Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 1 of 40

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

97- 1182

MARCIANO RODRIGUEZ, LAZARO RODRIGUEZ,

by his next friend and guardi~
EMELINA RODRIGUEZLIV-GRAHA~~

RAFAEL CARAMAZANA, by his next friend and natural frlA_GISTRATE Ju DGi

guardian MARIA CARAMAZANA, GINA MARTELLY, ~- - GARBER c
ANTONIA FERNANDEZ, by her next friend MILAGROS

FERMIN, EDUARDO MARSANS, by his next friend and

natural guardian EDUARDA FERNANDEZ, HENRIETTE

GUILLAUME, on behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated; METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY,

FLORIDA, a political subdivision of the State of Florida;

LAWTON M. CHILES, JR., Governor of the State of

Florida; THE STATE OF FLORIDA; ROBERT A.

BUTTERWORTH, Attorney General of Florida; EDWARD

A. FEAVER, Secretary, Florida Department of Children &

Family Services; DOUGLAS M. COOK, Director, Florida

Agency for Health Care Administration,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 97-

vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DONNA E. SHALALA, in her capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Service; and JOHN J. CALLAHAN, in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of Social Security; DANIEL GLICKMAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture,

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

___________________D__ef_e_n_da_n_t_s.________________/

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COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiffs, Marciano Rodriguez, by his next friend and guardian Lazaro Rodriguez,

Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, by his next friend and guardian Maria Caramazana, Gina

Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, by her next friend Milagros Fermin, Eduardo Marsans, by his next

friend and natural guardian Eduarda Fernandez, Henriette Guillaume, on behalf of themselves and

all others similarly situated; Metropolitan Dade County, Florida; Lawton M. Chiles, Jr., Governor

of Florida; the State of Florida; Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida; Edward A.

Feaver, Secretary, Florida Department of Children and Family Services; and Douglas M. Cook,

Director, Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, sue defendants, the United States of

America; Donna E. Shalala, in her capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services; John J.

Callahan, in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of Social Security; and Daniel Glickman, in his

capacity as Secretary of Agriculture, and allege:

NATURE OF THIS ACTION

1.

This action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from provisions of the

"Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996," P.L. 104-193, Title

IV (110 Stat. 21 05) (hereafter "Welfare Act"), on the basis that the Act on its face and as interpreted

by the rule adopted by the Social Security Administration ("SSA") violates: (1) the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by denying equal protection of

the laws to those elderly, blind or other legal noncitizens who have disabilities, were legally

residing in this country prior to the enactment ofthe Welfare Act, and whose Supplemental Security

Income and related Food Stamp benefits will be denied or terminated under the Welfare Act solely

on the basis of citizenship; (2) the Agreement for Reimbursement to the State for Interim Assistance

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Payments pursuant to § 1631 (g) of the Social Security Act and the Administrative Procedure Act

by refusing to reimburse Dade County for "interim assistance" paid by Florida to legal noncitizens

residing in Florida; and (3) Article IV, § 4, and the Tenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, by forcing a very few states, including Florida and its political subdivisions, to assume

the cost of caring and providing welfare benefits to legal noncitizens who, prior to enactment of this

law, were entitled to receive various benefits essential to their survival from the defendants.

2.

The purported justification ofthese provisions ofthe Welfare Act is to: (1)

discourage illegal immigration, and (2) to encourage self sufficiency among aliens. As applied to

legal noncitizens resident in Florida, these purported justifications are wholly irrational. The Act's

denial of subsistence benefits to legal noncitizens who, by statutory definition, are severely

impoverished and precluded from gainful employment by virtue of their advanced age, blindness

or disability, bears no rational relation to the Act's stated purposes of furthering the "self-

sufficiency" of noncitizens and providing a disincentive for "illegal immigration." These persons

are lawfully residing in this State by affirmative action of the defendants. Denying them benefits

can have no impact whatever on illegal immigration. These persons receive SSI benefits and

related Food Stamps because they cannot work. Denying them benefits cannot make them self-

sufficient. Furthermore, the Act's denial of essential benefits solely on the basis of noncitizenship

status invidiously singles out the most politically and physically vulnerable group of noncitizens

for discriminatory treatment, notwithstanding that these need-based benefits are warranted by severe

disabilities and/or advanced age.

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JURISDICTION

3.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States; 28

U.S.C. § 1346, because the United States is a defendant; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, because

declaratory and injunctive relief is sought; and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) because it is brought under the

Social Security Act.

4.

This Court has jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2201 because there is an actual controversy between the parties, and 22 U.S.C. § 2202

because the plaintiffs seek further necessary and proper relief that the Court deems appropriate.

5.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because the

United States and its employees are defendants, a substantial portion of the events or omissions

giving rise to the claims alleged have occurred and will continue to occur within the jurisdiction of

this Court, and the plaintiffs reside in this judicial district.

PARTIES

6.

Plaintiff Marciano Rodriguez brings this lawsuit through his next friend and

legal guardian, his son Lazaro Rodriguez. Plaintiff Marciano Rodriguez lives in Hialeah, in Dade

County, Florida. Mr. Rodriguez is 94 years old and has been a lawful permanent resident of the

United States since the 1960s.

7.

Plaintiff Emelina Rodriguez lives with her husband, Marciano Rodriguez,

in Hialeah, in Dade County, Florida. Plaintiff Emelina Rodriguez is 88 years old and has been a

lawful permanent resident of the United States since the 1960s.

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8.

Plaintiff Rafael Caramazana brings this case by and through his next friend

and natural guardian, his mother Maria Caramazana. Plaintiff Caramazana has been a lawful

permanent resident since 1983 when he immigrated to the United States from Cuba. He lives in

Hialeah, in Dade County, Florida.

9.

Plaintiff Gina Martelly immigrated to the United States from Haiti in 1969

and is currently a lawful permanent resident of the United States. Ms. Martelly lives in Miami,

Florida.

10. Plaintiff Antonia Fernandez, brings this case through her next friend, her

daughter Milagros Fermin. Ms. Fernandez has been a lawful permanent resident of the United

States since she immigrated from the Dominican Republic in 1962. Ms. Fernandez lives in Dade

County, Florida.

11. Plaintiff Eduardo Marsans, brings this case by and through his next friend

and natural guardian, his mother Eduarda Fernandez. Mr. Marsans has been a lawful permanent

resident of the United States since 1993. He lives in Miami, Florida.

12. Plaintiff Henriette Guillaume lives with her nearly 10 year old United States

citizen daughter in North Miami, Dade County, Florida. She immigrated to the United States from

Haiti in December 1984, and is currently a lawful permanent resident ofthe United States.

13. Plaintiff Metropolitan Dade County, Florida is a political subdivision of the

State of Florida established pursuant to Article VIII, § 11, of the Florida Constitution of 1885, as

amended, incorporated into the 1968 Constitution by Article VIII, § 6(e).

14. Plaintiff Lawton M. Chiles, Jr., is a citizen, resident and taxpayer of the

United States and the State of Florida. Plaintiff Chiles is the Governor of Florida and, pursuant to

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Article IV of the Florida Constitution, exercises the supreme executive power of the State of Florida. He is also responsible for initial preparation of the state budget, which, as a requirement ofthe Florida Constitution, must be balanced. See Article VII,§ 1(d), Fla. Const., and§ 216.162, Fla. Stat. In this capacity the Governor, in order to cover the costs of providing essential services and benefits to legal noncitizens, must recommend to the Florida Legislature that it either cut spending for other important state obligations and programs or that it increase taxes levied upon the residents and citizens of the State.
15. Plaintiff State of Florida is a sovereign state of the United States, whose political subdivisions are or are about to be denied reimbursements for "interim assistance" payable to them pursuant to § 1631 (g) of the Social Security Act, and whose citizens, residents and taxpayers are adversely and disproportionately affected by the Act in comparison to the citizens, residents and taxpayers of other states of the United States.
16. Plaintiff Robert A. Butterworth is the Attorney General of Florida, and pursuant to Article IV, § 4(c), of the Florida Constitution, is the chief state legal officer. He is authorized to appear in and attend all suits in which the state is interested. § 16.02(4) & (5), Fla. Stat.
17. Plaintiff Edward A. Feaver is the Secretary of the Florida Department of Children and Family Services (Department) and is charged with the responsibility, inter alia, to administer various welfare programs. The Department is required by the Welfare Act to recertify the eligibility of"qualified aliens" (as described herein) receiving Food Stamps under the federal Food Stamps program.
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18. PlaintiffDouglas M. Cook is the Director ofthe Florida Agency for Health Care Administration and is charged with the responsibility of administering the Medicaid program in Florida.
19. Defendant United States of America is a sovereign entity with the powers and duties specified in the Constitution ofthe United States and Acts of Congress.
20. Defendant Donna E. Shalala is the Secretary of Health and Human Services (hereafter "SSA") and as such she supervises those persons who administer the federal Supplemental Security Income program ("SSI"), as authorized by Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381(a). She is sued in her official capacity.
21. Defendant John J. Callahan is the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") and as such is responsible for the administration of SSI. He is sued in his official capacity.
22. Defendant Daniel Glickman is the Secretary of Agriculture and as such he supervises those persons who administer the federal Food Stamps program, as authorized by the Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. He is sued in his official capacity.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 23. Plaintiffs Marciano and Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez and Eduardo Marsans bring this case as a class action, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of a class of all persons similarly situated. 24. The class of plaintiffs consists of all poor, elderly or disabled noncitizens legally residing in Florida who were formerly eligible for, or who will be eligible for in the future,
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federal SSI and related Food Stamps, and who, based solely on their noncitizen status, will lose, be denied or have been denied SSI benefits and related Food Stamps as a result of the Welfare Act.
25. The plaintiffs' class consists of an unknown but extremely large number of individuals, approximately 54,000 individuals in South Florida alone, so that joinder of all members is impracticable.
26. Controlling issues oflaw and fact are common to all members ofthe plaintiff class in that each is a person lawfully residing in the United States and the State of Florida and each will lose SSI and related Food Stamp benefits solely as a result of the enactment ofthe Welfare Act.
27. The claims ofthe named plaintiffs are typical ofthe claims ofclass members, in that the named plaintiffs are lawfully residing in Florida, are blind, disabled or aged according to the eligibility standards specified in Title XVI ofthe Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13811383(d), and have been, are being, or will be denied SSI and related Food Stamps based solely on their citizenship.
28. The named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the class members. The named plaintiffs have no interests adverse to the plaintiff class. Plaintiffs' attorneys are experienced in federal class action litigation asserting constitutional claims and have no interests adverse to the plaintiff class.
29. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class in that defendants have manifested their intention to deny SSI and related Food Stamps to each and every member of the plaintiff class based solely on their alien status, thereby making appropriate final declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 8

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Marciano Rodri~uez

30. Plaintiff Marciano Rodriguez brings this lawsuit through his next friend and

legal guardian, his son Lazaro Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez has been a lawful permanent resident of

the United States since the 1960s, when he came at the invitation of the United States Government

after spending five years as a political prisoner in Cuba. Mr. Rodriguez is 94 years old. Even

though Mr. Rodriguez was in his sixties when he came to this country, he worked for about five

years after his arrival, first in a lamp factory and later as a security guard. He was regularly taxed

for contributions to the Social Security system but did not vest because his advanced age and poor

health prevented him from working for the requisite number of quarters.

31.

Mr. Rodriguez now suffers from numerous physical and mental disabilities,

including advanced organic brain disorder, Parkinson's disease and severe heart disease. He cannot

walk and is dependent on a pacemaker to stay alive. He lives with his 88 year old wife, plaintiff

Emelina Rodriguez. Their only income and support comes from their monthly SSI benefits, and

both have been notified that those benefits will be terminated if they do not provide SSA with proof

oftheir continued eligibility under the Welfare Act by May 12, 1997. Without SSI benefits, Mr.

Rodriguez risks going hungry, becoming homeless and going without the home care that he

depends upon for such basic needs as bathing, eating and taking his six different medications.

32. Although Mr. Rodriguez has now applied to become a citizen, it is highly

unlikely that he will be qualified to naturalize. Even if the Department of Immigration and

Naturalization Service ("INS") waives Mr. Rodriguez' English test and civics exam, his mental

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disabilities in all likelihood would prevent him from having the capacity to take the oath of allegiance.
Emelina Rodriguez 33. PlaintiffEmelina Rodriguez came to this country with her husband, plaintiff Marciano Rodriguez, in the 1960s. She, too, worked for several years after her arrival in the United States, paying regular income and social security taxes, but falling short of the requisite number of quarters necessary to vest in benefits. 34. Mrs. Rodriguez has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since the 1960s. She depends completely on her SSI benefits to meet all of her living expenses. Without her SSI benefits, Mrs. Rodriguez risks going hungry, becoming homeless and being unable to provide care for her frail husband, plaintiff Marciano Rodriguez. 35. Mrs. Rodriguez recently applied to become a United States citizen. Although she may qualify for naturalization if the English and civics examinations are waived, the INS has informed her that it will be at least six to nine months before they will even begin to process her application. Furthermore, after her benefits have been terminated, she will face another delay of several months to have her SSI benefits restored. In the interim, Mrs. Rodriguez risks going. hungry, becoming homeless and being unable to provide care for her frail husband, plaintiff Marciano Rodriguez.
Rafael Caramazana 36. Plaintiff Rafael Caramazana brings this case by and through his next friend and natural guardian, his mother Maria Caramazana. Mr. Caramazana was born in Cuba in 1965 with severe brain damage and cerebral palsy. He has quadriplegia and lacks motor skills. He must
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use a wheelchair and has to rely on others to move the wheel chair for him. He also lacks the ability to speak.
37. Mr. Caramazana immigrated to the United States with his parents as a lawful permanent resident in 1983 when he was 18 years old and the family was reunited with their relatives in the United States under federal immigration law. He still lives with his parents and his mother plans to continue to care for him as long as she is physically able. Currently, Mr. Caramazana attends a special day program for persons with disabilities and receives home care to assist him with bathing, eating and using the bathroom, none of which he can do on his own. He receives SSI and related Food Stamps on which the family depends in order to be able to care for him.
38. Mr. Caramazana's father, Miguel Angel Caramazana, has worked in a factory since he arrived in this country in 1983. He earns about $220 a week before taxes. Mr. Miguel Angel Caramazana has worked more than forty qualifying quarters, and paid all applicable social security and other taxes. Last year he became a United States citizen. Because caring for Rafael Caramazana takes all of Maria Caramazana's time and energy, the family's only income is Miguel Angel Caramazana's weekly paycheck and Rafael Caramazana's monthly SSI benefit.
39. The Caramazana family has received notification that Mr. Caramazana's SSI benefits will be terminated unless he can establish his eligibility under the new standards by May 12, 1997. Although the Caramazana family has repeatedly applied for PlaintiffRafael Caramazana to become a United States citizen, their applications have been rejected on the basis that his severe mental impairments prevent him from taking the oath ofallegiance. Without Mr. Caramazana's SSI benefits and related Food Stamps, he and his family risk losing their meager apartment, going
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hungry and doing without home care for him.

Gina Martelly

40.

Plaintiff Gina Martelly immigrated to the United States from Haiti in 1969,

when she was ten years old. She is deaf and mentally retarded. She is severely linguistically

impaired, and has trouble understanding and communicating even in sign language. Although

almost every day presents a difficult struggle for Ms. Martelly, she is making every effort to

improve her lot in life and achieve some self-sufficiency.

41.

Ms. Martelly is currently enrolled in a special vocational training program

for the hearing impaired where she is learning sewing and studying textile design. She plans to

graduate in one year and hopes to get a job in the garment industry. She is also on a waiting list to

move into her own apartment.

42.

Ms. Martelly depends entirely on her SSI benefits to survive at this time.

Without her monthly SSI check she will be unable to continue her vocational training program and

to move into her own apartment. She currently possesses no job skills and her severe

communication impairments prevent her from entering the workforce, the very impediments her

training program is designed to help her overcome.

43.

Ms. Martelly, who has been a lawful permanent resident ofthe United States

as far back as she can remember, applied for naturalization in August of last year. She has not

received a waiver for the English and civics portions of the examination and it is therefore highly

unlikely that she will be able to pass the examination and become a United States citizen. If she

cannot naturalize she will lose her SSI benefits and any hope of becoming self sufficient.

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Antonia Fernandez

44.

Plaintiff Antonia Fernandez is an 80 year old lawful permanent resident of

the United States. She brings this case by and through her daughter and next friend, Milagros

Fermin. Ms. Fernandez has lived in the United States since 1962 when she came from the

Dominican Republic to rejoin family members pursuant to federal immigration law.

45.

Ms. Fernandez suffers from numerous incapacitating illnesses which

developed many years after she arrived in this country, including organic brain syndrome,

psychosis, senility and Alzheimer's disease. Ms. Fernandez is also deaf, has hypertension and

arteriosclerotic heart disease. She is unaware of her surroundings most of the time and has lost the

ability to communicate.

46.

Ms. Fernandez needs 24 hour care as she is completely unable to care for

herself. She resides in a special home where she is cared for by a home care worker and a social

worker. She is able to pay for this residence only through her monthly SSI disability benefit, which she has received for about fifteen years. She has received notification from SSA that her SSI benefits will be cut off unless she provides proof of her continuing eligibility under the Welfare Act

by May 12, 1997.

47.

Ms. Fernandez has applied for U.S. citizenship but will probably not be able

to naturalize since she now lacks the capacity to take the oath of allegiance. Although she worked

in this country as a seamstress after her arrival, she has been informed by SSA that she does not

have sufficient qualifying quarters to continue receiving the benefits. Thus, under the Welfare Act

Ms. Fernandez faces complete termination of her SSI benefits due to her lack of citizenship.

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48. If Ms. Fernandez' SSI benefits are terminated, she will have to do without the 24 hour attention that she needs. Without such essential care and supervision, Ms. Fernandez risks serious injury and even death.
Eduardo Marsans 49. PlaintiffEduardo Marsans brings this case by and through his next friend and natural guardian, his mother Eduarda Fernandez. Mr. Marsans has cerebral palsy and quadriplegia. He must use an electric wheelchair to get around. Mr. Marsans, his mother and his younger brother came to the United States from Cuba when Eduardo was thirteen. They have been lawful permanent residents of this country since 1993. 50. Mr. Marsans lives with his mother, who spends almost all her time caring for him because they have no other assistance available to them. They also live with Mr. Marsans's younger brother, Miguel, a teenager who has been working full time for three years as a tile setter to help support the family. Miguel Marsans works for minimum wage, earning about $250 per week. 51. Mr. Marsans receives SSI benefits and related Food Stamps on which the family depends in order to be able to pay their rent and buy enough food for him. He has received a notice from SSA that his benefits will be terminated unless he submits proof of his continued eligibility for SSI by May 12, 1997. Because Mr. Marsans is not eligible for naturalization until May 1998, when he will have completed the requisite five years of lawful residence, he will not be able to submit such proof and his SSI and related Food Stamps will be terminated. Without SSI and related Food Stamps Mr. Marsans and his family risk homelessness and hunger.
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Henriette Guillaume

52. Plaintiff Henriette Guillaume immigrated to the United States from Haiti in

December 1984. She worked, first at a garden, then at a day care center, and lastly at a nursing

home. She paid Social Security taxes. Through her work, she supported herself and her United

States citizen daughter, Melissa Guillaume, who was born on April 25, 1987. In 1990, she was in

an automobile accident and became paralyzed as a result. She has paraplegia. She must use a

wheelchair for mobility, and she is unable to transfer herself in and out of the chair. As a result, she

needs personal care assistance in order to use the bathroom, shower, dress and undress herself, and

to go in and out of bed. She presently receives one to two hours ofhome care assistance during the

week. Her sister and daughter help her the rest of the time.

53.

Ms. Guillaume is a lawful permanent resident. In November 1995, she

applied to become a United States citizen. She is waiting for her application to be processed. She

speaks English fluently. Because of delays in processing applications for naturalization, it is

unlikely that she will become a citizen before her SSI benefits are cut off.

54. Ms. Guillaume uses her SSI check of $484 to support herself and her United

States citizen daughter. She also receives a small amount of money ($153) from Florida's welfare

program (WAGES) for her daughter's support. She is a single mother and receives no support from

Melissa's father, who has not had any contact with her or her daughter since her accident. Ms.

Guillaume receives SSI-related Food Stamps for herself. Her daughter also receives Food Stamps.

Henriette Guillaume's SSI benefits enable her to provide housing, clothing and adequate food for

herself and her daughter. Without her SSI benefits and SSI-related food stamps, Ms. Guillaume and

her United States citizen daughter risk going hungry and becoming homeless. If her mother is

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unable to support her and to provide adequate food and shelter, Melissa Guillaume may be removed from her loving mother and put in foster care at much greater expense to the State of Florida and

the United States.

Impact on the State of Florida and Dade County

55.

Plaintiffs Dade County and the State of Florida calculate that as ofDecember

1996 some 79,834 legal noncitizens residing in Florida were receiving SSI. Plaintiffs further

calculate that as of January 1997 some 38,123 legal noncitizens residing in Florida were receiving

Food Stamps related to SSI benefits. The majority ofthese legal noncitizens reside in Dade County.

56.

Plaintiffs Dade County and the State of Florida also calculate that 68% of

Florida's legal noncitizens receiving SSI in December 1996--54,000 persons, like the named

plaintiffs --will be left without these essential subsistence benefits as a result of the Welfare Act.

Ofthis number, plaintiffs estimate 15,047 are under age 65, the remainder are over age 65, and that

6,944 are age 85 or over.

57.

Plaintiffs Dade County and the State of Florida further calculate that 38,123

of Florida's legal noncitizens receiving Food Stamps related to SSI benefits in January 1997 will

be ineligible for Food Stamps as a result ofthe Welfare Act. Ofthis number, plaintiffs estimate that

27,500 are age 65 or over and that 4,902 are age 85 or over, like Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez.

58.

According to INS' estimates, three out of every four legal permanent

residents reside in one of six states: either Florida, California, New York, Texas, New Jersey or

Illinois. More than 1,000,000 legal noncitizens were believed to be residing in Florida before

August 22, 1996. All of these individuals reside in Florida by action of the federal government.

However, INS estimates that, as of April 1996, only 405,000 out ofthe 790,000 legal permanent

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residents believed to be residing in the State of Florida at the time were eligible for United States

citizenship. 59.

Naturalization is not a viable alternative for a substantial number of those

who will lose SSI and related Food Stamps benefits under the Act. Many ofthe SSI recipients like Marciano Rodriguez or Rafael Caramazana do not possess the capacity to understand or learn the English language, pass a civics test, or swear the oath of allegiance. Even if these examinations are waived, many like Rafael Caramazana and Marciano Rodriguez, lack the capacity to take the oath of allegiance. Moreover, the relatively few who can naturalize face the daunting prospect of

lengthy delays in the naturalization process for up to two years due to INS backlogs, leaving a large

time gap between when their benefits terminate and when they can naturalize. Upon information

and belief, the INS offices in Florida have an existing backlog of 86,982 or more pending

applications for naturalization. The many additional applications spurred by the Act can be

expected to significantly exacerbate the backlog. 60. Many SSI and related Food Stamps beneficiaries who are "qualified alien"
residents in Florida, like all the named Plaintiffs, will be unable to support themselves. Although

some of the legal noncitizens resident in Florida may be eligible for public assistance programs

financed in whole or in part by the State and Dade County, such as Medicaid or the Work and Gain

Economic Self Sufficiency (WAGES) programs, the State of Florida and Metropolitan Dade

County do not have programs equivalent or even similar to SSI and related Food Stamps for the

aged, blind or persons with disabilities, like the named Plaintiffs in this action.

61. Nearly all of the above-identified recipients of SSI and related Food Stamps

depend on these benefits for their survival. When the Welfare Act becomes operative, the State of

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Florida, Dade County and other local governments will necessarily be confronted with an overwhelming demand for essential services, including food, shelter, medical and hospital care, nursing home services, and police services. Dade County, in particular, will face a social and fiscal crisis ofenormous proportions. Already one of the nation's poorest metropolitan counties on the basis of per capita income, Dade County is the residence for a disproportionate share of the State's legal noncitizen population, who will now lose even their subsistence benefits under the Act.

62. When the Welfare Act becomes operative, approximately 54,000 noncitizens currently receiving SSI will no longer be categorically eligible for Medicaid. Because Florida has

exercised its option under the federal welfare law to provide Medicaid coverage to qualified aliens, at an estimated cost of $51 million to the taxpayers of Florida, the Florida Department of Children and Family Services (which determines eligibility for the Medicaid program) will be required to make eligibility determinations as to each ofthese individuals, imposing a significant administrative

cost, at an estimated additional $16 million, to the State.

63. Because the State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration

administers Medicaid, this Agency will also be significantly burdened and will also incur significant

costs.

64.

Some legal noncitizens are eligible for admission to nursing homes based on

their current health status but live with their families such as the Rodriguez family or Mr. Caramazana or in less costly facilities such as Mr. Hernandez and support themselves with SSI

payments. Some of these individuals who will lose SSI eligibility, like Ms. Fernandez, will be forced into costly nursing home care. It is estimated that nearly 800 are currently eligible for

admission to nursing homes, at an estimated cost of $29 million to the taxpayers of Florida.

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65.

Legal noncitizens resident in Florida also will be denied Food Stamps related

to SSI benefits, another program administered by the Florida Department of Children & Family

Services. Moreover, because of the Department's role, imposed by the Welfare Act, in making

Food Stamp determinations, the Department will be under a legal duty to participate in the

unconstitutional violation challenged here.

66.

Furthermore, because of the Florida Department of Children & Family

Services' role in making eligibility determinations for and providing financial assistance through

WAGES and Medicaid programs for noncitizens newly ineligible for SSI and Food Stamps, as well

as making eligibility determinations for the Food Stamp program, the Florida Department of

Children & Family Services and the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration has a

significant relationship with the "qualified aliens" resident in Florida whose equal protection rights

are being violated.

67.

Plaintiffs Dade County and the State of Florida calculate, and so allege, that

the direct financial impact on the State of Florida will be $258,214,502 annually, equal to the value

ofthe SSI and related Food Stamps benefits that will be denied "qualified aliens" resident in Florida

who are current recipients.

68.

Therefore, Plaintiffs calculate, and so allege that the total impact on the State

of Florida will be at least $304,014,502, equal to the value of denied SSI and related Food Stamps

benefits, unreimbursed interim assistance, and administrative and other costs incurred as a result

of the Welfare Act.

19

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 20 of 40

COUNT I

Violation of the Plaintiff Class' Fifth Amendment Rights

69.

Plaintiffs, Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana,

Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume, on behalfofthemselves

and all others similarly situated, reallege paragraphs 1 through 68.

The Supplemental Security Income Program

70. In 1972, the SSI program was established by Title XVI ofthe Social Security

Act. Congress' stated intent in that legislation was to establish a national program with uniform

standards to provide minimal subsistence benefits to individuals 65 years of age or older or who

are blind or who have disabilities which prevent them from being able to earn a living and who

have insufficient other income or resources to support themselves. SSI benefits, which still leave

the recipient far below the federal poverty level, provide minimal income to persons without the

means or capacity to provide for the most basic human needs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382, 1381a.

71.

To be disabled for purposes ofthe SSI program, an individual must be unable

to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medical, physical, or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than 12 months (or, in the case of a child under the age of 18, if she

suffers from any medical, physical, or mental impairment which results in marked or severe

functional limitations, and which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less that 12 months). 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A), as amended by§ 211 ofthe Welfare Act.

72. Adults are considered to have sufficient disabilities to qualify only if their

physical or mental impairment(s) are of such severity that they are not only unable to do their

20

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 21 of 40

previous work but cannot, due to their age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether a specific job vacancy exists for them, or whether they would be hired if they applied for work. 42

U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(B).

73.

For purposes ofSSI eligibility, individuals are considered blind ifthey have

central visual acuity of 20/200 or less in the better eye with the use of a correcting lens or an

equivalent loss ofvision. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(c)(2).

74.

All SSI eligible individuals, whether aged, blind, or having such disabilities,

must meet a stringent income and resources test. An individual SSI applicant or recipient may have

no more than $2,000 in resources (including vehicles and personal property) and countable income must be below the applicable SSI benefit level. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382a, 1382b. If an SSI recipient obtains any other source of income, the SSI benefit is reduced accordingly. Those who meet the stringent income and resources test may be entitled to receive the maximum 1997 federal SSI benefit rate for one person which is $484 per month. The federal poverty level is currently $658 per

month for an individual. 61 Fed. Reg. 8286.

75.

There are no prior work history requirements for SSI eligibility. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1381, et seq.

The Food Stamp Proeram

76.

The Food Stamp program was enacted in 1964 by Congress to safeguard the

health and well-being of the nation's population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households. Congress found that "the limited food purchasing power of low-income households contributes to hunger and malnutrition among members of such households." 7 U.S.C. § 2011.

21

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 22 of 40

77. The Food Stamp program is administered by states under the supervision of

the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). States must follow rules governing Food

Stamps promulgated by USDA.

78. Food Stamp eligibility is limited to households whose net income is below

the federal poverty level and whose resources are below $2000, or if a household member is age

60 or older, $3000. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) and (g).

79. SSI eligible recipients, by virtue of their extreme poverty, also are

categorically qualified to receive Food Stamps. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a). Any household which contains

an SSI recipient is automatically eligible for Food Stamps. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a).

The Welfare Act

80. Before Congress enacted the Welfare Act in 1996 all persons lawfully

residing in the United States of America, citizens and noncitizens alike, who were aged, blind, or had disabilities and whose countable income and resources fell below eligibility thresholds,

qualified for SSI benefits and related Food Stamps.

81. On August 22, 1996, the Welfare Act was signed into law. Section 431 of

the Welfare Act created a new eligibility category called "qualified aliens." Under § 431, a

"qualified alien" is a noncitizen who, at the time the noncitizen applies for, receives, or attempts

to receive a Federal public benefit is

(1)

an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence

under the Immigration and Nationality Act;

(2) an alien who is granted asylum under§ 208 of such Act;

(3) a refugee who is admitted to the United States under § 207 of such Act;

22

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 23 of 40

(4) an alien who is paroled into the United States under § 212(d)(5) of such Act for a period of at least 1 year;

(5)

an alien whose deportation is being withheld under § 243(h) of

such Act,

(6) an alien who is granted conditional entry pursuant to § 203(a)(7) of such Act as in effect prior to April 1, 1980, or

(7)

a battered alien as referenced in§ 501 ofthe Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.

82. As such, all "qualified aliens" are legal immigrants, lawfully present and

resident in the United States, or battered aliens as referenced in§ 501 of the Illegal Immigration

Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 . The decision to admit each of these qualified

aliens in the State of Florida, was that of an agency of the United States, not that of Florida.

83. Section 402(a)(1)(2) and (3) ofthe Welfare Act provides that with certain

narrow, defined exceptions no qualified alien is eligible for supplemental security income under

Title XVI of the Social Security Act or Food Stamps pursuant to§ 3(h) of the Food Stamp Act of

1977. Consequently, the Welfare Act renders most noncitizens ineligible for SSI benefits and

related Food Stamps.

84. Section 402(a)(2)(D)(i) provides that within one year ofthe date ofenactment

of the Welfare Act (which is, by August 22, 1997) the Commissioner of Social Security shall

redetermine the eligibility of any individual who is receiving benefits as of the date of the

enactment of the Welfare Act and whose eligibility for such benefits may terminate by reason of

§ 402(a)(l) ofthe Act.

85. Section 402(a)(2)(D)(ii) provides that within one year of the date of

enactment of the Welfare Act (which is, by August 22, 1997), the relevant state agency, here, the

23

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 24 of 40
State of Florida Department of Children and Family Services, shall be required to recertify the eligibility of any individual who is receiving Food Stamps as of the date of enactment of the Welfare Act and whose eligibility for such benefits may terminate by reason of§ 402(a)(l).
86. In enacting the Welfare Act, Congress declared two purposes for denying SSI and related Food Stamps to otherwise legal noncitizens: (1) to "assure that aliens be self-reliant," and (2) to "remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits." On its face and as applied to members of the plaintiff class, the Welfare Act furthers neither interest identified by Congress and is wholly irrational.
87. Denying SSI and related Food Stamps to members ofthe plaintiffclass cannot encourage them to be "self-reliant." Members of this class, are by definition, unable to work and without assets or other means of support. Denying them basic subsistence benefits can only make members ofthe plaintiff class less self-reliant since they are likely to become homeless, hungry and unable to provide care for themselves as a result of the Welfare Act. Many face the uncertain prospect of being institutionalized or re-institutionalized at greater public expense if the SSI benefits which permitted them a modicum of independent living are withheld.
88. Denying basic subsistence benefits to class members --legal noncitizens who are blind, elderly or whose disabilities preclude them from substantial gainful employment -- cannot and will not deter illegal immigration. Members of the plaintiff class are not living in this country illegally; rather they reside here at the invitation of the United States government. Persons illegally present in the United States have never been eligible for SSI and related Food Stamps.
24

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 25 of 40
89. Denying SSI benefits and related Food Stamps to members of the plaintiff class, based solely on the fact that they are not United States citizens, denies them the equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Femandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, respectfully request that this Court:
A. Assume jurisdiction over this matter; B. Certify this matter as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 23; C. Declare that the Welfare Act, as it applies to members of the plaintiff class, violates plaintiffs' right to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; D. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining defendants from enforcing§ 402 of the Welfare Act; E. Award class plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs in this action; and F. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT II Violation of Administrative Procedure Act -Abuse of Discretion- as to the State of Florida
and Metropolitan Dade County 90. Plaintiffs, the State of Florida and Metropolitan Dade County, reallege paragraphs 1 through 89.
25

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 26 of 40
91. The SSA upon information and belief takes approximately one to two years to determine whether an applicant is eligible for SSI and to issue the first monthly benefit check.
92. In recognition of this lengthy application process, Congress and the Secretary of Health and Human Services have encouraged states and local governments to provide SSI applicants with interim assistance during the application period. See 42 U.S.C. §1383(g); 20 C.P.R. §416.1901-1922.
93. The State of Florida and Metropolitan Dade County agreed to provide this interim assistance to SSI applicants residing in Dade County and therefore entered into an agreement with the Secretary of Health and Human Services in 1989 entitled, "Agreement for Reimbursement to State for Interim Assistance Payments Pursuant to Section 1631 (g) of the Social Security Act."
94. Under that agreement, Dade County created an interim assistance program in which it provides interim assistance to applicants for SSI residing in Dade County. In return, the Secretary of Health and Human Services allows Dade County to recover the interim assistance out of the first retroactive lump sum payment that SSA issues to a successful applicant.
95. The Commissioner of Social Security Administration promulgated Programs Operations Manual Systems, Number 00502.150A.2 which indicates that legal permanent residents who had pending claims or appeals on August 22, 1996, are ineligible to receive SSI benefits, even for the period of time prior to the enactment of the Welfare Act. In other words, the. Commissioner has applied the Welfare Act retroactively.
96. By adopting a rule applying the Welfare Act retroactively to deny SSI benefits to legal noncitizens, even for the period of time prior to enactment, the Commissioner is also
26

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 27 of 40
refusing to reimburse Dade County for the interim assistance that it has already advanced to those legal noncitizens.
97. Upon information and belief, Metropolitan Dade County has thereby lost approximately $800,000 in interim assistance revenue, revenue that would be available for future SSI applicants.
98. The Welfare Reform Act did not provide an effective date for the implementation of the new eligibility criteria in§ 402(a). Specifically, the Welfare Act does not explicitly state that the new criteria in§ 402(a) shall apply to benefits payable to legal residents for claims and appeals pending prior to the Welfare Act's enactment. In other words, the Welfare Act does not provide that§ 402(a) be given retroactive effect.
99. Defendant Commissioner of Social Security Administration has given the Welfare Act retroactive effect promulgating Program Operations Manual Systems Number 00502.150A.2 (October 1996). This policy declares that any legal resident with a pending claim or appeal on August 22, 1996 is ineligible to receive any SSI benefits, even for the period of time prior to its enactment.
100. The Social Security Administration as an administrative agency cannot apply a new statute retroactively unless Congress has explicitly directed it to do so.
101. The Commissioner of Social Security Administration has violated the rules of statutory construction and has failed to give effect to the plain meaning ofthe Welfare Act.
102. The Commissioner's actions are contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and in violation ofthe Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. C. 55 et. seq.
27

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 28 of 40
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, the State of Florida and Metropolitan Dade County, respectfully request that this Court:
A. Assume jurisdiction over this matter; B. Declare that Program Operations Manual Systems Number 00502.150A.2 (October 1996) is contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion and violates the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 55, et seq.; C. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining defendants from retroactively enforcing § 402 of the Welfare Act; D. Award plaintiffs the State of Florida and Metropolitan Dade County attorneys' fees and costs in this action; and E. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT III Violation of the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act as to the
State of Florida and Metropolitan Dade County 103. Plaintiffs, the State of Florida and Metropolitan Dade County, reallege paragraph 1 through 102. 104. SSA's retroactive application of the Welfare Act is a rule, because it is an agency statement of general applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy. 105. SSA's retroactive application of the Welfare Act, being a rule, is subject to rulemaking procedures, including publication in the Federal Register for public notice and comment.
28

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 29 of 40
106. On information and belief, SSA did not publish its rule mandating retroactive application of the Welfare Act in the Federal Register for notice and comment, but instead issued it only in a Programs Operations Manual System.
107. SSA's failure to publish its substantive rule mandating retroactive application of the Welfare Act in the Federal Register violates the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §553.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, the State of Florida and Metropolitan Dade County, respectfully request that this Court:
A. Assume jurisdiction over this matter; B. Declare that Program Operations Manual Systems Number 00502.150A.2 (October 1996) was unlawfully promulgated and its promulgation violated the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §553; C. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining defendants from applying Programs Operations Manual System Number 00502.150A.2 in order to retroactively enforce § 402 of the Welfare Act; D. Award plaintiffs the State ofFlorida and Metropolitan Dade County attorneys' fees and costs in this action; and E. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
29

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 30 of 40
COUNT IV Common Law Breach of Contract as to Plaintiffs the State of Florida and Metropolitan
Dade County 108. Plaintiffs, the State of Florida and Metropolitan Dade County, reallege paragraphs 1 through 107. 109. The State of Florida and Dade County entered into an agreement with the Secretary of Health and Human Services in 1989 entitled, "Agreement for Reimbursement to State for Interim Assistance Payments Pursuant to Section 1631 (g) of the Social Security Act." 110. Under the agreement, Dade County agreed to provide interim assistance from the County's general revenue funds to SSI applicants. Under the Agreement, Dade County has provided at least $800,000 in interim assistance to the applicant between the date of application and the date of final receipt ofthe SSI benefits. 111. The Secretary of Health and Human Services in turn agreed to reimburse Dade County for the interim assistance by forwarding to Dade County, the initial retroactive lump sum payment awarded to the applicant. 112. The Secretary ofHealth and Human Services and the Commissioner of Social Security Administration have breached the contract with the State and Dade County by retroactively applying§ 402 of the Welfare Act to legal residents with pending claims and appeals. 113. As a consequence of this breach of contract, Dade County and the state of Florida have been damaged. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, the State of Florida and Metropolitan Dade County, respectfully request that this Court:
30

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 31 of 40
A. Assume jurisdiction over this matter; B. Declare that the "Agreement for Reimbursement to State for Interim Assistance Payments Pursuant to Section 1631 (g) of the Social Security Act" between the United States and the state of Florida, has been breached as a result of defendant's enforcement of the Welfare Act; C. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining defendants from enforcing § 402 ofthe Welfare Act as it applies to the Agreement for Reimbursement to State for Interim Assistance Payments Pursuant to Section 1631 (g) of the Social Security Act; D. Order that defendants compensate plaintiff Metropolitan Dade County for all unreimbursed interim assistance provided under the Agreement; E. Award plaintiffs the State ofFlorida and Metropolitan Dade County attorneys' fees and costs in this action; and F. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
COUNTV Violation of the Article IV,§ 4 and the Tenth Amendment as to Plaintiffs the State of
Florida and Metropolitan Dade County 114. Plaintiffs, the State of Florida and Metropolitan Dade County, reallege paragraphs 1 through 113. 115. "Qualified aliens" are those noncitizens whose presence in the United States is lawful and in accordance with immigration laws. The plain purpose and clear effect of the Welfare Act is to deny these "qualified aliens" the most basic of federal benefits--benefits essential to survival--and therefore to make the few states in which these "qualified aliens" reside responsible
31

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 32 of 40
for supporting them. Consequently, the State and Dade County will not be reimbursed the interim assistance it provided "qualified aliens" in violation of the Agreement for Reimbursement to State for Interim Assistance Payment pursuant to § 1631(g) of the Social Security Act. This obvious and shameful effort on the part of Congress to wash its hands ofthe most needy is purely fiscal policy, not immigration policy. Insofar as it is the intent of the Welfare Act to discourage the future immigration of persons likely to become public charges, the denial of benefits to those already present totally fails to implement that goal. As a means to that end, the Welfare Act is wholly irrational. A policy to discourage future immigration of persons likely to become public charges can only be effective if applied to persons who enter the United States as legal noncitizens after the enactment ofthe Welfare Act. Furthermore, the refusal to reimburse the interim assistance provided these "qualified aliens" resident in Florida does nothing to further Congress' stated goals.
116. The Welfare Act implements fiscal policy only, and the costs of this policy are disproportionately concentrated in only a few states, Florida among them. The Congressional representatives of states having few or no qualified aliens have forced this fiscal policy on the six states that have the overwhelming majority of qualified aliens. The Welfare Act is nothing more than an attempt to balance the federal budget on the backs of a few disfavored states.
117. The sovereign interests of the State of Florida and Dade County are violated by the denial ofSSI and related Food Stamps to those "qualified aliens" heretofore eligible, because the State must, consistent with its duty to protect the public health and welfare, and to ensure public safety, provide benefits previously supplied by federal programs.
118. The sovereign interests of the State of Florida and Dade County are violated by the denial of SSA to reimburse interim assistance provided to "qualified aliens" heretofore
32

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 33 of 40
eligible pursuant to the Agreement for Reimbursement to State for Interim Assistance Payment pursuant to § 1631 (g) of the Social Security Act. Plaintiffs calculate that SSA has refused to reimburse them $800,000 to date.
119. The imposition ofthe above-described financial burdens constitutes a violation of Article IV, § 4 and the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Welfare Act effectively commandeers Florida's legislative processes, requires Florida, as a state, to pay for federal fiscal policies, and makes federal legislative priorities Florida's legislative priorities. Congress cannot, consistent with Article IV, §4, and the Tenth Amendment, so conscript Florida's resources and political processes.
120. The Welfare Act makes meaningless the political accountability guaranteed by Article IV,§ 4 and the Tenth Amendment. Because only five other states are similarly affected, the political process has proven inadequate to protect Florida's rights and to safeguard it from discrimination by the overwhelming majority of states.
121. Unless this court declares unconstitutional the denial of benefits to qualified aliens, the State of Florida will continue to have to pay a disproportionate share of the costs of Congress' misguided and discriminatory attempt to balance the federal budget. It is clear that the huge majority of states, which have few or no immigrants who are "qualified aliens", have every political incentive to cast the burden of their support on the few states where they are disproportionately concentrated. For this reason the political process has failed and will continue to fail those few states.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, the State of Florida and Metropolitan Dade County, respectfully request that this Court:
33

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 34 of 40 A. Assume jurisdiction over this matter; B. Declare that the Welfare Act violates Article IV, §4, and the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, because it conscripts plaintiffs' resources and political processes;
C. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining defendants from enforcing § 402 of the Welfare Act;
D. Award plaintiffs the State ofFlorida and Metropolitan Dade County attorneys' fees and costs in this action; and
E. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
34

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 35 of 40

Respectfully submitted,

LAWTON M. CHILES, JR.

ATTORNEYS FOR MARCIANO

GOVERNOR

RODRIGUEZ, EMELINA

RODRIGUEZ, RAFAEL

CARAMAZANA, GINA MARTELLY,

ANTONIA FERNANDEZ, EDUARDO

~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~ANS,ANDALLOTHERS

·r t{; S~-~RLY SITUATF;» t,_;/tll

Special Counsel to the Governo Florida Bar No. 0843067
Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol, Room 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Telephone No.: (904) 488-3494 Facsimile No.: (904) 488-9810
ROBERT A. GINSBURG DADE COUNTY ATTORNEY

lu'NDALL C. BERG, JR.

Florida Bar No. 318371

'__..;. -~ J

/1

J L NEWMAN, Pro Hac Vice

Authorized Legal Aid Practitioner

PETER M. SIEGEL, Esquire

Florida Bar No. 227862

Florida Justice Institute, Inc.

2870 First Union Financial Center

200 South Biscayne Boulevard

Miami, Florida 33131-2309

Telephone No.: (305) 358-2081

Facsimile No.: (305)358-0910

Rbii;~~f •'L?/
Assistant County Attorney Florida Bar No. 256293

ATTORNEYS FOR HENRIETTE GUILLAUME, AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

Assistant County Attorney Florida Bar No. 892637 Dade County Attorney's Office 111 N.W. First Street, Suite 2800 Miami, Florida 33128 Telephone No.: (305)375-1311 Facsimile No. (305)375-5634

PETER NIMKOFF, Litigation Director Florida Bar No. 058840 ELLEN SAIDEMAN, Senior Attorney Florida Bar No. 038751 Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, Inc. 2901 Stirling Road, Suite 206 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Telephone No.: (954) 967-1493 Facsimile No.: (954) 967-1496

35

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 36 of 40

ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH

ATTORNEY GENERAL

dA ..~~. ~---

~

I FloridaBarNo.ll4422

EDWARD A. FEAVER SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN &
F~ ~A.JM'IJL/Y2.S/E'RffV;I.CES

'-£--0"<A~NA/~2l~Z Assistant Attorney General Florida Bar No. 0851655 MICHAEL A. GROSS

_ _N_ <lr/Y-4'-RI;...C....:.H-ARD---~.::E,......,.,...D.::_O_RA _ _ _ __
U General Counsel
Florida Bar No. 0325104 1323 Winewood Blvd, Bldg. 1, Rm. 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Telephone No.: (904) 488-2381 Facsimile No.: (904) 922-3947

Assistant Attorney General

Florida Bar No. 0 199461 The Capitol, Suite PL-0 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Telephone No.: (904) 488-1573 Facsimile No.: (904) 413-7555

DOUGLAS M. COOK DIRECTOR, FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION

PARKER D. THOMSON Florida Bar No. 081225 Special Assistant Attorney General 1700 Sun Bank International Center One S.E. Third Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Telephone No.: (305) 350-7200 Facsimile No.: (305) 374-1005

7 Mahan Drive Tallahassee Florida 32308 Telephone No.: (904) 922-5873 Facsimile No.: (904) 413-9313

36

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 37 of 40

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A PROPERTY RIGHTS 0 820 Co!>fnghlo
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VI. ORIGIN
XI 1 Onginol F»rcc!!d!!g
VII. REQUESTED
IN COMPLAINT

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0 1194 E-vr Aloca!ion Ad

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0 8701-(\JS- orDalondlnl) 0885F.-oflnlom\otionA<:t

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JURY DEMAND:

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VIII. RELATED

(See Instructions):

c, I.) CA E IF NY

DATE

3) q)

JUDGE

DOCKET NUMBER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 511" 1-2
REV. 9194

i l l 7 7/ ,FOR OFFICE USE ONLY: Receipt No.

/17 I

DatePaid:~J

Mlifp: _ _ __

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 38 of 40
PLAINTIFFS:
MARCIANO RODRIGUEZ, by his next friend and guardian LAZARO RODRIGUEZ, EMELINA RODRIGUEZ, RAFAEL CARAMAZANA, by his next friend and natural guardian MARIA CARAMAZANA, GINA MARTELLY, ANTONIA FERNANDEZ, by her next friend MILAGROS FERMIN, EDUARDO MARSANS, by his next friend and natural guardian EDUARDA FERNANDEZ, HENRIETTE GUILLAUME, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, a political subdivision ofthe State of Florida; LAWTON M. CHILES, JR., Governor of the State of Florida; THE STATE OF FLORIDA; ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH, Attorney General of Florida; EDWARD A. FEAVER, Secretary, Florida Department of Children & Family Services; DOUGLAS M. COOK, Director, Florida Agency for Health Care Administration,
DEFENDANTS:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DONNA E. SHALALA, in her capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Service; and JOHN J. CALLAHAN, in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of Social Security; DANIEL GLICKMAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS:
ATTORNEYS FOR MARCIANO RODRIGUEZ,EMELINA RODIUGUEZ, RAFAEL CARAMAZANA, GINA MARTELLY, ANTONIA FERNANDEZ, EDUARDO MARSANS, AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED:
RANDALL C. BERG, JR., Esquire JONEL NEWMAN, Pro Hac Vice Authorized Legal Aid Practitioner PETER M. SIEGEL, Esquire Florida Justice Institute, Inc. 2870 First Union Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-2309 Telephone No.: (305) 358-2081
ATTORNEYS FOR HENRIETTE GUILLAUME, AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED:
PETER NIMKOFF, Litigation Director ELLEN SAIDEMAN, Senior Attorney Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, Inc. 2901 Stirling Road, Suite 206 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Telephone No.: (954) 967-1493

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 39 of 40
ATTORNEYS FOR METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA:
ROBERT A. GINSBURG DADE COUNTY ATTORNEY ROBERT A. DUVAL Assistant County Attorney KARON M. COLEMAN Assistant County Attorney Dade County Attorney's Office 111 N.W. First Street, Suite 2800 Miami, Florida 33128 Telephone No.: (305)3 75-1311
ATTORNEYS FOR LAWTON M. ClllLES, JR., GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA:
W. DEXTER DOUGLASS General Counsel MARK R. SCHLAKMAN Special Counsel to the Governor Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol, Room 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Telephone No.: (904) 488-3494
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA AND ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA:
ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH ATTORNEY GENERAL ANA CRISTINA MARTINEZ Assistant Attorney General MICHAEL A. GROSS Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Suite PL-0 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Telephone No.: (904) 488-1573
PARKER D. THOMSON Special Assistant Attorney General 1700 Sun Bank International Center One S.E. Third Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Telephone No.: (305) 350-7200

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/1997 Page 40 of 40
ATTORNEYS FOR EDWARD A. FEAVER, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES:
RICHARD E. DORAN General Counsel 1323 Winewood Blvd, Bldg. 1, Rm. 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Telephone No.: (904) 488-2381
DOUGLAS M. COOK, DIRECTOR, FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION:
JEROME W. HOFFMAN General Counsel 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee Florida 32308 Telephone No.: (904) 922-5873
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS:
Not known

 
 Ca.-se 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/14/1997 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICf COURf SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION

MARCIANO RODRIGUEZ, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

et al.,

)

)

_____D_e_fe_n_da_n_ts_. _______________))

Case No. 97-1182-CIV-GRAHAM MAGISTRATE JUDGE GARBER

1.•~. t_\'f -' j 1997

CLECRAKR•-u0:.:s. .

Ju/1,
DIST.

\t
C

f,

S.O. OF FLA. • MIAMI

STIPULATED CLASS CERfiFICATION AND SCHEDULING ORDER

THE PARriES, having agreed as follows, and THE COURf, having reviewed this

Stipulated Class Certification and Scheduling Order, and being otherwise fully advised in the

premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. This matter may proceed as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23. A class is hereby certified on behalf of all poor, elderly, blind or disabled

noncitizens legally residing in Florida who were formerly eligible for, or who will be eligible

for in the future, federal SSI and related Food Stamps, and who, based solely on their

noncitizen status, will lose, be denied or have been denied SSI benefits and related Food

Stamps as a result of the Welfare Act.

2. Plaintiffs shall file any requests for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief on

or before June 2, 1997.

3. Defendants shall simultaneously file any motions to dismiss or other dispositive

motions on or before June 2, 1997.

Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/14/1997 Page 2 of 2

4. Any replies to motions or requests filed pursuant to 11 2 and 3 above shall be

simultaneously filed on or before June 18, 1997.

5. This matter shall be available for hearing after June 18, 1997. A hearing shall be

Jwu scheduled on 1nll·~

13 /rff. , at~ o'clock in the J1.m.

I]

cc: JoNel Newman John R. Tyler Ana Christina Martinez Robert A. Duvall Ellen Saideman Mark R. Schlakman

2

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01182-DLG Document 67 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/30/1997 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Miami Division

MARCIANO RODRIGUEZ, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

et al.,

)

)
_________D_e_fe_n_d_an_ts_. __________))

CASE NO. 97-1182-CIV-GRAHAM Magistrate Judge Garber
, t-"ILED hv
OCT
(;At( I<..)~ ;I.J~ •'11'\t.
CLER• IJ.5. ;)1ST, Cl. S.O. Jf FLI'.. MIAM!

FINAL JUDGMENT AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION AS TO COUNT ONE

PLAINTIFFS MARCIANO RODRIGUEZ, EMELINA RODRIGUEZ, RAFAEL

CARAMAZANA, GINA MARTELLY, ANTONIA FERNANDEZ, EDUARDO

MARSANS, and HENRIETTE GillLLAUME, on behalf of themselves and a class of

similarly situated persons, having moved for final judgment and Rule 54(b) certification as to

Count One, and THE COURT, having reviewed the Motion, and being otherwise fully

advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

Final judgment of dismissal is hereby entered as to Count One of the Complaint in

this action, and this Court further certifies that there is no just reason for delay and that such

judgment is ripe for review.

cc: JoNel Newman John R. Tyler Richard E. Doran Mark R. Schlakman Jerome W. Hoffman W. Dexter Douglass Ana Cristina Martinez Robert A. Duvall Ellen Saideman

Umte

 
 983 F.Supp. 1445 (1997)
Marciano RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.
97-1182-Civ. United States District Court, S.D. Florida.
September 17, 1997. 14467 *1446 *1447 Randall Challen Berg, Jr., JoNel Newman, Peter M. Siegel, Florida Justice Institute Incorporated,
Miami, FL, Michael A. Gross, for Emelina Rodriguez. Randall Challen Berg, Jr., JoNel Newman, Peter M. Siegel, Florida Justice Institute Incorporated, Miami, FL, for Marciano Rodriquez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans. Ellen Marjorie Saideman, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Henriette Guillaume. Karon Margaret Coleman, Dade County Atty.'s Office, Miami, FL, for Metropolitan Dade County. Mark Robert Schlakman, W. Dexter Douglass, State of Florida Office of the Governor, Tallahassee, FL, for Lawton M. Chiles, Jr. Parker D. Thomson, Thomson, Muraro, Razook & Hart, P.A., Miami, FL, Michael A. Gross, Ana Cristina Martinez, Office of the Atty. General, Tallahassee, FL, for State of Florida, Attorney General. Richard E. Doran, General Counsel, Tallahassee, FL, for Edward A. Feaver. Jerome Wayne Hoffman, Tallahassee, FL, Michael A. Gross, for Douglas M. Cook. Edward George Labrador, John Jefferson Copelan, Jr., Broward County Atty.'s Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Broward County.
ORDER
GRAHAM, District Judge. THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the following: 1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (DE 30); and 2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (DE 28).
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. PARTIES
Plaintiffs Marciano Rodriguez, Emelia Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, and Henriette Guillaume are poor individuals who are blind, elderly or disabled legal noncitizens receiving SSI and Food Stamp benefits from the United States government. These plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 on behalf of all poor individuals who are blind, elderly or disabled legal non-citizens residing in Florida who were formerly eligible for, or who will be eligible for in the future federal SSI and related Food Stamp benefits, and who, based solely on their non-

citizen status, will lose or be denied those benefits as a result of § 402 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, codified at, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601, et. seq. (hereinafter referred to as the "Welfare Reform Act"). The parties stipulated that there was a proper class and that the case could proceed as a class action. This Court approved the class stipulation on May 15, 1997. When this action was originally filed, the class was estimated to involve approximately 80,000 individuals throughout Florida. The individual plaintiffs named above and the class of individuals they represent shall sometimes hereinafter collectively be referred to as "The Plaintiff Class".
1448 Also participating as plaintiffs in this action are the following: (1) The State of Florida; *1448 (2) Metropolitan Dade County, Florida ("Dade County"); (3) Florida Governor Lawton M. Chiles, Jr., ("Governor"); (4) Florida Attorney General Robert A. Butterworth ("Attorney General"); (5) Secretary of Florida Department of Children and Family Services, Edward A Feaver ("Secretary of Family Services"); and (6) Director of the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, Douglas M. Cook ("Director of Health Care"). The State of Florida, Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of Family Services, and Director of Health Care are sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Florida State Plaintiffs".
Plaintiffs have brought this action against the following defendants: (1) The United States of America ("USA"); (2) Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), Donna Shalala ("Secretary of HHS"); (3) Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), John J. Callahan ("Commissioner of SSA"); and (4) Secretary of Agriculture, Daniel Glickman ("Secretary of Agriculture"). The Secretary of HHS, Commissioner of SSA and Secretary of Agriculture have been sued in their official capacities only.
The counts of the complaint in this action are as follows: (1) The Plaintiff Class v. All defendants: Violations of Equal Protection Rights Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (2) Florida State Plaintiffs and Dade County v. All Defendants: Violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (Abuse of Discretion); (3) Florida State Plaintiffs and Dade County v. All Defendants: Violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (Rulemaking Procedures); (4) Florida State Plaintiffs and Dade County v. All Defendants: Breach of Contract; and (5) Florida State Plaintiffs and Dade County v. All Defendants: Violations of Article IV, § 4, and the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
B. BACKGROUND
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq., the federal government provides subsistence level benefits known as Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") to individuals who are impoverished and either elderly, blind or disabled. In order to qualify, individuals must show: (1) that they have minimal assets and income[1] and (2) they are blind[2], severely disabled[3] or elderly[4].
Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011, et seq., the federal government provides benefits known as food stamps to financially needy individuals and families. In order to qualify, individuals must show that they have minimal assets and income.[5] Anyone who qualifies for SSI benefits automatically qualifies for food stamp benefits. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a).
Through these programs, SSI and food stamp benefits have been heretofore available to qualified legal aliens.
Over the years, the costs of these programs increased dramatically. Due to these increased costs, Congress investigated possible changes through which it could reform the welfare system. During its investigation, Congress discovered that the number of alien welfare recipients were increasing at a rapid rate. For example, 151,207 aliens received SSI benefits in 1983 as compared to 683,178 in 1993. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Human Resources, 1449 Committee on Ways and Means, *1449 House of Representatives: Welfare Reform: Implications of Proposals on Legal Immigrants' Benefits, GAO-HEHS-95-58 at p. 7 (February 1995) (hereinafter referred to as the "February 1995 GAO Report"). In addition, aliens constituted approximately 6% of all SSI cases in 1986, but comprised 12% of all SSI cases by 1994. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives: Supplemental

Security Income: Noncitizen Caseload Continues to Grow, GAO-T-HEHS-96-149 at p. 4 (May 23, 1996) (Statement of Jane L. Ross, Director Income Security Issues: Health, Education, and Human Services Division) (hereinafter referred to as the "May 1996 GAO Report"). In terms of cost, the General Accounting Office determined that aliens received approximately $3.6 billion in benefits during 1996. May 1996 GAO Report at p. 4. Furthermore, the number of aliens receiving SSI benefits increased by 6.4% from 1994 to 1995, even though the total number of SSI cases only increased 3.5% during that same period of time. Id.
To reduce the increasing costs of the welfare programs, to promote self sufficiency amongst aliens, and to encourage aliens to naturalize, Congress enacted the Welfare Reform Act. On August 22, 1996, this Act became law.
The Welfare Reform Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1612, changed welfare eligibility rules for legal aliens. Under the new rules, many legal aliens no longer qualify for SSI or food stamp benefits. See 8 U.S.C. § 1612. The groups of legal aliens who are still eligible for Social Security and Food Stamp benefits include the following groups: (1) refugees; (2) asylees; (3) certain aliens who have had their deportation withheld; (4) aliens who were granted status as Cuban or Haitian entrants; (5) certain Ameriasians; (6) lawful permanent residents who have worked 40 qualifying quarters; (7) legal aliens who were honorably discharged or are on active duty in the Armed Forces. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2). In addition, through recent amendments to the Welfare Reform Act, Congress provided that groups of legal aliens that are still eligible for Social Security benefits only, include the following: (1) legal aliens who were lawfully residing in the United States and who were receiving SSI benefits on August 22, 1996; (2) an alien who was lawfully residing in the United States on August 22, 1996 and is blind or disabled; (3) certain American Indians; and (4) Certain SSI beneficiaries who are receiving benefits pursuant to applications that were filed before January 1, 1979. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(E 0907 G).
Through the Welfare Reform Act, Congress also provided that all legal aliens were to be evaluated under the new guidelines by the Social Security Commissioner. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(D). Legal aliens who were not receiving benefits as of August 22, 1996, were not entitled to any such benefits unless they met the new eligibility requirements. Legal aliens who were already receiving benefits as of August 22, 1996, had to requalify under the new eligibility rules. If they could not, their SSI benefits would be terminated effective September 30, 1998 and their food stamp benefits would be terminated effective August 22, 1997. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(D), as amended by, Pub.L. 105-33 § 5301. However, some of these aliens will continue to receive replacement food stamp benefits through aid that they receive from the State of Florida until June 30, 1998.
The Social Security Commissioner issued a policy for interpreting the Welfare Reform Act. This policy was issued pursuant to the SSA's Program Operations Manual System. The Policy is entitled Special Processing Requirements That Apply To Current Recipients, SI 00502.150 SSI Eligibility for Aliens Receiving Benefits on 8/22/96 (1996 Legislation). The Policy shall hereinafter be referred to as the "POMS Policy." A Copy of the POMs Policy is attached as Exhibit C to Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claims (DE 33). The POMS Policy eliminated all benefits to individuals who had pending SSI and Food Stamp applications as of August 22, 1996. Thus, legal aliens who applied for SSI and Food Stamp benefits before August 22, 1996, but did not obtain any award or approval for those benefits prior to that date[6] have been 1450 denied all such benefits, *1450 including those benefits extending back to the date of their applications.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g), the State of Florida (including Dade County) entered into an agreement with the SSA to provide interim assistance to prospective welfare recipients while they were waiting for their applications to be processed. This interim assistance was necessary because it often took up to two years before an applicant would receive a favorable determination.
Dade County estimates that it advanced approximately $800,000 in interim assistance prior to August 22, 1996. Due to the SSA's POMS Policy, Dade County has not been reimbursed for the interim assistance it advanced.
As a result of the Welfare Reform Act, the Plaintiff class will lack subsistence level benefits that assist them in meeting their most basic needs. This will cause severe hardship on the Plaintiff Class, including homelessness, lack of food, and possible death.

In addition, the impact on the State of Florida and Dade County will be substantial because a high concentration of Plaintiff Class members reside in Florida and Dade County.[7] The State of Florida has already responded in part to the crisis by enacting the Temporary Income Bridge Program which makes $12,000,000 available for replacing food stamp benefits to certain members of the plaintiff class who are 65 years of age or older.[8]See Temporary Income Bridge Program, H.B. 1835, Ch. 97-259, Laws of Florida § 10 and Budget Amendment, EOG-0265 (Approved 9/2) (hereinafter "The Florida Temporary Income Bridge").
As stated in Count I of the complaint, the Plaintiff Class argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1612 unconstitutionally discriminates against them due to their non-citizen status. Therefore, they request this Court to (1) declare 8 U.S.C. § 1612 unconstitutional and (2) order that 8 U.S.C. § 1612 not be enforced. Through the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, the Plaintiff Class has requested that 8 U.S.C. § 1612 not be enforced during the pendency of this action. The plaintiffs submitted an appendix of materials in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction. This appendix contains the declarations of over 30 individuals as well as other reports, statistics and data. Defendants have moved to dismiss the entire complaint. The Court held a hearing on the instant matters on July 15, 1997.
II. THE WELFARE REFORM ACT

A. Statement of Government Purpose in Enacting the Welfare Reform Act

In 8 U.S.C. § 1601, Congress set forth statements concerning the policies and purposes of the Welfare Reform Act. Congress stated as follows:

§ 1601. Statements of national policy concerning welfare and immigration

The Congress makes the following statements concerning national policy with respect to welfare and immigration:

(1) Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration law since this country's earliest immigration statutes.

(2) It continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that 0907

1451

(A) aliens within the Nation's borders not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, *1451 their sponsors, and private organizations, and

(B) the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States.

(3) Despite the principle of self-sufficiency, aliens have been applying for and receiving public benefits from Federal, State, and local governments at increasing rates.

(4) Current eligibility rules for public assistance and unenforceable financial support agreements have proved wholly incapable of assuring that individual aliens not burden the public benefits system.

(5) It is a compelling government interest to enact new rules for eligibility and sponsorship agreements in order to assure that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national immigration policy.

(6) It is a compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits.

(7) With respect to the State authority to make determinations concerning the eligibility of qualified aliens for public benefits in this chapter, a State that chooses to follow the Federal classification in determining the eligibility of such aliens for public assistance shall be considered to have chosen the least restrictive means available for achieving the compelling governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national immigration policy.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (West Electronic Update Approved 6/27/97).
B. Relevant Provisions of the Welfare Reform Act
The Welfare Reform Act states in pertinent part:
§ 1612. Limited eligibility of qualified aliens for certain Federal programs
(a) Limited eligibility for specified Federal programs
(1) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in paragraph (2), an alien who is a qualified alien (as defined in section [1641] of this title) is not eligible for any specified Federal program (as defined in paragraph (3)).
8 U.S.C.A. § 1612 (West Electronic Update Approved 6-27-97).
A qualified alien is defined as follows:
§ 1641. Definitions
* * * * * *
(b) Qualified alien
For purposes of this chapter, the term "qualified alien" means an alien who, at the time the alien applies for, receives, or attempts to receive a Federal public benefit, is 0907
(1) an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq.],
(2) an alien who is granted asylum under section 208 of such Act [8 U.S.C.A. § 1158],
(3) a refugee who is admitted to the United States under section 207 of such Act [8 U.S.C.A. § 1157],
(4) an alien who is paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of such Act [8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(5)] for a period of at least 1 year,
(5) an alien whose deportation is being withheld under section 243(h) of such Act (as in effect immediately before the effective date of section 307 of division C of Public Law 104-208) or section 241(b)(3) of such Act (as amended by section 305(a) of division C of Public Law 104-208);
(6) an alien who is granted conditional entry pursuant to section 203(a)(7) of such Act as in effect prior to April 1, 1980 [8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(7)] or
(7) an alien who is a Cuban or Haitian entrant (as defined in section 501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980).[9]
8 U.S.C.A. § 1641(b), as amended by, P.L. 105-33 §§ 5302 and 5562 (August 5, 1997).
1452 *1452 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(3) defines a specified Federal program as follows:

(3) Specified Federal program defined For purposes of this chapter, the term "specified Federal program" means any of the following:
(A) SSI
The supplemental security income program under title XVI of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 1381 et seq.], including supplementary payments pursuant to an agreement for Federal administration under section 1616(a) of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 1382e(a)] and payments pursuant to an agreement entered into under section 212(b) of Public Law 93-66.
(B) Food stamps
The food stamp program as defined in section [2012(h) of Title 7].
8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(3) (West Electronic Update Approved 6/27/97).
Congress provided pursuant to 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2)(A) 0907 (C), as amended by, P.L. 105-33 §§ 5302, 5306, and 5562 that only the following legal aliens remain eligible for SSI and Food Stamp benefits:
1. refugees, asylees, certain aliens who had their deportation withheld, aliens who were granted status as Cuban or Haitian entrants, and certain Amerasian immigrants are permitted to receive SSI benefits for seven (7) years and Food Stamp benefits for five (5) years after they obtain such status;[10]
2. lawful permanent residents who have worked 40 qualifying quarters may obtain SSI and Food Stamp benefits; and
3. legal aliens who are honorably discharged from or who are on active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States and who have fulfilled active duty requirements (and their spouses, unmarried surviving spouses or unmarried dependent children) may obtain SSI and Food Stamp benefits.[11]
In addition, Congress recently provided that the following legal aliens remain eligible for SSI benefits only:
1. legal aliens who were lawfully residing in the United States and who were receiving SSI benefits on August 22, 1996[12];
2. an alien who 0907 (i) was lawfully residing in the United States on August 22, 1996; and (ii) is blind or disabled, as defined in section 1614(a)(2) or 1614(a)(3) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3))[13];
3. Certain American Indians[14]; and
4. Certain SSI beneficiaries who are receiving benefits pursuant to an application that was filed before January 1, 1979.[15]
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2)(D), Congress provided that SSI benefits would terminate for all other legal 1453 aliens on September *1453 30, 1998[16] and Food Stamp benefits would terminate for all other legal aliens on
August 22, 1997[17].
III. Standards for Dismissal
A motion to dismiss is appropriate when it is demonstrated "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

IV. Motion to Dismiss Count I: Violations of Equal Protection Rights Under the Fifth Amendment
A. Equal Protection Standards in General
In order to avoid dismissal, Count I must set forth a viable claim that 8 U.S.C. § 1612 violates the Plaintiff Class' equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment states as follows:
Amendment V. Grand Jury Indictment for Capital Crimes; Double Jeopardy; Self-Incrimination; Due Process of Law; Just Compensation for Property
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. (Emphasis Added).
Although the Fifth Amendment does not have an equal protection clause, equal protection rights are incorporated into the Fifth Amendment through the above-quoted due process clause. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n. 2, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 1228 n. 2, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975).[18]
1454 *1454 Equal protection rights restrict Congress' ability to enact laws that (1) discriminate against certain classes of people or (2) burden basic freedoms which are considered to be fundamental rights of an individual. See City of Cleburne, et al. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1287, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), reh'g. den., 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1919, 36 L.Ed.2d 418 (1973). If Congress enacts a law that discriminates against a suspect class (e.g., race) or burdens a fundamental right (e.g., voting), then the government must show that the law is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. See San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 16, 93 S.Ct. at 1287; City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254. This is known as the strict scrutiny test. If Congress enacts a law that discriminates against a semi-suspect class (e.g., gender), the government must show that the law is substantially related to an important government interest. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41, 105 S.Ct. at 3254-55. This is known as the heightened or mid-level scrutiny test. However, if Congress enacts a law that does not affect a fundamental right or a suspect (or semi-suspect) classification, the government only needs to show that the law is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254. This is known as the rational basis test.
B. Federal vs. State Regulation of Aliens
Pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, Congress has been granted the power "To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." The United States Supreme Court has broadly interpreted this power to include the authority to regulate not only the conditions of entry and residence of aliens, but also the conduct of aliens in the country. See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339, 29 S.Ct. 671, 676, 53 L.Ed. 1013, aff'd, 214 U.S. 344, 29 S.Ct. 678, 53 L.Ed. 1024 (1909) (over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over immigration); see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1891, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976) (holding that Congress' broad power over naturalization and immigration encompasses the power to condition an alien's eligibility for participation in a federal medical insurance program);

Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1854, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n., 334 U.S. 410, 419, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 1142, 92 L.Ed. 1478 (1948)).
Given Congress' plenary power over immigration, the courts have uniformly held that federal laws which regulate aliens must only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose in order to withstand scrutiny. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 83, 96 S.Ct. at 1893; Moving Phones Partnership v. Federal Communications Commission, 998 F.2d 1051, 1056 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. den. sub. nom., Cellswitch v. FCC, 511 U.S. 1004, 114 S.Ct. 1369, 128 L.Ed.2d 46 (1994); Abreu v. Callahan, 971 F.Supp. 799, 1997 WL 414113, *11 (S.D.N.Y.1997).
In arguing for a rational basis test, defendants rely primarily on Mathews. In this case, the Court upheld federal regulations which excluded aliens from participation in the Medicare Part B supplemental medical insurance program[19] unless the alien had been admitted for permanent residence and had resided in the United States for at least 5 years. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 69, 96 S.Ct. at 1886. The Court found that these federal requirements were valid restrictions on aliens since neither requirement was "wholly irrational". Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84, 96 S.Ct. at 1893. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the classifications created by the federal government 1455 distinguished between *1455 different groups of aliens, not just between citizens and aliens. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80, 96 S.Ct. at 1892. The Court found that Congress could create sub-classes within the alien population for the purpose of determining Medicaid eligibility requirements. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 82-83, 96 S.Ct. at 1892-93.
Furthermore, the Mathews court acknowledged that the immigration policy had been committed to the political branches of the federal government. The Court stated as follows:
Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.
* * * * * *
Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility of the political branches of government to respond to changing world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution. The reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization.
Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81-82, 96 S.Ct. at 1892.
In contrast, state regulations of aliens are subject to strict scrutiny. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372, 91 S.Ct. at 1852 (court that struck down state welfare laws applied strict scrutiny review because alien-plaintiffs were a suspect class); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254.
This difference in standards is attributable to the fact that state governments do not possess the same interest in or power over immigration matters as does the federal government. The Mathews case explained this distinction as follows:
Insofar as state welfare policy is concerned, there is little, if any, basis for treating persons who are citizens of another State differently from persons who are citizens of another country. Both groups are noncitizens as far as the State's interest in administering its welfare programs are concerned. Thus, a division by a State of the category of persons who are not citizens of that State into subcategories of United States citizens and aliens has no apparent justification, whereas, a comparable classification by the Federal Government is a routine and normally legitimate part of its business.
* * * * * *

Contrary to appellees' characterization, it is not `political hypocrisy' to recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment's limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and naturalization.
Mathews, 426 U.S. at 85 and 86-87, 96 S.Ct. at 1894 and 1895.
In the instant action, the plaintiffs are challenging 8 U.S.C. § 1612 of the Welfare Reform Act which is a federal measure affecting aliens' rights to receive federal welfare benefits. As in the Mathews case, 8 U.S.C. § 1612 pertains to sub-groups of aliens, not just groups that distinguish between citizens and aliens. Section 1612 declares that some legal aliens are eligible for SSI and food stamp benefits, while other legal aliens are not eligible. As in Mathews, Congress has the authority to make such distinctions, and such Congressional action only warrants a rational basis review by the Courts.
Citing to Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217-19, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2108, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995), the plaintiffs have argued that federal and state laws regulating aliens should be subject to the same strict scrutiny review. In Adarand, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a federal affirmative action plan which permitted minorities to obtain favorable treatment on the basis of race. An individual who did not benefit from the affirmative action plan argued that the plan violated his equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment under the strict scrutiny test. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200-04, 115 S.Ct. at 2101. The proponents of the plan argued that 1456 strict scrutiny did not apply because the federal government was not subject to the same strict *1456 scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment as were the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211-13, 115 S.Ct. at 2105. The Adarand court held that the federal government was subject to the same strict scrutiny test as the state governments when a racial classification was at issue. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235-37, 115 S.Ct. at 2117. However, in its analysis, the Adarand court also acknowledged that certain other cases would require a different analysis when they involved matters in which special deference was to be given to the political branches of the federal government. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 217-19, 115 S.Ct. at 2108; see also Abreu v. Callahan, 971 F.Supp. 799, 812 n. 84. Therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled to a strict scrutiny review of 8 U.S.C. § 1612 pursuant to Adarand.
C. Essential Welfare Benefits vs. Fundamental Rights
As mentioned above, courts have applied a heightened or mid-level scrutiny test when evaluating certain laws affecting semi-suspect classifications. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41, 105 S.Ct. at 3254-55.
Plaintiffs have argued that this heightened scrutiny test should be applied in the instant action because the Welfare Reform Act affects important life sustaining benefits to aliens.
It is well settled that the receipt of welfare benefits does not implicate a fundamental right for the purposes of equal protection law. Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 8, 94 S.Ct. at 1540; City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254.
However, plaintiffs have argued for a heightened scrutiny test based on certain equal protection cases which discuss the regulation of welfare benefits to aliens. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 98 S.Ct. 1067, 55 L.Ed.2d 287 (1978); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982), reh'g. den., 458 U.S. 1131, 103 S.Ct. 14, 73 L.Ed.2d 1401 (1982) and reh'g. den. sub. nom., Texas v. Certain Named & Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children, 458 U.S. 1131, 103 S.Ct. 14, 73 L.Ed.2d 1401 (1982); Moving Phones Partnership L.P. v. F.C.C., 998 F.2d 1051 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. den. sub. nom.; Cellswitch v. F.C.C., 511 U.S. 1004, 114 S.Ct. 1369, 128 L.Ed.2d 46 (1994). These cases contain language which suggests that a heightened scrutiny test may be used when states deny essential welfare benefits (as opposed to non-essential welfare benefits) to aliens. However, each of these cases acknowledges that federal alienage classifications are evaluated differently than state alienage classifications.
For example, in the Foley case, the Court upheld state laws that prohibited aliens from becoming members of the state police force. Foley, 435 U.S. at 293, 98 S.Ct. at 1069. The Court reasoned that only a rational basis test was required when the state excluded aliens from serving in sensitive governmental positions that involved

discretionary decision making or the execution of policy which substantially affected members of the political community. Foley, 435 U.S. at 296, 98 S.Ct. at 1070-71. In contrast, the Foley court found that a heightened scrutiny test applied when states restricted the availability of essential benefits to aliens. Foley, 435 U.S. at 294, 98 S.Ct. at 1070. The Foley, court stated in pertinent part:
[B]eginning with a case which involved the denial of welfare assistance essential to life itself, the Court has treated certain restrictions on aliens with "heightened judicial solicitude," a treatment deemed necessary since aliens 0907 pending their eligibility for citizenship 0907 have no direct voice in the political processes. Following Graham, a series of decisions have resulted requiring state action to meet close scrutiny to exclude aliens as a class from educational benefits, eligibility for a broad range of public employment, or the practice of licensed profession. These exclusions struck at the noncitizens' ability to exist in the community, a position seemingly inconsistent with the congressional determination to admit the alien to permanent residence.
Foley, 435 U.S. at 294, 98 S.Ct. at 1070 (citations omitted).
In the Plyler case, the Court took this idea one step further when it struck down state regulations that restricted important educational benefits to illegal aliens. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230, 102 S.Ct. at 2401-02. In Plyler, 1457 children of illegal aliens were denied *1457 a public education by the State of Texas. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. at 2388. The Court found that the children did not constitute a suspect class because they were illegal aliens. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223, 102 S.Ct. at 2398. In addition, the Court found that a public education was not a fundamental right. Id. Notwithstanding these findings, the Court struck down the State statutes at issue as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, based on the idea that education was a very important right (although not a fundamental right), and that the class of children were unable to affect their own status or the actions of their parents (even though the children were not a suspect or semi-suspect class). See id. The Court also found that the restrictive state education laws were not compelled or supported by any broad federal immigration policy. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226, 102 S.Ct. at 2399.
As demonstrated in their opinions, both Foley and Plyler acknowledge that a heightened standard of review is applicable when state, rather than federal, alienage laws are at issue. See Foley, 435 U.S. at 294-95, 98 S.Ct. at 1070 and Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226, 102 S.Ct. at 2399.
In addition, the Moving Phones case upheld federal restrictions on aliens in the communications industry pursuant to a rational basis test. Moving Phones, 998 F.2d at 1056. First, citing to Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976), the Moving Phones court found that "classifications based on alienage in federal statutes are permissible so long as the challenged statute is not a `wholly irrational' means of effectuating a legitimate government purpose." Moving Phones, 998 F.2d at 1056. Second, the Moving Phones court found that the "essential benefits" analysis used by the Court in Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 98 S.Ct. 1067, 55 L.Ed.2d 287 (1978) was not applicable because the Federal Communications Commission regulations at issue did not involve essential welfare benefits. Moving Phones, 998 F.2d at 1056. Having determined that Foley was inapposite, the Moving Phones court further noted that Foley was distinguishable because it involved state, rather than federal action. Moving Phones, 998 F.2d at 1056 n. 3. The Moving Phones case also noted that state restrictions on essential welfare benefits were objectionable when they were inconsistent with federal policy concerning aliens. See id. However, these issues were not thoroughly analyzed by the Moving Phones court since the Court found that essential welfare benefits were not at issue in the case before it or in the Mathews case. See id.[20] Thus, although it raised many issues, Moving Phones did not create a new heightened scrutiny test for federal laws which regulate aliens.
Based on the above, this Court finds that, Foley, Plyler and Moving Phones, do not entitle plaintiffs to a heightened scrutiny review of 8 U.S.C. § 1612.
D. Application of the Rational Basis Test to the Case At Bar
As stated above, this Court has found no basis upon which to apply a strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny test. Therefore, the Court evaluates 8 U.S.C. § 1612 under the rational basis test pursuant to the Mathews case.

Pursuant to the rational basis test, 8 U.S.C. § 1612 must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.
1458 *1458 The defendants have asserted several legitimate grounds for the enactment of 8 U.S.C. § 1612. They include the following:
1. Encouraging aliens to be self-reliant, or to rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, their sponsors and private organizations, rather than becoming public charges.
2. Reducing the costs of the SSI and Food Stamp programs.
3. Removing welfare as an incentive for both legal and illegal immigration.
4. Encouraging aliens to naturalize.
Plaintiffs argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1612 does not accomplish its purported goals as follows:
1. 8 U.S.C. 1612 will not make plaintiffs more self-reliant because their disabilities will not disappear and 8 U.S.C. § 1612 will not make plaintiffs more capable of supporting themselves.
2. Favoring citizens to aliens in the distribution of welfare benefits is not a legitimate goal pursuant to the law. In addition, such favoritism is unfair because legal aliens pay taxes that contribute to these programs.
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1612 will not deter illegal immigration because depriving benefits to legal aliens does not have an impact on individuals who come into the country illegally.
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1612 will not encourage naturalization in this population because many of the Plaintiff Class members are physically unable to naturalize because of their age and physical disabilities.
Although there must be a connection to an actual legitimate governmental purpose, a classification "does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification `is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.'" Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), reh'g. den., 398 U.S. 914, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970), (citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369).
This Court finds that the reasons articulated by defendants for the enactment of 8 U.S.C. § 1612 are legitimate governmental purposes. Abreu, 971 F.Supp. 799, 815-20 (court found that the following were legitimate governmental purposes: (1) encouraging naturalization, (2) encouraging self-sufficiency, (3) fiscal savings, and (4) removing an incentive for immigration).
Moreover, although 8 U.S.C. § 1612 may not be a perfect method for effectuating the governmental purposes listed above, it is a sufficient method for doing so. This is particularly true in light of Congress' most recent amendments to 8 U.S.C. § 1612, which have expanded the class of legal aliens that are still eligible for SSI benefits. In light of the above, the Court finds that 8 U.S.C. § 1612 is constitutional. Therefore, it is hereby ordered that Count I of the complaint must be DISMISSED.
V. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AN INJUNCTION BASED ON COUNT I OF THE COMPLAINT
Based on count I of the complaint, plaintiffs have requested an injunction to prohibit the enforcement of 8 U.S.C. § 1612 during the pendency of this action. In light of the fact that Count I has been dismissed, Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction must be DENIED.

VI. MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS II and III: VIOLATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
Defendants have also moved to dismiss Counts II and III of the complaint. In these Counts the Florida State Plaintiffs and Dade County seek to invalidate the above-mentioned POMS Policy because it allegedly violates the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA").
A. The Application Process for SSI and Food Stamp Benefits
Applications for SSI and Food Stamp benefits often take a lengthy time to process. When an individual does receive a favorable determination, he is awarded benefits back to the date of his application. 20 C.F.R. § 501. To provide for this lag time between the application and the award, the federal Department of Health and Human 1459 Services pursuant *1459 to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g) contracts with states (and counties) for the provision of interim assistance benefits. In the instant action, a Reimbursement Agreement is in effect between the SSA Commissioner and the State of Florida (including Dade County) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g). This agreement is attached as Exhibit D to Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claims (DE 33). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g) and the Reimbursement Agreement, the State of Florida and Dade County is to provide interim benefits to qualified applicants. The federal government is then to send the first lump sum award of an individual's benefits to the State (or County). The State of Florida (or Dade County) is to reimburse itself from this lump sum award and send any excess benefits to the applicant.
However, as stated above, the SSA issued its POMS Policy. Under this policy, individuals who had applications pending before August 22, 1996, were to be denied benefits unless they also had a favorable Social Security determination on their application before August 22, 1996. Consequently, any interim assistance provided to individuals who did not receive a favorable determination by August 22, 1996, would not be reimbursed to the State of Florida or Dade County.
In counts II and III, the State of Florida and Dade County argue that the POMS Policy is a violation of the APA.
B. Provisions of the APA
The APA states in pertinent part:
§ 702. Right of review
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party.
* * * * * *
§ 704. Actions reviewable
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.
§ 706. Scope of review
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall 0907

* * * * * * (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be 0907 (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; * * * * * *
C. The POMS Policy

The POMS Policy states as follows:

The following individuals are considered to have been "Receiving SSI benefits on 8/22/96":

0905 recipients in current pay on 8/22/96, including payment status NO1 recipients in section 1619(b) status, and

0905 individuals in nonpay, suspense, and payment status EO1 on 8/22/96, and

0905 claimants for whom a field office (FO) input had been made on or before 8/22/96 to allow an initial claim or reverse the prior determination on a denied claim, even if the input rejected, and

1460

0905 claimants for whom a Disability Determination Service (DDS) had issued a favorable initial claim or reconsideration disability determination on or before 8/22/96, whether or not the FO had completed *1460 nondisability development or effectuated payment, and

0905 claimants for whom an administrative law judge (ALJ) or the Appeals Council (AC) had issued a fully or partially favorable decision on or before 8/22/96, whether or not the FO had completed nondisability development or effectuated payment, and

0905 claimants with appeals pending after 8/22/96 on claims on which a fully or partially favorable allowance was issued on or before 8/22/96, and

0905 claimants for whom a presumptive disability determination had been made on or before 8/22/96.

* * * * * *

2. Aliens Not Considered to Be "Receiving SSI Benefits on 8/22/96"

Aliens with claims and appeals of denied claims that do not meet the requirements in 1. above are subject to the eligibility rules in SI 00502.100 for the entire period in the life of the application (SI 00601.010C.), including months before August 1996.

* * * * * *

D. Count II: Violation of APA (Abuse of Discretion)

In Count II, the State of Florida and Dade County argue that the POMS Policy is contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA because it requires 8 U.S.C. § 1612 to be applied retroactively in violation of Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) and Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). Defendants argue that the POMS Policy is not retroactive because it merely applies the current law (the Welfare Reform Act) at the time that the

SSA makes a benefits determination. Therefore, defendants argue that the POMS Policy is a proper application of 8 U.S.C. § 1612 under Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974).
1. The Bowen Rule
In the case of Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988), the Court set forth the general rule that laws should not be applied retroactively. The Bowen case involved the federal Health & Human Services Department's attempt to retroactively impose cost-limit rules in the Medicaid program that resulted in the recoupment of monies from hospitals. Under Bowen, the general rule is as follows:
Retroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.
Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208, 109 S.Ct. at 471.
2. The Bradley Rule
Defendants primarily rely on Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974) to argue that the POMS Policy was a proper application of 8 U.S.C. § 1612. The Bradley case involved the application of new law (a statutory provision permitting attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in school desegregation cases) to a case that was pending on appeal. Under Bradley, the general rule is as follows:
[T]hat a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.
Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711, 94 S.Ct. at 2016.
This general rule applies with equal force to changes that are made by administrative agencies acting pursuant to legislative authorization. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 715, 94 S.Ct. at 2018.
However, a significant exception to this general rule exists to prevent a manifest injustice. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 716, 94 S.Ct. at 2019. The factors that must be considered to prevent a manifest injustice are as follows: (1) the nature and identity of the parties; (2) the nature of their rights; and (3) the nature of the impact of the change in law upon those rights. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 717, 94 S.Ct. at 2019.
In evaluating factor No. 1 above, the Court should consider whether the parties are merely private parties or 1461 whether the issues at hand affect public or national concerns. *1461 Bradley, 416 U.S. at 719, 94 S.Ct. at 2020. If
national concerns are at issue, applying Bradley is less likely to produce a manifest injustice than if the dispute merely concerns private parties. Id.
In evaluating factor No. 2, the Court should consider whether or not the rights at issue are matured, unconditional or vested rights. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 720, 94 S.Ct. at 2020. If the rights are matured or vested, it is more likely that a manifest injustice will be present by applying Bradley. Id.
In evaluating factor No. 3, the Court should consider the impact of the changing law upon existing rights, i.e., will "unanticipated obligations ... be imposed upon a party without notice or an opportunity to be heard." Bradley, 416 U.S. at 720, 94 S.Ct. at 2020-21.
3. The Landgraf Rule
The case of Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) analyzes the apparent tension between the Bowen and Bradley rules. In settling this apparent tension, the Landgraf case states:

The conclusion that a particular rule operates `retroactively' comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event. Any test of retroactivity will leave room for disagreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity. However, retroactivity is a matter on which judges tend to have `sound instinct[s]' and familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance.
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268-70, 114 S.Ct. at 1499.
In further discussing this apparent tension, the Landgraf court also noted that Bradley did not intend to displace the "traditional presumption against applying statutes affecting substantive rights, liabilities or duties to conduct arising before their enactment." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 278, 114 S.Ct. at 1504.
The touchstone in these cases appears to be Congressional intent and the idea of settled expectations.
In making this clear, Landgraf stated as follows:
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280-81, 114 S.Ct. at 1505.
In the case at bar, the defendants have argued that Congress provided that the Welfare Reform Act would be applied to applications that were pending, but not ruled upon as of August 22, 1996. The defendants argue that Congress' intent is made clear through 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612(a)(1), 1641, and 1612(a)(2)(D). First, defendants read 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612(a)(1) and 1641 as prohibiting any payment of benefits to qualified aliens after August 22, 1996. Defendants further argue that the only qualified aliens who are excepted from this general rule are those enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(D), which provides that "the Commissioner of Social Security shall redetermine the eligibility of any individual who is receiving benefits under such program as of August 22, 1996." According to defendants, if Congress wanted to pay benefits to aliens who had pending applications as of August 22, 1996, it would have written another exception into the Welfare Reform Act, specifically addressing aliens who had applications pending as of August 22, 1996. In addition, the defendants assert that such a reading of the 1462 Welfare *1462 Reform Act is consistent with Congress' intent of encouraging aliens to be self-sufficient.
However, the language of the Welfare Reform Act does not support defendants' arguments. Under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612(a)(1) and 1641, payments to aliens are not prohibited. Rather, qualified aliens are deemed ineligible to receive SSI and Food Stamp benefits. Qualified aliens include "an alien who, at the time the alien applies for, receives, or attempts to receive a Federal public benefit" is (1) a permanent resident, (2) an asylee, (3) a refugee, (4) an alien paroled into the United States for at least one year, (5) an alien whose deportation has been withheld, (6) an alien who has been granted conditional entry, and (7) an alien who is a Cuban or Haitian entrant. 8 U.S.C. § 1641. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(D), the Commissioner is to redetermine the eligibility of aliens who are receiving benefits as of August 22, 1996. Nothing in these provisions addresses or prohibits payments of benefits that were due prior to August 22, 1996.
Since there is no clear congressional intent favoring the defendants' proposed application of the Welfare Reform Act, the Court must consider whether or not the POMS policy has a retroactive effect pursuant to Landgraf. This requires the Court to evaluate the following factors: (1) whether a party's rights have been impaired; (2) whether a party's liability has been increased; and (3) whether new duties have been imposed on a party.

The Court finds that the POMS Policy does have a retroactive effect pursuant to Landgraf. Contrary to defendants' arguments, an entitlement or vesting of benefits is not contingent on an adjudication by the SSA Commissioner. "`Both in legal and general usage, the normal meaning of entitlement includes a right or benefit for which a person qualifies, and it does not depend upon whether the right has been acknowledged or adjudicated. It means only that the person satisfies the prerequisites attached to the right.'" Teitelbaum v. Chater, 949 F.Supp. 1206, 1211 (E.D.Pa.1996) (court found that amendments to Social Security Act which barred disability benefits to alcoholics and drug addicts could not be applied if drug and alcohol related disabilities arose before amendments, even if SSA Commissioner did not adjudicate such rights before the amendments were enacted), citing to, Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2595, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992), but see Sprouse v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1029, 1030 (4th Cir.1982). Furthermore, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.501, applicants are entitled to benefits from the date of their applications, not the date of the SSA's adjudication.
In addition, because the State of Florida and Dade County's reimbursement rights are directly linked to the aliens' accrued benefits, the SSA cannot issue a policy which eliminates those accrued benefits without causing injustice and hardship to the State of Florida and Dade County. Prior to August 22, 1996, the State of Florida and Dade County operated its interim assistance program in accordance with the law in effect at that time. In reliance upon that law, the State of Florida and Dade County expended substantial funds prior to August 22, 1996.[21] By 1463 changing the welfare laws retroactively and without notice, the SSA is substantially impairing the rights *1463 of the State of Florida and Dade County and upsetting settled expectations that were based on the law at the time that the State of Florida and Dade County made the interim assistance available.
Therefore, denying aliens' accrued rights and failing to reimburse the State of Florida and Dade County for interim assistance that was expended prior to August 22, 1996, unfairly impairs the rights of aliens and imposes upon the State of Florida and Dade County new duties and increased liability for past conduct in violation of Landgraf. Since the POMS Policy causes a retroactive application of the Welfare Reform Act, the POMS Policy cannot govern in the instant action.[22]
Furthermore, even under the Bradley rule, the POMS Policy is invalid. As mentioned above, the Bradley rule provides that a Court or administrative agency is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision unless doing so would result in a manifest injustice. As demonstrated above, a manifest injustice would be present because the POMS policy affects accrued benefits to aliens and imposes unanticipated obligations on the State of Florida and Dade County.
In light of the above, the Court finds that the POMS Policy is contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Therefore, the Motion to dismiss Count II is DENIED.
E. Count III: Violation of APA (Rulemaking Authority)
Even if it was a valid rule under Count II, the State of Florida and Dade County argue that the POMS Policy is invalid because it was not issued in accordance with the APA's formal rulemaking procedures. Such procedures provide that a substantive rule must be published in the Federal Register and interested parties must be granted an opportunity to comment on the rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553. The State of Florida and Dade County further argue that such rulemaking procedures were required because the POMS Policy is a substantive rule. Defendants argue that the POMS Policy is not subject to the formal APA Rulemaking procedures because it is an interpretive rule, rather than a substantive rule.
The Court agrees with Dade County that the POMS Policy is a substantive rule because it affects the substantive rights of the parties. See Brown Express v. U.S., 607 F.2d 695, 700 (5th Cir.1979). Accordingly, the POMS Policy was subject to the formal rulemaking authority of the APA. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss Count III of the Complaint is DENIED.

VII. MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT IV: BREACH OF CONTRACT
At the hearing held on July 15, 1997, Dade County withdrew Count IV of the Complaint. Therefore, Count IV of the Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
VIII. MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT V: VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE IV, SEC. 4 AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT
In Count V, the State of Florida and Dade County allege that Article IV, § 4 and the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution has been violated because the Welfare Reform Act essentially forces Florida to pay basic subsistence benefits to individuals who were previously entitled to SSI and Food Stamp benefits. The State of Florida alleges that this violates the Constitution because a disproportionate share of immigrants receiving welfare benefits reside in the State of Florida. (As mentioned above, 83% of all immigrants receiving SSI or AFDC in 1993 resided in California, New York, Florida and Texas.) Therefore, the State of Florida asserts that it is required to pay a disproportionate amount of the cost of replacement benefits to needy individuals due to the harsh effects of the Welfare Reform Act. As a result, Florida argues that the Tenth Amendment has been violated because it is forced to pay these costs by the federal government and Article IV, Section 4 is violated because these costs are an invasion which denies Florida its republican form of government.
1464 *1464 Defendants argue that The Welfare Reform Act does not violate the Tenth Amendment or Article VI, Section 4, because the federal government is not compelling the State of Florida to enact any laws to provide replacement welfare benefits and because the claim under Article IV, Section 4 is subject to the political question doctrine.
Based on the case of Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir.1995), cert. den., ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1674, 134 L.Ed.2d 777, 64 U.S.L.W. 3762 (1996), the Court finds that defendants' contentions are correct. In Chiles, Florida state and local governments brought an action against the United States, the Attorney General and other federal officials alleging that the defendants had failed to enforce immigration policies, thereby causing the state to incur a disproportionate amount of expenses in providing welfare and education benefits to illegal aliens. See Chiles, 69 F.3d at 1096. The State of Florida argued that defendants' actions violated the Tenth Amendment and Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution. Id. at 1097. The District Court dismissed these claims and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held "that whether the level of illegal immigration is an `invasion' of Florida and whether this level violates the guarantee of a republican form of government present nonjusticiable political questions." Chiles, 69 F.3d at 1097. In addition, with respect to the Tenth Amendment claim, the Eleventh Circuit held, "we agree that Florida's provision of benefits to illegal aliens is not the product of federal coercion of the kind which violates the Tenth Amendment." Chiles, 69 F.3d at 1097. Similarly, in the case at bar, whether the level of legal aliens in Florida who are no longer entitled to welfare benefits is an invasion of Florida and whether it rises to the level of denying Florida a republican form of government is a nonjusticiable political question. Furthermore, Florida's provision of welfare benefits to legal aliens who no longer qualify for federal welfare benefits is not the product of federal coercion of the kind which violates the Tenth Amendment. For the reasons stated in Chiles, Count V of the Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
IX. CONCLUSION
In light of the above, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to Counts I, IV and V. Therefore, these counts are hereby DISMISSED. The Motion is DENIED as to Counts II and III of the Complaint.

2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (DE 28) is DENIED.
[1] See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382-1382b for general financial eligibility rules. For example, an individual who receives SSI benefits cannot have resources that exceed $2,000. A married couple cannot have combined resources exceeding $3,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a).
[2] Pursuant to this statute, an individual is blind if "he has central visual acuity of 20/200 or less in the better eye with the use of a correcting lens." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(2).
[3] Pursuant to this statute, an individual is disabled if "he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3).
[4] Elderly individuals must be 65 years of age or older. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(A).
[5] 7 U.S.C. § 2014. For example, a household that receives food stamps cannot have resources that exceed $2,000. If that household includes a member who is 60 years of age or older the household cannot have resources that exceed $3,000. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(g).
[6] The parties have informed the Court that the POMS Policy may be altered due to recent amendments to the Welfare Reform Act. However, the SSA's new policies based on the recent amendments may not be available until late October or mid-November. Therefore, the Court will assume that the POMS Policy is still valid for the purposes of this opinion.
[7] Approximately 83% of all immigrants receiving SSI or AFDC in 1993 resided in California, New York, Florida or Texas. February 1995 GAO Report at p. 7.
[8] Originally, this program was to provide replacement SSI and Food Stamp benefits to certain members of the Plaintiff Class. At that time, the State of Florida appropriated $23,000,000, for that purpose. However, subsequent to the enactment of Florida's Bridge Program, the federal government amended the Welfare Reform Act to reinstate SSI benefits to most individuals. As a result, the Florida legislature amended the Bridge Program as described above. This program is a temporary measure that will distribute Food Stamp benefits to certain members of the Plaintiff Class who are 65 years of age or older. These benefits will terminate on June 30, 1998. See The Florida Temporary Income Bridge.
[9] Subsection (7) was added by P.L. 105-33 § 5302 and Subsection (5) was amended by P.L. 105-33 § 5562.
[10] 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2)(A), as amended by, P.L. 105-33 §§ 5302 and 5306.
[11] 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2)(A) 0907 (C), as amended by, P.L. 105-33 §§ 5302, 5306, and 5562 (August 5, 1997).
[12] 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612, as amended by, P.L. § 5301 (August 5, 1997). This section will be codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2)(E) and will state as follows:
(E) Aliens receiving SSI on August 22, 1996. 0907 With Respect to eligibility for benefits for the program defined in paragraph (3)(A) (relating to the supplemental security income program), paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien who is lawfully residing in the United States and who was receiving such benefits on August 22, 1996.
[13] 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2), as amended by, P.L. 105-33 § 5301 (August 5, 1997). This section will be codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2)(F) and will state as follows:
(F) Disabled aliens lawfully residing in the United States on August 22, 1996. 0907 With respect to eligibility for benefits for the program defined in paragraph (3)(A) (relating to the supplemental security income program), paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien who 0907 (I) was lawfully residing in the United States on August 22, 1996;

and (ii) is blind or disabled, as defined in section 1614(a)(2) or 1614(a)(3) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3)).
[14] 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2), as amended by, P.L. 105-33 § 5303 (August 5, 1997). This section will be codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2)(G).
[15] 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2), as amended by, P.L. 105-33 § 5304 (August 5, 1997). This section will be codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2)(H).
[16] See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2)(D), as amended by, P.L. 105-33 § 5301 (August 5, 1997), which states in pertinent part:
(D) Transition for aliens currently receiving benefits
(i) SSI
(I) In general
With respect to the specified Federal program described in paragraph (3)(A), during the period beginning on August 22, 1996 and ending on September 30, 1998, the Commissioner of Social Security shall redetermine the eligibility of any individual who is receiving benefits under such program as of August 22, 1996 and whose eligibility for such benefits may terminate by reason of the provisions of this subsection.
(II) Redetermination criteria
With respect to any redetermination under subclause (I), the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply the eligibility criteria for new applicants for benefits under such program.
(III) Grandfather provision
The provisions of this subsection and the redetermination under subclause (I), shall only apply with respect to the benefits of an individual described in subclause (I) for months beginning on or after September 30, 1998.
(IV) Notice
Not later than March 31, 1997, the Commissioner of Social Security shall notify an individual described in subclause (I) of the provisions of this clause.
[17] See § 1612(a)(2)(D)(ii) which states in pertinent part:
(ii) Food stamps
(I) In general
With respect to the specified Federal program described in paragraph (3)(B), ineligibility under paragraph (1) shall not apply until April 1, 1997, to an alien who received benefits under such program on August 22, 1996, unless such alien is determined to be ineligible to receive such benefits under the Food Stamp Act of 1977 [7 U.S.C.A. § 2011 et seq.]. The State agency shall recertify the eligibility of all such aliens during the period beginning April 1, 1997, and ending August 22, 1997.
(II) recertification criteria
With respect to any recertification under subclause (I), the State agency shall apply the eligibility criteria for applicants for benefits under such program.
(III) Grandfather provision
The provisions of this subsection and the recertification under subclause (I) shall only apply with respect to the eligibility of an alien for a program for months beginning on or after the date of recertification, if on August 22, 1996 the alien is lawfully residing in any State and is receiving benefits under such program on August 22, 1996.

[18] Equal protection rights are protected against the State governments through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Equal protection rights are protected against the federal government through the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In the instant action, plaintiffs must invoke their Fifth Amendment rights because they are challenging laws that were enacted by the federal government.
[19] Medicare Part B medical insurance program covers a part of the cost of certain physicians' services, home health care, outpatient physical therapy and other medical and health care. The Part B program supplements Part A hospital insurance. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 70 n. 1, 96 S.Ct. at 1886 n. 1.
[20] The Moving Phones court stated as follows:
We note that Foley involves state, rather than federal, regulation of aliens. Even so, for the purposes of this case, that fact represents a distinction without a difference. The denial of Medicare benefits which survived the rational basis test in Mathews could well withstand the Foley analysis, which applied strict scrutiny to "exclusions [which] struck at the noncitizens' ability to exist in the community," 435 U.S. at 295, 98 S.Ct. at 1070, based on the court's conclusion that such exclusions "were inconsistent with the congressional determination to admit the aliens to permanent residence." Id. In fact, the facets of community life from which aliens may not be excluded, including eligibility for public employment, educational benefits, or "welfare assistance essential to life itself," are those that, if withheld, would directly cause economic dependance or physical harm. In contrast, receipt of Medicare benefits, while desirable, might legitimately be considered a perquisite of citizenship, insofar as a government's decision not to extend such benefits to aliens does not necessarily involve withholding of essential welfare assistance, as would, for example, the denial of food stamps or emergency services at a hospital. Moving Phones, 998 F.2d at 1056 n. 3.
[21] Under the Reimbursement Agreement with the SSA, the State of Florida and Dade County were entitled to at least 30 days written notice from the SSA Commissioner before the Reimbursement Agreement could be terminated. The Reimbursement Agreement states in pertinent part:
The Secretary of Health and Human Services, hereinafter, referred to as the "Secretary," and the State of Florida, hereinafter referred to as the "State," for the purpose of assuring the availability of assistance to meet the basic needs of applicants for benefits under the supplemental security income program, title XVI of the Social Security Act, hereby agree to the following:
ARTICLE I
SCOPE
This Agreement covers reimbursement by the Secretary to the State for assistance furnished by the State to individuals during (a) the months their supplemental security income (SSI) applications are pending, and (b) during the months their SSI benefits have been suspended or terminated, if said individuals are subsequently found to be eligible for SSI benefits for those months.
ARTICLE XI
A. The State or the Secretary may terminate this Agreement at any time upon thirty (30) days written notice to the other party.
[22] The Court notes that Congress, as opposed to the SSA Commissioner, can provide for retroactive changes to Welfare Benefits. However, Congress must clearly indicate its intent to do so.
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U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:97-cv-01182-DLG

CLOSED

Rodriguez, et al v. United States, et al Assigned to: Judge Donald L. Graham Demand: $800,000 Cause: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment Plaintiff Marciano Rodriguez by his next friend and guardian Lazaro Rodriguez
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Date Filed: 04/23/1997 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 444 Civil Rights: Welfare Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant
represented by JoNel Newman Florida Justice Institute 100 SE 2nd Street 4320 Bank of America Tower Miami, FL 33131-2309 305-358-2081 Fax: 358-0910 Email: jnewman@law.miami.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Gross Attorney General Office Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol PL-01 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 850-488-5899 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter Michael Siegel Florida Justice Institute 100 SE 2nd Street 4320 Bank of America Tower Miami, FL 33131-2309 305-358-2081 Fax: 358-0910 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randall Challen Berg, Jr. Florida Justice Institute 100 SE 2nd Street 4320 Bank of America Tower Miami, FL 33131-2309 305-358-2081 Fax: 358-0910
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CM/ECF - Live Database - flsd - Docket Report
Plaintiff Emelina Rodriguez
Plaintiff Rafael Caramazana by his next friend and natural guardian Maria Caramazana
Plaintiff Gina Martelly
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Email: rberg@floridajusticeinstitute.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by JoNel Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Gross (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter Michael Siegel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randall Challen Berg, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by JoNel Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter Michael Siegel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randall Challen Berg, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by JoNel Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter Michael Siegel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
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Plaintiff Antonia Fernandez by her next friend Milagros Fermin
Plaintiff Eduardo Marsans by his next friend and natural guardian Eduarda Fernandez
Plaintiff Henriette Guillaume
3 of 13

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randall Challen Berg, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by JoNel Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter Michael Siegel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randall Challen Berg, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by JoNel Newman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter Michael Siegel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randall Challen Berg, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ellen Marjorie Saideman Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities 4411 Sheridan Street Hollywood, FL 33021 954-967-1493 Fax: 967-1496 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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Plaintiff Metropolitan Dade County a political subdivision of the State of Florida
Plaintiff Lawton M. Chiles, Jr. Governor of the State of Florida
Plaintiff State of Florida
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represented by Karon Margaret Coleman Dade County Attorney's Office Metro Dade Center 111 NW 1st Street Suite 2810 Miami, FL 33128-1993 305-375-1057 Fax: 326-8239 Email: KColeman@um-jmh.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mark Robert Schlakman State of Florida Office of the Governor The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0001 904-488-3494 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W. Dexter Douglass State of Florida Office of the Governor The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0001 904-488-3494 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ana Cristina Martinez Attorney General Office Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol PL-01 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 850-488-1573 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Gross (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Parker D. Thomson Hogan & Hartson 1111 Brickell Avenue Suite 1900
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Plaintiff Attorney General Attorney General of Florida
Plaintiff Edward A. Feaver Secretary, Florida Department of Children & Family Services
Plaintiff Douglas M. Cook Director, Florida Agency for Health Care Administration

https://ecf.flsd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?446103173219071-L_92...
Miami, FL 33131 305-459-6500 Fax: 459-6550 Email: pdthomson@hhlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ana Cristina Martinez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Gross (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Parker D. Thomson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard E. Doran Ausley & McMullen PO Box 391 Tallahassee, FL 32302 850-556-8001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jerome Wayne Hoffman Holland & Knight 315 S Calhoun Street PO Drawer 810 Tallahassee, FL 32302 850-425-5654 Fax: 224-8832 Email: jerome.hoffman@hklaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Gross (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

5 of 13

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V. Defendant United States
Defendant Donna E. Shalala in her capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Service
Defendant John J. Callahan in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant Daniel Glickman in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture

represented by Robyn Juanita Hermann United States Attorney's Office 99 NE 4 Street Miami, FL 33132 305-961-9332 Fax: 530-7139 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robyn Juanita Hermann (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robyn Juanita Hermann (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robyn Juanita Hermann (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/23/1997 04/23/1997 04/23/1997
04/23/1997 04/23/1997

#

Docket Text

1 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT filed; FILING FEE $150.00 RECEIPT # 675771; A-7; BLG (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
Magistrate identification: Magistrate Judge Garber (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
2 MOTION by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans for JoNel Newman to appear pro hac vice per Administrative Order 96-56 (attached as Exhibit A) (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
3 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
4 SUMMONS(ES) issued for United States by serving William A. Keefer (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/24/1997)

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04/23/1997 04/23/1997 04/23/1997 04/23/1997 04/23/1997 04/23/1997 04/23/1997 04/23/1997 04/28/1997
05/01/1997 05/01/1997 05/01/1997 05/01/1997 05/05/1997
05/20/1997 05/22/1997
05/28/1997

5 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Donna E. Shalala (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
6 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Donna E. Shalala by serving William A. Keefer (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
7 SUMMONS(ES) issued for John J. Callahan (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
8 SUMMONS(ES) issued for John J. Callahan by serving Janet Reno (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
9 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Daniel Glickman by serving William A. Keefer (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
10 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Daniel Glickman (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
11 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Daniel Glickman by serving Janet Reno (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
12 SUMMONS(ES) issued for John J. Callahan by serving William A. Keefer (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
13 ORDER granting [2-1] motion for JoNel Newman to appear pro hac vice ( signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 4/28/97) CCAP (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/06/1997)
14 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Daniel Glickman 4/25/97 Answer due on 6/24/97 for Daniel Glickman (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/08/1997)
15 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to John J. Callahan 4/25/97 Answer due on 6/24/97 for John J. Callahan (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/08/1997)
16 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Donna E. Shalala 4/25/97 Answer due on 6/24/97 for Donna E. Shalala (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/08/1997)
17 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to United States 4/25/97 Answer due on 6/24/97 for United States (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/08/1997)
18 STIPULATED CLASS CERTIFICATION and SCHEDULING ORDER [see order for further details] (signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 5/5/97) CCAP (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/14/1997)
19 MOTION by Broward County for leave to participate as amicus curiae and memorandum of law (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/1997)
20 ORDER that the parties are directed to respond to Broward County's motion for leave to participate as amicus curiae within ten days ( signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 5/22/97) CCAP (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/1997)
21 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume, Dade County, Lawton M. Chiles Jr., State of Florida, Attorney General, Edward A. Feaver, Douglas M. Cook to amend [18-1] Scheduling order (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/05/1997)

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05/30/1997 06/03/1997 06/03/1997
06/10/1997
06/10/1997 06/10/1997 06/10/1997 06/11/1997 06/11/1997 06/11/1997 06/11/1997 06/11/1997 06/16/1997

22 ORDER granting [21-1] motion to amend [18-1] Scheduling order ( signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 5/30/97) CCAP (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/09/1997)
23 RESPONSE by Dade County to [19-1] motion for leave to participate as amicus curiae and memorandum of law (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/12/1997)
24 NOTICE of attorney appearance for Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume, Dade County, Lawton M. Chiles Jr., State of Florida, Attorney General, Edward A. Feaver, Douglas M. Cook by Michael A. Gross (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/12/1997)
25 MOTION with memorandum in support by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume, Dade County, Lawton M. Chiles Jr., State of Florida, Attorney General, Edward A. Feaver, Douglas M. Cook for leave to file memorandum exceeding 20 pages (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/18/1997)
26 ORDER granting [19-1] motion for leave to participate as amicus curiae and memorandum of law ( signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 6/10/97) CCAP (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/18/1997)
27 NOTICE of filing exhibits in support of its motion for preliminary injunction by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/18/1997)
28 MOTION with memorandum in support by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume for preliminary injunctive relief (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/18/1997)
29 MOTION with memorandum in support by Broward County to set schedule for filing amicus curiae memorandum and resposne (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/23/1997)
30 MOTION by United States, Donna E. Shalala, John J. Callahan, Daniel Glickman to dismiss all counts in plaintiff's complaint (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/23/1997)
31 RESPONSE by Douglas M. Cook to [29-1] motion to set schedule for filing amicus curiae memorandum and resposne (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/23/1997)
32 UNOPPOSED MOTION with memorandum in support by United States, Donna E. Shalala, John J. Callahan, Daniel Glickman to file a brief in excess of page limitations (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/23/1997)
33 MEMORANDUM by United States, Donna E. Shalala, John J. Callahan, Daniel Glickman in support of [30-1] motion to dismiss all counts in plaintiff's complaint (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/23/1997)
34 NOTICE to Court of non-objection to motion for leave by General Counsel (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/27/1997)

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06/17/1997 06/17/1997 06/18/1997 06/20/1997
06/24/1997 06/25/1997 06/26/1997 06/26/1997 06/26/1997 06/27/1997 06/27/1997 06/27/1997 06/30/1997

35 ORDER granting [32-1] motion to file a brief in excess of page limitations ( signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 6/17/97) CCAP (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/01/1997)
36 ORDER that defendants may file a memorandum in support of their motion for preliminary injunction exceeding 20 pages in lenght but no more than 30 pages( signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 6/17/97) CCAP (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/01/1997)
37 ORDER granting [25-1] motion for leave to file memorandum exceeding 20 pages ( signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 6/17/97) CCAP (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/1997)
38 NOTICE of filing attached original affidavit by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume, Dade County, Lawton M. Chiles Jr., State of Florida, Attorney General, Edward A. Feaver, Douglas M. Cook (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/1997)
39 MOTION with memorandum in support by United States, Donna E. Shalala, John J. Callahan, Daniel Glickman for leave to file brief in excess of page limitations (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/07/1997)
40 ORDER granting [39-1] motion for leave to file brief in excess of page limitations ( signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 6/25/97) CCAP (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/07/1997)
41 MEMORANDUM by Lawton M. Chiles Jr., State of Florida, Attorney General in opposition to [30-1] motion to dismiss all counts in plaintiff's complaint (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/07/1997)
42 MEMORANDUM by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss count one of complaint (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/07/1997)
43 MEMORANDUM by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss count 1 of the complaint (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/07/1997)
44 RESPONSE by Donna E. Shalala, John J. Callahan, Daniel Glickman in opposition to [28-1] motion for preliminary injunctive relief (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/07/1997)
45 MEMORANDUM by Dade County in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss counts II, III, and IV of complaint (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/07/1997)
46 MEMORANDUM by Broward County in support of [28-1] motion for preliminary injunctive relief (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/07/1997)
47 ORDERED and ADJUDGED that on or before 7/7/97, the Plaintiffs shall file a notice with the court stating wether or not they will require a sign language interpreter to be present at the injunction hearing currently set for 7/15/97. If the

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07/07/1997
07/10/1997
07/10/1997 07/10/1997
07/10/1997
07/11/1997 07/11/1997 07/14/1997 07/14/1997

parties make a request as directed above, a sign language interpreter will be appointed by the Court. It is further ORDERED and ADJUDGED that plaintiffs shall provide their own Spanish interpreter should such an interpreter be required. Any such interpreter must be duly certified in accordance with the Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida. A list of recommended certified interpreters is attached ( signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 6/30/97) CCAP (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/08/1997)
48 NOTICE that a sign language interpreter will be required to be present at injunction hearing for 7/15/97 at 10:00 by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume, Dade County, Lawton M. Chiles Jr., State of Florida, Attorney General, Edward A. Feaver, Douglas M. Cook (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/16/1997)
49 Memorandum in REPLY by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume, Dade County, Lawton M. Chiles Jr., State of Florida, Attorney General, Edward A. Feaver, Douglas M. Cook to response to [28-1] motion for preliminary injunctive relief (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/20/1997)
50 NOTICE of Filing Supplemental authority by State of Florida (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/20/1997)
51 Notice by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume, Dade County, Lawton M. Chiles Jr., State of Florida, Attorney General, Edward A. Feaver, Douglas M. Cook for Sign language interpreter at preliminary injunction hearing (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/20/1997)
52 NOTICE of withdraw of their notice requesting sign language interpreter by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume, Dade County, Lawton M. Chiles Jr., State of Florida, Attorney General, Edward A. Feaver, Douglas M. Cook (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/20/1997)
53 MOTION with memorandum in support by United States, Donna E. Shalala, John J. Callahan, Daniel Glickman for leave to file a brief in excess of page limitations (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/21/1997)
54 REPLY MEMORANDUM by United States, Donna E. Shalala, John J. Callahan, Daniel Glickman in support of [30-1] motion to dismiss all counts in plaintiff's complaint (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/21/1997)
55 ORDER granting [53-1] motion for leave to file a brief in excess of page limitations ( signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 7/14/97) CCAP (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/23/1997)
56 NOTICE of withdrawal of their Notice concerning Interpreter for Preliminary injunction hearing by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume, Dade County, Lawton M. Chiles Jr., State of Florida, Attorney General, Edward A. Feaver, Douglas M. Cook (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/23/1997)

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07/16/1997 07/29/1997 08/05/1997 08/06/1997 08/12/1997
08/14/1997 08/18/1997
09/17/1997 10/02/1997 10/17/1997 10/28/1997 10/30/1997
10/30/1997

57 NOTICE of filing pleading(not attached) by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/24/1997)
58 NOTICE of authority by United States, Donna E. Shalala, John J. Callahan, Daniel Glickman (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/06/1997)
59 AFFIDAVIT by Dade County Re: [45-1] opposition memorandum (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/11/1997)
60 Transcript filed re: motion hearing Date: 7/15/97 Before Judge: Graham Number of pages: 1-83 (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/13/1997)
61 JOINT Statement of the parties concerning effect of recent Congressional action by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume, Dade County, Lawton M. Chiles Jr., State of Florida, Attorney General, Edward A. Feaver, Douglas M. Cook, United States, Donna E. Shalala, John J. Callahan, Daniel Glickman, Broward County (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/13/1997)
62 ORDER denying [61-1] Statement of ( signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 8/14/97) CCAP (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/18/1997)
63 NOTICE of filing the attached second declarations by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume, Dade County, Lawton M. Chiles Jr., State of Florida, Attorney General, Edward A. Feaver, Douglas M. Cook (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/20/1997)
64 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [30-1] motion to dismiss all counts in plaintiff's complaint, denying [28-1] motion for preliminary injunctive relief ( signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 9/17/97) CCAP (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/22/1997)
65 MOTION with memorandum in support by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume for certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/09/1997)
66 RESPONSE by All Defendants to [65-1] motion for certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/23/1997)
67 JUDGMENT granting [65-1] motion for certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) ( signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 10/27/97) CCAP/M (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/30/1997)
68 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Henriette Guillaume, Eduardo Marsans, Antonia Fernandez, Gina Martelly, Rafael Caramazana, Emelina Rodriguez, Marciano Rodriguez of [67-1] judgment order . EOD Date: 10/30/97; Filing Fee: $ Fee not paid;; Copies to USCA and Counsel of Record. (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/17/1997)
69 MOTION by Marciano Rodriguez to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/18/1997)

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12/01/1997
12/02/1997 12/08/1997 12/19/1997 12/19/1997 02/18/1998
02/18/1998
04/01/1998 05/17/1999 05/17/1999
05/17/1999 06/24/1999 06/24/1999

Appeal Information Sheet re: [68-1] appeal by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume. No transcript requested. Appeal Record due on 12/14/97. (cp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/02/1997)
70 ORDER granting [69-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal ( signed by Judge K. M. Moore for DLG on 12/2/97) CCAP (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/05/1997)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt by U.S.C.A. of: NOA U.S.C.A. # 97-5812 (cp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/11/1997)
71 NOTICE of filing original transcript of proceedings held 7/15/97 by Dade County (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/30/1997)
72 Transcript filed re: civil motion hearing Date: 7/15/97 Before Judge: Graham Number of pages: 1-83 (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/30/1997)
Certificate of readiness transmitted to USCA Re: [68-1] appeal by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume USCA NUMBER: 97-5812 (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/12/1998)
Transmitted record on appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals (Miami Office) Consisting of 3 Volumes of Pleadings, 1 Transcript & 1 Accordian Folder with DE#27: [68-1] appeal by Marciano Rodriguez, Emelina Rodriguez, Rafael Caramazana, Gina Martelly, Antonia Fernandez, Eduardo Marsans, Henriette Guillaume (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/12/1998)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt by U.S.C.A. of: COR received 3/18/98 U.S.C.A. # 97-5812 (cp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/08/1998)
73 MANDATE OF USCA (certified copy) affirming district court judgment/order [68-1] appeal Mandate Issued Date: 05/11/99; USCA Appeal #: 97-5812; to Judge. (ga, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/18/1999)
Record on appeal returned from U.S. Court of Appeals consisting of 1 folder of exhibits and 4 volumes of record on appeal: [68-1] appeal by Henriette Guillaume, Eduardo Marsans, Antonia Fernandez, Gina Martelly, Rafael Caramazana, Emelina Rodriguez, Marciano Rodriguez USCA #: 97-5812-CC (ga, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/18/1999)
Magistrate identification: Magistrate Judge Barry L. Garber (ga, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/18/1999)
74 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER closing case (Signed by Judge Donald L. Graham on 6/24/99) CCAP [EOD Date: 6/28/99] (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/28/1999)
CASE CLOSED. Case and Motions no longer referred to Magistrate. (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/28/1999)

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 US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100

97-5812-CC Rodriguez v. USA

Closed
Docket #: 97-5812-CC Short Style: Rodriguez v. USA Docket Date: 11/25/1997 Lead Case:
Agency: Nature of Suit: Civil Rights: Welfare
Misc. Type: Clerk: Dixon, Eleanor
Clerk Phone: (404) 335-6172

District Information

Docket #: 97-01182-CV-DLG Judge: Donald L. Graham

Dkt Date: 04/23/1997

District: Florida-Southern

NOA Date: 10/30/1997

Office: SFL-Miami

Secondary Case Information

Docket #: Judge: Dkt Date: / /
Case Relationships

Docket # Short Style Relation Status

Pending Motions
No Pending Motions

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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100

97-5812-CC Rodriguez v. USA
United States Court OF Appeals FOR the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100

Appellant
Marciano Rodriguez Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found.
Emelina Rodriguez Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found.
Rafael Caramazana Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found.
Gina Martelly Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found.
Antonia Fernandez Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found.
Eduardo Marsans Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found.
Henriette Guillaume Address Not On File

97-5812-CC Rodriguez v. USA
Appellant Attorney

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No Briefing Information Found.

Randall C. Berg, Jr. Florida Justice Institute, Inc. 100 SE 2ND ST STE 4320 MIAMI, FL 33131-2100 (305) 358-2081 Fax: (305) 358-0910 rcberg@bellsouth.net No Briefing Information Found.
JoNel Newman University of Miami School of Law 1311 MILLER RD CORAL GABLES, FL 33146-2300 (305) 284-4125 Fax: (305) 284-1588 jnewman@law.miami.edu No Briefing Information Found.
Peter Nimkoff Advocacy Center 2671 Executive Center Cir. W. - Suite 100 Tallahassee, FL 32301 (850) 488-9071 pnimkoff@seneccagamingauthority.com No Briefing Information Found.
Donald L. Graham, Hon. 99 NE 4TH ST RM 1155 MIAMI, FL 33132-2139 No Briefing Information Found.

Appellee
United States of America Address Not On File
Donna E. Shalala Address Not On File
Commissioner of Social Security Administration Address Not On File
Daniel R. Glickman Address Not On File

Appellee Attorney
No Briefing Information Found.
No Briefing Information Found.
No Briefing Information Found.
No Briefing Information Found. Michael S. Raab 950 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW WASHINGTON, DC 20530-0009 (202) 514-4053 Fax: (202) 514-7964 michael.raab@usdoj.gov No Briefing Information Found. Robyn Hermann 99 NE 4TH ST

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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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MIAMI, FL 33132-2131 (305) 536-5266 No Briefing Information Found.
Carlos Juenke, MIAMI 301 N MIAMI AVE MIAMI, FL 33128-7702 No Briefing Information Found.
Mark B. Stern 601 D ST NW RM 9108 WASHINGTON, DC 20530-0001 (202) 514-5089 Fax: (202) 514-7964 mark.stern@usdoj.gov No Briefing Information Found.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100

97-5812-CC Rodriguez v. USA

File Date

Entry

11/28/1997 Probable Jurisdiction Noted Converted from Old CMS.

03/18/1998 Certificate of Readiness Converted from Old CMS.

03/27/1998 Briefing Notice Issued Converted from Old CMS.

06/17/1998 Appellant Brief Converted from Old CMS.

07/02/1998 Appearance Form Submitted: Michael S Raab

08/20/1998 Appellee Brief Converted from Old CMS.

08/25/1998 Reply Brief Converted from Old CMS.

01/12/1999 Argument Scheduled Converted from Old CMS.

03/15/1999 Opinion Issued Converted from Old CMS.

03/27/1999

See Previous Docket Sheet for Case date. Converted from Old CMS.

Information

prior

to

conversion

05/11/1999 CASE CLOSED

05/11/1999 Mandate Issued

Party Pending

No

No

No

No

Michael S. Raab

No

No

No

No

No

No

No No

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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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MDT1 (Mandate - Issuance) issued. cc: Berg, Randall C., Jr. cc: 05/11/1999 Newman, JoNel cc: Nimkoff, Peter cc: Raab, Michael S cc: Hermann,
Robyn To: Juenke, Carlos, MIAMI cc: Stern, Mark B.

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 169 F.3d 1342 (1999)
Marciano RODRIGUEZ, by his next best friend and guardian Lazaro Rodriguez; Emelina Rodriguez; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
UNITED STATES of America; Donna Shalala, in her capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 97-5812.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
March 15, 1999.
1343 *1343 JoNel Newman, Florida Justice Institute, Inc., Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Royn Juanita Hermann, Adalberto Jordan, Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, FL, Mark B. Stern, Maria Simon, App. Staff, Civ. Div., Michael S. Raab, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., App. Staff, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
This appeal involves a class action challenge to one provision of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, which is more formally known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). The challenged provision, codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1612, provides that only specified categories of aliens remain eligible for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") or food stamps, or both. The plaintiffs are a class of aliens who do not fit within any of the eligible categories. The plaintiffs contend that the statute violates their Fifth Amendment right to equal protection because it does not include among those eligible for benefits all legal aliens.[1]
After determining that the Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976), dictated application of the rational basis test in assessing the constitutionality of § 1612, the district court concluded that provision satisfied that level of scrutiny and dismissed the plaintiffs' claim. We agree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE WELFARE REFORM ACT'S PROVISIONS AFFECTING THE ELIGIBILITY OF ALIENS FOR SSI AND FOOD STAMP WELFARE BENEFITS
The federal government provides SSI benefits to impoverished individuals who are elderly, blind, or disabled, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1382c, and food stamp benefits to low-income households, see 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011, et seq. Prior to the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, aliens were eligible for both SSI and food stamp benefits on the same 1344 basis as citizens. However, that act, along with two *1344 subsequent amendments to it,[2] restricts aliens' eligibility for SSI and food stamps. It does so in two ways.
First, with certain exceptions not relevant to this case, the Act provides that "an alien who is not a qualified alien (as defined in [8 U.S.C. § 1641]) is not eligible for any Federal public benefit [including SSI and food stamps]." 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a). Thus, § 1611(a) eliminates from eligibility for SSI and food stamps any alien who is not a "qualified alien."[3]

The second way in which 8 U.S.C. § 1612 restricts the class of aliens who can receive SSI and food stamps is through § 1612(a)(1). That provision specifies that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in [8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2) ], an alien who is a qualified alien ... is not eligible for [SSI and food stamps]." (emphasis added) Unless an alien falls into one of the fourteen categories of qualified aliens listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2), he is ineligible for SSI and food stamps. The fourteen categories that are eligible, i.e., excepted from ineligibility, are as follows:[4]

(1) A permanent resident legal alien who has either worked or can be credited with "40 qualifying quarters"[5] of work in the United States is eligible for SSI and food stamps, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612
(a)(2)(B);

(2) An alien who is "lawfully residing in any State" and is either a veteran with an honorable discharge, an active duty service member, or the spouse or unmarried dependent child of such veteran or active duty service member is eligible for SSI and food stamps, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a) (2)(C);

(3) An alien who "is lawfully residing in the United States" and "was a member of a Hmong or Highland Laotian tribe" who provided assistance to the United States military in the Vietnam era is eligible for food stamps, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(K);

(4) An alien who is a refugee admitted to the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1157 is eligible for SSI and food stamps for seven years after the alien's admission, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A) (i);

(5) An alien who is granted asylum in the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158 is eligible for SSI and food stamps for seven years after asylum is granted, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A)(ii);

1345

*1345 (6) An alien whose deportation is withheld, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) because of fear of persecution is eligible for SSI and food stamps for seven years from the date the deportation is withheld, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A)(iii);

(7) An alien who is a Cuban or Haitian entrant pursuant to the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980 is eligible for SSI and food stamps for seven years after such status is granted, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A)(iv);

(8) An alien who is admitted to the United States as an "Amerasian immigrant," an 0907 alien fathered by a United States citizen and born in Vietnam between January 1, 1962 and January 1, 1976[6] is 0907 eligible for SSI and food stamps for seven years after admission to the United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A)(v);

(9) "[A]n alien who was lawfully residing in the United States on August 22, 1996" and is "blind or disabled"[7] is eligible for SSI and is also eligible for food stamps if he "is receiving benefits or assistance for blindness or disability,"[8]see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(F);

(10) An alien who was "lawfully residing in the United States on August 22, 1996" and, on that date, was 65 years of age or older is eligible for food stamps, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(I);

(11) An alien who was "lawfully residing in the United States" on August 22, 1996 and is currently under 18 years of age is eligible for food stamps, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(J);

(12) "[A]n alien who is lawfully residing in the United States and who was receiving [SSI] benefits on August 22, 1996" is eligible for SSI, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(E);

(13) An alien who is receiving SSI benefits "for months after July 1996" pursuant to an application filed before January 1, 1979 remains eligible for SSI if "the Commissioner of Social Security lacks

clear and convincing evidence that such individual is ... ineligible" for SSI benefits because of the Welfare Reform Act's new eligibility requirements, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(H);
(14) An alien who is either an American Indian born in Canada or a member of an "Indian tribe"[9] is eligible for SSI and food stamps, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(G).
In summary, the Welfare Reform Act, as amended, makes the fourteen categories of qualified aliens specified in 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2) the only aliens eligible for SSI or food stamps, or both. All other aliens, even those who otherwise meet the definition of "qualified alien," are ineligible.
B. THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM THAT THE WELFARE REFORM ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISPOSITION OF THAT CLAIM
The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against the United States and several other defendants (collectively "the defendants") seeking to enjoin § 402 of the Welfare Reform Act, which is codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1612.[10] The plaintiffs defined their class as consisting of all individuals who "are poor, elderly, or disabled noncitizens legally residing in Florida before the enactment of the Welfare Reform Act who were eligible for, or who will become 1346 eligible for, federal SSI and related Food Stamp [benefits], and who, based solely on their noncitizen status, will *1346 lose or be denied or have been denied SSI benefits and related Food Stamps as a result of [8 U.S.C. § 1612] of the Welfare Reform Act."
In Count 1 of their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that 8 U.S.C. § 1612 is unconstitutional because it violates their right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[11] They requested that the district court declare 8 U.S.C. § 1612 unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Count 1 of the complaint.
Applying the rational basis standard of review, the district court concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1612 was rationally related to legitimate government interests and therefore constitutional. Accordingly, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and issued a final judgment of dismissal as to Count 1 of the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The plaintiffs appealed that final judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. DISCUSSION
The plaintiffs raise two contentions on appeal. First, they contend that the district court should have applied a heightened level of scrutiny, such as the strict scrutiny test, instead of the rational basis test, in assessing the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1612. Second, they contend that, even if the district court was correct that the rational basis test is the applicable one, it erred in concluding that § 1612 satisfied even that minimal level of scrutiny. We will address each contention in turn, applying a de novo standard of review. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)(de novo standard applies to determination of the constitutionality of a statute).
A. WHETHER RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY APPLIES IN ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 8 U.S.C. § 1612
In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976), the Supreme Court considered a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge to a federal statute which, like 8 U.S.C. § 1612, discriminated among aliens by granting welfare benefits to specified categories of them but denying those benefits to all other aliens. The statute challenged in Mathews provided that the only aliens eligible for certain Medicare benefits on the same basis as citizens were those who were 65 or older, had been admitted for permanent residence, and had resided in the United States for at least five years. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 69-70, 96 S.Ct. at 1886-87.

After noting that Congress is not required to treat citizens and aliens alike in the provision of welfare benefits, id. at 78-80, 96 S.Ct. at 1890-92, the Court narrowly framed the question raised by the plaintiffs' challenge to the statute: "The real question presented by this case is not whether discrimination between citizens and aliens is permissible; rather, it is whether the statutory discrimination within the class of aliens0907allowing benefits to some aliens but not to others is 0907 permissible." Id. at 80, 96 S.Ct. at 1892 (emphasis in original). The Court answered that question by holding that the statutory discrimination between the classes of aliens in the provision of Medicare benefits was permissible.

Integral to the Mathews decision was the Court's holding concerning the level of scrutiny applicable to a federal statute that discriminates among aliens in the provision of welfare benefits. About that, the Court wrote:

1347

For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of *1347 changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.... Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility of the political branches of government to respond to changing world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution. The reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization.

Id. at 81-82, 96 S.Ct. at 1892 (emphasis added). The Court defined the scope of that "narrow standard of review" as follows:

Since it is obvious that Congress has no constitutional duty to provide all aliens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens, the party challenging the constitutionality of the particular line Congress has drawn has the burden of advancing principled reasoning that will at once invalidate that line and yet tolerate a different line separating some aliens from others.

Id. at 82, 96 S.Ct. at 1892-93 (emphasis in original). Applying that standard to the lines Congress had drawn in making only certain aliens eligible for Medicare benefits, the Court concluded that the classifications were constitutionally permissible because they were not "wholly irrational." Id. at 83, 96 S.Ct. at 1893 (emphasis added). Although the Court did not actually use the phrase "rational basis scrutiny" to describe its "narrow standard of review," it did apply as the decisional criterion a "wholly irrational" standard, id., and that is merely another way of stating the rational basis test. Neither party in this case contends there is any difference between a statute lacking a rational basis and being wholly irrational, and we perceive none.

Although the strict scrutiny standard does apply to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenges to a state's classification of aliens, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971), the Mathews Court firmly rejected the argument it also applies to a Fifth Amendment challenge to Congress' classification of aliens. The Court explained that "the Fourteenth Amendment's limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and naturalization." Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86-87, 96 S.Ct. at 1895. That is so, because "it is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of ... the States ... to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens. The equal protection analysis also involves significantly different considerations because it concerns the relationship between aliens and the States rather than between aliens and the Federal Government." Id. at 84-85, 96 S.Ct. at 1893-94. Thus, the Court concluded, there is no "political hypocrisy" in applying strict scrutiny to a state's classification of aliens, but the considerably narrower "wholly irrational" or rational basis test to Congress' classification of aliens. Id. at 86-87, 96 S.Ct. at 1895.

Faced with the tight fit between the holding in Mathews and the issue before us, the plaintiffs offer six arguments in support of their position that Mathews nonetheless does not control and we should apply heightened or strict scrutiny in assessing the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1612. We find none of them persuasive. First, they argue that the rational basis standard used by the Supreme Court in Mathews applies only to federal statutes that

discriminate within the class of aliens generally, while a tougher standard applies when the discrimination is between aliens on the one hand and citizens on the other. This distinction is critical, they say, because, unlike the statute challenged in Mathews, 8 U.S.C. § 1612 discriminates between aliens and citizens instead of merely within the class of aliens.
We find this argument unpersuasive because its central premise0907that § 1612 discriminates against aliens 1348 generally instead of within the class of aliens is 0907 belied by § 1612's plain language. As we have discussed, *1348
§ 1612 provides that fourteen categories of aliens are eligible for SSI or food stamps, or both, while all other aliens are ineligible. By providing that some aliens are eligible for those benefits while others are not, § 1612 is a statute that discriminates among categories of aliens instead of against aliens generally; in that respect, it is like the statute the Court subjected to rational basis scrutiny in Mathews. In that case, as in this one, some aliens were eligible under the statute and others were not.
The plaintiffs next argue that, even assuming 8 U.S.C. § 1612 does discriminate among aliens instead of against aliens generally, it differs from the statute in Mathews because § 1612 lacks a "principled basis" for distinguishing among aliens. The plaintiffs point out that the statute at issue in Mathews limited Medicare benefits to aliens who had five years of lawful residency in the United States. Noting that this five year period mirrors the time period an alien must wait before seeking naturalization, they argue that the Mathews statute's principled basis for distinguishing among aliens was that aliens "who are most like citizens qualify. Those who are less like citizens do not." Mathews, 426 U.S. at 83, 96 S.Ct. at 1893. According to the plaintiffs, the fourteen categories Congress defined in § 1612(a)(2) do not distinguish among aliens on a principled basis.
This second argument fails to address the relevant issue. Instead of discussing whether rational basis scrutiny applies to federal statutes that draw distinctions among aliens in the provision of welfare benefits, it jumps ahead to the issue of whether the distinctions in § 1612 have principled bases, and argues that they do not because they differ from the distinctions drawn by the statute examined in Mathews. However, whether there are principled bases for § 1612's distinctions is not properly addressed until the level of scrutiny is settled. On this point, as we have explained, Mathews holds that federal statutes which discriminate among aliens in the provision of welfare benefits are subject to rational basis scrutiny. Moreover, nothing in Mathews indicates that the Court meant to hold that the only statutes subject to rational basis scrutiny are those that are based on the same distinguishing factor used in that statute, i.e., length of residency. The fact that the specific classifications of aliens in Mathews involved subgroups of aliens different from the fourteen categories specified in § 1612(a)(2) has no bearing on the deference owed to Congress' decisions about immigration matters. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84, 96 S.Ct. at 1893-94 ("[I]t is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of ... the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens.").
Third, the plaintiffs argue that heightened scrutiny is called for in reviewing 8 U.S.C. § 1612 because "they have a constitutionally protected interest in continuing to receive the essential life-sustaining benefits" provided by SSI and food stamps. They also assert that "numerous Supreme Court decisions have acknowledged" that right. The plaintiffs are wrong. No Supreme Court decision has held that anyone, alien or citizen, has a right to welfare benefits. Perhaps what plaintiffs mean to argue is that those receiving welfare benefits have a property interest in the benefits, which cannot be taken away without due process. If that is the argument, it, too, fails to establish that a heightened standard of review applies. Mathews stands for the proposition that statutes which discriminate within the class of aliens comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (and the equal protection principles it incorporates) so long as they satisfy rational basis scrutiny. Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that "a welfare recipient is not deprived of due process when the legislature adjusts benefit levels.... [T]he legislative determination provides all the process that is due...." Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432-433, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1156, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982).
Fourth, the plaintiffs argue that the deferential rational basis test only applies to statutes affecting aliens that were 1349 enacted *1349 pursuant to Congress' sovereign power over immigration, a power conferred by Article 1, § 8 of
the Constitution. In their view, that sovereign immigration power extends only to legislation affecting aliens' ability to enter and exit the United States and the terms of their naturalization. According to them, 8 U.S.C. § 1612 falls outside that power because it is not a provision addressing the entry, exit, and naturalization of aliens. Because §

1612 was not passed pursuant to Congress' sovereign immigration power, the argument concludes, the strict scrutiny that applies to a state's classification of aliens should apply to this federal statute as well.
That argument is foreclosed, at least in this case, by Mathews. The Court rejected in Mathews the narrow view of Congress' sovereign immigration power advanced by the plaintiffs in this case. Broadly defining the scope of Congress' sovereign power over immigration, the Court stated that "the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government" Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81, 96 S.Ct. at 1892, (emphasis added), and that "it is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of ... the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens." Id. at 84, 96 S.Ct. at 1893-94 (emphasis added). Not only that, of course, but Mathews specifically held a statute discriminating among aliens in the provision of Medicare, a form of welfare benefits, does lie within Congress' power "in the area of immigration and naturalization," and for that reason is subject to rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 82, 96 S.Ct. at 1892. As to that holding, it is impossible to distinguish § 1612, which also discriminates among aliens in the provision of welfare benefits, from the statute at issue in Mathews.
Contrary to another position of the plaintiffs, holding that rational basis scrutiny applies is not inconsistent with the dicta in Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 973 (11th Cir.1984), that some federal actions affecting aliens may fall "outside the plenary power to control immigration that justifies the extraordinary executive and congressional latitude in that area." While that dicta may, or may not, have some viability in other situations, it has none here; the holding of Mathews0907not dicta but holding is 0907 that the decision to discriminate among aliens in the provision of welfare benefits is a decision that lies within Congress' plenary power over immigration.
Fifth, the plaintiffs suggest that the Supreme Court's decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 96 S.Ct. 1895, 48 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976), requires that we apply heightened scrutiny in this case. It does not. In Hampton, the Court invalidated a rule promulgated by the federal Civil Service Commission which barred aliens from federal employment. The Court reasoned that "the Commission performs [the] limited and specific function [of] ... promot[ing] an efficient federal service" and therefore lacks authority over immigration matters. Id. at 114, 96 S.Ct. at 1910. However, the Court expressly stated that "[w]e may assume ... that if Congress or the President had expressly imposed the citizenship requirement, it would be justified by the national interest in providing an incentive for aliens to become naturalized...." Id. at 105, 96 S.Ct. at 1906. Because Hampton did not deal with a Congressional enactment, it provides no support for the plaintiffs' position that rational basis scrutiny does not apply in this case.
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1612 must be subjected to heightened scrutiny because they would be severely harmed by losing their right to SSI and food stamps. In support of that argument, plaintiffs rely primarily on Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). In that case, the Court considered a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge to a state law excluding illegal immigrant children from public education. Although noting that illegal aliens are not a suspect class and that education is not a fundamental right, the Court declined to apply rational basis scrutiny and instead required the state to show something more, 1350 the something more being *1350 that the law advanced some "substantial goal of the State." Id. at 224, 102 S.Ct. at 2398. The Court based its holding in part on the fact that the complete deprivation of such an important right as education would "impose[] a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status." Id. at 223, 102 S.Ct. at 2398. The plaintiffs argue that Plyler's heightened standard of review should apply here.
This argument, too, is meritless. Plyler is inapposite because it deals with a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a state's classification of aliens. Nothing in Plyler even arguably suggests that a heightened level of scrutiny would have applied if the challenged statute had been enacted by Congress, i.e., that Mathews would not have controlled had the same classification been prescribed by a federal statute. Indeed, the Plyler Court specifically cited Mathews for the purpose of noting that the deference which extends to Congress' power to govern aliens' "admission to our Nation and status within our borders," id. at 225, 102 S.Ct. at 2399 (emphasis added), does not extend to a state's classification of aliens. Plyler is entirely consistent with Mathews, which noted that while strict scrutiny is applicable to a state's classification of aliens, it does not apply to congressional classifications. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86-87, 96 S.Ct. at 1895 ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment's limits on state powers are

substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and naturalization.").
In summary, Mathews is inescapably on point as to the level of scrutiny applicable in this case. It holds that a federal statute which discriminates among aliens in the provision of welfare benefits is subject only to rational basis scrutiny. In this case, the plaintiffs are challenging 8 U.S.C. § 1612, a federal statute which discriminates among aliens by providing that the fourteen categories of qualified aliens specified in § 1612(a)(2) are the only aliens eligible for SSI or food stamps, or both. Mathews dictates that we apply rational basis scrutiny to the classifications Congress has drawn in 8 U.S.C. § 1612, and we proceed to do so.
B. WHETHER 8 U.S.C. § 1612 SATISFIES RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY
Under rational basis scrutiny, "a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity," and should be upheld "if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). The Supreme Court has cautioned that "rational-basis review in equal protection analysis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.... [A] classification must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Moreover, the government need not come forward with evidence to justify the classification; instead the burden is on those challenging the legislation "to negative every conceivable basis which might support it, whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record." Id. at 320-21, 113 S.Ct. at 2643 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Finally, "courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends. A classification does not fail rational-basis review because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations 0907illogical, it may be, and unscientific." Id. at 321, 113 S.Ct. at 2643 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In this case, we agree with the defendants that Congress' decision to reduce the number of aliens eligible for SSI 1351 and food stamps by providing that only the aliens in the fourteen categories specified in *1351 § 1612(a)(2) are
eligible for those benefits is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of reducing the cost of those welfare programs. The plaintiffs do not contend that § 1612's limitations on the number of aliens eligible for those benefits will not achieve cost savings. Instead, they argue that cost savings is not a legitimate interest for Congress to pursue under its sovereign immigration power. That argument is foreclosed by Mathews where the Supreme Court recognized that one of Congress' purposes in restricting the number of aliens eligible for Medicare benefits was "to maintain[] the fiscal integrity of the Medicare Part B program." Mathews, 426 U.S. at 83 n. 22, 96 S.Ct. at 1893 n. 22. By upholding the exclusion of aliens from Medicare benefits for that purpose, the Court implicitly endorsed cost considerations as a legitimate interest for Congress to consider in exercising its immigration powers. Part and parcel of Congress' power to regulate immigration is the power to control the effects of immigration, one of which is the cost it imposes on the nation's welfare system. Where Congress makes a judgment that immigration is creating, or adding to, financial burdens, it lies within Congress' plenary sovereign power over immigration to take action to alleviate such burdens.[12]
However, the fact that denying all aliens, except those identified in § 1612(a)(2), SSI and food stamp benefits is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of achieving cost savings in those benefit programs does not end our inquiry into whether § 1612 satisfies rational basis scrutiny. The plaintiffs also contend that there is no rational basis for Congress' decision to draw a line extending SSI or food stamps, or both, to aliens who fall into one or more of the fourteen eligible categories while denying those benefits to all other aliens. Because "Congress has no constitutional duty to provide all aliens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens," the plaintiffs, in order to prevail on that argument, have "the burden of advancing principled reasoning" that will both (1) "invalidate [the] line" Congress drew by showing the fourteen categories Congress established for eligibility are "wholly irrational,"

and (2) "to-lerate a different line separating some aliens from others." Mathews, 426 U.S. at 82, 96 S.Ct. at 1892-93 (emphasis in original).
The plaintiffs have failed to meet that burden in this case. A category by category examination reveals that none of the fourteen categories Congress established is wholly irrational. To begin with, three of the categories extend benefits to aliens who have made special contributions to this country. Those categories consist of aliens who have substantially assisted our nation's economy by working for at least 40 quarters (10 years), aliens who are veterans or active military personnel, and Hmong or Highland Laotian aliens who provided aid to the United States during the Vietnam era. See § 1612(a)(2)(B), (C), (K). Certainly, it is not wholly irrational for Congress to extend welfare benefits to such aliens, either to reward them for their special contributions to the United States or to encourage other aliens to make contributions of a similar nature, or for both reasons.
Congress could have concluded that aliens in five of the other categories 0907refugees, asylees, aliens whose deportation has been withheld because of fear of persecution, certain Cuban or Haitian entrants, and Amerasian immigrants, see § 1612(a)(2)(A)(i)-(v)0907are seeking refuge in the United States because of especially trying political, social, or economic circumstances in their native countries. Extending welfare benefits to those aliens is not wholly irrational; it is rationally related to the humanitarian purpose of aiding aliens fleeing such difficult conditions.
1352 Three of the remaining categories consist of aliens who both were lawfully residing in *1352 the United States on August 22, 1996, and who also have some trait0907blindness or disability, old-age, youth 0907which Congress could have concluded makes them particularly vulnerable to poverty. See § 1612(a)(2)(F), (I), (J). It is not wholly irrational for Congress to provide these aliens with welfare assistance in light of their vulnerability.
As for Congress' decision to extend benefits to especially vulnerable aliens only if they were lawfully residing in the United States as of August 22, 1996, the day the Welfare Reform Act was enacted, that is not "wholly irrational" either. Congress could have rationally imposed that cutoff date to deter future immigration by those seeking access to welfare benefits. In addition, the rationality of a cutoff date, indeed the necessity of having one, flows from the fact that the funds available for welfare programs are not unlimited. The fact that cutoff dates inevitably lead to persons "who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be[ing] placed on different sides of the [eligibility] line" is not enough to make such a classification irrational any more than the necessity of "drawing lines for federal tax purposes" is irrational. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 83, 96 S.Ct. at 1893. In the matter of drawing lines, judicial deference to congressional judgment is particularly appropriate, because the "differences between the eligible and the ineligible are differences in degree rather than differences in the character of their respective claims." Id. at 83-84, 96 S.Ct. at 1893.
We have covered eleven of the fourteen categories of aliens excepted from ineligibility. One of the remaining categories consists of lawfully residing aliens who were receiving SSI benefits on August 22, 1996, the day the Welfare Reform Act was enacted; they remain eligible for that type of benefit. See § 1612(a)(2)(E). It is not wholly irrational for Congress to have decided that it would upset expectations and reliance interests more to cutoff lawfully residing aliens who were actually receiving SSI benefits when the reform legislation was enacted than it would to deny those benefits to aliens who had not been receiving them.
Congress also decided to continue to extend SSI benefits to aliens who are receiving benefits "for months after July 1996 on the basis of an application filed before January 1, 1979" and "with respect to whom the Commissioner of Social Security lacks clear and convincing evidence that such [aliens are] ineligible for such benefits as a result" of the eligibility changes instituted by the Welfare Reform Act. § 1612(a)(2)(H). It is not wholly irrational for Congress to have concluded that administrative and litigation costs would be saved by continuing to provide such aliens with benefits.
We turn to the last category for discussion. Congress decided to provide benefits to aliens who are members of an Indian tribe or are American Indians born in Canada. See § 1612(a)(2)(G). That decision was not "wholly irrational" given the historically unique relationship of Indians to this country. See 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) (recognizing "the Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people"). See also Akins v. Saxbe, 380 F.Supp. 1210, 1219-20 (D.Me.1974) (recognizing Congressional interest in preserving aboriginal rights of American Indians to move freely across territories originally occupied by them).

Plaintiffs have failed to show that Congress acted in a wholly irrational manner in regard to any of the fourteen categories it established in § 1612(a)(2). They have also failed to suggest a principled basis for prescribing a different standard of eligibility than the standards selected by Congress. Their request that we enjoin enforcement of § 1612 is nothing more than an invitation for us to substitute our judgment for that of Congress. We follow the Supreme Court in Mathews when we "decline the invitation" to do that. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84, 96 S.Ct. at 1893 .
Finally, we reject the plaintiffs' contention that the Supreme Court's decisions in United States Dept. of Agric. v. 1353 Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct.
*1353 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996), somehow compel us to conclude that § 1612 fails rational basis scrutiny. Moreno is inapposite because, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Mathews, "[n]o question involving alienage was presented in that case." Mathews, 426 U.S. at 87, 96 S.Ct. at 1895.
As for Romer, the plaintiffs point to that case's statement that a statute fails rational basis scrutiny if it cannot be explained by "anything but animus toward the class that it affects." Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 116 S.Ct. at 1627. They argue that Congress' decision to deny SSI and food stamps to aliens other than those specified in § 1612 (a)(2) cannot be explained by anything but animus. We are unconvinced. As we have explained, there are rational bases for Congress' decision to extend benefits only to the specified categories of aliens. More fundamentally, the plaintiffs' animus argument ignores the Supreme Court's statement in Mathews that "[t]he fact that an Act of Congress treats aliens differently from citizens does not in itself imply that such disparate treatment is `invidious.'" Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80, 96 S.Ct. at 1891. Here, the plaintiffs position that § 1612 is animusbased or "invidious" discrimination is grounded on nothing more than the fact that it treats some aliens differently from other aliens and from citizens, the very thing Mathews held was insufficient.
III. CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that rational basis scrutiny applies to 8 U.S.C. § 1612 and that the classifications drawn in § 1612 satisfy such scrutiny, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
[1] The Welfare Reform Act excludes all illegal aliens from eligibility for SSI and food stamp benefits. Because no members of the plaintiff class are illegal aliens, we will for convenience use the term "alien" in the remainder of this opinion as though it encompasses only legal aliens.
[2] See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub.L. No. 105-33, §§ 5301-5304, 5306, 5562-5563, 111 Stat. 251 (1997); Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105-185, §§ 503-508, 112 Stat. 523 (1998).
[3] The Act defines "qualified alien" as follows:
[T]he term "qualified alien" means an alien who ... is 0907
(1) an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.],
(2) an alien who is granted asylum under section 208 of such Act [8 U.S.C. § 1158],
(3) a refugee who is admitted to the United States under section 207 of such Act [8 U.S.C. § 1157],
(4) an alien who is paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of such Act [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)] for a period of at least 1 year,
(5) an alien whose deportation is being withheld under section 243(h) of such Act [8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) ] (as in effect immediately before the effective date [April 1, 1997] of section 307 of division C of Public Law 104-208) or section 241(b)(3) of such Act [8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3)] (as amended by section 305(a) of division C of Public Law 104-208).

(6) an alien who is granted conditional entry pursuant to section 203(a)(7) of such Act as in effect prior to April 1, 1980 [8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) ]; or
(7) an alien who is a Cuban and Haitian entrant (as defined in section 501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980).
8 U.S.C. § 1641(b). In addition, the term "qualified alien" also includes certain "battered aliens" as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c).
The plaintiffs contend that some of them are "qualified aliens" and others are not. Nonetheless, we have relegated the definition of "qualified alien" to a footnote and discuss it no further, because none of the plaintiffs fit within the fourteen categories of aliens eligible for benefits set forth in § 1612(a)(2), and that alone defeats their eligibility for SSI and food stamp benefits.
[4] We have rearranged the order for the convenience of later reference.
[5] The term "qualifying quarters" is defined in Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
[6] See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act § 584, as contained in Pub.L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987).
[7] The term "blind or disabled" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1382.
[8] The term "receiving benefits or assistance for blindness or disability" is defined in 7 U.S.C. § 2012(r).
[9] The term "Indian tribe" is defined in 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e).
[10] The other defendants are Donna Shalala, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, John J. Callahan, the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, and Daniel Glickman, the Secretary of Agriculture.
[11] There were four additional counts in the complaint. However, none of those counts are involved in this appeal, which concerns only the district court's dismissal of and entry of final judgment as to Count 1 of the complaint.
[12] In light of our conclusion that § 1612's limitation on the number of aliens eligible for SSI or food stamps is rationally related to achieving cost savings in those programs, we have no occasion to consider whether Congress' decision to impose that limitation is rationally related to other legitimate purposes or to exhaustively catalogue every conceivable legitimate purpose to which the statute could be rationally related. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 320, 113 S.Ct. at 2642 (Under rational basis scrutiny, "a classification must be upheld ... if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." (emphasis added)).
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