Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 1 of 19

JURY,SVH−Inmate
U.S. District Court District of South Carolina (Columbia) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:17−cv−01426−MBS

Brown et al v. Lexington County, South Carolina et al Assigned to: Honorable Margaret B Seymour Case in other court: United States Court of Appeals, 18−01524 Cause: 42:1983pr (Other)
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 06/01/2017 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Twanda Marshinda Brown

represented by Carl Gavin Snodgrass American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad Street 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 215−519−7822 Email: csnodgrass@aclu.org TERMINATED: 11/13/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric Nusser Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC 936 North 34th Street Suite 300 Seattle, WA 98103 206−816−6630 Email: eric@terrellmarshall.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nusrat Jahan Choudhury ACLU of Illinois 150 N Michigan Avenue Suite 600 Chicago, IL 60601 312−201−9740 Fax: 312−901−9760 Email: nchoudhury@aclu−il.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan King Dunn American Civil Liberties Union of SC Foundation PO Box 20998 Charleston, SC 29413 843−282−7953 Fax: 843−720−1428 Email: sdunn@aclusc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Toby Marshall Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC 936 North 34th Street Suite 300 Seattle, WA 98103 206−816−6630

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 2 of 19

Plaintiff Sasha Monique Darby
Plaintiff Cayeshia Cashel Johnson

Email: tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl Gavin Snodgrass (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/13/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Nusser (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nusrat Jahan Choudhury (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan King Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Toby Marshall (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl Gavin Snodgrass (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/13/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Nusser (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nusrat Jahan Choudhury (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan King Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Toby Marshall (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 3 of 19

Plaintiff Amy Marie Palacios
Plaintiff Xavier Larry Goodwin on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl Gavin Snodgrass (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/13/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Nusser (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nusrat Jahan Choudhury (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan King Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Toby Marshall (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl Gavin Snodgrass (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/13/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Nusser (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nusrat Jahan Choudhury (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan King Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Toby Marshall (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 4 of 19

Plaintiff Raymond Wright, Jr on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff Nora Ann Corder

represented by Carl Gavin Snodgrass (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/13/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Nusser (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nusrat Jahan Choudhury (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan King Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Toby Marshall (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl Gavin Snodgrass (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/13/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric Nusser (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nusrat Jahan Choudhury (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan King Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Toby Marshall (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 5 of 19

V. Defendant Lexington County, South Carolina
Defendant Gary Reinhart in his official and individual capacities as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County
Defendant Rebecca Adams in her official and individual capacities as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County and in her official capacity as the Judge of Irmo Magistrate Court
Defendant Robert Madsen in his official capacity as the Circuit Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of South Carolina TERMINATED: 05/17/2018
Defendant

represented by Kenneth Paul Woodington Davidson Wren and Plyler PA 1611 Devonshire Drive Second Floor PO Box 8568 Columbia, SC 29204 803−806−8222 Fax: 803−806−8855 Email: kwoodington@dml−law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Henry Davidson , II Davidson Wren and Plyler PA 1611 Devonshire Drive Second Floor PO Box 8568 Columbia, SC 29204 803−806−8222 Fax: 803−806−8855 Email: wdavidson@dml−law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kenneth Paul Woodington (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Henry Davidson , II (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kenneth Paul Woodington (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Henry Davidson , II (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kenneth Paul Woodington (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Henry Davidson , II (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 6 of 19

Bryan Koon in his official capacity as the Lexington County Sheriff
Defendant Albert John Dooley, III in his official capacity as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County Intervenor Marie Assa'ad−Faltas

represented by Kenneth Paul Woodington (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Henry Davidson , II (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kenneth Paul Woodington (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Marie Assa'ad−Faltas PO Box 9115 Columbia, SC 29290 PRO SE

Date Filed 06/01/2017 06/01/2017 06/02/2017 06/02/2017
06/05/2017
06/05/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Rebecca Adams, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart, Bryan Koon (Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0420−7181905), filed by Sasha Monique Darby, Amy Marie Palacios, Xavier Larry Goodwin, Twanda Marshinda Brown, Cayeshia Cashel Johnson. Service due by 8/30/2017.(mwal) (Entered: 06/02/2017)
3 Local Rule 26.01 Answers to Interrogatories by Twanda Marshinda Brown, Sasha Monique Darby, Xavier Larry Goodwin, Cayeshia Cashel Johnson, Amy Marie Palacios.(mwal) (Entered: 06/02/2017)
4 Summons Issued as to Rebecca Adams, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. (mwal) (Entered: 06/02/2017)
5 MOTION to Certify Class by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 6/16/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support, # 2 Affidavit In support of motion, # 3 Affidavit In support of motion, # 4 Affidavit In support of motion, # 5 Affidavit In support of motion, # 6 Exhibit Exh A. Chart of inmates, # 7 Exhibit Exh. B Analysis of Jail Population, # 8 Affidavit In support of motion, # 9 Exhibit Exh.A Brown Bench Warrant, # 10 Exhibit Exh.B Brown Public Index, # 11 Exhibit Exh.C Darby Bench Warrant, # 12 Exhibit Exh.D Darby Public Index, # 13 Exhibit Exh. E Johnson Bench Warrant, # 14 Exhibit Exh. F Johnson Public Index)No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Attachment 3 replaced on 6/5/2017) (mwal). Modified to add additional attachments at ECF No. 7 on 6/6/2017 (mwal). (Entered: 06/02/2017)
6 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Nusrat J. Choudhury ( Filing fee $ 250 receipt number 0420−7188143) by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 6/19/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Choudhury Affidavit in support of PHV motion, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing for Choudhury)Proposed order is being emailed to chambers with copy to opposing counsel.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 06/05/2017)
7 Additional Attachments to Main Document 5 MOTION to Certify Class . First attachment description: Palacio Bench Warrant. (Attachments: # 1 Palacio Public Index, # 2 Goodwin Bench Warrant, # 3 Goodwin Public Index, # 4 Spreadsheet Failure to Comply and Archived Bench Warrants, # 5 Spreadsheet narrowed to exclude Jail only and Nolle Prosequi)(mwal) (Entered: 06/06/2017)

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 7 of 19

06/08/2017
06/08/2017
06/27/2017 07/07/2017
07/07/2017 07/07/2017 07/18/2017 07/19/2017 07/19/2017 07/19/2017 07/20/2017
07/21/2017 07/21/2017

8 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Toby J. Marshall ( Filing fee $ 250 receipt number 0420−7194758) by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 6/22/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Marshall Affidavit for PHV admission, # 2 Exhibit Marshall Certificate of Good Standing)Proposed order is being emailed to chambers with copy to opposing counsel.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
9 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Eric R. Nusser ( Filing fee $ 250 receipt number 0420−7194770) by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 6/22/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Nusser affidavit for PHV admission, # 2 Exhibit Nusser Certificate of Good Standing)Proposed order is being emailed to chambers with copy to opposing counsel.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
10 TEXT ORDER granting 6 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Nusrat J. Choudhury; granting 8 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Toby J. Marshall; and granting 9 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Eric R. Nusser. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 6/27/2017. (mwal) (Entered: 06/28/2017)
12 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 5 MOTION to Certify Class by Rebecca Adams, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. Response to Motion due by 7/21/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/07/2017)
13 TEXT ORDER granting 12 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time. Defendants response to 5 MOTION to Certify Class is now due by August 7, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 7/7/2017. (mwal) (Entered: 07/07/2017)
14 NOTICE of Appearance by William Henry Davidson, II on behalf of Rebecca Adams, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart (Davidson, William) (Entered: 07/07/2017)
15 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Robert Madsen.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/18/2017)
16 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Bryan Koon.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/19/2017)
17 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Lexington County, South Carolina.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/19/2017)
18 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Rebecca Adams, Gary Reinhart.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/19/2017)
19 SCHEDULING ORDER Rule 26(f) Conference Deadline 8/9/2017, 26(a) Initial Disclosures due by 8/23/2017, Rule 26 Report due by 8/23/2017, Motions to Amend Pleadings due by 10/18/2017, Plaintiffs ID of Expert Witness due by 11/17/2017, Defendants ID of Expert Witnesses due by 12/18/2017, Records Custodian Affidavit due by 12/18/2017, Discovery due by 2/15/2018, Motions due by 3/2/2018, ADR Statement due by 4/6/2018, Mediation due by 5/1/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 7/20/2017. (mwal) (Entered: 07/20/2017)
20 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Service due by 10/19/2017 (Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 07/21/2017)
21 MOTION to Certify Class by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 8/4/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support Memo in support of Amended Motion for Class certification, # 2 Affidavit From Choudhury in support, # 3 Affidavit From Dunn in support of motion, # 4 Affidavit From Marshall in support of motion, # 5 Affidavit From Nusser in support of Motion, # 6 Exhibit A to Nusser declaration−Inmate Chart, # 7 Exhibit B to Nusser declaration− Bench Warrant analysis, # 8 Affidavit From Papachristo in support, # 9 Exhibit A to

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 8 of 19

07/26/2017
07/27/2017 08/17/2017 08/17/2017 08/17/2017 08/17/2017 08/17/2017 08/18/2017
08/18/2017
08/23/2017
08/23/2017 08/23/2017

Papachristo−Bench Warrant Brown, # 10 Exhibit B to Papachristo−Public Index Brown, # 11 Exhibit C to Papachristo−Bench Warrant Darby, # 12 Exhibit D to Papachristo−Public Index Darby, # 13 Exhibit E to Papachristo−Bench Warrant Johnson, # 14 Exhibit F to Papachristo−Public index Johnson, # 15 Exhibit G to Papachristo−Bench Warrant Palacio, # 16 Exhibit H to Papachristo−Public Index Palacio, # 17 Exhibit I to Papachristo−Bench Warrant Goodwin, # 18 Exhibit J to Papachristo− Public Index Goodwin, # 19 Exhibit K to Papachristo−Inmate Chart, # 20 Exhibit L to Papachristo−Chart)No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 07/21/2017)
22 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 20 Amended Complaint by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. Response to Motion due by 8/9/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/26/2017)
23 TEXT ORDER granting 22 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time. Additionally, Defendants' deadline to respond to Plaintiffs' motion to certify class is extended to August 18, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 7/27/2017. (mwal) (Entered: 07/27/2017)
24 ANSWER to 20 Amended Complaint by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Gary Reinhart.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
25 ANSWER to 20 Amended Complaint by Bryan Koon.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
26 ANSWER to 20 Amended Complaint by Lexington County, South Carolina.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
27 ANSWER to 20 Amended Complaint by Robert Madsen.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
28 Local Rule 26.01 Answers to Interrogatories by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
29 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment (declaratory and injunctive relief) by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. Response to Motion due by 9/1/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support, # 2 Exhibit Affidavit of Colleen Long)No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
30 RESPONSE in Opposition re 21 MOTION to Certify Class Response filed by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart.Reply to Response to Motion due by 8/25/2017 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
31 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 30 Response in Opposition to Motion, 29 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment (declaratory and injunctive relief) by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 9/6/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 08/23/2017)
32 Rule 26(f) Report by Twanda Marshinda Brown. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Joint 26f report)(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 08/23/2017)
33 TEXT ORDER granting 31 MOTION for Extension of Time. Plaintiff's deadline to file a response to 29 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment (declaratory and injunctive relief) and reply to 30 Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Class Certification is now September 11, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 8/24/2017. (mwal) (Entered: 08/24/2017)

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 9 of 19

08/24/2017
09/11/2017 09/11/2017 09/14/2017
09/14/2017 09/22/2017 09/22/2017 09/29/2017 09/29/2017 10/13/2017 10/18/2017

34 FIRST AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER 26(a) Initial Disclosures due by 9/13/2017, Rule 26 Report due by 8/23/2017, Motions to Amend Pleadings due by 10/18/2017, Plaintiffs ID of Expert Witness due by 1/19/2018, Defendants ID of Expert Witnesses due by 2/23/2018, Records Custodian Affidavit due by 2/23/2018, Discovery due by 4/2/2018, Motions due by 5/4/2018, ADR Statement due by 5/2/2018, Mediation due by 6/1/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 8/24/2017. (mwal) (Entered: 08/24/2017)
35 RESPONSE in Opposition re 29 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment (declaratory and injunctive relief) Response filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown.Reply to Response to Motion due by 9/18/2017 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Goodwin, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of Wright)(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 09/11/2017)
36 REPLY to Response to Motion re 21 MOTION to Certify Class , 31 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 30 Response in Opposition to Motion, 29 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment (declaratory and injunctive relief) Response filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown. (Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 09/11/2017)
37 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 35 Response in Opposition to Motion, 29 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment (declaratory and injunctive relief) by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. Response to Motion due by 9/28/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/14/2017)
38 TEXT ORDER granting ECF No. 37 . Defendants' reply to ECF No. 35 is now due by September 22, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges on 9/14/2017. (bgoo) (Entered: 09/14/2017)
39 REPLY to Response to Motion re 29 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment (declaratory and injunctive relief) Response filed by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 10 year driving record of Xavier Goodwin, # 2 Exhibit Richland Co. records for Goodwin, # 3 Exhibit Lexington Co. records for Goodwin)(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/22/2017)
40 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. Response to Motion due by 10/6/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Memo of Chief Justice Beatty)No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/22/2017)
41 MOTION for Extension of Time by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 10/13/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 09/29/2017)
42 TEXT ORDER granting 41 MOTION for Extension of Time. Plaintiff's response to 40 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment is now due by October 13, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 9/29/2017. (mwal) (Entered: 09/29/2017)
43 RESPONSE in Opposition re 40 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment Response filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown.Reply to Response to Motion due by 10/20/2017 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Eric Nusser, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of Toby Marshall)(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 10/13/2017)
44 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 43 Response in Opposition to Motion, 40 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. Response to Motion due by 11/1/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 10 of 19

10/18/2017 10/18/2017
10/19/2017 10/19/2017 10/30/2017
10/31/2017
10/31/2017
11/01/2017 11/01/2017 11/01/2017 11/02/2017 11/07/2017 11/07/2017

Hodges.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/18/2017)
45 TEXT ORDER granting 44 MOTION for Extension of Time. Defendants' reply in support to 40 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment is now due by November 3, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 10/18/2017. (mwal) (Entered: 10/18/2017)
46 MOTION to Amend/Correct 20 Amended Complaint by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 11/1/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit EX. 1 Proposed 2nd Amended Complaint with changes redlined, # 2 Exhibit EX.2 Proposed 2nd Amended Complaint (Clean copy))Proposed order is being emailed to chambers with copy to opposing counsel.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 10/18/2017)
47 TEXT ORDER granting 46 MOTION to Amend/Correct 20 Amended Complaint. The Clerk's office is directed to file ECF No. 46−2 as Plaintiff's second amended complaint. Defendants' deadline to answer or otherwise plead as to the second amended complaint is November 2, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 10/19/2017. (mwal) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
48 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart, filed by Sasha Monique Darby, Amy Marie Palacios, Xavier Larry Goodwin, Twanda Marshinda Brown, Cayeshia Cashel Johnson.(mwal) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
49 MOTION to Stay re 40 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. Response to Motion due by 11/13/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Agenda for judges' training session)No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
50 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Damage Claims by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. Response to Motion due by 11/14/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support)No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/31/2017)
51 MOTION to Stay Discovery and Scheduling Order Deadlines by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. Response to Motion due by 11/14/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/31/2017)
52 ANSWER to 48 Amended Complaint, by Lexington County, South Carolina.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/01/2017)
53 ANSWER to 48 Amended Complaint, by Robert Madsen.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/01/2017)
54 ANSWER to 48 Amended Complaint, by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Gary Reinhart.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/01/2017)
55 ANSWER to 48 Amended Complaint, by Bryan Koon.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Main Document 55 replaced to correct document on 11/2/2017) (mwal). (Entered: 11/02/2017)
56 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 11/21/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 11/07/2017)
57 TEXT ORDER granting 56 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time. Plaintiffs' deadline to respond to ECF Nos. 50 and 51 is now November 29, 2017.

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 11 of 19

11/13/2017 11/17/2017 11/17/2017 11/20/2017 11/21/2017
11/22/2017 11/29/2017
11/29/2017 12/08/2017
12/08/2017 12/13/2017
01/05/2018

Defendants' replies will be due by December 11, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 11/7/2017. (mwal) (Entered: 11/07/2017)
58 RESPONSE in Opposition re 49 MOTION to Stay re 40 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment Response filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown.Reply to Response to Motion due by 11/20/2017 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 11/13/2017)
59 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 12/1/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 11/17/2017)
60 TEXT ORDER granting 59 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 11/17/2017. (mwal) (Entered: 11/17/2017)
61 REPLY to Response to Motion re 49 MOTION to Stay re 40 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment Response filed by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. (Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/20/2017)
62 Withdrawal of Motions: 49 MOTION to Stay re 40 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Bryan Koon, Gary Reinhart, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Albert John Dooley, III, Rebecca Adams, 40 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Bryan Koon, Gary Reinhart, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Albert John Dooley, III, Rebecca Adams.. (Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/21/2017)
64 Withdrawal of Motions: 5 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown. (mwal) (Entered: 11/27/2017)
66 RESPONSE in Opposition re 50 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Damage Claims Response filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown.Reply to Response to Motion due by 12/6/2017 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Brown, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of Darby, # 3 Affidavit Declaration of Palacios, # 4 Affidavit Declaration of Corder, # 5 Affidavit Declaration of Goodwin, # 6 Affidavit Affidavit of Ryan authenticating Exh. A and B, # 7 Affidavit Rule 56(b) Declaration of Chourdury)(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 11/29/2017)
67 RESPONSE in Opposition re 51 MOTION to Stay Discovery and Scheduling Order Deadlines Response filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown.Reply to Response to Motion due by 12/6/2017 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Nusser declaration in opposition)(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 11/29/2017)
68 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages and for two−day extension of time by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. Response to Motion due by 12/27/2017. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/08/2017)
69 TEXT ORDER granting 68 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages and extension of time. Replies to ECF Nos. 66 and 67 are now due by December 13, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 12/8/2017. (mwal) (Entered: 12/08/2017)
70 REPLY to Response to Motion re 51 MOTION to Stay Discovery and Scheduling Order Deadlines, 50 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Damage Claims Response filed by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Long affidavit with attachments (tickets and bench warrants), # 2 Exhibit Amended Complaiint in Foster v. Alexander)(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/13/2017)
71 Joint MOTION to Stay Scheduling Order by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 1/19/2018. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 12 of 19

01/08/2018 02/05/2018 02/05/2018
02/07/2018 02/12/2018 02/27/2018 02/27/2018 03/02/2018 03/02/2018 03/22/2018 03/23/2018 03/29/2018
04/03/2018

otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 01/05/2018)
72 ORDER granting 71 Joint MOTION to Stay Scheduling Order filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 1/8/2018. (mwal) (Entered: 01/08/2018)
73 TEXT ORDER granting 51 MOTION to Stay Discovery and Scheduling Order Deadlines, as consistent with the court's January 8, 2018 text order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 2/5/2018. (mwal) (Entered: 02/05/2018)
74 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION recommending the court: (1) deny Plaintiff's 21 MOTION to Certify Class; (2) grant Defendants' 29 MOTION for Summary Judgment as to declaratory and injunctive relief; and (3) deny Defendants' 50 MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' damages claim against Lexington County for failure to afford counsel and grant the motion as to all other claims. Objections to R&R due by 2/20/2018. (mwal) (Main Document 74 replaced on 2/5/2018) (mwal, ). (Entered: 02/05/2018)
75 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 2/21/2018. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 02/07/2018)
76 TEXT ORDER granting 75 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time. Objections to 74 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION are now due by March 2, 2018. Reply to objections are now due by March 23, 2018. Signed by Honorable Margaret B Seymour on 2/12/2018. (mwal) (Entered: 02/12/2018)
77 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 3/13/2018. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 02/27/2018)
78 TEXT ORDER granting 77 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 2/27/2018. (mwal) (Entered: 02/27/2018)
79 OBJECTION to 74 Report and Recommendation by Lexington County, South Carolina. Reply to Objections due by 3/16/2018 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/02/2018)
80 OBJECTION to 74 Report and Recommendation by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Reply to Objections due by 3/16/2018 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 03/02/2018)
81 REPLY by Twanda Marshinda Brown to 79 Objection to Report and Recommendation . (Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
82 REPLY by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart to 80 Objection to Report and Recommendation . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Court Admin. memo, orders and forms)(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/23/2018)
84 ORDER declining to adopt 74 Report and Recommendation; denying Plaintiffs' 21 Motion to Certify Class; denying Defendants' 29 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to declaratory and injunctive relief; and denying Defendants' 50 Motion for Summary Judgment. This matter is recommitted to the Magistrate Judge for further pretrial handling. Signed by Honorable Margaret B Seymour on 3/29/2018. (mwal) (Entered: 03/30/2018)
85 SECOND AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Plaintiffs ID of Expert Witness due by 6/4/2018, Defendants ID of Expert Witnesses due by 7/2/2018, Records Custodian Affidavit due by 7/2/2018, Discovery due by 8/6/2018, Motions due by 9/4/2018, ADR Statement due by 9/7/2018, Mediation due by 10/9/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 4/3/2018. (mwal) (Entered: 04/03/2018)

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 13 of 19

04/17/2018 04/24/2018
04/26/2018
04/26/2018 04/26/2018 04/30/2018 05/01/2018 05/03/2018
05/03/2018 05/08/2018 05/10/2018
05/15/2018

86 Second MOTION to Certify Class by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 5/1/2018. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support Memo in support of 2nd amended class certification)No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
87 MOTION for Reconsideration re 84 Order Ruling on Report and Recommendation, by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. Response to Motion due by 5/8/2018. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support)No proposed order.(Woodington, Kenneth) Modified to edit text on 4/24/2018 (mwal). (Entered: 04/24/2018)
88 Supplemental MOTION for Reconsideration re 84 Order Ruling on Report and Recommendation, by Lexington County, South Carolina. Response to Motion due by 5/11/2018. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support)No proposed order. (Woodington, Kenneth) Modified to edit text on 4/26/2018 (mwal). (Entered: 04/26/2018)
89 RESPONSE in Opposition re 86 Second MOTION to Certify Class Response filed by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart.Reply to Response to Motion due by 5/3/2018 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/26/2018)
90 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 84 Order Ruling on Report and Recommendation, by Rebecca Adams, Bryan Koon, Gary Reinhart. − Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0420−7747398. The Docketing Statement form, Transcript Order form and CJA 24 form may be obtained from the Fourth Circuit website at www.ca4.uscourts.gov (Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/26/2018)
91 Transmittal Sheet for Notice of Appeal to USCA re 90 Notice of Appeal, The Clerk's Office hereby certifies the record and the docket sheet available through ECF to be the certified list in lieu of the record and/or the certified copy of the docket entries. (mwal) (Entered: 05/01/2018)
92 ASSEMBLED INITIAL ELECTRONIC RECORD TRANSMITTED TO FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS re 90 Notice of Appeal, Electronic record successfully transmitted. (mwal) (Entered: 05/01/2018)
93 RESPONSE in Opposition re 87 MOTION for Reconsideration re 84 Order Ruling on Report and Recommendation, , 88 Supplemental MOTION for Reconsideration re 84 Order Ruling on Report and Recommendation, Response filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown.Reply to Response to Motion due by 5/11/2018 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 05/03/2018)
94 REPLY to Response to Motion re 86 Second MOTION to Certify Class Reply in Support of Motion Response filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown. (Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 05/03/2018)
95 Letter from 4CCA. (mwal) (Entered: 05/08/2018)
97 REPLY to Response to Motion re 87 MOTION for Reconsideration re 84 Order Ruling on Report and Recommendation, , 88 Supplemental MOTION for Reconsideration re 84 Order Ruling on Report and Recommendation, Response filed by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Robert Madsen, Gary Reinhart. (Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/10/2018)
98 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Carl G. Snodgrass ( Filing fee $ 250 receipt number 0420−7780793) by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 5/29/2018. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Application to Appear PHV, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing)Proposed order is being emailed to chambers with copy to opposing counsel.Motions referred to Shiva V

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 14 of 19

05/15/2018 05/16/2018 05/16/2018
05/30/2018 05/30/2018 06/01/2018 06/01/2018
07/10/2018 08/06/2018 08/09/2018 09/07/2018

Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 05/15/2018)
99 TEXT ORDER granting 98 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Carl G. Snodgrass. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 5/15/2018. (mwal) (Entered: 05/15/2018)
100 STIPULATION of Dismissal without Prejudice as to Defendant Madsen by Twanda Marshinda Brown. (Dunn, Susan) (Entered: 05/16/2018)
101 First MOTION to Compel Production by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 5/30/2018. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Nusser in support of motion, # 2 Exhibit First set of requests to Lexington County and Madsen, # 3 Exhibit First set of request to Koon, # 4 Exhibit First set of requests to Reinhart, Adams and Dooley, # 5 Exhibit May 4, 2018 letter from Marshall to Defense attorneys, # 6 Exhibit Emails relating to production)No proposed order.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Main Document 101 replaced on 5/18/2018) (mwal, ). (Entered: 05/16/2018)
103 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Status Conference re discovery set for 6/1/2018 at 2:00 p.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(ttil, ) (Entered: 05/30/2018)
104 TEXT ORDER suspending the deadline for defendant's response to plaintiff's 101 First Motion to Compel Production pending further notice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 5/30/2018. (ttil, ) (Entered: 05/30/2018)
105 AMENDED NOTICE of Hearing (change in time only): Telephone Status Conference re discovery set for 6/1/2018 at 3:00 p.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(ttil, ) (Entered: 06/01/2018)
106 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges: Telephone Status Conference held on 6/1/2018. The parties address the court re 101 Motion to Compel, oral order denying 101 Motion to Compel without prejudice, the court suspends the current scheduling order deadlines and directs the parties to contact chambers upon Judge Margaret Seymour's ruling on 87 Motion for Reconsideration. Court Reporter: no court reporter. (ttil, ) (Entered: 06/04/2018)
107 OPINION AND ORDER denying 87 Motion for Reconsideration ; denying 88 Motion for Reconsideration Signed by Honorable Margaret B Seymour on 7/9/2018.(mdea ) (Entered: 07/10/2018)
108 NOTICE of Hearing:Telephone Status Conference set for 8/9/2018 10:00 AM before Honorable Margaret B Seymour. Counsel should arrange the call and provide a conference call−in number to the Court (via email at filingdocs_ecf_chas@scd.uscourts.gov) by 12:00 PM on 8/8/2018.(cper, ) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
109 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Honorable Margaret B Seymour: Status Conference held on 8/9/2018. Parties agree and will be available for mediation before Honorable Patrick Michael Duffy set for Wednesday, August 22, 2018. Court Reporter Elena Graham, Court Smart. (cper, ) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
111 TEXT ORDER: Plaintiffs have requested the undersigned issue an amended scheduling order. In light of Judge Seymour's directive that the parties mediate this case and, after consultation with her chambers, the court finds the parties' energies should be devoted to mediation efforts at this time. Therefore, the court declines to issue an amended scheduling order at this time. The parties are directed to advise the court by October 9, 2018, as to the progress of their mediation efforts on this case by emailing a joint status report to hodges_ecf@scd.uscourts.gov. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges on 9/7/18. (vhor) (Entered: 09/07/2018)

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 15 of 19

09/28/2018

112 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Electronically Recorded Telephone Conference for date of August 9, 2018, before Judge Margaret B. Seymour, re 90 Notice of Appeal, Court Reporter/Transcriber Kathleen Richardson, RMR, CRR, Telephone number/e−mail Kathleen_Richardson@scd.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Parties have 7 calendar days from the filing of the transcript to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction. Does this satisfy all appellate orders for this reporter? Y

10/19/2018 10/26/2018
10/30/2018 10/31/2018 11/01/2018
11/13/2018
11/13/2018 11/14/2018 01/08/2019
01/10/2019 01/10/2019

Redaction Request due 10/19/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/29/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/27/2018. (kari, ) (Entered: 09/28/2018)
113 TEXT ORDER: The court orders mediation in this case before Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges. Signed by Honorable Margaret B. Seymour on 10/19/2018. (lbak) (Entered: 10/19/2018)
114 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Conference re mediation set for 10/30/2018 at 3:00 p.m in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(ttil, ) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
115 Minute Entry. Proceedings held in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges: Telephone Conference held on 10/30/2018 re pre−mediation issues. Order forthcoming. Court Reporter: no court reporter. (ttil, ) (Entered: 10/31/2018)
116 ORDER re conflict disclosed to parties on 115 Pre−Mediation Telephone Conference; Specific Document (Objections) due by 11/6/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 10/31/2018. (ttil, ) (Entered: 10/31/2018)
117 ORDER scheduling mediation for 11/14/2018 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom # 8, Matthew J. Perry Court House, 901 Richland St, Columbia, SC before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. In addition, the parties are directed to provide to the court and each other by November 9, 2018, any proposals containing procedures to be utilized in addressing the issues raised in the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 11/1/2018. (ttil, ) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
118 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Twanda Marshinda Brown. Response to Motion due by 11/27/2018. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. Proposed order is being emailed to chambers with copy to opposing counsel.Motions referred to Shiva V Hodges.(Dunn, Susan) (Main Document 118 replaced on 11/15/2018 with corrected document submitted by filing user.) (lbak) (Entered: 11/13/2018)
119 TEXT ORDER granting 118 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges on 11/13/18. (vhor) (Entered: 11/13/2018)
120 Minute Entry. Mediation Hearing held on 11/14/2018 before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Court Reporter: no court reporter. (ttil, ) (Entered: 11/15/2018)
121 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Conference set for 1/10/2019 at 2:30 p.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(ttil, ) (Entered: 01/08/2019)
122 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges: Telephone Conference held on 1/10/2019; the parties request additional time to consider a proposal; hearing to be continued. Court Reporter: no court reporter. (ttil, ) (Entered: 01/11/2019)
123 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Status Conference set for 1/18/2019 at 10:00 a.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(ttil) (Entered: 01/11/2019)

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 16 of 19

01/14/2019
01/23/2019 01/29/2019 01/29/2019 02/14/2019 02/15/2019 02/26/2019 02/27/2019 03/01/2019 03/06/2019 03/29/2019 08/06/2019 08/12/2019

124 NOTICE OF RESCHEDULED HEARING Telephone Status Conference scheduled for 1/18/2019 at 10:00 a.m. has been cancelled and rescheduled to: Telephone Status Conference rescheduled for 1/29/2019 at 11:00 a.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(ttil, ) (Entered: 01/14/2019)
125 USCA OPINION for 90 Notice of Appeal, filed by Bryan Koon, Gary Reinhart, Rebecca Adams. Appeal Dismissed. (lbak) (Entered: 01/23/2019)
126 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges: Telephone Status Conference held on 1/29/2019; the parties discussed the status of the case and continued efforts of mediation; a follow−up status hearing will be scheduled for 2/26/2019 at 10:00 a.m. before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Court Reporter: no court reporter. (ttil, ) (Entered: 01/29/2019)
127 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Status Conference set for 2/26/2019 at 10:00 a.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431. (ttil, ) (Entered: 01/29/2019)
128 USCA MANDATE and JUDGMENT as to 90 Notice of Appeal, filed by Bryan Koon, Gary Reinhart, Rebecca Adams (Attachments: # 1 4CCA Judgment)(lbak) Modified on 2/15/2019 to edit text. (lbak) (Entered: 02/14/2019)
129 NOTICE of Hearing: A Continuing Mediation Hearing is set for 3/11/2019 at 9:00 a.m. in Columbia # 8, Matthew J. Perry Court House, 901 Richland St, Columbia before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. (ttil, ) (Entered: 02/15/2019)
130 NOTICE of Cancellation of Hearing: Telephone Status Conference scheduled for 2/26/2019 at 10:00 a.m. before Magistrate Judge Shiva Hodges has been cancelled, to be rescheduled at a later time. (ttil, ) (Entered: 02/26/2019)
131 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Status Conference set for 3/1/2019 at 10:00 a.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431. (ttil, ) (Entered: 02/27/2019)
132 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges: Telephone Status Conference held on 3/1/2019; the parties discussed the status of the case and continued efforts of mediation; a continuing mediation hearing is currently scheduled for 3/11/2019 at 9:00 a.m. Court Reporter: no court reporter. (ttil, ) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
133 NOTICE of Cancellation of Hearing: Mediation hearing scheduled for 3/11/2019 at 9:00 a.m. before Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges has been cancelled until further notice. (ttil, ) (Entered: 03/06/2019)
134 TEXT ORDER: Plaintiffs' 86 second motion to certify class is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to refile after a report from Judge Hodges that mediation has concluded. Signed by Honorable Margaret B. Seymour on 3/29/2019. (lbak) (Entered: 03/29/2019)
135 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Status Conference set for 8/12/2019 at 1:30 p.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(ttil, ) (Entered: 08/06/2019)
136 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges: Telephone Status Conference held on 8/12/2019; the parties discussed the status of the case and continued efforts of mediation; the court requested (3) documents from the parties which are due by 8/23/2019. Court Reporter: no court reporter. (ttil, ) (Entered: 08/12/2019)

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 17 of 19

01/02/2020 01/06/2020
01/08/2020 02/04/2020 02/12/2020 02/26/2020 03/04/2020 03/11/2020 03/25/2020 03/26/2020 03/26/2020 04/01/2020

137 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Conference set for 1/6/2020 02:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(jpet, ) (Entered: 01/02/2020)
138 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges: Telephone Conference held on 1/6/2020; the parties discussed the status of the case and continued efforts of mediation. Upon notification from the parties of a mutually agreeable date/time, a follow−up conference will be scheduled the first week of February 2020. Court Reporter: no court reporter. (ttil, ) (Entered: 01/06/2020)
139 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Conference set for 2/4/2020 at 1:30 p.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(ttil, ) (Entered: 01/08/2020)
140 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges: Telephone Conference held in chambers on 2/4/2020. The parties discussed the status of the case and continued efforts of mediation. Upon notification from the parties of a mutually agreeable date/time, a follow−up conference will be scheduled. Court Reporter: no court reporter. (ttil, ) (Entered: 02/05/2020)
141 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Conference set for 2/26/2020 at 4:00 p.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(ttil, ) (Entered: 02/12/2020)
142 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges: Telephone Conference held on 2/26/2020. The parties discussed the status of the case and continued efforts of mediation. Upon notification from the parties of a mutually agreeable date/time, a follow−up conference will be scheduled. Court Reporter No court reporter. (jpet, ) (Entered: 02/26/2020)
143 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Conference set for 3/26/2020 at 10:00 a.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(ttil, ) (Entered: 03/04/2020)
144 MOTION to Intervene by Marie Assa'ad−Faltas. Response to Motion due by 3/25/2020. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support, # 2 Supporting Documents) (lbak) (Entered: 03/12/2020)
146 RESPONSE in Opposition re 144 MOTION to Intervene Response filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown.Reply to Response to Motion due by 4/1/2020 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Dunn, Susan) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/27/2020: # 1 Certificate of Service) (lbak, ). (Entered: 03/25/2020)
147 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges: Telephone Conference held in chambers on 3/26/2020. The parties discussed the status of the case and continued efforts of mediation. A follow−up conference will be scheduled for April 14, 2020 at 10:00 a.m. before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Court Reporter: no court reporter. (ttil, ) (Entered: 03/26/2020)
148 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Conference set for 4/14/2020 at 10:00 a.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(ttil, ) (Entered: 03/26/2020)
149 REPLY to Response to Motion re 144 MOTION to Intervene Response filed by Marie Assa'ad−Faltas. (lbak) (Entered: 04/02/2020)

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 18 of 19

04/13/2020 04/14/2020 04/15/2020 04/23/2020 04/24/2020 04/30/2020 05/20/2020 05/20/2020 05/21/2020
05/21/2020

150 NOTICE of Cancellation of Hearing: Telephone Conference scheduled 4/14/2020 at 10:00 a.m. before Magistrate Judge Shiva Hodges has been cancelled. (ttil, ) (Entered: 04/13/2020)
151 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Conference set for 4/23/2020 at 1:00 p.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(ttil, ) (Entered: 04/14/2020)
152 RESPONSE in Opposition re 144 MOTION to Intervene Response filed by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Gary Reinhart.Reply to Response to Motion due by 4/22/2020 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/15/2020)
153 NOTICE OF RESCHEDULED HEARING: Telephone Conference scheduled 4/23/2020 at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge Shiva Hodges has been rescheduled to: Telephone Conference rescheduled for 4/30/2020 at 3:30 p.m. in chambers before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to arrange and initiate the conference call at the specified time, conference in all other participating counsel and then connect to chambers at (803) 253−6431.(ttil, ) (Entered: 04/23/2020)
154 REPLY to Response to Motion re 144 MOTION to Intervene Response filed by Marie Assa'ad−Faltas. (Attachments: # 1 Supporting Documents) (lbak) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/28/2020: # 2 Supporting Documents 2) (lbak, ). (Entered: 04/27/2020)
155 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges: Telephone Conference held in chambers on 4/30/2020. The parties discussed the status of the case and continued efforts of mediation. Court Reporter: no court reporter. (ttil, ) (Entered: 04/30/2020)
156 ORDER AND OPINION denying 144 MOTION to Intervene. Signed by Honorable Margaret B. Seymour on 5/20/2020. (lbak) (Entered: 05/20/2020)
157 ***DOCUMENT MAILED 156 Order placed in U.S. Mail from Columbia Clerks Office to Marie Assa'ad−Faltas, PO Box 9115, Columbia, SC 29290. (lbak/mmcd) (Entered: 05/20/2020)
158 MOTION for Reconsideration re 156 Order by Marie Assa'ad−Faltas. Response to Motion due by 6/4/2020. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Transcript of 2016 12−07 Faltas v State Part 1, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Transcript 2017−06−14 Faltas v State part 2, # 3 Exhibit 3 − 2018−03−22−23 corrected Marie Faltas v State March 22 2018, # 4 2018−08−10 et seq Amended Apps Vol 2 pages 590−688, # 5 Exhibit 5 − 2016 06 07 State vs Faltas.2016, # 6 Exhibit 6 − highlighted transcript 2016−06−07 State vs. Assa'ad−Faltas, # 7 Exhibit 7 − 1992−10−24 Dr. Falats'Cycle Breaker plan in USC Times, # 8 Exhibit 8 − Unfair demotion letter, # 9 Exhibit 9 − highlighted 1993−05−21 unfair demotion letter, # 10 Exhibit 10 − 1993−06−16 My Family Practice at USC)(lbak) Supplements filed on 5/21/2020 at 159 and 160 . (lbak) Supplements filed on 5/26/2020 at 161 and 162 . (mmcd) Supplement added on 6/1/2020 at 163 . (lbak) (Entered: 05/22/2020)
159 SUPPLEMENT (Exhibit 11) by Marie Assa'ad−Faltas to 158 MOTION for Reconsideration re 156 Order. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 12 − 1993−09−03 Unanimous reinstatement recommendation, # 2 Exhibit 13 − 1993−09−09 Dr. Kessler forward recommendatin to Dean Humphries, # 3 Wxhibit 14 − 1993−09−09 First Action on Unanimous Recommedation, # 4 Exhibit 15 − 1993−09−20 Further Action on Recommendation, # 5 Exhibit 16 − Human Affairs Commission's letter to Cliff Scott, # 6 Exhibit 17 − 1993−10−03 The State newspaper reports on my reinstatement, # 7 Exhibit 18 − 1993−10−10 The State newspaper SCHAC's findings, # 8 Exhibit 19 − 1993−10−11 Altekruse's letter to Moser, # 9 Exhibit 20 − 1993−10−12 Altekruse's letter to SCHAC, # 10 Exhibit 21 − 1993−10−25 Sheridan amits to hindering my research, # 11 Exhibit 22 − 1993−10−27 Scott's letter to Whittleton, # 12 Exhibit 23 − 1993−10−28 Eslinger to Alterkruse, # 13 Exhibit 24 − 1993−10−28 Eslinger to

Case: 3:17-cv-1426 As of: 06/07/2020 12:21 PM EDT 19 of 19

05/21/2020
05/26/2020 05/26/2020
06/01/2020 06/04/2020 06/04/2020

Parham, # 14 Exhibit 25 − 1993−11−10 I was fired a second time due to Eslinger's letters)(lbak) (Entered: 05/22/2020)
160 SUPPLEMENT (Exhibit 26) by Marie Assa'ad−Faltas to 158 MOTION for Reconsideration re 156 Order. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 27 − Exerpt Ed Turbeville's deposition, # 2 Exhibit 28 − 1997−09−16 Judge Shedd denies sanctions, # 3 Exhibit 29 − 2011−10−11 Dr. Assa'ad−Faltas' false accuser's false complaint, # 4 Exhibit 30 − 2011−10−11 John Ansell's Business Card, # 5 Exhibit 31 − 2011−10−20 Summons 201310 Front, # 6 Exhibit 32 − Summons 201310 Back, # 7 Exhibit 33 − 2012−08−15 Letter from Hatcher, # 8 Exhibit 34 − email attaching photos from City of Columbia Agent Michal O'Neal Mail, # 9 Exhibit 35 − 2016−02−15 fallen leave and branches, # 10 Exhibit 36 − 2016−03−08 City of Columbia Agent Michael O'Neill's email to Dr. Assa'ad−Faltas, # 11 Exhibit 37 − 2016−02−16 Michael O'Neill's email to Drt. Assa'ad−Faltas Mail, # 12 Exhibit 38 − 2019−12−09 Justice Sotomayor's statement in Schnexnayder v Vannoy, # 13 Exhibit 39 − 2020−02−24 Justice Sotomayor's statement re Reed v Texas 19−411)(lbak) (Entered: 05/22/2020)
161 SUPPLEMENT by Marie Assa'ad−Faltas to 158 MOTION for Reconsideration re 156 Order. (mmcd) (Entered: 05/26/2020)
162 SUPPLEMENT by Marie Assa'ad−Faltas to 158 MOTION for Reconsideration re 156 Order. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − 2011−10−20 Summons 201310 Back, # 2 Exhibit 2 − 2011−10−20 Summons 201310 Front, # 3 Exhibit 3 − 2012−08−15 Letter from Hatcher−ocr, # 4 Exhibit 4 − 2016−03−08 City of Columbia Agent Michael O'Neill's e−mail to Dr. Assa'ad−Faltas Mail − Marie Faltas, # 5 Exhibit 5 − 2020−05−22 Rehearing Denied unexplained in Assa'ad−Faltas v. State, # 6 Exhibit 6 − 2020−05−22 Remittitur in Assa'ad−Faltas v. State, # 7 Exhibit 7 − 2019−10−31 Rehearing − Denied in City of Laurens v. City of Fountain Inn, # 8 Exhibit 8 − 2019−12−11 Rehearing − Denied in Ledford v. SC DPS, # 9 Exhibit 9 − 2020−01−15 Rehearing Denied Order in Winrose Homeowners' Association, # 10 Exhibit 10 − 2020−01−22 Rehearing − Denied with Substitute Opinion in Skydive v_, # 11 Exhibit 11 − 2020−02−12 Rehearing Denied Order in Woods v. State, # 12 Exhibit 12 − 2020−02−13 Rehearing Denied Order in Paschal v. Lott, # 13 Exhibit 13 − 2020−02−19 Opinion granting rehearing in State v. Hardin, # 14 Exhibit 14 − 2020−03−12 Rehearing Denied Order in Rose v. SC Dept of Probation Parole and Pardon, # 15 Exhibit 15 − 2020−03−12 Rehearing Denied in State v. Marquez Devon Glenn, # 16 Exhibit 16 − 2020−03−12 Rehearing Denied Order in State v. Aaron Scott Young Jr_, # 17 Exhibit 17 − 2020−04−01 Rehearing Denied Order in State v Spears, # 18 Exhibit 18 − 2020−05−22 Rehearing Denied Order in State v. Simmons) (mmcd) (Entered: 05/26/2020)
163 SUPPLEMENT by Marie Assa'ad−Faltas to 158 MOTION for Reconsideration re 156 Order. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Banniste v. Davis, # 2 Exhibit B − Bannister v. Davis) (lbak) (Entered: 06/01/2020)
164 RESPONSE in Opposition re 158 MOTION for Reconsideration re 156 Order, Terminate Motions Response filed by Rebecca Adams, Albert John Dooley, III, Bryan Koon, Lexington County, South Carolina, Gary Reinhart.Reply to Response to Motion due by 6/11/2020 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Woodington, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/04/2020)
165 RESPONSE in Opposition re 158 MOTION for Reconsideration re 156 Order, Terminate Motions Response filed by Twanda Marshinda Brown, Nora Ann Corder, Sasha Monique Darby, Xavier Larry Goodwin, Cayeshia Cashel Johnson, Amy Marie Palacios, Raymond Wright, Jr.Reply to Response to Motion due by 6/11/2020 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Dunn, Susan) (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/4/2020: # 1 Certificate of Service) (lbak) (Entered: 06/04/2020)

 
 3:17-cv-01426-MBS-SVH Date Filed 06/01/17 Entry Number 1 Page 1 of 98

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

TWANDA MARSHINDA BROWN, SASHA MONIQUE DARBY, CAYESHIA CASHEL JOHNSON, AMY MARIE PALACIOS, and XAVIER LARRY GOODWIN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

Case No.

Plaintiffs,

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

v.
LEXINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA; GARY REINHART, in his official and individual capacities as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County; REBECCA ADAMS, in her official and individual capacities as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County and in her official capacity as the Judge of the Irmo Magistrate Court; BRYAN KOON, in his official capacity as the Lexington County Sheriff; and ROBERT MADSEN, in his official capacity as the Circuit Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of South Carolina,

(Violation of Rights under the Fourteenth, Sixth, and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution)
JURY TRIAL REQUESTED

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION 1. Defendant Lexington County (“the County”) is home to a modern-day debtors’ prison. Impoverished people are routinely arrested and incarcerated for their inability to pay fines and fees imposed by the County’s magistrate courts in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases. Each year, hundreds, if not more than one thousand, of the poorest residents of the County and its surrounding areas are deprived of their liberty in the Lexington County Detention
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Center (“Detention Center”) for weeks and even months at a time for no reason other than their poverty and in violation of their most basic constitutional rights.
2. Plaintiffs Twanda Marshinda Brown, Sasha Monique Darby, Cayeshia Cashel Johnson, Amy Marie Palacios, and Xavier Larry Goodwin are victims of the ongoing and widespread constitutional violations occurring in Lexington County. Each Plaintiff is indigent and was arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for a period of time ranging from 20 to 63 days because she or he could not afford to pay magistrate court fines and fees that provide revenue to the County.
3. Ms. Brown was arrested on a Saturday morning at home, in front of her children, and was incarcerated for 57 days because she could not pay $1,907.63. Ms. Darby was arrested at her mother’s house and incarcerated for 20 days because she could not pay $680. Ms. Johnson was arrested at a traffic stop and incarcerated for 55 days because she could not pay $1,287.50. Ms. Palacios was arrested at a traffic stop and incarcerated for 21 days because she could not pay $647.50. Mr. Goodwin was arrested at a traffic stop and incarcerated for 63 days because he could not pay $1,710.
4. Plaintiffs’ arrests and incarcerations were not isolated incidents. Lexington County relies on the collection of fines and fees imposed on defendants in traffic and criminal cases in the County’s magistrate courts as a critical source of General Fund revenue. Year after year, the County projects it will collect substantial revenue in the form of magistrate court fines and fees despite the fact that the percentage of the County’s population living in poverty increased 14.5% from 2012 to 2015, according to U.S. Census estimates.
5. Over time, the generation of County revenue through magistrate court fines and fees has given rise to a system that routinely deprives indigent people of their rights under the
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U.S. Constitution. This system is established by the County and the following state officials: Defendant Gary Reinhart, the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County; Defendant Rebecca Adams, the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County; Defendant Bryan “Jay” Koon, the Lexington County Sheriff; and Defendant Robert Madsen, the Circuit Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in South Carolina, who also acts on behalf of Lexington County.
6. As the administrative policymakers for Lexington County magistrate courts, Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversee, enforce, and sanction two unwritten policies and practices that are the standard operating procedure in these courts: the Default Payment Policy and the Trial in Absentia Policy. Both of these policies and practices lead directly to the arrest and incarceration of indigent people, who cannot afford to pay magistrate court fines and fees, without any pre-deprivation court hearing concerning their ability to pay and without courtappointed counsel to help defend against incarceration.
7. Under the Default Payment Policy, Lexington County magistrate courts routinely order the arrest and jailing of people who cannot afford to make payments toward court fines and fees in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases. When an indigent person is unable to pay in full at sentencing, the magistrate court imposes a payment plan requiring steep monthly payments that are usually beyond the individual’s financial means. If the indigent person fails to pay in the amount of time required by the payment plan, the magistrate court issues a bench warrant that orders law enforcement to arrest and jail the individual unless the full amount owed is paid before booking in the Detention Center (“payment bench warrant”).
8. Similarly, under the Trial in Absentia Policy, Lexington County magistrate courts routinely order the arrest and jailing of indigent people who cannot afford to pay fines and fees
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imposed through trials and sentencing proceedings held in their absence. The County’s magistrate courts routinely ignore requests for continuances by indigent people who are ticketed for traffic or misdemeanor offenses and who contact the court to explain why they cannot appear on the date and time of their scheduled hearing. Rather, regardless of the reason for the defendant’s absence, Lexington County magistrate courts proceed without the defendant, impose a conviction in absentia, and sentence the defendant to a term of incarceration suspended on the payment of fines and fees. Without affording the defendant notice of the sentence, magistrate courts swiftly issue a bench warrant ordering law enforcement to arrest and jail the individual unless the full amount owed is paid before booking.
9. Defendant Koon, the chief law enforcement officer of the Lexington County Sheriff’s Department (“LCSD”) and the chief administrator of the Detention Center, oversees and directs the arrest and incarceration of indigent people who are subjected to bench warrants issued under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. Under his direction and supervision, LCSD officers execute payment bench warrants at people’s homes, during traffic and pedestrian stops, and elsewhere, including by enlisting other law enforcement agencies to locate debtors. Defendant Koon oversees and enforces a standard operating procedure by which people arrested on bench warrants, including indigent people, are transported to the Detention Center and incarcerated there for weeks to months at a time unless they can pay the full amount of fines and fees owed before booking, such as by raising money through phone calls from the jail to family and friends. Indigent people who are unable to pay remain in jail without ever seeing a judge, having a hearing, or receiving the advice of counsel.
10. As the administrative leadership of Lexington County’s magistrate courts, Defendants Reinhart and Adams are aware, or should be aware, that the Default Payment and
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Trial in Absentia Policies result in the persistent, widespread, and routine arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of court fines and fees without pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings or representation by counsel. Defendants Reinhart and Adams make a deliberate administrative decision not to correct this longstanding and pervasive practice through any written policy. As an exercise of their administrative authority, Defendants Reinhart and Adams also make a deliberate decision not to increase the size of magistrate court dockets, require additional hours of court operation, or request additional County funding for magistrate court operations in order to ensure that magistrate courts conduct pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings before ordering the arrest and incarceration of indigent people who are unable pay outstanding fines and fees in full. Finally, Defendants Reinhart and Adams make a deliberate administrative decision not to require or permit indigent people booked in jail on bench warrants to be brought to the Bond Court located adjacent to the Detention Center or to the original magistrate court that issued the bench warrant for a post-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing and appointment of counsel to guard against continued unlawful incarceration.
11. The Lexington County Council and Defendant Madsen, as the final policymakers for the provision of indigent defense in the County’s magistrate courts, routinely and systemically deprive indigent people of the right to assistance of counsel when they face incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen make the deliberate decision to provide grossly inadequate funding for indigent defense in Lexington County magistrate courts. Indeed, Defendants Lexington County and Madsen provide less than half the amount of funding provided for public defense by South Carolina counties of comparable population size. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen also make the deliberate decision not to assign public defenders to represent indigent people
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facing incarceration for nonpayment; not to assign public defenders in magistrate court proceedings that lead to sentences of incarceration suspended on payment of fines and fees; not to assign public defenders to staff the Bond Court to represent indigent people arrested on bench warrants for nonpayment; and not to assign public defenders to meet with indigent people incarcerated in the Detention Center under bench warrants. Instead, Defendants Lexington County and Madsen acquiesce to the longstanding, persistent, widespread, and routine absence of public defenders in Lexington County magistrate courts, particularly in cases that may and do lead to the incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees.
12. The arrest and jailing of indigent people for nonpayment of court fines and fees they cannot afford, including each of the Plaintiffs, is the result of deliberate decisions, actions, omissions, and longstanding policies, practices, customs, and standard operating procedures established, overseen, and sanctioned by Defendants Lexington County, Reinhart, Adams, Koon, and Madsen. Indigent people who lack the financial means to pay the full amount of fines and fees owed to Lexington County magistrate courts are routinely arrested and incarcerated for weeks and months at a time without being afforded a pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing, notice of the right to request counsel, or the assistance of a court-appointed attorney to help defend against incarceration. None of the Plaintiffs were provided a hearing on their ability to pay, informed of their right to request court-appointed counsel, or appointed counsel before being arrested and jailed for nonpayment of court fines and fees despite prima facie evidence of their indigence.
13. Through their deliberate acts and omissions, Defendants have established a system that relies on arrest and incarceration to elicit payment toward magistrate court fines and fees rather than providing people with notice of a failure-to-pay charge (for example, through an
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order to show cause), summoning them to magistrate court for an ability-to-pay hearing, providing notice of their right to request an attorney, and appointing counsel to represent those for whom there is prima facie evidence of indigence, including evidence of receipt of needsbased public assistance and income around or below the relevant Federal Poverty Guideline. This unlawful system involves the routine misuse of bench warrants, which South Carolina law and the South Carolina Supreme Court have made clear are to be used for the sole purpose of bringing to court a defendant who previously failed to appear—not to coerce indigent people to pay fines and fees they cannot afford under the threat of lengthy incarceration.
14. Defendants’ conduct has violated, and continues to violate, rights that are clearly established by the U.S. Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the incarceration of a person for nonpayment of court fines, fees, costs, assessments, or restitution without first holding a court hearing on the individual’s ability to pay and the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration and making a finding that nonpayment was willful. The Sixth Amendment requires affording indigent defendants the assistance of court-appointed counsel when sanctioned with actual incarceration for nonpayment of a court-ordered legal financial obligation, when facing a sentence of incarceration suspended upon the payment of fines and fees, and when the incarceration term of a suspended incarceration sentence is enforced. The Sixth Amendment also prohibits systemic deficiencies in the funding, staffing, and assignment of cases to public defenders that result in the denial of the right to counsel to indigent defendants. The Fourth Amendment prohibits arresting people based on warrants that are unsupported by probable cause of a criminal offense or probation violation, as is the case when a warrant is based solely on a report that the defendant has failed to pay a court-ordered legal financial obligation.
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15. The longstanding, routine, and widespread practice of arresting and jailing indigent people who owe fines and fees to Lexington County magistrate courts has instilled fear and panic among the poorest residents of the County and surrounding region. Indigent people who owe money to Lexington County feel pressured to divert funds for basic necessities—food, medication, utilities, rent, and transportation—to avoid jail and the devastating impact of incarceration on their families, loved ones, jobs, and housing.
16. Defendants continue to engage in acts and omissions that directly and proximately cause the arrest and jailing of people who owe fines and fees to the County’s magistrate courts despite their awareness of the longstanding, persistent, widespread, and routine deprivation of the constitutional rights of debtors, including indigent people.
17. As a result, Plaintiff Goodwin, who remains indigent and continues to owe $2,163 to a Lexington County magistrate court, faces an imminent and substantial threat that he will again be arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees in violation of his Fourteenth, Sixth, and Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff Goodwin brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate those constitutional rights and to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated impoverished people.
18. The actions, omissions, policies, practices, customs, and standard operating procedures of Defendants Lexington County, Reinhart, Adams, and Koon directly and proximately caused the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ liberty for extended periods of time, violated Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth, Sixth, and Fourth Amendment rights, and caused Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, anxiety, stress, emotional distress, sleeplessness, disturbed sleep, hunger, loss of employment, and other irreparable injury from being incarcerated in unsanitary jail conditions
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and separated from their families and loved ones. Accordingly, all Plaintiffs bring this action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate their individual rights and to seek damages for the violations

they suffered.

PARTIES1

19. Plaintiff Twanda Marshinda Brown is a 40-year-old indigent woman who resides

in Columbia, South Carolina. Ms. Brown is the mother of seven children and the sole provider

for her three youngest children, who are in secondary school. She also provides financial

support to her two older sons.

20. Plaintiff Sasha Monique Darby is a 27-year-old indigent woman who resides in

Fall River, Massachusetts. Ms. Darby is the mother of a four-year-old child for whom she

provides financial support.

21. Plaintiff Cayeshia Cashel Johnson is a 26-year-old indigent woman who resides in

Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Ms. Johnson is the mother and principal provider for four young

children, all of whom are under nine years old.

22. Plaintiff Amy Marie Palacios is a 40-year-old indigent woman who resides in

Lexington, South Carolina. Ms. Palacios is the mother of three children and the principal

provider for her two younger daughters.

23. Plaintiff Xavier Larry Goodwin is a 31-year-old indigent man who resides in

Columbia, South Carolina. Mr. Goodwin and his wife have two young daughters, and he is the

family’s principal financial provider. Mr. Goodwin is also the father of two sons for whom he

provides financial support.

1 Plaintiffs make the allegations in this Complaint based on personal knowledge as to all matters in which they have had personal involvement and on information and belief as to all other matters.
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24. Defendant Lexington County, South Carolina, is a municipal governmental entity whose policies, practices, and customs were, and continue to be, a moving force behind the constitutional violations described in this Complaint. The County, through the Lexington County Council, adopts ambitious projections for County revenue generation through the collection of fines and fees in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases in magistrate courts located in its territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, the County contracts with Defendant Madsen for public defense services in the County’s magistrate courts, and has delegated to him final policymaking authority for the County’s provision of indigent defense. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen deliberately, systematically, and routinely deprive indigent people of the right to assistance of counsel to defend against unlawful incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees. The County is also aware of and causes, authorizes, condones, ratifies, approves, participates in, or knowingly acquiesces to the longstanding, persistent, widespread, and routine absence of public defenders from Lexington County magistrate court proceedings that result in the imposition of actual or suspended incarceration sentences on indigent people. Plaintiffs pursue individual damages claims against Defendant Lexington County. Plaintiff Goodwin also sues the County for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of himself and the proposed class.
25. Defendant Gary Reinhart, a state actor, has served since 2004 as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County by order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. On April 30, 2015, the Governor of South Carolina reappointed, and the Senate confirmed, Defendant Reinhart to his current four-year term as a magistrate court judge. Defendant Reinhart’s administrative responsibilities include establishing and instituting standard operating procedures applicable to all Lexington County
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magistrate courts, including procedures concerning the collection of fines and fees; designating the hours of operation of those courts and determining their nighttime and weekend schedules; assigning cases to magistrate court judges across the County; coordinating the planning of budgets for Lexington County magistrate courts; administering the County Bond Court; and requesting County funding for magistrate court operations. Defendant Reinhart oversees, enforces, and sanctions the Default Payment Policy, the Trial in Absentia Policy, the policy of denying individuals arrested on bench warrants an ability-to-pay hearing in the Bond Court or the magistrate court that issued the bench warrant, and other written and unwritten policies, practices, and standard operating procedures that directly cause the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without any pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing or representation by court-appointed counsel to defend against unlawful incarceration. Defendant Reinhart resides in this District and this Division. Plaintiffs pursue damages claims against Defendant Reinhart in his individual capacity for actions taken in the exercise of his administrative authority. On behalf of himself and the proposed Class, Plaintiff Goodwin sues Defendant Reinhart in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief for ongoing constitutional violations resulting from the exercise of his administrative authority.
26. Defendant Adams, a state actor, has served since 2014 as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County by order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. On April 30, 2015, the Governor of South Carolina reappointed, and the Senate confirmed, Defendant Adams to her current four-year term as a magistrate court judge. Defendant Adams exercises the administrative responsibilities of the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County in the event that Defendant Reinhart is absent or disabled. She oversees, enforces, and sanctions the
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Default Payment Policy, the Trial in Absentia Policy, the policy of denying individuals arrested on bench warrants an ability-to-pay hearing in Bond Court or the magistrate court that issued the bench warrant, and other written and unwritten policies, practices, and standard operating procedures that directly cause the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without any pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing or representation by court-appointed counsel to defend against unlawful incarceration. Defendant Adams resides in this District and this Division. Plaintiffs pursue damages claims against Defendant Adams in her individual capacity for actions taken in the exercise of her administrative authority. On behalf of himself and the proposed class, Plaintiff Goodwin sues Defendant Adams in her official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief for ongoing constitutional violations resulting from the exercise of her administrative authority.
27. Defendant Adams also serves as the judge of the Irmo Magistrate Court. In her judicial capacity, Defendant Adams routinely sentences indigent people to pay fines and fees according to payment plan terms they cannot afford; routinely fails to inform people of their right to request court-appointed counsel and to seek waiver of the $40 public defender application fee on the basis of financial hardship; routinely fails to appoint counsel to represent indigent people incarcerated for nonpayment; and routinely fails to ensure that any waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Defendant Adams also routinely issues bench warrants ordering the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of fines and fees without any pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing and without affording them courtappointed counsel. On behalf of himself and the proposed class, Plaintiff Goodwin pursues a declaratory relief claim against Defendant Adams in her official capacity for her judicial actions.
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28. Defendant Bryan Koon, a state actor, is the elected Lexington County Sheriff, the chief law enforcement officer of the LCSD, and the chief administrator of the Detention Center. In his administrative capacity, Defendant Koon oversees and enforces the execution of bench warrants issued by Lexington County magistrate courts against people charged with nonpayment of fines and fees. Under his direction and supervision, LCSD officers execute bench warrants at people’s homes, during traffic and pedestrian stops, and elsewhere, including by enlisting other law enforcement agencies to locate debtors. Defendant Koon enforces a standard operating procedure by which people, including indigent people, are arrested on bench warrants and incarcerated in the Detention Center unless they can pay the full amount owed before booking, such as by raising money through phone calls to family and friends. Defendant Koon resides in this District and this Division. On behalf of himself and the proposed class, Plaintiff Goodwin sues Defendant Koon in his official capacity declaratory and injunctive relief for ongoing constitutional violations connected to the exercise of his enforcement and administrative authority.
29. Defendant Robert Madsen, who is both a state and local actor, is the Circuit Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in South Carolina, which includes Lexington County. Under South Carolina law, Defendant Madsen contracts with Lexington County to provide public defense services in the County’s magistrate courts. Defendant Madsen is responsible for requesting County funding for the provision of indigent defense in Lexington County’s magistrate courts, General Sessions Court, and Family Court. Defendant Madsen is also responsible for spending money appropriated by Lexington County, the state, and other sources to ensure the provision of public defense to indigent people in Lexington County magistrate courts. The County has delegated to Defendant Madsen final policymaking authority
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for the County’s provision of indigent defense. Defendant Madsen deliberately, systematically, and routinely deprives indigent people of the right to assistance of counsel to defend against unlawful incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees in Lexington County. Defendant Madsen is also aware of and causes, authorizes, condones, ratifies, approves, participates in, or knowingly acquiesces to the longstanding, persistent, widespread, and routine absence of public defenders from Lexington County magistrate court proceedings that result in the imposition of actual or suspended incarceration sentences on indigent people. These actions can be fairly attributed to Lexington County; in the alternative, Defendant Madsen engages in this conduct as a state actor. Defendant Madsen resides in this District and this Division. On behalf of himself and the proposed class, Plaintiff Goodwin sues Defendant Madsen in his official capacity as a final County policymaker for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. In the alternative, on behalf of himself and the proposed class, Plaintiff Goodwin sues Defendant Madsen in his official capacity as a state actor for declaratory and injunctive relief.
30. Defendants undertook all of the acts set forth in this Complaint under color of state law.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 31. This is a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief based on past and ongoing civil rights violations committed by Defendants Lexington County, Reinhart, Adams, Koon, and Madsen, in violation of the Fourteenth, Sixth, and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 32. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).
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33. An actual, ongoing controversy exists within this Court’s jurisdiction. The Court is therefore authorized to grant declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
34. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c), and (d) because this judicial district is where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred and where Defendants Lexington County, Reinhart, Adams, Koon, and Madsen reside.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. Lexington County’s Reliance on Magistrate Court Fines and Fees for General
Fund Revenue 35. Recent years have witnessed a rise in poverty among residents of Lexington County and its surrounding areas. According to U.S. Census figures, the County’s poverty rate jumped 14.5% from 2012 to 2015. U.S. Census figures also show that poverty rates increased in neighboring Richland County by 4% from 2012 to 2015. 36. Black and Latino residents of the County have been hardest hit. In 2015, 26.1% of Black residents and 27.7% of Hispanic and Latino residents lived in poverty compared to only 10.7% of white residents. Similarly, in neighboring Richland County in 2015, 22.4% of Black residents and 24.1% of Hispanic and Latino residents lived in poverty compared to only 10.8% of white residents. 37. Given these figures, a significant number of people living in and around Lexington County who are charged with traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases in the County’s magistrate courts are likely to suffer from poverty, particularly if they are Black or Latino. 38. Nevertheless, Lexington County relies heavily on magistrate court fines and fees from traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases as a critical source of General Fund revenue.
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39. Magistrate courts in South Carolina are courts of limited jurisdiction. All magistrate judges located in Lexington County have county-wide territorial jurisdiction over certain categories of criminal and traffic offenses, and certain civil claims.
40. Lexington County sets ambitious projections for General Fund revenue from the collection of fines and fees from defendants in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases in the County’s magistrate courts, which include the Central Traffic Court and six district magistrate courts—Irmo Magistrate Court, Lexington Magistrate Court, Swansea Magistrate Court, CayceWest Columbia Magistrate Court, Oak Grove Magistrate Court, and Batesburg-Leesville Magistrate Court.
41. The Lexington County Council is the County’s final policymaker concerning the establishment of annual General Fund revenue projections and the appropriation of County funds. Each year, the County Council considers requests for County funding and adopts the Lexington County annual budget. The County’s approved annual budget documents final decisions concerning the appropriation of funding for magistrate judge salaries, magistrate court operations, and public defender services in Lexington County courts.
42. The County’s annual budget also documents projected revenue from the collection of fines and fees from defendants in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases in magistrate courts. According to the Lexington County fiscal year 2017-2018 Requested Budget, the Central Traffic Court “generates substantial revenue from traffic violations, criminal fines and weight violations,” and the district magistrate courts are expected to “generate revenue from Criminal and Traffic cases.”
43. Together, the Central Traffic Court and district magistrate courts collected $1,420,154 in revenue from traffic and criminal fines for the County General Fund in fiscal year
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2015-2016. Of that amount, the Central Traffic Court alone generated over $1 million and the Irmo Magistrate Court generated more than $122,000. Thus, the Central Traffic Court and Irmo Magistrate Court generate the lion’s share of traffic and criminal fines and fees funneled into the County’s General Fund.
B. Failure to Provide Public Defense to Indigent People in Lexington County Magistrate Court Traffic and Criminal Cases
44. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen have a constitutional duty to operate a public defense system that provides the assistance of counsel to indigent people facing incarceration in cases handled by magistrate courts in Lexington County.
45. Through their actions, omissions, practices, policies, standard operating procedures, and customs, the County and Defendant Madsen systemically and routinely deprive indigent people of the right to assistance of counsel to defend against unlawful incarcerations ordered by Lexington County magistrate courts for nonpayment of fines and fees.
46. Under South Carolina law, Lexington County contracts with Defendant Madsen, the Circuit Public Defender for South Carolina’s Eleventh Judicial Circuit, to provide public defender services for the County’s magistrate courts, General Session Court, and Family Court.
47. Under South Carolina law, Defendant Madsen is responsible for seeking, and the County is responsible for providing, resources for public defender services in the County’s magistrate courts. Defendant Madsen submits annual requests for funding to Defendant Lexington County and meets with County officials to justify budgetary requests.
48. Under South Carolina law, Defendant Madsen also exercises final decisionmaking authority over the expenditure of resources appropriated by Lexington County for public defender services. Defendant Madsen is the final decision-maker on whether public defenders are assigned to serve indigent defendants in magistrate court proceedings and in the Bond Court.
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49. According to the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense website, “South Carolina’s Public Defender System is a county-based system.” County funding for public defense is critical to ensure that public defenders are appointed to represent indigent people in magistrate courts in each county.
50. Although the South Carolina General Assembly provides some annual funding for public defender services in each county, that amount is not intended to provide sufficient funding to ensure public defense in each county’s General Sessions Court, Family Court, and magistrate courts. To the contrary, the South Carolina public defender funding scheme requires counties to provide additional funding to ensure assistance of counsel in those courts.
51. Moreover, Defendant Madsen remits to Lexington County any state money he receives for public defender services in Lexington County because all of the employees assigned by Defendant Madsen to perform public defender services in Lexington County magistrate courts are County employees under South Carolina law.
52. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen have made, and continue to make, the deliberate decision to inadequately fund public defender services for indigent people facing incarceration in magistrate court cases.
53. Lexington County allocated only $514,306 for public defender services in fiscal year 2015-2016 and only $543,932 in fiscal year 2016-2017. The amount of funding requested by Defendant Madsen and provided by Lexington County for public defense is entirely inadequate to provide public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts.
54. Lexington County provides less than half of the funding for public defender services that counties of comparable population size provide, which demonstrates the gross inadequacy of the County’s funding for public defender services in magistrate courts.
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55. According to U.S. Census estimates, Lexington County had a population of 273,843 in 2015, while York County had a slightly smaller population of 240,076 and Spartanburg County had a slightly larger population of 291,240. Lexington County provided only $514,306 for public defender services in fiscal year 2015-2016, whereas both York County and Spartanburg County provided more than double that amount for the same time period: York County allocated $1,369,721 and Spartanburg County allocated $1,116,169.
56. A comparison of the ratio of county to state funding for public defender services in Lexington County and counties of comparable size further underscores the gross inadequacy of Lexington County’s funding for indigent defense. In fiscal year 2015-2016, Lexington County provided only 50% of the amount received from the state for public defender services, while York County provided 155% of the amount received in state funding and Spartanburg County provided 101%.
57. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen have made, and continue to make, a deliberate decision to prioritize the collection of public defender application fees over the provision of assistance of counsel to indigent people facing incarceration in magistrate court cases. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen have established a county-wide policy, practice, and custom of requiring indigent people to pay an up-front $40 fee at the time they apply for court-appointed representation and of failing to inform indigent people that they may seek a court waiver of the fee based on financial hardship.
58. As a result, on those rare occasions that an indigent person requests courtappointed counsel at an initial appearance in a traffic or criminal case in Lexington County magistrate court, it is standard operating procedure that the individual is directed to leave court and to travel to the office of the Lexington County Clerk of Court or to the Lexington County
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Public Defender’s Office in order to pay the $40 fee and submit the application for a public defender. This practice dissuades indigent people from applying for a public defender to help defend against incarceration in magistrate court cases.
59. As a result of the policies, practices, and customs of Defendants Lexington County and Madsen, only one public defender is assigned to represent indigent defendants in cases handled by the County’s magistrate courts. This level of staffing is entirely inadequate in light of the volume of magistrate court cases in which indigent people face incarceration, as discussed in paragraphs 331 to 336 below.
60. As a result of the policies, practices, and customs of Defendants Lexington County and Madsen, no public defender is present in court, or otherwise available for appointment, to represent an indigent person when a Lexington County magistrate court conducts critical proceedings in which the Sixth Amendment affords a right to counsel. Public defenders are entirely absent from magistrate court proceedings in which indigent people are sentenced to “fine or jail,” or to incarceration suspended upon payment pursuant to a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement. Public defenders are also entirely absent from any show cause hearings that may occur in magistrate court, at which indigent people are sanctioned with incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees.
61. As a result of the policies, practices, and customs of Defendant Lexington County and the actions, omissions, policies, practices, customs, and standard operating procedures of Defendant Madsen, no public defender is present in the Bond Court to represent indigent people who have been booked on bench warrants because they could not pay the amount of fines and fees specified on the face of the warrant. Nor is any public defender assigned to interview people booked in the Detention Center on magistrate court bench warrants, which would
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facilitate the identification of indigent people who have been incarcerated without the assistance of counsel or an ability-to-pay hearing.
62. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen, through their officers, representatives, and employees, have known of the structural deficiencies of their public defense system for many years.
63. In April 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union of South Carolina, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”) catalogued the deficiencies with indigent defense in South Carolina summary courts and specifically highlighted the lack of counsel for indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees in magistrate court cases. See ACLU of South Carolina, et. al., Summary Injustice: A Look at Constitutional Deficiencies in South Carolina’s Summary Courts 7, 13–14 (2016) (“Summary Injustice Report”).
64. The Summary Injustice Report received extensive media coverage in South Carolina and particularly in the Lexington County area.
65. On April 2, 2016, The Post and Courier drew attention to the Summary Injustice Report, highlighting “[t]he dearth of lawyers for the indigent” in South Carolina summary courts.
66. On April 4, 2016, The State reported that the Summary Injustice Report “paints a bleak picture of what can happen to poor and unrepresented defendants in the state’s lower courts where often no lawyer is present, cases are sometimes prosecuted by police and thousands face criminal charges that can send them to jail for 30 days with a criminal record.” The State also highlighted the finding that these courts “often fail to inform defendants of their right to counsel and refuse to provide counsel to the poor at all stages of the criminal process.”
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67. On April 5, 2016, South Carolina Radio Network reported on the Summary Injustice Report’s finding that summary courts “often rush[] through trials without allowing the state’s poorest residents to understand their rights to an attorney or sometimes even disregarding those individuals when they do.”
68. That same day, the Washington Post covered the Summary Injustice Report and highlighted that “South Carolina’s magistrate and municipal courts are often deprived of counsel, resulting in de facto debtors’ prisons across the state.”
69. In January 2017, NACDL issued a follow-up report that further confirmed the findings of the Summary Injustice Report. See National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al., Rush to Judgment: How South Carolina’s Summary Courts Fail to Protect Constitutional Rights (2017) (“Rush to Judgment Report”).
70. On January 21, 2017, the Post and Courier published an article detailing the findings of the Rush to Judgment Report as a “Top Story.”
71. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen know or should know that the inadequacies in the provision of indigent defense in South Carolina summary courts identified in the Summary Injustice Report apply to Lexington County magistrate courts.
72. Despite knowing about deficiencies in their system for public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts, Defendants Lexington County and Madsen have failed, and continue to fail, to take reasonable steps to protect the constitutional right to counsel of indigent people.
73. In 2016, Defendant Madsen presented a budget request to the County Council for a “jail attorney” to provide representation to inmates in the Detention Center on charges issued by the General Sessions Court. That request did not seek funding to represent indigent people in
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Lexington County magistrate courts even though it was made after the Summary Injustice Report had exposed the lack of counsel for indigent defendants in South Carolina summary courts. Defendant Madsen has not requested any County funding for the representation of indigent people incarcerated in the Detention Center because they cannot afford to pay fines and fees specified on magistrate court bench warrants.
74. The policies, practices, and customs described in the preceding paragraphs constitute the policy of Defendant Lexington County because the failure to adequately fund public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts is a decision of the Lexington County Council, the County’s final policymaker with respect to budgeting decisions.
75. The policies, practices, and customs described in the preceding paragraphs also constitute the policy of Defendant Lexington County because the failure to provide public defense to indigent people facing actual or suspended incarceration sentences in traffic and criminal cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts is longstanding, persistent, widespread, and so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.
76. The policies, practices, and customs described in the preceding paragraphs also constitute the policy of Lexington County because the County has delegated to Defendant Madsen final policymaking authority for the County’s provision of indigent defense. Defendant Madsen is aware, or should be aware, that there is a longstanding, persistent, and widespread failure to provide public defense to indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees in traffic and criminal cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts, and that this is due to grossly inadequate County funding, the requirement that indigent people pay an upfront $40 fee with each public defender application, and the failure to staff public defenders in
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magistrate court proceedings. Defendant Madsen causes, authorizes, condones, ratifies, approves, participates in, or knowingly acquiesces in these illegal policies, practices, and customs. Defendant Madsen’s actions and inactions were, and continue to be, deliberately indifferent to the clearly established Sixth Amendment rights of indigent people.
C. Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon Oversee, Enforce, and Sanction the Widespread and Routine Arrest and Incarceration of Indigent People Who Cannot Afford to Pay Magistrate Court Fines and Fees
77. Since at least 2014, by order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Defendant Reinhart has served as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County and Defendant Adams has served as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County.
78. On January 3, 2017, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued its most recent Order on Chief Judges for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts (“2017 Order”). Like previous orders, the 2017 Order grants Defendant Reinhart significant administrative responsibility over magistrate court policy, procedure, and practice.
79. The 2017 Order generally empowers Defendant Reinhart to convene quarterly meetings of the County’s magistrate and municipal court judges to “formulate procedures which establish uniformity of procedures in the county summary court system.” It also explicitly tasks Defendant Reinhart with the responsibility to establish a county-wide procedure “to ensure that court generated revenues are collected, distributed, and reported in an appropriate and timely manner” and to “[r]eport to the Office of Court Administration any significant or repetitive noncompliance by any summary court judge in the county concerning the Chief Judge’s execution” of this and other duties.
80. The 2017 Order also requires Defendant Reinhart to administer the County’s Bond Court, determine the nighttime and weekend schedules of county magistrate courts,
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designate the hours of operation of the County’s magistrate courts, assign cases to magistrate court judges across the County, coordinate the planning of budgets for Lexington County magistrate courts, and request County funding for magistrate court operations.
81. The 2017 Order requires Defendant Adams to carry out all of the administrative responsibilities of the Chief Judge in the event he is absent or disabled and to accept any administrative duties assigned by Defendant Reinhart.
82. Together, Defendants Reinhart and Adams have exercised, and continue to exercise, their administrative authorities to oversee, enforce, and sanction standard operating procedures across Lexington County magistrate courts that directly cause the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of fines and fees in violation of their basic constitutional rights.
1. Default Payment Policy 83. Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversee, enforce, and sanction the Default Payment Policy, which has become an unwritten standard operating procedure in Lexington County magistrate courts. 84. Lexington County magistrate courts routinely sentence people to the payment of hefty fines and fees for traffic and criminal cases. When an indigent person cannot afford to pay in full at sentencing, the County’s magistrate courts impose a payment plan, known as a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement, rather than reducing the sentence to an amount the individual can afford to pay or exploring other alternatives to payment and incarceration. 85. Under the Default Payment Policy, magistrate court judges in Lexington County do not inquire into financial ability to pay when imposing fines and fees on an indigent defendant and setting the terms of a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement. At most, a judge may ask if a
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defendant is employed. But magistrate court judges routinely fail to ask whether the defendant appearing before them has steady employment, the amount of any income, household size, expenses, the needs of financial dependents, or other financial responsibilities, including child support. Many judges do not even ask whether a defendant is employed, disabled, or otherwise unable to work. Instead, if a defendant cannot pay the full amount of fines and fees at sentencing, Lexington County magistrate court judges impose a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement that requires steep monthly payment amounts untailored to the needs of the individual and often entirely beyond the person’s financial means.
86. Under the Default Payment Policy, every indigent defendant whom the magistrate court places on a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement is charged an additional statutory court collection fee of three percent of the total amount of fines and fees for each offense.
87. Under the Default Payment Policy, when an indigent person fails to pay in the time or amount required by the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement, magistrate courts routinely issue a bench warrant that orders law enforcement to arrest and incarcerate the individual unless the full amount owed, including the collection fee, is paid.
88. Upon information and belief, Defendants Reinhart and Adams are aware of, and sanction the use of, magistrate court forms and procedures that implement the Default Payment Policy. When imposing a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement, magistrate courts require the defendant to sign a form that sets forth the payment schedule and includes the following statement: “Failure to appear as directed or failure to comply with the terms set forth in this payment schedule will result in BENCH WARRANT/COMMITMENT being issued for my arrest and denial of any future requests for a scheduled time payment.”
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89. The Scheduled Time Payment Agreement form does not explain that before being arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of court fines and fees, all people have a constitutional right to an ability-to-pay hearing and indigent people also have the right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel to defend against incarceration. Moreover, under the Default Payment Policy, Lexington County magistrate judges and court staff routinely fail to explain these rights to indigent people before requiring them to sign Scheduled Time Payment Agreements.
90. At no point before issuing a bench warrant for the arrest and incarceration of a debtor under the Default Payment Policy does a magistrate court judge hold a hearing to inquire about the reasons for the defendant’s nonpayment, the defendant’s ability to pay, or the availability of alternatives to payment and incarceration that would adequately achieve the goal of punishment and deterrence.
91. At no point before issuing a bench warrant for the arrest and incarceration of a debtor under the Default Payment Policy does a magistrate court judge notify the individual of the right to request court-appointed counsel or the right to request waiver of any public defender application fee. Likewise, at no point before issuing such a bench warrant does a magistrate court judge appoint counsel to represent indigent people who face incarceration for nonpayment.
92. Lexington County magistrate court judges routinely reference the Default Payment Policy when adjudicating individual traffic and criminal cases.
93. For example, when imposing sentences as a judge in the Irmo Magistrate Court, Defendant Adams routinely threatens indigent defendants with arrest and jail if they do not pay court fines and fees according to payment plan terms imposed by the court.
94. On one occasion, Defendant Adams sentenced a defendant to 30 days in jail suspended upon the payment of $500 for a breach of trust offense, ordered the defendant to make
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monthly payments of $100, and threatened, “Make sure you pay that. If not, I’ll have a bench warrant in 30 days for your arrest.”
95. On another occasion, Defendant Adams ordered a defendant to pay a nonwaivable court cost of $100 on two shoplifting charges and warned, “Don’t make me send [the officer] to get you for $100. Because I will.”
2. Trial in Absentia Policy 96. Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversee, enforce, and sanction the Trial in Absentia Policy, which has become an unwritten standard operating procedure in Lexington County magistrate courts and leads to the routine conduct of trials and sentencing proceedings in traffic and criminal cases without even having defendants present in court. 97. Lexington County magistrate courts routinely ignore or deny requests for a continuance when an indigent person who has been ticketed for a traffic or misdemeanor criminal offense contacts the court to request a new court date and to explain the reason for the request. Instead, Lexington County magistrate courts proceed without the defendant, impose a conviction in absentia, and sentence the person in absentia to a term of incarceration suspended on the payment of fines and fees. 98. Under the Trial in Absentia Policy, Lexington County magistrate courts do not ensure that the individual who has been tried and sentenced in absentia has actual notice of the conviction and sentence imposed. Instead, within a week of the date on which the sentence was imposed, the magistrate court issues a bench warrant that orders law enforcement to arrest and incarcerate the individual for a specified number of days unless the full amount of fines and fees owed is paid. Significantly, the purpose of the bench warrant is not to secure the individual’s
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appearance in court; rather, its purpose is to elicit payment or, if payment is not received, to incarcerate the person.
99. At no point before issuing a bench warrant ordering the arrest and incarceration of a debtor under the Trial in Absentia Policy does a magistrate court judge hold a hearing to determine whether the individual can afford to pay the fines and fees imposed or whether there are alternatives to payment or incarceration that would serve the court’s interest in punishment and deterrence.
100. At no point before issuing a bench warrant ordering the arrest and incarceration of a debtor under the Trial in Absentia Policy does a magistrate court judge notify the individual of the right to request court-appointed counsel or the right to request waiver of any public defender application fee. Likewise, at no point before issuing such a bench warrant does a magistrate court judge appoint counsel to represent indigent people who face incarceration for nonpayment.
101. Magistrate court judges and court staff routinely reference the Trial in Absentia Policy.
102. For example, at the end of a typical Central Traffic Court docket, court staff will call out each case in which a defendant has not appeared, hold a trial in absentia, and then announce that the defendant has been convicted and sentenced to a “fine or jail” sentence. The court staff person announces that the absent defendant is expected to pay the full amount of fines and fees within a specific amount of time and that if payment is not received, the court will issue a bench warrant ordering the arrest and jailing of the individual.
103. Upon information and belief, even when magistrate court staff fail to announce in open court that defendants in traffic and criminal cases will be tried and sentenced in absentia, magistrate court judges and court staff routinely conduct such trials outside the presence of the
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public and sentence the absent defendants to pay the full amount of fines and fees within a specific amount of time. If the payment is not received, the courts will issue a bench warrant ordering the arrest and jailing of the individual.
3. The Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies Result from the Exercise of Administrative Authority by Defendants Reinhart and Adams
104. Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversee, enforce, and sanction the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies through the exercise of their administrative responsibility for establishing uniform procedures in Lexington County magistrate courts, including a countywide procedure for the collection of magistrate court fines and fees “in an appropriate and timely manner.”
105. In their administrative capacities, Defendants Reinhart and Adams have oversight authority over nine magistrate court judges and 24 court staff who operate Lexington County magistrate courts. Under the direction and supervision of Defendants Reinhart and Adams, magistrate judges and court staff implement the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. Defendants Reinhart and Adams direct magistrate court staff to alert magistrate judges when people have failed to pay pursuant to the terms of Scheduled Time Payment Agreements or have not appeared in court on traffic or criminal charges, both of which trigger the issuance of bench warrants under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies.
106. Defendants Reinhart and Adams make a deliberate decision not to correct through any written policy the longstanding, pervasive, and widespread practice of arresting and incarcerating indigent people for nonpayment of fines and fees without pre-deprivation abilityto-pay hearings or representation by court-appointed counsel, which is the result of the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies.
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107. The 2017 Order requires Defendants Reinhart and Adams to report significant or repetitive non-compliance by any magistrate court judge concerning policies and procedures overseen and enforced by the Chief Judge, including those relating to the collection of magistrate court fines and fees. Defendants Reinhart and Adams have not reported to the Office of Court Administration any noncompliance with any county-wide policies, practices, and standard operating procedures concerning the collection of magistrate court fines and fees “in an appropriate and timely manner.”
108. Defendants Reinhart and Adams have the administrative authority to increase the size of magistrate court dockets, to require additional hours of magistrate court operation, to require magistrate judges to work on evenings and weekends, and to request additional County funding for magistrate court operations. They make a deliberate decision not to use any of these administrative powers to ensure that magistrate court judges and staff under their supervision expend the time and resources required to afford pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings and representation by court-appointed counsel to indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment.
109. The Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies squarely contradict South Carolina law and directives from the Supreme Court of South Carolina that permit the use of bench warrants only for the purpose of securing a defendant’s appearance in court. South Carolina Code Section 22-5-115 governs magistrate court criminal matters and provides: “If the defendant fails to appear before the court . . . a bench warrant may be issued for his arrest.” South Carolina Code Section 38-53-70 further provides: “If a defendant fails to appear at a court proceeding to which he has been summoned, the court shall issue a bench warrant for the defendant.” A November 14, 1980 Order of the Supreme Court of South Carolina makes clear
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that “bench warrants . . . are to be used only for the purpose of bringing a defendant before a court which has already gained jurisdiction over that defendant by previous service of a valid charging paper.” Moreover, a Memorandum dated November 24, 1980 from John Patrick, the Assistant Director of the South Carolina Office of Court Administration, to Magistrate and Municipal Judges transmitted the South Carolina Supreme Court’s Order concerning bench warrants and stated that “bench warrants . . . are to be used only for the purpose of bringing a defendant before a court.”
110. Even the South Carolina Summary Court Judges Bench Book, which is promulgated by the South Carolina Office of Court Administration and used to train magistrate judges, defines a bench warrant as “a form of process to be used to bring a defendant back before a particular court on a particular charge for a specific purpose after the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant on that particular charge by virtue of a previously served proper charging paper.” The Bench Book makes clear that the purpose of a bench warrant is to bring a defendant to court, even when the warrant is issued against a defendant who, “under sentence, fails to properly pay a fine” or a defendant who did not appear in court, was tried in absentia, and “must now be brought before the court to comply with the sentence.” See South Carolina Judicial Department, Summary Judges Benchbook, “Criminal,” Chapter C, “Warrants.”
111. As the administrative leadership responsible for coordinating between Lexington County magistrate courts and the Office of Court Administration, Defendants Reinhart and Adams know, or should know, that the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies involve the routine misuse of bench warrants to elicit fine and fee payments and to incarcerate indigent people rather than to bring defendants to court, contrary to South Carolina law and directives from the Supreme Court of South Carolina and the Office of Court Administration.
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112. In his administrative capacity under South Carolina law, Defendant Reinhart remits to the Lexington County Treasurer’s Office the fines and fees collected by the Central Traffic Court and six district magistrate courts. Defendant Reinhart is aware, or should be aware, that the fines and fees he collects and remits to the Lexington County Treasurer include payments made by indigent people who were under duress because they faced arrest and incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees under the Default Payment Policy or the Trial in Absentia Policy.
4. Defendant Koon Enforces the Arrest and Incarceration of Indigent People for Unpaid Fines and Fees
113. It is the standard operating procedure for Lexington County magistrate courts to transmit to the Warrant Division of the LCSD all bench warrants issued under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies.
114. Defendant Koon is the chief law enforcement officer of the LCSD and the chief administrator of the Detention Center.
115. Under South Carolina law, Defendant Koon has the authority and ongoing responsibility to execute bench warrants and to incarcerate people who have been arrested in the Detention Center. Rule 30(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure grants Defendant Koon “the continuing duty . . . to make every reasonable effort to serve bench warrants and to make periodic reports to the court concerning the status of unserved warrants.” Under Section 23-15-50 of the South Carolina Code, “[t]he sheriff or his deputy shall arrest all persons against whom process for that purpose shall issue from any competent authority commanding such person to be taken into custody or requiring him to give bond, with security.”
116. Under Defendant Koon’s direction and supervision, LCSD officers in the Warrant Division are required to locate and arrest the individuals named in bench warrants issued under
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the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. LCSD officers are often tasked with going to the home address of the individual, which is identified on the face of the warrant. They are also instructed to conduct bench warrant checks at traffic and pedestrian stops.
117. Under Defendant Koon’s direction and supervision, LCSD officers seek and obtain the assistance of other law enforcement agencies in South Carolina in locating people who are the subject of bench warrants. Upon information and belief, the LCSD has an agreement with the Richland County Sheriff Department (“RCSD”) by which RCSD officers go to the homes of Richland County residents who are the subject of Lexington County magistrate court bench warrants, execute those warrants, and detain the arrestees in the Richland County Jail for up to 72 hours before LCSD officers transport the arrestees to the Detention Center. LCSD has a similar agreement with the Horry County Sheriff’s Department.
118. Under South Carolina Code Section 22-5-210, LCSD officers are required to provide an arrestee with the bench warrant used to effect the arrest. Whether by providing the arrestee with a copy of the bench warrant and/or through verbal explanation, LCSD officers under the direction and supervision of Defendant Koon inform people arrested on bench warrants that the only way to avoid incarceration is to pay in full the fines and fees identified on the face of the warrant before booking.
119. Under Defendant Koon’s direction and supervision, when people arrested on a bench warrant are brought to the Detention Center, Detention Center staff explain to them that they must either pay the entire amount of the fines and fees identified on the bench warrant or serve the full term of incarceration identified on the bench warrant. Detention Center staff frequently serve a copy of the bench warrant on the arrested individual and explain that early release is possible for good time served at the rate of one day of credit for every two days in jail.
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120. Under Defendant Koon’s direction and supervision, it is a Detention Center standard operating procedure that if a person arrested on a bench warrant is unable to pay the full amount of the balance due identified on the face of the bench warrant before being booked in jail, he or she is incarcerated for approximately two-thirds of the time listed on the bench warrant. It is a standard operating procedure for Detention Center officers to begin the booking process as soon as they can verify that an arrestee is unable to pay the full amount of fines and fees identified on the face of the bench warrant.
121. Any payments made toward magistrate court fines and fees at the Detention Center are forwarded by Detention Center staff to the magistrate court that issued the bench warrant.
5. The Lack of Judicial Process After the Arrest and Incarceration of Indigent People for Nonpayment of Fines and Fees Results from the Exercise of Administrative Authority by Defendants Reinhart and Adams and the Actions of Defendant Koon
122. At no point after the issuance of a bench warrant and before an individual is booked in the Detention Center on a bench warrant does a Lexington County magistrate court hold a hearing to determine whether the individual’s nonpayment of fines and fees was willful or the result of inability to pay, notify the individual of the right to counsel, or appoint counsel to represent the individual at no cost to assist in defending against incarceration for nonpayment.
123. At no point after an individual is booked in the Detention Center on a bench warrant does a Lexington County magistrate court hold a hearing to determine whether the individual’s nonpayment of fines and fees was willful or the result of financial inability to pay, provide notice of the right to counsel to the individual, or appoint counsel at no cost to the individual to assist in defending against incarceration for nonpayment.
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124. Pursuant to South Carolina law and the 2017 Order, Defendants Reinhart and Adams determine the schedule, staffing, policies, procedures, and practices of the Lexington County Bond Court, which is located in a building adjacent to the Detention Center.
125. In the exercise of their administrative authority over the Bond Court, Defendants Reinhart and Adams have made, and continue to make, a deliberate decision not to require or even permit the Bond Court to review the cases of indigent people arrested and jailed on magistrate court bench warrants under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. Defendants Reinhart and Adams have elected to understaff the Bond Court and limit its hours of operation such that the Bond Court does not have the resources to afford hearings to people arrested and jailed on magistrate court bench warrants under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies.
126. In the exercise of their administrative authority over magistrate court case assignments and hours of operation, Defendants Reinhart and Adams have made, and continue to make, a deliberate administrative decision not to require or permit indigent people booked in jail on bench warrants to be brought to the original magistrate court that issued the bench warrant for a post-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing and appointment of counsel to guard against continued unlawful incarceration.
127. Under the direction and supervision of Defendant Koon, neither LCSD officers who transport bench warrant arrestees to the Detention Center nor Detention Center staff who book or detain these people bring them to the Bond Court (or any magistrate court) for an abilityto-pay hearing or inform them of their right to request the assistance of court-appointed counsel to defend against unlawful incarceration.
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128. As a result of the exercise of administrative authority by Defendants Reinhart and Adams and the deliberate acts of Defendant Koon, indigent people targeted for fine and fee collection through magistrate court bench warrants are jailed for weeks to months at a time simply because of their inability to pay the full amount of fines and fees identified on the bench warrant between the time of their arrest and before being booked in the Detention Center. Other indigent people are able to avoid incarceration only by forgoing basic necessities, begging their families and friends for money, and quickly selling their possessions in order to pay their debts in full.
D. The Effects of Defendants’ Policies, Practices, Customs, Acts, Omissions and Standard Operating Procedures on the Named Plaintiffs 1. Twanda Marshinda Brown
129. Twanda Marshinda Brown is a single mother of seven children, five of whom live with her. She is the sole provider for her three youngest children, who are in secondary school, and also provides financial support to her two older sons.
130. Ms. Brown lives in poverty. She works whenever she can find employment, but struggles to earn enough money to pay for rent, electricity, food, clothing, transportation, and other necessities for herself and her family.
131. Ms. Brown qualifies for needs-based public assistance in the form of Medicaid and Section 8, the federal housing subsidy program for low-income residents. She has relied on housing obtained with Section 8 assistance since at least 2015.
132. In 2016, Ms. Brown worked at Burger King and earned an annual income far below $24,250, the 2016 federal poverty guideline for a four-person household.
133. On March 15, 2016, Ms. Brown borrowed her niece’s car to drive a friend home even though she does not have a license to drive. On her way home, Ms. Brown was stopped
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and ticketed by an LCSD officer for driving on a suspended license (DUS, 2nd offense) and for driving with “no tag light.” The tickets instructed Ms. Brown to appear in the Irmo Magistrate Court on April 12, 2016.
134. On April 12, 2016, Ms. Brown appeared before Defendant Adams in the Irmo Magistrate Court.
135. Ms. Brown did not know, and Judge Adams did not inform her, that she had the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney before pleading guilty, and the right to seek a waiver of any public defender application fees due to financial hardship.
136. Without being informed of her rights and without the assistance of counsel, Ms. Brown pled guilty to the charges of DUS, 2nd offense and driving with no tag light.
137. Judge Adams sentenced Ms. Brown to $237.50 in fines and fees for the driving with no tag light offense. She also sentenced Ms. Brown to $2,100 in fines and fees for the DUS, 2nd offense, even though the maximum penalty under South Carolina law is $600, 60 days of imprisonment, or both.
138. Judge Adams asked Ms. Brown if she had any money to pay that day. When Ms. Brown responded that she did not, Judge Adams stated that Ms. Brown would be required to pay $100 each month toward her fines and fees.
139. Ms. Brown was scared. She knew that she could not afford to pay $100 each month to the court and still support her family. Ms. Brown told Judge Adams that she could afford to pay only $50 a month.
140. Judge Adams replied that a $50 monthly payment was not enough. Ms. Brown recalls that Judge Adams said, “I don’t care what happens. Your payment is going to be on the 12th. I want my money on the 12th.”
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141. Ms. Brown tried to explain her financial responsibilities related to her children. Judge Adams replied, “I don’t care if you have 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 kids.”
142. Judge Adams threatened to jail Ms. Brown for 90 days if she did not make a $100 payment each month to the Irmo Magistrate Court.
143. Judge Adams did not ask Ms. Brown about her income, assets, expenses, dependents or other financial obligations. Nor did Judge Adams ask whether Ms. Brown received any form of needs-based, means-tested public assistance.
144. The conduct and statements of Judge Adams terrified Ms. Brown. She left court fearing that if she missed a monthly payment to the court, she would be arrested and jailed.
145. After the hearing, Ms. Brown went to the payment window outside the courtroom. There she was given a “Trial Information and Plea Sheet.” Neither the judge nor any court staff explained the contents of the document to Ms. Brown. Ms. Brown provided her current mailing address and phone number on the document. Ms. Brown does not remember placing a check mark next to the appropriate statement on the Trial Information and Plea Sheet to indicate that she wished to plead guilty to the offenses charged or waive her right to counsel.
146. At the payment window, a staff member of the Irmo Magistrate Court Clerk’s Office also provided Ms. Brown with two Scheduled Time Payment Agreements. The staff person explained to Ms. Brown that a payment of $100 was due on the twelfth of each month and asked Ms. Brown to sign the documents. The staff person did not explain the other contents of the documents to Ms. Brown or provide copies of the documents to take home.
147. Ms. Brown signed the Scheduled Time Payment Agreements as instructed. 148. According to the terms of the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement, Ms. Brown was required to pay $2,163 in fines and fees for the DUS, 2nd offense and $244.63 in fines and
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fees for the driving with no tag light offense. The total amount due for each offense included a three percent collection fee.
149. Ms. Brown was not informed by the judge, court staff, or the Scheduled Time Payment Agreements that if her financial circumstances changed in the future and she was unable to pay the $100 required each month, she could request a court hearing on her ability to pay and consideration of alternatives to incarceration. Rather, the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement included the following paragraph: “Failure to appear as directed or failure to comply with the terms set forth in this payment scheduled will result in a BENCH WARRANT/COMMITMENT being issued for my arrest and denial of any future requests for a scheduled time payment.”
150. After her hearing in the Irmo Magistrate Court, Ms. Brown faced difficulty making payments to the court while also financially supporting herself and her family. Nevertheless, because she feared that Judge Adams would jail her if she missed a payment, Ms. Brown made payments to the Irmo Magistrate Court her highest priority.
151. Ms. Brown made payments of $100 to the Irmo Magistrate Court on the following dates: May 12, 2016; June 13, 2016; July 12, 2016; August 30, 2016; and October 4, 2016. These payments satisfied Ms. Brown’s fines and fees for the offense of driving with no tag light and contributed toward her fines and fees for the DUS, 2nd offense.
152. Despite her best efforts, Ms. Brown could not afford to make payments toward her court fines and fees after October 4, 2016. Ms. Brown’s income was diminished because she needed to reduce her hours at Burger King in order to take care of her son, who had an accident that required him to undergo a major surgery.
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153. Around the same time, the Burger King franchisee for whom Ms. Brown worked was not properly paying her. On numerous occasions in 2016, Ms. Brown faced difficulty cashing her paychecks from the Burger King franchisee because they bounced. The franchisee failed to correct the problem, and Ms. Brown left her job at Burger King in December 2016 to look for a new job that would provide consistent income.
154. During January 2017, Ms. Brown made significant efforts to find a new job and requested an extension of time to pay her electricity bills, which she could not afford to pay.
155. On January 12, 2017, Judge Adams issued a bench warrant ordering the arrest and jailing of Ms. Brown for nonpayment of fines and fees imposed for the DUS, 2nd offense. The warrant stated that Ms. Brown had a “sentence imposed/balance due of $1,907.63 or 90 days” and that she would be jailed “until he/she shall be thereof discharged by due course of law.”
156. In early February 2017, Ms. Brown secured temporary employment at McIntyre Food Products, where she packaged food sent to fast-food restaurants. Ms. Brown was grateful to have secured a job and hoped to resume her payments to the Irmo Magistrate Court after receiving her first paycheck on February 20, 2017. She also expected to be promoted to a permanent position with an hourly rate increase on that day.
157. On Saturday, February 18, 2017, at around seven o’clock in the morning, two RCSD officers came to Ms. Brown’s home in the City of Columbia. When Ms. Brown realized the officers were there for her arrest, she sent her youngest child to take out the trash so that he would not see her being handcuffed and arrested.
158. When Ms. Brown opened the front door, an officer informed her that there was a bench warrant for her arrest.
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159. The officers arrested Ms. Brown and transported her to the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center in Richland County. At the jail, Ms. Brown was served with the bench warrant issued by the Irmo Magistrate Court, which required her to pay $1,907.63 or serve 90 days in jail.
160. Ms. Brown could not afford to pay $1,907.63 and did not know anyone who could lend her the money to secure her release.
161. Ms. Brown was incarcerated for three nights in the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center. On February 21, 2017, she was transported to the Detention Center.
162. At the Detention Center, a guard informed Ms. Brown that she would have to serve 63 days of a 90-day sentence.
163. Ms. Brown was ultimately released on April 15, 2017. She was incarcerated for a total of 57 days—three days in the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center and 54 days in the Detention Center. Ms. Brown believes she was released earlier than expected because she earned additional credit toward her time by cleaning the jail.
164. Ms. Brown’s incarceration was devastating for her and her children. She was extremely distressed to be separated from her children, including her thirteen-year-old son. Ms. Brown cried every day out of concern for her children.
165. As a result of her 57-day-long incarceration, Ms. Brown was separated from her family, including her three teenage sons, one of whom is only thirteen years old. Ms. Brown also missed her son’s seventeenth birthday and her granddaughter’s first birthday, could not be with her family when her cousin died, and spent her fortieth birthday in the jail, away from her family.
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166. While she was incarcerated, Ms. Brown suffered from a severe migraine which caused her eyelids and face to swell, but did not receive any medication. Ms. Brown also lost her job at McIntyre Food Products, where she was supposed to be promoted to a permanent position with an hourly rate increase.
167. Following her release from jail, Ms. Brown is struggling to find paid work and to pay bills incurred while she was incarcerated.
2. Sasha Monique Darby 168. Sasha Monique Darby is a single mother of a four-year old son for whom she provides financial support. 169. Ms. Darby suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of abuse and assault she experienced as a child. 170. Ms. Darby lives in poverty. While in Massachusetts in 2015, she received needsbased public assistance in the form of Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”), and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”). 171. Ms. Darby and her son moved to South Carolina from Massachusetts in the spring of 2015 to be close to her mother and extended family. 172. Following her move to South Carolina, Ms. Darby struggled to find employment and financially support herself and her son. In 2016, she worked in several low-wage jobs, including as a forklift driver, but earned an annual income of around $11,770, the 2016 federal poverty guideline for a one-person household. 173. At first, Ms. Darby’s mother was able to help by providing child care for her son while Ms. Darby looked for work or worked. After suffering complications related to diabetes, Ms. Darby’s mother could no longer provide child care.
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174. Because Ms. Darby could not afford child care, in June 2015, she made the difficult decision to send her son to live with his paternal grandmother in Massachusetts. Ms. Darby continued to provide financial support for her son after he moved back to Massachusetts.
175. From January 2016 to early August 2016, Ms. Darby lived with a roommate in order to make ends meet, but the arrangement did not work out as she had hoped.
176. On August 4, 2016, the day on which Ms. Darby was supposed to move out of the apartment, her roommate demanded an additional payment of $200, which Ms. Darby believed was unjustified. Ms. Darby and her roommate got into a heated argument. Ms. Darby saw her roommate raise a hand and thought her roommate was going to hit her. Because she suffers from PTSD, Ms. Darby felt threatened. Out of fear, Ms. Darby responded by hitting her roommate first. Ms. Darby’s roommate called the police in response.
177. Two officers came to the apartment and issued Ms. Darby a ticket charging her with assault and battery in the third degree and requiring her to appear in the Irmo Magistrate Court on August 23, 2016.
178. Ms. Darby appeared in the Irmo Magistrate Court on August 23, 2016. 179. Before Ms. Darby entered the courtroom, an officer handed her a “Trial Information and Plea Sheet” and instructed her to “check a box.” 180. The Trial Information and Plea Sheet indicated that an application for a courtappointed attorney required a “$40 non-refundable fee.” Because she did not have $40, Ms. Darby placed a check mark next to the statement, “I waive my right to have an attorney present.” 181. The Trial Information and Plea Sheet also indicated that Ms. Darby could plead no contest, guilty, or not guilty. Because there was no one to help her, Ms. Darby placed a mark next to the option for “Not guilty” and went into the courtroom.
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182. Ms. Darby provided her mother’s permanent home address as her contact information on the Trial Information and Plea Sheet, along with her personal cell phone number. Ms. Darby had been staying with her aunt and her mother following the termination of her apartment share in August 2016 and received mail at her mother’s home.
183. When Ms. Darby’s name was called, Judge Adams read the Trial Information and Plea Sheet and said, “So you didn’t want a lawyer? Trial’s about to start now.”
184. Judge Adams did not inform Ms. Darby that she had the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney and the right to seek waiver of any fees related to the application for a public defender due to financial hardship.
185. Moreover, Judge Adams did not engage in a colloquy with Ms. Darby to determine whether any waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Judge Adams did not inform Ms. Darby of the benefits of being represented by counsel, the risks of proceeding pro se, or the potential penalties if she was found guilty. As a result, Ms. Darby did not make a knowing, voluntary or intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.
186. Judge Adams held a trial on the charge of assault and battery in the third degree. Ms. Darby did not know how to cross-examine a witness or take other steps to represent herself.
187. Judge Adams found Ms. Darby guilty of assault and battery in the third degree. 188. Judge Adams asked Ms. Darby whether she wanted to serve 30 days in jail or pay a fine. Because Ms. Darby did not want to go to jail, she stated that she would pay a fine. Judge Adams did not, however, inform Ms. Darby of the amount that she would have to pay. 189. Judge Adams asked Ms. Darby if she had the money to pay the fine. Ms. Darby was confused because she did not know how much the fine would be. She informed Judge Adams that she had some money.
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190. Judge Adams asked Ms. Darby where she worked, but asked no further questions about Ms. Darby’s financial circumstances.
191. At no point did Judge Adams tell Ms. Darby the amount of the fine imposed, ask whether Ms. Darby could pay that amount, or ask questions about Ms. Darby’s income, assets, expenses, dependents, or other financial obligations. Nor did Judge Adams ask whether Ms. Darby received any form of needs-based, means-tested public assistance.
192. Ms. Darby left the courtroom and went to the payment window. There, she was informed that she was sentenced to pay $1,000 in fines and fees. Ms. Darby was shocked. She could not afford to pay $1,000.
193. Ms. Darby returned to the courtroom and waited for Judge Adams to speak with her. When Judge Adams called her back to the bench, Ms. Darby requested a payment plan and indicated that she could afford to pay $100 to $120 a month. Ms. Darby knew that paying more than $100 per month would be difficult for her, but she sought to show Judge Adams that she would try her best to pay the fine as soon as possible.
194. Judge Adams said that the monthly payment amount Ms. Darby proposed was not enough and ordered Ms. Darby to pay $150 a month.
195. At the payment window, Ms. Darby paid $200 toward the $1000 fine. She signed a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement to pay the $800 balance and an additional three percent collection fee of $30. According to the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement, Ms. Darby was required to pay $150 each month from September 23, 2016 through January 23, 2016, and to make a final $80 payment on February 23, 2017.
196. Ms. Darby was not informed by the judge, court staff, or the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement that if her financial circumstances changed in the future and she was unable
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to pay the $150 required each month, she could request a court hearing on her ability to pay and consideration of alternatives to incarceration. Rather, the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement included the following paragraph: “Failure to appear as directed or failure to comply with the terms set forth in this payment scheduled will result in a BENCH WARRANT/COMMITMENT being issued for my arrest and denial of any future requests for a scheduled time payment.”
197. Following her trial and sentencing in the Irmo Magistrate Court, Ms. Darby had difficulty making the $150 payment due to the court on September 23, 2016. Nevertheless, she made a $150 payment on October 4, 2016.
198. Ms. Darby could not make further payments because she fell into significant financial distress in the fall of 2016.
199. In November 2016, Ms. Darby found herself facing additional childcare costs. Starting that month, Ms. Darby was required to spend $180 every two weeks for her son’s daycare. She was also saving money to visit her son in Massachusetts because, at that time, she had not seen him since the Mother’s Day weekend in May 2016 when she had last been able to afford a trip to Massachusetts.
200. On December 8, 2016, Judge Adams issued a bench warrant ordering the arrest and immediate jailing of Ms. Darby for nonpayment of fines and fees on the offense of assault and battery in the third degree.
201. On March 28, 2017, Ms. Darby went to her mother’s house to help support a family member who was scheduled to be transported to a mental health facility. Ms. Darby was pregnant at that time.
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202. The mental health facility personnel came to the house accompanied by two law enforcement officers. One officer recognized Ms. Darby and asked for her identification. The officer ran her name and informed Ms. Darby that there was a warrant for her arrest.
203. Ms. Darby was surprised. She had not received a notice from the Irmo Magistrate Court charging her with nonpayment, and her mother had not received any mail from the Irmo Magistrate Court addressed to Ms. Darby.
204. The officers arrested Ms. Darby and transported her to the Detention Center. 205. At the Detention Center, Ms. Darby was provided a copy of the bench warrant. It indicated that she was required to pay a balance of $680 toward her sentence for assault and battery in the third degree or serve 20 days in jail. 206. Ms. Darby could not afford to pay $680, and did not know anyone who could lend her the money to secure her release. 207. Ms. Darby was ultimately released on April 17, 2017. She was incarcerated in the Detention Center for 20 days. 208. Ms. Darby’s 20-day-long incarceration was devastating for her. Ms. Darby missed her first prenatal care appointment and was extremely distressed that she could not talk to her four-year-old son who lives in Massachusetts during the entire duration of her incarceration. 209. While she was incarcerated, Ms. Darby did not get enough food to eat or proper medical care related to her pregnancy. 210. While incarcerated, Ms. Darby feared she would lose her job because she could not report to work.
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211. During her incarceration, Ms. Darby’s landlord initiated eviction proceedings, which ultimately caused her to lose her home in May 2017. Ms. Darby also lost her job as a forklift driver due to her inability to report to work while incarcerated.
212. Because she would be homeless if she stayed in South Carolina, Ms. Darby moved to Massachusetts to live with family.
213. Ms. Darby is struggling to find paid work and to pay bills incurred while she was incarcerated.
3. Cayeshia Cashel Johnson 214. Cayeshia Cashel Johnson is a single mother and the principal provider for her four children, all of whom are under the age of nine. She and her children live in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. 215. Ms. Johnson lives in poverty. She works multiple part-time jobs and struggles to earn enough money to pay for rent, electricity, food, clothing, transportation, and other necessities to support herself and her family. 216. Ms. Johnson receives needs-based public assistance in the form of Medicaid and food assistance through SNAP. 217. In 2016, Ms. Johnson’s annual income was far below $28,410, the 2016 federal poverty guideline for a five-person household. 218. On August 21, 2016, Ms. Johnson got into a minor car accident in Lexington County when driving her mother’s car. At the time, Ms. Johnson was driving from Columbia to Myrtle Beach with a friend.
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219. Shortly after the accident, an LCSD patrol car arrived at the scene. The officer asked Ms. Johnson for her driver’s license. Ms. Johnson answered truthfully that she had a valid driver’s license but that it was not with her at the time.
220. The officer issued Ms. Johnson tickets charging her with five traffic offenses and one misdemeanor offense: (1) uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense; (2) operating a motor vehicle without license in possession; (3) improper start of vehicle; (4) violation of beginner permit; (5) failure to return license plate and registration upon loss of insurance, 1st offense; and (6) simple possession of marijuana.
221. The tickets notified Ms. Johnson that she was required to appear in court on September 22, 2016, and provided the address of the Central Traffic Court.
222. When Ms. Johnson returned to Myrtle Beach, her mother was upset about the accident and would no longer allow Ms. Johnson to drive her car. Ms. Johnson could not arrange for transportation to travel to Lexington for her court hearing from Myrtle Beach, which is approximately three hours away by car.
223. About a week before the scheduled hearing, Ms. Johnson called the Central Traffic Court and spoke to a staff person. Ms. Johnson informed the court staff person that she could not attend the court hearing because she lives in Myrtle Beach and could not find transportation to get to and from Lexington in light of her childcare and employment responsibilities. Ms. Johnson explained that she had called everyone she knew to ask for help in traveling to Lexington, but had not been able to secure transportation.
224. The court staff person informed Ms. Johnson that lack of transportation was not a valid reason for missing a court hearing and that her case would be tried in her absence.
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225. Ms. Johnson asked the court staff person about arranging a payment plan for the fines on the tickets. The court staff person told Ms. Johnson, “The only way to have a payment plan is to talk to the judge.”
226. The court staff person explained that the judge was in the middle of a hearing. Ms. Johnson provided the court staff person both her work number and cell phone number. The court staff person assured Ms. Johnson that the court would contact her.
227. No staff person or judge of the Central Traffic Court called Ms. Johnson to respond to her request for continuance and a payment plan.
228. On September 22, 2016, the Central Traffic Court tried Ms. Johnson in her absence and found her guilty of all six charges.
229. Ms. Johnson did not receive any notice that she had been tried in absentia, convicted of one misdemeanor and five traffic offenses, sentenced to serve jail time or pay fines and fees for three offenses, and sentenced to pay fines and fees for three offenses.
230. On September 26, 2016, the Central Traffic Court issued a bench warrant ordering the arrest and immediate jailing of Ms. Johnson. The bench warrant required Ms. Johnson to pay $1,287.50 or be jailed for 80 days for her conviction on the charges of uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense, operating a motor vehicle without license in possession, and simple possession of marijuana.
231. On February 13, 2017, Ms. Johnson was a passenger in a car driven by her cousin. They were near Ms. Johnson’s mother’s house in Myrtle Beach when local police stopped the car because of a broken taillight.
232. The officer asked for Ms. Johnson’s driver’s license. The officer informed her that there was a bench warrant for her arrest from Lexington County.
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233. The officer arrested Ms. Johnson immediately. Ms. Johnson explained that her children were waiting for her at home with her mother. The officer nevertheless handcuffed Ms. Johnson and took her to the local jail, the J. Reuben Long Detention Center in Horry County, where she was incarcerated for one night.
234. The next morning, on February 14, 2017, two officers from Lexington County transported Ms. Johnson to the Detention Center. At the Detention Center, Ms. Johnson was served with the bench warrant.
235. The bench warrant was the first notice Ms. Johnson had received that she had been convicted of uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense, operating a motor vehicle without license in possession, and simple possession of marijuana. It was also the first notice she received regarding the requirement to pay the Central Traffic Court $1,287.50 or serve 80 days in jail.
236. Ms. Johnson asked the officer who had given her the bench warrant, “Is this the amount I need to get out?” Ms. Johnson recalls that the officer responded, “Yes, that’s the amount or the days.”
237. Ms. Johnson could not afford to pay $1,287.50 and did not know anyone who could lend her the money to secure her release.
238. Ms. Johnson was ultimately released on April 9, 2017. She was incarcerated for a total of 55 days—one night in the J. Reuben Long Detention Center and 54 days in the Detention Center.
239. Ms. Johnson’s 55-day-long incarceration was devastating for her and her four children. Ms. Johnson was extremely distressed to be separated from her four children for eight
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long weeks. Likewise, because Ms. Johnson’s family was located hours away in Myrtle Beach, they were unable to visit her during the entire eight weeks of her incarceration.
240. While she was incarcerated, Ms. Johnson also suffered from severe headaches for which she received insufficient medical attention.
241. While incarcerated, Ms. Johnson feared that she would lose the three part-time jobs that she held before her arrest due to her inability to report to work. Upon her release, Ms. Johnson discovered that she lost all three jobs, which had provided critical financial support to her and her children, as a result of her incarceration.
242. Following her release from jail, Ms. Johnson struggled to find paid work and to pay bills incurred while she was incarcerated. She ultimately found employment in low-wage jobs but still struggles to support her family financially.
243. Upon her release from the Detention Center, Ms. Johnson discovered that she still owes Lexington County $905 for the charges of improper start of vehicle, violation of beginner permit, and failure to return license plate and registration upon loss of insurance.
244. Ms. Johnson received a letter from the Central Traffic Court indicating that she also owes $100 “non-suspendable mandatory costs,” which were due on May 15, 2017.
245. Ms. Johnson does not have the money to pay $905 for the outstanding tickets or $100 in mandatory costs.
4. Amy Marie Palacios 246. Amy Marie Palacios is a single mother and the principal provider for herself and her two teenage daughters. 247. In 2016, Ms. Palacios moved to South Carolina in order to live closer to her extended family.
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248. Ms. Palacios lives in poverty. She works whenever she can find employment but struggles to earn enough money to support herself and her family.
249. In 2016, Ms. Palacios earned an annual income below $20,090, the federal poverty guideline for a three-person household in that year.
250. Ms. Palacios’ driver’s license was suspended in or around June 2015 because she had neglected to pay the fine for a speeding ticket incurred that year. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Palacios moved to California.
251. When Ms. Palacios returned to South Carolina in May 2016, she paid the fines on the 2015 speeding ticket, contacted the DMV to find out exactly how much she owed in reinstatement fees, and began saving money in earnest to pay those fees and reinstate her driver’s license. Her ability to reinstate her license was delayed, however, in part because of miscommunication between different DMV offices.
252. On October 28, 2016, Ms. Palacios was a passenger in a car driven by a friend who was pregnant. When her friend felt sick and could no longer drive, they pulled over and switched places. A few minutes later, Ms. Palacios was stopped by state troopers at a roadblock.
253. The state troopers ran the names of Ms. Palacios and her friend for warrants. One of the troopers discovered that Ms. Palacios’ driver’s license was suspended. Ms. Palacios explained that she had driven only because her friend was pregnant and had suddenly become too ill to drive. Ms. Palacios also explained that she was working toward getting her driver’s license reinstated but could not afford to pay the reinstatement fee.
254. The officer ticketed Ms. Palacios for driving on a suspended license (DUS, 1st offense). The ticket notified Ms. Palacios that she was required to appear in court on November 10, 2016 and provided the address of the Central Traffic Court.
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255. Before her court date, Ms. Palacios discovered she would be unable to attend the hearing due to work. Ms. Palacios worked twelve hours a day, five to six days a week, as a restaurant server with only one break between 3:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m.
256. On November 9, 2016, Ms. Palacios called the Central Traffic Court to ask how to request a different court date. She explained to a court staff person that she could not attend the court hearing because she was scheduled to work at the restaurant during the time of the hearing and could not secure time off or find anyone to replace her during her shift.
257. The court staff person explained to Ms. Palacios that her manager could fax an affidavit to the court explaining her situation. Ms. Palacios asked what would happen if she did not attend the hearing. The court staff person assured her, “As long as you fax that over, you should be ok.” The staff person said that the judge would review the papers and notify her of the decision.
258. That same day, Ms. Palacios faxed to the Central Traffic Court an affidavit from her employer that explained that Ms. Palacios would not be able to attend court due to work. The affidavit stated: “I Jorge Gomez Manager @ El Jimador Mexican Restaurant state that Amy Palacios is scheduled to work on 11/10/2016 & cannot attend court date scheduled for 11/10/2016. Ms. Palacios would like to request an extension for this date to avoid any future issues. If you have any Questions, Please call me.” The affidavit provided Mr. Gomez’s contact information.
259. Neither Ms. Palacios nor her employer received a call or written notice from the court in response to her request for a new court date. Because the court staff person of the Central Traffic Court had assured her that the court would follow up with her, Ms. Palacios did not check on the status of her case.
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260. On November 10, 2016, Ms. Palacios was tried in her absence in the Central Traffic Court and found guilty of DUS, 1st offense.
261. Ms. Palacios did not receive any notice that she had been tried in absentia, convicted of a traffic offense, and sentenced to serve jail time or pay fines and fees for the offense.
262. On November 15, 2016, the Central Traffic Court issued a bench warrant ordering the arrest and immediate jailing of Ms. Palacios. The bench warrant required Ms. Palacios to pay $647.50 or be jailed for 30 days for her conviction on the charge of DUS, 1st offense.
263. Around 1:00 a.m. on February 25, 2017, after work, Ms. Palacios had dinner with a close friend who was staying at a local motel. Another friend who was at the dinner agreed to drive Ms. Palacios home.
264. Several minutes after the friend pulled her car out of the parking lot of the motel, an LCSD patrol car stopped the vehicle for not having a proper, visible tag.
265. Unbeknownst to Ms. Palacios, the driver’s license of the friend who was giving her a ride had been suspended. While the officers issued a ticket for driving on a suspended license to the friend, Ms. Palacios made calls to find someone who could drive her home.
266. One of the officers asked Ms. Palacios for her identification. When Ms. Palacios told the officer that her license had been suspended, the officer asked for another valid form of identification. Ms. Palacios provided her South Carolina state identification card.
267. The officer ran Ms. Palacios’ name and discovered an outstanding bench warrant. 268. The officers transported Ms. Palacios to the Detention Center. 269. Before being booked in the Detention Center, Ms. Palacios asked why there was a bench warrant for her arrest. An officer informed her that the bench warrant was related to the
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October 2016 charge against her for DUS, 1st offense. The officer explained, “So either you do 30 days in jail or you pay a fine of $647.50. These are your options.”
270. Ms. Palacios was confused. She asked, “So I can pay to get out?” The officer responded that she was correct.
271. This discussion of the bench warrant was the first notice Ms. Palacios received that she had been convicted of DUS, 1st offense. It was also the first notice she received regarding the requirement to pay the Central Traffic Court $647.50 fines and fees or serve 30 days in jail.
272. Ms. Palacios could not afford to pay $647.50 and did not know anyone who could lend her the money to secure her release.
273. Ms. Palacios was never served a copy of the bench warrant. 274. When she arrived at the Detention Center, Ms. Palacios also asked the officer whether she would be seen in the Bond Court. The officer responded, “No. When you have a bench warrant, you don’t go to the Bond Court. Either you pay the fine or you sit for 30 days.” 275. Ms. Palacios was ultimately released on March 18, 2017, after serving 21 days in the Detention Center. 276. Ms. Palacios’ 21-day incarceration was devastating for her and her family. Ms. Palacios was extremely distressed to be separated from her daughters, and missed the opportunity to take her fifteen-year-old daughter to the DMV for her driving test. 277. While incarcerated, Ms. Palacios feared that she would lose her job as a server at El Jimador. Upon her release, Ms. Palacios discovered that she lost her job, which had provided critical financial support for her and her daughters, as a result of her incarceration.
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278. While she was incarcerated, Ms. Palacios also suffered from high blood pressure, for which she received insufficient medical attention.
279. Ms. Palacios continues to owe the Central Traffic Court a $25 non-suspendable cost related to her conviction for DUS, 1st offense.
5. Xavier Larry Goodwin 280. Xavier Larry Goodwin is the principal provider for a household of four people: his two teenage daughters, his wife, and himself. He also pays $232 each week—around $12,000 a year—in child support for two sons with whom he does not live. 281. Mr. Goodwin lives in poverty. He struggles to financially support himself and his family through his work as a welder and machine operator. 282. Mr. Goodwin qualifies for needs-based public assistance in the form of Medicaid. 283. In 2016, Mr. Goodwin earned an annual income around $32,570, the federal poverty line for a six-person household. 284. On July 15, 2016, Mr. Goodwin received five traffic tickets during a traffic stop: (1) DUS, 2nd offense; (2) uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense; (3) seatbelt violation; (4) temporary license plate – time limit to replace; and (5) use of license plate other than for vehicle which issued. The tickets instructed Mr. Goodwin to appear in the Central Traffic Court on August 9, 2016. 285. On August 9, 2016, Mr. Goodwin was unable to appear in court due to work. Mr. Goodwin called the Central Traffic Court during his morning break. Because he thought he had already missed the court hearing, Mr. Goodwin asked the court staff person, “Is there anything that can be done so I can reappear or reschedule the court date?” The court staff person told Mr. Goodwin, “It’s best if you just come down here and see what can be done.” The Central Traffic
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Court is open on Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Mr. Goodwin could not go to the court that day because of his work schedule.
286. On August 9, 2016, Mr. Goodwin was tried in his absence in the Central Traffic Court and found guilty of all five charges.
287. Mr. Goodwin did not receive any notice that he had been tried in absentia, convicted of five traffic offenses, sentenced to serve jail or pay fines and fees for two of the offenses, and sentenced to pay fines and fees for the other three offenses.
288. On August 10, 2016, the Central Traffic Court issued a bench warrant ordering the arrest and immediate jailing of Mr. Goodwin. The bench warrant required Mr. Goodwin to pay $1,710 or be jailed for a total of 90 days for his conviction on the charges of DUS, 2nd offense and uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense.
289. On February 2, 2017, Mr. Goodwin was stopped by an LCSD patrol car a block away from his home.
290. One of the officers asked Mr. Goodwin for his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. Mr. Goodwin gave the officer the vehicle registration and proof of insurance and explained that he did not have a driver’s license.
291. The officers discovered there was an outstanding bench warrant for Mr. Goodwin’s arrest. They returned to Mr. Goodwin’s car and asked him to step out of the car and put his hands behind his back.
292. The officers told Mr. Goodwin that he was being arrested on a bench warrant. They also issued him a ticket for DUS, 3rd offense. The ticket notified him that he was required to appear in the Irmo Magistrate Court on April 4, 2017.
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293. Mr. Goodwin was transported to the Detention Center. At the Detention Center, Mr. Goodwin was served with the bench warrant. This bench warrant was the first notice Mr. Goodwin had received that he had been convicted of DUS, 2nd offense, and uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense. It was also the first notice he received regarding the requirement to pay the Central Traffic Court $1,710 in fines and fees or to serve 90 days in jail.
294. The following morning, on February 3, 2017, Mr. Goodwin was taken to the Bond Court for a hearing on the DUS, 3rd offense charge from the previous day. The Bond Court judge did not inform Mr. Goodwin of his right to request the assistance of court-appointed counsel or his right to seek waiver of any public defender application fee. Nor did the judge appoint counsel to represent Mr. Goodwin as an indigent person facing incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees. The Bond Court judge did not address the Central Traffic Court bench warrant that was the basis for his arrest and incarceration.
295. On April 4, 2017, the officer who had issued Mr. Goodwin the DUS, 3rd offense ticket on February 2, 2017 came to the Detention Center and transported Mr. Goodwin to the Irmo Magistrate Court for a hearing.
296. On their way to court, Mr. Goodwin asked the officer whether he could request a public defender. The officer suggested that the screening process could take a long time and that Mr. Goodwin’s incarceration in the Detention Center could be extended as a result. Mr. Goodwin feared the prospect of spending additional time in jail and did not ask any further questions about requesting a public defender.
297. Judge Adams of the Irmo Magistrate Court heard Mr. Goodwin’s case. 298. Mr. Goodwin did not know, and the judge did not inform him, that he had the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney before pleading guilty and the right
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to seek a waiver of any fees related to the application for a public defender due to financial hardship.
299. Without being informed of his rights and without the assistance of counsel, Mr. Goodwin pled guilty to the charge of DUS, 3rd offense.
300. Judge Adams sentenced Mr. Goodwin to 90 days in jail and $2,100 in fines and fees. The judge credited the time Mr. Goodwin had already spent incarcerated in the Detention Center toward the jail portion of the sentence. She also said something to the effect of: “You are not gonna make a payment, which I think will happen. I’m gonna issue a bench warrant faster than you can turn your head.”
301. Judge Adams instructed Mr. Goodwin to return to court to set up a payment plan within 30 days of his release from jail. She threatened to have him arrested and incarcerated if he failed to do so.
302. Mr. Goodwin was transported back to the Detention Center after the court hearing.
303. Mr. Goodwin was ultimately released from the Detention Center on April 6, 2017 and transported to the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center in Richland County to serve time on a bench warrant issued by the Upper Township Magistrate Court in Richland County.
304. On April 26, 2017, Mr. Goodwin was released from the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center.
305. Mr. Goodwin was incarcerated for a total of 63 days in the Detention Center for nonpayment of fines and fees to the Central Traffic Court. His incarceration was devastating for him and his family. Mr. Goodwin was extremely distressed to be separated from his family. He
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was unable to be with his daughter on her eleventh birthday or with his wife on their wedding anniversary.
306. Mr. Goodwin was housed in a dorm in the Detention Center that was very hot and had significant mold growth on the walls due to a leaky roof and ceiling. Mr. Goodwin suffered from a cold and severe headaches as a result of the fans used to circulate air in the dorm because the air conditioner was broken.
307. While incarcerated, Mr. Goodwin feared that he would lose the job he had held for thirteen years and his home. Upon his release, he discovered that he had lost both.
308. Following his release from the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center, Mr. Goodwin has struggled to find a job he can get to without driving and to earn enough money to get himself and his family back on their feet.
309. On May 5, 2017, Mr. Goodwin went to the Irmo Magistrate Court to establish a payment plan for the $2,100 fine owed to the Irmo Magistrate Court. The court staff person at the payment window gave Mr. Goodwin a piece of paper and said, “This is your copy. I need for you to sign and date this back copy. Your first payment will start in June.” The Scheduled Time Payment Agreement was already completed and required Mr. Goodwin to make a monthly payment of $100 starting on June 5, 2017. It also indicated that Mr. Goodwin was being charged a three percent collection fee.
310. Mr. Goodwin explained to the court staff person that he had just been released from jail and did not have a job. Nevertheless, she required him to sign the Schedule Time Payment Agreement, which required Mr. Goodwin pay $100 each month.
311. Mr. Goodwin signed the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement.
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312. Mr. Goodwin is not able to pay $100 on June 5, 2017 as required by the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement. Mr. Goodwin continues to struggle to earn money and to rebuild his life following his extended incarceration. He and his family do not have a home, and Mr. Goodwin is behind on bills incurred during his incarceration including child support payments. Mr. Goodwin still owes fines on three traffic charges for which he was tried and convicted in absentia by the Central Traffic Court as well as court costs on all five offenses adjudicated in that court.
313. Mr. Goodwin faces an imminent and substantial risk that the Irmo Magistrate Court will issue a bench warrant ordering law enforcement officers to arrest and book him in the Detention Center unless he can pay $2,163—the entire balance owed for the DUS, 3rd offense.
6. Allegations Common to All Plaintiffs 314. Plaintiffs would not have been booked in the Detention Center if they had been able to pay the entire amount of the court fines and fees identified on the face of the magistrate court bench warrants used to arrest them before being booked in the Detention Center. 315. Plaintiffs were not afforded ability-to-pay hearings when their fines and fees were imposed by Lexington County magistrate courts. 316. No Lexington County magistrate court inquired into Plaintiffs’ financial ability to pay the fines and fees identified on the bench warrants used to arrest them, their efforts to secure resources, or alternatives to incarceration. No Lexington County magistrate court determined that Plaintiffs’ nonpayment of fines and fees was willful, that Plaintiffs made inadequate efforts to secure resources to pay, or that alternatives to incarceration and payment were inadequate— whether before issuing the bench warrants, after Plaintiffs were arrested, or after Plaintiffs were booked in the Detention Center.
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317. At no point after being arrested on the bench warrants were any of the Plaintiffs taken to appear before a Lexington County magistrate judge in the Bond Court located adjacent to the Detention Center or in the original magistrate court that issued the bench warrant for a determination as to the propriety of incarceration.
318. At no point before or after being incarcerated in the Detention Center under magistrate court bench warrants were Plaintiffs notified of their right to request the appointment of counsel to defend against incarceration for the underlying offense charged or noncompliance with a court order to pay fines and fees. Likewise, at no point before or after being incarcerated were Plaintiffs informed of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee. And at no point did any of the Lexington County magistrate court judges engage in a colloquy with Plaintiffs to ensure that any waiver of the right to request appointment of counsel, whether written or oral, was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
319. At no point before or after being incarcerated in the Detention Center under magistrate court bench warrants were Plaintiffs afforded representation by court-appointed counsel in order to defend against incarceration despite prima facie evidence of their indigence.
320. Plaintiffs suffered humiliation, anxiety, stress, emotional distress, disturbed sleep and other irreparable injury from being handcuffed, arrested, jailed, separated from their families and loved ones, and incarcerated for periods of time ranging from 20 to 63 days.
321. Ms. Brown, Ms. Darby, Ms. Johnson, and Ms. Palacios were incarcerated in a very cold dorm in the Detention Center. Detention Center staff provided insufficient clothing for each Plaintiff and only a thin blanket despite the very low temperature.
322. Mr. Goodwin was subjected to discomfort from hot and unsanitary jail conditions.
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323. As a direct result of their unlawful incarceration, Plaintiffs lost needed income and employment.
E. Evidence of Widespread Arrest and Jailing of Indigent People for Nonpayment of Magistrate Court Fines and Fees
324. Magistrate court records obtained through public records requests and available on the South Carolina Judicial Department’s online Case Records Search system (“Public Index”) demonstrate the widespread use of bench warrants by Lexington County magistrate courts to coerce fine and fee payments.
325. The Public Index allows public searches for information concerning traffic and criminal cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts, including the Central Traffic Court, Irmo Magistrate Court, Lexington Magistrate Court, Swansea Magistrate Court, CayceWest Columbia Magistrate Court, Oak Grove Magistrate Court, and Batesburg-Leesville Magistrate Court. A Public Index case record provides, among other information, the name of the defendant, case number, the name of the court and judge handling the case, the date on which the case was filed, a description of the offense charged, the date on which the case was disposed, and the type of disposition.
326. A Public Index case record also includes an “Action” tab that contains information about whether the defendant is on a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement and the date of any required payments. A court may notate the “Action” tab with the term “Failure to Comply” or the term “Archived Bench Warrant,” among other things.
327. A Public Index case record also includes a “Financials” tab that identifies whether any fines and fees imposed as part of the sentence for an offense remain outstanding and the date and amounts of any payments that have been made.
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328. A review of the Central Traffic Court bench warrants and corresponding Public Index case records pertaining to Plaintiffs Johnson, Palacios, and Goodwin shows that the date of the bench warrant issued against each of these Plaintiffs corresponds with the date of a “Failure to Comply” or “Archived Bench Warrant” notation in the “Action” tab of the applicable Public Index case record.
329. Similarly, a review of the Irmo Magistrate Court bench warrants and corresponding Public Index case records pertaining to Plaintiffs Brown and Darby shows that the date of each bench warrant corresponds with the date of a “Failure to Comply” notation in the “Action” tab of the applicable Public Index case record.
330. Consequently, the issuance of a bench warrant by the Central Traffic Court, Irmo Magistrate Court, or any other Lexington County magistrate court is documented by the entry of a “Failure to Comply” or “Archived Bench Warrant” notation with the date of the bench warrant in the applicable Public Index case record.
331. A search of Public Index case records for Lexington County magistrate courts reveals that between February 1, 2017 and March 31, 2017, the courts reported a “Failure to Comply” or “Archived Bench Warrant” notation in 204 cases corresponding to 183 different individuals. Therefore, between February 1, 2017 and March 31, 2017, around 183 people were at risk of being arrested, or ultimately were arrested, under a bench warrant issued for nonpayment of fines and fees to a Lexington County magistrate court.
332. If bench warrants are issued at the same rate throughout the year, this two-month estimate suggests that bench warrants are issued against more than 1,000 people each year for nonpayment of fines and fees imposed by a Lexington County magistrate court.
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333. A review of online Detention Center records demonstrates that the use of bench warrants to coerce payments toward magistrate court fines and fees results in the widespread arrest and incarceration of indigent people.
334. The Detention Center produces a daily list of all inmates. This online list identifies the name of each inmate, the “Primary Charge,” the “Arrest Date,” and the “Booking Agency.” Individual records associated with each inmate are also available online and provide more detailed information, including any additional charges and any outstanding “FINES AND COSTS.”
335. A review of these records for the period beginning May 1, 2017 and ending May 28, 2017 shows that, over the course of those four weeks, 95 people were incarcerated for a primary charge listed as either “Magistrate Court Bench Warrant” or “Magistrate/Municipal Court Bench Warrant.” The largest total number of people incarcerated under either primary charge on any given day was 63, and the average daily total was 43. The inmates for whom the unpaid balance of fines and costs were posted on the Detention Center’s online record owed between $232.50 and $3,470.00, with an average debt amount of $960.60.
336. It is fair to estimate that hundreds of indigent people, if not more than one thousand, are incarcerated each year on bench warrants issued for nonpayment of fines and fees imposed by Lexington County magistrate courts. On average, the number of people jailed under such warrants on any given day during the four-week period amounted to 7.22% of the total inmate population. In 2015, the total number of people booked in the Detention Center was 12,100, and in 2016 the total number was 10,980. Assuming that 10,000 people in total are booked in the Detention Center in 2017, it is highly likely that more than 700 will be incarcerated on a bench warrant issued for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees.
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337. As a result of the policies, practices, and customs of Defendants Lexington County and Madsen, and the failures, acts, omissions, policies, practices, and standard operating procedures of Defendants Reinhart, Adams, Koon and Madsen, indigent people are routinely arrested and jailed for nonpayment of fines and fees owed to Lexington County magistrate courts in violation of their most basic constitutional rights.
338. At the time Plaintiffs were arrested and jailed, Defendants were on notice that indigent people were routinely arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without first being afforded pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings or representation by counsel, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
339. Defendants were also on notice that Lexington County magistrate court judges, including Defendant Adams, routinely sought to obtain written waivers of the right to counsel from indigent people before a plea proceeding or trial on standard forms without adequately informing them of their rights or engaging in any colloquy to determine whether any waivers were knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
340. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen were also on notice that their underfunding of public defense in magistrate courts and staffing decisions had led to the absence of public defenders from magistrate court proceedings leading to incarceration or the imposition of suspended incarceration sentences, and from Bond Court proceedings.
341. Defendants were also on notice that indigent people were routinely arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center on bench warrants unsupported by probable cause of criminal conduct in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
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CLASS ALLEGATIONS 342. Plaintiff Goodwin brings this case as a class action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated for the purpose of asserting declaratory and injunctive relief claims on a common basis. 343. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which Plaintiff Goodwin and the proposed class members can challenge Defendants’ common courses of conduct in relation to the routine and widespread incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of fines and fees in Lexington County magistrate court cases. 344. This action is brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 345. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a). 346. Plaintiff Goodwin seeks to represent the following defined class (the “Class”): “All indigent people who currently owe, or in the future will owe, fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution in cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts.” 347. The Class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. Hundreds, if not thousands, of indigent people currently owe fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution in cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts, and these numbers will continue to grow. 348. Class members are subjected to the ongoing policies, practices, customs, standard operating procedures, acts, and omissions of Defendants discussed in this Complaint. To the extent they are not currently incarcerated, Class members (including Plaintiff Goodwin) face a substantial and imminent threat of being arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without a pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing, notice of the right to request
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court-appointed counsel to defend against incarceration, notice of the right to request a waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, or the assistance of counsel.
349. As discussed above, a search of online court records indicates that Lexington County magistrate courts collectively issued 204 bench warrants charging at least 183 people with nonpayment of fines and fees between February 1, 2017 and March 31, 2017. It is estimated that hundreds, if not thousands, of indigent people have been the subjects of bench warrants issued under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies during the past few years. Many of these warrants likely remain unexecuted, placing hundreds of indigent people, if not thousands, at substantial and imminent risk of arrest and incarceration for nonpayment without the notice and process required by law.
350. Defendants maintain records with the names, case numbers, and bench warrant dates of those who owe fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution in cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts.
351. Joinder of all Class members is also impracticable because many members are unaware that their rights under the U.S. Constitution have been violated or that they are entitled to seek redress in court. Members of the Class also lack the means to retain an attorney to represent them in a civil rights lawsuit. Finally, many Class members are likely to avoid bringing individual claims because they fear retaliation and reprisal, including arrest and incarceration, by one or more Defendants. There is no appropriate avenue for the protection of the Class members’ constitutional rights other than a class action.
352. The class members share a number of common questions of law and fact, including, but not limited to:
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a. Whether Defendant Koon, his deputies, and officers of cooperating law enforcement agencies routinely arrest members of the Class on payment bench warrants;
b. Whether Defendant Koon and his deputies routinely incarcerate for extended periods of time members of the Class who are arrested on payment bench warrants when they cannot pay all fines and fees identified on the faces of those warrants;
c. Whether Defendant Koon and his deputies routinely fail to bring members of the Class before Lexington County magistrate court judges after executing payment bench warrants, even when members are jailed for extended periods of time;
d. Whether members of the Class are routinely denied the assistance of counsel before being incarcerated in the Detention Center on payment bench warrants;
e. Whether Defendant Reinhart is a state actor in his capacity as Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County;
f. Whether Defendant Reinhart is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional due process and equal protection rights of Class members;
g. Whether Defendant Reinhart is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to assistance of counsel;
h. Whether Defendant Reinhart is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to be free from unreasonable seizures;
i. Whether Defendant Adams is a state actor in her capacity as Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County;
j. Whether Defendant Adams is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional due process and equal protection rights of Class members;
k. Whether Defendant Adams is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to assistance of counsel;
l. Whether Defendant Adams is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to be free from unreasonable seizures;
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m. Whether Defendant Koon is a state actor in his capacity as Lexington County Sheriff;
n. Whether Defendant Koon is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional due process and equal protection rights of Class members;
o. Whether Defendant Koon is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to assistance of counsel;
p. Whether Defendant Koon is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to be free from unreasonable seizures;
q. Whether Defendant Koon sanctions the misuse of payment bench warrants against members of the Class;
r. Whether Defendant Lexington County has a practice of inadequately funding public defense for people charged with traffic and other misdemeanor offenses handled in the County’s magistrate courts;
s. Whether Defendant Lexington County’s practice of inadequately funding public defense for indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees is the result of a deliberate decision by the Lexington County Council as the County’s final policymaker for budgetary appropriations for public defense in the County’s magistrate courts;
t. Whether Defendant Lexington County’s practice of inadequately funding public defense for indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees is so pervasive and well-settled as to constitute Lexington County custom with the force of law;
u. Whether Defendant Lexington County’s policymakers have actual or constructive knowledge of the County’s custom of failing to adequately fund public defense and acquiesce in that custom;
v. Whether Defendant Madsen is a state actor in his capacity as Circuit Public Defender;
w. Whether Defendant Madsen is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to assistance of counsel;
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x. Whether Defendant Madsen is a final policymaker concerning Lexington County’s provision of indigent defense in magistrate courts;
y. Whether Defendant Madsen fails to adequately fund public defense for indigent people who face the threat of incarceration in the County’s magistrate courts;
z. Whether Defendant Madsen fails to adequately allocate resources for the public defense of Class members being incarcerated in the Detention Center for failure to pay court fines and fees;
aa. Whether the right to be free from unreasonable seizures is routinely violated in relation to the arrest and jailing of Class members on payment bench warrants;
bb. Whether members of the Class are routinely deprived of their right to an ability-to-pay hearing before or after being arrested on payment bench warrants;
cc. Whether the right to assistance of counsel is routinely violated in relation to the arrest and jailing of Class members on payment bench warrants;
dd. Whether the right to due process is routinely violated in relation to the arrest and jailing of Class members on payment bench warrants; and
ee. Whether the right to equal protection of the law is routinely violated in relation to the arrest and jailing of Class members on payment bench warrants.
353. Plaintiff Goodwin’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class because all
claims arise from the same common courses of conduct by Defendants. Like the other Class
members, Mr. Goodwin currently owes fines and fees to at least one Lexington County
magistrate court, cannot afford to pay according to the terms of his Scheduled Time Payment
Agreement, and faces a substantial and imminent risk of being arrested and incarcerated for
nonpayment. Indeed, Mr. Goodwin has been previously arrested and incarcerated for
nonpayment of fines and fees owed to the Central Traffic Court.
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354. Plaintiff Goodwin seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under legal theories that are the same as those on which all members of the Class will rely.
355. Plaintiff Goodwin has suffered and faces a substantial and imminent risk of continuing to suffer harms that are typical of the harms Class members have suffered and are continuing to suffer.
356. Plaintiff Goodwin has a strong personal interest in the outcome of this action, has no conflicts of interest with members of the Class, and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.
357. By developing and maintaining policies, practices, standard operating procedures, acts, and omissions that result in the routine and widespread arrest and incarceration of people for nonpayment of fines and fees owed in Lexington County magistrate court cases, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Class, and final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole.
358. The named Plaintiffs are represented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of South Carolina, and Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC (“Terrell Marshall”). All counsel are experienced civil rights attorneys who have litigated a range of complex class action lawsuits and have knowledge of the relevant constitutional and statutory law.
359. Plaintiffs’ counsel also have extensive knowledge of the widespread constitutional violations occurring in Lexington County and outlined in this Complaint based on a months-long investigation involving court observation, review of public records, and numerous interviews with witnesses, inmates, and families. Plaintiffs’ counsel have studied Lexington County budget documents, court records from numerous Lexington County magistrate courts,
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and Detention Center online records in order to understand Defendants’ policies, practices, standard operating procedures, and customs as they relate to federal constitutional requirements.
360. Plaintiffs’ counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation have served as lead counsel in similar federal lawsuits bringing constitutional challenges to revenue generation and debt-collection systems in violation of the rights of indigent people to notice, process, and counsel. See Kennedy v. Biloxi, 1:15-cv-348-HSO-JCG (S.D. Miss Oct. 21, 2015); and Thompson v. DeKalb County, No. 1:15-cv-280 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2015). Plaintiffs’ counsel at Terrell Marshall served as lead counsel, with the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation as co-counsel, in a state lawsuit bringing similar constitutional claims. See Fuentes v. Benton County, No. 15-2-02976-1 (Wash. Superior Court, Yakima Cty. Oct. 7, 2015). Plaintiffs’ counsel at Terrell Marshall have also served as lead counsel in a federal lawsuit bringing constitutional challenges to inadequate public defense. Wilbur v. Mount Vernon, No. C111100RSL (W.D. Wash. April 15, 2014).
361. Plaintiffs’ counsel have the resources, expertise, and experience to prosecute this action. Plaintiffs’ counsel know of no conflicts among members of the Class or between the attorneys and members of the Class.
362. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class such that final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate to the Class as a whole.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 363. Plaintiffs request a trial by jury.
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CLAIM ONE FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Incarceration Without Pre-deprivation Ability-to-Pay Hearing (in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Plaintiff Goodwin against Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon, in
their official capacities) 364. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 365. This claim is brought by Mr. Goodwin on behalf of himself and the members of the Class. 366. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution have long prohibited the imprisonment of people for nonpayment of courtimposed fines or restitution without a pre-deprivation inquiry by a judge into the person’s ability to pay, efforts to secure resources to pay and, if the person lacks the ability to pay despite having made reasonable efforts to acquire resources, the adequacy of any alternatives to incarceration. Courts are prohibited from jailing people for nonpayment without conducting such an inquiry and making at least one of the following findings: (1) the individual’s nonpayment was willful; (2) the individual failed to make sufficient efforts to acquire the resources to pay; or (3) the individual was unable to pay, despite having made sufficient efforts to acquire resources, but alternative methods of achieving punishment or deterrence are inadequate. 367. Plaintiff Goodwin suffered a violation of his clearly established right to a predeprivation ability-to-pay hearing when he was arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for 63 days because he could not afford to pay fines and fees owed to the Central Traffic Court. Before his lengthy incarceration, Mr. Goodwin was not afforded a pre-deprivation judicial
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inquiry into, or findings of fact on, ability to pay, efforts to secure resources, or the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration.
368. Plaintiff Goodwin is indigent and owes $2,163 in fines and fees to the Irmo Magistrate Court, a Lexington County magistrate court under the administrative supervision of Defendants Reinhart and Adams. Mr. Goodwin is unable to pay the $100 payment due on June 5, 2017 as required by the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement imposed on him. Mr. Goodwin faces a substantial and imminent risk that, without being afforded a pre-deprivation ability-topay hearing, a bench warrant for nonpayment will issue and Defendant Koon will arrest and incarcerate him in the Detention Center on that warrant. For all relevant purposes, all individuals processed for commitment to the Detention Center for unpaid fines, fees, costs, assessments or restitution imposed by Lexington County magistrate courts are similarly situated with respect to their right to due process of law. There exists no legitimate governmental reason to jail individuals who are unable to pay the full amount of outstanding monetary penalties for traffic or misdemeanor criminal offenses, while permitting individuals who have the financial means to pay fines, fees, costs, assessments, and restitution to avoid being jailed for the same offenses.
369. In their official, administrative capacities, Defendants Reinhart and Adams are sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the rights of Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class to due process and equal protection of the law. In their exercise of administrative responsibility for the establishment of uniform policies and procedures for the timely and appropriate collection of court fines and fees in Lexington County, Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversee, enforce, and sanction the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. The Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies have become unwritten standard operating procedures in Lexington County magistrate courts, and directly and proximately lead
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to the routine and widespread use of bench warrants to arrest and incarcerate indigent people for nonpayment of court fines and fees without any pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing. Moreover, Defendants Reinhart and Adams have failed, and continue to fail, to exercise their administrative authority to correct the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies.
370. As a judge on the Irmo Magistrate Court, Defendant Adams is also sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the rights of Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class to due process and equal protection of the law. In her judicial capacity, Defendant Adams routinely orders the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without affording any pre-deprivation ability-topay hearings, just as she did in the cases of Plaintiffs Brown and Darby. Moreover, Defendant Adams sentenced Plaintiff Goodwin to pay fines and fees according to a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement, and Mr. Goodwin is unable to afford the required payments. Mr. Goodwin and members of the Class thus face a substantial and imminent risk of being arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of the magistrate court fines and fees they owe without a predeprivation ability-to-pay hearing.
371. In his official capacity as Lexington County Sheriff and chief administrator of the Detention Center, Defendant Koon is also sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class. By supervising, controlling, and directing LCSD officers and Detention Center staff who execute bench warrants issued under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies, Defendant Koon effects the arrest and incarceration of people for nonpayment of fines, fees, costs, assessments, or restitution without necessary pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings and judicial findings concerning the reasons for nonpayment. Mr. Goodwin and members of the Class face a
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substantial and imminent risk of being arrested and incarcerated under bench warrants for nonpayment of fines and fees. Defendant Koon is responsible for executing and enforcing any such bench warrants.
372. The ongoing conduct of Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon places Plaintiff Goodwin at continuing and foreseeable risk of being arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of fines and fees without any pre-deprivation court hearing on his ability to pay despite prima facie evidence of his indigence. Mr. Goodwin seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of himself and members of the Class because he and the members have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to prevent future injury caused by confinement in jail in violation of their constitutional rights.
373. The ongoing conduct of Defendants Reinhart, Adams and Koon violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon act under color of state law and their conduct creates a real, imminent, and substantial threat that Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class will be arrested and jailed in violation of their due process and equal protection rights.
CLAIM TWO FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Failure to Afford Assistance of Counsel (in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Plaintiff Goodwin against Defendant Lexington
County and Defendants Madsen, Reinhart, Adams, and Koon, in their official capacities)
374. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs.
375. This claim is brought by Plaintiff Goodwin on behalf of himself and the members of the Class.
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376. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution affords all indigent people a right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel at no cost when they face actual incarceration for nonpayment of fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution, regardless of whether incarceration is imposed through criminal contempt procedures or the implementation of a sentence of incarceration previously suspended upon the condition of payment of monetary penalties.
377. Plaintiff Goodwin suffered a violation of his clearly established right to counsel when he was arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for nonpayment of fines and fees owed to the Central Traffic Court without being informed of his right to request counsel, informed of his right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, and appointed counsel as an indigent person facing incarceration for nonpayment, despite prima facie evidence of his indigence.
378. Plaintiff Goodwin is indigent and owes $2,163 fines and fees to the Irmo Magistrate Court, a Lexington County magistrate court under the administrative supervision of Defendants Reinhart and Adams. Mr. Goodwin is unable to pay the $100 payment due on June 5, 2017 as required by the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement imposed by Defendant Adams. Mr. Goodwin faces a substantial and imminent risk that without affording him the assistance of counsel, Defendant Adams will issue a bench warrant ordering his arrest and incarceration for nonpayment and Defendant Koon will arrest and incarcerate him in the Detention Center on that warrant.
379. The policies, practices, customs, standard operating procedures, acts and omissions of Defendants Lexington County and Madsen directly and proximately cause ongoing
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violations of the right to counsel, and Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class face an imminent and substantial threat of having that right violated.
380. As the County’s final policymakers for the provision of public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts, the Lexington County Council and Defendant Madsen routinely and systematically deprive indigent people of the right to court-appointed counsel at no cost when facing incarceration for nonpayment of court fines and fees by providing grossly inadequate funding for indigent defense in Lexington County magistrate courts. The Lexington County Council and Defendant Madsen either know, or should know, when making final decisions to inadequately fund public defense in these courts that public defenders are routinely not assigned to provide any representation to indigent people facing suspended or actual incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees. Defendant Lexington County and Defendant Madsen’s policy of grossly underfunding public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts therefore reflects deliberate indifference to the Sixth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class.
381. Defendant Madsen also makes deliberate decisions when requiring the payment of an up-front $40 fee with each application for a public defender; when failing to assign public defenders to represent indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment; when failing to assign public defenders to represent indigent people sentenced by magistrate courts to incarceration suspended on payment of fines and fees; when failing to assign public defenders to staff the Bond Court to represent indigent people arrested on bench warrants for nonpayment; and when failing to assign public defenders to meet with indigent people incarcerated in the Detention Center under bench warrants. As the County’s final policymaker for the provision of indigent defense, Defendant Madsen is aware, or should be aware, that such decisions result in
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the longstanding, persistent, and widespread failure to provide public defense to indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees in traffic and criminal cases in Lexington County magistrate courts. Defendant Madsen causes, authorizes, condones, ratifies, approves, participates in, or knowingly acquiesces in these illegal policies, practices, and customs. Defendant Madsen’s actions and inactions are deliberately indifferent to the clearly established Sixth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class.
382. The failure to provide public defense to indigent people facing actual or suspended incarceration sentences in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases in Lexington County magistrate courts is so longstanding, persistent, widespread, common, and well-settled as to constitute a custom with the force of law. Lexington County has acquiesced to this custom, and it fairly represents municipal policy.
383. In their official, administrative capacities, Defendants Reinhart and Adams are sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the right to counsel of Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class.
384. In their exercise of administrative responsibility for the establishment of uniform policies and procedures for the timely and appropriate collection of magistrate court fines and fees in Lexington County, Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversee and enforce the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies as standard operating procedures in Lexington County magistrate courts. These policies routinely lead to the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without notice of the right to request counsel, without notice of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, and without affording court-appointed counsel to defend indigent people from incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees. The enforcement of the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia
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Policies by Defendants Reinhart and Adams places Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class at substantial and imminent risk of arrest and incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
385. Moreover, Defendants Reinhart and Adams make deliberate decisions to exercise their administrative authority to enforce, oversee, and sustain a standard operating procedure by which judges accept so-called written “waivers” of the right to counsel through the use of Trial Information and Plea Sheets without engaging in the colloquy necessary to ensure that any waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. These deliberate decisions place Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class at substantial and imminent risk of violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
386. As a judge on the Irmo Magistrate Court, Defendant Adams is sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the right to counsel of Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class. In her official capacity and in an exercise of her judicial authority, Defendant Adams places Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class at substantial and imminent risk of violation of the right to counsel when facing incarceration or a suspended sentence for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees. Defendant Adams routinely violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by failing to notify indigent people of the right to request counsel, failing to notify them of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, and failing to appoint counsel to represent them at no cost before ordering their arrest and incarceration for nonpayment, despite prima facie evidence of indigence. Defendant Adams also routinely fails to inform indigent defendants of the risk of proceeding without counsel. Finally, Defendant Adams routinely fails to engage in any colloquy to ensure that the
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act of signing a Trial Information and Plea Sheet confirms a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.
387. In his official capacity, Defendant Koon is sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the right to counsel of Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class. By supervising, controlling, and directing LCSD officers and Detention Center staff who execute bench warrants issued under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies, Defendant Koon effects the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of fines, fees, costs, assessments or restitution without the assistance of counsel. Mr. Goodwin and members of the Class face a substantial and imminent threat of being subjected to bench warrants for nonpayment of fines and fees, and Defendant Koon is responsible for executing and enforcing any such bench warrants.
388. The ongoing policies, practices, customs, standard operating procedures, acts, and omissions of Defendants Lexington County, Madsen, Reinhart, Adams, and Koon place Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class at a continuing and foreseeable risk of being arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for nonpayment of fines and fees without the benefit of representation by court-appointed counsel. Mr. Goodwin seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of himself and members of the Class because he and the members have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to prevent future injury caused by confinement in jail in violation of their Sixth Amendment rights.
389. The conduct of Defendants Lexington County, Madsen, Reinhart, Adams, and Koon violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants act under color of state law and their conduct creates a real, imminent, and substantial threat that Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class will be arrested and jailed in violation of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
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CLAIM THREE FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Unconstitutional Seizure (in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff Goodwin against Defendants Reinhart,
Adams, and Koon, in their official capacities) 390. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 391. This claim is brought by Mr. Goodwin, on behalf of himself and members of the Class. 392. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, including arrest and incarceration without probable cause or legal authority. 393. In their official, administrative capacities, Defendants Reinhart and Adams are sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the rights of Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class to freedom from unreasonable seizures. 394. Defendants Reinhart and Adams are sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members, including Mr. Goodwin, to be free from unreasonable seizures. In their exercise of their administrative authority, Defendants Reinhart and Adams place Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class at substantial and imminent risk of violation of their right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversee, enforce, and sanction the Default Payment Policy, which directly and proximately causes the issuance of bench warrants against people solely because they failed to make payments toward magistrate court fines and fees according to the terms of a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement. Those bench warrants are routinely used to arrest and incarcerate people even though they are unsupported by probable cause that the subject of the warrant has
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committed a crime. This was the case, for example, with Plaintiffs Brown and Darby, both of whom were arrested and incarcerated solely for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees.
395. In his official capacity, Defendant Koon is sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the constitution right of Class members, including Plaintiff Goodwin, to be free from unreasonable seizures. Defendant Koon places Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class at substantial and imminent risk of violation of their right to be free from unreasonable seizures because he directs and oversees LCSD officers who execute bench warrants issued against people under the Default Payment Policy solely because they have failed to pay according to the terms of a payment plan.
396. The ongoing conduct of Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon places Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class at a substantial and imminent risk of being arrested and incarcerated under a bench warrant lacking legal authority or probable cause. Mr. Goodwin seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of himself and members of the Class because he and the members have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to prevent future injury caused by confinement in jail in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.
397. The ongoing conduct of Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon act under color of state law and their conduct creates a real, imminent, and substantial threat that Plaintiff Goodwin and members of the Class will be arrested in violation of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
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CLAIM FOUR FOR DAMAGES Incarceration Without Pre-deprivation Ability-to-Pay Hearing (in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by all Plaintiffs against Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon, in their individual capacities) 398. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 399. This claim is brought by all named Plaintiffs. 400. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution have long prohibited the imprisonment of people for nonpayment of courtimposed fines or restitution without a pre-deprivation inquiry by a judge into the person’s ability to pay, efforts to secure resources to pay and, if the person lacks the ability to pay despite having made reasonable efforts to acquire resources, the adequacy of any alternatives to incarceration. Courts are prohibited from jailing people for failure to pay without conducting such an inquiry and making at least one of the following findings: (1) the individual’s nonpayment was willful; (2) the individual failed to make sufficient efforts to acquire the resources to pay; or (3) the individual was unable to pay, despite having made sufficient efforts to acquire resources, but alternative methods of achieving punishment or deterrence are inadequate. 401. All Plaintiffs suffered a violation of the clearly established right to a predeprivation ability-to-pay hearing when they were arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for periods of time ranging from 20 to 63 days because they could not afford to pay fines and fees owed to Lexington County magistrate courts. Plaintiffs were not afforded any predeprivation judicial inquiry into or findings of fact on, their ability to pay, efforts to secure resources, or the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration.
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402. For all relevant purposes, all individuals processed for commitment to the Detention Center for unpaid fines, fees, costs, assessments, or restitution imposed by Lexington County magistrate courts are similarly situated with respect to their right to due process of law. There exists no legitimate governmental reason to jail individuals who are unable to pay the full amount of outstanding monetary penalties for traffic or misdemeanor offenses, while permitting individuals who have the financial means to pay fines, fees, costs, assessments and restitution to avoid being jailed for the same offenses.
403. In their individual capacities and as an exercise of their administrative responsibility for the establishment of uniform policies and procedures for the timely and appropriate collection of magistrate court fines and fees in Lexington County, Defendants Reinhart and Adams directly and proximately caused violations of the named Plaintiffs’ right to a pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing. Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversee, enforce, and sanction the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. Both policies directly and proximately led to the routine and widespread issuance of bench warrants that were used to arrest and incarcerate the named Plaintiffs without any pre-deprivation judicial inquiry into or findings of fact on ability to pay, efforts to secure resources, or the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration.
404. In his individual capacity as the chief law enforcement officer of the LCSD and the chief administrator of the Detention Center, Defendant Koon directly and proximately caused violations of the named Plaintiffs’ right to a pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing. Defendant Koon oversees and directs LCSD officers and Detention Center staff who arrest and incarcerate people subjected to bench warrants issued under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. Defendant Koon enforces a standard operating procedure by which people arrested on
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bench warrants, including indigent people, are transported to the Detention Center and incarcerated unless they can pay the full amount of fines and fees owed before booking. This standard operating procedure established, enforced and sanctioned by Defendant Koon directly and proximately led to the arrests and incarceration of the named Plaintiffs without any predeprivation judicial inquiry into, or findings of fact on, their ability to pay, efforts to secure resources, or the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration.
405. The actions and conduct of Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon in violating Plaintiffs’ rights to a pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing also constitute violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon were acting under color of state law when they violated Plaintiffs’ rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
406. The named Plaintiffs seek damages from Defendants Koon, Reinhart, and Adams, in their individual capacities for the humiliation, anxiety, stress, emotional distress, hunger, sleeplessness, disturbed sleep, and other irreparable injury they suffered for being jailed, forcibly separated from their family and loved ones, and detained in unsanitary jail conditions without enough food to eat for periods ranging from 20 to 63 days.
CLAIM FIVE FOR DAMAGES Failure to Afford Counsel (in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by all Plaintiffs against Defendants Lexington County; Defendant Madsen, in his official capacity as a County official; and Defendants Reinhart and Adams, in their individual capacities) 407. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 408. This claim is brought by all named Plaintiffs.
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409. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution affords all indigent people a right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel at no cost when they face actual incarceration for nonpayment of fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution, regardless of whether incarceration is imposed through criminal contempt procedures or the implementation of a sentence of incarceration previously suspended upon the condition of payment of monetary penalties.
410. Each of the named Plaintiffs suffered a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when they were arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without being informed of the right to request counsel, informed of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, and appointed counsel as an indigent person facing incarceration for nonpayment, despite prima facie evidence of indigence.
411. Defendant Lexington County directly and proximately caused the violation of Plaintiffs’ right to counsel by developing and maintaining a policy, practice, and custom of grossly underfunding public defense that demonstrated deliberate indifference to the right to counsel of indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees. As the County’s final policymakers for the provision of public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts, the Lexington County Council and Defendant Madsen made the deliberate decision to provide grossly inadequate funding for indigent defense in Lexington County magistrate courts during the time period relevant to the incarceration of Plaintiffs without counsel. The Lexington County Council and Defendant Madsen already knew, or should have known, when they made final decisions to inadequately fund public defense in these courts that public defenders would not be assigned to represent indigent people facing suspended or actual
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incarceration sentences for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen’s policy of grossly underfunding public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts therefore reflects deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
412. Through policy, practice, and custom, Defendant Lexington County also directly and proximately caused the violation of Plaintiffs’ right to counsel by adopting, and acquiescing to, the following policies, practices, and customs that demonstrate deliberate indifference to the right to counsel of indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees: (1) requiring an up-front $40 application fee from indigent people seeking public defenders; (2) making a deliberate decision not to assign public defenders to represent indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment in magistrate court cases; (3) making a deliberate decision not to assign public defenders to represent indigent people sentenced by magistrate courts to incarceration suspended on payment of fines and fees; (4) making a deliberate decision not to assign public defenders to represent indigent people when the incarceration portion of a suspended sentence is implemented in a magistrate court case; (5) making a deliberate decision not to assign public defenders to staff the Bond Court to represent indigent people arrested on bench warrants for nonpayment; and (6) making a deliberate decision not to assign public defenders to meet with indigent people incarcerated in the Detention Center under bench warrants. As the County’s final policymaker for the provision of indigent defense, Defendant Madsen was aware, or should have been aware, that such decisions have led to the longstanding, persistent, and widespread failure to provide public defense to indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases in Lexington County magistrate courts. On behalf of Lexington County, Defendant Madsen
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caused, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved, participated in, or knowingly acquiesced in these illegal policies, practices, and customs. Defendant Madsen’s actions and inactions were deliberately indifferent to the clearly established Sixth Amendment rights of indigent people.
413. In their exercise of administrative responsibility for the establishment of uniform policies and procedures for the timely and appropriate collection of magistrate court fines and fees in Lexington County, Defendants Reinhart and Adams directly and proximately caused the violation of the named Plaintiffs’ right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversee and enforce the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. Both policies directly and proximately led to the routine and widespread issuance of bench warrants that were used to incarcerate the named Plaintiffs for nonpayment of fines and fees to Lexington County magistrate courts without notice of the right to request counsel, without notice of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, and without being afforded court-appointed counsel as people who faced incarceration, despite prima facie evidence of indigence. Additionally, in their administrative capacities, Defendants Reinhart and Adams endorse the use of Trial Information and Plea Sheets that encourage, sanction, and ratify a standard operating procedure by which magistrate court judges accept so-called written “waivers” of the right to counsel without engaging in a colloquy to ensure that any waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
414. The actions and conduct of Defendants Lexington County, Madsen, Reinhart and Adams in violating Plaintiffs’ right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment also constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Each of these Defendants was acting under color of state law when their policies, practices, customs, standard operating procedures, and omissions violated Plaintiffs’ right to counsel.
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415. The named Plaintiffs seek damages from Defendants Lexington County, Madsen (in his official capacity as a County official), Reinhart (in his individual capacity for his administrative conduct), and Adams (in her individual capacity for her administrative conduct) for the humiliation, anxiety, stress, emotional distress, hunger, sleeplessness, disturbed sleep, and other irreparable injury they suffered for being jailed, forcibly separated from their family and loved ones, and detained in unsanitary jail conditions without enough food to eat for periods ranging from 20 to 63 days.
CLAIM SIX FOR DAMAGES Unreasonable Seizure (in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by all Plaintiffs against Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon, in their individual capacities) 416. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 417. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs Brown and Darby. 418. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, including arrest and incarceration without probable cause or legal authority. 419. The arrests and incarceration of Plaintiffs Brown and Darby violated their Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable seizures because the arrests and incarceration were carried out under bench warrants based solely on nonpayment of fines and fees, which were unsupported by probable cause that Ms. Brown or Ms. Darby had committed a crime. Neither Ms. Brown nor Ms. Darby were arrested and jailed following a show cause hearing or contempt proceeding at which a court considered information other than the fact that Ms. Brown and Ms. Darby missed payments required by the Scheduled Time Payment Agreements in their cases. As a result, the LCSD officers who arrested and transported Ms. Brown and Ms. Darby to the
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Detention Center had no particularized and objective basis to believe that either Ms. Brown or Ms. Darby had committed any criminal offense.
420. The arrests that led to the incarceration of Plaintiffs Brown and Darby were arrests for which probable cause was required.
421. The detentions of Plaintiffs Brown and Darby following their arrest for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees were unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
422. The seizures of Plaintiffs Brown and Darby were excessive and unreasonable in their duration and scope.
423. It was clearly established before the arrest and incarceration of Plaintiffs Brown and Darby that seizing and detaining Ms. Brown and Ms. Darby simply because they did not have money to pay fines and fees would violate their clearly established rights. Defendants Reinhart and Adams had fair warning that their conduct would violate the Fourth Amendment and no reasonable officer could have believed that the seizures or incarceration of Ms. Brown and Ms. Darby were reasonable.
424. In their individual capacities and in an exercise of their administrative authority, Defendants Reinhart and Adams directly and proximately caused violations of Plaintiffs Brown and Darby’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizures. Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversaw, enforced, and sanctioned the Default Payment Policy, and that conduct directly and proximately caused the issuance of bench warrants against Ms. Brown and Ms. Darby for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees when they did not pay according to the terms of their Scheduled Time Payment Agreements. Those bench warrants were used to arrest and
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incarcerate Mr. Brown and Ms. Darby, but were unsupported by probable cause that either Ms. Brown or Ms. Darby had committed a crime.
425. Moreover, Defendants Reinhart and Adams have failed to exercise their administrative authority to correct the longstanding and pervasive Default Payment Policy through any written policy and to train Lexington County magistrate judges on how to ensure respect for the Fourth Amendment right when issuing bench warrants for the collection of magistrate court fines and fees.
426. In his individual capacity as the chief law enforcement officer of the LCSD and the chief administrator of the Detention Center, Defendant Koon directly and proximately caused violations of the named Plaintiffs’ right to freedom from unreasonable seizures. Defendant Koon oversaw and directed LCSD officers who arrested Plaintiffs Brown and Darby on payment bench warrants issued under the Default Payment Policy, which were not supported by probable cause of criminal activity. This standard operating procedure established, enforced, and sanctioned by Defendant Koon directly and proximately led to the arrests and incarceration of Plaintiffs Brown and Darby without probable cause of criminal activity.
427. The actions and conduct of Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon in violating the rights of Plaintiffs Brown and Darby to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment also constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Reinhart, Adams and Koon were acting under color of state law when they violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.
428. Plaintiffs Brown and Darby seek damages from Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon in their individual capacities for the humiliation, anxiety, stress, emotional distress, hunger, sleeplessness, disturbed sleep, and other irreparable injury they suffered for being jailed,
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forcibly separated from their family and loved ones, and detained in unsanitary and cold jail
conditions without enough food to eat for periods ranging from 20 to 63 days.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court:
• Assume jurisdiction over this action;
• Certify the Class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
• Award the following relief:
o A declaration that Defendants Reinhart and Adams, acting in their administrative capacities, and Defendant Koon are violating Class members’ Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and equal protection of the law by sustaining policies, practices, and standard operating procedures that result in the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without a predeprivation judicial inquiry into, and findings of fact on, ability to pay, efforts to secure resources, and the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration.
o A declaration that Defendants Reinhart and Adams, acting in their administrative capacities, and Defendant Koon are violating Class members’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel by sustaining policies, practices, and standard operating procedures that result in the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without notice of their right to request the appointment of counsel to defend against incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees; without notice of the right to request waiver of any $40 public defender application fee; without ensuring that any waiver of these rights is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; and without providing assistance of counsel.
o A declaration that Defendants Lexington County and Madsen are violating Class members’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel by routinely and systematically depriving indigent people of the right to court-appointed counsel when they face incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees, including through the failure to adequately fund indigent defense in Lexington County magistrate courts and the failure to assign public defenders to staff magistrate courts proceedings.
o A declaration that Defendant Adams is violating Class members’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel by ordering or effecting the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without notice of the right to request the appointment of counsel
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to help defend against incarceration; without notice of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee; and without ensuring that any waiver of these rights is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; and without providing assistance of counsel.
o A declaration that Defendants Reinhart and Adams, acting in their administrative capacities, and Defendant Koon are violating Class members’ Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable seizure by sustaining policies, practices, and standard operating procedures that result in indigent people being arrested and incarcerated on bench warrants based on nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees and without probable cause of criminal activity.
o An order and judgment permanently enjoining Defendants Reinhart, Adams, Koon, Lexington County, and Madsen from enforcing the abovedescribed unconstitutional policies and practices.
• Award compensatory damages to the named Plaintiffs in an amount to be determined at trial, including damages for deprivation of liberty, mental anguish, emotional distress, hunger, sleeplessness, disturbed sleep, illness, and loss of income;
• Award Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of all litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
• Afford any such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
DATED this 1st day of June, 2017.
Respectfully submitted by,

s/ Susan K. Dunn SUSAN K. DUNN (Fed. Bar #647) American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of
South Carolina P.O. Box 20998 Charleston, South Carolina 29413-0998 Tel.: (843) 282-7953 Fax: (843) 720-1428 sdunn@aclusc.org

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY* American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 Tel.: (212) 519-7876 Fax: (212) 549-2654 nchoudhury@aclu.org

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3:17-cv-01426-MBS-SVH Date Filed 06/01/17 Entry Number 1 Page 98 of 98 TOBY J. MARSHALL* ERIC R. NUSSER* Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC 936 N 34th Street, Suite 300 Seattle, Washington 98103 Tel.: (206) 816-6603 Fax: (206) 319-5450 tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com eric@terrellmarshall.com *Applications for pro hac vice admission to be submitted.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

TWANDA MARSHINDA BROWN; SASHA MONIQUE DARBY; CAYESHIA CASHEL JOHNSON; AMY MARIE PALACIOS; NORA ANN CORDER; and XAVIER LARRY GOODWIN and RAYMOND WRIGHT, JR., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
LEXINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA; GARY REINHART, in his individual capacity; REBECCA ADAMS, in her official and individual capacities as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County and in her official capacity as the Judge of the Irmo Magistrate Court; ALBERT JOHN DOOLEY, III, in his official capacity as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County; BRYAN KOON, in his official capacity as the Lexington County Sheriff; and ROBERT MADSEN, in his official capacity as the Circuit Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of South Carolina,

Case No. 3:17-cv-01426-MBS-SVH
CLASS ACTION SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Violation of Rights under the Fourteenth, Sixth, and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution)
JURY TRIAL REQUESTED

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION 1. Defendant Lexington County (“the County”) is home to a modern-day debtors’ prison. Impoverished people are routinely arrested and incarcerated for their inability to pay fines and fees imposed by the County’s magistrate courts in traffic and misdemeanor criminal
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cases. Each year, hundreds, if not more than one thousand, of the poorest residents of the County and its surrounding areas are deprived of their liberty in the Lexington County Detention Center (“Detention Center”) for weeks and even months at a time for no reason other than their poverty and in violation of their most basic constitutional rights.
2. Plaintiffs Twanda Marshinda Brown, Sasha Monique Darby, Cayeshia Cashel Johnson, Amy Marie Palacios, Nora Ann Corder, Xavier Larry Goodwin, and Raymond Wright, Jr. are indigent people, who are victims of the ongoing and widespread constitutional violations occurring in Lexington County. Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright were arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for a period of time ranging from seven to 63 days because they could not afford to pay magistrate court fines and fees that provide revenue to the County. At the time they filed their respective claims in this action, Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright faced an imminent threat of arrest and incarceration because they could not afford to pay fines and fees owed to Lexington County magistrate courts. Plaintiff Goodwin continues to face such an imminent threat because he remains unable to pay money owed to a Lexington County magistrate court.
3. Ms. Brown was arrested on a Saturday morning at home, in front of her children, and was incarcerated for 57 days because she could not pay $1,907.63. Ms. Darby was arrested at her mother’s house and incarcerated for 20 days because she could not pay $680. Ms. Johnson was arrested at a traffic stop and incarcerated for 55 days because she could not pay $1,287.50. Ms. Palacios was arrested at a traffic stop and incarcerated for 21 days because she could not pay $647.50. Mr. Goodwin was arrested at a traffic stop and incarcerated for 63 days because he could not pay $1,710. Ms. Corder was arrested when she went to court to challenge an eviction action stemming from her poverty and was incarcerated for 54 days because she could not afford
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to pay $1,320. Mr. Wright was arrested and was incarcerated for 7 days because he could not afford to pay $416.93.
4. Plaintiffs’ arrests and incarcerations were not isolated incidents. Lexington County relies on the collection of fines and fees imposed on defendants in traffic and criminal cases in the County’s magistrate courts as a critical source of General Fund revenue. Year after year, the County projects it will collect substantial revenue in the form of magistrate court fines and fees despite the fact that the percentage of the County’s population living in poverty increased 14.5% from 2012 to 2015, according to U.S. Census estimates.
5. Over time, the generation of County revenue through magistrate court fines and fees has given rise to a system that routinely deprives indigent people of their rights under the U.S. Constitution. This system was established and is perpetuated by the County and the following state officials: Defendant Rebecca Adams, the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County; Defendant Albert John Dooley, III, the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County; Defendant Gary Reinhart, who served as Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County prior to June 28, 2017; Defendant Bryan “Jay” Koon, the Lexington County Sheriff; and Defendant Robert Madsen, the Circuit Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in South Carolina, who also acts on behalf of Lexington County.
6. As the administrative policymakers for Lexington County magistrate courts, Defendants Adams and Dooley oversee, enforce, and sanction two unwritten policies and practices that are the standard operating procedure in these courts: the Default Payment Policy and the Trial in Absentia Policy. Both of these policies and practices lead directly to the arrest and incarceration of indigent people, who cannot afford to pay magistrate court fines and fees,
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without any pre-deprivation court hearing concerning their ability to pay and without courtappointed counsel to help defend against incarceration. Prior to June 28, 2017, when Defendant Adams was appointed to replace Defendant Reinhart as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County, Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversaw, enforced, and sanctioned the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies.
7. Under the Default Payment Policy, Lexington County magistrate courts routinely order the arrest and jailing of people who cannot afford to make payments toward court fines and fees in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases. When an indigent person is unable to pay in full at sentencing, the magistrate court imposes a payment plan requiring steep monthly payments that are usually beyond the individual’s financial means. If the indigent person fails to pay in the amount of time required by the payment plan, the magistrate court issues a bench warrant that orders law enforcement to arrest and jail the individual unless the full amount owed is paid before booking in the Detention Center (“payment bench warrant”).
8. Similarly, under the Trial in Absentia Policy, Lexington County magistrate courts routinely order the arrest and jailing of indigent people who cannot afford to pay fines and fees imposed through trials and sentencing proceedings held in their absence. The County’s magistrate courts routinely ignore requests for continuances by indigent people who are ticketed for traffic or misdemeanor offenses and who contact the court to explain why they cannot appear on the date and time of their scheduled hearing. Rather, regardless of the reason for the defendant’s absence, Lexington County magistrate courts proceed without the defendant, impose a conviction in absentia, and sentence the defendant to a term of incarceration suspended on the payment of fines and fees. Without affording the defendant notice of the sentence, magistrate
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courts swiftly issue a bench warrant ordering law enforcement to arrest and jail the individual unless the full amount owed is paid before booking.
9. Defendant Koon, the chief law enforcement officer of the Lexington County Sheriff’s Department (“LCSD”) and the chief administrator of the Detention Center, oversees and directs the arrest and incarceration of indigent people who are subjected to bench warrants issued under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. Under his direction and supervision, LCSD officers execute payment bench warrants at people’s homes, during traffic and pedestrian stops, and elsewhere, including by enlisting other law enforcement agencies to locate debtors. Defendant Koon oversees and enforces a standard operating procedure by which people arrested on bench warrants, including indigent people, are transported to the Detention Center and incarcerated there for weeks to months at a time unless they can pay the full amount of fines and fees owed before booking, such as by raising money through phone calls from the jail to family and friends. Indigent people who are unable to pay remain in jail without ever seeing a judge, having a hearing, or receiving the advice of counsel.
10. As the administrative leadership of Lexington County’s magistrate courts, Defendants Adams and Dooley are aware, or should be aware, that the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies result in the persistent, widespread, and routine arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of court fines and fees without pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings or representation by counsel. Defendants Adams and Dooley make a deliberate administrative decision not to correct this longstanding and pervasive practice through any written policy. As an exercise of their administrative authority, Defendants Adams and Dooley also make a deliberate decision not to increase the size of magistrate court dockets, require additional hours of court operation, or request additional County funding for magistrate court
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operations in order to ensure that magistrate courts conduct pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings before ordering the arrest and incarceration of indigent people who are unable pay outstanding fines and fees in full. Finally, Defendants Adams and Dooley make a deliberate administrative decision not to require or permit indigent people booked in jail on bench warrants to be brought to the Bond Court located adjacent to the Detention Center or to the original magistrate court that issued the bench warrant for a post-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing and appointment of counsel to guard against continued unlawful incarceration. Likewise, prior to June 28, 2017, while Defendants Reinhart and Adams served as the final administrative policymakers of Lexington County’s magistrate courts, they engaged in the same acts and omissions detailed above in an exercise of their administrative authority.
11. The Lexington County Council and Defendant Madsen, as the final policymakers for the provision of indigent defense in the County’s magistrate courts, routinely and systemically deprive indigent people of the right to assistance of counsel when they face incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen make the deliberate decision to provide grossly inadequate funding for indigent defense in Lexington County magistrate courts. Indeed, Defendants Lexington County and Madsen provide less than half the amount of funding provided for public defense by South Carolina counties of comparable population size. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen also make the deliberate decision not to assign public defenders to represent indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment; not to assign public defenders in magistrate court proceedings that lead to sentences of incarceration suspended on payment of fines and fees; not to assign public defenders to staff the Bond Court to represent indigent people arrested on bench warrants for nonpayment; and not to assign public defenders to meet with indigent people
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incarcerated in the Detention Center under bench warrants. Instead, Defendants Lexington County and Madsen acquiesce to the longstanding, persistent, widespread, and routine absence of public defenders in Lexington County magistrate courts, particularly in cases that may and do lead to the incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees.
12. The arrest and jailing of indigent people for nonpayment of court fines and fees they cannot afford, including Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright, is the result of deliberate decisions, actions, omissions, and longstanding policies, practices, customs, and standard operating procedures established, overseen, and sanctioned by Defendants Lexington County, Reinhart, Adams, Dooley, Koon, and Madsen. Indigent people who lack the financial means to pay the full amount of fines and fees owed to Lexington County magistrate courts are routinely arrested and incarcerated for weeks and months at a time without being afforded a pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing, notice of the right to request counsel, or the assistance of a court-appointed attorney to help defend against incarceration. None of the Plaintiffs who were arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of court fines and fees were provided a hearing on their ability to pay, informed of their right to request court-appointed counsel, or appointed counsel before being arrested and jailed for nonpayment of court fines and fees despite prima facie evidence of their indigence.
13. Through their deliberate acts and omissions, Defendants have established a system that relies on arrest and incarceration to elicit payment toward magistrate court fines and fees rather than providing people with notice of a failure-to-pay charge (for example, through an order to show cause), summoning them to magistrate court for an ability-to-pay hearing, providing notice of their right to request an attorney, and appointing counsel to represent those for whom there is prima facie evidence of indigence, including evidence of receipt of needs-
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based public assistance and income around or below the relevant Federal Poverty Guideline. This unlawful system involves the routine misuse of bench warrants, which South Carolina law and the South Carolina Supreme Court have made clear are to be used for the sole purpose of bringing to court a defendant who previously failed to appear—not to coerce indigent people to pay fines and fees they cannot afford under the threat of lengthy incarceration.
14. Defendants’ conduct has violated, and continues to violate, rights that are clearly established by the U.S. Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the incarceration of a person for nonpayment of court fines, fees, costs, assessments, or restitution without first holding a court hearing on the individual’s ability to pay and the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration and making a finding that nonpayment was willful. The Sixth Amendment requires affording indigent defendants the assistance of court-appointed counsel when sanctioned with actual incarceration for nonpayment of a court-ordered legal financial obligation, when facing a sentence of incarceration suspended upon the payment of fines and fees, and when the incarceration term of a suspended incarceration sentence is enforced. The Sixth Amendment also prohibits systemic deficiencies in the funding, staffing, and assignment of cases to public defenders that result in the denial of the right to counsel to indigent defendants. The Fourth Amendment prohibits arresting people based on warrants that are unsupported by probable cause of a criminal offense or probation violation, as is the case when a warrant is based solely on a report that the defendant has failed to pay a court-ordered legal financial obligation.
15. The longstanding, routine, and widespread practice of arresting and jailing indigent people who owe fines and fees to Lexington County magistrate courts has instilled fear and panic among the poorest residents of the County and surrounding region. Indigent people
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who owe money to Lexington County feel pressured to divert funds for basic necessities—food, medication, utilities, rent, and transportation—to avoid jail and the devastating impact of incarceration on their families, loved ones, jobs, and housing.
16. Defendants continue to engage in acts and omissions that directly and proximately cause the arrest and jailing of people who owe fines and fees to the County’s magistrate courts despite their awareness of the longstanding, persistent, widespread, and routine deprivation of the constitutional rights of debtors, including indigent people.
17. As a result, at the time they filed their respective claims in this action, Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, who were indigent and owed fines and fees to Lexington County magistrate courts, faced an imminent and substantial threat that they would be arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees in violation of their Fourteenth, Sixth, and Fourth Amendment rights. Even today, Plaintiff Goodwin continues to face such a threat because he remains unable to pay money owed to a Lexington County magistrate court. Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate their constitutional rights and to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated impoverished people.
18. The actions, omissions, policies, practices, customs, and standard operating procedures of Defendants Lexington County, Reinhart, Adams, Dooley, and Koon directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright to be deprived of their liberty for extended periods of time, violated their Fourteenth, Sixth, and Fourth Amendment rights, and caused them to suffer humiliation, anxiety, stress, emotional distress, sleeplessness, disturbed sleep, hunger, loss of employment, physical pain, serious illness, hospitalization, and other irreparable injury from being incarcerated in unsanitary jail
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conditions without adequate medical attention and separated from their families and loved ones.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright bring

this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate their individual rights and to seek damages for

the violations they suffered.

PARTIES1

19. Plaintiff Twanda Marshinda Brown is a 40-year-old indigent woman who resides

in Columbia, South Carolina. Ms. Brown is the mother of seven children and the sole provider

for her three youngest children, who are in secondary school. She also provides financial

support to her two older sons.

20. Plaintiff Sasha Monique Darby is a 27-year-old indigent woman who resides in

Fall River, Massachusetts. Ms. Darby is the mother of a four-year-old child for whom she

provides financial support.

21. Plaintiff Cayeshia Cashel Johnson is a 27-year-old indigent woman who resides in

Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Ms. Johnson is the mother and principal provider for four young

children, all of whom are under eight years old.

22. Plaintiff Amy Marie Palacios is a 40-year-old indigent woman who resides in

Lexington, South Carolina. Ms. Palacios is the mother of three children and the principal

provider for her two younger daughters.

23. Plaintiff Nora Ann Corder is a 53-year-old indigent woman who resides in

Lexington, South Carolina. Ms. Corder is homeless.

1 Plaintiffs make the allegations in this Complaint based on personal knowledge as to all matters in which they have had personal involvement and on information and belief as to all other matters.
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24. Plaintiff Xavier Larry Goodwin is a 31-year-old indigent man who resides in Columbia, South Carolina. Mr. Goodwin and his wife have two young daughters, and he is the family’s principal financial provider. Mr. Goodwin is also the father of two sons for whom he provides financial support.
25. Plaintiff Raymond Wright, Jr., is a 46-year-old indigent and disabled man who resides in Leesville, South Carolina. Mr. Wright and his wife support a household of five, which includes his daughter and two granddaughters.
26. Defendant Lexington County, South Carolina, is a municipal governmental entity whose policies, practices, and customs were, and continue to be, a moving force behind the constitutional violations described in this Complaint. The County, through the Lexington County Council, adopts ambitious projections for County revenue generation through the collection of fines and fees in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases in magistrate courts located in its territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, the County contracts with Defendant Madsen for public defense services in the County’s magistrate courts, and has delegated to him final policymaking authority for the County’s provision of indigent defense. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen deliberately, systematically, and routinely deprive indigent people of the right to assistance of counsel to defend against unlawful incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees. The County is also aware of and causes, authorizes, condones, ratifies, approves, participates in, or knowingly acquiesces to the longstanding, persistent, widespread, and routine absence of public defenders from Lexington County magistrate court proceedings that result in the imposition of actual or suspended incarceration sentences on indigent people. Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright pursue individual damages claims against Defendant Lexington County. Plaintiffs Goodwin and
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Wright also sue the County for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and the proposed class.
27. Defendant Gary Reinhart, a state actor, served as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County from as early as 2004 to June 27, 2017 by order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. In April 2015, the Governor of South Carolina reappointed, and the Senate confirmed, Defendant Reinhart to his current four-year term as a magistrate court judge. During his tenure as Chief Judge, Defendant Reinhart’s administrative responsibilities included establishing and instituting standard operating procedures applicable to all Lexington County magistrate courts, including procedures concerning the collection of fines and fees; designating the hours of operation of those courts and determining their nighttime and weekend schedules; assigning cases to magistrate court judges across the County; coordinating the planning of budgets for Lexington County magistrate courts; administering the County Bond Court; and requesting County funding for magistrate court operations. Defendant Reinhart oversaw, enforced, and sanctioned the Default Payment Policy, the Trial in Absentia Policy, the policy of denying individuals arrested on bench warrants an ability-to-pay hearing in the Bond Court or the magistrate court that issued the bench warrant, and other written and unwritten policies, practices, and standard operating procedures that directly caused the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without any pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing or representation by court-appointed counsel to defend against unlawful incarceration. Defendant Reinhart resides in this District and this Division. Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright pursue damages claims against Defendant Reinhart in his individual capacity for actions taken in the exercise of his administrative authority.
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28. Defendant Adams, a state actor, serves as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County, a position to which she was appointed on June 28, 2017 by order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. From December 20, 2013 to June 27, 2017, Defendant Adams served as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County by order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, a position in which she exercised the administrative responsibilities of the Chief Judge in the event that Defendant Reinhart was absent or disabled. In April 2015, the Governor of South Carolina reappointed, and the Senate confirmed, Defendant Adams to her current four-year term as a magistrate court judge. As the Chief Judge, she oversees, enforces, and sanctions the Default Payment Policy, the Trial in Absentia Policy, the policy of denying individuals arrested on bench warrants an ability-to-pay hearing in Bond Court or the magistrate court that issued the bench warrant, and other written and unwritten policies, practices, and standard operating procedures that directly cause the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without any pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing or representation by court-appointed counsel to defend against unlawful incarceration. Defendant Adams resides in this District and this Division. Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright pursue damages claims against Defendant Adams in her individual capacity for actions taken in the exercise of her administrative authority. On behalf of themselves and the proposed class, Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright sue Defendant Adams in her official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief for ongoing constitutional violations resulting from the exercise of her administrative authority.
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29. Defendant Adams also serves as the judge of the Irmo Magistrate Court. In her judicial capacity, Defendant Adams routinely sentences indigent people to pay fines and fees according to payment plan terms they cannot afford; routinely fails to inform people of their right to request court-appointed counsel and to seek waiver of the $40 public defender application fee on the basis of financial hardship; routinely fails to appoint counsel to represent indigent people incarcerated for nonpayment; and routinely fails to ensure that any waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Defendant Adams also routinely issues bench warrants ordering the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of fines and fees without any pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing and without affording them courtappointed counsel. Plaintiff Goodwin pursues a declaratory relief claim against Defendant Adams in her official capacity for her judicial actions.
30. Defendant Dooley, a state actor, has served since June 28, 2017 as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County by order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. On April 2015, the Governor of South Carolina reappointed, and the Senate confirmed, Defendant Dooley to his current fouryear term as a magistrate court judge. As the Associate Chief Judge, Defendant Dooley exercises the administrative responsibilities of the Chief Judge in the event that Defendant Adams is absent or disabled. He oversees, enforces, and sanctions the Default Payment Policy, the Trial in Absentia Policy, the policy of denying individuals arrested on bench warrants an ability-to-pay hearing in Bond Court or the magistrate court that issued the bench warrant, and other written and unwritten policies, practices, and standard operating procedures that directly cause the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without any pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing or representation by court-appointed
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counsel to defend against unlawful incarceration. Defendant Dooley resides in this District and this Division. On behalf of themselves and the proposed class, Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright sue Defendant Dooley in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief for ongoing constitutional violations resulting from the exercise of his administrative authority.
31. Defendant Bryan Koon, a state actor, is the elected Lexington County Sheriff, the chief law enforcement officer of the LCSD, and the chief administrator of the Detention Center. In his administrative capacity, Defendant Koon oversees and enforces the execution of bench warrants issued by Lexington County magistrate courts against people charged with nonpayment of fines and fees. Under his direction and supervision, LCSD officers execute bench warrants at people’s homes, during traffic and pedestrian stops, and elsewhere, including by enlisting other law enforcement agencies to locate debtors. Defendant Koon enforces a standard operating procedure by which people, including indigent people, are arrested on bench warrants and incarcerated in the Detention Center unless they can pay the full amount owed before booking, such as by raising money through phone calls to family and friends. Defendant Koon resides in this District and this Division. On behalf of themselves and the proposed class, Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright sue Defendant Koon in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief for ongoing constitutional violations connected to the exercise of his enforcement and administrative authority.
32. Defendant Robert Madsen, who is both a state and local actor, is the Circuit Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in South Carolina, which includes Lexington County. Under South Carolina law, Defendant Madsen contracts with Lexington County to provide public defense services in the County’s magistrate courts. Defendant Madsen is responsible for requesting County funding for the provision of indigent defense in Lexington
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County’s magistrate courts, General Sessions Court, and Family Court. Defendant Madsen is also responsible for spending money appropriated by Lexington County, the state, and other sources to ensure the provision of public defense to indigent people in Lexington County magistrate courts. The County has delegated to Defendant Madsen final policymaking authority for the County’s provision of indigent defense. Defendant Madsen deliberately, systematically, and routinely deprives indigent people of the right to assistance of counsel to defend against unlawful incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees in Lexington County. Defendant Madsen is also aware of and causes, authorizes, condones, ratifies, approves, participates in, or knowingly acquiesces to the longstanding, persistent, widespread, and routine absence of public defenders from Lexington County magistrate court proceedings that result in the imposition of actual or suspended incarceration sentences on indigent people. These actions can be fairly attributed to Lexington County; in the alternative, Defendant Madsen engages in this conduct as a state actor. Defendant Madsen resides in this District and this Division. On behalf of themselves and the proposed class, Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright sue Defendant Madsen in his official capacity as a final County policymaker for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. In the alternative, on behalf of themselves and the proposed class, Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright sue Defendant Madsen in his official capacity as a state actor for declaratory and injunctive relief.
33. Defendants undertook all of the acts set forth in this Complaint under color of state law.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 34. This is a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief based on past and ongoing civil rights violations committed by Defendants
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Lexington County, Reinhart, Adams, Koon, and Madsen, in violation of the Fourteenth, Sixth, and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
35. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).
36. An actual, ongoing controversy exists within this Court’s jurisdiction. The Court is therefore authorized to grant declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
37. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c), and (d) because this judicial district is where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred and where Defendants Lexington County, Reinhart, Adams, Koon, and Madsen reside.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. Lexington County’s Reliance on Magistrate Court Fines and Fees for General
Fund Revenue 38. Recent years have witnessed a rise in poverty among residents of Lexington County and its surrounding areas. According to U.S. Census figures, the County’s poverty rate jumped 14.5% from 2012 to 2015. U.S. Census figures also show that poverty rates increased in neighboring Richland County by 4% from 2012 to 2015. 39. Black and Latino residents of the County have been hardest hit. In 2015, 26.1% of Black residents and 27.7% of Hispanic and Latino residents lived in poverty compared to only 10.7% of white residents. Similarly, in neighboring Richland County in 2015, 22.4% of Black residents and 24.1% of Hispanic and Latino residents lived in poverty compared to only 10.8% of white residents.
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40. Given these figures, a significant number of people living in and around Lexington County who are charged with traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases in the County’s magistrate courts are likely to suffer from poverty, particularly if they are Black or Latino.
41. Nevertheless, Lexington County relies heavily on magistrate court fines and fees from traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases as a critical source of General Fund revenue.
42. Magistrate courts in South Carolina are courts of limited jurisdiction. All magistrate judges located in Lexington County have county-wide territorial jurisdiction over certain categories of criminal and traffic offenses, and certain civil claims.
43. Lexington County sets ambitious projections for General Fund revenue from the collection of fines and fees from defendants in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases in the County’s magistrate courts, which include the Central Traffic Court and six district magistrate courts—Irmo Magistrate Court, Lexington Magistrate Court, Swansea Magistrate Court, CayceWest Columbia Magistrate Court, Oak Grove Magistrate Court, and Batesburg-Leesville Magistrate Court.
44. The Lexington County Council is the County’s final policymaker concerning the establishment of annual General Fund revenue projections and the appropriation of County funds. Each year, the County Council considers requests for County funding and adopts the Lexington County annual budget. The County’s approved annual budget documents final decisions concerning the appropriation of funding for magistrate judge salaries, magistrate court operations, and public defender services in Lexington County courts.
45. The County’s annual budget also documents projected revenue from the collection of fines and fees from defendants in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases in magistrate courts. According to the Lexington County fiscal year 2017-2018 Requested Budget,
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the Central Traffic Court “generates substantial revenue from traffic violations, criminal fines and weight violations,” and the district magistrate courts are expected to “generate revenue from Criminal and Traffic cases.”
46. Together, the Central Traffic Court and district magistrate courts collected $1,420,154 in revenue from traffic and criminal fines for the County General Fund in fiscal year 2015-2016. Of that amount, the Central Traffic Court alone generated over $1 million and the Irmo Magistrate Court generated more than $122,000. Thus, the Central Traffic Court and Irmo Magistrate Court generate the lion’s share of traffic and criminal fines and fees funneled into the County’s General Fund.
B. Failure to Provide Public Defense to Indigent People in Lexington County Magistrate Court Traffic and Criminal Cases
47. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen have a constitutional duty to operate a public defense system that provides the assistance of counsel to indigent people facing incarceration in cases handled by magistrate courts in Lexington County.
48. Through their actions, omissions, practices, policies, standard operating procedures, and customs, the County and Defendant Madsen systemically and routinely deprive indigent people of the right to assistance of counsel to defend against unlawful incarcerations ordered by Lexington County magistrate courts for nonpayment of fines and fees.
49. Under South Carolina law, Lexington County contracts with Defendant Madsen, the Circuit Public Defender for South Carolina’s Eleventh Judicial Circuit, to provide public defender services for the County’s magistrate courts, General Session Court, and Family Court.
50. Under South Carolina law, Defendant Madsen is responsible for seeking, and the County is responsible for providing, resources for public defender services in the County’s
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magistrate courts. Defendant Madsen submits annual requests for funding to Defendant Lexington County and meets with County officials to justify budgetary requests.
51. Under South Carolina law, Defendant Madsen also exercises final decisionmaking authority over the expenditure of resources appropriated by Lexington County for public defender services. Defendant Madsen is the final decision-maker on whether public defenders are assigned to serve indigent defendants in magistrate court proceedings and in the Bond Court.
52. According to the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense website, “South Carolina’s Public Defender System is a county-based system.” County funding for public defense is critical to ensure that public defenders are appointed to represent indigent people in magistrate courts in each county.
53. Although the South Carolina General Assembly provides some annual funding for public defender services in each county, that amount is not intended to provide sufficient funding to ensure public defense in each county’s General Sessions Court, Family Court, and magistrate courts. To the contrary, the South Carolina public defender funding scheme requires counties to provide additional funding to ensure assistance of counsel in those courts.
54. Moreover, Defendant Madsen remits to Lexington County any state money he receives for public defender services in Lexington County because all of the employees assigned by Defendant Madsen to perform public defender services in Lexington County magistrate courts are County employees under South Carolina law.
55. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen have made, and continue to make, the deliberate decision to inadequately fund public defender services for indigent people facing incarceration in magistrate court cases.
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56. Lexington County allocated only $514,306 for public defender services in fiscal year 2015-2016 and only $543,932 in fiscal year 2016-2017. The amount of funding requested by Defendant Madsen and provided by Lexington County for public defense is entirely inadequate to provide public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts.
57. Lexington County provides less than half of the funding for public defender services that counties of comparable population size provide, which demonstrates the gross inadequacy of the County’s funding for public defender services in magistrate courts.
58. According to U.S. Census estimates, Lexington County had a population of 273,843 in 2015, while York County had a slightly smaller population of 240,076 and Spartanburg County had a slightly larger population of 291,240. Lexington County provided only $514,306 for public defender services in fiscal year 2015-2016, whereas both York County and Spartanburg County provided more than double that amount for the same time period: York County allocated $1,369,721 and Spartanburg County allocated $1,116,169.
59. A comparison of the ratio of county to state funding for public defender services in Lexington County and counties of comparable size further underscores the gross inadequacy of Lexington County’s funding for indigent defense. In fiscal year 2015-2016, Lexington County provided only 50% of the amount received from the state for public defender services, while York County provided 155% of the amount received in state funding and Spartanburg County provided 101%.
60. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen have made, and continue to make, a deliberate decision to prioritize the collection of public defender application fees over the provision of assistance of counsel to indigent people facing incarceration in magistrate court cases. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen have established a county-wide policy,
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practice, and custom of requiring indigent people to pay an up-front $40 fee at the time they apply for court-appointed representation and of failing to inform indigent people that they may seek a court waiver of the fee based on financial hardship.
61. As a result, on those rare occasions that an indigent person requests courtappointed counsel at an initial appearance in a traffic or criminal case in Lexington County magistrate court, it is standard operating procedure that the individual is directed to leave court and to travel to the office of the Lexington County Clerk of Court or to the Lexington County Public Defender’s Office in order to pay the $40 fee and submit the application for a public defender. This practice dissuades indigent people from applying for a public defender to help defend against incarceration in magistrate court cases.
62. As a result of the policies, practices, and customs of Defendants Lexington County and Madsen, only one public defender is assigned to represent indigent defendants in cases handled by the County’s magistrate courts. This level of staffing is entirely inadequate in light of the volume of magistrate court cases in which indigent people face incarceration, as discussed in paragraphs 331 to 336 below.
63. As a result of the policies, practices, and customs of Defendants Lexington County and Madsen, no public defender is present in court, or otherwise available for appointment, to represent an indigent person when a Lexington County magistrate court conducts critical proceedings in which the Sixth Amendment affords a right to counsel. Public defenders are entirely absent from magistrate court proceedings in which indigent people are sentenced to “fine or jail,” or to incarceration suspended upon payment pursuant to a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement. Public defenders are also entirely absent from any show cause
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hearings that may occur in magistrate court, at which indigent people are sanctioned with incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees.
64. As a result of the policies, practices, and customs of Defendant Lexington County and the actions, omissions, policies, practices, customs, and standard operating procedures of Defendant Madsen, no public defender is present in the Bond Court to represent indigent people who have been booked on bench warrants because they could not pay the amount of fines and fees specified on the face of the warrant. Nor is any public defender assigned to interview people booked in the Detention Center on magistrate court bench warrants, which would facilitate the identification of indigent people who have been incarcerated without the assistance of counsel or an ability-to-pay hearing.
65. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen, through their officers, representatives, and employees, have known of the structural deficiencies of their public defense system for many years.
66. In April 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of South Carolina (“ACLU-SC”), the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”) catalogued the deficiencies with indigent defense in South Carolina summary courts and specifically highlighted the lack of counsel for indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees in magistrate court cases. See American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of South Carolina, et. al., Summary Injustice: A Look at Constitutional Deficiencies in South Carolina’s Summary Courts 7, 13–14 (2016) (“Summary Injustice Report”).
67. The Summary Injustice Report received extensive media coverage in South Carolina and particularly in the Lexington County area.
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68. On April 2, 2016, The Post and Courier drew attention to the Summary Injustice Report, highlighting “[t]he dearth of lawyers for the indigent” in South Carolina summary courts.
69. On April 4, 2016, The State reported that the Summary Injustice Report “paints a bleak picture of what can happen to poor and unrepresented defendants in the state’s lower courts where often no lawyer is present, cases are sometimes prosecuted by police and thousands face criminal charges that can send them to jail for 30 days with a criminal record.” The State also highlighted the finding that these courts “often fail to inform defendants of their right to counsel and refuse to provide counsel to the poor at all stages of the criminal process.”
70. On April 5, 2016, South Carolina Radio Network reported on the Summary Injustice Report’s finding that summary courts “often rush[] through trials without allowing the state’s poorest residents to understand their rights to an attorney or sometimes even disregarding those individuals when they do.”
71. That same day, the Washington Post covered the Summary Injustice Report and highlighted that “South Carolina’s magistrate and municipal courts are often deprived of counsel, resulting in de facto debtors’ prisons across the state.”
72. In January 2017, NACDL issued a follow-up report that further confirmed the findings of the Summary Injustice Report. See National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al., Rush to Judgment: How South Carolina’s Summary Courts Fail to Protect Constitutional Rights (2017) (“Rush to Judgment Report”).
73. On January 21, 2017, the Post and Courier published an article detailing the findings of the Rush to Judgment Report as a “Top Story.”
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74. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen know or should know that the inadequacies in the provision of indigent defense in South Carolina summary courts identified in the Summary Injustice Report and the Rush to Judgment Report apply to Lexington County magistrate courts.
75. Despite knowing about deficiencies in their system for public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts, Defendants Lexington County and Madsen have failed, and continue to fail, to take reasonable steps to protect the constitutional right to counsel of indigent people.
76. In 2016, Defendant Madsen presented a budget request to the County Council for a “jail attorney” to provide representation to inmates in the Detention Center on charges issued by the General Sessions Court. That request did not seek funding to represent indigent people in Lexington County magistrate courts even though it was made after the Summary Injustice Report had exposed the lack of counsel for indigent defendants in South Carolina summary courts. Defendant Madsen has not requested any County funding for the representation of indigent people incarcerated in the Detention Center because they cannot afford to pay fines and fees specified on magistrate court bench warrants.
77. The policies, practices, and customs described in the preceding paragraphs constitute the policy of Defendant Lexington County because the failure to adequately fund public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts is a decision of the Lexington County Council, the County’s final policymaker with respect to budgeting decisions.
78. The policies, practices, and customs described in the preceding paragraphs also constitute the policy of Defendant Lexington County because the failure to provide public defense to indigent people facing actual or suspended incarceration sentences in traffic and
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criminal cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts is longstanding, persistent, widespread, and so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.
79. The policies, practices, and customs described in the preceding paragraphs also constitute the policy of Lexington County because the County has delegated to Defendant Madsen final policymaking authority for the County’s provision of indigent defense. Defendant Madsen is aware, or should be aware, that there is a longstanding, persistent, and widespread failure to provide public defense to indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees in traffic and criminal cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts, and that this is due to grossly inadequate County funding, the requirement that indigent people pay an upfront $40 fee with each public defender application, and the failure to staff public defenders in magistrate court proceedings. Defendant Madsen causes, authorizes, condones, ratifies, approves, participates in, or knowingly acquiesces in these illegal policies, practices, and customs. Defendant Madsen’s actions and inactions were, and continue to be, deliberately indifferent to the clearly established Sixth Amendment rights of indigent people.
C. Defendants Reinhart, Adams, Dooley, and Koon Oversee, Enforce, and Sanction the Widespread and Routine Arrest and Incarceration of Indigent People Who Cannot Afford to Pay Magistrate Court Fines and Fees
80. Defendants Adams, Dooley, and Reinhart are the current and former final administrative policymakers for Lexington County magistrate courts.
81. From at least 2004 to June 27, 2017, Defendant Reinhart served as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County and Defendant Adams served as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County. Since June 28, 2017, Defendant Adams has served as Chief Judge, and Defendant Dooley has served as the Associate Chief Judge.
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82. On June 28, 2017, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued its most recent Order on Chief Judges for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts (“2017 Order”). The 2017 Order grants Defendant Adams significant administrative responsibility over magistrate court policy, procedure, and practice.
83. The 2017 Order generally empowers Defendant Adams to convene quarterly meetings of the County’s magistrate and municipal court judges to “formulate uniform procedures in the county summary court system.” It also explicitly tasks Defendant Adams with the responsibility to establish a county-wide procedure “to ensure that court generated revenues are collected, distributed, and reported in an appropriate and timely manner” and to “[r]eport to the Office of Court Administration any significant or repetitive non-compliance by any summary court judge in the county concerning the Chief Judge’s execution” of this and other duties.
84. The 2017 Order also requires Defendant Adams to administer the County’s Bond Court, determine the nighttime and weekend schedules of county magistrate courts, designate the hours of operation of the County’s magistrate courts, assign cases to magistrate court judges across the County, coordinate the planning of budgets for Lexington County magistrate courts, and request County funding for magistrate court operations.
85. The 2017 Order requires Defendant Dooley to carry out all of the administrative responsibilities of the Chief Judge in the event she is absent or disabled and to accept any administrative duties assigned by Defendant Adams.
86. The 2017 Order is substantively identical to prior orders of the South Carolina Supreme Court issued from 2014 to January 2017, which addressed Chief Judges for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts. These prior orders granted Defendant Reinhart the same administrative responsibilities as those now held by Defendant Adams, and granted
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Defendant Adams the same administrative responsibilities as those now held by Defendant Dooley.
87. Together, Defendants Reinhart, Adams and Dooley have exercised, and Defendants Adams and Dooley continue to exercise, their administrative authorities to oversee, enforce, and sanction standard operating procedures across Lexington County magistrate courts that directly cause the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of fines and fees in violation of their basic constitutional rights.
1. Default Payment Policy 88. Prior to June 28, 2017, Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversaw, enforced, and sanctioned the Default Payment Policy, which has become an unwritten, standard operating procedure in Lexington County magistrate courts. Defendants Adams and Dooley currently oversee, enforce, and sanction the Default Payment Policy. 89. Lexington County magistrate courts routinely sentence people to the payment of hefty fines and fees for traffic and criminal cases. When an indigent person cannot afford to pay in full at sentencing, the County’s magistrate courts impose a payment plan, known as a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement, rather than reducing the sentence to an amount the individual can afford to pay or exploring other alternatives to payment and incarceration. 90. Under the Default Payment Policy, magistrate court judges in Lexington County do not inquire into financial ability to pay when imposing fines and fees on an indigent defendant and setting the terms of a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement. At most, a judge may ask if a defendant is employed. But magistrate court judges routinely fail to ask whether the defendant appearing before them has steady employment, the amount of any income, household size, expenses, the needs of financial dependents, or other financial responsibilities, including child
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support. Many judges do not even ask whether a defendant is employed, disabled, or otherwise unable to work. Instead, if a defendant cannot pay the full amount of fines and fees at sentencing, Lexington County magistrate court judges impose a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement that requires steep monthly payment amounts untailored to the needs of the individual and often entirely beyond the person’s financial means.
91. Under the Default Payment Policy, every indigent defendant whom the magistrate court places on a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement is charged an additional statutory court collection fee of three percent of the total amount of fines and fees for each offense.
92. Under the Default Payment Policy, when an indigent person fails to pay in the time or amount required by the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement, magistrate courts routinely issue a bench warrant that orders law enforcement to arrest and incarcerate the individual unless the full amount owed, including the collection fee, is paid.
93. Upon information and belief, Defendants Adams and Dooley are aware of, and sanction the use of, magistrate court forms and procedures that implement the Default Payment Policy. Likewise, upon information and belief, Defendants Reinhart and Adams were aware of, and sanctioned the use of, magistrate court forms and procedures that implemented the Default Payment Policy while Defendant Reinhart served as Chief Judge.
94. When imposing a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement, magistrate courts require the defendant to sign a form that sets forth the payment schedule and includes the following statement: “Failure to appear as directed or failure to comply with the terms set forth in this payment schedule will result in BENCH WARRANT/COMMITMENT being issued for my arrest and denial of any future requests for a scheduled time payment.”
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95. The Scheduled Time Payment Agreement form does not explain that before being arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of court fines and fees, all people have a constitutional right to an ability-to-pay hearing and indigent people also have the right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel to defend against incarceration. Moreover, under the Default Payment Policy, Lexington County magistrate judges and court staff routinely fail to explain these rights to indigent people before requiring them to sign Scheduled Time Payment Agreements.
96. At no point before issuing a bench warrant for the arrest and incarceration of a debtor under the Default Payment Policy does a magistrate court judge hold a hearing to inquire about the reasons for the defendant’s nonpayment, the defendant’s ability to pay, or the availability of alternatives to payment and incarceration that would adequately achieve the goal of punishment and deterrence.
97. At no point before issuing a bench warrant for the arrest and incarceration of a debtor under the Default Payment Policy does a magistrate court judge notify the individual of the right to request court-appointed counsel or the right to request waiver of any public defender application fee. Likewise, at no point before issuing such a bench warrant does a magistrate court judge appoint counsel to represent indigent people who face incarceration for nonpayment.
98. Lexington County magistrate court judges routinely reference the Default Payment Policy when adjudicating individual traffic and criminal cases.
99. For example, when imposing sentences as a judge in the Irmo Magistrate Court, Defendant Adams routinely threatens indigent defendants with arrest and jail if they do not pay court fines and fees according to payment plan terms imposed by the court.
100. On one occasion, Defendant Adams sentenced a defendant to 30 days in jail suspended upon the payment of $500 for a breach of trust offense, ordered the defendant to make
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monthly payments of $100, and threatened, “Make sure you pay that. If not, I’ll have a bench warrant in 30 days for your arrest.”
101. On another occasion, Defendant Adams ordered a defendant to pay a nonwaivable court cost of $100 on two shoplifting charges and warned, “Don’t make me send [the officer] to get you for $100. Because I will.”
2. Trial in Absentia Policy 102. Prior to June 28, 2017, Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversaw, enforced, and sanctioned the Trial in Absentia Policy, which has become an unwritten standard operating procedure in Lexington County magistrate courts and leads to the routine conduct of trials and sentencing proceedings in traffic and criminal cases without even having defendants present in court. Defendants Adams and Dooley currently oversee, enforce, and sanction the Trial in Absentia Policy. 103. Lexington County magistrate courts routinely ignore or deny requests for a continuance when an indigent person who has been ticketed for a traffic or misdemeanor criminal offense contacts the court to request a new court date and to explain the reason for the request. Instead, Lexington County magistrate courts proceed without the defendant, impose a conviction in absentia, and sentence the person in absentia to a term of incarceration suspended on the payment of fines and fees. 104. Under the Trial in Absentia Policy, Lexington County magistrate courts do not ensure that the individual who has been tried and sentenced in absentia has actual notice of the conviction and sentence imposed. Instead, within a week of the date on which the sentence was imposed, the magistrate court issues a bench warrant that orders law enforcement to arrest and incarcerate the individual for a specified number of days unless the full amount of fines and fees
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owed is paid. Significantly, the purpose of the bench warrant is not to secure the individual’s appearance in court; rather, its purpose is to elicit payment or, if payment is not received, to incarcerate the person.
105. At no point before issuing a bench warrant ordering the arrest and incarceration of a debtor under the Trial in Absentia Policy does a magistrate court judge hold a hearing to determine whether the individual can afford to pay the fines and fees imposed or whether there are alternatives to payment or incarceration that would serve the court’s interest in punishment and deterrence.
106. At no point before issuing a bench warrant ordering the arrest and incarceration of a debtor under the Trial in Absentia Policy does a magistrate court judge notify the individual of the right to request court-appointed counsel or the right to request waiver of any public defender application fee. Likewise, at no point before issuing such a bench warrant does a magistrate court judge appoint counsel to represent indigent people who face incarceration for nonpayment.
107. Magistrate court judges and court staff routinely reference the Trial in Absentia Policy.
108. For example, at the end of a typical Central Traffic Court docket, court staff will call out each case in which a defendant has not appeared, hold a trial in absentia, and then announce that the defendant has been convicted and sentenced to a “fine or jail” sentence. The court staff person announces that the absent defendant is expected to pay the full amount of fines and fees within a specific amount of time and that if payment is not received, the court will issue a bench warrant ordering the arrest and jailing of the individual.
109. Upon information and belief, even when magistrate court staff fail to announce in open court that defendants in traffic and criminal cases will be tried and sentenced in absentia,
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magistrate court judges and court staff routinely conduct such trials outside the presence of the public and sentence the absent defendants to pay the full amount of fines and fees within a specific amount of time. If the payment is not received, the courts will issue a bench warrant ordering the arrest and jailing of the individual.
3. The Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies Result from the Exercise of Administrative Authority by Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Dooley
110. Prior to June 28, 2017, Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversaw, enforced, and sanctioned the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies through the exercise of their administrative responsibility for establishing uniform procedures in Lexington County magistrate courts, including a county-wide procedure for the collection of magistrate court fines and fees “in an appropriate and timely manner.”
111. Since June 28, 2017, Defendants Adams and Dooley oversee, enforce, and sanction the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies through the exercise of those same administrative responsibilities.
112. From at least 2004 to the first half of 2017, Defendant Reinhart, in his administrative capacity, exercised oversight authority over magistrate court judges and court staff who operated Lexington County magistrate courts. During that time, under the direction and supervision of Defendants Reinhart and Adams, magistrate judges and court staff implemented the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. Defendants Reinhart and Adams directed magistrate court staff to alert magistrate judges when people failed to pay pursuant to the terms of Scheduled Time Payment Agreements or did not appear in court on traffic or criminal charges, both of which triggered the issuance of bench warrants under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies.
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113. Since June 28, 2017, Defendants Adams and Dooley, in their administrative capacities, exercise oversight authority over approximately nine magistrate court judges and 24 court staff who operate Lexington County magistrate courts. Under the direction and supervision of Defendants Adams and Dooley, magistrate judges and court staff implement the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. Defendants Adams and Dooley direct magistrate court staff to alert magistrate judges when people have failed to pay pursuant to the terms of Scheduled Time Payment Agreements or have not appeared in court on traffic or criminal charges, both of which trigger the issuance of bench warrants under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies.
114. Defendants Adams and Dooley have made, and continue to make a deliberate decision not to correct through any written policy the longstanding, pervasive, and widespread practice of arresting and incarcerating indigent people for nonpayment of fines and fees without pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings or representation by court-appointed counsel, which is the result of the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies.
115. The 2017 Order and prior, substantively identical orders concerning Chief Judges for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts require the Chief Judge and Associate Chief Judge for Lexington County magistrate courts to report significant or repetitive non-compliance by any magistrate court judge concerning policies and procedures overseen and enforced by the Chief Judge, including those relating to the collection of magistrate court fines and fees. Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Dooley have not reported to the Office of Court Administration any noncompliance with any county-wide policies, practices, and standard operating procedures concerning the collection of magistrate court fines and fees “in an appropriate and timely manner.”
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116. Defendants Reinhart and Adams exercised, and Defendants Adams and Dooley currently exercise, the administrative authority to increase the size of magistrate court dockets, to require additional hours of magistrate court operation, to require magistrate judges to work on evenings and weekends, and to request additional County funding for magistrate court operations. They have made and/or continue to make a deliberate decision not to use any of these administrative powers to ensure that magistrate court judges and staff under their supervision expend the time and resources required to afford pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings and representation by court-appointed counsel to indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment.
117. The Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies squarely contradict South Carolina law and directives from the Supreme Court of South Carolina that permit the use of bench warrants only for the purpose of securing a defendant’s appearance in court. South Carolina Code Section 22-5-115 governs magistrate court criminal matters and provides: “If the defendant fails to appear before the court . . . a bench warrant may be issued for his arrest.” South Carolina Code Section 38-53-70 further provides: “If a defendant fails to appear at a court proceeding to which he has been summoned, the court shall issue a bench warrant for the defendant.” A November 14, 1980 Order of the Supreme Court of South Carolina makes clear that “bench warrants . . . are to be used only for the purpose of bringing a defendant before a court which has already gained jurisdiction over that defendant by previous service of a valid charging paper.” Moreover, a Memorandum dated November 24, 1980 from John Patrick, the Assistant Director of the South Carolina Office of Court Administration, to Magistrate and Municipal Judges transmitted the South Carolina Supreme Court’s Order concerning bench
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warrants and stated that “bench warrants . . . are to be used only for the purpose of bringing a defendant before a court.”
118. Even the South Carolina Summary Court Judges Bench Book, which is promulgated by the South Carolina Office of Court Administration and used to train magistrate judges, defines a bench warrant as “a form of process to be used to bring a defendant back before a particular court on a particular charge for a specific purpose after the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant on that particular charge by virtue of a previously served proper charging paper.” The Bench Book makes clear that the purpose of a bench warrant is to bring a defendant to court, even when the warrant is issued against a defendant who, “under sentence, fails to properly pay a fine” or a defendant who did not appear in court, was tried in absentia, and “must now be brought before the court to comply with the sentence.” See South Carolina Judicial Department, Summary Judges Benchbook, “Criminal,” Chapter C, “Warrants.”
119. As the administrative leadership responsible for coordinating between Lexington County magistrate courts and the Office of Court Administration, Defendants Adams and Dooley know, or should know, that the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies involve the routine misuse of bench warrants to elicit fine and fee payments and to incarcerate indigent people rather than to bring defendants to court, contrary to South Carolina law and directives from the Supreme Court of South Carolina and the Office of Court Administration. Likewise, during Defendant Reinhart’s tenure as Chief Judge, Defendants Reinhart and Adams knew, or should have known, that the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies involved such misuse of bench warrants.
120. In their administrative capacities under South Carolina law, Defendant Reinhart remitted, and Defendant Adams currently remits, to the Lexington County Treasurer’s Office the
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fines and fees collected by the Central Traffic Court and six district magistrate courts. Defendant Reinhart was aware, or should have been aware, that the fines and fees he collected and remited to the Lexington County Treasurer included payments made by indigent people who were under duress because they faced arrest and incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees under the Default Payment Policy or the Trial in Absentia Policy. Likewise, Defendant Adams is aware, or should be aware, that the fine and fees she collects and remits to the Lexington County Treasurer includes payments made by indigent people who were under duress because they faced arrest and incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees under the Default Payment Policy or Trial in Absentia Policy.
4. Defendant Koon Enforces the Arrest and Incarceration of Indigent People for Unpaid Fines and Fees
121. It is the standard operating procedure for Lexington County magistrate courts to transmit to the Warrant Division of the LCSD all bench warrants issued under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies.
122. Defendant Koon is the chief law enforcement officer of the LCSD and the chief administrator of the Detention Center.
123. Under South Carolina law, Defendant Koon has the authority and ongoing responsibility to execute bench warrants and to incarcerate people who have been arrested in the Detention Center. Rule 30(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure grants Defendant Koon “the continuing duty . . . to make every reasonable effort to serve bench warrants and to make periodic reports to the court concerning the status of unserved warrants.” Under Section 23-15-50 of the South Carolina Code, “[t]he sheriff or his deputy shall arrest all persons against whom process for that purpose shall issue from any competent authority commanding such person to be taken into custody or requiring him to give bond, with security.”
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124. Under Defendant Koon’s direction and supervision, LCSD officers in the Warrant Division are required to locate and arrest the individuals named in bench warrants issued under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. LCSD officers are often tasked with going to the home address of the individual, which is identified on the face of the warrant. They are also instructed to conduct bench warrant checks at traffic and pedestrian stops.
125. Under Defendant Koon’s direction and supervision, LCSD officers seek and obtain the assistance of other law enforcement agencies in South Carolina in locating people who are the subject of bench warrants. Upon information and belief, the LCSD has an agreement with the Richland County Sheriff Department (“RCSD”) by which RCSD officers go to the homes of Richland County residents who are the subject of Lexington County magistrate court bench warrants, execute those warrants, and detain the arrestees in the Richland County Jail for up to 72 hours before LCSD officers transport the arrestees to the Detention Center. LCSD has a similar agreement with the Horry County Sheriff’s Department.
126. Under South Carolina Code Section 22-5-210, LCSD officers are required to provide an arrestee with the bench warrant used to effect the arrest. Whether by providing the arrestee with a copy of the bench warrant and/or through verbal explanation, LCSD officers under the direction and supervision of Defendant Koon inform people arrested on bench warrants that the only way to avoid incarceration is to pay in full the fines and fees identified on the face of the warrant before booking.
127. Under Defendant Koon’s direction and supervision, when people arrested on a bench warrant are brought to the Detention Center, Detention Center staff explain to them that they must either pay the entire amount of the fines and fees identified on the bench warrant or serve the full term of incarceration identified on the bench warrant. Detention Center staff
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frequently serve a copy of the bench warrant on the arrested individual and explain that early release is possible for good time served at the rate of one day of credit for every two days in jail.
128. Under Defendant Koon’s direction and supervision, it is a Detention Center standard operating procedure that if a person arrested on a bench warrant is unable to pay the full amount of the balance due identified on the face of the bench warrant before being booked in jail, he or she is incarcerated for approximately two-thirds of the time listed on the bench warrant. It is a standard operating procedure for Detention Center officers to begin the booking process as soon as they can verify that an arrestee is unable to pay the full amount of fines and fees identified on the face of the bench warrant.
129. Any payments made toward magistrate court fines and fees at the Detention Center are forwarded by Detention Center staff to the magistrate court that issued the bench warrant.
5. The Lack of Judicial Process After the Arrest and Incarceration of Indigent People for Nonpayment of Fines and Fees Results from the Exercise of Administrative Authority by Defendants Reinhart and Adams and the Actions of Defendant Koon
130. At no point after the issuance of a bench warrant and before an individual is booked in the Detention Center on a bench warrant does a Lexington County magistrate court hold a hearing to determine whether the individual’s nonpayment of fines and fees was willful or the result of inability to pay, notify the individual of the right to counsel, or appoint counsel to represent the individual at no cost to assist in defending against incarceration for nonpayment.
131. At no point after an individual is booked in the Detention Center on a bench warrant does a Lexington County magistrate court hold a hearing to determine whether the individual’s nonpayment of fines and fees was willful or the result of financial inability to pay,
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provide notice of the right to counsel to the individual, or appoint counsel at no cost to the individual to assist in defending against incarceration for nonpayment.
132. Pursuant to South Carolina law, the 2017 Order, and prior orders of the South Carolina Supreme Court concerning Chief Judges for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts, Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Dooley have determined, and/or currently determine the schedule, staffing, policies, procedures, and practices of the Lexington County Bond Court, which is located in a building adjacent to the Detention Center.
133. In the exercise of their administrative authority over the Bond Court, Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Dooley, have made, and continue to make, a deliberate decision not to require or even permit the Bond Court to review the cases of indigent people arrested and jailed on magistrate court bench warrants under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Dooley have elected to understaff the Bond Court and limit its hours of operation such that the Bond Court does not have the resources to afford hearings to people arrested and jailed on magistrate court bench warrants under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies.
134. In the exercise of their administrative authority over magistrate court case assignments and hours of operation, Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Dooley have made, and/or continue to make, a deliberate administrative decision not to require or permit indigent people booked in jail on bench warrants to be brought to the original magistrate court that issued the bench warrant for a post-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing and appointment of counsel to guard against continued unlawful incarceration.
135. Under the direction and supervision of Defendant Koon, neither LCSD officers who transport bench warrant arrestees to the Detention Center nor Detention Center staff who
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book or detain these people bring them to the Bond Court (or any magistrate court) for an abilityto-pay hearing or inform them of their right to request the assistance of court-appointed counsel to defend against unlawful incarceration.
136. As a result of the exercise of administrative authority by Defendants Reinhart, Adams and Dooley, and the deliberate acts of Defendant Koon, indigent people targeted for fine and fee collection through magistrate court bench warrants are jailed for weeks to months at a time simply because of their inability to pay the full amount of fines and fees identified on the bench warrant between the time of their arrest and before being booked in the Detention Center. Other indigent people are able to avoid incarceration only by forgoing basic necessities, begging their families and friends for money, and quickly selling their possessions in order to pay their debts in full.
D. The Effects of Defendants’ Policies, Practices, Customs, Acts, Omissions and Standard Operating Procedures on the Named Plaintiffs 1. Twanda Marshinda Brown
137. Twanda Marshinda Brown is a single mother of seven children, five of whom live with her. She is the sole provider for her three youngest children, who are in secondary school, and also provides financial support to her two older sons.
138. Ms. Brown lives in poverty. She works whenever she can find employment, but struggles to earn enough money to pay for rent, electricity, food, clothing, transportation, and other necessities for herself and her family.
139. Ms. Brown qualifies for needs-based public assistance in the form of Medicaid and Section 8, the federal housing subsidy program for low-income residents. She has relied on housing obtained with Section 8 assistance since at least 2015.
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140. In 2016, Ms. Brown worked at Burger King and earned an annual income far below $24,250, the 2016 federal poverty guideline for a four-person household.
141. On March 15, 2016, Ms. Brown borrowed her niece’s car to drive a friend home even though she does not have a license to drive. On her way home, Ms. Brown was stopped and ticketed by an LCSD officer for driving on a suspended license (DUS, 2nd offense) and for driving with “no tag light.” The tickets instructed Ms. Brown to appear in the Irmo Magistrate Court on April 12, 2016.
142. On April 12, 2016, Ms. Brown appeared before Defendant Adams in the Irmo Magistrate Court.
143. Ms. Brown did not know, and Judge Adams did not inform her, that she had the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney before pleading guilty, and the right to seek a waiver of any public defender application fees due to financial hardship.
144. Without being informed of her rights and without the assistance of counsel, Ms. Brown pled guilty to the charges of DUS, 2nd offense, and driving with no tag light.
145. Judge Adams sentenced Ms. Brown to $237.50 in fines and fees for the driving with no tag light offense. She also sentenced Ms. Brown to $2,100 in fines and fees for the DUS, 2nd offense, even though the maximum penalty under South Carolina law is $600, 60 days of imprisonment, or both.
146. Judge Adams asked Ms. Brown if she had any money to pay that day. When Ms. Brown responded that she did not, Judge Adams stated that Ms. Brown would be required to pay $100 each month toward her fines and fees.
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147. Ms. Brown was scared. She knew that she could not afford to pay $100 each month to the court and still support her family. Ms. Brown told Judge Adams that she could afford to pay only $50 a month.
148. Judge Adams replied that a $50 monthly payment was not enough. Ms. Brown recalls that Judge Adams said, “I don’t care what happens. Your payment is going to be on the 12th. I want my money on the 12th.”
149. Ms. Brown tried to explain her financial responsibilities related to her children. Judge Adams replied, “I don’t care if you have 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 kids.”
150. Judge Adams threatened to jail Ms. Brown for 90 days if she did not make a $100 payment each month to the Irmo Magistrate Court.
151. Judge Adams did not ask Ms. Brown about her income, assets, expenses, dependents or other financial obligations. Nor did Judge Adams ask whether Ms. Brown received any form of needs-based, means-tested public assistance.
152. The conduct and statements of Judge Adams terrified Ms. Brown. She left court fearing that if she missed a monthly payment to the court, she would be arrested and jailed.
153. After the hearing, Ms. Brown went to the payment window outside the courtroom. There she was given a “Trial Information and Plea Sheet.” Neither the judge nor any court staff explained the contents of the document to Ms. Brown. Ms. Brown provided her current mailing address and phone number on the document. Ms. Brown does not remember placing a check mark next to the appropriate statement on the Trial Information and Plea Sheet to indicate that she wished to plead guilty to the offenses charged or waive her right to counsel.
154. At the payment window, a staff member of the Irmo Magistrate Court Clerk’s Office also provided Ms. Brown with two Scheduled Time Payment Agreements. The staff
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person explained to Ms. Brown that a payment of $100 was due on the twelfth of each month and asked Ms. Brown to sign the documents. The staff person did not explain the other contents of the documents to Ms. Brown or provide copies of the documents to take home.
155. Ms. Brown signed the Scheduled Time Payment Agreements as instructed. 156. According to the terms of the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement, Ms. Brown was required to pay $2,163 in fines and fees for the DUS, 2nd offense, and $244.63 in fines and fees for the driving with no tag light offense. The total amount due for each offense included a three percent collection fee. 157. Ms. Brown was not informed by the judge, court staff, or the Scheduled Time Payment Agreements that if her financial circumstances changed in the future and she was unable to pay the $100 required each month, she could request a court hearing on her ability to pay and alternatives to incarceration. Rather, the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement included the following paragraph: “Failure to appear as directed or failure to comply with the terms set forth in this payment scheduled will result in a BENCH WARRANT/COMMITMENT being issued for my arrest and denial of any future requests for a scheduled time payment.” 158. After her hearing in the Irmo Magistrate Court, Ms. Brown faced difficulty making payments to the court while also financially supporting herself and her family. Nevertheless, because she feared that Judge Adams would jail her if she missed a payment, Ms. Brown made payments to the Irmo Magistrate Court her highest priority. 159. Ms. Brown made payments of $100 to the Irmo Magistrate Court on the following dates: May 12, 2016; June 13, 2016; July 12, 2016; August 30, 2016; and October 4, 2016. These payments satisfied Ms. Brown’s fines and fees for the offense of driving with no tag light and contributed toward her fines and fees for the DUS, 2nd offense.
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160. Despite her best efforts, Ms. Brown could not afford to make payments toward her court fines and fees after October 4, 2016. Ms. Brown’s income was diminished because she needed to reduce her hours at Burger King in order to take care of her son, who had an accident that required him to undergo a major surgery.
161. Around the same time, the Burger King franchisee for whom Ms. Brown worked was not properly paying her. On numerous occasions in 2016, Ms. Brown faced difficulty cashing her paychecks from the Burger King franchisee because they bounced. The franchisee failed to correct the problem, and Ms. Brown left her job at Burger King in December 2016 to look for a new job that would provide consistent income.
162. During January 2017, Ms. Brown made significant efforts to find a new job and requested an extension of time to pay her electricity bills, which she could not afford to pay.
163. On January 12, 2017, Judge Adams issued a bench warrant ordering the arrest and jailing of Ms. Brown for nonpayment of fines and fees imposed for the DUS, 2nd offense. The warrant stated that Ms. Brown had a “sentence imposed/balance due of $1,907.63 or 90 days” and that she would be jailed “until he/she shall be thereof discharged by due course of law.”
164. In early February 2017, Ms. Brown secured temporary employment at McIntyre Food Products, where she packaged food sent to fast-food restaurants. Ms. Brown was grateful to have secured a job and hoped to resume her payments to the Irmo Magistrate Court after receiving her first paycheck on February 20, 2017. She also expected to be promoted to a permanent position with an hourly rate increase on that day.
165. On Saturday, February 18, 2017, at around seven o’clock in the morning, two RCSD officers came to Ms. Brown’s home in the City of Columbia. When Ms. Brown realized
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the officers were there for her arrest, she sent her youngest child to take out the trash so that he would not see her being handcuffed and arrested.
166. When Ms. Brown opened the front door, an officer informed her that there was a bench warrant for her arrest.
167. The officers arrested Ms. Brown and transported her to the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center in Richland County. At the jail, Ms. Brown was served with the bench warrant issued by the Irmo Magistrate Court, which required her to pay $1,907.63 or serve 90 days in jail.
168. Ms. Brown could not afford to pay $1,907.63 and did not know anyone who could lend her the money to secure her release.
169. Ms. Brown was incarcerated for three nights in the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center. On February 21, 2017, she was transported to the Detention Center.
170. At the Detention Center, a guard informed Ms. Brown that she would have to serve 63 days of a 90-day sentence.
171. Ms. Brown was ultimately released on April 15, 2017. She was incarcerated for a total of 57 days—three days in the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center and 54 days in the Detention Center. Ms. Brown believes she was released earlier than expected because she earned additional credit toward her time by cleaning the jail.
172. Ms. Brown’s incarceration was devastating for her and her children. She was extremely distressed to be separated from her children, including her thirteen-year-old son. Ms. Brown cried every day out of concern for her children.
173. As a result of her 57-day-long incarceration, Ms. Brown was separated from her family, including her three teenage sons. Ms. Brown also missed her son’s seventeenth birthday
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and her granddaughter’s first birthday, could not be with her family when her cousin died, and spent her fortieth birthday in the jail, away from her family.
174. While she was incarcerated, Ms. Brown suffered from a severe migraine which caused her eyelids and face to swell, but did not receive any medication. Ms. Brown also lost her job at McIntyre Food Products, where she was supposed to be promoted to a permanent position with an hourly rate increase.
175. Following her release from jail, Ms. Brown is struggling to find paid work and to pay bills incurred while she was incarcerated.
2. Sasha Monique Darby 176. Sasha Monique Darby is the single mother of a four-year old son for whom she provides financial support. 177. Ms. Darby suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of abuse and assault she experienced as a child. 178. Ms. Darby lives in poverty. While in Massachusetts in 2015, she received needsbased public assistance in the form of Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”), and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”). 179. Ms. Darby and her son moved to South Carolina from Massachusetts in the spring of 2015 to be close to her mother and extended family. 180. Following her move to South Carolina, Ms. Darby struggled to find employment and financially support herself and her son. In 2016, she worked in several low-wage jobs, including as a forklift driver, but earned an annual income of around $11,770, the 2016 federal poverty guideline for a one-person household.
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181. At first, Ms. Darby’s mother was able to help by providing child care for her son while Ms. Darby was looking for work or was at work. After suffering complications related to diabetes, Ms. Darby’s mother could no longer provide child care.
182. Because Ms. Darby could not afford child care, in June 2015, she made the difficult decision to send her son to live with his paternal grandmother in Massachusetts. Ms. Darby continued to provide financial support for her son after he moved back to Massachusetts.
183. From January 2016 to early August 2016, Ms. Darby lived with a roommate in order to make ends meet, but the arrangement did not work out as she had hoped.
184. On August 4, 2016, the day on which Ms. Darby was supposed to move out of the apartment, her roommate demanded an additional payment of $200, which Ms. Darby believed was unjustified. Ms. Darby and her roommate got into a heated argument. Ms. Darby saw her roommate raise a hand and thought her roommate was going to hit her. Because she suffers from PTSD, Ms. Darby felt threatened. Out of fear, Ms. Darby responded by hitting her roommate first. Ms. Darby’s roommate called the police in response.
185. Two officers came to the apartment and issued Ms. Darby a ticket charging her with assault and battery in the third degree and requiring her to appear in the Irmo Magistrate Court on August 23, 2016.
186. Ms. Darby appeared in the Irmo Magistrate Court on August 23, 2016. 187. Before Ms. Darby entered the courtroom, an officer handed her a “Trial Information and Plea Sheet” and instructed her to “check a box.” 188. The Trial Information and Plea Sheet indicated that an application for a courtappointed attorney required a “$40 non-refundable fee.” Because she did not have $40, Ms. Darby placed a check mark next to the statement, “I waive my right to have an attorney present.”
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189. The Trial Information and Plea Sheet also indicated that Ms. Darby could plead no contest, guilty, or not guilty. Because there was no one to help her, Ms. Darby placed a mark next to the option for “Not guilty” and went into the courtroom.
190. Ms. Darby provided her mother’s permanent home address as her contact information on the Trial Information and Plea Sheet, along with her own personal cell phone number. Ms. Darby had been staying with her aunt and her mother following the termination of her apartment share in August 2016 and received mail at her mother’s home.
191. When Ms. Darby’s name was called, Judge Adams read the Trial Information and Plea Sheet and said, “So you didn’t want a lawyer? Trial’s about to start now.”
192. Judge Adams did not inform Ms. Darby that she had the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney and the right to seek waiver of any fees related to the application for a public defender due to financial hardship.
193. Moreover, Judge Adams did not engage in a colloquy with Ms. Darby to determine whether any waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Judge Adams did not inform Ms. Darby of the benefits of being represented by counsel, the risks of proceeding pro se, or the potential penalties if she was found guilty. As a result, Ms. Darby did not make a knowing, voluntary or intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.
194. Judge Adams held a trial on the charge of assault and battery in the third degree. Ms. Darby did not know how to cross-examine a witness or take other steps to represent herself.
195. Judge Adams found Ms. Darby guilty of assault and battery in the third degree. 196. Judge Adams asked Ms. Darby whether she wanted to serve 30 days in jail or pay a fine. Because Ms. Darby did not want to go to jail, she stated that she would pay a fine. Judge Adams did not, however, inform Ms. Darby of the amount that she would have to pay.
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197. Judge Adams asked Ms. Darby if she had the money to pay the fine. Ms. Darby was confused because she did not know how much the fine would be. She informed Judge Adams that she had some money.
198. Judge Adams asked Ms. Darby where she worked, but asked no further questions about Ms. Darby’s financial circumstances.
199. At no point did Judge Adams tell Ms. Darby the amount of the fine imposed, ask whether Ms. Darby could pay that amount, or ask questions about Ms. Darby’s income, assets, expenses, dependents, or other financial obligations. Nor did Judge Adams ask whether Ms. Darby received any form of needs-based, means-tested public assistance.
200. Ms. Darby left the courtroom and went to the payment window. There, she was informed that she was sentenced to pay $1,000 in fines and fees. Ms. Darby was shocked. She could not afford to pay $1,000.
201. Ms. Darby returned to the courtroom and waited for Judge Adams to speak with her. When Judge Adams called her back to the bench, Ms. Darby requested a payment plan and indicated that she could afford to pay $100 to $120 a month. Ms. Darby knew that paying more than $100 per month would be difficult for her, but she sought to show Judge Adams that she would try her best to pay the fine as soon as possible.
202. Judge Adams said that the monthly payment amount Ms. Darby proposed was not enough and ordered Ms. Darby to pay $150 a month.
203. At the payment window, Ms. Darby paid $200 toward the $1000 fine. She signed a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement to pay the $800 balance and an additional three percent collection fee of $30. According to the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement, Ms. Darby was
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required to pay $150 each month from September 23, 2016 through January 23, 2017, and to make a final $80 payment on February 23, 2017.
204. Ms. Darby was not informed by the judge, court staff, or the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement that if her financial circumstances changed in the future and she was unable to pay the $150 required each month, she could request a court hearing on her ability to pay and alternatives to incarceration. Rather, the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement included the following paragraph: “Failure to appear as directed or failure to comply with the terms set forth in this payment scheduled will result in a BENCH WARRANT/COMMITMENT being issued for my arrest and denial of any future requests for a scheduled time payment.”
205. Following her trial and sentencing in the Irmo Magistrate Court, Ms. Darby had difficulty making the $150 payment due to the court on September 23, 2016. Nevertheless, she made a $150 payment on October 4, 2016.
206. Ms. Darby could not make further payments because she fell into significant financial distress in the fall of 2016.
207. In November 2016, Ms. Darby found herself facing additional childcare costs. Starting that month, Ms. Darby was required to spend $180 every two weeks for her son’s daycare. She was also saving money to visit her son in Massachusetts because, at that time, she had not seen him since the Mother’s Day weekend in May 2016 when she had last been able to afford a trip to Massachusetts.
208. On December 8, 2016, Judge Adams issued a bench warrant ordering the arrest and immediate jailing of Ms. Darby for nonpayment of fines and fees on the offense of assault and battery in the third degree.
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209. On March 28, 2017, Ms. Darby went to her mother’s house to help support a family member who was scheduled to be transported to a mental health facility. Ms. Darby was pregnant at that time.
210. The mental health facility personnel came to the house accompanied by two law enforcement officers. One officer recognized Ms. Darby and asked for her identification. The officer ran her name and informed Ms. Darby that there was a warrant for her arrest.
211. Ms. Darby was surprised. She had not received a notice from the Irmo Magistrate Court charging her with nonpayment, and her mother had not received any mail from the Irmo Magistrate Court addressed to Ms. Darby.
212. The officers arrested Ms. Darby and transported her to the Detention Center. 213. At the Detention Center, Ms. Darby was provided a copy of the bench warrant. It indicated that she was required to pay a balance of $680 toward her sentence for assault and battery in the third degree or serve 20 days in jail. 214. Ms. Darby could not afford to pay $680, and did not know anyone who could lend her the money to secure her release. 215. Ms. Darby was ultimately released on April 17, 2017. She was incarcerated in the Detention Center for 20 days. 216. Ms. Darby’s 20-day-long incarceration was devastating for her. Ms. Darby missed her first prenatal care appointment and was extremely distressed that she could not talk to her four-year-old son who lives in Massachusetts during the entire duration of her incarceration. 217. While she was incarcerated, Ms. Darby did not get enough food to eat or proper medical care related to her pregnancy.
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218. While incarcerated, Ms. Darby feared she would lose her job because she could not report to work.
219. During her incarceration, Ms. Darby’s landlord initiated eviction proceedings, which ultimately caused her to lose her home in May 2017. Ms. Darby also lost her job as a forklift driver due to her inability to report to work while incarcerated.
220. Because she would be homeless if she stayed in South Carolina, Ms. Darby moved to Massachusetts to live with family.
221. Ms. Darby is struggling to find paid work and to pay bills incurred while she was incarcerated.
3. Cayeshia Cashel Johnson 214. Cayeshia Cashel Johnson is a single mother and the principal provider for her four children, all of whom are under the age of eight. 215. Ms. Johnson lives in poverty. She works multiple part-time jobs and struggles to earn enough money to pay for rent, electricity, food, clothing, transportation, and other necessities to support herself and her family. 216. Ms. Johnson receives needs-based public assistance in the form of Medicaid and food assistance through SNAP. 217. In 2016, Ms. Johnson’s annual income was far below $28,410, the 2016 federal poverty guideline for a five-person household. 218. On August 21, 2016, Ms. Johnson got into a minor car accident in Lexington County when driving her mother’s car. At the time, Ms. Johnson was driving from Columbia to Myrtle Beach with a friend.
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219. Shortly after the accident, an LCSD patrol car arrived at the scene. The officer asked Ms. Johnson for her driver’s license. Ms. Johnson answered truthfully that she had a valid driver’s license but that it was not with her at the time.
220. The officer issued Ms. Johnson tickets charging her with five traffic offenses and one misdemeanor offense: (1) uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense; (2) operating a motor vehicle without license in possession; (3) improper start of vehicle; (4) violation of beginner permit; (5) failure to return license plate and registration upon loss of insurance, 1st offense; and (6) simple possession of marijuana.
221. The tickets notified Ms. Johnson that she was required to appear in court on September 22, 2016, and provided the address of the Central Traffic Court.
222. When Ms. Johnson returned to Myrtle Beach, her mother was upset about the accident and would no longer allow Ms. Johnson to drive her car. Ms. Johnson could not arrange for transportation to travel to Lexington for her court hearing from Myrtle Beach, which is approximately three hours away by car.
223. About a week before the scheduled hearing, Ms. Johnson called the Central Traffic Court and spoke to a staff person. Ms. Johnson informed the court staff person that she could not attend the court hearing because she lives in Myrtle Beach and could not find transportation to get to and from Lexington in light of her childcare and employment responsibilities. Ms. Johnson explained that she had called everyone she knew to ask for help in traveling to Lexington, but had not been able to secure transportation.
224. The court staff person informed Ms. Johnson that lack of transportation was not a valid reason for missing a court hearing and that her case would be tried in her absence.
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225. Ms. Johnson asked the court staff person about arranging a payment plan for the fines on the tickets. The court staff person told Ms. Johnson, “The only way to have a payment plan is to talk to the judge.”
226. The court staff person explained that the judge was in the middle of a hearing. Ms. Johnson provided the court staff person both her work number and cell phone number. The court staff person assured Ms. Johnson that the court would contact her.
227. No staff person or judge of the Central Traffic Court called Ms. Johnson to respond to her request for continuance and a payment plan.
228. On September 22, 2016, the Central Traffic Court tried Ms. Johnson in her absence and found her guilty of all six charges.
229. Ms. Johnson did not receive any notice that she had been tried in absentia, convicted of one misdemeanor and five traffic offenses, sentenced to serve jail time or pay fines and fees for three offenses, and sentenced to pay fines and fees for three offenses.
230. On September 26, 2016, the Central Traffic Court issued a bench warrant ordering the arrest and immediate jailing of Ms. Johnson. The bench warrant required Ms. Johnson to pay $1,287.50 or be jailed for 80 days for her conviction on the charges of uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense, operating a motor vehicle without license in possession, and simple possession of marijuana.
231. On February 13, 2017, Ms. Johnson was a passenger in a car driven by her cousin. They were near Ms. Johnson’s mother’s house in Myrtle Beach when local police stopped the car because of a broken taillight.
232. The officer asked for Ms. Johnson’s driver’s license. The officer informed her that there was a bench warrant for her arrest from Lexington County.
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233. The officer arrested Ms. Johnson immediately. Ms. Johnson explained that her children were waiting for her at home with her mother. The officer nevertheless handcuffed Ms. Johnson and took her to the local jail, the J. Reuben Long Detention Center in Horry County, where she was incarcerated for one night.
234. The next morning, on February 14, 2017, two officers from Lexington County transported Ms. Johnson to the Detention Center. At the Detention Center, Ms. Johnson was served with the bench warrant.
235. The bench warrant was the first notice Ms. Johnson had received that she had been convicted of uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense, operating a motor vehicle without license in possession, and simple possession of marijuana. It was also the first notice she received regarding the requirement to pay the Central Traffic Court $1,287.50 or serve 80 days in jail.
236. Ms. Johnson asked the officer who had given her the bench warrant, “Is this the amount I need to get out?” Ms. Johnson recalls that the officer responded, “Yes, that’s the amount or the days.”
237. Ms. Johnson could not afford to pay $1,287.50 and did not know anyone who could lend her the money to secure her release.
238. Ms. Johnson was ultimately released on April 9, 2017. She was incarcerated for a total of 55 days—one night in the J. Reuben Long Detention Center and 54 days in the Detention Center.
239. Ms. Johnson’s 55-day-long incarceration was devastating for her and her four children. Ms. Johnson was extremely distressed to be separated from her four children for eight
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long weeks. Likewise, because Ms. Johnson’s family was located hours away in Myrtle Beach, they were unable to visit her during the entire eight weeks of her incarceration.
240. While she was incarcerated, Ms. Johnson also suffered from severe headaches for which she received insufficient medical attention.
241. While incarcerated, Ms. Johnson feared that she would lose the three part-time jobs that she held before her arrest due to her inability to report to work. Upon her release, Ms. Johnson discovered that she lost all three jobs, which had provided critical financial support to her and her children, as a result of her incarceration.
242. Following her release from jail, Ms. Johnson struggled to find paid work and to pay bills incurred while she was incarcerated. She ultimately found employment in low-wage jobs but still struggles to support her family financially.
243. Upon her release from the Detention Center, Ms. Johnson discovered that she still owes Lexington County $905 for the charges of improper start of vehicle, violation of beginner permit, and failure to return license plate and registration upon loss of insurance.
244. Ms. Johnson received a letter from the Central Traffic Court indicating that she also owes $100 “non-suspendable mandatory costs,” which were due on May 15, 2017.
245. Ms. Johnson does not have the money to pay $905 for the outstanding tickets or $100 in mandatory costs.
4. Amy Marie Palacios 246. Amy Marie Palacios is a single mother and the principal provider for herself and her two teenage daughters. 247. In 2016, Ms. Palacios moved to South Carolina in order to live closer to her extended family.
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248. Ms. Palacios lives in poverty. She works whenever she can find employment but struggles to earn enough money to support herself and her family.
249. In 2016, Ms. Palacios earned an annual income below $20,090, the federal poverty guideline for a three-person household in that year.
250. Ms. Palacios’ driver’s license was suspended in or around June 2015 because she had neglected to pay the fine for a speeding ticket incurred that year. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Palacios moved to California.
251. When Ms. Palacios returned to South Carolina in May 2016, she paid the fines on the 2015 speeding ticket, contacted the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) to find out exactly how much she owed in reinstatement fees, and began saving money in earnest to pay those fees and reinstate her driver’s license. Her ability to reinstate her license was delayed, however, in part because of miscommunication between different DMV offices.
252. On October 28, 2016, Ms. Palacios was a passenger in a car driven by a friend who was pregnant. When her friend felt sick and could no longer drive, they pulled over and switched places. A few minutes later, Ms. Palacios was stopped by state troopers at a roadblock.
253. The state troopers ran the names of Ms. Palacios and her friend for warrants. One of the troopers discovered that Ms. Palacios’ driver’s license was suspended. Ms. Palacios explained that she had driven only because her friend was pregnant and had suddenly become too ill to drive. Ms. Palacios also explained that she was working toward getting her driver’s license reinstated but could not afford to pay the reinstatement fee.
254. The officer ticketed Ms. Palacios for driving on a suspended license (DUS, 1st offense). The ticket notified Ms. Palacios that she was required to appear in court on November 10, 2016 and provided the address of the Central Traffic Court.
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255. Before her court date, Ms. Palacios discovered she would be unable to attend the hearing due to work. Ms. Palacios worked twelve hours a day, five to six days a week, as a restaurant server with only one break between 3:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m.
256. On November 9, 2016, Ms. Palacios called the Central Traffic Court to ask how to request a different court date. She explained to a court staff person that she could not attend the court hearing because she was scheduled to work at the restaurant during the time of the hearing and could not secure time off or find anyone to replace her during her shift.
257. The court staff person explained to Ms. Palacios that her manager could fax an affidavit to the court explaining her situation. Ms. Palacios asked what would happen if she did not attend the hearing. The court staff person assured her, “As long as you fax that over, you should be ok.” The staff person said that the judge would review the papers and notify her of the decision.
258. That same day, Ms. Palacios faxed to the Central Traffic Court an affidavit from her employer that explained that Ms. Palacios would not be able to attend court due to work. The affidavit stated: “I Jorge Gomez Manager @ El Jimador Mexican Restaurant state that Amy Palacios is scheduled to work on 11/10/2016 & cannot attend court date scheduled for 11/10/2016. Ms. Palacios would like to request an extension for this date to avoid any future issues. If you have any Questions, Please call me.” The affidavit provided Mr. Gomez’s contact information.
259. Neither Ms. Palacios nor her employer received a call or written notice from the court in response to her request for a new court date. Because the court staff person of the Central Traffic Court had assured her that the court would follow up with her, Ms. Palacios did not check on the status of her case.
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260. On November 10, 2016, Ms. Palacios was tried in her absence in the Central Traffic Court and found guilty of DUS, 1st offense.
261. Ms. Palacios did not receive any notice that she had been tried in absentia, convicted of a traffic offense, and sentenced to serve jail time or pay fines and fees for the offense.
262. On November 15, 2016, the Central Traffic Court issued a bench warrant ordering the arrest and immediate jailing of Ms. Palacios. The bench warrant required Ms. Palacios to pay $647.50 or be jailed for 30 days for her conviction on the charge of DUS, 1st offense.
263. Around 1:00 a.m. on February 25, 2017, after work, Ms. Palacios had dinner with a close friend who was staying at a local motel. Another friend who was at the dinner agreed to drive Ms. Palacios home.
264. Several minutes after the friend pulled her car out of the parking lot of the motel, an LCSD patrol car stopped the vehicle for not having a proper, visible tag.
265. Unbeknownst to Ms. Palacios, the driver’s license of the friend who was giving her a ride had been suspended. While the officers issued a ticket for driving on a suspended license to the friend, Ms. Palacios made calls to find someone who could drive her home.
266. One of the officers asked Ms. Palacios for her identification. When Ms. Palacios told the officer that her license had been suspended, the officer asked for another valid form of identification. Ms. Palacios provided her South Carolina state identification card.
267. The officer ran Ms. Palacios’ name and discovered an outstanding bench warrant. 268. The officers transported Ms. Palacios to the Detention Center. 269. Before being booked in the Detention Center, Ms. Palacios asked why there was a bench warrant for her arrest. An officer informed her that the bench warrant was related to the
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October 2016 charge against her for DUS, 1st offense. The officer explained, “So either you do 30 days in jail or you pay a fine of $647.50. These are your options.”
270. Ms. Palacios was confused. She asked, “So I can pay to get out?” The officer responded that she was correct.
271. This discussion of the bench warrant was the first notice Ms. Palacios received that she had been convicted of DUS, 1st offense. It was also the first notice she received regarding the requirement to pay the Central Traffic Court $647.50 in fines and fees or serve 30 days in jail.
272. Ms. Palacios could not afford to pay $647.50 and did not know anyone who could lend her the money to secure her release.
273. Ms. Palacios was never served a copy of the bench warrant. 274. When she arrived at the Detention Center, Ms. Palacios also asked the officer whether she would be seen in the Bond Court. The officer responded, “No. When you have a bench warrant, you don’t go to the Bond Court. Either you pay the fine or you sit for 30 days.” 275. Ms. Palacios was ultimately released on March 18, 2017, after serving 21 days in the Detention Center. 276. Ms. Palacios’ 21-day incarceration was devastating for her and her family. Ms. Palacios was extremely distressed to be separated from her daughters, and missed the opportunity to take her fifteen-year-old daughter to the DMV for her driving test. 277. While incarcerated, Ms. Palacios feared that she would lose her job as a server at El Jimador. Upon her release, Ms. Palacios discovered that she lost her job, which had provided critical financial support for her and her daughters, as a result of her incarceration.
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278. While she was incarcerated, Ms. Palacios also suffered from high blood pressure, for which she received insufficient medical attention.
279. Ms. Palacios continues to owe the Central Traffic Court a $25 non-suspendable cost related to her conviction for DUS, 1st offense.
5. Nora Ann Corder 280. Nora Ann Corder lives in poverty. She works whenever she can find employment, but struggles to earn enough money to pay for housing, electricity, food, clothing, transportation, and other necessities. 281. Ms. Corder receives needs-based public assistance in the form of food assistance through SNAP. 282. In 2016, Ms. Corder’s annual income was far below $12,060, the 2016 federal poverty guideline for a one-person household. That year, Ms. Corder was unemployed for a significant period of time and incurred significant legal expenses related to housing. 283. Due to financial hardship in 2016, Ms. Corder could not afford to pay for car insurance and her insurance policy lapsed. 284. In July 2016, a South Carolina Highway Patrol Officer issued Ms. Corder a citation for failure to return her license plate and registration upon the loss of insurance. Ms. Corder removed the license plates from her car and surrendered her driver’s license at the officer’s request. 285. The citation ultimately resulted in a $230 fine and the suspension of Ms. Corder’s driver’s license. 286. Ms. Corder regained employment at a shipping warehouse, but could not afford to pay the $230 fine, the cost of reinstating car insurance, or the $100 driver’s license reinstatement
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fee required by the DMV. Ms. Corder could not seek reinstatement of her driver’s license without paying these costs.
287. As a consequence, Ms. Corder’s driver’s license remained suspended. Ms. Corder continued to drive to work, however, in order to keep her job at a shipping warehouse, which was located around 18 miles from her rural home.
288. Ms. Corder had no reasonable means of getting to work other than driving her car. She feared that she would be fired if she failed to report to work due to lack of transportation. Ms. Corder also feared that loss of her job—her only source of income—would lead her deeper into poverty and debt, and prevent her from ever paying her court fines and fees and the costs required to reinstate her driver’s license.
289. On January 27, 2017, Ms. Corder was pulled over by a Lexington County Sheriff’s Deputy near her home and issued three separate citations: (1) DUS, 1st offense; (2) violation of temporary license plate for vehicle to be registered in another state; and (3) uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense. The citations required Ms. Corder to appear in the Lexington Magistrate Court on February 15, 2017.
290. The deputy also impounded Ms. Corder’s car. 291. Ms. Corder could not afford to pay to release her car from impound. As a result, she lost her car, which was her sole source of transportation from her rural home to work and court. 292. On February 15, 2017, Ms. Corder appeared in the Lexington Magistrate Court. Before the hearing began, the deputy who issued the tickets informed Ms. Corder that she owed a total of $1,320 in fines and fees.
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293. The deputy asked Ms. Corder what she had “gotten done.” Ms. Corder was unsure what the deputy was referring to, but she explained that she did not have the money to pay the tickets, get her license or automobile insurance reinstated, or to get her car out of impound.
294. The deputy told Ms. Corder that he would “get a continuance” until the following month for her to “take care” of what she needed to take care of. Ms. Corder did not request the continuance or understand what a continuance was, but she did not believe she could challenge the officer’s handling of the case. The deputy did not provide Ms. Corder explicit instructions concerning what she should do before the next hearing date.
295. In February 2017, Ms. Corder lost her job because she could not arrange for transportation to and from work. She had sought assistance from neighbors and acquaintances, but was unable to secure transportation, in part, because she worked the night shift and needed to be picked up at around five o’clock in the morning.
296. On March 22, 2017, Ms. Corder appeared in the Lexington Magistrate Court as required. Before the hearing began, the same deputy asked her what actions she had taken since she last came to court.
297. Ms. Corder explained that she was unemployed and could not afford to reinstate her driver’s license or car insurance. She also explained that she had not obtained car insurance because she could not afford to get her car out of impound. The deputy stated that if she could reinstate her driver’s license and car insurance, he would drop certain charges or ask the court to reduce the amount Ms. Corder would have to pay in fines and fees.
298. The deputy informed Ms. Corder that he would continue the hearing to the following month so she could reinstate her driver’s license. Ms. Corder told the deputy that she
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did not know how she was going to do that because she was unemployed and in significant financial distress. Nonetheless, the deputy continued the trial date a second time, rather than permitting the case to proceed before a magistrate judge.
299. Ms. Corder did not request the continuance, but again did not believe she could challenge the deputy’s decision.
300. In late March 2017, Ms. Corder began working at a Waffle House. The distance from her rural home to work was too far to walk and there was no public transportation, so Ms. Corder paid neighbors and acquaintances $10 to $15 per workday for rides to and from the restaurant..
301. Although she worked full-time, Ms. Corder only earned around $290 each week, remained indigent, and faced difficulty paying for rent, utilities, and other basic necessities.
302. From March 2017 to May 2017, Ms. Corder received needs-based public assistance in the form of SNAP food assistance.
303. Due to her significant period of unemployment in 2017 and low wages from Waffle House, Ms. Corder earned a projected annual income far less than $12,060, the 2017 federal poverty guideline for a one-person household.
304. Despite her poverty, Ms. Corder sought to pay the outstanding $230 court fine stemming from the 2016 ticket for failure to return her license plate and registration upon the loss of insurance.
305. On April 19, 2017, Ms. Corder appeared in the Lexington Magisrate Court as required for a third time concerning the January 2017 traffic tickets. At court, Ms. Corder paid the outstanding $230 fine.
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306. Before the hearing began, the same deputy questioned Ms. Corder about what actions she had taken since her last appearance in court.
307. Ms. Corder informed the deputy that she still could not afford to reinstate her driver’s license or car insurance, but that she had recently secured a job at Waffle House. The deputy indicated that he would again continue the trial to the following month, but that it was the last time he would do so. The deputy informed Ms. Corder that her next court date would be May 17, 2017. Again, Ms. Corder did not request the continuance.
308. Ms. Corder had appeared in the Lexington Magistrate Court, as required, on three separate days for a court hearing on the January 2017 traffic citations. At no point on any of these three days did any Lexington County magistrate court judge speak to Ms. Corder, instruct her on how to prepare for a continued court hearing, or inform her of her right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney, the right to seek waiver of any public defender application fees due to financial hardship, or the right to a jury trial on the charges against her.
309. Likewise, the deputy, who repeatedly informed Ms. Corder that her court hearing would be continued to a subsequent date, did not instruct her on how to prepare for her continued court hearing. Nor did he inform Ms. Corder of her rights concerning counsel or her right to a jury trial on any of the three occasions in which she appeared in court.
310. On May 17, 2017, Ms. Corder was unable to secure transportation to attend the fourth Lexington Magistrate Court hearing concerning her January 2017 traffic tickets. At the time, Ms. Corder lived around nine miles from court. She could not walk to court from her home and did not have access to any reasonable means of public transportation to make the trip.
311. That same day, the Lexington Magistrate Court tried Ms. Corder in her absence and found her guilty of all three charges.
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312. Ms. Corder did not receive any notice that she had been tried in absentia, convicted of three traffic offenses, and sentenced to serve jail time or pay fines and fees for the three traffic offenses.
313. On or around May 17, 2017, the Lexington Magistrate Court issued a bench warrant ordering the arrest and immediate jailing of Ms. Corder. Upon information and belief, the bench warrant required Ms. Corder to pay $1,320 or be jailed for 90 days for her conviction on the charges of DUS, 1st offense, violation of temporary license plate for vehicle to be registered in another state, and uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense.
314. Ms. Corder feared that she would be arrested for the three traffic citations, even though she had been unable to appear in court on May 17, 2017 due to lack of transportation. Several days after the scheduled hearing, Ms. Corder called the Lexington County Sheriff’s Department and was informed that a bench warrant had been issued for her arrest.
315. Ms. Corder called the Lexington Magistrate Court to explain that she had been unable to secure transportation to court and asked what she could do. A clerk informed her that she was required to pay $1,320 or turn herself in for arrest.
316. Ms. Corder explained to the clerk that she had only recently gained employment and could not afford to pay $1,320, but could pay the total amount due in five or six installments.
317. The clerk informed Ms. Corder that she was not permitted to pay in installments. The clerk told Ms. Corder that she had to pay $1,320 in full or would be arrested.
318. At the same time that Ms. Corder sought to prevent arrest and incarceration for unpaid magistrate court fines and fees, she faced eviction from her home because she could not afford to pay rent.
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319. On May 26, 2017, Ms. Corder went to the Lexington Magistrate Court to file forms to fight the eviction action. Shortly after her arrival, a deputy of the Lexington County Sheriff’s Department handcuffed and arrested Ms. Corder.
320. Ms. Corder was transported to the Detention Center and booked. 321. Ms. Corder could not afford to pay $1,320 prior to being booked and did not know anyone who could lend her the money to secure her release. 222. Ms. Corder was ultimately released on July 19, 2017. She was incarcerated for a total of 54 days. 223. Ms. Corder’s 54-day-long incarceration has been devastating for her. Because she was incarcerated, she was unable to report to work and lost her job. She suffered emotional distress from the loss of her physical liberty as well as the knowledge that she would be homeless and unemployed upon her release from jail.
6. Xavier Larry Goodwin 322. Xavier Larry Goodwin is the principal provider for a household of four people: his two teenage daughters, his wife, and himself. He also pays $232 each week—around $12,000 a year—in child support for two sons with whom he does not live. 323. Mr. Goodwin lives in poverty. He struggles to financially support himself and his family through his work as a welder and machine operator. 324. Mr. Goodwin qualifies for needs-based public assistance in the form of Medicaid. 325. In 2016, Mr. Goodwin earned an annual income around $32,570, the federal poverty line for a six-person household. 326. On July 15, 2016, Mr. Goodwin received five traffic tickets during a traffic stop: (1) DUS, 2nd offense; (2) uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense; (3) seatbelt violation; (4) temporary license plate – time limit to replace; and (5) use of license plate other
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than for vehicle which issued. The tickets instructed Mr. Goodwin to appear in the Central Traffic Court on August 9, 2016.
327. On August 9, 2016, Mr. Goodwin was unable to appear in court due to work. Mr. Goodwin called the Central Traffic Court during his morning break. Because he thought he had already missed the court hearing, Mr. Goodwin asked the court staff person, “Is there anything that can be done so I can reappear or reschedule the court date?” The court staff person told Mr. Goodwin, “It’s best if you just come down here and see what can be done.” The Central Traffic Court is open on Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Mr. Goodwin could not go to the court that day because of his work schedule.
328. On August 9, 2016, Mr. Goodwin was tried in his absence in the Central Traffic Court and found guilty of all five charges.
329. Mr. Goodwin did not receive any notice that he had been tried in absentia, convicted of five traffic offenses, sentenced to serve jail or pay fines and fees for two of the offenses, and sentenced to pay fines and fees for the other three offenses.
330. On August 10, 2016, the Central Traffic Court issued a bench warrant ordering the arrest and immediate jailing of Mr. Goodwin. The bench warrant required Mr. Goodwin to pay $1,710 or be jailed for a total of 90 days for his conviction on the charges of DUS, 2nd offense and uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense.
331. On February 2, 2017, Mr. Goodwin was stopped by an LCSD patrol car a block away from his home.
332. One of the officers asked Mr. Goodwin for his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. Mr. Goodwin gave the officer the vehicle registration and proof of insurance and explained that he did not have a driver’s license.
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333. The officers discovered there was an outstanding bench warrant for Mr. Goodwin’s arrest. They returned to Mr. Goodwin’s car and asked him to step out of the car and put his hands behind his back.
334. The officers told Mr. Goodwin that he was being arrested on a bench warrant. They also issued him a ticket for DUS, 3rd offense. The ticket notified him that he was required to appear in the Irmo Magistrate Court on April 4, 2017.
335. Mr. Goodwin was transported to the Detention Center. At the Detention Center, Mr. Goodwin was served with the bench warrant. This bench warrant was the first notice Mr. Goodwin had received that he had been convicted of DUS, 2nd offense, and uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense. It was also the first notice he received regarding the requirement to pay the Central Traffic Court $1,710 in fines and fees or to serve 90 days in jail.
336. The following morning, on February 3, 2017, Mr. Goodwin was taken to the Bond Court for a hearing on the DUS, 3rd offense charge from the previous day. The Bond Court judge did not inform Mr. Goodwin of his right to request the assistance of court-appointed counsel or his right to seek waiver of any public defender application fee. Nor did the judge appoint counsel to represent Mr. Goodwin as an indigent person facing incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees. The Bond Court judge did not address the Central Traffic Court bench warrant that was the basis for his arrest and incarceration.
337. On April 4, 2017, the officer who had issued Mr. Goodwin the DUS, 3rd offense ticket on February 2, 2017 came to the Detention Center and transported Mr. Goodwin to the Irmo Magistrate Court for a hearing.
338. On their way to court, Mr. Goodwin asked the officer whether he could request a public defender. The officer suggested that the screening process could take a long time and that
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Mr. Goodwin’s incarceration in the Detention Center could be extended as a result. Mr. Goodwin feared the prospect of spending additional time in jail and did not ask any further questions about requesting a public defender.
339. Judge Adams of the Irmo Magistrate Court heard Mr. Goodwin’s case. 340. Mr. Goodwin did not know, and the judge did not inform him, that he had the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney before pleading guilty and the right to seek a waiver of any fees related to the application for a public defender due to financial hardship. 341. Without being informed of his rights and without the assistance of counsel, Mr. Goodwin pled guilty to the charge of DUS, 3rd offense. 342. Judge Adams sentenced Mr. Goodwin to 90 days in jail and $2,100 in fines and fees. The judge credited the time Mr. Goodwin had already spent incarcerated in the Detention Center toward the jail portion of the sentence. She also said something to the effect of: “You are not gonna make a payment, which I think will happen. I’m gonna issue a bench warrant faster than you can turn your head.” 343. Judge Adams instructed Mr. Goodwin to return to court to set up a payment plan within 30 days of his release from jail. She threatened to have him arrested and incarcerated if he failed to do so. 344. Mr. Goodwin was transported back to the Detention Center after the court hearing. 345. Mr. Goodwin was ultimately released from the Detention Center on April 6, 2017 and transported to the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center in Richland County to serve time on a bench warrant issued by the Upper Township Magistrate Court in Richland County.
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346. On April 26, 2017, Mr. Goodwin was released from the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center.
347. Mr. Goodwin was incarcerated for a total of 63 days in the Detention Center for nonpayment of fines and fees to the Central Traffic Court. His incarceration was devastating for him and his family. Mr. Goodwin was extremely distressed to be separated from his family. He was unable to be with his daughter on her eleventh birthday or with his wife on their wedding anniversary.
348. Mr. Goodwin was housed in a dorm in the Detention Center that was very hot and had significant mold growth on the walls due to a leaky roof and ceiling. Mr. Goodwin suffered from a cold and severe headaches as a result of the fans used to circulate air in the dorm because the air conditioner was broken.
349. While incarcerated, Mr. Goodwin feared that he would lose the job he had held for thirteen years and his home. Upon his release, he discovered that he had lost both.
350. Following his release from the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center, Mr. Goodwin has struggled to find a job he can get to without driving and to earn enough money to get himself and his family back on their feet.
351. On May 5, 2017, Mr. Goodwin went to the Irmo Magistrate Court to establish a payment plan for the $2,100 fine owed to the Irmo Magistrate Court. The court staff person at the payment window gave Mr. Goodwin a piece of paper and said, “This is your copy. I need for you to sign and date this back copy. Your first payment will start in June.” The Scheduled Time Payment Agreement was already completed and required Mr. Goodwin to make a monthly payment of $100 starting on June 5, 2017. It also indicated that Mr. Goodwin was being charged a three percent collection fee.
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352. Mr. Goodwin explained to the court staff person that he had just been released from jail and did not have a job. Nevertheless, she required him to sign the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement, which required Mr. Goodwin to pay $100 each month.
353. Mr. Goodwin signed the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement. 354. Mr. Goodwin eventually obtained a job as a heavy machine operator earning about $280 weekly. 355. Even with this job, however, Mr. Goodwin remains indigent. He and his family do not have a home and struggle financially to pay for basic necessities. Mr. Goodwin incurred significant debts during his incarceration, which he is obligated to repay. On top of the fines and fees he owes to the Irmo Magistrate Court for the DUS, 3rd offense, Mr. Goodwin owes fines and fees for three additional traffic charges for which he was tried and convicted in absentia by the Central Traffic Court in July 2016, court costs on all five offenses adjudicated in that court, and more than $10,000 for past due child support. 356. Despite his best efforts, Mr. Goodwin remains unable to pay according to the terms of the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement and constantly fears that he will again be arrested and incarcerated. 357. Mr. Goodwin could not afford to pay his first installment of $100 by June 5, 2017 as required by the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement. He ultimately was able to pay $100 by June 23, 2017 only by prioritizing payment to the Irmo Magistrate Court over paying child support. 358. Mr. Goodwin could not afford to pay $100 on July 5, 2017 as required by the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement because of his limited income and significant debts, including child support and court debt. He has still not been able to make this $100 payment.
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359. Mr. Goodwin faces an imminent and substantial risk that the Irmo Magistrate Court will issue a bench warrant ordering law enforcement officers to arrest and book him in the Detention Center unless he can pay $2,063—the entire balance owed for the DUS, 3rd offense.
7. Raymond Wright, Jr. 360. Raymond Wright, Jr., is a disabled man. Along with his wife, he provides for a household of five, which includes his daughter and two granddaughters. 361. Mr. Wright lives in poverty. He has been disabled and largely unemployed since a 1991 workplace accident required his left leg to be amputated. Mr. Wright’s sole source of income is Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) in the amount of $547 per month. Although his wife had been steadily employed, her unemployment from July 2016 to June 2017 caused their household to experience even greater financial hardship. 362. Mr. Wright’s driver’s license was suspended in or around 2014 because he could not afford to pay court fines and fees. 363. On July 1, 2016, Mr. Wright was pulled over by a South Carolina Highway Patrol officer and ticketed for DUS, 1st offense, which instructed him to appear in the Central Traffic Court on July 26, 2016. 364. On July 26, 2016, Mr. Wright appeared in the Central Traffic Court as required. 365. Mr. Wright did not know, and the judge did not inform him, that he had the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney before pleading guilty and the right to seek a waiver of any fees related to the application for a public defender due to financial hardship. 366. Without being informed of his rights and without the assistance of counsel, Mr. Wright pled guilty to the charge of DUS, 1st offense. The judge sentenced him to pay $666.93 in fines and fees.
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367. The judge asked Mr. Wright if he could pay in full that day. Mr. Wright explained that his only income was from SSDI and that he could not afford to pay.
368. Mr. Wright informed the judge that he had brought bills and other documents showing his inability to pay with him to court. The judge did not look at these documents, inquire about their contents, or ask Mr. Wright any other questions about his income, assets, expenses, dependents or other financial obligations. Nor did the judge ask whether Mr. Wright received any form of needs-based, means-tested public assistance. At the time of the hearing, however, Mr. Wright received needs-based, means-tested public assistance in the form of food assistance through SNAP.
369. Instead, the judge required Mr. Wright to pay $50 per month toward the full amount due, and informed Mr. Wright that if he did not make these payments, he would be jailed.
370. Mr. Wright faced difficulty paying $50 each month to the Central Traffic Court while supporting his family on his SSDI income. With great effort, he made payments of $50 to the Central Traffic Court on the following dates: July 26, 2016; August 29, 2016; October 3, 2016; October 28, 2016; and December 7, 2016.
371. In order to make these payments, however, Mr. Wright was forced to cut back on buying groceries and other basic necessities for himself, his wife and granddaughters. During this time, Mr. Wright’s wife was unemployed.
372. Despite his best efforts, Mr. Wright could not afford to make payments toward fines and fees owed to the Central Traffic Court after December 7, 2016.
373. In April 2017, Mr. Wright received a letter summoning him to appear before the Central Traffic Court for a show cause hearing.
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374. On April 19, 2017, Mr. Wright appeared in the Central Traffic Court as required. 375. Before hearing Mr. Wright’s case, the Central Traffic Court judge made a general announcement that all defendants had a right to an attorney. The judge did not, however, inform Mr. Wright that he had the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney and the right to seek waiver of any fees related to the application for a public defender due to financial hardship. 376. Nor did the judge engage in a colloquy with Mr. Wright to determine whether any waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The judge did not inform Mr. Wright of the benefits of being represented by counsel, the risks of proceeding pro se, or the potential penalties if he was found guilty. As a result, Mr. Wright did not make a knowing, voluntary or intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. 377. He explained to the judge that he was not able to make further payments to the court due to financial hardship, that his only income was a limited amount of SSDI, and that his wife was unemployed. Mr. Wright also explained that he had just lost his home because he could not afford to pay the mortgage and that he owed taxes, had additional bills to pay, and needed to buy groceries to feed his family of four. 378. The judge informed Mr. Wright that he would be jailed if he did not pay the full $416.93 balance due to the court within ten days. 379. The judge did not ask Mr. Wright any questions about his financial circumstances. Although Mr. Wright brought documentation to demonstrate his inability to pay with him to court, the judge told Mr. Wright that he did not want to see any of the documents.
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380. Mr. Wright asked if he could make partial payments until he fully paid the outstanding fines and fees. The judge informed him that the court would only accept payment of the full amount owed.
381. Despite his best efforts, Mr. Wright was unable to pay his balance of $416.93 to the Central Traffic Court by April 29, 2017, which was ten days after the show cause hearing.
224. On May 2, 2017, the Central Traffic Court issued a bench warrant ordering the arrest and immediate jailing of Mr. Wright for nonpayment of fines and fees imposed for the DUS, 1st offense. The bench warrant alleged that Mr. Wright had failed to comply with the court’s order to pay $100 by April 28, 2017. The bench warrant ordered law enforcement to arrest and jail Mr. Wright for 10 days unless he paid $416.93—the entire balanced owed for the DUS, 1st offense.
382. In June 2017, Mr. Wright’s wife obtained employment after being out of work for ten months. But Mr. Wright remained indigent. His SSDI income and his wife’s wages together were insufficient to support the couple’s five-person household. Mr. Wright and his wife struggled to provide housing, utilities, food, transportation, and other basic necessities for themselves and his daughter and two granddaughters.
383. Mr. Wright suffered significant stress and illness from living in fear that he would be arrested and incarcerated for his inability to pay fines and fees to the Central Traffic Court. Mr. Wright experienced panic attacks and shortness of breath. He was eventually hospitalized for two days because he unexpectedly lost consciousness due to stress and anxiety from fear that he would be imminently arrested and jailed because he could not afford to pay money owed to the Central Traffic Court.
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384. On the morning of July 25, 2017, Mr. Wright was arrested pursuant to the Central Traffic Court bench warrant for failure to pay. Because Mr. Wright was unable to pay $416.93, which was the entire amount of his debt to the Central Traffic Court, he was booked in the Detention Center.
385. When Mr. Wright was booked in jail, Detention Center staff confiscated medication in his possession. Mr. Wright informed the staff that he needed to take the medication before every meal to treat a stomach condition.
386. Despite being on notice that Mr. Wright required his medication before meals, Detention Center staff failed to properly provide Mr. Wright his medication from July 25 through July 27 2017. As a result, Mr. Wright experienced severe stomach pain, acid reflux, diarrhea, high blood pressure, and loss of consciousness from July 27 through July 31, 2017.
387. While incarcerated in the Detention Center, Mr. Wright also requested help from jail staff to treat pain he was experiencing from a cracked tooth. But Detention Center staff did not provide adequate or proper medication to treat his pain. Mr. Wright also developed a rash on his skin from the extremely hot water with which he was required to shower.
388. On the evening of July 31, 2017, Mr. Wright experienced severe pain, diarrhea and blood in his stool due to the failure of jail staff to provide him proper medication for his stomach condition over the previous days. Mr. Wright was so ill, he blacked out twice. On one occasion, he hit his head and face on the brick wall and concrete floor after passing out due to illness. Mr. Wright suffered large, painful contusions on his head as a result.
389. Mr. Wright was subsequently transported to the Lexington Medical Center emergency room. He was treated for dangerously low blood pressure and provided a blood
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transfusion because he had lost so much blood in his stool. Mr. Wright received his medical care while restrained to his hospital bed in handcuffs and chains.
390. On August 1, 2017, a Lexington County Sheriff’s Department officer informed Mr. Wright, who remained in the Lexington Medical Center emergency room, that he was released from the jail. Mr. Wright had been incarcerated for seven days.
391. Mr. Wright was admitted to the hospital, and continued to suffer from stomach pain, acid reflux, diarrhea, blood in his stool, and pain from contusions on his head.
392. Mr. Wright remained hospitalized for three more days. Mr. Wright’s treating physician informed him that he was suffering from severe intestinal inflammation.
393. As a result of his 7-day long incarceration, Mr. Wright suffered from severe illness and serious health complications, including intestinal inflammation, stomach pain, acid reflux, diarrhea, blood in his stool, high and low blood pressure, and painful contusions on the head because Mr. Wright was incarcerated in the Detention Center, rather than at liberty to take needed stomach medication as required. Furthermore, because of his 7-day-long incarceration, Mr. Wright was separated from his wife and family and suffered severe emotional distress and anxiety from the loss of his physical liberty.
8. Allegations Common to Numerous Plaintiffs 394. Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright would not have been booked in the Detention Center if they had been able to pay the entire amount of the court fines and fees identified on the face of the magistrate court bench warrants used to arrest them before being booked in the Detention Center. 395. Likewise, at the time they filed their respective claims, in this action Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright would not have faced an imminent and substantial risk of arrest and incarceration in the Detention Center for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees if they
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could have afforded to pay the entire amount of fines and fees they owed to Lexington County magistrate courts. Moreover, Plaintiff Goodwin continues to face an imminent and substantial risk of arrest and incarceration for money owed to a Lexington County magistrate court, and would not face such a threat if he could pay his outstanding debt to the Irmo Magistrate Court in full.
396. Plaintiffs were not afforded ability-to-pay hearings when their fines and fees were imposed by Lexington County magistrate courts.
397. No Lexington County magistrate court inquired into the financial ability of Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright to pay the fines and fees identified on the bench warrants used to arrest them, their efforts to secure resources, or alternatives to incarceration. No Lexington County magistrate court determined that Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright willfully failed to pay court fines; that these Plaintiffs made inadequate efforts to secure resources to pay; or that alternatives to incarceration and payment were inadequate—whether before issuing the bench warrants, after these Plaintiffs were arrested, or after these Plaintiffs were booked in the Detention Center.
398. At no point after being arrested on the bench warrants were Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright taken to appear before a Lexington County magistrate judge in the Bond Court located adjacent to the Detention Center or in the original magistrate court that issued the bench warrant for a determination as to the propriety of incarceration.
399. At no point before or after being incarcerated in the Detention Center under magistrate court bench warrants were Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright notified of their right to request the appointment of counsel to defend
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against incarceration for the underlying offense charged or noncompliance with a court order to pay fines and fees. Likewise, at no point before or after being incarcerated were Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright informed of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee. And at no point did any of the Lexington County magistrate court judges engage in a colloquy with Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright to ensure that any waiver of the right to request appointment of counsel, whether written or oral, was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
400. At no point before or after being incarcerated in the Detention Center under magistrate court bench warrants were Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright afforded representation by court-appointed counsel in order to defend against incarceration despite prima facie evidence of their indigence.
401. Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright suffered humiliation, anxiety, stress, emotional distress, disturbed sleep and other irreparable injury from being handcuffed, arrested, jailed, separated from their families and loved ones, and incarcerated for periods of time ranging from seven to 63 days.
402. Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, and Palacios were incarcerated in a very cold dorm in the Detention Center. Detention Center staff provided insufficient clothing for each Plaintiff and only a thin blanket despite the very low temperature.
403. Plaintiffs Goodwin, Corder, and Wright were subjected to discomfort from hot and unsanitary jail conditions.
404. As a direct result of their unlawful incarceration, Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, and Goodwin lost needed income and employment.
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405. At the time they filed their respective claims in this action, neither Plaintiff Goodwin nor Plaintiff Wright had any ongoing or pending proceedings in any Lexington County magistrate court. Although Mr. Goodwin owes fines and fees to the Irmo Magistrate Court, that court has entirely concluded proceedings concerning the DUS, 3rd offense for which Mr. Goodwin was convicted and sentenced to fines and fees. Similarly, although at the time he filed his claim, Mr. Wright owed fines and fees to the Central Traffic Court, that court had entirely concluded proceedings concerning the DUS, 1st offense for which Mr. Wright was convicted and sentenced to fines and fees.
406. No Lexington County magistrate court inquired into the financial ability of Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright to pay the fines and fees they owed to Lexington County magistrate courts at the time they filed their respective claims in this action, their efforts to secure resources, or alternatives to incarceration. No Lexington County magistrate court has determined that Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright willfully failed to pay these court fines and fees, that these Plaintiffs made inadequate efforts to secure resources to pay, or that alternatives to incarceration and payment are inadequate.
407. Likewise, no Lexington County magistrate court has inquired into the financial ability of Plaintiff Goodwin to pay the fines and fees he currently owes to the Irmo Magistrate Court, his efforts to secure resources, or alternatives to incarceration. No Lexington County magistrate court has determined that Plaintiff Goodwin willfully failed to pay these court fines and fees, that he made inadequate efforts to secure resources to pay, or that alternatives to incarceration and payment are inadequate.
408. With respect to the magistrate court fines and fees he owed at the time he filed his claims in this action, Plaintiff Wright had not been informed by any Lexington County
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magistrate court of his right to request the appointment of counsel to defend against incarceration for the underlying offenses charged or noncompliance with a court order to pay fines and fees. Nor had he been appointed counsel by any Lexington County magistrate court judge for such a defense. Likewise, no Lexington County magistrate court judge informed Plaintiff Wright of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, or engaged in a colloquy with him to ensure that any waiver of the right to request appointment of counsel, whether written or oral, was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
409. With respect to the magistrate court fines and fees he currently owes, Plaintiff Goodwin has not been informed by any Lexington County magistrate court of his right to request the appointment of counsel to defend against incarceration for the underlying offenses charged or noncompliance with a court order to pay fines and fees. Nor has he been appointed counsel by any Lexington County magistrate court judge for such a defense. Likewise, no Lexington County magistrate court judge has informed Plaintiff Goodwin of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, or engaged in a colloquy with him to ensure that any waiver of the right to request appointment of counsel, whether written or oral, was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
410. E. Evidence of Widespread Arrest and Jailing of Indigent People for Nonpayment of Magistrate Court Fines and Fees
411. Magistrate court records obtained through public records requests and available on the South Carolina Judicial Department’s online Case Records Search system (“Public Index”) demonstrate the widespread use of bench warrants by Lexington County magistrate courts to coerce fine and fee payments.
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412. The Public Index allows public searches for information concerning traffic and criminal cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts, including the Central Traffic Court, Irmo Magistrate Court, Lexington Magistrate Court, Swansea Magistrate Court, CayceWest Columbia Magistrate Court, Oak Grove Magistrate Court, and Batesburg-Leesville Magistrate Court. A Public Index case record provides, among other information, the name of the defendant, case number, the name of the court and judge handling the case, the date on which the case was filed, a description of the offense charged, the date on which the case was disposed, and the type of disposition.
413. A Public Index case record also includes an “Action” tab that contains information about whether the defendant is on a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement and the date of any required payments. A court may notate the “Action” tab with the term “Failure to Comply” or the term “Archived Bench Warrant,” among other things.
414. A Public Index case record also includes a “Financials” tab that identifies whether any fines and fees imposed as part of the sentence for an offense remain outstanding. It also provides the date(s) and amount(s) of any payments that have been made.
415. A review of the Central Traffic Court bench warrants and corresponding Public Index case records pertaining to Plaintiffs Johnson, Palacios, Goodwin, and Wright shows that the date of the bench warrant issued against each of these Plaintiffs corresponds with the date of a “Failure to Comply” or “Archived Bench Warrant” notation in the “Action” tab of the applicable Public Index case record.
416. Similarly, a review of the Irmo Magistrate Court bench warrants and corresponding Public Index case records pertaining to Plaintiffs Brown and Darby shows that the
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date of each bench warrant corresponds with the date of a “Failure to Comply” notation in the “Action” tab of the applicable Public Index case record.
417. Consequently, the issuance of a bench warrant by the Central Traffic Court, Irmo Magistrate Court, or any other Lexington County magistrate court is documented by the entry of a “Failure to Comply” or “Archived Bench Warrant” notation with the date of the bench warrant in the applicable Public Index case record.
418. A search of Public Index case records for Lexington County magistrate courts reveals that between February 1, 2017 and March 31, 2017, the courts entered a “Failure to Comply” or “Archived Bench Warrant” notation in 204 cases corresponding to 183 different individuals. Therefore, between February 1, 2017 and March 31, 2017, around 183 people were at risk of being arrested, or ultimately were arrested, under a bench warrant issued for nonpayment of fines and fees owed to a Lexington County magistrate court.
419. If bench warrants are issued at the same rate throughout the year, this two-month estimate suggests that bench warrants are issued against more than 1,000 people each year for nonpayment of fines and fees owed to a Lexington County magistrate court.
420. A review of online Detention Center records demonstrates that the use of bench warrants to coerce payments toward magistrate court fines and fees results in the widespread arrest and incarceration of indigent people.
421. The Detention Center produces a daily list of all inmates. This online list identifies the name of each inmate, the “Primary Charge,” the “Arrest Date,” and the “Booking Agency.” Individual records associated with each inmate are also available online and provide more detailed information, including any additional charges and any outstanding “FINES AND COSTS.”
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422. A review of these records for the period beginning May 1, 2017 and ending May 28, 2017 shows that, over the course of those four weeks, 95 people were incarcerated for a primary charge listed as either “Magistrate Court Bench Warrant” or “Magistrate/Municipal Court Bench Warrant.” The largest total number of people incarcerated under either primary charge on any given day was 63, and the average daily total was 43. The inmates for whom the unpaid balance of fines and costs were posted on the Detention Center’s online record owed between $232.50 and $3,470.00, with an average debt amount of $960.60.
423. It is fair to estimate that hundreds of indigent people, if not more than one thousand, are incarcerated each year on bench warrants issued for nonpayment of fines and fees imposed by Lexington County magistrate courts. On average, the number of people jailed under such warrants on any given day during the four-week period amounted to 7.22% of the total inmate population. In 2015, the total number of people booked in the Detention Center was 12,100, and in 2016 the total number was 10,980. Assuming that 10,000 people in total are booked in the Detention Center in 2017, it is highly likely that more than 700 will be incarcerated on a bench warrant issued for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees.
424. As a result of the policies, practices, and customs of Defendants Lexington County and Madsen, and the failures, acts, omissions, policies, practices, and standard operating procedures of Defendants Reinhart, Adams, Dooley, Koon and Madsen, indigent people are routinely arrested and jailed for nonpayment of fines and fees owed to Lexington County magistrate courts in violation of their most basic constitutional rights.
425. At the time Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright were arrested and jailed, Defendants were on notice that indigent people were routinely arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and
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fees without first being afforded pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings or representation by counsel, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
426. Defendants were also on notice that Lexington County magistrate court judges, including Defendant Adams, routinely sought to obtain written waivers of the right to counsel from indigent people before a plea proceeding or trial on standard forms without adequately informing them of their rights or engaging in any colloquy to determine whether any waivers were knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
427. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen were also on notice that their underfunding of public defense in magistrate courts and staffing decisions had led to the absence of public defenders from Bond Court proceedings and magistrate court proceedings leading to incarceration or the imposition of suspended incarceration sentences.
428. Defendants were also on notice that indigent people were routinely arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center on bench warrants unsupported by probable cause of criminal conduct in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 429. Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright bring this case as a class action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated for the purpose of asserting declaratory and injunctive relief claims on a common basis. 430. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright and the proposed class members can challenge Defendants’ common courses of conduct in relation to the routine and widespread incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of fines and fees in Lexington County magistrate court cases. 431. This action is brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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432. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a).
433. Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright seek to represent the following defined class (the “Class”): “All indigent people who currently owe, or in the future will owe, fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution in cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts.”
434. The Class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. Hundreds, if not thousands, of indigent people currently owe fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution in cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts, and these numbers will continue to grow.
435. Class members are subjected to the ongoing policies, practices, customs, standard operating procedures, acts, and omissions of Defendants discussed in this Complaint. To the extent they are not currently incarcerated, Class members (including Plaintiff Goodwin currently, and Plaintiff Wright, at the time he filed his claims) face a substantial and imminent threat of being arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without a predeprivation ability-to-pay hearing, notice of the right to request court-appointed counsel to defend against incarceration, notice of the right to request a waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, or the assistance of counsel.
436. As discussed above, a search of online court records indicates that Lexington County magistrate courts collectively issued 204 bench warrants charging at least 183 people with nonpayment of fines and fees between February 1, 2017 and March 31, 2017. It is estimated that hundreds, if not thousands, of indigent people have been the subjects of bench warrants issued under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies during the past few years. Many of these warrants likely remain unexecuted, placing hundreds of indigent people, if
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not thousands, at substantial and imminent risk of arrest and incarceration for nonpayment without the notice and process required by law.
437. Defendants maintain records with the names, case numbers, and bench warrant dates of those who owe fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution in cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts.
438. Joinder of all Class members is also impracticable because many members are unaware that their rights under the U.S. Constitution have been violated or that they are entitled to seek redress in court. Members of the Class also lack the means to retain an attorney to represent them in a civil rights lawsuit. Finally, many Class members are likely to avoid bringing individual claims because they fear retaliation and reprisal, including arrest and incarceration, by one or more Defendants. There is no appropriate avenue for the protection of the Class members’ constitutional rights other than a class action.
439. The class members share a number of common questions of law and fact, including, but not limited to:
a. Whether Defendant Koon, his deputies, and officers of cooperating law enforcement agencies routinely arrest members of the Class on payment bench warrants;
b. Whether Defendant Koon and his deputies routinely incarcerate for extended periods of time members of the Class who are arrested on payment bench warrants when they cannot pay all fines and fees identified on the faces of those warrants;
c. Whether Defendant Koon and his deputies routinely fail to bring members of the Class before Lexington County magistrate court judges after executing payment bench warrants, even when members are jailed for extended periods of time;
d. Whether members of the Class are routinely denied the assistance of counsel before being incarcerated in the Detention Center on payment bench warrants;
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e. Whether Defendant Adams is a state actor in her capacity as Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County;
f. Whether Defendant Adams is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional rights of Class members to due process and equal protection of the law;
g. Whether Defendant Adams is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to assistance of counsel;
h. Whether Defendant Adams is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to be free from unreasonable seizures;
i. Whether Defendant Dooley is a state actor in his capacity as Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County;
j. Whether Defendant Dooley is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional rights of Class members to due process and equal protection of the law;
k. Whether Defendant Dooley is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to assistance of counsel;
l. Whether Defendant Dooley is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to be free from unreasonable seizures;
m. Whether Defendant Koon is a state actor in his capacity as Lexington County Sheriff;
n. Whether Defendant Koon is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional rights of Class members to due process and equal protection of the law;
o. Whether Defendant Koon is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to assistance of counsel;
p. Whether Defendant Koon is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to be free from unreasonable seizures;
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q. Whether Defendant Koon sanctions the misuse of payment bench warrants against members of the Class;
r. Whether Defendant Lexington County has a practice of inadequately funding public defense for people charged with traffic and other misdemeanor offenses handled in the County’s magistrate courts;
s. Whether Defendant Lexington County’s practice of inadequately funding public defense for indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees is the result of a deliberate decision by the Lexington County Council as the County’s final policymaker for budgetary appropriations for public defense in the County’s magistrate courts;
t. Whether Defendant Lexington County’s practice of inadequately funding public defense for indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees is so pervasive and well-settled as to constitute Lexington County custom with the force of law;
u. Whether Defendant Lexington County’s policymakers have actual or constructive knowledge of the County’s custom of failing to adequately fund public defense and acquiesce in that custom;
v. Whether Defendant Madsen is a state actor in his capacity as Circuit Public Defender;
w. Whether Defendant Madsen is sufficiently connected to and responsible for ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members to assistance of counsel;
x. Whether Defendant Madsen is a final policymaker concerning Lexington County’s provision of indigent defense in magistrate courts;
y. Whether Defendant Madsen fails to adequately fund public defense for indigent people who face the threat of incarceration in the County’s magistrate courts;
z. Whether Defendant Madsen fails to adequately allocate resources for the public defense of Class members being incarcerated in the Detention Center for failure to pay court fines and fees;
aa. Whether the right to be free from unreasonable seizures is routinely violated in relation to the arrest and jailing of Class members on payment bench warrants;
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bb. Whether members of the Class are routinely deprived of their right to an ability-to-pay hearing before or after being arrested on payment bench warrants;
cc. Whether the right to assistance of counsel is routinely violated in relation to the arrest and jailing of Class members on payment bench warrants;
dd. Whether the right to due process is routinely violated in relation to the arrest and jailing of Class members on payment bench warrants; and
ee. Whether the right to equal protection of the law is routinely violated in relation to the arrest and jailing of Class members on payment bench warrants.
440. Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class because all claims arise from the same common courses of conduct by Defendants. Like the other Class members, at the time their filed their respective claims in this action, Mr. Goodwin and Mr. owed fines and fees to at least one Lexington County magistrate court, could not afford to pay according to the terms of their Scheduled Time Payment Agreements, and faced a substantial and imminent risk of being arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment. Mr. Wright was subsequently arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of fines and fees owed to the Central Traffic Court. Additionally, Mr. Goodwin continues to owe money to the Irmo Magistrate Court, cannot afford to pay, and faces a substantial and imminent risk of being arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment. Indeed, Mr. Goodwin has been previously arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of fines and fees owed to the Central Traffic Court.
441. Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright seek declaratory and injunctive relief under legal theories that are the same as those on which all members of the Class will rely.
442. At the time they filed their respective claims in this action, Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright suffered and faced a substantial and imminent risk of continuing to suffer harms that are typical of the harms Class members have suffered and are continuing to suffer. Moreover,
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Plaintiff Goodwin continues to face a substantial and imminent risk of continuing to suffer harms that are typical of the harms experienced by Class members.
443. Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright have a strong personal interest in the outcome of this action, have no conflicts of interest with members of the Class, and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.
444. By developing and maintaining policies, practices, standard operating procedures, acts, and omissions that result in the routine and widespread arrest and incarceration of people for nonpayment of fines and fees owed in Lexington County magistrate court cases, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Class, and final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole.
445. The named Plaintiffs are represented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of South Carolina, and Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC (“Terrell Marshall”). All counsel are experienced civil rights attorneys who have litigated a range of complex class action lawsuits and have knowledge of the relevant constitutional and statutory law.
446. Plaintiffs’ counsel also have extensive knowledge of the widespread constitutional violations occurring in Lexington County and outlined in this Complaint based on a months-long investigation involving court observation, review of public records, and numerous interviews with witnesses, inmates, and families. Plaintiffs’ counsel have studied Lexington County budget documents, court records from numerous Lexington County magistrate courts, and Detention Center online records in order to understand Defendants’ policies, practices, standard operating procedures, and customs as they relate to federal constitutional requirements.
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447. Plaintiffs’ counsel at the ACLU have served as lead counsel in similar federal lawsuits bringing constitutional challenges to revenue generation and debt-collection systems in violation of the rights of indigent people to notice, process, and counsel. See Kennedy v. Biloxi, 1:15-cv-348-HSO-JCG (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 2015); and Thompson v. DeKalb County, No. 1:15cv-280 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2015). Plaintiffs’ counsel at Terrell Marshall served as lead counsel, with the ACLU Foundation as co-counsel, in a state lawsuit bringing similar constitutional claims. See Fuentes v. Benton County, No. 15-2-02976-1 (Wash. Superior Court, Yakima Cty. Oct. 7, 2015). Plaintiffs’ counsel at Terrell Marshall have also served as lead counsel in a federal lawsuit bringing constitutional challenges to inadequate public defense. Wilbur v. Mount Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL (W.D. Wash. April 15, 2014).
448. Plaintiffs’ counsel have the resources, expertise, and experience to prosecute this action. Plaintiffs’ counsel know of no conflicts among members of the Class or between the attorneys and members of the Class.
449. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class such that final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief are appropriate to the Class as a whole.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 450. Plaintiffs request a trial by jury.
CLAIM ONE FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Incarceration Without Pre-deprivation Ability-to-Pay Hearing (in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright against Defendants Adams, Dooley,
and Koon, in their official capacities) 451. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs.
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452. This claim is brought by Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Wright on behalf of themselves and the members of the Class.
453. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution have long prohibited the imprisonment of people for nonpayment of courtimposed fines or restitution without a pre-deprivation inquiry by a judge into the person’s ability to pay, efforts to secure resources to pay and, if the person lacks the ability to pay despite having made reasonable efforts to acquire resources, the adequacy of any alternatives to incarceration. Courts are prohibited from jailing people for nonpayment without conducting such an inquiry and making at least one of the following findings: (1) the individual’s nonpayment was willful; (2) the individual failed to make sufficient efforts to acquire the resources to pay; or (3) the individual was unable to pay, despite having made sufficient efforts to acquire resources, but alternative methods of achieving punishment or deterrence are inadequate.
454. Plaintiff Goodwin suffered a violation of his clearly established right to a predeprivation ability-to-pay hearing when he was arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for 63 days because he could not afford to pay fines and fees owed to the Central Traffic Court. Before his lengthy incarceration, Mr. Goodwin was not afforded a pre-deprivation judicial inquiry into, or findings of fact on, his ability to pay, his efforts to secure resources, or the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration.
455. Plaintiff Goodwin is indigent and owes $2,063 in fines and fees to the Irmo Magistrate Court, a Lexington County magistrate court under the administrative supervision of Defendants Adams and Dooley. Mr. Goodwin is unable to pay the $100 payment due on July 5, 2017 as required by the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement imposed on him. Mr. Goodwin faces a substantial and imminent risk that, without being afforded a pre-deprivation ability-to-
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pay hearing, a bench warrant for nonpayment will be issued and Defendant Koon will arrest and incarcerate him in the Detention Center on that warrant.
456. At the time he filed his claims in this action, Plaintiff Wright was indigent and owed $416.93 in fines and fees to the Central Traffic Court, a Lexington County magistrate court under the administrative supervision of Defendants Adams and Dooley. A Lexington County magistrate judge ordered Mr. Wright to pay in full by April 29, 2017, and threatened Mr. Wright with incarceration if he did not do so. But that judge did not first consider or make factual findings concerning Mr. Wright’s ability to pay, his efforts to secure resources, and the adequacy of alternatives to incarceration in achieving punishment and deterrence. Mr. Wright was unable to pay $416.93 by the date imposed by the judge and remains unable to pay. A bench warrant was issued to order his incarceration unless he could pay the full amount due. At the time he filed his claims in this action, Mr. Wright faced a substantial and imminent risk that, without being afforded a pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing, Defendant Koon would arrest and incarcerate him in the Detention Center. Indeed, just days after filing his claims, Mr. Wright was arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for nonpayment of money owed to the Central Traffic Court.
457. For all relevant purposes, all individuals processed for commitment to the Detention Center for unpaid fines, fees, costs, assessments or restitution imposed by Lexington County magistrate courts are similarly situated with respect to their right to due process of law. There exists no legitimate governmental reason to jail individuals who are unable to pay the full amount of outstanding monetary penalties for traffic or misdemeanor criminal offenses, while permitting individuals who have the financial means to pay fines, fees, costs, assessments, and restitution to avoid being jailed for the same offenses.
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458. In their official, administrative capacities, Defendants Adams and Dooley are sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the rights of Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class, to due process and equal protection of the law. In their exercise of administrative responsibility for the establishment of uniform policies and procedures for the timely and appropriate collection of court fines and fees in Lexington County, Defendants Adams and Dooley oversee, enforce, and sanction the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. The Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies have become unwritten standard operating procedures in Lexington County magistrate courts, and directly and proximately lead to the routine and widespread use of bench warrants to arrest and incarcerate indigent people for nonpayment of court fines and fees without any pre-deprivation ability-topay hearing. Moreover, Defendants Adams and Dooley have failed, and continue to fail, to exercise their administrative authority to correct the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies.
459. In his official capacity as Lexington County Sheriff and chief administrator of the Detention Center, Defendant Koon is also sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class. By supervising, controlling, and directing LCSD officers and Detention Center staff who execute bench warrants issued under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies, Defendant Koon effects the arrest and incarceration of people for nonpayment of fines, fees, costs, assessments, or restitution without necessary pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings and judicial findings concerning the reasons for nonpayment. Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Wright, and members of the Class face a substantial and imminent risk of being arrested and incarcerated
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under bench warrants for nonpayment of fines and fees. Defendant Koon is responsible for executing and enforcing any such bench warrants.
460. The ongoing conduct of Defendants Adams, Dooley and Koon places Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright at continuing and foreseeable risk of being arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of fines and fees without any pre-deprivation court hearing on their ability to pay despite prima facie evidence of their indigence. Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Wright seek prospective declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and members of the Class because they and the members have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to prevent future injury caused by confinement in jail in violation of their constitutional rights.
461. The ongoing conduct of Defendants Adams, Dooley and Koon violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Adams, Dooley and Koon act under color of state law and their conduct creates a real, imminent, and substantial threat that Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class will be arrested and jailed in violation of their due process and equal protection rights.
CLAIM TWO FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Failure to Afford Assistance of Counsel (in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright against Defendant
Lexington County and Defendants Madsen, Adams, Dooley, and Koon, in their official capacities)
462. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs.
463. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright on behalf of themselves and the members of the Class.
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464. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution affords all indigent people a right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel at no cost when they face actual incarceration for nonpayment of fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution, regardless of whether incarceration is imposed through criminal contempt procedures or the implementation of a sentence of incarceration previously suspended upon the condition of payment of monetary penalties.
465. Plaintiff Goodwin suffered a violation of his clearly established right to counsel when he was arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for nonpayment of fines and fees owed to the Central Traffic Court without being informed of his right to request counsel, informed of his right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, and appointed counsel as an indigent person facing incarceration for nonpayment, despite prima facie evidence of his indigence.
466. Plaintiff Goodwin is indigent and owes $2,063 in fines and fees to the Irmo Magistrate Court, a Lexington County magistrate court under the administrative supervision of Defendants Adams and Dooley. Mr. Goodwin is unable to pay the $100 payment which was due on July 5, 2017 as required by the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement imposed by Defendant Adams. Mr. Goodwin faces a substantial and imminent risk that without being afforded the assistance of counsel, Defendant Adams will issue a bench warrant ordering his arrest and incarceration for nonpayment and Defendant Koon will arrest and incarcerate him in the Detention Center on that warrant.
467. At the time he filed his claims in this action, Plaintiff Wright was indigent and owed $416.93 in fines and fees to the Central Traffic Court, a Lexington County magistrate court under the administrative supervision of Defendants Adams and Dooley. The Central Traffic
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Court issued a bench warrant ordering the immediate arrest and incarceration of Mr. Wright, and did not afford him counsel prior to issuing the warrant. At the time he filed his claims Mr. Wright faced a substantial and imminent risk that without being afforded the assistance of counsel, the Central Traffic Court would enforce the warrant and Defendant Koon would arrest and incarcerate him in the Detention Center on that warrant. Indeed, just days after filing his claims, Mr. Wright was arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for nonpayment of money owed to the Central Traffic Court.
468. The policies, practices, customs, standard operating procedures, acts and omissions of Defendants Lexington County and Madsen directly and proximately cause ongoing violations of the right to counsel, and Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class face an imminent and substantial threat of having that right violated.
469. As the County’s final policymakers for the provision of public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts, the Lexington County Council and Defendant Madsen routinely and systematically deprive indigent people of the right to court-appointed counsel at no cost when facing incarceration for nonpayment of court fines and fees by providing grossly inadequate funding for indigent defense in Lexington County magistrate courts. The Lexington County Council and Defendant Madsen either know, or should know, when making final decisions to inadequately fund public defense in these courts that public defenders are routinely not assigned to provide any representation to indigent people facing suspended or actual incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees. Defendant Lexington County and Defendant Madsen’s policy of grossly underfunding public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts therefore reflects deliberate indifference to the Sixth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class.
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470. Defendant Madsen also makes deliberate decisions when requiring the payment of an up-front $40 fee with each application for a public defender; when failing to assign public defenders to represent indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment; when failing to assign public defenders to represent indigent people sentenced by magistrate courts to incarceration suspended on payment of fines and fees; when failing to assign public defenders to staff the Bond Court to represent indigent people arrested on bench warrants for nonpayment; and when failing to assign public defenders to meet with indigent people incarcerated in the Detention Center under bench warrants. As the County’s final policymaker for the provision of indigent defense, Defendant Madsen is aware, or should be aware, that such decisions result in the longstanding, persistent, and widespread failure to provide public defense to indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees in traffic and criminal cases in Lexington County magistrate courts. Defendant Madsen causes, authorizes, condones, ratifies, approves, participates in, or knowingly acquiesces in these illegal policies, practices, and customs. Defendant Madsen’s actions and inactions are deliberately indifferent to the clearly established Sixth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class.
471. The failure to provide public defense to indigent people facing actual or suspended incarceration sentences in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases in Lexington County magistrate courts is so longstanding, persistent, widespread, common, and well-settled as to constitute a custom with the force of law. Lexington County has acquiesced to this custom, and it fairly represents municipal policy.
472. In their official, administrative capacities, Defendants Adams and Dooley are sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the right to counsel of Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class.
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473. In their exercise of administrative responsibility for the establishment of uniform policies and procedures for the timely and appropriate collection of magistrate court fines and fees in Lexington County, Defendants Adams and Dooley oversee and enforce the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies as standard operating procedures in Lexington County magistrate courts. These policies routinely lead to the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without notice of the right to request counsel, without notice of the risk of proceeding without counsel, without notice of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, and without affording court-appointed counsel to defend indigent people from incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees. The enforcement of the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies by Defendants Adams and Dooley places Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class, at substantial and imminent risk of arrest and incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
474. Moreover, Defendants Adams and Dooley make deliberate decisions to exercise their administrative authority to enforce, oversee, and sustain a standard operating procedure by which judges accept so-called written “waivers” of the right to counsel through the use of Trial Information and Plea Sheets without engaging in the colloquy necessary to ensure that any waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. These deliberate decisions place Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class, at substantial and imminent risk of violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
475. In his official capacity, Defendant Koon is sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the right to counsel of Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class. By supervising, controlling, and directing LCSD officers and Detention
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Center staff who execute bench warrants issued under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies, Defendant Koon effects the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of fines, fees, costs, assessments or restitution without the assistance of counsel. Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Wright, and members of the Class face a substantial and imminent threat of being subjected to bench warrants for nonpayment of fines and fees, and Defendant Koon is responsible for executing and enforcing any such bench warrants.
476. The ongoing policies, practices, customs, standard operating procedures, acts, and omissions of Defendants Lexington County, Madsen, Adams, Dooley and Koon place Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class, at a continuing and foreseeable risk of being arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for nonpayment of fines and fees without the benefit of representation by court-appointed counsel. Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Wright seek prospective declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and members of the Class because they and the members have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to prevent future injury caused by confinement in jail in violation of their Sixth Amendment rights.
477. The conduct of Defendants Lexington County, Madsen, Adams, Dooley, and Koon violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants act under color of state law and their conduct creates a real, imminent, and substantial threat that Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class will be arrested and jailed in violation of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
CLAIM THREE FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Unconstitutional Seizure (in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright against Defendants Adams, Dooley, and Koon, in their official capacities) 478. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs.
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479. This claim is brought by Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Wright, on behalf of themselves and members of the Class.
480. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, including arrest and incarceration without probable cause or legal authority.
481. In their official, administrative capacities, Defendants Adams and Dooley are sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the rights of Plaintiffs Goodwin, Wright, and members of the Class to freedom from unreasonable seizures.
482. Defendants Adams and Dooley are sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members, including Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Wright, to be free from unreasonable seizures. In their exercise of administrative authority, Defendants Adams and Dooley place Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class at substantial and imminent risk of violation of their right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Defendants Adams and Dooley oversee, enforce, and sanction the Default Payment Policy, which directly and proximately causes the issuance of bench warrants against people solely because they failed to make payments toward magistrate court fines and fees according to the terms of a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement. Those bench warrants are routinely used to arrest and incarcerate people even though they are unsupported by probable cause that the subject of the warrant has committed a crime. This was the case, for example, with Plaintiffs Brown and Darby, both of whom were arrested and incarcerated solely for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees.
483. In his official capacity, Defendant Koon is sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of the constitutional right of Class members, including Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, to be free from unreasonable seizures. Defendant Koon places
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Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class at substantial and imminent risk of violation of their right to be free from unreasonable seizures because he directs and oversees LCSD officers who execute bench warrants issued against people under the Default Payment Policy solely because they have failed to pay according to the terms of a payment plan.
484. The ongoing conduct of Defendants Adams, Dooley, and Koon places Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class at a substantial and imminent risk of being arrested and incarcerated under a bench warrant lacking legal authority or probable cause. Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Wright seek prospective declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and members of the Class because they and the members have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to prevent future injury caused by confinement in jail in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.
485. The ongoing conduct of Defendants Adams, Dooley, and Koon violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Adams, Dooley and Koon act under color of state law and their conduct creates a real, imminent, and substantial threat that Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright, and members of the Class will be arrested in violation of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
CLAIM FOUR FOR DAMAGES Incarceration Without Pre-deprivation Ability-to-Pay Hearing (in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983by Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright against Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon, in their individual capacities) 486. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs.
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487. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright.
488. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution have long prohibited the imprisonment of people for nonpayment of courtimposed fines or restitution without a pre-deprivation inquiry by a judge into the person’s ability to pay, efforts to secure resources to pay and, if the person lacks the ability to pay despite having made reasonable efforts to acquire resources, the adequacy of any alternatives to incarceration. Courts are prohibited from jailing people for failure to pay without conducting such an inquiry and making at least one of the following findings: (1) the individual’s nonpayment was willful; (2) the individual failed to make sufficient efforts to acquire the resources to pay; or (3) the individual was unable to pay, despite having made sufficient efforts to acquire resources, but alternative methods of achieving punishment or deterrence are inadequate.
489. Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright suffered a violation of the clearly established right to a pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing when they were arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for periods of time ranging from seven to 63 days, or suffered the imminent threat of incarceration, because they could not afford to pay fines and fees owed to Lexington County magistrate courts. Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright were not afforded any pre-deprivation judicial inquiry into or findings of fact on, their ability to pay, their efforts to secure resources, or the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration.
490. For all relevant purposes, all individuals processed for commitment to the Detention Center for unpaid fines, fees, costs, assessments, or restitution imposed by Lexington County magistrate courts are similarly situated with respect to their right to due process of law.
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There exists no legitimate governmental reason to jail individuals who are unable to pay the full amount of outstanding monetary penalties for traffic or misdemeanor offenses, while permitting individuals who have the financial means to pay fines, fees, costs, assessments and restitution to avoid being jailed for the same offenses.
491. In their individual capacities and as an exercise of their administrative responsibility for the establishment of uniform policies and procedures for the timely and appropriate collection of magistrate court fines and fees in Lexington County, Defendants Reinhart and Adams directly and proximately caused violations of the named Plaintiffs’ right to a pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing. Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversaw, enforced, and sanctioned the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. Both policies directly and proximately led to the routine and widespread issuance of bench warrants that were used to arrest and incarcerate the named Plaintiffs without any pre-deprivation judicial inquiry into or findings of fact on ability to pay, efforts to secure resources, or the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration.
492. In his individual capacity as the chief law enforcement officer of the LCSD and the chief administrator of the Detention Center, Defendant Koon directly and proximately caused violations of the named Plaintiffs’ right to a pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing. Defendant Koon oversees and directs LCSD officers and Detention Center staff who arrest and incarcerate people subjected to bench warrants issued under the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. Defendant Koon enforces a standard operating procedure by which people arrested on bench warrants, including indigent people, are transported to the Detention Center and incarcerated unless they can pay the full amount of fines and fees owed before booking. This standard operating procedure established, enforced and sanctioned by Defendant Koon directly
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and proximately led to the arrests and incarceration, or the imminent threat of arrest and incarceration, of the named Plaintiffs without any pre-deprivation judicial inquiry into, or findings of fact on, their ability to pay, efforts to secure resources, or the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration.
493. The actions and conduct of Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon in violating the rights of Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright to a predeprivation ability-to-pay hearing also constitute violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon were acting under color of state law when they violated these Plaintiffs’ rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
494. Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright seek damages from Defendants Koon, Reinhart, and Adams, in their individual capacities for the humiliation, anxiety, stress, emotional distress, hunger, sleeplessness, disturbed sleep, physical pain, serious illness, hospitalization, and other irreparable injury they suffered for being jailed, forcibly separated from their family and loved ones, and detained in unsanitary jail conditions without enough food to eat for periods ranging from seven to 63 days, or from the imminent threat of being jailed under such conditions.
CLAIM FIVE FOR DAMAGES Failure to Afford Counsel (in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright against Defendants Lexington County; Defendant Madsen, in his official capacity as a County official; and Defendants Reinhart and Adams, in their individual capacities) 495. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs.
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496. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright.
497. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution affords all indigent people a right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel at no cost when they face actual incarceration for nonpayment of fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution, regardless of whether incarceration is imposed through criminal contempt procedures or the implementation of a sentence of incarceration previously suspended upon the condition of payment of monetary penalties.
498. Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright suffered a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when they were arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without being informed of the right to request counsel, informed of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, and appointed counsel as an indigent person facing incarceration for nonpayment, despite prima facie evidence of indigence.
499. Defendant Lexington County directly and proximately caused the violation of the right of Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright to counsel by developing and maintaining a policy, practice, and custom of grossly underfunding public defense that demonstrated deliberate indifference to the right to counsel of indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees. As the County’s final policymakers for the provision of public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts, the Lexington County Council and Defendant Madsen made the deliberate decision to provide grossly inadequate funding for indigent defense in Lexington County magistrate courts during the time period relevant to the incarceration of Plaintiffs without counsel. The Lexington County
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Council and Defendant Madsen already knew, or should have known, when they made final decisions to inadequately fund public defense in these courts that public defenders would not be assigned to represent indigent people facing suspended or actual incarceration sentences for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees. Defendants Lexington County and Madsen’s policy of grossly underfunding public defense in Lexington County magistrate courts therefore reflects deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
500. Through policy, practice, and custom, Defendant Lexington County also directly and proximately caused the violation of the right of Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright to counsel by adopting, and acquiescing to, the following policies, practices, and customs that demonstrate deliberate indifference to the right to counsel of indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees: (1) requiring an up-front $40 application fee from indigent people seeking public defenders; (2) making a deliberate decision not to assign public defenders to represent indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment in magistrate court cases; (3) making a deliberate decision not to assign public defenders to represent indigent people sentenced by magistrate courts to incarceration suspended on payment of fines and fees; (4) making a deliberate decision not to assign public defenders to represent indigent people when the incarceration portion of a suspended sentence is implemented in a magistrate court case; (5) making a deliberate decision not to assign public defenders to staff the Bond Court to represent indigent people arrested on bench warrants for nonpayment; and (6) making a deliberate decision not to assign public defenders to meet with indigent people incarcerated in the Detention Center under bench warrants. As the County’s final policymaker for the provision of indigent defense, Defendant Madsen was aware, or should have been aware, that such decisions have led to the longstanding,
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persistent, and widespread failure to provide public defense to indigent people facing incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases in Lexington County magistrate courts. On behalf of Lexington County, Defendant Madsen caused, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved, participated in, or knowingly acquiesced in these illegal policies, practices, and customs. Defendant Madsen’s actions and inactions were deliberately indifferent to the clearly established Sixth Amendment rights of indigent people.
501. In their individual capacities and as an exercise of their administrative responsibility for the establishment of uniform policies and procedures for the timely and appropriate collection of magistrate court fines and fees in Lexington County, Defendants Reinhart and Adams directly and proximately caused the violation of the right of Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversaw and enforced the Default Payment and Trial in Absentia Policies. Both policies directly and proximately led to the routine and widespread issuance of bench warrants that were used to incarcerate the named Plaintiffs for nonpayment of fines and fees to Lexington County magistrate courts without notice of the right to request counsel, without notice of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, and without being afforded court-appointed counsel as people who faced incarceration, despite prima facie evidence of indigence. Additionally, in their administrative capacities, Defendants Reinhart and Adams endorse the use of Trial Information and Plea Sheets that encourage, sanction, and ratify a standard operating procedure by which magistrate court judges accept so-called written “waivers” of the right to counsel without engaging in a colloquy to ensure that any waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
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502. The actions and conduct of Defendants Lexington County, Madsen, Reinhart and Adams in violating Plaintiffs’ right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment also constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Each of these Defendants was acting under color of state law when their policies, practices, customs, standard operating procedures, and omissions violated Plaintiffs’ right to counsel.
503. Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Corder, Goodwin, and Wright seek damages from Defendants Lexington County, Madsen (in his official capacity as a County official), Reinhart (in his individual capacity for his administrative conduct), and Adams (in her individual capacity for her administrative conduct) for the humiliation, anxiety, stress, emotional distress, hunger, sleeplessness, disturbed sleep, physical pain, serious illness, hospitalization and other irreparable injury they suffered for being jailed, forcibly separated from their family and loved ones, and detained in unsanitary jail conditions without enough food to eat for periods ranging from seven to 63 days.
CLAIM SIX FOR DAMAGES Unreasonable Seizure (in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, and Wright against Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon, in their individual capacities) 504. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 505. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs Brown, Darby and Wright. 506. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, including arrest and incarceration without probable cause or legal authority.
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507. The arrests and incarceration of Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, and Wright violated their Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable seizures because the arrests and incarceration were carried out under bench warrants based solely on nonpayment of fines and fees, which were unsupported by probable cause that Ms. Brown, Ms. Darby, or Mr. Wright had committed a crime.
508. Neither Ms. Brown nor Ms. Darby were arrested and jailed following a show cause hearing or contempt proceeding at which a court considered information other than the fact that Ms. Brown and Ms. Darby missed payments required by the Scheduled Time Payment Agreements in their cases.
509. Despite the fact that Mr. Wright appeared at a show cause hearing in the Central Traffic Court concerning his nonpayment of court fines and fees, the court failed to inquire into, or make findings of fact on, his ability to pay, efforts to secure resources, or the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration. Mr. Wright was ultimately arrested and incarcerated pursuant to the court’s directive that he be jailed for ten days unless he paid the full amount of money owed to the Central Traffic Court.
510. As a result, the LCSD officers who arrested and transported Ms. Brown, Ms. Darby, and Mr. Wright to the Detention Center had no particularized and objective basis to believe that Ms. Brown, Ms. Darby, or Mr. Wright had committed any criminal offense.
511. The arrests that led to the incarceration of Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, and Wright were arrests for which probable cause was required.
512. The detentions of Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, and Wright following their arrest for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees were unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
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513. The seizures of Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, and Mr. Wright were excessive and unreasonable in their duration and scope.
514. It was clearly established before the arrest and incarceration of Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, and Darby that seizing and detaining Ms. Brown, Ms. Darby, and Mr. Wright simply because they did not have money to pay fines and fees would violate their clearly established rights. Defendants Reinhart and Adams had fair warning that their conduct would violate the Fourth Amendment and no reasonable officer could have believed that the seizures or incarceration of Ms. Brown, Ms. Darby, and Mr. Wright were reasonable.
515. In their individual capacities and in an exercise of their administrative authority, Defendants Reinhart and Adams directly and proximately caused violations of Plaintiffs Brown Darby, and Wright’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizures. Defendants Reinhart and Adams oversaw, enforced, and sanctioned the Default Payment Policy, and that conduct directly and proximately caused the issuance of bench warrants against Ms. Brown, Ms. Darby, and Mr. Wright for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees when they did not pay according to the terms of their Scheduled Time Payment Agreements. Those bench warrants were used to arrest and incarcerate Ms. Brown, Ms. Darby, and Mr. Wright, but were unsupported by probable cause that Ms. Brown, Ms. Darby, or Mr. Wright had committed a crime.
516. Moreover, Defendants Reinhart and Adams have failed to exercise their administrative authority to correct the longstanding and pervasive Default Payment Policy through any written policy and to train Lexington County magistrate judges on how to ensure respect for the Fourth Amendment right when issuing bench warrants for the collection of magistrate court fines and fees.
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517. In his individual capacity as the chief law enforcement officer of the LCSD and the chief administrator of the Detention Center, Defendant Koon directly and proximately caused violations of the rights of Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, and Wright to freedom from unreasonable seizures. Defendant Koon oversaw and directed LCSD officers who arrested Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, and Wright on payment bench warrants issued under the Default Payment Policy, which were not supported by probable cause of criminal activity. This standard operating procedure established, enforced, and sanctioned by Defendant Koon directly and proximately led to the arrests and incarceration of Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, and Wright without probable cause of criminal activity.
518. The actions and conduct of Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon in violating the rights of Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, and Wright to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment also constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Reinhart, Adams and Koon were acting under color of state law when they violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.
519. Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, and Wright seek damages from Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon in their individual capacities for the humiliation, anxiety, stress, emotional distress, hunger, sleeplessness, disturbed sleep, and other irreparable injury they suffered for being jailed, forcibly separated from their family and loved ones, and detained in unsanitary and cold jail conditions without enough food to eat for periods ranging from seven to 57 days.
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CLAIM SEVEN FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF Incarceration Without Pre-deprivation Ability-to-Pay Hearing (in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Plaintiff Goodwin against Defendant Adams, in her official capacity) 520. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 521. This claim is brought by Mr. Goodwin. 522. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution have long prohibited the imprisonment of people for nonpayment of courtimposed fines or restitution without a pre-deprivation inquiry by a judge into the person’s ability to pay, efforts to secure resources to pay and, if the person lacks the ability to pay despite having made reasonable efforts to acquire resources, the adequacy of any alternatives to incarceration. Courts are prohibited from jailing people for nonpayment without conducting such an inquiry and making at least one of the following findings: (1) the individual’s nonpayment was willful; (2) the individual failed to make sufficient efforts to acquire the resources to pay; or (3) the individual was unable to pay, despite having made sufficient efforts to acquire resources, but alternative methods of achieving punishment or deterrence are inadequate. 523. Plaintiff Goodwin is indigent and owes $2,063 in fines and fees to the Irmo Magistrate Court. Mr. Goodwin is unable to pay the $100 payment that was due on July 5, 2017 as required by the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement imposed on him by Defendant Adams. Mr. Goodwin faces a substantial and imminent risk that without affording him a pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearing, Defendant Adams will issue a bench warrant ordering his arrest and incarceration for nonpayment and Defendant Koon will arrest and incarcerate him in the Detention Center on that warrant.
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524. For all relevant purposes, all individuals processed for commitment to the Detention Center for unpaid fines, fees, costs, assessments or restitution imposed by Lexington County magistrate courts are similarly situated with respect to their right to due process of law. There exists no legitimate governmental reason to jail individuals who are unable to pay the full amount of outstanding monetary penalties for traffic or misdemeanor criminal offenses, while permitting individuals who have the financial means to pay fines, fees, costs, assessments, and restitution to avoid being jailed for the same offenses.
525. As a judge on the Irmo Magistrate Court, Defendant Adams is sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of Plaintiff Goodwin’s right to due process and equal protection of the law. In her official capacity and in an exercise of her judicial authority, Defendant Adams routinely orders the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without affording them any pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings, just as she did in the cases of Plaintiffs Brown and Darby. Moreover, Defendant Adams sentenced Plaintiff Goodwin to pay fines and fees according to a Scheduled Time Payment Agreement, and Mr. Goodwin is unable to afford the required payments. Mr. Goodwin thus faces a substantial and imminent risk of being arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of the magistrate court fines and fees that he owes without a pre-deprivation abilityto-pay hearing.
526. The ongoing conduct of Defendant Adams places Plaintiff Goodwin at continuing and foreseeable risk of being arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment of fines and fees without any pre-deprivation court hearing on his ability to pay despite prima facie evidence of hisindigence. Mr. Goodwin seeks prospective declaratory relief because he has no plain,
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adequate, or complete remedy at law to prevent future injury caused by confinement in jail in violation of his constitutional rights.
527. The ongoing conduct of Defendant Adams violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Adams acts under color of state law and her conduct creates a real, imminent, and substantial threat that Plaintiff Goodwin will be arrested and jailed in violation of his due process and equal protection rights.
CLAIM EIGHT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF Failure to Afford Assistance of Counsel (in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Plaintiff Goodwin against Defendant Adams, in her official capacity) 528. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 529. This claim is brought by Plaintiff Goodwin. 530. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution affords all indigent people a right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel at no cost when they face actual incarceration for nonpayment of fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution, regardless of whether incarceration is imposed through criminal contempt procedures or the implementation of a sentence of incarceration previously suspended upon the condition of payment of monetary penalties. 531. Plaintiff Goodwin is indigent and owes $2,163 fines and fees to the Irmo Magistrate Court. Mr. Goodwin is unable to pay the $100 payment that was due on July 5, 2017 as required by the Scheduled Time Payment Agreement imposed by Defendant Adams. Mr. Goodwin faces a substantial and imminent risk that without affording him the assistance of counsel, Defendant Adams will issue a bench warrant ordering his arrest and incarceration for
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nonpayment and Defendant Koon will arrest and incarcerate him in the Detention Center on that warrant.
532. As the judge of the Irmo Magistrate Court, Defendant Adams is sufficiently connected to, and responsible for, ongoing violations of Plaintiff Goodwin’s right to counsel. In her official capacity and in an exercise of her judicial authority, Defendant Adams routinely fails to notify indigent people of the right to request counsel and the risks of proceeding without counsel, fails to notify them of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee, and fails to appoint counsel to represent them at no cost before ordering their arrest and incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees, despite prima facie evidence of their indigence. Finally, Defendant Adams routinely fails to engage in any colloquy to ensure that the act of signing a Trial Information and Plea Sheet confirms a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.
533. The ongoing policies, practices, customs, standard operating procedures, acts, and omissions of Defendant Adams place Plaintiff Goodwin at a continuing and foreseeable risk of being arrested and incarcerated in the Detention Center for nonpayment of fines and fees without the benefit of representation by court-appointed counsel.
534. Mr. Goodwin seeks prospective declaratory relief because he has no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to prevent future injury caused by confinement in jail in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.
535. The conduct of Defendant Adams violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Adams acts under color of state law and her conduct creates a real, imminent, and substantial threat that Plaintiff Goodwin will be arrested and jailed in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court:
 Assume jurisdiction over this action;
 Certify the Class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
 Award the following relief:
o A declaration that Defendants Adams and Dooley, acting in their administrative capacities, and Defendant Koon are violating Class members’ Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and equal protection of the law by sustaining policies, practices, and standard operating procedures that result in the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without a predeprivation judicial inquiry into, and findings of fact on, ability to pay, efforts to secure resources, and the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration.
o A declaration that Defendants Adams and Dooley, acting in their administrative capacities, and Defendant Koon are violating Class members’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel by sustaining policies, practices, and standard operating procedures that result in the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without notice of their right to request the appointment of counsel to defend against incarceration for nonpayment; without notice of the right to request waiver of any $40 public defender application fee; without ensuring that any waiver of these rights is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; and without providing assistance of counsel.
o A declaration that Defendants Lexington County and Madsen are violating Class members’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel by routinely and systematically depriving indigent people of the right to court-appointed counsel when they face incarceration for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees, including through the failure to adequately fund indigent defense in Lexington County magistrate courts and the failure to assign public defenders to staff magistrate courts proceedings.
o A declaration that Defendant Adams violates Plaintiff Goodwin’s Fourteenth Amendment right to an ability-to-pay hearing by ordering or effecting the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without first affording a pre-deprivation judicial inquiry into, and findings of fact on, ability to pay, efforts to secure resources, and the adequacy of readily available alternatives to incarceration.
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o A declaration that Defendant Adams violates Plaintiff Goodwin’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by ordering or effecting the arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees without affording notice of the right to request appointment of counsel to defend against incarceration and notice of the right to request waiver of the $40 public defender application fee; without ensuring that any waiver of these rights is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; and without appointing counsel to defend Plaintiff Goodwin as an indigent person facing incarceration for nonpayment.
o A declaration that Defendants Adams and Dooley, acting in their administrative capacities, and Defendant Koon are violating Class members’ Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable seizure by sustaining policies, practices, and standard operating procedures that result in indigent people being arrested and incarcerated on bench warrants based on nonpayment of magistrate court fines and fees and without probable cause of criminal activity.
o An order and judgment permanently enjoining Defendants Adams, Dooley, Koon, Lexington County, and Madsen from enforcing the abovedescribed unconstitutional policies and practices.
 Award compensatory damages to the Plaintiffs Brown, Darby, Johnson, Palacios, Goodwin, and Wright in an amount to be determined at trial, including damages for deprivation of liberty, mental anguish, emotional distress, hunger, sleeplessness, disturbed sleep, illness, and loss of income;
 Award Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of all litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
 Afford any such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

DATED this 17th day of October, 2017. Respectfully submitted by,

s/ Susan K. Dunn SUSAN K. DUNN (Fed. Bar #647) American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of
South Carolina P.O. Box 20998 Charleston, South Carolina 29413-0998 Tel.: (843) 282-7953 Fax: (843) 720-1428 sdunn@aclusc.org

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY* American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 Tel.: (212) 519-7876 Fax: (212) 549-2654 nchoudhury@aclu.org

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TOBY J. MARSHALL* ERIC R. NUSSER* Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC 936 N 34th Street, Suite 300 Seattle, Washington 98103 Tel.: (206) 816-6603 Fax: (206) 319-5450 tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com eric@terrellmarshall.com *Admitted pro hac vice.
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 3:17-cv-01426-MBS-SVH Date Filed 02/05/18 Entry Number 74 Page 1 of 22

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Twanda Marshinda Brown; Sasha

)

Monique Darby; Cayeshia Cashel

)

Johnson; Amy Marie Palacios; Nora

)

Ann Corder; and Xavier Larry Goodwin )

and Raymond Wright, Jr., on behalf of )

themselves and all others similarly

)

situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

Lexington County, South Carolina; Gary )

Reinhart, in his individual capacity;

)

Rebecca Adams, in her official and

)

individual capacities as the Chief Judge )

for Administrative Purposes of the

)

Summary Courts in Lexington County )

and in her official capacity as the Judge )

of the Irmo Magistrate Court; Albert

)

John Dooley, III, in his official capacity )

as the Associate Chief Judge for

)

Administrative Purposes of the

)

Summary Courts in Lexington County; )

Bryan Koon, in his official capacity as )

the Lexington County Sheriff; and

)

Robert Madsen, in his official capacity )

as the Circuit Public Defender for the )

Eleventh Judicial Circuit of South

)

Carolina,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

C/A No.: 3:17-1426-MBS-SVH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

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Plaintiffs have been convicted of magistrate-level offenses in Lexington, South Carolina, and received assessments of fines and fees. Plaintiffs’ cases include convictions for misdemeanor offenses such as simple possession of marijuana, assault and battery in the third degree, and traffic-level offenses such as driving on a suspended license and uninsured status. Plaintiffs are represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and name as defendants Lexington County, the current and former judges for administrative purposes of the Lexington County summary courts, the county sheriff, and the county public defender (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiffs request damages and declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants for alleged constitutional violations, including lack of due process, denial of equal protection of the law, failure to provide assistance of counsel, and unreasonable seizure. Plaintiffs also seek certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2) of a proposed class of “all indigent people who currently owe, or in the future will owe, fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution in cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts.”
This matter comes before the court on the following motions: (1) Plaintiff’s motion to certify class [ECF No. 21]; (2) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief [ECF No. 29]; and (3) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on damages claims [ECF No. 50]. These matters having been fully briefed [ECF Nos. 30, 35, 36, 39, 66, 70], they are ripe for disposition.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(f) (D.S.C.). Because the motion for summary judgment is dispositive, this report and
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recommendation is entered for the district judge’s consideration. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s motion to certify class be denied, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to injunctive and declaratory relief be granted, and Defendants’ motions for summary judgment for damages be granted in part and denied in part. I. Factual Background
The second amended complaint is the now operative complaint (“Complaint”). [ECF No. 48], which consists of 122 pages with 535 paragraphs of factual allegations and asserts eight counts.
A. Defendants Lexington County is a municipal governmental entity whose policies, practices, and customs Plaintiffs allege deprived them of their constitutional rights. [Compl. ¶ 26]. Gary Reinhart, Rebecca Adams, and Albert John Dooley III (collectively “Judicial Defendants”) are South Carolina magistrates for Lexington County summary courts. Reinhart served as Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County until June 27, 2017. Id. at ¶¶ 27–30. Adams succeeded Reinhart as Chief Judge and was formerly the Associate Chief Judge. Dooley was appointed as Associate Chief Judge upon Adams’s promotion to Chief Judge. Id. Bryan Koon is the elected Lexington County Sheriff, chief law enforcement officer for the Lexington County Sheriff’s Department (“LCSD”), and the chief administrator for the Lexington County Detention Center (“LCDC”). Id. at ¶ 30.
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Robert Madsen is the Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of South Carolina that includes Lexington County. Id. at ¶ 32.
B. Plaintiffs 1. Twanda Marshinda Brown
On March 15, 2016, Twanda Marshinda Brown (“Brown”) was ticketed by an LCSD officer for driving on a suspended license (DUS, 2nd offense) and for driving with no tag light. Id. at ¶ 141. On April 12, 2016, Brown appeared before Judge Adams in the Irmo Magistrate Court and pled guilty to both charges, id at ¶¶ 141, 142, 144, and was assessed $237.50 for the tag light conviction and $2,100 for the DUS, 2nd conviction. Id. at ¶ 145. Brown alleges she told Judge Adams she had no money to pay that day and that Judge Adams established a $100/month payment schedule. Id. at ¶ 146. Brown alleges she stated she could not afford a monthly $100 payment and that Judge Adams threatened to jail her for 90 days. Id. at ¶ 150. Brown made five payments of $100 through October 4, 2016, which satisfied the fines and fees for the tag light conviction and contributed toward her fines and fees for the DUS, 2nd conviction. Id. at ¶ 159. After Brown failed to make any payments after October 4, 2016, id. at ¶ 160, Judge Adams issued a bench warrant on January 12, 2017, for her nonpayment on the DUS, 2nd conviction, id. at ¶ 163. The warrant stated that Brown had a “sentence imposed/balance due of $1,907.63 or 90 days” and that she would be jailed “until he/she shall be thereof discharged by due course of law.” Id. Brown was arrested on the bench warrant on February 18, 2017, id. at ¶¶ 165–67, and was advised that she could pay $1,907.63 or serve 90 days in jail. Id. Brown served 57 days in jail. Id. at ¶¶ 168, 171.
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Brown claims she did not know, and that Judge Adams did not inform her, that she had the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney before pleading guilty and the right to seek a waiver of any public defender application fees due to financial hardship. Id. at ¶ 143.
2. Sasha Monique Darby On August 4, 2016, Sasha Monique Darby (“Darby”) was ticketed for assault and battery in the third degree after she hit her roommate. Id. at ¶¶ 184–85. She appeared in Irmo Magistrate Court on August 23, 2016, was given a “Trial Information and Plea Sheet,” and instructed to “check a box.” Id. at ¶¶ 186–87. Darby checked the statement, “I waive my right to have an attorney present,” id. at ¶ 188, and “Not guilty,” id. at ¶ 189. Judge Adams found Darby guilty of assault and battery in the third degree, id. at ¶¶ 193–95, and asked her whether she wanted to serve 30 days in jail or pay a fine, id. 196. Darby stated that she would pay the fine, id. at ¶ 196, but after learning the fine was $1,000, id. at ¶ 200, she returned to the courtroom and told Judge Adams she could only pay $100 to $120 a month. Id. at ¶¶ 201–02. Judge Adams ordered her to pay $150 a month. Id. at 202. Darby paid $200 on the date of the hearing and $150 on October 4, 2016. Id. at 205. After Darby failed to make any further payments, id. at ¶¶ 205–06, a bench warrant issued for Darby on December 8, 2016. Id. at ¶ 208. Darby was arrested on the bench warrant on March 28, 2017. Id. at ¶¶ 209–12. Darby was advised that she could pay $680 or serve 20 days in jail. Id. at ¶ 213. Darby served 20 days in jail. Id. at ¶ 215.
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Darby alleges Judge Adams did not engage in a colloquy with her to determine whether her waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. at ¶ 193.
3. Cayeshia Cashel Johnson After having an accident on August 21, 2016, while driving her mother’s car, Cayeshia Cashel Johnson (“Johnson”) was charged with simple possession of marijuana and the following traffic offenses: (1) operating a motor vehicle without license in possession; (2) improper start of vehicle; (3) violation of beginner permit; (4) failure to return license plate and registration upon loss of insurance, 1st offense; and (5) uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense. Id. at ¶¶ 218–20. Johnson alleges that the week before her court hearing on September 22, 2016, she called the Central Traffic Court and informed someone that she could not attend the hearing because she lived in Myrtle Beach and lacked transportation. Id. at ¶ 223. Johnson says she was told lack of transportation was not a valid reason for missing a court hearing and that her case would be tried in her absence. Id. at ¶ 224. Johnson states she inquired about arranging a payment plan for the fines, but was told she needed to talk to a judge about arranging a payment plan. Id. at ¶ 225. Johnson states she left her work and cell numbers and was allegedly assured that the court would contact her, but that no one did. Id. at ¶ 226–27. On September 22, 2016, the Central Traffic Court tried Johnson in her absence and found her guilty of all six charges. Id. at ¶ 228. On September 26, 2016, a bench warrant issued for Johnson to pay $1,287.50 or serve 80 days in jail. Id. at ¶ 230. On
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February 13, 2017, Johnson was arrested in Myrtle Beach, id. at ¶¶ 231–33, and jailed for 55 days, id. at ¶ 238.
4. Amy Marie Palacios Around June 2015, Amy Marie Palacios (“Palacios”) had her driver’s license suspended for failure to pay an earlier speeding ticket. Id. at ¶¶ 250–51. On October 28, 2016, she was stopped by state troopers at a roadblock and ticketed for driving on a suspended license (DUS, 1st offense). Id. at ¶¶ 253–54. The day before her November 10, 2016 court hearing, Palacios called the Central Traffic Court to request a different court date because of her work schedule. Id. at ¶ 256. Palacios was tried in her absence on November 10, 2016, and found guilty of DUS, 1st offense. Id. at ¶ 260. On November 15, 2016, a bench warrant issued, requiring payment of $647.50 or 30 days in jail. Id. at ¶ 262. On February 25, 2017, Palacios was arrested on the bench warrant, id. at ¶¶ 263–68, and released after serving 21 days. Id. at ¶ 275.
5. Nora Ann Corder In July 2016, Nora Ann Corder (“Corder”) was cited for failing to return her license plate and registration upon the loss of insurance, resulting in a $230 fine and the suspension of her driver’s license. Id. at ¶¶ 284–85. On January 27, 2017, Corder was cited for driving under suspension (DUS, 1st offense), violation of temporary license plate for vehicle to be registered in another state, and uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense, Id. at ¶ 289. Her car was impounded. Id. at ¶ 290. Prior to her February 15, 2017 hearing, the deputy who issued the tickets asked Corder about her interim remedial efforts and had the judge continue the case until the
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following month for Corder to “take care of what she needed to take care of.” Id. at ¶¶ 293–94. Prior to her March 22, 2017 hearing, Corder discussed her interim remedial efforts with the same deputy, who stated that if she could reinstate her driver’s license and car insurance, he would drop certain charges or ask the court to reduce the amount she would have to pay in fines and fees. Id. at ¶¶ 296–97. The deputy continued the hearing to April 19, 2017, to allow her to reinstate her driver’s license. Id. at ¶ 298. Before the April 19, 2017 hearing began, Corder paid the $230 fine arising from the 2016 ticket for failing to return her license plate and registration upon loss of insurance. Id. at ¶¶ 304–05. Corder told the same deputy that she could not afford to reinstate her driver’s license or car insurance, but that she had recently secured a job. Id. at ¶ 307. The deputy indicated he would continue the trial a final time to May 17, 2017. Id.
Corder failed to appear on May 17, 2017, and was tried and found guilty in her absence, and a bench warrant issued for her arrest. Id. at ¶¶ 310–11, 313. She was arrested the following week when she appeared at the Lexington Magistrate Court with the intention of filing forms to forestall eviction for failing to pay rent. Id. at ¶ 319. She was jailed for 54 days in lieu of paying the $1,320 fine. Id. at ¶¶ 321, 222.1
Corder claims she never requested a continuance and never spoke to the presiding judge, was not instructed on how to prepare for a continued court hearing, was not informed of the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney, the right to
1 The two paragraphs between paragraphs 321 and 322 are numbered 223 and 223 in the Second Amended Complaint.
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seek waiver of any public defender application fees due to financial hardship, or the right to a jury trial. Id. at ¶ 308.
6. Xavier Larry Goodwin During a traffic stop on July 15, 2016, Xavier Larry Goodwin (“Goodwin”) was ticketed for (1) driving under suspension (DUS, 2nd offense); (2) uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense; (3) seatbelt violation; (4) temporary license plate–time limit to replace; and (5) use of license plate other than the vehicle for which it was issued. Id. at ¶ 326. He was tried in his absence on August 9, 2016, and a bench warrant issued, requiring payment of $1,710 or 90 days in jail for the convictions of DUS, 2nd offense and uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense. Id. at ¶¶ 327–28, 330. On February 2, 2017, Goodwin was stopped and ticketed for DUS, 3rd offense and served with the bench warrant requiring payment of $1,710 or 90 days in jail. Id. at ¶¶ 331–35. At his bond hearing on the DUS, 3rd charge, Goodwin claims he was not informed of his right to request the assistance of court-appointed counsel or his right to seek waiver of a public defender application fee. Id. at ¶ 336. During his transport on April 4, 2017, for a hearing, Goodwin claims he asked the LCDC officer whether he could request a public defender. Id. at ¶¶ 337–38. Goodwin says the officer suggested that the screening process could take a long time and that his incarceration in LCDC could be extended as a result. Id. at ¶ 338. Goodwin pled guilty to DUS, 3rd offense, id. at ¶ 341, and was sentenced to $2,100 and 90 days in jail, with instructions to set up a payment plan within 30 days, id. at ¶ 342–43. Goodwin was jailed at LCDC for 63 days for nonpayment of fines and fees, id. at ¶ 344–47, and on April 6, 2017, he was
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transported to the detention center in Richland County to serve time on a Richland County bench warrant, id. at ¶ 345. After being released on April 26, 2017, he returned to the Irmo Magistrate Court on May 5, 2017, and signed a $100/month payment plan. Id. at ¶¶ 346, 351–53. Goodwin made one payment. Id. at ¶ 357–58.
Goodwin alleges that Judge Adams did not inform him that he had the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney before he pled guilty and the right to seek a waiver of any fees related to the application for a public defender due to financial hardship. Id. at ¶¶ 339–40.
7. Raymond Wright, Jr. On July 1, 2016, Raymond Wright, Jr. (“Wright”), was stopped and ticketed for DUS, 1st offense. Id. at ¶ 363. He pled guilty on July 26, 2016, was fined $666.93, id. at ¶ 366, and set up on a $50/month payment plan, id. at ¶¶ 368–69. Wright made five payments. Id. at ¶ 370. He was summoned for a show cause hearing on April 19, 2017, at which the Central Traffic Court judge made a general announcement that all defendants had a right to an attorney. Id. at ¶¶ 373–75. Because Wright failed to pay the balance of $416.93 within 10 days, a bench warrant issued on May 2, 2017, directing payment of $416.93 or 10 days in jail. Id. at ¶ 224.2 Wright was arrested on July 25, 2017, and released on August 1, 2017. Id. at ¶¶ 384, 390. Wright states the judge did not advise him of the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney and the right to seek waiver of any fees related to the application for a public defender due to financial hardship. Id. at ¶ 375. 2 The paragraph between 381 and 382 is numbered 224 in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
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C. Claims

Because Plaintiffs’ claims vary by which Plaintiffs sue which Defendants for

which causes of action, the court distills the Complaint into the following claims chart:

No. Claim
1 Incarceration without predeprivation ability-to-pay hearing (Comp. ¶¶ 451–61)

Relief Sought Declaratory and Injunctive

By
Goodwin and Wright

Against
Adams, Dooley, and Koon (official capacities)

2 Failure to afford assistance of counsel (Comp. ¶¶ 462–77)

Declaratory and Injunctive

Goodwin and Wright

Lexington County, Madsen, Adams, Dooley, and Koon (official capacities)

3 Unconstitutional seizure (Comp. Declaratory Goodwin and Adams, Dooley, and

¶¶ 478–85)

and

Wright

Koon (official

Injunctive

capacities)

4 Incarceration without predeprivation ability-to-pay hearing (Comp. ¶¶ 486–94)

Damages

All plaintiffs

Reinhart, Adams, and Koon (individual capacities)

5 Failure to afford assistance of counsel (Comp. ¶¶ 495–03)

Damages

All plaintiffs

Lexington County, Madsen (official capacity), Reinhart and Adams (individual capacities)

6 Unreasonable seizure (Comp. ¶¶ Damages 504–19)

Brown, Darby, and Wright

Reinhart, Adams, and Koon (individual capacities)

7 Incarceration without predeprivation ability-to-pay hearing (Comp. ¶¶ 520–27)

Declaratory Goodwin

Adams (official capacity)

8 Failure to afford assistance of counsel (Comp. ¶¶ 528–535)

Declaratory Goodwin

Adams (official capacity)

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II. Discussion A. Jurisdiction of Prospective Relief Claims (Including all Class Claims) As an initial matter, it appears to the undersigned that all requests for prospective
relief in this case are now moot. See Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that whether this court is “presented with a live case or controversy is a question [the court] may raise sua sponte since mootness goes to the heart of the Article III jurisdiction of the courts” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Tejada-Revulcaba, 675 F. App’x 393 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding that courts may raise the issue of mootness sua sponte).
Defendants have submitted the September 15, 2017 memorandum from Chief Justice Donald W. Beatty of the South Carolina Supreme Court to South Carolina Magistrate and Municipal Judges, requiring that all defendants in the state facing criminal charges carrying possible imprisonment be fully informed of their right to counsel, and if indigent, their right to court-appointed counsel prior to trial. [ECF No. 40-1]. Chief Justice Beatty’s memorandum further directed that absent a waiver of counsel or the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants:
summary court judges shall not impose a sentence of jail time, and are limited to imposing a sentence of a fine only for those defendants, if convicted. When imposing a fine, consideration should be given to a defendant’s ability to pay. If a fine is imposed, an unrepresented defendant should be advised of the amount of the fine and when the fine must be paid. This directive would also apply to those defendants who fail to appear at trial and are tried in their absence. Id. (emphasis in original). The memorandum on its face appears to moot all claims for prospective relief in this case. To the extent that Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory
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relief from future injury, their alleged injuries cannot be “conjectural” or “hypothetical[,]” City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983); “remote[,]” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 507 (1975); “speculative[,]” Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42–46 (1976); or “[a]bstract[,]” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). Rather, they must be “certainly impending.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (citation omitted). After Chief Justice Beatty’s instruction to magistrate and municipal courts, no future injury to Plaintiffs is impending, nor have Plaintiffs shown a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy. Super Tire Eng’g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 122 (1974) (requiring allegations to show a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant declaratory relief).3 Absent a showing of a live case or controversy,4 the undersigned recommends that Plaintiffs’ prospective relief claims all be dismissed as moot. As Plaintiffs’ motion to certify class [ECF No. 21] relies on their claims for prospective relief, the undersigned also recommends it be denied.
3 Although Goodwin argues that he is still subject to being jailed for failure to pay fines, Plaintiffs have not indicated that Goodwin is subject to a live bench warrant, which information is easily ascertainable. 4 The undersigned expects Plaintiffs to argue that Defendants have not met the heavy burden of showing that it is absolutely clear that the alleged wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000). However, the Fourth Circuit has held that a governmental entity’s change of policy renders a challenge moot when the governmental entity “has not asserted its right to enforce [the challenged policy] at any future time.” Telco Commc’ns, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1231 (4th Cir. 1989). Here, Chief Justice Beatty’s memorandum makes clear the policies of the state courts and the undersigned finds the complained-of conduct/policies cannot be reasonably expected it to recur.
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B. Immunity Immunity is a threshold issue that should be resolved early in a case. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991). Therefore, the undersigned first addresses immunity.
1. Judicial Immunity Defendants argue that the Judicial Defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. [ECF No. 50-1 at 3, 9]. A judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties has absolute immunity from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991). Judicial immunity extends to judges of courts of limited jurisdiction, such as municipal and magistrate court judges. Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 441–43 (3d Cir. 2000). Further, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978). An exception to judicial immunity exists when a judge engages in nonjudicial acts, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Id.; see Figueroa, 208 F.3d at 440. Plaintiffs argue that the Judicial Defendants are sued for actions they allegedly took in their administrative capacities as Chief Judges and Associate Chief Judges for Lexington County Summary Courts. A closer analysis of Plaintiffs’ argument reveals that Plaintiffs do not sue the Judicial Defendants for their actions, but only for alleged omissions, which Plaintiffs couch as “decisions” not to act in some way. Specifically, Plaintiffs state that Judicial Defendants “exercised their administrative responsibilities in a manner that established and sanctioned the unwritten standard operating procedures resulting in Plaintiffs’ arrest[s] and incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees
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without pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings or representation by court-appointed counsel.” [ECF No. 66 at 38]. Plaintiffs list the following administrative omissions: (1) the Judicial Defendants’ failure to make indigency hearings mandatory; (2) the Judicial Defendants’ failure to assign cases, increase the size of magistrate court dockets, require additional hours of magistrate court operation, and mandate magistrate judges to work on evenings and weekends to facilitate mandatory indigency hearings; and (3) the Judicial Defendants’ failure to report and correct the use of bench warrants to coerce fine and fee payments and to incarcerate indigent people. Id. The undersigned finds Plaintiffs’ argument unavailing.
The Fourth Circuit has noted “the important purpose served by the doctrine of judicial immunity, which has been described as protecting the public interest in having judges who are ‘at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.’” King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). “Judicial immunity is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence, and without fear of consequences.” Town of Hopkins, S.C. v. Cobb, 466 F. Supp. 1215, 1218 (D.S.C. 1979) (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has warned that controversial issues are even more worthy of the protection of judicial immunity so that a judge may act without fear of suit:
Disagreement with the action taken by the judge . . . does not justify depriving that judge of his immunity. Despite the unfairness to litigants that sometimes results, the doctrine of judicial immunity is thought to be in the
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best interests of “the proper administration of justice . . . [, for it allows] a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him [to] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 363 (quotations omitted). Under the facts of this case, the undersigned finds that Judicial Defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Plaintiffs’ argument that their damages claims against Judicial Defendants are for the “manner” in which they “exercised their administrative responsibilities” is undercut by their argument that the Judicial Defendants’ administrative “decisions” (i.e., omissions) had a direct impact on the criminal proceedings, thereby causing Plaintiffs damages. [ECF No. 66 at 38]. Further, the alleged administrative decisions Plaintiffs argue should have been made could only have been made by a judge, evidencing their judicial nature. The undersigned is not persuaded that an alleged decision, which can only be made by a judge and that affects the adjudication of a criminal proceeding, can be characterized as a non-judicial administrative decision such that the judge should be deprived of judicial immunity. Plaintiffs provide no authority, either binding or merely persuasive, in which a court allowed suit based on a judge’s alleged failure to prescribe how other judges should perform their judicial functions. Allowing an action to proceed against the Judicial Defendants in this instance would virtually eliminate the doctrine of judicial immunity, as any disgruntled litigant could bypass the barrier of judicial immunity by simply suing the chief judge of a court. If, as Plaintiffs argue, a litigant may sue a chief administrative judge for a “decision . . . not to require” a judge issuing a warrant to hold specific
16

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hearings, any disgruntled litigant may sue a court’s chief judge for an alleged failure to require a specific hearing. If a chief administrative judge were liable for an alleged failure “to report and correct” the alleged improper procedures used by other judges of the court, any chief judge would be subject to suit for failure to report wrongs by a judge alleged by any disgruntled litigant. Plaintiffs’ attempt to sue the Judicial Defendants for failing to prescribe specific details of how judges should perform judicial functions is a thinlyveiled attempt to circumvent judicial immunity. The undersigned finds the Judicial Defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity and recommends dismissal as to claims asserted against them.
2. Quasi-Judicial Immunity Defendants argue that Koon is similarly shielded by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. The doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity has been adopted and made applicable to court personnel, including clerks of court, law enforcement officers, and others who enforce court orders, because of “the ‘danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly, will vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts[.]’” Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 1989)). “Officials whose duties are comparable to those of judges or prosecutors” are, like judges, entitled to absolute immunity. Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 1999); see Goldstein v. Moatz, 364 F.3d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs argue that they do not sue Koon for arresting and incarcerating them pursuant to the bench warrants, noting they have not sued the individual deputies that
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arrested them. [ECF No. 66 at 40]. Instead, similar to their arguments concerning the Judicial Defendants, Plaintiffs argue that they sue Koon for his “exercise of administrative authority as the head of the [LCSD] to establish the standard operating procedures that directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs unlawful arrest and incarceration.” Id. Specifically, Plaintiffs complain of the following alleged actions of Koon: (1) to prioritize the execution of payment bench warrants at people’s homes, during traffic and pedestrian stops, and elsewhere, including by enlisting other law enforcement agencies to locate debtors; (2) to direct LCSD deputies and LCDC staff to inform bench warrant arrestees that the only way to avoid incarceration is to pay in full the amount of money identified on a bench warrant; (3) to direct LCDC staff to book people arrested on bench warrants as soon as they can verify that an arrestee is unable to pay the full amount of fines and fees identified on the face of the bench warrant; and (4) to direct, supervise, and train LCSD deputies and LCDC staff, who allegedly systematically failed to notify bench warrant arrestees of their right to request counsel and to a hearing on ability to pay and representation by counsel. Id. at 41–42.
Just as for the Judicial Defendants, allowing Plaintiffs to sue Koon in this matter would effectively abolish the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. Plaintiffs’ reasons for suing Koon is illustrative of the underlying reasons for the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, i.e., to prevent them from becoming a “lightning rod for harassing litigation aimed at judicial orders.” Valdez v. City and County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 1989) (internal quotes omitted) (finding sheriff and deputies absolutely immune for enforcing facially valid court order); see also Fowler v. Alexander, 478 F.2d
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694, 696 (4th Cir. 1973) (finding jailer immune for confining plaintiff pursuant to order of court). Plaintiffs have not alleged Koon or his deputies committed any constitutional violation independently of their actions in executing court-ordered bench warrants. Plaintiffs have also failed to identify how any of Koon’s alleged administrative actions deprived them of their constitutional rights.
Therefore, the undersigned recommends Koon be dismissed from this case, as he is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity.
3. Immunity for Injunctive Relief To the extent the district judge finds that prospective relief is not moot as discussed supra, the immune defendants are also entitled to immunity from injunctive relief. The common law doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity do not extend to actions for declaratory or injunctive relief. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540-42 (1984). But the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bar injunctive relief against a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has addressed whether § 1983 protects quasi-judicial actors, but the weight of authority has found immunity from such actions. See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999); Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272, 1286–87 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Gilbert v. Ferry, 401 F.3d 411, 414 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2005) (dicta); Pelletier v. Rhode Island, No. 07-186S, 2008 WL 5062162, at *5–6 (D.R.I. Nov. 26, 2008); Cannon v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 2008 WL 269519, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2008); Von
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Staich v. Schwarzenegger, No. 04-2167, 2006 WL 2715276 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2006). In light of the weight of authority above, the undersigned finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief against the Judicial Defendants and Koon and recommends those claims be dismissed.
C. Madsen Defendants argue that suit against public defender Madsen in his official capacity is essentially a suit against Lexington County and he should be dismissed as duplicative. Plaintiffs concede that their damages claim against Madsen is functionally equivalent to their damages claim against Lexington County. [ECF No. 66, n.4]. Madsen is sued only in his official capacity. Official-capacity suits represent an alternative way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Here, the parties do not dispute that Madsen is an agent of Lexington County. Because Plaintiffs have asserted the same causes of action against Lexington County and Madsen, the claims against Madsen are duplicative, and the undersigned recommends Madsen be dismissed from the case. D. Lexington County (Damages for Failure to Afford Assistance of Counsel)5 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ damages claims against Lexington County based on underfunding of the public defender system are barred for lack of causation because a judge could appoint a member of the bar to represent an indigent person if the public defender system did not exist. [ECF No. 50-1]. In support, Defendants cite to S.C. Code
5 Plaintiffs’ other damages claims are against immune or duplicative defendants, which the undersigned addressed, supra.
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Ann. § 17-3-10, which provides in relevant part: “Any person entitled to counsel under the Constitution of the United States shall be so advised and if it is determined that the person is financially unable to retain counsel then counsel shall be provided upon order of the appropriate judge unless such person voluntarily and intelligently waives his right thereto.”
The undersigned finds that the statute does not address whether the court may appoint a member of the bar for indigent defendants and therefore is not relevant to causation. The undersigned recommends that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their damages claim against Lexington County for failure to afford assistance of counsel be denied without prejudice. III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the court: (1) deny Plaintiffs’ motion to certify class [ECF No. 21]; (2) grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to declaratory and injunctive relief [ECF No. 29]; and (3) deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ damages claim against Lexington County for failure to afford counsel and grant the motion as to all other claims [ECF No. 50].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

February 5, 2018 Columbia, South Carolina

Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge

The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note). Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court
901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201 Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).
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 3:17-cv-01426-MBS-SVH Date Filed 03/29/18 Entry Number 84 Page 1 of 29

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Twanda Marshinda Brown; Sasha Monique Darby;

)

Cayeshia Cashel Johnson; Amy Marie Palacios;

)

Nora Ann Corder; Xavier Larry Goodwin; and

)

Raymond Wright, Jr., on behalf of themselves and

)

all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

)

vs.

)

)

Lexington County, South Carolina; Gary Reinhart, in

)

his individual capacity; Rebecca Adams, in her official )

and individual capacities as the Chief Judge for

)

Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in

)

Lexington County and in her official capacity as the Judge )

of the Irmo Magistrate Court; Albert John Dooley, III, in )

his official capacity as the Associate Chief Judge for

)

Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in

)

Lexington County; Bryan Koon, in his official capacity as )

the Lexington County Sheriff; and Robert Madsen, in his )

official capacity as the Circuit Public Defender for the )

Eleventh Judicial Circuit of South Carolina,

)

)

Defendants.

)

________________________________________________)

C/A No. 3:17-cv-1426-MBS OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Twanda Marshinda Brown; Sasha Monique Darby; Cayeshia Cashel Johnson;

Amy Marie Palacios; Nora Ann Corder; Xavier Larry Goodwin; and Raymond Wright, Jr.

(hereinafter collectively “Plaintiffs”), brought the underlying action against Defendant Lexington

County of South Carolina (hereinafter “Lexington County”); Defendants Gary Reinhart,1 Rebecca

1 Defendant Gary Reinhart served as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County from 2004 through June 27, 2017. Second Amended Compl. ¶ 27. Defendant Gary Reinhart is currently a Magistrate Judge for Lexington County, South Carolina. Id.
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Adams,2 and Albert John Dooley, III,3 as former or current Judges for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County and the Irmo Magistrate Court (hereinafter “Judicial Defendants”); Defendant Bryan Koon as the Lexington County Sheriff (hereinafter “Koon”);4 and Defendant Robert Madsen as the Circuit Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of South Carolina (hereinafter “Madsen”) (hereinafter collectively “Defendants”).5 Plaintiffs allege violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and of their constitutional rights under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments because they were denied the opportunity to have counsel appointed or otherwise informed of their rights. Plaintiffs seek class certification, damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 73.02, D.S.C., this matter was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges for pretrial handling. This matter is now before the court on the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation filed on February 5, 2018, recommending that the court: (1) deny Plaintiffs’ motion to certify class, ECF No. 21; (2) grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to declaratory and injunctive relief, ECF No. 29; (3) deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ damages claims against Lexington County for failure to afford counsel and grant the motion as to all other claims, ECF No. 50.
2 Defendant Rebecca Adams served as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County, South Carolina from December 20, 2013 to June 27, 2017. Second Amended Compl. ¶ 28. Defendant Adams currently serves as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County and as the Judge of the Irmo Magistrate Court. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. 3 Defendant Albert John Dooley, III currently serves as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County, South Carolina. Second Amended Compl. Id. ¶ 30. 4 Defendant Bryan Koon serves as the elected Lexington County Sheriff; the Chief Law Enforcement Office of the Lexington County Sheriff Department; and the Chief Administrator of the Detention Center. Second Amended Compl. ¶ 31. 5 Defendant Robert Madsen, is the Circuit Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in South Carolina that includes Lexington County. Second Amended Compl. ¶ 32.
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs separately were arrested and incarcerated for a period ranging from seven to sixty-three days because they failed to pay magistrate court fees and fines. ECF No. 48, Second Amended Compl. ¶ 2.6 Plaintiffs allege eight causes of actions against Defendants in their official and individual capacities. Id. ¶¶ 451-535. The relevant facts concerning each Plaintiff are as follows:
1. Twanda Marshinda Brown On March 15, 2016, Plaintiff Twanda Marshinda Brown (hereinafter “Brown”) was ticketed by a Lexington County Sheriff’s Department (hereinafter “LCSD”) officer for driving on a suspended license (DUS, 2nd offense) and for driving with “no tag light.” Id. at ¶ 141. On April 12, 2016, Brown appeared before Defendant Adams in the Irmo Magistrate Court and pleaded guilty to both charges. Id. ¶¶ 142, 144. Defendant Adams sentenced Brown to $237.50 in fines and fees for driving without tag lights and $2,100 in fines and fees for the DUS, 2nd offense. Id. ¶ 145. Brown claims she advised Defendant Adams that she did not have any money to pay that day and that Defendant Adams created a payment schedule of $100 each month. Id. ¶ 146. Brown informed Defendant Adams that she could afford to pay only $50 a month, but Defendant Adams required Brown to pay $100 each month. Id. ¶¶ 147, 148. Brown alleges that Defendant Adams threatened to jail her for 90 days if she did not make the $100 payment each month. Id. ¶ 150. Brown made payments beginning on May 12, 2016 through October 4, 2016, which satisfied the court fines and fees for the tag light offense and contributed towards her fines and fees for the DUS, 2nd offense. Id. ¶ 159. After October 4, 2016, Brown could no longer afford to make payments and a bench warrant for nonpayment of court fines and fees was issued on January 12, 2017. Id. ¶¶ 160, 163.
6 The Second Amended Complaint filed on October 19, 2017, is the operative complaint in this case. ECF No. 48.
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The bench warrant indicated that Brown had a “sentence imposed/balance due of $1,907.63 or 90 days” and that Brown would be jailed “until he/she shall be thereof discharged by due course of law.” Id. ¶ 163. Brown was arrested on the bench warrant on February 18, 2017, and was informed that she could pay $1,907.63 or serve 90 days in jail. Id. ¶ 165, 167. Brown served 57 days in jail and was released on April 15, 2017. Id. ¶ 171.
Brown alleges that she did not know nor did Defendant Adams inform her that she had the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney before pleading guilty, and the right to seek a waiver of any public defender application fees due to financial hardship. Id. ¶ 143.
2. Sasha Monique Darby On August 4, 2016, Sasha Monique Darby (hereinafter “Darby”) was ticketed for assault and battery in the third degree for hitting her roommate. Id. ¶ 184. Darby appeared in Irmo Magistrate Court and was handed a “Trial Information and Plea Sheet” along with instructions to “check a box.” Id. ¶¶ 186, 187. Darby alleges that because the “Trial Information and Plea Sheet” indicated that an application for a court-appointed attorney required a “$40 non-refundable fee,” she placed a check mark next to the statement, “I waive my right to have an attorney present.” Id. ¶ 188. Darby also placed a check mark next to the option “not guilty.” Id. ¶ 189. Darby appeared before Defendant Adams who found Darby guilty of assault and battery in the third degree and asked her whether she wanted to serve 30 days in jail or pay a fine. Id. ¶¶ 195, 196. Darby indicated that she would pay a fine; however, after discovering that the fine would be $1,000, she returned to the courtroom to speak with Defendant Adams. Id. ¶¶ 196, 200-01. Defendant Adams refused Darby’s proposed payment plan of $100 to $120 a month and ordered Darby to pay $150 a month. Id. ¶¶ 201-02. Darby paid $200 on the date of the court hearing and $150 payment on October 4, 2017. Id. ¶¶ 203, 205. After October 4, 2017, Darby could not afford to make any further payments
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and a bench warrant was issued for her arrest on December 6, 2016. Id. ¶¶ 206, 208. Darby was arrested on the bench warrant on March 28, 2017, and informed that she could pay $680 or serve 20 days in jail. Id. ¶ 213. Darby served 20 days in jail and was released on April 17, 2017. Id. ¶ 215.
Darby alleges that Defendant Adams did not inform her that she had the right to request assistance of a court-appointed attorney and the right to seek waiver of any fees related to the application for a public defender due to financial hardship. Id. ¶ 192. Darby alleges that Defendant Adams did not engage in a colloquy with Darby to determine whether any waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. at 193. Moreover, Darby alleges that she was not informed that if her financial circumstances changed in the future or if she was unable to pay the $150 required each month, that she could request a court hearing on her ability to pay and alternatives to incarceration. Id. at 204.
3. Cayeshia Cashel Johnson On August 21, 2016, Cayeshia Cashel Johnson (hereinafter “Johnson”) was in a minor car accident while driving her mother’s car from Columbia to Myrtle Beach. Id. ¶ 218. Johnson was charged with simple possession of marijuana and the following five traffic offenses: (1) uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense; (2) operating a motor vehicle without license in possession; (3) improper start of vehicle; (4) violation of beginner permit; and (5) failure to return license plate and registration upon loss of insurance, 1st offense. Id. ¶ 220. Johnson claims that one week before her court hearing on September 22, 2016, she called the Central Traffic Court and informed the court staff that she could not attend the hearing because she lives in Myrtle Beach and lacked transportation to Lexington County. Id. ¶¶ 221, 223. Johnson was advised that lack of transportation was not a valid reason for missing a court hearing and that her case would be tried
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in her absence. Id. at 224. Johnson inquired on whether she could arrange for a payment plan for the fines and was told that “the only way to have a payment plan is to talk to the Judge.” Id. ¶ 225. Johnson claims she left her work and cell phone number and was assured that someone would contact her; however, Johnson did not receive a response. Id. ¶¶ 226, 227.
On September 22, 2016, the Central Traffic Court tried Johnson’s case in her absence and found her guilty of all six charges. Id. ¶ 228. On September 26, 2016, the Central Traffic Court issued a bench warrant for Johnson to pay $1,287.50 or serve 80 days in jail for the following charges: (1) uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense; (2) operating a motor vehicle without license in possession; and (3) simple possession of marijuana. Id. ¶ 230. On February 13, 2017, Johnson was arrested in Myrtle Beach and jailed for 55 days. Id. ¶¶ 231, 233, 238.
Johnson alleges that she did not receive any notice that she had been tried in absentia; and convicted for one misdemeanor and five traffic offenses, in which she was sentenced to serve jail time or pay fines for three of those offenses and sentenced to pay fines and fees on the other three offenses. Id. ¶ 229. Johnson claims she has an outstanding balance on three offenses in the amount of $905 plus $100 in mandatory costs with the Central Traffic Court. Id. ¶¶243-45.
4. Amy Marie Palacios Sometime in June 2015, Amy Marie Palacios (hereinafter “Palacios”) had her driver’s license suspended for failure to pay a speeding ticket incurred earlier that year. Id. ¶ 250. On October 28, 2016, Palacios was stopped by state troopers at a roadblock and ticketed for driving on a suspended license (DUS, 1st offense). Id. ¶¶ 252, 254. The day before her court hearing, Palacios contacted the Central Traffic Court to reschedule the hearing due to a conflict with her work schedule and was advised that her employer could fax an affidavit to the court explaining why she could not attend the hearing. Id. ¶¶ 256, 257. On the same day, Palacios’ employer faxed
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an affidavit explaining her work schedule and requesting an extension. Id. ¶ 258. Palacios alleges that no one contacted her in response to her request to reschedule the hearing. Id. ¶ 259. On November 10, 2016, Palacios was tried in her absence in Central Traffic Court and found guilty of DUS, 1st offense. Id. ¶ 260. On November 15, 2016, the court issued a bench warrant requiring payment of $647.50 or serve 30 days in jail. Id. ¶ 262. On February 25, 2017, Palacios was arrested on the bench warrant and served 21 days in jail. Id. ¶¶ 263, 275.
Palacios alleges that she did not receive any notice that she had been tried in absentia; convicted of a traffic offense; and sentenced to serve jail time or pay fines and fees for the offense. Id. ¶ 261.
5. Nora Ann Corder In July 2016, Nora Ann Corder (hereinafter Corder) was ticketed for neglecting to return her license plate and registration upon the loss of insurance. Id. ¶ 284. Corder was ordered to pay a $230 fine and her driver’s license was suspended. Id. ¶ 285. On January 27, 2017, Corder was ticketed by a LCSD Deputy for DUS, 1st offense; violation of temporary license plates for vehicle to be registered in another state; and uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense. Id. ¶ 289. Her car was also impounded. Id. ¶ 290. On February 15, 2017, Corder appeared in the Lexington Magistrate Court and was asked by the Deputy who issued the tickets about what she had “gotten done.” Id. ¶ 292, 293. Although Corder did not understand what the Deputy was referring to she explained, she did not have the money to pay the tickets to get her driver’s license reinstated; car insurance; or get her car out of impound. Id. ¶ 292, 293. The Deputy sought a continuance on her case so that “she can take care of what she needed to take care of.” Id. ¶ 294. On March 22, 2017, Corder appeared in the Lexington Magistrate Court and spoke to the same Deputy about her inability to reinstate her driver’s license and to obtain car insurance. Id. ¶
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297. The Deputy advised her that if she could reinstate her driver’s license and car insurance, he would drop certain charges or ask the court to reduce the amount she would have to pay in fines and fees. Id. The Deputy continued her case to April 19, 2017. Id. ¶ 298.
On April 19, 2017, Corder appeared in Lexington County Magistrate Court and paid the $230 fine incurred in July 2016 for neglecting to return her license plate and registration upon the loss of insurance. Id. ¶ 305. Corder informed the Deputy that she had recently secured a new job and still could not afford to reinstate her driver’s license or car insurance. Id. ¶ 307. The Deputy informed Corder that he would continue her case for the last time until May 17, 2017. Id.
On May 17, 2017, Corder failed to appear and was found guilty in her absence on all three charges. Id. ¶¶ 310-311. A bench warrant was issued for her arrest that required Corder to pay $1,320 or serve 90 days in jail. Id. ¶ 313. Corder was arrested a week later after seeking to file a dispute on an eviction action in Lexington Magistrate Court. Id. ¶ 319. Corder was jailed for 54 days and released on July 19, 2017. Id. ¶ 223.
Corder claims that she was never instructed on how to prepare for a continued court hearing; was not informed of her right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney; nor informed of her rights concerning counsel or her right to jury trial on any of the three occasions in which she appeared in court. Id. ¶ 309. Moreover, Corder claims that she did not receive any notice that she had been tried in absentia; convicted of three traffic offenses; and sentenced to serve jail time or pay fines and fees for the three traffic offenses. Id. ¶ 312.
6. Xavier Larry Goodwin On July 15, 2016, Xavier Larry Goodwin (hereinafter “Goodwin”) received five traffic tickets during a traffic stop: (1) DUS, 2nd offense; (2) uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense; (3) seatbelt violation; (4) temporary license place – time limit to replace; and (5) use of
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license plate other than for vehicle which issued. Id. ¶ 326. On August 9, 2016, Goodwin was tried in his absence and found guilty on all five charges. Id. ¶ 328. On August 10, 2016, the Central Traffic Court issued a bench warrant requiring Goodwin to pay $1,710 or serve 90 days on the charges of DUS, 2nd offense and uninsured motor vehicle fee violation, 1st offense. Id. ¶ 330.
On February 2, 2017, Goodwin was ticketed for DUS, 3rd offense and served with the bench warrant issued on August 10, 2016. Id. ¶¶ 331-335. A bond hearing was held on February 3, 2017, for his DUS, 3rd offense charge, in which Goodwin claims that he was not informed of his right to request the assistance of court-appointed counsel or his right to seek waiver of any public defender application fee. Id. ¶ 336. Goodwin also claims that during his transportation to the court, he asked a Lexington County Detention Center (hereinafter “LCDC”) officer whether he could request a public defender. Id. ¶ 338. The LCDC officer responded that the screening process could take a long time and that his incarceration could be extended as a result. Id. Goodwin pleaded guilty to the charge of DUS, 3rd offense and was sentenced by Defendant Adams to 90 days in jail and $2,100 in fines and fees. Id. ¶¶ 341-42. Goodwin was directed to set up a payment plan within 30 days of his release from jail. Id. ¶ 343. Goodwin was detained at LCDC for 63 days for nonpayment of fines and fees and released on April 7, 2017. Id. ¶ 345-347. Upon being released, Goodwin was transported to the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center in Richland County to serve time on bench warrant issued in Richland County and was released on April 26, 2017. Id.
On May 5, 2017, Goodwin returned to the Irmo Magistrate Court and established a $100 monthly payment plan on the outstanding balance of $2,100 in fines and fees. Id. ¶ 351. Goodwin alleges that he faces imminent and substantial risk that the Irmo Magistrate Court will issue a bench warrant for his arrest unless he pays $2,063 – the outstanding balance owed for the DUS, 3rd offense conviction. Id. ¶ 359.
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Goodwin claims that Defendant Adams did not inform him that he had the right to request the assistance of a court-appointed attorney before pleading guilty and the right to seek a waiver of any fees related to the application for a public defender due to financial hardship. Id.
7. Raymond Wright, Jr. On July 1, 2016, Raymond Wright, Jr. (hereinafter “Wright”) was ticketed for DUS, 1st offense. Id. ¶ 363. Wright pleaded guilty on July 26, 2016, and was required to pay $666.93 in fines and fees. Id. ¶ 336. He established a payment plan of $50 per month and made payments from July 26, 2016 through December 7, 2016. Id. ¶¶ 369-70. After December 7, 2016, Wright could no longer afford to make payments and was summoned for a show cause hearing on April 19, 2017. Id. ¶¶ 373-74. At the hearing, Wright was informed that he would be jailed if he did not pay the full $416.93 balance within 10 days. Id. ¶ 378. Wright was unable to pay the full balance and on May 2, 2017, the Central Traffic Court issued a bench warrant for his arrest requiring him to pay $416.93 or serve 10 days in jail. Id. ¶ 381-382. On July 25, 2017, Wright was arrested and incarcerated for seven days until August 1, 2017. Id. ¶ 390. Wright alleges that a Central Traffic Court Judge made a general announcement that all defendants had a right to an attorney. Id. ¶¶ 375. Wright alleges that the Judge7 did not inform him that he had the right to request assistance of a court-appointed attorney and the right to seek waiver of any fees related to the application for a public defender due to financial hardship. Id. ¶ 375. Moreover, Wright alleges that the Judge did not engage in a colloquy with him to determine whether any waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. ¶ 376.
7 In Plaintiffs’ complaint, Plaintiff Wright does not specify the name of the presiding Judge.
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On June 1, 2017, Plaintiffs brought the present lawsuit against Defendants alleging numerous constitutional violations. ECF No. 1. On June 2, 2017, Plaintiff Goodwin filed a motion to certify class on behalf of himself and the other Plaintiffs. ECF No. 5. On July 21, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against all Defendants.8 ECF No. 20. An amended motion to certify class was also filed on July 21, 2017. ECF No. 21. In the amended motion to certify class, Plaintiff Goodwin and Wright, Jr., seek to be appointed as Class Representatives and to appoint the ACLU Foundation, the ACLU of South Carolina Foundation, and Terrell Marshall Law Group, PLLC, as Class Counsel. ECF No. 21 at 2-3. Plaintiff Goodwin and Wright also seek certification of the following Class: “All indigent people who currently owe, or in the future will owe, fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution in cases handled by Lexington County Magistrate Court.” Id. at 2. Plaintiffs seek class certification only for purposes of Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. On August 18, 2017, Defendants collectively filed a motion for partial summary judgment concerning Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.9 ECF No. 29. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot considering that six of the seven Plaintiffs’ sentences have been satisfied and no longer present a live case or controversy.
8 The amended complaint seeks to include allegations that Plaintiff Goodwin and Wright currently face an imminent threat of arrest and incarceration as they cannot afford to pay fines and fees due to Lexington County Magistrate Court. ECF No. 20 at 2. On August 17, 2017, Defendants filed an answer to Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. ECF Nos. 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28. 9 The following five claims seek declaratory and injunctive relief: Cause of Action 1 for incarceration without predeprivation ability to pay hearing by Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright; Cause of Action 2 for failure to afford assistance of counsel by Goodwin and Wright; Cause of Action 3 for unconstitutional seizure by Goodwin and Wright; Cause of Action 7 for incarceration without pre-deprivation ability to pay by Goodwin; and Cause of Action 8 for failure to afford assistance of counsel by Goodwin. ECF No. 20 at 91-118, First Amended Complaint. At the time, Defendants filed their motion Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint was the operative complaint. On October 18, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint and this complaint is the current operative complaint. ECF No. 48. Defendants filed answers to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint on November 1, 2017 and November 2, 2017, respectively. ECF Nos. 52, 53, 54, 55.
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ECF No. 29-1 at 4. In support thereof, Defendants submitted an Affidavit from Colleen Long, employed as the Deputy Court Administrator for the Lexington County Summary Court, who provided the status of the seven Plaintiffs’ as disclosed in the Lexington County records. ECF No. 29-2, Exhibit 1. Defendants argue that the Affidavit sets forth in detail that the criminal proceedings against the six of the seven Plaintiffs have concluded. ECF No. 29-1 at 3.
Moreover, Defendants argue that, with respect to remaining Plaintiff Goodwin, the doctrine of abstention set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), prohibits the court from intervening in his ongoing state criminal proceeding. ECF No. 29-1 at 6. Defendants contend that all three Younger requirements are satisfied in this case: (1) Plaintiff Goodwin’s sentence for the DUS, 3rd offense has not been concluded; (2) violations of state traffic laws implicate an important state interest – the safety of its roadways; and (3) if a bench warrant is issued for Plaintiff Goodwin’s arrest, he would have the adequate opportunity to raise some, if not all, of his current challenges in the context of the state proceeding. Id. at 7. Therefore, Defendants request that Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief be dismissed. Id. at 8.
Also on August 18, 2017, Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion to certify class. ECF No. 30. Defendants assert that the court’s consideration of Plaintiffs’ motion to certify class should be postponed until the issues raised in Defendants’ summary judgment motion have been resolved. Id. at 1. Defendants argue that if “Defendants’ summary judgment motion is granted on the issue of the absence of a case or controversy, it goes without saying that a class of such plaintiffs cannot be certified.” Id. at 2. Defendants further argue that whether Younger abstention applies should be addressed prior to any determination of Plaintiffs’ class certification. Id. at 2. In support of this argument, Defendants cite to case law that instruct district courts to reach the abstention issue first and then decide on the class certification. Id. at 3. Defendants contend that if
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their summary judgment motion is granted “there is no need to consider class certification at all.” Id.
On September 11, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, which included Affidavits from Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright. ECF No. 35. Plaintiffs Goodwin and Wright assert the requirements for standing are satisfied because they present a live case and controversy. Id. at 19. Plaintiff Goodwin and Wright argue that when the complaint was filed they faced a real imminent threat of injury on being arrested upon nonpayment of court fees. Id. at 19-24. Thus, Plaintiff Goodwin and Wright contend they have standing to assert claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 24. Plaintiff Goodwin further alleges that his claims are not moot because he still owes fines and fees to Lexington County Magistrate Court and therefore the court may proceed to certify the class on this basis alone. Id. Plaintiff Wright asserts that although he no longer owes fines and fees to Lexington County Magistrate Court, he can pursue his claims for prospective relief on behalf of the proposed class pursuant to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), which provides an exception to the mootness doctrine by way of allowing claims to remain live until the court certifies the class. ECF No. 35 at 25.
With respect to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Younger doctrine, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants mischaracterized the scope of the doctrine and incorrectly applied it to this case. Id. at 29. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants ignored the recent Supreme Court’s decision in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013), that discussed the Younger abstention and federal court jurisdiction when applying the Younger doctrine. Id. at 30. Plaintiffs claim Sprint limited the application of Younger to three “exceptional circumstances” that do not apply to this case. Id. In applying Younger, Plaintiffs claim that (1)
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there is no “ongoing state criminal proceeding” against Plaintiff Goodwin because he was convicted and sentenced with no further pending criminal proceedings at the present time, id. at 37; (2) the important state interests have been satisfied because Plaintiff Goodwin has already been convicted and sentenced to jail time for DUS, 3rd offense, id. at 38; and (3) Plaintiff Goodwin does not have the opportunity to raise his claims in state court. Id. Therefore, Plaintiffs request that the court deny Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. Id. at 39.
Defendants filed a reply on September 22, 2017, arguing that, even if Plaintiffs’ claims are categorized as “inherently transitory” under Gerstein, Plaintiffs’ claims do not overcome the Younger abstention principles. ECF No. 39 at 2. Defendants concede that Plaintiff Goodwin’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief is the only claim that has standing, but is barred by the Younger doctrine. Id. at 4. Defendants maintain that the requirements of Younger have been satisfied and Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden on this issue. Id. at 8-9. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff Goodwin still has an opportunity to raise his claims in the state court. Id. at 910.
On September 22, 2017, Defendants filed a supplemental motion in support of their motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. ECF No. 40. Defendants attached a Memorandum issued by Chief Judge Donald W. Beatty to Magistrate Judges and Municipal Judges on September 15, 2017, that provided as follows:
“Absent a waiver of counsel, or the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant, summary court judges shall not impose a sentence of jail time, and are limited to imposing a sentence of a fine only for those defendants, if convicted. When imposing a fine, consideration should be given to a defendant’s ability to pay. If a fine is imposed, an unrepresented defendant should be advised of the amount of the fine and when the fine must be paid. This directive would also be apply to those defendants who fail to appear at trial and are tried in their absence.” ECF No. 40, Exhibit 1.
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Defendants argue that the Fourth Circuit has held that “a government entity’s change of policy renders a challenge moot when the government entity ‘has not asserted its right to enforce [the challenged policy] at any future time.” Id. at 3. (citing Porter v. Clarke, 852 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted)). Therefore, Defendants assert that the Chief Justice’s Memorandum renders moot Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and those claims should be dismissed. ECF No. 40 at 4.
In response, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendants’ supplemental motion on October 13, 2017. ECF No. 43. Plaintiffs argue that (1) Defendants must meet a heavy burden under the voluntary cessation doctrine to prove that the Chief Justice’s Memorandum moots Plaintiffs’ prospective relief claims, id. at 16; (2) Defendants fail to demonstrate that the County’s Magistrate Courts have terminated their conduct and that the conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur, id. at 19; (3) evidence in the record raises questions of material fact concerning whether Defendants’ conduct continues to result in unlawful arrest and incarceration of indigent people who cannot pay money owed to the County’s Magistrate Courts, id. at 29-31; and (4) additional discovery is necessary to defend against Defendants’ premature motion, id. at 31-35.
On October 30, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to stay consideration of the supplemental motion pending a ruling on Defendants’ original motion for partial summary judgment filed on August 18, 2017. ECF No. 49. Defendants state that “Plaintiffs’ response to the motion indicates that discovery about the application in practice of the Chief Justice’s memorandum might be necessary in order to resolve the supplemental motion, which is not the case for the original motion.” Id. at 2-3. In addition, Defendants informed the court that South Carolina Court Administration has scheduled a training session for Summary Court Judges to ensure compliance with Chief Justice Beatty’s Memorandum and attached a copy of the training agenda. Id. at 1-2,
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Exhibit 1. Defendants contend that this supplemental motion “could be taken up at a future time if necessary, if the original motion for summary judgment . . . is not granted, or if events following the training session clarify any questions about the implementation of Chief Justice Beatty’s memorandum.” Id. at 3.
In response, Plaintiffs requested that the court deny and strike Defendants’ supplemental motion for summary judgment on November 13, 2017. ECF No. 58 at 4. Plaintiffs further requested that the court allow discovery to proceed. Id. at 5. Defendants withdrew their supplemental motion and their motion to stay proceedings with leave to refile at a later time on November 21, 2017. ECF No. 62.
On October 31, 2017, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ damages claims. ECF No. 50. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ causes of action numbered 4, 5, and 6 seeking damages should be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) if Plaintiffs’ claims were to be recognized, such result would necessarily imply that their criminal convictions are invalid, and therefore those claims are barred by Heck v. Humphry, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)10 and by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine;11 ECF No. 50-1 at 4-8; (2) Plaintiffs’ claims against the three Judicial Defendants and Defendant Sheriff Koon are barred by judicial or quasi-judicial immunity, id. at 9; (3) even if these Defendants “had created a ‘policy’ governing the handling of cases such as those of the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ damage claims against [them] are barred by legislative
10 The Supreme Court in Heck held that “[w]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. 11 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). See Davani v. Virginia Dept. of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 717 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that the RookerFeldman doctrine generally bars district courts from sitting in direct review of state court decisions. The prohibition extends not only to issues actually decided by a state court but also to those that are inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court. A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court decision if success on the federal claims depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.).
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immunity,” id. at 10; (4) that, as a matter of law, Defendants have no authority to prescribe rules or policies for the determination of individual cases along the lines alleged by Plaintiffs’ claims, id. at 11; (5) Plaintiffs’ claims against Lexington County for the alleged underfunding of the public defender system are barred for lack of causation, because Magistrates can still appoint counsel for indigent persons from members of the bar, id. at 14; and (6) Plaintiffs’ damages claim against Defendant Madsen as public defender is a suit against the County itself and should be dismissed as duplicative, id. at 14.
On November 29, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Damages Claims along with Affidavits from all seven Plaintiffs. ECF No. 66. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ reliance on Heck is misplaced for two reasons: (1) Plaintiffs had no practical access to habeas relief while in custody, id. at 27; and (2) success on Plaintiffs’ damages claims does not invalidate Plaintiffs’ guilty pleas, convictions, or sentence, id. at 29. In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because Plaintiffs do not attack their underlying guilty pleas, convictions, or sentences. ECF No. 66 at 34. Instead, Plaintiffs’ damages claims dispute the “post-sentencing procedures used to arrest and incarcerate them when they could not pay money in violation of their rights to due process, equal protection, counsel, and freedom from unreasonable seizures.” Id.
With respect to judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, Plaintiffs contend that “Defendants fail to demonstrate that Defendants Reinhart and Adams acted in a judicial, rather than administrative, capacity when engaged in the challenged conduct.” Id. at 36. Plaintiffs assert that Plaintiffs’ damages claim against Defendant Reinhart and Adams are for their actions in their administrative capacities as Chief Judge and Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Lexington County Summary Courts and not in their judicial capacity. Id. at 37. Similarly,
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Plaintiffs argue that their claims against Defendant Koon are not for arresting Plaintiffs, but for his “administrative authority as the head of the Lexington County Sheriff’s Department to establish standard operating procedures that directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs’ unlawful arrest and incarceration.” Id. at 40. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants Reinhart, Adams, and Koon fail to show that they acted in a legislative capacity when engaged in the challenged conduct.” Id. at 42. Based on these reasons, Plaintiffs request that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ damages claims be denied and the case proceed to discovery. Id. at 50-54.
Defendants filed a reply on December 13, 2017, maintaining that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. ECF No. 70 at 5-10. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden on the application of Heck and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. Id. at 15-17. In addition, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not made a showing that would entitle them to engage in discovery. Id. at 19-21.
On February 5, 2018, the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation recommending that the court: (1) deny Plaintiffs’ motion to certify class, ECF No. 21; (2) grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to declaratory and injunctive relief, ECF No. 29; (3) deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ damages claims against Lexington County for failure to afford counsel and grant the motion as to all other claims, ECF No. 50. Pursuant to Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005), the parties were advised of the right to file objections to the Report and Recommendation and the possible consequences if they failed to timely file written objections to the Report and Recommendation. Both parties filed objections on March 2, 2018, ECF Nos. 79, 80, and filed replies on March 22, 2018 and March 23, 2018. ECF Nos. 81, 82.
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW A. Magistrate Judge’s Finding in Report and Recommendation
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the court. Matthews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The court reviews de novo only those portions of a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation to which specific objections are filed, and reviews those portions which are not objected to – including those portions to which only “general and conclusory” objections have been made – for clear error. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983); Opriano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 77 (4th Cir. 1982). The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
B. Motion for Summary Judgment Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A genuine question of material fact exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, the court finds that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Newport News Holding Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, 650 F.3d 423, 434 (4th Cir. 2011).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 12324 (4th Cir. 1990). The non-moving party may not oppose a motion for summary judgment with
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mere allegations or denials of the movant’s pleading, but instead must “set forth specific facts” demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir. 1991). All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
IV. DISCUSSION A. Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
1. Plaintiffs’ motion to certify class and Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to declaratory and injunctive relief (ECF Nos. 21, ECF No. 29)
First, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiffs’ claims for prospective, injunctive, and declaratory relief are moot. ECF No. 74 at 12. The Magistrate Judge determined that the Memorandum issued by Chief Justice Donald W. Beatty of the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed to all South Carolina Magistrate and Municipal Judges mooted Plaintiffs’ claims, because “no future injury to Plaintiffs is impending, nor have Plaintiffs shown a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy.” Id. at 13 (citing Super Tire Eng’g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 122 (1974) (requiring allegations to show a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant declaratory relief)). The Magistrate Judge acknowledged that Plaintiff Goodwin is still subject to being jailed for failure to pay fines, but has not claimed that he is subject to a live bench warrant. ECF No. 74 at 13 n.3. The Magistrate Judge concluded that absent a showing of a live case or controversy, Plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief should be dismissed as moot, as well as Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification being that it relies on claims for prospective relief.12 Id. at 13. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the court deny
12 Plaintiffs seek class certification only for purposes of Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. ECF No. 21 at 2.
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Plaintiffs’ motion to certify class, ECF No. 21, and grant Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to declaratory and injunctive relief, ECF No. 29.
2. Defendants’ motion for summary on Plaintiffs’ damages claims (ECF No. 50) i. Judicial Defendants
Second, the Magistrate Judge found that all Judicial Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity. ECF No. 74 at 14. The Magistrate Judge noted that, although Plaintiffs contend that Judicial Defendants are sued for actions they took in their administrative capacities as Chief Judges and Associate Chief Judges, “a closer analysis of Plaintiffs’ argument reveals that Plaintiffs do not sue the Judicial Defendants for their actions, but only for alleged omissions, which Plaintiffs couch as ‘decisions’ not to act in some way.” Id. The Magistrate Judge found that “the alleged administrative decisions Plaintiffs argue should have been made could only have been made by a judge, evidencing their judicial nature.” Id. at 16. As such, the Magistrate Judge “was not persuaded that an alleged decision, which can only be made by a judge and that affects the adjudication of a criminal proceeding, can be characterized as a non-judicial administrative decision such that the judge should be deprived of judicial immunity.” Id. Thus, the Magistrate Judge determined that “allowing an action to proceed against the Judicial Defendants in this instance would virtually eliminate the doctrine of judicial immunity, as any disgruntled litigant could bypass the barrier of judicial immunity by simply suing the chief judge of a court.” Id. The Magistrate Judge finds that Judicial Defendants are also entitled to immunity from injunctive relief. Id. at 19.
ii. Defendant Koon Third, the Magistrate Judge found that Defendant Koon is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. ECF No. 74 at 17. The Magistrate Judge noted that Plaintiffs assert “that they sue Koon
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for his ‘exercise of administrative authority as the head of the [LCSD] to establish the standard operating procedures that directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs’ unlawful arrest and incarceration.’” Id. at 18. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge noted that “Plaintiffs have not alleged Koon or his deputies committed any constitutional violation independently of their action in executing court-ordered bench warrants . . . or how any of Koon’s alleged administrative actions deprived them of their constitutional rights.” Id. at 19. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Defendant Koon be dismissed as he is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Id.
iii. Defendant Madsen Fourth, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendant Madsen be dismissed as duplicative. ECF No. 74 at 20. The Magistrate Judge found that Defendant Madsen is sued in his official capacity and that “official capacity suits represent an alternative way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Id. at 20 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). The Magistrate Judge determined that “the parties do not dispute that Madsen is an agent of Lexington County.” Id. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge found that “because Plaintiffs have asserted the same causes of action against Lexington County and Madsen, the claims against Madsen are duplicative, and . . . Madsen should be dismissed.” Id. at 20.
iv. Defendant Lexington County Fifth, the Magistrate Judge rejected Defendants’ argument that a damage claim for underfunding the public defender system against Lexington County is “barred based on the lack of causation because a judge could appoint a member of the bar to represent an indigent person if the public defender system did not exist.” Id. at 20. The Magistrate Judge reviewed S.C. Code Ann. § 17-3-10, which provides, in relevant part: “Any person entitled to counsel under the
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Constitution of the United States shall be so advised and if it is determined that the person is financially unable to retain counsel then counsel shall be provided upon order of the appropriate judge unless each person voluntarily and intelligently waives his right thereto.” ECF No. 74 at 21. The Magistrate Judge determined that “the statute does not address whether the court may appoint a member of the bar for indigent defendants and therefore is not relevant to causation.” Id. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their damages claim against Lexington County for failure to afford assistance of counsel be denied without prejudice. Id.
B. Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Report and Recommendation Plaintiffs object to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation on several
grounds. ECF No. 80. First, Plaintiffs argue that their claims for prospective relief remain live following the issuance of Chief Justice’s Memorandum. Id. at 25. Plaintiffs claim there is undisputed evidence showing that after the issuance of Chief Justice Beatty’s Memorandum constitutional violations continue to occur against individuals who are arrested on bench warrants and do not receive an inability to pay hearing before the Magistrate Courts. Id. at 15, 18. Plaintiffs allege that the Chief Justice’s Memorandum does not address the following: (1) two central constitutional violations challenged by Plaintiffs based on the “ongoing, substantial risk that indigent people will be arrested based on warrants unsupported by probable cause,” and “the ongoing, substantial risk that these indigent people will then be automatically incarcerated when they cannot pay in full their debts to the County Magistrate Courts without any pre-deprivation court hearing involving consideration of ability to pay,” Id. at 29; (2) the Memorandum does not bind Defendants’ exercise of administrative and policymaking authority to ensure that violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional amendment rights cannot be expected to recur in Lexington County;
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and (3) the Memorandum does not eliminate the controversy between Plaintiff Goodwin and Defendant Adams “because it does not address the requirements to hold ability to pay hearings and because merely reminding Defendant Adams of constitutional requirements does not ensure she will not violate such requirements in the future.” Id. at 48. Thus, Plaintiffs assert there are issues of material fact that must be addressed with respect to the application of the Memorandum issued by Chief Justice Beatty. Id. at 33.
In addition, Plaintiffs object to the Magistrate Judge’s findings that the doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity shield claims against the Judicial Defendants and Defendant Koon. Id. at 34. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Adams, Dooley, and Koon may be sued in their official capacities as administrators under Ex Parte Young, which provides that “a plaintiff may sue a state actor in his or her official capacity for prospective relief to stop ongoing violations of federal law including 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” ECF No. 80 at 34. Plaintiff argues that Ex Parte Young is applicable to this case because Defendants Adam and Koon are responsible for administering procedures at Magistrate Courts and Defendant Koon is responsible for administering procedures at Lexington County Sheriff Department and the Detention Center. Id. at 35. Thus, Plaintiffs claim that these Defendants are state actors in their administrative capacity and are not entitled to immunity. Id. at 35-36.
Specifically, Plaintiffs argue they “do not challenge any judicial acts or omissions by these Defendants but instead contest their enforcement of county-wide policies in their administrative capacities.” Id. at 36. Plaintiffs noted that “whether judges are proper defendants in a § 1983 action depends on whether they are acting as adjudicators or as administrators, enforcers, or advocators.” ECF No. 80 at 36 (citing Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 2004)). Plaintiffs further noted that “a judicial defendant’s ‘[a]administrative decisions, even though they may be essential
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to the very functioning of the courts, [are] not . . . regarded as judicial acts.’” ECF No. 80 at 36 (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988)). As such, Plaintiffs argue that their “prospective claims challenge deliberative administrative decisions that Defendants Adams and Dooley make in their administrative capacities - decisions to limit Magistrate Court dockets; schedules; and hours of operations as well as requests for County funding for court operations to exclude from Magistrate Court practice any hearings to determine the ability to pay of indigent people subject to payment bench warrants.” ECF No. 80 at 38. Therefore, “[b]ecause Plaintiffs challenge conduct that has nothing to do with judges’ exercise of discretion to adjudicate individual cases, Plaintiffs’ prospective relief claims Defendants Adams and Dooley do not fall within Section 1983’s bar on injunctive relief.” Id. at 40. Likewise, Plaintiffs argue Defendant Koon “is sued for administrative conduct that extends well beyond the mere execution of bench warrants,” and do not bar injunctive relief claims against Defendant Koon. Id. at 41.
Plaintiffs request that the court allow the case to proceed to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)13 discovery on whether the challenged conduct and whether Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual Defendants concern administrative, rather than judicial or quasi-judicial conduct. Id. at 43. Plaintiffs “request time to conduct discovery on whether Defendants ceased the challenged conduct following issuance of the Chief Justice’s Memorandum.” Id. at 44. In support thereof, Plaintiffs’ assert that they “have put forward evidence that raises genuine questions of material fact and thus precludes summary judgment for the individual Defendants on Plaintiffs’ damages claims based on judicial and quasi-judicial immunity.” Id. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that they “have submitted a request for production of records concerning policies, procedures . . . and
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) provides that “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specific reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,” the court may, inter alia, permit the requested discovery and defer considering the motion or deny it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
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training on the imposition of court fines and fees . . . to defeat summary judgment on the basis of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity.” Id. at 45. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue the Magistrate Judge erred as a matter of law by not addressing Plaintiffs’ timely requests for Rule 56(d) discovery. Id.
Lastly, Plaintiffs claim that neither § 1983 nor judicial immunity bars Plaintiff Goodwin’s declaratory relief against Defendant Adam for conduct in her judicial capacity. Id. at 46. Plaintiff Goodwin asserts that Defendant Adam’s ongoing judicial conduct places him at continuing and foreseeable risk of being arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment without a pre-deprivation court hearing and his inability to pay without the assistance of court-appointed counsel. Id. at 46. Plaintiffs request that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be denied and that the court rule on Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Id. at 47.
C. Defendant Lexington County Objections to the Report and Recommendation Defendant Lexington County contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending
dismissal of the claims against all Defendants except Lexington County. ECF No. 79 at 1. Defendant assert that only one of numerous grounds in its motion for summary judgment was discussed by the Magistrate Judge. Id. at 1. Defendant Lexington County argues that the “alleged failures to provide appointed counsel for indigent persons do not give rise to a cause of action for damages against the County.” Id. at 2. Defendants cite the following reasons: (1) any alleged underfunding of a public defender system does not, as a matter of law, show proximate cause of any alleged injury; (2) no authority supports Plaintiffs’ claims for damages against a local governing body for alleged failure to fund a public defender system; (3) the damage claims against Lexington County are barred by Heck and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 2-13. Therefore, Defendants request that the court decline to adopt the portion of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation that declines to dismiss the damages claims against Lexington County. Id. at 13.
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D. Analysis 1. Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
At issue in Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is whether Chief Justice Beatty’s Memorandum renders moot Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. “[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Telco Commc’n, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1230 (4th Cir. 1989). “There is, however, a well-recognized exception to the mootness doctrine holding that “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.” Porter v. Clark, 852 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 2017). This “exception ‘traces to the principle that a party should not be able to evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering questionable behavior.’” Id. To assert voluntary cessation, “a defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000); see also Telco, 885 F.2d at 1231 (recognizing that “[j]urisdiction, however, may abate if there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and ‘interim events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation”)).
Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ claims have been addressed by Chief Justice Beatty’s Memorandum, which “effectively orders Summary Court Judges to provide the relief sought by Plaintiffs in this case, to the extent such relief was not already being provided.” See ECF No. 39 at 2. Plaintiffs assert that there are genuine issues of material fact as to the compliance and implementation of the Memorandum in Magistrate Courts. See ECF No. 80 at 22. More specifically, Plaintiffs assert that “according to court and Detention Center records, in the 24 days
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following issuance of the Memorandum, the County’s Magistrate Court issued 50 new payment bench warrants, and at least 57 people were incarcerated in the Detention Center after being arrested on payment bench warrants issued by a Lexington County Magistrate Court.” Id. at 22. After reviewing the record, the court finds there is an issue of material fact as to the application of Chief Justice Beatty’s Memorandum in Magistrate Court and whether the alleged conduct could not reasonably be expected to recur. Therefore, the court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to declaratory and injunctive relief.
2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims for damages. “As a general rule, judges acting in their judicial capacity are absolutely immune (in both their individual and official capacities) from suit for monetary damages under the doctrine of judicial immunity.” Ingram v. Township of Deptford, 858 F. Supp. 2d 386, 390 (D.N.J. 2012). “Quasi-judicial immunity is given only to public employees who perform judge-like functions and attaches when a public official’s role is functionally comparable to that of a judge.” Id. at 390. “Absolute immunity does not apply in every action against a judge or court personnel.” Id. “[T]he touchstone for the applicability of the doctrine of judicial immunity is ‘the performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.” Id. “The Supreme Court has stated that judicial immunity does not protect the ‘administrative, legislative, or executive’ acts performed by judges.” Id. at 391. “Therefore, it [is] the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that informs [] [an] immunity analysis.” Id. Upon reviewing the record, the court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendants are entitled to judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. Plaintiffs assert that the challenged conduct was administrative in nature case and thus immunity does not apply. On the
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other hand, Defendants argue that the doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity shield them

because the challenged conduct pertains to ‘judicial acts’ performed in their official capacities as

judges. The court finds that there are issues of material fact as to whether the challenged conduct

is considered “administrative” or ‘judicial’ acts, as well as, to the scope of Defendants’

administrative duties in the Magistrate Court. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary

judment as to Plaintiffs’ claims for damages is denied. The matter should proceed to discovery.

See Al Shimari v. CACI Intern, Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 220 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[D]isputed questions that

arises with respect to claims of immunity are not the exception . . . fundamentally, a court is entitled

to have before it a proper record, sufficiently developed through discovery proceedings, to

accurately assess any claim, including one of immunity. And even a party whose assertion of

immunity proves worthy must submit to the burdens of litigation until a court becomes sufficiently

informed to rule.”).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court DECLINES to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation. Plaintiffs’ motion to certify class is DENIED without prejudice. ECF No.

21. Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to declaratory and injunctive relief is

DENIED without prejudice, ECF No. 29. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on damages

claim is DENIED without prejudice, ECF No. 50. This matter is recommitted to the Magistrate

Judge further pretrial handling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 29, 2018

_s/ Margaret B. Seymour ___________ Margaret B. Seymour Senior United States District Court Judge

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 3:17-cv-01426-MBS Date Filed 07/10/18 Entry Number 107 Page 1 of 17

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Twanda Marshinda Brown; Sasha Monique Darby;

)

Cayeshia Catel Johnson; Amy Marie Palacios;

)

Nora Ann Corder; Xavier Larry Goodwin; and

)

Raymond Wright, Jr., on behalf of themselves and

)

all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

Lexington County, South Carolina; Gary Reinhart, in his )

individual capacity; Rebecca Adams, in her official

)

and individual capacities as the Chief Judge for

)

Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in

)

Lexington County and in her official capacity as the

)

Judge of the Irmo Magistrate Court; Albert John

)

Dooley, III, in his official capacity as the Associate

)

Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary )

Courts in Lexington County; Bryan Koon, in his official )

capacity as the Lexington County Sheriff; and Robert

)

Madsen, in his official capacity as the Circuit Public

)

Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of South

)

Carolina,

)

)

Defendants.

)

________________________________________________)

C/A No. 3:17-cv-1426-MBS OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is now before the court on Defendants’ motion for reconsideration pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 filed on April 24, 2018, ECF No. 87, and Defendant

Lexington County’s supplemental motion for reconsideration filed on April 21, 2018, ECF No. 88.

Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration

on May 3, 2018, ECF No. 93, to which Defendants filed a reply on May 10, 2018. ECF No. 97.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A detailed recitation of this matter’s relevant factual and procedural background can be

found in the order entered on March 29, 2018 (the “March order”), and incorporated herein by

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reference. ECF No. 84. Briefly, this case involves claims by Plaintiffs Twanda Marshinda Brown;
Sasha Monique Darby; Cayeshia Cashel Johnson; Amy Marie Palacios; Nora Ann Corder; Xavier
Larry Goodwin; and Raymond Wright, Jr. (hereinafter collectively “Plaintiffs”), against Defendant
Lexington County of South Carolina (hereinafter “Lexington County”); Defendants Gary Reinhart,1 Rebecca Adams,2 and Albert John Dooley, III,3 as former or current Judges for
Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County and the Irmo Magistrate
Court (hereinafter “Judicial Defendants”); Defendant Bryan Koon as the Lexington County Sheriff (hereinafter “Koon”);4 and Defendant Robert Madsen as the Circuit Public Defender for the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of South Carolina (hereinafter “Madsen”) (hereinafter collectively “Defendants”).5 According to Plaintiffs, magistrate courts in Lexington County routinely
incarcerate indigent defendants who are unable to afford magistrate court fines and fees without
pre-deprivation ability-to-pay hearings or representation by counsel. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Plaintiffs allege violation of their constitutional rights under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
1 Defendant Gary Reinhart served as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County from 2004 through June 27, 2017. Second Amended Compl. ¶ 27. Defendant Gary Reinhart is currently a Magistrate Judge for Lexington County, South Carolina. Id. 2 Defendant Rebecca Adams served as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County, South Carolina from December 20, 2013 to June 27, 2017. Second Amended Compl. ¶ 28. Defendant Adams currently serves as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County and as the Judge of the Irmo Magistrate Court. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. 3 Defendant Albert John Dooley, III currently serves as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County, South Carolina. Second Amended Compl. Id. ¶ 30. 4 Defendant Bryan Koon serves as the elected Lexington County Sheriff; the Chief Law Enforcement Office of the Lexington County Sheriff Department; and the Chief Administrator of the Detention Center. Second Amended Compl. ¶ 31. 5 Defendant Robert Madsen, is the Circuit Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in South Carolina that includes Lexington County. Second Amended Compl. ¶ 32.
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Amendments. Plaintiffs seek class certification, damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants.
In the March order, the court declined to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 74). The court also denied Plaintiffs’ motion to certify class without prejudice (ECF No. 21); denied Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to declaratory and injunctive relief (ECF No. 29); and denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on damages claim without prejudice (ECF No. 50). See March order, ECF No. 84. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to the application of Chief Justice Beatty’s Memorandum in magistrate courts and whether the alleged conduct could not reasonably be expected to recur. Id. at 27-28. The court further found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendants are entitled to judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. Id. at 28-29. The court then recommitted the matter to the Magistrate Judge for further pretrial handling. Id. at 29.
II. LEGAL STANDARD Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides the following:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief – whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim – or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities. “Under Rule 54(b), the district court retains the power to reconsider and modify its interlocutory judgments . . . at any time prior to final judgment when such is warranted.” Am. Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514-15 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983) (noting that “every order short of a final decree
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is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge”). “The Fourth Circuit has offered little guidance on the standard for evaluating a Rule 54(b) motion, but has held motions under Rule 54(b) are ‘not subject to the strict standards applicable to motions for reconsideration of a final judgment.’” Sanders v. Lowe’s Home Ctr., C/A No. 0:15-cv-02313-JMC, 2016 WL 5920840, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 11, 2016) (citing Am. Canoe Ass’n, 326 F.3d at 514)); see also Fayetteville Inv’r v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1472 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that the court found it unnecessary to thoroughly express its views on the interplay of Rules 54, 59, and 60). “In this regard, district courts in the Fourth Circuit, in analyzing the merits of a Rule 54 motion, look to the standards of motions under Rule 59 for guidance.” Sanders, 2016 WL 59202840, at *2. “Therefore, reconsideration under Rule 54(b) is appropriate on the following grounds: (1) to follow an intervening change in controlling law; (2) on account of new evidence; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Id. (citing Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 2010 WL 3059344, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 4, 2010) (“This three-part test shares the same three elements as the Fourth Circuit’s test for amending an earlier judgment under Rule 59(e), but the elements are not applied with the same force when analyzing an [ ] interlocutory order.”) (citing Am. Canoe Ass’n, 326 F.3d at 514)).
III. DISCUSSION A. Defendants’ motion for reconsideration
Defendants seek reconsideration on two grounds. ECF No. 87-1. First, Defendants assert that the court overlooked Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief (ECF No. 29). Id. at 5-8. Defendants note that “the basis for the motion was that the claims of all but one Plaintiff were moot and no longer involved live cases or controversies, and the claims of that one remaining Plaintiff [Goodwin], who still had (and has)
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a criminal action pending against him are barred by the principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).” ECF No. 87-1 at 1. Defendants argue that “there can be no question that if a bench warrant is issued for his arrest, Mr. Goodwin either previously has had, or would eventually have an adequate opportunity to raise some, if not all, of his current challenges in the context of the state proceedings, and he would have an army of lawyers to help him if his current counsel were to appear in any such proceedings.” ECF No. 29-1 at 7.
Second, Defendants argue that the court did not address or consider the additional evidence submitted by Defendants in their reply to Plaintiffs’ objections to the Report and Recommendation. ECF No. 87-1 at 8. Defendants assert that they attached to their reply detailed revisions to forms and procedures by the South Carolina Court Administration, which were formalized by orders signed by Chief Justice Beatty. ECF No. 87-1 at 8. The additional evidence submitted by Defendants included a Memorandum by the South Carolina Court Administration outlining the procedures discussed at the Mandatory Program meeting on November 1, 2017, regarding the sentencing of unrepresented defendants to imprisonment. ECF No. 82-1 at 2. It also included a “Checklist for Magistrates and Municipal Judges” signed by Chief Justice Beatty, along with changes to forms for use by Magistrates and Municipal Judges. ECF No. 82-1 at 10-22. Defendants further assert that “at the annual mandatory program for summary court judges on November 1, 2017, the office of court administration set forth the practical requirements of the Chief Justice’s Memorandum in considerable detail.” ECF No. 87-1 (citing ECF No. 82-1, Court Administration Memorandum, dated Mar. 14, 2018)). Defendants note that Chief Justice Beatty on February 23, 2018, also “signed two administrative orders further implementing those procedures, and promulgating a total of seven new or revised forms intended to ensure that imprisonment does not occur unless the [defendants are] ‘informed of their right to counsel, and if indigent, their right to
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court-appointed counsel prior to proceeding with trial.”’ ECF No. 87-1 at 9. Defendants argue that together these changes “are all directed toward insuring that no one is incarcerated for summarycourt-level offenses in the absence of being informed of the right to counsel in a meaningful manner.” ECF No. 87-1 at 9-10.
Defendants argue that even “if such noncompliance still persists, which seems unlikely in view of the extensiveness of the state judicial system’s efforts, Plaintiffs’ counsel would be able to identify it without the need for discovery from Defendants.” Id. As such, Defendants argue that “if Plaintiff’s counsel, in opposition to the present motion, cannot point to any cases in Lexington County in which the problem persists, then Plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief should be dismissed based on mootness resulting from the remedial action of the Chief Justice and the South Carolina Court Administration.” Id. at 11.
B. Defendants’ Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration Defendants Lexington County and Madsen separately request that this court reconsider the
March order on several grounds. ECF No. 88-1. First, Defendant Lexington County requests that the court clarify that Defendant Madsen should be dismissed from the case. Id. at 1. In support thereof, Defendant Lexington County contends that “the Magistrate Judge noted that ‘the parties do not dispute that [public defender] Madsen is an agent of Lexington County.’” Id. “Because Plaintiffs have asserted the same causes of action against Lexington County and Madsen, the claims against Madsen are duplicative, and the undersigned recommends Madsen be dismissed from the case.” Id. at 1 (citing ECF No. 74 at 20). Second, Defendant Lexington County argues that “the damages claims against Lexington County were barred for the following reasons other than the immunity grounds: (1) all of Plaintiffs’ damages claims are barred by the principles set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) as a matter
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of law Lexington County could not have created the policies alleged by Plaintiffs to exist with regard to matters occurring in the adjudicated cases of individuals; and (3) Plaintiffs’ damages claims against Lexington County based on underfunding of the public defender system are barred for lack of causation, because even if public defender systems did not exist, a magistrate judge would still be able to appoint counsel for indigent persons from members of the bar. In addition, no case has ever held that a federal damage claim lies against a county or municipal entry for failure to fund appointed counsel.” ECF No. 88-1 at 2.
C. Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ motions for reconsideration As to mootness, Plaintiffs acknowledge that Plaintiff Wright’s arrest and incarceration
“within days of filing his claims in this action eliminated the case or controversy between him and Defendants with respect to his claims for prospective relief.” ECF No. 93 at 11. However, Plaintiffs argue that because Wright “was arrested and incarcerated for nonpayment “after” filing his prospective relief claims, he is allowed to pursue prospective relief on behalf of the proposed class under a long-standing exception to the mootness doctrine established in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), for claims that are “inherently transitory.” ECF No. 93 at 13.
Plaintiffs argue that the court should decline to exercise Younger abstention as to Plaintiff Goodwin’s prospective relief claims. Id. Plaintiffs assert that Goodwin’s criminal prosecution concluded with his conviction and “there is simply no state court criminal proceeding to which this court should defer, much less one in which Goodwin could raise the serious constitutional claims for prospective relief from unlawful arrest and incarceration that he raised in this action.” ECF No. 93 at 14. Plaintiffs argue that although Plaintiff Goodwin “[o]wes money to the Irmo Magistrate Court, it is undisputed that Mr. Goodwin’s criminal prosecution concluded with his
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conviction and sentence in that court months before the commencement of this action, and that there was no appeal.” Id.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the court correctly declined to find the documents submitted by Defendants satisfy the “formidable” burden of proof necessary to demonstrate mootness of Plaintiffs’ claims. ECF No. 93 at 14. Plaintiffs argue that “the burden lies with Defendants to present evidence that the specific conduct challenged by each of Plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief cannot reasonably be expected to recur in order to secure dismissal of these claims on mootness grounds.” Id. at 15. Plaintiffs assert that “not one of the documents is addressed to Defendant Lexington County or concerns the County’s provision and funding for indigent defense in magistrate courts.” Id. at 15-16. Plaintiffs further argue that “there remain numerous questions of fact as to whether the OCA [Office of Court Administration] Memorandum or the revised forms and orders of the Supreme Court of South Carolina have resulted in any changes to the individual Defendants’ maintenance of standard operating procedures, which cause the automatic, unlawful arrest and incarceration of indigent people for nonpayment of money owed to magistrate courts without pre-deprivation ability to pay-hearing or court appointment of counsel, and based on warrants unsupported by probable cause.” Id. at 16.
D. Defendants’ reply Defendants argue that Plaintiff Goodwin’s claim is barred by Younger and no factual
information is necessary through discovery with regard to this claim. ECF No. 97 at 2. Defendants further argue that Younger would bar the application of Plaintiffs’ “inherently transitory” exception to mootness, because a federal court cannot enter declaratory or injunctive relief in a case involving an active state criminal prosecution. Id. Therefore, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are either moot or barred by Younger. Id. Moreover,
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Defendants maintain that even if the reasons set forth above were not enough to lead to the dismissal of the declaratory and injunctive relief claims, Defendants have also shown “a deep and serious commitment by the Chief Justice of South Carolina and South Carolina Court Administration to prevent future instances of incarceration in the absence of counsel being made available.” Id. at 2.
E. Court’s Analysis a. Defendants’ motion for reconsideration 1. Mootness
“Mootness principles derive from the requirement in Article III of the Constitution that federal courts may adjudicate only disputes involving a “case or controversy.” Warren v. Sessmons & Rogers, P.A., 676 F.3d 365, 370 (4th Cir. 2012). A case is moot when “the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). The Supreme Court has held that a class plaintiff’s standing will relate back to the filing of the complaint if the claims asserted are “so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative’s interest expires.” Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991); see also Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 98 (1978) (affirming a district court’s decision to certify a class of juveniles involved in the juvenile court system despite the fact that the named plaintiff’s claims were moot at the time of the decision).
Because Plaintiff Goodwin still has a criminal action pending, his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are not moot. See ECF No. 93 at 12, ECF No. 29-1 at 6, ECF No. 87-1 at 6. The court finds that Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is denied as to this issue.
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The court agrees with Plaintiff Wright’s argument that his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief may proceed on behalf of the proposed class under the “inherently transitory” exception to the mootness doctrine as established by the Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 n.11 (1975). The Supreme Court held in Gerstein that claims challenging pretrial detention conditions were not moot, even though the named plaintiffs were no longer pretrial detainees, because “[p]retrial detention is by its nature temporary,” and “[i]t is by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to certify the class.” Following the reasoning of Gerstein, the court in Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2010), held that a case brought by an inmate of a county jail did not become moot when the inmate was released from custody due to the “inherently transitory” exception to the mootness doctrine. In Olson, the Seventh Circuit clarified that for the “inherently transitory” exception to apply, a plaintiff must show: (1) it is uncertain that a claim will remain live for any individual who could be named as plaintiff long enough for a court to certify class; and (2) there will be a constant class of persons suffering the deprivation complained of in the complaint. Olson, 594 F.3d at 582. Additionally, the Olson court recognized that “the length of incarceration in a county jail generally cannot be determined at the outset and is subject to a number of unpredictable factors, thereby making it inherently transitory.” Id. The Olson court also noted that “while the ultimate length of confinement does affect the applicability of the ‘inherently transitory’ exception, the essence of the exception is uncertainty about whether a claim will remain alive for any given plaintiff long enough for a district court to certify the class.” Id. at 582. The Olson court further noted, “all [Plaintiff] must show is that the claim is likely to recur with regard to the class, not that the claim is likely to recur with regard to him.” Olson, 594 F.3d at 584.
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The court finds that the declaratory and injunctive relief claims in this litigation are of the type encompassed within the “inherently transitory” doctrine. As to the first requirement of the Gerstein test, Plaintiff Wright filed his complaint on June 1, 2017, and was subsequently arrested and incarcerated the next month on July 25, 2017. The court finds that the brief period of time between the filing of the complaint and his incarceration was not long enough for the claim to remain live for a court to certify the class. Moreover, the duration of Plaintiff Wright’s incarceration for ten days or until he paid $416.63 in court fines further demonstrates the uncertainty of whether a claim will remain live long enough for a court to certify the class. ECF No. 48 at 77. See Zurak v. Regan, 550 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that “because of the relatively short period of time involved [90 days] and the possibility of conditional release, there was a significant possibility that any single named plaintiff would be released prior to certification”). Accordingly, the court concludes that the first element of the Gerstein test is satisfied.
As to the second requirement of the Gerstein test, the court concludes that Plaintiff Wright has shown that there will be a constant class suffering the deprivation at issue. Assuming Plaintiffs’ allegations are true, the court finds that the challenged conduct is likely to occur with regard to other members of the proposed class. While Defendants inform the court of their efforts to remedy the challenged conduct, the record has not been fully established for the court to ascertain that no member of the proposed class will suffer the same deprivation. Therefore, this case meets the second requirement of the Gerstein test, making the “inherently transitory” exception applicable to this case.
In opposition, Defendants primarily rely on O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). ECF No. 87-1 at 6. The plaintiffs in O’Shea alleged that local prosecutors, police, magistrate judges,
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and associate judges were engaged in intentional and systematic discrimination against seventeen black and two white residents. Id. The O’Shea court noted that “the sole allegations of injury are that petitioners ‘have engaged in and continue to engage in, a pattern and practice of conduct . . . all of which has deprived and continues to deprive plaintiffs and members of their class of their constitutional rights and, again, that petitioners have denied and continue to deny to plaintiffs and members of their class their constitutional rights by illegal bond-setting, sentencing, and jury-fee practices.’” Id. at 495. The O’Shea court found that none of the plaintiffs, however, alleged that he or she had suffered any injury as a result of these practices. Id. at 495. Therefore, none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent the class established a case or controversy, and none could seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class. Id. at 497. Further, none of the plaintiffs could show they would suffer deprivation in the future. Id.
In contrast to O’Shea, Plaintiffs allege they sustained injuries as a result of Defendants’ alleged practices. See ECF No. 48 at 108-22. Further, at the time that Plaintiff Wright filed the complaint, he alleged a real and imminent risk of being arrested and incarcerated because of Defendants’ challenged conduct. ECF No. 48 at 97-98. See Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991) (holding that claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under § 1983 were not moot, despite the mooting of named plaintiffs’ individual claims prior to class certification, because the claims were so inherently transitory that the court would not have enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the purported class representatives’ claims became moot). For these reasons, the court finds that Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is denied as to this issue.
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2. Younger abstention In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), “the Supreme Court detailed ‘our national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.’” Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 41). As the Fourth Circuit explained, “the Younger doctrine is anchored in a ‘belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.’” Nivens, 444 F.3d at 241. In determining whether Younger abstention is warranted, courts apply a three factor test: “(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) an important state interest in the subject matter of the proceeding must be implicated; and (3) the state proceeding must afford an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges.” Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). The court notes that Plaintiffs are not seeking review of Plaintiffs’ individual state criminal convictions. Rather, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendants’ alleged policies or practices in summary courts are unconstitutional, and an injunction enjoining those practices. See Thana v. Board of License Comm’r for Charles Cty., 827 F.3d 314 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that “if a plaintiff in federal court does not seek review of the state court judgment itself but instead presents an independent claim, it is not an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction that the same or a related claim was earlier aired between the parties in state court.”); see also Bairefoot v. City of Beaufort, C/A No. 9:17-cv-2759-RMG, 2018 WL 2272712, at *8 (D.S.C. May 16, 2018) (noting that “[p]laintiffs’ claims under § 1983 are not an attempt to ‘sidetrack’ the direct appeal process for state convictions for shoplifting, assault, or motor vehicle violations, but rather, are claims independent of the underlying state criminal judgments”). Accordingly, the court finds that the first Middlesex factor is not satisfied.
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As to the second Middlesex factor, the court concludes because the subject matter of this lawsuit pertains to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments an important state interest is not implicated. The court notes that this federal action was commenced by Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to which federal courts have original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Thana, 827 F.3d at 321 (holding that a federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of a licensing board’s action under the First Amendment qualifies as an independent claim that does not undermine state court judgments). Thus, the court finds that the second Middlesex factor is not met.
As to the final factor, the court concludes that Plaintiffs did not have an adequate opportunity to raise the subject constitutional claims in the state proceeding. The court finds that a habeas petition would have been inappropriate because Plaintiffs are not seeking release from prison, but are challenging the constitutionality of Defendants’ post-conviction debt collection practices that resulted in incarceration without a pre-deprivation judicial hearing or representation by counsel. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 264 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for unconstitutional imprisonment is the proper vehicle to bring his claims because a habeas petition would have been inappropriate as he does not seek release from custody); Bairefoot v. City of Beaufort, C/A No. 9:17-cv-2759-RMG, 2018 WL 2272712, at *8 (D.S.C. May 16, 2018) (explaining that the ability of a plaintiff to challenge the constitutionality of defendants’ practices through a habeas petition would have been difficult to imagine due to the short period of incarceration in a county jail); see also Wilson, 535 F.3d at 268 (recognizing that “if a prisoner could not, as a practical matter, seek habeas relief, and after release, was prevented from filing a § 1983 claim, § 1983’s purpose of providing litigants with ‘a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and
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law of the Nations . . . would be severely imperiled.’”). Accordingly, the court finds that the final Middlesex factor is not satisfied.
For these reasons, the court concludes that Plaintiffs claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are not barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is denied.
3. Documents The court has reviewed Defendants’ additional evidence together with the remaining record, and finds that Defendants fail to make a sufficient showing warranting reconsideration. The Supreme Court has held that the voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct moots a case only if it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur,” and the “heavy burden of persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies with the defendant.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 222 (2000). “Voluntary cessation will not render a case moot unless events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the challenged violation.” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 632 (1979). Based on the current record and as previously noted in the court’s March order, issues of material fact remain as to the implementation and compliance with the remedial actions made by the South Carolina Court Administration. Indeed, Defendants acknowledge that “it was to be expected that it would take some time for the practical effects of the Chief Justice’s memorandum to be understood and implemented by summary court judges.” ECF No. 87-1 at 9. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is denied.
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a. Defendants’ supplemental motion for reconsideration Defendant Lexington County and Madsen seek reconsideration of the March order on several grounds. ECF No. 88. The court notes that on May 16, 2018, the parties submitted a stipulation of voluntary dismissal of Defendant Madsen pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). ECF No. 100. The parties agreed that Defendant Madsen is dismissed without prejudice and without an award of fees and costs to any parties. Id. at 1. The parties further agreed that “this stipulation does not affect any claim against any other named Defendant in this case.” Id. In light of Defendant Madsen’s voluntary dismissal, the court will only address Defendant Lexington County’s arguments for reconsideration. With regard to Defendants’ argument that the damages claims are barred by the principles set forth in Heck v. Humphrey and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court is persuaded by the reasoning in Bairefoot v. City of Beaufort, South Carolina, C/A No. 9:17-2759-RMG, 2018 WL 2272712 (D.S.C. May 16, 2018). In Bairefoot, unrepresented indigent plaintiffs alleged that municipal court judges sentenced them to jail for the inability to pay court fees and costs. Id. at *1-2. The court in Bairefoot addressed the relationship between the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Heck, and claims based on underfunding of the public defender system. The Bairefoot court concluded that neither Heck nor the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would bar the plaintiffs’ claims under § 1983, because these claims are independent of their state court judgment and seek only “to force two South Carolina municipalities to comply with the Constitution’s requirement to provide counsel for indigent defendants appearing in criminal courts created and managed by those municipalities, and to remedy the municipalities’ past failure to meet that basic constitutional requirement.” Id. at *8. The Bairefoot court also noted that the municipalities’ failure to provide counsel is actionable under federal law. Id. at *5 (“A deliberate decision to create criminal courts
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that operate without providing counsel to indigent defendants is actionable under § 1983.”) (citing

to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (holding the right to counsel “is made

obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment”)). With respect to the underfunding of

the public defender system and whether the municipal judges should have ordered some member

of the bar to represent indigent defendants, the Bairefoot court held that “it was foreseeable that

Defendants’ failure to provide for indigent defense in courts of their own creation, as required by

state law, would result in a violation of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at *6. The Bairefoot court

further noted that in “a counter factual hypothesis that the municipal judges appointed by defendant

might have intervened to prevent an ongoing constitutional violation known to defendants does

not make the violation unforeseeable.” Id. at *6. For these reasons, the Bairefoot court denied

defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Based on the reasoning and identical arguments raised by Defendant Lexington County,

Defendant Lexington County’s supplemental motion for reconsideration is denied. Moreover, the

court finds that Defendants have failed to make a sufficient showing that there has been a change

in the controlling law, the introduction of new evidence justifying reconsideration, or that the court

committed a clear error in its March order. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for reconsideration

and Defendant Lexington County’s supplemental motion for reconsideration is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motion for

reconsideration, ECF No. 87, and Defendant Lexington County’s supplemental motion for

reconsideration, ECF No. 88.

Dated: July 9, 2018 Columbia, South Carolina

__/s/ Margaret B. Seymour________ Margaret B. Seymour Senior United States District Judge

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-1524

TWANDA MARSHINDA BROWN; SASHA MONIQUE DARBY; CAYESHIA CASHEL JOHNSON; AMY MARIE PALACIOS; NORA ANN CORDER; and XAVIER LARRY GOODWIN and RAYMOND WRIGHT, JR., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs – Appellees,
v.
GARY REINHART, in his individual capacity; REBECCA ADAMS, in her official and individual capacities as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County and in her official capacity as the Judge of the Irmo Magistrate Court; BRYAN KOON, in his official capacity as the Lexington County Sheriff,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
LEXINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA; ROBERT MADSEN, in his official capacity as the Circuit Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of South Carolina; ALBERT JOHN DOOLEY, III, in his official capacity as the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior District Judge. (3:17-cv-1426-MBS-SVH)

Argued: December 12, 2018

Decided: January 23, 2019

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Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Motz joined. Judge Wilkinson wrote a concurring opinion.
ARGUED: Kenneth Paul Woodington, DAVIDSON, WREN & PLYLER, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. Nusrat Jahan Choudhury, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: William H. Davidson, II, DAVIDSON WREN & PLYLER, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. Carl G. Snodgrass, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York; Toby J. Marshall, Eric R. Nusser, TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC, Seattle, Washington; Susan K. Dunn, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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DUNCAN, Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs-Appellees are indigent individuals who were arrested and incarcerated in
Lexington County, South Carolina (the “County”) for failing to pay fines and fees to the magistrate courts. They filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis that once arrested, they were not brought before a judge, afforded a court hearing, or granted court-appointed counsel. In relevant part, Plaintiffs seek damages against Defendants-Appellants--county magistrates Gary Reinhart and Rebecca Adams, and Lexington County Sheriff Bryan Koon (“Defendants”)--for their oversight and enforcement of alleged countywide policies and practices that purportedly caused Plaintiffs’ unlawful arrests and incarceration.
Defendants moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ damages claims based on absolute immunity. The district court denied the motion without prejudice and ordered that the matter should proceed to discovery.
Defendants subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal, asserting that they are entitled to absolute immunity as to Plaintiffs’ claims for damages. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that this court lacks jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the district court’s order and must therefore dismiss the appeal. Because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we do not reach the question of whether the district court properly denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the damages claims or otherwise address the merits of this action.
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I. Plaintiffs allege that Lexington County is a municipal government entity that relies on the collection of fines and fees imposed on defendants in traffic and misdemeanor cases in the magistrate courts as an essential revenue source. To generate this revenue, Defendants Reinhart and Adams, as the chief administrators of the magistrate courts, and Defendant Koon, as the chief law enforcement officer, exercise their administrative authority to establish, oversee, enforce, and sanction two unwritten administrative policies and practices--the “default payment” policy and the “trial in absentia” policy. Under the default payment policy, indigent people sentenced to pay fines and fees for traffic or misdemeanor convictions are placed on payment plans without regard to whether they can afford the monthly payments. Under the trial in absentia policy, indigent people who do not appear for a scheduled traffic or misdemeanor hearing are automatically tried in their absence, convicted, and sentenced to jail time suspended on the payment of fines and fees. Under both policies, when indigent people fail to pay money owed to the magistrate courts, bench warrants ordering their arrest and incarceration for nonpayment issue automatically. They are then arrested and incarcerated by the Sheriff’s Department unless they can immediately pay their entire debt to the magistrate courts. At no point prior to or after their arrest and incarceration are these individuals afforded courtappointed counsel or a determination by a magistrate court or bond court regarding their ability to pay the fines and fees.
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Pursuant to these policies, Plaintiffs Twanda Marshinda Brown, Sasha Monique Darby, Cayeshia Cashel Johnson, Amy Marie Palacios, Nora Ann Corder, Xavier Larry Goodwin, and Raymond Wright, Jr. were arrested and incarcerated in Lexington County for failing to pay magistrate court fines and fees. Once arrested, none of the Plaintiffs were brought before a judge, afforded a court hearing, or given the advice of counsel. Unable to pay their debts, they spent weeks or months in jail.1 Several Plaintiffs also suffered from a host of collateral consequences due to their incarceration, including loss of housing and employment.
II. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiffs brought the instant action. Pursuant to § 1983, they raise claims for violations of their Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights against Defendants for their oversight and enforcement of the alleged policies and practices that caused Plaintiffs’ unlawful arrests and incarceration. Before engaging in discovery, Defendants filed multiple motions for summary judgment, including a motion as to Plaintiffs’ damages claims--the subject of this appeal. Defendants argued that those claims should be dismissed because they are entitled to judicial, quasi-judicial, or legislative immunity (the “asserted immunities”).

1 Aside from Plaintiff Wright, who was incarcerated for seven days, Plaintiffs spent between twenty to sixty-three days in jail.
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The district court denied Defendants’ motion without prejudice. In its order, the district court found that there were outstanding issues of material fact as to whether the challenged conduct is administrative and therefore not protected by immunity, as Plaintiffs contend, or judicial, quasi-judicial, or legislative, as Defendants do. The court thereby ordered that the matter proceed to discovery, citing our decision in Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc., for the proposition that it “is entitled to have before it a proper record, sufficiently developed through discovery proceedings, to accurately assess any claim, including one of immunity. And even a party whose assertion of immunity [ultimately] proves worthy must submit to the burdens of litigation until a court becomes sufficiently informed to rule.” Brown v. Lexington Cty., No. 3:17-CV-1426-MBS, 2018 WL 1556189, at *15 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2018) (quoting Al Shimari, 679 F.3d 205, 220 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
Following the district court’s decision, however, and before discovery, Defendants filed this interlocutory appeal, seeking review of the district court’s order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that this court lacks jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Accordingly, we first determine, as we must, whether we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 233 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (“[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself . . . of its own jurisdiction.”)). We conclude that we do not.
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A. We have long recognized that interlocutory appeals are generally disallowed, id. at 234, and that our jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions of the district courts of the United States,”2 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the district court’s order in this case--denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of the asserted immunities--is interlocutory. Consequently, we have jurisdiction only if we determine that the order satisfies the collateral order doctrine, which provides that “a district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law” is immediately appealable. Iko, 535 F.3d at 234 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)). If, on the other hand, summary judgment was denied “solely because there is a genuine issue of material fact, that claim is not immediately appealable and we lack jurisdiction to consider it.” Id. at 235. As a threshold requirement, and before jurisdiction can be invoked under the collateral order doctrine, an appealable order must definitively resolve the question in dispute. Al Shimari, 679 F.3d at 220 (citing Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006)). A question in dispute is not so resolved where “a district court ‘ma[kes] clear that its decision [is] a tentative one, . . . and that it might well change its mind’ after further proceedings.” Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted). In Al Shimari, we
2 28 U.S.C. § 1292 sets forth limited categories of interlocutory orders that are appealable, but Defendants have not argued that any of these exceptions are at issue here.
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determined that we lacked jurisdiction over decisions denying defendants immunity. In so doing, we pointed to the absence of a “vast pretrial record” coupled with the fact that the issues were “factually entrenched and far less amenable to meaningful analysis by resort merely to the plaintiffs’ pleadings.” Id. at 221 (internal citation omitted). Consequently, we concluded that “these appeals encompass fact-based issues of law, with the need for additional development of the record,” and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 221, 224.
B. We accept as given that immunity is absolute where it applies. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993). The narrow question here is whether, based on the limited record before it, the district court’s order is properly before us on appeal. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction because, as in Al Shimari, the district court’s order did not conclusively determine the disputed question. Based on the limited record before it, the district court found that there were genuine issues of material fact outstanding as to whether the Defendants are entitled to the asserted immunities, and subsequently ordered that the matter proceed to discovery. In so doing, the court cited Al Shimari for the proposition that it “is entitled to have before it a proper record . . . to accurately assess any claim, including one of immunity.” Brown, 2018 WL 1556189 at *15 (quoting Al Shimari, 679 F.3d at 220). Such an order from a district court indicating that its decision is tentative and that “it might well change its mind after further proceedings,” is not appealable. Al Shimari, 679 F.3d at 220 (quoting Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 230 (4th Cir. 1994)).
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Contrary to Defendants’ contention, whether the asserted immunities apply in this case is not a purely legal question. Instead, the district court correctly determined that whether Defendants are immune from suit is a fact-intensive inquiry that will turn on the record as it develops at least through discovery. Here, whether the Defendants are entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity depends upon the scope of conduct carried out by the Defendants in their administrative capacities and whether such conduct included the oversight and enforcement of unwritten policies. Similarly, the applicability of legislative immunity is also fact-dependent, and will require the court to determine, inter alia, whether the alleged policies “bear the outward marks of public decisionmaking.” E.E.O.C. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 631 F.3d 174, 184 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Such fact-based issues of law require “development of the record,” a matter “more within a district court’s ken.” Al Shimari, 679 F.3d at 221 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 674).
With respect to their arguments regarding judicial and quasi-judicial immunity specifically, Defendants attempt to distinguish our holding in Al Shimari by framing the immunity inquiry here as purely legal--namely, whether the arrests and incarcerations ordered by Defendants were judicial or quasi-judicial acts. This misconstrues the complaint. Plaintiffs are not suing Defendants with respect to individual judicial determinations, e.g., denials of bond or incarceration orders. In fact, as both parties acknowledge, Plaintiffs declined to sue the individual judges who sentenced them. This case is therefore distinguishable from our decision in Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 114 (4th Cir. 2018), where we held that the state’s attorney was entitled to immunity
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regarding her decision to prosecute certain police officers following the death of an individual who suffered fatal injuries while in their custody.
Instead, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, acting in their administrative capacities, oversaw and enforced policies and practices that violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Specifically, they allege that by order of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the Chief Justice delegated significant administrative authority to Defendants Reinhart and Adams as Chief Judge and Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Lexington County Summary Courts, including the responsibility to establish and oversee countywide procedures to ensure the collection of court-generated revenues, and to administer the County’s Bond Court. Exercising their administrative authority to control magistrate court dockets, schedules, and hours of operation, Defendants are alleged to have excluded hearings to determine people’s ability to pay fees and fines.
Similarly, Defendant Koon, as chief administrator of the Detention Center, had administrative powers and responsibilities. Namely, he was responsible for providing direction and overall management for the center’s day-to-day operations, which included overseeing the deputies in the warrant and civil process division who track and serve warrants. In this capacity, Defendant Koon is alleged to have exercised these administrative powers to enforce a standard operating procedure of automatically arresting indigent people on bench warrants and incarcerating them in the Detention Center unless they can pay the full amount of court fines and fees owed before booking. As the Supreme Court has held, “[a]dministrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as
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judicial acts” entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988).
Therefore, while it is true that Defendants Reinhart and Adams played a role in effectuating the alleged policies through judicial actions--e.g., ordering the unconstitutional arrests and incarceration of indigent people for failure to pay fines and fees--those specific acts are not the ones that Plaintiffs challenge as unconstitutional. The same reasoning applies to Defendant Koon, whom the Plaintiffs sue in his capacity as an administrator of the Detention Center, and not as the deputy responsible for enforcing specific warrants. To find otherwise would misconstrue the Plaintiffs’ theory of their case and run counter to the Court’s caution that “§ 1291 requires [the court] of appeals to view [Defendants’] claims of a ‘right not to be tried’ with skepticism, if not a jaundiced eye.” Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873 (1994).
At the same time, we emphasize our recognition of the importance of immunity from suit. And because we lack jurisdiction over the appeal, this opinion does not address Defendants’ arguments on the merits as to the asserted immunities, nor does it foreclose the possibility that Defendants may be successful in so arguing following discovery on this issue.
We therefore conclude that the district court’s order did not conclusively resolve the disputed question, and the court’s order fails to meet the threshold requirement of the collateral order doctrine. The appeal is therefore
DISMISSED.
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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur in the majority opinion because the majority has made it clear, and the
district court likewise made it clear, that its opinion was only tentative and not necessarily a forecast of what its ultimate ruling on summary judgment might be. See Maj. Op. at 11 (“[T]his opinion does not address Defendants’ arguments on the merits as to the asserted immunities, nor does it foreclose the possibility that Defendants may be successful in so arguing following discovery on this issue.”).
Specifically, it is not clear to me that Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc), the case on which plaintiffs chiefly rely, is dispositive in the different setting of this case. Al Shimari dealt with private contractor immunity. This case deals with the very different defense of judicial immunity. Different values are at stake. “[A] judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872)). We should hesitate to transplant decisions in the context of private contractor immunity to claims of judicial immunity. If we allow actions against judicial officers to become progressively burdensome, we risk “destroy[ing] that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.” Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347.
Secondly, I am not convinced that the distinction between what is an administrative action on the one hand and a judicial action on the other rests solely on the matter of whether the challenged action is a “policy.” A policy, written or unwritten, can

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bear so directly on the judicial function and be so intertwined with judicial duties that absolute judicial immunity will attach. While internal personnel actions are a classic example of an administrative proceeding, see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), policies affecting outside parties in court proceedings are much more likely to be judicial. They are not, after all, “acts that simply happen to have been done by judges.” Id. at 227. Further factual development in this case may shed light on how the alleged policies here, if they existed at all, can be characterized. While the district court is no doubt aware that overly burdensome discovery can negate the very reason for an immunity, see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-27 (1985), I believe the trial judge is entitled to a fuller record at this stage.
I thus concur in the dismissal of the appeal.

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