Case 0:05-cv-60687-JAL Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/27/2005 Page 1 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - - . -. - r o : I lj SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORID A

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff
V.
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA Defendant .

Case No . :

COMPLAINT Plaintiff, the United States of America, files this complaint and alleges : 1 . This action is brought by the United States to enforce the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U .S .C . §§ 2000cc et sec . 2. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U .S .C. § 1345 . 3 . Venue is proper because the claims alleged herein arose in the Southern District of Florida . 28 U .S .C. § 1391 . 4. Defendant City of Hollywood-including but not limited to the City Commission, the Development Review Board (formerly known as the Board of Appeals & Adjustment), the Department of Building and Engineering Services, the Department of Economic Development Administration, the Department of Design and Construction Management, and the Office of the City Manager-has the authority to regulate and restrict the use of land and structures within its borders, including granting special exception permits . 5 . Under Florida law, Defendant City of Hollywood has the power to sue and be sued . Fla. Const . art . VIII, § 2(b) ; Fla . Stat. ch. 166 .021 (1994) . 6 . For purposes of RLUIPA, Defendant constitutes a "government ." 42 U.S .C. § 2000cc5(4)(A)(i), ( ii).

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7 . Hollywood Community Synagogue (HCS) was founded approximately 12 years ago . Its members are adherents of a branch of Hasidic Judaism known as the Chabad-Lubavitch movement . Before moving to its present location, HCS rented space in the Post Haste Plaza on Sheridan Street . It moved out of the Post Haste Plaza approximately four years ago .
8 . For purposes of RLUIPA, HCS constitutes a "religious assembly or institution ." 42 U.S .C . § 2000cc(2)(b)(1) .
9. HCS is currently located at 2215 and 2221 North 46th Avenue, one block south of Sheridan Street . Both of these properties are located in a single-family residential district .
10. HCS holds prayer services every morning and evening at 2215 North 46th Avenue . Each service requires the presence of a min yan , which is a quorum of ten males over the age of thirteen. Approximately twenty to thirty individuals attend the Friday and Saturday evening services . Approximately fifty to sixty individuals attend the Saturday morning service .
11 . For purposes of RLUIPA, HCS's use of the property located at 2215 and 2221 North 46th Avenue constitutes "religious exercise ." 42 U .S.C . §§ 2000cc-5(7)(A)-(B) .
12. In 2000, the City began granting HCS building permits that would allow it to make substantial changes to the property, such as expanding the existing great room, enclosing the existing patio, and filling in the existing swimming pool .
13. In or around February 2001, Defendant's Building Division issued a stop-work order to HCS and informed HCS that it would have to obtain a special exception (SPEX) if it wished to operate as a house of worship.
14. For purposes of RLUIPA, Defendant's processes and requirements regarding the grant or denial of a special exception constitute "land use regulation[s] ." 42 U.S .C. § 2000cc5(5) .
15 . On February 14, 2001, HCS applied for a special exception for the first time . The application requested that HCS be allowed to use 2215 and 2221 North 46th Avenue as a place of worship .
2

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16. Hollywood's Zoning and Land Development Regulations (ZLDR) state that the Development Review Board (formerly known as the Board of Appeals & Adjustment (BAA)) may grant a petition for a special exception if it makes the following four findings :
a. That the use is compatible with the existing natural environment and other properties within the vicinity ; b. That there will be adequate provision for safe traffic movement, both vehicular and pedestrian, both internal to the use and in the area which will serve the use ; c. That there are adequate setbacks, buffering, and general amenities in order to control any adverse effects of noise, light, dust and other potential nuisances ; and d . That the land area is sufficient, appropriate and adequate for the use as proposed . ZLDR § 5 .2G. 1 . The ZLDR also state that the DRB is authorized to impose conditions on a special exception . See id . at § 5 .2G.2. 17. On May 10, 2001, the BAA granted HCS a conditional special exception by a 3 to 1 vote . In granting the special exception, the BAA found that the application satisfied all four criteria for a special exception . 18 . On May 21, 2001, City Commissioner Sal Oliveri appealed the BAA decision . The City Commission heard the appeal on September 12, 2001 . 19 . After a meeting that lasted through the night, the City Commission granted the special exception to HCS on September 13, 2001 . It imposed several conditions on the special exception, however, including a one-year time limit, a maximum of six parking spaces on the property, and a statement that the special exception would be revoked if a Special Master found a violation of any provision of City Ordinance if the violation were not cured within 60 days . 20. Upon information and belief, Defendant had never previously imposed a time limit on a special exception for a religious use, and had only once imposed a time limit on a special exception for a nonreligious use . 21 . HCS applied for a second special exception on August 1, 2002 . The application requested that its special exception be "renewed ."
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22. The DRB approved the application in a 4-3 vote on September 12, 2002 . Among the conditions it imposed was that the special exception would expire in 180 days . The DRB later passed a resolution clarifying its intent that HCS would keep the special exception for as long as it adhered to the other conditions, which addressed parking or proper maintenance of the property .
23 . City Commissioner Oliveri again appealed the DRB's decision to the City Commission . The City Commission conducted a hearing on Commissioner Oliveri's request for review on October 16, 2002 . After a hearing, the City Commission denied the request for review .
24. HCS applied for a third special exception on February 10, 2003, asking that its special exception be renewed or made permanent .
25 . On March 13, 2003, the DRB heard HCS's request for a third special exception . The DRB voted 4-3 to grant the special exception and imposed several conditions relating to, inter alia, parking and construction . It also ordered HCS to return to the DRB in three years "to determine whether the Special Exception should be revoked . "
26 . On March 17, 2003, Commissioner Oliveri filed a request for review of the DRB decision. The City Commission granted the request for review by a 4-3 vote on April 9, 2003 .
27. On June 4, 2003, the City Commission heard HCS's third application for a specia l exception . After a lengthy public hearing, the Commission voted 5-2 to reverse the DRB's decision and deny HCS's petition for a third special exception .
28 . Upon information and belief, Defendant had never previously denied a request by a place of worship to operate in either a single-family or multiple-family residential zone until it denied HCS's special exception application .
29 . Defendant currently permits other religious and nonreligious assemblies and institutions to operate in residential districts in violation of the ZLDR and without being subjected to any enforcement action for such violation .
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30. On October 16, 2003, Defendant sent HCS a letter notifying the congregation that it "must desist holding services and other related activities " at its current location as of October 20, 2003 .
31 . The Department of Justice (DOJ) notified Defendant on October 20, 2003, that it was conducting an investigation pursuant to RLUIPA of Defendant's treatment of HCS .
32 . During a July 7, 2004 City Commission meeting, the Commission voted to direct the City Attorney to file a lawsuit to stop further organized religious services from taking place at the HCS property . The Commission took this action despite the fact that the item was not on the agenda and no notice had been given to HCS or the public that such a vote would take place .
33 . For purposes of RLUIPA, Defendant's filing of that lawsuit against HCS constitutes the "application" of a "land use regulation" that "limits or restricts a claimant's use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land) ." 42 U .S.C . § 2000cc-5(5) .
34. Defendant's treatment of HCS's special exception applications and Defendant's action to prevent organized religious services from taking place on the HCS property were based on HCS's religion or religious denomination .
35 . Defendant's treatment of RCS's special exception applications and Defendant's action to prevent organized religious services from taking place on the HCS property constitute the imposition or implementation of a land use regulation that treated, and continues to treat, HCS on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution, in violation of Section 2(b)(1) of RLUIPA, 42 U .S .C . § 2000cc(b)(1) .
36. Defendant's treatment of RCS's special exception applications and Defendant's action to prevent organized religious services from taking place on the HCS property constitute the imposition or implementation of a land use regulation that discriminated, and continues to discriminate, against HCS on the basis of religion or religious denomination, in violation of Section 2(b)(2) of RLUIPA, 42 U .S .C. § 2000cc(b)(2) .
5

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WHEREFORE, the United States prays that the court enter an ORDER that : 1 . Declares that Defendant's policies and practices, as alleged herein, violate RLUIPA ; and 2. Enjoins Defendant, its officers, employees, agents, successors and all other persons in concert or participation with it, from (a) treating HCS on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies, and (b) discriminating against HCS on the basis of religion or religiou s denomination . The United States further prays for such additional relief as the interests of justice may require .
ALBERTO R . GONZALES Atto rney General

MARCOS DANIEL JIMENEZ United StaX.es Attorney
LINDSE Y Assistant U .S. Attorney 500 E. Broward Blvd Ft . Lauderdale , Fl. 33394 Florida Bar No . Tel: (954) 356-7255 Fax : (954 ) 356-733 6 E-mail: Marilynn .Lindsey@usdoj .gov

R. ALEXANDER A Assist ant Attorney Gene Civil Rights Division
STEVEN H . ROSENBAUM Chief, Housing and Civil Enforcement Sectio n Civil Rights Division
HAEL S' MAURE , eputy Chief SEAN KEVENEY, Tri torney Housing and Civil Enforcement Section Civil Rights Division U.S . Department of Justic e 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N .W ., G Street Washington, D .C. 2053 0 Tel: (202) 514-4838 Fax : (202) 514-111 6 E-mail : Sean . R. Keveney@usdoj .gov
6

Case 0:05-cv-60687-JAL Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/27/2005 Page 7 of 7

JS 4 4 ( Rev . 12/96)

CIVIL COVER SHEE T

The JS-44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the Un ited States In September 1974, is required tar the I.rse of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of Initiating the civil docket sheet . (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM .)

1 . (a) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

United States of America City of Hollywood, Florida

5-le-6O6 8

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Br d_ COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED DEFENDANT

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(EXCEPT IN U .S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

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Il . BASIS OF JURISDICTION (PUCE AN IC IN ONE Bo

a, U .S. Government Plaintiff

D 3 Federal Questio n (U.S . Government Not a Party)

III . CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL

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u 140 Negotiable Instliument
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A REAL PRO PERTY
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8° 220 Foreclosure 3 230 Rant Lease a E(ectmun D 240 Tons to La n d ° 246 Tort Product Liability 0 210 All Other Real Property

(PLACE AN 'X" IN ONE BO X ONL)Y

A TORTS

FORFEITURE /PENALTY A BANKRUPTCY

A OTHER STATUTES

PERSONAL INJURY

PEA5ONALRYURY aD 010 Agriculture

u 422 Appear 26 USC 158 0 400 Seta Reapportionment

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u 762 PersoneI klplry - OD 020 Other Food & Drug

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This action is brought pursuant to 42 USC 2000cc at seq . to remed y

LENGTH OF TRIAL religious discrimination perpetrated by the City of Hollywood .
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VIII . RELATED CASE( S) (See instructions) : IF A NY
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MAO . JUDGE

 
 Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 272 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2006 Page 1 of 63

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 04-61212-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN [CONSOLIDATED WITH CASE NO. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN]

HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC.

Plaintiff. vs.
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA and SAL OLIVERI, individually,
Defendants.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -I

~
FILED by~~.._Jo.c.
\
MAY 1 0 2000
C~ARENC[ MADDOX C LfRK U.S. DIST. CT. !l. 0. or r~A. · MIAMI

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
vs. CITY OF HOLLYWOOD,
Defendant.
_________________________!
OMNIBUS ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT CITY OF HOLLYWOOD'S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (D.E. 140) AND DENYING DEFENDANT CITY OF
HOLLYWOOD'S MOTION TO DISMISS (D.E. 225)
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Second Amended Complaint ("Motion to Dismiss Second Amended

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 272 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2006 Page 2 of 63
Complaint,'' D.E. 140), filed January 5, 2006, and Motion to Dismiss ("Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff United States' Complaint," D.E. 225), filed May 28, 2005. On January 20, 2006, Plaintiff Hollywood Community Synagogue filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint. (''Hollywood Synagogue's Response,'' D.E. 144.) On January 30, 2006, Defendant City of Hollywood filed a Reply. ("Reply to Hollywood Synagogue's Response,'' D.E. 145.) On June 3, 2005, Plaintiff United States filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss its Complaint. (''United States' Response," D.E. 226.) On June 15, 2005, Defendant City of Hollywood filed a Reply. ("Reply to United States' Response," D.E. 227.)
I. Factual and Procedural Background On September 15, 2004, Plaintiff Hollywood Community Synagogue (hereinafter ''HCS") filed a Complaint against Defendants City of Hollywood and Sal Oliveri (Case No. 04-61212-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 14), alleging violations of numerous rights and statutes, including the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (hereinafter ''RLUIPA."). On April 26, 2005, Plaintiff United States of America filed a Complaint against Defendant City of Hollywood (Case No. 05-60687-CIVLENARD, D.E. 1), requesting declaratory and injunctive relief based upon Defendant's alleged violation ofRLUIPA. On June 16,2005, the Court issued an Order consolidating these cases and administratively closing the higher numbered case (Case No. 04-61212-CIVLENARD, D.E. 75; Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 14), finding they involved
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common questions of law and fact, including substantially the same factual scenario, same defendants, and same attorneys.
On December 2, 2005, Plaintiff HCS was granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (D.E. 124.) This Second Amended Complaint (D.E. 125) contains 19 counts and is the operative Complaint for purposes of City of Hollywood's Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint. The legal claims and facts which follow are taken from the Second Amended Complaint in the consolidated case, unless otherwise specified. PlaintiffHCS is a Synagogue, with its principal place of business at 2215-2221 N. 46th Avenue, Hollywood, Florida 33021. (D.E. 125 at~ 6.) Defendant City of Hollywood is a city municipality empowered by the State of Florida to regulate the use ofland and structures within the City's borders, consistent with law. (ld. at ~7.) Defendant Sal Oliveri is a City Commissioner for the City of Hollywood, representing the area of Hollywood Hills. (lll at~ 8.)
In 1999, Yosef Elul, then-President of the Synagogue, purchased two residences, located at 2215 and 2221 N. 46th Avenue, Hollywood. (ld. at ~15.) In the neighborhood of single family residences in which the land was purchased, a place of worship could only operate if granted a Special Exception. (ld. at~ 19.) After the purchase of the land by Yosef Elul, the Director of Planning for the City of Hollywood advised the Synagogue that it needed to apply for a House of Worship Special Exception but assured Synagogue representatives that such Special Exception would be granted. (ld. at~~ 19-20.)
In May of 2001, Alan Razla, on behalf of Mr. Elul, applied for a House of Worship
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! I
Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 272 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2006 Page 4 of 63
Special Exception. (Id. at~ 21.) The Board ofAppeal and Adjustments (hereinafter "BAA'') granted a six month Special Exception. (Id.) Four months later, in September of 2001, Commissioner Oliveri filed an appeal to the City Commission of the BAA's grant of the Special Exception. 1 (ld. at 22.) The Commission heard the appeal and subsequently granted the Synagogue a one year Special Exception, which included certain conditions as to limited parking and persons. (I d.) Plaintiff United States notes that, upon information and belief, Defendant had never previously imposed a time limit on a special exception for a religious use, and had only once imposed a time limit on a special exception for a nonreligious use. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1 at~ 20.)
In late 2001 and 2002, according to Plaintiff HCS's Second Amended Complaint, Defendant Oliveri began regularly contacting the City's code enforcement and/or police departments, in order to enlist their services to issue citations and harass the Synagogue and its members. (D.E. 125 at~ 24.) Oliveri allegedly told code enforcement and police officers that "careful and vigilant monitoring" ofthe Synagogue's properties was required, instructed them to check the Synagogue's property daily for code violations, and told them to only give tickets to cars parked on the Synagogue's property. (Id. at~~ 25-27.) The Synagogue's Administrator, George Albo, witnessed the Code Enforcement and/or Hollywood Police Officers ticketing only those cars parked on the Synagogue's side of the street. (ld. at~ 75.). When Albo inquired as to why only the cars belonging to the Synagogue were being ticketed,
1 Plaintiff I-ICS does not seek liability in this action against Oliveri for his appeal to the Commission from the decision of the BAA. (!£l at~ 22.)
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the officer stated that he was following directions which came from Oliveri. (Id.) Also, a Code Enforcement Officer told Albo that the department was under orders from Commissioner Sal Oliveri and the Mayor to keep an eye on the Chabad [the Synagogue] and to enforce the code. (Id. at~ 76.) The Code Enforcement Officer further stated that she "paid special attention" to the Synagogue. (ld.) In addition, City Commissioner Cathy Anderson allegedly became aware of Defendant Oliveri's use of city personnel to constantly check on the Synagogue and publicly scolded Commissioner Oliveri, stating, "what we have here is
selective enforcement and I'm very troubled by it." iliL. at~ 77.)
In September of2002, the Development Review Board (hereinafter "ORB," formerly known as the BAA) granted Arthur Eckstein, on behalf of the Synagogue, a six month Temporary Special Exception subject to certain enumerated conditions. (Id. at~ 30.) At the September 2002 hearing, the ORB found that, subject to the enumerated conditions, the use ofthe property as a House of Worship was compatible with the existing natural environment and other properties within the vicinity? (Id. at~ 3l(A).) After the ORB hearing, Defendant Sal Oliveri filed an appeal to the Commission.3 (ld. at ~ 32.) In October 2002, the Commission denied Oliveri's appeal and allowed HCS the six month Temporary Special Exception. (ld. at~ 33.)
1
- The ORB found that usc of the property as a House of Worship was compatible with the existing natural environment and other properties within the vicinity once the Applicant: (I) prohibited parking of any type in the alley located behind the Synagogue; (2) entered a lease agreement for off-site parking, (3) obtained garbage dumpsters in a size and style acceptable to City staff. (4) entered into a property maintenance agreement with a property maintenance provider who would maintain the premises in accordance with the city code, and (5) created an appropriate buffer along the rear side of the property. (D.E. 125 at '1)30.)
3 Plaintiff HCS docs not seck liability in this action against Oliveri for his appeal. (J_fl at '1)30.)
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In March of 2003, the DRB granted the Synagogue a Permanent Special Exception subject to certain enumerated conditions being met within 180 days. (Id. at~ 33.) Defendant Sal Oliveri filed another appeal.4 (Id. at~ 38.) Only 53 days after the Permanent Special Exception was granted, and after considerable debate, on June 5, 2003, the Commission reversed the earlier decision made by the DRB. (Id. at~ 39.) The Commission determined that the Synagogue was ''too controversial,'' despite the fact that "controversiality" was not an enumerated factor in the City Code to be evaluated when considering a Special Exception. (Id. at~ 41, 44.) Plaintiff states that contrary to Commission procedure, Defendant Sal Oliveri was permitted to vote on his own appeal and cast the deciding vote (4-3)5 against the Synagogue.6 (Id. at ~ 40.) Defendant Oliveri stated, "it's almost common sense and reasonable that the Chabad [the Synagogue] will never fit in Hollywood Hills." (Id. at~ 41.) Plaintiff United States notes that, upon information and belief, Defendant had never previously denied a request by a place of worship to operate in ether a single-family or multiple-family residential zone. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1 at~ 28.)
On October 16, 2003, Defendant sent HCS a letter notifYing the congregation that it was to cease holding services and other related activities at its current location within one week. (Id. at~ 30.) Thereafter, Defendant Oliveri openly campaigned against the Synagogue
4 Plaintiff HCS does not seek liability in this action against Oliveri for his appeal. (!sLat 'II 38.)
5 Plaintiff United States' Complaint contains a discrepancy in that it alleges that the Commission voted 5-2 to reverse the DRB's decision and deny IICS's petition for a third Special Exception. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD. D.E. I at '1]27.)
6 Plaintiff HCS does not seek liability in this action against Oliveri for his vote in the Commission meeting.~ at 'II
40.)
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in his 2004 campaign for City Commissioner of Hollywood Hills. (D.E. 125 at~ 45.) Oliveri claimed the Synagogue negatively impacted the residential neighborhood, but did not substantiate his statements with any facts. (ld.) At a July 2004 Commission meeting, Oliveri asked the Commission ''to evict" the Synagogue and allegedly stated in support thereof, "I would just like to ask the Commission and I beg for their support for the sake of the neighborhoods here... We're talking about neighborhoods here. We're talking about neighborhoods having a smell.''7 (ld. at~ 47.) During a July 7, 2004 City Commission meeting, the Commission voted to direct the City Attorney to file a lawsuit to stop further organized religious services from taking place at HCS, despite the fact that this item was not on the agenda and no notice had been provided to HCS or the public that such a vote would take place. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1 at~ 32.) On or about July 16,2004, the City filed suit against the Synagogue, in Broward County Circuit Court, Case No. 0411444 (21 ), seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Synagogue for operating as a House of Worship without a Special Exemption. (D.E. 125 at~ 57.)
Plaintiff HCS asserts that there are presently at least nineteen houses of worship located in Hollywood Hills residential neighborhoods: Hollywood Hills Alliance Church, Temple Sinai of Hollywood, First United Church of Christ, Hollywood Hills Church of Christ, St. George Greek Orthodox Church, Church ofJesus Christ ofHollywood Hills, Saint
7 Defendant Oliveri subsequently stated that his comment was an effort to compare his efforts to protect his single family neighborhood with the City of Hollywood's efforts to protect the Hollywood Lakes section from a smelly waste treatment facility. (Am. Compl.; Ex. II.)
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Andrews Presbyterian Church & Korean Mission, Temple Solei, Church of the Latter Day Saints, Hollywood Hills Methodist Church, Harvest-Time Apostolic Church, Apostolic Christian Church Nazarean, Young Israel, Westside Pentecostal Church, St. Mark's Lutheran Church, Advent Christian Cathedral, Faith Deliverance Cathedral, Hollywood Florida Congregation of Jehovah's Witness East Unit, and United Church of God. (Id. at~ 48.) Plaintiff HCS notes that both of the Jewish houses of worship listed above have been in existence for approximately 20 years and were granted Special Exceptions by previous members of the Hollywood Commission, none of whom are still members of the current Commission. (ld. at n.3.) One non-Jewish house of worship is located only 0.5 miles from the Synagogue. (Id.) In addition, some ofthe above-listed houses ofworship are also, similar to HCS, operated out of single family homes. (Id.)
Plaintiff HCS also points out that a resident, Rosa Lopez, located blocks away from the Synagogue, has for more than a decade operated a shrine to the Virgin Mary. (Id. at~ 51.) She takes donations from visitors, operates a commercial gift shop, and hosts as many as 4,000 people at one time. (Id.) The City of Hollywood has received numerous complaints regarding the traffic, noise and garbage associated with the residence and activities of Ms. Lopez, but the City has not interfered with the operation of this shrine. (ld. at~~ 52-53.) Ms. Lopez has not requested a Special Exception. (ld. at~ 53.) When Defendant Sal Oliveri was asked by the Synagogue why Ms. Lopez was not required to obtain a Special Exception, he allegedly replied, ''it's a miracle to true believers and the venue cannot be changed since the
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Virgin Mary visits that particular home... If you people know anything about the Catholic religion, that's called a vision. To Christians and Catholics, that is considered a miracle. That's not establishing a house of worship. That is a miracle.'' (ld. at~ 54.)
Plaintiff HCS further asserts that one non-Jewish house of worship operated for approximately thirteen years without having applied for, or being approved for, a Special Exception. (ld. at ~ 49.) It was not until after the Synagogue inquired about unequal treatment that this house of worship applied for and was immediately granted a Special Exception. (ld.)
PlaintiffHCS alleges that Defendants have made no showing that perceived issues of ''noise," "garbage," or "traffic" were any greater for the Synagogue than that posed by other houses ofworship operating in the City. (ld. at~ 55.) HCS contends that the actions of the City, in utilizing the Commission to reverse the ORB's grant of a permanent Special Exception, were arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. Qd. at~ 56.)
PlaintiffHCS alleges the following 18 Counts against the City in its Second Amended Complaint: 1) damages for violation of the Synagogue's right to free exercise of religion; 2) injunctive relief for violation of the Synagogue's right to free exercise of religion; 3) damages for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(l) - substantial burden); 4) injunctive relief for violation ofRLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(l)- substantial burden); 5) damages for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(l) - unequal terms); 6) injunctive relief for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(l)- unequal terms); 7)
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II
I'

damages for violation ofRLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2)- discrimination); 8) injunctive relief for violation ofRLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2)- discrimination); 9) damages for violation of the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998 (Florida RFRA); 10) injunctive relief for violation of the Florida RFRA; 11) damages for violation of the Equal Protection Clause; 12) injunctive relief for violation of the Equal Protection Clause; 13) damages for violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 14) injunctive relief for violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 15) promissory estoppel; 16) facial equal protection challenge to Article V of the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances; 17) as applied equal protection challenge to Article V of the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances; and 18) preliminary injunctive relief. (D.E. 125 at~~ 60-151.) Plaintiff United States' Complaint contains substantially similar facts to PlaintiffHCS' s Second Amended Complaint and requests that the Court grant injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendant for violations ofRLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(I )-(2), based on treatment of HCS on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies and discrimination against HCS on the basis of religion or religious denomination. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1 at 6.)
II. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss United States' Complaint In its Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 225), Defendant City of Hollywood moves the Court for entry ofan Order dismissing Plaintiff United States' Complaint for failure to state a cause ofaction pursuant to Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Id. at 1.) Therein, Defendant

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argues that Plaintiff United States asserts numerous legal conclusions unsupported by fact. (ld.) First, Defendant maintains that Plaintiffs Complaint alleges religious discrimination but never connects HCS 's religion with any actions taken by or on behalf of the City. (I d. at 2.) Second, Defendant contends that while Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that HCS was treated on unequal terms with non-religious assemblies, there are no allegations that other religious or non-religious assemblies were treated on terms more favorable than HCS. (ld.) Moreover, Defendant claims that Plaintiff has failed to name any specific religious or nonreligious institution other than HCS, and has further failed to allege that the other institutions were similarly situated. (Id.) Third, Defendant argues that, Plaintiff has failed to allege that HCS was subject to a substantial burden on its religious exercise. (ld. at 4.) Defendant maintains that the absence of allegations regarding any substantial burden, any similarly situated institutions, or any discriminatory enforcement of the City's zoning code is fatal to a claim for relief under RLUIPA. (ld. at 5.)
In its Response (D.E. 226), Plaintiff United States first argues that the jurisdictional test of RLUIPA Section (a)(2) does not apply to Section (b) claims. (ld. at 2.) The Government maintains that it is thus not required, as a matter oflaw, to allege that Defendant imposed a substantial burden on HCS 's religious exercise, and that the Eleventh Circuit supports this interpretation. (Id. at 2-3.) To hold otherwise, contends Plaintiff, would be inconsistent with Congress's intention that RLUIPA provide broad protection of religious exercise and judicial interpretations holding that RLUIPA codifies free-exercise
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jurisprudence prohibiting intentional religious discrimination. (ld. at 4.) Moreover, the Government argues that numerous factors support an interpretation that Sections (a) and (b) are independent of one another. (Id. at 4-5.)
Second, Plaintiff United States contests Defendant's assertion that the Government failed to allege that any other similarly situated assembly or institution was treated more favorably than HCS. (Id. at 5-6.) Instead, the Government argues that it put the City of Hollywood on notice of the range of uses to be considered "similarly situated" for RLUIPA purposes when it defined HCS as an assembly or institution located in a residential district that regularly hosted more than 10 individuals for religious services. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff also notes that it specifically contrasted Defendant's treatment ofHCS with its treatment ofother religious and nonreligious assemblies permitted to operate in residential districts without being subject to any City enforcement actions. (ld.) The United States maintains that this is sufficient to state a claim under RLUIPA for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes. (ld. at 6-7.)
Third, the United States asserts that it sufficiently alleged facts establishing that Defendant discriminated against HCS on the basis of religion. (ld. at 7.) The Government maintains that it identified HCS as a religious institution, described how the City of Hollywood denied it a Special Exception and sought to prevent religious worship there, and demonstrated that the City's actions constituted religious discrimination. (ld. at 7-8.) Moreover, the United States points out that its Complaint identifies the City's implementation of a time limit on HCS's Special Exception and the City's ultimate denial
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II

of a permanent Special Exception as the first such measures ever imposed on a religious institution by the City. (ld. at 8.) Finally, the Government maintains that it specifically alleged that Defendant's actions against HCS were motivated by HCS's religion or religious denomination. (Id. at 9.)
In its Reply, (D.E. 227), Defendant City ofHollywood maintains that Plaintiff United States' cursory allegations, even if true, do not support Plaintiffs cause of action. (ld. at 2.) Defendant reiterates that Plaintiffs failure to name specific non-religious assemblies treated on better than equal terms than HCS proves fatal to Plaintiffs claim. (Id.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to detail any enforcement actions taken against HCS which could be said to be based upon HCS 's religion or religious denomination. (Id.) Finally, Defendant argues that the Court should not follow the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of RLUIPA Section (b) as independent from the jurisdictional requirements of Section (a), but should instead hold that Sections (b)( 1) and (b)(2) are subsets to the general rule and thus require the showing of a substantial burden upon religious exercise. (Id. at 3.)
III. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint In its Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (D.E. 140), Defendant City of Hollywood argues, first, that Plaintiff Hollywood Community Synagogue lacks standing to assert a claim for compensatory damages pursuant to § 1983. (Id. at 6.) Defendant maintains that Plainti fflacks associational standing to bring a claim on behalfofits members because an action for damages requires the participation ofthe association's members. (ld.

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at 6-7.) Thus, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not established a case or controversy sufficient to invoke the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. (I d. at 7.)
Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause ofaction against the City pursuant to § 1983 because municipal liability requires a showing of a policymaker, an official policy or custom, and a violation ofconstitutional rights whose moving force is such policy or custom. (ld. at 8.) Moreover, Plaintiff must show that the municipality had actual or constructive knowledge of the custom or practice. (ld.) Since Plaintiff has failed to identify any policy, custom or practice deliberately chosen by Defendant which was the moving force behind constitutional violations, the City argues that Plaintiffs municipal
liability claims under § 1983 must be dismissed. iliL 10.)
Third, Defendant contends that Plaintiffhas failed to identify any "substantial burden" on religious exercise imposed by the City, and thus HCS's claims pursuant to RLUIPA and Florida RFRA should be dismissed. (ld.) While HCS has alleged that the City's conduct imposes a substantial burden, the City maintains that this unspecific assertion is not supported by facts demonstrating that Plaintiff is prevented from conducting religious activities. (Id. at 11.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffhas not shown that this is the only piece of property within the City of Hollywood where HCS can hold services, as there is nothing unique about this property, and thus Plaintiffs claim is insufficient. (ld.)
Fourth, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs equal protection claims pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment should be dismissed because HCS has not alleged that any other
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li
I

religious organization or private business was similarly situated but treated differently. (I d. at 12.) Plaintiff does not state that any other organization was granted a permanent Special Exception under similar circumstances and thus, maintains Defendant, these claims should be dismissed. (ld.)
Fifth, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs Substantive Due Process claims should be stricken as redundant of its equal protection and promissory estoppel claims. (Id.)
Sixth, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff does not specifically identify what expenditures it made in reliance on the representations of the ORB. (Id. at 13.) Since Plaintiff must identify substantial expenses incurred to support a cause of action for detrimental reliance, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state such a claim. (ld.) Moreover, the City maintains that HCS has not
identified with any specificity which requirements it had to meet. iliU
Seventh, Defendant avers that Plaintiffs claim that the Commission is granted unbridled discretion in its zoning decisions must fail. (ld.) The City disputes that the Commission's discretion is unreviewable, as a process exists to appeal a Commission decision to the circuit court. (Id. at 13-14.) Moreover, Defendant notes that Plaintiff has participated in such a process regarding the property in question. (Id. at 14.) Thus, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Article V is void for vagueness. (Id.)
Finally, Defendant urges the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs claim for an injunction because such claim is unsupported by legal authority and contrary to the Federal Anti-

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Injunction Statute. (ld. at 14.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff has not stated grounds that would entitle it to an injunction against the City. (ld. at 15.) Finally, Defendant argues
that the proper procedure for requesting a preliminary injunction is via motion. (l.g.J
In its Response (D.E. 144), Plaintiff HCS first argues that, rather than seeking associational standing, Plaintiff seeks to bring its claims for damages on its own behalf, for
direct injuries suffered by the Synagogue. (llL at 3-4.) Plaintiff maintains that the City's
interference with its purpose of providing teaching and worship by arbitrary and capricious zoning enforcement, burdensome land use regulations, and purposeful harassment constitutes a direct injury in fact to HCS supporting a case or controversy. (ld. at 4.) HCS further alleges that the City's attempt to enjoin the Synagogue from providing a house of worship would prevent it from fulfilling its purpose, maintaining its congregation, and attracting new members or raising money. (ld. at 6.) Thus, Plaintiff maintains it has standing to assert claims for damages on its own behalf. (ld.)
Second, Plaintiff assets that it has identified three policies, any one of which would be sufficient to support a § 1983 claim for municipal liability. (Id.) The first policy alleged is the City's practice of routinely granting (or declining to require) Special Exceptions for houses of worship in the Hollywood Hills residential area. (Id. at 6-7 .) The second policy arises from the single act of the Commission reversing the ORB's grant of a permanent Special Exception. (ld. at 7.) HCS maintains that the Commission was a final policymaker for purposes of the Supreme Court's test for when a single decision constitutes an
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I

I

unconstitutional policy, because no other employee of the City could rev1ew the Commission's decision. (ld. at 7-8.) The third policy alleged is the City's knowledge of the harassment of, and selective enforcement against, the Synagogue by code enforcement and police departments, and its failure to take action to prevent such conduct. (ld. at 8.) This allegation is supported by facts in the Second Amended Complaint that the Hollywood Hills City Commissioner scolded Defendant Oliveri for his ''abuse of the police force" and noted that she was troubled by selective enforcement against the Synagogue. (ld. at 9.) Thus, argues Plaintiff, HCS has alleged three unconstitutional policies perpetuated by the City, any one ofwhich is sufficient to support HCS's § 1983 claim.
Third, Plaintiff argues that it has demonstrated that the City's actions constitute a substantial burden for purposes of its RLUIPA and Florida RFRA claims in that the reversal of the DRB 's grant of a permanent Special Exception threatens to prevent the Synagogue from providing prayer services for its members, as required by the Jewish faith. (Id. at 9-1 0.) Further, Plaintiff maintains that the burden is on Defendant to demonstrate that its land use regulation was the least restrictive means to further a compelling government interest or that its actions constituted a ''mere inconvenience" to the Synagogue. (ld.) Moreover, HCS argues that it has a legal right to operate a house of worship where it is because the City's Code provides for Special Exceptions for houses of worship within residential areas of the City, and that the City does not have the right to force the Synagogue to move to another location. (Id. at 10-11.) Finally, the Synagogue adopts the arguments of Plaintiff United

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I I

States (see supra, pp. ll-13) with regard to the City's arguments as to HCS's Section (b)(l) and (b)(2) claims.
Fourth, Plaintiff HCS argues that it has stated a claim for relief under the Equal Protection Clause because it has demonstrated that the Synagogue was not treated the same as similarly situated landowners. (Id. at 12.) HCS notes that it has alleged that the Commission has granted numerous permanent Special Exceptions to similarly situated houses of worship in the Hollywood Hills residential area, that one house of worship operated for 13 years without a Special Exception, only to immediately receive one after inquiry by the Synagogue, and that Rosa Lopez has operated a house of worship without being required to obtain a Special Exception. (Id.) Furthermore, HCS maintains that the City, through its Commission, intentionally discriminated against the Synagogue to prevent the Synagogue from exercising its First Amendment rights. (Id.) In support, HCS points to certain comments made by Defendant Oliveri suggesting differential treatment based upon religious beliefs. (Id. at 12-13.)
Fifth, Plaintiff HCS maintains that its Substantive Due Process claims are not redundant and do not request the same relief as its Equal Protection claims. (ld. at 13.) The Synagogue argues that its Substantive Due Process claim stems from the City's revocation of its constitutionally-protected property interest in its permanent Special Exception. (Id.) HCS claims that this revocation was arbitrary and capricious, thereby rising to the level of an unconstitutional denial ofproperty rights. (Id.) Furthermore, HCS argues that it has plead

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the elements of property interest by way of equitable estoppel because the Synagogue relied in good faith and to its detriment on the requirements set out by the ORB. (Id. at 13-14.)
Sixth, Plaintiff HCS argues that it has stated a claim for promissory estoppel based upon its detrimental reliance on representations of the DRB that the Synagogue would be granted both temporary and permanent Special Exceptions if it met certain conditions. (Id.) HCS maintains that it alleged expenditures of both time and money stemming from this reliance in its Second Amended Complaint. (Id. at 14-15.) However, HCS contends that it was denied the full allotment of time to meet these conditions, indicating that the City's decision was based on factors other than the conditions set forth in its Code. (ld. at 15.) Further, HCS argues that the question of whether the Synagogue's expenditures were substantial in nature is a factual question, not appropriately considered in a Motion to Dismiss. (ld. at 16.)
Seventh, Plaintiff HCS argues that Section 5.3 of the City's Code, dealing with Special Exceptions, is void for vagueness because it lacks any objective guidelines or determinable criteria, and thus led to arbitrary and capricious zoning decisions. (ld. at 17.) Moreover, the Code's permissive "may" language, asserts HCS, provides the Commission unbridled discretion to reverse the grant of, or deny a Special Exception, even if the petitioner manages to satisfY the vague criteria. (Id.) HCS maintains that the Commission's finding that the Synagogue was too "controversial" in substantiating its revocation of the Special Exception illustrates this broad discretion to rely on any number of outside factors.
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(Id. at 17-18.) Further, HCS clarifies that Count XVII refers to a lack of meaningful administrative review of the Commission's decision, not ORB decisions. (ld. at 18.)
Finally, HCS argues that it has stated a claim for injunctive relief under the exception to the Anti-Injunction statute for § 1983 actions. (ld.) HCS maintains that the only way the Court can determine if the City violated the Synagogue's rights would be to stay the state court proceeding. (ld.) HCS concedes that a separate motion for temporary relief is likely required, but notes that as the City has not actively pursued declaratory or injunctive relief in the parallel state action, the Synagogue has not been required to pursue this claim seeking an injunction from this Court as to the state action. (ld. at 19.)
In its Reply (D.E. 145), Defendant concedes that for purposes of standing, an organization can sue in its own right. (ld. at 1.) However, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient injury in fact to meet the Article III requirements for standing. (ld. at 2.) Defendant argues that PlaintiffHCS has not alleged it has suffered any injury, let alone a concrete and particularized injury, and that HCS's statements in its Response regarding adverse impact on the Synagogue's ability to raise money should be disregarded because it does not appear in the Second Amended Complaint. (ld.) Moreover, Defendant contends that such injury is not sufficiently specific or concrete to allege an "injury in fact." (ld. at 2-3.) Additionally, Defendant avers that even ifthe Court was to find an injury in fact, Plaintiff has failed to establish that this injury is directly traceable to the City or redressable by a favorable decision. (Id. at 3.)

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Defendant also argues that Plaintiff HCS has failed to meet the prudential requirements necessary for an organization suing on its own behalf to establish standing. (Id. at 4.) Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs members could assert their own rights by directly suing for any wrong they've suffered. (Id.)
As to Plaintiffs § 1983 claims for municipal liability based upon a City custom or policy, Defendant responds that HCS fails to allege that the City's purported policy of routinely granting Special Exceptions proximately caused a constitutional violation or meant that Special Exceptions were granted to all houses of worship that applied. (ld. at 5.) Defendant next asserts that the single incident of the Commission to deny Plaintiffs final application for a Special Exception cannot constitute an "official municipal policy;" the Synagogue must show that this incident was pursuant to a separate "official municipal policy." (Id. at 5-6.) Finally, Defendant maintains that failing to prevent monitoring by police officers and code officers could not engender§ 1983 municipal liability because such actions do not constitute "known constitutional violations." (ld. at 6.)
For purposes ofPlaintiffs RLUIPA claims, Defendant maintains that Plaintiffhas still failed to identity any "substantial burden." (Id.) While noting that the Eleventh Circuit has not directly addressed whether the jurisdictional requirement of a "substantial burden" from RLUIPA § (a) applies to § (b), Defendant cites cases from other Districts supporting its argument that such a showing is required under both sections. (ld. at 7-8.) As to HCS's Florida RFRA claims, Defendant argues that neither the City nor the Commission ever
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prevented the Synagogue from providing prayer services for its members, nor did Plaintiff ever allege such prevention in its Second Amended Complaint. (ld. at 8.)
As to PlaintiffHCS's Equal Protection claims, Defendant reiterates that Plaintiffhas not met the requirement of alleging that other similarly situated houses of worship received disparate treatment. (Id. at 9.) Defendant notes that the words "similarly situated'' do not appear in either Equal Protection count and Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that the Synagogue was similarly situated to other houses of worship. Q.!L)
Defendant also argues that PlaintiffHCS likewise failed to allege that it was similarly situated for purposes of its Substantive Due Process claims. (ld.) Moreover, Defendant argues that Plaintiffhas failed to allege detrimental reliance with any specificity for equitable estoppel purposes and has also failed to demonstrate that the Synagogue acquired any rights through the ORB decision which were later destroyed. (ld. at 9-10.)
Defendant relies on its previous arguments in support for dismissal of Plaintiffs Promissory Estoppel and Void for Vagueness claims. (Id. at 10.) As for Plaintiffs request for an injunction of the state court proceedings, Defendant maintains that it has not sought to enjoin Plaintiff from conducting a house of worship at any other properly zoned location within the City, and thus Plaintiff has not shown it is likely to succeed on the merits. Q.!L)
IV. Standard of Review In the context of a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true facts alleged in the Complaint, and construes them in a light favorable to Plaintiff. Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108,
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1109 (11th Cir. 1991 ). Moreover, a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Defendant has moved to dismiss each of Plaintiff United States' claims and 16 of Plaintiff HCS's 18 claims for relief, and the Court will therefore address each in tum.
V. Analysis of Defendant's Motions The Court will now address each of the claims raised in Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and Defendant City's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff United States' Claims.
A. Standing Before addressing PlaintiffHCS's substantive claims, the Court must first determine whether the Synagogue has standing to bring this action on its own behalf or on behalf of its members. The Supreme Court has held that Article III of the Constitution limits the federal judicial power to ''Cases" or "Controversies,'' thus requiring that there be at least (1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See,~' United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 551 ( 1996); Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663 (1993); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 ( 1982). The threshold question is,
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therefore, whether the plaintiff has directly "suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action'' to warrant invocation of federal court jurisdiction. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975), quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,617 (1973).
Aside from these minimum constitutional requirements, the Supreme Court has recognized prudential limits on the class of persons who may invoke the courts' decisional and remedial powers. Thus generally, absent a Congressional grant of standing, a plaintiff must also assert his own legal rights and interests, and not rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of other parties. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
Here, Plaintiff HCS expressly rejects any claim of associational standing, asserting instead that it has standing to bring this action on its own behalf for direct injuries suffered by the Synagogue. The Supreme Court has held that, "[t]here is no question that an association may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy." Id. at 511. Moreover, an association suing on its own behalfcan assert the rights of its members so long as the challenged conduct impinges on its members' associational ties. Id. The test for standing of an association suing on its own behalf is the same as in the case of an individual, namely, whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the action as to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on its own behalf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378 (1982); Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99.
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Defendant City of Hollywood argues that HCS fails to meet both the Article III and the prudential requirements to assert a§ 1983 claim. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff fails to allege that it suffered an injury in fact, that the injury is traceable to the actions of Defendant, or that its injury would likely be redressed by a favorable decision on the merits. Defendant maintains that frustration ofthe Synagogue's objections is the type of abstract concern that does not impart standing, and neither will a speculative or nonspecific injury, such as difficulty raising money, suffice. Additionally, Defendant posits that Plainti ffHCS has failed to meet the prudential requirements of standing because it is resting its claims on wrongs suffered by its members, where the members could sue on their own behalf for any alleged constitutional violations of their rights.
Plaintiff HCS, on the other hand, argues that its claims are based upon the City's interference with its purpose of providing teaching and worship through the City's arbitrary and capricious zoning enforcement, burdensome land use regulations, and purposeful harassment of and selective enforcement against the Synagogue. The Synagogue alleges in the Second Amended Complaint that the City's reversal ofthe grant of a permanent Special Exception and the initiation of litigation to enjoin the Synagogue from providing teaching and worship has unreasonably limited the Synagogue's activities and will prevent the Synagogue from fulfilling its purpose or building its congregation. (D.E. 125 at 24.)
The primary question at the heart of the standing issue is whether Plaintiff HCS has alleged a sufficiently specific and immediate, rather than abstract and speculative, injury in

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fact to invoke federal jurisdiction. In Havens, the Supreme Court had occasion to address a similar issue when HOME, a non-profit organization whose purpose was to make equal opportunity in housing a reality in the Richmond Metropolitan Area, sued an owner of an apartment complex, alleging its efforts had been frustrated by defendant's racial steering practices. 455 U.S. at 379. The Court held that if the apartment owner's steering practices had perceptibly impaired HOME's ability to provide counseling and referral services for lowand moderate-income homeseekers, the organization had suffered an injury in fact. Id. The Court further held that such a concrete injury and subsequent drain on the organization's resources constituted far more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social interests. Id.
The Court finds that the Synagogue has similarly alleged that the City's reversal of its permanent Special Exception and the selective enforcement and harassment by the City's police officers and code enforcers has substantially interfered with HCS's activities and its purpose. Such conduct adversely affects the Synagogue's ability to provide teaching and worship to its members, and creates a drain on its resources. Therefore, the Court finds that the Synagogue has alleged a sufficient injury in fact to create standing for the Synagogue to challenge such conduct on its own behalf. See Florida Democratic Party v. Hood, 342 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1079 (N.D.Fla. 2004) ("an organization has standing to challenge conduct that impedes its ability to attract members, to raise revenues, or to fulfill its purposes), citing Havens, 455 U.S. at 379. The Court finds that the Synagogue has likewise alleged a causal
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connection between the City's activities and this injury, and that a favorable decision on the merits in this action will provide redress to HCS in the form ofdamages to replace its drained resources and the potential for an injunction to prevent the City from inflicting future injuries. The Court finds the City's arguments to the contrary disingenuous. Moreover, there is no question that the prudential requirements for standing have been met. The Synagogue is the proper party to bring this action based upon direct injury to the organization from an ongoing pattern of discrimination and harassment against the City; the Synagogue's individual members suing over parking tickets would in no way address these allegations or adequately represent the Synagogue's interests in this controversy.
B. Counts I and II - § 1983 claims for violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
In Counts I and II ofthe Second Amended Complaint, PlaintiffHCS alleges violations of its constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8 In these counts, the Synagogue alleges that the City's official harassment of HCS, its denial of the Special Exception, and its action to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief against the Synagogue violated the Synagogue's constitutional rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of assembly for purposes of worship and teaching.9 (D.E. 125 at 19.)
8 As is the ca~e with nearly all of its claims. Plaintiff IICS divides its§ IY83 claim into two counts. one seeking
damages. and the other seeking injunctive relief. 9 To the extent that the Synagogue also alleges violations of its substantive due process rights and equal protection
rights in Counts I and II (D.E. 125 at 20), these claims are redundant and will be addressed solely in Counts XII, XIII. XIV. and XV.
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In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that conduct under color of state law, complained of in the civil rights suit, violated its rights, privileges, or immunities under the Constitution or laws of the United States. Whitehorn v. Harrelson, 758 F.2d 1416, 1419 (lith Cir. 1985). Additionally, while Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 provides a plaintiffconsiderable leeway in framing its complaint, the Eleventh Circuit, along with others, has tightened the application of Rule 8 with respect to§ 1983 cases in an effort to weed out nonmeritorious claims, requiring the plaintiff in such cases to allege with some specificity the facts which make out its claim. GJR Investments. Inc. v. County ofEscambia. Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (lith Cir. 1998).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has placed strict limitations on municipal liability under section 1983. Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998), citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). There is no respondeat superior liability upon which to inculpate a municipality for the wrongful actions of its employees or agents. 436 U.S. at 691, 694. Thus, a municipality can only be held liable ifan official policy or custom of that municipality causes a constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95. Moreover, it is not enough for the plaintiff to merely identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality; the plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through deliberate conduct, the municipality is the moving force behind the alleged injury. Board of County Com'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
Defendant argues that PlaintiffHCS 's § 1983 claims based on violations ofPlaintiffs
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rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of assembly should be dismissed because the Synagogue has failed to identify, generally or specifically, any custom, policy or practice that is the moving force behind Plaintiffs alleged injuries. Plaintiff responds that it has alleged three policies or practices ofthe City that satisfy the requirements for municipal liability: (I) the City's history of routinely granting Special Exceptions to house of worship in the Hollywood Hills residential areas; (2) the single act by the Commission of reversing the ORB's grant ofa permanent Special Exception pursuant to the authority granted by the City's zoning ordinances, and (3) the pattern of improper police conduct of harassment and selective enforcement against the Synagogue which the City was aware of and failed to prevent. The Court will address each in turn.
As to the first alleged policy, that the City routinely grants Special Exceptions, the Court begins by noting that there is very little factual support contained in the Second Amended Complaint for the inference that the City grants most or all applications for Special Exceptions for houses ofworship that it considers. Though the Synagogue refers to multiple other houses of worship in the Hollywood Hills area, it fails to specify if they are likewise located in areas zoned for single-family residences or if and when they were granted Special Exceptions. 10 However, even if the Court were to find such a policy existed, it is entirely unclear how this policy could have been the moving force behind the injuries suffered by the Synagogue. If anything, a policy of routinely granting Special Exceptions would be the
10 Defendant has noted that Special Exceptions were not required prior to 1994.
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proximate cause ofthe granting of a Special Exception for HCS, rather than the denial by the City. Thus, this policy is insufficient to establish municipal liability.
Plaintiffs second argument is that the single act by the Commission of reversing the ORB pursuant to the City's zoning ordinances is sufficient to invoke municipal liability, pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 ( 1986). The Court in Pembaur held that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances. Id. at 480. However, any such single act must still be made pursuant to an existing, unconstitutional official municipal policy to properly attribute such conduct to the municipality pursuant to Monell. ld. at 478 n. 6, 479-81; City ofOklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,823-824 (I985).
The Eleventh Circuit has summarized the guiding principles laid out by the Supreme Court to evaluate whether the single action ofan official policymaker is sufficient to give rise to municipal liability, as follows: ( 1) whether the action is officially sanctioned or ordered by the municipality; (2) whether the action is taken by officers with final policymaking authority; (3) whether this final policymaking authority is granted by state law, including valid local ordinances and regulations; (4) whether the challenged action was taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the officials responsible for making policy in that particular area of the city's business, as determined by state law. Martinez v. City ofOpa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 713 (II th Cir. I992) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff HCS has alleged that the decision of the Commission, in overturning
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the granting of a conditional permanent Special Exception by the ORB, acted in its capacity as final policymaking authority, pursuant to the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances and Zoning and Land Development Regulations (''ZLDR''). (D.E. 125 at~ 61.) The Synagogue further alleges that Commission decisions are attributable to the City because such decisions are not subject to meaningful administrative review. (Id. at~ 62.) Finally, the Synagogue states that the Commission's arbitrary and capricious decision deprived HCS of its First Amendment rights. (ld. at~~ 66-67.)
Plaintiff also provides the text of Sections 5.3 and 5.7 ofthe City's ZLDR, governing Commission requests for review of ORB decisions on Special Exception applications. (Id. at~~ 138-39.) These provisions demonstrate that the Commission is authorized by local ordinances to review decisions by the DRB and either approve, approve with conditions, or deny an application for a Special Exception. They also demonstrate that this review is to be conducted pursuant to four subjective criteria, the same standards used by the ORB in its initial decision, and that the Commission still has the discretion to deny the Special Exception, even if all of these criteria are met.
Thus, Plaintiff has satisfied all four factors from Martinez for evaluating whether a single official act constitutes municipal liability. First, as HCS alleges the Commission's reversal was undertaken pursuant to Sections 5.3 and 5.7 ofthe City's ZLDR, the Synagogue has alleged that the Commission's decision was officially-sanctioned. Second, since the Synagogue has alleged that no other city employee could review this decision, it has alleged
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an action taken by officials with final policymaking authority. See Martinez, 971 F.2d at 715 (local law is determinative of who is an official policymaker; thus, when City Manager was vested by the City's charter with discretionary authority unreviewable by another city employee, the Manager had final decisionmaking authority). Third, the City's local ZLDR, as controlling local law, further bolsters the allegation that the Commission had final policymaking authority. Finally, the Synagogue has alleged that the Commission's reversal was taken pursuant to the official municipal policy granting the Commission review ofDRB decisions. Sections 5.3 and 5.7 demonstrate that this policy provides the Commission with complete discretion to deny Special Exceptions for any reason whatsoever, thus allowing the Commission to regulate houses ofworship without objective and precise criteria, in violation of the First Amendment rights of these assemblies. Lady J. Lingerie. Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176F.3d 1358, 1362(11thCir.1999);seealsoinfraat58-60. Suchpolicywas adopted by the Commission, which ZLDR Sections 5.3 and 5.7 demonstrate is responsible under local law for effectuating policy in the area of local zoning and development regulation. Thus, the Synagogue has met the fourth and final factor articulated in Martinez. Therefore, Plaintiff HCS has stated a claim for relief under § 1983 pursuant to the Commission's decision to reverse the DRB's grant of a permanent Special Exception.
The Synagogue also alleges a third policy: that the City knew of a pattern of harassment and selective enforcement via its police officers and code enforcers, and that the City did nothing to halt such actions. The Second Amended Complaint alleges that City
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Commissioner Sal Oliveri began, in late 200 I or early 2002, regularly contacting the City's code enforcement and/or police departments, in order to enlist their services to harass the Synagogue and its members. (D.E. 125 at 9.) Attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint is a memorandum from Oliveri to the former Director of Economic Development and Development Administration stating that "careful and vigilant monitoring" ofthe Synagogue was required. (Id. at 9-10, Ex. A.) Attached as Exhibit B to the Complaint are emails from various City officials showing that the Synagogue's properties were inspected daily. (Id. at 10, Ex. B.) The Synagogue also alleges that Oliveri told code enforcement and police officers to only issue tickets to cars parked on the Synagogue's properties. (Id.) Exhibits C and D reflect the results of this frequent inspection and Oliveri's request for monthly reports of police and code enforcement activity at the Synagogue. (I d. at 10, Ex. C, D.) The Synagogue further provides evidence that such behavior was well known to City officials, citing City Commissioner Cathy Anderson's public scolding of Oliveri for abuse of City resources in constantly checking on the Synagogue and her comment that, "[w]hat we have
here is selective enforcement and I'm very troubled by it." fuh at 22, Ex. K.)
In short, the Synagogue has provided ample evidence of a City policy and practice of harassment and selective enforcement against the Synagogue, and further demonstrated that nothing was done to prevent this conduct despite the fact that such policy was well known or should have been well known to City officials. The Eleventh Circuit has held that, "the continued failure of the city to prevent known constitutional violations by its police force is
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precisely the type ofinformal policy or custom that is actionable under section 1983." Depew v City of St. Marys. Georgia, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (lith Cir. 1986). Such policy is sufficient to constitute the moving force behind the Synagogue's injuries. See Griffin v. City ofOpaLocka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1312 (lith Cir. 2001) (City's tolerance of gross sexual harassment and failure to take action despite actual and constructive knowledge of the problem constituted a moving force behind sexual harassment at the City).
However, the City argues that the City's actions ofconstant monitoring and checking do not constitute "known constitutional violations" for purposes of a § 1983 claim. The Court finds this argument entirely contrary to prevailing case law. In Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2005), the Court of Appeals held that, "[a] plaintiff suffers adverse action ifthe defendant's allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person ofordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment rights." ld. at 1254. The Court went on to hold that a prolonged and organized campaign of harassment by local police officers was sufficiently adverse that a jury could find they would chill a person ofordinary firmness form exercising his or her First Amendment rights. ld. at 1254-55.
Here, Plaintiff HCS has alleged a violation of its First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion and right to free assembly. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging... the right ofthe people peaceably to assemble...," U.S. Const., amend. I, cl.l, and is applicable to the states and their subdivisions through the Fourteenth
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Amendment. Employment Div.. Dep't of Human Resources of Ore. V. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 ( 1990). The guarantee of free exercise of religion grants citizens the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine they choose, and thus forbids government regulation of religious beliefs as such. Id. The Clause further prohibits government from imposing special disabilities on the basis of religious views or status or otherwise interfering with the practice ofreligious beliefs. Id.
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the Clause forbids, not just facially discriminatory laws or official practices, but ''subtle departures from neutrality" and "covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.'' Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court held that official action which had as its main object the suppression of a central element of the Santeria religion constituted a "religious gerrymander" and an impermissible attempt to target petitioners and their religious practices. Id. At 535 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has also recognized the freedom of assembly as a fundamental First Amendment right. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960). Contained within this right is the freedom to associate for purposes of engaging in the exercise of religion. ld.; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). The Constitution guarantees freedom ofassociation as an indispensable means ofpreserving other individual liberties. ld.
Numerous courts have found that harassment in the form of constant monitoring,
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investigating or issuance of violations can contravene First Amendment rights. See Garcia v. City ofTrenton, 348 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 2003) (retaliatory issuance of parking tickets totaling $35 created a jury issue because defendant "engaged in the punitive machinery of government in order to punish Ms. Garcia for her speaking out") (citations omitted); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 828 (11th Cir. 1982) (city commissioners' formation of building code task force which conducted frequent inspections of designated hotels and issued numerous violations, and which was designed to harass and drive hotels out of business, was sufficient to state a§ 1983 claim); Georgia Association of Educators v. Gwinnett County School District, 856 F.2d 142, 145 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding the Government may not retaliate against individuals or associations exercising their First Amendment rights "by imposing sanctions for the expression of particular views it opposes"); Words of Faith Fellowship. Inc. V. Rutherford County Dep't of Social Services, 329 F.Supp.2d 675,693 (WDNC 2004) (parents had alleged basis for municipal liability on allegations that county officials engaged in prolonged campaign to undermine church and interfere with members' religious practices through series of investigations).
The Court finds that the City's alleged conduct in the instant case of ticketing only cars parked on the Synagogue's side of the street could reasonably engender the discouragement of Synagogue members wishing to attend prayer services. Thus, Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief in Counts I and II for municipal liability pursuant to § 1983 violations of Plaintiffs rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of assembly.
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However, such claims relate only to the Commission's decision to reverse the ORB's grant ofa permanent Special Exception and to the City's alleged policy ofallowing or encouraging harassment and selective enforcement against the Synagogue; the other claims based on Counts I and II are dismissed, consistent with this Order.
C. Counts IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI- RLUIPA AND Florida RFRA Claims
In PlaintiffHCS's Counts IV through IX and in Plaintiff United States' Complaint, Plaintiffs allege violations of various provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. Defendant City of Hollywood has moved to dismiss all such Counts based upon its assertion that all require a showing that the City imposed a substantial burden on Plaintiffs religious exercise, and Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy this requirement. The Court finds the facts alleged in Plaintiff United States' Complaint to be sufficiently similar to those alleged in the Plaintiff HCS's Second Amended Complaint that it may handle Defendant's objections to Plaintiffs' claims together.
I. Substantial Burdens Provision The Synagogue's first RLUIPA claims, Counts IV and V, are made pursuant to section (a)(l ), the "substantial burdens" provision. This provision states,
[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition
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of the burden on that person, assembly or institution- (A) is in furtherance ofa compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000cc(a)( 1). Section (a)( 1) only applies when at least one ofthree jurisdictional tests is met: (A) the substantial burden is imposed in a federally-funded program or activity; (B) the substantial burden affects, or removal ofthat burden would affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or system of regulations in which the government makes individualized assessments ofthe proposed uses for the property involved. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2). "Land use regulation" is defined as a "zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant's use or development ofland (including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5). Here, Plaintiff HCS alleges that it is the owner in fee simple absolute of two properties used as houses or worship, teaching, and discourse. (D.E. 125 at~ 6.) The City ofHollywood's Zoning and Land Development Code limits the use and development ofland where these properties are located to single family detached dwellings. (Id. at~ II). Petitions for Special Exceptions to operate places of worship may be filed with the City's Development Review Board by the owners of properties within Single Family Districts. (Id.) The ORB hears each such Petition on a case-by-case basis pursuant to the City's quasi-
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judicial procedures, and may grant the Petition if various findings are made regarding compatibility with environment, provisions for safe traffic movement, and controls for nuisances. (Id. at 6-7.) HCS alleges that this procedure incorporates an improper system of individualized, arbitrary and potentially discriminating assessments. Thus, based on HCS's allegations, jurisdiction in this case is appropriate under the ''individualized assessment" prong of RLUIPA 's jurisdictional tests. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)©.
The general rule of RLUIPA is that state action substantially burdening "religious exercise" must be justified as the least restrictive means of furthering compelling governmental interest. Id. at§§ 2000cc(a)(l), 2000cc-l(a); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. V. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1225 (11th Cir. 2004). "Religious exercise" is defined by RLUIPA to include the "use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise," 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B). In passing RLUIPA, Congress recognized that places of assembly are needed to facilitate religious practice and that governments may use zoning regulations to prevent religious organizations from using land for these purposes. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1226. Thus, the regulations at issue in this case clearly impact ''religious exercise" as contemplated by RLUIPA. See id. However, Defendant City of Hollywood argues that PlaintiffHollywood Community Synagogue has not demonstrated that the regulation in question substantially burdens this religious exercise. The Court will now address this question.
Because RLUIPA does not offer a definition for "substantial burden," a reviewing
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court is to give the tenns their ordinary or natural meaning. Id. Combining this principle with the Supreme Court's instructional definition of"substantial burden" within its free exercise cases, as well as that of other courts, the Eleventh Circuit held that a substantial burden, ·'must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise... [it] is akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to confonn his or her behavior accordingly. Thus, a substantial burden can result from pressure that tends to force adherents to forego religious precepts or from pressure that mandates religious conduct." Id. at 1227.
Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not plead facts sufficient to meet this standard. Defendant City maintains that is has merely precluded the Synagogue from holding services in an area not zoned for such activity when the Synagogue may relocate to other areas that are zoned for such activity. It contends that Plaintiff has not alleged that their property is unique or the only suitable property to hold services, and further that Plaintiff has never specifically stated what substantial burden is being imposed upon the Synagogue. Thus, Defendant City argues that Plaintiffs claims under the "substantial burdens" provisions must be dismissed because Plaintiff has stated nothing more than a mere
m. convem.ence.
Plaintiff HCS responds that the City's reversal of the pennanent Special Exception, and subsequent initiation of a state suit for injunctive relief to shut down the Synagogue, constitutes a substantial burden and not a mere inconvenience. HCS argues that it has a legal right to operate a house of worship where it is because the City's Code provides for Special
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Exceptions for houses ofworship within residential areas ofthe City. The Synagogue alleges that requiring it to relocate would adversely impact its ability to continue providing religious teaching and worship to the community (D.E. 125 at ~ 87); however, the Synagogue explicitly declines to assert a substantial burden based upon increased walking distance for its members resulting from relocation. (D.E. 144 at 11.)
The Court in Midrash had the opportunity to review an analogous set of facts when it considered whether the Town of Surfside's zoning ordinance that would require a synagogue to relocate imposed a substantial burden. 366 F.3d at 1227-28. The Court first found that the fact that congregations may not be able to find suitable alternative space did not create a substantial burden within the meaning of RLUIPA. Id. at 1227 n.ll. Next, the Court found that requiring a congregation to apply for a Conditional Use Permit (CUP) did not constitute a substantial burden because it allowed the zoning commission to consider factors such as size, congruity with existing uses, and availability of parking. Id. The Court noted that, '[w]e have found that such reasonable 'run ofthe mill' zoning considerations do not constitute substantial burdens on religious exercise." Id. (citations omitted). Finally, the Court held that the Town of Surfside had not placed a substantial burden upon the synagogue by requiring it to relocate and forcing its members to walk a few additional blocks. Id. at 1228. The Court found significant the facts that the synagogue's current location held no particular religious significance, that the synagogue could apply for a permit to operate only a few blocks away, and that municipalities would find it nearly impossible to ensure that no
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individual would be burdened by the walk to a temple of choice. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on whether the government practice in
question substantially burdens plaintiffs exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a), (b); Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1225. In this case, the Court cannot determine that Plaintiff has met its burden of demonstrating that the City's denial of a Special Exception has substantially burdened its religious exercise. The Synagogue has not shown that its property carries unique religious significance or that other properties are not available that could accommodate its practices. Instead, the Synagogue has merely offered vague and conclusory statements that it has a "legal right" to be granted a Special Exception and that relocation would substantially burden its ability to continue to provide religious teaching and worship to the community. Such bare and unspecific assertions are insufficient to support Plaintiffs claims under RLUIPA section (a)(1 ). Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), (e). Moreover, given the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Midrash, the Court cannot conclude that the City's process of requiring a Special Exception constitutes a substantial burden under RLUIPA. Plaintiffs claims under RLUIPA section (a)( 1) must be dismissed.
2. Equal Terms and Nondiscrimination Provisions Plaintiff HCS's Counts VI and VII and Plaintiff United States' first claim is made pursuant to RLUIPA section (b)( 1), the "equal terms" provision. This provision states,"[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or
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institution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(I). The Eleventh Circuit held that the "natural perimeter'' for consideration under this section is the category of"assemblies and institutions.'' Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230. Thus, the Midrash Court first evaluated whether the plaintiff had made allegations that other entities were qualified as assemblies or institutions before considering whether such nonreligious entities were treated differently than religious assemblies or institutions. Id. Finding that an assembly was "a group gathered for a common purpose,'' the Court in Midrash went on to find that the plaintiff had properly alleged that private clubs and lodges were assemblies or institutions under RLUIPA, and thus could not be treated differently from religious assembles. ld. at 1231.
Here, PlaintiffHCS alleges that the City has granted Special Exceptions to day care centers and educational facilities, while denying the Synagogue a Special Exception. Plaintiff United States alleges that the City currently permits other nonreligious assemblies and institutions to operate in residential districts in violation of zoning ordinances and without being subjected to any enforcement action for such violation. Though these allegations are cursory at best, they are sufficient to allege the required nonreligious assemblies or institutions for Plaintiffs' equal terms claims to survive Defendant's Motions.
Plaintiffs Counts VIII and IX and Plaintiff United States second claim are made pursuant to RLUIPA section (b)(2), the "nondiscrimination" provision. This provision states, "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination." 42 U.S.C. §
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2000cc(b)(2). PlaintitT HCS alleges that there were ten other house of worship Special Exception applications filed with the City in the last twenty years, and not one except the Synagogue's was denied. (D.E. 125 at~ 99.) Plaintiff United States alleges that Defendant had never previously denied a request by a place of worship to operate in either a singlefamily or multiple-family residential zone until it denied HCS 's Special Exception application. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1 at~ 28.)
Defendant argues that both Plaintiffs' equal terms and nondiscrimination claims should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts giving rise to a substantial burden on religious exercise. Citing numerous opinions from other district courts, Defendant argues that the jurisdictional tests and substantial burden requirements of section (a) of RLUIPA also apply to section (b). Defendant argues that while the Eleventh Circuit, in Midrash, suggested that section (a)(l)'s threshold jurisdictional tests do not apply to section (b)(I)'s equal terms provision, the Court did not actually reach this issue.
Plaintiff United States (and PlaintiffHCS, in adopting the United States' argument) argues that nothing in the text ofRLUIPA supports the proposition that a substantial burden showing is required for a§ (b) claim. (Case No. 04-61212-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN, D.E. 226 at 3.) Plaintiff maintains that while § (a) regulates substantial burdens upon religious exercise, and thus the jurisdictional tests are appropriate,§ (b) was intended to provide broad protection for discriminatory government action, regardless of its substantiality. (ld. at 3-4.)
Though the Court recognizes that the Eleventh Circuit did not actually decide the issue
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II

I

of whether RLUIPA 's jurisdictional and substantial burden tests apply to sections (b)( 1) and (b)(2), the Midrash Court's extensive discussion of the issue is illustrative. In Midrash, the Court noted that, ''[t]he plain terms and structure ofRLUIPA indicate that the jurisdictional prerequisites included in§ (a)... do not apply to§ (b)'s prohibition on discrimination against and exclusion of religious institutions.'' 366 F.3d at 1229. In support, the Eleventh Circuit cited the fact that, 1) §(b) is silent as to jurisdictional tests while three jurisdictional tests are enumerated in § (a); 2) section (a)(2), by its terms, specifically applies to "subsection'' (a); and 3) the language regarding substantial burdens in the jurisdictional tests is consistent with an application to § (a)'s prohibition on substantial burdens. See id. The Court went on to state that while, "RLUIPA'S text and structure suggest that§ (a)(2)'s threshold jurisdictional test does not apply to §(b)'s equal terms provision," it did not reach the question because it found that, regardless, the third jurisdictional prong of§ (a)(2) had been satisfied. See id.
However, the Court notes that the Seventh Circuit has had the opportunity to reach this issue. In Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir. 2003 ), the court found that the substantial burden and nondiscrimination provisions were operatively independent of one another. The court read RLUIPA as "afford[ing] a government the discret ion to take corrective action to eliminate a nondiscrimination provision violation, whether or not it was the result of a substantial burden on religious exercise.'' Id.
The Court agrees with the holding of the Seventh Circuit and the reasoning of the

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Eleventh Circuit that the text and structure of RLUIPA support a finding that § (b) is operatively independent of the jurisdictional prerequisites of § (a). The Court finds persuasive the facts that § (a) states that it applies only to ''subsection" (a) while §(b) is silent as to jurisdictional tests and that§ (a)'s prohibition of substantial burdens on religious exercise is consistent with the substantial burden language in the jurisdictional tests. As Defendant can cite no persuasive authority that suggests otherwise, the Court finds that Plaintiffs need not allege a substantial burden to state claims under RLUIPA §§ (b)(I) and (b )(2).
Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff United States' nondiscrimination claim should be dismissed because it fails to connect any alleged discrimination suffered with HCS's religious affiliation. The Government responds that it adequately connected the alleged discrimination with HCS's religious affiliation by identifying HCS as a religious institution, describing how the City of Hollywood denied it a Special Exception and sought to prevent religious worship there, and identifying the City's implementation of a time limit on HCS's Special Exception and the City's ultimate denial ofa permanent Special Exception as the first such measures ever imposed on a religious institution by the City. (Case No. 0461212-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN, D.E. 226 at 7-9.) The Court finds that PlaintiffUnited States has sufficiently alleged facts, including the denial of a Special Exception and the selective enforcement against the Synagogue, to make out a claim that Defendant discriminated against HCS on the basis of its religious affiliation.
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Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, as it applies to RLUIPA sections (b)(l) and (b)(2), and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff United States' Complaint are denied.
3. Florida RFRA Claims Plaintiff HCS's Counts X and XI are made pursuant to § 761.03 of the Florida Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (Florida RFRA). Section 761.03 states,
[t]he government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that governments may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application ofthe burden to the person: (a) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. Fla. Stat. § 761.03(1 ). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs Florida RFRA claims should be dismissed because, similar to its RLUIPA claims, Plaintiff fails to identify a "substantial burden." The Florida RFRA was modeled after the federal RFRA and made the compelling state interest test from federal jurisprudence applicable to state cases involving questions of the free exercise of religion. Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So.2d 1023, 1031-32 (Fla. 2004.) In Warner, in response to two questions certified by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Florida Supreme Court held that the Florida RFRA is broader than United States Supreme Court precedent because the Florida RFRA applies a compelling interest test to neutral laws of general application and the "exercise of religion" definition includes any act
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or refusal to act, whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief. 887 So.2d at I032. However, the court stopped short of holding that any act by an individual motivated by religion is subject to the compelling state interest test, finding instead that only government regulations which ·'substantially burden" a person's exercise of religion are subject to the test. Id. at I033.
After considering various definitions of "substantial burden'' adopted at the federal level, the court in Warner settled upon the narrow definition adopted by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. ld. Thus, a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion under the Florida RFRA, "is one that either compels the religious adherent to engage in conduct that his religion forbids or forbids him to engage in conduct that his religion requires." Id. As the Court previously found that Plaintiff had not demonstrated a substantial burden under this same standard for RLUIPA purposes, the Court likewise finds that Plaintiffs Florida RFRA claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, Counts X and XI are dismissed.
D. Count XII and XIII - Equal Protection Claims In Counts XII and XIII, PlaintiffHCS alleges violations of its constitutional right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Synagogue alleges that it was treated less favorably than other houses of worship in the residential areas of the City. (D.E. 125 at ~ 114.) Plaintiff also contends that the Commission failed to consider the least restrictive means to address issues of traffic, noise and garbage. (ld. at~ 117.) Moreover,
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Plaintiff alleges that the City, through Oliveri, selectively enforced the Code by directing its code enforcement officers to check for violations on a daily basis and only ticket cars parked in front ofthe Synagogue's properties. (Id. at~~ 119-20.) HCS maintains that such selective enforcement was motivated by impermissible considerations of religion, demonstrated by Oliveri's comments indicating disparate treatment for Synagogue members as compared to members ofthe Catholic faith. (ld. at~ 121; D.E. 144 at 12-13.)
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which is essentially a mandate that all similarly situated persons be treated alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. V. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that plaintiffs may bring an equal protection claim for the unequal administration of a facially neutral statute, so long as intentional or purposeful discrimination is shown on the part ofthe state. E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1112-13 (11th Cir. 1987) citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 ( 1944). To prevail on this traditional type of equal protection claim, basically a selective enforcement claim, Plaintiff must show (I) that it was treated differently from other similarly situated entities, and (2) that Defendant unequally applied a facially neutral ordinance for the purpose of discriminating against Plaintiff. Campbell v. Rainbow City, Ala., 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (lith Cir. 2006) citing Strickland v. Alderman, 74 F.3d 260, 264 (11th Cir. 1996).
The Eleventh Circuit has held that in order for any two housing developments to be
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similarly situated, they must be prima facie identical in all relevant respects. ld. Thus, Plaintiff must show with some specificity that its house of worship was similarly situated to another house of worship that was treated disparately. See id. Additionally, projects seeking different types of variances in a zoning context are not considered similarly situated. Id.
In its motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiffhas failed to state that any other religious organization or any other private business was granted a permanent Special Exception under the same or similar circumstances to those under which Plaintiffs application was denied. (D.E. 140 at 12.) Plaintiff responds by pointing out facts in its Second Amended Complaint alleging: ( 1) that the Commission has granted numerous permanent Special Exceptions to similarly situated houses of worship in the Hollywood Hills residential area; (2) that one house ofworship operated for sixteen 11 years without a Special Exception, only to be granted one immediately after inquiries by the Synagogue; and (3) that Rosa Lopez has operated a house of worship without being required to obtain a Special Exception, despite complaints about traffic, noise and garbage. (D.E. 144 at 12.) In its Reply, Defendant further argues that the fact that the words "similarly situated" never appear in Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is fatal to its equal protection claims.
The Court first notes that there is no requirement that Plaintiffs Complaint contain the words "similarly situated" in order to make out a claim for relief under the Equal
11 The Court notes that there is a discrepancy in the pleadings regarding the number of years this house of worship operated without a Special Exception. In its Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff states this number to be thirteen ( 13) years (D.E. 144at 12), while the Second Amended Complaint alleges the house operated for sixteen ( 16) years. (D.E. 125 at~ 49.) For purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the Court will rely upon the number alleged in the Second Amended Complaint.
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Protection Clause. Instead, if the facts stated by Plaintiff, taken as true by the Court for purposes of this Motion, support the existence of other similarly situated entities that were treated differently, Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief. Here, Plaintiff alleges facts demonstrating numerous similarly situated entities.
First, Plaintiff has alleged that the City directed its police officers and code enforcement officers to constantly monitor the Synagogue and issue parking citations only to cars parked in front of the Synagogue's property. For purposes of the enforcement of traffic regulations, Plaintiffs status as a house of worship is irrelevant to its equal protection claims. Instead, it is enough that Plaintiff has alleged that cars parked in front of properties on the same street, with no readily apparent distinctions in the type of parking available, received disparate treatment from the cars parked in front of the Synagogue. This type of selective enforcement of the City's traffic codes is precisely the type of unequal administration of a facially neutral law that is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.
Second, the Synagogue has alleged that the City applied its zoning regulations unequally, either by not requiring other similarly situated houses of worship to apply for Special Exceptions or by granting Special Exceptions to such houses. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that numerous houses of worship are operated out of single family homes in the residential neighborhoods ofthe City and have been granted permanent Special Exceptions. (D.E. 125 at 15-16.) Plaintiff also alleges that one house of worship operated within a residential neighborhood for sixteen years without being required to apply for a Special
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Exception; only upon inquiries from the Synagogue did this church apply for, and immediately receive, a Special Exception. (Id. at ,-r 49.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Rosa Lopez operates a shrine to the Virgin Mary out of her home, hosting up to 4,000 people for monthly visits to see the apparition. (ld. at ,-r 50-51.) Plaintiff alleges that though Ms. Lopez's home is only three blocks from the Synagogue, and has received complaints regarding noise, traffic and garbage not materially distinct from those associated from the Synagogue, no Special Exception was ever required of her. (Id. at 16-18.) Any one of these allegations is sufficient to demonstrate that a similarly situated establishment was treated differently under a facially neutral law. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss must be denied as to these claims.
E. Counts XIV and XV- Substantive Due Process Claims In Counts XIV and XV, PlaintiffHCS alleges that the Commission's reversal of the decision of the ORB to grant a permanent Special Exception was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable because it bore no substantial relation to issues ofpublic health, safety, welfare, or morals. (D.E. 125 at ,-r 126.) Moreover, the Synagogue claims that it had a property interest in the ORB's grant of a Special Exception because the Synagogue expended money in good faith reliance on the ORB's conditions for the granting of a permanent Special Exception. (I d. at ,-r 128.) Thus, the Synagogue alleges that its substantive due process rights
were violated by the Commission's reversal. iliL at 34-35.)
In its Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, Defendant first argues that
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these claims are redundant to Plaintiffs equal protection claims. Plaintiff responds by demonstrating the distinct basis of these claims as compared to that of its prior equal protection claims. In its Reply. Defendant argues that the claims should be dismissed because, inter alia, Plaintiff has not alleged facts regarding similarly situated houses of worship, what expenses were incurred by the Synagogue to meet zoning conditions and whether they were excessive, or what rights were acquired by the ORB's decision. However, Defendant does not provide any legal authority for these alleged insufficiencies.
In Greenbriar, Ltd.. v. City of Alabaster, the Eleventh Circuit noted the longestablished tenet that zoning regulations would not be declared unconstitutional as violative of substantive due process unless they were "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1989), quoting Village of Euclid. Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 ( 1926). The Greenbriar Court went on to lay out the two-pronged test for violations of substantive due process: ( 1) it must be determined that there has been a deprivation of a federal constitutionally protected interest, and (2) that deprivation must be the result of an abuse of governmental power sufficient to raise an ordinary tort to the statute of a constitutional violation. 881 F.2d at 1577 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court then elaborated that the second prong was met when the deprivation was undertaken for an improper motive and by means that were pretextual, arbitrary and capricious, and without any
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rational basis. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). In Coral Springs Street Systems. Inc. v. City of Sunrise, the Eleventh Circuit held that
vested rights could be created - thus engendering an enforceable entitlement to satisfy the first prong of the test- when a party had reasonably and detrimentally relied on existing law, creating the conditions of equitable estoppel. 371 F.3d 1320, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004). Under Florida law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be raised against a local government when a property owner: ( 1) in good faith; (2) upon an act or omission of the government; (3) has made such a substantial change in position or incurs such substantial expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right the owner acquired. ld. (citations and quotation marks omitted). As further explained by the Court in Coral Springs,
the theory of equitable estoppel amounts to nothing more than an application of the rules of fair play. One party will not be permitted to invite another onto a welcome mat and then be permitted to snatch the mat away to the detriment of the party induced or permitted to stand thereon. A citizen is entitled to rely on the assurances or commitments ofa zoning authority and if he does, the zoning authority is bound by its representations, whether they be in the form of words or deeds... ld. at 1334-35, quoting Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp, 309 So.2d 571, 573 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1975). The Court finds that while PlaintiffHCS has not provided a wealth of facts pertaining to the substantial expense incurred in reasonable reliance on the ORB's decision, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the contours of its substantive due process claim to satisfy the short and plain statement requirement of Rule 8. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. HCS alleges that it was granted
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a permanent Special Exception by the ORB, subject to certain enumerated conditions that had to be met within 180 days for the permanent Special Exception to become final. The Synagogue further alleges that it expended time and sums of money in an attempt to meet these conditions and in reliance on the requirements set out by the ORB. However, with more than two-thirds ofthe allotted time remaining to meet such conditions, the Commission revoked the HCS's Special Exception because the Synagogue was allegedly ''too controversial.,. This consideration was neither enumerated as a factor to be considered by the Commission in evaluating this decision, nor was it part of the conditions laid out by the ORB. Thus, the Synagogue has alleged facts demonstrating that the City of Hollywood extended the "welcome mat" by representing that HCS would be granted a Special Exception if certain conditions were met, but then arbitrarily snatched the mat away for reasons unrelated to public health, safety, welfare or morals. Taken as true, these allegations state a claim that the Synagogue relied in good faith and to its detriment on representations by the City, such that subsequent denial of the property right acquired would be unjust and inequitable. Thus, Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion to Dismiss as to PlaintiffHCS's substantive due process claim is denied. 12
12 The Court notes that it previously dismissed Plaintiff IICS's substantive due process claim against Defendant Sal Oliveri in its Order of March 18, 2005. (D. E. 58 at 32-34.) While there, the Court found that no fundamental property right existed in the permanent Special Exception, this conclusion applies only as to the individual Defendant. Sal Oliveri. The Synagogue ha~ repeatedly denied that it is seeking liability against Oliveri for his appeals or his votes during the City's consideration of IICS' s application for a Special Exception. Thus, Plaintiff has alleged no facts demonstrating that Oliveri denied the Synagogue of a fundamental property right. Nor can Plaintiff demonstrate that Oliveri's actions or representations induced the Synagogue to detrimentally rely in the first place. However. Plaintiff has stated a cause of action against Defendant City of Hollywood based upon its representations and subsequent revocation of the Special Exception. The Court hereby amends its previous Order to clarify any apparent inconsistencies.
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F. Count XVI - Promissory Estoppel Claim In Count XVI, PlaintiffHCS alleges that the City knew, or should have known, that the Synagogue would rely to its detriment on the representations ofthe DRB that a permanent Special Exception would be granted ifcertain conditions were met. (D.E. 125 at.~ 133.) The Synagogue claims that it thereby changed its position in reliance and expended sums of money to meet these requirements, and thus the City should be estopped from denying the
Synagogue a permanent Special Exception. ilil at~~ 134-35.)
Defendant argues that this claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to specify what sums of money it expended, what requirements it had to meet, or what it did to meet those requirements. Defendant maintains that HCS must demonstrate "substantial" expenditures with clear and convincing evidence to support a cause of action. Plaintiff responds that it has specified the conditions and requirements imposed by the DRB for the grant of a permanent Special Exception. HCS maintains that the substantiality of its expenses is a question of fact not properly raised in a Motion to Dismiss.
Promissory estoppel is defined as follows: "[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement ofthe promise." W.R. Grace and Co. V. Geodata Services. Inc., 547 So.2d 919, 924 (Fla. 1989) quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1979); see also Roberts v. Rayonier, Inc., 135 Fed.Appx. 351,362 (lith Cir. 2005). Nothing in this
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definition stipulates that the action or forbearance taken in reliance on the promise of the promisor be substantial in character, nor does the authority cited by Defendant provide any support for this position. Furthermore, should the substantiality of the reliance in question become relevant, it would be a question of fact not properly before the Court in the instant Motion to Dismiss. Additionally, Plaintiff need not provide clear and convincing evidence to survive a Motion to Dismiss, but need only allege a short and plain statement of its claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Plaintiff has satisfied this requirement, and thus Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to this Count is denied.
G. Count XVII- Facial Equal Protection Challenge to Article Vofthe City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances
In Count XVII, Plaintiff HCS alleges that Sections 5.3, 5.7 and 5.8 of the City of Hollywood's Zoning and Land Development Regulations (ZLDR) fail to provide any objective criteria by which to measure zoning decisions made by the Commission. (D.E. 125 at~ 140.) Thus, claims Plaintiff, these provisions grant the Commission unbridled and unreviewable discretion in its zoning decisions and render Article V void for vagueness. (Id. at~ 141.)
Defendant argues that this claim should be dismissed because Article V provides for an appeal of the City Commission's decision to the circuit court, a process in which Plaintiff participated regarding the property in question. Thus, Defendant maintains that Plaintiffs claim that there's no accountability or review process for those dissatisfied with the City
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Commission or DRB decision is without merit. Plaintiff responds that its claim centers on the lack of objective guidelines or
determinable criteria within the decisionmaking process and lack of administrative review ofthe Commission's decision, not on the appeals process for DRB decisions. Plaintiffargues that because the DRB makes Special Exception determinations based on factors other than those set forth in the Code, and because the Commission applies those same discretionary criteria when reviewing ORB decisions, Article V leads to arbitrary and capricious zoning decisions by both.
The Supreme Court has held that, an ordinance which... makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official - as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official - is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969); see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 226 ( 1990). Thus, a law regulating the exercise of First Amendment freedoms must contain narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority. Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150-51. While some measure of discretion is acceptable, standards must be precise and objective, and any amount of discretion beyond the merely ministerial is suspect. Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358, 1362 (lith Cir. 1999).
Consequently, in Lady J. Lingerie, the Eleventh Circuit held that a Jacksonville land
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Synagogue's assertion that the Commission denied HCS a permanent Special Exception, without giving the Synagogue an opportunity to comply with its criteria or conditions, because the application was too "controversial." (D.E. 144 at 17-18.) As HCS has alleged that Article V provides officials far more than merely ministerial discretion, it has thus stated a claim for relief pursuant to the Supreme Court's vagueness jurisprudence.
H. Count XIX - Preliminary Injunctive Relief In Count XIX, Plaintiff HCS requests that the Court enter an appropriate injunction in the event that the court in the City's state court action against the Synagogue to prevent the use of the residence as a house of worship permits the action to move forward. (D.E. 125 at 39.) Therein, Plaintiff alleges that the Synagogue has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury will result ifthe injunction is not issued, and the injury to the Synagogue outweighs whatever damages the proposed injunction may cause the City. (Id.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffhas failed to provide facts or legal authority supporting a preliminary injunction, and has further failed to follow the appropriate procedure by making a motion for such an injunction. Defendant also contends that there is no exception to the Federal Anti-Injunction Statute that empowers the Court to grant such an injunction. Plaintiff responds that it has alleged that this claim falls under the § 1983 exception to the Federal Anti-Injunction Statute. However, Plaintiff concedes that the City has not actively pursued declaratory or injunctive relief in its state court action, and the Synagogue has thus not been required to pursue this claim for a preliminary injunction. The Synagogue
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use ordinance specifying procedures for granting zoning exceptions was overly broad and unconstitutional. 176 F.3d at 1362. The provision contained numerous "run-of-the-mill'' zoning considerations such as compatibility with contiguous uses, environmental impact, and effect of pedestrian traffic. Id. The Court found that none of the nine criteria was precise or objective, and all of them - individually and collectively - empowered the zoning board to covertly discriminate. ld.
Though the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Lady J. Lingerie dealt with the City of Jacksonville's regulation of adult entertainment establishments, it can readily be applied to the instant case, where the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause is implicated by the City of Hollywood's denial of a Special Exception for Plaintiffs house of worship. The criteria alleged to be applied by the DRB, and the Commission in reviewing the decision ofthe DRB, are equally vague and imprecise, using terms such as "compatible with the existing natural environment,'' "adequate provision for safe traffic movement,'' "adequate setbacks," and ''land area is sufficient, appropriate and adequate for the use as proposed." (D.E. 125 at~ 139.) These terms are precisely the type of criteria the Eleventh Circuit in Lady J. Lingerie found overbroad and lacking objectivity. See 176 F.3d at 1362. Moreover, the alleged procedures in the instant case are even more constitutionally invidious, as they allow officials further discretion to deny a Special Exception even if all four enumerated criteria are met. (See D.E. 125 at~ 139 (Section 5.3 provides that, "the Board may grant the petition if the Board makes all of the following findings ...") (emphasis in Complaint).) This is illustrated
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by the Synagogue's assertion that the Commission denied HCS a permanent Special Exception, without giving the Synagogue an opportunity to comply with its criteria or conditions, because the application was too ''controversial." (D.E. 144 at 17- I8.) As HCS has alleged that Article V provides officials far more than merely ministerial discretion, it has thus stated a claim for relief pursuant to the Supreme Court's vagueness jurisprudence.
H. Count XIX - Preliminary Injunctive Relief In Count XIX, PlaintiffHCS requests that the Court enter an appropriate injunction in the event that the court in the City's state court action against the Synagogue to prevent the use ofthe residence as a house ofworship permits the action to move forward. (D.E. 125 at 39.) Therein, Plaintiff alleges that the Synagogue has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury will result ifthe injunction is not issued, and the injury to the Synagogue outweighs whatever damages the proposed injunction may cause the City. (ld.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffhas failed to provide facts or legal authority supporting a preliminary injunction, and has further failed to follow the appropriate procedure by making a motion for such an injunction. Defendant also contends that there is no exception to the Federal Anti-Injunction Statute that empowers the Court to grant such an injunction. Plaintiff responds that it has alleged that this claim falls under the § 1983 exception to the Federal Anti-Injunction Statute. However, Plaintiff concedes that the City has not actively pursued declaratory or injunctive relief in its state court action, and the Synagogue has thus not been required to pursue this claim for a preliminary injunction. The Synagogue
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maintains that it will file an appropriate motion should the need arise. The Court notes that Plaintiff has alleged a proper exception to the Federal Anti-
Injunction Statute for relief from state court proceedings in a § 1983 action. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). However, the Court finds that the Synagogue's claim for a preliminary injunction is not ripe, as the City has not pursued declaratory or injunctive relief in state court. As the Synagogue therefore faces no immediate and irreparable harm, this claim shall be dismissed without prejudice. Should the need arise, the Synagogue may refile its claim for a preliminary injunction as a separate motion.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that 1. Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Second
Amended Complaint (D.E. 140), filed January 5, 2006, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as follows: a. Counts I and II are dismissed with prejudice in part as to claims
relating to an alleged City policy of regularly granting Special Exceptions. Defendant's Motion on Counts I and II as to claims of a City policy of harassment and as to the single act of the Commission reversing the ORB's grant of a Special Exception is denied. b. Counts IV, V, X, and XI are dismissed with prejudice. c. Count XIX is dismissed without prejudice.
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d. Defendant's Motion as to all other Counts is denied, consistent with this Order.
2. Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff United States'
Complaint (D.E. 225), filed May 28, 2005, is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this _jQ_ day of May,
2006.

cc:

U.S. Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein

All Counsel of Record

Case No.04-61212-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

lASE NO. 04-61212-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN [CONSOLIDATED WITH CASE NO. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN]

HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC.

Plaintiff.
VS.
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA and SAL OLIVERI, individually,
Defendants. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -I

FILED by

D.c.

JUN 2 7 2006
rl Af?UH"l MADDOX f LI.:Rk. ll. ~- DIST. CT.
::~ U nt- FLA. MIAMI

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
vs. CITY OF HOLLYWOOD,
Defendant. ________________________!

OMNIBUS ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT CITY OF HOLLYWOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE (D.E. 247); DENYING DEFENDANT CITY OF HOLLYWOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES (D.E. 177); AND DENYING SAL OLIVERI'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (D.E. 250)
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion for

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Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff, Hollywood Community Synagogue (D.E. 247), filed April 24, 2006; Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion for Summary Judgment against PlaintiffUnited States (D.E. 177), filed March I0, 2006; and Defendant Sal Oliveri's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 250), filed April 24, 2006. On May 23, 2006, Plaintiff Hollywood Community Synagogue ("HCS") filed a Response to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment Against HCS. (D.E. 292.) On May 30, 2006, Defendant City of Hollywood ("the City'') filed a Reply to its Motion for Summary Judgment Against HCS. (D.E. 306.) On April 11, 2006, Plaintiff United States filed a Response to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff United States (D.E. 228.) On May 1, 2006, the City filed a Reply to its Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff United States. (D.E. 258.) On May 23,2006, Defendant HCS filed a Response to Oliveri's Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E. 294.) On May 30, 2006, Defendant Oliveri filed a Reply to his Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E. 309.) Having considered the Motions, the Responses, the Replies, and the record, the Court finds as follows.
I. Factual and Procedural Background On September 15, 2004, Plaintiff Hollywood Community Synagogue (hereinafter "HCS" or "the Synagogue") filed a Complaint against Defendants City of Hollywood (hereinafter "Defendant City'' or "the City") and Sal Oliveri (hereinafter "Defendant Oliveri" or"Oiiveri") (Case No. 04-61212-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 14), alleging violations ofnumerous rights and statutes, including the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
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2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (hereinafter "RLUIPA.''). On April 26, 2005, Plaintiff United States of America (hereinafter "Plaintiff United States" or "United States") filed a Complaint against Defendant City of Hollywood (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. I), requesting declaratory and injunctive reliefbased upon Defendant City's alleged violation of RLUIPA. On June 16, 2005, the Court issued an Order consolidating these cases and administratively closing the higher numbered case (Case No. 04-61212-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 75; Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 14), finding they involved common questions of law and fact.
On December 2, 2005, Plaintiff HCS was granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (D.E. 124.) Unless otherwise specified, the legal claims and facts which follow are taken from the allegations contained in the Second Amended Complaint (D.E. 125) in the consolidated case.
Plaintiff HCS is a Synagogue, with its principal place of business at 2215-2221 N. 46th Avenue, Hollywood, Florida 33021. (D.E. 125 at~ 6.) Defendant City of Hollywood is a city municipality authorized by the State of Florida to regulate the use of land and structures within the City's borders, consistent with law. (ld. at ~7.) Defendant Sal Oliveri is a City Commissioner for the City of Hollywood, representing the area ofHollywood Hills. (ld. at~ 8.)
In 1999, Yosef Elul, then-President of the Synagogue, purchased two residences, located at 2215 and 2221 N. 46th Avenue, Hollywood, in a single family district. (Id. at
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~15.) In such single family districts, a place of worship 1 may operate only if granted a Special Exception. (Id. at~ 19.) After the purchase of the land by YosefElul, the Director of Planning for the City of Hollywood advised the Synagogue that it needed to apply for a Special Exception as a place of worship but assured Synagogue representatives that such Special Exception would be granted. (Id. at~~ 19-20.)
In May of 2001, Alan Razla, on behalf of Mr. Elul, applied for a Special Exception as a place of worship. (Id. at~ 21.) The Board of Appeal and Adjustments (hereinafter "BAA") granted a six month Special Exception. (Id.) Four months later, in September of 2001, Commissioner Oliveri filed an appeal to the City Commission of the BAA's grant of the Special Exception. (Id. at 22.) The Commission heard the appeal and subsequently granted the Synagogue a one year Special Exception, which included certain conditions that limited parking and capacity. (Id.) Plaintiff United States notes that, upon information and belief, Defendant City of Hollywood had never previously imposed a time limit on a special exception for a religious use, and had only once imposed a time limit on a special exception for a nonreligious use. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. I at~ 20.)
In late 2001 and early 2002, according to the allegations in Plaintiff HCS 's Second Amended Complaint, Defendant Oliveri directed the City's code enforcement and/or police departments to issue citations and thereby harass the Synagogue and its members. (D.E. 125
1 The City's Zoning and Land Development Regulations do not define place of worship, and thus the Coun will look to the natural and ordinary meaning. Konikov v. Orange County, Fla., 410 F.Jd 1317, 1325 (II th Cir. 2005). A '"place" is defined as ··a building or locality used for a special purpose." Webster's 3d New lnt'l Unabridged Dictionary 1727 ( 1993). "Worship'' is detined as "the reverence or veneration tendered a divine being or supernatural power." !fLat 2637. Thus, taken together, a "place of worship" is a building or locality used for the reverence or veneration of a divine being or supernatural power.
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at ~ 24.) Oliveri allegedly told code enforcement and police officers that "careful and vigilant monitoring" of the Synagogue's properties was required, instructed them to check the Synagogue's property daily for code violations, and directed them to give tickets to cars parked on Plaintiffs property. (Id. at ~~ 25-27.) HCS's Administrator, George Albo, witnessed Code Enforcement and/or Hollywood Police Officers ticketing only those cars parked on the Synagogue's side of the street. (ld. at~ 75.). When Albo inquired as to why only cars belonging to the Synagogue were being ticketed, the officer stated that he was following directions from Defendant Oliveri. (Id.) In addition, a Code Enforcement Officer told Albo that the department was under orders from Commissioner Sal Oliveri and the Mayor to keep an eye on the Synagogue and to enforce the code. (ld. at~ 76.) The Code Enforcement Officer further stated that she "paid special attention'' to Plaintiff. (Id.)
In August of 2002, Arthur Eckstein, on behalf of the Synagogue, applied to the Development Review Board (hereinafter "DRB," formerly known as the BAA) for a Special Exception. In September of 2002, the DRB granted a six-month Temporary Special Exception subject to certain enumerated conditions and found that, subject to those conditions,2 the use of the property as a place of worship was compatible with the existing natural environment and other properties within the vicinity. (ld. at~~ 30, 31(A).) After the DRB hearing, Defendant Sal Oliveri filed an appeal to the Commission. (ld. at~ 32.) In
0
• The conditions imposed by the ORB were: (I) parking of any type is prohibited in the alley located behind the Synagogue; (2) the Synagogue must enter into a lease agreement for off-site parking. (3) the Synagogue must obtain garbage dumpsters in a size and style acceptable to City staff, (4) the Synagogue must enter into a property maintenance agreement with a property maintenance provider who will maintain the premises in accordance with the City Code, and (5) the Synagogue must work with City staff to create a buffer along the rear side of the property. (D.E. 125, at~ 30.)
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October 2002, the Commission denied Oliveri's appeal and allowed HCS the six-month
Temporary Special Exception. iliL at~ 33.)
In March of 2003, the DRB granted the Synagogue a Permanent Special Exception subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions3 within 180 days. (Id. at~ 37.) Defendant Sal Oliveri filed another appeal. (ld. at~ 38.) On June 5, 2003, only 53 days after the Permanent Special Exception was granted, the Commission reversed the decision made by the DRB. (Id. at~ 39.) Among other things, the Commission claimed that the Synagogue was "too controversial." (Id. at~ 41.) "Controversiality" is not defined by the City Code as a factor to be evaluated when considering whether to grant a Special Exception. (Id. at~ 44.) Plaintiff HCS states that contrary to Commission procedure, Defendant Sal Oliveri was permitted to vote on his own appeal and cast the deciding vote (4-3 )4 against the Synagogue. (Id. at~ 40.) Defendant Oliveri stated, "it's almost common sense and reasonable that 'the Chabad' will never tit in Hollywood Hills.'" (ld. at~ 41 (internal quotation marks added).) PlaintiffUnited States notes that, upon information and belief, Defendant City ofHollywood had never previously denied a request by a place of worship to operate in ether a singlefamily or multiple-family residential zone. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1 at~ 28.)
3 The conditions imposed by the ORB require the Synagogue to: (I) build a six-foot soundproof wall at the rear property line; (2) provide for appropriate three-sided dumpster as approved by the City's Public Works Department; (3) provide additional landscaping along the north and south property lines as determined appropriate by the City's Office of Planning; and (4) provide a site plan to the City's Planning Staff that demonstrates how the Synagogue will satisfy the first three conditions. (D.E. 125,at~37.)
4 Plaintiff United States' Complaint contains a discrepancy in that it alleges that the Commission voted 5-2 to reverse the ORB's decision and deny HCS's petition for a third Special Exception. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD. D. E. I at~ 27.)
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On October 16, 2003, Defendant City of Hollywood sent HCS a letter notifying the congregation that it was to cease holding services and other related activities at its current location within one week. (Id. at~ 30.) Thereafter, Defendant Oliveri openly campaigned against the Synagogue in his 2004 campaign for City Commissioner of Hollywood Hills. (D.E. 125 at~ 45.) At a July 2004 Commission meeting, Oliveri asked the Commission ''to evict" the Synagogue and allegedly stated in support thereof, "I would just like to ask the Commission and I beg for their support for the sake of the neighborhoods here... We're talking about neighborhoods here. We're talking about neighborhoods having a smell."5 (Id. at~ 47.) During a July 7, 2004 meeting, the City Commission voted to direct the City Attorney to file a lawsuit to stop further organized religious services from taking place at the Synagogue, despite the fact that this item was not on the agenda and no notice had been provided to HCS or the public that such a vote would take place. (Case No. 05-60687-CIVLENARD, D.E. I at ~ 32.) On or about July 16, 2004, the City filed suit against the Synagogue, in Broward County Circuit Court, Case No. 04-11444 (21 ), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Synagogue for operating as a place of worship without a Special Exception. (D.E. 125 at~ 57.)
Plaintiff HCS asserts and lists at least nineteen places of worship located in Hollywood Hills residential neighborhoods, some of which are located in single family
5 Defendant Oliveri subsequently stated that his comment was an effort to compare his efforts to protect his single family district with the City of Hollywood's efforts to protect the Hollywood Lakes district from a smelly waste treatment facility. (Am. Compl.; Ex. H.)
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districts. (Id. at~ 48.) Additionally, Plaintiff HCS asserts that a single family residence owned by Rosa Lopez, located blocks away from the Synagogue, has for more than a decade operated a "shrine'' to the Virgin Mary. (Id. at~ 51.) She takes donations from visitors, operates a commercial gift shop, and hosts as many as 4,000 people at one time. (Id.) The City of Hollywood has received numerous complaints regarding the traffic, noise and garbage associated with the residence of Ms. Lopez, but has failed to take any action. (Id. at ~~ 52-53.) Ms. Lopez has never applied for a Special Exception. (ld. at~ 53.) When Defendant Sal Oliveri was asked by the Synagogue why Ms. Lopez was not required to obtain a Special Exception, he allegedly replied, "it's a miracle to true believers and the venue cannot be changed since the Virgin Mary visits that particular home... If you people know anything about the Catholic religion, that's called a vision. To Christians and Catholics, that is considered a miracle. That's not establishing a house of worship. That is a miracle." (ld. at~ 54.)
Plaintiff HCS further asserts that one place of worship operated for approximately thirteen years without having applied for a Special Exception. (Id. at~ 49.) It is further alleged that after inquiry by the Synagogue, this place of worship applied for and was
immediately granted a Special Exception. ilil)
PlaintiffHCS alleges that the perceived issues of"noise," "garbage," or "traffic" were no greater for the Synagogue than those posed by other places of worship operating within the City. (ld. at~ 55.) HCS contends that the reversal of the ORB's grant of a permanent
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Special Exception, was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. (Id. at~ 56.) PlaintiffHCS alleges the following 18 Counts against Defendant City of Hollywood
in its Second Amended Complaint: Count 1- damages for violation of the Synagogue's right to free exercise of religion; Count II- injunctive relief for violation of the Synagogue's right to free exercise of religion; Count IV - damages for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)( I)- substantial burden); Count V- injunctive relief for violation ofRLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(l)- substantial burden); Count VI- damages for violation ofRLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(I) - unequal terms); Count VII - injunctive relief for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(l)- unequal terms); Count VIII- damages for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2) - discrimination); Count IX - injunctive relief for violation ofRLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2)- discrimination); Count X- damages for violation of the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998 (Florida RFRA); Count XI- injunctive relief for violation of the Florida RFRA; Count XII- damages for violation of the Equal Protection Clause; Count XIII - injunctive relief for violation of the Equal Protection Clause; Count XIV- damages for violation ofthe Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; Count XV- injunctive relief for violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment; Count XVI- promissory estoppel; Count XVII - facial equal protection challenge to Article V of the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances; Count XVIII- as applied equal protection challenge to Article V of the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances; and Count XIX - preliminary injunctive relief. (D.E. 125
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at~~ 60-151.) P1aintiffHCS's Second Amended Complaint also asserts two claims against Defendant Sal Oliveri, individually: Count III- damages for violation of the Synagogue's right to free exercise of religion; and Count XII - damages for violation of the Equal Protection Clause. (I d. at~~ 72-80, 113-121.) Plaintiff United States' Complaint contains substantially similar facts to PlaintiffHCS's Second Amended Complaint and requests that the Court grant injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendant City of Hollywood for violations of two provisions ofRLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)-(2), based on treatment of HCS on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies and discrimination against HCS on the basis ofreligion or religious denomination. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1 at 6.)
On May I 0, 2006, the Court issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion to Dismiss. (D.E. 272.) Therein, the Court: 1) dismissed Counts I and II with prejudice in part as to any claims related to an alleged City policy of regularly granting Special Exceptions; 2) dismissed Counts IV, V, X, and XI with prejudice; 3) dismissed Count XIX without prejudice; and 4) denied Defendant's Motion with respect to all other Counts. (Id. at 61-62.) On June 16, 2006, the Court issued an oral ruling on Plaintiff HCS's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, finding that the City's Special Exception zoning ordinances were unconstitutional on their face as they related to places of worship, in violation of the First Amendment. (D.E. 354.)6
6 Oral Ruling supplemented by written Order issued on June 26, 2006. (D.E. 370.)
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II. City of Hollywood's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff HCS A. Parties' Arguments
In the City's Motion for Summary Judgment Against HCS (D.E. 247), Defendant City of Hollywood moves for summary judgment on Counts I, II, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XII, XIII, XIV, and XV.7 (ld. at 1.) First, Defendant addresses Counts I, II, XIV and XV, Plaintiff HCS 's § 1983 claims. Defendant City of Hollywood argues that egregious police conduct is necessary to make out a § 1983 claim for police harassment or selective enforcement. (Id. at 4.) Defendant maintains that here, there is no record evidence that police officers or code enforcement officers engaged in egregious conduct. Specifically, the City states that there is no evidence they entered HCS's premises, identified or interrogated congregants, stopped congregants upon exiting the Synagogue, engaged in surveillance of the premises, sat for long hours outside HCS, or confiscated any member's belongings. (ld. at 5.) Defendant points to testimony of officers indicating they issued tickets only in response to complaints, and often after attempting to gain voluntary correction of violations. (Id. at 5-6.) The City further disputes that there was a directive to conduct "park-and-walks" at the Synagogue. (Id. at 8.)
In addition, Defendant City challenges PlaintiffHCS's claim that the City's filing of
7 Defendant City of Hollywood filed its Motion prior to the Court issuing its May I0, 2006 Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and its June 16, 2006 oral ruling on Plaintiff HCS's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. To the extent that the pleadings on any Motions for Summary Judgment address issues rendered moot by the Court's prior Orders, these arguments will be ignored.
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a state court suit seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to prevent the use of the Synagogue's property as a place of worship is actionable under§ 1983. (Id. at 11.) The City argues than any claim for misuse of the legal procedure as a means of harassment must demonstrate egregious conduct, and that the simple filing of a state court suit, without more, is not actionable under§ 1983. (Id. at 11-12.)
Defendant City of Hollywood next argues that its denial ofa Special Exception failed to violate PlaintiffHCS's rights to freedom of assembly, substantive due process or equal protection. (Id. at 13.) Defendant maintains that, as the City's zoning ordinances at issue do not limit the liberties of all persons, the Synagogue's challenge is not cognizable as a substantive due process concern. (Id. at 14.) The City also argues that there is no evidence that the denial ofthe Special Exception was an arbitrary or unreasonable act not substantially related to concerns of public health, safety, welfare or morals. (I d.) In support of this argument, the City cites the testimony of City Commissioners that they voted to deny Plaintiffs application for a Special Exception for permissible reasons. (ld. at 15-16.)
Finally, as to Plaintiffs § 1983 claims, Defendant City of Hollywood argues that PlaintiffHCS has failed to demonstrate a violation of its equal protection rights as it has not shown that any similarly situated entities received more favorable treatment. (Id. at 16.) Defendant also argues that the Synagogue's freedom of assembly has not been deprived because HCS has many areas available to it in the City of Hollywood to freely assemble and worship as a matter of right. (ld. at 17.)
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Second, Defendant City ofHollywood addresses Plaintiffs remaining RLUIPA claims (Counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX). The City argues that a § (b) claim requires a showing that ''similarly situated" uses were treated differently. (D.E. 177 at 6-7.) Defendant City contends that the Eleventh Circuit's definition of"similarly situated" in the equal protection context should control. (Id. at 9.) The City asserts that compared uses should share the same type of zoning district, the same land use designation, the same frequency of gathering, and comparable community impacts. (Id. at 10.) Defendant maintains that Plaintiffhas failed to establish that any other institutions were similarly situated when considering whether the Synagogue was treated on equal terms or suffered discrimination. (ld. at 13, 16.) The City further identifies and distinguishes numerous comparable properties from that of the Synagogue. (Id. at 13-25.)
Third, Defendant City of Hollywood moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs equal protection claims, Counts XII and XIII. Defendant City argues first that Plaintiffs equal protection claims are subsumed within its RLUIPA § (b) claims. (D.E. 247 at 20.) Alternatively, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff must, as with RLUIPA, demonstrate that the Synagogue was treated differently than similarly situated entities. (Id.) As the City contends that Plaintiff has made no showing of similarly situated uses, religious or nonreligious, that received preferential treatment, its equal protection claims must fail. (ld.)
In its Response (D.E. 292), PlaintiffHCS first disputes Defendant's arguments raised in support ofgranting summary judgment on its § 1983 claims for selective enforcement and
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harassment. (Id. at 1.) HCS points to evidence indicating that monitoring ofthe Synagogue's property was motivated by the directives of Defendant Oliveri. (ld. at 2.) Further, the Synagogue argues that the City may not justify the level of police and code activity as responses to anonymous citizen complaints, as many such complaints have been determined unfounded. (I d. at 5-6.) HCS asserts that there is evidence of similar parking violations, not ticketed, at other religious institutions in the neighborhood. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff argues that its selective enforcement and harassment claims raise factual issues which require jury
determination and are thus not ripe for decision on summary judgment. iliL. at 7.)
Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendant City's act of filing a state court suit to enjoin HCS from operating a place of worship in its current location was an act in furtherance of the City's pattern ofharassing the Synagogue for exercising its First Amendment rights. (Id.) HCS further maintains that the City knew or should have known that it was filing suit on the basis of an unconstitutional scheme of zoning ordinances in violation of§ 1983. (Id. at 7-8.)
Third, Plaintiff HCS argues that it suffered a violation of its substantive due process rights under § 1983 via an arbitrary and capricious denial of a constitutionally-protected property right by the City. (ld. at 9.) The Synagogue maintains that the determination of whether a zoning decision is "arbitrary and capricious" is a question oflaw for the court. (Id.) The Synagogue argues that the criteria contained in the City's Zoning and Land Development Regulations (ZLDR) are unconstitutionally vague, and therefore provided Defendant City of Hollywood unbridled discretion in evaluating HCS's application for a Special Exception.
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(ld.) The Synagogue further points to evidence that impermissible considerations entered into the Commission's decision. (ld.) Finally, HCS contends that it had a vested property right in the Synagogue's property because it reasonably relied on the ORB's grant of a Permanent Special Exception to its detriment. (Id. at 12.) Thus, PlaintiffHCS maintains that the City is estopped from denying the Special Exception. (lll)
Fourth, in addressing its RL UIPA claims, Plaintiffadopts the arguments advanced by the United States in its Response to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment Against the United States. (D.E. 228.) Therein, Plaintiff United States argues, inter alia, that substantial evidence exists that the City's decision to deny PlaintiffHCS a Special Exception was made on the basis of the Synagogue's religious denomination, namely, Hasidic Judaism. (Id. at 5.) The United States also maintains that there is substantial evidence that the City discriminated against the Synagogue by treating it differently than other properties. (ld.) Plaintiff United States points to numerous properties that hosted assemblies that were religious in nature, but which were never required to apply for a Special Exception. (Id. at 6-8.) Plaintiff also cites evidence of numerous religious institutions that received Special Exceptions, despite either
failing to meet all four criteria or failing to come before the City Commission. ilil at 8-9.)
Plaintiff further presents evidence that other nonreligious institutions were treated more favorably than the Synagogue (Id. at 10.) The United States further argues that it has demonstrated disputed facts underlying its equal terms and nondiscrimination claims by presenting evidence of similarly situated institutions. (Id. at 11-22.)
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Finally, the United States maintains that even absent evidence of other properties, there is sufficient evidence that Plaintiff HCS was the victim of religious discrimination to support its § 2(b)(2) claim. (Id. at 22-23.) Plaintiff United States contends that no showing of disparate treatment is necessary to maintain such a claim. Instead, the United States argues that evidence ofdiscriminatory intent on the part ofthe City, including discriminatory slurs from the crowd, comments by a City Commissioner during the meeting on the Synagogue's Special Exception application, statements by Commissioners that the Synagogue's application was controversial, and the City's decision to file a state court suit against the Synagogue without notice to the public, support its cause of action under the nondiscrimination provision ofRLUIPA. (ld. at 23-24.) Such evidence is in addition to the fact that the Synagogue was subjected to daily visits by code enforcement officers, that such violations went unpunished at other institutions, that Plaintiff HCS was the only religious institution to receive a limit on the number of people who could attend services or a time limit on the use of its property for religious services, and that Defendant City of Hollywood had never before denied a request by a place of worship to operate in a single-family or multiple-family residential zone. Qd. at 6, 23-24.)
On the C ity's final claim, the Synagogue also adopts Plaintiff United States' arguments regarding similarly situated properties in support of its equal protection claims. (Id. at 14.) PlaintiffHCS argues that it has demonstrated that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether other similarly situated entities were treated differently during the
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Special Exception process. (ld.) In its Reply to its Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff HCS (D.E. 306),
the City of Hollywood again argues that the Synagogue has not demonstrated egregious police conduct sufficient to support a § 1983 claim of police harassment. (ld. at 1.) Defendant avers that there is no evidence that the City retaliated against HCS to deter members from exercising their religious beliefs or that a person of ordinary firmness would, in fact, have been deterred from exercising such beliefs. (ld. at 2-3.) The City maintains that a parking ticket would not deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising their beliefs and that the Synagogue has presented no evidence that its members' First Amendment expression was actually chilled. (ld. at 3.) The City further argues that its park-and-walks were not conducted frequently enough to constitute egregious police conduct and that mere surveillance by government authorities is insufficient to give rise to a First Amendment violation. (ld. at 5-6.) Defendant contends that the presence of police or code enforcement officers at or near the Synagogue bore a substantial relation to legitimate law enforcement. (Id. at 6.) Finally, the City contests that the Synagogue's evidence regarding code enforcement demonstrates unconstitutional practices. (ld. at 7-8.)
Second, Defendant City of Hollywood contends that Plaintiff HCS' s claim that the City retaliated against it by filing a state court suit is without merit. (ld. at 8-9.) The City maintains that the Synagogue has not shown any evidence of retaliation. (Id.) Moreover, Defendant argues that filing suit with knowledge or constructive knowledge that it was
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seeking to enforce an unconstitutional statute does not itself make out a deprivation of a constitutional right. (ld. at 9.)
Third, in regard to Plaintiffs due process claim, Defendant City argues that Plaintiff HCS cites no evidence ofimpermissible considerations, improper motive or pretextual means by the City. (I d.) The City further asserts that the Synagogue has cited no evidence demonstrating good faith reliance on the ORB's 2003 grant of a Permanent Special Exception, such as evidence of substantial expenses. (Id. at 9-1 0.) Defendant City argues that the DRB 's grant made it clear that the Synagogue would have to reapply in three years. (ld. at 10.) Thus, Defendant City of Hollywood maintains that any expenses incurred with knowledge that the matter was on appeal would not have been made in good faith detrimental reliance. (Id.)
Finally, as to Plaintiffs equal protection claims, Defendant argues that the Court is well within its authority to rule as a matter of law that certain properties and uses are not similarly situated. (ld.) In support, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to meet the prima facie showing that other institutions are identical in all relevant respects to survive
summary judgment. iliU
B. Analysis 1. Standard of Review
On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v.
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S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 ( 1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (c). The Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard as follows:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.317, 322-23 ( 1986). The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 ( 1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir. 1989). The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file, together with affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'' Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once this initial demonstration under rule 56(c) is made, the
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burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must ''go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Id. at 324; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). In meeting this burden the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Id. at 587. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Id.
2. HCS's First Amendment Claims (Counts I and II) In order to obtain relief under§ 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that conduct under color of state law, complained of in the civil rights suit, violated its rights, privileges, or immunities under the Constitution or laws ofthe United States. Whitehorn v. Harrelson, 758 F.2d 1416, 1419 ( ll th Cir. 1985). Moreover, the Supreme Court has placed strict limitations on municipal liability under section 1983. Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998), citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). There is no respondeat superior liability upon which to inculpate a municipality for the wrongful actions of its employees or agents. 436 U.S. at 691, 694. Thus, a municipality can only be held liable if an official policy or custom of that municipality causes a constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95. It is not enough for the plaintiff to merely identify
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conduct properly attributable to the municipality; the plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through deliberate conduct, the municipality is the moving force behind the alleged injury. Board of County Com'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
In its May 10, 2006 Order ofDismissal, the Court dismissed any § 1983 claim relating to an alleged City policy of routinely granting Special Exceptions. (D.E. 272.) In its June 16, 2006 oral ruling Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Minutes of Pretrial Conference," D.E. 354),8 the Court granted summary judgment on HCS's § 1983 claims relating to the one incident of the City denying Plaintiffs application for a Special Exception. Thus, the sole remaining basis for Plaintiffs § 1983 claims that the Court must address herein is the allegation that the City of Hollywood violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights via a policy of harassment and selective enforcement.
Plaintiff HCS claims its First Amendment rights were violated by the knowing harassment and selective enforcement of code violations by Defendant City of Hollywood, as well as by the retaliatory filing of a state law suit to enjoin the operation of a place of worship. The Eleventh Circuit has held that, "the continued failure of the city to prevent known constitutional violations by its police force is precisely the type of informal policy or custom that is actionable under section 1983." Depew v City ofSt. Marys. Georgia, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (lith Cir. 1986). Moreover, in Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247 (lith Cir. 2005), the Court of Appeals held that, "[a] plaintiff suffers adverse action if the defendant's
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allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment rights." ld. at 1254. The Court went on to hold that a prolonged and organized campaign of harassment by local police officers was sufficiently adverse that a jury could find they would chill a person of ordinary firmness form exercising his or her First Amendment rights. ld. at 1254-55.
In its Order of May 10, 2006, the Court found that the City's policy of harassment, selective enforcement and retaliation alleged by Plaintiff was sufficient to constitute the moving force behind the Synagogue's injuries. See Griffin v. City ofOpa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1312 (1 Jth Cir. 200I)(City's tolerance of gross sexual harassment and failure to take action despite actual and constructive knowledge ofthe problem constituted a moving force). The Court, therefore, must only address whether there is a genuine issue ofmaterial fact that harassment and selective enforcement rose to a level sufficient to violate Plaintiffs rights under the Constitution.
Defendant City of Hollywood has argued that there is no record evidence that police and code enforcement officers have violated the Synagogue's First Amendment rights, as there's no evidence of, inter alia officers entering the premises, stopping or interrogating congregants, or engaging in surveillance. (D.E. 247 at 4-5.) In its Statement of Material Facts (D.E. 248), the City provides evidence intended to support this argument, including testimony from Officer Stephanie Ramirez that she never performed surveillance of the Synagogue but instead waited for violations to occur (ld. at ~ 2), that she would not
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automatically issue citations for violations but would ticket flagrant violations (Id. at ~ 3), and that she would attempt to gain voluntary compliance to correct violations. (ld. at~ 4.) The City also cites testimony of Officer Susan Jacobs stating that her visits to Plaintiffs properties were the result of daily complaints (Id. at~ 9), that the violations she issued were no different from those she had written for other properties (Id. at~ II), and that she had documented violations of conditions of at least two other Special Exceptions, besides those at HCS. (Id. at~ 12.) Moreover, the City cites testimony suggesting that code officers were not directed to monitor the Synagogue. (ld. at~ 8, 13.) Thus, Defendant City maintains that the conduct of its police and code enforcement officers did not rise to the level of egregiousness necessary for a § 1983 violation.
In response, Plaintiff argues that egregiousness is not necessary, but that a prolonged and organized campaign of harassment by local police is sufficient to demonstrate its claim under§ 1983. (D.E. 292 at 2.) The Synagogue provides significant evidence to support the existence ofsuch a campaign, including a communication from Defendant Sal Oliveri stating that "careful and vigilant monitoring and reporting of violations" of the Synagogue was required (Id. at Ex. B), a communication from City Chiefof Police Jim Scarberry noting that, "'[p]er Commissioner Oliveri's request, the Police Department. .. will continue to monitor and provide a monthly synopsis ofactivity'' (Id. at Ex. C), and various communications from City officials indicating that HCS properties were visited daily (ld. at Ex. D-F.) The Synagogue has also provided evidence that various City officials were concerned with the level ofpolice
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and enforcement activity and the behavior of Commissioner Sal Oliveri, including Commissioner Cathy Anderson, who expressed concern over the City's and Oliveri's legal expenses in dealing with the Synagogue and wrote that "[t]he surveillance on 'the Chabad' and Rabbi's home is 365 days per year, 24 hours a day and borders on harassment," (Id. at Ex. G (internal quotation marks added)) and Mayor Mara Giulianti, who responded to a concerned citizen via email that "I agree with you that Commissioner Oliveri's behavior was out-of-line... Unfortunately, [the City Manager] probably allowed the enforcement to be overly zealous because of Commissioner Oliveri's urging." (Id. at Ex. G.) Furthermore, in the Synagogue's Statement of Material Facts (D.E. 296), PlaintiffHCS provides evidence that numerous City officials found unusual Oliveri's requests for monthly reports of code activity at a particular property. (See id at~~ 15-18.)
The Court finds Plaintiff HCS has presented substantial evidence demonstrating a pattern of harassment and selective enforcement sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact ofwhether the City has violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Further, the Court finds that the Defendant City's reliance on the standard of"egregiousness" for police conduct to violate § 1983 is misplaced; it is clear that a prolonged and organized campaign of harassment by local police officers may be sufficient to chill First Amendment rights for purposes of§ 1983. Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1254-55.
3. PlaintifTHCS's Substantive Due Process Claims (Counts XIV and XV)
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In Counts XIV and XV, PlaintiffHCS alleges that the Commission's reversal of the decision of the DRB to grant a permanent Special Exception was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable because it bore no substantial relation to issues ofpublic health, safety, welfare, or morals. (D.E. 125 at ~ 126.) Moreover, the Synagogue claims that it had a property interest in the DRB 's grant of a Special Exception because the Synagogue expended money in good faith reliance on the DRB's conditions for the granting of a permanent Special Exception. (Id. at~ 128.) Thus, the Synagogue alleges that its substantive due process rights were violated by the Commission's reversal. (l!L. at 34-35.)
In Greenbriar. Ltd., v. City of Alabaster, the Eleventh Circuit noted the longestablished tenet that zoning regulations would not be declared unconstitutional as violative of substantive due process unless they were "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1989), quoting Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 ( 1926). The Greenbriar Court further stated the two-pronged test for violations of substantive due process: ( 1) it must be determined that there has been a deprivation of a federal constitutionally protected interest, and (2) that deprivation must be the result of an abuse of governmental power sufficient to raise an ordinary tort to the statute of a constitutional violation. 881 F.2d at 1577, citing Rymer v. Douglas County, 764 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1985). The Court then elaborated that the second prong was met when the deprivation was undertaken for an improper motive and by means that were pretextual,
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arbitrary and capricious, and without any rational basis. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In Coral Springs Street Systems. Inc. v. City ofSunrise, the Eleventh Circuit held that vested rights could be created, thus engendering an enforceable entitlement to satisfY the first prong of the test, when a party had reasonably and detrimentally relied on existing law, creating the conditions of equitable estoppel. 371 F.3d 1320, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004). Under Florida law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be raised against a local government when a property owner: ( 1) in good faith; (2) upon an act or omission of the government; (3) has made such a substantial change in position or incurs such substantial expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right the owner acquired. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). As further explained by the Court in Coral Springs,
the theory of equitable estoppel amounts to nothing more than an application of the rules of fair play. One party will not be permitted to invite another onto a welcome mat and then be permitted to snatch the mat away to the detriment of the party induced or permitted to stand thereon. A citizen is entitled to rely on the assurances or commitments ofa zoning authority and if he does, the zoning authority is bound by its representations, whether they be in the form of words or deeds... Id. at 1334-35, quoting Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp, 309 So.2d 571, 573 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1975). Here, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that it made a substantial change in position or incurred substantial expenses in reliance upon the representations of the City of Hollywood. Though HCS lists numerous actions that were allegedly taken in reliance on the
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ORB's grant of a Permanent Special Exception with conditions (D.E. 292 at 12), it provides no record evidence to support these assertions. At Pretrial Conference, held June 16, 2006, Plaintiff HCS indicated that, though it could not provide specific cites, such evidence was contained in the depositions of Rabbi Joseph Korf and Arthur Eckstein. (''Transcript of Pretrial Conference," D.E. 354 at 59:12-19.) However, after thorough review of the deposition ofKorf, containing extensive discussion ofthe Synagogue's alleged damages, the Court finds no reference to substantial expenses incurred in reliance on the City's grant of a temporary Special Exception. (See Deposition ofRabbi Joseph Korfat 104-224.) Although Arthur Eckstein testified that the Synagogue entered into a six-month agreement for off-site parking as a result of requests from the City around 2003, costing the Synagogue 250-300 dollars per month (see Deposition of Arthur Eckstein at 107:9-18; 119:6-120:3), Eckstein provides no testimony about any other specific or substantial expenditures in reliance on City requests. The Court finds that evidence of this brief contract alone is insufficient to show a genuine issue on whether the Synagogue undertook such a substantial change in position or incurred such substantial expenses that it would be highly inequitable or unjust to revoke its Special Exception. As the nonmoving party, PlaintiffHCS must do more than allege facts purporting to show a genuine issue of material fact; the Synagogue must designate specific facts in depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits or admissions on file that demonstrate the existence ofa genuine issue. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Plaintiff has therefore not met its burden with respect to equitable estoppel, and the
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Court will grant Defendant's Motion on these grounds. However, Plaintiff HCS also argues that Defendant City's decision to revoke the
Synagogue's Special Exception denied HCS of its constitutionally protected rights because the revocation was arbitrary and capricious. On this claim, the Court finds that the first prong of the Greenbriar test, that there has been a deprivation of federal constitutionally protected interest, has been met by the City's revocation of the Synagogue's Special Exception. The Court announced at oral arguments that it had found the City's zoning ordinances unconstitutional as they related to Special Exceptions for places of worship because they granted unbridled discretion to officials. The Court hereby finds that by applying this unconstitutional statute to the Synagogue, Defendant City of Hollywood deprived Plaintiff HCS of its constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
On the second prong, the Greenbriar Court held that a deprivation is the result of an abuse of governmental power of constitutional stature if it is undertaken "'for an improper motive and by means that were pretextual, arbitrary and capricious, and... without any rational basis." 881 F.2d at 1577 (quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, Plaintiffhas provided the following facts in support of its argument that the City's decision was arbitrary and capricious or made for an improper motive. First, Commissioner Sal Oliveri stated that he voted against granting the Synagogue a Special Exception because no matter what efforts HCS made or conditions the Commission put upon them, the Synagogue ·'does not fit and, in my opinion, will never fit" in its neighborhood in the City of Hollywood. (See Oliveri
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Deposition at 132:5-134:22.) Second, Mayor Mara Giulianti stated that Oliveri's "actions as a commissioner, to be perfectly honest, were not - were very - I think they were very personal in many respects.'' (Giulianti Deposition at 256: 11-13.) She also stated that, she felt that Oliveri's behavior was out ofline and that in '' 15 years I have never seen such a single focus.'' (D.E. 352, Ex. A at 413:14-20.) Third, Giulianti stated that she, moreover, had personally voted against the Special Exception in part to avoid setting a dangerous precedent that the City didn't enforce its zoning codes. (See id. at 187:10-188:23.) Fourth, Commissioner Keith Wasserstrom characterized the Synagogue issue as a controversial and divisive issue, and stated that, in his opinion, part of the reason for the Commission's denial of the Synagogue's Special Exception was because of this controversial and divisive characteristic. ("Wasserstrom Deposition," D.E. 217, Ex. 3 at 138:11-139: 17.) These facts, taken together, raise a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to whether the Commission's decision to deny the Synagogue a Special Exception was arbitrary or unreasonable, or undertaken based upon a pretextual or improper motive. Therefore, Defendant has not met its burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to any essential element of Plaintiffs substantive due process claim, as it relates to the arbitrary and capricious denial of Plaintiffs First Amendment rights. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is denied as to this portion of Plaintiffs Counts XIV and XV.
4. Plaintiff HCS's RLUIPA Claims (Counts VI, VII, VIII and IX)
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PlaintiffHCS's Counts VI and VII are made pursuant to RLUIPA section (b)(l), the ''equal terms" provision. This provision states, "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.'' 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(I). As Plaintiff alleges that the City applied its zoning ordinances differently to the Synagogue as compared to other nonreligious institutions, its claims can be categorized as an "as-applied" equal terms challenge under RL UIPA. The Eleventh Circuit recently held, in Primera Iglesia v. Broward County, that a plaintiff bringing an as-applied equal terms RLUIPA claim must offer evidence of a similarly situated comparator that was treated differently to make out a
claim. 2006 WL 1493825, at *11 (lith Cir.). The Court further held that the standard for
comparison of religious and nonreligious assemblies or institutions should be the "similarly situated" standard from the Eleventh Circuit's equal protection cases, as articulated in Campbell v. Rainbow City. Ala., 434 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2006). Id. Thus, in order for any property to be similarly situated to the Synagogue, it must be prima facie identical in all relevant respects. Campbell, 434 F.3d at 1314.
The Eleventh Circuit in Konikov v. Orange County, Fla., 410 F.3d 13 17, 1324 (11th Cir. 2005), found that whether a zoning code had been implemented in a manner violative of the equal terms provision of RLUIPA required a thorough review of the record and an examination of evidence considered by the governmental body in question, including the frequency of meetings, the number of people and vehicles at the properties, and whether
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invitation to meetings and services was extended to the public. Id. at 1327. Thus, the Court in the instant case will compare the record evidence pertaining to the Synagogue and other nonreligious assemblies and institutions in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, to see if there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City treated the two on less than equal terms. In doing so, the Court adopts the findings of the Konikov Court regarding the applicable definitions of the relevant terms for RLUIPA purposes. Thus, an "assembly" is defined as "a company of persons collected together in one place and usually for some common purpose (as deliberation and legislation, worship, or social entertainment)." Id. at 1325 (citations omitted). An "institution" is defined as "an established society or corporation: an establishment or foundation [especially] ofa public character..." Id. (citations omitted).
Plaintiff HCS, in adopting the arguments advanced by Plaintiff United States, points to evidence with respect to two institutions that the Court finds raises a genuine issue regarding whether they are similarly situated for equal terms purposes. First, Plaintiffargues that the day care facility located at 2427-2431 Taft Street is comparable to HCS in that it is located on a street comparable to 46th Avenue where the Synagogue is located ("United States' Statement of Material Facts," D.E. 229 at~ 60), it is located in a comparable zoning district (ld. at~ 55), the City Planning Director testified that both properties were places where people assembled, generated more trash than a single family home, and used multiple buildings, and that the day care center at Taft Street had more of an impact on the
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surrounding community than the HCS. (ld. at~~ 62-64.) Plaintiff further notes that one Commissioner testified that there was "lots'' ofcommunity opposition to conversion for both properties. (ld. at~ 65.) Despite the City Planning Commission's recommendation that the City deny the day care center's application for a Special Exception, based upon the determination that the day care center was inconsistent with three of the four Special Exception criteria (based on concerns over compatibility, traffic, setbacks, and noise), the DRB granted (with conditions) the center a Special Exception to convert three single-family dwellings into a day care facility. (ld. at~~ 67-69.) Further, Plaintiff provides evidence that no Commissioner appealed this decision. (Id. at ~ 71.)
Defendant City of Hollywood disputes the characterization of the property at 2427243 1 Taft Street as comparable to the Synagogue and provides the following evidence in support. Defendant notes that the property at 2427-2431 Taft Street was zoned for "low/Medium Multi-Family Residential" use, whereas the Synagogue was in an area zoned for "low residential" single family use. ("City of Hollywood's Statement ofMaterial Facts Regarding Motion Against U.S.," D.E. 248 at~~ 59-61, 65.) The City has pointed out that the permissible density in Multi-Family Residential districts is greater than that allowed in single family neighborhoods. (Transcript ofPretrial Conference at61 :23-62:16,63: 18-64:4.)
The Court finds that the argument Defendant City of Hollywood makes that the two properties are not similarly situated based upon the different permissible densities ofthe two areas suggests that the Synagogue had a relatively greater impact on its surroundings.
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However, Plaintiff HCS has presented testimony indicating that the daycare center had a greater impact on the surrounding community than the Synagogue. Moreover, in Multiple Family Districts, ''day care facilities'' are treated as permitted uses subject to the ORB's grant of a Special Exception. (D.E. 191, Ex. Bat§ 4.2.) Thus, day care facilities are treated under exactly the same rubric in Multiple Family zoning districts as the Synagogue is in its Single Family zoning district. (See id. at 4.1.) Finally, Jacqueline Gonzalez testified that, in her observations, day care centers have peak hours that have created more traffic problems than the Synagogue. (Gonzalez Deposition at 186:9-21.) Therefore, the record evidence contains a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the daycare center at 2427-2431 Taft street is similarly situated to the Synagogue.
Second, Plaintiff HCS points to the home of Rosa Lopez as evidence of another nonreligious institution9 that was treated on less than equal terms by Defendant City of Hollywood. Plaintiff argues that Rosa Lopez's residence constitutes an "assembly" for RLUIPA purposes because groups of persons gather there, often in an organized fashion, for the purposes of prayer and receiving healing benefits. (D.E. 228 at 19.) In support of its argument that the property is identical to the Synagogue's property, Plaintiff notes that the property is in a neighborhood zoned for single-family use, people gather each month for religious services, Defendant has received complaints from neighbors about noise and illegal
9 As described in more detail below. Plaintiff United States maintains that the home of Rosa Lopez should be treated as a religious institution for purposes of the Court's analysis. and argues in the alternative that it is a comparable nonreligious institution in the event the Court finds it was nonreligious in nature. (D. E. 228 at 18.)
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parking, Lopez sells religious articles from her home, and Lopez operates an "Apparition Room'' that is open to visitors daily. (United States' Statement of Material Facts at~~ 24-25, 33-35,41-43, 47-48.) However, the City ofHollywood has never requested that Lopez apply for a Special Exception, either to operate as a place of worship, as a meeting hall, or for "other accessory uses," and no such application was ever filed as of September 200 I. (Id. at ~~ 29-32, 49-51.) Moreover, Defendant City's current Planning Director testified that he was specifically directed not to visit the Lopez home. (Id. at~ 53.) Therefore, ifLopez's property is not considered a religious institution under RLUIPA, Plaintiff argues it is a similarly situated property for purposes of its equal terms claim.
Defendant argues that Rosa Lopez is not a similarly situated assembly or institution for RLUIPA purposes. Defendant claims, inter alia, that Ms. Lopez uses the property primarily as a residence, that there is no unusual behavior surrounding the property on days other than the 13th of the month, and that there have been no structural changes to the house to remove it from characterization as a single-family home. (City of Hollywood's Statement of Material Facts Regarding Motion Against U.S. at~~ 41-42, 47-50.)
The Court finds that the home of Rosa Lopez may be characterized as more than merely a "[s]ingle family detached dwelling," defined by the ZLDR as "[a] dwelling occupied by not more than one family; a dwelling comprised of only one dwelling unit'' and constituting the main permitted use in a Single Family District. (D.E. 355 at§ 2.2; D.E. 191, Ex. 8 at § 4.1) Record evidence shows that the Lopez home is often occupied by hundreds
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if not thousands of people. Yet, Lopez has not been required to apply for any permits for her

additional uses. The ZLDR provides that a property owner must apply to the Community

Planning Director to approve "other accessory uses'' (aside from uses customarily associated

with

single

family

homes

10 ),

if a number of criteria

are

met.

(D.E.

191,

Ex.

B at

§ 4.l.E.)

Despite the fact that record evidence demonstrates that Lopez is offering religious articles

on her property in exchange for "donations," she has never been required to obtain a permit

for an accessory use.

Further, ''meeting halls and similar nonprofit uses" are also considered Special

Exceptions under the ZLDR in Single Family Districts. As the code does not define

"meeting halls," the Court gives it its ordinary or natural meaning. Konikov, 410 F.3d at

1325, citing Midrash Sephardi. Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2004). Though "meeting hall" is not given an independent definition, 11 the meaning of the

compound term can be derived from the meanings ofthe individual terms. A "meeting" is

defined as "an act or process for coming together." Webster's 3d New Int'l Unabridged

Dictionary 1404 (1993). A "hall" is defined, alternatively, as "a) A building for public

meetings or entertainments; b) The large room in which such events are held." Webster's II

New College Dictionary 500 (1995). Taken together, the Court finds that the ordinary and

natural meaning of "meeting hall" is a building used for the act or process of coming

10 Such uses customarily associated with single family homes include, but arc not limited to, decks, swimming pools, spa~. sheds. ornamental features and tennis courts. (D. E. 191, Ex. Bat § 4.1.E.)
11 However. "meetinghouse" is defined as "a building used for public assembly." See Webster's 3d lnt'l Unabridged Dictionary 1404 ( 1993 ).
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together. The record evidence demonstrates that Lopez regularly hosted visitors who came together for a common purpose at her residence, namely, to pay homage to the Virgin Mary. Therefore, the Court finds that there exists a material issue of genuine fact as to whether the Lopez residence fits the definition of meeting hall, and thus was a similarly situated institution or assembly for purposes of RLUIPA and Defendant City's Special Exception provisions. Thus, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs as-applied equal terms claim under RLUIPA is denied.
Plaintiffs Counts VIII and IX are as-applied challenges made pursuant to RLUIPA section (b)(2), the "nondiscrimination" provision. This provision states, "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2). Defendant City of Hollywood's primary argument in favor of summary judgment is that PlaintiffHCS has not demonstrated that the Synagogue was discriminated against compared to other similarly-situated religious institutions. However, the Parties, acknowledging a dearth of case law regarding the applicable standard of comparison for assemblies or institutions under RLUIPA, have stipulated that discriminatory intent is a required showing under section (b)(2).
Plaintiff HCS, in adopting the arguments of Plaintiff United States, argues that discriminatory intent is shown by the following facts. First, that the City of Hollywood has never before denied a Special Exception to a place of worship or even imposed a time limit
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on the grant ofa Special Exception. (United States' Statement of Material Facts at ,-r,-r 77-78.) Second, that a City Commissioner made discriminatory comments about the Synagogue in comparison to the Lopez property at a City meeting such as, "the spiritual benefit that may be achieved by the people going [to the Lopez home] once a month far outweighed the inconvenience of that occasion.'' (Id. at ,-r 81.) Third, that on July 7, 2004, Defendant City voted to enjoin the Synagogue from operating as a place of worship without placing the item on the agenda or giving notice to the public or the Synagogue that such a vote would take place, an unusual act. (Id. at ,-r,-r 97-98.) Fourth, Plaintiff HCS points to facts regarding the disparate treatment received by the Nativity Catholic Church, located in a single family residential neighborhood in Hollywood Hills. (Id. at ,-r 99.) Plaintiff cites record evidence showing that numerous City officials attend this Church, that cars regularly park illegally at the Church, that residents ofthe City have complained for years about parking at the Church, and that Defendant City has not issued a parking ticket to an illegally parked car at Nativity Church in ten years. (Id. at ,-r,-r 100-104.) All of these facts raise an inference of discriminatory treatment and intent on the part of the City of Hollywood toward Hollywood Community Synagogue, as compared to other religious institutions, including the Nativity Church.
PlaintiffHCS also points to facts regarding numerous other religious institutions, most notably the house of Rosa Lopez, that received differential treatment. As noted above, despite the fact that Lopez's home attracts numerous visitors for religious services and
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generates complaints about noise and parking, Lopez has never been required to apply for a Special Exception as a place ofworship. (ld. at~~ 24-25, 29-35,41-43, 47-51.) Moreover, as noted above, the City's current Planning Director testi fled that he was specifically directed not to visit the Lopez home. (Id. at~ 53.)
The City's ZLDR does not define place ofworship, and thus the Court will again look to the natural and ordinary meaning. Konikov, 410 F.3d at 1325. A "place" is defined as "a building or locality used for a special purpose." Webster's 3d New Int'l Unabridged Dictionary 1727 (1993). "Worship" is defined as "the reverence or veneration tendered a divine being or supernatural power." ld. at 2637. Thus, taken together, a "place of worship" is a building or locality used for the reverence or veneration ofa divine being or supernatural power. The record evidence presented by Plaintiff demonstrates that Lopez was holding monthly public gatherings at her home to pay homage to the Virgin Mary. This creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lopez was operating a place of worship under the City's ZLDR and was thus similarly situated for RLUIPA purposes.
Therefore, the Court finds that the above facts are sufficient to generate a genuine issue of material fact as to PlaintiffHCS's section (b)(2) claims under RLUIPA, and defeat Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion for Summary Judgment as to those claims.
5. Plaintiff's Equal Protection Claims (Counts XII and XIII) PlaintiffHCS's Counts XII and XIII allege violations ofthe Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for differential treatment of the Synagogue by the Defendant
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City of Hollywood as compared to other similarly situated places of worship. Primera Iglesia at *11, citing Campbell, 434 F.3d at 1314. For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has demonstrated that there exists a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether other places of worship were similarly situated and treated disparately by the Defendant City. Therefore, summary judgment on these claims must be denied.
III. Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff United States
Defendant City of Hollywood likewise moves for Summary Judgment on both of PlaintiffUnited States' Claims under RLUIPA section (b)(l) and (b)(2). The City argues that Plaintiff United States has not shown that other similarly situated institutions were treated disparately compared to the Synagogue. As noted above, the standard for finding another entity as similarly situated is identical as that identified for as-applied equal terms challenges under RLUIPA. As the Court has already addressed this issue above in discussing the identical claims by PlaintiffHCS, and the Parties make no new or additional arguments with respect to Plaintiff United States, the Court adopts its previous findings and finds genuine issues of material fact exist as to Plaintiff United States sections (b)(1) and (b)(2) claims. Accordingly, the City of Hollywood's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff United States is denied.
IV. Defendant Sal Oliveri's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff HCS
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A. Parties' Arguments In his Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 250), Defendant Sal Oliveri argues that the Court should grant summary judgment as to Count III, the Synagogue's § 1983 for violation of its right to free exercise of religion, and Count XII, the Synagogue's equal protection claim for damages. In support, Defendant Oliveri first argues that he's entitled to absolute immunity because he is a legislator who was engaged in furtherance ofhis duties. (Id. at 4.) Oliveri maintains that information·gathering is an essential element of the legislative function, and that his efforts to obtain monthly reports on police and code enforcement violations at the Synagogue were intended to assure that the policy dictated by the Commission be followed and to help decide City policy. (lih at 5.) Second, Defendant Oliveri argues he's entitled to qualified immunity because he was acting within his discretionary authority. (Id. at 6.) Defendant Oliveri further argues that the Synagogue has not shown a change in its schedule, lost membership, or how any such loss or overzealous enforcement could be attributed to him. (ld.) Third, Defendant Oliveri argues that the statements attributed to him cannot establish discriminatory intent because they were taken out of context. (Id. at 7-8.) Fourth, Defendant Oliveri argues that the home of Rosa Lopez is not similarly situated for equal protection purposes. (Id. at 8-12.) In its Response (D.E. 294), Plaintiff HCS argues first that Defendant Oliveri is not entitled to absolute or legislative immunity. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff contends that legislative immunity does not apply to all actions by a legislator, but only those taken within his
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legitimate legislative activity, which does not encompass zonmg enforcement or the application of policy to a specific party. (ld. at 1-3.) Second, the Synagogue argues that Oliveri is not entitled to qualified immunity because Defendant has not shown that targeting the Synagogue was within the scope of his discretionary authority and because such action constituted a known constitutional violation. (ld. at 3-7.) Further, PlaintiffHCS argues that intent is an element ofthe underlying constitutional violation ofthe Equal Protection Clause, and that the jury should be left to decide whether Defendant Oliveri's comments demonstrate discriminatory intent. (Id. at 7-10.) Third, Plaintiff maintains that whether Rosa Lopez is similarly situated is a question for the jury. (Id. at 10-12.) Finally, on its equal protection claim, the Synagogue contends that the evidence shows that park and walks were motivated by Defendant 0 Iiveri and that Defendant 0 Iiveri' s proffered testimony ofOfficers Stephanie Ramirez and Susan Jacobs does not establish that these officers actually looked for violations at surrounding properties. (Id. at 13-14.)
In his Reply, Defendant Oliveri argues that numerous statements cited by Plaintiff HCS constitute inadmissible hearsay upon which the Court cannot rely for summary judgment purposes. (D.E. 309 at 1-3.) Oliveri further argues that having City ofHollywood employees monitor HCS's premises is not an known constitutional violation. (Id. at II.) Finally, Defendant Oliveri maintains that, because Rosa Lopez's house is out ofhis district, he could not possibly be liable for an equal protection claim based upon disparate treatment of Lopez. (ld. at 16.) Moreover, Defendant Oliveri argues that none of the other churches
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identified by Plaintiffgenerated complaints from neighbors, and thus could not be considered
similarly situated to HCS, which generated numerous complaints. ful at 17.)
In Plaintiff HCS's Sur-Reply (D.E. 352), permitted by the Court to address claims raised for the first time in Defendant Oliveri's Reply, HCS argues that it relied on numerous statements that were not hearsay because they constituted party admissions. (ld. at 2.) Plaintiffalso points to numerous comments in the record suggesting that Defendant Oliveri's actions were not within the scope of his authorized duties. (ld. at 2-8.)
B. Analysis Summary judgment is appropriate if Defendant can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the claims made against him. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Defendant has argued that he is entitled to absolute immunity and qualified immunity on both Counts against him, and that, regardless of whether immunity is found, summary judgment should be granted on both Counts. The Court shall address each of these arguments in tum.
1. Absolute Immunity It is well settled that legislators are protected by absolute immunity in their legislative functions. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). This holding has been extended by the Eleventh Circuit to purely local legislators in land use and zoning cases. Com v. City ofLauderdale, 997 F.2d 1369, 1392 (lith Cir. 1993). However, not all actions taken by local legislators are subject to this protection; absolute legislative immunity "extends only to
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actions taken within the sphere oflegitimate legislative activity." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). While actions taken in connection with promulgating zoning ordinances and classifications, even the decision about which zoning classification should be applied to a specific parcel of land, have been held to be protected by legislative immunity, see id., citing Baytree oflnverray Realty Partners v. City ofLauderhill, 873 F.2d 1407, 1409 (lith Cir. 1989), the application of policy to a specific party, including the denial of a development permit, has been held not protected by legislative immunity. See id., citing Crymes v. DeKalb County, 923 F.2d 1482, 1485-86 (lith Cir. 1991 ).
Thus, Defendant Oliveri's argument that he was seeking to enforce the City's ordinances through his efforts is unavailing. Alternatively, Defendant Oliveri argues that his requests for monthly reports on police and code enforcement violation at Plaintiff's properties were undertaken to gather information for the Commission to decide City policy. Information-gathering and investigation, it is true, have been deemed essential elements of the legislative function. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 ( 1927); Tenney et al. v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1951). However, whether this is the proper characterization of Oliveri's activities is a disputed fact.
PlaintiffHCS argues that Defendant Oliveri personally demanded excessive levels of enforcement out of a desire to make the Synagogue leave, and not in furtherance of any bonafide legislative purpose. The Synagogue points first to the fact that the memo from Defendant Oliveri to Director of Economic Development and Development Administration
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Jacqueline Gonzales states that "careful and vigilant monitoring and reporting of violations is required." (D.E. 294, Ex. A.) The Synagogue argues that this is a directive to code enforcement officers and police officers, not an effort to gather information. (Transcript of Pretrial Conference at 21 :23-25.) Second, HCS notes that Commissioners do not have authority to order inspections of a particular property or to order code enforcement to issue tickets at a particular property, and that Defendant Oliveri failed to follow the proper procedure when sending the aforementioned memo. (''Plaintiffs Statement ofMaterial Facts in Opposition to Oliveri's Motion," D.E. 296 at~~ l-3.) Moreover, City Mayor Mara Giulianti noted in her deposition that Oliveri had no authority to command staff, and that the City Manager determined what staff actions were going to be. (Giulianti Deposition at 253:12-17 .) Giulianti added, "the bottom line is [Oliveri] doesn't have the ability to demand that staff do anything; he's not allowed to. He could be removed from office if he did; it would be a violation of the charter for him to direct staff." (Id. at 255 :20-24.) She stated further that Defendant Oliveri's "actions as a commissioner, to be perfectly honest, were not -were very- I think they were very personal in many respects." (!Q.. at 256:11-13.)
The Court determines that Defendant has not provided evidence sufficient to invoke the doctrine of absolute immunity. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Defendant Oliveri was acting in furtherance of non-legislative goals, as the primary focus of Oliver's activities was on code enforcement, rather than information-gathering. Moreover, to the extent that Defendant Oliveri was collecting information on the Synagogue, the application
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oflegislative policy to a speci fie party, including on the issuance ofa permit, is not protected by legislative immunity. See Crymes, 923 F.2d at 1485-86. The Court finds that absolute immunity is not available to Defendant Oliveri in this case.
2. Qualified Immunity Defendant Oliveri also asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity in this action. Qualified immunity shields from civil liability government officials sued in their individual capacity who act pursuant to discretionary authority insofar as their conduct does not knowingly violate, "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1081 (lith Cir. 2004)(citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)); Williams v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 341 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 2003); Kyle K. v. Chapman, 208 F.3d 940,942 (II th Cir. 2000). Because of the important policies served by the qualified immunity defense, 12 it should be applied to shield all government officials "but the plainly incompetent and those who knowingly violated the law." Ray, 370 F.3d at I082. Under the first step ofthe qualified immunity analysis, the public official must prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly unconstitutional acts took place. Storck v. City ofCoral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, I314 (II th Cir. 2003)(citing Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (lith Cir. 1991)). In
12The purpose of qualified immunity is to allow government officials to can)' out their discretionary duties without fear of personal liability or harassing litigation. Consolidated City of Jacksonvill~ 341 F.3d at 1267; see also~. 370 F.3d at 1082 (discussing other important public policies served by the qualified immunity defense).
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determining whether the public official has met his burden, the Court is advised to, ask whether the government employee was (a) performing a legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through means that were within his power to utilize... .In applying each prong of this test, look to the general nature of the defendant's action, temporarily putting aside the fact that it may have been committed for an unconstitutional purpose, in an unconstitutional manner, to an unconstitutional extent, or under constitutionally inappropriate circumstances.
O'Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2004)(citing Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Once the public official has established that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that qualified immunity does not apply. Storck, 354 F.3d at 1314 (citing Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)). The Supreme Court has provided the following two-part test for determining if the plaintiff has met its burden: ( 1) taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) ifa constitutional right would have been violated under the plaintiffs version ofthe facts, the court must then determine whether the right was clearly established. Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001)). In addition, a Court should address a defendant's claim of entitlement to qualified immunity as to each count asserted against the public official. GJR Investments Inc., 132 F.3d at 1370. A district court's failure to address claims possibly barred by qualified immunity undermines the policies served by the qualified immunity defense. Id.
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PlaintiffHCS alleges that Defendant Oliveri violated the Synagogue's rights to Free Exercise and Free Association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Plaintiffs right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court will apply the Eleventh Circuit's two-part test to both of these claims.
Both of Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Oliveri center on his role in retaliation and harassment, via selective code enforcement, against the Synagogue. Defendant Oliveri argues that if there was overzealous enforcement, it cannot be imputed to him, and that any role he had in any enforcement against the Synagogue was pursuant to the proper exercise of his discretionary authority to manage his district and respond to the needs and demands of his constituents. (D.E. 250 at 6-8.) Plaintiff HCS counters that Defendant Oliveri has failed to demonstrate he was acting within his discretionary authority by targeting the Synagogue and singling it out for daily monitoring. The Synagogue cites the evidence supporting the fact that Commissioners do not have the authority to order inspections of a particular property or to order code enforcement to issue tickets at a particular property. (Plaintiffs Statement of Material Facts in Opposition to Oliveri's Motion at~~ 1-3.) Further, Jacqueline Gonzalez testified that this was the only situation she recalled of a City Commissioner asking the chief of police to provide him with updates of parking violations at a property that received a Special Exception, that Oliveri specifically asked her to investigate all code violations at the Synagogue and investigate whether they were operating a day care, and that the level of enforcement against the synagogue bordered on harassment.
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(Gonzalez Deposition at 176:25-177:15, 184:15-23, 239:2-13, 242: 12-14.) The Court must first examine whether Defendant Oliveri was performing a legitimate
job-related function through means that were within his power to utilize. In doing so, the Court recognizes that it is to look to the general nature ofDefendant Oliveri's actions, putting aside any infirmity caused by his alleged unconstitutional actions. Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1266. Here, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff HCS, the general nature of Defendant Oliveri's actions appear to have been enforcement-related. Substantial testimony indicates that Defendant Oliveri failed to follow proper procedure in engaging in the direction of staff, a role generally reserved for the City Manager in the executive branch of the City government structure. Constant monitoring of one particular party is not the role of a legislator, who generally focuses on policy issues with global significance. The record evidence does not support Oliveri's contention that it is undisputed that he was acting within his discretionary authority.
Moreover, even if the Court was to find that Defendant was acting within his discretion, the burden would then shift to Plaintiff to demonstrate that Defendant Oliveri violated clearly established law based upon objective standards. Hightower v. Evans, 117 F.3d 1318, 1320 (I I th Cir. 1997). This standard requires that the alleged unlawfulness was evident in light of pre-existing case law at the time of the alleged constitutional violation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-41 (2002).
The Court finds that PlaintiffHCS has met its burden in demonstrating that Defendant
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Oliveri's alleged actions violate clearly established law. The actions complained of occurred on or around September of200 1. The Eleventh Circuit has found that harassment in the form of constant monitoring, checking, or issuing citations has long constituted a violation of ..clearly established" law. (D.E. 272 at 34, citing Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 828 (11th Cir. 1982) (city commissioners' formation of building code task force which conducted frequent inspections of designated hotels and issued numerous violations, and which was designed to harass and drive hotels out of business, was sufficient to state a § 1983 claim).) Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit in Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2005), held that it has been "settled law" since 1988 that the government may not retaliate against citizens for the exercise of First Amendment rights. Id., citing Georgia Association ofEducators v. Gwinnett County School District, 856 F.2d 142, 145 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding the Government may not retaliate aga inst individuals or associations exercising their First Amendment rights "by imposing sanctions for the expression of particular views it opposes'').
Record evidence in the instant case raises a material issue of fact as to whether any overzealous or harassing monitoring, enforcement, or retaliation against the Synagogue could indeed be imputed to Defendant Oliveri. Oliveri's aforementioned memo stated that "careful and vigilant monitoring" of the Synagogue was "required." (D.E. 294 at Ex. A.) George Albo, an administrator for Plaintiff, confronted a code enforcement officer issuing tickets to cars parked on Synagogue property and was told by the officer that Oliveri had instructed
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 372 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/28/2006 Page 50 of 55
him and his department to ticket and "keep a close eye on" the Synagogue. 13 ("Albo Deposition," D.E. 192 at 206:2-19.) Gonzalez also testified that the enforcement level against the Synagogue was ''directly related" to requests by Defendant Oliveri. (Gonzalez Deposition at 240:3-9.) The Court therefore finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Oliveri's actions violated clearly established law, namely Plaintiffs right to the free exercise of religion. The Court further finds that the above stated actions could reasonably engender the discouragement of Synagogue members wishing to attend religious services, in violation ofthe First Amendment. Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1254-55. Accordingly, for purposes of Plaintiffs section 1983 claim, Defendant Oliveri has failed to either meet his burden under part one of the Eleventh Circuit's test for qualified immunity, or overcome Plaintiffs showing under part two. The Court thus declines to grant qualified immunity to Defendant Oliveri on either ofPlaintiffHCS's claims against him.
3. Equal Protection Claim Finally, Defendant Oliveri argues that there is no genuine issue with respect to Plaintiffs Equal Protection claim against him, and that summary judgment should be granted as a matter oflaw. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no State shall ''deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,"
13 Contrary to Oliveri's assertions. this does not constitute double hearsay. as Oliveri's statement was a directive, and thus not offered for the truth of the matter, and the code enforcement officer's statement constituted a party admission, as they were made in the code enforcement officer's capacity, concerning a matter within the scope of his agency. Fed.R.Evid. 80 l(d)(2)(A). Moreover. even if one could argue that Oliveri's statement was offered for the truth of the matter asserted, namely. that he did direct code enforcement to monitor the Synagogue, the statement would likewise constitute a party admission on the
part of Oliveri. !£L -50-

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 372 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/28/2006 Page 51 of 55
essentially a mandate that all similarly situated persons be treated alike. City of Cleburne. Tex. V. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that plaintiffs may bring an equal protection claim for the unequal administration of a facially neutral statute, so long as intentional or purposeful discrimination is shown on the part of the state. E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1112-13 (11th Cir. 1987) citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944). To prevail on this selective enforcement claim, a traditional type of equal protection claim, Plaintiff must show ( 1) that it was treated differently from other similarly situated entities, and (2) that Defendant unequally applied a facially neutral ordinance for the purpose of discriminating against Plaintiff. Campbell v. Rainbow City. Ala., 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006) citing Strickland v. Alderman, 74 F.3d 260, 264 (11th Cir. 1996).
Defendant Oliveri posits three arguments is support of his Motion. First, he contends that discriminatory intent is a required showing for an equal protection claim based on selective enforcement. In this regard, Oliveri contends that the statements cited by Plaintiff in the record cannot establish discriminatory intent when proper context is provided. (D.E. 250 at 7-8.) Second, Defendant Oliveri maintains that the home of Rosa Lopez is not similarly situated for purposes of the claim because it is not within Oliveri's district. (ld. at 8-12.) Third, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff has not shown unequal treatment. (Id. at 1214.) The Court will address each in tum.
Defendant Oliveri is correct that discriminatory intent is an element of an equal
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protection claim based on selective enforcement. E&T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1113 (11th Cir. 1987). However, Defendant fails to demonstrate that there exists no genuine issue of material fact as to whether discriminatory intent can be inferred from his comments. Plaintiff HCS has alleged that Defendant Oliveri made the following public comments. 14 First, at a Commission meeting, Oliveri allegedly said, "it's almost common sense and reasonable that 'the Chabad' will never fit in Hollywood Hills." (D.E. 125 at~ 41 (internal quotation marks added).) Second, Defendant Oliveri allegedly stated at a subsequent Commission meeting, "[w]e're talking about our neighborhoods here. We're talking about neighborhoods having a smell.'' (ld. at~ 47.) Third, when asked why Rosa Lopez did not need to apply for a Special Exception, Oliveri allegedly stated, "it's a miracle to true believers and the venue cannot be changed since the Virgin Mary visits that particular home... if you people know anything about the Catholic religion, that's called a vision. To Christians and Catholics, that is considered a miracle. That's not establishing a house of worship. That is a miracle." (lil at 54.) Fourth, Oliveri allegedly said to the Mayor at a Commission meeting, ''[w]e all interpret our faith and religion in a personal manner and clearly a lot of disturbance out there with the parking, a lot of people were disturbed to live close to them on this side, but the spiritual benefit that may be achieved by the people going there once a month far outweighed the inconvenience on that occasion." (Oliver Deposition
14 Though little record evidence has been provided to support these comments, neither Party disputes either that they were made or that they were made publicly. Defendant Oliveri has admitted to making some of the alleged statements.~ '"Oliveri Deposition," D.E. 192 at I I0:5-25 (stating that comment about spiritual benefits outweighing the inconvenience of the occasion at the Lopez house was made at a late hour and came out the wrong way.) For the rest, Defendant has contested only the context, not the content. ~ D.E. 250 at 2-4.) This constitutes a genuine issue of material fact.
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at 11 0:2-25.) Viewing these statements in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that discriminatory intent can be imputed on the part of Defendant Oliveri. Moreover, the record evidence previously cited from the Depositions of Mayor Giulianti and Jacqueline Gonzalez themselves create an inference of discriminatory intent sufficient to survive summary judgment. Therefore, Defendant has not met his burden ofdemonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to this element.
Second, concerning the residence of Rosa Lopez, Defendant Oliveri argues that because the residence is outside the confines of his district, he could not have pursued enforcement or monitoring actions against it, even had he wished to. (D.E. 309 at 16.) Moreover, Defendant Oliveri argues that no other group of neighbors has complained about places of worship in the same manner as those complaining about Plaintiff. (Id.) The Court finds this contention highly dubious. Under the existing Special Exception zoning scheme, Defendant Oliveri had the authority to vote and file appeals on Special Exception applications in any district in the City of Hollywood. Moreover, this argument assumes that Defendant Oliveri had the authority to direct code enforcement in his district in the first place, a contention that has been disputed by record evidence. Further, as stated earlier, testimony from George Albo indicates that Defendant Oliveri had instructed code enforcement officers to ticket the Synagogue and monitor Plaintiffclosely. (Albo Deposition at 206:2-19.) Albo further testified that he witnessed code enforcement officers ticketing vehicles parked at the Synagogue while ignoring other similarly parked vehicles in the
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immediate area, including directly across the street from HCS property. (Id. at 202:4-204:11, 210:20-213:1.) Therefore, this evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact that there were cars parked similarly on other nearby properties that were treated differently at the behest and direction of Defendant Oliveri.
Finally, other evidence indicating unequal treatment has been raised by Plaintiff, despite Defendant Oliveri's arguments to the contrary. Such evidence includes Gonzalez's testimony about Defendant Oliveri's singular focus on Plaintiff, including her testimony that Oliveri criticized her for not taking vigorous enough enforcement actions against the Synagogue, despite having sent code enforcement there sometimes twice a day (Gonzalez Deposition at 204: 18-205:4) and the testimony from Mayor Giulianti stating that in" 15 years I have never seen such a single focus." (D.E. 352, Ex. A at 413:14-20.) Thus, Defendant Oliveri has not met his burden of demonstrating there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to any element of Plaintiffs equal protection claim, and summary judgment is therefore inappropriate.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that 1. Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion for Summary Judgment Against
Plaintiff, Hollywood Community Synagogue (D.E. 247), filed April 24, 2006, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows: a. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant City of
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 372 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/28/2006 Page 55 of 55 Hollywood on PlaintiffHCS's Substantive Due Process Claims (Counts XIV and XV) as they relate to equitable estoppel, but denied as to the remainder of those claims.
b. Summary judgment is denied as to all other remaining claims. 2. Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion for Summary Judgment against
Plaintiff United States, filed March I 0, 2006, is DENIED. 3. Defendant Sal Oliveri's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 250), filed
April 24, 2006, is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this U day of June,
2006.
cc: U.S. Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein All Counsel of Record Case No.04-61212-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN
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 Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 1 of 24

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

United States

Case No .04-61212/05-60687 (Lenard/Klein)

Plaintiff, vs . City of Hollywood

(CONSOLIDATED)

Defendant.
Case No.04-61212 (Lenard/Klein) Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc .,
Plaintiff,

It

FILED b

.D .C .

JUL =12006

CLARENCE MADDOX
CLERK U .S . DIST . CT. S . D . OF FLA . • MIAM I

vs .

City of Hollywood, et al . ,

Defendants .

I . INTRODUCTION A. Backgroun d 1 . This consent decree is entered between the United States ("Plaintiff') and Defendant City
of Hollywood ("the City" or "Defendant") . 2. This action is brought by the United States to enforce provisions of the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S .C . §§ 2000cc, et M .
EXHIBIT

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 2 of 24
Specifically, the United States alleges that the Defendant City of Hollywood has : (a) treated the Hollywood Community Synagogue ("HCS") on less than equal terms with nonre li gious ins ti tutions and assemb lies in violation of Section 2(b)(1) of RLUIPA; and (b) discriminated against HCS on the basis of religion or religious denominati on, in viola ti on of Section 2(b)(2) ofRLUIPA, by denying HCS a permanent special exception to operate a house of worship on the real property located at 2215 and 2221 North 46th Avenue, Hollywood, Florida . The City filed an answer denying the United States' allegations . 3 . HCS is currently located at 2215 and 2221 North 46th Avenue, one block south of Sheri dan Street in Hollywood, Florida. Both of these properties are located in a singlefamily residential district . HCS holds prayer services every morning and evening at 2215 North 46th Avenue . 4. Each prayer service described in paragraph 3, above, requires the presence of a minyan, or a quorum of ten males over the age of thirteen . Approximately twenty to thirty individuals attend the Friday and Saturday evening services . Approximately fifty to sixty individuals attend the Saturday morning serv ice . 5: Defendant' s Zoning and Land Use Regulations provide that a house of worship may not operate in an area zoned for residential use without a special excepti on. 6. In or around February 2001, Defendant informed HCS that it would have to obtain a special exception if it wished to operate .a house of worship at 2215 and 2221 North 46th Avenue .
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 3 of 24
7. On May 10, 2001, the City of Hollywood Board of Adjustment and Appeals ("BAA") granted HCS a conditional special exception. In granting the special exception, the BAA found that HCS's special-exception application satisfied the City's criteria for the granting of a special exception .
8. On May 21, 2001, City Commissioner Sal Oliveri appealed the BAA's decision . The City Commission heard the appeal on September 12, 2001 .
9. After a meeting that lasted through the night, the City Commission granted HCS a limited special exception on September 13, 2001 . The limited special exception included numerous conditions, including a one-year time limit, a maximum of six parking spaces on the property, and a statement that the special exception would be revoked if a Special Master found a violation of any provision of a City Ordinance if the violation were not cured within 60 days.
10. HCS applied for a second special exception on August 1, 2002 . The application requested that its earlier special exception be "renewed .".
11. On September 12, 2002, the City'of Hollywood Development and Review Board ("DRB"), a successor body to the BAA, approved HCS's "renewed" special-exception application with conditions .
12. City Commissioner Oliveri again appealed the DRB's decision to the City Commission . The City Commission conducted a hearing on Commissioner Oliveri's request for review on October 16, 2002 . After a hearing, the City Commission denied the request fo r review .
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13. HCS appli ed for a third special exception on February 10, 2003, asking that its special exception be renewed or made permanent .
14. On-March 13, 2003 , the DRB heard HCS's re quest for a third special excep tion. The DRB granted the special exception and imposed several condi ti ons re lating to, among other things, parking and construction.
15. On March 17, 2003, Commissioner Oli veri filed a request for review of the DRB decision . The City Commission granted the request for review .
16. On June 4, 2003, the City Commission heard HCS's third applica ti on for a special exception . After a public hearing, the Commission reversed the DRB ' s decision and denied HCS's petiti on for a third special excep tion .
17. Defendant had never previously denied a request by a place of worship to operate in either a single- family or mul ti ple- family residenti al zone until it denied HCS's special excep ti on application .
18. Defendant currently permits other religious and nonreli gious assembli es and institutions to operate in residential distri cts.
19. On October 16, 2003, Defendant sent HCS a letter notifying the congregation that it "must desist holding services and other related activi ties " at 2215 and 2221 North 46th Avenue as of October 20, 2003 .
20. On July 7, 2004 the City Commission directed the City Attorney to fi le a lawsuit to stop further organized religious services from taking place at 2215 and 2221 North 46th Avenue.
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21 . The United States and the City (together "the Parties") agree that the City is a "government," and that HCS is a "religious assembly or institution" within the meaning of RLUIPA . 42 U .S .C . §§ 2000cc(2)(b)(1), cc-5(4)(A)(i) . The Parties further agree that HCS's use of the property located at 2215 and 2221 North 46th Avenue as a house o f L worship constitutes "religious exercise ," id. at § 2000cc-5(7)(A)-(B), and that the Defendant' s processes and requirements regarding the grant or denial of a special exception constitute "l and use regulation[s] ." Id . at § 2000cc-5(5) .
22. The parties further agree that the City's denial of the HCS' s special excepti on app li cation constitutes an "individualized assessment" undertaken in a system of "land use regulations ." Ld. at § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) ; id. at § 2000cc-5(5) .
23. The parties further agree that the City of Hollywood has authority under Florida state law and the City of Hollywood Code to regulate and restrict the use of certain land and structures within City of Hollywood's borders, including the authority to grant the special exception sought by HCS .
B . Consent of the Parties to Entry of This Orde r 24. The Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case
pursuant to 28 U.S .C . § 1345 and 42 U.S .C . § 2000cc-2 . The Parties further agree that the controversy should be resolved without further proceedings or an evidentiary hearing . 25 . . As indicated by the signatures below, all parties agree to the entry of this Consent Order.
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 6 of 24
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED : II . GENERAL INJUNCTION
26. For the term of this Order, Defendant shall not : a . Impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with-a nonreligious assembly or institution ; b. Impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination ; c . Otherwise engage-in any conduct that violates RLUIPA ; or d. Coerce, intimidate, threaten, interfere with or retaliate against any person in'the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected by RLUIPA . M. SPECIAL EXCEPTION APPLICATION PROCES S
27. . The Commission may adopt new special exception procedures governing land-use applications for residential zones or for houses of worship and other similar .uses. Those procedures must comply with the United States Constitution and with RLUIPA . Within 15 days after the City adopts such procedures, it shall provide a copy of those procedures to the Department of Justice. If the City adopts new special exception procedures, among the new procedures will be the following:
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 7 of 24
a. Special Exception Application or Inquiry. Upon receipt of an application or inquiry. about the special-exception application process, the Planning Division shall provide to the applicant or the person inquiring about the application process a document that describes the application process and the criteria under which the Planning Division will accept, and the City will decide the application . The Planning Division will provide to the applicant or the person inquiring a form describing an applicant's rights under RLUIPA . The language of the form shall conform to Appendix A.
b. . Planning Division Report . The Planning Division shall issue a report concerning all special exception applications. The report shall evaluate the applicant's proposed special-exception use and any impacts associated with that use in light of (i) as-of-right uses and their potential impacts ; and (ii) uses permitted by' special exception on similarly situated land, including uses proffered as similarly situated by the applicant or an intervenor . Whenever the applicant is a religious institution or assembly, or whenever the applicant proposes that the property or properties at issue in the application be used, in anyway, for religious purposes, the report shall evaluate the proposed use in light of RLUIPA . In light of these and other appropriate evaluations, the report shall recommend to grant ; deny, or take other appropriate action on the proposed use, whether or not the proposed use is contested or a hearing is scheduled before any City board or before the City Commission .
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I

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 8 of 24
c . Development Review Board Hearing . The Development Review Board shall conduct a de novo review of the proposed special-exception use, including a de novo review of all applicable facts an d laws . The Board's review shall take account of, among other things : (i) the Planning Division report , (ii) any submissions made by the applicant or any intervenors ; (iii) stipulated evidence; (iv) the parties' exceptions to and support of the special-exception application; and (v) any other relevant materials . Whenever the app li c ant is a re ligious institution or assembly, or whenever the applicant proposes that the property or properties at issue in the app li cation be used, in any way, for religious purposes, the Development Review Board shall evaluate the proposed use in li ght of RLUIPA.
d. City Commission Hearing . If the City Commission elects to hold a hearing on any application for a special exception, or to hear an appeal from any decision of the Development Review Board with respect to any app licati on for a special exception, the City Commission will conduct a de novo review of the proposed special- excepti on use, including a de novo review of all app licable facts and laws. The Commission ' s review shall take account of, among other things : (i) the Planning Division repo rt, (ii) any submissions made by the applicant or any intervenors ; (iii) stipulated evidence; (iv) the parties ' exceptions to and support of the special-excep ti on application ; and (v) any other relev ant materi als . Whenever the applicant is a reli gious insti tution or assembly, or whenever the applicant proposes that the property or properties at issue in the application be used, in any
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 9 of 24

way, for re li gious purposes , the City Commission shall evaluate the proposed us e in light of RLUIPA .

IV. NOTICE

28. Within 60 days of the date of entry of this Order, the City shall implement the following

procedures to ensure notice to the public of this Order and its effects :

a. Sianage. The Planning Division shall post and maintain a printed sign within

sight of each public entrance to the Planning Division of fi ces . The sign shall state

in bold, block le tt ers , at least one-inch high, that the City of Ho ll ywood does not

discriminate against religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA , and shall state that

the' City has entered into this Order and will provide a copy of it to any person

upon request. The text of this sign will conform to Appendix A.

b . Internet Posting. Both the Planning Division and the City of Hollywood shall post

and maintain on the first .page of their respective Internet home pages a notice

stating that the City of Hollywood does not discriminate against reli gious exercise

in violation of RLUIPA . The no tice wi ll state that the City has entered into this

Order and will provide a copy of this Order to any person upon request. The text

of this posting is provided in Appendix B .

Q.

Newspaper Publication. The City shall purchase advertising in the Miami Herald

and the Ft . Lauderdale Sun Sentinel, for fourteen consecutive days, stating that the

City does not discriminate against reli gious exercise in violation of RLUIPA. The

notice will be of a size equivalent to at least one-qua rter- page , shall be printed in .

Page 9 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 10 of 24
at least 12-point font , and shall state that the City has entered into this Order and wi ll provide a copy of it to any person upon request . The text of this publication is provided in Appendix A. d . Noti ce to Past Re li gious Use Appli cants . Within 90 days of the date of entry of this Order, the City shall provide notice of this Order to every person , reli gious assembly, or ins titution, since January 1, 2001, who or which had app li ed for and was denied a special excep ti on, or other individualized land use determination, concerning the re ligious use of property. The noti ce shall explain why the Commission is contacting them and shall indicate that the Commission will provide a copy of this Order upon request . A copy of the form for this notice is provided in Appendix A.
V . TRAININ G 29 . Within ninety ( 90) days after the entry of this Order, the City shall provide training on the
requirements of RLUIPA to : (i) all City Commissioners; (ii) all manageri al employees of the Ci ty, including but not limited to, the Ci ty Manager, the Assistant City Manager, the City Attorney, and the Chief of Police ; (iii) all Code Enforcement officers or employees, excluding cleri cal staff; (iv) all employees , excluding clerical staff, of the City Attorneys Office; and (v) all Planning Division officers or employees , excluding cle rical staff. The training shall be conducted by a quali fied person or organization approved by the United States . The City shall pay all training costs . Within one-hundred twenty ( 120) days after the ent ry of this Order, the City shall secure and deliver to counsel for the United States a
Page 10 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 11 of 24
written certification of each employee ' s attendance at the RLUIPA training, together with a copy of all training mate ri als, including but not limited to a course syll abus, if any. 30. Within 30 days of the date of ent ry of this Order, the City shall conduct and complete the following program for all persons with responsibi liti es relating to the implementati on and enforcement of all zoning or land use regulati ons , including all City Commissioners who,
A- I Development Review Board members ; all Code Enforcement officers or employees ; all employees of the City Attorn ey's Office; and all Planning Division officers or employees . Such program shall include : a. Furnishing to each person a copy of this Order, and informing each such person,
in person, of the duti es of the Planning Division and the Commission under this Order ; and b . Securing a signed statement , appearing at Appendix C, from each such person . stating that he or she has received, has re ad, and understands this Order and the po li cy of nondiscrimination mandated by this Order, and further understands that violati on of this Order may result in sanctions against the City . 31. For the durati on of this Order, each person with responsibili ti es relating to the implementation and enforcement of all zoning or land use regula tions within the City of Ho llywood sha ll be given a copy of, and be required to read this Order, and shall sign the statement appearing at Appendix C, within 10 days after the date he or she commences membership , employment, or an agency relationship with the City Att orney's Offi ce, th e
Page 11 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 12 of 24

Planning Division, the Code Enforcement Division, the Development Review Board, or

City Commission.

32. The statements prescribed by this section of the Order sha ll be maintained in the offices

of both the Planning Division and the City Attorney for the City of Ho llywood for the

durati on of this Order.

VI. COMPLAINT PROCEDURE

33 . Within 90 days of the date of entry of this Court, the Planning Division and Commission

shall establish the foll owing procedure to address complaints by any person who be lieves

that the City, either officiall y or through any one of its officers , employees, or agents,

I

since January 1, 2001, or during the duration of this Order, and in connection with any

application for a special exception or other individualized land use determina ti on

concerning a reli gious land use, may have violated or may violate the United States

Constituti on or federal law . Upon complaint by such person, the City, through one of its

offi cers, employees , or agents, shall offer to provide a writt en form to the complainant,

and sha ll provide that form upon request. A copy of this form is attached as Append ix D .

If the complaint is wri tt en, the Planning Division shall accept and maintain the original

complaint and any proposed or actual action taken by the City in response to the

complaint . If the complaint is oral, the City through one of its offi cers, employees, or

agents, shall prepare a wri tten summary of the complaint along with the name, address,

phone number, and other iden ti fying informati on of the complainant and any proposed or

actual acti on taken by the City in response to the complaint . Upon receiving any

Page 12 of 24,

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 13 of 24

complaint, the City shall offer to provide to the complainant a copy of this Order, an d

shall provide a copy of this Order to the complainant upon request .

VII. REMEDY FOR PAST ACTION S
1Rc _ Jr(t.a f . . In order to remedy past acti ons in this case , the City s all ow HCe34 S to operate at 221 5
aha
and 2221 North 46t .Avenue. as a house of worship as a matt er of right in perpetuity T kas made- 3dddIO,I } 3vning ronC gjO"i co44 ,ns~ I~ c rlio I, Sk~s~cfrenj
k5w
F F* Sd ) W N .D . I_-7,obI.- 2e -3 (a 4a-Ae-k -±o D.LG . ` o) .

'S ee_ 2,1 so Ov[Ie, P?5M1 5 S 1 ns 5sc l oj-- f lC~~x11C~~ Fo .4?~o~C 1, P i4-erc&

C

J

Beem is Maeked as

35. Within 15 days of the entry of this Order, the City Attorney shall advise the City

Commission on the record of the terms of this Order. The City Commission shall also

vacate all stop-work or similar orders prohibiting activity at 2215 and 2221 North 46th

Avenue, Hollywood, Florida, and direct the City Attorney to file a moti on withdrawing,

with prejudice , any legal acti ons , pending in any court, by the City against HCS or it s

agent or representative . VIII. REPORTING, RECORD-KEEPING, AND MONITORING

36. No later than 180 days after the date of entry of this Order, the City sha ll send a report

evidencing its comp liance with this Order to counsel for the United States) This report

shall consist of the fo llowing :

.1 For purposes of this Order, all submissions to the United States or its counsel should be submitted to : Chief, Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, Civil Rights Division , United States Department of Justice , 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N .W ., Washington, D .C. 20530, Attn: DJ# 210-18-3, Fax: 202-514- 1116, or as otherwise directed by the United States .
Page 13 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 14 of 24

a. A signed declaration by each of the member of the City Commission stating that

the City has complied with Sections II VII of this Order;

b. Appropri ate documenta ry evidence , including but not limited to the text of all new

I

policies or procedures implemented as a result of this Order., demons trating the

City's compliance with Sections II VII of this Order; and

c . Copies of all signed statements from each person descri bed in paragraphs 29-31

of this Order.

-for 37. Nine months after the date of entry of this Order, and every six months thweAm-mff

dwq h w pf -His D ►'d~r, ?V

Defendant shall send to

counsel for the United States a w ritten report evidencing continuing compli ance with this Order. This report shall contain the fo ll owing information:

a. Copies of a ll new signed statements at Append ix -C from each person described in

paragraph 31, above, that have not been previously provided to counsel for the

United States ;

b. Any written . or oral complaint descri bed in paragraph 33 of this Order . If the

complaint is written, the City shall provide a copy, if the complaint is oral, the

City shall provide a copy of the written summary described in Section VI or thi s

Order .

c . The Planning Division and the City shall , unti l this lawsuit is dismissed with

prejudice as described in Secti on IX, below, preserve all records that are the

source of or that contain any of the informa tion pertinent to the City's ob li gations

. Page 14 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 15 of 24

under this Order . Upon reasonable noti ce to the City Attorney, representatives of

the United States shall be permitted to inspect and copy all pertinent records of the

City at any and a ll reasonable times; provided, however, that the United States

shall endeavor to minimize any inconvenience to the Planning Division or City

Commission from inspecti on of such records . IX. DURATION OF ORDER AND TERMINATION'OF LEGAL ACTIO N

38. This Consent Order shall remain in effect for five ( 5) years after the date of its ent ry, or

for three ( 3) years after the date the City's new special excepti on procedures take effect,

whichever is later.

39. The Court shall retain juri sdiction for the durati on of this Consent Order to enforce the

terms of the Order;

Q
H4 0 ,tie

. United States may move the Court to extend the duration of the Order in the interests o f

justice .

40. The Parties sha ll endeavor in good faith to resolve informally any differences regarding

interpretation of and compliance with this Order prior to bringing such matters to the

Court for resolution . However, in the event of a failure by Defendant to perform in a

timely manner any act required by this Order or otherwise to act in conformance with any

provision thereof, the United States may move this Court to impose any remedy

authorized at law or equity , including, but not limited to, an order requiring performance

of such act or deeming such act to have been performed , and costs and reasonable

att orneys ' fees which may have been occasioned by the viola tion or failure to perform

X. TIM FOR PERFORMANCE

41 . Any time limits for performance imposed by this Consent Order may be extended by th e

Page 15 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 16 of 24

mutual written agreement of the United States and the relevant Defendants . M. ENFORCEMENT OF THIS ORDER
42. Except as provided in paragraph 43 below , any failure to comply with any or all of the provisions of this Order shall subject Defendant to findings of contempt, and the United States may seek any and all reli ef from this Court against Defendant for noncompliance.
43 . In the event that the City Commission fails to comply with paragraph 35, above, or to all ow HCS to operate as a house of worship in compliance with paragraph'34 , above, Defendant wi ll be' subject to a show cause order as to why it should not be held in contempt of this Court, and the United States may seek any and all reli ef from this Court against Defendant for a finding of contempt . XII. COSTS OF LITIGATION
44. Each party to this liti gati on will bear its own costs and attorneys ' fees associated with this litigati on .

ENTERED THIS day of

J 2006(,, • ` Am / ~

QiAl,!= ME
I/ - J6kN A. !ENARD UNTIED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 16 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 17 of 24

The undersigned apply for and consent to the ent ry of this Order : Dated ? .A 12006 FOR THE UNITED STATES :

Wan J . Kim Assistant Attorney General

R. Alexander Acosta United States Attorne y

Steven H. Rogenbium Chief
Michael S . Maurer Deputy Chief
Sean R . Keveney R . Tamar Hagler Tri al Attorn eys Civil Rights Divisio n
United States Department of Justice Housing and Civil Enforcement Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W . Washington, D.C . 2053 0 Tel . : (202) 514-4838 Fax : (202) 514-111 6 Email : sean.r .keveney@usdoj .gov Fla . Bar No . A550092 6 Counselfor the United States

Marilynn Lindse y
Assistant U.S . Attorney Wendy Jacobus Assistant U.S .,Attomey 500 E. Broward Blvd Ft. Lauderdale, Fl . 33394 Tel : (954) 356-725 5 Fax : (954) 356-7336 Counsel for the United States

Page 17 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 18 of 24

FOR THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD :
Daniel Abbott City of Hollywoo d 2600 Hollywood Boulevard , Room 407 Hollywood, FL 3302 0 Tel . : (954) 921-3435 Fax : (954) 921-308 1 City Attorney

Thomas J . McCausland Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans & Abel, PA 3440 Hollywood Boulevard Hollywood, FL 33021 Tel .: (954) 961-1400 Fax : (954) 967-857 7 Counsel for the City of Hollywood

Ca'rrferon Ben--onCity of Hollywood 2600 Hollywood Boulevard, Room 407 Hollywood, FL 33020
City Manager

Page 18 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 19 of 24

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORID A

Case No . 04-61212/05-60687 (LeriardlKlein)

United States

Plaintiff, vs .

CONSENT ORDER: APPENDIX A

City of Hollywood

Defendant .

APPENDIX A 2006, the United States District Court for the Southern District o f Florida entered a Consent Order resolving a religious-discrimination lawsuit brought by the United States against the City of Hollywood under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), for the City' s treatment of the Hollywood Community Synagogue. Under the terms of the Consent Order the City of Hollywood is required, among other things, to inform all applicants for any special exception to the City's zoning code of the applicant's rights under the RLUIPA . Under RLUIPA, no government, including the City of Hollywood, . may apply its zoning or land use laws in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the re li gious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution. RLUIPA also provides that. no government, including the City of Hollywood, may apply a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution (a church, for example) on less than equal terms than a nonreligious institution or assembly (a day care center or movie theater) . Finally, RLUIPA provides that no government, including the City of Hollywood, may impose a land use regulation in a manner that discriminates against a religious assembl y or institution .

Page 19 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 20 of 24
If you believe that any local government or municipality has discriminated against you in the implementation of its zoning or land use laws, please contact the United States Department of Justice at :
(202) 514-4713 You may also w rite to : United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Housing and Civil Enforcement Section 950 Pennsylvania Ave. N. W. -G St Washington, DC 2053 0 if you would like a copy of the Consent Order referenced above and entered in United States v . City of Hollywood, Civ. No. 05-60687 (S .D . Fla.), please contact the office of the City Attorney for the City of Hollywood at (954) 921-3435, and you will be provided with a copy free of charge.
Page 20 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 21 of 24

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORID A

Case No . 04-61212/05-60687 (Lenard/Klein )

United States

Plaintiff, vs .

CONSENT ORDER: APPENDIX B

City of Hollywood

Defendant .

APPENDIX B

NOTICE OF NONDISCRIMINATION POLICY

CONSISTENT WITH THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT OF 2000, THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION IN THE APPLICATION OF ITS LAWS, POLICIES, OR PROCEDURES, INCLUDING THE APPLICATION OF ITS LAND USE REGULATIONS AND ZONING LAWS .

Page 21 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 22 of 24

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA -

Case No. 04-61212/05-60687 (Lenard/Klein)

United States vs .

Plaintiff,

CONSENT ORDER : APPENDIX C

City of Hollywood

Defendant.

APPENDIX C CERTIFICATION OF RECEIPT OF CONSENT ORDER
certify that I have received the Consent Orde r entered in United States v . City ofHollywood, Civ . No . 05-60687 (S .D . Fla.) . I further certifythat Ihave read and understand the aforementioned Consent Order, that all my questions were answered concerning it, and that I understand that my violation of this Consent Order may result in s anctions against the City of Hollywood .

(Signature) (Print name ) (Date)

Page 22 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 23 of 24

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORID A
Case No . 04-61212/05 - 60687 (Lenard/Klein)

United States Plaintiff,
vs . City of Hollywood
Defendant .

CONSENT ORDER : APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D COMPLAINT AGAINST THE CITY OF HOLLYWOO D Under the terms of a settlement with the United States Department of Jus tice, the City of Ho llywood is required to perform certain actions to ensure that it does not violate RLUIPA, including processing this complaint and providing you with a . free copy of the Consent Oder entered in United States v . City of Ho llywood, Civ . No . 05-60687 (S .D . Fla.) .
Name : Address : Telephone :

Please state briefly the nature of the'service or request that you made of the City of Hollywood (e.g., special exception, variance, etc .) . In addi ti on , please include a desc ription of the religious land use or institution at issue in your request :

Page 23 of 24

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/10/2006 Page 24 of 24
Please state briefly in what way(s) you believe that the City of Hollywood may have violated your rights under the United States Constitution, federal law, the Florida State Constitution, Florida State law, or the City of Hollywood Code:
If you believe that the City of Hollywood, or any other local government or municipality, has discriminated against you in the implementation of its zoning or land use laws, in addition to completing this complaint, please contact the United States Department of Justice at :
(202) 514-471 3 You may also write to : United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Housing and Civil Enforcement Section 950 Pennsylvania Ave. N. W.. -G St Washington, DC 2053 0
Page 24 of 24

 
 Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 399 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/22/2008 Page 1 of 8

Thomas K. Kahn Clerk

United States Court of Appeals
Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303

For rules and forms visit www.call.uscourts.gov

January 15, 2008

Clarence Maddox
Clerk, U.S. District Court 301 N MIAMI AVE STE 150 MIAMI FL 33128-7788

1.1\ N ~ P ?.008

JAN 182008

Appeal Number: 06-14343-DD Case Style: Hollywood Community Synagogue v. City of Hollywood District Court Number: 04-61212 CV-JAL SECONDARY CASE NO: 05-60687-CV-JAL

The enclosed certified as the mandate of this

copy court.

of

the

judgment

and

a

copy

of

this

court's

opinion

are

hereby

issued

Also enclosed are the following:

Bill of Costs Original Exhibits, consisting of: eight folders Original record on appeal or review, consisting of: nine volumes

The clerk of the the copy of this

court letter

or agency shown above enclosed to the clerk.

is

requested

to

acknowledge

receipt

on

A copy of this letter, and the judgment form decision, is also being mailed to counsel and was previously mailed to counsel and prose

if noted above, but not a copy of the pro se parties. A copy of the court's parties on the date it was issued.

court's decision

Sincerely, THOMAS K. KAHN, Clerk Reply To: James 0. Delaney (404) 335-6113

Encl.
~ vols
l Vol
~
L{

MDT-1 (06/2006)

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 399 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/22/2008 Page 2 of 8
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 06-14343
District Court Docket No. 04-61212-CV -JAL
HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC., UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FL, SAL OLIVERI,
Defendants-Appellees,

FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Nov 20,2007
THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK

versus
LISA SELF, HEIDI O'SHEEHAN, RICHARD JOHNSON, CAROLYN JOHNSON,
Proposed Intervenors-Appellants.
PATRICK PETRILLO EVA PETRILLO,
Proposed Intervenors.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

JUDGMENT

It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and reference, is entered as the judgment of this

decreed Court.

that

the

attached

opinion

included

herein

by

,~suE.O AS MA.No~r~

Entered: November 20, 2007

JA~i 1 5 2008

For the Court: Thomas K. Kahn, Clerk By: Jackson, Jarvis

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 399 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/22/2008 Page 3 of 8

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
F l U ~--------------~ :I)

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

No. 06-14343 Non-Argument Calendar

ELEVENTH CIRCtHT NOVEMBER 20. :2007
THOI\1AS K. KAHJ\

CLERK

D.C. Docket Nos. 04-61212-CV-JAL & 05-60687-CV-JAL

HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC., UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FL, SAL OLIVERI,

versus

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

LISA SELF, HEIDI O'SHEEHAN, RICHARD JOHNSON, CAROLYN JOHNSON,

versus

Defendants-Appellees,

PATRICI PETRILLO, EVA PETRILLO,

Proposed Intervenors-Appellants,

Proposed Intervenors.

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 399 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/22/2008 Page 4 of 8
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
(November 20, 2007) Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and COX, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:
The Appellants-Proposed Intervenors appeal the district court's denial oftheir motion to intervene as defendants in a civil action between the Hollywood Community Synagogue and the United States as plaintiffs and the City ofHollywood and Sal Oliveri as defendants. Because we find no error in the district court's determination that the Appellants' motion was untimely, we affirm denial of the motion and dismiss the appeal.
The Appellants moved to intervene as a matter of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) on July 6, 2006 (R. 7-382), one day before the district court approved a consent decree to which all parties to the action agreed. They sought intervention to challenge the proposed decree on the grounds that it violated their rights to due process and quiet enjoyment of their property. (R.7-382 at 2.) After considering the factors in Rule 24(a), the district court denied their motion on the basis that they had
2

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 399 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/22/2008 Page 5 of 8
only an "extremely tenuous" legal interest in the action (R.7-384 at 9) and, even assuming a colorable legal interest, their motion was untimely (R.7-384 at 15).
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under the "anomalous rule," whereby "the court has jurisdiction to determine whether the denial ofintervention [is] proper. If the district court was correct in denying the motion to intervene, this court's jurisdiction evaporates and we must dismiss the appeal for want ofjurisdiction. Ifthe district court erred, we retain jurisdiction and must reverse." Davis v. Butts, 290 F.3d 1297, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotingFTCv. Am. Legal Distribs., Inc., 890 F.2d 363, 364 (11th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This rule only applies where intervention was sought as a matter of right under Rule 24(a). !d. Because the Appellants moved to intervene under Rule 24(a), we have jurisdiction.
Under Rule 24(a), a nonparty is entitled to intervene where he can show: (1) that the intervention application is timely; (2) that an interest exists relating to the property or transaction which is the subject ofthe action; (3) that disposition of the action, as a practical matter, may impede or impair the ability to protect that interest; and (4) the existing parties to the lawsuit inadequately represent the interests. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 983 F.2d 211, 215 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989)). The Supreme Court has held that the timeliness ofa motion to intervene is a threshold factor that must be satisfied before the other factors should be considered. NAACP
3

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 399 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/22/2008 Page 6 of 8
v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365, 93 S. Ct. 2591, 2603 (1973) ("If [a motion to intervene] is untimely, intervention must be denied. Thus, the court where the action is pending must first be satisfied as to timeliness."). And, although we typically review denial of a motion to intervene de novo, we have consistently reviewed a district court's timeliness determination for abuse of discretion. See Meek v. Metro. Dade County, 985 F.2d 1471, 1477 (11th Cir. 1993); Campbell v. Hall-Mark Elecs. Corp., 808 F.2d 775, 777 (lith Cir. 1987); United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983).
Analysis of the timeliness of a motion to intervene must account for the chronology leading up to the motion and
( 1) the length of time during which the would-be intervenor knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case before he petitioned for leave to intervene; (2) the extent of prejudice to the existing parties as a result of the would-be intervenor's failure to apply as soon as he knew or reasonably should have known ofhis interest; (3) the extent of prejudice to the would-be intervenor if his petition is denied; and (4) the existence ofunusual circumstances militating either for or against a determination that the application is timely. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d at 1516. Applying these factors, the district court found that the Appellants' motion was untimely. (R.7-384 at 15.) The court found that the Appellants were aware that the City may not represent their interests as early as February 2003 in light of the City's
4

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 399 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/22/2008 Page 7 of 8
opposition to the Appellants' attempted intervention in a state court action arising from the same dispute. (R.7-384 at 12-13.) The court further found that intervention by the Appellants would substantially prejudice the existing parties by practically undoing twenty-two months of litigation and settlement negotiations culminating in a consent decree. (R.7-384 at 14.) Finally, the court concluded that prejudice to the Appellants would be minimal as they could litigate the constitutionality ofthe consent decree in another forum (R.7-384 at 15) and that no unusual circumstances justified intervention (R.7-384 at 15). We find no abuse of discretion in the court's conclusion. Because the Appellants' motion was untimely, we need not consider whether the Appellants satisfied the remaining Rule 24(a) factors. See NAACP, 413 U.S. at 369, 93 S. Ct. at 2604-05.
As a consequence of affirming denial of the motion to intervene, we dismiss the appeal for lack ofjurisdiction, Jefferson County, 720 F.2d at 1515, and do not consider the Appellants' argument that they were entitled to a hearing before the district court approved the consent decree. 1
AFFIRMED.
The Government's motion to reconsider and grant its motion to supplement the record and file a supplemental index is DENIED.
5

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 399 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/22/2008 Page 8 of 8

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

BILL OF COSTS

I: ILED

vs.

Case No. ~6_-_14_3_4_3,'14~~.~.-E-LnC~~OE-U~~~R~-T-~~-O-gf-~~A~~Il~-J'-~.F~.-.E~-~-L1-~-~~------i1

CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA

Appellee

\

n·mMAS K. KAHN

\

Fed.R.App.P. 39 and lith Cir. R. 39-1 (see reverse) govern costs which are taxable in this ourt and the time for ~@.i{~e Bill of Costs. A

motion for leave to file out of time is required for a Bill of Costs not timely received.

INSTRUCTIONS
In the grid below, multiply the number of original pages of each document by the total number of documents reproduced to calculate the total number of copies reproduced. Multiply this number by the cost per copy ( $.15 per copy for "In-House", up to $.25 per copy for commercial reproduction, supported by receipts) showing the product as costs requested.

DOCUMENT Appellant's Brief

Repro. Method (Mark One)
In-House Comm*

--
No. of Original
Pages

Total No. Documents Reproduced

Total No. of Copies

COSTS REQUESTED

CT. USE ONLY COSTS
ALLOWED

Record Excerpts

Appellee's Brief Reply Brief

XXX

23

10

?~()

¢. ')./, <;()

t."l.t.. c;.n

•Note: If reproduction was done commercially, receipt(s) must be attached.

TOTAL

I hereby swear or affinn that the costs claimed were actually and necessarily incurred of Costs on counsel/parties of record.
ZL------- Date Signed: _______/ )__-_3_-_c._
Attomeyfor: CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA (Type or print name of client)

FOR COURT USE ONLY

$ 34.50
REQUESTED

S$34.50
ALLOWED

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 436 F.Supp.2d 1325 (2006)
HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC., Plaintiff, v.
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA, and Sal Oliveri, individually, Defendants.
United States of America, Plaintiff, v.
City of Hollywood, Defendant.
Nos. 04-61212CIV, 05-60687CIV.
United States District Court, S.D. Florida.
June 26, 2006.
1326*1326 1327*1327 Franklin L. Zemel, Esq., Arnstein & Lehr, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff Hollywood Community Synagogue.
Sean R. Keveney, Esq., United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff United States.
Chad B. Hess, Esq., Thomas J. McCausland, Esq., Conroy Simberg Ganon Krevans & Abel, P.A., Hollywood, FL, for Defendant City of Hollywood.
William T. Boyd, Esq., Boyd Mustelier Smith & Parker, Miami, FL, for Defendant Sal Oliveri.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (D.E. 225)
LENARD, District Judge.
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff Hollywood Community Synagogue's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Motion," D.E. 190), filed on March 21, 2006. On April 20, 2006, Defendant City of Hollywood ("Defendant" or "the City") filed a Response. ("Response," D.E. 243.) On May 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Reply. ("Reply," D.E. 260.) On May 25, 2006, the City filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority. ("Supplement," D.E. 301.) On June 1, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Supplement. ("Response to the Supplement," D.E. 319.) Having considered the Motion, the Response, the Reply, the Supplement, the Response to the Supplement, and the record, the Court finds as follows:

I. Factual and Procedural Background
On September 15, 2004, Plaintiff Hollywood Community Synagogue (hereinafter "HCS" or "the Synagogue") filed a Complaint against Defendants City of Hollywood and Sal Oliveri (Case No. 04-61212-CIV—LENARD, D.E. 14), alleging violations of numerous federal constitutional rights and statutes, including the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (hereinafter "RLUIPA"). On April 26, 2005, Plaintiff United States of America filed a Complaint against Defendant City of Hollywood (Case No. 05-60687—CILENARD, D.E. 1), requesting declaratory and injunctive relief based upon Defendant's alleged violation of RLUIPA. On June 16, 2005, the Court issued an Order consolidating these cases and administratively closing the higher-numbered case (Case No. 04-61212-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 75; Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 14), finding that they involved common questions of law and fact.
On December 2, 2005, Plaintiff HCS was granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (D.E. 124.) This Second Amended Complaint (D.E. 125) contains 19 counts and is the operative complaint for purposes of Plaintiffs Motion. Unless otherwise specified, the legal claims and facts that follow are taken from the allegations contained in the Second Amended Complaint in the consolidated case.
Plaintiff HCS is a synagogue with its principal place of business at 2215-2221 N. 46th Avenue, Hollywood, Florida 33021. (D.E. 125, at ¶ 6.) Defendant City of Hollywood is a city municipality authorized by the State of Florida to regulate the use of land and structures within the City's borders, consistent with law. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Defendant Sal Oliveri is a City Commissioner for the City of Hollywood, representing the area of Hollywood Hills. (Id. at ¶ 8.)
In 1999, Yosef Elul, then-President of the Synagogue, purchased two residences, located at 2215 and 2221 N. 46th Avenue, Hollywood, in a single-family district. (Id. at ¶ 15.) In such single-family districts, a 1328*1328 place of worship[1] may operate only if granted a Special Exception. (Id. at ¶ 19.) After the purchase of the land by Yosef Elul, the Director of Planning for the City of Hollywood advised the Synagogue that it needed to apply for a Special Exception as a place of worship but assured Synagogue representatives that such Special Exception would be granted. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.)
In May of 2001, Alan Razla, on behalf of Mr. Elul, applied for a Special Exception as a place of worship. (Id. at ¶ 21.) The Board of Appeal and Adjustments (hereinafter "BAA") granted a six-month Special Exception. (Id.) Four months later, in September of 2001, Defendant Oliveri filed an appeal with the City Commission of the BAA's grant of the Special Exception. (Id. at ¶ 22.) The Commission heard the appeal and subsequently granted the

Synagogue a one-year Special Exception, which included certain conditions that limited parking and capacity. (Id.) Plaintiff United States notes that, upon information and belief, Defendant City of Hollywood had never previously imposed a time limit on a special exception for a religious use and had only once before imposed a time limit on a special exception for a nonreligious use. (Case No. 05-60687-CIVLENARD, D.E. 1, at ¶ 20.)
In August of 2002, Arthur Eckstein, on behalf of the Synagogue, applied to the Development Review Board (hereinafter "DRB," formerly known as the BAA) for a Special Exception. (D.E. 125, at ¶ 30.) In September of 2002, the DRB granted a six-month Temporary Special Exception subject to certain enumerated conditions and found that, subject to those conditions,[2] the use of the property as a place of worship was compatible with the existing natural environment and other properties within the vicinity. (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 31(A).) After the DRB hearing, Defendant Oliveri filed an appeal with the Commission. (Id. at ¶ 32.) In October 2002, the Commission denied Oliveri's appeal and allowed HCS the six-month Temporary Special Exception. (Id. at ¶ 33.)
In March of 2003, the DRB granted the Synagogue a Permanent Special Exception subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions[3] within 180 days. (Id. at ¶ 37.) Defendant Oliveri filed another appeal. (Id. 1329*1329 at ¶ 38.) On June 5, 2003, 53 days after the Permanent Special Exception was granted, the Commission, after considerable debate, reversed the decision of the DRB. (Id. at ¶ 39.) Among other things, the Commission claimed that the Synagogue was "too controversial." (Id. at ¶ 41.) "Controversiality" is not identified by the City Code as a factor to be evaluated when considering whether to grant a Special Exception. (Id. at ¶ 44.) Plaintiff United States notes that, upon information and belief, Defendant City of Hollywood had never previously denied a request by a place of worship to operate in either a single-family or multiple-family residential zone. (Case No. 05-60687CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1, at ¶ 28.)
On October 16, 2003, Defendant City of Hollywood sent HCS a letter notifying the congregation that it was to cease holding services and other related activities at its current location within one week. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1, at ¶ 30.) During a July 7, 2004, meeting, the City Commission voted to direct the City Attorney to file a lawsuit to stop further organized religious services from taking place at HCS, despite the fact that this item was not on the agenda and no notice had been provided to HCS or the public that such a vote would take place. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1, at ¶ 32.) On or about July 16, 2004, the City filed suit against the Synagogue in Broward County Circuit Court, Case No. 04-11444(21), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Synagogue for operating as a place of worship without a Special Exception. (D.E. 125, at ¶ 57.)

In its Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff HCS alleges the following 18 Counts against the City of Hollywood: I) damages for violation of the Synagogue's right to free exercise of religion; II) injunctive relief for violation of the Synagogue's right to free exercise of religion; IV) damages for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)—substantial burden); V) injunctive relief for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)—substantial burden); VI) damages for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)— unequal terms); VII) injunctive relief for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)—unequal terms); VIII) damages for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2)—discrimination); IX) injunctive relief for violation of RLUPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2)—discrimination); X) damages for violation of the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998 (Florida RFRA); XI) injunctive relief for violation of the Florida RFRA; XII) damages for violation of the Equal Protection Clause; XIII) injunctive relief for violation of the Equal Protection Clause; XIV) damages for violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; XV) injunctive relief for violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; XVI) promissory estoppel; XVII) facial equal protection challenge to Article V of the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances; XVIII) as applied equal protection challenge to Article V of the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances; and XIX) preliminary injunctive relief. (D.E. 125, at ¶¶ 60-151.)
Plaintiff HCS's Second Amended Complaint also asserts two claims against Defendant Sal Oliveri, individually, for damages stemming from the alleged violation of Plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Free Exercise of Religion (Count III) and from the alleged violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Right to Equal Protection (Count XII). (Id. at ¶¶ 72-80, 113-121.)
Plaintiff United States' Complaint contains substantially similar facts to Plaintiff HCS's Second Amended Complaint and requests that the Court grant injunctive 1330*1330 and declaratory relief against Defendant City of Hollywood for violations of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)-(2), based on the City's treatment of HCS on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies and on discrimination against HCS on the basis of religion or religious denomination. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1, at page 6.)
On May 10, 2006, the Court issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion to Dismiss HCS' Second Amended Complaint. (D.E. 272.) Therein, the Court: 1) dismissed with prejudice those parts of Counts I and II that relate to an alleged City policy of regularly granting applications for Special Exceptions; 2) dismissed Counts IV, V, X, and XI with prejudice; 3) dismissed Count XIX without prejudice; and 4) denied Defendant's Motion with respect to all other Counts. (Id. at 61-62.)

II. Plaintiff HCS's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
In its Motion (D.E. 190), Plaintiff HCS moves for partial summary judgment, arguing that Article V, Sections 5.3 and 5.7 of the City's Zoning and Land Development Regulations (ZLDR) are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to the Synagogue.[4] (Id. at 2-2.) The Synagogue asserts that this determination does not require any factual findings or review of testimony, but may be made entirely on the basis of the law. (Id. at 13.) First, HCS maintains that Section 5.3.G. of the City's ZLDR is facially void because it gives City officials unbridled and unfettered discretion in their review of Special Exception applications. (Id.) The Synagogue contends that this Section contains four subjective criteria to be applied in reviewing an application for a Special Exception and that, even if the City Commission finds that all four criteria have been met, it still has the discretion to deny the application. (Id. at 5-6.)
Second, the Synagogue argues that Section 5.3.G.1. constitutes a prior restraint on activities protected by the First Amendment and is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to HCS. (Id. at 3, 16.) HCS maintains that, although prior restraints must contain standards that are precise, definite, and objective in order to guide government officials, the City's Special Exception zoning criteria employ terms such as "compatibility," "vicinity," "adequate provision," and "sufficient, appropriate, and adequate" that are vague, subjective, and imprecise. (Id. at 8.) Thus, HCS argues that the Special Exception provisions threaten the right to free exercise of religion. (Id.at 16.)
In its Response (D.E. 243), Defendant City of Hollywood argues that the amount of discretion afforded a zoning board in determining particular land uses is extremely high because zoning is an inherently discretionary system. (Id. at 2.) The City thus maintains that Plaintiff has not established grounds for summary judgment on its facial or as-applied challenges. (Id.) Defendant agrees that the adjudication of this Motion does not require the Court to make factual determinations or consider testimony regarding witnesses' interpretations of the ZLDR sections at issue. (Id. at 13.)
Defendant City of Hollywood contends that Section 5.3G.2. is not facially void for "unbridled discretion" because the DRB or Commission, after reviewing an application for a Special Exception, has only three options: it may grant the application, 1331*1331 grant the application with conditions, or deny the application. (Id. at 5.) Defendant further argues that the four criteria used to evaluate such applications require specific findings. (Id. at 8.) Moreover, Defendant maintains that Section 5.3.G. of the ZLDR should be reviewed in light of the purpose of the zoning district in question, i.e., in light of the section's purpose of protecting the character of single-family neighborhoods. (Id. at 6.)

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's asapplied challenge is without merit because the zoning ordinances in question do not operate as a prior restraint on Plaintiffs First Amendment rights. (Id. at 15.) Defendant asserts that the ZLDR neither directly regulates the content of Plaintiffs protected activity nor operates as a licensing scheme and, thus, the zoning scheme should be reviewed under the more permissive standard of time, place, and manner restrictions for content-neutral regulations. (Id. at 15-16, 18.) Defendant then maintains that, because the ordinances are narrowly tailored to the City's substantial interest in preserving the quality of urban life and because the ordinances leave Plaintiff significant alternative avenues of expression, Plaintiffs Motion should be denied. (Id. at 1920.)
In its Reply (D.E. 260), Plaintiff reiterates that the zoning scheme provides Defendant City of Hollywood unbridled discretion to grant or deny a Special Exception permit, even if all four criteria are met, and that it makes no difference that the City must make some kind of decision on every application. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff further maintains that the Special Exception procedure constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment activity because applicants must obtain a permit before operating in certain parts of the City. (Id. at 4.) Thus, there exists a heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of the procedure, one that may only be overcome by narrow, objective, and definite standards, standards that are absent here. (Id.) Moreover, argues Plaintiff, this infirmity is not cured by the fact that Defendant provides alternate for a for the exercise of First Amendment activity. (Id. at 7.) Instead, Plaintiff argues that the prior restraint analysis is triggered by the existence of official discretion to deny use of a given forum for First Amendment protected activity. (Id. at 8.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that, even if the Court was to construe Section 5.3.G. of the ZLDR as a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction, the Section is still unconstitutional because it does not contain precise and objective standards to guide the City's decisionmaking. (Id. at 10.)
In its Supplement (D.E. 301), Defendant argues that, in the event that the Court determines that the standards governing the Special Exception procedure are invalid, a conditional use "becomes a prohibited one since the obvious reason for making it a special exception use is to prohibit it in the absence of the specified approval." (Id. at 2-3.) Since the terms would then be considered too indefinite, the City argues that Board would be unable to grant a Special Exception to the Synagogue and thus, even if the Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is granted, the Court cannot order that HCS be granted a Special Exception. (See id. at 2-3.)
In the Response to the Supplement (D.E. 319), the Synagogue argues that Defendant's position is lacking in legal support and represents a "disturbing tactic" on the part of the

City. (Id. at 2.) First, Plaintiff argues that the authorities relied upon by the City are factually distinguishable because they do not concern the First Amendment. (Id.) Next, Plaintiff argues that, if the Special Exception provisions are declared unconstitutional, the proper 1332*1332 remedy is to allow the Synagogue to remain in its present location. (See id. at 3, 7-8.) In support of this argument, Plaintiff states that other provisions of the Code consider special exception uses, including places of worship, as generally suitable in singlefamily neighborhoods. (Id. at 7.)
III. The Hearing
On May 23,2006, the Court held a hearing ("the Hearing," see D.E. 298), at which the Parties were provided an opportunity to present their arguments. During the Hearing, Plaintiff HCS emphasized its position that the zoning ordinances in question constituted a prior restraint on protected First Amendment activity and, as such, the ordinances are required to contain clear and precise standards. (Id. at 3:1-12.) Plaintiff further argued the standards currently in place allow the Commission to use their unfettered discretion and to base their decisions on any criteria they choose, including "controversiality," as was cited as a basis for rejecting the Synagogue's application. (Id. at 4:2-6.) Plaintiff noted that, even though the City code states that a place of worship is, "generally suitable in this district," the Synagogue was denied a Special Exception because it was purportedly not compatible with its surroundings. (Id. at 5:21-6:6.) Thus, HCS maintained that, because it is impossible to know what criteria need to be met to obtain a Special Exception, the provisions are unconstitutionally vague. (Id. at 5:11-19; 12:6-17.)
Defendant City of Hollywood responded that no prior restraint can be found here. (Id.at 14:7.) Defendant defined a prior restraint as a governmental attempt to control the content of expression and further asserted that the City's zoning ordinances are not prior restraints because they do not require every place of worship in all zoning districts to get permission before operating. (Id. at 15:3-8, 16:18-17:2.) Because a place of worship need apply for a permit only if it wants to operate in residential neighborhoods, the City contended that there was no licensing scheme or prior restraint. (Id. at 17:9-16.) Instead, Defendant argued that its zoning regulations were narrowly tailored to the substantial government interest of zoning and preserving the quality of urban life. (Id. at 20:8-18.) Thus, the City asserted that its regulations were governed by the permissive time, place, and manner restriction standards, and that this only mandated that decisions not be left up to the whim of the decisionmaker. (Id.at 23:8-24:3.) The City argued that, while its standards allow some elasticity, they do not leave the decision to the whim of the decisionmaker. (Id. at 24:20-23.)

Plaintiff responded that the City established a system in which places of worship were deemed generally acceptable subject to a Special Exception, but provided unlimited discretion to officials to decide whether to grant such an Exception. (Id. at 32:15-33:8.)
Upon questioning by the Court, the City stipulated that the substantial government interest justifying the zoning ordinances in question is twofold: the City's interest in zoning, generally, and the purpose of protecting the character of singlefamily neighborhoods, as stated in ZLDR § 4.1A. (Id. at 39:23-40:2.) The City argued that the provisions were narrowly tailored because they applied only to places of worship wanting to operate in residential districts. (Id. at 42:14-25.) Defendant further maintained that the zoning ordinances do not constitute a prior restraint because there are places in the City of Hollywood where the Synagogue can practice their First Amendment protected activities without having to ask the City for permission or a Special Exception. (Id. at 41:2-22.) Finally, Defendant City conceded that, if the Court 1333*1333 found the zoning ordinances at issue to constitute a prior restraint, the holding of Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir.1999), would control in this case. (Id. at 58:14-59:3.)
IV. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard as follows:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).
The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file, together with affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also FED.R.Civ.P. 56(e). In meeting this burden the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Id.
Plaintiff HCS and Defendant City of Hollywood agree that the Court need not make any factual findings or examine any testimony in considering the instant motion and that the Court may issue its ruling after reviewing the text of the challenged portions of the zoning regulations in light of the applicable legal standards. After reviewing the record, the Court agrees that no genuine issue exists for trial and that partial summary judgment 1334*1334 may be granted as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court will now turn to the text of the City's ZLDR in question.
B. The City's Zoning and Land Development Regulations (ZLDR)
Hollywood Community Synagogue is located in a "Single Family District" in the City of Hollywood. Section 4.1 of the ZLDR specifies that the purpose of Single Family Districts is "to protect the character of the single family neighborhoods." (D.E. 191, Ex. B at 4.1.) The "Main Permitted Uses" in such districts are "[s]ingle family detached dwelling[s]." (Id.) The "Special Exceptions" in such districts are "[e]ducational facilities[,][p]laces of worship, meeting halls and similar nonprofit uses and ham radio antennas." (Id.)
Section 5.3.G. of the ZLDR, entitled "Special exceptions," is the primary provision at issue and contains the following language:

Certain uses are listed as special exceptions in the Zoning and Land Development Regulations and are permitted in zoning districts subject to the approval of the Development Review Board. These uses are considered generally suitable for the districts in which listed. However, the character and nature of the uses may necessitate controls and safeguards on the manner of establishment and operation which would best serve the interests of the community and the owners of the property in question.
(D.E. 191, Ex. A at 5.3.G.) Section 5.3.G.1., entitled "Review of petitions for special exceptions," provides that all petitions for Special Exceptions shall be reviewed by the DRB, which may grant the petition if it makes all of the following findings:
a. That the use is compatible with the existing natural environment and other properties within the vicinity;
b. That there will be adequate provision for safe traffic movement, both vehicular and pedestrian, both internal to the use and in the area which will serve the use;
c. That there are adequate setbacks, buffering, and general amenities in order to control any adverse effects of noise, light, dust and other potential nuisances; and
d. That the land area is sufficient, appropriate and adequate for the use as proposed.
(Id. at A at 5.3.G.1(a)-(d).) The ensuing section, entitled "Decision of the Board," provides:
In considering a petition for a special exception, the Board may grant the special exception, grant the special exception with appropriate conditions when the Board determines such conditions . . . are necessary to further the purpose of the zoning district or compatibility with other property within the vicinity, or deny the special exception.
(Id. at A at 5.3.G.2.) Finally, pursuant to Section 5.7.A., the City Commission may request a hearing on any application which, upon its determination, requires additional review to ensure that, inter alia, development standards and criteria have been met. (D.E. 125, at ¶ 138.[5]) Section 5.7.B. provides the Commission shall apply the same standards and criteria employed by the DRB and shall approve, approve with conditions, or deny the application. (D.E. 125, at ¶ 138; Hearing Transcript at 24:20-23, 28:1-12.)
1335*1335 C. Plaintiff's Facial and As-Applied Challenges
Plaintiff first raises a facial challenge to the City's zoning scheme. Generally, content-neutral zoning regulations are reviewed under the deferential "time, place, and manner" standards that were delineated by the Supreme Court in City of Renton v. Playtime, Theatres,

Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-54, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). Under these standards, "a zoning ordinance is valid if it is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest and [if] it allows for reasonable alternative avenues of expression." Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358 (citing Int'l Eateries of America, Inc. v. Broward County, Fla., 941 F.2d 1157, 1161-65 (11th Cir.1991) and City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-52, 106 S.Ct. 925.) A city's interest "in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life" is a substantial government interest that "must be accorded high respect." City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50, 106 S.Ct. 925.
A zoning ordinance that touches upon activities protected by the First Amendment must also contain "narrow, objective, and definite standards" to guide city officials in their review. See Camp Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1279 (11th Cir.2006) (citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969)). Absent such standards, the ordinance grants "unbridled discretion" to city officials and fails to "`prevent[ ] the official from encouraging some views and discouraging others through the arbitrary' grant of an exemption."[6] Camp, at 1279 (quoting Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992)); see also Thornhill v. State of Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 97-98, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (stating that the lack of objective criteria "readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure"). "A government regulation that allows arbitrary application is inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because such discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Out of these concerns regarding the dangers of censorship, the Supreme Court has developed a long line of jurisprudence aimed at fostering the legitimate goals of lawmaking while curbing the threats of arbitrary enforcement. Yet, in reaching the proper balance, the Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that an ordinance that "makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official—as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official—is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms."Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151, 89 S.Ct. 935.
A "prior restraint" is a restriction on expression that is imposed before the expression occurs. United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795 n. 5, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989); Camp, at 1283 ("[t]he term `prior restraint' is used to describe administrative and

judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications occur (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 553, 113 1336*1336 S.Ct. 2766, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993) (internal quotations omitted)))." "Classic prior restraints have involved judge-issued injunctions against the publication of certain information." Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1215 (11th Cir.2005). "Prior restraints have also been found where the government has unbridled discretion to limit access to a particular public forum." Id.
Defendant City of Hollywood first argues that, because places of worship can operate in other districts in the City without applying for a special exception, no prior restraint exists here. The Court finds that this assertion is in direct conflict with established Supreme Court precedent. In Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that anti-canvassing ordinances, which restricted canvassing only in streets and alleys, were valid because they did not prohibit the distribution of printed matter in other public places. The Schneider Court found that streets were the natural and proper places for dissemination of information and that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Id. at 163, 60 S.Ct. 146. Further, in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975), the Supreme Court found that a decision to deny the petitioner's request to use a municipal facility for a theater production constituted a prior restraint, even though the denial did not prevent petitioner from using another theater in the city. Accordingly, the existence of alternative fora for expression does not justify an otherwise impermissible prior restraint. Id. at 555, 95 S.Ct. 1239.
Next, Defendant contends that Section 5.3.G. of the ZLDR sufficiently restricts the discretion of City regulators and is therefore a valid time, place, and manner restriction. After careful consideration of this ordinance, the Court cannot agree. Instead, the Court finds that Section 5.3.G.1. constitutes an unconstitutional[7] prior restraint because it lacks "narrow, objective, and definite standards" to guide city officials in their review of applications for a Special Exception and thus provides City officials unbridled discretion in their consideration of the application. See Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358, 1362 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that "some measure of discretion is acceptable, but . . . virtually any amount of discretion beyond the merely ministerial is suspect").
In Lady J. Lingerie, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered and invalidated a similar licensing scheme. 176 F.3d at 1362. There, the City of Jacksonville created a zoning scheme that allowed adult entertainment establishments to operate as of right in only one zone; such establishments were allowed to operate in a second zone only if the zoning

board granted a zoning exception after consideration of nine enumerated criteria.[8] Id. at 1337*1337 1361. The Eleventh Circuit characterized these criteria as "runof-the-mill zoning considerations" that concerned compatibility with contiguous uses, environmental impact, and effect of pedestrian traffic. Id. at 1362. After examining these factors, the Eleventh Circuit held that none was precise or objective and that "all of them— individually and collectively—empower the zoning board to covertly discriminate against adult entertainment establishments under the guise of general `compatibility' or `environmental' considerations." Id. Specifically, in place of objective requirements, e.g., there must be X number of doors per square foot, the provisions used broad, subjective language, such as buildings must "be sufficiently accessible to permit entry by" rescue services. Id. Because these criteria were being applied to establishments that are entitled to First Amendment protections, the Eleventh Circuit held that the licensing scheme was unconstitutional.
The criteria contained in Section 5.3.G.1. are as, if not more, broad and imprecise as those found in Lady J. Lingerie. The Section directs the DRB to determine whether the use is "compatible with" the natural environment and other properties; whether there will be "adequate provision" for safe traffic movement or "adequate setbacks, buffering, and general amenities . . . to control . . . potential nuisances"; and whether the land area is "sufficient, appropriate, and adequate for the use." (D.E. 191, Ex. A at 5.3.G.1.) As in Lady J. Lingerie, the Court finds that none of these criteria is "precise and objective" and that all of them empower the DRB, or the Commission on appeal, to covertly discriminate against places of worship under the guise of "compatibility" or other intangible considerations. Lady J. Lingerie, 176 F.3d at 1362. Moreover, the Special Exception procedure employed here is even more constitutionally invidious, as it provides City officials the discretion to deny a Special Exception even if all four enumerated criteria are met. (D.E. 191, Ex. A at 5.3.G.) Nothing in the ordinance or its application prevents City officials from encouraging some places of worship while discouraging others through the arbitrary grant or denial of a Special Exception. 1338*1338See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992). Because Plaintiff HCS, as a place of worship, is entitled to the protections of the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment, the provision of such unbridled discretion to City officials is constitutionally impermissible.[9]
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the zoning scheme established in Section 5.3.G., as it relates to places of worship, is void on its face, and summary judgment is therefore GRANTED in favor of Plaintiff HCS on Count XVII of the Second Amended Complaint.

Last, because the Court has found the City's zoning scheme unconstitutional, it does not reach Plaintiff's argument that the provisions are also unconstitutional as applied to HCS. See Cafe Erotica of Florida, Inc. v. St. Johns County, 360 F.3d 1274, 1293 (11th Cir.2004); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1318 n. 9 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that an asapplied challenge is rendered moot if the underlying statute is deemed unconstitutional). Therefore, Plaintiff's as-applied equal protection claim, contained in Count XVIII of the Second Amended Complaint, is DENIED as moot.
D. Impact on Counts I and II
In Counts I and II of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff HCS seeks damages and injunctive relief, respectively, as a result of the City's violation of HCS's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In these counts, the Synagogue alleges, inter alia, that the City's denial of the Special Exception violated the Synagogue's constitutional rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of assembly for purposes of worship and teaching. (D.E. 125, at 19.)
In order to obtain relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that conduct under color of state law, complained of in the civil rights suit, violated its rights, privileges, or immunities under the Constitution or laws of the United States.Whitehorn v. Harrelson, 758 F.2d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir.1985). Moreover, the Supreme Court has placed strict limitations on municipal liability under Section 1983.Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.1998), citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). There is no respondeat superior liability upon which to inculpate a municipality for the wrongful actions of its employees or agents. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Thus, a municipality can only be held liable if an official policy or custom 1339*1339 of that municipality causes a constitutional violation. Id. at 694-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Moreover, it is not enough for the plaintiff to merely identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality; the plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through deliberate conduct, the municipality is the moving force behind the alleged injury. Board of County Com'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).
The Supreme Court in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), held that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances. Id. at 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292. However, any such single act must still be made pursuant to an existing, unconstitutional official municipal policy to properly attribute such conduct to the municipality pursuant to Monell. Id. at 478 n. 6, 479-81, 106 S.Ct. 1292; City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-824, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). The Eleventh Circuit has

summarized the Supreme Court's guiding principles, to be employed when evaluating the single action of an official policymaker is sufficient to give rise to municipal liability, as follows: (1) whether the action is officially sanctioned or ordered by the municipality; (2) whether the action is taken by officers with final policymaking authority; (3) whether this final policymaking authority is granted by state law, including valid local ordinances and regulations; (4) whether the challenged action was taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the officials responsible for making policy in that particular area of the city's business, as determined by state law. Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 713 (11th Cir.1992) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In its Order of May 10, 2006, the Court ruled that Plaintiff had demonstrated all four factors from Martinez, and had thus stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon the single act by the Commission of reversing the DRB pursuant to the City's zoning ordinances. (D.E. 272, at 31-32.)
The Court has determined herein that the City's zoning ordinance relating to Special Exceptions for places of worship is unconstitutionally vague on its face in violation of Plaintiff HCS's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. It is undisputed that the City applied this zoning ordinance to the Synagogue in denying its application for a Special Exception. The Court has, moreover, already determined that this single act of denying HCS's application constituted a municipal policy or practice sufficient to invoke municipal liability. The Court further finds that this denial pursuant to an unconstitutional ordinance was the moving force behind the violation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Finding no genuine issues of material fact as to this claim, the Court concludes that Plaintiff HCS is entitled to summary judgment as to the portions of Counts I and II in which Plaintiff claims that the City violated its constitutional rights through the single act of the Commission's denial of a Special Exception.
E. Remedy
In Counts I, II, XVII, and XVIII, the Synagogue requests, inter alia, that the Court enter judgment against the City, direct that it be granted a Special Exception, award damages to the Synagogue, and declare the portions of Article V of the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances relating to Special Exceptions unconstitutionally vague. (D.E. 125 at ¶¶ 69, 71, 141.)
The City, in its Supplement, argues that it may still prevent the Synagogue from operating as a place of worship in its present location even if the Special Exception procedures are deemed unconstitutional. 1340*1340 Essentially, the City maintains that if the Special Exception provisions are excised from the ZLDR, no special exceptions could be granted in single-family districts and the only the permitted principals uses would be allowed.

The primary issue now before the Court is whether the City's Special Exception provision may be severed from the rest of the ZLDR and what impact such severance would have on places of worship. The City is correct that severability of local ordinances is a question of state law. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub.Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); Mayflower Farms, INC. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 274, 56 S.Ct. 457, 80 L.Ed. 675 (1936). However, the Florida District Court of Appeals cases provided by the City provide no support for its conclusion that, in the First Amendment context, the invalidation of the Special Exception provisions transform all conditional uses into prohibited uses.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that Florida law clearly favors the severance of invalid portions of a law from the valid ones, where possible. Coral Springs Street Systems, Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1347 (11th Cir.2004). The doctrine of severability is derived from the doctrine of separation of powers and is designed to show great deference to the legislative prerogative to enact laws. Id. However, severability is not possible where an illegal provision has tainted the remainder of the statute. Id. The severability determination is made by examining the invalidated section's "relation to the overall legislative intent of the statute of which it is a part, and whether the statute, less the invalid provisions, can still accomplish this intent."Id. (citations omitted).
The Florida Supreme Court, in Smith v. Department of Insurance, 507 So.2d 1080, 1089 (Fla.1987), has suggested the following test for discerning severability:
When a part of a statute is declared unconstitutional the remainder of the act will be permitted to stand provided: (1) the unconstitutional provisions can be separated from the remaining valid provisions, (2) the legislative purpose expressed in the valid provisions can be accomplished independently of those which are void, (3) the good and the bad features are not so inseparable in substance that it can be said that the Legislature would have passed the one without the other, and (4) an act complete in itself remains after the invalid provisions are stricken.
Coral Springs, 371 F.3d at 1348 (citations omitted). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, under Florida law, an unconstitutional portion of a challenged statute "should be excised, leaving the rest intact and in force, when doing so does not defeat the purpose of the statute and leaves in place a law that is complete." Id.
While, in this case, factors (1) and (4) of the Smith test have been met, as the challenged portions of the ZLDR could be separated from the remaining provisions and leave an act complete in itself, the City's proposed remedy fails to satisfy the other two factors. Instead, the Court finds that such severance would thwart the legislative purpose of the ZLDR such

that it could not be said that the Commission would have passed the one without the other. The ZLDR expressly states that places of worship are considered "generally suitable" uses within single family districts subject to controls to best serve the interests of the community and the owners of the property in question. (D.E. 191, at Ex. A at 5.3.G.; id. at Ex. B at 4.1.) Thus, the City never intended the complete exclusion of places of worship in single family districts and would have been unlikely to 1341*1341 enact an ordinance devoid of exception procedures. Removal of the Special Exception provision, therefore, cannot be accomplished without defeating the purpose of the statute and destroying the intent of the enacting body.
Accordingly, pursuant to the Court's authority to fashion a remedy for the City's violation of Plaintiff HCS's right to free exercise of religion and because the Court finds that Plaintiff HCS has been irreparably injured by the violation of its rights, the Court orders that the Synagogue shall be granted the Permanent Special Exception it was awarded by the DRB in March 2003, subject only to those conditions that are objective and definite.[10] Specifically, the Permanent Special Exception shall be conditioned upon the Synagogue building a six-foot soundproofing wall at the rear property line and providing a three-sided dumpster as approved by the City's Public Works department, provided that a list of approved dumpsters exists.[11]
Further, the Court orders that the City shall promptly enact new Special Exception ordinance(s) for places of worship, one(s) that contain "narrow, objective, and definite standards" guiding City officials in their review and that are otherwise constitutionally sound.
Last, the Court orders that the issue of damages that arise from Count I and that relate to the constitutional violation found here is properly placed before a jury for further determination.
V. Conclusion
As stated above, the Court recognizes that the City of Hollywood has a substantial interest in preserving the quality of urban life in its neighborhoods. Moreover, the Court accords great respect for the City's interest in protecting the character and nature of neighborhoods in which single-family, detached dwellings predominate and in furthering the ability of its residents to engage in the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of their property.
However, the City of Hollywood, through its officials, is also charged with the protection of the religious freedoms that are found in the First Amendment and that form the cornerstone of American democracy. Zoning regulations that affect those freedoms must therefore be precise and objective in both their terms and their application. Our Constitution and our love of liberty demand no less.

Accordingly, it is:
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff Hollywood Community Synagogue's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D.E. 190), filed March 21, 2006, is GRANTED in part and DENIED as moot in part as described herein.
[1] The City's Zoning and Land Development Regulations do not define place of worship, and thus the Court will look to the natural and ordinary meaning. Konikov v. Orange County, Fl, 410 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005). A "place" is defined as "a building or locality used for a special purpose." Webster's 3d New Int'l Unabridged Dictionary 1727 (1993). "Worship" is defined as "the reverence or veneration tendered a divine being or supernatural power." Id. at 2637. Thus, taken together, a "place of worship" is a building or locality used for the reverence or veneration of a divine being or supernatural power.
[2] The conditions imposed by the DRB were: (1) parking of any type is prohibited in the alley located behind the Synagogue; (2) the Synagogue must enter into a lease agreement for off-site parking, (3) the Synagogue must obtain garbage dumpsters in a size and style acceptable to City staff, (4) the Synagogue must enter into a property maintenance agreement with a property maintenance provider who will maintain the premises in accordance with the City Code, and (5) the Synagogue must work with City staff to create a buffer along the rear side of the property. (D.E. 125, at ¶ 30.)
[3] The conditions imposed by the DRB require the Synagogue to: (1) build a six-foot soundproofing wall at the rear property line; (2) provide for appropriate three-sided dumpster as approved by the City's Public Works Department; (3) provide additional landscaping along the north and south property lines as determined appropriate by the City's Office of Planning; and (4) provide a site plan to the City's Planning Staff that demonstrates how the Synagogue will satisfy the first three conditions. (D.E. 125, at ¶ 37.)
[4] Though Plaintiff never specifies as to which Counts its Motion relates, the Court finds that the Motion is dispositive of Counts XVII and XVIII and also affects portions of Counts I and II.
[5] Plaintiff provided the text of Section 5.7 of the ZLDR in the Second Amended Complaint (D.E. 125, at § 138); Defendant City of Holly-wood, in its Answer, admitted to the contents of this paragraph of the pleading (D.E. 307, at ¶ 138).
[6] The Court notes that a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance may be raised when the mere threat of abuse of power exists; no proof of actual abuse of power is required. Thornhill v. State of Alabama,310 U.S. 88, 97, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940).
[7] Though prior restraints are not per se unconstitutional, there exists a strong presumption against their constitutionality. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990). Any scheme that places unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agency, however, must be invalidated due to the great danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms. Id.; Southeastern Promotions, 95 S.Ct. at 1244.
[8] The relevant provision of the City of Jacksonville regulations provided that the zoning board shall issue an order to grant the exception on if it finds from a preponderance of the evidence . . . that the proposed use meets, to the extent applicable, the following standards and criteria:
(i) Will be consistent with the Comprehensive Plan, including any subsequent plan adopted by the Council pursuant thereto;
(ii) Will be compatible with the existing contiguous uses or zoning and compatible with the general character of the area, considering population density, design, scale and orientation of structures to the area, property values, and existing similar uses or zoning;
(iii) Will not have an environmental impact inconsistent with the health, safety and welfare of the community;

(iv) Will not have a detrimental effect on vehicular or pedestrian traffic, or parking conditions, and will not result in the generation or creation of traffic inconsistent with the health, safety and welfare of the community;
(v) Will not have a detrimental effect on the future development of contiguous properties or the general area, according to the Comprehensive Plan, including any subsequent amendment to the plan adopted by the Council;
(vi) Will not result in the creation of objectionable or excessive noise, lights, vibrations, fumes, odors, dust or physical activities, taking into account existing uses or zoning in the vicinity;
(vii) Will not overburden existing public services and facilities;
(viii) Will be sufficiently accessible to permit entry onto the property by fire, police, rescue and other services; and
(ix) Will be consistent with the definition of a zoning exception, and will meet the standards and criteria of the zoning classification in which such use is proposed to be located, and all other requirements for such particular use set forth elsewhere in the Zoning Code, or otherwise adopted by the Planning Commission.
Lady J. Lingerie, 176 F.3d at 1369-70.
[9] The Court notes that, even if it found that the City of Hollywood's zoning scheme constituted a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction instead of a prior restraint, the City's Special Exception standards as applied to places of worship do not pass constitutional muster. The Supreme Court has held that even time, place, and manner restrictions must contain adequate standards to guide officials' discretion and allow for effective judicial review in the First Amendment context. Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 323, 122 S.Ct. 775, 151 L.Ed.2d 783 (2002). Therefore, such regulations must contain "narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards." Burk v. Augusta-Richmond County, 365 F.3d 1247, 1256 (11th Cir. 2004), quoting Thomas, 534 U.S. at 324, 122 S.Ct. 775. As discussed above, the standards provided for the DRB to review Special Exception applications contain vague and imprecise language allowing for wide variances in interpretation and application. This infirmity is only exacerbated by the fact that both the DRB and Commission retain the discretion to deny a Special Exception application, even if a place of worship is found to satisfy all four criteria. Therefore, the Court finds that the City's zoning regulations relating to places of worship are unconstitutional, even if construed as content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.
[10] The Court notes that, at a hearing held on June 26, 2006, the Parties announced that, as a part of the proposed settlement, the City would allow the Synagogue, inter alia, to operate as a "matter of right" in its present location. The Court's ruling, contained in this Order, shall not preclude the Parties from agreeing to terms that are more favorable to the Synagogue, provided that such terms are consistent with all applicable laws.
[11] The Court finds that the remaining conditions—requiring "additional" landscaping "as determined appropriate" and providing a site plan—are insufficiently objective to be imposed.

 
 Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 1 of 77

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO: 04-61212-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN
HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC.,
Plaintiff, v.
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA, and SAL OLIVERI, individually,
Defendants. ______________________________!

(
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PLAINTIFF HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC.'S NOTICE OF FILING
Plaintiff, HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC., by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby gives notice of filing the Stipulation for Entry of Consent Decree with the Clerk of the United States District Court. A copy of the Stipulation for Entry of Consent Decree is attached hereto.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE WE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was furnished via U.S. Mail and E-Mail to Robert M. Oldershaw, Esquire, Chief Litigation Counsel, City of Hollywood, Florida, 2600 Hollywood Boulevard, Room 407, Hollywood, Florida 33021, Thomas J. McCausland, Esq., Conroy, Simberg et al, 3440 Hollywood Blvd., Second Floor, Hollywood, FL 33021 and W. Todd Boyd, Esq., Boyd, Mustelier, Smith & Parker, P.L., counsel for Oliveri, Bank of America Tower at International Place, I00 S.E. 2nd St., 36th Floor Miami, Florida, 33131, Sean Keveney, Esq. and R. Tamar Hagler, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, Civil Rights Division, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,

110022 I

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 2 of 77
G Street. Washington, D.C. 20530 and Marilynn Lindsey, Esq .. U.S. Department of Justice, 500
E. Broward Blvd., Suite 700, Fort Lauderdale. FL 33394, on this 5th day of July. 2006.
ARNSTEIN & LEUR LLP Counsel for Plaintiff 200 East Las Olas Blvd. Suite 1700 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Phone: (305) 713-7600 Fax: (305) 713-7700 flzemel@arnstein.com jtgordon@arnstein.com
}
I I
By:~-+--~--------~~­ F F Jason Gordon, Esq. Florida Bar No. 0012973

110022_1

2

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 3 of 77
I ,

lJNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO: 04-61212-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN
HOLLYWOOD COf\-1MUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC.,
Plaintiff,
V.
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA, and SAL OLIVERI, individually,
Defendants.
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF CONSENT DECREE
Plaintiff, Hollywood Community Synagogue, lnc. ("the Synagogue") and Defendant, City
of Hollywood ("the City''), hereby authorize the entry of the Consent Decree attached hereto as
Exhibit "A," as evidenced by the signatures below and the Resolution attached hereto as Exhibit "B."
Dated this 4th day of July, 2006.

ARNSTEI,N & LEHR, L.L.P.

200 E. Las Olas Blvd., Ste. 1700

Fort Lauderdale, Flori

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, E ire Community Synagogue, Inc.
HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC.
BY:/~
Rab~orf

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 4 of 77

CASE NO. 04-61212-CIY-LENARD!KLEIN

CONROY, SIMBERG, GANON, KREYANS, ABEL, LURVEY, MORROW & SCHEFER. P.A. 3440 Hollywood Boulevard Second Floor Hollywood, Florida 33021 (954) 961-1400 Broward (305) 940-4821 Dade
BY~~
Thoma's J. McCausland, Esquire Chad B. Hess, Esquire For the Cit)' of Hollywood

CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA

o!ilA- I f(·I/,,,
BY: Lk/

-r . _

.

Darnel Abbott, Esquire

City Attorney

IZH6!43.WPD 06.0704

-2-

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 5 of 77
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO: 04-61212-CIV-LENARD!KLEIN
HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA, and SAL OLiVERI, individually,
Defendants.
------------------------------~/
CONSENT DECREE
WHEREAS Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. (herein "Synagogue") and City of Hollywood (herein "City") (collectively "the Parties") have agreed to entry by the Court of this Consent Decree and whereas the Parties shall be bound by the findings, conclusions and orders of this Consent Decree, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows:
l. In light of the Cow1's June 26, 2006 Order, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," the Court orders that the Synagogue's properties located at 2215 N. 46th Avenue and 2221 N. 46th Avenue (collectively herein "Properties") shall be deemed rezoned to allow the Synagogue to operate a house of worship in perpetuity as a matter of right (i.e. as a "main pennitted use" which is also sometimes referred to as a "frrst-pennitted use") at its Properties. These two properties shall be exempt from the City's parking requirements, as contained in the City's Code of Ordinances and/or Zoning and Land Development Regulations (herein "ZLDR"), or as amended, revised or otherwise at any time in the future. The Synagogue shall have the right to demolish the two structures currently located at 2215 and 2221 North 46th Avenue in order to build a facility on the properties, subject to state and local building and fire codes and regulations and current development standards (e.g. setbacks and height restrictions) applicable to current special exception uses. Further, any such properties shall not be deemed "legal non-conforming" as a result of any such future land use or zoning legislation adopted by the City.
2. For the three year period commencing from the date of entry of the Consent Decree, the Synagogue shall have the right to acquire one parcel contiguous to or abutting the properties located at 2215 North 461h Avenue or 2221 North 46th Avenue for usc, as a matter of right, as a parking lot for a place of worship so long as such parking lot complies with all applicable codes, other than that portion of the City's Zoning and Land Development Regulations that prohibits parking lots in single-family districts. However, the Synagogue shall also have the right to either designate one of its then existing three parcels to provide the required number of parking spaces for
EXHIBIT
I.

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 6 of 77
a place of worship, or to provide the required number of parking spaces for a place of worship amongst or between all three parcels. Further, the Synagogue, at its election, can defer purchasing one property for usc, as a matter of right, as a parking lot to any time subsequent to three years after the date of entry of the Consent Decree, as set forth in paragraph (3) below. Further, the Synagogue shall not apply for a special exception within the three years following the date of entry of this Consent Decree.
3. Commencing three years after the date ofentry ofthe Consent Decree, the Synagogue shall have the right to acquire not more than two (2) additional parcels in the area bounded on the South by West Park Road, on the North by Sheridan Street, on the West hy North 471h Avenue, and on the East by North 45th Avenue, to maintain thereon, as a matter right (i.e. as a main permitted use which is also sometimes referred to as a "ftrst-perrnitted use"), any use pursuant to the version of Section 4.1 of the City's ZLDR in existence at the time of entry of this Consent Decree which requires a special exception, so long as such use is for residential or a Section 4.1 ZLDR use and the Synagogue complies with all other applicable codes, including all parking requirements. If the Synagogue does not construct a parking lot for a place of worship during the three year period commencing from the date of entry of the Consent Decree, as set forth in paragraph (2) above, the Synagogue shall have the right to designate one or more of its then existing parcels to provide the required numher of parking spaces for a place of worship, or to provide the required number of parking spots an1ongst or between the Synagogue's then existing parcels. As to any additional properties which may be purchased by the Synagogue after three years from the date of entry ofthe Consent Decree, whether within the bounded area or othe1wise, the Synagogue must, if otherwise applicable, apply for a special exception for those additional properties, pursuant to the special exception procedure in existence at the time of filing of the application, in order to use any such property for a section 4.1 ZLDR use.
4. Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the Synagogue's entitlement to maintain, as a matter ofright, those uses contained in the version ofSection 4.1 ofthe City's ZLDR in existence at the time of entry of this Resolution which require a special exception, on its properties located at 2215 North 46th Avenue and 2221 North 46th Avenue, and those additional parcels acquired pursuant to paragraphs (2) or (3) above, shall be transferable (i.e. "portable"), in perpetuity, upon the Synagogue providing written notice to the City Attorney, to the property located at 1400 North 461h Avenue (commonly known as "Temple Sinai"). Upon the Synagogue providing such written notice to the City Attorney, the Synagogue shall have the right to continue using its properties located at 2215 and 2221 North 46 Avenue, and any properties acquired by the Synagogue pursuant to paragraphs (2) or (3) above as a matter of right., for a period of thirty (30) days from the date a certificate of occupancy requested by the Synagogue is issued. Upon expiration of said thirty (30) days, the section 4.1 ZLDR use rights at its existing properties shall cease.
5. The City's code t:nforcement and police departments, including all code enforcement officers, police officers, employees, agents and representatives ofboth departments are permanently enjoined from selectively enforcing and harassing the Synagogue through the application of any
2

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 7 of 77
provision ofthe City's Code ofOrdinances, ZLDRand any other City ordinances, codes, regulations, resolutions or otherwise. The pennanent enjoinment from selective enforcement and harassment also applies to the Synagogue's members, guests, invitees, employees, agents, representatives or otherwise, who are present at the Synagogue's current Properties and any properties the Synagogue may subsequently purchase or acquire an ownership interest in.
6. The Synagogue shall be paid $2,000,000 by the Defendants, inclusive of all fees and costs, within twenty (20) days from the date this consent decree is entered by the Court. The $2,000,000 shall be paid to Arnstein & Lehr, LLP's Trust Acco1mt.
7. The City of I Iollywood shall adopt a constitutional and RLUIPA compliant special exception ordinance.
8. The action filed in Broward County Circuit Court by the City against the Synagogue, Case No. 04-011444 (21), and the action filed in Broward County Circuit Court by the Synagogue against the City, the Mayor and Commissioners Peter Bober, Quentin Furr and Sal Oliveri, Case No. 06-003010 (08), shall both be dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs.
9. Simultaneously herewith, the Court is entering that certain Consent Order between the City and the DOJ, the tenus of which having already been negotiated and agreed to by and between the DOJ and the City. The Synagogue shall have standing to independently enforce the tenns of the Consent Order between the Department of Justice and the City.
10. The parties shall execute mutual releases which fully, finally, and forever release and discharge each other, Sal Oliveri, Mara Giulianti, Peter Bober, Quentin Furr and National Union Fire Insurance Company ofPittsburgh, PA, its parent, subsidiaries and affiliates, including AIG Domestic Claims, Inc. (collectively "National Union"), including their heirs, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, shareholders, members, officers, directors, employees, attorneys, representatives, managers, predecessors, successors, assigns, and their respective shareholders, officers, directors, members, managers, employees, agents, representatives, attorneys, insurers, administrators, or any of them from liability for all acts and events occurring up to the date of execution of this Consent Decree including any and all claims, rights, demands, causes of action, suits, matters, and issues whether known or unknown, hidden, suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated, and whether based on federal, state, or local law, statute, ordinance, regulation, contract, common law, or any other basis, that have been, could have been, may be, or could be alleged or asserted, now or in the future, whether before a court of law or before any court, tribunal, arbitration panel, or other adjudicatory body, based on any fact or matter from the beginning of time through and including the date hereof. These mutual releases, however, shall have no effect upon or otherwise prevent enforcement of this Settlement Consent Decree.
II. The Parties represent and warrant that they have the sole right and exclusive authority to execute this Consent Decree and to receive the sum specified in it; and that there has not been, nor
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will there be, as of the date hereof, an effective assignment or other transfer of any interest in any claim by the Synagogue.
12. The Parties have declared to the Court that they have had the benefit of advice from their attomeys, and the tem1s of this Consent Decree have been completely read and are fully understood and voluntarily accepted for the purpose of making a full and final compromise of any and all claims.
13. This Consent Decree shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Parties, their estates, heirs, legal representatives, successors, predecessors, parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, insurers, owners, directors, members, managers, officers, partners, representatives, shareholders, employees, agents, and assigns.
14. This Consent Decree shall be governed by the laws of the State of Florida and by the laws of the United States, where applicable.
15. Should it he necessary for any party to enforce any terms of this Consent Decree, the prevailing party in such an enforcement action, may be entitled to its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs expended to enforce the terms of this Consent Decree, as dctem1ined by the Court.
16. By entering into this Consent Decree, all parties hereby agree to waive their right to appeal any of the tenns and provisions of this consent decree.
DONF: AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami-Dade County, Florida this_ day of - - - - - - - - - · 2006.

Copies Furnished to: Franklin L. Zemel, Esq. Thomas J. McCausland, Esq. Robert M. Oldershaw, Esq. W. Todd Boyd, Esq. Sean Keveney, Esq. Marilynn Lindsey, Esq.
rmnl

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 4

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 04-61212-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN lCONSOLIDATED WITH CASE NO. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN]

HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC.,
Plaintiff, vs.
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA, and SAL OLIVERI, individually,
_____D_e_fe_n_da_n_ts_. ______________!

FILED by _r: . 1 D.C.
~6 JUN 2 6
ClAA(NC£ MADDOX Cl[R< U.S. DIST. CT. S. 0. Of FLA.· UIAI.tl

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
vs. CITY OF HOLLYWOOD,
Defendant.
------------------------I
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (D.E. 225)
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on PlaintiffHollywood Community Synagogue's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("'Motion," D.E. 190), filed on March 21, 2006. On April20, 2006, Defendant City of Hollywood ("Defendant" or "the City'') filed a Response.

EXHIBIT "A"

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("Response," D.E. 243.) On May 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Reply. ("Reply," D.E. 260.) On May 25,2006, the City filed a Notice ofSupplemental Authority. ("Supplement," D.E. 301.) . On June 1, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Supplement. ("Response to the Supplement," D.E. 319.) Having considered the Motion, the Response, the Reply, the Supplement, the Response to the Supplement, and the record, the Court finds as follows:
1. Factual and Procedural Background On September 15. 2004, Plaintiff Hollywood Community Synagogue (hereinafter "HCS" or "the Synagogue") filed a Complaint against Defendants City of Hollywood and Sal Oliveri (Case No. 04-61212-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 14), alleging violations of numerous federal constitutional rights and statutes, including the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (hereinafter "RLUIPA"). On April 26, 2005, Plaintiff United States of America filed a Complaint against Defendant City of Hollywood (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. I), requesting declaratory and injunctive relief based upon Defendant's alleged violation of RLUIPA. On June 16,2005, the Court issued an Order consolidating these cases and administratively closing the highernumbered case (Case No. 04-61212-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 75; Case No. 05-60687-CIVLENARD, D.E. 14), finding that they involved common questions of law and fact. On December 2, 2005, Plaintiff HCS was granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (D.E. 124.) This Second Amended Complaint(D.E. 125) contains 19 counts and
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is the operative complaint for purposes of Plaintiffs Motion. Unless otherwise specified, the legal claims and facts that follow are taken from the allegations contained in the Second . Amended Complaint in the consolidated case.
PlaintiffHCS is a synagogue with its principal place ofbusiness at 221 S-2221 N. 46th Avenue, Hollywood, Florida 33021. (D.E. 125, at, 6.) Defendant City of Hollywood is a city municipality authorized by the State of Florida to regulate the use of land and structures within the City's borders, consistent with law. (ld. at ,7.) Defendant Sal Oliveri is a City Commissioner for the City ofHollywood, representing the area of Hollywood Hills. (ld. at
In 1999, Yosef Elul, then-President of the Synagogue, purchased two residences, located at 2215 and 2221 N. 46th Avenue, Hollywood, in a single-family district. (Id. at ,15.) In such single-family districts, a place of worship' may operate only if granted a Special Exception. (~at, 19.) After the purchase ofthe land by YosefEiul, the Director of Planning for the City of Hollywood advised the Synagogue that it needed to apply for a Special Exception as a place of worship but assured Synagogue representatives that such Special Exception would be granted. (ld. at,~ 19-20.)
In May of 200 I, Alan Razla, on behalf of Mr. Elul, applied for a Special Exception as a place of worship. (lil at, 21.) The Board of Appeal and Adjustments (hereinafter
1 The City's Zoning and Land Development Regulations do nol define place of worship, and thus the Coun will look to the natural and ordinary meaning. Konikov v. Orange Coun!v. Fl. 410 F.ld 1317. 132~ (lith Cir 2005). A "'place.. is defined as •·a building or locality used for a special purpose .. Webster's 3d New lnt'l Unabridged Dictionary 1727 (1993). "Worship"' is defined as "'the n:verencc or veneration tendered a divine being or supernatural power."'l!L at2637. Thus, taken together, a "'place of worship'· is a building or locality used for the reverence or venenllion. of a divine being or supernatural power
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"BAA") granted a six-month Special Exception. (Id.) Four months later, in September of 2001, Defendant Oliveri filed an appeal with the City Commission of the BAA's grant ofthe Special Exception. (Id. at~ 22.) The Commission heard the appeal and subsequently granted the Synagogue a one-year Special Exception, which included certain conditions that limited parking and capacity. (Id.) Plaintiff United States notes that, upon information and belief, Defendant City of Hollywood had never previously imposed a time limit on a special exception for a religious use and had only once before imposed a time limit on a special exception for a non-religious use. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1, at~ 20.)
In August of 2002, Arthur Eckstein, on behalf of the Synagogue, applied to the Development Review Board (hereinafter "DRB," formerly known as the BAA) for a Special Exception. (D.E. 125, at ~ 30.) In September of 2002, the ORB granted a six-month Temporary Special Exception subject to certain enumerated conditions and found that, subject to those conditions,2 the use of the property as a place of worship was compatible with the existing natural environment and other properties within the vicinity. (ld. at~ 30, 3l(A).) After the DRB hearing, Defendant Oliveri filed an appeal with the Commission. (ld. at~ 32.) In October 2002, the Commission denied Oliveri's appeal and allowed HCS the six-
month Temporary Special Exception. iliL at~ 33 .)
In March of 2003, the ORB granted the Synagogue a Permanent Special Exception
2 The condit10ns imposed by the DRB were: (I) parking of any type is prohibited in the alley located behind the Synagogue; (2) the Synagogue must enter into a lease agreement for off·site parking, (3) the Synagogue must obtain garbage dumpsters in a size and style acceptable to City staff, (4) the Synagogue must enter into a property maintenance agreement with a property maintenance provider who will maintain the premises in accordance with the City Code, and (S) the Synagogue must work with City staff to create a buffer along the rear side of the property. (D.E. 125, at1 30.)
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subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions 3 within 180 days. (ld. at~ 37.) Defendant Oliveri filed another appeal. ([d. at~ 38.) On June 5, 2003, 53 days after the Permanent . Special Exception was granted, the Commission, after considerable debate, reversed the decision of the ORB. (ld. at~ 39.) Among other things, the Commission claimed that the Synagogue was "too controversial." (ld. at~ 41.) "Controversiality" is not identified by the City Code as a factor to be evaluated when considering whether to grant a Special Exception.
(Id. at 'd 44.) PlaintiffUnited States notes that, upon information and belief, Defendant City
of Hollywood had never previously denied a request by a place of worship to operate in ether a single-family or multiple-family residential zone. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1, at~ 28.)
On October 16, 2003, Defendant City of Hollywood sent HCS a letter notifying the congregation that it was to cease holding services and other related activities at its current location within one week. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1, at~ 30.) During a July 7, 2004, meeting, the City Commission voted to direct the City Attorney to file a lawsuit to stop further organized religious services from taking place at HCS, despite the fact that this item was not on the agenda and no notice had been provided to HCS or the public that such a Yote would take place. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 1, at~ 32.) On or about July 16, 2004, the City filed suit against the Synagogue in Broward County Circuit
'The conditions imposed b~ the DRD rcqu1re the Synagogue to: (I! build a six-foot soundproofing wall at the rear
property line; (2) provide for appropriate three-sided dumpster as approved by the City's Public Works Department; (3) provide additional landscaping along the north and south property lines as detenmned appropriate by the City's Office of Planning; and (4) provide a site plan to the City's Planning Staff that demonstrates how the Synagogue will satisfy the first three conditions. (DE. 125, at 1 37.)
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Court, Case No. 04-11444 (21 ), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Synagogue for operating as a place of worship without a Special Exception. (D.E. 125, at~ -57.)
In its Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff HCS alleges the following 18 Counts against the City of Hollywood: I) damages for violation of the Synagogue's right to free exercise of religion; II) injunctive relief for violation of the Synagogue's right to free exercise of religion; IV) damages for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)substantial burden); V) injunctive relief for violation ofRLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)( 1)substantial burden); VI) damages for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)unequal terms); VII) injunctive relief for violation ofRLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(l)unequal terms); VIII) damages for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2) discrimination); IX) injunctive relief for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2) discrimination); X) damages for violation of the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998 (Florida RFRA); XI) injunctive relief for violation of the Florida RFRA; XII) damages for violation of the Equal Protection Clause; XIII) injunctive relief for violation of the Equal Protection Clause; XIV) damages for violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourtccnth Amendment; XV) injunctive relief for violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; XVI) promissory estoppel; XVII) facial equal protection challenge to Article V ofthe City ofHollywood Code ofOrdinances; XVIII) as applied equal protection challenge to Article V of the City of Hollywood Code of
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Ordinances; and XIX) preliminary injunctive relief. (D.E. I25, at~~ 60-151.) Plaintiff HCS's Second Amended Complaint also asserts two claims against
. Defendant Sal Oliveri, individually, for damages stemming from the alleged violation of Plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Free Exercise of Religion (Count III) and from the alleged violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Right to Equal Protection (Count XII). (ld. at 1~ 72-80, I 13-121.) Plaintiff United States' Complaint contains substantially similar facts to Plaintiff HCS's Second Amended Complaint and requests that the Court grant injunctive and declaratory reliefagainst Defendant City ofHollywood for violations ofRLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)( 1)-(2), based on the City's treatment ofHCS on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies and on discrimination against HCS on the basis of religion or religious denomination. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. I, at page 6.) On May I0, 2006, the Court issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion to Dismiss HCS' Second Amended Complaint. (D.E. 272.) Therein, the Court: 1) dismissed with prejudice those parts of Counts I and II that relate to an alleged City policy of regularly granting applications for Special Exceptions; 2) dismissed Counts IV, V, X, and XI with prejudice; 3) dismissed Count XIX without prejudice; and 4) denied Defendant's Motion with respect to all other Counts. (lil at 61-62.) II. PlaintiffHCS's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment In its Motion (D.E. I90), PlaintiffHCS moves for partial summary judgment, arguing
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'
I'
that Artide V, Sections 5.3 and 5.7 ofthe City's Zoning and Land Development Regulations (ZLDR) are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to the Synagogue.~ (14.. at 2-2.) The Synagogue asserts that this determination does not require any factual findings or review of testimony, but may be made entirely on the basis ofthe law. (l.Q., at 13.) First, HCS maintains that Section SJ.G. of the City's ZLDR is facially void because it gives City officials unbridled and unfettered discretion in their review of Special Exception applications. (l.Qj The Synagogue contends that this Section contains four subjective criteria to be applied in reviewing an application for a Special Exception and that, even if the City Commission finds that all four criteria have been met, it still has the discretion to deny the
application. C.!sl at S-6.)
Second, the Synagogue argues that Section 5.3.0.1. constitutes a prior restraint on activities protected by the First Amendment and is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to HCS. (Id. at 3, 16.) HCS maintains that, although prior restraints must contain standards that are precise, definite, and objective in order to guide government officials, the City's Special Exception zoning criteria employ tcnns such as '·compatibility," "vicinity," "adequate provision," and "sufficient, appropriate, and adequate" that are vague, subjective, and imprecise. (ld. at 8.) Thus, HCS argues that the Special Exception provisions threaten the right to free exercise of religion. (Id. at 16.)
In its Response (D.E. 243 ), Defendant City of Hollywood argues that the amount of
4 Though Plaintiff never specifies as to which Counts its Motion relates. the Court finds that lhe Motion is disposjtive of Counts XVII and XVIIJ and also affects portions of Counts I and II.
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discretion afforded a zoning board in determining particular land uses is extremely high because zoning is an inherently discretionary system. (til at 2.) The City thus maintains that . Plaintiff has not established grounds for summary judgment on its facial or as-applied challenges. (ld.) Defendant agrees that the adjudication of this Motion does not require the Court to make factual determinations or consider testimony regarding witnesses' interpretations of the ZLDR sections at issue. (!.Q. at I3.)
Defendant City of Hollywood contends that Section 5.3G.2. is not facially void for "unbridled discretion" because the ORB or Commission, after reviewing an application for a Special Exception, has only three options: it may grant the application, grant the application with conditions, or deny the application. (Id. at 5.) Defendant further argues that the four criteria used to evaluate such applications require specific findings. (Id. at 8.) Moreover, Defendant maintains that Section 5.3.0. of the ZLDR should be reviewed in light of the purpose of the zoning district in question,!.&., in light of the section's purpose of protecting
the character of single-family neighborhoods. ilil at 6.)
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs as-applied challenge is without merit because the zoning ordinances in question do not operate as a prior restraint on Plaintiff's First Amendment rights. (Id. at I5.) Defendant asserts that the ZLDR neither directly regulates the content of Plaintiffs protected activity nor operates as a licensing scheme and, thus, the zoning scheme should be reviewed under the more permissive standard of time, place, and manner restrictions for content-neutral regulations. (Id. at 15-16. I 8.) Defendant then
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maintains that, because the ordinances are narrowly tailored to the City's substantial interest in presen ing the quality of urban life and because the ordinances leave Plaintiff significant alternative avenues of expression, Plaintiffs Motion should be denied. (ld. at 19-20.)
In its Reply (D.E. 260), Plaintiff reiterates that the zoning scheme provides Defendant City of Hollywood unbridled discretion to grant or deny a Special Exception permit, even if all four criteria are met, and that it makes no difference that the City must make some kind of decision on every application. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff further maintains that the Special Exception procedure constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise ofFirst Amendment activity because applicants must obtain a permit before operating in certain parts ofthe City. (Id. at 4.) Thus. there exists a heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of the procedure. one that may only be overcome by narrow, objective, and definite standards, standards that are absent here. (Id.) Moreover, argues Plaintiff, this infirmity is not cured by the fact that Defendant provides alternate fora for the exercise of First Amendment activity. (Id. at 7.) Instead, Plaintiff argues that the prior restraint analysis is triggered by the existence of official discretion to deny use of a given forum for First Amendment protected activity. (Id. at 8.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that, even if the Court was to construe Section 5.3 .G. ofthe ZLDR as a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction, the Section is still unconstitutional because it does not contain precise and objective standards to guide the
City's decisionmaking. Clll at 10.)
In its Supplement (D.E. 30 I), Defendant argues that, in the event that the Court
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detennines that the standards governing the Special Exception procedure are invalid, a conditional use "becomes a prohibited one since the obvious reason for making it a special . exception use is to prohibit it in the absence of the specitied approval." (~at 2-3.) Since the terms would then be considered too indefinite, the City argues that Board would be unable to grant a Special Exception to the Synagogue and thus, even if the Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is granted, the Court cannot order that HCS be granted a Special Exception. (See id. at 2-3.)
In the Response to the Supplement (D.E. 319), the Synagogue argues that Defendant's position is lacking in legal support and represents a "disturbing tactic" on the part of the City. (~ at 2.) First, Plaintiff argues that the authorities relied upon by the City are factually distinguishable because they do not concern the First Amendment. (Id.) Next, Plaintiff argues that, if the Special Exception provisions are declared unconstitutional, the proper remedy is to allow the Synagogue to remain in its present location. (Sec id. at 3, 7-8.) In support of this argument, Plaintiff states that other provisions ofthe Code consider special exception uses, including places of worship, as generally suitable in single-family neighborhoods. (IQ. at 7.)
Ill. The Hearing On May 23, 2006, the Court held a hearing ("the Hearing," see D.E. 298), at which the Parties were provided an opportunity to present their arguments on the. During the Hearing, Plaintiff HCS emphasized its position that the zoning ordinances in question
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constituted a prior restraint on protected First Amendment activity and, as such, the ordinances are required to contain clear and precise standards. (Id. at 3:1-12.) Plaintiff . further argued the standards currently in place allow the Commission to use their unfettered discretion and to base their decisions on any criteria they choose, including
"contro\'ersiality," as was cited as a basis for rejecting the Synagogue's application. Q!L at
4:2-6.) Plaintiff noted that, even though the City code states that a place of worship is, "generally suitable in this district," the Synagogue was denied a Special Exception because it was purportedly not compatible with its surroundings. (Id. at 5:21-6:6.) Thus, HCS maintained that, because it is impossible to know what criteria need to be met to obtain a Special Exception, the provisions are unconstitutionally vague. (Id. at 5: 11-19; 12:6-17 .)
Defendant City of Hollywood responded that no prior restraint can be found here. QQ.., at 14:7 .) Defendant defined a prior restraint as a governmental attempt to control the content of expression and further asserted that the City's zoning ordinances are not prior restraints because they do not require every place of worship in all zoning districts to get permission before operating. (lll at 15:3-8, 16: 18-17:2.) Because a place of worship need apply for a permit only if it wants to operate in residential neighborhoods, the City contended that there was no licensing scheme or prior restraint. (ld. at 17:9-16.) Instead, Defendant argued that its zoning regulations were narrowly tailored to the substantial government interest of zoning and preserving the quality of urban life. (ld. at 20:8-18.) Thus, the City asserted that its regulations were governed by the permissive time, place, and manner restriction standards,
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and that this only mandated that decisions not be left up to the whim of the decisionmaker. (lit. at 23:8-24:3.) The City argued that, while its standards allow some elasticity, they do . not leave the decision to the whim of the decisionmaker. (Td. at 24:20-23.)
Plaintiff responded that the City established a system in which places of worship were deemed generally acceptable subject to a Special Exception, but provided unlimited discretion to officials to decide whether to grant such an Exception.(~ at 32: 15-33:8.)
Upon questioning by the Court, the City stipulated that the substantial government interest justifying the zoning ordinances in question is twofold: the City's interest in zoning, generally, and the purpose of protecting the character of single-family neighborhoods, as stated in ZLDR § 4.1A. (ld. at 39:23-40:2.) The City argued that the provisions were narrowly tailored because they applied only to places of worship wanting to operate in residential districts. (ld. at 42:14-25.) Defendant further maintained that the zoning ordinances do not constitute a prior restraint because there are places in the City of Hollywood where the Synagogue can practice their First Amendment protected activities without having to ask the City for permission or a Special Exception. (Id. at 41 :2-22.) Finally, Defendant City conceded that, if the Court found the zoning ordinances at issue to constitute a prior restraint, the holding of Lad\· J. Lingerie. Jnc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 1999), would control in this case. (Id. at 58:14-59:3.)
IV. Analysis A. Standard of Review
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On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. - S.H.Kress&Co.,398U.S.l44, 157(1970). Summaryjudgmentcanbeenteredonaclaim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." fED.R.Crv.P. 56(c). The Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard as follows:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential clement of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Com. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.317, 322-23 (1986). The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 f.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir. 1989). The party asking. for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file, together with
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affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, . the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions. answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324; see also FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e). In meeting this burden the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 ( 1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Id. at 587. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." I d.
Plaintiff HCS and Defendant City of Hollywood agree that the Court need not make any factual findings or examine any testimony in considering the instant motion and that the Court may issue its ruling after reviewing the text of the challenged portions of the zoning regulations in light of the applicable legal standards. After reviewing the record, the Court agrees that no genuine issue exists for trial and that partial summary judgment may be granted as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court will now tum to the text of the City's ZLDR in question.
B. The City's Zoning and Land Development Regulations (ZLDR) Hollywood Community Synagogue is located in a "Single Family District" in the City
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ofllollywood. Section 4. I ofthe ZLDR specifies that the purpose of Single Family Districts
is ··to protect the character of the single family neighborhoods.'" (D.E. 19 I, Ex. B at 4.1.)
. The "Main Permitted Uses" in such districts are ··[s]ingle family detacheddwelling[s]." (Id.)
TI1e "Special Exceptions" in such districts are"[e]ducational facilities[,] [p]laces ofworship,
meeting halls and similar nonprofit uses and ham radio antennas."~)
Section 5.3 .G. of the ZLDR, entitled "Special exceptions," is the primary provision
at issue and contains the following language:
Certain uses are listed as special exceptions in the Zoning and Land Development Regulations and are permitted in zoning districts subject to the approval of the Development Review Board. These uses are considered generally suitable for the districts in which listed. However, the character and nature of the uses may necessitate controls and safeguards on the manner of establishment and operation which would best serve the interests of the community and the owners of the property in question.
(D.E. 191, Ex. A at 5.3.0.) Section 5.3.0.1., entitled "Review of petitions for special
exceptions," provides that all petitions for Special Exceptions shall be reviewed by the ORB,
which may grant the petition if it makes all of the following findings:
a. That the use is compatible with the existing natural environment and other properties within the vicinity;
b. That there will be adequate provision for safe traffic movement, both vehicular and pedestrian, both internal to the use and in the area which will serve the use;
c. That there are adequate setbacks, buffering, and general amenities in order to control any adverse effects of noise, light, dust and other potential nuisances; and
d. That the land area is sufficient, appropriate and adequate for the use as proposed.
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(.lil at A at 5.3.G.l(a)-(d).) The ensuing section, entitled ·'Decision ofthe Board," provides: In considering a petition for a special exception, the Board may grant the special exception, grant the special exception with appropriate conditions when the Board determines such conditions... are necessary to further the purpose of the zoning district or compatibility with other property within the vicinity, or deny the special exception.
(ld. at A at 5.3.0.2.) Finally, pursuant to Section 5.7.A., the City Commission may request a hearing on any application which, upon its determination, requires additional review to ensure that, inter alia, development standards and criteria have been met. (D.E. 125, at ~ 138.5) Section 5.7.B. provides the Commission shall apply the same standards and criteria employed by the DRB and shall approve. approve with conditions, or deny the application. (D.E. 125, at~ 138; Hearing Transcript at 24:20-23, 28:1-12.)
C. Plaintifrs Facial and As-Applied Challenges Plaintiff first raises a facial challenge to the City's zoning scheme. Generally, content-neutral zoning regulations are reviewed under the deferential "time, place, and manner" standards that were delineated by the Supreme Court in City of Renton v. Playtime, Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-54 (1986). Under these standards, "a zoning ordinance is valid if it is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest and [if] it allows for reasonable alternative avenues ofexpression." Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City ofJacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358 (citing Int'l Eateries of America. Inc. v. Broward County. Fla., 941 F.2d 1157,
'Plaintiff provided the text of Section 5.7 of the ZLDR in the Second Amended Complaint (D.E. 125, at§ 138);
Defendant City of Hollywood, in its Answer, admitted to the contents of this paragraph of the pleading (D.E. 307, at 1 138). -17-

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 26 of 77
I 161-65 (I lth Cir. 1991) and City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-52.) A city's interest "in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life" is a substantial government interest that "must be accorded high respect." Citv of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.
A zoning ordinance that touches upon activities protected by the First Amendment must also contain •·narrow, objective, and definite standards" to guide city officials in their review. See CAMP Legal Defense Fund. Inc. v. CitY of Atlanta,_ F.3d _ , 2006 WL 1623279 at* 19 (11th Cir., June 13, 2006)(citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. I47, 151 (1969)). Absent such standards, the ordinance grants "unbridled discretion" to city officials and fails to '"prevent[] the official from encouraging some views and discouraging others through the arbitrary' grant of an exemption.'>6 CAMP, 2006 WL
1623279 at *19 (guoting Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133
(I 992)); see also Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 ( 1940) (stating that the lack of objective criteria "readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure"). "A government regulation that allows arbitrary application is inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because such discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point ofview." ld. (internal citations omitted).
Out of these concerns regarding the dangers of censorship, the Supreme Court has developed a long line ofjurisprudence aimed at fostering the legitimate goals oflawmaking
6 The Court notes that a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance ma'" be raised when the mere threat of abuse of power exists; no proof of actual abuse of power is required. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88. 97 ( 1940).
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 27 of 77
while curbing the threats of arbitrary enforcement. Yet, in reaching the proper balance, the Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that an ordinance that "makes the peaceful . enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official- a<; by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official- is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment ofthose freedoms." Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151.
A "prior restraint" is a restriction on expression that is imposed before the expression occurs. United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 ( llth Cir. 2000); se~ also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,795 n.5 (1989); CAMP, 2006 WL 1623279 at *24 ("[t]he term 'prior restraint' is used to describe administrati\'e and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance ofthe time that such communications occur (citingAiexanderv. United States, 509 U.S. 544,553 (1993) (internal quotations omitted))). "Classic prior restraints have involved judge-issued injunctions against the publication of certain information:· Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1215 (llth Cir. 2005). "Prior restraints have also been found where the government has unbridled discretion to limit access to a particular public forum." ld.
Defendant City of Hollywood first argues that, because places of worship can operate in other districts in the City without applying for a special exception, no prior resuaint exists here. The Court finds that this assertion is in direct conflict with established Supreme Court precedent. In Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939), the Supreme
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 28 of 77
Court rejected the argument that anti~canvassing ordinances, which restricted canYassing only in streets and alleys, were valid because they did not prohibit the distribution of printed . matter in other public places. The Schneider Court found that streets were the natural and proper places for dissemination of infonnation and that "one is not to haYe the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised
in some other place." liL at 163. Further, in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546, 555 (1975), the Supreme Court found that a decision to deny the petitioner's request to use a municipal facility for a theater production constituted a prior restraint, even though the denial did not prevent petitioner from using another theater in the city. Accordingly, the existence of alternative fora for expression does not justify an otherwise impermissible prior restraint. ld. at 555.
Next, Defendant contends that Section 5.3.0. of the ZLDR sufficiently restricts the
discretion of City regulators and is therefore a valid time, place, and manner restriction. After careful consideration of this ordinance, the Court cannot agree. Instead, the Court fmds that Section 5.3.G. I. constitutes an unconstitutionaJ? prior restraint because it lacks "narrow, objective, and definite standards" to guide city officials in their review of applications for a Special Exception and thus provides City officials unbridled discretion in their consideration of the application. See Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358, 1362
m 7 Though prior restraints are no1 ~ unconstitutional, there exists a strong presumption against their
constitutionality. FWf!'BS, Inc. v. City ofDpllas, 493 U.S. 215,225 (1990). Any scheme that places unbridled discretion m the hands of a government official or agency, however, must be invalidated due to the great danger of censorship and of ab;,dgmcnt of our precious First Amendment freedoms.l!L Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. al 1244.
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 29 of 77

(11th Cir. 1999) (noting that "some measure of discretion is acceptable, but ... virtually any amount of discretion beyond the merely ministerial is suspect").
In Lady J. Lingerie, the Eleventh Circuit Court ofAppeals considered and invalidated a similar licencing scheme. 176 FJd at 1362. There, the City of Jacksonville created a zoning scheme that allowed adult entertainment establishments to operate as of right in only one zone; such establishments were allowed to operate in a second zone only if the zoning board granted a zoning exception after consideration of nine enumerated criteria.8 ld. at 1361. The Eleventh Circuit characterized these criteria as "run-of-the-mill zoning

1 The rdevant provision of the City of Jackson\'ille regulations provided that the zoning board

shall issue an order to grant the exception on if it finds from a prepond~rance of the

evidence ... that the proposed use m~lS, to the extent applicable, the following standards

and criteria:

(i)

Will be consistent with th~ Comprehensive Plan, including any subsequent

plan adopted by the Council pursuant thereto;

(ii)

Will be compatible with th~ existing contiguous uses or zoning and compatible

with the general character of the area, considering population density, design,

scale and orientation of structures to the area, property values, and existing

similar uses or zoning;

(iii)

Will not have an environm~mal impact inconsistent with the health, safety and

welfare of the community;

(iv)

Will not have a detrimental effect on vehicular or pedestrian traffic, or parking

conditions, and will not result in the generation or creation oftramc

inconsistent with the health.. safety and welfare of the community;

(v)

Will not have a detrimental effect on the furure development of contiguous

properties or the general ar-..a, according to the Comprehensive Plan, including

any subsequent amendment to the plan adopted by the Council;

(vi)

Will not result in the creation of objectionable or excessive noise, lights,

vibrations, fumes, odors, dust or physical activities, taking into account existing

uses or zoning in the vicini~·;

(vii) Will not overburden existing public services and facilities;

(viii) Will be sufficiently accessible to permit entry onto the property by fire, police,

rescue and other services; and

(ix)

Will be consistent with the defmition of a mning exception. and will meet the

standards and criteria of th~ zoning classification in which such use is proposed

to be located, and all other requirements for such particular use set forth

elsewhere in the Zoning Code, or otherwise adopted by the Planning

Commission.

Lady J. Lingeri~ I 76 F.3d at 1369-70.

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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 30 of 77
considerations" that concerned compatibility with contiguous uses, environmental impact,
and effect of pedestrian traffic. !fL. at 1362. Aaer examining these factors, the Eleventh
. Circuit held that none was precise or objective and that "all of them - individually and collectively-- empower the zoning board to covertly discriminate against adult entertainment establishments under the guise ofgeneral 'compatibility' or 'environmental' considerations." Id. Specifically, in place of objective requirements. ~. there must be X number of doors per square foot, the provisions used broad, subjecti\ e language, such as buildings must "be sufficiently accessible to pennit entry by" rescue services. Id. Because these criteria were being applied to establishments that are entitled to First Amendment protections, the Eleventh Circuit held that the licensing scheme was unconstitutional. The criteria contained in Section 5.3.0.1. are as, if not more, broad and imprecise as those found in Ladv J. Lingerie. The Section directs the ORB to detenn ine whether the use is "compatible with'' the natural environment and other properties; whether there will be "adequate provision'' for safe traffic movement or"adequate setbacks, buffering, and general amenities ... to control ...potential nuisances"; and whether the land area is "sufficient, appropriate, and adequate for the use." (O.E. 191, Ex. A at 5.3 .G.l.) As in Ladv J. Lingerie, the Court finds that none of these criteria is "precise and objective" and that all of them empower the ORB, or the Commission on appeal, to covertly discriminate against places of worship under the guise of "compatibility" or other intangible considerations. Lady J. Lingerie, 176 FJd at 1362. Moreover, the Special Exception procedure employed here is

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 31 of 77
even more constitutionally invidious, as it provides City officials the discretion to deny a Special Exception even if all four enumerated criteria are met. (D.E. 191, Ex. A at 5.3.G.) . Nothing in the ordinance or its application prevents City officials from encouraging some places ofworship while discouraging others through the arbitrary grant or denial ofa Special Exception. SeeForsythCountyv. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992). Because PlaintiffHCS, as a place of worship, is entitled to the protections ofthe Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment, the provision of such unbridled discretion to City officials 1s constitutionally imperrnissible.9
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the zoning scheme established in Section 5.3 .G., as it relates to places of worship, is void on its face, and summary judgment is therefore GRANTED in favor ofPiaintiffHCS on Count XVII ofthe Second Amended Complaint.
Last, because the Court has found the City's zoning scheme unconstitutional, it does not reach Plaintiffs argument that the provisions are also unconstitutional as applied to HCS. See Cafe Erotica of Florida, Inc. v. St. Johns County, 360 F.3d 1274, 1293 (11th Cir. 2004); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1318 n.9 (ll th Cir. 2002) (finding that an as-applied
• The Court notes that, even if it found that the City of Hollywood's 7.oning scheme constituted a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction instead of a prior restraint, the City's Special Exception standards as applied to places of worship do not pass constitutional muster. The Supreme Court has held that even time, place, and manner restrictions must contain adequate standards to guide officials' discretion and allow for effective judicial review in the First Amendment contc11t. Thomas v. Chicago Park Djstrict, 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002). Therefore, such regulations must contain "narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards." Burk v. Augusta-Richmond County, 365 F.Jd 1247, 12.56 (lith Cir. 2004), quoting Thomas, 534 U.S. at 324. As discussed above, the standards provided for the DRB to review Special E11ception applications contain \'ague and imprecise language allowing for wide variances in interpretation and application. This infirmity is only e11acerbated by the fact that both the DRB and Commission retain th~ discretion to deny a Special Exception application, even if a place of worship is found to satisfy all four criteria. Therefore, the Court finds that the City's 7.oning regulations relating to places of worship are unconstitutional, even if construed as content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 32 of 77
challenge is rendered moot if the underlying statute is deemed unconstitutional). Therefore, Plaintiff's as-applied equal protection claim, contained in Count XVIII of the Second . Amended Complaint, is DENIED as moot.
D. Impact on Counts I and II In Counts I and II of the Second Amended Complaint, PlaintiffHCS seeks damages and injuncti\·e relief, respectively, as a result of the City's violation of HCS's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In these counts, the Synagogue alleges, inter alia, that the City's denial of the Special Exception violated the Synagogue's constitutional rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of assembly for purposes of worship and teaching. (D.E. 125, at 19.) In order to obtain relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that conduct under color of state law, complained of in the civil rights suit, violated its rights, privileges, or immunities under the Constitution or Jaws of the Lnited States. Whitehorn v. Harrelson, 758 F.2d 1416, 1419 (lith Cir. 1985). Moreover. the Supreme Court has placed strict limitations on municipal liability under Section 1983. Gold v. City ofMiami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (lith Cir. 1998), citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). There is no respondeat superior liability upon which to inculpate a municipality for the wrongful actions of its employees or agents. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 694. Thus, a municipality can only be held liable ifan official policy or custom of that municipality causes a constitutional violation. Jd. at 694-95. Moreover, it is not enough for the plaintiff to
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 33 of 77
merely identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality; the plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through deliberate conduct, the municipality is the moving force behind the . alleged injury. Board of County Com'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,404 (1997).
The Supreme Court in Pembaur v. City ofCincinnati, 475 U.S. 469ll986), held that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances. Id. at 480. However, any such single act must still be made pursuant to an existing, unconstitutional official municipal policy to properly attribute such conduct to the municipality pursuant to Monell. Id. at 478 n. 6. 479-81; Cirv ofOklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-824 ( 1985). The Eleventh Circuit has summarized the Supreme Court's guiding principles, to be employed when evaluating the single action of an official policymaker is sufficient to give rise to municipal liability, as follows: (I) whether the action is officially sanctioned or ordered by the municipality; (2) whether the action is taken by officers with final policymaking authority; (3) whether this final policymaking authority is granted by state law, including valid local ordinances and regulations; (4) whether the challenged action was taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the officials responsible for making policy in that particular area of the city's business, as detennined by state law. Martinez v. City ofOpa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 7 I3 (I 1th Cir. 1992) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In its Order of May I0, 2006, the Court ruled that Piainti ff had demonstrated all four factors from Martinez, and had thus stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon the single act by the Commission of reversing the ORB pursuant
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 34 of 77
to the City's zoning ordinances. (D.E. 272, at 31-32.) The Court has detem1ined herein that the City's zoning ordinance relating to Special
. Exceptions for places of worship is unconstitutionally vague on its face in violation of PlaintifTHCS's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. It is undisputed that the City applied this zoning ordinance to the Synagogue in denying its application for a Special Exception. The Court has, moreover, already detem1ined that this single act of denying HCS's application constituted a municipal policy or practice sufficient to invoke municipal liability. The Court further finds that this denial pursuant to an unconstitutional ordinance was the moving force behind the violation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Finding no genuine issues of material fact as to this claim, the Court concludes that Plaintiff HCS is entitled to summary judgment as to the portions of Counts I and II in which Plaintiff claims that the City violated its constitutional rights through the single act of the Commission's denial of a Special Exception. E. Remedy In Counts I, II, XVII, and XVIII, the Synagogue requests, inter alia, that the Court enter judgment against the City, direct that it be granted a Special Exception, award damages to the Synagogue, and declare the portions of Article V of the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances relating to Special Exceptions unconstitutionally vague. (D.E. 125 at m/69, 71, 141.) The City, in its Supplement, argues that it may still prevent the Synagogue from
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 35 of 77
operating as a place of worship in its present location even if the Special Exception procedures are deemed unconstitutional. Essentially, the City maintains that ifthe Special . Exception provisions are excised from the ZLOR, no special exceptions could be granted in single-family districts and the only the pennitted principals uses would be allowed.
The primary issue now before the Court is whether the City's Special Exception provision may be severed from the rest of the ZLDR and what impact such severance would have on places of worship. The City is correct that severability of local ordinances is a question of state law. City of Lakewood,._ Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750,772 (1988); Mayflower Fanns, Inc. v. TenEyck, 297 U.S. 266, 274 ( 1936). However, the Florida District
Court of Appeals cases provided by the City provide no support for its conclusion that, in the
First Amendment context, the invalidation of the Special Exception provisions transform all conditional uses into prohibited uses.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that Florida law clearly favors the severance of invalid portions of a law from the valid ones, where possible. Coral Springs Street Systems, Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1347 (lith Cir. 2004). The doctrine of severability is derived from the doctrine of separation of powers and is designed to show great deference to the legislative prerogative to enact laws. lQ.,_ However, severability is not possible where an illegal provision has tainted the remainder of the statute. lQ_, The severability detem1ination is made by examining the invalidated section's "relation to the overall legislative intent of the statute of which it is a part, and whether the statute, Jess the invalid
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 36 of 77
provisions, can still accomplish this intent." ld. (citations omitted). The Florida Supreme Court, in Smith,.. Department of Insurance, 507 So.2d l ORO,
IOR9 (Fla. 1987), has suggested the following test for discerning severability: When a part of a statute is dec Jared unconstitutional the remainder of the act will be pennitted to stand provided: (I) the unconstitutional provisions can be separated from the remaining valid provisions, (2) the legislative purpose expressed in the valid provisions can be accomplished independently of those which are void, (3) the good and the bad features are not so inseparable in substance that it can be said that the Legislature would have passed the one without the other, and (4) an act complete in itself remains after the invalid provisions are stricken.
Coral Springs, 371 F.3d at 1348 (citations omitted). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, under Florida law, an unconstitutional portion of a challenged statute "should be excised, leaving the rest intact and in force, when doing so does not defeat the purpose ofthe statute and leaves in place a law that is complete." Id.
While, in this case, factors (I) and (4) of the Smith test have been met, as the challenged portions of the ZLDR could be separated from the remaining provisions and leave an act complete in itself, the City's proposed remedy fails to satisfy the other two factors. Instead, the Court finds that such severance would thwart the legislative purpose of the ZLDR such that it could not be said that the Commission would have passed the one without the other. The ZLDR expressly states that places of worship are considered "generally suitable" uses within single family districts subject to controls to best serve the interests of the communityand the owners of the property in question. (D.E. 191, at Ex. A at 5.3.0.; id.
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 37 of 77
at Ex. Bat 4.1.) Thus, the City never intended the complete exclusion of places of worship in single family districts and would have been unlikely to enact an ordinance devoid of . exception procedures. Removal of the Special Exception provision, therefore, cannot be accomplished without defeating the purpose ofthe statute and destroying the intent of the enacting body.
Accordingly, pursuant to the Court's authority to fashion a remedy for the City's violation ofPiainti tTHCS 's right to free exercise ofreligion and because the Court finds that Plaintiff HCS has been irreparably injured by the violation of its rights, the Court orders that the Synagogue shall be granted the Permanent Special Exception it was awarded by the ORB in March 2003, subject only to those conditions that are objective and definite. 10 Specifically, the Permanent Special Exception shall be conditioned upon the Synagogue building a six-foot soundproofing wall at the rear property line and providing a three-sided dumpster as approved by the City's Public Works department, provided that a list of approved dumpsters exists. 11
Further, the Court orders that the City shall promptly enact new Special Exception ordinance(s) for places of worship, one(s) that contain "narrow, objective, and definite standards" guiding City officials in their review and that are otherwise constitutionally sound.
10 The Court notes that, at a hearing held on June 26, 2006, the Parties announced that, as a part of the proposed settlement, the City would allow the Synagogue, inter alia, to operate as a "matter of nght" in its present location. The Court's ruling, contained in this Order, shall not preclude the Parties from agreeing to terms that are more favorable to the Synagogue, provided that such terms are consistent with all applicable laws.
11 The Court finds that the remaining conditions- requiring "additional" landscaping "as determined appropriate'' and providing a site plan- are insufficiently objective to be imposed.
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Last, the Court orders that the issue of damages that arise from Count I and that relate
to the constitutional violation found here is properly placed before a jury for further determination.
III. Conclusion
As stated above, the Court recognizes that the City of Hollywood has a substantial interest in preserving the quality of urban life in its neighborhoods. Moreover, the Court accords great respect for the City's interest in protecting the character and nature of neighborhoods in which single-family, detached dwellings predominate and in furthering the ability of its residents to engage in the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of their property.
However, the City of Hollywood, through its officials, is also charged with the protection of the religious freedoms that are found in the First Amendment and that form the cornerstone of American democracy. Zoning regulations that affect those freedoms must therefore be precise and objective in both their terms and their application. Our Constitution and our love of liberty demand no less.
Accordingly, it is: ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintifl'Hollywood Community Synagogue's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D.E. 190), filed March 21, 2006, is GRANTED in part and DENIED as moot in part as described herein.
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y DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 1-

day of

June, 2006.

cc:

U.S. Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein

All Counsel of Record

Case No.04-61212-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN

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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 40 of 77
RESOLUTION NO.
A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA, MAKING A COUNTEROFFER TO THE HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE'S PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OFFER.
WHEREAS. the City filed a civil action against Scott Kramer and the Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. {the "Synagogue") in Case No. 04-011444 (21) in the Circuit Court of the 171h Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida;
WHEREAS, the Synagogue and the United States then filed a civil action against the City of Hollywood, Florida and Sal Oliveri in consolidated Case Nos. 04-61212 and 05-60687 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida;
WHEREAS, the Synagogue filed a civil action against the City, Mara Giulianti, Peter Bober. Quentin Furr and Sal Oliveri in Case No. 06-003010 (08) in the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA:
Section 1: That it hereby makes a counteroffer to settle the above-described lawsuits and agrees to the entry of a Consent Decree, containing the following terms:
(A) Payment of $2,000,000.00 to the Synagogue to be paid by National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa;
(B) The Synagogue shall have the right to operate a place of worship in perpetuity as a matter of right (i.e. as a main permitted use which is also sometimes
referred to as a "first-permitted use"), at the properties located at 2215 and 2221 North 46m
Avenue, Hollywood, Florida. These two properties shall be exempt from the City's parking requirements, as contained in the City's Code of Ordinances and/or Zoning and Land Development Regulations (herein "ZLDR"}, or as amended, revised or otherwise at any time in the future. The Synagogue shall have the right to demolish the two structures currently located at 2215 and 2221 North 46th Avenue in order to build a facility on the properties, subject to state and local building and fire codes and regulations and current development standards (i.e. setbacks and height restrictions) applicable to current special exception uses;
(C) For the three year period commencing from the date of entry of the Consent Decree, the Synagogue shall have the right to acquire one parcel contiguous to or abutting the properties located at 2215 North 46th Avenue or 2221 North 46\h Avenue for use, as a matter of right, as a parking lot for a place of worship so long as such parking lot
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 41 of 77

complies with all applicable codes, other than that portion of the City's Zoning and Land Development Regulations that prohibits parking lots in single-family districts;

(D) Commencing three years after the date of entry of the Consent Decree, the Synagogue shall have the right to acquire not more than two (2) additional parcels in the area bounded on the South by West Park Road, on the North by Sheridan Street, on the West by North 47th Avenue, and on the East by North 451h Avenue, to maintain thereon, as a matter right (i.e. as a main pennitted use which is also sometimes referred to as a "first-permitted use"), any use pursuant to the version of Section 4.1 of the City's ZLDR in existence at the time of entry of this Resolution which requires a speciaI exception, so long as such use is for residential or a Section 4.1 ZLDR use and the Synagogue complies with all other applicable codes, including all par1<ing requirements. As to any additional properties which may be purchased by the Synagogue after the period commencing three years from the date of entry of the Consent Decree, whether within the bounded area or otherwise, the Synagogue must. if otherwise applicable, apply for a special exception for those additional properties, pursuant to the special exception procedure in existence at the time of filing of the application, in order to use any such property for a section 4.1 ZLDR use;

(E) Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the

Synagogue's entitlement to maintain, as a matter of right, those uses contained in the

version of Section 4.1 of the City's ZLDR in existence at the time of entry of this Resolution

which require a special exception, on its properties located at 2215 North 461tl Avenue and

2221

North

4

6

1 h

Avenue,

and

those

additional

parcels

acquired

pursuant to section

(C) or

(D) above, shall be transferable (i.e. "portable"), in perpetuity, upon the Synagogue

providing written notice to the City Attorney to the property located at 1400 North 46th

Avenue (commonly known as "Temple Sinai"). Upon the Synagogue providing such written

notice to the City Attorney, the Synagogue shall have the right to continue using its

properties located at 2215 and 2221 North 46 Avenue, and any properties acquired by the

Synagogue pursuant to sections (C) or (D) above as a matter of right, for a period of thirty

(30) days from the date a certificate of occupancy requested by the Synagogue is issued.

Upon expiration of said thirty (30) days, the section 4.1 ZLDR use rights at its existing

properties shall cease.

(F) The City shall adopt a constitutional and RLUIPA-compliant special exception ordinance;

(G) The City shall be enjoined from selective enforcement and/or harassment of the Synagogue;

(H) All of the terms contained in the Consent Order previously proposed by

the United States are accepted, except that Section 34 thereof shall be amended to

conform to the terms set forth in paragraph nos. 1 through 4 of the Consent Decree as

between the City and the Synagogue. c E!~~- ~9:wtasogue shall have standing to

independ~ntly enforce the terms of t~~~~m, 9t9rrf:~r~?n~~. ~he Department of Justice

and the Crty;

of the record •n n111 otfic13 _

- --

WITNESSETI-" my hand ant1 ;Jf7 ::1a1 .se:,l 0 ,

the C'

llyw

4 d. Floriaa. t'l1s 11~&

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 42 of 77

(I) The City, the Synagogue and the United States shall dismiss all pending lawsuits and enter into appropriate settlement agreements and releases;

(J) Any settlement of this matter between the parties is contingent upon the Court entering the Consent Decree as between the City and the Synagogue and the Consent Order as between the City and the Department of Justice.

Section 2: That it hereby approves and authorizes the execution, by the appropriate City officials. of all documents necessary to implement the settlement described in Section 1 above, including the Consent Decree attached hereto as Exhibit wA," together with such nonmaterial changes as may be subsequently agreed to by the City Manager and approved as to form and legality by the City Attorney.

Section 3: That this resolution shall be in full force and effect immediately upon its passage and adoption.

d!i_ ~ PASSED AND ADOPTED this

day of

e.__

, 2006.

FRANCES RUSSO, VICE-MAYOR

APPROVED AS TO FORM & LEGALITY for the use and reliance of the City of Hollywood, Florida only:
DANIELL. ABBOTI, CITY ATTORNEY

CERTlFICt- '''

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 43 of 77
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO: 04-61212-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN
HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC.,
Plaintiff.
v.
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA, and SAL OLIVERI, individually,
Defendants.
CONSENT DF:CREE
WHEREAS Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. (herein "Synagogue") and City of Hollywood (herein "City") (collectively "the Parties") have agreed to entry by the Court of this Consent Decree and whereas the Parties shall be bound by the findings, conclusions and orders of this Consent Decree, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows:
l. In light of the Court's June 26, 2006 Order, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," the Court orders that the Synagogue's properties located at 2215 N. 46th Avenue and 2221 N. 46th Avenue (collectively herein "Properties") shall be deemed rezoned to allow the Synagogue to operate a house of worship in perpetuity as a matter of right (i.e. as a "main pennitted use" which is also sometimes referred to as a "first-pennitted use") at its Properties. These two properties shall be exempt from the City's parking requirements, as contained in the City's Code of Ordinances and/or Zoning and Land Development Regulations (herein "ZLDR"), or as amended, revised or otherwise at any time in the future. The Synagogue shall have the right to demolish the two structures currently located at 2215 and 2221 North 46th Avenue in order to build a facility on the properties, subject to state and local building and fire codes and regulations and current development standards (e.g. setbacks and height restrictions) applicable to current special exception uses. Further, any such properties shall not be deemed "legal non-confom1ing" as a result of any such future land use or zoning legislation adopted by the City.
2. For the three year period commencing from the dale of entry of the Consent Decree, the Synagogue shall have the right to acquire one parcel contiguous to or abutting the properties located at 2215 North 46'h Avenue or 2221 North 46th Avenue for use, as a matter of right, as a parking lot for a place of worship so long as such parking Jot complies with all applicable codes, other than that portion of the City's Zoning and Land Development Regulations that prohibits parking lots in single-family districts. However, the Synagogue shall also have the right to either designate one of its then existing three parcels to provide the required number of parking spaces for
EXHIBIT "A"

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 44 of 77
a place of worship, or to provide the required number of parking spaces for a place of worship amongst or hetween all three parcels. Further, the Synagogue, at its election, can defer purchasing one property for usc, as a matter of right, as a parking lot to any time subsequent to three years after the date of entry ofthe Consent Decree, as set forth in paragraph (3) below. Further, the Synagogue shall not apply for a special exception within the three years following the date of entry of this Consent Decree.
3. Commencing three years after the date ofentry ofthe Consent Decree, the Synagogue shall have the right to acquire not more than two (2) additional parcels in the area bounded on the South by West Park Road, on the North by Sheridan Street, on the West by North 47'h Avenue, and on the East by North 45th Avenue, to maintain thereon, as a matter right (i.e. as a main permitted use which is also sometimes referred to as a "first-permitted use"), any use pursuant to the version of Section 4.1 of the City's ZLDR in existence at the time of entry of this Consent Decree which requires a special exception, so long as such use is for residential or a Section 4.1 ZLDR use and the Synagogue complies with all other applicable codes, including all parking requirements. If the Synagogue does not construct a parking lot for a place of worship during the three year period commencing from the date of entry of the Consent Decree, as set forth in paragraph (2) above, the Synagogue shall have the right to designate one or more of its then existing parcels to provide the required number of parking spaces for a place of worship, or to provide the required number of parking spots amongst or between the Synagogue's then existing parcels. As to any additional properties which may be purchased by the Synagogue after three years from the date of entry of the Consent Decree, whether within the bounded area or othetwise, the Synagogue must, if otherwise applicable, apply for a special exception for those additional properties, pursuant to the special exception procedure in existence at the time of filing of the application, in order to use any such property for a section 4.1 ZLDR use.
4. Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the Synagogue's entitlement to maintain, as a matter of right, those uses contained in the version ofSection 4.1 ofthe City's ZLDR in existence at the time of entry of this Resolution which require a special exception, on its properties located at 2215 North 46th Avenue and 2221 North 46lh Avenue, and those additional parcels acquired pursuant to paragraphs (2) or (3) above, shall be transferable (i.e. "portable"), in perpetuity, upon the Synagogue providing written notice to the City Attorney, to the property located at 1400 North 46'h Avenue (commonly known as "Temple Sinai"). Upon the Synagogue providing such written notice to the City Attorney, the Synagogue shall have the right to continue using its properties located at 2215 and 2221 North 46 Avenue, and any properties acquired by the Synagogue pursuant to paragraphs (2) or (3) above as a matter of right, for a period of thirty (30) days from the date a certificate of occupancy requested by the Synagogue is issued. Upon expiration of said thirty (30) days, the section 4.1 ZLDR use rights at its existing properties shall cease.
5. The City's code enforcement and police departments, including all code enforcement officers, police officers, employees, agents and representatives ofboth departments are permanently enjoined from selectively enforcing and harassing the Synagogue through the application of any
2

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 45 of 77
provision ofthe City's Code ofOrdinances, ZLDR and any other City ordinances, codes, regulations, resolutions or otherwise. The pennanent enjoinment from selective enforcement and harassment also applies to the Synagogue's members, guests, invitees, employees, agents, representatives or otherwise, who are present at the Synagogue's current Properties and any properties the Synagogue may subsequently purchase or acquire an ownership interest in.
6. The Synagogue shall be paid $2,000,000 by the Defendants, inclusive of all fees and costs, within twenty (20) days from the date this consent decree is entered by the Court. The S2,000,000 shall be paid to Arnstein & Lehr, LLP's Trust Account.
7. The City of Hollywood shall adopt a constitutional and RLUIPA compliant special exception ordinance.
8. The action filed in Broward County Circuit Court by the City against the Synagogue, Case No. 04-011444 (21 ), and the action filed in Broward County Circuit Court by the Synagogue against the City, the Mayor and Conunissioners Peter Bober, Quentin Furr and Sal Oliveri, Case No. 06-003010 (08), shall both be dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs.
9. Simultaneously herewith, the Court is entering that certain Consent Order between the City and the DOJ, the tenns of which having already been negotiated and agreed to by and between the DOJ and the City. The Synagogue shall have standing to independently enforce the terms ofthc Consent Order between the Department of Justice and the City.
10. The parties shall execute mutual releases which fully, finally, and forever release and discharge each other, Sal Oliveri, Mara Giulianti, Peter Bober, Quentin Furr and National Union Fire Insurance Company ofPittsburgh, PA, its parent, subsidiaries and affiliates, including AIG Domestic Claims, Inc. (collectively "National Union"), including their heirs, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, shareholders, members, officers, directors, employees, attorneys, representatives, managers, predecessors, successors, assigns, and their respective shareholders, officers, directors, members, managers, employees, agents, representatives, attorneys, insurers, administrators, or any of them from liability for all acts and events occurring up to the date of execution of this Consent Decree including any and all claims, rights, demands, causes of action, suits, matters, and issues whether known or unknown, hidden, suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated, and whether based on federal, state, or local law, statute, ordinance, regulation, contract, common Jaw, or any other basis, that have been, could have been, may be, or could be alleged or asserted, now or in the future, whether before a court of law or before any court, tribunal, arbitration panel, or other adjudicatory body, based on any fact or matter from the beginning of time through and including the date hereof. These mutual releases, however, shall have no effect upon or otherwise prevent enforcement of this Settlement Consent Decree.
II. The Parties represent and warrant that they have the sole right and exclusive authority to execute this Consent Decree and to receive the sum specified in it; and that there has not been, nor
3

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 46 of 77

will there be, as of the date hereof, an effective assignment or other transfer of any interest in any claim by the Synagogue.
12. The Parties have declared to the Court that they have had the benefit of advice from their attorneys, and the terms of this Consent Decree have been completely read and are fully understood and voluntarily accepted for the purpose of making a full and final compromise of any and all claims.
\3. This Consent Decree shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Parties, their estates, heirs, legal representatives, successors, predecessors, parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, insurers, owners, directors, members, managers, officers, partners, representatives, shareholders, employees, agents, and assigns.
14. This Consent Decree shall be governed by the laws of the State ofFlorida and by the laws of the United States, where applicable.
15. Should it be necessary for any party to enforce any tenns of this Consent Decree, the prevailing party in such an enforcement action, may be entitled to its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs expended to enforce the terms of this Consent Decree, as determined by the Court.
16. By entering into this Consent Decree, all parties hereby agree to waive their right to appeal any of the tenns and provisions of this consent decree.
DONF: AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami-Dade County, Florida this_ day of - - - - - - - - - ' 2006.

Copies Furnished to: Franklin L. Zemel, Esq. Thomas J. McCausland, Esq. Robert M. Oldershaw, Esq. W. Todd Boyd, Esq. Sean Kcveney, Esq. Marilynn LinJsey, Esq.
fmal

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 4

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 47 of 77 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
J::ASE NO. 04-61212-CIV-LENARD/KLElN [CONSOLIDATED WlTH CASE NO. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD/KLEfN]

HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY SYNAGOGUE, INC.,
Plaintiff, vs.
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA, aod SAL OLIVERI, individually,
_____D_ef_en_d_an_t_s. _____________!

FILED by ..L';...._I D.C.
JUN 2 6 ~IIi
\.l"IUNr[ .. A00UII:
Ct fR~t. U S O•st. CT. " n Qr" '"l4. 't41U.41

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
vs. CITY OF HOLLYWOOD,
Defendant.
-----------------------I
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF HOLLYWOOD COMM\JNITY SYNAGOGUE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT CD.E. 225)
THIS CAUSE is before the Coun on Plaintiff Hollywood Community Synagogue's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("'Motion:· V.E. I 90), filed on March 21, 2006. On April20, 2006, Defendant City of Hollywood (..Defendant" or ''the City'') filed a Response.

EXHIBIT "A"

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 48 of 77
('·Response," D.E. 243.) On May 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Reply. (..Reply," D.E. 260.) On May 25.2006, the City filed a Notice ofSupplemental Authority. (''Supplement," D.E. 301.) On June I. 2006, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Supplement. ("Response to the Supplement," D.E. 319.) Having considered the Motion. the Response, the Reply, the Supplement, the Response to the Supplement, and the record, the Court finds as follows:
I. Factual and Procedural Background On September 15, 2004, Plaintiff Hollywood Community Synagogue (hereinafter ''HCS'' or ''the Synagogue") filed a Complaint against Defendants City or Hollywood and Sal Oliveri (Case No. 04-61212-CIV-LENARD, D.E. 14), alleging violations of numerous federal constitutional rights and statutes, including the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (hereinafter ''RLUIPA"). On Apri\26, 2005, Plaintiff United States of America filed a Complaint against Defendant City of Hollywood (Case No. 05-60687-CIV -LENARD. D.E. I), requesting declaratory and injunctive relief based upon Defendant's alleged violation of RLUIPA. On June 16, 2005, the Court issued an Order consolidating these cases and administratively closing the highernumbered case (Case No. 04-61212-CIV-LENARD, O.E. 75; Case No. 05-60687-CIVLENARD, D. E. 14), finding that they involved common questions orlaw and fact. On December 2, 2005, Plaintiff HCS was granted leave to tile a Second Amended Complaint. (D.E. 124.) This Second Amended Complaint (D.E. 125) contains 19 counts and
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 49 of 77
is the operative complaint for purposes of Plaintiffs Motion. Unless otherwise specified, the legal claims and facts that follow are taken from the allegations contained in the Second Amended Complaint in the consolidated case.
Plainti tTHCS is a synagogue with its principal place ofbusiness at 2215-2221 N. 46th Avenue, Hollywood, Florida 33021. (D.E. 125, at, 6.) Defendant City of Hollywood is a city municipality authorized by the State of Florida to regulate the use of land and structures within the City's borders, consistent with law. {}!l at ,7.) Defendant Sal Oliveri is a City
Commissioner for the City of Hollywood, representing the area of Hollywood Hills. (!4. at
~' 8.) In 1999, Yosef Elul, then-President of the Synagogue, purchased two residences,
located at 2215 and 2221 N. 46th Avenue, Hollywood, in a single-family district. (l.Q.. at ,15.) In such single-family districts. a place of worship' may operate only if granted a Special Exception. (ld. at~ 19.) After the purchase of the land by YosefEiul, the Director of Planning for the City of Hollywood advised the Synagogue that it needed to apply for a Special Exception as a place of worship but assured Synagogue representatives that such Special Exception would be granted. (ld. at~~ 19-20.)
In May of 200 I, Alan Razla, on behalf of Mr. Elul, applied for a Special Exception as a place of worship. (tiL at~ 21.) The Board of Appeal and Adjustments (hereinafter
1 The Ciry's Zonma and Land Dl:vclupnlenl Regulaloons do not de fmc pi~ orwonhip. &nd thus lhc Court will look 10 the nalural
and ordm.-y mnnmg. ~>;on1kov v. Orange County, fl. 410 F 3d 1317, 1325 (II Ill Cor. 2005). A ·'place'· os defined as "1 bu1ldmg or locality mcd for a ~pc~:~ll purpnsc- Wcbsl£r's 3d New lnt'l Un.bndged D1Cioon~~ry 1727 (I ~3) "'Worship" IS defined as "the reverence or veneration tendered 1 d1vone bc1ng or sul)(maluralpowcr "~ 11 2637 Thus. liken logelher. 1 "place of worsh1p~ IS 1 build1ng or locahl) used for lhe reverence or veneration of a d1vone bcmp. or supernllural po.. rr
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 50 of 77
·'BAA'') granted a six-month Special Exception. (ld.) Four months later, in September of 200 I. Defendant Oliveri filed an appeal with the City Commission ofthe BAA's grant ofthe Special Exception. (Id. at, 22.) The Commission heard the appeal and subsequently granted the Synagogue a one-year Special Exception, which included certain conditions that limited parking and capacity. (!.g.J Plainrifi· United States notes that, upon infonnation and belief, Defendant City of Hollywood had never previously imposed a time limit on a special exception for a religious use and had only once before imposed a time limit on a special exception for a non-religious use. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD. O.E. I, at, 20.)
In August of 2002, Arthur Eckstein, on behalf of the Synagogue, applied to the Development Review Board (hereinafter "ORB," fonnerly known as the BAA) for a Special Exception. (D.E. 125, at ~ 30.) In September of 2002, the ORB granted a six-month Temporary Special Exception subject to certain enumerated conditions and found that, subject to those conditions." the use of the property as a place of worship was compatible with the existing natural environment and other properties within the vicinity. (tit. at~ 30, 3l(A).) After the ORB hearing, Defendant Oliveri filed an appeal with the Commission. (ld. at~ 32.) In October 2002, the Commission denied Oliveri's appeal and allowed HCS the six-
month Temporary Special Exception. ilil at~ 33.)
In March of2003, the ORB granted the Synagogue a Pennanent Special Exception
2 The conditions impos~d by the ORB were: (I J purking of any type is prohibited in the alley located behind the Synagogue; (2) the Symt&OI!UC mu~t enter mto a lease agr«ment for o(f-sitc parking, (3) the Synagogue must oblain garbage dumpster! in a size and style acceptable to C1ty staff, (4) the S)"llagoguc must enter into a property maintenance agreement with a property maintcnmcc provider who will maintain lhc premises in accordance wilh lhe City Code, and (S) the Synagogue must work with Cily !'laff to creal.: a buffer alonttlhc rear side of the prnpcr1y. (D.E 125. at, 30.)
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subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions3 within 180 days. (!d., at 137.) Defendant
Oliveri filed another appeal. (ld. at, 38.) On June 5, 2003, 53 days after the Pennanent Special Exception was granted, the Commission, after considerable debate. reversed the
decision of the DRB. {14. at, 39.) Among other things, the Commission claimed that the Synagogue was "'too controversial.·· (lit at~ 41.) ·-controversiality•· is not identified by the Cicy Code as a factor to be evaluated when considering whether to grant a Special Exception. (ld. at, 44.) Plaintiff United States notes that, upon intonnation and belief, Defendant City
of Hollywood had never previously denied a request by a place of worship to operate in ether a single-family or multiple-family residential zone. (Case No. 05-60687 -CIV -LENARD, D.E. I, at~ 28.)
On October 16, 2003, Defendant City of Hollywood sent HCS a letter notifying the congregation that it was to cease holding services and other related activities at its current location within one week. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-l.ENARD, D.E. I, at, 30.) During a July 7, 2004, meeting, the City Commission voted to direct the City Attorney to file a lawsuit to stop further organized religious services from taking place at HCS, despite the fact that this item was not on the agenda and no notice had been provided to HCS or the public that such a vote would take place. (Case No. 05-60687-CJV-LENARD. D.E. I, at~ 32.) On or about July 16, 2004, the City ftled suit against the Synagogue in Broward County Circuit
' lhc conditions imposed by the ORB r~:quin: the Synagogue to. (I) build a siK·foot soundproofing wall at the rear rropcrty line:; (2) provide for appropriate: three-sided dumpster as approved by the City's Publi• Works Dcpanment; (J) pro•idc additional landscaping o.long the north and south propcny lines as determined approprialc by the City's Office of i>lannin&; and (4) provide a site plan to the Cit}' 's Planning Staff tnat dcmon~tratcs how the Synagu11uc will sat1~fy the lirst three conditions. (!)F. 125.1t, 37)
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 52 of 77
Coun, Case No. 04-11444 (21 ), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Synagogue for operating as a place of worship without a Special Exception. (D.E. 125, at, 57.)
In its Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff HCS alleges the following 18 Counts against the City of Hollywood: I) damages for violation of the Synagogue's right to free exercise of religion; II) injunctive relief for violation of the Synagogue's right to free exercise of religion; IV) damages for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)( I)substantial burden); V) injunctive reliefforviolationofRLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)( l)substantial burden); Vl) damages for violation ofRLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(l)unequal tenns); VII) injunctive relief for violation ofRLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)unequal terms); VIII) damages for violation of RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2) discrimination); IX) injunctive relicffor violation ofRLUlPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2)discrimination); X) damages for violation ofthe Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998 (Florida RFRA); XI) injunctive relief for violation of the Florida RFRA; XII) damages for violation ofthe Equal Protection Clause; XIII) injunctive relief for violation of the Equal Protection Clause; XIV) damages for violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment; XV) injunctive relief for violation ofthe Substantive Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment; XVI) promissory estoppel; XVII) facial equal protection challenge to Article Vofthe City of Hollywood Code ofOrdinances; XVIII) as applied equal protection challenge to Anicle V of the City of Hollywood Code of
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 53 of 77
Ordinances; and XIX) preliminary injunctive relief. (D.E. 125, at,~ 60-151.) Plaintiff HCS's Second Amended Complaint also asserts two claims against
Defendant Sal Oliveri, individually. for damages stemming from the alleged violation of Plaintitrs First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Free Exercise of Religion (Count UJ) and from the alleged violation of Plaintiff's Founeenth Amendment Right to Equal Protection (Count XII). (ld. at,, 72-80, 113-121.)
Plainti IT United States' Complaint contains substantially similar facts to Plaintiff HCS's Second Amended Complaint and requests that the Court grant injunctive and declaratory reliefagainst Defendant City ofHollywood for violations ofRLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)( I)-(2), based on the City's treatment ofHCS on less than equal tenns with nonreligious assemblies and on discrimination against HCS on the basis of religion or religious denomination. (Case No. 05-60687-CIV-LENARD, D.E. I, at page 6.)
On May I0, 2006. the Court issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant City of Hollywood's Motion to Dismiss HCS' Second Amended Complaint. (D.E. 272.) Therein, the Court: I) dismissed with prejudice those parts of Counts I and II that relate to an alleged City policy of regularly granting applications for Special Exceptions; 2) dismissed Counts IV, V, X, and XI with prejudice; 3) dismissed Count XIX without
prejudice; and 4) denied Defendant's Motion with respect to all other Counts. (l!L. at 61-62.)
H. Plaintiff HCS's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment In its Motion (D.E. 190), PlaintiffHCS moves for partial summary judgment, arguing
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 54 of 77
that Article V, Sections 5.3 and 5.7 ofthe City'sZoning and Land Development Regulations (ZLDR) are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to the Synagogue! (I d. at 2-2.) The Synagogue asserts that this determination does not require any factual findings or review of testimony. but may be made entirely on the basis of the law. (J.Q. at 13.) First, HCS maintains that Section 5.3.G. of the City's ZLDR is facially void because it gives City officials unbridled and unfettered discretion in their review of Special Exception applications. (!d.) The Synagogue contends that this Section contains four subjective criteria to be applied in reviewing an application for a Special Exception and that, even if the City Commission finds that all four criteria have been met, it still has the discretion to deny the application. (ld. at 5-6.)
Second, the Synagogue argues that Section 5.3.G.l. constitutes a prior restraint on activities protected by the First Amendment and is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to HCS. (!JL at 3, 16.) HCS maintains that, although prior restraints must contain standards that are precise, definite, and objective in order to guide government officials, the City's Special Exception zoning criteria employ terms such as ''compatibility," "vicinity," "adequate provision," and "sufficient, appropriate, and adequate" that are vague, subjective, and imprecise. (ld. at 8.) Thus, HCS argues that the Special Exception provisions threaten the right to free exercise of religion. (Id. at 16.)
In its Response (D.E. 243), Defendant City of Hollywood argues that the amount of
4 rhough PlaintilT nc•·cr spccilics as to which Counts 1ts Motion relates. the Cuun finds thac the Motion is dispositive of Count~ XVII and XVIII and also afrccts pontom of Counts I and II.
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discretion afforded a zoning board in detennining particular land uses is extremely high because zoning is an inherently discretionary system. (ld. at 2.) The City thus maintains that Plaintiff has not established grounds for summary judgment on its facial or as-applied challenges. (ld.) Defendant agrees that the adjudication of this Motion does not require the Court to make factual determinations or consider testimony regarding witnesses'
interpretations of the ZLDR sections at issue. (!d.. at 13.)
Defendant City of Hollywood contends that Section 5.30.2. is not facially void for "unbridled discretion" because the ORB or Commission, after reviewing an application for a Special Exception, has only three options: it may grant the application, grant the application with conditions. or deny the application. (lil. at 5.) Defendant further argues that the four
criteria used to evaluate such applications require specific findings. {lll. at 8.) Moreover,
Defendant maintains that Section 5.3.G. of the ZLDR should be reviewed in light of the
purpose of the zoning district in question, i&, in light of the section's purpose of protecting
the character of single-family neighborhoods. (lsl at 6.) Defendant also argues that Plainti frs as-applied challenge is without merit because
the zoning ordinances in question do not operate as a prior restraint on Plaintiffs First Amendment rights. (til at 15.) Defendant asserts that the ZLDR neither directly regulates
the content of Plaintiff's protected activity nor operates as a licensing scheme and, thus, the zoning scheme should be reviewed under the more permissive standard of time, place, and
manner restrictions for content-neutral regulations. (.tiL. at 15-16, 18.) Defendant then
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maintains that, because the ordinances are narrowly tailored to the City's substantial interest in preserving the quality of urban life and because the ordinances leave Plaintiffsignificant alternative avenues of expression. Plaintiffs Motion should be denied. (ld. at 19-20.)
In its Reply (D.E. 260), Plaintiff reiterates that the zoning scheme provides Defendant City of Hollywood unbridled discretion to grant or deny a Special Exception penn it, even if all four criteria are met, and that it makes no difference that the City must make some kind of decision on every application. (l.Q. at 2-3.) Plaintiff further maintains that the Special Exception procedure constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise ofFirst Amendment activity because applicants must obtain a penn it before operating in certain parts of the City. (Id. at 4.) Thus, there exists a heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of the procedure. one that may only be overcome by narrow, objective, and definite standards, standards that are absent here. (ld.) Moreover, argues Plaintiff. this infirmity is not cured by the fact that Defendant provides alternate fora for the exercise of First Amendment activity.
(til at 7.) Instead, Plainti IT argues that the prior restraint analysis is triggered by the
existence of official discretion to deny use of a given forum for First Amendment protected activity. (ld. at 8.) Finally, PlaintifTasserts that, even ifthe Court was to construe Section SJ.G. ofthe ZI.DR as a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction, the Section is still unconstitutional because it does not contain precise and objective standards to guide the City's decisionmaking. Mat 10.)
In its Supplement (D.E. 30 I), Defendant argues that, in the event that the Court
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 57 of 77
. 'I
detennines that the standards governing the Special Exception procedure are invalid, a conditional use ''becomes a prohibited one since the obvious reason for making it a special exception use is to prohibit it in the absence of the specified approval.'' (lil at 2-3.) Since the tenns would then be considered too indefinite, the City argues that Board would be unable to grant a Special Exception to the Synagogue and thus, even if the Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is granted, the Court cannot order that HCS be granted a Special Exception. (See id. at 2-3.)
In the Response to the Supplement (D.E. 319}, the Synagogue argues that Defendant's position is lacking in legal support and represents a "disturbing tactic" on the part of the City.
(lfl at 2.) First, Plaintiff argues that the authorities relied upon by the City are factually
distinguishable because they do not concern the First Amendment. (Id.) Next, Plaintiff argues that, if the Special Exception provisions are declared unconstitutional, the proper remedy is to allow the Synagogue to remain in its present location. (See id. at 3, 7-8.) In support of this argument, Plaintiff states that other provisions of the Code consider special exception uses. including places of worship, as generally suitable in single-family neighborhoods. (ld. at 7.)
Ill. The Hearing On May 23, 2006, the Court held a hearing ("the Hearing," see D.E. 298), at which the Parties were provided an opportunity to present their arguments on the. During the Hearing, Plaintiff HCS emphasized its position that the zoning ordinances in question
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constituted a prior restraint on protected First Amendment activity and, as such, the ordinances are required to contain clear and precise standards. (l.Q., al 3: 1-12.) Plaintiff further argued the standards currently in place allow the Commission to use their unfettered discretion and to base their decisions on any criteria they choose, including
··controversiality," as was cited as a basis for rejecting the Synagogue's application. fuL at
4:2-6.) Plaint itT noted that. even though the City code states that a place of worship is, ·•generally suitable in this district," the Synagogue was denied a Special Exception because it was purportedly not compatible with its surroundings. (ld. at 5:21-6:6.) Thus. HCS maintained that, because it is impossible to know what criteria need to be met to obtain a
Special Exception, the provisions are unconstitutionally vague. M at 5: I 1-19; 12:6-17.)
Defendant City of Hollywood responded that no prior restraint can be found here. (,Ul at 14:7 .) Defendant defined a prior restraint as a governmental attempt to control the content of expression and further asserted that the City's zoning ordinances are not prior restraints because they do not require every place of worship in all zoning districts to get permission before operating. (ld. at 15:3-8, 16: 18-17:2.) Because a place of worship need apply for a permit only if it wants to operate in residential neighborhoods, the City contended that there was no licensing scheme or prior restraint. (ld. at 17:9-16.) Instead, Defendant argued that its zoning regulations were narrowly tailored to the substantial government interest of zoning and preserving the quality of urban life. (lll at 20:8-18.) Thus, the City asserted that its regulations were governed by the permissive time, place, and manner restriction standards,
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and that this only mandated that decisions not be left up to the whim of the decisionmaker. (Id. at 23:8-24:3.) The City argued that, while its standards allow some elasticity. they do not leave the decision to the whim of the dccisionmaker. {ld. at 24:20-23.)
Plaintiff responded that the City established a system in which places of worship were deemed generally acceptable subject to a Special Exception. but provided unlimited discretion to officials to decide whether to grant such an Exception. (!4. at 32:15-33:8.)
Upon questioning by the Court, the City stipulated that the substantia\ government interest justifying the zoning ordinances in question is twofold: the City's interest in zoning, generally, and the purpose of protecting the character of single-family neighborhoods, as stated in ZLDR § 4.1 A. (ld. at 39:23·40:2.) The City argued that the provisions were narrowly tailored because they applied only to places of worship wanting to operate in residential districts. (tiL at 42: 14-25.) Defendant further maintained that the zoning ordinances do not constitute a prior restraint because there are places in the City of Hollywood where the Synagogue can practice their First Amendment protected activities without having to ask the City for permission or a Special Exception. (lllat 41 :2-22.) Finally, Defendant City conceded that, ifthe Court found the zoning ordinances at issue to constitute a prior restraint, the holding of Lady J. Lin&erie. Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358 {lith Cir. 1999), would control in this case. (ld. at 58:\4-59:3.)
IV. Analysis A. Staodard of Review
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On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving pany. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co .. 398 U.S. 144. 157 ( 1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a maner of law." FEo.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard as follows:
[Tlhe plain language of Rule 56(c} mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.3l7, 322-23 (1986). The trial court's function at this juncture is not "1o weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'' Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986}. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Rarfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir. 1989). The party asking for summary judgment ·'always bears the initial responsibility of infonning the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file, together with
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affidavits, if any,· which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'' Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must ·'go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ·depositions. answers to interrogatories, and admissions on tile,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" !d. at 324; see also Fm.R.Civ.P. 56(e). In meeting this burden the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec.lndus. Co. v. Zenith Radio cow .. 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Id. at 587. An action is void of a material issue fortrial"[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Id.
Plaintifl HCS and Defendant City of Hollywood agree that the Court need not make any factual findings or examine any testimony in considering the instant motion and that the Court may issue its ruling after reviewing the text of the challenged portions of the zoning regulations in light of the applicable legal standards. After reviewing the record, the Court agrees that no genuine issue exists for trial and that partial summary judgment may be granted as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court will now tum to the text of the City's ZLDR in question.
B. The City's Zoning and Land Development Regulations (ZLDR) Hollywood Community Synagogue is located in a "Single Family District" in the City
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of Hollywood. Section 4.1 of the ZLDR specifies that the purpose ofSingle Family Districts
is "to protect the character of the single family neighborhoods.'' (D.E. 191, Ex. B at 4.1.)
The ''Main Pennitted Uses'' in such districts are "[s]ingle family detached dwelling[s]." (Id.)
The ··special Exceptions'' in such districts are"[e]ducational facilities[, l [p]laces ofworship,
meeting halls and similar nonprofit uses and ham radio antennas." (1.4.)
Section 5.3.G. of the ZLDR, entitled ··special exceptions," is the primary provision
at issue and contains the following language:
Certain uses are listed as special exceptions in the Zoning and Land Development Regulations and are pennitted in zoning districts subject to the approval of the Development Review Board. These uses are considered generally suitable for the districts in which listed. However, the character and nature of the uses may necessitate controls and safeguards on the manner of establishment and operation which would best serve the interests of the community and the owners of the property in question.
(D.E. 191, Ex. A at 5.3.G.) Section 5.3.G.I., entitled "Review of petitions for special
exceptions," provides that all petitions for Special Exceptions shall be reviewed by the ORB,
which may grant the petition if it makes all ofthe following findings:
a. That the use is compatible with the existing natural environment and other properties within the vicinity;
b. That there will be adequate provision for safe traffic movement, both vehicular and pedestrian, both internal to the use and in the area which will serve the use;
c. That there are adequate setbacks, buffering, and general amenities in order to control any adverse effects of noise, light, dust and other potential nuisances; and
d. That the land area is sufficient, appropriate and adequate for the use as proposed.
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(ld. at Aat 5.3.G.I(a)-(d).) The ensuing section, entitled ''Decision of the Board," provides: In considering a petition for a special exception, the Board may grant the special exception, grant the special exception with appropriate conditions when the Board determines such conditions ... are necessary to further the purpose of the zoning district or compatibility with other property within the vicinity, or deny the special exception.
(l.Q, at A at 5.3.G.2.) Finally, pursuant to Section 5.7.A., the City Commission may request a hearing on any application which, upon its detennination, requires additional review to
ensure that, inter ilia. development standards and criteria have been met. (D.E. 125, at,
138.5) Section 5.7.B. provides the Commission shall apply the same standards and criteria employed by the ORB and shall approve, approve with conditions, or deny the application. (D.E. 125, at~ 138; Hearing Transcript at24:20-23, 28: l-12.)
C. Plaintiff's Facial and As-Applied Challenges Plaintiff first raises a facial challenge to the City's zoning scheme. Generally, content-neutral zoning regulations are reviewed under the deferential ''time, place, and manner" standards that were delineated by the Supreme Court in City of Renton v. Playtime. Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-54 (1986). Under these standards, "a zoning ordinance is valid if it is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest and [if] it allows for reasonable alternative avenues of expression." Lady J. Linierie. Inc. v. City ofJas;ksonville, 176 F.3d 1358 (citing Jnt' IEateries of America. Inc. v. Broward County. Fla., 941 F.2d 1157,
1 Plaintiff' provided the ~~-~t of ~cction ~- 7 of the ZLDR in the Second Amended Complaint (D.F.. 125. at§ 138): Dcfcndan1 Cit~· of Hollywood. in its Ans"·cr. admoncd to the ~on1en1~ of thi~ par~raph of the pleading (O.E. 307. at, 138).
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1161-65 (lith Cir. 1991) and City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-52.) A city's interest "in
attempting to preserve the quality of urban life" is a substantial government interest that "must be accorded high respect:· City ofRenton. 475 U.S. at 50.
A zoning ordinance that touches upon activities protected by the first Amendment must also contain "narrow, objective, and definite standards" to guide city officials in their review. Sec CAMP Legal Defense Fund. Inc. v. City of Atlanta,_ F.3d _ . 2006 WL 1623279 at •19 (II th Cir.. June 13, 2006) (citing Shuttlesworth v. City ofBinnin&]lam, 394 U.S. 147, I5I (1969)). Absent such standards, the ordinance grants "unbridled discretion" to city officials and fails to ·"prevent[] the official from encouraging some views and discouraging others through the arbitrary' grant of an exemption.',(, CAMP, 2006 WL 1623279 at •19 (guotjog Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 ( 1992)); see also Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 ( 1940) (stating that the lack of objective criteria "readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure"). "A government regulation that allows arbitrary application is inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because such discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view.·· ld. (internal citations omitted).
Out of these concerns regarding the dangers of censorship, the Supreme Court has developed a long line ofjurisprudence aimed at fostering the legitimate goals of lawmaking
• The Cwn notes that ~ racial challenge 10 ~ .wnin11, ordinance may be raised when the mere threat of abuse of power ex 1sts; m1 proof of ac1ual abuse of flOWer is rcqui~d. Ttlomhlll v. Stale of Alabama. J I0 U S. 811, 97 {1940).
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while curbing the threats of arbitrary enforcement. Yet, in reaching the proper balance, the Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that an ordinance that "makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official -as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official- is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.'' Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151.
A "'prior restraint" is a restriction on expression that is imposed before the expression occurs. United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (lith Cir. 2000); ~also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795 n.5 (1989); CAMP, 2006 WL 1623279 at *24 ("l t]he tenn 'prior restraint' is used to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance ofthe time that such communications occur (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 553 ( 1993) (internal quotations omitted))). "Classic prior restraints have involved judge-issued injunctions against the publication of certain infonnation.'' Cooper v. Dillon. 403 F.3d 1208, 1215 (lith Cir. 2005). "Prior restraints have also been found where the government has unbridled discretion to limit access
to a particular public forum.'' !d.
Defendant City ot Hollywood first argues that, because places of worship can operate in other districts in the City without applying for a special exception, no prior restraint exists here. The Court finds that this assertion is in direct conflict with established Supreme Court precedent. In Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939), the Supreme
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Coun rejected the argument that anti-canvassing ordinances, which restricted canvassing only in streets and alleys, were valid because they did not prohibit the distribution of printed matter in other public places. The Schneider Court found that streets were the natural and proper places for dissemination of infonnation and that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." ld. at 163. Further, in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 ( 1975), the Supreme Court found that a decision to deny the petitioner's request to use a municipal facility for a theater production constituted a prior restraint, even though the denial did not prevent petitioner from using another theater in the city. Accordingly, the existence of alternative fora for expression does not justify an olherwise
impennissible prior restraint. tiL at 555.
Next. Defendant contends that Section 5.3.G. of the ZLDR sufficiently restricts the discretion of City regulators and is therefore a valid time, place, and manner restriction. After careful consideration of this ordinance, the Court cannot agree. Instead, the Court finds that Section 5.3 .G .1. constitutes an unconstitutional7 prior restraint because it lacks "narrow, objective, and definite standards" to guide city officials in their review of applications for a Special Exception and thus provides City officials unbridled discretion in their consideration of the application. See Lady J. Lingerie. Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358, 1362
1 Though prior restraints arc not tw: ~ uncon_~titutional, there extsts a strong presumption against their
constitutionality. FWIJ'HS, Inc. v. City Df Dalla.\ 493 U.S. 215. 225 ( 1990) Any scheme that places unbridled discretion in the hand~ of a go~cmmcnt official or agency. however. must be invalidated due to the great d11nger of censorship and of abridgment of our pm;ious Ftr~t Amendment fr~edoms )5L; Southeastem Promotions. 420 \1 S. at 1244.
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(II th Cir. 1999) (noting that "some measure of discretion is acceptable, but ... virtually any amount of discretion beyond the merely ministerial is suspect'").
In Lady J. Lin~erie, the Eleventh Circuit Court ofAppeals considered and invalidated a similar licencing scheme. 176 F.3d at 1362. There, the City of Jacksonville created H zoning scheme that allowed adult entertainment establishments to operate as of right in only one zone; such eslablishments were allowed to operate in a second zone only if the zoning
board granted a zoning exception after consideration of nine enumerated criteria.8 lsl at
1361. The Eleventh Circuit characteri7.ed these criteria as "run-of-the-mill zoning

1 -rhc n:kvant provision uf the City of Jacksonville regulations provided that the toning hoard

shall issue an ord'r to grant the c~ccption on if it finds from a preponderance of the

evidencc...lhat the proposed usc meets. to the extent applicable. the following uandards

and crit ~ria:

( i)

Will be consistent with the Comprehc:nsive Plan. including any subsequent

plan adopled by 1hc Council punu11111hereto;

(ii)

Will be compatible with the: e~tisting contiguous ~s or 7.0nins and compatible

wuh the general character or !he lltt&, considering population density. design.

scale and orientation of stnJc1urcs 10 !he area. property values. and existing

~imilar uses or wning;

(iii)

Will no1 have an environmental impact inconsistent with the health. safety and

wei fan: of the comrnunily;

(iv)

W111 not have a dclrimental effect on vehicular or ptdesman 1raffic. or pllfking

'ondilions. 1111d will not rc~ult in the generation uJ ~reation of traffic

inconsistent with the health. safety and wclfart olthe community;

(v)

Will not have a detrimental effect on the fu1urc development of contiguous

propcrtic.s or the gcnc::ral ama. according to the Comprehen~ivc Plan. induding

ilny subsequent amcndmenlto the plan adopted by the Council;

t•i J

Will not re~ult in the crcatioo of objectionable or c~ccssive noise, lights,

v1bralions. fumes. odo!'l'. dust or physical activiucs. lakin& mto account cxisling

uses or zon10g in the vicinity;

(•ii) Will nut overburden ex1S1ing puhlic scrviCC:S :111d facilities;

1viii) Will bt ~umc1cntly acces~1blc to ~rmit<.'Tlll)' onto the property by fire. pollee.

rescue and uthcr !>trvices; and

(i.~ J will be consistent w11h tile detinition of a wnin~ cxcep1ion. 1111d 1Y1II mec1 the

slandard~ and crueria or the zoning classification in wh1ch such usc is propo~~d

to bt located, 1111d all other requirements for such pll1\1cuhu usc sci fonh

~lsewhcrc in the loning Code. or otherwise ;adO(Itcd hy lht Planning

Commission.

Lady J. l.inp.crit. 17& FJd al 1369-70.

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considerations" that concerned compatibility with contiguous uses, environmental impact,
and effect of pedestrian traffic. !.Q. at 1362. After examining these factors, the Eleventh
Circuit held that none was precise or objective and that "all of them - individually and collectively- empower the zoning board to covertly discriminate against adult entertainment establishments under the guise ofgeneral 'compatibility' or 'environmental' considerations." Id. Specifically, in place of objective requirements,~. there must be X number of doors per square foot, the provisions used broad, subjective language, such as buildings must "be
sufficiently accessible to permit entry by" rescue services. M. Because these criteria were
being applied to establishments that are entitled to First Amendment protections, the Eleventh Circuit held that the licensing scheme was unconstitutional.
The criteria contained in Section 5.3.G.I. are as, if not more, broad and imprecise as those found in Lady J. Lineerie. The Section directs the DRB to determine whether the use is ''compatible with'' the natural environment and other properties~ whether there will be "adequate provision" for safe traffic movement or ''adequate setbacks, buffering, and general amenities... to control...potential nuisances"; and whether the land area is "sufficient, appropriate, and adequate for the use." (D.E. 191, Ex. A at SJ.G.I.) As in Lady J. Linierie, the Court finds that none of these criteria is ·'precise and objective" and that all of them empower the DRB, or the Commission on appeal, to covertly discriminate against places of worship under the guise of ·•compatibility" or other intangible considerations. Lady 1. Lingerie, 176 F.3d at 1362. Moreover, the Special Exception procedure employed here is
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even more constitutionally invidious, as it provides City officials the discretion to deny a
Special Exception even if all four enumerated criteria are met. (O.E. 191, Ex. A at 5.3.G.)
Nothing in the ordinance or its application prevents City oflicials from encouraging some
places ofworship while discouraging others through the arbitrary grant or denial of a Special
Exception.~ Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 ( 1992). Because
PlaintifTHCS, as a place of worship, is entitled to the protections ofthe free Exercise clause
of the First Amendment, the provision of such unbridled discretion to City officials is constitutionally impennissible.9
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the zoning scheme
established in Section 5.3.G., as it relates to places of worship, is void on its face, and
summary judgment is therefore GRANTED in favor ofPiaintiffHCS on Count XVII of the
Second Amended Complaint. Last, because the Court has found the City's zoning scheme unconstitutional, it does
not reach Plaintiffs argument that the provisions are also unconstitutional as applied to HCS.
See Cafe Erotica of Florida. Inc. v. St. Johns County, 360 F.3d 1274, 1293 (lith Cir. 2004);
Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1318 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that an as-applied
'The Coun notes that., ~ven if it found that the City of Hollywood's zoning scheme constituted a content-neutreltimc. place il!ld manner restriction instead of a prior restraint. lhe City's Spcci¥1 E~'cption s!andards as applied to places of worship do not pass constitutional mu~cr. The Supreme Coun has hdd that even time, place, and manner restnct1ons must contain adequate ~tandards to guide ollitial~' discretion and allow for e!Tcclivc judicial review in the first Amendment contc~t. Thomas v. Chicago Par\ District. S34 U S. 316. 323 (2002). Therefore, such rcgulalions must contain ··narrowly drawn, reasonable and
definite standards.~ Burk V. Augusta-Richm!l!!d Counrv. 365 F.Jd 1247, 1256 (lith Cir. 2004). .Y!!2ti!!i!l!f!m» 534 u.~ at
324. As discusSC'd above, the standards pro~ided for the DRB to review Special E~ception applications contain vague and 1mprecisc language allowing for wide ~ariances in interprct1111on 1111d application. This infinnity is only !!Xacerbated by U!e lact that both the DRB and Commission retain the discretion lo den)· a Special Exceplion application, even if a piiiCe of worship is found to satisfy all four criteria. lhcrcfon:, lhc Coun finds that the Ciry's zonmg re~ulations rclaling 10 places of wonh1p 11rc uncon~titullonal. even if constr\ICd as content-ncutraltimc, pia~ c. and manner restriction~.
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challenge is rendered moot if the underlying statute is deemed unconstitutional). Therefore. Plaintiff's as~applied equal protection claim, contained in Count XVIII of the Second Amended Complaint. is DENIED as moot.
D. Impact on Counts I and II In Counts I and 11 ofthe Second Amended Complaint, PlaintiffHCS seeks damages and injunctive relief, respectively. as a result of the City's violation of HCS's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In these counts, the Synagogue alleges, inter~. that the City's denial of the Special Exception violated the Synagogue's constitutional rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of assembly for purposes of worship and teaching. (D.E. 125, at 19.) In order to obtain relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that conduct under color of state law, complained of in the civil rights suit, violated its rights, privileges, or immunities under the Constitution or laws ofthe United States. Whitehorn v. Harrelson, 758 F.2d 14! 6. 1419 (II th Cir. I985). Moreover, the Supreme Court has placed strict !imitations on municipal liability under Section 1983. Gold v. City of Miami, IS 1F.3d 1346, 1350 (lith Cir. 1998), citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 ( 1978). There is no respondeat superior liability upon which to inculpate a municipality for the wrongful actions of its employees or agents. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 694. Thus, a municipality can only be held liable ifan official policy or custom ofthat municipality causes
a constitutional violation . .lll at 694-95. Moreover, it is not enough lor the plaintiff to
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I ,
merely identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality; the plaintiff must also demonstrate that. through deliberate conduct. the municipality is the moving force behind the alleged injury. Board of County Com'rs v. Brown. 520 U.S. 397. 404 (1997).
The Supreme Court in Pembaur v. Citv ofCincinnati. 475 U.S. 469 (1986), held that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances. ld. at 480. However, any such single act must still be made pursuant to an existing, unconstitutional official municipal policy to properly attribute such
conduct to the municipality pursuant to Monell. ld.. at 478 n. 6, 479-81 ~City of Oklahoma
Cjty v. Tuttle. 471 U.S. 808. 823-824 (1985 ). The Eleventh Circuit has summarized the Supreme Court's guiding principles. to be employed when evaluating the single action of an official policymaker is sufficient to give rise to municipal liability, as follows: ( l) whether the action is officially sanctioned or ordered by the municipality: (2) whether the action is taken by officers with final policymaking authority; (3) whether this final policy making authority is granted by state law. including valid local ordinances and regulations; (4) whether the challenged action was taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the officials responsible for making policy in that particular area of the city's business, as detennined by state law. Martinez v. City ofOpa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708. 713 ( ll th Cir. 1992) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In its Order of May 10, 2006, the Court ruled that Plaintiff had demonstrated all four factors from Martinez, and had thus stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon the single act by the Commission of reversing the ORB pursuant
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to the City's zoning ordinances. (D.E. 272, at 31-32.) The Court has determined herein that the City's zoning ordinance relating to Special
Exceptions for places of worship is unconstitutionally vague on its face in violation of Plaintiff HCS 's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. It is undisputed that the City applied this zoning ordinance to the Synagogue in denying its application for a Special Exception. The Court has. moreover, already detennined that this single act of denying HCS's application constituted a municipal policy or practice suflicient to invoke municipal liability. The Court funher finds that this denial pursuant to an unconstitutional ordinance was the moving force behind the violation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Finding no genuine issues of material fact as to this claim, the Court concludes that Plaintiff HCS is entitled to summary judgment as to the portions of Counts I and II in which Plaintiff claims that the City violated its constitutional rights through the single act of the Commission's denial of a Special Exception.
E. Remedy In Counts I, IJ. XVII, and XV!ll, the Synagogue requests, inter alia, that the Court enter judgment against the City, direct that it be granted a Special Exception, award damages to the Synagogue, and declare the portions of Article V of the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances relating to Special Exceptions unconstitutionally vague. (D.E. 125 at, 69, 71,
141.)
The City, in its Supplement, argues that it may still prevent the Synagogue from
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operating as a place of worship in its present location even if the Special Exception procedures are deemed unconstitutional. Essentially, the City maintains that ifthe Special Exception provisions are excised from the ZLDR, no special exceptions could be granted in single-family districts and the only the permitted principals uses would be allowed.
The primary issue now before the Court is whether the City's Special Exception provision may be severed from the rest ofthe ZLDR and what impact such severance would have on places of worship. The City is correct that severability of local ordinances is a question of state law. City ofLakewoQd v. Plain Pealer Pub. Co.. 486 U.S. 750,772 (1988); Mayflower Fanns. Inc. v. Teo Eyck, 297 U.S. 266,274 ( 1936). However, the Florida District Court of Appeals cases provided by the City provide no support for its cone\usion that, in the First Amendment context, the invalidation of the Special Exception provisions transform all conditional uses into prohibited uses.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that Florida law clearly favors the severance of invalid portions of a law from the valid ones, where possible. Coral Springs Street Systems. Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.Jd 1320, 1347 (lith Cir. 2004). The doctrine of severability is derived from the doctrine of separation of powers and is designed to show great deference to the legislative prerogative to enact laws. Id. However, severability is not possible where an illegal provision has tainted the remainder of the statute. ld. The severability determination is made by examining the invalidated section's "relation to the overall legislative intent of the statute of which it is a part, and whether the statute, less the invalid
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Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 74 of 77
provisions, can still accomplish this intent." J.Q. (citations omitted). The Florida Supreme Court, in Smith v. Department of Insurance. 507 So.2d I080,
I089 (Fla. 1987), has suggested the following test for discerning severability: When a part of a statute is declared unconstitutional the remainder of the act will be permitted to stand provided: (I) the unconstitutional provisions can be separated from the remaining valid provisions, (2) the legislative purpose expressed in the valid provisions can be accomplished independently of those which are void, (3) the good and the bad features are not so inseparable in substance that it can be said that the Legislature would have passed the one without the other, and (4) an act complete in itself remains after the invalid provisions are stricken.
Coral Springs, 371 F.3d at 1348 (citations omitted). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit l:oncluded that. under Florida law, an unconstitutional portion of a challenged statute ''should be excised, leaving the rest intact and in force, when doing so does not defeat the purpose of the
statute and leaves in place a law that is complete." ld. While. in this case, factors (I) and (4) of the Smith test have been met, as the
challenged portions ofthe ZLDR could be separated from the remaining provisions and leave an act complete in itsell~ the City's proposed remedy fails to satisfY the other two factors. Instead, the Court finds that such severance would thwart the legislative purpose of the l.LDR such that it could not he said that the Commission would have passed the one without the other. The ZLDR expressly states that places of worship are considered ''generally suitable" uses within single family districts subject to controls to best serve the interests of the community and the owners of the property in question. (D. E. 191, at Ex. A at 5.3.G.; id.
-28-

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 75 of 77
at Ex. Bat 4.1.) Thus, the City never intended the complete exclusion of places of worship in single family districts and would have been unlikely to enact an ordinance devoid of exception procedures. Removal of the Special Exception provision, therefore, cannot be accomplished without defeating the purpose of the statute and destroying the intent of the enacting body.
Accordingly. pursuant to the Court's authority to fashion a remedy for the City's violation ofPlaintiffHCS's right to free exercise of religion and because the Court finds that PlaintiffHCS has been irreparably injured by the violation of its rights, the Court orders that the Synagogue shall be granted the Pennancnt Special Exception it was awarded by the ORB in March 2003, subject only to those conditions that are objective and definite. 10 Specifically, the Permanent Special Exception shall be conditioned upon the Synagogue building a six-foot soundproofing wall at the rear property line and providing a three-sided dumpster as approved by the City's Public Works department, provided that a list of approved dumpsters exists.''
Further, the Court orders that the City shall promptly enact new Special Exception ordinance(s) for places of worship, onc(s) that contain '·narrow, objective, and definite standards'' guiding City officials in their review and that are otherwise constitutionally sound.
' 0 The Coun notes that. at a hearing held on June: 26, 21106. the Pan1~S announced thal. ~a pan of the proposed :;cttlcmc:uc. the City would allow the Synagogue. jnter alia. ro operate as a '"mancr of right" in il.~ prcsc:ntlocation. The Court's rulin@.. contained in this Order. shall not preclude the Panics from ag.rc:eing to terms that arc more fa\·orabl~ to the Synagogue. provided thai ~uch tenn~ are consistent w1th all applicable laws.
11 The Coun finds that the n:maining conditions- requiring "'additional~ land~caping ··as dctennlncd appropriate" ond provi,Jing a ~itc plan- arc m~ufficicntly objective to be imposed
-29-

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 76 of 77
Last, the Court orders that the issue of damages that arise from Count I and that relate to the constitutional violation found here is properly placed before a jury for further detennination.
Ill. Conclusion As stated above, the Court recognizes that the City of Hollywood has a substantial interest in preserving the quality of urban life in its neighborhoods. Moreover, the Court accords great respect for the City's interest in protecting the character and nature of neighborhoods in which single-family, detached dwellings predominate and in furthering the ability of its residents to engage in the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of their property. However, the City of Hollywood, through its officials, is also charged with the protection of the religious freedoms that are found in the First Amendment and that fonn the cornerstone of American democracy. Zoning regulations that affect those freedoms must therefore be precise and objective in both their tenns and their application. Our Constitution and our love of liberty demand no less. Accordingly, it is: ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff Hollywood Community Synagogue's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D.F.. 190), tiled March 21, 2006, is GRANTED in part and DENIED as moot in part as described herein.
-30-

Case 0:04-cv-61212-JAL Document 380 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2006 Page 77 of 77
I'
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this -·-'-)-'Vr--- day of June, 2006.
~· 'fr ~"'L&-. ~.
J N A. LENARD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: U.S. Magistralc: Judge: Theodore Klein A11 Counsel of Record C•s~ No.04-61212-CJV-LENARDIKLEJN
-31-

 
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U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida (Ft. Lauderdale) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 0:05-cv-60687-JAL

CLOSED

United States of v. City of Hollywood Assigned to: Judge Joan A. Lenard Demand: $0 Cause: 28:1345 USA Plaintiff
Plaintiff
United States

Date Filed: 04/26/2005 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by Marilynn Koonce Lindsey United States Attorney's Office 500 E Broward Boulevard 7th Floor Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301-3002 954-356-7314X3610 Fax: 356-7180 Email: MARILYNN.LINDSEY@USDOJ.GOV
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael S. Maurer United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 202-514-3812 Fax: 514-1116 Email: michael.maurer@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R. Tamar Hagler United States Department of Justice Civil Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 3141 Washington, DC 20530 202-616-5617 Fax: 514-1116 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean R. Keveney United States Department of Justice

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V. Defendant City of Hollywood, Florida

Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 202-514-4838 Fax: 514-1116 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven H. Rosenbaum United States Department of Justice Civil Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 3141 Washington, DC 20530 202-514-4838 Fax: 514-1116 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven J. Rosenbaum Covington & Burling 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue NW PO Box 7566 Washington, DC 20044-7566 202-662-6000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Chad Brandon Hess Conroy Simberg Ganon Krevans & Abel
3440 Hollywood Boulevard 2nd Floor Hollywood, FL 33021 954-961-1400 Fax: 967-8577 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Matthew Oldershaw City of Hollywood 2600 Hollywood Boulevard Suite 407 PO Box 229045 Hollywood, FL 33022-9045 954-921-3435 Fax: 921-3081 Email: roldershaw@hollywoodfl.org

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Date Filed 04/26/2005 04/26/2005 04/28/2005 04/28/2005 05/02/2005
05/26/2005
05/26/2005
05/26/2005

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Darryl Krevans Conroy Simberg Ganon Krevans & Abel
3440 Hollywood Boulevard 2nd Floor Hollywood, FL 33021 954-961-1400 Fax: 967-8577 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas Jeffrey McCausland Conroy Simberg Ganon Krevans & Abel PA 3440 Hollywood Boulevard Second Floor Hollywood, FL 33021 954 961-1400 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT filed; FILING FEE Waived; Magistrate Judge Edwin G. Torres (ss, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/27/2005)

2 SUMMONS(ES) issued for City of Hollywood (ss, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/27/2005)

3 SUMMONS(ES) issued for City of Hollywood (ss, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/29/2005)

4 SUMMONS(ES) issued for City of Hollywood (ss, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/29/2005)

5 ORDER requiring counsel to meet, file joint scheduling report and joint discovery report (Signed by Judge William P. Dimitrouleas on 5/2/05) [EOD Date: 5/4/05] (ss, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/04/2005)

6 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for City of Hollywood by serving Mara Giulianti, Mayor on 5/4/05 Answer due on 5/24/05 for City of Hollywood (ss, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/27/2005)

7 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for City of Hollywood by serving Cathleen Anderson, Vice Mayor on 5/4/05 Answer due on 5/24/05 for City of Hollywood (ss, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/27/2005)

8 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for City of Hollywood by serving Daniel Abbott, Esq. on 5/4/05 Answer due on 5/24/05 for City of Hollywood (ss, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/27/2005)

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05/26/2005 05/26/2005 06/03/2005 06/13/2005
06/13/2005 06/15/2005 06/15/2005 06/16/2005
06/16/2005 06/16/2005 06/23/2005
08/05/2005 08/15/2005 09/26/2005 11/01/2005
11/03/2005

9 MOTION with memorandum in support by City of Hollywood to dismiss complaint (ss, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/27/2005)
10 NOTICE of Pendency of Other Action. by City of Hollywood (ss, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/27/2005)
11 RESPONSE by United States of to [9-1] motion to dismiss complaint (gz, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/03/2005)
12 ORDER transferring case to the calendar of Joan A. Lenard ( Signed by Judge William P. Dimitrouleas on 6/7/05) [EOD Date: 6/14/05] (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/14/2005)
CASE reassigned to Judge Joan A. Lenard (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/14/2005)
13 REPLY by City of Hollywood to response to [9-1] motion to dismiss complaint (ss, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/16/2005)
DOCKET pleadings in LEAD case only (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/17/2005)
14 ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION AND ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSING CASE No. 05-60687-CV-JALK consolidating case No. 0461212-CV-JAL and 05-60687-CV-JAL (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 06/16/05) [EOD Date: 6/17/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/17/2005)
DOCKET pleadings in LEAD case only (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/17/2005)
CASE CLOSED. Case and Motions no longer referred to Magistrate. (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/17/2005)
15 NOTICE of attorney appearance for City of Hollywood by Scott Darryl Krevans, Thomas Jeffrey McCausland (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/24/2005)
16 Joint Scheduling Report of Scheduling Meeting by United States (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/05/2005)
17 Report of Results of Rule 26(f) Conference by United States of, City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
18 NOTICE of attorney appearance for United States of by R. Tamar Hagler (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/27/2005)
19 MOTION by City of Hollywood (Attorney Chad Brandon Hess) for protective order regarding deposition of Commissioner Keith Wasserstrom (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/03/2005)
20 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL by City of Hollywood of [19-1] motion for protective order regarding deposition of Commissioner Keith Wasserstrom (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/04/2005)

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11/07/2005 11/21/2005 12/01/2005 12/20/2005 12/28/2005 12/28/2005 12/28/2005 01/04/2006 02/16/2006 02/24/2006 02/24/2006 02/24/2006
03/03/2006 03/03/2006
03/06/2006 03/07/2006

21 MOTION by City of Hollywood (Attorney ) for Hearing on [19-1] motion for protective order regarding deposition of Commissioner Keith Wasserstrom (bs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/2005)
22 RESPONSE by United States of to Amended Motion for Protective Order [Amended motion not found] (wc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/22/2005)
23 MEMORANDUM by City of Hollywood in reply to [22-1] motion response (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/05/2005)
24 Return of Service on 12/2/05 as to Christie Demnico with a true copy of a Subpoena in a Civil Case (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/21/2005)
25 RETURN OF SERVICE executed on 10/20/05 as to Heidi O'Sheehan Answer due on 5/24/05 (gz, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
26 RETURN OF SERVICE executed on 10/18/05 as to Jacqueline Gonzales (gz, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
27 RETURN OF SERVICE executed on 10/15/05 as to Eva Petrillo (gz, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
28 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Scott Roberts on 12/28/05 Answer due on 5/24/05 (gz, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/06/2006)
29 NOTICE of filing attached Exhibit "J" by United States Re: motion for sanctions and compel discovery (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/17/2006)
30 MEMORANDUM by City of Hollywood in opposition to United States' motion for sanctions and to compel discovery (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/27/2006)
31 MOTION by City of Hollywood for oral argument or Hearing (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
32 NOTICE of filing defendant, City of Hollywood's memorandum in response to the United States motion for sanctions and to compel discovery by City of Hollywood (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
33 JOINT MOTION by United States, City of Hollywood to extend deadline for filing Daubert motions (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
34 MOTION by City of Hollywood (Attorney ) for leave to file /to exceed page limits of any motion for summary judgment and any statement of facts (document(s) not attached/found on docket) (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
35 MOTION by City of Hollywood for permission to exceed page limits (ra, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 03/08/2006 (Entered: 03/07/2006)
36 ORDER granting [35-1] motion for permission to exceed page limits ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 03/07/06) [EOD Date: 3/8/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/08/2006)

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03/09/2006 03/15/2006 03/15/2006
03/16/2006 03/16/2006 03/16/2006 03/16/2006 03/17/2006 03/17/2006 04/03/2006
04/04/2006 05/10/2006
06/26/2006

37 DEMAND for jury trial by City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/10/2006)
38 MOTION by City of Hollywood to extend time and to exceed page limitations in responding to defendant's motion for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
39 ORDER granting [34-1] motion for leave to file /to exceed page limits of any motion for summary judgment and any statement of facts (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 03/14/06) [EOD Date: 3/16/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
40 MOTION with memorandum in support by City of Hollywood for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
41 Statement of Material Facts by City of Hollywood re: [40-1] motion for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
42 REQUEST by City of Hollywood for Oral Argument or Hearing on [401] motion for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
43 NOTICE of filing attached Documents by City of Hollywood re: in support of [40-1] motion for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
44 MOTION by United States for bifurcated trial (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
45 ORDER granting motion for extension of time and to exceed page limitations (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 03/16/06) [EOD Date: 3/20/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
46 ORDER granting [38-1] motion to extend time and to exceed page limitations in responding to defendant's motion for summary judgment ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 04/03/06) [EOD Date: 4/4/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/04/2006)
47 ORDER granting [33-1] joint motion to extend deadline for filing Daubert motions ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 04/04/06) [EOD Date: 4/6/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/06/2006)
48 MOTION by City of Hollywood (Attorney ) in limine to preclude any evidence related to fact witnesses opinions about whether or not the terms of the City's zoning regulations are vague and ambiguous (bs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/11/2006)
49 ORDER granting USA's motion to use computers in courtroom ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/26/06) [EOD Date: 6/27/06] (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/27/2006)

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 Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 1 of 27
U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida (Ft Lauderdale) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 0:04−cv−61212−JAL

CLOSED,EGT

Hollywood Synagogue v. City of Hollywood, et al Assigned to: Judge Joan A. Lenard Demand: $0 Case in other court: 06−14343−D Cause: 42:1981 Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 09/15/2004 Date Terminated: 07/07/2006 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc.

represented by Franklin Lewis Zemel Arnstein &Lehr 200 E Las Olas Boulevard Suite 1700 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 954−713−7610 Fax: 713−7710 Email: flzemel@arnstein.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Gordon Arnstein &Lehr 200 E Las Olas Boulevard Suite 1700 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 954−713−7611 Fax: 713−7711 Email: jtgordon@arnstein.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nannette Piccolo Law Office of Michael Krakar 1900 Summit Tower Blvd Suite 500 Orlando, FL 32810 407−659−0700 Fax: 407−659−0202 Email: nannette.piccolo@zurichna.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Matthew Oldershaw City of Hollywood 2600 Hollywood Boulevard Suite 407 PO Box 229045 Hollywood, FL 33022−9045 954−921−3435 Fax: 921−3081 Email: roldershaw@hollywoodfl.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Consol Plaintiff United States

represented by Marilynn Koonce Lindsey United States Attorney's Office 500 E Broward Boulevard

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 2 of 27
7th Floor Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301−3002 954−356−7314X3610 Fax: 356−7180 Email: MARILYNN.LINDSEY@USDOJ.GOV LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael S. Maurer United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 202−514−3812 Fax: 514−1116 Email: michael.maurer@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean R. Keveney United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 202−514−4838 Fax: 514−1116 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant City of Hollywood

represented by Chad Brandon Hess Conroy Simberg Ganon Krevans &Abel 3440 Hollywood Boulevard 2nd Floor Hollywood, FL 33021 954−961−1400 Fax: 967−8577 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Darryl Krevans Conroy Simberg Ganon Krevans Abel Lurvey Morrow &Schefer PA 3440 Hollywood Boulevard 2nd Floor Hollywood, FL 33021 954−961−1400 Fax: 954−518−8658 Email: skrevans@conroysimberg.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas Jeffrey McCausland Conroy Simberg Ganon Krevans &Abel PA 3440 Hollywood Boulevard Second Floor Hollywood, FL 33021 954 961−1400 Email: tmccausland@conroysimberg.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 3 of 27

Tracy Ann Lyons City of Hollywood 2600 Hollywood Boulevard Suite 407 PO Box 229045 Hollywood, FL 33022−9045 954−921−3435 Fax: 921−3081 Email: tlyons@hollywoodfl.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Sal Oliveri

represented by Alexis Marie Yarbrough Florida Department of Transportation Office of the General Counsel 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399−0458 850−414−5270 Fax: 850−414−5264 Email: alexis.yarbrough@dot.state.fl.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos E. Mustelier , Jr. Winget, Spadafora &Schwartzberg, LLP 14 NE 1st Avenue Suite 600 Miami, FL 33132 305−830−0600 Fax: 305−830−0601 Email: mustelier.c@wssllp.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Ashley Garcia Kotzen Garcia Paez, PA 15476 NW 77th Court Suite 600 Miami, FL 33016 u 305−826−3345 Fax: 866−332−8231 Email: jgarcia@kgplegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Todd Boyd Boyd Santini 100 SE 2nd Street 36th Floor Miami, FL 33131 786−425−1045 Fax: 786−425−3905 Email: tboyd@boydlawgroup.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor
St. Gregorios Orthodox Church of India, Inc. South Florida

represented by Jason Gordon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 4 of 27

Date Filed 09/15/2004 09/15/2004 09/15/2004 10/13/2004 10/13/2004 10/21/2004 10/21/2004 10/26/2004 11/03/2004 11/04/2004
11/12/2004 11/19/2004 11/19/2004 11/24/2004 11/24/2004 11/29/2004
12/01/2004
12/09/2004

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed; FILING FEE $150.00 RECEIPT # 907575 ; Magistrate Judge Andrea M. Simonton (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
2 SUMMONS(ES) issued for City of Hollywood (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
3 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Sal Oliveri (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
4 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for City of Hollywood on 10/1/04 Answer due on 10/21/04 for City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/14/2004)
5 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Sal Oliveri on 10/1/04 Answer due on 10/21/04 for Sal Oliveri (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/14/2004)
6 NOTICE of attorney appearance for Sal Oliveri by Alexis Marie Yarbrough (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/21/2004)
7 MOTION with memorandum in support by Sal Oliveri to dismiss this action (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/21/2004)
8 MOTION with memorandum in support by City of Hollywood (Attorney Robert Matthew Oldershaw) to dismiss complaint , and to strike punitive damages (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/27/2004)
9 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to serve responses to defendant, City of Hollywood's motion to dismiss and strike and defendnat Sal Oliveri's motion to dismiss (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/04/2004)
10 ORDER granting [9−1] motion to extend time to serve responses to defendant, City of Hollywood's motion to dismiss and strike and defendant Sal Oliveri's motion to dismiss Response to motion reset to 11/15/04 for [8−1] motion to dismiss complaint, reset to 11/15/04 for [8−2] motion to strike punitive damages, reset to 11/15/04 for [7−1] motion to dismiss this action ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 11/04/04) [EOD Date: 11/5/04] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/05/2004)
11 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to serve amended complaint (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/15/2004)
12 MOTION with memorandum in support by Sal Oliveri to compel compliance with FRCP 5 (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/19/2004)
12 RESPONSE by Sal Oliveri to [11−1] motion to extend time to serve amended complaint (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/19/2004)
13 NOTICE of filing Amended Complaint by Hollywood Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/29/2004)
14 AMENDED COMPLAINT by Hollywood Synagogue, (Answer due 12/6/04 for Sal Oliveri, for City of Hollywood) amending [1−1] complaint (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/29/2004)
15 ORDER REFERRING PRETRIAL DISCOVERY MOTIONS to Magistrate Judge Andrea M. Simonton, and directing parties to file Certificate of Interested Parties and Joint Scheduling Report and requiring completion of form consenting to jurisdiction by United States Magistrate Judge for final disposition (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 11/29/04) CCAP [EOD Date: 11/30/04] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
16 OMNIBUS ORDER granting [11−1] motion to extend time to serve amended complaint denying [8−1] motion to dismiss complaint, [8−2] motion to strike punitive damages, denying [7−1] motion to dismiss this action (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 12/01/04) [EOD Date: 12/6/04] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/06/2004)
17 MOTION with memorandum in support by Sal Oliveri to dismiss amended complaint or in the alternative to strike nimerous allegation in the amended complaint (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/09/2004)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 5 of 27

12/13/2004 12/13/2004 12/13/2004 12/13/2004 12/14/2004 12/14/2004 12/16/2004
12/17/2004 12/20/2004 12/21/2004 12/22/2004 12/22/2004 12/27/2004 12/27/2004 12/30/2004 12/30/2004
01/03/2005 01/06/2005

18 CONSENT to Jurisdiction by a Magistrate Judge for final disposition on Motions concerning discovery, motions for costs, motion for sanctions and all other Pretrial motions by Hollywood Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/14/2004)
19 MOTION with memorandum in support by City of Hollywood to dismiss amended complaint , and/or to strike its prayer for compensatory damages and pre−judgment interest (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/14/2004)
20 Certificate of Interested parties and corporate disclosure statement by Sal Oliveri (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/14/2004)
21 CONSENT to Jurisdiction by a Magistrate Judge for final disposition on Motions concerning discovery only by Sal Oliveri (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/14/2004)
22 Certificate of Interested persons and corporate disclosure statement by Hollywood Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/14/2004)
23 ORDER denying [12−1] motion to compel compliance with FRCP 5 (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 12/14/04) [EOD Date: 12/15/04] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/15/2004)
24 CONSENT to Jurisdiction by a Magistrate Judge for final disposition on Motions concerning discovery, motions for costs, motions for attorney's fees and all other Pretrial motions by Hollywood Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/16/2004)
25 ORDER OF REFERENCE to Magistrate, Referring Motions concerning discovery only (signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 12/17/04) [EOD Date: 12/20/04] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/20/2004)
26 Certificate of Interested parties and corporate disclosure statement by City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/21/2004)
27 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to file its responses to motion to dismiss amended complaint (ra, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 12/22/2004 (Entered: 12/21/2004)
28 OPPOSITION by Sal Oliveri to [27−1] motion to extend time to file its response to motion to dismiss amended complaint (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/22/2004)
29 MOTION with memorandum in support by Sal Oliveri for protective order staying discovery pending resolution of his qualified immunity denfense (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/22/2004)
30 JOINT REPORT pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) by Hollywood Synagogue, City of Hollywood, Sal Oliveri (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/28/2004)
30 Joint Scheduling Report pursuant to Local Rule 16.1B32M by Hollyood Synagogue, City of Hollywood, Sal Oliveri (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/28/2004)
31 REPLY by Hollywood Synagogue to response to [27−1] motion to extend time to file its responses to motion to dismiss amended complaint (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/30/2004)
32 ORDER granting [27−1] motion to extend time to file its responses to motion to dismiss amended complaint Response to motion reset to 4:00 1/6/05 for [19−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint, reset to 4:00 1/6/05 for [17−2] motion to strike nimerous allegation in the amended complaint (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 12/30/04) [EOD Date: 1/3/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/03/2005)
33 REVISED JOINT REPORT AND SCHEDULING REPORT by Hollywood Synagogue, City of Hollywood, Sal Oliveri (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/03/2005)
34 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [17−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint, [17−2] motion to strike nimerous allegation in the amended complaint (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/06/2005)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 6 of 27

01/06/2005 01/07/2005 01/10/2005
01/10/2005 01/13/2005 01/14/2005 01/14/2005 01/14/2005 01/14/2005 01/14/2005 01/18/2005 01/19/2005 01/25/2005 01/25/2005 01/26/2005 02/01/2005

35 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [19−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint, [19−2] motion to strike its prayer for compensatory damages and pre−judgment interest (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/06/2005)
36 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [29−1] motion for protective order staying discovery pending resolution of his qualified immunity denfense (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/10/2005)
37 ORDER ADOPTING JOINT SCHEDULING REPORT, SETTING PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND TRIAL, ESTABLISHING PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURES AND ESTABLISHING PRETRIAL DEADLINES Set Jury trial for 9:00 2/6/06 before Judge Joan A. Lenard , Reset calendar call for 2:30 2/1/06 before Judge Joan A. Lenard , Reset pretrial conference for 3:00 1/25/06 before Judge Joan A. Lenard , Setting all fact and expert discovery deadline for 9/15/05 , Set motion filing deadline for 10/3/05 , Set pretrial stipulation due for 12/28/05 (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 01/10/05) [EOD Date: 1/11/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
38 ORDER referring case to mediation. 15 days to appoint mediator (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 01/10/05) [EOD Date: 1/11/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
41 REPLY MEMORANDUM by Sal Oliveri in support of [17−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint, [17−2] motion to strike nimerous allegation in the amended complaint (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
39 STIPULATION by Sal Oliveri In Re: substitution of Todd Boyd instead of Alexis Yarbrough as counsel (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
40 MOTION by Sal Oliveri (Attorney ) to extend time to comply with Rule 26 disclosures (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
42 NOTICE of filing order granting substitution of counsel by Sal Oliveri (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
43 REPLY MEMORANDUM by Sal Oliveri in support of [29−1] motion for protective order staying discovery pending resolution of qualified immunity denfense (ra, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 01/18/2005 (Entered: 01/18/2005)
43 MOTION by Sal Oliveri to strike [36−1] motion response to [29−1] motion for protective order staying discovery pending resolution of his qualified immunity denfense (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
44 REPLY by City of Hollywood to response to [19−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint, [19−2] motion to strike its prayer for compensatory damages and pre−judgment interest (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/19/2005)
45 ORDER granting [40−1] motion to extend time to comply with Rule 26 disclosures ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 01/19/05) [EOD Date: 1/20/05] (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/20/2005)
46 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to comply with order of referral to mediation and directing plaintiff's counsel o submit within 15 days proposed order scheduling mediation (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/25/2005)
47 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [43−1] motion to strike [36−1] motion response to [29−1] motion for protective order staying discovery pending resolution of his qualified immunity denfense (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/25/2005)
48 ORDER granting [46−1] motion to extend time to comply with order of referral to mediation and directing plaintiff's counsel o submit within 15 days proposed order scheduling mediation ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 01/26/05) [EOD Date: 1/27/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/27/2005)
49 NOTICE of attorney appearance for City of Hollywood by Thomas Jeffrey McCausland (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/02/2005)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 7 of 27

02/01/2005 02/01/2005 02/04/2005 02/07/2005 02/10/2005 02/10/2005 02/10/2005 03/10/2005 03/15/2005 03/18/2005
03/24/2005 04/01/2005 04/01/2005 04/01/2005 04/04/2005 04/04/2005
04/11/2005 04/18/2005 04/26/2005

50 Rule 26 Initial Disclosures/Witness list by City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/02/2005)
51 Rule 26 Initial Disclosures/Witness list by City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/02/2005)
52 Notice of compliance: by Hollywood Synagogue with [48−1] order (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/04/2005)
53 ORDER SCHEDULING MEDIATION before Mediator: Gerald Wetherington for 11/19/05 at 10:00 ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 02/07/05) [EOD Date: 2/8/05] (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/08/2005)
54 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to Correct order scheduling mediation (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/10/2005)
55 ORDER granting [54−1] motion to Correct order scheduling mediation (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 02/10/05) [EOD Date: 2/11/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/11/2005)
55 ORDER SCHEDULING MEDIATION before Mediator: Gerald Wetherington for 11/09/05 at 10:00 ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 02/10/05) [EOD Date: 2/11/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/11/2005)
56 STIPULATION by Sal Oliveri In Re: Substitution of Counsel (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/11/2005)
57 ORDER allowing [56−1] substitution of counsel (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 03/15/05) [EOD Date: 3/16/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/16/2005)
58 OMNIBUS ORDER granting in part, denying in part [17−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint, denying [17−2] motion to strike nimerous allegation in the amended complaint denying [29−1] motion for protective order staying discovery pending resolution of his qualified immunity denfense, denying [43−1] motion to strike [36−1] motion response to [29−1] motion for protective order staying discovery pending resolution of his qualified immunity denfense (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 03/18/05) [EOD Date: 3/21/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
59 MOTION by Sal Oliveri for clarification of [57−1] order allowing [56−1] substitution of counsel (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/24/2005)
60 ORDER CERTIFICATION REGARDING REFERRED CASE/ORDER pursuant to Administrative Order 2005−9 (Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrea M. Simonton on 04/01/05) [EOD Date: 4/4/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/04/2005)
Magistrate identification: Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/04/2005)
62 ORDER granting [59−1] motion for clarification of [57−1] order allowing [56−1] substitution of counsel, AMENDING [57−1] order Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 04/01/05) [EOD Date: 4/5/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/05/2005)
61 NOTICE of Mediation Hearing on 11/09/05 at 10:00 Gerald Wetherington added as mediator (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/04/2005)
63 CERTIFICATION REGARDING REFERRED CASE/ORDER pursuant to Administrative Order 2005−9 and all orders of reference entered in the case remain full force and effect except that hereafter Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein shall be responsible for acting pursuant to such order (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 04/04/05) [EOD Date: 4/5/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/05/2005)
64 ANSWER by Sal Oliveri to amended complaint; jury demand (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/13/2005)
65 NOTICE of Unavailability by Sal Oliveri for dates of: 06/22/05 to 06/24/05 (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/19/2005)
66 NOTICE of Unavailability by Sal Oliveri for dates of: 07/11/05 to 07/15/05 (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/27/2005)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 8 of 27

04/26/2005 05/19/2005 05/24/2005 05/25/2005
05/28/2005 06/01/2005
06/03/2005 06/08/2005 06/13/2005 06/15/2005 06/16/2005 06/16/2005 06/16/2005 06/23/2005 06/29/2005 07/08/2005 07/12/2005
07/14/2005 07/14/2005

67 OPPOSED MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue for enlargement of time to join additional parties (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/27/2005)
68 MEMORANDUM by City of Hollywood in opposition to [67−1] motion for enlargement of time to join additional parties (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2005)
69 ORDER denying [67−1] motion for enlargement of time to join additional parties ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 05/24/05) [EOD Date: 5/25/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/25/2005)
70 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to serve plaintiff's response and objections to defendnat City of Hollywood's frst request for production of documents and first set of interrogatories (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/25/2005)
225 MOTION by City of Hollywood to dismiss complaint (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/11/2006)
71 ORDER granting [70−1] motion to extend time to serve plaintiff's response and objections to defendnat City of Hollywood's frst request for production of documents and first set of interrogatories ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Patrick A. White on 06/01/05) [EOD Date: 6/2/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/02/2005)
226 RESPONSE by United States to [225−1] motion to dismiss complaint (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/11/2006)
72 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue for reconsideration of [69−1] order denying [67−1] motion for enlargement of time to join additional parties (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/09/2005)
73 MEMORANDUM by City of Hollywood in opposition to [72−1] motion for reconsideration of [69−1] order denying [67−1] motion for enlargement of time to join additional parties (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/13/2005)
227 REPLY by City of Hollywood to response to [225−1] motion to dismiss complaint (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/11/2006)
74 NOTICE and Correction of Scrivener's Error by City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/16/2005)
75 ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION consolidating case No. 04−61212−CV−JAL and 05−60687−CV−JAL (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 06/16/05) [EOD Date: 6/17/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/17/2005)
Consolidated Lead Case (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/17/2005)
76 REPLY by Hollywood Synagogue to memorandum in opposition to [72−1] motion for reconsideration of [69−1] order denying [67−1] motion for enlargement of time to join additional parties (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/23/2005)
77 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) for a pre−trial conference on [75−2] order (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/29/2005)
78 NOTICE of Unavailability by Sal Oliveri for dates of: 10/24/05 to 10/31/05 (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/12/2005)
79 ORDER denying [77−1] motion for a pre−trial conference on [75−2] order and directing parties to file joint scheding report for consolidated action. ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 7/12/05) [EOD Date: 7/14/05] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/14/2005)
80 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) to extend time to serve Plaintiff's response and objections to Defendant Sal Oliveri's first set of interrogatories (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/15/2005)
81 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) for clarification of [79−1] order (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/15/2005)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 9 of 27

07/19/2005 07/20/2005 07/21/2005
08/05/2005 08/05/2005 08/15/2005 08/16/2005
08/16/2005
08/22/2005 08/29/2005 09/06/2005
09/06/2005 09/06/2005 09/13/2005 09/15/2005 09/21/2005

82 SUPPLEMENT by Hollywood Synagogue to: [72−1] motion for reconsideration of [69−1] order denying [67−1] motion for enlargement of time to join additional parties (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/20/2005)
83 ORDER denying [81−1] motion for clarification of [79−1] order (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 07/20/05) [EOD Date: 7/21/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/21/2005)
84 ORDER granting [80−1] motion to extend time to serve Plaintiff's response and objections to Defendant Sal Oliveri's first set of interrogatories ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 07/21/05) [EOD Date: 7/22/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/22/2005)
85 Joint Scheduling Report of Scheduling Meeting by United States (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/05/2005)
86 MOTION by City of Hollywood (Attorney ) to compel discovery from Plaintiff (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
87 Report of Results of Rule 26(f) Conference by United States, City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
88 AMENDED ORDER ADOPTING JOINT SCHEDULING REPORT, SETTING PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND TRIAL, ESTABLISHING PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURES AND ESTABLISHING PRETRIAL DEADLINES Reset Jury trial for 9:00 6/26/06 before Judge Joan A. Lenard , Reset calendar call for 2:30 6/21/06 before Judge Joan A. Lenard , Reset pretrial conference for 3:30 6/9/06 before Judge Joan A. Lenard , Resetting all fact discovery deadline for 1/15/06 , Resetting all expert discovery deadline for 1/15/06 , Resetting motion filing deadline for 2/1/06 , Reset pretrial stipulation due for 5/12/06 (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 08/16/05) [EOD Date: 8/17/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/17/2005)
89 ORDER granting [72−1] motion for reconsideration of [69−1] order denying [67−1] motion for enlargement of time to join additional parties ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 08/16/05) [EOD Date: 8/17/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/17/2005)
90 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [86−1] motion to compel discovery from Plaintiff (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/23/2005)
91 MEMORANDUM IN REPLY by City of Hollywood to response to [86−1] motion to compel discovery from Plaintiff (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/31/2005)
92 ORDER Motion hearing before Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein set for 10:00 9/15/05 for [86−1] motion to compel discovery from Plaintiff (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 9/6/05) [EOD Date: 9/7/05] (mh, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/07/2005)
93 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) to compel better answers to its first set of interrogatories from Defendant, City of Hollywood (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/07/2005)
94 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) to compel better answers to its first set of interrogatories from Defendant, City of Hollywood (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/07/2005)
95 NOTICE of Change of Address of Attorney by Sal Oliveri (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/14/2005)
96 Minutes of Motion Hearing held before Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 09/15/05; Tape #: 05I−52−1867 (bs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/16/2005)
97 MEMORANDUM by City of Hollywood in opposition to [94−1] motion to compel better answers to its first set of interrogatories from Defendant, City of Hollywood, [93−1] motion to compel better answers to its first set of interrogatories from Defendant, City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/22/2005)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 10 of 27

09/23/2005 09/26/2005 09/26/2005 09/28/2005
09/30/2005 10/04/2005 10/05/2005
10/07/2005 10/11/2005 10/12/2005 10/14/2005 10/14/2005
10/20/2005 11/03/2005 11/07/2005 11/08/2005 11/08/2005 11/10/2005

98 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [86−1] motion to compel discovery from Plaintiff ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 09/19/05) [EOD Date: 9/26/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/26/2005)
99 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to serve plaintiff's response and objections to defendant Sal Oliver's first set of interrogatories (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/27/2005)
100 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to serve plaintiff's response and objections to defendant Sal Oliver's first set of interrogatories (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/27/2005)
101 ORDER granting [100−1] motion to extend time to serve plaintiff's response and objections to defendant Sal Oliver's first set of interrogatories, granting [99−1] motion to extend time to serve plaintiff's response and objections to defendant Sal Oliver's first set of interrogatories ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 09/28/05) [EOD Date: 9/29/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/29/2005)
102 REPLY by Hollywood Synagogue to response to [93−1] motion to compel better answers to its first set of interrogatories from Defendant, City of Hollywood (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/03/2005)
103 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) to extend time to comply with Court Order dated September 19, 2005 (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/05/2005)
104 ORDER granting [93−1] motion to compel better answers to its first set of interrogatories from Defendant, City of Hollywood ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 10/05/05) [EOD Date: 10/6/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/06/2005)
105 SECOND UNOPPOSED MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to comply with Court order dated 09/19/05 (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/12/2005)
106 ORDER granting [103−1] motion to extend time to comply with Court Order dated September 19, 2005 ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 10/11/05) [EOD Date: 10/12/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/12/2005)
107 ORDER granting [105−1] motion to extend time to comply with Court order dated 09/19/05 ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 10/12/05) [EOD Date: 10/13/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/13/2005)
108 Notice of compliance: by Hollywood Synagogue with [107−1] order, [98−1] order (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/17/2005)
109 MEMORANDUM by Hollywood Synagogue in support of the issues to be briefed during the hearing re [98−1] 9/23/05 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [86−1] motion to compel production of documents/discovery from Plaintiff (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/17/2005)
110 ORDER denying [86−1] motion to compel discovery from Plaintiff ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 10/19/05) [EOD Date: 10/21/05] (bs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/21/2005)
119 AMENDED MOTION by City of Hollywood for protective order regarding deposition of Commissioner Keith Wasserstrom (mg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/01/2005)
118 Letter MOTION by City of Hollywood for Hearing on amended motion for protective order (not on docket) (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/30/2005)
111 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) to extend time for disclosure of Expert Witnesses (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/08/2005)
112 NOTICE of mediation conference for 11/09/05 at 10:00 by Melvin Rubin (bs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/10/2005)
113 ORDER granting [111−1] motion to extend time for disclosure of Expert Witnesses ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 11/10/05) [EOD Date: 11/14/05] (bs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/14/2005)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 11 of 27

11/15/2005 11/17/2005 11/25/2005 11/29/2005
11/30/2005 11/30/2005 11/30/2005 11/30/2005 12/01/2005 12/02/2005 12/05/2005 12/06/2005 12/06/2005 12/06/2005
12/06/2005 12/08/2005 12/09/2005 12/09/2005

114 SECOND UNOPPOSED MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to file Second Amended Complaint (wc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/15/2005)
115 ORDER granting [114−1] motion to extend time to file Second Amended Complaint ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 11/17/05) [EOD Date: 11/21/05] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/21/2005)
116 MOTION by City of Hollywood for leave to serve additional interrogatories (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/30/2005)
120 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE that the plaintiff and defendant shall have up to and including December 9, 2005 to file with the Court either a report from mediator or joint status report. (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 11/29/05) [EOD Date: 12/1/05] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/01/2005)
117 MEMORANDUM IN REPLY by City of Hollywood to response to defendant's amended motion for protective order (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/30/2005)
121 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by United States (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/02/2005)
122 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue for leave to file second amended complaint (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/02/2005)
125 AMENDED COMPLAINT by Hollywood Synagogue , (Answer due 12/12/05 for Sal Oliveri, for City of Hollywood ) amending [14−1] amended complaint (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/05/2005)
123 MEMORANDUM IN REPLY by City of Hollywood to response to [119−1] motion for protective order regarding deposition of Commissioner Keith Wasserstrom (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/02/2005)
124 ORDER granting [122−1] motion for leave to file second amended complaint ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 12/2/05) [EOD Date: 12/5/05] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/05/2005)
126 PARTIALLY OPPOSED MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) for leave to file a response to Defendant City of Hollywood's amended motion for protective order (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/06/2005)
127 JOINT MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue, City of Hollywood, Sal Oliveri, United States to extend discovery deadline , and to extend dispositive motion deadline (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/07/2005)
128 ORDER to submit proposed order re RE−SCHEDULING of MEDIATION Judge Joan A. Lenard on 12/06/05) [EOD Date: 12/7/05] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/07/2005)
129 ORDER mooting [19−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint, mooting [19−2] motion to strike its prayer for compensatory damages and pre−judgment interest ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 12/06/05) [EOD Date: 12/7/05] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/07/2005)
130 REPORT of Mediator that mediation is continuing (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/08/2005)
131 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [119−1] motion for protective order regarding deposition of Commissioner Keith Wasserstrom (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2005)
132 Notice of compliance: by Hollywood Synagogue, City of Hollywood, Sal Oliveri, United States with [120−1] Order to show cause (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2005)
133 ORDER granting [127−1] joint motion to extend discovery deadline, granting [127−2] joint motion to extend dispositive motion deadline ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 12/09/05) [EOD Date: 12/12/05] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2005)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 12 of 27

12/14/2005 12/15/2005
12/19/2005
12/19/2005 12/30/2005 01/03/2006 01/05/2006 01/06/2006
01/09/2006 01/19/2006 01/20/2006 01/26/2006 01/30/2006 01/30/2006 01/30/2006 01/31/2006 02/01/2006 02/03/2006

134 ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses by Sal Oliveri (Attorney Carlos E. Mustelier Jr., Joseph Ashley Garcia) to second amended complaint; jury demand (wc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/14/2005)
135 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL by City of Hollywood of [119−1] motion for protective order regarding deposition of Commissioner Keith Wasserstrom, [119−2] amended motion, [118−1] motion for Hearing on amended motion for protective order (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/19/2005)
136 ORDER mooting [126−1] motion for leave to file a response to Defendant City of Hollywood's amended motion for protective order ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 12/19/05) [EOD Date: 12/20/05] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
137 ORDER granting [116−1] motion for leave to serve additional interrogatories ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 12/19/05) [EOD Date: 12/20/05] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
138 Notice of compliance: by Hollywood Synagogue, City of Hollywood, Sal Oliveri with [128−1] hearing order (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/30/2005)
139 ORDER SCHEDULING MEDIATION before Mediator: Mel Rubin for 02/27/06 at 9:30 ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 01/03/06) [EOD Date: 1/5/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/05/2006)
140 MOTION with memorandum in support by City of Hollywood to dismiss second amended complaint , and/or to strike [125−1] amended complaint (ra, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 05/08/2006 (Entered: 01/06/2006)
141 MOTION with memorandum in support by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney Scott Darryl Krevans, Thomas Jeffrey McCausland, Chad Brandon Hess) to dismiss second amended complaint , and/or to strike [125−1] amended complaint (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
142 MEDIATOR'S NOTICE to parties by Melvin Rubin (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/11/2006)
143 NOTICE by Sal Oliveri to take deposition of Rabbi Joseph Krof 2/15/06 at 9:00 (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
144 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [140−1] motion to dismiss second amended complaint, [140−2] motion to strike [125−1] amended complaint (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
146 MOTION by City of Hollywood (Attorney ) to extend time to reply to response to motion to dismiss second amended complaint (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
145 MEMORANDUM IN REPLY by City of Hollywood to response to [141−1] motion to dismiss second amended complaint (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/30/2006)
147 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to serve response and objection to City of Hollywood's second set of interrogatories (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/01/2006)
148 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue for enlargement of time for disclosure of expert witnesses (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/01/2006)
149 ORDER granting [146−1] motion to extend time to reply to response to motion to dismiss second amended complaint ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 01/31/06) [EOD Date: 2/2/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/02/2006)
150 NOTICE of Charging Lien by Hollywood Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
151 NOTICE of attorney appearance for Hollywood Synagogue by Franklin L. Zemel (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/07/2006)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 13 of 27

02/03/2006 02/03/2006 02/13/2006 02/14/2006 02/14/2006 02/16/2006
02/17/2006 02/23/2006 02/24/2006 02/24/2006 02/27/2006 03/01/2006 03/01/2006
03/01/2006
03/01/2006 03/01/2006 03/02/2006 03/02/2006 03/03/2006

152 ORDER granting [148−1] motion for enlargement of time for disclosure of expert witnesses ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 02/03/06) [EOD Date: 2/7/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/07/2006)
161 MOTION by Sal Oliveri to compel discovery from plaintiff (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/01/2006)
153 MOTION with memorandum in support by United States for sanctions , and to compel discovery (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
154 MOTION with memorandum in support by Hollywood Synagogue for enlargement of the discovery deadline (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
155 NOTICE of Change Pre−Trial Conference Date: Reset pretrial conference for 3:30 6/16/06 before Judge Joan A. Lenard (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
156 ORDER OF REFERENCE Referring Motion(s) [153−1] motion for sanctions referred to Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein, [153−2] motion to compel discovery referred to Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein ( signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 02/16/06) [EOD Date: 2/17/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/17/2006)
157 PARTIALLY OPPOSED MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to serve response to defendant, Sal Oliveri's motion to compel discovery from plaintiff, Hollywood Synagogue, Inc (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/22/2006)
158 PARTIALLY OPPOSED MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to file response to defendant Sal Oliveri's motion to compel discocery from plaintiff Hollywood Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/24/2006)
159 RESPONSE by City of Hollywood to [154−1] motion for enlargement of the discovery deadline (bs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/27/2006)
218 MOTION by City of Hollywood for Oral Argument or Hearing (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/07/2006)
160 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue for entry of an order approving joint stipulation for substitution of counsel (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
162 MOTION by Sal Oliveri for an enlargement of time until 04/08/06 in order to disclose his expert report and an extension until 04/30/06 by which dispositive motion must be filed (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/01/2006)
163 ORDER granting [158−1] motion to extend time to file response to defendant Sal Oliveri's motion to compel discocery from plaintiff Hollywood Synagogue ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 03/01/06) [EOD Date: 3/2/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/02/2006)
164 ORDER granting [157−1] motion to extend time to serve response to defendant, Sal Oliveri's motion to compel discovery from plaintiff, Hollywood Synagogue, Inc ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 03/01/06) [EOD Date: 3/2/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/02/2006)
165 ORDER granting [147−1] motion to extend time to serve response and objection to City of Hollywood's second set of interrogatories ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 03/01/06) [EOD Date: 3/2/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/02/2006)
166 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [161−1] motion to compel discovery from plaintiff (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
168 ORDER granting [154−1] motion for enlargement of the discovery deadline ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 03/02/06) [EOD Date: 3/6/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
169 ORDER Approving [160−1] motion for entry of an order approving joint stipulation for substitution of counsel (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 03/02/06) [EOD Date: 3/6/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
167 AMENDED MOTION by Sal Oliveri to extend time to disclose expert report and file dispositive motions referring to [162−1] motion for an enlargement of time until 04/08/06 in order to disclose his expert report and an extension until 04/30/06

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 14 of 27

03/06/2006 03/06/2006
03/08/2006
03/09/2006 03/09/2006 03/10/2006
03/10/2006 03/10/2006 03/10/2006 03/10/2006 03/10/2006 03/10/2006 03/10/2006
03/14/2006
03/14/2006
03/15/2006
03/15/2006 03/16/2006 03/16/2006 03/16/2006

by which dispositive motion must be filed (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
170 REPLY by United States to response to [153−1] motion for sanctions, [153−2] motion to compel discovery (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/07/2006)
171 NOTICE of adoption of [167−1] motion to extend time to disclose expert report and file dispositive motions by City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/07/2006)
172 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue for clarification of [168−1] ORDER granting [154−1] motion for enlargement of the discovery deadline (gz, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
173 DEMAND for jury trial by City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/10/2006)
174 CORRECTED RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [161−1] motion to compel discovery from plaintiff (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/10/2006)
175 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) to extend time of deadline to file motions to exclude or limit proposed expert testimony (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/10/2006)
176 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) to extend time deadline for dispositive motions (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/10/2006)
177 MOTION with memorandum in support by City of Hollywood for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/13/2006)
178 Statement of Material Facts by City of Hollywood re: [177−1] motion for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/13/2006)
179 NOTICE of filing attached exhibits by City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/13/2006)
180 REQUEST by City of Hollywood for Oral Argument on [177−1] motion for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/13/2006)
181 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/13/2006)
182 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue for sanctions including entry of default judgment and attorneys' fees against defendant , and for sanctions against Mayor Mara Giulianti, for breach of mediation confidentiality (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/20/2006)
183 ORDER granting [176−1] motion to extend time deadline for dispositive motions (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 03/14/06) [EOD Date: 3/15/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/15/2006)
184 ORDER/TWENTY−ONE DAY NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 03/14/06) [EOD Date: 3/15/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/15/2006)
185 ORDER SETTING HEARING Motion hearing before Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein set for 10:00 3/22/06 for [161−1] motion to compel discovery from plaintiff, set for 10:00 3/22/06 for [153−2] motion to compel discovery, set for 10:00 3/22/06 for [153−1] motion for sanctions ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 03/15/06) [EOD Date: 3/16/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
186 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
187 REPLY by Sal Oliveri to response to [161−1] motion to compel discovery from plaintiff (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
219 MOTION with memorandum in support by City of Hollywood for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/07/2006)
220 REQUEST by City of Hollywood for Oral Argument or Hearing on [219−1] motion for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/07/2006)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 15 of 27

03/17/2006 03/17/2006 03/20/2006 03/21/2006
03/21/2006 03/21/2006 03/21/2006 03/22/2006 03/22/2006
03/22/2006 03/22/2006
03/24/2006 03/24/2006 03/24/2006
03/24/2006 03/24/2006 03/27/2006 03/28/2006 03/28/2006 03/29/2006

221 MOTION by United States for Bifurcated Trial (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/07/2006)
222 MEMORANDUM by United States in support of [221−1] motion for Bifurcated Trial (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/07/2006)
188 RESPONSE by Sal Oliveri to [172−1] motion for clarification of [168−1] ORDER granting [154−1] motion for enlargement of the discovery deadline (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
189 SECOND AMENDED MOTION by Sal Oliveri, City of Hollywood to extend time to disclose his expert witness and provide his expert report and extend time to file dispositive motions referring to [167−1] motion to extend time to disclose expert report and file dispositive motions (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/21/2006)
Text not available. (Entered: 03/22/2006)
190 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue for partial summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
191 Statement of Material Facts by Hollywood Synagogue re: [190−1] motion for partial summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
192 Notice of filing attached complete deposition transcripts/ EXHIBITS to: [177−1] motion for summary judgment by City of Hollywood (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/23/2006)
193 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [153−1] motion for sanctions, granting in part, denying in part [153−2] motion to compel discovery, granting in part, denying in part [161−1] motion to compel discovery from plaintiff ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 3/22/06) [EOD Date: 3/24/06] (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
Motion hearing re: [153−1] motion for sanctions, [153−2] motion to compel discovery (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
194 Minutes of motion hearing re: [153−1] motion for sanctions, [153−2] motion to compel discovery held before Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 3/22/06; Court Reporter Name or Tape #: 06I−13−1−1245 (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
195 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/28/2006)
196 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/28/2006)
197 NOTICE of adoption of second amended [189−1] motion to extend time to disclose his expert witness and provide his expert report and extend time to file dispositive motions, [189−2] motion by City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/28/2006)
198 NOTICE of adoption of [188−1] response by City of Hollywood to motion for clarification (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/28/2006)
199 MOTION by City of Hollywood for Oral Argument or Hearing on plaintiff's motion for sanctions (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/28/2006)
200 ORDER/TWENTY−ONE DAY NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 03/27/06) [EOD Date: 3/29/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/29/2006)
201 FINAL report of Mediator. Disposition: No Agreement was reached (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/29/2006)
202 MEMORANDUM by City of Hollywood in opposition to Motion for Bifurcated trial (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/29/2006)
203 OPPOSED MOTION by City of Hollywood to extend time to respond to motion for partial summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/30/2006)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 16 of 27

03/30/2006
03/30/2006 03/31/2006 04/03/2006 04/03/2006 04/03/2006
04/03/2006
04/04/2006
04/04/2006
04/04/2006
04/04/2006 04/04/2006
04/04/2006
04/05/2006 04/05/2006 04/06/2006 04/11/2006

204 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK AND PARTIES TO FILE MOTIONS UNDER CONSOLIDATED CASE NUMBER (**04−61212−CV−JAL**), no further filing shall be docketed in case No. 05−60687−CV−JAL (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 03/30/06) [EOD Date: 3/31/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
205 REPLY by Hollywood Synagogue to response to plaintiff's motion for clarification of order granting plaitiff's motion for enlargement of time of the discovery deadline (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
206 NOTICE of adoption of [202−1] memorandum in opposition to motion for bifurcated trial by Sal Oliveri (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/03/2006)
207 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/04/2006)
208 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/04/2006)
209 ORDER granting [203−1] motion to extend time to respond to motion for partial summary judgment Response to motion reset to 4/21/06 for [190−1] motion for partial summary judgment ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 04/03/06) [EOD Date: 4/4/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/04/2006)
210 ORDER/NOTICE to all parties regarding status of motions for enlargement of time and for clarification of order granting enlargement of discovery deadline (Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 04/03/06) [EOD Date: 4/4/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/04/2006)
211 ORDER granting [171−1] notice of joining in co−defedant Oliveri's motion for enlargment of time, or in the alternative, city's motion for enlargement of time ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 04/04/06) [EOD Date: 4/5/06] (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
212 ORDER denying as moot [162−1] motion for an enlargement of time until 04/08/06 in order to disclose his expert report and an extension until 04/30/06 by which dispositive motion must be filed ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 04/04/06) [EOD Date: 4/5/06] (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
213 ORDER granting [189−1] motion to extend time to disclose his expert witness and provide his expert report and extend time to file dispositive motions ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 04/04/06) [EOD Date: 4/5/06] (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
214 ORDER denying as moot [167−1] motion to extend time to disclose expert report and file dispositive motions ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 04/04/06) [EOD Date: 4/5/06] (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
215 ORDER granting [175−1] motion to extend time of deadline to file motions to exclude or limit proposed expert testimony Set motion filing deadline for 4/24/06 ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 04/04/06) [EOD Date: 4/5/06] (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
216 ORDER denying [172−1] motion for clarification of [168−1] ORDER granting [154−1] motion for enlargement of the discovery deadline ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 04/04/06) [EOD Date: 4/5/06] (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
217 NOTICE of filing deposition of Daniel Abbott in support of motion for partial summary judgment by Hollywood Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/06/2006)
223 REPLY by United States to opposition to [221−1] motion for Bifurcated Trial (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/07/2006)
224 REPLY by United States to opposition to [221−1] motion for Bifurcated Trial (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/07/2006)
228 MEMORANDUM by United States in support of response to defendant's motion for summary judgment (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/12/2006)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 17 of 27

04/11/2006 04/12/2006 04/12/2006 04/12/2006 04/13/2006 04/13/2006 04/14/2006
04/14/2006 04/17/2006 04/18/2006 04/18/2006 04/18/2006
04/18/2006
04/20/2006 04/20/2006 04/20/2006 04/21/2006

229 Statement of material facts in support of response to defendant's motion for summary judgment by United States (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/12/2006)
230 NOTICE of filing atached documents in support of the United States response to motion for summary judgment by United States (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
231 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by United States in support of the United States' response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
232 Statement of Material Facts by United States in support of the United States' response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
233 MOTION by United States for protective order (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
234 EMERGENCY MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue for protective order as to the defendants' engaging in additional fact discovery after the discovery cut−off (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/14/2006)
235 ORDER denying [234−1] motion for protective order as to the defendants' engaging in additional fact discovery after the discovery cut−off ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 04/14/06) [EOD Date: 4/17/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/17/2006)
236 PARTIALLY OPPOSED MOTION by City of Hollywood to extend time to file reply memorandum and end enlargement of page limitation (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/17/2006)
237 NOTICE OF FILING AFFIDAVIT of Joel Cantor by City of Hollywood in compliance with Magistrate's 03/22/06 order (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/18/2006)
238 ORDER denying [233−1] motion for protective order ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 04/18/06) [EOD Date: 4/19/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/19/2006)
239 ORDER granting [236−1] motion to extend time to file reply memorandum and end enlargement of page limitation ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 04/18/06) [EOD Date: 4/19/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/19/2006)
240 ORDER denying [234−1] motion for protective order as to the defendants' engaging in additional fact discovery after the discovery cut−off ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 04/17/06) [EOD Date: 4/19/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/19/2006)
241 ORDER denying [182−1] motion for sanctions including entry of default judgment and attorneys' fees against defendant, denying [182−2] motion for sanctions against Mayor Mara Giulianti, for breach of mediation confidentiality denying [199−1] motion for Oral Argument or Hearing on plaintiff's motion for sanctions ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 04/17/6) [EOD Date: 4/20/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/20/2006)
242 Statement of Material Facts by City of Hollywood in opposition to motion for partial summary judgment of plaintiff and in opposition to plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/21/2006)
243 MEMORANDUM by City of Hollywood in opposition to [190−1] motion for partial summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/21/2006)
244 NOTICE of Filing documents in support of its memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment by City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/21/2006)
245 NOTICE of withdrawal of Expert and Expert Report by Sal Oliveri, City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/25/2006)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 18 of 27

04/24/2006 04/24/2006 04/24/2006 04/24/2006 04/24/2006 04/26/2006
04/26/2006
04/26/2006 04/27/2006 04/27/2006 04/28/2006 05/01/2006 05/01/2006 05/01/2006 05/02/2006 05/03/2006 05/04/2006 05/05/2006 05/05/2006

246 MOTION by All Defendants in limine to exclude plaintiff's expert report for partial summary judgment as to damages (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
247 MOTION with memorandum in support by City of Hollywood for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
248 Statement of Material Facts by City of Hollywood re: [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
249 Statement of facts by Sal Oliveri re: motion for summary judgment (document(s) not attached/found on docket) (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/26/2006)
250 MOTION by Sal Oliveri (Attorney ) for summary judgment (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/26/2006)
251 NOTICE of filing Exhibits to defendants Sal Oliveri and City of Hollywood's motion to exclude Hollywood Community Synagogue's expert report and for partial summary judgment by Sal Oliveri, City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/27/2006)
252 NOTICE of filing supplemetal documents in support of defendants Sal Oliveri and City of Hollywood's motion to exclude Hollywood Community Synagogue's expert report and for partial summary judgment and Sal Oliveri's motion for summary judgment by Sal Oliveri, City of Hollywood (1 box of Attachments) (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/27/2006)
253 NOTICE of filing supplemetal documents in support of defendant Sal Oliveri's motion for summary judgment by Sal Oliveri (1 Box of attachments) (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/27/2006)
254 AGREED MOTION by Sal Oliveri to extend time to submit motions in limine (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
255 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to strike [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
256 NOTICE of Consent and Authorization to file Joint Motion by City of Hollywood (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/01/2006)
257 ORDER granting [254−1] motion to extend time to submit motions in limine ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 05/01/06) [EOD Date: 5/2/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/02/2006)
258 REPLY by City of Hollywood to memorandum in opposition to [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/02/2006)
259 REPLY by City of Hollywood to USA's [229−1] Statement of Material Facts in support of USA's response to City's motion for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/02/2006)
260 REPLY by Hollywood Synagogue to memorandum in opposition to [190−1] motion for partial summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/03/2006)
262 ORDER Directing Defendants to file expedited response (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 05/03/06) [EOD Date: 5/4/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/04/2006)
261 RESPONSE by City of Hollywood to [255−1] motion to strike [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/04/2006)
263 REPLY by Hollywood Synagogue to response to [255−1] motion to strike [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
264 RESPONSE by Sal Oliveri to [255−1] motion to strike [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (sk, Deputy Clerk)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 19 of 27

05/05/2006 05/05/2006 05/08/2006 05/08/2006 05/09/2006 05/09/2006 05/10/2006
05/10/2006
05/11/2006
05/11/2006
05/11/2006 05/11/2006
05/12/2006 05/12/2006 05/12/2006 05/12/2006 05/12/2006

(Entered: 05/05/2006)
266 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to file responses to motions for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/09/2006)
267 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to extend time to file response to defendant's motion to exclude Hollywood Community Synagogue's expert report and partial summary judgment as to damages (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/09/2006)
265 ORDER denying [255−1] motion to strike [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 05/08/06) [EOD Date: 5/8/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/08/2006)
268 NOTICE of CHANGING/RESETTING Hearing: Reset pretrial conference for 2:00 6/16/06 before Judge Joan A. Lenard (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/09/2006)
269 ORDER granting [266−1] motion to extend time to file responses to motions for summary judgment (Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 05/09/06) [EOD Date: 5/10/06] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/10/2006)
270 RESPONSE by City of Hollywood to [255−1] motion to strike [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/10/2006)
271 MOTION by City of Hollywood (Attorney ) in limine to preclude any evidence related to fact witnesses opinions about whether or not the terms of the City's zoning regulation are vague and ambiguous (bs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/11/2006)
272 OMNIBUS ORDER denying [140−1] motion to dismiss second amended complaint, granting in part, denying in part [140−2] motion to strike [125−1] amended complaint, granting in part, denying in part [225−1] motion to dismiss complaint ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 5/10/06) [EOD Date: 5/11/06] (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/11/2006)
273 OBJECTION/RESPONSE by Sal Oliveri to [267−1] motion to extend time to file response to defendant's motion to exclude Hollywood Community Synagogue's expert report and partial summary judgment as to damages (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/11/2006)
274 OBJECTION by Sal Oliveri to [267−1] motion to extend time to file response to defendant's motion to exclude Hollywood Community Synagogue's expert report and partial summary judgment as to damages (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
275 JOINT PRETRIAL STIPULATION by Sal Oliveri, City of Hollywood, Hollywood Synagogue (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
280 REPLY by Hollywood Synagogue to objection to [267−1] motion to extend time to file response to defendant's motion to exclude Hollywood Community Synagogue's expert report and partial summary judgment as to damages (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
276 MOTION with memorandum in support by Gerald Wetherington to bifurcate trial (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
277 MOTION with memorandum in support by Sal Oliveri in limine to exclude Hearsay testimony from unknown or unidentified declarants (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
278 MOTION with memorandum in support by Sal Oliveri in limine to exclude testimony from plaintiff's Rule 30(B)(6) representativefrom which the entity has no personal knowledge (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
279 MOTION with memorandum in support by Sal Oliveri in limine to exclude photographs taken by plaintiff (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
281 MOTION with memorandum in support by Sal Oliveri in limine to exclude evidence or testimony of lost membership revenues, lost real estate opportunities

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 20 of 27

05/12/2006 05/13/2006 05/15/2006
05/22/2006 05/22/2006 05/22/2006 05/23/2006 05/23/2006 05/23/2006 05/23/2006 05/23/2006 05/23/2006 05/23/2006 05/23/2006 05/23/2006 05/23/2006 05/23/2006 05/24/2006 05/24/2006

and lost building costs (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
283 NOTICE of Hearing: Motion hearing before Judge Joan A. Lenard set for 11:00 5/23/06 for [190−1] motion for partial summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
282 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue in limine to exclude any evidence related to Yosef Elul's arrest, conviction, jail sentence and deportation (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
284 ORDER granting [267−1] motion to extend time to file response to defendant's motion to exclude Hollywood Community Synagogue's expert report and partial summary judgment as to damages ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 05/15/06) [EOD Date: 5/16/06] (bs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/16/2006)
285 RESPONSE by Sal Oliveri to [266−1] motion to extend time to file responses to motions for summary judgment (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/23/2006)
286 EMERGENCY MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney Jason Gordon) to extend time for a 24 hour extension of time to file responses to motions for summary judgment (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/23/2006)
287 ORDER granting [286−1] motion to extend time for a 24 hour extension of time to file responses to motions for summary judgment ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 5/22/06) [EOD Date: 5/23/06] (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/23/2006)
288 NOTICE of adoption of [277−1] motion in limine to exclude Hearsay testimony from unknown or unidentified declarants by City of Hollywood (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
289 NOTICE of adoption of [278−1] motion in limine to exclude testimony from plaintiff's Rule 30(B)(6) representative for which the entity has no personal knowledge by City of Hollywood (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
290 NOTICE of adoption of [279−1] motion in limine to exclude photographs taken by plaintiff by City of Hollywood (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
291 NOTICE of adoption of [281−1] motion in limine to exclude evidence or testimony of lost membership revenues, lost real estate opportunities and lost building costs by City of Hollywood (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
292 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
293 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to statement of material facts (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
294 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [250−1] motion for summary judgment (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
295 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to statment of material facts in support of motion for summary judgment (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
296 Statement of material facts in support by Hollywood Synagogue re: [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
297 Statement of materical facts in support by Hollywood Synagogue re: [250−1] motion for summary judgment (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
Motion hearing re: [190−1] motion for partial summary judgment Motion hearing held (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
298 Minutes of Motion Hearing held before Judge Joan A. Lenard on 5/23/06; Court Reporter Name or Tape #: Lisa Edwards (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
300 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) for reconsideration of of the portion of the omnibus granting in part and enying in part defendant City of Hollywood's motion to dismiss second amended complaint, dismissing with

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 21 of 27

05/25/2006 05/25/2006
05/26/2006
05/30/2006 05/30/2006
05/30/2006
05/30/2006
05/30/2006 05/30/2006 05/30/2006
05/30/2006 05/30/2006 05/30/2006 05/30/2006
05/30/2006 05/31/2006 05/31/2006 06/01/2006 06/01/2006 06/01/2006

prejudice counts IV, V, X and XI (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
301 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by City of Hollywood re: motion for partial summary judgment (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
302 MEMORANDUM by Hollywood Synagogue in opposition to motion to exclude expert report and for parital summary judgment (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
299 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by City of Hollywood re: Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (bb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
303 Answer and affirmative defenses by City of Hollywood (Attorney ),; jury demand (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
304 REPLY by City of Hollywood to response to [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
305 NOTICE of filing documents in support of its reply to Chabad's statement of material facts in support of Chabad's response to City's motion for summary judgemtn by City of Hollywood (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
306 REPLY by City of Hollywood to response to [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
307 ANSWER by City of Hollywood (Attorney ) to second amended complaint (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
308 Answer and affirmative defenses by City of Hollywood (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
309 REPLY by Sal Oliveri to response to [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
310 REPLY by Sal Oliveri to response to [250−1] motion for summary judgment (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
311 RESPONSE by Sal Oliveri in opposition to [297−1] Statement of, [296−1] Statement of (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
312 MOTION by City of Hollywood (Attorney ) to strike supplement to expert report of Richard K. Hollowell (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
313 RESPONSE by Sal Oliveri to [282−1] motion in limine to exclude any evidence related to Yosef Elul's arrest, conviction, jail sentence and deportation (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/01/2006)
314 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) to extend time to serve responses (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/01/2006)
315 NOTICE of of adopting motion to strike by Sal Oliveri (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/01/2006)
316 MOTION by City of Hollywood (Attorney ) to strike supplement to expert report of Richard K. Hollowell (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/01/2006)
317 MOTION by City of Hollywood (Attorney ) to be excused from portion of trial calendar (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/01/2006)
318 NOTICE of filing transcripts in support of docket entries #297, 296, 295, 294 and 292 by Hollywood Synagogue (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/02/2006)
319 MEMORANDUM by Hollywood Synagogue in opposition to notice of supplemental authority regarding plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment or in the alternative motion to strike (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/02/2006)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 22 of 27

06/02/2006 06/02/2006 06/02/2006 06/02/2006 06/02/2006
06/05/2006
06/05/2006 06/05/2006 06/05/2006 06/05/2006 06/05/2006 06/05/2006 06/05/2006 06/05/2006 06/06/2006
06/06/2006 06/06/2006 06/07/2006 06/09/2006

320 MOTION by City of Hollywood (Attorney ) to be excused from portion of trial calendar (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
321 ORDER granting [314−1] motion to extend time to serve responses ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/2/06) [EOD Date: 6/5/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
322 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [316−1] motion to strike supplement to expert report of Richard K. Hollowell (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
323 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) to strike portionsof commissioner Sal Oliveri reply (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
389 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Sal Oliveri to extend time to reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in opposition to Defendants' motion to exclude Plaintiff's expert report and for partial summary judgment as to damages (wc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/09/2006)
324 RESPONSE by City of Hollywood to [300−1] motion for reconsideration of of the portion of the omnibus granting in part and enying in part defendant City of Hollywood's motion to dismiss second amended complaint, dismissing with prejudice counts IV, V, X and XI (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
325 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [281−1] motion in limine to exclude evidence or testimony of lost membership revenues, lost real estate opportunities and lost building costs (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
326 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [279−1] motion in limine to exclude photographs taken by plaintiff (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
327 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [276−1] motion to bifurcate trial (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
328 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [278−1] motion in limine to exclude testimony from plaintiff's Rule 30(B)(6) representativefrom which the entity has no personal knowledge (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
329 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [281−1] motion in limine to exclude evidence or testimony of lost membership revenues, lost real estate opportunities and lost building costs (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
330 ORDER denying [320−1] motion to be excused from portion of trial calendar ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/5/06) [EOD Date: 6/6/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
333 REPLY by Sal Oliveri, City of Hollywood to response to motion to exclude report and for partial summary judgment (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
335 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [320−1] motion to be excused from portion of trial calendar, [317−1] motion to be excused from portion of trial calendar (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/08/2006)
331 RESPONSE by City of Hollywood to [300−1] motion for reconsideration of of the portion of the omnibus granting in part and enying in part defendant City of Hollywood's motion to dismiss second amended complaint, dismissing with prejudice counts IV, V, X and XI (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
332 ORDER denying [323−1] motion to strike portions of Commissioner Sal Oliveri reply ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/6/06) [EOD Date: 6/7/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
334 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) for leave to file a sur−reply (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
336 RESPONSE by Sal Oliveri to [323−1] motion to strike portionsof commissioner Sal Oliveri reply (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/08/2006)
337 RESPONSE by Sal Oliveri to [334−1] motion for leave to file a sur−reply (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/09/2006)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 23 of 27

06/09/2006 06/09/2006 06/09/2006 06/12/2006 06/12/2006 06/12/2006 06/12/2006 06/12/2006 06/12/2006 06/14/2006 06/14/2006
06/14/2006 06/15/2006
06/15/2006 06/15/2006 06/15/2006 06/16/2006

338 REPLY by Sal Oliveri to response to [316−1] motion to strike supplement to expert report of Richard K. Hollowell (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
339 MOTION by City of Hollywood for protective order regarding scheduling of contination deposition of Mayor Mara Giulianti (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
340 REPLY by Hollywood Synagogue to response to Motion in Limine (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
341 REPLY by Sal Oliveri to response to [276−1] motion to bifurcate trial (kw, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
342 REPLY by Sal Oliveri to response to [281−1] motion in limine to exclude evidence or testimony of lost membership revenues, lost real estate opportunities and lost building costs (kw, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
343 REPLY by Sal Oliveri to response to [279−1] motion in limine to exclude photographs taken by plaintiff (kw, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
344 REPLY by Sal Oliveri to response to [281−1] motion in limine to exclude evidence or testimony of lost membership revenues, lost real estate opportunities and lost building costs (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
345 MOTION by City of Hollywood (Attorney ) for protective order requiring scheduling continuation deposition of Mayor Mara Guilianti (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/13/2006)
390 REPLY by Sal Oliveri to response to [278−1] motion in limine to exclude testimony from plaintiff's Rule 30(B)(6) representativefrom which the entity has no personal knowledge (wc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/09/2006)
346 ORDER granting [334−1] motion for leave to file a sur−reply ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/14/06) [EOD Date: 6/15/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
347 REPLY by Hollywood Synagogue to response to [300−1] motion for reconsideration of of the portion of the omnibus granting in part and enying in part defendant City of Hollywood's motion to dismiss second amended complaint, dismissing with prejudice counts IV, V, X and XI (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
391 Notice of Filing AFFIDAVITS by Sal Oliveri in support [310−1] reply to response to motion for summary judgment (attachments) (wc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/09/2006)
348 ORDER denying [345−1] motion for protective order requiring scheduling continuation deposition of Mayor Mara Guilianti ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Theodore Klein on 6/15/06) [EOD Date: 6/16/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/16/2006)
349 ORDER denying [180−1] motion for Oral Argument on [177−1] motion for summary judgment ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/15/06) [EOD Date: 6/16/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/16/2006)
350 ORDER denying [218−1] motion for Oral Argument or Hearing ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/15/06) [EOD Date: 6/16/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/16/2006)
351 ORDER denying [220−1] motion for Oral Argument or Hearing on [219−1] motion for summary judgment ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/15/06) [EOD Date: 6/16/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/16/2006)
352 Sur−REPLEY by Hollywood Synagogguei,to defenant Sal Oliveris' reply to plaintiff's response to Sal Oliveris by to [250−1] motion for summary judgment (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/19/2006)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 24 of 27

06/16/2006
06/16/2006 06/19/2006 06/19/2006 06/19/2006 06/19/2006 06/21/2006 06/21/2006
06/21/2006 06/21/2006
06/22/2006 06/22/2006
06/22/2006 06/22/2006 06/22/2006 06/22/2006 06/22/2006 06/23/2006 06/23/2006 06/26/2006
06/26/2006 06/26/2006 06/27/2006

353 RESPONSE by Hollywood Synagogue to [282−1] motion in limine to exclude any evidence related to Yosef Elul's arrest, conviction, jail sentence and deportation (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/19/2006)
Pre−trial conference held before Judge Joan A. Lenard (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/20/2006)
354 Minutes of pretrail conference held before Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/16/06; Court Reporter Name or Tape #: Lisa Edwards (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/20/2006)
355 Proposed Voir dire questions by United States (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/21/2006)
356 Certification of service by United States (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/21/2006)
357 MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue to bring electronic equipment into the courtroom (kw, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/21/2006)
358 NOTICE of filing documents requested by the Court on June 20, 2006 by City of Hollywood (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
359 ORDER granting [357−1] motion to bring electronic equipment into the courtroom ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/21/06) [EOD Date: 6/22/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
360 Minutes of calendar call held before Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/21/06; Court Reporter Name or Tape #: Lisa Edward (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
361 ORDER denying as moot [246−1] motion in limine to exclude plaintiff's expert report for partial summary judgment as to damages ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/21/06) [EOD Date: 6/22/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
362 Proposed Voir dire questions by Hollywood Synagogue (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
363 ORDER granting [357−1] motion to bring electronic equipment into the courtroom ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/22/06) [EOD Date: 6/23/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
364 NOTICE of filing defendant City of Hollywood's proposed Voir Dire Questions by City of Hollywood (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
365 NOTICE of filing defendant commissioner Sal Oliveri's proposed voir dire questions by Sal Oliveri (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
366 MOTION by Sal Oliveri (Attorney ) to use computers in the courtroom (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
367 MEMORANDUM of law (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
392 Notice of Filing OBJECTION by City of Hollywood to United States' [355−1] proposed voir dire questions (attached) (wc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/09/2006)
368 Notice of filing Proposed Voir dire questions by Hollywood Synagogue (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2006)
369 MEMORANDUM by City of Hollywood in opposition to [355−1] proposed voir dire jury questions (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2006)
370 ORDER granting in part, denying as moot [190−1] motion for partial summary judgment ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/26/06) [EOD Date: 6/27/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/27/2006)
371 Minutes of trial/settlement held before Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/26/06; Court Reporter Name or Tape #: Lisa Edwards (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/27/2006)
Jury trial held before Judge Joan A. Lenard (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/27/2006)
372 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [247−1] motion for summary judgment against Hollywood Community Synagogue denying [177−1] motion for summary

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 25 of 27

06/27/2006 06/27/2006 06/27/2006
06/28/2006 06/29/2006 07/03/2006 07/03/2006 07/03/2006 07/05/2006 07/05/2006 07/05/2006 07/05/2006 07/06/2006 07/06/2006 07/07/2006
07/07/2006 07/07/2006
07/07/2006

judgment, denying [250−1] motion for summary judgment ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/27/06) [EOD Date: 6/28/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/28/2006)
373 EMERGENCY MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue (Attorney ) for status conference and other relief (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/28/2006)
374 RESPONSE by Sal Oliveri to [373−1] motion for status conference and other relief (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
376 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL by Sal Oliveri of [372−1] order . EOD Date: 6/28/06; Filing Fee: $ 455.00; Receipt #: 942676; Copies to USCA and Counsel of Record. (hh, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 07/12/2006 (Entered: 07/03/2006)
Status conference held before Judge Joan A. Lenard (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
375 Minutes of telephonic status conference held before Judge Joan A. Lenard on 6/28/06; Court Reporter Name or Tape #: Lisa Edwards (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
Certified copies of Notice of Appeal, Docket, and Order under appeal to USCA: [376−1] appeal by Sal Oliveri (hh, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2006)
377 Minutes of status conference/vior dire held before Judge Joan A. Lenard on 7/3/06; Court Reporter Name or Tape #: Janice Evans (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/05/2006)
Status conference held before Judge Joan A. Lenard (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/05/2006)
378 STIPULATION for Entry of CONSENT DECREE by Sal Oliveri (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/06/2006)
379 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appeal by Sal Oliveri (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/06/2006)
380 NOTICE of filing the stipulation for entry of consent decree by Hollywood Synagogue (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/06/2006)
381 JOINT MOTION by Hollywood Synagogue, All Defendants to approve consent decree and consent order (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/06/2006)
382 MOTION (Attorney ) to intervene by Lisa Self, Heidi O'Sheehan, Richard Johnson, Carolyn Johnson, Patrick Petrillo, Eva Petrillo (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
383 ANSWER by Lisa Self, Heidi O'Sheehan, Richard Johnson, Carolyn Johnson, Patrick Petrillo, Eva Petrillo (Attorney ) to second amended complaint; jury demand (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
384 ORDER denying [382−1] motion to intervene by Lisa Self, Heidi O'Sheehan, Richard Johnson, Carolyn Johnson, Patrick Petrillo, Eva Petrillo ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 7/7/06) [EOD Date: 7/10/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
385 ORDER granting [381−1] joint motion to approve consent decree and consent order ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 7/7/06) [EOD Date: 7/10/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
386 ORDER dimissing case with prejudice. All pending motions are denied as moot. The case is closed. All extraneous filings are striken as moot. ( Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 7/7/06) [EOD Date: 7/10/06] (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
CASE CLOSED. Case and Motions no longer referred to Magistrate. (ct, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/10/2006)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 26 of 27

07/11/2006 08/04/2006 08/09/2006 08/10/2006 08/17/2006 08/18/2006
12/12/2006
06/26/2007 07/09/2007 01/18/2008
01/18/2008 05/29/2009 05/29/2009 06/01/2009

387 NOTICE of Receipt of Notice of Appeal Transmittal Letter from USCA on 7/5/06as to Sal Oliveri Re: [376−1] appeal by Sal Oliveri USCA NUMBER: 06−13711−I (nc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/12/2006)
388 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Lisa Self, Heidi O'Sheehan, Richard Johnson, Carolyn Johnson, Patrick Petrillo, Eva Petrillo of [384−1] order EOD Date: 7/10/06; Filing Fee: $ 455.00; Receipt #: 944645 &944646 Copies to USCA and Counsel of Record. (nc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/09/2006)
Certified copies of Notice of Appeal, Docket, and Order under appeal to USCA: [388−1] appeal by Eva Petrillo, Patrick Petrillo, Carolyn Johnson, Richard Johnson, Heidi O'Sheehan, Lisa Self (nc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/09/2006)
393 ORDER of dismissal from USCA (certified copy) dismissing [376−1] appeal appellant's motion to dismiss this appeal with prejudice, due to settlement, is GRANTED USCA #: 06−13711−I USCA Order Date: 8/7/06 (hh, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/11/2006)
394 Transcript Information Form re: as to Lisa Self, Heidi O'Sheehan, Richard Johnson, Carolyn Johnson, Patrick Petrillo, Eva Petrillo [388−1] appeal by Eva Petrillo, Patrick Petrillo, Carolyn Johnson, Richard Johnson, Heidi O'Sheehan, Lisa Self . No transcript requested. (nc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/18/2006)
395 NOTICE of Receipt of Notice of Appeal Transmittal Letter from USCA on 8/14/06as to Lisa Self, Heidi O'Sheehan, Richard Johnson, Carolyn Johnson, Patrick Petrillo, Eva Petrillo Re: [388−1] appeal by Eva Petrillo, Patrick Petrillo, Carolyn Johnson, Richard Johnson, Heidi O'Sheehan, Lisa Self USCA NUMBER: 06−14343−D (nc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/22/2006)
396 DISMISSAL of USCA Appellants Patrick and Eva Petrillo's motion to dismiss their appeal with prejudice is GRANTED. This order does not affect the appeal of the remaining Appellants. In Re: 388 Notice of Appeal, filed by Richard Johnson,, Lisa Self,, Heidi O'Sheehan,, Carolyn Johnson,, Patrick Petrillo,, Eva Petrillo, USCA NUMBER: 06−14343−DD (pc) (Entered: 12/13/2006)
397 CERTIFICATE of Readiness transmitted to USCA re 388 Notice of Appeal, filed by Richard Johnson,, Lisa Self,, Heidi O'Sheehan,, Carolyn Johnson,, Patrick Petrillo,, Eva Petrillo,. USCA NUMBER: 06−14343−D. (pc) (Entered: 06/27/2007)
398 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT FROM USCA re 388 Notice of Appeal, receipt of: COR/ROA date received by USCA 6/29/07 USCA number 06−14343−D. (pc) (Entered: 07/11/2007)
399 MANDATE OF USCA (certified copy) Affirming judgment/order of the district court with court's opinion; Bill of Costs are hereby taxed in the amount of $34.50 against Appellant and are payable directly to Appellee, re 388 Notice of Appeal, filed by Richard Johnson, Lisa Self, Heidi O'Sheehan, Carolyn Johnson, Patrick Petrillo, Eva Petrillo, Date issued 1/15/2008; USCA Case Number: 06−14343−DD. Copy to Judge (abd) (Entered: 01/22/2008)
400 Appeal Record Returned (Miami Records)Consisting of (9) Volumes of Pleadings and (8) Accordion Folder containing DE, re 388 Notice of Appeal (abd) (Entered: 01/22/2008)
401 MOTION to Intervene *** Emergency*** Post−Judgment Motion to Intervene by St. Gregorios Orthodox Church of India, Inc. South Florida. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Gordon, Jason) (Entered: 05/29/2009)
402 MOTION for Order to Show Cause ** Expedited** Motion for Order to Show Cause Why City of Hollywood Officials Should Not Be Held in Contempt by St. Gregorios Orthodox Church of India, Inc. South Florida. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Gordon, Jason) (Entered: 05/29/2009)
403 SUPPLEMENT re 402 MOTION for Order to Show Cause **Expedited** by St. Gregorios Orthodox Church of India, Inc. South Florida. (Gordon, Jason) Modified on 6/4/2009 (ls). (Entered: 06/01/2009)

Case: 0:04-cv-61212 As of: 06/17/2013 12:35 AM EDT 27 of 27

06/03/2009 06/04/2009
06/10/2009 06/19/2009 07/06/2009 07/07/2009

404 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Tracy Ann Lyons on behalf of City of Hollywood (Lyons, Tracy) (Entered: 06/03/2009)
405 Clerks Notice of Docket Correction and Instruction to Filer re 403 Supplement filed by St. Gregorios Orthodox Church of India, Inc. South Florida. Error − Incorrect Document Link/No Link; Correction − Document relinked properly by Clerk. Instruction to filer − In the future, please link the document to the proper entry. It is not necessary to refile this document. (ls) (Entered: 06/04/2009)
406 RESPONSE to Motion to Intervene filed by City of Hollywood. Replies due by 6/22/2009. (Lyons, Tracy) (Entered: 06/10/2009)
407 REPLY to Response to Motion ***Emergency*** Post−Judgment Motion to Intervene filed by St. Gregorios Orthodox Church of India, Inc. South Florida. (Gordon, Jason) (Entered: 06/19/2009)
408 NOTICE by St. Gregorios Orthodox Church of India, Inc. South Florida Notice of Issuance of Certificate of Use (Zemel, Franklin) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
409 ORDER denying as moot 401 Motion to Intervene and 402 Motion for Order to Show Cause. Third parties that wish to make a constitutional claim against Defendants in the future are instructed to open a new case number and file a complaint. This entry constitutes the ENDORSED ORDER in its entirety. Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 7/7/2009. (bby) (Entered: 07/07/2009)