling Defendant to respond to 30 of the 42 requests to produce that she served upon Defendant. 3 For the most part, Defendant objects to Plaintiff's requests.
Fashion Cents is a retail clothing store owned and operated by Defendant.
2
In 1999, when Plaintiff worked for Defendant, Defendant operated stores in Tampa, Jacksonville, and Orlando, among others.
3
On pages 9 and 10 of her motion to compel, Plaintiff references interrogatory numbers 11, 12, 21, and 22, indicating that "the main question as to the interrogatories is whether Defendants' responses
are 'evasive or incomplete.'" (Dkt. 42 at 10 (citation omitted)). These interrogatories are not at issue in Plaintiff's motion. Accordingly, this court will not address Plaintiff's interrogatories.
2

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 3 of 17
DISCUSSION In request number 3, Plaintiff seeks profit and loss statements or other corporate documents reflecting sales comparisons from the Tampa, Jacksonville, and Orlando Fashion Cents stores for the period May 1, 1998, through January of 2002. Plaintiff argues that these documents are relevant to a determination of whether "Plaintiff or others similarly situated made any profit or created losses for the Defendant." (Dkt. 42 at 9. ) Plaintiff argues that such determination is relevant to demonstrate pretext because "Plaintiff was hired to make a profit for the Defendant corporation." (Dkt. 42 at 9.) Defendant argues that its reasons for terminating Plaintiff are related to her "overall performance" as a store manager: "chronic attendance and tardiness issues, poor management of the store, unacceptable condition of the store and store appearance, failure to properly inventory and stock merchandise, failure to hire adequate assistance in management of the store, as well as a negative attitude toward her job, title, and responsibilities." (Dkt. 43 at 10.) Additionally, Defendant argues that these records would serve no useful comparison, even if such comparison were relevant to the claims or defenses at issue, because sales vary from store-to-store based on different factors affecting each location. Given Defendant's stated reasons for terminating Plaintiff,
3

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 4 of 17
profit and loss information is irrelevant to the issue of pretext, as Defendant has not cited as a reason for terminating Plaintiff that she failed to meet profit and loss expectations. Accordingly, with regard to request number 3, the documents sought are irrelevant and Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED.
Request number 4 seeks "any and all documents and/or writings identifying the name, current and last known address and telephone numbers" of each of Defendant's current and former employees for the period January 1999 to January 2002 for the Tampa, Orlando, and Jacksonville stores.
Plaintiff indicates in her motion that she "agree[d] to limit #4 [to] January 1999 to January 2001." (Dkt. 42 at 2.) With regard to relevance, Plaintiff contends that other employees of Defendant's company are relevant to Plaintiff's negligent training, supervision, and retention claims, as well as to Defendant's claim that it terminated Plaintiff for legitimate reasons.
Defendant argues that the only individuals relevant to Plaintiff's negligent training, supervision, and retention claims are those individuals who managed or supervised other employees: Rick Moyer, Glennda Herring, Monica Barr, Jean Aldridge, and Stephanie Roper. (Dkt. 43 at 13.)
This court agrees that Defendant's employees at the Tampa, Jacksonville, and Orlando stores who worked at the same time that Moyers, Herring, Barr, Aldridge, or Roper were managers or
4

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 5 of 17
supervisors may have information relevant to Plaintiff's negligent training, supervision, and retention claims. However, Plaintiff's request for "[a] ny and all documents" containing an employee's address and telephone numbers is overbroad. See, e.g., Mosier v. American Home Patient, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 645, 647 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (request seeking every document in Defendant's possession that contained the name of an employee was "plainly too broad") .
Additionally, the court finds a more reasonable time-frame to be January 1999 through January 2000.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel with regard to request number 4 is GRANTED to the extent that Defendant shall provide a list of any and all employees, including each employee's name, current and last known address, current and last known telephone number, and current and last known cellular telephone number, if any, from Defendant's Tampa, Jacksonville, and Orlando stores for the period January 1999 through January 2000. Plaintiff's motion with regard to request number 4 is otherwise DENIED.
Request number 5 seeks various forms, located in Defendant's training manual, for all of Defendant's employees in the Tampa, Jacksonville, and Orlando stores from January of 1999 to January of 2001.
A request for training forms for all employees from three stores over a three-year period is overbroad and overly burdensome.
5

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 6 of 17
The court finds a more reasonable time-frame to be January 1999 through January 2000.
In response to this request, Defendant contends that it has agreed to produce personnel files, which contain training information for employees Herring, Moyers, Barr, Aldridge, Roper, Sherylynn Augustin, Nakita Robinson, Janelle Scales, Kim Brooks, Roszetta Thomas, Antoinette Jackson, and Belinda Godfrey. (Dkt. 43, Ex. B at 4, ~ 5.) To the extent that this list of individuals does not include all supervisors and managers who worked at Defendant's Tampa, Orlando, or Jacksonville stores, or supervised Tampa, Orlando, or Jacksonville managers, from January 1999 through January 2000, Defendant shall supplement its production. Plaintiff's motion to compel with regard to request number 5 is thus GRANTED in part.
In request number 6, Plaintiff seeks time cards and hour sheets, or similar documents reflecting the dates and times that store managers at Defendant's Tampa, Orlando, and Jacksonville stores worked for the period May 1, 1998, through January of 2002.
In response, Defendant argues that testimony established that the district manager used the alarm company reports to ascertain when the stores opened and closed. Thus, its production of 1999 alarm reports for the Tampa Bay store is sufficient, Defendant argues, to demonstrate when managers opened and closed that store in 1999. Defendant also argues that it agreed to produce weekly
6

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 7 of 17
time sheets for the Tampa Bay store from March 1999 though December 1999.
Plaintiff's request for documents demonstrating the times that other employees worked is not unreasonable considering that Defendant's stated reasons for terminating Plaintiff include "chronic attendance and tardiness issues." (Dkt. 43 at 5.) While the district manager may have used alarm reports as a basis for determining when managers opened and closed their stores, any other documents that show hours worked for employees similarly situated to Plaintiff, to the extent they exist, are also relevant. Moreover, Defendant has not indicated that such documents from the Orlando, Jacksonville, and University Mall stores would not serve as a useful comparison.
The time-frame of this request, however, is overbroad. A more appropriate time-frame is January 1999 through January 2000.
Thus, Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED in part as it relates to request number 6 and Defendant shall produce documents responsive to this request, as amended herein. Additionally, to the extent it has not already done so, Defendant shall produce alarm records for the same period of time from Defendant's Tampa, Jacksonville, and Orlando stores indicating when the stores opened and closed.
Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED with regard to request number 7, as Defendant indicates in its response to Plaintiff's
7

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 8 of 17
motion that documents responsive to this request, if they exist, are contained within the personnel files of the requested employees (Barr, Moyers, Herring, and Roper), which Defendant has already produced.
In request number 9, Plaintiff seeks "[a]ny and all documents and/or writing which evidence and/or refer to claims of missing inventory and shrinkage documents" from Defendant's Tampa, Orlando, and Jacksonville stores for the period May 1, 1998, to the present. Defendant argues that such information is irrelevant. Plaintiff did not address this request in her motion to compel, except to say that it "require[s] court ruling." (Dkt. 42 at 2.)
Defendant does not purport to have terminated Plaintiff for inventory or shrinkage problems. Without any other guidance as to how such documents might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, this court agrees with Defendant that this request seeks irrelevant information. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED with regard to request number 9.
In request number 10, Plaintiff seeks" [a] ny and all documents and/or writings which evidence and/or refer to complaints or concerns [from Defendant's Florida and Georgia stores] of sexual harassment, wrongful termination, retaliation, or other violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or the Florida Civil Rights Act" for the period May 1, 1998, through the present. Defendant argues that this request is overbroad and "should be limited to
8

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 9 of 17
complaints or concerns regarding Ricardo Moyers." (Dkt. 43, attachment B at 6, ~ 10.)
This court agrees that the request is overbroad, and Plaintiff has failed to present any argument to persuade this court that the request should be narrowed. Thus, the motion to compel is DENIED as to request number 10.
Request number 11, which seeks comparative store sales for Defendant's Florida stores for the period January 1998 through January 2002, seeks essentially the same documents as request number 3, which sought profit and loss statements or other documents reflecting sales comparisons. Defendant argues that such documents are irrelevant. While Plaintiff did not specifically address this request in her motion, she argues generally that "documents pertaining to [Defendant's] three Florida stores located in Orlando, Jacksonville, and Tampa" are relevant and necessary to Plaintiff's claim that Defendant terminated her for an illegitimate purpose.
This court DENIES Plaintiff's motion with regard to request number 11. Sales, profits, and losses are not relevant to Plaintiff's claims because Defendant does not'purport to have fired Plaintiff based on her sales volume or based on the store's revenues.
For the same reason, the motion to compel request number 13, which seeks "documents of sales and inventory results for the
9

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 10 of 17
Fashion Cents stores during the employment of two store managers who preceded Glenda Herring as store manager," is also DENIED.
Plaintiff's request number 12 seeks information regarding the manager who preceded Plaintiff as manager of Defendant's Tampa Bay Mall store. Plaintiff fails to address this request in her motion to compel, and the motion to compel is DENIED as to this request.
Plaintiff's motion to compel with regard to request number 15 is DENIED, as Defendant indicates that "any such documents responsive to this request are contained in the identified individual's personnel files which have been produced." (Dkt. 43, attachment B at 8, ~ 15.)
Plaintiff's motion to compel with regard to request number 16 is DENIED, as Defendant indicates that it has produced documents responsive to this request. (Dkt. 43, attachment B at 8, ~ 16.)
Request number 19 requires Defendant to: 1) identify the security alarm company with whom it contracts for its Tampa stores; 2) provide documents reflecting the name, address, account number, and telephone number for the local and corporate branches of the alarm company; and 3) provide the name, address, and phone number for the alarm company's local sales and service representatives.
Defendant states that it has provided the name and address of the security alarm company but information regarding the company's independent contractors "is obtainable from another source that is more convenient, in the form of a nonparty request for documents."
10

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 11 of 17

(Dkt. 42, attachment B at 9, ~ 20.)

The court agrees that contact information for the alarm

company, including its sales and service representatives, is

relevant and should be produced by Defendant. However, the request

is overbroad. Accordingly, this court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to

compel with regard to request number 19 to the extent that

Defendant shall provide Plaintiff with a list that contains the

name, address, account number, and telephone number for: 1) the

local and corporate branches of the alarm company (or companies)

that installed and monitored the alarms located at the front and

back of Defendant's Tampa stores; and 2) the alarm company's (or

companies') local sales and service representatives.

It is

otherwise DENIED.

Request number 20 seeks a copy of Defendant's contract with

the alarm company and all alarm service records.

Defendant's objections notwithstanding, it appears that

Defendant has complied with Plaintiff's request number 20 by

indicating that it does not have a contract with the alarm company

and by providing alarm service records for its Tampa stores for

calendar year 1999. The court finds the scope of the production

reasonable given the ambiguity of the request for alarm service

records and the facts of this case. Moreover, the court finds the

time-frame reasonable and consistent with this court's ruling on

other requests. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel with

11

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 12 of 17
respect to request number 20 is DENIED. Request number 21 seeks bank records of deposits made by the
managers of Defendant's Tampa stores from January 1998 through January 2002. Plaintiff specifically seeks those portions of the bank records that reflect the time and location that the managers made the deposits. Plaintiff argues that the information is relevant because Defendant contends that it terminated Plaintiff for, among other reasons, making bank deposits late, which caused her to be late to work. Defendant argues that the bank deposit records may not reflect accurately the time the deposits were made. Moreover, Defendant argues that the request is overbroad.
The court agrees that the request is overbroad and of limited relevance. The motion to compel as to request number 21 is therefore DENIED.
Plaintiff's request numbers 22 and 23 seek various information regarding ~key holders" for Defendant's Fashion Cents stores in Tampa, Jacksonville, and Orlando. Plaintiff offers no support in her motion with regard to these requests; accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED with respect to request numbers 22 and 23.
Similarly, Plaintiff provides no rationale for request number 24, which seeks a copy of the lease agreement between Defendant and Tampa Bay Mall and "any separate agreement" between Defendant and Tampa Bay Mall's security service, and request number 27, which
12

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 13 of 17
seeks various expenses claimed by Stephanie Manley Roper, Monica Barr, and Ricardo Moyers while employed by Defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED with respect to request numbers 24 and 27.
Request number 25 seeks "copies of any documents recording fines levied by the Tampa Bay Mall for late openings or warnings of late openings by the Tampa Bay Mall." (Dkt. 42, ex. A at 12, '3l 25.) This information is relevant, as Defendant claims that it received information from Tampa Bay Mall that Plaintiff was tardy in opening the Fashion Cents store and that Plaintiff's absences and tardiness comprise legitimate reasons for terminating Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel with regard to request number 25 is GRANTED, to the extent that Defendant shall provide the requested information for the period of time Plaintiff worked at Defendant's Tampa Bay Mall store: March 9, 1999, through May 27, 1999.
Request number 28 seeks the names and copies of any and all standardized tests that Defendant used to evaluate its employees' suitability for working "in any level position of employment." Plaintiff argues that this information is relevant to prove negligence in training, supervision, and retention. Defendant argues that the request is overbroad because it seeks testing information for all Norstan employees, when the only employees relevant to Plaintiff's negligent training, supervision, and
13

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 14 of 17
retention claims are the managers and supervisors. Defendant further states that the standardized test that it used to evaluate Ricardo Moyers is in his personnel file, which it has already produced.
This court agrees with Defendant's overbreadth objection and will not narrow this request because Plaintiff repeatedly fails to do so on her own. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED as to request number 28.
In request number 34, Plaintiff seeks employment applications for all of Defendant's Georgia and Florida employees who Defendant terminated from 1998 to 2001. Defendant argues that this request is overbroad and unreasonable because the reasons alleged as a basis for Plaintiff's termination are specific to management employees only, whose files Defendant has already provided. Defendant further argues that the relevant store is the Tampa Bay Mall store, where Plaintiff worked. Lastly, Defendant argues that responding to this request would take months and would be very expensive.
This court agrees. For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion to compel with regard to request number 34 is DENIED.
Plaintiff seeks in request number 35 any and all information regarding Defendant's background check for Barr, Moyers, Roper, Jackson, all other assistant managers and managers employed in Florida by Defendant from January of 1998 through the present, and
14

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 15 of 17
all full-time and probationary employees hired by Defendant for the Florida stores from January of 1999 to the present. Defendant argues that the only background check relevant to the issues in this lawsuit is that of Mr. Moyers.
Once again, this request is clearly overbroad and Plaintiff offers no argument specific to this request. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED with regard to request number 35.
Plaintiff's request number 38, subsections (a), (b), and (c) seek educational and training materials that Defendant uses to train its non-management and management employees "in following corporate procedures for recruiting, hiring, terminating, managing and supervising Norstan personnel."
Plaintiff's motion with respect to subsections (a) and (b) of request number 38, which seek training material, is GRANTED.
Subsection (c) of request 38 seeks "corporate documents that name every Florida and Georgia Fashion Cents [e] mployee that received any of the training," including the training dates, the name of the person who administered the training, the location of the training, and copies of all test results or certificates of completion. As worded, this request is overbroad and overly burdensome and is therefore DENIED.
With regard to request numbers 36, 40, and 41, Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED, as Defendant argues that it has produced documents responsive to these requests and Plaintiff has
15

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 75 Filed 06/03/2002 Page 16 of 17

not persuaded this court otherwise.

Defendant shall produce within twenty days from the date of

this order any documents at issue.

This court declines at this time to award sanctions to either

party, but may revisit this ruling if circumstances warrant.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1) Plaintiff/Intervenor's Motion to Compel Production of

Documents and Request for Attorney's Fees and Sanctions (Dkt.

42) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as outlined above;

and

2) Plaintiff's request for sanctions is DENIED.

~ay DONE and ORDERED at Tampa, Florida this

of June, 2002.

Copies to: District Judge Counsel of record

~~
---------
United States Magistrate Judge

16

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Date Printed: 06/04/2002

DFocIumLenEt 75 COFilPed Y06/03/2002

Page 17 of 17

Notice sent to:

Carla J. Von Greiff, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Tampa Area Office 501 E. Polk St., Suite 1020 Tampa, FL 33602

Delner-Franklin Thomas, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower
2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Joanne Braddock Lambert, Esq. Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman 390 N. Orange Ave., Suite 1285
P.O. Box 3389 Orlando, FL 32801-3389

Kristyne E. Kennedy, Esq. Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman 390 N. Orange Ave., Suite 1285
P.O. Box 3389 Orlando, FL 32801-3389

Margaret Alverson Laney, Esq. Laney Law Firm, LLC 2575 Peachtree Rd. N.E., Suite 17B Atlanta, GA 30305

Mary A. Lau Lau, Lane, Pieper, Conley & McCreadie, 100 S. Ashley Dr., Suite 1700 P.O. Box 838
Tampa, FL 33601-0838

P.A.

 
 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --

-

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 106 Filed 07/29/2002 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and GLENNDA HERRING,
Plaintiff,

.:-") ',)

6i\-- -..(. -
(
!

r"._")

-r:

\._.>

r-

-"

ril
0

-..

.- ~
,. .
;

v.

CASE NO: 8:01-cv-379-T-26EAJ

NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, INC., d/b/a FASHION CENTS,

Defendant.
--------------------------~/

ORDER Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts, and supporting memorandum (Dkts. 55, 56, and 57), Defendant's Notice of filing Supplemental Authority (Dkt. 58), Plaintiff Glennda Herring's Responses (Dkts. 82, 83, 84,99, 100, and 102), Plaintiff EEOC's Response and Statement of Facts (Dkts. 87 and 88), Defendant's Reply (Dkt. 95),1 and the numerous depositions, affidavits, declarations, exhibits and other documents. After careful consideration of the entire file, the Court concludes that the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

On July 16,2002, this Court ordered that Defendant's Motion to Strike (Dkt. 95) would be treated as a reply. (Dkt. 96).
IOh

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 106 Filed 07/29/2002 Page 2 of 9
Title VII Retaliation In viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds that the Plaintiff may be able to establish a causal connection between her termination and her complaints to her supervisor and the management regarding the sexual harassment occurring at the store. There is evidence supporting a finding that Defendant's management knew of Plaintiffs protected activity-the complaints of sexual harassment- before the decision to discharge her. In this respect, the protected activity and the negative employment action are "not completely unrelated." See Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11 th Cir. 1998). Moreover, Plaintiff has come forward with contradictory evidence in regard to the legitimacy of Defendant's reasons for termination. Accordingly, the Court finds genuine issues of material fact with regard to Plaintiffs retaliation claim.
Conspiracy Count II of the First Amended Complaint, titled "Conspiracy," alleges a claim for violation of Plaintiffs civil rights and also attempts to assert a conspiracy under Florida law. The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1036-38 (11 th Cir. 2000); Foster v. Pall Aeropower Corp., III F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1324 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (citing McAndrew). In other words, the employees, agents and officers of the Defendant corporation cannot conspire among themselves, because there is no
-2-

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 106 Filed 07/29/2002 Page 3 of 9
"multiplicity of actors necessary for the formulation of a conspiracy." See McAndrew, 206 F.3d at 1036. Although the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not extend to criminal conspiracies, Plaintiffhas failed to allege or demonstrate a conspiracy to commit acnme.
Plaintiff has also failed to establish that her claim falls within the personal stake exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. See McAndrew, 206 F.3d at 1037 n. 6, citing Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369,378 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1065 (1999). Under this exception, if a corporate employee acts for his or her own personal purposes, then a conspiracy may be established. See H & B Equipment Co., Inc. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1978), cited with approval in Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 378.
In Benningfield, the plaintiffs alleged that one of the defendants had a personal stake in retaliating against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs asserted that because the defendant's father had been terminated, the defendant intended to avenge his father by retaliation against those individuals responsible for the termination. The defendant "retaliated" by permitting a hostile work environment to continue despite repeated reports of the problems. The Benningfield court held that the plaintiffs must show that the alleged conspiracy was "motivated by class-based animus." See Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 379, quoting Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649,653 (5th Cir. 1994). In Benningfield, the plaintiffs' theory that the defendant's motivation for the conspiracy was his desire to
-3-

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 106 Filed 07/29/2002 Page 4 of 9
get even with the individuals who forced his father's resignation, did not establish the necessary ammus.
In the instant case, Plaintiff submits that Plaintiffs direct supervisor, Monica Barr, had a personal stake in having Plaintiff terminated. Ms. Barr's purported motivation to conspire with the Defendant was ''to keep from getting fired herself' because of her failure to report the Plaintiffs complaints to her superiors. Monica Barr is in the same protected class-females-as is Plaintiff. Consequently, no class-based animus could possibly exist in this case.
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to circumvent the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine on a non-discriminatory theory, Plaintiff may not do so. Plaintiff submits that Ms. Barr stood to lose her job, and therefore her salary, if the Plaintiff was not terminated. Thus, Plaintiff claims that Ms. Barr had a personal stake, her salary, in keeping her job. The "personal stake" intended to be gained, however, must flow from a source independent of the defendant corporation. See H & B Equipment, 577 F.2d at 244. There is no separate entity in which Ms. Barr held an interest; her compensation flows directly from the Defendant, not from an independent source. Thus, the "personal stake" exception does not apply under any circumstances.
To the extent Plaintiff alleges a state law claim for conspiracy, Florida law holds that an employee cannot conspire with his or her corporate employer. See Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So. 2d 170, 180 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2000). Florida also recognizes the
-4-

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 106 Filed 07/29/2002 Page 5 of 9
"personal stake" exception. See Greenberg v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. of Greater Miami, Inc., 629 So. 2d 252,256 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1993). For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff cannot establish this exception. Accordingly, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in Plaintiff's favor on the claims of conspiracy.
State Law Claims Fraud/Constructive Fraud
Plaintiff contends that either fraud or a constructive fraud occurred in the termination process. She claims that she signed, under duress, the Defendant's version of a termination report, wherein she admitted to falsehoods, giving the Defendant just reason for termination. The Court finds that generally, there is no fiduciary relationship between an employer and employee giving rise to the tort of constructive fraud. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for constructive fraud.
As to fraud in the inducement or duress, Plaintiff has failed to show that any employment contract existed which would give her any rights in this terminable-at-will state. Plaintiff cannot show any damages resulting from her signing false statements used to justify her termination when she could have been terminated for any reason absent her signing the termination document. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for fraud in the inducement.
-5-

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 106 Filed 07/29/2002 Page 6 of 9
False Imprisonment Count IV of the original PlaintifflIntervenor's Complaint (Dkt. 13) seeks damages
for false imprisonment.2 The Court finds a genuine issue of material fact as to this count. Defamation
Plaintiffalleges that defamatory statements were made by employees of the Defendant. The Court finds that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the statements were true and whether a privilege applies. Negligent Retention. Training and Supervision
The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's claims for negligence are based on the alleged acts of sexual harassment committed against other employees and the Defendant's investigation and response regarding the complaints. Plaintiff contends that the underlying wrong committed by Mr. Moyer was sexual harassment. In Florida, sexual harassment was not a recognized cause of action at common law. See Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Services. Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 1999). Accordingly, Plaintiffhas failed to establish the elements of claims for negligent training, supervision and retention.
2 PlaintifflIntervenor did not request that the original Intervenor Complaint be amended with respect to Count IV for false imprisonment.
-6-

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 106 Filed 07/29/2002 Page 7 of 9
Assault and Battery Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendant employer is vicariously liable for the
tortious acts of Mr. Moyer, because Plaintiff has failed to establish that the massages or neck rubs were committed in the scope of his employment. An employee's conduct is within the scope of his employment when "(1) the conduct is of the kind he was employed to perform, (2) the conduct occurs substantially within the time and space limits authorized or required by the work to be performed, and (3) the conduct is activated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master." Iglesia Cristiana La Casa Del Senor v. L.M., 783 So. 2d 353,357 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2001). "Generally, sexual assaults and batteries by employees are held to be outside the scope of an employee's employment, and therefore, insufficient to impose vicarious liability on the employer." Iglesia, 783 So. 2d at 357, quoting Nazareth v. Herndon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 457 So.2d 1076, 1078 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985). Nothing in the record suggests that the neck rubs, or any other alleged unwanted touches, constituted anything other than independent, self-serving acts by Mr. Moyer. Thus, Defendant cannot be held liable for Mr. Moyer's actions.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 55) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Summary judgment is denied as to the original Complaint brought by the EEOC and as adopted by reference as Count I in PlaintifflIntervenor Glennda Herring's First Amended Complaint. Summary judgment is granted as to Counts II, III, VI, VII, VIII, and IX of the
-7-

------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 106 Filed 07/29/2002

Page 8 of 9

PlaintifflIntervenor's First Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 20). Summary judgment is denied as to Count V in the of the PlaintifflIntervenor's First Amended Complaint, (Dkt. 20), and to Count IV for false imprisonment in the original PlaintifflIntervenor Complaint. (Dkt. 13). The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment as to Counts II, III, VI, VII, VIII, and IX of the PlaintifflIntervenor's First Amended Complaint in favor of Defendant and against PlaintifflIntervenor Glennda Herring. This case shall proceed to trial on the original Complaint filed by the EEOC (Dkt. 1), Counts I and V ofthe PlaintifflIntervenor's First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 20), and Count IV of the original PlaintifflIntervenor Complaint (Dkt. 13).
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on July 29, 2002.

COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Counsel ofRecord

RICHARD A. A.~~r....~ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-8-

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Date Printed: 07/30/2002

FDoIcuLmeEnt 10C6 OPFileYd 07/29/2002

Page 9 of 9

Notice sent to:

Carla J. Von Greiff, Esq.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Tampa Area Office 501 E. Polk St., Suite 1020 Tampa, FL 33602

Delner-Franklin Thomas, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District·Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Joanne Braddock Lambert, Esq. Jackson Lewis LLP 390 N. Orange Ave., Suite 1285 P.O. Box 3389 Orlando, FL 32802-3389

Kristyne E. Kennedy, Esq. Jackson Lewis LLP 390 N. Orange Ave., Suite 1285 P.O. Box 3389 Orlando, FL 32802-3389

Margaret Alverson Laney, Esq. Laney Law Firm, LLC 2575 Peachtree Rd. N.E., Suite 17B Atlanta, GA 30305

Mary A. Lau Lau, Lane, Pieper, Conley & McCreadie, 100 S. Ashley Dr., Suite 1700 P.O. Box 838
Tampa, FL 33601-0838

P.A.

 
 Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 141 Filed 12/10/2002 Page 1 of 12

/3W iJLEO
IN TIlE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR1lIE~~~~~i6~FFL~~_3 Pii 2:~5

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

and

)

)

GLENNDA HERRING

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervener,

)

)

v.

)

)

NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, INC.

)

d/b/a FASHION CENTS

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

)

~

. ., _I, \ I

• 'OL<~ - : ,

•• , FL£,;dD,\

II,,;, f .; U:..:1DA

CASE NO. 8:01-CV-379-T-26EAl
61.! FILED /'
lIMo gEe 1 0 2002 .
Ct..H.5lK., u.s. ~:!~rIg;{;'r ootlftT
JiIIDlPl.Z:1 ~~r~lCl (n.' ~ 'f,;\~4'J~A, ~iJ:'Il'~~~\.

CONSENT DECREE

1. This Consent Decree (the "Decree") is made and entered into by and between

Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter referred to as the

"Commission" or "EEOC"), Plaintiff-Intervener Glennda Herring (hereinafter "Glennda Herring"

or "Plaintiff-Intervener"), and Defendant, Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. d/b/a Fashion Cents

(hereinafter referred to as the "Company" or "Defendant"). The Commission, Plaintiff-Intervener,

and Defendant are collectively referred to herein as "the Parties."

2. On February 21,2001, EEOC initiated this action by filing its Complaint in the

United States District Court for the Middle District ofFlorida, Tampa Division, Civil Action No.

8:01-CV-379-T-26EAJ, based upon a charge filed by Glennda Herring (EEOC Charge No.IS 1-

/ll ( 99-0995). EEOC's Complaint alleges that Defendant violated Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, including but not limited to, amendments authorized by the Civil Righ1s Act

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 141 Filed 12/10/2002 Page 2 of 12
of 1991, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq. ("Title VII'') by terminating Mrs. Herring from her employment with Defendant in retaliation for her complaints ofwhat she reasonably and in good faith believed to be unlawful sexual harassment. Subsequently, Mrs. Herring filed a motion to intervene in this action, which was granted by the Court. Mrs. Herring's Intervener Complaint
alleges the same Title vn violations as Plaintiff EEOC's Complaint and additionally pleads state
causes of action. 3. In the interest of resolving this matter and as a result of having engaged in
comprehensive settlement negotiations, the Parties have agreed that this action should be finally resolved by entry of this Decree. This Decree is fmal and binding upon the Parties, their successors and assigns.
4. The Parties agree that this Decree resolves all claims alleged against the Defendant in EEOC Charge Number No.1 51-99-0995, and the Complaints filed in this action, and constitutes
a complete resolution of all claims under Title vn that were made by the Commission and
Plaintiff-Intervener in this action. S. NOW, THEREFORE, the Courthaving carefully examined thetenns andprovisions
of this Decree. and based on the pleadings filed by the parties, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED TIlAT:
JURISDICTION
6. This Court has jurisdiction ofthe subject matter ofthis action and over the Parties for the pmposes of enterina and enforcing this Decree.
7. No party shall contest jurisdiction ofthis federal court to enforce this Decree and its terms or the right ofthe EEOC to seek enforcement in the event Defendant breaches any ofthe
terms of this Decree. 2

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 141 Filed 12/10/2002 Page 3 of 12
GENERAL PROVISIONS 8. Defendant, its officers, and employees, agree not to engage in conduct which violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, by adversely affecting the terms and conditions of any individual's employment because of the individual's complaints of what belshe reasonably and in good faith believes to be unlawful conduct under TitleVll. 9. Defendant, its officers, and employees, agree not to discriminate against any employee who files a charge ofdiscrimination with the EEOC alleging violation(s) ofsuch statute; who cooperates with the EEOC in the investigation and/or prosecution of any charge of discrimination; or who cooperated in the investigation or prosecution ofthis case.
DISCRIMINATION POLICY AND TRAINING 10. Defendant has established a written policy against discrimination and retaliation, which is attached as Exhibit A. Defendant agrees that all ofits employees and managers will be provided a complete copy ofits policy against discriminationand retaliation within thirty (30) days ofthe entry ofthis Decree. Defendant also agrees that all new employees shall be given a copy
of its policy against discrimination and retaliation within their first week ofemployment with the
Defendant.
11. In order to further ensure the effective implementation of Defendant's antidiscrimination policy, Defendant will conduct training for all of its managers and supervisory personnel on recognizina harassment, on acts that could constitute retaliation, on the proper procedure to be followed ifthey become aware ofharassment in the workplace or ifthey receive complaints ofdiscrimination, and on the proper retention ofdocuments related to discrimination
complaints. The trainina will be conducted on an annual basis in sessions ofnot less than two (2)
hours induration. 1Mtraining session for Defendant's Corporate Training Coordinator, presently 3

~----- Ca- se- 8:0~ 1-c- v-- 003- 79- -R- AL-- Do- cum- e- nt 1- 41-- Fi- led- 12- /10- /2- 002-- Pa- ge~ 4 ~ of ~ 12 ._-_._. - - .
Ms. Jean Aldridge, and Defendant's Regional Managers will be conducted at Defendant's corporate headquarters in New York and will be conducted by Jeanne M. Colachico, Esq. & Associates. Defendant's Regional Managers will, in tum, conduct the required training, in sessions no less than two (2) hours, with the District Managers and Store Managers employed in their respective regions. Defendant agrees to provide the EEOC, at least two weeks notice before it conducts its training sessions, with the dates and locations of the training, the identification of
the training materials to be used at the training session, and a general description ofthe category of employees who will be in attendance at the training. Such notice should be forwarded to the attention of Carla Von Greiff, Trial Attorney. at the Tampa Area Office of the EEOC, SO1 East
Polk Street, Room 1020, Tampa, Florida. 33602. Additionally, Defendant agrees that the EEOC may, at the EEOC's discretion, be in attendance at each training session. Should the EEOC determine that it will attend one ofthe training sessions described in this Paragraph, EEOC will provide Defendant with notice of its intent to attend that training session. Such notice will be provided ten (10) business days prior to the scheduled date ofthat training session.
12. Defendant agrees that the training described in paragraph 11 shall be conducted
within one hundred and twenty (120) days ofthe entry ofthis Decree. And, should thereafter take place annually thereafter for the duration of this Decree. Defendant further agrees that the discrimination policy andtraining materials utilized for the training described in paragraph 11 shall be presented to and explained to all new managers and supervisors, who did not attend the annual
training, within thirty (lID days ofbeing placed in a management or supervisory position.
EXPUNGEMENT OF ENTRIES FROM PERSONNEL RECORDS 13. Defendant IIIfCCS to remove from Glennda Herring's personnel file, the employee
warning and termination report regarding Mrs. Herring within ten (10) business days oftile entry
4

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 141 Filed 12/10/2002 Page 5 of 12
ofthis Decree. The Defeodant further agrees to give Mrs. Herring a neutral letter ofreference,
attached as Exhibit B, within ten (10) business days ofthe entry ofthis Decree.
POSTING
14. Defendant will post a laminated 11 x 14 copy ofthe Notice, attached as Exhibit C, no later than October 31,2002. Said notice shall be posted at all of Defendant's Fashion Cents stores in Florida for the duration of this Decree in a conspicuous location accessible to all
employees such as an employee bulletin board and/or breakllunch room. MONITORING
15. Defendant will retain all employment and/or investigative records relating in any way to any complaint or allegation of retaliation for the duration of this Decree and as required
under federal law. 16. Defendant will certifY to the EEOC semi-annually throughout the duration ofthis
Decree that it is in compliance with all aspects of this Decree. Such certification should be forwarded to the attention of Carla Von Greiff, Trial Attorney, at the Tampa Area Office of the EEOC, 501 East Polk Street, Room 1020, Tampa, Florida, 33602. The farst such certification will be due no later than thirty(30) days from the first training provided pursuant to paragraph 12. With each certification Defendant will further provide the EEOC with the name, address, and phone number ofany person who alleges they have been harassed or retaliated against while working for Defendant during the pl'.,r~:Ung six month period. Defendant will also state the actions taken in response to each such allegation and provide any and all documentation associated with such complaint.
5

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 141 Filed 12/10/2002 Page 6 of 12

MONETARY RELIEF

17. Defendant agrees to pay a total sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars

($250,000.00) to resolve this litigation.

(A) Defendant will pay Glennda Herring seven thousand five hundred dollars

(57,500.00) representing back wages. Defendant agrees to make all withholdings as required by

law and to pay the employer's share of social security witbholdings, and issue a W-2 itemizing

same. This payment shall be made by check payable to Mrs. Glenda Herring.

(B) Defendant will pay two hundred forty two thousand five hundred dollars

(5242,500.00) for damages received for emotional distress resulting from the employment

discrimination suit against Defendant. This payment shall be made by check payable to the Trust

Account of Laney and Associates, LLC, and Defendant sball issue an IRS Fonn 1099 itemizing

same.

The payments shall be sent by certified mail to Margaret Laney, Esq., Laney and

Associates, LLC, 2575 Peachtree Road NE, Suite 17B, Atlanta, GA, 30305.

All payments shall be mailed within ten (10) business days from the Court's execution ofthis

Decree. 18.

Defendant agrees to provide the EEOC with a copy ofthe payments set forth in

paragraph 17 above within ten (10) business days from the Court's execution ofthis Decree. Said

copy shall be forwarded to the attention of Carla Von Greift'; Trial Attorney, at the Tampa Area

Office of the EEOC, 501 East Polk Street, Room 1020, Tampa, Florida, 33602.

19. If Defendant tails to tender the above-mentioned payments within the ten (10)

business day period agreed upon in paragraph 16, Defendant shall pay interest on the defaulted

payment at the rate calculated pursuant to 26 U.S.C. Section 662 I (b) until the same is paid.

6

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 141 Filed 12/10/2002 Page 7 of 12
ENFORCEMENT OF DECREE 20. The Commission shall have independent authority to seek the judicial enforcement ofany aspect, term or provision ofthis Decree.
COSTS 21. Each party shall bear her or its own costs and attorney's fees associated with this litigation.
DURATION OF DECREE 22. This Decree shall remain in effect for three (3) years from the date of the Court's execution of the Decree.
AGREED TO: FOR THE PLAINTIFF, UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
by: &QI~,,- Date: 11/0/°2Delner Franklin-Thomas Regional Attorney Pennsylvania Bar No. 54205 Miami District Office United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission One Biscayne Tower, Suite 2700 2 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131
7

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 141 Filed 12/10/2002 Page 8 of 12

AGREED TO:

FOR TIIE PLAINTIFF INTERVENER,

~ By'

Date: 1/·'-01-

ti et
Florida Bar No. 00 g yo

Laney Law Firm, LLC

Attorney for PlaintitT-Intervener

2575 Peachtree Road NE

Suite 17 B

Atlanta. Georgia 30305

AGREED TO: FOR TIlE DEFENDANT. NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS. INC. d/b/a! FASmON CENT

IIIL by:

~~t:;t:'lf1l~~
oR

ayttel:-ato

de

'I

2 )
I

OL

Florida Bar N . ~~'-"""~'---_

Jackson Lewis l-LP

Attorneys for Defendant

390 N. Orange Avenue

Miami. Florida 32801-1641

SO ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED. this.kl.. day of•11 pv~ ",17 =y2

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 141 Filed 12/10/2002 Page 9 of 12
EXHIBIT "A": NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, INC.'S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICY
It is the policy ofNorstan Apparel Shops, Inc. to provideEqual Employment Opportunities to all qualified individuals and to administer hiring, working conditions, benefits, as well as, privileges ofemployment, compensation, training, opportunities for advancement, or termination of employment, for all employees without discrimination due to race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, veteran status, or disability.
Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. will monitor and adhere to federal and state laws to ensure fair and equal treatment for all employees. Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. complies with the
Americans With Disabilities Act and applicable state and local laws providing for nondiscrimination in employment against qualified individuals with disabilities.
Ifany employee observes any violation ofthe above policies, they are encouraged to report the violation to our Human Resources Department at our corporate headquarters. A
thorough investigation will be conducted. Ifthe investigation reveals that a violation has occurred, Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. will take promptand effective corrective measures. Employees reporting violations ofthe above policies will not be subject to any penalty, retaliation or embarrassment for coming forward.
It is the belief of Norstan Apparel Shops ,Inc., that our employees are our most valued asset and that discriminatory employment practices would be harmful to our efforts to ensure the continued growth of our corporation.

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 141 Filed 12/10/2002 Page 10 of 12
EXHIBIT "B": LETTER OF REFERENCE
[Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. Letterhead] To Whom It May Concern:
This letter serves to confIrm that Ms. Glennda Herring was employed by Norstan Apparel
Shops, Inc. in the position ofStore Manager at the company's "Fashion Cents" store in the Tampa
Bay Mall, Tampa, Florida. She was employed from March 9, 1999 through May 27, 1999, at a
salary oftive hundred dollars ($500.00) per week. This information is being provided pursuant to Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. '5, policy of
responding to reference requests from fonner employees or potential employers by providing information limited to the former employee's position, length ofservice and salary. Sincerely, [Human Resources Official]
10

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 141 Filed 12/10/2002 Page 11 of 12

EXHIBIT "C": NOTICE

NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES POSTED PURSUANT TO A CONSENT DECREE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND NORSTAN APPAREL SHOPS, INC. D/B/A FASmON CENTS

Thisnotice is beingpostedpursuant to aConsent Decreeentered by the United StatesDistrict

Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division. in EQual Employment Qmxn1unity

Commissiony. Norstan Apparel Shops. Inc. d/b/a FashionCents. Civil Action No. 8:0 l-CV-379-

T-26EAJ. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). Title VII protects individuals

from employment discrimination because of their race, religion, color, sex (including sexual
harassment and pregnancy) and/or national origin. Title vn also protects individuals from

retaliation for having complained ofan unlawful employment practice. Norstan Apparel Shops,

Inc. d/b/a Fashion Cents does not condone discrimination or retaliation of any kind as set forth in

federal laws.

Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. d/b/a Fashion Cents assures its employees that it supports
Title vn and will not take any action against an individual because he/she has exercised hislher

rights under the law to oppose discriminatory acts or to file charges with the EEOC.

Appropriate corrective action. up to and including termination, shall be taken against any

employee (including management personnel) found to violate company policies regarding

discrimination, based upon the circumstances involved.

This notice shall remain posted for three (3) years from the date signed. Employees or

applicants for employment who have questions about their rights under Title VII or any other federal

anti-discrimination law may telephone the Miami District Office of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission at 1-800-669-4000 or (305) 530-6001.

Signed this _ day of

, 2002.

ChiefFinancial Officer Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc.

11

Case 8:01-cv-00379-RAL Document 141 Filed 12/10/2002 Page 12 of 12 F I L E COP Y
Date Printed: 12/11/2002

Notice sent to:

Carla J. Von Greiff, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Tampa Area Office 501 E. Polk St., Suite 1020 Tampa, FL 33602

Kristyne E. Kennedy, Esq. Jackson Lewis LLP 390 N. Orange Ave., Suite 1285 P.O. Box 3389 Orlando, FL 32802-3389

Stephanie A. Yelenosky, Esq. Jackson Lewis LLP 390 N. Orange Ave., Suite 1285 P.O. Box 3389 Orlando, FL 32802-3389

David E. Block, Esq. Jackson Lewis LLP One Biscayne Tower, Suite 3500 Two S. Biscayne Blvd. Miami, FL 33131-2374

Margaret Alverson Laney, Esq. Laney Law Firm, LLC 2575 Peachtree Rd. N.E., Suite 17B Atlanta, GA 30305

Mary A. Lau Lau, Lane, Pieper, Conley & McCreadie, 100 S. Ashley Dr., Suite 1700 P.O. Box 838 Tampa, FL 33601-0838

P.A.

 
 Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...
CLOSED, EAJ, SL DOC
U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida (Tampa) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 8:01-cv-00379-RAL

EEOC v. Norstan Apparel Assigned to: Judge Richard A. Lazzara Demand: $0 Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex) Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Intervenor Plaintiff Glenda Herring
V. Defendant Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. doing business as Fashion Cents

Date Filed: 02/21/2001 Date Terminated: 09/19/2002 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by Carla Johanna Von Greiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Tampa Area Office 501 E. Polk St., Ste. 1000 Tampa, FL 33602 813/202-7903 Fax: 813/228-2045 Email: carla.vongreiff@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Margaret Alverson Laney Laney Law Firm, LLC Suite 17B 2575 Peachtree Rd Atlanta, GA 30305 888/222-1991 Email: mlaneylaw@yahoo.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David E. Block Jackson Lewis, LLP One Biscayne Tower - Ste 3500 2 S Biscayne Blvd Miami, FL 33133 305/577-7600 Fax: 305/373-4466 Email: blockd@jacksonlewis.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

1 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...

Mediator Mary A. Lau TERMINATED: 09/19/2002
Intervenor Defendant Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. doing business as Fashion Cents

Kristyne E. Kennedy Jackson Lewis LLP 390 N. Orange Ave., Suite 1285 P.O. Box 3389 Orlando, FL 32802-3389 407/246-8440 Fax: 407/246-8454 Email: kennedyk@jacksonlewis.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephanie A. Yelenosky ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mary A. Lau Lau, Lane, Pieper, Conley & McCreadie, P.A. 100 S. Ashley Dr., Suite 1700 P.O. Box 838 Tampa, FL 33601-0838 813/229-2121 Email: Mlau@laulane.com PRO SE
represented by David E. Block (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristyne E. Kennedy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephanie A. Yelenosky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/21/2001 02/21/2001 02/21/2001

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT filed; injunctive relief sought; jury demand (plk) (Entered: 02/22/2001)
MAGISTRATE JUDGE CASE ASSIGNMENT Magistrate assigned: Elizabeth A. Jenkins (plk) (Entered: 02/22/2001)
SUMMONS issued for Norstan Apparel. Consent(s) issued. (plk) (Entered: 02/22/2001)

2 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...

02/23/2001 05/01/2001 05/01/2001 05/08/2001 05/18/2001 05/22/2001 05/25/2001
05/25/2001 05/25/2001 05/30/2001 06/29/2001 07/03/2001
07/03/2001 07/23/2001
07/24/2001

2 NOTICE of designation under Local Rule 3.05 - TRACK 2. (ctc) (bls) (Entered: 02/23/2001)
3 Certificate of interested persons and corporate disclosure statement by Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. (bls) Modified on 05/15/2001 (Entered: 05/02/2001)
4 NOTICE of pendency of other actions by Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. (bls) (Entered: 05/02/2001)
5 ANSWER and affirmative defenses to [1-1] complaint by Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc.; jury demand (bls) (Entered: 05/09/2001)
6 CASE MANAGEMENT REPORT (bls) (Entered: 05/21/2001)
7 Certificate of interested persons and corporate disclosure statement by EEOC (bls) (Entered: 05/23/2001)
8 CASE MANAGEMENT AND SCHEDULING ORDER setting Joining of parties, amending of pleadings on 6/19/01; Discovery cutoff 5/6/02; dispositive motion filing deadline for 6/3/02; Pretrial statement due on or before 8/21/02; Pretrial conference for 9:30 a.m. on 8/27/02; Scheduled for Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ( signed by Deputy Clerk ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
DEADLINE updated This case is set for jury trial during the term commencing 9/30/02; scheduled for Judge Richard A. Lazzara (bls) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
9 MOTION by Glenda Herring to intervene by Glenda Herring ; proposed intervening complaint attached. (jnb) Modified on 05/29/2001 (Entered: 05/29/2001)
10 ORDER denying [9-1] motion to intervene by Glenda Herring for failure to comply with the certification requirement of Local Rule 3.01(g). ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (rjc) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
11 MOTION by Glenda Herring to intervene . Proposed complaint of intervenor submitted. (bls) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
12 ORDER granting [11-1] motion to intervene subject to the defendant's right to seek a severance of the intervener's state claims from the federal claims. The Clerk shall accept for filing the complaint accompanying the motion. ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) Modified on 07/09/2001 (Entered: 07/05/2001)
13 INTERVENOR'S COMPLAINT by Glenda Herring against Norstan Apparel (bls) (Entered: 07/05/2001)
14 UNOPPOSED MOTION with memorandum in support by Norstan Apparel (unopposed) for enlargement of time to respond to intervenor-plaintiff, Glenda Herring's complaint to 7/30/01 (bls) Modified on 07/31/2001 (Entered: 07/24/2001)
ENDORSED ORDER granting [14-1] consent motion for enlargement of time to respond to intervenor-plaintiff, Glenda Herring's complaint to 7/30/01, reset answer due for 7/30/01 for Norstan Apparel ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) Modified on 07/26/2001 (Entered: 07/25/2001)

3 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...

07/30/2001 07/30/2001 08/09/2001 08/09/2001 08/10/2001
08/10/2001 08/10/2001 08/27/2001 08/27/2001 09/04/2001 09/06/2001
09/17/2001 10/02/2001 11/01/2001 11/05/2001

15 ANSWER and affirmative defenses to counts 1 and 4 by Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. to [13-1] intervenor complaint (bls) (Entered: 07/31/2001)
16 MOTION by Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. with memorandum in support to dismiss counts 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of plaintiff-intervenor's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (bls) (Entered: 07/31/2001)
17 MOTION by EEOC for leave to amend [1-1] complaint by adding a new count and adding additional paragraphs in counts 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 (bls) (Entered: 08/10/2001)
18 MEMORANDUM by EEOC in support of [17-1] motion for leave to amend [1-1] complaint by adding a new count and adding additional paragraphs in counts 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 (bls) (Entered: 08/10/2001)
19 ORDER granting [17-1] motion for leave to amend [1-1] complaint by adding a new count and adding additional paragraphs in counts 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8; granting [16-1] motion to dismiss counts 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of plaintiff-intervenor's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 08/13/2001)
20 AMENDED INTERVENOR'S COMPLAINT by Glenda Herring : amending [13-1] intervenor complaint (bls) (Entered: 08/13/2001)
DEADLINE updated; set answer due for 8/28/01 as to plaintiff-intervenor's first amended complaint for Norstan Apparel (bls) (Entered: 08/13/2001)
21 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by Norstan Apparel to counts 1, 4, and 5 of [20-1] amended intervenor's complaint (bls) (Entered: 08/28/2001)
22 MOTION by Norstan Apparel with memorandum in support to dismiss counts 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of intervenor's first amended complaint (bls) (Entered: 08/29/2001)
23 RESPONSE by Glenda Herring in opposition to [22-1] motion to dismiss counts 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of intervenor's first amended complaint (bls) (Entered: 09/05/2001)
24 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [22-1] motion to dismiss counts 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of intervenor's first amended complaint set intervenor's second amended complaint deadline at 9/17/01 for Glenda Herring ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 09/07/2001)
25 SECOND AMENDED INTERVENOR'S COMPLAINT by Glenda Herring: amending [20-1] intervenor's amended complaint (bls) (Entered: 09/18/2001)
26 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by Norstan Apparel to [25-1] plaintiff-intervenor's second amended complaint (bls) (Entered: 10/02/2001)
27 NOTICE of substitution of counsel for EEOC by Carla J. Von Greiff (bls) (Entered: 11/02/2001)
ENDORSED ORDER granting [27-1] notice of substitution of counsel ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 11/06/2001)

4 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...

11/05/2001
11/07/2001
12/14/2001 12/17/2001 03/05/2002 03/12/2002 03/12/2002 03/13/2002 03/18/2002 03/19/2002

28 MOTION by Glenda Herring to quash defendant's request for production of documents , to rule all evidence received by defense counsel in response to subpoenas inadmissible , to tax costs incurred as a result of bringing this motion , for attorney fees incurred as a result of bringing this motion , or in the alternative to grant Glenda Herring additional time to prepare briefs in response to defense motions for production of documents until 11/27/01 , or in the alternative to order the defendant to show cause referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (bls) Modified on 11/07/2001 (Entered: 11/06/2001)
29 ORDER denying [28-1] motion to quash defendant's request for production of documents, denying [28-2] motion to rule all evidence received by defense counsel in response to subpoenas inadmissible, denying [28-3] motion to tax costs incurred as a result of bringing this motion, denying [28-4] motion for attorney fees incurred as a result of bringing this motion, denying [28-5] motion to grant Glenda Herring additional time to prepare briefs in response to defense motions for production of documents until 11/27/01, denying [28-6] motion to order the defendant to show cause ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 11/08/2001)
30 JOINT MOTION with memorandum in support by EEOC, Norstan Apparel, Glenda Herring (joint) for enlargement of time of six weeks for the deadline to disclose expert witness reports , (joint) to extend the deadline for all parties to disclose expert witness reports to 3/18/02 (bls) Modified on 12/19/2001 (Entered: 12/17/2001)
ENDORSED ORDER granting [30-1] joint motion for enlargement of time of six weeks for the deadline to disclose expert witness reports, granting [30-2] joint motion to extend the deadline for all parties to disclose expert witness reports to 3/18/02 ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) Modified on 12/19/2001 (Entered: 12/18/2001)
31 MOTION by Norstan Apparel with memorandum in support to compel mental examination of plaintiff referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (plj) (Entered: 03/06/2002)
32 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Norstan Apparel with memorandum in support (unopposed) to extend mediation hearing deadline to 5/15/02 (plj) (Entered: 03/13/2002)
32 NOTICE of selection of mediator by Norstan Apparel. Mediator: Mary A. Lau (plj) (Entered: 03/13/2002)
33 ORDER granting [32-1] notice of selection of mediator, granting [32-1] unopposed motion to extend mediation hearing deadline to 5/15/02, reset mediation conference for 5/15/02 ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 03/14/2002)
34 MOTION by Norstan Apparel with memorandum in support for enlargement of time for all parties to disclose expert witness reports from 3/18/02 to 4/22/02 , for enlargement of the 5/6/02 discovery deadline to 6/3/02 (bls) (Entered: 03/19/2002)
35 ORDER denying without prejudice [34-1] motion for enlargement of time for all parties to disclose expert witness reports from 3/18/02 to 4/22/02; denying

5 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...

03/20/2002
03/20/2002 03/20/2002 03/21/2002 03/21/2002 03/25/2002
04/05/2002 04/19/2002 04/22/2002 05/03/2002 05/03/2002

without prejudice [34-2] motion for enlargement of the 5/6/02 discovery deadline to 6/3/02 ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc MFR Number (bls) (Entered: 03/20/2002)
36 MOTION by Glenda Herring with memorandum in support for protective order prohibiting an independent mental examination or, in the alternative, (alternative) for mental examination to be subject to the limitations found in last paragraph of this motion , for attorney fees incurred in relation to this motion , for costs incurred in relation to this motion referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (bls) (Entered: 03/20/2002)
37 MOTION by Glenda Herring in opposition to [31-1] motion to compel mental examination of plaintiff (bls) (Entered: 03/20/2002)
38 MOTION by Glenda Herring to file under seal exhibits A, B, E and F to [37-1] motion in opposition to defense motion to compel mental examination pursuant referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (bls) Modified on 03/21/2002 (Entered: 03/20/2002)
39 RESPONSE by EEOC in opposition to [31-1] motion to compel mental examination of plaintiff (bls) (Entered: 03/22/2002)
40 RESPONSE by EEOC in opposition to [34-1] motion for enlargement of time for all parties to disclose expert witness reports from 3/18/02 to 4/22/02, [34-2] motion for enlargement of the 5/6/02 discovery deadline to 6/3/02 (bls) (Entered: 03/22/2002)
41 ORDER denying [31-1] motion to compel mental examination of plaintiff; denying as moot [36-1] motion for protective order prohibiting an independent mental examination, denying as moot [36-2] motion for mental examination to be subject to the limitations found in last paragraph of this motion; denying as moot [36-3] motion for attorney fees incurred in relation to this motion; denying as moot [36-4] motion for costs incurred in relation to this motion; granting [38-1] motion to file under seal exhibits A, B, E and F to [37-1] motion in opposition to defense motion to compel mental examination pursuant ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 03/26/2002)
42 MOTION by Glenda Herring with memorandum in support to compel production of documents , for attorney fees , for sanctions referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (jnb) (Entered: 04/12/2002)
43 RESPONSE by Norstan Apparel in opposition to [42-1] motion to compel production of documents, [42-2] motion for attorney fees, [42-3] motion for sanctions (bls) (Entered: 04/22/2002)
44 NOTICE by Glenda Herring of change of address for counsel (bls) (Entered: 04/23/2002)
45 MOTION by Norstan Apparel with memorandum in support for enlargement of discovery deadline to complete the deposition of Dr. Alan Waldman referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (bls) (Entered: 05/06/2002)
46 MOTION by EEOC with memorandum in support to compel financial worth discovery referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (bls) (Entered: 05/06/2002)

6 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...

05/06/2002
05/06/2002 05/08/2002 05/13/2002 05/17/2002 05/21/2002
05/29/2002 05/31/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002

47 ORDER granting [45-1] motion for enlargement of discovery deadline to complete the deposition of Dr. Alan Waldman. The parties shall take the deposition of Dr. Waldman on 6/13/02. ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 05/07/2002)
48 MOTION by Norstan Apparel with memorandum in support to compel supplemental responses to discovery , for sanctions referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (bls) (Entered: 05/07/2002)
49 ORDER denying [48-1] motion to compel supplemental responses to discovery, denying [48-2] motion for sanctions ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 05/09/2002)
50 NOTICE OF mediation with Mary Lau: set mediation conference for 5/13/02 (map) (Entered: 05/13/2002)
51 RESPONSE by Norstan Apparel in opposition to [46-1] motion to compel financial worth discovery (bls) (Entered: 05/20/2002)
52 RENEWED MOTION by Norstan Apparel with memorandum in support (renewed) to compel supplemental responses to discovery , (renewed) for sanctions referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (bls) (Entered: 05/22/2002)
53 MOTION by Norstan Apparel with memorandum in support for leave to file memorandum of law in support of motion for summary judgment in excess of 20 pages (rm) (Entered: 05/30/2002)
54 ORDER denying [53-1] motion for leave to file memorandum of law in support of motion for summary judgment in excess of 20 pages ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 06/03/2002)
55 MOTION by Norstan Apparel for summary judgment (bls) (Entered: 06/03/2002)
56 STATEMENT OF FACTS by Norstan Apparel in support of [55-1] motion for summary judgment (bls) (Entered: 06/03/2002)
57 MEMORANDUM by Norstan Apparel in support of [55-1] motion for summary judgment (bls) (Entered: 06/03/2002)
58 NOTICE of filing supplemental authority by Norstan Apparel re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment (bls) (Entered: 06/03/2002)
59 REQUEST for oral argument by Norstan Apparel re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment (bls) (Entered: 06/03/2002)
59 NOTICE of withdrawal of motion for enlargement of page limitation of memorandum of law in support of motion for summary judgment by Norstan Apparel (bls) (Entered: 06/03/2002)
60 NOTICE of filing depositions and affidavits in support of motion for summary judgment by Norstan Apparel (bls) (Entered: 06/03/2002)
61 DEPOSITION of Glenda Herring (volume 1) by Norstan Apparel re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment. Transcript filed separately. (bls) Modified on 06/03/2002 (Entered: 06/03/2002)

7 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...

06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002
06/04/2002 06/13/2002

62 DEPOSITION of Glenda Herring (volume 2) by Norstan Apparel re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment. Transcript filed separately. (bls) (Entered: 06/03/2002)
63 DEPOSITION of Stephanie Manley by Norstan Apparel re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment. Transcript filed separately. (bls) (Entered: 06/03/2002)
64 DEPOSITION of Janelle N. Scales by Norstan Apparel re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment. Transcript filed separately. (bls) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
65 DEPOSITION of Monica Carey-Barr by Norstan Apparel re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment. Transcript filed separately. (bls) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
66 DEPOSITION of Jean Aldridge by Norstan Apparel re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment. Transcript filed separately. (bls) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
67 DEPOSITION of Ricardo Moyers (volume 1) by Norstan Apparel re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment. Transcript filed separately. (bls) Modified on 06/04/2002 (Entered: 06/04/2002)
68 DEPOSITION of Ricardo Moyers (volume 2) by Norstan Apparel re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment. Transcript filed separately. (bls) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
69 DEPOSITION of Kim Brooks by Norstan Apparel re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment. Transcript filed separately. (bls) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
70 AFFIDAVIT of Antoinette Jackson by Norstan Apparel. Re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment (bls) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
71 AFFIDAVIT of authenticity of Romualdo Santos by Norstan Apparel. Re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment (bls) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
72 AFFIDAVIT of authenticity of Romualdo Santos by Norstan Apparel. Re: [55-1] motion for summary judgment. (bls) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
73 RESPONSE by Glenda Herring in opposition to [53-1] motion for leave to file memorandum of law in support of motion for summary judgment in excess of 20 pages (bls) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
74 RESPONSE by Glenda Herring to [52-1] renewed motion to compel supplemental responses to discovery, [52-2] renewed motion for sanctions (bls) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
75 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [42-1] motion to compel production of documents; granting in part, denying in part [42-2] motion for attorney fees, denying [42-3] motion for sanctions ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
76 ORDER denying [59-1] oral argument request ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 06/05/2002)
77 MOTION by Norstan Apparel with memorandum in support for enlargement of the discovery deadline for the limited purpose of deposing Dr. Alan Waldman referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (bls) (Entered: 06/14/2002)

8 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...

06/14/2002 06/14/2002 06/18/2002 06/18/2002 06/19/2002
06/24/2002 06/24/2002 06/24/2002 06/24/2002 06/24/2002 06/24/2002 06/24/2002 06/24/2002 06/24/2002 06/24/2002 06/24/2002

ENDORSED ORDER granting [77-1] motion for enlargement of the discovery deadline for the limited purpose of deposing Dr. Alan Waldman ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 06/17/2002)
78 AMENDED MOTION amending [77-1] motion (amended) for additional limited enlargement of discovery deadline to complete the deposition of Dr. Alan Waldman by Norstan Apparel (bls) (Entered: 06/17/2002)
79 MOTION by Glenda Herring for expansion of time to respond to motion for summary judgment until 8/1/02 (bls) (Entered: 06/19/2002)
ENDORSED ORDER granting [78-1] amended motion for additional limited enlargement of discovery deadline to complete the deposition of Dr. Alan Waldman ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 06/19/2002)
80 ORDER granting [79-1] motion for expansion of time to respond to motion for summary judgment until 8/1/02, response to motion set to 7/19/02 for [55-1] motion for summary judgment by intervenor-defendby defendant ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 06/20/2002)
81 RESPONSE by Norstan Apparel in opposition to [79-1] motion for expansion of time to respond to motion for summary judgment until 8/1/02 (bls) (Entered: 06/25/2002)
82 STATEMENT OF LAW IN RESPONSE by Glenda Herring to [55-1] motion for summary judgment (filed separately) (bls) Modified on 06/25/2002 (Entered: 06/25/2002)
83 STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Glenda Herring (bls) (Entered: 06/25/2002)
84 PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR'S STATEMENT OF FACTS by Glenda Herring (bls) (Entered: 06/25/2002)
85 PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS by Glenda Herring (bls) (Entered: 06/25/2002)
86 NOTICE of filing copies of affidavits in support of opposition to motion for summary judgment by Glenda Herring (bls) (Entered: 06/25/2002)
87 RESPONSE by EEOC in opposition to [55-1] motion for summary judgment (bls) (Entered: 06/25/2002)
88 STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE IN SUPPORT OF EEOC'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by EEOC (bls) (Entered: 06/25/2002)
89 NOTICE of filing deposition transcripts by EEOC (bls) (Entered: 06/25/2002)
90 DEPOSITION of Kim Brooks by EEOC re: [87-1] response in opposition to motion for summary judgment. Transcript filed separately. (bls) (Entered: 06/25/2002)
91 DEPOSITION of Gail Ann Smith by EEOC re: [87-1] response in opposition to motion for summary judgment. Transcript filed separately. (bls) (Entered: 06/25/2002)

9 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...

07/03/2002 07/03/2002
07/10/2002 07/15/2002 07/16/2002 07/17/2002
07/17/2002 07/19/2002 07/19/2002 07/19/2002 07/19/2002 07/19/2002 07/19/2002
07/22/2002

92 ORDER denying without prejudice [46-1] motion to compel financial worth discovery ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 07/05/2002)
93 ORDER TO SHOW why defendant's reasonable expenses incurred in making its motion to compel, including attorney's fees, should not be awarded. Response due on 7/26/02 for EEOC. granting [52-1] renewed motion to compel supplemental responses to discovery ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 07/05/2002)
94 NOTICE of name change by Norstan Apparel as to Jackson Lewis LLP (bls) (Entered: 07/11/2002)
95 MOTION by Norstan Apparel with memorandum in support to strike portions of [87-1] plaintiff's opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment (bls) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
96 ORDER denying [95-1] motion to strike portions of [87-1] plaintiff's opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 07/17/2002)
97 NOTICE of intent to file an amended motion in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Court order expanding the plaintiff/intervener's time to respond and withdrawal of the previously filed motion by Glenda Herring (bls) Modified on 07/19/2002 (Entered: 07/18/2002)
98 RESPONSE to show cause order filed by intervenor-plaintiff Glenda Herring (bls) (Entered: 07/18/2002)
99 RESPONSE (MOTION) by Glenda Herring in opposition to [55-1] motion for summary judgment (bls) (Entered: 07/19/2002)
100 STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS by Glenda Herring (bls) (Entered: 07/19/2002)
101 NOTICE of filing affidavits in support of opposition to motion for summary judgment by Glenda Herring (bls) (Entered: 07/19/2002)
102 STATEMENT OF LAW by Glenda Herring in response to [55-1] motion for summary judgment (filed separately) (bls) Modified on 07/22/2002 (Entered: 07/19/2002)
103 RESPONSE to show cause order filed by intervenor-plaintiff Glenda Herring (filed separately) (bls) Modified on 07/22/2002 (Entered: 07/22/2002)
103 CROSS MOTION by Glenda Herring for the Court to impose sanctions on the defense attorneys and Jackson & Lewis , for costs to be awarded to plaintiff/intervener , for attorney fees to be awarded to plaintiff/intervener referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (filed separately) (bls) Modified on 07/22/2002 (Entered: 07/22/2002)
104 OBJECTION by EEOC to [92-1] the Magistrate's order denying plaintiff EEOC's motion to compel financial worth discovery without prejudice (bls) (Entered: 07/23/2002)

10 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...

07/23/2002
07/29/2002 07/31/2002 07/31/2002 08/02/2002
08/05/2002 08/19/2002 08/21/2002 08/21/2002
08/23/2002
08/23/2002 08/26/2002

105 ORDER denying [103-1] cross motion for the Court to impose sanctions on the defense attorneys and Jackson & Lewis, denying [103-2] cross motion for costs to be awarded to plaintiff/intervener, denying [103-3] cross motion for attorney fees to be awarded to plaintiff/intervener ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 07/24/2002)
106 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [55-1] motion for summary judgment. See order for details. ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 07/30/2002)
107 RESPONSE by Norstan Apparel in opposition to [104-1] EEOC's objection to Magistrate's order denying EEOC's motion to compel financial worth discovery (bls) (Entered: 08/01/2002)
108 ORDER referring case to mediation. Appointing Mary A. Lau as mediator. The mediation shall be scheduled by the mediator and shall occur prior to the scheduled trial date of 9/30/02. ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 08/01/2002)
109 ORDER that plaintiff's objections to Magistrate Judge's [92-1] order are sustained. The Magistrate Judge's order is reversed, and the defendant shall respond to the EEOC request number 13 and interrogatory number 23 within 15 days of the date of entry of this order. The EEOC shall maintain the responses in strict confidence and shall not disclose the responses until further order of the Court. (Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara), ctc (ag) Modified on 08/06/2002 (Entered: 08/05/2002)
110 NOTICE of change of counsel by Norstan Apparel (wlb) (Entered: 08/06/2002)
111 MOTION by Glenda Herring with memorandum in support for leave to amend [20-1] amended intervenor complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages , for leave to amend [25-1] second amended intervenor complaint to add a claim for punitive damages (bls) (Entered: 08/20/2002)
112 JOINT PRETRIAL STIPULATION. (bls) (Entered: 08/22/2002)
113 ORDER denying [111-1] motion for leave to amend [20-1] amended intervenor complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages; denying [111-2] motion for leave to amend [25-1] second amended intervenor complaint to add a claim for punitive damages ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 08/22/2002)
114 ORDER: The parties are put on notice that this Court looks with disfavor on motions in limine and motions to strike, filed on the eve of trial, which are either disguised motions for summary judgment or motions seeking an evidentiary ruling best left to time of trial. See order for further details. ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 08/26/2002)
115 NOTICE to schedule mediation by Mary A. Lau. Mediation will be scheduled and noticed shortly after conclusion of the pretrial conference. (bls) (Entered: 08/26/2002)
116 MOTION by Norstan Apparel with memorandum in support in limine to exclude certain irrelevant, non-probative, prejudicial evidence regarding sexual harassment, Ricardo Moyers and Herring's sales or awards (rjc) (Entered:

11 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...

08/26/2002 08/26/2002
08/27/2002 08/27/2002 08/27/2002 08/27/2002 08/27/2002 08/27/2002 08/27/2002 08/27/2002 08/28/2002 08/28/2002

08/27/2002)
117 MOTION by Glenda Herring with memorandum in support to compel copies of documents pursuant to Court order to produce documents of defendant's financial worth to the EEOC referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (rjc) (Entered: 08/27/2002)
126 ORDER denying without prejudice [120-1] motion to strike certain witnesses listed by plaintiff; denying without prejudice [120-2] motion in limine to exclude plaintiffs' witnesses: Kristy Augustin, Gricela Rodriguez, Thomas Kelly Stevens and EEOC paralegal; denying without prejudice [119-1] motion to strike plaintiffs' claims for certain damages; denying without prejudice [119-2] motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding certain damages; denying without prejudice [116-1] motion in limine to exclude certain irrelevant, non-probative, prejudicial evidence regarding sexual harassment, Ricardo Moyers and Herring's sales or awards ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 08/29/2002)
118 STIPULATION of no objection to add the plaintiff intervenors claim for attorneys fees and cost back into the joint pretrial statement by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Norstan Apparel . (rjc) (Entered: 08/27/2002)
119 MOTION by Norstan Apparel with memorandum in support to strike plaintiffs' claims for certain damages or, alternatively in limine to exclude evidence regarding certain damages (rjc) (Entered: 08/27/2002)
120 MOTION by Norstan Apparel with memorandum in support to strike certain witnesses listed by plaintiff , or alternatively in limine to exclude plaintiffs' witnesses: Kristy Augustin, Gricela Rodriguez, Thomas Kelly Stevens and EEOC paralegal (rjc) (Entered: 08/27/2002)
121 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE held on 8/27/02 before Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins. (bls) (Entered: 08/28/2002)
ORAL MOTION in open court by Glenda Herring to bring a laptop computer into the courthouse referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (bls) (Entered: 08/28/2002)
122 ORDER granting [0-0] oral motion to bring a laptop computer into the courthouse ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 08/28/2002)
ORAL MOTION in open court by EEOC to bring a laptop computer into the courthouse referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (bls) (Entered: 08/28/2002)
123 ORDER granting [0-0] oral motion to bring a laptop computer into the courthouse ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 08/28/2002)
124 PRETRIAL ORDER filed. ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 08/29/2002)
125 ORDER denying [117-1] motion to compel copies of documents pursuant to Court order to produce documents of defendant's financial worth to the EEOC.

12 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...

08/28/2002 08/29/2002 08/29/2002 08/30/2002 09/13/2002 09/18/2002 09/19/2002 09/19/2002 09/19/2002 11/21/2002 11/25/2002 11/27/2002 12/02/2002
12/03/2002

However, the plaintiff is directed to share with the intervenor the financial worth documents is has received from the defendant. ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 08/29/2002)
127 RENEWED MOTION by Glenda Herring (renewed) for leave to amend [25-1] amended intervenor complaint (bls) (Entered: 08/29/2002)
128 ORDER granting [52-2] renewed motion for sanctions to the extent that said sanctions not exceed $1,000.00, to be paid within 30 days. ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 08/30/2002)
129 NOTICE OF SCHEDULING OF MEDIATION: set mediation conference for 2:30 p.m. on 9/12/02 (bls) (Entered: 08/30/2002)
ENDORSED ORDER denying [127-1] renewed motion for leave to amend [25-1] amended intervenor complaint ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 09/03/2002)
130 OCTOBER TRIAL CALENDAR for trial term commencing on 9/30/02 scheduled for Judge Richard A. Lazzara. This term will encompass the entire month. ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 09/16/2002)
131 TRIAL CALENDAR for trial term October 1, 2002 scheduled for Judge Anne E. Thompson. Jury trial deadline set for term commencing at 9:00 a.m. on 10/1/02 (case no. 11) (Signed by Deputy Clerk), ctc (ag) (Entered: 09/19/2002)
132 MEDIATION REPORT. Mediation conference held: 9/12/02. Mary A. Lau, mediator. Hearing outcome: The case has been concluded and will be dismissed. (bls) (Entered: 09/20/2002)
133 ORDER: The Court has been advised by the mediator that the action has settled. This cause is hereby dismissed without prejudice. ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 09/20/2002)
CASE CLOSED. (rjc) (Entered: 09/23/2002)
134 MOTION by Glenda Herring to seek enforcement of the settlement agreement (bls) (Entered: 11/22/2002)
135 ORDER denying [134-1] motion to seek enforcement of the settlement agreement ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 11/25/2002)
136 MOTION by EEOC with memorandum in support for relief from from the 09/19/02 court order . (jab) (Entered: 11/29/2002)
137 ORDER: response to motion set to 12/12/02 for [136-1] motion for relief from from the 09/19/02 court order by plaintiff , Evidentiary hearing set for 9:30 a.m. on 12/13/02 for [136-1] motion for relief from from the 09/19/02 court order Scheduled for Judge Richard A. Lazzara deferring [136-1] motion for relief from from the 09/19/02 court order ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 12/02/2002)
138 CONSENT DECREE by EEOC, Norstan Apparel, Glenda Herring (bls) (Entered: 12/04/2002)

13 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?866388316172954-L_3...

12/09/2002 12/10/2002
12/10/2002

139 JOINT STIPULATION (joint) for extension of court's sixty-day order dated 9/19/02, nunc pro tunc by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Norstan Apparel, intervenor-plaintiff Glenda Herring (bls) (Entered: 12/10/2002)
140 ORDER granting [139-1] joint stipulation for extension of court's sixty-day order dated 9/19/02, nunc pro tunc; denying as moot [136-1] motion for relief from from the 09/19/02 court order. The hearing on [136-1] motion for relief scheduled for 12/13/02 at 9:30 a.m. is cancelled. ( Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara ) ctc (bls) Modified on 12/11/2002 (Entered: 12/11/2002)
141 CONSENT DECREE by EEOC, Norstan Apparel, Glenda Herring signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara (bls) (Entered: 12/11/2002)

PACER Service Center

Transaction Receipt

07/25/2007 14:49:01

PACER Login:

hs0328

Client Code:

Description:

Docket Report

Search Criteria:

Billable Pages: 9

Cost:

eeoc 8:01-cv-00379-RAL 0.72

14 of 14

7/25/2007 1:49 PM

 
 THREE FLORIDA EMPLOYERS TO PAY TOTAL OF $570,000 FO...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/3-18-03.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 18, 2003

CONTACT: Federico Costales Miami District Director (305) 530-6060
Delner Franklin-Thomas Miami Regional Attorney (305) 530-6001
Michael J. Farrell Supervisory Trial Attorney (305) 530-6008 TTY: (305) 536-5721

Three Florida Employers to Pay Total of $570,000 for Unlawful Retaliation, in EEOC Settlements
Discrimination Cases Span State from Jacksonville to Tampa to Florida Keys
MIAMI - The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) today announced the settlement of three recent retaliation lawsuits against Florida employers filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, netting a combined total of $570,000 for charging parties as well as significant injunctive and remedial relief. The settlements occurred on March 3, 2003, against GeoLogistics Americas, Inc. of Jacksonville for $100,000, in January 2003 against the Marine Bank of the Florida Keys for $220,000, and in late December 2002 against Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. of Tampa for $250,000. All three suits were filed after the EEOC exhausted its conciliation efforts to reach voluntary pre-litigation settlements, after investigating each case and finding that discrimination took place.
"These cases all involved allegations of discriminatory discharge of employees for exercising federally protected rights," said Delner Franklin-Thomas, Regional Attorney for the EEOC's Miami District Office, which has jurisdiction over Florida. "Retaliating against employees for complaining about what they reasonably believed to be employment discrimination is completely contrary to federal law. The settlement of these lawsuits should remind employers that retaliation is unlawful and will not be tolerated by the EEOC."
The EEOC's suit against GeoLogistics Americas, Inc. (Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-216-J-32TEM) alleged that the Branch Manager in Jacksonville fired a female employee in retaliation for exercising her right to complain of what she reasonably believed to be gender discrimination. Specifically, she complained that GeoLogistics provided forklift training and certification to the male employees required to lift the same heavy freight from one area of the company's warehouse to another, but consistently denied her requests for such training and certification because of her sex.
An order adopting a Consent Decree, signed by United States District Court Judge Timothy J. Corrigan, finally brought the litigation to closure on March 3 and required GeoLogistics to pay $100,000 to the female employee. In addition to the payment of monetary relief, the Consent Decree required GeoLogistics to employ injunctive measures during the next three years, including:
The distribution and posting of an anti-discrimination policy to all employees;
Annual training of its managers on Title VII retaliation by experienced employment trainers; and
Semi-annual reporting to EEOC regarding its compliance process.
The Commission will monitor GeoLogistics' compliance with all provisions of the Consent Decree throughout its three year duration.
In January of this year, the EEOC's Miami office settled a similar lawsuit against Marine Bank of the Florida Keys (Case No. 01-10082-CIV-PAINE). In that case, the EEOC charged the company with allowing a vice president's sexually offensive conduct to go unchecked and subsequently terminating one of the female employees for complaining about the sexually offensive conduct. The Marine Bank litigation was resolved with the company agreeing to pay two claimants $220,000 as well as agreeing to implement extensive

1 of 2

7/25/2007 2:38 PM

THREE FLORIDA EMPLOYERS TO PAY TOTAL OF $570,000 FO...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/3-18-03.html

injunctive relief, including annual training at all of its facilities in the state of Florida for both management and supervisory employees, a laminated notice posting, and semi-annual monitoring reports.
Similarly, in late December 2002, the federal agency's Miami office successfully secured substantial injunctive relief, and $250,000 in monetary relief, including back pay and compensatory damages for a female manager who worked for Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc. in Tampa (Case No. 8:01-CV-379-T-26EAJ). EEOC's lawsuit contended that the store manager was fired for complaining to district managers about the sexual harassment that female employees under her supervision suffered at the hand of another male manager.
Federico Costales, Director of the EEOC's Miami District Office, said: "We are satisfied that the injunctive measures required by all three Consent Decrees will ensure that preventive measures are in place to protect the rights of other employees in the workplace." He added that he would like to see more employers set in place preventive measure that will advance the eradication of discrimination in the workplace, especially for retaliation which is on the rise nationally.
Costales noted that retaliation charge filings with the EEOC nationwide have sharply increased by 33% from 17,070 filings in Fiscal Year 1995 to 22,768 filings in FY 2002. In Florida, there were 1,725 retaliation filings in FY 2002, accounting for 29% of all discrimination charge filings in the state. Most charges filed with the EEOC in which merit is found are resolved through conciliation and voluntary pre-litigation settlements.
In addition to enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination based on national origin, sex (including pregnancy and sexual harassment), race, color, religion, and retaliation, the EEOC enforces the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; The Equal Pay Act of 1963; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; and sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Further information about the Commission is available on its web site at www.eeoc.gov.
This page was last modified on March 18, 2003.

Return to Home Page

2 of 2

7/25/2007 2:38 PM