IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

DANIEL RENTERIA-VILLEGAS,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF

)

NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, )

)

Defendant.

)

Case No. 3:11-cv-218 Judge Sharp Magistrate Judge Brown

FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

1. This is an action for declaratory relief and damages to remedy Plaintiff’s unlawful

detention by Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. This action was originally filed in the Chancery Court for Davidson County,

Tennessee on January 7, 2011. The Chancery Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Tenn. Code.

Ann. §§ 16-11-102 and 29-14-101 et seq.

3. On March 9, 2011, former Defendant U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”), a component agency of the U.S Department of Homeland Security, filed a

Notice of Removal in this Court. (Doc. Entry No. 1). ICE asserted the jurisdiction of this Court

under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Doc. Entry No. 1, ¶ 8.

4. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal

question), § 1343 (civil rights), and § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). Declaratory judgment is

sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02.

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5. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) & (2) because Defendant resides within this District and because the acts at issue in this lawsuit occurred within this District.
PARTIES 6. Plaintiff Daniel Renteria-Villegas (“Renteria”) is a citizen of the United States. At all times relevant to this action, he resided in Davidson County, Tennessee. Plaintiff Renteria is of Latino race, ethnicity and appearance. He is a native Spanish-speaker of limited English proficiency. 7. Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro Government”) is an incorporated, legal subdivision of the State of Tennessee. The Davidson County Sheriff’s Office (“DCSO”) is the agency of Metro Government vested by the Charter with the duty to keep and maintain the jails of Nashville and Davidson County.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 8. The Metro Government entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) with ICE in 2009 which empowered certain trained DCSO personnel to perform the functions of a federal immigration official pursuant to § 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). 9. One of the functions that the trained, deputized DCSO personnel perform under the MOA is the preparation and issuance of a federal immigration detainer, “Form I-247, Immigration Detainer – Notice of Action.” 10. The detainer – also commonly referred to as an “ICE Hold” – requests that the DCSO keep the inmate in custody for up to forty-eight additional hours (not including weekends
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and federal holidays) beyond the time when the inmate would be otherwise released while ICE investigates his or her immigration status.
11. Even if no Form I-247 has been lodged against an inmate and without any legal authority to do so, DCSO personnel who have not been trained and deputized pursuant to the MOA place “ICE Holds” on inmates in DSCO custody simply by adding a notation in DCSO’s Jail Management System (“JMS”) file.
12. Metro Police Department Officer Rickey Bearden arrested Daniel Renteria at his home in Davidson County on Sunday, August 22, 2010, at or around 4:46 p.m.
13. This arrest occurred pursuant to a criminal warrant that was subsequently dismissed for lack of probable cause.
14. The Metro Police Officer who arrested Renteria completed an Arrest Report indicating Renteria’s place of birth was “Mexico.”
15. DCSO personnel booked Renteria into the DCSO’s Criminal Justice Center facility between 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on August 22.
16. When DCSO personnel booked Renteria into the Criminal Justice Center, they asked him where he was born.
17. Renteria truthfully responded that he was born in Portland, Oregon. The demographic information in Renteria’s DCSO Jail Management System file states his P[lace] O[f] B[irth] as “OR[EGON].”
18. During the booking process a DCSO employee named “K. Cash” added an ICE Hold notation in Renteria’s JMS file at approximately 5:57 p.m. on August 22, 2010. Upon information and belief, DCSO employee “K. Cash” is not a trained and deputized Jail Enforcement Officer pursuant to the MOA.
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19. At approximately 9:47 a.m. on August 24, 2010, DCSO deputy and designated 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officer Marty Patterson scheduled Renteria for an “ICE Interview”, to occur between 10:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. the same day.
20. The purpose of the DCSO Jail Enforcement Officer’s interrogation of Renteria was to elicit specific information related to possible violations of federal immigration and criminal law. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(1).
21. This 287(g) interrogation by a designated 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officer occurred in a small office within the DCSO’s administrative area at the Criminal Justice Center between 12:26 p.m. and 1:09 p.m. on August 24, 2010.
22. The DSCO Jail Enforcement Officer who conducted the 287(g) interrogation did not lift the ICE Investigative Hold notation in the jail management system when the interrogation ended.
23. The DCSO Jail Enforcement Officer did not tell Renteria what, if anything, he could do to prove his U.S. citizenship to the DCSO and get the ICE Hold Notation in the jail management system removed and nothing was immediately done to confirm Renteria’s claim of citizenship.
24. At or around 12:52 p.m. on September 3, 2010 the DCSO became aware via the jail management system that a Davidson County General Sessions Judge dismissed the charge for which Renteria was arrested on August 22, 2010. Despite the dismissal of the charges, the “ICE Hold” remained in place, preventing Renteria’s release.
25. “W. Ford” lifted the ICE Hold notation in the jail management system after two of Renteria’s relatives brought his original birth certificate and original passport to the Criminal Justice Center late in the evening on September 3, 2010, on their own accord.
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26. A DCSO employee made copies of these documents, returned the originals, and kept the copies.
27. At 9:56 p.m. on September 3, 2010, DCSO deputy or employee “W. Ford” deactivated Renteria’s ICE Hold notation in the jail management system imposed by DCSO several days earlier.
28. Even after DCSO employees had original documents proving Renteria’s U.S. citizenship and made photocopies of those documents at around 10:00 p.m. on September 3, it took almost three hours for Defendants to release him.
29. The DCSO released Renteria at 12:48 a.m. on September 4, 2010. 30. The twelve hours Renteria spent in Defendant DCSO’s custody after his charge was dismissed were a direct result of the ICE Hold notation added to the jail management system by DCSO personnel who were not trained and deputized Jail Enforcement officers pursuant to the MOA. 31. No DCSO employee deputized under the MOA or any other ICE agent ever lodged an I-247, Immigrant Detainer – Notice of Action against Renteria.
CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT I
Violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
32. The following practices of Defendant Metro Government violated Renteria’s right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution:
a. Imprisoning without probable cause after the release of Renteria’s state charges;
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b. Imprisoning without the issuance of a Form I-247 detainer after the release of Renteria’s state charges; and
c. Failing to give Renteria notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the grounds for the DCSO detainer before imprisoning him pursuant to it.
33. This imprisonment was the result of the Metro Government’s policy, custom, and practice pursuant to which DCSO booking personnel who are not trained or deputized under the MOA placed “ICE Hold” notations on all DCSO inmates who may be investigated by ICE, regardless of whether ICE or the deputized DCSO personnel ever issued an actual immigration detainer.
34. Defendant’s policy, custom, and practice of entering “ICE Hold” notations for individuals who were not subject to ICE detainers was the moving force that caused Renteria’s illegal detention.
35. Renteria has suffered substantial damages as a result of Defendant’s illegal policy, practice or custom.
36. As a result, Renteria seeks compensatory damages against the Metro Government and a declaratory judgment that his right to due process was violated.
COUNT II False Imprisonment in Violation of Tennessee Tort Law 37. Renteria hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all paragraphs above. 38. Metro Government imprisoned Renteria against his will for approximately twelve hours without any legal authority to detain him. 39. Renteria suffered severe emotional distress, humiliation, and psychological trauma as a result of his unlawful imprisonment by the DCSO.
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40. Renteria therefore seeks compensatory and punitive damages against Metro Government and a declaratory judgment declaring that he was falsely imprisoned.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court grant the following relief: (a) Issue a Declaratory Judgment declaring Defendant violated Plaintiff Renteria’s right under the Fourteenth Amendment to due process; (b) Award Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages; (c) Award Plaintiff reasonable costs and attorneys fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1988, 2412(d). (d) Grant Plaintiff any further relief this Court deems equitable and just.

DATED this 9th day of November, 2012

Respectfully submitted,

__/s/ Elliott Ozment Elliott Ozment (No. 4331), Lead Counsel /s/ R. Andrew Free R. Andrew Free (No. 30513) OZMENT LAW 1214 Murfreesboro Pike Nashville, TN 37217 Phone: 615-321-8888 Fax: 615-321-5230 elliott@ozmentlaw.com afree@ozmentlaw.com
Thomas Fritzsche (GA 940482) Daniel Werner (GA 422070) Admitted Pro Hac Vice Christina Iturralde (NY 4705455)* *Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice

Trina Realmuto (NY 2864981) Admitted Pro Hac Vice National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild 14 Beacon Street, Suite 602 Boston, MA 02108 Phone: 617-227-9727 ext. 8 Fax: 617-227-5495 trina@nationalimmigrationproject.org

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Forthcoming Immigrant Justice Project Southern Poverty Law Center 233 Peachtree St. NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone: 404-521-6700 Fax: 404-221-5857 tom.fritzsche@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served by electronic means via the U.S. District Court’s electronic filing system on November 9, 2012 on:

Laura Barkenbus Fox Assistant Metropolitan Attorney Department of Law Metro Courthouse One Public Square — Suite 108 P.O. Box 196300 Nashville, TN 37219-6300
Keli Oliver Assistant Metropolitan Attorney Department of Law Metro Courthouse One Public Square — Suite 108 P.O. Box 196300 Nashville, TN 37219-6300
Elizabeth A. Sanders Assistant Metropolitan Attorney Department of Law Metro Courthouse One Public Square — Suite 108 P.O. Box 196300 Nashville, TN 37219-6300

Jerry E. Martin United States Attorney Middle District of Tennessee
Mark H. Wildasin Assistant United States Attorney 110 9th Ave. South, Suite A-961 Nashville, Tennessee 37203-3780
Tony West Assistant Attorney General
David J. Kline Director
Joshua E.T. Braunstein Assistant Director
Craig A. Defoe Trial Attorney United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section Ben Franklin Station, P.O. Box 868 Washington, D.C. 20044

s/ R. Andrew Free

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 RECEIVED IN CLERK'S OFF~E

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
~June 14, 2012 Session

OCT 19 2012
U.S. DISTRICT COURT MID. DIST. TENN.

DANIEL RENTERIA-VILLEGAS ET AL. v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY ET AL.

Rule 23 Certified Question of Law from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee No. 3:11-00218 Kevin H. Sharp, Judge

No. M2011-02423-SC-R23-CQ

We accepted a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to determine whether the October 2009 Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Metropolitan Government ofNashville and Davidson County, by and through the Davidson County Sheriffs Office, violates the Charter ofNashville and Davidson County or other state law. We conclude that the Memorandum of Agreement does not violate the Charter or any other state law cited by the plaintiffs.
Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 23 Certified Question of Law
SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion ofthe Court, in which GARYR. WADE, C.J., JANICE M. HOLDER, CORNELIA A. CLARK, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined.
Elliott Ozment and Andrew Free, Nashville, Tennessee; Trina Realmuto, Boston, Massachusetts; William L. Harbison and Phillip F. Cramer, Nashville, Tennessee; Thomas Fritzsche and Daniel Werner, Atlanta, Georgia, for the plaintiffs, Daniel Renteria-Villegas, David Ernesto Gutierrez-Turcios, and Rosa Landaverde.
Saul Solomon, Director ofLaw; Keli J. Oliver and Derrick C. Smith, Assistant Metropolitan Attorneys, Nashville, Tennessee, for the defendant, Metropolitan Government ofNashville and Davidson County.
Jerry Martin, United States Attorney; Matthew M. Curley, Assistant United States Attorney; Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; David J. Kline, Director; Jeffrey Robins, Assistant

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Director; Craig A. Defoe, Trial Attorney, for the defendant, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Scott P. Tift, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amici curiae, George E. Barrett, C. Dewey Branstetter, Jr., and Hon. Marietta M. Shipley.
Tricia Herzfeld, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amici curiae, The Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition, The American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee, ASISTA Immigration Assistance, The National Center for Victims of Crime, and The National Crime Victim Law Institute at Lewis & Clark Law School.
OPINION
We accepted this case pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, which allows this Court to answer questions of Tennessee law certified by any federal court when "there are questions of law of this state which will be determinative of the cause and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee." Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 23, § 1. As head ofthis state's judiciary and as part of our inherent judicial power under Article VI, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution, we are authorized to answer certified questions of law. Seals v. H & F, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tenn. 2010). Rather than requiring a federal court to make the law ofthis state or to abstain from deciding the case until the state courts resolve the point oflaw, answering certified questions from federal courts promotes judicial efficiency and comity and also protects this state's sovereignty. Haley v. Univ. ofTenn.-Knoxville, 188 S.W.3d 518, 521 (Tenn. 2006). Under Rule 23, we only answer questions oflaw, not questions of fact or controversies as a whole. Seals, 301 S.W.3d at 241.
We address the question of whether the October 2009 Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, by and through the Davidson County Sheriff's Office, violates the Charter of Nashville and Davidson County or other state law. This issue oflaw arises out oflitigation filed by the plaintiffs Daniel Renteria-Villegas, David Ernesto Gutierrez-Turcios, and Rosa Landaverde against the Metropolitan Government ofNashville and Davidson County ("Metro") and the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE").' Plaintiffs Renteria-Villegas and Gutierrez-
1 ICE is an agency within the Department ofHomeland Security that plays a major role in enforcing federal immigration statutes and is responsible for conducting criminal investigations to identify, apprehend, and remove illegal aliens from the United States. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499-500 (2012) (citing Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Enforcement Actions:
(continued ... )
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Turcios allege that Davidson County Sheriffs officers arrested and wrongfully interrogated and detained them while the officers investigated the plaintiffs' immigration status pursuant to the October 2009 Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") entered into between the Davidson County Sheriffs Office ("DCSO") and ICE. Plaintiff Landaverde, a property owner and taxpayer in Davidson County, alleges that removal proceedings were instituted against her son after he was processed by Davidson County Sheriffs officers pursuant to the MOA. In addition to injunctive relief and damages, the plaintiffs seek declaratory relief regarding the validity of the MOA entered into between the DCSO and ICE under the Metropolitan Charter of Nashville and Davidson County (the "Charter").
According to the stipulated facts presented with the certified question, the MOA was entered into under the Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). The MOA authorizes selected DCSO personnel to perform certain immigration officer duties after being trained and certified by ICE. Those duties include interrogating any person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or remain in the United States; processing any removable alien or those aliens who have been arrested for violating a federal, State, or local offense for immigration violations; serving arrest warrants for immigration violations; administering oaths, taking and considering evidence, and preparing affidavits and sworn statements for ICE supervisory review; preparing charging documents for signature of ICE supervisors; issuing immigration detainers for processing aliens in categories established by ICE supervisors; and detaining and transporting arrested aliens subject to removal to ICEapproved detention facilities. DCSO officers perform their duties subject to the limitations contained in the Standard Operating Procedure in Appendix D2 to the MOA; provide notification within twenty-four hours to an ICE supervisor of any detainees placed under authority; obtain authorization from an ICE supervisor or designee prior to initiating transfer of§ 287(g) detainees into ICE custody; submit a plan to ensure that steps are taken to correct, modify, or prevent the recurrence oferrors when informed by ICE ofany error in the records; and make individualized custody recommendations to ICE.
We are guided in our interpretation of the Charter by the principles of statutory construction. Jordan v. Knox Cnty., 213 S.W.3d 751,763 (Tenn. 2007). We must give full effect to the intent and purpose of the drafters, see Waldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.3d 173, 176 (Tenn. 2008), without unduly broadening or restricting the Charter. Seals, 301 S.W.3d at 242. We must look to the language ofthe Charter, and if the

1 (

...

continued)

2010, at 1, 2 (2011)).

2 Appendix D to the MOA establishes standard, uniform procedures for the implementation and oversight of the§ 287(g) program. It outlines standard procedures for inmate prioritization, training, data collectim;, and supervision.

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language is "clear and unambiguous, . . . we must simply enforce it as written." Waldschmidt, 271 S.W.3d at 176. However, if the language is ambiguous, then we may refer to the broader statutory scheme, the history of the Charter, and other sources to discern its meaning. See Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 836 (Tenn. 2008).
When the Charter was adopted in 1962, it consolidated the functions ofthe DCSO and the Nashville Police Department. The stated purpose of the constitutional amendment authorizing consolidation was to "eliminate duplication and overlapping of duties and services'' to realize "economic savings to taxpayers." Metro. Gov't ofNashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Poe, 383 S.W.2d265, 277 (1964). Itisnotlikelythatthe Charter framers envisioned that decades later, a sheriff would be performing immigration functions for the federal authorities and, accordingly, there are no Charter provisions that directly address the DCSO' s authority to perform these duties.
Consistent with its purpose ofconsolidation, the Charter delineated the separate duties of the Sheriff and Police Chief. Charter section 16.05 provides that the Sheriff shall have such duties prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-8-201 or by any other provisions of general law. Pursuant to section 8-8-201 (20 11), the Sheriffhas broad general powers, including the power to enforce the ordinances ofthe municipality, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-201 (34), and "such other duties as are, or may be, imposed by law or custom." Tenn. Code Ann.§ 8-8-201(36)(b)(2). Section 8-8-201(36)(b)(l)references ov~r 100 code sections which also set forth the Sheriffs duties. Tennessee Code Annotated section 38-3-102 (20 10) is among the code sections listed, and it provides
(a) The sheriff is the principal conservator of the peace in the sheriffs county. It is the sheriffs duty to suppress all affrays, riots, routs, unlawful assemblies, insurrections, or other breaches of the peace, to do which the sheriff may summon to such sheriffs aid as many of the inhabitants of the county as such sheriff thinks proper.
(b) It shall be the duty of the sheriffs, in their respective counties, by themselves or deputies, to patrol the roads of the county, to ferret out crimes, to secure evidence of crimes, and to apprehend and arrest criminals.
Contrary to section 38-3-102, however, section 16.05 ofthe Charter expressly provides that within the area of the metropolitan government, the Sheriff shall not be the "principal conservator ofthe peace." This function is assigned to the Metropolitan Chief ofPolice. As
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between the Sheriffand the Police Chief, Charter section 16.05 gives the Sheriffcustody and control ofthe metropolitan jail, and designates the Police Chiefas the "principal conservator of the peace." Charter section 2.01 provides that when any power is vested by the Charter in a specific officer, that officer shall be deemed to have exclusive jurisdiction within the particular field.
The Charter marks the boundary between the duties of the Sheriff and the Police Chief. There is no dispute, however, between the Sheriff and the Police Chief as to who can perform the duties required by the MOA. The question is whether the Sheriff can perform these duties when the Police Chief does not do so and Metro has specifically directed the Sheriff to perform the duties. By resolution, Metro authorized and directed the Sheriff to perform "such immigration officer functions, in coordination with ICE, as specified in the [MOA]."3 The Sheriff, acting at the direction of Metro, entered into the MOA with ICE.4
While the Charter makes the Police Chiefthe "principal conservator ofthe peace," it does not expressly prohibit the Sheriff from engaging in all activities that could conceivably be considered "law enforcement." Nothing in section 16.05 indicates that the Police Chief is the only conservator ofthe peace. The role ofprincipal conservator ofthe peace, assigned to the sheriff by section 38-3-102, is shared with other officials based on the following language from section 38-3-103:
The judicial and ministerial officers ofjustice in the state, and the mayor, aldermen, marshals and police of cities and towns, and the director, commissioner, or similar head of any metropolitan or municipal police department, whether elected or appointed, are also conservators of the peace, and are required
3 Metro Gov't ofNashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn. Resolution No. RS2009-997.
4 Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-101(a) (2011) provides as follows:
For purposes of enforcing federal immigration laws, ... the legislative body of a municipality or county, or the chief law enforcement officer of the county upon approval by the governing legislative body, may enter into a written agreement, in accordance with federal law, between the municipality or county and the United States department of homeland security concerning the enforcement offederal immigration laws, detention and removals, and investigations in the municipality or county.
Metro was specifically authorized to enter into an agreement with ICE, and Metro authorized the Sheriffto execute the agreement on Metro's behalf. Since the Sheriff was not specifically precluded by statute from signing the agreement, the agreement between ICE and the Sheriff on behalf of Metro is valid.
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- - - - - _, - ,k ___________ ,
to aid in the prevention and suppression ofpublic offenses, and for this purpose may act with all the power of the sheriff.
This statute, giving more than one governmental official the title and authority of conservator of the peace, was in effect when the Charter was drafted,5 and the drafters' use of similar language in the Charter reflects an awareness of the statute. The language of the Charter clearly contemplates that the principal conservator of the peace is not the only conservator of the peace.
According to the MOA, the purpose ofthe collaboration between ICE and the Sheriff is to "enhance the safety and security of communities by focusing resources on identifying and processing for removal criminal aliens who pose a threat to public safety or danger to the community." In other words, the goal of the MOA and its delegation of authority to the Sheriff is to preserve the public peace through enforcement of federal immigration law. Since collaborative programs such as the one at issue were rare in 1962 when the Charter was adopted, it is understandable that the Charter is silent regarding the power ofthe city or its agencies to enter into a contract such as the MOA. However, Section 18.17 ofthe Charter anticipates cooperative endeavors between metropolitan officials and outside authorities, as follows:
The mayor and council of the metropolitan government shall have the power and authority to partiCipate in, cooperate in and take all necessary action with respect to any and all projects, programs and undertakings ofany nature whatsoever authorized by any statute, rule, or regulation of the United States, of the State of Tennessee, or any federal or state agency.
The language of this section encompasses and sanctions the contract in this case, which constitutes a cooperative law enforcement effort between the Sheriff and ICE.
The plaintiffs assert that the outcome ofthis case is controlled by our holding in Poe, in which, shortly after adoption of the Charter in 1964, we addressed the division of law enforcement duties between the Sheriff and the Metropolitan Police Department. In Poe, a declaratory judgment was sought concerning the relationship of the Sheriffs office to the Metropolitan Government in matters of duties, functions, budgeting, purchasing, and personnel policies. 383 S.W.2d at 267. Addressing the issue of whether the "criminal law enforcement powers and authority in the area of the Metropolitan Government [are] vested in the Metropolitan Chief of Police exclusively," id., we held as follows:
5 See Tennessee Code 1932, §§ 11418, 11419.
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It is plain to us that it is the purpose and intent of the Charter to take away from the Sheriffthe responsibility for the preservation of the public peace, prevention and detection of crime, apprehension of criminals, protection of personal and property rights except insofar as may be necessary and incidental to his general duties as outlined in T.C.A. § 8-8106 and to transfer such duties to the Department of Police of the Metropolitan Government.
Id. at 275 (footnote added).
Although we stated in Poe that the intent of the Charter was to take away from the sheriff the responsibility for the preservation of the public peace, necessarily, given the express language of the Charter, our holding can only be viewed as divesting the Sheriff of his authority as principal conservator of the peace. As specifically stated at Section 16.05 of the Charter, "the sheriff shall not be the principal conservator of peace. The function as principal conservator ofpeace is hereby transferred and assigned to the metropolitan police chief." (emphasis added). The express language ofthe Charter only divested the Sheriff of his authority as principal conservator of the peace, and it is only to that extent that his role as conservator of the peace was transferred to the Police Chief. Our holding in Poe is, consequently, so restricted. Accordingly, our ruling in Poe does not prohibit a construction ofthe Charter which allows the Sheriffto perform the federal immigration officer duties set forth in the MOA, when directed to do so by Metro and in the absence ofaction by the Police Chief.
The plaintiffs also argue that the MOA violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-101 (b), which provides in pertinent part that "[i]fa memorandum ofunderstanding with the United States department of homeland security is executed pursuant to subsection (a), municipal and county law enforcement officers shall be designated from local law enforcement agencies who, . . . shall be trained pursuant to the memorandum of understanding." The plaintiffs contend that section 50-1-1 01(b) directs power, authority, and duties to local law enforcement officers and that the language ofthis section falls within the Charter's exclusive vestment of law enforcement authority in the Police Chief. We respectfully disagree. As we have explained, the Charter does not prohibit the Sheriff from engaging in all law enforcement functions.
6 Section 8-810 is now codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-8-201.
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The plaintiffs additionally contend that the MOA violates section 1.16.050 of the Metro Code of Ordinances, which provides in pertinent part that "[t]he sheriff shall permit the interrogation of prisoners by authorized personnel of the police department." Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., Code of Ordinances (2012). The plaintiffs argue that this section indicates that the Police Department, not the DCSO, shall conduct interrogations of prisoners and that the MOA violates this section to the extent the MOA authorizes the DCSO to interrogate suspected aliens. We respectfully disagree. The language of this section merely requires that the DCSO allow the Police Department to interrogate prisoners in the Sheriffs custody; it does not prohibit the DCSO from also interrogating those prisoners. The plaintiffs do not cite to any other state or municipal law that the MOA allegedly violates, and we are aware of none.
We conclude that the October 2009 Memorandum ofAgreement between the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, by and through the Davidson County Sheriffs Office, does not violate the Charter ofNashville and Davidson County or any other state law cited by the plaintiffs. The Sheriff of Davidson County has authority under the Charter to perform the duties enumerated in the Agreement. Costs ofthis appeal are taxed equally to the plaintiffs, Daniel Renteria-Villegas, David Ernesto Gutierrez-Turcios, and Rosa Landaverde, for which execution may issue, if necessary.
\~d-~ SHARON G. LEE, JUSTICE
, tt:i::hcll:!i 11"1. Catalano, Cier!t, •lereO)' certify the. •. this is a true and e~act cAopy of the original
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 796 F.Supp.2d 900 (2011)
Daniel RENTERIA-VILLEGAS, and David Ernesto Gutierrez-Turcios, Plaintiffs, v.
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Defendants.
No. 3:11-00218.
United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.
June 21, 2011.
Harry Elliott Ozment, Law Offices of Elliott Ozment, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiffs.
Craig Andrew Defoe, Department of Justice-Office of Immigration Litigation, Joshua E. T. Braunstein, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Mark H. Wildasin, Office of the United States Attorney, Keli J. Oliver, Elizabeth A. Sanders, Lora Barkenbus Fox, Metropolitan Legal Department, Nashville, TN, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
KEVIN H. SHARP, District Judge.
Upon reassignment of this case to the undersigned on June 1, 2011, the following Motions were pending:
(1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 3); (2) Defendant United States Immigration and Custom Enforcement's ("ICE's") Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 10); (3) Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County's ("Metro's") Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 12); and (4) Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Docket No. 30).
With the exception of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, those motions have been fully briefed by the parties. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will grant Plaintiffs' request to amend, and deny the remaining motions as moot.
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Although in its infancy, this litigation has a somewhat lengthy procedural history and presents interesting threshold issues regarding this Court's power to adjudicate a controversy filed as a declaratory judgment action in state court raising only state law claims, but removed when a federal 902*902 agency—against which no affirmative relief was sought—was deemed to be an indispensable party under state law. To place the legal issues in context, the Court sets forth the case's history in some detail.[1]
The centerpiece of this case is an October 2009 Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") between ICE and Metro pursuant to Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). Section 287(g) authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to enter into written agreements to train and deputize local law enforcement officers to perform specified acts relating to immigration enforcement. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g)(1), (2) & (5). When performing duties under Section 287(g), local law enforcement officers act under the direction and supervision of the United States Attorney General. Id. § (g)(3).
Metro entered into the MOA "by and through" the Davidson County Sheriff's Office ("DCSO"). (Agreement, Docket No. 1-1 at 39). Under the MOA, Metro agreed that ICE would train and certify "DCSO personnel to perform certain immigration enforcement functions," and agreed that "[i]t is the intent of the parties that these delegated authorities will enable DCSO to identify and process immigration violations and conduct criminal investigations under ICE supervision." (Id.).
Metro's agreement allowing DCSO personnel to perform immigration enforcement tasks served as the catalyst for this suit after Plaintiff Daniel Renteria-Villegas ("Mr. Renteria"), a natural born United States citizen, was arrested on August 14, 2010, by Metropolitan Nashville Police Department ("MNPD") officers and taken to the Criminal Justice Center ("CJC")[2] for booking. According to the original Complaint filed in state court, both the arrest report, and the booking documents indicated that Mr. Renteria was born in Portland, Oregon. Nevertheless, he was allegedly placed under an "ICE hold," which, in DCSO's vernacular, meant that he was being held under Section 287(g) for suspected violation(s) of immigration and/or federal criminal law. Mr. Renteria was not released until August 20, 2010, when his family provide DCSO employees with his original passport and birth certificate.
Mr. Renteria's freedom was short-lived. On August 22, 2010, MNPD Officer Rickey Bearden arrested Mr. Renteria on a new charge. Officer Bearden indicated on the arrest report that
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Mr. Renteria was born in Mexico, even though he did not ask Mr. Renteria about his place of birth. During booking at the CJC, Mr. Renteria was asked about his birthplace, and he told the jail officer that he was born in Portland, Oregon, and a notation was made in his record to that effect. Again, Mr. Renteria was placed under an "ICE hold."
On August 24, 2010, Mr. Renteria was subjected to an "ICE interview," during which he was informed that he was suspected of having lied about being born in the United States. Even though Mr. Renteria answered numerous questions which should have resolved any doubt about his citizenship, the "ICE hold" was not lifted until September 3, 2010, when his family again presented the originals of his birth certificate and passport to DCSO personnel. He was released early the next day.
Based on these events, Mr. Renteria filed a six-count Verified Complaint in the Davidson County Chancery Court on January 903*903 7, 2011, against Metro, Officer Bearden, and Daron Hall, the Sheriff of Davidson County. In the Verified Complaint, Mr. Renteria alleged: (1) the MOA between Metro and ICE violated the Nashville Metropolitan Charter ("Charter") and Metro. Gov't. of Nashville & Davidson County v. Poe, 215 Tenn. 53, 383 S.W.2d 265 (Tenn.1964), a Tennessee Supreme Court decision interpreting that Charter, (Counts I & II); (2) his due process rights under Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution were violated, (Count III); (3) he was subjected to malicious harassment in violation of Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 4-21-701 & 702, (Counts IV & V); and (4) he was falsely imprisoned in violation of state common law, (Count VI).
On February 14, 2011, Mr. Renteria filed a First Amended Verified Complaint which significantly limited his claims, and focused on his August 22, 2010, arrest and subsequent incarceration at the CJC. Metro was named as the sole Defendant. Mr. Renteria sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that, by entering into the MOA, Metro violated the Charter and Poe.
In response to a Motion to Dismiss filed by Metro, the Chancery Court entered an Order on February 22, 2011, finding that the United States was an indispensable party under state law. In doing so, the Chancery Court observed that ICE was a party to the MOA, and the Verified Complaint sought a declaration that the MOA was void because it allegedly provided authority to the DCSO beyond those allowed in the Charter. Since "all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration," Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-14-107(a), and since the United States' interests could be affected were the MOA declared invalid, the Chancery Court deemed the United States indispensable to the litigation and allowed Mr. Renteria thirty days to add the United States as a party. (Docket No. 1-3 at 2).
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On March 2, 2011, Mr. Renteria filed his Second Amended Verified Complaint, adding Ernesto Gutierrez-Turcios ("Mr. Gutierrez") as a Plaintiff and ICE as a Defendant. Like the most recent iteration of the Complaint, the sole claim for relief was premised on the contention that Metro's entry into the MOA was a violation of the Charter because it wrongfully granted additional law enforcement powers to the DCSO. Plaintiffs asked the Chancery Court to declare that the MOA violated the Charter, and enjoin DCSO from acting under the MOA.
With respect to Mr. Gutierrez, the Second Amended Verified Complaint alleges that he was arrested by MNPD officers after a traffic stop on April 12, 2010, taken to the CJC, and placed on an "ICE hold." Shortly thereafter, Mr. Gutierrez was interrogated by a DCSO officer in an effort to determine his immigration status, and whether he had violated any federal criminal laws. Upon questioning, Mr. Gutierrez informed DCSO personnel that, while he was born in Honduras, he was a lawful permanent resident of the United States. DCSO personnel then ran Mr. Gutierrez's social security number and were apparently satisfied that he was lawfully in the United States.
Mr. Gutierrez intends to pled guilty and to serve a several day sentence in a facility run by the DCSO. He is fearful that when he arrives for his sentence he will be subjected to another "ICE hold." This is not insignificant because inmates under an "ICE hold" are automatically categorized as medium security offenders.
ICE removed the action to this Court on March 9, 2011. The basis for removal was the federal officer and agency removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
904*904 Within days of removal, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 3). In that Motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to enjoin enforcement of the MOA, pending a decision on the merits as to whether Metro's entry into the MOA violates the Charter. In doing so, Plaintiffs allege that they, along with more than 14,000 other inmates, have been harmed by DCSO's participation in the Section 287(g) program.
Subsequently, both Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss. In its Motion, ICE argues that dismissal is appropriate because it is nothing more than a nominal Defendant, in that no claim or any request for relief is made against ICE. ICE also asks the Court to find, contrary to the Chancery Court's ruling, that ICE is not an indispensable party. ICE request that it be dismissed from this lawsuit with prejudice so as to preclude the possibility that, if the case is subsequently remanded to state court, ICE will not again be deemed to be an indispensable party by the Chancery Court.
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For its part, Metro raises three arguments in support of dismissal. First, Metro argues this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because neither Plaintiff can show any real and immediate threat of harm so as to have standing to bring a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. Second, Metro claims the Second Amended Verified Complaint fails to state a claim because the MOA does not violate the Charter as alleged by Plaintiffs. Third, Metro contends the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for declaratory relief because, even if the MOA is deemed void, the controversy regarding DCSO's practice of making inquiries into the citizenship of arrestees will continue under a statute that requires all jail keepers to verify the citizenship of arrestees.
In addition to filing responses to the Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint, together with a proposed Third Amended Complaint intended to address some of the concerns raised by Defendants' Motions. The proposed Complaint adds an additional Plaintiff and several new causes of action.
Specifically, the proposed Complaint alleges that Rosa Landaverde, a native of El Salvador who has held Temporary Protected Status since 2001, is a Davidson County property owner and taxpayer. She claims harm because her son is currently in removal proceedings as a result of DCSO's participation in the Section 287(g) program. Further, the proposed Complaint adds two federal claims, including a claim that, by entering into the MOA, ICE violated the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., and a claim that both Defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The proposed Complaint also renews Mr. Renteria's claim that he was falsely imprisoned by Metro.
After the foregoing Motions were filed, an Order was entered on April 21, 2011, addressing certain housekeeping matters. Among other things, the Order granted ICE's Motion to Stay (which Metro supported and Plaintiffs did not oppose), and provided that ICE would not be required to respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction until further order of the Court. (Docket No. 33 at 1). The Order also provided that, in responding to Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, Defendants were to address whether their Motions to Dismiss would be moot if the Court allowed the filing of the Third Amended Complaint. (Id.).
In accordance with the Order and in response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, ICE indicated it had no objection to Plaintiffs filing an Amended Complaint and that, if the proposed complaint were filed, 905*905 ICE's previously filed Motion to Dismiss would be rendered moot. (Docket No. 35 at 1-2). For its part, Metro objected to amendment because Plaintiffs allegedly lack standing, but conceded that, "the filing of the Third Amended Complaint would moot the motion to dismiss from a technical pleading standpoint." (Docket
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No. 34 at 2, italics in original). Both Defendants reserved the right to file renewed Motions to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
As indicated, there are several pending Motions before the Court. Because resolution of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend directly impacts the other motions, the Court addresses it first.
"The district court has broad discretion to permit or deny a motion to amend."Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 114 (6th Cir.1995). When a party seeks leave to amend a pleading, "[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). "However, motions to amend `should be denied if the amendment is brought in bad faith, for dilatory purposes, results in undue delay or prejudice to the opposing party, or would be futile.'" United States v. Gibson, 424 Fed.Appx. 461, 465, 2011 WL 2008308 at *3 (6th Cir. May 24, 2011) (citation omitted).
Here, Metro does not argue that Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend is brought for an improper purpose, that the amendment would cause delay, that it would suffer prejudice, or even the that amendment would be futile. Rather, Metro objects to the amendment on the grounds of "nullity" because Plaintiffs allegedly lack standing under Article III of the United States Constitution.
The Court's power to adjudicate is limited to "cases and controversies" under Article III. U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The Supreme Court has defined standing generally as "the question of . . . whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
Standing must exist at the time of filing of the complaint, and "does not have to be maintained throughout all stages of the litigation." Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 524 & 526 (6th Cir.2001). The Complaint is construed in Plaintiffs' favor for purposes of determining standing, and all material allegations are accepted as true. Courtney v. Smith, 297 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir.2002); Greater Cincinnati Coalition for the Homeless v. City of Cincinnati, 56 F.3d 710, 715 (6th Cir.1995). In this case, the Complaint was "filed" when the action was removed, making the Second Amended Complaint the operative one for determining standing.
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As a preliminary matter, Metro raises the procedural argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to even consider the Motion to Amend because of the alleged lack of standing. In support of that position, Metro relies upon Zurich Ins. Co. v. Logitrans, Inc., 297 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2002) for the proposition that "[t]he Sixth Circuit has expressly held that a plaintiff cannot amend a jurisdictionally defective complaint to retroactively confer jurisdiction upon a court." (Docket No. 34 at 3). While that may be so as a general proposition, this Court's jurisdiction was invoked by the United States, even though there was no suggestion of a federal cause of action, or even a potential federal defense. See, City of Cookeville v. Upper Cumberland 906*906 Elec. Membership Corp., 484 F.3d 380, 389 (6th Cir.2007) (federal agency has a right to remove under 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) simply because it has been sued in state court).[3]
In this regard, Zurich is distinguishable because it involved a negligence suit initially filed in federal court by a party which had no standing to bring the action in the first place, and, therefore, no standing to move to substitute a party which could have brought the action. Moreover, the underlying premise that a court can never allow a Motion to Amend to correct a perceived standing problem is incorrect. See, Revell v. Port Auth. of New York, 321 Fed.Appx. 113, 118 (3rd Cir.2009) (finding court abused discretion by not allowing reasonable opportunity to amend to establish standing);Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237, 1238 (11th Cir.2000) (leave to amend should have been granted where "proffered amended complaint would have cured the defect about standing in the original complaint").
Even though the Court's analysis could end here, the Court addresses Metro's substantive arguments on the issue of standing. This is because Plaintiffs have made clear that their primary objective is to secure a declaration that Metro violated the Charter by entering into the MOA, the parties have fully briefed the standing issue in relation to that request, and it would make little since to allow an Amended Complaint to be filed, only to later rule that Plaintiffs have no standing to pursue their primary claim.
The linchpin of Metro's substantive argument is that Plaintiffs lack standing because, in the Second Amended Complaint, they seek only injunctive and declaratory relief, but there is no suggestion of any real and immediate threat of future harm. Such a showing is essential, Metro claims, because "[t]he Sixth Circuit has consistently and repeatedly rejected the notion that past injury can confer standing for declaratory and injunctive relief." (Docket No. 34 at 5, collecting cases). While the Court acknowledges that Metro correctly sets forth the law in the Sixth Circuit regarding standing for declaratory and injunctive relief under Article III, see, Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court, 252 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir.2001) (past exposure
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to wrongful conduct does not show present case or controversy), the Court is unpersuaded by Metro's arguments as applied in this case for two reasons.
First, Metro errs in addressing standing only under Article III. "The seemingly obvious proposition that a removed case may not go forward in federal court unless Article III standing requirements are met as to some claims may not obtain in cases removed to federal court pursuant to all removal statutes." Lee v. Amer. Nat'l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1002 n. 4 (9th Cir.2001) (italics added). In fact, as noted in Lee, the United States Supreme Court in Int'l Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 78, 111 S.Ct. 1700, 114 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991), specifically "left open the question whether a federal court in a § 1442(a)(1) removal case may require plaintiffs to meet Article III's standing requirements with respect to the state-law claims over which the federal court exercises pendant jurisdiction." 907*907 This Court has found no controlling case which directly answers that question, but a recent unpublished decision by the Sixth Circuit indicates that a plaintiff who has standing under state law for purposes of a state declaratory judgment action, has standing for purposes of that same cause of action when the action is removed under Section 1441.
In Aarti Hospitality, LLC v. City of Grove City, 350 Fed.Appx. 1 (6th Cir. 2009), a group of hotel owners, who were originally from India, filed suit in state court against the city and others after the city passed a tax abatement ordinance and approved certain design plans which benefitted the plaintiffs' competitors. Among other things, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was void under Ohio law, and asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After removal, the district court dismissed the request for declaratory relief on the grounds that plaintiffs' alleged injury was insufficient to confer standing under Ohio's Declaratory Judgment Act, and ruled that plaintiffs had failed to establish any federal law claims.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit, while ultimately affirming the trial court, "first assess[ed] if the district court erred in not considering whether plaintiffs satisfied theconstitutional standing requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution." Id.at 6 (italics in original). After noting that "Article III standing is `the threshold question in every federal case,'" and that a court may determine jurisdictional issues in any sequence, the Sixth Circuit wrote:
[B]ecause plaintiffs' right to relief on these state law claims arises solely from an Ohio statute, the crucial inquiry is whether Ohio law, not federal law, authorizes the remedy sought. The law is well-settled that a federal court exercising supplemental or diversity subject matter jurisdiction over state law claims must apply state substantive law to those claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n. 7, 116
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S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Whether plaintiffs have standing to seek a declaratory judgment under Ohio Revised Code § 2721.03 is a question of Ohio substantive, not federal procedural, law. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 225, 116 S.Ct. 629, 133 L.Ed.2d 596 (1996) (holding that the issue of "who may bring suit" is a "substantive question[]" that must "be answered by the domestic law selected by the courts of the contracting states."); Int'l Primate Protection League and its Members v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 111 S.Ct. 1700, 114 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991) (approving the principle that "standing `should be seen as a question of substantive law, answerable by reference to the statutory . . . provision whose protection is invoked.'") (quoting Fletcher, THE STRUCTURE OF STANDING, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 229 (1988)); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532, 69 S.Ct. 1233, 93 L.Ed. 1520 (1949) ("[T]he rights enjoyed under local law should not vary because enforcement of those rights was sought in the federal court rather than in the state court. If recovery could not be had in the state court, it should be denied in the federal court."). * * * Thus, on facts similar to those in this case, the Eighth Circuit inWestborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.1982) applied state substantive law to determine whether the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the validity of a city's zoning ordinances. Affirming the district court's grant of 908*908 summary judgment in favor of the city, the Eighth Circuit held (without addressing Article III standing) that the plaintiffs' allegation of "mere competitive disadvantage" resulting from the ordinances "does not give rise to standing" under Missouri law. Id. at 747-48.
Id. at 6-7; see also, Bennett v. MIS Corp., 607 F.3d 1076, 1091 n. 13 (6th Cir.2010)(citation omitted) ("when removal of a state court action is available because the defendant is a federal officer, the substantive law to be applied is unaffected by removal. If state law was applicable before the removal, it will apply after the removal").
For all practical purposes, the posture of this case when originally filed is no different than the posture of Aarti when it was filed. Both cases involve a pleading filed in state court raising a state court declaratory judgment claim which was later removed to federal court. If anything, this case presents a stronger reason for applying the state's standing rules since, unlike the Aarti plaintiffs, Mr. Renteria's original Verified Complaint presented no federal claims, named no federal Defendant, and the case arrived in this Court only because Mr. Renteria was required by the state court to add ICE as a Defendant.
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"In its present form, the Tennessee Declaratory Judgment Act grants courts of record the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations." Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 837 (Tenn.2008). "The Act also conveys the power to construe or determine the validity of any written instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise, provided that the case is within the court's jurisdiction." Id.Specifically,
[a]ny person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
Tenn.Code Ann. 29-14-103.
To bring a case under the Act, a plaintiff does not need to show a present injury, although an "actual `case' or `controversy' is required." Colonial Pipeline, 263 S.W.3d at 837. "A bona fide disagreement must exist; that is, some real interest must be in dispute" because a court "may not render advisory opinions based on hypothetical facts." Id. at 838.
In this case, both Plaintiffs are interested parties in relation not only to the MOA, but also in relation to how the Charter is construed. As Davidson County residents who have been subjected to the 287(g) program and who allegedly will be subjected to that program if they are ever again arrested, they present an actual case or controversy and have standing to bring a Declaratory Judgment Action under Tennessee law. See, Doe v. Gwyn, 2011 WL 1344996 at *7 (Tenn.Ct.App.2011) (sex offender had standing to file declaratory action challenging statute which would require him to register as a sex offender); Robinson v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville,1992 WL 205268 at *3 (Tenn.App.1992) ("[p]ersons affected by municipal ordinances have standing to request a declaratory judgment" under Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-14-103).[4] The conclusion that standing exists under the facts presented here is in keeping with the liberal construction afforded the Tennessee Declaratory Judgment Act, 909*909 Williams v. Hirsch, 2011 WL 303257 at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App.2011), and the longstanding principle in Tennessee that citizens have standing to challenge the actions of public officials where they "aver special interest or a special injury not common to the public generally." Bennett v. Stutts, 521 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tenn.1975).
Second, even assuming for purposes of both declaratory and injunctive relief[5] a plaintiff must show the immediate threat of real harm (as opposed to merely showing past injury) under federal law, it does not follow that there is no standing in this case. This is because, at least with respect to Mr. Gutierrez, the allegations show past harm and more than a
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theoretical possibility of future harm. See, Bowsher v. Synar,478 U.S. 714, 721, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (where standing exists with respect to at least one plaintiff, a court need not consider whether the other plaintiffs also have standing).
According to the Second Amended Complaint, after Mr. Gutierrez was arrested and taken to the CJC, he was investigated pursuant to the Section 287(g) program and in accordance with the MOA. Mr. Gutierrez suffered at least a modicum of harm because he was treated differently than other inmates who did not appear to be of Latino origin, and he was automatically classified as a medium security inmate as a result of being placed under an "ICE hold." Further, when the allegations are construed in Plaintiffs' favor, that harm is bound to be repeated because he has entered into a plea agreement which requires that he spend several days in a DCSO jail. (Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 66-67). That Mr. Gutierrez will again be subjected to an interrogation and investigation under the 287(g) program is not mere speculation because the Sheriff of Davidson County has allegedly "stated under oath that it is the DCSO's policy to subject every person who enters the Davidson County Jail system to a 287(g) investigation, if they are or may be foreign-born." (Id. ¶ 68).[6]
Certainly in Mr. Gutierrez' situation there exists a future threat of injury that is "both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical," City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,461 U.S. 95, 10102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), and this threat may be eliminated by the declaration that the MOA is void and/or an injunction prohibiting its enforcement. "It can scarcely be doubted that, for a plaintiff who is injured or faces the threat of future injury due to illegal conduct ongoing at the time of suit, a sanction that effectively abates that conduct and prevents its recurrence provides a form of redress." Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Environ. Serv's Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).[7]
910*910 In reaching this conclusion, the Court has considered Metro's contention that Mr. Gutierrez suffered no harm because his release was not delayed, and its contention (set forth in the papers supporting its Motion to Dismiss) that a favorable decision will not aid either Plaintiff because jailers are required under state law to determine the immigration status of prisoners. The Court rejects both arguments.
With respect to the former, Mr. Gutierrez, unlike non-Latinos, was subjected to an "interrogation" by DCSO personnel. While Metro might view this as nothing more than an inconvenience, the "injury in fact" requirement delimits litigation in federal court to persons with a stake in the outcome. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency, 412 U.S. 669, 690 n. 14, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1974). Even though "`[t]he contours of the injury-in-fact requirement [are] not precisely defined, [they] are very generous,'" and the
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"standard is met as long as the party alleges a specific, `identifiable trifle' of injury." In re Global Indus. Tech., Inc., 2011 WL 1662792 at *5 (3rd Cir. May 4, 2011) (citation omitted); see also, Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir.2009) (a "small injury" is sufficient to confer standing); Preminger v. Peake, 552 F.3d 757, 763 (9th Cir.2008)(for purposes of standing, "[t]he injury may be minimal").
As for the latter, Metro has not shown that the state law requirements for immigration screening are anywhere near as rigorous as those conducted under a Section 287(g) program. It cites Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-7-123, but that statute merely says that the Tennessee Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission "shall develop a standardized written procedure for verifying the citizenship status of individuals who are arrested, booked, or confined for any period in a county or municipal jail," and that jailers are to comply with those procedures "to verify the citizenship status" of inmates who come into their custody. Id. § (a) & (b).
Because ICE does not object to amendment and the Court rejects Metro's argument on standing, the Court will allow Plaintiffs to file the Amended Complaint. "Once an amended pleading is filed, the original pleading no longer serves a function in the cases and is considered to have no effect." Holt v. City of Dickson, 2011 WL 134249 at *2 (M.D.Tenn.2011) (collecting cases). Therefore, the Court will deny the remaining motions as moot.
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction has been pending since March 16, 2011. However, it does not appear that Plaintiffs require an urgent resolution of that Motion since they did not object to ICE's Motion to Stay pending a ruling on the Motions to Dismiss. Moreover, because ICE has not responded to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and the Third Amended Complaint adds numerous factual allegations, an additional Plaintiff and three new causes of action, any request for injunctive relief should be addressed in the context of the now operative Complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint will be granted. The Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants will be denied as moot, as will Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The parties will be allowed to 911*911 file similar motions in relation to the Third Amended Complaint, if warranted.
[1] For purposes of the pending motions, the factual allegations in the various incarnations of the Complaint are set forth as if true.
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[2] The CJC is under the control of the Davidson County Sheriff and manned by DCSO personnel. [3] Metro asserts that "the Sixth Circuit specifically stated in City of Cookeville that § 1442 cannot overcome the jurisdiction defect of lack of standing," and cites footnote 5 of the opinion for that proposition of law. (Docket No. 41 at 2). However, the referenced footnote says no such thing. Rather, the Sixth Circuit's concern in that case was whether a federal agency needed to posit a federal claim or defense in order to remove an action from state court, and the court concluded that, under Section 1442(a)(1), "a federal agency may remove without more." City of Cookeville, 484 F.3d at 390. [4] Under Tennessee law, the same rules of construction apply to statutes, ordinances and charters.Metro. Elec. Power Bd. v. Metro Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 309 S.W.3d 474, 477 (Tenn.Ct.App.2009). [5] In the Second Amended Complaint, the sole "Cause of Action" is a request for a declaratory judgment, with the request for an injunction appearing as part of the prayer for relief. Though rare, it is possible for a plaintiff to have standing for declaratory, but not injunctive, relief. See, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) (there are "unusual circumstances" in which an injunction might be withheld, not withstanding the granting of a declaratory judgment). The Court need not decide if this is that rare case since Plaintiffs have standing to pursue both a declaration and an injunction. [6] This conclusion is further underscored by Mr. Renteria's alleged treatment after he was rearrested and returned to the CJC two days after being released. [7] In its Motion to Dismiss (which also addresses the standing issue) Metro claims that Mr. Gutierrez will not, in fact, be subjected to further immigration screening because, under the plea agreement, he is only required to serve weekends in jail. According to Metro, those serving weekend sentences are all "minimum security" inmates and are not subjected to being "screened by ICE." (Docket No. 14 at 10). While the contention is supported by a Declaration from an Administrative Services Manager at the DCSO, it at most raises a factual issue.
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 Renteria-Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville..., Not Reported in...

2011 WL 4048523 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee,
Nashville Division.
Daniel RENTERIA–VILLEGAS, David Ernesto Gutierrez–Turcios, and Rosa Landaverde, Plaintiffs, v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Defendants.
No. 3:11–00218. | Sept. 12, 2011.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Harry Elliott Ozment, Law Offices of Elliott Ozment, Nashville, TN, Thomas Paul Fritzsche, Dan Werner, Atlanta, GA, Trina Realmuto, for Plaintiffs.
Keli J. Oliver, Derrick C. Smith, Elizabeth A. Sanders, Lora Barkenbus Fox, Metropolitan Legal Department, Mark H. Wildasin, Office of the United States Attorney, Nashville, TN, Craig Andrew Defoe, Joshua E. T. Braunstein, Department of Justice–Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
KEVIN H. SHARP, District Judge.
*1 Pending before the Court is Defendant United States Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s (“ICE’s”) Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III (Docket No. 54). That Motion has been fully briefed by ICE and Plaintiffs. (Docket Nos. 55, 58 & 67). Also pending is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Finding Defendants Liable Under Counts I and II (Docket No. 69), Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County’s (“Metro’s”) Motion to Hold Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in Abeyance (Docket No. 72), and Metro’s Motion to Open Case for Necessary Discovery (Docket No. 75). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant ICE’s Motion to Dismiss Count III insofar as it alleges that ICE violated

Plaintiffs’ rights to due process, but deny ICE’s Motion to Dismiss Count II. All remaining motions will be denied pending certification of the dispositive issue in this case to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
In a June 21, 2011, Order and Memorandum (Docket Nos. 43 & 44), the Court detailed the procedural history and the factual allegations underlying this litigation. See, Renteria–Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 2011 WL 2471585 at –––– 1–4 (M.D.Tenn. June 21, 2011) (Renteria I ). Basically, this case presents a challenge to an October 2009 Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA” or “287(g) Agreement”) between ICE and Metro pursuant to Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), which authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to enter into written agreements to train and deputize local law enforcement officers to perform specified acts relating to immigration enforcement. The MOA empowers Davidson County Sheriff’s Office (“DCSO”) deputies to perform those immigration enforcement acts.
The case began when Plaintiff Renteria–Villegas (“Renteria”), a natural born United States citizen, filed suit in the Davidson County Chancery Court on January 7, 2011, against Metro, a city police Officer, and the Sheriff of Davidson County, Daron Hall (“Sheriff Hall”). Renteria’s primary complaint was that the MOA violated the Nashville Metropolitan Charter (“Charter”) and Poe v. Metro. Gov’t. of Nashville & Davidson County, 215 Tenn. 53, 383 S.W.2d 265 (Tenn.1964), a Tennessee Supreme Court decision interpreting the Charter. After an Amended Complaint was filed, and after the Chancery Court Judge found that ICE was an indispensable party to the MOA for purposes of declaratory relief, Renteria again amended his Complaint, adding David Gutierrez–Turcios (“Gutierrez”), a lawful permanent resident of the United States, as an additional Plaintiff and ICE as a Defendant. ICE then removed the case to this Court and the Court allowed Plaintiffs to once again amend their Complaint.
In the presently controlling Third Amended Complaint (Docket No. 45) (which will simply be referred to hereafter as “the Complaint”), Rosa Landaverde (“Landaverde”), a Davidson County resident holding temporary protected status, was added as a Plaintiff. Metro and ICE are the only named Defendants. The
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Complaint sets forth four causes of action: In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that, by entering into the MOA, Metro violated the Charter. In Count II, Renteria and Gutierrez allege that ICE violated the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. In Count III, Renteria alleges that both Defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, In Count IV, Renteria sets forth a state law claim for false imprisonment against Metro.
II. LEGAL DISCUSSION
*2 The four pending motions are, to an extent, interrelated in that the continued viability of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Metro’s Motion to Hold in Abeyance, and Metro’s Motion to Allow Necessary Discovery hinge on this Court’s disposition of ICE’s Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, the Court addresses the Motion to Dismiss first.
A. ICE’s Motion to Dismiss ICE seeks dismissal of Counts II and III, which are the only claims made against it. Prior to reaching the specific substantive arguments raised with respect to each Count, the Court first acknowledges that ICE moves to dismiss both Counts because Plaintiffs allegedly cannot “establish standing to challenge the 287(g) Agreement because neither of them can show that there is an imminent risk that they will be subject to the 287(g) program in the future.” (Docket No. 55 at 8). In both the decision allowing Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend, as well as a subsequent Order and Memorandum that denied Metro’s request that it be allowed to take an interlocutory appeal of that ruling, the Court discussed Plaintiffs’ standing in detail. See, Renteria I, 2011 WL 2471585 at ––––5–10; Renteria–Villegas v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville and Davidson County, 2011 WL 2938428 at ––––1–3 (M.D.Tenn. July 19, 2011) (“Renteria II” ). The Court finds no need to revisit those rulings, other than to address a couple of points raised by ICE in its Motion to Dismiss.
ICE states:
In its Memorandum granting plaintiffs’ motion to file the TAC, the Court addressed and rejected Metro Government’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ standing to bring “state-law claims” in their proposed TAC. (See ECF No. 43 at 10). In their TAC, plaintiffs now sue ICE for allegedly violating federal law. As such, their standing to sue ICE is a “matter of federal law” that “does not

depend on [their] prior standing in state court.” Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 495 (6th Cir.1999). Because Plaintiffs base their claims against ICE on violations of federal law, federal standing requirements necessarily apply to those claims.
(Docket No. 55 at 8 n. 5). In the Court’s view, ICE reads Renteria I too narrowly, relies upon an inapposite case, and neglects to consider that Plaintiffs have now added a claim under the APA.
In addressing standing in Renteria I, the Court began by observing that, because the action was removed to this Court by a federal agency, Metro erred in addressing standing only under Article III. However, the Court went on to write: “even assuming for purposes of both declaratory and injunctive relief a plaintiff must show the immediate threat of real harm (as opposed to merely showing past injury) under federal law, it does not follow that there is no standing in this case. This is because, at least with respect to Mr. Gutierrez, the allegations show past harm and more than a theoretical possibility of future harm.” Renteria I, 2011 WL 2471585 at *9 (italics and footnote omitted). The Court then went on to amplify its reasons for that conclusion.
*3 Indeed, a primary case upon which ICE relies, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), was considered by the Court in Renteria I. However, this case—in which Plaintiffs allege they have been subjected to 287(g) investigations, and in which they allege that anyone who appears foreign-born is subjected to such an investigation upon entry into a DCSO facility—is markedly different from the allegations in Lyons that rogue police officers violated departmental policy by placing compliant motorists in unauthorized chokeholds.
Further, ICE’s reliance on Coyne is misplaced. There, a group of citizens purported to represent the State of Ohio and Ohio taxpayers and sought to recover state monies that had been spent treating citizens suffering from tobacco-related illnesses. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries were “not direct or particularized,” and they could not show that a favorable outcome would result in either the receipt of a tax refund by them or a reduction in the tax bill of Ohioans generally since “the power to decrease state taxes or issue a tax refund rests within the province of the legislative and executive branches of the State of Ohio.” Coyne, 183 F.3d at 496. Here, at least insofar as Plaintiffs Renteria and Gutierrez are concerned, Plaintiffs have suffered a direct and particularized injury by virtue of being subjected to 287(g) investigations,1 and they would receive a favorable outcome were the Court to rule in
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their favor since, presumably, they would not again be subjected to the alleged indignities of such an investigation.

1

The fact that Plaintiffs have been subjected to such

investigations distinguishes this case from O’Shea v.

Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674

(1974) upon which ICE also relies because, in Littleton,

“[n]one of the named plaintiffs [wa]s identified as

himself having suffered any injury in the manner

specified,” and they claimed harm by one defendant

“only in the most general terms.” Id. at 495. Although

this case shares a common thread with Littleton to the

extent that the possibility of future harm partially

depends upon Plaintiffs’ own conduct, this case is also

distinguishable from Littleton because “[i]mportant to

this assessment” in Littleton was “the absence of

allegations that” the statute upon which their complaint

was based was unlawful. Here, of course, the very

essence of this lawsuit is that the MOA is unlawful

because it violates the Charter.

Moreover, as this Court ruled in both Renteria I, 2011 WL 2471585 at *9 and Renteria II, 2011 WL 2938428 at ––––1–2, a plaintiff may amend a complaint to address standing issues, an allowance which seems particularly apropos where, as here, a state court plaintiff was effectively forced to litigate claims in federal court. When ICE removed the case, Plaintiffs added federal claims, including a claim under the APA.
“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. To bring a claim under the APA in federal court a plaintiff “must not only meet the constitutional requirements of standing, but must also demonstrate prudential standing.” Courtney v. Smith, 297 F.36d 455, 460 (6th Cir.2002).
“To demonstrate constitutional standing, a plaintiff must satisfy the following three elements: (1) an allegation of an ‘injury in fact,’ which is a concrete harm suffered by the plaintiff that is actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a demonstration of ‘causation,’ which is a fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant; and (3) a demonstration of ‘redressability,’ which is a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury.” Friends of Tim Fords v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 585 F.3d 955, 966 (6th Cir.2009). “Prudential standing is ... met if the plaintiff alleges it suffered a legal wrong,” which “must relate to “ ‘agency action,’ which is defined to include ‘failure to

act.’ ” Id. at 967.
*4 In this case, Plaintiffs point to a relevant statute, to wit, 8 U . S.C. § 1387(g)(1), which they claim “explicitly provides that federal immigration law enforcement functions may be performed by state and local law enforcement officers only ‘to the extent consistent with State and local law.’ “ (Docket No. 45 at 22 ¶ 155). Plaintiffs have also satisfied the requirement for both constitutional and prudential standing by alleging in the Complaint that Renteria has twice been subjected to a 287(g) investigation, and Gutierrez has been subjected to that investigation once. These allegations suggest an injury-in-fact, and, for purposes of declaratory relief, the Complaint alleges the imminent threat of future harm because Gutierrez is heading back into the DCSO system and Sheriff Hall has stated that DCSO’s policy is to subject every inmate who enters one of his jail facilities, and who is, or may be, foreign-born, to a 287(g) investigation.2 Finally, there is a likelihood that a ruling favorable to Plaintiffs would afford relief inasmuch as Gutierrez might not be subjected to another 287(g) investigation upon his reentry into custody.

2

Where one plaintiff has standing to sue, the Court need

not consider whether the other plaintiffs also have

standing. See, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.

417, 431 n. 19, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393

(1998). Nevertheless, the Court notes that, according to

the allegations in the Complaint, Renteria was

subjected to immigration investigations twice within a

two week period. “It is the reality of the threat of

repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry,

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n. 8 (italics in original), and

“[p]ast wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is

a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.”

Littleton, 414 U.S. at 496.

Having considered the matter of standing for the third time in relation to the pleadings, the Court has gone as far as it intends to go on the issue and turns to the other arguments raised by ICE in relation to Counts II and III. Prior to doing so, however, the Court sets forth the standard which governs this Court’s review.

1. Standard of Review “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ “ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
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“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Although the Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in a complaint, the same does not hold true with respect to legal conclusions and, therefore, a complaint must include factual allegations to support the legal claims asserted. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
2. Count II ICE argues Plaintiffs “cannot receive relief under the APA because they have an adequate alternative remedy available.” (Docket No. 55 at 13). In this vein, ICE asserts “Plaintiffs could (and should) have brought their claim in state court without involving ICE.” (Id. at 14).
This is a remarkable argument given the procedural history of this case. Plaintiff Renteria did just what ICE claims he should have done: he filed a Verified Complaint in the Davidson County Chancery Court against only city and county actors. It was only because the Chancery Court concluded that ICE was an indispensable party to the MOA that ICE was added, and it was only because ICE chose to remove the case that the litigation ended up here. It seems almost inevitable that were the case dismissed and these Plaintiffs or other plaintiffs went to Chancery Court arguing about the validity of the MOA, ICE would again be deemed an indispensable party, and the case would again end up here.
*5 ICE refines its argument by stating that Plaintiffs should have “limited their lawsuit to challenging the DCSO officers’ actions, and sought injunctive relief regarding those actions without directly challenging the validity of the 287(g) agreement[.]” (Id.). This way, ICE submits, “there likely would have been no grounds for the state court to order ICE’s addition as a party to this lawsuit.” (Id.).
“Yet the plaintiff, not the defendants, remains the master of a complaint, including the master of what law [ ]he opts to invoke in filing a claim.” Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 629 F.3d 527, 531 (6th Cir.2010). Central to this case from its inception has been Plaintiffs’ contention that 287(g) investigations are unlawfully conducted by DCSO personnel. Simply suing the individual jailers who conduct the immigration investigations would not get to the heart of whether the MOA is valid under the Charter. Since the Chancery Court has ruled that ICE is an

indispensable party and ICE has exercised its option to remove the case from state court, the state Chancery Court would not provide an adequate remedy.
If ICE’s position were accepted by the Court, and if Plaintiffs are correct that Metro could not, by law, enter into the MOA with ICE, then the illegality of the MOA, and ICE’s agreement to enter into it, could never be effectively redressed. This would run counter to the “presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action,” Kucana v. Holder, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 827, 839, 175 L.Ed.2d 694 (2010), a presumption that “has been reaffirmed over many years by Congress as embodied in Sections 702, 703 and 704 of the APA.” Hamilton Stores, Inc. v. Hodel, 925 F.2d 1272, 1277 (10th Cir.1991).
Section 704 upon which ICE exclusively relies, and which provides that final agency action is reviewable only to the extent that “there is no other adequate remedy,” cannot be read in isolation. As noted previously, Section 702 provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Section 703, in pertinent part, provides:
The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action, including actions for declaratory judgments ... in a court of competent jurisdiction. If no special statutory review proceeding is applicable, the action for judicial review may be brought against the United States, the agency by its official title, or the appropriate officer.
5 U.S.C. § 703.
There is no special statutory review procedures relating to Section 287(g) agreements. Therefore, Plaintiffs can seek declaratory relief under the APA against ICE in this Court, particularly since the Chancery Court has ruled that a challenge to the MOA cannot go forward in the absence of ICE, and ICE has indicated it has no intention of litigating in state court.3 See, Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, ––– F.3d ––––, ––––, 2011 WL 2040870 at *7 (9th Cir. May 26, 2011) (collecting Supreme Court
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cases) (the presumption of judicial review “is overcome only in two narrow circumstances”—“when Congress expressly bars review by statute” and “in those rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply”).

3

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) where a civil action is

commenced in a state court against the United States or

one of its agencies, the action “may be removed ... to

the district court of the United States for the district and

division embracing the place wherein it is pending [.]”

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (italics added).

*6 ICE next claims that dismissal is warranted because the allegations in the Complaint “do not demonstrate that ICE acted unlawfully by approving the DCSO 287(g) Agreement and relying on Metro Government’s determination that the Agreement was consistent with state and local law.” (Docket No. 55 at 14). ICE writes:
... Congress did not mandate that ICE independently research whether a particular 287(g) agreement would require 287(g) officers to violate state and local law when acting under the agreement. Nor did Congress preclude ICE from relying on a state or local government entity’s determination that its officials are complying with state and local law when acting under a 287(g) Agreement. In short, the INA imposes no duty on ICE to independently determine whether state and local officers comply with state and local law when they act under a 287(g) agreement. Therefore, ICE properly relied on Metro Government’s determination that DCSO officials could lawfully execute the 287(g) Agreement under state and local law.
(Id. at 15). In response, Plaintiffs argue that “[w]heter ICE or DCSO was at fault for exceeding the authority granted ICE by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) is irrelevant to the APA analysis” and the statute itself requires that immigration enforcement powers be delegated “only to the extent consistent with State and local law.” (Docket No. 59 at 11 & 12).
So far as relevant, Section 287(g) provides:

(g) Performance of immigration officer functions by State officers and employees
(1) Notwithstanding section 1342 of Title 31 ,[4] the Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens across State lines to detention centers), may carry out such function at the expense of the State or political subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local law.

4

31 U.S.C. § 1342 places limitations on the ability of

governmental officers and employees to accept

voluntary services for governmental functions.

8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1). Contrary to Plaintiffs’ reading, the foregoing language can be read as not specifically requiring that ICE ensure that a particular 287(g) agreement be in compliance with local and state law. Rather, and as ICE asserts, the limiting language can be read as requiring that the actions of local officers be consistent with state and local law, and the fact that a local officer might violate state or local law in executing a Section 287(g) agreement does not mean, perforce, that ICE violated federal law in entering into the agreement in the first place. The limiting language can also be read in yet a third way because, arguably, one can only be “determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens,” if performing the function is in compliance with local and state law.
*7 Regardless of the gloss placed on the language, the Court rejects ICE’s underlying premise that it can enter into unlawful agreements unless Congress specifically bars it from doing so through the implementing statute, and that the entry into such an agreement is barred from review. While “[a] court must give a statute its plain and ordinary meaning and not go beyond the words of the statute where those words are sufficient to explain its meaning,” In re Wright Enterprises, 76 Fed. Appx. 717, 725 (6th Cir.2003), courts should refrain from construing statutes to have an effect not intended by Congress. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504–07, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979).
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It is unlikely that Congress, in passing Section 287(g), contemplated ICE would enter into agreements which violated state or local law, or that ICE would merely assume any agreement it enters into under Section 287(g) is in accordance with state law. The whole statutory scheme envisions qualified local officers who work in the place of immigration officers “subject to the direction and the supervision of the Attorney General” and who are considered to be acting “under color of Federal authority for purposes of determining liability and immunity from suit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1157(g) (2) & (8). The statute grants significant federal powers to local authorities and certainly Congress envisioned that those who undertake immigration enforcement functions do so in accordance with the law.
Under Section 702(2) of the APA, “[t]he reviewing court shall ... (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or “(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right[ ].” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & (C). “Reviewing courts are not obliged to stand aside and rubberstamp ... administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.” N.L.R.B. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S.Ct. 980, 13 L.Ed.2d 839 (1965). “Such review is always properly within the judicial province, and courts would abdicate their responsibility if they did not fully review such administrative decisions.” Id. at 291–92. The Court will not dismiss Plaintiffs’ APA claim as set forth in Count II, on the grounds that ICE allegedly relied on Metro’s determination that the MOA was consistent with state and local law.
Finally, ICE moves to dismiss Count II because it claims the MOA does not, in fact, violate the Charter. This is the legal question upon which Plaintiffs’ entire case rests, and it is one which, for the reasons explained in section II. B., below, will be certified to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
3. Count III ICE moves to dismiss Count III because there is no “jurisdictional basis for the claim, and the claim is not viable under the APA.” (Docket No. 55 at 23). In response, Plaintiffs eschew reliance on the APA as the substantive basis for Count III, but allege instead that Renteria’s due process claim is “grounded in the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), and is properly before this Court.” (Docket No. 59 at 19). In reply, the Government argues the claim “is not justiciable because [Renteria] fails to identify any waiver of sovereign

immunity” and “explicitly disavows the APA as the jurisdictional basis for his due process claim, even though the APA is the only waiver of sovereign immunity that possibly could apply to the claim.” (Docket No. 67 at 6).
*8 As a preliminary matter, the Court rejects ICE’s sovereign immunity argument.5 “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1999). The APA contains a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Specifically, it allows for suits against the Untied States to “set aside agency action ... found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a), when the suit calls for “relief other than money damages.” Id. § 702. Even though Renteria’s due process claim is said to arise under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), jurisdiction over the United States is proper because Plaintiffs’ bring a claim under the APA and the Supreme Court has held, “[j]urisdiction over any suit against the Government requires a clear statement from the United States waiving sovereign immunity, ... together with a claim falling within the terms of the waiver.” United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472, 123 S.Ct. 1126, 155 L.Ed.2d 40 (2003) (italics added, internal citations omitted). As the Federal Circuit has recently explained:

5

The Court also rejects ICE’s related contentions that (1)

Plaintiffs fail to allege final agency action and (2) there

has been no final agency action for purposes of the

APA. A two-part test is used to determine whether an

agency’s action is final: “First, the action must mark the

consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking

process—it must not be of a merely tentative or

interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be

one by which rights or obligations have been

determined, or from which legal consequences will

flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78, 117

S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). Here, Plaintiffs

specifically allege that “ICE’s approval of the 287(g)

Memorandum of Agreement constitutes final agency

action.” (Docket No. 45, at 22 ¶ 153). The Court agrees

that ICE’s decision to enter into the MOA is a final

agency action inasmuch as there is no suggestion that

the agreement is tentative, and legal consequences flow

from the agreement because those brought to DCSO

facilities face the possibility that they will be subjected

to an immigration investigation.

The APA can be said to do three things with respect to judicial review of actions or failures to act by government agencies or employees: First, it recognizes a right of judicial review for “agency action” made
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reviewable by another statute and provides rules governing such review. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, 706. Second, it creates a right of judicial review, even in the absence of a review-authorizing statute, for “final agency action” for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court. Id. at § 704. Third, and most importantly for present purposes, it waives sovereign immunity for any action stating a claim against the United States (or its officers or employees) and seeking relief other than money damages. Id. at § 702. The United States and the Commission argue that the waiver of sovereign immunity is limited to the first two categories—the types of judicial review recognized or created by the APA. However, nothing in the text of section 702 limits its scope to “agency action,” as defined in section 704 of the APA, or “final agency action,” for which section 704 of the APA directly provides the right to judicial review. A review of the background and judicial analysis of the sovereign immunity waiver in section 702 leads us to reject the defendants’ argument.
As originally enacted in 1946, the APA provided a cause of action for review of certain actions of federal agencies and officials. It did not, however, expressly waive sovereign immunity for either causes of action grounded in section 704 of the APA or for causes of action brought under other laws, such as a particular statute or the Constitution. An action that did not fall within an exception to the general principles of sovereign immunity was therefore subject to dismissal even though the action was authorized by the APA. In 1976, Congress amended the APA to solve that problem. It did so by amending section 702 to include what is now the second sentence, which consists of a broad waiver of sovereign immunity for actions seeking relief other than money damages against federal agencies, officers, or employees.
*9 Delano Farms Co. v. California Table Grape Comm’n, –––F.3d ––––, ––––, 2011 WL 3689247 at 15 (Fed.Cir. Aug.24, 2011) (italics added); see also, Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 186 (D.C.Cir.2006) (citations omitted) (“ ‘APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity applies to any suit whether under the APA or not’ “ and the second sentence of Section 702 “waives sovereign immunity for ‘[a]n action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages,’ not for an action brought under the APA”); Western Shoshone Nat. Council v. United States, 408 F.Supp.2d 1040, 1048 (D.Nev.2005) (“The APA is a specific waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity for actions for non-monetary relief brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331”). This is the position adopted

by the Sixth Circuit, United States v. City of Detroit, 329 F.3d 515, 520–21 (6th Cir.2003), which has found that the “APA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to non-monetary claims applies to ... distinct constitutional claims ... under the district court’s general federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction of 28 U .S.C. § 1331.” Hamdi v. Napolitano, 620 F.3d 615, 623 (6th Cir.2010). Turning to the merits of Renteria’s due process claim, Count III of the Complaint is titled “Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause (42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bivens [6]).” In the body of that count, Plaintiffs alleges:

6

“Bivens” is a reference to Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.

388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

164. The following practices of Defendant Metro Government violated Plaintiffs’ right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
a. Subjecting Renteria to custodial interrogation for the purpose of obtaining evidence of criminal violations without advising him of his right to counsel;
b. Imprisoning without probable cause after the release of his state charges, and without the issuance of a Form I–247 detainer;
c. Failing to give Renteria notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the grounds for the DCSO detainer before imprisoning him pursuant to it; and
d. Seizing Renteria’s Tennessee State I.D. card and never returning it.
165. The imprisonment of Renteria on the basis of a false detainer without due process was carried out under the guise of the 287(g) authority delegated by ICE to DCSO Jail Enforcement Officers.
166. Upon information and belief, this imprisonment was the result of a DCSO custom, policy, and/or practice of deliberate indifference on the part of the DCSO and ICE supervisors charged with administering the 287(g) Agreement.
167. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages against the Metro Government and a declaratory judgment
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against the Metro Government and ICE declaring that his right to due process was violated.
(Docket No. 45 at 24–25, ¶¶ 164–167). Grounded as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens, Count III, on its face, fails to state a claim against ICE. “To state a viable claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and must show that the deprivation of that right was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Harbin–Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir.2005). ICE is a federal agency, not a person who acts under color of state law. See, Payne v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 Fed. Appx. 836, 837 (6th Cir.2003) (no viable Section 1983 claim against head of federal agency because she acts under color of federal law).
*10 Likewise, the Due Process Clause proscribes conduct by the state, not the federal government. It provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of a citizen, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” See, Shell v. United States Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 355 Fed. Appx. 300, 307 (11th Cir.2009) (plaintiff “cannot show that the ... defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment, because that amendment applies only to state action, and the defendants are a federal agency and a federal employee”).
Plaintiffs’ Bivens claim fares no better. In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that an individual harmed by a federal agent’s violation of the constitution may bring an action for damages against the agent. 403 U.S. at 397. Since then, the Supreme Court has “ ‘responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens be extended into new contexts,” and held that “[a]n extenstion of Bivens to agencies of the Federal Government is not supported by the logic of Bivens itself.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994); see, Salt Lick Bancorp. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 187 Fed. Appx. 428, 435 (6th Cir.2009) (“a Bivens claim may not be brought against a federal agency”).
To be sure, “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... imposes the same restraints on the states that the corresponding clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes on the national government,” Inmates of Orient Corr. Inst., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir.1991), and, therefore, “[a] Federal agency may not, consistently with the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, do that which a State is forbidden to do by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.” Stone v. FDIC, 179 F.3d 1368, 1374 n. 2 (Fed.Cir.1999). It would exalt form over

substance not to consider Count III as having been brought under the Fifth Amendment because Plaintiffs’ specifically allege that ICE’s actions in entering into the MOA violated their due process rights. See, Consejo de Desarrolo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1170 n. 4 (9th Cir.2007) (reading an Equal Protection Clause claim as arising under the Fifth Amendment since it was brought against the Bureau of Reclamation, a federal agency). Even so, the Court does not see how ICE—as opposed to perhaps DCSO employees or ICE supervisors—violated Renteria’s due process rights as alleged in the Complaint.
The physical actions which constitute the alleged due process violations, to wit, subjecting Renteria to custodial interrogation, imprisoning him without probable cause based on a detainer, failing to give him notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the detainer, and seizing his identification card are all actions specifically alleged to have been taken by Metro personnel, not ICE, the agency. ICE’s sole culpability was entering into the MOA allegedly in violation of a city charter; however, “[m]ere violation of a state statute does not infringe the federal constitution,” Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1994), and, in order to establish the deprivation of either procedural or substantive due process, a plaintiff must show an intent more culpable than mere negligence. See, Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 377 (6th Cir.2007) (substantive due process); Wantanabe Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 159 Fed. Appx. 235, 237 (2nd Cir.2005) (procedural due process).
*11 Perhaps recognizing as much, Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that Rentieria’s imprisonment was the result of “custom, policy, and/or practice of deliberate indifference of the DCSO and ICE supervisors charged with administering the 287(g) Agreement on the part of ICE.” (Docket No. 45 at 25 ¶ 166). However, “[t]he deliberate indifference standard is a ‘stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a[n] ... actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action’ ” and “there must be a ‘direct causal link between the ... policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.’ ” Beard v. Whitmore Lake School Dist., 244 Fed. Appx. 607, 611 (6th Cir.2007) (citations omitted).
In response to ICE’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs do not explain the causal link or indeed the policy, practice and custom that they claim led to the alleged deprivation of Renteria’s rights. Plaintiffs merely argue that “the MOA signed by ICE and Metro Government constitutes a final agency action which caused Renteria’s injuries[.]” (Docket No. 59 at 20). Yet the only agency action
8

Renteria-Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville..., Not Reported in...

identified in this case is the entry into a 287(g) agreement which may or may not have violated the Charter. There is no suggestion that 287(g) agreements are facially unconstitutional, or that ICE has knowingly entered into other 287(g) Agreements that are alleged to violate a local law. All that is alleged against ICE (as opposed to “ICE supervisors” who are not Defendants in this case) is that ICE should not have entered into such an agreement with Metro because of the Charter. Plaintiff simply has not alleged how this amounts to deliberate indifference and/or identified a custom, policy or practice by ICE which directly led to the deprivation of Renteria’s constitutional rights. Cf. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryn County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (internal citations omitted) (“we have required a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury ... Locating a ‘policy’ ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body”); Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416, 430 (6th Cir.2006) (citation omitted) (“Deliberate indifference remains distinct from mere negligence. Where a city does create reasonable policies, but negligently administers them, there is no deliberate indifference and therefore no § 1983 liability”).7 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ due process claims, as set forth in Count III, will be dismissed as to ICE.

7

Even though Brown and Perez involved Fourteenth

Amendment claims against municipalities under

Section 1983, the quoted language is useful by analogy

because the Supreme Court in Iqbal held that “the

federal analog” to Section 1983 claims is a Bivens suit

and, thus, “[g]overnment officials may not be held

liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their

subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948.

B. Remaining Motions and Decision to Certify Question to Tennessee Supreme Court As has already been noted, a portion of ICE’s Motion to Dismiss Count II rests upon its contention that the MOA does not violate the Charter. The question of whether the MOA violates the Charter is also pivotal to the remaining motions. Most importantly, that question is the very centerpiece of this lawsuit and may prove to be dispositive of the litigation. Under the particular circumstances of this case, the Court will certify to the Tennessee Supreme Court the question of whether the 287(g) agreement violates the Charter. With that conclusion, the Court will deny the remaining Motions

pending an answer to the certified question, or an indication by the Tennessee Supreme Court that it declines to answer the question.
*12 The decision of whether to certify a question to a state supreme court “rests in the sound discretion of the federal court,” Lehman Bros. v. Shein, 416 U.S. 386, 391, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974), and it is a decision which may be made sua sponte by the court. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 662, 98 S.Ct. 1338, 55 L.Ed.2d 614 (1978). While a matter of discretion, it is not a decision undertaken lightly by this Court.
On the one hand, federal courts often answer state law questions, just as state courts answer federal questions. Thus, the practice of certifying questions can be overused and add unnecessary burden on the answering court, particularly when the certification involves routine, run-of-the mill legal questions. See, Seals v. H & F, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 237, 241 n. 3 (Tenn.2010) (noting that the Tennessee Supreme Court does “not share[ ] ... the harsh assessment of the general merits of the certification process” espoused by some commentators, but also observing “certifying a question is not always the best option”).
On the other hand, certification eliminates guesswork and speculation about questions of state law, and “[t]aking advantage of certification made available by a State may ‘greatly simplif[y]’ an ultimate adjudication in federal court.” Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997); Shein, 416 U.S. at 386 (by certifying a question of state law, the federal court may save “time, energy and resources and hel[p] build a cooperative judicial federalism”). It also serves the salutary function of “protect[ing] states’ sovereignty,” something which “ ‘is no small matter, especially since a federal court’s error may perpetuate itself in state courts until the state’s highest court corrects it.’ ” Haley v. Univ. of Tennessee–Knoxville, 188 S.W.3d 518, 521 (Tenn.2006) (citation omitted).
Recognizing that the process should be used sparingly, the Court finds that certification of the state law question is appropriate in this case. The answer to the question will determine whether correctional officers in Nashville and Davidson County are lawfully performing immigration enforcement duties. It will also answer the question of whether many local citizens who enter the jail system are subjected to unlawful investigations. Additional, since the very beginning of this case, Plaintiffs have desired an answer from the Tennessee state courts as to whether the 287(g) Agreement violates the Charter, and a decision on
9

Renteria-Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville..., Not Reported in...

the certified question by the Tennessee Supreme Court will provide the definitive answer to this important question.
Under Tennessee law,
The Supreme Court may, at its discretion, answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, a District Court of the United States in Tennessee, or a United States Bankruptcy Court in Tennessee. This rule may be invoked when the certifying court determines that, in a proceeding before it, there are questions of law of this state which will be determinative of the cause and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
*13 Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 23 § 1. In accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, the Court finds that (1) the issue of whether the MOA violates the Charter will, one way or the other, effectively determine the outcome of this case, and (2) there does not appear to be a Tennessee Supreme Court decision which is directly controlling.
First, each of the causes of action brought by Plaintiffs’ have as their genesis the alleged illegality of the MOA under the Charter. Counts I directly alleges that the MOA gives employees of the DCSO powers which exceed those allowed under the Charter, Count II alleges a violation of the APA precisely because the 287(g) Agreement violates the Charter, and Count III alleges due process violations because of the 287(g) Agreement. Even Count IV, which alleges that Renteria was falsely imprisoned for “nearly twelve hours without any legal authority,” is grounded on the claim that said imprisonment was “a direct result of the DCSO’s 287(g) Program .” (Docket Entry No. 45 at 16 & 24 ¶ ¶ 102 & 169). Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief also hinges upon the validity of the 287(g) Agreement under the Charter. (Id. at 24–26 §§ (a) & (b)).
Second, there does not appear to be any controlling precedent from the Tennessee Supreme Court that addresses the question of whether DCSO officers performing immigration duties under a 287(g) Agreement

violate the Charter, although decision discussed the Charter in relation to the DCSO and the Nashville Police Department. In Poe, the Court was presented with several different issues regarding the Charter, including: “Are the criminal law enforcement powers and authority in the area of the Metropolitan Government vested in the Metropolitan Chief of Police exclusively?” Poe, 383 S.W.2d at 267. Looking to the Charter, the Court observed that Section 16.06 dealt “with the functions of constitutional and county officers,” by providing:
The Sheriff, elected as provided by the Constitution of Tennessee, is hereby recognized as an officer of the Metropolitan Government. He shall have such duties as are prescribed by T.C.A. 8–810 or by other provisions of the general law, except that within the area of the Metropolitan Government the Sheriff shall not be the principal conservator of the peace. The function as principal conservator of the peace is hereby transferred and assigned to the Metropolitan Chief of Police as set out in Article 8, Chapter 2 of this Charter.
Id. at 273. Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that, in light of the language of the Charter, “[i]t is plain to us that it is the purpose and intent of the Charter to take away from the Sheriff the responsibility for the preservation of the public peace, prevention and detection of crime, apprehension of criminals, protection of personal and property rights except insofar as may be necessary and incidental to his general duties as outlined in T.C.A. § 8–810 and to transfer such duties to the Department of Police of the Metropolitan Government.” Id. at 275.
*14 Tellingly, the Poe decision was penned half a century ago. In its opinion, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that times and circumstances change:
Any language employed by us over and above that necessary and proper to dispose of the issues presented as aforesaid is not binding on future decisions of this Court.
It is a familiar law that a decision is authority for the point or points decided, and nothing more, and that general expressions in an opinion are to be taken in connection with the case in which they were used, and when they go beyond that, they are not authority for another case.
10

Renteria-Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville..., Not Reported in...

* * *
The Court in construing the Charter provisions of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County has always considered the stated purpose of the Amendment, that is, to consolidate functions of the two former governments so as to eliminate duplication and overlapping of duties and services by which economic savings to taxpayers will be realized.
It is our duty to observe the doctrine of stare decisis as one of commanding importance giving as it does firmness and stability to principles of law evidenced by judicial decisions. The Court, however, should not close its doors to the changing conditions, but should so fashion its opinions that the new truly grows out of the old as the product of a changing environment.
We have and do keep this thought in mind in passing upon matters that have and may be presented to us in regard to this new concept of metropolitan government, looking for precedents where they may be found to guide us, and where there are none, we undertake to apply logic and reason in resolving the complex situations which have been herein and heretofore presented to us.
Poe, 383 S.W.2d at 277 (internal citations omitted).
Having decided to certify the question of the legality of the 287(g) Agreement under the Charter, the Court will call upon the parties to formulate the precise facts which serve as the basis for the claim that the 287(g) Agreement either does, or does not, violate the Charter. This should not be too difficult a task since the MOA contains a listing of the immigration enforcement duties, Plaintiffs have identified those duties in his Complaint, and no arguments thusfar have been raised about the actual duties contemplated by the Agreement.
The parties should seek to arrive at a stipulation which

includes a complete list of the duties performed by DCSO personnel under the Agreement. It is only fair that, if the Tennessee Supreme Court decides to take the time and effort to answer the certified question, it have before it a concise but complete set of facts. See, Shorts v. Bartholomew, 278 S.W.3d 268, 271 n. 1 (Tenn.2009) (noting that because it did not have the record and “federal district court did not certify the facts,” Tennessee Supreme Court was required to look to prior orders entered by the federal courts in order to determine the facts). Moreover, the Court does not want to be presented with a situation wherein the Tennessee Supreme Court answers the question, only to have a party or parties call the answer into question by claiming that some other unlisted duties were not considered.
III. CONCLUSION
*15 On the basis of the foregoing, ICE’s Motion to Dismiss Count II will be denied at this time, but the Motion will be granted as to Plaintiffs’ due process claim against ICE as set forth in Count III. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Counts I and II will be denied. With that ruling, Metro’s Motions to Hold Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in Abeyance and its alternative Motion to Open Case for Necessary Discovery will be denied as moot.
Finally, the Court will certify to the Tennessee Supreme Court the question of whether the 287(g) Agreement between ICE and Metro violates the Charter. The parties will be required to meet in person and confer in an effort to arrive at a complete stipulation as to the duties that DCSO personnel perform under the 287(g) Agreement.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
	  

11

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

DANIEL RENTERIA-VILLEGAS,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

No. 3:11-00218

)

Judge Sharp

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF

)

NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY,

)

)

Defendant.

)

ORDER

On April 23, 2013, the Court entered an Order alwloing counsel for Plaintiff Daniel Renteria-

Villegas to withdraw. That Order also provided:

The Plaintiff will be allowed thirty (30) daysfrom the date of the entry of this order within which to retain substitute counsel or to notify the Court that he intends to proceed pro se. If substitute counsel is retained, said substitute counsel shall file a Notice of Entry of Appearance with the Cl erk before the expiration of this 30-day time period. If substitute counsel is not retained, Plaintiff shall notify the Court in writing before the expiration of this 30-dayperiod that he wishes to proceed pro se.

(Docket No. 132). No appearance has been entered onbehalf of Plaintiff, he has not indicated that

he intends to proceed pro se, and he has not otherwise responded to the Order. In fact, from all

outward appearances, Mr. Renteria-Villegas appears to have abandoned this case. Since Mr.

Renteria-Villegas is the only named Plaintiff in the Fourth Amended Complaint (Docket No. 121),

and since he is no longer diligently prosecuting this action, this case is hereby DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

It is SO ORDERED.

____________________________________ KEVIN H. SHARP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 134 Filed 05/29/13 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 2479

 
 EXHIBIT A
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 1 of 190 PageID #: 6

STATE OF TENNESSEE 20'1'H JUDICIAL DISTRICT. CHANCERY COURT

SUMMONS

PLAINTIFF

DEFENDANT

Daniel Renteria-Villegas

Daren Hall, Sheriff, in his individual capacity;

MNPD Officer Ricky Bearden, in his individual capacity;

TO: (NAME AND ADDRESS OF DEFENDANT)

Metro Govt. of Nashville and Davidson Co.

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County C/o Karl Dean, Mayor
One Public Square - Metro Cthouse, Suite 100 Nashville, TN 37201

Method of Service:
G Certified Mail G Davidson Co. Sheriff G *Co:mm. Of Insurance

G *Secretary of State G *Out of County Sheriff G Private Process Server

List each defendant on a separate summons.

G Other *Attach Required Fees

YOU ARE SUMMONED TO DEFEND A CIVIL ACTION FILED AGAINST YOU IN CHANCERY COURT, DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE. YOUR DEFENSE MUST BE MADE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS FROM THE DATE THIS SUMMONS IS SERVED UPON YOU. YOU MUST FILE YOUR DEFENSE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND SEND A COPY TO THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY AT THE ADDRESS LISTED BELOW. IF YOU FAIL TO DEFEND THIS ACTION BY THE ABOVE DATE, JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT CAN BE RENDERED AGAINST YOU FOR THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE COMPLAINT.

Attorney for plaintiff or plaintiff if filing Pro Se: (Name, address &telephone number)
Elliott Ozment Law Offices of Elliott Ozment 1214 Murfreesboro Pike Nashville, TN 37217
615-321-8888

FILED, ISSUED & ATIESTED

JAN -7 Z011

CRISTI SCOTI, Clerk and Master

By:

1 Public Square

Suite 308

Nashville, TN 37201

Deputy Clerk & Master
NOTICE OF DISPOSITION DATE

The disposition date of this case is twelve months from date of filing. The case must be resolved or set for trial by this date or it will be dismissed by the Court for failure to prosecute pursuant to T.R.C.P. 41.02 and Local Rule 18.

If you think the case will require more than one year to resolve or set for trial, you must send a letter to the Clerk and Master at the earliest practicable date asking for an extension of the disposition date and stating your reasons. Extensions will be granted only when exceptional circumstances exist.

TO THE SHERIFF:

DATE RECEIVED

Sheriff

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Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 2 of 190 PageID #: 7

IN

THE

CHANCERY

COURT

OF

DAVIDSON

COUNTY,

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~ c;:.. / c.---

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(.. ' --=-:-:. ';'.".:/

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DANIEL RENTERIA-VILLEGAS,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

\,

(·

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c, : : .

'1~

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--~- ·, <-;,~

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CASE NO.

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DARON HALL, in his official capacity as

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-- ·- --~ ~, - ·~_
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Sheriff of Davidson County, and individually; )

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF

)

NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY; )

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·,_.

and OFFICER RICKEY BEARDEN, in his

)

individual capacity,

)

)

Defendants.

)

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES Plaintiff Daniel Renteria-Villegas ("Renteria"), by and through his undersigned counsel, files this Verified Complaint against Defendants, Daron Hall, Sheriff of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County ("Hall"), the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County ("Metro Government"), a.Ild Officer Rickey Bearden ofthe Metropolitan Police Department of Nashville/Davidson County.
I. Preliminary Statement 1. In 1963, the Charter of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County transferred the law enforcement role as principal conservator of the peace from the Davidson County Sheriff to the Chief of the newly created Metropolitan Police Department. Metropolitan Charter of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee §§ 16.05, 8.202. See Certified Copy of Metro Charter§§ 16.05 and 8.202 (attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03).

1
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 3 of 190 PageID #: 8

2. The very next year, the Tennessee Supreme Court held: "It is plain to us that it is the purpose and intent of the Charter to take away the responsibility from the Sheriff for the preservation of the public peace, prevention and detection of crime, apprehension of criminals, protection of personal property rights except insofar as may be necessary and incidental to his general duties as outlined is T.C.A. sec. 8-8-10 and to transfer such duties to the Department of Police of the Metropolitan Government." Metropolitan Government ofNashville and Davidson County v. Poe, 383 S.W.2d 265, 275 (Tenn. 1964).
3. In 1996, Congress added Section 287(g) to the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), which authorizes the federal government to enter into written agreements allowing the "performance of immigration officer functions by State officers and employees." 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAlRA), §_ 133, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). Section 287(g) allows State and local law enforcement officers to perform federal immigration law enforcement functions only ''to the extent consistent with State and local law." 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(l).
4. In October 2009, after extensive efforts led by Defendant Daron Hall, Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County ("Metro Government") approved a resolution authorizing the Davidson County Sheriffs Office ("DCSO") to enter into a 287(g) contract with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DRS) -Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). See Memorandum of Agreement ("287(g) contract" or "contract")
(attached hereto as Exhibit 2 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.3). See
also Metro Council Resolution 2009-997 (approved Oct. 20, 2009; signed by Mayor Karl Dean Oct. 23, 2009) (attached hereto as Exhibit 3 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03).
2
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 4 of 190 PageID #: 9

5. To "enable DCSO to identify and process immigration violators and conduct criminal investigations within its area of responsibility[,]" the contract deputizes DCSO personnel, called "Jail Enforcement Officers" ("JEOs"), "to perform immigration officer functions ... regarding the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens." 287(g) Contract at~ 1.
6. Appendix D to the contract lists the specific federal law enforcement functions delegated to DCSO Jail Enforcement Officers. These functions include ''the power and authority to interrogate any person believed to be an alien as to his right to be in the United States (INA § 287(a)(l) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(l))" and the "power and authority ... to take and consider evidence (INA§ 287(b) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(2))." 287(g) Contract at Appendix D.
7. Speaking under oath, Defendant Hall has offered his understanding of the interrogation and evidence-taking functions DCSO 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officers perform: "Well, the way I understand it, it's just like a Police Department, or, you know, taking their charges to a district attorney, for example; here's what we believe happened, here are the facts surrounding_ this case; and then it's determined whether to pursue charges. Charges, in my analogy, is that the federal agent then takes that case to a federal judge. Very similar to that. We're doing the grunt work of the case and we're turning in what we have on the individual[.]" See Excerpt from Deposition of Daron Hall (attached hereto as Exhibit 4 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. I0.03).
8. Defendant Hall's understanding of these functions matches that of the United States Supreme Court, which construed the federal iinrnigration law enforcement power to "interrogate" as "precisely the same as that of a policeman, constable, sheriff, or Federal Bureau of Investigation agent who interrogates a person, perhaps himself a suspect, in connection with a
3
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 5 of 190 PageID #: 10

murder or some other crime." United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 191 (1956) Black, J. concurring.
9. Plaintiff is a natural born citizen of the United States who was subjected to a law enforcement investigation by one or more DCSO Jail Enforcement Officers acting under the authority of the 287(g) contract and the powers it delegates.
10. During this law enforcement investigation, one or more Jail Enfprcement Officers interrogated Plaintiff about suspected violations of federal innnigration and criminal law.
11. As a result of this law enforcement investigation, Defendant DCSO detained Plaintiff for twelve hours after a court order required his release.
12. As a part of this law enforcement investigation, the DCSO required Plaintiff to supply documentary proof of his U.S. citizenship in order to secure his release.
13. The JEOs' investigation of Plaintiff constituted law enforcement by DCSO employees.
14. This law enforcement activity was not necessary and incidental to the Sheriff's duty to house inmates and serve civil process. Cf Metro Legal Opinion No. 2004-04, Department of Law Metropolitan Government ofNashville and Davidson County (From: Sue B. Cain, Deputy Director of Law; To: Daron Hall, Sheriff of Davidson County; Approved by: Karl Dean, Director of Law) (Oct. 6, 2004) (analyzing the Sheriff's duty to investigate and pursue an escapee) (attached hereto as Exhibit 5 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03). See also DCSO Policy No. 1-3.142, Preservation of Physical Evidence at 2 (listing crimes calling for DCSO investigation and preservation of evidence (attached hereto as Exhibit 6 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03)
4 Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 6 of 190 PageID #: 11

15. Consequently, DCSO's law enforcement investigation of the Plaintiff and the contract that authorized it violate Sections 16.05 and 8.202 of the Metro Charter, the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Poe, and the Tennessee Constitution.
II. Nature of the Complaint 16. This is an action for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. Pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 29-14-102 and 29-14-103, Plaintiff seeks a declaration ofhis rights and a construction of the validity of the 2009 287(g) contract between Metro Government and ICE. 17. Under the claimed authority of this contract, Defendant Metro Government allowed Defendant Hall and the DCSO to implement a standardized policy, custom, and practice that violates sections 16.05 and 8.202 of the Metro Charter and Poe by empowering DCSO personnel to perform civil and criminal law enforcement functions, including the "investigation and apprehension" of suspected aliens, that are not "necessary and incidental" to Defendant Hall's duties as the custodian of Metro's jails. 18. Pursuant to Appendix D of the Agreement, DCSO Jail Enforcement Officers have the authority to "interrogate" and "take and consider evidence" from any inmate who enters the Davidson County Jail system and is suspected to be foreign-born. 19. The express objective of their interrogation and evidence collection is to determine the inmate's right to be and remain in the United States, and to ascertain if the inmate has violated federal immigration and criminal laws. 20. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the 287(g) contract is void ab initio because it authorizes DCSO employees to perform law enforcement functions in excess of the Sheriffs authority under the Metro Charter - specifically, "the power and authority to
5
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 7 of 190 PageID #: 12

interrogate" under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1), 8 C.P.R. § 287.5(a)(1) and the power to take and consider evidence, other than fingerprints, under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(b), 8 C.P.R. § 287.5(a)(2).
21. Plaintiff also seeks a temporary and a permanent injunction, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
22. This is Plaintiffs first application for extraordinary relief. Ill. Jurisdiction and Venue
23. This Court has jurisdiction over this action and the parties under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-102 and 29-14-101 et seq.
24. Venue is proper in this Court under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-4-lOl(a) as the wrongful and unlawful conduct for which Plaintiff seeks relief has occurred and is occurring in Davidson County, Tennessee. Plaintiff and, upon information and belief, all Defendants are currently located in Davidson County, Tennessee.
IV. Parties 25. Plaintiff Daniel Renteria-Villegas ("Renteria") is a nineteen year-old United States citizen of Latino race, ethnicity, and appearance. He is a member of a protected class under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. At all times relevant to this action, he has resided in Davidson County, Tennessee. 26. Defendant Daron Hall is the Sheriff of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County. Defendant Hall is responsible for performing the duties of Sheriff as defined by the Tennessee Constitution, the Tennessee Code Annotated, the Charter of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County, and the Metro Code. Defendant Hall's principal responsibilities under the Metro Charter are limited to housing inmates and serving civil process. Defendant Hall is a signatory, on behalf of the DCSO, to the current 287(g) Memorandum of Agreement between
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ICE and the DCSO. Sheriff Hall is the chief policymaker and decision-maker with ultimate responsibility for the activities of the DCSO. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief, and in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages.
27. Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County ("Metro Government") is an incorporated, legal subdivision of the State of Tennessee. Metro Govenunent is governed by a Mayor and a Metro Council, subject to the organic document enabling its creation - the Metropolitan Charter of Nashville and Davidson County - and the Tennessee Constitution and Tennessee Code Annotated.
28. Defendant Rickey Bearden is an Officer of the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department. He is sued in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages.
V. Factual Allegations 29. Plaintiff Daniel Renteria-Villegas is a natural born citizen of the United States. 30. He was born in Portland, Oregon. 31. Renteria is of Latino race, ethnicity, and appearance. 32. He is a native Spanish-speaker oflirnited English proficiency. 33. On August 14, 2010, he was arrested by the Metro Nashville Police Department. 34. The August 14 Arrest Report correctly states Renteria's Place of Birth is "Portland, OR." See Arrest Report ~o. 100069817, August 14,2010 (attached hereto as Exhibit 7 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03). 35. The DCSO booked Renteria into custody at the Criminal Justice Center ("CJC") the same day, and his booking documents also reflect his place of birth is Oregon. See DCSO JMS Demographics Page, Aug. 14, 2010 (attached hereto as Exhibit 8 and incorporated herein as provided byTeru1. R. Civ. P. 10.03).
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36. Shortly after his arrest, Renteria's family enlisted the help of Barbara Murphy to assist with determining the bond amount and securing his release. See Affidavit of Barbara Murphy, ~ 2 ("Murphy Affidavit"). (attached hereto as Exhibit 9 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03).
37. Murphy contacted the DCSO by phone on or around August 16, 2010 to determine the amount of Renteria's. bond. Exh. 9, Murphy Affidavit,~ 4.
38. Murphy provided the DCSO with Renteria's full name and date of birth. Exh. 9, Murphy Affidavit,~ 5.
39. Upon information and belief, the DCSO employee informed Ms. Murphy that Renteria was being held subject to an "ICE Hold." Exh. 9, Murphy Affidavit,~ 6.
40. An "ICE Hold" is a notation in the DCSO Jail Management System (JMS) indicating that the inmate is under federal investigation by DCSO's 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officers and ICE for suspected violations of immigration and criminal law.
41. Murphy contacted Renteria's family and told them about the ICE hold. The family informed Murphy that Renteria was born in the United States. Exh. 9, Murphy Affidavit,
mp-8.
42. Murphy called the DCSO again and informed the officer wh~ answered the call that Renteria is a U.S. citizen. Exh. 9, Murphy Affidavit,~ 9.
43. Upon information and belief, the DCSO employee with whom Murphy spoke during this call told her that in order to release Renteria, the DCSO required his U.S. passport . and his original birth certificate as proof of U.S. citizenship. Exh. 9, Murphy Affidavit, ~ 10.
44. Murphy relayed this message to Renteria's family, and they provided her with Renteria's original U.S. passport and original birth certificate. Exh. 9, Murphy Affidavit,~ 11.
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45. Murphy made a copy of the biographic page of Renteria's passport and a copy of his birth certificate. Exh. 9, Murphy Affidavit,~ 12.
46. Murphy went to ere on the evening of August 19, 2010 with the photocopies of Renteria's passport and birth certificate. Exh. 9, Murphy Affidavit,~ 13.
47. Murphy presented these documents to an AfricanwAmerican male DCSO employee at a window in the Sheriffs Office at the ere. Exh. 9, Murphy Affidavit,~ 14.
48. The DCSO employee took possession of these documents and did not return them. Exh. 9, Murphy Affidavit,~ 15.
49. The next day, Renteria's family called Murphy and told her that the DCSO required original documents, not just photocopies. Exh. 9, Murphy Affidavit,~ 16.
50. Renteria's family picked up the original documents from Murphy on August 19. Exh. 9, Murphy Affidavit,~ 17.
51. At or around 9:23p.m. on August 19, 2010, a representative of A.B. Bonding Co., Inc. posted Mr. Renteria's bond. See Criminal Appearance Recognizance (attached hereto as Exhibit 10 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03).
52. Renteria was scheduled for release at 11:35 p.m. on August 19, according to the DCSO's Jail Management System records. See DCSO rMS Release Form (attached hereto as Exhibit 11 and incorporated herein as provided byTeru1. R. Civ. P. 10.03).
53. Renteria's family and friends arrived at the CJC late in the evening on August 19, 2010.
54. · After being informed by a DCSO employee that Renteria would not be released unless his original U.S. passport and birth certificate were presented, one of these friends showed
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Renteria's original birth certificate and passport I.D. page to an African-American male DCSO employee at the CJC.
55. Upon information and belief, the DCSO employee took possession of the original documents, made photocopies, and returned the originals.
56. The DCSO did not release Renteria until 1: 18 a.m. on August 20, 2010, according to the DCSO's records. See DCSO Jail Management System Log for Daniel R. Villegas, Aug. 14-August 20, 2010 (attached hereto as Exhibit 12 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn.
R. Civ. P. 10.03).
57. On Sunday, August 22, 2010, Renteria was arrested at or around 4:46p.m. by Defendant Ricky Bearden on a separate charge at his horne in Davidson County.
58. This arrest occurred pursuant to a criminal warrant that was subsequently dismissed by a General Sessions Judge for lack of probable cause. See Criminal Court Clerk Case Search Result, Case No. GS505783 (attached hereto as Exhibit 13 and incorporated herein as provided byTenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03).
59. Defendant Bearden never asked Renteria where he was born. 60. Bearden never asked Renteria if he was from Mexico. 61. During the arrest at Renteria's house, Defendant Bearden asked for Renteria's I. D. 62. Renteria handed his Tennessee state I.D. card to Bearden. 63. Bearden reviewed the card and handed it back to Renteria. 64. Rent~ria put the I.D. back in his wallet.
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65. Upon information and belief, Defendant Bearden completed an Arrest Report for Renteria's August 22 arrest. See Arrest Report for Arrest Number 100072288. (attached hereto as Exhibit 14 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03).
66. According to this Arrest Report, Renteria's Place of Birth is "Mexico." 67. Upon information and belief, Defendant Bearden had no articulable reason to believe Renteria was born in Mexico other than his Latina-sounding name, his Latino ethnicity, his Latino appearance, and his lack of English proficiency. 68. Upon inf<?rmation and belief, Defendant Bearden was aware at the time he arrested Renteria that the DCSO operates a 287(g) program in Metro's jails. 69. Upon information and belief, Defendant Bearden was aware at the time of Renteria's arrest that DCSO officers interview foreign-born arrestees to determine immigration status. 70. Upon information and belief, Defendant Bearden was aware at the time he arrested Renteria that deportation is c,me possible consequence of the 287(g) program. 71. Upon information and belief, prior to hls arrest of Renteria, Defendant Bearden had arrested both United States citizens and non-citizens pursuant to his duties as an MNPD officer. 72. Upon information and belief, Defendant Bearden knew that listing Renteria's Place of Birth as a foreign country would subject Renteria to the DCSO's 287(g) program. 73. Despite Defendant Bearden's knowledge of the 287(g) program and its possil:.>le consequences, and despite his failure to question Renteria about his place of birth, Defendant Bearden listed "Mexico" on the arrest report.
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74. Between 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on August 22, DCSO employees booked Renteria into the DCSO's Criminal Justice Center facility. See DCSO Jail Management System Log for Daniel R. Villegas, Aug. 22-Sept. 4, 2010 ("JMS Log II") (attached heretoas Exhibit 15 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03).
75. Among the belongings Renteria had in his possession at the time of booking was his Tennessee state Identification Document (I.D.) card.
76. A DCSO employee took this card and all Renteria's other belongings into the DCSO's possession at the time ofbooking.
77. When DCSO deputies booked Renteria into the Criminal Justice Center, they asked him where he was born.. See DCSO Policy No. 1-4.100, Inmate Admission and Orientation Procedures (attached hereto as Exhibit 16 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03).
78. He responded that he was born in Portland, Oregon. 79. The demographic infortnation in his JMS file states his P[lace] O[f] B[irth] as "OR[EGON]". See DCSO JMS Demographics Report for Daniel R. Villegas (attached hereto as Exhibit 17 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03). 80. At approximately 5:57p.m. on August 22, during the booking process, a DCSO deputy or employee in the booking department named "K. Cash" placed an ICE Hold on Renteria. See Exh. 15, JMS Log II (showing the following notation on Renteria's JMS Log: "Hold Inserted: Type= ICE- Sent to ICE. Status: Active."). 81. At 7:57 p.m. on August 22, a DCSO deputy named "W. Sydnor" updated Renteria's ICE Hold status to reflect that an active ICE investigation was underway. See Exh.
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15, JMS Log II, (showing notation: "Hold Inserted: Type = ICE - Investigative. Status =
Active."). 82. Upon information and belief, a DCSO deputy placed a red stamp that reads "ICE"
on Renteria's intake and booking paperwork and dropped that paperwork into a box for DCSO's 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officers to retrieve. See Arnada Armenta, From Sheriff's Deputies to Immigration Officers: Screening Immigrant Status in a Tennessee Jail, at 9 (attached hereto as Exhibit 18 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03).
83. At this point, DCSO's 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officers or other DCSO employees had initiated a federal law enforcement investigation of Renteria to determine his immigration status, and whether he had made a false claim to U.S. citizenship.
84. Constance Taite is the Administrative Counsel to the Davidson County Sheriffs Office.
85. Responding to an Open Records Request submitted by undersigned counsel on Renteria's behalf, Taite stated that Renteria "was interviewed because the arrest report stated his birthplace was Mexico, which conflicts with what he later told booking staff." See Email from Constance Taite to Elliott Ozment, January 4, 2011, 6:59PM (attached hereto as Exhibit 19 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03).
86. At approximately 9:47a.m. on August 24, 2010, DCSO 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officer Marty Patterson scheduled Renteria for an "ICE Interview" to occur between 10:30 a.m. and 11 :00 a.m. the same day. See Exh. 15 JMS Log II.
87. This 287(g) interrogation occurred in a small office within the CJC's booking area between 12:26 p.m. and 1:09 p.m. on August 24. See Exh. 15 JMS Log.
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88. The sign above the door on this small office reads, "ICE OFFICE." See Photographs of DCSO 287(g) Office, (attached hereto as Exhibit 20 and incorporated herein as ·provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03).
89. Upon information and belief, a computer terminal inside this ICE office is equipped with ICE's !DENT/ENFORCE software and database. See DHS-ICE Office of Professional Responsibility Management Inspections Unit 287(g) Program Review Findings (May 12-14, 2009) at 8 ("The processing area was adequately equipped with working
IDENT/ENFORCE terminals and printers.") (attached h~reto as Exhibit 21 and incorporated
herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03). 90. Upon information and belief, the !DENT/ENFORCE system is used by DCSO
287(g) Jail Enforcement Officers to collect and share with ICE and other law enforcement agencies information the DCSO JEOs gather during encounters with suspected foreign-born inmates.
91. Upon information and belief, a DCSO 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officer utilized the !DENT/ENFORCE system and other computer technology during Daniel Renteria's interrogation on August 24, 2010.
92. The purpose of the DCSO Jail Enforcement Officer's interrogation of Renteria was to elicit specific information related to possible violations of federal immigration and criminal law. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(l). See also Sample ICE Interview Data Collection Sheet
(attached hereto as Exhibit 22 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03)
93. During this interrogation, a male DCSO 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officer told Renteria that he was suspected of having lied about being born in the United States.
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94. Making a false claim to U.S. citizenship is a violation offederal criminal law. See
18 u.s.c. § 911.
95. The Jail Enforcement Officer asked Renteria the name of the hospital where he was born. ·
96. Renteria truthfully answered that he was born at St. Vincent's Hospital. 97. Renteria's answer, however, did not appear to allay the Jail Enforcement Officer's suspicions about Renteria's citizenship. 98. Improper entry into the United States by a non-U.S. citizen is a federal crime, as is illegal reentry. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326. 99. Constance Taite has previously stated that a DCSO inmate will be subjected to 287(g) investigation if the inmate "claims to have been born at Baptist Hosp., but speaks little English." See Email from Constance Taite to TBALlNK-TALK listserv, July 18, 2007, 3:05:52 PM CDT (attached hereto as Exhibit 23 and incorporated herein as provided by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03). 100. Upon information and belief, the DCSO's booking and intake staff and DCSO 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officers have an unwritten policy, practice and custom of subjecting any Latino or Hispanic inmate who is not fluent in English to a 287(g) investigation. 101. Upon information and belief, this unwritten policy, practice, and custom occurs regardless of whether the inmate claims to be a United States citizen, or reports being foreignborn. 102. Upon information and belief, this practice involves flagging the inmate for investigation by the DCSO Jail Enforcement, and then letting the JEO sort out the Latino or Hispanic inmate's citizenship status.
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103. The DCSO 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officer infonned Renteria that the social security number he provided at booking did not match th~ one on a previous report.
104. Using a false social security number is a federal crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028. 105. When Renteria recited his social security number, the DCSO Jail Enforcement Officer appeared to type that number on a computer keyboard. 106. Renteria recalls the DSCO JEO interrogator looking at a computer monitor after typing the numbers into the computer saying, "Oh, okay. That's right." 107. This indicated to Renteria that his social security number had come back on a computer database as being valid, and as belonging to him. 108. Upon information and belief, at this point in the interrogation and investigation, the DCSO Jail Enforcement Officer had objectively verified using a government or other database that Renteria possessed a valid social security number. 109. In addition to questioning him about his social security number, the DCSO Jail Enforcement Officer questioned Renteria about the names of his family members, their places of birth, and their current places ofresidence. 110. Renteria responded that both of his parents had been born in Mexico, and that some of his relatives currently live in Mexico. He also said that other relatives currently live in the United States. 111. During the interrogation, Renteria saw his Tennessee state I.D. card paper-clipped to a file folder that the DCSO Jail Enforcement Officer was using as part of the investigation. 112. Renteria saw several pages of paper, including some that appeared to be light pink, like carbon copies, inside this file folder.
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113. The Jail Enforcement Officer took Renteria's I.D. card off the file folder, showed it to Renteria, and asked Renteria how he had obtained it.
114. Renteria told the officer he used his U.S. passport and social security card when he applied for his state I.D.
115. Using a false identification document is a federal crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028. 116. Tennessee law requires applicants to demonstrate proof of U.S. citizenship or other lawful immigration status as a pre-requisite for obtaining a.valid, state-issued I.D. 117. The DSCO Jail Enforcement Officer who conducted the 287(g) interrogation did not lift the ICE Investigative Hold when the interrogation ended. See Exh. 15, JMS Log II. 118. Nor did the JEO tell Renteria what, if anything, he could do to prove his U.S. citizenship to the DCSO and ICE. 119. The JEO did not ask that Renteria arrange with his family to provide documents proving his U.S. citizenship. 120. Upon information and belief, at or around 12:52 p.m. on September 3, 2010, the DCSO became aware via the JMS that a Davidson County -General Sessions Judge dismissed the charge for which Renteria was arrested on August 22, 2010. See Exh.15, JMS Log ll. 121. Upon information and belief, it was not until 9:56p.m. on September 3, 2010 that DCSO deputy or employee "W. Ford" deactivated Renteria's ICE Investigative Hold. See Exh. 15, JMS Log II. 122. "W. Ford" lifted the ICE Investigative Hold only after Renteria's friend and relatives brought his original birth certificate and original passport to the CJC late in the evening on September 3, 2010.
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123. A DCSO employee made a copy of these documents, returned the originals, and kept the copies.
124. Even after DCSO employees had original docmnents proving Renteria's U.S. citizenship and made photocopies of those documents at around 10:00 p.m. on September 3, it took almost three more hours for Defendants to release him.
125. The DCSO finally released Renteria at 12:48 a.m. on September 4, 2010. See Exh. 15, JMS Log II.
126. The twelve hours Renteria spent in Defendant DCSO's custody after his charge was dismissed were a direct result of the DCSO's 287(g) Program and the ICE Investigative Hold.
127. DCSO employees did not return Renteria's Tennessee state I.D. card when he was released on September 4, 2010.
128. Approximately three days later, on or around September 7, 2010, Renteria visited the CJC and asked DCSO to return his Tennessee state I.D. card.
129. An African-American male DCSO employee on the second floor of the CJC asked for Renteria's full name.
130. Then the DCSO employee typed something into a computer. 131. After reading what was on the screen, the DCSO employee said that Renteria could not have his I.D. card back. 132. Three days after Renteria's release, at around 12:43 p.m. on September 7, 2010, DCSO 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officer Marty Patterson added one final note Renteria's Jail Management System record: "Updated inmate: Villegas, Daniel . R. control no: 436258." See Exh. 15, JMS Log II.
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133. Upon information and belief, a 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officer was the last DCSO employee to make a record in Renteria's file after his release.
134. Nevertheless, the DCSO's 287(g) program contends that it has no 287(g) file on Renteria in its possession. See Exh. 19, Email from Constance Taite in Response to Open Records Request.
135. DCSO also claims that it does not have Renteria's Tennessee state I.D. card. See Exh.19.
136. DCSO Jail Enforcement Officers either failed to create an investigative file on Renteria, or have failed to maintain that file.
137. Despite being provided photocopies of Renteria's citizenship documents on two separate occasions, the DCSO maintains that it has no such records in its possession. See E:xh. 19.
138. Even though the General Sessions Judge dismissed Renteria's August 22 charge, Renteria's criminal attorney has informed him that the two other criminal charges from August 14, 2010 have been bound over.
139. If for any reason Renteria is taken back into DCSO custody, there is nothing to stop Defendants' 287(g) program from opening yet another investigation and issuing yet another ICE Investigative Hold, once again forcing Renteria to prove his U.S. citizenship in order to secure his freedom.
140. As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiff has suffered a deprivation of his liberty, public humiliation, severe emotional distress and discrimination based on his Latino race, ethnicity, and appearance, all resulting in damages in the amount of$100,000.
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VI. Causes of Action
Count I -Violation of the Metro Charter and Metro v. Poe
{Tenn. Code.§§ 29-14-102, 103, 111) Against Defendants Hall and Metro Government 141. Plaintiff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all paragraphs above. 142. Plaintiff and both Defendants meet the definition of a "person" under T.C.A. § 29-14-101. 143. The Te1messee legislature has directed that the Declaratory Judgment provisions of the Tennessee Code be liberally construed to settle disputes and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations. T:C.A. § 29-14-113. 144. A real and actual controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants Hall and Metro Government concerning the legality of the DCSO's conduct and the 287(g) contract under the Metro Charter. 145. Plaintiff claims the DCSO's 287(g) law enforcement investigation and interrogation ofhim exceeds the Sheriff's powers under the Metro Charter. 146. Defendants Hall and Metro Government maintain the 287(g) Agreement is valid in all respects. 147. A declaratory judgment as to the validity of the contract- specifically, Appendix D's delegation of the law enforcement power to "interrogate" and to "take and consider evidence" - would resolve this controversy. 148. Plaintiff's legal rights have been adversely affected by Defendants' actions under the 287(g) Agreement. T.C.A. § 29-14-103.
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149. Plaintiff therefore seeks a declaration that Appendix D of the 287(g) contract between Defendants and ICE violates the Metro Charter by empowering DCSO employees to perform law enforcement functions that are not necessary and incidental to the Sheriff's role as custodian of the jail and civil process server, and that the DCSO and Sheriff Hall have exceeded their powers under the Metro Charter by implementing the contract.
Count II- Violation of the Metro Charter and Metro v. Poe (Tenn. Code.§§ 29-14-102, 103, 111) Against Defendant Metro Government
150. Plaintiff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all paragraphs above.
151. Both Plaintiff and Defendant Metro Government meet the definition of a "person" underT.C.A. § 29-14-101.
152. A real and actual controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendant Metro Government concerning the legality of the 287(g) contract under the Metro Charter.
153. Plaintiff claims that because the 287(g) contract violates mandatory provisions of the Metro Charter, see§§ 16.05 and 8.202, as interpreted in the binding precedent Metro v. Poe, Metro Government acted ultra vires by passing Resolution 2009-997, and that the contract the Council approved is consequently void ab initio.
154. Defendant Metro Government maintains the 287(g) contract is valid in all respects.
155. A declaratory judgment as to the validity of the contract- specifically, Appendix D's delegation of the power to "interrogate" and to "take and consider evidence"- would resolve this controversy by determining whether Metro Govenunent's actions are Inconsistent with the mandatory provisions of the Metro Charter.
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156. Plaintiff's legal rights have been affeCted by Defendants' actions under the 287(g) Agreement. T.C.A. § 29-14-103.
157. Plaintifftherefore seeks a declaration that the Metro Government acted ultra vires when it approved a contract that violates mandatory provisions of the Metro Charter by empowering DCSO employees to perform law enforcement functions that are not necessary and incidental to the Sheriff's role as custodian of the jail and civil process server, and that the contract between Metro Government and DHS is consequently void ab initio.
Count III - Violation of Due Process (Tenn. Constitution, Article I, Section 8 &
Tenn. Code.§§ 29-14-102, 103, 111) Against Defendants Hall and Metro Government 158. Plaintiff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all paragraphs above. 159. Defendants Hall and Metro Government exceeded their lawful authority under the Charter by approving a 287(g) contract that violates the mandatory provisions of the Charter, as interpreted by Poe. 160. Defendant was illegally interrogated, investigated, and detained for hours after a court dismissed his charges as a result of Defendants actions. 161. Defendants' implementation of the 287(g) contract is consequently a violation of
Renteria's right to due process oflaw under Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. Count IV- Malicious Harassment
Based on Race, Color and National Origin (T.C.A. §§ 4-21-701, 702) Against Defendant Hall
162. Plaintiff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all paragraphs above.
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163. Plaintiffs Latino race, ethnicity, and appearance make him a member of a protected class under the Tennessee Human Rights Act.
164. In exceeding the authority of the Charter, Defendant Hall created, directed, and supervised a program within Metro's jail system which allows for impermissible discrimination based on race, color, and national origin in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act.
165. Hall's approval and supervision of the 287(g) contract directly resulted m Plaintiffs being subjected to impermissible and invidious discrimination in the form of disparate treatment while in the CJC, being subject to a prolonged, unlawful law enforcement investigation, being automatically categorized as a medium-security prisoner due to the ICE hold, and other disparate treatment that non-Latino U.S. citizen arrestees are not subjected to.
166. As a result, Renteria sustained substantial injuries, including prolonged restraint of his liberty, emotional distress, and public humiliation.
Count V- Malicious Harassment Based on Race, Color and National Origin
(T.C.A. §§ 4-21-701, 702) Against Defendant Bearden 167. Plaintiff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all paragraphs above. 168. Plaintiffs Latino race, ethnicity, and appearance make him a member of a protected class under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. 169. Without even asking Renteria where he was born, Defendant Bearden assumed, based on Renteria's Latina-sounding name, appearance, and limited English proficiency, that he was born in Mexico. 170. D~fendant Bearden knew when he reported this incorrect information on the arrest report that it would have immediate legal and practical consequences once Renteria
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entered the DCSO's 287(g) program. Specifically, Defendant Bearden was aware of the 287(g) program and the possibility that Renteria would be placed in deportation proceedings if he could not prove that he was a U.S. citizen or otherwise lawfully present.
171. Bearden's actions thus intentionally deprived Renteria of his civil rights Wlder the Tennessee Human Rights Act and constituted malicious harassment on the basis of Renteria's Latino race, appearance, ethnicity, and perceived national origin.
Count VI- False Imprisonment Against Defendant Hall
172. Plaintiff hereby adopts a..11d incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all paragraphs above.
173. Defendant Hall created, supervised, and directed a 287(g) program that directly resulted in twelve hours of unlawful imprisonment after Renteria was ordered released.
174. Under Hall's supervision, 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officers engaged in law enforcement activities that exceeded Hail's authority under the Metro Charter and Metro v. Poe.
175. The ICE Investigative Hold that occurred as a result of Hall's policies and supervision was without legal authority because the 287(g) contract that authorized DCSO's ICE investigation of Renteria is void under the Metro Charter and Metro v. Poe.
176. Defendant Hall thus intentionally subjected Renteria to the tortious deprivation of his liberty without legal authority.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court grant the following relief: (a) Issue a Declaratory Judgment declaring:
1. The 287(g) contract between DCSO and ICE violates the Metro Charter and the Tennessee Supreme Court's holding in Metro v. Poe by allowing
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Defendants' employees to interrogate inmates and take and consider evidence as part of a federal law enforcement function that is not necessary and incidental to the Sheriffs role as custodian of the jail and civil process server, and that contract is consequently invalid; 2. Defendant Metro Govermnent acted ultra vires by approving a contract that violates the mandatory provisions of the Metro Charter, and that the contract is consequently void ab initio; 3. Defendants Hall and Metro Government acted ultra vires by implementing a contract that violates the mandatory provisions of the Metro Charter, and that the contract is consequently void ab initio; (b) That this Court issue a Temporary and then a Permanent Injunction enjoining Defendants Hall and Metro Government from the following actions because the performance of these actions violates the Metro Charter and Poe: (1) authorizing, allowing, or directing DCSO personnel to perform the federal immigration law enforcement function of "interrogation," as delegated in Appendix D of the Agreement and defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(l) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(l); and (2) authorizing, allowing or directing DCSO personnel to perform the federal immigration law enforcement functions of "tak[ing] and consider[ing] evidence" as delegated in Appendix D of the Agreement and defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(b) and-8 C.P.R. § 287.5(a)(2); (c) That the Court issue an order bifurcating these proceedings, in the interest of efficiency and judicial economy, to first determine the validity of the 287(g)
contract under the Metro Charter and Poe (Counts I-III).
25
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 27 of 190 PageID #: 32

(d) That the Court order a speedy hearing on the declaratory judgment phase of the proceedings and advance the case on the calendar, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 57.
(e) That Plaintiff be awarded compensatory damages and punitive damages and reasonable attorney's fees;
(e) That Plaintiff be awarded such costs as are equitable and just, pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-14-111; and
(e) That Plaintiffbe granted such other relief as the nature of his claims may require. DATED this 7th day of January, 2011.
Respectfully submitted,
~..~~
Elliott Ozment Law Office of Elliott Ozment 1214 Murfreesboro Pike Nashville, TN 37217
26 Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 28 of 190 PageID #: 33

STATE OF TENNESSEE ) COUNTY OF DAVIDSON )
VERIFICATION I, Daniel Renteria-Villegas, being first duly sworn and under oath, state that I am a Plaintiff in this matter, that I have read the foregoing Verified Complaint, that I am personally familiar with the facts stated therein or otherwise know of those facts based upon diligent investigation and reports, and that the same are true and correct based upon my present knowledge, information and belief.
DANIEL RENTERIA-VILLEGAS SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me at Davidson County, Tennessee, this the
,./~ -, day of January, 2011
5(2/J I My Commission Expires: J Lt
24
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 29 of 190 PageID #: 34

..
TRANSLATION CERTIFICj.TION

STATE OF TENNESSEE

)

)

COUNTY OF DAVIDSON

)

After being duly sworn, I hereby certify that I am proficient in both English and Spanish and that the above document was translated from English to Spanish and from Spanish to English for the above-named affiant, and the above document represents an accurate and true record of his sworn statement.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this _Q_}·day o~n ~fM ~ , 20~JL.

s:)'b()! My commission expires

I~

25
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 30 of 190 PageID #: 35

\ \
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE \._,,

DANIEL RENTERIA-VILLEGAS,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

\,
-~~
. ·c~ '.-~~

)

v.

)

CASENO. _________

)

DARON HALL, in his official capacity as

)

Sheriff of Davidson County, and individually; )

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF

)

NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY; )

and OFFICER RICKEY BEARDEN, in his

\ I

·=..;,

----
<:_

individual capacity,

)

)

\:-__-,.

Defendants.

)

Exhibit 1:
Exhibit 2: Exhibit 3: Exhibit 4: Exhibit 5:

EXHffiiTLIST
Certified Copies of Metropolitan Charter ofNashville and Davidson County, Section 16.05 and Section 8.202
287(g) Memorandum of Agreement (October 2009)
Certified Copy of Metro Council Resolution 2009-997 (Approved Oct. 23, 2009)
Excerpt from Deposition ofDaron Hall, July 23, 2010
Legal Opinion No. 2004-04, Department ofLaw of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (From: Sue B. Cain, Deputy Director of Law, To: Daron Hall, Sheriff of Davidson County; Approved by: Karl Dean, Director ofLaw) (Oct. 6, 2004)

Exhibit 6: Exhibit 7: Exhibit 8: Exhibit 9:

DCSO Policy No. 1-3.142, Preservation ofPhysical Evidence Arrest Report No. 100069817, August 14, 2010 DCSO JMS Demographics Page, Aug. 14,2010 Affidavit of Barbara Murphy

Exhibit 10: Exhibit 11:

Criminal Appearance Recognizance Form DCSO Jail Management System Release Form

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 31 of 190 PageID #: 36

Exhibit 12: DCSO Jail Management System Log for Daniel R. Villegas, Aug. 14-August 20, 2010

Exhibit 13: Criminal Court Clerk Case Search Result, Case No. GS505783

Exhibit 14: Arrest Report for Arrest Number 100072288

Exhibit 15: DCSO Jail Management System Log for Daniel R. Villegas, Aug. 22-Sept. 4, 2010

Exhibit 16: DCSO Policy No. 1-4.100, Inmate Admission and Orientation Procedures

Exhibit 17: DCSO JMS Demographics Report for Daniel R. Villegas

Exhibit 18:

Amada Armenta, From Sheriff's Deputies to Immigration Officers: Screening Immigrant Status in a Tennessee Jail, Univ. of California at San Diego Center for Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper (funded by National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant No 0960882)

Exhibit 19: Email from Constance Taite, DCSO Administrative Counsel to Elliott Ozment, Counsel for the Plaintiff, January 4, 2011, 6:59PM

Exhibit 20: Photographs ofDCSO 287(g) Office

Exhibit 21:

U.S. Department ofHomeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office ofProfessional Responsibility, Management Inspections Unit 287(g) Program Review Findings; Davidson County Sheriffs Office, TN; DRO Field Office Director New Orleans, LA (May 12-14, 2009)

Exhibit 22: Sample ICE Interview Data Collection Sheet

Exhibit 23: Email from Constance Taite to TBALINK-TALK listserv, July 18,2007, 3:05:52 PMCDT

2
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 32 of 190 PageID #: 37

Exhibit!
Certified Copies of Metropolitan Charter of Nashville and Davidson County, Section 16.05 and Section
8.202
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 33 of 190 PageID #: 38

J

Sec. 16.05.- Sheriff.

The sheriff, elected as provided by the Constitution of Tennessee, is hereby recognized as an officer of the metropolitan government. He shall have such duties as are prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated, section 8-8-201, or by other provisions of general law; except, that within the area of the metropolitan government the sheriff shall not be 'the principal conservator of peace. The function as principal conservator of peace is hereby transferred and assigned to the metropolitan chiefof police, provided for by article 8, chapter 2 of this Charter. The sheriff shall have custody and control of the metropolitan jail and of the metropolitan workhouse to which persons are sentenced for violation of state law, but the urban jail and workhouse in which persons are .confined for violations of ordinances of the metropolitan government, or while awaiting trial for such violation, shall be under the custody and control of the metropolitan chief of police. By ordinance the urban jail may be consolidated with the metropolitan jail and the urban workhouse may be consolidated with the metropolitan workhouse. After either or both such consolidations, the jail and the workhouse shall be under the custody and control of the sheriff.

All fees, commissions,.emoluments and perquisites of the office of sheriff shall accrue to the metropolitan government as the same formerly accrued to the County of Davidson.

(Res. No. 88·:526, § 30, 10-4-88)

EXHIBIT
l
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 34 of 190 PageID #: 39

CERTIFICATION
I, Marilyn S. Swing, being the duly appointed Metropolitan Clerk of The Metropolitan Govenunent of Nashville and Davidson County, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and exact copy of Section 16.05 ofthe Charter ofThe Metropolitan Government ofNashville and Davidson County, approved in referendum on June 28, 1962, and amended on October21, 1965; NovemberS, 1966; AugustS, 1971; November?, 1972;November5, 1974; November 6, 1976; November 7, 1978; November 4, 1980; August 4, 1983;
November 4, 1986; March 8, 1988; ·August 1, 1991; September 5, 1991; November 3, 1992;
November 8, 1994;. November 5, 1996; August 7, 2003; November 7, 2006; August 2, 2007; November 4, 2008; and November 2, 2010.
WITNESS MY HAND and the Seal of The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, this 7th day of January, 2011.

STATE OF TENNESSEE

)

)

COUNTY OF DAVIDSON

)

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 35 of 190 PageID #: 40

Sec. 8.202. -Responsibility and powers of department. The department of the metropolitan police shall be responsible within the area of the metropolitan government for the preservation of the public peace, prevention and detection of crime, apprehension of criminals, protection of personal and property rights and enforcement of laws of the State of Tennessee and ordinances of the metropolitan government.3 The director and other members of the metropolitan police force shall be vested with all the power and authority belonging to the office of constable by the· common law and also with all the power, authority and duties which by statute may now or hereafter be provided for police and law enforcement officers of coun+•."=es and cc'+..'.:es. 3. Designation of police department, rather than sheriff as principal conservator of the peace is a valid exercise of power under T.C.A., § 6-3701 et seq. Metropolitan Government v. Poe, 215 Tenn. 53, 383 S.W. 2d 265 (1964).
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 36 of 190 PageID #: 41

CERTIFICATION
I, Marilyn S. Swing, being the duly appointed Metropolitan Clerk of The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and exact copy of Section 8.202 of the Charter of The Metropolitan Government ofNashville and Davidson County, approved in referendum on June 28, 1962, and amended on October 21, 1965; November 8, 1966; August 5, 1971; November 7, 1972; November 5, 1974; November 6, 1976; November 7, 1978; November 4, 1980; August 4, 1983; November 4, 1986; March 8, 1988; August 1, 1991: September 5, 1991; November 3,.1992; November 8, 1994;. November 5, 1996; August 7, 2003; November 7, 2006; August 2, 2007; November 4, 2008; and November 2, 2010.
WITNESS MY HAND and the Seal of The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, this 7th day of January, 2011.

STATE OF TENNESSEE

)

)

COUNTY OF DAVIDSON

)

Sworn to and subscribed before me, by Marilyn S. Swing this 7th of January, 2011. .

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 37 of 190 PageID #: 42

Exhibit 2 ·
287(g) Memorandum of Agreement (October 2009)
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 38 of 190 PageID #: 43

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
tDcaentSITohrumnoeCihratfmmcohmioSbsuuoiriiOirnncdgrgiMiaaeteh'rtystlmaieeebtadtime(isyhnroD,neevontwtaRhterreiafsSaDaoluntlin)tfinand,egdrevecunaeandtimtnsCinda,iopsodsbunoconalsosentenstnhrfosdtaeitmuibCshAfcnMiiesoolgedsiudnprteeEDyen,edrtnre.tCciaoyfmtIiSionpfCToierdOoSehEncnldehesiattmtseuacDohu(rtnoeMehpCinnirfoeGdeStfOtrraiseOvioni(AnzniIv.etsOCe)aieidfdnorEfyIncdfntDh)iom,,caeIniCenCsreaaseSdnstEti(iOtchntDpdouee.oreCtmnpfoetiteSasnpceNrlOertoiseaesanoi)nssdnn,enhttnnovihpoamteieutglflohlmrrreeittsefshoiiuengateaMmhn,rpnaedpeewOttarinDDofriAtttotonheairebpviimnsnvewaiditrgotwhtcsthomlhioeaeacoernteethtdonanctrCithfsoInaoUeCnoiusatfinEhfennimindtHtayemdedns,odeecidlmglboeoerSynagegfagtdaltaaaartitutthoneeneecdedendsst I. PURPOSE
pHatDppfTranouuaohCrdcirbwtenusSilcuepiseOcpiidavopnun,'ewsasgrtraatpe,ianfrtornoeerdtssgeshtwyeoaeanDuhpooooerCiprcrcfxfmrSeheoratsOaerhvsclsoideleippsyndasloeeencirnpcbdgsotsooyoeeelisflbnnrdIsaitnCetbtliDheoisfoEtyelsCyreitas.tnShdiohtmgeiOaoNbplmanclyoepnoiortedgmifhpcrsorspicaamnrourrttmgooitnruoicncnoncc.eeieinopestlnylenrsayh(tin.ttapnaaifaninagionsngTrcrfteepchfiodDcuerirositmnCphhrvceaeMeeSitmtdnirOioeOestnoniadgnAvasfpueiaDensotltrshyhCsftecaohotrSalasriinlnsOminntfodyMeiiotpmnlhreOgastemheralrrAsascawionugtl.hmniitrreeseinatenedteymistlole)uiwbrnomnmwefhdoirisotselcflfrotpaihobmcnotefehedsmrijetnsuhcuwoareonMimitsntihDhtddOiirniieCiencAtasaiSttoitteOohbntdtooneys.,· II. AUTHORJTY
fwS(Su1eein9tcchc9rttie6iaoto)an,Snrsaty2aso8toea7ffm(DoagnreH)naioSmndyef,mdatphicobgetylirinaIttgmithcioteamhnlrHisgoouofrufbamgitdchieioelvtrnahi.nseiadTonAhnSdsiesosNcifMsuaatratOiiSntoyAttnaSAatceelocictstnyroesottAtfiahtr2ucay0ttte0o(qs2IfuNs,iaCuAPlciEuf)hi,b,ealdtciocowpdeLreinirfattsitweeeordnn1inana0egtt7lor-8ec2wea9Umnr6i.tep,Stneea.Ctnru.ft.oahrg§omrrei1ezc3mee5sre7tatn(higtnes) III. POLICY
otpsitcaTohmuteouhheprnttmieshhesvoroioriesgvnpaMryriinseMesazperOidtiaeolinO;oAtcngiaAnto3rsn)e;stfihoeonatsethfrvonsueetdfbhppsfjestaao4teiuhrrrg)ectttpeatmhiipeccttriripipovotppvlrhegaaiooIesttryCgfoiiaunnmrfrEmanogygemclslnitrDou.DnietowpfqCaConeuniSrsFSrnidmvrOgOoaeip:arssmteipiaop1treoheufn)ennoretrtshtsnwshoooo,pnerhnrnuaiiindnnzlnrfeeaepecucltldolneaputscedoiooettnhriisnfnofaltodpgnyhtouresitmfstrthiahfeoieoMtsenshfrDgimOrbtsaeoCyiA;nqmMSup.2imiOmiam)OrDreimtgmAitmiCshcri,iaigSeergptenrOIriaaqoaCtdttutnuiirtEinoieh-orrrgtnaaeneatotdDliifanoeopftCtsnnfiaoecffSrdsioetcocuOirrocedpfscliruepelptertmewhativchreteiiestiaslsnolnatiagnoptsupDnnupDtraerHhoaonslCo.vruSdftrSia/iadootnOilyesrlft

1

L------------------------------------.1~

EXHIBIT
2.

1---------------~------------------

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 39 of 190 PageID #: 44

.----------------------- .. ·--·-

The Davidson County caused the alien to be jurisdiction.

authorities taken into

is expected to pursue to custody and over which

completion all the Davidson

criminal charges County athorities

that has

oFdooICeifffeftaEaeelndnnnwytsaOieloiislfneolefninnciasltwesyesrnhDueacoqmfieturdeeeiororcfeectb,dosuiernsinbtnc(ooyFagtdrOscymitneDaefrtooa)ueftrttoiemator;hnneeah;dniaas2dlbbi)dyeo3wenv)tshehiwIegoc)hnraeiehwltneaiehesrtdonihape'es.crhiiaIcodCsuresEsbctoreoDidenmienatianencnacottlahnisoavcentoi-cns·btauveyncdi-dchctaRoiaosfelenimeasbnoaaSvshntiaaadsltsetwOoc, ohplanoeesnccrsaaluutliimmdooenemrdsciFgs(uDeersadrtRvtoeiiOrdocayne)l

IV. DESIGNATION OF AUTHORIZEO FUNCTIONS

Approved functions detention Operating

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. V. DETENTION AND TRANSPORTATION ISSUES

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2
L---------~----------~--------~---------·
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 40 of 190 PageID #: 45

VI. NOMINATION OF PERSONNEL
The DCSO will nominate candidates for ICE training and approval under this MOA. All candidates must be United States citizens. The DCSO is responsible for conducting a criminal background check within the last five years for all nominated candidates. Upon request, the
DCSO will provide all related information and materials it collected, referenced, or considered
during the criminal background check for nominated candidates to ICE.
In addition to the DCSO background check, ICE will conduct an independent background check
for each candidate. This background check requires all candidates to complete a background questionnaire. The questionnaire requires, but is not limited to, the submission of fingerprints, a personal history questionnaire, and the candidate's disciplinary history (including ·allegations of excessive force or discriminatory action). ICE reserves the right to query any and every national and international law enforcement database to evaluate a candidate's suitability to participate in the enforcement of immigration authorities under this MOA. Upon request by ICE, the DCSO will provide continuous access to disciplinary records of all candidates along with a written privacy waiver signed by the candidate allowing ICE to have continuous access to his or her disciplinary records.
The DCSO agrees to use due diligence to screen individuals nominated for training and agrees that individuals who successfully complete the training under this MOA will perform immigration officer functions authorized under 287(g) of the INA for a minimum of two years. If DCSO personnel under consideration are in a bargaining unit, that DCSO must, prior to the execution of the MOA, have an agreement with the exclusive representative that allows the designated officers to remain in their position for a minimum of two years. This requirement may be lifted solely at the discretion of ICE for good cause in si.tuations that involve, among other things, imminent promotion, officer career development, and disciplinary actions. Failure by the DCSO to fulfill this commitment could jeopardize the tenns of this MOA, and ICE reserves the right, under these circumstances, to take appropriate action as necessary, including tenninating this MOA.
All DCSO candidates shall have knowledge of and have enforced laws and regulations pertinent to their la:w enforcement activities and their jurisdictions.
In the task force model setting, all DCSO task force officer candidates must be sworn/certified officers, must possess arrest authority, must be authorized to carry firearms, and must be employed full-time by the DCSO. Each DCSO candidate must certify that he/she is not prohibited from carrying a firearm pursuant to State or Federal law, including, but not limited to, the Lautenberg Amendment (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) or (9)).
3
~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 41 of 190 PageID #: 46

All DCSO candidates must be approved by ICE and must be able to qualify for access to appropriate DHS and ICE databases. Should a candidate not be approved, a qualified substitute candidate 'may be submitted. Such substitution must occur without delaying the start of training.
Any future expansion in the number of participating DCSO personnel or scheduling of additional
training classes may be based on an oral agreement between the parties and is subject to all the requirements of this MOA and the accompanying SOP.
VII. TRAINING OF PERSONNEL
ICE will provide participating DCSO personnel with Immigration Authority Delegation Program (IADP) training consistent with the accompanying SOP.
VIII. CERTIFICATION AND AUTHORIZATION
Before participating DCSO personnel receive authorization to perform immigration officer functions granted under this MOA, they must successfully complete the IADP training, as described in the accompanying SOP. The·IADP will be provided by ICE instructors who will train participating DCSO personnel in the enforcement of Federal immigration laws and policies, the scope of the powers delegated pursuant to this MOA and civil rights and civil liberties practices. Participating DCSO personnel must pass an ICE examination after instruction. Upon completion of training, those DCSO personnel who pass the ICE examinations shall be deemed "certified" under this MOA.
ICE will certify in writing the names of those DCSO personnel who successfully complete training and pass all required test(s). Upon receipt of the certification, the ICE Special Agent in Charge (SAC) and/or the ICE FOD in the New Orleans Field Office will provide the participating DCSO persmmel a signed authorization letter allowing the named DCSO personnel to perform specified functions of an immigration officer for an initial period o{ one year from the . date of the authorization. ICE will also provide a copy of the authorization letter to the DCSO. Only those certified DCSO personnel who receive authorization letters issued by ICE and whose immigration enforcement efforts are subject to a designated ICE supervisor may conduct immigration officer functions described in this MOA.
Along with the authorization .Jetter, ICE will issue the certified DCSO personnel official Delegation of Authority credentials. Upon receipt of the Delegation of Authority credentials, DCSO personnel will provide ICE a signed receipt of the credentials on the ICE Record of Receipt- Property Issued to Employee (Form G~570).
Authorization of participating DCSO personnel to act pursuant to this MOA may be withdrawn at any time and for any reason by ICE or the DCSO, and must be memorialized in a written notice of withdntwal identifying an effective date of withdrawal and the personnel to which the withdrawal pertains. Such withdrawal may be effectuated immediately upon notice to the other party. The DCSO and the ICE SAC and/or the ICE FOD in the New Orleans Field Office will be responsible for notification of the appropriate personnel in their respective agencies. The termination of this MOA shall constitute immediate revocation of all immigration enforcement authorizations delegated hereunder.
4
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Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 42 of 190 PageID #: 47

The DCSO will immediately notify ICE when any certified and/or authorized DCSO personnel is no longer participating in the 287(g) program so that appropriate action can be taken, including termination of user account access to DHS and ICE systems.

IX. COSTS AND EXPENDITURES

Participating agencies are responsible for personnel expenses, including, but not limited to, salaries and benefits, local transportation, and official issue material. The DCSO is responsible
for the salaries and benefits, including overtime, of all of its personnel being trained or
performing duties under this MOA and of those personnel performing the regular functions of . the participating DCSO. personnel while they are receiving training. The DCSO will cover the
costs of all DCSO personnel's travel, housing, and per diem affiliated with the training required for participation in this MOA. ICE is responsible for the salaries and benefits of all of its personnel, including instructors and supervisors.

If ICE determines the training provides a direct service for the Government and it is in the best interest of the Government, the Ooverriment may issue travel orders to selected personnel and reimburse travel, housing, and per diem expenses only. The bCSO remains responsible for
paying salaries and benefits of the selected personnel.

ICE will provide instructors and training materials.

Subject to the availability of funds, ICE will be responsible for the purchase, installation, and maintenance of technology (computer/IAFIS/Photo and similar hardware/software) necessary-to support the investigative functions of participating DCSO personnel at each DCSO facility with an active 287(g) program. Only participating DCSO personnel certified by ICE may use this equipment. ICE will also provide the necessary technological support and software updates for use by participating DCSO personnel to accomplish the delegated functions. Such hardware, software, and other technology purchased or provided by ICE shall remain the property of ICE and shall be returned to ICE upon termination of this agreement, or when deemed necessary by
the ICE SAC and/or the ICE FOD in the New Orleans Field Office.

The DCSO is responsible for covering all expenses at the DCSO facility regarding cabling and
power upgrades. If the connectivity solution for the DCSO is determined to include use of the DCSO's own communication lines- (phone, DSL, site owned T-1/T-3, etc), the DCSO will be
responsible for covering any installation and recurring costs associated with the DCSO line.

The DCSO is responsible for providing all administrative supplies, such as paper, toner, pens, pencils, or other similar items necessary for normal office operations. The DCSO is also responsible for providing the necessary security equipment, such as handcuffs, leg restraints and
flexi cuffs, et<;.

Also, if ICE deems it necessary, the DCSO will provide ICE, at no cost, with an office within

each participating DCSO facility for ICE supervisory employees to work.

·

5
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X. ICE SUPERVISION
Immigration enforcement activities conducted by the participating DCSO personnel will be supervised and directed by ICE supervisory officers or designated ICE team leaders. Participating DCSO personnel are not authorized to perform immigration officer functions
except when working under the supervision or guidance of ICE. To establish supervisory and
other administrative responsibilities, the SAC/FOD will specify the supervisory and other administrative responsibilities in an accompanying agreed-upon SOP.
Participating DCSO personnel shall give timely notice to the ICE supervisory officer within 24 hours of any detainer issued under the authorities set forth in this MOA. The actions of participating .DCSO personnel will be reviewed by ICE supervisory officers on an ongoing basis to ensure compliance with the requirements of the immigration laws and procedures and to assess the need for individual training or guidance.
For purposes of this MOA, ICE officers will provide superviSIOn of participating DCSO personnel only as to immigration enforcement functions and for investigations conducted in conjunction to this authority. The DCSO retains supervision of all other aspects of the employment of and performance of duties by participating DCSO personnel.
In the absence of a written agreement to the contrary, the policies and procedures to be utilized by the participating DCSO personnel in exercising these authorities shall be DHS and ICE policies and procedures,- including the ICE Use of Force Policy. However, when engaged in immigration enforcement activities, no participating DCSO personnel will be expected or required to violate or otherwise fail to maintain the DCSO's rules, standards, or policies, or be required to fail to abide by restrictions or limitations as may otherwise be imposed by law.
If a conflict arises between ·an order or direction of an ICE supervisory officer or a DHS or ICE policy &nd the DCSO's rules, standards, or policies, the conflict shall be promptly reported to·the SAC and/or the FOD in the New Orleans Field Office, or designees, and the DCSO, or designee, when circumstances safely allow the concern to be raised. The SAC and/or the FOD in the New Orleans Field Office and the DCSO shall attempt to resolve the conflict.
XL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
ICE does not require the DCSO to provide statistical or arrest d~ta above what is entered into ENFORCE; however, ICE reserves the right to request the DCSO provide specific tracking data and/or any information, documents, or evidence related to the circumstances of a particular alien's arrest. ICE may use this data to compare and verify ICE's own data, and to -fulfill ICE's statistical reporting requirements, or to assess the progress and success of the DCSO's 287(g) program.
XII. LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
If any participating DCSO personnel are the subject of a complaint of any sort that may result in that individual receiving employer discipline or bec-oming the subject of a criminal investigation
6
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or civil lawsuit, the DCSO shall, to the extent allowed by State law, immediately notify the local
point of contact for the ICE Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and the SAC/FOD of the existence and nature of the complaint. The resolution of the complaint shall also be promptly reported to ICE. Complaints regarding the exercise of immigration enforcement authority, as specified herein, by participating DCSO personnel shall be handled as described below.
Except as otherwise noted in this MOA or allowed by Federal law, and to the extent required by
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g}(7) and (8), the DCSO will be responsible and bear the costs of participating DCSO personnel with regard to their property or personal expenses incurred by reason of death, injury, or incidents giving rise to liability.
Participating DCSO personnel will be treated as Federal employees only for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, and worker's compensation claims, 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq., when performing a function on behalf of ICE as authorized by this MOA, 8 U.S.C. § I357(g)(7); 28 U.S.C. § 2671. It is the understanding of the parties to this MOA that participating DCSO personnel will enjoy the same defenses and immunities for their in-scope acts that are available to ICE officers from personal liability arising from tort lawsuits based on actions conducted in compliance with this MOA, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(8). Patticipating DCSO personnel named as defendants in litigation arising from activities carried out under this MOA may request representation by the U.S. Department of Justice. Such requests must be made in writing directed to the Attorney General of the Unit~.d States, and will be handled in coordination with the SAC and/or the FOD in the New Orleans Field Office. Requests should be in the form of a written memorandum prepared by the defendant addressing each and every allegation in the complaint, explaining as well as admitting or denying each allegation against the defendant. Requests for representation must be presented to the ICE Office of the Chief Counsel at I 010 East Whatley Road, Oakdale, Louisiana 71463.. Any request for representation and related correspondence must be clearly marked "Subject to Attorney-Client Privilege." The Office of the Chief Counsel will forward the individual's request, together with a memorandum outlining the factual basis underlying the event(s) at issue in the lawsuit, to the ICE Headquarters Office ofthe Principal Legal Advisor, which will forward the request, the factual memorandum, and an advisory statement opining whether such representation would be in the interest of the United States, to the Director of the Constitutional and Specialized Torts Staff, Civil Division, Department of Justice. ICE will not be liable for defending or indemnifYing acts of intentional misconduct on the part of participating DCSO personnel.
The DCSO agrees to cooperate with any Federal investigation related to this MOA to the full extent of its available powers, including providing access to appropriate databases, personnel, and documents. Failure to do so may result in the termination of this MOA. Failure of an officer to cooperate in any Federal investigation related to this MOA may result in revocation of such individual's authority provided under this MOA. The DCSO agrees to cooperate with Federal personnel conducting reviews to ensure compliance with the tenns of this MOA and to provide access to appropriate databases, personnel, and documents necessary to complete such compliance review. It is understood that infonnation provided by any DCSO personnel under threat of disciplinary aCtion· in an administrative investigation cannot be used against that
L_________________________7 __________________________
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individual in subsequent criminal proceedings, consistent with Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967), and its progeny.
As the activities of participating DCSO personnel under this MOA are undertaken under Federal authority, the participating DCSO personnel will comply with Federal standards and guidelines relating to the Supreme Court's decision in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and its progeny, which relates to the disclosure of potential impeachment information about possible witnesses or affiants in a criminal case or investigation. The DCSO and ICE are each responsible for compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974, as applicable, and related system of records notices with regard to data collection and use of information under this MOA. The applicable Systems of Record Notice for privacy compliance is the ENFORCE Systems of Records Notice, 71 FR 13987, dated March 20,2006. XIII. COMPLAINT PROCEDURES The complaint reporting procedure for allegations of misconduct by participating DCSO personnel, with regard to activities undertaken under the authority of this MOA, is included in Appendix B. XIV.. CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS Participating DCSO personnel are bound by all Federal civil rights laws, regulations, guidance relating to non-discrimination, including the U.S. Department of Justice "Guidance Regarding The Use Of Race By Federal Law Enforcement Agencies" dated June 2003 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et. seq., which prohibits discrimination based upon race, color, or national origin (including limited English proficiency) in any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. XV. INTERPRETATION SERVICES Participating DCSO personnel will provide an opportunity for subjects with limited English ·language proficiency to request an interpreter. Qualified foreign language interpreters will be provided by the DCSO, as needed. The DCSO will maintain a list of qualified interpreters or companies it contracts with to provide such interpreters. Participating law enforcement personnel will be instructed on the proper administrative procedures to follow to obtain the services of an interpreter. A qualified interpreter means an interpreter who can interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially, using any specialized vocabulary. If an interpreter is used when a designated officer is performing functions under this MOA, the interpreter must be identified, by name, in records. XVI. COMMUNICATION The ICE SAC and/or the FOD in the New Orleans Field Office, and the DCSO shall meet at least annually, and as needed, to review and assess the immigration enforcement activities conducted
8
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by the participating DCSO personnel, and to ensure compliance with the terms of this MOA. When necessary, ICE and the DCSO may limit the participation ofthese meetings in regards to non-law enforcement personnel. The attendees will meet in Nashville, Tennessee at locations to
be agreed upon by the parties, or via teleconference. The participants will be supplied with
specific infonnation on case reviews, individual participants' evaluations, complaints filed, media coverage, and, to the extent practicable, statiStical infonnation on immigration
enforcement activity in DCSO's jurisdiction. An initial review meeting will be held no later than
nine months after certification of the initial class of participating DCSO personnel under Section VIII, above.
XVII. COMMUNITY OUTREACH The DCSO may, at its discretion, engage in community outreach with individuals and organizations expressing an interest in this MOA. ICE may participate in such outreach upon the DCSO's request. Nothing in this MOA shall limit ICE's own community outreach program.
XVIII. RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO THE MEDIA AND OTHER THIRD PARTIES The DCSO may, at its discretion, communicate the substance of this agreement to organizations and groups expressing an interest in the law enforcement activities to be engaged in under this MOA. It is the practice of ICE to provide a copy of this MOA, only after it has been signed, to requesting media outlets; the DCSO is authorized to do the same. The DCSO agrees to coordinate with ICE prior to releasing any information related to, or exchanged under, this MOA, including any SOPs developed for the implementation of this MOA. If ICE detennines that any requested records are protected from public disclosure/ not appropriate for public disclosure/ law enforcement sensitive under federal law, ICE will provide the DCSO with the legal authority that makes such records protected from public disclosure under federal law. The DCSO will not release any records that it agrees are protected from disclosure under federal laws, regulations, or executive orders. If there is a good faith disagreement between the DCSO and ICE regarding the public nature of such records, the DCSO may release such records; provided, however, that DCSO will release such records only after notifying ICE of the date the DCSO intends to release the records so that ICE may seek a judicial order, stay, or other intervention barring release on the proposed date. The release of statistical information regarding the 287(g) program must be coordinated with the ICE Office of Public Affairs. The DCSO hereby agrees to coordinate with ICE regarding information to be released to the media regarding actions taken under this MOA. In the task force model setting, all contact with the media involving investigations conducted under this MOA by Task Force Officers (TFO) will be done pursuant to ICE policy. The points of contact for ICE and the DCSO for this purpose are identified in Appendix C. Appendix B to this MOA describes the complaint procedures available to members of the public regarding actions taken by participating DCSO personnel pursuant to this agreement.
9
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.------------- ·- ---.- -··
XIX. MODIFICATIONS TO THIS MOA Modifications to this MOA must be proposed in writing and approved and signed by the signatories. Modification to Appendix D shall be done in accordance with the procedures outlined in the SOP.
XX. POINTS OF CONTACT ICE and DCSO points of contact for purposes of this MOA are identified in Appendix A. Points
of contact (POC) can be updated at any time by providing a revised Appendix A to the other
party to this MOA. XXI. DURATION AND TERMINATION OF THIS MOA
This MOA will remain in effect for three (3) years from the date of signing unless terminated earlier by either party. At the expiration of the three year effective period, ICE and the DCSO shall review the MOA and modify, extend, or permit the MOA to lapse. During the MOA's effective period, either party, upon Written notice to the other party, may terminate the MOA at any time. A termination notice shall be delivered personally or by certified or registered mail and termination shall take effect immediately upon receipt of such notice. Either party, upon written or oral notice to the other party, may temporarily suspend activities under this MOA when resource constraints or competing priorities necessitate such suspension. Notice of termination or suspension by ICE shall be given to the DCSO. Notice of termination or suspension by the DCSO shall be given to the SAC and/or the FOD fn the New Orleans Field Office. Upon a good faith determination that the DCSO is not fulfilling its duties, ICE shall notify the DCSO, in writing, and inform the DCSO that it has 90 days to demonstrate a continued need for 287(g) program services. If this continued need is not demonstrated by the DCSO, the authorities and resources given to the DCSO pursuant to this MOA will be terminated or suspended. Upon a subsequent demonstration of need, all costs to reinstate access to such authorities and/or program services will be incurred by the DCSO. This MOA does not, is not intended to, shall not be construed to, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any person in any matter, civil or criminal.
10
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By the

signing terms,

rtheisspMo~~~b,~t~easc,h

pa~ r~presents
obhgat10ns, and

it_is .ful~y authori~ed to enter into this MOA, accepts
hmttations of thts MOA, and· agrees to be bound

thereto to the fullest extent allowed by law.

D~D~fjlf&

Jo orton . Assistant Secretary Immigration and Customs Enforcement DeparLrnent of Homeland Security

Daron Hall Sheriff Davidson County Sheriff's Office Nashville, Tennessee

l1
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APPENDIX A POINTS OF CONTACT The ICE and DCSO points of contact for purposes of implementation of this MOA are: For the DCSO: John L. Ford, Ill, ChiefDeputy Davidson County Sheriffs Office 506 Second Avenue North Nashville, TN 37201 (615) 862-8955 jford({i),dcso.nashville.org
For ICEDRO: Gerald B. Smith Assistant Field Office Director 827 Forrest Avenue Gadsden, AL 35901 (256) 543-8154 X 233
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. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · -- ···------- -------
..
APPENDIXB COMPLAUNTPROCEDURE
This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) is between the US Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Davidson County Sheriffs Office (DCSO), pursuant to which selected DCSO personnel are authorized to perform immigration enforcement duties in specific situations under Federal authority. As such, the training, supervision, and performance of participating DCSO personnel pursuant to the MOA, as well as the protections for U.S. citizens' and aliens' civil and constitutional rights, are to be monitored. Part of that monitoring will be accomplished through these complaint reporting and resolution procedures, which the parties to the MOA have agreed to follow.
The MOA sets forth the process for designation, training, certification, and authorization of certain DCSO personnel to perform certain immigration enforcement functions specified herein. Complaints filed against tho.se personnel in the course of their non-immigration duties will remain the domain of the DCSO and be handled in accordance with the DCSO's Manual of Policy and Procedures, or equivalent rules, regulations, or procedures. If any participating DCSO personnel are the subject of a complaint or allegation involving the violation of the terms ofthis MOA or a complaint or allegation of any sort that may result in that individual receiving employer discipline or becoming the subject of a criminal investigation or civil lawsuit. the DCSO shall, to the extent allowed by State law, immediately notify ICE of the existence and nature of the complaint or allegation. The results of any internal investigation or inquiry connected to the complaint or allegation and the resolution of the complaint shall also be promptly reported to ICE. The ICE notifications should be made to the SAC and the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) points of contact in New Orleans, Lquisiana. Complaints regarding the exercise of immigration enforcement authority by participating DCSO personnel shall be handled as described below.
The DCSO will also handle complaints filed against DCSO personnel who are not designated and certified pursuant to this MOA but are acting in immigration functions in violation of this MOA. Further, any such complaints regarding non-designated DCSO personnel shall be forwarded to the SAC or the FOD in the New Orleans Field Office.
In order to simplify the process for the public, complaints against participating DCSO personnel relating to their immigration enforcement can be reported in the following manner "Complaint and Allegation Reporting Procedures."
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1. Complaint and Allegation Reporting Procedures
Complaint reporting procedures shall be disseminated by the DCSO within facilities under its jurisdiction (in English and other languages as appropriate) in order to ensure that individuals are aware of the availability of such procedures. Such reporting procedures shall also be inCluded within facility manuals for detainees who have been processed under the 287(g) program. Such material must include up-to-date contact infonnation necessary to file the complaint.
Complaints will be accepted from any source (e.g., ICE, DCSO, participating DCSO personnel, inmates, and the public). ICE will immediately forward a copy of the complaint to the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) Review and Compliance.
Complaints can be reported to Federal authorities as follows:
A. Telephonically to the DHS Office of the Inspector General (DHS OIG) at the toll free number 1-800-323-8603, or
B. Telephonically to the ICE OPR at the Joint Intake Center (JIC) in Wasrungton, D.C., at the toll-free number 1-877-246-8253, email Joint.Intake@dhs.gov, or
C. Via mail as follows: Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Professional Responsibility P.O. Box 14475 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington D.C. 20044
2. Review of Complaints
All complaints or allegations (written or oral) reported to the DCSO directly that involve DCSO personnel with ICE delegated authority will be reported to ICE OPR. ICE OPR will verify participating personnel status under the MOA with the assistance of the SAC of the ICE Office · of Investigations in New Orleans, Louisiana. Complaints received by any ICE entity will be reported directly to ICE OPR as per existing ICE policies and procedures.
ICE OPR, as appropriate, will make an initial determination regarding ICE investigative jurisdiction and refer the complaint to the appropriate ICE office for action as soon as possible, given the nature of the complaint.
Complaints reported directly to ICE OPR will be shared with the DCSO's Internal Investigations Unit when the complaint involves DCSO personnel. Both offices will then coordinate appropriate- investigative jurisdiction, which may include initiation of a joint investigation to resolve the issue(s).
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3. Complaint and Allegations Resolution Procedures

Upon receipt complaint in

of any complaint accordance with

or allegation, existing ICE

ICE OPR allegation

will undertake a complete review of each
criteria and reporting requirements. As

stated relate

above, the ICE OPR to the DHS OIG and

will adhere to CRCL and/or

the the

reporting requirements as stated DOJ CRD. Complaints will be

above and as they resolved using the

existing procedures, supplemented as follows:

A. Referral of Complaints or Allegations to the DCSO's Internal Investigitions Unit.

The ICE OPR will refer complaints, as appropriate, involving DCSO personnel to the DCSO' s Internal Investigations Unit for resolution. The· Chief Deputy will inform ICE OPR of the disposition and resolution of any complaints or allegations against DCSO's participating officers.

B. Interim Action Pending Complaint Resolution

When participating DCSO personnel are under investigation for any reason that

could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal, or are alleged to have

violated the terms of this MOA, ICE may revoke that individual's authority and

have that MOA.

individual

removed

from

participation .

in

the

activities

covered

under

the

C. Time Parameters for Resolution of Complaints or Allegations It is expected that any complaint received will be resolved within 90 days of receipt. However, this will depend upon the nature and complexity of the substance of the complaint itself. D. Notification of Resolution of a Complaint or Allegation · ICE OPR will coordinate with the DCSO's Internal Investigations Unit to ensure . notification as appropriate to the ICE SAC in New Orleans, Louisiana, the subject(s) of a complaint, and the person filing the complaint regarding the resolution of the complaint. These Complaint Reporting and Allegation Procedures are ICE's internal policy and may be gasaunpoyppvpleysrluentcmmoheeInsnCutteE.pdpalonermdmednootdsnifooiert drmebsotydriiIcfCitcEoatriuoannpispl.alyteTrthaolelosyet.h,CeIrComiEnpvwleasiiltlnigtpaRrtoievvpeiodroetrignDagCnaiSznOadtiwAoniltlshegwwaittrihiotitnnenPthrceoocpfeeiddeuserreoaslf

15
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APPENDIXC PUBLIC INFORMATION POINTS OF CONTACT
Pursuant to Section XVIII of this MOA, the signatories agree to coordinate appropriate release of information to the media regarding actions taken under this MOA before any information is
released. The points of contact for coordinating such activities are: For the DCSO: Karla Weikal, Director of Communications Davidson County Sheriff's Office
506 Second Avenue North Nashville, TN 37201
(615) 862-8226 kweikal(W,dcso.nashville.org
For ICE: Temple Black Public Affairs Officer Office ofPublic Affairs and Internal Communication U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 1250 Poydras Street, Suite 2200 New Orleans, LA 70113 (504) 310-8887
16
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,----------- -·

APPENDIXD

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP)

The
and

purpose of this appendix oversight of the 287(g)

is to establish delegation o

standard, uniform procedures f authority program within

for the

the implementation
SAC/FOD area of

responsibility. This appendix can be modified only in writing and by mutual acceptance of the

SAC/FOD, the Sheriff of Davidson County, the ICE Office of State and Local Coordination

(OSLC) and the ICE Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA).

There are two models for the 287(g) program, a Task Force Officer (TFO) model or a D~tention model. Pursuant to this MOA, DCSO has been delegated authorities under the Detention model as outlined below.

Prioritization:
ICE retains sole discretion in determining how it will manage its limited resources and meet its mission requirements. To ensure resources are managed effectively, ICE requires the DCSO to also manage its resour.ces dedicated to 287(g) authority under the MOA. To that end, the following list reflects the categories of aliens that are a priority for arrest and detention with the highest priority being Level 1 criminal aliens. Resources should be prioritized to the following levels:
0 Level 1 - Aliens who have been cm1victed of or arrested for major drug offenses and/or violent offenses such as murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, and kidnapping; 0 Level 2 - Aliens who have been convicted of or arrested for minor drug offenses and/or mainly property offenses such as burglary, larceny, fraud, and money laundering; and D Level 3 -Aliens who have been convicted of or arrested for other offenses.

Training:
The 287(g) training program, the Immigration Authority Delegation Program (IADP), will be taught by ICE instructors and tailored to the immigration functions to be perfonned. ICE Office of Training and Development (OTD) will proctor examinations during the IADP. The DCSO nominee must pass each examination with a minimum score of 70 percent to receive certifLcation. If the DCSO nominee fails to attain a 70 percent rating on an examination, the DCSO nominee will have one opportunity to remediate the testing material and re-take a similar examination. During the entire duration of the IADP, the DCSO nominee will be offered !! maximum of one remediation examination. Failure to achieve a 70 percent on any two examinations (inclusive of any remediation examination), will result in the disqualification of the DCSO nominee and their discharge from the IADP.

17
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Training will include, among other topics: (i) discussion of the terms and limitations of this MOA; (ii) the scope of immigration officer authority; (iii) relevant immigration law; (iv) the ICE Use of Force Policy; (v) civil rights laws; (vi) the U.S. Department of Justice "Guidance Regarding the Use Of Race By Federal Law Enforcement Agencies," dated June 2003; (vii) public outreach and complaint procedures; (viii) liability issues; (ix) cross-cultural issues; and (x) the obligation under Federal law and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to make proper notification upon the arrest or detention of a foreign national. Approximately one year after the participating DCSO personnel are trained and certified, ICE may provide additional updated training on relevant administrative, legal, and operational issues related to the performance of immigration officer functions. Local training on relevant issues will be provided as needed by ICE supervisors or designated ICE team leaders. An OSLC designated official shall, in consultation with OTD and local ICE officials, review on an annual basis and, if needed, refresh training requirements. Trained DCSO personnel will receive, as needed, a DHS email account and access to the necessary DHS applications. The use of the information technology (IT) infrastructure and the DHSIICE IT security policies are defined in the Interconnection Security Agreement (ISA). The ISA is the agreement between ICE Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) and DCSO Designated Accreditation Authority (DAA). DCSO agrees that each of its sites using ICEprovided network access or equipment will sign the ISA, which defines the IT policies and rules of behavior for each user granted access to the DHS network and applications. Failure to adhere to the terms ofthe l~A could result in the loss of all user privileges. Data Collection:··· ENFORCE is the primary processing system for alien removals and is the main resource for statistical information for the 287(g) program. All ENFORCE entries must be completed in accordance with established ICE polices and adhere to OSLC guidance. ICE does not require the DCSO to provide statistical or arrest data above what is entered into ENFORCE; however, ICE reserves the right to request specific tracking or arrest data be maintained and provided for comparison and verification with ICE's own data and statistical information. This data may also be used for ICE's statistical reporting requirements or to assess the progress and success of the DCSO's 287(g) program. The DCSO and ICE are each responsible for compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974, as applicable, and related system of records notices with regard to data collection and use of
information under this MOA. The applicable Systems of Record Notice for privacy compliance is the ENFORCE Systems of Records Notice, 71 FR 13987, dated March 20,2006.
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DETENTION MODEL:
Participating DCSO personnel performing immigration~related duties pursuant to this MOA will be DCSO officers assigned to detention operations supported by ICE. Those participating DCSO personnel will exercise their immigration~related authorities only during the course of their normal duties while assigned to DCSO jail/correctional facilities. Participating DCSO personnel will identify and remove criminal aliens that reside within the DCSO's jurisdiction pursuant to the tiered level of priorities set forth in Appendix D's "Prioritization" section. The participating DCSO personnel are authorized to perform the following functions as allowed by 287(g) of the INA for the Detention Model:
• The power and authority to interrogate any person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or remain in the United States (INA§ 287(a)(I) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(l)) and to process for immigration violations any removable alien or those aliens who have been arrested for violating a Federal, State, or local offense;
• The power and authority to serve warrants of arrest for immigration violations pursuant to INA§ 287(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(3);
• The power and authority to administer oaths and to take and consider evidence (INA § 287(b) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(2)), to complete required criminal alien processing, including fingerprinting, photographing, and interviewing of aliens, as well as the preparation of affidavits and the taking of sworn statements for ICE supervisory review;
• The power and authority to prepare charging documents (INA§ 239,,8 C.F.R. § 239.1; INA § 238, 8 C.F.R § 238.1; INA § 24l(a)(5), 8 C.F.R § 241.8; INA § 235(b)(l), 8 C.F.R. § 235.3) including the preparation of a Notice to Appear (NTA) application or other charging document, as appropriate, for the signature of an ICE officer for aliens in categories established by ICE supervisors;
• The power and authority to issue immigration detainers (INA § 236, INA § 287, and 8 C.F.R. § 287.7) and I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, for processing aliens in categories established by ICE supervisors; and
• The power and authority to detain and transport (INA § 287(g)(l) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(c)(6)) arrested aliens subject to removal to ICE~approved detention facilities.
As noted under Appendix D's "Prioritization" section, ICE requires the DCSO to focus its use of the 287(g) program in accord with ICE's priorities.
Supervision: A 287(g) delegation of authority detention model is designed to identify and remove aliens amenable to removal that are incarcerated within the DCSO's detention facilities pursuant to the tiered level of priorities set forth in Appendix D's "Prioritization" section. The following
i9
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identifies each entity's roles and responsibilities. These roles and responsibilities include, but are not limited to:
The DCSO shall provide notification to· the ICE supervisor of any detainers placed under 287(g) authority within 24 hours.
The DCSO shall coordinate transfer of detainees processed under 287(g) authority in a timely manner. Prior to initiating the transfer of287(g) arrests from the Sheriff's custody to the custody of ICE under the provisions of the DCSO Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) with IG:E, DCSO must obtain detention authorization from the ICE supervisor, or his designee, in accordance with the MOA. No 287(g) arrests may be booked under the ICE !GSA by DCSO without an I-203A (Order to Detain Aliens) signed by the ICE supervisor, or his designee.
The DCSO is responsible for ensuring proper record checks have been completed, obtaining the necessary court/conviction documents, and, upon arrest, ensuring that the alien is processed through ENFORCE/IDENT and served with the appropriate charging documents.
The DCSO must immediately report all encounters of an individual who claims U.S. citizenship to the POD through their chain of command. The FOD shall make the appropriate notification to DRO headquarters.
The ICE supervisor is responsible for requesting alien files, reviewing alien files for. completeness, approval of all arrests, and TECS checks and input. The FOD office is responsible for providing the DCSO with current and updated DHS policies regarding the arrest and processing of illegal aliens.
On a regular basis, the ICE supervisors are responsible for conducting an audit of the !DENT/ENFORCE computer system entries and records made by the DCSO's officers. Upon review and auditing of the !DENT/ENFORCE computer system entries and records, if errors are found, the ICE supervisor will communicate those errors in a timely manner to the responsible official for DCSO. The ICE supervisor will notifY the DCSO of any errors in the system and the DCSO is responsible for submitting a plan to ensure that steps are taken to correct, modify, or prevent the recurrence of errors that are discovered.
Custody decisions will be made on an individualized case basis consistent with the above priorities. Whenever deemed appropriate, DCSO through the ICE supervisor will utilize an alternative to detention for lower level violators. Such alternatives may include but need not be limited to electronic monitoring and/or personal reporting schedule as outlined on Form I-220A (Order of Release on Recognizance).
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r--------------·-···. Nominated Personnel: All DCSO jail enforcement officer candidates shall have specific experience that should consist of having supervised inmates. Candidates must show that they have been trained on and concerned with maintaining the security of the facility. Candidates must have enforced rules and regulations governing the facility on inmate accountability and conduct. Candidates must also
show an ability to meet and deal with people ?f differing backgrounds and behavioral patterns.
21 Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 59 of 190 PageID #: 64

SIGNATURE PAGE Davidson CountY 287(g) MOA
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have by their duly authorized representatives set their signatures.
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY

APPROVED AS TO AVAilABILITY OF FUNDS:
APPROVED AS TO RISK AND INSURANCE:
Dir~!a~~~~rance
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND
~~IrTYn. eynvD

to/<t{cff
Date
Date
Date I /

Date 1 7
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 60 of 190 PageID #: 65

Exhibit 3
Certified Copy of Metro Council · Resolution 2009-997
(Approved Oct. 23, 2009)
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 61 of 190 PageID #: 66

RESOLUTION NO. RS2009-997 A resolution approving an agreement between the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County authorizing the training and use of Davidson County Sheriffs Office personnel to identify and process immigration offenders in DCSO jail and correctional facilities. WHEREAS, the United States Bureau of ~igration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of the United States Department of Homeland Security, is authorized under 8 U.S.C. 1357(g) to enter into written agreements with any political subdivision of a State so that qualified persoimel can perform certain functions of immigration officers; and, WHEREAS, the Davidson County Sheriff's Office will perform such immigration officer functions, in coordination with ICE, as specified i.11 the Agreement attached hereto and ·incorporated herein; and, WHEREAS, it is to benefit the citizens of The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County that such Agreement be approved. NOW, TIIEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY: Section 1. That the Agreement between The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County and the United States Buteau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement authorizing Davidson County Sheriff's Office personnel to perform certain functions of immigration officers, attached hereto and incorporated herein, is hereby approved. Section 2. That any amendments to the terms of the Agreement must be approved by resolution of the Metropolitan Council receiving twenty-one affirmative votes. Section 3. That any funds received pursuant to this Agreement shall be appropriated to the Davidson County Sheriff's Office. Section 4. That this resolution shall take effect from and after its adoption, the welfare of The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County requiring it.
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 62 of 190 PageID #: 67

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 63 of 190 PageID #: 68

20090CT 13 PH 1: ~6

t:I.,LE·n

(

.1til

,~f..T~Qfi!Qi.l'~;i\Jt!

. . ·.;fi-~LJ~.:~

ORIGll\lf\L

METROPOLITAN COUNTY COUNCIL
Resoluti~n No. ~S~oo'j-qq7

A resc::Aution ~my'ing an agreement

between ~ United S.tates Bureau ;of

~~

and

Ctistems

Enf-eroement and The Metropdlitao

O"v-emment of Nashw.lie anti

Davitlsen County authiDrizing :the

~ag and use of Davidsmn. Cowtty

Sheriff's Office p:ersoone1 to identitY

and process immigratioo. otfenclers ii.n

DCSO jaii and OOJ::reCtio1'18.1 facilities.

i
. i
i
j
Introduced-----O-C-T--2--0-2-0-0-9-------
Amended------------------------

Adopted OCT 20 2009

Approvid

OCT 2 3 2009

By~~ 1 .L ( _,.... ... ..

Metropolitan Mayor

CERTIFICATION I, Marilyn S. Swing, being the duly appointed Metropolitan Clerk of The Metropolitan Government ofNashville and Davidson County, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and exact copy of Resolution No. RS2009-997 of said Metropolitan Government, which resolution was adopted on October 20, 2009, at the meeting of the Metropolitan Council held on that date, and is now recorded in Book No. M66, Page 75. W1TNESS MY HAND and the Seal of The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, this 7th day of January, 2011.
STATE OF TENNESSEE ) COUNTY OF DAVIDSON ) Sworn to and subscribed before me, by Marilyn S. Swing, this 7th day of January, 2011.
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 64 of 190 PageID #: 69

Exhibit 4
Excerpt from Deposition of Daron Hall
(July 23, 2010)
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 65 of 190 PageID #: 70

1 Q.

-Is i t the DCSO 287(g) interrogator

2 that makes the determination that the person-

3 being interrogated is or is not an

4 undocumented alien?

5 A.

No. Is it their job to determine? Is

6 that what you --

7 Q.

No. Who makes the deter.mination that

8 this person being interrogated is not, or is

9 an undocumented alien?

10 A.

I believe it's the fed-eral

11 government' s job to do it. We do the work,

12 hand it over to them, and they review it and

13 either agree or not with what our conclusion

14 is.

15 Q.

So the person who finds that this

16 person being interrogated is an undocumented

17 alien is not the DCSO deputy, but the ICE

18 representative on-site; is that correct?

19 A.

Well, the way I understand it, it's

20 just like a Police Department or, you know,

21 taking their charges to a.district attorney,

22 for example; here • s what we believe happened,

23 here are the facts surrounding this case; and

24 then it•s determined whether to pursue

25- charges.

Vowell & Jennings, Inc. (615) 256-1935

235

EXHIBIT

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 66 of 190 PageID #: 71

1

· Charges, in my analogy, is that the

2 federal agent then takes that case to a

3 federal judge. Very similar to that. We're

4 doing the grunt work, if you will, of the

5 case and we're turning in what we have on the

6 individual and the federal employee is the

7 one who must sign off on the report.

8 Q.

Is the NTA initiated before that case

9 is taken to the, to the ICE, the federal ICE

10 representative?

11 A.

I mean, I wouldn't think it would be

12 finalized. There may be some preliminary

13 work done on it. I mean, I'm not real clear

14 about that.

15 Q.

My question was, is it initiated.

16 A.

I don• t know.

17 Q.

Let me take you back to this Hispanic

18 Nashville article. I don•t know why I don't

19 just put it on top of all my stuff. Here we

20 go. This is Exhibit 22.

21

In this article on the second page,

22 you say, "Would deportation.-- I mean, H,

23 .Hispanic Nashville Notebook said, "Would

24 deportation occur in every instance in which

25 an individual is flagged for deportation- or

Vowell & Jennings, Inc. (615} 256-1935

236

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 67 of 190 PageID #: 72

Exhibit 5
Legal Opinion No. 2004-04, Department of
Law of the Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County (From: Sue B. Cain, Deputy Director of Law,
To: Daron Hall, Sheriff of Davidson County; Approved by: Karl Dean, Director of Law)
(Oct. 6, 2004)
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 68 of 190 PageID #: 73

BILL PURCELL MAYOR
METROPOLITAN
KARL F. DEAN DIRECTOR OF LAW

AND DAVIDSON COUNTY
DePARTMENT OFLAW 204 COURTHOUSH
NASHVll.LE. TliNN!:.SSEE 3720 I
Legal Opinion 2004-04

To: Daron Hall, Sheriff Metropolitan Nashville & Davidson County Sheriffs Office 506 Second Avenue North Nashville, TN 37201
Date: October 6, 2004

You have requested a legal opinion from the Department of Law on the folloWing question:
Question
Does the Metropolitan Sheriff have the authority or the duty to apprehend a jail escapee who was in the custody of the Metropolitan Sheriff before escaping?
Shott Answer
The Metropolitan Sheriff has the authority and the duty to apprehend an escapee if the pursuit is fresh, that is, if there has not been significant delay in the pursuit. Once the pursuit is no longer fresh pursuit, the Metropolitan Police Department has the authority and the duty to locate and apprehend the escapee.
Analysis
"Sheriffs are constitutional officers." Smith v. Plummer, 834 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tenn. Ct. . App. 1992); Tenn. Const., Art. VII, § 1. "The duties of sheriffs are not prescribed by the Constitution and were originally defined by common law." Smith v. Plummer, 834 S.W.2d at 313. 1 At common law, the sheriff was the custodian of the county jail. Prmvtt v. Dunt'fJn, 148 S.W. 229, 238 (Tenn. i 912) ("Ll1he sheriff at common law was the keeper of the county jail and had given to him the custody of the prisoners confined therein, and, when d1e Coostirutiort of 1870
I See, State ex reL ThompJon v. Reichman, 188 S.W. 225, 227 (Tenn. 1916) ("The office of sheriff is a most ancient one. It carl'ies with it, in America, all of its comr:non-law duties and powers except ?S modified by statute.")

TELEPHONE NUMBER: C615) 862·6341 FAX NUMBER: (615) 862·6352
EXHIBIT
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 69 of 190 PageID #: 74

Legal Opinion 2004-04 October 6, 2004 Page 2 of 6
provided for d1e election of a sheriff without defining his duties, it was held that the term 'sheriff must be understood in its constitutional sense as including all the duties and powers, and having all the privileges and emoluments, which belonged to that office at common Jaw.")
See, 'Felts v. Ci!J ofMemphis, 39 Tenn. 650 (I'enn. 1859) ("At the· common law, the custody of jails, .
of right belonged, and was annexed, as an incident, to the office of sheriff.")
As custodian of the jail, the sheriff had the common law duty to pursue prisoners who
escaped and to use every lawful means to recapture them. See, State t'. r'tm/k, 1:16 So. (i01, 603 (Fla. 1931). Howev~, if the sheriff lost sight of the prisoners, the duty to pursue no longer existed. Id.; Barry v. Mandell, 10Johns 563 (N'.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
"Most duties of sheriffs are now prescribed by statute." Smith v. Plummer, 834 S.W.2d at 313: See, Tenn. Canst., Art VII, § 1.2· The sheriffs statutory duties encompass his common law duties and include operating the jail-' and preserving the peacc.4 Smith v. Plumttm; 834 S.W.2d at 313; George 11. Harlan, 1998 WL 668637 (fenn. 1998).
In 1953, the Tennessee Constitution was amended to authorize the consolidation of
cities and counties. Tenn. Const., Art. XI, § 9;5 Metropolitan Go1JCrnment oJNa.rhville & Dcmid.ron Comt!Y v. Poe, 383 S.W.2d 265,277 (l'enn. 1964). Pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Const.,
Art. XI,§ 9, the General Assembly enacted laws providing for the creation of metropolitan
governments. T.C.A. §§ 7-1-101 et seq. The legislature permitted the alteration of the duties of
any city or county office by the metropolitan charter so long as the alteration is consistent with
2 Tenn. Const., Art. VTI, § 1 provides in relevant part: "The qualified voters of each county shall elect for
terms of four years a legislative body, a county executive, a Sheriff, a Trustee, a Register, a County Clerk and an Assessor of Property. Their qualifications and duties shall be prescribed by the General ~t\ssembly. ~.'lny officer shall be removed for malfeasance or neglect of duty as prescribed by the General Assembly."
l See, T C. A.§- 41-4-101 ("'The sheriff of the county has, except in cases otherwise provided by law, the custody and ch~ge of the jail of the county, and of all prisoners committed rl1crcto, and may appoinr a jailer, · for whose acts d1e sheriff is civilly responsible.") See also, T.C.A. § 8-8-201(a)(3) ("It .is the sheriff's duty to: ... Take charge and custody of the jail of the sheriff's county, and of the prisoners therein; rccci\'C rho~t' lawfully committed, and keep them personally, or by deputies or jailer, until discharged by law").
4 See, T. C. A.§ 38-3-102 ("The sheriff i~ the principal conservator of the peace in the ~hcriff's ccmnry. am] it .is the sheriff's duty to suppress all affrays, riots, routs, unlawful assemblies, insurrections, or other breaches of the peace, to do which the sheriff may summon to such sheriffs aid as many of the inhabitants of the county as such sheriff thinks proper.'') See al!o, T. C. A. § 8-8-213 ("The sheriff and the sheriff's deputie~ are conservators of rl1c peace, and may call any person, or summon the body of the county to d1eir aid, in order
to keep the peace, prc.'Vent crime, arrest any person lawfully, or to execute process of law.")
· s See, Tenn. Const., Art. XI,§ 9 ("The General Assembly may provide for the consolidation of any or all of the governmental and corporate functions now or hereafter vested in muniCipal corporations with the governmental and. corporate functions now or hereafter vested in the counties in which such municipal
corporations are located; provided, such consolidations shall not become effective until submitted to the qualified voters residing with1n the municipal corporation and in the county outside thereof, and approved by
a majority of those voting within the municipal c01:poracion and by a majority of those voting in the county
outside d1e municipal corporation.")
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Legal Opinion 2004-04 October G, 2004
Page 3 of6
the Tennessee Constitution. T.C.A. § 7-1-110;C• T.C.A. § 7-2-108(16).' See, A1etropo!itan Cha11er §
2.01(36).11
In accordance with the provisions of the enabling statutes addressed above, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County adopted charter provisions that transferred to the Metropolitan Chief of Police, the duties of the sheriff as the principal
conservator of peace. Metropolitan Charter§ 16.05.9 The Charter specifies that the "department

6 T. C. .A § 7-1-110 provides: "Any city or county office, department, board, commission, agency or function
established by private act prior to the adoption of a metropolitan form of government may be altered. consolidated or abolished by ordinance of the chief legislative body of the metropolitan government if the charter of the metropolitan government does not otherwise provide for the office, department, board, commission, agency or function, and such alteration, consolidation or abolition is not otherwise prohibited by chapters 1-6 of t.~s title or the Constitution of Tennessee."

7 T.C.A. § 7-2-108(a)(16) provides: "The proposed metropolitan charter shall provide: ... For such

administrative departments, agencies, boards and commissions as may be necessary and appropriate to

perform the consolidated functions of city and county government in an efficient and coordinated manner

and for this purpose for the alteration or abolition of existing city and county offices, departments, boards,

commi~sions, agencies and functions, except where otherwise provided in chapters 1-6 of this title or

prohibired by the Constitution of Tennessee".

·

H Metropolitan Chartcr § 2.01(36), which adopts d1e power given to d1e Metropolitan Government hy tiH· legislature to alter offices, provides: "The metropolit:m govemmenr of Nashville nnd Davidson County shall have powet: ...To create, ruter or abolish departments, boards, commissions, offices and agencies other d1.an d1ose specifically established by this Charter, and to confer upon the same necessary and appropriate authority for carrying out of aU powers, including the promulgation of building, plumbing, zoning, planning and other codes; but when nny power is vested by this Charter in ll specific officer, board. commis~inn or other agency, the same shall be deemed to have exclusive jurisdiction within rl1e particular field."

9 Metropolitan Charter§ 16.05, which addresses the duties of the Metropolitan Sheriff, provides in relevant
part as follows:

The sheriff, elected as provided by the Constitution of Tennessee, is hereby recognized as an officer of the metropolitan government. He shall have such duties as are prescribed by · Tennessee Code Annotated, section 8-8-201, or by other provisions of general law; except, that within the area of the metropolitan government the sheriff shall not be the principal conservator of peace. The function as principal conservator of peace. is hereby transferred and assigned to the metropolitan chief of police, provided for by article 8, chapter 2 of this Charter. The sheriff shall have Clt~tody and cn11tml nf the metropolitan jail and of the metropolitan workhouse to which persons arc scntcnccJ for violation of state law, but the urban jail and workhouse in which persons are confined for \•iolations of ordinances of the metropolitan government, or while awaiting trial for such
violation, shall be under the custody and control of the metropolitan chief of police. By
ordinance the urban jail may be consolidated with the metropolitan jail and the urban workhouse may be consolidated with the metropolitan workhouse. After either or both such consolidations, the jail and the workhouse shall be under the custody and control of the
sheriff."
(Emphasis added.)

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Legal Opinion 2004-04 October 6, 2004 Page 4 of 6
of the metropolita.tl police shall be responsible within the area of the metropolitan government
for_ the preservation of the public peace, prevention and detection of crime, apprehension of criminals, protection of personal and ptoperty rights and enforcemenr oflaws of the Stat<: of
Tennessee and ordinances of the metropolitan government" Mctropoiitan Charter§ 8.202. The
Charter, however, still reserves for the sheriff, the duty and obligation of overseeing the
consolidated jail and workhouse. Metropolztan Charter§ 16.05.
The Tennessee Supreme Court has held thar the Charter's transfer of law en forccmenr duties from the sheriff to the police department is a valid exercise of the Metropolitan Government's power under Tennessee Code sections permitting the creation of metropolitan
forms of govemment. Metropolitan Government ofNashville & Davidson Cou~ty v. Poe, 383 S.W.2d
265 (Tenn. 1964).10 The Cow:t stated that the "Sheriff, 1n the conduct of his office, shall be
subject to and governed by Sec. 16.05 and Sec. 8.202 of the Metropolitan Charter." Id at. 278. When any power is vested by the "Charter i.-1. a ::.pecific officer, board, commi~sion ot other
agency, the same shall be deemed to have exclusive jurisdiction within the particular field."
Metropolitan Charter§ 2.01(36). According to Poe, section 16.05 of the Charter makes such an exclusive vesting of criminal law enforcement duties in the Metropolitan Chief of Police. Poe, 383 S.W.2d at 275.
The Charter has assigned custody and control of the jail to the sheriff. Metropolitan Charftr§ 16.05. Incident to exercising such control, thG Sheriff retains the common law duty and authority to pursue and apprehend inmates attempting to escape. See, State ?J. J:<aulk, 136 So. 601, 603 (Fla. 1931). See, State v. Paulk, 136 So. at 603 ("[I]t is the duty of the lcgat custodian of a prisoner to maintain his custody of such prisoner and, if the prisoner attempts to escape, to pursue him and use every lawful means to recapture and return him to prison so long as he docs
not lose sight of the prisoner.") See also, Barry v. Mandell (N".Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) ("The statutes . :. have not altered the common law as to the liability of sheriffs for es~·apeJ, nor taken a\vay t11eir
common law rights as to a fresh pursuit and recaption").
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-114 provides that if "a perspn arrested escapes or is rescued, the person from whose custody the arrested person escaped or was rescued may immediately pursue and retake the arrested person at any time and in any place within the si:ate." Pursuant to the p"rovisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-114, in the case of an immediate pursuit, the custodian of the escapee may pursue and retake him. MtCaslin v. McCord, 94 S.W. 79 (Tenn. 1906). 1n McCaslin v. MtCord, supra, the Tennessee Supreme Court con~trued the provision~ of Shannon Code§§ 7006 and 7007, the precursor to Tenn. Code Ann.§§ 40-7-114 and 40-7-115.11 The
1!1 See, Metrop()/itan Government ofNa.rhvil/e and Davidson Coun(y v. Poe, 383 S.W.2d 265, 276 (l'c-nn. 196-+) ("ll1c: duties of the Shel'iff of Davidson County in regard to criminal law enforcement have been taken from him by the Charter adopted pursuant to agenenzllaw which, in tum, was specifically authorize~ by a constitutional amendment The Charter bears the approval of the people in a plebiscite conducted for that purpose in the area covered by the Metropolit:m Govemment. ... Therefore, we see no constitutional inflrmity against taking this one duty and responsibility from the Sheriff and transferring it to the Chief of Police.")
11 T.C.A. § 40-7-114 is nearly identical to Shannon Code§ 7006. Compare T.C.A.. § 40-7-114('1fa per~on arre>tcd escapes or is re:;cued,-the person from whose custody the arrested pcr~o11 escaped or was rC"scut•d _
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Legal Opinion 2004-04 October 6, 2004 Page 5 of6
Court interpreted the referenced statutes as stated in Shannon's Code, to permit an officer to pursue and retake an escapee without a warrant, but only when the pursuit is immediate or "fresh": 12 n
[W]e think that under these sections an officer would have the right to make such immediate pursuit and recapture, without a warrant, where a person charged with crin1e had escaped, whether from jail or from the personal custody of the officer.
We are of the opinion, however, that these sections ... do not authorize either a private person or an officer to arrest, without a warrant, a person who has escaped from jail or from custody when the pursuit is not immediate or fresh.
McCa.ili11 v. McCord, 94 S.W. at 82.
Thus, if an arrested defendant escapes &om the custody of the Sheriff, and the Sheriff is in fresh pursuit, he may, without a warrant, pursue and recapture the escapee. 9 Tenn. Prac. Crim. Prac, & Procedure§ 18.163 (2003).
may immediately pursue and ret.'l.ke the arrested person at any time and in any place within the state") with Shannon Code § 7006 ("If a person anested escape or be rescued, the person from whose custody he escaped or was rescued may irn.tnediately pw:sue and retake him, at any time and in any place within the state"} [Pro,•isions of Shannon Code 7006 as cited in M,Caslitr v. McCord, 94 S.\\1. 79, 82 {fcnn. 1906)j.
Likewise, T.C.A. §40-7-115 is ne:tr.ly identical to Shannon Code 7007. CompareT.C.A. 40-7-115 ("To retake the party escaping or rescued, the person pursuing may, after notice of such person's intention and refusal of admittance, break open any outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house'~ with Shannon Code § 7007 ("To retake the party escaping or rescued, d1e person pursuing may, after notice of hi~ intention and· rcfu~al .of admittance, break open any outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house") (Provi~ion~ of Shannon Code 7007 as cited in MtCarlin tl. McCord, 94 S.W. at 82J.
12 .r·resh pursuit .is defined in T.C.A. § 40-7-202 as follows:
as "Fresh pursuit" includes fresh pursuit defl.ned by the common law, and also the pursuit <lf
has a person who committed a felony or who is reasonably suspected of having committed a
fdony; (A) It also includes the pursuit of a person suspected of having comrrutted a supposed felony, though no felony has actually been committed, if there is reasonable ground for believing that a felony has been committed;
(B) "Prcsh pursuit" does not necessarily imply instant pursuit, bur-pursuit without
unreasonable delay ....
Although the above referenced definition is only applicable as used in the Uniform Law of Fresh Pursuit, T.C.A. § 40-7-201 et seq., dealing with pursuit across state lines, it is nonetheless inst1uctive in that "fresh
pursuit" is l10t limited to instant pursuit, but includes pursuit without unreasonable delay.
u Where the pursuer is a private person, not only must pursuit be fresh, the e~capc itsclf must be a felony. MrCi.rJ/in.• 94 S.\"'V'. at 82 (''Nor do we think that (the] sections ...authorii:e llny pri,·ate pergon to makran mT<'~t
for an escape, except in those instances in ..;fuch th~· escape itself is br law a felon}·.")
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Legal Opinion 2004-04 October 6, 2004 Page 6 of6
However, if the pursuit is not fresh, a warrant must be obtained. .State v. End.rk'J, 126 S.W. 103, 103 (fenn. 1910) ("We find no authority for the sheriff's arresting a prisoner for a crime not committed in his presence, or in fresh pursuit, where there is sufficient time to get a warrant, even after he has escaped from jail.") Sec aLro, 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest§ 104 (citing McCaslin and Endsley). Because Charter § 8.202 gives the Metropolitan Police exclusive jurisdiction over the preservation of the public peace, once the inmate.: has escaped or is reasonably believed to have done so, unless the sheriff is in fresh pursuit, it is the sole duty of the Police Department to pursue and apprehend the escapee. 14 Metropolitttlz Charter§ 8.202.
Conclusion
The Shet:iff has th.e ability and the common law duty to pursue and apprehend inmates attempting to escape from the metropolitan jail and workhouse pursuant to the authority to maintai.11 custody :and control of those areas. However, once the inmate has escaped, or is reasonably believed to have done so, unless the sheriff is in immediate pursuit, it is the sole duty ofPolice Department to pursue and apprehend the escapee. 15
THE DEPARTMENT OF IJ\W OF THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NA'i:lHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY
Sue B. Cain Deputy Director of Law
.APPROVED BY:
/C._ \ T. !U------
K.'\RL F. DEAN Director of Law
cc: The Honorable Bill Purcell, Mayor
R:\B\B-!Ul51l1KI+\Il·U05K41 \l.c~al Opiniun Drnfr3SC:.JDo
14 Currently, when an inmate escapes from custody, is outside of the jail or workhouse, and the Sheriff is unsure of the inmate's whereabouts, the sheriffs office takes out an escape warrant. In accordance with the
legru authority cited in this opinion, the duty then -~ails on the Metropolitan Police Department to recapture the escapee.
15 Major portions of this opinion were researched and drafted by M>. Niki Eke, J.D., :0.1r. Jcff Campbell, J.D.,
and Ms. Erica Kruse, J.D., Research Staff
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Exhibit 6
DCSO Policy No. 1-3.142, Preservation of Physical Evidence
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 75 of 190 PageID #: 80

* w
Index Number 1-3.142

Davidson County Sheriff's Office

Su2ersedes Policy# 1-3.142

Chapter Institutional Operations
Subiect Preservation of Physical Evidence
Related Standards ACA 4-Al.DF-2C-06, 6C-19
Subject Preservation of Physical Evidence

Page l of2
Effective Date
10 2'5,(07 1\
A mrc\v, lil!IHt
~ ~v
Effective
8/23/06

PURPOSE To outline procedures to be followed for investigation of possible criminal violations oflaw and/or agency regulation on Davidson County Sheriff's Office (D.C.S.O.) property.

POLICY D.C.S.O. staffwill provide for the preservation, control, and disposition of all physical evidence obtained in connection with a violation oflaw and/or departmental regulation. At a minimum, the procedures will address the following: • chain ofcustody; • evidence handling; a location and storage requirements; • manner of disposition.
This policy is reviewed annually.
PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES This policy governs all searches and preservation ofevidence when an inmate is suspected ofa new crime and/or major disciplinary infraction. Only the facility administrator/designee and/or the investigative division may authorize such searches unless immediate action is necessary, in which case the facility administrator/designee and the investigative division shall be fully informed as soon as possible after the search.
Evidence of inmate disciplinary infractions shall be obtained, controlled, and preserved in accordance with D.C.S.O. policy# 1-3.141, "Contraband Control." Ifthe administrator or designee wants to pursue criminal charges, the supervisor/designee shall take the evidence before the appropriate authority to request that a criminal warrant be issued. Ifa warrant is issued, the supervisor/designee will see that the contraband items are delivered to the Metropolitan Police Department's property section to be stored while the case awaits a.p.judication.
Strict accountability ofphysical evidence collected in connection with a crime must be established to preserve the integrity of the disciplinary and/or legal process.
Minor rule violations should be exempt from the procedural requirements of this policy. The procedures set forth in policy# 1-3.141, "Contraband Control" will be followed.

Crime Scene Preservation In addition to the preservation of individual items ofevidence, the following incidents will require that the area of the incident itselfbe secured to prevent the contamination of the crime
scene:

O·FF!CIAL
EXHIBIT

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Index Number 1-3-142 Supersedes Policy# 1-3.142

Effective Date 10/25/07 Effective 8/23/06

Subject Preservation 6f Physical Evidence
Subiect Preservation ofPhysical Evidence

Page 2 of2
Pa11:e 2 of2

• · death of an inmate or service-related death ofan employee, volunteer, or visitor; • extensive property damage resulting from fire, manmade or natural disaster, or inmate
actions; • actual, suspected, or attempted hostage situation; • sexual assaultofanytype; e assaults involving weapons that result in serious bodily injury; • actual suicide; • riot or use ofriot control equipment, including chemical agents; • escape or attempted escape; • actual or suspected sabotage resulting in major property damage or prolonged disruption of
operations, such as suspected arson, cutting off power lines or telephone lines, or tampering with heating/cooling/ventilation plant;· • use of firearms by any person on facility property; • accidental discharge of a weapon; • any other occurrence that the facility administrator/designee believes to be of sufficient magnitude to warrant such measures.

Where possible, access to the crime scene area should be denied by securing the area. Ifthe location of the incident is such that it cannot feasibly be locked down, it will be cordoned off with crime scene tape that is available in each facility. In either case, access to the area will be denied/restrictive until such time as the D.C.S.O. investigative staff instructs the facility staff to
this effect

OFFICIAL
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 77 of 190 PageID #: 82

Exhibit 7
Arrest Report No. 100069817 August 14, 2010
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 78 of 190 PageID #: 83

· 1¥1.1"'.11. I"UI<M 1Uii
(Rev.04-07)
CAL.EA 112.2.1, s2.1.7

Arrest Report

2. Related Incident Number

Metropolitan Pofice Departmetrt Nasksille. Temiessee

1. M.P.O. Incident Number 0Juvenile-
\l··---~' -I\(,-_'1,,"""·-_:"..')>} \l"\

uomesttc Violence

[$DYes {If Yes. Speciiy

N
0

PmseCIJtorl

Oofficar Oviclim
0Bolh

I
\.J\f

0 (Select up to 21 (Enter 'A'lr. Box if Autcmalic)

Rifie-

!..ethal CuUing 111Slrument

("-9- Swl:Chl>ia.le l<nife)

53. Warrant Number 54. Code (Cr.apter & Section)
t

Orow-inl.!lt
0 Other (Specify}
55. Charge
~....:.::-i f.:, ":r~\r~ '\~

NIA
56. Related Incident Number

60. Physical Evidence

soe tnadertl R<>po~ ·61. Held or Stored By;

NIA

54. Residen-c:e-~~(-s-t·r-e~~e~t,\C'it-y~) ----=------~.....:......::~--+-·616~. ,W"-o·~r_'-.-Plh_.·cm-e--~

EXHIBIT
7 Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 79 of 190 PageID #: 84

Exhibit 8
DCSO JMS Demographics Page Aug. 14, 2010
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 80 of 190 PageID #: 85

December 29, 2010 14:37
DCSOJMS Demographics - 527771 VILLEGAS, DANiEL

LastNaCme:IjS;:;NV;IoLL::j;:5:;2E7G;7::7A:1;:$=::...._--:....:..:.___:~::O~F:C::A"irsN""ot."'j"~:;2:5j-8=D)~<A::_:N~:-;I~;E-;L:=-c=::_i=-.:_=-.:_=:_C;:_o=:m_=-p.:l_a=-i.n;,t;:N..o..:.l:2~M0=i1=d0d-6le7;.7;:3:;1.:.j.4:..;R~~~~~-=:_~.:.;-D:._a.:t.e.:_A.:d._.m::.i_t.t:e_:d..::SjOuBf/fi1x4: /2j0_'!]2:.:£J~~

I Addres ~---·-·--·--~--
OL-N~: SSN:

City: NASHVILLE
[;::::::===-._ _:.:. OLS: [___:::±J

State: jTI\1 · @
TOMIS ID: l-1_ _ _

Zip: 137217 Phone:[..!..(__,_)_-_ __

g_ Admission Type: ,_[N_orm_a_l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Federal Responsibility: 12]
:j Booking Location: ""'C""R.,.IM.,..,I,..,.NA""'L-J.,.U""'S""T"""IC""'E:-:C:;,:E~N::::TE=R~--:a-.
Interpreter: [B Language: j,__ _ _ ___...~-

Arresting Officer Name:

No::===========. Badge
Agency:

1::;::;:;:;:;:;:;::::;;::;::;:;::;::;~~

Location of Arrest: \ GLENROSE AVE & OLD·GLENROS

Sex:jMALE

~ Ethni~ [Hispanic ·~

Race:jWhite

:±.1

DOB:·~

A!;!e: l.la:>:.·.;;;;:;;;;,;:,

Height [o7o
Weight [165 POB: joR

I Eye:jBROWN ~ Education:

Hair: !BLACK
:±..1 Religion:

E!..l

Marital: [

B

EmploY,ed: QOO§O:_e No i

EXHIBIT
'i>
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 81 of 190 PageID #: 86

Exhibit 9
Affidavit of Barbara Murphy
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 82 of 190 PageID #: 87

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 83 of 190 PageID #: 88

U~ THE CHANCERY COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE

DANIEL RENTERIA-VILLEGAS;
Plaintiff,
v.
DARON HALL, et al. Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

CASENO. _________

)

)

)

)

AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA r~KPHY I, Barbara Murphy, having been duly sworn, hereby make oath that the facts are true and correct and are based upon my personallmowledge: 1. I am an adult resident citizen of Rutherford County, Tennessee. I am in all respects competent to give sworn testimony; 2. Shortly after the arrest of Daniel Renteria-Villegas ("Renteria"), his family contacted me and requested my assistance with locating him in the detention system and finding out the amount ofhis bond. 3. I am proficient in English and Spanish, and familiar with the detention system. 4. I contacted the Davidson County Sheriffs Office ("DCSO") by phone on or around August 16,2010 to determine the amount ofRenteria's bond. 5. I gave the male DCSO officer who answered the phone Renteria's full name and date ofbirth. 6. The DCSO employee told me Renteria was being held subject to an "ICE Hold." 7. I called back Renteria's family and told them about the ICE hold. 8. The family member I spoke with told me Renteria was born in the United States.

Case 3:11-cv-00218

Document 1-1

1,..-~~-,

i

EXHIBIT

i q

Filed 03/09/11 Page 84 of 190 PageID #: 89

9. I called the DCSO back and, after giving Renteria's inf<:>rmation, told the DCSO

officer who answered the phone that Renteria is a U.S. citizen.

10. The DCSO employee I spoke with during this call told me that in order to release

Renteria, the DCSO required his U.S. passport and his original birth certificate as proof of U.S.

citizenship.
'
11.

I relayed this message to Renteria's family, and they provided me with his

original U.S. passport and original birth certificate.

12. I made a photocopy of the biographic page of Renteria's passport and a copy of

his birth certificate.

13. I took these photocopies to the CJC late in the evening on or around August 18,

2010.

14. I presented them to an African-American male DCSO employee at a Window in

the Sheriffs Department at the CJC.

15. The DCSO employee took possession ofthe photocopies and did not return them.

16. The next day, Renteria's family called me and said that the DCSO required the

original documents - not just photocopies.

-17. They came to pick up their original documents from me on or around August 19,

2010.

18. The family members later told me that DCSO required these original documents

in order to release Mr. Renteria on or around August 19, 2010.

Further the affiant sayeth not.

2 Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 85 of 190 PageID #: 90

State of Tennessee

County ofDavidson

)

Sworn to and subscribed before me a notary public for said state and county, this the
.~
6th day of January, 2011.

'&'/ "M'"Y ,.., . . ~...-omm.lSSlOn ...c. xp.ues: ..rJ:-/1... ."\ /.1 ~'j

3 Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 86 of 190 PageID #: 91

Exhibit 10
Criminal Appearance Recognizance Form
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 87 of 190 PageID #: 92

Receipt#: 195671

CRIMINAL APPEARANCE -RECOGNIZANCE

State vs Dame! r< -.;,,.~"g:'l· -1.16/58 tierem atter called the defendant.

ctaahanceukdsnTdseohee.Wfsveterlncearaddamsaglleyned.thath<IoJ•\r:·-.,·r:m:nc·>~seg!o.i.r;.•:lw.:).·J.lLv:<r;:l,·;:·',.·~'·J·Ew·,-=,;;.:s..,f,,u:!p;whtno:ee1drrsura!oeg~nndroauao·lc!td.>a!set1poeorarnaeendanudpersaobwc~1tnrec1adrctten!!te'~oJlsbtd!h.eteleeflfoaeSrnSnedtdlaatsathteneaetno,oCdfnfoTaTteuemenrnnteennodmete.saesDsbnsaeoetvsevei;deoits,nonowtbnahietehcChvPoSoaueuirdnngr,etaeythl.yoos~w'tAa.t:rv:BVr "noe·qri,sSJet4.snm.C0scC0do0lrJrc:fduilrtyooitnroJOnt.>rln!tht1lyaisl

CASE/ WARRANT II 1. GS504.:396 2. GS50469t

c~~~G.~ ::.; ·., :Ji':i
• '•''

~CURT

§O~.Q DATE I TIME

I vadrng ArrestAMJSD

$? DO:J 00 D8/?bJ?:11 0 09:00 AN

- - - - Cur<trrbu!Jng !o the Delinquency of AMI SO

S? :iOO OC 0812!Jl?O 1 0 09:00 AN

Total:

$4.000.00

· = an- d- n- ot- to~ de.p...<.-:H: ". w·· ..u,;• .,~,;~·,r

::Jf

thl?

Coul1
~-:-

f.:r.r;: st

1180

a. nd

obtained.

lDENTIFJCATION DATA STATEOrTlNl\JFs~q.• vstlanre!HVI!Iagas 436258

Alias

,1.11 ·.::.it GA~

- - · .-·

.-----:;.:;;.----=-~

Actdress: 5::'1 C>Ll •.;or,;•. • : •·
·c S~f.l. XXX I • ~~:.
R!lce· W"'r1::
f.ye Color: E:!ro~
.. · - =--~·

City; NASHV<LLE State: Tenr.~S!<i1o: Zip: '!!/F

DOB. 4!oi1991
Hcighr 5 · ·.o" .

Age: 19 Weigh!: 165

Sex M
H!tir Co Of' f::)i;;:,:k,

OLII.-

DL. St:

-=::.. - · loP-.,

• -="""====

Address
i"../1 ! y.£r .. ~JJJJ,_L,o£2]A. rl/ r~ i'L .
Company t.Ji:ITTie

Telepho·:r:
79/(J-1 Cj ct.~
Telepho"r:

'"'

\0

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 88 of 190 PageID #: 93

Exhibit 11
DCSO Jail Management System Release Form
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 89 of 190 PageID #: 94

DCSO JMS.

Au~ust 19, 2010 23:40

Release Form- 527771 VlLLEGAS,DANIEL R

DAVIDSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE Release Form

08/1912010 23:40

CIS No. 527711

OCANo. 436258 VILLEGAS, DANIEL R

Housing Location Security Level SRA

CDM·c-c2-1-49

Minimum

MW19

.· Scheduled Release Date:j#1_~12~p 23:3? .

ReteaseReason:laond.l?~.......- ........... jj

. Release Event:~-[~. _______jJ

-Jl Release To Agency: ~.~IJ!;ciing C~e_~-.•

"-I____ Release Auth By:I_~!~----·..- ....-...- __1

·

---·------·-,.......................-.............-·~ --·~·······--· ...-..-~.........;..............,_._,,,__,~-.........··-

Authorized B!(:

frVJ

Officer's name:

#,ji>s

Released to:

d~

xnl!J_ Inmate Signature:

w d o Date:

' }

Badge number: ~/c6·

Time: ~~

EXHIBIT Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 90 of 190 PageID #: 95

Exhibit 12
DCSO Jail Management System Log for Daniel R. Villegas Aug. 14-August 20, 2010

---- ··- ·-···

-----·----------------------- ------------- ----~ ··- ............................ -~---- ... --····-·····

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 91 of 190 PageID #: 96

' User ID i3IT'ociiitib"ii';~X ltr;~J{S:FUn'ctrilii'it~:f; Log Time

'J{;-:_ interface P

~~~--- SBT INITIAL FILE 08114110 06:16.28 -----

Code 0

Entrv Tvoe '

Log Messa11e

!successful Inserted Inmate: VILLEGAS, DANIEL,
- - - - - RETERIA control no: 436258

I CIS No.
52m1 -----

5_2_7_77_1_____;

:~:~·:L dgraves JCSO\DCS01! SBT MEDICALSCR! 08114/10 07:00.35

0 !successful

Inserted or Updated Health Screening 527771 527771 Time Creation 14-AUG-10

;~~:~t~:: dgraves JCSO\DCS01 SBT CREATE PRO DB/14110 07:44.1

0 lsucce~- Inserted or Updated Process Status

527771

.

~27771

'

-·~·-

,;c.: dgraves JCSO\DCS011 SBT MEDICALSCR! 08114/1.0 07:44.1

0 !successful

Inserted or Updated Health Screening 1527771 527771 Time Creation 14-AUG-10

I

.._:_-~_?: dgraves JCSO\DCS01! SBT_CREATE PRO OB/1411 0 07:44.2

0 · lsu.ccessful

inserted or Updated Process Status 2m1

s2m1

/: ~:: dgraves JCSO\DCS01 SBT_MEDICALSCRI 08114/10 07:44.2~ -----------------------

0

$uccessful -------

~n2s7e7r7te1d

or Updated Health Screening Time Creation 14-AUG-10

527771 -------

:· ~ interface

)-e--rv-e-~r--=-----'-S-B+-T..D:.E_M.:O..G..R:A..P.H:.I .0.8./:1.4../1:0..0..7::.4.9:.:5~~---=--0-~::.=~.u:c~c.e:s.s.f.u.l:..;___U~pcodnattreodl

inmate: VILLEGAS, no: 436258

DANIEL,

52m1

J:C- interface:_;e_rv_e_r_ _ _,s,;..B.;..T-=..W_AR.:....:..RA.:....:..N.;..T=-.F..:.IIU11o:.;.81.:.14.:/.:.1.;.0.:.0.:.;7:.:.4.:.:9..:.51i~---::..o_.~~::.:tu:.:c::..ce:.:ssf=u:..l_ 1CcahsaergeNoS.t-aNtuAs; =WAaWrrfaRnLt No.-GS504697; 52m1

;·_· :>~:.:.J.;;:.i;n.;.t;e:.r._ fac_e

_

3erver
,;..;.;__:..

_ _

_

,.S:.:B..;T.::._:.W:..;.A.;.R;.:.R.;:A..:_N:.T;__,;;F:...i:l.p.l:8:..!:;1,_4:../;1;_:0.:..0,:;7.:_:4;_9;.:.:5::.1:.J,._

_0:__I!!S.u:c.:c:e.s;s.f:u=l =-- !CChaasergNe oS.t-aNtAus; =WAaWrrafRntLN. o.:=GS504696; 527771

,l:)_,""'\'•-.'.::.:.l-k-sm_i_th_ .-

_,)_C_S_O_\_T_ 2 _!-S-B_T:U_P_D_A_T_E::;:::C_H_A~~'-B-'-1_14...:./_10-'-0-7_:5...:.2:.::.2:_2~--0--.\is:..:tu:.:c_ce-'-s-'-sf.:.u:...l--leCahsaergNe oS.=taNtuAs; =WAaWrrfaRnLt No.=GS504697; ~27771

:£:l: ~~- ~~- ~~~~~~8~~-~~3 0 ~..!___ Update inmateinal status in jail 527771 ~--·

:·-'.·'. ksmith )CSO\T2
:~.\.. .ksmith JCSO\T2

SBT_UPDATE_CHA [o8114/10 07:52.43

0 Successful Case No.=NA; Warrant No.=GS504696; 52m1 - Charge Status=AWTRL

-

SBT EVAL INMATE 08114/10 07:52.431 0 Successful Update inmate inal status in jail 527771 527771

.t(~: interface 3erver

SBT CHECKPERSC 08/14/10 07:55.0

0 Successful

Checking Conflicts in Holding areas for s2m1 vent 27378)9

~-:1~~~:: interface 3erver -~;-i interface 3erver

SBT REGISTERNE) 08114/1 0 07:55.0.6

0 Successful

Next event didn't exist. Next event is 527771 going to be OINSERTnext

leyenti27.37.B09tMoyemenlStatusJL.___

SBT_COURT SCHE ~8/14/1 0 07:55.06

0 !Successful

Court appea-ance created : SC918057 527771

!

21-SEP-201 0 08:30)

I

1:>x jwilson
~\-i' jwilson

-

SBT UPDATEHOUS 08/14/10 08:00.27 0 lsuccessfu I

- ----li-=-S=-BT=.:C_R:.::Ef\...:.J...:.E...:.M.:..;O...:.V-IE0.:.:.:.8/..:..14...:./..:.:10:...0:.::8:.:::0:.::0.::.2~7 __o:.___1l=s.1ucce:.:.:.s:.::sfu:.:.:..l_

Update house changeorder table with 527771 ·information for jms_number 527771 and

bed_ckev.32902..._

..

··-- u•~••

...

Current next event is 2737809 and is not 527771

:

·!active, Seeing ifO will take its place. - - - - - '

Chanoina_to.active_MovemenLStatus<>

1mF:oorvuendsicnhmeadtuele5:l2e7v7enntfr(oHmOUS-UNSCH ~ 152-77-71---,
CJCdi:!JJK,M~j.:.18.:to.CJC-J.IIIKY.:M

'i

0\J\.I~-jw-ils-on-----------S- BT=_- RE-T- UR-N-M- OV-E

08/14110 08:00.27 ----------.1

Returned inmate 527771 to -· CJC-TNKY·M~1-8 from event 0
(HO.US:UNSCHtunscheduled

527771
5-2-77-71- - - - 'i
_

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 92 of 190 PageID #: 97

tM jwilson

SBT CREATE PRO 08/14/10 08:00.27 0

Entry Type '

LoQ MessaQe

uccessful

Inserted or Updated Process Status 527771

. 2}:: Jwilson_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,_sB_T-=-C_H..;.A..;.N;.:G..:EH:....:.O..:U_11D:.;B:.:../1:.;4:.;/1:.:0....:0:.:B:.::D:.:0.:=2.:.7I---o=-- jsuccessful

Changing Housing Location b CJC.TNKY-M-2-3(28322)

:.;····..:··::~:!-_cm_c:fi_a_ll_s_,_)_CS_O_ID_CS_0_1_!,s_B.:..T-=..:U..:..P.::.D:..:AT..:..E=.Y;.:E:..:S..:..R:\D:;.:B.:..:/1:..:4:..:/1..:.0..:.0.::8::=20:..:.:..:52=l----=O:___r-:.::uc:.:c:.:es:..:sf::.:u::.i_1updated class_id 274624, part 1

I CISNo.
\52-77-7-1 --·
1-----
527771

:,:,~.
r=-

grodger!;__

~CSO\DCS01!
---

·SB-T-_U-P·D-A-TE-H·O-U·S

0-8-/1·4/·10-D-B-:49-.2-S

0

~uccessful
·---·--..·---·-..

~pdate ~ouse ~hangeordertable with 1nfonnat10n for jms_number 527771 and

~27771

:

·-·-·------

bed.ckev_32326

..

/.< grodgers )CS0\DCS01! SBT_CHECKPERSC 08/14/10 OB:49.2E

0 ~uccessful

Checking Conflicts in Holding areas for

!-'-'-'- - - - - - - - - - --------~------- -----~-------~vent 2904791

r52-77-71- - - -'

'/', grodgers )CS0\DCS01!isBT_REGISTERN8 08/14/10 08:49.28

0 !Successful

Cument next event is 2737809and is not~27771 clive. Seeing if 2904791 will take its
olace.290~J.9jjs.notActive.290~I91

,~;_. grodgers )CSO\DCS01!iSBT SCHEDULEHO 08/14110 08:49.2~ 0 ~uc:Cessful

F) For Inmate 527771 Created event ~27771

;.;;,:;._l.::;_.:;__l-----!'--=------\---~.:..:..:.:..:.:..:;\--..:._...-.\:.::..:..::.:..:..::.:..:....._1?904791 Scheduled Inmate for event

290419:1

---...::..r----i-----''--=----~-------~--.:._~.;:_;_:.:._:_:_:__1,Cculi.vrree.ntSneeexitnegveifn2t9i0s427990147w9il1l taankde iistsnot~27771
olace_Chanaina.2904_Z9.1_to_active

For event 2904791 (HOUS-8CHED _ _ _ _ _,:_.:..=.:_ _.:....:.._:_:_.=F_::_:_'--.:..:.::.:..:...:.:::..:..:.:~--=----~=:..:..:;.::.::.::=-:::___Imoved in·mate 527771 from
CJC::.T.NKY.:M:2:3Jo.CJC-..1=&1-:lAB

527771

Inserted or Updated Proces~ Status ·
l--=----=--o\------~----1-----1527771

527771

Clothing fonn updated 1-pant, 1-shrt, -t-~=-------~------11-----1,-------11-shoe, For INMATE_CLOTHING_ID:
I233286:...Jos...cloth.bislrec#3j0$SQ
1i~serted. Jaills5ued Properzy fonn for
--------~--~---------I------------~---~---------I~MSnu~ber527n1

527771
1------
527771

Inserted '01' Updated Process Status
~~r-----·t-----~r--~----=~~·-------o\----~l----------15'27771

527771

Inserted new property form. Group id: 527771

,

~::.:I-"___:_'---II-----I-'_:_:_=:::..~..:....::.;.:..:_:_:_F.=;....:..::..;.:.;.;:.:.::::..:.:...:..:J..-_::._~===:.;_-1?37951, Form ld: 259531

Update house changeordertable with s2m1 ~-1..:.:=.._:___1--..::...::..:..:_..:_l.:..:.:...:=:...:..:::..:...:.:..::...:..:..::..::~:..:.:..:..:.:..:..:.....::.::.:....:..:..:-:J.---=-~====----I;-nformation for jms_number 527771 and 1 - - - - - - - '
bed ckev_32326 _____ _

~urrent next event Is 2904791 and is ~27771 ------·active. Seeing if2904791 will take its ·
lorac:e..2904.Z9:Us.notActive..Next.evenl

.,-;::;,.~-----1·-----!--=-----l------~·-'---l:..::....:.:..::....:...:...:..; _
r

_ lwNew ere

bed is CJC-1-A-1-148(32326) The~
moved in their new bed when 1he

527771

move.was.started

IRetumedinmate 527771 to ~~r..:.::.:..:.:..:..._l_..:_.::..::..:::..::.::..:~=.:..:;;..;::.:..:..:...::.::.::;:..:...:.:~.:..:.:..:..:.:..:..:.....::.::.:....:..:..:.:~----=--~====----1cJC-1-A-1-148 from event 2904791
/f,IQUS:SCHEDl_Comoietinc._Move..to

527771

jVhecking Conflicts in Holding areas for 527771
~~l----~l---------!·~~:.;_:_.:._:_.:.._\·_:.;'--..:.:..;..:.:.:~~---=---\~=..::.:..=--~vem2834~5

,.>.:::..,;:.::;!1-in_t_erf_a_c_e_.+3_e_rv_e_r---+S_B_T=-R_EG_IS_T_E_R_N-4E>D_8:.../1_4..:../-1.:..:0:...1_0_:0.:..4.:...3~9__:..;0_:_:_-Jrls-='u.::.cc:..:e:.::ssf.::..::.ui_:_:_--bCurrent next event is 273Z809 and is not~27771

,..

clive. Seeing if2834995 will take its

olace .. 283499.5js_oot.Active.2834995

p~;:>..Fr• -Int-erfa-ce- 3_erv_ er _ _,SBT_COURT

SCH~ 08/14/10

10:13.38

_ _0 _. ~-uc-ce-ss-fu·l - -

Court appearance created: GS504697 16-AUG-2010 12:00)

js27771

~ f~O.\!:~-- ----·-"--- SBT CHECKPERSC~_B/1.5/.10 08:09.14

0 ~uccessfui

Checking Conflicts in H!)lding areas for 527171

1

vent 2905155 · ··· ·

· ___;::.:.;___;___

1 .~i'""l>i~t;: _a_w_o_ol_bn_·-I----~ISBT_REGISTERNE>~8/15/10 08:09.14 · 0 !successful

Current next event is 2834995 and is not s2m1 !active. Seeing if2905155 will take Its olace.2905l55Js.notActi.v.e.2905j,55

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 93 of 190 PageID #: 98

' User ID : Y' t:-o&tiffii~ frlifr!' Ftit'i'iltidli~'!f Log Time

Code ' Entry Type '

Log Messa!le

'·::'·, awoolbli

SBT SCHEDULEIN~ 08/15/10 08:09.1~ _ _o__ !Successful

jSchedule Inmate 527771 for event 905155 MED-TRTCJC

I CIS No.
527771

:>CSO\DCS01 SBT_REGISTERNE> 08/15/1013:34.11 0 !successful 1-'urrent next event is 2905155and is not 527771 -·,---~-----·hctive. Seeing if2905155 will take Its blace.2905J55 is_notActive.U~DAIE-

t .. ; vnoel . :>CSO\DCS01 ;:.;·-".::'._.·1, . - - - - ' - 1

SBT_UPDATEINMA

08/15/1a 13:34.11

---a -~-Su-cc-e-sS-fu-l bveUnpdtate2d9[0U5)1I5n5mate 527771 schedule for

527771

·:: ..,; chcarter

-··..·.~·:

.

SBT REGISTERNE) 08/16/1 a 05:29.47 0 ~uccessful

Current next event is 2834995 and is not 527771

r

--~----11----·- !active. Seeing if2905516 will take its 1 - - - '

olace.. 29a55.16. is. notActive.2905516.

;':;, · chcarter

SBT SCHEDULEIN~ 08/16/10 05:29.47

;.;.·.:::-·~::;...-ll----l-----~--=:.....:...:.;;;.~,;;.::;....:.:.l,:..:;;..;..;;..;_;_;.:.;:::.:.:..;;:.J

_

0 __

_

!Successful !Schedule
~------1?905516

inmate 52777 MED-MD-CJC

1fo

r

ev

e

nt

527771

Current next event is 2905516and is not 52m1 _...:.,.::..;~..:...l:;__;.:::...;;;;,:;.;.;:...:..::.:...:..:.:~l=-~~~:.:..:.;:.:..:.;:~-__::..__~:=:::.:;:=::..__l,ctive. Seeing if 2905516 will take its
clace_29055l6Js_notActive.UE'DA.TE..._

Updated[U]Inmate 527771 schedule for 527771

_...:.,;:_;_:_:._~:__-=-.:....::....:..::::..:..:.::..+-::.:....::_::.:....::_:.._:.:..:.;:.:..:.;:~-__::..__~:=:.=::=:.._-bvent2905516

~----~·

Current next event Is 2834995 and is not 527771 --=---:1:..:..~.:..:.::..--lactive. Seeing if2834995 will take its
ciace_Chanaina2834995JQactive..
For event 2834995 (CBC-CRTA moved 527771 ----~------t.1nmate 52m1 from CJG-1-A-1-148 to
BC ·COURT ROOM.3C
Current next event is 2834995 and is 527771 1::.:.:.:...:.~---bctive. Seeing if 2834995 will take its - - - - - -
clace.2834.995Js_no1ActiYe.J\lextev.enl
527771

,-.::.:.:..:..:...::.:.:.:....._Returned inmate 527771 to BC- COURT 527771

,.

ROOM 3C from event 2834995 .

ICBC"C~TALComoletina.Move_to

Checking Conflicts in Holding areas for 527771
~~l------·l-------~t--=~~--~·--~~~~~--~--ll~~~=--~·vent2665~4

1 1 ~~~<;~ intert'ace ~_e_rv_e_r___ _s'-'B'-'T~R=E=G'-'IS'-'TE...:::.:...R::...N~E>0;:.8:. :./.:. .16:. :./.:. .10:....:...14:..:.:4::...0:.:·::...4~=-I-:.:...:._O:;___+:S:..:tu.::cc:.:e:..:s.::sf.::u::...l--bpurrent next event is 2737809 and is net 527771 clive. Seeing if 2665284 will take its olace•.2665284..is..not Active.26S5284

';.-,': interface :;erver

SBT_COURT_SCHE 08/16/10 14:40.4€

P -~--- .- - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - -

0 ~uccessful

Court appea-ance created: GS504697 s2m1

- - - - - 19-AUG-2010 09:15)

-----

'37~.' interface :lerver
~
;·:·J~·~,: tcaldweO

SBT_COURT SCHE 08/16/10 14:40.4S 0 !successful

Court a_ppea-ance created : GS504696 527771 19-AUG-2010 09:15)

I

SBT CHECKPERSC 08/17/10 06:52.5€

0 !successful

Checking Conflids in Holding areas for 527771

I
I

vent 2906554

1:•::;: tcaldweD
-~~.i~j~ tcaldweo

SBT_REGISTERN8 08/17/1Q 06:52.5€ SBT SCHEDULEINr 08/17/1a 06:52.5E

0 !successful
0 ~uccessful

Current next event is 2665284 and is notj527771 clive. Seeing lf2906554 will take its

olace.2906554..is..not.Active.2906554

[Schedule inmate 527771 for event 906554 MED-TRTCJC

~27771

r~}=i;r .jg-r-if-fi-t --·- ·----·-·-·--- S· BT UPDA-TE-Y-ES-R 0-8-/1-7. ·/·1-0·-0-8-:3-4-.-1-1

0

~--u·c-_c.e_s_s_f_u_l_,___

Updat~d class_id 2~4624, part 11~s Item
1; Ins 1tem 237; Ins 1tem 378; Ins 1tem

527771

!

--------

38t:Jns. item..382:Jnsjtem.389::.1ns..item

1 SBT_UPDATEPROC ~8/17/~08:~~ _._o___ ~_,_uc_c_es_sf_u_l_ Updating classification toS1 for 52m1 527771

s__ ~ jgliffit .•.. ______1 B....;T-::.C_R_EA_J...:E::.P_R_o_1o_8_I_17_I1_o_o_8_:3'-'4'-'.3-'81__.:...o_!Successful

Inserted or Updated Process Status 527771

527771

- . . . "'--'"-'---'-..- '

~jgriffit

SBT_UPDATECLAS 08/17/10 08:34.38 __o:;___ 1s:..::'u::...cc:::e.::ssf::...u:.:l__lwiLJpdate inmate dassificalion history table 527771

,-

1

ith information for inmate 527771

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 94 of 190 PageID #: 99

s:l; lappleto )CSO\DCS01 jsBT REGISTERN8p8117/10 1a:20.19 0
1

E:ntrv Tvoe '

Loa Message

I CIS No.

uccessful Current next event is 2906554 and is not 527771 ·!active. Seeing if 2906554 will take its

~ lappleto )CSO\DCS011jsBT CREATEMOVEio8117/10 1a:20.19 0

uccessful

oiace._Chanainc 2906554.to. active.
Forevent2906554(MED-TRTCJC moved inmate 527771 from CJC-1-A-1~148.to CJC MEDICAL .• _.

527771

1

----

T lappleto )CSO\DCS01 iSBT
..:';,;.-.-~·1-- ' - ' - - - - 1 - - - - -

REGISTERNE>

08/17/10

10:20.38

a

uccessful Current

---~------t~ctive.

SneeexitnegveLnf2t 9is0625950465w5m4taankde

is its

527771

olace,_290655~Us.notActive .. lllext.event

F2:~: -lap-ple-to - J-C-S·-O-\D-C-S·-0·1· ~. -B.T.,_.C-O-M-P-L--E-T-E-M-C-O-B-/-1··.7.·/·1··0-1-0-:2-0-.-3-8 0 S-u-cce-ss-ful- -

~-2-7-7-7-1----··',

~r lappleto )CSO\DCS01 jsBT RETURNMOVE08/17/10 10:20.38 - -'--'----- - - - - - ·

•: '.> ' alking

SBT_CHECKPERSC

~r---;_-1--------1---~---~

08/18/10

07:00.03

0 !successful Retumedinmate 527771 to CJC
- - - - - - - - MEDICAL from event2906554 IME~IRTCJC\.Comoletina Move.to.

0 ~uccessful

Checking Conflicts in Holding areas for 527771 vent 2907970

pS.

~king_ _

-----·!--==-=..:.:S.:B:.T..:R..E:G:;I.S.:T.E::R::N.JEj)~.a.8:./:1.8;/.1.:0.:a:7..:0.:0..:0.3.::;...;0;..:.:~~-u-c=c--e-s~s=f-=u=l=-=---1C,cutrivreen. tSneeexitnegveifn2t9is072967605w28il4l taankde

Is not its

52m1

olace•.2907:97.a.is.notl.\ctive.2907:9Za

'..:\· alking

SBT_SCHEDULEIN~ a8t1811 a a7:oo.o~

0 ISuccesSfu I

!Schedule inmate 527771 for event 907970 MED-PHYCJC

527771

I;'{: . sbuchholz

SBT CHECKFORCC 08/18110 07:27.1~

J_.:.;;.C.j-:----j-----11.:....-=--~:.:..:..~

-505700 ~ppHcation Spa tfhe event 2907970 MED PHYCJC is schedued for the Inmate

beiweell..1.8:AU.G~.0.09;00.an~'~

52m1

.'·,_;,, sbuchholz

SBT_REGISTERNE> 08/18/10 07:27.21 0 Successful Current next event is 2907970 and is not 52777.1

1==-1----1------

- -11-·---+------bctive. Seeing ff2907970 will take Its

olace. 290.79.LO..is.not Active. UPDATE _

,J:;,'. sbuchholz

SBT UPDATEINMA OB/18/10 07:27.21
~-------~

0 !successful' 527771I.EI Cancelled by 29a7984: - - - - - MED-TRTCJC

527771

').· t,.., . sbuchholz

--

--

,-

-

+

-

-

=, S-B-T-

-C-H- E. lC-K-P-E- -R-S-q10-8/-1-8-/1-0.

l0'7::.2.7..;2_1

;

_

.

:0.

.

.

;

_S:u.c.c;e_ss:f_u_ l

_

Checking ConfDds b vent2907$4

in

Holding

areas

for

52m1

1 l;'-1:.:_:.

sbuchholz

-----l--='-S-B-T_-R-E-G-+IST-E..R.N..8;j 0.8./.1.8./1..0;0_7_:27_.2_11__0

_

S~..u.c:.c.:e;s.:s..f:u.l:.:.._--tp,urrent next event is 2665284 and
clive. Seeing if 2907984 will take

is not its

527771

lotace..29019B~Js.notActive.2907984

SBT SCHEDULEINN 08118110 07:27.21

0 Successful

~chedule inmate 527771 for event 907984 MED-T.RTCJC

s2m1

t;'=;?-;~-f~--· --fb--eln:.d.e..r;...:::>_:C..S:O._\_D..C:.S.l0~1:.f:S:.B.=T.:.R::E.G..l-=S-.T::E.:R:N=-~1;:0.8.1:.1:8../1:.0.:0.9:.:.4:6...2:.8..:..:.0:..:.==1S-u-=c-c-~e:s=s.:fu.:l.:==---jbGcutirvree.nt

next event is 2907984 and Seeing if2907984 will take

is not its

527771

lolace....Chanaina 2907984. to active....

~ fbender__ JCSO~'?_CS01 SBT_CREATEMOVE 08/18/10 09:46.2~

~~~:.f alking

SBT UPDATEYESR 08/18/10 10:01.38

:{:~~~:-~ fbender )CSO\DCS01 SBT_REGISTERN8 08/18/1010:18.06

0 Successful For event 2907984 (MED-TRTCJC - - - - · - - · - moved inmate 527771 from CJC-...1:A:.1~A.BJo CJC.MEDICAL__

527771

0 !successful

! - - - - - ' Up~ated class_id 274624, part 31ns Item 527771
598; Ins item 42; Ins item 44; Ins item 72, lns.itemJ.3:Jns.item.Z5:..1ns.itemJ.6:

0 !successful

Current next event Is 2907984 and is ~27771 ctive. Seeing If 29079.84 will take its olace_2901984Js.not.Active•.Next.event...

i,:>i. fbender JCSO\DCS01 SBT COMPLETEMC 08/18110 10:18.06 0 lsuccessfuI

1527771

J-C--S-O-\1D-C-=S-0-1--S-B--TlrR-E-T..U:R.N.M.O.~V-~+-0-8=/1-8-/-1-0-1.0I:.1:8..0.6.;.::.0:..:!.su.c:c:e.s:s:f.u:l .:~-IRMeEtuDrInCeAdLinfrmomateev5e27n7t27910t7o9C84JC

11_5:_277_71_ _,

CMED-..JRICJC)_Comoletina.Move.to

;:ir;: ccrain · )CSO\DCS01 SBT UPDATEYESR 08/18/10 13:39.37 p=' - -..- ..,...... --------- -------------- - - - - - -

o

!Successful --------

~U1p7d;aItnesditcelamss3_3id7;2l7n4s6lt2e4m,

part 11ns 338; Ins

item item

527771

i

- - - - - -..·

3!!.3:Jns.item.3!1A;Jns..item.3!19: lns.itern..

~: ccrain

- - - - - - - - - - JCSO\DCS01! SBT_UPDATEPROC 08118/10 13:3!!.3~ .

0 !successful

Updating classilicaUon to S2 for 527771 ,52-7-7-71----''

§~: !pickard JCSO\DCS01! SBT_CREATE PRO 08/18/10 14:18.1~

0 !successful Inserted or Updated Process Status

.. --- --~~---- s2m1 ·

·· -

15~_2_77-'-'.7_1..;__:

__ ~~: tpickard

JCSO\DCS01! SBT_CREATE_PR<?,O=.:..B/;..:1..:.8;..:11.:..0_1_4;..1::.:..8:.:.1~.:~---=-o ,.

~ls:..'u=.:c;.::c.:.es=.:sf::.:u::.l__ 1nserted or Updated Process Status 1527771

527771

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 95 of 190 PageID #: 100

D !pickard
I?'.~ tpic:kai'd

JCSO\DCS01 SBT UPDATEHOUS 08/18/10 14:18.1E,_~o--~~=lu=c=ce=s=sf=u.l:___ Update house changeordertable with 27771

-,-

information for jms_number 527771 and 1 - - - - -

bed.ckev-4:1.310

. JCSO\DCS01 SBT CHECKPERSC 08/18/10 14:18.1E 0 [successful Checking Conflids in Holding areas for 27771 .----~------bvent 2908290

J;':, !pickard

J_c_s_o_\D_CS_0_1_1..;S_B....:T-:::R..:.E:..:.G:..;JS.:..T:..:.E..:.R..:.N_E_>Fo_s:.:./..:.18:.:./1:.:.0:_1:_4:.:.:1:..:8..:..1:E..:1_ _:_o- - l ·~:::1u=cce:=ssf::.u:;l..:.._

1,cculirvree.ntS'neeexitnegveifn2t9I0s822696052w8il4l taankde

is not its

527771

olace_2908290Js.notAc:tlve.2908290

.,j;\~ ~ick~~ ~~~_(?~DCS01 SBT_UPDATEClAS 08/18/10 14:18.15

~

----- ---------- ----·-·-·-------

0 ~ucc:essful . Upd~te inmate dassification history table 527771

i

--------------- ~ith mfollTlation for inmate 527771

-----·

.:}~ cmthomas JCSOIDCS01 SBT_INTERFACJLJ"fi08/18/10 19:00.16 ~ ----- --------------- -------------- --------------------

0 ~uccessful

Inter-Facility move has affected the

527771

:.:..:.:.:..:.=:___lochedule of inmate 527771 Schedule for - - - - -

O.events. chanced. status•.O. events.were..

11-.-L<-'.-

cmthoma:_ JCSO\DCS01! SBT

REGISTERNE> 08118110

19:00.16

___:0:__~:.::!.s:u:.c::c.e.:s:s.:f.u.:l:.:...._C!auctrirvee.ntSneeexitnegvief2n9tl0s822990082w9il0l taankde

is not its

527771

olaca...Chaoaioa.2908290Jo.active_

. ':. cmthomas JCSOIDCSOHisBT_CREATEMOV~ 08118/10 19:00.16 0 !successful

For event 2908290 (HOU8-TCJC moved 52ID1
mmate 527771 from CJC-1-A-1-148 to I - - - - - -

CDM.C-C2-:1=49Jnter:Eacilitv ·

. ~.···:.
.; .. _. dvickers

SBT UPDATEPRO~ 08/18/10 19:59.5~

0 !successful

Update prop:'lrty location for Inmate

------l·--=------~-----~1--:__-l::...;...:.:__:___ _lcroperty Form 259531 to Fac=CDM,

~27771

oc=MA_Conttvoe;:;BAG•.Contid:083Q__

p··:..:;<:.

-dv-ic-ke-rs- ·

SBT_CREATE_PRO 08/18/10"20:00.23 0 ;>uccessful Inserted
-----·---=----=---+------~---~------1<::27771

or

Updated

Process

Status

527771

1 ---~- _SB_T-=-=-U_P_D_A_T_ECLOT 08/18/10 20:00.2~
8l !alford __ - - - - - - ~BT_UPDATEHOU~08/18/10 21:51.1~

0 ~uccessful 11-'iothlng form inserted For ---~-'-----· INMATE_CLOTHING_ID: 233286:

527771

Deact: cloth .hist rec.#31 0590Jns•.cloth .....

0 ~uc:cessful

Update house changeordertable with 52ID1

- - - - infollTlation for jms_number 527771 and 1 - - - - -

bed..ckeJ/...41.310

[f>( P'-l:.:ja::l_fo_:r_d__l----~!-=--=~:..:.:..:..:S.=B:.T.;:R..E;=G-oIS~:T:.E.:R.N:.E.:>..0:.8:/.1.:8./.1:0..:2:1:.:.5:1.:.:1:~..:.:.:.0:.~.-..,:S:u_-c-cJeI=s=s=f:u:.l :...-IbC.cutrirvee.nt

next event Is 2908290 and Seeing if 2908290 will take

is Its

527771

olac:e..2908290Js.notActiva..Next.event_

1\.~\ jalford

SBT~COMPLETEMC 08/18/10 21:51.1~

0 ~uccessful

New bed is CDM·C-C2-1-;49(41310) ~2m1

-----1·--=------1-------1---~------trnlneywere moved in their new bed when

,

he.rriove..was.staded

:~_;:·.,; .. jalford

I5BT RETURNMOVE OB/18/10 21:51.1~

0 Successful

Returned .inmate 527771 to

-----~--=-----~-------l'----l---'-'-'---lc:DM-C-C2-1-49 from event290B290

(!;lO.US-.ICJ.CLC.omaletioa.Move.to

52ID1

·:~--!; dpeterse

~BT_REGISTERNE> 08/19/1 0 05:02.04

o· !successful

Current next event Is 2665284 and is not 527771

~ ·i·T: :'·!:·:r--=----J-----1---=-----1·------1---~1-----I..ctive. Seeing If 2665284 will take its .

Iii. dpeterse -----~BT CREATEMOVE 08/19/10 05:02.0~

0 lsuc:cessful

olace••. Chanaina .2665284. to active. .. ..

Foreverit2665284(CBc-CRTAmoved. 527771

;

inmate 527771 from CDM-C-C2-1-49 to · - - - - - ·

BC - COURJ..RO.OM.3C

J'\ill; !griffin

SBT CREATE PRO 08/19/10 07:33.H 0 !Successful Inserted or Updated Process Status
--------l-~=-----=--1\----------l------4---------1527771

527771

·:;;~ !griffin

SBT_UPDATEClASi 08/19/10 07:33.1~ _ _::_o__.,ls:.:u::c:..ce::s;.:sf;.:u..:.l--lwUpdate inmate dassifica~on history table 527771

,-

rith infollTlati~n for inmate 527771

_:;_"~ interface 3erver

SBT COURT SCHE 08/19110 09:10.45 0 !successful Court appearance created : GS504697 527771

J.::::::'-'1-----l-----+:_-=~--=-..:.:.:.-~-:__:.:.._...:..:..:_:.:...:.:.j.-...:..:..-4:.:.:..:::.:.:=- 19-AUG-201 0 09:00)

1 ·;~~Y ·interfaceS:..e_rv_e_r~__,s.:_B_T-=-C_O_U..:.R.:..T=S.:..C..:.H_E~0--=-81_1..:.9/_1_0.:..0.:.9::..;1.:.0.:..;4.:6~__.:.0__1s=u~c.:..ce::.:ssfi:.=u.:..J--~Court appearance created : GS504696 · 527771 19-AUG-2010 09:00)

tU~:t)
i=

interface
·-------

3--e-r-v-e--r-----------S--B--T-_--C·-O--U--R-T--_-S-=C-H--E-0-8-/1-9-1-1-0-0-9-:1-6-.-4-2

0

!-su·cc-es-sf-ul

--

Court appearance deleted 19-AUG-2010 09:00)

:GS504696

527771

1

------'

:>erver

SBT COURT SCHE 08/19/10 09:16.42 0 !successful Court appearance deleted :GS504697 527771 - - - - - - - - - 19-AUG-2010 09:00)

'iiti interface 3_e,.r;v..e.r.._ _...JS.:.B::.T.:._::C:.;O...';..-!_~T_SC~ 0-,~8.:..f1_9:...11-'0:_0:.:.9:.:.:2::.:2"'-,4.:.._:2~_:__O:___Fis..:.lu_cc_e'-.s-"-5fu"-I--L1'C9o-uArtUaGpp-2e0a1ra0n0c9e:0c0re)ated: G. S50469. 7 ~277'1:1
filfii~:!F.;.::i:n.t;e..r:f:a:.c:.e:~I:..:S.:e..r:v.e.:r..__ _ _,S:.B::.T.:_.:C::O.:.U..R::T..:.S:..C:.H:.E:.:0..8:./1.:9.:1.:1:0-~:0:.9:.::2..2....4:2..:.:.:..=0=.:...~-!-s-=u--c~=c.e::s.:s.f:u..l:..::.:::C.::o::u_r__tLa'1p9-pAUeG-a2r01a0n0c9e:0c0re)ated : GS504696 527771

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 96 of 190 PageID #: 101

:.~<,- interface Server

lsBT CHECKPERSC 06/19/10 10:49.54

Code Entry Type ;

Log Messa!:le

CIS No.

0 !successful

Checking Confllds In Holding areas for 527771

·!event 2555115

-

._..·.:..,-·. interface ;erver
:· ~
:·.._:. interface 3erver

jsBT REGISTERNE> 08/19/10 10:49.54 SBT COURT_SCHE 08/19/1 0 10:49.54

0 !successful 0 successful

Next Event unchange:l. The event 555115 beilg registered is not the
curreot!Y..active_even12665284
!Court appearance created : GS504697 25-AUG-2010 09:00)

527771 ~27771

F;,,_;:-i-n--t-e--r--f-a--c--e--·--- )-e-r-v-e--r -------- S-B-T_-C-OU-R-T-_S-CH-E0·8--/1-9-/-1-0--10-:-4-9-.-5-~

0

S__u_c,c__e_s__s_f_u, l _~

Court'appearancecreated 25-AUG-2010 09:00)

:GS504696

527771

'

~} sbell

SBT CHECKPERSC 08/1 S/1 0 13:53.09

P ----- -----

··-----

< sbell

SBT REG1STERN8 08/19/1013:53.0

-;·. ~-, : sbell
..:'''1•

,- : -.-.:.·

kcahall

:·.-··.-·· , kcahall

SBT SCHEDULEIN~ 08/19/10 13:53.0~ SBT REGISTERN8 08/19/10 14:25.38 SBT COMPLETEMq 08/19/10 14:25.38

0 !successful · Checking Conflids in Holding areas for s2m1

------~vent 2909911

-----

..

------

-· --- -·-··-

0 lsuccessfu I

Next Event unchange:l. The event 909911 bei'lg registered is not the

527771

currentht..active..event26652M

0 !successful

Schedule Inmate 527771 for-event

527771

'

909911 MED-TRTCDM

0 !Successful

Current next event is 2665284 ancl is s2m1 ctive. Seeing if2665264 will take its

olace_266528A ls_no!Active..Next_event_
--··

0 !successful

s2m1 ;

~
..-·- kcahall

SBT RETUR~MOVli 08/19/10 14:25.38

$1 ----- - - - - - tgant

SBT_REGISTERNE) 08/19/10 15:51.0

...~ ;:.~ :..:·.
..~ ;

tgant

SBT CREATEMO~ 08/19/10 15:51.0

'•·"'
-·_,_ ..

tgant

SBT REGISTERNE:>i 08/19/10 16:33.3

~---~:~:·. tgant

SBT COMPLETEMq108/19/10 16:33.3

0 Successful

!Returned inmate 52m1 to BC- COURT 52m1

'

ROOM 3C from event 2665264

~

ICBC--CRTAl. Comcletina.Move. to____

0 Successful

Current next event is 2909911 and is not 527771 _ _,_

· !active. Seeing lf 2909911 will take its

!olace._Chaoaioa.290991ito_ac!ive.__

0 Successful

For event2909911 (MED-TRTCDM

s2m1

moved inmate 527'771 from

CDM.C:C2_,j =49.to_CDM.MEDICAL__

0 Successful

Current next event is 2909911 and is 527i71 clive. Seeing if2909911 will take its

'

olace..2909911.is_not.Active..NexLeveot.

0 Successful

527771

;

-~.;\:';::. tgant
iii -int-erf-ac-e · ~erver

SST RETURNMOVE 08/19/1 0-16:33.3q 0 Successful

Retumed inmate 52m1 to COM
MEDICAL from event2909911

527771

;
!

CMED-TRTCDMl Comoletina_Move to______

SST-_-U-P-D-A-T-E-_-C-H-A- 08/19~10 21:24.37

0 ~uccessful

Case No.=NA; Warrant No.=GS504696; 527771

· Charge Status=BM

1

12;;:; interface 5erver

SST UPDATE CHA 08/19/10 21 :24.3i

0 !s-uccessful

Case No.=NA; Warrant No.=G$504697; 527771

!

Charge Status=SM

~.~_:-_~·-~> pstadake )CSO\DCS01.. SBT CREATE_PRO 08/19/10 23:35.0

0 !successful

Inserted or Updated Process Status 527771

s2m1

' i

::~?·~~; pstadake )CSO\DCS01 SST UPDATERELEJ 08/19/10 23:35.06

0 ~uccessful

Updated release checklist

527771-

!

.. :..:
t~x~ pstadake XSO\DCS01 SBT_CHECKPERSC 08/19/1 0 23:35.22

0 !successful

Checking Confllds in Holding areas for 527771 vent2910:£1

[

;j(_!:
~

-ps-ta-cl-ak-e -

)_C__S__O_.\._D_C_S0_1_

S--B-T=R·-E-G-I-S-T-E-R-N--E->

0-8-/1-9-/1-0-2-3-:3-5·.2-2

---0 --!-su-c-ce-s-sf-ul---

Current next event is 2555115 and ~clive. Seeing if2910381 will take

is not its

52m1

i

-----'

olace ... 291.038i.is.not.Active.29:1038j

~0.:~ pstadake

)CSO\DCS01! SBT UPDATERELEJ 08/19/10 23:35.22

0 :Successful

Updated Relea;e Farm.

- - - - - f----'"·

-----~------

527771

;

--- - -

--·-- --

- - · - - - ---- ~-~!: khowell
~ --~

SBT_REGISTERNE> 08/19/10 23:43.1
"

0 !successful

Current next event Is 2910381 a~d Is not s2m1 ctive. Seeing if2910381 will'takell$

'

alace Chanaino.29J038j__ta__active.

1 1 ~~ khowell ·

.,., _

__

_

s~;.::B:..;.T:C.:;R;.::EA~T..:::E::.:M;.::O:...:V--=IE0:.:::8/:..;.19.:.:/_10::..2::..:3::.:4.:.:03::..1;.;;~.!-s~-~u::c..:c:.e:;:s..s;..f:u;:.l.:::.:.;___

For event2910381 (REL-RELEAS moved Inmate 527771 from

527771

!

CDM:C:C2-:!=.49Jo

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 97 of 190 PageID #: 102

i UseriD :~'l::O'i'iatib'ik: ·r.:co-:''PFf.'nFti'CiriT-.''? Log Time

Code EntrvTvPe ll

Loa Messaae

I CIS No.

F - - - - ~-:1-jroundtree

)C~\DCS01_~ SBT_V~Rl~,...MED_ 06/19/10 23:45.33

0 lsuccessf~ jSet med_notification to Y in

~27771

inmate_release for jms number:527771

ld: -nh-ibb-s- - )CSO\DCS02! SB!__PROPERTYRE 08/20/10 01:18.02

... ·..· nhibbs
o:·

)CSO\DCS01! SBT CLOTHINGREI 08/20/10 01:18.34

0 !successful 0 !Successful

Updated the inmate_prq>erty_group 527771 able with release information br group id..number_23Z95.1
~MS: 527771-STEP_1 233286 STEP_2 527771 BAG-0830 STEP 3 0-v ci=TRUE SIE~ 4.BOII:I.SIEP- S::O::v_or=.ffiUE.__,

~

-·-··· . nhlbbs ~·-·~···"h'

-~~~9~~<?~

SBT==-~EGIS'!:§~~~?

g_8_!?_~~~1:18.:.-:_s

---------· Is~~~~~~- 0

~urrent next eventis 2910381 and is 527771

~ctive. Seeing if2910381 will take its

kllace.. 29:l 036:l.is.notActive..Next event. ·

--------- - - - .·. nhibbs )CSO\DCS01l SBT COMPLETEMC 08/20/10 ~8.4E ---~-

0 ~u~9essful ___

5-27-77-1 - - -

-- -·· ----·-·

··-- --- -·- .. ··-· -·

.·:.-".. nhibbs

)CSO\DCS01 SBT_RETURNMOVE 08120/10 01:18.48

0 ~uccessful

Returned inmate 527771 to from event ~27771 910381 (REL-RELEAS) Completing

·.

... ..
; ; nhibbs

)CSO\DCS01 SBT REGISTERN~ ~001:18.49

0 ~uccessful

MoveJo..CDM:C,C2::1:49
Current next event is 2555115 and is not 52m1 ctive. Seeing If 2555115 will take its
olace.2555jj5js_not~ctive.UffiATL.

•:·
nhibbs

)CSO\DCS01 SBT REGISTERN~ 08/20/10 01:18.49

0 . Successful

Current next event is 2737809 and is not 527771 ctive. Seeing if2737809 will take Its
olace.2I3Z809.is.notl\ctive.DELEIE

,
_.

.,....

nhibbs

)CSO\DCS01 SBT DEACTIVATEir 08/20/10.01:18.49

0 Successful

Inmate Deactiva1ed: 527771

~27771

......_..·.-··. ..

.~
'

·'•r"' ···.· ...

·- .. . ,• ~

~.

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 98 of 190 PageID #: 103

Exhibit 13
Criminal Court Clerk Case Search Result Case No. GS505783
. . --·-· .. ·------,.--...- ·- ------- - ·-···· ··- -- .. . .. - --·- -· ..... - -· - - - --·- -- . ·' ·- .............. - ------ ...., .. -- ···-·· ····-. -·· ...... --- ··- ·- . . ..... - ........ -.... ·-········- ---
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 99 of 190 PageID #: 104

1/7/2011
f:' "'"David

.. _
T(}rreuce'.''f~~

Criminal Court Clerk of Metropolitan. Na...

, ,,."..,:--NCa.r~i"mitlll1c a-.,loC.,..o,:ifdi.'iI:Dt·Cii:tl.OerifKutv' Case Search Resmts
••o•••••·---·•~••' ~·- •••-••Oho~•c-•o • '- • .:. ••o••:~ •..:.~-Y.::~ii 0

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-Defendant Details

-Defendant
Villegas, Daniel R

Case Number
GS505783

-Appearance Details

Date

Judge

Court Room

-charge Details
Charged/Cited Offense(s) Agg. Assault

Convicted

-Charging Instrument
Downloads
:::"j
El Click to view affidavit.

Defendant Status CONCLUDED

Case Status CLOSED

Search Public Case

InfNm -:.tio n 8<

-._ ft

Research D-:.\•idson ~4~'

Co wnty CriminaI Re:c•:• rds _;,;,,,

:.--~-:";. .-::..;:;~'1~ •.< r;~·'.,.::<:>:~.o:t •. -. -~~""'.'-"':..::-: •.': -~·: '·!. .,-_;~" ~:•..:.:::::f=..-:.-.:

-,__..i e:•.,, s, Map
Arre::.t c:~ata

Attorney Christensen, David

Reason

:= P~ ~· State Tr.=fflc
·~'f-·- Citation$ Qnline
-~~-g~~-;;;,~,:ijf.~~:;;:r..-:f'¢.I~r~~-:-'.·::'"".:-.:"'::.:'J ·:.:-;·§..;.~·.:!:~:.r;:;.:G:'·

Disposition

Bond

Dismissed $50000

Date
09/03/2010

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NOTE: The "detalled background information" report available via your search will provide information separated.in the following categories- CJIS Data and Legacy Data. The definitions of each are below.

• CJIS Data

• General Sessions Court dispositions beginning January 11, 2000

• State Trial Court dispositions beginning July 11, 2000

• Legacy Data

.

• Records posted between 1980 and the dates noted above

For records prior to 1980, please contact our office directly.

The public information viewed here reflects the actual filed .documents or docket entries required to be kept by the Office of the Davids-on County Criminal Court Clerk which are considered to be public record and contained in the official case files. The information provided herein includes the offense(s) with which an Individual was charged/cited and the dispositlon(s) If the case has been concluded. No information is contained herein regarding charges/citations that have bee·n expunged pursuant to state law. The data entry can generally be deemed reliable. However, the information is subject to change at any time. It is important to note the Tennessee General Assembly has made -It a criminal offense for information to be made public once it has been expunged pursuant to T.C.A. 40-32-101. Therefore·, it is strongly suggested that you update any search before using the information for official purposes. In no event shall the Criminal Court Clerk of Davidson County, Tennessee, be held liable for damage of any nature, direct or indirect, arising from the use
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EXHIBIT

l3
·...nashville.gov/.. ./caseSearchPublicResul. ..

1/2

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 100 of 190 PageID #: 105

Exhibit 14
Arrest Report for Arrest Number 100072288
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 101 of 190 PageID #: 106

. "jloP.O. fi;IRM 1DG iRV',,04-07) ..: ..
• C~LEA 82.2.'1, 82.3.7 . ·

~S"'f :Metropolitan P.oiice Dep"m~nt
'NfZShl'ille. Termess~e

53: Warrant t-~umbar ·54. Coda (Chapter & Section?

0Tow-lnlat
. 0 Olh... (Spe:i!y} •• -

.s6. Ralated lli::idant Number.
-..-. ·

65:.H.o.ma Phone

..· ..

..: . ~
.'·.

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 102 of 190 PageID #: 107

·,
.. ---·I
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 103 of 190 PageID #: 108

Exhibit 15
.DCSO Jail Management System Log for Daniel R. Villegas,
i\ug.22-Sept.4,2010
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 104 of 190 PageID #: 109

'' UseriD 1:I t'OcationO'if p:~~~~~-~~ FU'DCtiOh~~~ Loll Time

.~?i~ interface :>erver

SBT INITIAL FILE ~8/22/10 17:26.4~

________ 2£" ---- ------· kcash )CSO\T2

SBT HOLDER __, 08/22/10 17:56.4~

... _........ :~;(~~ interface ~erver

SBT_DEMOGRAPHI 08/22/10 17:56.4~

Code 0
0
0

i Entrv Type '

Log Message

I CIS No•

Successful

Inserted inmate: VILLEGAS, DANIEL,~ 28998

·· control no: 436258

..

·-

--·

-· -·-··· ·······-~----·····

~UC<?_~-s_!~L____ ~old Inserted: Type"' DNA TesUrig
fequired ,Status= Active

528998
-~----

~uccessful

I
Updated inmate: VILLEGAS, DANIEL, 28998 R control no: 436258

;,...-::
ElL interface ;erver

... ·- ·..··· kcash

)CSO\T2

o SBT WARRANT Fl~ 08/22/1 17:56.5q

SBT_HOLDER

08122/1017:57.11

0 fSuccessful

Case No.=GS505783; Warrant .

528998

No.=GS505783; Charge Status=AWTRL

0 ~uccessful

Hold Inserted: Type- ICE- Sentto ICE , 528998

.!'>talus = Active

:::y:_ kcash )CSO\T2

SBT UPDATE CHA 08/2211 a 17:57.25 0 fSuccessful

Case No.-GS5a5783; Warrant

528998

No.=GS505783; Charge Status=AWTRL

_____ - - - - - ·-··:-. kcash

)_C_, SO\T2

SB~E~~L_I~-~ATEj 08/22/1a 17:57.25 ----0--· Successful

·-----·--· ·Update inmate inal status in jail 528993 528998

f

._:1_.•
·r,:·,,. hmcquade

.:••L..•
;- -~ -~~

hmcquade

SBT_CREATE_PRO 08/22/10 17:58.42 a Successful SBT MEDICALSCR~ 08/22/10 17:58.4~ 0 Successful

-

Inserted or Updated Process Status

528998

-- --

...

Inserted or Updated Health Screening

528998 Time Creation 22-AUG-1 0

526998 528gg8

ilL interface :>erver

fSBT_CHECKPERSq 08/22/10 18:02.01

0 Successful

Che9klng Conflicts in Holding areas for . 528998 vent 27378)9

-...-..·...
...

interface

5erver

fSBT REGISTERNB! 08/22110 18:02.01

0 Successful

Next event didn't exist. Next event is
~oing to be OINSERT next
evenU2Z3Z80.9l_Mo:vement.Status_n.

528998

[£ -int-er-fac-e - ;-;e-r·v-er-·----- SBT COURT SCHE 08/22/1 0 18:a2.01

0

~uccessful

Court appecrance created : SC91 8057 528998

· 21-5EP-2010 08:30)

:

...
.:•.:-:. interface

~erver

.·.:.··
~.c.=.

interface

5erver

I1i Interface )erver

SBT CHECKPERSO 08/22110 18:02.0~ 0 ~uccessful

Checking Conflicts in Holding areas for 528998 vent 2555115
-- . -

SBT REGISTERNE> 08/22110 18:02.0~ D !Successful Current next event is 2737809 and is not 528998

;

clive. Seeing if 2555115 will take its

lolace...2555U5Js..not.Ac!hre;2555H5

SST_COURT_SCHE 08/22/10 18:02.0~

0 fSuccessful

Court appea-ance created : GS504696 528998 25-AUG-2010 09:00)

~; . :: i_f;: --:.:,·.':

interface

:>erver

SST COURT SCHE 08/22/10 18:02.0~

0 !Successful

~...ourt appecrance created : GS504697 528998 25-AUG-2010 09:00)

:<~~~! interface )erver

SBT_CHECKPERSC 08/22/10 18:02.0~

0 Successful

Checking Conflicts in Holding areas for 5289g8

i

vent2713$3

;·::-~ interlace 5erver ..:....:...:...
r2 - inter-face- :>erver

SBT_REGISTERNE> 08/22/10 18:02.03 SBT_COURT_SCH~ 08122110 18:02.03

0 Successful

Current next event is 2555115 and is no~ 528998

;

ctlve. Seeing·if2713g63 will take its

olace. 21:13963 .is notActive.UP.DATE

0

-~~_:f~-

Court appearance created 26-AUG-2010 09:00)

: GS505783

5289~__:

:F'i: hmcquade

SBT CREATE PRO 08/22110 ~8:08.41

0 Successful

Inserted or Updated Process Status

528998

i

528998

~;:.::·:
~ ~:-:~·:

hmcquade

SBT_MEDICALSCR.Ej 08122/10 18:08.41 0 Successful

Inserted or Updated Health Screening 528998

i

5289981ime Creation 22-AUG-10

~:~:.?{ hmcquade

SBT_CREATE_PRO 08122/10 18:09.37 0 Successful

Inserted or Updated Process Status 528998

528998

' '

!~ hmcquade

-. SST. MEDICALSCR~ 08122/10 18:09.3~ 0 . Successful . lnse.rted or. Updated Health Screening . !528998 528998 lime Creation 22-AUG-10

·-

-- -

----~-- -···-··

I~ -jwils-on - --···--

SBT_UPDATEHOU~ 08/22/10 18:37.0~

- - - - - 0 .. !Successful _ Update house changeorder table with 528998 information for jms_number 528998 and

' '

b.etlckeY...32902__

.ill

EXHIBIT

;;

·~ [g'&"'&.

I.".'. l$"'

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 105 of 190 PageID #: 110

',':i'_i' jwilson

Code
lsBT_REGISTERNE~D8/22/1D 18:37.04 0

Entry Type

Loa Message

CIS No.

uccessful

jljUrrent next event is 2555115 and is not 528998 _clive. Seeing ifO will take its place. lr-hanoina_to.active .• MovemenlStatus<>

:;;: jwllson _

jsBT_CREATEMOV~ 08/2211 0 18:37.04

0 !successful For unschedule:l event (HOUS-UNSCH ,5_2_89_9_8_---',

· - - - - - - moved Inmate 5289S from

-,-

CJCdiiiiK-:M-J:B.to.CJC-..INKY.M

1 l-':'""'.-=-:·t~jw_il_so_n_

_,

-----+SB_T-=..U..:.P..=D.:..A..:.T.=E..:.H.:..O.:..U..:S

o~-=8/-=2=2!.:..1.:.0..:.1.:.8:..:3.:.:7·..:0..:41-

0 --1-

!successful ----llnfo

r

r

Update house nation for

changeorder table wlth jms_number 528998 and

28998 1----

'

-

--

-

bed.cke~ 25337 ·

;2.. jwils~~....... -----·-----·- ~~!.-=.~E~_~I,~RN~ ~~~-~~~-~.! ~:~?.:?~ 0 ~~-essf~!___ ~~~~~\~~x!~,v~~e~~~~~~~ ~ct~~~- 528998

\ {]wilson

SBT_COMPLETEMq 08!?211 0 18:37.04

0 ~uccessful

~ctive. UI?DAIE.next.event(2555J.15.l
Changing beds to CJC-TNKY-M-1-14(25337)

528998

":;~' }' jwilson

SBT_R§!_~RNMOV~ 08/22/10 18:37.04
------~~-

--·

0 ~uccessful

Returned inmate 528998 to

· CJC-TNKY-M-1-8 from event 0

(i:IOUS"UNSCE:Il.Unschedule..t

.. 528998

·.·;:, ;,-:.r·

jwilson

SBT CREATE PRO 08/22/10 18:37.0~

0 Successful

Inserted or Updated Process Status 528998

528998

.. .-:·
·.·-:

jwilson

SBT CHANGEHOU~ 08/22/10 18:37.0~

0

Successful

Changing Housing Location b CJC-TNKY-M-1-14(25337}

528998

,_,-,;-- wsydnor JCSO\DCS01 SBT HOLDER

08/22/10 19:57.06 0 ~uccessful

Hold Inserted: Type= ICE -lnvestig_ath.e 528998

;.;,.;.,.f---=-----I-------4--=------+---..:...:.---'-~-----.1-----IIHold , Status= Active

,:.. ~'
~

-ws-yd-no-r

JCSO\DCS01 SBT HOLDER

08/22/10 19:57.14 0 !successful Hold Updated: Type= ICE· Sent to ICE

-------t---=::__----11---=----'----'--ll----~-=-~..:.._--lstatus =Inactive

528998 -----·-·

- ... _,_

- -·-

~-.:~:~ ·. jbhoiUn

SST UPDATEHOUS 08/22/10 20:38.28

0

!successful

Update house changeorder table with · Information for jms number 528998 and

5-28-99-8 - - ·

bed.ckelL.190j 7 -

":0-J jbhollin

SBT CHECKPERSO 08/22/10 20:38.28 0 ~uccessful

Checking Conflicts in Holding areas for 528998 vent 2911937

:.:..~. jbholfin ~:\~~ jbhomn

SBT REGISTERN8f08/22/10 20:38.28 SBT_SCHEDULEHq 08/22/10 20:38.2~

0 !successful 0 Successful

Current next event Is 2555115 and is not 528998 clive. Seeing if2911967 will take its
lolace_29jj_96ZJs.not.Actille.29j_1.9.6Z

F) For Inmate 528993 Scheduled nmate for event2911967

528998

0X: mbarshaw

SBT REGISTERNE>i 08/23/10 00:11.5~ 0 Successful

Current next event is 2911967 and is not 528998 clive. Seeing if 2911967 will take its

'

olace .Chancina.291 196Z.to active

}1: -m-ba-rs-h-aw- - · - - - - - SBT_CREATEMOVE 08/23/10 00:11.5~

0 Successful

orevent2911967(HOUS-SCHED oved Inmate 52B9S from

528998

:

r JC,T.NKY.::M-1,:jAJo_CJC::l.::&1-1.2

l::.~~h jdemonbr JCSO\DCSO 11 SST CREATE_PRO 08/23/10 00:35.56

0 !successful

Inserted or Updated Process Status 28998

~28996

1'•\i jdemonbr JCSO\DCS011 SBT UPDATEPROP 08/23/10 00:35.56

0 !successful

Inserted new property form. Group ld: ~28996

;

38684,Fonnld:260345

-~~
·:.-.:,:,· jdemonbr JCSO\DCS01 SBT_UPDATEMONE loa/23/1 o oo:36.15

0 !successful

Update money bnn 45846.Total ollected is$9

1528998

~f~t~~~- jdemonbr JCSO\DCS01 SBT CREATE_PRO loat23/10 oo:37.oe

0 !successful

Inserted or Updated Process Status 28998

528998

- - - - - - - ti;~ jdemonbr
~----~

JCSO\DCS01
~-----·----

SBT_UPDATECLOT

0-8-/2-3-/1-0- -00-:-3-7.-0-8

i!~V jdemonbr JCSO\DCS01 SST UPDATEISSUE 08/23/10 00:37.1~

0 !successful

Clothing form updated 1-pant, 1-shrt,

- - - - - - 1-shoe, For INMATE_CLOTHING_ID:

l234001:_ins_clotb.hist.re0#.3jl7.93

0 __ ~uccessful

Inserted Jail Issued Property form for -~MS number528998

5·2-89-9-8 ---

526998

'

----

~ jfajgenbau )CSO\DCS01. SBT U.PDATEHOU*B/23/10 00:40.1.~ . 0 .~-:.:IU:.:c~ce:.:s:.:sf..:u:..l--f,l,Jpda!Ei_ ~ous~ ch_ar]geq~d~r l"!b.!?..\o/JI,h.. 528998.

•-

Information for jms_number 528998 and

j:,ed..cke.Y..:I.90H

~t jfa]9enbau JCSO\DCSO 11 SBT REG !STERN~ 08/23/10 00:40.1 ~

0 !Successful

Current next event is 2911967 and is 528998

• ,..

-

·---- ----1·-----bctive. Seeingif2911967willtakeits

olace..29.U96ZJs.llot.Active.:Next.event.

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 106 of 190 PageID #: 111

i User ID 1'~'-"-t"ocatlo~ !;::;::~~"'. f'u'ii'Cti'O'fiC'fS:T Log Time

Code Entry Type 'I

LoQ Messaae

I CIS No.

------'-+--=-- 2':~· jfajgenbau )CS0\DCS011 SBT_COMPLETEMC 08/23/10 00:40.1 E · ·0

1i=u-c=c-e=s=sf:u::l

New ._-11.,.,ere

bed is CJC-1-A-1-12(19017) They moved in 1heir new bed when the

28996 ~----­

move.was.started

; .:" jfajgenbau ::>CSO\DC$011 SBT RETURNMOV~ 08/23/10 00:40.H

0

uccessful

Relumed inmate 528996 to CJC-1-A-1-12 from event 2911$7

528996

1;::" szavala :JCSO\DCS01! SBT CHECKPERSC 08/23/10 19:37.3~

0 !successful

ll:l.OU.S-SCI:lEDl..Comoletino.Move.io_
Checking Conflicts in Holding areas for 528998 vent 2913171

:~,~; szavala JCSO\DC$01! SBT_REGISTERNE> 08/23/10 19:37.38 !'-"' ---- ---·.. ---·-·----·-· -----·--- --~- -- --- - - - ---------

0 !successful Curren.t next event is 2555115 and is not 528998

:

----· ---··-- ~clive. Seeing if 2913171 will take its ---------·

olace•.2 9 l 3 . 1 ] j ..is.notAclive.29.1.3t7.1

.' :<:. szavala :JCSO\DCS01!isBT_SCHEDULEIN~ 08/23/10 19:37.38 0 !successful ~chedule inmate 528998 for ev.ent

-·- - - - - - - - - - -

· - - - - - - - - -----1'913171 MED-TRTCJC

528998
----~

.,._...,
p sdavis )CSO\DCS011I5BT REGISTERNE> 08/23/10 19:53.39 -~v........ --•···•~ ·-----·---~

~-~~ -~- sdavis

-·".
'

sdavis

. :JCSO\DCS01t SBT CREATEMOVE 06/23/10 19:53.39 :JCSO.\DCS011 SBT REGISTERNEJ 08/23/10 20:02.45

. ,..
,.

.

sdavis

)CSO\DC$011 SBT COMPLETEMC 08/23/10 20:02.45

0 Successful

Current next event is 2913171 and is not 528998 ~clive. Seeing if2913171 will take its olace. .Chanaina.29.1.3UHo.active

0 ~uccessful

For event2913171 (MED-TRTCJC

· moved inmate 5289$ from

CJC~h12.to.CJC..MEDIC81

528998

0 ~uccessful

Current next event is 2913171 and Is 528998 clive. Seeing if 2913171 wiU take Its olace....29.:1 3H.1 is.not.Active•.Next.event..

0

~uccessful

528998

.,. _·, sdavis

::>CSO\DCS011 SBT RETURN)v10Vf 08/23/10 20:02.45

''..';'
-

·mp-att-ers- JCSO\DCS011 SBT_CHECKPERSq 06/24/1 0 09:47.39

··~:;:~ mpatters
·,; ·:-.~·

JCSO\DCS01 SBT REGISTERNE>j 06/24/1 0 09:47.3~

·:::. mpatters JCSO\DCS01 SBT SCHEDULEINN 08/24/10 09:47.3~
,,; ~- lappleto JCSO\DCS01 SST REGISTERNE>j 08124/10 12:26.4~

~~·:~·;r Jappleto JCSO\DC$01 SBT CREATEMOV~ 08/24/10 12:26.4~

?2 -----·- lappleta JCSO\DC$01 SBT_~EGISTERNEJ ~~/24/10 13:09.4E
:;;;;.:;;='::· lappleto JCSO\DCS01! SBT_COMPLETEMC 08/24/10 13:09.4E

0 ~uccessful

Returned inmate 528998 to CJC

528998

·MEDICAL-from event2913171

rMED,TRTCJCl.Comcletina Move.to

0 !successful

Checking Conflicts in Holding areas for 528996

-- event 2914071

I

0 !successful

purrent next event Is 2555115 and is not 528996 ctive. Seeing if2914071 will take Its
biac:e....29j~O'Z:I is_ootActive.29j~07.i___

0

!successful

~chedule inmate 528998 for event · ~914071 ADD-ICEINT

528998

0 !successful

purrent next event is 2914071 and is no~ ~28998 clive. Seeing if2914071 will take its
lnlac:e Chanoina.29.1AD7.:Lto.actlve

0 lsuc:cessful

Forevent2914071 (ADD-ICEINT moved 1528996 1nmate 528008 from CJC-1-A-1-12 to

CJC BOOKING..

.. . - .. -

0 ~-uccessful

Current next event is 2914071 and is ~28998

-!active. Seeing if 2914071 will take its

olace•.29.1.40'Z:I.is.not.8ctive..J\Jext.event

0 !successful

528998

,,..~:;/, Jappleto
.·:.~~"t apressle

:JCSO\DC$01 SBT RETURNMOVE 08/24/10 13:09.4,1!

0 !successful

Returned inmate 528998 to CJC BOOKING from event2914071 IADDdCEIND.Comole!ina.Move..to

1528-99-8- - - '

o__1 JCSO\DCS01 SBT REGISTERN~_._0_8_12_5_11_o_o_5~:1_0_.0+7__ '

1s~u_c...:.c...:.es_sf_u_J_

Current !active.

next event Is 2555115 and Seeing if 2555115 will take

Iitssnot~52-89-9-8 ~-'

olace Chancinc.2555.1..1.5Jo.active.

::} apressle

JCSO\DCS011 SBT CREATEMOVE 08/25/10 05:10.07 0 !successful Forevent2555115 (CBC-CRTA mo\led j528998 -----1--=-----~~-------~----~--..,;,_c.;..__,inmate 528008 fro~ CJC-1-A-1-12 to BC

_CO.UBI.BO.OM.3.

F%.= ·in-te-rfa·c-e-.. 3·-e-rv-e-r------- S__B__T____C,H_E_C_K.._P_E__R_S__C 0-8-/2-5/-1-0 -11-:1-2-.1·3 · - -0- -!s-u-cc-e-ss-fu-l.·~vCehnetck2in5g52C5o7n2flicts in Holding areas for

528998

I

-·~-------

~ interface :>erver

SBT REGISTERN8 08/25/10 11:12.13

0 s-uccessful

-
Next Event unchanged. The event ·
552572 behg registered is not the

js28996

currentlv.active.event2555.1.15....... ---·

;~~L in)erfac:e :>erver

SBT COURT_SCHE 08/25/10. 11:12.13

0 lsu ccessfu I _G9LJ.rt appea<!nc~ .~reated : GS_504697 . 528998
· 03-SEP-2010 09:00)

'

~BT:..COURT SCHE 08/25!10 11:12.14

0 !successful

Court appeaance created : GS504696 528998 03-SEP-2010 09:00)

t

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 107 of 190 PageID #: 112

:(;'i fbender
:;,_J fbender

Entrv TvDe '

Loa Messaqe

I CIS No.

)CSO\DCS01 SBT REGISTERNE>08/25/10 12:18.4£ 0

uccessful

Current next event Is 2555115 and is 528998 ctive. Seeing if 25S5115 will take its - - - - · olace-2555:1 t5Js.notActive..Next.evenL

)CSO\DCS01 SBT COMPLETEMC 08/25/1 o 12:18.4€ 0

uccessful

-----11----------1

528998

-\>': fbender

)CSO\DCS01l

SBT _RETURNMOVfl

08/25/10 12:18.49 0 !successful Returned inmate 528998 to BC~--------1---1.:..::.::.::_:~=---IROOM 3A from event 2555115

COURT

528998

f.CB.C:,CB.JALComoletino.Moye_to
!iii -~~!aln _ )CSO~CS01~ SBT_UPDATEYESR ~~~~~!~..:!_~~-~~ 0 SuccesS:u_l___:_~~rl~sdi~~~t~~;Tt~r{,~~~;1l~:i~:~ ~~8_998 --··

>>1---'

interface ----

-

3-e-r-ve-r- - - - - - ·

S--B-T-_'R=-E-G--IS--T-E-R-N~-E->-0-8.:/2.5.1.1.0..1.3.:~2.7..:1.~:.:~--0=--- !successful

382:.JnsJlem.3B9;.Jns..itern..390:.1ns.item_
Current next event is 2713963 and is not 528998 cUve. Seeing if 2713963 will take its. ! - - - - · - ' olace. 27.13963 isnot.Active.UPDATE

, ._.:- interface
1~-1----1

3-e-rv-e:r----,.--S:B=T-_-C-O-U=R--T-_'S-C'H-E-I08-/-25-1.1:0..1.3::2.7;.1:6:.:;:0.,.~~-u-cc-e-s+s-fu-l--·~2C6o-uArtUaGp-p2ePa1-a0n0c9e:0d0e)leted:

GS505783

528998

·_:::i interface 3--e·rv-e-r-+~-=~.:..S.B..T..C.O=~U=R~.T~:S.:C.H=.E.:0.8./2.5.1.1:0.:1:3.:.2:7...1:~.:.::.0:..:..:u.c:c1e-s-s-f-u!l-----ICIo0u3r-tSaEpPp-2e0a1ra0n0c9e:0c0re) ated: GS505783 528998

-~; ~-· etrotter
'· .. :_1 etrotter
~

------t--=----.S:B.T...U:P.D.+A-T-E=-H-O=-U:S:.0;8_/;2_5:/:1.0;_2;3_:1~~6-.1-6:......0.~:=:.s:u.c:c=e:s.s.f.u.l..-liUnfpodnantaetlhoonusfeo~cJhmasn_gneuomrbdeerr5ta2b8l9e9w8itahnd_ 528998

bed..cke'l t841

.

I----------!S·B-T-_~C-H-E-C-K-P-E-R-S-q~0-81-2-5-/1-0-2-3-:1-6-.1-~-~--0---~S~u~c-ce-s-s-fu-l --~vCehnetck2in9g16C~o7nflicts in Holding areas for 528998

-~
~ ,-,:: etrotter

SBT REGISTERNE> 08125/10 23:16.1~

·"·' .. etrotter
~

···---

SBT SCHEDULEHO 08125/10 23:16.16

0

·-

S~u~:c.c:e:s.s:f.u:l :~--acCtuirvree.nt

next event is 2552572 and Seeing if2916577 will take

is not its

528998

olace. 29.1657_7._ is. not Active.29.165'Z7.

0 fsuccessfu!

F) For Inmate 5289511 Scheduled

· ----lnmateforevent29165·77

528998

;,;~: ;. jhart .

)-C--S-0-\-D-Ct-S~0-1---S-B-T+-R-E=-G-I=S-T:E:R.N.:E.>.0:8./~2~5-/1-0:.2.3.:.4.1..-5+~==.:.0...:.S.u:c.c.e.s.s.fu.l_t;,c~t.i;uvrere.nl

next event Is 2916577 and Seeing if2916577 will take

is not its

528998

olace Cbancino.29j 65ZZJo.aclive

-~-jhart

J-C--S~-O-\-D!-C-S~-0-1"--S-S-T+--C-R::E.A.:T.E.M:.O:.V.E..0_8../2.5:./1.0..2.3.1:4-1-.-5-:+2:..=.:0..:..S:.u.c:c.e_s:_s:fu_l_

For event 2916577 (HOU5-SCHED _ lmoved inmate 5289511 from

CJC-..1~..12.to CJC-,3,&8:16

528998

~-~:·:·,·_ lbrown ~ ------ -------·

SBT

-

UPDATEHOUSID8/26/10 00:10.29 0 !----'--"-'--'-JI----,\-

-

fsuccessful Update house changeordertable with ------'----Iinformation fo.!:Jms_number 528998 and

528998

bed.cked.847"

1};', !brown

-------S~ BT-R-EG~IS-T- ER-N~ E>~ l08-/2- 6l1-0 ~ 00~ :10~.2~~ --0-- fsuccessful

jJ2 _!brow~-- - - - - - ~BT_COMPLETEM~ 08/26/10 00:10.29 0 ~ucc7ssful

Current next event is 2916577 and is 528998 clive. Seeing if 2916577 will take its
olace..29.16577_fs .not Active..Next event.. ·

New bed is CJC-3-A-8-16(18475) They ~28998

:

!were moved in lheir new bed when the - - - - · ·

move.was.star:ted

~:".-,:'"I\.;;!'b-r-o--w1-n------F-'-=:..=..:..:..:...::.i.s;;B.:T.:_.R.::E..T.:U..R.lN.:.M.:O.:V..E:.:0.8.:/.2.:6../1:.0;..0:.0.::1:.0:...2:9.::.::~.-0_::____jiS::u.:c;c.:e.s:.s:f.u:.l::.::::..R..e..tu_IrCnJCe-3d-Ai-n8m-16aftreom52e8v9e9n8t

to . 2916577

(I:IOUS.SCI:IEDLComoletino:Move.to

~ls~_:289_9_ 8 _i

~' .q: -cc-rai-n ~--JC-S- O\- DC-S-01-l S1B- T =UP-D-AT-EP-R-OC-0181-26-11-0 0-6~ :59~.3~ 8 --.0~- !successful

Updating classification to S1 for 528998 528998

). ;'; interface Server

__ o SBT_CHECKPERSC 08/2611 09:45.25 __o__~ls!u_cce_ssfi_u_l__..,checklng Conflicts in Holding areas for 528998

-

vent 2713933

J2_ _in_t_e_rfa_ce_j_3_erv_e_r____~.S_B_T~-~R_E_G_IS_T_E_RN_~~~_OB__I2_61_1_0_0_9:_45_.~25 1

:',~~;; interiace 3erver

SBT_COURT~sCHE 0812611 o09:45.25

~ ----------· ----·-··-- - - - - - - ----.--·---·

0 !successful

Current next event is 2552572 and is not 528998 !active. Seeing if2713963 will take Its olace_27J.3963Js.not.Active.2753963

o !Successful

Court appea-ance created : GS505783 528998

:

- - - · - - 26-AUG-2010 09:00)

--------

;-:~~': Interface Server

SBT REGISTERNE> ~-8126110 09:4~.26 ___o___,_:.[SI_uc_c_e_ssli__ul_ _ Current next event is 2713963 and is not 528998 !active. Seeing if 2713963 will take Its olace.. 2'Z.13963.is.notActive.UI?.DATE._

. hli;;;:: ~~~-in-te-r-fa-c-e-1S-e-r-ve-r------. !S-B-T=C~O--U~R-T-S-C-H-E~-0-8/-26-/-1.-0-0-9-:4-5-.2!6----0--- ~uccessfol

GC>!!rl apP.e!lllr1CJE!_d_el~ted : GS505783 528998 . 26-AUG-2010 09:00)

IJ"fj:;~:!!l:~~ll1;~,.:s..:le~e----I)CSO\DCS01 SBT_UPDATEYESR 08/26110 14:21.01 0 !successful llfpdated class_id 275352, part 1

~5-2-8-9M-----l;

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 108 of 190 PageID #: 113

User ID '~: LocatiorN~r f:11Jl.TF1Tn'ctlon";::~.,1' I Log Time

Code Entry Type

LoQ Messeae

' CIS No•

.·:: . slee

)CSO\DCS01 SBT UPDATEPROC 08126/10 14:21.01

0 ~uccessful

Updating classification to 82 for 528998 528998

-------------\·------\--~~--~

,.,...

1·;.-.·'"s"le-e'----- :lCSO\DCS01 SBT CREATE CON 08126110 14:21.2

0 Successful Created Contactfor 528998 contact type 528998
---\-...:...:..:..:..._.;__,_L~

z slee __ )CS0\DCS01 SBT_CREATE_CON08/26110 14:21.2

· 0 !Successful

c . Created Contactfor 528998 contact type 528998

1~[}~;-· _sl_ee___ )__c_SO\DCS01 ~ SBT_CREATE_CON 08126110 14:21.2 --~~lsucces~ ~reated Contactfor 528998 contact type 528998_-_' 1

..

..

J-:....:_ _sle_e_ _ )_C_S_O\DCS01! SBT CREATE CON 0_8_12_6_11_0_1_4:_21_.2_.__0__ l_su_cc_es_sf_ul--1JCreated Contactfor 528998 contact type 528998

1

1

1

0

1 ::c:··=-~:._· _s_le_e_ _ )CSO\DCSOH SBT CREATE PR0~8126110 14:21.32 1

0 !successful

Inserted or Updated Process Status 528998

- - - 528998 - -

1 l'-~"-".:~_c _s_le_e_ _ )CSO\DCS01! SBT_UPDATEClAS 08126/10 14:21.32 1

0 Successful

Update inmate dassification history table! 528998 1vvith information for inmate 528900

1_,_-~;:·--~·-s_le_e_-1 JCSO\DCSO 1! SBT UPDATEHOUS 08126/1 0 14:21.57

0 Successful

Update house changeorder table with ~28998 information for jms_number 528998 and bed.cke:.r.J.862Z

1 1-··"'-•,~:~: _s_le_e_ _ JCSO\DCS01! SST CHECKPERSC 08/26/10 14:21.57 1

0 Successful

Checking Conflicts In Holding areas for ~28998
vent 29171522

,..

·-· . ---· _,_ --

S s_le_e___

JCSO\DCS01!~BT_REGISTERNE~08/26/10

14:21.57

-·0-~~·ucc-ess-fu-l -

Current next event is 2552572 and ~ctlve. Seeing if 2917622 will take

is not its

528998

-·

clace.29j1622.is.natAcliYe.29fl.622._.

1'-'-}''--'-X.·~s_l_ ee _-1)CSO\DCS01! SBT UPDATEC~08/26J1.0 14:21.57

0 Successful

Update inmate dassification history table 528998 vvith infonnation for inmate 528993
1

,_...':,. wevans

SBT REGISTERN~08/26/10 15:27. 3~

0 ~uccessful

Current next event is 2917622 and is not 528998 clive. Seeing if2917622 will take i1s
olace._Chancina.29:11622.to.active.

~-:~;;:.::;1.:.:w.

:.ev.:.

:a:

.:n.:.

s-l-----FS..:.B.:.:T=-C::..:R.:.:E::..:/i..:..::T.:.:E.:..:M.:.:O'::'~F0-=8/-=26.::..:/..:.10::__:__:15::..:::2::..:70..:..3:.:S~~u:~c-c--e=-s--s-f·uF-l==:=..-f,For event 2917622 (HOUS..SCHED
moved inmate 526993 from

CJ.C:3::A:B::16Jo..CJ.C:3:D-...1B:36

528998

:_:~~·::: wevans

SBT UPDATEHOU~08126/10 15:49.5~

0 Successful

Update house changeardertable with 528998

J2:=:.C:I----I-----II--=-----\------+---1~----Iiinformatlon forjms number 528998 and

bed. ckev.:JB627. - · _

__

.:> _' wevans

SBT_REGISTERNEJ 08/26110 15:49.56

;,i;_;.;. - - - - - - · - - - - - - · - - - - - - - - - ----------------

0 ·

S-u-cc-e-ss-fu~l cliCvuerre.nt

next event is 2917622 and Seeing If 2917622 will take

is Its

528998 1-------.l

olace.29fl.622.is.natActive..Next.evenL

\.:;;; wevans

SST COMPLETEMC 08/26110 15:49.5

0 !Successful

New bed is CJC--3-D-18--36(1862-n The} 528998

P-'l"'l----1------!---=-----1-----~-+-__c...--ll.;___c__ _ _lwere moved in !heir new bed when the

move.w.as.staded

I,(~: wevans

SST RETURNMOVI 08/26/1015:49.5

0 !successful Retumedinmate 528998to

-----!:.:;_;.:;..=;,;...:..:..;__;_;.;.;;__l~.;;..:.=.::..:..;.~.::..:..;..::.:..:.;:l--.:.___-1·:.:.:.:..:...:.;:.:.:.:_:___ CJC-3-D--18-36 from eve'nt 2917622

5__2_89_9_8_ _, 1

rl:lOUS:SCI:IEDl..Comoletino.Move.to

\ j, ccrain )CSO\DCS011 SST UPDATEYESR 08/27/10 06:26.56 1"'--''-'-1--'---·

IS 0

uccessful. Updated cl1!ss_id 275352, part 41nsltem 528998

9;

...!

;;{ ccrain

)CSO\DCS01! SST CREATE_PRO a·8127/10 06:26.59 0 !successful

nserted or Updated Process Status

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,.--~~~~~::..::=.;__,~528998

.

\5__2_8_9_98_~1

f~
r--=

_c,c_r,a_in____

·J-C-S-O-\.D-C--S-0-1·

S. -B-T-_-U-P-D-A-T-E-C-L-A-S-

0-8-1-2-7/-10- -0-6-:2-6-.5-9

~
- - - ~ alklng

SBT_CHECKPERSC 08127/10 07:07.33

- - - - ~ ~-· alking
~~~ alking

SBT REGISTERNE> 08127/10 07:07.33 SBT_SCHEDULBN~ 08/27/1 0 07:07.3

0

!s--u-c-c-e--s-s-f-u-l-----

Update inma~e das~ificafion history
f.y1th Information for1nmate 528900

table

528996

:

-----·---·

0 !successful 0. !successful 0 !successful

f.,:hecking Conflicts in Holding areas fur vent 2918040

1528-9-98- - - ·!

--- ·--

1\,iUrrel)t next eyei]l_is_25_52572 11.!'14. is not ~28998. ctive. Seeing If 2918040 will take Its

·'

olace.29.:1.B040JsJlotActiYe.29.:1.8.040

!Schedule inmate 528998 for event 918040 MED·PHYCJC

J528998

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 109 of 190 PageID #: 114

Code EntrvType '

CIS No.

;;,~o;-: ktrue
a ktrue

SBT_REGISTERNE> 08127110 13:27.5S 0

uccessful Current next event is 2918040 and is not 528998

----~.,------''--·l•ctive. Seeing if2918040 will take its

lolace Chanama.29j8040..to.active.

··- --~-- SBT_CREATEMOVE08/27/10 13:27.5S

0 ~_;cessful

For event 2918040 (MED-PHYCJC

.· moved inmate 5289!B from

28998

CJC:3=D-_j 8-,36.to .CJC...MEDICAL__

~ /·- : ;; ktrue

SBT REGISTERNE> 08127/10 14:24.05 0 ~uccessful Current next event is 2918040 and Is 528998

~-"-l----l-----1·--=----'--'----+-'---;_:_.:.=...:..:..:....:~---·~-----·bctive. Seeing if2918040 will take its

olace .. 29_18040_is.oot.Active.-Nextevenl

528998

,22 ktrue____________ 1_SI_BT-=-R_ET_;_:_U_RN_M_O_)VE_+~.:..I8/.:..2_.:7/_10.:.....:...14:.:::2::..:4..:.:.0~9~--o~ !successful Returned inmate 528998 to CJC

'

·· --

1

· --·-----MEDICAL from event2918040

~28998
1-----

fMED-E'HY.CJC). Comoletina .Move .to_

·... aiking

isBT UPDATEYES~ 08/27/10 14:49.08 0 !successful Updated class_id 275352, part 31ns item 528998

P-- ----·-·- -----------t::..=....:.=::..:..;:..;..;.~..:.....;:.:...:r:.::..:~:..::...~;:.:.:.: ----~-----172; Ins item 74; Ins item 75; Ins item 76;

mransom
'.

SBT_CASE_NOTE 08/31/1014:04.33 ---01~-!-su-c-ce-stsflunl matInes#e:rte5d2c8a3seS8note#:84.7061 for

528998

' : ·.._ tdotson

SBT_REGISTERNE> 09/03/10 05:17.33 0 Successful Current next event is 2552572 and is not 528998

J..C..:-"-!----~1-----1--==-----~------~----~------bctive. Seeing if2552572.will take tts

olace_Chanaina.255257.2.to.active

~- tdotson

SBT CREATEMOVE 09/03/10 05:17.33 0 !successful Far.event2552572 (CBG-CRTA moved 528998 -----1·-~.:...:::=----+-=--.:.....:..:..:..:...:.....:..:~--=---l=:..::..:..:..:.:..::.::::....:.._t,inmate 528E98 from CJG-3-D-18-36 to

BC - CO.Uirr.ROOM.3A

· ·,:_" mransom

SBT_CASE_NOTE 09/03/10 11 :01.33 0 Successful Inserted case note #:848991 for·

~ - - - · - - - -----l·--=---=---~-------~----~------linmate#:5283S8

528998

ss:r UPDATE CHA 09/03/1!i 12:52.16

0 Successful Case No.=GS505783; warrant

528998

- - - · - · - - No.=GS505783; Charge Status=DIS

2<~ deadams
..-.--:···. deadams

SST_REGISTERNE)09/03/1 0 14:31.53 0 Successful r.;urrent next eveilt is 2552572 and Is 52_8998 -----l--'-=----=----+---'-::....:..::....:..::....:...:.....:..:1--=---l·_;..:..:..:.:..::.::::....:.._to.ctlve. Seeing if2552572 will take its .

lllace..25525Z2.is notActlve..JIIext..evenL

SST COMPLETEMcj09/03!10 14:31.5~ 0 Successful

528998

.'.'.:....".. deadams

SBT RETURNMOV~ 09/03/10 14:31.5~ _.;__O;.__~~:.:..luc.::.:c:..::e.::.:ssf::.:u:.:..l_ Returned inmate 528998 to BC- COUR1528998 · ROOM 3A from event 2552572

(CBC:.CBT.ALComoletina.Move to

l}'S' blavende JCSO\DCS01~ SBT HOLDER

p9/03/10 18:39.17: 0 ~uccessful Hold Updated: Type- DNA Testing

I:..L+=.:..=--.:......4.....:.::....:.....:::....:...:....:....:..:[::..:....:.=.:.....:..:...:....:..:..:.._ _1::...:.:.;:..:....:..:.....:.::.:::.:..:..:..:.~--:..:.....--fl:.:.==:..:..:..-tRequired , Status= Inactive

528998

Inserted or Updated Process Status

- 528998

.

528998 _ _:

[;_c), blavende JCSO\OCS01 SBT UPDATERELE.Io9!03/10 20:07.02 0 !successful Updated release checklist
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~=~=.:..:..::~~~~--~--~~~~--!

152-89-98- - - ''

o___ ";~·.:' blavende JCSO\DCS01 SST CHECKPERSQ 09/03/10 20:07.1€ __ 1s.::.:u_c_ce_s_sf_u_l__ Checking Conflicts in Holding areas for 528998

1

jevent 29253>2

~;:-~. blavende JCSO\DCS01 SBT REGISTERNE> 09/03/10 20:07.1E 0 !Successful Current next event is 2737809 and is not ~28998 ~'·+---·1-----·t---='------J,------1---1------l<lctive. Seeing lf2925362 will take its
olace..2925362.is.nat.Actlve.2925362.

\".:~~ blavende JC$0\DCS01!jsBT UPDATERELEI 09/03/10 20:07.16 0 !successful Updated Relea>e Farm.
~~~~~-~~~~~=--l~~__:_~__:_.....:.~----~~.:...:::~i--~--~~~~--1

52899e

~ ':r::

blavende ·----·-·-·

JCSO\DCS01~ SBT REGISTERNE> 09/03/10 20:11.57 ---·-·---· ---------------- ----·------

\:;;' _blavende JCSO\DCs01! SBT_UPDATEINMA 09/03110 20:1 ~-?

0

!successful ------

-

·

~Cctuirvree.ntSneeexitnegveifn2t9i2s523962253w6il2l taankde

is not its

528998 ----

-

·

i -1

olace..2925362Js.notActive.UEDAIE.

0 ~uccessful

Updated[E] Inmate 528938 schedJle for 528998 !event 29253>2

1i.il blavende J.CSO\DCS01 SBT_UPDATERETA 0.9/03/1 0 20:11.5.7 . 0 ~uccessful

l,Jp~ated .R~taln Rag to: T

~q------l~------~t---=--------\-~------~1-----~---------

528998

)CSO\DCS01 SST HOLDER

09/03/10 21:56.41

0 ~uccessfl.ll

Hold Updated: Type= ICE· Investigative 528998

::.::....:..:....;:_:.;:_:...:..1--=-;.:.:;;:...:...:..:...._-\---'---- _ __:___·!----'--·11--lold •Status= Inactive

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 110 of 190 PageID #: 115

' UseriD : ~OCBtfOrf~ ~-'Funl:uorl'~':f:':: Loa Time '
~~.-
.. -~-:-. : blavende JCSO\DCSOH SBT UPDATERETA 09/03/10 22:59,1~

~.~"! .·,;_,

blavende

JCSO\DCS01~ SBT_CREATE_PRO 09/03/10 22:59.19

Code 0
0

Entry Type ~uccessful
~uccessful

Log Message Updated Retain Rag to: F
--
nserted or Updated Process Status . 26996

I CIS No.

528996

~

528996

'.. ·. ; · blavende JCSO\DCSOH SBT UPDATEREL~ 09/03/1 0 22:59.19

0 ~uccessful

Updated relese checklist

526998

k blavende JCS<?\D~_OH ~BT~-~~~~TE_P~e ~~-~/10 22:59.:3_.1 . 0 -------~-

):~ blavende JCSO\DCS01! SBT UPDATERELEJ 9/03/10 22:59.21

0

T blavende JCSO\DCS01! SBT CREATE_PRO 09/0311_0 22:59.2~

0

·=::, blavende JCSO\DCS01! SBT UPDATERELE 09/03/1 0 22:59.2~ . 0

~~~.::::r~~---

Inserted 526998

or

Updated

Process

Status .

- -·

-

Successful

Updated release checklist

528998 -------·····-····--·~28998 _ _

~uccessful Successful

-·

-

~-·-·

·------·- -

. Inserted or Updated Process Status
.528998

28996

Updated release checklist

28998

r,.,-_

blavende JCSO\DCSOH SBT_CHECKPERSC 09/03/10 22:59.51

0 Successful

Checking Conflicts in Holding areas for 528998

;

vent 2925427

.... ~ ··.;~
blavende

JCSO\DCS01!ISBT_REGISTERNE'i 09/03/10 22:59.51

..
~ -bla-ve-nd-e· JCSO\DCS01

SBT_UPDATEREL~

0-9-/0-3/10

22:59.51
.

~ - - - j!!aster JCSO\DCS01 SB!_-:~~9PERTYR~ 09/03/10 23:~7.22

.. . .'· ~
.-~ ';:·-~

jl!aster

JCSO\DCS01 SBT CLOTHINGRE 09/03/10 23:48.29

..
--

jfajgenbau

SBT_REG !STERNE'! 09/03/10 23:56.57

·=.·::
.--~'

jfajgenbau

SST_CREATEMOVE 09/03/10 23:56.5~

;;,:_'.:.: ~ ··: .:.::

truck

JCSO\DCS01~ SBT REGISTERNE> 09/04/10 00:48.3~

l2 truck ---:

-

-

· -

~~S9~~~~~

SBT_COMPLETEMC

~-~0-~/1

0

00:48.35

···: ~ truck

JCSO\DCSOH SBT_RETURN MOVE 09/04/10 00:48.35

[':,;I> ~;: ..,.,._

truck

JCSO\DCS01! SBT REGISTERNE 09/04/1 0 00:48.35

- - - - .,,,
.. . truck
~

JCSO\DCS01 SBT DEACTIVATE1~09/04/10 00:48.3~

0 !successful

Current next event is 2737809 and is not 528998 ctive. Seeing if 2925427 will take Its
olace...2925A2.1.is.nolAclive.292542.7.

0 Successful 0 Successful

Updated Relea;e Fonn.

-528-99-8 - -

·····-··· -

·-·--·

..

fJpdated the inmate_prcperty_group 528998 able with release information br group

d.number:.23B6RA

0 Successful

JMS: 528998-STEP_1 234007 STEP_2 528998 BAG-2956 STEP_3 0-v_ci,.TRUE
SIEE !I..BOTH.SIEe....S.O,.v...oiEIFWE_

0 ~uccessful

Current next event is 29254_27 and is not 526998 clive. Seeing if 2925427 will take its
lolace Chanaina.2925421 to.active

0 ~uccessful

For event 2925427 {REL-RELEAS
moved inmate 5289S from
CJC·:k~18:3.6Jo

528998

0 Successful

Current next event is 2925427 and is 528998

i

active. Seeing if 2925427 will take its

olace..2925427Js..not Actlve•.Next event.

0 Successful__

528998

-

0 Successful

Returned inmate 528998 to from event p28998

;

925427 {REL-RELEAS) Completing

Mova1o.CJ.C:3:D-.J.8:36

0 Successful

Current next event is 2737809 and is not 528998 ~clive. Seeing if 2737809 ·will take Its

;

olace ..27.3.7.80.9Js.notActhle.DELETE

0 Successful

Inmate Deactiva1ecl: 526998

528998

l(,,j; mpatters

SBT_CREATE OEM 09/07/10 12:39.54J 0 ~uccessful

Updated inmate: VILLEGAS, DANIEL, 526998 R control no: 436258

... ......... ··>.: ___ .u.'•' • '· ,·, - ...·• ~ =- ~ ""1•' .. ···~·- ...~··; ,'J' '·" .; ;..--, ~

. ....,,;,

-

. V· t"'!'''i'"-" ~·.... ~....

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 111 of 190 PageID #: 116

Exhibit 16
DCSO Policy No. 1-4.100 Inmate Admission and Orientation
Procedures

-----. -- - ----- - ------· .... ·--·- . ·--- -·. -" ·- . -· - - . .. - .. . ..• ... .. ~- ·····- ---·-·

--- - -- ·--······- -- .. ----·· ---

... . . ------ ··-- --··--·-- ·--- ..... ---

········---

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 112 of 190 PageID #: 117

*
Index Number 1-4.100

Davidson County Sheriff's Office

Su:Qersed.es Policy# 1-4.100

Chapter Institutional Services
Subject Inmate Admission and Orientation Procedures
Related Standards ACA 4-ALDF-2A-20, 22, 23, 27, 28, 65, 66, 4C-Ol, 6A-05, 7D-19, 7E-05; 2-C0-4A-Ol
Subject Inmate Admission and Orientation Procedures

Page 1 of9 Effective Date 1/22108
]i
Effective 11/08/07

PURPOSE

To describe the procedures that will be used to process inmates into the Davidson County

-.. /

· Sheriff's Office (D.C~S.O.) facilities.

POLICY · It is the policy of the D.C.S.O. to admit and process inmates in a way that ensures the legality of
their commitment, assures that the conditions ofconfinement to which they are assigned will be appropriate, and assures that the security of the D.C.S.O. facilities is maintained.

This policy is reviewed annually.

PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES The D.C.S.O. booking and intake area will be staffed twenty-four (24} hours a day and will have the following facilities available: • a sally port entrance that ensures the area's integrity;. • secure holding cells for arrestees, with seating for the capacity of the areas; • drinking water reasonably available in the area; • hand washing and toilet facilities for all categories ofarrestees; • secure storage for arrestee property retained in the institution but not permitted .in housing
units; • telephones for use: by arrestees to make calls to attorneys and other approved calls in the
initial coilfinement period; • office space for use by booking, pretrial services staff and medical staff; • computer terminals for staffto enter information in the D.C.S.O. and other .automated data
systems and to check for "wants an~ warrants" on each individual booked.

All incoming inmates will undergo thorough screening and assessment at admission and receive thorough orientation to the facility's procedures, rules, programs, and services.

All iniilate property will be immediately searched upon airi.val at the facility.

These procedures will include at a minimum the following:

• determination that the inmate is legally committed to the facility;

• determination of drug/alcohol use;

·

OFFICIAL
____. U_l_~EXHIBIT ]
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 113 of 190 PageID #: 118

Index Number l-4.100 Supersedes Policy_# 1-4.100

Effective Date 1/22108 Effective ll/08/07

Subject Inmate Admission and Orientation Procedures
Subject Inmate Admis~ion and Orientation Procedures

Page 2of9-
Page 2of9

• thorough search of the individual and possessions; " disposition of personal property; • shower and hair care, ifnecessary; • issue of clean,·laundered clothing when appropriate; • photographing and fingerprinting, including notation ofidentifying marks or other unusual
physical characteristics;
• medical, dental, and mental health screening; • assignment to housing unit; • recordblg of basic personal data and information to be used for mailand visiting list; • explanation ofmail and visiting procedures; • assistance to inmates in notifying their next of kin and families of admission; • suicide screening; • assignment ofregistered number to the inmate; e giving written orientation materials to the inmate; • giving procedures for telephone calls by the irunate and allowing telephone calls by the
inmate; • a!?Signment of a housing unit; • criminal history checks.

Automated Systems

,

The D.C.S.O. will have computer terminals in the intake and booking areas with links to the

Tennessee Criminal Information Center (TCIC), the Tennessee Repository for the Apprehension

of Persons (TRAP), and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). The facility

administrator/designee may identify additional locations for selected purposes.

These computer terminals will be used to enter all relevant data regarding incoming arrestees. All staff using these terrnmals will be trained in their use and in the relevant security procedures to safeguard against sabotage of the hardware and against unauthorized access to the data
contained in the automated systems.

A transaction and access log system will be in place to document the use of these terminals.

The automated· fingerprint and mug shot equipment will be used to enter all relevant data regarding incoming arreste~ and this equipment will be used to verify the arrestees' identification. All staff using this equipment will be trained in the proper use of the equipment and in relevant security procedures to safeguard against sabotage of the hardware, as well as
against unauthorized access to the data contained in this equipment

All manuals and instructional materials for each of the information systems will be treated as confidential and kept secure from !Jnauthorized access.

Records contained in these systems maybe expunged only by court order or on a documented finding that the information was erroneously entered. A documented finding must be approved

OFFICIAL

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 114 of 190 PageID #: 119

Index Number 1-4.100 Supersedes Policy# 1-4.100

Effective Date 1/22/08 Effective 11/08/07

Subject

Page

Inmate Admission and Orientation Procedures _ 3 of9

Subject

Page

Inmate Admission and Orientation Procedures 3 of9

by the D.C.S.O. records manager/designee before the record may be expunged from the automated jail system. A documented finding must be approved by the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department (MNPD) information service administrator/designee or by a supervisor in the MNPD identification division or quality control division before the record can be expunged from the automated arrest system.

Initial ProceSsing The committing agent will be buzzed into the booking sally-port by the D.C.S.O. master control officer. Note: The committing agent shall not surrender his/her duty weapon unless it is necessary to breach the secured area during the booking process.

The com.-nitting officer will give theD.C.S.O, intake officer a jail intake form, original arrest report, arrest warrant, a parole or probation revocation wa..."Tant, a judgment order, or an equivalent docllm.ent authorizing the arrestees'_ commitment. A booking correctional officer will review the commitment papers to determine whether they have be_en properly completed. If inaccuracies exist, the committing court, commissioner, or agency will be contacted immediately
so inaccuracies can be corrected.

A unique Originating Case Agency (OCA) number and CorrectionBl Information System (CIS) number will be assigned to the arrestee upon entering him/her into the automated computer systems.

The committing officer will prepare a "Jail Intake Form" on each individual being coiDiriittedto a D.C.S.O. facility. The committing officer will include his own name, title, and signature on this form. The original "Jail Intake Fonn" will be placed in the arrestee's commitment file. The designated turnkey officer will enter admission information in the hallway logbook.

When an inmate is being transferred from another D.C.S.O. facility, the escorting officer will deliver any available inmate file information to the receiving booking correctional officer. All personal property accompanying such transfer cases will be turned over to the secure property
room.

A booking correctional officer will decline to accept into custody an arrestee who requires immediate medical attention or who gives clear signs of serious mental illness. If necessary, the
supervisor on duty will be advised, and medical staff on duty will be summoned to the area to
examine the arrestee. The medical staffexamining the arrestee will document the physical or
mental condition of any such arrestee.

A booking correctional officer will maintain observation ofinmates in the booking area. The designated booking correctional officer will make an initial risk assessment on each committed inmate based on any evidence that he/she may be suicidal or prone to victimization or violence or may need protection or some other special management.

OFFIC·iAL

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 115 of 190 PageID #: 120

Index Number 1-4.100 Supersedes Policy # 1-4.100

Effective Date 1/22/08 Effective 11/08/07

Subject Inmate Admission and Orientation Procedures Subject Ln.m~te _A_.imission and Orientation Procedures

Page 4of9 Page 4of9 ·

Medical, dental, and mental health screening will be performed by health-trained or qualified health care personnel on all inmates, excluding intrasystem transfers, on the inmate's arrival at the facility. All findings will be recorded on a form approved by the health authority. The
screening will include at least the following:

Inquiry into: • current illness and health problems, including venereal diseases and other infectious diseases;
" dental problems;
• mental health problems; " use of alcohol and other drugs, including type(s) ofdrugs used, mode of use, amounts used,
frequency used, date or time of last use, and history of any problems that may have occurred after ceasing use (e.g., convulsions); • past and present treatment or hospitalization for mental disturbance or suicide;
e possibility of pregnancy; • other health problems designated by the responsible physician.

Observation of:

• behavior, including state ofconsciousness, mental status, appearance, conduct, tremor, and

sweating;

.

• body deformities, ease of movement, etc.;

• condition.ofskin. including trauma markings, bruises, lesions, jaundice, rashes and

infestations, and needle marks or other indications of drug abuse;

Medical disposition of inmate: " general population OR • general population with prompt referral to appropriate health care service OR • referral to appropriate health care service for emergency treatment.
a The medical authority will provide for early identification and treatment of inmates with alcohol
and drug abuse problems through standardized battery assessment. This battery shall be documented and include, at a minimum, the following: • screening and sorting; 011 clinical assessment and reassessment; · • medical assessment for drug and alcohol program assignment appropriate to the needs ofthe
individual; e referrals; " monitoring and drug testing.

Inmates in need of emergency prenatal care will be referred to Metro Nashville General Hospital by medical staff, and appropriate transportation will be provided by the D.C.S.O. or by an ambulance service. If the.medical staff directs that care be given chemi,cally addicted, pregnant
female inmates upon their arrival in the booking room or intake area, any necessary
-transportation to the hospital will be provided by the D.C.S.O. or by an ambulance service.

OFFiCiAL

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 116 of 190 PageID #: 121

Index Number
1~4.100
Sugersedes Policv # 1-4.1 00

Effective Date 1/22108 Effective 11/08/07

Subject Inmate Admission and Orientation Procedures Subject Inmate Arhnis8ion a...l"ld Orientation Procedures

Page 5 of9 Page 5of9

Medical staff will inform classification regarding any special housing needs of the inmate.

Medical staffin the Criminal Justice Center clinic will be notified in each instance when one of

the above-identified risk factors is noted. Medical staff will be responsible for making an

immediate housing assignment and for referring the case for more detailed review. Inmates with

·urgent medical or mental health needs will be plaeed in designated medical housing at once, and

the medical or mental health staffwill be called to attend to their needs and to make a

·

determination regarding the need for emergency care outside the D.C.S.O.

The designated booking correctional officer will be alert to observe signs of new commitments
that are under the influence of alcohol or other sub~tances. He/she will observe these individuals and ensure they are promptly screened by medical staff.

During the admissions process, newly admitted inmates will be separated from the general population.

Female inmates will be separated from male inmates in the intake area. Juvenile inmates who have been bound over as adults will be separated from adult inmates in the intake area.
Prior to being placed mthe general population, each inmate will be provided with an orientation
to the facility. which will include at a minimum, • written materials describing facility rules and regulations • explanation of mail and visiting procedures • explanation of transportation options for visitors • explanation ofgrievance procedures • explanation of all fees, charges, or co-payments that may apply • description ofservices, programs, and eligibility requirements • information on how to access medical care • · . identification ofavailable pretrial release options

This information will be contained in a written handbook that is given to each inmate. The handbook is translated into those languages spoken by significant number of i.ruhates.
Identification
rart Arrestee identification is a critical of the booking process. A prisoner processor will
photograph, fingerprint. and record identifying information, handicaps, marks. or unusual physical characteristics. Identifying marks and/or unusual physical characteristics will be
breuctonrodtedbebylimthieteodfft.ioc,evricsuoamlpelxeatimngintahteioanutoofmviastiebdlemsucgarssh, ontootaftitohne aorfrepshtye.sei'cwalhdicehfowrmililtiinesc,luadned' a
photograph of any tattoos which are visible or which can be photographed.

OFFICIAL
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 117 of 190 PageID #: 122

Index Number 1-4.100
Supersedes Policy# 1-4.100

Effective Date 1/22108 Effective 1!108!07

Subject Inmate Admission and Orientation Procedures Subject Ir>_rna!e Admission and Orientation Procedures

Page 6 of9 Page 6 of9

Foreign Nationals

When foreign nation~ls are arrested or detained:

• •

they must be advised of the right to have their consular officials notified;

they must be advised that their consular officials
wishes if it is a mandatory notification country;

will

be

notified

regardless

of

the

national's

•

consular officials are entitled provide consular·assistance.

to

access

to

their

nationals

in

detention,

and

are

entitled

to

Offense Information

Gharge-related information also include the following:

obtained

during

booking

and

incorporated

into

the

inmate

file

will

• name of the committing agency;

• name and title of the committing officer; ~ charge or other reason for commitment;

• date ot; and authority for, commitment;

•

any legal commitment papers, arrest other court document supporting the

report, mittimus, commitment;

probation

or

parole

violation

report,

or

• •

mjaeunxeryiinssittdnaeilnfcochtreiemoaonlaft'thsaionisnntyatketcunnostoni.wofunnmttooedtathwkeeacrcoruamsnttmosdipyttliaoncfgetdohfaaftgicianeidrnisrvetigtdhaueradalirnw·rgehspetenreevreiinoleduaissceamdtie;ndgicaanloctohnedr ition or

Background Information

oTfhfeicbeor oankdintgh/eseacrureristtyeep,etrhsoenfnoelllowwiilnlgpebrascokngarlolyunodbsienrfvoerm, oartiwonil:l secure from the committing • name, nickname, and aliases used; • gender;

• address, or last known address; • race/ethnic origin;

• age;

• nationality;

• date and place ofbirth;

• date, time, and duration ofconfinement, when appropriate; e booking/OCA number,

• prior offense record;

• comments on physical and mental status;

• next ofkin, with address and phone number;

• date ofprior confinement and duration, ifknown;

• occupation and last place of employment;

• •

notation that the arrestee had access to make phone driver's license and Social Security numbers;

calls

while

in

admission

status;

• any information gathered at other institutions;

OFFICIAL

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 118 of 190 PageID #: 123

Index Number 1-4.100 Supersedes Policy_# 1-4.100

Effective Date 1/22/08
Effective 11!08/07

Subiect Inmafe Admission and Orientation Procedures
Subject !n..rnate Anmi~sion and Orientation Procedures

Page
7 of9
Page
7of9

• ·.complaint number;
• date and time of arrest;
• date and time booked; • education; • disposition of vehicle, when appropriate; • · court and sentence, if arrestee is sentenced; • amount ofbond and bonding company (if arrestee makes bond); • warrant number; • court date and time, when appropriate;
• cell assignment; • additional information concerning special custody requirements, service needs, or other
identifying information such as birthmarks or tattoos.

Want and Warrant Cheek

An NCIC check and a check ofTRAP will be made for each new commitment. Prisoner

processing
-

staff will

review

the

results

o f any

such

check

and

take

action

as

deemed.necessary.

Searches As soon as the arrestee is turned over to D.C.S.O. custody, the designated booking correctional officer will conduct a preliminary (pat) search of each new arrestee to make an immediate determination no weapons are introduced into the intake.area. Thorough searches ofincoming arrestees are critical to ensuring the security of the facility and will be conducted in accordance
with D.C.S.O. policy# 1-3.140, "Inmate Searches."

Property Processing There will be an itemized inventory of all personal property of newly admitted iruriates and secure storage of inmate property, including money and other valuables. The inmate will be given a receipt for all property held until their release. Property pro.cessing wi-11 be conducted in
accordance with D.C.S.O. policy# 1-4.102, "Inmate Personal Property."

Phone Calls After the initial booking process, newly arrested inmates may make one free phone call.· Collect telephones are also located in.the open booking area, open booking holding cells and the rear holding cells for use by every arrestee. Every arrestee who is unable to coniplete at least one collect phone call will be allowed to complete at least one telephone call to the person of his or
her choice free ofcharge.

Orientation, Rules, and Regulations An orientation program will be available for aU new inmates in a D.C.S.O. facility. This orientation program will be offered in both English and Spanish. As a minimum, all incoming inmates, including transfers from other agencies, will receive an inmate handbook containing
general information about the D.C.S.O. ·

OFFiCiAL

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 119 of 190 PageID #: 124

Index Number 1-4.100 Supersedes Policy_# 1-4.100

Effective Date 1/22/08 Effective ! 1/08/07

Subject Inmate Admission and Orientation Procedures Subject Inmate Admission and Orientation Procedures

Page 8 of9 Page 8 of9

The inmate handbook will includ~ a complete list ofjail rules, regulations, and penalties for violations of the rules and regulations; information regarding counts; a description of programs available; a description ofjail activities; an explanation of any educational or vocational testing and examinations that may be available; rules on visiting and mail; legal rights; and information on sick call, commissary, and similar institutional activities. The inmate will sign a form acknowledging receipt of this material. This acknowledgment form will be maintained in his
inmate file.

Staffwill help inmates who are illiterate read and understand applicable rules. In addition, booking staff will have available to them contract interpreters who may be called on to assist in
specific cases.

The D.C.S.O. rules for booking and intake will be posted in English and Spw.-llsh in t1.e admission area. Inmates who do not understand either ofthese languages will be provided a special orientation, arranged within forty-eight (48) hours ofreceipt in the booking room, by special contract interpreters.
· An audio-visual presentation may be used for inmate orientation in order to ensure that standardized inforrnationis presented to all inmates. Inmates will sign a record acknowledging participation in any audio-visual presentation, and staffs providing or overseeing the orientation will also sign this record. This record will then be placed in the individual's inmate file.
Reasonable accommodation will be made to ensure that all parts ofD.C.S.O. facilities that are accessible to the public are accessible and usable by staff and visitors with disabilities.

Inmate Medical Access All inmates are informed about how to access health services and the grievance system upon arrival at the facility. This inforrtlation is communicated orally and in writing, and is conveyed in a language that is easily understood by each inmate. The information is translated into those languages spoken by significant numbers of inmates. When a literacy or language problem prevents an inmate from understanding written information, a staffmember or translator assist
the inmate.

Inmate Classification After completing intake processing and being provided with orientation infom1ation, the inmate
will be moved to the classification housing area.. The info1mation gathered during the booking and admissions process will be used by D.C.S.O. classification personnel when detemllning an appropriate housing location for the inmate. When the inmate is moved to the classification. housing unit, he will be classified in accordance with D.C.S.O. policy# 1·4.101, "Inmate Classification.,. ·

Clothing and Hygiene Issue for New Commitments
Upon admission, inmates will be issued an initial "hygiene package" that will include all
necessary articles for maintaining personal hygiene. Additional hygiene items will be provided

OFFICIAL

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Index Number 1-4.100 Supersedes Policy# 1-4.100

Effective Date 1/22/08 Effectiv·e 11/08/07

Subject Inmate Admission and Orientation Procedures
Subject In...-nate Admission and Orientation Procedures

Page 9of9 Page 9of9

through commissary purchase or under provisions of indigent status. Each incoming inmate will be showered and .fitted with properly sized, suitable inmate clothing. Clothing issued to new arrivals will be in accordance with D.C.S.O. policy# 1-4.102, "Inmate Personal Property."

Inmate Mail and Visitation

Inmates will be allowed to send and receive mail in accordance with D.C.S.O. policy# 1-5.400,

.·

"Inmate Mail.'' Inmates will be allowed to receive visitors in accordance with D.C.S.O. policy#

1-5.420, "fmnate Visitation."

OFFICiAL
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Exhibit 17
DCSO JMS Demographics Report for n....,an1.eI R_._ . ,r"-11..1. egas
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December 29, 2010 14:38

.

DCSOJMS

Demographics:-. 528998 VILLEGAS~ DANIEL

CIS No: ~~5~28~9~98~=~---=0.:CA=No::_.='j=3§?~' {~ ;}~::;:

Complaint No: 1,:;;.;20~1~06::.:9~909~5==-.:.D::at.:.e:..:A::dm.:.itte=.:d: joB/22/2010 17:26

Last Name;j~V~ILL~EG~A~S~;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;=:::;::::::=== j First DANIEL

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Zip: J37221 Phone: j_,_(-"-)_-_ __

Admission Type: '-JN_orm~a~l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _i],..

0 Federal Responsibility:

Booking Location:·· JCRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER

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Arresting Officer Name: Badge No:
Agency: ~~~-=:~=_=_=_=_=~-=:_~=-=_:..
Location of Arrest: js21 GLENPARK DR

Sex:JMALE Race:JWhite
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POB: joR

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EXHIBIT
I J_.
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 123 of 190 PageID #: 128

Exhibit 18
Amada Armenta, From Sheriff's Deputies to Immigration Officers: Screening Immigrant Status in a Tennessee Jail, Univ. of California at San Diego Center for Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper (funded by National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement
Grant No 0960882)
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F:rom Sheriff's Deputies to !m!llig:ration Officers: Screening Immigrant Status in a Tennessee Jail1
Amada Armenta Comparative Center for Immigration Studies University of California, San Diego 9500 Gilman Drive, Mail Code 0548
La Jolla CA 92093-0548
Tel. (310) 570-5718 Fax. (858) 822-4432 armenta@ucla. edu
AMADA ARMENTA is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department ofSociology at the University ofCalifomia Los Angeles and a Predoctoral Research Fellow at the Compai·ative Centerfor Immigration Studies at UC San Diego. Recently published in Qualitative Sociology, her current research focuses on immigration and local law enforcement.

1 The author would like to thank Katharine Donato, Shannon Gleeson, Arpi Miller, Renee Reichi-Luthra, Rocio. Rosales, and Roger Waldinger for their support while completing this paper. The author especially is grateful to employees in the Davidson County Sheriff's Office for their honesty'and participation in this project. This research
was supported by the National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant# 0960882.

EXHIBIT

1

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From Sheriff's Deputies to Immigration Officers: Screening Immigrant Status in a Tennessee Jail
This paper contributes to emerging literature documenting the devolution of immigration enforcement authority by focusing on the implementation of the 287(g) program in Davidson County, Tennessee. It outlines how deputized immigration officers do their work, as well as the
ways_they come to think about their roles in the larger immigration bureaucracy. Immigration
officers see themselves as bbjective administrators whose primary responsibilities are to identify and proc~s immigrants for removal, but who are not responsible for their subsequent deportation. While immigration officers never waiver about their obligation to uphold the rule of law, alternate narratives emerge depending on how they feel about the immigrants they encounter. These frames range from pride at identifying "criminal aliens", to guilt for processing immigrants who were arrested for very minor violations. Ultimately, this work shows deputized immigration officers act as extensions of the federal government, rather than independent agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article seeks to shed light on the local implementation of a 287(g) program, a federal policy that permits state, county or city officers and employees to perform the functions of federal immigration officers. 1 The 287(g) program is a primary example of the devolution of immigration authority from the federal bureaucracy to county and municipal agencies. Thus, the implementation of 287(g) represents a massive effort, not just on the part of federal bureaucrats who have traditionally controlled immigration, ·but also by localities across the country where
federally deputized officers screen immigration status.
The 287(g) program provides a rich case :with which to study policy implementation and
contributes to two important areas of research and theory. First, it draws from existing research
about how administrative discretion is deployed by frontline inunigration personnel (Calavita
1992, 2000; Ellermann 2005, 2009; Fuglerud 2004; Gilboy 1991; van der Leun 2003; Wells
2004). Second, it contributes to the growing body ofliterature focusing on the rescaling of
immigration enforcement away from the federal government and the nation's borders to
subnational authorities and the nation's inteJ,ior (Coleman 2007; Varsanyi 2008). By focusing on
2
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the frontline officers to whom enforcement is delegated, we can understand how non-federal bureaucrats produce and reproduce the authority of the state (Bloin Hansen and Stepputat 2001 ). Specifically, how do county employees interpre~ their roles as deputized immigration officers?
My data come from a variety of sources including interviews, observations ofmeetings at the Sheriff's office, and news articles. I rely heavily on in-depth interviews with deputized immigration officers in a Tennessee county Sheriff's Office and their supervisors.
The paper is organized as follows. First, I provide an overview of policy changes that allowed for increased local authority in immigration enforcement as well as the specific local context in which my study takes place. Next, I examine how deputized immigration officers explain their work and how they link their roles as local deputies to the goals of the 287(g) program and the larger societal context I show that immigration officers see themselves as objective administrators whose primary responsibilities are to process and identify immigrants for status, but who are not implicated in the deportation process. While immigration officers never waiver about their obligation to uphold the rule oflaw, alternate frames emerge depending on how theyfeel about the immigrants they encounter. These frames range from pride at identifying "criminal aliens", to guilt for processing immigrants who were arrested for very minor violations. Ultimately, this work shows that despite the great deal of concern about localities creating de facto policies and implementing laws as they please, the 287(g) program in Davidson County is-tightly controlled by the federal government and immigration officers act as extensions of the state, rather than autonomous actors.
II. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT GOES LOCAL A. CHANGES IN THE POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT LANDSCAPE
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Many scholars identify 1996 as a watershed year when the "criminalization" of iinrnigration law began (Miller 2002; Stumpf 2006). That year, the illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (1996) made noncitizens who had previously committed misdemeanor crimes eligible for deportation. Changes to immigration law also allowed for greater cooperation between federal immigration enforcement and local and state law enforcement through the 287(g) provision. Although not immediately implemented, 287(g) represented a blurring of immigration enforcement boundaries. Historically, local enforcement agencies enforced only criminal violations of immigration law; while federal agencies enforced both civil and criminal violations. 1 In 2002, reversing their previous position, a Department of Justice memo (US Office of the Assistant Attorney General2002) announced that states have the "inherent authority" to enforce civil provisions of immigration law. That year, the state of Florida signed the nation's first 287(g) agreement after officials learned several 9/11 hijackers had lived in the state. The 287(g) program is just one·ofthe initiatives operated through ICE's Office of State and Local Coordination. ICE also CQoperates with local law enforcement agencies through the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) and Secure Communities, both resulting in immigration screenings at .state, county, an~ municipal jails. Post 9/11, the nation's interior has emerged as a new space to police immigrants, increasingly by local and state actors who previously had no power to enforce immigration law (Coleman 2007)
Through the 1990s and 2000s, there has also been a rapid expansion of immigration detention infrastructure. In addition to for-profit private detention fa~ilities, apd their own federal detention facilities, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) pays municipalities to house detainees in local jail~ and transport detainees between detention centers through intergovernmental ~ervice agreements. In 2009, an estimated three hundred thousand deportable
4
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immigrants were hqused in detention facilities nationwide, and over 60% of them arrived in immigrant detention after local arrests resulted in immigration checks at federal, state, or county jails (Schriro 2009). Detainees remain in custody until they are released, bonded and paroled, or deported from the United States (Hernandez 2008).
Concurrent with the devolution of immigration authority from federal to local agencies, we have also seen the emergence of immigration policymaking at multiple levels of government, called immigration federalism (Motomura 1999). Convinced that the federal government is not doing enough to curtail unauthorized migration, attempts to regulate immigration have trickled down to state, county, and municipal governments (Chavez and Provine 2009; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2007). Hopkins (2010) finds that local anti-immigrant policies are most likely in communities that experienced a sudden growth in the immigrant population and when national rhetoric about immigration is most salient and threatening. In Pennsylvania, a town of twentytwo thousand people grabbed national headlines for its illegal Immigration Relief Act (2006), which sought to punish employers who hire undocumented immigrants and landlords who rent to them. More recently, Arizona's Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (201 0), more commonly known as SB 1070, sought to require Arizona police officers to check individual's immigration status if officers suspected the person might be in the country without status. Courts struck down these local immigration policies because of federal preemption, holding that the federal government has the exclusive authority to control immigration.
·B. FRONTLINE WORKERS, BUREUACRACY, AND IMMIGRANTS Understanding how officials in bureaucratic agencies make decisions has been a topic of import for socio-legal scholars for decades. Rather than focus on the government elites who create policy, Lipsky (1980) famously argued that street-level bureaucrats, although regarded as
5
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low-level workers, should also be considered policy makers. According to Lipsky (1980), understanding street-level bureaucrats is important because they are most peoples' point of contact with the government and they "make policy" through their "relatively high degrees of
discretion and relative autonomy from organizational authority" (p. 13).
Scholars have examined how frontline workers execute their administrative duties in varied settings including how police officers patrol the streets (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003) or how welfare workers provide serVices to clients after welfare reform (Meyers et al. 1998). Recently, scholars have turned their attentions to how bureaucrats respond to the presence of immigrants (see Janes-Correa 2007; Lewis and Ramakrishnan 2007; Marrow 2009; van der Leun 2003) especially in light of increased local pressure to deny services to the unauthorized. In the Netherlands, van der Leun (2003) describes variability in how employees in different sectors implement national policies toward unauthorized migrants. For example, police officers who worked in immigration enforcement were selective and pragmatic about who to detain and deport. Moreover, workers in education and health sectors found loopholes in the law and provided services to undocumented immigrants, contradicting policy directives.
Others have turned their attention more specifically to the immigration enforcement bureaucracy by examining how administrative discretion is deployed by officials implementing the Chinese Exclusion Act (Calavita 2000), airport inspectors regulating entry (Gilboy 1991), and deportation officers making decisions about who to return to their countries of origin (Ellermann 2005, 2009). While often immigration enforcement is imagined as being executed by some monolithic state, these studies illustrate how frontline workers apply regulations on entry and exit.
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Research suggests that employees in the federal immigration bureaucracy are constrained in their ability to enforce immigration policies. Although U.S. immigration investigators are motivated to do their job because of their strong orientation towards law enforcement (Weissenger 1996), employees in the immigration bureaucracy are ineffective because they are given conflicting and unclear policy directives (Magana 2003). Wells (2004) shows how informal agreements between city officials and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) employees3 resulted in practices that were less restrictive than mandated federal policies. Specifically, after immigration raids outraged the local community, city officials and INS officers made informal agreements after which INS narrowed its enforcement efforts to those with felony convictions (Wells 2004). Ellermann (2009) documents variation in the capacity of bureaucrats to deport migrants and argues that lack of implementation is a result of incapacity rather than unwillingness. For instance, in Germany, where immigration bureaucrats are more insulated from external pressures than in the United States, deportation officers face fewer hurdles when implementing deportation policy (Ellermann 2009).
The devolution of immigration authority from the federal bureaucracy to non-federal law enforcement agencies necessitates examining immigration enforcement from the bottom-up to understand the numerous actors and their roles in the new enforcement regime. Decker et al. (2009) found police departments reported substantial variation when surveyed about the circumstances under which they would inquire about individual's immigration status. Variation was largest in places where neither the police department nor the city had an official immigration policy for officers to follow (Decker et al. 2009). A study of three cities in the Phoenix area described how anti-solicitation ordinances (ordinances that prohibit day-laborers from seeking employment) resulted in immigration policing "through the back door" (Varsanyi 2008: 29).
7
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Thus, not only are more local law enforcement agencies involved in immigration enforcement through federally authorized programs like 287(g), but the evolving immigration enforcement landscape has also led to de-facto immigration policing.
C. BACKGROUND AND METHODS This paper focuses on the politics and policy implementation of a 287(g) program in Davidson County, Tennessee. Over the last 20 years, Latino population growth in the South has exploded, with most Latinos in the South concentrated in metropolitan areas (Neal and Bohon 2003). A 2006 estimate placed the Hispanic foreign born population in Nashville-Davidson
County at about 4% of the total population, with over 26,500 people (American Community Survey 2005-2007).4
In 2006, several high profile drunk driving cases in Davidson brought immigration to the political forefront after it was revealed that th~ assailants were unlawfully present in the United States. One case that received a great deal of attention occurred in July 2006, when an undocumented drunk driver with fourteen previous arrests killed a Nashville couple after crashing into their vehicle.
By September of 2006, the SheriffofDavidson County, flanked by the District Attorney, the Police Chief, and other local politicians, announced their intent to participate in the 287(g) program. The Davidson County Sheriff announced, "During 2006, several very serious cases involving criminal illegal immigrants inNashville prompted the three of us to begin formulating plans to better protect the citizens of Davidson County... It is important for us to emphasize that this program will affect only those illegal immigrants who have a blatant disregard for laws in Davidson County. If you are in this country illegally and commit a crime, we will process you under the federal authority given to us through 287(g)" (Crocker 2006). After a meeting in
8
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Washington D.C. where Tennessee's elected officials pressed the federal government to approve Davidson County for the program, Davidson was approved for participation by the end of the year.
After 287(g) approval, the Davidson County Sheriff's Office was charged with assembling a team of fifteen employees who would receive training to be deputized ICE officers. For employees to be eligible for ICE deputization they had to have been DCSO employees for at least two years and they had to be United States citizens. After the team was selected, these employees completed a federal training program that prepared them to be deputized ICE officers. While most agencies involved in 287(g) send their employees to the Federal Law Enforcement Training C~nter in Charleston for training, in this instance, ICE sent instructors directly to Nashville. Training lasted for four weeks during February and March of2006, and occurred at the Davidson County Sheriff's Office training facility. Deputies describe the program as especially :q.gorous or harder than they expected.
Davidson County performs the jail model of287(g), meaning that immigration checks occur in the jail, after foreign-born people are arrested and incarcerated. In Davidson County, the DCSO does not have the authority to make arrests; arrests are made by officers from the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, which does not have a 287(g) agreement. When individuals are arrested, police officers fill out an arrest report that indicates the arrestee's place of birth. If this information indicates the person is foreign born, when they a,re booked in to the DCSO jail, a red stamp that says ''ICE" is placed on their paperwork and dropped into a box for deputized officers to .retrieve and the person is placed on an "ICE Hold". The deputized ICE officers then conduct an administrative interview where they detennine the arrestee's
9
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immigration status. If the person has legal status, the individual's ICE Hold is removed but if the person is found to be illegally present, the ICE Hold remains.
When the individual is on an ICE hold, he or she may be eligible for an immigration bond. Tnunigration bonds range from $5,000 to $20,000 and must be paid in full in Memphis, Tennessee. If the individual does not qualify, or cannot pay the immigration bond, he or she is · transferred to ICE custody after serving the local time for the crime for which he or she was arrested. The DCSO has an inter-service government agreement to hold individuals for Immigration and Customs Enforcement, so although technically in ICE Custody, the individual is still housed in the Davidson County jail. DCSO is reimbursed $63 a day by the federal government for housing ICE Holds. Twice a week, agents from the Office ofDetention and Removal pick up ICE Holds to take them to the local ICE office, after which they are transported
to a detention facility in Oakdale, Louisiana.
Data from this paper comes from in-depth interviews and observations with administrative actors from the Davidson County Sheriffs Office (DCSO). While DCSO employs over 500 people, but only a small number ofits employees are directly involved in the 287(g) program. DCSO employees involved in 287(g) include the Sheriff, the ICE Supervisor, the Communications Director, the ICE Services Coordinator, and the 10-12 deputized ICE officers. I conducted interviews with these employees in addition to the ICE agent from the Office of Detention and Removal charged with overseeing 287(g) in Davidson County. Interviews were conducted inside offices at the Sheriffs Office or in the jail during work hours. Each interview lasted approximately one hour, and was audio-recorded and subsequently transcribed. I coded these interviews for analytic themes that came up repeatedly in the interviews.
10
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Observations include two years of attendance at Sheriffs Advisory Council meetings, which are held quarterly at the Sheriffs Office. Sheriffs Advisory Council meetings are meant to serve as a conduit of information between the Sheriffs Office and interested parties (police officials, the public defender, and immigrant advocates) with respect to the operations of the 287(g) program.
ill. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
When the Sheriffs office announced it would select a team that would be trained as immigration officers, over two hundred people (one-fourth of all Sheriffs office employees) applled for the available positions. Consequently, upper level management refers to the group as "the cream of the crop." Those ultimately selected included men and women, they have between five and nineteen yearS of experience, and they came from different positions from within the jail-including guards, booking officers, and one employee from the maintenance department.
This section highlights the work that ~eputized immigration officers do, and how they interpret this work. Primarily, immigration officers see themselves as objective implementers of immigration law, a role I characterize as the by-the-books adiilinistrator. Immigration officers think of themselves in these terms because they identify and process immigrants for removal, but they have no discretion. Other narratives that emerge to describe how immigration officers do the work they do include the public protector, the reluctant regulator, and the benevolent gatekeeper. For example, the immigration officer's role as a public protector emerged when the officer discussed cases where the immigrant screened for removal was arrested for a serious offense. In contrast, officers spoke about themselves as reluctant regulato~s when immigrants they screened could not be easily characterized as criminal aliens and were sympathetic or deserving. In a few cases, officers described themselves as people who bestowed legal
11
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immigration status, a role I've described as the benevolent gatekeeper. Below, I present each narrative in more detail. The by-the-books administrator
When generalizing about their jobs, deputized immigration officers emphasized their professionalism and the federal training they received. Overwhelmingly, Sheriffs office deputies cited this federal training as one of their reasons for applying for 287(g) positions. Employees
the described 287(g) as an opportunity to participate in something unique, and saw position as a
promotion even if they received no pay increase. Instead of interacting with large segments of the inmate population, they interviewed foreign born arrestees one by one. DCSO immigration officers had the use of two furnished offices that contained several desks, rolling office chairs, and multiple computers with internet access. A picture of the deputized officers hung on the wall in one of the offices, a picture that officers frequently pointed to as I interviewed them. Below, DCSO employees explain their motivations to become deputized immigration officers:
Look at the picture on the wall [points to picture with team of immigration officers]. All these individuals there were the ones who started this and no one else, whether they come to replace (us) or not, they can't say they were at ground level when it got started. (Interview Officer 3) My number one reason was I kind of felt like it was cutting edge law enforcement. You know, it was kind of what was coming. You could see it coming across the board in the entire nation. (Interview Officer 2)
DCSO immigration officers described their participation in the 287(g) program as something special. They saw themselves as pioneers-among the first to be trained for a cutting edge law enforcement program.
They had a strong sense of identity as officers of the law. When describing their jobs and various cases, officers using the by-the-books administrator frame usually highlighted their strict
12
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interpretation of the law and their lack of discretion. They would speak of the law in black and white terms often Saying "the law is the law" or, when referring to foreign born arrestees' immigration statuses, "illegal is illegal." Officers did not make moralistic statements or judgments about those who lacked status, but emphasized that those without immigration status violated the law:
Most of these people are good hardworking people, but they're violating some kind oflaw. Two laws, I know one's a civil immigration law but the other one is a
criminal law. It might happen to be a misdemeanor but it's the law and that's an
apolitical statement. That's just the law. (Interview Officer 8)
While some research highlights how-immigration laws create immigration status (Calavita 1998; DeGenova 2002, Ngai 2004), to immigration officers, the law as unambiguous. As the quote above demonstrates, the immigrants he screens may be "good hardworking people" but they have violated both federal immigration law and state criminal law. Similarly another officer said, "Ify<?u're here illegal, you're illegal and that's just how it is."
Much of the work on the street-level bureaucrats focuses on the role of discretion in the implementation ofpolicy. For example, street-level bureaucrats exercise discretion based on their judgments about the worth of the client, rather than the written rules or procedures they are directed to follow (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2000). In contrast, immigration officers describe a strict adherence to immigration law, and make few judgments regarding immigrants' worth. One immigration officer mentioned it might feel better to process. a gang member than someone who was arrested for driving without a license but she made no distinctions because "it's not my responsibility to carry that burden." Thus, the statements made by officers as they describe their adherence to laws and rules shows, as Ellermann (2009) suggests, that immigration bureaucrats are driven by mandate fulfillment, and a desire to enforce the law.
13
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Research on street-level workers has demonstrated that often workers have wide latitude in exercising discretion; workers ignore or bend the rules to cope with a stressful working environment (Lipsky 1980) or to help deserving· clients (Maynard-Moody and Leland 1999). In contrast, immigration officers describe their roles in the 287(g) program as very limited. Immigration officers question every foreign born arrestee about his or her immigration status and verifies immigration status by taking fingerprints and using federal databases. If the person is amenable to removal, the immigration officer begins prepares the paperwork for an order of removal or a reinstatement of deportation (if the person has been ordered deported before). Below, officers explain the extent of their authority:
Well of course my powers are the power to question someone as to their admissibility or inadmissibility (for deportation) and beyond that my powers are none. I get all the guys, you can let me go, and you can let me go. And I said, 'You .don't understand. I'm not the man. (Interview Officer 6) We have nothing to do with them getting arrested. We get called heartless, we're cold, we're breaking up families, but they don't understand we don't go out and get these folks. They get dropped off to us.... All my job is, once they get brought in here, I just have to find out their legal status. So all this that we go out and we're breaking up. families and we're arresting people for- I mean, we have nothing to do with that. That's not our job. (Interview Officer 9)
These statements demonstrate that although the DCSO immigration officers determine one's admissibility for removal, officers do not see themselves as participants in removal proceedings. Almost every officer emphasized that he or she did not deport anyone. When deploying the frame of a by-the-books administrator, immigration officers describe their jobs in terms of categorizing status and processing paperwork, rather than removing people. In fact, immigration officers take offense to any claims that they are responsible for breaking up families. As one officer states, "I'm not the man." Indeed, although local·officers prepare charging documents so that ICE can proceed with removal, a supervisor from ICE's Detention and Removal Operations
14
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reviews and signs off on the document again. Consequently, officers describe ICE as ultimately responsible for removal. For example, in those instances where a person's immigration status is more difficult to determine, officers rely on an ICE supervisor to make the determination regarding how to proceed. In contrast to work by Ellermann (2009) and Wells (2004) that illustrates how immigration officials avoid implementing some immigration laws; DCSO officers do not have prosecutorial discretion.
Over and over officers described their jobs in very narrow terms and emphasized their objectivity. For example, one said, "We kind of do what is directed from the top. It depends on the Feds; I don't know why they change their mind on what they do. We have to go with whatever they recommend for us... I don't take it personal." Further reinforcing their interpretation that they are not participants in removal proceedings, immigration officers do not know ifthe people they initiate proceedings against are ultimately removed. One explains their role in the following terms:
We're helping, I think this gets lost a little bit, we're helping the federal government with their immigration issues so we're a force multiplier so there are more ways for us to get people to immigration court. I don't know what happens to them when they go to immigration court. I don't know if they get deported, I don't know if they come back. I don't know what happens (Interview Officer 7).
The by-the-books administrator then, emphasizes one's limited authority, and deference to the federal government. While officers are proud of their training as law enforcement officers, they speak about their jobs in neutral terms. They emphasize the importance of following rules and laws, and describe implementing them because "the law is the law", and not because they are .right or wrong. Officers lack discretion, and see their job in narrow terms. Immigration officers
process people and filter paperwork to assist in due process; they do not break up families ot
deport people,
15
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The Public Protector By-the-books administrators emphasize their limited discretion when applying the law
and argue that although they are immigration officers, they are not responsible for or participants in deportation. In contrast, when using the public protector frame, officers speak proudly about identifying immigrants for removal and keeping the public safe. For public protectors, immigrants must be removed not necessarily because they are in violation of immigration laws, but because they are a threat to the public. Their statements closely mirror the initial justifications for the 287(g) program because they talk about immigrants as criminal aliens.
So what we do when we screen people, we got rid of some... pretty bad, pretty rough people- gang members... I think we're doing the community a service by having this program. (Interview Officer 5) It's a tool to help our community to try to make it safer... actually, it's a service for the community (to) try to document some of these individuals if they're, let's say a threat to the community, we'll deal with it. (Interview Officer 8)
Unlike the by-the-books administrator, who is "just enforcing the law", the public protector relishes his or her role as an immigration officer. In the statements above, officers highlight their roles in getting rid of or dealing with "bad people" who pose a threat to the community. Moreover, they describe identifying immigrants for removal as a form of service to the community. Officers are most likely to emphasize their role in the deportation process when immigrants are arrested for serious charges such as drunk driving, drug charges, and crimes against people.
When immigrants commit crimes, they are viewed as having committed multiple
violations, one of which is violating the way guests should behave in the country (Sayad 2004). Some days you're more than happy to do your job because you have a real criminal. A child rapist or all the horrible people that we get in here... I'mjust
16
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like yes we've got to get them out of here and a lot of these ones that are criminal, an illegal criminal... (Interview Officer 2)
This officer describes getting pleasure from his job, particularly when identifying "real" criminals to remove. This quote demonstrates that being an "illegal" criminal makes one even more deserving of removal. Indeed, the Dlegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (1996), of which 287(g) is a part, imposed "stunningly harsh control measures" on criminal offenders because few interest groups were willing to lobby on the behalf of undocumented immigrants who committed crimes (Ellermann 2009: 67). Ellermann (2009) argues that Congress focused on tightening restrictions for criminal offenders because they were "a migrant group much different from undocumented workers" (p. 67).
Many immigrants processed for removal through the 287(g) program, however, have not committed serious crimes. Halfof those identified for removal were arrested for misdemeanor crimes such as driving without a license or failing to appear in court (Davidson County Sheriff's Office 2009). In addition, twenty-five immigrants have been processed for removal after being arrested for fishing without a license (Echegaray 201 0). Although it may not be clear why processing immigrants for removal after non-violent misdemeanor offenses contributes to public safety, to the public protector, today's misdemeanor violator is tomorrow's drunk driver. An officer says," If! determine that that person's a good person and I'm gonna let him go and he goes out and gets a DUI and kills someone than I have to answer to that and than people say why'd you let him go?" To the public protector, misdemeanor violators could tum out to be a threat to public safety someday. Therefore, it is more desirable to remove them before they commit a serious crime, because if they go on to commit more serious offense, the public will have already been threatened.
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Since even those arrested for misdemeanors could commit more serious crimes in the future, public protectors believe the best way to keep the public safe is to process all of those without status for removal. As one officer said, "We have to be consistent and the only way to be consistent is to process everyone." This statement illustrates how the secondary frame of the public protector converges with the primary frame of the by-the-books administrator. Processing
everyone identically appeals to by-the-books administrators' interest in fairness and the public
protectors' interests in removing potential threats. The Reluctant Regulator
Inevitably, officers encounter cases wh,ere, even though immigrants have been arrested, they are not perceived as criminals. By-the-books administrators justify their removal because they have violated the nation's civil immigration laws and public protectors argue they may commit more dangerous crimes in the future. However, sometimes immigration officers face a moral dilemma-they must treat everyone identically, even those who they believe should not be processed for removal. In these instances, officers become reluctant regulators.
As the implementation of 287(g) demonstrates, although its purpose may have been to identify criminal aliens, in practice it results in removal proceedings for people who are hard to label as criminals. When asked to explain the range of crimes for which people are arrested and then processed for removal, several officers recalled, in detail, cases that bothered them months or years later. For example, an officer explained a case where a young man had been arrested by mistake:
One of my very first ones, he was, I don't know, probably 23, had been in the country since he was 15, had never been arrested, had never been charged with anything, hadn't been caught at the border, nothing. He was here with his older brother and I think one of his cousins, they all lived together. Metro served a warrant at his house and became and turned himself in. Like I said, the program was new, so he probably didn't know much about it. Turned himself in, ended up
18
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getting processed because he was here illegally, and then it turned out the next day they had served the warrant at the wrong house. It wasn't even for him. So I
felt horrible. I 'mean, there was nothing i could do. But I felt so bad for that guy
because he had not done anything wrong. (Interview Officer 7)
In the case this officer described, the young man she processed for removal was taken into custody after the police department served an arrest warrant at the wrong house. The officer emphasized the young man had spent eight years in the country with a clean record and took the fact that he turned himself in as more evidence ofhis good character. The next day, crinlinal charges against the young man were dropped. However, because immigration screening occurs upon booking, the young man was screened even though ''he had not done anything wrong." Once the young man was identified as having committed a civil immigration violation, there was nothing the immigration officer could do but process him for removal. Although she processed hundreds of people for removal after this case, she remembered this case as one she wished had never happened.
Most officers shared stories about in;unigrants who they processed for removal to whom they were especially sympathetic. An officer told me about a Hon4uran man who was arrested for driving without a license. The officer described the man as a "little old farmer guy working .tobacco" and he explained that the man came to the United States to pay for his daughters'
college tuition in Honduras. The immigration officers' description of the immigrant as a worker
is notable because it highlights the tensions between immigration control and labor, a primary dilemma in contemporary immigration enforcement (Calavita 1992). Early versions of the illegal Immigration Reform and Inunigrant Responsibility Act introduced provisions for worksite enforcement, but legislators dropped these plans because of public opposition (Ellermann 2009). Instead, Congress focused on tightening restrictions for criminal offenders because they were "a
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migrant group much different from undocumented workers" (Ellermann 2009: 67). However, statements from immigration officers charged with processing jailed immigrants for removal demonstrate how these categories are not always easily distinguishable.
While the Davidson County Sheriff points out that immigrants are eligible for immigration screening because they are incarcerated, statements from officers demonstrate how undocumented workers become cri.mirials. Indeed, when the Sheriff's Office shares its statistics regarding the number of immigrants processed for removal, these reports do not speeify whose charges were dropped or those arrested by mistake. Instead, the Sheriff emphasizes that all those screened for immigration status were arrested for committing crimes in Davidson County. He therefore implies that all those identified for removal are criminals, something that is easy for him to do as the elected head of the agency, and as someone who rarely interacts with i:inmigrants during immigration screening.
In contrast to the Sheriff, who can gloss over the cases where "deserving" immigrants were processed for removal, an immigration officer explained that although he liked his job, "some days it's bad." Officers expressed the most reluctance at processing immigrants who were arrested by mistake or whose arrest was bad luck, such' as those arrested for fishing without a license or loitering. Moreover, officers recognized that immigrants came to work and several said that lacking other options, they might do the same thing to provide for their family. Some of the immigrants processed for removal had lived in the U.S. for years, had U.S. citizen children, and owned property. One officer explained she was sometimes frustrated when immigrants signed voluntary departure orders when they might be eligible for relief, if they fought their deportation in court. She shrugged and explained that by law, they were not allowed to give legal advice.
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As this data demonstrates, Davidson County 287(g) immigration officers do not have the authority to choose not to process people for removal. Usually, the best they can do to help "deserving" immigrants is to recommend to the federal ICE officer stationed at the jail regarding people's immigration bond, possible humanitarian release, or releasing people on their own recognizance. Often, the federal ICE officer follows the recommendations of 287(g) immigration officers and 287(g) officers.
When removable immigrants get out ofjail on an immigration bond, humanitarian release, or when they are released on their own recognizance, this does not mean their immigration charges go away. Instead, immigrants can go through the adjudication process from home, rather than from detention facilities. And, since immigration officers do not know the outcomes of immigration court, this allows them to imagine that deserving immigrants will have a positive outcome and will be able to legally remain in the country. The Benevolent Gatekeeper
When officers used the public protector frame, they explained their job in terms of serving the community by keeping the community safe. In contrast, the benevolent gatekeeper frame emerged when officers described how they have been able to help immigrants while simultaneously screening them for immigration status.
Most officers described helping immigrants by being compassionate during the immigration screening process. For example, officers mentioned they tried to tell jokes to put immigrants at ease because they understood it was a tenuous situation. In addition, officers described answering questions, letting immigrants use the phone to call family, and listening to immigrants' stories during the interview process, even when these stories included much more detail than was necessary. In addition, some officers believed that by getting unauthorized
21
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immigrants an immigration court date, they were giving immigrants the opportunity to regularize their immigration status.
When using the frame ofthe benevolent gatekeeper, officers described admitting people who "belonged" in the country. Belonging in the United States was not described in terms of language or culture, but immigration status:
I hate the fact that people feel like we're profiling. If you have somebody who comes in and they say, "I was born in Utah." Ok. And they speak Spanish. Ok, you're a Spanish-speaking person that was born in Utah. If you have a social security number and we know it's a good number, by all means, you belong here, you're an American. (Immigration Officer 1) In over three years of screening, immigration officers screened two foreign-born arrestees who thought they were undocumented, but discovered they had derived citizenship. A DCSO immigration officer described this discovery as giving people immigration status: "That was a situation that when they came to us they were illegal and when they left they were legal. We cut them loose." Although those cases were clearly the exception, other officers relied on those examples as evidence of their good work. An officer said, ''What I'm trying to do is basically I'm trying to help people and inform people and make sure they are legal because if you're legal you get more benefits than if you're illegal." In another case, an officer described interviewing a Mexican woman who had been smuggled to the United States to engage in prostitution. The woman was arrested during a prostitution sting. Listening to her story made the officer sick to his stomach, because the woman had already been victimized. The officer believed that incarcerating her while she was in the process of removal was akin to additional punishment. After explaining her case to the federal ICE officer, the ICE office declined to prosecute her civil immigration violation. The woman was released, provided information about the prostitution ring to federal authorities, and was
22
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approved for a ''visa for victims." The officer who brought her case to the attention of the ICE office described being proud of the outcome of that case.
It is clear that an addition to indifferently applying the law (the role of the by-the-books administrator), immigration officers sometimes see themselves as benevolent gatekeepers. .On a few occasions, immigration officers have been able to intervene on behalf of immigrants, after which a few have adjusted their status. Although these cases are the exception, officers can rely on them as proof ofthe ways immigration officers help immigrants. Moreover, all officers claim · to help immigrants by being kind to them during the immigration screening process. In this sense, officers see themselves as ambassadors or gatekeepers of information.
IV. DISCUSSION Research on federal immigration officers shows that officers exercise discretion regarding whether or not to pursue deportation, particularly when faced with public opposition (Ellermann 2009; Wells 2006). In contrast, this paper shows that deputized immigration officers in Davidson County, Tennessee h~ve a narrow mandate and virtually no discretion. Their lack of discretion is not a result ofbeing tightly monitored or controlled; in fact, a report issued by the Government Accountability Office (2009) criticized the federal government for not supervising deputized immigration officers. closely enough. Although immigration officers deputized through the 287(g) program technically have the authority of any federal ICE officer, in practice they do not have prosecutorial discretion and characterize making decisions as above their pay grade. Deputized immigration officers determine who is eligible for removal, and then they create the charging documents for the federal government to pursue that person's deportation. It is up to federal immigration officers, however, to intervene and decline to prosecute.
23
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The picture of immigration control that emerges in Davidson County is not one where local actors are enforcing immigration laws however they deem necessary. Instead, immigration officers have a very narrow role in immigration enforcement. The 287(g) program is an example of devolution, in the sense that county officers are processing people for removal rather than federal officers. However, as it is implemented, county immigration officers are acting as
extensions of state authority, rather than independently. Thus, incorporating non~state actors in
immigration control represents a consolidation of state power, rather than a weakening of federal authority (Lahav 1998; Lahav and Guiraudon 2006). In this particular context of interior immigration enforcement, deputized immigration officers are policy implementers, but not policy makers, as Lipsky (1980) describes street-level bureaucrats.
This paper, then, explains how deputized officers understand their roles in the federal immigration bureaucracy, given their very limited authority. Primarily, in what I have characterized as the by-the-books administrator frame, immigration officers in the Davidson County jail see themselves as objective im.plementers of federal immigration law. In this role, officers do what is directed by the federal government, and express few opinions regarding the merits of the 287(g) program. To them, screening immigrants for immigration status is just a job, and one where they lack discretion and their role is limited to administrative processing. Under these circumstances, processing everyone identically for immigration violations, regardless of their suspected crimes, is a way to ensure fairness. To the by-the-hooks administrator, the law is not interpreted, it is applied; all immigrants can be categorized as either legally present or removable. Moreover, because immigration officers lack prosecutorial discretion, they are incredibly efficient at processing immigrants for removal-between April of 2007 and 2009, county immigration. officers identified 5,300 immigrants for removal (DCSO 2009).
24
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To the Sheriff, the 287(g) program is successful because it results in the identification and eventual removal of thousands who were arrested for local criminal charges. Deputized immigration officers speak of the inunigrants they process as criminal~ when they have been arrested for serious charges. In these instances, immigration officers talk about performing a service to the community by getting rid of bad people.
While it is easy for officers to feel proud of protecting the public they identify a drunk driver for removal, it is more difficult to explain why removing non-violent misdemeanor offenders serves the public's interests. Some officers justify their removal by arguing that it is preventative-misdemeanor offenders could commit more serious crimes in the future.
Sometimes, however, officers express reluctance at having to process especially deserving immigrants for removal. This is most likely to happen when immigrants are not easily categorized as criminals-people the 287(g) program was designed to remove. While research on bureaucracy shows that front-line bureaucrats go out of their way to help deserving immigrants (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2000), immigration officers cannot choose to ignore immigration violations. Instead, the best officers can do is recommend humanitarian release so that immigrants can go through the removal process from home rather than from a detention center.
In addition, since immigration officers do not know the outcome of immigration cases, they imagine that deserving immigrants have the opportunity to adjust their legal status. Officers imagine that by giving immigrants an immigration court date, they are helping them by putting them on a path to legal status, rather than deportation. Immigration courts, however, are reluctant to overturn the decisions of the immigration officers because administrative agencies such as the
25
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Department ofHomeland Security are politically accountable to the executive branch of government, and therefore not subject to judicial oversight (Ellermann 2009).
Immigration officers could only recall one case in which an immigration officer intervened on the behalf of a removable immigrant. A woman who had been smuggled to the United States to engage in prostitution was able to get a visa after a deputized officer brought her case to the attention to federal authorities. The deputized officer who intervened was proud he helped the woman adjust her status. In addition, officers mentioned two cases where immigration officers discovered foreign born arrestees had derived citizenship. Thus, in isolated cases, immigration officers have acted as benevolent gatekeepers. whereby a lucky few achieve legal status.
V. CONCLUSION This article sheds light on the devolution of immigration enforcement by examining the local implementation of a 287(g) program. It shows that, as a result of their limited discretion, deputized immigration officers have developed overlapping and contradictory ideas about their jobs. Most often, they rely on a law enforcement ethos and think of themselves as obJective implementers of the law. In their role as by-the-books administrators, they process everyone who violates civil or criminal immigration laws identically. However, depending on the particular cases that officers encounter, they also believe they protect the public by identifying criminals for deportation and they help immigrants adjust their status by giving them an immigration court. date. Deputized immigration officers identify incarcerated immigrants for removal and process their paperwork, work formerly performed by ICE officers. In this context then, devolution entails "9:ansferring tasks, but not authority, from feqeral to lo9al bureaucracies. Local ~ctors are
26
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acting as extensions of state power (Lahav 1998; Lahav and Guiraudon 2006). Consequently, subnational immigration enforcement is a powerful political tool. Locally elected officials take credit for processing criminal aliens for removal because they are instrumental in adopting local immigration enforcement programs. At the same time, they deflect criticism by arguing that they have no say in the program's implementation.
NOTES 1. In 1996, Congress added subsection (g) ''Performance oflmmigration Officer Functions by
State Officers and Employees" to section 287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USC § 1357) through the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (Pub L 104-208, Div C, 110 Stat 3009-546). Although signed into law in 1996, no state or local law enforcement agencies received training to enforce immigration laws until 2002. 2. Civil viola#ons of immigration law include unauthorized presence or overstaying a visa. Criminal immigration violations include illegal re-entry to the United States after a prior deportation or ''willfully" refusing a deportation order. 3. The hnmigration and Naturalization Service, formerly under the Department of Justice, was the agency in charge of enforcing immigration laws before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002. 4. The actual-size of the Hispanic immigrant population is likely significantly higher, as surveys tend to undercount immigrants, particularly if they are undocumented.
LAWS CITED Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Ac~ of 1996, )?ub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214.
27
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illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub L 104-208, Div C, 110 Stat 3009-546 (1996).
Illegal Immigration Relief Act (Hazleton, PA Ordinance 2006-18) Performance of Immigration Officer Functions by State Officers and Employees, 8 USC§ 1357
(g)(1996).
Support our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (Arizona SB 1070).
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Procedures as Instruments ofPolitical Control," Journal ofLaw Economics and Organization 3: 243-77. Meyers, Marcia K., Glaser, Bonnie and Karin MacDonald. 1998. "On the Front Lines of Welfare Delivery: Are Workers Implementing Poli?Y Reform?" Journal ofPolicy Analysis and Management 17(1): 1-22. Neal, Mick:i, and Stephanie A Bohon. 2003. "The Dixie Diaspora: Attitudes Towards Immigrants in Georgia," Sociological Spectrum 23: 181-212. Ngai, Mae M. 2004.Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Maldng ofModern America. Princeton: Princeton University Press Ramakrisbnan, S. Karthick and Tom Wong. 2007. Immigration Policies Go Local: The Varying Responses ofLocal Governments to Undocumented Immigration. Working Paper for the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity. Berkeley, CA: Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity. Sayad, Abdelmalek. 2004. The Suffering ofthe Immigrant. Cambridge, UK: Polity. Schriro, Dora. 2009.Immigration Detention Overview and Recommendations. http://www.ice.gov/doclib/091005 ice detention report-final.pdf(accessed August 1, 2010) Spiro, Peter J. 1997. "Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism," Connecticut Law Review 29:1627-1646.
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Exhibit 19
Email from Constance Taite, DCSO Administrative Counsel to Elliott Ozment, Counsel for the Plaintiff,
January 4, 2011, 6:59PM
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Page 1 of4

Elliott Ozment

From: Taite, Constance (DCSO) [CTaite@DCSO.nashville.org]

Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2011 12:17 PM

To:

Elliott Ozment

Subject: RE: Daniel Renteria-Villegas

Hello Elliott,

As I said yesterday, it's my understanding that a 287(g) record, for lack of a better term, is created when information sufficient to request a detainer is discovered. A record is not created by virtue of the fact that a staff member talks to an inmate, nor does the fact that someone's name is run in a database create a record. I don't know that any DCSO employee viewed your client's Tennessee ID card, and we have no record that Mr. Renteria possessed such a card at the time of booking. I don't know that any DCSO employee verified Mr. Renteria's place of birth, only that Mr. Patterson made an entry clarifying the place of birth as Oregon.

We have produced the public records you requested and provided additional information that is not part of the records request. As I noted earlier, you may want to contact MNPD to confirm the ID card isn't in their property room, or if you want to obtain additional records related to Mr. Renteria's arrests.

Thanks, CT
From: Elliott Ozment [mailto:elliott@ozmentlaw.com] Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2011 10:55 AM To: Taite, Constance (DCSO) Subject: RE: Daniel Renteria-Villegas

Thanks, Constance. I just have a few follow-up questions:

(1} If Marty Peterson created no 287(g) records, how did he know Renteria was a U.S. Citizen when he updated the record on September 7?
(2) Did Marty Peterson ever examine Mr. Renteria's Tennessee state I.D. card?
(3) Did Marty Peterson ever enter Mr. Renteria's name into any federal database?
(4) If the answer to either question 2 or question 3 is yes, why wasn't a record created? (5) If the answer to either or both question 2 and question 3 is no, how did Officer Peterson verify Renteria's citizenship?
If I could get the answer by the close of business today, it would be most helpful. Thanks again for
your help.

Elliott Ozment Immigration Law Offices of Elliott Ozment 1214 Murfreesboro Pike

EXHIBIT

1/7/2011 Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 159 of 190 PageID #: 164

Nashville, TN 37217 615-321-8888

Page 2 of4

From: Taite, Constance (DCSO) [mailto:CTaite@DCSO.nashville.org]
sent: Wednesday, January OS, 2011 6:59 PM
To: Elliott Ozment
Subject: RE: Daniel Renteria-Villegas

Hi Elliott,

This is to confirm that no 287(g) records responsive to your request exist or ever existed. Nothing was either initiated or destroyed. Your client was interviewed because the arrest report stated his birthplace was Mexico, which conflicts with what he later told booking staff. The time frame in JMS only indicates inmate movement, not the actual number of minutes the interview lasted. Think of it as analogous to how long you sit in a doctor's office compared to how much time you actually spend with
the doctor.

Marty Patterson made an entry a few days later to ensure our system shows Mr. Renteria's birthplace was Oregon so that if he is rearrested in the future there will be no confusion.

I'm advised that the in-house hold, which was applied only to indicate the arrestee needed to be interviewed, was released less than two hours after his court appearance on the criminal charges.

It's my understanding that when a routine interview results in a conclusion that there's no cause to

request a 287(g) detainer, no paperwork is initiated documenting the interview.

·

I hope this resolves your questions, but if not, feel free to let me know.

Best wishes, CT

From: Elliott Ozment [mailto:elliott@ozmentlaw.com]
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 201111:23 AM
To: Taite, Constance (DCSO) Subject: RE: Daniel Renteria-Villegas
Thank you, Constance. Sorry to bug you during your time off. Just let me know today or tomorrow whether any records exist from the 287(g) program and I'll leave you alone. Thanks especially for checking on this during your time off. You're very kind.
Elliott Ozment Immigration Law Offices of Elliott Ozment 1214 Murfreesboro Pike Nashville, TN 37217 615-321-8888
-----. ---.-·--. ··-------------· .
From: Taite, Constance (DCSO) [mailto:CTaite@DCSO.nashville.org]
Sent: Tuesday,. January 04, 201110:16 AM
11712011 Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 160 of 190 PageID #: 165

Page 3 of4
To: Elliott Ozment Subject: RE: Daniel Renteria-Villegas
Hi Elliott,
While I am off this week, the wonderful world Of Blackberry and VPN allow me to follow up on your requests. © Tom Davis plans to speak with Marty Patterson to clarify the meaning of the JMS entries to which you refer below. I believe that will be today or tomorrow.
Your message indicates Mr. Renteria's release was delayed until he provided some documents. Does your client say to whom he provided a passport and birth certificate, or, if they were brought to the jail by someone else, who brought them? Even if for some reason they were provided, that is no indication that we have a record of it in response to your records request. Mr. Renteria was released from jail the same day his state criminal charges were adjudicated.
I cannot "re-verify ... that all 287(g) records were indeed destroyed." As I said in yesterday's message, there was no indication that any 287(g) records were created beyond what you see in JMS, so naturally none would have been destroyed. However, as noted above, the ICE supervisor intends to speak with Mr. Patterson when he returns to work to ensure nothing has been overlooked.
Constance S. Taite Administrative Counsel Davidson County Sheriffs Office 506 Second Ave. N., Nashville, TN 37201 Office: {615) 862-8164 Fax: (615) 880-3900
Assistant: Joy Vague (615) 862-8191
From: Elliott Ozment [mailto:elliott@ozmentlaw.com] Sent: Monday, January 03, 2011 3:23 PM
To: Taite, Constance (DCSO) Subject: RE: Daniel Renteria-Villegas
Constance,
Thank you so much for your response.
I'm puzzled by the lack of documentation from the 287{g) program. Renteria reports to me that he was interviewed for immigration status. I can also tell from the Jail Management System report that Marty Patterson scheduled Renteria for a 287(g) interrogation, that a 287(g) was conducted on 8/24 from 12:26 PM til 1:09 PM, and that Marty Patterson made yet another entry on the Jail Management System on 9!7/1 0, three days after his release on 9/4. Renteria also reports to me that he was only released after jail personnel were given a copy of his birth certificate and US passport. Could you please try to re-verify from your sources that all 287(g) records were indeed destroyed? Thank you again for your attention to this matter.
Elliott Ozment Immigration Law Offices of Elliott Ozment 1214 Murfreesboro Pike Nashville, TN 37217 615-321-8888
From:-Taite, Constance (DCSO) [mailto:CTaite@DCSO.nashville.org] Sent: Monday, January 03, 2011 7:25 AM
To: Elliott Ozment
117/2011 Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 161 of 190 PageID #: 166

Page 4 of4 Cc: Grizzle, Byron (DCSO); Miller, Wayne (DCSO) Subject: Daniel Renteria-Villegas Good morning Mr. Ozment, Pursuant to your public records request, I recently forwarded your client's institutional file by e-mail. l promised to contact you again .once we determined whether records exist related to any conversations between Mr. Renteria and DCSO's 287(g) officers that might have occurred when he was booked into jail after his arrests on August 14, 2010 and August 22, 2010. We have no record documenting conversations or interviews between Mr. Renteria and DCSO 287(g) officers, and there is no indication that any such record was ever created. As you are likely aware, mug shots, arrest reports, arrest affidavits and so forth belong to the Metro Police Department and therefore are not included in our response to your request. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions about this matter. Best wishes for a good New Year, Constance S. Taite Administrative Counsel Davidson County Sheriff's Office 506 Second Ave. N., Nashville, TN 37201 Office: (615) 862-8164 Fax: (615) 880-3900 Assistant· Joy Vague (615) 862-8191
117/2011
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Exhibit 20
Photographs ofDCSO 287(g) Office
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d-O--- Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 164 of 190 PageID #: 169

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Exhibit 21
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Professional Responsibility, Management Inspections Unit 287(g)
Program Review Findings; Davidson County Sheriff's Office, TN; DRO Field Office Director New Orleans, LA (May 12-14, 2009)
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 168 of 190 PageID #: 173

· ·sj · f',;.,.,..~ .~·-~ ~~f- t~"~~"''~
\;;:;)~~~-~~~~~> ~-~~~_!:.o<::/>'1;-f

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Professional Responsibility
Management Inspections Unit

Washington, DC 20024

Management Inspections Unit 287(g) Program Review Findings
Davidson Co.unty Sheriffs Office, TN ORO Field Office Director New Orleans, LA
rv1ay 12- 14, 2009

FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY. This document may contain sensitive commercial, financial, Jaw enforcement, management and employee information. It has been written for the express use of the Department of Homeland Security to identify and correct management and operational deficiencies. In reference to OPR Directive 08006.1; issued 09/22/05, any disclosure, dissemination, or reproduction of this document, or any segments thereof, is prohibited without the approval of the Director, Office of Professional Responsibility.
l.AW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
EXHIBIT
2\
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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY MISSION STATEMENT

The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) is responsible for investigating allegations of employee misconduct impartially, independently, and thoroughly.

OPR prepares timely and comprehensive reports of investigations for judicial

or management action.

·

OPR inspects and reviews U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) field offices, operations and processes in order to provide executive management with an independent review of the agency's organizational health, and assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall ICE mission.

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiBiLITY MANAGEMENT INSPECTIONS UNIT 287(g) PROGRAM REVIEW
This summary outlines the results of a program review conducted on May 12- 14, 2009, by the OPR Management Inspections Unit (MIU) of the Davidson County Sheriff's Office (DCSO), TN, 287(g) Delegation of Authority Program. The objective of the review was to assess conformance with conditions of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) bebNeen ICE and DCSO, and provide
management with feedback on the administration of this program by DCSO and the responsible ICE field offices. To accomplish this objective, MIU reviewed procedures, case flies, DCSO jail records, Automated Biometric Identification and Enforcement Case Tracking Systems (!DENT/ENFORCE) entries, and detainee Alien Files (A-Files). The te·am also conducted interviews with the Office of Detention and Removal Operations (ORO) and DCSO management and staff regarding the 287(g) program.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On January 31, 2007, the ICE Assistant Secretary signed a MOA with the DCSO, authorizing the Sheriff's office to identify and process immigration violators in the Davidson County jaiL _Based on the agreement, ICE initially authorized DCSO to have 12 trained officers; four additional officers were later authorized, trained and certified, for a total of 16 trained officers.
The DCSO 287(g) program is a jail enforcement model. Only those individuals arrested by local law enforcement agencies and booked into the DCSO jail are scrutinized under the 287(g) authority. In Davidson County, the Sheriff has the primary responsibility of serving civil process and jail functions without the common law enforcement powers to keep the peace. The Metropolitan Nashville Police Department is the primary provider of law enforcement services for Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County, TN.
DCSO uses the 287(g) authority to identify and process immigration violators in the Davidson County jail population. MIU observed the booking and admission procedures at Davison County Jail and found the processing area was adequately equipped ~ith working !DENT/ENFORCE terminals and printers to accomplish the processing of illegal aliens. DCSO 287(g) Jail Enforcement Officers (JEO) reported the need for local information technqlogy support. DCSO 287(g) JEOs stated the closest Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCtO) support was located approximately 200 miles away in Memphis, TN.
DCSO has contracted detention services with ICE. The Intergovernmental Service Agreement (JGSA) with ICE has an estimated reimbursement of one million dollars for
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
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fiscal year 2009. On average, an iiiegal alien is ·detained in Davidson County Jail three
to five days, until removed by ICE ORO.
The DCSO 287(g) program is under the supervision of the Field Office Director (FOD), · New Orleans. Currently, an Assistant Field Office Director (AFOD) and a Supervisory
Detention and Deportation Officer (SDDO) are responsible for the daily supervision of the DCSO 287(g) program. Both DCSO and DRO consider the program an effective force multiplier. Communication between ORO and DCSO is excellent. Overall, morale was assessed as good, and employees described the program as a great enhancement to their law enforcement authority and overall mission. Currently, the DCSO is a defendant in a civil case involving an undo~umented alien. According to the Sheriff, the undocumented alien is aileging mistreatment during transportation by the arresting agency, Berry Hill Police Department. This case has recently made national headline news. In an unrelated case, the Acting Field Office Director issued a Letter of Revocation of 287(g) Authority to a DCSO 287(g) officer who reportedly worked part-time at a family business that employs illegal aliens. The.287(g) officer had reportedly processed at least two of these illegal aliens while working at the DCSO jail. The allegations are currently being investigated by the DHS Office of Inspector General. At the time of the review, DCSO 287(g) JEOs had processed over 5,300 illegal aliens for removal from the United States. The MIU review found no significant deficiencies with the DCSO 287(g) Delegation of Authority Program. Overall, the DCSO 287(g) program is well managed.
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
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REPORT OF PROGRAM REViEW
DAVIDSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE TABLE OF CONTENTS

REVIEW PROCESS

Report Organization................................................................

2

Review Team Members........................................................... ·2

BACKGROUND

.

DCSO 287(g) Program Overview................................................. 3

ORO 287{g) Program Overview.................................................. 4

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
ICE Management and Employees................................................ 5 DCSO Management and Employees............................................. 5 United States Attorney's Office.................................................... 6
Davidson County District Attorney's Office...................................... 7
Deputy Chief of Police, City of Nashville.......................................... 7

REVIEW RESULTS
DCSO Jail Operations................................................................ 8 Areas of Concern....................................................................... 9 Recommendations...................................................................... 9

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
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REViEW PROCESS

REPORT ORGANIZATION
This report documents review results, and serves as the official record. MIU conducted the review through interviews, and through examinations of Law Enforcement Agency (LEA} and field office records and procedures. MIU reviewed the MOA, and current policies and procedures, and applied these against the processes employed by the LEA and the ICE field offices with oversight responsibilities. Interviews were conducted with employees, and their perceptions are represented in the report. External relationships were evaluated through interviews of relevant agency representatives within the area of responsibility of the field offices and the LEA.
Prior to the review, MIU collected and analyzed information from the Headquarters
Office of State and Local Coordination (OSLC), in addition to data provided by the field offices and the LEA
Comments and questions regarding the report findings can be forwarded to the Director, OPR.

REVIEW TEAM MEMBERS

Karen I. Ballard (Lead) Victor Vartanian · Steven Daugherty Michael Tirrell Roemer Villa Richard Zabel

Management Analyst Section Chief Senior Special Agent Management Analyst Senior·Special Agent · Senior Special Agent

OPR, Headquarters, MIU OPR, Headquarters, MIU OPR, Headquarters, MIU OPR, Headquarters, MIU OPR, Long Beach, CA OPR, Headquarters, MIU

Management Inspections Unit May2009 OPR/MIU-2009-06836

Office of Professional Responsibility

2B7(g) Review and Inspection Section

2

Davidson County Sheriffs Office,. TN

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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BACKGROUND

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Public Law 104-208, enacted on September 30, 1996, amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by adding Section 287(g), 8 USC 1357(g). Section 287(g) of the
INA provides for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enter into an
agreement to delegate the authority to enforce federal immigration laws to state and
local law enforcement. The law requires an agreement be created that defines the authorities being certified, the training requirements, the required DHS/.ICE sUpervision, the length of the agreement, and other important issues.

DAVIDSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 287(g) PROGRAM

OVERVIEW

.

The Sheriff of Davidson County is an elected official. As of the 2000 census of, there were 569,891 people; 237,405 households; and 138,109 families residing in the county. The population density was 1,135 people per square mile.

On April16, 2007, DCSO began participation in the 287(g) Delegation of Authority Program. To date, over 5,300 illegal aliens have been processed for removal from the United States.

In all Tennessee counties except Davidson County, the sheriff is an official with full
police powers. In Davidson County, the sheriff has the primary responsibility of serving civil process and jail functions without the common law powers to keep the peace. The fv1etropolitan Nashville Police Department is the primary provider of law enforcement services for Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County, TN ..

DCSO operates jail and rehabilitation programs at the Criminal Justice center (CJC),
the Hill Detention Center, and the Correctional Development Center, (CDC). CJC provides detention services to numerous state and local law enforcement agencies serving the Nashville metropolitan area and Davidson County. The DCSO 287(g) officers screen all individuals booked into CJC, the main intake point for arrestees in Davidson County. Arrestees who remain in custody after 48 hours are classified for
housing and custody levels. The arrestees housed at CJC are pre-trial males classified
at maximum, medium, medical or mental health custody levels. Female arrestees are booked and transferred to the CDC. Although the CJC is the maximum security facility
for the county, it also houses juveniles adjudicated by the courts to stand trial as adults.

DCSO has trained and certified a total of 16, 287(g) officers. Currently, tWo are not working due to medical conditions, one ls on a military deployment, and one has been

Management Inspections Unit May 2009 QPRJMIU-200.9c06836 ·

Office of Professional Responsibility

2B7(g) Review and Inspection Section

3.

. Davidson County Sheriff's Office, =rN .

LAW ENFORCEMENT SEIIISITIVE

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suspended from the 287(g) program due to allegations of conflict of interest and misconduct
DRO 287(g) PROGRAM OVERVIEW
The FOD, New Orleans has the ultimate responsibility for managing the DCSO 287(g)
program, and has delegated the oversight of the program to the AFOD,· Birmingham,
and the SDDO in Nashville, TN. The SDDO has daily contact with DCSO, regularly discusses the effectiveness of the 287(g) program with DCSO staff and resolves any operational issues that may arise. The SDDO is also responsible for the Criminal Alien Program (CAP). The SDDO has four Deportation Officers (DOs) and one Immigration
Enforcement Agent (iEA) assigned to assist with-both CAP and 287(g) related duties.
The SDDO is responsible for reviewing A-Files and signing charging documents.
The DCSO 287(g) program was managed by the Office of Investigations from itS
inception in April 2007, until DRO assumed supervisory responsibilities in June 2008. From June 2008 to January 2009, due to staffing issues, there were several temporary duty SDDOs responsible for the CAP and 287(g) programs. This was resolved in · January 2009, with the placement of a permanent SDDO.

Management Inspections Unit May 2009 OPRIMIU"2009-06836

Office of Professional Responsibility

287(g) Review and Inspection Section

4

Davidson County-Sheriff's Office, TN .

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

MIU has developed this section to offer the concerns and opinions of ICE and LEA
management and employees. MIU encourages interviewees to provide their perceptions of the program-and how it functions. This often resufts in examples and anecdotes. MIU cautions that, due to the nature of the information, it rs not possible to
verify each statement. Nonetheless, it is important those interviewed have their views
represented:

ICE MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEES
fviiU interviewed the Acting Deputy Field Office Director (ADFOD), who stated the DCSO 287(g} program was very beneficial to ICE, and an additional15 ICE employees would be needed to perform the work accomplished by the DCSO officers. The ADFOD
stated the communication between DCSO and ICE has improved since DRO placed a permanent SDDO at the county jail. The DRO supervisors consider the conduct and
performance of the DCSO 287(g) officers to be professional and meeting the
requirements of the MOA.
The AFOD was interviewed during the review. The AFOD stated the program is well run since a permanent SDDO was hired. In addition, the AFOD stated the recent hiring of another SDDO to take over the supervision of CAP will allow for a more focused supervison of the 287(g) program.
MlU interviewed the SDDO who currently supervises both CAP and the 287(g) program.
. The SDDO stated there is a need for dedicated lEAs and DOs for the 287{g) program. He indicated ICE office space is needed at the jail to properly supervise the DCSO 287(g) JEOs and review A-Files. The SDDO also stated direct communication with the Sheriff has added to the effectiveness of the overall program.

DCSO SHERIFF, MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEES
SHERIFF
MIU interviewed the Sheriff of Davidson County, who has occupied his position for
seven years. The Chief Deputy was also present during the interview. The Sheriff stated the relationship with ICE has been very good since the arrival of a permanent SDDO. The Sheriff stated the current ORO representatives have improved the relationship, as well as the efficiency of the program. He indicated a local. Immigration Judge would expedite the processing of the large number of aliens·they handle.

Management Inspections Unit May2009 OPRIMIU-2009..()6836

Office of Professional Responsibmty

287(g) Review and Inspection Section

5

Davidson County Sheriffs Office:TN

. . LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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The Sheriff regularly interacts with the FOD/New Orleans via e-mail and meets with the
FOD in person at least once a year. The Sheriff conducts a weekly meeting with the
DCSO Chief Deputy and the DCSO Director of Immigration Enforcement to address any concerns with the program and the 287(g) JEOs. The Sheriff also conducts a quarterly Steering Committee meeting with DRO to review and assess the immigration enforcement activities of DCSO personnel.
The Sheriff stated all internal investigations, including investigations of 287(g) personnel, are conducted in the lrwestigative Division, and then reported directly to the Chief Deputy. The Sheriff stated his office is currently the defendant in a civil lawsuit filed by an undocumented alien.
DCSO JAil ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
MIU conducted interviews with DCSO 287(g) JEOs. The JEOs reported having daily contact and communication with DR.O officers. Several JEOs stated the relationship bei:\oveen ICE and DCSO is very good, and the SDDO is responsive to any questions and CO!Jcerns that arise.
The JEOs indicated the initial 287(g) training lacked procedural hands-on exercises. The JEOs further stated they haq received approximately two weeks of on-the-job training provided by ORO at the DCSO processing area, which was extremely helpful.
The JEOs reported the need for better access to technical support for the !DENT/ENFORCE systems. In one case, when the systems were not operational, the JEOs were unable to conduct the search and enroll functions for several days.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE {USAO)
·Ml U interviewed the Chief of the· Criminal Division within the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO) in the Middle District of Tennessee.
T)le Chief stated the establishment of a permanent SDDO in Nashville markedly improved the efficiency of Re-entry After Deportation cases being presented to the USAO. Prior to the SDDO's arrival, timeliness of case present~tions was lacking.
The USAO accepts for prosecution all Re-entry After Deportation cases, which meet established local minimum guidelines. The Chief is unaware of any pending civil or criminal actions against the 287(g) program or 287(g) personnel.

Management Inspections Unit May2009 ·
OPRIMIU-2009-06836

Office of Professional Responsibility

287(g) Review and Inspection Section

6

· Davidson County Sheriffs Office, TN

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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. DAVIDSON COUNTY DISTRICT-ATTORNEY GENERAL
MIU interviewed the District Attorney General (DAG) for Davidson County. The DAG stated the 287(g) program was established in Davidson County due to public outcry after an undocumented alien, with a history of multiple arrests, committed a vehicular homicide of two individuals. The DAG's office prosecutes all persons charged with felony violations, regardless of their alienage or removability. The DAG stated his office becomes concerned with· alienage and removability only during the sentencing stage of the prosecution. He explained it is unrealistic to expect a removed alien to satisfy the terms of supervised probation. Therefqre, the DAG asks the court to have the alien serve a suspended sentence, or be given .time served if an ICE detainee is going to be removed from the country. The DAG stated the implementation of-the 287(g} program has not changed the. ratio of felony or misdemeanor arrests.
The DAG stated he is unaware of any civil rights or civil liberties allegations, or actions against the DCSO 287{g) program. According to the DAG, the 287{g) program is well received by a majority of the population of Davidson County.
DEPUTY CHIEF OF POLICE, CITY OF NASHVILLE
The Deputy Chief of Police for the Nashville Police Department (PD), TN, was interviewed. The Nashville PO is the main Jaw enforcement body providing arrestees to DCSO. The Deputy Chief stated Nashville PD is not involved with 287(g) in any way. Generally, there is no interaction between DCSO and Nashville PD regarding the 287(g) program. All arrests are based on state or local charges, and are not related in any way to the possibility that an individual may be impacted by the 287(g) program at the DCSO jail. The Deputy Chief stated he knows of no problems regarding the DCSO or the 287(g} program.

Management Inspections Unit May2009 OPRIMIU~2009-06836 ·

. . 7.

Office of Professional Responsibility 287(g) Review and Inspection Section ·
Davidson County Sheriff's Office, TN

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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REVIEW RESULTS

DAVIDSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE JAIL OPERATIONS

The DCSO 287(g) JEOs are available 24 hours a day to process 287(g) cases. All arrestees are brought to the CJC for booking, but before an arrestee can be committed to jail and subjected to 287(g) screening, the arresting officer must bring the individual before a judicial magistrate who validates the arrest This is an additional step most other jurisdictions do not have in place.

The DCSO 287{g} JEOs have no enforcement authority outside the jail, and do not participate in any enforcement operations. If arrestees do not bond out and are not diverted through pre-trial release, they are classified and assigned a housing location at either the CJC or one of the other DCSO facilities. !nmates housed at CJC are generally in a pre-trial status on at least one felony charge.

The communications and working relationship between DRO and DCSO is excellent.

The review reveals the JEOs have the materials, resources and equipment for the

processing of undocumented aliens. The processing area was adequately equipped

with working IDENT/ENFORCE terminals and printers. However, MIU found the lack of

local OCIO technical support has contributed to extended delays in processing when.

the IDENT/ENFORCE systems are not properly functioning.

· ·

·

MIU observed the facility intake process and reviewed A-Files of processed criminal aliens. During intake, JEOs review arrest reports, and segregate criminal aliens based on country of birth and citizenship..All foreign born individuals are interviewed by 287(g) JEOs to determine if they are subject to immigration proceedings. A JEO completes the processing, and as required, places ICE detainers on the criminal aliens. MIU noted .criminal aliens are not formally served with immigration charges by the DCSO 287{g} officers until they have completed the state judicial process.

ICE personnel are available by telephone 24-hours a day to assist the JEOs in

resolving problems. The Davidson County CJC has tv.to rooms equipped with

IDENT/ENFORCE within the booking area for 287(g) processing. However, the

workspace allocated to ICE was deemed inadequate to properly review A-Files and

supervise the JEOs.

·

DCSO is currently a defendant in a civil case filed by a female undocumented alien. A pregnant female was arrested by Beny Hill Police Department subsequent to a traffic stop and was transported to the· Davidson County jail. The female was booked and processed by DCSO 287(g) personnel. A detainer was issued pending the adjudication of the case. Before coming into ICE custody, the arrestee went into' labor and was

Management Inspections Unit May 2009
. OPRIMIU~2009-ti6836..

Office of Professional Responsibifity . 287(g) ~vi~w and. Inspection .Se.c!ion
· Davidson county· Sheriffs O'flice~ ·TN

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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transported to the Metro-Nashville General Hospital for delivery of the baby. The arrestee remained at the hospital for a few days after giving birth. She was returned to the jail and released later that day. The ICE detainer was cancelled and the female was released. The DCSO 287(g) officers were not cited in the lawsuit.
On January 5, 2009, the FOD received information from a Nashville-based news reporter alleging a DCSO 287(g) officer was working part-time at a family business which employs illegal aliens. The 287(g) officer had processed at least two of these illegal aliens while on duty at ~he DCSO jail. On January 7, 2009, the Acting FOD issued a Letter of Revocation of 287(g) Authority to the DCSO 287(g) officer against whom the allegations had been made. The allegations are currently under investigation by the DHS Office of Inspector General.
MIU reviewed the following A-Files processed by the 287(g) JEOs:
A088641510,A088641504,A099762489,A099762476,A089B48045,A072254050, A087218073,A088641511,A094487492,A088641482,A089848077,A089848034, A089848061,A089235105,A088641514,A099762491,A029287477,A089843033, A089848048,A095080073
The review showed A-Files were in good order. In each case prosecution was pursued by the District Attorney's Office, and consular notification was made, when appropriate.
The MIU review found no significant deficiencies with the DCSO 287(g) Delegation of Authority Program. The program appears properly supervised and efficient.
AREAS OF CONCERN
None
RECOMMENDATIONS TO lMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY
None

Management Inspections Unit May2009 OPRIMIU-2009-06836

Office of Professional Responsibility

287(g) Review and Inspection Section

9

Davidson County Sheriffs Office,- TN

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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Ojjicf! <>f.'iwJc ami Lacr1l Coordino1i011
U.S. l>cpnrl·menl or Hon1cland Securily
500 12'h Slrccl SW II'" Floor Washingmn. DC 2.0024
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: SUBJECT:

Timothy Moynihan Acting Director Office ofProfessional Responsibility
William F. Riley ·7~_j.t-' ~
Acting Executive Director Office of State and Local Coordination
Davidson County Sheriff's Office 287(g) Review Follow-Up

The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) Management Inspection Unit (MIU) conducted a review of the Davidson County Sheriffs Office (DCSO) 2S7(g) Delegation of Authority Program during May 121h -May 141\2009. The MlU review of the DCSO 287(g) Program revea[ed several fmdings that need to be addressed by the Office of State and Local Coordination (OSLC), the Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO), the Office of the Chiefinformation Officer (OCIO), and the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA).

OSLC has reviewed the findings and has addressed the concems raised by OPR. Attached is a

summary findin'gs;

of the

the findir!gs; scope of the

along issue.

with the responsible the proposed action,

paanrdtyanfoersatidmdaretesdsintigm/reesfoorlvriensgoltuhteion.

Attachment I: Summary Response Memorandum Attachment DCSO

\\'\V\V.ice.gov
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Concerns Raised in the Davidson County Sheriff's Office (DCSO) Report

I. The MlU report mentions ~tatements by DCSO 287(g) officers requesting improved information technology {IT) support On one particular occasion, computers went offline for several days and officers were subsequently unable to conduct search and enroll procedures within the ENPORCEIIDENT/lAFIS processing module. Responsible Prog.ram(s): DRO, OCIO Scope: Local Action: It is recommended thaL DRO oflicials coordinate wilh OCIO and local omcials
to designate an rr specialist whom will be responsible for pr(widing crticicnt anti timi!ly
287(g) technical support. Estimated Time for Resolution: 6 months Status: On-going Call-Up Date: March2010

2. The report mentions a civil lawsuit filed against the DCSO by an undocumented alien alleging mistreatment. The complainant was detained on local charges filed by the Berry Hill Police Department, TN. While in DCSO custody, 287(g) personnel interviewed and processed the subject. An ICE detainer was issued and pending adjudication of the case, the ~lien was transported to a local medical facility for child birth. The alien was subsequently released and the ICE detainer was cancelled. This case was still pending when the MlU conducted their review.

Responsible Progmm(s): DRO

Scope: Local

Action: It is recommended that local DRO oflicials ascerlain the status of this case. lt is

also recommended that DRO officials determine and report to the OSLC the following

details:

·

• Explanation for release and cancellation of the JC£ detainer; • Was Ihe complainant subject to removal under the INA;
o lfsubjecl to removal. was the complainnnt eligible and/or is she current]);
enrolled in the Intensive Supe.rvision Appcaranc~ Program (!SAP) or the Enhanced Supcrvision/Reporling {ESR) program. Estimated Time for Resolution: 6 tvlonths Status: On-going

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 183 of 190 PageID #: 188

C;tii-Up Date: March 20 l0
3. The report mentions an on-going investigation by the Department of Homeland Security, Office of the lnspector (DHS, OlG). This inve-stigation stemmed from information provided by a local news reporter. According to the review, a DCSO 287(g} officer was reportedly working at a local business that employs illegal aliens; aliens that the officer bad previously encountered and processed nt the Davidson County jail. Responsible P1·ognlm(s): OSLC. DHS/OIG Scope: LLJcal Action: The OSLC and FOD New Orleans revoked tlti:s \)fficer"s 287(g.) :mthority on or about 1/7/1009. ll1ere's no further action required.
Estimated Time fm· Rcsoiution: N/A Status: Complete Call-Up Date: N/A
4. An inadequate allocation ofDRO work space and personnel are mentioned within the report. Lack of work space and personnel at the jail has made it difficult for DRO officials to review A-Files and supervise the program. Rc..c:ponsible PI'Ograru(s): DRO Scope: Local
or Action: It is recommended that local DRO officials address any personnel shortnges and
coordinate with DCSO officials lO C\'aluate the rea.sibility e..xpnnding their work aren. Creating an improved ORO work environment within the Davidson County j11il would help maintain current program perception nnd integrity. Estimated Time for Resolution: 6 Montlts Status: On~going Call-Up J)ate: March 2010
5. The report mentions statements by the Davidson County Sheriff. TN.. The Sheriff suggested an assignment of a local immigration judge to accommodate the large number of aliens his officers' encoun1er and process for removal. . Responsible Program(s): OSLC, OPLA Scope: Locnl
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 184 of 190 PageID #: 189

Action: h h; recommended that OSLC and OPLA oflicinls a:;~:c:nain the necessity and feasibility of this request. Eslimalctl Timt: fnr Resolution: 6 tvlonlhs Status: On-going. Call-Up Date: r>.•larch 2.0 I0
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 185 of 190 PageID #: 190

Exhibit 22
Sample ICE Interview Data Collection Sheet
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Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 186 of 190 PageID #: 191

.~.-~

.
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INFORMACION DE LA FAMILIA
FAMILY !NFOH..MA110N

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. Estado Civil (Mtirital Status); So!iero (sint{l•~); Cosado (m~rric-.d), Divorciarlo (di,:orced).

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(1(.1(S1l7N6d5p.ud.o.rmDuNeNsbyieoUsremclr.olcmaobfcmresfipercd6oolCrund<'idlet.drdielezre)Feelni.siniiepCsfsohiipotisiopzsoe./;/oi•C;!pC.fSiisui-tupidp·dna-aodud~facs~·hnlnilifla-da·r·-d·ed·elel)lneifsiopso·so-._-.·-----~----··----_-_·--.-_--_-_--_--_--_--_·-_-··-_-_--_-· _-_-__·_-__-_-··_--_·------

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address tv~d phone number offamily in

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ESTADO DE LA INMIGRACION
IMMJORATION STATtf.S

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Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 188 of 190 PageID #: 193

Exhibit 23
Email from Constance Taite to TBALINK-TALK listserv
July 18, 2007, 3:05:52 PM CDT
Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 189 of 190 PageID #: 194

· From: ''Taite, Constance (DCSO)" <CTaite@DCSO.nashville.orq> Date: July 18,2007 3:05:52 PM CDT To: <tbalink-talk@tba2.org> Subject: RE: [rbalink-talk]lmmigration "hold" Reply-To: tbalink-talk@tba2.om
John,
I can answer your question if he was arrested in Davidson Co. and held pursuant to the 287(g) program. I agree that he should have received a citation in lieu of arrest under the circumstances you describe, and TN law certainly encourages use of citations.
The police department has repeatedly told us that the issue is whether the person can show ID, and that "even a utility bill11 showing the name & address may be acceptable under otherwise routine circumstances. If your guy had gotten a citation, he would have had to report for citation booking, but absent an NCIC hit that triggers an arrest, e.g., burglary warrants in Georgia, his immigration status would not have been checked.
Once the police make· an arrest and the commissioner signs a committal, the person MUST be booked into jail. Information is automatically streamed to ICE on anyone who acknowledges being born outside the U.S. (or claims to have been born at Baptist Hosp. but speaks little English). After the local charges are disposed of(d_ismissed, bail posted, time served, etc.) ICE officers have 48 hrs., excluding holidays and weekends; to investigat~ and take action, which may be anything from a release with a notice to appear to a detainer for deportation. Typically; however, the investigation is completed long before 48 hrs.
I can't speak to police practices or explain their decisions regarding who gets arrested and who gets a citation. However, the decision to arrest leaves us no discretion about what happens next. We have to book.
Constance Taite Davidson County Sheriffs Offc. 506 Second Ave. North, Nashville, TN 37201 Offc: (615)862-8164 Fax: 880-3900

§

EXHIBIT

i 13

Case 3:11-cv-00218 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/11 Page 190 of 190 PageID #: 195

 
 CASE−CLOSED,CASE−MANAGER−BROWN,CASE−REFERRED,PRO−SE−CASE,STAYED
U.S. District Court Middle District of Tennessee (Nashville) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:11−cv−00218

Renteria−Villegas et al v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville Date Filed: 03/09/2011

&Davidson County et al

Date Terminated: 05/29/2013

Assigned to: District Judge Kevin H. Sharp

Jury Demand: Defendant

Referred to: Magistrate Judge Joe Brown

Nature of Suit: 190 Contract: Other

Case in other court: Chancery Court for Davidson County,

Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

Tennessee, 11−00032−II

Cause: 28:1441 Notice of Removal−−Other Contract

Plaintiff

Daniel Renteria−Villegas

represented by Daniel Renteria−Villegas 1305 Venus Drive Nashville, TN 37217 PRO SE

Christina Iturralde Southern Poverty Law Center Immigrant Justice Project 233 Peachtree Street, NE Suite 2150 Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 521−6700 Fax: (404) 221−5857 Email: christina.iturralde@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 04/23/2013

Dan Werner Southern Poverty Law Center Immigrant Justice Project 233 Peachtree Street, NE Suite 2150 Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 521−6700 Fax: (404) 221−5857 Email: daniel.werner@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 04/23/2013

Harry Elliott Ozment Law Offices of Elliott Ozment 1214 Murfreesboro Pike Nashville, TN 37217 (615) 321−8888 Email: elliott@ozmentlaw.com TERMINATED: 04/23/2013

R. Andrew Free Barrett Johnston, LLC 217 Second Avenue, N Nashville, TN 37201 (615) 244−2202 Fax: (615) 244−4345 Email: andrew@immigrantcivilrights.com TERMINATED: 04/23/2013

Case: 3:11-cv-00218

Thomas Paul Fritzsche Southern Poverty Law Center Immigrant Justice Project 233 Peachtree Street, NE Suite 2150
As of: 02/01/2014 03:41 PM CST 1 of 15

Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 221−5820 Fax: (404) 221−5845 Email: tom.fritzsche@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 04/23/2013 PRO HAC VICE

Trina Realmuto National Immigration Project of hte National Lawyers' G 14 Beacon Street Suite 602 Boston, MA 02108 (617) 227−9727 x. 8 Fax: (617) 227−5495 Email: trina@nationalimmigrationproject.org TERMINATED: 04/23/2013

Plaintiff
David Ernesto Gutierrez−Turcios TERMINATED: 12/27/2012

represented by Christina Iturralde (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dan Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harry Elliott Ozment (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

R. Andrew Free (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas Paul Fritzsche (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Trina Realmuto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Rosa Landaverde TERMINATED: 12/27/2012

represented by Christina Iturralde (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dan Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harry Elliott Ozment (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

R. Andrew Free (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas Paul Fritzsche (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Case: 3:11-cv-00218 As of: 02/01/2014 03:41 PM CST 2 of 15

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Trina Realmuto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County

represented by Keli J. Oliver Metropolitan Legal Department P O Box 196300 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 862−6341 Email: keli.oliver@nashville.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Derrick C. Smith Metropolitan Legal Department P O Box 196300 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 862−6341 Fax: (615) 862−6352 Email: derrick.smith@nashville.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth A. Sanders Metropolitan Legal Department P O Box 196300 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 862−6380 Email: libby.sanders@nashville.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lora Barkenbus Fox Metropolitan Legal Department P O Box 196300 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 862−6341 Email: lora.fox@nashville.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement TERMINATED: 11/15/2012

represented by Craig Andrew Defoe Department of Justice−Office of Immigration Litigation PO Box 868 Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20008 (202) 532−4114 Fax: (202) 305−7000 Email: craig.defoe@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua E. T. Braunstein Department of Justice 450 5th Street, NW Room 6024 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 305−0194 Fax: (202) 305−7000 Email: joshua.braunstein@usdoj.gov
Case: 3:11-cv-00218 As of: 02/01/2014 03:41 PM CST 3 of 15

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark H. Wildasin Office of the United States Attorney (MDTN) 110 Ninth Avenue, S Suite A961 Nashville, TN 37203−3870 (615) 736−2079 Fax: (615) 736−5323 Email: mark.wildasin@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew M. Curley Bass, Berry &Sims (Nashville) 150 Third Avenue South Suite 2800 Nashville, TN 37201 (615) 742−6200 Email: mcurley@bassberry.com TERMINATED: 10/12/2012

Date Filed

# Docket Text

03/09/2011

1 NOTICE OF REMOVAL by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement from Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, case number 11−32−II. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Civil Cover Sheet)(eh) (Entered: 03/09/2011)

03/10/2011

Bar status for attorneys Harry Elliot Ozment, Lora Barkenbus Fox, Mark H. Wildasin of TN, Joshua E.T. Braunstein of MD and Craig Andrew Defoe of IN verified as active on this date. (eh) (Entered: 03/10/2011)

03/15/2011

2 NOTICE of Initial Case Management Conference set for 5/9/2011 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 783 before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown. (afs) (Entered: 03/15/2011)

03/16/2011

3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by David Gutierrez and by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− MOA, # 2 Exhibit B −− Armenta Paper, # 3 Exhibit C −− DCSO Policy 1−4.100, # 4 Exhibit D −− Sample I−247, # 5 Exhibit E −− JMS Log, # 6 Exhibit F −− ICE Interview Data Collection Sheet, # 7 Exhibit G −− DCSO 287(g) Review, # 8 Exhibit H −− Sample Removal Packet, # 9 Exhibit I −− Sample I−213, # 10 Exhibit J −− ICE Academy Workbook, # 11 Exhibit K −− Sample I−877, # 12 Exhibit L −− Sample Removal Forms, # 13 Exhibit M −− Metro Legal Opinion, # 14 Exhibit N −− Hall Depo Excerpt, # 15 Exhibit O −− DCSO Policy 1−3.142, # 16 Exhibit P −− Sec Comm Jurisdictions, # 17 Exhibit Q −− Sec Comm MOA Sample, # 18 Exhibit R −− NCLR Report on 287(g), # 19 Exhibit S −− AP Story, # 20 Exhibit T −− MNPD Press Release, # 21 Exhibit U −− Gutierrez Plea Bargain Confirm, # 22 Exhibit V −− Taite Open Rec Response, # 23 Exhibit X −− Fox Supp Open Records Response)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 03/16/2011)

03/16/2011

4 MEMORANDUM in Support of 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by David Gutierrez and filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Appendix to Memo in Supp of Prelim Injunc)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 03/16/2011)

03/16/2011

5 NOTICE of Appearance by Keli J. Oliver on behalf of Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County (Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 03/16/2011)

03/16/2011

6 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Responsive Pleading by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 03/16/2011)

03/16/2011

7 NOTICE of Appearance by Elizabeth A. Sanders on behalf of Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County (Sanders, Elizabeth) (Entered: 03/16/2011)

Case: 3:11-cv-00218 As of: 02/01/2014 03:41 PM CST 4 of 15

03/17/2011 03/18/2011 03/21/2011 03/21/2011 03/29/2011 03/29/2011 03/29/2011
03/29/2011
03/29/2011 03/29/2011 03/29/2011 03/30/2011 03/30/2011 04/04/2011
04/04/2011 04/05/2011
04/08/2011

8 ORDER granting 6 Motion for Extension of Time to File Pleading to April 15, 2011. (Brown, Joe) (Entered: 03/17/2011)
9 NOTICE of Filing by Daniel Renteria−Villegas re 4 Memorandum in Support (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Appendix With Corrected Table of Contents)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 03/18/2011)
10 MOTION to Dismiss by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Defoe, Craig) (Entered: 03/21/2011)
11 MEMORANDUM in Support of 10 MOTION to Dismiss filed by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Feb. 8, 2011 Letter)(Defoe, Craig) (Entered: 03/21/2011)
12 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 03/29/2011)
13 DECLARATION of Constance S. Taite filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County re: 12 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint. (Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 03/29/2011)
14 MEMORANDUM in Support of 12 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Hudson unpublished opinion, # 2 Attachment Arias unpublished opinion, # 3 Attachment Lakewood unpublished opinion)(Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 03/29/2011)
15 RESPONSE in Opposition re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by David Gutierrez and filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Cox unpublished opinion, # 2 Attachment Brian A. unpublished opinion, # 3 Attachment Arias unpublished opinion)(Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 03/29/2011)
16 DECLARATION of Constance S. Taite filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 03/29/2011)
17 DECLARATION of Sheriff Daron Hall filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 03/29/2011)
18 DECLARATION of Matt Morley filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 03/29/2011)
19 MOTION to Stay re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by David Gutierrez and by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Wildasin, Mark) (Entered: 03/30/2011)
20 MEMORANDUM in Support of 19 MOTION to Stay re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by David Gutierrez and filed by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Wildasin, Mark) (Entered: 03/30/2011)
21 RESPONSE in Opposition re 10 MOTION to Dismiss Defendant ICE filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A −− Metro Motion to Dismiss in State Ct, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B −− Metro Memo of Law Supp Dismissal in State Court, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C −− Metro Reply Supp Addition of ICE)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 04/04/2011)
22 MEMORANDUM in Support of 21 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 04/04/2011)
23 RESPONSE in Opposition re 10 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment U.S. v. Arizona PI, # 2 Attachment Adler Unpublished, # 3 Attachment Charter Lakeside Unpublished, # 4 Attachment Mann Unpublished, # 5 Attachment Siemens Unpublished)(Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 04/05/2011)
24 RESPONSE to Motion re 19 MOTION to Stay re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by David Gutierrez and filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 04/08/2011)

Case: 3:11-cv-00218 As of: 02/01/2014 03:41 PM CST 5 of 15

04/08/2011 04/11/2011 04/11/2011 04/13/2011 04/19/2011 04/19/2011
04/19/2011 04/20/2011 04/21/2011
05/03/2011
05/03/2011 05/05/2011

25 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 12 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 04/08/2011)
26 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of ICE's Motion to Dismiss by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Wildasin, Mark) (Entered: 04/11/2011)
27 REPLY to Response to 10 MOTION to Dismiss, filed by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1 − Case Law (TIG Insurance Company v. Merryland Childcare))(Wildasin, Mark) Modified text on 4/13/2011 (tmw). (Entered: 04/11/2011)
28 ORDER granting 25 Motion for Extension of Time, to 4/19/2011, to File Response re 12 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint. Signed by Senior Judge John T. Nixon on 4/13/11. (tmw) (Entered: 04/13/2011)
29 ORDER OF RECUSAL. Senior Judge John T. Nixon recused. Case reassigned to District Judge Aleta A. Trauger for all further proceedings. Signed by Senior Judge John T. Nixon on 4/19/11. (tmw) (Entered: 04/19/2011)
30 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint With [Proposed] Third Amended Complaint by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Third Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit 1 to Third Amended Complaint −− Metro Charter Sections, # 3 Exhibit 2 to Third Amended Complaint −− Certified Copy of 2009 MOA, # 4 Exhibit 3 to Third Amended Complaint −− Certified Copy of Metro Council Resolution)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 04/19/2011)
31 RESPONSE in Opposition re 12 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 −− 287(g) Training Materials, # 2 Exhibit 2 −− POST Commission Standards, # 3 Exhibit 3 −− ICE Interview Data Collection Sheet)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 04/19/2011)
32 ORDER granting 26 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of ICE's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 4/20/11. (tmw) (Entered: 04/20/2011)
33 ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the Motion to Stay filed by defendant United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 19 , to which defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County has responded in support 24 , and to which the plaintiffs have filed no response, is GRANTED. The defendants need not respond to the plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary Injunction 3 until further order of the court. It is further ORDERED that the reference of this case for case management to the Magistrate Judge 2 is WITHDRAWN, and the initial case management conference scheduled for May 9, 2011 is CANCELLED. The court will defer ruling on the two pending Motions to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 10 , 12 ) until the defendants respond to the plaintiffs' Motion For Leave to Amend Complaint 30 , which responses should address whether the pending Motion to Dismiss will be moot, if the court allows the filing of a Third Amended Complaint. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 4/20/2011. (hb) (Entered: 04/21/2011)
34 RESPONSE in Opposition re 30 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint With [Proposed] Third Amended Complaint, filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Unpublished Sapp v. Broadwing, # 2 Attachment Unpublished Vianix v. Nuance, # 3 Attachment Unpublished Barker v. TSA)(Oliver, Keli) Modified text on 5/5/2011 (tmw). (Entered: 05/03/2011)
35 RESPONSE to Motion re 30 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint With [Proposed] Third Amended Complaint, filed by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Wildasin, Mark) Modified text on 5/5/2011 (tmw). (Entered: 05/03/2011)
36 MOTION for Leave to re 34 Response in Opposition to Motion, to File Reply by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment [Proposed] Reply to Metro Opp to Amend Complaint)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 05/05/2011)

Case: 3:11-cv-00218 As of: 02/01/2014 03:41 PM CST 6 of 15

05/12/2011

37 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply re 30 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Sur−Reply)(Sanders, Elizabeth) Modified text on 5/13/2011 (tmw). (Entered: 05/12/2011)

05/12/2011

38 ORDER granting 36 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 5/12/11. (tmw) (Entered: 05/13/2011)

05/13/2011

39 REPLY to Response to Motion re 30 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Ozment, Harry) Modified text on 5/13/2011 (tmw). (Entered: 05/13/2011)

05/16/2011

40 ORDER granting 37 Motion for Leave to File Sur−reply. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 5/16/11. (tmw) (Entered: 05/16/2011)

05/16/2011

41 SUR−REPLY in Opposition to Pltfs' 30 Motion for Leave to Amend, filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (tmw) (Entered: 05/17/2011)

06/01/2011

42 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to District Judge Kevin H. Sharp for all further proceedings. District Judge Aleta A. Trauger no longer assigned to case. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 6/1/11. (tmw) (Entered: 06/02/2011)

06/21/2011

43 MEMORANDUM. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 6/21/11. (tmw) (Entered: 06/21/2011)

06/21/2011

44 ORDER: For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint 30 . Plaintiffs' proposed Third Amended Complaint and the accompanying exhibits (Docket Nos. 30 −1 to 30 −4) are hereby filed as of record in this case. With that ruling, the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 10 and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County 12 are hereby DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction 3 is also DENIED AS MOOT. Said denials are without prejudice to the parties filing similar motions in relation to the Third Amended Complaint, if appropriate. It is SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 6/21/11. (tmw) (Entered: 06/21/2011)

06/21/2011

45 THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT against Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas, David Ernesto Gutierrez−Turcios, Rosa Landaverde. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Metro Charter Sections, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Certified Copy of 2009 MOA, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Certified Copy of Metro Council Resolution)(tmw) (Entered: 06/21/2011)

06/23/2011

46 ORDER: This case is hereby referred to the Magistrate Judge for case management purposes pursuant to Local Rule 16.01. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 6/23/11. (tmw) (Entered: 06/23/2011)

06/24/2011

47 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 45 Amended Complaint, Or Otherwise Respond, by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Wildasin, Mark) (Entered: 06/24/2011)

06/24/2011

48 ORDER granting 47 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer All Defendants. (Brown, Joe) (Entered: 06/24/2011)

06/28/2011

49 NOTICE of Appearance by Derrick C. Smith on behalf of Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County (Smith, Derrick) (Entered: 06/28/2011)

07/05/2011

50 MOTION to Amend Order for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal and for Stay Pending Appeal re 44 Order, by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Smith, Derrick) Modified text on 7/22/2011 (tmw). (Entered: 07/05/2011)

07/05/2011

51 MEMORANDUM in Support of 50 MOTION to Amend Order for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal and for Stay Pending Appeal re 44 Order, filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Attachments: # 1

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07/14/2011
07/19/2011 07/22/2011 07/22/2011 07/22/2011 08/03/2011 08/08/2011
08/08/2011 08/12/2011 08/12/2011 08/12/2011 08/12/2011 08/12/2011 08/15/2011 08/16/2011

Attachment Treatise Section, # 2 Attachment Revell Unpublished, # 3 Attachment Aarti Unpublished, # 4 Attachment Hudson Unpublished)(Smith, Derrick) Modified text on 7/22/2011 (tmw). (Entered: 07/05/2011)
52 RESPONSE in Opposition re 50 MOTION to Amend Order for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal and for Stay Pending Appeal re 44 Order, filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Unreported Case −− Brown v. Matausak, # 2 Attachment Unreported Case −− Feck v. Dia Sekou Mari−Juta, # 3 Attachment Unreported Case −− Shreeve v. Obama, # 4 Attachment Unreported Case −− Trollinger v. Tyson Foods)(Ozment, Harry) Modified text on 7/22/2011 (tmw). (Entered: 07/14/2011)
53 ORDER: Accordingly, Metro's "Motion to Amend Order for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal and for Stay Pending Appeal" 50 is hereby DENIED. It is SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 7/19/11. (tmw) (Entered: 07/19/2011)
54 MOTION to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Wildasin, Mark) (Entered: 07/22/2011)
55 MEMORANDUM in Support of 54 MOTION to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint filed by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Wildasin, Mark) (Entered: 07/22/2011)
56 ANSWER to 45 Amended Complaint, by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County.(Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 07/22/2011)
57 NOTICE of Hearing: Initial Case Management Conference set 8/23/2011 at 10:00 a.m. before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown, Courtroom 783. (af) (Entered: 08/03/2011)
58 RESPONSE in Opposition re 54 MOTION to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint by ICE filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− Deposition of Daren Hall, # 2 Exhibit B −− Gutierrez Domestic Assault Sentence, # 3 Exhibit C −− Renteria Agg Assault Dismissed, # 4 Exhibit D −− Sheriff Hall's 287(G) Request)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 08/08/2011)
59 MEMORANDUM in Support of 58 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 08/08/2011)
60 MOTION to Stay Discovery as to the Claims Against ICE by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Defoe, Craig) (Entered: 08/12/2011)
61 MEMORANDUM in Support of 60 MOTION to Stay Discovery as to the Claims Against ICE filed by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Defoe, Craig) (Entered: 08/12/2011)
62 MOTION for attorney(s) Dan Werner to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−1134284) by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 08/12/2011)
63 MOTION for attorney(s) Tom Fritzsche to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−1134290) by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 08/12/2011)
64 MOTION for attorney(s) Trina Realmuto to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−1134293) by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 08/12/2011)
65 ORDER: Presently pending in this matter are three motions for admission of attorneys 62 , 63 , and 64 . These motions are all GRANTED and the Clerk will add these attorneys as counsel for the Plaintiffs. It is so ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 8/15/11. (tmw) (Entered: 08/15/2011)
66 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of ICE's re 54 MOTION to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Defoe, Craig) (Entered: 08/16/2011)

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08/16/2011

67 REPLY to Response to Motion re 54 MOTION to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint filed by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Defoe, Craig) (Entered: 08/16/2011)

08/18/2011

68 Joint MOTION to Continue Initial Case Management Conference by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 08/18/2011)

08/19/2011

69 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts, # 2 Exhibit A −− Kidd Email Re I−213s, # 3 Exhibit B −− Taite Email Re English, # 4 Exhibit C −− Gutierrez Green Card, # 5 Exhibit D −− Landaverde Assessor Printout, # 6 Exhibit E −− Landaverde Assessor Title Chain &Deed Book, # 7 Exhibit F −− 2010 Prop Tax Statement, # 8 Exhibit G −− Elenilson I−213 (DCSO 287(g)), # 9 Exhibit H −− Gutierrez−Landaverde Master Calendar Hearing Notice, # 10 Exhibit I −− Nashville City Paper Story Re Gun, # 11 Exhibit J −− Gun in Jail Complaint)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 08/19/2011)

08/19/2011

70 MEMORANDUM in Support of 69 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Bailey v County of Shelby, # 2 Attachment Nye v Bayer Cropscience, # 3 Attachment State v Baker, # 4 Attachment State v Bohanan, # 5 Attachment State v Hakoda, # 6 Attachment US v Medlin, # 7 Attachment Villegas v Metro)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 08/19/2011)

08/22/2011

71 ORDER granting 68 Joint MOTION to Stay Discovery and Reschedule the Initial Case Management Conference. The Magistrate Judge will promptly reschedule an initial case management conference upon either a decision by Judge Sharp on the pending motion to dismiss 54 or a motion pursuant to Rule 56(d) permitting discovery in response to an anticipated Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. It is so ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 8/22/11. (tmw) (Entered: 08/22/2011)

08/25/2011

72 MOTION To Hold Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment In Abeyance re 69 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 08/25/2011)

08/30/2011

73 ORDER granting 66 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 8/30/11. (tmw) (Entered: 08/30/2011)

09/01/2011

74 RESPONSE in Opposition re 72 MOTION To Hold Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment In Abeyance re 69 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) MOTION To Hold Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment In Abeyance re 69 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 09/01/2011)

09/02/2011

75 MOTION for Discovery Open Case for Necessary Discovery for the Purpose of Presenting Facts to Respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Affidavit of Derrick C. Smith)(Smith, Derrick) (Entered: 09/02/2011)

09/02/2011

76 MEMORANDUM in Support of 75 MOTION for Discovery Open Case for Necessary Discovery for the Purpose of Presenting Facts to Respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Smith, Derrick) (Entered: 09/02/2011)

09/09/2011

77 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 75 MOTION for Discovery Open Case for Necessary Discovery for the Purpose of Presenting Facts to Respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 69 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Defoe, Craig) (Entered: 09/09/2011)

09/12/2011

78 MEMORANDUM. An appropriate Order will be entered. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 9/12/11. (tmw) (Entered: 09/12/2011)

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09/12/2011
09/13/2011
09/16/2011 09/16/2011 09/20/2011 10/03/2011 10/03/2011 10/03/2011 10/03/2011

79 ORDER: For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, the Court hereby enters the following rulings: (1) Defendant United States Immigration and Custom Enforcement's Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III 54 is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion to Dismiss Count II is DENIED AT THIS TIME, but the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' due process claim as to Immigration and Custom Enforcement, as set forth in Count III, is hereby GRANTED; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Finding Defendants Liable Under Counts I and II 69 is hereby DENIED AT THIS TIME; (3) Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County's Motion to Hold Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in Abeyance 72 is hereby DENIED AS MOOT; (4) Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County's Motion to Open Case for Necessary Discovery 75 is hereby DENIED AS MOOT; and (5) The Court will certify to the Tennessee Supreme Court the question of whether the Memorandum of Agreement between Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County violates the Nashville Metropolitan Charter. The parties are hereby ORDERED to meet in person and confer in a good faith effort to compose a short set of stipulated facts listing the specific immigration enforcement duties that Davidson County Sheriff's Office personnel perform under the Memorandum of Agreement. Upon certifying the question to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the Court will administratively stay this case until the Tennessee Supreme Court decides whether to answer the certified questions and/or renders an opinion on the certified question. It is SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 9/12/11. (tmw) (Entered: 09/12/2011)
80 ORDER: Judge Sharp has issued an order staying proceedings in this matter pending the results of a certification of a question to the Tennessee Supreme Court 79 . In view of this order, the United States' motion to stay discovery as to claims against ICE 60 is terminated as moot. Likewise, the consent motion for an extension of time to file responses to motions for discovery is terminated as moot. The parties are directed to immediately notify the Magistrate Judge of the action of the Tennessee Supreme Court so that a case management conference can be promptly scheduled, if needed. It is so ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 9/13/11. (tmw) (Entered: 09/13/2011)
81 MOTION For Extention of Time To Submit Stipulations To Be Presented To Tennessee Supreme Court by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
82 RESPONSE in Opposition re 81 MOTION For Extention of Time To Submit Stipulations To Be Presented To Tennessee Supreme Court filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
83 ORDER denying 81 Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Stipulations to be Presented to Tennessee Supreme Court. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 9/20/11. (tmw) (Entered: 09/20/2011)
84 JOINT STIPULATION re 79 Order, by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − MOA)(Defoe, Craig) Modified text on 10/25/2011 (tmw). (Entered: 10/03/2011)
85 MOTION To Modify And/Or Clarify September 12, 2011 Order re 79 Order, by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Oliver, Keli) Modified text on 10/25/2011 (tmw). (Entered: 10/03/2011)
86 STIPULATION re 79 Order Proposed Stipulations by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Oliver, Keli) Modified text on 10/25/2011 (tmw). (Entered: 10/03/2011)
87 STIPULATION of Duties Proposed by Plaintiffs by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− Plaintiffs Proposed List of Supplemental Duties, # 2 Exhibit B −− Plaintiffs List of Proposed Duties Used in 9−28 Meeting, # 3 Exhibit C −− Metro's List of Proposed Duties Used in 9−28 Meeting, # 4 Exhibit D −− Declaration of Trina Realmuto, # 5 Exhibit E −− Declaration of Thomas Fritzsche)(Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 10/03/2011)

Case: 3:11-cv-00218 As of: 02/01/2014 03:41 PM CST 10 of 15

10/11/2011
10/12/2011 10/19/2011 10/21/2011 10/24/2011 10/25/2011
10/26/2011 11/04/2011 11/09/2011
11/09/2011

88 ORDER: The Court will hold a HEARING on Metro's Motion to Modify and/or Clarify 85 on Friday, October 21, 2011, at 1:30 p.m. At the hearing, the parties shall be prepared to discuss not only that Motion, but also their proposed stipulations and their objections to their opponent's proposed stipulations. The Court intends to use the hearing to formalize and finalize a listing of the duties of the Sheriff's personnel as they pertain to the issue of the legality of the Agreement, and the Court expects the parties' full cooperation in that endeavor. As this Court pointed out in its last opinion, it is in the best interest of all of the parties to receive a definitive answer from the Tennessee Supreme Court on the central issue in this case. It is an opportunity that should not be squandered. It is SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 10/11/11. (tmw) (Entered: 10/11/2011)
89 RESPONSE filed by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement re 87 Stipulation, filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas, 86 Stipulation, filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Defoe, Craig) (Entered: 10/12/2011)
90 OBJECTIONS to Plaintiff's Proposed Stipulations. (Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 10/19/2011)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Kevin H. Sharp: Motion Hearing held on 10/21/2011 re 85 MOTION To Modify And/Or Clarify September 12, 2011 Order 79 filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Court Reporter Dorothy Stiles.) (ab) (Entered: 10/21/2011)
91 STIPULATION re 84 Stipulation, Revised by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 10/24/2011)
92 ORDER: For the reasons explained at the hearing held on October 21, 2011, the Metropolitan Government's "Motion to Modify and/or Clarify September 11, 2011 Order" 85 is hereby DENIED. However, because there was an indication at the hearing that the parties may be able to enter into some additional stipulations regarding the duties performed by Sheriff's Department personnel under the 287(g) Agreement, and they have in fact filed at least one (1) additional stipulation, the Court will allow the parties seven (7) days from the date of entry of this Order within which to file any further stipulations. If no additional stipulations are filed within that time, the Court will enter an Order certifying this case to the Tennessee Supreme Court utilizing the "Joint Stipulation" 84 and subsequent amendment 91 that has been previously filed. It is SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 10/25/11. (tmw) (Entered: 10/25/2011)
93 STIPULATION re 92 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,,, 91 Stipulation Revised and Amended by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Ozment, Harry) (Entered: 10/26/2011)
94 NOTICE of Appearance by R. Andrew Free on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Free, R.) (Entered: 11/04/2011)
95 ORDER CERTIFYING QUESTION. The Court hereby CERTIFIES to the Tennessee Supreme Court the aforementioned question of state law. In accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 23, Sec. 4, the Clerk of this Court shall serve copies of this Certification Order upon all parties or their counsel of record. Additionally, the Clerk shall file this Certification Order and the copy of the MOA attached hereto as Exhibit A with the Clerk of the Tennessee Supreme Court, under seal of this Court, along with proof of service. It is SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 11/9/11. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Memorandum of Agreement) (xc:Counsel of record via NEF; certified copy to Clerk of TN Supreme Court via cert mail) (tmw) (Entered: 11/09/2011)
96 ORDER: Contemporaneously herewith, the Court enters an Order certifying the controlling question in this case to the Tennessee Supreme Court. In accordance with this Court's September 12, 2011, Order 79 , this case is hereby ADMINISTRATIVELY STAYED until the Tennessee Supreme Court decides whether to answer the certified questions and/or renders an opinion on the certified question. It is SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 11/9/11. (tmw) (Entered: 11/09/2011)

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11/10/2011

97 CERTIFIED MAIL RECEIPT re 95 Order Certifying Question. (tmw) (Entered: 11/10/2011)

11/15/2011

98 Certified Mail Return Receipt Card received this date as to DE #95 mailed to Tennessee Supreme Court Clerk's Office, signed for by S. Jackson with no date of delivery indicated. (tmw) (Entered: 11/16/2011)

11/16/2011

99 Letter from Tennessee Supreme Court stating: A Certification Order pursuant to Rule 23 of the Supreme Court Rules was filed in the Supreme Court on November 15, 2011, and was assigned case no. M2011−02423−SC−R23−CQ. (tmw) (Entered: 11/17/2011)

11/18/2011

100 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew M. Curley on behalf of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Curley, Matthew) (Entered: 11/18/2011)

04/13/2012

101 COPY OF ORDER in the Supreme Court of Tennessee re 95 Order Certifying Question. (rd) (Entered: 04/13/2012)

10/05/2012

102 COPY OF JUDGMENT in the Supreme Court of Tennessee re 95 Order Certifying Question. (dt) (Entered: 10/09/2012)

10/10/2012

103 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney and Notice of Substitution by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Curley, Matthew) (Entered: 10/10/2012)

10/10/2012

104 NOTICE of Appearance by Mark H. Wildasin on behalf of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Wildasin, Mark) (Entered: 10/10/2012)

10/11/2012

105 ORDER: A case management conference is set for 11:30 a.m. on 10/25/12 in Courtroom 783 before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 10/11/12. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(rd) (Entered: 10/11/2012)

10/12/2012

106 ORDER: Deft's 103 Motion to Withdraw and Notice of Substitution is GRANTED. Atty Matthew M. Curley terminated. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 10/12/12. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(rd) (Entered: 10/12/2012)

10/19/2012

107 MANDATE from the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee regarding Rule 23 Certified Question of Law. (Attachments: # 1 Certified Copy of Judgment, # 2 Opinion, # 3 Cover Letter, # 4 Envelope)(rd) (Entered: 10/22/2012)

10/25/2012

108 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown: Case Management Conference held on 10/25/2012. (mk) (Entered: 10/29/2012)

10/29/2012

109 INITIAL CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER: Pltfs will seek partial voluntary dismissal and move to amend their complaint no later than 11/9/12; defts shall respond by 11/30/12; reply, if any, shall be filed by 12/10/12. All fact discovery shall be completed so as to have responses in hand by 6/24/13. Expert depositions shall be completed by 9/20/13. All dispositive motions shall be filed by 9/30/13. Any motion to amend or to add an indispensable party shall be filed by 4/5/13. A telephone conference is set for 2:00 p.m. on 1/28/13 before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown. A jury trial is set for 9:00 a.m. on 2/18/14 in Courtroom A826 before District Judge Kevin H. Sharp. The pretrial conference is set for 1:30 p.m. on 1/27/14. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 10/29/12. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(rd) (Entered: 10/29/2012)

11/09/2012

110 NOTICE by David Ernesto Gutierrez−Turcios, Rosa Landaverde, Daniel Renteria−Villegas : Partial Voluntary Dismissal (Free, R.) (Entered: 11/09/2012)

11/09/2012

111 MOTION for Leave to to file Fourth Amended Complaint by David Ernesto Gutierrez−Turcios, Rosa Landaverde, Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint)(Free, R.) (Entered: 11/09/2012)

11/13/2012

112 MOTION to Amend/Correct 110 Notice (Other) of Voluntary Dismissal by David Ernesto Gutierrez−Turcios, Rosa Landaverde, Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1 − Corrected Notice of Voluntary Dismissal)(Free, R.) (Entered: 11/13/2012)

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11/13/2012 11/13/2012
11/15/2012
11/30/2012 12/04/2012 12/05/2012 12/05/2012 12/10/2012 12/12/2012
12/12/2012 12/27/2012 12/27/2012 01/09/2013 01/09/2013

Bar status for atty Christina Iturralde of NY verified as active this date. (rd) (Entered: 11/13/2012)
NOTICE TO COUNSEL Christina Iturralde of Southern Poverty Law Center, Atlanta, GA: WITHIN 20 DAYS (on or before 12/3/12), counsel shall file a Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice, a Certificate of Good Standing signed by the Clerk of a United States District Court where admitted, and pay a fee of $75.00. (LR 83.01(d)). (rd) (Entered: 11/13/2012)
113 ORDER: Pltf's 112 Motion to Amend/Correct 110 Notice of Partial Voluntary Dismissal is GRANTED. Deft United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement is dismissed with prejudice. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 11/15/12. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(rd) (Entered: 11/15/2012)
114 RESPONSE in Opposition re 111 MOTION for Leave to to file Fourth Amended Complaint filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 11/30/2012)
115 MOTION for attorney(s) Christina Iturralde to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−1419951) by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificates of Good Standing, # 2 Proposed Order)(Fritzsche, Thomas) (Entered: 12/04/2012)
116 ORDER granting 115 Motion for Christina Iturralde to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Brown, Joe) (Entered: 12/05/2012)
Notice to filer Thomas Fritzsche re 115 : This document is a scanned document; scanning should only be used for documents not created on your computer. This document does not need to be re−filed unless otherwise directed by the Court. (rd) (Entered: 12/05/2012)
117 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Further Support of 111 Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachment: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Reply Memorandum)(Fritzsche, Thomas) Modified on 12/11/2012 (rd). (Entered: 12/10/2012)
118 ORDER: Pltf's 117 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 12/12/12. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(rd) (Entered: 12/12/2012)
119 REPLY Memorandum in Further Support of 111 Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint filed by David Ernesto Gutierrez−Turcios. (rd) (Entered: 12/12/2012)
120 ORDER: Pltf's 111 motion to file a fourth amended complaint is GRANTED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 12/27/12. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(rd) (Entered: 12/27/2012)
121 FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT against Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County, filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas.(rd) (Entered: 12/27/2012)
122 MOTION to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 01/09/2013)
123 MEMORANDUM in Support of 122 MOTION to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment McMillion v Metro, # 2 Attachment Heyne v. Metro, # 3 Attachment Arnold v. Metro, # 4 Attachment Howard v. City of Girard, # 5 Attachment Johnson v. Metro, # 6 Attachment Hale v. Randolph, # 7 Attachment Rhodes v. City of Chatanooga, # 8 Attachment Jackson v. Thomas, # 9 Attachment Okolo Memorandum Opinion, # 10 Attachment Dressman v. Metro)(Oliver, Keli) (Entered: 01/09/2013)

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01/28/2013

124 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Partial Opposition to 122 MOTION to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Iturralde, Christina) Modified on 1/29/2013 (rd). (Entered: 01/28/2013)

01/28/2013

127 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown: Telephone Conference held on 1/28/2013. (mk) (Entered: 01/29/2013)

01/29/2013

NOTICE TO FILER Christina Iturralde re 124 : Counsel failed to include the mandatory description of the attached exhibits. The exhibits shall be RESUBMITTED by filing a Notice of Filing and attaching the exhibits with the mandatory brief description. (EXAMPLE: Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Police Report dated 1/1/06, # 2 Exhibit 2 Unreported Case Smith v. Jones). (rd) (Entered: 01/29/2013)

01/29/2013

125 NOTICE of Filing by Daniel Renteria−Villegas re 124 Response in Opposition to Motion (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A Screening Immigrant Status Apr. 2012, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B Davidson County Five Year Report Apr. 2012)(Iturralde, Christina) (Entered: 01/29/2013)

01/29/2013

126 ORDER: A telephone conference was held on 1/28/13. The parties are advised that the Magistrate Judge remains available to discuss ADR with them at their request at any point. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 1/29/13. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(rd) Modified Text on 1/30/2013 (dt). (Entered: 01/29/2013)

02/06/2013

128 REPLY in Support of 122 MOTION to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint filed by Metropolitan Government of Nashville &Davidson County. (Attachment: # 1 Exhibit A − Arrest Report)(Oliver, Keli) Modified on 2/7/2013 (rd). (Entered: 02/06/2013)

04/01/2013

129 MOTION for Leave to File Document Under Seal by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Plaintiff's Counsel Leave to File Documents under Seal)(Free, R.) (Entered: 04/01/2013)

04/05/2013

130 ORDER: Pltf's 129 Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal is GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 4/5/13. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(rd) (Entered: 04/05/2013)

04/16/2013

131 Sealed Document − Motion to Withdraw Representation filed by Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Counsel)(Free, R.) Modified Text on 4/23/2013 (dt). (Entered: 04/16/2013)

04/23/2013

132 ORDER: Plaintiff's Counsel SEALED Motion to Withdraw from Representation of Plaintiff Daniel Renteria−Villegas 131 is Granted, and Plaintiff's counsel are permitted to withdraw as counsel of record in this action. The Plaintiff will be allowed thirty (30) days from the date of the entry of this order within which to retain substitute counsel or to notify the Court that he intends to proceed pro se. If substitute counsel is retained, said substitute counsel shall file a Notice of Entry of Appearance with the Clerk before the expiration of this 30−day time period. If substitute counsel is not retained, Plaintiff shall notify the Court in writing before the expiration of this 30−day period that he wishes to proceed pro se. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 4/23/13. (xc: Plaintiff Daniel Renteria−Villegas by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 04/23/2013)

04/24/2013

133 CERTIFIED MAIL RECEIPT re 132 Order on Sealed Motion. (la) (Entered: 04/24/2013)

05/29/2013

134 ORDER: No appearance has been entered on behalf of Plaintiff, he has not indicated that he intends to proceed pro se, and he has not otherwise responded to the Order. In fact, from all outward appearances, Mr. Renteria− Villegas appears to have abandoned this case. Since Mr. Renteria−Villegas is the only named Plaintiff in the Fourth Amended Complaint (Docket No. 121), and since he is no longer diligently prosecuting this action, this case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. It is SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on

Case: 3:11-cv-00218 As of: 02/01/2014 03:41 PM CST 14 of 15

05/29/2013 05/30/2013 06/26/2013
06/26/2013

5/29/2013. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb) (Entered: 05/30/2013)
135 ENTRY OF JUDGMENT re 134 Order Dismissing Case. (hb) (Entered: 05/30/2013)
136 CERTIFIED MAIL RECEIPT re 134 Order Dismissing Case, and 135 ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. (la) (Entered: 05/30/2013)
137 Certified Mail Returned as Unable to Forward. 134 Order Dismissing Case,, 135 ENTRY OF JUDGMENT − DOCKET CLERK. Mail sent to Daniel Renteria−Villegas. (la) (Entered: 06/27/2013)
138 Certified Mail Returned as Unable to Forward re: 132 Order on Sealed Motion. Mail sent to Daniel Renteria−Willegas. (la) (Entered: 06/27/2013)

Case: 3:11-cv-00218 As of: 02/01/2014 03:41 PM CST 15 of 15