Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 1 of 41

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION

Case No.:
MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC., SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWORK, and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC.
Plaintiffs,
v.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and THE DISTRICT HOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MIAMI-DADE COLLEGE,
Defendants.

07-2~1088
CIV ·ALTONAGJ\
MAGISTRATE JUDGJl TURNOFF

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
This is a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief and injunctive relief, as well as damages, for violation of Plaintiffs' First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs, comprised of organizations whose members are concerned about current political, social and economic issues affecting the region and the world, challenge several provisions of the Miami-Dade County Code ("MD Code" or "Code") that impose impermissible permit requirements on the right to engage in expressive activity in
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quintessential public fora in the County, and which code provisions also violate due process rights of plaintiffs' members.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, for ongoing and threatened injury to the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights of organizations engaged in lawful expressive activity within MiamiDade County. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202.
2. Venue is proper in the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, under 28 U.S.C. §139l(b). All parties reside in or are headquartered the Southern District, all Defendants an: located in the Miami Division, and all of the acts or omissions complained of herein have occurred or will occur in the Miami Division.
INTRODUCTION 3. ~v1iami-Dade County (hereinafter "M-D County") employs a permit scheme for expressive activity in public fora that is both an unlawful prior restraint and an unreasonable time, place and manner regulation. Adopted in 1973, it requires a "permit issued by the Sheriff' for every "parade or procession." The ordinance is absolutely devoid of any standards to guide the decision of whether and under what conditions a permit will issue, how long public officials are allowed to decide whether they will issue a permit, and what conditions may be imposed on expressive activities. The absence of any standards in these key areas means that the ordinance vests public officials with unbridled discretion and invites content-based decisions based on the nature of the speaker. This is a forbidden basis on which to rest a permit scheme that requires a license to engage in protected speech; the standardless permit scheme violates Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights by impermissible limiting their rights to speech, association, assembly
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and petition. For these reasons, the Defendants must be enjoined from prohibiting the lawful exercist:: of First Amendment-protected activity. Further, the the Pllaintiffs seek a declaration that the county's "loitering ordinance" is a violation of Due Process insofar as it is vague and an abrogation of protected liberty interests, and further seek injuctive relief precluding the enforcement of said ordinance by the Defendants.
PARTIES
Plaintiffs 4. Plaintiff MIAMI FOR PEACE (hereinafter "MFP") is a not-for-profit
corporation located in Miami, Florida, incorporated in Florida since 2003 [Declaration of Linda Belgrave, dated April 19, 2007, hereinafter "Belgrave Decl.," at, 3]. Among the activities MFP has participated in are protests in the tri-county area in March 2006 to commemorate the third anniversary of the Iraq War; an Iraq War protest in Doral, MiamiDade County, Florida in March 2007 to commemorate the fourth anniversat)' of the Iraq War; a protest in January 2007 to advocate shutting down the Guantanamo facilities where alleged terrorism suspects are being held; an event in February 2007 in downtown Miami to support freedom of speech; and a monthly protest against the Iraq War, along US 1 in Miami during the evening rush hour. [Belgrave Decl. at , 4]. Plaintiff MFP is one of the key organizing groups of REJECT THE BUSH AGENDA (hereinafter "RBA"), including the march and rally planned for the afternoon of April 28, 2007. [Belgrave Decl. at, 5].
5. Plaintiff SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE & JUSTICE NETWORK (hereinafter "SFPJN") is an unincorporated network of peace and social justice groups in the Miami-Dade/Broward/Palm Beach tri-county region [Declaration of Raymond Del Papa, dated April 20, 2007, hereinafter "Del Papa Decl.," at, 2]. Among the activities that SFPJN has participated in or organized during the past year or so are a march and
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rally in Fort Lauderdale in March 2006 to commemorate the third anniversary of the Iraq War, which involved temporary lane closures along State Road 84, a major east-west artery in Fort Lauderdale; attendance at rallies and demonstrations in support of striking janitors at the University of Miami and janitors at Nova Southeastern University fired for unionizing efbJrts in 2006; a demonstration to support the campaign of the Coalition of Immokalee Workers to convince Burger King to assure that tomato pickers are paid a decent wage; activities in support of the Umoja Village, an encampment in the Liberty City area of tv1iami for people lacking housing. [Del Papa Decl. at ~ 3]. SFPJN is a participating entity in RBA. [Del Papa Decl. at ~~ 2, 4]. Many of its member organizations will have participants in the April 28th march and rally in rvtiami-Dade County.
6. Plaintiff HAITI SOLIDARITY (hereinafter "HS") is a not-for-profit corporation located in Miami, Florida, having been incorporated since 2004 in the State of Florida [Declaration of Jack Lieberman, dated April 20, 2007, hereinafter "Lieberman Decl.," at ~ 3]. Among the activities HS has participated in are a mass rally of 1,000 people within the past month in front of the Immigration building at the corner of NE 79th Street and Biscayne Boulevard, to protest discrimination against Haitians who recently came ashore at Hallandale Beach, Broward County, Florida; various immigrants' rights demonstrations during 2006, some in downtown Miami and others at the Immigration building on NE 79th Street; and a march of approximately 6,000 people in downtown Miami to urge that the Haitian government free Father Gerard Jean-Juste, which took place approximately a year and a half ago. [Lieberman Decl. at ~4]. Plaintiff HS anticipates that it will bring one of the largest contingents of demonstrators to the April 28 demonstration at Miami-Dade College, with up to 200 HS members expected to participate [Lieberman Decl. at ~ 6].
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Defendants
7. Defendant MIAMI-DADE COUNTY (hereinafter "M-D County") is a political subdivision of the State of Florida, with the capacity to sue and be sued. It is the legal entity responsible for the actions of the Miami-Dade County Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter "M-D BCC"), including the County Code promulgated by the M-D BCC, as well as the actions of law enforcement officers employed in the County. M-D County controls and is responsible for the Miami-Dade Police Department (hereinafter ":M-D PD"), including the actions taken by the Metropolitan Sheriff and law enforcement officers employed by the M-D PD.
8. Defendant MIAMI-DADE COLLEGE (hereinafter "M-D College") is a state-supported college with eight campuses in Miami-Dade County. One of M-D College's campuses is located at 11011 SW 1041h Street, Miami, known as the "Kendall Campus." M·-D College has invited President George W. Bush to address its 2007 graduating class on April28, 2007.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
Miami-Dade College Commencement: 9. During the evening of April28, 2007, President George W. Bush is scheduled
to give a commencement address at Miami-Dade College, located in the Kendall section of the Southern region of unincorporated Miami-Dade County. It is anticipated that the President's spe:ech will begin at some point between 5:00 and 6:00p.m.
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Reject the Bush Agenda Demonstration Event: 10. tv1FP, SFPJN, HS and other constituent organizations comprising the RBA
plan to hold a march in Miami-Dade County between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. [Belgrave Decl. at ~ 5]. The proposed march route is a half-mile long, starting just south of the east entrance to the Miami-Dade College (hereinafter "MDC") Kendall campus at SW lOOth Street and SW 107th Avenue. Id. The march will proceed south on SW 107th Avenue, and tum the comer to proceed west on SW 104th Street, stopping just before the main entrance to the MDC Kendall campus at SW 104th Street and SW 109th Court. Id. [See Map ofRoute attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Linda Belgrave.] The march will not block the entrances to the campus. ld. At the conclusion of the march, it is planned that march participants will hold a rally adjacent to the main entrance to the MDC Kendall campus locate:d at SW 104th Street and S"'¥1/ 109th Court, and the rally will continue from 4 p.m. to 7 p.m. [Belgrave Decl. at ~ 7]. A website providing additional details regarding the demonstration is located at http://w\vw. rcjcctbushmiami.com. [Belgrave Decl. at~ 5].
Miami-Dade County Code Provisions: 11. Miami-Dade County has an antiquated permit scheme for all parades in the
unincorporated portions of the county, first adopted in 1971 and last revised in 1973. Provisions of this type have been repeatedly condemned insofar as they are clearly violative of First Amendment protections for the freedoms of speech, assembly and petition.
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12. Miami-Dade Code§ 30-274: Parades and processions; permit required
In the unincorporated areas, no procession or parade, excepting the forces of United States Armed Services, the military forces of the State, the forces of the police and fire departments, and funeral processions, shall occupy, march, or proceed along any street or roadway except in accordance with a permit issued by the Sheriff and such other regulations as are set forth herein which may apply.
13. Miami-Dade County has a code provision criminalizing the: standing or
remaining on any public sidewalk or public place so as to hinder or impede the passage of
pedestrians or vehicles; this section was first adopted in 1967, and last revised in 1982.
This criminalization of loitering contains no exception for First Amendment-protected
activity or for innocent conduct protected by federal jurisprudence.
14. Miami-Dade County Code § 21-31.1: Disorderly Condud, Loitering,
J>enalties.
(b) Loitering. For the purpose of this section "loitering" means. the act of standing, remaining or sleeping on, in or about any public street, public sidewalk, public overpass, public bridge,. public library or other place specifically enumerated herein. A person commits the offense of loitering when he knowingly:
( 1) Loiters on any public street, public sidewalk, public: overpass, public bridge or public place so as to hinder or impede the passage of pedestrians or vehicles.
(4) Loiters in or about a school, college or university campus so as to hinder to impede the orderly conduct of instructional, recreational or other school activities.
(c) Penalties for violation. . .. Any person convicted of a violation of any other subsection of this section shall bt:: punished by a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by
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imprisonment in the County Jail for a term not to exceed sixty (60) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in llhe discretion of the court. This section is applicable in both the incorporated and unincorporated areas of Miami-Dade County and all violations thereof shall be prosecuted in the County Court. Plaintiffs' Efforts to Obtain a Permit to Demonstrate in a Parade and Rally at the Miami-Dade College Commencement Event: 15. Various groups in the social justice and peace movements learned in March 2007 that President George W. Bush was tentatively scheduled to give a commencement address on April 28th at Miami-Dade College. Initial inquiries to the county police relating to the possible need for a permit to demonstrate during the President's visit were made on or about April 1, 2007, by Ray Del Papa of Plaintiff SFPJN [Belgrave Decl. at •rr 8]. Mr. Del Papa was directed to the Special Events Department.
16. On April 2nd, event organizer Linda Belgrave (ofMFP and SFP.JN) contacted the Miami-Dade Police Department ("M-D PD"), and was contacted on April 4th with direction to contact Capt. Michael Mouring of the Kendall district station of the M-D PD. [Belgrave Decl. at ~~ 9-1 0].
17. A tentative meeting to resolve demonstration issues was set for April 6t\ but this meeting was cancelled by the M-D PD. [Belgrave Decl. at~~ 10-11].
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18. On April 14th Linda Belgrave ofMFP received an e-mail from Capt. Mouring indicating that the M-D PD would not accommodate a "march route" for the demonstration planned on April 28th. [Belgrave Decl. at~ 13]. No reason for the arbitrary rejection was provided by the M-D PD. !d.
19. As to the request for a location for a rally, Ms. Belgrave was advised that the M-D PD was not willing to meet to discuss a demonstration location until the week of April 23rct. [Belgrave Decl. at ~13].
20. On April 16th, Ms. Belgrave received numerous inquires by organizations seeking infom1ation about the RBA demonstration, particularly the march route. [Belgrave Decl. at ~14].
21. On April 17th and 18th, upon request by the plaintiffs, legal counsel attempted to resolve outstanding issues arising from the RBA political march and rally with MiamiDade County, to no avail [Declaration of Mara Shlackman, dated April 21, 2007, hereinafter "Shlackman Decl.," at ~~ 3 to 6].
22. The refusal by the M-D PD to accommodate the RBA's proposed political parade route, and the failure of the M-D PD to provide a location for the post-parade rally,
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have caused legitimate fear among the Plaintiffs that the M-D PD may endeavor to shut down any rally on April 28th through enforcement of its quarter-century old loitering ordinance. [Del Papa Decl. at ,-r 6].
23. In light of the MDPD'S denial of a lane closure for the political parade in which Plaintiffs plan to participate, the hundreds of participants, including Plaintiffs' members, would be forced to crowd onto the sidewalks, and would risk arrest for hindering or impeding the passage of pedestrians. [Del Papa Decl. at ~6]. Additionally, Plaintiffs are aware that the loitering ordinance carries maximum penalties of a $500.00 fine and/or sixty (60) days in jail, which are serious penalties that are likely to discourage participation in the march given the denial of lane closures to facilitate the march. !d. The County's parade permit ordinance and its loitering ordinance infringe on Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to peaceably assemble, and to be visible on the street to their intended audience while exercising their First Amendment freedoms of speech, assembly and petition.
CAUSES OF ACTION 24. As to each cause of action delineated below in Counts One through Three:, plaintiffs advance their federal constitutional claims against the governmental entities as state actors, through the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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COUNT ONE Monell Claim - Official Policy to Suppress Protected Speech and Assembly
(42 USC§ 1983 -Violation of First Amendment- Various Grounds) County Code § 30-274 - Parades & Processions Ordinam:e By ALL PLAINTIFFS Against MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
25. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate each jurisdictional and factual allegation of Paragraphs 1-24, as if set forth at length herein.
26. At all times relevant hereto, the Miami-Dade County Board of County Commissioners ("M-D BCC") was the final policymaker of Miami-Dade County ("M-DC") for purposes of adopting ordinances and other policies formally regulating eonstitutionallyprotected expression and assembly within the county's boundaries.
27. In December, 1971, the M-D BCC enacted Ordinance No. 71-94, now codified at County Code§ 30-274 (not revised since March, 1973), precluding any "procession or parade" in the unincorporated areas of Miami-Dade County, except in accordance with a permit issued by the Sheriff. This Parades & Processions Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face as an impermissible prior restraint, containing terms which provide unfettered discretion to law enforcement officials, lack of deadlines for considering applications, lack of appropriate review for unfavorable decisions, and other deficiencies.
28. County Code§ 30-274 was used as the basis for defendant M-DC's refusal to issue a permit for the plaintiffs' planned political march on April28, 2007.
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29. The adoption by the M-D BCC of Code§ 30-274, and the implementation ofthis Parades and Processions Ordinance by the M-DPD, is the proximate cause: of the deprivation of the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs and other demonstrators for the planned activities on April28, 2007, on public streets, sidewalks and other public property adjacent to M-D College. Plaintiffs seek redress for this violation of the First Amendment through the op~~ration of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT TWO Monell Claim - Official Policy to Suppress Protected Speech and Assembly
(42 USC§ 1983 -Violation of First Amendment- Overbreadth) County Code§ 21-31.1- Loitering Ordinance
By ALL PLAINTIFFS Against MIAMI-DADE COUNTY and MIAMI-DADE COLLEGE
30. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate each jurisdictional and factual allegation of Paragraphs 1-24, as if set forth at length herein.
31. At all times relevant hereto, the M-D BCC was the final policymaker of Miami-Dade County for purposes of adopting ordinances and other policies formally regulating conduct in public, including constitutionally-protected expression and assembly within the county's boundaries.
32. In March, 1967, the M-D BCC enacted Ordinance No. 67-17, now codiHed at County Code § 21-31.1. The Loitering Ordinance provides that it is unlawful to engage in "standing" or "remaining'' on any public street, sidewalk or "place" so as to hinder or impede vehicular or pedestrian traffic, see M-D County Code§ 21-31.1 (b) (1):; it is also
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unlawful to "loiter in or about a ... college or university campus so as to hinder or impede the orderly conduct of instructional, recreational or other school activities," see M-D County Code § 21-31.1 (b)(4). These sections are applicable in the incorporated and unincorporated areas ofMiami-Dade County, see M-D County Code§ 21-31.1 (c).
33. This Loitering Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face as an impennissibly overbroad prohibition that has a substantial impact on conduct protected by the: First Amendment, including the expressive conduct which the plaintiffs in this action plan for the public street and sidewalks adjacent to M-D College.
34. The anticipated use of County Code§ 21-31.1 by the M-DPD and M·-D College campus police have chilled the First Amendment-protected activities of the plaintiffs, and may cause the arrest of members ofthe plaintiffs, as well as others similarly situated who wish to exercise their rights of free speech, assembly and association on April 28, 2007.
35. The adoption by the M-D BCC of Code§ 21-31.1, and the anticipated implementation of this Loitering Ordinance by the M-DPD and/or the M-D College campus police are the proximate causes of the deprivation of the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs, and other demonstrators similarly situated, with respect to the planned activities on April28, 2007 on public streets, sidewalks and other public property adjacent to M-D College. Plaintiffs seek redress for this violation of the First Amendment through the operation of42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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COUNT THREE Monell Claim - Official Policy to Suppress Protected Speech and Assembly (42 USC§ 1983 -Violation of 14th Amendment- Vagueness and Liberty Interest)
County Code§ 21-31.1- Loitering Ordinance By ALL PLAINTIFFS Against MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
and MIAMI-DADE COLLEGE
36. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate each jurisdictional and factual allegation of Paragraphs 1-24, as if set forth at length herein.
37. At all times relevant hereto, the M-D BCC was the final policymaker of Miami-Dade County for purposes of adopting ordinances and other policies formally regulating conduct in public, including constitutionally-protected expression and assembly within the county's boundaries.
38. In March, 1967, the M-D BCC enacted Ordinance No. 67-17, now codified at County Code § 21-31.1. The Loitering Ordinance provides that it is unlawful to engage in "standing" or "remaining" on any public street, sidewalk or "place" so as to hinder or impede vehicular or pedestrian traffic, see M-D County Code§ 21-31.1 (b) (1); it is also unlawful to "loiter in or about a ... college or university campus so as to hinder or impede the orderly conduct of instructional, recreational or other school activities," see M-D County Code§ 21-31.1 (b)(4). These sections are applicable in the incorporated and unincorporated areas ofMiami-Dade County, see M-D County Code§ 21-31.1 (c).
39. This Loitering Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, as an impermissibly vague prohibition that has a substantial impact on conduct protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for two reasons. First, this ordinance fails to provide the kind
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of notice that enables ordinary citizens to understand what precise conduct it prohibits; second, it authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement through its lack of precision.
40. This Loitering Ordinance is further unconstitutional on its face as an impermissible prohibition on conduct that is protected by the liberty interest arising from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The members of the plaintiff organizations have a significant liberty interest in standing on public sidewalks and public places according to their inclination.
41. The anticipated use of County Code§ 21-31.1 by the M-DPD and M·-D College campus police have chilled the First Amendment-protected activities of the plaintiffs, and may cause the arrest of members of the plaintiffs, as well as others similarly situated who wish to exercise their rights of free speech, assembly and association on April28, 2007.
42. The adoption by the M-D BCC of Code § 21-31.1, and the anticipated implementation of this Loitering Ordinance by the M-DPD and/or the M-D College campus police in a manner disallowed by the 14th Amendment, is the proximate cause of the deprivation of the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs without due process, and other demonstrators similarly situated, on April28, 2007, with respect to the planned activities on public streets, sidewalks and other public property adjacent to M-D College. Plaintiffs seek redress for this violation of the 14th Amendment through the operation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF - ALL COUNTS

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs seek judgment against Defendants for the following relief 1. A preliminary and permanent injunction, enjoining Defendants, their officers, agents and employees from enforcing Miami-Dade County Code§§ 30-274 and 21-31.1(b). 2. For a declaration that Defendant Miami-Dade County's challeng,ed ordinances violate Plaintifis' rights to free speech, assembly, association and to petition the government for redress of grievances, under the First Amendment, and are a further violation of due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3. For costs of suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1920 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
4. For attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
5. For such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

ROSS LAW FIRM, P 3923 Lake Worth Ave. Suite 102 Lake Worth, FL 33461 Tel: (561) 251-4896 bravclaw/(f:bellsouth.net

'»f~ Jlu~ Mara Shlackman FB 988618 LAW OFFICES OF MARA SHLACKMAN, P.L. 757 SW 1ih St., PMB 309 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316 Tel: (954) 523-1131 mara(ii!shlackmanlaw. com

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VERIFICATION I, RAYMOND DEL PAPA, declare: 1. I am a member of the Plaintiff South Florida Peace & Justice Network. I submitted a declaration in support of the preliminary injunction that sets out the facts set forth in the Complaint, adopted in the Statement of Facts in the Memorandum. I have personal knowledge of those facts. 2. I have read the Complaint filed in this action and I am familiar with the factual matters set forth in the pleading. I verifY that these facts are true and correct. I declan~ under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on April23, 2007 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
RAYMOND.DEL PAPA
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DMSION
Case No. --------------------

MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC., SOUTH
FLORIDA PEACEANDJUSTICE NETWORK, and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC.,

Plaintiffs, v.

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and THE DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MIAMI-DADE COLLEGE,

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF LINDA BELGRAVE

LINDA BELGRAVE, being of full age, hereby declares the following under penalty of pexjury:

1. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this declaration.

2.

I am a resident of the unincorporated area of Miami-Dade County known as Kendall,

the secretary of Miami for Peace, Inc. ("MFP"), and one of the principal organizers for Reject the

Bush Agenda ("RBA"), a coalition of activist groups plcmning protest activities relating to the

commencement address that President Bush is scheduled to give at Miami-Dade College ("MDC") on

April 28, 2007. MFP is a participating group in the RBA coalition. MFP is also a partjcipant in the

South Florida Peace and Justice Network ("SFPJN"), a tri-county network of groups dedicated to

issues of peace and social justice, which is also a Plaintiff in this case.

3.

MFP is a Florida non-profit corporation that has been registered with the State of

Florida since 2003. The group's goals arc to end the Iraq War, and to promote peace generally.

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Toward these ends, MFP and its members participate in protests, do educational work such as teach-

ins, and participate in letter writing campaigns.

1. Among the activities MFP has participated in are protests in the tri-county area in

March 2006 to commemorate the third anniversary of the Iraq War; an Iraq War protest in Doral,

Miami-Dade County, Florida, in March 2007 to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the Iraq

War; a protest in .January 2007 to advocate shutting down the Guantanamo facilities where alleged

terrorism suspects are being held; an event in February 2007 in downtown Mian1i to support freedom

of speech; and a monthly protest against the Iraq War, along US 1 in Miami during the evening rush

hour.

5.

MFP initiated the planning of the April 28, 2007 protest with the goals of demanding

the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, and the restoration of civil liberties and freedom

of speech in the United States. A website for the protest is located at ""'"w.rejectbushmi<uni.com.

MFP plans to hold a march between 3 p.m. and 1 p.m. The proposed march route is a half-mile

long, startingjust south of the east entrance to the MDC Kendall can1pus at SW 100" Street and SW

107'h Avenue. The march will proceed south on SW 107"' Avenue, and tum the comer to proceed

west on SW 104"' Street, stoppingjust before the main entrance to the MDC Kendall campus at SW

101."' Street and SW 109"' Court. A map of the route is attached as Exhibit A. The march will not

block the entrances to the campus. Our t,>roup's goal is to communicate our message to people

entering the campus to attend the commencement, to passersby on the roadways, and to the general

public through the media. Our intended audience is the larger community, rather than the college

community, and we do not wish to interfere with the commencement itself.

6. Because hundreds of people are expected to attend tins march, ti1e sidewalks will be

insufficient to accommodate ti1e march, and I have requested in writing that the police issue a pcnnit

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for a parade and/or procession and close ofriancs of traffic to facilitate our march. A parade and/or procession with closed traffic lanes will protect the safety of participants in the march. There arc 2 northbound lanes and 2 southbound lanes with no median on SW 107.. Avenue, while SVV 104"' Street

has 3 eastbound lanes and 3 westbound lanes, separated by a median. Given the number oflancs on these thoroughfares, the brevity of the march, and the fact that the cmmnencemcnt ceremonies do not begin until 5 p.m., we believe that our request for partial lane closure could be accomplished by closing off a single lane on SW 107"' Avenue and a single lane on SW 104.. Street, wi1hout interfering

with traffic safety in any way.

7.

At the conclusion of the march, it is planned that march participants will hold a rally

adjacent to the main entrance to the MDC Kendall can1pus located at SW 101... Street and SW 109"'

Court, and the rally will continue from 4 p.m. to 7 p.m.

8.

To initiate the process of seeking a pcnnit from the Mian1i-Dade Police Department

("MDPD") to hold the march and rally, on April1, 2007, my fdlow organizer, Ray Del Papa, called

the Miami-Dade Police Department's non-emergency number, to ask who to call to coordinate a

protest when President Bush is in town. Mr. Del Papa was t,riven another number, for Special Events.

9.

On the morning of April 2, 2007, I called the MDPD Special Events telephone

number, where I was put through to Lt. Del Menendez's number. There was no answer, so I left a

message, telling him we wanted to hold a demonstration while President Bush is at Miami Dade

College, and I was calling to get the process started. With no response by late afternoon, I called at,>ain,

leaving another message. 10. On April1, 2007, Lt. Menendez left me a message to call Captain Michael C. Mouring,

of the Kendall police station, saying he had also provided my contact infonnation to the Captain. On

the same day, I called and spoke to Captain Mouring. He seemed accommodating (although he did

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Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 21 of 41
try to steer us toward holding the demonstration on campus, despite our desire to be out ;md \~sible to the public), and we set a meeting for Friday, April6, 2007, at 10:30 a.m. Captain Mom·ing said that he would check with his colleague in the MDPD legal department (regarding scheduling), and would confinn the meeting by April 5th. Captain Mouring indicated that he did not anticipate a problem.
11. Captain Mouring had not called to confinn the April 6th appointment by mid-day on April 5th, so I called him and left a message with my office phone number and a request for confinnation of the following day's appointment. I did not receive a call-back by late afternoon on April 5th, so I called awain, and Captain Mouring answered and told me that the following day was "premature" for a meeting; we would have to postpone. I discussed with Captain Mouring the size of the demonstration; I gave a very rough estimate of a few hundred, but with caveats, since it is impossible to predict turnout. I did not try to set a new meeting date and time during that call, because Captain Mouring said he was going to be out of the office the following Monday & Tuesday, and I was going; to be out of town the rest of that week, and I wanted to confer with others before taking the next step.
12. On April 6, 2007, I sent Captain Mouring an e-mail describing in detail the RBA adhoc committee's plans for our demonstration (e-mail is attached hereto as Exhibit B). I requested that we reschedule our cancelled meeting for Monday, April 16, 2007. In the e-mail, I requested that Captain Mouring call my cell phone to respond, as I would be out of town and off-line. I also suggested that Captain Mouring respond to my e-mail using the "reply all" function, so that Ms. Mara Shlackman, our counsel, as well as Mr. Del Papa, could handle any matters that arose during my absence. I received no phone call from Captain Mouring while I was out of town.
13. On April 14, 2007, I returned home in the evening, and discovered that Captain Mouring had responded to my e-mail the previous afternoon, April 13m (e-mail from Captain Mouring
-4-

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 22 of 41
attached as Exhibit C). In his e-mail, Captain Mouring stated that a meeting would still be "premature" and that he would contact me the week of April 23"' to schedule a meeting, which is the same week the demonstration is scheduled to take place. In this e-mail Captain Mouring also rejected a critical aspect of our planned event, stating that he was "not willing" to close traffic lanes. No reason was provided. Because of the manner in which Captain Mouring responded to my April 6'h e-mail, there was a delay in my receipt of notice of Captain Mouring's refusal to schedule a timely appointment reg-arding planning for the demonstration and his refusal to grant our request for lane closures.
14. On April 16, 2007, I received numerous phone calls from people who want to participate in the demonstration. The most common questions concerned the starting point for the march and other inquiries relating to the march. Because Captain Mouring has continuallly declined to meet with us, this has been a diflicult question to answer.
15. My counsel have advised me that Mian1i-Dade County has a very minimal ordinance scheme, that gives unfettered discretion to the MDPD in deciding whether to grant a pennit for a political procession or parade. The County Code provides no criteria the MDPD must follow in deciding whether to grant or deny a parade pennit, provides no time fran1es for the processing of pennit requesl'i, and provides our group with no avenue of administrative appeal now that our request for a safe parade route has been denied. The manner in which Captain Mouring: has treated my request for lane closures is a direct result of this insufficient ordinance scheme. The First Amendment rights ofMFP have been violated, in that Captain Mouring's refusal to meet with me and to grant lane closures has already hindered MFP'S efforts in organizing this protest, since uncertainty over the details of the demonstration discourages participation. Moreover, if we are unable to proceed with the demonstration on March 28, MFP'S First Amendment rights will be further infringed.
-5-

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 23 of 41 Pursuanl to 28 U .S.C. §1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct.
l'l~
Executed on this day of April, 2007.
-~a~~~
UNDA BELGRAVE
-6-

CGaosoegl1e:0M7a-pcsv-21088-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 PPaaggee12o4f2of 41

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CGaosoegl1e:0M7a-pcsv-21088-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 PPaaggee22o5f2of 41 Reject Bush Miatmi
George W. Bush will be speaking at the Miami-Dade College graduation at the Kendall Campus on April 28th at 3pm. Thousands of us from all over Florida will be gathering there to send a clear message! View only Created by DFAM on fl.pr 18- Updated yesterday
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CYaasheoo1t:0M7a-cilv--2m1a0r8a@8-sChMlacAkmaDnloacwu.cmoemnt 1

- Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007

PPaaggeel2o6f o1f 41

~HoO·!,. SMALL BUSINESS
Email

Print - Close Window

Subject: Protest, April 28

Date:

Fri, 6 Apr 2007 15:42:27 -0400

From: "Belgrave, Linda" <l.belgrave@miami.edu>

To:

sta05info@rndpd .com

CC:

"Mara Shlackman" <rnara@shlackmanlaw.com>, mrrratpp@aol.com

Captain Mouring,

In order to facilitate the process of permitting (if necessary) our demonstration for April 28, and sorting out the particulars, I thought it would be helpful if I sent you the details of what we are planning and requesting. That way, when we sit down together, we can all be on the same page.

ORGANIZATION: Reject Bush Agenda (This is the name we've given to our ad-hoc organizing committee. It consists of a number of local organizations, including the South Florida Peace & Justice Network & Miami for Peace, the hats you currently know me by.)

DATE & TIME: April ~~8. 3:00p.m. to 7:00p.m. (As we continue to firm up our plans, we anticipate narrowing this window somewhat.)

DEOMONSTRATION PLAN & PLACE: March & rally/picket outside Miami Dade College, Kendall Campus. We plan to gather at the MDC driveway that intersects S.W. 107th Ave. We will march from that location, south to S.W. 104th St., then west on 104th to the MDC main entrance. At that point, we plan to spread out along S.W. 104th St. and rally/picket for the duration.

SOUND: We have not made plans regarding sound yet, but at a minimum, we will probably use a batteryoperated megaphone.

SIZE: As you and I discussed, this is very hard to predict. At this point, we anticipate a few hundred people.

PROTEST REQUEST: We are requesting lane closures on S.W. 107th Ave. & S.W. 104th ST., as needed.

MEETING REQUEST: Ms. Mara Shlackman and I would like to reschedule the Friday, April 6th meeting that you felt was premature, to Monday April16, after 10:00 a.m.

I realize that your "out of office" schedule and mine will make communication somewhat awkvvard this coming week. If you have any questions, and/or to respond regarding our meeting, it is probably best to call me on me cell, which I'll have out of town. That number is 305-801-0245. You can also hit "reply all" to respond to this message. I don't anticipate having e-mail access while I'm away, but the others will receive your note and I can see it when I return.

Meanwhile, I hope you have a good weekend and time away.

Thank you,

Linda Belgrave Reject Bush Agenda
South Florida Peace lo. Justice Network
Miami for Peace
fXH1BtT 'B

http://b3.mail.yahoo.com/ym/shlackmanlaw.com/ShowLetter?box=Inbox&Msgld=2923_2... 4/19/2007

CYaasheoo1!:0M7-acilv--2m1a0r8a@8-sChMlacAkmaDnloacwu.cmoemnt 1
·-·

- Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007

PPaaggeel2o7f ol f 41

~H00·!1., SMALL BUSINESS Email

Print - Close Window

Date:

Thu, 19 Apr 2007 17:47:14-0700 (PDT)

From: "Mara Shlackman" <mara@shlackmanlaw.com>

Subject: Fwd: FW: Pre-Event Meeting

To:

mara@shlackmanlaw.com

>- - -
>
>From: Mouring, Michael C. (MDPD) [mailto:mcmouring@mdpd.com] >Sent: Fri 4/13/2007 2:51 PM >To: Belgrave, Linda >Cc: 'mrrratpp@aol.com'; Caneva, Edgardo (MDPD); O'Donnell, Grace M. (MDPD) >Subject: Pre-Event Meeting
> > >
>Ms. Belgrade, good afternoon. Our meeting would still be premature, we >don't know as yet if the school will allow protesters on campus and what >requirements will be dictated by the Secret Service. Although we would like >to finalize plans as far in advance as possible, that won't happen till the >Monday before thE~ event. I will contact you the week of the 23rd to >schedule. As far as closing off a lane on 107 Avenue and on 104 Street, I >am not willing to do that.
>
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http://b3. mai I. yahoo.com/ym/shlackmanlaw.com/ShowLetter?box=Sent&Msgld=34_8408... 4/19/2007

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 28 of 41

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
Case No.

MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC., SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWORK, and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC.,

Plaintiffs,
v.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and THE DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MIAMI-DADE COLLEGE,

Defendants. DECLARATION OF JACK LIEBERMAN
JACK LIEBERMAN, being of full age, hereby declares the following under penalty of

perjury:

1. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this declaration.

2.

I am a resident of an unincorporated area of northeast Miami-Dade County,

Florida, a director of Haiti Solidarity, Inc. ("HS"), and an organizer for Reject the Bush

Agenda ("RBA"), a coalition of activist groups planning protest activities relating to the

commencemE~nt address that President Bush is scheduled to give at Miami-Dade College

("MDC") on April 28, 2007. I have attended several organizing meetings for this

demonstration during the past month. HS is a participating group in the RB.A coalition. HS

is also a participant in the South Florida Peace and Justice Network ("SFPJN"), a tri-county

-1-

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA

-Document 1

Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 29 of 41

network of groups dedicated to issues of peace and social justice, which is also a Plaintiff

in this case.

3.

HS is a Florida non-profit corporation that has been registered with the State

of Florida since 2004. HS' purpose is to raise awareness in the United States regarding

issues of democracy and human rights in Haiti, by participating in various educational and

protest activities. 4. Among the activities HS has participated in are a mass rally ofa 1,000 people within

the past month in front of the Immigration building at the comer of NE 79th Street and Biscayne

Boulevard, to protest discrimination against Haitians who recently came ashore at Hallandale Beach, Broward County, Florida; various immigrants' rights demonstrations during 2006, some in downtown Miami and others at the Immigration building on NE 79th Street; and a march of

approximately 6,000 people in downtown Miami to urge that the Haitian government free Father

Gerard Jean-Juste, which took place approximately a year and a half ago.

5.

HS' purpose in participating in the demonstration against the Bush Administration on

April28, 2007, adjacent to the Kendall campus ofMiami-Dade College, is to demand that Haitian refugees in the United States be granted Temporary Protected Status under U.S. immigration law. Our group's goal is to communicate our message to people entering the campus to attend the commenc~3ment, to passersby on the roadways, and to the general public through the media. Our intended audience is the larger community, rather than the college community,

and we do not wish to interfere with the commencement itself. 6. HS plans to bring in buses ofpeople from the Little Haiti section ofthe CityofMiami
to attend this d(;:monstration. HS anticipates that approximately 200 Haitians will attend this event,

-2-

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 30 of 41

aside from from any other groups that will be attending this protest.

7.

My counsel have advised me that Miami-Dade County has a w~ry minimal

ordinance scheme, that gives unfettered discretion to the Miami-Dade Police Department

("MDPD") in deciding whether to grant a permit for a political procession or parade. The

County Code provides no criteria the MDPD must follow in deciding whether to grant or

deny a parade permit, provides no time frames for the processing of permit requests, and

provides no avenue of administrative appeal now that a safe parade rout~3 has been

denied. 8.

The South Florida Haitian community is upset about the denial ofa safe parade route,

as it infringes on their First Amendment right to peaceably assemble, and to be visiblt:: on the street

to their intended audience while exercising their First Amendment freedom of speech. Moreover,

the MDPD's n:fusal to provide a safe parade route, which is a direct result of this insufficient ordinance scheme, very much concerns Haitian refugees, who do not want to be in d~mger ofarrest

or other negative encounters with law enforcement personnel. The MDPD's restrictions on the

Haitian refuget::s' exercise ofdemocratic freedoms will have a chilling effect on their participation in the march and rally, as an arrest could result in loss of permanent resident status and/or deportation back to Haiti. For the size of the crowd anticipated, lane closures are necessary to 1ensure a safe, peaceful march, free of tension for participants and others. Moreover, if the Haitian community in South Florida is unable to proceed with the demonstration on April 28, its First

Amendment rights will be further infringed. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the~ foregoing is

true and corn3ct.

-3-

·--------------·----- ,_ Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 31 of 41

26~ay Executed on thI.S -

of April, 2007.

k A--,_--_

I

JACK LIEBERMAN

-4-

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1

- Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007

Page 32 of 41

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
Case No.

MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC., SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWORK, and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and THE DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MIAMI-DADE COLLEGE,
Defendants.
DECLARATION OF RAYMOND DEL PAPA
RAYMOND DEL PAPA, being of full age, hereby declares the following under
penalty of perjury:
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this declaration. 2. I am a resident of the City of Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, a
member of the steering committee of the South Florida Peace and Justiice Network ("SFPJN"), and an organizer for Reject the Bush Agenda ("RBA"), a coalition of activist groups planning protest activities relating to the commencement address that President Bush is scheduled to give at Miami-Dade College ("MDC") on April 28, 2007. I have
attended several organizing meetings for this demonstration during the past month.
SFPJN is a participating group in the RBA coalition. SFPJN is a tri-county (Miami-Dade,

-1-

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 33 of 41
Broward, and Palm Beach Counties) unincorporated network of groups dedicated to issues of peace and social justice. Among the groups that are part of the SFPJN are the other two Plaintiffs in this litigation, Miami for Peace, Inc. and Haiti Solidarity, Inc. Other groups that participate in the SFPJN include Code Pink, the Raging Grannies, and the Bolivarian Youth.
3. Among the activities that SFPJN has participated in or organized during the past year or so are a march and rally in Fort Lauderdale in March 2006 to commemorate the third anniversary of the Iraq War, which involved temporary lane closures along State Road 84, a major east-west artery in Fort Lauderdale; attendance at rallies and demonstrations in support of striking janitors at the University ofMiami and janitors at Nova Southeastern University fired for unionizing efforts; a demonstration to support the campaign ofthe Coalition oflmmokalee Workers to convince Burger King to assure that tomato pickers are paid more; activities in support of Umoja Village, an encampment in the Liberty City area of Miami for people lacking housing.
4. SFPJN is participating in the demonstration against the Bush Administration on April 28, 2007, adjacent to the Kendall campus ofMiami-Dade College, to demand immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, restoration of civil liberties, and Temporary Protected Status under U.S. immigration law for Haitian refugees, all causes supported by member groups. Our group's goal is to communicate our message to people entering the campus to attend the commencement, to passersby on the roadways, and to the general public through the media. Our intended audience is the larger community, rather than the college community, and we do not wish to interfere with the commencement itself.
5. My counsel have advised me that Miami-Dade County has a very minimal
-2-

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1

·- Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 34 of 41

ordinance scheme, that gives unfettered discretion to the Miami-Dade Police Department ("MDPD") in deciding whether to grant a permit for a political procession or parade. The County Code provides no criteria the MDPD must follow in deciding whether to grant or deny a parade permit, provides no time frames for the processing of permit requests, and provides no avenue of administrative appeal now that a safe parade routH has been denied.
6. My counsel has also advised me that Miami-Dade County has an unconstitutionally vague ordinanc1~ concerning loitering, which penalizes loitering on public streets, public sidewalks, and near college campuses, among other places. In light ofthe MDPD 'S denial of a lane closure for the political parade in which SFPJN plans to participate, the hundreds of participants, including SFPJN members, would be forced to crowd onto the sidewalks, and would risk arrest for hindering or impeding the passage ofother pedestrians. Additionally, my counsel has advised that the loitering ordinance carries maximum penalties of a $500.00 fine and/or sixty (60) days in jail, which are serious penalti{:s that are likely to discourage participation in the march given the denial of lane closures to facilitate the march. The County's parade permit ordinance and its loitering ordinance infringe on our group's First Amendment right to peaceably assemble, and to be visibl,e on the street to our intended audience while exercising our First Amendment freedom ofspeech. Moreover, the MDPD's refusal to provide a safe parade route is a direct result of this insufficient ordinance scheme.

-3-

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 35 of 41 ,_.,.
Likewise, if SFPJN members are unable to proceed with the demonstration on April 28, their First Amendment rights will be further infringed.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and corred.
I Afl,
Executed on this _oW_ day of April, 2007. D DEL PAPA
-4-

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1

- Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007

Page 36 of 41

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DMSION
Case No.----------

MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC., SOUTH FLORIDA
PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWO~ and
HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC.,
Plaintiffs, v.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State ofFlorida, and THE DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MIAMI-DADE COLLEGE,
Defendants.

DECLARATION OF MARA SHLACKMAN MARA SHLACKMAN, being of full age, hereby declares the following under penalty of perjury: 1. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this declaration. 2. I have been a member ofthe Florida Bar in good standing since 1993, and I am also admitted to practice in the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Eleventh Circuit, as well as the U.S. District Courts for the: Southern and Middle Districts of Florida. I reside and practice law in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida. I am one of the counsel representing the Plaintiffs in this action. 3. The Plaintiffs contacted me for assistance in the early part of the week of April 16, 2007, with regard to negotiating on their behalfto obtain the necessary permits and/or approvals from
-1-

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1

-· Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007

Page 37 of 41

the Miami-Dad1e Police Department ("MDPD") to hold a demonstration on April28, 2007, adjacent

to the Kendall c:ampus ofMiam.i-Dade College ("MDC"), coinciding with President Bush's delivery

of the commencement address to graduating students. The Plaintiffs called me afte:r receiving a

rejection ofa key element oftheir planned protest byMiami-Dade PoliceDepartment offitcials, namely

their request for lane closures to facilitate a half-mile march commencing just past tht~ intersection

ofSW 100th Street and SW 10~ Avenue (the east entrance to the campus), and concluding at the

intersection of SW 104th Street and SW 109th Court (the main entrance to the campus).

4.

On Tuesday, Aprill7, 2007, I called Captain Michael C. Mouring, the same official

that Plaintiffs themselves had previously communicated with, and left a message reque:sting that he

call me regarding issues pertaining to the planned demonstration. At 5:36 p.m. the same day,

Captain Mouring left a detailed voice mail message for me, in which he indicated that he could not

confirm a definite location where Plaintiffs could hold their demonstration. Captain Mouring also

stated that MDC had not yet decided whether to allow the activist groups on campus in "First

Amendment zones," but he would prefer that MDC do so, because otherwise ifeveryom~ were on the

sidewalk, that could become"hectic" and "dangerous". Furthermore, without giving any explanation,

Captain Mouring stated he was not inclined to close traffic Janes for the demonstration and did not

plan to do so.

5. During the late morning and early afternoon ofWednesday, April IS, 2007, I spoke

twice with Assistant Miami-Dade County Attorney Jeffrey Ehrlich, who handles Federal litigation for

the County. Mr. Ehrlich advised me that someone from the MDPD legal staffwould contact me to

address permits and/or approvals for the march and rally planned by the Plaintiffs.

6.

Shortly after 3 p.m. on Wednesday, April 18, 2007, I spoke with Robert Diers, an

-2-

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 38 of 41
attorney with the MDPD who had left me a message earlier in the afternoon that day advising that he was the "informal First Amendment person" for the MDPD, and that he was involved in everything related to President Bush's upcoming visit. Mr. Diers indicated that unless a demonstrating group has a history ofviolence, such as the Ku Klux Klan, the MDPD does not mandate First Amendment zones, and protjesting groups are allowed to use the sidewalks. However, Mr. Diers also stated that traffic lanes would not be shut down for this demonstration.
7. On the evening ofApril 18th, after concluding that all efforts to negotiate in good faith with the MDPD had failed, the Plaintiffs authorized the undersigned counsel and co-counsel, Robert W. Ross, Jr., to proceed to prepare for filing suit in this matter.
Pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §1746, I declare under penalty ofperjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
4'}J'v..
Executed on this day of April, 2007.
MARASHLACKMAN
-3-

- - - - - - - - · · CaseAR1:T0I7C-LcvE-2I.1I0N88G-ECNMEARALDocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 PagPeag3e91ooff411
Sec. 30-274. Parades and processions; permit required; sound trucks. ewNfAuxriontmcheeserpoaadtulpniIpnSendareromcttrchrcvuieoeitccsriedkssusasinoo,utninrnetcshocde,eothsbrwpehmyioarthitrllvhliateaeaotehrcpSydiccehulfreaepomrryreeici,ftqafemiusssa,isnapuodrpncefeohsdtd,uhpbciowsryhroitcStphohertteoashactsemSeeiro,hpenreldteihrfgiioeeaffurl.rolfapoontarrgicorleanoasdsuneydao,sssfpettreaxhearceeeketeppsorteoirnstlirghcfooeaartlhltdahewbnehadfeoydrrfrieecrixveeinces;dneweophuptfipcaiUnohrtnnammitcaeecandnoyytrsSdas,apttarapnetnlceyedes.t (Ord. No. 71-94, § 1, 12-21-71; Ord. No. 73-18, § 1, 3-8-73)

http://library 1.municode.com/mcc/DocView/1 0620/113 75/376

4119/2007

-------------------- Case 1A:R0T7I-CcvL-E21IV08. 8M-CISMCAELLADNoEcuOmUeSnt 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 PagePa4g0e oIf o4f12

Sec. 21-31.1. Disorderly conduct, loitering; penalties, trial for violations.

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forth involves and Domestic

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(Ord No 67-17 §§ 1--3.3-7-67. Ord No 67-56 § 1. 7-25-67 Ord No 69-93. § 1 12-17-69 Ord No

-l ~~~ ::'I )()'7

07-2~1088 Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 41 of 41

""JS 44 (Rev. 11/05)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

f\J . ALTO I'\ tbThyheelcoJicSvail4l 4rduocleicvskieol tcfsochvoeueerrtts..hTe(eShtEiasEnfodINrtmShTe, RainpUfpCorTromIvOeaNdtiSobnyOcNtohneTtHJauEindReicdEiaVhleECrReoSinnEfneOerFietnhTceHerEroeFfpOtlhaRecMeU.n)noitresduSpptNaletOemsTeinnItCStheEoe:tfeiAmlintbgteorarn1nd9e7sy4es.rviM sicreeUaowSfpTreledIanfdodirnigcthsaeotuersoAetholelfrRthpeea-pfCeilrleserak~soCrfeaCqsuoeiursertdB fboyretlhalewoo, w uerxpcN oespetA oafsmG priotJivaiL tdine_dg

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

DEFENDANTS

Miami for Peace, Inc., South Florida Peace & Justice Network, Inc. and Haiti Solidarity.

Miami-Dade County and Miami-Dade College

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Maimi-Dade
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)
(c) Attorney's (Finn Name, Address, and Telephone Number)
Robert W. Ross, Jr., Ross Law Firm, P.L., 3923 Lake Worth Rd., Ste. 102, Lake Worth, FL 33461, Tel: 561-251-4896

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant Miami-Dade
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE fRACT LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys (If Known)

MAGISTRATE .JUl)Git
TURNOFF

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · UPAJ"ff:i~S\Piace~'X" (d) Check County Where Action Arose: 0 MIAMI· DADE 0 MONROE 0 BROWARD 0 PALM BEACH 0 MARTIN 0 ST. LUCIE

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL

0 ll':ID~ Rl~
1·::~- -··..J

0 OKEECHOBEE
HIGHLANDS in One Box for Plaintiff

OI U.S. Government Plaintiff

./J3 Federal Question
(U.S. Government Not a Party)

(For Diversity Cases Only)

Citizen of This State

PTF

0

I

DEF 0 I

·'""',. · ·· and~ Box for Defendant)

· ~..

,.,,_) . PTF DEF

olnfBcuosripno•r•a~t·e~d;:.ar~. iPnsnSciptal.aPl:tacee:! .~. 4

J 4

0 2 U.S. Government Defendant
J::>At>~-o

04 Diversity

Citizen of Another State 0 0

0 2 lncorpomted:Lind Princip;ii:Piace~
ofBwlifte~ In AnotheTState (

[J

·~·

l..c':l

0 3 Foreign Niiii6n

0 6 (J 6

IV NATURE OF SUIT _1Place an "X" in One Box Only)_

I

CONTRACT

TORTS

FORFEITURE/PENALTY

0 II 0 Insurance

PERSONAL INJURY

0 120 Marine

0 310 Airplane

0 130 Miller Act

0 3 I5 Airplane Product

0 140 Negotiable Instrument

Liability

0 I 50 Recovery of Overpayment 0 320 Assault, Libel &

& Enforcement ofJudgment

Slander

0 151 Medicare Act

0 330 Federal Employers'

0 I 52 Recovery of Defaulted

Liability

Student Loans

0 340 Marine

(Excl. Veterans)

0 345 Marine Product

0 I53 Recovery of Overpayment

Liability

ofVeteran's Benefits

0 350 Motor Vehicle

0 160 Stockholders' Suits

0 355 Motor Vehicle

0 190 Other Contract

Product Liability

0 195 Contract Product Liability 0 360 Other Personal

0 I96 Franchise

Injury

I REAL PROPERTY

CMLRIGHTS

0 2 !0 Land Condemnation

0 441 Voting

0 220 Foreclosure

0 442 Employment

0 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment 0 443 Housing!

0 240 Torts to Land 0 245 Tort Product Liability

Accommodations 0 444 Welfare

0 290 All Other Real Property 0 445 Arner. w/Disabilities -

PERSONAL INJURY 0

0 362 Personal Injury - 0

Med. Malpractice 0

0 365 Personal Injury -

Product Liability 0

0 368 Asbestos Personal 0

Injury Product

0

Liability

0

PERSONAL PROPERTY

0 370 Other Fraud

0

0 371 Truth in Lending

0 380 Other Personal

0

Property Damage

0 385 Property Damage 0

Product Liability 0

PRISONER PETITIONS 0

0 510 Motions to Vacate 0

Sentence

0

Habeas Corpus:

0 530 General

0 535 Death Penalty

0 540 Mandamus & Other

610 Agriculture
620 Other Food & Drug 625 Drug Related Seizure
of Property 21 USC 881 630 Liquor Laws 640 R.R. & Tmck 650 Airline Regs. 660 Occupational
Safety/Health 690 Other
LABOR 710 Fair Labor Standards
Act 720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations 730 Labor/Mgmt.Reporting
& Disclosure Act 740 Railway Labor Act 790 Other Labor Litigation 791 Empl. Ret. Inc.
Security Act

Employment

0 550 Civil Rights

i0 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - 0 Other 440 Other Civil Rights

555 Prison Condition

BANKRUPTCY

OTHER STATUTES

0 422 Appeal 28 USC 158

0 400 State Reapportionmen

0 423 Withdrawal

0 410 Antitrust

28 usc 157

0 430 Banks and Banking

== PROPERTY RIGHTS

0 450 Commerce 0 460 Deportation

0 820 Copyrights 0 830 Patent

0 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

0 840 Trademark

0 480 Consumer Credit

0 490 Cable/Sat TV

so 0 810 Selective Service

IAL SE URITL- 0

0 861 HIA (I 395ft)

--

850 Securities/Commodities/ Exchange

0 862 Black Lung (923)

0 875 Customer Challenge

0 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g))

12 usc 3410

0 864 SSID Title XVI 0 865 RSI (405(g))

0 890 Other Statutory Actic·ns 0 891 Agricultural Acts

FEDERAL TAX SUITS 0 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff

0 892 Economic Stabilization Act 0 893 Environmental Matkrs

or Defendant)

0 894 Energy Allocation Ac:

0 87 I IRS-Third Party
26 usc 7609

0 895 Freedom of lnfonnation Act

0 900Appeal of Fee Detennination

Under Equal Access

to Justice

0 950 Constitutionality of

State Statutes

V. ORIGIN
.jJ 1 Original
Proceeding

(Place an "X" in One Box Only)

0 2 Removed from

0 3 Re-filed-

State Court

(see VI below)

0

4 Reinstated or 0
Reopened

5

Transferred from another district

(specify)

0 6 Multidistrict
Litigation

Appeal to District

0

7

Judge from Magistrate

Judgment

VI. RELATEDIRE-FILED CASE(S).

(See instructions second page):

a) Re-filed Case 0 YES ~NO JUDGE N/A

b) Related Cases 0 YES C1NO DOCKET N/A
NUMBER

Cite the U.S. diversity):

Civil

Statute

under

which

you

are

filing

and

Write

a

Brief Statement

of Cause

(Do

not

citt~

jurisdictional

statutes

unless

VII. CAUSE OF ACTION

42 U.S.C. 1983 for First Amendment violation. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relliefagainst local ordinance.

VIII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

LENGTH OF TRIAL via_3_ _ days estimated (for both sides to try entire case)

(l CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER F.R.CP. 23

DEMAND$

ABOVE INFORMATION IS TRUE & CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE

CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: JURY DEMAND: [DYes ~No
DATE
April 20, 2007

-.v"~~r•~/j~g r;r_Y,P _ _

cJ;fb-{107

 
 Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION

Case No.:
MIAMI };"OR PEACE, INC., SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWORK, and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC.
Plaintiffs,
v.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and THE DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MIAMI-DADE COLLEGE,
Defendants.
---------------------------~/

07-21088
CMIAVG-ISATRLATTOE NruAoGo•A TURNOFF

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF J:MERGENCY MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEJF

1

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 2 of 15
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, Miami for Peace ("MFP"), South Florida Peace & Justice Network (SFP&JN"), and Haiti Solidarity ("HS") challenge§ 30-274 ofthe Miami-Dade County Code ("M-D County Code"), the Parades and Processions Ordinance that regulates core political expression in traditional public fora, and § 21-3l.l(b), Miami-Dade County's Loitering Ordinance. M-D County Code § 30-274 violates the First Amendment in several key respects. First the challenged code section regulating parades is an unlawful prior restraint as it requires permission from the sheriff for any "parade" or "procession" in Miami-Dade County, but contains no standards for obtaining permission. The M-D County Code does not set out a procedural process for filing a permit, sets no time by which a decision to grant or deny the requested permit must be made, and sets no standards for making the decision. In short, the M·-D County Code is overbroad, vague and lacks any standards or guidelines to check the unbridled discretion of Miami-Dade County ("M-D County") officials to use content-based factors to decide who may or may not "speak" in the public fora. This law is presumptively unconstitutional, as are all prior restraints, and fails the test applied to reasonable time, place or manner regulations. In addition, M-D County's loitering ordinance is violative ofFirst Amendment free speech and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The relevant factual information is set out in the Verified Complaint at Paragraphs 3 through 23, and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
2

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 3 of 15
LEGAL ARGUMENT
POINT 1 PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE CODE
Plaintiffs have standing to bring a facial challenge to the subject Code st:ctions on two bases. First, they have standing as entities subject to the requirements of the permit scheme. City ofLakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1988); CAMP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. City ofAtlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs plan to engage in expressive activities covered by the Code to protest the policies of the Bush Administration and the Iraq War on April28, 2007. Plaintiffs plan to march and protest and, as such, are subject to the provisions of the Miami-Dade County Code§ 30-274. Plaintiffs have, as of yet, been unable to obtain a permit as required by§ 30-274 and as a result are subject to criminal penalties for illegal assembly.
Plaintiffs also have standing because of the risk of a chilling effect on the protected expression of others not before the Court. Under this well-established exception to Article III standing, challenges may be made to "laws that are written so broadly that they may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties." Members ofthe City Council of the City ofLos Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,798 (1984). "[T]he Supreme Court and this [Circuit] consistently have permitted facial challenges to prior restraints on speech without requiring the plaintiffto show that there are no conceivable set of facts where the application of the particular government regulation might or would be constitutional." United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Accord, Abramson v. Gonzalez, 949 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir. 1992) (facial challenge proper as the rule "affects the enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees and subjects the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to licensing requirements"). When free speech may be chilled, society's interest in reviewing an unconstitutional law offsets the usual concern of federal courts to avoid deciding constitutional questions ifpossible. As the Supreme Court observed in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129-130 (1992):
3

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 4 of 15
[I]n the area of freedom of expression an overbroad regulation may be subject to facilal review and invalidation, even though its application in the case under consideration may be constitutionally unobjectionable....This exception from general standing rules is based on an appreciation that the very existence of some broadly written laws has the potential to chill the expressive activity of others not before the court. POINT 2 PLAINTIFFS SATISFY THE REQUISITE CRITERIA FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
A pn~liminary injunction is proper if a plaintiff establishes four elements: 1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; 2) the likelihood of irreparablt:: injury unless the injunction issues; 3) the balance of harms tips in favor of the moving party; and, 4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs readily meet each part of this test.
A. There Is a Substantial Likelihood That Plaintiffs Will Succeed on the Merits 1. Miami-Dade County's Permit Scheme is a Prior Restraint that Violates the First Amendment as an Impermissibly Overbroad Provision
'"A prior restraint on expression exists when the government can deny access to a forum for expression before the expression occurs." Frandsen, 212 F.3d at 1236-37. The provision in M-D County Code§ 30-274 that requires prior approval or notification before a march can occur places a prior restraint on free speech. There is a strong presumption against the constitutionality ofprior restraints on free speech. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004). This is so because a '"[p]rior restraint upon spet~ch suppresses the precise freedom which the First Amendment sought to protect against abridgment." Carroll v. Pres. & Commissioners ofPrincess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968). Ordinances that place a prior restraint on speech by requiring '"before-the-fact permitting and licensing schemes" to the point that they create '"an impermissible risk of suppression ofideas" will be found to be unconstitutionally overbroad. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 129.
4

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 5 of 15
A prior restraint must contain basic procedural safeguards to ensure that protected expression is not inhibited. At a minimum, it must allow for prompt judicial review in the event the permit is denied or unduly burdened. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965). See also Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 123. "Meaningful judicial review is the touchstone of the [prior restraint] test. 'Prompt judicial review must be available to correct erroneous denials of access to expression."' Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1319-20. Because it lacks any time for deciding a permit application, the County's Code misses the mark completely. See Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1994) ("ordinance ... inadequate under any interpretation of 'prompt judicial review' because it creates the risk that expressive activity could be suppressed indefinitely prior to any judicial review of the decision to deny a license").
2. The Ordinance Lacks Adequate Safeguards to Check the Unbridled Discretion of Officials in Implementing the Miami-Dade County Permit Scheme
It is black letter law that any attempt to subject "the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority is unconstitutional." Shuttlesworth v. City ofBirmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969). See also Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 132. A law regulating speech in public fora fails if it "delegate[s] overly broad licensing discretion" to officials. !d. at 130. Miami-Dade County Code§ 30-274 requires persons interested in planning a parade or procession to obtain a permit from the "Sheriff." However, the Code dm:s not indicate how to apply for the permit, how long the process should take, what the basis of approval or denial of a permit is; the Code is totally bereft of any detail.
"It is settled ... that an ordinance which ... makes peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official-as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official-is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms."
5

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 6 of 15

Shuttlesworthv. CityofBirmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 149-51 (1969)quotingStaubv. Baxley,

355 U.S. 313, 322 (1957). (emphasis added).

When there are no clear standards upon which an official can make these decisions, or

standards can be applied differently to different types of gatherings, an ordinance will not be

upheld. See Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1317 (holding a restriction is invalid when no standards

appear anywhere, no limitations are listed, and there is '"no circumscribing of the absolute

power" of the decision-maker). "To curtail that risk, a law subjecting the ex1~rcise of First

Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license must contain narrow, objective, and

definite standards to guide the licensing authority." Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 130-31.

Standards provide the guideposts that check the licensor and allow courts

quickly and easily to determine whether the licensor is discriminating

against disfavored speech. Without these guideposts, post hoc

rationalizations by the licensing official and the use of shifting or

illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult determine whether the licensor is permitting favorable, unfavorable expression. City ofLakewood, 486 U.S. at

for courts to
and suppressing 758. 1

The M-D County Code lacks the narrow and specific guidelines needed to check official discretion. So, it is not "narrowly drawn" in a manner sufficient to pass the First
Amendment's dictates. It matters not if M-D County may never have applied the Code in a content-based
manner. A facial challenge to a permit scheme that '"delegates overly broad discretion to the decision-maker rests not on whether the administrator has exercised his discretion in a content-based manner, but whether there is anything in the ordinance preventing him from doing so." Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 133 and n.10; accord, City ofLakewood, 486 U.S. at 757 ("mere existence of licensor's unfettered discretion, coupled with the power ofprior restraint, intimidates parties into censoring their own speech, even if the discretion and power are never actually abused"). "The First Amendment does not permit the government to place

1 Even content-neutral time, place and manner rules require adequate standards to guide the decisionmaker's determination. Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002).

6

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 7 of 15
burdens on speech and assembly in ... an unprincipled, ad hoc manner[,]" Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1318,. and neither this Court nor the public can "depend on the individuals responsible for enforcing [a regulation] to do so in a manner that cures [the law] of constitutional infirmities[.]" Frandsen, 212 F.3d at 1240.
Miami-Dade County Code§ 30-274 requires permission issued by the sheriff for any "procession or parade," but contains absolutely no time for filing or time by which a permit would be decided. For nearly four decades, the United States Supreme Comt has condemned similar laws imposing lengthy advance filing requirements. "[T]iming is of the essence in politics ... and when an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard promptly, if it is to be considered at all." Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 163. Here, County officials are unconstrained by any textual limits in the Code from holding a permit request until the last moment, only then to deny it for unspecified reasons, leaving no opportunity to seek prompt judicial review of the denial of a permit.
The fatal lack of a time by which to decide a permit application is compounded here because the Code is devoid of standards on other key provisions. M-D County Code § 30274 requires permission of the sheriff to "parade," but does not state how permission is obtained. "Excessive discretion over permitting decisions is constitutionally suspect because it creates th~;: opportunity for undetectable censorship and signals a lack ofnarrow tailoring." Burk v. Augusta Richmond County, 365 F.3d 1247, 1256 (11th Cir. 2004). Because M-D County's Code embodies "[e]xcessive discretion over permitting decision," it fails this key test of constitutional adequacy.
3. Miami-Dade County Code§ 30-274 is Not a Reasonable Time, Place or Manner Regulation
The County regulates core expressive activity in virtually all public fora. "In such places, which occupy a 'special position in terms of First Amendment protection,' United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983), the government's ability to restrict expressive
7

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 8 of 15
activity 'is very limited.' !d. at 177." Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988). Time, place, and manner restrictions in traditional public fora are constitutional as long as they are content-neutral,2 are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels to communicate the message. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984). The failure to meet any prong is fatal to the entin~ law. Perry Educ. Ass 'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass 'n, 406 U.S. 36, 45 (1983) (emphasis supplied). The City's scheme violates all three prongs.
First, Miami-Dade County Code Section 30-274 is not a content-neutral regulation. To pass constitutional muster, a time, place or manner regulation ofspeech in a traditional public forum must be content-neutral. Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. at 293. If the decision involves the "appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion," it is content-based and the "the danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great to be permitted." Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 131 [internal citations omitted]. The County's Code contains no standards for deciding permits. Officials may decide based on the: content ofthe speech and, for disfavored speakers, delay or deny the permit, or impose onerous conditions. For this reason, Miami-Dade County Code § 30-274 is not content-neutral.
Second, even assuming content-neutrality, the County cannot meet its burden to prove that the permit scheme is narrowly-tailored. While "[t]he State ... has a strong interest in ensuring the public safety and order, in promoting the free flow oftraffic on public streets and sidewalks ... ," at the same time, when First Amendment rights are at issue, the government has the burden of showing that the law is narrowly tailored and that there is evidence supporting its proffered justification. In this regard, it is important to underscore that "[courts] have never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment
2cHthoAoimswcmpeoevnoletlreiernn,gsti-ttbrsiiatsnasgtene:eodnitntrnteteeesrctseretis,sctsb,ta"ieorcaynanutidossebseeuxabsa"jmnseahcirnotrewotowwntlhhhyeeedtrmhereaionrwr,eSnietstcoctrtaiiaonncnnghoe3inte0tve-vre2ee7tqnh4uasiotraefetimtnshfdeey.n"MtthteihaBamloet soii-stsD,beae4xd8a"e5cntCeiUnco.geSus.nsstataayrtnyC3d2taoo1rdd.seefrmovreeeats content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.
8

·---------------- Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 9 of 15
burden." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000). See also Turner Broadcast System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,644 (1994) ("When th'~ government defends a regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply posit the existence of the disease to be cured.'"). To prove narrowly tailoring, the County must show actual, not speculative harm, and that the disputed
laws actually address that harm. !d. Even a content-neutral law is not narrowly-tailored "[w]here the licensing official
enjoys unduly broad discretion ... to grant or deny a permit, [as] there is a risk that he will favor or disfavor speech based on its content." Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323, citing Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131. "A government regulation that allows arbitrary application is 'inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place and manner regulation because such discretion has the potential for becoming a means ofsuppressing a particular point ofview.'"
Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 132 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court "requires that a time, place and manner regulation contain
adequate standards to guide the official's decision and render it subject to effective judicial review." 534 U.S. at 323, citing Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). The ordinance in Thomas included express bounds on the bases for denying a permit, required officials to process applications within 28 days and explain in writing any denials. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 32. These were held to be sufficiently specific and objective to insulate against the exercise of the "whim of the administrator." !d., citing Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 133. "They provide 'narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards' to guide the licensor's determination.... And they are enforceable on review- first by appeal to the General Superintendent of the Park District, ... and then by writ of common-law 'certiorari in the Illinois courts[.]" 534 U.S. at 32. By way of contrast, in the instant case Defendant MiamiDade's Code lacks any standards and any opportunity for review.
Absent the safeguards present in Thomas, the County's pennit scheme is unconstitutional. See also City ofLakewood, 486 U.S. at 769-70 (discretion impermissibly unfettered where official may impose "such other terms and conditions deemed necessary");
9

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 10 of 15
Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 156-58 (unbridled discretion in regulation permitting decisions to grant or deny parade permit on grounds of "the public welfare, peace, safety, health"). Defendant's Code sets no time by which a permit request must be decided, enumerates no bases for granting or denying a request, and contains no standards for setting conditions on a permit. Such "[e]xcessive discretion over permitting decisions is constitutionally suspect because it creates the opportunity for undetectable censorship and signals a lack of narrow tailoring." Burk, 365 F. 3d at 1256 (emphasis added).
Third, the permit scheme fails to leave open ample alternatives for communication. It is a cardinal rule of First Amendment law that "[the:] streets [and sidewalks] are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 105-106 [citations omitted]. The County's Code does not allow for ample alternatives for core expression within the County. If a permit for a parade or procession is not obtained, the group is thereby foreclosed from all public fora in the County. Even the sidewalks are unavailable to Plaintiffs since they are potentially subject to arrest under the Miami-Dade County Loitering Ordinance found at M-D County Code § 21-31.1.(b).
4. The Loitering Ordinance is Impermissibly Vague and Overbroad Under the First Amendment as it Unreasonably Restricts Protected Expressive Activity in Quintessential Public For a
The loitering provisions of§ 21-31.l.(b) of the Miami-Dade County Code make it unlawful to be on a public street, public sidewalk, public overpass, public bridge or public place "to hinder or impede pedestrians or vehicles." This same Section makes it a crime to "loiter[] in or about a school, college or university campus" when doing so would "hinder or impede the orderly conduct of . . . school activities.'' All of these restrictions are impermissible under the First Amendment.
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Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 11 of 15
The overbreadth doctrine invalidates laws that inhibit the free e:xercise of First Amendment--protected activities. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999). Peaceful protest on public sidewalks is a quintessential First Amendment activity. See e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; Gregory v. City ofChicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969). The City may not "make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views.... 'unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."' Terminiello v. Chicago, 347 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
The ability to restrict assemblies on sidewalks based on any conceivable "obstruction" is unlawful. In Cox v Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), the Supreme Court overturned the convictions of civil rights activists. Two thousand students assembled peaceably at the state capitol building and marched to the courthouse, where fellow activists arrestE:d earlier were being held. With official permission, but without a permit, they assembled on the sidewalk across the street from the courthouse and, in a lawful manner, rallied and marched. When they failed to disperse pursuant to a police order indicating that they had exceeded their time for demonstrating, they were arrested for obstructing a sidewalk.
An ordinance is overbroad where every application creates an impermissiable risk of suppression of ideas, such as when an ordinance allows unfettered discretion in one decisionmaker or where the ordinance sweeps too broadly to penalize constitutionally-protected speech. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 129-30. The Supreme Court has consistently held that ordinances are unconstitutionally broad under the circumstances noted in Cox and Forsyth, as these ordinances would allow punishment for peaceful protest involving disfavored views. The Court also held that the conviction under a statute banning obstruction of public sidewalks was a clear violation of freedom of speech and assembly where the "obstruction" ordinance was coupled, as here, with the unfettered discretion of local officials to regulate the use of streets for peaceful parades and assemblies. Precedent requin:s that Section 2131.l.(b) be invalidated.
11

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 12 of 15

5.

The Anti-Loitering Ordinance Inten~st Under the Fourteenth

is Impermissibly Amendment Due

Vague and Restri1cts Process Claus~~

a

Liberty

Vagueness can invalidate a criminal law because either: (1) it failed to provide the kind of notice that allow ordinary persons to understand what conduct is prohibited, or (2) it authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Cily of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999). M-D County's Loitering Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, in part because there is uncertainty about what type of loitering would be considered criminal conduct, and which conduct would not fall within its sweep. !d. at 57. Courts have consistently invalidated laws or ordinances that do not join the crime of loitering with a second specific element. !d. at 58. Miami-Dade County's Loitering Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to alert the public to what type of conduct is prohibited since M-D County could not "conceivably have meant to criminaliz~:;~ each instance
a citizen stands in public." See !d. at 57.

Freedom to loiter "for innocent purposes" is a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. City ofChicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999). The Supreme Court has held that a person's decision to remain in "a public place of his choice" or to move to another place upon his own inclination is "as rnueh a part of ... liberty as the freedom of movement inside frontiers that is 'a part ofour heritage.'" !d. citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958). Miami-Dade County Cod<~§ 21-3l.l(b) unconstitutionally restricts the liberty interest of Plaintiffs by criminalizing standing or remaining on public streets, sidewalks, overpasses, bridges, and places. Plaintiffs have a constitutional right to stand or remain on a public place if their conduct is not injurious or threatening. Miami-Dade County's Loitering Ordinance violates critically important due
process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and is invalid.

12

~---------------
Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 13 of 15
B. Irreparable Injury Will Occur if the Preliminary Injunction is Not Granted
The loss ofFirst Amendment freedoms unquestionably constitutes itTeparable injury. KH Outdoor, LLCv. City ofTrussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1272 (11th Cir. 2006), quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit has held that there is a finding of irreparable harm when First Amendment rights are violated on an ongoing basis because the plaintiffs cannot be made whole by money damages when their free speech is chilled. KH Outdoor, LLC v. City ofTrussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1272 (11th Cir. 2006) citing Northeastern Fla. Chapter ofthe Ass 'n ofGen. Contractors o._fAmerica v. City ofJacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990). As noted above, Miami-Dade County Code§ 30-274 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on free speech,, and accordingly violates the First Amendment.
C. The Balance of Hardships Favors Plaintiffs
The injury to the Plaintiffs as a result of the provisions requiring advance permitting and unbridled discretionary authority is the violation of their First Amendme:nt right to free speech, assembly and association. Such an egregious violation of civil rights poses a grave hardship to Plaintiffs seeking to convey their political and social justice messages. The Defendants are not similarly harmed. M-D County and Miami-Dade College may need to add additional law enforcement officers to enhance security, but such a hardship is no greater than any other increase in security a municipality or university might face when large numbers of people gather together, such as at a concert or sporting event. Defendants are still free to maintain the peace by enforcing existing criminal laws to keep an area secure. The granting of injunctive relief to Plaintiffs will not alter this prerogative. As a result, when
13

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 14 of 15
balancing the hardships, it is clear that the greater injury is to the Plaintiffs who are faced with restrictions on First Amendment-protected activity.
D. Granting Plaintiffs' Preliminary Injunction is in the Public Interest
A preliminary injunction is in the public interest in the case sub judice. "[T]he public interest is always served when constitutional rights, especially free speech rights, are vindicated." University Books & Videos, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 33 F. Supp.2d 1364, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 1999). "The public has no interest in enforcing an unconstitutional ordinance." KH Outdoor, LLC v. City ofTrussville, 458 F.3d at 1272. Furthermore, it is not in the public interest to support a governmental entity's expenditure of time, effort and money in order to enforce an unconstitutional ordinance. Fla. Businessmenfor Free Enter. v. City ofHonvwood, 648 F.2d 956,959 (5th Cir. 1981). The public interest is clearly in favor of Plaintiffs and, thus, injunctive relief should be granted.
CONCLUSION
Miami-Dade County Code § 30-274 violates the First Amendment in several key respects. The Parades and Processions Ordinance is an unlawful prior restraint. The Code is overbroad, vague and lacks any standards or guidelines to check the unbridled discretion of the County officials to use content-based factors to decide who may or may not "speak" in the public fora. The Loitering Ordinance, M-D County Code § 21.31.1(b), is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and thereby violates First Amendment free speech and Fourte~;!nth Amendment due process rights. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the enforcement of both code provisions should be enjoined by this tribunal..
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Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/24/2007 Page 15 of 15
W. Ross., Jr., FBN 921 ROSS LAW FIRM, P.L. 3923 Lake Worth Road, Lake Worth, FL 33461 Tel: (561) 251-4896 bravelaw@bellsouth.net Mara Shlackman, FBN 988618 LAW OFFICES OF MARA SHLACKMAN, P.L. 757 Southeast 171h Street, PMB 309 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Tel: (954)523-1131 mara@shlackmanlaw.com
15

 
 Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2007 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
Case No. 07-21088-Civ-Altonaga-Turnoff

MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

/ ORDER

This matter comes before this Court on an Emergency Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

(the “Motion”), which was filed by Miami for Peace, Inc., South Florida Peace and Justice Network,

and Haiti Solidarity, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) on April 24, 2007 [D.E. 3]. Upon due

consideration, and the Court having been duly advised in the premises, and having heard argument

of counsel on April 25, 2007 and April 26, 2007, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

Given the agreement between Defendant, Miami-Dade County, and Plaintiffs, the terms of

which are outlined below, regarding Plaintiffs’ march and rally at Miami-Dade College, Kendall

Campus (the “College”), 11011 S.W. 104th Street in Miami, Florida, on Saturday, April 28, 2007,

the Motion [D.E. 3] is hereby DENIED AS MOOT.

The parties acknowledge that their agreement allows for appropriate First Amendment

expression for the demonstrators, while at the same time minimizing the significant and potential

security risks and traffic interruptions relating to the commencement event at the College.

Plaintiffs plan a march and a rally at the College on April 28, 2007. The march is scheduled

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2007 Page 2 of 3
Case No. 07-21088-Civ-Altonaga to commence at 3:15 p.m., with the rally scheduled to begin at 4:00 p.m. and last until 7:00 p.m. Plaintiffs’ initial rally point will occur at the sidewalk located at the intersection of S.W. 100th Street and S.W. 107th Avenue. At 3:15 p.m., Plaintiffs will begin the march on the west sidewalk on S.W. 107th Avenue, proceed south to S.W. 104th Street, and continue their march on the north sidewalk of S.W. 104th Street, heading westbound no further than the entrance to the College at the intersection of S.W. 104th Street and S.W. 109th Court, at which time the group shall be allowed to fan out onto an area consisting of grass and sidewalks bounded by S.W. 109th Court to the west, S.W. 104th Street to the south, the lake and Student Parking Facility 61to the north, and E. Perimeter Road to the east, for sign-waving and sloganeering from 4:00 to 7:00 p.m.
Plaintiffs understand and agree that the County will not close any traffic lanes on S.W. 107th Avenue or S.W. 104th Street, and that their march and rally are relegated to the designated sidewalks and grassy areas.
Without waiving any rights or defenses in connection with any present or future legal challenges to the constitutionality or validity of Sections 30-274 and 21-31.1 of the Code of MiamiDade County, Miami-Dade County agrees to not enforce the aforementioned ordinances against Plaintiffs during the protests or demonstrations at the College on April 28, 2007.
The Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami-Dade County, Florida on this 26th day of April, 2007.
_____________________________________ CECILIA M. ALTONAGA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2007 Page 3 of 3

Copies Furnished to:
Bernard Pastor, Esq. Robert W. Ross, Jr., Esq. Carol A. Licko, Esq. Carmen Dominguez, Esq.

Case No. 07-21088-Civ-Altonaga

3

 
 Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 16 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2007 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION Case No. 07-21088-CIV-ALTONAGA/Turnoff
MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC.; SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWORK; and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC.,
Plaintiffs, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and THE DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MIAMI-DADE COLLEGE,
Defendants.
FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AS TO DEFENDANT, THE DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES
OF MIAMI-DADE COLLEGE THIS CAUSE having come before the Court on the Joint Stipulation for Final Order of Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant, THE DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MIAMIDADE COLLEGE [D.E. 15], and having considered the request and the record in this action, and being otherwise fully advised, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Motion [D.E. 15] is GRANTED. Defendant, THE DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MIAMI-DADE COLLEGE, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this action. Defendant, THE DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MIAMIDADE COLLEGE, and Plaintiffs shall each bear their own attorneys’ fees and costs.

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 16 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2007 Page 2 of 2

Case No. 07-21088-CIV-ALTONAGA/Turnoff
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami-Dade County, Florida, on this 11th day of May, 2007.

Copies Furnished to: Magistrate Judge William C. Turnoff All counsel of record

____________________________ CECILIA M. ALTONAGA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 61 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/18/2008 Page 1 of 22
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION Case No. : 07-21088-CIV-ALTONAGA-Turnoff
MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC., SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWORK, and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC.
Plaintiffs, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida,
Defendant.
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FINAL PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANT MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
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Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 61 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/18/2008 Page 2 of 22
LEGAL ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The matter sub judice involves a straightforward challenge by several political organizations in South Florida to two code sections of the Miami-Dade County Code (“M-D County Code”). Specifically, Plaintiffs, Miami for Peace (“MFP”), South Florida Peace & Justice Network (SFP&JN”), and Haiti Solidarity (“HS”) challenge § 30-274 of the M-D County Code, the Parades and Processions Ordinance that effectively regulates core political expression in traditional public fora, and Code § 21-31.1(b), Miami-Dade County’s Loitering Ordinance.
Plaintiffs assert that M-D County Code’s Parades & Processions Ordinance violates the First Amendment in numerous respects. First the challenged code section regulating parades is an unlawful prior restraint as it requires permission from the sheriff for any “parade” or “procession” in Miami-Dade County, but contains no standards for obtaining permission. The M-D County Code does not contain a procedural process for filing a permit, sets no time framework by which a decision to grant or deny the requested permit must be made, and sets no standards for making the decision. In short, the M-D County Code is overbroad, vague and lacks any standards or guidelines to check the unbridled discretion of Miami-Dade County (“County”) officials to use content-based factors to decide who may or may not “speak” in the public fora. This law is presumptively unconstitutional, as are all prior restraints, and fails the test applied to reasonable time, place or manner regulations.
In addition, Miami-Dade County’s Loitering Ordinance is violative of First Amendment free speech guarantees insofar as it is vague and overbroad, thereby
2

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 61 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/18/2008 Page 3 of 22
infringing upon expressive conduct in public fora, and it also transgresses Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because it criminalizes innocent conduct that is constitutionally protected as a recognized liberty interest .
FACTUAL BACKGROUND The factual information relevant to this application are set forth in Plaintiffs’ Concise Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated March 17, 2008, and filed this date in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Partial Summary Judgment
3

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 61 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/18/2008 Page 4 of 22
LEGAL ARGUMENT
POINT 1 - THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A DECLARATION THAT THE PARADES & PROCESSIONS ORDINANCE IS AN UNLAWFUL PRIOR RETRAINT THAT VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Plaintiffs asserted in Count One of the Second Amended Complaint that Miami-Dade County Code § 30-274, its Parades & Processions Ordinance, is clearly violative of the First Amendment insofar as it constitutes an unlawful prior restraint due to its lack of basic procedural safeguards, because it vests unbridled discretion in public officials, and finally because Code § 30-274 is not a reasonable Time, Place or Manner regulation.
A. Miami-Dade County’s Permit Scheme Constitutes an Unlawful Prior Restraint Insofar as the Ordinance Lacks Adequate Procedural Safeguards.
Code § 30-274, by its specific terms, mandates that no social or political procession or parade “shall occupy, march or proceed along any street or roadway except in accordance with a permit issued by the Sheriff.” This Code section was specifically relied upon by Miami-Dade County in refusing to issue a permit for the “Reject the Bush Agenda” March and Rally planned for April 28, 2007.
The permit scheme embodied by M-D County Code § 30-274 is a classic prior restraint on constitutionally-protected expression. “A prior restraint on expression exists when the government can deny access to a forum for expression before the expression occurs.” United States v.Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1236-37
4

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 61 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/18/2008 Page 5 of 22
(11th Cir. 2000); Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1215 (11th Cir. 2005). As the Cooper tribunal noted, “[b]ecause statutes silencing speech before it happens are inimical to the tenets of free expression underlying a free society, these statutes are characterized as prior restraints on speech and are subjected to strict scrutiny.” Cooper, 403 F.3d at 1214-15 (bold emphasis added); Burk v. AugustaRichmond County, 365 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004).
Therefore, the provision in M-D County Code § 30-274 that requires prior approval by the Sheriff, before a politically-oriented march can occur on a public street, clearly places a prior restraint on free speech. There is a strong presumption against the constitutionality of prior restraints on free speech. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004). This is because a “[p]rior restraint upon speech suppresses the precise freedom which the First Amendment sought to protect against abridgment.” Carroll v. Pres. & Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968). Ordinances that place a prior restraint on speech by requiring “before-the-fact permitting and licensing schemes” to the point that they create “an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas” will be found to be unconstitutionally overbroad. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992).
A prior restraint must contain basic procedural safeguards to ensure that protected expression is not inhibited. At a minimum, it must allow for prompt judicial review in the event the permit is denied or unduly burdened. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965). “Meaningful judicial review is the touchstone of the [prior restraint] test. ‘Prompt judicial review must be available to correct erroneous denials of access to expression.’” Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1319-20. Because the challenged ordinance lacks any time for deciding a permit application, the County’s Code misses the mark completely. See Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[the] ordinance [is]. . . inadequate under any
5

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 61 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/18/2008 Page 6 of 22
interpretation of ‘prompt judicial review’ because it creates the risk that expressive activity could be suppressed indefinitely prior to any judicial review of the decision to deny a license”).
B. Miami-Dade County’s Permit Scheme Constitutes an Unlawful Prior Restraint Since the Ordinance Vests Unbridled Discretion in Public Officials.
By its express terms, M-D County Code § 30-274 requires persons interested in planning a parade or procession to obtain a permit from the “Sheriff.” However, the Code does not indicate how one must apply for a permit, how long the process will take, what factors constitute the basis for approval or denial of a permit, or what administrative remedies are available upon the denial of a permit request. In sum, the Code is totally bereft of meaningful guidelines.
It is black letter law that any attempt to subject “the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority is unconstitutional.” Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969). See also Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 132-33. A law regulating speech in public fora fails if it “delegate[s] overly broad licensing discretion” to officials. Id. at 130.
“It is settled . . . that an ordinance which . . . makes peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official—as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official—is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.” Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 149–51 (1969) quoting Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1957). (emphasis added).
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Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 61 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/18/2008 Page 7 of 22
When there are no clear standards upon which an official can make these decisions, or standards can be applied differently to different types of gatherings, an ordinance will not be upheld. See Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1317 (holding a restriction is invalid when no standards appear anywhere, no limitations are listed, and there is “no circumscribing of the absolute power” of the decision-maker). “To curtail that risk, a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license must contain narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority.” Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 130-31.
Standards provide the guideposts that check the licensor and allow courts quickly and easily to determine whether the licensor is discriminating against disfavored speech. Without these guideposts, post hoc rationalizations by the licensing official and the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for courts to determine whether the licensor is permitting favorable, and suppressing unfavorable expression.
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988).1 The
M-D County Code lacks the narrow and specific guidelines needed to check
official discretion. Thus, it is not “narrowly drawn” in a manner sufficient to
pass the First Amendment’s dictates.
It matters not if M-D County may never have applied the Code in a contentbased manner. A facial challenge to a permit scheme that “delegates overly broad discretion to the decision-maker rests not on whether the administrator has exercised his discretion in a content-based manner, but whether there is anything in the ordinance preventing him from doing so.” Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 133, 133 n.10; accord, City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757 (“mere existence of licensor’s
1 Even content-neutral time, place and manner rules require adequate standards to guide the decisionmaker’s determination. Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002).
7

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unfettered discretion, coupled with the power of prior restraint, intimidates parties into censoring their own speech, even if the discretion and power are never actually abused”). “The First Amendment does not permit the government to place burdens on speech and assembly in . . . an unprincipled, ad hoc manner[,]” Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1318, and neither this Court nor the public can “depend on the individuals responsible for enforcing [a regulation] to do so in a manner that cures [the law] of constitutional infirmities[.]” Frandsen, 212 F.3d at 1240.
Miami-Dade County Code § 30-274 requires permission issued by the sheriff for any “procession or parade,” but contains absolutely no time for filing or time by which a permit would be decided. For nearly four decades, the United States Supreme Court has condemned similar laws imposing lengthy advance filing requirements. “[T]iming is of the essence in politics . . . and when an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one’s voice heard promptly, if it is to be considered at all.” Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 163. Here, County officials are unconstrained, by any textual limits in the Code, from holding a permit request until the last moment, only then to deny it for unspecified reasons, leaving no opportunity to seek prompt judicial review of the denial of a permit.
The fatal lack of a time by which to decide a permit application is compounded here because the Code is devoid of standards on other key provisions. M-D County Code § 30-274 requires permission of the sheriff to “parade,” but does not state how permission is obtained. “Excessive discretion over permitting decisions is constitutionally suspect because it creates the opportunity for undetectable censorship and signals a lack of narrow tailoring.” Burk v. Augusta Richmond County, 365 F.3d 1247, 1256 (11th Cir. 2004). Because M-D County’s Code embodies “[e]xcessive discretion over permitting decision” it fails this key test of constitutional adequacy.
8

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 61 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/18/2008 Page 9 of 22
C. Miami-Dade County’s Permit Scheme Constitutes an Unlawful Prior Restraint Because the Ordinance is Not a Reasonable Time, Place or Manner Regulation.
County Code § 30-274 exempts only federal and state military forces, members of police and fire departments, and persons participating in funerals from the requirement of obtaining permission from “the Sheriff” before participating in a procession or parade on the public streets and roadways of Miami-Dade County.
The County regulates core expressive activity in virtually all public fora. “In such places, which occupy a ‘special position in terms of First Amendment protection,’ the government’s ability to restrict expressive activity ‘is very limited.’” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 180 (1983). Time, place, and manner restrictions in traditional public fora are constitutional as long as they are content-neutral,2 are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels to communicate the message. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). The failure to meet any prong is fatal to the entire law. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 406 U.S. 36, 45 (1983) (emphasis added). The City’s scheme violates all three prongs.
First, Miami-Dade County Code Section 30-274 is not a content-neutral regulation. To pass constitutional muster, a time, place or manner regulation of
2 A content-based restriction is subject to the more stringent requirement that it be “necessary to serve a compelling state interest,” and be “narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. However, it is not necessary to examine whether Section 30-274 of the Miami-Dade County Code meets this more stringent test, because as shown herein, it cannot even satisfy the less exacting standard for content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.
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speech in a traditional public forum must be content-neutral. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293. If the decision involves the “appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion,” it is content-based and the “the danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great to be permitted.” Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 131 [internal citations omitted]. The County’s Code contains no standards for deciding permits. Officials may decide based on the content of the speech and, for disfavored speakers, delay or deny the permit, or impose onerous conditions. For these reasons, M-D County Code § 30-274 is not content-neutral.
Second, even assuming content-neutrality, the County cannot meet its burden to prove that the permit scheme is narrowly-tailored. While “[t]he State . . . has a strong interest in ensuring the public safety and order, in promoting the free flow of traffic on public streets and sidewalks . . . ,” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994), at the same time, when First Amendment rights are at issue, the government has the burden of showing that the law is narrowly tailored and that there is evidence supporting its proffered justification. In this regard, it is important to underscore that “[courts] have never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000). See also Turner Broadcast System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 644 (1994) (“When the government defends a regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply posit the existence of the disease to be cured.”). To prove narrowly tailoring, the County must show actual, not speculative harm, and that the disputed laws actually address that harm. Id.
Even a content-neutral law is not narrowly-tailored “[w]here the licensing official enjoys unduly broad discretion . . . to grant or deny a permit, [as] there is a risk that he will favor or disfavor speech based on its content.” Thomas, 534 U.S.
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at 323, citing Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131. “A government regulation that allows arbitrary application is ‘inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place and manner regulation because such discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view.’” Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 132 (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court “requires that a time, place and manner regulation contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision and render it subject to effective judicial review.” Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002), citing Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). The ordinance in Thomas included express bounds on the bases for denying a permit, required officials to process applications within 28 days and explain in writing any denials. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 32. These were held to be sufficiently specific and objective to insulate against the exercise of the “whim of the administrator.” Id., citing Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 133. “They provide ‘narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards’ to guide the licensor’s determination. . . . And they are enforceable on review – first by appeal to the General Superintendent of the Park District, . . . and then by writ of common-law certiorari in the Illinois courts[.]” Thomas, 534 U.S. at 32. By way of contrast, in the instant case Defendant MiamiDade’s Code lacks any standards and any opportunity for review.
Absent the safeguards present in Thomas, the County’s permit scheme is unconstitutional. See also City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 769-70 (discretion impermissibly unfettered where official may impose “such other terms and conditions deemed necessary”); Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 156-58 (unbridled discretion in regulation permitting decisions to grant or deny parade permit on grounds of “the public welfare, peace, safety, health”). Defendant’s Code sets no time by which a permit request must be decided, enumerates no bases for granting or denying a request, and contains no standards for setting conditions on a permit.
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Such “[e]xcessive discretion over permitting decisions is constitutionally suspect because it creates the opportunity for undetectable censorship and signals a lack of narrow tailoring.” Burk, 365 F. 3d at 1256 (emphasis added).
Third, the permit scheme fails to leave open ample alternatives for communication. It is a cardinal rule of First Amendment law that “[the] streets [and sidewalks] are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105-106 (1940) [citations omitted]. The County’s Code does not allow for ample alternatives for core expression within the County. If a permit for a parade or procession is not obtained, the group is thereby foreclosed from all public streets and highways in the County. Even the sidewalks are unavailable to Plaintiffs since they are potentially subject to arrest under the Miami-Dade County Loitering Ordinance found at M-D County Code § 21-31.1 (b).
POINT 2 - THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A DECLARATION THAT THE COUNTY’S LOITERING ORDINANCE IS AN OVERBROAD PROHIBITION THAT VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In Count Two of the Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs assert that Miami-Dade County Code § 21-31.1 (b), the Loitering Ordinance, is unconstitutional on its face because it is impermissibly overbroad and thereby capable of chilling the exercise of lawful First Amendment-protected core expressive activities.
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The loitering provisions of § 21-31.1 (b) of the M-D County Code make it unlawful to be on a public street, public sidewalk, public overpass, public bridge or public place “to hinder or impede pedestrians or vehicles.”
The overbreadth doctrine invalidates laws that inhibit the free exercise of First Amendment-protected activities. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999). Peaceful protest on public sidewalks is a quintessential First Amendment activity. See e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969). The City may not “make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views. . . . ‘unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.’” Terminiello v. Chicago, 347 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
The ability to restrict assemblies on sidewalks based on any conceivable “obstruction” is unlawful. In Cox v Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), the Supreme Court overturned the convictions of civil rights activists. Two thousand students assembled peaceably at the state capitol building and marched to the courthouse, where fellow activists arrested earlier were being held. With official permission, but without a permit, they assembled on the sidewalk across the street from the courthouse and, in a lawful manner, rallied and marched. When they failed to disperse pursuant to a police order indicating that they had exceeded their time for demonstrating, they were arrested for obstructing a sidewalk.
An ordinance is overbroad where every application creates an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas, such as when an ordinance allows unfettered discretion in one decision-maker or where the ordinance sweeps too broadly to penalize constitutionally-protected speech. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 129-30. The Supreme Court has consistently held that ordinances are unconstitutionally broad under the circumstances noted in Cox and Forsyth, as these ordinances would allow punishment for peaceful protest involving disfavored views. The
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Court also held that the conviction under a statute banning obstruction of public sidewalks was a clear violation of freedom of speech and assembly where the “obstruction” ordinance was coupled, as here, with the unfettered discretion of local officials to regulate the use of streets for peaceful parades and assemblies. Precedent requires that Miami-Dade County Code § 21-31.1(b) be invalidated by this tribunal.
POINT 3 - THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A DECLARATION THAT THE COUNTY’S LOITERING ORDINANCE IS FACIALLY INVALID BECAUSE IT OFFENDS THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ON THE GROUNDS OF VAGUENESS AND VIOLATION OF A PROTECTED LIBERTY INTEREST
In Count Three of the Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs assert that Miami-Dade County Code § 21-31.1 (b), the Loitering Ordinance, is unconstitutional on its face as being offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, because: (1) it is an impermissibly vague prohibition, in that it fails to provide notice as to precisely what conduct falls within its sweep, and it authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and (2) it prohibits conduct that is protected by the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause.
Vagueness can invalidate a criminal law because either: (1) it failed to provide the kind of notice that allows ordinary persons to understand what conduct is prohibited, or (2) it authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999). M-D County’s Loitering Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, in part because there is uncertainty about what type of loitering would be considered criminal conduct, and which conduct would not fall within its sweep. Id. at 57. Courts have consistently invalidated laws or ordinances that do not join the crime of loitering with a second
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specific element. Id. at 58. Miami-Dade County’s Loitering Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to alert the public as to what type of conduct is prohibited since M-D County could not “conceivably have meant to criminalize each instance a citizen stands in public.” See Id. at 57.
Freedom to loiter “for innocent purposes” is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999). The Supreme Court has held that a person’s decision to remain in “a public place of his choice” or to move to another place upon his own inclination is “as much a part of . . . liberty as the freedom of movement inside frontiers that is ‘a part of our heritage.’” Id. citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958). Miami-Dade County Code § 21-31.1(b) unconstitutionally restricts the liberty interest of Plaintiffs by criminalizing standing or remaining on public streets, sidewalks, overpasses, bridges, and places. Plaintiffs have a constitutional right to stand or remain on a public place if their conduct does not completely obstruct a sidewalk, or if their presence is not injurious or threatening. Miami-Dade County’s Loitering Ordinance violates this critically important due process right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and is invalid.
POINT 4 - THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR ENTITLEMENT TO FINAL PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THEIR CLAIMS FOR BOTH DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. Standard Governing Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. Any party to an action can move for a motion for summary on all or part of any
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claim. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56 (c). Further, “[a] summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be issued on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.” Id. Summary judgment is proper when, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. D Beach, 486 F.3d (11th Cir. 2007).
B. The Plaintiffs are Entitled to a Declaratory Judgment as to Counts One, Two and Three of the Second Amended Complaint.
Any Court of the United States may declare the rights of any interested party seeking such a declaration, and it shall have the force and effect of a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. §2201. Federal courts have jurisdictional authority to issue declaratory judgment and injunctive relief prohibiting the enforcement of an ordinance or statute when the ordinance or statute’s application is unconstitutional. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320, 331 (2006); Beaulieu v. City of Alabaster, 454 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming the District Court’s declaratory judgment against the City holding that their sign ordinance violated the First Amendment). Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. §2201 because Miami-Dade County’s Parade & Procession Ordinance is violative of the First Amendment, and because the Loitering Ordinance violates both the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, as delineated with specificity hereinabove.
C. The Plaintiffs are Entitled to a Permanent Injunction as to Counts One, Two and Three of the Second Amended Complaint.
A permanent injunction is proper if a plaintiff establishes four elements: 1) actual
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success on the merits; 2) the likelihood of irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; 3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the damage caused to the County; and, 4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs readily meet each part of this test.
Plaintiffs assert that they meet the “actual success” prong of the permanent injunction test based on the arguments delineated in Points One through Three, supra.
As to the issue of irreparable injury, it has been specifically noted by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the loss of First Amendment freedoms unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1272 (11th Cir. 2006), quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit has held that there is a finding of irreparable harm when First Amendment rights are violated on an ongoing basis because the plaintiffs cannot be made whole by money damages when their free speech is chilled. KH Outdoor, LLC, 458 F.3d at 1272, citing Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990). As noted above, Miami-Dade County Code § 30-274 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on free speech, and the Loitering Ordinance, M-D County Code § 21-31.1 (b) is overbroad, and accordingly, both code sections infringe upon First Amendment-protected core expressive conduct. Additionally, the County’s continued enforcement of the Loitering Ordinance, with its abrogation of due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, is similarly an injury that is irreparable in nature to those subjected to the loss of their freedom by the enforcement of the ordinance.
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As to the balance of hardships, Plaintiffs assert that the injury to them and to others similarly situated in South Florida is that rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments will be abrogated by the two M-D Code sections requiring advance permitting and unbridled discretionary authority to public officials. Such an egregious violation of civil rights poses a grave hardship to Plaintiffs when seeking to convey their political and social justice messages. The Defendant is not similarly harmed. Miami-Dade County may need to add additional law enforcement officers to enhance security, but such a hardship is no greater than any other increase in security a municipality would face when large numbers of people gather together, such as at a music concert or sporting event. Defendants are still free to maintain the peace by enforcing existing criminal laws to keep the area secure. The granting of injunctive relief to Plaintiffs will not alter this prerogative. As a result, when balancing the hardships, it is clear that the greater injury is to the Plaintiffs who are faced with restrictions on First Amendment-protected activity and the loss of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
The Plaintiffs assert that the granting of their request for a Permanent Injunction as to both Code § 30-274 and Code § 21-31.1 (b) is in the public interest in the case sub judice. “[T]he public interest is always served when constitutional rights, especially free speech rights, are vindicated.” University Books & Videos, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 33 F. Supp.2d 1364, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 1999). “The public has no interest in enforcing an unconstitutional ordinance.” KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d at 1272. Furthermore, it is not in the public interest to support a governmental entity’s expenditure of time, effort and money in order to enforce an unconstitutional ordinance. Fla. Businessmen for Free Enter. v. City of Hollywood, 648 F.2d 956,
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959 (5th Cir. 1981). The public interest is clearly in favor of Plaintiffs and, thus, injunctive relief should be granted.
CONCLUSION
Miami-Dade County Code § 30-274 violates the First Amendment in several key respects. The Parades and Processions Ordinance is an unlawful prior restraint. The Code is overbroad, and lacks any standards or guidelines to check the unbridled discretion of County officials to use content-based factors to decide who may or may not “speak” in public places. The Loitering Ordinance, M-D County Code § 21.31.1(b), is unconstitutionally vague, overbroad and an abrogation of liberty interests, and thereby violates First Amendment free speech and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the enforcement of both code provisions should be declared unconstitutional and that final summary judgment should be granted.

DATED : March 17, 2008

s/Robert W. Ross, Jr.
Robert W. Ross, Jr. FBN 921660 ROSS LAW FIRM 8461 Lake Worth Road Suite 426 Lake Worth, FL 33467

Mara Shlackman FBN 988618 LAW OFFICES OF MARA SHLACKMAN, P.L. 757 SW 17th St., PMB 309 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
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Tel: (561) 251-4896 bravelaw@bellsouth.net

Tel: (954) 523-1131 mara@shlackmanlaw.com

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 17, 2008, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served on March 17, 2008, on all counsel identified on the attached Service List, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing.
s/Robert W. Ross, Jr. Robert W. Ross, Jr., FBN 921660 ROSS LAW FIRM, P.L. 8461 Lake Worth Road, Suite 426 Lake Worth, FL 33467 Tel: (561) 251-4896 bravelaw@bellsouth.net
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Bernie Pastor Asst. County Attorney Miami-Dade County 111 NW 1st St. Suite 2810 Miami, FL 33128 Tel: (305) 375-1506 pastor@miamidade.gov

Service List

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION Case No. 07-21088-CIV-ALTONAGA/Brown
MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC.; SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWORK; and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC.,
Plaintiffs, vs. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida,
Defendant. _________________________________________/
ORDER THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant Miami-Dade County (“Motion”) [D.E. 60]. Plaintiffs request partial summary judgment in their favor regarding Defendant, Miami-Dade County’s liability for all three counts of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint [D.E. 43]. The undersigned has considered the parties’ written submissions, the record, and applicable law.
I. BACKGROUND 1 Plaintiffs, Miami for Peace (“MFP”), South Florida Peace & Justice Network (“SFPJ”), and Haiti Solidarity (“HS”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) are not-for-profit corporations operating in Miami, Florida. In April 2007, Plaintiffs planned and organized an anti-war demonstration to coincide with a commencement address given by President George W. Bush at the Miami-Dade College (“MDC”) campus in Kendall, Florida, on April 28, 2007 (the “April Protest”). As part of the April
1 Unless otherwise specified, all facts contained in this section are undisputed.

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Protest, Plaintiffs sought to have their members march on S.W. 107th Avenue and S.W. 104th Street to the entrance of the MDC campus. Miami-Dade County (the “County”) has a parade permit requirement (“Permit Ordinance”) for any parades or processions in the unincorporated areas of the County, which includes the area surrounding the MDC campus. The County’s Permit Ordinance provides as follows:
In the unincorporated areas, no procession or parade, excepting the forces of the United States Armed Services, the military forces of the state, and the forces of the police and fire departments, and funeral processions, shall occupy, march, or proceed along the street or roadway except in accordance with a permit issued by the sheriff and such other regulations as are set forth herein which may apply. No sound truck or other vehicle equipped with amplifier or loudspeaker shall be driven upon any street except in accordance with a permit issued by the sheriff. Miami Dade Code § 30-274 [D.E. 62-2]. Although Plaintiffs were informed by the County that they could hold their planned demonstration, they were denied a permit to march or process along any of the roadways surrounding the MDC campus. The County submits that on April 18, 2007, it informed one of the attorneys for the Plaintiffs that a permit would not be issued for the planned demonstration because shutting down the streets surrounding the MDC campus would cause “congestion and not allow ingress and egress for emergency vehicles, creating serious security and public safety problems, especially considering the presence of the President of the United States.” (Declaration of Robert L. Diers (“Diers Decl.”) [D.E. 72-2] at ¶ 5).2 The County also submits that a permit is only required for parades or
2 Plaintiffs contend that the original version of the Diers Declaration lacked an executed signature page and therefore cannot be properly considered on summary judgment. The County, however, provided the executed signature page along with a Notice [D.E. 77] on May 27, 2008, notifying the Court that the page was inadvertently omitted from the initial filing. The undersigned, therefore, considers the Diers Declaration for purposes of this Motion.
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processions, and that the Permit Ordinance is inapplicable to First Amendment demonstrations. (See id. at ¶ 8).
Unable to secure a permit for the April Protest, Plaintiffs claim their members were fearful of arrest or prosecution under Miami-Dade County Code § 21-31.1, the County’s anti-loitering ordinance (the “Loitering Ordinance”). The Loitering Ordinance provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(b) Loitering For the purposes of this Section “loitering” means the act of standing, remaining or sleeping on, in or about any public street, public sidewalk, public overpass, public bridge, public library, or other place specifically enumerated herein. A person commits the offense of loitering when he knowingly: (1) Loiters on any public street, public sidewalk, public overpass, public bridge or public place so as to hinder or impede the passage of pedestrians or vehicles. . . . (4) Loiters in or about a school, college or university campus so as to hinder or impede the orderly conduct of instructional, recreational, or other school activities. . . . (c) Penalties for violation . . . Any person convicted of a violation of any subsection of this section shall be punished by a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment in the County Jail for a term not to exceed sixty (60) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. This section is applicable in both the incorporated and unincorporated areas of Miami-Dade County and all violations thereof shall be prosecuted in the County Court. Miami-Dade County Code § 21-31.1. The County has offered testimony from one of its representatives, Robert Diers, that the County “has rarely, if ever, enforced” the Loitering Ordinance, and that the “Miami-Dade Police Department does not have any recent history of enforcing [it] against First Amendment demonstrators
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or protestors.” (Diers Decl. at ¶ 13). Diers also testified that the Loitering Ordinance is not included in the handbook of criminal statutes provided to Miami-Dade Police officers. (See id. at ¶ 14).
In light of Plaintiffs’ conclusion that the Permit Ordinance and the Loitering Ordinance would impair their ability to hold the April Protest, Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint [D.E. 1] on April 24, 2007, accompanied by an Emergency Motion for a Preliminary Injunction [D.E. 3]. Upon the agreement of the parties, the Court entered an Order [D.E. 13] that the County would not enforce either of the two challenged ordinances during the April Protest, and denied Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion as moot. The April Protest was subsequently able to proceed, although with the understanding that no traffic lanes or streets would be closed. The demonstrations, therefore, were limited to the sidewalks and grassy areas surrounding the MDC campus. None of Plaintiffs’ members at the April Protest were arrested or threatened with arrest for violation of the County’s Loitering Ordinance. (See Diers. Decl. at ¶ 12).
Plaintiffs, MFP and SFPJN, intend to hold future demonstrations in Miami-Dade County, including an anticipated demonstration on election day, November 4, 2008. (See Declaration of Linda Belgrave (“Belgrave Decl.”) [D.E. 62-3] at ¶ 3). They anticipate the planned demonstrations will require street closures. (See id. at ¶ 5). As a result, Plaintiffs submit the County’s Permit Ordinance and Loitering Ordinance will impede their efforts to plan these future demonstrations (see id. at ¶ 6), and discourage future participants from exercising their First Amendment rights (see id. at ¶ 8).
Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on September 14, 2007. The Second Amended Complaint contains three counts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I alleges the Permit
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Ordinance “is unconstitutional on its face as an impermissible prior restraint, containing terms which provide unfettered discretion to law enforcement officials, lack of deadlines for considering applications, lack of appropriate review for unfavorable decisions, and other deficiencies.” (Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 26). It further alleges the Permit Ordinance and the County’s implementation of that Ordinance, “were the proximate cause of the deprivation of the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs and other demonstrators [at the April Protest] . . . and are the proximate cause of the ‘chilling,’” of Plaintiffs’ activities at other demonstrations in the County. (Id. at ¶ 28). Plaintiffs also seek compensatory damages for “the expenditure of money . . . for printing, travel and related expenses for portions of [their planned events] negatively impacted by the Defendant’s ordinances . . . .” (Id.)
Count II of the Second Amended Complaint alleges that the Loitering Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face as an impermissibly broad prohibition, that has had, and will in the future have, a substantial impact on conduct protected by the First Amendment . . . .” (Id. at ¶ 32). It further alleges that the County’s adoption and implementation of the Loitering Ordinance “were the proximate cause of the deprivation of the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs, and other demonstrators similarly situated, with respect to the [April Protest] . . . on public streets, sidewalks, and other public property adjacent to [the MDC campus], and are the proximate cause of the ‘chilling,’” of Plaintiffs’ activities at other demonstrations in the County. (Id. at ¶ 34).
Finally, Count III alleges the Loitering Ordinance is “unconstitutional on its face, as an impermissibly vague prohibition that has a substantial impact on conduct protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” because “it fails to provide the kind of notice that
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enables ordinary citizens to understand what precise conduct it prohibits” and “authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement through its lack of precision.” (Id. at ¶ 38) (emphasis in original). It further alleges the adoption and implementation of the Loitering Ordinance “are the proximate cause of the past deprivation of the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs without due process, and other demonstrators similarly situated [at the April Protest] . . . with respect to the planned activities on public streets, sidewalks and other public property adjacent to [the MDC campus], and the proximate cause of the ‘chilling,’” of Plaintiffs’ activities at other demonstrations in the County. (Id. at ¶ 41). As a result of this deprivation, Plaintiffs also seek compensatory damages. (See id.).
Plaintiffs filed the present Motion seeking partial summary judgment on all counts as to the following issues: (1) Plaintiffs’ entitlement to a permanent injunction, enjoining Defendant from enforcing the Permit Ordinance and the Loitering Ordinance; (2) Plaintiffs’ entitlement to a declaration that the Permit Ordinance and Loitering Ordinance violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the First Amendment; and (3) Plaintiffs’ entitlement to a declaration that the Loitering Ordinance violates Plaintiffs’ due process rights.
II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment shall be rendered “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In making this assessment, the Court “must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Stewart v.
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Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997), and “must resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant.” United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Ins. Co. of Am., 894 F.2d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990).
“By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. Likewise, a dispute about a material fact is a “genuine” issue “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Id. at 252,
“For factual issues to be considered genuine, they must have a real basis in the record . . . mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary
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judgment is proper “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322. In those cases, there is no genuine issue of material fact “since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. B. Plaintiffs’ Standing to Seek Declaratory Relief
Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief on their claims that the Permit Ordinance and the Loitering Ordinance violate their constitutional rights. Generally, federal courts are empowered to issue a declaratory judgment prohibiting the enforcement of an ordinance or statute that is determined to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320, 331 (2006); Bischoff v. Osceola County, Fla., 222 F.3d 874, 877 (11th Cir. 2000); Beaulieu v. City of Alabaster, 454 F.3d 1219, 1234 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming district court’s declaratory judgment that sign ordinance violated the First Amendment).
Nevertheless, “Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power of the federal courts to hear ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2). The most significant element of “case or controversy” is the requirement of standing. See id. (citation omitted). “[E]very court has an independent duty to review standing as a basis for jurisdiction at any time, for every case it adjudicates.” Florida Ass’n of Medical Equipment Dealers, Med-Health Care v. Apfel, 194 F.3d 1227, 1230 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). In order to demonstrate it has standing a party must show: “1) an injury in fact or an invasion of a legally
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protected interest; 2) a direct causal relationship between the injury and the challenged action; and 3) a likelihood of redressability.” Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1223 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
“The requirements for standing are somewhat more lenient for facial challenges to statutes on the grounds of overbreadth.” Bischoff, 222 F.3d at 883; see also Digital Properties, Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he injury requirement is most loosely applied when a plaintiff asserts a violation of First Amendment rights based on the enforcement of a law, regulation or policy.”). “However, even under the more lenient requirements for standing applicable to First Amendment overbreadth challenges, it still remains the law that plaintiffs must establish that they have suffered some injury in fact as a result of the defendant’s actions.” Bischoff, 222 F.3d at 883 (citations omitted).
The County does not question Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the Permit Ordinance on the ground of constitutional overbreadth. Moreover, upon the Court’s own review, it is plain that Plaintiffs easily satisfy the permissive standing requirement for such a challenge. See id. Plaintiffs are involved in the planning and execution of public demonstrations. Plaintiffs and their members were denied a permit for the April Protest under the Permit Ordinance, and they submit their First Amendment rights were infringed as a result of this denial. They further submit they intend to engage in future demonstrations for which they will require additional permits under the current licensing scheme. (See Belgrave Decl. at ¶¶ 3-5).
The County does, however, challenge Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the Loitering Ordinance. Specifically, the County asserts Plaintiffs lack “associational standing” to challenge the
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Loitering Ordinance on behalf of their members. “‘(W)hether an association has standing to invoke the court’s remedial powers on behalf of its members depends in substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought.’” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515 (1975)). “‘If . . . the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured.’” Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 515). Thus, “an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Id.; accord Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
The text of the Loitering Ordinance is exceedingly broad in scope. A person commits the offense of loitering “when he knowingly . . . [l]oiters on any public street, public sidewalk, public overpass, public bridge or public place so as to hinder or impede the passage of pedestrians or vehicles” or “[l]oiters in or about a school, college or university campus so as to hinder or impede the orderly conduct of instructional, recreational, or other school activities.” Miami-Dade County Code § 21-31. The range of activities that can “impede” the passage of pedestrians or vehicles, or “hinder” the orderly conduct of school activities is limitless. The awkward and sweeping language of the Ordinance results in a legislative pronouncement that defines loitering with use of the term it seeks to define: “knowingly . . . [l]oitering” in selected public areas, “so as to hinder or impede the
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passage of pedestrians or vehicles” or “the orderly conduct of instructional, recreational, or other school activities.” Id. Indeed, even the only arguably “objective” component of this construction – “so as to hinder or impede” – is also relatively subjective. A violation of the Loitering Ordinance is classified in penal terms, resulting in maximum penalties of a $500.00 fine, or sixty days in the County Jail. See id.
Plaintiffs contend their members’ activities at the April Protest, as well as their likely activities at future demonstrations fall within the reach of the Loitering Ordinance. The undersigned agrees. Since the Loitering Ordinance lacks virtually any objective standards regarding its application, every participant in a public demonstration, or indeed anyone using a public right of way, may be deemed to be in violation of the ordinance and be subjected to its stated penalties. Indeed, in the context of a demonstration like the April Protest, where the streets and sidewalks surrounding the MDC campus were filled with demonstrators, it is a virtual certainty that Plaintiffs’ members could be deemed “guilty” of hindering or impeding pedestrians and traffic.
Although none of the Plaintiffs’ members have actually been prosecuted under the Loitering Ordinance, “[t]he Supreme Court has accepted imminent harm as satisfying the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing.” Florida State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1160-61 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). Moreover, “‘[i]mminence’ as a doctrinal standard is ‘somewhat elastic,’” and is intended to ensure that the threatened injury is not too speculative. Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2). The undersigned is unpersuaded by the County’s assurances that the Loitering Ordinance has been rarely, if ever, enforced against protestors in the past (see Diers Decl. ¶ at 13), particularly in
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the context of this facial challenge. As discussed, virtually every public demonstration in unincorporated Miami-Dade County will involve a violation of the Loitering Ordinance, and there is nothing preventing the County from enforcing the ordinance at future demonstrations. Moreover, Plaintiffs have identified specific future planned public demonstrations, including one to coincide with the November 2008 election. Plaintiffs’ members are subject to imminent harm from any future application of the Loitering Ordinance and they consequently have individual standing to sue.
Citing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in White’s Place, Inc. v. Glover, 222 F.3d 1327, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000), the County also contends that Plaintiffs lack associational standing to challenge the Loitering Ordinance because the interests they seek to vindicate are not germane to each of the organizations’ purposes. In White’s Place, the court premised its decision upon the fact that the plaintiff, a corporation operating a club offering erotic dancing, did not have a substantial interest in challenging an ordinance that prohibited individuals from opposing a police officer, absent “[t]he participation of an individual employee who has been threatened with arrest.” Id. The undersigned finds White’s Place inapposite to the instant matter. In contrast to the plaintiff in White’s Place, one of Plaintiffs’ primary activities is the planning and execution of public demonstrations. Accordingly, the interests of each of these organizations in opposing the Loitering Ordinance are very closely aligned with the interests of their members. See, e.g., Browning, 522 F.3d at 1165-66 (holding that NAACP had associational standing to challenge voter registration statute on behalf of its members). Finally, Plaintiffs’ members’ participation is unnecessary for purposes of this facial challenge. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Loitering Ordinance.
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C. Constitutionality of the Permit Ordinance Plaintiffs assert the Permit Ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad in that it fails to
articulate specific standards for the granting of parade permits, and thereby provides the County official in charge of its administration with unfettered discretion. Generally, a party making a facial challenge to a statute or ordinance on a constitutional basis must demonstrate that there are no circumstances under which the statute or ordinance would be valid. See U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). However, the Supreme Court has “acknowledged an exception to the ‘unconstitutional-in-every-conceivable-application’ rule in cases involving the overbreadth doctrine in ‘the limited context of the First Amendment.’” Horton v. City of St. Augustine, Fla., 272 F.3d 1318, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs contend that the Permit Ordinance is a prior restraint which infringes their First Amendment rights. “A prior restraint on speech prohibits or censors speech before it can take place.” Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1215 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Alexander v. U.S., 509 U.S. 544, 553 (1993)). One such type of prior restraint occurs “where the government has unbridled discretion to limit access to a particular public forum.” Id. (citing U.S. v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding prior restraint where a National Park Service licensing scheme gave park official unlimited power to grant or deny permits to protest in the park)). “Although there is a ‘heavy presumption’ against the validity of a prior restraint . . . [a] government, in order to regulate competing uses of public forums, may impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold a march, parade, or rally . . . .” Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (internal citations omitted). “Such a scheme, however, must meet certain
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constitutional requirements.” Id. For instance, “[i]t may not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official.” Id. (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965)).
With respect to a licensing scheme, “the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional.” Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969). An ordinance which “‘makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official – as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official – is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.’” Id. (quoting Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1957)).
The Permit Ordinance provides “no narrow, objective, and definite standards,” or indeed any standards at all regarding the issuance of parade permit. See Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151. Instead, it states simply that “no procession or parade, excepting the forces of the United States Armed Services, the military forces of the state, and the forces of the police and fire departments, and funeral processions, shall occupy, march, or proceed along the street or roadway except in accordance with a permit issued by the sheriff.” Miami Dade Code § 30-274. It does not provide any criteria for the sheriff or other County official to consider in determining whether a license should be granted, nor does it state any reason justifying a denial of a permit request. It does not apprise the applicant of what the criteria are guiding the sheriff’s decision to issue or not issue a permit. Moreover, there is no time limit set forth in the Permit Ordinance for the County official to consider a permit request, and no provision is made for any type of review or appeal of an adverse decision.
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The County has submitted that Plaintiffs were denied a permit for the April Protest because of “congestion” and “serious security and public safety problems.” (Diers Decl. at ¶ 5). None of the County’s stated criteria for denying Plaintiffs’ application, however, appear anywhere in the Permit Ordinance. We are left simply to assume the benevolence and good intentions of the sheriff in denying the application. Interestingly, the Ordinance makes no mention of security or safety concerns at all. Notwithstanding the County’s assertions regarding its reasons for denying Plaintiffs’ permit application, the Court must “analyze [the ordinance] as written.” Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 1994). This is because it is not reasonable to “depend on the individuals responsible for enforcing [an] Ordinance to do so in a manner that cures it of constitutional infirmities.” Id. On a facial challenge, therefore, the County’s explanations regarding the criteria it applied to Plaintiffs’ permit application are irrelevant. The Court must rely on the text of the Ordinance.
In any event, even assuming the County had applied a written standard of “public safety” to deny Plaintiffs’ application, that would not be sufficient by itself to cure the constitutional defect. Indeterminate standards like “public safety” are generally insufficient to satisfy the limited discretion requirement. See Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150-51 (holding that an ordinance directing public officials to grant licenses where the proposed expression is consistent with “public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience” was too amorphous to meaningfully limit public officials’ discretion). Similarly, the County’s assertion that a permit is not required for First Amendment demonstrations (see Diers Decl. at ¶ 8), and that Plaintiffs were not denied a permit on the basis of their message is also unavailing since “the success of a facial challenge on the grounds that an ordinance delegates overly broad discretion to the decisionmaker rests not on whether the
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administrator has exercised his discretion in a content-based manner, but whether there is anything in the ordinance preventing him from doing so.” Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 133 n.10. No such restriction exists in the Permit Ordinance.
Significant to the present analysis, the Permit Ordinance lacks any procedural safeguards. “[A]ny system of censorship that runs the risk of suppressing constitutionally protected expression must contain three procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of censorship: (1) the burden of going to court to suppress the speech and the burden of proof once in court must lie with the censor; (2) any restraint prior to a judicial determination may only be for a specified brief time period in order to preserve the status quo; and (3) an avenue for prompt judicial review of the censor’s decision must be available.” Redner, 29 F.3d at 1500 (citing Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59). The Permit Ordinance clearly lacks the second and third procedural safeguards set forth by the Supreme Court. It provides no time limit for the County to make a determination regarding the issuance of a permit, and thereby “risks the suppression of protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on the part of the decisionmaker or any judicial determination.” Id. at 1501. Similarly, there is no provision in the statute for prompt, meaningful judicial review of the County’s decision to deny a permit. See Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2004) (“‘[P]rompt judicial review must be available to correct erroneous denials’ of access to expression.”) (quoting Cafe Erotica of Fla., Inc. v. St. John’s County, 360 F.3d 1274, 1283 (11th Cir. 2004)). In view of the unrestricted discretion provided to the County official issuing or not issuing the parade permits, and the lack of required procedural safeguards, the undersigned concludes the Permit Ordinance is constitutionally overbroad.
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Plaintiffs also contend the Permitting Ordinance is unconstitutional because it is not a contentneutral time, place, and manner regulation. It is well established that, “any permit scheme controlling the time, place, and manner of speech must not be based on the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must leave open ample alternatives for communication.” Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 130 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)). The Permit Ordinance provides exceptions from its permit requirement for “the forces of the United States Armed Services, the military forces of the state, and the forces of the police and fire departments, and funeral processions . . . .” Miami Dade Code § 30-274. Although the undersigned is not persuaded by the County’s argument that the Permit Ordinance is content-neutral, a further inquiry is unnecessary since “[e]ven a facially content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation may not vest public officials with unbridled discretion over permitting decisions.” Burk v. Augusta-Richmond County, 365 F.3d 1247, 1256 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). A contentneutral ordinance must still “contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision and render it subject to effective judicial review.” Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002) (citing Niemotko v. State of Md., 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951)). As discussed, the Permit Ordinance fails to sufficiently limit the sheriff or County official’s discretion in granting permits, and fails to provide the required constitutional safeguards. Accordingly, it is constitutionally overbroad regardless of whether or not it is deemed to be content-neutral. D. Constitutionality of the Loitering Ordinance
Plaintiffs challenge the Loitering Ordinance on the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague. “[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with
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sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citations omitted). Thus, “[v]agueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons.” City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (holding that loitering ordinance which required a police officer, on observing a person whom he reasonably believed to be a street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more other persons, to order all such persons to disperse, and made failure to obey such an order a violation, was unconstitutionally vague). “First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357). The Loitering Ordinance is constitutionally vague for both of these reasons.
The plain text of the Loitering Ordinance, specifically its use of the phrase “hinder or impede,” criminalizes an extremely broad variety of activities on a public right of way, including simply standing on a sidewalk, and criminalizes virtually all behavior likely to take place at a public demonstration. This broad language makes it exceedingly hard to discern exactly what conduct is prohibited. Indeed, at least one Florida court has long ago held that a loitering statute utilizing a similar “hinder or impede” construction as the County’s Loitering Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. See Ciccarelli v. City of Key West, 321 So. 2d 472, 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (concluding that a valid loitering statute using such language “must contain some restrictive standards which would limit its application to impediments to passage that threaten public safety or a breach of the peace.”).
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Second, the lack of any objective standards for determining when an individual is in violation of the Ordinance raises the likelihood of its arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. As discussed, the undersigned is not persuaded by the County’s assertion that the Loitering Ordinance is rarely, if ever, enforced (see Diers Decl. at ¶ 13), as this does little to mitigate the fact that there is nothing to preclude its enforcement against Plaintiffs’ members absent a permanent injunction. For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that the Loitering Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. Having concluded that the Loitering Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, the undersigned declines to consider Plaintiffs’ other constitutional challenges to the Ordinance.3 E. Entitlement to a Permanent Injunction
A district court may grant permanent injunctive relief if the moving party demonstrates: (1) actual success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006). As to first prong, Plaintiffs have demonstrated actual success on the merits of their claims that the Permit Ordinance and the Loitering Ordinance are unconstitutional.
As to the second prong, “‘[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” KH Outdoor, LLC, 458 F.3d at 1271-72 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Thus, having demonstrated that the ordinances
3 Plaintiffs also challenge the Loitering Ordinance on the grounds that it is constitutionally overbroad and violates Plaintiffs’ liberty interest.
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have subjected them to a deprivation of their First Amendment rights, Plaintiffs have made a showing of irreparable injury.
Similarly, Plaintiffs have shown the equities are in their favor. See id. at 1268. While Plaintiffs have shown that the future application of the Permit Ordinance and the Loitering Ordinance may subject them to the deprivation of their constitutional rights, the County has not articulated any hardship it will suffer as a result of the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs.
Finally, “[t]he public has no interest in enforcing an unconstitutional ordinance.” KH Outdoor, LLC, 458 F.3d at 1272 (citations omitted); see also Joelner v. Vill. of Washington Park, 378 F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here can be no irreparable harm to a municipality when it is prevented from enforcing an unconstitutional statute[.]”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In light of the undersigned’s determination that the challenged ordinances are unconstitutional, Plaintiffs have also satisfied the final element for a permanent injunction. For all of these reasons, Plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent injunction against enforcement of the Permit and Loitering Ordinances.4
III. CONCLUSION In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs’ Motion [D.E. 60] is GRANTED. A permanent injunction is issued prohibiting the County from future enforcement or application of Miami Dade Code Sections 30-274 (the Permit Ordinance) and
4 On April 16, 2008, the County filed a Motion to Stay [D.E. 68], notifying the Court it was in the process of revising its Code in the wake of mediation and requesting an abatement of the proceedings in this matter. That Motion was denied in an Order [D.E. 70] dated April 17, 2008. The permanent injunction shall apply only to the current versions of the Permit and Loitering Ordinances.
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21-31.1 (the Loitering Ordinance). The parties are further ordered to schedule a mediation by June 25, 2008, and submit their report of mediation results within five days thereafter. The mediation is to address the remaining issues of attorney’s fees and any compensatory damages.
This case is removed from the Court’s trial calendar. The parties’ Joint Motion Filed Out of Time for Extension of Time to Submit Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [D.E. 79] is DENIED as moot.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 4th day of June, 2008.

cc: (1) Magistrate Judge Stephen T. Brown (2) All counsel of record

_________________________________ CECILIA M. ALTONAGA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 86 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/18/2008 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION Case No. 07-21088-CIV-ALTONAGA/Brown MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC., SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWORK, and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC., Plaintiffs, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendant. _________________________________________/ ORDER ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSING CASE THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the parties’ Mediation Status Report [D.E. 85], filed on July 2, 2008. The Court having carefully reviewed the Report, the file, and being otherwise fully advised, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 1. The above-styled action is administratively CLOSED without prejudice to the parties to file a Stipulation for Final Order of Dismissal, with a proposed order, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Upon the parties’ filing of the Stipulation, the Court will enter an order dismissing the case with prejudice. Pursuant to the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures, the proposed orders shall be submitted to the Court by e-mail in WordPerfect or Word format at altonaga@flsd.uscourts.gov. 2. If the parties fail to complete the expected settlement, either party may request the Court to reopen the case.

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CASE NO. 08-07-21088-CIV-ALTONAGA/Brown
3. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case for administrative purposes only. Any pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida this 18th day of July, 2008.

Copies provided to: Counsel of record

_________________________________ CECILIA M. ALTONAGA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 89-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/20/2008 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION Case No. 07-21088-CIV-ALTONAGA
MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC., SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWORK, and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC.,
Plaintiffs, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida,
Defendant. _________________________________________/
STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT The Plaintiffs, MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC., SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWORK, and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC., and Defendant, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, by and through their respective undersigned attorneys, hereby settle the claims remaining in dispute between them as to compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees on the following terms: 1. The parties acknowledge that the Court has awarded declaratory and permanent injunctive relief to Plaintiffs, precluding Defendants from enforcing Miami-Dade Code Sections 30274 and 21-31.1(b). 2. Pursuant to the terms of the Releases, the County will pay compensatorydamages and attorneys’ fees to the Plaintiffs. 3. The County Manager’s Office has already approved the settlement of compensatory

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damages and attorneys’ fees referenced in Paragraph 2 above, and no further County approvals are required.
4. Each Plaintiff shall execute a Release to the County (including its officers, agents, and employees) on a form jointly acceptable to the County Attorney and the Plaintiffs’ attorneys, with respect to the claims for compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees.
5. Plaintiffs retain the right to seek judicial enforcement of the declaratory and permanent injunctive relief granted by the Court in its Order dated June 4, 2008, should the County violate the permanent injunction in the future, and Plaintiffs also retain the right to seek attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for such future enforcement efforts. Dated: August 20, 2008

LAW OFFICES OF MARA SHLACKMAN, P.L. 757 Southeast 17th Street, PMB 309 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Tel: (954) 523-1131 mara@shlackmanlaw.com
s/Mara Shlackman Mara Shlackman, FBN 988618

Miami-Dade County Attorney’s Office 111 N.W. 1st Street, Suite 2810 Miami, Florida 33128–1930 Telephone: (305) 375-5151 Facsimile: (305) 375-5634 pastor@miamidade.gov
s/Bernard Pastor Bernard Pastor, FBN 46582

Robert W. Ross., Jr. ROSS LAW FIRM, P.L. 8461 Lake Worth Road, Suite 426 Lake Worth, FL 33467 Tel: (561) 251-4896 bravelaw@bellsouth.net Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs

 
 Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 90 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/22/2008 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION Case No. 07-21088-CIV-ALTONAGA/Brown MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC., SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWORK, and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC., Plaintiffs, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendant. _________________________________________/
FINAL JUDGMENT THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the parties’ Stipulation of Settlement [D.E. 89-2], filed on August 20, 2008. Being fully advised, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows, in accordance with the Stipulation: 1. Judgment is entered for Plaintiffs, Miami for Peace, Inc., South Florida Peace and Justice Network, and Haiti Solidarity, Inc., and against Defendant, Miami-Dade County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief, and the Court hereby incorporates by reference its Order entered June 4, 2008. 2. The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the parties’ Stipulation, which are as follows:
(a) The parties acknowledge that the Court has awarded declaratory and permanent injunctive relief to Plaintiffs, precluding Defendants from enforcing Miami-Dade Code Sections 30-274 and 21-31.1(b).

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(b) Pursuant to the terms of the Releases, the County will pay compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees to the Plaintiffs.
(c) The County Manager’s Office has already approved the settlement of compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees referenced in Paragraph 2(b) above, and no further County approvals are required.
(d) Each Plaintiff shall execute a Release to the County (including its officers, agents, and employees) on a form jointly acceptable to the County Attorney and the Plaintiffs’ attorneys, with respect to the claims for compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees.
(e) Plaintiffs retain the right to seek judicial enforcement of the declaratory and permanent injunctive relief granted by the Court in its Order dated June 4, 2008, should the County violate the permanent injunction in the future, and Plaintiffs also retain the right to seek attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for such future enforcement efforts.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 21st day of August, 2008.

Copies provided to: (1) Magistrate Judge Stephen T. Brown (2) All counsel of record

_________________________________ CECILIA M. ALTONAGA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 24 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/05/2007 Page 1 of 18
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION Case No. : 07-21088-CIV-ALTONAGA-Turnoff
MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC., SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWORK, and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC.
Plaintiffs, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida,
Defendant.
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
This is a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages, for violation of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs, comprised of organizations whose members are concerned about current political, social and economic issues affecting the region and the world, challenge several provisions of the Miami-Dade County Code (“MD Code” or “Code”) that impose impermissible permit requirements on the right to engage in expressive activity in quintessential public fora in Miami-Dade County, and which code provisions also violate due process rights of Plaintiffs’ members.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This action seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief and compensatory damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, for ongoing and threatened injury to the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights of organizations engaged in lawful expressive activity within Miami-Dade County, Florida. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343, and in accordance with the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202.
2. Venue is proper in the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b). All parties reside, in or are headquartered in the Southern District; the Defendant is located in the Miami Division, and all of the acts or omissions complained of herein have occurred or will occur in the Miami Division.
INTRODUCTION 3. Miami-Dade County (hereinafter “M-D County”) employs a permit scheme for expressive activity in public fora that is both an unlawful prior restraint and an unreasonable time, place and manner regulation. Adopted in 1973, it requires a “permit issued by the Sheriff” for every “parade or procession.” The ordinance is absolutely devoid of any standards to guide the decision of whether and under what conditions a permit will issue, how long public officials are allowed to decide whether they will issue a permit, and what conditions may be imposed on expressive activities. The absence of any standards in these key areas means that the ordinance vests public officials with unbridled discretion and invites content-based decisions based on the nature of the speaker. This is a forbidden basis on which to rest a permit scheme that requires a license to engage in protected speech; the standardless permit scheme violates Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by impermissibly limiting their rights to speech, association, assembly and petition. For these reasons, the Defendant must be enjoined from prohibiting the lawful exercise of First Amendment-protected activity. Further, the Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the county’s “loitering ordinance” is a violation of Due
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Process insofar as it is vague and an abrogation of protected liberty interests, and further seek injunctive relief precluding the enforcement of said ordinance by the Defendant.
PARTIES
Plaintiffs : 4. Plaintiff MIAMI FOR PEACE (hereinafter “MFP”) is a not-for-profit
corporation located in Miami, Florida, incorporated in Florida since 2003. Among the activities MFP has participated in are protests in the tri-county area in March 2006 to commemorate the third anniversary of the Iraq War; an Iraq War protest in Doral, MiamiDade County, Florida in March 2007 to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the Iraq War; a protest in January 2007 to advocate shutting down the Guantanamo facilities where alleged terrorism suspects are being held; an event in February 2007 in downtown Miami to support freedom of speech; and a monthly protest against the Iraq War, along US 1 in Miami during the evening rush hour. Plaintiff MFP was one of the key organizing groups of the REJECT THE BUSH AGENDA events (hereinafter “RBA”), including the march and rally that occurred on the afternoon of April 28, 2007. Members of MFP will be actively participating in the September 15th “End the War” March and Rally in Miami-Dade County, and will be distributing flyers in Miami-Dade County and Broward County prior to the event to publicize its occurrence. MFP expended time and money to organize its membership for the April 28th RBA demonstration event, but MFP was impeded in its ability to organize and generate turnout by Defendant Miami-Dade County’s ordinances and actions, and suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of defendant’s policies and practices.
5. Plaintiff SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE & JUSTICE NETWORK (hereinafter “SFPJN”) is an unincorporated network of peace and social justice groups in the Miami-Dade/Broward/Palm Beach tri-county region. Among the activities that SFPJN has participated in or organized, since early 2006, are: a march and rally in Fort
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Lauderdale in March 2006 to commemorate the third anniversary of the Iraq War, which involved temporary lane closures along State Road 84, a major east-west artery in Fort Lauderdale; attendance at rallies and demonstrations in support of striking janitors at the University of Miami and janitors at Nova Southeastern University fired for unionizing efforts in 2006; a demonstration to support the campaign of the Coalition of Immokalee Workers to convince Burger King to assure that tomato pickers are paid a decent wage; activities in support of the Umoja Village, an encampment in the Liberty City area of Miami for people lacking housing. SFPJN was a participating entity in RBA, and many of its member organizations participated in the April 28th march and rally at Miami-Dade College. Members of SFPJN will be actively participating in the September 15th “End the War” March and Rally in Miami-Dade County, and will be distributing flyers in Miami-Dade County and Broward County prior to the event to publicize its occurrence. SFPJN expended time and money to organize its membership for the April 28th RBA demonstration event, but SFPJN was impeded in its ability to organize and generate turnout by Defendant Miami-Dade County’s ordinances and actions, and suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s policies and practices.
6. Plaintiff HAITI SOLIDARITY (hereinafter “HS”) is a not-for-profit corporation located in Miami, Florida, having been incorporated since 2004 in the State of Florida. Among the activities HS has participated in are a mass rally of 1,000 people within the past month in front of the Immigration building at the corner of NE 79th Street and Biscayne Boulevard, to protest discrimination against Haitians who recently came ashore at Hallandale Beach, Florida; various immigrants’ rights demonstrations during 2006, some in downtown Miami and others at the Immigration building on NE 79th Street; and a march of approximately 6,000 people in downtown Miami to urge that the Haitian government free Father Gerard Jean-Juste, which took place approximately a year and a half ago. Plaintiff HS brought one of the largest contingents of demonstrators to the April 28th demonstration at Miami-Dade College. Members of HS will be actively
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participating in the September 15th “End the War” March and Rally in Miami-Dade County, and will be distributing flyers in Miami-Dade County and Broward County prior to the event to publicize its occurrence. HS expended time and money to organize its membership for the April 28th RBA demonstration event, but HS was impeded in its ability to organize and generate turnout by Defendant Miami-Dade County’s ordinances and actions, and suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s policies and practices.
Defendant :
7. Defendant MIAMI-DADE COUNTY (hereinafter “M-D County”) is a political subdivision of the State of Florida, with the capacity to sue and be sued. It is the legal entity responsible for the actions of the Miami-Dade County Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter “M-D BCC”), including the County Code promulgated by the M-D BCC, as well as the actions of law enforcement officers employed in the County. M-D County controls and is responsible for the Miami-Dade Police Department (hereinafter “M-D PD”), including the actions taken by the Metropolitan Sheriff and law enforcement officers employed by the M-D PD.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
Miami-Dade County Code Provisions: 8. Miami-Dade County has an antiquated permit scheme for all parades in the
unincorporated portions of the county, first adopted in 1971 and last revised in 1973. Provisions of this type have been repeatedly condemned insofar as they are clearly
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violative of First Amendment protections for the freedoms of speech, assembly and
petition.
9. Miami-Dade Code § 30-274: Parades and processions; permit required
In the unincorporated areas, no procession or parade, excepting the forces of United States Armed Services, the military forces of the State, the forces of the police and fire departments, and funeral processions, shall occupy, march, or proceed along any street or roadway except in accordance with a permit issued by the Sheriff and such other regulations as are set forth herein which may apply.
10. Miami-Dade County has a code provision criminalizing the standing or
remaining on any public sidewalk or public place so as to hinder or impede the passage
of pedestrians or vehicles; this section was first adopted in 1967, and last revised in 1982.
This criminalization of loitering contains no exception for First Amendment-protected
activity or for innocent conduct protected by federal jurisprudence.
11. Miami-Dade County Code § 21-31.1: Disorderly Conduct, Loitering,
Penalties.
(b) Loitering. For the purpose of this section “loitering” means the act of standing, remaining or sleeping on, in or about any public street, public sidewalk, public overpass, public bridge, public library or other place specifically enumerated herein. A person commits the offense of loitering when he knowingly:
(1) Loiters on any public street, public sidewalk, public overpass, public bridge or public place so as to hinder or impede the passage of pedestrians or vehicles. . . .
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(4) Loiters in or about a school, college or university campus so as to hinder to impede the orderly conduct of instructional, recreational or other school activities. . . . (c) Penalties for violation. . . . Any person convicted of a violation of any other subsection of this section shall be punished by a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment in the County Jail for a term not to exceed sixty (60) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. This section is applicable in both the incorporated and unincorporated areas of Miami-Dade County and all violations thereof shall be prosecuted in the County Court. Plaintiffs’ Past Efforts to Obtain Permit to Demonstrate in Parade & Rally: 12. Various groups in the social justice and peace movements learned in March 2007 that President George W. Bush was scheduled to give a commencement address on April 28th at Miami-Dade College. Initial inquiries to the county police relating to the possible need for a permit to march, rally and otherwise demonstrate during the President’s visit were made on or about April 1, 2007, by Ray Del Papa of Plaintiff SFPJN. A tentative meeting to resolve demonstration issues was set for April 6th, but this meeting was cancelled by the Miami-Dade Police Department (“M-D PD”).
13. On April 14th Linda Belgrave of MFP received an e-mail from M-D PD indicating that M-D PD would not accommodate a “march route” for the demonstration planned on April 28th. No reason for the arbitrary rejection was provided by the M-D PD.
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14. As to the request for a location for a rally, Ms. Belgrave was advised that the M-D PD was not willing to meet to discuss a demonstration location until just a few days prior to the event date. On April 16th, Ms. Belgrave received numerous inquires by organizations seeking information about the RBA demonstration, particularly the march route. Ms. Belgrave advised these organizations that county authorities had refused to either approve tentative plans or to meet to discuss critical issues.
15. On April 17th and 18th, upon request by the Plaintiffs, legal counsel for Plaintiffs attempted to resolve outstanding issues arising from the RBA political march and rally with Miami-Dade County, to no avail.
16. The refusal by the M-D PD to accommodate the RBA’s proposed political parade route, and the failure of the M-D PD to provide a location for the post-parade rally, caused legitimate fear among the Plaintiffs that the M-D PD would endeavor to shut down any rally on April 28th through enforcement of its quarter-century old loitering ordinance.
17. In light of the M-D PD’S denial of a lane closure for the political parade in which Plaintiffs planned to participate on April 28th, the hundreds of participants, including Plaintiffs’ members, were forced to crowd onto the sidewalks, and legitimately feared that they risked arrest for hindering or impeding the passage of pedestrians. Additionally, Plaintiffs were aware that the loitering ordinance carried maximum
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penalties of a $500.00 fine and/or sixty (60) days in jail, which are serious penalties that discouraged participation in the march. The County’s parade permit ordinance and its loitering ordinance infringed upon Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to peaceably assemble, and to be visible on the street to their intended audience while exercising their First Amendment freedoms of speech, assembly and petition.
18. As a result of the impact of the Defendants’ parade permit scheme and overbroad loitering ordinance, the Plaintiffs were forced to seek judicial relief by way of the filing, in U.S. District Court, of a Verified Complaint, Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, Memorandum of Law supporting said motion, and related papers. As a result of this civil action, Defendant Miami-Dade County finally acquiesced, and agreed to accommodate the Plaintiffs’ First-Amendment-protected activity.
September 15, 2007 Demonstration Event: 19. MFP, SFPJN, HS and other organizations are planning to hold a march and rally in Miami-Dade County on Bird Road (SW 42nd Street) between Noon and 2:00 p.m. on September 15, 2007. The proposed march route is about a half-mile long, starting just north of the Kendall Regional Medical Center, at Bird Road (SW 42nd Street) and SW 119th Avenue, and proceeding westbound along Bird Road, stopping between SW 128th and SW 129th Avenues, at the Congressional Field Office of U.S. Representative Mario Diaz-Balart, located at 12851 SW 42nd Street. The march will not block the entrances to
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the congressional office. At the conclusion of the march, it is planned that the march participants will hold a rally in front of the Congressman’s office.
CAUSES OF ACTION 20. As to each cause of action delineated below in Counts One through Three, Plaintiffs advance their federal constitutional claims against the governmental entities as state actors, through the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
COUNT ONE Monell Claim - Official Policy to Suppress Protected Speech and Assembly
(42 USC § 1983 – Violation of First Amendment - Various Grounds) County Code § 30-274 – Parades & Processions Ordinance By ALL PLAINTIFFS Against MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
21. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate each jurisdictional and factual allegation of Paragraphs 1-20, as if set forth at length herein.
22. At all times relevant hereto, the Miami-Dade County Board of County Commissioners (“M-D BCC”) was the final policymaker of Miami-Dade County (“MDC”) for purposes of adopting ordinances and other policies formally regulating constitutionally-protected expression and assembly within the county’s boundaries.
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23. In December, 1971, the M-D BCC enacted Ordinance No. 71-94, now codified at County Code § 30-274 (not revised since March, 1973), precluding any “procession or parade” in the unincorporated areas of Miami-Dade County, except in accordance with a permit issued by the Sheriff. This Parades & Processions Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face as an impermissible prior restraint, containing terms which provide unfettered discretion to law enforcement officials, lack of deadlines for considering applications, lack of appropriate review for unfavorable decisions, and other deficiencies.
24. County Code § 30-274 was used as the basis for defendant M-DC’s refusal to issue a permit for the Plaintiffs’ political march on April 28, 2007, and it is reasonably anticipated by Plaintiffs that said ordinance will be used as the basis to delay or refuse the issuance of a permit for the Plaintiffs planned march and rally on September 15, 2007.
25. The adoption by the M-D BCC of Code § 30-274, and the implementation of this Parades and Processions Ordinance by the M-D PD, were the proximate cause of the deprivation of the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs and other demonstrators for the planned activities on April 28, 2007, on public streets, sidewalks and other public property adjacent to M-D College, and are the proximate cause of the “chilling,” including reluctance of some to participate, uncertainty and confusion, surrounding the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment-protected core political events on September 15, 2007. Plaintiffs seek redress for this violation of the First Amendment through the operation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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COUNT TWO Monell Claim - Official Policy to Suppress Protected Speech and Assembly
(42 USC § 1983 – Violation of First Amendment - Overbreadth) County Code § 21-31.1 – Loitering Ordinance
By ALL PLAINTIFFS Against MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
26. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate each jurisdictional and factual allegation of Paragraphs 1-20, as if set forth at length herein.
27. At all times relevant hereto, the M-D BCC was the final policymaker of MiamiDade County for purposes of adopting ordinances and other policies formally regulating conduct in public, including constitutionally-protected expression and assembly within the county’s boundaries.
28. In March, 1967, the M-D BCC enacted Ordinance No. 67-17, now codified at County Code § 21-31.1. The Loitering Ordinance provides that it is unlawful to engage in “standing” or “remaining” on any public street, sidewalk or “place” so as to hinder or impede vehicular or pedestrian traffic, see M-D County Code § 21-31.1 (b) (1). This section is applicable in the incorporated and unincorporated areas of Miami-Dade County. See M-D County Code § 21-31.1 (c).
29. This Loitering Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face as an impermissibly overbroad prohibition, that has had, and will in the future have, a substantial impact on conduct protected by the First Amendment, including the expressive conduct of these Plaintiffs.
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30. The anticipated use of County Code § 21-31.1 by the M-D PD has chilled the First Amendment-protected activities of the Plaintiffs in the past, and may cause the arrest of members of the plaintiffs, as well as others similarly situated who wish to exercise their rights of free speech, assembly and association on September 15, 2007.
31. The adoption by the M-D BCC of Code § 21-31.1, and the implementation of this Loitering Ordinance by the M-DPD were the proximate cause of the deprivation of the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs, and other demonstrators similarly situated, with respect to the activities on April 28, 2007 on public streets, sidewalks and other public property adjacent to M-D College, and are the proximate cause of the “chilling,” including reluctance of some to participate, uncertainty and confusion, surrounding the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment-protected core political events on September 15, 2007. Plaintiffs seek redress for this violation of the First Amendment through the operation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT THREE Monell Claim - Official Policy to Suppress Protected Speech and Assembly (42 USC § 1983 – Violation of 14th Amendment – Vagueness and Liberty Interest)
County Code § 21-31.1 – Loitering Ordinance By ALL PLAINTIFFS Against MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
32. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate each jurisdictional and factual allegation of Paragraphs 1-20, as if set forth at length herein.
33. At all times relevant hereto, the M-D BCC was the final policymaker of MiamiDade County for purposes of adopting ordinances and other policies formally regulating conduct in public, including constitutionally-protected expression and assembly within the county’s boundaries.
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34. In March, 1967, the M-D BCC enacted Ordinance No. 67-17, now codified at County Code § 21-31.1. The Loitering Ordinance provides that it is unlawful to engage in “standing” or “remaining” on any public street, sidewalk or “place” so as to hinder or impede vehicular or pedestrian traffic, see M-D County Code § 21-31.1 (b) (1). This section is applicable in the incorporated and unincorporated areas of Miami-Dade County, see M-D County Code § 21-31.1 (c).
35. This Loitering Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, as an impermissibly vague prohibition that has a substantial impact on conduct protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for two reasons. First, this ordinance fails to provide the kind of notice that enables ordinary citizens to understand what precise conduct it prohibits; second, it authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement through its lack of precision.
36. This Loitering Ordinance is further unconstitutional on its face as an impermissible prohibition on conduct that is protected by the liberty interest arising from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The members of the plaintiff organizations have a significant liberty interest in standing on public sidewalks and public places according to their inclination.
37. The use of County Code § 21-31.1 by the M-D PD chilled the First Amendmentprotected activities of the Plaintiffs on April 28, 2007, and may cause the arrest of members of the Plaintiffs’ organizations, as well as others similarly situated who wish to exercise their rights of free speech, assembly and association, on September 15, 2007.
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38. The adoption by the M-D BCC of Code § 21-31.1, and the past and future implementation of this Loitering Ordinance by the M-D PD in a manner disallowed by the 14th Amendment, are the proximate cause of the past deprivation of the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs without due process, and other demonstrators similarly situated, on April 28, 2007, with respect to the planned activities on public streets, sidewalks and other public property adjacent to M-D College, and the proximate cause of the “chilling,” including reluctance of some to participate, uncertainty and confusion, the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment-protected core political events on September 15, 2007. Plaintiffs seek redress for this violation of the 14th Amendment through the operation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF - ALL COUNTS
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs seek judgment against Defendant for the following relief: 1. A preliminary and permanent injunction, enjoining Defendant, its officers, agents and employees from enforcing Miami-Dade County Code §§ 30-274 and 21-31.1(b); 2. For a declaration that Defendant Miami-Dade County’s challenged ordinances violate Plaintiffs’ rights to free speech, assembly, association and to petition the government for redress of grievances, under the First Amendment, and are a further violation of due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 3. For compensatory damages, as permitted by law; 4. For costs of suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1920 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988; 5. For attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; 6. For such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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Dated:

June 4, 2007

s/Robert W. Ross, Jr._________ Robert W. Ross, Jr. FBN 921660 ROSS LAW FIRM, P.L. 3923 Lake Worth Ave. Suite 102 Lake Worth, FL 33461 Tel: (561) 251-4896 bravelaw@bellsouth.net

Mara Shlackman FB 988618 LAW OFFICES OF MARA SHLACKMAN, P.L. 757 SW 17th St., PMB 309 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316 Tel: (954) 523-1131 mara@shlackmanlaw.com

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on June 5, 2007, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served on June 5, 2007, on all counsel identified on the attached Service List, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electric Filing.
s/Robert W. Ross, Jr. Robert W. Ross, Jr., FBN 921660 ROSS LAW FIRM, P.L. 3923 Lake Worth Road, Suite 102 Lake Worth, FL 33461 Tel: (561) 251-4896 bravelaw@bellsouth.net
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Bernie Pastor Asst. County Attorney Miami-Dade County 111 NW 1st St. Suite 2810 Miami, FL 33128 Tel: (305) 375-1506 pastor@miamidade.gov

Service List

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 Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 43 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/14/2007 Page 1 of 19
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION Case No. : 07-21088-CIV-ALTONAGA-Turnoff
MIAMI FOR PEACE, INC., SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE AND JUSTICE NETWORK, and HAITI SOLIDARITY, INC.
Plaintiffs, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida,
Defendant.
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
This is a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages, for violation of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs, comprised of organizations whose members are concerned about current political, social and economic issues affecting the region and the world, challenge several provisions of the Miami-Dade County Code (“MD Code” or “Code”) that impose impermissible permit requirements on the right to engage in expressive activity in quintessential public fora in Miami-Dade County, and which code provisions also violate due process rights of Plaintiffs’ members.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This action seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief and compensatory damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, for ongoing and threatened injury to the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights of organizations engaged in lawful expressive activity within Miami-Dade County, Florida. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343, and in accordance with the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202.
2. Venue is proper in the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b). All parties reside, in or are headquartered in the Southern District; the Defendant is located in the Miami Division, and all of the acts or omissions complained of herein have occurred or will occur in the Miami Division.
INTRODUCTION 3. Miami-Dade County (hereinafter “M-D County”) employs a permit scheme for expressive activity in public fora that is both an unlawful prior restraint and an unreasonable time, place and manner regulation. Adopted in 1973, it requires a “permit issued by the Sheriff” for every “parade or procession.” The ordinance is absolutely devoid of any standards to guide the decision of whether and under what conditions a permit will issue, how long public officials are allowed to decide whether they will issue a permit, and what conditions may be imposed on expressive activities. The absence of any standards in these key areas means that the ordinance vests public officials with unbridled discretion and invites content-based decisions based on the nature of the speaker. This is a forbidden basis on which to rest a permit scheme that requires a license to engage in protected speech; the standardless permit scheme violates Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by impermissibly limiting their rights to speech, association, assembly and petition. For these reasons, the Defendant must be enjoined from prohibiting the lawful exercise of First Amendment-protected activity. Further, the Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the county’s “loitering ordinance” is a violation of Due
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Process insofar as it is vague and an abrogation of protected liberty interests, and further seek injunctive relief precluding the enforcement of said ordinance by the Defendant.
PARTIES
Plaintiffs : 4. Plaintiff MIAMI FOR PEACE (hereinafter “MFP”) is a not-for-profit
corporation located in Miami, Florida, incorporated in Florida since 2003. Among the activities MFP has participated in are protests in the tri-county area in March 2006 to commemorate the third anniversary of the Iraq War; an Iraq War protest in Doral, MiamiDade County, Florida in March 2007 to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the Iraq War; a protest in January 2007 to advocate shutting down the Guantanamo facilities where alleged terrorism suspects are being held; an event in February 2007 in downtown Miami to support freedom of speech; and a monthly protest against the Iraq War, along US 1 in Miami during the evening rush hour. Plaintiff MFP was one of the key organizing groups of the REJECT THE BUSH AGENDA events (hereinafter “RBA”), including the sidewalk march and rally that occurred on the afternoon of April 28, 2007, and the September 15th “End the War” Sidewalk March and Rally in Miami-Dade County. MFP expended time and money to organize its membership for the April 28th RBA demonstration event and the September 15th events, but MFP was impeded in its ability to organize and generate turnout by Defendant Miami-Dade County’s ordinances and actions, and suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of defendant’s policies and practices.
MFP will be marching in solidarity with the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (also referred to hereinafter as “CIW”) through Miami-Dade County for the “March on Burger King Headquarters” on November 30, 2007, and with other peace-oriented groups in an “End the War” March and Rally on March 22, 2008, as more fully set forth herein.
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5. Plaintiff SOUTH FLORIDA PEACE & JUSTICE NETWORK (hereinafter “SFPJN”) is an unincorporated network of peace and social justice groups in the Miami-Dade/Broward/Palm Beach tri-county region. Among the activities that SFPJN has participated in or organized, since early 2006, are: a march and rally in Fort Lauderdale in March 2006 to commemorate the third anniversary of the Iraq War, which involved temporary lane closures along State Road 84, a major east-west artery in Fort Lauderdale; attendance at rallies and demonstrations in support of striking janitors at the University of Miami and janitors at Nova Southeastern University fired for unionizing efforts in 2006; a demonstration to support the campaign of the Coalition of Immokalee Workers to convince Burger King to assure that tomato pickers are paid a decent wage; activities in support of the Umoja Village, an encampment in the Liberty City area of Miami for people lacking housing. SFPJN was a participating entity in RBA, and many of its member organizations participated in the April 28th march and rally at Miami-Dade College. Members of SFPJN actively organized and participated in the September 15th “End the War” March and Rally in Miami-Dade County. SFPJN expended time and money to organize its membership for the April 28th RBA demonstration event and the September 15th events, but SFPJN was impeded in its ability to organize and generate turnout by Defendant Miami-Dade County’s ordinances and actions, and suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s policies and practices.
SFPJN will be marching in solidarity with the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (also referred to hereinafter as “CIW”) through Miami-Dade County for the “March on Burger King Headquarters” on November 30, 2007, and with other peace-oriented groups in an “End the War” March and Rally on March 22, 2008, as more fully set forth herein.
6. Plaintiff HAITI SOLIDARITY (hereinafter “HS”) is a not-for-profit corporation located in Miami, Florida, having been incorporated since 2004 in the State of Florida. Among the activities HS has participated in are a mass rally of 1,000 people within the past month in front of the Immigration building at the corner of NE 79th Street and Biscayne Boulevard, to protest discrimination against Haitians who recently came
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ashore at Hallandale Beach, Florida; various immigrants’ rights demonstrations during 2006, some in downtown Miami and others at the Immigration building on NE 79th Street; and a march of approximately 6,000 people in downtown Miami to urge that the Haitian government free Father Gerard Jean-Juste, which took place approximately a year and a half ago. Plaintiff HS brought one of the largest contingents of demonstrators to the April 28th demonstration at Miami-Dade College. Members of HS actively organized and participated in the September 15th “End the War” March and Rally in Miami-Dade County. HS expended time and money to organize its membership for the April 28th RBA demonstration event and the September 15th events, but HS was impeded in its ability to organize and generate turnout by Defendant Miami-Dade County’s ordinances and actions, and suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s policies and practices.
HS will be marching in solidarity with the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (also referred to hereinafter as “CIW”) through Miami-Dade County for the “March on Burger King Headquarters” on November 30, 2007, and with other peace-oriented groups in an “End the War” March and Rally on March 22, 2008, as more fully set forth herein.
Defendant :
7. Defendant MIAMI-DADE COUNTY (hereinafter “M-D County”) is a political subdivision of the State of Florida, with the capacity to sue and be sued. It is the legal entity responsible for the actions of the Miami-Dade County Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter “M-D BCC”), including the County Code promulgated by the M-D BCC, as well as the actions of law enforcement officers employed in the County. M-D County controls and is responsible for the Miami-Dade Police Department (hereinafter “M-D PD”), including the actions taken by the Metropolitan Sheriff and law enforcement officers employed by the M-D PD.
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
Miami-Dade County Code Provisions: 8. Miami-Dade County has an antiquated permit scheme for all parades in the
unincorporated portions of the county, first adopted in 1971 and apparently last revised in 1973. Provisions of this type have been repeatedly condemned insofar as they are clearly violative of First Amendment protections for the freedoms of speech, assembly and petition, and Fourteenth Amendment protections of property interests and liberty interests.
9. Miami-Dade Code § 30-274: Parades and processions; permit required In the unincorporated areas, no procession or parade, excepting the forces of United States Armed Services, the military forces of the State, the forces of the police and fire departments, and funeral processions, shall occupy, march, or proceed along any street or roadway except in accordance with a permit issued by the Sheriff and such other regulations as are set forth herein which may apply.
10. Miami-Dade County has a code provision criminalizing the standing or remaining on any public sidewalk or public place so as to hinder or impede the passage of pedestrians or vehicles; this section was first adopted in 1967, and last revised in 1982. This criminalization of loitering contains no exception for First Amendment-protected activity or for innocent conduct protected by federal jurisprudence.
11. Miami-Dade County Code § 21-31.1: Disorderly Conduct, Loitering, Penalties.
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(b) Loitering. For the purpose of this section “loitering” means the act of standing, remaining or sleeping on, in or about any public street, public sidewalk, public overpass, public bridge, public library or other place specifically enumerated herein. A person commits the offense of loitering when he knowingly:
(1) Loiters on any public street, public sidewalk, public overpass, public bridge or public place so as to hinder or impede the passage of pedestrians or vehicles. . . . (4) Loiters in or about a school, college or university campus so as to hinder to impede the orderly conduct of instructional, recreational or other school activities. . . . (c) Penalties for violation. . . . Any person convicted of a violation of any other subsection of this section shall be punished by a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment in the County Jail for a term not to exceed sixty (60) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. This section is applicable in both the incorporated and unincorporated areas of Miami-Dade County and all violations thereof shall be prosecuted in the County Court.
Plaintiffs’ Past Efforts to Obtain Permit to Demonstrate in Parade & Rally:
12. Various groups in the social justice and peace movements learned in March
2007 that President George W. Bush was scheduled to give a commencement address on
April 28th at Miami-Dade College. Initial inquiries to the county police relating to the
possible need for a permit to march, rally and otherwise demonstrate during the
President’s visit were made on or about April 1, 2007, by Ray Del Papa of Plaintiff
SFPJN. A tentative meeting to resolve demonstration issues was set for April 6th, but this
meeting was cancelled by the Miami-Dade Police Department (“M-D PD”).
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13. On April 14th Linda Belgrave of MFP received an e-mail from M-D PD indicating that M-D PD would not accommodate a “march route” for the demonstration planned on April 28th. No reason for the arbitrary rejection was provided by the M-D PD.
14. As to the request for a location for a rally, Ms. Belgrave was advised that the M-D PD was not willing to meet to discuss a demonstration location until just a few days prior to the event date. On April 16th, Ms. Belgrave received numerous inquiries by organizations seeking information about the RBA demonstration, particularly the march route. Ms. Belgrave advised these organizations that county authorities had refused to either approve tentative plans or to meet to discuss critical issues.
15. On April 17th and 18th, upon request by the Plaintiffs, legal counsel for Plaintiffs attempted to resolve outstanding issues arising from the RBA political march and rally with Miami-Dade County, to no avail.
16. The refusal by the M-D PD to accommodate the RBA’s proposed political parade route, and the failure of the M-D PD to provide a location for the post-parade rally, caused legitimate fear among the Plaintiffs that the M-D PD would endeavor to shut down any rally on April 28th through enforcement of its quarter-century old loitering ordinance.
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17. In light of the M-D PD’S denial of a lane closure for the political parade in which Plaintiffs planned to participate on April 28th, the hundreds of participants, including Plaintiffs’ members, were forced to crowd onto the sidewalks, and legitimately feared that they risked arrest for hindering or impeding the passage of pedestrians. Additionally, Plaintiffs were aware that the loitering ordinance carried maximum penalties of a $500.00 fine and/or sixty (60) days in jail, which are serious penalties that discouraged participation in the march. The County’s parade permit ordinance and its loitering ordinance infringed upon Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to peaceably assemble, and to be visible on the street to their intended audience while exercising their First Amendment freedoms of speech, assembly and petition.
18. As a result of the impact of the Defendants’ parade permit scheme and overbroad loitering ordinance, the Plaintiffs were forced to seek judicial relief by way of the filing, in U.S. District Court, of a Verified Complaint, Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, Memorandum of Law supporting said motion, and related papers. As a result of this civil action, Defendant Miami-Dade County finally acquiesced, and agreed to accommodate the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment-protected activity.
September 15, 2007 Demonstration Event: 19. MFP, SFPJN, HS and other organizations held a march and rally in Miami-
Dade County on Bird Road (SW 42nd Street) between Noon and 2:00 p.m. on September 15, 2007. The proposed march route was about a half-mile long, starting just north of the
9

Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 43 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/14/2007 Page 10 of 19
Kendall Regional Medical Center, at Bird Road (SW 42nd Street) and SW 119th Avenue, and proceeding westbound along Bird Road, stopping between SW 128th and SW 129th Avenues, at the Congressional Field Office of U.S. Representative Mario Diaz-Balart, located at 12851 SW 42nd Street. At the conclusion of the march, the march participants held a rally in front of the Congressman’s office.
20. MFP, SFPJN, HS and other organizations participating in this event expended time and money to organize members and community residents for the September 15th demonstration event, but the Plaintiffs were impeded in their ability to organize and generate turnout by Defendant M-D County’s ordinances, and suffered damages as a direct result of the Defendant M-D County’s policies and practices.
November 30, 2007 Demonstration Event 21. MFP, SFPJN, HS and other organizations are planning to march in an
approximately eight-mile parade from downtown Miami through unincorporated MiamiDade County on November 30, 2007, as part of the Coalition of Immokalee Workers’ “March on Burger King Headquarters,” a feature event in the Campaign for Fair Food. The proposed parade route will require the use of public highways, and the parade organizers and participants have a legitimate fear that M-D County parade permit scheme and loitering ordinances may be used to hinder this First Amendment-protected event.
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March 22, 2008 Demonstration Event 22. MFP, SFPJN, HS and other organizations are planning a parade and rally in
unincorporated Miami-Dade County, in the area near Miami-Dade College, on March 22, 2008, for an “End the War” demonstration event. The proposed parade route will begin near the east side of Miami-Dade College at SW 100th Street and SW 107th Avenue, proceeding west on SW 104th Street to the college’s entrance, with a peace rally at that location. The proposed parade route will require the use of public highway lanes, and the parade organizers and participants have a legitimate fear that M-D County’s parade permit scheme and loitering ordinances may be used to hinder this First Amendmentprotected event.
CAUSES OF ACTION 23. As to each cause of action delineated below in Counts One through Three, Plaintiffs advance their federal constitutional claims against the governmental entities as state actors, through the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
COUNT ONE Monell Claim - Official Policy to Suppress Protected Speech and Assembly
(42 USC § 1983 – Violation of First Amendment - Various Grounds) County Code § 30-274 – Parades & Processions Ordinance By ALL PLAINTIFFS Against MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
24. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate each jurisdictional and factual allegation of Paragraphs 1-23, as if set forth at length herein.
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25. At all times relevant hereto, the Miami-Dade County Board of County Commissioners (“M-D BCC”) was the final policymaker of Miami-Dade County (“MDC”) for purposes of adopting ordinances and other policies formally regulating constitutionally-protected expression and assembly within the county’s boundaries.
26. In December, 1971, the M-D BCC enacted Ordinance No. 71-94, now codified at County Code § 30-274 (not revised since March, 1973), precluding any “procession or parade” in the unincorporated areas of Miami-Dade County, except in accordance with a permit issued by the Sheriff. This Parades & Processions Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face as an impermissible prior restraint, containing terms which provide unfettered discretion to law enforcement officials, lack of deadlines for considering applications, lack of appropriate review for unfavorable decisions, and other deficiencies.
27. County Code § 30-274 was used as the basis for defendant M-DC’s refusal to issue a permit for the Plaintiffs’ political march on April 28, 2007, and it is reasonably anticipated by Plaintiffs that said ordinance has or will be used as the basis to delay or refuse the issuance of a permit for the Plaintiffs’ planned parades and rallies on September 15, 2007, November 30, 2007 and March 22, 2008.
28. The adoption by the M-D BCC of Code § 30-274, and the implementation of this Parades and Processions Ordinance by the M-D PD, were the proximate cause of the deprivation of the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs and other demonstrators for the planned activities on April 28, 2007 and September 15, 2007, on public streets, sidewalks and other public property adjacent to M-D College, and are the proximate cause of the “chilling,” including reluctance of some to participate, uncertainty and confusion, surrounding the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment-protected core political events on
12

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November 3, 2007 and March 22, 2008. Further, the expenditure of money by the Plaintiffs for printing, travel and related expenses for portions of these events negatively impacted by the Defendant’s ordinances entitles them to compensatory damages. Plaintiffs seek redress for this violation of the First Amendment through the operation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT TWO Monell Claim - Official Policy to Suppress Protected Speech and Assembly
(42 USC § 1983 – Violation of First Amendment - Overbreadth) County Code § 21-31.1 – Loitering Ordinance
By ALL PLAINTIFFS Against MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
29. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate each jurisdictional and factual allegation of Paragraphs 1-23, as if set forth at length herein.
30. At all times relevant hereto, the M-D BCC was the final policymaker of Miami-Dade County for purposes of adopting ordinances and other policies formally regulating conduct in public, including constitutionally-protected expression and assembly within the county’s boundaries.
31. In March, 1967, the M-D BCC enacted Ordinance No. 67-17, now codified at County Code § 21-31.1. The Loitering Ordinance provides that it is unlawful to engage in “standing” or “remaining” on any public street, sidewalk or “place” so as to hinder or impede vehicular or pedestrian traffic, see M-D County Code § 21-31.1 (b) (1). This section is applicable in the incorporated and unincorporated areas of Miami-Dade County. See M-D County Code § 21-31.1 (c).
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32. This Loitering Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face as an impermissibly overbroad prohibition, that has had, and will in the future have, a substantial impact on conduct protected by the First Amendment, including the expressive conduct of these Plaintiffs.
33. The anticipated use of County Code § 21-31.1 by the M-D PD has chilled the First Amendment-protected activities of the Plaintiffs in the past, and may cause the arrest of members of the plaintiffs, as well as others similarly situated who wish to exercise their rights of free speech, assembly and association on November 30, 2007 and March 22, 2008.
34. The adoption by the M-D BCC of Code § 21-31.1, and the implementation of this Loitering Ordinance by the M-DPD were the proximate cause of the deprivation of the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs, and other demonstrators similarly situated, with respect to the activities on April 28, 2007 and September 15, 2007 on public streets, sidewalks and other public property adjacent to M-D College, and are the proximate cause of the “chilling,” including reluctance of some to participate, uncertainty and confusion, surrounding the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment-protected core political events on November 30, 2007 and March 22, 2008. Plaintiffs seek redress for this violation of the First Amendment through the operation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
14

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COUNT THREE Monell Claim - Official Policy to Suppress Protected Speech and Assembly (42 USC § 1983 – Violation of 14th Amendment – Vagueness and Liberty Interest)
County Code § 21-31.1 – Loitering Ordinance By ALL PLAINTIFFS Against MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
35. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate each jurisdictional and factual allegation of Paragraphs 1-23, as if set forth at length herein.

36. At all times relevant hereto, the M-D BCC was the final policymaker of Miami-Dade County for purposes of adopting ordinances and other policies formally regulating conduct in public, including constitutionally-protected expression and assembly within the county’s boundaries.

37.

In March, 1967, the M-D BCC enacted Ordinance No. 67-17, now

codified at County Code § 21-31.1. The Loitering Ordinance provides that it is

unlawful to engage in “standing” or “remaining” on any public street, sidewalk or “place”

so as to hinder or impede vehicular or pedestrian traffic, see M-D County Code § 21-31.1

(b) (1). This section is applicable in the incorporated and unincorporated areas of Miami-

Dade County, see M-D County Code § 21-31.1 (c).

38. This Loitering Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, as an impermissibly vague prohibition that has a substantial impact on conduct protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for two reasons. First, this ordinance fails to provide the kind of notice that enables ordinary citizens to understand what precise conduct it prohibits; second, it authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement through its lack of precision.

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39. This Loitering Ordinance is further unconstitutional on its face as an impermissible prohibition on conduct that is protected by the liberty interest arising from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The members of the plaintiff organizations have a significant liberty interest in standing on public sidewalks and public places according to their inclination.
40. The use of County Code § 21-31.1 by the M-D PD chilled the First Amendment-protected activities of the Plaintiffs on April 28, 2007 and September 15, 2007, and may cause the arrest of members of the Plaintiffs’ organizations, as well as others similarly situated who wish to exercise their rights of free speech, assembly and association, on November 30, 2007 and March 22, 2008.
41. The adoption by the M-D BCC of Code § 21-31.1, and the past and future implementation of this Loitering Ordinance by the M-D PD in a manner disallowed by the 14th Amendment, are the proximate cause of the past deprivation of the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs without due process, and other demonstrators similarly situated, on April 28, 2007 and September 15, 2007, with respect to the planned activities on public streets, sidewalks and other public property adjacent to M-D College, and the proximate cause of the “chilling,” including reluctance of some to participate, uncertainty and confusion, the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment-protected core political events on November 30, 2007 and March 22, 2008. Further, the expenditure of money by the Plaintiffs for printing, travel and related expenses for portions of these events negatively impacted by the Defendant’s ordinances entitles them to compensatory damages. Plaintiffs seek redress for this violation of the 14th Amendment through the operation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
16

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF - ALL COUNTS

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs seek judgment against Defendant for the following relief:

1. A preliminary and permanent injunction, enjoining Defendant, its officers, agents and employees from enforcing Miami-Dade County Code §§ 30-274 and 21-31.1(b);

2. For a declaration that Defendant Miami-Dade County’s challenged ordinances violate Plaintiffs’ rights to free speech, assembly, association and to petition the government for redress of grievances, under the First Amendment, and are a further violation of due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;

3. For compensatory damages, as permitted by law;

4. For costs of suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1920 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

5. For attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

6. For such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Dated:

September 14, 2007

s/Robert W. Ross, Jr._________ Robert W. Ross, Jr. FBN 921660 ROSS LAW FIRM, P.L. 3923 Lake Worth Ave. Suite 102 Lake Worth, FL 33461 Tel: (561) 251-4896 bravelaw@bellsouth.net

Mara Shlackman FB 988618 LAW OFFICES OF MARA SHLACKMAN, P.L. 757 SW 17th St., PMB 309 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316 Tel: (954) 523-1131 mara@shlackmanlaw.com

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Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 43 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/14/2007 Page 18 of 19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 14, 2007, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served on September 14, 2007, on all counsel identified on the attached Service List, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electric Filing.
s/Robert W. Ross, Jr. Robert W. Ross, Jr., FBN 921660 ROSS LAW FIRM, P.L. 3923 Lake Worth Road, Suite 102 Lake Worth, FL 33461 Tel: (561) 251-4896 bravelaw@bellsouth.net
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Case 1:07-cv-21088-CMA Document 43 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/14/2007 Page 19 of 19

Bernie Pastor Asst. County Attorney Miami-Dade County 111 NW 1st St. Suite 2810 Miami, FL 33128 Tel: (305) 375-1506 pastor@miamidade.gov

Service List

19

 
 Case: 1:07-cv-21088 As of: 03/08/2009 10:50 AM EDT 1 of 8
CLOSED, REF_DISCOV, STB
U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:07−cv−21088−CMA

Miami for Peace,Inc et al v. Miami−Dade County et al Assigned to: Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga Referred to: Magistrate Judge Stephen T. Brown Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Date Terminated: 07/18/2008 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Miami for Peace,Inc

represented by Mara Shlackman Mara Shlackman PL 757 SE 17th Street PMB 309 Fort Lauderdale , FL 33316 954−523−1131 Fax: 206−0593 Email: mara@shlackmanlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert William Ross , Jr. Ross Law Firm 8461 Lake Worth Road Suite 426 Lake Worth , FL 33467 561−251−4896 Email: bravelaw@bellsouth.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
South Florida Peace and Justice Network

represented by Mara Shlackman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert William Ross , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Haiti Solidarity,Inc

represented by Mara Shlackman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert William Ross , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Miami−Dade County a political subdivision of the State of Florida

represented by Bernard Pastor Dade County Attorney's Office Metro Dade Center

Case: 1:07-cv-21088 As of: 03/08/2009 10:50 AM EDT 2 of 8

111 NW 1st Street Suite 2810 Miami , FL 33128−1993 305−375−5151 Fax: 375−5634 Email: pastor@miamidade.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Miami−Dade College District Board of Trustees TERMINATED: 05/11/2007

represented by Carol Ann Licko Hogan &Hartson 1111 Brickell Avenue Suite 1900 Miami , FL 33131 305−459−6500 Fax: 459−6550 Email: calicko@hhlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carmen Dominguez Miami Dade College 300 NE 2nd Avenue Suite 1454 Miami , FL 33132 305−237−3694 Fax: 305−237−7654 Email: cdoming3@mdc.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/24/2007
04/24/2007 04/24/2007 04/24/2007 04/24/2007 04/24/2007 04/25/2007
04/25/2007

# Docket Text
1 VERIFIED COMPLAINT for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief for violation of civil rights against Miami−Dade County, Miami−Dade College Filing fee $ 350. Receipt#: 958443, filed by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc.(rb) (Entered: 04/24/2007)
2 Summons Issued as to Miami−Dade County, Miami−Dade College. (rb) (Entered: 04/24/2007)
3 EMERGENCY MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and request for expedited hearing by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (rb) (Entered: 04/24/2007)
4 NOTICE of filing of proposed order on motion for preliminary injunction by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (rb) (Entered: 04/24/2007)
5 MEMORANDUM in Support re 3 EMERGENCY MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (rb) (Entered: 04/24/2007)
6 REQUEST for oral argument by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc re 3 EMERGENCY MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (rb) (Entered: 04/24/2007)
7 AFFIDAVIT signed by : Mara Shlackman. re 1 Complaint,, 4 Notice (Other), 5 Memorandum in Support, 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 2 Summons Issued, 6 Notice (Other) Declaration of Service by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 04/25/2007)
8 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Carmen Dominguez, Filing Fee $75, Receipt #958615. (cw) (Entered: 04/25/2007)

Case: 1:07-cv-21088 As of: 03/08/2009 10:50 AM EDT 3 of 8

04/25/2007 04/25/2007 04/25/2007 04/25/2007
04/26/2007 04/26/2007 04/26/2007
05/01/2007 05/11/2007 05/11/2007 05/14/2007 05/15/2007 05/23/2007 05/25/2007 05/29/2007
05/29/2007

9 ORDER granting 8 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice (CMA) (Entered: 04/25/2007)
10 ORDER Setting Hearing on Motion 3 Emergency MOTION for Preliminary Injunction: Motion Hearing set for 4/25/2007 01:00 PM in Miami Division before Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga.Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on 4/24/07.(lk) (Entered: 04/25/2007)
11 RESPONSE in Opposition re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Miami−Dade College. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Licko, Carol) (Entered: 04/25/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga: Motion Hearing held on 4/25/2007 re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Miami for Peace, Inc., South Florida Peace and Justice Network, and Haiti Solidarity,Inc.. The parties were heard, and the Court continued the hearing to April 26, 2007 at 2 p.m.. Court Reporter: Barbara Medina (lc1) (Entered: 04/26/2007)
12 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in support of preliminary injunction by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (Ross, Robert) (Entered: 04/26/2007)
13 ORDER denying as moot 3 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; please see order for details. Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on April 26, 2006. (ps1) (Entered: 04/26/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga : Motion Hearing held on 4/26/2007 re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Miami for Peace,Inc., South Florida Peace and Justice Network, and Haiti Solidarity,Inc.. The parties informed the Court that they have reached a settlement regarding the Emergency Motion. The Court approved the settlement and issued an order resolving the Emergency Motion. Order forthcoming. Court Reporter: Barbara Medina (lc1) (Entered: 04/26/2007)
14 Order Requiring Joint Scheduling Report, Joint Scheduling Report due by 5/23/2007.Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on 5/1/07.(lk) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
15 NOTICE by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc of Filing Joint Stipulation and Proposed Order for Dismissal with Prejudice of Miami−Dade College (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
16 FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, re 15 Notice (Other)as to Defendant, The District Board of Trustees of Miami−Dade College.Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on 5/11/07.(gw) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
17 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Complaint by Miami−Dade County. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 05/14/2007)
18 ORDER granting 17 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to the complaint; Miami−Dade County shall have until June 4, 2007 to file. Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on May 15, 2007. (ps1) (Entered: 05/15/2007)
19 SCHEDULING REPORT− Rule 26(f). (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Joint Proposed Scheduling Order)(Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 05/23/2007)
20 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE for Plaintiffs' failure to file certificates in interested persons and corporate disclosure statements; Show Cause Response due by 6/1/2007.Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on May 25, 2007.(ps1) (Entered: 05/25/2007)
21 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Mediation. 15 days to appoint mediator., ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge William C. Turnoff for Discovery Calendar Call set for 6/3/2008 09:00 AM in Miami Division before Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga. Jury Trial set for 6/9/2008 09:00 AM in Miami Division before Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga.Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on 5/29/07.(tb) (Entered: 05/29/2007)
22 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Miami−Dade County. (Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 05/29/2007)

Case: 1:07-cv-21088 As of: 03/08/2009 10:50 AM EDT 4 of 8

05/29/2007 06/05/2007 06/19/2007 06/19/2007 06/20/2007
06/22/2007 06/22/2007 06/27/2007 06/27/2007 06/28/2007 06/29/2007 07/02/2007 07/13/2007 07/16/2007
07/20/2007 07/20/2007 09/04/2007

23 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 05/29/2007)
24 AMENDED COMPLAINT, filed by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc.(Ross, Robert) (Entered: 06/05/2007)
25 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE for failure to submit a proposed order scheduling mediation; Show Cause Response due by 6/27/2007.Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on June 19, 2007.(ps1) (Entered: 06/19/2007)
26 ANSWER to Amended Complaint by Miami−Dade County.(Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 06/19/2007)
27 Notice of Instruction to Filer re 26 Answer to Amended Complaint filed by Miami−Dade County. The Answer has case #07−21099, however,it was filed in 07−21088. Please file a Notice of Striking this document and re−file correctly. Notice of Striking is found under "Notices" and you must create a pdf. document to upload to the Notice of Striking. Please link the Notice of Striking to DE#26 when promoted by the system. Your cooperation in ths matter is greatly appreciated. (gw) (Entered: 06/20/2007)
28 NOTICE of Striking 26 Answer to Amended Complaint filed by Miami−Dade County, by Miami−Dade County (Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
29 Corrected ANSWER to Complaint by Miami−Dade County.(Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
30 Notice of Mediation Hearing before Mediator, E. Hugh Chappellfiled by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. Mediation Hearing set for 12/4/2007 01:00 PM (Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 06/27/2007)
31 Notice of Mediation Hearing before Mediator, E. Hugh Chappellfiled by E. Hugh Chappell. Mediation Hearing set for 12/4/2007 01:00 PM (Chaplin, James) (Entered: 06/27/2007)
32 ORDER Scheduling Mediation before E.Hugh Chappell Mediation Hearing set for 12/4/2007 01:00 PM Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on 6/27/07.(lk) (Entered: 06/28/2007)
33 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. Miami−Dade County served on 4/24/2007, answer due 6/4/2007. (Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 06/29/2007)
Set/Reset Answer Due Deadline: Miami−Dade County answer due 5/14/2007. (gw) (Entered: 07/02/2007)
34 NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY by Miami−Dade County for dates of August 6 to August 17 (Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 07/13/2007)
35 Notice of Instruction to Filer re 34 Notice of Unavailability filed by Miami−Dade County. ERROR: Thhe case number on the document does not match the case number in which it was filed in. Please review and re−file correctly. Upon re−filing correctly, please create a pdf document titled "Notice of Striking" striking DE#34. You must include the case number, case caption and judges initials as well as the purpose for striking the document. Then file a "Notice of Striking" found under "Notices" and download the pdf. document you created. Your cooperation in this matter is greatly appreciated. (gw) (Entered: 07/16/2007)
36 NOTICE of Striking Notice of Unavailability by Miami−Dade County (Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 07/20/2007)
37 NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY by Miami−Dade County for dates of August 6 to August 17 (Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 07/20/2007)
38 Plaintiff's MOTION for Extension of Time to Amend (Motion Filed Out of Time for Extension of Deadline to Amend Pleadings and Join Parties) by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. Responses due by 9/18/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Extending Deadline for Motions to Amend Pleadings or Join Parties)(Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 09/04/2007)

Case: 1:07-cv-21088 As of: 03/08/2009 10:50 AM EDT 5 of 8

09/04/2007 09/06/2007 09/07/2007
09/10/2007 09/10/2007 09/14/2007 10/01/2007 12/12/2007 12/17/2007 12/17/2007 12/18/2007 12/18/2007
12/18/2007
01/08/2008 01/08/2008 02/05/2008

39 ORDER taking under advisement 38 Motion for Extension of Time to Amend. Defendant is asked to file any opposition to the Motion by Thursday, September 6, 2007. A reply memorandum is due by Friday, September 7, 2007. (CMA) (Entered: 09/04/2007)
40 RESPONSE in Opposition re 38 Plaintiff's MOTION for Extension of Time to Amend (Motion Filed Out of Time for Extension of Deadline to Amend Pleadings and Join Parties) filed by Miami−Dade County. (Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 09/06/2007)
41 REPLY to Response to Motion re 38 Plaintiff's MOTION for Extension of Time to Amend (Motion Filed Out of Time for Extension of Deadline to Amend Pleadings and Join Parties) filed by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A − Miami Herald Article)(Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 09/07/2007)
42 ORDER granting 38 Motion for Extension of Deadline to Amend Pleadings and Join Parties. Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on September 10, 2007. (ps1) (Entered: 09/10/2007)
Set Deadline: Amended Complaint due by 9/15/2007. (dm) (Entered: 09/11/2007)
43 AMENDED COMPLAINT Second, filed by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc.(Ross, Robert) (Entered: 09/14/2007)
44 ANSWER to Amended Complaint by Miami−Dade County.(Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 10/01/2007)
45 ORDER on Mediation Results; the parties are instructed to submit the results of their mediation conference by December 20, 2007.Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on December 12, 2007.(ps1) (Entered: 12/12/2007)
46 Notice of Mediation Hearing before Mediator, E. Hugh Chappell, Jr.filed by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. Mediation Hearing set for 1/25/2008 01:00 PM (Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 12/17/2007)
47 Notice of Mediation Hearing before Mediator, E. Hugh Chappell, Jr.filed by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. Mediation Hearing set for 1/25/2008 01:00 PM (Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 12/17/2007)
48 ORDER Scheduling Mediation before E. Hugh Chappell, Jr.: Mediation Hearing set for 1/25/2008 01:00 PM. Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on December 18, 2007.(ps1) (Entered: 12/18/2007)
49 NOTICE of Instruction to Filer: re 46 Notice of Mediation Hearing filed by Miami for Peace,Inc,, South Florida Peace and Justice Network,, Haiti Solidarity,Inc, Error: Proposed Order/Exhibit Docketed as Main Document; Instruction to Filer=File a Notice of Striking Docket Entry and Refile the Document correctly as an attachment to Notice of Filing Proposed Order (tp) (Entered: 12/18/2007)
50 NOTICE of Instruction to Filer: re 47 Notice of Mediation Hearing filed by Miami for Peace,Inc,, South Florida Peace and Justice Network,, Haiti Solidarity,Inc, Error: Document Title Does Not Match Event Selected; Instruction to Filer=File a Notice of Striking Docket Entry and Refile the Document correctly. Notice of Mediation Hearing which can be found in "Mediation Documents" you can file the proposed order 46 as an attachment to this Notice. (tp) (Entered: 12/18/2007)
51 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on EMERGENCY MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION held on 04/25/2007 before Judge CECILIA M. ALTONAGA. Court Reporter: Barbara Medina− phone number 305−523−5518 1−31 pages.. (amb) (Entered: 01/09/2008)
52 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on CONTINUED EMERGENCY MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION held on 04/26/2007 before Judge CECILIA M. ALTONAGA. Court Reporter: Barbara Medina− phone number 305−523−5518 1−22 pages.. (amb) (Entered: 01/09/2008)
53 ORDER ON MEDIATION RESULTS; the parties are instructed to submit the results of their mediation conference by February 11, 2008.Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on February 5, 2008.(ps1) (Entered: 02/05/2008)

Case: 1:07-cv-21088 As of: 03/08/2009 10:50 AM EDT 6 of 8

02/08/2008
02/11/2008 02/11/2008 03/12/2008 03/12/2008 03/17/2008 03/17/2008 03/18/2008 03/18/2008
03/18/2008 03/20/2008
03/25/2008 03/26/2008 04/07/2008 04/16/2008 04/17/2008

54 OBJECTION by E. Hugh Chappell to 46 Notice of Mediation Hearing, 47 Notice of Mediation Hearing Related document: 46 Notice of Mediation Hearing filed by Miami for Peace,Inc,, South Florida Peace and Justice Network,, Haiti Solidarity,Inc,, 47 Notice of Mediation Hearing filed by Miami for Peace,Inc,, South Florida Peace and Justice Network,, Haiti Solidarity,Inc, (Chaplin, James) (Entered: 02/08/2008)
55 NOTICE of Instruction to Filer: re 54 Objection to Report of Mediator, filed by E. Hugh Chappell, Error: Document Title Does Not Match Event Selected; Instruction to Filer=File a Notice of Striking Docket Entry and Refile the Document correctly; (ls) (Entered: 02/11/2008)
56 REPORT of Mediation Disposition: Impasse(Chaplin, James) (Entered: 02/11/2008)
57 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Pre−Trial Motions by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Extending Time to File Pretrial Motions)(Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
58 ORDER granting 57 Motion for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions. Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on March 12, 2008. (ps1) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
59 NOTICE by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc of Filing Transcripts in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Transcript of 4/25/07 Hearing# 2 Exhibit B − Transcript of 4/26/07 Hearing)(Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
60 Plaintiff's MOTION for Summary Judgment by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. Responses due by 3/31/2008 (Ross, Robert) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
61 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (Ross, Robert) Modified text on 3/20/2008 (tp). See document number 63 for corrected entry (Entered: 03/18/2008)
62 Statement of: Concise Statement of Material Facts by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc re 61 Memorandum of Law, 60 Plaintiff's MOTION for Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Shlackman Declaration with Attachments# 2 Exhibit B − Belgrave Declaration)(Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
63 MEMORANDUM in Support re 60 Plaintiff's MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. See document number 61 for image (tp) (Entered: 03/20/2008)
64 NOTICE of Docket Correction and Instruction to Filer: re 61 Memorandum of Law filed by Miami for Peace,Inc,, South Florida Peace and Justice Network,, Haiti Solidarity,Inc, Error: Wrong Event Selected; Correction=Redocketed as Memorandum in Support. Instruction to Filer=In the future please select the proper Event found in "Responses and Replies" See document number 63 for corrected entry (tp) (Entered: 03/20/2008)
65 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response as to 60 Plaintiff's MOTION for Summary Judgment by Miami−Dade County. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 03/25/2008)
66 ORDER granting 65 Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to 60 MOTION for Summary Judgment; Response due by 4/17/2008.Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on March 25, 2008. (ps1) (Entered: 03/26/2008)
67 Case Reassignment of Paired Magistrate Judge pursuant to Administrative Order 2008−09 to Judge Stephen T. Brown. Judge William C. Turnoff no longer assigned to the case. (ra) (Entered: 04/07/2008)
68 MOTION to Stay by Miami−Dade County. Responses due by 4/30/2008 (Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 04/16/2008)
69 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 68 MOTION to Stay filed by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (Shlackman, Mara)

Case: 1:07-cv-21088 As of: 03/08/2009 10:50 AM EDT 7 of 8

04/17/2008 04/24/2008 04/24/2008 05/02/2008
05/05/2008 05/13/2008 05/21/2008 05/27/2008 05/27/2008 06/02/2008
06/03/2008 06/04/2008
06/19/2008 06/25/2008 06/26/2008 07/02/2008 07/18/2008

(Entered: 04/17/2008)
70 ORDER denying 68 Motion to Stay; the Defendant has until April 24, 2008 to respond to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on April 17, 2008. (ps1) (Entered: 04/17/2008)
71 RESPONSE in Opposition re 60 Plaintiff's MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Miami−Dade County. (Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 04/24/2008)
72 Statement of: Material Facts by Miami−Dade County. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A−Declaration of Robert Diers)(Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 04/24/2008)
73 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply as to 71 Response in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Granting Extension of Time to File Reply Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment)(Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
74 ORDER granting 73 Motion for Extension of Time to Reply re 60 Plaintiff's MOTION for Summary Judgment: Replies due by 5/12/2008.Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on May 5, 2008. (ps1) (Entered: 05/05/2008)
75 REPLY to Response to Motion re 60 Plaintiff's MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial Summary Judgment) filed by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 05/13/2008)
76 Order Providing Instructions for Bench Trial.Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on May 21, 2008.(ps1) (Entered: 05/21/2008)
77 NOTICE by Miami−Dade County re 72 Statement of Filing Signature Page (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 05/27/2008)
78 PRETRIAL STIPULATION (Joint) by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 05/27/2008)
79 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Granting Extension of Time for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)(Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 06/02/2008)
80 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga: Calendar Call held on 6/3/2008. Court Reporter: Barbara Medina− phone number 305−523−5518 (Entered: 06/03/2008)
81 ORDER granting 60 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying as moot 79 Motion for Extension of Time to File Proposed Findings of Fact; the parties are to schedule mediation by June 25, 2008 and report their results within 5 days of the hearing. Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on June 4, 2008. (ps1) (Entered: 06/04/2008)
82 Notice of Mediation Hearing before Mediator, E. Hugh Chapellfiled by E. Hugh Chappell. Mediation Hearing set for 6/27/2008 10:00 AM (Chaplin, James) (Entered: 06/19/2008)
83 Plaintiff's MOTION for Extension of Time to Mediate and Submit Mediation Report by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (Ross, Robert) (Entered: 06/25/2008)
84 ORDER granting 83 Motion for Extension of Time to Mediate. The parties shall file their report of mediation results by July 2, 2008. (CMA) (Entered: 06/26/2008)
85 STATUS REPORT re Mediation by Miami−Dade County, Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc. (Pastor, Bernard) (Entered: 07/02/2008)
86 ORDER ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSING CASE; Settlement Agreement due by 8/18/2008. Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on July 18, 2008. (ps1) (Entered: 07/18/2008)

Case: 1:07-cv-21088 As of: 03/08/2009 10:50 AM EDT 8 of 8

07/24/2008 07/28/2008 08/20/2008
08/22/2008

87 FINAL REPORT of Mediation Disposition: Settled(Chaplin, James) (Entered: 07/24/2008)
88 FINAL REPORT of Mediation Disposition: Settled(Chaplin, James) (Entered: 07/28/2008)
89 NOTICE by Miami for Peace,Inc, South Florida Peace and Justice Network, Haiti Solidarity,Inc of Filing Stipulation of Settlement and Proposed Final Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Stipulation of Settlement, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Final Judgment)(Shlackman, Mara) (Entered: 08/20/2008)
90 FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of the Plaintiffs against the Defendant. Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on August 21, 2008. (ps1) (Entered: 08/22/2008)