Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 1 Filed: 03/13/17 Page: 1 of 21 PageID #: 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

METROPOLITAN ST. LOUIS EQUAL HOUSING AND OPPORTUNITY COUNCIL,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF MAPLEWOOD, MISSOURI,
Defendant.

Civ. Action No. 17-cv-886 COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

INTRODUCTION 1. This is a challenge to the City of Maplewood's "chronic nuisance ordinance," pursuant to which the city revokes the occupancy pennits of residents whom it deems to be "chronic nuisances." Maplewood designates certain residents to be nuisances simply because they have been the subject ofmultiple police calls, regardless of whether they did anything wrong or are, instead, the victims ofdomestic violence or otherwise in legitimate need of municipal services. The effect of the city's revocation of occupancy pennits is to exile those residents from the City, since without an occupancy pennit it is a crime to live in Maplewood. 2. Maplewood has employed this draconian remedy in discriminatory fashion. Maplewood was almost entirely white as recently as 1970, and even now African-American residents account for only 17 percent of Maplewood's population. Nonetheless, Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council' s ("EHOC") analysis of Maplewood' s enforcement of its nuisance ordinance reveals that a majority of enforcement actions have been taken against African-American households. Maplewood intentionally targets its African-American residents for enforcement actions- and then banishes them from the

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City- based on conduct that would not result in such enforcement against white residents. Moreover, a large percentage of Maplewood's enforcement actions have been taken against women who are survivors of domestic violence and/or people with disabilities; these actions serve no legitimate purpose and effectively punish these vulnerable populations for requiring police protection. To end this discrimination based on race, sex, and disability, EHOC, which is devoted to furthering fair housing and combating discriminatory practices such as the one described in this complaint, brings this suit pursuant to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., and the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.010 et seq., for injunctive, monetary and declarative relief.
3. EHOC acquired and extensively analyzed records pertaining to Maplewood's enforcement of its nuisance ordinance over a 5-year period. These records make clear that Maplewood does not enforce its law even-handedly against any person eligible for such enforcement under the law' s terms. Rather, Maplewood enforces its nuisance ordinance selectively, and in doing so it disproportionately enforces the ordinance against AfricanAmerican residents while ignoring similar conduct by other residents. This discriminatory enforcement has the purpose and effect of perpetuating Maplewood's status as a "white" community in the starkly segregated St. Louis metropolitan area.
4. An alarmingly high number of enforcement actions have been taken against women who are the victims of domestic violence and/or against people with disabilities in Maplewood. Many of these people either called the police themselves for assistance or had someone else call on their behalf. Rather than protect its most vulnerable residents, Maplewood chooses to blame these victims for needing assistance and either immediately exiles them from
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the city or puts them on probation such that they will be exiled should they again need police assistance.
5. Maplewood is just one of many jurisdictions that have enacted some form of chronic nuisance ordinance in recent years. In response, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has issued guidance warning that discriminatory enforcement of nuisance laws can violate the Fair Housing Act. This guidance makes clear that municipalities such as Maplewood must ensure that chronic nuisance laws are enforced even-handedly. It also makes clear that municipalities such as Maplewood will have difficulty demonstrating the necessity of punishing residents simply because of a certain number of police calls.
6. Maplewood's chronic nuisance ordinance has the purpose and effect of making housing unavailable based on race, sex, and disability, and it fails to further any legitimate purpose. In particular, rather than making communities safer, it makes them less safe by discouraging crime victims and other residents from contacting the police or availing themselves of other emergency services such as ambulances.
7. Maplewood's discriminatory conduct has harmed EHOC by frustrating its mission to further fair housing in the region that includes Maplewood and forcing EHOC to divert resources to counteract Maplewood's discrimination. EHOC brings this action to address Maplewood's discriminatory and unlawful enforcement of its chronic nuisance ordinance and to redress the harm it has suffered and will continue to suffer as a direct result of Maplewood's discriminatory practices absent relief.
PARTIES
8. Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council is a private, non-profit corporation founded in 1992. It is dedicated to ensuring equal access to
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housing and places of public accommodation for all people through education, counseling, investigation, and enforcement. EHOC serves the greater St. Louis area, where it is the only private, non-profit corporation working to end illegal housing discrimination.
9. Defendant City of Maplewood, Missouri is a municipal corporation located in St. Louis County, Missouri. The City is organized under and operates by virtue of the rules of the State of Missouri as a home rule unit of local government. The City is governed by a Mayor and a six-member City Council. It acts through its agents and employees and is responsible for the actions described below, which were taken by agents and employees acting within the scope of their authority.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 10. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 42 U.S.C. § 3613, which authorizes claims brought under the Fair Housing Act. This Court also has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343(a)(3), because the Fair Housing Act claim alleged herein arises under the laws of the United States. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the Missouri Human Rights Act claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. II. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because the claims arose in the District, Defendant is incorporated in and/or resides in this District, Plaintiff does business in this District, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to this action occurred in the District.
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FACTS Maplewood's History of Racial Division 12. Maplewood adopted its nuisance ordinance against a background of municipal decline and changing demographics. Once prosperous and virtually all white, Maplewood in recent years has seen increasing racial diversity and a falling population. 13. Maplewood was incorporated in 1908 as one of St. Louis's early, "inner-ring" suburbs. Located directly to the west of St. Louis, it was designed to be a "bedroom community" for people who worked in St. Louis but wanted to live outside the city. By the 1950 Census, Maplewood's population had increased to more than 13,000. Virtually all of those residents- all but about 1% ofthem- were white. 14. The population of Maplewood- like that of other inner-ring St. Louis suburbsdwindled. Beginning in the 1960s, Maplewood's population has been in a steady decline. By the 1990 Census, the City's population had fallen to under 10,000. By the 2010 Census, the City's population barely exceeded 8,000. 15. Although Maplewood remains a majority-white municipality, its population has become increasingly racially diverse. As of 1970, Maplewood still had just 252 AfricanAmerican residents, less than 2% of its population. By 1990, Maplewood had 1,425 AfricanAmerican residents, comprising more than 14% of Maplewood's population. In the next two decades, Maplewood's African-American population remained steady, but became a larger share of the city's diminishing population. In 2010, Maplewood had an African-American population of 1,384, more than 17 percent of its population. 16. In recent years, Maplewood has taken steps to arrest and roll back these demographic changes. It has explicitly sought to lure more upscale, white residents to replace
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those who have been lost, highlighting its historic downtown and rising property values. The City's website states: "Over the past decade, Maplewood's central location and housing values have brought many young professionals and their families to our community."'
Maplewood's Adoption and Enforcement of Its Nuisance Ordinance
17. Against that background of years of declining population and demographic change, and amidst hopes for revitalization, Maplewood in 2006 instituted one of the country's most onerous nuisance ordinances.
18. Maplewood requires each renter to obtain an "occupancy permit" for every apartment rented. Applying for an occupancy permit costs $15. Applicants must allow city officials to inspect a photo identification. An applicant must specify every proposed resident of the dwelling and certify his or her understanding that no one else is permitted to reside there. Maplewood Code of Ordinances§ 12-25.
19. In 2006, Maplewood enacted an ordinance that permits occupancy permits to be revoked for a variety of actions that lead a person to be deemed a "nuisance." The effect of such revocation is to exile the person in question from the City, since without an occupancy permit that person is neither allowed to rent a dwelling nor reside at anyone else's dwelling.
20. Maplewood Code§ 34-240 defines eligible "nuisances" so broadly as to potentially include virtually any act that city officials do not like.
21. For example, a nuisance can be:
1 City of Maplewood, Demographics, available at http://momaplewood.civicplus.com/1 04/Demographics.
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• "Any act done or committed or allowed to be done and committed ... which is injurious or dangerous to public health." Maplewood Code§ 34240(1).
• "Any pursuit followed or act done ... to the hurt, injury, annoyance, inconvenience or damage of the public." Maplewood Code§ 34-240(2).
22. More specifically, Maplewood defines a nuisance to include, among many other things, more than two instances within a 180-day period of"peace disturbance or domestic violence resulting in calls to the police." Maplewood Code§ 34-240(17)(f). Thus, on its face, Maplewood' s ordinance specifically provides that a woman who suffers an incident of domestic violence that results in a call to the police is a proper target of enforcement.
23. Once a nuisance has been identified, Maplewood's ordinance calls for a hearing before the city manager or a designee. The hearing officer then must issue an order that will "effect the abatement ofthe nuisance by any means necessary." Maplewood Code§ 34242(2)(e). The ordinance, however, specifies only one means of abating such a "nuisance": revoking a resident's occupancy permit for a period of up to six months. Jd. Such revocation amounts to an effective exile from the City for that period.
Maplewood's Discriminatory Enforcement of Its Nuisance Ordinance 24. As described above, Maplewood's nuisance ordinance is drafted so as to give the city enormous discretion in deciding which people it will exile from the City. In practice, Maplewood has invoked this harsh remedy primarily against African Americans; people with disabilities; and women who are facing domestic violence.
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25. EHOC's investigation, which included multiple requests for public records, uncovered details about 43 enforcement hearings Maplewood held between March 2010 and August 2015.
26. In 34 of the hearings, the race of the household could be ascertained. In 19 of those- more than 55 percent- the household was African-American. The African-American share of nuisance enforcement actions thus is three times as high as the African-American share ofthe city's population (17 percent).
27. No relevant difference between African-American and white residents that is unrelated to race can explain this disparity. Neither can any legitimate enforcement policy. Rather, Maplewood enforces its ordinance so as to punish- and often drive out of the City altogether- African-American residents for reasons that would not lead to enforcement action against white residents.
28. In particular, Maplewood has chosen to bring multiple enforcement actions against African-American women who are the victims of domestic violence. Such enforcement would be unlawful and unreasonable against any woman. Maplewood's decision to do so only against African-American women demonstrates the discriminatory nature of its ordinance enforcement.
29. Sixteen of the 43 enforcement actions- more than 37 percent- arose at least in part out of incidents of domestic disturbance. In six of them- almost one-seventh of all enforcement actions studied- the "nuisance" involved a female resident being attacked by a male partner, former partner, or rebuffed suitor. Rather than protecting these survivors, Maplewood instituted enforcement actions against them.
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30. All six of those female residents punished for being survivors of domestic violence were African-American.
31. In all six of those incidents, Maplewood deemed the survivor of domestic violence to be a nuisance subject to occupancy permit revocation. In two of them, it Hsuspended" the revocation, essentially putting the survivor on probation. These orders still constitute a significant infringement ofliberty, because they effectively forbid these women from reporting incidents of domestic violence or calling for police assistance during the specified time, on pain of being exiled from town.
32. For example, one order revoked a woman' s occupancy permit after she was abused repeatedly by her husband, who no longer lived with her. The order suspended that revocation for twelve months, conditioned on no further "incidents of peace disturbance or domestic violence" occurring at her property during that period.
33. Similarly, Maplewood held an enforcement hearing against another woman based on three incidents in which a male acquaintance, whose romantic advances she had rebuffed, became intoxicated in and around her home and threatened violence against her. That enforcement action led the pastor at the woman's church and a fellow churchgoer to submit letters supporting her and criticizing the threatened revocation of her occupancy permit. Maplewood conditionally suspended enforcement of that order for twelve months. One of the conditions it imposed was that the woman immediately obtain and vigorously enforce a restraining order against the acquaintance. Maplewood's order did not explain how the woman could vigorously enforce the restraining order without calling the police and thereby risking revocation ofher occupancy permit.
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34. Maplewood's enforcement of its nuisance ordinance similarly discriminates against individuals with disabilities.
35. Eleven of the enforcement actions- more than a quarter- involved residents whose "misconduct" was the manifestation of mental illness or other disabilities. Rather than making any accommodations for these disabilities, or providing any other assistance, Maplewood used these behaviors as a reason to exile the resident in question.
36. For example, one suicidal man had his occupancy pennit revoked for making too many calls for medical assistance. Another resident suffering from depression had his occupancy pennit revoked for a "peace disturbance" after his girlfriend made a police call to report that he was considering committing suicide.
37. In a particularly troubling incident, Maplewood took enforcement action against a suicidal woman suffering from depression and post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of a rape. Maplewood cited her for generating too many calls for police services. The woman did not even make the last of the police calls for which Maplewood cited her; rather, the call was made by a volunteer at a suicide hotline who was concerned for her safety.
38. Maplewood's discriminatory enforcement of its nuisance ordinance has caused residents to be afraid to call for ambulance or police assistance, for fear of having their occupancy permits revoked. Residents- particularly those who already have been subject to nuisance ordinance enforcement- understand that each such call generates a record that can eventually be used against them, no matter how justified the call may be.
39. For example, shortly after Maplewood entered an order revoking the occupancy permit of one family of five because both parents had experienced mental-illness-related incidents that required police calls, one parent had an episode that required her hospitalization.
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Because the family was afraid to call an ambulance, they instead were forced to pay $35 for a cab ride. As one parent told the city in a voicemail: "We had to call a cab because apparently the ambulance is a crime for us."
40. Upon information and belief, Maplewood does not enforce its ordinance evenhandedly against all residents who could be eligible for such enforcement, but instead enforces the ordinance selectively against those residents whom it deems undesirable for other reasons.
41. This process was illustrated by an e-mail sent by one city official to another regarding a woman whom a social services agency was trying to help find a home in Maplewood. The agency had told city officials it understood there could be a problem if the woman's occupancy permit previously had been revoked. The city official checked records and found that no nuisance hearing had occurred regarding that woman. However, she said in the email to the other city official that before calling the agency back she would "see if we have enough to hold a nuisance hearing on her."
42. On information and belief, other residents have engaged in conduct that would permit Maplewood to revoke their occupancy licenses, but Maplewood has not acted against them. Instead, Maplewood has chosen to selectively enforce its ordinance in a manner that has a disproportionate impact based on race, sex, and disability. It has done so knowingly and intentionally.
43. Maplewood is aware of the chilling effects of its enforcement choices, but it nonetheless continues to enforce its ordinance in a manner that discourages crime victims from contacting the police.
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Maplewood's Enforcement of Its Ordinance Serves No Legitimate Purpose and Contradicts Federal Law and Guidance
44. Maplewood's discriminatory enforcement of its nuisance ordinance serves no legitimate purpose. There is no legitimate reason for Maplewood to exile people from the City based on number of police calls. And even if it were ever proper for Maplewood to do so, there is no legitimate reason to target African-American residents for selective enforcement; punish women for being survivors of domestic violence; or banish individuals with disabilities rather than providing them with appropriate and reasonable accommodations.
45. In particular, Maplewood's enforcement of its nuisance ordinance does not further the legitimate interest in tenant safety. Instead, it makes housing less safe by discouraging residents, neighbors, and landlords from contacting law enforcement.
46. Even if Maplewood's enforcement of its nuisance ordinance did make housing safer or otherwise further some legitimate interest, such a goal could be achieved in a manner that does not result in such a disproportionate and severe harm on African-American and female residents as well as residents with disabilities.
47. Maplewood's enforcement practices are inconsistent with various federal laws and guidance, further demonstrating that they are not the least discriminatory means of accomplishing any legitimate end.
48. For example, in 2005, Congress recognized that it is improper to evict survivors of domestic violence because of their abusers' activities. Accordingly, Congress amended the Violence Against Women Act to provide that, for federally funded housing, intimate partner violence "shall not be good cause for tenninating the assistance, tenancy, or occupancy rights of the victim of such violence." 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(9)(B); see also 42 U.S.C. § 14043e-ll(b) (covered housing programs may not deny occupancy based on the applicant or tenant being a
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victim of domestic violence). While those provisions do not directly regulate private housing or the municipal nuisance ordinance at issue here, they express a clear federal policy that is inconsistent with the notion that Maplewood's policy of revoking the occupancy permits of survivors of domestic violence is ever appropriate, let alone could be the least discriminatory means of furthering any legitimate safety interests.
49. Most survivors of domestic violence are women. In specifically targeting survivors ofdomestic violence for nuisance law enforcement, Maplewood thus discriminates on the basis of sex.
50. Punishing those who need police or other emergency services for seeking them may also infringe on their First Amendment right to petition the government for assistance. There is no legitimate reason for violating the constitutional rights of survivors of domestic violence and individuals with disabilities who need assistance, nor can doing so be the least discriminatory means of achieving a legitimate end.
51. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development issued guidance in 2016 confirming that nuisance ordinances that function like Maplewood's are not the least discriminatory means ofaccomplishing a legitimate purpose.2
52. HUD observed that many such ordinances, like Maplewood's, result in tenants' eviction because of police contacts regardless of whether the tenants did anything wrongful.
Under such circumstances, it stated, a municipality will have a "difficult burden" to prove that it
is necessary to "cut[] off access to emergency services for those in grave need of such services,
2 See HUD, Office of General Counsel, Guidance on Application ofFair Housing Act Standards to the Enforcement ofLocal Nuisance and Crime-Free Housing Ordinances Against Victims of Domestic Violence, Other Crime Victims, and Others Who Require Police or Emergency Services (Sept. 13, 20 16).
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including victims ofdomestic violence or other crimes, thereby potentially endangering their lives, safety and security."
53. Accordingly, as HUD's guidance makes clear, a nuisance ordinance that has a disparate impact based on race, sex and/or disability-as Maplewood's does- is likely to violate the Fair Housing Act, because there is no legitimate reason for enforcing such an ordinance in the manner that Maplewood does.
Injury to EHOC 54. Maplewood's enactment and enforcement of its nuisance ordinance has injured and is continuing to injure Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. EHOC has devoted significant resources to identifying and counteracting Maplewood's unlawful practices, and the injuries described below are fairly traceable to those practices. 55. As described above, Maplewood's nuisance ordinance has the purpose and effect of making housing opportunities unavailable, and making the terms and conditions of housing less favorable, based on race, sex, and disability. It also has the purpose and effect of perpetuating Maplewood's status as a white enclave in the deeply segregated St. Louis area. 56. EHOC's broad mission is to eliminate housing discrimination and racial segregation in housing in the St. Louis metropolitan area. It has only very limited resources, and thus discriminatory practices that require it to divert those resources from other worthy projects frustrate the full achievement ofEHOC's mission. 57. Maplewood's discriminatory enforcement of its nuisance ordinance has frustrated and continues to frustrate EHOC's mission of ensuring that all people have equal access to housing opportunities, in Maplewood and elsewhere in the region that EHOC serves.
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58. In response, EHOC has diverted scarce resources and staff to investigating and remedying Maplewood's discriminatory enforcement. Those resources and staffwould have been devoted to other projects if not for the discriminatory actions described in this complaint.
59. For example, when it becomes aware of occupancy permit revocation proceedings, EHOC has expended staff time and other resources representing some of those targeted in order to ensure that fair housing rights are protected. Maplewood's ordinance thus has directly depleted EHOC's resources.
60. Maplewood does not inform EHOC or anyone else on a regular basis when permit revocation proceedings have been initiated. In order to preserve its ability to combat Maplewood's discriminatory enforcement, EHOC has had to expend staff time and other resources monitoring city functions to detect permit revocation proceedings.
61. EHOC has had to expend resources acquiring public information about Maplewood's enforcement practices in order to confirm and document the extent of Maplewood's discrimination. In particular, Maplewood has charged EHOC thousands of dollars to obtain the public records that permitted the analysis necessary to assess the nature and scope of Maplewood's discriminatory enforcement practices.
62. EHOC has devoted considerable staff time and other resources to analyzing this evidence and evaluating Maplewood's conduct in order to counteract the discrimination described in this complaint.
63. EHOC has had to expend resources doing outreach to the community about Maplewood's discriminatory enforcement, educating community members. and otherwise counteracting the effects of Maplewood's discrimination. These activities, too, have required the diversion and expenditure of financial resources and staff time. Maplewood would not have
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engaged in these activities and expended such resources ifnot for Maplewood's discriminatory conduct.
64. For example, in reaction to Maplewood's discriminatory conduct, EHOC has given presentations at numerous area events to educate community members, advocates, organizations, and municipal employees regarding discriminatory nuisance ordinance enforcement in general and Maplewood's ordinance in particular. These events include, but are not limited to:
• Multiple sessions about nuisance ordinances and their discriminatory effects at EHOC's annual regional fair housing training conference on April 10, 20 15- a conference that Maplewood officials attended;
• An October 2015 training for social workers and domestic violence advocates at Washington University regarding nuisance ordinance enforcement;
• An October 2015 training for local government officials about fair housing issues affecting the area, including nuisance ordinance enforcement;
• A June 2016 presentation to the St. Louis Ending Violence Against Women Network regarding nuisance ordinance enforcement;
65. In reaction to Maplewood's discriminatory ordinance enforcement, EHOC also conducted a fair housing training session in July 2015 at the Maplewood Library in order to ensure that Maplewood residents understand their rights. Organizing this event required significant time spent finding a venue; distributing flyers and posters throughout Maplewood; and inviting local organizations.
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66. As a result of this diversion ofresources to addressing Maplewood's discriminatory conduct, EHOC has had to put on hold or shelve entirely other projects that would further its mission.
67. For example, EHOC had planned to prepare an extensive report regarding residential segregation in the greater St. Louis metropolitan area. This report, tentatively entitled "A Tale of Two Cities," would have documented in detail the disparities between predominantly white and predominantly African-American communities in the region. Because of the time spent on Maplewood's ordinance, EHOC has not been able to prepare this report.
68. EHOC also has had to postpone an investigation into discriminatory practices by
an East St. Louis landlord because of resources devoted to Maplewood's ordinance. 69. EHOC is continuing to suffer similar injury from Maplewood's ongoing
enforcement of its nuisance ordinance. 70. Through its actions described above, Maplewood has acted negligently,
intentionally, maliciously, and with willful, malicious, wanton, and reckless disregard for federal and state fair housing and non-discrimination laws. It is by now clear that the conduct described in this complaint violates the Fair Housing Act and other laws- and EHOC has told Maplewood as much- yet Maplewood persists in discriminatory and illegal conduct.
CAUSES OF ACTION First Cause of Action
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b), (f)
71. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the facts and allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 70 as fully set forth herein.
72. The federal Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to deny housing or make housing unavailable to any person "because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
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origin," 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), or because of a disability, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(t)(l). The Act also makes it unlawful to discriminate in the "terms, conditions, or privileges ofsale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith" for the same reasons. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (t)(2).
73. Both Supreme Court precedent and regulations of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development provide that a defendant can violate the Fair Housing Act either by committing intentional discrimination or through conduct that has an unnecessary disparate impact based on one or more protected classifications such as race, sex, or disability. See Tex. Dep 't ofHous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015); 24 § C.F.R. 100.500, et seq.
74. Maplewood's enforcement of its nuisance ordinance disproportionately impacts non-white residents, women, and people with disabilities, and it hinders the racial integration of a still-predominantly-white city in a region that is marked by long-standing residential segregation. These effects are not accidental, but rather stem from the intentional decisions to enforce the ordinance disproportionately in certain communities based on race, to make abuse victims responsible for the acts of their abusers, and to punish individuals with disabilities for needing city services. There is no legitimate justification for the ordinance or its discriminatory enforcement, and any legitimate purpose they serve could be accomplished in a less discriminatory manner.
75. Maplewood's nuisance ordinance makes housing unavailable anywhere in the city for those residents whose occupancy permit has been revoked. It also discriminates against those same tenants in the privileges of renting, as well as in the provision of municipal services related to renting.
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76. In selectively enforcing its ordinance as it does, Maplewood knowingly and intentionally makes housing unavailable, discriminates in the privileges of renting, and discriminates in the provision of municipal services related to rental housing, because of race, color, and disability. Additionally, it intentionally discriminates based on disability because Maplewood revokes the occupancy pennits of people with disabilities without making reasonable accommodations for their needs.
77. Maplewood's nuisance ordinance also violates the Fair Housing Act because it has an unnecessary disparate impact on the availability of housing based on race, sex, and disability, and because it perpetuates racial segregation in the greater St. Louis region. Maplewood's nuisance ordinance serves no legitimate purpose, and even if it did, such a goal could be achieved in a manner that does not result in such a disproportionate and severe harm on African-American and female residents as well as residents with disabilities.
78. Defendant, through its actions and the actions of its agents, is liable for the violation of Plaintiffs rights under the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b), (f).
Second Cause of Action Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 213.040(1), (2). 79. Plaintiffrealleges and incorporates the facts and allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 70 as fully set forth herein. 80. The Missouri Human Rights Act also bars housing practices that make housing unavailable or otherwise discriminate based on race, sex, and disability. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.040(1), (2). The Act was "patterned after the federal Fair Housing Act," Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 1233, 1238 (8th Cir. 1978), and so Maplewood's conduct violates it for the same reasons described above with respect to the federal Fair Housing Act.
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81. EHOC has filed a complaint against Maplewood with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. That complaint has been administratively exhausted, and the Commission has issued a right-to-sue letter regarding these allegations.
82. Defendant, through its actions and the actions of its agents, is liable for the violation of Plaintiffs rights under the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 213.040(1), (2).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council prays that this Court:
(a) enter a declaratory judgment that the actions of Defendant complained of herein are in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.040 et seq.;
(b) issue a permanent injunction restraining Defendant, its agents, employees, representatives, or any other person acting directly or indirectly with Defendant from enforcing its chronic nuisance ordinance, and directing Defendant to take all affirmative steps necessary to remedy the effects of the illegal, discriminatory conduct described herein and to prevent similar occurrences in the future;
(c) award compensatory damages in an amount to be determined by the jury that would fully compensate Plaintiff for the loss that has been caused by the conduct of Defendant alleged herein;
(d) award punitive damages to Plaintiff in an amount to be determined by the jury that would punish Defendant for its willful, wanton, and reckless conduct alleged herein and that would effectively deter Defendant from engaging in similar conduct in the future;
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(e) award Plaintiff its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 213.111; and
(t) order such other relief as this Court deems just and equitable. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b), Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council demands a trial by jury of all issues in this case.

Dated: March 13, 2017

Respectfully submitted,
Is/ Sasha Samberg-Champion
John P. Reiman"' Sasha Samberg-Champion"' RELMAN, DANE & COLFAX PLLC 1225 19th Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 Phone: (202) 728-1888 Fax: (202) 728-0848 jrelman@relmanlaw.com ssamberg-champion@relmanlaw.com
Is/ Thomas E. Kennedy. III Thomas E. Kennedy, III (MO Bar No. 46617)
Sarah Jane Hunt (63899) LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS E.
KENNEDY, III, L.C.
906 Olive St., Suite 200 St. Louis, MO 63101 Phone: (314) 872-9041 Fax: (314) 872-9043 tkennedy@tkennedylaw.com sarahjane@tkennedylaw.com
Attorneysfor PlaintiffMetropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Center
"' Pro hac vice admission to be sought
21

 
 Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 33 Filed: 12/08/17 Page: 1 of 12 PageID #: 156

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

METROPOLITAN ST. LOUIS EQUAL

)

HOUSING AND OPPORTUNITY COUNCIL, )

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF MAPLEWOOD, MISSOURI,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 4:17CV886 RLW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Maplewood, Missouri's Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 19). The motion is fully

briefed and ready for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant

Defendant's motion.

I. Background

Defendant City of Maplewood, Missouri ("Maplewood") is a municipality located in St. Louis County which has enacted a comprehensive Code of Ordinances ("City Code"). 1

Maplewood requires renters to obtain an occupancy permit for $15, and without such occupancy

permit, a person is not allowed to rent a dwelling or reside at another renter's dwelling. (Compl.

1 Courts "may consider materials that necessarily are embraced by the pleadings or that are part of the public record and do not contradict the complaint." Mickelson v. Cty. ofRamsey, 823 F.3d 918, 923 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). "For example, courts may consider 'matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint."' Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir.1999) (internal quotation omitted)). Here, Plaintiffs Complaint references the nuisance ordinance and related provisions enacted by Maplewood such that the Court will consider the relevant portions of the City Code. (Def.' s Exs. A & B, ECF Nos. 20-1, 20-2)

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 33 Filed: 12/08/17 Page: 2 of 12 PageID #: 157

iii! 18-19, ECF No. 1) In 2006, Maplewood enacted a nuisance ordinance that permits occupancy to be revoked where the person is deemed a "nuisance." (Id. at iii! 17, 19) Plaintiff
Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council ("EHOC") contends that the
nuisance ordinance is drafted so broadly that the city has enormous discretion to decide which
people the city will "exile." (Id. at iii! 19-24) Specifically, the nuisance ordinance provides in
relevant part:
In addition to any other act declared to be a nuisance by this Code or other ordinances of the city, nuisances are hereby defined and declared to be as follows:
(1) Any act done or committed, permitted or allowed to be done or committed, by any person, or any substance or thing kept, maintained, placed or found in or upon any public or private place which is injurious or dangerous to public health;
(2) Any pursuit followed or act done by any person to the hurt, injury, annoyance, inconvenience or damage of the public;

(17) Any premises upon which any of the following acts or conditions have occurred or continue to occur, whether by the owner, occupants or persons frequenting or congregating about the property:

f.

More than two instances within a 180-day period of

incidents of peace disturbance or domestic violence

resulting in calls to calls to the police;

(Id. at iii! 21-22; Def.'s Ex. A, City Code§ 34-240, ECF No. 20-1) When a nuisance has been

identified, the city manager or designee holds a hearing, and if a nuisance exists, the nuisance

may be abated by revoking the occupancy permit for a period not to exceed six months. (Def.

Ex. A, City Code § 34-242, ECF No. 20-1)

2

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 33 Filed: 12/08/17 Page: 3 of 12 PageID #: 158
On March 13, 2017, PlaintiffEHOC filed a Complaint alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et seq., and the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.040, et seq. Plaintiff alleges that the nuisance ordinance discriminates against and disproportionately impacts non-white residents, women, and people with disabilities. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Maplewood disproportionately enforces the ordinance against its small African-American population to perpetuate Maplewood's status as a
"white" community. (Compl. iii! 2, 3, 16) Plaintiff further avers that enforcement of the nuisance
ordinance punishes victims of domestic violence, African-American women in particular, and
exiles them from Maplewood. (Id. at iii! 22-23, 28-33) Plaintiff also contends that the nuisance
ordinance is enforced against individuals with disabilities, including those with mental illnesses.
(Id. at iii! 34-39)
Plaintiff EHOC claims that Maplewood does not enforce its ordinance evenhandedly but instead knowingly and intentionally enforces the ordinance in a selective manner that discriminates against and has a disproportionate impact based on race, sex, and disability.2 (Id.
at iii! 41-44) Plaintiff contends that Maplewood's discriminatory enforcement of its nuisance
ordinance has frustrated and continues to frustrate the EHOC's mission of ensuring all people
have equal access to housing. (Id. at if 57) Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment that Defendant's
actions violate the FHA and the MHRA; a permanent injunction restraining Defendant
2 Plaintiff alleges that it investigated 43 enforcement hearings between March 2010 and August
2015. (Compl. if 25) Plaintiff ascertained the race of the household in 34 of the hearings, and 19
of those enforcement actions were against African-Americans, even though African-Americans
constitute only 17 percent of the City's population. (Id. at if 26) Six of the 43 enforcement
actions involved domestic disturbances where a female African American resident was
"attacked" by a male. (Id. at if 29) Finally, 11 of the actions involved incidents that allegedly resulted from the "manifestation of mental illness or other disabilities." (Id. at if 35)
3

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 33 Filed: 12/08/17 Page: 4 of 12 PageID #: 159
Maplewood from enforcing the nuisance ordinance; compensatory damages; punitive damages; and attorneys' fees and costs.
II. Legal Standard With regard to motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must be dismissed if it fails to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (abrogating the "no set of facts" standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 4546 (1957)). While the Court cautioned that the holding does not require a heightened fact pleading of specifics, "a plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555. In other words, "[fJactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ...." Id. This standard simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the claim. Id. at 556. Courts must liberally construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept the factual allegations as true. See Id. at 555; see also Schaafv. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that in a motion to dismiss, courts accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint); Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that courts should liberally construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Further a court should not dismiss the complaint simply because the court is doubtful that the plaintiff will be able to prove all of the necessary factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. However, "[w]here the allegations show on the face of the complaint
4

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 33 Filed: 12/08/17 Page: 5 of 12 PageID #: 160
there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate." Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Courts '"are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court can "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. Legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss. Id.
III. Discussion The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to "refuse to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Further, it is unlawful to "discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). The FHA also makes it unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental, or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling because of a handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(l)-(2). The Missouri Human Rights Act similarly makes it unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of a dwelling based on race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, disability, or familial status. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.040.1. In its motion to dismiss, Defendant Maplewood argues that Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed because it contains no factual support for the claim of disparate treatment. Further, Defendant contends that Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination. Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs cause of action under the MHRA in
5

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 33 Filed: 12/08/17 Page: 6 of 12 PageID #: 161
Count II should be dismissed as duplicative of Count I under the FHA. The Court will discuss each argument in tum.
A. Disparate Treatment Defendant first argues that Plaintiffs disparate treatment claims lack the required factual support such that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted. '"Disparate-treatment claims under the FHA are tested under the same framework as Title VII disparate-treatment claims,' the question being whether Defendant treated Plaintiffs 'less favorably than other based on their race, color, religion, sex or national origin."' Folger v. City ofMinneapolis, 43 F. Supp. 3d 922, 931 (D. Minn. 2014) (quoting Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831 (8th Cir. 2010)). '"Proof of discriminatory purpose is crucial for a disparate treatment claim.'" Id Discriminatory purpose implies that the decision maker selected a course of action because of its adverse effects on an identifiable group. Spirit Lake Tribe ofIndians ex rel. Comm. of Understanding and Respect v. Nat'! Coll. Athletic Ass'n, 715 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotations and citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that "Maplewood intentionally targets its African-American residents for enforcement actions - then banishes them from the City - based on conduct that would not result in such enforcement against white residents." (Compl. ~ 2) Likewise, Plaintiff contends that "a large percentage of Maplewood' s enforcement actions have been taken against women who are survivors of domestic violence and/or people with disabilities." (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that the nuisance ordinance discriminates against African-American residents, women, and individuals with disabilities in that "Maplewood does not enforce its ordinance evenhandedly against all residents who could be eligible for such enforcement, but instead
6

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 33 Filed: 12/08/17 Page: 7 of 12 PageID #: 162
enforces the ordinance selectively against those residents whom it deems undesirable for other
reasons." (Id. at iii! 27-28, 34, 40)
Plaintiffs Complaint merely sets forth conclusory allegations that do not give an inference of discrimination. As stated above, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation omitted). "A claim is facially plausible 'where the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."' Wilson v. Ark. Dep 't ofHuman Servs., 850 F.3d 368, 371 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1055 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted)). While a plaintiff need not plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the elements of a prima facie case '"are part of the background against which a plausibility determination should be made.'" Blomker, 831 F.3d at 1056 (quoting Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013)).
The Court finds that the facts contained in Plaintiffs Complaint do not create an inference that Maplewood enforces its nuisance ordinance for the purpose of adversely affecting African American residents, women, and/or disabled residents. While Plaintiff purports to cite statistics and percentages, nothing on the face of the pleading sets forth facts or examples of white residents receiving more favorable treatment than African-American residents, or of nondisabled residents receiving better treatment because of an intent or motive to discriminate against these groups. Plaintiff baldly claims that the statement on Maplewood's website that "[o]ver the past decade, Maplewood' s central location and housing values have brought many young professionals and their families to our community" demonstrates a discriminatory purpose of enforcing the ordinance to exile African-American residents, people with disabilities, and
7

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 33 Filed: 12/08/17 Page: 8 of 12 PageID #: 163
women facing domestic violence. (Compl. iii! 16, 24) Other than conclusory assertions and
conjecture upon information and belief, Plaintiffs Complaint fails to assert any facts which would infer that Maplewood ignores similar conduct by other residents and only enforces its nuisance ordinance against African-American, female, and disabled residents. See Pope v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 561 Fed. App'x 569, 573 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding that a pleading based on information and belief with no facts that would lead to an inference of a plausible claim is insufficient under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12).
In short, Plaintiffs Complaint fails to identify specific instances where Defendant Maplewood had a discriminatory intent or motive in providing favorable treatment to white and/or non-disabled residents over other residents based on race, gender, disability, or any other improper criteria when enforcing its nuisance ordinance. See Folger, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 931-37 (D. Minn. 2014) (granting judgment on the pleadings with respect to plaintiffs disparate treatment claim under the FHA where the "Complaint consist[ed] of nothing more than conclusory allegations devoid of any plausible basis that the City enforced its housing code with the motive of intent to discriminate against any protected class ...."). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of disparate treatment that "nudge[s] [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible" such that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
B. Disparate Impact Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Maplewood' s overbroad definition of nuisance activity has an unlawful disparate impact on African-American, female, and disabled residents. Defendant Maplewood contends that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because the allegations
8

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 33 Filed: 12/08/17 Page: 9 of 12 PageID #: 164
are not supported by the necessary causal connection between a Maplewood policy and the alleged disparity required to adequately plead disparate impact.
"The Eighth Circuit has long recognized disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA." Ellis v. City ofMinneapolis, 860 F.3d 1106, 1110 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). '"In contrast to a disparate-treatment case, where a plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive, a plaintiff bringing a disparate-impact claim challenges practices that have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale."' Id. (quoting Tex. Dep 't ofHousing and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,_ U.S._, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2009) (internal quotation omitted)). "But disparate-impact liability has always been properly limited in key respects that avoid the serious constitutional questions that might arise under the FHA, for instance, if such liability were imposed based solely on a showing of statistical disparity." Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2522. The Supreme Court has emphasized, "'prompt resolution of these cases is important. A plaintiff who fails to allege facts at the pleading stage ... demonstrating a causal connection [between a defendant's policy and a disparity] cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate impact."' Ellis, 860 F.3d at 1111 (quoting Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523). Such "robust causality requirement ensures that '[r]acial imbalance ... does not, without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact' and thus protects defendants from being held liable for racial disparities they did not create." Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989)). The Supreme Court held that limitations on disparate-impact liability are "necessary to protect potential defendants against abusive disparate-impact claims." Id. at 2524. For example, governmental entities "must
9

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 33 Filed: 12/08/17 Page: 10 of 12 PageID #: 165
not be prevented from achieving legitimate objectives, such as ensuring compliance with health and safety codes." Id.
Here, Plaintiff contests Maplewood' s definition of nuisance in the ordinance has a disparate impact on African Americans, women, and people with disabilities, asserting that the enforcement results in exiling these groups from the City. (Pl.'s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss pp. 910, ECF No. 23) In support, Plaintiff presents statistical data allegedly demonstrating that the ordinance has a causal connection to disparate outcomes and a larger discriminatory pattern. Defendant contends that Plaintiff's statistical analysis fails to meet the causal connection standard required by Inclusive Communities.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead a causal connection between the alleged discriminatory policy, Maplewood's nuisance ordinance, and the alleged discriminatory disparate impact on African Americans, women, and disabled residents. As previously stated, at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff must plead a prima facie case of disparate impact under the FHA. Ellis, 860 F.3d at 1111. "[A] plaintiff must, at the very least, point to an 'artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary' policy causing the problematic disparity." Id. at 1114. In addition, Plaintiff must "allege facts at the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection" to make a prima facie case of disparate impact. Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
Here, the policy complained of is a nuisance ordinance enacted to promote public health, safety, and welfare. While Plaintiff has identified a policy, at best the statistical evidence merely shows an imbalance resulting from enforcement of the ordinance. Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that the ordinance causes the disparity. See Id. ("A robust causality requirement ensures that racial imbalance ... does not, without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
10

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 33 Filed: 12/08/17 Page: 11 of 12 PageID #: 166
and thus protects defendants from being held liable for racial disparities they did not create.") (internal quotation omitted); see also TBS Grp., LLC v. City ofZion, Ill., No. 16-cv-5855, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2017) (dismissing the complaint where plaintiff failed to "lay out a chain of inferences explaining how the Ordinance will cause a racially disparate impact, as distinct from just resulting in disparate impact").
Instead, Plaintiff points to only 43 selected enforcement hearings over the course of nearly 5 years that Plaintiff contends are evidence of a causal connection between the definitions in the nuisance ordinance and a disparate impact on African-Americans, women, and people with disabilities. The Court finds that this data is insufficient to state a plausible prima facie case "demonstrating that the [nuisance ordinance] complained of [is] arbitrary and unnecessary under the FHA." Ellis, 860 F.3d at 1112. As stated by the Supreme Court, "[w]ere standards for proceeding with disparate-impact suits not to incorporate at least the safeguards discussed here, then disparate-impact liability might displace valid governmental and private priorities, rather than solely 'remov[ing] ... artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers."' Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401U.S.424, 431 (1971)). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Complaint fails to set forth factual allegations sufficient to move its disparate impact claim over the plausibility threshold, and dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted.
Because the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs federal FHA claims against Defendant Maplewood pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over Plaintiffs state law claims under the MHRA.
Accordingly,
11

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 33 Filed: 12/08/17 Page: 12 of 12 PageID #: 167 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant City of Maplewood, Missouri's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED. A separate Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this &h day of December, 2017.
~~
RONNIE L. WHITE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12

 
 Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 47 Filed: 05/08/18 Page: 1 of 4 PageID #: 243

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

METROPOLITAN ST. LOUIS EQUAL

)

HOUSING AND OPPORTUNITY COUNCIL, )

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF MAPLEWOOD, MISSOURI,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 4:17CV886 RLW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and

Opportunity Council's ("EHOC") Motion for Relief from Judgment, pursuant to Rules 59, 60(b),

and 60(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 35) The motion is fully briefed and

ready for disposition. For the reasons discussed herein, the motion is denied.

PlaintiffEHOC seeks relief from this Court's final judgment and Memorandum and

Order of December 8, 2017, granting Defendant City of Maplewood, Missouri's ("Maplewood")

motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 33, 34) Plaintiff claims that the Court overlooked that EHOC's

sex discrimination and disability discrimination claims are conceptually distinct from the race

discrimination claims, and thus the Court erred in dismissing those claims for the same reasons.

EHOC requests that the Court further consider the sex and disability claims under a different

analysis. Defendant Maplewood asserts that Plaintiff cannot use Rule 60(b) to re-litigate the

merits of its case and that the Court fully addressed all of Plaintiffs claims as pleaded. Plaintiff

replies that it brings the motion, not under Rule 60(b) but under Rule 59(e), which allows a court

to correct errors in a final judgment.

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 47 Filed: 05/08/18 Page: 2 of 4 PageID #: 244
Under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file a motion to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days after the entry ofjudgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). "A district court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e)." United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). "Rule 59(e) motions serve the limited function of correcting 'manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence."' Id. (quoting Innovative Home Health Care v. P. T-0. T Assoc. ofthe Black Hills, 141 F.3d 1284, 1286 (8th Cir.1998) (internal quotation omitted)). Motions under 59(e) '"cannot be used to introduce new evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise arguments which could have been offered or raised prior to entry ofjudgment."' Id. (quoting Innovative Home Health Care, 141 F.3d at 1286). "Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry ofjudgment." § 2810.l Grounds for Amendment or Alteration of Judgment, 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2810.1 (3d ed.) (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, under Rule 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a court order for several reasons including mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, misconduct by an opposing party, or any other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l)-(3), (6). '"Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors oflaw or fact or to present newly discovered evidence."' Arnold v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 627 F.3d 716, 721 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hagerman, 839 F.2d at 414 (quotations and citations omitted)). "The district court has wide discretion in ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion ...." Jones v. Swanson, 512 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 2008). Rule 60(b) "authorizes relief based on certain enumerated circumstances (for example, fraud, changed
2

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 47 Filed: 05/08/18 Page: 3 of 4 PageID #: 245
conditions, and the like). It is not a vehicle for simple reargument of the merits." Broadway v. Norris, 193 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 1999).
Upon review of Plaintiff's motion and supporting memoranda, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b), both rules cited by Plaintiff as grounds for relief. Contrary to Plaintiff EHOC's assertion, the present motion is an attempt to re-litigate the issues which the Court thoroughly addressed in the Memorandum and Order. To the extent that EHOC finds the Court's judgment erroneous, a Rule 60(b) motion is not the proper vehicle for raising such objections. The Eighth Circuit "has maintained consistently that 'Rule 60(b) was not intended as a substitute for a direct appeal from an erroneous judgment.'" Spinar v. South Dakota Bd. ofRegents, 796 F.2d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Hartman v. Lauchli, 304 F.2d 431, 432 (8th Cir. 1962)). While Plaintiff now maintains that it is not requesting Rule 60(b) relief, the motion states that the "Court overlooked that EHOC's sex discrimination and disability discrimination claims are conceptually distinct from the race discrimination claims ...." (Pl.'s Mot. for Relief p. 1, ECF No. 35) Plaintiff's motion then argues that the Court's legal analysis of its sex and disability discrimination claims is erroneous. As state above, relief for alleged judicial error is not a proper basis for Rule 60(b) relief. 1 See Delaterjera v. Bowersox, No. 4:12-CV-1311NAB,2015 WL 300379, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 22, 2015) (citation and internal quotation omitted) (finding that an argument that the court misunderstood or misapplied the law is not grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(l)).
With respect to Rule 59(e), Plaintiff argues that the Court would commit error by refusing to reconsider the merits of the motion to dismiss and correct factual or legal errors
1 Nowhere in Plaintiffs initial memorandum does it argue that its request for relief meets the requirements of either Rule 60(b) or Rule 59(e). Only in the reply memorandum does Plaintiff explicitly rely upon Rule 59(e) as grounds for reconsideration.
3

Case: 4:17-cv-00886-RLW Doc. #: 47 Filed: 05/08/18 Page: 4 of 4 PageID #: 246
encompassed by the judgment. (Pl.' s Reply p. 2, ECF No. 40) However, contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, Rule 59(e) does not allow a plaintiff to re-litigate matters previously determined by the court. "It is not appropriate to use a Rule 59(e) motion to repeat arguments or to raise new arguments that could have been made before judgment." In re Gen. Motors Corp. Anti-Lock Brake Prod. Liab. Litig!., 174 F.R.D. 444, 446 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). Instead, as stated above, Rule 59(e) motions are limited to correcting manifest errors of law. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d at 933. Here, PlaintiffEHOC has not pointed to any manifest error by the Court. Review of Plaintiffs motion and related memoranda shows the present motion is merely an attempt to re-argue the merits, which the Court previously and thoroughly considered. Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiffs motion for relief from judgment. See Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 827 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court's denial of Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider where plaintiff merely restated arguments made in her opposition to defendant's summary judgment motion).
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council's Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 35) is DENIED. Dated this 8th day of May, 2018.
~~~
RONNIE L. WHITE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4

 
 U.S. District Court Eastern District of Missouri (St. Louis) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:17−cv−00886−RLW

CLOSED

Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council v. City of Maplewood,Missouri Assigned to: District Judge Ronnie L. White Cause: 42:3604 Title VIII − Housing Discrimination
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 03/13/2017 Date Terminated: 12/08/2017 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 443 Civil Rights: Accomodations Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council

represented by John P. Relman RELMAN AND DANE PLLC 1225 19th St NW Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 202−728−1888 Fax: 202−728−0848 Email: jrelman@relmanlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Cacace RELMAN AND DANE PLLC 1225 19th St NW Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 202−728−1888 Email: mcacace@relmanlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sasha Samberg−Champion RELMAN AND DANE PLLC 1225 19th St NW Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 202−728−1888 Fax: 202−728−0848 Email: ssamberg−champion@relmanlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E. Kennedy , III KENNEDY HUNT, PC 906 Olive St. Suite 200 St. Louis, MO 63101 314−872−9041 Fax: 314−872−9043 Email: tkennedy@tkennedylaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah Jane Hunt LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS E. KENNEDY, III, LC 906 Olive St. Suite 200 St. Louis, MO 63101

314−872−9041 Fax: 314−872−9043 Email: sarahjane@tkennedylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri

represented by Craig S. Biesterfeld LEWIS RICE, LLC 600 Washington Suite 2500 St. Louis, MO 63101 314−444−7600 Fax: 314−612−7726 Email: cbiesterfeld@lewisrice.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Tolles HUSCH BLACKWELL, LLP 190 Carondelet Plaza Suite 600 St. Louis, MO 63105 314−480−1858 Fax: 314−480−1500 Email: mike.tolles@huschblackwell.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/13/2017 03/13/2017 03/13/2017 03/13/2017
03/13/2017 03/15/2017 03/15/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri with receipt number 0865−5856359, in the amount of $400 Jury Demand,, filed by Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Original Filing Form, # 3 Summons)(Kennedy, Thomas) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
2 NOTICE OF PROCESS SERVER by Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council Process Server: Jose Pineiro (Kennedy, Thomas) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
3 DISCLOSURE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTERESTS CERTIFICATE by Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. Parent companies: None, Subsidiaries: None, Publicly held company: None,. (Kennedy, Thomas) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
Case Opening Notification: 1 Summons(es) issued. The summons was emailed to attorney Thomas E. Kennedy, III. All parties must file the Notice Regarding Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction Form consenting to or opting out of the Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. Click here for the instructions. Judge Assigned: U.S. Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Cohen. (BAK) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
4 Pursuant to Local Rule 2.08, the assigned/referred magistrate judge is designated and authorized by the court to exercise full authority in this assigned/referred action or matter under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636 and 18 U.S.C Sec. 3401. (CSAW) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. City of Maplewood,Missouri served on 3/14/2017, answer due 4/4/2017. (Kennedy, Thomas) (Entered: 03/15/2017)
6 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Sasha Samberg−Champion. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5860376) by Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Samberg−Champion, Sasha)

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(Entered: 03/15/2017)
7 ENTRY of Appearance by Sarah Jane Hunt for Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. (Hunt, Sarah) (Entered: 03/15/2017)
8 ORDER. This matter is before the Court on a verified motion for admission pro hac vice filed by Plaintiff's attorney, Sasha Samberg−Champion [Doc. 6 ]. Movant practices in Washington, D.C., and her motion contains the information required by Local Rule 12. After careful consideration, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the verified motion for admission pro hac vice [Doc. 6 ] is GRANTED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Cohen on 3/15/2017. (CBL) (Entered: 03/15/2017)
9 AMENDED ORDER − This matter is before the Court on a verified motion for admission pro hac vice filed by Plaintiff's attorney, Sasha Samberg−Champion [Doc. 6]. Movant practices in Washington, D.C., and the motion contains the information required by Local Rule 12. After careful consideration, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the verified motion for admission pro hac vice [Doc. 6] is GRANTED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Cohen on March 16, 2017. (MCB) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
10 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice John P. Relman. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5862948) by Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Relman, John) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
11 ORDER. This matter is before the Court on a verified motion for admission pro hac vice filed by Plaintiff's attorney, John P. Relman [Doc. 10 ]. Movant practices in Washington, D.C., and the motion contains the information required by Local Rule 12. After careful consideration, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the verified motion for admission pro hac vice [Doc. 10 ] is GRANTED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Cohen on 3/16/2017. (CBL) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
12 ENTRY of Appearance by Michael J. Tolles for Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri. (Tolles, Michael) (Entered: 03/28/2017)
13 ENTRY of Appearance by Craig S. Biesterfeld for Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri. (Biesterfeld, Craig) (Entered: 03/28/2017)
14 CJRA ORDER (GJL). Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Cohen termed. Case reassigned to District Judge Ronnie L. White for all further proceedings. (MCB) (Entered: 03/28/2017)
15 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer Defendant Maplewood, Missouri's Consent Motion to Extend Its Time to File a Response to Plaintiff's Complaint by Thirty Days by Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri. (Tolles, Michael) (Entered: 03/28/2017)
16 Docket Text ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response to Plaintiff's Complaint [ECF No. 15] is GRANTED to and including May 4, 2017. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 3/29/17. (ALM) (Entered: 03/29/2017)
17 Consent MOTION for Extension of: Time to Answer or Otherwise Respond to Plaintiff's Complaint by Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri. (Tolles, Michael) (Entered: 05/03/2017)
18 Docket Text ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Maplewood, Missouri's Consent Motion to Extend Time to File a Response to Plaintiff's Complaint [ECF No. 17] is GRANTED to and including May 11, 2017. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 5/4/17. (ALM) (Entered: 05/04/2017)
19 MOTION to Dismiss Case For Failure to State a Claim by Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri. (Tolles, Michael) (Entered: 05/11/2017)
20 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 19 MOTION to Dismiss Case For Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Chapter 34 (portions) City Code, # 2 Exhibit Chapter 12 (portions) City Code)(Tolles, Michael) (Entered: 05/11/2017)

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21 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 19 MOTION to Dismiss Case For Failure to State a Claim by Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. (Samberg−Champion, Sasha) (Entered: 05/16/2017)
22 Docket Text ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Consent Motion to Extend Time to File a Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 21] is GRANTED to and including June 9, 2017. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 5/17/17. (ALM) (Entered: 05/17/2017)
23 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 19 MOTION to Dismiss Case For Failure to State a Claim filed by Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. (Samberg−Champion, Sasha) (Entered: 06/09/2017)
24 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 19 MOTION to Dismiss Case For Failure to State a Claim Defendant Maplewood, Missouri's Consent Motion to Extend Its Time to File Its Reply in Support of Its Motion by Seven (7) Days by Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri. (Tolles, Michael) (Entered: 06/12/2017)
25 Docket Text ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Extend its Time to File its Reply in Support of its Motion [ECF No. 24] is GRANTED to and including June 23, 2017. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 6/12/17. (ALM) (Entered: 06/12/2017)
26 REPLY to Response to Motion re 19 MOTION to Dismiss Case For Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri. (Tolles, Michael) (Entered: 06/23/2017)
27 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority: by Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ellis v. City of Minneapolis)(Tolles, Michael) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
28 Docket Text ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file a response to Defendant's Notice of Supplemental Authority [ECF No. 27] no later than September 28, 2018. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 9/18/17. (ALM) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
29 RESPONSE to re 27 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority filed by Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. (Samberg−Champion, Sasha) (Entered: 09/28/2017)
30 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Megan Cacace. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−6233606) by Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing of Megan Cacace)(Cacace, Megan) (Entered: 11/09/2017)
31 SUPPLEMENTAL re 30 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Megan Cacace. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−6233606) Inadvertent filing error by Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. (Cacace, Megan) (Entered: 11/09/2017)
32 Docket Text ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Verified Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice by Megan Cacace on behalf of Plaintiff [ECF No. 30] is GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 11/13/17. (ALM) (Entered: 11/13/2017)
33 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant City of Maplewood, Missouri's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 19 ) is GRANTED. Aseparate Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on December 8, 2017. (BRP) (Entered: 12/08/2017)
34 ORDER OF DISMISSAL: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et seq., are DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiffs state law claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.040, et seq., are DISMISSED

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without prejudice. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on December 8, 2017. (BRP) (Entered: 12/08/2017)
35 MOTION for Reconsideration re 33 Memorandum & Order, 34 Order of Dismissal (case − Stipulation of Dismissal), by Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. (Samberg−Champion, Sasha) (Entered: 01/05/2018)
36 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 35 MOTION for Reconsideration re 33 Memorandum & Order, 34 Order of Dismissal (case − Stipulation of Dismissal), by Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri. (Tolles, Michael) (Entered: 01/09/2018)
37 Docket Text ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Joint Motion to Extend Deadlines Related to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration [ECF No. 36] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall file its response to Plaintiff's motion no later than January 22, 2017, and Plaintiff shall file its reply no later than February 2, 2018. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 1/10/18. (ALM) (Entered: 01/10/2018)
38 NOTICE of Change of Address filed by Craig S. Biesterfeld. (Biesterfeld, Craig) (Entered: 01/22/2018)
39 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 35 MOTION for Reconsideration re 33 Memorandum & Order, 34 Order of Dismissal (case − Stipulation of Dismissal), filed by Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri. (Tolles, Michael) (Entered: 01/22/2018)
40 REPLY to Response to Motion re 35 MOTION for Reconsideration re 33 Memorandum & Order, 34 Order of Dismissal (case − Stipulation of Dismissal), filed by Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. (Samberg−Champion, Sasha) (Entered: 02/02/2018)
41 MOTION for Leave to File a Sur−Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Relief by Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Tolles, Michael) (Entered: 02/06/2018)
42 Docket Text ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Leave to File a Sur−Reply [ECF No. 41] is GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 2/6/18. (ALM) (Entered: 02/06/2018)
43 SURREPLY to Motion re 35 MOTION for Reconsideration re 33 Memorandum & Order, 34 Order of Dismissal (case − Stipulation of Dismissal), filed by Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri. (Tolles, Michael) (Entered: 02/06/2018)
44 ORAL MOTION for Oral Argument by Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. (Samberg−Champion, Sasha) (Entered: 02/14/2018)
45 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 44 ORAL MOTION for Oral Argument City of Maplewood, Missouri's Opposition to Request for Oral Argument filed by Defendant City of Maplewood,Missouri. (Tolles, Michael) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
46 Docket Text ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Oral Argument [ECF No. 44] is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 2/15/18. (ALM) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
47 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council's Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 35 ) is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 05/08/2018. (KCB) (Entered: 05/08/2018)