IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DAN GLICKMAN, SECRETARY, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
Defendant.

) Civil Action No. ) 97-1978 (PLF)
)
1.

CECIL BREWINGTON, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. DANIEL R. GLICKMAN,
Defendant.

1 1
) Civil Action No. ) 98-1693 (PLF)
) )

CONSENT DECREE WHEREAS the parties desire to resolve amicably all the claims raised in these suits, including the plaintiffsf claims under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, et seq.,
and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S .C. 5 551, et
seq.; and WHEREAS the parties have agreed upon mutually satisfactory
terms for the complete resolution of all the claims that have, or could have, been asserted by the plaintiffs in this litigation; and

WHEREAS, in light of the remedial purposes of this Consent Decree, the parties intend that it be liberally construed to effectuate those purposes in a manner that is consistent with law; and
WHEREAS the parties have entered into this Consent Decree for the purpose of ensuring that in their dealings with USDA, all class members receive full and fair treatment that is the same as the treatment accorded to similarly situated white persons;
NOW THEREFORE, the plaintiffs and the defendant, Dan Glickman, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"), hereby consent to the entry of this decree with the following terms:
1. Definitions The following terms shall have the following meanings for purposes of this Consent Decree. (a) The term "adjudicator" shall mean (i) the person or persons who is/are assigned by the facilitator to undertake the initial review of, and where appropriate make recommended decision on Track A claims under ¶ 9, below; and (ii) JAMS-Endispute, Inc., which shall make the final decision in all Track A claims and resolve issues of tolling under ¶ 6, below. (b) The term "arbitrator" shall mean Michael K. Lewis of ADR Associates, and the other person or persons selected by Mr. Lewis who meet qualifications agreed upon by the parties and by

Mr. Lewis and whom Mr. Lewis assigns to decide Track B claims under ¶ 10, below.
(c) The term "claimant" shall mean any person who submits a claim package for relief under the terms of this Consent Decree.
(d) The term 'claim package" shall mean the materials sent to claimants who request them in connection with submitting a claim for relief under the provisions of this Consent Decree. The claim package will include (i) a claim sheet and election form and a Track A Adjudication claim affidavit, copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit A; and (ii) associated documentation and instructions.
(e) The term "class counsel" shall mean Alexander J. Pires, Jr. and Phillip L. Fraas, Lead Counsel for members of the class defined in ¶ 2(a), infra. In addition, the following counsel and law firms have been acting, and will continue to act, as Of Counsel in this case: J.L. Chestnut, of Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway, P.C., Selma, AL. ; T. Roe Frazer of Langston, Frazer, Sweet & Freese, P.A., Jackson, MS.; Hubbard Saunders, IV, of The Terney Firm, Jackson, MS.; Othello Cross, of Cross, Kearney & McKissic, Pine Bluff, AR., Gerard Lear of Speiser Krause, Arlington, VA.; and William J. Smith, Fresno, CA.
(f) The term "credit" shall mean the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and

defer its payment or to purchase property or services and defer

payment therefor.

(g) The term "defendant's counsel" shall mean the United

States Department of Justice.

(h) The term "discrimination complaint" shall mean a

communication from a class member directly to USDA, or to a member

of Congress, the White House, or a state, local or federal

official who forwarded the class member's communication to USDA,

asserting that USDA had discriminated against the class member on

the basis of race in connection with a federal farm credit

transaction or benefit application.

(i) The term "facilitator" shall mean the Poorman-Douglas

Corporation, which shall receive claims pursuant to this Consent

Decree and assign claims to adjudicators and arbitrators for final

resolution. The parties may, by agreement and without the Court Is

approval, assign to the facilitator such additional tasks related

to the implementation of this Consent Decree as they deem

appropriate.

( j1

The term "preponderance of the evidence" shall mean

such relevant evidence as is necessary to prove that something is

more likely true than not true.

(k) The term "priority consideration" means that an

application will be given first priority in processing, and with

respect to the availability of funds for the type of loan at issue

among all similar applications filed at the same time; provided,
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however, that all applications to be given priority consideration
will be of equal status.
(1) The term 'substantial evidence" shall mean such relevant
evidence as appears in the record before the adjudicator that a
reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion
after taking into account other evidence in the record that fairly
detracts from that conclusion. Substantial evidence is a lower
standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence.
(m) The term "USDA" shall include the United States
Department of Agriculture and all of its agencies,
instrumentalities, agents, officers, and employees, including, but
not limited to the state and county committees which administer
USDA credit programs, and their staffs.
(n) The term "USDA listening session" shall mean one of the
meetings of farmers and USDAfs representatives conducted by USDAfs
Civil Rights Action Team between January 6, 1997 and January 24,
1997. 2. Class Definition
(a) Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3) the Court hereby
certifies a class defined as follows: All African American farmers who (1) farmed, or attempted to farm, between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1396; (2) applied to the united States Department of Agriculture (USDA) during that time period for participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program and who believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race in USDA's response to that application; and (3) filed a discrimination complaint on

or before July 1, 1997, regarding USDA's treatment of such farm credit or benefit application. (b) Any putative class member who does not wish to have his claims adjudicated through the procedure established by this Consent Decree may, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c) ( 2 ) , request to be excluded from the class. To be effective, the request must be in writing and filed with the facilitator within 120 days of the date on which this Consent Decree is entered. 3. Duties of Facilitator (a) Poorman-Douglas Corporation shall serve as the facilitator and shall perform the following functions: (i) publish the Notice of Class Settlement in the manner prescribed in ¶ 4, below; (ii) mail claim packages to claimants who request them; (iii) process completed claim packages as they are received; (iv) determine, pursuant to the terms of this Consent Decree, which claimants satisfy the class definition as contained in ¶ 2 (a); (v) transmit to adjudicators claim packages submitted by claimants who contend that they are entitled to participate in the claims process due to equitable tolling of ECOA1s statute of limitations under the particular circumstances of their claim; (vi) transmit to the adjudicator the claims packages of class members with ECOA claims who elect to proceed under Track A;

(vii) transmit to the arbitrator the claims packages of class members with ECOA claims who elect to proceed under Track B;
(viii) transmit to the adjudicator the claims packages of class members who assert only non-credit benefit claims; and
(ix) maintain and operate a toll-free telephone number to provide information to interested persons about the procedure for filing claims under this Consent Decree.
(b) The facilitator's fees and expenses shall be paid by USDA.
4. Class Notice Procedure (a) Within 10 days after the entry of the Order granting preliminary approval of this Consent Decree the facilitator shall mail a copy of the Notice of Class Certification and Proposed Class Settlement (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B) to all then-known members of the class. (b) As soon as possible after entry of the Order granting preliminary approval of this Consent Decree the facilitator shall take the following steps: (i) arrange to have 44 commercials announcing the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing aired on the Black Entertainment Network, and 18 similar commercials on Cable News Network, during a two-week period; (ii) arrange to have one-quarter page advertisements announcing the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree and the
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time and place of the fairness hearing placed in 27 general circulation newspapers, and 115 African-American newspapers, in an 18-state region during a two-week period; and
(iii) arrange to have a full page advertisement announcing the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing placed in the editions of TV Guide that are distributed in an 18-state region, and a half page advertisement in the national edition of Jet Magazine.
(c) USDA shall use its best efforts to obtain the assistance of community based organizations, including those organizations that focus on African-American and/or agricultural issues, in communicating to class members and potential class members the fact that the Court has preliminarily approved this Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing.
5. Class Membership Screenins; Election by Claimant; Processinq.
(a) The facilitator shall send claim packages to claimants who request them.
(b) To be eligible to obtain relief pursuant to this Consent Decree, a claimant must complete the claim sheet and return it and any supporting documentation to the facilitator. The claimant must also provide to the facilitator evidence, in the form described below, that he filed a discrimination complaint between January 1, 1981 and July 1, 1997:

(i) a copy of the discrimination complaint the claimant filed with USDA, or a copy of a USDA document referencing the discrimination complaint; or
(ii) a declaration executed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 by a person who is not a member of the claimantfs family and which (1) states that the declarant has first-hand knowledge that the claimant filed a discrimination complaint with USDA; and (2) describes the manner in which the discrimination complaint was filed; or
(iii) a copy of correspondence from the claimant to a member of Congress, the White House, or a state, local, or federal official averring that the claimant has been discriminated against, except that, in the event that USDA does not possess a copy of the correspondence, the claimant also shall be required to submit a declaration executed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 by the claimant stating that he sent the correspondence to the person to whom it was addressed; or
(iv) a declaration executed pursuant to 28 U.S .C. § 1746 by a non-familial witness stating that the witness has first-hand ,knowledgethat, while attending a USDA listening session, or other meeting with a USDA official or officials, the claimant was explicitly told by a USDA official that the official would investigate that specific claimantfs oral complaint of discrimination.

(c) In order to be eligible for relief under ¶ ¶ 9 or 10, below, a claimant must submit his completed claim package to the facilitator postmarked within 180 days of the date of entry of this Consent Decree, except that a claimant whose claim is otherwise timely shall have not less than 30 days to submit a declaration pursuant to subparagraph (b)(iii), above, after being directed to do so without regard to the 180-day period.
(d) At the time a claimant who asserts an ECOA claim submits his completed claim package, he must elect whether to proceed
under Track A, see ¶ 9, below, or Track B see ¶ 10, below, except
that claimants whose claims arise exclusively under non-credit benefit programs shall be required to proceed under Track A. A class member's election under this subparagraph shall be irrevocable and exclusive.
(e) Each completed claim package must be accompanied by a certification executed by an attorney stating that the attorney has a good faith belief in the truth of the factual basis of the claim, and that the attorney has not and will not require the claimant to compensate the attorney for assisting him.
(f) Within 20 days of receiving a completed claim package the facilitator shall determine, pursuant to subparagraph (b), above, whether the claimant is a member of the class as defined by ¶ 2(a). If a claimant is determined to be a class member, the facilitator shall assign the class member a consent decree case number, refer the claim package to an adjudicator or an
10

arbitrator, as appropriate, and send a copy of the entire claim package to the class counsel and defendant's counsel along with a notice that includes the class member's name, address, telephone number, social security number, consent decree case number, and that identifies the track under which the class member is proceeding. If a claimant is found not to be a class member, the facilitator shall notify the claimant and the parties' counsel of that finding.
(g) A claimant who satisfies the definition of the class in ¶ 2 (a), above, but who fails to submit a completed claim package within 180 days of entry of this Consent Decree may petition the Court to permit him to nonetheless participate in the claims resolution procedures provided in ¶ ¶ 9 & 10, below. The Court shall grant such a petition only where the claimant demonstrates that his failure to submit a timely claim was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.
6. Tollins of ECOArs Statute of Limitations. (a) In addition to the class defined herein, a person who otherwise satisfies the criteria for membership in the class defined in ¶ 2 (a), above, but who did not file a discrimination complaint until after July 1, 1997, shall be entitled to relief under this Consent Decree by demonstrating, consistent with Irwin v. United States, 498 U.S. 89 (1990), that:

(i) he has actively pursued.his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the applicable statute of limitations period;
(ii) he was induced or tricked by USDArs misconduct into allowing the filing deadline for the applicable statute of limitations period to pass; or
(iii) he was prevented by other extraordinary circumstances beyond his control from filing a complaint in a timely manner, provided that excusable neglect shall not qualify as extraordinary circumstances.
(b) Within 10 days of a receiving a completed claim package from a person who did not file a discrimination claim until after July 1, 1997, the facilitator shall forward the claim to an adjudicator. The adjudicator shall then determine whether the claim is timely pursuant to subparagraphs (a)(i), (ii), or (iii), above. If the claim is found to be qualified under subparagraph (a), above, the adjudicator shall return the claim package to the facilitator, along with a written determination to that effect. The facilitator shall then process the claim pursuant to ¶ 5(f), above, and the claimant shall be eligible for the relief provided herein for class members. If the claim is found by the adjudicator to be untimely, the adjudicator shall return the claim package to the facilitator with a written determination to that effect. The facilitator shall promptly notify the claimant of the adjudicatorfs decision.
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7. Interim Administrative Relief Upon being advised by the facilitator that a claimant satisfies the class definition in ¶ 2(a), above, or that a claimant has met the criteria for equitable tolling under ¶ 6, above, USDA shall immediately cease all efforts to dispose of any foreclosed real property formerly owned by such person. USDA also will refrain from foreclosing on real property owned by the claimant or accelerating the claimant's loan account; however, USDA may take such action up to but not including foreclosure or acceleration that is necessary to protect its interests. USDA may resume its efforts to dispose of any such real property after a final decision in USDA's favor on the class memberfs claim pursuant to ¶ ¶ 9 or 10, below. 8. Response bv USDA to a Track A Referral Notice In any Track A case USDA may, within 60 days after receipt of the materials and notice the facilitator 1s required, pursuant to ¶ 5(f), above, to furnish to USDA with respect to persons who are determined to be class members, provide to the adjudicator assigned to the claim, and to class counsel, any information or materials that are relevant to the issues of liability and/or damages. 9. Track A - Decision bv Adjudicator (a) In cases in which a class member asserts an ECOA violation and has elected to proceed under Track A:

(i) the adjudicator shall, within 30 days of receiving the material required to be submitted by the class member under ¶ 5, along with any material submitted by defendant pursuant to ¶ 8, above, determine on the basis of those materials whether the class member has demonstrated by substantial evidence that he was the victim of race discrimination. To satisfy this requirement, the class member must show that:
(A) he owned or leased, or attempted to own or lease, farm land;
(B) he applied for a specific credit transaction at a USDA county office during the period identified in ¶ 2(a), above;
(C) the loan was denied, provided late, approved for a lesser amount than requested, encumbered by restrictive conditions, or USDA failed to provide appropriate loan service, and such treatment was less favorable than that accorded specifically identified, similarly situated white farmers; and
(D) USDArs treatment of the loan application led to economic damage to the class member.
(ii) The adjudicator's decision shall be in a format to be agreed upon by the class counsel and defendant's counsel, and shall include a statement of the reasons upon which the decision is based.
(iii) In any case in which the adjudicator decides in a class member's favor, the following relief shall be provided to the class member:
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(A) USDA shall discharge all of the class member's outstanding debt to USDA that was incurred under, or affected by, the program(s) that was/were the subject of the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the adjudicator. The discharge of such outstanding debt shall not adversely affect the claimant's eligibility for future participation in any USDA loan or loan servicing program;
(B) The class member shall receive a cash payment of $50,000 that shall be paid from the fund described in 31 U.S.C. § 1304 ( "the Judgment Fund") ;
(C) an additional payment equal to 25% of the sum of the payment made under subparagraph (B), above, and the principal amount of the debt forgiven under subparagraph (A), above, shall be made by electronic means directly from the Judgment Fund to the Internal Revenue Service as partial payment of the taxes owed by the class member on the amounts paid or forgiven pursuant to those provisions;
(D) The injunctive relief made available pursuant to ¶ 11, below; and
(E) The immediate termination of any foreclosure proceedings that USDA has initiated against any of the class member's real property in connection with the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the adjudicator; and the return of any USDA inventory property that formerly was owned by the class

member but which was foreclosed in connection with the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the adjudicator.
(iv) If the adjudicator determines that a class member's claim is not supported by substantial evidence, the class member shall receive no relief under this Consent Decree.
(v) The decision of the adjudicator shall be final, except as provided by ¶ 12 (b)(iii), below. The parties hereby agree to forever waive their right to seek review in any court or before any tribunal of the decision of the adjudicator with respect to any claim that is, or could have been decided by the adjudicator.
(b) In cases in which a class member asserts only non-credit claims under a USDA benefit program: '
(i) the adjudicator shall, within 30 days of receiving the material required to be submitted by the class member under ¶ 5, along with any material submitted by defendant pursuant to ¶ 8, above, determine on the basis of those materials whether the class member has demonstrated by substantial evidence that he was the victim of race discrimination. To satisfy this requirement, the class member must show that:
(A) he applied for a specific non-credit benefit program at a USDA county office during the period identified in ¶ 2(a), above; and
(B) his application was denied or approved for a lesser amount than requested, and that such treatment was different than the treatment received by specifically identified, similarly
16

situated white farmers who applied for the same non-credit benefit. *
(ii) The adjudicator's decision shall be in a format to be agreed upon by the parties, and shall include a statement of the reasons upon which the decision is based.
(iii) In any case in which the adjudicator decides in a class member's favor, the following relief shall be provided to the class members:
(A) USDA shall pay to the class member the amount of the benefit wrongly denied, but only to the extent that funds that may lawfully be used for that purpose are then available; and
(B) The injunctive relief made available pursuant to
It11(c)- (d), below.
(iv) If the adjudicator determines that a class member's claim is not supported by substantial evidence, the class member shall receive no relief under this Consent Decree.
(v) The decision of the adjudicator shall be final, except
as provided by YI 12(b)(iii), below. The parties hereby agree to
forever waive their right to seek review in any court or before any tribunal of the decision of the adjudicator with respect to any claim that is, or could have been decided by the adjudicator.
(c) The adjudicator's fees and expenses shall be paid by USDA.

10. Track B - Arbitration (a) Within 10 days of receiving the completed claim package of a class member who has elected to proceed under Track B, the arbitrator shall notify the class member and defendant of the date on which an evidentiary hearing on the class member's claim will be held. The hearing shall be scheduled for a date that is not less than 120 days, nor more than 150 days, from the date on which the hearing notice is sent. (b) At least 90 days prior to the hearing described in subparagraph (a), above, USDA and the class member shall file with the arbitrator and serve on each other a list of the witnesses they intend to call at the hearing along with a statement describing in detail the testimony that each witness is expected to provide, and a copy of all exhibits that each side intends to introduce at such hearing. The parties shall be required to produce for a deposition, and for cross examination at the arbitration hearing, any person they identify as a witness pursuant to subparagraph (a), above. (c) Each side shall be entitled to depose any person listed as a witness by his opponent pursuant to subparagraph (b), above. (d) Discovery shall be completed not later than 45 days before the date of the hearing described in subparagraph (a), above. (e) Not less than 21 days prior to commencement of the hearing described in subparagraph (a), above, each side shall (i)
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notify the other of the names of those witnesses whom they intend to cross-examine at the hearing; and (ii) file with the arbitrator memoranda addressing the legal and factual issues presented by the class member's claim.
(f) The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the . Federal Rules of Evidence. All direct testimony shall be introduced in writing and shall be filed with the arbitrator and served on the opposing side at least 30 days in advance of the hearing. The hearing shall be limited in duration to eight hours, with each side to have up to four hours within which to cross examine his opponent's witnesses, and to present his legal arguments.
(g) The arbitrator shall issue a written decision 30-60 days after the date of the hearing. If the arbitrator determines that the class member has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the victim of racial discrimination and that he suffered damages therefrom, the class member shall be provided the following relief:
(i) actual damages as provided by ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a) to be paid from the Judgment Fund;
(ii) USDA shall discharge all of the class member's outstanding debt to the Farm Service Agency that was incurred under, or affected by, the program(s) that were the subject of the claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the arbitrator. The discharge of such outstanding debt shall not adversely affect
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the claimant's eligibility for future participation in any USDA loan or loan servicing program;
(iii) The injunctive relief made available pursuant to ¶ 11, below; and
(iv) The immediate termination of any foreclosure proceedings that have been initiated against any of the class member's real property in connection with the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the arbitrator, and the return of any USDA inventory property that was formerly owned by the class member but which was foreclosed in connection with the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the arbitrator.
(h) If the arbitrator rules in the defendantfs favor, the class member shall receive no relief under this Consent Decree.
(i) The decision of the arbitrator shall be final, except as provided by ¶ 12 (b)(iii), below. The parties hereby agree to forever waive their right to seek review in any court or before any tribunal of the decision of the arbitrator with respect to any claim that is, or could have been decided, by the arbitrator.
(k). The arbitrator's fees and expenses shall be paid by
USDA. 11. Class-Wide Iniunctive Relief (a) USDA will provide each class member who prevails under
¶ ¶ 9(a) or 10 with priority consideration, on a one-time basis, for the purchase, lease, or other acquisition of inventory property to the extent permitted by law. A class member must
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exercise his right to the relief provided in the preceding sentence in writing and within 5 years of the date this order.
(b) USDA will provide each class member who prevails under ¶ ¶ 9(a) or 10 with priority consideration for one direct farm ownership loan and one farm operating loan at any time up to five years after the date of this Order. A class member must notify USDA in writing that he is exercising his right under this agreement to priority consideration in order to receive such consideration.
(c) Any application for a farm ownership or operating loan, or for inventory property submitted within five years of the date of this Consent Decree by any class member who prevails under ¶ ¶ 9 or 10, will be viewed in a light most favorable to the class member, and the amount and terms of any loan will be the most favorable permitted by law and USDA regulations. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed to affect in any way the eligibility criteria for participation in any USDA loan program, except that outstanding debt discharged pursuant to
¶ ¶ 9 (a)(iii)(A) or 10 (g)(ii), above, shall not adversely affect
the claimant's eligibility for future participation in any USDA loan or loan servicing program.
(d) In conjunction with any application for a farm ownership or operating loan or for inventory property submitted by a class member who prevails under ¶ ¶ 9 or 10, above, USDA shall, at the request of such class member provide the class member with
21

reasonable technical assistance and service, including the assistance of qualified USDA employees who are acceptable to the class member, in connection with the class member's preparation and submission of any such application.
12. Monitor (a) From a list of three persons submitted to it jointly by the parties, or, if after good faith negotiations they cannot agree, two persons submitted by plaintiffs and two persons submitted by defendant, the Court shall appoint an independent Monitor who shall report directly to the Secretary of Agriculture. The Monitor shall remain in existence for a period of 5 years and shall not be removed except upon good cause. The Monitor's fees and expenses shall be paid by USDA. (b) The Monitor shall: (i) Make periodic written reports (not less than every six months) to the Court, the Secretary, class counsel, and defendant's counsel on the good faith implementation of this Consent Decree; (ii) Attempt to resolve any problems that any class member may have with respect to any aspect of this Consent Decree; (iii) Direct the facilitator, adjudicator, or arbitrator to reexamine a claim where the Monitor determines that a clear and manifest error has occurred in the screening, adjudication, or arbitration of the claim and has resulted or is likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice; and
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(iv) Be available to class members and the public through a toll-free telephone number in order to facilitate the lodging of any consent decree complaints and to expedite their resolution.
(c) If the Monitor is unable within 30 days to resolve a
problem brought to his attention pursuant to subparagraph (ii),
above, he may file a report with the parties' counsel who may, in turn, seek enforcement of this Consent Decree pursuant to ¶ 13, below.
13. Enforcement Procedures Before seeking any order by the Court concerning the alleged violation of any provision of this Consent Decree, the parties must comply with the following procedures: (a) The person seeking enforcement of a provision of this Consent Decree shall serve on his opponent a written notice that describes with particularity the term(s) of the Consent Decree that are alleged to have been violated, the specific errors or omissions upon which the alleged violation is based, and the corrective action sought. The person alleging the violation shall not inform the Court of his allegation at that time. (b) The parties shall make their best efforts to resolve the matter in dispute without the Courtrs involvement. If requested to do so, the movant shall provide to his opponent any information and materials available to the movant that support the violation alleged in the notice.

(c) The person who served the notice of violation pursuant to subparagraph (a), above, may not move for enforcement of this Consent Decree until at least 45 days after the date on which he served the notice.
14. Attorney's Fees (a) Class counsel (for themselves and all Of-Counsel) shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs under ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d), and to reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses under the APA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d) (as appropriate), that are generated in connection with the filing of this action and the implementation of this Consent Decree. Defendant reserves the right to challenge any and all aspects of class counsel's application for fees, costs, and/or expenses. (b) Recognizing the fees, costs, and/or expenses already incurred, and given the anticipated fees, costs, and/or expenses to be incurred by class counsel in the implementation of this Consent Decree, defendant will make a one-time payment to class counsel of $1,000,000 as a credit toward class counsel's application for attorney's fees, costs, and/or expenses. The payment shall be made to class counsel and of counsel (payable to Alexander J. Pires, Jr. and Phillip L. Fraas) within 20 days of the date on which this Consent Decree is entered by the Court. This one-time payment shall be credited against any ultimate award or negotiated settlement of fees, costs, and expenses, and to the extent any such ultimate award or settlement is less than this
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one-time payment, class counsel shall refund to defendant the entire amount by which this one-time payment exceeds the award or settlement amount.
(c) The provision of attorney's fees, costs, and/or expenses in this Consent Decree is by agreement of the parties and shall not be cited a precedent in any other case.
15. Partiesf Respective Responsibilities No party to this Consent Decree is responsible for the performance, actions, or obligations of any other party to this Consent Decree. 16. Fairness Hearinq (a) Upon the parties' execution of this Consent Decree, the parties shall transmit the Decree to the Court for preliminary approval; request that the Court schedule a fairness hearing on the Consent Decree; and request that the Court, upon issuance of an order granting preliminary approval of this Decree, issue an order setting aside the dates currently scheduled for trial and staying this litigation. (b) Within 5 days of the execution of this Consent Decree by class counsel and defendant's counsel, the Notice of Class settlement provided for in ¶ 4, above, containing, inter alia, a notice of the fairness hearing on this Consent Decree shall be sent to all known, potential members of the class. The fairness hearing will be held at 10:OO AM on March 2, 1999, in Courtroom 20 of the E. Barrett Pettyman United States Courthouse at 3rd St. and
25

Constitution Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. Any objections to the entry of this Consent Decree shall be filed not later than February 15, 1999.
17. Final Judqment If, after the fairness hearing, the Court approves this Consent Decree as fair, reasonable, and adequate, a Final Judgment, the entry of which shall be a condition precedent to any obligation of any party under this Consent Decree, shall be entered dismissing with prejudice, pursuant to the terms of this Consent Decree and Rule 41 (a)(1)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all claims in the litigation. 18. Releases As provided by the ordinary standards governing the preclusive effects of consent decrees entered in class actions, all members of the class who do not opt out of this Consent Decree pursuant to ¶ 2(b), above, and their heirs, administrators,
successors, or assigns (together, the "Releasers"), hereby release
and forever discharge the defendant and his administrators or successors, and any department, agency, or establishment of the defendant, and any officers, employees, agents, or successors of any such department, agency, or establishment (together, the "Releasees") from -- and are hereby themselves forever barred and
precluded from prosecuting -- any and all claims and/or causes of
action which have been asserted in the Seventh Amended Complaint, or could have been asserted in that complaint at the time it was
2 6

filed, on behalf of this class, by reason of, or with respect to, or in connection with, or which arise out of, any matters alleged in the complaint which the Releasors, or any of them, have against the Releasees, or any of them. It also is expressly understood that any class-wide claims of race-based discrimination in USDArs credit programs by members of the class defined in ¶ 2(a), above are barred unless the operative facts giving rise thereto did not occur prior to the entry of this Decree.
19. Defendant's Dutv Consistent With Law and Resulations Nothing contained in this Consent Decree or in the Final Judgment shall impose on the defendant any duty, obligation or requirement, the performance of which would be inconsistent with federal statutes or federal regulations in effect at the time of such performance. 20. No Admission of Liabilitv Neither this Consent Decree nor any order approving this Consent Decree is or shall be construed as an admission by the defendant of the truth of any allegation or the validity of any claim asserted in the complaint, or of the defendant's liability therefor, nor as a concession or an admission of any fault or omission of any act or failure to act, or of any statement, written document, or report heretofore issued, filed or made by the defendant, nor shall this Consent Decree nor any confidential papers related hereto and created for settlement purposes only, nor any of the terms of either, be offered or received as evidence
27

of discrimination in any civil, criminal, or administrative action or proceeding, nor shall they be construed by anyone for any purpose whatsoever as an admission or presumption of any wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, nor as an admission by any party to this Consent Decree that the consideration to be given hereunder represents the relief which could be recovered after trial. However, nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the use of this Consent Decree in order to effectuate the consummation, enforcement, or modification of its terms.
21. No Effect if Default Subject to the terms of ¶ 17, above, and following entry by the Court of Final Judgment, no default by any person or party to this Consent Decree in the performance of any of the covenants or obligations under this Consent Decree, or any judgment or order entered in connection therewith, shall affect the dismissal of the complaint, the preclusion of prosecution of actions, the discharge and release of the defendant, or the judgment entered approving these provisions. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed to affect the Court's jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree on a motion for contempt filed in accordance with ¶ 13. 22. Effect of Consent Decree if Not Approved This Consent Decree shall not become binding if it fails to be approved by the Court or if for any reason it is rendered

ineffective in any judicial proceeding before initially taking effect. Should it fail to become binding, this Consent Decree shall become null and void and shall have no further force and effect, except for the obligations of the parties under this paragraph. Further, in that event: this Consent Decree; all negotiations in connection herewith; all internal, private discussions among the Department of Justice and/or USDA conducted in furtherance of the settlement process to determine the advisability of approving this Consent Decree; and all statements made by the parties at, or submitted to the Court during, the fairness hearing shall be without prejudice to any person or party to this Consent Decree, and shall not be deemed or construed to be an admission by any party to this Consent Decree of any fact, matter, or proposition.
23. Entire Terms of Asreement The terms of this Consent Decree constitute the entire agreement of the parties, and no statement, remark, agreement, or understanding, oral or written, which is not contained herein, shall be recognized or enforced. 24. Authoritv of Class Counsel Class counsel who are signatories hereto hereby represent, warrant, and guarantee that such counsel are duly authorized to execute this Consent Decree on behalf of the plaintiffs, the members of the plaintiff class, and all Of-Counsel for the plaintiffs.
2 9

25. Dutv to Defend Decree

The parties to this Consent Decree shall employ their best

efforts to defend this Consent Decree against any challenges to

this Consent Decree, in any forum.

Consented to:

ALEXANDER J. PIRES, Jr.
Conlon, Frantz, Phelan, Pires & Leavy
1818 N. St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-7050

DAVID W. OGDEN Acting Assistant Attorney General
PHILIP D. BARTZ Deputy Assistant Attorney
General
DENNIS G. LINDER Civil Division

PHILLIP L. FRAAS Tuttle, Taylor & Heron 1025 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20007 (202) 342-1300
Of Counsel: J.L. Chestnut Othello Cross T. Roe Frazer Gerald R. Lear Hubbard I Sanders, IV Willie Smith

MICHAEL SITCOV CAROLINE LEWIS WOLVERTON DANIEL E. BENSING CARLOTTA WELLS Department of Justice Civil Division 901 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 (202)514-1944

SO ORDERED.

DATE :

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

 
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FURTHER ORDERED that any and all isfied; (3) amendment of complaint would be

motions in limine shall be filed not later allowed to satisfy typicality requirement ar-

than November 6, 1998; oppositions are due guably not currently being satisfied by all

not later than November 13, 1998; and re- existing named plaintiffs; (4) representation

plies, if any, shall be filed by November 18, requirement was satisfied; and (5) action

1998. Service of legal memoranda shall be could be maintained on grounds that USDA

made the same day as filing, either by hand failed to act on grounds applicable to all

or by facsimile. Where exhibits cannot be members of class.

served on the same day, they shall be served by overnight express mail (morning deliv-

Classes and subclasses certified.

ery); and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Pretrial 1. Judgment O715(3)

Statements conforming to the requirements

Rejection of class action certification re-

of Local Rule 209(b) shall be filed not later quest made by proposed class of farmers

than November 23, 1998. Pretrial Statements should be prepared on the assumption that all motions in limine will be denied, but

allegedly incurring racial discrimination in granting of loans and subsidies, in suit brought against Department of Agriculture

the parties should note in their respective (USDA), did not preclude certification of statements how the granting of any of the class in another suit alleging discrimination

motions in limine may affect a party’s trial presentation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

in processing of discrimination complaints; issues in two cases were significantly different. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(a, b), 28 U.S.C.A.

,
Timothy PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Dan GLICKMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture,
Defendant. Civ.A. No. 97–1978 PLF. United States District Court,
District of Columbia. Oct. 9, 1998.
African-American farmers, suing Department of Agriculture (USDA) for discrimination in handling of discrimination complaints, sought certification of class and subclasses. The District Court, Paul L. Friedman, J., held that: (1) class and subclasses were adequately described in general terms; (2) numerosity requirement was satisfied; (2) commonality requirement was sat-

2. Federal Civil Procedure O176 In order to be certified as class, for class
action purposes under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, proposed class must be sufficiently definite that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member. Fed.Rules Civ. Proc.Rule 23(a, b), 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure O186.15 Farmers suing Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA) for racial discrimination adequately identified class for class certification purposes, by referring to African-American farmers who farmed between indicated dates, applied during that period for participation in USDA programs and as direct result of USDA response to application believed they were discriminated against by race and filed written discrimination complaint with USDA. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.
4. Federal Civil Procedure O186.15 Farmers suing Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA) for racial discrimination adequately identified subclasses for certification purposes, by referring to subclasses of African-American farmers who (1) have file with USDA containing discrimination claim and

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182 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS

did not receive written response, (2) have file with USDA containing discrimination claim and received response believed not to be reached in accordance with law, and (3) did not have file because letters were discarded, destroyed or lost by USDA. Fed.Rules Civ. Proc.Rule 23(c)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.
5. Federal Civil Procedure O186.15 Proposed classes and subclasses, for ra-
cial discrimination suit filed by AfricanAmerican farmers against Department of Agriculture, were comprised of sufficient numbers of persons to satisfy numerosity requirement for certification under Rules of Federal Procedure; complainants had names of 401 persons falling within class and subclass definitions, located in several states, and there was likelihood that many more farmers qualified for class membership. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
6. Federal Civil Procedure O186.15 Proposed classes and subclasses, for ra-
cial discrimination suit filed by AfricanAmerican farmers against United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), satisfied class certification requirement that members share common questions of law and fact with respect to liability; complainants shared in common questions whether USDA had duty to process claims, if so whether there was systematic failure to timely process claims, whether complainants had private right of action against USDA, and whether there was statute of limitations defense. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.
7. Federal Civil Procedure O392 Proponents of class action certification
of suit brought against Department of Agriculture (USDA), claiming racial discrimination in handling of discrimination claims, would be allowed to amend complaint to provide for named plaintiffs whose claims were typical of class, or provide additional information regarding typicality of currently named plaintiffs, in order to cure problems involving atypicality of one presently named plaintiff and lack of information regarding others; as there were at least 401 identified members of class, finding of persons satisfying typicality requirement would be easy.

Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(a)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.
8. Federal Civil Procedure O186.15 Class counsel and representatives of
class would adequately represent proposed class and subclasses in suit against Department of Agriculture (USDA); with 401 named plaintiffs, and input from various law firms representing different putative class members, wide variety of interests would be represented if class were certified. Fed. Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(a)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.
9. Federal Civil Procedure O186.15 Class action involving claims by African-
American farmers that Department of Agriculture (USDA) discriminated against them in processing of discrimination claims was maintainable on grounds that USDA failed to act on grounds generally applicable to all members of class, even though members would be seeking individual monetary relief in addition to injunctive relief. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(b)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.
Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs.
Susan Hall Lennon/Terry Henry, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.
OPINION
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.
This case is before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Upon consideration of plaintiffs’ motion, the opposition filed by the government, plaintiffs’ reply and the arguments presented by counsel at oral argument, the Court concludes that the class action vehicle is the most appropriate mechanism for resolving the issue of liability in this case. The Court therefore will certify a class for the purpose of determining liability.
I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs, four hundred and one African American farmers from Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas,

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343

Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, Okla- mechanisms available if the loan was denied

homa, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and differed slightly.

Virginia, allege (1) that the United States Department of Agriculture (‘‘USDA’’) willfully discriminated against them when they applied for various farm programs, and (2) that when they filed complaints of discrimination with the USDA, the USDA failed properly to investigate those complaints. Fifth Amended Complaint at 53.1

Under the FSA and previously under the ASCS and the FmHA, a farmer who believes that his application was denied on the basis of his race or for other discriminatory reasons has the option of filing a civil rights complaint either with the Secretary of the USDA or with the Office of Civil Rights Enforcement and Adjudication (‘‘OCREA’’).

Plaintiffs challenge the USDA’s administration of several different farm loan and subsidy programs and/or agencies. Until 1994, the USDA operated two separate programs that provided, inter alia, price support loans, disaster payments, ‘‘farm ownership’’ loans and operating loans: the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (‘‘ASCS’’) and the Farmers Home Administration (‘‘FmHA’’). In 1994, the functions of the ASCS and the FmHA were consolidated into one newly-created entity, the Farm Service Agency (‘‘FSA’’).

In the case of a farmer whose FmHA application was denied, the farmer also had the option of filing a complaint with the FmHA Equal Opportunity Office. A program discrimination complaint filed with USDA is supposed to be forwarded to OCREA, and after reviewing the complaint, OCREA is supposed to return it to the FSA for conciliation and/or preliminary investigation. The FSA then is required to forward the complaint to the Civil Rights and Small Business Utilization Staff (‘‘CR & SBUS’’), the division of FSA responsible for investigating complaints alleging discrimination within FSA’s

A farmer seeking a loan or subsidy from programs. CR & SBUS is required to for-

the FSA must submit an application to a ward the complaint to the State Civil Rights

county committee, comprised of producers Coordinator who is supposed to attempt to

from that county who are elected by other conciliate the complaint and/or conduct a pre-

producers in that county. If the county com- liminary investigation and then report back

mittee approves the application, the farmer to CR & SBUS. Ultimately, any conciliation

receives the subsidy or loan. If the application is denied, the farmer may appeal to a state committee and then to a federal review

agreement or investigatory findings are to be reported to OCREA for a final determination.

board. Under the ASCS and the FmHa, the Plaintiffs allege a complete failure by the

procedure for applying for a loan or subsidy USDA to process discrimination complaints.

essentially was the same as the current FSA Plaintiffs allege that in 1983, OCREA essen-

procedure, with several slight variations. If tially was dismantled and that complaints

a farmer applied for an ASCS benefit, a that were filed were never processed, investi-

County Executive Director was supposed to gated or forwarded to the appropriate agen-

work with that farmer to help him complete cies for conciliation. As a result, farmers

his application, and the County Executive who filed complaints of discrimination never

Director also was supposed to do an initial received a response, or if they did receive a

review of the application. If a farmer ap- response, it was a cursory denial of relief.

plied for a loan from FmHA, the review In some cases, plaintiffs allege that OCREA

1. Between the time the original complaint was filed and the time of oral argument on the motion for class certification, plaintiffs filed five separate motions for leave to file amended complaints. On May 22, 1998, the government indicated that it did not oppose the five motions for leave to amend, and on June 3, 1998, the Court granted plaintiffs’ five motions for leave to file amended complaints. While the filing of the amended complaints had not been authorized at

the time of argument on the motion for class certification, the issue since has been resolved and the Court therefore will treat the Fifth Amended Complaint as the relevant complaint for purposes of this Opinion.
On October 2, 1998, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a Sixth Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs have stated that the government does not oppose the motion.

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182 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS

simply threw discrimination complaints in the trash without ever responding to or investigating them.
In response to the numerous complaints of minority farmers, Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman appointed a Civil Rights Action Team (‘‘CRAT’’) to ‘‘take a hard look at the issues and make strong recommendations for change.’’ See Pls’ Motion for Class Certification, Exh. B (Report of the Civil Rights Action Team) at 3. In February of 1997, the CRAT issued a report which concluded that ‘‘[m]inority farmers have lost significant amounts of land and potential farm income as a result of discrimination by FSA programs and the programs of its predecessor agencies, ASCS and FmHATTTT The process for resolving complaints has failed. Minority and limited-resource customers believe USDA has not acted in good faith on the complaints. Appeals are too often delayed and for too long. Favorable decisions are too often reversed.’’ Id. at 30–31.
Also in February of 1997, the Office of the Inspector General of the USDA issued a report to the Secretary of the USDA indicating that the USDA had a backlog of complaints of discrimination that had not been processed, investigated or resolved. See Pls’ Motion for Class Certification, Exh. A (Evaluation Report for the Secretary on Civil Rights Issues). The Report found that immediate action was needed to clear the backlog of complaints, that the ‘‘program discrimination complaint process at [the Farm Services Agency] lacks integrity, direction, and accountability,’’ id. at 6, and that ‘‘[s]taffing problems, obsolete procedures, and little direction from management have resulted in a climate of disorder within the civil rights staff at FSA.’’ Id. at 1.
The CRAT Report and the Report of the Inspector General clearly contributed to plaintiffs’ decision to file this class action. Even before the reports were issued, however, minority farmers had alleged that the USDA discriminated on the basis of race in the administration of its farm programs. In

late 1995, five farmers filed a lawsuit in this Court captioned Williams v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 95–1149 (now captioned Herrera v. Glickman ). Williams, originally was filed as a class action alleging that the USDA discriminated against minority farmers in the operation of its farm programs. The proposed Williams class was defined as
All African American or Hispanic American persons who, between 1981 and the present, have suffered from racial or national origin discrimination in the application for or the servicing of loans or credit from the FmHA (now Farm Services Agency) of the USDA, which has caused them to sustain economic loss and/or mental anguish/emotion [sic] distress damages.
See Williams v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 95–1149, 1997 WL 74547, Memorandum Opinion of February 14, 1997 at 7. On February 14, 1997, Judge Thomas A. Flannery denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Judge Flannery essentially found that plaintiffs’ proposed class definition was too amorphous and overly broad and that the claims of the named plaintiffs were not typical or representative of the claims of potential class members. Judge Flannery also found that even if plaintiffs could meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing class actions, plaintiffs had failed to establish any of the Rule 23(b) requirements. On April 15, 1997, Judge Flannery denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.2
II. DISCUSSION
[1] As a preliminary matter, the Court will address the government’s contention that the issue of class certification presented here has already been decided by Judge Flannery in Williams. While there are some facial similarities between plaintiffs’ complaint in this case and the complaint in Williams, there also are significant differences. Most fundamentally, the gravaman of plaintiffs’ complaint in this case is not just that they were subjected to discrimination when they applied for loans and subsidies but that when

2. Most of the original Williams plaintiffs settled their claims against the USDA. The two remaining plaintiffs, both of whom are Hispanic, had pending administrative complaints with the

USDA, and the court therefore stayed the lawsuit pending an administrative determination by the USDA on the merits of the administrative complaints.

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345

they filed complaints with the USDA regard- the Federal Rules, but they rely primarily on

ing the alleged discrimination, the USDA Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3).

failed properly to process and investigate those complaints. By contrast, the basis of plaintiffs’ complaint in Williams was ‘‘the existence of a ‘common thread of discrimination in the granting and servicing of loans by FmHA, which is a basic issue that affects all or a significant number of the putative class members.’ TTT as well as the fact that they have all suffered the same ‘injury’—that is, denial of credit and loan servicing.’’ See Williams v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 95– 1149, Memorandum Opinion of February 14, 1997 at 12. In Williams, Judge Flannery found that the class was insufficiently defined and that there was no commonality of claims because plaintiffs were ‘‘asking the Court to certify a class which would encompass every possible instance of discrimination in connection with the FmHA’s making and servicing of loans.’’ Id. at 15. By contrast, the legal and factual issues presented by plaintiffs in this case relate, in the first instance, to the USDA’s processing of written complaints of discrimination (or lack thereof), and the class

Plaintiffs have proposed a number of class definitions with varying degrees of specificity. The original complaint and the four amended complaints that followed define the class rather generally. The parties appear to have briefed the class certification issue on the basis of the Fourth Amended Complaint, but plaintiffs’ motion for class certification uses a slightly different definition from the one contained in the Fourth Amended Complaint. Subsequently, plaintiffs sought and were granted leave to file a Fifth Amended Complaint, which contains a third definition of the class. Finally, after oral argument on the issue of class certification, plaintiffs filed a revised proposed order which has yet another definition of the class. The final proposed class definition is the most specific and responds to many of the concerns raised by the government. The Court therefore will use that definition as the basis for its analysis. The revised proposed order defines the class as follows:

certification questions therefore differ signifi- All African–American farmers who (1)

cantly from those addressed in Williams. farmed between January 1, 1983, and Feb-

In order to establish that they are entitled to certification of a class, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that a class exists, that all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been met and that the class falls within at least one of the three categories of Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1468

ruary 21, 1997; and (2) applied, during that time period, for participation in a federal farm program with USDA, and as a direct result of a determination by USDA in response to said application, believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race, and subsequently filed a written discrimination complaint with USDA.

(D.C.Cir.1994); Franklin v. Barry, 909 Plaintiffs also have proposed three sub-

F.Supp. 21, 30 (D.D.C.1995). The four pre- classes pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) of the Fed-

requisites of Rule 23(a) require plaintiffs to eral Rules of Civil Procedure: (1) ‘‘African–

demonstrate that (1) the class is so numerous American farmers, who have a file with De-

that joinder of all members is impracticable; fendant, but did not receive a written deter-

(2) there are questions of law or fact common mination from Defendant in response to their

to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the discrimination complaint;’’ (2) ‘‘African–

representative parties are typical of the American farmers, who have a file with De-

claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the fendant, who received a written determina-

representative parties will fairly and ade- tion from Defendant in response to their

quately protect the interests of the class. discrimination complaint but said Defendant

Rule 23(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. Plaintiffs claim that was not in accordance with the law;’’ and (3)

they meet all of the prerequisites of Rule ‘‘African–American farmers, who do not have

23(a) and that a class can be certified pursu- a file with Defendant because their discrimi-

ant to all three subdivisions of Rule 23(b) of nation complaints were destroyed, lost or

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182 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS

thrown away by Defendant.’’ 3 Each subclass must independently meet the standards of Rule 23 class certification. Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C.Cir.1997).
A. Existence of Class
[2] Although Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not specifically require plaintiffs to establish that a class exists, this is a common-sense requirement and courts routinely require it. See, e.g., Franklin v. Barry, 909 F.Supp. at 30; Lewis v. Nat’l Football League, 146 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.D.C.1992). The requirement that a class be clearly defined is designed primarily to help the trial court manage the class. See Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d at 1471. It is not designed to be a particularly stringent test, but plaintiffs must at least be able to establish that ‘‘the general outlines of the membership of the class are determinable at the outset of the litigation.’’ 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1760 at 118. In other words, the class must be sufficiently definite ‘‘that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member.’’ Id. at 121. The government contends that plaintiffs have failed to meet this basic requirement because, as in Williams, the definition of the class are so amorphous that it is impossible to determine who is or is not a member of the class.
[3] The Court concludes that the parameters of the proposed class as defined by plaintiffs in this case are sufficiently clear to make the proposed class administratively manageable; by looking at the class definition, counsel and putative class members can easily ascertain whether they are members of the class. The class is limited in three ways. First, the class is limited to African–

American farmers who were farming at some point during the time period between January 1, 1983 and February 21, 1997. Second, the class is limited to farmers who applied during that same time period for participation in federal farm programs with the USDA. Finally, the class is limited to farmers who filed written discrimination complaints with the USDA as a result of the USDA’s response to their applications for participation in the farm programs. While plaintiffs’ proposed class definition does not specify the time frame within which a farmer must have filed a written complaint with the USDA, plaintiffs made clear at oral argument that in order to be a member of the class, a farmer must have filed a written complaint of discrimination with the USDA in the time period between January 1, 1983 and February 21, 1997. The Court therefore will incorporate that time limitation into the proposed class definition.
[4] The Court also finds that the proposed subclasses are sufficiently well-defined to make the subclasses administratively feasible and that the creation of subclasses will facilitate more focused discovery, a more orderly trial, and potentially a more refined approach to mediation and settlement. See Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 378 (2d Cir.1997). Subclass 1 includes any member of the class who has a file with the USDA, but who never received a written response to his or her complaint of discrimination. The parameters of this subclass are clear, and it does not appear that there will be any difficulty identifying members of this subclass.
Subclass 2 includes any member of the class who has a file with the USDA, who received a written determination in response to his or her complaint of discrimination, but who claims that the determination by the USDA was not in accordance with law.4 The

3. The ‘‘file’’ referred to in the subclass definitions apparently is a file that is maintained by the USDA when a farmer submits an administrative discrimination complaint. The file presumably includes the complaint, the investigation and any resolution of the complaint.
4. Plaintiffs’ proposed definition for Subclass 2 defines it as all African American farmers who have a file with the USDA and ‘‘who received a

written determination from Defendant in response to their discrimination complaint but said Defendant was not in accordance with the law.’’ See Revised Proposed Order (emphasis added). It would appear to be more manageable to define the subclass in terms of whether the determination issued by the USDA was in accordance with law rather than whether the USDA was in accordance with the law, and the Court therefore will use that as the definition.

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government contends that trying to deter- USDA in order to determine whether a per-

mine whether a farmer is a member of this son belongs to the subclass.

subclass will require an individualized determination with respect to the merits of the individual’s claim that his or her complaint of discrimination was not adequately processed or investigated and thus undermines the utility of the class action vehicle. See Hagen v. City of Winnemucca, 108 F.R.D. 61, 63 (D.Nev.1985) (proposed class definition of ‘‘ ‘[a]ll persons whose constitutional rights have been TTT are or may be violated by [city’s unwritten prostitution policy]’ TTT is insufficient, in that it would require the court to determine whether a person’s constitutional rights had actually been violated in order to determine whether that person was a class member’’); Williams v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 95–1149, Memorandum Opinion of Feb. 14, 1997 at 8–9.

Subclass 3 is comprised of any member of the class who does not have a file with the USDA because his or her complaint never was processed. Of all of the proposed subclasses, the members of this subclass probably will be most difficult to identify, since the USDA has not maintained a file on them. Nonetheless, this subclass is sufficiently welldefined to identify its members at least for the liability stage of the litigation. Membership in the subclass is limited to persons who are members of the class, and to be a class member a farmer must establish that he or she filed a written complaint of discrimination with the USDA between January 1, 1983 and February 21, 1997. Although as a practical matter persons without a file may have a more difficult time establishing their mem-

While Subclass 2 as defined by plaintiffs may require individualized determinations, a slight modification to the definition of the subclass will correct the problem. The subclass is framed primarily by two objective criteria and one subjective criterion. The

bership in the class than will the members of the other two subclasses for whom there is a paper trail within the USDA, the Court nevertheless finds that the parameters of the subclass, as limited by membership in the class, are sufficiently well-defined.

two objective criteria are: (1) membership in

the class, and (2) a determination from

B. Rule 23(a) Prerequisites

USDA with respect to the written complaint of discrimination. The third criterion for

1. Numerosity

membership in the subclass is that the deter- [5] The class and all three subclasses are

mination issued by the USDA ‘‘was not in so numerous that joinder of all members is

accordance with the law.’’ The problem with impracticable. See Rule 23(a)(1), Fed.

this criterion, as the government suggests, is R.Civ.P. Plaintiffs estimate that there are

that it either requires the Court to make an approximately 2500 members of the class.

individualized finding with respect to wheth- The government disputes this number and

er each determination issued by the USDA contends that plaintiffs are only speculating

was in accordance with law before the indi- about the exact number of class members.

vidual can be considered a member of the Govt’s Opp. at 21. Mere conjecture, without

subclass or it requires the Court to assume more, is insufficient to establish numerosity,

that the USDA is liable and did not act in but plaintiffs do not have to provide an exact

accordance with law when it made any deter- number of putative class members in order

mination with respect to a written complaint to satisfy the numerosity requirement. See

of discrimination. The problem is avoided e.g., Marcial v. Coronet Ins. Co., 880 F.2d

simply by modifying the third criterion for 954, 957 (7th Cir.1989); Franklin v. Barry,

membership in Subclass 2 to include those 909 F.Supp. at 29. This is especially true

‘‘who maintain that the written determination where plaintiffs allege that it is the USDA’s

from Defendant was not reached in accor- actions of destroying complaints that has led

dance with law.’’ Redefining the third crite- to plaintiffs’ inability to provide a more pre-

rion in this way removes any need for the cise number. The Court therefore concludes

Court either to make an individualized merits that the numbers provided by plaintiffs suffi-

inquiry or to assume the liability of the ciently establish numerosity.

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182 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS

Plaintiffs have provided the names of four hundred and one named plaintiffs who they claim fall within the class definition. That alone is sufficient to establish numerosity, especially where the class members are located in different states. See, e.g., Markham v. White, 171 F.R.D. 217, 221 (N.D.Ill.1997) (class of 35 to 40 plaintiffs sufficient to satisfy numerosity where class members resided in different states). In addition, for all of the named plaintiffs, it is not mere conjecture to assume that there are more people who have not yet been identified who will emerge. The sheer number of amended complaints filed in this case is a result of the fact that more plaintiffs keep coming forward. It simply is not manageable to require plaintiffs to keep filing amended complaints to add the names of more plaintiffs.
Since plaintiffs have sufficiently established numerosity with respect to the class as a whole, the subclasses also are sufficiently numerous. The only subclass about which there is any serious question with respect to the numerosity requirement is Subclass 2, and plaintiffs appear to acknowledge that there are fewer members of this subclass than the other two subclasses. See Transcript at 38, 40 (‘‘the Government gave them a decision which there’s a few of them’’). While there may not be as many members of Subclass 2 as there are members of the other subclasses, there appear to be a sufficient number of members of this subclass and the issues presented by this subclass are sufficiently distinct to warrant making this a separate subclass.
2. Commonality
[6] Plaintiffs also have established that there are questions of law and fact with respect to liability that are common to the class. See Rule 23(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. Plaintiffs allege that the USDA failed properly to process each class member’s complaint of discrimination. For purposes of determining liability, the same factual and legal issues arise: (1) Did the USDA have a legal obligation to process and investigate complaints of discrimination that it received? (2) If the USDA had such a duty, was there a systemic failure properly to process complaints in the specified time period? (3) If there was such

a systemic failure, do plaintiffs have a private cause of action against the USDA? (4) Does the government have a legitimate statute of limitations defense to the claims asserted by plaintiffs? These shared issues are more than sufficient to meet the commonality prerequisite. See Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 426 (5th Cir.1997) (‘‘The commonality test is met where there is at least one issue, the resolution of which will affect all or a significant number of the putative class members’’), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 118 S.Ct. 700, 139 L.Ed.2d 643 (1998).
The government contends that the factual and legal issues presented by each putative class member are distinct on two levels. First, the government contends that while some of the putative class members allege that they received no response from the USDA after they filed their discrimination complaints, other putative class members received findings of no discrimination from the USDA and still others received findings of discrimination. The government contends that the basis of the claims of each of these groups is distinct, and they therefore argue that the class action mechanism is inappropriate. The claims of these three different groups do present slightly different issues, but the class action rule does not require commonality on every fact or every issue, Franklin v. Barry, 909 F.Supp. at 30, and the Court finds that there is sufficient similarity in the claims presented by class members that the differences that do exist are best addressed through the subclass mechanism rather than by abandoning the class mechanism altogether.
The government also argues that the ‘‘underlying question here is whether or not discrimination occurred in the credit and crop subsidy transactions that each class member is alleged to have participated in TTT [Putative class members] seek redress for the discrimination that occurred in any form or any variety of forms in the transactions that the class members participated in with their local offices.’’ Transcript at 20–21. For instance, one class member may have filed a discrimination complaint with the USDA after the County Commission in Yazoo County, Mississippi delayed his FSA

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 182 F.R.D. 341 (D.D.C. 1998)

349

emergency disaster loan, while another class The members of Subclass 2 present slightly

member may have filed a discrimination com- different issues depending on whether the

plaint with the USDA with respect to the USDA denied them relief or granted them

denial of an emergency disaster payment in relief that they maintain was insufficient, but

Greene County, Alabama, and a third class all of the members of that subclass share a

member may have filed a discrimination com- common issue in addition to those shared by

plaint with the USDA after he received a all class members: whether the fact that the

lower crop subsidy through the ASCS pro- USDA responded to their complaints pre-

gram than he thought he was entitled to cludes relief. The Court therefore finds that

receive. The government argues that be- each subclass presents common issues of law

cause plaintiffs have failed to identify a par- and fact.

ticular practice or policy of discrimination in the USDA that is common to all class members, there is no commonality to their claims.

3. Typicality
[7] Plaintiffs also have established that the claims of the class representatives are

The government overlooks the central fact typical of those of the class. See Rule

that the unifying pattern of discrimination at 23(a)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P. The typicality prereq-

issue in this case is the USDA’s failure prop- uisite is ‘‘intended to assess whether the

erly to process complaints of discrimination, action can be efficiently maintained as a class

without regard to the program that triggered and whether the named plaintiffs have incen-

the discrimination complaint. Plaintiffs’ pri- tives that align with those of the absent class

mary complaint is a pattern of ‘‘systemic members so as to assure that the absentees’

racial discrimination by the USDA based interests will be fairly represented.’’ Baby

upon their fraudulent act in 1983—the dis- Neal for and by Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48,

banding of the USDA civil rights enforce- 57 (3d Cir.1994). It is satisfied if each class

ment office—and the fourteen years follow- member’s claim arises from the same course

ing that fraudulent act TTT Defendant’s of events that led to the claims of the reprewrongful act in 1983 and continuing wrong sentative parties and each class member

from 1983 to 1997 created, for each Plaintiff, makes similar legal arguments to prove the

the circumstances that lead to each. Plain- defendant’s liability. Id. at 58; Marisol A. v.

tiff’s claim.’’ Plaintiffs’ Reply at 6, 8. The Giuliani, 126 F.3d at 376; Johns v. Rozet,

damage caused by the USDA’s alleged fail- 141 F.R.D. 211, 216 (D.D.C.1992). Plaintiffs’

ure to properly process the discrimination Fifth Amended Complaint contains four hun-

complaints may vary according to whether a dred and one named plaintiffs. As discussed

class member actually was subjected to dis- supra at 348–349, the claims of all class

crimination in the process of applying for a members arise from the USDA’s alleged dis-

USDA program and according to the pro- mantling of its civil rights office and its sub-

gram about which he or she complained. sequent failure to process discrimination

But for purposes of liability, class members complaints, the same event, practice and

uniformly present the issue of whether the course of conduct that give rise to the claims

USDA, for all intents and purposes, disband- of the four hundred and one representative

ed its civil rights office in 1983 and failed, in plaintiffs.

the fourteen years that followed, properly to process written complaints of discrimination or to process them at all.5

The government contends that the claims of only three of the named plaintiffs are described in detail in the complaint and that

The claims of the members of Subclasses 1 the claims of Mr. Pigford in particular are

and 3 present common issues of law and fact. not typical or representative of the claims of

5. The government contends that an allegation that class-wide racial discrimination has occurred is insufficient by itself to establish the right to proceed as a class action. See General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). Plaintiffs have alleged not just class-wide racial discrimi-

nation, but that the USDA for a period of fourteen years systematically failed to properly process written complaints of discrimination filed by African American farmers. It is the allegation of that discriminatory practice that defines this class and that entities plaintiffs to class certification.

350

182 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS

other putative class members because he previously has filed his claims in this Court, and his claims therefore may be barred on res judicata grounds. Since this is the second complaint filed by Mr. Pigford, the government indeed may be able to assert defenses to his claims that it could not assert against other members of the class. Moreover, upon review of the Fifth Amended Complaint, it appears that plaintiffs have not provided a detailed description of the claims of a representative of each subclass as defined in this Opinion. Because the Fifth Amended Complaint includes four hundred and one named plaintiffs who cover the spectrum of claims and interests that may be presented by the class, however, it is not too much to assume that this deficiency can be easily remedied. In order to provide greater precision and clarity as the legal and factual issues presented by each subclass are briefed and eventually tried or settled, plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint detailing the claims of at least four typical representatives of each subclass.
4. Adequacy of Representation
[8] The final element of Rule 23(a) necessitates an inquiry into the adequacy of representation, including the quality of class counsel, any disparity of interest between class representatives and members of the class, communication between class counsel and the class and the overall context of the litigation. Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d at 575. The Court finds that class counsel and the representative class members adequately will represent the interests of the class.
First, Mr. Alexander Pires and Mr. Phillip Fraas as lead counsel and Mr. J.L. Chestnut, Mr. Othello Cross, Mr. T. Roe Frazer, Mr. Hubbard T. Saunders, IV, Mr. Gerald Lear and Mr. James Myart, Jr., all serving as of counsel, have demonstrated that they will advocate vigorously for the interests of the class. Class counsel represent a breadth of geographic coverage: they are associated with firms from Washington D.C.; Jackson, Mississippi; Selma, Alabama; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; and Arlington, Virginia. Moreover, there has been no suggestion that class counsel has not communicated with members of

the class nor, given the large number of plaintiffs who have attended each hearing, could there be any such suggestion.
Second, the Court finds that there is no disparity of interest between the representative parties and members of the class as a whole. The fact that there are over four hundred named plaintiffs representing a breadth of situations and interests provides assurance that the interests of all class members are fairly represented. To the extent that the lack of detail in the complaint with respect to particular named plaintiffs’ factual situations presents a concern, that concern will be allayed when plaintiffs file a further amended complaint detailing the facts of four representatives of each subclass. See supra at 350.
Finally, the overall context of this litigation demonstrates the extent to which counsel in this case and the represented parties have worked together. At the time the original complaint was filed, only Mr. Pires and Mr. Fraas were involved. Shortly thereafter, a number of attorneys from other states moved to intervene on behalf of their clients. All of the motions to intervene now have been withdrawn, and the lawyers who filed the motions now are of counsel, working closely and in tandem with lead counsel. All (or most) have attended each hearing and, as appropriate, have participated actively. With the addition of these lawyers, it is clear that class counsel represent the spectrum of interests of the various class members.
C. Rule 23(b) Prerequisites
[9] While plaintiffs believe they satisfy each of the subparts of Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court concludes that the class is most appropriately certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). See Rule 23(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. (‘‘the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole’’). Civil rights actions frequently are certified under Rule 23(b)(2), and in fact the provision was added specifically to ensure that there was a mechanism for certifying classes in civil

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 182 F.R.D. 341 (D.D.C. 1998)

351

rights cases. See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, etary relief, court may adopt a ‘‘hybrid’’ ap-

ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDER- proach and certify (b)(2) class as to claims for

AL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1776 at 495; injunctive or declaratory relief and certify

Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 92 (b)(3) class at monetary relief stage). For

(D.C.Cir.1997).

the purposes of determining liability, howev-

The government contends that plaintiffs primarily are seeking monetary rather than equitable relief and that the class therefore

er, the Court will certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

cannot properly be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). Plaintiffs certainly are seeking

D. Notice and Opt–Out Provisions

money damages. The mere fact that plain- While Rule 23 does not specifically provide

tiffs are seeking monetary relief in addition for notice and opt-out rights when a class is

to injunctive and declaratory relief, however, certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), the Court

does not preclude class certification pursuant in its discretion may require plaintiffs to

to Rule 23(b)(2), ‘‘at least where the mone- provide notice to all class members and may

tary relief does not predominate.’’ Eubanks provide an opportunity for class members to

v. Billington, 110 F.3d at 92. Plaintiffs seek opt out of the class. See Rule 23(d)(5), Fed.

a variety of injunctive and declaratory reme- R.Civ.P.; Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227,

dies: they seek, inter alia, a declaratory 234–35 (D.C.Cir.1998), petition for cert. filed,

judgment defining ‘‘the rights of plaintiffs 67 U.S.L.W. 3156 (U.S. Aug. 24, 1998) (No.

and class members under defendant’s farm 98–326); Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d at

programs including their right to equal cred- 96.

it, participation in farm programs, and their right to full and timely enforcement of racial discrimination complaints,’’ and an injunction reversing as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and contrary to law defendant’s acts of denying class members credit and other benefits. See Fifth Amended Complaint at 90–94. While plaintiffs also seek monetary relief for the alleged acts of discrimination, the requested injunctive and declaratory relief, if granted, would have a significant impact on how the USDA processes its complaints and how it handles discrimination complaints currently proceeding through the administrative mechanism.

Plaintiffs in their proposed order suggest that the Court order that notice be ‘‘given to all class members to inform them of the following: i) the conditions to be met for inclusion into the class; ii) the conditions resulting in the exclusion of certain individuals from the class; iii) the alternatives to joining the class; iv) the date, time and place of hearings to be held with regard to this matter; and v) the benefits and consequences derived from joining the class.’’ Proposed Order at 3. Since the USDA has an administrative system to process complaints of discrimination that some class members may want to use, some form of notice and

In addition, it is appropriate to certify this opt-outs provisions may be appropriate in

class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) because it is this case. The parties therefore shall jointly

being certified only for purposes of determin- submit a draft notice.

ing liability. If liability is found and the case reaches the remedy stage, the Court will have to determine the most appropriate mechanism for determining remedy. It is

An Order consistent with this Opinion shall be issued this same day.
SO ORDERED.

possible that at that point it would be appropriate to certify a class pursuant to Rule

ORDER

23(b)(3) (common questions of law or fact For the reasons stated in the Opinion is-

predominate over questions affecting individ- sued this same day, the Court finds that

ual members and class action is superior plaintiffs have established that they meet the

method for adjudication of controversy). See prerequisites for class certification of Rule

Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d at 96 (in 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

class action seeking both injunctive and mon- and that plaintiffs have established that the

352

182 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS

class properly is certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is GRANTED; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that a class is CERTIFIED for purposes of determining liability; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the class is defined as follows:
All African–American farmers who (1) farmed between January 1, 1983, and February 21, 1997; and (2) applied, during that time period, for participation in a federal farm program with USDA, and as a direct result of a determination by USDA in response to said application, believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race, and filed a written discrimination complaint with USDA in that time period.
it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the above class is divided into three subclasses, defined as follows:
Subclass I: African–American farmers, who have a file with Defendant, but did not receive a written determination from Defendant in response to their discrimination complaint;
Subclass II: African–American farmers, who have a file with Defendant, who received a written determination from Defendant in response to their discrimination complaint but who maintain that the written determination from Defendant was not reached in accordance with law; and
Subclass III: African–American farmers, who do not have a file with Defendant because their discrimination complaints were destroyed, lost or thrown away by Defendant.
it is
FURTHER ORDERED that by October 23, 1998, plaintiffs shall file a further amended complaint detailing the claims of four

typical representatives of each subclass; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall jointly file a draft notice to class members by October 30, 1998.
SO ORDERED.
,
Brian BREGMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 97–789 HHK/JMF.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Oct. 23, 1998.
Arrestee brought suit against arresting officer and the District of Columbia, alleging that officer falsely arrested him and, for no apparent reason, kicked him in the head. On various discovery motions, the District Court, Facciola, United States Magistrate Judge, held that: (1) District of Columbia would be required to designate an official to testify on behalf of the District; (2) officer’s employment history prior to his becoming an officer was discoverable insofar as it was relevant to excessive force claim; (3) District was not entitled to protective order precluding discovery of information regarding the hiring, training, supervision and discipline of officers other than arresting officer; (4) plaintiff was obliged under discovery rule to produce copies of the relevant medical records; and (5) plaintiff’s failure to comply with civil rule requiring him to file a privilege log, barred any claim of privilege with respect to discovery, whatever its basis.
So ordered.

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD 2093 East Arcadia Road Riegelwood, NC 28456
and
LLOYD SHAFER P.O. Box 382 Bentonia, MS 39040
and
GEORGE HALL Route 2, Box 163-A Boligee, AL 35443
and
EDDIE L. ROSS 380 Spout Spring Road Vicksburg, MS 39180
and
STROWN AND FANNIE MARTIN 19207 Cajalco Road Perring, CA 92570
and
LUCIOUS ABRAMS 2023 Gough Red Hill Keysville, GA 30816
and
GRIFFIN TODD, SR. 810 Pony Road Zebulon, NC 27592
and
BEN HILSMAN 300 Hunting Ridge Road Roanoke Rapids, NC 27870
and

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
SEVENTH AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
FILED
OC T 26 1998
NANCY tMYER-WHITIINGTON. Q.£IlC
U.S I)ISTRICT COURT

•

CALVIN C. BROWN 3900 County Pond Road Freeman, VA 23856

and

JAMES B. BEVERLY P.O. Box 522 Burkeville, VA 23927

and

EDDIE H. COTTON Route I, Box 120 Pattison, MS 39144

and

ALVIN STEPPES Route I, Box 82-B Moro, AR 72368

ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE 14th and Independence Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20250

S.W.

Defendant.

FILED
OCT 26 1998
NANCY MAYER-WHITTINGTON. CLERK
u.s. DISTRIG COURT

SEVENTH AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT (FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION, VIOLATIONS OF EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT,
AND OTHER RELIEF)
By Order of the Court dated October 9, 1998, this case was
certified as a class action, the Class was divided into three
subclasses, and inter alia, plaintiffs were ordered to file this
Seventh Amended Complaint, detailing the claims of 12 Class
representatives:

• •

"For the reasons stated in the Opinion issued this same day,

the Court finds that plaintiffs have established that they meet

the prerequisites for class certification of Rule 23(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that Plaintiffs have

established that the class properly is certified pursuant to Rule

23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, it

is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for class certification is

GRANTED; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that a class is CERTIFIED for purposes of

determining liability; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the class is defined as follows:

All African-American farmers who (1) farmed between January I, 1983, and February 21, 1997; and (2) applied, during that time period, for participation in a federal farm program with USDA, and as a direct result of a determination by USDA in response to said application, believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race, and filed a written discrimination complaint with USDA in that time period.

FURTHER ORDERED that the above class is divided into three

subclasses, defined as follows:

Subclass I:

African-American farmers, who have

a file with Defendant, but did not receive a written

determination from Defendant, in response to their

discrimination complaint;

Subclass II: African-American farmers, who have a file with Defendant, who received a written determination from Defendant in response to their discrimination complaint but who maintain that the written determination from Defendant was not reached in accordance with law; and

-3-

• •
Subclass III: African-American farmers, who do not have a file with Defendant because their discrimination complaints were destroyed, lost or thrown away by Defendant. it is FURTHER ORDERED that by October 23, 1998, plaintiffs shall file a further amended complaint detailing he claims of four typical representatives of each subclass; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall jointly file a draft notice to Class members by October 30, 1998. SO ORDERED."
The individual and representative plaintiffs (listed in the caption) (llplaintiffs"), on behalf of themselves and the Class members, complain of defendant as follows:
NATURE OF THE CASE This case involves defendant's administration, during the period January, 1983 to January, 1997, of applications by AfricanAmerican farmers for farm loans and credit and participation in federal farm programs, (referred to hereinafter as, generally, IIfarm programs ll ). Plaintiffs contend that defendant, when processing applications of African-American farmers for farm programs (1) willfully discriminated against them, and (2) when, in response, plaintiffs filed written discrimination complaints with defendant, defendant failed, although required by, inter alia, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, to investigate the complaints. For example, when African-American farmers filed complaints of discrimination with defendant, defendant willfully either (1) avoided processing and
-4-

• •
resolving the complaints by stretching the review process out over many years; (2) conducted a meaningless, or "ghost investigation", or (3) failed to do anything. These two acts: (1) the discrimination in denial of the application and (2) the failure to properly investigate the discrimination complaints, deprived the African-American farmers, inter alia, of equal and fair access to farm credit and farm programs, and due process, resulting in damages to them.
In May, 1997, defendant's officials admitted that in early 1983, the Reagan administration had quietly disbanded and dismantled the civil rights enforcement arm at United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") and that discrimination complaints had not been properly investigated since that time. Two federal reports, issued in February, 1997, verified these facts.
In the original complaint, the proposed Class consisted of 641 African-American farmers who filed complaints of discrimination during the period January, 1983 to January, 1997. Their claim for damages was $512,800,000.00.
Since the filing of the original complaint, USDA's Office of Inspector General released "Minority Participation in Farm Service Agency's Farm Loan Program - Phase II", which inter alia, stated that the backlog of unresolved discrimination complaint cases increased. This increased the proposed Class from 641 to 874, and increased the claim of damages to $699,200,000.00, as so stated in plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, filed on October 23, 1997, which also increased the number of plaintiffs to 14.
-5-

• •
The Second Amended Complaint, filed December 5, 1997, increased the number of plaintiffs to 69.
Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint on December 17, 1997, increasing the number of plaintiffs to 220, increasing the proposed Class to 2,000, and the claim of damages to $2,000,000,000.
On February 18, 1998 plaintiffs filed a Fourth Amended Complaint, increasing the number of plaintiffs to 349, increasing the proposed Class to 2,500, and the claim of damages to $2,500,000,000.
On May 12, 1998, plaintiffs filed a Fifth Amended Complaint, increasing the number of plaintiffs to 400.
On October 2, 1998, plaintiffs filed a Sixth Amended Complaint, increasing the number of plaintiffs to 447.
This is the Seventh Amended Complaint. 1 JURISDICTION
1. Jurisdiction is founded upon 15 U.S.C. §1691, et seq. 28 U.S.C. 1331, 28 U.S.C. §1343, 28 U.S.C. 2201, 42 U.S.C. 2000d and 5 U.S.C. 706.
VENUE
2. Venue lies in this judicial district because the claim arose in this judicial district, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391 (e) .

1

Because the Class has been certified, the individual

plaintiffs have not been listed in the caption; they now approach

500 in number.

- 6-

• • PARTIES There are 12 Class representatives, each of which falls under one of three subclasses. 3 (a) . Plaintiff and Class representative, Timothy C. Pigford ("Pigford"), (Subclass II), is an African-American farmer and resident of Riegelwood, North Carolina. Mr. Pigford (a) timely applied for various loan programs with defendant during the years 1976 to 1986 and was the subject of willful and continuous racial discrimination, including denial of his applications for farm ownership loans, and refusal to provide operating credit, and appropriate loan servicing, by reason of his race, causing him substantial damages and (b) timely filed complaints with defendant of these acts of discrimination, which complaints were denied by defendant, although such denial was contrary to the facts and applicable law causing him substantial damages. 3(b). On a number of separate occasions beginning in 1976 and extending through 1987, Tim Pigford applied for farm ownership ("FO It ) loans from FmHA and was turned down by the Bladen County FmHA office. The denial of this credit was due to racial discrimination against Tim Pigford -- this was acknowledged at the highest level of the agency, and the Civil Rights Office at USDA also concluded there was discrimination in the handling of Pigford's appeal on one of the FO denials. 3(c). A draft analysis of the Pigford FO denials done by FmHA staff on May 23, 1986, noted that FmHA had "placed an unyielding burden on [Tim Pigford] in rejecting his FO loan application. . The rejection of the FO by the County Committee
-7-

• •

was directly counter to Agency regulations as well as to its own

actions before and after the FO loan decision", and further noted

that the County Supervisor failed to provide Pigford farm program

servicing according to FmHA regulations "comparable to that

provided white borrowers". It was suggested as a remedy then that

Tim be given an inventory farm of which he could take ownership

of.

3(d). A memorandum by the Administrator of FmHA, dated

August 22, 1986, said that "Our review of the files of the white

farmers mentioned indicates the county supervisor was more

tolerant of the problems experienced by them.

The two white

farmers also received large loans in a timely manner despite

irregularities noted in paying FmHA, and in not following their

established Farm and Home Plans. It is our conclusion Mr. Pigford

was treated differently than the two white farmers."

3(e). A later (July 7, 1987) memorandum from one member of

USDA's civil rights staff to another person on that staff stated

that "Mr. Pigford has again charged discrimination regarding his

denial of a farm ownership loan in 1987. . We believe the

hearing officer erred when he declined to accept Mr. Pigford's

allegations of discrimination during the appeal process."

3(f). In addition, the statistics on the award of Fos in

Bladen County, North Carolina, show disparity of treatment between

white and black applicants for these loans.

3(g). Pigford timely filed a civil rights complaint matter

with USDA on the racially discriminatory denial of the farm

ownership loans. However, the Civil Rights Office at USDA in a

- 8-

• •
December 19, 1986, determination chose to ignore the FmHA findings and held against Pigford on the issue of discrimination on the FO loan denials as well as on unrelated matters of FmHA's servicing of his operating loan debts. Pigford re-filed his complaints in 1987, and USDA's civil rights staff again rejected them, as reflected in a July 7, 1997, memorandum (which is quoted above). Pigford has continued to press his complaints since then, both at USDA and with members of Congress.
3(h). As a result of these actions of USDA, Pigford has suffered frustration, humiliation, anxiety, and other mental distress at his inability to obtain redress from USDA for the racial discrimination committed against him; and members of his family have been subjected to mental and emotional stress after Pigford's loss of his farm and his homestead due to his inability to obtain such redress for the racial discrimination. Further, by being denied the farm ownership loan due to racial discrimination, Pigford additionally has suffered the loss of the ability to purchase a farm, the loss of the opportunity to continue farming, the loss of profits from a farming operation, and related pain and suffering on his part and that of his family.
4 (a). Plaintiff and proposed Class representative, Lloyd Shafer ("Shafer"), (Subclass I), is an African-American farmer and resident of Yazoo County, Mississippi. Mr. Shafer is a farmer who (a) timely applied for various loan programs with defendant's agency, FmHA, for the years 1992 and 1993 and was the subject of willful and continuous racial discrimination, including refusal to provide full operating credit and appropriate loan servicing, by
- 9-

•
reason of his race, causing him substantial damages, and (b) timely filed complaints with defendant of these acts of discrimination, which complaints were never acted upon pursuant to the applicable law, causing him substantial damages.
4(b). Shafer began farming in 1992, and as a beginning farmer sought operating loan credit from FmHA. The Yazoo County, Mississippi, FmHA office initially denied him credit, but was later forced to retract the denial as baseless. However, the operational credit provided by FmHA was delayed and inadequate to allow Shafer to harvest crops.
4(c). This pattern of FmHA only grudgingly providing Shafer operational credit, at times with onerous restrictions on the use of the funds, continued through 1994. Shafer, however, was making every effort to succeed as a farmer. For example, in 1993, Shafer enrolled in classes in agricultural science at Alcorn State University (an USDA designated minority farmer outreach grantee) , and the Alcorn staff assisted him in preparing his farm plan in 1993 (although Yazoo County FmHA office refused to use it) .
4(d). Again in 1994, Shafer was initially denied operative credit, but the denial was reversed. However, FmHA retaliated against Shafer by delaying and restricting operating loan funds. In 1995, Shafer's crops were adversely affected by natural disasters and he applied to FSA for a disaster loan. Again, his application was initially denied, but an appeal over the head of the Yazoo County FSA office was approved. However, the payment to Shafer of the disaster loan funds was delayed for a substantial period of time, to August 1995.
- 10 -

•

4(e). Over time, Shafer concluded that as an African-

American farmer he was being discriminated against by FmHA and FSA

an Yazoo County, Mississippi. He had been the President of the

Yazoo County Chapter of the National Association for the Advance-

ment of Colored People (NAACP), and there has been for some time

an atmosphere of hostility toward the NAACP and its work in Yazoo

County. Shafer believes the Yazoo County FSA office is part of

the oppressive white establishment of Yazoo County.

4(f). A report in the Jackson, Mississippi, Clarion-Ledger,

dated January 12, 1997, included a table showing the disparate

treatment given white farmers, on the one hand, and minority and

women farmers on the other than, in the award of farm loans by FSA

in Mississippi:

Sunday, January 12, 1997 The Jackson, Mississippi Clarion-Ledger-

9A

FEDERAL FARM LOANS

FISCAL YEAR 1996

Loan type Direct Operating Guaranteed
Operating Direct Farm'
Ownership Guaranteed Farm
Ownership

No.

Amount

285 $16,800,410

Minority 77

Amount $3,097,040

217 40,136,405

10

1,168,320

3

365,150

3

247,700

37

5,277/570

0

0

FISCAL YEAR 1995

Female 0 0
1
1

Amount $0
0
76,650
40,200

Loan type Direct Operating Guaranteed
Operating Direct Farm
Ownership Guaranteed Farm
Ownership

No.

Amount

243 $13,87l,300

273 54,533,980

2

199,000

69

9,034,820

Minority 100
26
4
2

Amount $4,949,030
2,657,525
400,800
300,000

Female 0
0
0
4

Amount $0 0
0
430,000

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4(g). Shafer timely filed his civil rights complaint in early 1997. Because of numerous financial set-backs he has suffered as a farmer, due in no small part to the Yazoo County FSA office's racially discriminatory actions, Shafer is on the verge of financial ruin and cannot wait for a flawed civil rights administrative review process to slowly wind its way to a conclusion. He seeks a fair resolution of his complaint, and for that reason joins as a plaintiff in this law suit.
5 (a). Plaintiff and proposed Class representative, George Hall ("Hall"), (Subclass II), is an African-American farmer and resident of Greene County, Alabama who (a) timely applied for disaster payments with defendant for 1994 and was the subject of willful and continuous racial discrimination, including initial refusal by defendant to provide disaster payments and then acts of reprisal when Hall appealed the initial denial, and (b) timely filed complaints with defendant of these acts of discrimination, which complaints were never acted upon pursuant to the applicable law, causing him substantial damages.
5 (b). Hall suffered racially-based disparate treatment in being denied disaster payments in 1994. Disaster payments have been made available to U.S. farmers in most years since 1987, to compensate farmers for losses to their production because of natural disasters.
5 (c). In 1994, Hall's county, Greene County, Alabama, was declared eligible for the disaster payment program on 1994 crop losses. All applications for disaster payments were approved by the Greene County ASC committee except for Hall's application on
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four of his crops. Further, when Hall appealed these denials, the Green County, ASC office retaliated against him by reducing his payment yield on the crops. He appealed the denials and reprisals to the state office and his benefits were restored.
5(d). Hall filed a timely complaint of racial discrimination with USDA on August 9, 1996. USDA found that the Green County ASC committee discriminated against Hall on the basis of race, in denying his application for disaster payments. However, two years later, no corrective action based on this finding has been made, the discrimination against Hall has never been compensated, and the racially discriminatory situation in the Green County FSA office still exists.
6 (a). Plaintiff and proposed Class representative, Eddie Ross ("Ross"), (Subclass II), is an African-American farmer and resident of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Mr. Ross (a) timely applied for various loan programs with defendant during the period 19911994 and was the subject of willful and continuous racial discrimination, including failure to process his loan applications in a timely manner, and (b) timely filed complaints with defendant of these acts of discrimination. These complaints twice resulted in a finding of discrimination by defendant but did not adequately compensate Ross. On a third occasion, the complaint was never acted upon pursuant to applicable law. In each case, defendant's illegal conduct has caused Ross substantial damages.
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6 (b). The Eddie Ross case is several cases of racial
discrimination committed by the Farmers Home Administration
(FmHA) , beginning in 1991. They involve--
(1) FmHA's discriminatory deprivation of timely operating credit for Eddie Ross for his 1991 crops;
(2) FmHA's discriminatory deprivation of timely operating credit for Eddie Ross for his 1992 crops;
(3) FmHA's discriminatory delays, denials, and harassment of Eddie Ross regarding his operating credit for his 1993 crops, including--
(A) delay in the consideration by the FmHA county committee of Eddie Ross's December 9, 1992, loan application until February 23, 1993;
(B) delays and refusals of Eddie Ross's application for 1993 operating credit after county committee review;
(C) the freeze of Eddie Ross's 1993 FmHA operating loan funds in July 1993; and
(D) FmHA's call to one of Eddie Ross's creditors about the fund freeze on July 2, 1993; and
(4) FmHA's reprisal against Eddie Ross in 1993 and 1994 (including specific refusals by the county FmHA director to conduct business with Eddie Ross) for filing civil rights complaints on the 1991, 1992, and 1993 operating loan matters.
6 (c). In each of these cases, Eddie Ross timely filed civil
rights complaints with USDA, and the matters have been given
various degrees of review by USDA after having been filed.
6 (d). With respect to the 1991 discrimination, USDA already
has found that in fact Eddie Ross was the victim of racial
discrimination in the initial denial of operating credit (based,
inter alia, on statistical analysis showing disparate treatment of
whites and blacks by FmHA in Warren County, Mississippi). The
question became whether he has been compensated for that act of
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discrimination. Eddie believed that what USDA offered in 1991--access to operating credit when such credit was offered too
late to allow him to plant his planned crops in 1991--was not truly compensation and declined it. He has continued to seek appropriate compensation since then.
6 (e). As to the 1992 acts of discrimination, USDA has already found prima facie evidence of discrimination in the initial denial of Eddie's OL application (based, inter alia, on statistical analysis showing disparate treatment of whites and blacks by FmHA in Warren County, Mississippi).
6 (f). As to the 1993-94 acts of discrimination, the delays, denials and harassment to which Eddie was subject by FmHA have never been reviewed as USDA indicated inter alia that these complaints were made outside of the Statute of Limitations timeframe.
7 (a). Plaintiff and proposed Class representatives, Strown and Fannie Martin (liThe Martins ll ), (Subclass I), are AfricanAmerican farmers and residents of Riverside County, California. The Martins (a) timely applied for an operating loan from 1994 to 1996 and were the subject of willful and continuous racial discrimination, including failure to process their loan applications in a timely manner, and (b) timely filed complaints with defendant of these acts of discrimination, which complaints were never acted upon pursuant to applicable law, causing them substantial damages.
7 (b). Plaintiffs Strown and Fannie Martin are AfricanAmerican farmers in Perris, Riverside County, California, who
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began farming in 1994. The Martins went to the local Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) to find out how they could apply for funds to refinance their 80 acres of farm land. The Martins were given an application for a Farm Ownership Loan. Shortly thereafter the Martins returned to the FmHA office with their completed application.
7 (c). The Martins received a letter from Mr. Christopher Ketner (FmHA County Supervisor for Riverside County) dated March 25, 1994, which listed items needed to complete their Farm Ownership Loan application. Mr. Ketner also explained in his letter that the Martins could apply for an operating loan of up to $200,000. Within a few days, the Martins had obtained the items listed in Mr. Ketner's letter and returned them to him sometime during the first week in April 1994. After many telephone calls, the Martins finally received a letter from Mr. Ketner dated May 24, 1994, stating the local county committee had found them eligible for a loan and that FmHA would work their loan up as quickly as possible.
7 (d) The Martins did not receive anything else from FmHA until the latter part of July 1994. They finally received a letter from Mr. Ketner which stated their loan application was completed on July 18, 1994. After receiving Mr. Ketner's letter, the Martins called his office and spoke with Mr. Brooks Whitlock.
Mr. Whitlock gave them an appointment to come into the office on August 9, 1994.
7 (e). At the August 9th meeting, Mr. Whitlock told the Martins that FmHA could put them on an 18-month plan, with an
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operating loan of $31,240 to get them started. The Martins had already missed the planting season for some of the crops they had hoped to plant, so they felt the operating loan would allow them to be able to plant some cabbages, turnips, and mustards. However, prior to telling Mr. Whitlock they would accept the operating loan, the Martins asked Mr. Whitlock if they would have to reapply for a loan to refinance t heir land. Mr. Whitlock said that they would not have to, because they had already been approved for the loan. Mr. Whitlock stated that FmHA just had not had time to work up the loan to refinance the land, but that the loan would be worked up by the first of the year. The Martins accepted Mr. Whitlock's word that the loan to refinance their land would be completed by the first of the year. Mr. Whitlock also told the Martins that they would have to put up all of their assets (including their home) for the loan. They thought what Mr. Whitlock meant was that these assets would collaterize the loan to refinance their land and the operating loan. The Martins' land was appraised at $2.6 million dollars. The Martins felt they had no other choice but to do as Mr. Whitlock said if they were to get the loan to start their farm operation.
7 (f). Due to heavy flooding starting in January and lasting through March, 1995, the Martins had a total crop loss. They applied for an emergency loan with FmHA. While the Martins were waiting on the status of the emergency loan application, on March 8, 1995, they received a Notice of Loan Servicing and Debt Settlement from Mr. Whitlock. Upon receiving Mr. Whitlock's March
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8th letter I the Martins called Mr. Whitlock for an explanation of his letter. He gave them an appointment to come into the office.
7 (g). The Martins met with Mr. Whitlock on April 111 1995 1 at which time Mr. Whitlock showed them a farm and home plan he had prepared for them. They told Mr. Whitlock they disagreed with the plan. Mr. Whitlock said that he would not approve the Martins l plan and that they could meet with Mr. Ketner to discuss the situation.
7 (h). The Martins met with Mr. Ketner and Mr. Whitlock on April 121 1995. In the meeting the Martins tried to explain to Mr. Ketner why they disagreed with the farm and home plan prepared by Mr. Whitlock. Mr. Ketner told Mr. Whitlock to prepare some questions for the Martins to answer and get back to him. Mr. Whitlock prepared a list of questions for the Martins and l within a couple of days I they submitted their answers to Mr. Ketner. After a few more days I the Martins called Mr. Ketner to get his answer on their loan request. It was then that Mr. Ketner told the Martins that FmHA was out of money. On May 13 1 1995 1 the Martins filed their discrimination complaint.
7 (i). In June 1995 1 the Martins received two letters from Mr. Ketner l both of which were dated June 221 1995. One letter stated that FmHA would not be able to approve the Martins I application for primary loan servicing and their applications for an emergency loan and a farm ownership loan to refinance their land. The second letter was a notice of intent to accelerate or to continue acceleration and notice of borrowerls rights. The Martins filed an appeal.
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7 (j). At the National Appeal Division (NAD) hearing, Mr. Whitlock admitted that the Martins' 1994 farm ownership application to refinance their land and their 1995 emergency loan application were never processed. The hearing officer reversed FmHA's decision and instructed FmHA to continue processing the Martins' 1994 and 1995 loan applications.
7 (k) FmHA, however, flatly refused to implement NAD's decision. In 1996, to further delay the Martins and lull them into believing their loans were going to be processed, Mr. Ketner sent the Martins a letter telling that updated information was needed to process their 1994 and 1995 loan applications. Yet, the Martins had already provided FmHA with the information needed to process their loan applications.
8 (a). Plaintiff and proposed Class representative, Lucious Abrams ("Abrams"), (Subclass III), is an African-American farmer and resident of Burke County, Alabama who (a) timely applied for various loan programs with defendant during the period 1981-1994 and was the subject of willful and continuous racial discrimination, including failure to process his loan applications in a timely manner, and (b) timely filed four complaints of these acts of discrimination with defendant in 1989, 1993 and twice in 1997, which complaints were never acted upon pursuant to the applicable law, causing him substantial damages.
8 (b). The four discrimination complaints were: (i) in 1989, official testimony before the Agriculture
Committee of the House of Representatives by the Office of Rep. Lindsay Thomas on behalf of Mr. Abramsi
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(ii) in 1993, testimony before defendant's agency by the Office of Rep. Cynthia McKinney on behalf of Mr. Abrams;
(iii) in 1997, Mr. Abrams complained before defendant USDA listening session in Albany, Georgia;
(iv) in 1997, Mr. Abrams filed a written complaint of discrimination with USDA. 8 (c). Abrams suffered race-based disparate treatment in being denied timely consideration by FmHA of his operating loan applications, which in turn caused him damaging delays in the planting of his crops. These failures to provide timely consideration happened on a on-going basis over the years 1981 through 1994. In each year, the local county FmHA supervisor would precipitate the delay by unnecessarily submitting and resubmitting several farm financial plans for Abrams to the District and State Offices of the FmHA. For example, with respect to Abrams's 1994 crops, he submitted his financial plan for the crop to the FmHA county supervisor on September I, 1993, but the plan was not finally approved until March 16, 1994, after field preparation should have been completed for timely planting of crops. As a result, Abrams suffered substantial loss of farm income in 1994. 8(d). Abrams suffered further discrimination in the form of harassment when in 1994, in establishing conditions for Abrams's purchases of a farm from FSA inventory with several partners (a farm previously owned by a white farmer), FSA unnecessarily required his two partners to pledge their individual homes as
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collateral. This action was administratively appealed and was overturned by the National Appeals Division.
8 (e). Also, Abrams's case file was selected for "review" by the State FmHA Office in 1993, and an issue was raised as to whether a previous debt write-down by FmHA was excessive and required a repayment. After much gathering and presentation of documentation, the repayment required was only $2,800. The result of the discriminatory actions is that Mr. Abrams has lost his reputation for creditworthiness in his community and has no credit standing with local financial institutions, and has suffered other related losses.
9 (a). Plaintiff and proposed Class representative, Griffin Todd, Sr. ("Todd"), (Subclass I), is an African-American farmer and resident of Wake County, North Carolina who (a) timely applied for loan programs with defendant in the 1980s and was the subject of willful and continuous racial discrimination, including refusal by defendant to discuss the rescheduling of outstanding loans or to accept an application for a farm loan, and (b) timely filed complaints with defendant of these acts of discrimination, which complaints were never acted upon pursuant to the applicable law, causing him substantial damages.
9 (b). Todd suffered racially-based disparate treatment at the hands of FmHA in being denied access to the full range of FmHA farmer lending program alternatives, especially those with respect to debt rescheduling, that were offered to white farmers in Wake County. When Todd suffered severe financial reversals in the early 1980s after two consecutive drought years and then
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petitioned the county FmHA office for assistance in servicing his FmHA debt, the county supervisor for FmHA refused to discuss the various alternative financial options suggested by Todd, while at the same time providing financial relief to white farmers in similar situations. When Todd later sought information from the FHA county supervisor as to the amount Todd would have to pay annually to retire all of the FmHA debt owed, the supervisor took two years to reply. During this time additional debt had accumulated to the unpaid interest. Also, at one point, the county FmHA committee refused to accept an application form from Todd for farm operating loan financing. Provision of the operating loan would have allowed Todd to continue farming and provided an opportunity for him to retire the outstanding debt. The result of the discriminatory actions is that Mr. Todd has had to pare back his farming operations considerably and, as a result, has lost substantial amounts of farm income and suffered related losses.
10 (a). Plaintiff and proposed class representatives, Ben & Zelma Hilsman ("the Hilsmans"), (Subclass III), are husband and wife African-American farmers and residents of Halifax County, North Carolina. In January of 1988, Mr. And Mrs. Hilsman (a) timely applied for a farm ownership loan to purchase additional farm land and were subjected to willful discrimination by their local FmHA office, including denial of appropriate loan servicing, by reason of their race, causing substantial financial losses in farm income earning potential, and they (b) timely filed a discrimination complaint with defendant's investigator in
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1991, but were never informed of any action on their complaint contrary to the facts and applicable law, causing them further damages.
10(b) In January of 1988, the Hilsmans obtained a 90-day option on a farm acreage. They then timely applied for a farm ownership loan at their local FmHA office. Their loan application, however, was not processed until two weeks before the option expired. As a result, their loan was denied. The Hilsmans appealed to the State and the local FmHA county office supervisor's decision was overturned. However, they had lost the opportunity to purchase the farm because the option had expired. Nevertheless, this same FmHA county supervisor was able to timely process a loan for David Johnson (a white farmer) to purchase the same property.
10 (c). In 1991, the county supervisor attempted to accelerate their farm loans because he claimed they had purchased a house without his permission. The State office overturned his decision. This initial action by the FmHA supervisor, however, caused them to receive their operating loan late in that year. In 1993, the Hilsmans applied for an operating loan and were denied three times before receiving the funds. It was only after repeated appeals of the FmHA supervisor's decision that they were able to get funding. In the final appeal, they were able to prove that the information entered into the DARLS program was incorrect.
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10 (d). In 1996, the Hilsmans did not get their operating loan until September. Because of the late planting, they lost their entire crop to a freeze. The reason for them not getting their loan until September was again due to incorrect information being entered into the DARLS program.
10 (e). This case has four key issues: (1) persistent negative action by the county supervisor, (2) the denial of the Hilsman's farm ownership loan at the county level, a deliberate act to make sure the white farmer was able to purchase the farm, (3) the attempt to accelerate the farm loans as retaliation, (4) the lack of a finding by USDA with respect to the 1988 complaint.
11 (a). Plaintiff and proposed class representative Calvin Brown ("Brown"), (Subclass III), is an African-American farmer and resident of Brunswick County, Virginia. Mr. Brown (a) timely filed his application for an operating loan in January, 1984, and was subjected to willful discrimination by forcing him to reapply for the loan, approving and subsequently releasing the funds late in the growing season, thus causing substantial financial losses in farm income, and Mr. Brown timely filed his discrimination complaint November 26, 1984, for which no response was ever received from the defendant, thus causing him further damages.
11 (b). In January, 1984, Mr. Brown filed his application for an operating loan. When Mr. Brown called the FmHA County Supervisor about the status of his loan application, toward the end of January, 1984, he was told his loan was being processed. In February, 1984, the same FmHA county supervisor told him he had no record of him ever applying for a loan. He was forced to
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reapply for the operating loan. The loan was finally approved and Mr. Brown received the funds late in the planting season (Mayor June, 1984) causing substantial financial losses due to the shortened growing season.
11 (c). Furthermore, the funds received were placed in a supervised bank account (an account requiring the co-signature of FmHA county supervisor) for no apparent reason and without consultation with Mr. Brown. As a result, Mr. Brown often had problems getting his checks co-signed in a timely manner.
11 (d) . Additional problems arose because Wednesday was the county supervisor's 'open door day,' i.e., farmers came in to see the county supervisor without an appointment. Since appointments were rarely given Black farmers, Wednesday was the only day Black farmers could visit the FmHA office. On many Wednesday visits, Mr. Brown and other Black farmers were belittled and disrespected. On one Wednesday when Mr. Brown and other Black farmers were waiting to see the county supervisor, and had been waiting for quiet some time, a white farmer came into the FmHA office from a side door and walked right into the county supervisor's office, conducted his business with the door closed (the door always remained open when the county supervisor was with Black farmers) and left. These incidents are examples of the disparate treatment received by the Black farmers compared to their white farmer neighbors.
11 (e) Shortly after this incident, the FmHA county supervisor refused to give Mr. Brown an application for loan funds to build a tobacco barn. Then, in the mid-eighties, the
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FmHA county supervisor stopped granting operating loans to Mr. Brown because he considered Mr. Brown to be a "gentleman farmer."
11 (f). This case has, inter alia, three issues: (1) was the reason for placing Mr. Brown on a supervised bank account proper and within the regulation, (2) was setting a particular day for Black farmers to come into the office discriminatory, and (3) was the treatment by the county supervisor discriminatory.
12 (a). Plaintiff and proposed class representative, James Beverly ("Beverly"), (Subclass III), is a Black farmer and resident of Nottoway County, Virginia. Mr. Beverly sought financial counseling and advice, and timely applied for loan funds with the defendant during the years 1981 to 1984 on the expansion and modernization of his swine herd operation. Mr. Beverly was (a) subjected to willful and continuous racial discrimination from his local FmHA office, including denial of loan funding called for in his approved Farm and Home Plan, based upon the advice received from his local FmHA office. This denial of proper loan financing and loan servicing, caused Mr. Beverly to suffer sever financial losses, leading to the failure of his farming operation, and Mr. Beverly (b) timely filed a complaint with defendant in 1985 of these acts of discrimination, which complaint was ignored contrary to the requirements of law, causing substantial damages to Mr. Beverly.
12 (b). Mr. Beverly sought advise from his local FmHA office and made plans for expanding his farming operation based upon that advise and the approved Farm and Home Plan. He then timely applied for an operating loan to purchase breeding stock and
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equipment as called for in his farm and home plan developed in association with his local FmHA office. Mr. Beverly received loan funds to purchase breeding swine and equipment, but he was denied funding for the farrowing houses as called. for by his Farm and Home plan. This denial came even though his local FmHA officials knew that he had accepted the loan for the breeding swine and equipment and had purchased same, and that without the farrowing houses, the other funding was basically useless. In addition, these denials came in spite of the fact that he had been told he would get funding for the farrowing houses. FmHA officials knew that without the farrowing houses, Mr. Beverly could not succeed with his farm operation. Indeed, he lost everything including his property, which he sold so he could settled his debt with FmHA.
12 (c). Prior to seeking assistance from FmHA, Mr. Beverly had a successful small farm operation. However, within a six year period after going to the FmHA office for assistance with the expansion of his farming operation, Mr. Beverly was forced out of farming. He filed a complaint of discrimination with the local office in February, 1985, but never heard anything from his complaint. An FmHA employee will verify that Mr. Beverly filed a discrimination complaint.
12 (d). Four issues, inter alia, arise in this case: (1) did FmHA deliberately mislead Mr. Beverly so he would accept the operating loan; (2) did he receive appropriate loan servicing; (3) was the denial of funding for the farrowing houses correct
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according to regulations, and (4) the impact of defendant's unresponsiveness to Mr. Beverly's discrimination complaint.
13 (a). Plaintiff and proposed Class representative Eddie Cotton ("Cotton") , (Subclass I), an African-American farmer and resident of Claiborne County, Mississippi. Mr. Cotton received two loans from the Farmers Home Administration in February, 1982.
The first loan was for $53,280 and the second was for $10,850 for a total of $64,130. The loans are secured by Mr. Cotton's home and 80 acres of land. When Mr. Cotton submitted his loan applications, he informed Mr. Miskelly, County Supervisor for FmHA, that he only wanted to put up 70 acres of his land to secure the debt. Mr. Miskelly told Mr. Cotton that this was acceptable. Mr. Cotton later learned, however, that his home and 80 acres of land had been taken as security on his debt with FmHA.
13 (b). On October 10, 1990, Mr. Cotton filed a completed application for primary loan servicing. The FmHA did not begin processing Mr. Cotton's application until January, 1996, at which time it requested updated information from Mr. Cotton, including an updated farm and home plan dated April 30, 1996. On July 9, 1996, Mr. Cotton was sent a Notice of Intent to Accelerate, which stated, "You can not get primary loan servicing because your farm and home plan does not show you can pay all of your family living expenses, farm operating expenses, and scheduled debt repayments. II The FmHA notified Mr. Cotton that he could buy-out his security at a net recovery value of $42,562. The FmHA never addressed the fact that FmHA's decision to deny Mr. Cotton's
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application for primary loan servicing was based on updated information required by FmHA and not on information provided in 1990 when Mr. Cotton/s application was submitted.
13 (c). In 1982 or 1983 1 Mr. Cotton went to FmHA and applied for a loan to purchase 132 acres of land adjacent to his property. FmHA held Mr. Cotton/s application for over a year before notifying him t hat his application would be approved. By the time Mr. Cotton received notification from FmHA that he would get the loan l the landowner told him that the sales price had gone up from $55 1 000 to $75 / 000 and he had taken 12.5 acres from the land that was for sale.
13 (d). In 1987 / the Veterans Administration was investigating Mr. Cotton/s claim for improved pension benefits. The Veterans Administration/s investigator went to the FmHA office and without Mr. Cotton/s permission l obtained information from an FmHA employee. Mr. Cotton states some of the information provided to the investigator was incorrect. Mr. Cotton complained to FmHA about it providing information to the Veterans Administration without his permission l and he also questioned the accuracy of the information provided to the Veterans Administration/s (Mr. Cotton told FmHA that Mr. Charles Johnson had not paid any loan for him and that he did not own any property other than his 80 acres and horne). FmHA provided no explanation to Mr. Cotton regarding how it had the authority to release the information to the Veterans Administration l nor did FmHA attempt to correct any of the information it had provided the Veterans Administration.
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13 (e). Mr. Cotton often went to his local FSA (formerly FmHA) office and inquired about participating in a tree planting program where FSA would pay $45 per acre for 13 years. Mr. Cotton was repeatedly told he did not qualify, though it was never explained to him why he did not qualify or that he could even apply to participate in the program. Mr. Cotton states that the employees at the FSA office were abusive and treated him other than like a human being.
13 (f) The USDA, through its FSA (formerly FmHA) office in Port Gibson, Claiborne County, Mississippi, discriminated against Mr. Cotton on the basis of his race by the following acts:
(1) Excessive Collateral to secure FmHA loan. Mr. Cotton was told that it would be acceptable for him to use only 70 acres of his land to secure the debt. Instead, without Mr. Cotton's knowledge, FmHA listed Mr. Cotton's home and 80 acres as collateral. The requirement of Mr. Cotton's home to secure the debt was excessive. (2) Failure to issue a decision on Mr. Cotton's loan applications within the required timeframe. (FmHA Instruction 1910-A, section 1910 (h) (i) (1) Farmer Program Applications. Each application must be approved or disapproved and notified in writing of the action taken, not later than 60 days after receipt of complete application) Mr. Cotton did not receive a decision on his application for a loan to purchase land adjacent to his property for over a year after filing his application. Also, he did not receive a decision on his application for primary loan servicing for over six (6) years.
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(3) FSA failed to give proper consideration to Mr. Cotton's application for primary loan servicing.
Mr. Cotton applied for primary loan servicing in October 1990 and did not receive a decision on his application until 1996. The FSA required Mr. Cotton to provide them with a 1996 farm and home plan in order for it to make a decision on his 1990 application for primary loan servicing. The FSA should not have required Mr. Cotton to provide a farm and home plan for a 1990 application. At the time Mr. Cotton filed his application, he did not have 1996 information.
(4) FmHA provided information to an outside source without Mr. Cotton's permission.
An employee of FmHA gave information to a Veterans Administration investigator without Mr. Cotton's permission. The FmHA failed to assist Mr. Cotton in making sure the Veterans Administration had obtained accurate information regarding Mr. Cotton. The FmHA never proved to Mr. Cotton that it had the authority to provide any information to the Veterans Administration without his permission.
(5) FSA failed to provide Mr. Cotton with program information and applications for participation.
The FSA employees did not provide Mr. Cotton information regarding why he did not qualify to participate in the treeplanting program, nor did FSA provide him with an application to participate in the program.
14 (a). Plaintiff and proposed Class representative, Alvin E. Steppes ("Steppes"), (Subclass II), an African-American farmer and
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resident of Lee County 1 Arkansas 1 where he and many other AfricanAmerican farmers had been farming for many years. Due to racebased disparate treatment by the Farmers Home Administration throughout the 1980s 1 Mr. Steppes and other black farmers were unable to gain access to FmHA loans and loan servicing to which they were otherwise entitled. This discrimination resulted in substantial losses in farm income. These losses led to Mr. Steppes losing his farm land and his ability to farm and to like damages to many other African-American farmers in the same county and state. Further l Mr. Steppes has incurred substantial farm debts as a direct result of FmHA/s racial discrimination which he is unable to repay.
14 (b). The racially discriminatory treatment Mr. Steppes was subjected to includes l in 1986 1 the unfair denial by FmHA of operating credit l even though he should have qualified and complied with all loan application requirement. This denial of credit prevented him from putting in crops and applying fertilizer l pesticides l and other treatments to the crops he did plant. As a result l he suffered a substantial loss in production and farm income in 1986.
14 (c). Mr. Steppes also is representative of many 1 if not all l African-American farmers in Arkansas in those years. He and 17 other African-American farmers from Lee County filed a detailed complaint with USDA in 1986 1 stating that they had been mistreated and at that time were all still being mistreated by FmHA in the same manner on the basis of their raCe.
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14 (d). After investigating the claims of the group of which Mr. Steppes is a representative, USDA's Office of Advocacy and Enterprise in 1987 found that the racial discrimination of which Mr. Steppes and others complained was in fact occurring in the form of disparate treatment, and that it was occurring not only at the Lee County level, but at the level of the entire State. The findings include the following acts of disparate treatment and other acts of racial animus:
1. African-American farmers' projected crop yields were calculated differently from White farmers.
2. African-American farmers' applications were not handled in a timely manner.
3. African-American farmers were not provided timely information on required documents for completion of their applications.
4. African-American farmers' Farm and Home Plans contained computation errors, which resulted in their applications being rejected.
5. Approved African-American farmers' title opinions were delayed for an unacceptable time period.
6. African-American farmers were not advised of all servicing options.
7. County office personnel were rude and insensitive to African-American farmers.
14 (e). Despite these findings, Defendant responded, but never properly ruled pursuant to ECOA, on the discrimination complaints filed by Mr. Steppes and the other black farmers.
15. Each of the remaining Class members, is an AfricanAmerican farmer and resident of either Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina,
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Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas or Virginia, who Ca) timely applied for loans and/or program payments with defendant during the period 1983-1997 and was the subject of willful and continuous racial discrimination, and (b) timely filed a complaint or complaints with defendant of these acts of discrimination, which complaint(s) was/were never acted upon pursuant to the applicable law, causing the farmer substantial damages.
16. Defendant, Dan Glickman, is Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"), and is the federal official responsible for the administration of the statutes, regulations and programs which are the focus of this action.
HOW DEFENDANT IS ORGANI ZED AND, GENERALLY, THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AT ISSUE 17. USDA's Farm Service Agency ("FSA") provides commodity program benefits (such as deficiency payments, price support loans, conservation reserve benefits), disaster payments, farm loans and other farm credit benefits to u.S. farmers. The agency was created in 1994, as a result of a reorganization of USDA, primarily by the merger of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service ("ASCS", which previously had handled commodity program benefits, price support loans, CRP payments, disaster payments, and related services) with the Farmers Home Administration ("FmHA", which previously had provided farm loans and other farm credit benefits) . 18. The FmHA was created decades ago to provide loans, credit and technical assistance for farmers. FmHA made loans directly to farmers or guaranteed the loans made to farmers by private, commercial lenders. These loans included "farm
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ownership", "operating", and "continuing assistance" loans, as well as loans that "restructure"existing loans and "emergency disaster" loans.
19. ASeS was an agency of USDA created to provide services to U.S. farmers under the price support, deficiency payment, eRP, and related programs to stabilize farm income and prices, and to assist in the conservation of land. It was consolidated into the Farm Service Agency in 1994.
20. Defendant, Glickman is responsible for the administration of the Farm Service Agency (FSA) and previously FmHA & Ases. FSA, like FmHA and Ases before it, administers the federal farm programs through a three-tiered review system consisting of (1) county offices and committees, (2) state offices and committees, and (3) a federal level of review in Washington, D.C., the National Appeals Division ("NAD"). The local county committees consist of producers from a county who have been elected by other producers in that county; they oversee the county offices. The state committees consist of producers from each state selected by the Secretary of USDA; they oversee the state offices. At the federal level NAD renders final determinations of administrative appeals. (Prior to the 1994 consolidation, FmHA had its own administrative appeal process) . HOW FARMERS (1) APPLIED FOR LOANS AND CREDIT WITH FmHA AND (2) APPLIED FOR PARTICIPATION IN OTHER FARM PROGRAMS WITH ASCS
21. Traditionally, when a farmer applied for any FmHA loan or program, he went to his county office (formerly the FmHA office), and filled out a Farm and Home Plan (FHP) , which required
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the assistance and guidance of defendant's officials to complete. Assistance and guidance was critical because of the complexity of the programs and forms. This application process was done pursuant to regulations found at 7 C.F.R. 1910, et seq. Tf the farmer needed an ASCS-type benefit or assistance, he worked with his County Executive Director ("CED") and county committee in applying for participation or benefits. The process was and is done pursuant to ASCS regulations (7 C.F.R. Part 700, et seg.) and Commodity Credit Corporation ("CCC") regulations (7 C.F.R. at 1400, et seg.).
22. When the FmHA loan application with its supporting documents was completed it was presented to the county committee. If approved, the loan was processed. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") prohibits discrimination in credit based on sex, marital status, race, color, age, or national origin, religion, etc. (15 U.S.C. §1691(a)). If an FmHA loan was denied on discriminatory grounds, the farmer could file a complaint of discrimination with the Secretary of USDA, the FmHA - Equal Opportunity ("EO") office or with the Office of Civil Rights Enforcement and Adjudication ("OCREA"), or both.
23. With respect to ASCS-type programs, the application was reviewed by the CED and then presented to the county committee. If approved, the ASCS benefits were awarded. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits exclusion of participation in federal programs based on race, color or natural origin. With respect to ASCS-type applications, if a farm program application
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was denied on discriminatory grounds, the farmer could file a complaint of discrimination with the Secretary of USDA or OCREA.
HOW PLAINTIFFS AND MEMBERS OF THE CLASS WERE DAMAGED -WHAT DEFENDANT DID IN RESPONSE TO COMPLAINTS OF DISCRIMINATION
24. Unbeknownst to plaintiffs and members of the Class, defendant disbanded the enforcement ability of EO and OCREA in 1983, leaving defendant with no ability to investigate discrimination complaints. In a May 25, 1997 Richmond News Dispatch article and interview of Lloyd Wright, Director of USDA Office of Civil Rights, Mr. Wright stated that (1) no systematic probes or investigations had been taken since 1983, when the Reagan administration disbanded the Civil Rights investigative staff, and (2) that agency regulations and the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, et al. were violated. Further evidence of defendant's willful failure to investigate discrimination complaints is evident in the February 27, 1997, Office of Inspector General Report ("OIG Report"), and the February, 1997 Civil Rights Action Team Report (IICRAT Report"), both explained below.
25. The Department of Justice (DOJ) was required to ensure that Federal agencies met their Title VI enforcement obligations and provide civil rights protection to persons filing discrimination complaints in the FSA programs. DOJ failed to ensure that defendant met its Title VI obligations.
26. Within USDA, The Policy Analysis and Coordination Center (PACC), an agency under the Assistant Secretary for Administration, was responsible for civil rights compliance and developing regulations for processing program discrimination
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complaints at USDA. [OIG Report, p. 4] OCREA was responsible for processing program discrimination complaints received by USDA from participants in FSA programs. [OIG Report, p. 4]
27. OCREA was required to forward written complaints from FSA program participants of discrimination to the appropriate agency within USDA asking the agency to attempt conciliation of the complaint. If conciliation was not successful, the agency was to be instructed to perform a preliminary inquiry and make a recommendation of a finding of "discrimination" or "no discrimination". OCREA was to perform its own analysis of the complaint and the preliminary inquiry and make a recommendation to the Assistant Secretary for Administration on the finding of "discrimination" or "no discrimination". This process never occurred during the relevant period covered by this lawsuit. [OIG Report, p. 4]
28. FSA's Civil Rights and Small Business Staff (CR&SBUS) was responsible for handling program discrimination complaints within FSA. CR&SBUS never followed proper procedure pursuant to the law during the relevant period covered by this lawsuit. [OIG Report, p. 5]
29. The applicable State Civil Rights Coordinator in FSA' was responsible for obtaining a conciliation agreement or performing a preliminary inquiry and forward it to CR&SBUS. If a conciliation agreement was reached with the complainant, CR&SBUS was to forward the agreement to OCREA and recommend the discrimination complaint be closed. If a preliminary inquiry was performed, CR&SBUS would analyze the information and determine if
- 38 -

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discrimination was foundi CR&SBUS was to forward the preliminary inquiry and its analysis to OCREA with its determination. These procedures were never properly followed.
30. USDA has codified regulations, 7 C.F.R., Part 15 "Nondiscrimination," which states USDA's policy of nondiscrimination in federally assisted and conducted programs. in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The regulations should have served as a basis for civil rights compliance and enforcement with respect to participants in FSA programs, however, defendant admits the regulations have long been and still are outdated and never reflected the departmental agencies, programs and laws. (Emphasis supplied.) [OIG Report, p. 5]
31. USDA Regulation 4330-1, which is over 11 years old, dated June 27, 1986, set the departmental policy for program civil rights compliance reviews, but does not provide policy and guidance for processing program discrimination complaints. [OIG Report, p. 5]
32. On December 12, 1994, in a management alert to the then Office of Civil Rights Enforcement, defendant's Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported problems with how USDA received, processed, and resolved program discrimination complaints. OIG recommended that "a departmental regulation be promulgated that sets forth the authorities of the Office of Civil Rights Enforcement and that written procedures and controls be established governing the receipt, processing, and resolution of program discrimination complaints within established timeframes". [OIG Report, p. 5]
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33. The regulation was never published. 2
34. After years of abuse and benign neglect of African
American farmers 1 OIG finally undertook an investigation and
review 1 the results of which were released on February 271 1997 1
of defendant's program discrimination complaints within FSA as
well as 10 other agencies within USDA. OIG found 1 inter alia l
that the discrimination complaint process within USDA lacked
"integritYI II and "accountability" was without a tracking systeml
was in "disorder" l did not resolve discrimination complaints 1 and
had a massive backlog:
liThe program discrimination complaint process at FSA lacks integrity 1 direction and accountability. The staff responsible for processing discrimination complaints receives little guidance from management 1 functions in the absence of any current position descriptions or internal procedures 1 and is beset with its own personnel EEO problems. The staff also processes discrimination complaints without a reliable tracking system to determine the status of the complaints and l apparentlYI with-out deadlines to resolve the complaints. The resulting climate of disorder has brought the complaint system within FSA to a near standstill. Little gets accomplished to resolve discrimination complaints or to make program managers aware of alleged problems within their programs. After developing our own data base of unresolved cases 1 we determined that as of January 271 1997 1 FSA had an outstanding backlog of 241 complaints. II (Emphasis supplied) [OIG Report 1 p. 6]
35. OIG found that the staff responsible for processing the
discrimination complaints consisted of two untrained and unquali-
fied people:
liThe FSA staff responsible for processing discrimination complaints 1 the Civil Rights and Small Business
2The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issued a report in June 1996 1 titled Federal Title VI Enforcement to Ensure Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs. This report also had specific findings and recommendations critical of the USDA discrimination complaints processing system.
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Utilization Staff (CR&SBUS)" has two full-time program specialists working to resolve program complaints. These program specialists are supplemented by an administrative assistant who provides secretarial support and two staff assistants who maintain case files and the tracking system. The two program specialists and the two staff assistants transferred to FSA from the civil rights staff of the former Farmer's Home Administration (FmHA) during the Department's reorganization in October 1995. The staff assistants have been performing analyses of the preliminary inquiries conducted on the complaints, although they are not trained or otherwise qualified to do so. None of the former FmHA employees with CR&SBUS have position descriptions to reflect their current duties and responsibilities, and none have received performance appraisals for fiscal year 1996." (Emphasis supplied) [DIG Report, p. 6]
36. DIG found a "massive backlog" of unprocessed FSA com-
plaints. [DIG Report, p. 6)
37. DIG found the FSA files "disorganized" and unaccount-
able:
" ... CR&SBUS was unable to provide' us with an accurate number of outstanding complaints or their status. We reviewed the case files and found them generally disorganized. It was difficult for us to readily determine the date of the complaint, the reason it was brought, and the status of its resolution." (Emphasis supplied) [DIG Report, p. 7]
38. DIG found hundreds of FSA cases unresolved:
"Our review at the CR&SBUS and CREA disclosed that, between them, they had ,listed a total of 272 cases as being active. The oldest case listed dates
back to 1986. * * * After resolving all duplications
and determining the actual status of the 272 cases, we found that FSA had 241 cases of program discrimination complaints that had not been resolved." (Emphasis supplied) [DIG Report, p. 7]
39. DIG found repeated unaccountability and missing files:
"During our, reconciliation of the two agencies' lists, we noted that some cases were listed by one or
- 41 -

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the other agency but could not be .found in its filing system. CR&SBUS listed 32 cases that we could no find in its filing system, and CREA listed 28 cases that we could not find in its filing system. We also noted that CR&SBUS listed cases unknown to CREA. CR&SBUS listed 19 cases that CREA did not list." [OIG Report, p. 7]
40. OIG found there was no reliable method to the process-
ing:
"CREA had officially closed 30 of the 272 cases with findings of no discrimination. CREA had also closed one case with a finding of discrimination, and the complainant was compensated. The case involved the FSA disaster program, and the complainant received the benefits which were at first denied by FSA. Four of the remaining 24 cases had findings of discrimination as determined by CREA and are pending resolution. One of the four complainants has not responded to the Department I s written notice regarding filing a claim for compensation. Office of Operations officials are negotiating a settlement with the remaining three complainants." [OIG Report, pp. 7-8]
41. OIG found improperly closed files and improper reviews,
and many files with no documentation:
"We found that FSA improperly closed and forwarded 30 complaints to program managers, without notifying the Department (26 of 30 cases were closed under the old FmHA agency management). The civil rights staff concluded without first receiving concurrence from the Department that these cases were the result of "programmatic discrepancies" (i.e., agency error rather than civil rights violations). Without departmental concurrence with its findings, the agency may not have addressed the legitimate cases of discrimination. CREA has the responsibility to make final determination of program discrimination. FSA may recommend to CREA that cases be closed, but it does not have the authority to close these cases without concurrence from CREA. For example, we noted that in one instance FSA (the former FmHA) incorrectly concluded that a case had only programmatic concerns and closed the case without forwarding it to the Department. Only after a civil rights staff member complained, did FSA process the case as a civil rights discrimination case. The civil rights
- 42 -

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staff stated in a letter that the allegation of racial

discrimination was overlooked.

The mix-up was

discussed with the Department r which determined that the case should be processed by the civil rights staff.

For most of the remaining cases r we found no

documentation in the case files at FSA that the

Department has reviewed these cases. " (Emphasis

supplied) [018 Report r p. 8]

42. 018 found 58% of the FSA civil rights complaint case files were over 1 year old and over 150 cases were almost two years old:

"

. the average age of the 241 cases we consid-

er open because they were not officially closed by the

Department.

No. of Cases

Program

Average Age

151

Ag. Credit

(Farm Loans) 703 Days

40

Disaster

485 Days

50

Others

482 Days

Of the 241 open cases r 139 (58 percent) were known to be over 1 year old. Of the 241 cases r 129 (54 percent) are awaiting action in FSAi the remaining 112 cases (46 percent) are in the hands of the CREA staff in USDA's Office of Operations. Sixty-five of the cases at FSA (50 percent) need a preliminary inquiry. Some of these date back to 1993." [018 Report r p. 8]
43. 018 found no system within FSA for reconciliation or
tracking of civil rights complaint cases:

"CR&SBUS has no procedures in place to reconcile or track the status of complaints after they are forwarded to CREA. Therefore r CR&SBUS could not tell us the status of complaints at CREA. As noted above r both CR&SBUS and CREA had different numbers and were not aware of all the outstanding complaints." (Emphasis supplied) [018 Report r p. 8]
44. 018 found no management oversight within FSA with
respect to the handling of civil rights complaints:

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"CR&SBUS also does not prepare management reports to inform FSA program managers of alleged problems of discrimination within their programs. Without this information, program managers may not be aware of potential discrimination in the programs they are responsible for administering." [OIG Report, p. 9]

45. With respect to defendant's Office of Operations, Civil

Rights Enforcement and Adjudication (CREA) , OIG found repeated

inaccuracies and unaccountability:

" ... that the listing of outstanding cases provided by CREA contained inaccurate information. In some instances we were unable to locate the case files at CREA that were on its outstanding case list. Without reviewing the case files, we were unable to verify the status of the complaints. Also, CREA and FSA had not reconciled their cases, and neither could inform us of the correct number of outstanding cases."

"CREA does not have controls in place to monitor

and track discrimination complaints. When complaints

are received they are logged in, given a case number,

and after the agency forwards the preliminary inquiry

to CREA, the case is assigned to one of its seven

program specialists. There are no procedures to require

the program specialists to follow up on overdue re-

sponses from the agency. We have found that CREA is

not following up on discrimination cases it returned to

FSA for conciliation or performance of a preliminary

inquiry. CREA advises the agency that it has 90 days

to complete its review, but it does not follow up with

the agency to determine the status of the complaint."

[OIG Report,

p. 9]

46. OIG surveyed 10 other USDA program agencies in addition

to FSA, to determine the procedures used for processing program

discrimination complaints and found the same problems. [OIG

Report, pp. 10-11]

47. OIG compiled a list of outstanding ("open") program

discrimination complaints, as late as 1996, within the Department,

totaling 271. [OIG Report, at Attachment A]

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48. At the same time that OIG released its report, a USDA
Civil Rights Action Team released a report, dated February 1997,
condemning defendant's lack of civil rights enforcement and
accountability which, inter alia, was a cause of the drastic
decline in the number of African American farmers. (The Report is
hereinafter referred to as "CRAT"):
"According to the most recent Census of Agriculture, the number of all minority farms has fallen -from 950,000 in 1920 to around 60,000 in 1992. For African Americans, the number fell from 925,000, 14 percent of all farms in 1920 to only 18,000, 1 percent of all farms in 1992." [CRAT, p. 14]
49. CRAT found a common problem involved minority farmers
applying to defendant for loans:
"The minority or limited-resource farmer tries to apply for a farm operating loan through the FSA county office well in advance of planting season. The FSA county office might claim to have no applications available and ask the farmer to return later. Upon returning, the farmer might receive an application without any assistance in completing it, then be asked repeatedly to correct mistakes or complete oversight in the loan application. Often those requests for correcting the application could be stretched for months, since they would come only if the minority farmer contacted the office to check on the loan processing. By the time processing is completed, even when the loan is approved, planting season has already passed and the farmer either has not been able to plant at all, or has obtained limited credit on the strength of an expected FSA loan to plant a small crop, usually without the fertilizer and other supplies necessary for the best yields. The farmer's profit is then reduced." (Emphasis supplied) [CRAT, p. 15]
50. CRAT found systematic mistreatment of minority farmers:
"If the farmer's promised FSA loan finally does arrive, it may have been arbitrarily reduced, leaving the farmer without enough money to repay suppliers and any mortgage or equipment debts. In some cases, the
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FSA loan never arrives, again leaving the farmer without means to repay debts. Further operating and disaster loans may be denied because of the farmer I s debt load, making it impossible for the farmer to earn any money from the farm. As an alternative, the local FSA official might offer the farmer an opportunity to lease back the land with an option to buy it back later. The appraised value of the land is set very high, presumably to support the needed operating loans, but also making repurchase of the land beyond the limited-resource farmer I s means. The land is lost finally and sold at auction, where it is bought by someone else at half the price being asked of the minority farmer. Often it is alleged that the person was a friend or relative of one of the FSA county officials." (Emphasis supplied) [CRAT, p. 16]
51. CRAT found insufficient oversight of farm credit to
minorities:
"Currently, the Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services (FFAS) Mission Area, which manages the FSA program delivery system, provides ineffective oversight of the local delivery of farm credit services." (Emphasis supplied) [CRAT, p. 16]
52. CRAT found a lack of diversity in FSA program delivery
structure:
"Because of the ways in which State and county committees are chosen and county offices are staffed, FSA lacks diversity in its program delivery structure.
Federal EEO and Affirmative Employment laws and policies do not govern the FSA non-Federal workforce except by agency regulation." (Emphasis supplied) [CRAT, p. 18]
53. CRAT found a lack of minority employees in FSA county
offices:
"A recent GAO study indicated that in the 101 counties with the largest concentration of minority farmers, one-quarter had no minority employees in their offices." [CRAT, p. 18]
54. CRAT found lower participation rates and lower approval
rates for minorities in FSA programs:
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"Recent studies requested by Congress and FSA have found lower participation and lower loan approval rates for minorities in most FSA programs. Participation rates in 1994 in programs of the former Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS), particularly commodity programs and disaster programs, were disproportionately low for all· minorities. The GAO found that between October 1, 1994 and March 31, 1996, 33 percent of minority applications but only 27 percent of non-minority applications in the Agricultural ConservationProgram (ACP) were disapproved. During the same period, 16 percent of minority but only 10 percent of non-minority loans in the direct loan program were disapproved." (Emphasis supplied) [CRAT, p. 21]
55. For some states, the approval rates for farm loans were
widely disparate:
"For example, only 67 percent of African-American loans were approved in Louisiana, compared to 83 percent of non-minority loans. Alabama showed a similar disparity -- only 78 percent of African-American loans approved, compared to 90 percent of non-minority loans." [CRAT, p. 21]
56. CRAT found minorities endured longer loan processing
times:
"Again, however, some States showed consistently longer processing times for minorities. In the Southeast, for example, in several States in took three times as long on average to process African-American loan applications as it did non-minority applications.
Similar disparities between non-minority loan processing and American Indian loan processing appeared in records for a number of States included in FSA's Northwest region." [CRAT, p. 21]
57. CRAT found discrimination complaints at USDA were often
ignored:
"Farmers who told the CRAT stories of discrimination and abuse by USDA agencies also described a complaints processing system which, if anything, often makes matters worse. They described a bureaucratic nightmare where, even after they receive a finding of discrimination, USDA refuses to pay damages. They charged USDA with forcing them into court to seek justice, rather than working with them to redress acknowledged grievances. They painfully described the
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toll these ongoing battles with USDA has taken on their
families, and on their health." [CRAT, pp. 22-23)

58. CRAT found decisions favoring farmers routinely not
enforced by USDA:
"However, many farmers, especially small farmers, who have managed to appeal their cases to FSA charge that even when decisions are overturned, local offices often do not honor the decision. They claim that decisions favoring farmers are simply "not enforced"." [CRAT, p. 23 ]

59. CRAT found a lack of USDA regulations for discrimina-
tion complaint processing:
"Program discrimination complaints generally fall within two categories: (1) programs conducted directly by a USDA agency, such as USDA loan programs, and (2) federal assisted programs, where USDA does not directly offer services to customers, but recipients of USDA funds do. The recipients must obey civil rights laws, and USDA can be sued under such laws as Title VI, the Rehabilitation Act, IX, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and others. CRAT members were informed by OGC that USDA presently has no published regulations with clear guidance on the process or time lines involved in program discrimination complaints. When a farmer does <;l.llege discrimination, "preliminary investigations" are typically conducted by the agency that has been charged with violating her or his right." [CRAT, p. 24]

60. CRAT found discrimination complaints often are not

responded to by USDA:

"

. USDA doesn't respond even when they do file

complaints. In Tulsa, OK. an advocate representing

black and American Indian farmers said, "we have filed

72 civil rights complaints. Not one complaint has even

been answered." [CRAT, p. 24]

61. CRAT found record-keeping on discrimination complaints

"non-existent" and that a backlog existed:

"The CRAT was unable to gather historical data on program discrimination complaints at USDA because record keeping on these matters has been virtually

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nonexistent. Complaints filed with the agencies are

not necessarily reported to USDA's Civil Rights office.

Some figures are available however, for cases that

were open as of December 31, 1996. The largest number

of pending discrimination complaints, as comments at

the listening sessions suggests, are concentrated in

three agencies at USDA. There were 205 case pending,

representing 42 percent of the total, against the FSS:

165, or 33.3 percent against the Rural Housing Service

(RHS): and 62, or 12.5 percent against the Food and

Consumer Services. Sixty-three cases,. or 12.7 percent

of the total, were pending against other agencies. The

Department had a total of 495 pending program discrimi-

nation complaints.

Approximately one-half of the

pending cases are 2 years old or older, verifying

farmers contention that complaints are being processed

slowly, if at all. According to the Complaints Pro-

cessing Division at the Office of Operation (00), which

processes complaints that make it to the Department

level. USDA averages about 200 new program discrimina-

tion complaints each year. However, in fiscal year

1996, an average of only 9 cases were closed per month,

or 108 during the year

increasing a backlog of

program complaints." (Emphasis supplied.) [CRAT, pp.

24-25]

62. CRAT uncovered neglect of and bias against minorities
by USDA, resulting in a loss of farmers' land and income.
"The recent Civil Rights listening-sessions revealed a general perception of apathy, neglect, and a negative bias towards all minorities on the part of most local USDA government officials directly involved in decision making for program delivery. A reporter at the recent listening session in Tulsa, OK. observed that minority farmer are not sure which condition "was worse - - being ignored by the USDA and missing potential opportunities or getting involved with its programs and facing a litany of abuses. Minority farmers have lost significant amounts of land and potential farm income as a result of discrimination of FSA programs and the programs of its predecessor agencies, ASCS and FmHA. Socially disadvantaged and minority farmers said USDA is part of a conspiracy to take their land and look to USDA for some kind of compensation for their loses." [CRAT, p. 30]

63. CRAT found USDA the fifth worst (of 56 government agencies) in hiring minorities:

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"According to the US Department of Labor, between 1990 and 2000, women, minorities, and immigrants will account for 80 percent of the United States labor force growth. The IIFramework for Change: Work Force Diversity and Delivery of Programs," a USDA report released in 1990, found that USDA had a need to remedy under-representation in its workforce by providing equal employment and promotion opportunities for all employees. When this statement was made, USDA ranked 52 out of 56 Federal agencies in the employment of minorities, women, and individuals with disabilities. II [CRAT, p.
33]

64. CRAT found the lack of diversity at USDA adversely

affects program delivery to minorities:

"USDA's workforce does not reflect the diversity of it customer base. The lack of diversity in field offices adversely affects program delivery to minority and women customers of USDA. II [CRAT, p. 45]

65. CRAT found a lack of resources at USDA to ensure fair

and equitable (non-discriminatory) program delivery to farmers:

liThe Assistant Secretary for Administration is USDA's senior official responsible for civil rights. Although that position has the responsibility for civil rights policy and compliances, it does not have the authority or resources necessary to ensure that programs are delivered and employees are treated fairly and equitably." [CRAT, p. 46]

66. CRAT found enforcement of civil rights at USDA in

program delivery lacking:

IIAnother problem with enforcing civil rights in

program delivery is fragmentation. Agency civil rights

directors have a number of responsibilities.

For

example, USDA agencies each perform some complaint

processing functions. However, the Commission noted

that the respective roles of OCRE and the agencies were

not clearly defined. The Commission also found that

OCRE was providing technical assistance to agencies on

civil rights statutes, not proactively, but only when

requested. II [CRAT, p. 51]

67. CRAT found a lack of civil rights specialists and knowledge for program-related civil rights issues at USDA:

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"The Civil Rights Commission's report on the lack of Title VI enforcement also pointed to USDA's lack of civil rights specialists in program-related civil rights issues. Many of the Department's civil rights resources are devoted to processing of employment discrimination complaints. Of the current staff in the Department's two civil rights offices, two-thirds work on EEO complaints. That means only a small percentage of USDA's civil rights staff works on civil rights issues relating to program delivery. According to the Commission, the 1994 civil rights reorganization was deficient because OCRE did not separate internal and external civil rights issues into separate offices. The Commission predicted that "a probable consequence is that USDA's Title VI enforcement program may suffer as OCRE responds to pressures to improve USDA's internal civil rights program." It recommended that USDA establish "two separate units, with different supervisory staff," one for internal and one for external civil rights issues." [CRAT, p. 54]
68. CRAT found defendant's counsel hostile to civil rights,
if not racist:
"The perception that the Office of the General Counsel [at USDA] is hostile to civil rights has been discussed earlier in this report. OGC' s legal positions on civil right issues are perceived .as insensitive at the least, and racist at worst. Correcting this problem is critical to the success of USDA's civil rights program." [CRAT, p. 55]
69. CRAT found defendant's counsel often have no civil
rights experience or education:
"However, the CRAT has found that attorneys who practice civil rights law at [USDA's] OGC are not required to have specialized experience or education in civil rights when they are hired. They acquire their civil rights experience on the job. In addition, most of OGC's lawyers working on civil rights issues work on non-civiI-rights issues as well." [CRAT, p. 55]
70. In sum, CRAT concluded that defendant does not support
or enforce civil rights:
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• •

"USDA does not have the structure in place to

support an effective civil rights program. The Assis-

tant Secretary for Administration lacks authority and

resources essential to ensure accountability among

senior management ranks. There has been instability

and lack of skilled leadership at the position of USDA

Director of Civil Rights. Dividing up the Department's

Civil Rights office between policy and complaints has

further exacerbated the problem.

The division of

responsibility for civil rights among different USDA

offices and agencies has left confusion over enforce-

ment responsibilities. Finally, OGC is perceived as

unsupportive of civil rights." [CRAT, p. 56]

71. On September 29, 1997, USDA's Office of Inspector General issued phase II of the OIG Report on Civil Rights Issues, entitled "Minority Participation In Farm Service Agency's Farm Loan Programs - Phase II" (hereinafter "OIG Report Phase II") which found, inter alia that (a) defendant has resolved only 32 of the 241 outstanding discrimination complaints reported in the OIG Report (back in February, 1997) and (b) that the backlog of discrimination complaints had increased from 241 to 474 for FSA and from 530 to 984 for all of USDA.
72. On September 30, 1998, the USDA's Office of Inspector General released its "Report to the Secretary on Civil Rights Issues - Phase V" [hereinafter "OIG Report V"], which supplements plaintiffs claims and supporting materials in this lawsuit and in the above pending motions. In particular, OIG Report V states, inter alia:

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a. "We found that the Department [USDA] , through CR [Office of Civil Rights], has not made significant progress in reducing the complaints backlog. Whereas the backlog stood at 1,088 complaints on November 1, 1997, it still remains at 616 complaints as of September 11, 1998." OIG Report V, cover letter to the Secretary.
b. "The backlog is not being resolved at a faster rate because CR itself has not attained the efficiency it needs to systematically reduce the caseload. Few of the deficiencies we noted in our previous reviews have been corrected. The office is still in disarray, providing no decisive leadership and making little attempt to correct the mistakes of the past. We noted with considerable concern that after 20 months, CR has made virtually no progress in implementing the corrective actions we thought essential to the viability of its operations." 01G Report V at i (emphasis added) .
c. "Most conspicuous among the uncorrected problems is the continuing disorder within CR. The data base CR uses to report the status of cases is unreliable and full of error, and the files it keeps to store needed documentation are slovenly and unmanaged. Forty complaint files could not be found, and another 130 complaints that were listed in USDA agency files were not recorded in CR's data base. Management controls were so poor that we could not render an opinion on the quality of CR's investigations and adjudications." 01G Report V at iii (emphasis added) .
d. "Of equal significance is the absence of written policy
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and procedures. n DIG Report V at iii. e. "The absence of formal procedures and accurate records
raises questions about due care within the complaints resolution process. We found critical quality control steps missing at every stage of the process. Staff members with little training and less experience were put to judging matters that carry serious legal and moral implications. Many of CR's adjudicators, who must determine whether discrimination occurred, were student interns. Legal staff members with the Office of General Counsel (OGC) , who review CR's decisions for legal sufficiency, have had to return over half of them because they were based on incomplete data or faulty analysis. We noted that a disproportionately large percent of the 616 cases of unresolved backlog had bottlenecked in the adjudication unit. n DIG Report V at iii (emphasis added) .
73. In sum, defendant's willful disregard of, and failure to properly investigate, African-American discrimination complaints began with the disbanding of civil rights enforcement functions back in 1983, until February 1997 when the current administration reorganized and reestablished the enforcement staff of the civil rights office, and since February, 1987, has gotten worse, as evidenced by the massive increase of backlogged, unresolved cases and overall disarray in the USDA Office o'f Civil Rights as reported in the most recent DIG Report.
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•
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
74. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") , as amended
in 1976, is a detailed and exhaustive legislative directive
unequivocal in its statutory intent to stamp out discrimination
by any lender, anywhere, whether they be a private, public,
governmental or quasi-governmental entity.
ECOA states, inter alia:
It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction - (1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract) i ... 15 U.S.C. §1691 (a) (1) .
ECOA provides for monetary relief to both individuals and
class members who are damaged by creditors who violate the
statute:
Any creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be liable to the aggrieved applicant for any actual damages sustained by such applicant acting either in an individual capacity or as a member of a class. 15 U.S.C. §1691e(a) (emphasis added) .
Thirdly, district courts are invested with the authority to
provide equitable and declaratory relief:
Upon application by an aggrieved applicant, the appropriate United States district court or any other court of competent jurisdiction may grant such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce the requirements imposed under this subchapter.
15 U.S.C. §1691e(c) (emphasis added).
Fourthly, the prevailing party can recover costs and
reasonable attorneys fees:
In the case of any successful action under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, the cost of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court, shall be added to any damages
- 55 -

• •
awarded by the court under such subsection. 15 U.S.C. §1691e (d) (emphasis added) . 75. In sum, this court has jurisdiction to grant actual damages, equitable and declaratory relief, costs and attorneys fees, and ECOA contains a waiver of United States sovereign immunity. 3 76. When the class members filed discrimination complaints, they fell four-square under the umbrella of ECOA. It is plaintiffs' belief that ninety-five percent of class members filed complaints of discrimination with respect to the USDA loan application process. Only five percent have claims for denial of disaster applications. 77. Defendant does not dispute the waiver of sovereign immunity under ECOA. Plaintiffs assert that there is no just reason for denying the remaining five percent of plaintiffs' relief for complaints of discrimination involving disaster benefits. While ECOA covers farm "credit" programs, but not disaster programs, the APA provides an avenue of relief for Black farmers who have been denied equal access to disaster programs and, subsequently, due process of law in challenging the implementation of that program. The implementation of USDA's credit programs and other programs were closely intertwined and the violation of plaintiffs' rights equally egregious in both areas. Racial discrimination ran rampant under both programs, and neither offered Black farmers an opportunity to appeal to a civil rights enforcement body to obtain relief. Further, in many instances, the calculation of loans under the credit program and
- 56 -

• •

payments or benefits under the other programs were

interdependent. For example, the amount of program benefits or

program allotments that a farmer could receive for the crop of a

commodity (such as cotton, corn, wheat, rice, peanuts, or

tobacco) in a year required a review of his or her farming

history, which, in turn, was directly related to the yield per

acre the farmer cultivated, which was dependent on the amount of

operating credit made available to the farmer.

78. Class members are seeking redress for the denial of due

process to the members of the class for the discriminatory

implementation of these interconnected farm programs and for the

defendant's failure regarding these programs to provide

sufficient civil rights investigation and enforcement.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS WAIVED

79. On October 21, 1998, the President signed into law the

Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999, P.L.

105-

This legislation contains the following provisions:

Sec. [741]. Waiver of Statute of Limitations.

(a) To the extent permitted by the Constitution, any civil action to obtain relief with respect to the discrimination alleged in an eligible complaint, if commenced not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, shall not be barred by any statute of limitations.

(b) The complainant may, in lieu of filing a civil action, seek a determination on the merits of the eligible complaint by the Department of Agriculture if such complaint was filed not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act. The Department of
Agriculture shall--

(1) provide the complainant an opportunity

Moore v. USDA, 55 F.3d 991 (5 th Cir. 1995).

- 57 -

• •
for a hearing on the record before making that determination;
(2) award the complainant such relief as would be afforded under the applicable statute from which the eligible complaint arose notwithstanding any statute of limitations; and
(3) to the maximum extent practicable within 180 days after the date a determination of an eligible complaint is sought under this subsection conduct an investigation, issue a written determination and propose a resolution in accordance with this subsection.
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), if an eligible claim is denied administratively, the claimant shall have at least 180 days to commence a cause of action in a Federal Court of competent jurisdiction seeking a review of such denial.
(d) The United States Court of Federal Claims and the United States District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over--
(1) any cause of action arising out of a complaint with respect to which this section waives the statute of limitations; and
(2) any civil action for judicial review of a determination in an administrative proceeding in the Department of Agriculture under this section.
(e) As used in this section, the term "eligible complaint" means a nonemployment related complaint that was filed with the Department of Agriculture before July I, 1997 and alleges discrimination at any time during the period beginning on January I, 1981 and ending December 31, 1996--
(1) in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. 1691 et seq.) in administering--
(A) a farm ownership, farm operating, or emergency loan funded from the Agricultural Credit Insurance Program Accounti or
(B) a housing program established under title V of the Housing Act of 1949; or
(2) in the administration of a commodity
- 58 -

• •
program or a disaster assistance program. (f) This section shall apply in fiscal year 1999 and thereafter. (g) The standard of review for judicial review of an agency action with respect to an eligible complaint is de novo review. Chapter 5 of title 5 of the United States Code shall apply with respect to an agency action under this section with respect to an eligible complaint, without regard to section 554(a) (1) of that title.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
80. On March 9, 1998, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Certification of Class. On April 8, 1998, Defendant filed its Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and its Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On October 9, 1998, this court certified plaintiffs' class, defined as "[a]ll African-American farmers who (1) farmed between January 1, 1983, and February 21, 1997; and (2) applied"during that time period, for participation in a federal farm program with USDA, and as a direct result of a determination by USDA in response to said application, believed that th11ey were discriminated against on the basis of race, and filed a written discrimination complaint with USDA in that time period." The Class was further divid~d into three subclasses depending on what action, if any, that USDA has taken in responding to Class members' complaints of racial discrimination.
81. Notice to the "potential" Class members (estimated to be between 50-60,000) should result in somewhere between 2-8,000 Class members. With respect to the Class members, the allegations
- 59 -

• •
are similar, if not identical, to the allegations and causes of actions of the 12 Class representatives. Simply put, each and every plaintiff was denied a loan or program benefit (such as a disaster loan) by defendant, or was granted a loan or program ·benefit on terms different than that of white farmers; said plaintiff complained on grounds of discrimination; said discrimination complaint was never resolved pursuant to the law; and all of these events occurred during the period 1983-1997.
82. The foregoing allegations are typical as to all Class Members. The Class Representatives, for themselves and members of the Class will present a prima facie case of discrimination showing (1) defendant's awarding of credit and farm program participation to whites was a pattern different than for the Class members and (2) a willful failure of defendant to properly investigate the discrimination complaints of plaintiffs and members of the Class.
COUNT I
(Declaratory Judgment) 83. The Class representatives, on behalf of themselves and all Class members, re-allege all paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 84. An actual controversy exists between Class representatives and Class members and defendant as to their rights with respect to defendant's farm programs. 85. The Class representatives and the Class members pray that this Court declare and determine, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2201, the rights of the Class members under defendant's farm programs
- 60 -

• •
including their right to equal credit, participation in farm programs, and their right to full and timely enforcement of racial discrimination complaints.
COUNT II (Violation of Equal Credit Opportunity Act)
86. Class representatives, ·on behalf of themselves and all Class members similarly situated, re-allege all paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
87. Defendant's acts of denying Class members credit and other benefits and systematically failing to properly process their discrimination complaints was racially discriminatory and contrary to the requirements of ECOA.
88. Class representatives and the Class members pray defendant's actions be reversed as violative of and contrary to ECOA, 15 U.S.C. 1691 et seq.
89. Class members pray for equitable and declaratory relief, 16 U.S.C. §1691e(c); money damages, 16 U.S.C. §1691e(a), for the Class of not less than $2,500,000,000; and costs and attorneys fees, 16 U.S.C. §1691e(d).
COUNT III (Agency Action That Is Arbitrary Capricious, An Abuse Of Discretion, Not In Accordance With Law, And In Excess of Statutory Jurisdiction)
90. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, re-allege all paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
91. Defendant's acts of denying Class members credit or other benefits (particularly disaster applications)and
- 61 -

• •
systematically failing to properly process their discrimination complaints was racially discriminatory and not authorized nor justified by any statute, regulation, or reasonable interpretation of program procedures, and thus constitutes arbitrary, capricious and unlawful action.
92. Plaintiffs and the Class pray defendant's actions be reversed as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not in accordance with law, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 706(2) (A), and in excess of defendant's statutory jurisdiction, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (C) .
93. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, request this Court enter judgment against defendant as follows:
(1) ffil Order declaring, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2201, that the Class members were denied equal credit and other farm program benefits and full and timely enforcement of their civil rights discrimination complaints.
(2) An Order declaring defendant's actions to be a breach of the Class members' rights under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and declare the Class members' eligible to receive equitable relief, declaratory relief, monetary damages of not less than $2,500,000,000, and costs and reasonable attorneys fees.
(3) An Order declaring defendant's actions arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with the law, and in excess of defendant's statutory authority and jurisdiction;
- 62 -

• •
(4) An Order granting the Class members and their counsel attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §1691e(d) et seq., and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. §2412, costs of suit, and interest upon the judgment from date when the Class members should have been.paid to actual date of payment, and all other relief that the Court determines proper and fair.

October 26, 1998

By:
A~---a~r,e-r--~J~.~P~i~r-e-s~,~J~r-.-'#~1~8~5~0~0~9~--
CONLON, FRANTZ, PHELAN & PIRES 1818 N Street, N.W., Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-7050
l~
By, ~ P~ h~ i l~l ~ i p---=F-r-a- a s--#-2~ 1 1~2~1~~~~----1025 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20007 (202) 342-1300 Counsel for Plaintiffs

Of Counsel:
T. Roe Frazer LANGSTON, FRAZER, SWEET & FREESE 201 N. President Street Jackson, Mississippi 39201 (601) 969-1356
J. L. Chestnut CHESTNUT, SANDERS, SANDERS & PETTAWAY 1405 Jeff Davis Avenue Selma, Alabama 36701 (334) 875-9264

- 63 -

Othello C. Cross CROSS, KEARNEY & MCKISSIC 100 South Pine Street P.O. Box 6606 Pine Bluff, AR 71611 (870) 536-4056 Hubbard T. Saunders, IV THE TERNEY FIRM 401 East Capitol Street 200 Heritage Building Jackson, MS 39201-2607 Gerard R. Lear SPEISER KRAUSE 2300 Clarendon Blvd., Suite 306 Arlington, VA 22201
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of Defendants' Seventh Amended Class Action Complaint was delivered by fax and hand to Michael Sitcov and Susan Hall Lennon, 901 E Street, N.W., U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch, Room 920, Washington, D.C. 20044, on the 6th day of October, 1998.
- 64 -

• •
\MARLENE\ASCS\PIGFORD\Pleadings\Complaint - Seventh Amended.doc
- 65 -

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 382 Filed 01/04/01 Page 1 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et aI., Plaintiffs,
v. DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary,
United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

FILE 0

)

)

JAN - 4 2001

)

NANCY MAVEfI WHITIINGTON. CLERK

)

U.S. DtSTRlCT COURT

)

)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) /

)

)

)

)

)

----------------------------------)
)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

----------------------------------)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The Court has before it the motion of certain individual plaintiffs to reconsider the fairness of the Consent Decree approved by this Court on April 14, 1999, defendant's opposition, Class Counsel's response, and movants' reply to defendant's and Class Counsel's arguments. The Court heard oral argument on the motion and permitted movants and the defendant to file supplemental memoranda. Upon consideration of the pre-and post-hearing memoranda and the arguments of counsel, the Court will deny the motion.

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 382 Filed 01/04/01 Page 2 of 10
I. BACKGROUND On January 5, 1999, the parties filed a proposed Consent Decree which, if approved by the Court, would settle this case and establish a process for adjudicating claims by individual African American farmers who claimed that the United Stated Department of Agriculture had discriminated against them on the basis of their race when, among other things, it denied their applications for credit and/or benefit programs. After granting preliminary approval of the settlement, the Court conducted an extensive fairness hearing on March 2, 1999. On April 14, 1999, the Court gave final approval to the Consent Decree, finding that it represented a fair, reasonable and adequate resolution of the class members' claims under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999) Shortly after the Court approved the Decree, seven individual putative class members appealed the Court's order approving the Consent Decree to the court of appeals, arguing that the Decree was unfair in certain respects and should be set aside. Appellants' arguments were considered and summarily rejected by the court of appeals. See Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cif. 2000), ajf'g Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999). While the appeal was pending, the same seven appellants/movants filed the instant motion asking this Court to reconsider the fairness of the Consent Decree in light of "changed circumstances" which, they argue, justify vacating the Decree and scheduling this case for trial.
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 382 Filed 01/04/01 Page 3 of 10
II. DISCUSSION Movants have asked the Court to reconsider the fairness of the Consent Decree under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.] Rule 60(b)(5) permits a court to "relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding ... [it] it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Rule 60(b)(5), Fed. R. Civ. P; see Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378-83 (1992) (applying Rule 60(b) to request for modification of consent decree); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 46 F.3d 1198, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying Rufo analysis to request under Rule 60(b)(5) to modify consent decree). A party seeking modification of a consent decree under Rule 60(b)(5) "must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstances." Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. at 377; see NLRB v. Harris Teeter Supermarkets, 215 F.3d 32, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2000). To succeed on their motion in this case, movants must demonstrate that events or changed facts (1) "make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous"; (2) make the decree "unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles"; or (3) make "enforcement (of
Movants also seek relief under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b)(6) permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Rule 60(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. The phrase "other reason," however, consistently has been interpreted by the courts to mean reasons other than those specified in subsections (1) through (5) of Rule 60(b). See Baltia Airlines, Inc. v. Transaction Management, Inc., 98 F.3d 640,642 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 F.3d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1987». By its plain terms, therefore, Rule 60(b)(6) does not apply in this case because movants have sought relief under one of the other provision of Rule 60(b). The Court therefore will focus only on whether it should reconsider its ruling under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules.
3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 382 Filed 01/04/01 Page 4 of 10

the decree] detrimental to the public interest." Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. at 384; NLRB v. Harris Teeter Supermarkets, 215 F.3d at 35. Movants meet none of these three tests.
In their original motion for reconsideration, movants cited several examples of "changed circumstances" regarding the Track A claims process that allegedly constituted sufficient justifications for either setting aside the Consent Decree in its entirety or modifying it in unspecified ways. Many of the issues raised in the motion, however, were resolved or had become moot by the time the Court heard oral argument on the motion. 2 Accordingly, movants' supplemental hearing memorandum narrowed the alleged changed circumstances to only those still outstanding at the time of oral argument, and the Court therefore focuses only on those issues.
The majority of the issues raised by movants are essentially complaints regarding the manner in which adjudicators have been deciding Track A claims. Movants believe that an unacceptably high rate of Track A claims are being denied; that too few farmers are receiving debt relief; that adjudicators are deciding claims in an arbitrary and capricious manner; that adjudicators have a tendency to resolve factual disputes against class members;

2

For example, questions regarding the standard the Monitor should use to evaluate

Petitions for Monitor Review and whether claimants are able to supplement the record when filing

their Petitions were resolved by the Order of Reference, which appointed Randi Roth as the

Monitor and clarified her duties and powers. See Order of Reference, Apr. 4, 2000, at , 8(e).

In addition, uncertainty regarding the rules that apply to late-filed claims has been resolved by

Court order, see Stipulation and Order, July 14, 2000, as has the issue of attorneys' fees for

counsel other than Class Counsel and Of Counsel. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Aug.

28, 2000. Certain other arguments made by these same movants throughout this litigation were

considered and rejected by the D.C. Circuit in Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir.

2000), aff'g Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999).

4

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 382 Filed 01/04/01 Page 5 of 10
and that adjudicators have in certain cases accepted false and possibly perjurious information submitted by the government.
These arguments are not properly before the Court. Even if the Court were presented with evidence sufficient to support movants' claims - and it has not been - it would still decline to act on those claims at this time. As the Consent Decree and the Order of Reference make very clear, disputes regarding decisions by arbitrators should be brought to the attention of the Monitor through a Petition for Monitor Review. See Consent Decree "9(b)(v), 12(b)(iii); Order of Reference' 8. Such complaints regarding the outcome of individual Track A adjudications do not constitute changed circumstances within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5). The parties settled this case on the premise that such complaints, at least as an initial matter, would be referred to the Monitor, not the Court.
Movants also suggest that Class Counsel's use of non-lawyers to assist class members fill out their claims packages and Class Counsel's alleged inability to provide comprehensive information regarding similarly-situated white farmers to Track A claimants constitute changed circumstances justifying substantial modification or vacation of the Consent Decree. Movants' arguments ignore the reality of this case and are without merit.
The size of the class, which the parties originally estimated would reach 2,000 farmers, quickly ballooned to more than 21,000 farmers. In light of this enormous and unforeseen expansion of the class, and considering the relative unwillingness of lawyers other than Class Counsel and Of Counsel to assist class members, it is difficult to fathom how movants can argue that Class Counsel's decision to use non-lawyer assistants constitutes changed circumstances and somehow harms the class. Faced with the need to assist a class
5

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 382 Filed 01/04/01 Page 6 of 10
more than 10 times larger than expected, Class Counsel made a wise decision: rather than tell potential class members that they could not participate in this case because there were not enough lawyers to assist each and everyone of them with every aspect of the filing of their claims, Class Counsel chose to allow non-lawyers to assist some class members to assemble their claim packages, so long as an attorney ultimately reviewed and signed each claim before it was filed (as required by the Consent Decree). See Consent Decree' 5(e).
With respect to movants' argument that the Consent Decree should be vacated because Class Counsel has been unable to assist a sufficient number of claimants to identify a similarly-situated white farmer (which is critical to success in a Track A claim), the Court again finds that movants' assertion, even if true, does not make the Consent Decree unfair. At the hearing on this motion, Class Counsel admitted that it has failed to identify as many similarly situated white farmers as it had anticipated (largely due to the increased class size), but noted that it expects to identify many more before filing Petitions for Monitor Review with respect to those Track A claims that were denied due to Class Counsel's admitted failures. Movants' suggestion that Class Counsel's shortcomings have so injured the chances of class members to ultimately prevail on their claims that the Consent Decree has become inherently unfair is without merit. In light of the fact that many Track A claims have not yet been decided and that the Monitor has yet to determine whether any of these allegedly injured claimants will get a "second chance" on reconsideration, this argument is premature.
The remainder of movants' arguments revolve around their apparent misunderstanding regarding the manner in which the Consent Decree has been implemented by Class Counsel and government counsel. Movants suggest that the two have colluded on
6

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 382 Filed 01/04/01 Page 7 of 10
several occasions to make decisions that adversely affect the class without first giving notice to and receiving the consent of the class. Movants cite two specific examples of such alleged "material modifications" that have been made to the Consent Decree without consent from the class: the alteration of the government's deadline for responding to Track A claims; and modification to the definition of "class member" that allegedly reduces the number of farmers who might obtain relief under the Consent Decree.
Movants first suggest that the parties' decision to enlarge the time within which the government has to respond to Track A claims violated class members' rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment and warrants setting aside the Consent Decree. In reality, however, the parties and the Court simply came to an agreement that a temporary extension of time for the government to respond in a relatively small number of cases was appropriate and necessary, particularly in light of the exponentially increased class size. The extension was not a material modification of the Consent Decree and has had only the most minor impact on claimants. In fact, the negative impact on the class would have been much more substantial if the parties had sought and the Court had required that the entire Track A claims process be halted for months while the parties notified and obtained the consent of the class on such a mmor Issue.
Movants also argue that the parties made a material modification to the Consent Decree that substantially harmed the class when they failed to consult all class members before deciding to consider farmers who attempted to apply, in addition to those who actually applied, as part of the class in this case (referred to by the parties as the "constructive application" principle). Movants misunderstand the motivation behind and the impact of this decision. The
7

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 382 Filed 01/04/01 Page 8 of 10
constructive application principle, which was fully agreed to by the parties, actually expanded the scope of the class beyond the plain language of the Consent Decree and made more farmers eligible for relief. While the language of the Decree limits the class to "African American farmers who ... applied to the United States Department of Agriculture ... for participation in a federal farm credit or benetit program," Consent Decree' 2(a) (emphasis added), the constructive application principle extends possible relief in this case to those who attempted to apply as well, so long as certain requirements are met. Such an agreed-upon interpretation of the Consent Decree is not a change of circumstances that operates to the detriment of claimants; it is a reading that substantially broadens the scope of the class, is highly favorable to the claimants, and is completely in line with the parties' and the Court's expectation that the Consent Decree would be liberally construed to the benetit of African American farmers. See Consent Decree, Apr. 14, 1999, at 1-2 ("[1]n light of the remedial purposes of this Consent Decree, the parties intend that it be liberally construed to effectuate those purposes in a manner that is consistent with the law. ").
III. CONCLUSION As Class Counsel, government counsel and movants' counsel all note in their briefs, the Consent Decree approved by the Court on April 14, 1999, is a grand, historical first step toward righting the wrongs visited upon thousands of African American farmers for decades by the United States Department of Agriculture. In the 20 months since the settlement was approved, more than 11,000 African American farmers have filed successful claims for relief and have received monetary compensation and/or debt relief totaling more than
8

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 382 Filed 01/04/01 Page 9 of 10
$500,000,000. This motion, brought on behalf of seven farmers out of the class of more than 21,000, seeks to obliterate this achievement and the possibility that thousands of additional farmers will receive additional millions of dollars by having the Court vacate the Consent Decree. Such an action would not only mean that the thousands of hours and hundreds of millions of dollars spent to this point administering the Decree would all be for naught, but also would mean that the thousands of farmers who have already prevailed on their claims would be forced to return their monetary awards to the government and would have to reassume the debt of which they just recently were relieved. Movants have failed to demonstrate that there are any changed circumstances that justify modifYing or vacating the Consent Decree. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that certain individual plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the fairness of the Consent Decree [248-1] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
J/ DATE: ,( ~ l
9

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 382 Filed 01/04/01 Page 10 of 10

Copies to:
Stephen J. Bowens, Esq. NCABL Land Loss Prevention Project P.O. Box 179 Durham, NC 27702
Michael Sitcov, Esq. U. S. Department of Justice, Civil Division P.O. Box 883, Room 1022 Washington, DC 20044
Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Esq. Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP 1818 N Street, NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20036

Randi Ilyse Roth, Esq. Oftice of the Monitor 46 East Fourth Street, Suite 1301 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101
Michael Lewis, Esq. ADR Associates 1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20009
Julie Redell and Nicole Fahey Poorman-Douglas Corporation 10300 S.W. Allen Blvd. Beaverton, Oregon 97005

10

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 429 Filed 04/06/01 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED
APR 0 6 2001

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

-----------------------------------)
)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et.&.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

--------------------------------)

NANCY MAYER WHITIINGTON, CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)~
Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

ORDER On July 14, 2000, the Court entered a Stipulation and Order agreed upon by the parties that set a deadline of November 13, 2000, for submitting all Petitions for Monitor Review relating to claimants who received a Track A or Track B decision on or before July 14, 2000. See Stipulation and Order of July 14, 2000, at 4. When it became clear that the November 13 deadline would not be met with respect to petitions for roughly 4,000 claimants, Class Counsel requested an enlargement of time. Instead of extending the deadline, the Court created a method of handling the petitions that required all Petitions for Monitor Review to be

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 429 Filed 04/06/01 Page 2 of 5
filed by November 13, but which allowed counsel to submit materials in support of those petitions over the following six months. See Order of Nov. 8, 2000. The Court directed counsel to submit a Register of Petitions listing all eligible claimants by November 13, 2000, and then to file supporting materials and/or notices of withdrawals with respect to at least 400 claimants on a monthly basis. See id. at 4-5. The Court required the first batch of materials and withdrawals to be filed by December 15, 2000, to be followed by new batches on the 15th of every subsequent month through May 15, 2001 - the final day on which the Monitor would accept supporting materials and/or withdrawals from counsel. See id. at 5.
In light of Class Counsel's past difficulty in submitting timely Petitions for Monitor Review, the Court asked the Monitor to file regular reports with the Court summarizing counsel's progress in meeting the monthly 400 claimant minimum requirement. See Order of Nov. 8, 2000, at 6. A review of the four monthly Monitor reports filed to this point reveal a very disturbing trend. Despite the explicit assurances of Class Counsel that they would be able to submit supporting materials or withdrawals with respect to at least 400 claimants monthly, they have failed to meet the minimum requirement even once. By December 15, Class Counsel was able to file materials or withdrawals with respect to 399 claimants; by January 15, counsel was able to submit only 315 more; on February 15, only 282 were submitted; and on March 15, a mere 180. This means that in the two months between March 15 and May 15, 2001, Class Counsel will have to process roughly 3000 Petitions for Monitor Review - or approximately three times what counsel has been able to accomplish in the last four months.
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 429 Filed 04/06/01 Page 3 of 5
These daunting numbers, when coupled with recent reports that Class Counsel has drastically cut its staff, bring Class Counsel's ability to adequately represent the petitioners into serious question. An April 6, 2001, letter from Rose Sanders of the Chestnut, Sanders law firm to Arbitrator Michael Lewis only heightens the Court's concerns over the adequacy of Class Counsel's representation of their clients and the effectiveness of counsel. Class Counsel offered repeated assurances that if they were given an extension of time to file complete Petitions for Monitor Review, the Court would see dramatically improved performance from Class Counsel, ensuring that the petitioners would not suffer because of their counsel's past mistakes. What the past four months have proven, however, is the exact opposite. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that a status conference is scheduled for April 19, 2001, at 2:00 p.m.; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that government counsel, Class Counsel, and their respective fee counsel all shall appear at the status conference. Class Counsel shall be prepared to inform the Court of the following:
(1) What plan counsel has adopted to complete the remaining Petitions for Monitor Review by May 15, 2001; (2) What firm resources are being devoted to meeting the deadline; (3) What consideration has been given to using pro-bono counsel to assist Class Counsel in meeting the deadline; and
3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 429 Filed 04/06/01 Page 4 of 5

(4) What quality-control procedures have been instituted to ensure that counsel not only submit materials with respect to the correct number of claimants, but that each claimant's interests are fully, fairly and adequately represented; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that the April 15,2001, deadline is postponed until April 30,2001. The ultimate May 15,2001, deadline, however, remains in effect. SO ORDERED.

I DATE: c..fJ b ~ l

(j~ g~-k---
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
United States District Judge

4

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 429 Filed 04/06/01 Page 5 of 5

Copies to:

Alexander J. Pires, Jr. Conlon, Franz, Phelan & Pires 1818 N Street, NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20036 202-331-7050 202-331-9306 (fax)
J.L. Chestnut, Jr. Rose M. Sanders Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway P.O. Box 1305 Selma, Alabama 36702 334-875-9264 334-875-9853 (fax)
Jacob A. Stein David U. Fierst Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, L.L.P. 1100 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20036 202-737-7777 202-296-8312 (fax)
Michael Sitcov Terry M. Henry U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division 901 E Street, NW Room 920 Washington, DC 20044 202-514-1944 202-616-8187 (fax)

Michael Lewis ADR Associates 1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20009 202-332-0490 202-328-9162 (fax)
Randi Iilyse Roth Office of the Monitor 46 East Fourth Street, Suite 1301 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101 651-229-0991 651-229-0992 (fax)
Nicole Fahey Julie Redell Poorman-Douglas Corporation 10300 SW Allen Blvd Beaverton, OR 97005 503-350-5800 503-350-5890 Fax

5

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 438 Filed 05/15/01 Page 1 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED
MAY 1 5 2001

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

--------------------------------)
)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

--------------------------------)

NANCY MA~R WHITIINGTON, CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) 0/
Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The Court recently suspended certain deadlines related to the Petition for Monitor Review process in this case. See Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001. Recognizing that it was going to be impossible for Class Counsel to meet a May 15, 2001, deadline for petitions with respect to roughly 2,000 claimants, the Court suspended the deadlines to offer Class Counsel the time to meet with and hopefully recruit pro bono counsel to assist with these filings. The Court directed Class Counsel, after consulting with potential pro bono counsel, to file a motion for an extension of time that would include a realistic

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 438 Filed 05/15/01 Page 2 of 7
schedule for completing the petition process and a plan for incorporating pro bono counsel in
the process. The Court now has before it Class Counsel's motion for an extension of time,
the government's response and plaintiffs' reply. In their motion, Class Counsel request an extension of an additional four months to complete the process. While the government contends in its response that the proposed schedule is unrealistic, Class Counsel's reply brief includes a revised projection of the number of pro bono counsel now willing to assist Class Counsel. Upon consideration of Class Counsel's reply brief, the Court believes that a four month extension of time is both realistic and reasonable. Class Counsel's motion will be granted.
The Court's willingness once again to extend the deadline, however, should not be construed as a change of heart or opinion regarding Class Counsel's performance and conduct throughout the petition process. There are only two reasons why the Court is willing to grant Class Counsel the leeway they certainly do not deserve: (1) because it believes that the class should be protected from the failings of their attorneys; and (2) because it seems very
likely that the impressive commitment made by pro bono counsel to assist Class Counsel -
both with the processing of Petitions for Monitor Review and with a number of the Track B
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 438 Filed 05/15/01 Page 3 of 7
claims - will be enough to bring this matter to a close within four months in a way that is fair and just to the class. 1
Finally, Class Counsel is reminded that the breach of their agreement with the government, memorialized in the Court's Stipulation and Order of July 14, 2000, and their deliberate violation of the Court's Order of November 8, 2000, will not go unpunished. The schedule of fines announced in the Court's Order of April 27, 2001, will be repeated here, with slight modifications. Furthermore, the Court will require Class Counsel to file weekly updates with the Court so that counsel's progress can be monitored.
Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that all deadlines set forth in the Court's Order of November 8, 2000, are permanently suspended. The extended deadline for filing supporting materials or withdrawals of Petitions for Monitor Review involving claimants on Class Counsel's Register of Petitions who received a decision on or before July 14,2000, is September 15, 2001; it is FURTHER ORDERED that counsel shall file fully researched, fully briefed, fully documented supporting materials or withdrawals of petitions every Friday, on a weekly basis, until all petitions involving claimants on Class Counsel's Register of Petitions who
Of particular note have been the efforts of Robert N. Weiner of Arnold & Porter and Chair of the ABA Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service, Susan M. Hoffman of Crowell & Moring, and Steven B. Scudder, Staff Director of the ABA Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service, to recruit a formidable team of attorneys from many of the nation's premier law firms to assist Class Counsel. See Ex. 1 to Class Counsel's Reply Memorandum. The Court is encouraged by the significant number of attorneys who have agreed to assist with Petitions for Monitor Review, as well as those who have agreed to assume responsibility for litigating Track B cases. The latter commitment, in particular, will remove the heavy burden of Track B litigation from the shoulders of Class Counsel and will allow them to place greater focus on the petition process and their other responsibilities and obligations in this case.
3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 438 Filed 05/15/01 Page 4 of 7
received a decision on or before July 14, 2000, have been filed. Under no circumstances, however, shall the Monitor accept supporting materials or withdrawals that are filed after September 15, 2001; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the weekly deadlines will be satisfied so long as the filing is postmarked by the Friday that the filings are due. All supporting materials and withdrawals shall be sent to the Facilitator in accordance with previously established practice; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Class Counsel shall report directly to the Court on a weekly basis regarding their progress and the status of their operations. By 10:00 a.m. on every Monday between the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order and September 15, 2001, Class Counsel shall file with the Clerk's Office and hand-deliver or fax to Chambers and to the government a report that will include the following information:
(1) How many claimants' supporting materials or withdrawals were filed with the Facilitator the previous Friday; (2) Exactly how many claimants' supporting materials or withdrawals remain to be filed; (3) The name of each attorney who is currently employed by Class Counsel and assisting with the petitions, as well as the name of each attorney who is assisting Class Counsel on a pro bono basis with the petitions. Each attorney shall be identified as a full time attorney (working 40 hours or more per week on the petitions), a part time attorney (working 20-39 hours), an occasional attorney (1-19 hours), or a prospective attorney (has not yet worked any hours, but is scheduled to or has agreed to do so). (4) A summary of Class Counsel's efforts during the previous week to hire or acquire additional pro bono assistance or additional attorneys to assist with the Petitions for Monitor Review; and
4

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 438 Filed 05/15/01 Page 5 of 7
(5) A best estimate of when Class Counsel expects to complete the petitions involving claimants on Class Counse1's Register of Petitions who received a decision on or before July 14, 2001; it is FURTHER ORDERED that the Monitor shall continue to submit monthly reports to the Court pursuant to Paragraph 12(b)(i) of the Consent Decree based on information provided by the Facilitator that summarize Class Counsel's progress. The next report, which shall cover the period of time from March 16, 2001, to May 15,2001, is due on May 31, 2001. Subsequent reports shall be filed on the last days of June, July, August, and September and shall cover the time periods from the 16th of the preceding month through the 15th of the month during which the report is filed; it is FURTHER ORDERED that after all petitions on Class Counsel's Register of Petitions have been supplemented or withdrawn, Class Counsel will be fined for each day after May 15, 2001, that their obligation was not complete. Class Counsel will be fined $1,000 for each day during the first month after the deadline that all supporting materials or withdrawals were not filed, $2,000 for each day during the second month after the deadline, $3,000 for each day during the third month after the deadline, and $4,000 for each day during the fourth month after the deadline. In addition, for each petition that the Monitor reports was not supported or withdrawn by the ultimate deadline of September 15, 2001, Class Counsel will be fined $50,000. Fines collected from Class Counsel will be placed in the Registry of the Court until such time as the Court rules on a future motion for attorneys' fees or when the parties settle such a motion; at such time the Court will order that all funds in the Registry be paid to the government; and it is
5

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 438 Filed 05/15/01 Page 6 of 7

FURTHER ORDERED that at a date to be determined, but not before September 15,2001, the Court will hold a hearing to review the conduct of Class Counsel with respect to Petitions for Monitor Review. At that time the Court will consider whether additional sanctions, fines or other measures are necessary to address Class Counsel's conduct.
SO ORDERED.

/>.J DATE:...s /f;)'

V,) ~
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
United States District Judge

6

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 438 Filed 05/15/01 Page 7 of 7

Copies to:

Alexander J. Pires, Jr. Conlon, Franz, Phelan & Pires 1818 N Street, NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20036 202-331-7050 202-331-9306 (fax)
J.L. Chestnut, Jr. Rose M. Sanders Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway P.O. Box 1305 Selma, Alabama 36702 334-875-9264 334-875-9853 (fax)
Jacob A. Stein David U. Fierst Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, L.L.P. 1100 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20036 202-737-7777 202-296-8312 (fax)
Michael Sitcov Terry M. Henry U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division 901 E Street, NW Room 920 Washington, DC 20044 202-514-1944 202-616-8187 (fax)
Michael Lewis ADR Associates 1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20009 202-332-0490 202-328-9162 (fax)

Randi Iilyse Roth Office of the Monitor 46 East Fourth Street, Suite 1301 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101 651-229-0991 651-229-0992 (fax)
Nicole Fahey Julie Redell Poorman-Douglas Corporation 10300 SW Allen Blvd Beaverton, OR 97005 503-350-5800 503-350-5890 (fax)
Lester Levy JAMS 2 Embarcadero Center Suite 1100 San Francisco, CA 94111 415-982-5267 415-982-5287 (fax)
Robert N. Weiner Arnold & Porter 555 12th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20004 202-942-5855 202-942-5999 (fax)
Susan M. Hoffman Crowell & Moring 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20004 202-624-2591 202-628-5116 (fax)

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 451 Filed 06/28/01 Page 1 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

A LED
JUN 2.8 2001

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et aI., Plaintiffs,
v. ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary,
United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

NANCY MA"fR WHITTINGTON, CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) v

)

)

)

)

)

---------------------------------)
)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

----------------------------------)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER By Order of April 27, 2001, the Court held Class Counsel accountable for its failures to meet deadlines in the Track A Petition for Monitor Review process. See Order of April 6, 2001; Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001. After receiving input from Class Counsel and the team of pro bono attorneys assembled to assist Class Counsel on this matter, the Court set a new deadline of September 15, 2001, created a weekly reporting requirement so that it can track Class Counsel's progress, and established a progressive schedule of fines that would be imposed for each day that Class Counsel had not completed

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 451 Filed 06/28/01 Page 2 of 7
their Petition for Monitor Review obligations. See Memorandum Opinion and Order of May 15, 2001. While Class Counsel was given this financial "incentive" to complete the process as expeditiously as possible, they were reminded of their ongoing obligation to provide full, fair and adequate representation to all their clients, regardless of when during the process those clients' petitions are processed.
Reports filed by the Monitor and the weekly reports submitted by Class Counsel relating to their performance in filing petitions and responding to government Petitions for Monitor Review once again bring into question Class Counsel's fidelity to their clients. First, the rate at which Class Counsel has decided to withdraw petitions, rather than file supplementary materials in support of those petitions, has increased dramatically since the Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001. 1 Despite Class Counsel's attempt to allay the concerns of the Monitor and the Court regarding this increase, see Class Counsel's May 29, 2001 Report to the Court; Monitor's May 2001 Report Regarding Registers of Petitions, the Court still fears that Class Counsel may be withdrawing meritorious petitions because of time constraints, threatened financial penalties and a lack of the resources required to make adequate attempts to identify a "similarly situated white farmer," perhaps the most important thing a lawyer must do for a claimant in this stage of the case.
Prior to the Court's Order of April 27, 2001, Class Counsel's rate of withdrawals was approximately 19 percent. See Monitor's December 2000, January 2001, February 2001 and March 2001 Reports Regarding Registers of Petitions. Subsequent to the Court's Order, Class Counsel's rate of withdrawals has more than doubled to approximately 48 percent. See Plaintiffs' Reports to the Court dated May 29, June 4, June 11, and June 18,2001.
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 451 Filed 06/28/01 Page 3 of 7
A decision to withdraw a Petition for Monitor Review from the Register based solely on such non-merit based grounds is unacceptable, and Class Counsel has a professional obligation not to withdraw petitions for such reasons. In particular, Class Counsel should not withdraw petitions based on a lack of time or resources necessary to identify similarly situated white farmers or to communicate adequately with a claimant. If Class Counsel lacks the resources to adequately review each case and communicate in an effective way with each of their clients, and then to supplement every meritorious Petition for Monitor Review, they should seek additional help from pro bono counselor hire additional staff to satisfy their obligations to their clients. Class Counsel is reminded that the Court intends to hold a hearing after September 15, 2001, to review counsel's conduct with respect to the Petition for Monitor Review process and to consider fines or sanctions. See Order of May 15,2001, at 6. Specifically with respect to the issue of withdrawals, the Court may decide to appoint an ombudsman or special master to review the case files of all those petitions that were withdrawn to determine whether Class Counsel fulfilled their professional obligations to their clients. 2

2

The sanctions to be considered are not necessarily limited to those suggested in the

Court's Order of May 15, 2001. With this in mind, Class Counsel should maintain - indeed,

they should have been maintaining from the beginning - very precise, very thorough

documentation in the file of each claimant whose petition was withdrawn. An ombudsman or a

special master should be able to review those files and with minimal effort - and perhaps a

telephone interview with the claimant - be able to determine exactly what efforts were made to

communicate with the claimant, why the petition was withdrawn, under what conditions it was

withdrawn and what lengths counsel went to before deciding to withdraw the petition.

3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 451 Filed 06/28/01 Page 4 of 7

Second, and perhaps of even more concern to the Court, Class Counsel has not responded to a large percentage of the government's Petitions for Monitor Review. 3 Since all of the claimants in this posture initially prevailed and therefore assume that they are entitled to compensation from the government, the Court is deeply troubled by Class Counsel's failure to respond to the government petitions. Counsel's decisions not to respond invariably will turn many of those claimants' initial successes into permanent defeats.
Class Counsel suggest that many of the nonresponses occur because approximately half the claimants do not request Class Counsel's assistance in responding to the government's petitions, see Monitor's May 2001 Report Regarding Registers of Petitions at 10-12 (indicating that Class Counsel was asked to respond to only 84 of the first 150 government petitions), but the Court is left to wonder whether the lack of a request was the result of a conscious, informed decision by the claimant or simply of miscommunication by counselor a failure to communicate at all. Class Counsel's efforts to communicate with class members apparently have amounted to little more than a single letter sent by regular mail (not sent certified, return-receipt, or overnight), with no attempt to send additional letters or make follow-up telephone calls. See id. at 11. To make matters worse, Class Counsel admits that a significant number of the letters to claimants were sent out approximately two to three weeks into the claimant's 60-day response period. See id. at 10.

3

Class Counsel had responded to approximately one-third of the government's

Petitions for Monitor Review through May 18, 2001, leaving the Monitor to decide the other two-

thirds without any response from the claimants. See Monitor's May 2001 Report Regarding

Registers of Petitions at 10 (indicating that 57 responses were filed to the government's first 150

petitions, and that time to respond to the other 93 has expired).

4

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 451 Filed 06/28/01 Page 5 of 7
As Class Counsel has understood from the earliest stages of this case, communication with class members - some of whom are elderly or have difficulty reading and most of whom have little experience with the legal system - is difficult and time consuming. Such obstacles do not, however, diminish counsel's responsibility to their clients. A cursory effort to communicate with a class member when an important decision is being made regarding the class member's claim - if that in fact is what has happened here - does not constitute full, fair and adequate representation. This miscommunication or complete lack of communication necessarily results in some claimants' gains being lost for reasons unrelated to the merits of their cases, in effect snatching defeat from the jaws of victory because of Class Counsel's failure to take aggressive steps to communicate with their own clients. In view of the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that from the date of this Order forward, the Facilitator shall immediately notify any claimant against whom the government files a Petition for Monitor Review. The Facilitator shall similarly notify any claimant against whom the government filed a petition during the three weeks preceding the date of this Order. The notification shall be mailed overnight and shall require the signature of the claimant (certified mail, return receipt). The notification shall briefly and in plain language explain the Petition for Monitor Review process, direct the claimant to contact his or her attorney immediately (providing phone numbers), inform the claimant of the time within which his or her attorney must respond to the petition, and warn the claimant of the consequences of failing to respond to the petition. If the package is not accepted by or otherwise is not delivered to the claimant, the Facilitator shall take steps to contact that claimant by telephone; it is
5

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 451 Filed 06/28/01 Page 6 of 7
FURTHER ORDERED that Class Counsel shall, from the date of this Order forward, file a memorandum with the Facilitator each time they decide not to file a response to a government Petition for Monitor Review. The memorandum shall detail their efforts to communicate with the relevant claimant and shall explain as fully as possible, without disclosing privileged communications, the reasons why Class Counsel chose not to respond to the government's petition. The memoranda likely will be used by the Court, an ombudsman or a special master who will review the conduct of Class Counsel with respect to this matter. The Facilitator shall hold these memoranda until further order of the Court; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Class Counsel shall, by July 20, 2001, submit to the Facilitator a list of all claimants whose petitions were withdrawn for primarily non-merit based reasons prior to the date of this Order. For purposes of this list, "non-merit based reasons" include, but are not limited to, (1) difficulties communicating effectively with the claimant, and (2) limited resources preventing Class Counsel from making proper attempts to identify a similarly situated white farmer. The list likely will be used by the Court, an ombudsman or a special master who will review the conduct of Class Counsel with respect to this matter. The Facilitator shall hold the list until further order of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge
6

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 451 Filed 06/28/01 Page 7 of 7

Copies to:

Alexander J. Pires, Jr. Conlon, Franz, Phelan & Pires 1818 N Street, NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20036 202-331-7050 202-331-9306 (fax)

, Randi Ilyse Roth Office of the Monitor 46 East Fourth Street, Suite 1301 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101 651-229-0991 651-229-0992 (fax)

J.L. Chestnut, Jr. Rose M. Sanders Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway P.O. Box 1305 Selma, Alabama 36702 334-875-9264 334-875-9853 (fax)

Nicole Fahey Julie Redell Poorman-Douglas Corporation 10300 SW Allen Blvd Beaverton, OR 97005 503-350-5800 503-350-5890 (fax)

Jacob A. Stein David U. Fierst Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, L.L.P. 1100 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20036 202-737-7777 202-296-8312 (fax)
, Michael Sitcov . Terry M. Henry
U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division 901 E Street, NW Room 920 Washington, DC 20044 202-514-1944 202-616-8187 (fax)
Michael Lewis ADR Associates 1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20009 202-332-0490 202-328-9162 (fax)

Lester Levy JAMS 2 Embarcadero Center Suite 1100 San Francisco, CA 94111 415-982-5267 415-982-5287 (fax)
Robert N. Weiner Arnold & Porter 555 12th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20004 202-942-5855 202-942-5999 (fax)
Susan M. Hoffman Crowell & Moring 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20004 202-624-2591 202-628-5116 (fax)

7

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 1 of 26

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

----------------------------------)

FILE 0
NOV 2 6 ZOOl
NANCY MAYER W}ilTT1NGTON, CLERK U.S. DtSTRtcT COURT
Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The Court has before it twenty-nine motions filed by individual claimants! -- all separate but very similar in content -- to vacate judgment and/or to intervene in this case, and defendant's multiple oppositions thereto. See Defendant's Opposition to Motions to Vacate Judgment and, In One Case, to Intervene (September 7, 2001); Defendant's Opposition to

! The movants are: Larry Barnes, Daryl Brentr, Linda Catching, Lois Clark, Evelyn Coleman, Colie, Curtis and Harold Dixon, Larry and Betty Garrett, Edith Lomax-Barnes, Willie and L.D. Maymon, Ezra and Carrie McNair, Grover and Geraldstine Miller, Carolyn Smith, Marilyn Stewart and Henry and Floria Vaughn.

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 2 of 26
Motions to Vacate Judgment, and Defendant's Motion For an Order to Show Cause (September 13, 2001); Defendant's Opposition to Rule 60(b) Motions (September 20, 2001). In addition, the Court has received numerous informal letters from claimants asking the Court to reverse the Arbitrator's denial of their petitions to file a late claim, or to allow late filing where a petition never has been filed with the Arbitrator. Because these motions concern common issues of law and fact, the Court addresses them as an aggregate rather than individually.
In the original Consent Decree settling this case, negotiated by the parties and approved by the Court, farmers seeking relief under the settlement were required to file claim packages by October 12, 1999. Consent Decree, , 5(c) (April 14, 1999). The only way for a claimant to become part of the settlement after this deadline was to file under Section 5(g) of the Decree, which allowed farmers to file late claims but only if their failure to file within the allotted time resulted from "extraordinary circumstances beyond [their] control." After the October 12, 1999, deadline passed, however, the Court learned that a large number of individuals planned to seek permission to late file under Section 5(g). Finding that it would be "more efficient and expeditious" to let these claims be decided on a case-by-case basis by the Arbitrator, the Court delegated its authority to the Arbitrator in this case, Michael Lewis, to apply the "extraordinary circumstances" standard set out in Section 5(g) of the Decree. See Order (December 20, 1999).
Initially, the Court allowed late-claim petitions under Section 5(g) to be submitted only through January 30, 2000. Id. By stipulation and order of July 14, 2000, however, the Court again decided that the number of claimants seeking to file late claims
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 3 of 26
warranted further enlargement of time, and the deadline was extended to September 15, 2000. This date of September 15, 2000, was an absolute deadline, intended to be the final date by which all Section 5(g) petitions had to be submitted. It represented a substantial allowance beyond the original deadlines set in the Consent Decree. See Stipulation and Order (July 14, 2000).
As of November 2001, Michael Lewis has received approximately 68,000 petitions to file a late claim in this case, pursuant to Section 5(g) of the Decree. See Arbitrator's Report on the Late-Claim Petition Process at 11 (November 14, 2001) ("Arbitrator's Report") attached hereto. 2 Of these, 61,000 were filed by the September 15, 2000, deadline, and thus clearly are eligible for consideration. Id. at 5. Mr. Lewis has considered approximately 41,000 of these timely petitions to file a late claim, almost 40,000 of which he denied. Id. Most of the movants now before the Court seek relief from these denials, asking the Court to reverse Mr. Lewis' decision and grant them permission to file late claims in this case under Section 5(g) of the Decree. The threshold issue, therefore, is whether the Court has or should assert the authority to reverse Mr. Lewis' denials.
The Court has delegated the authority to decide these petitions -- completely and finally -- to Michael Lewis. See Order of December 20, 1999; Stipulation and Order of July 14, 2000. Furthermore, the Court finds that its delegation to Mr. Lewis included the authority not only to consider late-claim petitions but also to reconsider denials of these petitions. Mr. Lewis has informed the Court that he has a reconsideration policy in place, through which
2 Mr. Lewis' report also may be found on the District Court's website at http://www.dcd. uscourts .govIdistrict-court-recent.html.
3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 4 of 26
individuals whose late-claim petitions have been denied may ask for reconsideration by the Arbitrator. See Arbitrator's Report at 8-11. The existence and implementation of such a policy affirms the wisdom of giving Mr. Lewis final authority -- his own process for reconsideration assures that justice will be served through his decisions.
Indeed, petitioners under Section 5(g) of the Consent Decree actually receive far more consideration under Mr. Lewis' reconsideration process than they would under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if this Court had retained authority to decide late-claim petitions. Under the Rule 60(b) standard, a discretionary decision such as this -whether to allow late claims based on "extraordinary circumstances" -- could be considered by this Court only within a limited time frame and would only be cursorily reviewed by our court of appeals, if reviewed at all. See Twelve John Does v. D.C., 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (sound discretion of trial court reviewed by court of appeals on abuse of discretion standard); see also Leedo Cabinetry v. James Sales & Distribution, Inc., 157 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); In re Gledhill, 76 F.3d 1070 (loth Cir. 1996) (same). Indeed, the sheer volume of denied Section 5(g) petitions, already over 40,000, would preclude individualized review of each claim by any court. The procedures outlined in detail in the Arbitrator's Report demonstrate that the Court has ensured a far more thorough consideration and reconsideration of all claims by delegating its authority to Mr. Lewis. While the Court retains authority over general implementation of the Consent Decree, see Pigford v. Glickman, 105 F.R.D. 82, 110 (D.D.C. 1999), the Court finds that Mr. Lewis' late-claim petition processes are more than sufficient to ensure that Section 5(g) of the Consent Decree is properly and justly applied and to assure that fair process is afforded. Furthermore, because the Court
4

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 5 of 26

has seen no evidence that Mr. Lewis has abused his discretion, the Court will not second-guess

his decisions as movants request.

The Court also rejects movants' objections to the Stipulation and Order of July

14, 2000. Even if a party is entitled to challenge an order to which that party's own counsel

agreed (of which the Court is not at all convinced), the time for objection has passed. The

Court's order of July 14, 2000, clearly stated that "any person who objects to any aspect of

this Stipulation and Order shall submit his/her objections to this Court within 30 days of the

entry of this order." It being now more than fifteen months beyond that deadline, the Court

rejects movants' objections and all related arguments for vacation of judgment.

Finally, several movants have sought to intervene in this case. Because this is a

closed case, the Court denies these motions. While the Court retains authority over

implementation of the Consent Decree, there are no ongoing proceedings in which the movants

may participate. Thus, all motions to intervene are denied. Upon consideration of the

foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the instant motions to vacate judgment and/or to intervene

[482-1; 483-1; 484-1; 485-1; 485-2; 488-1; 489-1; 490-1; 492-1; 494-1; 496-1; 496-2; 497-1;

497-2; 498-1; 498-2; 500-1; 500-2; 501-1; 501-2; 507-1; 507-2; 508-1; 508-2; 512-1; 513-1;

514-1; 516-1; 527-1] are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

) J z '~
PAUL L. FRIED AN
United States District Judge

5

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 6 of 26
Copies to:
Michael Sitcov, Esq. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division P.O. Box 883, Room 1022 Washington, D. C. 20044
Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Esq. Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP 1818 N Street, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20036
Randi Ilyse Roth, Esq. Office of the Monitor 46 East Fourth Street, Suit e1301 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101
Michael Lewis, Esq. ADR Associates 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20009
Lester Levy JAMS 2 Embarcadero Center Suite 1100 San Francisco, CA 94111
Larry Barnes 5348 Gatesville Road Harrisville, MS 39082
Daryl Brentr 1765 Highway 28 West Pinola, MS 39149
Linda Catching 1008 Lofton Road Hazlehurst, MS 39083
6

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 7 of 26
Lois S. Clark 2025 Brownwells Road Wesson, MS 39191
Evelyn M. Coleman 19147 Dentville Road Hazlehurst, MS 39083
Colie Dixon, Sr. 2088 Brushy Creek Road Georgetown, MS 39078
Curtis Dixon 374 Broadview Dr. Jackson, MS 39209
Harold B. Dixon 19147 Dentville Road Hazlehurst, MS 39083
Larry and Betty Garrett 2100 Brushy Creek Road Georgetown, MS 39078
Edith Lomax-Barnes 1028 Lomax Lane Crystal Springs, MS 39059
L.D. Maymon P.O. Box 455 Hazlehurst, MS 39159
Willie S. Maymon P.O. Box 48 Rolling Fork, MS 39159
Carrie McNair 1009 Joiner Lane Georgetown, MS 39078
Ezra McNair 1046 Lomax Lane Crystal Springs, MS 39059
7

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 8 of 26
Grover and Geraldstine Miller 5044 Cooper Road Georgetown, MS 39078 Carolyn Smith 5087 New Hope Road Georgetown, MS 39078 Marilynn Stewart 5371 Keele Street Jackson, MS 39206 Henry A. and Floria A. Vaughn 19153 Dentville Road Hazlehurst, MS 39083 Joyce Branch-Williams 422 Nottingham Road Baltimore, MD 21229
8

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 9 of 26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, et .eL,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANNEVENEMAN, SECRETARY,

)

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT )

OF AGRICULTURE,

)

)

Defendant.

)

--------------------------)

)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANNE VENEMAN,

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)

F' LED

NOV 2 6 2001

NANCY MAYER w;lITIlNGTON, CLERK U.S. DlmtcT COURT

COpy

Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

ARBITRATOR'S REPORT ON THE LATE-CLAIM PETITION PROCESS

On December 20, 1999, and again on July 14, 2000, the Court delegated to the

Arbitrator the review of late claim petitions filed pursuant to 1(5 (g) of the Consent

Decree. There has been no public report on the late claim process. Given the

thousands of farmers who have filed late claim affidavits, the implementation of this

portion of the Decree has assumed an importance no one expected when the Court's

delegations were made. The report below details progress on the review of late-claims.

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 10 of 26
Background On April 14, 1999, the Court approved the Consent Decree in the above-
captioned case. The Consent Decree required that in order for class members to obtain relief under the decree, they must have submitted completed claim packages within 180 days of the date of entry of the Consent Decree. Consent Decree, Paragraph 5(c). As a result, October 12, 1999 became the last date a claim could be postmarked to be considered timely.
Potential relief from the October 12, 1999 deadline was provided by Paragraph 5(g} of the Consent Decree. 1 If "extraordinary circumstances" beyond a claimant's control prevented him from meeting the October 12, 1999 deadline, the claimant could petition the Court to permit him to file after the October 12, 1999 deadline.2 On December 20, 1999, the Court determined that it would be more "efficient and expeditious" for the Arbitrator to decide several hundred expected petitions to file late claims and delegated its authority under Paragraph 5(g) to the Arbitrator. The Court's
1 On October 21, 1999, the Court declined to grant potential claimants an extension of time beyond the October 12, 1999 deadline to submit their claims. The Court further expected the parties and movants to "devise a means by which individual farmers or discrete, defined groups of farmers will be required to provide adequate, documented justification for an extension of time as required by the Consent decree." 2 Paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree states:
A claimant who satisfies the definition of the class in ~ 2(a), above, but who fails to submit a completed claim package within 180 days of entry of this Consent Decree may petition the Court to permit him to nonetheless participate in the claims resolution
procedures provided in 1f1f 9 & 10, below. The Court shall grant such a petition only
where the claimant demonstrates that his failure to submit a timely claim was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control. 3 The Consent Decree names Michael K. Lewis of ADR Associates as the "Arbitrator". See Consent Decree, Paragraph 1(b).
-2-

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 11 of 26
order established a deadline for filing such petitions of January 30, 2000. 4 By
Stipulation and Order of July 14, 2000, the parties and the Court permitted potential
claimants who had not previously sent in petitions to file late claims by January 31,
2000, to do so by September 15, 2000. In that stipulation, the Court continued to
delegate the Court's authority under Paragraph 5(g) to the Arbitrator. 5
Processes and Procedures
Forms & Filing
Acting pursuant to the Court's October 21, 1999 order, the parties and the
Arbitrator developed a form captioned, Affidavit in Support of Petition to File a Late
Claim, to be executed under penalty of perjury as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1746. The
form established three categories to justify an extension of time: (1) "Hurricane Floyd",
which permitted petitioners to indicate that they "resid[ed] and/or farm[ed] in one of the
4 Specifically, the Court stated: The Court has been advised by class counsel that several hundred putative class
members who did not submit completed claim forms that were post-marked by October 12,1999
intend to utilize the 1f 5(g) process. The Court has determined that it would be more efficient and
expeditious for the Arbitrator to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether these putative class members can demonstrate that their failure to submit timely claim forms "was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond [their} control" than if this Court were to make each of those determinations. According, it hereby is
ORDERED that the Court's authority to determine whether a class member's petition
under 1f 5(g) of the Consent Decree shall be granted is hereby delegated to the Arbitrator. It
further is
ORDERED that all petitions under 1f 5(g) of the Consent Decree shall be postmarked not
later than January 30, 2000 and submitted directly to the Arbitrator (and without copies to the Court)[.} 5 Specifically, the Stipulation and Order stated:
2. All putative class members who seek relief under 1f 5(g) of the Consent Decree shall submit
written requests for such relief to the Facilitator - without a Claim Sheet and Election Form postmarked no later than September 15, 2000. No extensions of that deadline will be granted for any reason. 3. Michael K. Lewis, the Decree's Arbitrator, is hereby delegated this Court's authority to
determine whether requests for relief under 1f 5(g) of the Consent Decree that were filed after
January 31, 2000 and before September 15, 2000 satisfy the requirements of that provision.
-3-

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 12 of 26
North Carolina counties declared by the federal government to be a disaster area as a result of Hurricane Floyd" and that they were "unable to submit [their] claim before the October 12, 1999 deadline because of this disaster;,,6 (2) "Homebound", which permitted petitioners to indicate that they "became homebound due to illness and/or physical disability, and remained homebound, during the time-period beginning on August 12, 1999, and ending on October 12, 1999;" and (3) "Other Extraordinary Circumstances Beyond Your Control", which served as a catch-all category. For this third category, petitioners were required to provide details about the circumstances preventing them from filing a timely claim. The form provided some guidance to putative petitioners for this third category, advising that '''extraordinary circumstances' do not include 'I did not know about the case' or 'I did not know about the deadline.' It means you were prevented from completing the forms on time by unique circumstances over which you had no authority.,,7
A second form was developed in response to the Stipulation and Order of July 14, 2000. This form provided information about the late-claim petition process, but did not identify any specific categories. It also advised petitioners to provide detailed information and documentation which could help convince the Arbitrator that
6 On September 16,1999, then President Clinton declared that certain portions of North Carolina warranted designation as federal disaster areas as a result of the damage caused by Hurricane Floyd on September 15, 1999. That same day, James L. Witt, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency listed 66 counties as the areas adversely affected by the disaster. See FEMA-1292-DR. 7 In the Court's opinion of April 14, 1999 in which it entered the Consent Decree, the Court concluded that "class members have received more than adequate notice...[and] the timing and breadth of notice of the class settlement was sufficient" with the possible exception of the U.S. Virgin Islands. 185 F.R.D. 82, 101102.
-4-

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 13 of 26
circumstances beyond their control prevented them from filing a timely claim. This form also required execution pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
Putative claimants were instructed to send their affidavits to the Claims Facilitator. Most did, although some petitioners sent affidavits directly to the Arbitrator or to Class Counsel. All affidavits were forwarded to the Claims Facilitator for processing. The Facilitator entered all late claim petitions into its database for tracking purposes and subsequent mailings, and, beginning with petitions received in response to the July 14, 2000 order, assigned each petition a unique identifying number. The Facilitator then forwarded information relating to the petition to the Arbitrator's office.
In response to the Court's order of December 20, 1999, approximately 2300 petitions to file late claims were filed by January 30,2000. Approximately 61,000 petitions were filed by the September 15, 2000 deadline. An additional 7500 putative claimants filed petitions postmarked after the September 15, 2000 deadline.
Categorization & Research To facilitate review of the affidavits, the Arbitrator collaborated with staff of the
Claims Facilitator to develop a series of categories into which late claim affidavits could be sorted. These categories, based on the justifications put forward by petitioners to establish the extraordinary circumstances surrounding their failure to file a claim by October 12,1999, included, in addition to the "Hurricane Floyd" and "Homebound"
-5-

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 14 of 26
justifications provided in the first form, such categories as "Misplaced papers or forgot about deadline date", "Unaware of lawsuit," "Unaware of deadline," "Unaware that they qualified," "Unaware of need to request claim form," "Did not understand the form or how to file" and "Lawyer unavailable," among others.
Categorization guided the decision-making process. For example, those petitioners who documented in their petition that they fell into the "Hurricane Floyd" and "Homebound" categories were approved on the basis of the paperwork submitted with their petition to file a late claim. Conversely, those whose affidavits clearly demonstrated that they belonged in the "Unaware of lawsuit" category, without any mitigating factors, were rejected. Categorization helped to decide which petitioners had demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances prevented them from filing a timely claim, which ones had failed to demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances caused them not to file timely, and which petitions required further information before a decision could be made.
In order to gather further information about late-claim petitions, the Arbitrator hired a cadre of law school students and graduates. This staff contacts petitioners by telephone to conduct structured interviews based upon the categories into which each undecided petition falls. The interviewers record the information collected from the petitioners and maintain a log of the persons contacted. They also maintain a log of who they have been unable to reach by telephone. Those petitioners who cannot be reached
-6-

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 15 of 26
by telephone are sent a letter requesting that they provide current contact information. To date, approximately 500 petitioners have been sent such letters. If petitioners respond that they cannot be reached by telephone, they are mailed a detailed questionnaire based upon the category of their affidavit.
Five interviewers were hired to contact petitioners for late claim affidavits received pursuant to the January 30, 2000 deadline. That number has increased to a staff of twenty. Affidavits are assigned to interviewers in batches of one hundred. At any given time, over two thousand petitions are being investigated by the interviewers.
Based on the Arbitrator's criteria for late claim affidavits, as well as the discovery of new types of standard explanations for missing the October 12, 1999 filing deadline (e.g. "Slave Reparations"), the Facilitator developed a late claim affidavit categorization list. Following an agreement on the categorization list with the Arbitrator, the Facilitator used the list in sorting late claim petitions.
Internally, the Facilitator created a document to help guide the categorizations, which fully described the categories, and assigned a two letter code for database entry. The Facilitator then categorized every late-claim petition which had not previously been forwarded to the Arbitrator for decision. The Facilitator completed sorting the petitions into categories in May 2001.
-7-

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 16 of 26
Following completion of the categorization process, members of the Arbitrator's staff traveled to the Facilitator's offices in Portland, Oregon to review the results. Following this review, all petitions falling solely into one of the following categories were rejected: EG (Not Eligible), FO (Unsure on How to Fill Out Claim), NL (Case Not Legitimate), SR (Slave Reparations), & TX (Tax Forms ("Sack Tax Lawsuit"», and those in the UL (Unaware of LawsuiUDeadline) & RQ (Unaware of Need to Request Claim) categories who had not requested a claim package prior to October 12, 1999.
Rejections based upon the categories above were sent at the end of June and during July 2001. At the same time, letters were sent to those petitioners whose affidavits were postmarked after September 15, 2000 that their petitions would not be considered. A number of farmers who filed a late claim affidavit following the Court's December 20, 1999 order attempted to file a second affidavit following the issuance of the Court's July 14, 2000 order. These farmers have been reminded of the decision already made on their initial affidavit. To date, approximately 33,000 petitions to file late claims have been denied, 1100 approved, with 27,000 remaining to be decided. The vast majority of approvals have come from petitioners who filed their petitions before January 30, 2000.
Reconsideration Persons whose petitions are denied initially, may make a written request for
reconsideration. Many of those who have requested reconsideration of a denial of their
-8-

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 17 of 26
late claim appeal directly to the Arbitrator upon receiving their rejection letter. Others request reconsideration following telephone calls to the Arbitrator or to the Facilitator asking what steps may be taken in the wake of a denial. The late-claim process continues to generate a high volume of telephone calls. The Facilitator fields most of those calls.
Other petitioners have submitted what is essentially a de facto request for reconsideration; that is, although they did not explicitly request a reconsideration of the decision to deny their petition, they have submitted a second petition to file a late claim (prior to September 15, 2000) after they received a letter denying their right to participate. This last group is almost completely comprised of persons who had initially petitioned by January 30, 2000, had their petitions denied, and who submitted the second standardized form in response to the Court's July 14, 2000 order. Several petitioners have made multiple requests for reconsideration.
Although approximately 800 formal requests for reconsideration have been made, with an additional 500 de facto requests for reconsideration as described above, it has become clear that the reconsideration process is not well understood. To address this problem two steps have been taken. First, the standard denial letter has been edited to specifically include information on the reconsideration process. Second, the Facilitator has sent a letter to all previous petitioners who had been denied, and who
-9-

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 18 of 26
have not yet requested that their petitions be reconsidered, informing them of the reconsideration process.8
As with the original review of affidavits, decisions on reconsiderations may be made on the record submitted by the petitioner, or the record may be augmented through an information~gathering telephone call or letter. If, in the request for reconsideration itself (and any attached evidence), the petitioner demonstrates that the original denial was in error, the petition is approved. If, in the request for reconsideration, the petitioner presents no information which calls into question the original denial, the petitioner is sent a letter detailing the reasons for the denial. If, however, in the request for reconsideration the petitioner presents information which calls into question the decision to reject the petition, but fails to provide sufficient information to justify an approval, the petitioner may be interviewed or sent a letter requesting further information. This letter provides for a thirty day period in which to supplement the record. Following the thirty day period or the interview, the petition is approved or the petitioner is sent a factually specific, detailed letter explaining the reasons for the denial.
Approximately 340 of the 800 formal requests for reconsideration have been reviewed to date. Of that number, 55 petitions have been approved. The Facilitator is notified of all approvals following reconsideration. All petitioners who request
8 The original letters of denial, the new letter of denial, and the letter informing petitioners of the reconsideration process are attached.
-10-

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 19 of 26
reconsideration and send such a request through the Facilitator are sent a letter notifying them that their requests for reconsideration may take some time as approximately half of the late claim petitions received have not been reviewed for the first time.

Results to Date The current status of the late claim review process, as described above, is presented in tabular form below. All figures are approximate.

Number of Petitions to File Late Claims Petitions filed by September 15, 2000 Petitions filed by January 30. 2000 Petitions Approved Petitions Denied Petitions assigned to Researchers Petitioners sent "No Contact" letters Requests for Reconsideration Requests for Reconsideration Decided Petitions Approved upon Reconsideration

68,000 61,000
2,300 1,100 33,000 6,400
500 1,300
340 55

Conclusion The Court believed that the review of late claim petitions could be made more efficiently and expeditiously by the Arbitrator than by the Court. When the Court issued the July 14, 2000 order, no one anticipated the high volume of petitions ultimately received in response to the Court's order. All of the parties

-11-

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 20 of 26
associated with implementing the Consent Decree are cognizant of the impact of the late-claim petition process upon the other portions of the Consent Decree. The Arbitrator's intention is to make an initial decision on every petition within the next twelve months. It is not at all clear that all current and forthcoming requests for reconsideration will be resolved in that same time frame. Finally, given the importance of the late claim process to the implementation of the Consent Decree, the Arbitrator intends to report to the Court and to the parties on a semiannual basis.
Respectfully submitted,
~ Arbitrator
Date: ,J()V~ &~IL Itfl 200 I
Copies to: Michael Sitcov, Esq. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division P.O. Box 883, Room 1022 Washington, DC 20044 Fax: 202-616-8470 Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Esq. Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP 1818 N Street, NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20036 • Fax: 202-331-9306
-12-

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 21 of 26 Randi lIyse Roth, Esq. 46 East Fourth Street, Suite 1301 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101 Fax: 651-223-5335
-13-

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 22 of 26
Mediatim Artlitnrtim Training &
Djspute~nw
Design

.o\DR AS~OCIArEs.

Re: Pigford et al. v. Glickman - Civil Action No. 97-1978 CPLF) Brewington et al. v. Glickman - Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

1666

Dear Claimant:

Comecticut Ave. NW

Sule 500 Washington, DC
20009
phcne
202-332-0490
fa)(
202-332-39 51

The deadline for filing a claim in the Black Farmers Settlement against the U.S. Department of Agriculture was October 12, 1999. Paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree in this case provides that farmers who missed the October 12, 1999 deadline may petition the Court to permit the farmer to nonetheless participate in the claims resolution procedures set out in the decree.

e-mail

The Consent Decree also establishes a high standard for the review oflate

ADRAssoc@8Cl1.com claims in that the farmer must demonstrate that his failure to submit a timely claim

was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control. On December 20,

1999, Judge Friedman delegated to me the review of all late-filed claims.

After a thorough review of your late claim affidavit and supporting documentation, I have concluded that you have not met the high standard contained in paragraph 5(g). Thus, your request to be permitted to participate in the settlement is denied.

Michael K. Lewis

FORM E6551

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 23 of 26
Mediatioo Arbitratioo TrainingS
Dispute~ms
Design

.-\M: ASSOCIArES 1666

Re: Pigford et aI. v. Glickman - Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) Brewington et al v. Glickman - Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

Comecticut /We. NW Dear Claimant:

Suite 500

Wastlin(ton, DC
20009 phcne 202·332·0490 fax 202·332-39 51

The deadline for filing a claim in the Black Farmers Settlement against the U.S. Department of Agriculture, pursuant to Paragraph 5(c) of the Consent Decree, was October 12, 1999. Paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree in this case provides that farmers who missed the October 12, 1999 deadline may petition the Court to pennit the farmer to nonetheless participate in the claims resolution

e-mail

procedures set out in the decree.

ADRAssoc@aol.com

The Consent Decree also establishes a high standard for the review of late claims in that the farmer must demonstrate that his failure to submit a timely claim was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his controL On December 20, 1999, Judge Friedman delegated to me the review of all late-filed .

After a thorough review of your late claim affidavit and supporting documentation, I have concluded that you have not met the high standard contained in paragraph 5(g). Thus, your request to be permitted to participate in the settlement is denied. My decision is final and may not be appealed to the Monitor or to the Court.

Sincerely,

Michael K. Lewis

FORM E6551

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 24 of 26
Black Farmers' Settlement
P.O. Box 4390 Portland, OR 97208-4390
1-800-646-2873
Re: Pigford et al. v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) Brewington et al. v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)
Dear Claimant: The deadline for filing a claim in the Black Farmers Settlement against the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, pursuant to Paragraph 5(c) of the Consent Decree, was October 12, 1999. Paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree in this case provides that farmers who missed the October 12, 1999 deadline may petition the Court to permit the farmer to nonetheless participate in the claims resolution procedures set out in the decree.
The Consent Decree also establishes a high standard for the review of late claims in that the farmer must demonstrate that his failure to submit a timely claim was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control. On December 20, 1999, Judge Friedman delegated to me the review of all late-filed claims.
After a thorough review of your late claim affidavit and supporting documentation, 1 have concluded that you have not met the high standard contained in paragraph 5(g). Thus, your request to be permitted to participate in the settlement is denied. My decision is final and may not be appealed to the Monitor or to the Court.
Arbitrator
Form E6541

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 25 of 26

Black Farmers' Settlement
P.O Box 4390 Portland, OR 97208-4390
1-800-6·+6-2873

«Name of Client First Middle Last» «Address 1» «Address 2» «City», «St» «Zip_Code»

November 14,2001
Claim # «Claim » Tracking # «Tracking_»

RE: Pigford et al v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) Brewington et al. v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

Dear Claimant,

The deadline for filing a claim in the Black Farmers' Settlement against the U.S Department of Agriculture, pursuant to Paragraph S(c) of the Consent Decree, was October 12, 1999. Paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree in this case provides that farmers who missed the October 12, 1999 deadline may petition the Court to permit the farmer to nonetheless participate in the claims resolution procedures set out in the decree. The Consent Decree also establishes a high standard for the review of late claims in that the farmer must demonstrate that his failure to submit a timely claim was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.

On December 20, 1999, Judge Friedman delegated to me the review of all late-filed claims. After a thorough review of your late claim affidavit and supporting documentation, I have concluded that you have not met the high standard contained in paragraph 5(g). Thus, your request to be permitted to participate in the settlement is denied.

There is a process for me to reconsider your application. Such a request must be in writing to the address above, postmarked within 60 days of the date of this letter. Before you make a request for reconsideration, I ask that you think about any circumstances that make stronger your argument that you should be permitted to participate in the settlement. As I have said above, the standard established in the consent decree is that only circumstances beyond the control of the claimant should be considered. Only information or documents I do not already have will convince me to change my decision.

All written information must be accompanied by a cover letter signed by the claimant. The following sentence must be written above the claimant's signature: "I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT."

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 560 Filed 11/26/01 Page 26 of 26

Black Farmers' Settlement
P.O Box 4390 Portland, OR 97208-4390
1-800-6,),6-2873

«Name of Client- First- Middle- Last» «Address I» «Address 2»

November 14,2001

Tracking # «Tracking_» RE: Pigford et al. v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Brewington et al. v Veneman - Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

Dear Claimant,

As you know, you previously received a letter from me that denied your petition to file a late claim in the Black Farmers' Settlement. This letter is to inform you that there is a process for me to reconsider your application. Such a request must be in writing to the address above, postmarked within 60 days of the date of this letter. If you previously have requested reconsideration, you do not need to respond to this letter.

Before you make a request for reconsideration, I ask that you think about any circumstances that make stronger your argument that you should be permitted to participate in the settlement. As I said in my first letter to you, the standard established in the consent decree is that only circumstances beyond the control of the claimant should be considered. Only information or documents I do not already have will convince me to change my decision.

All written information must be accompanied by a cover letter signed by the potential claimant. The following sentence must be written above the claimant's signature: "I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT."

As you may be aware, there were thousands of people who petitioned to file late claims. Although you have received a decision from me, many others have not. Fairness dictates that before I review your petition for a second time, I must decide the petitions of those who have not heard from me once. In time, I will review your petition if you send me a request for reconsideration, but please be advised that it may be as much as a year before you hear from me again.

Michael K. Lewis Arbitrator

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 589 Filed 01/17/02 Page 1 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et ~,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

--------------------------------)
)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

--------------------------------)

F I LED
JAN 1 7 2002
NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON., CLERK U.S. DISTRtCT COURT
Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) ./
Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The Court has before it plaintiffs' motion to endow arbitrators with discretion to extend arbitration deadlines, a joinder in the motion filed by Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP and defendant's oppositions to both filings. Based on the parties' written arguments, the Consent Decree and the history of this case, the Court will GRANT plaintiffs' motion for the following reasons.

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 589 Filed 01/17/02 Page 2 of 7
Under the Consent Decree that settled this case, the parties agreed that the Arbitrator, Michael Lewis, would conduct hearings to decide all claims for relief under Track B. See Consent Decree' 10 (April 14, 1999). The Consent Decree laid out a time frame for the stages of these proceedings, including the conclusion of discovery, identification of witnesses and submission of exhibits and written testimony. See id. at , lO(a)-(f). In addition, the Decree stated that the decisions of the Arbitrator and, by inference, his designees ("arbitrators"), would be final, and that the parties could not seek review in any court with respect to "any claim that is, or could have been decided, by the arbitrator." Id. at , lO(i).
In their motion, plaintiffs ask that the Consent Decree be interpreted or modified by the Court to allow the arbitrators discretion to extend certain deadlines in the Track B proceedings. Plaintiffs point out that many Track B cases are being handled by pro bono counsel, who were brought into the cases after initial deadlines had passed and with little time to prepare before other deadlines were upon them. Based on this circumstance, plaintiffs argue, the arbitrators necessarily have the authority or should be endowed with the authority to extend deadlines in the Track B proceedings as appropriate. See Plaintiff's Motion at 7-11.
Defendant objects to such deadline revisions by the arbitrators, contending first that the Court lacks jurisdiction even to consider plaintiffs' motion and further that the deadlines set in the Consent Decree were meant to be absolute and final and thus cannot be modified by the arbitrators without the consent of both parties. See Defendant's Opposition at 2, 9. To alter the deadlines now, defendant argues, not only would permit plaintiffs' counsel unfairly to "re-do" the claims process but would remove a central benefit of the bargain on which defendant relied in agreeing to the settlement. See Defendant's Opposition at 7, 18-19.
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 589 Filed 01/17/02 Page 3 of 7
As a threshold matter, the Court rejects defendant's contention that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' motion. It is established that a court maintains authority to enforce and to interpret an approved Consent Decree. See, e.g., Beckett v. Air Line Pilot Ass'n, 995 F.2d 280,285-6 (D.C.Cir. 1993); Hammon v. Kelly, 154 F.R.D. 11,27 (D.D.C. 1994). Here, the Consent Decree explicitly allows for its construction in a liberal manner in view of its remedial purposes, recognizing that the Decree could not possibly have anticipated every circumstance that would arise in the course of implementation. See Consent Decree at 1-2. Defendant is correct that the Decree precludes judicial review of arbitrator decisions of Track B claims, see Defendant's Opposition at 3-4 (citing the Consent Decree, , lOCi»~. In their motion, however, plaintiffs do not ask the Court to review a "claim that is, or could have been decided, by the arbitrator." Consent Decree, , lOci). Plaintiffs do not challenge any specific decision by an arbitrator to grant or deny a claim for relief. 1 Instead, plaintiffs ask the Court only to interpret the Decree and clarify the scope of the arbitrators' authority to revise deadlines. Because the Consent Decree does not preclude Court consideration of the scope of the arbitrators' discretion in Track B proceedings, this Court has jurisdiction to decide plaintiffs' motion.
With respect to the scope of the arbitrators' discretion, the Court concludes that the Arbitrator and his designees have essentially the same authority over Track B hearings that a trial judge would have over a trial or related pre-trial proceedings. In Paragraph 10 of the
The Court does not accept defendant's assumption that a request for extension of deadlines constitutes a "claim" subject to , lOCi) unreviewability. See Defendant's Opposition at 10-11.
3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 589 Filed 01/17/02 Page 4 of 7
Consent Decree, this Court delegated its authority over Track B claims to the Arbitrator. That authority implicitly includes the powers necessary to conduct both the evidentiary hearing and pre-hearing proceedings, such as deciding requests to enlarge the discovery period, to extend deadlines for submission of testimony and exhibits, and to schedule and, if appropriate, reschedule the hearing date. In this case, therefore, it is evident that granting extensions of such dates and deadlines is well within the arbitrators' authority.
The more difficult question, however, concerns deadlines already past: Can the arbitrator allow pro bono counsel to conduct discovery and submit direct testimony when the dates for the close of discovery and submission of testimony have expired? The Court recognizes that, as a general practice, it is rare for a trial judge to reopen discovery after discovery has closed and discovery deadlines have not been extended by consent or on motion. Certainly where a lawyer has disregarded deadlines established by rules or court order, a judge is loathe to provide relief, even where the errors of counselor even former counsel have weakened a litigant's ability effectively to present his or her claim. The history of this case is unique, however, and requires more than hasty application of general practice.
Pro bono counsel originally were solicited by the Court itself to provide services to class members as a result of class counsel's inability to represent all Track B claimants adequately. See Order of April 27, 2001 at 6-7. In the course of that solicitation, the Court informally assured pro bono counsel that arbitrators in Track B cases would be reasonable and flexible with deadlines in order to accommodate counsel's late entry into ongoing proceedings. Nevertheless, the parties have remained unsure as to whether the arbitrators may allow pro bono counsel to "undo" the errors of their predecessors by vacating past deadlines, or whether
4

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 589 Filed 01/17/02 Page 5 of 7
the arbitrators' authority is limited to granting delays of future proceedings, so that counsel may "catch up" in the process.
Based on the parties' submissions and the history of this case, the Court concludes that the arbitrators do have discretion to allow for revision of certain deadlines, even after the deadlines have passed, so long as justice requires the revisions and provided that the burden on the defendant is not so great as to outweigh the interest of the claimant in fully presenting his or her claim. These decisions are within the discretion of the arbitrator in each case. In the interest of fairness, the arbitrators may reschedule hearings and permit late filing of written testimony and exhibits. Reopening of discovery is a more difficult question. Just as a trial judge would have discretion to reopen discovery under extraordinary circumstances, so too does each arbitrator have the same authority. This Court is confident, however, that the arbitrators will hue to this standard of restraint as they consider any such requests. In other words, the Court expects the arbitrators to be much more reluctant to reopen discovery than to accept the submission of testimony and exhibits out of time. For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to endow arbitrators with discretion to extend arbitration deadlines is GRANTED. The Court holds that the arbitrators' authority to revise deadlines in Track B proceedings is implicit in the terms of the Consent Decree and supported
5

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 589 Filed 01/17/02 Page 6 of 7

by general principles of judicial discretion, and therefore the Court need not "endow" the arbitrators with any supplemental authority.
SO ORDERED.

DATE: '/Ir/'::>)...

.)

,~'--f-

V ~~ ",

"~

-PA-U-=-L'--'L=---.--=P-RI-E:::-D-M-A-----'N'.-.O..;.;.:::--'4OOOI>o;;:;;I;o'"

United States District Judge

6

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 589 Filed 01/17/02 Page 7 of 7
Copies to:
Michael Sitcov, Esq. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division P.O. Box 883, Room 1022 Washington, D. C. 20044
Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Esq. Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP 1818 N Street, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D. C. 20036
J.L. Chestnut, Jr., Rose M. Sanders Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway P.O. Box 1305 Selma, Alabama 36702
Randi Ilyse Roth, Esq. Office of the Monitor 46 East Fourth Street, Suit e1301 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101
Anthony Herman, Esq. Covington & Burling 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20004
Michael Lewis, Esq. ADR Associates 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20009
Lester Levy JAMS 2 Embarcadero Center Suite 1100 San Francisco, CA 94111
Julie Redell Nicole Fahey Poorman-Douglas Corporation 10300 SW Allen Blvd. Beaverton, Oregon 97005
7

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 615 Filed 05/14/02 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

--------------------------------)
)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et f!L.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

----------------------------------)

F I LED
MAY 1 4 2002
NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON, CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) ,./
Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

ORDER By Order of December 20, 1999, this Court delegated authority to the Arbitrator in this case, Michael K. Lewis, to decide all petitions by claimants seeking to late file under Section 5(g) of the Consent Decree. See also Order of November 26, 2001. Pursuant to that order, the Arbitrator continues to review petitions to late file as well as reconsider previously denied petitions, upon request of the claimant. See Arbitrator's Second Report on the Lateclaim Petition Process, dated May 3, 2002.

,,- </U. I~)

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 615 Filed 05/14/02 Page 2 of 4
The Court now has before it an "Original Petition for Consideration in the Claims Resolution Process Due to Extraordinary Circumstances" ("Williams Petition"), filed by Darrell W. Williams, a putative member of the plaintiff class. The Court has directed the Clerk's Office to accept the Petition for filing. In his submission to the Court, Williams states that he "has decided to petition the Court directly under section 5.g.[sic]." Because the Court has delegated to the Arbitrator the authority to decide petitions to late file, however, the Court cannot consider Mr. Williams' request. See Order (December 20, 1999); Order (November 26, 2001). If Mr. Williams believes that he is entitled to late file under the terms of Section 5(g) of the Consent Decree -- and under its subsequent interpretation by the Court and the Arbitrator, see Order (December 20, 1999); Stipulation and Order (January 14, 2000); Arbitrator's Report on the Late-Claim Petition Process (November 14, 2001); Order (November 26, 2001); Arbitrator's Second Report on the Late-Claim Petition Process (May 3, 2002) 1 -- he must submit his argument directly to the Arbitrator. The Court will not consider any such petition, either at the first instance or following denial and/or reconsideration by the Arbitrator. See Order (November 26, 2001) at 3-4. For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Petition of Darrell W. Williams will not be considered by the Court; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Williams and all putative class members seeking permission to late file under Section 5(g) of the Consent Decree are directed to review the terms of that provision, as interpreted by the Court and the Arbitrator. If, having reviewed
Many of these documents may be accessed on the District Court's website at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/district-court-recent .html.
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 615 Filed 05/14/02 Page 3 of 4
the requirements for eligibility under Section 5(g), petitioners believe that they are entitled to
late file, petitioners must seek permission directly from the Arbitrator, Michael K. Lewis.
SO ORDERED.
c<~~
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge
Darrell W. Williams 3316 Oxsheer Drive Austin, TX 78732
Michael Sitcov, Esq. U. S. Department of Justice, Civil Division P.O. Box 883, Room 1022 Washington, D.C. 20044
Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Esq. Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP 1818 N Street, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D. C. 20036
Randi Ilyse Roth, Esq. Office of the Monitor 46 East Fourth Street, Suit e1301 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101
Anthony Herman, Esq. Covington & Burling 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20004
(continued on next page)
3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 615 Filed 05/14/02 Page 4 of 4
Michael Lewis, Esq. ADR Associates 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20009 Lester Levy JAMS 2 Embarcadero Center Suite 1100 San Francisco, CA 94111 Julie Redell Nicole Fahey Poorman-Douglas Corporation 10300 SW Allen Blvd. Beaverton, Oregon 97005
4

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 629 Filed 06/27/02 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et fll,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

---------------------------------)
)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

-----------------------------------)

JUN 2 7 2002
NANCY MA~R WHITTINGTON, ClERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) v
Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The Court has before it eleven motions filed by individual class members, each identical in content and filed as a "request for exclusion and to volunteer appearance" or under a similar title. 1 From the statements contained in each motion it appears that movants seek exclusion from the certified class of plaintiffs in this case, based on the fact that they were "not

Movants are the following individuals: Robert and Velma Collins, Colie and Harold Dixon, Betty and Larry Garrett, Willie Maymon, Geraldstine and Grover Miller, Carolyn Smith, Marilynn Stewart.

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 629 Filed 06/27/02 Page 2 of 5
served with process when the original action was commenced." Because the Court cannot provide the relief that movants seek, all motions will be denied.
On October 9, 1998, this Court certified a class of farmers in this case, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). In large class actions such as this, where there is a description of the class but no actual list of class members, the law does not require that every class member receive service of process or notice of the action, but only that the parties provide the "best notice practicable under the circumstances." Rule 23(c)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P.; see Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172-77 (1974). In this case, the parties agreed to reach class members through a targeted advertising campaign and to allow a 120-day period for members to opt out of the class. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82,101 (D.D.C. 1999). The period for opt-out expired on August 30, 1999, beyond which date all members were bound by the terms of the settlement as established in the Consent Decree. See Consent Decree ~2(b) (April 14, 1999). In approving the Consent Decree that settled this case, the Court approved the 120-day opt-out period set out within the Decree and also found that the notice provided to class members had been "more than adequate." See id.
Because it is now nearly two years past the deadline for opting out of the class, and because movants have offered no reason for missing the deadline other than lack of notice, movants no longer may choose to exclude themselves from the class. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Products, 1995 WL 251402, *4, 6-7 (E.D.Pa. 1995). The Court notes that "[n]either Rule 23 nor the requirements of due process require actual notice to each and every possible class member. ... the fact that notice did not reach some class members, while unfortunate, does not alter the fact that such efforts constituted the best notice practicable." In
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 629 Filed 06/27/02 Page 3 of 5 re Prudential Insurance Company of America Sales Practices Litigation, 177 F.R.D. 216, 23334 (D.N.J. 1997) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950». Movants' contention that lack of service at the commencement of the case entitles them to opt out after the established period is without merit. See In re Prudential Insurance Company of America Sales Practices Litigation, 177 F.R.D. at 234.
For these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the class members' motions for exclusion and to volunteer appearance [554, 555, 556, 557, 564, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572] are DENIED. SO ORDERED.
c?-.-<-~~
PAUL L. FRIEDMA United States District Judge
3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 629 Filed 06/27/02 Page 4 of 5
Copies to:
Michael Sitcov, Esq. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division P.O. Box 883, Room 1022 Washington, D.C. 20044
Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Esq. Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP 1818 N Street, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20036
Randi Ilyse Roth, Esq. Office of the Monitor 46 East Fourth Street, Suit e1301 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101
Michael Lewis, Esq. ADR Associates 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20009
Lester Levy JAMS 2 Embarcadero Center Suite 1100 San Francisco, CA 94111
Nicole Fahey, Julie Redell Poorman-Douglas Corporation 10300 SW Allen Blvd Beaverton, OR 97005
Robert & Velma Collins P.O. Box 266 Hazelhurst, MS 39083
Colie Dixon, Sr. 2088 Brushy Creek Road Georgetown, MS 39078
4

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 629 Filed 06/27/02 Page 5 of 5
· Harold B. Dixon 19147 Dentville Road Hazelhurst, MS 39083 Larry and Betty Garrett 2100 Brushy Creek Road Georgetown, MS 39078 Willie S. Maymon P.O. Box 48 Rolling Fork, MS 39159 Grover and Geraldstine Miller 5044 Cooper Road Georgetown, MS 39078 Carolyn Smith 5087 New Hope Road Georgetown, MS 39078 Marilynn Stewart 5371 Keele St. Jackson, MS 39206
5

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 655 Filed 08/15/02 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ))

CECIL BREWINGTON, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

----------------------------------)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
RLED
I.\UG 1 5 200l.
..,-y~ct.EM
Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

ORDER The Court has received a letter from the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas regarding the membership and good standing of James W. Myart in the State Bar of Texas. Because this letter relates to recent filings in this case, it is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to file this letter in the record and to deliver copies of the letter to all parties on the service list. SO ORDERED.

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 655 Filed 08/15/02 Page 2 of 3
Copies to: Michael Sitcov, Esq. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division P.O. Box 883, Room 1022 Washington, D.C. 20044 Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Esq. Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP 1818 N Street, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20036 Phillip L. Fraas Hogan & Hartson 555 13th St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 J. L. Chestnut Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright, P.C. 1 Union St. Selma, AL 36701 Randi Ilyse Roth, Esq. Office of the Monitor 46 East Fourth Street, Suit e1301 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101 Julie Redell Nicole Fahey Poorman-Douglas Corporation 10300 SW Allen Blvd. Beaverton, Oregon 97005
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 655 Filed 08/15/02 Page 3 of 3
STATE BAR OF TEXAS

Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
August 1, 2002
Re: James W. Myart, State Bar Number 14755950

FlED
=- AUG 1 5 2002
1W.1cr_ _ ~ U.s. Dlsrmct Cl8tK

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that Mr. James W. Myart was licensed to practice law in Texas on May 5, 1989, and is an active member in good standing with the State Bar of Texas. "Good standing" means that the attorney is current on payment of Bar dues and attorney occupation tax; has met Minimum Continuing Legal Education requirements; and is not presently under either administrative or disciplinary suspension.

I have researched our disciplinary records and report that our records reflect at this time four (4) grievances pending in the San Antonio Regional Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.

The following disciplinary action involving professional misconduct has been taken against Mr. Myart's law license.

Action Date 0711611998
07/1711998
0112911999

Case Number S0019806164
S0059806430
S0019806138

Start/End N/A
N/A
03/04/1999 - 03/0312000; Active 03/0412000 - 03/0312002; Probated

SanctlOn PrIvate Reprimand
Public Reprimand
Partially Probated Suspension

Please let me know if you need additional information or if I can be of further assistance to you.

Sincerely,

Chief Disciplinary Counsel DM/lmg

P.O. BOX 12487, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-2487, 512-453-5535 or 1-877-953-5535

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 733 Filed 01/14/03 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

-------------------------------)
)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

-------------------------------)

FI LED
JAN 1 ,~ Z003
NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON, CLERK US DIS1RICTCOURT
Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The parties came before the Court for a status conference on December 11, 2002 to discuss the issues of attorneys' fees and potential sanctions, as well as the remanded issue of modification of deadlines in certain Track B proceedings. Because the Court did not have time to address the third issue at the hearing, it held a conference call to discuss the Track B issue on December 18, 2002 that included class counsel, counsel for the government,
1

133

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 733 Filed 01/14/03 Page 2 of 9
pro bono counsel and Arbitrator Michael Lewis. Based on the parties' representations in written submissions, at the hearing, and during the subsequent conference call, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order on December 30, 2002. To clarify the amount of potential sanctions at issue, the Court issues the following amended findings and relief.
First, as a general matter, the Court concludes that the issue of sanctions is appropriately addressed separately from the matter of attorneys' fees. While the government argues that class counsel should be penalized both with a reduction in the amount of compensable hours or a reduction in hourly billing rates and with sanctions, the Court finds this position untenable. To reduce the amount of counsel's fees as well as to impose sanctions would amount to a double hit, making counsel pay twice what should be a single, comprehensive penalty. Thus, although the Court has granted defendant's motion to consolidate consideration of the issue of fees with the issue of sanctions, see Order of November 22, 2002, the Court will not confuse the distinct questions of law and fact that underlie these fundamentally separate issues. The parties are urged to address these issues with this guidance in mind.
Second, in light of the parties' evolving positions on fees and the relatively small amounts now in dispute, the Court finds it reasonable for the parties to continue to try to settle the issue of attorneys' fees. Toward that end, the Court urges the parties to continue their negotiations and to consider the fact that a judicial determination of fees would require a vast expenditure of time and resources by all involved. Indeed, if the parties are unable to settle this issue, the Court may find it necessary to appoint a special master to handle all fee-
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 733 Filed 01/14/03 Page 3 of 9
related issues and may require the parties to bear the costs of the special master. In hopes that settlement among the parties can achieve a fair and efficient resolution without judicial intervention, the Court chooses not to appoint a special master at this time. Therefore, while several issues relating to fees remain undecided -- such as defining the parameters of "implementation" work and determining the adequacy of counsel's billing records and fee petitions -- the parties nonetheless may find it preferable to agree to a mutually acceptable resolution rather than to pursue precise judicial determination of all issues. Based on the representations made by certain counsel at the December 11 status conference, it seems possible that a form of "rough justice" can be achieved without the need to reach a consensus with respect to each hour spent by each attorney on each task. The Court strongly urges both sides to approach the issue with a degree of flexibility and to work toward a nonjudicial determination of the amounts with respect to both fees and sanctions.
Third, independent of the parties' eventual success in settling these matters, the Court finds it appropriate to order an immediate payment in the amount of $500,000 to class and of counsel for implementation fees and costs. As stated in their recent fee petitions, class and of counsel urgently need an infusion of funds to continue their work in this case. In addition, plaintiffs expect to seek fees for non-implementation work in the future, which fees can serve as collateral for any sanctions ultimately imposed by the Court. Specifically, current requests for implementation fees total $858,685, and counsel anticipate fees for nonimplementation work in the amount of $836,000 or more. In total, therefore, the attorneys' fees sought by class and of counsel now and in the future will amount to at least $1.6 million,
3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 733 Filed 01/14/03 Page 4 of 9

while the potential sanctions likely will total no more than $308,000. 1 Based on these estimates, the Court concludes that the amount imposed as sanctions is unlikely to exceed or even approach the amount of fees owed to counsel and therefore that immediate payment of $500,000 for implementation work will not unfairly prejudice the defendant. 2
Fourth, in order to ensure that the matter of attorneys' fees is resolved promptly if it cannot be settled, the Court will enter the briefing schedule suggested by the government,

Although the Court has not fully addressed the issue of sanctions, at the Court's request, the Monitor provided the Court with the following calculations of the potential sanctions based upon the Court's Orders of April 27, 2001, May 15,2001, and June 28, 2001:

(1) There are 31 days in the period between May 16 and June 15, 2001. $1,000 per day times 31 days equals $31,000.

(2) There are 30 days in the period between June 16 and July 15, 2001. $2,000 per day times 30 days equals $60,000.

(3) There are 31 days in the period between July 16 and August 15,2001. $3,000 per day times 31 days equals $93,000.

(4) There are 31 days in the period between August 16 and September 15,2001. $4,000 per day times 31 days equals $124,000.

(5) According to the formula detailed in the Orders referenced above, the total amount of sanctions would be $31,000 + $60,000 + $93,000 + $124,000, for a total of $308,000.

2

Defendant asserts that the amount of sanctions may be higher, based on the Court's Order

of June 15,2001 threatening to impose sanctions for any violations of the September 15,2001

deadline, and based on the Court's Order of January 17, 2002 suggesting that class counsel's

violation of the protective order in this case might warrant further sanctions. While the Court

will not address these arguments in depth at this time, it notes that the Monitor has found no

evidence of violations under the June 15,2001 Order. See Monitor's Status Report Regarding

Registers of Petitions, November 7, 2001. In addition, the January 17, 2002 Order explicitly

notes the lack of harm resulting from plaintiffs' violation of the protective order, and the parties

can assume that any sanctions based on that violation will take this factor into account. In any

case, the Court concludes that it is reasonable to award $500,000 to class and of counsel at this

time without serious risk of prejudice to defendant.

4

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 733 Filed 01/14/03 Page 5 of 9
with the understanding that this schedule will be vacated if the parties are able to resolve the issues of fees and sanctions among themselves. For updates on the status of negotiations before then, the Court will rely on the Arbitrator, Michael Lewis, who has assisted in negotiations up to this point.
Fifth, the parties have agreed that it is necessary to institute a regular process for the submission and approval of all future fee requests. Attorney Phillip Fraas has submitted a proposal for procedures and these have been largely agreed to (with certain suggested modifications). See Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Expenses for Implementation Work Only for Phillip L. Fraas and for the Establishment of Deadlines and Procedures for the Resolution of Future Fees Motions. Because these procedures seem reasonable, the Court generally approves this system for submission and approval of all future fee requests. Rather than the monthly submission schedule suggested by Mr. Fraas, however, the Court concludes that quarterly submission of fee petitions would be more reasonable and efficient.
Finally, with respect to the remanded issue of modification of deadlines in certain Track B proceedings, the parties have agreed that it is necessary for the Court to decide whether or not claimants who were not originally represented by class counsel are covered by the principles articulated in the court of appeals' June 21,2002 opinion on this issue. 3 lfthe
Due to a conflict of interest recently discovered by pro bono counsel at Wiley, Rein & Fielding, the firm that represents those Track B claimants who potentially are covered by the court of appeals' opinion but were never represented by class counsel, representation of these claimants will be assumed by Anthony Herman of Covington & Burling for the limited purpose of briefing the Court on this issue.
5

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 733 Filed 01/14/03 Page 6 of 9
Court finds that such claimants are entitled to the benefits of the court of appeals' opinion, pro bono counsel at Wiley, Rein & Fielding will seek new counsel to represent these claimants in pursuit of relief. With respect to those claimants who were represented by class counsel at one time and thus clearly are covered by the court of appeals' opinion, the parties agree that they will continue to pursue a settlement within a finite period of time. The parties will submit a joint report to the Court no later than February 1, 2003, stating either that the cases have been settled or that the parties believe that the cases cannot be settled without judicial intervention and proposing a schedule for briefing on this issue.
For all of these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant shall pay class counsel Alexander Pires in the amount of $500,000 for implementation fees and costs no later than January 10, 2003. Class and of counsel who have submitted implementation fee requests shall divide this payment among themselves as they deem appropriate and Mr. Pires shall report to the Court as to when and how the division and payments have been made; it is FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall continue (with the assistance of Mr. Lewis) to negotiate toward settlement of the issues of fees and sanctions; it is FURTHER ORDERED that unless settlement of the issue of sanctions is reached sooner, the government shall file a brief setting forth its position on the issue of sanctions by February 3, 2003; it is FURTHER ORDERED that unless settlement of the issue of fees is reached sooner, the government shall file a brief setting forth its position on the issue of
6

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 733 Filed 01/14/03 Page 7 of 9
implementation fees by February 24, 2003. Class and of counsel shall file any responses by March 10, 2003 and the government shall file a reply, if any, by March 17, 2003; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall continue to negotiate toward settlement of the issue of modification of deadlines in Track B cases involving claimants originally represented by class counsel. The parties shall file a joint report with the Court no later than February 1, 2003 informing the Court as to the status of the negotiations and, if necessary, including a proposed briefing schedule on this issue; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will decide the question of whether the court of appeals ' June 21, 2002 opinion applies to claimants who were never represented by class counsel. The law firm of Covington & Burling shall represent these claimants for the limited purpose of briefing this issue and the parties involved shall submit a proposed briefing schedule on this issue promptly upon receipt of this Order; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that, for fees, costs and expenses incurred by any class counselor of counsel after June 30, 2002 --
(1) such class counselor of counsel shall file motions for his own fees, costs and expenses, on a quarterly basis, on the 30th day of March, June, September and December;
(2) after receipt of any such motion for fees, and costs and expenses, defendant's counsel shall have 30 days to review the motion and file a response;
(3) within 10 days after defendant's counsel files a response, Arbitrator Michael Lewis shall convene a meeting of class counsel and of counsel and defendant's counsel to
7

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 733 Filed 01/14/03 Page 8 of 9

resolve any differences that may exist and, if possible, to reach an agreement for the payment of fees, costs and expenses covered by the motion;
(4) if no agreement for such payment is reached, class counsel and of counsel and defendant's counsel, within 10 days thereafter, shall submit to the arbitrator statements of their final positions on unresolved issues with respect to such motion;
(5) within 10 days thereafter, the arbitrator shall file with the Court the statements of final position, along with his proposed findings and recommendations with respect to the motion, copies of which shall be provided to the parties;
(6) thereafter, this Court shall rule on the motion; and (7) quarterly motions filed by each class counsel under this procedure shall include all fees, costs and expenses generated from work done on the implementation of the Consent Decree during such period and work done during the period beginning July 1, 2001, through the end of such quarter on each Track A claim, Track B claim, or petition for monitor review that such class counsel handled and that was successfully concluded during such period; for the purposes of this clause, the facilitator shall provide to class counsel and defendant's counsel at the end of each month a report on the successful claims and petitions concluded during such month. SO ORDERED.

DATE: 111"'f 10 J

/Q ~~.
~~ ~~~~---­
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge
8

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 733 Filed 01/14/03 Page 9 of 9

Copies to:

Thomas W. Kirby, III, Esq. 1776 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20006

Michael Sitcov, Esq. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division P.O. Box 883, Room 1022 Washington, D.C. 20044
Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Esq. Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP 1818 N Street, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20036
Phillip L. Fraas, Esq. 3050 K Street, N. W., Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20007-5108
J .L. Chestnut, Jr., Esq. Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright, LLC 1 Union S1. Selma, AL 36701

Michael Lewis, Esq. ADR Associates 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20009
Lester Levy JAMS 2 Embarcadero Center Suite 1100 San Francisco, CA 94111
Julie Redell Nicole Fahey Poorman-Douglas Corporation 10300 SW Allen Blvd. Beaverton, Oregon 97005

Kenneth W. Barton Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada Deposit Guaranty Plaza, 17th Floor 210 East Capitol Street Jackson, Mississippi 39201

Randi Ilyse Roth, Esq. Office of the Monitor 46 East Fourth Street, Suit e1301 Saint Paul, Minnesota 5510 1

Anthony Herman, Esq. Covington & Burling 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Washington, DC 20004

9

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 739 Filed 01/15/03 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

----------------------------------)
)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et gL,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

----------------------------------)

JAN 1 5 Z003
NANCY MAYER WHI; liNG lON, CLERK US DISTflIC r cnURT
Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) v"
Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER By Order of December 30, 2002, the Court directed defendant to pay $500,000 to Alexander Pires (on behalf of Class Counsel and Of Counsel) by January 10, 2003 for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in implementation of the Consent Decree in this case. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, December 30,2002 at 5. An Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order was issued on January 14, 2003. Defendant has filed a motion for an extension of time until March 11, 2003 to make this payment, asserting that defendant is logistically unable to make payment by the

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 739 Filed 01/15/03 Page 2 of 5
now-expired January 10, 2003 deadline and that defendant requires additional time to consider whether to appeal the Court's decision before even submitting the request for payment to the Treasury Department Judgment Fund. Class Counsel opposes defendant's motion for extension of time, arguing that defendant seeks only to inflict financial harm on Class Counsel by delaying a payment that is inevitable and risks no serious prejudice to defendant. Furthermore, Class Counsel notes that because defendant admittedly has not yet submitted a request to the Judgment Fund, it is evident that defendant will not be able to comply with any reasonable deadline regardless of the Court's ruling on defendant's motion for extension of time. Defendant has filed a reply, addressing each of plaintiffs' arguments.
Despite the many points of contention raised at the status conference on December 11, 2002, the parties appear to agree that plaintiffs' counsel are entitled to be paid something for their work and that the attorneys' fees and costs sought by Class and Of Counsel now and in the future will amount to at least $1.6 million. See Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2-3. In addition, the Court has noted that the potential sanctions to be imposed on Class Counsel likely will not exceed $308,000. See id. at 4. It is inconceivable that the Court would disallow as much as $792,000 of the fees sought based on poor record keeping, unreasonable hourly rates or too many hours (or too many lawyers) spent on a given task. Thus, the government cannot be harmed by the interim payment ordered by the Court. It is equally inconceivable, in the Court's judgment, that the Solicitor General would authorize an appeal of this Court's decision in this matter and for that reason (among others) that the Court would enter a stay pending appeal (or pending a decision by the government whether to appeal). It would be a more fruitful expenditure of time, as the Court suggested in both its
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 739 Filed 01/15/03 Page 3 of 5
original and its Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order, for the government to continue to work through the mediator toward negotiation of a final fee amount and a final sanctions amount; indeed, the representations made by Class Counsel at the December 11 status conference suggest a great deal of flexibility with respect to such a negotiated resolution. Nevertheless, recognizing that it will take some time for a request to the Judgment Fund to be approved, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant's motion for extension of time [729] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART nunc pro tunc; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that defendant shall submit a request to the Judgment Fund by January 22, 2003 to effectuate prompt payment in compliance with this Court's Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order regardless of any internal consideration of a possible appeal of the payment provision of the Court's order and the possible request for a stay of that provision pending appeal; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that defendant shall pay Class Counsel Alexander Pires in the amount of $500,000 for implementation fees and costs no later than February 12, 2003. Class and Of Counsel who have submitted implementation fee requests shall divide this payment among themselves as they deem appropriate and Mr. Pires shall report to the Court as to when and how the division and payments have been made; and it is
3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 739 Filed 01/15/03 Page 4 of 5 FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with this Order shall not deprive
defendant of any otherwise available right to appeal the Court's Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order, in whole or in part.
SO ORDERED. PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge
4

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 739 Filed 01/15/03 Page 5 of 5

Copies to:
Michael Sitcov, Esq. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division P.O. Box 883, Room 1022 Washington, D. C. 20044
. Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Esq. Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP 1818 N Street, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D. C. 20036
. Phillip L. Fraas, Esq. 3050 K Street, N. W., Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20007-5108
J.L. Chestnut, Jr., Esq. Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright, LLC 1 Union St. Selma, AL 36701
Kenneth W. Barton Butler, Snow, Q'Mara, Stevens & Cannada Deposit Guaranty Plaza, 17th Floor 210 East Capitol Street Jackson, Mississippi 39201
, Randi Uyse Roth, Esq. Office of the Monitor 46 East Fourth Street, Suit e130 1 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101
, Anthony Herman, Esq. Covington & Burling 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20004
Thomas W. Kirby, III, Esq. 1776 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20006

Michael Lewis, Esq. ADR Associates 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20009
Lester Levy JAMS 2 Embarcadero Center Suite 1100 San Francisco, CA 94111
Julie Redell Nicole Fahey Poorman-Douglas Corporation 10300 SW Allen Blvd. Beaverton, Oregon 97005

5

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 790 Filed 04/14/03 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et ill.,.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

--------------------------------)
)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et ill.,.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

--------------------------------)

APR 1 4 2003 NANCYuM.sA.VDfRISWrrHuCITTTINCGOTUORNT, CLERK
Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) /'
Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The Court has before it defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs' response to defendant's response to the motion to reopen all late claims due to mail delays, as well as plaintiffs' opposition to the motion to strike and defendant's reply. Upon consideration of the parties' arguments, Rule 11 and Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the challenged document itself, the Court will grant defendant's motion to strike.

790

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 790 Filed 04/14/03 Page 2 of 8
In a recent filing pertaining to its motion to reopen all late claims due to mail delays, class counsel Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright made the following statement: "Throughout this litigation, Michael Sitcov has persistently demonstrated the same racist attitude of U.S.D.A. workers who systematically destroyed the farms and lives of thousands of farmers, simply because they were black." Response to Defendant's Response to Motion to Reopen All Late Claims Due to Mail Delays at 1-2 ("PI. Response Regarding Mail Delays"). In a subsequent filing, Chestnut, Sanders wrote: "We believe Mr. Sitcov's dishonesty or wreckless [sic] disregard for the truth is inspired by his contempt for 'lawyers of color' who dare to challenge his unequal concern for black and white farmers." Response to Motion to Strike at 3. Despite the enormity of these accusations, Chestnut, Sanders has provided no factual basis or evidence in support of its charges. Nor has the firm explained how such accusations could be relevant to plaintiff's pending motion to reopen late claims. Instead, Chestnut, Sanders simply accused defendant's lead counsel, Michael Sitcov -- an experienced and dedicated Department of Justice attorney and public servant of many years who has devoted nearly six years of his professional life to this important case -- of engaging in conduct of the most deplorable kind. The Court cannot abide this type of groundless accusation.
Almost from the beginning of this lawsuit, virtually every party and lawyer has endured sometimes harsh criticism -- from other parties to the case, from segments of the public and the media, and occasionally from this Court. The Court is well aware that attorneys both for plaintiffs and for the government have experienced frustration in their efforts throughout this difficult and often contentious matter. Despite the disputes between counsel
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 790 Filed 04/14/03 Page 3 of 8
over a variety of issues in implementing the procedures agreed to in the settlement, however, it has been apparent to the Court from the very beginning that every attorney of record -- no matter who the client -- consistently has honored the fundamental rights of the AfricanAmerican farmers on whose behalf the case was brought. Although Mr. Sitcov's role necessarily has been to protect and defend the interests of his client, the United States Department of Agriculture, the Court has no doubt that Mr. Sitcov always has recognized and respected the basic rights of plaintiffs and their lawyers, without regard to their race. Indeed, the Court has expressed its respect and appreciation for Mr. Sitcov's hard work and dedication repeatedly in open court, as early as March 2, 1999, at the Court's fairness hearing on the Consent Decree, and as recently as the December 11, 2002 status conference. See Transcript of Fairness Hearing, March 2, 1999 at 192-95; Transcript of Status Conference, December 11, 2002 at 41-43. Yet Chestnut, Sanders unfairly likens Mr. Sitcov to those within the Department of Agriculture and on the state level who unlawfully discriminated against AfricanAmerican farmers for many years before this case was settled. See PI. Response Regarding Mail Delays at 1-2.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that by presenting to the court any "pleading, written motion, or other paper," an attorney "is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," the pleading "is not being filed for an improper purpose, such as to harass ... and [that] the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support . . . . " Fed. R. Civ. P. II(b). Here, not only did Chestnut, Sanders fail to offer any evidence of Mr. Sitcov's alleged "racist attitude," but the Court can find nothing
3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 790 Filed 04/14/03 Page 4 of 8
in the entire record of this case -- spanning many years, many hearings and many pages -- that would support such a charge. The Court has observed Mr. Sitcov and listened to his arguments and representations in court on scores of occasions, has met with him and opposing counsel in Chambers a number of times, and has read thousands of pages that he has either written or whose preparation he has supervised. While his frustration level may have risen over the years (and his choice of language in certain recent filings has reflected that frustration), Mr. Sitcov has appeared always to have acted professionally, honorably and ethically. There is no basis in fact and no evidentiary support for the charges that he has exhibited a racist attitude or that he has contempt for "lawyers of color." Such" [a]busive language toward opposing counsel has no place in documents filed with our courts; the filing of a document containing such language is one form of harassment prohibited by Rule 11." Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1989).
In addition, Rule 12(t) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may strike any matter that is "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(t).1 Although a motion to strike generally is disfavored because it seeks an extreme remedy, a court has "liberal discretion" to strike such filings as it deems appropriate under Rule 12(t). Stanbury Law Firm v. IRS, 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000); see 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §12.37[1] at 12-93 to 12-94 (3d ed. 2002). The word
Although Rule 12(t) applies by its terms only to "pleadings," courts occasionally have applied the Rule to filings other than those enumerated in Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, U" Cobell v. Norton, No. 96-1285,2003 WL 721477 (D.D.C. March 3, 2003) (considering Rule 12(f) motion to strike plaintiffs' response to defendant's historical accounting plan).
4

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 790 Filed 04/14/03 Page 5 of 8
"scandalous" in Rule 12(f) "generally refers to any allegation that unnecessarily reflects on the moral character of an individual or states anything in repulsive language that detracts from the dignity of the court." 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §12.37[3] at 12-97; see also In re 2TheMart.com Inc. Securities Litigation, 114 F.Supp.2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("scandalous" includes allegations that cast "a cruelly derogatory light on a party or other person"). Chestnut, Sanders' charges of racism are plainly scandalous within the meaning of the Rule, in that they "improperly cast[] a derogatory light" on a dedicated government attorney who has done his best to navigate the deep and murky waters of this litigation. 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1382 (2d ed. 1995). The accusations are indefensible and wholly inappropriate and have no place in filings in this court.
Because the accusations of racism in the Chestnut, Sanders filings are unsupported by facts or evidence, constitute a form of harassment, and are scandalous, the Court will grant defendant's motion to strike Chestnut, Sanders' Response Regarding Mail Delays and sua sponte will strike Chestnut, Sanders' Response to the Motion to Strike, based both on Rule 11 and on Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §12.37[1] at 12-94; McCorstin v. United States Dep't of Labor, 630 F .2d 242,244 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
Finally, counsel are reminded that Local Civil Rule 83.8(b)(6)(v) of the Rules of this Court requires all counsel to familiarize themselves with the D.C. Bar Voluntary Standards for Civility in Professional Conduct, which are included as Appendix D to those
5

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 790 Filed 04/14/03 Page 6 of 8
Rules. Among other things, the Standards provide that
we [attorneys] will treat all participants in the legal process, including counsel ... in a civil, professional, and courteous manner, at all times and in all communications, whether oral or written.... Except within the bounds of fair argument in pleadings or in formal proceedings, we will abstain from disparaging personal remarks or acrimony toward such participants . . . . We will not bring the profession into disrepute by making unfounded accusations of impropriety or making ad hominem attacks on counsel, and, absent good cause, we will not attribute bad motives or improper conduct to other counsel. . . . We will not degrade the intelligence, ethics, morals, integrity or personal behavior of others, unless such matters are legitimately at issue in the proceeding.
D. C. Bar Voluntary Standards for Civility in Professional Conduct " 1 , 3, 5, 28. Despite these established principles, the communications among counsel and some of their court filings
in this case have grown less civil, less respectful, and less professional, and the language used
by Chestnut, Sanders in its most recent filings is beyond the pale. Whatever the underlying
issues in this lawsuit -- and despite the undeniably tragic history of discrimination against
African-American farmers in this country -- counsel have an obligation to their clients, to this
Court and to the legal profession not to engage in the type of conduct that is the subject of this
Opinion and that has begun to pervade this case in recent months. When the lawyers involved
in this litigation resort to scurrilous accusations and inflammatory remarks about opposing
counsel, no one wins -- least of all the African-American farmers in whose name this case was
brought.
For all of these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs' response to defendant's response to plaintiffs' motion to reopen all late claims due to mail delays [763] is GRANTED;
it is 6

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 790 Filed 04/14/03 Page 7 of 8 FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' response to defendant's response to
plaintiffs' motion to reopen all late claims due to mail delays [776] is STRICKEN from the record in this case; it is
FURTHER ORDERED sua sponte that plaintiffs' Response to the Motion to Strike [772] is STRICKEN from the record in this case; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to strike these two documents from the records of this Court.
SO ORDERED.
G?~ ~-cz;..~.t~--
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge
7

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 790 Filed 04/14/03 Page 8 of 8

Copies to:
. Michael Sitcov Elizabeth Goitein U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division 20 Massachusetts Ave. Room 6146 Washington, D.C. 20001 202-514-1944 202-616-8187 (fax)
Randi Ilyse Roth Office of the Monitor 46 East Fourth Street, Suite 1301 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101 651-229-0991 651-229-0992 (fax)
Alexander J. Pires, Jf. Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires 1818 N Street, NW, Suite 700 Washington, D. C. 20036 202-331-7050 202-331-9306 (fax)
J.L. Chestnut, Jf. Rose M. Sanders Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway P.O. Box 1305 Selma, Alabama 36702 334-875-9264 334-875-9853 (fax)
Michael Lewis ADR Associates 1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20009 202-332-0490 202-328-9162 (fax)
Nicole Fahey Julie Redell Poorman-Douglas Corporation 10300 SW Allen Blvd Beaverton, OR 97005 503-350-5800 503-350-5890 (fax)

Lester Levy JAMS 2 Embarcadero Center Suite 1100 San Francisco, CA 94111 415-982-5267 415-982-5287 (fax)
Philip Fraas Suite 400 3050 K St., NW Washington, D.C. 20000-5108 342-8864 342-8451 (fax)

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 1 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

--------------------------------)
)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

----------------------------------)

JUN 0 2 2003
HANCY MAv.£R WHITTINGTON, ClfRK
U.S. DlSTTtiCT COURT Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

OPINION AND ORDER The Court has before it plaintiffs' motion for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for Monitor review, as well as defendant's opposition and plaintiffs' reply. I

Plaintiffs initially brought this issue before the Court in their December 11, 2001 "Motion for Relief on Behalf of 97 Class Members Whose Petitions for Monitor Review Were Filed on or Before September 15, 2001, but Have Been Designated by the Facilitator as Late" (under seal) (hereinafter "PI. December 11, 2001 Motion"). Because plaintiffs subsequently learned that additional late petitions were at issue, plaintiffs withdrew their first motion and ultimately filed the instant motion for relief on July 19, 2002. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief for Four Groups of Claimants Who Filed Petitions for Monitor Review at 2 (" PI. Motion"). Among the claimants included in plaintiff's December 11, 2001 motion and

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 2 of 18
Plaintiffs seek relief for a total of 350 individual claimants whose petitions for Monitor review were deemed untimely by the Facilitator and not forwarded to the Monitor for consideration, based on the Facilitator's determination that either the petition or an amendment to the petition was untimely filed. 2 Relying on Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court's inherent equitable authority, plaintiffs ask the Court to order that these petitions be processed for consideration by the Monitor. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies plaintiffs' motion.
I. BACKGROUND A. Petitions for Monitor Review By Stipulation and Order of July 14, 2000, the parties agreed to deadlines for the submission of all petitions for Monitor review of Track A Adjudicator decisions, and the

not included in the instant motion are approximately 10 whose deadlines were missed as a result of confusion caused by Facilitator error. Specifically, when printing duplicate copies of Adjudicator decisions for farmers or their attorneys, the Facilitator mistakenly marked the decisions with the date on which they were printed, rather than the date on which the decision originally issued, thus misleading the claimant or attorney in his or her calculation of the petition deadline. See PI. December 11, 2001 Motion at 11. Based on the government's agreement to allow these petitions to be processed as timely, the Court considers this issue to be conceded by the government and considers the concession applicable to any and all claimants whose deadlines were missed for the same reason.

2

In the instant motion, plaintiffs originally sought relief for a total of 387

claimants. In subsequent briefing, however, the parties reached an agreement with respect to

37 of these claimants, reducing the total to 350 claimants. See Defendant's Opposition to

Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief for Four Groups of Claimants Who Filed Petitions for Monitor

Review at 9 ("Def. Opp. "); Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion

for Relief for Four Groups of Claimants Who Filed Petitions for Monitor Review at 2-3 ("PI.

Reply").

2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 3 of 18

Court endorsed this agreement. 3 Under that Stipulation and Order, for claimants who received a decision before July 14, 2000 the deadline for filing a petition was 120 days from the date of the Order, that is November 13, 2000. For those claimants who received an Adjudicator decision after July 14, 2000, the deadline was 120 days after the date of the decision. See Stipulation and Order of July 14, 2000 at '5 ("Stip. and Order").
Subsequent to the entry of these deadlines, the Court issued a series of orders that created a "Register" process, through which plaintiffs' counsel provided the government with the names of all those claimants to whom the November 13, 2000 deadline applied and on whose behalf they intended to file petitions. For reasons explained in these subsequent Orders, the Court effectively extended the November 13, 2000 deadline for the filing of petitions to May 15, 2001 and subsequently to September 15, 2001. The Court, however, did not alter the deadlines to petition for Monitor review for claimants who received an Adjudicator decision after July 14, 2000 or for those who had received a decision before July 14, 2000 but whose names had not been placed on the Register. See Order of November 8,2000; Memorandum Opinion and Order of May 15, 2001; see also Monitor's Report on Late Petition Filings, February 28, 2002 at 3 ("Monitor Report"). Accordingly, most claimant petitions for Monitor review were due on September 15, 2001, and the vast majority of these were timely filed. See Monitor Report at ,5; Pl. Motion at 3. Of the thousands of petitions that were filed on behalf of claimants, both pursuant to the Register and otherwise, plaintiffs' motion pertains to the 350 petitions (less than 1. 8 % of all Track A claimants) that currently are not being processed for consideration. See PI. Reply at 3.

3

Although the Stipulation and Order applied to both Track A (Adjudicator) and

Track B (Arbitrator) decisions, plaintiffs' motion and this Opinion deal only with the former.

3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 4 of 18

B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief Plaintiffs address their motion to four groups of claimants, describing the specific circumstances that justify relief for each group. Although plaintiffs further divide these groups into subcategories and provide individual detail with respect to each of the 350 affected claimants, the motion is devoted primarily to two circumstances that plaintiffs suggest justify relief: (1) mistakes made by class counsel, of counsel, pro bono counselor unaffiliated attorneys, largely owing to the high volume of petitions and/or the short period of time within which class counsel had to compile the initial Register; and (2) inadequate notice to pro se farmers and unaffiliated attorneys regarding the l20-day deadline for petitions for Monitor review. 4 With an eye to these two circumstances, the Court turns to the question of legal support for the requested relief.

II. DISCUSSION A. Sources ofAuthority Plaintiffs argue that the Court has authority to direct the Facilitator to process the 350 petitions for Monitor review despite the Facilitator's determination that either the petition or a supplement to the petition was untimely filed. In support of this position, plaintiffs rely on Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a court to interpret and modify its orders, and on the Court's inherent equitable authority to modify its decrees.

4

To the extent that certain claimants included in plaintiffs' motion do not fit into

either of these categories, the Court will address those circumstances and arguments for relief

separately.

4

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 5 of 18
With respect to the first ground, plaintiffs argue that because the petition deadlines were established by the Court's Stipulation and Order of July 14, 2000 and effectively extended by its Orders of November 8, 2000 and May 13, 2001, Rule 60(b) gives the Court discretion to "interpret" its prior orders so as to deem these 350 petitions timely. See PI. Motion at 33. Alternatively, plaintiffs suggest that the Court may modify its prior orders under Rule 60(b) to allow at least some of the petitions at issue to be treated as exceptions to the deadlines. See id.
With respect to the Court's inherent equitable authority, plaintiffs argue that it is "in the interests of justice to designate these petitions as timely filed," based on "unforeseeable errors" made by the Facilitator, attorneys and possibly the Monitor, as well as "inevitable" logistical problems resulting from the "practical realities" of representing so many claimants in the petition process. See PI. Motion at 34-36. In essence, plaintiffs ask the Court to set aside the framework of deadlines established by the parties' stipulation and the Court's prior orders "in recognition of the inequity that will result" and the extreme hardship that claimants will suffer if the deadlines that have been established now are enforced. See id. at 35-36.
Defendant opposes plaintiffs' motion on the grounds that the requested relief can be achieved only through modification of the Court's prior orders and that such modification is not justified in these circumstances. Specifically, defendant argues that plaintiffs have not satisfied the legal standard for modification and that the Court therefore lacks authority to order that these petitions be processed for consideration. As for the Court's inherent equitable authority, defendant argues that the standard is essentially the same regardless of whether the Court analyzes the question under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or under general equitable principles. See Def. Opp. at 6.
5

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 6 of 18
Upon review of the parties' arguments, the relevant law and the entire record in this case, the Court concludes as a threshold matter that the requested relief cannot be granted without modification ofthe Court's previous orders; to declare these petitions timely cannot reasonably be seen as mere "interpretation." The Court therefore turns to the legal standard for modification, as expressed in Rule 60(b) itself and the applicable case law.
B. Legal Standard for Modification Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding [where] . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or ... [for] any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). To demonstrate that it is "no longer equitable" under Rule 60(b)(5) for the petition deadlines to be given effect, plaintiffs have the burden of identifying a "significant change in circumstances" that justifies modification. See Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992). Such changed circumstances may include "unforeseen obstacles" that make a decree or order "unworkable." Id. at 384; see also Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918,925 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Pigford v. Glickman, 127 F.Supp.2d 35,38 (D.D.C. 2001). Moreover, Rule 60(b)(5) "is not to be read without emphasis on the important words 'no longer'; assuming that the propriety of the injunction as issued has passed beyond debate, it refers to some change in conditions that makes continued enforcement inequitable." Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 642 F.2d 578, 583, n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529,530 (2nd Cir. 1964». Similarly, to
6

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 7 of 18
justify modification of an order under a court's general equitable authority, a party also must demonstrate a "significant change in the circumstances obtaining at the time the [order] was entered." Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229,1240 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Upon close consideration of the specific circumstances described in plaintiffs' motion and attached exhibits, the Court concludes that modification of its prior orders is not justified. With respect to each of plaintiffs' two main arguments for relief -- the high volume of petitions and inadequate notice of deadlines -- the Court finds that the facts presented do not constitute "changed circumstances" sufficient to justify modification of the Court's prior orders either under Rule 60(b) or under the Court's equitable authority. With respect to the unique circumstances of certain individuals falling outside these two main categories, the Court also finds that modification is not justified.
C. Changed Circumstances Plaintiffs present two main theories of changed circumstances in support of their request for modification: (1) attorney error resulting from the high volume of petitions; and (2) inadequate notice ofthe 120-day deadline. The Court examines each theory under the standard articulated above.
1. Attorney Errors Due to High Volume For approximately 114 of the late petitions at issue -- including most in Group One, who filed untimely petitions, and most in Group Four, who filed timely petitions but untimely supplements -- plaintiffs admit that the lateness resulted from attorney error. See PI.
7

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 8 of 18

Motion at 6, 26.5 Notwithstanding this admission, plaintiffs argue that the attorney error was an unavoidable result of the large volume of claimants requesting assistance with petitions during a short period of time. See Pl. Motion at 35. Because the number of petitioners in this case increased so far beyond original estimates, plaintiffs reason, attorney errors in the petition process were not "careless" but rather an inevitable byproduct of lawyers having to handle so many cases under a system set up with far fewer participants in mind. See PI. Reply at 4-5, 7, 10. Plaintiffs assert that this explosion in volume is "[t]he predominant change in circumstance" that justifies modification of the Court's prior orders. Id. at 5.
The fundamental flaw in this reasoning is that the critical "changed circumstance" on which plaintiffs rely occurred before, not after, the relevant deadlines were agreed to by the parties and endorsed by the Court. The exponential increase in claimants was fully apparent when plaintiffs and defendant negotiated and agreed to the July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order, including its clear provision that "no extensions of these deadlines will

5

Plaintiffs suggest that in 13 of the cases in Group Four, the untimely

submissions were intended as supplements to timely petitions and that some claimants and

attorneys understood such supplements to be permissible. See PI. Motion at 26. In support,

plaintiffs note that supplements to timely petitions are not discussed in the Consent Decree and

attach the statement of one attorney who submitted four such late supplements based on her

understanding that the Monitor's Office would accept late supplements under certain

conditions. See PI. Motion, Exhibit H, Statement of Diane Cooley. Despite Ms. Cooley's

statements, the Court agrees with defendant that claimants and their attorneys "could not

legitimately have been confused about whether supplemental filings would be accepted." Def.

Opp. at 10. The possibility of late supplements to timely petitions was expressly rejected by

the Court in a prior order, on the ground that to allow such filings would permit "an indefinite

extension of time so that [class counsel] can complete what should have been complete six

months ago." Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 4; see also Office of the

Monitor, Questions and Answers About Monitor Review ofDecisions, at Q.14, available at:

www.pigfordmonitor.org/classI200206qa.htm (June 2002) ("No Petitions or additional Petition

information can be submitted after your deadline has passed. ").

8

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 9 of 18
be granted for any reason." Stip. and Order at '4. Plaintiffs' burden in assisting thousands of claimants while adhering to these negotiated deadlines thus was entirely foreseeable and does not constitute a change in circumstance. Accordingly, the Court must find that plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that the factual circumstances have changed in a way that would justify a modification of the July 14 Stipulation and Order. See Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. at 383-84 (ordinarily modification should not be granted where the moving party relies upon events that were actually known or anticipated at the time of the original order); see also Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 642 F.2d at 583,

2. Inadequate Notice The majority of late petitions at issue -- 208 of the 350, according to plaintiffs' motion -- were late not because of error by class counsel, of counselor pro bono counsel but because claimants or their unaffiliated attorneys received inadequate notice of the l20-day deadline. See PI. Reply at 9. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the decision letters mailed to claimants after July 14, 2000 "mistakenly omitted language informing claimants that they had 120 days from the date of the decision to petition the Monitor for review." PI. Motion at 14-15. Plaintiffs characterize this omission as "an honest mistake" resulting from miscommunications among the parties, PI. Reply at 9, and explain that "[b]ased on the July 14,

6

With respect to those claimants who filed timely petitions but whose files

contain additional documents that were untimely filed (all but one of the claimants included in

Group Four of plaintiffs' motion), the Facilitator should forward all timely-filed portions of the

files to the Monitor since these portions are properly eligible for Monitor consideration, while

all portions deemed untimely by the Facilitator should not be forwarded.

9

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 10 of 18
2000 Stipulation and Order, by July 27,2000, the parties, Facilitator, and Arbitrator had agreed upon modified language for Track A and Track B decisions." PI. Motion at 15, n.5. Defendant objects to this characterization, asserting that "neither the parties nor the Facilitator ever intended to include such language [regarding the 120-day deadline] in adverse decision letters" but only in letters informing claimants of favorable decisions. Def. Opp. at 8. Moreover, defendant notes that the Stipulation and Order itself did not require any language regarding the deadline to be included in letters to claimants. Because this form of notice was not contemplated by the Court or the parties at the time that the deadlines were established by Stipulation and Court Order, defendant argues, the fact that such notice was not given does not constitute changed circumstances. See id.
Although it is unclear from the record precisely what reference to the deadline, if any, the parties intended to include in decision letters, the Court concludes that the actual omission of such notice to many claimants does not justify modification of the Court's prior orders. Whatever the reasons for the omission of language regarding the deadline from decision letters, it is evident that the July 14 StipUlation and Order establishing the 120-day deadline did not require such language. See Stip. and Order at "5,7. The Stipulation and Order required two forms of notice: "Copies of this Stipulation and Order shall be (a) posted in a conspicuous public place in every USDA Farm Services Agency county office; and (b) mailed by the Facilitator to every person who (i) requested a Claim Sheet and Election Form and (ii) did not submit a completed Claim Form to the Facilitator within the period
10

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 11 of 18
prescribed by '5(c) of the Consent Decree." Stip. and Order at '7. 7 At the time that the Stipulation and Order was entered, therefore, it was clear to both parties and to the Court that the Order did not require individual notice to unsuccessful Track A claimants. See id.; Monitor's Notice Report at 3; see also United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 154 F.R. D. 1,7, n.16 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd, 46 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[T]he scope of a consent decree [or stipulated court order] must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purpose of one of the parties to it . . . . [T]he instrument must be construed as it is written, and not as it might have been written." (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971». Accordingly, the absence of individual notice does not create a situation where "changed factual conditions make compliance with the [order] substantially more onerous." Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. at 384. For these reasons, the Court cannot grant the requested relief on this ground.
3. Unique Circumstances Finally, plaintiffs assert that the Court should grant relief to 13 claimants who present unique circumstances. Plaintiffs' argument fails with respect to these claimants as well.

7

This mailing of the Stipulation and Order thus targeted people who were likely

to be affected by provisions of the Order other than the 120-day deadline. See Monitor's

Report to the Court Regarding Notice to the Class of the 120-Day Deadline to File a Petition

For Monitor Review, May 30, 2003 at 3 ("Monitor's Notice Report"). As the Monitor has

noted, "few people eligible to file a petition with the Monitor would have received direct

notice of the 120-day deadline from this mailing." Id.

11

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 12 of 18
The first group described by plaintiffs as presenting "special circumstances" is the Carpenter family. Within this group of claimants are five individuals and a farming business, all of whom requested assistance from class counsel in filing petitions for Monitor review but only one of whom was included on the Register. See PI. Motion at 6. Upon review of the information in plaintiffs' motion and attached exhibits relating to each of the Carpenter claimants, the Court finds that the circumstances surrounding these late petitions are not "unique" but the same as those surrounding the claimants in Group One of plaintiffs' motion -- namely, attorney error. As stated in plaintiffs' exhibits, the situation underlying each of the Carpenters' requests for relief is simple: "This claim was eligible for the Register but was mistakenly omitted." See PI. Motion, Exh. D, Nos. 92-96 (under seal).While plaintiffs attribute the omission of five out of the six Carpenter claimants to a cause other than the high volume of petitions -- the fact that all correspondence relating to the claim of any Carpenter was faxed to class counsel under a uniform cover sheet from Carpenter's Produce, which class counsel mistook for correspondence from only one member of the family, whose name was the only one placed on the Register -- the omission reflects a circumstance presented by many other claimants in plaintiffs' motion: attorney error. Accordingly, the Court's preceding analysis of petitions untimely filed as a result of attorney error applies to the Carpenters' petitions as well, and the request for relief on their behalf is denied. See supra § II.C.l.
Plaintiffs also seek relief on behalf of six claimants who did not submit petitions for Monitor review but submitted letters requesting Monitor assistance, which the Facilitator treated as petitions for Monitor review. See PI. Motion at 6, 22-23, 25. While there are no
12

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 13 of 18
deadlines that apply to requests for Monitor assistance, the Facilitator treated these letters as petitions and thus deemed them untimely because they were filed beyond the 120-day deadline. Plaintiffs seek relief for these claimants "in the event that the Court determines that [the letters are] more appropriately considered by the Monitor as petition[s]." PI. Motion at 22-23. Plaintiffs' motion is not entirely clear as to what relief is sought for these claimants, but it appears that plaintiffs are asking the Court either to reverse the Facilitator's decision to designate these letters as petitions for Monitor review and permit them to be
forwarded to the Monitor for her assistance or to uphold the designation of the submissions as
late petitions but nonetheless allow them to be processed as petitions for Monitor review in spite of their untimely filing.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court will not disturb the Facilitator's determination that these letters should not be forwarded to the Monitor as petitions for Monitor review. If these requests for assistance concern matters properly outside of the Monitor's petition process, however, the letters should be forwarded to the Monitor for her resolution, pursuant to her authority under Paragraph 12(b)(ii) of the Consent Decree. Moreover, claimants may seek assistance on such matters directly from the Monitor's Office at any time, using the process outlined in the Order of Reference and detailed on the Monitor's website: www.pigfordmonitor.org. To the extent that plaintiffs ask the Court to grant relief for these six claimants by modifying the prior orders that established the relevant deadlines, the Court finds no basis for such modification, as explained above. See supra § II.C.
Another unique circumstance presented in plaintiffs' motion is the case of one claimant whose submission was not a petition for Monitor review but a request for
13

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 14 of 18
reconsideration of the Monitor's prior decision to deny his petition for Monitor review. See PI. Motion at § II.D.3(a)(5). It is unclear from the record why the Facilitator designated this submission as a late petition, given the fact that claimants are allowed only one lifetime
'6. petition for Monitor review and this claimant already had filed one. See Stip. and Order at
Moreover, the Monitor has implemented a process for reconsideration of her decisions on petitions for Monitor review. See www.pigfordmonitor.org/reconpoI.htm.This claimant's submission appears to be a request for such reconsideration. In light of the Monitor's established process for reconsideration, and the fact that this submission could not be a late petition, the Facilitator should redesignate this submission and forward it to the Monitor. Alternatively, the claimant may wish to submit the request for reconsideration of the Monitor's prior decision directly to the Office of the Monitor. The Court is not the appropriate authority for reviewing the Facilitator's decision.
Finally, plaintiffs seek relief for one claimant who was incarcerated at the time that the 120-day deadline passed. See PI. Motion at 6. In support of relief for this claimant, plaintiffs rely on D.C. Code Section 12-302(a)(3), which provides that the applicable limitations period for filing civil actions is tolled during an individual's incarceration. See Proctor v. Morrissey, 979 F.Supp. 29, 32 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing Brown v. Jonz, 572 A.2d 455,457, n.7 (D.C. 1990». It is unclear from the record precisely when this claimant's incarceration began and ended, and it therefore is unclear whether this petition would be timely if viewed in light of that circumstance. This claimant may wish to seek reconsideration from the Facilitator itself, which may reverse its decision in light of the alleged incarceration, the relevant case law and the potential tolling of the 120-day deadline.
14

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 15 of 18
D. Consent Decree, Prejudice to Defendant and Waiver In addition to the argument that changed circumstances justify the requested relief, plaintiffs present several other rationales in support of their motion. First, plaintiffs argue that the requested relief is consistent with and supported by the remedial purposes of the Consent Decree, which, they assert, apply equally to these petitions because the Consent Decree was the basis for the Court's Stipulation and Order of July 14, 2000 and its subsequent orders. See PI. Motion at 36-38; PI. Reply at 11. The Court cannot agree. While plaintiffs are correct that "without the Consent Decree, the petition process does not exist," PI. Reply at 11, this statement gets them nowhere. It is precisely because the Consent Decree did not contain deadlines for petitions for Monitor review that the parties negotiated the July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order and the Court endorsed the agreement of the parties. It therefore is implausible to read the July 14 Order as somehow flowing from and subject to the interpretive principles of the Consent Decree. Certainly the Consent Decree's remedial purpose cannot justify modification of the Court's subsequent orders where such modification is otherwise impermissible. Plaintiffs next suggest that the Court should grant the requested relief because the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced. The Court finds this argument equally unavailing. It is beyond question that further financial obligation would constitute prejudice to defendant, and that is precisely what plaintiffs seek through their motion. As the parties point out, the government already has paid out over $800 million as a result of this settlement, PI. Reply at 2, and defendant will "be prejudiced to the tune of almost one million dollars" if the
15

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 16 of 18
Court permits consideration of the late petitions and if even five percent of them are successful. Def. Opp. at 11. Accordingly, the Court perceives no absence of prejudice to support plaintiffs' motion.
Plaintiffs also argue that defendant has waived her right to object to plaintiffs' motion because she has "repeatedly avoided strict application of the petition deadlines throughout this petition process." Pl. Motion at 38. As examples of the extensions that constitute defendant's waiver, plaintiffs cite repeated requests by defendant that the Facilitator either slow or delay the routing of petitions to defendant for response, as well as defendant's request to the Court for an extension of time to respond to a number of petitions in May and June of 2002. See id. at 39. Plaintiffs also assert that defendant filed a number of petitions for Monitor review out of time and will have to seek relief from the Court, but provide no further specifics on this claim.
The Court concludes that defendant has not waived the right to object to plaintiffs' motion. In contrast to plaintiffs' request for relief, defendant's repeated requests of the Facilitator did not require the modification of any Court order. Neither the July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order nor the September 12, 2000 Stipulation and Order (which extended the time for party responses to petitions to 60 days and set a maximum of 125 petitions per week to be routed by the Facilitator to the Monitor and to the parties) provided a minimum number of petitions that must be routed to defendant each week. Furthermore, defendant's requests that this Court extend the time for response to already routed petitions in May and June of 2002 arose from an incident of mass flooding at defendant's offices that destroyed several
16

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 17 of 18

computers. See Def. Opp. at 14. Such an unforeseeable disaster is qualitatively different from the circumstances described by plaintiff and thus does not constitute a waiver of defendant's right to object.
In sum, plaintiffs ask the Court to modify its prior orders to allow the processing of 350 petitions deemed late by the Facilitator. Upon close review of the parties' arguments and the record, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate changed circumstances sufficient to justify modification either under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or under the Court's inherent equitable powers. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for relief [639] is DENIED with respect to all 350 claimants.
SO ORDERED.

6/ I DATE: ~ 0 3

~ =< .~_._L.___J
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 801 Filed 06/02/03 Page 18 of 18

Copies to:
Michael Sitcov Elizabeth Goitein U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division 20 Massachusetts Ave. Room 6146 Washington, D.C. 20001 202-514-1944 202-616-8187 (fax)
Randi Ilyse Roth Office of the Monitor 46 East Fourth Street, Suite 1301 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101 651-229-0991 651-229-0992 (fax)
Alexander J. Pires, Jr. Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires 1818 N Street, NW, Suite 700 Washington, D. C. 20036 202-331-7050 202-331-9306 (fax)
J.L. Chestnut, Jr. Rose M. Sanders Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway P.O. Box 1305 Selma, Alabama 36702 334-875-9264 334-875-9853 (fax)
Michael Lewis ADR Associates 1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20009 202-332-0490 202-328-9162 (fax)
Nicole Fahey Julie Redell Poorman-Douglas Corporation 10300 SW Allen Blvd Beaverton, OR 97005 503-350-5800 503-350-5890 (fax)

Lester Levy JAMS 2 Embarcadero Center Suite 1100 San Francisco, CA 94111 415-982-5267 415-982-5287 (fax)
Philip Fraas Suite 400 3050 K St., NW Washington, D.C. 20000-5108 342-8864 342-8451 (fax)

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 804 Filed 06/04/03 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

----------------------------------)
)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

----------------------------------)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) /
FILED
JUN 4 2003
NANCY MAYER WHITtiNGTON. CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The Court has before it a motion by class counsel J. L. Chestnut on behalf of certain plaintiffs to reopen all late claims due to mail delays, as well as the government's opposition. l Upon consideration of the parties' arguments, the Court denies the motion to reopen. Under the terms of the Consent Decree that resolved this case, farmers seeking relief under the settlement were required to file claim forms by October 12, 1999. See Consent Decree, April 15, 1999 at ~5(c). After this deadline passed, thousands of putative

Although plaintiffs also filed a reply to the government's opposition, the Court struck the reply on defendant's motion. See Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 14, 2003.

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 804 Filed 06/04/03 Page 2 of 4
claimants petitioned for leave to late file under Paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree, which allows late claims only where the failure to timely file was caused by "extraordinary circumstances beyond [the claimant's] control." See Consent Decree at '5(g). The Court subsequently delegated the authority to decide these petitions to the Arbitrator in this case, Michael Lewis. See Order of December 20, 1999. As of June 2, 2003, Mr. Lewis continues to work toward completion of that process. See Arbitrator's Fourth Report on the Late-Claim Petition Process at 3 ("Fourth Arb. Report").
Plaintiffs now assert that a substantial number of claims may have been timely filed but never delivered to the Facilitator due to loss or delay by the United States Postal Service ("U.S.P.S. "). See Motion to Reopen All Late Claims Due to Mail Delays at 2-3 ("PI. Motion"). Plaintiffs base this assertion on the fact that in January 2003, a U.S. Post Office in Wilcox County, Alabama discovered approximately 36 claim forms that had been postmarked October 12, 1999 but not delivered. See id. at 2. These claims subsequently were delivered to the Facilitator and processed as timely filed, but plaintiffs suggest that other timely claims may have been similarly lost or delayed by the Postal Service. See id. To ensure that other claimants are not denied relief because their timely claims were lost or delayed by the Postal Service, plaintiffs urge the Court to (1) reopen all cases where claimants have sought leave to late file by asserting that they timely filed their claims through the U.S. mail; (2) establish standards for Michael Lewis to employ to determine when late claims should be allowed based on the negligence or willful misconduct of the U.S.P.S. or its agents; and (3) order the initiation of a "serious government investigation" into potential misconduct by the U.S.P.S. in delaying or destroying farmer claims for relief. See id. at 3.
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 804 Filed 06/04/03 Page 3 of 4
The Arbitrator has established standard procedures for deciding all petitions to late file, including those where the claimant alleges that he or she timely filed a claim through the U.S. mail. See Fourth Arb. Report at 3. As it has made clear by previous Orders, the Court has delegated final authority to the Arbitrator to consider late-claim petitions and to reconsider denials of these petitions; it has retained no authority to review the Arbitrator's rulings on petitions to late file. See Pigford v. Veneman, 201 F.Supp.2d 139, 141 (D.D.C. 2002) (Order of May 10,2002); Pigford v. Veneman, 173 F.Supp.2d 38,40 (D.D.C. 2001) (Order of Nov. 26, 2001). Nor has it retained authority to control or review the procedures that the Arbitrator employs to reach his decisions. See id.
Even if the Court had retained the authority to reopen cases already reviewed by the Arbitrator or to establish standards for him to apply, however, it is evident that these forms of relief are not necessary. As the Court has observed previously, Mr. Lewis has established thorough and well-reasoned procedures that are "more than sufficient to ensure that Section 5(g) of the Consent Decree is properly and justly applied and to assure that fair process is afforded." See Pigford v. Veneman, 173 F.Supp.2d at 40. Moreover, with respect to those petitions where a claimant alleges timely filing by U.S. mail, Mr. Lewis reports that even before the discovery of undelivered claim forms in a U.S. Post Office, he had developed a particularized system of review for such cases. See Fourth Arb. Report at 3. Under this system, "researchers have been assigned to investigate those allegations [of timely filing and failed delivery] in order to uncover the circumstances of the alleged timely filing and to seek corroborating evidence." See id. at 4. Such corroborating evidence may be in the form of retained copies of the claim form; U. S. P. S. return receipts; affidavits by attorneys who allegedly completed the timely claim form; or corroborating statements of other witnesses.
3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 804 Filed 06/04/03 Page 4 of 4

See id. In addition to these careful methods of initial investigation and consideration, Mr. Lewis has instituted a policy of reconsideration, under which a claimant may seek reconsideration directly from Mr. Lewis within 60 days of denial if the claimant believes that his or her petition was denied wrongfully. See Fourth Arb. Report at 5; see also Pigford v. Veneman, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 40. In light of these procedures, the Court sees no reason to direct Mr. Lewis to reopen all late claims alleging mail delivery failures or to provide standards for the decision of such claims. See Pigford v. Veneman, 201 F.Supp.2d at 141 ("The Court will not consider any such petition, either at the first instance or following denial and/or reconsideration by the Arbitrator. ").
Finally, the Court will not order a government investigation into possible misconduct by the United States Postal Service in connection with this case. Even if the Court had the authority to do so -- which is far from obvious -- the Court doubts that ordering an investigation would be a wise exercise of its power. If plaintiffs wish to pursue allegations of misconduct by the U.S.P.S., plaintiffs would do best to proceed by other means.
For these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion to Reopen All Late Claims Due to Mail Delays [753] is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

DATE: ~ \ 'i \ ~ J

;;< ' ~'~ ) ~

/~' :~ y -~j~

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN--~

United States District Judge

4

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 890 Filed 03/10/04 Page 1 of 12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

OPINION The Court has before it two motions for reconsideration of the Court's June 2, 2003 Opinion and Order denying plaintiffs' motion for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for Monitor review. Upon consideration of plaintiffs' motions, defendant's response, plaintiffs’ reply and defendant's surreply, the Court concludes that both motions for reconsideration must be denied.

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I. BACKGROUND On April 14, 1999, this Court approved and entered a Consent Decree in these consolidated actions that was designed to bring resolution and finality to the claims of race discrimination of those class members who opted to have their claims resolved under the adjudication or arbitration processes provided in the Consent Decree. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The Consent Decree provided that the Court would appoint an independent Monitor and that the Monitor would have the authority to direct the facilitator, adjudicator, or arbitrator to reexamine a claim if the Monitor determined that a “clear and manifest error” had occurred and had resulted in, or was likely to result in, a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Consent Decree ¶ 12(b)(iii). The Consent Decree did not provide a time limit within which a claimant could petition for Monitor review of his or her claim. See id. To bring finality to the proceedings under the Consent Decree, the parties stipulated on July 14, 2000, that any claimant who had already received an adverse decision from the Adjudicator would have 120 days from the date of the Order, until November 13, 2000, to file a petition for Monitor review. See July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order (“Stipulation and Order”) at 4.1 They further stipulated that all claimants who were to receive adjudication decisions after July 14, 2000 would have 120 days from the date of their adverse decision to file a petition for Monitor review. See id. The Stipulation and Order specifically provided that “[n]o
1Although the Stipulation and Order applied to both Track A (Adjudicator) and Track B (Arbitrator) decisions, plaintiffs' motions and this Opinion deal only with the former.
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extensions of these deadlines will be granted for any reason.” Id. The Court approved this agreement. See id.2
The Court provided in a later Order that instead of filing fully supported petitions for Monitor review, counsel could instead submit a Register of Petitions that would list all claimants who received a decision prior to the July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order and had asked counsel to provide assistance with the filing of his or her petition for Monitor review. See Pigford v. Veneman, No. 97-1978, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16374, *9 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2000). The Court entered this Order, permitting such an abbreviated process, in order "to ensure that claimants would not bear the burden of counsel's inability to process Petitions at a rate sufficient to meet the November 13 deadline" agreed to in the July 14 Stipulation. Id. at *6. The November 8 Order laid out a time frame for filing fully supported petitions and provided that all supporting materials had to be filed no later than May 15, 2001. See id. at *9-11. On May 15, 2001, the Court reluctantly changed the deadline for filing supporting materials and withdrawals, setting a final deadline of September 15, 2001 to complete the petition process. See Pigford v. Veneman, 143 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
The Register process discussed above did not apply to claimants receiving a decision from the Adjudicator after July 14, 2000; these claimants' petitions therefore were untimely if they were filed more than 120 days after the Adjudicator's decision. See Pigford v.

2

On behalf of plaintiffs, the stipulation was signed by class counsel, Alexander

Pires and Phillip L. Fraas. Also listed were of counsel: J.L. Chestnut; Othello Cross; Willie

Smith; Gerald R. Lear and Hubbard I. Sanders, IV. See Stipulation and Order. On December 22,

2000, the Court issued an Order amending the Consent Decree to include J.L. Chestnut as class

counsel. See December 22, 2000 Order.

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Veneman, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 31. The deadline was never modified as to claimants who received their Adjudicator decisions after July 14, 2000.
The Register process also did not apply to claimants who received their adverse Adjudicator decisions before July 14, 2000, but whose names were not placed on the Register. Petitions for individuals in this situation therefore were untimely if they were not filed by the original November 13, 2000 deadline set by the Stipulation and Order. See Pigford v. Veneman, No. 97-1978, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16374 at *9.
Several hundred petitions fitting into these two excluded categories, as well as those of a few other claimants with more unique circumstances, were declared untimely by the Facilitator because they were submitted after the deadlines set by the Stipulation and Order. Plaintiffs moved the Court to direct the Facilitator to process these petitions despite their untimely nature. See Plaintiff’ Motion for Four Groups of Claimants Who Filed Petitions for Monitor Review. On June 2, 2003, the Court issued an Opinion and Order denying relief for a total of 350 individual claimants whose petitions for Monitor review had been deemed untimely. See Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2003).
II. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs’ original motion for relief argued that the Court could interpret and modify the Orders imposing the deadlines under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or exercise its inherent equitable authority to modify the decrees. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief for Four Groups of Claimants Who Filed Petitions for Monitor Review at 32-36. The Court determined, however, that since the requested relief could not be granted
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without modification of the Court’s previous orders, allowing the petitions to be filed could not be viewed as mere “interpretation.” Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 45. The Court therefore determined that the motion for relief would be governed by the legal standard for modification. See id.3
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that “upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding [where] . . . [5] it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or . . . [6] [for] any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). For a judgment to no longer be equitable, plaintiffs must identify a “significant change in circumstances” justifying modification. Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992). This Court concluded in its earlier Opinion that the circumstances described by plaintiffs (attorney error due to the high volume of petitions and inadequate notice of the 120-day deadline) did not warrant modification of the Court’s previous Orders. See Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 46-50. The Court noted that the high volume of petitions was apparent at the time the Stipulation was negotiated by counsel for the parties and approved by the Court; accordingly, there were no changed circumstances based on attorney error. See id. at 46-48. Similarly, the Court held that the

3

On June 21, 2002, the United States Court of Appeals had reversed an earlier

decision of this Court "interpreting" another provision of the Consent Decree. See Pigford v.

Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The Court of Appeals held that "the district court's

interpretive and enforcement authority depends on the terms of the decree and related court order,

rather than on some 'ancillary' or 'inherent' power." Id. at 925. "To now hold that the district

court, through either some 'ancillary' authority to enforce the decree absent a violation or

'inherent' authority to interpret it, may permit extensions of Track B deadlines would not only

deny the Department [of Agriculture] the benefit of its bargain, but would also discourage

settlements." Id. This Court is bound by the holding of the Court of Appeals and must apply the

principles announced by the Court of Appeals in resolving issues under the Consent Decree.

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Stipulation and Order did not require language regarding the 120-day deadline to be included in the Track A and Track B decisions of the Adjudicator and Arbitrator and that the absence of such language also did not constitute changed circumstances. See id. at 47-49. The Court also found that various unique situations presented by a handful of other claimants did not warrant relief from the Court. See id. at 49-50. The Court concluded that plaintiffs had “failed to demonstrate changed circumstances sufficient to justify modification either under Rule 60(b) or the Court’s inherent equitable powers” and denied plaintiffs’ motion for relief. Id. at 51. Plaintiffs now ask the Court to reconsider that decision.
Plaintiffs have filed two separate motions for reconsideration of the Court’s June 2, 2003 Opinion and Order.4 Because both raise similar issues, they will be dealt with together.

A. Rule 60(b) Plaintiffs repeat their previous arguments that the Court should grant relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Conlon Motion at 6-18; Chestnut Motion at 9-21. Arguments are made both under Rule 60(b)(5), which was discussed at length in the Court’s June 2, 2003 Opinion and Order, and Rule 60(b)(6). As an initial matter, the Court declines to revisit its determination that the asserted “changed circumstances” presented by plaintiffs do not justify modification of the Court’s prior orders under Rule 60(b)(5). The Court is well aware of the circumstances surrounding these petitions and further elaboration does not

4

Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP filed a motion for reconsideration of the

Court’s Order of June 2, 2003 (“Conlon motion”) on June 16, 2003, which was joined by J.L.

Chestnut, Jr. on July 9, 2003. Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway & Campbell, LLC also

submitted a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Order on June 16, 2003 (“Chestnut

motion”).

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change this Court’s opinion that plaintiffs have not demonstrated changed circumstances sufficient to justify modification of the Court’s Orders under Rule 60(b)(5).
Plaintiffs also urge the Court to exercise its discretion to grant relief to the claimants under Rule 60(b)(6), which provides that relief may be granted for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); see Chestnut Motion at 13; Conlon Motion at 6. Although both parties represent this as a “new” argument, the language of Rule 60(b)(6) was included both in plaintiffs’ initial motion for relief and in the Court’s Opinion. See Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 45; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief for Four Groups of Claimants Who Filed Petitions for Monitor Review at 33. Although the Court explicitly analyzed plaintiffs’ request under Rule 60(b)(5), this does not mean that it was unaware of Rule 60(b)(6). See Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved for “extraordinary circumstances.” Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 372-73 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 n.10 (1988). Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is not available “unless the other clauses, (1) through (5), are inapplicable.” Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d at 372-73; see also Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. at 864 n.10 (“This logic, of course, extends beyond clause (1) and suggests that clause (6) and clauses (1) through (5) are mutually exclusive”). "If the reasons offered for relief from judgment could be considered under one of the more specific clauses of Rule 60(b)(1)-(5), those reasons will not justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6)." 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 60.48[2] (3d ed. 2002).
The Court concluded in its June 2, 2003 Opinion and Order that the “specific circumstances” described in plaintiffs’ motion and attached exhibits did not justify the
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modification of its Orders. Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 45. In analyzing plaintiffs’ request under Rule 60(b)(5), the Court obviously concluded that Rule 60(b)(5) was applicable but that plaintiffs had not satisfied the requirements of that subsection of the Rule. Under the established principle that Rule 60(b)(6) is not available where another subsection of Rule 60(b) provides the proper analytical framework for consideration, plaintiffs cannot obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) merely because they have failed to satisfy the strictures of Rule 60(b)(5). See 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 60.48[2] (3d ed. 2002) ("The provision applies only when there are reasons for relief other than those set out in the more specific clauses of Rule 60(b). To read the provision any other way would eliminate the need for the specific provisions and would eliminate the limitations that are imposed on those specific provisions.") Even were analysis appropriate under Rule 60(b)(6), the Court finds that the “extraordinary circumstances” required for relief are not present here. The Court therefore declines to disturb its ruling declining to grant relief under Rule 60(b).
The Chestnut motion offers the additional argument that the Stipulation and Order itself was a change in circumstances because the Chestnut firm, which was still Of Counsel at the time of the Stipulation, was not involved in the decision to negotiate and agree to the deadlines imposed by the Stipulation. Although the cases cited by the Chestnut motion deal specifically with the negotiation of settlement agreements, the courts of appeals do acknowledge that lead counsel have the responsibility to keep other counsel apprised of negotiations and to consult with them about settlement terms. See In Re Ivan F. Boesky Securities Litigation, 948 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d. Cir. 1991); In Re General Motors Corporation Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d
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1106, 1124-33 (7th Cir. 1979). The Court properly assumed that the Chestnut firm was aware of the Stipulation by the time it was approved by the Court.
As the government points out, the Stipulation and Order contained a provision stating that, “[a]ny person who objects to any aspect of this Stipulation and Order shall submit his/her objections to the Court in writing not later than 30 days from the date of the entry of this Order.” Stipulation and Order at 5. Notwithstanding the Chestnut motion’s assertion that it entered a “verbal objection” with the Court – further support that it knew of the existence of the Stipulation and Order -- the firm failed to file any written objection to the Stipulation and Order as was required by its clear language. Although it is true that all counsel should be involved to the extent practicable in the negotiation process, “knowledge and extended silence might easily support a finding of implied consent or estoppel.” In Re Boesky, 948 F. 2d at 1367.
Regardless of the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the Stipulation, the Court is unconvinced by the argument that the adoption of the Stipulation and Order can constitute “changed circumstances” that would justify modification of the Stipulation and Order itself. As the Court explained in denying relief on the grounds asserted in plaintiffs’ original motion for relief, “the fundamental flaw in this reasoning is that the critical ‘changed circumstance’ on which plaintiffs rely occurred before, not after, the relevant deadlines were agreed to by the parties and endorsed by the Court.” Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 46. If the Chestnut firm objected to the deadlines imposed by the Stipulation and Order, its proper course of action was to file its objections with the Court at the time the Stipulation and Order was adopted by the Court or within 30 days thereafter, not to later seek relief under Rule 60(b).
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B. Finality of July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order Plaintiffs suggest for the first time in their motion for reconsideration that the Court has the power to modify the Stipulation and Order because the Order was interlocutory, not final. See Conlon Motion at 2. In support of this argument, plaintiffs argue that the Stipulation and Order cannot be considered final because it was modified by later Orders, specifically those of November 8, 2000, April 27, 2001, and May 15, 2001. See Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motions for Reconsideration at 6. They argue that the Court therefore is not bound by the strictures of Rule 60(b) in deciding whether to modify its Orders. See Conlon Motion at 3. This argument is unpersuasive. At the time the Court approved the July 14 Stipulation, its Order was intended to be a final resolution of the deadlines involved in the Petition process. The fact that certain modifications were later made to the deadlines set out in the Stipulation and Order at the request of plaintiffs does not alter the fact that it was intended to be, and is, a final decision. The modifications made to it by the Court in its subsequent Orders were governed by Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as are the modifications now requested. As discussed above, the changed circumstances cited by plaintiffs do not justify relief under Rule 60(b).
C. Lack of Notice In their reply brief, plaintiffs also raise for the first time the argument that a court presiding over a class action has the authority to deal with matters of notice to class members and to remedy lack of notice in individual cases. See Plaintiffs' Reply at 11-14. Plaintiffs appear to be offering this argument to augment their arguments for relief both under Rule 60(b) and under the Court's inherent equitable authority. They urge the Court to adopt the “excusable neglect” standard
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in determining whether to direct the Facilitator to consider the late-filed petitions for Monitor review as timely.
The Court notes as a threshold matter that all of the cases cited by plaintiffs involved claimants who were seeking either to file claims or opt-out requests out of time. See Plaintiffs’ Reply at 11-14. In the instant case, all of the claimants had the opportunity to participate in the adjudicatory processes established by the Consent Decree and had their claims denied. By failing to meet the deadlines established by the Stipulation and Order, they have lost only their opportunity to petition for Monitor review of those adverse decisions.
Under Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may for cause shown “in its discretion” enlarge the time within which an act required by an order of the court must be completed “where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b); see also In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 327 F.3d 1207, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2003).5 Assuming that the “excusable neglect” standard would otherwise be applicable in this case, that standard has not been met. The factors involved in determining whether certain neglect was “excusable” include: the danger of prejudice to the non-movant; the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings; the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant; and whether the movant acted in good faith. See In re Pioneer Investment Services Co., 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993); see also In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 327

5

Defendants argue that the rationale of the cases cited by plaintiff is inapposite

because the deadlines at issue in the instant case were not merely determined by the district court,

but rather were the result of negotiations between the parties and therefore the deadlines in the

Stipulation and Order have legal significance because they are the result of a contract. Surreply

at 7. Because the Court finds that the standard for excusable neglect is not met, it does not

address whether the standard is applicable.

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F.3d at 1209. As this Court found quite explicitly in its earlier Opinion, “defendant will 'be prejudiced to the tune of almost one million dollars' if the Court permits consideration of the late petitions and if even five percent of them are successful.” Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 50. Because this is not a case in which there is a limited settlement fund, the granting of relief to plaintiffs would necessarily result in actual prejudice to the defendant. Similarly, because the deadlines were negotiated and agreed to by plaintiffs, it logically follows that the resulting failure to meet those deadlines had been within the reasonable control of plaintiffs. The Court therefore finds that the standard for excusable neglect is not met and that plaintiffs’ request for relief must be denied.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will issue this same day. SO ORDERED.

DATE:

___________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

OPINION The Court has before it one motion to vacate the sanctions imposed by the Court in its May 15, 2001 Memorandum Opinion and Order and one motion for reconsideration of the sanctions. The first motion was filed by class counsel Alexander Pires and class counsel Phillip Fraas on September 25, 2001. The second motion was filed by class counsel J.L. Chestnut and his partner Rose Sanders on September 13, 2002. On February 3, 2003, defendant filed a supplemental memorandum regarding sanctions pursuant to the Court’s Order of December 30, 2002. Upon consideration of class counsels' motions, defendant’s responses, class counsels'

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replies, defendant’s supplemental memorandum, class counsels' opposition and defendant’s reply, the Court has concluded that class counsels' motions must be denied. The Court will specify the fines that are to be imposed.
I. BACKGROUND Many of the facts surrounding these sanctions were discussed in this Court’s Opinion of this same day denying two motions for reconsideration of a previous Order of the Court. The Court therefore will only briefly summarize them here. On April 14, 1999, the Court approved and entered a Consent Decree which established an adjudication and arbitration process for the claims of race discrimination of those class members who opted to have their claims resolved under the Consent Decree. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The Consent Decree provided that the Court would appoint an independent Monitor and that the Monitor would have the authority to direct the facilitator, adjudicator, or arbitrator to reexamine a claim if the Monitor determined that a “clear and manifest error” had occurred and had resulted in, or was likely to result in, a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Consent Decree ¶ 12(b)(iii). The Consent Decree did not provide a time limit within which a claimant could petition for Monitor review of his or her claim. See id.1 To bring finality to the proceedings under the Consent Decree, the parties stipulated on July 14, 2000, that any claimant who had already received an adverse decision from the Adjudicator would have 120 days from the date of the Order, until November 13, 2000, to file a petition for Monitor review under the Consent Decree. See July 14, 2000 Stipulation and
1The Monitor's appointment, however, was to last for a period of five years. See Consent Decree ¶ 12.
2

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Order ("Stipulation and Order") at 4.2 All future claimants would have 120 days from the date of their adverse decision. Id. The Stipulation specifically provided that “[n]o extensions of these deadlines will be granted for any reason.” Id. The Court approved this Stipulation. Id.
The Court provided in a later Order that instead of filing fully supported petitions for Monitor review, counsel could instead submit a Register of Petitions that would list all claimants who received a decision prior to the July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order and had asked for assistance with the filing of his or her petition for Monitor review. See Pigford v. Veneman, No. 97-1978, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16374, *9 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2000). The Order laid out a time frame for filing fully supported petitions and withdrawals and provided that all petitions and withdrawals had to be filed no later than May 15, 2001. See id. On April 27, 2001, the Court temporarily suspended the deadlines set forth in the November 8, 2000 Order while it considered whether to extend the time for filing petitions for Monitor review. See Pigford v. Veneman, 144 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20 (D.D.C. 2001). It also announced that if a change to the deadline ultimately were to be granted, the Court would impose a progressive schedule of daily fines on class counsel. See id. The Order provided that class counsel would be fined for each day after May 15, 2001 that they had not completed the petition process:
Class Counsel will be fined $1,000 for each day during the first month after the [May 15, 2001] deadline that all supporting materials or withdrawals were not filed, they will be fined $2,000 for each day during the second month after the [May 15, 2001] deadline that all supporting materials or withdrawals were not filed,

2

On behalf of plaintiffs, the stipulation was signed by class counsel, Alexander

Pires and Phillip L. Fraas. Also listed were of counsel: J.L. Chestnut; Othello Cross; Willie

Smith; Gerald R. Lear and Hubbard I. Sanders. See July 14, 2000 Stip. On December 22, 2000,

the Court issued an Order amending the Consent Decree to include J.L. Chestnut as class

counsel. See December 22, 2000 Order.

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they will be fined $3,000 for each day during the third month after the [May 15, 2001] deadline that all supporting materials or withdrawals were not filed, and so on. Id. On May 15, 2001, the Court permanently suspended the deadlines and reluctantly changed the deadline for filing supporting materials and withdrawals, setting a final deadline of September 15, 2001 to complete the petition process. See Pigford v. Veneman, 143 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2001). The Court then imposed the schedule of fines announced in the April 27, 2001 Order, adding that class counsel would be fined $4,000 for each day during the fourth month after May 15, 2001 that all supporting materials or withdrawals were not filed. See id. at 32. The Order further provided that “for each petition that the Monitor reports was not supported or withdrawn by the ultimate deadline of September 15, 2001, Class Counsel will be fined $50,000.” Id. As of September 15, 2001, the final deadline set by the Order, class counsel had accumulated $308,000 in fines.3

3

Sanctions are calculated as follows: $1,000 per day for 31 days (May 16 to June

15); $2,000 per day for 30 days (June 16 to July 15); $3000 per day for 31 days (July 16 to

August 15); and $4,000 per day for 31 days (August 16 to September 15). This value assumes

that all petitions were either filed or withdrawn by the September 15, 2001 deadline.

At the time of the briefing on the sanctions issues, there was a pending motion for relief for four groups of claimants who had filed untimely petitions for Monitor review. Defendant had suggested that if the filing of those petitions was permitted, it would be appropriate to sanction class counsel for successful petitions. See Defendant’s Memorandum Regarding Sanctions to be Imposed upon Class Counsel and Of Counsel to the Class filed pursuant to Order of December 30, 2002 ("Def. Sanctions Mem.") at 7-8. On June 2, 2003, the Court issued an Order denying relief for those claimants whose petitions for Monitor review had been deemed untimely because they missed deadlines imposed by the Stipulation and Order. In an Opinion and Order issued this same day, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a reconsideration of the June 2, 2003 decision.
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As of November 2001, attorneys from Covington and Burling ("Covington") were serving as pro bono "plaintiffs' counsel" in sixteen Track B cases. On November 7, 2001, class counsel filed a notice of intention to produce files to pro bono counsel and then released several hundred Track A files to Covington. Defendant moved for emergency enforcement of the Second Amended Supplemental Privacy Act Protective Order ("Protective Order") and for sanctions. The Protective Order had set guidelines regarding who could obtain USDA files, or information contained in those files, and under what conditions. Although Covington attorneys were serving as plaintiffs’ counsel for certain claimants and therefore would have been authorized under the Protective Order to receive files from the government, class counsel was not authorized to release any files to Covington. See Pigford v. Veneman, 182 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2002). Because Covington was solicited by class counsel and by the Court to assist in representing certain Track B claimants, the Court nevertheless determined that it would be unfair to deny Covington the benefits of access to Track A files that class counsel would have been free to consult had they still been representing the Track B claimants. See id. at 56-57. Covington therefore was permitted to retain the files improperly released by class counsel. See id.
The Court found that class counsel’s violation of the Protective Order was “both knowing and willful” in view of the Notice of Intention served by class counsel, and that the Court would “seriously consider imposing sanctions” on class counsel. Pigford v. Veneman, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 57. The actual decision on the sanctions was postponed until such time as the Court addressed all of the potential sanctions against class counsel. See id. Class counsel were permanently enjoined from releasing protected files to any pro bono counsel in the future. See id. The Court is not aware of any violation of this injunction and presumes that class counsel have honored the terms of the Order.
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II. DISCUSSION A. Progressive Schedule of Fines
1. Criminal v. Civil Sanctions Class counsel first argues that the progressive schedule of fines imposed by the Court’s Orders constitutes criminal sanctions and that such sanctions cannot be imposed without a criminal trial. See Class Counsel’s Motion to Vacate the Sanctions Set Forth in the April 27, 2001 Memorandum Opinion and Order and the May 15, 2001 Memorandum Opinion and Order of the Court (“Mot. Vacate Sanctions”) at 30. The Court has both an inherent and a statutory power to enforce compliance with its orders and may exercise that authority through a civil contempt proceeding. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 330-32 (1947); Petties v. District of Columbia, 897 F. Supp. 626, 629 (D.D.C. 1995); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bankers Alliance Corp., 881 F. Supp. 673, 678 (D.D.C. 1995). "A party commits contempt when it violates a definite and specific court order requiring him to perform or refrain from performing a particular act or acts with knowledge of that order." Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bankers Alliance Corp., 881 F. Supp. at 678. Civil contempt is a remedial device intended to achieve full compliance with a court's order. See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826 (1994); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1988). A contempt fine therefore is civil and remedial – not criminal – if it either "coerces the defendant into compliance with the court's order, [or] . . . compensates the complainant for losses sustained.” Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829 (citing United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. at 303-304).
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a. Compensatory Fines “As a part of the bargain struck between the parties and approved by the Court in the Order of July 14, 2000, Class Counsel agreed to meet the 120 day deadline [for filing petitions for Monitor review] in return for the government’s agreement to admit more than 1,100 Track A claimants into the class who otherwise would have been excluded.” Pigford v. Veneman, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 19 n.2. The government abided by the terms of the agreement, but class counsel failed to meet its deadline. See id. The government argues that the sanctions imposed by the Court’s orders serve a function of being “partially compensatory” for class counsel’s breach. See Defendant’s Response to Motion of Class Counsel to Vacate the Sanctions Set Forth in the April 27, 2001 Memorandum Opinion and Order of the Court and the May 15, 2001 Memorandum Opinion and Order of the Court (“Def. Resp.”) at 11 n.11. The Court has previously expressed this same sentiment, noting that although the schedule of fees would not “fully recompense” the government, it would “provide at least a degree of compensation.” Pigford v. Veneman, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 19 n.2. In exchange for class counsel agreeing to deadlines for petitions for Monitor review, the government gave up its right to contest approximately 1,100 untimely filed claims. See id. Assuming a 60% success rate in Track A claims, allowing those claims to proceed was a governmental concession worth at least $33 million in class member relief. See id. Because class counsel failed to comply with the deadlines imposed by the agree-to Stipulation and Order, the government did not realize the intended benefit of its bargain, and the sanctions imposed by the Court therefore are compensatory in nature.
7

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 892 Filed 03/10/04 Page 8 of 15
b. Coercive Fines Even assuming the sanctions were not compensatory, they still would be civil in nature. “Civil contempt sanctions, or those penalties designed to compel future compliance with a court order, are considered to be coercive and avoidable through obedience, and thus may be imposed in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and opportunity to be heard.” Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826. The Court imposed a per diem fine on class counsel for each day they failed to submit the completed petitions for Monitor review. As soon as class counsel fully complied with the Court’s Order, the accumulation of fines ceased. Although the Supreme Court held in Bagwell that certain fixed fines for prospective conduct that violates a court order may be characterized as punitive in nature, the D.C. Circuit has noted that the Bagwell decision “did not call into question the traditional classification of some categories of contempt sanctions – compensatory fines, coercive imprisonment, and per diem fines to coerce compliance with affirmative court orders – as civil in nature.” National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). “A close analogy to coercive imprisonment is a per diem fine imposed for each day a contemnor fails to comply with an affirmative court order. Like civil imprisonment, such fines exert a constant coercive pressure, and once the jural command is obeyed, the future, indefinite, daily fines are purged.” Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829. Class counsel contends that the sanctions at issue were more closely akin to a suspended, determinate fine than a per diem fine. See Mot. Vacate Sanctions at 38. Class counsel relies heavily on the court of appeals’ decision in Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292
8

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 892 Filed 03/10/04 Page 9 of 15
(D.C. Cir. 2000), to support their position that the instant sanctions were punitive. The district court in Evans had adopted a plan by which whenever defendant District of Columbia failed to pay a vendor’s invoice within thirty days, a fine would be imposed. See Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d at 1294. In finding that these fines constituted criminal contempt, the court of appeals noted that “each missed payment was a separate violation of the consent decree and a separate act of contempt.” Id. at 1296. The court determined that it was “improper to regard the District as capable of purging itself of contempt by paying a bill before the thirtieth day – it simply was not in contempt until it failed to pay on the thirtieth day.” Id. In this case, by contrast, there is only one deadline at issue. Class counsel was put on notice on April 27, 2001 that the Court was considering instituting a daily fine that would continue every day after May 15, 2001 until class counsel complied with the Court’s Order. Class counsel was in contempt for the same act, failing to timely complete the petition process, throughout the entire sanctions period. Class counsel could have halted the accumulation of fines at any time by complying with the Court’s Order. The fines imposed on class counsel therefore were not criminal in nature.
Evans can be further distinguished in that the court of appeals focused on the nature of the injunction itself as “key” both to the Supreme Court’s finding of criminal contempt in Bagwell and the court of appeals’ own finding in Evans. See Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d at 1296. The court of appeals noted that the injunction that defendant had been sanctioned for violating established a “detailed code of conduct” through which the court was governing “an entire governmental program in the District of Columbia.” Id. at 1296-97. “When a district judge assumes the responsibility to regulate the activities of a large institution and then seeks to identify and punish violators of his or her injunction, he or she comes perilously close to fusing
9

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 892 Filed 03/10/04 Page 10 of 15
the powers which our Constitution separates.” Id. at 1297. There is no such concern in this case. The Court ordered only that class counsel timely submit petitions for Monitor review, as it had previously agreed to do in a Stipulation with the government. When class counsel failed to meet the deadlines they had agreed to and then those ordered by the Court, the Court instituted a daily fine as a “financial incentive” to encourage class counsel to comply expeditiously with the Court’s Order. The per diem, coercive fine imposed on class counsel in this case is the epitome of a civil sanction.
2. Impossibility Class counsel next argue that sanctions are not appropriate because it was impossible for class counsel to meet the November 2000 deadline or the May 2001 deadline. "[I]mpossibility of performance constitutes a defense to a charge of contempt[,] and a respondent who raises the defense of impossibility must demonstrate his inability to comply categorically and in detail," despite its good faith efforts. Securities and Exhange Commission v. Bankers Alliance Corp., 881 F. Supp. at 678; see Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d at 1299; Tinsley v. Mitchell, 804 F.2d 1254, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1986). When a district court determines, however, that a contemnor has “not done all within its power” to comply with the court’s orders, contempt may be appropriate even where compliance is difficult. Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 855 F.2d 874, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Class counsel agreed to the deadlines imposed by the July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order and maintained that they could complete the petition process within four months. The Stipulation and Order specifically provided that "no extensions of these deadlines will be granted
10

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 892 Filed 03/10/04 Page 11 of 15
for any reason." Stipulation and Order at 4. Despite being granted an additional six months by the Court, class counsel still failed to fulfill its responsibilities. Particularly since class counsel negotiated for the deadlines in question and agreed to them in advance, and in view of the "no extensions . . . for any reason" language in the Stipulation and Order, the Court finds that class counsel has not demonstrated that it should be relieved from civil contempt on grounds of impossibility.
3. Due Process Class counsel also argue that they were deprived of due process because the fines were imposed without prior notice from the Court and because class counsel did not receive any opportunity to be heard. But class counsel were given notice in the April 27, 2001 Memorandum Opinion and Order that fines would begin to accrue after the May 15, 2001 deadline. That message was reiterated in the Memorandum Opinion and Order of May 15, 2001. The accumulation of fines could have been avoided at any time through compliance with the Court's Order. Even were such notice not sufficient, the issues involved have been exhaustively briefed since the time of class counsel’s motion. The imposition of the sanctions has been suspended for nearly two years while the matter has been extensively briefed and carefully considered. As for a hearing, due process does not require a hearing every time sanctions are imposed. See LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1998); McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("While it is perhaps conceivable that due process could require a hearing on sanctions under [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11] in certain circumstances, [appellant] offers no basis for any further proceedings on that subject here."). Moreover, on December 11, 2002, the parties appeared for a status conference to discuss, among
11

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 892 Filed 03/10/04 Page 12 of 15
other topics, the “consolidated issue of fees and sanctions.” November 22, 2002 Order at 2. Although the December 11, 2002 status conference was not a “hearing” on the issue of sanctions in the traditional sense, it gave the parties the opportunity to air their views with the Court for nearly ninety minutes.4 The Court has determined that no further hearing is necessary in this case and that class counsel's right to due process has been satisfied.
4. Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway and Campbell At the time the sanctions were imposed, the Court did not delineate between the various attorneys and firms involved in the Court's imposition of a progressive schedule of fines against “class counsel.” Pigford v. Veneman, 144 F. Supp. 2d 16 at 20. In addition to challenging the imposition of the sanctions themselves, Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright, LLC (“Chestnut”) also contends in its motion for reconsideration that it should be relieved of liability because Mr. Chestnut was named as class counsel only after the July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order was signed and only after class counsel missed the key November 2000 deadline. See supra note 2. The Court makes no findings in this Opinion regarding who was involved in and aware of the negotiation of the July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order and to what extent responsibility for the actions predating the sanctions attaches to which class counsel. The Court declines to allocate the $308,000 fine between the various counsel and

4

Moreover, during that hearing, class counsel Alexander Pires said, with respect to

the issue of sanctions: “I can speak on behalf of my firm. We are more than willing to pay any

reasonable penalty to resolve this for all kinds of obvious reasons.” Transcript of December

11, 2002 Hearing at 6; see id. at 39 (“I’ll pay the whole thing out of my pocket, I don’t mind,

to bring this to an end.”).

12

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 892 Filed 03/10/04 Page 13 of 15
is confident that counsel can decide among themselves the fairest method of allocating the payment to the government.
B. Sanctions for Failure to Meet September 15, 2001 Deadline The Court’s Order of May 15, 2001 also provided that class counsel would be fined $50,000 for each petition that the Monitor reported was not supported or withdrawn by the ultimate deadline of September 15, 2001. Defendants argue that class counsel should be sanctioned for any petition that was filed or supplemented after September 15, 2001 and that resulted in an award for the claimant. See Def. Sanctions Mem. at 7-8. All of the petitions listed on the Register were either supported or withdrawn by the September 15, 2001 deadline. See Monitor’s Final September 2001 Report Regarding Registers of Petitions at 7. The only remaining petitions that could be construed as triggering this sanction were those included in class counsel’s motion for relief for four groups of claimants. Subsequent to the briefing on the sanctions issue, however, the Court denied relief to the claimants in question and declined to allow the untimely petitions for Monitor review to be filed. See Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2003). In an Opinion and Ordered entered this same day, the Court has declined to reconsider that decision. See March 10, 2004 Opinion and Order. Thus, all petitions listed on the Register were either fully supported or withdrawn by the September 15, 2001 deadline and any question regarding these sanctions is moot.5

5

Because this issue is moot, the Court declines to determine whether these

petitions, if allowed, would have triggered sanctions.

13

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 892 Filed 03/10/04 Page 14 of 15

C. Sanctions for Violation of Second Supplemental Privacy Act Protective Order In its Order of January 17, 2002, the Court noted that it would consider imposing
sanctions on class counsel for the release of hundreds of Track A files to Covington. The government maintains that “any fees, costs, and expenses to which class and of counsel otherwise may be entitled should be reduced” as a sanction for these violations of the Protective Order. Def. Sanctions Mem. at 12. The government proposes that an “easily calculable” option for reducing any fee award would be to assess a $1,000 reduction in fees for each disclosure of an individual’s Privacy Act-protected records. Id. at 14 n.16.6
In its January 17, 2002 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court “closely reviewed the language” of the Protective Order and concluded that class counsel violated the Protective Order by releasing Track A files to Covington and that they did so “both knowing[ly] and willful[ly].” Pigford v. Veneman, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 55, 57. Class counsel concedes that they incorrectly interpreted the Protective Order in releasing the protected information to pro bono counsel. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Memorandum Regarding Sanctions to be Imposed Upon Class Counsel and Of Counsel to the Class Filed Pursuant to Order of December 30, 2002 at 8. They contend, however, that civil contempt sanctions are not appropriate because no actual harm resulted from the sharing of the files. Id. The Court is inclined to agree. The Court ordered that no more files be improperly released by class counsel and none have been. Had Covington gone directly to the government with the request for white farmer files, this Court

6

The government contends that it would be appropriate to sanction class and of

counsel in the same manner that the government would have been sanctioned had it willfully and

intentionally disclosed Privacy Act-protected records, which would have been actual damages or

$1,000, whichever was greater. Def. Sanctions Mem. at 13.

14

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 892 Filed 03/10/04 Page 15 of 15

would have expected the government to produce files in compliance with both the spirit and the letter of the Consent Decree. Moreover, government compliance with the request would have been fully authorized by the Second Supplemental Security Act Protective Order. See Protective Order at 1-2. Although class counsel's conduct in violation of the Protective Order cannot be excused or condoned, no harm resulted from the improper release of the files to Covington. See Pigford v. Veneman, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 56-57. The Court therefore declines to impose monetary sanctions for class counsels' violation of the Protective Order.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will issue this same day. SO ORDERED.

DATE:

___________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

15

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1041 Filed 11/08/04 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Claimants’ Submission Pursuant to the Court’s

January 14, 2003 Request Seeking Clarification that the Court of Appeals’ June 21, 2002

Opinion Applies to Claimants Not Previously Represented by Class Counsel. On April 4, 2003,

the Court gave leave for nine claimants to file an additional submission on this issue. On June

25, 2003, those claimants filed Nine Named and or Lead Plaintiffs’ Memorandum: Submitted in

Response to the Court’s January 14th 2003 Order. Upon consideration of claimants’ submission,

the government’s opposition, claimants’ reply, the government’s surreply, the nine named

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1041 Filed 11/08/04 Page 2 of 6
plaintiffs’ submission and the government’s response, the Court concludes that the relief granted by the court of appeals in its June 21, 2002 opinion does not apply to claimants not originally represented by class counsel. As noted below, however, if any of these plaintiffs were, in fact, originally represented by class counsel and injured by class counsel’s actions, relief is warranted.
On June 21, 2002, the court of appeals concluded that this Court had erred in interpreting the Consent Decree to allow extension of certain critical deadlines. See Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Although the court of appeals concluded that this Court “exceeded its interpretative authority,” it concluded that “class counsel’s conduct justifie[d] modifying the decree under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5).” See id. at 919. Rule 60(b)(5) permits courts “upon such terms as are just” to “relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding . . . [if] it is no longer equitable that the judgement should have prospective application.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). “[A] significant change in circumstances,” the Supreme Court has held, may “warrant[] revision of [a] decree.” Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992).
The court of appeals noted that, generally, an attorney’s mistakes cannot form the basis of a Rule 60(b)(5) modification of a consent decree. See Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 926. Because a client voluntarily chooses his attorney, he cannot “avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of [the] freely selected agent.” Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962). The court of appeals in Pigford concluded, however, that other than the three named plaintiffs, none of the class members had “voluntarily” chosen class counsel and that the general rule of Link may not apply. See Pigford v. Veneman, 282 F.3d at 926. The court of appeals therefore concluded that the failure of class counsel not freely chosen by a class member
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1041 Filed 11/08/04 Page 3 of 6
to meet the critical Track B deadlines necessary to pursue that particular class member’s claim “amounts to an ‘unforeseen obstacle’ that [made] the decree ‘unworkable.’” See id. at 927. The court of appeals then remanded the case to this Court to “suitably tailor” a remedy, or Rule 60(b)(5) modification, for each claimant depending on what failings of his or her lawyer led to the missing of Track B deadlines so as to “reset the clock” so far as possible and provide an opportunity to have the individual claims processed by competent counsel. See id. at 927.
The issue now before the Court is whether claimants who were not originally represented by class counsel were covered by the principles articulated in the court of appeals’ opinion. See Pigford v. Veneman, 239 F. Supp. 2d 68, 72 (D.D.C. 2003). Claimants suggest that the court of appeals’ decision clearly applies to claimants not originally represented by class counsel because the court of appeals’ decision turned on the conduct of counsel rather than on the identity of counsel. See Claimants’ Submission Pursuant to Court’s January 14, 2003 Request at 5. Defendant maintains that the court of appeals was quite clear that relief was appropriate only because plaintiffs had not truly “chosen” their counsel and therefore that any claimant who did elect to choose his own counsel was responsible for the errors of that counsel. See Defendant’s Response to Claimant’s Submission Pursuant to the Court’s January 14, 2003 Request at 3. Defendant is right; the court of appeals could not have been clearer.
Unlike the cases cited by claimants from this and other circuits, this case does not involve the discretionary dismissal of a case as a penalty for an attorney’s misconduct. Instead, claimants ask the Court to relieve them from bargained-for Track B deadlines because their attorneys have failed to fulfill their duties to their clients. In allowing for Rule 60(b) relief in this case, the court of appeals relied exclusively on this case’s status as a class action and the lack of
3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1041 Filed 11/08/04 Page 4 of 6
voluntary choice of counsel on the part of the class members. See Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 925-26. The D.C. Circuit recently reiterated, in an unpublished opinion, that “parties are generally considered bound by the acts of their lawyers, whom they have voluntarily chosen to represent them.” Sabbagh v. United Arab Emirates, No. 03-7027, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1785, *3 (D.C. Cir. February 4, 2004). Contrary to claimants’ assertions, the court of appeals in Pigford addressed the actual conduct of class counsel only after determining that the claimants were not bound by that conduct because the case was a class action and the class members had not voluntarily chosen their counsel. It would not be in keeping with the decision of the court of appeals to expand its decision to those claimants not originally represented by class counsel.
The arguments advanced by the pro se plaintiffs are similarly unavailing. First, plaintiffs argue that they are due special consideration as “private attorney generals” and lead plaintiffs in the action. See Lead Pl. Mot. at 2. Plaintiffs cite no law, however, to support their contention that the burden under Rule 60(b) is any less for lead plaintiffs or pro se plaintiffs in a class action than for other parties to an action. Plaintiffs next argue that the court of appeals’ decision is rooted in the “intent of Congress” and that that intent weighs in favor of modification and that it is the burden of the Court to protect the class. See id. at 3. Neither of these arguments, however, provides grounds for this Court to modify the Consent Decree pursuant to Rule 60(b). Plaintiffs finally maintain that the Court could simply send the cases back to the arbitrator for rescheduling, allow the plaintiffs to opt out of the settlement, or use the arbitration process used for Tim and Clara Pigford. See id. That argument is similar to the one accepted by this Court in its decision of January 17, 2002. See Pigford v. Veneman, 182 F. Supp. 2d 50, 5253 (D.D.C. 2002) (“the Court concludes that the arbitrators do have discretion to allow for
4

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1041 Filed 11/08/04 Page 5 of 6

revision of certain deadlines, even after the deadlines have passed, so long as justice requires the

revisions and provided that the burden on the defendant is not so great as to outweigh the interest

of the claimant in fully presenting his or her claim.”). Unfortunately for plaintiffs, this Court was

reversed by the court of appeals for reaching that conclusion. See Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d

at 919. None of these options is available because all would involve modification of the Consent

Decree under Rule 60(b) which, for the reasons listed above, is not available relief in this case.

Defendant acknowledges, however, that in their pro se filing the nine plaintiffs

alleged that they “were represented by class counsel from August 15th, 1997 until December

1999.” Nine Named and or Lead Plaintiffs’ Memorandum: Submitted in Response to the Courts’

January 14th 2003 Order (“Lead Pl. Mot.”) at 2; Defendant’s Response to Pro Se Plaintiffs’

Submission Pursuant to the Court’s January 14, 2003 Request (“Def. Resp.”) at 2. Defendant

agrees that, if these plaintiff were, in fact, originally represented by class counsel and therefore

were injured by lead counsel’s errors, they clearly are entitled to the relief discussed in the court

of appeals’ June 21, 2002 decision. See Def. Resp. at 2. The Court is confident that should this

be the case, the affected claimants and the government will work together to determine the

appropriate relief.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the relief granted by the court of appeals in its June 21, 2002

Opinion does not apply to those claimants not originally represented by class counsel.

SO ORDERED.

DATE:

________________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

5

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1041 Filed 11/08/04 Page 6 of 6

Copies to:
Kenneth W. Barton Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada Deposit Guaranty Plaza, 17th Fl. 210 East Capitol Street Jackson, Mississippi 39201
Thomas W. Kirby, III 1776 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006
Cecil Brewington 478 Tatoe Road Willard, North Carolina 28478
Lucious Abrams 2023 Gough Red Hill Keysville, Georgia 30816
Gregory Erves 540 Northside Drive, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30318
Austin L. Dennis, Jr. and Rosie C. Dennis P.O. Box 4433 228 MLK Jr. Drive Watonton, Georgia 31024
Herbert Williams 600 Floweree Road Redwood, Mississippi 39156
Kenneth L. Thompson Michelle Thompson 5100 County Road 189 Florence, Alabama 35633
Eddie Gray 9790 Oak Ridge Road Vicksburg, Mississippi 39183

Randi Ilyse Roth Office of the Monitor 340 Cedar Street, Suite 1000 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101
Michael Lewis ADR Associates 1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20009

6

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1088 Filed 01/03/05 Page 1 of 39

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture, )

)

Defendant.

)

)

)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture, )

)

Defendant.

)

)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

OPINION This matter is before the Court on a motion to modify the Consent Decree filed by certain African American farmers and a motion to disqualify lead class counsel filed by a number of the same African American farmers and others. As a result, the Court again finds itself called upon to review the fairness of the Consent Decree memorializing a settlement agreement entered into more than five years ago by the United States Department of Agriculture and the plaintiff class of African American farmers, and the adequacy of plaintiff class counsel.

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1088 Filed 01/03/05 Page 2 of 39
The terms of the Consent Decree were approved by this Court in April 1999. Since then, more than 13,500 farmers have received more than $830 million in cash and other relief from the government. In the present motions, however, a small number of individual African American farmers seek to overturn these gains, renegotiate with the government, and fashion what they believe would be a better solution. Because the motion to modify and the motion to disqualify concern common issues, the Court will address them together. As explained in this Opinion, the Court finds no grounds to grant the extraordinary relief sought by movants and again reminds all parties, movants and counsel that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the relevant case law provide an avenue for such relief only in the rarest of circumstances. Consequently, the Court will deny both motions.
I. BACKGROUND The issues raised by movants in their motions to modify the Consent Decree and to disqualify class counsel cover a broad range of matters related to the fairness of the negotiated settlement of this case, as approved by the Court after a fairness hearing and embodied in the Consent Decree, and the process of its implementation. Because these issues are bound up with the progress of the case over the past five years, a review of its history is appropriate. It is important to note that many of the arguments advanced by movants have already been raised and decided both by this Court and by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. As counsel for movants is well aware, those decisions constitute the law of this case and therefore, absent extraordinary changed circumstances, must be followed. This Court and the court of appeals have described the history and context of the case as follows:
2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1088 Filed 01/03/05 Page 3 of 39
On August 28, 1997, three African-American farmers filed suit on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated AfricanAmerican farmers alleging racial discrimination in the administration of USDA programs and further harm from the allegedly surreptitious dismantling of USDA's Office of Civil Rights in 1983, which together were alleged to violate the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, prohibiting discrimination in consumer credit. Following amendments to the complaint, the district court granted class certification in October 1998. See Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 90. At that time, most of the farmers' ECOA claims were arguably barred by a two-year statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f). Responding to petitions from class members, Congress enacted, and the President signed in November 1998, an amendment to retroactively extend the limitations period for persons who had filed administrative complaints between January 1, 1981, and July 1, 1997, for acts of discrimination occurring between January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1996. A second class action, Brewington v. Glickman, Civ. No. 98-1693, filed in July 1998 and making similar allegations covering a different time period, was consolidated with Pigford for purposes of settlement, and a new class was certified. See Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 90.
As the February 1999 trial date drew near, the parties' negotiations shifted from individual claims to a global settlement, id., and with the assistance of a court-appointed mediator, the parties developed and agreed to a consent decree that contemplated a two-track dispute resolution mechanism to determine whether individual class members had been the victims of discrimination and, if so, the amount of monetary relief to which they were entitled.
Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (footnotes omitted).
Designed to "ensure that in their dealings with USDA, all class members receive full and fair treatment that is the same as the treatment accorded to similarly situated white persons," the decree establishes procedures for resolving class members' individual claims. Consent Decree at 2. Specifically, the decree allows class members to choose between two claims procedures, known as Tracks A and B. In recognition of the fact that "most . . . [class] members . . . had little in the way of documentation or proof" of either discriminatory treatment or damages suffered,
3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1088 Filed 01/03/05 Page 4 of 39
Track A awards $ 50,000 to those farmers able to "meet only a minimal burden of proof." Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 103. Track B . . . imposes no cap on damages, but requires farmers who choose this track, after limited discovery consisting "essentially [of] an exchange of lists of witnesses and exhibits and depositions of the opposing side's witnesses," to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence in one-day mini-trials before an arbitrator. Id. at 106. . . . Track A and B decisions are final, except that the losing side may petition for review by a court-appointed monitor. [Consent Decree] at ¶¶ 9(a)(v), 9(b)(v), 10(i), 12(b)(iii).
Pigford v. Glickman, 292 F.3d 918, 920-21 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
By law, the proposed consent decree could not take effect until the district court had approved it, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), and the district court's approval could not be granted until notice had been given to the class of the proposed settlement and a fairness hearing had been held to determine whether the "settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable and is not the product of collusion between the parties." Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 98 (quoting Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). The district court held a day-long hearing in which representatives of eight organizations and sixteen individuals . . . voiced their objections to the terms of the proposed consent decree. Many . . . objected to the absence of certain forms of prospective structural relief, notwithstanding the fact that the complaint, as amended, did not seek such injunctive relief. 185 F.R.D. at 110. While USDA was likely to face billion-dollar monetary liability under the decree, no changes to the county committee system were mandated, and objectors feared that no improvements would be made to the way in which the farm credit and non-credit programs are administered. See Transcript of Fairness Hearing ("Tr."), Mar. 2, 1999 at Joint Appendix (JA) 388 (Mr. Bowens); 493 (Mr. Cooper). They also maintained that insufficient information had been exchanged during the discovery period leading up to the settlement. . . .
Following the hearing, the district court suggested fourteen changes to the proposed consent decree, including modifying paragraph 19 to require USDA to use its best efforts to comply with laws prohibiting discrimination and modifying paragraph 21 to make clear that the district court retained jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree with its contempt power. The class and USDA rejected the first suggestion and adopted the second. The district court then allowed another round of written objections to be filed
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to the revised consent decree. After considering all of the objections and the entire record, the district court approved the proposed consent decree as fair under Rule 23 and ordered that the decree be entered.
Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d at 1215-16 (footnotes omitted).
Shortly after the Court approved the Decree, seven individual putative class members appealed the Court’s order approving the Consent Decree to the court of appeals, arguing that the Decree was unfair in certain respects and should be set aside. Appellants’ arguments were considered and summarily rejected by the court of appeals. See Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’g Pigford v. Glickman 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999). While that appeal was pending, the same seven appellants/movants filed [a motion] asking the [District] Court to reconsider the fairness of the Consent Decree in light of “changed circumstances” which, they argue[d] justify vacating the Decree. . . .
Pigford v. Glickman, 127 F.Supp. 2d 35, 37 (D.D.C. 2001). The motion to reconsider the
fairness of the Consent Decree was denied, see id., and implementation of the Consent Decree
continued unimpeded.
Given the size of the class, disputes about the adjudication and arbitration
processes were bound to arise. Fortunately, the Consent Decree anticipated these problems and
established means to address them:
The Consent Decree provided that the Court would appoint an independent Monitor and that the Monitor would have the authority to direct the facilitator, adjudicator, or arbitrator to reexamine a claim if the Monitor determined that a "clear and manifest error" had occurred and had resulted in, or was likely to result in, a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Consent Decree ¶ 12(b)(iii). The Consent Decree did not provide a time limit
within which a claimant could petition for Monitor review of his or her claim. See id.
To bring finality to the proceedings under the Consent Decree, the parties stipulated on July 14, 2000, that any claimant
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who had already received an adverse decision from the Adjudicator would have 120 days from the date of the Order, until November 13, 2000, to file a petition for Monitor review. See July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order ("Stipulation and Order") at 4. They further stipulated that all claimants who were to receive adjudication decisions after July 14, 2000 would have 120 days from the date of their adverse decision to file a petition for Monitor review. See id. The Stipulation and Order specifically provided that "no extensions of these deadlines will be granted for any reason." Id.
Pigford v. Veneman, 307 F.Supp. 2d 43, 45-46 (D.D.C. 2004) (footnotes omitted).
Less than a year after the denial of the first motion to reconsider the fairness of
the Consent Decree, several pro se members of the plaintiff class filed motions before this Court
to vacate the Decree and remove lead class counsel, arguing that the decision of the court of
appeals in Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2002), proved that the Consent Decree
was “unworkable.” The decision by the court of appeals, however, had focused on problems
with the Track B process, and the court of appeals found that class counsel’s failure to meet
critical deadlines for arbitration of certain individual Track B claims amounted to an “unforeseen
obstacle” that warranted a tailored modification of the Consent Decree to permit the arbitrator to
set new deadlines for both parties in certain Track B cases. See id. at 927. Thus, when later
considering the motion to vacate the Consent Decree and remove class counsel, this Court found
the movants’ reliance on the court of appeals’ decision to be misplaced:
With respect to the motion to vacate the Consent Decree, movants rely on the court of appeals’ statement that the Decree is “unworkable.” See Motion to Vacate Consent Decree at 2. In making that determination, however, the court of appeals was referring only to the tight deadline schedule of the Track B process – since that was the matter before it – although the judgment was influenced by the court’s assessment of counsel’s overall performance when faced with a workload well beyond what anyone could have imagined and counsel’s failure to seek assistance of this Court or other lawyers earlier. See Pigford v.
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Veneman, 292 F.3d at 926-27. The Consent Decree therefore was described as “unworkable” only with respect to the Track B process established by the Consent Decree and the relatively few Track B cases in which crucial deadlines were missed. See id. Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F.Supp. 2d 95, 98 (D.D.C. 2002). Today, slightly more than two years after that decision, certain individual class members once again ask the Court to modify the Consent Decree and remove class counsel. The present motions are significantly more expansive than the 2002 motions, however, and present a dizzying array of grounds for the Court to consider.1 Movants’ complaints can be grouped into two overarching arguments: (1) the Consent Decree was unfair, and (2) implementation of the Decree has been flawed. See Movants’ Reply to Oppositions to Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree (“Mov. Reply (Consent Decree)”) at 4. The first argument raises four primary concerns: (a) the number of objectors to the settlement was discounted by the Court, (b) the award amounts were insufficient and payments have been unduly delayed, (c) necessary forward-looking injunctive relief was not included in the Decree, and (d) notice of the settlement was inadequate. See id. at 5-14. The second argument is comprised substantially of three claims: (a) full recovery by claimants has been thwarted by unwarranted and aggressive opposition by the government, (b) discrimination at the USDA persists, and (c) class counsel has been inadequate. See Mov. Reply (Consent Decree) at 14-21.

1

Whereas previous movants confined their concerns to a handful of issues of particular

concern, movants here assert dozens of claims with no particular priority or order, attaching

more than 100 exhibits – many of which are never referenced in their briefs – and hundreds

of pages of Congressional testimony. The seemingly indiscriminate approach by which

movants have made their case renders it considerably more difficult to discern the bases for

their claims. The Court will attempt to address herein all the clearly articulated claims that

movants have presented.

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The last rationale is further expressed in movants’ motion to disqualify class counsel. In that context, movants assert that class counsel: (a) failed to provide adequate notice to putative class members, (b) agreed to an allegedly deficient settlement and, in doing so, “fail[ed] to follow the demands” of class members, (c) performed poorly and missed crucial deadlines, (d) colluded with defendant regarding a “secret confidential [fee] settlement arrangement,” and (e) refuse to communicate with class members. See Movants’ Motion to Disqualify Class Counsel and Request for Emergency Hearing (“Mov. Mot. (Class Counsel)”) at 3-5, 13-15.
II. DISCUSSION As the history of this case makes clear, the present motions are not the first of their kind. See Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F.Supp. 2d 95 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying motions to vacate Consent Decree and remove lead class counsel); Pigford v. Glickman, 127 F.Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2001) (refusing to vacate Consent Decree in light of alleged “changed circumstances”); Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’g Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999) (upholding fairness of Consent Decree). Nor are the issues that movants raise novel. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 102 (D.D.C. 1999) (notice to class members); Pigford v. Veneman, 208 F.R.D. 21, 23 (D.D.C. 2002) (same); Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 102 (number of objectors); id. at 108-09 (sufficiency of Track A monetary award); id. at 110-12 (forward-looking injunctive relief); Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d at 1215-16 (same); Pigford v. Glickman, 127 F.Supp. 2d at 38 (difficulty of recovery); Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 350 (D.D.C. 1998) (adequacy of class counsel); Pigford v. Glickman, 127 F.Supp. 2d at 38-40 (same); Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d. 918, 921-22 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same); Pigford
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v. Veneman, 217 F.Supp. 2d at 98-100 (same). With this background, it is important to note at the outset that many, if not all, of
the issues raised by movants are foreclosed by this Court’s approval of the Consent Decree after notice and a comprehensive fairness hearing and the entry of a final judgment in this case. See Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212, aff’g Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82.2 Because the Consent Decree operates as a final judgment in the case, see Consent Decree at ¶17, and given the length of time that has passed since it was approved (over five years), movants have limited avenues available for relief.3 Consequently, as the present motions are addressed in turn, particular attention will be paid to whether movants’ claims even qualify for reconsideration.

2

As movants are well aware, the Court gave careful consideration to an analogous set of

issues when it approved the Consent Decree following the March 1999 fairness hearing. See

Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 99-113.

3

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strictly limit reconsideration of final judgments,

particularly when motions to reconsider come so many years after entry of judgment. See FED.

R. CIV. P. 59(e) (“Any motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days

after entry of the judgment.”). After the time limits imposed by the Rules, the Court may relieve

a party from a final judgment only when certain unusual or extraordinary conditions are met.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).

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A. Standing 1. Motion to Modify Consent Decree The issue of movants’ standing to seek modification of the Consent Decree has been raised by defendant and by class counsel. See Defendant’s Opposition (Consent Decree) at 2 n.1; Plaintiffs’ Opposition (Consent Decree) at 2 n.1. The doctrine of “standing” concerns which persons or entities have the right to make a legal claim or present an issue for resolution in court. The issue of the lack of standing of some of the movants has been invoked previously in response to motions to modify the Consent Decree. See, e.g., Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F. Supp.2d at 97 n.1. Because some of the named movants are members of the class, it is conceivable that they could possibly have standing with respect to some of their claims. Since none of them speak for the class or for all of the class members – including Thomas Burrell, who inexplicably suggests in all of his filings that he does – it is highly unlikely, however, that these movants have standing to raise all or even most of their claims. For example, one of the primary grounds for relief posited by movants is that many farmers did not receive adequate notice of the settlement, see Mov. Reply (Consent Decree) at 10-14, but none of the movants actually appears to fall within this category. In fact, many of the movants have been involved in this case since before the terms of the settlement were proposed and the Consent Decree was approved. Thomas Burrell and Eddie Slaughter, for instance, both spoke in opposition to the Consent Decree at the fairness hearing this Court held in March 1999. See Transcript of Fairness Hearing, Mar. 2, 1999 at 105-14 (Burrell), 154-56 (Slaughter). Why neither individual chose to opt out of the class because of his disagreement with the terms of the settlement is unclear. Had they done so, of course, they could have pursued their individual claims as they saw fit. What is clear is that both
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had actual notice of the terms of the Consent Decree and both continue to lodge essentially the same objections they have held since 1999. Indeed, for Mr. Burrell, Mr. Slaughter and another movant, William Miller, this attempt to modify the Consent Decree is their second. See Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F. Supp.2d at 97. The Court understands their determination but suggests that their unwillingness to accept the Court’s rulings – rulings that they are bound by because of their own decisions to remain within the class – is inconsistent with the class action process established by law and thus ultimately and predictably unlikely to bear fruit. These movants have attempted to have it both ways, accepting the benefits of class membership while attacking many of the limits they knew would be imposed upon it.
Furthermore, at least eight of the eleven movants have been claimants under either Track A or Track B of the procedures established by the Consent Decree, some successful and some unsuccessful. Five of the unsuccessful ones have petitions for review pending before the Monitor and thus ultimately may obtain relief under the Consent Decree. See Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike or, in the Alternative, Opposition to Movants’ Motion to Modify Consent Decree at 2 n.1. It follows that they also had notice of the settlement process and the terms of the Consent Decree and chose to play by the rules agreed to rather than exercise their rights to opt out.
2. Motion to Disqualify The motion to remove class counsel names an additional 31 individual African American farmers, an unnamed “approximately 2,700 clients” of James W. Myart, Jr., and the Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association, Inc. (“BFAA”). Neither Mr. Myart’s 2,700 unnamed clients nor the BFAA are properly before the Court. The standing of the individually named movants also is doubtful, as they appear to allege no facts that would demonstrate
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concrete individual injury caused to them personally by class counsel. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (to have standing a movant must allege a concrete injury resulting from the conduct complained of that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the court). While movants who are class members had standing as members of the class to bring their individual claims of discrimination, they chose not to opt out of the class and their claims therefore are governed by the procedures established under the terms of the Consent Decree. And under the Decree’s terms settling the class action, all individual claims, including theirs, have been dismissed with prejudice. See Consent Decree ¶ 17. Since the motion to disqualify class counsel effectively sets forth a new claim, movants must demonstrate separate standing – personal and individual injury to them as a result of class counsel’s conduct – in order to pursue it. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (movant must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought); Lewis v. Gross, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996) (“[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross.”); Blum v. Yaretzky, 457 U.S. 991, 1001-02 (1982) (same); Taylor v. Resolution Trust Corp., 56 F. 3d 1497, 1507-08 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same). This they have failed to do.
B. Motion to Modify the Consent Decree At this stage, over five years after approval of the Consent Decree and entry of final judgment in this case, this Court has a very limited role to play. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit made clear in an earlier decision in this case, “district courts enjoy no free-ranging ‘ancillary’ jurisdiction to enforce consent decrees, but are instead constrained by the terms of the decree and related order.” Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 924. Along with the limited ability to “interpret and enforce a decree to the extent authorized
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either by the decree or by the related order,” district courts “may modify a decree pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5).” Id. at 923. The appeals court recognized these

sources of authority as reflecting the “hybrid character” of consent decrees, which have qualities

of both contracts agreed to by the parties and court orders entered by the court. See id.

Movants here do not contend that the interpretation of the Consent Decree is

flawed. Instead, they ask the Court to reconsider the fairness of the Consent Decree under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Rule 60(b)(5) permits a court “upon such

terms as are just” to "relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order,

or proceeding . . . [if] it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective

application." FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5); see Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367,

378-83 (1992); Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 925; United States v. Western Elec. Co., 46

F.3d 1198, 1202-04; (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying Rufo analysis to request under Rule 60(b)(5) to

modify consent decree). Parties seeking the modification of a consent decree under Rule

60(b)(5) must show a “significant change in circumstances” and “establish that a significant

change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is

suitably tailored to the changed circumstances.” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502

U.S. at 383, 393; see Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 925; NLRB v. Harris Teeter

Supermarkets, 215 F.3d 32, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2000). To succeed on their motion in this case,

therefore, movants must demonstrate that subsequent events or changed facts (1) "make

4

Movants also suggest that the Consent Decree was “unfair and inadequate pursuant to

Rule 23(c) and case law.” Mov. Mot. (Consent Decree) at 3. Defendant notes that movants’

argument “appears to be that the Court ‘abused its discretion’ in approving the Consent Decree

in the first place.” Def. Opp. (Consent Decree) at 6. To the extent that movants assert this

claim, the Court declines to address it. Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212, aff’g Pigford v.

Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, serves as the “law of the case” with respect to all Rule 23

determinations.

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compliance with the decree substantially more onerous"; (2) make the decree "unworkable

because of unforeseen obstacles"; or (3) make "enforcement [of the decree] detrimental to the

public interest." Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. at 384; see NLRB v. Harris

Teeter Supermarkets, 215 F.3d at 35. Movants satisfy none of these three tests.

In their reply brief, movants assert that the “factual circumstances . . . have

changed, dramatically.” Mov. Reply (Consent Decree) at 4. They then attempt to characterize

these changes as falling within all of the categories listed above. They allege, for instance, that

implementation of the Consent Decree has been “fraught with delay and would render further,

documented deprivation of Constitutional rights to . . . class members,” thereby making the

Decree’s continued enforcement “substantially more onerous” to class members and

“unworkable” given the “unforeseen obstacles” causing delay. See id. Movants assert that continued enforcement of the Decree would be “detrimental to the public interest.” See id. at 3.5

Closer scrutiny of the factual circumstances, however, reveals that none of the asserted changes

in circumstances rises to the level of significance necessary to permit revision or modification under Rule 60(b)(5).6

5

Movants argue that the decision by a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the

House of Representatives to conduct hearings that focus on this case is “clear and convincing

evidence of the public’s interest in this matter” and, thus, grounds for applying a flexible

modification standard. Mov. Reply (Consent Decree) at 3 n.2. The Court fully agrees that

Congressional hearings represent a faithful barometer of issues that are of public concern. But

the Supreme Court in Rufo was concerned about “detriment” to the “public interest” in the sense

that it denotes harm to the “public good” from continued enforcement rather than mere

“awareness.” See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. at 384-85. Because

Congressional attention cannot be considered a statement of the public interest in this sense –

legislation fills that role – the argument is unavailing.

6

Movants in their reply brief attempt to clarify their request for relief but, in doing so,

only confuse the matter further. According to their reply brief, they ask only that the Court

“appoint a committee to evaluate the Pigford Consent Decree and report proposed modifications,

or no modifications, to the Court and the parties for their deliberate consideration.” Mov. Rep.

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1. Fairness of the Consent Decree After notice to class members of the proposed settlement of a class action and a fairness hearing where objections are heard, the Court may approve the negotiated and proposed settlement if it finds that it is “fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable” under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.85[1] at 23-347 (3d ed. 2002). This Court set out the relevant factors for its consideration in assessing the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of the settlement more than five years ago, the court of appeals affirmed this Court’s decision, and no “changed circumstances” justify reconsideration now. While movants assert that the Consent Decree is “fundamentally and legally flawed,” see Mov. Mem. (Consent Decree) at 12, none of their claims vary in material respects from the issues that were carefully evaluated by the Court at the time the Decree was approved. Specifically, objections related to the sufficiency of Track A monetary awards, see Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 108-09, lack of forward-looking injunctive relief, see id. at 110-12, and adequacy of notice, see id. at 102, all were considered at the fairness hearing and addressed by this Court
(Consent Decree) at 1-2. Movants’ protestation that they are asking only for a committee to review the Consent Decree is disingenuous. The thrust of their request amounts to a courtordered modification or dissolution of the Consent Decree, as is clear elsewhere in their brief, where movants note that the alleged problems “can only be remedied by meaningful modification of the Consent Decree.” Id. at 23. Even if one were to ignore this contradictory language, however, movants’ characterization of their requested relief is outside the scope of Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the only avenue currently available for relief.
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in its decision approving the proposed settlement agreement.7 Moreover, the validity of these
determinations was upheld by the court of appeals on direct appeal:
[T]here is no doubt that the district court exercised its discretion [to determine the fairness of the consent decree] well within the boundaries of the law. The serious concerns and objections to the proposed consent decree were carefully considered by the district court and balanced against the likely alternatives in a manner reflecting a considered and compassionate conclusion.
Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d at 1219. Given the history of the case, it is difficult to conceive
how these claims can amount to the “significant change[s] in circumstances” required by Rufo.
Nonetheless, in the interests of fairness and finality, the Court will once again address these
issues.
a. Sufficiency of Awards
Movants first assert that the “awards to date are insufficient and unduly delayed.”
Mov. Reply (Consent Decree) at 7. To the extent that this claim encompasses the argument that
the recovered amount is too low, the Court references its earlier decision:
Putting a monetary value on the damage done to someone who has experienced discrimination at the hands of the government obviously is no easy matter, and it is probable that no amount of money can fully compensate class members for past acts of discrimination. It is quite clear, as the objectors point out, that $50,000 is not full compensation in most cases.

7

At best, only one aspect of the present claims – that the number of objectors was

underestimated because organizational leaders were not seen to be speaking on behalf of the

whole of their membership – is even a new argument. Although the Court may not have known

the exact number of members of each organization represented by each leader who testified, the

Court was well aware that in many cases leaders were expressing the views of membership

organizations. Because this claim relies on information known and considered by the Court at

the time the Consent Decree was approved, it is a wholly insufficient ground for the requested

relief.

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To the extent that a specific value can be put on such compensation, however, class counsel have thoroughly researched the issue and provided persuasive evidence that the amount is fair. As class counsel points out, every claimant who prevails under Track A will receive not $50,000 but at least $62,500 (the sum of a $50,000 cash payment plus $12,500 in tax relief). Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 108-09 (internal citations omitted). The Court went on to note that the relief would be significant, especially in view of the fact that a claimant who lacks the detailed records required in a normal civil action to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence need [under the terms of the Consent Decree] only establish his claim by substantial evidence in order to receive that compensation. Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 108-09 (internal citations omitted). “As our court of appeals has said, in considering a proposed class action settlement, the Court must first compare the likely recovery that plaintiffs would have realized if they had gone to trial with the terms of the settlement.” Id. at 103 (citing Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). As this Court noted when approving the Consent Decree in 1999, “most of the members of the class had little in the way of documentation or proof of their claims and likely would have recovered nothing if they were required to prove their cases by the traditional preponderance of the evidence standard.” Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 103. Nothing has changed. Indeed, the fact that thousands of claimants chose Track A and only a handful chose Track B (in which the traditional preponderance standard must be met) only underscores the point. To the extent that movant’s claim involves concerns not just about the amount of the awards, but also about the length of the claims process and other delays in the receipt of payment, movants aver no facts to support their argument. While movants note that “[o]nce an award is challenged, the class member must wait until the decision is reviewed,” Mov. Reply
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(Consent Decree) at 7, they nowhere indicate that this is a common circumstance. The Court notes that the government has challenged awards by filing petitions for Monitor review with respect to the claims of only 687 of the more than 13,000 successful claimants – only 5% of the cases. See Testimony Submitted by the Monitor, Randi Ilyse Roth, to the Constitution Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on September 28, 2004 (“Roth Testimony”) at Appendix 1, Chart 1. Although the Court understands movants’ frustration with respect to delays in the petition process, it is well-documented that the process itself ultimately benefits claimants. See id. (55% of losing claimants file petitions for Monitor review, and in 50% of those cases, the Monitor has directed reexamination). This is a complex and detailed process, and the Court is confident that both the parties and the neutrals are expending every effort to see that it moves as quickly and smoothly as possible.
b. Lack of Injunctive Relief Movants also reiterate the previous objection of certain class members that muchneeded injunctive relief was not included in the Consent Decree. See Mov. Reply (Consent Decree) at 8-9. Movants contend that this objection is now relevant to demonstrate “changed circumstances” because “[s]uch fears of continued discrimination have been realized through the actions and/or omissions of Defendant and the DOJ attorneys during implementation of the Consent Decree.” Id. at 9. Again, however, the Court finds this post hoc justification unavailing. Plaintiffs did not request an injunction in their Seventh Amended Complaint and did not allege any constitutional violation in their complaint that would have supported such relief. The Court therefore determined at the time it approved the settlement that such relief was either outside the scope of the complaint filed in this case or unavailable in view of the violations
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alleged . See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 110-11 (“The Court cannot reject the Consent Decree merely because it does not provide relief for some other hypothetical case that plaintiffs could have but did not bring.”).
Furthermore, the Court finds no basis for movants’ incongruous statement that “the existing Constitutional and statutory law . . . does not [] prohibit the [USDA] from discriminating and retaliating against class members.” Mov. Mot. (Consent Decree) at 31. As the Court repeatedly has recognized, “the USDA is not above the law.” Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 111. In fact, considerable safeguards are in place to protect against discrimination and, when it occurs, provide for relief:
Whether or not the government explicitly states it in this Consent Decree, . . . the Constitution and laws of the United States continue to forbid discrimination on the basis of race, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; 15 U.S.C. § 1691; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, as do the regulations of the USDA. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.1, 15.51. Id. at 112. If movants believe that the USDA continues to violate the law, they are encouraged to bring forward evidence to the relevant authorities in the two political branches of the government or, if appropriate, file a new lawsuit alleging discrimination. The present motions are not the appropriate vehicles for such complaints.
c. Adequacy of Notice The final claim with respect to the fairness of the Consent Decree involves notice. Movants repeat their contention that the Consent Decree did not provide adequate notice to putative class members. See Mov. Reply (Consent Decree) at 9-14. They support this assertion with allegations that “nearly 80,000 black farmers” were not included in the lawsuit, see id. at 2-3, and that “it is undisputed that two-thirds of the class did not receive notice.” Id. at 4.
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Although both statements are demonstrably false, the fact remains that while more than half of the late-filing applicants acknowledged that they did in fact have notice, a large number of African American farmers filed late claims and cited lack of notice as the primary reason for their failure to file on time. See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Supplemental Testimony of Michael Lewis, Hearing Record at 1598 (noting that 28,854 of 64,006 petitions for leave to file late claims specified lack of knowledge as the primary reason for missing the deadline, while half conceded that they had notice). The Court shares the concern of movants about the fate of these farmers, who, because they failed to file on time, may be barred from entering the adjudication or arbitration process to prove their claims of discrimination. No matter how harsh it may appear, however, this result is unavoidable under the law governing class action litigation and the negotiated terms of the Consent Decree.
Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all members of a class are bound by the judgment entered in the action unless they make a timely election for exclusion, socalled “opting out.” See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 379 (1996). For class members who fail to opt out, however, any final judgment or settlement binds all class members, precluding any claims they may wish to assert individually. Thus, all African American farmers who fall within the definition of the Pigford class are bound by the terms of the Consent Decree unless they opted out in a timely fashion. See Consent Decree ¶ 2. These farmers cannot bring a similar lawsuit regarding the same time period in another court or claim that the Consent Decree’s provisions do not apply to them. Under the law, that simply is the way class actions work. See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.11 at 23-53 (3d ed. 2002) (“A class member who does not opt out [prior to the entry of a final judgment] may challenge the
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judgment only by filing objections with the district court or, in appropriate circumstances, by appealing a final judgment or an order approving a settlement.”). Given these serious consequences of class action litigation, due process concerns would arise if notice were not required and an opportunity to opt out not afforded. See In re Veneman, 309 F.3d 789, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Because members of a class seeking substantial monetary damages may have divergent interests, due process requires that putative class members receive notice and an opportunity to opt out.”). The standard for providing notice therefore is correspondingly high.
“When a class is certified and a settlement is proposed, the parties are required to provide class members with the ‘best notice practicable under the circumstances.’” Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 101 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)). If all (or most) class members can be individually identified and located, courts will require that individual notice be sent via mail or other direct means. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 155, 174-75 (1974); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (the “best notice practicable” includes “individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”). When all class members cannot be identified, however, practical issues of effectuating notice arise and other methods, such as publication in newspapers or periodicals, are deemed sufficient. See, e.g., Reppert v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., Inc., 359 F.3d 53, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding notice provided through ads published in 33 newspapers of general circulation); 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22:85 (4th ed.) (noting that “courts have usually required a combination of first-class mailed notice to the identifiable members and publication in one or more newspapers” when difficulties arise locating all putative class members). See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §§ 21.311, 21.312 (4th ed. 2004). Whether class members are provided notice through direct or indirect means, the consequence remains the same: “[I]f the absent class members fail to opt out
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of the class action, [they] will be bound by the court’s action, including settlement and judgment,

even though those individuals never actually received notice.” Reppert v. Marvin Lumber &

Cedar Co., Inc., 359 F.3d at 56-57 (emphasis added). Thus, it is particularly important that

efforts to notify absent class members be the “best notice practicable under the circumstances.”

Notice in this case has been “more than adequate.” Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 101. The Court came to that conclusion in 1999 and stands by it today.8 The record is

clear that, under the prevailing standards, “the timing and breadth of notice [were] sufficient

under Rule 23.” Id. at 102. Indeed, the efforts made to notify class members were extensive.

“The parties . . . exerted extraordinary efforts to reach class members through a massive

advertising campaign in general circulation and African American targeted publications and

radio and television stations.” Id.

Within ten days after the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree, the facilitator mailed a copy of the Notice of Class Certification and Proposed Class Settlement to all thenknown members of the class. The facilitator also arranged a print notification program with one-quarter page advertisements in 26 general circulation newspapers for January 21, 1999, and in 100

8

As stated above, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212, aff’g

Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, serves as the “law of the case” with respect to all Rule 23

determinations. Moreover, to find notice inadequate at this stage, under the guise of Rule

60(b)(5) and “changed circumstances,” would undermine this and potentially all future class

action settlement negotiations:

A too liberal application of Rule 60(b) in class actions would undermine the finality of judgments entered therein and would discourage settlement of such actions. Defendants will be loath to offer substantial sums of money in compromise settlement of class actions unless they can rely on the notice provisions of Rule 23 to bind class members.

4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:63 (4th ed.). This result would be doubly true were the Court today to find wanting the extensive efforts of the parties to notify a large and scattered class more than five years after the fact.

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African-American newspapers between January 13, 1999 and January 27, 1999. . . . The facilitator also arranged to have a full page advertisement announcing the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing placed in the editions of TV Guide that were distributed in an 18state region, and a half page advertisement in the national edition of Jet Magazine. In addition, the facilitator aired 44 commercials announcing the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing on the Black Entertainment Network and aired 18 similar commercials on the Cable News Network over the course of a two-week period. The facilitator estimates that on average, the print and television notice campaign "reached 87 percent of African-American farm operators, managers or others in farm-related industries, an average frequency of 2.4 times."

Id. at 92 (internal citations omitted).

These efforts continued after the Consent Decree was approved. More than 200

informational meetings were held around the country in the regions with the highest

concentrations of class members, and the facilitator fielded 96,000 telephone calls before the cut-

off date. See Class Counsel’s Surreply to Reply in Support of Motion to Disqualify Class

Counsel, Exh. 2, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee of the

Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Supplemental Testimony of Jeanne Finegan (“Finegan

Testimony”) at 9. “Prior to the claims filing deadline, a total of 52,736 claims packages and 192,277 Schedules of Meetings were distributed.” Id. at 6.9 Additional media coverage

supplemented the notice program, including a segment regarding the case that aired on the CBS

news program “60 Minutes” and reached 1.15 million African American television viewers over

the age of 25. See id. at 8 n.16. While hindsight may provide insights as to missed

9

Although 52,736 claim packages were distributed, only approximately 22,000 farmers

filed eligible claims within the announced time frame. See Testimony Submitted by the

Monitor, Randi Ilyse Roth, to the Constitution Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee

on September 28, 2004 at 4.

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In April 1999, this Court determined that the settlement in this case was fair, reasonable and adequate. It reaffirms that judgment today. As a result, there are more than 13,500 farmers who have received monetary relief. As Mr. Chestnut described it: "This settlement is not perfect, [but] nobody will devise a settlement better than this one which will give money to as many people as quickly as this one." Transcript of Fairness Hearing, Mar. 2, 1999 at 174.
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2. Implementation of the Consent Decree Implementation of the Consent Decree, while a complex process, has not generated any changes in factual circumstances on which the Court could base relief under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rufo analysis focuses on the facts that existed at the time the decree was approved rather than on the opinions or predictions of certain class members regarding how those facts likely would play out. See Thompson v. HUD, 220 F.3d 241, 247 (4th Cir. 2000). Most of movants’ claims fail because they ignore this temporal distinction. For instance, movants assert that full recovery by claimants has been thwarted by unwarranted and overly aggressive opposition by the government. See Mov. Reply (Consent Decree) at 14-16. They imply that the Consent Decree contemplated a particular rate of recovery and that this rate was not achieved in the Track A process. This objection ignores the terms of the Consent Decree or, at least, emphasizes the “purpose” of the settlement above the specific terms agreed upon to further it. The parties bargained for a process, not an outcome. See Consent Decree ¶¶ 5-10. While movants may argue that the arbitrations resemble “a full scale litigation battle,” see Mov. Reply (Consent Decree) at 15, nowhere do they state how the process as it currently operates is either inconsistent with the negotiated terms of the Consent Decree or amounts to a significant change in facts that fits any of the three categories in Rufo. Thus, it cannot be grounds for relief. Similar problems plague movants’ next claim regarding implementation, that discrimination at the USDA persists. While the behavior of the USDA certainly served as the foundation for the complaints in this case, the Consent Decree did not vest the Court with permanent oversight over USDA’s actions and continued compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act or other civil rights laws. Nor was the likelihood of continued discrimination a
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factual basis for decision that might be subject to changed circumstances. Any allegation of present violations would be beyond the scope of this case, as the Court recognized when it approved the decree: “The Court cannot guarantee class members that they will never experience discrimination at the hands of the USDA again, and the Consent Decree does not purport to make such a guarantee.” Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 111. This is not to say that the USDA is above the law. As noted earlier, if movants believe that the USDA has violated the law, they are encouraged to assert their claims in the proper forum.10
Movants’ final attempt at relief rests on the theory that class counsel’s actions during the implementation phase constituted “ineffective assistance of counsel.” See Mov. Mem. (Consent Decree) at 39-41 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). Not only does this argument rely on a line of criminal law cases regarding the Sixth Amendment that is wholly inapplicable in this context, but it also fails to provide any basis for the Court to grant modification at this time. The mistakes of class counsel following the entry of a negotiated Consent Decree settling a class action cannot justify vacating the settlement itself. This conclusion was articulated by the Court in response to an earlier motion asserting similar claims. See Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F.Supp. 2d at 99 (“Class Counsel's failings in handling certain matters after entry of the Consent Decree cannot provide a basis for vacating the Consent Decree.”).
10 Movants’ request for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Agriculture to enforce civil rights laws is denied on similar grounds. To the extent that movants believe the Secretary has failed to uphold the terms of the Consent Decree, paragraph 13 of the Consent Decree provides an avenue for enforcement. Any other grounds for an issuance of the writ is beyond the scope of this case.
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While movants allege a litany of mistakes by class counsel other than those raised two years ago, the Court’s previous discussion of class counsel’s performance applies with equal force today:
Class Counsel ably litigated the case throughout its early stages, and they negotiated and entered into a fair settlement for the class as a whole. Indeed, this Court has noted just how remarkable Class Counsel's performance was at those early stages in vigorously litigating this case to the brink of trial and negotiating a landmark settlement with the government. See [Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001] ("Class Counsel have earned accolades of acclaim for their efforts in initiating this case, litigating it to the verge of trial, and then negotiating a truly historic settlement with the government."). To the extent that the Court has been justifiably critical of Class Counsel, its concerns have related only to counsel's handling of the implementation process after entry of the Consent Decree. Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 99 (emphasis in original). Therefore, as with movants’ other claims regarding the post-Consent Decree implementation process, the allegations proffered by movants that class counsel served the plaintiff class inadequately cannot amount to changed circumstances. Because nothing about the implementation of the Consent Decree has been shown to make compliance substantially more onerous, create an undue burden, or make enforcement of the decree detrimental to the public interest, the movants have not met their burden under Rule 60(b)(5) and Rufo.
3. Consequences of Modifying the Consent Decree Finally, movants fail realistically to confront the consequences of this Court granting their motion to modify the Consent Decree. Since the settlement and its terms would not exist if the Court modified the Decree as proposed by movants, the 13,500 African American farmers who have received a total of $830 million would have to return the money, and there is
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no guarantee that the government would again agree to settle the case on terms as favorable. As this Court noted when faced with a similar motion two years ago,“to vacate the Consent Decree would nullify the settlement of this case [and] undo the substantial progress that has been made for so many African-American farmers in the long five years since this case was filed.” Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F.Supp at 98. “To vacate the Consent Decree also would require that every dollar already paid out to African-American farmers, whether in cash awards or in the form of debt relief or tax relief, be returned to the government.” Id. These concerns are amplified today.
To date, more than $830 million of relief has gone to approximately 13,500 families of African American farmers. See National Statistics Regarding Pigford v. Veneman Track A Implementation as of December 27, 2004 available at http://www.pigfordmonitor.org/stats/. This Court believed in 2002, and continues to believe today, that “[r]equiring these families to pay back the considerable sums that they received would be an extreme, unwarranted remedy that would bring great hardship to thousands of members of the class.” Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F.Supp. 2d at 98.
Movants claim in their reply brief that these drastic implications need not arise from a decision vacating the Consent Decree. See Mov. Reply (Consent Decree) at 16. Calling arguments about returning previously-awarded benefits a “red herring” meant to dissuade the Court from fairly considering their motion, movants state that “[t]here is no rigid requirement that the Court set aside all findings and awards that have occurred and been received to date.” Id. at 16-17. Instead, movants offer a cryptic solution:
[A]dditional protections could be added to the existing guidelines governing the Monitor and the Adjudicator regarding timetables for completion of appeals and to permit, where necessary, limited
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discovery by class members to obtain information necessary to submit their claim. The modification order can grant the government a credit for any benefits already provided to class members. Id. at 17. While the Court does not entirely understand movants’ proposal for “grant[ing] the government a credit,” it is sufficiently clear that their argument is untenable and without any basis in law. Movants provide no case law to support the notion, for instance, that discovery could be unilateral, or that the Court can impose its own guidelines on the Monitor or the Adjudicator outside the terms of the Consent Decree. Nor do movants suggest that the defendant would ever agree to such modifications. Furthermore, movants end their discussion on this point by stating that their motion “is not a request for a finding that Defendant should not have paid successful class members,” because the adjudication process already has led to a finding of discrimination in those cases. Id. In essence, then, movants are willing to accept the Consent Decree where plaintiffs have benefited from it but seek modifications elsewhere. This attitude not only has been rejected explicitly by the court of appeals in this very case as contrary to the contractual aspect of consent decrees, whereby both sides must receive the benefit of their bargain. See Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 923-25.
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C. Motion to Disqualify Class Counsel
Even if any of the movants had standing to raise the issue of disqualification,
removal of class counsel at this late stage of the proceedings would be an extreme and
unwarranted action. See Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F.Supp. 2d at 99. Notwithstanding its
gravity, movants’ present motion marks the second time that the Court has been asked to take
such a step. See id. at 97. Movants here allege that lead class counsel (1) failed to ensure that
adequate notice was provided to putative class members, (2) agreed to an allegedly deficient
Consent Decree against the wishes of class members, (3) performed poorly and missed crucial
deadlines, (4) colluded with defendant regarding a “secret [fee] arrangement,” and (5) refuse to
communicate with certain class members. See Mov. Reply (Class Counsel) at 3-5, 13-15. While
movants assert a litany of facts that they contend amount to new grounds for disqualification, the Court finds none of their arguments persuasive. 11
In making this determination, the Court relies on its reasoning in response to the
previous motion to remove class counsel, brought more than two years ago:
Removal of counsel would be appropriate only if the Court were to find that it was absolutely necessary to preserve the integrity of the adversary process, as, for example, where an attorney's conflict of interest undermines the Court's confidence in the vigor of the attorney's representation of his or her client, or where the attorney is in a position to use privileged information concerning the other side as a result of prior representation. See Board of Education of the City of New York v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d
11 Movants again assert numerous vague claims with no particular priority or order. In one section of their brief, they list 23 “allegations of misconduct and disciplinary violations,” see Mov. Mot. (Class Counsel) at 3-5, while in another they include 24 “actions and/or omissions . . . to the detriment to [sic] class members.” Id. at 13-15. The indefinite nature of many of these allegations, coupled with claims that duplicate issues raised in the motion to modify the Consent Decree, substantially reduces the number of issues before the Court here. To the extent that movants raise cognizable claims related to class counsel’s performance, the Court will attempt to address them in this discussion.
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1241, 1246 (2d Cir.1979); see also Koller ex rel. Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1055-56 (D.C.Cir.1984), vacated on other grounds, 472 U.S. 424, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985); Ackerman v. National Property Analysts, Inc., 1993 WL 258679 (S.D.N.Y.1993). Here, movants have presented no evidence of a conflict of interest or the potential misuse of privileged information by Class Counsel. Furthermore, the Court sees nothing that would be gained by the removal of Class Counsel now since this case already has reached the advanced stages of settlement implementation. See In re Barnett, 97 F.3d 181, 184 (7th Cir.1996) (removal of class counsel improper where trial was almost concluded and nothing would be gained from expelling attorneys).
Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F.Supp. 2d at 99-100.
While movants here allege some forms of asserted misconduct not before the
Court in 2002, none of the present claims undermine the Court’s rationale for maintaining the
status of lead class counsel. Indeed, the Court recognized the success class counsel has achieved
and emphasized the appropriateness of their continued role in this case.
The efforts of Class Counsel have resulted in relief for thousands of African-American farmers. Although final decisions and awards have been made in thousands of individual claims, many claims remain to be finally determined and Class Counsel continues to make important contributions. None of the mistakes in the implementation process that have come to the attention of this Court and been discussed by the court of appeals warrants the removal of Class Counsel in the midst of the Consent Decree implementation process.
Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 100. The Court believes these grounds remain
compelling. The Court nonetheless will address the specific claims made by movants here.
In many respects, movants’ claims against class counsel track arguments they put
forth in the context of their motion to modify the consent decree. These arguments consequently
fail for the same reasons. Movants assert, for instance, that class counsel should be removed
because they supported a notice program that failed to inform a large number of putative class
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members about the settlement. Because the Court already has discussed why it continues to believe that notice was adequate, class counsel’s support for the notice program in no way impugns their competence. Movants’ claim with respect to poor performance and missed deadlines is important; the Court is acutely aware, however, of the difficulties class counsel encountered in the petitions process and, where appropriate, has taken measures to deal with them. See e.g. Pigford v. Veneman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2004) (ordering class counsel to pay fines in connection with missed deadlines in petitions process); Pigford v. Veneman, 144 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2001) (announcing schedule of fines). Although admittedly troubling, the Court reiterates its view that this conduct does not warrant the removal of class counsel, particularly at this late stage in the case.
Movants also argue that class counsel should be disqualified because of their failure, in many cases, to identify a similarly situated white farmer to prove the class members’ claims of discrimination. This issue is not new. In declining to vacate the Consent Decree in 2001, the Court stated:
With respect to movants’ argument that the Consent Decree should be vacated because Class Counsel has been unable to assist a sufficient number of claimants to identify a similarly-situated white farmer (which is critical to success in a Track A claim), the Court again finds that movants’ assertion, even if true, does not make the Consent Decree unfair. Pigford v. Veneman, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 39 (refusing to vacate the Consent Decree). Although the Court went on to explain at that time that it was not possible to know how many of these claimants would ultimately prevail on their petitions to the Monitor, see id., the Court now notes that the success rate on petitions for review by the Monitor is approximately 50%, see Roth Testimony at 5, thus demonstrating that many of the farmers whose Track A claims were denied
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initially are ultimately prevailing on their claims.12 Class counsel’s admitted failure “to identify as many similarly situated white farmers as it had anticipated,” see 127 F. Supp. 2d at 39, did not justify vacating the Consent Decree in 2001 and does not justify disqualifying class counsel now.
Movants raise three other claims against class counsel, none of which implicates the continued validity of the Consent Decree. These include failure to heed the desires of class members, collusion with the defendant to hide fees, and refusal to communicate with certain class members. The purported evidence in support of these allegations, however, is unconvincing. In fact, movants’ accusation about a “secret [fee] arrangement” borders on the absurd. Counsel for movants is well aware that the fees received by class counsel are a matter of public record. See e.g., Pigford v. Veneman, 369 F.3d 545 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 921-22; Pigford v. Veneman, 239 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2002). Some were negotiated as part of a fee dispute settlement, others awarded by the Court after requests and responses were filed on the public docket of this Court. Any suggestion of collusion is wholly without foundation. Moreover, no member of the class was harmed by any fee award. Unlike some class actions, this was not a case where there was a finite “pot” of money to be divided among class members or apportioned among successful class members and their counsel. The amount awarded to lawyers in no way affects class members’ recovery.
While the other two claims are less offensive on their face, neither is justified. Class counsel certainly have a duty to represent the class as a whole, but the diversity of membership in class action cases makes unanimity impossible. Consequently, class counsel may
12 When a claimant succeeds on a petition for review to the Monitor, the Monitor will direct reexamination of his or her claim by the adjudicator. Claimants have ultimately prevailed in 90% of the cases in which the Monitor has directed reexamination. See Roth Testimony, Appendix 1, Chart 1.
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well disagree sharply with some members of the class. Still, they must attempt to represent and protect the class as a whole. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.641 (4th ed. 2004) (advising that class counsel is responsible for “protecting the interests of the class as a whole, even in circumstances where the class representatives take a position that counsel consider contrary to the interests of absent class members. . . . [Class counsel] must act in the best interests of the class as a whole."). Class counsel has done this, even though doing so has exposed class counsel to countless personal attacks. As class counsel notes:
The[] real complaint [of movants] is that Class Counsel will not join with them in their effort to rewrite and undo the Consent Decree. On that score, if nothing else, they are correct. Class Counsel will continue to work diligently to fully implement the Consent Decree for the benefit of all class members. Class Counsel’s Surreply to Reply in Support of Motion to Disqualify Class Counsel at 12-13.13 Finally, movants’ claims about class counsel’s communications with class members is anecdotal at best. The overwhelming evidence in the record of this case demonstrates that class counsel has actively sought out, advised, and responded to class members including those dissatisfied with certain aspects of the settlement or the performance of class counsel. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion to Disqualify Class Counsel at 10-11 and Exhibit 3. Because none of movants’ claims warrants the extreme remedy of disqualification after the entry of the Consent Decree, the Court declines to disqualify and remove class counsel.
D. Movants’ Unrealistic Agenda
13 To the extent that movants criticize class counsel for agreeing to a deficient Consent Decree over the wishes of some members of the class, as previously noted, such class members could have opted out but chose not to.
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Both of the motions denied in this Opinion were filed by James Myart, Esquire, Thomas Burrell – on behalf of himself personally, and as President of the Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association – and other African American farmers, most of whom never opted out of the class and who in fact took advantage of the procedures established by the negotiated Consent Decree. In some cases, Mr. Myart and/or Mr. Burrell and some of the other movants have purported to speak for all members of the class or “on behalf of all plaintiffs.” As this Opinion makes clear (if it was not clear before), they do not. See Memorandum Opinion and Order of July 29, 2004. Class counsel speaks for the class. Furthermore, as anyone familiar with the history of this case – as Mr. Myart and Mr. Burrell surely are – and any reasonably sophisticated attorney familiar with Rule 23 (class actions) and Rule 60(b) (relief from final judgment) should have anticipated, these motions to modify or vacate the Consent Decree and to disqualify class counsel could not have succeeded.
By filing these motions and trumpeting their optimism in the press and on the Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association, Inc. website, Mr. Myart and Mr. Burrell have given false hope to thousands of African American farmers. To the extent that these motions were meant to benefit those who did not get notice of the requirements of the Consent Decree or those who sought to file late claims, Mr. Myart should have understood that under the law
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governing class actions, negotiated settlements and finality of judgments, and the constraints under which judges are bound to operate, this was simply the wrong forum in which to seek relief.
Judges are not legislators or policymakers. Their job is to interpret and apply the laws as written by Congress, the rules of procedure adopted by the Supreme Court, and the law and legal precedents announced by the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals. The federal judiciary was intended by the Founders to be the least active branch of the federal government and, correspondingly, it operates under significant constraints – not the least of which are the statutes enacted by Congress, the rules of procedure and legal precedents. Principles of judicial restraint that govern the judicial branch turn on what Professor Wechsler called the application of “neutral principles,” Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14, 16 (1959), and what, more recently, Judge Tatel has referred to as “those principles of judicial methodology that distinguish judging from policymaking” – principles that include stare decisis (following precedent), “faithful[ness] to constitutional and statutory text and to the intent of the drafters,” and appropriate deference to “the policy judgments of Congress and administrative agencies.” David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology, Southern School Desegregation, and the Rule of Law, 79 N.Y.U. L.R. 1071, 1074 (2004). Although faithfulness to these principles sometimes can be frustrating, they also can, as Judge Tatel explained, be “immensely reassuring. . . . Although [judges] have personal views about such questions, we have neither the expertise to resolve them nor the accountability to the electorate for doing so.” Id. at 1075.
These methodological constraints . . . mean that we judges sometimes sustain actions we think make little sense, invalidate programs we like, or apply precedents we believe were wrongly
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decided. . . . In all these cases, though we may have been troubled by the outcomes, we knew that vindicating the rule of law was far more important to our constitutional system than the issues at stake in any particular case. Id. at 1075-76.14 Applying the relevant law, this Court found that the Consent Decree embodied a fair, reasonable and adequate negotiated settlement. Under the Federal Rules and the law of this circuit, this is all the Court could do. The judicial power reaches only so far. Legislatures, however, can take steps that judges cannot. If Congress believes that burdens imposed by the administration of the Consent Decree are unfair, or that a significant number of African American farmers – despite extraordinary efforts to reach them – never received notice, or that the class members who were unsuccessful in their attempts to receive restitution through Track A or Track B deserve compensation, then it surely has means at its disposal to correct these wrongs. Legislative solutions are not unprecedented, see, e.g. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1989 et. seq (Japanese internment reparations); Fla. HB 591 (reparations for Rosewood, Florida families), and the Court is confident that Congress could devise the means to provide relief for these farmers.
14 Justice Ginsburg has referred to the “decisionmaking mores to which legions of federal judges adhere: restraint, economy, prudence, respect for other agencies of decision . . ., reasoned judgment, and, above all, fidelity to law.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Judicial Independence: The Situation of the U.S. Federal Judiciary, Presented at the University of Melbourne Law School (Feb. 1, 2001)
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III. CONCLUSION Forty acres and a mule. The Court invoked that broken promise five years ago when it approved what was then “the largest civil rights settlement in history.” Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 112. At the time, the Court noted that “[h]istorical discrimination cannot be undone” but believed that the Consent Decree “represent[ed] a significant first step” toward undoing its effects. Id. at 112-13. Less than two years later, the Court was able to report that “[i]n the 20 months since that settlement was approved, more than 11,000 African American farmers have filed successful claims for relief and have received monetary compensation and/or debt relief totaling more than $500,000,000.” Pigford v. Glickman, 127 F.Supp. 2d at 40. Today, both the number of successful claimants and the total amount of money awarded have increased, and it is without hesitation that this Court recalls the parties’ belief that the Consent Decree “is a grand, historical first step toward righting the wrongs visited upon thousands of African American farmers.” Id. This praise cannot be repeated, however, without an acknowledgement of the challenges that persist and a recognition that a first step, no matter its value, is only that – a beginning. That the Consent Decree has not solved every problem faced by African American farmers is less an indictment of its terms and implementation than a reflection of the scope of the problem and the limitations of litigation. The task of “assuring that the kind of discrimination that has been visited on African American farmers since Reconstruction will not continue into [this] century” is far from accomplished. Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 85-86. But this beginning remains a bright one, with circumstances no more onerous or conditions changed so much as to dampen the Court’s faith in it. Therefore, because the movants fail to support a Rule
38

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1088 Filed 01/03/05 Page 39 of 39

60(b)(5) claim, their motion to modify the Consent Decree is denied. Similarly, the Court finds no grounds to justify the disqualification and removal of class counsel.
An Order consistent with this Opinion shall issue this same day, SO ORDERED.

DATE:

_______________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

39

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1090 Filed 01/03/05 Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ANN VENEMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

OPINION On December 22, 2004, Mr. James Myart, Esq. filed, on behalf of his client, Mr. Thomas Burrell, a “Notice of Unprofessional Conduct by Michael Sitcov in Connection with Allegations of Department of Justice/Attorney Misconduct in Direct Relation to Class Members Cases and Defendant’s Appeals of Arbitrator Awards.” This is not the first document captioned “Notice” that Mr. Myart has filed in this case, and the Court is less than pleased at counsel’s repeated use of the Court’s docket as a forum for what are, in essence, press releases. This most

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1090 Filed 01/03/05 Page 2 of 11
recent “notice” has crossed a line that the Court will not ignore. Because the Court finds this notice to be unprofessional, harassing and irrelevant to this litigation, the Court will order, sua sponte, that it and another notice filed the following day be stricken from the record.1 The Court will not reach into the past to strike other inappropriate notices that have been filed, but admonishes counsel against the use of such mechanisms in the future in this, or any other, case.2
Mr. Myart’s “notice” appears to complain that Mr. Sitcov will not speak with him on the telephone concerning the recent concerns raised regarding Margaret O’Shea, an individual who participated in the Department of Justice’s work regarding the implementation of the Consent Decree. Mr. Myart claims that “[i]n spite of the urgency of this matter, Mr. Sitcov refuses to communicate with Counsel justifying his refusal to communicate and insistence on hanging up in Counsel’s face.” Notice at 2. As noted, Mr. Myart’s filing is a notice, not a motion requesting relief from the Court. Indeed, the Court notes that Mr. Myart has already filed both a notice to bring the Court’s attention to the matter of Ms. O’Shea 3 and multiple motions on

1

This second “notice” was captioned “Notice of Environmental Working Group

Communication with Assistant Attorney General Peter D. Keisler Regarding Allegations of

Department of Justice/Attorney Misconduct in Direct Relation to Class Members Cases and

Defendants’s Appeals of Arbitrator Awards.” The Court notes that the Environmental Working

Group is not a party in this case nor a movant in the two motions – a motion to modify the

Consent Decree and a motion to disqualify class counsel – decided today by separate Opinion.

2

In view of the separate Opinion issued today denying Mr. Myart’s motions to

modify the Consent Decree and to disqualify class counsel, the Court does not know of any

reason why Mr. Myart or Mr. Burrell will have occasion to file anything further in this case, but

Mr. Myart does have other cases pending before the undersigned and other judges of this Court.

3

See Notice of Allegations of Department of Justice/Attorney Misconduct in Direct

Relation to Class Members Cases and Defendant’s Appeals of Arbitrator Awards filed December

19, 2004.

2

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1090 Filed 01/03/05 Page 3 of 11

the same topic.4 Thus, the “notice”, if it involved only the matter of Ms. O’Shea, at the very least would be redundant.5
The focus of the “notice,” however, is not the matter of Ms. O’Shea, but rather Mr. Sitcov’s refusal to speak with Mr. Myart on the telephone. The Court notes that this is not the first time Mr. Myart has raised this complaint. In a hearing for a temporary restraining order in Bradshaw v. Veneman, Civil Action No. 04-1422, on October 8, 2004, Mr. Myart advanced similar concerns regarding Mr. Sitcov’s alleged failure to communicate. After explaining his reasons for refusing to speak to Mr. Myart over the telephone, including Mr. Myart’s previous suspension from the Texas State Bar, Mr. Sitcov explained:

4

See Motion for Status Conference or Hearing Seeking Inquiry into the Track A

and Track B Cases Handled by Margaret O’Shea and on Allegations of Department of

Justice/Attorney Misconduct in Direct Relation to Class Members Cases and Defendant’s

Appeals of Arbitrator Awards and Other Matters as May be Determined by the Court, filed on

December 20, 2004; Amended Motion for Emergency Status Conference or Hearing Seeking

Inquiry into the Track A and Track B Cases Handled by Margaret O’Shea and on Allegations of

Department of Justice/Attorney Misconduct in Direct Relation to Class Members Cases and

Defendant’s Appeals of Arbitrator Awards and Other Matters as May Be Detrmined [sic] by the

Court and Request for Expedited Ruling, filed on December 23, 2004.

5

As the Court notes, infra at 10-11, documents captioned “notices” like those filed

by Mr. Myart here have no place in this litigation. Furthermore, since class counsel – not Mr.

Myart – represents the class – it was their responsibility or that of the Monitor or the Arbitrator,

not Mr. Myart’s, to bring the matter of Ms. O’Shea to the attention of the government and the

Court. (Any class member, of course, could have brought the matter to the attention of class

counsel.).

Indeed, on December 20, 2004, the very day Mr. Myart filed his motion, co-lead class counsel, Alexander Pires, filed a motion “on behalf of the class” asking the Court to order the Justice Department to undertake an inquiry into each Track A or Track B case handled by Ms. O’Shea in the event the Justice Department did not promptly do so on its own initiative. On December 30, 2004, the Justice Department filed a response to class counsel’s request, describing for the Court the nature of Ms. O’Shea’s involvement in this case and informing the Court that defendant has provided class counsel with the names of the class members whose cases defendant has identified as cases on which Ms. O’Shea worked.

3

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1090 Filed 01/03/05 Page 4 of 11
I have told him that I will accept e-mail from him or letters or faxes. And when it suits his purpose, which is almost every day, he sends me one of his e-mails. But when he wants to create what he views as some sort of issue about me not talking to him, he calls me. Now, I am not lead counsel in any one of these cases. As I think Your Honor is aware by this time, I supervise a practice area that, one little corner is a farm services agency. The practice involves HUD, it involves the V.A., it involves FEMA; it is nationwide in scope. The way our office operates, there are trial attorneys, and the trial attorneys are personally and primarily responsible for litigating those cases.
Mr. Myart knows who the trial attorney on Pigford is. It’s Liza [Goitein]. He has her number. He calls her, she calls him. If he wants to talk to somebody by phone about a motion, he can call her. And when it suits his purpose, he does.
So if he is going to stand up here and lie to you that there is no way for us to communicate, that is simply false. And if he is going to say to you that there is no way for us to communicate other than by e-mail, that’s false as well, because he can call Ms. [Goitein], who is the person that he should call.
In other cases, he calls the lawyers who are assigned to them. There is a case called Williams that’s being handled by Josh Rabinovitz. He regularly calls Mr. Rabinovitz. There’s a fellow named Cowden in the United States Attorney’s Office who is in several cases. Mr. Myart regularly calls Mr. Cowden. So the notion that I am some sort of roadblock is just a lie. And it is in keeping with, and I’m just going to quote now, what, “the Texas Bar found that it was conduct that was deceitful and fraudulent in those proceedings.” And it is deceitful and fraudulent in these.
October 8, 2004 Motions Hearing in Bradshaw v. Veneman, 04-1422 (“Bradshaw Hearing”) at
9-11. Mr. Myart knows that Mr. Sitcov prefers to communicate with him in writing in
connection with this case. This is not a “refusal to communicate.” It is merely a refusal to
communicate by telephone. It is certainly not uncommon, in contentious cases, for prudent
attorneys to prefer that their communication with opposing counsel be memorialized in writing.
4

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1090 Filed 01/03/05 Page 5 of 11

The Court notes that, during that same hearing, Mr. Myart essentially accused Mr.
Sitcov of racism, saying: “[I]f I am being treated any differently than any other lawyer or white
lawyer that he deals with, that I’d consider that to be discriminatory,“ and, later in the hearing,
when handing Mr. Sitcov a document said “yes sir, yes sir” in what Mr. Sitcov described as the
patois of a slave speaking to a master, Bradshaw Hearing at 9, 26, to which Mr. Sitcov
responded: “I don’t have to be treated like dirt privately in e-mail and I don’t have to be treated
as dirt by Mr. Myart here.” Id. at 27.6 In response, the Court, acknowledging the contentious
nature of this case, noted its agreement with Mr. Sitcov on this point, id., and admonished all
counsel to conduct themselves courteously and professionally, stating:
Mr. Myart, you are both, everybody in this case is going to have to conduct themselves professionally. There are a lot of lawsuits where people don’t, lawyers on the other side don’t like each other. There are a lot of lawsuits where there is a history between lawyers on the other side. But they still both have an obligation. All have an obligation to try to act professionally toward each other and try to act professionally in their filings and in the courtroom.
* * *
I just don’t think it is appropriate to, and I heard what you said. I don’t think that was appropriate, the way you addressed Mr. Sitcov just now. There may be other things that are not appropriate, too. You’ve identified some things that you think are inappropriate on his side and things that he has done. As I say, there have been other things as well. This has been a contentious matter for a long time.
* * *

6

The Court notes that this is not the first time that Mr. Myart acted in such an

inappropriate manner. In his Opposed Motion to Deem Pleading Served on Defendant, filed July

29, 2004, Mr. Myart included a copy of e-mail communications between himself and Mr. Sitcov

on July 27, 2004. The first line states: “Myart Response: ‘yas Sir, me’s be gett’in it for ya real

quick Sirrr. I’s soory, Sirrr.” See Opposed Motion to Deem Pleading Served on Defendant at 2.

5

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1090 Filed 01/03/05 Page 6 of 11
But it seems to me that it is the responsibility of the lawyers in the case, and the neutrals in the case, and the professionals in the case to try to keep the level of contentiousness and bad blood down and the level of civility and professionalism up. And I don’t know if that is ever going to be repairable between you, Mr. Myart and you, Mr. Sitcov. And it does not have to be repaired. But people have to act professionally and civilly when they file things in writing and when they say things in Court.
Bradshaw Hearing at 27-31. The hearing ended with the following exchange:
Mr. Myart. Does the Court have any admonition, structure, otherwise any learned advice on how to deal with my phone calls with Mr. Sitcov?
Court: No.
Id. at 71. The Court assumed that its previous admonition would be sufficient. Clearly it has not
been.
Mr. Myart claims to be “at a loss on this insurmountable problem and the Court’s
refusal to address this conduct even after the Court admonished all attorneys regarding
professional conduct toward each other.” Notice at 3. Mr. Myart states that he “has abided by
the Court’s admonishment.” Id. It is clear, however, from the tenor of this and past filings by
Mr. Myart, that this is not so. The e-mail attached to Mr. Myart’s Notice that was directed
towards Mr. Sitcov and copied to multiple members of Congress is undeniably unprofessional in
tone. It states, in part:
SITCOV, It does not matter that you did not respond to my December 19th request for information on the DOJ/O’Shea “debacle.” Ms. Goitien [sic] did not respond either.
Sitcov, it does not matter that you and Ms. Gotien [sic] did not answer my December 20th effort to confer on my most recent motion. . . .
6

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1090 Filed 01/03/05 Page 7 of 11

The e-mail continues in a similar tone, with multiple paragraphs all beginning “Sitcov.” The Court considers the tenor of this e-mail to be entirely unprofessional.7
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that by presenting to the court any "pleading, written motion, or other paper," an attorney "is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," the pleading "is not being filed for an improper purpose, such as to harass . . . and [that] the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support . . . ." FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). The notice and the attached e-mail have been filed for an improper purpose unrelated to this litigation, serving instead to bring opprobrium on a fellow member of the Bar. "[A]busive language toward opposing counsel has no place in documents filed with our courts; the filing of a document containing such language is one form of harassment prohibited by Rule 11.” Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1989), see John G. Koeltl, The Argument for Civility, 23 LITIGATION 66 (Spring 1997) (“Judges are not impressed by papers that hurl epithets against the other side. Memoranda that are personally insulting to an adversary are also often offensive to the Court.”).
The Court has noted in the past, and will reiterate now, that Mr. Sitcov is “an experienced and dedicated Department of Justice attorney and public servant of many years who has devoted nearly six [now seven] years of his professional life to this important case” and that he “always has recognized and respected the basic rights of plaintiffs and their lawyers, without

7

Although this opinion focuses on the most recent filings regarding Mr. Sitcov,

the Court notes that Mr. Myart’s inappropriate “notices” have extended to class counsel as well.

See, e.g. Notice of Client Communication with Class Counsel, filed September 16, 2004

(attaching various letters purporting to fire Mr. Pires).

7

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1090 Filed 01/03/05 Page 8 of 11

regard to their race.” Pigford v. Veneman, 215 F.R.D. 2, 3-4 (D.D.C. 2003). The Court has observed Mr. Sitcov and listened to his arguments and representations in court on scores of occasions and has read thousands of pages that he has either written or whose preparation he has supervised. While his frustration level clearly has risen over the years (and his choice of language in certain filings has reflected that frustration), Mr. Sitcov has appeared always to have acted professionally, honorably and ethically.
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may strike any matter that is "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).8 Although striking filings is generally disfavored as an extreme remedy, a court has "liberal discretion" to strike such filings as it deems appropriate under Rule 12(f). Stanbury Law Firm v. IRS, 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000); see 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.37[1] at 12-93 to 12-94 (3d ed. 2002). The word "scandalous" in Rule 12(f) "generally refers to any allegation that unnecessarily reflects on the moral character of an individual or states anything in repulsive language that detracts from the dignity of the court." 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.37[3] at 12-97; see also In re TheMart.com Inc. Securities Litigation, 114 F. Supp. 2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("scandalous" includes allegations that cast "a cruelly derogatory light on a party or other person"). Mr. Myart’s insinuations "improperly cast[] a derogatory light" on a dedicated government attorney who has done his best to navigate the deep and murky waters of this litigation. 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,

8

Although Rule 12(f) applies by its terms only to "pleadings," courts occasionally

have applied the Rule to filings other than those enumerated in Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 213 F.R.D. 33 (D.D.C. 2003) (considering Rule

12(f) motion to strike plaintiffs' response to defendant's historical accounting plan).

8

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1090 Filed 01/03/05 Page 9 of 11
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1382 (3d ed. 2004). The current accusations, and others, which too often have been contained in superfluous and inappropriate filings, have no place in this Court and will be stricken.
Finally, counsel is reminded that Local Civil Rule 83.8(b)(6)(v) of the Rules of this Court requires all counsel appearing in this forum to familiarize themselves with the D.C. Bar Voluntary Standards for Civility in Professional Conduct, which are included as Appendix D to those Rules. Among other things, the Standards provide that
we [attorneys] will treat all participants in the legal process, including counsel . . . in a civil, professional, and courteous manner, at all times and in all communications, whether oral or written. . . . Except within the bounds of fair argument in pleadings or in formal proceedings, we will abstain from disparaging personal remarks or acrimony toward such participants . . . . We will not bring the profession into disrepute by making unfounded accusations of impropriety or making ad hominem attacks on counsel, and, absent good cause, we will not attribute bad motives or improper conduct to other counsel. . . . We will not degrade the intelligence, ethics, morals, integrity or personal behavior of others, unless such matters are legitimately at issue in the proceeding.
D.C. Bar Voluntary Standards for Civility in Professional Conduct ¶¶ 1, 3, 5, 28. Despite these established principles, the communications among counsel and some of the court filings in this case are not civil, respectful, or professional. Counsel is reminded that it is a privilege to practice law in this Court, not a right, and that the Court’s docket is not a forum for personal attacks. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644-45 (1985) (“The license granted by the court requires members of the bar to conduct themselves in a manner compatible with the role of courts in the administration of justice.”).
9

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1090 Filed 01/03/05 Page 10 of 11
Finally, even outside the context of ad hominem attacks, the flood of “notices” with which Mr. Myart has deluged the Court deserves comment. Many of these notices, including the instant notices, serve no legitimate litigation-related purpose and appear to be a form of grandstanding really addressed to other audiences. There are generally two types of documents that are appropriately filed in a court: pleadings (complaints, answers, counterclaims, etc.) which either state a claim or respond to a claim, and motions (oppositions, responses, etc.) which are used to bring before a court for resolution disputes involving the claims in the case or the procedures to be followed. Although in some limited circumstances it may be appropriate for a party to file a notice with the Court, the purpose of such a filing is not to carry on a conversation with the world at large.9 The Court is a forum for dispute resolution, not a means of disseminating press releases, letters to the two political branches of government (the Congress and the Executive Branch), or postings from the Black Farmers and Agriculturalists, Inc. website. Rarely has the Court encountered filings that constitute a greater waste of the Court’s resources and time or that are as inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the Federal Rules. Cf. Moore v. National Children’s Center, Civil Action No. 96-0118 (PLF) (D.D.C. 1997) (“[C]ounsel seem to have adopted the notion that ‘quantity is quality,’ resulting in this Court . . . being barraged with motions that seemingly articulate each and every spat over which counsel find it necessary to bicker.”).

9

Legitimate “notices” under the Federal Rules include notices of hearing in those

courts where that is the practice (FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d)), notices of removal (28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)),

notices of appeal (FED. R. APP. P. 3), notices of lawsuit (Form 1A to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure), and notices of condemnation (FED. R. CIV. P. 71A(d) and Form 28).

10

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1090 Filed 01/03/05 Page 11 of 11

Mr. Myart should take care in the future to file papers with this Court only to the

extent that they serve a legitimate litigation-related purpose. Should the Court be forced to

expend its time striking inappropriate filings, the Court will seriously consider imposing

sanctions. The Court notes, however, that this same day the Court has issued an Opinion and

Order denying Mr. Myart’s motion to modify the Consent Decree and denying his motion to

disqualify class counsel in this case. Mr. Myart may not, therefore, purport to speak on behalf of

“all plaintiffs” in this litigation anymore, or file documents for “Thomas Burrell, on behalf of all

class members.” Indeed, he never had the right to do so. Class counsel, and only class counsel,

speak on behalf of the class. Should a class member have a concern, that class member may

certainly contact class counsel directly or through counsel; and the Court is confident that class counsel will bring issues to the Court’s attention that may require the Court’s intervention.10

An Order consistent with this Opinion shall issue this same day.

SO ORDERED. DATE:

________________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

10 The Court notes that the “Motion to Enjoin James W. Myart and Thomas Burrell From Disseminating Misleading Communications to Class Members and for other Relief” remains pending. Clearly, should further filings be required by the Court in connection with this motion, Mr. Myart would be permitted to submit briefs on behalf of himself and Mr. Burrell. Since briefing on the motion is already complete, however, the Court is confident that no further briefing will be forthcoming absent Court order. Otherwise, the Court presumes that Mr. Myart’s filings in this case should now be at an end, as will his use for any purpose of the caption in this case.
11

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

EDWARD T. SCHAFER, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,1

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

EDWARD T. SCHAFER, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

OPINION This matter is before the Court on two motions to enforce the Consent Decree governing the settlement of this case. The first motion is brought by class members George Roberts and Ernest and Ruth Banks. The second is brought by the estates of class members

1

The first amended complaint named Daniel Glickman, former Secretary of

Agriculture, as the party defendant. The Court subsequently substituted his successor, Ann

Veneman, and then her successor, Mike Johanns, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The Court now substitutes Edward T. Schafer, Mr. Johanns’ successor,

pursuant to that Rule.

Robert and Jessie Howard.2 Because the two motions raise essentially the same issues, the Court will address them together.3
As discussed more fully below, all plaintiffs are “prevailing class members” and therefore are entitled to the discharge of any debt made eligible for debt relief by the Consent Decree. The question presented is when plaintiffs “incurred” their outstanding debts to the Department of Agriculture. The question is important because the debt relief provisions of the Consent Decree entitle a prevailing class member to the discharge of all debts (1) directly affected by defendant’s discriminatory behavior toward the class member, and (2) all debts subsequently incurred in the same program(s) in which the prevailing class member suffered discrimination. See Pigford v. Veneman, Civil Action No. 97-1978 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2001) (“Debt Relief Stipulation and Order”); MONITOR’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON AMENDED DECISIONS at 16-18 (July 9, 2007), available at http://www.pigfordmonitor.org/ reports/rpt20070709_amenddec.pdf.

2

The instant motion is brought by the Howards’ estates because Mr. Howard died

in 1996 and Mrs. Howard died in 2005.

3

The papers submitted in connection with these motions are: Motion of George

Roberts and Ernest and Ruth Banks to Enforce the Consent Decree [1315] (“Roberts Motion”);

Defendant’s Opposition to Motion to Enforce Consent Decree [1327] (“Roberts Opposition”);

Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Motion of George Roberts and Ernest and Ruth Banks to

Enforce the Consent Decree [1331] (“Roberts Reply”); Motion of the Estates of Robert and

Jessie Howard to Enforce the Consent Decree [1351] (“Howard Motion”); Defendant’s

Opposition to Motion of the Estates of Robert and Jessie Howard to Enforce the Consent Decree

[1355] (“Howard Opposition”); Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to the Motion of the Estates of

Robert and Jessie Howard to Enforce the Consent Decree [1358] (“Howard Reply”); and

plaintiffs Ernest and Ruth Banks’ Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of Motion to Enforce Consent Decree [1431] (“Banks Supplemental Motion”).

2

I. THE COURT’S AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE CONSENT DECREE As an initial matter, it is important to emphasize that “district courts enjoy no
free-ranging ‘ancillary’ [or inherent] jurisdiction to [interpret or] enforce consent decrees.” Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A district court’s power to interpret or enforce a consent decree is necessarily limited by a decree’s “hybrid character,” which includes “qualities of both contracts and court orders.” Id. at 923. Thus, district courts may exercise only two types of authority over consent decrees: “First, they may interpret and enforce a decree to the extent authorized either by the decree or the related order. . . . Second, they may modify a decree pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5).” Id. The Supreme Court has held that a decree modification may be warranted by a “significant change in circumstances.” Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992).
Here, plaintiffs invoke the Court’s power to interpret and enforce the Consent Decree pursuant to paragraphs 13 and 21 of that Decree. Under those provisions, the Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree through contempt proceedings if a party alleges a violation of its terms. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 110 (D.D.C. 1999).4
II. BACKGROUND A. The Consent Decree This Court approved the Consent Decree embodying the class action settlement of the Pigford lawsuit on April 14, 1999. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 113. The

4

The Consent Decree requires the parties to attempt to resolve their differences

without resorting to judicial enforcement procedures, but the Court remains available if the

parties cannot resolve their differences. See Consent Decree ¶ 13.

3

Consent Decree creates a mechanism for resolving individual claims of class members outside the traditional litigation process. See id. at 94. Class members may choose between two claims procedures, known as Track A and Track B. Track A awards $50,000 in monetary damages, debt relief, tax relief, and injunctive relief to those claimants able to meet a minimal burden of proof. See id. at 103. Track A claims are decided by a third-party neutral known as the adjudicator. Track B imposes no cap on damages and also provides for debt relief and injunctive relief. Claimants who choose Track B must prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence in one-day mini-trials before a third-party neutral known as the arbitrator. See id. at 106.
Decisions of the adjudicator and the arbitrator are final, except that the monitor, a court-appointed third-party neutral, may on petition direct the adjudicator and the arbitrator to reexamine claims if the monitor determines that “a clear and manifest error has occurred” that is “likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See Consent Decree ¶¶ 9(a)(v), 9(b)(v), 10(i), 12(b)(iii).
B. Debt Relief Class members who prevail under either Track A or Track B are entitled to certain forms of debt relief in addition to monetary damages, injunctive relief, and, in Track A, tax relief. With respect to prevailing Track A claimants, the Consent Decree provides that [i]n any case in which the adjudicator decides in a class member’s favor, . . . USDA shall discharge all of the class member’s outstanding debt to USDA that was incurred under, or affected by, the program(s) that was/were the subject of the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member’s favor by the adjudicator. Consent Decree ¶ 9(a)(iii)(A). With respect to prevailing Track B claimants, the Consent Decree
4

provides that
[i]f the arbitrator determines that the class member has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the victim of racial discrimination and that he suffered damages therefrom, . . . USDA shall discharge all of the class member’s outstanding debt to the Farm Service Agency that was incurred under, or affected by, the program(s) that were the subject of the claim(s) resolved in the class member’s favor by the arbitrator.
Id. ¶ 10(g)(ii). After the approval of the Consent Decree, the parties entered into a stipulation,
approved by the Court, clarifying the nature and scope of debt relief owed to prevailing
claimants. See Debt Relief Stipulation and Order.
Under the Debt Relief Stipulation, the parties agreed that prevailing class
members are entitled to the discharge of
all debts which were identified by the Adjudicator or the Arbitrator as having been affected by the discrimination. Additionally, such relief includes all debts incurred at the time of, or after, the first event upon which a finding of discrimination is based, except that such relief shall not include: (a) debts that were incurred under FSA programs other than those as to which a specific finding of discrimination was made by the Adjudicator or Arbitrator with respect to the class member . . . ; (b) debts that were incurred by the class member prior to the date of the first event upon which the Adjudicator’s or Arbitrator’s finding of discrimination is based, or (c) debts that were the subject of litigation separate from this action in which there was a final judgment as to which all appeals have been foregone or completed.
Debt Relief Stipulation and Order at 3-4 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
III. MOTIONS TO ENFORCE
Several prevailing Track A claimants have moved to enforce the debt relief
provisions of the Consent Decree as clarified by the Debt Relief Stipulation and Order. They
5

argue that defendant’s view of when a debt is “incurred” is impermissibly narrow and they proffer their own view of when a debt is incurred. For the reasons set forth below, the Court rejects plaintiffs’ view and denies plaintiffs’ motions to enforce.

A. Motion of George Roberts, Ernest Banks and Ruth Banks 1. George Roberts
Class member George Roberts prevailed on his Track A claim in 1999. The adjudicator found that USDA had discriminated against Mr. Roberts by denying him certain loans in 1988. At the time of the adjudicator’s decision, Mr. Roberts had two USDA loans: loan 41-01 and loan 44-02.5 Both of these loans originated in 1982 and were subsequently rescheduled or reamortized through USDA loan servicing programs on four occasions – in 1984, 1986, 1990 and 1997. See Roberts Mot. at 4-5.6
The adjudicator’s original decision did not grant Mr. Roberts any debt relief. See Roberts Mot., Ex. 11, Decision of Adjudicator at 3 (Nov. 12, 1999). Mr. Roberts sought review of the adjudicator’s decision by the monitor. The monitor found that the adjudicator’s failure to acknowledge that Mr. Roberts was entitled to debt relief as outlined by the Debt Relief Stipulation and Order (which had been issued subsequent to the adjudicator’s original decision) constituted a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” see id., Ex. 12, Decision of the Monitor at 5

5

The USDA loans at issue in these motions are coded as follows: Farm Ownership

Loans begin with the number “41”; Emergency Loans begin with the number “43”; and

Operating Loans begin with the number “44.”

6

USDA regulations permit financially distressed and delinquent borrowers to

reschedule or reamortize – that is, restructure – their loans. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 766.101 et seq.

(2007). Such restructuring may include debt consolidation, repayment period extension, interest

capitalization, interest rate revision, or debt forgiveness. See Roberts Opp. at 3-4.

6

(Nov. 27, 2002), and she therefore directed the adjudicator to reexamine his decision. Upon reexamination, the adjudicator issued a revised decision. In that decision, the adjudicator expressly stated that Mr. Roberts was entitled to all debt relief guaranteed by the Debt Relief Stipulation and Order, concluding that
in addition to the relief previously awarded, Claimant shall be relieved of any USDA Farm Ownership and/or Operating Loan debt incurred between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 1996, and shall receive 25% of that debt relief in tax credits. Roberts Mot., Ex. 13, Decision of Adjudicator on Reexamination at 2 (May 16, 2003) (emphasis added). Notably, the revised decision did not specifically direct USDA to discharge loans 41-01 and 44-02, although the former is a Farm Ownership Loan and the latter is an Operating Loan. See Roberts Mot. at 6. Nevertheless, Mr. Roberts takes the position that the adjudicator’s revised decision “ipso facto discharged these debts [because they were] Mr. Roberts’ only outstanding obligations to USDA” at the time of the decision. Roberts Mot. at 6. Defendant has refused to discharge Mr. Roberts’ loans on the ground that they originated prior to 1988, and hence were not “incurred” between January 1988 and December 1996.
2. Ernest and Ruth Banks Class members Ernest and Ruth Banks are also successful Track A claimants. The adjudicator found that the Banks suffered discrimination when USDA processed their Operating Loan applications in a discriminatory manner in 1981 and therefore instructed USDA to discharge all of the Banks’ Operating Loan debt incurred between 1981 and 1985. See Roberts Mot. at 7; id., Ex. 24, Decision of Adjudicator at 2-4 (Aug. 2, 2000). At the time of the
7

adjudicator’s decision, the Banks had four outstanding USDA loans: Emergency Loan 43-19, Emergency Loan 43-20, Emergency Loan 43-22, and Emergency Loan 43-23.7 All of these loans originated before 1981, but were rescheduled in 1991. Like Mr. Roberts, the Banks insisted that the adjudicator’s award required defendant to discharge their loans. Defendant resisted, again arguing that the Banks’ loans were not eligible for discharge because they were not incurred after the date of discrimination.8
B. Motion of the Estates of Robert and Jessie Howard Class members Robert and Jessie Howard were successful Track A claimants. The Howards co-signed promissory notes for several USDA loans in the late 1970s and 1980s. Three of those loans – Emergency Loan 43-07, Emergency Loan 43-10 and Operating Loan 4407 – are at issue here. Those loans originated in 1978 and 1979 and were rescheduled in 1981, 1987 and 1989. In addition, the Howards signed a “shared appreciation agreement” with USDA in 1989. As part of that agreement, USDA agreed to “write down” – that is, forgive – much of the unpaid debt on nine other loans, while reserving the right to recoup some of the unpaid debt

7

Emergency Loans are often sought for operating purposes. Thus, if it can be

determined “that an outstanding [Emergency Loan] clearly was made for operating purposes,”

then USDA may, in some cases, discharge Emergency Loans incurred subsequent to the date of

discrimination even if an adjudicator’s decision identifies only the Operating Loan program, not

the Emergency Loan program, as the program in which a prevailing claimant suffered

discrimination. Roberts Mot., Ex. 25, Information Memo for the Monitor, Memo No. 4 at 2 (date

unknown) (memorandum describing USDA’s criteria for discharging loans).

8

Defendant did discharge the Banks’ Emergency Loan 43-29, which originated in

1981. See Roberts Mot. at 8.

8

should the property securing the loans later increase in value. See Howard Mot. at 7; id., Ex. 1 (shared appreciation agreement and summary of Howard debt transactions).
Mrs. Howard filed a Track A claim on behalf of her husband in 1999. See Howard Mot. at 8. She prevailed on that claim when the adjudicator concluded that Mr. Howard had suffered discrimination beginning in 1981. The adjudicator’s decision directed USDA to discharge all of the Howards’ Operating Loan debts incurred between 1981 and 1987. Mrs. Howard petitioned the monitor for review of the adjudicator’s decision, contending that the award did not discharge “all the debt tainted by the discrimination.” Id. at 9. She also argued that the adjudicator’s decision should have precluded defendant from enforcing the shared appreciation agreement, on the theory that defendant was required to discharge all of the loans on which it was based. Id. at 9-10.
The monitor concluded that the adjudicator’s decision included “clear and manifest error because the record was incomplete regarding the precise type of loan for operating purposes received by [Mr. Howard] during the claim years.” Howard Mot., Ex. 13, Decision of the Monitor at 5-7 (Mar. 31, 2004). The monitor thus instructed the adjudicator to reexamine his decision.
Upon reexamination, the adjudicator clarified the scope of debt relief owed to the Howards. Specifically, the adjudicator concluded that his previous decision was in error because it excluded any Emergency Loans incurred after the date of discrimination and received for operating purposes.9 Thus, the adjudicator concluded that

9

Again, because Emergency Loans are often put to the same uses as Operating

Loans, they may be discharged when it is found that the claimant suffered discrimination within

the Operating Loan program. See supra note 7.

9

in addition to the relief previously awarded, Claimant shall be relieved of all USDA Emergency Loan for operating purposes debt incurred between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996, and all Operating Loan debt incurred between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 1996 . . . .
Howard Mot., Ex. 15, Decision of Adjudicator on Reexamination at 3 (Sept. 9, 2005). Like Mr.
Roberts, the Howard estates take the position that this language ipso facto discharges loans 43-
07, 43-10 and 44-07, because those are the Howards’ only outstanding Operating Loans and
Emergency Loans. Defendant, however, maintains that these loans should not be discharged
because they originated prior to 1981. Defendant also maintains that it can continue to enforce
the shared appreciation agreement with respect to any of the underlying loans which originated
before the date of discrimination.10
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to the discharge of certain debts originated
prior to the date on which they have shown they suffered discrimination, even though the Debt
Relief Stipulation and Order expressly excludes from the scope of debt relief “debts that were
incurred by the class member prior to the date of the first event upon which the Adjudicator’s or
10 Unfortunately, the parties’ papers make it difficult to understand which underlying Operating Loans and Emergency Loans, if any, originated after the applicable dates of discrimination. See Howard Mot. at 11 (“On information and belief, it is understood that [defendant] has determined that at least some of the nine loans written down in 1989 and underlying the agreement are not subject to discharge under the Consent Decree because [defendant] believes them to be just reaffirmations of debts incurred prior to the first discriminatory event.”); id., Ex. 15, Decision of Adjudicator on Reexamination at 2 (Sept. 9, 2005) (observing that defendant represented to the adjudicator that only two of the nine loans underlying the shared appreciation agreement originated after the date of discrimination); Howard Opp. at 4 n.2 (suggesting that defendant believes that none of the loans underlying the shared appreciation agreement originated after the date of discrimination).
10

Arbitrator’s finding of discrimination is based.” Debt Relief Stipulation and Order at 4. Plaintiffs make two arguments in support of this counterintuitive position.
Plaintiffs’ first and primary argument is based on an interpretation of the term “incurred” as it is used in the Consent Decree and Debt Relief Stipulation and Order. Plaintiffs reason that their outstanding debts were “incurred” not only when their loans originated, but also when their loans subsequently were restructured. See Roberts Mot. at 10-12; Howard Mot. at 12-13. According to plaintiffs, their debts were “incurred” when restructured because the promissory notes used to restructure their loans did not merely affirm debts already owed; rather, the new notes created entirely new obligations. See Roberts Mot. at 12; Howard Mot. at 12. See also Roberts Reply at 4 (“The new promissory notes restructuring or reamortizing the original notes are new obligations and not mere renewals or reaffirmations of the original debt.”). Plaintiffs base this conclusion primarily on the fact that when their loans were restructured, the parties did not revise the original promissory notes but rather “executed new instruments with new principal amounts and payment terms subject to a new statute of limitations.” Roberts Mot. at 11; see also Howard Mot. at 12-13. They argue that since a debt is “incurred” when a loan is restructured (at least when a loan is restructured pursuant to a new promissory note), and since the loans at issue were restructured pursuant to new promissory notes after plaintiffs suffered discrimination, the loans should be discharged. See Roberts Mot. at 10-12; see also Howard Mot. at 12-14.
Plaintiffs also rely heavily on the remedial goals expressed in the Consent Decree and the Debt Relief Stipulation and Order. Plaintiffs argue that limiting debt relief to loans originated after the date of discrimination is inconsistent with the purpose of the debt relief
11

feature of the Pigford settlement, which is to “remed[y] consequential harm to a prevailing class
member caused by discrimination.” Debt Relief Stipulation and Order at 2. Plaintiffs claim that
[t]he discriminatory denial of access to timely and appropriate loans has both immediate and ongoing adverse impact upon the farmer. It affects both the amount and type of credit assistance needed in the future. For example, if a farmer is denied a loan one year, the resulting financial distress will adversely impact his current farming operation and will impact his ability to pay-off [sic] any existing debt, forcing him to seek rescheduling or reamortization of that debt. Accordingly, the prospective relief from debt incurred after the discriminatory treatment implements the parties’ intent to “remed[y] the consequential harm . . . caused by discrimination” and requires that farm loan debt, original and rescheduled or reamortized, be covered by the debt relief provisions.
Roberts Mot. at 8-9 (quoting Debt Relief Stipulation and Order at 2). See also Howard Mot. at
13 (“Thus, one ripple effect of the discrimination is the creation of a need to seek rescheduling of
. . . older debt.”).11 In other words, plaintiffs assert that there is a remedial imperative to extend
debt relief to loans restructured after the date of discrimination because defendant’s post-
origination (but pre-restructuring) discrimination likely contributed to plaintiffs’ need to
restructure their loans.12
11 On occasion, plaintiffs suggest that their restructured loans are “tainted” in a more direct way as well – that is, that their loans were actually restructured in a discriminatory manner by USDA officials. See Roberts Reply at 3; Howard Reply at 6.
12 The Howards’ estates also rely on the “internal language” of the restructuring notes executed by the Howards in 1989. Howard Reply at 3. They contend that the language of the 1989 notes transforms the Howards’ restructured loans into debt eligible for debt relief because the 1989 notes refer to the Howards’ 1987 restructuring notes (which were executed after Mr. Howard suffered discrimination) as the “original debt” rescheduled by the 1989 notes. See Howard Mot. at 15-17. Defendant responds that
[c]ontrary to [plaintiffs’] assertion . . . nothing in the language of the 1989 notes suggests that the referenced 1987 notes are the
12

Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ interpretation of the term “incurred” is untenable because it is inconsistent with the clearly expressed intent of the parties as indicated by the plain language of the Consent Decree and the Debt Relief Stipulation and Order. See Howard Opp. at 5 (“A debt ‘originates’ when it is ‘incurred,’ and vice versa. It cannot be the case that [plaintiffs’] debt ‘originated’ before the discriminatory event, yet was ‘incurred’ after.”). In essence, says defendant, the problem with plaintiffs’ understanding of the term “incurred” in the Consent Decree and Debt Relief Stipulation and Order is that “it confuses a debt with a debt instrument.” Roberts Opp. at 11. Defendant acknowledges that it executed new promissory notes with plaintiffs when it restructured plaintiffs’ loans, and that those new notes altered plaintiffs’ loan obligations in a number of ways. See Howard Opp. at 5. But, says defendant, the mere fact that the parties chose to restructure pre-existing debts by executing new promissory notes does not change the fact that at the time those notes were executed, everyone – plaintiffs included – understood that plaintiffs were renewing their original promise to repay on revised terms, not satisfying old obligations or creating new and independent obligations. See Roberts Opp. at 9-11; see also Howard Opp. at 5.
“original loan” or the “original debt” [and thus eligible for debt relief]. . . . Any such inference is refuted by the 1987 notes themselves, which specify that they are being issued to reschedule, not satisfy, the 1981 and 1978 [restructuring] notes . . . ; the 1981 notes, in turn, specify that they are being issued to reschedule, not satisfy, the 1978 and 1979 [original] notes . . . . Taken together, the notes make clear that the [Howards’ original debts] were never satisfied or extinguished [via restructuring], but were simply carried forward from note to note. Howard Opp. at 7-8. The Court agrees.
13

Defendant also takes issue with plaintiffs’ remedial argument. First, defendant contends that discharging a loan that was made before a plaintiff suffered discrimination would not remedy harm flowing from that discrimination. See Roberts Opp. at 14; see also Howard Opp. at 9. Moreover, even assuming that class members were compelled to seek restructuring for a pre-discrimination loan because of the “ripple effects” of discrimination suffered after that loan was made, defendant points out that the Consent Decree and the Debt Relief Stipulation and Order were intended to remedy a discrete set of consequential harms suffered by class members – not all consequential harms suffered by class members. See Roberts Opp. at 15 n.9 (noting other limitations of the debt relief provisions and arguing that while “remedying . . . consequential harm is a characteristic of the debt relief provisions[,] . . . it does not follow that the parties agreed to institute any and all measures that might remedy consequential harm”). The Court agrees with the defendant on both points.
Courts generally apply ordinary principles of contract law when interpreting consent decrees and stipulations. See USX Corp. v. Penn. Cent. Corp., 130 F.3d 562, 566 (3d Cir. 1997) (“A consensual stipulation of the parties is to be interpreted according to the general principles of contract construction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 12 F.3d 225, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“In interpreting the Decree, we apply ordinary principles of contract law.”). When interpreting contracts, “the judicial task . . . is to give effect to the mutual intent of the parties,” and “when the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, a court will assume that the meaning ordinarily ascribed to those words reflects the intention of the parties.” Mesa Air Group, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 87 F.3d 498, 503 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting NRM Corp. v. Hercules, Inc., 758 F.2d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
14

Parties asserting ambiguity must establish that ambiguity by objective evidence. See Mesa Air Group, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 87 F.3d at 503.
Here, plaintiffs have provided no objective evidence that the term “incurred” is ambiguous as it is used in the Consent Decree and Debt Relief Stipulation and Order. See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 270 F.3d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that “mere disagreement among parties as to the meaning of a term [does not] constitute ambiguity”). The Court concludes that the term “incurred” is not ambiguous, and it therefore is to be given its ordinary meaning. As discussed below, plaintiffs’ position is plainly at odds with that ordinary meaning.
The Debt Relief Stipulation and Order indicates that the parties intended by the Consent Decree to discharge loans incurred after the applicable date of discrimination, but not those incurred before the date of discrimination. See Debt Relief Stipulation and Order at 3 (expressly excluding from scope of debt relief “debts that were incurred by the class member prior to the date of the first event upon which a finding of discrimination is based”). Using the ordinary meaning of the word, a class member “incurs” his or her debts when he or she becomes liable to repay those debts. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 768 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “incur” as “[t]o suffer or bring on oneself (a liability or expense)”); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1146 (1993) (defining “incur” as to “become liable or subject to”); 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 835 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “incur” as “to become through one’s own action liable or subject to; to bring upon oneself”). A class member becomes liable to repay those debts when he or she executes the first promissory note memorializing his or her promise to repay – that is, when the debt is originated. Nothing in the Consent Decree or the
15

Debt Relief Stipulation and Order suggests that the parties intended the term “incur” to be interpreted to mean “originate or restructure,” rather than simply “originate.” As the Court’s duty is to give effect to the intent of the parties through a common sense reading of unambiguous terms, see Mesa Air Group, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 87 F.3d at 503, it will not strain to justify plaintiffs’ more creative reading of the word “incurred.”
Plaintiffs object that this interpretation reads into the debt relief provisions of the Consent Decree and Stipulation a limitation that is nowhere expressly stated. They argue that if defendant had wished to exclude from the scope of debt relief loans that were originated before but restructured after the applicable date of discrimination, defendant should have bargained for express language to that effect. See Roberts Reply at 2-4. The answer to this objection is that contracting parties need not – and could not – bargain for language precluding every possible interpretation of contract terms that might be adverse to their interests. Here, the fact that the debt relief provisions fail to specify that a debt is incurred only when it is originated – rather than when it is originated or restructured – does not compel the conclusion that the latter interpretation is more consistent with the intent of the parties. Rather, it indicates that the latter interpretation is so inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the term “incur” that neither party foresaw a need to foreclose it.
Plaintiffs also insist that because they executed new promissory notes as part of their post-discrimination transactions, their loans were effectively “incurred” or “originated” during restructuring. See Roberts Mot. at 10-11; Howard Mot. at 12-13. This view elevates form over substance. At no point were plaintiffs’ original obligations to repay ever forgiven or satisfied; rather, the restructuring transactions merely amended or altered the underlying
16

obligations plaintiffs incurred when they signed their original promissory notes. Cf. supra note 12. Moreover, as plaintiffs themselves acknowledge, the post-discrimination restructuring transactions at issue here were undertaken pursuant to regulations governing servicing for existing loans, not regulations governing new loans. See Roberts Mot. at 9-10; Howard Mot. at 5-6. In light of the parties’ intent – as evidenced by their behavior and a common sense reading of their agreements – the Court concludes that the effect of these restructuring transactions was to “service” plaintiffs’ existing outstanding loans, not to “incur” or “originate” new ones.
Plaintiffs’ remedial argument also is flawed. To begin with, the premise on which plaintiffs rely so heavily – that is, that the goal of debt relief is to “remed[y] consequential harm to a prevailing class member caused by discrimination,” Debt Relief Stipulation and Order at 2 – is in fact not based on one of the terms agreed to in the Debt Relief Stipulation and Order. It is based on predicate language which cannot trump the enforceable terms of the Stipulation. See, e.g., Grynberg v. FERC, 71 F.3d 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (observing that “it is standard contract law that a Whereas clause, while sometimes useful as an aid to interpretation, cannot create any right beyond those arising from the operative terms of the document”) (internal quotation marks omitted). For better or worse, the parties bargained for the terms of the Consent Decree and the Debt Relief Stipulation and Order, and it therefore is those terms which the Court must enforce. As defendant correctly points out, those terms were intended to remedy some, but not all, of the conceivable consequential harms flowing from defendant’s discriminatory behavior. See Roberts Opp. at 15 n.9. The harms that plaintiffs identify fall outside the scope of the remedy provided by the debt relief provisions.
17

That leaves only one loose end to address. As noted above, see supra note 10, it is difficult to tell which loans underlying the Howards’ shared appreciation agreement, if any, originated after defendant discriminated against Mr. Howard. Under the reasoning of this Opinion, defendant is precluded from enforcing the shared appreciation agreement with respect to any Operating Loans or Emergency Loans originated after the applicable dates identified by the adjudicator in his revised decision. Before defendant may demand payment under that agreement, it must provide to the Howards’ estates a clear and comprehensive accounting of which loans underlying the shared appreciation agreement originated after the date of discrimination against Mr. Howard and therefore are not subject to recapture under the shared appreciation agreement. This accounting must also describe, to the satisfaction of both the estates and this Court, how defendant has calculated the amount now owed under the shared appreciation agreement.
Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the Consent Decree and the Debt Relief Stipulation and Order must be rejected because it is inconsistent with the plain meaning of those documents. An Order consistent with this Opinion will issue this same day.

DATE: February 20, 2008

/s/___________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

18

 
 Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1262 Filed 03/23/06 Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

(PLF)

)

MIKE JOHANNS, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

(PLF)

)

MIKE JOHANNS, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

) Civil Action No. 97-1978 ) ) Civil Action No. 98-1693 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This matter comes before the Court on the motion of New Communities, Inc. for extraordinary relief. The movant argues that the circumstances surrounding the arbitration of its claim brought under the Consent Decree necessitate the setting aside of the arbitrator’s decision. The movant asks this Court to vacate the hearing conducted by the arbitrator and
1

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set aside the findings of the arbitrator and instead to enter its own judgment in movant’s favor. In the alternative, movant asks the Court to order a new hearing conducted by an arbitrator assigned by the Court and agreed upon by the plaintiff.

I. BACKGROUND Movant New Communities, Inc.(“New Communities”) filed a Track B claim as permitted under the terms of the Consent Decree in 2000. As provided for in Paragraph 10 of the Consent Decree, an evidentiary hearing on the movant’s claim was held before an arbitrator on July 30, 2002.1 The arbitrator assigned to this hearing was Linda Singer. On October 8, 2002, the arbitrator issued a decision in favor of the USDA. New Communities sought monitor review of the arbitrator’s decision, pursuant to Paragraph 12 (b)(iii) of the Consent Decree on February 3, 2003. In December 2004, subsequent to the hearing before and decision by the arbitrator, all of the parties, including the defendant, learned for the first time that the attorney acting as counsel for defendant in the arbitration – Margaret O’Shea – was alleged in news reports to have lied to her employers, including the government, about her bar status. See Notice of Allegations of

1

Under the Consent Decree, “[t]he term ‘arbitrator’ shall mean Michael K. Lewis . . . and

other person or persons selected by Mr. Lewis who meet qualifications agreed upon by the

parties and by Mr. Lewis and whom Mr. Lewis assigns to decide Track B claims under ¶ 10,

below.” Consent Decree ¶ 1(b). To avoid confusion, this Opinion will refer to Mr. Lewis

exclusively as the “Arbitrator,” capitalized, and any other assigned arbitrator will be referred to

as an “arbitrator” in the lower case.

2

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Department of Justice/Attorney Misconduct [Docket No. 1073]; Motion on Behalf of the Class Seeking an Inquiry into the Track A and Track B Cases Handled by Margaret O’Shea [Docket No. 1075]; Emergency Motion for Hearing [Docket No. 1076]; Emergency Motion for Hearing [Docket No. 1080]; Defendant’s Response to (1) Notice of Allegations of Department of Justice/Attorney Misconduct; (2) Motion on Behalf of the Class Seeking Inquiry into Track A and Track B Cases Handled by Margaret O’Shea; and (3) Motion and Amended Motion for Status Conference or Hearing [Docket No. 1082]; Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Motion on Behalf of the Class Seeking an Inquiry into the Track A and Track B Cases Handled by Margaret O’Shea [Docket No. 1091]. At that time, Ms. O’Shea was no longer an employee of the defendant.
Within three weeks of this matter being brought to the Court’s attention, class counsel confirmed with the Arbitrator that Ms. O’Shea had worked on five of the arbitrated claims, four as counsel for the government in arbitration hearings, as the government reported. Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Motion on Behalf of the Class Seeking an Inquiry into the Track A and Track B Cases Handled by Margaret O’Shea at 2. Apparently satisfied that the issue of Ms. O’Shea’s bar status had no broader implications for the class, class counsel left the matter to individual claimants and their attorneys to address as they saw fit, stating:
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Based upon the report we received from the defendant, we believe the interests of the five individual claimants (all of whom are class members) affected by Ms. O’Shea’s work are currently being protected because we have (1) notified their individual attorneys of the defendant’s report, and (2) inquired of the Arbitrator of any other involvement of Ms. O’Shea in this case, finding the answer in the negative. Should circumstances change, we will immediately inform the Court through an appropriate motion. Id. Since the time that this matter was brought to the Court’s attention, only New Communities has raised any further complaints with this Court regarding Ms. O’Shea.
II. DISCUSSION New Communities moves for this Court to set aside the arbitrator’s October 8, 2002 decision and find for the movant, or, in the alternative, to order a new hearing to be conducted by an arbitrator assigned by the Court. In support of its motion, the movant cites the following: (1) Ms. O’Shea’s status as an unlicensed practitioner of law who may have deceived the government in that respect and the attendant “taint” it threw on the entire process, including the possibility that she could have destroyed evidence; (2) Ms. O’Shea’s insistence that a court reporter talk privately with her during the hearing and her alleged comment to the court reporter during the July 30, 2002 hearing that “I pay your salary”;
4

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(3) speculation that Ms. O’Shea’s comment to the court reporter could have had a negative impact on the arbitrator, Linda Singer, and the credibility of her decision on the claim; (4) the alleged change in demeanor of a witness who testified in the hearing after she spoke to Ms. O’Shea during a break in the hearing. The Court must deny the motion for the reasons discussed below.
The movant does not cite any the authority in law or in the negotiated Consent Decree that would justify granting the relief requested – that is, that the Court render a judgment for the movant or order a new hearing. First, with the agreement of the parties to the class action, this Court has delegated completely the authority to make final decisions on individual claims in this case to the Arbitrator and the Adjudicator. Consent Decree ¶¶ 9(a)(v), 10(i). Second, the parties agreed in the Consent Decree that “except as provided by ¶ 12(b)(iii) [of the Consent Decree]” class members with claims under Track B had “forever waive[d] their right to seek review in any court or before any tribunal of the decision of the arbitrator with respect to any claim that is, or could have been decided, by the arbitrator.” Consent Decree ¶ 10(i). Paragraph 12(b)(iii) provides the mechanism by which the movant could, and has, petitioned for Monitor review of an arbitrator’s decision. Even were the Court inclined to do so, it could not render judgment for the movant or order a new hearing without running afoul of the express terms of the Consent Decree which governs this case. The Court has no
5

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authority under the Decree or under any relevant statute or case law to overturn the carefully crafted process that has been put in place by the Consent Decree.
The facts surrounding Ms. O’Shea’s case are unfortunate and disturbing. A misrepresentation of this sort is, of course, unacceptable and unethical. Class counsel should and appropriately did take note of this serious incident. The fact remains, however, that there exists no evidence other than Ms. O’Shea’s misrepresentation concerning her bar status that she acted unethically during movant’s hearing or in the course of handling movant’s claim, or that movant was in any way prejudiced by her conduct. The totality of the movant’s actual evidence of the asserted unethical behavior (other than Ms. O’Shea’s misrepresentation about her bar status) are (1) a single statement that, while rude, is not significant and not directed at a party to the case, and (2) a reported change in demeanor by one of movant’s own witnesses who has not, apparently, provided movant with any information to support the allegation that Ms. O’Shea had any effect on her testimony. Furthermore, movant has provided no support for its charge that Ms. O’Shea destroyed evidence. These charges hardly undermine the integrity of either this particular arbitration or the entire process under which this case has operated over the course of the seven years since the Consent Decree was entered and under which over dozens of claims have been decided.
6

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1262 Filed 03/23/06 Page 7 of 11
The Court turns now to the particular allegation that Ms. O’Shea’s alleged statement to the court reporter within the hearing of the arbitrator assigned to movant’s claim could somehow have had an impact on arbitrator Linda Singer’s decision in this case. Movant states that the statement “I pay your salary” could have influenced the arbitrator because “the government also pays the salary of the Arbitrator,” going on to say that “[w]e do not intend to impugn the integrity of the Arbitrator, but it is possible that unbiased weight was given to Ms. O’Shea’s representations and arguments.” Mot. ¶ 6. The Court finds this assertion to be pure speculation and baseless; the suggestion that Ms. Singer could have been so influenced lacks credence.
First, the alleged statement in and of itself was not directed at Ms. Singer, but at the court reporter. Second, counsel for the movant reported Ms. O’Shea’s statement to Arbitrator Michael Lewis, who assured her that he did not believe that the assigned arbitrator was affected by the statement. Third, and most importantly, the inference that Ms. O’Shea had any power over the arbitrator’s “salary” is strained, if not absurd, and would hardly have been of concern to an experienced arbitrator like Ms. Singer. The defendant USDA bears the cost of the Arbitrator’s fees and expenses pursuant to the Consent Decree, as it bears the costs and expenses of all of the neutrals assigned to implement the Consent Decree. Consent Decree ¶¶ 3(b) (Facilitator’s fees and expenses borne by the USDA); 9(c) (Adjudicator’s fees
7

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1262 Filed 03/23/06 Page 8 of 11
and expenses borne by the USDA); 10(k) (Arbitrator’s fees and expenses borne by the USDA); 12(a) (Monitor’s fees and expenses borne by the USDA). In fact, the USDA’s obligation to pay the fees and expenses associated with implementing the Consent Decree extends not just to the neutrals in this case, but also to class counsel (who represent the movant here) and other attorneys performing work in the implementation of the Consent Decree. Consent Decree ¶ 14. If movant’s argument is to be credited, then not only the Arbitrator (and his designated arbitrators), but class counsel themselves would be compromised by the fact of these payments. That simply is not the case.
The USDA bears all of these costs as part of the negotiated settlement reached years ago by class counsel. Payment of these costs obviously is a huge benefit to the class, and Ms. O’Shea, as an individual government “attorney” (one among many) assigned to this case, would have had no authority or influence over the payment of these costs – as an arbitrator as intelligent, experienced and sophisticated as Ms. Singer surely understood. The Court has never been given any reason to believe that the USDA’s payment of fees and costs associated with implementing the Consent Decree has ever had an impact on the objectivity of the persons designated by the Court as neutrals or the vigorousness with which class counsel and other attorneys have represented their clients.
8

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1262 Filed 03/23/06 Page 9 of 11
Arbitrator Michael Lewis and the persons he has designated as arbitrators pursuant to his authority in the Consent Decree, including Linda Singer, have done an exemplary job of arbitrating the numerous complex and emotionally fraught claims that have been brought to them over the years in this process. Both Mr. Lewis and Ms. Singer are nationally renowned experts in the alternative dispute resolution field and have decades of experience doing this kind of work. The Court has the utmost confidence in the Arbitrator’s neutrality, thoroughness, and integrity in implementing the Consent Decree and in deciding the Track B claims. The meager evidence on the record before the Court does not shake the Court’s confidence and cannot provide a basis for taking away the authority delegated to Mr. Lewis and his designees by agreement of the parties when they negotiated and – after a Rule 23 Fairness Hearing – the Court approved the settlement and signed the Consent Decree.
Furthermore, by asking the Court itself to review and overturn the arbitrator’s decision, the movant is requesting the Court not only to act in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the Consent Decree and for which it can find no legal authority, but also in a way that would usurp the Monitor’s authority under the Consent Decree. The Monitor and the Monitor alone has the power to review an arbitrator’s decision pursuant to Paragraph 12(b)(iii) of the Consent Decree. She may “[d]irect the facilitator, adjudicator, or arbitrator to reexamine a claim where the Monitor determines that a clear and
9

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1262 Filed 03/23/06 Page 10 of 11
manifest error has occurred in the screening, adjudication, or arbitration of the claim and has resulted or is likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Consent Decree ¶ 12(b)(iii). The movant filed a petition for Monitor review under this process and, as of the time of this motion’s briefing, was still awaiting a response. Other than stating that it had not yet received a decision from the Monitor, the movant provides no particular reason why the Court should circumvent the process set out in the negotiated Consent Decree. This is not a legal or even a logical basis for asking the Court to step in.
The Monitor appointed by the Court in this case, Randi Roth, has established an office of professionals whose primary task is to review and examine decisions that have been petitioned under Paragraph 12(b)(iii) of the Consent Decree. Under Ms. Roth’s leadership, her staff has performed this task in a thorough and conscientious manner that does credit to both the Monitor’s Office and the process established under the Consent Decree. Ms. Roth herself has performed extraordinarily under the pressures of her role, a role which includes not only reviewing Arbitrator and Adjudicator decisions, but also handling “any problems that any class member may have with respect to any aspect of this Consent Decree.” Consent Decree ¶ 12(b)(ii). Over 20,000 persons filed timely claims and an additional 60,000 or more requested permission to file late claims in this case. The mandate, therefore, to deal with “any problems” that arise for “any class member” with respect to
10

Case 1:97-cv-01978-PLF Document 1262 Filed 03/23/06 Page 11 of 11
the Consent Decree created for Ms. Roth the almost Herculean task of reviewing and responding to a huge number of complaints on a wide variety of issues, in addition to her primary task of deciding the petitions for review. Despite the challenges presented in performing all the duties assigned to her, Ms. Roth has demonstrated at every turn an unwavering dedication to her work and an incredible level of competence in carrying out her responsibilities. The Court could not have chosen a better person for the job and continues to have the utmost confidence in Ms. Roth and her staff, including General Counsel Kenneth Saffold and Senior Counsel Stephen Carpenter. The movant has presented no law or facts that would cause this Court to usurp the authority it has delegated to the Monitor. Nor can the Court see why the movant would not want the Monitor’s Office to review its petition, with the expertise and dedication they bring to their work.
For all of these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that movant’s motion for extraordinary relief [1155] is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

_______/s/_________________________

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

DATE: March 23, 2006

United States District Judge

11

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

EDWARD T. SCHAFER, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,1

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

EDWARD T. SCHAFER, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This matter is currently before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Shutts & Bowen’s Petition for Implementation Fees and Its Request for an 80% Enhancement of Its Fee for Representing Teddy Miller, an opposition thereto by petitioner law firm Shutts & Bowen, LLP (hereinafter “Shutts & Bowen”), and defendant’s reply in support of its motion.

1

Petitioner’s initial fee petition named Mike Johanns, former Secretary of

Agriculture, as the party defendant. The Court now substitutes Edward T. Schafer, Mr. Johanns’

successor, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. BACKGROUND This matter first came before the Court on Shutts & Bowen’s motion for an interim award of attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses. See Shutts & Bowen, LLP’s Motion for Interim Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Expenses (June 19, 2006) (“Initial Motion”). After Shutts & Bowen’s initial motion was filed, the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) moved for – and Shutts & Bowen consented to – “bifurcation” of this matter. The parties asked the Court to address two preliminary legal issues raised by Shutts & Bowen’s initial motion before considering the initial motion in its entirety. See Motion to Bifurcate Shutts & Bowen’s Fee Petition at 2. Specifically, the parties asked the Court to decide (1) whether Shutts & Bowen is entitled to any attorneys’ fees or costs for services related to “general implementation” of the Consent Decree governing this case, and (2) whether Shutts & Bowen is entitled to an 80% enhancement of its fees for its work on the successful Track B claim of Teddy D. Miller on the ground that the firm achieved “extraordinary success” for Mr. Miller. The parties represented that, were the Court to decide these two “determinative issues,” they would likely be able to reach a settlement as to the remainder of the issues in the initial motion. Id. In the interest of conserving time, effort and judicial resources, the Court granted the USDA’s unopposed motion to bifurcate and ordered the parties to submit briefs on the two preliminary issues identified above. See Pigford v. Veneman, Civil Action No. 97-1978, Order at 2 (D.D.C. July 5, 2006). The USDA then filed a motion to “dismiss” Shutts & Bowen’s fee petition to the extent that it sought implementation fees and costs and a fee enhancement for the firm’s work on Mr. Miller’s Track B claim. Shutts & Bowen submitted an opposition thereto, and the USDA submitted a brief in support of its motion.
2

II. LETTERS TO THE COURT
On December 4, 2008, counsel for Shutts & Bowen hand-delivered to the
Chambers of the undersigned a letter recounting the procedural history of this matter and
informing the Court that Shutts & Bowen “is eager for a resolution of this matter.” Letter to the
Honorable Paul L. Friedman from Counsel for Shutts & Bowen at 2 (Dec. 4, 2008). On
December 8, 2008, counsel for the USDA responded to the above letter by way of another letter
to Chambers. Among other things, that letter stated that “the parties recently concluded that
those portions of the fee petition that do not involve the bifurcated issues were previously
resolved in a settlement agreement approved by the Court in December 2001.” Letter to the
Honorable Paul L. Friedman from Counsel for the USDA at 1 (Dec. 8, 2008). On December 15,
2008, counsel for Shutts & Bowen submitted yet another letter to Chambers. That letter took
issue with the quoted statement from USDA’s December 8, 2008 letter. Specifically, counsel for
Shutts & Bowen asserted that
the parties have not concluded that those portions of Shutts & Bowen’s Motion for Interim Award [Dkt. 1290] that were not bifurcated by this Court were resolved by a December 2001 settlement. . . . This Court did not bifurcate Shutts & Bowen’s entitlement to an unenhanced fee award for representing Mr. Miller. The December 2001 settlement agreement referenced by the Government [in its December 8, 2008 letter] expressly preserved Shutts & Bowen’s right to seek fees, expenses, and costs for representing Mr. Miller, and the parties have never even discussed the possibility that that settlement instead might have resolved Shutts & Bowen’s claims for such fees.
Letter to the Honorable Paul L. Friedman from Counsel for Shutts & Bowen at 1 (Dec. 15, 2008).
Finally, that same day, counsel for the USDA responded to counsel for Shutts & Bowen’s second
letter. In that letter, counsel for the USDA asserted that
3

[o]n September 30, 2008, petitioner asked if we could settle that portion of the pending fee petition that relates to 24 Track A claims (that do not involve the bifurcated issues). We agreed to, and did, make a settlement offer on those claims – but rescinded the offer when we discovered that those claims had been settled in December 2001. [We also asked] petitioner’s counsel to let us know if he disagreed [with the government’s view of the scope of the December 2001 settlement agreement]. We never heard back.
Petitioner also asked at that time for a settlement offer on the Track B claim of Teddy Miller, which offer we made and remains outstanding. That offer directly involves the bifurcated issue of enhancement and, if accepted, would moot the issue.
Letter to the Honorable Paul L. Friedman from Counsel for the USDA at 1 (Dec. 15, 2008).
As an initial matter, it must be noted that the manner in which the parties have
chosen to communicate with the Court about these issues – that is, through informal letters to
Chambers rather than through formal filings – violates the Local Rules of this Court. See
L. CIV. R. 5.1(b) (“Except when requested by a judge, correspondence shall not be directed by the
parties or their attorneys to a judge, nor shall papers be left with or mailed to a judge for filing.”).
The proper vehicle for seeking relief from the Court, or advising the Court of pertinent
information, is a formal filing. Thus, the Court will order the parties to (1) cease submitting
informal letters to the Court about these or any other issues (unless instructed to do so), and
(2) file their informal letters of December 4, December 8 and December 15, 2008 on the public
docket of this case.
In addition, the Court will order the parties to meet, confer and file a joint report
clarifying certain statements and suggestions contained in their informal letters because, to be
frank, those letters raise more questions than they answer. For example, after reading the parties’
letters, it is unclear to this Court whether one or both of the parties believe that the December
4

2001 settlement agreement referenced therein resolves Shutts & Bowen’s claims for fees and costs for “general implementation” work. This is an important issue. If the parties agree that the December 2001 settlement agreement resolves Shutts & Bowen’s claim for fees and costs incurred while performing “general implementation” work, then the first of the so-called “bifurcated issues” is moot. In addition, it is unclear to the Court whether, at this writing, the parties are actively engaged in negotiations about a settlement of Shutts & Bowen’s claim for fees for its work on the Track B claim of Mr. Miller. Were the parties to settle that claim, of course, then the second of the so-called “bifurcated issues” would be moot. In short, the Court concludes that it would be unwise for it to take any further action in this matter until the parties have addressed the ambiguities identified above and clearly and jointly informed the Court what action (if any) they would like the Court to take at this time. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the parties shall cease submitting informal letters to the Court unless the Court expressly requests such submissions; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall, on or before December 24, 2008, file the four informal letters discussed above on the public docket of this case; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that on or before January 6, 2009, the parties shall meet, confer and file a joint report setting forth their views as to the following questions:
1. Does the December 2001 settlement agreement discussed above resolve Shutts & Bowen’s claim for fees and costs incurred while performing “general implementation” work?
2. The parties’ letters seem to suggest that the December 2001 settlement agreement does not resolve all of Shutts & Bowen’s claims for fees, costs and expenses – that is, all of the fees, costs and expenses sought in Shutts & Bowen’s initial motion. If that is true,
5

precisely which of Shutts & Bowen’s claims fall outside the scope of the December 2001 settlement agreement?
3. Do the parties wish the Court to rule on the issue of Shutts & Bowen’s entitlement to an 80% fee enhancement for its work on the Track B claim of Mr. Miller at the present time, or would the parties first prefer to attempt to reach a negotiated settlement of that particular claim?
4. In any event, do the parties wish to enlist the services of the Court’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, a private mediator, or a magistrate judge to aid in settling any part of Shutts & Bowen’s fee petition?; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall attach to their joint report any and all documents (including any final settlement agreements (not drafts) and relevant Orders of this Court) upon which their responses to the above questions rely – including but not limited to the December 2001 settlement agreement.
SO ORDERED.

DATE: December 19, 2008

/s/___________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

6

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

TOM VILSACK, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,1

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

TOM VILSACK, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

OPINION AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on a motion for attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses by Covington & Burling LLP (“Covington”), counsel for class member Robert E. Holmes, Sr. (“Mot.”); an opposition to Covington’s motion by the United States Department of Agriculture (“Opp.”); Covington’s reply (“Reply”), and USDA’s surreply (“Surreply”).

1

Petitioners initially named Edward T. Schafer, former Secretary of Agriculture, as

the party defendant. The Court now substitutes Tom Vilsack, current Secretary of Agriculture,

pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. BACKGROUND On October 1, 2007, “Mr. Holmes prevailed against the [USDA] in a Track B arbitration, which was conducted pursuant to the Court’s April 14, 1999 consent decree[.]” Mot. at 1-2; see also id., Declaration of Joshua A. Doan, Ex. 1, In Re: Track B Claim of Robert E. Holmes, Sr. (Claim No. 19230, Arb. No. 131) (Oct. 1, 2007) (“Arbitrator’s Decision”).2 The USDA chose not to appeal the arbitrator’s decision, and it became final on January 29, 2008. In the Track B proceeding, Mr. Holmes alleged that the Farmers Home Administration, an agency of the USDA, discriminated against him in the provision and servicing of farm loans on various occasions between 1985 and 1994. Presumably because they

2

The Court approved the Pigford Consent Decree on April 14, 1999. See Pigford

v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 113 (D.D.C. 1999). The Consent Decree

creates a mechanism for resolving individual claims of class members outside the traditional litigation process. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 94 (D.D.C. 1999). Class members may choose between two claims procedures, known as Track A and Track B. Track A awards $50,000 in monetary damages, debt relief, tax relief, and injunctive relief to those claimants able to meet a minimal burden of proof. See id. at 96-97. Track A claims are decided by a third-party neutral known as an adjudicator. Track B imposes no cap on damages and also provides for debt relief and injunctive relief. Claimants who choose Track B must prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence in one-day mini-trials before a third-party neutral known as an arbitrator. See id. at 97. Decisions of the adjudicator and the arbitrator are final, except that the monitor, a court-appointed third-party neutral, may on petition direct the adjudicator and the arbitrator to re-examine claims if the monitor determines that “a clear and manifest error has occurred” that is “likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See id.

Pigford v. Schafer, Civil Action No. 97-1978, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2008).

2

occurred at different times and rested on distinct facts, the arbitrator treated Mr. Holmes’ various allegations of discrimination as eleven discrete claims. The arbitrator found in Mr. Holmes’ favor with respect to some but not all of his claims. Specifically, the arbitrator found in Mr. Holmes’ favor on Claim 1 (“Failure to Provide Limited Resource Interest Rate[] [Loan in] 1985”); Claim 2 (“Delay in Processing 1986 Loan”); Claim 3 (“Delay in Processing 1987 Loan”), Claim 4 (“Delay in Processing the 1988 Loan”); and two of three allegations in Claim 6 (“Denial of Loans and Loan Servicing in 1990”). The arbitrator did not find in Mr. Holmes’ favor on Claim 5 (“Delay in Processing the 1989 Loan and Servicing Request”); one of three allegations in Claim 6; Claim 7 (“Denial of Loans and Loan Servicing in 1991”); Claim 8 (“Denial of Loans and Loan Servicing in 1992”); Claim 9 (“Denial of Loan Servicing in 1993 and 1994”); Claim 10 (“Denial of Loans for Machinery Purposes”); and Claim 11 (“Denial of Farm Ownership Loans”). See Arbitrator’s Decision at 21-33. The arbitrator awarded Mr. Holmes a total of $202,290.87 in actual damages and $100,000 in emotional distress damages. Id. at 36. He also directed that any outstanding loan balances in the Operating Loan program dating from 1985 were to be forgiven. Id.
Covington represented Mr. Holmes throughout the litigation of his Track B claim. The firm now seeks $192,180.93 in attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d) (“ECOA”), and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (“EAJA”).3 The USDA concedes that Mr. Holmes is a prevailing party for fee-

3

Under the ECOA, parties who prosecute “successful action[s]” against the

government are entitled to reasonable fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d). Similarly, under the EAJA,

“prevailing part[ies]” are entitled to reasonable fees – unless the government’s position was

substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412

(d)(1)(A).

3

shifting purposes, and thus that the ECOA and the EAJA entitle Covington to reasonable fees, costs and expenses. See Opp. at 1. The USDA contends, however, that Covington’s fee should be reduced to account for the fact that Mr. Holmes did not prevail on all of his claims. See id.
The USDA’s argument is based on Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), and its progeny. In Hensley, the Supreme Court “defined the conditions under which a plaintiff who prevails on only some of his claims may recover attorney fees” under fee-shifting statutes like the ECOA and the EAJA. George Hyman Construction Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d 1532, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1992).4 In such cases, Hensley prescribes the following two-part inquiry for assessing a plaintiff’s “degree of success,” Goos v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 997 F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and hence the reasonableness of the fees sought:
First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award? Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 434. If the answer to the first question is “yes,” then “no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim[s],” because “[t]he congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties requires that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits[.]” Id. at 435. See also Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (fees should not be awarded for meritless or unsuccessful claims “simply because those unsuccessful claims were brought in a lawsuit that included successful claims”).

4

“Though the Hensley analysis was crafted in the . . . context [of the Civil Rights

Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988], it was explicitly designed by the Court to

apply to all federal statutes limiting fee awards to ‘prevailing part[ies].’” George Hyman

Construction Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d at 1535.

4

If, however, the court finds that a prevailing party’s unsuccessful and successful claims are “interrelated,” then it is instructed “to skip the first Hensley [prong] and move to its second.” George Hyman Construction Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d at 1537. Under Hensley’s second prong, the court must consider “whether the success obtained . . . is proportional to the efforts expended by counsel,” George Hyman Construction Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d at 1535, and then “award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 440. In other words, if the successful and unsuccessful claims “share a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories, then a court should simply compute the appropriate fee as a function of degree of success.” George Hyman Construction Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d at 1537.
The USDA’s principal argument is that Covington’s fee request should be reduced under Hensley’s first prong. Specifically, the USDA contends that Covington is not entitled to fees for its work on Mr. Holmes’ unsuccessful claims because those claims are “unrelated” to Mr. Holmes’ successful claims. See Opp. at 2; see also id. at 11-13. In the alternative, the USDA argues that if the Court disagrees with its principal argument – i.e., if the Court concludes that Mr. Holmes’ claims are “related” under Hensley’s first prong – then Covington’s fee request should be reduced under Hensley’s second prong. The USDA asserts that it would be disproportionate and excessive to award Covington fees for its work on all of Mr. Holmes’ claims when Mr. Holmes prevailed on only some of those claims. See id. at 16-17.
Covington, of course, disagrees on both points. With respect to the first point, Covington argues that Mr. Holmes’ unsuccessful claims were related to his successful claims because all of his claims were formulated as “disparate treatment claims under the Equal Credit
5

Opportunity Act that relied on the McDonnell Douglas framework (because of an absence of direct evidence of racial animus).” Reply at 7; see also id. at 10 (arguing that “Mr. Holmes’ successful and unsuccessful claims were closely related because they were brought using related legal theories under the same statute using the same legal framework and relying on the same type of evidence.”).5 With respect to the second point, Covington argues that it is entitled to the full fee sought because that fee would reasonably compensate the firm for its work on Mr. Holmes’ Track B claim, particularly in light of the excellent results obtained. See id. at 10.
II. SCOPE As an initial matter, the Court will accept the USDA’s invitation to (1) limit its analysis to the first issue raised by the parties – that is, whether Mr. Holmes’ unsuccessful claims are “related” to his successful claims under Hensley’s first prong – and (2) order the parties to attempt to settle this matter in light of the Court’s ruling on that issue. See Opp. at 2, 16; see also Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, Civil Action No. 83-0124, 1988 WL 30760, at *6-7 & n.4 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 1988) (utilizing this approach). Because “[a] request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation,” and “[i]deally . . . litigants will settle the amount of a fee,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437, the Court concludes that it is both wiser and more efficient to give the parties one last chance to resolve this dispute. See Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting the “Supreme Court’s call for [parties to make a] conscientious effort to resolve differences over [fee] awards”).

5

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court

set forth a burden-shifting formula for evaluating claims of discrimination when direct evidence

of discriminatory animus is lacking.

6

III. “RELATEDNESS” OF CLAIMS According to the D.C. Circuit, unsuccessful claims are unrelated to successful claims when the unsuccessful claims are “‘distinctly different’ in all respects, both legal and factual, from the . . . successful claims.” Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d at 1066 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 434) (emphasis added); see also Williams v. First Gov’t Mortgage and Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 746 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (same). Although “there is no certain method of determining when claims are ‘related’ or ‘unrelated,’” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 436 n.12, generally speaking “interrelated claims are those that ‘cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims.’” George Hyman Construction Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d at 1539 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 435). Thus, for example, a plaintiff’s claims may be related if they are brought under different legal theories but are intended to establish the illegality of the same conduct. See Goos v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 997 F.2d at 1569 (concluding that a common law contract claim and a statutory claim were related because “both claims focused on a single, necessary factual issue:” whether plaintiff was dismissed from her job for retaliatory and hence unlawful reasons). But when a plaintiff’s claims “overwhelmingly involve[] distinct legal and factual issues,” then they are unrelated under Hensley’s first prong. Martin v. Lauer, 740 F.2d 36, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Applying these principles, the Court concludes that Mr. Holmes’ unsuccessful claims are unrelated to his successful claims, and that Covington therefore is not entitled to a fee award for work performed on Mr. Holmes’ unsuccessful claims.
7

It is beyond dispute that Mr. Holmes’ unsuccessful claims are factually distinct from his successful claims. As the arbitrator’s 38-page decision illustrates, each of Mr. Holmes’ eleven claims of discrimination were based on different factual allegations, with no discernible factual overlap among claims. Compare, e.g., Arbitrator’s Decision at 21 (discussing Claim 1, based on Mr. Holmes’ allegation that “in 1985, a similarly-situated white farmer . . . received a Limited Resource loan while he did not”) with id. at 30 (discussing Claim 7, based on Mr. Holmes’ allegation that he “applied for and was qualified for an OL loan and servicing in January 1991 but never received the desired funding”). Thus, not surprisingly, Covington does not contend that Mr. Holmes’ unsuccessful claims are factually related to his successful claims. See, e.g., Goos v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 997 F.2d at 1569 (claims were related because they “shared a common core of facts”). Rather, Covington argues that Mr. Holmes’ unsuccessful claims are legally related to his successful claims because all of Mr. Holmes’ claims were based on the same legal argument: that is, that specific actions by the USDA were motivated by racial discrimination in violation of the ECOA. See, e.g., Reply at 7.
This argument has some surface plausibility, but it must be rejected for at least three reasons. First, Covington cites no authority (and the Court has discovered none) which supports its theory that a series of otherwise discrete, easily separable claims are “legally related” simply because they invoke the same legal authority and rely on the same legal standard. Rather, the case law indicates that claims are legally related for Hensley purposes when they require the resolution of identical, interlocking or overlapping legal questions (or mixed questions of law and fact). See, e.g., Williams v. First Gov’t Mortgage and Investors Corp., 225 F.3d at 746 (statutory and common law claims were related because they all required resolution of whether
8

defendant’s sale of insurance to plaintiff was fraudulent); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d at 1066 (claims were related because they all arose from plaintiff’s “central claim that the [defendants] had been deliberately indifferent to [plaintiff’s] eighth amendment rights in connection with the assault [suffered by plaintiff]”).
Mr. Holmes’ claims did not require the resolution of identical, interlocking or overlapping legal questions or mixed questions of law and fact. Instead, each claim required the arbitrator to resolve a unique and distinct legal question: whether Mr. Holmes’ allegations and evidence pertaining to a specific governmental action (for example, the denial of a loan to Mr. Holmes in a particular year), evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas framework, were sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the specific action in question was motivated by discriminatory animus. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d at 803 (claims were unrelated because “petitioners could be granted relief on any one issue without necessarily obtaining their desired relief on any other issue”); Martin v. Lauer, 740 F.2d at 47 (claims under the First Amendment and a whistleblower statute were unrelated because “the legal issues raised by the First Amendment claim were largely distinct from those implicated by the whistleblower claim”); Hawaii Longline Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Svc., Civil Action No. 01-0765, 2004 WL 2239483, at *6 & n.3 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (claims could be “compartmentalized” for Hensley purposes). Thus, Mr. Holmes’ claims are easily “viewed as a series of discrete claims” – both factually and legally – and his unsuccessful claims therefore should be regarded as unrelated to his successful claims. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 435.
9

Second, to accept Covington’s theory would be to severely undermine the purpose and intent of Hensley’s first prong. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, Hensley’s first prong is intended to ensure that “a plaintiff [will] not be able to force his opponent to pay for the legal services involved in bringing groundless claims simply because those unsuccessful claims were brought in a lawsuit that included successful claims.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d at 801. Under Covington’s theory, however, a prevailing party could seek fees for any number of groundless claims so long as those groundless claims were submitted under the same legal authority as the party’s successful claims. In other words, Covington’s theory would permit a prevailing party to seek fees that were not in any cognizable way “premised on successful litigation of a claim,” Trout v. Winter, 464 F. Supp. 2d 25, 30 (D.D.C. 2006) – in direct contravention of Hensley’s first prong.
Third, and relatedly, it would be particularly inappropriate to adopt Covington’s theory in the context of Track B adjudications under the Pigford Consent Decree. As the USDA points out, “only disparate treatment claims under the ECOA can be brought under Track B, and all [or nearly all] are subject to the McDonnell Douglas standard of proof.” Surreply at 2 (emphasis added). Thus, under Covington’s theory, “all claims in a Track B arbitration would always be ‘interrelated[.]’” Id. That result would be unacceptable because – as Mr. Holmes’ case illustrates – Track B claims may well include many “truly fractionable” claims. Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 724 F.2d 211, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
10

IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court concludes that Mr. Holmes’ unsuccessful claims are unrelated to his successful claims under the principles of Hensley and its progeny. As the parties will be ordered to try to settle this matter in light of that conclusion, it is worthwhile to note what that conclusion does not entail or imply. In deciding that Mr. Holmes’ unsuccessful claims are unrelated to his successful claims, and hence that Covington is not entitled to fees for its work on Mr. Holmes’ unsuccessful claims, the Court does not mean to endorse “a mathematical approach” to calculating a reasonable fee. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 435 n.11. The Court recognizes – as the USDA seems to concede, see Surreply at 7 – that simply reducing Covington’s fee by a fraction corresponding to the number of unsuccessful claims is not likely to result in a fair and reasonable fee for Covington’s services. After all, “even when a lawsuit involves distinct claims, there inevitably may be some overlap in the requisite factual and legal analysis.” Martin v. Lauer, 740 F.2d at 47. Cf. Int’l Center for Technology Assessment v. Vilsack, Civil Action No. 03-0020, 2009 WL 693154, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2009) (concluding that plaintiffs’ unsuccessful claims were unrelated to their successful claims, but noting that “[p]laintiffs spent a good deal of time . . . working on other issues not directed to any of the three claims specifically, but which was necessary to plaintiffs’ successes”). Moreover, Covington likely would have had to perform certain litigation-related tasks whether or not it brought the unsuccessful claims. See Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1988).6

6

The Court also expresses no view as to the USDA’s argument that Covington is

not entitled to certain fees related to this fee dispute. See Surreply at 8-9.

11

For all of these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall attempt to settle Covington’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees in light of this Opinion and Order. If the parties are able to settle this matter, they shall inform the Court immediately in writing and shall file the appropriate settlement or dismissal papers. If the parties are unable to settle this matter, they shall file a joint report so informing the Court on or before June 8, 2009. SO ORDERED.

DATE: May 12, 2009

/s/___________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

12

 
 Pigford v. Conner, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 4545851 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Timothy PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Chuck CONNER, Acting Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture,1 Defendant. Cecil Brewington, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Chuck Conner, Acting Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.
Civil Action Nos. 97-1978 (PLF), 98-1693(PLF). | Dec. 21, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Alexander John Pires, Jr., David Joseph Frantz, Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling, David A. Branch, Law Office of David A. Branch, Jacob A. Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Richard Talbot Seymour, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Mona Lyons, Law Office of Mona Lyons, Caroline Lewis Wolverton, U.S. Department of Justice, Phillip L. Fraas, Washington, DC, Charles Jerome Ware, Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Columbia, MD, J. L. Chestnut, Jr., Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright, Selma, AL, Stephon J. Bowens, Blanchard, Jenkins, Miller, Lewis and Styers, P.A., Raleigh, NC, Marcus B. Jimison, NCCU School of Law, Durham, NC, Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, Jesse L. Kearney, Othello C. Cross, Cross, Kearney & McKissic, Pine Bluff, AR, for Plaintiffs.
Elizabeth Goitein, Michael Sitcov, Terry Marcus Henry, Joel L. McElvain, Elbert Lin, Marsha Stelson Edney, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

*1 This matter is before the Court on a motion to enforce the consent decree filed by Anthony and Selena Miller, who are members of the plaintiff class and successful Track A claimants.2 On June 30, 2005, the Adjudicator issued a decision discharging the Millers’ loans pursuant to the debt relief provisions of the Consent Decree governing this case. See Miller Mot. at 3. The Millers argue that the Adjudicator’s decision eliminated all interests defendant had in the proceeds of a loan which had been placed in a supervised bank account, thereby entitling the Millers to those proceeds without any restrictions. See id. at 5-7.3
Defendant responds that the Millers are not entitled to the proceeds because (1) the proceeds were not the Millers’ assets and the defendant therefore did not impermissibly obtain payment on a non-existent debt when it recovered those proceeds; and (2) even if defendant did (unintentionally) obtain a payment, the Millers suffered no harm and thus are entitled to no relief. See Def.’s Opp. at 6-8; id. at 8-9. The latter argument is based on the idea that the Adjudicator’s decision eliminated the Millers’ obligation to repay USDA, but did not eliminate the “separate and distinct obligation[ ]” to use the loan proceeds only for hog farming purposes. Id. at 9. Thus, reasons defendant, because the Millers still do not have the permits required to engage in hog farming, they have no legal right to recover or use the funds at issue. See id. at 8-9. Defendant further contends that the Millers’ continuing inability to use the proceeds gives defendant authority to reclaim and retain the proceeds as “unexpended loan funds.” See id. at 9-10; see also 7 C.F.R. § 1902.15(b) (2005).
In light of the parties’ positions, the nature of the controversy, and the relatively small amount in disputeapproximately $23,000-the Court concludes that this matter would benefit from settlement discussions. The Court therefore will order the parties to initiate negotiations and to contact the court-appointed Monitor, Randi Ilyse Roth, to discuss ways in which the Monitor and her Office can facilitate the parties’ efforts. The Court urges both sides to approach the issue with a degree of flexibility in order to achieve a fair and efficient resolution without judicial intervention.
In the event that the parties are unable to resolve their differences, the Court will require additional briefing to reach a decision. In their reply brief, the Millers argue that they became “paid-up borrowers” under the applicable USDA supervised bank account regulation when the
1

Pigford v. Conner, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

Adjudicator discharged their debts. See Miller Reply at 23; see also 7 C.F.R. § 1902.15(d) (2001) (“paid-up borrower” regulation in effect at the time of the Adjudicator’s decision in the Millers’ case).4 The Court finds this argument persuasive, at least on first reading. If the Millers are correct, then it is possible that defendant’s own regulation establishes the Millers’ entitlement to the funds at issue. The Court therefore believes it would be useful for defendant to respond to this argument (addressing, for example, whether the Millers’ interpretation is correct and whether any subsequent revisions to this regulation or other regulations should affect the analysis), and for the Millers to offer further support for their interpretation of the “paid-up borrower” regulation and its applicability to them. The Court also believes it would be useful for both parties to address certain related matters, such as (1) whether other federal agencies with authority to enter into supervised bank account agreements have confronted analogous situations and, if so, how they have resolved those situations; (2) whether creditor-debtor law or property law sheds any light on the effect of the Adjudicator’s decision on the parties’ interests in the supervised bank account proceeds; and (3) whether there is any helpful discussion of these or closely related issues in recent case law.

*2 Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the parties pursue further settlement discussions with the assistance of the court-appointed Monitor, Randi Ilyse Roth. The Monitor’s Office may be reached via telephone at 1-877-924-7483; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that if the parties are unable to reach a settlement agreement on or before February 1, 2008, they shall file supplemental briefs as follows. On or before February 20, 2008, defendant shall file a supplemental brief addressing the Millers’ argument that the Millers are entitled to the proceeds of the supervised bank account as “paid up borrowers” under all applicable USDA regulations. The Millers may respond to defendant’s supplemental brief on or before March 5, 2008. The supplemental briefs should address the matters listed above.
SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

1

The first amended complaint named Ann Veneman, former Secretary of Agriculture, as the party defendant. The Court

subsequently substituted her successor, Mike Johanns, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court

now substitutes Chuck Conner, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Mr. Johanns’ successor, pursuant to that Rule.

2

The papers submitted in connection with this matter are: Motion of Anthony and Selena Miller to Enforce the Consent Decree

[1270] (“Miller Mot.”); Defendant’s Opposition to Motion of Anthony and Selena Miller to Enforce the Consent Decree [1284]

(“Def.’s Opp.”); and Reply of Anthony and Selena Miller to Defendant’s Opposition to Motion to Enforce Consent Decree [1288]

(“Miller Reply”).

3

United States Department of Agriculture regulations allow for loan proceeds to be placed in “supervised bank accounts” in certain

situations. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1902.1 et seq. (2005). Withdrawals from supervised bank accounts are permitted only by order of the

borrower and countersignature by USDA personnel, or by written demand of certain USDA officials. See id. § 1902.10 (2005).

USDA maintains a security interest in supervised bank account proceeds which allows USDA to reclaim the proceeds to satisfy a

borrower’s debts. See Def.’s Opp. at 3; Miller Mot., Ex. 5 at 1, ¶¶ 1-2.

The proceeds of the Millers’ Operating Loan No. 44-03 were placed in a supervised bank account in 1997. Under the terms of

the Millers’ loan agreements, the proceeds of this loan were to be used for financing a hog farming business. See Def.’s Opp. at

3; id. Ex. C. USDA subsequently authorized several withdrawals for that purpose. By 2005, however, a balance of

approximately $23,000 remained in the account because the Millers were unable to obtain the environmental permits required to

further pursue the business. See id. at 3-4. In the meantime, the Millers had become delinquent on Loan No. 44-03. As noted

above, the Adjudicator discharged the Millers’ loans in June 2005. In July 2005, a USDA official (who apparently was unaware

of the Adjudicator’s decision) authorized the Millers’ bank to issue a check to USDA for all proceeds remaining in the account;

USDA then applied those proceeds to the balance owed on Loan No. 44-03. See id. at 5. Defendant concedes that at the time the

proceeds were reclaimed and applied to the Millers’ debt there was, in fact, no debt to repay. Id. at 6. Nonetheless, for reasons

discussed above, defendant maintains that it need not “write [the Millers] a check for $22,882 as ‘debt relief’ on a loan that they

never used.” Id. at 1.

2

Pigford v. Conner, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

4

The version of the “paid-up borrower” regulation in effect at the time of the Adjudicator’s decision provided that

[a] paid-up borrower is one who has a balance remaining in the supervised bank account and has repaid the entire indebtedness

to FmHA or its successor agency under Public Law 103-354 and has properly expended all funds advanced by other lenders. In

such cases the District Director or County Supervisor will (i) notify the borrower in writing that the interests in the account of

FmHA or its successor agency under Public Law 103-354 have been terminated, and (ii) inform the borrower of the balance

remaining in the supervised bank account.

7 C.F.R. § 1902.15(d) (2001).

3

 
 Pigford v. Veneman, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

2006 WL 2251029 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Timothy PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Ann VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. Cecil Brewington, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ann Veneman, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.
Civil Action Nos. 97-1978(PLF), 98-1693(PLF). | Aug. 7, 2006.
Attorneys and Law Firms
David Joseph Frantz, Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling, David A. Branch, Law Office of David A. Branch, Jacob A. Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Richard Talbot Seymour, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Mona Lyons, Law Office of Mona Lyons, Caroline Lewis Wolverton, U.S. Department of Justice, Phillip L. Fraas, Washington, DC, Charles Jerome Ware, Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Columbia, MD, J.L. Chestnut, Jr., Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright, Selma, AL, Stephon J. Bowens, Blanchard, Jenkins, Miller, Lewis and Styers, P.A., Raleigh, NC, Marcus B. Jimison, NCCU School of Law, Durham, NC, Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, Jesse L. Kearney, Othello C. Cross, Cross, Kearney & McKissic, Pine Bluff, AR, for Plaintiffs.
Elizabeth Goitein, Michael Sitcov, Terry Marcus Henry, Joel L. McElvain, Elbert Lin, Marsha Stelson Edney, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Alexander John Pires, Jr., Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, Washington, DC.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
*1 On December 7, 2005, class members Elmore and Ludean Hicks filed a motion to enforce the Consent Decree entered in this case, claiming that they had not received the relief granted to them by the Adjudicator under the Decree. Through the briefs submitted by the parties, the Court learned that the Hicks’ Adjudicator decision and other final decisions of the Adjudicator had been “amended.” For the Hicks, this “amendment” in effect reduced the amount of cash relief awarded in the Adjudicator’s initial decision by $47,000, as well as eliminating various forms of injunctive and debt relief.
The Consent Decree provides authority for certain Courtappointed neutrals, including the Adjudicator, to issue decisions regarding class members’ entitlement to relief. The Consent Decree states that these decisions are final, except as provided in the portion of the Consent Decree that authorizes review by an independent Monitor. See Consent Decree ¶¶ 9(a)(v), 9(b)(v), 12(b)(iii). Because the “amended” decisions issued by the Adjudicator to the Hicks and others fell outside the procedures authorized under the Consent Decree, on February 23, 2006, the Court ordered the Monitor to investigate this situation and report to the Court certain information regarding these “amended” decisions. See February 23, 2006 Memorandum Opinion and Order [Docket No. 1254].
On April 7, 2006, the Monitor filed her Report, which concerned four different categories of amended or potentially amended decisions: (1) forty-three decisions in the “conservation loan” group; (2) twenty-three decisions that had “other substantive” amendments; (3) sixty-one decisions that had “technical” amendments; and (4) possible additional “amended” Facilitator eligibility decisions. See Monitor’s Report on Amended Adjudicator Decisions [Docket No. 1269].
The Court has considered the Monitor’s April 7, 2006 Report and believes that additional information is required concerning certain of these categories of amended or potentially amended decisions.
1

Pigford v. Veneman, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)
II. MONITOR’S REPORT
A. The “Conservation Loan” Group
The Monitor’s Report states that amended decisions have been issued in forty-three conservation loan claims. The Report includes the Facilitator’s explanation as to why amended Adjudicator decisions have been issued in this group, despite the fact that the Consent Decree does not authorize such amendments. In light of the Court’s February 23, 2006 Memorandum Opinion and Order stating that the Court has serious concerns as to how and why these amendments were undertaken, the parties appear to have discussed and negotiated a resolution to this issue. To that end, on June 12, 2006, the parties submitted a joint proposed stipulation regarding those conservation loan claims. See [Joint Proposed] Stipulation and Order [Docket No. 1287].
The proposed stipulation and order has the effect of reinstating the original Adjudicator decisions for claims where class members had not already petitioned for Monitor review, subject to the USDA’s right to petition for review of those reinstated decisions on the sole issue of whether the class member should receive credit relief under Paragraph 9(a)(iii) of the Consent Decree or noncredit relief under Paragraph 9(b)(iii) of the Decree. The Court was satisfied that the parties’ stipulation and order adequately addressed the issues related to the conservation loan group of amended Adjudicator decisions, and therefore it approved the stipulation and order on June 30, 2006. See Stipulation and Order, entered June 30, 2006 [Docket No. 1296].
B. Twenty-Three “Other Substantive” Amendments
*2 In her April 7, 2006 Report to the Court, the Monitor explained that the Facilitator categorizes some amendments as “substantive” when they result from rereview by the Adjudicator, and categorizes others as “technical” when they are simply the correction of an administrative or clerical error.1 The Monitor reported that in addition to the “substantive” amendments to the fortythree conservation loan claims, there were twenty-three other claims in which the Adjudicator had made “substantive” amendments. These claims are listed in Exhibit of the Monitor’s Report with unique identifiers 44

through 66.
In some of the twenty-three additional claims, it appears that the amended Adjudicator decision decreased the cash relief (and other corresponding relief) provided to the class member. In others, it appears that the amended Adjudicator decision may have affected the class member’s debt relief. The Facilitator’s letter in Exhibit A states generally that amended Adjudicator decisions were issued in response to errors that had been called to the Facilitator’s attention through internal quality-control measures, contact from a class member, and/or contact from the government. Some of these twenty-three class members petitioned for Monitor review; others did not. The Monitor’s Report does not contain sufficient information for the Court to evaluate fully the origin of and effect of the amended Adjudicator decisions in these twenty-three cases. The Court therefore will require the Monitor to investigate and report further on this matter.
C. Sixty-One “Technical” Amendments
The Monitor reported that in addition to the “substantive” amendments to sixty-six Adjudicator decisions (fortythree conservation loan claims and twenty-three others), there were sixty-one claims in which the Facilitator made “technical” amendments that may have affected the relief provided to class members. Some of these “technical” amendments involve corrections of administrative errors, such as cases in which a decision was packaged in the wrong “jacket,” as explained by the Facilitator’s letter in Exhibit A to the Monitor’s Report. The Court has determined that this subset of “technical” amendment cases does not require further examination. In the processing of tens of thousands of individual claims decisions, it is inevitable that clerical errors would have occurred. The Court is confident that where the Facilitator’s internal quality control safeguards were able to identify and correct these administrative and clerical errors, the class members’ rights were not adversely affected.
The Monitor’s Report, however, describes other “technical” amendments that went beyond a simple clerical or administrative error. In some cases, it appears that class members received amended Adjudicator decisions that clarified or corrected the text of the decision page that made specific findings as to the class member’s claim. Such amendments included changes to
2

Pigford v. Veneman, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)
the USDA program under which the Adjudicator found the class member had succeeded, or the year of the claim under which the Adjudicator found the class member had succeeded. Changes in the text of the decision page, including changes in the description of the relief, may have affected the class members’ rights to cash and/or debt relief. The Monitor’s Report does not disclose the reason for these “technical” amendments to the decision text-that is, whether they involved more than correcting typographical errors or other such clerical or administrative problems-or whether they instead involved additional analysis of the Adjudicator’s original decision or reasoning. Because the Monitor’s Report does not contain sufficient information for the Court to evaluate which claims in this category were affected by these types of amendments, or whether class members’ rights were adversely affected by these amendments, the Court will require additional information.
D. Other Possible Amendments
*3 In addition to “amended” Adjudicator decisions, the Monitor reports that there may have been amendments to some Facilitator determinations of class member eligibility, specifically concerning the Facilitator’s processing of claim packages during the class member screening process. The Monitor’s April 7, 2006 report to the Court contains no further information as to the specifics of how or why these determinations may have been amended. The Court therefore will require additional information on this matter as well.
Accordingly it is hereby
ORDERED that the Monitor shall investigate and provide to the Court a further report containing such information as the Monitor deems appropriate to fully apprise the Court of the circumstances involved in any “amended” decisions not authorized by the Consent Decree that affected class members’ cash and/or debt relief. The Monitor, with whatever assistance she requires from the Facilitator, Adjudicator, and the parties, shall obtain information and report to the Court on or before December 15, 2006 with respect to:
1. Any amended Adjudicator decision in claims identified in the Monitor’s Report as “other substantive” amendments;

2. Any amended Adjudicator decision in claims identified in the Monitor’s Report as “technical” amendments, where such amendments were not purely clerical and the amendments affected class members’ cash and/or debt relief; and
3. Any instances in which the Facilitator initially notified a claimant that he or she was eligible to participate in the claims process, but later notified that same claimant that the eligibility decision had been “amended,” and that the claimant was no longer eligible; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Facilitator, the Adjudicator, and the parties shall provide the Monitor with whatever assistance and information she requires to investigate and report on these these matters to the Court; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to her authority under Paragraph 12(b)(ii) of the Consent Decree, the Monitor shall attempt to resolve with the parties, on or before December 15, 2006, any problems regarding:
1. Class members who received amended Adjudicator decisions that changed their cash relief other than through the Monitor review process set forth in the Consent Decree;
2. Class members who received amended Adjudicator decisions that changed their debt relief other than through the Monitor review process set forth in the Consent Decree;
3. Putative class members who received initial notification from the Facilitator that they were eligible to participate in the claims process, and then later received a notice of rejection from the claims process or other such amended notification from the Facilitator, resulting in the denial of the putative class members’ opportunity to participate in the claims process; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Monitor shall report to the Court, on or before December 15, 2006, regarding the resolution of any matters referred to her in this Order and regarding the status of any unresolved matters; and it is
*4 FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent that the Monitor reports about any unresolved matters, she shall make recommendations regarding these matters to the Court on or before December 15, 2006.
SO ORDERED.
3

Pigford v. Veneman, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

Footnotes

1

The Court notes that the Facilitator’s use of the word “substantive” is different from the way in which the Court used the term in its

February 23, 2006 Memorandum Opinion and Order directing the Monitor to report on this situation. The Court used the term

“substantive” to refer to any amended Adjudicator decision that resulted in a change to the relief awarded under the initial decision.

The Court used the word “substantive” to describe the outcome of these amended decisions, whereas the Facilitator has used word

to describe the method by which a particular decision was amended.

4

 
 Pigford v. Veneman, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

2005 WL 6783452 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Timothy PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Ann VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. Cecil Brewington, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ann Veneman, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.
Civil Action Nos. 97–1978 (PLF), 98–1693(PLF). | May 5, 2005.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.
*1 This matter is before the Court on the pro se motions of Cecil Brewington, Eddie Gray, Gregory Erves, Arthur Flonnory, Lucious Abrams and Herbert Williams for a Court Order instructing the Arbitrator that so long as they were were originally represented by class counsel and were not named plaintiffs, that they are qualified for relief under the June 21, 2002 decision by the court of appeals in this case. Upon consideration of plaintiffs’ motions and the government’s opposition, the Court concludes that plaintiffs’ motions must be denied.
On June 21, 2002, the court of appeals explained in this case that an attorney’s mistakes generally cannot form the basis for the modification of a consent decree under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. See Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918, 926 (D.C.Cir.2002). The court of appeals noted, however, that an exception to the general rule could be made in the class action context where a plaintiff had not “voluntarily” chosen class counsel—i.e. was not a named plaintiff. See id. The court of appeals then remanded the case to this Court to tailor a remedy for the affected plaintiffs. See id. at 927.

One of the issues remaining before this Court was whether the relief granted by the court of appeals applied to those claimants not originally represented by class counsel. On November 8, 2004, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order explaining that it did not. See Pigford v. Veneman, 344 F.Supp.2d 149, 152 (D.D.C.2004). At that time, however, a number of pro se plaintiffs alleged that they were represented by class counsel from August 15, 1997 through December 1999. See id. The Court acknowledged that “if any of these plaintiffs were, in fact, originally represented by class counsel and injured by class counsel’s actions, relief is warranted.” Id. at 150.
A number of pro se plaintiffs have now filed motions with the Court asking that the Court instruct the Arbitrator that to claim relief under the Court’s November 8, 2004 Memorandum Opinion and Order, a claimant need only demonstrate that (1) he or she was not a named plaintiff and (2) that he or she was originally represented by class counsel. These motions were filed in response to a November 9, 2004 letter from the Arbitrator which stated, in relevant part:
Judge Friedman has just issued an order in which he finds that he does not have the authority to extend the Consent Decree deadlines unless you were represented by class counsel and your case was somehow injured by class counsel’s errors.
Our records indicate that the attorney handling your case at the time that your Track B claim was filed and began moving through the process was Heidi Pender. She was not class counsel.
As a result of Judge Friedman’s decision, I am now obligated to dismiss your claim unless you can show me that class counsel represented you and that class counsel made errors affecting your claim.
*2 See Plaintiff’s Motion, Exh. 1, November 9, 2004 Letter to Lucious Abrams.1 The Arbitrator is correct. Because the relief afforded by the court of appeals relies on the fact that it was class counsel’s errors that injured the plaintiff, a claimant seeking relief under the decision by the court of appeals must demonstrate both that he or she was represented by class counsel and that it was errors made by class counsel which caused him or her to miss the deadlines imposed by the Consent Decree. The
1

Pigford v. Veneman, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

Arbitrator’s requirement, therefore, that the claimant demonstrate that he was injured by class counsel is not an additional criteria and was, in fact, required by this Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order. Plaintiffs’ motions must therefore be denied.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff Cecil Brewington’s motion [473] in Civ. No. 98–1693 is DENIED; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Eddie Gray’s motion and [1095] in Civ. No. 97–1978 and [484] in Civ. No. 98– 1693 is DENIED; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Arthur Flonnory’s motion [1098] in Civ. No. 97–1978 and [487] in Civ. No. 98– 1693 is DENIED; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Lucious Abrams’ motion [1099] in Civ. No. 97–1978 and [488] in Civ. No. 98– 1693 is DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Herbert Williams’ motion [1100] in Civ. No. 97–1978 and [489] in Civ. No. 98– 1693 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

FURTHER ORDERED that Gregory Erves’ motion [1096] in Civ. No. 97–1978 and [485] in Civ. No. 98– 1693 is DENIED; it is

Footnotes

1

Although all of the farmers attached a copy of the letter that was sent to Lucious Abrams, the Court assumes that a similar letter

was received by the other farmers as well.

2

 
 Pigford v. Veneman, 216 F.R.D. 1 (2003)

216 F.R.D. 1 United States District Court,
District of Columbia.
Timothy PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Ann VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. Cecil Brewington, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ann Veneman, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.
Nos. CIV.A. 97–1978(PLF), CIV.A. 98–1693(PLF). | May 28, 2003.
Class of African-American farmers brought suit alleging that United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) systematically discriminated against them on basis of their race in administration of credit and benefit programs. After settlement of claims, Secretary of USDA moved to strike class counsel’s response to earlier pleading. The District Court, 215 F.R.D. 2, granted motion, and counsel moved for reconsideration and to strike comment by government attorney. The District Court, Paul L. Friedman, J., held that government attorney’s statement accusing class counsel of “hate mongering” was not scandalous.
Motions denied.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*1 Jacob A. Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Alexander John Pires, Jr., Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, David A. Branch, Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling, Richard Talbot Seymour, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Washington, DC, J. L. Chestnut, Jr., Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright, Selma, AL, John Michael Clifford, Mona Lyons, Clifford, Lyons & Garde, Caroline Lewis Wolverton, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Marcus B. Jimison, NCCU School of Law, Stephen J. Bowens, Durham, NC, Phillip L. Fraas, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs.
Terry M. Henry, Susan Hall Lennon, Daniel Edward Bensing, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Amanda Quester, Federal Trade Commission,

Washington, DC, David Monro Souders, Weiner, Brodsky, Sidman & Kider, PC, Michael Sitcov, Elizabeth Goitein, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch, Washington, DC, for defendant.
John Wesley Davis, Washington, DC, James W. Myart, Jr., Law Offices of James W. Myart, Jr., & Associates, San Antonio, TX, Gerard Robert Lear, Arlington, VA, for claimant.
Evans M. Folins, Los Valores, CA, pro se.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.
The Court has before it a motion for reconsideration and a motion to strike filed by the law firm of Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright L.L.C. (“Chestnut, Sanders”), both requesting modification of this Court’s April 14, 2003 Memorandum Opinion and Order granting defendant’s motion to strike. Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments and the entire record in this case, the Court will deny both motions. In addition, the Court reminds movants (and all counsel in this case) that any reference to the content of a roundtable meeting held by the Monitor in this case, or disclosure of any confidential notes from such a meeting is an express violation of the confidentiality provision of the April 4, 2000 Order of Reference.
In its Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 14, 2003, the Court struck two recent *2 filings by Chestnut, Sanders on the ground that the documents included unsupported and scandalous accusations of racism directed at counsel for defendant. See Pigford v. Veneman, 215 F.R.D. 2 (D.D.C.2003). Central to the Court’s decision to strike was the enormity of the allegations: Chestnut, Sanders had accused defense counsel of “engaging in conduct of the most deplorable kind.” Id. at 3. In the instant motions, movants argue that “[i]n all fairness” the Court also should strike a comment by defense counsel that described a motion by Chestnut, Sanders as an example of “hate mongering.” Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reopen All Late Claims Due to Mail Delays at 1.
1

Pigford v. Veneman, 216 F.R.D. 1 (2003)
In urging the Court to restore “fairness” by striking defendant’s comment, movants overlook the qualitative difference between defendant’s statement and the accusations of racism previously struck by the Court. While defendant’s accusation of “hate mongering” did not exhibit an ideal, or even appropriate, level of civility, that statement simply does not compare to movants’ subsequent accusation that defense counsel shared the reprehensible racist attitude of those “who systematically destroyed the farms and lives of thousands of farmers, simply because they were black.” Because a motion to strike seeks “an extreme remedy” that “generally is disfavored,” the Court will not undertake to excise every harsh statement from the record. See Pigford v. Veneman, 215 F.R.D. at 4. Such a course would be unwise and wasteful for all involved.
Furthermore, as it made clear in its previous opinion, the Court is disappointed that recent filings by counsel on both sides of this case “have grown less civil, less respectful, and less professional.” Pigford v. Veneman, 215 F.R.D. at 5. The Court now reiterates the need for improved communication among counsel and urges them to focus on increased civility rather than on an endless exchange of accusations followed by an endless exchange

of motions to strike.
Finally, the Court is greatly concerned about Chestnut, Sanders’ reference to events allegedly occurring at confidential Monitor-led roundtable meetings. See Motion for Reconsideration at 2. The Court is confident that counsel are well aware that such references expressly violate the confidentiality provision of the April 4, 2000 Order of Reference. Given the importance of confidentiality to all those involved in roundtable meetings, the Court expects no further breaches of that confidentiality.
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Chestnut, Sanders’ motion for reconsideration [793] is DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Chestnut, Sanders’ motion to strike [797] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

2

 
 Pigford v. Veneman, 227 F.Supp.2d 157 (2002)

227 F.Supp.2d 157 United States District Court,
District of Columbia.
Timothy C. PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Ann M. VENEMAN, Secretary, The United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. Cecil Brewington, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, The United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.
Nos. CIV.A. 97–1978(PLF), CIV.A. 98–1693(PLF). | Oct. 29, 2002.
African American farmers sued Department of Agriculture (USDA), alleging racial discrimination in violation of Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). On modification of consent decree, the District Court, Paul L. Friedman, J., held that any party who filed complete claim package and received wholly or partially adverse decision from facilitator in screening process had 120 days to petition monitor for review.
Ordered accordingly.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*157 Jacob A. Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Alexander John Pires, Jr., Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, David A. Branch, Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling, Richard Talbot Seymour, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Washington, DC, J. L. Chestnut, Jr., Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright, Selma, AL, John Michael Clifford, Mona Lyons, Clifford, Lyons & Garde, Caroline Lewis Wolverton, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Marcus B. Jimison, Stephon J. Bowens, Durham, NC, Phillip L. Fraas, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
*158 Michael Sitcov, Terry M. Henry, Susan Hall Lennon, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Daniel Edward Bensing, U.S. Department of Justice Federal Programs Branch, Amanda Quester, Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection, David Monro Souders, Weiner Brodsky Sidman & Kider, PC, Elizabeth Goitein, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

Wyndell Oliver Banks, Washington, DC, for Non party. Randi Ilyse Roth, St. Paul, MN, Pro se. John Wesley Davis, Washington, DC, James W. Myart, Jr., Law Offices of James W. Myart, Jr., & Associates, San Antonio, TX, Stephon J. Bowens, Durham, NC, Gerald Robert Lear, Arlington, VA, for Claimants. Evans M. Folins, Los Valores, CA, Pro se. Dennis Charles Sweet, Lanston, Frazer, Sweet & Freese, Jackson, MS, Ford C. Ladd, Alexandria, VA, for Movants. Evelyn M. Coleman, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se. Willie S. Maymon, Rolling Fork, MS, Pro se. Colie Dixon, Sr., Georgetown, MS, Pro se. L. D. Maymon, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se. Lois S. Clark, Wesson, MS, Pro se. Curtis Dixon, Jackson, MS, Pro se. Linda Catching, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se. Henry A. Vaughn, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se. Floria A. Vaughn, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se. Marilynn Stewart, Jackson, MS, Pro se. Ezra McNair, Crystal Springs, MS, Pro se. Grover Miller, Georgetown, MS, Pro se. Geraldstine Miller, Georgetown, MS, Pro se. Larry D. Barnes, Harrisville, MS, Pro se. Edith Lomax–Barnes, Crystal Springs, MS, Pro se. Daryl Brentr, Pinola, MS, Pro se. Harold B. Dixon, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se. Larry Garrett, Georgetown, MS, Pro se. Velma J. Collins, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se. Opinion
1

Pigford v. Veneman, 227 F.Supp.2d 157 (2002)
ORDER
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.
WHEREAS, the Consent Decree in this case provides that the Monitor may direct the Facilitator, Adjudicator, or Arbitrator to reexamine a claim where the Monitor finds that a clear and manifest error has occurred in the screening, adjudication, or arbitration of a claim and has resulted or is likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice;1 and
WHEREAS the Monitor’s appointment is scheduled to expire on March 1, 2005; and,
WHEREAS, the Order of Reference issued by this Court on April 4, 2000, further defines the petition for Monitor review process, but does not set deadlines regarding that process; and
WHEREAS, a Stipulation and Order issued by this Court on July 14, 2000, established a deadline for the filing of Monitor petitions from wholly or partially adverse decisions under Track A or Track B; and
*159 WHEREAS, the Adjudicator and Arbitrator have implemented procedures for giving each claimant notice of the 120–day deadline from their decisions under Track A or Track B; and
WHEREAS, the Consent Decree also permits petitions for Monitor review of decisions made by the Facilitator in the class membership screening process; and
WHEREAS, it is important that all claimants who wish to file petitions for Monitor review from Facilitator decisions complete their filings in a timeframe that will allow resolution of their claim before the expiration of the Monitor’s appointment; and,
WHEREAS, the Facilitator reports the following class membership screening activity as of August 6, 2002:
1. Approximately 138,911 individuals made inquiries regarding the claims procedure; 2. Approximately 34,179 individuals requested blank Claim Sheets and Election Forms (“claim packages”), and had the blank claim packages sent to them, but never returned them to the Facilitator;2

3. Approximately 76,654 individuals requested blank claim packages but were never sent them, because the claim filing deadline had passed and the parties agreed that packages should not be sent;3 4. Approximately 3,320 putative class members returned incomplete claim packages to the Facilitator, and, upon notice of the deficiency in the claim package and a chance to cure, successfully cured the deficiency;4
5. Approximately 1,255 putative class members returned incomplete claim packages to the Facilitator, and, upon notice of the deficiency in the claim package and a chance to cure, failed to cure the deficiency;
6. Approximately 21,766 putative class members sent the Facilitator complete claim packages which were accepted by the Facilitator in the screening process; and
7. Approximately 129 putative class members sent the Facilitator complete claim packages which were rejected by the Facilitator in the screening process; and WHEREAS, several thousand claims are currently pending for resolution in the Monitor petition process; and
WHEREAS, in cases in which no completed claim package was ever filed, there is no cognizable claim within the meaning of Consent Decree paragraph 12(b)(iii); and
WHEREAS, the parties agree it is important to provide notice concerning the Facilitator decisions that may be the subject of a petition for Monitor review; and
WHEREAS, the parties agree it is important to provide notice concerning the process for petitioning for Monitor review from Facilitator class membership screening decisions where the Facilitator determined a claim package was complete and rejected the claim on the ground that the claimant failed to meet the class membership screening criteria;
*160 NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Any party who filed a complete claim package and received a wholly or partially adverse decision from the Facilitator in the screening process as of the date of this Order shall have 120 days from the date of this Order to
2

Pigford v. Veneman, 227 F.Supp.2d 157 (2002)

petition the Monitor for review under paragraph 12(b)(iii) of the Consent Decree. Any party who filed a complete claim package and receives a wholly or partially adverse decision from the Facilitator in the screening process after the date of this Order shall have 120 days from the date of the Facilitator’s class membership screening decision to petition the Monitor for review under paragraph 12(b)(iii) of the Consent Decree.

2. There shall be no Monitor review of cases in which the Facilitator rejected the putative class member’s claim package because the putative class member failed to timely complete a claim package after notice of the defect and an opportunity to cure.5

3. The Facilitator shall promptly establish a reconsideration process through which claimants can communicate with the Facilitator if they believe the Facilitator committed error in determining that they failed to timely complete a claim package after notice of the defect and an opportunity to cure.

4. In cases in which the Facilitator received timely, complete claim packages and rejected the claim on the ground that the claimant failed to meet the class membership screening criteria, the claimant shall have the opportunity to petition for Monitor review in accordance with the Consent Decree and the Order of Reference.

5. The Monitor may consider additional materials with a Petition for Monitor Review of a Facilitator class

Footnotes

1

Consent Decree, paragraph 12(b)(iii).

membership screening decision or with a response to such Petition only when such materials address a potential flaw or mistake in the claims process that in the Monitor’s opinion would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice if left unaddressed. The decision to consider additional materials regarding this flaw or mistake and to permit those materials to be made part of the record for review upon reexamination by the Facilitator is within the discretion of the Monitor.
6. Any claimant who is rejected by the Facilitator in the class membership screening process after filing a complete claim package shall be entitled to file only one petition for review of the Facilitator’s decision under paragraph 12(b)(iii) of the Consent Decree, and neither the Monitor’s decision on the petition for review, nor the decision of the Facilitator upon reconsideration shall be subject to further review of any type in any forum.
7. Copies of this Order shall be: (a) posted in a conspicuous public place in every USDA Farm Services Agency county office; and (b) mailed by the Facilitator to every person who was rejected by the Facilitator in the screening process, along with a letter from the Facilitator explaining the Order.
SO ORDERED.

2

This number does not screen out duplicate requests from individuals.

3

Most of these individuals were sent a package of materials regarding the filing of a late claim affidavit (request for permission to

file late under paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree).

4

This includes more than 1,000 claimants who filed timely claim packages but cured their deficiencies after the deadline set in ¶

5(c) of the Consent Decree but who were deemed timely by the July 14, 2000, Stipulation and Order.

5

The Stipulation and Order of July 14, 2000, provided in its first numbered paragraph that certain claim packages that were timely

filed but corrected and resubmitted after the paragraph 5(c) deadline are to be deemed timely. The Facilitator should not have

rejected the claimants who are the subject of that paragraph. All of the provisions of the July 14, 2000, Stipulation and Order

continue in full force and effect, and are not modified by this Order.

3

 
 Pigford v. Veneman, 221 F.Supp.2d 1 (2002)

221 F.Supp.2d 1 (Mem) United States District Court,
District of Columbia.
Timothy PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Ann VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. Cecil Brewington, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ann Veneman, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.
Nos. Civ.A. 97–1978(PLF), Civ.A. 98–1693(PLF). | Sept. 12, 2002.
Opinion
ORDER
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

The Court has before it an Emergency Motion to Order the Government to Reopen Public Facility, filed by pro se movant Thomas Burrell. Although the motion contains the conclusory assertion that “[t]he court has jurisdiction in this matter,” the subject of the motion—the allegedly unconstitutional closing of a public facility by the United States Department of Agriculture—is altogether unrelated to the complaint in this case, the settlement that closed this case or the continuing implementation of that settlement. Furthermore, to the extent that any federal court has jurisdiction to act on this motion, it is the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Arkansas, in which, movant has informed the Court, he also has filed this motion. Based on the absence of any connection between the instant motion and the case of Pigford v. Veneman, it is hereby
ORDERED that the emergency motion to order the government to reopen public facility is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

1

 
 Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F.Supp.2d 95 (2002)

217 F.Supp.2d 95 United States District Court,
District of Columbia.
Timothy PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Ann M. VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. Cecil Brewington, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.
Nos. CIV.A.97–1978(PLF), CIV.A.98–1693(PLF). | Sept. 11, 2002.
Class of African-American farmers brought suit alleging that United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) systematically discriminated against them on basis of their race in administration of credit and benefit programs. After entry of consent decree creating settlement fund, several pro se members of plaintiff class moved to vacate consent decree or to stay all proceedings pending order on said motion, and motion to remove lead class counsel. The District Court, Paul L. Friedman, J., held that (1) class counsel’s failure to meet crucial discovery and other deadlines, required by consent decree, did not justify broad remedy of vacating consent decree, and (2) counsel’s mistakes did not warrant removal of counsel in midst of consent decree implementation process.
Motions denied.
See also, 292 F.3d 918.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*96 Jacob A. Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Alexander John Pires, Jr., Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, David A. Branch, Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling, Richard Talbot Seymour, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Washington, DC, J. L. Chestnut, Jr., Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright, Selma, AL, John Michael Clifford, Mona Lyons, Clifford, Lyons & Garde, Caroline Lewis Wolverton, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Marcus B. Jimison, Stephon J. Bowens, Durham, NC, Phillip L. Fraas, Washington, DC,

for Plaintiffs.
Michael Sitcov, Terry M. Henry, Susan Hall Lennon, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Daniel Edward Bensing, U.S. Department of Justice Federal Programs Branch, Amanda Quester, Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection, David Monro Souders, Weiner Brodsky Sidman & Kider, PC., Elizabeth Goitein, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Wyndell Oliver Banks, Washington, DC, for Non party.
Randi Ilyse Roth, St. Paul, MN, Pro se.
John Wesley Davis, Washington, DC, James W. Myart, Jr., *97 Law Offices of James W. Myart, Jr., & Associates, San Antonio, TX, for Claimant.
Evans M. Folins, Los Valores, CA, Pro se.
Dennis Charles Sweet, Lanston, Frazer, Sweet & Freese, Jackson, MS, Ford C. Ladd, Alexandria, VA, Gerald Robert Lear, Arlington, VA, for Movants.
Evelyn M. Coleman, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
Willie S. Maymon, Rolling Fork, MS, Pro se.
Colie Dixon, Sr., Georgetown, MS, Pro se.
L D. Maymon, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
Lois S. Clark, Wesson, MS, Pro se.
Curtis Dixon, Jackson, MS, Pro se.
Linda Catching, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
Henry A. Vaughn, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
Floria A. Vaughn, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
Marilynn Stewart, Jackson, MS, Pro se.
Ezra McNair, Crystal Springs, MS, Pro se.
Grover Miller, Georgetown, MS, Pro se.
Geraldstine Miller, Georgetown, MS, Pro se.
Larry D. Barnes, Harrisville, MS, Pro se.
1

Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F.Supp.2d 95 (2002)
Edith Lomax–Barnes, Crystal Springs, MS, Pro se.
Daryl Brentr, Pinola, MS, Pro se.
Curtis Dixon, Jackson, MS, Pro se.
Harold B. Dixon, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
Larry Garrett, Georgetown, MS, Pro se.
Velma J. Collins, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.
The Court has before it two motions filed by several pro se members of the plaintiff class: a motion to vacate the Consent Decree in this case or, in the alternative, to stay all proceedings pending order on said motion, and a motion to remove lead Class Counsel, both requesting an emergency hearing.1 Because the Court finds that these motions concern common issues, the Court will address both motions together.
The Court finds no grounds to grant the extraordinary relief sought by movants. To the extent that these motions are based on the recent opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in this case, see Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (D.C.Cir.2002), *98 movants have misread that opinion and the prior Orders of this Court cited therein.
I. MOTION TO VACATE THE CONSENT DECREE [1] With respect to the motion to vacate the Consent Decree, movants rely on the court of appeals’ statement that the Decree is “unworkable.” See Motion to Vacate Consent Decree at 2. In making that determination, however, the court of appeals necessarily was referring only to the tight deadline schedule of the Track B process—since that was the matter before it—although the judgment was influenced by the court’s assessment of counsel’s overall performance when faced with a workload well beyond what anyone could have imagined

and counsel’s failure to seek the assistance of this Court or other lawyers earlier. See Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 926–27. The Consent Decree therefore was described as “unworkable” only with respect to the Track B process established by the Consent Decree and the relatively few Track B cases in which crucial deadlines were missed. See id. With respect to those cases, this Court may now fashion a narrow remedy that is “suitably tailored to the changed circumstances.” Id. at 927 (citing Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 391, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (modification of consent decree permitted only where required by significant changes in law or fact and must be tailored to changed circumstances)). As the government notes, to vacate the Consent Decree would be “ ‘far too broad’ a remedy” to address the “unforeseen obstacles” that have arisen in some Track B cases. Government Opposition to motion to vacate Consent Decree at 4 (citing Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 927). See also Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748. Although Class Counsel have encountered many difficulties in the implementation of this enormously complex settlement agreement, those difficulties do not warrant vacating the Consent Decree.
Indeed, to vacate the Consent Decree would nullify the settlement of this case, “the grand, historical first step toward righting the wrongs visited upon thousands of African–American farmers for decades by the United States Department of Agriculture,” Pigford v. Glickman, 127 F.Supp.2d 35, 40 (D.D.C.2001), and would undo the substantial progress that has been made for so many African–American farmers in the long five years since this case was filed. To vacate the Consent Decree also would require that every dollar already paid out to African–American farmers, whether in cash awards or in the form of debt relief or tax relief, be returned to the government. See id. To date, nearly $800 million of relief has gone to approximately 13,000 families of African– American farmers.2 Requiring these families to pay back the considerable sums that they received would be an extreme, unwarranted remedy that would bring great hardship to thousands of members of the class.
In urging the Court to vacate the Consent Decree, movants have made much of the court of appeals’ reference to the “double betrayal” of African–American farmers; first, historically, by the Department of Agriculture and then—at least as this Court reads the opinion—by counsel in litigating the merits of certain individual claims under the Consent Decree. To the extent that some have read the “double betrayal” language more
2

Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F.Supp.2d 95 (2002)
broadly, they are *99 taking it out of context. As noted, the court of appeals’ ruling pertained only to those Track B cases where crucial discovery and other deadlines have been missed, not to any events occurring before or even closely following entry of the Consent Decree. See Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 927. The ruling did not relate at all to the over 20,000 Track A cases that were not the subject of the court of appeals’ opinion. While the court of appeals criticized Class Counsel’s failings regarding Track A, the ruling itself did not turn on those errors but only on the mishandling of Track B claims. Finally, the court of appeals’ “double betrayal” language could not have related to any actions that may have been taken—or not taken—by the Department of Agriculture after the settlement, because any such actions necessarily would be beyond the scope of this case and its settlement. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 92, 110–11 (D.D.C.1999), aff’d, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C.Cir.2000) (class consisted only of African–American farmers discriminated against between January 1, 1983 and February 21, 1997, and consent decree did not provide mechanism to prevent future discrimination).
Similarly, the references by this Court and the court of appeals to conduct “border[ing] on malpractice,” related only to counsel’s failure “to meet critical consent decree deadlines,” Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 5, deadlines required to be met after the Consent Decree was approved. Class Counsel ably litigated the case throughout its early stages, and they negotiated and entered into a fair settlement for the class as a whole. Indeed, this Court has noted just how remarkable Class Counsel’s performance was at those early stages in vigorously litigating this case to the brink of trial and negotiating a landmark settlement with the government. See id. at 4–5 (“Class Counsel have earned accolades of acclaim for their efforts in initiating this case, litigating it to the verge of trial, and then negotiating a truly historic settlement with the government.”). To the extent that the Court has been justifiably critical of Class Counsel, its concerns have related only to counsel’s handling of the implementation process after entry of the Consent Decree. See id.; Pigford v. Veneman, 143 F.Supp.2d 28 (D.D.C.2001); Pigford v. Veneman, 148 F.Supp.2d 31 (D.D.C.2001). Class Counsel’s failings in handling certain matters after entry of the Consent Decree cannot provide a basis for vacating the Consent Decree.
II. MOTION TO REMOVE LEAD CLASS

COUNSEL
[2] [3] Removal of Class Counsel at this stage would be an extreme action that should not be taken lightly. Removal of counsel would be appropriate only if the Court were to find that it was absolutely necessary to preserve the integrity of the adversary process, as, for example, where an attorney’s conflict of interest undermines the Court’s confidence in the vigor of the attorney’s representation of his or her client, or where the attorney is in a position to use privileged information concerning the other side as a result of prior representation. See Board of Education of the City of New York v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir.1979); see also Koller ex rel. Koller v. Richardson– Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1055–56 (D.C.Cir.1984), vacated on other grounds, 472 U.S. 424, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985); Ackerman v. National Property Analysts, Inc., 1993 WL 258679 (S.D.N.Y.1993). Here, movants have presented no evidence of a conflict of interest or the potential misuse of privileged information by Class Counsel. Furthermore, the Court sees nothing that would be gained by the removal of Class Counsel now since this case already has reached the advanced stages of settlement implementation. See In re Barnett, 97 F.3d 181, 184 (7th Cir.1996) *100 (removal of class counsel improper where trial was almost concluded and nothing would be gained from expelling attorneys).
At the core of the criticisms voiced both by this Court and by the court of appeals was Class Counsel’s repeated failure to meet deadlines for submission of claimant Petitions for Monitor Review, specifically the November 13, 2000 and May 15, 2001 deadlines. See Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 1–3, 5–6; Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 920. Class Counsel’s failure in this respect was significant, as evinced by this Court’s imposition of sanctions and its framing of issues for a possible future hearing on sanctions. In fact, the Court considered the performance of Class Counsel with respect to the Monitor review process “dismal,” their disregard of deadlines “brazen,” and their explanation for this performance with respect to the Monitor Petition process unacceptable and evasive. Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 2–5.
Still, the practical impact of Class Counsel’s failings was to threaten the government’s enjoyment of the benefit of its bargain and to cost the government as much as an additional $33 million, not to deprive claimants of the right to Monitor review. See Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 6, n. 2. Ultimately, all the claimant Petitions subject to the November 13, 2000
3

Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F.Supp.2d 95 (2002)

deadline were either fully supported and deemed filed as of the original deadline or were withdrawn from the petition process as a result of substantive review by Class Counsel.3 While the Court is aware of allegations that Class Counsel mishandled certain individual petitions, no such misconduct has been found by this Court or by the court of appeals, and movants’ papers do not constitute a basis for making such a finding. As it has made clear in the past, the Court is fully prepared to impose sanctions on Class Counsel if the Court finds that Class Counsel “has shirked any of their responsibilities with respect to the filing of these materials and/or withdrawals [of Petitions for Monitor Review].” Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 6.4 No evidence or argument presently before this Court, however, warrants Class Counsel’s removal.

individual claims, many claims remain to be finally determined and Class Counsel continues to make important contributions. None of the mistakes in the implementation process that have come to the attention of this Court and been discussed by the court of appeals warrants the removal of Class Counsel in the midst of the Consent Decree implementation process. For all of these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion to vacate the Consent Decree [633] is DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to remove lead Class Counsel [634] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

The efforts of Class Counsel have resulted in relief for thousands of African–American farmers. Although final decisions and awards have been made in thousands of

Footnotes

1

Four movants are named in the text of both motions: Thomas Burrell, Eddie Slaughter, Fernando Burkette and William H. Miller.

Gary Grant also joins the motion to remove Class Counsel. Despite the government’s objections that not all of the above movants

or other individuals who have signed the motions are members of the plaintiff class with standing to bring these motions, the Court

finds that more than one of the above-named individuals are members of the class and thus do have standing. See Response and

Opposition of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires to motion to vacate Consent Decree or in the alternative, to stay all proceedings

pending order on said motion and request for emergency hearing at 1–2. Nor will the Court consider the representation of Class

counsel that four of the five movants have no basis for complaint because they participated in the process to which they now object

and prevailed on their claims. See id. The Court will move to the substance of the motions rather than address the issue of standing

with respect to each movant.

2

See Facilitator’s Report of September 9, 2002 (available from Consent Decree Facilitator).

3

To ensure that claimants were not injured by Class Counsel’s failure, the Court expressly required that each Petition be supported

by “fully researched, fully briefed, fully documented materials.” Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 6.

4

See also Board of Education of the City of New York v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1247 (“Since disqualification entails immediate

disruption of the litigation, it is better to relegate any questions about [counsel’s] conduct to other appropriate proceedings.”)

4

 
 Pigford v. Veneman, 182 F.Supp.2d 50 (2002)

182 F.Supp.2d 50 United States District Court,
District of Columbia.
Timothy PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Ann VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. Cecil Brewington, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ann Veneman, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.
Nos. CIV.A. 97–1978(PLF), CIV.A. 98–1693(PLF). | Jan. 17, 2002.
Class of African-American farmers brought suit alleging that United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) systematically discriminated against them on basis of their race in administration of credit and benefit programs. After entry of consent decree creating settlement fund, plaintiffs moved to endow arbitrators ruling on claims to fund with discretion to extend arbitration deadlines. The District Court, Paul L. Friedman, J., held that: (1) court maintained authority to interpret decree, and (2) decree permitted arbitrators to extend deadlines.
Motion granted.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*50 Michael Sitcov, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC.
*51 Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Esq., Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP, Washington, DC.
J.L. Chestnut, Jr., Rose M. Sanders, Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway, Selma, AL.
Randi Ilyse Roth, Esq., Office of the Monitor, Saint Paul, MN.
Anthony Herman, Esq., Covington & Burling, Washington, DC.
Michael Lewis, Esq., ADR Associates, Washington, DC.

Lester Levy, Jams, San Francisco, CA.
Julie Redell, Nicole Fahey, Poorman–Douglas Corporation, Beaverton, OR.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.
The Court has before it plaintiffs’ motion to endow arbitrators with discretion to extend arbitration deadlines, a joinder in the motion filed by Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP and defendant’s oppositions to both filings. Based on the parties’ written arguments, the Consent Decree and the history of this case, the Court will GRANT plaintiffs’ motion for the following reasons.
Under the Consent Decree that settled this case, the parties agreed that the Arbitrator, Michael Lewis, would conduct hearings to decide all claims for relief under Track B. See Consent Decree ¶ 10 (April 14, 1999). The Consent Decree laid out a time frame for the stages of these proceedings, including the conclusion of discovery, identification of witnesses and submission of exhibits and written testimony. See id. at ¶ 10(a)-(f). In addition, the Decree stated that the decisions of the Arbitrator and, by inference, his designees (“arbitrators”), would be final, and that the parties could not seek review in any court with respect to “any claim that is, or could have been decided, by the arbitrator.” Id. at ¶ 10(i).
In their motion, plaintiffs ask that the Consent Decree be interpreted or modified by the Court to allow the arbitrators discretion to extend certain deadlines in the Track B proceedings. Plaintiffs point out that many Track B cases are being handled by pro bono counsel, who were brought into the cases after initial deadlines had passed and with little time to prepare before other deadlines were upon them. Based on this circumstance, plaintiffs argue, the arbitrators necessarily have the authority or should be endowed with the authority to extend deadlines in the Track B proceedings as appropriate. See Plaintiff’s Motion at 7–11.
Defendant objects to such deadline revisions by the arbitrators, contending first that the Court lacks
1

Pigford v. Veneman, 182 F.Supp.2d 50 (2002)
jurisdiction even to consider plaintiffs’ motion and further that the deadlines set in the Consent Decree were meant to be absolute and final and thus cannot be modified by the arbitrators without the consent of both parties. See Defendant’s Opposition at 2, 9. To alter the deadlines now, defendant argues, not only would permit plaintiffs’ counsel unfairly to “re-do” the claims process but would remove a central benefit of the bargain on which defendant relied in agreeing to the settlement. See Defendant’s Opposition at 7, 18–19.
[1] [2] As a threshold matter, the Court rejects defendant’s contention that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ motion. It is established that a court maintains authority to enforce and to interpret an approved Consent Decree. See, e.g., Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 995 F.2d 280, 285–6 (D.C.Cir.1993); Hammon v. Kelly, 154 F.R.D. 11, 27 (D.D.C.1994). Here, the Consent Decree explicitly allows for its construction in a liberal manner in view of its remedial purposes, recognizing that the Decree could not possibly have anticipated every circumstance that would *52 arise in the course of implementation. See Consent Decree at 1–2. Defendant is correct that the Decree precludes judicial review of arbitrator decisions of Track B claims, see Defendant’s Opposition at 3–4 (citing the Consent Decree, ¶ 10(i)). In their motion, however, plaintiffs do not ask the Court to review a “claim that is, or could have been decided, by the arbitrator.” Consent Decree, ¶ 10(i). Plaintiffs do not challenge any specific decision by an arbitrator to grant or deny a claim for relief.1 Instead, plaintiffs ask the Court only to interpret the Decree and clarify the scope of the arbitrators’ authority to revise deadlines. Because the Consent Decree does not preclude Court consideration of the scope of the arbitrators’ discretion in Track B proceedings, this Court has jurisdiction to decide plaintiffs’ motion.
[3] With respect to the scope of the arbitrators’ discretion, the Court concludes that the Arbitrator and his designees have essentially the same authority over Track B hearings that a trial judge would have over a trial or related pretrial proceedings. In Paragraph 10 of the Consent Decree, this Court delegated its authority over Track B claims to the Arbitrator. That authority implicitly includes the powers necessary to conduct both the evidentiary hearing and pre-hearing proceedings, such as deciding requests to enlarge the discovery period, to extend deadlines for submission of testimony and exhibits, and to schedule and, if appropriate, reschedule the hearing date. In this case, therefore, it is evident that granting extensions of such dates and deadlines is well within the arbitrators’ authority.

The more difficult question, however, concerns deadlines already past: Can the arbitrator allow pro bono counsel to conduct discovery and submit direct testimony when the dates for the close of discovery and submission of testimony have expired? The Court recognizes that, as a general practice, it is rare for a trial judge to reopen discovery after discovery has closed and discovery deadlines have not been extended by consent or on motion. Certainly where a lawyer has disregarded deadlines established by rules or court order, a judge is loathe to provide relief, even where the errors of counsel or even former counsel have weakened a litigant’s ability effectively to present his or her claim. The history of this case is unique, however, and requires more than hasty application of general practice.
Pro bono counsel originally were solicited by the Court itself to provide services to class members as a result of class counsel’s inability to represent all Track B claimants adequately. See Order of April 27, 2001 at 6–7. In the course of that solicitation, the Court informally assured pro bono counsel that arbitrators in Track B cases would be reasonable and flexible with deadlines in order to accommodate counsel’s late entry into ongoing proceedings. Nevertheless, the parties have remained unsure as to whether the arbitrators may allow pro bono counsel to “undo” the errors of their predecessors by vacating past deadlines, or whether the arbitrators’ authority is limited to granting delays of future proceedings, so that counsel may “catch up” in the process.
Based on the parties’ submissions and the history of this case, the Court concludes that the arbitrators do have discretion to allow for revision of certain deadlines, even after the deadlines have passed, so long as justice requires the revisions and provided that the burden on the defendant *53 is not so great as to outweigh the interest of the claimant in fully presenting his or her claim. These decisions are within the discretion of the arbitrator in each case. In the interest of fairness, the arbitrators may reschedule hearings and permit late filing of written testimony and exhibits. Reopening of discovery is a more difficult question. Just as a trial judge would have discretion to reopen discovery under extraordinary circumstances, so too does each arbitrator have the same authority. This Court is confident, however, that the arbitrators will hue to this standard of restraint as they consider any such requests. In other words, the Court expects the arbitrators to be much more reluctant to reopen discovery than to accept the submission of
2

Pigford v. Veneman, 182 F.Supp.2d 50 (2002)

testimony and exhibits out of time. For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to endow arbitrators with discretion to extend arbitration deadlines is GRANTED. The Court holds that the arbitrators’ authority to revise deadlines in Track B proceedings is implicit in the terms of the Consent Decree and supported

by general principles of judicial discretion, and therefore the Court need not “endow” the arbitrators with any supplemental authority.
SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

1

The Court does not accept defendant’s assumption that a request for extension of deadlines constitutes a “claim” subject to ¶ 10(i)

unreviewability. See Defendant’s Opposition at 10–11.

3

 
 Pigford v. Glickman, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

2000 WL 34292618 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Timothy PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Dan GLICKMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. Cecil BREWINGTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Dan GLICKMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.
No. Civ.A. 97–1978(PLF), Civ.A. 98–1693(PLF). | filed Aug. 28, 1997. | Nov. 8, 2000. | of last filing
April 8, 2004.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Othello C. Cross, Cross, Kearney & McKissic, Pine Bluff, AK, Lead Attorney, Attorney to be Noticed, representing Othello C. Cross, (Movant).
Marsha Stelson Edney, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Attorney to be Noticed, representing Ann M. Veneman, (Defendant).
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Harvard law School, Cambridge, MA, Lead Attorney, Attorney to be Noticed, representing Leonard Hunter, (Plaintiff).
Opinion
ORDER
FRIEDMAN, J.
*1 On April 14, 1999, the Court gave final approval to the Consent Decree that settled this case, finding that it represented a fair, reasonable and adequate resolution of the class members’ claims. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C.1999), aff’d, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C.Cir.2000). As part of the settlement, the parties agreed that the Monitor appointed pursuant to the Consent Decree would be able to “[d]irect the facilitator, adjudicator, or arbitrator to reexamine a claim where the Monitor determines that a clear and manifest error has

occurred in the screening, adjudication, or arbitration of the claim and has resulted or is likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Consent Decree ¶ 12(b)(iii) (April 14, 1999). In the Court’s Order of Reference appointing the Monitor, the Court established the procedure by which claimants could file Petitions for Monitor Review in accordance with Paragraph 12(b)(iii) of the Consent Decree. See Order of Reference ¶ 8 (April 4, 2000). In a joint Stipulation and Order that the parties subsequently proposed to the Court and which the Court approved, the parties agreed to clarify the Petition for Monitor Review process by establishing a framework for deadlines by which all Petitions would have to be submitted to the Monitor. See Stipulation and Order ¶ 5 (July 14, 2000).
The deadline for the vast majority of claimants, November 13, 2000, is now fast approaching.1 In an expedited motion for hearing filed on October 31, 2000, and at an emergency hearing held today, November 8, 2000, Class Counsel informed the Court that despite receiving requests from approximately 4,000 claimants to file Petitions for Monitor Review on their behalf, Class Counsel and Of Counsel have been able to file only 300 Petitions in the past four months. These numbers do not include the hundreds or thousands of additional Petitions for Monitor Review that are being handled by unaffiliated counsel representing other class members or by claimants filing pro se without the assistance of a lawyer. In their motion and at today’s hearing, Class Counsel asked that the Petition for Monitor Review process be modified to ensure that claimants would not bear the burden of counsel’s inability to process Petitions at a rate sufficient to meet the November 13 deadline. The government vigorously opposed any modification of the July 14 Stipulation and Order, citing the agreement of the parties in Paragraph 5 of the Stipulation and Order that “[n]o extensions of these deadlines will be granted for any reason.”
The Court agrees with the government that the deadlines should not be modified without further agreement of the parties; counsel should be held to the commitments to which they agreed. On the other hand, counsel’s failings should not be visited on their clients. The issue therefore is whether the Petition for Monitor Review process can be modified on a one-time basis without altering the deadlines by which Petitions must be filed and without undermining the negotiated stipulation of the parties.
*2 At the hearing, the Court raised the possibility of
1

Pigford v. Glickman, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)
allowing counsel to file a simple notice Petition to the Monitor by the November 13 deadline, specifying all claimants whom counsel represents who received a decision on or before July 14 and who are seeking Monitor review of that decision, but then delay the submission of materials in support of those Petitions until a later date that is fair to both the parties. Allowing this kind of notice Petition would reveal the total, finite number of claimants (and the names of all such claimants) who received a decision on or before July 14 and who are petitioning for Monitor review, and would allow the parties and the Monitor to manage the filing and resolution of these Petitions at a fair and reasonable pace. Furthermore, under such a process, any Petitioner who received a decision on or before July 14 but fails to file a Petition until after the November 13 deadline would still be summarily rejected in accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Stipulation and Order.
It is obvious that if Class Counsel, Of Counsel and all unaffiliated counsel were forced to file thousands of fully supported Petitions by November 13, the government would be unable to respond to them in a meaningful way within the 60 days that it has to file a response. See Order of September 12, 2000. Furthermore, the Monitor informed the Court at the hearing that even if the government had the resources to complete such a task, the Monitor initially will be unable to decide the Petitions at a pace greater than 200 to 300 each month. In view of these realities, it would seem unfair to disenfranchise thousands of claimants merely because their lawyers have not met their obligations to the process – so long as the letter and spirit of the July 14 Stipulation and Order are not violated.
Upon consideration of the foregoing, and having considered the manifest injustice to claimants that would result if they are excluded from the Petition for Monitor Review process solely because of the failings of their attorneys, it is hereby
ORDERED that the deadline for Petitions for Monitor Review involving claimants who received a decision on or before July 14, 2000, remains November 13, 2000. Instead of filing fully supported Petitions for Monitor Review, however, the government or any claimant’s counsel (including but not limited to Class Counsel and Of Counsel), may submit a Register of Petitions by that date. For each Register of Petitions filed on behalf of claimants, the Register shall list every claimant (and his or her claim number) who received a decision on or before July 14, 2000, and has asked the attorney or law

firm for assistance with the filing of his or her Petition for Monitor Review; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that a Register of Petitions shall not include any claimant who already has had an attorney file a Petition on his or her behalf, and shall include only those claimants who have presented counsel with a facially meritorious claim for a Petition for Monitor Review. No individual attorney or law firm may file more than one Register of Petitions, and all Registers of Petitions must be filed by November 13, 2000; it is
*3 FURTHER ORDERED that if a Register of Petitions lists 400 or fewer claimants, counsel shall file materials in support of each Petition for Monitor Review by December 15, 2000. By that same date, counsel shall file notices of withdrawal with respect to those Petitions that upon further review counsel determines have no reasonable chance of satisfying the clear and manifest error standard set forth in Paragraph 12(b)(iii) of the Consent Decree; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that if a Register of Petitions lists more than 400 claimants, counsel shall file supporting materials or withdrawals, as described above, with respect to a total of at least 400 claimants by December 15, 2000. Counsel shall file similar supporting materials or withdrawals with respect to at least 400 more claimants on the 15th of every month thereafter. Under no circumstances shall the Monitor accept supporting materials or withdrawals after May 15, 2001; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the deadlines mentioned herein will be satisfied so long as the filing is postmarked by the stated date. All Petitions for Monitor Review, Registers of Petitions, supporting materials and withdrawals shall be sent to the Facilitator in accordance with previously established practice with respect to the Petitions for Monitor Review; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Monitor shall submit monthly reports to the Court pursuant to Paragraph 12(b)(i) of the Consent Decree that summarize the progress of any lawyer or law firm that files a Register of Petitions listing more than 400 claimants. Such reports shall be filed on the last day of every month, beginning on December 31, 2000.
SO ORDERED.
2

Pigford v. Glickman, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

Footnotes

1

The November 13 deadline applies to all claimants who received wholly or partially adverse decisions under Track A or Track B

on or before July 14, 2000 – the date the Stipulation and Order was entered. Because most Track A and Track B claims had been

decided by July 14, the November 13 deadline applies to the majority of claimants who might petition for Monitor review. For the

much smaller number of claimants who have received or will receive decisions after July 14, 2000, those claimants have 120 days

from the date of such decision to file a Petition for Monitor Review. See Stipulation and Order ¶ 5 (July 14, 2000). Those 120–day

deadlines shall remain in effect and are not effected by this Order.

3

 
 Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 1 of 203
CONSOL,JURY,TYPE−E
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF

PIGFORD, et al v. VENEMAN, et al Assigned to: Judge Paul L. Friedman Demand: $512,800,000 Cases: 1:16−cv−01999−PLF
1:05−cv−01821−JR Case in other court: USCA, 04−05171
USCA, 04−05173 12−05302 13−05303 Cause: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights Special Master
RANDI ILYSE ROTH
Plaintiff
TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD

Date Filed: 08/28/1997 Date Terminated: 04/14/1999 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant
represented by Anthony Herman COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 850 Tenth Street N.W. One City Center Washington, DC 20001 (202) 662−5280 Fax: (202) 662−6291 Email: aherman@cov.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles Jerome Ware CHARLES JEROME WARE, P.A. 10630 Little Patuxent Parkway Suite 113 Columbia, MD 21044 (410) 730−5016 Fax: (410) 730−7603 Email: charlesjeromeware@msn.com LEAD ATTORNEY
David A. Branch LAW OFFICES OF DAVID A. BRANCH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 1828 L Street, NW Suite 820 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 785−2805 Fax: (202) 785−0289 Email: davidbranch@dbranchlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Faya R. Toure P.O. Box 1290 Selma, AL 36702 (334) 875−9264 Fax: (334) 875−9853 Email: fayarose@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 2 of 203
Jacob A. Stein STEIN, MITCHELL & MUSE, L.L.P. 1100 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20036−4107 (202) 737−7777 Fax: 202−296−8312 Email: jstein@steinmitchell.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Talbot Seymour LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD T. SEYMOUR, P.L.L.C. 888 17TH STREET N.W. 900 BRAWNER BLDG. Washington, DC 20006−3307 (202) 785−2145 Fax: (800) 805−1045 Email: rick@rickseymourlaw.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander John Pires , Jr. PIRES COOLEY 4401 Q Street, NW Washington, DC 20007 (202) 905−6706 Fax: (202) 333−1134 Email: farmerslawyer@aol.com TERMINATED: 06/19/2006
Barbara Kim Kagan STEPTOE & JOHNSON, LLP 1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 429−6258 Fax: (202) 261−0540 Email: bkagan@steptoe.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J. L. Chestnut , Jr. CHESTNUT, SANDERS, SANDERS, PETTAWAY, CAMPBELL & ALBRIGHT One Union Street P.O. Box 1290 Selma, AL 36702−1290 (334) 875−9264 Fax: (334) 875−9375 Email: bhayes@csspca.com TERMINATED: 09/30/2008
Joshua A Doan U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ENRD, Natural Resources Section 601 D Street, NW Room 3135 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 305−0874 Email: joshua.doan@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Talbot Seymour

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 3 of 203

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff LLOYD SHAFER

represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John M. Clifford CLIFFORD & GARDE, LLP 1850 M St., NW Suite 1060 Washington,, DC 20036 (202) 280−6115 Fax: (202) 289−8992 Email: jclifford@cliffordgarde.com TERMINATED: 12/09/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mona Lyons LAW OFFICES OF MONA LYONS 1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 525 Washington, DC 20009 (202) 387−7000 Fax: (202) 387−7116 Email: mlyons@monalyons.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Talbot Seymour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006

Plaintiff
GEORGE HALL On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated

represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caroline Lewis Wolverton AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 887−4107 Fax: (202) 887−4288

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 4 of 203

Email: cwolverton@akingump.com TERMINATED: 08/10/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Talbot Seymour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006

Plaintiff LEONARD COOPER

represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephon J. Bowens BLANCHARD, JENKINS, MILLER, LEWIS AND STYERS, P.A. 1117 Hillsborough Street Raleigh, NC 27603 (919) 755−3993 Fax: 919−755−3994 Email: sbowens@bmlslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marcus B. Jimison NCCU SCHOOL OF LAW Land Loss Prevention Project 1512 South Alston Avenue Room 205 Durham, NC 27707 (919) 682−5969

Plaintiff ABRAHAM CARPENTER

represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 5 of 203

Plaintiff BEN HILLMAN, JR., Plaintiff ZELMA J. HILLMAN Plaintiff LEONARD HUNTER
Plaintiff ALL PLAINTIFFS

David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Phillip L. Fraas LAW OFFICE OF PHILLIP L. FRAAS 1001 G Street, NW Suite 800 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 280−2411 Fax: (202) 355−1799 Email: phil@phillipfraaslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006
represented by Charles J. Ogletree , Jr. CHARLES J. OGLETREE CONSULTING 54 Pemberton Street Cambridge, MA 02140 (617) 496−2054 Email: ogletree@law.harvard.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anurag Varma AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 887−4222 Fax: (202) 887−4288 Email: avarma@akingump.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David U. Fierst STEIN MITCHELL CIPOLLONE BEATO & MISSNER LLP 1100 Connectticut Avenue, NW Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20036−4195 (202) 737−7777

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 6 of 203
Fax: (202) 296−8312 Email: dfierst@steinmitchell.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Joseph Frantz CONLON, FRANTZ & PHELAN, LLP 1740 N. Street, NW Suite One Washington, DC 20036 (202) 331−7050 Fax: (202) 331−9306 Email: dfrantz@conlonfrantz.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Faya R. Toure (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jesse L. Kearney 1022 West 6th Avenue Pine Bluff, AR 71603 (870) 536−4056 Fax: (870) 536−0216 Email: attyjkearn@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Othello C. Cross CROSS, KEARNEY & MCKISSIC 1022 West Sixth Avenue Pine Bluff, AR 71603 (870) 536−4056 Email: othellocross@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Phillip L. Fraas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rose M. Sanders P.O. Box 1290 Selma, AL 36702−1290 (334) 875−9264 Fax: (334) 875−9853 Email: fayarose@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006
James W. Myart , Jr. LAW OFFICE OF JAMES W MYART, JR. PC 1104 Denver Street San Antonio, TX 78210 (210) 533−9461 Fax: (210) 533−4815

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 7 of 203

TERMINATED: 02/28/2005

Plaintiff
BERNICE C. ATCHINSON TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by BERNICE C. ATCHINSON 1072 Highway 191 Jemison, AL 35085 (205) 688−2715 PRO SE

Plaintiff
MELVIN MELTON TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by MELVIN MELTON P.O. Box 409 Jemison, AL 35085 PRO SE

Plaintiff
JOHN A. WRIGHT TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by JOHN A. WRIGHT P.O. Box 291 Verbena, AL 36091 PRO SE

Plaintiff
THELMA JOURNEY TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by THELMA JOURNEY 715 Plant Street Montezuma, GA 31063 PRO SE

Plaintiff
lYWANDA LOONEY TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by lYWANDA LOONEY 208 1/2 Willis Circle Clanton, AL 35045 PRO SE

Plaintiff
DONALD A. MCDONALD TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by DONALD A. MCDONALD P.O. Box 666 Oglethorpe, GA 31068 (478) 472−6109 PRO SE

Plaintiff CROSS & KEARNEY PLLC

represented by David U. Fierst (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff ESTATE OF ROBERT J. PARKER

represented by ESTATE OF ROBERT J. PARKER PRO SE

Plaintiff CARL J. PARKER

represented by CARL J. PARKER 358 Bryan Rd Ashburn, VA 31714 229−848−0260 PRO SE

V.

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Petitioner HOUSTON BLAKENEY

represented by Stephon J. Bowens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Petitioner REATHA BLAKENEY

represented by Stephon J. Bowens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Petitioner LEROY ROBINSON

represented by Stephon J. Bowens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Petitioner BOBBI NEWTON

represented by Stephon J. Bowens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Petitioner PEARLIE PETERSON

represented by Stephon J. Bowens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Petitioner NAOMI KNOCKETT

represented by Stephon J. Bowens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Petitioner ILENTHE PORTER

represented by Stephon J. Bowens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Petitioner JAMES DAVIS

represented by Stephon J. Bowens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
DAN GLICKMAN Secretary, The United States Department of Agriculture TERMINATED: 03/06/2001

represented by Amanda Quester FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION Bureau of Consumer Protection 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20580 (202) 326−2719 Fax: 202−326−3768 Email: aquester@ftc.gov

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 9 of 203
TERMINATED: 11/19/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Edward Bensing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Ave N.W. Suite 6114 Washington, DC 20530 (202) 305−0693 Fax: (202) 616−8460 Email: daniel.bensing@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David M. Souders WEINER BRODSKY KIDER PC 1300 19th Street, NW 5th Floor Washington, DC 20036−1648 (202) 628−2000 Fax: (202)628−2011 Email: souders@thewbkfirm.com TERMINATED: 04/11/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY
Julie Straus Harris U.S. DEPARMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 353−7633 Fax: (202) 616−8460 Email: julie.strausharris@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY
Michael Sitcov U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 514−1944 Fax: (202) 616−8187 Email: michael.sitcov@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Hall Lennon U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division 901 E Street, NW Room 1043 Washington, DC 20830 (202) 514−5838 LEAD ATTORNEY
Tamra Tyree Moore U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Room 5375 Washington, DC 20530 (202) 305−8628 Fax: (202) 305−8517

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 10 of 203

Email: tamra.moore@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terry Marcus Henry U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 514−4107 Fax: (202) 616−8470 Email: terry.henry@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Marshall Bernie U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 616−8488 Fax: (202) 616−8470 Email: andrew.m.bernie@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Edward Gardner U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 305−7583 Fax: (202) 307−0972 Email: joshua.e.gardner@usdoj.gov

Matthew A. Josephson U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch P.O. Box 883 Washington, DC 20044 (202) 514−9237 Fax: (202) 616−8470 Email: Matthew.A.Josephson@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen McCoy Elliott U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 305−8177 Fax: (202) 616−8470 Email: stephen.elliott@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
ANN M. VENEMAN Secretary of Agriculture

represented by Andrea Iris Newmark U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Room 7118 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 514−4267 Email: andrea.newmark@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 11 of 203
Daniel Edward Bensing (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elbert Lin OFFICE OF THE WEST VIRGINIA ATTORNEY GENERAL Solicitor General 1900 Kanawha Boulevard East State Capitol Building 1, Room 26−E Charleston, WV 25305 (681) 313−4567 Email: elbert.lin@wvago.gov TERMINATED: 08/17/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Goitein UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue NW Room 7320 Washington, DC 20530 (202) 514−4470 Fax: (202) 616−8470 Email: elizabeth.goitein@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herbert E. Forrest US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Room 7112 Washington, DC 20530−0001 (202) 514−2809 Fax: (202) 616−8470 Email: herbert.forrest@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie Straus Harris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Matthew A. Josephson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tamra Tyree Moore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terry Marcus Henry (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 12 of 203

Defendant THOMAS J. VILSACK Secretary, United States Department of Agriculgure TERMINATED: 07/31/2017
Defendant SONNY PERDUE Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture

Andrew Marshall Bernie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel L. McElvain U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Room 7200 Washington, DC 20530 (202) 514−2988 Fax: (202) 616−8460 Email: joel.l.mcelvain@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Sitcov (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/12/2014
Stephen McCoy Elliott (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marsha Stelson Edney U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch P.O. Box 883 Washington, DC 20530 (202) 514−4520 Fax: (202) 616−8470 Email: marsha.edney@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Matthew A. Josephson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Megan Anne Crowley U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE P.O. Box 883 Washington, DC 20044 (202) 305−0754 Fax: (202) 616−8470 Email: megan.a.crowley@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Marshall Bernie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tamra Tyree Moore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew Marshall Bernie (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 13 of 203
Elbert Lin OFFICE OF THE WEST VIRGINIA ATTORNEY GENERAL 1900 Kanawha Boulevard East State Capitol Building 1, Room 26−E Charleston, WV 25305 304.558.2021 Email: elbert.lin@wvago.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Interested Party CONNIE CHANEY TERMINATED: 02/23/2006
Interested Party EARNEST HAROLD LONG
Interested Party JOHN WILL ALLEN, JR. TERMINATED: 02/23/2006
Interested Party SAMUEL BALDWIN TERMINATED: 02/23/2006
Interested Party ADAM J. ALLEN TERMINATED: 02/23/2006
Interested Party DAVID NUNN
Interested Party JEROLD RAY CHANEY TERMINATED: 02/23/2006
Interested Party DEKINGON ATCHISON BALDWIN TERMINATED: 02/23/2006
Interested Party LATONYA ATCHISON
Interested Party GRENETHA ATCHISON BALDWIN TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by CONNIE CHANEY PRO SE
represented by EARNEST HAROLD LONG PRO SE
represented by JOHN WILL ALLEN, JR. 1800 CO RD 402 Clanton, AL 35045 PRO SE
represented by SAMUEL BALDWIN PRO SE
represented by ADAM J. ALLEN 1800 Co. Rd 402 Clanton, AL 35045 PRO SE
represented by JEROLD RAY CHANEY PRO SE
represented by DEKINGON ATCHISON BALDWIN 970 Highway 191 Jemison, AL 35085 PRO SE
represented by GRENETHA ATCHISON BALDWIN 970 Highway 191 Jemison, AL 35085 PRO SE

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 14 of 203

Interested Party JAY ATCHISON TERMINATED: 02/23/2006
Interested Party JOSHLYNN ALLEN Interested Party MILDRED A. LONG TERMINATED: 02/23/2006 Interested Party MERDITH NUNN TERMINATED: 02/23/2006
Interested Party ERNEST BANKS
Interested Party RUTH BANKS
Interested Party GEORGE ROBERTS
Interested Party BUTLER, SNOW, O'MARA, STEVENS & CANNADA
Interested Party DOROTHY F. FORD Interested Party JESSE FORD Interested Party CASSANDRA WILSON Interested Party SHEILA JOHNSON

represented by JAY ATCHISON 1076 Highway 191 Jemison, AL 35085 PRO SE
represented by MILDRED A. LONG PRO SE
represented by MERDITH NUNN 173 Smith Rd Jemison, AL 35085 PRO SE
represented by David Joseph Frantz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Joseph Frantz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Joseph Frantz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David U. Fierst (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert Elijah Jordan , III STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036−1795 (202) 429−6290 Fax: (202) 261−7541 Email: rjordan@steptoe.com

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 15 of 203

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Interested Party ANGELA DOZIER−CARTER

represented by ANGELA DOZIER−CARTER P.O. Box 581 Franklinton, NC 27525 919−494−2773 PRO SE

Interested Party THEODORE F.B. BATES

represented by THEODORE F.B. BATES 524 W. McFarland Hill City, KS 67642 (785) 421−6242 PRO SE

Interested Party AVA L. BATES

Interested Party BRAD E, BATES

Interested Party THEODORE B. BATES, Jr.

Interested Party KARLA K. BATES−ADAMS

Interested Party TERRIE L. BATES−BEST

Interested Party PHILLIP L. FRAAS

represented by Phillip L. Fraas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Interested Party BERNARD BATES

Claimant THOMAS BURRELL

represented by John Wesley Davis LAW OFFICES OF JOHN W. DAVIS 1629 K Street, NW Suite 300 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 403−2276 Fax: (202) 403−3495 Email: jwdalaw@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James W. Myart , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/28/2005

Claimant

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 16 of 203

EVANS M. FOLINS On behalf of parents, Clifton and Lela Folins, both deceased. TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by EVANS M. FOLINS P.O. Box 81−1865 Los Valores, CA 90081 PRO SE

Claimant SANDY MCKINNON

represented by Stephon J. Bowens (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claimant BEN HILLSMAN, JR.

represented by Gerard Robert Lear SPEISER KRAUSE 2200 Clarendon Boulevard Suite 1201 Arlington, VA 22201 (703) 522−7500 Fax: (703) 522−7905 Email: grl@speiserkrause.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claimant ZELMA J. HILLSMAN

represented by Gerard Robert Lear (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claimant GEORGE BARR GRIFFIN

represented by J. L. Chestnut , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2008

Claimant LEON MATHEWS

represented by Joshua A Doan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claimant ROBERT HOLMES, SR.

represented by Joshua A Doan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claimant ESTATE OF CHARLIE KNOTT

represented by David N. Fagan COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 850 Tenth Street N.W. One City Center Washington, DC 20001 (202) 662−5291 Email: dfagan@cov.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claimant MAURICE MCGINNIS

represented by John M. Shoreman MCFADDEN & SHOREMAN, LLC

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 17 of 203

1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 772−3188 Fax: (202) 204−8610 Email: mstlaw@erols.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claimant EDWARD L. SCOTT, JR.

represented by Phillip L. Fraas (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Levi Boone , III BOONE LAW FIRM, P.A. ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant SARAH DAVIS

represented by Dennis Charles Sweet LANSTON, FRAZER, SWEET & FREESE 201 North President Street Jackson, MS 39201 (601) 969−1356 LEAD ATTORNEY

Movant BANKS LAW FIRM

represented by Wyndell Oliver Banks 1225 I Street, NW Suite 500 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 682−4761 Fax: 202−371−1990 LEAD ATTORNEY

Movant JAMES TANNER

represented by Ford C. Ladd LAW OFFICES OF FORD C. LADD 908 King Street Suite 350 Alexandria, VA 22314 (703) 836−4880 Fax: (703) 683−5983 Email: fladd@sec−law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant HAROLD B. DIXON

Movant LARRY GARRETT

Movant BETTY GARRETT

Movant

represented by

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 18 of 203

EVELYN M. COLEMAN TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

EVELYN M. COLEMAN 19147 Dentville Road Hazlehurst, MS 39083 (601) 364−2666 Fax: AREA CODE (601) PRO SE

Movant CAROLYN SMITH

Movant
WILLIE S. MAYMON TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by WILLIE S. MAYMON P.O. Box 48 Rolling Fork, MS 39159 PRO SE

Movant COLIE DIXON, SR.

Movant
L. D. MAYMON TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by L. D. MAYMON P.O. Box 455 Hazlehurst, MS 39159 PRO SE

Movant
LOIS S. CLARK TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by LOIS S. CLARK 2025 Brownwells Road Wesson, MS 39191 (601) 894−5016 Fax: AREA CODE (601) PRO SE

Movant
CURTIS DIXON TERMINATED: 02/23/2004

Movant
LINDA CATCHING TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by LINDA CATCHING 1008 Lofton Road Hazlehurst, MS 39083 PRO SE

Movant
HENRY A. VAUGHN TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by HENRY A. VAUGHN 19153 Dentville Road Hazlehurst, MS 39083−9441 (601) 894−3378 Fax: AREA CODE (601) PRO SE

Movant
FLORIA A. VAUGHN TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by FLORIA A. VAUGHN 19153 Dentville Road Hazlehurst, MS 39083−9441 Fax: AREA CODE (601) PRO SE

Movant

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 19 of 203

MARILYNN STEWART

Movant FERNANDO BURKETTE

Movant WILLIAM H. MILLER

Movant GARY GRANT

Movant
LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. BRANCH

represented by David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
J.L. CHESTNUT on behalf of an identified class of "late claimants"

represented by Faya R. Toure (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J. L. Chestnut , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2008

Movant ROSE M. SANDERS

represented by Faya R. Toure (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rose M. Sanders (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant OTHELLO C. CROSS

represented by Othello C. Cross (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant CLARENCE HARDY

Movant
BARBARA J. HARDY TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by BARBARA J. HARDY #90 Route Three Broadlane Road Williamstown, NJ 08094 PRO SE

Movant
CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES

represented by Anurag Varma (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 20 of 203

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Joseph Frantz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006

Movant LEOLA LOGAN

represented by James W. Myart , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/28/2005

Movant THEODIE LOGAN

represented by James W. Myart , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/28/2005

Movant ELMORE HICKS

Movant LUDEAN HICKS

Movant SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP

represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Emily Johnson Henn COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 333 Twin Dolphin Drive Suite 700 Redwood Shores, CA 94065 (650) 632−4715 Fax: (650) 632−4815 Email: ehenn@cov.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua A Doan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dawn V. Martin LAW OFFICES OF DAWN V. MARTIN 1725 I Street, NW Suite 300 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 408−7040 Fax: (703) 642−0208 Email: dvmartinlaw@yahoo.com TERMINATED: 08/22/2008

Movant

represented by

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 21 of 203

BLACK FARMERS & AGRICULTURALISTS ASSOCIATION TERMINATED: 03/02/2012

Dedrick Brittenum , Jr. 6465 Quail Hollow Road Suite 401C Memphis, TN 38120 (901) 751−7932 Email: db@brittenumbruce.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant HENRY BURRIS

Movant MUHAMMAD ROBBALAA

represented by MUHAMMAD ROBBALAA 16802 Ft. Coffee Road Spiro, OK 74959 PRO SE

Movant DOROTHY WISE

represented by DOROTHY WISE 2251 Swift Creek School Road Whitakers, NC 27891 PRO SE

Movant EDDIE WISE

represented by EDDIE WISE 2251 Swift Creek School Road Whitakers, NC 27891 252−397−8983 PRO SE

Movant COWTOWN FOUNDATION INC.

Plaintiff MCARTHUR NESBIT

represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Talbot Seymour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006

Plaintiff EDDIE SLAUGHTER

represented by

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 22 of 203

Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Talbot Seymour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006

Plaintiff LEO JACKSON

represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Talbot Seymour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006

Plaintiff J. B. BLACK

represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 23 of 203

Plaintiff LUCIOUS ABRAMS, JR.
Plaintiff GRIFFIN TOOD, SR.

Richard Talbot Seymour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006
represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Talbot Seymour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Harold Dowdy WILLIAM H. DOWDY ATTORNEY AT LAW P.O. Box 2307 101 North Court Street Suite 13 Lumberton, NC 28359 (910) 739−7399 Fax: 910−739−7391 Email: dowdylaw@raleigh.twcbc.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006
represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 24 of 203

Richard Talbot Seymour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006

Plaintiff GREGORY ERVES

represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Talbot Seymour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006

Plaintiff CECIL BREWINGTON

represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Talbot Seymour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Harold Dowdy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 25 of 203

J. L. Chestnut , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2008

Plaintiff HERBERT L. SKINNER, JR.

represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Talbot Seymour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006

Plaintiff OBIE L. BEAL

represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Talbot Seymour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006

Plaintiff
CLIFFORD LOVETT On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

represented by Anthony Herman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David A. Branch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 26 of 203

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacob A. Stein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Talbot Seymour (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander John Pires , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2006

Movant
ANTONIO SANTOS Applicants nos. 1−50

represented by Gerard Robert Lear (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant CLINTON R. MARTIN

represented by Gerard Robert Lear (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant JAMES WALKER

Movant SALLIE WALKER

Movant
EZRA MCNAIR TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by EZRA MCNAIR 1046 Lomax Lane Crystal Springs, MS 39059 (601) 892−1490 Fax: AREA CODE (601) PRO SE

Movant GROVER MILLER

Movant
GERALDSTINE MILLER TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by GERALDSTINE MILLER 5044 Cooper Road Georgetown, MS 39078 (601) 858−2497 Fax: AREA CODE (601) PRO SE

Movant
LARRY D. BARNES TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by LARRY D. BARNES 5348 Gatesville Road Harrisville, MS 39082 PRO SE

Movant

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 27 of 203

EDITH LOMAX−BARNES TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by EDITH LOMAX−BARNES 1028 Lomax Lane Crystal Springs, MS 39059 (601) 846−2814 Fax: AREA CODE (601) PRO SE

Movant CARRIE MCNAIR

Movant
DARYL BRENTR TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by DARYL BRENTR 1765 Highway 28 West Pinola, MS 39149 (601) 847−2690 Fax: AREA CODE (601) PRO SE

Movant CURTIS DIXON

represented by CURTIS DIXON 374 Broadview Drive Jackson, MS 39209 (601) 355−8753 PRO SE

Movant HAROLD B. DIXON

Movant
VELMA J. COLLINS TERMINATED: 02/23/2006

represented by VELMA J. COLLINS P.O. Box 266 Hazlehurst, MS 39083 (601) 894−2240 Fax: AREA CODE (601) PRO SE

Movant ROBERT E. COLLINS

Date Filed 08/28/1997 08/28/1997 09/05/1997 09/09/1997
09/12/1997
09/16/1997

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by plaintiff TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, plaintiff LLOYD SHAFER, plaintiff GEORGE HALL; jury demand (dbw) (bj, ). (Entered: 08/29/1997)
SUMMONS (3) issued to federal party(s) federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN, and non−parties: U.S. Attorney and U.S. Attorney General. (dbw) (Entered: 08/29/1997)
2 NOTICE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN of related cases; exhibit (1) (blj) (bj, ). (Entered: 09/09/1997)
3 MOTION filed by plaintiffs TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, LLOYD SHAFER, GEORGE HALL requesting assignment to Magistrate Judge kay for non−binding mediation (blj) (Entered: 09/10/1997)
4 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN to motion requesting assignment to Magistrate Judge kay for non−binding mediation [3−1] by GEORGE HALL, LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (blj) (Entered: 09/15/1997)
5 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN by Susan Hall Lennon (blj) (Entered: 09/17/1997)

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09/23/1997 09/23/1997 10/08/1997 10/23/1997 10/23/1997 10/23/1997
10/23/1997 10/24/1997 10/30/1997 10/30/1997 11/04/1997
11/04/1997 11/14/1997 11/14/1997 11/17/1997

6 OBJECTIONS by plaintiffs TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, LLOYD SHAFER, GEORGE HALL to related case designation; attachment (blj) (Entered: 09/24/1997)
7 REPLY by plaintiffs TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, LLOYD SHAFER, GEORGE HALL to response to motion requesting assignment to Magistrate Judge kay for non−binding mediation [3−1] by GEORGE HALL, LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD; attachment (blj) (Entered: 09/24/1997)
8 REPLY by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in support of defendant's notice of related cases [2−1] by DAN GLICKMAN, and response to plaintiff's letter dated 10/7/97 . (bm) (Entered: 10/10/1997)
9 NOTICE OF FILING by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN of proposed scheduling order (blj) (Entered: 10/24/1997)
10 MEET AND CONFER STATEMENT/REPORT PURSUANT TO L.R. 206(d) filed by plaintiffs TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, LLOYD SHAFER, GEORGE HALL, federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN. (blj) (Entered: 10/24/1997)
11 AMENDED COMPLAINT by plaintiffs TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, LLOYD SHAFER, GEORGE HALL adding plaintiffs MCARTHUR NESBIT, EDDIE SLAUGHTER, LEO JACKSON, J. B. BLACK, LUCIOUS ABRAMS JR., GRIFFIN TOOD SR., GREGORY ERVES, CECIL BREWINGTON, HERBERT L. SKINNER JR., OBIE L. BEAL, CLIFFORD LOVETT, and amending complaint [1−1] . (blj) (bj, ). (Entered: 10/24/1997)
SUMMONS NOT ISSUED. (blj) (Entered: 10/24/1997)
MEET AND CONFER STATUS CONFERENCE before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Status conference set for 10:00 10/30/97 Reporter: Vernell Marshall (bm) (Entered: 10/24/1997)
STATUS CONFERENCE before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures due in 15 days; dispositive motions due 11/18/97; status conference set for 10:00 11/17/97 ; plaintiff can file a motion for class certification after it reviews the files. Reporter: Santa Zizzo (bm) (Entered: 10/30/1997)
12 TRANSCRIPT filed of status conference for date(s) of 10/24/97. Reporter: Vernell A. Marshall (ks) (Entered: 10/30/1997)
13 SCHEDULING ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman confirming dates set at the meet and confer status conference held 10/30/97; disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) shall be made by 11/14/97; plaintiffs shall file a motion for class certification within 90 days after the date the complaint was filed or at their earliest convenience; defendant shall respond or shall move for discovery on the class certification issue within 11 days; dispositive motions due 11/18/97; response to dispositive motions due 12/1/97; reply to dispositive motions due 12/8/97; further status conference set for 11/17/97 at 10:00 a.m. ; setting forth instructions to counsel. (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/04/1997)
14 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: denying defendant's motion for related case designation; denying motion requesting assignment to Magistrate Judge kay for non−binding mediation [3−1] by GEORGE HALL, LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/04/1997)
15 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman ; setting forth procedures for handling confidential material; allowing designated material to be filed under seal; attachment. (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/14/1997)
16 MOTION filed by counsel for JOHN DOE applicants nos. 1−50 for leave to intervene ; Exhibit (MOTION FOR INTERVENTION, REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RULING AND MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT) (blj) (Entered: 11/14/1997)
STATUS CONFERENCE before Judge Paul L. Friedman: movant interveners shall supplement their motions due 11/21/97; parties will respond to motion to intervene due 12/3/97; reply to motion due 12/9/97; status conference set for 10:00 12/19/97 Reporter: Santa Zizzo (bm) (Entered: 11/17/1997)

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11/17/1997
11/17/1997 11/20/1997
11/20/1997 11/20/1997 11/21/1997 12/01/1997
12/01/1997 12/03/1997
12/03/1997 12/05/1997 12/09/1997
12/10/1997 12/11/1997 12/15/1997 12/17/1997
12/17/1997 12/19/1997
12/22/1997 12/24/1997

17 REPORT by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN to the Court regarding his compliance with the 11/4/97 Scheduling Order; Exhibit (1); Declaration (1). (ks) (Entered: 11/18/1997)
20 MOTION filed by movant SARAH DAVIS to intervene (blj) (Entered: 11/20/1997)
18 AGREED ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : that the deadlines extablished in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 11/4/97 Scheduling order are extended for a period of thirty (30) days; and setting fourth instructions to counsel. (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/20/1997)
19 SCHEDULING ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : Confirming dates set at the status conference on 11/17/97. (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/20/1997)
21 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 10/30/97. Reporter: Santa Theresa Zizzo (blj) (Entered: 11/21/1997)
22 MOTION filed for CLINTON R. MARTIN to intervene ; Exhibit (COMPLAINT) (blj) (Entered: 11/24/1997)
23 MOTION filed for JAMES WALKER, SALLIE WALKER to intervene; by attarney J. L. Chestnut; "Let this be filed" (fiat) Judge Friedman ; Attachment (1) (blj) (Entered: 12/01/1997)
24 LETTER to Judge Friedman regarding the intervenors agreement "Let this be filed" (fiat) Judge Friedman (blj) (Entered: 12/01/1997)
25 RESPONSE by plaintiff in opposition to amended motion for CLINTON R. MARTIN to intervene and memorandum brief in support [22−1]; Exhibit (1) (blj) (Entered: 12/04/1997)
26 MEMORANDUM by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in opposition to motion for CLINTON R. MARTIN to intervene [22−1] (blj) (Entered: 12/04/1997)
27 MOTION filed by plaintiff for leave to file second amended class action complaint ; EXHIBIT (second complaint) (JMF) (Entered: 12/08/1997)
28 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in opposition to motion for CLINTON R. MARTIN to intervene [22−1]; Attachments (2) (blj) (Entered: 12/10/1997)
40 REPLY by movant CLINTON R. MARTIN to response to motion for CLINTON R. MARTIN to intervene [22−1] (ks) (Entered: 02/24/1998)
STATUS CONFERENCE before Judge Paul L. Friedman: held Reporter: Laura Beasley (bm) (Entered: 12/11/1997)
29 MOTION filed by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN to extend time to respond to plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint (bm) (Entered: 12/16/1997)
30 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to respond to plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint [29−1] by DAN GLICKMAN (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/17/1997)
31 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for leave to file third anended class action complaint ; Exhibit (THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT) (blj) (Entered: 12/18/1997)
STATUS CONFERENCE before Judge Paul L. Friedman: case will be sent to mediation for a period of 60 days; status conference set for 2:00 1/26/98 ; plaintiff shall file a proposed scheduling order; motions to intervene shall be held in abeyance. Reporter: Santa Zizzo (bm) (Entered: 12/19/1997)
Tele−conference held before Judge Paul L. Friedman reporter: Santa Zizzo (bm) (Entered: 12/22/1997)
32 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : that the stipulation and Order entered this same day is not intended to preclude, nor does it preclude, Mr. Eddie Ross, represented by Mr. Philip Fraas, from completing the administrative settlement of his case with the Department of Agriculture. (N) (dot) (Entered: 12/24/1997)

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12/24/1997
12/24/1997 12/31/1997 01/07/1998 01/08/1998 01/26/1998 01/26/1998 02/10/1998 03/05/1998 03/05/1998 03/06/1998
03/09/1998 03/09/1998

33 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : this matter is stayed for a period of 6 months from the date of entry of this order, during which period the parties shall participate in non−binding mediation; that, plaintiffs and putative class members shall participate in non−binding, court−supervised mediation which the parties shall commence on a case−by−case basis as soon as practicable using the services of one or more mediators to be agreed upon by the parties; the Court appoints Michael Lewis as the lead mediator for the mediations referred to in the preceding sentence; parties shall jointly contact Mr. Lewis as coon as practicable for the purpose of initiating the mediation process, but in no event later than the week of 1/5/98; putative class members who are represented by counsel other than Messrs. Pires, Fraas, Frazer, Chestnut, and Cross may elect to attempt to settle their claims through the US Department of Agriculture's administrative procedure for resolving claims of discrimination in USDA farm programs; that the costs associated with obtaining the services of the mediator(s) described in paragraph 2, above, shall be divided equally between plaintiffs and defendant; that, for purposes of factual development, defendant may contact any person who has filed a claim with USDA alleging discrimination in USDA's implementation of its farm programs, and whom plaintiffs' counsel have not identified to defendant in writing as being a represented party in this litigation; defendant's investigators shall not contact any person identified by plaintiffs' consel in writing pursuant to the preceding sentence without first obtaining permission to do so from such counsel; status hearing set for 2:00 1/26/98 (N) (dot) (bj, ). (Entered: 12/24/1997)
34 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 11/17/97. Reporter: Santa Theresa Zizzo (blj) (Entered: 12/29/1997)
35 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Gerard Robert Lear representing movant JOHN DOE, movant CLINTON R. MARTIN . New address: SPEISER KRAUSE 2300 Clarendon Boulevard, Suite 306, Arlington, VA 22201, (703) 522−7500. (ks) (Entered: 12/31/1997)
36 TRANSCRIPT filed of status conference for date(s) of 12/11/97. Reporter: Laura Beasley (ks) (Entered: 01/08/1998)
37 TRANSCRIPT filed of Status conference for date(s) of 12/19/97. Reporter: Santa Zizzo (ks) (Entered: 01/08/1998)
STATUS CONFERENCE before Judge Paul L. Friedman: status conference set for 10:00 3/5/98 ; parties will notify the Court if they wish to set a tele−conference date. Reporter: Edward Hawkins (bm) (Entered: 01/26/1998)
38 AFFIDAVIT of Jacob Lipscomb. (ks) (Entered: 01/27/1998)
39 TRANSCRIPT filed of status conference for date(s) of 1/26/98. Reporter: Edward Hawkins (ks) (Entered: 02/11/1998)
STATUS CONFERENCE before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Stay lifted; plaintiff to file their motion on the statute of limitations; motion for class certification and motion for injunctive relief; trial set for 2/1/99 at 9:30 a.m.; the parties will file a report in ten days stating how they wish to proceed with mediation; an order will be filed setting forth exact dates. Reporter: Laura Beasley (bm) (Entered: 03/05/1998)
41 MOTION filed by movant CLINTON R. MARTIN to withdraw motion for CLINTON R. MARTIN to intervene [22−1] (bm) (Entered: 03/05/1998)
42 SCHEDULING ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman lifting stay for the purposes of briefing plaintiffs' motion for class certification and motion for partial summary judgment due 3/9/98; response to motions due 4/8/98 reply to motions due 4/15/98; parties shall meet with the mediator by 3/17/98 to discuss whether further mediation would be fruitful and, if so, how best to proceed; the parties shall file a written report with the Court by 3/18/98 respecting a proposed course of action; trial set for 2/1/99 (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/06/1998)
43 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for certification of class ; Exhibits (6). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 03/10/1998)
44 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for partial summary judgment ; Exhibits (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 03/10/1998)

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03/10/1998 03/30/1998 04/06/1998 04/08/1998 04/08/1998 04/08/1998 04/15/1998 04/15/1998 04/16/1998 04/22/1998 04/22/1998 04/29/1998 05/01/1998 05/06/1998 05/08/1998
05/11/1998

45 SCHEDULING ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman extending the parties' deadline for meeting with the mediator and filing a written report with the Court until 3/20/98 (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/10/1998)
46 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing for date(s) of 3/5/98. Reporter: Laura Beasley (ks) (Entered: 03/31/1998)
47 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the parties shall continue to meet with the mediator and the parties or the mediator shall report to the Court in writing on the status of settlement negotiations by 4/15/98. (N) (bm) (Entered: 04/06/1998)
48 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in opposition to motion for certification of class [43−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD; Exhibits (14). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 04/09/1998)
49 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in opposition to motion for partial summary judgment [44−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD; Exhibits (2). (ks) (Entered: 04/09/1998)
50 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN by Terry M. Henry (ks) (Entered: 04/09/1998)
51 MOTION (consent) filed by plaintiffs to extend time to 4/22/98 to file reply briefs on plaintiff's motions for class certification and for partial summary judgment. (ks) (Entered: 04/16/1998)
52 MOTION filed by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN to communicate with unnamed, unrepresented putative class members ; Exhibits (5). (ks) (Entered: 04/16/1998)
53 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to 4/22/98 to file reply briefs on plaintiff's motions for class certification and for partial summary judgment [51−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (N) (bm) (Entered: 04/16/1998)
55 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to motion for partial summary judgment [44−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (ks) (Entered: 05/01/1998)
56 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to motion for certification of class [43−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD; Exhibits (4). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 05/01/1998)
54 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to communicate with unnamed, unrepresented putative class members [52−1] by DAN GLICKMAN . (ks) (Entered: 04/30/1998)
57 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: motions hearing set for 2:30 5/13/98 at which time the Court will hear argument on all pending motions ; setting forth instructions to counsel regarding time limit; counsel shall notify the Court by 5/12/98 of how the time will be allocated. (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/01/1998)
58 REPLY by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN to response to motion to communicate with unnamed, unrepresented putative class members [52−1] by DAN GLICKMAN (ks) (Entered: 05/07/1998)
59 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: lifting stay imposed on Order of 12/24/97 to the extent necessary to permit the Court to rule on the pending motions to amend the complaint and to permit the government to answer or otherwise respond to the relevant amended complaint; by 5/13/98 plaintiffs shall file their motion for leave to file fourth amended complaint; government's response to motion for leave to file second, third and fourth amended complaint by 5/22/98; plaintiffs' reply due 5/29/98; setting forth instructions to the government regarding responsive pleading; plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment shall be held in abeyance pending filing of the government's answer or other responsive pleading; setting forth instructions what the parties shall do within ten days after responsive pleading is filed; plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment shall be be argued at the hearing for 5/13/98 a t 2:30 p.m. (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/08/1998)
60 MOTION filed by plaintiff TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD for leave to file fourth amended class action complaint (ks) (Entered: 05/12/1998)

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05/12/1998 05/13/1998
05/15/1998 05/22/1998 05/22/1998
05/27/1998
06/01/1998 06/03/1998
06/03/1998 06/03/1998 06/10/1998 07/01/1998 07/01/1998 07/06/1998 07/06/1998 07/20/1998 07/21/1998

61 MOTION filed by plaintiff TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD for leave to file fifth amended complaint [1−1] by GEORGE HALL, LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD ; EXHIBIT (FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT) (ks) (Entered: 05/14/1998)
MOTION HEARING before Judge Paul L. Friedman taken under advisement by DAN GLICKMAN motion to communicate with unnamed, unrepresented putative class members [52−1], taken under advisement by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD motion for certification of class [43−1] Reporter: Santa Zizzo (bm) (Entered: 05/14/1998)
62 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for leave to file a revised proposed order. (ks) (Entered: 05/18/1998)
63 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in opposition to motion for leave to file a revised proposed order. [62−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD; Exhibits (2). (ks) (Entered: 05/26/1998)
64 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in opposition to motion for leave to file fifth amended complaint [1−1] [61−1]; motion for leave to file fourth amended class action complaint [60−1]; motion for leave to file third anended class action complaint [31−1]; motion for leave to file second class action complaint [27−1] by plaintiffs. (ks) (Entered: 05/26/1998)
65 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion for leave to file fifth amended complaint [1−1] by GEORGE HALL, LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD [61−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, motion for leave to file fourth amended class action complaint [60−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, motion for leave to file third anended class action complaint [31−1] by plaintiff, motion for leave to file second amended class action complaint [27−1] by plaintiff (ks) (Entered: 05/28/1998)
66 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion for leave to file a revised proposed order. [62−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (ks) (Entered: 06/02/1998)
67 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for leave to file second amended class action complaint [27−1] by plaintiff; granting motion for leave to file third amended class action complaint [31−1] by plaintiff; motion for leave to file fourth amended class action complaint [60−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD; granting motion for leave to file fifth amended complaint [1−1] by GEORGE LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD [61−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/03/1998)
207 FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT by plaintiffs [1−1] .; jury demand (Bulky) (ks) Modified on 06/30/1999 (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/30/1999)
208 FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT by plaintiffs [1−1] .; jury demand (Bulky) (ks) (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/30/1999)
68 TRANSCRIPT filed of motions hearing for date(s) of 5/13/98. Reporter: Santa Zizzo (ks) (Entered: 06/11/1998)
69 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to withdraw motion for CLINTON R. MARTIN to intervene [22−1] [41−1] by CLINTON R. MARTIN (N) (ks) (Entered: 07/01/1998)
70 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for leave to file a revised proposed order. [62−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (N) (ks) (Entered: 07/01/1998)
71 MOTION filed by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN for judgment, in part, on the pleadings , and for partial summary judgment ; exhibits (9). (dot) (Entered: 07/07/1998)
72 ANSWER TO COMPLAINT [1−1] by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN . (dot) (bj, ). (Entered: 07/07/1998)
73 JOINT STATUS REPORT by plaintiff, federal defendant on plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. (ks) (Entered: 07/22/1998)
74 RESPONSE by plaintiff in opposition to motion for judgment, in part, on the pleadings [71−1] by DAN GLICKMAN, motion for partial summary judgment [71−2] by DAN GLICKMAN; Exhibit (1). (ks) (Entered: 07/22/1998)

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07/23/1998 07/23/1998 07/28/1998
08/10/1998 08/21/1998 08/27/1998 09/23/1998 09/29/1998 10/02/1998 10/07/1998 10/07/1998 10/09/1998 10/09/1998
10/09/1998 10/09/1998 10/13/1998 10/15/1998
10/15/1998

75 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiffs of withdrawing Count IV with prejudice to the amended complaint. (dot) (Entered: 07/24/1998)
76 MOTION (unopposed) filed by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN to extend time to 8/10/98 to file a reply in support of defendant's motion for judgment, in part, on the pleadings and for partial summary judgment. (dot) (Entered: 07/24/1998)
77 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to 8/10/98 to file a reply in support of defendant's motion for judgment, in part, on the pleadings and for partial summary judgment [76−1] by DAN GLICKMAN (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/28/1998)
78 REPLY by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN to response to motion for judgment, in part, on the pleadings [71−1] by DAN GLICKMAN, motion for partial summary judgment [71−2] by DAN GLICKMAN; declaration (1). (dot) (Entered: 08/12/1998)
79 MOTION filed by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN for status conference (dot) (Entered: 08/24/1998)
80 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion for status conference [79−1] by DAN GLICKMAN . (ks) (Entered: 08/28/1998)
81 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for status conference [79−1] by DAN GLICKMAN; status conference for 1:30 10/13/98 in Courtroom 20 (N) (bm) (bj). (Entered: 09/23/1998)
82 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying as moot motion to intervene [20−1] by SARAH DAVIS; denying as moot motion for JAMES WALKER, SALLIE WALKER to intervene [23−1] (N) (bm) (bj). (Entered: 09/29/1998)
83 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to amend complaint [1−1] by GEORGE HALL, LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD ; EXHIBIT (SIXTH AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT) (ks) (Entered: 10/05/1998)
84 MOTION filed by plaintiff for leave to file supplement to plaintiff's motion for certification of class ; EXHIBIT (SUPPLEMENT) (tb) (Entered: 10/08/1998)
85 MOTION filed by plaintiff for partial summary judgment (tb) (Entered: 10/08/1998)
86 OPINION by Judge Paul L. Friedman (N) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 10/09/1998)
87 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for certification of class [43−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD; certifying a class for purposes of determining liability; setting forth definition of class; directing plaintiffs shall file a further amended complaint detailing the claims of four typical representatives of each subclass by 10/23/98; the parties shall jointly file a draft notice to class members by 10/30/98. (N) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 10/09/1998)
88 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: setting forth to counsel issues to be discussed at the status conference 10/13/98. (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/09/1998)
209 SIXTH AMENDED COMPLAINT by plaintiffs [1−1] .; jury demand (Bulky) (ks) Modified on 06/30/1999 (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/30/1999)
HEARING before Judge Paul L. Friedman: held, Court will issue a scheduling order. Reporter: Santa Zizzo (bm) (Entered: 10/14/1998)
89 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: defendant shall file a supplement to motion for partial summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings due 10/27/98; plaintiffs' supplemental response to motions due 11/6/98; plaintiffs shall file a notice with the Court as soon as possible or by 11/9/98; setting forth what the notice should address; defendant's response, if any, is due five days after plaintiffs' notice is filed; discovery closes 12/15/98; pretrial conference set for 1:30 1/4/99; counsell for all parties shall file a Joint Pretrial Statement due 12/22/98 setting forth instructions to counsel (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/15/1998)
210 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs; Exhibits (2). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 06/30/1999)

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10/22/1998 10/23/1998
10/26/1998 10/28/1998 10/28/1998 10/30/1998 11/18/1998 12/23/1998 01/05/1999 01/05/1999
01/05/1999 01/05/1999 01/05/1999 01/05/1999
01/05/1999 01/28/1999 02/11/1999 02/16/1999

90 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs and federal defendant to extend time to 10/26/98 to file their Seventh Amended Complaint and 10/28/98 for defendant to file his supplemental brief (tth) (Entered: 10/23/1998)
91 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting joint motion to extend time to 10/26/98 to file their Seventh Amended Complaint and 10/28/98 for defendant to file his supplemental brief [90−1] by plaintiff, federal defendant, (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/23/1998)
92 AMENDED COMPLAINT (SEVENTH) by plaintiffs [1−1] .; jury demand (ks) (bj, ). (Entered: 10/28/1998)
93 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL of motion for partial summary judgment [44−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (st) (Entered: 10/29/1998)
94 PRETRIAL STATEMENTS by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN (st) (Entered: 10/29/1998)
95 RESPONSE by plaintiffs, and federal defendant to order [87−1]; notice of filing draft class notices; Exhibits (2). (ks) (Entered: 11/02/1998)
96 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting motion for partial summary judgment [85−1] by plaintiffs; plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment shall be removed from the docket of the Court. (N) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 11/18/1998)
97 LETTER undated, to Judge Friedman regarding settlement efforts. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (Entered: 12/23/1998)
98 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs, federal defendants, to consolidate case with 98−1693 (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 01/06/1999)
99 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting joint motion to consolidate case with 98−1693 [98−1] plaintiffs and federal defendant, in 1:97−cv−01978, granting joint motion to consolidate case with 97−1978 [8−1] by plaintiffs and federal defendant in 1:98−cv−01693 for purposes of settlement. (N) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 01/06/1999)
100 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: vacating the Court's 10/9/98 Order certifying a class of plaintiffs pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(2); certifying the following class of plaintiffs; setting forth that class. (N) (bm) (bj). (Entered: 01/06/1999)
101 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs and federal defendant in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiffs and federal defendant in 1:98−cv−01693 for preliminary approval of consent decree (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 01/06/1999)
102 NOTICE by plaintiffs and federal defendant in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiffs and federal defendant in 1:98−cv−01693, of class certification and proposed class settlement (bm) (Entered: 01/06/1999)
103 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting joint motion for preliminary approval of consent decree [101−1] by plaintiffs, federal defendant, in 1:97−cv−01978, 1:98−cv−01693; the trial of 2/1/99 temporarily postponed until after the fairness hearing; fairness hearing set for 10:00 3/2/99 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 ; no term of the Consent Decree shall be effectuated unless and until the Court finally approves, executes, and enters the Consent Decree after the fairness hearing. (N) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 01/06/1999)
104 UNEXECUTED CONSENT DECREE (copy for viewing only) by plaintiffs and federal defendant in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiffs and federal defendant in 1:98−cv−01693; exhibits (2) (bm) (Entered: 01/06/1999)
105 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file report to the court :EXHIBIT (Report No. 1) (lkn) (Entered: 01/29/1999)
110 OBJECTIONS to consent judgment plaintiff Estell Green Jr [104−1] 1:97−cv−01978, consent judgment [14−1] 1:98−cv−01693 (bjsp) (Entered: 02/18/1999)
106 OBJECTIONS to consent judgment filed 1/5/99 [104−1] by We, Greg Smitman, and Lorette Picciano l:97−cv−01978, consent judgment filed 1/5/99 [14−1] by 1:98−cv−01693 ; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 02/18/1999)

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02/16/1999 02/16/1999 02/16/1999 02/16/1999
02/17/1999 02/17/1999 02/18/1999

107 OBJECTIONS to consent judgment filed 1/5/99 [104−1] by Lawrence C. Lucas [14−1] 1:98−cv−01693 (bjsp) (Entered: 02/18/1999)
108 OBJECTIONS to consent judgment 1/5/99 [104−1] by Philip Haynie 1:97−cv−01978, [14−1] 1:98−cv−01693 (bjsp) (Entered: 02/18/1999)
109 OBJECTIONS to consent judgment filed 1/5/99 [104−1] by individuals and organizations listed in this pleading. 1:97−cv−01978, consent judgment [14−1] 1:98−cv−01693 (bjsp) (Entered: 02/18/1999)
114 OBJECTIONS by Ada Bates, Theodore Bates, Ava Bates and Theodore Bates to the 1/5/99 consent judgment [104−1] in 1:97−cv−01978, consent judgment [14−1] by plaintiff, federal defendant, plaintiff, movant, plaintiff, federal defendant, plaintiff in 1:98−cv−01693 (cjp) (Entered: 02/23/1999)
111 OBJECTIONS to consent judgment filed 1/5/99 [104−1] by Jessie Nimmons 1:97−cv−01978, consent judgment [14−1] 1:98−cv−01693 (bjsp) (Entered: 02/18/1999)
112 OBJECTIONS to consent judgment filed 1/5/99 [104−1] by Lorette Picciano and other plaintiffs who object 1:97−cv−01978, order [13−2] in 1:98−cv−01693 ; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 02/18/1999)
113 STATUS REPORT by plaintiff TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LLOYD SHAFER in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff GEORGE HALL in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff MCARTHUR NESBIT in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff EDDIE SLAUGHTER in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LEO JACKSON in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff J. B. BLACK in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LUCIOUS ABRAMS JR. in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff GRIFFIN TOOD SR. in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff GREGORY ERVES in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff CECIL BREWINGTON in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff HERBERT L. SKINNER JR. in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff OBIE L. BEAL in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff CLIFFORD LOVETT in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff CECIL BREWINGTON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JERRY COOPER in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ARTHUR GRIFFIN in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CHARLIE H HARRIS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WILLIAM LAMPLEY in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff HENRY SIMMONS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WILLIE FRANK WHEELER in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff PAUL WINGARD in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ROY G. WOOD in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ARTHUR AMOS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff RANSOM ARNOLD in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CLARENCE POLK in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff HUBERT BROWN in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CAROL JEAN BROWN in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WILLIE HEAD JR. in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ANDREW JACKSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CLEM JONES in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff AARON MOBLEY in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff THEODORE F.B. BATES in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WILBERT WALKER in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JOHN M. DECOUDREAUX in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ROY H. ADAMS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff LARRY ALEXANDER in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff HERBERT C. ALLEN JR. in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JAMES C. BACON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff STANLEY BACON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff W. E. BRANDON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JOSEPH BROWN in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff LEON E. BROWN in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WILLIE J. BURNES in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JOSPEH CARTHAN in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff MICHAEL V. CHATMAN in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff RONALD CLARKE in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ALBERT J. COOPER in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ANDREW L. COOPER in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ELIJAH COLE JR. in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff HOUSTON COLEMAN in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ROBERT COLEMAN in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JIMMY L. CURRY in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ALFORT DAVIS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ADELL DAVIS SR. in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff HAROLD L. DAVIS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ONZIE GLEN in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff MARQUIS GRANT in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WILLIAM HAMKLIN in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff THETIS HARDY in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff GEORGE HENDERSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CARY HOLMES in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff MARK A. HOUSTON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff LEE ANDREW HOWARD in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff OLLIE HUDSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff TOBIAS JENKINS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff GARRETT JOHNSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff SAMMY JOHNSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WILLIE JOHNSON in

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02/22/1999 02/25/1999 02/25/1999

1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff FREDDIE JONES in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WILLIE E. LANE in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JAMES MADLOCK in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JAMES MADLOCK in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ANDRE MATHEWS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff KENZIE MCGINNIS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CURTIS MILLER in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff TED MILLER in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JESSIE MOORE in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ROGERS B. MORRIS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CARL PERRY in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JAMES W. PIGGS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff EDDIE REED in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JAMES SANDER in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff MATTIE SANDERS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WILLIE E. SIAS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff OLIVER SHORT in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff EDWARD SMITH in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff VERNON SMITH in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff W. C. SPENCER JR. in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff MCARTHUR STRAUGHTER in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JOHNNIE THOMAS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff HARRY P. THURMOND in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WILLIAM WATKINS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff BOBBY WELLS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff MICHAEL A. WHITE in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CARL WHITTINGTON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CLEOTHA WILLIAMS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff HERBERT WILLIAMS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JOHN A. WILLIAMS JR. in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ROBERT WILLIAMS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff SUSIE L. CROFT in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff RAPHAEL L. WILLIAMS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff SANDERS WILLIAMS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff FREDDIE L. WINTERS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff PERRY WOODS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WILLIE RICHARDSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff GRETHEL RICHARDSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ERIC RICHARDSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff DIONYSIA RICHARDSON−SMITH in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff GARON TRAWICK in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff PHILLIP R. BARKER in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CHENAY COSTON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff PERCY DAVIS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff SHEILA W. HARVEY in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff EDISON LAMONT SMITH JR. in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff LARRY R. WHITT in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff LAWRENCE L. BRECKENRIDGE in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff GEORGE C. ROBERTS JR. in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ENOCH EDWARDS JR. in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff HEZEKIAH GIBSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WALTER GORE in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff THEODORE HOUGH in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ANDREW B. JOHNSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CHARLIE MACK in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WALTER TERRELL in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff DAVID E. BOYD in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff TOM GARY EWELL in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ROBERT H. TAYLOR in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JACK TYUS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JAMES JENKINS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff KIRK A. BENOIT in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ABERRA BULBULLA in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CARL CHRISTOPHER in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff DENNIS CONNELL in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff BENJAMIN JACOBS−EL in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff VANNICO HANNEY in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ALPHONSO L. JAMES in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff SAMUEL MOORE in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JOAN NELSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff DELROY A. PETERSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff MARTIN REYNOLDS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WAYNE M. SMITH in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff LEONA WATSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CURNEALL WATSON in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff GAIL CHIANG in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff JAMES B. BEVERLY JR. in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff MACIO HILL in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff MASHELIA GRANDISON−KIZZIE in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff WEST BONES JR. in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ALICE DAVIS in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff CLINTON F. JOHNSON JR. in 1:98−cv−01693, plaintiff ALL PLAINTIFFS in 1:98−cv−01693 ; exhibits (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 02/19/1999)
115 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to status report [113−1] by plaintiff (tw) (Entered: 02/24/1999)
116 OBJECTIONS by John W. Boyd, Jr. to proposed consent decree (bm) (Entered: 02/25/1999)
117 LETTER dated 2/15/99 to Judge Friedman from 6 black farmers regarding the objections to the proposed consent decree, "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 02/25/1999)

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02/25/1999 02/25/1999 02/25/1999 02/25/1999 02/25/1999 02/25/1999 02/25/1999 02/25/1999 02/25/1999 02/25/1999
02/25/1999 03/01/1999
03/01/1999
03/01/1999 03/01/1999
03/02/1999 03/02/1999

118 LETTER dated 2/15/99 to Judge Friedman from Dr. Joseph Lowery, Convenor regarding settlement ageement. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 02/25/1999)
119 LETTER undated to Judge Friedman from George and Patricia Hildebrandt regarding concerns about the settlement agreement. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 02/25/1999)
120 LETTER dated 2/10/99 to Judge Friedman from Thomas Burrell, et al "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 02/25/1999)
121 LETTER dated 2/12/99 to Judge Friedman from Vernon D. Breckenridge, Advisor regarding terms of settlement agreement. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 02/25/1999)
122 LETTER dated 1/27/99 to the Clerk of the Court from Roy L. Rolle, Jr. regarding settlement agreement. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 02/25/1999)
123 LETTER dated 2/12/99 to Judge Friedman from Amelia Roland Washington regarding the settlement agreement. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 02/25/1999)
124 LETTER dated 1/27/99 to Judge Friedman from Jerome Williams regarding the settlement agreement "Let this be filed" (Fiat) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 02/25/1999)
125 LETTER dated 2/5/99 to Judge Friedman from Leonard C. Cooper regarding the settlement agreement "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 02/25/1999)
126 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiff THEODORE F.B. BATES in 1:98−cv−01693 entry of appearance temporarily (717 W. McFarlane, Hill City, KS 67662) (bm) (Entered: 02/26/1999)
127 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: setting forth persons or entities to have timely filed their objections; setting forth the allotted time to present objections; a schedule of presentations will be posted on the morning of the hearing. (N) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 02/26/1999)
128 MEMORANDUM by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in support of final approval of consent decree; Attachments. (lkn) (bj, ). (Entered: 02/26/1999)
129 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 in support of the objection to proposed consent decree filed by Greg Smitman and the National Council of Community Based Organizations in Agriculture; attachments (2) (tw) (bj, ). (Entered: 03/02/1999)
130 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to written objections to the consent decree [116−1], objection [112−1], objection [111−1], objection [109−1], objection [108−1], objection [107−1], objection [106−1], objection [114−1], objection [110−1]; exhibits (2) (tw) (Entered: 03/02/1999)
133 NOTICE of withdrawal of temporary appearance of Theodore B. Bates, Jr. (bm) (Entered: 03/05/1999)
143 MOTION filed by Natl. Black Farmers and Agriculturalist Assoc.and North Carolina Assoc. of Black Lawyers Land Loss Prevention Project for reconsideration of order [142−1] in 1:97−cv−01978, order [37−1] in 1:98−cv−01693 (bjsp) (Entered: 03/11/1999)
FAIRNESS HEARING before Judge Paul L. Friedman begun and concluded; issue taken under advisement; parties will respond to the motion for reconsideration by 3/8/99 Reporter: Santa Zizzo (bm) (Entered: 03/03/1999)
131 NOTICE OF FILING by RICHARD T. SEYMOUR, TERESA A. FERRANTE AND JULIE L. GANTZto the Court RE: their request to be added as counsel for National Council of Community based organizations in Agriculture et al (bjsp) (Entered: 03/03/1999)

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03/02/1999 03/08/1999 03/08/1999 03/08/1999 03/08/1999
03/08/1999 03/09/1999 03/10/1999 03/11/1999 03/11/1999 03/15/1999 03/19/1999 03/19/1999

132 NOTICE OF FILING of table of cases for the memorandum of the National Council of Community based organizations in Agriculture et al ; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 03/03/1999)
134 MOTION filed by NATL. COUNCIL OF COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATION, LAND LOST PREVENTION PROJECT, NATL BLACK FARMERS AAND NATL ASSOC. FOR ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE for order returning the proposed consent decree to the parties ; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 03/09/1999)
135 MEMORANDUM (POST HEARING) filed by NATL COUNCIL OF COMMUNICTY BASED ORG. , LAND LOSS PREVENTION, NATL BLACK FARMERS ASSOC AND NATL ASSOC FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (bjsp) (Entered: 03/09/1999)
136 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 10/13/98. Reporter: Santa Zizzo (bjsp) (Entered: 03/09/1999)
137 RESPONSE by plaintiff TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LLOYD SHAFER in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff GEORGE HALL in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff MCARTHUR NESBIT in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff EDDIE SLAUGHTER in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LEO JACKSON in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff J. B. BLACK in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LUCIOUS ABRAMS JR. in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff GRIFFIN TOOD SR. in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff GREGORY ERVES in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff CECIL BREWINGTON in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff HERBERT L. SKINNER JR. in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff OBIE L. BEAL in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff CLIFFORD LOVETT in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff ALL PLAINTIFFS in 1:98−cv−01693 to objectors' motion for reconsideration filed by Natl. Black Farmers, North Carolina Assoc. Black Lawyers and Land Loss Prevention Project (bjsp) (Entered: 03/09/1999)
139 MOTION filed by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978, federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:98−cv−01693 for reconsideration of order [127−1] in 1:97−cv−01978, order [25−1] in 1:98−cv−01693 to motion to reconsider order denyin request to present evidence and expert testimony (bjsp) (Entered: 03/10/1999)
138 (STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD PURSUANT TO THE JUDGE'S ORDER DOCKET NUMBER 141) NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiffs−objectors to the Court RE: post hearing submission of declarations and memorandum ; exhibits (2) (bjsp) Modified on 03/11/1999 (Entered: 03/10/1999)
140 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion for order returning the proposed consent decree to the parties in 1:97−cv−01978, 1:98−cv−01693 (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/11/1999)
141 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the Clerk of the Court shall not accept for filing the Post−Hearing Memorandum of the National Council of Community Based Organizations in Agriculture of the Rural Coalition and the Court will not consider it. (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/11/1999)
142 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: denying the motion of objector Land Loss Prevention Project for reconsideration of the Court's Order of 2/25/99 (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/11/1999)
144 RESPONSE by Horst W. Josellis to the Court pursuant to the 3/11/99 order directing parties to file their responses to class certification and proposed class settlement issues [127−1] in 1:97−cv−01978, 1:98−cv−01693, order [13−2] in 1:98−cv−01693, 1:97−cv−01978 (bjsp) (Entered: 03/18/1999)
145 LETTER from Judg Friedman to Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Esquire and Michael Sitcov, Esquire in re: objections and submisstion filed in support of Consent Decree. "Let this be filed" "Fiat" (jwd) (Entered: 03/19/1999)
146 LETTER dated 3/19/99 to Judge Friedman from Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Esquire and Philip D. Bartz, Esquire in response to Court 3/5/99 letter In re: revistion of Consent Decree. (jwd) (Entered: 03/19/1999)

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03/19/1999 03/19/1999 03/19/1999 03/19/1999
03/22/1999
03/26/1999
03/26/1999 03/29/1999 03/29/1999 03/29/1999
03/29/1999 03/29/1999 03/29/1999 03/31/1999 03/31/1999 04/05/1999
04/06/1999

147 CONSENT DECREE (FOR VIEWING ONLY) (jwd) (bj, ). (Entered: 03/19/1999)
148 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiff Theodore F.B. Bates to the Court RE: issues in this case regarding consent decree (bjsp) (Entered: 03/22/1999)
149 NOTICE OF FILING by Clarence Hardy to the Court RE: plaintiff's position regarding the consent decree; attachments (bjsp) Modified on 03/22/1999 (Entered: 03/22/1999)
150 RESPONSE by plaintiff CHARLIE H HARRIS in 1:98−cv−01693, federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:98−cv−01693 to to file notice [138−1] in 1:97−cv−01978, to objector LAND LOSS PREVENTION PROJECT's post hearing submission which was stricken from the record [33−1] in 1:98−cv−01693 (bjsp) (Entered: 03/22/1999)
151 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: any class member with comments on or objections to the changes made in the revised proposed consent decree may file those comments or objections in writing in the Clerk's Office by 3/29/99 ; setting forth instructions regarding the comments or objections (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/22/1999)
152 STIPULATED ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : dismissing without prejudice motion for judgment, in part, on the pleadings [71−1] and for partial summary judgment by DAN GLICKMAN [71−2] in 1:97−cv−01978; dismissing without prejudice motion to communicate with unnamed, unrepresented putative class members by DAN GLICKMAN [52−1] in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 03/26/1999)
153 TRANSCRIPT fairness hearing filed for date(s) of 3/2/99. Reporter: Santa Zizzo (st) (temp1, ). (Entered: 03/29/1999)
154 OBJECTIONS to the Consent Decree by plaintiff Theodore F.B. Bates (bjsp) (Entered: 03/31/1999)
155 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiff Joseph L. Perry Jr to the Court RE: Consent Decree (bjsp) (Entered: 03/31/1999)
156 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff−objectors, hundred named and putative class members, Natl. Black Farmers and Agricultaralist Assoc. and 23 state chapters (NCABL Land Loss Prevention Project plaintiffs−objectors) to the Court RE: objections to the consent decree (bjsp) (Entered: 03/31/1999)
157 OBJECTIONS by Percy L. Gooch, Sr. and Family to the Court's consent decree (bjsp) (Entered: 03/31/1999)
158 OBJECTIONS by National Family Farm Coalition to the Court's consent decree released on 3/22/99 filed on behalf of Bill Christison President of the National Family Farm Coalition (bjsp) (Entered: 03/31/1999)
159 OBJECTIONS by North Carolina Assoc. of Black Lawyers Land Loss Prevention Project members to the Court's consent decree (bjsp) (Entered: 03/31/1999)
160 RESPONSE by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to submissions of objections; Exhibits (3) (tth) (Entered: 04/01/1999)
161 ERRATA by plaintiff THEODORE F.B. BATES in 1:98−cv−01693 amended objections replacing the objections of March 26, 1999 to the revised consent decree. (tw) (Entered: 04/05/1999)
162 MOTION filed by plaintiff TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff CECIL BREWINGTON in 1:98−cv−01693 for ANURAG VARMA, to appear pro hac vice ( CONLON, FRANTZ, PHELAN 1818 N Street, NW SUITE 700, WASHINGTON, DC 20036, (202) 331−7050) ; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 04/06/1999)
164 RESPONSE and OBJECTIONS to revised consent decree by Natl Council of Community Based Organizations, North Carolina Assoc of Black Lawyers, Natl Black Farmers Assoc and Natl Assoc for the Advancement of Colored People (bjsp) (Entered: 04/07/1999)

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04/07/1999
04/09/1999
04/14/1999 04/14/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999
04/15/1999
04/15/1999
04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999
04/15/1999 04/15/1999
04/15/1999 04/15/1999

163 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for ANURAG VARMA, to appear pro hac vice ( CONLON, FRANTZ, PHELAN 1818 N Street, NW SUITE 700, WASHINGTON, DC 20036, (202) 331−7050) [162−1] by CECIL BREWINGTON, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978, 1:98−cv−01693 (N) (bm) (Entered: 04/07/1999)
165 ERRATA by P.L. Bartz and A.J. Pires Jr. to the Court RE; the filing of a revised page 21 which was originally filed on 3/19/99 ; attachment (bjsp) Modified on 04/13/1999 (Entered: 04/13/1999)
166 OPINION by Judge Paul L. Friedman (N) (bm) (Entered: 04/14/1999)
167 CONSENT DECREE (See Consent Decree for details) (N) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/14/1999)
169 LETTER dated 4/3/99 from Joseph Lowery, Convener to Judge Friedman. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
170 LETTER dated 4/4/99 from Gary R. Grant, President Black Farmers & Agriculturists Association to Judge Friedman. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
171 LETTER dated 4/3/99 from Stephon Bowens, Esq, Executive Director Land Loss Pevention Project to Judge Friedman. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
172 LETTER dated 3/26/99 from L. C. Cooper, President Black Farmers & Agriculture Association of North Carolina to Judge Friedman. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
173 STATEMENT of Bill Christison, President, National Family Farm Coalition dated 3/1/99 '"Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
174 LETTER dated 3/25/99 to Judge Friedman from George and Larry Ephfrom. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
175 LETTER dated 3/27/99 to Judge Friedman from V. J. Switzer "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
176 LETTER 3/26/99 to Judge Friedman from George M. Whitehead. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
177 LETTER dated 3/27/99 to Judge Friedman from Eddie & Dorothy Wise. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
178 LETTER dated 3/27/99 to Judge Friedman from Brown J. Hawkins. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
179 LETTER dated 3/25/99 to Judge Friedman from Herbert L. Skinner, Jr. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
180 LETTER dated 3/25/99 to Judge Friedman from plaintiff Leonard C. Cooper. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
181 LETTER dated 3/25/99 to Judge Friedman from Thomas Burrell, Concerned Black Farmers of Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi Georgia and North Carolina; attachments (2). "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
182 LETTER dated 3/28/99 to Judge Friedman from Joseph Lowery, Convener. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
183 LETTER dated 3/26/99 to Judge Friedman from Gary R. Grant, President Black Farmers & Agriculturists Association. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
184 LETTER 3/26/99 to Judge Friedman from Black Farmers of North Carolina "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
185 LETTER dated 3/5/99 to Judge Friedman from Roy L. Rolle, Jr. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)

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04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999
04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999
04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/16/1999
05/13/1999
05/28/1999
05/28/1999

186 LETTER dated 3/17/99 to Judge Friedman from Gladys R. and Griffin Todd, Sr. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
187 LETTER dated 3/18/99 to Judge Friedman from Dave J. Miller, President, D.J. Miller and Associates, Inc. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
188 LETTER dated 2/17/99 to Whom it may concern from Gregory R. Swecker. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
189 LETTER dated 3/5/99 to Judge Friedman from George Hildebrandt, Jr. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
190 LETTER dated 2/28/99 to Judge Friedman from Gladys R. Todd and Griffin Todd, Sr. (G−Todd Farm) "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
191 LETTER dated 3/8/99 to Judge Friedman from Clarence Hardy "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
192 LETTER dated 2/23/99 to Judge Friedman from Pearlene J. Hamler, President, Board of Directors Central Piedmont Economic Association. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
193 LETTER dated 3/29/99 to Judge Friedman from Jerome Williams "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
194 LETTER dated 3/25/99 to Judge Friedman from George Hobbs; attachments. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
195 POST CARD to Judge Friedman from Patricia Gilson Green, "Let this be filed" (Fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
196 LETTER dated 3/29/99 to Judge Friedman from Ralph Paige, Executive Director, The Federation of Southern Cooperatives Land Assistance Fund. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
197 LETTER dated 3/30/99 to Judge Friedman from Robert R. Binion. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
198 LETTER dated 3/29/99 to Judge Friedman from George Hildebrandt. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
199 LETTER dated 3/8/99 to Judge Friedman from Abraham Carpenter, Jr. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
200 LETTER dated 3/11/99 to Judge Friedman from Percy Gooch, Sr. and Family "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
201 LETTER dated 2/19/99 to Judge Friedman from Harold M. Dunkelberger. "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
168 OBJECTIONS by Oklahoma Black Farmers & Agriculturalissts Association to revised proposed consent decree "Let this be filed (fiat) J. Friedman (bm) Modified on 04/22/1999 (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/16/1999)
202 STATEMENT filed by plaintiffs TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, et al in 1:97−cv−01978, and federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 regarding the Consent Decree. (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 05/14/1999)
203 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the Court has received a letter from plaintiffs raising several substantive issues. The letter will not be accepted for filing; it appears to the Court that these issues are best resolved by the parties without the Court's intervention; if the issues cannot be resolved after good faith efforts, plaintiffs should notify the Court by submitting a filing made in accordance with Local Rules 106, 108 and 110. (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/01/1999)
204 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LLOYD SHAFER in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff GEORGE HALL in 1:97−cv−01978, federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff MCARTHUR NESBIT in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff EDDIE SLAUGHTER in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LEO JACKSON in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff J. B. BLACK in

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06/02/1999
06/11/1999
06/14/1999 06/17/1999 06/25/1999 07/13/1999 07/21/1999 08/20/1999 08/30/1999 08/30/1999 09/02/1999
09/07/1999
09/10/1999 09/14/1999

1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LUCIOUS ABRAMS JR. in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff GRIFFIN TOOD SR. in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff GREGORY ERVES in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff CECIL BREWINGTON in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff HERBERT L. SKINNER JR. in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff OBIE L. BEAL in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff CLIFFORD LOVETT in 1:97−cv−01978 for entry of supplemental privacy act protective order. (tw) (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/01/1999)
205 SUPPLEMENTAL PRIVACY PROTECTIVE ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman granting joint motion for entry of supplemental privacy act protective order. [204−1] by plaintiffs, federal defendant, in 1:97−cv−01978; setting forth procedures for handling confidential material; allowing designated to be filed under seal; attachment. (N) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/02/1999)
206 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL from memorandum order [166−1] ,entered on: 4/14/99 by L.C. Cooper individually and as a representative of a class of African American farmers. Filing fee paid $5.00. Docketing Fee $100.00. Copies were sent out to Alexander Pires, Richard Seymour, Caroline Wolverton, David Souders, Susan Lennon, Terry Henry, Michael Sitcov, Gerard Robert Lear and Dennis Sweet. (bjsp) Modified on 06/14/1999 (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/14/1999)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [206−1] to U.S. Court of Appeals (bjsp) (Entered: 06/14/1999)
USCA # 99−5222 assigned for appeal [206−1] (tw) (Entered: 06/22/1999)
TRANSMITTED supplemental record on appeal [206−1] in 1:97−cv−01978, appeal [62−1] by CECIL BREWINGTON in 1:98−cv−01693 USCA No.: 99 5222. (bjsp) (Entered: 06/25/1999)
211 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 and plaintiffs in 1:98−cv−01693 for Black Farmers settlement for abitrator ;attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 07/14/1999)
212 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 and plaintiffs' in 1:98−cv−01693 for status conference , and submisiion of candidates for monitor (COPY); exhibits (2) (bjsp) Modified on 07/22/1999 (Entered: 07/22/1999)
216 NOTICE OF FILING by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 submitting 2 candidates for the position of monitor pursuant to consent decree (st) (Entered: 09/08/1999)
213 MOTION (emergency) filed by plaintiff TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend date by which Timothy C. Pigford may request exclusion from class. (tw) (Entered: 08/30/1999)
214 MOTION (EMERGENCY) filed by plaintiff TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend date by which plaintiff PIGFORD may request exclusion from class (FIAT) FRIEDMAN, J. (FAX) (bjsp) (Entered: 08/31/1999)
215 RESPONSE by plaintiff TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD et al in 1:97−cv−01978 and plaintiff CECIL BREWINGTON et al in 1:98−cv−01693 to motion to extend date by which Timothy C. Pigford may request exclusion from class. [213−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978, motion to extend date by which plaintiff PIGFORD may request exclusion from class [65−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:98−cv−01693 (bjsp) (Entered: 09/03/1999)
217 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978, federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:98−cv−01693 in opposition to motion to extend date by which Timothy C. Pigford may request exclusion from class. [213−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978 and 98 cv 1693 [65−1] (bjsp) (Entered: 09/09/1999)
218 SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSION by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 of candidates for monitor (st) (Entered: 09/13/1999)
219 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: striking plaintiffs' supplement to submission of candidates for monitor (9/10/99) from the record, removed from the file and returned to counsel. (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/14/1999)

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09/17/1999 09/17/1999 09/22/1999
09/23/1999
09/27/1999 09/29/1999 10/06/1999 10/08/1999 10/13/1999 10/15/1999 10/20/1999
10/20/1999 10/20/1999 10/21/1999

220 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978, federal defendant in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to permit redesignation of track selection (st) (Entered: 09/20/1999)
221 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978, and plaintiffs in 1:98−cv−01693 for extraordinary relief for Aaron Ellison ; exhibit (1) (bjsp) Modified on 09/21/1999 (Entered: 09/21/1999)
222 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting joint motion to permit redesignation of track selection [220−1] by plaintiffs, federal defendant, in 1:97−cv−01978; the Track B claims of Ellis Davis, Claim #5408; M.L. Easterling, Claim #5596; Geraldine Hall, Claim #5552; Robert Lumzy, Sr., Claim #5449; and James L. Myers, Claim #5224 are redesignated as Track A claims. (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/22/1999)
223 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend date by which Timothy C. Pigford may request exclusion from class. [213−1] [214−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978, 1:98−cv−01693; Mr. Pigford shall have until 10/20/99 to file his election to opt out of the class under paragraph 2 of the Consent Decree; no further extensions will be granted. (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/23/1999)
224 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for extraordinary relief for Aaron Ellison [221−1]; attachment (1) (tw) (Entered: 09/28/1999)
225 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: allowing payments to prevailing class members to be made through Poorman−Douglas Corporation. (N) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 09/29/1999)
226 LETTER undated to Judge Friedman, from John Boyd, Jr. of the National Black Farmers Association, Inc. "Let this be filed" (fiat) J. Friedman (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 10/12/1999)
227 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 and plaintiffs in 1:98−cv−01693 to extend time to 10/29/99 of the deadline for claimants to submit completed claim packages for adjudication ; exhibits (10) (bjsp) (Entered: 10/13/1999)
228 SUPPLEMENT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion to extend time to 10/29/99 of the deadline for claimants to submit completed claim packages for adjudication [227−1] by CECIL BREWINGTON, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD; Attachment (1) (tth) (Entered: 10/14/1999)
229 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion to extend time to 10/29/99 of the deadline for claimants to submit completed claim packages for adjudication [227−1] by CECIL BREWINGTON, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (st) (Entered: 10/18/1999)
230 LETTER dated 10/7/99 to Judge Friedman, from Ralph Paige, Executive Director of the Federation of Southern Cooperatives Land Assistance Fund requesting a 30 day extension for the distribution of claims packages and a 60 day extension for farmers to submit their packages. (fiat) "Let this be filed" J. Friedman (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 10/20/1999)
231 LETTER dated 10/10/99 to Judge Friedman, from Gary R. Grant, President, Black Farmers & Agriculturists Association requesting and extension of 6 months for Black farmers and former farmers to sign onto the Class Action. (fiat) "Let this be filed" J. Friedman (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 10/20/1999)
234 MOTION filed by plaintiff−movants HENRY SWIMPSON and BRYANT DEWITT CREECY to extend time to file a completed claims package with the facilitator pursuant to the consent decree issued by this Court on 4/14/99 (FIAT) FRIEDMAN, J. ; declarations (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 10/21/1999)
232 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion for extraordinary relief for Aaron Ellison [221−1] by CECIL BREWINGTON, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978, 1:98−cv−01693 (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/21/1999)

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10/21/1999 11/01/1999 11/04/1999 11/08/1999
11/30/1999 12/20/1999
12/21/1999 12/29/1999 01/04/2000 01/06/2000
01/06/2000 01/10/2000 01/14/2000
01/18/2000 01/19/2000

233 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: hearing set for 2:00 11/8/99 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 on the issue of extending the deadline for the filing of claims ; setting forth instructions to movants, mediator and counsel for both parties (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/21/1999)
235 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for status conference to discuss and resolve issues regarding timley claims ; attachments (2) (tw) (Entered: 11/03/1999)
236 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the hearing on the issue of extending the deadline for the filing of claims, currently scheduled for 11/8/99 is postponed pending further order of the Court to determine if a hearing remains necessary. (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/04/1999)
237 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion for status conference to discuss and resolve issues regarding timley claims [235−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978; counsel for both counsel parties shall, with assistance of mediator Michael Lewis, attempt to resolve this matter, if plaintiffs' concerns cannot be fully resolved and a hearing is still necessary, Mr. Lewis shall so inform the Court (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/08/1999)
238 AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman ; setting forth procedures for handling confidential material; allowing designated material to be filed under seal; attachment. (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/30/1999)
239 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: The Court's authority to determine whether a class member's petition under 5(g) of the Consent Decree shall be granted is herby delegated to the arbitrator; all petitions under 5(g) of the Consent Decree shall be postmarked not later than 1/30/00 and submitted directly to the arbitrator and without copies to the Court; setting forth address (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/21/1999)
240 MOTION (PETITION) filed by THE BANKS LAW FIRM for attorney fees and costs ;attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 12/23/1999)
241 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs and defendants in 1:97−cv−01978, for order to permit redesignation of track selection of class member Marvin D. Stockdale (bjsp) (Entered: 12/30/1999)
242 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: appointing Randi Hyse Roth, Executive Director of the Farmers' Legal Action Group, Inc. as the independent Monitor under the Consent Decree, effective 1/18/00 (N) (bm) (bj). (Entered: 01/04/2000)
243 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting joint motion for order to permit redesignation of track selection of class member Marvin D. Stockdale [241−1] by DAN GLICKMAN, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978; designating the Track B claim of Marvin D. Stockdale, Claims #17572 as a Track A claim. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/06/2000)
244 MOTION (REQUEST) filed by Non Party BANKS LAW FIRM in 1:97−cv−01978 for hearing on petition for attorneys fees and costs (bjsp) (Entered: 01/07/2000)
245 RESPONSE by federal defendant in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for attorney fees and costs [240−1] ; exhibits (2) ; declaration (1) (bjsp) (Entered: 01/11/2000)
246 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for HOWARD S. SHEFTMAN, to appear pro hac vice ( FINKEL & ALTMAN, COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, , , ) , AND for RALPH C. MCCULLOUGH, to appear pro hac vice ( FINKEL & ALTMAN, COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, , ) , and for ROBERT CULVER, to appear pro hac vice ( FINKEL & ALTMAN, COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, , ) , and for WILLIAM D. BRITT, to appear pro hac vice ( FINKEL & ALTMAN, COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, , ) ; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 01/18/2000)
248 MOTION filed by movants in 1:97−cv−01978 for reconsideration of the Courts order RE: consent decree [239−1] ; exhibits (18) (bjsp) (Entered: 01/20/2000)
247 STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with prejudice of case as to plaintiff James Wade (Arbitration Claim No. 11312) including his arbitration claim under paragraph 10 of the 4/14/99, Consent Decree; approved (fiat) J. Friedman. (N) (bm) (temp1, ).

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01/20/2000 01/20/2000 01/24/2000
01/24/2000
01/24/2000 01/24/2000 01/24/2000
01/24/2000 01/24/2000 01/27/2000 02/04/2000 02/04/2000
02/08/2000 02/11/2000 02/14/2000 02/22/2000

(Entered: 01/19/2000)
253 REPLY by plaintiffs' attorney BANKS LAW FIRM in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's opposition to motion for attorney fees and costs [240−1] (bjsp) (Entered: 01/24/2000)
254 MOTION filed by plaintiffs attorney BANKS LAW FIRM in 1:97−cv−01978 for sanctions ; declaration (1) (bjsp) (Entered: 01/24/2000)
249 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for HOWARD S. SHEFTMAN, to appear pro hac vice ( FINKEL & ALTMAN, COLUMBIA, SC) [246−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/24/2000)
250 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for RALPH C. MCCULLOUGH, to appear pro hac vice ( FINKEL & ALTMAN, COLUMBIA, SC) [246−2] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/24/2000)
251 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for ROBERT CULVER, to appear pro hac vice ( FINKEL & ALTMAN, COLUMBIA, SC) [246−3] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/24/2000)
252 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for WILLIAM D. BRITT, to appear pro hac vice ( FINKEL & ALTMAN, COLUMBIA, SC) [246−4] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/24/2000)
255 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to track B claimant Michael Patterson's motion for stay and for immediate review (FILED UNDER SEAL IN ROOM 1800) ; exhibits (4) (bjsp) (Entered: 01/27/2000)
261 MOTION filed by Michael Patterson for stay , and for immediate review (FILED UNDER SEAL IN ROOM 1800) ;exhibits (6) (bjsp) Modified on 02/11/2000 (Entered: 02/11/2000)
262 MOTION (REDACTED VERSION) filed by MICHAEL PATTERSON for stay , and for immediate review ; attachments (bjsp) Modified on 05/12/2000 (Entered: 02/11/2000)
256 MOTION (UNOPPOSED) filed by federal defendant in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 2/4/00 to respond to motion to reconsider fairness of consent decree (bjsp) (Entered: 02/01/2000)
257 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion for reconsideration of the Courts order RE: consent decree [239−1] [248−1] by movant (jf) (Entered: 02/07/2000)
258 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for reconsideration of the Courts order RE: consent decree [239−1] [248−1] by Non Party, plaintiff, movant .; exhibits (10) (jf) (Entered: 02/07/2000)
259 JOINT MOTION by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN and track B claimant JOHN DECOUDREAUX in 1:97−cv−01978 for stay of arbitration (bjsp) (Entered: 02/09/2000)
260 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to 2/4/00 to respond to motion to reconsider fairness of consent decree [256−1] by DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (clv) (Entered: 02/11/2000)
263 REPLY by movants in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendants and plaintiffs opposition to motion for reconsideration of the Courts order RE: consent decree [239−1] [248−1] by Non Party and movants (bjsp) (Entered: 02/15/2000)
264 MEMORANDUM by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for status conference [212−1] by CECIL BREWINGTON, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, motion submisiion of candidates for monitor [212−2] by CECIL BREWINGTON, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, motion for Black Farmers settlement for abitrator RE: the arbitration of Clarence Hardy, claim n. 11513 [211−1]

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 46 of 203

02/22/2000 03/01/2000
03/06/2000 03/09/2000 03/09/2000
03/10/2000 03/10/2000 03/10/2000 03/13/2000
03/15/2000 03/17/2000 03/20/2000 03/20/2000
03/22/2000 03/28/2000

by CECIL BREWINGTON, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD ; exhibits (2) (bjsp) (Entered: 02/24/2000)
265 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to stay processing of "A" claims ; exhibits (8) (bjsp) (Entered: 02/25/2000)
266 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting joint motion for stay of arbitration [259−1] by DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978; the Court's authority to stay arbitrations or postpone evidentary hearing beyond the 150−day deadline imposed by 10(a) of the Consent Decree shall be delegated to the Arbitrator; such authority is delegated only with regard to consent motions for such relief; all such motions shall be submitted directly to Arbitrator (and without copies to the Court); setting forth Arbitrator's address (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/02/2000)
267 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978, federal defendant in 1:97−cv−01978 for order to permit redesignation of track selection (bjsp) (Entered: 03/07/2000)
268 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting joint motion for order to permit redesignation of track selection by DAN GLICKMAN, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978; the Track B claim of Maggie Echols c/o Byethel Abram, Claim #17616 is redesignated a Track A claim. (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/09/2000)
269 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion for stay of arbitration [261−1] in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for immediate review [261−2] in 1:97−cv−01978; denying as moot the motions of Jeffrey P. Reynolds, Edwin S. Gault, Jr. and Teri D. Gleason to apear pro hac vice. (N) (bm) Modified on 05/12/2000 (Entered: 03/09/2000)
270 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff LLOYD SHAFER in 1:97−cv−01978 by Mona Lyons, John Michael Clifford (tth) (Entered: 03/13/2000)
271 MOTION filed by plaintiff LLOYD SHAFER in 1:97−cv−01978 for settlement agreement , and for expedited consideration ; Exhibits (5) (tth) (Entered: 03/13/2000)
273 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion for admission pro hac vice of Jeffrey P. Reynolds; exhibits (3) (bjsp) (Entered: 03/15/2000)
272 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for expedited consideration [271−2] by LLOYD SHAFER in 1:97−cv−01978; the government shall respond to motion to enforce the settlement agreement and hand−deliver a copy to plaintiff's counsel and Chambers due 5:00 3/15/00 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693; motion hearing set for 10:30 3/17/00 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/14/2000)
274 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for settlement agreement [271−1] by LLOYD SHAFER ;exhibit (1) (bjsp) (Entered: 03/16/2000)
MOTION HEARING before Judge Paul L. Friedman taken under advisement by LLOYD SHAFER motion for settlement agreement [271−1] in 1:97−cv−01978 pending filing by plaintiff Lloyd Shaffer of a document regarding the jurisdiction issue. Reporter: Cheryl Gerber (bm) (Entered: 03/17/2000)
275 MOTION filed by L.J. Chestnut, Jr., Esquire in 1:97−cv−01978 to withdraw a previously filed motion (bm) (Entered: 03/20/2000)
276 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to withdraw a previously filed motion [275−1] by J.L. Chestnut Jr. in 1:97−cv−01978; a motion filed by J.L. Chestnut, Jr. asking a stay in Track A adjudications is withdrawn on the basis of a subsequent motion by that attorney seeking such an order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/20/2000)
277 REPLY by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendants opposition to motion for settlement agreement [271−1] by LLOYD SHAFER (bjsp) (Entered: 03/23/2000)
278 SURREPLY by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion for settlement agreement [271−1] by LLOYD SHAFER; "Let this be filed", FRIEDMAN, J. (tth) (Entered: 03/29/2000)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 47 of 203

04/04/2000
04/24/2000 05/05/2000
05/08/2000 05/08/2000 05/11/2000 05/12/2000 05/15/2000 05/18/2000 05/19/2000 05/22/2000 05/22/2000 05/22/2000
05/22/2000

279 ORDER OF REFERENCE by Judge Paul L. Friedman: setting forth instructions to the Independent Monitor; directing USDA within 15 days after the Court's approval of the first budget, shall deposit with the Clerk of Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the pro−rata portion of the approved budget for the month of April, 2000; within the first 15 days of May, 2000; within the first 15 days of each month thereafter during the Monitor's tenure, USDA shall deposit with the Clerk of Court a sum equal to a pro−rata portion of the approved budget; all deposits made by USDA shall be placed by the Clerk of Court in an interest−bearing account; any monies on deposit with the Clerk of Court that are unspent in a given month shall be carried over and applied to payment of future fees and expenses of the Monitor. (N) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 04/05/2000)
280 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying without prejudice motion to enforce settlement agreement [271−1] by LLOYD SHAFER (dam) (Entered: 04/24/2000)
281 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's request for a total budget amount of $961,953 for the period of 4/1/00 through 6/30/00; directing the USDA shall make deposits with the Clerk of Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia; setting forth the breakdown of deposits. (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/08/2000)
282 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 by Jacob A. Stein (tw) (Entered: 05/09/2000)
283 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorney fee against DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 ; exhibits (13); attachments (21) (tw) (Entered: 05/09/2000)
284 MOTION filed by plaintiff ALL PLAINTIFFS in 1:98−cv−01693 for immediate status conference to resolve issues regarding 1,131 timely filed claims ; attachments (2) (tw) (Entered: 05/12/2000)
285 MOTION filed by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 7/14/00 to respond to plaintiff's interim fee petition (tb) (Entered: 05/13/2000)
286 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion to extend time to 7/14/00 to respond to plaintiff's interim fee petition [285−1] by DAN GLICKMAN . (ks) (Entered: 05/16/2000)
287 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: motion hearing set for 2:00 6/5/00 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693; defendant shall respond to motion due 5/24/00 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693; plaintiffs' reply to motion due 5/31/00 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/18/2000)
288 REPLY by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion to extend time to 7/14/00 to respond to plaintiff's interim fee petition [285−1] by DAN GLICKMAN (tb) (Entered: 05/22/2000)
289 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: motion hearing set for 10:00 7/31/00 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/22/2000)
290 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for hearing on petition for attorneys fees and costs [244−1] by BANKS LAW FIRM in 1:97−cv−01978; motions hearing set for 10:00 7/31/00 (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/22/2000)
291 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to 7/14/00 to respond to plaintiff's interim petition [285−1] by DAN GLICKMAN; defendant shall respond to motion for interim attorney's fees due by 6/29/00 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693; plaintiffs' reply to motion due by 7/14/00 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 ; in 1:97−cv−01978; motion hearing set for 10:00 7/31/00 (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/22/2000)
292 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for the issues of 1,143 pending late petitions filed after January 31, 2000 and 940 late claims not accompanied by late petitions be added to the June 5, 2000 status conference. (tw) (Entered: 05/23/2000)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 48 of 203

05/24/2000 06/05/2000
06/06/2000
06/07/2000 06/09/2000
06/09/2000 06/14/2000 06/20/2000 06/23/2000 06/29/2000 06/29/2000 07/14/2000
07/14/2000

293 CERTIFIED COPY of Order filed in USCA dated 05/22/00, referencing appeal [206−1] in 1:97−cv−01978, appeal [62−1] in 1:98−cv−01693, affirming the judgment of USDC OPINION USCA # 99−5222 & 99−5223 (mmh) (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/02/2000)
294 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: cancelling the 6/5/00 hearing on plaintiffs' motion regarding claims; motion hearing set for 2:00 6/9/00 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 ; defendant shall hand−deliver a copy to Chambers and to class counsel a consolidated response to motion due 1:00 6/8/00 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 ; reply to motion due 10:00 6/9/00 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 ; if the parties reach an agreement regarding plaintiffs' motions that obviates the need for the hearing, a joint motion or stipulation shall be filed to such effect at least 24 hours before the scheduled hearing. (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/06/2000)
296 MOTION filed by petitioner HOUSTON BLAKENEY in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner REATHA BLAKENEY in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner LEROY ROBINSON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner BOBBI NEWTON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner PEARLIE PETERSON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner NAOMI KNOCKETT in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner ILENTHE PORTER in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner JAMES DAVIS in 1:97−cv−01978 for adjudication of seven late claims. (tw) (Entered: 06/08/2000)
295 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to plaintiffs' motions for status conference status [292−1] [284−1] (tw) (Entered: 06/08/2000)
MOTION HEARING before Judge Paul L. Friedman held in abeyance motion for immediate status conference to resolve issues regarding 1,131 timely filed claims [284−1] by ALL PLAINTIFFS in 1:97−cv−01978; held in abeyance motion for the issues of 1,143 pending late petitions filed after January 31, 2000 and 940 late claims not accompanied by late petitions be added to the June 5, 2000 status conference. [292−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978; held in abeyance motion for adjudication of seven late claims. [296−1] by petitioners in 1:97−cv−01978 Reporter: Cheryl Gerber, Miller Reporting (bm) (Entered: 06/09/2000)
297 REPLY by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion for immediate status conference to resolve issues regarding 1,131 timely filed claims [284−1] by ALL PLAINTIFFS (tb) (Entered: 06/12/2000)
298 NOTICE by Roger Belanger of intent to file motion for attorneys fees; (FIAT. Judge Friedman) (tw) (Entered: 06/15/2000)
299 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 6/9/00. Reporter: Miller Reporting (dam) (Entered: 06/21/2000)
300 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's request for a total budget amount of $1,164,022 for the period of 7/1/00 through 9/30/00; in accordance with paragraph 17 of the Order of Reference, USDA shall make deposits with the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia; setting forth deposit schedule . (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/23/2000)
301 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for interim award of attorneys' fees [283−1] by plaintiffs; attachments (10) (bm) (Entered: 06/30/2000)
302 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM RE: exhibits (A−L) by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in support of objection [301−1] by DAN GLICKMAN; bulky pleading (tb) (Entered: 07/10/2000)
303 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: setting forth instructions regarding all timely filed but defective claim sheet and election forms; all putative class members who seek relief under 5(g) of the Consent Decree; authority delegated to Michael K. Lewis, the Decree's Arbitrator; any person who objects to any aspect of this Stipulation and Order shall submit his/her objections to the Court in writing within 30 days from the date of the entry of this Order. (See Stipulation and Order for details) (N) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 07/14/2000)
304 SECOND AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman ; setting forth procedures for handling confidential

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 49 of 203

07/14/2000
07/14/2000 07/27/2000 07/27/2000 07/28/2000 07/31/2000
07/31/2000 08/01/2000 08/02/2000 08/02/2000 08/03/2000 08/04/2000
08/07/2000 08/08/2000

material; allowing designated material to be filed under seal; attachment. (N) (bm) (bj, ). (Entered: 07/14/2000)
305 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of April 2000 in the amount of $61,344; in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Order of Reference, the Clerk of Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/14/2000)
306 REPLY by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 in support of motion of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for interim award of attorneys' fees and costs [283−1]. (td) (Entered: 07/17/2000)
307 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : motion hearing set for 10:00 7/31/00 in Courtroom 20 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 ; setting forth instructions to counsel (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/28/2000)
308 MOTION filed claimant Thomas Burrell to stay discovery proceeding of "B" claims and for other relief ; (FIAT. Judge Friedman); exhibits (5) (td) Modified on 07/31/2000 (Entered: 07/31/2000)
309 STATUS REPORT by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 (td) (Entered: 08/01/2000)
MOTION HEARING before Judge Paul L. Friedman taken under advisement motion for reconsideration of the Courts order RE: consent decree [239−1] [248−1] in 1:97−cv−01978; taken under advisement by plaintiffs motion for interim attorney fee against DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 [283−1] in 1:97−cv−01978; while the Court is considering the motion for interim attorney fees, the defendant shall meet with plaintiffs' counsel to consider an interim fee; taken under advisement motion for attorney fees and costs [240−1] by Banks Law Firm in 1:97−cv−01978 Reporter: Santa Zizzo (bm) (Entered: 08/01/2000)
310 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs−movants to motion for reconsideration of the Courts order RE: consent decree [239−1] [248−1] by plaintiffs, movants; attachment (1) (bm) (Entered: 08/02/2000)
311 MEMORANDUM by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion to stay discovery proceeding of "B" claims and for other relief [308−1]. (td) (Entered: 08/03/2000)
312 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 of class counsel and of counsel to suspend implementation of the consent decree. (td) (Entered: 08/03/2000)
313 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file exhibits under seal ; EXHIBITS (1) (Lodged Under Seal) (td) (Entered: 08/03/2000)
315 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of July 31, 2000. Reporter: Santa Theresa Zizzo (td) (Entered: 08/04/2000)
314 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: in recognition of the fees, costs and/or expenses already incurred by class counsel in the filing and settlement of this action and the implementation of the Consent Decree, defendant willl make a payment to class counsel of $7,000,000 as a credit toward class counsels pending application for an interim award of attorneys' fees and costs; directing payment shall be made to class counsel and of counsel within 20 days of the date of this Order; setting forth instructions regarding payment; this Order shall not be construed to indicate that the Court has made any express finding of fact or conclusion of law with respect to any specific portion of class counsel's pending motion. (N) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 08/04/2000)
316 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for leave to file exhibits under seal [313−1] by plaintiffs; setting forth further instruction to counsel; (N) (clv) (Entered: 08/08/2000)
324 REPORT by Monitor RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 regarding hearing on certain plaintiffs' motion to reconsider fairness of Consent Decree pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) and (6). (fiat) "Let this be filed" Judge paul L. Friedman (ks) (temp1, ). (Entered: 08/16/2000)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 50 of 203

08/09/2000 08/10/2000 08/11/2000
08/11/2000 08/11/2000 08/11/2000
08/14/2000 08/16/2000
08/17/2000 08/18/2000 08/21/2000
08/21/2000 08/22/2000 08/23/2000 08/23/2000 08/24/2000 08/24/2000

317 MOTION filed by certain attorneys for interim award of attorneys' fees and costs ;declaration (1); exhibits (3) (td) (Entered: 08/10/2000)
318 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to amend motion of class counsel and of counsel to suspend implementation of the consent decree. [312−1] by plaintiffs (tb) (Entered: 08/11/2000)
319 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: that the Monitor's invoice for the period of May 2000 in the amount of $148,331.00 is approved, the Clerk of the Court, United States Districe Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (dam) (Entered: 08/11/2000)
320 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to amend motion of class counsel and of counsel to suspend implementation of the consent decree. [312−1] by plaintiffs [318−1] by plaintiffs (N) (jf) (Entered: 08/14/2000)
321 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to withdraw motion to stay discovery proceeding of "B" claims and for other relief [308−1] (tb) (Entered: 08/14/2000)
322 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to withdraw motion to stay discovery proceeding of "B" claims and for other relief [308−1] [321−1] by plaintiffs; that plaintiffs' motion to stay discovery proceedings in Track B. claims is withdrawn and no longer is pending. (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/14/2000)
323 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to supplemental memorandum [310−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (tb) (Entered: 08/16/2000)
325 MOTION (UNOPPOSED) filed by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 for a temporary suspension of time to respond to motion of certain Mississippi attorneys for interim award of attorneys' fees and costs (cjp) (Entered: 08/17/2000)
327 MOTION filed by claimant EVANS M. FOLINS in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file late his claim (dam) (Entered: 08/21/2000)
329 RESPONSE by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978, to plaintiff−movants' reply to defendant's and plaintiff's objections, stipulation and order [323−1] by DAN GLICKMAN (dam) (Entered: 08/23/2000)
326 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for a temporary suspension of time to respond to motion of Mississippi attorneys for interim award of attorneys' fees and costs [325−1] by DAN GLICKMAN; suspending defendnt's time for response to the motion for interim fees and costs until twenty (20) days after the Court rules on the motion for attorneys' fees and costs filed by Class Counsel and other "Of Counsel" on 5/8/00. (N) (bm) (Entered: 08/21/2000)
328 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion to amend plaintiffs' counsel's motion to suspend and for other relief (bm) (Entered: 08/22/2000)
333 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to plaintiff's and defendant's 07/14/00 stipulation and order (tb) (Entered: 08/28/2000)
334 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file supplemental memorandum (tb) (Entered: 08/28/2000)
335 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file objection to plaintiff's and defendant's 07/14/00 stipulation and order nunc pro tunc (tb) (Entered: 08/28/2000)
330 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion by class counsel to file a supplemental memorandum concerning the pending petition for interim attorneys fees by 9/5/00; the Government shall respond by 9/15/00 (N) (bm) (Entered: 08/24/2000)
331 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion nunc pro tunc by plaintiff−objectors deeming objections filed as of 8/14/00 (N) (bm) (Entered:

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 51 of 203

08/24/2000
08/25/2000 08/28/2000 08/29/2000
08/29/2000 09/01/2000 09/05/2000 09/12/2000 09/15/2000 09/21/2000 09/29/2000 10/03/2000
10/03/2000

08/24/2000)
332 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period June 2000 in the amount of $173,379.00; in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Order of Reference, the Clerk of Court, United States for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 08/24/2000)
337 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for leave to file supplemental memorandum [334−1] by plaintiffs (dam) (Entered: 08/29/2000)
336 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying without prejudice motion for attorney fees and costs [240−1] by Bank Law Firm in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 08/28/2000)
338 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of July 2000 in the amount of $177,934.00; in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Order of Reference, the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 08/29/2000)
339 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to objection [333−1] by plaintiffs; exhibits (1) (tb) (Entered: 08/31/2000)
340 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : striking objection filed 8/22/00 [333−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978; there being no objections to the 7/14/00 Stipulation and Order, it shall stand unamended and remain in full force and effect (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/01/2000)
341 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion for interim award of attorneys' fees and costs [317−1]; attachments (4) (clv) (Entered: 09/06/2000)
342 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: setting forth instructions to the Monitor and the Facilitator regarding the Consent Decree (N) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 09/12/2000)
343 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to supplemental memorandum [341−1] by plaintiffs (tb) (Entered: 09/20/2000)
350 REPLY by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to supplemental memorandum [341−1] by plaintiffs (tb) (Entered: 10/06/2000)
344 MOTION filed by plaintiff GEORGE HALL in 1:97−cv−01978 to strike plaintiffs−movants' proposed order in support of their Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration. (td) (Entered: 10/02/2000)
345 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Stephon J. Bowens in 1:97−cv−01978 representing plaintiff LEONARD COOPER in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner HOUSTON BLAKENEY in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner REATHA BLAKENEY in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner LEROY ROBINSON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner BOBBI NEWTON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner PEARLIE PETERSON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner NAOMI KNOCKETT in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner ILENTHE PORTER in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner JAMES DAVIS in 1:97−cv−01978. New address: North Carolina Association of Post Office Box 179, Durham, North Carolina 27702 (919−682−5969). (td) Modified on 10/04/2000 (Entered: 10/04/2000)
348 MOTION filed by plaintiff LEONARD COOPER in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner HOUSTON BLAKENEY in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner REATHA BLAKENEY in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner LEROY ROBINSON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner BOBBI NEWTON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner PEARLIE PETERSON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner NAOMI KNOCKETT in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner ILENTHE PORTER in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner JAMES DAVIS in 1:97−cv−01978 for reconsideration of August 31, 2000 order [340−1] , and to provide plaintiff−objectors an opportunity to respond ; attachments (3); declaration (1) (td) (Entered: 10/05/2000)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 52 of 203

10/04/2000 10/04/2000 10/04/2000 10/06/2000 10/06/2000
10/10/2000 10/16/2000
10/17/2000 10/26/2000 10/31/2000 11/02/2000 11/07/2000
11/07/2000

346 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's request for a total budget amount of $1,094,957 for the period of 10/1/00 through 12/31/00; setting forth direction to USDA for making deposits with the Clerk of Court, United States District Court. (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/04/2000)
347 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of August, 2000 in the amount of $195,873.00; the Clerk of Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within 15 days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/04/2000)
349 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file report under seal ; EXHIBIT (report; LODGED UNDER SEAL) (td) (Entered: 10/06/2000)
351 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to strike movants' proposed order allowing motion to modify consent decree. (td) (Entered: 10/11/2000)
352 RESPONSE by plaintiff LEONARD COOPER in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner HOUSTON BLAKENEY in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner REATHA BLAKENEY in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner LEROY ROBINSON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner BOBBI NEWTON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner PEARLIE PETERSON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner NAOMI KNOCKETT in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner ILENTHE PORTER in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner JAMES DAVIS in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's motion to strike movants' proposed order allowing motion to modify consent decree. [351−1] by plaintiffs (td) (Entered: 10/12/2000)
353 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978, federal defendant in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to withdraw report from file. (td) (Entered: 10/13/2000)
355 RESPONSE by plaintiff LEONARD COOPER in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner HOUSTON BLAKENEY in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner REATHA BLAKENEY in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner LEROY ROBINSON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner BOBBI NEWTON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner PEARLIE PETERSON in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner NAOMI KNOCKETT in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner ILENTHE PORTER in 1:97−cv−01978, petitioner JAMES DAVIS in 1:97−cv−01978 to plainatiffs' motion to strike movants' proposed order [351−1]. (td) (Entered: 10/20/2000)
354 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting joint motion to withdraw report from file. [353−1] by plaintiffs, federal defendant, in 1:97−cv−01978; directing the Joint Motion shall be struck from the record and returned to counsel. (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/17/2000)
356 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION pursuant to paragraph 12(b)(iii) of the Consent Decree in this case. (td) (Entered: 11/02/2000)
358 MOTION (expedited) filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for hearing to resolve problems with Track A petition for monitor review process ; attachment s(3) (td) (Entered: 11/03/2000)
357 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of September 2000 in the amount of $217,766.00; in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Order of Reference, the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/02/2000)
359 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the conditions regarding information contained in Adjudicator and Arbitrator decisions and the release of those decisions that are set forth in paragraph 5 of the 7/14/00, second amended supplemental Privacy Act Protective Order apply to Monitor decisions as well as to Adjudicator and Arbitrator decisions; the Monitor's obligation under paragraph 8(f) of the 4/4/00, Order of Reference to forward information to claimants and (their attorneys) is modified by conditions set forth in paragraph 5 of the 7/14/00, second amended supplemental Privacy Act Protective Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/07/2000)
360 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for hearing to resolve problems with Track A petition for monitor review process [358−1] by plaintiffs 1:97−cv−01978 hearing set for 2:00 11/8/00 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 ;

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 53 of 203

11/07/2000 11/08/2000 11/08/2000 11/08/2000
11/14/2000 11/14/2000 11/16/2000 11/17/2000
11/17/2000 11/28/2000 12/06/2000

defendant shall file and hand−deliver to opposing counsel and Chambers a response to the issues outlined in plaintiffs' motion by 11:00 a.m. on 11/8/00 (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/07/2000)
361 NOTICE by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiffs in 1:98−cv−01693 report to the Court regarding fees improperly charged to a successful Track A claimant by an outside attorney; attachments (2) (td) Modified on 11/09/2000 (Entered: 11/09/2000)
HEARING before Judge Paul L. Friedman held : Reporter: Santa Zizzo (bm) (Entered: 11/08/2000)
362 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to plaintiffs expedited motion for hearing to resolve problems with Track A petition for monitor review process [358−1]. (td) (Entered: 11/11/2000)
363 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the deadline for Petitions for Monitor Review involving claimants who received a decision by 7/14/00, remains 11/13/00; setting forth instructions regarding each Register of Petitions; all Register of Petitions must be filed by 11/13/00; if a Register of Petitions listed 400 or fewer claimants, counsel shall file materials in support of each Petition of Monitor Review by 12/15/00; by that same date, counsel shall file notices of withdrawal with respect to those Petitions that upon further review counsel determines have no reasonable chance of satisfying the clear and manifest error standard set forth in Paragrph 12(b)(iii) of the Consent Decree; if a Register of Petitions lists more that 400 claimants, counsel shall file supporting materials or withdrawals with respect to a total of at least 400 claimants by 12/15/00; under no circumstances shall the Monitor accept supporting materials or withdrawals after 5/15/01; the deadlines mentioned herein will be satisfied so long as the filing is postmarked by the stated date; the Monitor shall submit monthly reports to the Court pursuant to Paragraph 12(b)(i) of the Consent Decree that summarize the progress of any lawyer or law firm that files a Register of Petitions listing more than 400 claimants; such report shall be filed on the last day of every month, beginning on 12/31/00. (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/14/2000)
364 LETTER by Ford C. Ladd to Judge Friedman that moves the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6, for an extension of time for James Tanner to submit his petition for Monitor Review under the Stipulation and Order entered on July 14, 2000; attachments (3); (FIAT. Judge Friedman) (td) Modified on 11/14/2000 (temp1, ). (Entered: 11/14/2000)
392 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL by movant James Tanner of motion for extension of time. (td) (Entered: 01/17/2001)
365 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion to strike [344−1] by GEORGE HALL in 1:97−cv−01978; denying motion to strike movants' proposed order allowing motion to modify consent decree. [351−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/16/2000)
366 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: directing Ms. Reed shall file a report with the Court by 11/30/00, that attaches a sworn affidavit or declaration of counsel; setting forth instructions to Ms. Reed regardin her report; from the date of this Order forward, if a claimant or any person is aware of an attorney who signs a Claim Sheet and Election Form but still requires compensation from a successful claimant, that person shall notify the Monitor in writing immediately; setting forth instructions to the Monitor. (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/17/2000)
367 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion for reconsideration [340−1] [348−1] by petitioners, plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion to provide plaintiff objectors an opportunity to respond [348−2] by petitioners, plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978; the 7/14/00 stipulation and order shall remain in full force and effect. (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/17/2000)
368 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to modify order dated 11/08/00 (jf) (Entered: 12/05/2000)
369 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of October 2000 in the amount of $177,986.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the

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12/13/2000 12/13/2000 12/15/2000 12/15/2000 12/18/2000 12/18/2000 12/19/2000 12/21/2000 12/21/2000 12/22/2000
12/22/2000 12/22/2000
12/26/2000 12/27/2000 12/27/2000 01/01/2001 01/04/2001 01/08/2001

Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/06/2000)
370 RESPONSE by SHirley Reed to order [366−1]; attachments (2); affidavit (1); (FIAT. Judge Friedman) (td) (Entered: 12/14/2000)
372 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion to modify order dated 11/08/00 [368−1] by plaintiffs (cjp) (Entered: 12/18/2000)
371 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: Ms. Reed shall a supplemental report to the Court by 1/8/01; setting forth instructions regarding the report. (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/15/2000)
373 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff in 1:98−cv−01693 to amend the consent decree to include J.L. Chestnut as Class Counsel [367−1] in 1:97−cv−01978 (cjp) (Entered: 12/18/2000)
374 STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 regarding the December 15, 2000 filing of class counsel and of counsel petitions for monitor review. (td) (Entered: 12/20/2000)
375 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to allow class counsel to make one register of petitions. (td) (Entered: 12/20/2000)
379 ERRATA by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 correcting an error found in class counsel's (1) report to the court regarding the 12/15/00 filing. (td) (Entered: 12/22/2000)
380 TRANSCRIPT filed for date of November 8, 2000. Reporter: Santa Zizzo (adc) (Entered: 01/03/2001)
381 TRANSCRIPT filed for date of July 31, 2000. Reporter: Santa Zizzo (adc) (Entered: 01/03/2001)
376 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to allow class counsel to make one register of petitions. [375−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978; combining the Registers of Petitions filed with the monitor by Conion, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP (which includes Phillip L. Fraaz), and Chestnut, Sanders to form one Register; all Petitions for Monitor Review or withdrawal letters on this single Register of Petitions be completed by 5/15/01 (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/22/2000)
377 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion to modify order dated 11/08/00 [368−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/22/2000)
378 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to amend the consent decree to include J.L. Chestnut as Class Counsel [367−1] in 1:97−cv−01978 [373−1] by CECIL BREWINGTON, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978, 1:98−cv−01693 (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/22/2000)
385 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 1/23/01 to receive documents from the Kansas Archives ; exhibits (5) (tb) (Entered: 01/08/2001)
383 MONITOR'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS regarding implementation of the Consent Decree for the Period of 3/1/00 through 8/31/00; Appendix (5). (ks) (Entered: 01/05/2001)
384 STATUS REPORT (INITIAL REPORT) by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 (bjsp) (temp1, ). (Entered: 01/05/2001)
397 STATUS REPORT by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 January 2001 report regarding registers of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 02/02/2001)
382 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion for reconsideration of the fairness of the consent decree [239−1] [248−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/04/2001)
386 AFFIDAVIT of Shirley Reed stating that she has written fro the escrow account a check for $16,500 which represents 1/3/ of $50,000 the contingency fee withled from Fred Crawford and Lizzie Crawford's Glack Farmer's settlement award. (td) (Entered:

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 55 of 203

01/12/2001 01/12/2001 01/16/2001 01/16/2001 01/16/2001 01/23/2001 01/30/2001
01/30/2001 01/30/2001 02/05/2001 02/07/2001
02/07/2001 02/14/2001

01/10/2001)
387 MOTION filed of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for third interim award of attorneys' fees and costs ; attachment (1) (td) (Entered: 01/16/2001)
388 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file exhibits under seal ; EXHIBITS (1 thru 3; LODGED UNDER SEAL) (td) (Entered: 01/16/2001)
389 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's request for a total budget amount of $3,240,882.00 for the period of 1/1/01 through 6/30/01; USDA shall deposit with the Clerk of Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a sum equal to a pro−rata month's portion of the approved budget within the first fifteen (15) days of each month. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/16/2001)
390 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : class counsel and counsel for the government shall file a joint Status Report due: 2/2/01 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 ; setting forth instructions regarding the report; if this paragraph of the Consent Decree has not been implemented by 2/2/01, the parties shall provide the Court with an approximate schedule for implementation. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/16/2001)
391 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion to extend time to 1/23/01 to file a Petition for Monitor Review [385−1] by plaintiffs Ada C. Bates, Theodore B. Bates, Jr., Ava L. Bates and Theodore B. F. Bates (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/16/2001)
393 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for third interim award of attorneys' fees and costs [387−1]; attachment (1); (SEALED) (td) (Entered: 01/24/2001)
394 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for leave to file exhibits under seal [388−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978; directing the Clerk to maintain under seal Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 to the motion of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for third interim award of attorneys' fees and costs, and the supporting memorandum of points and authorities; counsel for the Government shall file under seal any personal financial information concerning Counsel that may be addressed in their response to the motion of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for third interim award of attorneys' fees and costs. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/30/2001)
395 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of November, 2000 in the amount of $241,894.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/30/2001)
396 REPLY by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 in response to defendant's opposition to motion of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for third interim award of attorneys' fees and costs [387−1]. (td) (Entered: 01/31/2001)
398 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for interim award of attorneys' fees and costs for work performend between January 1, 2000 and June 30, 2000 ; exhibits (12) (td) (Entered: 02/07/2001)
399 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: empowering Arbitrator Michael Lewis to delegate to another arbitration panelist (other than the panelist whose ruling is at issue) the authority to rule on any petition seeking review of a non−final ruling by an arbitration panelist in the following circumstances; setting forth the circumstances; any such delegation shall be memorialized by a Memorandum of Delegation from Arbitrator Lewis to the designated arbitration panelist and severved upon the parties involved in the particular Track B proceeding, and class counsel (N) (bm) (Entered: 02/07/2001)
400 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: setting forth the terms of the Consent Decree. (See Stipulation and Order for details) (N) (bm) (Entered: 02/07/2001)
402 MOTION (unopposed) filed by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 3/6/01 to respond to the motion of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for interim award of attorneys' fees and for costs for work performed between 1/1/00 and 7/30/00. (td) (Entered: 02/22/2001)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 56 of 203

02/20/2001 02/21/2001 02/23/2001 02/27/2001
02/27/2001 02/27/2001 03/01/2001 03/02/2001
03/06/2001
03/08/2001
03/08/2001
03/08/2001 03/09/2001 03/13/2001 03/14/2001 03/14/2001 03/15/2001

401 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting unopposed motion by defendant extending time to 3/6/01 within which to respond to the motion for interim fees and costs (N) (bm) (Entered: 02/20/2001)
403 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 for prompt hearing of class counsels' motion for interim fees. (td) (Entered: 02/22/2001)
405 RESPONSE by federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion for prompt hearing of class counsels' motion for third interim award of attorneys' fees and costs [403−1]. (td) (Entered: 03/01/2001)
404 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of December, 2000 in the amount of $304,730.00; in accordance with paragrph 15 of the Order of Reference, the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 02/27/2001)
406 REPLY by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's response to request for prompt hearing of class counsels' motion for interim fees [403−1]. (td) (Entered: 03/01/2001)
407 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file exhibit under seal ; EXHIBIT (Affidavit; Lodged under seal) (td) (Entered: 03/01/2001)
409 STATUS REPORT by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 regarding registers of petitons. (td) (Entered: 03/07/2001)
408 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for leave to file exhibit under seal [407−1] by plaintiffs; directing the Clerk to maintain under seal the exhibit to the reply to defendant's response to request for prompt hearing on motion for interim award of fees. (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/02/2001)
412 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for interim award of attorneys' fees and costs for work performend between January 1, 2000 and June 30, 2000 [398−1]. (td) (Entered: 03/12/2001)
410 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for third interim award of attorneys' fees and costs without prejudice [387−1] in 1:97−cv−01978; denying motion for prompt hearing of class counsels' motion for interim fees. [403−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 without prejudice (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/08/2001)
411 OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting in part, denying in part motion for an inerim award of attorneys' fees, costs, expert fees and expenses [283−1] in 1:97−cv−01978; setting forth reasons for granting and denying; if the parties are unable to resolve this fee dispute without further involvement of the Court, Counse shall file a new motion for interim attorneys' fees consistent with this Opinion. (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/08/2001)
415 STATUS REPORT by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 regarding registers of petitions. (td) (Entered: 03/15/2001)
416 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff ABRAHAM CARPENTER in 1:97−cv−01978 to stipulation and order filed by the parties on 2/7/01; attachments (3) (td) (Entered: 03/15/2001)
413 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 4/10/01 to file their reply to petition for attorneys' fees and expense for work between 1/1/00 and 6/30/00 (bm) (Entered: 03/14/2001)
414 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to 4/10/01 to file their reply to petition for attorneys' fees and expense for work between 1/1/00 and 6/30/00 [413−1] by plaintiffs (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/14/2001)
419 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion for extension of time to file reply (bm) (Entered: 03/21/2001)
417 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for entry of an order suspending the deadline to file petitions of appeal to the monitor and to repond to the government's

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 57 of 203

03/21/2001
03/22/2001 03/27/2001 03/27/2001 03/28/2001 03/29/2001 03/30/2001 04/02/2001 04/04/2001
04/04/2001 04/06/2001
04/17/2001
04/19/2001 04/26/2001

petitions to appeal, and for an expeditious hearing on interim fees. (td) (Entered: 03/17/2001)
418 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of January, 2001 in the amount of $347,579; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/21/2001)
420 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion for suspension of deadlines , and for an expeditious hearing on interim fees. [417−1]; attachments (4) (td) (Entered: 03/27/2001)
421 REPLY by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's response to motion for entry of an order suspending the deadline to file petitions of appeal to the monitor and to repond to the government's petitions to appeal, and for an expeditious hearing on interim fees [417−1]; attachments (2) (td) (Entered: 03/29/2001)
422 MOTION (unopposed) filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 6/26/01 to respond to motion of certain Mississippi attorney's for interim award of attorneys' fees and costs. (td) (Entered: 03/30/2001)
423 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file surreply pertaining to motion for suspension of deadlines , and for expeditious hearing on interim fees ; declaration (1) (td) (Entered: 03/30/2001)
424 ORDER by Judge Richard W. Roberts : denying motion for entry of an order suspending the deadline to file petitions of appeal to the monitor and to respond to the government's petitions to appeal, and for an expeditious hearing on interim fees. [417−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/30/2001)
425 ORDER by Judge Richard W. Roberts : granting motion to extend time to 6/26/01 to respond to motion of certain Mississippi attorney's for interim award of attorneys' fees and costs. [422−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/30/2001)
426 RESPONSE by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 to Court's 11/8/00 order [363−1] regarding report registers of petitions (cjp) (Entered: 04/03/2001)
427 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying as moot motion for leave to file surreply pertaining to motion for suspension of deadlines [423−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for expeditious hearing on interim fees [423−2] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 04/04/2001)
428 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: Class counsel and counsel for the government shall file a response to Mr. Carpenter's objection by 4/27/01; counsel shall offer the Court specific guidance as to how to address Mr. Carpenter's concerns; counsel shall submit a joint response, if possible (N) (bm) (Entered: 04/04/2001)
429 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: status conference set for 2:00 4/19/01 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 ; directing government counsel, class counsel and their respective fee counsel all shall appear at the status conference; class counsel shall be prepared to inform the Court of the following; setting forth issues; postponing the 4/15/01 deadline until 4/30/01; the ultimate 5/15/01 deadline remains in effect. (N) (bm) (Entered: 04/09/2001)
430 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of February, 2001 in the amount of $497,935; in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Order of Reference, the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 04/18/2001)
STATUS CONFERENCE before Judge Paul L. Friedman: held Reporter: Santa Zizzo (bm) (Entered: 04/19/2001)
431 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of April 19, 2001. Reporter: Santa Theresa Zizzo (td) (Entered: 04/27/2001)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 58 of 203

04/27/2001
04/27/2001 04/27/2001 04/27/2001 05/04/2001 05/09/2001 05/10/2001 05/15/2001
05/18/2001 05/21/2001 05/25/2001

432 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Gladys Kessler: suspending all deadlines set forth in the Court's Order of 11/8/00 until further Order of the Court; if the Court ultimately decides to grant an extension of time beyond 5/15/01, it will impose a progressive schedule of fines against Class Counsel; setting forth guideline for imposition of fines for Class Counsel; if after meeting on 5/1/01, Class Counsel determine that an extension of time beyond the 5/15/01, deadline will be needed to complete the petition process in a professional manner, counsel shall file a motion seeking such an extension; the motion shall propose a realistic schedule; if such a motion is necessary, it shall be filed and hand delivered to Chambers and government counsel by 5/4/01 at 4:00 p.m.; a response from the government, if any, shall be filed and hand delivered to Chambers and Class Counsel by 5/8/01 at 4:00 p.m. (N) (bm) (Entered: 04/30/2001)
Text not available. (Entered: 05/01/2001)
433 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to Abraham Carpenter's objection to the stipulation and order of 2/7/01 [416−1]. (td) (Entered: 05/01/2001)
434 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to notice of objection to stipulation and order [433−1]. (td) (Entered: 05/02/2001)
435 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for relief from the stipulation and order of 7/14/00, as modified by the Court's order of 11/8/00 ; attachments (4) (td) (Entered: 05/10/2001)
436 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion for relief from the stipulation and order of 7/14/00, as modified by the Court's order of 11/8/00 [435−1] by plaintiffsssss (td) (Entered: 05/15/2001)
437 REPLY by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to response in opposition to motion for relief from the stipulation and order of 7/14/00, as modified by the Court's order of 11/8/00 [435−1]; attachment (1) (td) (Entered: 05/15/2001)
438 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: permanently suspending all deadlines set forth in the Court's Order of 11/8/00; extending the deadline for filing supporting materials or withdrawals of petitins for monitor review involving claimants on class counsel's register of petition who received a decision by 9/15/01; directing counsel fully research, fully brief, fully document materials or withdrawal of petitions every Friday, on a weekly basis until all petitions involving claimants on class counsel's register of petitions who received a decision by 7/14/01 has been filed; under no circumstances however, shall the Monitor accept supporting materials or withdrawals that are filed after 9/15/01; the weekly deadlines will be satisfied so long as the filing is postmarked by the Friday that the filings are due; all supporting materials and withdrawals shall be sent to the facilitator in accordance with previously established practice; class counsel shall report directly to the Court on a weekly basis regarding their progress and the status of their operations; by 10:00 a.m. on every Monday between the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order and 9/1501, class counsel shall file with the Clerk's Office and hand deliver or fax to Chambers and to the government, a report that will include the following information; setting forth that information; setting forth instructions to the Monitor regading monthly submissions; setting forth fine schedule; at a date to be determined, but not before 9/15/01, the Court will hold a hearing to review the conduct of class counsel with respect to petition for monitor review; at that time the Court will consider whether additional sanctions, fines or other measures are necessary to address class counsel's conduct. (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/16/2001)
439 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of March 2001 in the amount of $434,933; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/18/2001)
440 STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 on the progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 05/24/2001)
441 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: denying as moot class counsel's 5/8/00 motion for attorney's fees; denying motion of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for interim award of attorneys' fees and costs [398−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered:

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 59 of 203

05/29/2001 06/01/2001 06/04/2001 06/11/2001
06/11/2001 06/18/2001 06/25/2001 06/25/2001 06/25/2001 06/28/2001
06/29/2001
07/02/2001 07/02/2001 07/06/2001 07/06/2001 07/09/2001

05/25/2001)
442 STATUS REPORT by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/05/2001)
443 STATUS REPORT by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 May 2001 report regarding registers of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/06/2001)
444 STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978, federal defendant in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978; exhibits (2) (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/08/2001)
445 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of April 2001 in the amount of $406,699; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/11/2001)
446 STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to the court on progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/12/2001)
447 STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 on the progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/20/2001)
448 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 for a suspension of time to respond to motion of certain Mississippi attorney's for interim awards of attorneys' fees and costs (cjp) (Entered: 06/26/2001)
449 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 re: monitor's proposed budget [445−1] (cjp) (Entered: 06/26/2001)
450 REPORT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 of 6/25/01 to the Court on progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions; exhibit (1) (cjp) (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/26/2001)
451 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the Facilitator shall from the date of this Order forward, immediately notify any claimant against whom the government files a Petition for Monitor Review; setting forth further instructions to the Facilitator; Class Counsel shall, from the date of this Order forward, file a memorandum with the Facilitator each time they decide not to file a response to a government Petition for Monitor Review; Class Counsel shall, by 7/20/01, submit to the Facilitator a list of all claims who petitions were withdrawn for primarily non−merit based reasons prior to the date of this Order; the Facilitator shall hold the list until further order of the Court. (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/28/2001)
452 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for a suspension of time [448−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978; denying motion for interim award of attorneys' fees and costs [317−1] in 1:97−cv−01978; the denial shall be without prejudice for a period of 30 days from the date of this Order; if settlement is not consummated within that 30−day period, counsel may reinstate the motion upon motion approved by the Court; should counsel fail to move to reinstate the motion within the prescribed period, the matter shll, without further order, stand denied with prejudice. (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/29/2001)
453 STATUS REPORT by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 monitor's June 2001 report regarding registers of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 07/03/2001)
454 STATUS REPORT by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 July 2, 2001 Report to the Court on progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 07/06/2001)
455 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to the court's order of June 28, 2001 [451−1]. (td) (Entered: 07/09/2001)
456 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for appointment of co−lead counsel. (td) (Entered: 07/09/2001)
457 STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 July 9, 2001 report to the court on progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered:

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07/10/2001
07/16/2001 07/17/2001 07/17/2001 07/23/2001
07/23/2001 07/23/2001 07/23/2001 07/23/2001 07/24/2001 07/27/2001
07/27/2001 07/30/2001 08/02/2001
08/06/2001 08/08/2001 08/09/2001

07/10/2001)
458 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of May 2001 in the amount of $491,427; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/10/2001)
459 STATUS REPORT by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 July 16, 2001 report to the court on progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 07/18/2001)
460 STATEMENT filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978, regarding: plaintiff's response to the Court's June 28, 2001 memorandum and opinion order. (td) (Entered: 07/19/2001)
461 REPLY by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's response to monitor's proposed budget; exhibits (2) (td) (Entered: 07/19/2001)
MOTION HEARING before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Motion by plaintiffs for TRO, heard and denied for reasons stated on the record; the parties shall agree on a briefing schedule for the motion to modify the Court order of 3/1/01. Reporter: Santa Zizzo (bm) (Entered: 07/23/2001)
462 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: denying motion by claimant Earl Kitchen for a temporary restraining order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/24/2001)
463 MOTION filed by Earl Kitchen for temporary restraining order (bm) (Entered: 07/26/2001)
464 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for temporary restraining order [463−1]; attachments (16) BULKY PLEADING (bm) (Entered: 07/26/2001)
470 STATUS REPORT by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 on progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 08/06/2001)
465 MOTION filed by certain plaintiffs attorneys in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorney fees and costs ; exhibits (4) (bjsp) (Entered: 07/26/2001)
466 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's request for a total budget amount of $5,867,453.00 for the period of 7/1/01 through 12/31/01; USDA shall deposit with the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a sum equal to a pro−rata month's portion of the approved budget within the first fifteen (15) days of each month. (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/27/2001)
467 REPORT (MONITOR) July 2001 regarding registers of petitions (cjp) (temp1, ). (Entered: 07/30/2001)
468 STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 RE: the progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions; attachments (bjsp) (temp1, ). (Entered: 08/01/2001)
469 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the Monitor shall by 8/15/01 prepare a statement that details the amount of unspent funds in the reserve at the Court Registry from completed budget cycles; that statement shall be filed with the Court and served on the parties; the Government's responsibility to deposit funds into the Court Registry shall be reduced by said amount; the Clerk of the Court shall use said amount towards payment of the Monitor's monthly invoices; similar procedures shall be followed forty−five days after the completion of each subsequent budget cycle. (N) (bm) (Entered: 08/02/2001)
471 STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to the court on progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 08/07/2001)
472 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to plaintiffs' stipulation and order. (td) (Entered: 08/09/2001)
473 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file a response to orders dated 4/27/01 and 6/28/01. (td) (Entered: 08/10/2001)

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08/13/2001 08/15/2001
08/16/2001 08/16/2001 08/17/2001 08/20/2001
08/20/2001 08/20/2001 08/21/2001 08/23/2001 08/27/2001 08/27/2001
08/27/2001 08/27/2001 08/28/2001 08/28/2001 08/28/2001 08/29/2001

474 STATUS REPORT by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 of 8/13/01 on the progress of class counsel's register of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 08/14/2001)
476 ORDER by Judge Ricardo M. Urbina for Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting motion for leave to file a response to orders dated 4/27/01 and 6/28/01. [473−1] by plaintiffs; directing that response to memorandum response to order dated 4/27/01 and 6/28/01 be filed on or before 9/25/01 (N) (jwd) (Entered: 08/16/2001)
475 ORDER byy Judge Paul L. Friedman: directingthat plaintiffs shall file their brief by 8/17/01; the government shall file a reply brief by 9/10/01 (N) (jwd) (Entered: 08/16/2001)
477 STATUS REPORT by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978on surplus registry funds as of June 30, 2001. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 08/17/2001)
491 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to endow arbitrators with discretion to extend arbitration deadlines ; (copy) (td) (Entered: 08/29/2001)
478 ORDER by Judge Ricardo M. Urbina for Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of June 2001 in the amount of $460,500.00; directing that in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Orde of Reference, the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this order. (N) (jwd) (Entered: 08/20/2001)
479 STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 on the progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 08/21/2001)
480 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to endow arbitratiors with discretion to extend arbitration deadlines. (td) (Entered: 08/21/2001)
481 RESPONSE to orders [466−1] and [432−1]; (FIAT. Judge Friedman) (td) (Entered: 08/27/2001)
482 MOTION filed by Non Party HAROLD B. DIXON in 1:97−cv−01978 vacating judgment as to Non Party HAROLD B. DIXON in 1:97−cv−01978. (td) (Entered: 08/28/2001)
483 MOTION filed by Non Party EVELYN M. COLEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 vacating judgment as to Non Party EVELYN M. COLEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978. (td) (Entered: 08/28/2001)
484 MOTION filed by Non Party LARRY GARRETT in 1:97−cv−01978, Non Party BETTY GARRETT in 1:97−cv−01978 vacating judgment as to Non Party LARRY GARRETT in 1:97−cv−01978, Non Party BETTY GARRETT in 1:97−cv−01978. (td) (Entered: 08/28/2001)
485 MOTION filed by Non Party CAROLYN − SMITH in 1:97−cv−01978 vacating judgment as to Non Party CAROLYN − SMITH in 1:97−cv−01978. , and to intervene. (td) (Entered: 08/28/2001)
486 STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 on the progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 08/28/2001)
488 MOTION filed by movant COLIE DIXON in 1:97−cv−01978 to vacate judgment ; affidavit (1) (td) (Entered: 08/29/2001)
489 MOTION filed by movant L. D. MAYMON in 1:97−cv−01978 to vacate judgment ; affidavit (1) (td) (Entered: 08/29/2001)
490 MOTION filed by movant WILLIE S. MAYMON in 1:97−cv−01978 to vacate judgment ; affidavit (1) (td) (Entered: 08/29/2001)
487 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: exempting Mr. Carpenter's non−credit claims (filed for benefits denied to "Carpenters Produce") from the $3,000 damages cap established under the Court's 2/7/01, Stipulation and Order; in the event that Mr. Carpenter's Petition for Monitor Review is granted and his claims are approved upon rehearing by the Adjudicator, Carpenters Product shall be awarded the amount of the benefit wrongly denied, as determined by the Adjudicator. (N) (bm) (Entered: 08/29/2001)

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08/29/2001 08/29/2001 08/30/2001 08/30/2001 08/31/2001 09/04/2001 09/04/2001 09/04/2001 09/04/2001
09/04/2001 09/05/2001 09/06/2001 09/06/2001 09/07/2001 09/10/2001 09/10/2001 09/10/2001 09/12/2001 09/12/2001

492 MOTION filed by movant LOIS S. CLARK in 1:97−cv−01978 vacating judgment as to movant LOIS S. CLARK in 1:97−cv−01978 ; affidavit (1) (td) (Entered: 08/30/2001)
493 STATUS REPORT by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 August 2001 report regarding registers of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 08/30/2001)
494 MOTION filed by movant CURTIS DIXON in 1:97−cv−01978 to vacate judgment as to movant CURTIS DIXON in 1:97−cv−01978. (td) Modified on 08/31/2001 (Entered: 08/31/2001)
495 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to treat as conceded the motion of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for award of attorneys fees and costs. (td) (Entered: 08/31/2001)
496 MOTION filed for EZRA MCNAIR to case(s) 1:97−cv−01978, to intervene , and to vacate judgment ; affidavit (1) (td) (Entered: 09/04/2001)
498 MOTION filed for LARRY D. BARNES to case(s) 1:97−cv−01978, to intervene , and vacating judgment as to movant LARRY D. BARNES in 1:97−cv−01978. (td) (Entered: 09/10/2001)
499 STATUS REPORT by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to the court on progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 09/10/2001)
500 MOTION filed for EDITH LOMAX−BARNES to case(s) 1:97−cv−01978, to intervene , and to vacate judgment as to movant EDITH LOMAX−BARNES in 1:97−cv−01978 ; affidavit (1) (td) (Entered: 09/10/2001)
501 MOTION filed by movant Carrie Mcnair for CARRIE MCNAIR to case(s) 1:97−cv−01978, to intervene , and to vacate judgment as to movant CARRIE MCNAIR in 1:97−cv−01978 ; affidavit (1) (td) Modified on 09/10/2001 (Entered: 09/10/2001)
507 MOTION filed for DARYL BRENTR to case(s) 1:97−cv−01978, to intervene , and vacate judgment in 1:97−cv−01978 ; affidavit (1) (td) (Entered: 09/17/2001)
508 MOTION filed for CURTIS DIXON to case(s) 1:97−cv−01978, to intervene , and vacate judgment as to movant CURTIS − DIXON in 1:97−cv−01978. (td) (Entered: 09/17/2001)
497 MOTION filed by movants Grover Miller and Geraldstine Miller for GROVER MILLER, GERALDSTINE MILLER to case(s) 1:97−cv−01978, to intervene , and vacating judgment ; affidavit (1) (td) Modified on 09/10/2001 (Entered: 09/10/2001)
516 MOTION filed by movant HENRY A. VAUGHN in 1:97−cv−01978, movant FLORIA A. VAUGHN in 1:97−cv−01978 to vacate judgment . (td) (Entered: 09/20/2001)
509 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motions to vacate judgment and, in one case, to intervene[490−1] [489−1], [485−1],[485−2],[483−1]. (td) (Entered: 09/17/2001)
502 REPORT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 of 9/10/01 on progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions (bm) (Entered: 09/11/2001)
503 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion to endow arbitratiors with discretion to extend arbitration deadlines. [480−1] by plaintiffs. (bm) (Entered: 09/11/2001)
504 JOINDER by Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP claimants joining in motion to endow arbitratiors with discretion to extend arbitration deadlines. [480−1] (bm) (Entered: 09/11/2001)
512 MOTION filed for HAROLD B. DIXON to case(s) 1:97−cv−01978, to intervene. (td) (Entered: 09/18/2001)
513 MOTION filed by movant LINDA CATCHING in 1:97−cv−01978 to vacate judgment . (td) (Entered: 09/18/2001)

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09/12/2001 09/14/2001 09/14/2001 09/14/2001 09/17/2001
09/17/2001 09/19/2001 09/20/2001 09/21/2001 09/24/2001 09/24/2001 09/25/2001
09/25/2001 09/25/2001 09/26/2001
09/27/2001

514 MOTION filed for LARRY GARRETT to case(s) 1:97−cv−01978, to intervene. (td) (Entered: 09/18/2001)
505 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of September 2001 in the amount of $516,793.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/14/2001)
510 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motions to vacate judgment. (td) (Entered: 09/18/2001)
511 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 for order to show cause that would require any person who seeks to file a pro se motion to vacate the Pigford Decree to first file a written statement executed under penalty of perjury. (td) (Entered: 09/18/2001)
506 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: denying motion for attorney fees and costs [465−1] by LAW OFFICES OF DAVID BRANCH in 1:97−cv−01978; denying motion to treat as conceded the motion of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for award of attorneys fees and costs [495−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978; attachment (1) (N) (bm) Modified on 09/17/2001 (Entered: 09/17/2001)
515 STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to the court on progress and status of class counsel's register of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 09/19/2001)
517 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file opposition brief out of time ; EXHIBIT (Opposition) (td) (Entered: 09/20/2001)
518 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to rule 60(b) motions. (td) (Entered: 09/21/2001)
520 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to join der by WRF claimants in motion to endow arbitrators with discretion to extend arbitration deadlines [504−1]. (td) (Entered: 09/24/2001)
519 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for leave to file opposition brief out of time [517−1] by ANN VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978; both motions for attorney's fees and costs have been denied. (N) (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 09/24/2001)
521 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to petition by the Law Office of David A. Branch for attorney's fees and costs, and motion by the branch firm to have their fee petition conceded. . (td) (Entered: 09/24/2001)
522 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: clarifying the Court's order of 9/14/01 to approve the Monitor's invoice for the period of July 2001 in the amount of $516,793.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of the Court's original order on 9/14/01, that is, by 9/29/01. (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/25/2001)
525 RESPONSE by plaintiffs' attorney to memorandum response to orders dfated April 27, 2001 and June 28, 2001; attachment (1) (td) (Entered: 10/01/2001)
526 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to vacate the sanctions set forth in the 4/27/01 memorandum opinion and order of the court and the 5/15/01 memorandum opinion and order of the court ; attachments (13) (td) (Entered: 10/02/2001)
524 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion to vacate judgment . [513−1] by LINDA CATCHING, motion to vacate judgment . [516−1] by FLORIA A. VAUGHN, HENRY A. VAUGHN, motion vacating judgment as to Non Party EVELYN M. COLEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978. [483−1] by EVELYN M. COLEMAN . (bm) (Entered: 09/28/2001)
523 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: defendant shall not be required to respond further to any current or future such motions to vacate, so long as the motions do not present significant issues not already addressed by defendant; in the event that the

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10/01/2001 10/01/2001 10/02/2001 10/03/2001 10/03/2001 10/03/2001 10/03/2001 10/03/2001 10/03/2001 10/03/2001 10/05/2001 10/09/2001
10/09/2001
10/15/2001
10/19/2001
10/23/2001

Court is inclined to grant any or all of the motions to vacate judgment, or any similar motions even though differently captioned, the Court will alert defendant and allow her a reasonable period of time to raise additional points beyond those already stated in defendant's opposition briefs of September 7, 13 and 20, 2001. (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/27/2001)
527 MOTION filed by movant CAROLYN SMITH in 1:97−cv−01978 for contention. (td) (Entered: 10/02/2001)
528 OBJECTIONS by movant CAROLYN SMITH in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's motion for order to show cause [511−1]. (td) (Entered: 10/02/2001)
529 MONITOR'S PRELIMINARY REPORT by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 September 2001 report regarding registers of petitions. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 10/03/2001)
530 OBJECTIONS by movant GROVER MILLER in 1:97−cv−01978, movant GERALDSTINE MILLER in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's motion for order to show cause [511−1]. (td) (Entered: 10/04/2001)
531 OBJECTIONS by movant HENRY A. VAUGHN in 1:97−cv−01978, movant FLORIA A. VAUGHN in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendants' motion for order to show cause [511−1]. (td) (Entered: 10/04/2001)
532 OBJECTIONS by movant L. D. MAYMON in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendants' motion for order to show cause [511−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (td) (Entered: 10/04/2001)
533 OBJECTIONS by movant EVELYN M. COLEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendants' motion for order to show cause [511−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (td) (Entered: 10/04/2001)
534 OBJECTIONS by movant LARRY GARRETT in 1:97−cv−01978, movant BETTY GARRETT in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendants' motion for order to show cause [511−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (td) (Entered: 10/04/2001)
535 OBJECTIONS by Non Party HAROLD B. DIXON in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendants' motion for order to show cause [511−1]. (td) (Entered: 10/04/2001)
536 OBJECTIONS by movant COLIE DIXON SR. in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendants' motion for order to show cause [511−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (td) (Entered: 10/04/2001)
539 OBJECTIONS by movant WILLIE S. MAYMON in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's motion for an order to show cause [511−1]. (td) (Entered: 10/16/2001)
537 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion to vacate the sanctions set forth in the 4/27/01 memorandum opinion and order of the court and the 5/15/01 memorandum opinion and order of the court [526−1] by plaintiffs; exhibits (2) (tb) (Entered: 10/11/2001)
540 OBJECTIONS by movant MARILYNN STEWART in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion for order to show cause that would require any person who seeks to file a pro se motion to vacate the Pigford Decree to first file a written statement executed under penalty of perjury. [511−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (td) (Entered: 10/17/2001)
538 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of August 2001 in the amount of $377,008.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/15/2001)
541 REPLY by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to response in opposition to motion to vacate the sanctions set forth in the 4/27/01 memorandum opinion and order of the court and the 5/15/01 memorandum opinion and order of the court [526−1] by plaintiffs (tb) (Entered: 10/23/2001)
543 ERRATA by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 notice of correction to defendant's response to motion of class counsel to vacate the sanctions set forth in the April 27, 2001 memorandum opinion and order of the court and May 15, 2001 memorandum opinion and order of the court. (td) (Entered: 10/30/2001)

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10/24/2001
10/30/2001 11/01/2001
11/02/2001
11/05/2001 11/06/2001 11/07/2001
11/08/2001 11/08/2001 11/09/2001 11/09/2001 11/14/2001 11/15/2001 11/19/2001 11/19/2001 11/19/2001 11/20/2001 11/21/2001 11/26/2001

542 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to certify as final order for purposes of appeal the court's order denying certain plaintiffs' attorneys (Law office of David A. Branch, of counsel) motion for award of attorneys fees and costs ; exhibit (1) (td) (Entered: 10/29/2001)
545 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to show cause ; attachments (3) (td) (Entered: 11/01/2001)
544 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of September 2001 in the amount of $475,815.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/01/2001)
546 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion to certify as final order for purposes of appeal the court's order denying certain plaintiffs' attorneys (Law office of David A. Branch, of counsel) motion for award of attorneys fees and costs [542−1] by plaintiffsssss (td) (Entered: 11/06/2001)
547 NOTICE by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 of intention to resolve merged petitions; attachment (1) (td) Modified on 11/07/2001 (Entered: 11/07/2001)
548 NOTICE by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 of intention to produce certain files to pro bono counsel; attachments (7) (FILED UNDER SEAL AND PLACED IN VAULT IN ROOM 1800) (td) Modified on 11/07/2001 (Entered: 11/07/2001)
549 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: directing the Clerk of the Court to file class counsel's notice of intention to product certain documents to class counsel under seal, including all exhibits attached thereto, until further order of the Court. (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/07/2001)
550 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion to show cause [545−1]; (c/m 11/06/01) (td) (Entered: 11/13/2001)
551 STATUS REPORT by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 regarding registers of petitions; (c/m 11/7/01) (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 11/13/2001)
554 MOTION filed by movant HAROLD B. DIXON in 1:97−cv−01978 for exclusion and to volunteer appearance. (td) Modified on 11/20/2001 (Entered: 11/20/2001)
555 MOTION filed by movant EVELYN M. COLEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 for exclusion and to appear voluntarily. (td) (Entered: 11/20/2001)
552 STATUS REPORT by arbitrator Michael K. Lewis on late−claim process; attachment (1); (FIAT. Judge Friedman) (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 11/15/2001)
553 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 from order [506−1] , entered on: 9/17/01. $105.00 fee paid. copy mailed to parties. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 11/20/2001)
556 MOTION filed by movant L. D. MAYMON in 1:97−cv−01978 for exclusion and to volunteer appearance. (td) (Entered: 11/21/2001)
557 MOTION filed by movant MARILYNN STEWART in 1:97−cv−01978 for exclusion and to volunteer appearance. (td) (Entered: 11/21/2001)
559 REPLY by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's opposition to plaintiffs motion to show cause [545−1] by plaintiffs (td) (Entered: 11/21/2001)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [553−1] by plaintiffs to U.S. Court of Appeals (td) (Entered: 11/20/2001)
558 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying as moot motion to certify as final order for purposes of appeal [542−1] by movant (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/21/2001)
560 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion for contention. [527−1] by CAROLYN SMITH in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion for LARRY GARRETT to case(s) 1:97−cv−1978, to intervene. [514−1] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion to vacate judgment . [513−1] by LINDA CATCHING

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 66 of 203

11/28/2001 11/29/2001 11/29/2001 11/30/2001
12/04/2001 12/04/2001 12/04/2001

in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion for HAROLD B. DIXON to case(s) 1:97−cv−1978, to intervene. [512−1] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion to vacate judgment . [516−1] by FLORIA A. VAUGHN, HENRY A. VAUGHN in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion for GROVER MILLER, GERALDSTINE MILLER to case(s) 1:97−cv−1978, to intervene [497−1] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion vacating judgment [497−2] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion for CURTIS DIXON to case(s) 1:97−cv−1978, to intervene [508−1] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion vacate judgment as to movant CURTIS DIXON in 1:97−cv−1978. [508−2] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion for CARRIE MCNAIR to case(s) 1:97−cv−1978, to intervene [501−1] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion to vacate judgment as to movant CARRIE MCNAIR in 1:97−cv−1978 [501−2] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion for EDITH LOMAX−BARNES to case(s) 1:97−cv−1978, to intervene [500−1] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion to vacate judgment as to movant EDITH LOMAX−BARNES in 1:97−cv−1978 [500−2] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion for DARYL BRENTR to case(s) 1:97−cv−1978, to intervene [507−1] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion vacate judgment in 1:97−cv−1978 [507−2] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion for LARRY D. BARNES to case(s) 1:97−cv−1978, to intervene [498−1] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion vacating judgment as to movant LARRY D. BARNES in 1:97−cv−1978. [498−2] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion for EZRA MCNAIR to case(s) 1:97−cv−1978, to intervene [496−1] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion to vacate judgment [496−2] in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion to vacate judgment as to movant CURTIS DIXON in 1:97−cv−1978. [494−1] by CURTIS DIXON in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion vacating judgment as to movant LOIS S. CLARK in 1:97−cv−1978 [492−1] by LOIS S. CLARK in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion to vacate judgment [490−1] by WILLIE S. MAYMON in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion to vacate judgment [489−1] by L. D. MAYMON in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion to vacate judgment [488−1] by COLIE DIXON SR. in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion vacating judgment as to Non Party CAROLYN SMITH in 1:97−cv−1978. [485−1] by CAROLYN SMITH in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion to intervene. [485−2] by CAROLYN SMITH in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion vacating judgment as to Non Party LARRY GARRETT in 1:97−cv−1978, Non Party BETTY GARRETT in 1:97−cv−1978. [484−1] by BETTY GARRETT, LARRY GARRETT in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion vacating judgment as to Non Party EVELYN M. COLEMAN in 1:97−cv−1978. [483−1] by EVELYN M. COLEMAN in 1:97−cv−1978, denying motion vacating judgment as to Non Party HAROLD B. DIXON in 1:97−cv−1978. [482−1] by HAROLD B. DIXON in 1:97−cv−1978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/26/2001)
561 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion for appointment of 4 pro bono co−lead counsel [456−1] by OBIE L. BEAL, MCARTHUR NESBIT, GEORGE HALL, LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/28/2001)
562 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 foremergency enforcement of the second amended supplemental privacy act protective order , and for sanctions (cjp) (Entered: 11/30/2001)
USCA # 01−5411 assigned for appeal [553−1] by plaintiffsssss (td) (Entered: 12/06/2001)
563 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting defendant's request for expedited briefing; plaintiffs shall file and hand deliver to defendant, to pro bono counsel at Covington & Burling and to Chambers a response by 12/4/01; defendant shall file and hand deliver to plaintiffs to pro bono counsel at Covington & Burling and to Chambers a reply by 12/7/01; setting forth what shall be covered in the reply brief. (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/03/2001)
564 MOTION filed by movant GROVER MILLER in 1:97−cv−01978 for exclusion and to voluntarily appear. (td) (Entered: 12/05/2001)
565 RESPONSE by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion foremergency enforcement of the second amended supplemental privacy act protective order [562−1] and for sanctions [562−2]; attachments (2) (td) (Entered: 12/06/2001)
566 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to withdraw as attorney for plaintiffs. (td) (Entered: 12/06/2001)

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12/04/2001 12/04/2001 12/04/2001 12/04/2001 12/04/2001 12/04/2001 12/06/2001 12/11/2001 12/11/2001 12/12/2001 12/12/2001
12/14/2001
12/14/2001 12/19/2001
01/02/2002

567 MOTION filed for VELMA J. COLLINS to case(s) 1:97−cv−01978, to intervene , and for exclusion. (td) (Entered: 12/07/2001)
568 MOTION filed by movant LARRY GARRETT in 1:97−cv−01978, movant BETTY GARRETT in 1:97−cv−01978 for exclusion and to voluntairly appear. (td) (Entered: 12/07/2001)
569 MOTION filed by movant CAROLYN SMITH in 1:97−cv−01978 for exclusion and voluntarily appear. (td) (Entered: 12/07/2001)
570 MOTION filed by movant COLIE DIXON SR. in 1:97−cv−01978 for exclusion and to volunteer appearance. (td) (Entered: 12/07/2001)
571 MOTION filed by movant WILLIE S. MAYMON in 1:97−cv−01978 for exclusion and to volunteer appearance. (td) (Entered: 12/07/2001)
572 MOTION filed for ROBERT E. COLLINS to case(s) 1:97−cv−01978, to intervene , and for exclusion. (td) (Entered: 12/07/2001)
573 REPLY by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to plaintiffs' response to defendants' motion foremergency enforcement of the second amended supplemental privacy act protective order [562−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN, motion for sanctions [562−2] by ANN M. VENEMAN (td) (Entered: 12/07/2001)
574 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for T. Roe Frazer II, Esquire to withdraw as attorney for plaintiffs [566−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/11/2001)
575 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file plaintiffs' for relief under seal ; EXHIBIT ( LODGED UNDER SEAL motion for relief) (td) (Entered: 12/12/2001)
576 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for leave to file plaintiffs' for relief under seal [575−1] by plaintiffs and instructing the Clerk to file the document under seal. (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/12/2001)
581 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for relief for 97 class members whose petitions for monitor review were filed on or before 9/15/01, but have been designated by the facilitator as late ; attachments (102) ; (ALL OF PLEADING 581 SEALED EXCEPT FOR PAGES 1−13 WHICH WERE UNSEALED PURUSANT TO THE JUDGE'S ORDER DATED 1/18/02 (td) Modified on 01/25/2002 (Entered: 01/04/2002)
577 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion to show cause [545−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978; plaintiffs may refile the motion in the future if the issue of late payment remains a problem, and provided that they have complied with the notice requirements contained in paragraph 13 of the Consent Decree. (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/14/2001)
578 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of October 2001 in the amount of $533,924.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/14/2001)
579 ORDER by Judge Thomas P. Jackson: approving the Monitor's request for a total budget amount of $4,349,939.00 for the period of 1/1/02 through 6/30/02; USDA shall deposit with the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a sum equal to a pro−rata month's portion of the approved budget within the first fifteen (15) days of each month; within fifteen (15) days of the entry of this Order, USDA shall deposit with the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the additional sum of $500,000.00; this sum shall serve as an advance against expenses that the Monitor will incur; the full amount shall be accounted for as a credit toward Monitor invoice(s) during the last six months of the Monitor's tenure, according to a schedule of credits to be agreed to by the Monitor and USDA. (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/19/2001)
580 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to to plaintiffs motion for relief for 97 class members whose petitions for monitor review were filed on or before 9/15/01, but have been designated by the facilitator as late and

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01/02/2002 01/03/2002 01/04/2002 01/07/2002 01/08/2002 01/08/2002 01/16/2002 01/17/2002 01/17/2002
01/31/2002

request that plaintiffs' motion be partially unsealed; UNSEALED PURSUANT TO COURT'S ORDER ON 1/16/02 (td) Modified on 01/25/2002 (Entered: 01/02/2002)
582 REPLY by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's response to motion for relief for 97 class members whose petitions for monitor review were filed on or before 9/15/01, but have been designated by the facilitator as late [581−1]; attachments (3) (td) Modified on 01/04/2002 (Entered: 01/04/2002)
583 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file surreply pertaining to defendant's response to plaintiffs' motion for relief for 97 class members whose petitions for monitor review were filed on or before 9/15/01, but hav been disignated by the facilitator as late and request that plaintiffs' motion be partially unsealed ; (SEALED) (td) (Entered: 01/07/2002)
585 RESPONSE by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion for leave to file surreply pertaining to defendant's response to plaintiffs' motion for relief for 97 class members whose petitions for monitor review were filed on or before 9/15/01, but hav been disignated by the facilitator as late and request that plaintiffs' motion be partially unsealed [583−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (td) (Entered: 01/08/2002)
584 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of November, 2001 in the amount of $467,527.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/07/2002)
586 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for leave to file surreply pertaining to defendant's response plaintiffs' motion for relief for 97 class members whose petitions for monitor review were filed on or before 9/15/01, but hav been disignated by the facilitator as late and request that plaintiffs' motion be partially unsealed [583−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN; the defendant's surreply, attached to the motion, shall be deemed file and served as of the date of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/08/2002)
587 SURREPLY by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 pertaining to defendant's response to plaintiffs' motion for relief for 97 class members whose petitions for monitor revies were filed on or before 9/15/01, but have been designated by the facilitator as late UNSEALED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S ORDER DATED 1/16/02 (td) Modified on 01/25/2002 (Entered: 01/08/2002)
588 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting defendant's request to unseal portions of plaintiffs' motion and directing the Clerk of the Court to unseal pages one through thirteen of plaintiffs' motion for relief for 97 claimants (581−1), all of defendant's response (580−1) and all of defendant's surreply (587−1); the remaining pages and all exhibits to plaintiffs' motion (581−1) shall remain under seal. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/16/2002)
589 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting plaintiffs' motion to endow arbitrators with discretion to extend arbitration deadlines; the Court holds that the arbitrators' authority to revise deadlines in Track B proceedings is implicit in the terms of the Consent Decree and supported by general principles of judicial discretion, and therefore the Court need not "endow" the arbitrators with any supplemental authority. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/17/2002)
590 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting in part, denying in part motion for emergency enforcement of the second amended supplemental privacy act protective order [562−1] [562−2] in 1:97−cv−01978; Covington may retain and consult all files released to it by class counsel; permanently enjoining class counsel from releasing similar protected files to any pro bono counsel, including Covington attorneys' to whom the government itself has not released the files; if pro bono counsel wish to obtain such files, they are directed to seek release from the government itself, in accordance with the terms of the Protective Order and this Opinion; defendant's request for sanctions against class counsel will be decided at such time as the Court also can consider all pending requests for sanctions against class counsel. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/17/2002)
591 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for Levi Boone, III to appear pro hac vice ( BOONE LAW FIRM, P.A. 401 W. Sunflower Road, P.O. Box 1772,

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02/01/2002 02/01/2002 02/01/2002 02/01/2002 02/05/2002 02/05/2002 02/14/2002 02/14/2002 02/14/2002 02/15/2002
02/15/2002 02/15/2002 02/19/2002
02/20/2002 02/26/2002
02/26/2002
02/28/2002

Cleveland, MS 38732, (662) 843−7946 ext: 11) (td) (Entered: 02/01/2002)
592 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 from order [589−1] , entered on: 1/17/02. Government no fees; Copies mailed. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 02/05/2002)
NOTICE OF APPEAL by federal defendant ANN VENEMAN in 1:98−cv−01693 from order [182−1] , entered on: 1/17/02. Government no fees; Copies mailed. (td) (Entered: 02/05/2002)
NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL by federal defendant ANN VENEMAN in 1:98−cv−01693 from order [182−1] , entered on: 1/17/02. Government no fees; copies mailed. (td) (Entered: 02/05/2002)
593 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to stay pending appeal. (td) (Entered: 02/05/2002)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [184−1] by ANN VENEMAN to U.S. Court of Appeals (td) (Entered: 02/05/2002)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [592−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN to U.S. Court of Appeals (td) (Entered: 02/05/2002)
594 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Phillip L Fraas representing plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978. New address: HOGAN & HARTSON 555 Thirteenth Street, NW, Washington DC 20004, (202) 637−6624. (bm) (Entered: 02/15/2002)
598 ERRATA by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 amended certificate of service for plaintiffs' opposition to defendant's motion for stay pending appeal. (td) (Entered: 02/21/2002)
599 REPLY by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to plaintiffs' opposition to defendant's motion for stay pending appeal [593−1]. (td) (Entered: 02/21/2002)
595 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion to stay pending appeal. [593−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978; absent the issuance of a stay by the Court of Appeals, the Court's January 17, 2002, prder shall remain in effect pending defendant's appeal of the order to the Court of Appeals. (N) (jwd) Modified on 02/20/2002 (Entered: 02/20/2002)
597 RESPONSE by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to defendant's motion for stay pending appeal; (FIAT. Judge Friedman) (td) Modified on 02/20/2002 (Entered: 02/20/2002)
USCA # 02−5052 assigned for appeal [592−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (td) (Entered: 02/25/2002)
596 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of November 2001 in the amount of $559,061.00; in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Order of Reference, the Clerk ofthe Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15 days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (jwd) (Entered: 02/20/2002)
600 RESPONSE by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 to order [469−1] (nmr) (Entered: 02/26/2002)
601 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: denying motion for Levi Boone, III to appear pro hac vice ( BOONE LAW FIRM, P.A. 401 W. Sunflower Road, P.O. Box 1772, Cleveland, MS 38732, (662) 843−7946 ext: 11) [591−1] by plaintiffsssss in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (dam) (Entered: 02/27/2002)
602 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of 12/01 in the amount of $559,061.00; directing the Clerk of the Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 02/27/2002)
603 STATUS REPORT by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 on late petition filings. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 03/04/2002)

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03/01/2002 03/07/2002 03/20/2002 04/22/2002 04/30/2002 05/03/2002 05/06/2002
05/07/2002
05/08/2002 05/09/2002 05/10/2002 05/14/2002
05/24/2002
05/28/2002

604 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to monitor's report on late petition filings [603−1]; attachments (2) (td) (Entered: 03/06/2002)
605 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for reconsideration of order denying motion to appear pro hac vice [601−1] ; declaration (1); attachment (1) (td) (Entered: 03/12/2002)
606 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of January 2002 in the amount of $388,716.00; the Clker of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/21/2002)
607 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by EVANS M. FOLINS in 1:97−cv−01978 representing claimant EVANS M. FOLINS in 1:97−cv−01978. New address: k P.O. Box 81−1865 Los Valores California 90081 . (td) (Entered: 04/24/2002)
608 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: counsel for both plaintiffs and the defendant shall haveuntil 5/13/02 to file a response to the motion for reconsideration [605−1] after which time the Court will decide the motion (N) (bm) (Entered: 04/30/2002)
609 STATUS REPORT by Arbitrator Michael K. Lewis on the late claim petition process. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 05/06/2002)
610 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of January 2002 in the amount of $388,716.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/07/2002)
611 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of February 2002 in the amount of $384,496.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/08/2002)
612 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL by plaintiffs of motion for relief for 97 class members whose petitions for monitor review were filed on or before 9/15/01, but have been designated by the facilitator as late [581−1]. (td) (Entered: 05/10/2002)
614 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Arbitrator's second report on the late−claim petition process [609−1]; the report shall be made available to all interested parties by means of immediate posting on the District Court's website; setting forth website. (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/10/2002)
613 MOTION filed for consideration in the claims resolution process due to extraordinary circumstances ; exhibits (8); (FIAT. Judge Friedman) (td) Modified on 05/10/2002 (Entered: 05/10/2002)
615 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the petition of Darrell W. Williams will not be considered by the Court; directing Mr. Williams and all putative class members seeking permission to late file under Section 5(g) of the Consent Decree to review the terms of that provision, as interpreted by the Court and the Arbritrator; if, having reviewed the requirements for eligibility under Section 5(g), petitioners believe that they are entitled to late file, petitioners must seek permission directly from the Arbritrator, Michael K. Lewis. (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/14/2002)
616 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978, federal defendant ANN VENEMAN in 1:98−cv−01693 to extend time to file response to a petition for Monitor review be filed with Consent Decree Facilitator no later than sixty days from the date of non−moving parties recieves petition from facilitor ; declaration (1) (mpt) (Entered: 05/28/2002)
617 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the monitor's invoice for the period of March, 2002 in the amount of $329,290.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/28/2002)

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05/28/2002 05/31/2002 06/03/2002 06/06/2002 06/10/2002 06/11/2002
06/13/2002 06/18/2002 06/18/2002
06/20/2002 06/20/2002 06/27/2002

618 RESPONSE (Initial) by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's request for expedited briefing (of defendant's motion for extension) [616−1] by ANN VENEMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN (td) (Entered: 05/29/2002)
619 RESPONSE by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to expedited motion to extend time to file response to a petition for Monitor review be filed with Consent Decree Facilitator no later than sixty days from the date of non−moving parties recieves petition from facilitor [616−1] by ANN VENEMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN; exhibits (3) (bcs) (Entered: 06/05/2002)
620 REPLY by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in support of expedited motion to extend time to file response to a petition for Monitor review be filed with Consent Decree Facilitator no later than sixty days from the date of non−moving parties recieves petition from facilitor [616−1] by ANN VENEMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN (bcs) (Entered: 06/06/2002)
621 RESPONSE by federal defendant's in support of motion for reconsideration of order denying motion to appear pro hac vice [601−1] [605−1] by plaintiffs (rje) (Entered: 06/07/2002)
623 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to plaintiffs' response to defendant's expedited motion for an extension [619−1]; attachments (2) (td) (Entered: 06/13/2002)
622 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to file response to a petition for Monitor review be filed with Consent Decree Facilitator no later than sixty days from the date of non−moving parties petition from facilitor [616−1] by ANN VENEMAN, ANN M; defendant shall have an additional 14 days in which to respond to Groups 35−37 of claimant petitions for Monitor review; defendant shall file responses to Groups 35, 36, and 37 of petitions for Monitor review with the Consent Decree Facilitator on 7/5/02, 7/19/02 and 8/2/02 respectively. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/11/2002)
624 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to plaintiffs' supplement to plaintiff's response to defendant's expedited motion for an extension [623−1]. (td) (Entered: 06/14/2002)
625 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting plaintiffs' motion for leave, to which defendant consents, to file plaintiffs' supplement to plaintiffs' response to expedited motion for an extension. (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/18/2002)
626 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's request for a total budget amount of $4,025,158.00 for the period of 7/1/02 thorugh 12/31/02; USDA shall deposit with the Clerk of Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a sum equal to a pro−rata month's portion of the approved budget within the first fifteen (15) days of each month. (N) (bm) (Main Document 626 replaced on 4/28/2015) (temp1, ). (Entered: 06/18/2002)
627 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for reconsideration of order denying motion to allow Levi Boone to appear pro hac vice [601−1] [605−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/20/2002)
628 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the defendant shall have an additional 14 days in which to respond to Groups 38 and 39 of claimant petitins for Monitor review, as it had with Groups 35, 36 and 37 of claimant petitions under this Court's Order of 6/11/02. (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/20/2002)
629 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion to intervene. [572−1]; denying motion for exclusion. [572−2] in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for exclusion and to volunteer appearance. [571−1] WILLIE S. MAYMON in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for exclusion and to volunteer appearance. [570−1] by COLIE DIXON SR. in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for exclusion voluntarily appear. [569−1] by CAROLYN SMITH in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for exclusion and to voluntairly appear. [568−1] by BETTY GARRETT, LARRY GARRETT in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for VELMA J. COLLINS to case(s) 1:97−cv−01978, to intervene [567−1] in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for exclusion. [567−2] in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for exclusion and to voluntarily appear. [564−1] by GROVER MILLER in

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 72 of 203

07/08/2002 07/11/2002 07/11/2002 07/11/2002
07/11/2002
07/18/2002 07/18/2002 07/19/2002 07/19/2002 07/19/2002 07/19/2002 07/23/2002 07/24/2002
07/24/2002

1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for exclusion and to appearance. [557−1] by MARILYNN STEWART in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for exclusion and to volunteer appearance. [556−1] by L. D. MAYMON in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion exclusion and to appear voluntarily. [555−1] by EVELYN M. COLEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for exclusion and to volunteer appearance. [554−1] by HAROLD B. DIXON in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/27/2002)
630 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of April 2002 in the amount of $383,637.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/09/2002)
631 STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD PURSUANT TO ORDER 9/5/02 NOTICE by James W. Myart, Jr. of previous withdrawal of counsel as class counsel; (FIAT. Judge Friedman); affidavit (1); exhibits (7) (td) Modified on 09/06/2002 (Entered: 07/12/2002)
632 STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD PURSUANT TO ORDER 9/5/02 MOTION filed to correct record ;(FIAT. Judge Friedman); affidavit (1); exhibits (7) (td) Modified on 09/06/2002 (Entered: 07/12/2002)
633 MOTION filed by plaintiff EDDIE SLAUGHTER in 1:97−cv−01978, claimant THOMAS BURRELL in 1:97−cv−01978, movant FERNANDO BURKETTE in 1:97−cv−01978, movant WILLIAM H. MILLER in 1:97−cv−01978 to vacate conent decree , or in the atlternative to stay all proceedings , and for emergency hearing (td) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
634 MOTION filed by plaintiff EDDIE SLAUGHTER in 1:97−cv−01978, claimant THOMAS BURRELL in 1:97−cv−01978, movant FERNANDO BURKETTE in 1:97−cv−01978, movant WILLIAM H. MILLER in 1:97−cv−01978, movant GARY GRANT in 1:97−cv−01978 to remove lead class counsel , and for emergency hearing. (td) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
635 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: regarding consolidated petitions and debt relief. (See Stipulation and Order for details) (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/18/2002)
636 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to file appearance of counsel as a non−member of the bar of this court ; EXHIBIT (Notice of appearance of counsel) (td) (Entered: 07/19/2002)
637 STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD PURSUANT TO ORDER 9/5/02 ERRATA by James Willie Myart, Jr. Amended Notice of previous withdrawal of counsel as class counsel. (td) Modified on 09/06/2002 (Entered: 07/22/2002)
638 STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD PURSUANT TO ORDER 9/5/02 MOTION filed to correct the record , and for in camera inspection , and for emergency hearing. (td) Modified on 09/06/2002 (Entered: 07/22/2002)
639 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for monitor review. (td) (Entered: 07/22/2002)
640 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file (td) (Entered: 07/22/2002)
641 ERRATA by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 correcting an error found in the table of contents of Class Counsel's July 19, 2002 motion for relief for four groups of claimants. (td) (Entered: 07/24/2002)
643 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of May, 2002 in the amount of $393,624.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/25/2002)
644 ERRATA by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 correcting an error found in Class Counsel's July 19, 2002 consent motion for which should refer to exhibits D through H. (td) (Entered: 07/25/2002)

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07/25/2002

642 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for leave to file [640−1] by plaintiffs; instructing the Clerk to file under seal the exhibits D−H accompanying the memorandum of points and authorities in support of plaintiffs' motion for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for monitor review. (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/25/2002)

07/25/2002 645 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to strike from the record exhibits 3−5 to James W. Myart's notice [631−1] ; exhibits (2) (td) (Entered: 07/29/2002)

07/25/2002 646 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion to vacate consent decree. (td) (Entered: 07/29/2002)

07/25/2002 1101 NOTICE of filing of exhibits D−H to the memorandum of points and authorities in support of plaintiffs' motion re 639 for relief four groups of claimants who filed petitions for nonitor review by ALL PLAINTIFFS ; (SEALED) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 01/26/2005)

07/26/2002

647 RESPONSE by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion to remove lead class counsel and request for hearing [634−1], [634−2] by GARY GRANT, WILLIAM H. MILLER, FERNANDO BURKETTE, THOMAS BURRELL. (td) (Entered: 07/29/2002)

07/29/2002 648 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 9/24/02 to respond to plaintiffs' motion for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for Monitor review (bm) (Entered: 07/30/2002)

07/29/2002

650 RESPONSE by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion to vacate conent decree [633−1] by WILLIAM H. MILLER, FERNANDO BURKETTE, THOMAS BURRELL, EDDIE SLAUGHTER, motion to stay all proceedings [633−2] by WILLIAM H. MILLER, FERNANDO BURKETTE, THOMAS BURRELL, EDDIE SLAUGHTER, motion for emergency hearing [633−3] by WILLIAM H. MILLER, FERNANDO BURKETTE, THOMAS BURRELL, EDDIE SLAUGHTER . (td) (Entered: 07/30/2002)

07/30/2002

649 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to 9/24/02 to respond to plaintiffs' motion for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for Monitor review [648−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/30/2002)

08/02/2002 651 MOTION filed by plaintiff EDDIE SLAUGHTER in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to file reply brief. (td) (Entered: 08/05/2002)

08/02/2002 652 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for claimant THOMAS BURRELL in 1:97−cv−01978 by John Wesley Davis, James W. Myart Jr. (td) (Entered: 08/06/2002)

08/06/2002

653 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of June 2002 in the amount of $488,757; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount t the Monitor within 15 days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 08/06/2002)

08/08/2002 654 STATUS REPORT by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 on surplus registry funds as of June 30, 2002. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 08/09/2002)

08/15/2002 655 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : that the Clerk of the Court is directed to file this letter in the record and to deliver copies of the letter to all parties on the service list; attachment (1−letter) (N) (adc) (Entered: 08/16/2002)

08/15/2002

656 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 for a 12 week extension of time LCvR 7.1(b) provides for her response to the motion and requests that the extension not begin to run until 11 days after derfendants' counsel has been served by hand with a copy of the motion that includes all its pages and exhibits. (td) (Entered: 08/19/2002)

08/19/2002

657 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for extension of time to 11/19/02 to file opposition to the motion for award of attorney fees [656−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN response to motion(s) due by 11/19/02 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 ; in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (dcn) (Entered: 08/20/2002)

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08/19/2002 08/19/2002 08/22/2002 08/23/2002 09/05/2002
09/05/2002
09/05/2002 09/10/2002
09/12/2002 09/12/2002 09/12/2002 09/13/2002

DEPOSIT of $912,614.00 into courts Registry Fund. (td) (Entered: 08/21/2002)
658 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Phillip L. Fraas in 1:97−cv−01978 representing plaintiff ABRAHAM CARPENTER in 1:97−cv−01978. New address: 3050 K Street, NW Suite 400, Washington DC 20007−5108 (202) 342−8864, 342−8451 (fax). (td) (Entered: 08/21/2002)
659 SURREPLY by Rose Sanders to the response of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan and Pires motion to remove lead class counsel and request for emergency hearing [647−1]; exhibit (1); (FIATED. Judge Friedman "Let this be filed.") (td) (Entered: 08/23/2002)
660 REPLY by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to response of Rose Sanders to motion to remove lead class counsel [634−1]. (td) (Entered: 08/26/2002)
661 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to file reply brief [651−1] by EDDIE SLAUGHTER in 1:97−cv−01978; Mr. Slaughter and the other pro se plaintiffs directly involved in the pending motions to vacate the Consent Decree and to remove lead class counsel shall have until 9/9/02 at 4:00 p.m. to file a reply in support of both motions, either separately or in one submission; a copy of the reply shall be directly faxed or hand−delivered to Chambers, as well as filed with the Clerk of the Court; the time sought already having expired, no further extensions will be granted. (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/05/2002)
662 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: denying motion to file appearance of counsel as a non−member of the bar of this court [636−1] by JAMES MYART in 1:97−cv−01978; with respect to Mr. Myart's notice of previous withdrawal of counsel as class counsel [631−1] and amended notice of previous withdrawal of counsel as class counsel [637−1], directing the Clerk of the Court to strike these filings from the record; denying motion to correct record [632−1] in 1:97−cv−01978 and directing the Clerk of the Court to strike this filing from the record; denying motion to correct the record [638−1] in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for in camera inspection [638−2] in 1:97−cv−01978, denying motion for emergency hearing. in 1:97−cv−01978 and directing the Clerk of the Court to strike this filing from the record; denying as moot in light of the above rulings, motion to strike from the record exhibits 3−5 to James W. Myart's notice [631−1] [645−1] in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) Modified on 09/06/2002 (Entered: 09/06/2002)
663 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION by monitor Randi Roth regarding implementation of the consent decree for the period of 9/1/00 through 12/31/01; attachments (9) (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 09/06/2002)
664 REPLY by THOMAS BURRELL in 1:97−cv−01978, FERNANDO BURKETTE in 1:97−cv−01978, WILLIAM H. MILLER in 1:97−cv−01978, Clifford Griffin, Wanda Jackson, George Heldbrandt, Vellis Redden, Walter W. Powell, Alvin E. Steppes to response in opposition to motion to vacate conent decree [633−1] by WILLIAM H. MILLER, FERNANDO BURKETTE, THOMAS BURRELL, EDDIE SLAUGHTER, motion to stay all proceedings [633−2] by WILLIAM H. MILLER, FERNANDO BURKETTE, THOMAS BURRELL, EDDIE SLAUGHTER, motion for emergency hearing [633−3] by WILLIAM H. MILLER, FERNANDO BURKETTE, THOMAS BURRELL, EDDIE SLAUGHTER; attachment (1); declaration (1) (mpt) (Entered: 09/11/2002)
665 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion to vacate consent decree [633−1] by WILLIAM H. FERNANDO BURKETTE, THOMAS BURRELL, EDDIE SLAUGHTER in 1:97−cv−01978; denying motion to remove lead class counsel [634−1] by GARY GRANT, WILLIAM H. MILLER, FERNANDO BURKETTE, THOMAS BURRELL, EDDIE SLAUGHTER in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/12/2002)
666 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: denying the emergency motion to order the government to reopen public facility. (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/12/2002)
667 RESPONSE by J.L. Chestnut, Jr. to the latest filing by Mr. Alexander Pires. (td) (Entered: 09/13/2002)
668 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for reconsideration of Court's order penalizing class counsel for missed deadlines in the A appeals process (cdw) Modified on 10/15/2003 (Entered: 09/17/2002)

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09/18/2002 09/18/2002 09/19/2002 09/20/2002 09/20/2002 09/20/2002 09/23/2002 09/24/2002 09/24/2002
09/30/2002 09/30/2002 10/02/2002 10/02/2002 10/03/2002
10/04/2002 10/07/2002

669 CERTIFIED COPY of judgment filed in USCA dated 7/19/02, on appeal [553−1] , affirming the judgment of USDC . USCA # 01−5411 (cp) (temp1, ). (Entered: 09/19/2002)
675 MOTION filed by plaintiff BEN HILLMAN JR., in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff ZELMA J. HILLMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to enforce consent decree and order of the court ; attachments (10) (td) (Entered: 09/26/2002)
674 MOTION filed by claimant SANDY MCKINNON in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 9/29/02 to file motion for fees and costs (mpt) (Entered: 09/25/2002)
670 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for reconsideration Court's order penalizing class counsel for missed deadlines in the "A" appeals process [668−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD . (cdw) (Entered: 09/24/2002)
671 MOTION (UNOPPOSED) filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for monitor review (cdw) (Entered: 09/24/2002)
679 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion to enforce consent decree and order of the court [675−1] by ZELMA J. HILLMAN, BEN HILLMAN JR., . (td) (Entered: 10/03/2002)
676 REPLY by plaintiff BEN HILLMAN JR., in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff ZELMA J. HILLMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's opposition to motion to enforce consent decree and order of the court [675−1]; attachment (1) (td) (Entered: 09/26/2002)
672 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to 9/30/02 to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for monitor review [671−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/24/2002)
673 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the parties shall have until 10/2/02 to file any objections to the Proposed Draft Order attached as Appendix 9 to the Monitor's Report and Recommendation; if the Court does not receive any objections by this date, the Court will approve and enter the Proposed Draft Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/24/2002)
677 MOTION filed by claimant SANDY MCKINNON in 1:97−cv−01978 for fees and costs ; exhibits (6) (td) (Entered: 09/30/2002)
678 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for monitor review. [639−1]; attachment (1) (td) (Entered: 10/01/2002)
680 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to the court's order of 9/23/02 with respect to the monitor's proposed recommendations to resolve the need for clarification [673−1]. (td) (Entered: 10/04/2002)
682 REPLY by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to opposition to motion for reconsideration of Court's order [668−1]; attachment ( 1) (td) Modified on 10/04/2002 (Entered: 10/04/2002)
681 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of July 2002 in the amount of $447,756.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/04/2002)
683 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to dismiss class member Sandy McKinnon for fees , or, in the alternative to extend time to 3/1/03 to file response. (td) (Entered: 10/07/2002)
684 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorneys fees and costs for claimant Cal Greely ; exhibits (4) (td) (Entered: 10/08/2002)

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10/07/2002 10/10/2002 10/11/2002 10/17/2002 10/17/2002 10/18/2002
10/23/2002 10/29/2002 10/29/2002 10/31/2002 10/31/2002 11/06/2002 11/06/2002 11/12/2002
11/12/2002 11/14/2002

685 MOTION (unopposed) filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to file plaintiffs' reply to defendant's opposition to plaintiffs' motion for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for monitor review. (td) (Entered: 10/08/2002)
686 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to 11/6/02 to file plaintiffs' reply to defendant's opposition to plaintiffs' motion for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for monitor review. [685−1] by LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/10/2002)
687 RESPONSE by claimant SANDY MCKINNON in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion to dismiss class member Sandy McKinnon for fees [683−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (td) (Entered: 10/18/2002)
688 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion of the law firm of David A. Branch for attorneys fees and costs for claimant Cal Greely [684−1]; attachments (8) (td) (Entered: 10/20/2002)
689 REPLY by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in support of motion to dismiss class member Sandy McKinnon for fees [683−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN, motion to extend time to 3/1/03 to file response. [683−2] by ANN M. VENEMAN (td) (Entered: 10/20/2002)
690 ORDER by Judge Reggie B. Walton: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of August 2002 in the amount of $379,108.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount of the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) Modified on 10/21/2002 (Entered: 10/21/2002)
691 REPLY by plaintiffs to response in opposition to motion for attorneys fees and costs for claimant Cal Greely [684−1] by GEORGE HALL, LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (cdw) (Entered: 10/25/2002)
692 REPLY by plaintiff TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978 to response in opposition to motion for reconsideration of Court's order penalizing class counsel for missed deadlines in the "A" appeals process [668−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (bm) (Entered: 10/29/2002)
693 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: setting forth instructions regarding the Consent Decree (See Order for details) (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/30/2002)
694 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting claimant's to withdraw and deeming motion withdrawn as of this same day. (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/31/2002)
695 MOTION filed by claimant GEORGE BARR GRIFFIN in 1:97−cv−01978 for enforcement of the consent decree , and to show cause for failure of payment of settlement agreement ; attachments (cdw) (Entered: 11/01/2002)
696 REPLY by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's opposition to motion for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for monitor review [639−1]; exhibit (1) (td) Modified on 11/11/2002 (Entered: 11/11/2002)
697 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file under seal two of the exhibits to plaintiffs' reply to defendant's oppositon to plaintiffs' motion for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for monitor review ; EXHIBITS (B and C LODGED UNDER SEAL) (td) (Entered: 11/11/2002)
698 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting consent motion for leave to file under seal two of the exhibits to plaintiffs' reply to defendant's opposition to plaintiffs' motion for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for monitor review [697−1] by plaintiffs; instructing the Clerk to file under seal Exhibits B and C accompanying the plaintiffs' reply. (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/12/2002)
703 EXHIBITS by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 B and C to plaintiffs reply to defendant's opposition o plaintiffs' motio for relief for four groups of claimants who filed petitions for monitor review; (SEALED) (td) (Entered: 11/21/2002)
699 MOTION (unopposed) filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file surreply ; EXHIBIT (surreply) (td) (Entered: 11/15/2002)

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11/15/2002 11/19/2002 11/19/2002 11/20/2002 11/22/2002
11/22/2002 11/22/2002 11/26/2002 12/03/2002 12/03/2002 12/06/2002 12/06/2002 12/06/2002 12/06/2002

700 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for leave to file under seal three of the exhibits to the memorandum of points and authorities in support of motion for attorneys' fees and costs implementation work only for Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires ; EXHIBITS (MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS; EXHIBITS 1−3) (cdw) Modified on 11/19/2002 (Entered: 11/19/2002)
701 STATEMENT filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978, regarding: defendant's failure to comply with settlement agreement on payment of attorneys fees of the law office of David A. Branch; exhibits (2) (td) Modified on 11/20/2002 (Entered: 11/20/2002)
702 MOTION (unopposed) filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time in which to respond to motion for attorneys' fees by Darlene H. Smith. (td) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
704 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to stay all further proceedings on Conlon Frantz' fee motion until all class counsel and of counsel to the class have filed fee petions for any implementation work they performed during the period encompassed by the Conlon Frantz motion. (td) (Entered: 11/21/2002)
705 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to stay [704−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978; staying consideration of Conlon Frantz' motion for attorneys' fees and costs until 12/11/02; any and all attorneys who wish to seek fees and/or costs for implementation work performed as class counsel or of counsel during the period of 7/1/01 and 6/30/02 shall submit such fee petitions by 12/6/02; the matter of fees and costs for implementation work performed by class counsel and of counsel is consolidated with the pending issue of sanctions against class counsel and of counsel; status conference set for 2:00 12/11/02 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 to discuss how the Court will proceed toward resolution of the consolidated issues of fees and sanctions as well as the recently remanded issue of modification of deadlines in Track B proceedings ; accordingly, each party attending the status conference shall be prepared to state its position with respect to the best procedure and time frame for resolving these issues (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/22/2002)
706 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time in which to respond to motion for attorneys' fees by Darlene H. Smith. [702−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978; defendant's response to the motion for attorneys' fees is due 12/6/02. (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/22/2002)
707 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for leave to file surreply [699−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 11/22/2002)
708 MOTION filed by Phillip L. Frass for attorneys fees and costs and expenses for implementaiton on work only for Phillip L. Frass , and for the establishment of deadlines and procedures for the resolution of future fees motions ; attachments (3) (td) (Entered: 11/27/2002)
709 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: status conference reset for 1:30 12/11/02 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 ; the hearing shall last no more than one hour. (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/03/2002)
710 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of September 2002 in the amount of $420,976.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/03/2002)
712 MOTION filed of Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada for attorney's fees for implementation work ; attachments (2) (bm) (Entered: 12/10/2002)
713 RESPONSE by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to order dated 11/22/02 setting a status conference for 2:00 12/11/02 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 [705−1]; attachments (7) (bm) (Entered: 12/10/2002)
714 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to consider assistance with late claim as implementation work. (td) (Entered: 12/10/2002)
715 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorney fees and costs and expenses for implementation work only for J.L. Chstnut , and clarification of attorney

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12/09/2002 12/09/2002 12/09/2002 12/11/2002 12/12/2002 12/16/2002
12/17/2002 12/23/2002 12/24/2002 12/24/2002 12/30/2002 12/30/2002

fee issue and in support of establishment of deadlines and procedures for the resolution of future fees motions ; attachments (9) (td) Modified on 12/10/2002 (Entered: 12/10/2002)
711 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for leave to file under seal three of the exhibits to the memorandum of points and authorities in support of motion for attorneys' fees and costs implementation work only for Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires [700−1] by plaintiffs (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/09/2002)
716 MOTION filed by Non Party LAW OFC DAVID BRANCH in 1:97−cv−01978 to compel defendant to comply with settlement agreement on payment of attorneys fees to the Law Office of David A. Branch and for sanctions ; attachments (3) (bm) (Entered: 12/11/2002)
717 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion to compel defendant comply with settlement agreement on payment of attorneys fees to the Law Office of David A. Branch and for sanctions [716−1] by LAW OFC DAVID BRANCH . (bm) (Entered: 12/11/2002)
STATUS CONFERENCE before Judge Paul L. Friedman: The Court will issue an order setting out the procedures regarding attorneys fees; sanctions question will be taken under advisement; tele−conference will be held 12/18/02 at 3:30 p.m. regarding the remand from USCA on Track B cases. Reporter: Santa Zizzo (bm) (Entered: 12/11/2002)
718 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting motion by Darlene H. Smith to dismiss motion for award of attorney's fees without prejudice (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/12/2002)
719 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for attorney fees and costs and expenses for implementation work only for J.L. Chstnut [715−1] by LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, motion clarification of attorney fee issue and in support of establishment of deadlines and procedures for the resolution of future fees motions [715−2] by LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD; exhibit (1) . (rje) Modified on 12/17/2002 (Entered: 12/17/2002)
720 REPLY by Non Party LAW OFC DAVID BRANCH in 1:97−cv−01978 to response in opposition to motion to compel defendant to comply with settlement agreement on payment of attorneys fees to the Law Office of David A. Branch and for sanctions [716−1] by LAW OFC DAVID BRANCH (aet) (Entered: 12/18/2002)
722 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to impose sanctions against defendant for violation of the Second Amended Supplemental Privacy Act Protective Order and the Privacy Act of 1974 ; Affidavit (1); Attachment (1). (tth) (Entered: 12/26/2002)
721 ORDER by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle for Judge Paul L. Friedman approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of October 2002 in the amount of $366,268.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/24/2002)
723 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 1/17/03 to file response to plaintiff's motion to impose sanctions against defendant for violation of the second amended supplemental privacy act protective order and the privacy act of 1974 (rje) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
724 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of October, 2002 in the amount of $464,847.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
725 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to 1/17/03 to file response to plaintiff's motion to impose sanctions against defendant for violation of the second amended supplemental privacy act protective order and the privacy act of 1974 [723−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/30/2002)

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12/30/2002 12/30/2002
01/03/2003 01/06/2003 01/08/2003 01/09/2003 01/09/2003 01/09/2003 01/13/2003 01/14/2003

726 AMENDED ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: amending the Order of 12/24/02 to reflect the fact that the Court was approving and directing the Clerk to pay the Monitor's invoice for November, 2002 in the amount of $366,268.00 (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
727 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : defendant shall pay class counsel Alexander Pires in the amount of $500,000 for implementation fees and costs by 1/10/03; setting forth instructions for class and of counsel; the parties shall continue (with the assistance of Mr. Lewis) to negotiate toward settlement of the issues of fees and sanctions; unless settlement of the issue of sanctions is reached sooner, the government shall file a brief setting forth its position on the issue of sanctions by 2/3/03; unless settlement of the issues is reached sooner, the government shall file a brief setting forth its position on the issue of implementation fees by 2/24/03; counsel and of counsel shall file any responses by 3/10/03 and the government shall file a reply, if any, by 3/17/03; the parties shall continue to negotiate toward settlement of the issue of modification of deadlines in Track B cases involved claimants originally represented by class counsel; the parties shall file a joint report with the Court by 2/1/03 informing the Court as to the status of the negotiations and, if necessary, including a proposed briefing scheduled on this issue; the Court will decide the question of whether the Court of Appeals' 6/21/02 opinion applies to claimants who were never represented by class counsel; the law firm of Covington & Burling shall represent these claimants for the limited purpose of briefing this issue and the parties involved shall submit a proposed briefing scheduling on this issue promptly upon receipt of this Order; setting forth for fees, costs and expenses incurred by any class counsel or of counsel after 6/30/02 (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
728 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice fortheperiod of January 1,2003, through June 30, 2003, in the amount of $4,360.688.00; directing that USDA shall deposit with the Clerk of Court, United States District Court forthe District of Columbia, a sume equal to apro−rata month's portion of the approved budget within the first fifteen (15) days of each month. (N) (jwd) (Entered: 01/03/2003)
729 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to pay $500,000 to Alexander Pieres for consent decree. (td) (Entered: 01/08/2003)
730 RESPONSE by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to defendant's motion to extend time to pay $500,000 to Alexander Pieres for consent decree. [729−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN . (td) (Entered: 01/09/2003)
731 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorney fees , and for costs for Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires for the Quarters (1) July 1− September 30, 2002 and (2) October 1− December 31, 2002 ; exhibits (4) (mpt) Modified on 01/10/2003 (Entered: 01/10/2003)
732 STATEMENT filed by claimant BEN HILLSMAN JR. in 1:97−cv−01978, claimant ZELMA J. HILLSMAN in 1:97−cv−01978, regarding: the track B claim of Beh Hillsman, Jr., claim number claim number 20839 arbitration number 210; attachment (1) (td) (Entered: 01/13/2003)
734 STATUS REPORT by Thomas W. Kirby regarding certan Track B arbitration claimants; attachments (8). (td) (Entered: 01/14/2003)
737 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to strike motion for attorney fees [731−1]. (td) (Entered: 01/15/2003)
733 AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: defendant shall pay class counsel Alexander Pires in the amount of $500,000.00 for implementation fees and costs by 1/10/03; setting forth instructions to class and of counsel; the parties shall continue (with the assistance of Mr. Lewis) to negotiate toward settlement of the issues of fees and sanctions; unless settlement of the issue of sanctions is reached sooner, the government shall file a brief setting forth its position on the issue of sanctions by 2/3/03; unless settlement of the issues is reached sooner, the government shall file a brief setting forth its position on the issue of implementation fees by 2/24/03; class and of counsel shall file any responses by

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01/14/2003 01/14/2003 01/15/2003 01/15/2003
01/17/2003 01/21/2003 01/23/2003 01/30/2003 02/03/2003 02/03/2003

3/10/03 and the government shall file a reply, if any, by 3/17/03; the parties shall continue to negotiate toward settlement of the issue of modification of deadlines in Track B cases involved claimants originally represented by class counsel; the parties shall file a joint report with the Court by 2/1/03 informing the Court as to the status of the negotiations and, if necessary, including a proposed briefing schedule on this issue; the Court will decide the question of whether the Court of Appeals' 6/21/02 opinion applies to claimants who were never represented by class counsel; the law firm of Covington & Burling shall represent these claimants for the limited purpose of briefing this issue and the parties involved shall submit a proposed briefing schedule on this issue promptly upon receipt of this Order; setting forth instructions regarding fees, costs and expenses incurred by any class counsel or of counsel after 6/30/02 (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/14/2003)
735 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 12/11/02. Reporter: Santa Theresa Zizzo (td) (Entered: 01/15/2003)
738 REPLY by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in support of motion to extend time to pay $500,000 to Alexander Pieres for consent decree. [729−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (td) (Entered: 01/15/2003)
736 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the Court will withdraw claimants' motion to enforce concent decree and orders of the Court. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/15/2003)
739 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : nunc pro tunc granting in part, denying in part motion to extend time to pay $500,000 to Alexander Pieres for consent decree [729−1] in 1:97−cv−01978; defendant shall submit a request to the Judgment Fund by 1/22/03 to effectuate prompt payment in compliance with this Court's Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order regardless of any internal consideration of a possible appeal of the payment provision of the Court's Order and the possible request for a stay of that provision pending appeal; defendant shall pay Class Counsel Alexander Pires in the amount of $500,000.00 for implementation fees and costs by 2/12/03; Class and Of Counsel who have submitted implementation fee requests shall divide this payment among themselves as they deem appropriate and Mr. Pires shall report to the Court as to when and how the division and payments have been made; compliance with this Order shall not deprive defendant of any otherwise available right to appeal the Court's Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order, in whole or in part. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/15/2003)
740 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion to impose sanctions against defendant for violation of the Second Amended Supplemental Privacy Act Protective Order and the Privacy Act of 1974 [722−1] by plaintiffs; exhibits (2) (tb) (Entered: 01/22/2003)
741 RESPONSE by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion to strike motion for attorney fees [731−1]. [737−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN . (tb) (Entered: 01/22/2003)
742 REPLY by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in support of motion to strike motion for attorney fees [731−1]. [737−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (bcs) (Entered: 01/24/2003)
743 JOINT MOTION by claimants THOMAS BURRELL, EVANS M. FOLINS, SANDY MCKINNON, BEN HILLSMAN JR., ZELMA J. HILLSMAN, GEORGE BARR GRIFFIN in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 2/19/03 to submit joint report informing the court of the status of the negotiations regarding the modification of deadlines in track b cases (bcs) (Entered: 01/31/2003)
744 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting joint motion to extend time to 2/19/03 to submit joint report informing the court of the status of the negotiations regarding the modification of deadlines in Track B cases [743−1] by claimants in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 02/03/2003)
745 STATEMENT filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978, regarding: sanctions to be imposed upon class counsel to the class filed pursuant to Order of 12/30/02. (bm) (Entered: 02/05/2003)

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02/11/2003 02/12/2003 02/19/2003 02/19/2003 02/20/2003 02/20/2003 02/21/2003 02/21/2003 02/25/2003 02/25/2003 02/26/2003
02/27/2003 02/28/2003 03/03/2003 03/03/2003 03/03/2003

747 NOTICE OF FILING of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan and Pires pursuant to court's order of 1/15/03 (bcs) (Entered: 02/13/2003)
746 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: extending the deadline for submission of the Monitor's report on unspent funds for the period of July through December 2002 from 2/14/03 to 3/3/03 (N) (bm) (Entered: 02/12/2003)
753 MOTION filed by Non Party J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 to reopen all late claims due to mail delays (aet) (Entered: 02/27/2003)
754 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 2/21/03 to file opposition to defendant's memorandum regarding santions to be imposed upon class counsel (aet) (Entered: 02/27/2003)
748 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth for Judge Paul L. Friedman granting plaintiffs' consent motion extending time to 2/21/03 to file an opposition to defendant's memorandum regarding sanctions to be imposed upon class counsel and of counsel pursuant to the Court's Order of 12/30/02 (N) (bm) (Entered: 02/20/2003)
752 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to memorandum regarding sanctions to be imposed upon class counsel and of counsel to the class filed pursuant to order of 12/30/02 [745−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN; Exhibits (1) (nmr) (Entered: 02/27/2003)
749 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to plaintiffs' motion to reopen all late claims due to mail delays. (bm) (Entered: 02/24/2003)
750 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time for submission of briefs regarding attorney's fees for class and of counsel (bm) (Entered: 02/24/2003)
764 NOTICE OF APPEAL by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 from order [739−1], order [736−1], order [727−1], order [726−1], order [724−1] , entered on: 1/15/03 and 12/30/02. Copy mailed to parties; government no fees required. (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 03/11/2003)
NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL by federal defendant ANN VENEMAN in 1:98−cv−01693 from order [234−1], order [233−1], order [230−1], order [229−1], order [228−1], order [227−1] , entered on: 12/30/03 and 1/15/03. Government no fees required; copy mailed to parties. (td) (Entered: 03/12/2003)
751 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time for submission of briefs regarding attorney's fees for class and of counsel [750−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN; the government shall file its brief setting forth its position on the issue of fees by 2/28/03; class and of counsel shall file any responses by 3/14/03, and the government shall file a reply, if any, by 3/21/03. (N) (bm) (Entered: 02/26/2003)
760 MOTION (unopposed) filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 3/7/03 to file reply memorandum. (td) (Entered: 03/10/2003)
765 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to the motions of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for interim award of attorneys' fees and costs for work performed between July 1 2001 and June 30 2002; (SEALED) (td) (Entered: 03/12/2003)
755 LETTER dated 2/17/03 to Judge Friedman from Kenneth W. Barton, Esquire. "Let this be filed" (fiat) J. Friedman (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 03/03/2003)
756 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting defendant's motion extending time to 3/7/03 to file a reply memorandum in support of defendant's memorandum regarding sanctions to be imposed against class counsel and of counsel to the class filed pursuant to Order of 12/30/02 (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/03/2003)
758 MONITOR'S REPORT by RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 on surplus funds as of 12/31/02 (bm) (temp1, ). (Entered: 03/07/2003)

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03/05/2003
03/05/2003
03/07/2003 03/10/2003
03/10/2003 03/10/2003 03/11/2003 03/12/2003 03/14/2003 03/14/2003 03/14/2003 03/17/2003
03/17/2003 03/18/2003 03/21/2003

757 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: claimants shall file their opening brief on the issue of whether the Court of Appeals' 6/21/02 opinion applies to claimants who were never represented by class counsel by 3/26/03; the government shall file its response to brief due by 4/16/03; and claimants shall file their reply to brief due by 4/23/03 in 1:97−cv−01978, in 1:98−cv−01693 (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/05/2003)
761 RESPONSE (REDACTED) by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for attorney fees [731−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, motion for costs for Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires for the Quarters (1) July 1− September 30, 2002 and (2) October 1− December 31, 2002 [731−2] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD; Exhibits (2). (nmr) (Entered: 03/11/2003)
762 REPLY by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in support of her memorandum regarding sanctions [745−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN. (nmr) (Entered: 03/11/2003)
759 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of December 2002 in the amount of $418,876.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/10/2003)
763 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to strike plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Response to Motion to Reopen All Late Claims Due to Mail Delays (nmr) (Entered: 03/11/2003)
776 STRICKEN PURSUANT TO ORDER DATED 4/11/03 REPLY by Non Party J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 to response to motion to reopen all late claims due to mail delays [753−1] by J.L. CHESTNUT. (aet) Modified on 04/14/2003 (Entered: 03/27/2003)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [764−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN to U.S. Court of Appeals (td) (Entered: 03/11/2003)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [241−1] by ANN VENEMAN to U.S. Court of Appeals (td) (Entered: 03/12/2003)
766 RESPONSE by Non Party J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's memorandum on attorney fees dated 2/28/03. (td) (Entered: 03/17/2003)
USCA # 03−5079 assigned for appeal [764−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (td) (Entered: 03/17/2003)
767 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 3/19/03 to reply to the motions of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for interim award of attorney's fees and costs for work performed between 7/1/01 and 6/30/02 (nmr) (Entered: 03/17/2003)
768 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to 3/19/03 for plaintiff to file their response and defendant's to reply, if any, to memorandum of law in response to the motions of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for interim award of attorney's fees and costs for work performed between 7/1/01 and 6/30/02 [767−1] by GEORGE HALL, LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/17/2003)
795 ERRATA by Non Party ROSE M. SANDERS in 1:97−cv−01978 notice of filing of a true and correct copy of Herbert Knight's affidavit. (td) (Entered: 04/28/2003)
769 SURREPLY by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's memorandum of law in response to the motions of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for interim award of attorney's fees and costs for work performed between 7/1/01 and 6/30/02; attachment s(3) (td) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
772 STRICKEN PURSUANT TO ORDER DATED 4/11/03 RESPONSE by Non Party J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion to strike plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Response to Motion to Reopen All Late Claims Due to Mail Delays [763−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN; attachments (3) (bm) Modified on 04/14/2003 (Entered: 03/26/2003)

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03/21/2003 03/24/2003
03/24/2003 03/26/2003 03/26/2003 03/27/2003 03/28/2003 03/28/2003 03/31/2003 03/31/2003 03/31/2003 03/31/2003 03/31/2003

773 REPLY by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in support of motion to strike plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Response to Motion to Reopen All Late Claims Due to Mail Delays [763−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (bm) (Entered: 03/26/2003)
770 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the Monitor shall make periodic written reports to the Court, the Secretary, class counsel, and defendant's counsel on the good faith implementation of the Consent Decree specified in paragraph 12(b)(ii) of the Consent Decree, regarding each twelve−month period, upon the request of the Court or the parties, or as the Monitor deems necessary; Randi Roth, the Court−appointed Monitor under the Consent Decree in this matter, may, in her discretion, recuse herself from rendering a decision on any petition for Monitor Review in which the Monitor believes her impartiality might reasonably be questioned; for any claim in which the Monitor chooses to recuse herself from decision making under paragraph 12(b)(ii) of the Consent Decree, the Monitor may designate Kenneth Saffold of the Office of the Monitor to carry out the Monitor's duties under paragraph 12(b)(iii) of the Consent Decree. (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/24/2003)
771 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: regarding claims of Edith Frazier under Track B. and the "virtual malpractice of Chestnut, Sanders; the Consent Decres Arbitrator shall decide defendant's motions to dismiss Ms. Frazier's claim in a timely fashion. (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/24/2003)
774 REPLY by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in support of defendant's memorandum of law in response to the motions of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for interim award of attorneys' fees and costs for work performed between July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2002. (td) (Entered: 03/27/2003)
775 NOTICE by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 submission pursuant to the court's 1/14/03 request seeking clarification that the court of appeals 6/21/02 opinion applies to claimants not previously represented by class counsel; attachments (7) (td) (Entered: 03/27/2003)
777 MOTION filed by plaintiffs pro se LUCIOUS ABRAMS JR. and CECIL BREWINGTON in 1:97−cv−01978 to amend memorandum opinion [727−1], and order [726−1] of 12/30/02 (bm) (Entered: 03/28/2003)
778 MOTION filed by plaintiff LEONARD HUNTER to extend time to 4/14/03 to file a response to motion to dismiss (bm) (Entered: 03/31/2003)
779 MOTION filed by J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorney fees , for costs , and for expenses for implementation work only for J.L. Chestnut pursuant to Judge Friedman's Order dated 12/30/02 BULKY PLEADING (bm) (Entered: 03/31/2003)
780 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of January 2003 in the amount of $546,185.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 03/31/2003)
781 AMENDED MOTION filed by Non Party J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorney fees , and costs and expenses for implementation work only for J.L. Chestnut pursuant to Judge Friedman's Order dated 12/30/02. (bm) (Entered: 04/01/2003)
782 MOTION filed by BUTLER SNOW for attorney fees , and costs in the Woodard Track B Arbitration ; attachments (3) (bm) (Entered: 04/01/2003)
783 MOTION filed by Phillip L. Fraas in 1:97−cv−01978: for attorney fees , and for costs and expenses incurred by Phillip L. Fraas for implementation work during the period 7/1/02 to 3/31/03, and for work on two track B claims successfully completed during that time period; attachment (1) (bm) (Entered: 04/01/2003)
784 MOTION filed by Alexander John Pires Jr. in 1:97−cv−01978: for attorney fees , and for costs for implementation work for Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires for the quarters 7/1 through 9/30/02; 10/1 through 12/31/02 and 1/1/ through 3/30/03 ; attachments (4) (bm) (Entered: 04/01/2003)

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03/31/2003 03/31/2003 04/01/2003 04/07/2003
04/08/2003 04/10/2003 04/14/2003
04/16/2003 04/16/2003 04/18/2003 04/22/2003 04/29/2003
04/30/2003 05/13/2003

785 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to strike motion for attorney fees [779−1] and costs [779−2] by J. L. CHESTNUT (bm) (Entered: 04/01/2003)
786 MOTION filed for attorneys' fee and costs for non−implementation work for Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires for 7/1/01 to 6/30/02 (bm) (Entered: 04/02/2003)
787 MOTION filed by Non Party J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 to strike the last paragrpah in governments motion to strike [779−1] by J. L. CHESTNUT [785−1] (mpt) (Entered: 04/02/2003)
788 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to amend memorandum opinion [727−1], and order [726−1] of 12/30/02 [777−1] by CECIL BREWINGTON, LUCIOUS ABRAMS JR. in 1:97−cv−01978; permitting the nine claimants named in the combined petition and motion to obtain new counsel to represent them in briefing the Court on the question of whether the Court of Appeals' 6/21/02 Opinion applies to them; the movants shall have 45 days in which to obtain new counsel and to file an additional submission on this issue; any such submission shall be filed by 5///22/03 and will be considered by the Court in addition to the submission already filed by Covington & Burling; the defendant need not respond immediately to the submission filed by Covington & Burling, but instead may respond to both submissions on this issue simultaneously; defendant's response shall be filed by 6/12/03; replies to defendant's response by movants and/or Covington & Burling, if any, shall be filed by 6/19/03. (N) (bm) (Entered: 04/07/2003)
789 RESPONSE by Non Party ROSE M. SANDERS in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion to strike motion for attorney fees [779−1] and costs [779−2] by J. L. CHESTNUT [785−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (nmr) (Entered: 04/11/2003)
791 REPLY by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in support of motion to strike motion for attorney fees [779−1] and costs [779−2] by J. L. CHESTNUT [785−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (bm) (Entered: 04/14/2003)
790 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to strike plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Response to Motion to Reopen All Late Claims Due to Mail Delays [763−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978; striking response reply [776−1] by J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978; striking motion response [772−1] by J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978; directing the Clerk of the Court to strike these two documents from the record of this Court. (N) (bm) (Entered: 04/14/2003)
DEPOSIT of $702,020.00 into registry of the court. (td) (Entered: 04/17/2003)
792 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 of the law office of David A. Branch for the award of attorneys fees and costs for claimant Cal Greely. (td) (Entered: 04/17/2003)
793 MOTION filed by Non Party ROSE M. SANDERS in 1:97−cv−01978 for reconsideration of order entered on 4/14/03 [790−1]. (td) (Entered: 04/22/2003)
794 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for reconsideration [790−1]. [793−1] by ROSE M. SANDERS (bm) (Entered: 04/23/2003)
796 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to motions of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for attorneys' fees and costs submitted on or about the end of March 2003 [784−1],[784−2] ,[783−1] ,[783−2], ,[782−1], ,[782−2],[781−1] ,[781−2], [786−1], [779−1] ,[779−2]; exhibit (1); declaration (1) (td) Modified on 05/02/2003 (Entered: 05/02/2003)
797 MOTION filed by J.L. CHESTNUT and ROSE M. SANDERS in 1:97−cv−01978 to strike defendant's references to J.L. Chestnut and Rose Sanders as hate mongers (bm) (Entered: 05/02/2003)
798 ORDER by Judge Ricardo M. Urbina for Judge Paul L. Friedman approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of February 2003 in the amount of $439,036.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of

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05/27/2003 05/28/2003
06/02/2003 06/02/2003 06/02/2003 06/04/2003 06/05/2003
06/13/2003 06/16/2003 06/16/2003
06/18/2003 06/20/2003 06/20/2003 06/23/2003

the entry of this Order (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/13/2003)
799 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of March 2003 in the amount of $458,049.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/27/2003)
800 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion for reconsideration of order entered on 4/14/03 [790−1]. [793−1] by ROSE M. SANDERS in 1:97−cv−01978; denying motion to strike defendant's references to J.L. Chestnut Rose Sanders as hate mongers [797−1] by ROSE M. SANDERS, J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/28/2003)
801 OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion for relief with respect to all 350 claimants [639−1] by MCARTHUR NESBIT, GEORGE HALL, LLOYD SHAFER, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/02/2003)
802 STATUS REPORT by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978regarding notice to the class of the 120 day deadline to file a petition for monitor review. (td) (Entered: 06/03/2003)
803 STATUS REPORT (fourth) by Arbitrator Michael K. Lewis on the late−claim petition process. (td) (Entered: 06/03/2003)
804 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion to reopen all late claims due to mail delays [753−1] by J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/04/2003)
805 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for attorneys fees and costs for claimant Cal Greely [684−1] by LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. BRANCH in 1:97−cv−01978; granting motion of the law office of David A. Branch for the award of attorneys fees and costs for claimant Cal Greely. [792−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978; directing the defendant shall pay movant fees and costs for work done on behalf of claimant Cal Greely in the amount of $2,345.00 (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/05/2003)
806 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to file response to claimants' submission ; EXHIBIT−RESPONSE (bm) (Entered: 06/17/2003)
807 MOTION filed by Non Party ROSE M. SANDERS in 1:97−cv−01978 for reconsideration of 6/2/03 order denying relief to 38 claimants ; exhibits (7) (td) (Entered: 06/17/2003)
808 MOTION filed by plaintiff TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LLOYD SHAFER in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff GEORGE HALL in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff MCARTHUR NESBIT in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff EDDIE SLAUGHTER in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LEO JACKSON in 1:97−cv−01978 for reconsideration of court's order of 6/2/03 [801−1] ; attachments (2) (td) (Entered: 06/17/2003)
809 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time to 6/13/03 to file response to claimants' submission [806−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978; plaintiffs' reply shall be filed by 6/20/03. (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/18/2003)
811 MOTION filed by plaintiffs' LUCIOUS ABRAMS JR. and CECIL BREWINGTON; to extend time for Forty−five days to submit brief (jf) (Entered: 06/24/2003)
812 REPLY by claimants in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's response to the Court's January 14, 2003 request. (jf) (Entered: 06/25/2003)
810 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion to dismiss class member Sandy McKinnon for fees and costs, or in the alternative, for an extension of time to file a response; granting motion to dismiss class member Sandy McKinnon for fees [683−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978; denying motion for fees and costs without prejudice [677−1] by SANDY MCKINNON in 1:97−cv−01978; denying as moot motion to extend time to

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06/25/2003 06/25/2003 06/25/2003 06/25/2003
06/26/2003
06/27/2003 06/27/2003 06/30/2003 06/30/2003 06/30/2003 07/01/2003
07/09/2003 07/09/2003 07/22/2003

3/1/03 to file response [683−2] by ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/23/2003)
813 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of April 2003 in the amount of $489,115.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within 15 days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/25/2003)
818 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 7/18/03 to file a response to motions for reconsideration (bm) (Entered: 07/03/2003)
819 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file surreply to claimants' response to the Court's 1/14/03 request ; EXHIBIT−SURREPLY (bm) (Entered: 07/03/2003)
820 RESPONSE by plaintiffs CECIL BREWINGTON LUCIOUS ABRAMS JR., GREGORY ERVES, EDDIE GRAY, HERBERT WILLIAMS, ARTHUR FLONNORY, ARTHUR AND ROSE DENNIS, KENNETH AND MICHELLE THOMPSON and ENOCH EDWARDS to Court's 1/14/03 order [733−1] and a motion to be treated in like mannter as the administrative process the Court used in the case of lead plaintiff Timothy & Clara Pigford. (bm) (Entered: 07/03/2003)
814 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: the Court amends it filed Order in regard to the (9) named plaintiffs that filed for additional time to seek counsel on 3/27/03 and today seek to change the final date for submission of briefs requested in the Courts 1/14/03 to 6/25/03, instead of 5/22/03 in regard to the nine plaintiffs; granting the motion nunc pro tunc; the (9) plaintiffs shall have filed their briefs in response to the Court's Order by 6/25/03. (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/26/2003)
815 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting defendant's motion extending time to 7/18/03 to file a response to motion for reconsideration; Conlon, Frantz may file its reply by 8/8/03. (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/27/2003)
816 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting defendant's unopposed motion for leave to file surreply; directing the Clerk file the surreply attached to motion. (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/27/2003)
821 MOTION (amended) filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorney's fees and costs and expenses for implementation work only for J.L. Chestnut pursuant to Judge Friedman's order dated 12/30/03 ; attachment (1) (td) (Entered: 07/07/2003)
822 MOTION filed by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorneys' fees and costs for Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pieres for the quarter March 31 − June 29, 2003 ; attachments (3) (td) (Entered: 07/07/2003)
823 MOTION filed by plaintiff ABRAHAM CARPENTER in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorneys fees and costs and expenses, incurred by Phillip L. Fraas for implementation work during the period 4/1/003 to 6/30/03 and for work on six successfully completed petitions for monitor review. (td) (Entered: 07/07/2003)
817 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's request for a total budget amount of $4,363,806 for the period of 7/1/03 through 12/31/03; USDA shall deposit with the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a sum equal to a pro−rata month's portion of the approved budget within the first fifteen days of each month. (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/01/2003)
824 MOTION JOINDER by Non Party J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 joining in motion for reconsideration of court's order of 6/2/03 [801−1] [808−1] (jf) (Entered: 07/15/2003)
825 RESPONSE by federal defendants in 1:97−cv−01978 pro se plaintiffs' submissin pursuant to the Court's 1/14/03 request [733−1] (bjsp) (Entered: 07/18/2003)
829 RESPONSE by federal defendants in 1:97−cv−01978 to motion for reconsideration of court's order of 6/2/03 [801−1] [808−1] by plaintiffs (bjsp) (Entered: 07/24/2003)

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07/22/2003 07/22/2003
07/23/2003
07/23/2003
07/23/2003 07/29/2003 07/30/2003 08/08/2003 08/08/2003 08/12/2003 08/13/2003
08/15/2003 08/18/2003 08/18/2003
08/22/2003 09/04/2003
09/08/2003

831 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 nunc pro tunc to extend time to 7/22/03 to file response to motions for reconsideration case related 98 cv 1693. (bjsp) (Entered: 07/31/2003)
832 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 by the Law Office of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires in opposition to defendant's motion nunc pro tunc to extend time to 7/22/03 to file response to motions for reconsideration [831−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN . (bjsp) (Entered: 07/31/2003)
826 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of June 2003 in the amount of $513,599.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/23/2003)
827 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of May 2003 in the amount of $446,386.00; the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/23/2003)
828 REPLY by federal defendants in 1:97−cv−01978 in support of plaintiffs' opposition to motion for nunc pro tunc to file a response to motions for reconsideration [818−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN (bjsp) (Entered: 07/24/2003)
830 MOTION filed by Non Party J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 to strike defendants response to plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. [829−1] (bjsp) (Entered: 07/30/2003)
833 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by federal defendants in 1:97−cv−01978 in response to the motions of certain plaintiffs' attorneys for attorneys' fees and costs for work performed between 4/1/03 and 6/30/03 (bjsp) (Entered: 08/01/2003)
834 STATUS REPORT by Non Party RANDI ILYSE ROTH in 1:97−cv−01978 on Surpluss Registry Funds as of June 30, 2003 (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 08/11/2003)
840 REPLY by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 to defendant's response to motion for reconsideration order dated 6/2/03 [801−1] . (rje) (Entered: 08/26/2003)
836 RESPONSE by federal defendant in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion to strike defendants response to plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. [829−1] [830−1] by J.L. CHESTNUT . (bjsp) (Entered: 08/14/2003)
835 MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time which to respond to the government's brief filed in opposition to plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the time period 4/1/03 to 6/30/03 ; RE: case 98 cv 1693 (bjsp) (Entered: 08/14/2003)
837 MOTION filed by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file surreply ; EXHIBIT (Surreply) (td) (temp1, ). (Entered: 08/19/2003)
838 RESPONSE by plaintiff in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for leave to file surreply [837−1] by ANN M. VENEMAN . (td) (Entered: 08/19/2003)
839 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion to extend time which to respond to the government's brief filed in opposition to plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the time period 4/1/03 to 6/30/03 [835−1] by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (jwd) (Entered: 08/20/2003)
841 REPLY by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 to plaintiffs' opposition to motion for leave to file surreply [837−1] (jf) (Entered: 08/26/2003)
842 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion to impose sanctions against defendant for violation of the Second Amended Supplemental Privacy Act Protective Order the Privacy Act of 1974 [722−1] by plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/04/2003)
843 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting defendant's motion nunc pro tunc extending time to 7/22/03 to file a response to motion for reconsideration; Conlon, Frantz may file its reply by 8/12/03 (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/08/2003)

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09/09/2003 09/11/2003
09/16/2003 09/22/2003 09/22/2003 09/22/2003 09/30/2003 09/30/2003 09/30/2003
09/30/2003 10/01/2003 10/03/2003

844 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion to strike defendants response to plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration [829−1] [830−1] by J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/09/2003)
845 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: denying motion for review of the Arbitrator's final decision dismissing Mr. Hardy's Track B claim on 1/27/00 [211−1] CLARENCE HARDY in 1:97−cv−01978; if Mr. Hardy wishes to seek review of the Arbitrator's final decision he may direct a petition to the Monitor wihtin 120 days of the date of this Order; the Facilitator shall promptly send to Mr. Hardy a Form Petition for Monitor Review and a copy of the booklet "Questions and Answers about Monitor Review of Decisions" (June, 2002), which answers common questions about the petition for Monitor review process. (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/11/2003)
MOTION filed by plaintiffs in 1:98−cv−01693 for reconsideration of the Court's 9/4/03 order [263−1] (bjsp) (Entered: 09/17/2003)
846 RESPONSE by federal defendant ANN M. VENEMAN in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for reconsideration of court's order of 6/2/03 [801−1] [808−1] by plaintiffs (bjsp) (Entered: 10/02/2003)
857 MOTION filed by LEE VAN CRAWFORD, DONALD STOKES for attorney fees , for costs and expenses "Let this be filed" (fiat) J. Friedman 10/8/03 (bm) (Entered: 10/08/2003)
863 REPLY by Non Party J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 in response to certain plaintiffs' motion for attorneys fees and costs and expenses, incurred by Phillip L. Fraas for implementation work during the period 4/1/003 to 6/30/03 and for work on six successfully completed petitions for monitor review. [823−1] by ABRAHAM CARPENTER (bjsp) (Entered: 10/10/2003)
847 MOTION filed by Non Party J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorney's fees, costs and expenses for implementation work only for JL CHESTNUT pursuant to Judge Friedman's order dated 12/30/02 ; attachments (bjsp) Modified on 10/02/2003 (Entered: 10/02/2003)
850 MOTION filed by plaintiff ABRAHAM CARPENTER in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorney fees and costs incurred by attorney Phillip L. Fraas for implementation work during the period 7/1/03 to 9/30/03 ; exhibit (1) (bjsp) (Entered: 10/03/2003)
851 MOTION filed by plaintiff TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LLOYD SHAFER in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff GEORGE HALL in 1:97−cv−01978, federal defendant DAN GLICKMAN in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff MCARTHUR NESBIT in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff EDDIE SLAUGHTER in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LEO JACKSON in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff J. B. BLACK in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff LUCIOUS ABRAMS JR. in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff GRIFFIN TOOD SR. in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff GREGORY ERVES in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff CECIL BREWINGTON in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff HERBERT L. SKINNER JR. in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff OBIE L. BEAL in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff CLIFFORD LOVETT in 1:97−cv−01978, plaintiff ABRAHAM CARPENTER in 1:97−cv−01978 for leave to file under seal two of the exhibits to motion for attorneys fees and costs for plaintiffs attorneys EXHIBIT (motion for attorneys fees and exhibits are logged under seal in room 1800) (bjsp) (Entered: 10/03/2003)
859 MOTION filed by plaintiffs attorney in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorney fees and costs for CONLON, FRANTZ, PHELAN & PIRES for the June 30 − September 29, 2003 ; exhibit (1) (bjsp) (Entered: 10/08/2003)
848 ERRATA by Non Party J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 RE: the filing for Rose M. Sanders, and billing for successful appeals, which was inadvertently omitted from my mailing on 9/29/03 ; attachments (bjsp) (Entered: 10/03/2003)
852 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting motion for leave to file under seal two of the exhibits to motion for attorneys fees and costs for Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires for the Quarter June 30 − September 29, 2003 [851−1] by plaintiffs (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/06/2003)

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10/03/2003
10/03/2003 10/03/2003 10/07/2003 10/08/2003 10/08/2003 10/10/2003 10/10/2003 10/14/2003 10/15/2003
10/21/2003 10/24/2003
10/28/2003 10/30/2003

853 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of July 2003 in the amount of $503,738.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/06/2003)
854 EXHIBITS of plaintiffs in 1:97−cv−01978 RE: the filing of exhibits 1 and 2 under seal which are in support of motion for attorney's fees and costs for CONLON, FRANTZ, PHELAN & PIERES for the quarter June 30 − September 29, 2003; exhibit 3 attached to motion (bjsp) (Entered: 10/06/2003)
855 MOTION filed by Non Party OTHELLO C. CROSS in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorneys fees and costs/expenses for implementation work only for Othello C. Cross pursuant to Judge Friedman's order dated 12/30/02 ; exhibit (1) (bjsp) (Entered: 10/07/2003)
856 RESPONSE by movant CLARENCE HARDY in 1:97−cv−01978, movant BARBARA J. HARDY in 1:97−cv−01978 to the Court's 10/3/03 order [853−1] (bjsp) (Entered: 10/08/2003)
858 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : denying motion for reconsideration of the Court's 9/4/03 order [263−1] [267−1] by CECIL BREWINGTON in 1:98−cv−01693 (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/08/2003)
861 MOTION (UNOPPOSED) filed by federal defendant in 1:97−cv−01978 to extend time to 10/21/03 to respond to motion for attorney's fees, costs and expenses (bjsp) (Entered: 10/10/2003)
860 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman: granting motion by defendant extending time to 10/21/03 to file and serve opposition to the motion for attorney's fees, costs and expenses filed by Finkel & Altman (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/10/2003)
862 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : granting in part, denying in part motion for leave to file surreply [837−1] 1:97−cv−01978; granting motion with respect to Parts II and II of the surreply; denying the motion with respect to the remainder of the surreply. (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/10/2003)
864 MOTION (AMENDED) filed by Non Party J.L. CHESTNUT in 1:97−cv−01978 for attorney's fees, costs and expenses for implementation work only for J.L. Chestnut pursuant to Judge Freidman's order dated 12/30/02 (bjsp) (Entered: 10/16/2003)
863 ORDER by Judge James Robertson for Judge Paul L. Friedman : approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of August 2003 in the amount of $382,439.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/15/2003)
865 RESPONSE by federal defendants in 1:97−cv−01978 in opposition to motion for attorney's fees, costs and expenses filed by FINKEL & ALTMAN . (bjsp) (Entered: 10/22/2003)
866 ORDER approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of September, 2003 in the amount of $374,165.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 10/23/2003. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
867 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 847 Attorneys' Fees and Costs for Work Performed Between July 1 and Sept. 1, 2003 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Henry, Terry) (Entered: 10/28/2003)
868 MOTION by Finkel & Altman for Extension of Time to 11/10/2003 to file its reply to defendant's opposition to their motion for attorney's fees, costs and expenses. . Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 11/04/2003)

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11/07/2003 11/10/2003 11/12/2003 11/17/2003
11/21/2003 11/25/2003
11/25/2003
12/01/2003 12/09/2003 12/22/2003
12/22/2003 12/30/2003 12/30/2003

ORDER granting 868 Finkel & Altman's unopposed motion for extension of time up to and including November 10, 2003 to reply file and serve its reply to defendant's opposition to Finkel & Altman's motion for attorneys fees. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 7, 2003. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 11/07/2003)
869 RESPONSE to Motion for Extension of Time; Defendant's Opposition to Chestnut Sanders' Motion for Extension of Time filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 11/10/2003)
871 REPLY by FINKEL & ALTMAN to defendant's opposition to their motion for attorneys' fees and costs . Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 11/20/2003)
870 ORDER that Chestnut, Sanders' motion for an extension of time in which to respond to the government's brief filed in opposition to Chestnut, Sanders' motion for attorneys' fees and expenses is granted; no future reply will be permitted unless the party submitting the reply first moves the Court for leave and demonstrates good cause why the reply is necessary. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 17, 2003. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
874 MOTION for Extension of Time to respond to the government's opposition to plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and expenses by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jf, ) (Entered: 12/02/2003)
872 ORDER that the monitor's invoice for the period of October 2003 in the amount of $400,790.00 is approved; in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Order of Reference, the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 25, 2003. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 11/25/2003)
873 MEMORANDUM FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON FEES OF CLASS COUNSEL CONLON, FRANTZ, PHELAN AND PIRES FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1 − MARCH 31, 2003 from Arbitrator Michael Lewis. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix STATEMENT OF CONLON, FRANTZ, PHELAN AND PIRES# 2 Appendix STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Wolman, Jay) (Entered: 11/25/2003)
875 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE by James W. Myart Jr on behalf of plaintiff Thomas Burrell. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
876 MEMORANDUM Fifth Report on the Late−Claim Petition Process from Arbitrator Michael K. Lewis. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Wolman, Jay) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
877 ORDER approving the Monitor's request for a total budget amount of $4,196,188 for the period of 1/1/2004 through 6/30/2004; USDA shall deposit with the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a sum equal to a pro−rata month's portion of the approved budget within the first fifteen (15) days of each month. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/22/2003. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 12/22/2003)
878 ORDER that any objections to the Arbitrator's Findings and Recommendations shall be filed by 1/15/2004. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/22/2003. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 12/22/2003)
879 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Expenses for implementation work only for J.L. Chestnut pursuant to Judge Friedman's order dated December 30, 2002 by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jf, ) (Entered: 12/31/2003)
880 MOTION for Attorney Fees, and Cost and Expenses, incurred by Phillip L. Fraas for Implementation work during the period October 01, 2003, to December 30, 2003, and

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12/30/2003
12/31/2003 01/02/2004 01/13/2004 01/15/2004
01/21/2004 01/27/2004
01/30/2004 02/13/2004 03/01/2004 03/10/2004 03/10/2004
03/10/2004

for work done on three petitions for monitor review that have been successfully concluded by ABRAHAM CARPENTER. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jf, ) (Entered: 12/31/2003)
881 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires for the Quarter October 1 − December 30, 2003 by GEORGE HALL, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, LLOYD SHAFER. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit #1# 2 Exhibit #2# 3 Exhibit #3# 4 Exhibit #4)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jf, ) (Entered: 12/31/2003)
882 MOTION(Amended) for Attorney Fees and costs and expenses for implementation work only for J.L. Chestnut pursuant to Judge Friedman's order dated 12/30/02 by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 01/02/2004)
883 ORDER . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 2, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(dam, ) (Entered: 01/06/2004)
884 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Objections to the Arbitrator's Findings on Fees of Class Counsel by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 01/13/2004)
MINUTE ORDER granting 884 defendant's motion for extension of time up to and including January 22, 2004 to file its objections to the arbitrator's findings and recommendations on fees of class counsel for the period January 1−March 31, 2003. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 15, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 01/15/2004)
885 RESPONSE to Arbitrator's Findings and Recommendations on Fees of Class Counsel for period January−March 2003 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 01/21/2004)
886 MINUTE ORDER that monitor's invoice for the period of December 2003 is approved; in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Order of Reference, the Clerk of Court of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen days of the date of the entry of this order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 27, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 01/27/2004)
887 RESPONSE to Motions of Certain Plaintiffs Attorneys for Attorneys Fees and Costs for work performed between Oct and Dec 2003 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 01/30/2004)
888 STATUS REPORT on surplus registry funds as of 12/31/03 by RANDI ILYSE ROTH. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 02/17/2004)
889 ORDER that the monitor's invoice for the period of January 2004 in the amount of $478,949.00 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 1, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 03/01/2004)
890 OPINION denying plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration of the Court's June 2, 2003 Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 10, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
891 ORDER denying 807 plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the Court's Order of June 2, 2003, and denying 808 plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the Court's Order of June 2, 2003. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 10, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
892 OPINION regarding sanctions. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 10, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 03/10/2004)

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03/10/2004 03/12/2004 03/23/2004
03/30/2004 03/30/2004 03/30/2004 03/30/2004 03/31/2004 04/01/2004 04/02/2004 04/06/2004 04/06/2004
04/06/2004

893 ORDER denying 526 class counsel's motion to vacate, and denying 668 J.L. Chestnut and Rose M. Sanders' motion for reconsideration. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 10, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
894 MOTION for Extension of Time to respond to Department of Justice's motion to dismiss by LEONARD HUNTER. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 03/22/2004)
895 ORDER that the monitor's invoice for the period of February 2004 in the amount of $431,704.00 is approved; in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Order of Reference, the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within fifteen (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 23, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 03/23/2004)
896 MOTION for Attorney Fees by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 03/30/2004)
897 ENTERED IN ERROR. . . .MOTION for Order for Payment of Attorneys Fees by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) Modified on 3/31/2004 (td, ). (Entered: 03/30/2004)
900 MOTION for Attorney Fees, costs and expenses incurred by Phillip L. Fraas for implementation work during the period 1/1/04 to 3/30/04. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 04/05/2004)
901 MOTION for Attorney Fees, costs and expenses for implementation work only for J.L. Chestnut pursuant to Judge Friedman's order dated 12/30/02 by J.L. CHESTNUT. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 04/05/2004)
DOCUMENT NO. 897 MOTION for Order was Entered In Error and counsel has been advised to refile said document as an attachment to a notice of filing. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 03/31/2004)
898 NOTICE by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES re 896 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 897 MOTION for Order for Payment of Attorneys Fees (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Exhibit 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 04/01/2004)
899 STIPULATION by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/02/2004)
MINUTE ORDER denying as moot 894 plaintiff Leonard Hunter's Motion for Extension of Time to respond to the Department of Justice's motion to dismiss; this is no pending motion to dismiss in this matter. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 4/5/2004. (bm) (Entered: 04/06/2004)
902 STIPULATION: Conlon Frantz and USDA, thorugh their counsel, having participated in a mediation with Arbritrator Michael K. Lewis pursuant to the Court's Order of 12/30/2002, and having reached a settlement with respect to certain claims for attorney's fees, costs and expenses stipulate and agree; setting forth the agreement on fees, costs and expenses. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 4/5/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 04/06/2004)
903 ORDER: Stipulation filed this day resolved a number of pending motions for attorney's fees in this matter: closing 731 Motion for Attorney Fees, closing 731 Motion for Bill of Costs, closing 784 motion for attorney fees; denying as moot 737 Motion to Strike, closing 786 Motion for Attorney Fees, closing 822 Motion for Attorney Fees, closing 859 Motion for Attorney Fees, closing 881 Motion for Attorney Fees . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 4/5/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm, ) (Entered: 04/06/2004)

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04/07/2004
04/07/2004 04/08/2004
04/08/2004 04/08/2004 04/09/2004 04/09/2004 04/14/2004 04/20/2004
04/20/2004 04/21/2004
04/23/2004 04/29/2004
04/30/2004 05/03/2004 05/03/2004 05/04/2004

904 ENTERED IN ERROR. . . .NOTICE by ALL PLAINTIFFS re 801 Order,, 890 Memorandum & Opinion, 891 Order on Motion for Reconsideration,,, [Notice of Appeal] Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) Modified on 4/8/2004 (td, ). (Entered: 04/07/2004)
905 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 801 Order,, 890 Memorandum & Opinion, 891 Order on Motion for Reconsideration $255.00 appeal fee has not been paid by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (td, ) (Entered: 04/08/2004)
DOCUMENT NO. re 904 Notice (Other), Notice was Entered In Error and counsel was notified that Appeals must be sent to the court in pdf format for the Clerk to file. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 04/08/2004)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 905 Notice of Appeal (td, ) (Entered: 04/08/2004)
906 USCA Appeal Fees received $ 255 receipt number 122971 re 905 Notice of Appeal filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS (td, ) (Entered: 04/08/2004)
909 MOTION for relief from judgment re 891 Order on Motion for Reconsideration,,, by plaintiffs. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 04/20/2004)
910 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 891 and 294 in 98−1693 Order on Motion for Reconsideration,,, by plaintiffs. Filing fee remains to be paid $ 255. (td, ) Modified on 4/20/2004 (td, ). (Entered: 04/20/2004)
907 First MOTION to Reopen Case /Modify the Consent Decree by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 04/14/2004)
908 STIPULATION AND ORDER: The monitor shall remain in existence until her duties under the Consent Decree are completed, or until 3/1/2007, whichever occurs first. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 4/19/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 04/20/2004)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 910 Notice of Appeal (td, ) (Entered: 04/20/2004)
911 ORDER that 907 plaintiffs' motion to reopen the case or, in the alternative, to modify the consent decree is stricken from the record in this case. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 21, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 04/21/2004)
912 ORDER that the monitor's invoice for the period of March 2004 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 23, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 04/23/2004)
913 RESPONSE to Motion of Chestnut Sanders Sanders Pettaway Campbell & Albright for attorneys fees and costs for work peformed January−March 2004 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 04/29/2004)
915 MOTION to Withdraw 909 MOTION for relief from judgment re 891 Order on Motion for Reconsideration,,, by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jf, ) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
USCA Case Number 04−5171 for 905 Notice of Appeal filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (bm) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
USCA Case Number 04−5173 for 910 Notice of Appeal filed by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD. (bm) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
914 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSTION to 909 Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Judgment filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) Modified on 5/5/2004 (cp, ). (Entered: 05/04/2004)

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05/06/2004 05/10/2004 05/10/2004 05/10/2004
05/12/2004 05/17/2004 05/17/2004 05/17/2004
05/17/2004 05/17/2004
05/18/2004 05/18/2004

916 STIPULATION regarding settlement of attorney fees and expenses of Philip Fraas by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 05/06/2004)
917 ORDER withdrawing 909 plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment, and granting 915 class counsel's motion to withdraw counsel's April 9, 2004 motion for relief from judgment. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 10, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 05/10/2004)
918 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT regarding attorney's fees and expenses; "So Ordered" (Fiat) J. FriedmanAssociated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 05/10/2004)
919 ORDER CLOSING Mr. Fraas' motion 708 for attorneys' fees for implementation work for July 1, 12001 − June 30, 2002; CLOSING Mr. Fraas' motion 783 for attorneys' fees for implementation work for July 1, 2002 − March 31, 2003 and for work on two Track B claims; CLOSING Mr. Fraas' motion 823 for attorneys' fees for implementation work for April 1, 2003 − June 30, 2003; CLOSING Mr. Fraas' motion 850 for attorneys' fees for implementation work for July 1, 2003 − September 30, 2003; CLOSING Mr. Fraas' motion 900 for attorneys' fees for implementation work of January 1, 2004 − March 30, 2004. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 5/10/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 05/10/2004)
920 STIPULATION regarding attorney fees and expenses of Conlon Frantz Phelan & Pires for the January−March 2004 timeperiod by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 05/12/2004)
921 First MOTION for Leave to File Motion and Memorandum Brief in Support In Excess of Page Limitation by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 05/17/2004)
922 MOTION MODIFY CONSENT DECREE, REQUEST FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) Additional attachment(s) added on 5/18/2004 (cp, ). (Entered: 05/17/2004)
923 ENTERED IN ERROR..... MOTION MEMORANDUM AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO MODIFY AND REQUEST FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 6# 5 Exhibit 6# 6 Exhibit 7# 7 Exhibit 8# 8 Exhibit 12)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) Modified on 5/18/2004 (cp, ). (Entered: 05/17/2004)
924 RESPONSE to Motion for Leave to File Motion and Brief in Excess of Page Limit filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/17/2004)
NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Document No. 923 was Entered in Error as said pleading is NOT a Motion. This document is a Memorandum in support of Document No. 922. Counsel has been instructed NOT to file Non−motion documents as Motions. Counsel has also been intructed to file ALL supporting documents as attachments to the Motions they support. Document No. 922 has been modified to properly reflect its attachment erroneously filed as Document No. 923. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(cp, ) (Entered: 05/18/2004)
925 NOTICE by ALL PLAINTIFFS re 922 MOTION MODIFY CONSENT DECREE, REQUEST FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, 923 MOTION MEMORANDUM AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO MODIFY AND REQUEST FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 05/18/2004)
926 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT regarding attorney's fees and expenses of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires with respect to implementation work from January 2004 − March 2004; setting forth the amounts; so ordered (fiat) J. Friedman Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 05/18/2004)

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05/18/2004 05/18/2004 05/21/2004 05/22/2004 05/24/2004
05/24/2004 05/24/2004
05/24/2004
06/03/2004 06/04/2004 06/04/2004 06/04/2004 06/07/2004 06/07/2004

MINUTE ORDER granting 921 movants' motion for leave to file motion and brief in support of motion to modify consent decree in excess of page limit. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 18, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 05/18/2004)
927 ORDER closing 896 Motion by Conlon Frantz for Attorney Fees for implementation work for 1/1/2004 −3/31/2004. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 5/18/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 05/18/2004)
928 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 922 MOTION MODIFY CONSENT DECREE, REQUEST FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS by ALL PLAINTIFFS, ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 05/21/2004)
929 RESPONSE to Joint Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Motion to Modify Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Emergency Hearing filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 05/22/2004)
930 ORDER approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of April 2004 in the amount of $497,627.00; directing the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay this amount to the Monitor within FIFTEEN (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 5/20/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
931 RESPONSE re 928 Joint Motion for Extension filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) Modified on 5/25/2004 (cp, ). (Entered: 05/24/2004)
932 AMENDED RESPONSE to 928 Joint Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Motion to Modify Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Emergency Hearing filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) Modified on 5/25/2004 (cp, ). (Entered: 05/24/2004)
933 ORDER granting 928 Joint Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to motion to Modify Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Request for Emergency; extending time to Respond to 6/15/2004. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 5/24/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
934 APPLICATION for TRO and Temporary Injunction by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 06/03/2004)
MINUTE ORDER scheduling a TRO motions hearing on June 8, 2004 at 10:00 a.m. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 4, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 06/04/2004)
Motion Hearing set for 6/8/2004 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Paul L. Friedman. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 06/04/2004)
935 MEMORANDUM ARBITRATOR'S SIXTH REPORT ON THE LATE−CLAIM PETITION PROCESS from Arbitrator Michael K. Lewis. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Wolman, Jay) (Entered: 06/04/2004)
936 RESPONSE to Application for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Temporary Injunction filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 Affidavit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 06/07/2004)
937 RESPONSE to Application for Temporary Restraining Order filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A (complaint in U.S. v. Logan)# 2 Exhibit Exhibit B (judgment in U.S. v. Logan)# 3 Exhibit Exhibit C (Floyd affidavit)#

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06/07/2004 06/08/2004 06/08/2004 06/08/2004 06/09/2004 06/09/2004 06/15/2004
06/15/2004 06/15/2004 06/15/2004

4 Exhibit Exhibit D (Sitcov declaration))Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/07/2004)
939 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Expenses pursuant to order filed December 30, 2002.. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 Exhibit 1# 3 Exhibit 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(cp, ) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman : Temporary Restraining Order (re: Theodie Logan and Ceola Logan) held on 6/8/2004. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order heard and DENIED for reasons stated on record in open Court. (Court Reporter Linda Russo.) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
938 ORDER denying the application for temporary restraining order and injunctive relief (regardingTheodie Logan and Ceola Logan) for reasons stated on the record ; because movants sought both a temporary retraining order and injunctive relief, and because the foreclosure of movants' farm land is scheduled for tomorrow, 6/9/2004, this Order would appear to be immediately appealable under 28 USC 1292(a)(1). Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 6/8/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
940 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 938 Order denying motion for temporary restraining order and injunctive relief by LEOLA LOGAN, THEODIE LOGAN. Filing fee $ 255, receipt number 124860. (cp, ) (Entered: 06/09/2004)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 940 Notice of Appeal (cp, ) (Entered: 06/09/2004)
USCA Case Number 04−5209 for 940 Notice of Appeal filed by LEOLA LOGAN, THEODIE LOGAN. (cp, ) (Entered: 06/10/2004)
941 Second MOTION for Leave to File Document in excess of Page Limitation by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree...# 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 10 # 11 # 12 # 13 # 14 # 15 # 16 # 17 # 18 # 19 # 20 # 21 # 22 # 23 # 24 # 25 # 26 # 27 # 28 # 29 # 30 # 31 # 32 # 33 # 34 # 35 # 36 # 37 # 38 # 39 # 40 # 41 # 42 # 43 # 44 # 45 # 46 # 47 Table of Contents for Brief in Support of Motion to modify....# 48 Amended Brief in Support of Motion to Modify# 49 Exhibit 1# 50 Exhibit 2# 51 Exhibit 3# 52 Exhibit 4# 53 Exhibit 5# 54 Errata 6# 55 Exhibit 7# 56 Exhibit 8# 57 Errata 9# 58 Exhibit 10# 59 Exhibit 11# 60 Exhibit 12# 61 Exhibit 13# 62 Exhibit 13# 63 Exhibit 13# 64 Exhibit 13# 65 Exhibit 13# 66 Exhibit 13# 67 Exhibit 13# 68 Exhibit 13# 69 Errata 13# 70 Exhibit 13# 71 Exhibit 13# 72 Exhibit 13# 73 Exhibit 13# 74 Exhibit 13# 75 Exhibit 13# 76 Exhibit 13# 77 Exhibit 13# 78 Exhibit 13# 79 Exhibit 14# 80 Exhibit 15# 81 Exhibit 15# 82 Exhibit 16# 83 Exhibit 16# 84 Exhibit 16# 85 Exhibit 16# 86 Exhibit 17# 87 Exhibit 17# 88 Exhibit 17# 89 Exhibit 17# 90 Exhibit 17# 91 Exhibit 17# 92 Exhibit 18# 93 Exhibit 19# 94 Exhibit 20# 95 Exhibit 20# 96 Errata 20# 97 Errata 20# 98 Exhibit 20# 99 Exhibit 20# 100 Exhibit 20# 101 Exhibit 20# 102 Exhibit 20# 103 Exhibit 20# 104 Exhibit 20)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
942 MOTION to Strike 922 MOTION MODIFY CONSENT DECREE, REQUEST FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS , Or, In the Alternative, Opposition to Modify Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus, and Request for Emergency Hearing by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1 − E−Mail from Facilitator# 2 Exhibit Ex. 2 − Statistical Report# 3 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
943 NOTICE by ALL PLAINTIFFS re 942 MOTION to Strike 922 MOTION MODIFY CONSENT DECREE, REQUEST FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS , Or, In the Alternative, Opposition to Modify Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus, and Request for Emergency Hearing (Notice of Erratum) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 2 − Statistical Report)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
944 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 922 to Modify Consent Decree filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Alicia Lopez)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/15/2004)

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06/15/2004 06/15/2004 06/17/2004 06/21/2004 06/21/2004
06/21/2004 06/22/2004 06/24/2004 06/24/2004 06/24/2004 06/29/2004 06/29/2004 06/29/2004 06/30/2004
06/30/2004

945 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 922 to modify consent decree filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS; (See Document No. 942 for the image of the pleading). Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(rje, ) (Entered: 06/16/2004)
976 ORDER of USCA (certified copy)that the motion to dismiss be granted and case numbers 04−5173 and 04−5174 are hereby dismissed:USCA#04−5171 (jsc) (Entered: 08/12/2004)
946 NOTICE by ALL PLAINTIFFS Second Notice of Intent to Subpoena Witnesses Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 06/17/2004)
MINUTE ORDER that the monitor's request for a total budget amount for the period July 1, 2004 through December 31, 2004 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 21, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 06/21/2004)
947 ORDER approving the Monitor's request for a total budge amount of $4,292,247 for the period of 7/1/2004 through 12/31/2004; directing USDA shall deposit with the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia a sum equal to a pro−rata month's portion of the approved budget with the first FIFTEEN (15) days of each month. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 6/21/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 06/21/2004)
948 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief to Motion to Modify and Amended Motion to Modify by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 06/21/2004)
MINUTE ORDER granting 948 movants' motion for extension of time up to and including July 15, 2004 to file reply brief. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 22, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 06/22/2004)
949 ORDER that the monitor's invoice for the period of May 2004 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 24, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 06/24/2004)
950 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 941 Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Request for Emergency Hearing filed by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 06/24/2004)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 951 Notice of Appeal (jf, ) (Entered: 06/24/2004)
951 MOTION to Strike Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Michael Sitcov# 2 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/29/2004)
953 NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT FILED for temporary restraining order held on dates June 08, 2004; Court Reporter: Paul L. Friedman Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jf, ) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
956 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Expenses for implementation work only for J.L. Chestnut pursuant to order dated 12/30/02 by J.L. CHESTNUT. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jf, ) (Entered: 07/12/2004)
952 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, for the Quarter April 1 − June 30, 2004 by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1 − CFPP Bill − April − June 2004# 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 06/30/2004)
954 MOTION for Attorney Fees, and costs and expenses, incurred by Phillip L. Fraas for implementation work during the period April 01, 2004 to June 30, 2004 by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits)Associated Cases:

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 98 of 203

07/07/2004 07/09/2004 07/14/2004 07/20/2004 07/21/2004 07/22/2004 07/23/2004
07/26/2004
07/26/2004 07/27/2004 07/28/2004
07/28/2004 07/28/2004

1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jf, ) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
955 First MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Motion to Strike Amended Motion and Amended Memo Brief by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 07/07/2004)
ORDER granting 955 Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Amended Motion and Memorandum. Plaintiff shall file a response on or before July 31, 2004. Signed by Judge Gladys Kessler for Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 9, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lcplf2) (Entered: 07/09/2004)
957 Amended MOTION to Amend/Correct 956 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by CECIL BREWINGTON, TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 07/14/2004)
958 MOTION for Leave to File by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 10)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 07/20/2004)
974 MANDATE of USCA (certified copy) as to 764 Notice of Appeal filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. It is hereby ordered and adjudged that the appeals be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction;USCA#03−5079. (jsc) (Entered: 08/10/2004)
959 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 958 Motion for Leave to File filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/22/2004)
960 APPLICATION for TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND TEMPORARY INJUNCTION TO STAF FORECLOSURES AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFSETS AND REQUEST FOR IMMERGENCY HEARING by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 10 # 11 # 12 # 13 # 14 # 15 # 16 # 17 # 18 # 19 # 20 # 21 # 22 # 23 # 24 # 25 # 26 # 27 # 28)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 07/23/2004)
961 ORDER approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of June 2004 in the amount of $535,503.00; the Court of the Clerk, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall pay the amount to the Monitor within FIFTEEN (15) days of the date of the entry of this Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 7/26/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 07/26/2004)
962 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM from James Myart to the application 960 for temporary Restraining Order and Temporary injunction to stay foreclosures and administrative offsets and request for emergency hearing. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(rje, ) (Entered: 07/26/2004)
963 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to Application for TRO Temporary Injunction and Request for Emergency Hearing and Supplement to Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree and Writ of Mandamus and Request for Hearing from James W. Myart. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 07/27/2004)
964 ENTERED IN ERROR..... MOTION Deem Pleading Served on Defendant in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and District of Columbia Local Rules re 962 Reply in Support, Supplemental Memorandum,,, 963 Reply in Support, Supplemental Memorandum,, by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) Modified on 7/29/2004 (nmw, ). (Entered: 07/28/2004)
965 REPLY to opposition to motion re 951 and Defendant's Motion to Strike Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Emergency Hearing(Pigford Docket No. 950) filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 07/28/2004)
966 RESPONSE to Application for Temporary Restraining Order & Temporary Injunction to Stay Foreclosures and Administrative Offsets and Request for

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 99 of 203

07/28/2004 07/28/2004 07/29/2004 07/29/2004 07/29/2004 07/29/2004
07/30/2004 08/02/2004 08/09/2004 08/11/2004 08/12/2004 08/12/2004

Emergency Hearing filed by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of David J. Frantz# 2 Notice FLP−279 (Exhibit 2))Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 07/28/2004)
967 AFFIDAVIT re 966 Response to any document, Amended Affidavit of David J. Frantz (Exhibit #1) by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 07/28/2004)
MINUTE ENTRY ORDER denying without prejudice 964 motion to deem pleading served on defendant in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and District of Columbia Local Rules; plaintiffs filed two copies of the proposed order, but no motion. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 28, 2004.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lcplf2) (Entered: 07/28/2004)
968 MOTION ORDER DEEMING SUPPLEMENT SERVED ON DEFENDANT re 962 Reply in Support, Supplemental Memorandum,,, 963 Reply in Support, Supplemental Memorandum,, by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 07/29/2004)
NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY. Document No. 964 was entered in error and was refiled as Document No. 968. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(nmw, ) (Entered: 07/29/2004)
969 RESPONSE to Motion for Leave to File Supplement to Amended Motion and Amended Memorandum Brief in Support of Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus, and Request for Emergency Hearing filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 07/29/2004)
970 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 960 motion by Mr. Myart for a temporary restraining order and a temporary injunction to stay foreclosures and administrative offsets; directing Mr. Myart shall not file any further motions to supplement his current briefs until all pending motions to strike and motions to supplement have been resolved by the Court; after that time, Mr. Myart may file supplementation only with leave of the Court; Mr. Myart shall deliver to the Court by 8/6/2004, courtest copies of the Modification Motion and Amended Modification Motion along with all exhibits thereto; defendant and class counsel shall file any reply in support their respective motions to strike by 8/9/2004; class counsel shall file its opposition, if any, to Mr. Myart's 7/20/2004 motion to supplement the Amended Modification Motion by 8/9/2004; Mr. Myart shall file any reply in support of his 7/20/2004 motion to supplement the Amended Modification Motion by 8/16/2004. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 7/29/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 07/30/2004)
972 RESPONSE 954 to CHESTNUT, SANER, SANDER, PETTAWAY CAMPBELL & ALBRIGHT MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for work performed between March 31, 2004 and June 30, 2004 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jf, ) (Entered: 08/05/2004)
971 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 956 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 957 Amended MOTION to Amend/Correct 956 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Henry, Terry) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
973 REPLY to opposition to motion re 951 MOTION to Strike Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/09/2004)
975 STIPULATION Settlement Agreement regarding attorney fees and expenses by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 08/11/2004)
978 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(cdw) (Entered: 08/16/2004)
979 ORDER closing Conlon Frantz's motion for attorney's fees and costs for implementation work for July performed between July 2001 and June 2002; closing

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 100 of 203

08/14/2004 08/16/2004 08/19/2004
08/23/2004 08/27/2004 08/27/2004 08/29/2004 09/01/2004 09/01/2004 09/02/2004
09/03/2004 09/03/2004 09/07/2004

952 Conlon Frantz's motion for attorney's fees and costs for the Quarter April 1, 2004 through June 30, 2004. . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 12, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(cdw) (Entered: 08/16/2004)
977 RESPONSE to Defedant's Reply to Movants' Response to Motion to Strike the Amended Motion to Modify the Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Hearing filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 08/14/2004)
980 STATUS REPORT by RANDI ILYSE ROTH. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Roth, Randi) (Entered: 08/16/2004)
981 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS by RANDI ILYSE ROTH regarding implementation of the consent decree for the period of 1/1/02 through 12/31/03. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1# 2 Appendix 2# 3 Appendix 3# 4 Appendix 4# 5 Appendix 5)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Roth, Randi) (Entered: 08/19/2004)
982 MOTION to Strike "Reply to Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion to Strike" by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Response to Surreply# 2 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/23/2004)
983 NOTICE by ANN M. VENEMAN of Related Case (Attachments: # 1 Hildebrandt Complaint# 2 Stovall Complaint)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/27/2004)
984 NOTICE by ANN M. VENEMAN of Related Case (Attachments: # 1 Bradshaw Complaint# 2 Stovall Complaint)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/27/2004)
985 STIPULATION Settlement Agreement Regarding Attorneys Fees and Expenses by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Henry, Terry) (Entered: 08/29/2004)
986 ORDER that the monitor's invoice for the period of July 2004 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 1, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 09/01/2004)
987 Second MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Al Pires, Phil Frass, David Frantz and all other Class Counsel and C−Counsel and Request for Emergency Hearing by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 09/01/2004)
988 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES AND ORDER approving the stipulation of the parties resolving the claim on Phillip L. Fraas for attorney's fees and costs for implementation work for the period April 2004 through June 2004; in light of the stipulation, closing the motion for attorney's fees and costs of Phillip L. Fraas for implementation work during the period 4/1/2004 through 6/30/2004 (Docket No. 954) . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 9/1/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 09/02/2004)
989 ORDER that Mr. Myart's request for an emergency hearing is denied; the parties shall respond to the motion to disqualify class counsel within the time frame prescribed by the Local Rules. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 3, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 09/03/2004)
991 MOTION for relief into entering this lawsiut because of circumstances beyound our control by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/08/2004)
990 MOTION for Reconsideration re 987 Second MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Al Pires, Phil Frass, David Frantz and all other Class Counsel and C−Counsel and Request for Emergency Hearing, 989 Order, by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 09/07/2004)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 101 of 203

09/09/2004 09/10/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/16/2004 09/16/2004
09/16/2004 09/16/2004

992 ORDER that 779 J.L. Chestnut's motion for attorneys' fees is closed; J.L. Chestnut's motoin for attorneys' fees 847 is closed; J.L. Chestnut's motion for attorneys' fees 879 is closed; and J.L. Chestnut's 956 motion for attorney's fees is closed. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 9, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 09/09/2004)
993 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 991 "Plaintiff's Motion For" filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/10/2004)
994 ORDER that the motion of Willie Ruth McNeil, Essie B. Faulkner and Malissa Sharp 991 will not be considered by the Court and shall be closed. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 13, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 09/13/2004)
995 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 987 Disqualify Counsel and Request for Emergency Hearing filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1 − Weekly Statistical Report# 2 Exhibit Ex 2 − E−mail from P−D# 3 Exhibit Ex 3 − E−mail from J Myart# 4 Exhibit Ex 4 − D Frantz affidavit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 09/13/2004)
996 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply To Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Disqualify Class Counsel and Request for Hearing by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
997 MOTION To Enjoin James W. Myart and Thomas Burrell From Disseminating Misleading Communications to Class Members and For Other Relief by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Memo in Support# 2 Text of Proposed Order # 3 Exhibit Ex A − Entity Details# 4 Exhibit Ex B − BFAA homepage# 5 Exhibit Ex C − 6−11−04 press release# 6 Exhibit Ex D − Schedule of meetings# 7 Exhibit Ex E − BFAA Questionnaire and Petition# 8 Exhibit Ex F − Advs of membership# 9 Exhibit Ex G − 1st Notice of Prep# 10 Exhibit Ex H − 2nd Notice of Prep# 11 Exhibit Ex I − BFAA FAQs# 12 Errata Ex J − Hattiesburg American article# 13 Exhibit Ex K − MS Link article# 14 Exhibit Ex L − Tavis Smiley transcript# 15 Exhibit Ex M − 6−17−04 press release# 16 Exhibit Ex N − 6−9−04 press release# 17 Exhibit Ex O − 6−9−04 press release# 18 Exhibit Ex P − 7−20−04 press release# 19 Exhibit Ex Q − The State article# 20 Exhibit Ex R − 5−17−04 press release# 21 Exhibit Ex S − 10−30−03 press release# 22 Exhibit Ex T − 5−24−04 press release# 23 Exhibit Ex U − BFAA N Carolina website# 24 Exhibit Ex V − Burrell statement re Pires# 25 Exhibit Ex W − Pires Affidavit# 26 Exhibit Ex X − BBB Reliability Report)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
998 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 987 to Disqualify Class Counsel filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
999 NOTICE by THOMAS BURRELL re 167 Miscellaneous Document,, 108 Miscellaneous Document,, 190 Letter, 191 Letter, 109 Miscellaneous Document,, 192 Letter, 193 Letter, 110 Miscellaneous Document,, 111 Miscellaneous Document,, 195 Letter, 985 Stipulation, 164 Response to any document,, 987 Second MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Al Pires, Phil Frass, David Frantz and all other Class Counsel and C−Counsel and Request for Emergency Hearing, 963 Reply in Support, Supplemental Memorandum,,, 920 Stipulation, 112 Miscellaneous Document,, 197 Letter, 198 Letter, 199 Letter, 200 Letter, 201 Letter, 988 Order,,, 989 Order,, 990 MOTION for Reconsideration re 987 Second MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Al Pires, Phil Frass, David Frantz and all other Class Counsel and C−Counsel and Request for Emergency Hearing, 989 Order,, 965 Reply to opposition to Motion,, 941 Second MOTION for Leave to File Document in excess of Page Limitation, 966 Response to any document,, 942 MOTION to Strike 922 MOTION MODIFY CONSENT DECREE, REQUEST FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS , Or, In the Alternative, Opposition to Modify Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus, and Request for Emergency Hearing, 168 Miscellaneous Document, 142 Order,, 943 Notice (Other), Notice (Other), 169 Letter, 170 Letter, 922 MOTION MODIFY CONSENT DECREE, REQUEST FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, 727 Order,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 925 Notice (Other), Notice (Other), 944 Memorandum in Opposition, 945

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 102 of 203

Memorandum in Opposition, 171 Letter, 946 Notice (Other), 432 Order,,,,,,,, 172 Letter, 174 Letter, 739 Order,,,,,,,,,, 926 Settlement Agreement,, 969 Response to any document,, 202 Civil Statement, 970 Memorandum & Opinion,,,,, 995 Memorandum in Opposition,, 175 Letter, 176 Letter, 177 Letter, 178 Letter, 179 Letter, 154 Miscellaneous Document,, 156 Miscellaneous Document,,,, 157 Miscellaneous Document,, 927 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees, 158 Miscellaneous Document,, 929 Response to any document, 997 MOTION To Enjoin James W. Myart and Thomas Burrell From Disseminating Misleading Communications to Class Members and For Other Relief, 998 Memorandum in Opposition, 973 Reply to opposition to Motion, 153 Transcript, 135 Memorandum,, 180 Letter, 181 Letter, 182 Letter, 183 Letter, 184 Letter, 185 Letter, 186 Letter, 159 Miscellaneous Document,, 950 Memorandum in Opposition,, 931 Reply to opposition to Motion, 951 MOTION to Strike Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree, 932 Response to any document,, 733 Order,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 933 Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply,, 977 Response to any document,, 978 Settlement Agreement, 979 Order,, 187 Letter, 188 Letter, 189 Letter, 107 Miscellaneous Document,, 166 Order, (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 09/17/2004)

09/17/2004

1000

MOTION for Hearing re 997 MOTION To Enjoin James W. Myart and Thomas Burrell From Disseminating Misleading Communications to Class Members and For Other Relief, 998 Memorandum in Opposition, 999 Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other) by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 09/17/2004)

09/17/2004

MINUTE ORDER granting 996 movants' unopposed motion for enlargement of tme up to and including September 26, 2004 to file reply to plaintiffs' opposition to disqualify class counsel and request for hearing. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 17, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 09/17/2004)

09/17/2004

1001

MOTION to Amend/Correct 1000 MOTION for Hearing re 997 MOTION To Enjoin James W. Myart and Thomas Burrell From Disseminating Misleading Communications to Class Members and For Other Relief, 998 Memorandum in Opposition, 999 Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), No by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 09/17/2004)

09/20/2004

1002

ORDER denying 785 the government's motion to strike, and denying 787 J.L. Chestnut's motion to strike; no additional fees, costs or expenses shall be submitted for the period July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 20, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 09/20/2004)

09/20/2004

1003

Memorandum in opposition to motion re 990 Reconsideration of Emergency Hearing Denial and Notice of Intention to Subpoena Witnesses filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Affidavit of A J Pires, Jr.# 2 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 09/20/2004)

09/21/2004

1004

NOTICE by THOMAS BURRELL re 982 MOTION to Strike "Reply to Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion to Strike", 969 Response to any document,, 995 Memorandum in Opposition,, 929 Response to any document, 987 Second MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Al Pires, Phil Frass, David Frantz and all other Class Counsel and C−Counsel and Request for Emergency Hearing, 997 MOTION To Enjoin James W. Myart and Thomas Burrell From Disseminating Misleading Communications to Class Members and For Other Relief, 998 Memorandum in Opposition, 999 Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), 1000 MOTION for Hearing re 997 MOTION To Enjoin James W. Myart and Thomas Burrell From Disseminating Misleading Communications to Class Members and For Other Relief, 998 Memorandum in Opposition, 999 Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), No, 931 Reply to opposition to Motion, 932 Response to any document,, 990 MOTION for

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Reconsideration re 987 Second MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Al Pires, Phil Frass, David Frantz and all other Class Counsel and C−Counsel and Request for Emergency Hearing, 989 Order,, 942 MOTION to Strike 922 MOTION MODIFY CONSENT DECREE, REQUEST FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS , Or, In the Alternative, Opposition to Modify Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus, and Request for Emergency Hearing, 977 Response to any document,, Order on Motion for Extension of Time to,, 978 Settlement Agreement, 943 Notice (Other), Notice (Other), 1001 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1000 MOTION for Hearing re 997 MOTION To Enjoin James W. Myart and Thomas Burrell From Disseminating Misleading Communications to Class Members and For Other Relief, 998 Memorandum in Opposition, 999 Notice (Other), Not, 979 Order,, 1003 Memorandum in Opposition,, 922 MOTION MODIFY CONSENT DECREE, REQUEST FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, 924 Response to any document, 925 Notice (Other), Notice (Other) Notice of Issued and Served Subpoenas (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 09/21/2004)

09/21/2004 1005 Emergency MOTION to Quash Subpoenas by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/21/2004)

09/22/2004 1006 RESPONSE to Defendant's Motion to Quash Subpoenas filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 09/22/2004)

09/22/2004

1007

ORDER granting 1005 defendant's emergency motion to quash; the subpoenas issued to Sadna True, Lloyd Wright, and Rosalyn Gray on September 21, 2004 are quashed. Signed by Judge Bates for Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 22, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 09/22/2004)

09/23/2004

1008

NOTICE by THOMAS BURRELL re 1004 Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), 1006 Response to any document, 1007 Order on Motion to Quash, NOTICE OF RE−ISSANCE OF SUBPOENAS TO SADNA TRUE, LLOYD WRIGHT AND ROSLYN GRAY Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 09/23/2004)

09/23/2004 1009 MOTION to Quash Subpoenas and to Expedite Briefing by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order re: Motion to Quash Subpoenas# 2 Text of Proposed Order re: Motion to Expedite Briefing)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/23/2004)

09/23/2004 1010 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 990 for Reconsideration of Emergency Hearing Denial filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/23/2004)

09/24/2004

1011

ORDER that the monitor's report and recommendation regarding implementation of the consent decree for the period of January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2003 is approved by the Court; and the monitor's report shall be made available to all interested parties by means of immediate posting on the District Court's website at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/district−court−recent.html.Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 24, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 09/24/2004)

09/27/2004 1012 MOTION for Extension of Time to TO FILE RESPONSES AND REPLIES by THOMAS BURRELL. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 09/27/2004)

09/28/2004

MINUTE ORDER granting defendant's motion to expedite briefing; movants shall file any opposition to defendant's motion to quash subpoenas on or before October 1, 2004, and defendant shall file her reply on or before October 6, 2004. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 28, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 09/28/2004)

09/28/2004 1013 RESPONSE to Defendant's Motion to Quash and to Expedite Briefing filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires,

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Alexander) (Entered: 09/28/2004)

09/28/2004 1014 ORDER that the monitor's invoice for the period of August 2004 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 28, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 09/28/2004)

09/29/2004 1015 NOTICE by ALL PLAINTIFFS of Abatement Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 09/29/2004)

09/29/2004 1016 RESPONSE to Motion for Enlargement of Time filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Elizabeth Goitein)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/29/2004)

09/30/2004 1017 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1012 Enlargement of Time to File Responses and Replies filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 09/30/2004)

09/30/2004 1018 ORDER that the motion for attorenys' fees and costs in the Woodward Track arbitration 782 is closed. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 30, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 09/30/2004)

09/30/2004

1019

ORDER that Mr. Cross' motion for attorneys' fees and costs and expenses for implementation work only 855 is closed; and Mr. Cross' motion for attorneys' fees and costs and expenses for implementation work only 939 is closed. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 30, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 09/30/2004)

09/30/2004

1020

MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for the Quarter July 1 − September 30, 2004 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Implementation bill# 2 Exhibit 2 − Resps to Govt PMRs# 3 Exhibit 3 − PMRs# 4 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 09/30/2004)

09/30/2004

1021

MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Expenses, Incurred by Phillip L. Fraas for Implementation Work During the Period July 1, 2004, to September 30, 2004 by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 09/30/2004)

09/30/2004

1022

MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Enlargement of Time to FIle Response and Replies and Request to Stay all Proceedings Pending Receipt of Congressional Record, and Request for Expedited Ruling by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 10 # 11 # 12)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 09/30/2004)

09/30/2004 1023 MOTION for Attorney Fees And Costs And Expenses For Implementation Work Only For J.L. Chestnut, Jr. Pursuant To Judge Friedman's Order Dated December 30, 2002 by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 09/30/2004)

10/01/2004

1024

NOTICE by THOMAS BURRELL re 1022 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Enlargement of Time to FIle Response and Replies and Request to Stay all Proceedings Pending Receipt of Congressional Record, and Request for Expedited Ruling, 1012 MOTION for Extension of Time to TO FILE RESPONSES AND REPLIES, Order,, 1013 Response to any document, 1014 Order, 1015 Notice (Other), 1016 Response to any document, 1017 Memorandum in Opposition Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 10/01/2004)

10/06/2004 1025 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1022 "Amended Motion for Enlargement of Time" filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Michael Sitcov)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/06/2004)

10/12/2004 1026 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1022 Amended Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Responses and Replies, Request to Stay All Proceedings Pending Receipt

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of Congressional Record, and Request for Expedited Ruling filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 10/12/2004)

10/12/2004

1027

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying as moot 922 Mr. Myart's motion to modify the consent decree, granting 941 Mr. Myart's second motion for leave to file an amended motion and amended brief in excess of the page limit, denying 942 class counsel's motion to strike the motion to modify the consent decree, denying 951 defendant's motion to strike the exhibits accompanying the amended motion to modify the consent decree, granting 958 Mr. Myart's motion for leave to file a supplement to his amended motion to modify the consent decree, denying 982 defendant's motion to strike the "reply to defendant's reply." The government and class counsel shall file their oppositions to the Amended Modification Motion (including the EWG report) on or before October 27, 2004; Mr. Myart shall file any reply in support of the Amended Modification Motion on or before November 8, 2004. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 12, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 10/12/2004)

10/12/2004

1028

ORDER denying 990 Mr. Myart's motion for reconsideration, denying as moot 1000 Mr. Myart's motion for a hearing on the motion to enjoin Mr. Myart and Mr. Burrell from disseminating misleading communications to class members, denying without prejudice 1001 Mr. Myart's amended motion for a hearing on the motion to enjoin Mr. Myart and Mr. Burrell from disseminating misleading communications to class members, denying as moot 1009 defendants' motion to quash subpoenas, denying as moot 1012 Mr. Myart's motion for extension of time to file responses and replies, granting in part and denying in part 1022 Mr. Myart's motion for an enlargement of time to file its responses and replies and request to stay all proceedings pending receipt of the Congressional Record from the September 28, 2004 hearing of the House Judiciary Committee, Constitution Sub−Committee; Mr. Myart will file any reply in support of his motion to disqualify class counsel and any opposition to class counsel's motion to enjoin Mr. Myart and Mr. Burrell on or before October 27, 2004; class counsel shall file any response in support of its motion to enjoin Mr. Myart and Mr. Burrell on or before November 8, 2004; no further extensions of time will be granted; and no discovery requests shall be issued under the auspices of this case, unless and until leave is granted by the Court; no petitions for discovery shall be filed with the Court unless the Court indicates that it is willing to entertain such petitions. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 12, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 10/12/2004)

10/26/2004 1029 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply and Response by THOMAS BURRELL. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 10/26/2004)

10/26/2004 1030 NOTICE of Appearance by Elbert Lin on behalf of ANN M. VENEMAN Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Lin, Elbert) (Entered: 10/26/2004)

10/26/2004 1031 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1029 Second Motion for Enlargement filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Lin, Elbert) (Entered: 10/26/2004)

10/27/2004

1032

REPLY to opposition to motion re 1029 Enlargement of Time to File Responses and Replies and Notice of Availability of Congressional Record of September 28th House Judiciary Committee Constitution Sub−committee Hearing on Implementation of the Pigford Consent Decree filed by THOMAS BURRELL. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 10/27/2004)

10/27/2004

1033

RESPONSE to Movants' Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Request for Emergency Hearing filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Synopsis of Exhibits to Movants' Amended Mot# 2 Errata B − Weekly Statistical Report)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 10/27/2004)

10/27/2004 1034 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1029 Second Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Responses and Replies, Request to Stay All Proceedings Pending Receipt of Congressional Record, and Request for Expedited Ruling filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz,

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David) (Entered: 10/27/2004)

10/27/2004

1035

ORDER that Mr. Myart shall file his reply in support of his motion to disqualify class counsel and his opposition to class counsel's motion to enjoin Mr. Myart and Mr. Burrell on or before November 12, 2004; class counsel shall file any reply in support of its motion to enjoin Mr. Myart and Mr. Burrell on or before November 29, 2004. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 27, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 10/27/2004)

10/27/2004 1036 RESPONSE to Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree (Opposition) filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Bithell Declaration)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/27/2004)

10/29/2004 1037 RESPONSE to Motion of Chestnut Sanders Sanders Pettaway Campbell & Albright for attorneys fees and costs for July−Sept 2004 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 10/29/2004)

11/02/2004 1038 ORDER that the monitor's invoice for the period of September 2004 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 2, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 11/02/2004)

11/03/2004 1039 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Amended Motion to Modify, etc. by THOMAS BURRELL. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 11/03/2004)

11/04/2004

1040

NOTICE OF TESTIMONY BEFORE THE US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMMITTEE CONSTITUTION SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE "NOTICE PROVISIONS OF THE PIGFORD V. VENEMAN CONSENT DECREE " by THOMAS BURRELL re 969 Response to any document,, 995 Memorandum in Opposition,, 1033 Response to any document,, 987 Second MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Al Pires, Phil Frass, David Frantz and all other Class Counsel and C−Counsel and Request for Emergency Hearing, 997 MOTION To Enjoin James W. Myart and Thomas Burrell From Disseminating Misleading Communications to Class Members and For Other Relief, 998 Memorandum in Opposition, 999 Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), Notice (Other), 950 Memorandum in Opposition,, 1035 Order,, 1036 Response to any document, 1027 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,,,,, Order on Motion for Leave to File,,,,, Order on Motion to Strike,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1028 Order on Motion for Reconsideration,,,,,,, Order on Motion for Hearing,,,,,,, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct,,,,,,, Order on Motion to Quash,,,,,,, Order on Motion for Extension of Time to,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 925 Notice (Other), Notice (Other), 944 Memorandum in Opposition, 945 Memorandum in Opposition (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 11/04/2004)

11/04/2004

MINUTE ORDER granting 1039 motion for enlargement of time up to and including November 18, 2004 to file reply in support of the amended motion to modify consent decree and request for expedited ruling. The Court is of the opinion that a brief extension of time for Mr. Myart to file a reply is warranted and specifically to focus the Court on the relevant portions of the transcript. There will not be one more extension on this matter. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 4, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 11/04/2004)

11/08/2004

1041

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER that the relief granted by the court of appeals in its June 21, 2004 opinion does not apply to those claimants not originally represented by class counsel. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 8, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 11/08/2004)

11/12/2004 1042 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 997 Al Pires Motion to Enjoin James W. Myart, Jr. and Thomas Burrell filed by THOMAS BURRELL. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 11/12/2004)

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11/12/2004 1043 REPLY to opposition to motion re 987 Disqualification of Class Counsel and Co−Counsels filed by THOMAS BURRELL. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 11/12/2004)

11/13/2004

1044

NOTICE Of Filing of House Judiciary Committee Constitution Subcommittee September 28, 2004 Hearing Transcript Regarding the Implementation of the Pigford Consent Decree by THOMAS BURRELL re 1033 Response to any document,, 987 Second MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Al Pires, Phil Frass, David Frantz and all other Class Counsel and C−Counsel and Request for Emergency Hearing, 997 MOTION To Enjoin James W. Myart and Thomas Burrell From Disseminating Misleading Communications to Class Members and For Other Relief, Order on Motion for Extension of Time to,,, 950 Memorandum in Opposition,, 1035 Order,, 1036 Response to any document, 1042 Memorandum in Opposition, 1027 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,,,,, Order on Motion for Leave to File,,,,, Order on Motion to Strike,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1043 Reply to opposition to Motion, 1028 Order on Motion for Reconsideration,,,,,,, Order on Motion for Hearing,,,,,,, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct,,,,,,, Order on Motion to Quash,,,,,,, Order on Motion for Extension of Time to,,,,,,,,,,,,, (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 11/13/2004)

11/13/2004

1045

ENTERED IN ERROR....Emergency MOTION for Hearing re 1033 Response to any document,, 1035 Order,, 1036 Response to any document, 1042 Memorandum in Opposition, 1027 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,,,,, Order on Motion for Leave to File,,,,, Order on Motion to Strike,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1043 Reply to opposition to Motion, 1028 Order on Motion for Reconsideration,,,,,,, Order on Motion for Hearing,,,,,,, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct,,,,,,, Order on Motion to Quash,,,,,,, Order on Motion for Extension of Time to,,,,,,,,,,,,, Conduct Limited Discovery and/or Hearing to Take Live Testimony at Hearing Set by the Court by THOMAS BURRELL. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) Modified on 11/15/2004 (nmw, ). (Entered: 11/13/2004)

11/14/2004

1046

Emergency MOTION for Hearing (CORRECTED ENTRY REGARDING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE DISCOVERY OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE LIVE TESTIMONY AT HEARING SET BY THE COURT AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RULING by THOMAS BURRELL. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 11/14/2004)

11/15/2004

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY. Document No. 1045 (97cv1978) and Document No. 437 (98cv1693) were entered in error and have been refiled as Document No. 1046 (97cv1978) and Document No. 438 (98cv1693). Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(nmw, ) (Entered: 11/15/2004)

11/17/2004

1047

NOTICE of Constitution Subcommitte Winess List by THOMAS BURRELL re 1046 Emergency MOTION for Hearing (CORRECTED ENTRY REGARDING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE DISCOVERY OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE LIVE TESTIMONY AT HEARING SET BY THE COURT AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RULING, 1033 Response to any document,, 987 Second MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Al Pires, Phil Frass, David Frantz and all other Class Counsel and C−Counsel and Request for Emergency Hearing, 997 MOTION To Enjoin James W. Myart and Thomas Burrell From Disseminating Misleading Communications to Class Members and For Other Relief, 998 Memorandum in Opposition, 950 Memorandum in Opposition,, 989 Order,, 1036 Response to any document, 1042 Memorandum in Opposition, 1027 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,,,,, Order on Motion for Leave to File,,,,, Order on Motion to Strike,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1043 Reply to opposition to Motion, 1028 Order on Motion for Reconsideration,,,,,,, Order on Motion for Hearing,,,,,,, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct,,,,,,, Order on Motion to Quash,,,,,,, Order on Motion for Extension of Time to,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 925 Notice (Other), Notice (Other), 945 Memorandum in Opposition (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 11/17/2004)

11/18/2004 1048 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1046 BY DEFENDANT AND CLASS COUNSEL ON AMENDED MOTION TO MODIFY CONSENT DECREE, REQUEST FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND HEARING filed by THOMAS BURRELL. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 11/18/2004)

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11/19/2004 1049 STIPULATION regarding attorney fees and expesnses of Conlon Frantz Phelan & Pires for July−September 2004 by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 11/19/2004)

11/19/2004

1050

First MOTION for Leave to File Amended Reply To Class Counsel's and Defendant's Opposition Responses to Amended Motion to Modify the Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and for Hearing by THOMAS BURRELL. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 10 # 11 # 12 # 13 # 14 # 15 # 16 # 17 # 18 # 19 # 20 # 21 # 22 # 23)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 11/19/2004)

11/21/2004 1051 NOTICE OF SECOND REQUEST FOR CLASS COUNSEL TO FILE BREAKDOWN OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS WITH THE COURT AND CLASS MEMBERS by THOMAS BURRELL (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 11/21/2004)

11/21/2004 1052 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1050 for Leave to File Amended Reply filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/21/2004)

11/22/2004 1053 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1050 Motion for Leave to File Amended Reply to Oppositions to Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Hearing filed by THOMAS BURRELL. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 11/22/2004)

11/23/2004 1054 ORDER closing 1020 Conlon Frantz's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs for the Quarter 7/1/2004 through 9/30/2004. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 11/23/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 11/23/2004)

11/23/2004

1055

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT regarding attorney's fees and expenses for Conlon, Frantz in the amount of $113,000 in full and final settlement of any and all claims by Conlon Frantz pursuant to any statute or any other basis, for attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs for implementation work performed from July 2004 through September 2004 (See settlement agreement for other details). Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 11/22/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 11/23/2004)

11/23/2004

1056

MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to Reply in Support of Motion to Disqualify Class Counsel by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Surreply to Reply in Support of Motion to Disqualify Class Counsel# 3 Exhibit 1 to Surreply − Supplemental Testimony of M Lewis# 4 Exhibit 2 to Surreply − Testimony of J Finegan (part 1 of 3)# 5 Exhibit 2 to Surreply − Testimony of J Finegan (part 2 of 3)# 6 Exhibit 2 to Surreply − Testimony of J Finegan (part 3 of 3)# 7 Exhibit 3 to Surreply − Weekly Statistical Report)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 11/23/2004)

11/24/2004 1057 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of October 2004. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 24, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 11/24/2004)

11/24/2004 1058 ORDER denying 1050 Mr. Myart's motion for leave to file an amended reply. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 24, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) Modified on 11/26/2004 (lc, ). (Entered: 11/24/2004)

11/24/2004 1059 ORDER granting 1056 class counsel's motion for leave to file a surreply to Mr. Myart's reply in support of his motion to disqualify class counsel. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 24, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 11/24/2004)

11/24/2004 1060 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Motion to Conduct Limited Discovery by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/24/2004)

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11/24/2004

1061

SURREPLY to re 987 Second MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Al Pires, Phil Frass, David Frantz and all other Class Counsel and C−Counsel and Request for Emergency Hearing filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 to Surreply − Supplemental Testimony of M Lewis# 2 Exhibit 2 to Surreply − Testimony of J Finegan (part 1 of 3)# 3 Exhibit 2 to Surreply − Testimony of J Finegan (part 2 of 3)# 4 Exhibit 2 to Surreply − Testimony of J Finegan (part 3 of 3)# 5 Exhibit 3 to Surreply − Weekly Statistical Report)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lc, ) (Entered: 11/26/2004)

11/29/2004 1062 REPLY to Opposition to Enjoin James W. Myart Jr. and Thomas Burrell from Disseminating Misleading Communications to Class Members and for Other Relief filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 11/29/2004)

11/29/2004

1063

Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1046 Conduct Limited Discovery or in the Alternative for Live Testimony at Hearing Set by the Court and Request for Expedited Ruling filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 11/29/2004)

12/01/2004

1064

MEMORANDUM Arbitrator's Seventh Report on the Late−Claim Petition Process Arbitrator's Seventh Report on the Late−Claim Petition Process from Arbitrator Michael K. Lewis. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Arbitrator's Congressional Testimony)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Wolman, Jay) (Entered: 12/01/2004)

12/01/2004

1065

ORDER denying 1046 Mr. Myart's motion for leave to conduct limited discovery or, in the alternative, for live testimony at a hearing set by the Court; and denying as moot 1060 defendant's unopposed motion for an extension of time to file an opposition to Mr. Myart's motion to conduct limited discovery or, in the alternative, for live testimony. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 1, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 12/01/2004)

12/01/2004 1066 STIPULATION regarding attorney fees of Philip Fraas for July−Sept 04, and Oct−Dec 03 by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 12/01/2004)

12/02/2004

1067

First MOTION for Reconsideration re 1063 Memorandum in Opposition,, 1065 Order on Motion for Hearing,, Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply, by THOMAS BURRELL. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 12/02/2004)

12/03/2004

1068

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT regarding attorney's fees and expenses with respect to implementation work from July−September 2004; implementation work from October−December 2003 and Petitions for Monitor Review; setting forth attorney's fees, costs and expenses; SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/3/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 12/03/2004)

12/03/2004

1069

ORDER closing 880 Motion for Attorney Fees for implementation work for 10/1/2003 through 12/30/2003; closing 1021 Motion for Attorney Fees for implementation work for 7/1/2004 through 9/30/2004 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/3/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 12/03/2004)

12/03/2004 1070 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to Reply to Oppositions to Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Surreply# 3 Wolman Declaration)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/03/2004)

12/07/2004

MINUTE ORDER granting 1070 defendant's unopposed motion to file surreply to reply to oppositions to amended motion to modify consent decree. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 7, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 12/07/2004)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 110 of 203

12/14/2004

1071

Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1067 Reconsideration of Court's December 1, 2004 Order & Request for Expedited Ruling or in the Alternative Request for Clarification of Court's December 1, 2004 Order filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 12/14/2004)

12/14/2004 1072 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1067 for Reconsideration of December 1, 2004 Order filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/14/2004)

12/19/2004 1073 NOTICE of Allegations of Department of Justice/Attorney Misconduct by THOMAS BURRELL (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 12/19/2004)

12/20/2004 1074 ORDER approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of November 2004. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 20, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 12/20/2004)

12/20/2004 1075 MOTION Inquiry Into the Track A and Track B Cases Handled by Margaret O'Shea by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 12/20/2004)

12/20/2004

1076

Emergency MOTION for Hearing re 1073 Notice (Other), 1075 MOTION Inquiry Into the Track A and Track B Cases Handled by Margaret O'Shea Motion for Hearing on Allegations Against DOJ/Attorney by THOMAS BURRELL. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 12/20/2004)

12/22/2004 1077 NOTICE of Michael Sitcov Unprofessional Conduct Based on Court's Tacit Approval as Determined by Michael Sitcov by THOMAS BURRELL (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 12/22/2004)

12/22/2004

1078

ORDER approving the Monitor's request for a total budget amount of $3,806,280 for the period of 1/1/2005 through 6/30/2005; directing USDA shall deposit with the Clerk of Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a sum equal to a pro−rata month's portion of the approved budget within the first fifteen (15) days of each month. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/22/2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 12/22/2004)

12/23/2004 1079 NOTICE of EWG COMMUNICATION WITH PETER D. KEISLER, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL REGARDING POSSIBLE DOJ MISCONDUCT by THOMAS BURRELL Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 12/23/2004)

12/23/2004

1080

Emergency MOTION for Hearing re 1077 Notice (Other), 1079 Notice (Other), 1073 Notice (Other), 1075 MOTION Inquiry Into the Track A and Track B Cases Handled by Margaret O'Shea, 1076 Emergency MOTION for Hearing re 1073 Notice (Other), 1075 MOTION Inquiry Into the Track A and Track B Cases Handled by Margaret O'Shea Motion for Hearing on Allegations Against DOJ/Attorney Motion for Hearing and Expedited Ruling on Possible DOJ Attorney and Class Counsel Misconduct regarding Failure to Notify Court, Defendant and Class Members of Fraud by THOMAS BURRELL. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 12/23/2004)

12/28/2004 1095 MOTION to comply with the Arbitrator's 11/9/2004 order by EDDIE GRAY. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(rje, ) (Entered: 01/25/2005)

12/28/2004 1096 MOTION to comply with the Arbitrator's 11/9/04 order. by GREGORY ERVES. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(rje, ) (Entered: 01/25/2005)

12/28/2004 1098 MOTION to comply with the Arbitrator's 11/9/04 order by Arthur Flonnory. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(rje, ) (Entered: 01/25/2005)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 111 of 203

12/28/2004 1099 MOTION to comply with the Arbitrator's 11/9/04 order by LUCIOUS ABRAMS, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(rje, ) (Entered: 01/25/2005)

12/28/2004 1100 MOTION to comply with the Arbitrator's 11/9/04 order by HERBERT WILLIAMS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(rje, ) (Entered: 01/25/2005)

12/30/2004 1081 MOTION for Attorney Fees by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit 1# 3 Exhibit 2# 4 Exhibit 3# 5 Exhibit 4)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 12/30/2004)

12/30/2004

1082

RESPONSE to (1) Notice of Allegations of Department of Justice/Attorney Misconduct; (2) Motion on Behalf of the Class Seeking Inquiry into Track A and Track B Cases Handled by Margaret O'Shea; and (3) Motion and Amended Motion for Status Conference or Hearing filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Michael Sitcov# 2 Declaration of Elizabeth Goitein# 3 Exhibit 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/30/2004)

12/30/2004 1083 MOTION for Attorney Fees For Fourth Quarter 2004 by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 12/30/2004)

12/30/2004 1084 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1083 MOTION for Attorney Fees For Fourth Quarter 2004 by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 12/30/2004)

01/03/2005 1085 ENTERED IN ERROR. . . .MOTION for Extension of Time to File Fraas motion for attorney's fees by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) Modified on 1/5/2005 (td, ). (Entered: 01/03/2005)

01/03/2005

1086

ENTERED IN ERROR. . . .MOTION for Attorney Fees for Class Counsel Fraas for FOurth Quarter of 2004 by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Documentation of fees, and costs and expenses)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) Modified on 1/5/2005 (td, ). (Entered: 01/03/2005)

01/03/2005

1087

ORDER denying movants' amended motion to modify the consent decree, request for writ of mandamus and request for emergency hearing 941 , denying 987 movants' motion to disqualify class counsel and request for emergency hearing, and denying as moot 1067 movants' motion for reconsideration of Court's December 1, 2004 order and request for expedited ruling or, in the alternative, request for clarification of Court's December 1, 2004 order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 3, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 01/03/2005)

01/03/2005 1088 OPINION denying movants' amended motion to modify the consent decree, request for writ of mandamus and request for emergency hearing. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 3, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 01/03/2005)

01/03/2005 1089 ORDER denying 1076 movants' motion for hearing, and denying 1080 movants' motion for hearing. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 3, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 01/03/2005)

01/03/2005

1090

OPINION that the notice of unprofessional conduct by Michael Sitcov in connection with allegations of Department of Justice/Attorney misconduct in direct relation to class members cases and defendant's appeals of arbitrator awards filed on December 22, 2004 shall be stricken from the record. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 3, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 01/03/2005)

01/04/2005 1091 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1075 Seeking an Inquiry Into the Track A and Track B Cases Handled By Margaret O'Shea filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered:

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 112 of 203

01/04/2005)

01/05/2005

DOCUMENTS have been "Entered In Error" re 1085 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Fraas motion for attorney's fees, 1086 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Class Counsel Fraas for FOurth Quarter of 2004Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF; (Counsel has been notified that document no. 1086 needs to be an exhibit to document no. 1085 and counsel should wait until the Judge makes a ruling on document no. 1085 before filing 1086)(td, ) (Entered: 01/05/2005)

01/06/2005 1092 MOTION for Extension of Time to file motion for 4th quarter 2004 Fraas attorneys fees and costs by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 4th quarter 2004 fees motion# 2 Exhibit Exhibit to 4th quarter 2004 fees motion)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 01/06/2005)

01/10/2005

MINUTE ORDER granting 1092 class counsel Fraas' unopposed motion for extension of time up to and including January 3, 2005 to file motion for attorney's fees. Signed by Judge Leon for Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 10, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 01/10/2005)

01/10/2005

1093

MOTION for Attorney Fees, costs and expenses, incurred for implementation work during the period October 1, 2004 to December 30, 2004 and work on track A claims successfully concluded during that period by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 01/11/2005)

01/13/2005 1094 ORDER denying as moot 1075 plaintiffs' motion on behalf of the class seeking an inquiry into the Track A and Track B cases handled by Margaret O'Shea. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 13, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 01/13/2005)

01/25/2005 1097 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of December 2004. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 25, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 01/25/2005)

01/31/2005 1102 RESPONSE to Amended Motion of Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright for Attorney's Fees and Costs For Work Performed Between Oct. 1, 2004 and Dec. 31, 2004 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Henry, Terry) (Entered: 01/31/2005)

02/03/2005 1103 MOTION for Reconsideration re 1088 Memorandum & Opinion, 1087 Order on Motion to Disqualify Counsel,,, Order on Motion for Reconsideration,, by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Ware, Charles) (Entered: 02/03/2005)

02/04/2005 1104 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Myart, James) (Entered: 02/04/2005)

02/10/2005

1105

Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1095 "Motion[s], Petition[s], Affidavit[s] and Supporting Documents as Evidence in Support of" Lucious Abrams, Gregory Erves, Arthur Flonnory, Eddie Gray, and Herbert Williams filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 02/10/2005)

02/14/2005 1106 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of December 31, 2004, by RANDI ILYSE ROTH. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Roth, Randi) (Entered: 02/14/2005)

02/17/2005 1107 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1103 Reconsideration of the Court's Order of January 2005 (Request for Waiver of Deadline) filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 02/17/2005)

02/17/2005 1108 Proposed MOTION for Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 02/17/2005)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 113 of 203

02/17/2005

1109

Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1103 "Line" and "Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order of January 2005 (Request for Waiver of Deadline)" filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Lin, Elbert) (Entered: 02/17/2005)

02/18/2005 1110 NOTICE of Certificate of Service by ALL PLAINTIFFS re 1108 Proposed MOTION for Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, 1107 Memorandum in Opposition, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 02/18/2005)

02/18/2005 1111 STIPULATION regarding Attorney Fees of Phil Fraas for October−December 2004 by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 02/18/2005)

02/18/2005 1112 STIPULATION regarding attorney fees of Conlon Frantz for October−December 2004 by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 02/18/2005)

02/24/2005

1113

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT regarding Attorney's Fees and Expenses of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires for the Quarter October−December 2004 in the amount of $107,000; so ordered. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman 2/22/2005. (See for details)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 02/24/2005)

02/24/2005

1114

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT regarding Attorney's Fees and Expenses of Philip L. Fraas for implementation work from October−December, 2004 in the amount of $6,287.00. So Ordered, Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 2/22/2005. (See for details) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 02/24/2005)

02/25/2005 1115 ORDER granting 1104 Mr. Myart's motion to withdraw. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 25, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 02/25/2005)

02/25/2005

1116

ORDER denying 1103 Mr. Ware's motion for reconsideration. The Clerk's Office shall remove Mr. Ware as counsel for plaintiffs. The Clerk's Office shall not enter appearance for attorneys purporting to represent plaintiffs without leave of the Court. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 25, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 02/25/2005)

03/08/2005 1117 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of January 2005. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 8, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(ma) (Entered: 03/08/2005)

03/30/2005

1118

MOTION for Attorney Fees AND COSTS AND EXPENSES FOR IMPLEMENTATION WORK ONLY FOR J.L. CHESTNUT PURSUANT TO JUDGE FRIEDMAN'S ORDER DATED DECEMBER 30, 2002 by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 03/30/2005)

03/30/2005

1119

MOTION for Attorney Fees For the Quarter January 1 − March 30, 2005 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Legal Bill − Implementation# 2 Exhibit 2 − Legal Bill − Responses to Govt PMRs# 3 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 03/30/2005)

03/30/2005 1120 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip Fraas by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit P. Fraas attorney fees motion)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 03/30/2005)

03/31/2005 1121 ORDER that the monitor's invoice for the period of February 2005 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 31, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 03/31/2005)

03/31/2005 1122 AMENDED ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of February 2005. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 31, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 03/31/2005)

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03/31/2005

1123

NOTICE by J.L. CHESTNUT of filing of sealed exhibits to re 1118 MOTION for Attorney Fees AND COSTS AND EXPENSES FOR IMPLEMENTATION WORK ONLY FOR J.L. CHESTNUT PURSUANT TO JUDGE FRIEDMAN'S ORDER DATED DECEMBER 30, 2002 Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 04/02/2005)

03/31/2005 1124 STATUS REPORT by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 04/02/2005)

04/04/2005

1125

MANDATE of USCA (certified copy) It is hereby ordered that the order to show cause be discharged; It is further ordered on court's own motion that the consolidated appeals be dismissed for failure to prosecute; It is further ordered that the motion for summary affirmance be dismissed as moot; USCA#04−5209 (jsc) (Entered: 04/11/2005)

04/21/2005

1126

STIPULATION AND ORDER (1) the deadline for class members to exercise their right to injunctive rellief under subparagraphs 11(a), (b)(, and (c) of the Consent Decree is 4/14/2005, or two years after the date on which the prevailing class member has completed the Consent Decree claims process, whichever is later; (2) the deadline for class members to execise their right to injunctive relief under subparagraphs 11(d) of the Consent Decree is 4/14/2006, or two years after the date on which the prevailing class member has completed the Consent Decree claims process, whichever is later; (3) a class member's written request for priority consideration on inventory property or on a farm ownership or farm operating loan pursuant to subparagraphs 11(a) and (b), resprectively, of the Consent Decree must be submitted along with an actual application for inventory property or for a loan, or used for a pending application for inventory property or for a loan, in order for such priority consideration to be provided and in order to determine if such request for priority consideration is timely under paragraph 1 of this Stipulation and Order; (4) the phrase "the date on which the prevailing class member has completed the Consent Decree claims process" as used in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, is defined to mean: setting forth those meanings; (5) a prevailing class member may not obtain injunctive prusuant to paragraph 11 of the Consent Decree prior to 120 days of the date of the initial Adjudicator or Arbitrator decsion on which they prevail; a request for injunctive relief submitted by a class member within the 120−day period will be accepted by the agency, but will not be processed until 120 days after the date of the initial Adjudicator or Arbitrator decision; if the agency files a timely petition for Monitor review, the request will not be processed until the class member has completed the Consent Decree claims process; (6) the Monitor will send each class member who has prevailed in either an Adjudicator or Arbitrator decision issued through the date of this Stipulation and Order written notice of the contents of this Stipulation and Order; (7) copies of this Stipulation shall be posted in a conspicuous public place in every FSA county office; (8) any person who objects to any aspect of this Stipulation and Order shall submit his or her objections in writing no later than 30 calendar days from the date of the entry of this Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 4/21/2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 04/21/2005)

04/27/2005

1127

MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Points & Authorities# 2 Exhibit 1# 3 Exhibit 2# 4 Exhibit 3# 5 Exhibit 4# 6 Exhibit 5# 7 Exhibit 6 − Part 1# 8 Exhibit 6 − Part 2# 9 Exhibit 7# 10 Order for TRO)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/27/2005)

04/28/2005 1128 MEMORANDUM re 1127 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS, by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/28/2005)

04/29/2005 1129 NOTICE Praecipe by ALL PLAINTIFFS re 1127 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/29/2005)

04/29/2005 1130 NOTICE of Appearance by Joel L. McElvain on behalf of ANN M. VENEMAN Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 04/29/2005)

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04/29/2005

1131

Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1118 Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Response to the Motion of Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright for Attorney's Fees and Costs for Work Performed between January 1, 2005, and March 31, 2005 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 04/29/2005)

05/03/2005 1132 MINUTE ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of March 2005. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 3, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/03/2005)

05/05/2005

1133

ORDER denying 1095 Eddie Gray's motion, denying Gregory Erves' 1096 motion, denying 1098 Arthur Flonnory's motion, denying 1099 Lucious Abrams' motion, and denying 1100 Herbert Williams' motion. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 5, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/05/2005)

05/12/2005 1134 STIPULATION re 1119 MOTION for Attorney Fees For the Quarter January 1 − March 30, 2005 by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 05/12/2005)

05/16/2005 1135 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT regarding attorneys fees and expenses of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP for the Quarter of January 1 through March 30, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 05/16/2005)

05/18/2005 1136 ENTERED IN ERROR. . . .STIPULATION re 1120 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip Fraas for First Quarter of 2005 by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) Modified on 5/19/2005 (td, ). (Entered: 05/18/2005)

05/18/2005 1137 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT by ANN M. VENEMAN. (SEE DOCUMENT NO. 1136 FOR IMAGE) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 05/19/2005)

05/20/2005 1138 MOTION (Renewal) for Attorney Fees and costs by SANDY MCKINNON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 05/26/2005)

06/02/2005 1139 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of April 2005. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 2, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/02/2005)

06/02/2005

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement regarding attorney's fees and expenses. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 2, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/02/2005)

06/02/2005 1140 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 1138 MOTION for Attorney Fees by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 06/02/2005)

06/07/2005

ORDER granting 1140 defendants' motion for extension of time up to and including August 2, 2005 in which to file opposition to the motion by Sandy McKinnon for fees and costs 1138 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 7, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/07/2005)

06/08/2005 1141 MOTION for Reconsideration re Order granting defendant's Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to opposition to the motion for fees and costs by SANDY MCKINNON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 06/09/2005)

06/09/2005 1142 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1141 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration of This Court's Order Granting an Extension of Time filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 06/09/2005)

06/13/2005 1144 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Expenses by Othello C. Cross. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit # 2 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(nmw, ) (Entered: 06/17/2005)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 116 of 203

06/14/2005 1143 ORDER that the Clerk's Office shall deliver a copy of this Order and the attached 5/5/2005 Memorandum Opinion and Order to Mr. Lucious Abrams at the address herein. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 6/14/2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 06/14/2005)

06/29/2005

1145

MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for the Quarter April 1 − June 29, 2005 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Implementation Bill − part 1 of 2# 2 Exhibit 1 − Implementation Bill − part 2 of 2# 3 Exhibit 2 − Bill for Responses to Govt PMRs# 4 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 06/29/2005)

06/30/2005 1146 ORDER that the monitor's invoice for the period of May 2005 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 30, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/30/2005)

06/30/2005

MINUTE ORDER that the monitor's request for a total budget amount for the period of June 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 30, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/30/2005)

06/30/2005

ENTERED IN ERROR: ORDER previously entered approving the monitor's request for a total budget amount for the period of June 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005 was ENTERED IN ERROR. PLEASE DISREGARD. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 30, 2005.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/30/2005)

06/30/2005 1147 Unopposed MOTION to Stay re 1144 MOTION for Attorney Fees Unopposed Motion to Stay Further Briefing by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 06/30/2005)

06/30/2005

1148

ORDER approving the Monitor's request for a total budget amount of $3,526,306 for the period of 7/1/2005 through 12/31/2005; in accordance with Paragraph 17 of the Order of Reference, USDA shall deposit with the Clerk of Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia a sum equal to a pro−rata month's portion of the approved budget within the first fifteen (15 ) days of each month. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 6/30/2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 06/30/2005)

06/30/2005 1149 MOTION for Attorney Fees , Costs and Expenses by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 06/30/2005)

06/30/2005 1150 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas, 2Q 2005 by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 06/30/2005)

07/01/2005 1151 MOTION for Attorney Fees Phillip L. Fraas 2Q 2005 by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 07/01/2005)

07/01/2005

MINUTE ORDER granting 1147 defendant's unopposed motion to stay further briefing with regard to the motion by Othello Cross for fees and costs. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 1, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 07/01/2005)

07/01/2005 1152 Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees Phillip L. Fraas 2Q 2005 by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit hourly entries, and costs and expenses)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 07/01/2005)

07/01/2005 1153 Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees Phillip L. Fraas 2Q 2005 by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit hourly entries, and costs and expenses)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 07/01/2005)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 117 of 203

07/11/2005 1154 MEMORANDUM by MICHAEL K. LEWIS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Wolman, Jay) (Entered: 07/11/2005)

07/15/2005 1155 MOTION to Alter Judgment of Arbitrator by J.L. CHESTNUT. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Affidavit of Attorney# 2 Affidavit Affidavit of Attorney page 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 07/15/2005)

07/19/2005

MINUTE ORDER denying 1141 Sandy McKinnon?s motion to reconsider order granting defendant?s motion for an extension of time to file his opposition to the motion. On June 7, 2005, the Court granted defendant?s motion for a 60 day extension to respond to Mr. McKinnon?s motion for attorney?s fees. Mr. McKinnon?s attorney, for various reasons, explains that he did not receive defendant?s motion until after the Court had already granted it. Mr. McKinnon?s attorney notes that he would have agreed to a 30 day extension. Mr. McKinnon?s attorney argues that his original fees petition was filed in 2002, but was denied without prejudice pending Monitor review and that defendant does not require 60 days to respond to the petition. The Court is persuaded by defendant?s argument that the additional time is necessary to permit defendant to either negotiate a settlement with Mr. McKinnon?s attorney or to prepare a response. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 19, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 07/19/2005)

07/22/2005 1156 NOTICE of Settlement Settlement Agreement Regarding Philip Frass's Claim for Attorney's Fees by ANN M. VENEMAN Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 07/22/2005)

07/26/2005 1157 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1155 for Extraordinary Relief filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/26/2005)

07/28/2005 1158 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1118 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 07/28/2005)

07/29/2005 1159 ORDER approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of June 2005. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 29, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 07/29/2005)

07/29/2005

MINUTE ORDER closing 1081 Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs for the Quarter 10/1/2004 through 12/31/2004, closing 1119 Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs for the Quarter 1/1/2005 through 3/30/2005 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 7/29/2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 07/29/2005)

07/29/2005

MINUTE ORDER closing 1093 Mr. Fraas' Motion for Attorney Fees for Implementation Work for 10/1/2004 through 12/31/2004, closing 1120 Mr. Fraas' Motion for Attorney Fees for Implementation Work for 1/1/2005 through 3/31/2005, closing 1153 Mr. Fraas' Motion for Attorney Fees for Implementation Work for 4/1/2005 through 6/30/2005. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 7/29/2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 07/29/2005)

07/29/2005

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 1156 regarding Attorney's Fees and Expenses; directing defendant shall pay to Philip L. Fraas attorney's fees, expenses and costs in the amount of $13,500.00 in full and final settlement of any and all claims by Mr. Fraas pursuant to any statute or any other authority, for attorney's fees, expenses, and costs for implementation work performed between April and June 2005. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 7/29/2005. (See Settlement Agreement for Details)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 07/29/2005)

08/01/2005 1160 NOTICE of Settlement Settlement Agreement re Conlon Frantz 2nd Quarter 2005 Fee Petition by ANN M. VENEMAN Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 08/01/2005)

08/02/2005 1161 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1138 Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion by Sandy McKinnon for Fees and Costs filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases:

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 118 of 203

1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 08/02/2005)

08/03/2005

1162

MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction by J. B. BLACK. (Attachments: # 1 Memo of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion# 2 Text of Proposed Order # 3 Exhibit 1 − Statement of JB Black# 4 Exhibit 2 − 1992 Deed in Satisfaction of Secured Debt and Discharge of Debt# 5 Exhibit 3 − Consent Decree# 6 Exhibit 4 − 2005 Notice of Sale of Inventory Property and Advertisements)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Pires, Alexander) (Entered: 08/03/2005)

08/04/2005

NOTICE OF HEARING: Temporary Restraining Order (re: B. J. Black) Hearing set for 8/9/2005 02:00 PM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Paul L. Friedman. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 08/04/2005)

08/04/2005

1163

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT regarding attorney's fees and expenses, to resolve and settle, without further litigation the claims for Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP in the amount of $125,000.00 for the Quarter of 4/1/2005 through 6/29/2005. (fiat) SO ORDERED, Judge Paul L. Friedman on 8/4/2005 Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 08/05/2005)

08/08/2005 1164 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1162 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Lin, Elbert) (Entered: 08/08/2005)

08/08/2005 1165 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1162 Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction filed by J. B. BLACK. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 08/08/2005)

08/09/2005 1166 ORDER denying motion filed by Lywanda Looney for contempt and for an order reversing the Adjudicator's decision. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 9, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/09/2005)

08/09/2005 1167 ORDER denying motion filed by Donald McDonald for contempt and for an order directing the Facilitator to forward his petition for Monitor review. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 9, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/09/2005)

08/09/2005 1168 ORDER denying the motion filed by Thelma Journey for contempt and for an order reversing the Arbitrator's decision on her petition under paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 9, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/09/2005)

08/09/2005 1169 ORDER denying the motion filed by John Wright for contempt and for an order reversing the Adjudicator's decision. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 9, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/09/2005)

08/09/2005

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman on 8/9/2005; MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction filed by J. B. BLACK heard and denied. (Court Reporter Linda Russo.) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(rje) (Entered: 08/09/2005)

08/09/2005 1170 ORDER denying 1162 plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 9, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/09/2005)

08/09/2005 1171 ORDER denying the motion filed by Morris Wilson for contempt and for an order reversing the Arbitrator's decision on his petition under paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 9, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/09/2005)

08/09/2005 1172 ORDER denying the motion filed by Melvin Melton for contempt and for an order reversing the Arbitrator's decision on his petition under paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 9, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/09/2005)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 119 of 203

08/09/2005 1173 ORDER denying the motion filed by Bernice Atchison for contempt and for an order reversing the Arbitrator's decision on her petition under paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 9, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/09/2005)

08/09/2005 1174 MOTION for contempt and order by BERNICE C. ATCHINSON. (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Paul Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 08/12/2005)

08/09/2005 1175 MOTION contempt by MELVIN MELTON; (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Paul Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 08/12/2005)

08/09/2005 1176 MOTION for contempt; (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Paul Friedman) . Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 08/12/2005)

08/09/2005 1177 MOTION for contempt by JOHN A. WRIGHT; (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Paul Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 08/13/2005)

08/09/2005 1178 MOTION for contempt; (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Paul Friedman) by THELMA JOURNEY. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 08/13/2005)

08/09/2005 1179 MOTION for contempt; (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Paul Friedman) by lYWANDA LOONEY. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 08/13/2005)

08/09/2005 1180 MOTION for contempt; (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Paul Friedman) by DONALD A. MCDONALD. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 08/13/2005)

08/10/2005 1181 MOTION for Extension of Time to file reply in support of his motion for fees and costs by SANDY MCKINNON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 08/13/2005)

08/15/2005 1182 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of June 30, 2005 Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Roth, Randi) (Entered: 08/15/2005)

08/16/2005

MINUTE ORDER granting 1181 motion by Sandy McKinnon for an extension of time up to and including August 22, 2005 in which to serve and file his reply. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 16, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/16/2005)

08/18/2005

Set/Reset Deadlines: Replies by Sandy McKinnon due by 8/22/2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mon, ) (Entered: 08/18/2005)

08/24/2005 1183 REPLY in support 1138 of motion for fees and costs filed by SANDY MCKINNON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 08/31/2005)

08/31/2005

MINUTE ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of July 2005. Signed by Judge Roberts for Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 31, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/31/2005)

09/01/2005 1184 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of July 2005. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 31, 2005. Please disregard earlier minute entry order re same.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/01/2005)

09/01/2005

1185

ORDER that the motions filed by DeKenyon Atchison Baldwin, et al. for contempt and for an order reversing the Arbitrator's decision on her petition under paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree are denied. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 1, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/01/2005)

09/01/2005 1187 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order reversing the decision by David Nunn. (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Friedman) Associated Cases:

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 120 of 203

1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) Modified on 9/12/2005 (td, ). (Entered: 09/09/2005)

09/01/2005 1188 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order reversing decision by EARNEST HAROL,D LONG. (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/09/2005)

09/01/2005 1189 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order and reversing decision by JOHN WILL ALLEN, JR. (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/09/2005)

09/01/2005 1190 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order reversing the decision by SAMUEL BALDWIN. 9FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/12/2005)

09/01/2005 1191 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order reversing decision by ADAM J. ALLEN. (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/12/2005)

09/01/2005 1192 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order reversing decision by CONNIE CHANEY. (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Friedman)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/12/2005)

09/01/2005 1193 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order reversing decision by JEROLD RAY CHANEY. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/12/2005)

09/01/2005 1194 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order reversing decision by DEKINGON ATCHISON BALDWIN. (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/12/2005)

09/01/2005 1195 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order reversing decision by LATONYA ATCHISON. (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/12/2005)

09/01/2005 1196 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order reversing decision by GRENETHA ATCHISON BALDWIN. (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/12/2005)

09/01/2005 1197 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order reversing decision by JAY ATCHISON. (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/12/2005)

09/01/2005 1198 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order reversing decision by JOSHLYNN ALLEN. (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/12/2005)

09/01/2005 1199 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order reversing decision by MILDRED A. LONG. (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/12/2005)

09/01/2005 1200 MOTION for contempt, MOTION for Order reversing decision by MERDITH NUNN. (FIAT "Let this be filed" Judge Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/12/2005)

09/06/2005

1186

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying without prejudice 997 class counsel's motion to enjoin James W. Myart and Thomas Burrell from disseminating misleading communications to class members and for other relief. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 6, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/06/2005)

09/13/2005

1201

ORDER that the motions filed by DeKenyon Atchison Baldwin, et al. for contempt and for an order reversing the Arbitrator's decision on her petition under paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree are denied. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 1, 2005. THIS ENTRY REPLACES ENTRY #1185 WHICH SHOULD BE DISREGARDED.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/13/2005)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 121 of 203

09/21/2005 1202 Monitor's Amended Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of June 30, 2005 (Roth, Randi). (Entered: 09/21/2005)

09/30/2005 1203 ENTERED IN ERROR.....MOTION for Order Granting Attorneys Fees & Costs by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Frantz, David) Modified on 9/30/2005 (jeb, ). (Entered: 09/30/2005)

09/30/2005

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Document 1203 was entered in error and counsel was instructed to refile said pleading. (jeb, ) (Entered: 09/30/2005)

09/30/2005 1204 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Quarter July 1−September 30, 2005 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1A# 2 Exhibit 1B# 3 Exhibit 1C# 4 Exhibit 2# 5 Exhibit 3# 6 Text of Proposed Order)(jeb, ) (Entered: 09/30/2005)

09/30/2005 1205 MOTION for Attorney Fees by J.L. CHESTNUT. (Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 09/30/2005)

09/30/2005 1206 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip Fraas by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2, 3, and 4)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 09/30/2005)

10/03/2005 1207 ORDER approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of August 2005 in the amount of $471,273. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 10/3/05. (lcplf2) (Entered: 10/03/2005)

10/03/2005 1208 MOTION for Attorney Fees and costs and expenses for implementation work only for J.L. Chestnut pursuant to Judge Friedman's order December 30, 2002 by J.L. CHESTNUT. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(td, ) (Entered: 10/10/2005)

10/28/2005 1209 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1204 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 10/28/2005)

10/28/2005 1210 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1208 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 10/28/2005)

10/31/2005 1211 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of September 2005. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 31, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 10/31/2005)

11/15/2005 1212 NOTICE of Settlement of Claims for Attorney's Fees by Phillip L. Fraas by ANN M. VENEMAN Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 11/15/2005)

11/29/2005 1213 NOTICE of Settlement of Claim for Attorney's Fees by Conlon, Frantz for Third Quarter 2005 by all defendants Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 11/29/2005)

11/30/2005

1214

STATUS REPORT Arbitrator's Ninth Report on the Late−Claim Petition Process by MICHAEL K. LEWIS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Wolman, Jay)STATUS REPORT Arbitrator's Ninth Report on the Late−Claim Petition Process by MICHAEL K. LEWIS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Wolman, Jay) Modified on 12/13/2005 (td, ). Modified on 12/13/2005 (zcp, ). (Entered: 11/30/2005)

12/08/2005 1215 ORDER that the monitor's invoice for the period of September 2005 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 7, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/08/2005)

12/12/2005

1217

STATUS REPORT Arbitrator's Findings and Recommendations on Fees of Class Counsel Chestnus, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway & Campbell for the Period July 1, 2001 − December 30, 2003 by MICHAEL K. LEWIS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Wolman, Jay)STATUS REPORT Arbitrator's Findings and Recommendations on Fees of Class Counsel Chestnus, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway & Campbell for the Period July 1, 2001 − December 30, 2003 by MICHAEL K. LEWIS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Wolman, Jay) Modified on 12/13/2005 (td, ). Modified on 12/13/2005 (zcp, ). (Entered: 12/12/2005)

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12/14/2005 1218 ORDER that the monitor's request for a total budget for the period of January 1, 2006 through June 30, 2006 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 12, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/14/2005)

12/16/2005 1219 ENTERED IN ERROR.....Monitor's Report Regarding Implementation of the Consent Decree for the Period of January 1, 2004, Through December 31, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) Modified on 12/16/2005 (lc, ). (Entered: 12/16/2005)

12/16/2005

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: re 1219 Notice (Other) was entered in error and counsel was instructed to refile said pleading. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lc, ) (Entered: 12/16/2005)

12/16/2005 1220 Monitor's Report Regarding Implementation of the Consent Decree for the Period of January 1, 2004, Through December 31, 2004. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 12/16/2005)

12/16/2005

1221

ORDER that in recognition of the fees, costs, and/or expenses already incurred by class counsel Chestnut Sanders in the filing and settlement of this action and the implementation of the Consent Decree, defendant will make a payment to class counsel of $500,000.00 as a credit toward Chestnut Sanders pending motions for award of attorneys' fees and costs covering the period from July 1, 2001 through September 30, 2005. Furthered ordered that payment shall be made on or before January 20, 2006 and that it will be credited against any ultimate award or negotiated settlement. Further ordered that this Order shall not be construed to indicate that the Court has made any express finding of fact or conclusion of law with respect to any specific portion of class counsel's pending motions. Further ordered that parties shall file any objections on or before January 6, 2006; replies to the objections due on or before January 20, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/16/05. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lcplf2) (Entered: 12/16/2005)

12/16/2005 1223 AFFIDAVIT re: service on Elmore Hicks of Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Enforce Consent Decree by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/16/2005)

12/20/2005

1224

STATUS REPORT Arbitrator's Findings and Recommendations on Fees of Class Counsel Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway & Campbell for the Period January 1 − September 30, 2004 by MICHAEL K. LEWIS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Final Position of Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway & Campbell, LLC# 2 Exhibit Final Position of U.S. Department of Agriculture)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Wolman, Jay) (Entered: 12/20/2005)

12/20/2005 1226 MOTION for Extension of Time to file Objections, if any, to Arbitrator's Findings and Recommendations by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 12/20/2005)

12/21/2005 1227 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT regarding Attorney's Fees and Expenses of Philip L. Fraas during the period of July 2005 through September 2005 re: Larry Epfrom. So Ordered. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/19/2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 12/21/2005)

12/21/2005 1228 ORDER closing 1206 Philip L. Fraas' Motion for attorney fees for implemenetation work for 7/1/2005 through 9/30/2005 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/21/2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 12/21/2005)

12/21/2005 1229 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT regarding Attorney's Fees and Expenses of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, LLP for the Quarter of July 1 through September 30, 2005 SO ORDERED . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/19/2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 12/21/2005)

12/21/2005 1230 ORDER closing 1204 Conlon Frantz's Motion for Attorney Fees for implementation work for 7/1/2005 through 9/30/2005. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/20/2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 12/21/2005)

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12/21/2005 1231 NOTICE of Certificate of Service by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 12/21/2005)

12/23/2005

1232

ORDER that on or before January 6, 2006, the parties shall file any objections to the Arbitrator's December 20, 2005 findings and recommendations as to Chestnut Sanders motions for attorneys' fees for the period of January 1, 2004−September 30, 2004. Any replies to the objections shall be filed on or before January 20, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 23, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/23/2005)

12/23/2005

1233

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Othello C. Cross. :Address− 1022 West 6th Ave, PO Box 6606, Pine Bluff, AR 71603. Phone No. − (870) 536−4056. Fax No. − (870) 536−0216 by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 12/23/2005)

12/23/2005

1234

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Jesse L.. Kearney. :Address− 1022 West 6th Ave, PO Box 6606, Pine Bluff, AR 71603. Phone No. − (870) 536−4056. Fax No. − (870) 536−0216 by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 12/23/2005)

12/23/2005

1235

ORDER granting 1226 defendant's motion for extension of time in which to file any objections. All parties shall their objections, if any, on or before January 27, 2006; all partise shall file their replies to objections, if any, on or before February 10, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 23, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/23/2005)

12/27/2005

MINUTE ORDER granting 1234 Jesse L. Kearney's Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/27/05. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 12/27/2005)

12/27/2005

MINUTE ORDER granting 1233 Othello C. Cross' Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/27/05. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 12/27/2005)

12/27/2005 1236 RESPONSE to Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time filed by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 12/27/2005)

12/28/2005 1237 ORDER approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of November 2005 in the amount of $369,022. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/28/05. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 12/28/2005)

12/30/2005

1238

MOTION for Attorney Fees and for Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires for the Quarter October 1 − December 30, 2005 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Summary of Legal Fees and Costs# 2 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 12/30/2005)

12/30/2005 1239 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Expenses by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 12/30/2005)

12/30/2005 1240 MOTION for Attorney Fees by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 12/30/2005)

01/04/2006 1241 MOTION for Attorney Fees by OTHELLO C. CROSS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Cross, Othello) (Entered: 01/04/2006)

01/04/2006

1242

ORDER approving 1220 the Monitor's Report and Recommendations Regarding Implementation of the Consent Decree for the Period of January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2004. The Monitor's Report shall be made available on the District Court's website. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 1/4/2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf1) (Entered: 01/04/2006)

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01/04/2006 1243 RESPONSE to Plaintiffs' Response to Motion by Elmore and Ludean Hicks to Enforce Consent Decree filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/04/2006)

01/27/2006 1244 NOTICE of Settlement and Motion for Extension by ANN M. VENEMAN Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 01/27/2006)

01/30/2006 1245 Memorandum in opposition to re 1239 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Fees and Costs filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 01/30/2006)

02/02/2006 1246 NOTICE of Settlement of Claim for Attorney's Fees by Philip Fraas for Fourth Quarter 2005 by ANN M. VENEMAN Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 02/02/2006)

02/02/2006 1247 NOTICE of Settlement of Claim for Attorney's Fees by Conlon Frantz Phelan & Pires for Fourth Quarter 2005 by ANN M. VENEMAN Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 02/02/2006)

02/08/2006 1248 ORDER that the monitor's invoice for the period of December f2005 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 6, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/08/2006)

02/14/2006 1249 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of December 31, 2005, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Roth, Randi) (Entered: 02/14/2006)

02/17/2006 1250 STIPULATION of settlement of attorneys fees for Chestnut, Sanders,Sanders, Pettaway, and Campbell from July 2001−September 2004 by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Edney, Marsha) (Entered: 02/17/2006)

02/21/2006 1251 ORDER that Conlon Frantz's motion for attorneys' fees 1145 for implementation work for April 1, 2005 through June 29, 2005 is closed. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 17, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/21/2006)

02/21/2006

MINUTE ORDER approving the settlement agreement 1246 regarding atorney's fees and expenses. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 17, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/21/2006)

02/21/2006

MINUTE ORDER approving 1247 settlement agreement regarding attorney's fees and expenses. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 17, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/21/2006)

02/21/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1244 joint notice and motion to extend deadline to file objections if necessary. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 17, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/21/2006)

02/22/2006

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement regarding attorney's fees and expenses 1250 , and settling 864 Motion for Attorney Fees, 882 Motion for Attorney Fees, 901 Motion for Attorney Fees, 957 Motion to Amend/Correct, 1023 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 22, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/22/2006)

02/23/2006

1252

ORDER that the Clerk of Court shall place the unredacted motion to enforce the consent decree 1216 , opposition to the motion to enforce the consent decree 1222 , and response to the motion to enfoce the consent decree 1225 under seal. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 23, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/23/2006)

02/23/2006 1253 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying without prejudice 1216 motion to enforce the consent decree. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 23, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/23/2006)

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02/23/2006 1254 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that the monitor shall report to the Court on or before March 13, 2006 on the subject of "Amended" Adjudicator decisions. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 23, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/23/2006)

02/23/2006 1255 MOTION (Redacted) to Enforce Consent Decree with Attachments A & B by ELMORE HICKS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jeb, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)

02/27/2006 1256 RESPONSE to (Redacted) Motion by Elmore and Ludean Hicks to Enforce Consent Decree filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1# 2 Exhibit Ex 2# 3 Exhibit Ex 3)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 02/27/2006)

02/28/2006 1257 MINUTE ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period January 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 28, 2006.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/28/2006)

03/01/2006 1258 ERRATA to Redacted Response to Motion by Elmore and Ludean Hicks to Enforce Consent Decree by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 03/01/2006)

03/02/2006 1259 MOTION to Dismiss and Purposed Order by OTHELLO C. CROSS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Cross, Othello) (Entered: 03/02/2006)

03/07/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1084 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 7, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 03/07/2006)

03/09/2006 1260 Monitor's Request for Extension of Time, (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 03/09/2006)

03/10/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1260 monitor's request for an extension of time up to and including April 7, 2006 to provide the information and documents regarding "Amended" Adjudicator decisions required by the Court's February 23, 2006 memorandum opinion and order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 10, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 03/10/2006)

03/10/2006

1261

ORDER dismissing with prejudice 1144 Othello C. Cross' motion for attorneys; fees for implementation work performed between June 11, 2004 and June 10, 2005, and granting 1259 Othello C. Cross' motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 10, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 03/10/2006)

03/23/2006 1262 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 1155 movan'ts motion for extraordinary relif. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 23, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 03/23/2006)

03/24/2006

1263

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying movant's motion for extraordinary relief. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 23, 2006. Please note this is the same Memorandum Opinion and Order in #1262 with corrected format.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 03/24/2006)

03/30/2006 1264 ORDER approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of February 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 30, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 03/30/2006)

03/30/2006 1265 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Text of Proposed Order Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 03/30/2006)

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03/30/2006 1266 MOTION for Attorney Fees by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 03/30/2006)

03/30/2006 1267 MOTION for Attorney Fees by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 03/30/2006)

04/06/2006 1268 MOTION to Dismiss by OTHELLO C. CROSS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Cross, Othello) (Entered: 04/06/2006)

04/07/2006 1269 MONITOR'S REPORT ON AMENDED ADJUDICATOR DECISIONS (Attachments: # (A) Exhibit # (B) Exhibit # (C) Exhibit # (D) Exhibit # (E) Exhibit) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 04/07/2006)

04/13/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1268 Othello C. Cross' motion to dismiss with prejudice his previous motion for attorneys' fees for implementation work performed between June 11, 2005 and November 28, 2005. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 13, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 04/13/2006)

04/26/2006

1270

MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts Memo of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion# 2 Exhibit 1# 3 Exhibit 2# 4 Exhibit 3# 5 Exhibit 4# 6 Exhibit 5# 7 Exhibit 6# 8 Exhibit 7# 9 Exhibit 8# 10 Text of Proposed Order Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/26/2006)

04/27/2006 1271 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of March 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 27, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 04/27/2006)

04/27/2006 1272 MOTION for Extension of Time to 6/1/2006 to Conclude the Discussions Regarding the Problems Raised in the Hicks' Motion by RANDI ILYSE ROTH. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 04/27/2006)

04/27/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1272 monitor's request for extension of time up to and including June 1, 2006 t conclude the discussions regarding the problems raised in the Hicks' motion. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 27, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 04/27/2006)

04/28/2006 1273 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Exhibit 2 to Motion of Anthony and Selena Miller to Enforce the Consent Decree by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/28/2006)

05/01/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1273 consent motion for leave to file under seal Exhibit 2 to motion of Anthony and Selena Miller to enforce the consent decree. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 1, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/01/2006)

05/02/2006 1276 NOTICE of filing of exhibit 2 to Motion of Anthony and Selena Miller to enforce the consent decree by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF; (SEALED)(td, ) (Entered: 05/16/2006)

05/08/2006 1274 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 1270 MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/08/2006)

05/09/2006

1275

ORDER granting 1274 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 1274 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 1270 MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree Responses due by 5/25/2006. Signed by Judge John D. Bates for Judge Paul L. Friedman on 05/09/06. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(tb, ) (Entered: 05/10/2006)

05/19/2006 1277 Civil Statement from Bernice C. Atchison. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 05/19/2006)

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05/25/2006 1278 NOTICE of Settlement of Claims for Attorneys Fees for Phillip Fraas for the First Quarter 2006 by all parties Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 05/25/2006)

05/25/2006 1279 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 1270 MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/25/2006)

05/26/2006 1280 Memorandum in opposition to re 1266 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(McElvain, Joel) (Entered: 05/26/2006)

05/31/2006 1281 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Class Counsel and Co−Lead Counsel) by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Affidavit of David J. Frantz# 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 05/31/2006)

06/01/2006

MINUTE ORDER approving the settlement agreement regarding attorney's fees and expenses re Phillip L. Fraas 1278 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 1, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/01/2006)

06/01/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1279 defendant's unopposed motion for a second extension of time up to and including June 2, 2006 to respond to plaintiffs' motion to enforce consent decree 1270 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 1, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/01/2006)

06/01/2006 1282 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of April 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 1, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/01/2006)

06/01/2006 1283 NOTICE of Settlement Agreement Regarding Attorneys Fees and Expenses by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 06/01/2006)

06/02/2006 1284 Memorandum in opposition to re 1270 MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/02/2006)

06/02/2006 1285 Unopposed MOTION to Seal Document Exhibits to Defendant's Opposition to Motion of Anthony and Selena Miller to Enforce the Consent Decree by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/02/2006)

06/05/2006

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement regarding attorney's fees and expenses with respect to Conlon Frantz Phelan & PIres for the quarter January 1, 2006 through March 30, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 5, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/05/2006)

06/05/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1285 defendant's unopposed motion to file under seal exhibits to opposition to motion of Anthony and Selena Miller to enforce the consent decree. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 5, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/05/2006)

06/12/2006 1286 STIPULATION AND ORDER by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 06/12/2006)

06/12/2006 1287 STIPULATION AND ORDER by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 06/12/2006)

06/13/2006 1288 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1270 MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree by Anthony & Selena Miller filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2 (FILED UNDER SEAL) # 3 Exhibit 3)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) Modified on 6/13/2006

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(lc, ). (Entered: 06/13/2006)

06/13/2006 1289 ERRATA of Anthony & Selena Miller by ALL PLAINTIFFS 1288 Reply to opposition to Motion, filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS,. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 06/13/2006)

06/19/2006

1290

MOTION for Attorney Fees , with exhibits filed in Court, hard copy, due to volume by SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts Memorandum of Fact and Law in Support of Motion# 2 Exhibit Exhibit List, actual exhibits filed hard copy with Court, due to volume)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Martin, Dawn) (Entered: 06/19/2006)

06/19/2006 1291 ORDER granting 1281 Unopposed Motion of Alexander J. Pires, Jr. to Withdraw as Class Counsel and Co−Lead Counsel; substituting David J. Frantz as Class Counsel and Co−Lead Counsel. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 6/19/2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 06/19/2006)

06/19/2006 1292 ORDER approving the monitor's request for a total budget amount for the period of July l, 2006 through December 31, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 19, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/19/2006)

06/21/2006 1293 Civil Statement from John Alford Wright. (Fiat. Judge Paul L. Friedman "Let this be Filed") Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 06/23/2006)

06/29/2006 1294 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Quarter April 1−June 30, 2006 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 06/29/2006)

06/30/2006

1295

STIPULATION AND ORDER setting forth the stipulated agreement of the parties; any person who objects to this Stipulation and Order shall file his or her objections in writing no later than THIRTY (30) calendar days from the date of its entry. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 6/29/2006, Exhibit (1). Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 06/30/2006)

06/30/2006

1296

STIPULATION AND ORDER setting forth the stipulated agreement of the parties; any person who objects to this Stipulation and Order shall file his or her objections in writing no later than THIRTY (30) calendar days from the date of the entry. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 6/29/2006, Exhibit (1). Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(bm) (Entered: 06/30/2006)

06/30/2006 1297 Interim MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 06/30/2006)

06/30/2006 1298 Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 06/30/2006)

06/30/2006 1299 MOTION to Bifurcate Shutts & Bowen's Fee Petition by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 06/30/2006)

06/30/2006 1300 MOTION for Attorney Fees , Costs and Expenses by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 06/30/2006)

07/05/2006 1301 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of May 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 5, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 07/05/2006)

07/05/2006 1302 ORDER granting 1299 defendant's motion to bifurcate the attorneys' fee petitoin of Shutts & Bowen. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 5, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 07/05/2006)

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07/06/2006 1303 STIPULATION and Order by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 07/06/2006)

07/06/2006

MINUTE ORDER approving Stipulation and Order that the monitor shall remain in existence until her duties under the Consent Decree are completed, or until March 1, 2008, whichever occurs first. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 6, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 07/06/2006)

07/07/2006 1304 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Expenses, incurred by J.L. Chestnut for implementation work during the period from March 31, 2006 to June 30, 2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (part 1)# 2 Exhibit A (part 2))Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(tg, ) (Entered: 07/14/2006)

07/19/2006 1305 NOTICE of Settlement of claims for attorneys fees for Phillip Fraas for the second quarter 2006 by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 07/19/2006)

07/20/2006 1306 NOTICE of Change of Address by David Joseph Frantz Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 07/20/2006)

07/21/2006

MINUTE ORDER approving the settlement agreement regarding attorney's fees and expenses 1305 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 21, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 07/21/2006)

07/26/2006 1307 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of June 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 25, 2006. (MA)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 07/26/2006)

07/27/2006 1308 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of June 30, 2006 by RANDI ILYSE ROTH, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Entered: 07/27/2006)

07/28/2006

1309

MOTION to Dismiss Shutts & Bowen's Petition for Implementation Fees and Its Request for an 80% Enhancement of Its Fee for Representing Teddy Miller by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 Affidavit # 3)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 07/28/2006)

07/31/2006 1310 NOTICE of Change of Address by Phillip L. Fraas Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 07/31/2006)

08/04/2006

1311

Memorandum in opposition to re 1294 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Quarter April 1−June 30, 2006 of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires LLC filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/04/2006)

08/07/2006

1312

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that the Monitor shall investigate and provide to the Court a further report containing such information as the Monitor deems appropriate to fully apprise the Court of the circumstances involved in any "amended" decisions not authorized by the Consent Decree that affected class members' cash and/or debt relief. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 7, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/07/2006)

08/11/2006 1313 Memorandum in opposition to re 1309 MOTION to Dismiss Shutts & Bowen's Petition for Implementation Fees and Its Request for an 80% Enhancement of Its Fee for Representing Teddy Miller filed by SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Martin, Dawn) (Entered: 08/11/2006)

08/14/2006

1314

MOTION Clarification of Scope of Monitor Authority by Shelia Johnson claimant. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Kagan, Barbara) Modified on 8/14/2006 (td, ). (Entered: 08/14/2006)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 130 of 203

08/14/2006

1315

MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree on behalf of George Roberts and Ernest & Ruth Banks by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Exhibit 7# 8 Exhibit 8# 9 Exhibit 9# 10 Exhibit 10# 11 Exhibit 11# 12 Exhibit 12# 13 Exhibit 13# 14 Exhibit 14# 15 Exhibit 15# 16 Exhibit 16# 17 Exhibit 17# 18 Exhibit 18# 19 Exhibit 19# 20 Exhibit 20# 21 Exhibit 21# 22 Exhibit 22# 23 Exhibit 23# 24 Exhibit 24# 25 Exhibit 25# 26 Statement of Facts Points & Authorities# 27 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 08/14/2006)

08/14/2006 1317 MOTION for Leave to File under seal exhibit 12 to motion of George Roberts and Ernest and Ruth Banks to enforce the consent decree by ERNEST BANKS, RUTH BANKS, GEORGE ROBERTS; EXHIBIT (disk Lodged Under Seal) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 08/15/2006)

08/15/2006 1316 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Consent Decree by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Sitcov, Michael) (Entered: 08/15/2006)

08/17/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1316 defendant's unopposed motion for extension of time up to and including September 11, 2006 to respond to motion of George Roberts and Ruth Banks to enforce the Consent Decree. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 17, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/17/2006)

08/17/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1317 consent motion for leave to file under seal exhibit 12 to motion of George Roberts and Ernest and Ruth Banks to enforce the consent decree. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 17, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/17/2006)

08/17/2006

1318

REPLY to opposition to motion re 1309 MOTION to Dismiss Shutts & Bowen's Petition for Implementation Fees and Its Request for an 80% Enhancement of Its Fee for Representing Teddy Miller filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/17/2006)

08/17/2006

1319

Exhibit 12 by ERNEST BANKS, RUTH BANKS, GEORGE ROBERTS 1317 MOTION for Leave to File filed by GEORGE ROBERTS,, ERNEST BANKS,, RUTH BANKS,, 1315 MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree on behalf of George Roberts and Ernest & Ruth Banks filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS,. (SEALED) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 08/18/2006)

08/17/2006

Set Deadline: Response to George Roberts and Ruth Banks' motion to enforce consent decree due by 9/11/2006 Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 08/24/2006)

08/18/2006

1320

RESPONSE to Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs and Expenses Incurred by Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway & Campbell from March 31 − June 30, 2006 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/18/2006)

08/22/2006 1321 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 1314 MOTION Clarification of Scope of Monitor Authority by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Varma, Anurag) (Entered: 08/22/2006)

08/23/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1321 plaintiffs' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Movants' Request for Clarification of Scope of Monitor Authority. Responses due by 9/5/2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 8/23/06. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 08/23/2006)

08/23/2006 1322 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Request by Sheila Johnson for Clarification of Scope of Monitor Authority by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases:

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1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Sitcov, Michael) (Entered: 08/23/2006)

08/24/2006

ORDER granting 1322 defendant's unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 1314 MOTION Clarification of Scope of Monitor Authority. Defendant's Response due by 9/12/2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 8/24/06. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lcplf2) (Entered: 08/24/2006)

09/01/2006 1323 RESPONSE to Defendant's Memorandum In Response To 1304 Motion For Attorney Fees, Costs and Expenses filed by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) Modified on 9/5/2006 (lc, ). (Entered: 09/01/2006)

09/05/2006 1324 RESPONSE to Request for Clarification of Scope of Monitor Authority filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Bl Farmers Statistical Report as of Aug 29, 2006# 2 Exhibit 2 − Monitor Update #2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Varma, Anurag) (Entered: 09/05/2006)

09/07/2006 1325 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of July 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 7, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/07/2006)

09/11/2006 1326 NOTICE of Change of Address by Dawn V. Martin Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Martin, Dawn) (Entered: 09/11/2006)

09/11/2006 1327 Memorandum in opposition to re 1315 MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree on behalf of George Roberts and Ernest & Ruth Banks filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/11/2006)

09/12/2006 1328 Memorandum in opposition to re 1314 MOTION Clarification of Scope of Monitor Authority filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/12/2006)

09/13/2006

1329

MOTION for Attorney Fees and costs in the Track B Arbitration of the Estates of Wesley L. Hicks, Sr. and Portia Hicks by BUTLER, SNOW, O'MARA, STEVENS & CANNADA. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support# 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B# 4 Exhibit C# 5 Exhibit D# 6 Exhibit E# 7 Exhibit F# 8 Exhibit G# 9 Exhibit H# 10 Exhibit I# 11 Exhibit J# 12 Exhibit K)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jf, ) (Entered: 09/15/2006)

09/19/2006 1330 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Motion for Attorney's fees and Costs by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Sitcov, Michael) (Entered: 09/19/2006)

09/19/2006 1331 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1315 MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree on behalf of George Roberts and Ernest & Ruth Banks filed by ERNEST BANKS, RUTH BANKS, GEORGE ROBERTS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 09/19/2006)

09/20/2006 1332 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 1323 Response to any document filed by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 09/20/2006)

09/28/2006 1333 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion For Attorney Fees by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 09/28/2006)

09/29/2006 1334 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION filed by Arbitrator Michael K. Lewis Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jeb, ) (Entered: 09/29/2006)

09/29/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1333 class counsel J.L. Chestnut, Jr.'s unopposed motion for extension of time up to and including October 5, 2006 to file motion for attorney's fees. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 29, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/29/2006)

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09/29/2006 1335 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of August 2006. Signed by Judge Bates for Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 28, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/29/2006)

09/29/2006 1336 MOTION for Attorney Fees by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 09/29/2006)

09/29/2006

Set/Reset Deadlines: Class Counsel J. L. Chestnut, Jr.'s Motion for Attorneys' Feess due by 10/5/2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 09/29/2006)

09/30/2006 1337 Interim MOTION for Attorney Fees Phillip Fraas 3rd Quarter 2006 by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit hours and expenses# 2 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 09/30/2006)

09/30/2006

1338

MOTION to Amend/Correct 1336 MOTION for Attorney Fees by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Details of Expenses# 2 Exhibit 2 − Mot of CFPV for 3rd Quarter Fees & Costs − Revised Proposed Order# 3 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Varma, Anurag) (Entered: 09/30/2006)

10/05/2006 1339 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Cost and Expenses During The Period From March 31, 2006 to June 30, 2006 by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 10/05/2006)

10/06/2006 1340 Monitor's Report Regarding Implementation of the Consent Decree for the Period of January 1, 2005, Through December 31, 2005, by RANDI ILYSE ROTH Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 10/06/2006)

10/11/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1338 co−lead counsel Conlon Frantz Phelan & Varma's motion to amend motion for attorneys' fees and costs for the quarter July 1−September 30, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 11, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 10/11/2006)

10/12/2006 1341 ENTERED IN ERROR. . . .STIPULATION re 1337 Interim MOTION for Attorney Fees Phillip Fraas 3rd Quarter 2006 by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) Modified on 10/13/2006 (td, ). (Entered: 10/12/2006)

10/12/2006 1342 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT regarding attorney's fees and expenses by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 10/13/2006)

10/12/2006

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: re 1341 Stipulation was entered in error and refiled as document no. 1342 . Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 10/13/2006)

10/24/2006 1343 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Butler Snow Fee Petition by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Sitcov, Michael) (Entered: 10/24/2006)

10/25/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting nunc pro tunc 1330 defendant's unopposed motion for extension of time to file opposition. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 25, 2005. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 10/25/2006)

10/25/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1343 defendant's unopposed motion for extension of time up to and including November 2, 2006 to file opposition. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 25, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 10/25/2006)

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10/25/2006 1344 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of Sepember 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 25, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 10/25/2006)

10/31/2006

MINUTE ORDER approving the settlement agreement regarding attorney's fees and expenses 1294 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 31, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 10/31/2006)

11/02/2006 1345 ENTERED IN ERROR. . . .Consent MOTION to Withdraw 1329 MOTION for Attorney Fees by BUTLER, SNOW, O'MARA, STEVENS & CANNADA. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) Modified on 11/6/2006 (td, ). (Entered: 11/02/2006)

11/02/2006

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: re 1345 Consent MOTION to Withdraw 1329 MOTION for Attorney Fees was entered in error and refiled as a NoticeAssociated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 11/06/2006)

11/02/2006

1347

NOTICE of withdrawal of motion of Butler, Snow, O'mara, Stevens & Cannada for attorney's fees and costs in the Track B Arbitration of the Estates of Wesley L. Hicks, Sr. and Portia Hicks by BUTLER, SNOW, O'MARA, STEVENS & CANNADA Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 11/06/2006)

11/03/2006

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1342 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for July−September 2006 1337 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 11/2/06. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 11/03/2006)

11/03/2006

1346

ENTERED IN ERROR....Memorandum in opposition to re 1339 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Cost and Expenses During The Period From March 31, 2006 to June 30, 2006 (Third Quarter 2006) and for Track B Claim of Aaron Mobley filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) Modified on 11/6/2006 (td, ). (Entered: 11/03/2006)

11/03/2006

MINUTE ORDER that in future when class counsel files a stipulation of settlement regarding a pending petition for attorneys' fees, that stipulation shall specify not only the dates of the fee period to which the stipulation applies, but also the docket number of the petition in the Pigford case (Civil Action No. 97−1978) that the particular stipulation resolves. Counsel shall also identify the docket number of the petition resolved in the consolidated case, Brewington v. Johanns (Civil Action No. 98−1693). Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 11/3/06. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lcplf2) (Entered: 11/03/2006)

11/03/2006

MINUTE ORDER that upon consideration of Butler, Snow, O?Mara, Stevens & Cannada PLLC?s November 2, 2006 notice of withdrawal 1345 , Butler Snow?s motion for attorneys? fees and costs in the Track B Arbitration of the Estates of Wesley L. Hicks, Sr. and Portia Hicks 1329 is DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 11/3/06.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lcplf2) (Entered: 11/03/2006)

11/03/2006

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: re 1346 Memorandum in Opposition, was entered in error and counsel was instructed to refile said pleading. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 11/06/2006)

11/14/2006 1348 MOTION for Attorney Fees by OTHELLO C. CROSS. (Attachments: # 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Cross, Othello) (Entered: 11/14/2006)

11/20/2006

1349

SURREPLY to re 1266 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 1304 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 1300 MOTION for Attorney Fees , Costs and Expenses filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/20/2006)

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11/20/2006 1350 STIPULATION re 1336 MOTION for Attorney Fees of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan and Varma by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/20/2006)

11/22/2006

1351

MOTION to Enforce consent decree by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 points and authorities part 1# 2 points and authorities part 2# 3 Exhibit 1# 4 Exhibit 2# 5 Exhibit 3# 6 Exhibit 4# 7 Exhibit 5# 8 Exhibit 6# 9 Exhibit 7# 10 Exhibit 8# 11 Exhibit 9# 12 Exhibit 10# 13 Exhibit 11# 14 Exhibit 12# 15 Exhibit 13# 16 Exhibit 14# 17 Exhibit 15# 18 Exhibit 16# 19 Exhibit 17# 20 Exhibit 18# 21 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 11/22/2006)

11/22/2006 1352 MOTION to Seal Exhibit to motion to enforce by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 11/22/2006)

11/28/2006

MINUTE ORDER granting 1352 consent motion for leave to file under seal Exhibit 13 to motion to of the estates of Robert and Jessie Howard to enforce the consent decree. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 28, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 11/28/2006)

12/01/2006 1353 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of October 2006. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon for Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 30, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/01/2006)

12/04/2006 1354 NOTICE OF FILING by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 10 # 11 # 12 # 13 # 14 # 15 # 16 # 17 # 18 # 19 # 20 # 21 # 22)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 12/04/2006)

12/07/2006 1355 Memorandum in opposition to re 1351 MOTION to Enforce consent decree filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Goitein, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/07/2006)

12/14/2006 1356 Monitor's Interim Follow−up Report on Amended Adjudicator Decisions, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 12/14/2006)

12/14/2006 1357 ENTERED IN ERROR. . . .MOTION to Enforce consent decree−−reply to defendant's opposition by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) Modified on 12/15/2006 (td, ). (Entered: 12/14/2006)

12/14/2006 1358 REPLY to opposition to motion of the estates of Robert and Jessie Howard re 1351 MOTION to Enforce consent decree filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 12/15/2006)

12/14/2006

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: 1357 was entered in error and refiled as document no. 1358 . Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 12/15/2006)

12/15/2006

ORDER that, in view of the Monitor's December 14, 2006 interim follow−up report on amended adjudicator decisions, the Monitor shall file a further progress report on this matter on or before January 17, 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 15, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/15/2006)

12/15/2006

Set Deadline: Monitor's Progress Report due by 1/17/2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 12/19/2006)

12/15/2006 1360 ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENT (EXHIBIT 13) by ALL PLAINTIFFS 1352 MOTION to Seal Exhibit to motion to enforce filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS, ; (SEALED) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 12/20/2006)

12/19/2006 1359 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of November 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 19, 2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/19/2006)

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12/27/2006

1361

ORDER approving Monitor's total budget amount of $2,693,772 for the period of January 1, 2007 through June 30, 2007; further directing in accordance with paragraph 17 of the Order of Reference, the United States Department of Agriculture shall deposit with the Clerk of Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a sum equal to a pro−rata month's portion of the approved budget within fifteen (15) days of each month. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/27/06. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lcplf2) (Entered: 12/27/2006)

12/29/2006 1362 STIPULATION re 1348 MOTION for Attorney Fees of Othello Cross by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 12/29/2006)

12/29/2006 1363 ORDER approving settlement agreement regarding attorneys' fees and expenses Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/29/2006. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 12/29/2006)

12/30/2006 1364 Quarterly MOTION for Attorney Fees Fourth Quarter 2006 by J.L. CHESTNUT. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 12/30/2006)

12/30/2006 1365 Interim MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas 4Q 2006 by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 12/30/2006)

01/03/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1362 that resolves Cross & Kearney's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for January 7, 2006 through November 14, 2006 1348 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 3, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 01/03/2007)

01/08/2007

1366

MOTION for Attorney Fees by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − implementation work# 2 Exhibit 2 − claimant PMRs# 3 Exhibit 3 − resps to Govt PMRs# 4 Exhibit 4 − general phone calls# 5 Exhibit 5 − implementation − debt relief# 6 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Varma, Anurag) (Entered: 01/08/2007)

01/16/2007 1367 Monitor's Progress Report on Amended Adjudicator Decisions BY RANDI ILYSE ROTH (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (part 1 of 3)# 2 Exhibit 1 (part 2 of 3)# 3 Exhibit 1 (part 3 of 3)) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Roth, Randi) (Entered: 01/16/2007)

01/17/2007 1368 STIPULATION re 1365 Interim MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas 4Q 2006 by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 01/17/2007)

01/23/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1368 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for October−December 2006 1365 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 23, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 01/23/2007)

01/26/2007

1369

MOTION For Entry of Order Directing Payment of 2nd and 3rd Quarter 2006 Attorney's Fees, Costs and Expenses By February 16, 2007 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts And Memorandum in Support of Motion# 2 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Varma, Anurag) (Entered: 01/26/2007)

01/31/2007

MINUTE ORDER that, in view of the Monitor's January 16, 2007 interim follow−up report on amended adjudicator decisions, the monitor shall file a further progress report on this matter on or before March 29, 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 31, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 01/31/2007)

01/31/2007 1370 ORDER that defendant shall respond to class counsel David J. Frantz's motion for entry of an order directing payment of second and third quarter 2006 attorneys' fees, costs and expenses by February 16, 2007, on or before February 8, 2007. Signed by

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 136 of 203

Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 31, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 01/31/2007)

01/31/2007 1371 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of December 2006. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 31, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 01/31/2007)

01/31/2007

1372

RESPONSE to Motion by Class Counsel for Entry of An Order Directing Payment of 2d and 3d Quarter 2006 Attorney's Fees, Costs and Expenses by February 16, 2007 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 01/31/2007)

01/31/2007

1373

Memorandum in opposition to re 1364 Quarterly MOTION for Attorney Fees Fourth Quarter 2006 of Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway & Campbell filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 01/31/2007)

01/31/2007

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Progress Report due by 3/29/2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 02/01/2007)

01/31/2007

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to class counsel David Frantz's motion for entry of an order directing payment of second and third quarter 2006 attorneys' fees, costs and expenses due by 2/8/2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 02/01/2007)

02/01/2007

1374

REPLY to opposition to motion re 1369 MOTION For Entry of Order Directing Payment of 2nd and 3rd Quarter 2006 Attorney's Fees, Costs and Expenses By February 16, 2007 filed by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 02/01/2007)

02/02/2007 1375 NOTICE Regarding Motion by Class Counsel for Entry of An Order Directing Payment of 2nd and 3rd Quarter 2006 Attorney's Fees, Costs and Expenses by February 16, 2007 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 02/02/2007)

02/05/2007 1376 ORDER denying as moot 1369 defendant's motion for entry of an order directing payment of 2nd and 3rd quarter 2006 attorneys' fees, costs and expenses. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 5, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/05/2007)

02/13/2007 1377 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of December 31, 2006, by RANDI ILYSE ROTH; Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 02/13/2007)

02/15/2007 1379 Emergency MOTION for Hearing to enforce the consent decree paragraph 6 by DOROTHY F. FORD, JESSE FORD. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 02/17/2007)

02/16/2007 1378 SURREPLY to First and Second Quarter 2006 Fee Petition of Chestnut Sanders filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 02/16/2007)

02/27/2007 1380 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of January 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 27, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/27/2007)

03/01/2007

MINUTE ORDER that unless and until it is required by a further order of this Court, the parties in this case are NOT required to respond to the "Emergency Motion for Hearing to enforce the consent decree paragraph 6" 1379 or any related documents delivered to the Court and/or the parties. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 3/1/07. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 03/01/2007)

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03/08/2007 1381 Memorandum in opposition to re 1364 Quarterly MOTION for Attorney Fees Fourth Quarter 2006 re Track B Claim of Aaron Mobley filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 03/08/2007)

03/20/2007 1382 MOTION for Attorney Fees by OTHELLO C. CROSS (Cross, Othello) (Entered: 03/20/2007)

03/26/2007 1383 STIPULATION of Settlement re Chestnut Sanders Petition for Attorney's Fees for Track B Claim of Thomas Burrell (#1364) by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 03/26/2007)

03/27/2007 1384 DEPOSIT of Sequestered Funds in the amount of $1,818,193.00 receipt no. 4616003080(td, ) Modified on 3/29/2007 (td, ). (Entered: 03/29/2007)

03/29/2007 1385 Monitor's Second Progress Report on Amended Adjudicator Decisions; Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 03/29/2007)

03/30/2007 1386 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip Fraas for 1Q 2007 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit documentaton of 1Q 2007 fees motion for Phillip Fraas)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 03/30/2007)

04/03/2007 1387 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of February 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 3, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 04/03/2007)

04/06/2007 1388 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for the First Quarter of 2007 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Varma, Anurag) (Entered: 04/06/2007)

04/12/2007 1389 STIPULATION of Settlement re Fee Petition of Othello Cross, 11/06−3/07 by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 04/12/2007)

04/20/2007

1390

MOTION for Attorney Fees and Cost and Expenses, Incurred by J. L. Chestnut, Jr. for Implementation Work During The Period From January 1, 2007 − March 30, 2007 by J.L. CHESTNUT Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) Modified on 4/23/2007 (td, ). (Entered: 04/20/2007)

04/25/2007

MINUTE ORDER that, in view of the Monitor's March 29, 2007 Second Progress Report on Amended Adjudicator Decisions, the Monitor shall file a further progress report on this matter on or before June 21, 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 25, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 04/25/2007)

04/25/2007

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Progress Report due by 6/21/2007. (mm) (Entered: 04/26/2007)

04/26/2007 1391 STIPULATION re (1366 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees of Conlon Frantz Phelan & Varma for 4th Quarter 2006 by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 04/26/2007)

04/27/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1391 that resolves Conlon Frantz Phelan & Varma's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for October−December 2006 1366 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 27, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 04/27/2007)

05/01/2007 1392 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of March 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 1, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/01/2007)

05/02/2007 1393 STIPULATION Settling 1st Quarter 2007 Attorney Fee Petition of Phil Fraas by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 05/02/2007)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 138 of 203

05/03/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1393 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for January−March 2007 1386 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 3, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/03/2007)

05/04/2007 1394 MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree by J.L. CHESTNUT (Attachments: # 1)(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 05/04/2007)

05/07/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1389 that resolves Cross & Kearney, PLLC's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the period November 15, 2006 through March 20, 2007 1382 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 7, 2007.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/07/2007)

05/07/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1383 that resolves Chestnut, Sandes, Sanders, Pettaway and Campbell, LLC's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the Tack B Claim of Thomas Burrell 1364 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 5/7/07. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 7, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/07/2007)

05/10/2007 1395 RESPONSE in Opposition re 1394 MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Bensing, Daniel) Modified on 5/10/2007 (lc, ). (Entered: 05/10/2007)

05/30/2007 1396 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of April 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 30, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/30/2007)

05/31/2007 1397 Memorandum in opposition to re (733 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees by Chestnut Sanders (1st Quarter 2007) filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 05/31/2007)

06/04/2007 1398 STIPULATION re (1388 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for the First Quarter of 2007 of Conlon Frantz Phelan & Varma by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 06/04/2007)

06/06/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1398 that resolves Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Varma's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for January 1 − March 31, 2007 1388 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 6, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/06/2007)

06/20/2007 1399 Monitor's REQUEST for Extension of Time. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 06/20/2007)

06/21/2007

MINUTE ORDER granting 1399 monitor's request for extension of time up to and including July 9, 2007 to file a report with the court regarding the monitor's further investigation of certain amended decisions. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 21, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/21/2007)

06/21/2007

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report due by 7/9/2007. (mm) (Entered: 06/25/2007)

07/02/2007 1400 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip Fraas 2Q 2007 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Phil Fraas 2Q 2007 fees and expenses)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 07/02/2007)

07/03/2007 1401 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of May 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 3, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 07/03/2007)

07/09/2007 1402 Monitor's Report and Recommendations on Amended Decisions, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3 (part 1 of 2)# 4 Exhibit 3 (part 2 of 2)), Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 07/09/2007)

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07/10/2007

1403

MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for the Second Quarter of 2007 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Varma, Anurag) (Entered: 07/10/2007)

07/11/2007

NOTICE OF FILING by RANDI ILYSE ROTH: On July 9, 2007, the Monitor filed under seal copies of the original and amended decisions in certain Track A cases that were the subject of "technical" amendments. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 07/11/2007)

07/12/2007 1404 STIPULATION Settlement Agreement re Attorneys Fees Claim of David A. Branch by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 07/12/2007)

07/16/2007 1405 ENTERED IN ERROR.....MOTION to enforce the consent decree, MOTION to Stay by CASSANDRA WILSON (td, ) Modified on 7/19/2007 (td, ). (Entered: 07/18/2007)

07/17/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement regarding attorney's fees and expenses 1404 that resolves the claim for attorney's fees and expenses of David A. Branch on behalf of Moses Lewis and Glenn Slade for the period of March 28, 2000 through July 5, 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 17, 2007. (MA) (Entered: 07/17/2007)

07/18/2007

1406

MOTION for Attorney Fees by Leon Mathews (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Donald J. Ridings# 2 Ridings Declaration, Exhibit 1, Part A# 3 Ridings Declaration, Exhibit 1, Part B# 4 Ridings Declaration, Exhibit 1, Part C# 5 Ridings Declaration, Exhibit 2# 6 Ridings Declaration, Exhibit 3# 7 Ridings Declaration, Exhibit 4# 8 Ridings Declaration, Exhibit 5# 9 Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Doan, Joshua) Modified on 7/19/2007 (td, ). (Entered: 07/18/2007)

07/18/2007

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: re 1405 MOTION to enforce the consent decree MOTION to Stay was entered in error per chambers. (td, ) (Entered: 07/20/2007)

07/31/2007 1407 ORDER approving Monitor's Invoice for the period of June 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 7/31/07. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lcplf2) (Entered: 07/31/2007)

08/01/2007 1408 STIPULATION for Extension of Time to Respond to Covington & Burling's Motion for Attorneys' Fees by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/01/2007)

08/02/2007 1409 STIPULATION re Settlement of Phil Fraas 2d Quarter 2007 Attorney Fee Petition by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/02/2007)

08/06/2007 1410 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of June 30, 2007, by RANDI ILYSE ROTH, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 08/06/2007)

08/06/2007

ORDER approving stipulation regarding extension of time to respond to Covington & Burling's motion for an award of attorneys' fees 1408 . The defendant shall respond to petitioner's motion on or before October 1, 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 8/6/07. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lcplf2) (Entered: 08/06/2007)

08/06/2007

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to Covington & Burling's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees due by 10/1/2007 (mm) (Entered: 08/07/2007)

08/14/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving the settlement agreement 1409 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for April−June 2007 1400 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 14, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/14/2007)

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08/20/2007

MINUTE ORDER that, in view of the July 9, 2007 Monitor's Report and Recommendations on Amended Decisions, the Monitor shall report back to the Court on or before October 11, 2007 regarding the implementation tasks described in the Report, whether those tasks have been completed, and what, if any, tasks remain to be completed. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 20, 2007. (MA) (Entered: 08/20/2007)

08/20/2007

Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 10/11/2007. (mm) (Entered: 08/21/2007)

08/27/2007 1411 MOTION for Attorney Fees April 1, 2007 − June 30, 2007 by J.L. CHESTNUT Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Chestnut, J.) (Entered: 08/27/2007)

08/29/2007 1412 Memorandum in opposition to re (750 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for 2d Quarter 2007 by Chestnut Sanders filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/29/2007)

08/30/2007 1413 STIPULATION Settling 2d Quarter Fee Petition of Conlon Frantz by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/30/2007)

08/31/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1413 that resolves Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Varma's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for April−June 2007 1403 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 31, 2007. (MA) (Entered: 08/31/2007)

09/07/2007 1414 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of July 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 5, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/07/2007)

09/10/2007 1415 ORDER approving the monitor's request for a total budget amount for the period of July 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 10, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/10/2007)

09/10/2007

1416

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 1379 "Emergency Hearing Motion to Enforce the Consent Decree Paragraph 6 and to Stay" and all identical and substantially similar motions that have been submitted to this Court but not filed on its docket. Further ordered that no further papers prepared or submitted by Ms. Thedford Rowser−Bey will be accepted for filing without prior leave of this Court. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 9/10/2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 09/10/2007)

09/13/2007 1417 NOTICE of Change of Address by Anurag Varma Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Varma, Anurag) (Entered: 09/13/2007)

10/01/2007 1418 STIPULATION Settling Covington & Burling's Petition for Attorney's Fees for the Leon Mathews Arbitration (Doc. 1406) by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 10/01/2007)

10/01/2007 1419 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip Fraas by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit itemization of Phillip Fraas's hours and expenses)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 10/01/2007)

10/03/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1418 that resolves Covington & Burling's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the Track B Claim of Leon Mathews 1406 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 3, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 10/03/2007)

10/10/2007 1420 STIPULATION Settling Phil Fraas' 3d Quarter 2007 Fee Petition by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 10/10/2007)

10/11/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1420 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for July−September 2007 1419 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 10/11/07.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 10/11/2007)

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10/11/2007 1421 Monitors Third Progress Report on Amended Decisions (Attachments: (1) Exhibit A (2) Exhibit B), Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 10/11/2007)

10/12/2007 1422 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of August 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 12, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 10/12/2007)

10/15/2007

ENTERED IN ERROR.....NOTICE OF FILING by RANDI ILYSE ROTH: On October 11, 2007, the Monitor filed under seal copies of Exhibits A and B to the Monitor's Third Progress Report on Amended Adjudicator Decisions that list both the unique claimant identification numbers and the claim numbers. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) Modified on 10/15/2007 (td, ). (Entered: 10/15/2007)

10/15/2007

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: re Notice (Other), Notice (Other) was entered in error and counsel was instructed to refile said pleading attaching a scanned image. (td, ) (Entered: 10/15/2007)

10/15/2007 1423 Notice of Filing of Under Seal Exhibits to the Monitors Third Progress Report on Amended Adjudicator Decisions, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 10/15/2007)

10/22/2007

MINUTE ORDER that, in light of the Monitor's Third Progress Report on Amended Decisions, the Monitor is ordered to report to the Court on or before February 8, 2008, regarding the debt relief issues identified in the report. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 22, 2007. (MA) (Entered: 10/22/2007)

10/22/2007

1424

STIPULATION AND ORDER: Stipulated and ordered that the monitor shall remain in existence beyond 3/1/2008, until she issues the monitor's decision on the final petition for monitor review, or until three months after the date on which the final petition for monitor review is routed to the monitor for decision, whichever occurs first. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 10/22/2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 10/23/2007)

10/22/2007

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report due by 2/8/2008. (mm) (Entered: 10/23/2007)

10/23/2007 1425 MOTION for Attorney Fees by OTHELLO C. CROSS (Attachments: # 1)(Cross, Othello) (Entered: 10/23/2007)

10/24/2007 1426 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Third Quarter 2007 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 10/24/2007)

10/27/2007

1427

MOTION for Attorney Fees For Attorney David A. Branch on Successful Petitions of Raymond Goodwyn, Sr., #482 and Willie Branch #2298 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Sworn Declaration of David A. Branch# 2 Exhibit Invoice# 3 Exhibit Decisions in Nos. 482 and 2298)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Branch, David) (Entered: 10/27/2007)

10/29/2007 1428 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of September 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 26, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 10/29/2007)

11/07/2007 1429 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Fee Petition of David Branch (#1427) by ANN M. VENEMAN (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/07/2007)

11/08/2007

MINUTE ORDER granting (1429) defendant's motion for extension of time of two weeks from the date of receipt of the movant's contemporaneous billing records and expense receipts to respond to movant's fee petition. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 8, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 11/08/2007)

11/19/2007 1430 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enforce Consent Decree by ERNEST BANKS, RUTH BANKS (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Memo of Points & Authorities# 2 Exhibit 1# 3 Text of Proposed

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Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 11/19/2007)

11/20/2007

MINUTE ORDER granting (767) plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enforce Consent Decree 1430 . The Clerk of the Court shall accept for filing the supplemental memorandum attached to the motion. Defendant may reply to the supplemental memorandum on or before November 29, 2007. The Court will not grant plaintiffs request for an oral hearing on their motion to enforce at this time. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 20, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 11/20/2007)

11/20/2007 1431 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM in support re (767 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Leave to File filed by ERNEST BANKS, RUTH BANKS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 11/21/2007)

11/26/2007 1432 STIPULATION Settling March − October 2007 Fee Petition of Othello Cross by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/26/2007)

11/28/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1432 that resolves Cross & Kearney, PLLC's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for March 21, 2007 through October 26, 2007 1425 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 28, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 11/28/2007)

11/29/2007 1433 RESPONSE re (767 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Memorandum filed by ANN M. VENEMAN, DAN GLICKMAN, DAN GLICKMAN, ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Bensing, Daniel) (Entered: 11/29/2007)

11/30/2007 1434 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of October 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 29, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 11/30/2007)

12/03/2007 1435 STIPULATION Settling Third Quarter 2007 Fee Petition of Conlon Frantz & Phelan by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 12/03/2007)

12/03/2007

1436

MOTION for Attorney Fees −−Renewed Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs by Attorney David A. Branch for Successful Claims by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Sworn Declaration of Attorney David A. Branch# 2 Exhibit Invoice for Legal Services Provided by Attorney David A. Branch# 3 Exhibit Successful Decisions)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Branch, David) (Entered: 12/03/2007)

12/04/2007

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1435 that resolves Conlon, Frantz & Phelan's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for July−September 2007 1426 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 4, 2007. (MA) (Entered: 12/04/2007)

12/07/2007 1437 MOTION to Dismiss Fee Petition of David Branch by ANN M. VENEMAN (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 12/07/2007)

12/11/2007

1438

Memorandum in opposition to re (774 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION to Dismiss Fee Petition of Attorney David A. Branch and Request for Sanctions Against the Defendant filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Newmark Email)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Branch, David) (Entered: 12/11/2007)

12/13/2007 1439 REPLY to opposition to motion re (1437 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 774 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION to Dismiss Fee Petition of David Branch (#s 1438 and 775) filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 12/13/2007)

12/18/2007 1440 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of November 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 18, 2007. (MA) (Entered: 12/18/2007)

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12/21/2007 1441 ORDER approving the monitor's request for a total budget amount for the period of January 1, 2008 through June 30, 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 21, 2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/21/2007)

12/21/2007

1442

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Ordered that the parties pursue further settlement discussions with the assistance of the court−appointed Monitor, Randi Ilyse Roth. Further ordered that if the parties are unable to reach a settlement agreement on or before 2/1/2008, they shall file supplemental briefs as follows. On or before 2/20/2008, defendant shall file a supplemental brief addressing the Millers' argument that the Millers are entitled to the proceeds of the supervised bank account as "paid up borrowers" under all applicable USDA regulations. The Millers may respond to defendant's supplemental brief on or before 3/5/2008. The supplemental briefs should address the matters listed above. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/21/2007. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 12/21/2007)

12/30/2007 1443 Quarterly MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip Fraas by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit P Fraas 4Q 2007 fees documentation)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 12/30/2007)

12/31/2007

1444

Monitor's Report Regarding Implementation of the Consent Decree for the Period of January 1, 2006, Through December 31, 2006, by RANDI ILYSE ROTH (Attachments: # 1 Appendix # 2 Appendix # 3 Appendix # 4 Appendix # 5 Appendix # 6 Appendix # 7 Appendix # 8 Appendix # 9 Appendix # 10 Appendix)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 12/31/2007)

01/09/2008 1445 STIPULATION Settling Attorney Fee Claims of David A. Branch by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 01/09/2008)

01/11/2008 1446 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Fourth Quarter 2007 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 01/11/2008)

01/15/2008

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1445 that resolves David A. Branch's motions for attorney's fees and expenses for [1427 and 1436] work done by the firm on behalf of Willie Branch, Raymond Goodwyn, and Ernest Blount on claims filed under Track A of the Consent Decree in these consolidated actions. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 15, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 01/15/2008)

01/16/2008 1447 STIPULATION Settling 4th Quarter 2007 Fee Petition of Phillip Fraas (1443) by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 01/16/2008)

01/18/2008

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1447 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for October−December 2007 1443 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 18, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 01/18/2008)

01/24/2008 1448 MOTION by Thedford A. Rowser−Bey for relief from judgmentAssociated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 01/24/2008)

01/24/2008 1449 MOTION by Thedford A. Rowser−Bey for Recusal (See Docket Entry 1448 to view document) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 01/24/2008)

01/24/2008

1450

ENTERED IN ERROR.....MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 1448 Motion for Relief from Judgment and 1449 Motion for Recusal by Thedford A. Rowser−Bey. Further ordered that no identical or substantially similar documents will be accepted for filing without leave of this Court. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 1/24/2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) Modified on 1/24/2008 (mm). (Entered: 01/24/2008)

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01/24/2008

1451

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 1448 Motion for Relief from Judgment and 1449 Motion for Recusal by Thedford A. Rowser−Bey. Further ordered that no identical or substantially similar documents will be accepted for filing without leave of this Court. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 1/24/2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 01/24/2008)

01/24/2008

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: 1450 Memorandum Opinion and Order was entered in error as the wrong docket event was used and was re−docketed as 1451 . (mm) (Entered: 01/24/2008)

02/01/2008 1452 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of December 2007. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 1, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/01/2008)

02/08/2008 1453 Monitor's Fourth Progress Report on Amended Decisions, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 02/08/2008)

02/15/2008 1454 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of December 31, 2007, by RANDI ILYSE ROTH, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 02/15/2008)

02/21/2008

1455

ORDER denying (1315) motion of George Roberts and Ernest and Ruth Banks to enforce the consent decree; denying (1351) motion of the Estates of Robert and Jessie Howard to enforce the consent decree in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF; denying (673) Motion to Enforce in case 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 20, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/21/2008)

02/21/2008

1456

OPINION rejecting plaintiffs' interpretation of the consent decree and the debt relief stipulation and order because it is inconsistent with the plain meaning of those documents. An order consistent with this opinion will issue this same day. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 21, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/21/2008)

02/27/2008 1457 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of January 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 26, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 02/27/2008)

02/27/2008 1458 STIPULATION re (1446 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Fourth Quarter 2007 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 02/27/2008)

02/28/2008

1459

MOTION for Attorney Fees by ROBERT HOLMES, SR (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Doan Declaration Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit Doan Declaration Exhibit 2, Part I, # 4 Exhibit Doan Declaration Exhibit 2 (part II), # 5 Exhibit Doan Declaration Exhibit 2 (part III), # 6 Exhibit Doan Declaration Exhibit 2 (part IV), # 7 Exhibit Doan Declaration Exhibit 3, # 8 Exhibit Doan Declaration Exhibit 4, # 9 Errata Doan Declaration Exhibit 5, # 10 Exhibit Doan Declaration Exhibit 6, # 11 Exhibit Doan Declaration Exhibit 7, # 12 Exhibit Doan Declaration Exhibit 8, # 13 Exhibit Doan Declaration Exhibit 9, # 14 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Doan, Joshua) (Entered: 02/28/2008)

02/29/2008

MINUTE ORDER that, in light of the Monitors Fourth Progress Report on Amended Decisions, the Monitor is hereby ordered to file a further report informing the Court as to the parties progress regarding debt relief issues by June 27, 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 29, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 02/29/2008)

02/29/2008

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1458 that resolves Conlon Frantz & Phelan's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter October−December 2007 1446 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 29, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 02/29/2008)

02/29/2008

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report informing the Court as to parties' progress regarding debt relief issues due by 6/27/2008. (mm) (Entered: 03/03/2008)

03/06/2008 1460 STIPULATION Extending Time to Respond to Covington & Burling's Motion for Attorney's Fees by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 03/06/2008)

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03/17/2008 1461 NOTICE of resolution re Anthony and Selena Miller by ALL PLAINTIFFS re (1270 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 03/17/2008)

03/17/2008

MINUTE ORDER approving 1460 stipulation regarding extension of time up to and including March 31, 2008 to respond to Covington & Burling's motion for an award of attorneys' fees. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 17, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 03/17/2008)

03/17/2008

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to Covington & Burling's motion for an award of attorneys' fees due by 3/31/2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 03/18/2008)

03/31/2008

1462

ORDER that the monitor's report regarding implementation of the consent decree for the period of January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2006 is approved by the court. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 31, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) # 1 report of monitor) (Entered: 03/31/2008)

03/31/2008 1463 Interim MOTION for Attorney Fees for P. Fraas for 1Q 2008 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit P. Fraas 1Q 2008 fees and expenses)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 03/31/2008)

03/31/2008 1464 STIPULATION Extending Time to Respond To Covington & Burling's Motion for Attorney Fees by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 03/31/2008)

04/03/2008

MINUTE ORDER approving the stipulation regarding extension of time up to and including April 14, 2008 for defendant to respond to Covington & Burling's motion for an award of attorney's fees re the Robert Holmes arbitration. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 3, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 04/03/2008)

04/03/2008

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to Covington & Burling's motion for award of attorneys' fees re: the Robert Holmes arbitration due by 4/14/2008. (mm) (Entered: 04/03/2008)

04/07/2008 1465 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for February 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 7, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 04/07/2008)

04/07/2008 1466 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for First Quarter 2008 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/07/2008)

04/14/2008

1467

Memorandum in opposition to re (793 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees by Covington & Burling re Holmes Arbitration filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 04/14/2008)

04/14/2008

1468

ENTERED IN ERROR.....Memorandum in opposition to re (793 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees by Covington & Burling re Holmes Arbitration − Corrected Proposed order filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) Modified on 4/15/2008 (td, ). (Entered: 04/14/2008)

04/14/2008

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: re 1468 Memorandum in Opposition, was entered in error and counsel was instructed to refile said pleading using either the Errata event or Notice of Filing of Proposed Order. (td, ) (Entered: 04/15/2008)

04/16/2008 1469 NOTICE of Proposed Order (re 1467 in 1:97−1978−PLF) by ANN M. VENEMAN re (800 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) Memorandum in Opposition, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 04/16/2008)

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04/21/2008 1470 STIPULATION re (1468 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Memorandum in Opposition, (1467 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Memorandum in Opposition, by ROBERT HOLMES, SR. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Doan, Joshua) (Entered: 04/21/2008)

04/21/2008

DEPOSIT of Funds in the amount of $ $1,164,958.00, Receipt Number 46460011792. (td, ) (Entered: 04/23/2008)

04/30/2008 1471 STIPULATION Settling 1st Quarter 2008 Fee Petition of Phillip Fraas (#1463) by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 04/30/2008)

05/01/2008

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1471 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for January−March 2008 1463 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 1, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 05/01/2008)

05/08/2008 1472 STIPULATION Settling 1Q2008 Fee Petition of Conlon Frantz (#1466) by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 05/08/2008)

05/09/2008

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 805 that resolves Conlon Frantz & Phelan's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for January−March 2008 1466 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 9, 2008.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/09/2008)

05/15/2008 1473 ORDER approving the Monitor's invoice for March 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 5/15/08. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 05/16/2008)

05/19/2008 1474 STIPULATION re (1468 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Memorandum in Opposition, (1467 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Memorandum in Opposition, by ROBERT HOLMES, SR. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Doan, Joshua) (Entered: 05/19/2008)

05/20/2008

MINUTE ORDER approving the stipulation regarding extension of time up to and including June 6, 2008 for claimant Mr. Holmes to reply to defendant's opposition to Mr. Holmes' motion for an award of attorneys' fees. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 20, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/20/2008)

05/20/2008

Set/Reset Deadlines: Claimant Holmes' reply to response to motion for award of attorneys' fees due by 6/6/2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 05/21/2008)

05/29/2008 1475 ORDER approving the monitor's budget for the period July 1, 2008 through December 31, 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 29, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/29/2008)

06/06/2008

1476

REPLY to opposition to motion re (793 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF, 1459 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by ROBERT HOLMES, SR. (Attachments: # 1 Second Declaration of Joshua Doan, # 2 Second Doan Declaration Exhibit 1, # 3 Second Doan Declaration Exhibit 2, # 4 Second Doan Declaration Exhibit 3, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Doan, Joshua) (Entered: 06/06/2008)

06/10/2008

MINUTE ORDER that a status conference is scheduled for June 19, 2008 at 3:00 p.m. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 10, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 06/10/2008)

06/10/2008

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 6/19/2008 at 3:00 PM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (zcp, ) (Entered: 06/10/2008)

06/10/2008

PLEASE DISREGARD MINUTE ORDER ENTERED TODAY SCHEDULING STATUS CONFERENCE FOR JUNE 19, 2008 −− ENTERED IN ERROR. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 10, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 06/10/2008)

06/17/2008 1477 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of April 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 17, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/17/2008)

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06/25/2008 1478 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to Covington & Burling's Fee Petition for the Holmes Arbitration by ANN M. VENEMAN (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendant's Surreply, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 06/25/2008)

06/26/2008 1479 Monitor's Request for an Extension of Time. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 06/26/2008)

06/27/2008

MINUTE ORDER: The Monitor's Request for an Extension of Time is GRANTED. The Monitor shall submit her Fifth Amended Decisions Progress Report to the Court on or before July 11, 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 6/27/08. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 06/27/2008)

06/27/2008

Set/Reset Deadlines: The Monitor's Fifth Amended Decisions Progress Report due by 7/11/2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 06/30/2008)

06/30/2008 1480 MOTION for Attorney Fees Phillip Fraas 2Q 2008 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Phillip Fraas hours and expenses)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 06/30/2008)

07/09/2008 1481 Memorandum in opposition to re (811 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF, 1478 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Leave to File Surreply filed by ROBERT HOLMES, SR. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Doan, Joshua) (Entered: 07/09/2008)

07/10/2008 1482 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of May 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 10, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 07/10/2008)

07/11/2008 1483 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Second Quarter 2008 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 07/11/2008)

07/11/2008 1484 Monitor's Fifth Progress Report on Amended Decisions and Debt Relief Implementation (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 07/11/2008)

07/11/2008 1485 NOTICE of Appearance by Anthony Herman on behalf of SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Herman, Anthony) (Entered: 07/11/2008)

07/11/2008 1486 NOTICE of Appearance by Emily Johnson Henn on behalf of SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Henn, Emily) (Entered: 07/11/2008)

07/11/2008 1487 NOTICE of Appearance by Joshua A Doan on behalf of SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Doan, Joshua) (Entered: 07/11/2008)

07/28/2008 1488 STIPULATION Agreed Order Regarding Attorney's Fees and Expenses of Phillip L. Fraas by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 07/28/2008)

07/29/2008

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1488 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for April−June 2008 1480 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 29, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 07/29/2008)

08/01/2008

MINUTE ORDER: In light of the Monitor's Fifth Progress Report on Amended Decisions and Debt Relief Implementation, the Court hereby orders that the Monitor shall report to the Court on or before December 15, 2008, regarding the progress of debt relief implementation for all prevailing claimants who are entitled to debt relief, including the system for managing potential tax consequences of debt relief. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 8/1/08. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 08/01/2008)

08/01/2008

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report due by 12/15/2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 08/04/2008)

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08/06/2008 1489 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of June 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 6, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/06/2008)

08/12/2008 1490 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of June 30, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 08/12/2008)

08/21/2008 1491 MOTION for Hearing re (1314 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION Clarification of Scope of Monitor Authority by SHEILA JOHNSON (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Service)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Jordan, Robert) (Entered: 08/21/2008)

08/22/2008 1492 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP. Attorney Dawn V. Martin terminated. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Martin, Dawn) (Entered: 08/22/2008)

08/25/2008

1493

Memorandum in opposition to re (822 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Hearing re (1314 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION Clarification of Scope of Monitor Authority MOTION for Hearing re (1314 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION Clarification of Scope of Monitor Authority filed by DAN GLICKMAN, DAN GLICKMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Gardner, Joshua) (Entered: 08/25/2008)

08/27/2008

1494

MOTION for Attorney Fees on behalf of Cross & Kearney PLLC by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Declaration, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 08/27/2008)

09/02/2008 1495 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of July 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 2, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/02/2008)

09/03/2008

MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of claimant Sheila Johnson's motion for a hearing and the defendant's opposition thereto, Ms. Johnson's motion for a hearing 1491 is hereby DENIED. The Court agrees with the defendant that a hearing would not assist the Court in resolving this matter. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 3, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 09/03/2008)

09/03/2008 1496 STIPULATION Settling 2d Quarter 2008 Attorney Fee Petition of Conlon Frantz by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 09/03/2008)

09/04/2008 1497 STIPULATION Extending Time to Respond to Cross & Kearney's Fee Petition re Steppes Arbitration by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 09/04/2008)

09/05/2008

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1496 that resolves Conlon, Frantz & Phelan's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for April 2008−June 2008 1483 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 5, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/05/2008)

09/09/2008

MINUTE ORDER approving the stipulation 1497 regarding extension of time up to and including October 8, 2008 for defendant to respond to Cross & Kearney PLLC's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 9, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 09/09/2008)

09/09/2008

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to Cross & Kearney PLLC's motion for attorneys' fees and costs due by 10/8/2008. (mm) (Entered: 09/10/2008)

09/30/2008 1498 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip Fraas 3Q 2008 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Phillip Fraas fee petition 3Q 2008)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 09/30/2008)

10/08/2008 1499 STIPULATION Extending Government's Time to Respond To Fee Petition Re Steppes Arbitration by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 10/08/2008)

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10/10/2008 1500 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of August 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 10, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 10/10/2008)

11/05/2008 1501 STIPULATION Settling 3d Quarter 2008 Fee Petition of Phillip Fraas by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/05/2008)

11/06/2008 1502 STIPULATION Extending Time to Respond To Fee Petition re Steppes Arbitration by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/06/2008)

11/07/2008

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1501 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter July−September 2008 1498 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 7, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 11/07/2008)

11/07/2008

MINUTE ORDER granting Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Surreply Regarding Covington & Burling's Petition for Attorneys' Fees for the Robert Holmes Arbitration 1478 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 7, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 11/07/2008)

11/07/2008 1503 SURREPLY to re (793 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by ANN M. VENEMAN, ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(nmw, ) (Entered: 11/10/2008)

11/10/2008 1504 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Third Quarter, 2008 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 11/10/2008)

11/12/2008

MINUTE ORDER approving the parties' Stipulation Regarding Extension of Time to Respond to Cross & Kearney PLLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs 1502 . Defendant shall respond to Cross & Kearney PLLC's motion for attorneys fees and costs on or before December 8, 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 12, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 11/12/2008)

11/12/2008

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to Cross & Kearney PLLC's motion for attorneys fees and costs 1502 in 1:97−cv−1978 due by 12/8/2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 11/12/2008)

11/14/2008 1505 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting (1138) the renewal of motion by class member Sandy Mckinnon for fees and costs in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 12, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 11/14/2008)

11/17/2008 1506 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of September 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 17, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 11/17/2008)

11/21/2008 1507 NOTICE of Change of Address by Phillip L. Fraas (Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 11/21/2008)

12/08/2008 1508 STIPULATION Extending Time to Respond to Steppes Fee Petition by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 12/08/2008)

12/09/2008 1509 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of October 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 9, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/09/2008)

12/09/2008

1510

ORDER approving stipulation regarding extension of time to respond to Cross & Kearney, P.L.L.C.'s Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Defendant may have an additional 30−day extension of time, through and including 1/8/2009, to respond to the petitioner's Motion 1494 for an Award of Attorneys' Fees. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/9/2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 12/09/2008)

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12/10/2008 1511 Monitor's Request for an Extension of Time to Report to the Court Regarding Debt Relief Implementation Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Roth, Randi) Modified on 12/11/2008 correcting the event from Notice to Motion(td, ). (Entered: 12/10/2008)

12/12/2008

ORDER granting (1511) Motion for Extension of Time to File in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF; granting (840) Motion for Extension of Time to File in case 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. The Monitor will submit her report regarding debt relief implementation to the Court on or before March 31, 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/12/08. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lcplf2). (Entered: 12/12/2008)

12/12/2008

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's report regarding debt relief implementation due by 3/31/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 12/15/2008)

12/18/2008 1512 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of November 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 16, 2008. (MA) (Entered: 12/18/2008)

12/19/2008

1513

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re defendant's motion to dismiss Shutts & Bowen's petition for implementation fees and its request for an 80% enhancement of its fee for representing Teddy Miller. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 19, 2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/19/2008)

12/19/2008

Set/Reset Deadlines: Partis to file the four informal letters discussed in Memorandum Opinion and Order 1513 on public docket by 12/24/2008. Joint Report setting forth parties' views on questions propounded in Memorandum Opinion and Order 1513 due by 1/6/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 12/22/2008)

12/22/2008

MINUTE ORDER: The Court has before it Finkel & Altman's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs and Expenses 857 , defendant's opposition thereto 865 and Finkel & Altman's reply 871 . The parties' papers refer to various settlement agreements and other exhibits, but it is not clear whether those documents were ever filed with the Court; at any rate, the Court has been unable to locate them. In order to expedite the resolution of this matter, the parties are ordered to file (or re−file): (1) all of the settlement agreements referenced in the above papers, and (2) any other exhibits referenced in the above papers. The parties shall file (or re−file) those documents on or before January 16, 2009. In so doing, the parties are not to supplement their papers in any other way, nor to provide additional legal argumentation. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/22/2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 12/22/2008)

12/22/2008

Set/Reset Deadlines: Parties to file the documents referenced in the Court's 12/22/2008 Minute Order by 1/16/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm) (Entered: 12/23/2008)

12/23/2008 1514 NOTICE of filing letter to Court by SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP re (1513 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Memorandum & Opinion, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Herman, Anthony) (Entered: 12/23/2008)

12/23/2008 1515 NOTICE of filing letter to Court by SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP re (1513 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Memorandum & Opinion, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Herman, Anthony) (Entered: 12/23/2008)

12/24/2008 1516 NOTICE of Filing [per 1513] by ANN M. VENEMAN (Attachments: # 1 12/8/08 letter, # 2 12/15/08 letter)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 12/24/2008)

12/30/2008

1517

ORDER: The Monitor's request for a total budget amount of $1,575,088.00 for the period of January 1, 2009 through June 30, 2009 is approved. Further ordered that in accordance with paragraph 17 of the Order of Reference entered in this case on April 4, 2000, the United States Department of Agriculture shall deposit with the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a sum equal to a pro−rata month's portion of the approved budget within the first fifteen (15) days of

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each month. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/30/2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 12/30/2008)

12/30/2008 1518 STIPULATION Settling 3d Quarter 2008 Fee Petition of Conlon Frantz by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 12/30/2008)

12/30/2008

1519

Monitor's Report Regarding Implementation of the Consent Decree for the Period of January 1, 2007, Through December 31, 2007 (Attachments: #(1) Appendix 1, #(2) Appendix 2, #(3) Appendix 3, #(4) Appendix 4, #(5) Appendix 5, #(6) Appendix 6, #(7) Appendix 7, #(8) Appendix 8, #(9) Appendix 9, #(10) Appendix 10)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 12/30/2008)

12/30/2008 1520 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip Fraas for 4Q 2008 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Itemization of hours and expenses)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 12/30/2008)

01/05/2009 1521 MOTION to Appoint Counsel for Class by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 01/05/2009)

01/06/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving the Settlement Agreement Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Expenses 1518 that resolves Conlon, Frantz & Phelan's motion for attorneys' fees and expenses for July 2008 to September 2008 1504 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 6, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 01/06/2009)

01/06/2009 1522 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Report by ANN M. VENEMAN (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 01/06/2009)

01/08/2009 1523 STIPULATION REGARDING EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO CROSS & KEARNEY PLLCS MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 01/08/2009)

01/08/2009

MINUTE ORDER granting (1522) defendant's motion for extension of time up to and including January 13, 2009 for the parties to submit their joint report to the court in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 8, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 01/08/2009)

01/08/2009

MINUTE ORDER granting the unopposed Motion for Appointment of Rose Sanders as Class Counsel and Co−Lead Counsel Succeeding J.L. Chestnut 1521 . Rose Sanders is hereby appointed Class Counsel and Co−Lead Counsel for plaintiffs, succeeding J.L. Chestnut in those positions. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 8, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 01/08/2009)

01/08/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Report due by 1/13/2009. (mm) (Entered: 01/12/2009)

01/12/2009 1526 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Curtis Dixon; Type of Document Returned: 12/12/2008 Minute Order. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 01/21/2009)

01/13/2009 1524 NOTICE of filing Joint Report of Shutts & Bowen LLP and the USDA by SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP re (1513 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Memorandum & Opinion, (Attachments: # 1 December 2001 Settlement Agreement)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Doan, Joshua) (Entered: 01/13/2009)

01/14/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving the parties' Stipulation Regarding Extension of Time to Respond to Cross & Kearney PLLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs 1523 . Defendant's response is due on or before February 9, 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 14, 2090. (MA) (Entered: 01/14/2009)

01/14/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to 1523 motion for attorneys' fees due by 2/9/2009. (mm) (Entered: 01/15/2009)

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01/16/2009 1525 NOTICE Pursuant to the Court's 12/22/08 Minute Order by ANN M. VENEMAN, ANN VENEMAN (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A through E)(Dean, Paul) (Entered: 01/16/2009)

01/22/2009 1527 MOTION for Attorney Fees by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 01/22/2009)

01/26/2009 1528 NOTICE of Appearance by Herbert E. Forrest on behalf of ANN M. VENEMAN Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Forrest, Herbert) (Entered: 01/26/2009)

01/27/2009 1529 NOTICE Revised Limited Notice of Appearance by ANN M. VENEMAN Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Forrest, Herbert) (Entered: 01/27/2009)

02/02/2009 1530 STIPULATION Regarding Extension of Time to Respond to Cross & Kearney PLLC's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Forrest, Herbert) (Entered: 02/02/2009)

02/04/2009 1531 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for December 2008. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 3, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/04/2009)

02/04/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to motion for attorney's fees and costs re: Alvin Steppes arbitration due by 3/11/2009 Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mpt, ) (Entered: 02/04/2009)

02/09/2009 1532 STIPULATION Settling 4th Quarter Attorney's Fees for Philip Fraas by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 02/09/2009)

02/09/2009 1533 STIPULATION Settlling Attorney's Fee Request of Conlon Frantz for 4th Quarter 2008 by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 02/09/2009)

02/11/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1532 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter October−December 2008 1520 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 11, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/11/2009)

02/11/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1533 that resolves Conlon, Frantz & Phelan's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter October−December 2008 1527 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 11, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/11/2009)

02/12/2009 1534 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of December 31, 2008, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 02/12/2009)

03/06/2009 1535 STIPULATION Regarding Extension of Time to Respond to Cross& Kearney PLLC's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Forrest, Herbert) (Entered: 03/06/2009)

03/09/2009

1536

ORDER: Ordered that defendant may have an additional 30−day extension of time, through 4/10/2009, to respond to petitioner's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs re the Alvin Steppes arbitration. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 3/9/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 03/10/2009)

03/17/2009 1537 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for January 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 16, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 03/17/2009)

03/30/2009 1538 STIPULATION Settling Attorney's Fee Claims of Butler Snow by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 03/30/2009)

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03/31/2009 1539 Monitor's Report on Debt Relief Implementation, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 03/31/2009)

03/31/2009 1540 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip Fraas 1Q 2009 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit itemization of hours and calculation of fees)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 03/31/2009)

04/02/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1538 that resolves Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens and Cannada PLLC's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the Track A claims of West Bones,Jr., Joe Currin, Viola Douglas, James McClerking, Lawrence Morris, Mervin Owens, Joseph Sanders, Est. of Eddie Lee Williams, Est. of Curtis Kyle and Jan & Earl Lee Yarber. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 2, 2009. (MA) (Entered: 04/02/2009)

04/03/2009

1541

ORDER that, with respect to the motion for attorneys' fees and expenses by Finkel Law Firm, LLC, counsel for Track B claimants Lee Van Crawford and Donald Stokes, the parties shall enter into settlement negotiations to begin immediately. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 2, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 04/03/2009)

04/03/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Report due by 4/15/2009. Unless the parties resolve to settle this dispute by 4/30/2009, both parties on that date shall file (or re−file) the items discussed in this Court's Minute Order of 12/22/2008. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 04/06/2009)

04/06/2009 1542 STIPULATION Settling 1st Quarter Fee Petition of Phillip Fraas by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 04/06/2009)

04/08/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1542 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter January − March 2009 1540 .Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 04/08/2009)

04/08/2009 1543 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for First Quarter 2009 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/08/2009)

04/08/2009 1544 STIPULATION Regarding Extension of Time to Respond to Cross & Kearney PLLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Forrest, Herbert) (Entered: 04/08/2009)

04/10/2009

1545

ORDER approving (#1544 in 97−1978) Stipulation Regarding Extension of Time to Respond to Cross & Kearney PLLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Petitioner Cross & Kearney PLLC and Defendant, shall have an additional 14−day extension of time, that is, through 4/24/2009, to respond to Petitioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs re the Alvin Steppes arbitration (#1494). Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 4/9/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 04/10/2009)

04/15/2009 1546 STATUS REPORT REGARDING SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS RE ATTORNEYS FEES FOR STOKES AND CRAWFORD TRACK B CLAIMS by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 04/15/2009)

04/17/2009 1547 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of February 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 17, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 04/17/2009)

04/17/2009 1548 ORDER on motion for attorneys' fees, costs and expenses by Finkel Law Firm, LLc, counsel for Track B claimants Lee Van Crawford and Donald Stokes. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 17, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 04/17/2009)

04/17/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Unless the parties resolve this dispute, both parties to file (or re−file) the items discussed in this Court's Minute Order of 12/22/2008 by 5/15/2009.

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Parties' Joint Report regarding status of settlement negotiations due by 5/8/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 04/20/2009)

04/21/2009 1549 ORDER re Monitor's Report on Debt Relief Implementation. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 20, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 04/21/2009)

04/21/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report due by 6/30/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 04/21/2009)

04/22/2009 1550 STIPULATION Regarding Extension of Time to Respond to Cross & Kearney PLLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Forrest, Herbert) (Entered: 04/22/2009)

04/23/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving the stipulation 1550 regarding extension of time up to and including May 8, 2009 for defendant to respond to Cross & Kearney PLLC's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 23, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 04/23/2009)

05/01/2009 1551 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of March 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 1, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/01/2009)

05/05/2009 1552 STIPULATION and Order by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 05/05/2009)

05/06/2009 1553 STIPULATION SETTLING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES (#857) by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 05/06/2009)

05/07/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1553 that resolves Finkel Law Firm LLC's motion for attorney's fees and expenses filed on September 22, 2003 857 . Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/07/2009)

05/07/2009

1554

STIPULATION AND ORDER: The Claims Facilitator will promptly send a Claim Sheet and Election Form to the Claimants identified by Tracking Number in Exhibit A to this Stipulation and Order. The process for review of petitions under section 5(g) of the Consent Decree is complete and no additional Claim Sheet and Election Forms will be sent to other late−claim petitioners. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 5/6/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 05/07/2009)

05/08/2009

1555

Memorandum in opposition to re (825 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees Defendant Tom Vilsack's Response to Motion of Cross & Kearney for Attorneys' Fees and Costs in re Track B Arbitration of Alvin Steppes filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Forrest, Herbert) (Entered: 05/08/2009)

05/12/2009 1556 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying (1394) Motion to Enforce in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 12, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/12/2009)

05/12/2009 1557 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying (1314) Ms. Johnson's "motion for clarification" in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 12, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/12/2009)

05/12/2009 1558 OPINION AND ORDER that the parties shall attempt to settle Covington & Burling's motion for an award of attorneys' fees. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 12, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered:

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05/12/2009)

05/12/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Report due by 6/8/2009 if parties are unable to settle Covington's motion for an award of attorneys' fees. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 05/13/2009)

05/15/2009 1559 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 1494 MOTION for Attorney Fees on behalf of Cross & Kearney PLLC by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Fierst, David) (Entered: 05/15/2009)

05/15/2009 1560 OPINION AND ORDER denying (1290) Motion for Attorney Fees; granting (1309) Motion to Dismiss in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 15, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/15/2009)

05/15/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Report due by 6/15/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 05/15/2009)

05/19/2009

MINUTE ORDER granting (1559) consent motion of Cross & Kearney PLLC for extension of time up to and including June 15, 2009 to reply to opposition to motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 19, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/19/2009)

05/19/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Reply to response to motion for attorneys' fees and costs due by 6/15/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 05/20/2009)

05/27/2009 1561 STIPULATION Settling 1stQ 2009 Attorney's Fees Petition of Conlon, Frantz & Phelan by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 05/27/2009)

05/28/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1561 that resolves Conlon, Frantz & Phelan's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter January 2009 through March 2009 1543 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 28, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/28/2009)

06/08/2009 1562 STATUS REPORT Joint Report by ROBERT HOLMES, SR. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Henn, Emily) (Entered: 06/08/2009)

06/11/2009 1563 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to (1494 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees on behalf of Cross & Kearney PLLC by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 06/11/2009)

06/12/2009

MINUTE ORDER granting (1563) consent motion of Cross & Kearney PLLC for extension of time up to and including July 15, 2009 to reply to opposition to motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 12, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/12/2009)

06/12/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Reply to motion for attorneys' fees and costs due by 7/15/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 06/12/2009)

06/15/2009 1564 NOTICE of Appearance by Julie Straus on behalf of all defendants Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Straus, Julie) (Entered: 06/15/2009)

06/15/2009 1565 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report by SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP, ANN M. VENEMAN, ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Straus, Julie) (Entered: 06/15/2009)

06/16/2009 1566 NOTICE of Appearance by Julie Straus on behalf of all defendants Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Straus, Julie) (Entered: 06/16/2009)

06/17/2009

MINUTE ORDER: In light of the parties' Joint Status Report, filed on June 15, 2009, the Court will grant the parties additional time to attempt to settle the remainder of Shutts & Bowen's fee petition. The parties shall continue to negotiate in good faith,

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and file a further status report on or before July 15, 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 17, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/17/2009)

06/17/2009

1567

Monitor's Report Regarding Implementation of the Consent Decree for the Period of January 1, 2008, Through December 31, 2008 (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1, # 2 Appendix 2, # 3 Appendix 3, # 4 Appendix 4, # 5 Appendix 5, # 6 Appendix 6, # 7 Appendix 7, # 8 Appendix 8, # 9 Appendix 9, # 10 Appendix 10)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 06/17/2009)

06/17/2009 1568 STIPULATION Settling Covington & Burling's Fee Petition re Holmes Arbitration (#1459) by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 06/17/2009)

06/17/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 7/15/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm, ) (Entered: 06/18/2009)

06/19/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1568 that resolves Covington & Burling LLP's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the Track B Claim of Robert Holmes, Jr. 1459 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 19, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/19/2009)

06/25/2009 1569 ORDER approving the monitor's request for a total budget for the period of July 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 24, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/25/2009)

06/30/2009 1570 Monitor's Second Report on Debt Relief Implementation, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 06/30/2009)

06/30/2009 1571 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip Fraas for 2Q 2009 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 06/30/2009)

06/30/2009 1573 MOTION for Attorney Fees by ALL PLAINTIFFS, ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 07/02/2009)

07/01/2009 1572 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of April 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 1, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 07/01/2009)

07/02/2009 1574 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Expenses incurred by Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway, LLC for impelementation work during the period from March 31, 2009 to June 30, 2009 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(cp, ) (Entered: 07/02/2009)

07/09/2009 1575 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Second Quarter 2009 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 07/09/2009)

07/11/2009 1576 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to (1494 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees on behalf of Cross & Kearney PLLC by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 07/11/2009)

07/14/2009 1577 ORDER granting (1576) Consent motion for extension of time of 30 days, to and including 8/14/09 to reply to defendant's opposition to petitioner's motion (#1494) for attorneys' fees and costs. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 7/13/09. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(gdf) (Entered: 07/14/2009)

07/14/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Reply to response to 1494 motion for attorneys' fees and costs due by 8/14/2009. (mm) (Entered: 07/15/2009)

07/15/2009 1578 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report by SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Henn, Emily) (Entered: 07/15/2009)

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07/16/2009 1579 ORDER that the monitor shall continue to perform her role in the debt relief review process. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 16, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 07/16/2009)

07/16/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report due by 8/28/2009. (mm) (Entered: 07/16/2009)

07/17/2009

MINUTE ORDER: In light of the parties' Joint Status Report, filed on July 15, 2009, the Court will grant the parties additional time to attempt to settle the remainder of Shutts & Bowen's fee petition. The parties shall continue to negotiate in good faith, and file a further status report on or before August 14, 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 17, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 07/17/2009)

07/17/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 8/14/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 07/17/2009)

07/23/2009 1580 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for May 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 7/22/2009. (lcplf2) (Entered: 07/23/2009)

07/23/2009 1581 STIPULATION Settling 2d Quarter 2009 Fee Petition of Phillip Fraas by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 07/23/2009)

07/27/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving 1581 Settlement Agreement Regarding Attorney's Fees and Expenses which resolves 1571 Phillip L. Fraas' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs for April−June 2009 Quarter. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 7/27/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) Modified on 7/27/2009 (mm). (Entered: 07/27/2009)

07/27/2009

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Text of 7/27/2009 Order corrected to reflect that it is a "Minute Order". Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 07/27/2009)

07/27/2009 1582 NOTICE of Filing by ESTATE OF CHARLIE KNOTT (nmw, ) (Entered: 07/30/2009)

07/27/2009

1583

MOTION for Attorney Fees by ESTATE OF CHARLIE KNOTT (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Declaration of David Fagan, # 3 Exhibit 1 Part A, # 4 Exhibit 1 Part B, # 5 Exhibit 1 Part C, # 6 Exhibit 1 Part D, # 7 Exhibit 2, # 8 Exhibit 3, # 9 Exhibit 4, # 10 Exhibit 5, # 11 Exhibit 6, # 12 Exhibit 7, # 13 Text of Proposed Order)(nmw, ) (Entered: 07/30/2009)

08/04/2009 1584 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of June 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 4, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/04/2009)

08/05/2009 1585 STIPULATION Joint Motion to Bifurcate Chestnut Sanders' 2nd Quarter 2009 Fee Petition by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/05/2009)

08/05/2009 1586 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Motion for Attorney's Fees by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 08/05/2009)

08/06/2009 1587 STIPULATION Settling 2d Quarter 2009 Fee Petition of Conlon Frantz & Phelan by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/06/2009)

08/06/2009

MINUTE ORDER granting (1586) petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time up to and including September 14, 2009 to File Response/Reply in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF; granting (908) petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time up to and including September 14, 2009 to File Response/Reply in case 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 6, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/06/2009)

08/06/2009 1588 STIPULATION re Extension of Time to Respond to Covington & Burling Fee Petition re Knott Estate by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases:

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1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/06/2009)

08/06/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Reply due by 9/14/2009. (zmm, ) (Entered: 08/06/2009)

08/10/2009

MINUTE ORDER granting the stipulation 1588 regarding defendant's extension of time up to and including September 10, 2009 to respond to Covington & Burling's motion for an award of attorneys' fees for work on the estate of Knott Track B claim. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 10, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/10/2009)

08/10/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to Covington & Burling's motion for attorneys' fees due by 9/10/2009 Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 08/11/2009)

08/12/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving 1587 Stipulation which resolves 1575 Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs for 2nd Quarter 2009 filed by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 8/12/2009. (mm) (Entered: 08/12/2009)

08/14/2009 1589 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of June 30, 2009 Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 08/14/2009)

08/14/2009 1590 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report by SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Henn, Emily) (Entered: 08/14/2009)

08/20/2009

MINUTE ORDER: In light of the parties' Joint Status Report, filed on August 14, 2009, the Court will grant the parties additional time to attempt to settle the remainder of Shutts & Bowen's fee petition. The parties shall continue to negotiate in good faith, and file a further status report on or before September 11, 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 20, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/20/2009)

08/20/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 9/11/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 08/20/2009)

08/20/2009 1591 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to REGARDING APPLICATION OF COURT RULING TO MOBLEY TRACK B FEE PETITION filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/20/2009)

08/27/2009 1592 Monitor's Third Report on Debt Relief Implementation, (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1, # 2 Appendix 2) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 08/27/2009)

09/03/2009 1593 STIPULATION Settling Attorney's Fees for Patterson Track B Claim by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 09/03/2009)

09/04/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving 1593 settlement agreement which resolves 3597 motion for attorney's fees and costs of the law firm of Jeffery P. Reynolds, P.A. with respect to fees requested by the firm for the Track B claim of Michael Patterson. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 4, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/04/2009)

09/08/2009 1594 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of July 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 8, 2009.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/08/2009)

09/09/2009 1595 SURREPLY to OMNIBUS REPLY BRIEF OF CHESTNUT SANDERS SANDERS AND PETTAWAY filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 09/09/2009)

09/10/2009 1596 STIPULATION EXTENDING TIME TO RESPOND TO COVINGTON & BURLING'S FEE PETITION RE KNOTT ESTATE by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 09/10/2009)

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09/11/2009

1597

MINUTE ORDER: In light of the parties' joint stipulation regarding extension of time 1596 , the time for defendant to respond to petitioners motion for an award of attorneys fees for work on the Estate of Knott Track B claim is hereby extended to October 9, 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 11, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 09/11/2009)

09/11/2009

1598

REPLY to opposition to motion re (1494 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 825 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees on behalf of Cross & Kearney PLLC filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Kearney Supplemental Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Ruling of Monitor, # 3 Exhibit Fierst Supplemental Declaration)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 09/11/2009)

09/11/2009 1599 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report by SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Henn, Emily) (Entered: 09/11/2009)

09/11/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to petitioner's motion for an award of attorneys fees for work on the Estate of Knott Track B claim due 10/9/2009. (mm) (Entered: 09/17/2009)

09/15/2009

MINUTE ORDER: In light of the parties' Joint Status Report, filed on September 11, 2009, the Court will grant the parties additional time to attempt to settle the remainder of Shutts & Bowen's fee petition. The parties shall continue to negotiate in good faith, and file a further status report on or before September 25, 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 15, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/15/2009)

09/15/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 9/25/2009. (zmm, ) (Entered: 09/16/2009)

09/18/2009 1600 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply Regarding Motion of Cross & Kearney PLLC for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and Order by ANN M. VENEMAN Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Forrest, Herbert) (Entered: 09/18/2009)

09/21/2009

1601

ORDER granting (1600) Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Surreply Regarding Motion of Cross & Kearney PLLC for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Ordered that Defendant may file its surreply, not to exceed 15 pages, on or before 10/7/2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 9/21/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 09/21/2009)

09/21/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Surreply due by 10/7/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 09/22/2009)

09/25/2009 1602 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report by SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Henn, Emily) (Entered: 09/25/2009)

09/30/2009 1603 MOTION for Attorney Fees and costs and expenses incurred by Chestnut, Saunders, Sanders & Pettaway, LLC for implementation work during the period from July 1, 2009 to September 30, 2009 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (td, ) (Entered: 10/02/2009)

10/02/2009 1604 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report by SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Henn, Emily) (Entered: 10/02/2009)

10/06/2009 1605 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phil Fraas by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Itemization of Phil Fraas Hours and Expenses 3Q 2009)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 10/06/2009)

10/06/2009 1606 STIPULATION Settlement Agreement Regarding Attorney's Fees and Expenses by ANN M. VENEMAN, ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Straus, Julie) (Entered: 10/06/2009)

10/07/2009 1607 SURREPLY to Motion of Cross & Kearney PLLC for Attorneys' Fees and Costs filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Forrest, Herbert) (Entered: 10/07/2009)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 160 of 203

10/08/2009 1608 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of August 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 8, 2009.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 10/08/2009)

10/09/2009 1609 ORDER approving 1606 Settlement Agreement Regarding Attorney's Fees and Expensees regarding the law firm of Shutts & Bowen, L.L.P. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 10/8/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 10/09/2009)

10/14/2009

1610

ORDER approving 930 Settlement Agreement Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Expenses with respect to fees requested by Covington & Burling for the Estate of Charlie Knott Track B Claim 1573 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 10/13/2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm) (Entered: 10/16/2009)

10/19/2009 1611 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Third Quarter 2009 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 10/19/2009)

10/29/2009 1612 Memorandum in opposition to re (1603 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for 3Q 2009 by Chestnut Sanders filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 10/29/2009)

11/03/2009 1613 ORDER re the monitor's third report on debt relief implementation filed August 27, 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 30, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 11/03/2009)

11/03/2009

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report due by 1/15/2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(mm, ) (Entered: 11/03/2009)

11/16/2009 1614 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of September 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 13, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 11/16/2009)

11/23/2009 1615 STIPULATION Settling 3Q2009 Attorney's Fees for Conlon Frantz by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/23/2009)

11/25/2009

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement regarding attorney's fees and expenses 1615 that resolves the claim for attorney's fees and expenses of Conlon, Frantz & Phelan for the period of July 2009 through September 2009 1611 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 25, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 11/25/2009)

12/01/2009 1616 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of October 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 1, 2009.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/01/2009)

12/11/2009 1617 ORDER approving monitor's request for a total budget amount for the period January 1, 2010 through June 30, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 11, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/11/2009)

12/18/2009 1618 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of November 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 18, 2009. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 12/18/2009)

12/29/2009 1620 MOTION for Attorney Fees and costs and expenses incurred by Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders and Pettaway, LLC for implementation work during the period from October 1, 2009, to December 23, 2009 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (td, ) (Entered: 01/04/2010)

12/31/2009 1619 STIPULATION Settling 3d Quarter 2009 Fee Petition of Phillip Fraas by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 12/31/2009)

01/04/2010

MINUTE ORDER approving 1619 settlement agreement which resolves 1605 motion for attorney's fees and costs of Phillip L. Fraas and all persons currently or formerly

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 161 of 203

associated with that firm with respect to fees requested by the firm for the quarter July−September 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 4, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 01/04/2010)

01/11/2010 1621 STIPULATION and Order by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 01/11/2010)

01/13/2010 1622 ORDER approving 1621 Stipulation. Ordered that the Monitor shall remain in existence until her duties under the Consent Decree are completed, or until 6/15/2011, whichever occurs first. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 1/13/2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 01/13/2010)

01/15/2010 1623 Monitor's Fourth Report on Debt Relief Implementation, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 01/15/2010)

01/19/2010 1624 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Fourth Quarter, 2009 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 01/19/2010)

01/21/2010 1625 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 4Q 2009 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Itemized Time Entries and Fees)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 01/21/2010)

01/25/2010

1626

ORDER that, upon consideration of the Monitor's fourth report on debt relief implementation (filed 1/15/10), the monitor shall report to the court on or before 7/1/10 re the substantive review of USDA's implementation of Pigford debt relief, and USDA's implementation of the IRS guidance for issuing IRS forms 1099−C to claimants who have received debt relief. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 25, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 01/25/2010)

01/25/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report due by 7/1/2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 01/25/2010)

01/28/2010 1627 Memorandum in opposition to re (1620 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for 4th Quarter 2009 by Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway LLC filed by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 01/28/2010)

02/04/2010 1628 ARBITRATOR'S FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS on Fees of Class Counsel Chestnut, Sanders, Pettaway & Campbell by MICHAEL K. LEWIS; Appendix A (to be filed at later date) (Attachments: # 1 Appendix B)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jeb, ) (Entered: 02/05/2010)

02/09/2010

1629

ORDER that on or before March 2, 2010, the parties shall file any objections to the Arbitrator's February 4, 2010 findings and recommendations regarding Chestnut Sanders' motions for attorneys' fees for the period of October 1, 2004, through May 30, 2007. Any responses to the objections shall be filed on or before March 16, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 9, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 02/09/2010)

02/09/2010

1630

AMENDED ORDER that on or before March 2, 2010, the parties shall file any objections to the Arbitrator's February 4, 2010 findings and recommendations regarding Chestnut Sanders' motions for attorneys' fees for the period of October 1, 2004, through May 30, 2007. Any responses to the objections shall be filed on or before March 16, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 9, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 02/09/2010)

02/09/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Objections to Arbitrator's 2/4/2010 Findings and Recommendations due by 3/2/2010. Response to objections due by 3/16/2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 02/12/2010)

02/12/2010 1631 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of December 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 12, 2010. Associated Cases:

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1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lcplf2) (Entered: 02/12/2010)

02/16/2010 1632 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of December 31, 2009, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 02/16/2010)

03/03/2010 1633 STIPULATION re (1625 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 4Q 2009 by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 03/03/2010)

03/04/2010 1634 STIPULATION Settling 4Q2009 Fee Petition of Conlon Frantz (#1624) by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 03/04/2010)

03/04/2010 1635 STIPULATION AND ORDER ADOPTING ARBITRATOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS [#1628] REGARDING CHESTNUT SANDERS' PENDING AND FUTURE FEE PETITIONS by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 03/04/2010)

03/05/2010

MINUTE ORDER approving 1634 settlement agreement which resolves 1624 the motion for attorney's fees and costs of the law firm of Conlon, Frantz & Phelan with respect to fees requested by the firm for the quarter October 2009 through December 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 5, 2010.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 03/05/2010)

03/05/2010

MINUTE ORDER approving 1633 settlement agreement which resolves 1625 the motion for attorney's fees and costs of Phillip L. Fraas with respect to fees for the quarter September − December 2009. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 5, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 03/05/2010)

03/05/2010 1638 MOTION to expedite funds by ANGELA DOZIER−CARTER; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td, ) (Entered: 03/08/2010)

03/08/2010

1636

STIPULATION AND ORDER: In consideration of defendant's payment of $452,993.56, and Chestnut Sanders Sanders & Pettaway LLC's acceptance of that amount, in full and final satisfaction of the firm's fee petitions for work performed between October 1, 2004 and June 30, 2007 in this case, defendant and the firm (jointly "the parties") hereby stipulate and agree to the following: 1. In order to put an end to their longstanding fee disputes, and to avoid such disputes in the future, the parties agree to accept and abide by the Findings and Recommendations issued by Arbitrator Michael Lewis on February 4, 2010. See Order for further specifics. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 3/5/2010. (zmm, ) (Entered: 03/08/2010)

03/08/2010

1637

ORDER closing the following motions upon consideration of (1) the stipulation filed by the defendant and class counsel Chestnut Sanders Sanders Pettaway & Campbell on March 4, 2010, and (2) the arbitrator's findings and recommendations regarding Chestnut Sanders' fees: (1083) Motion for Attorney Fees; (1118) Motion for Attorney Fees; (1149) Motion for Attorney Fees; (1205) Motion for Attorney Fees; (1208) Motion for Attorney Fees; (1239) Motion for Attorney Fees; (1266) Motion for Attorney Fees; (1300) Motion for Attorney Fees; (1304) Motion for Attorney Fees; (1339) Motion for Attorney Fees; (1364) Motion for Attorney Fees; (1390) Motion for Attorney Fees; (1411) Motion for Attorney Fees in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 3/5/2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 03/08/2010)

03/15/2010 1639 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of January 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 15, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 03/15/2010)

03/22/2010 1640 STIPULATION and Order by ALL PLAINTIFFS, DAN GLICKMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 03/22/2010)

03/25/2010 1641 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of February 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 25, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 03/25/2010)

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03/29/2010

1642

STIPULATION AND ORDER authorizing the Monitor to disclose a representative sample of certain documents to the Archivist of the National Archives or a designee of the Archivist. See Order for specifics. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 3/29/2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 03/30/2010)

03/31/2010 1643 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 1Q 2010 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Phillip L. Fraas − Itemization of Hours and Expenses)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 03/31/2010)

04/02/2010 1644 MOTION for Extension of Time to file First Quarter Billing 2010 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (td, ) (Entered: 04/05/2010)

04/07/2010 1645 MOTION for Attorney Fees for 1st Quarter, 2010 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/07/2010)

04/12/2010

MINUTE ORDER granting 1644 Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders and Pettaway, LLC's motion for an extension of time in which to file their motion for fees and costs incurred during the first quarter of 2010. Chestnut, Sanders shall file their motion for fees on or before April 14, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 12, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 04/12/2010)

04/12/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Chestnut, Sanders' motion for fees due by 4/14/2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 04/13/2010)

04/15/2010 1646 MOTION for Attorney Fees by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits)(rdj) (Entered: 04/16/2010)

04/19/2010 1647 WITHDRAWN PER MINUTE ORDER FILED 5/14/2010.....MOTION to File Fee Petition Response to Defendants Objections to Attorney Fees out of time by ALL PLAINTIFFS. "Let this be Filed," Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 4/19/2010. (dr) Modified on 5/14/2010 (zmm, ). (Entered: 04/20/2010)

04/29/2010 1648 STIPULATION Settling 1st Quarter 2009 Fee Petition of Phillip Fraas by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 04/29/2010)

04/29/2010 1649 STIPULATION Settling 1st Quarter 2010 Fee Petition of Conlon Frantz by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 04/29/2010)

05/04/2010

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1649 that resolves Conlon Frantz & Phelan's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for January 1−March 31, 2010 1645 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 4, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 05/04/2010)

05/04/2010

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1648 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for January 1−March 31, 2010 1643 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 4, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 05/04/2010)

05/05/2010 1650 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of March 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 5, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 05/05/2010)

05/12/2010 1651 WITHDRAWN PER ORDER FILED 5/14/2010.....MOTION to Withdraw Memorandum in Opposition to Objection to Fees (1647 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) filed by Chestnut Firm Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) Modified on 5/17/2010 (td, ). (Entered: 05/14/2010)

05/14/2010

ORDER granting 1651 Motion to Withdraw 1647 Memorandum in Opposition to Objection to Fees. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 5/14/2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 05/14/2010)

05/18/2010

MINUTE ORDER denying 1638 Ms. Angela Dozier−Carters petition to expedite funds. Ms. Dozier−Carter seeks to claim the $1.25 Billion in unclaimed funds owed in

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the referenced case. The Court is aware of no such funds. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 18, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 05/18/2010)

05/19/2010 1653 MOTION to Intervene by BLACK FARMERS & AGRICULTURALISTS ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED (td, ) (Entered: 06/01/2010)

05/24/2010 1652 Memorandum in opposition to re (897 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF, 1574 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees of Chesnut Sanders for 2d Quarter 2009 filed by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 05/24/2010)

06/01/2010 1654 Memorandum in opposition to re (966 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION to Intervene filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 06/01/2010)

06/04/2010 1655 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of April 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 4, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/04/2010)

06/07/2010 1656 Memorandum in opposition to re (1646 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees by Chestnut Sanders for 1Q2010 filed by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 06/07/2010)

06/11/2010 1657 Memorandum in opposition to re 1653 MOTION to Intervene filed by DAN GLICKMAN. (Sitcov, Michael) (Entered: 06/11/2010)

06/17/2010

1658

Monitor's Report Regarding Implementation of the Consent Decree for the Period of January 1, 2009, Through December 31, 2009 (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1, # 2 Appendix 2, # 3 Appendix 3, # 4 Appendix 4, # 5 Appendix 5, # 6 Appendix 6, # 7 Appendix 7, # 8 Appendix 8, # 9 Appendix 9, # 10 Appendix 10)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 06/17/2010)

06/17/2010

1659

Memorandum in opposition to re (896 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF, 1573 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees and in Opposition to Chestnut Sanders Motion to Dismiss Defendant's 5/24/10 Opposition Brief filed by ANN VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 06/17/2010)

06/18/2010 1660 MOTION to Dismiss 1659 defendant's opposition to motion for attorney fees, costs and expenses incurred by Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway from April 1, 2009 through June 30, 2009 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (td, ) (Entered: 06/22/2010)

06/28/2010 1661 ORDER approving the monitor's budget for the period of July 1, 2010 through December 31, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 25, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 06/28/2010)

06/29/2010 1662 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of May 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 29, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 06/29/2010)

07/01/2010 1663 Monitor's Fifth Report on Debt Relief Implementation, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 07/01/2010)

07/01/2010 1664 MOTION for Attorney Fees for implementation work during the period from April 1, 2010 to June 21, 2010 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (td, ) (Entered: 07/06/2010)

07/15/2010 1665 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Second Quarter, 2010 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 07/15/2010)

07/26/2010 1666 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of June 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 26, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 07/26/2010)

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07/28/2010

1667

ORDER that, upon consideration of the Monitor's fifth report on debt relief implementation (filed July 1, 2010), the Monitor shall report to the court on or before September 15, 2010, regarding the progress of the substantive review of USDA's implementation of Pigford debt relief, and USDA's implementation of the IRS guidance for issuing IRS Forms 1099−C to claimants who have received debt relief. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 28, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 07/28/2010)

07/28/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report due by 9/15/2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 07/29/2010)

07/29/2010 1668 MOTION for Attorney Fees by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 07/29/2010)

08/09/2010 1669 STIPULATION Settling 2Q2010 Fee Petition of Phillip Fraas (#1668) by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/09/2010)

08/10/2010 1670 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of June 30, 2010, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 08/10/2010)

08/10/2010

MINUTE ORDER approving 1669 settlement agreement which resolves 1668 motion for attorney's fees and costs of Phillip L. Fraas for the quarter April 1 − June 30, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 10, 2010.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 08/10/2010)

08/12/2010 1671 Memorandum in opposition to re (1664 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for 2d Quarter 2010 by Chestnut Sanders filed by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/12/2010)

08/25/2010 1672 REPLY to opposition to re ( 1664 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(jf, ) (Entered: 08/26/2010)

08/31/2010 1673 STIPULATION re (1665 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for Second Quarter, 2010 Settling Conlon Frantz's Fee Petition by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/31/2010)

09/01/2010

MINUTE ORDER approving 1673 settlement agreement which resolves 1665 motion for attorney's fees and costs of Conlon, Frantz & Phelan, LLP for the second quarter April 1 − June 30, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 1, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 09/01/2010)

09/03/2010 1674 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of July 2010. Signed by Judge Roberts for Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 3, 2010.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 09/03/2010)

09/07/2010 1675 MOTION for Fees, expenses and fee enhancement by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 09/08/2010)

09/14/2010 1676 Monitor's Sixth Report on Debt Relief Implementation, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 09/14/2010)

09/15/2010

1677

MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to (1675 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees of Rose Sanders re Track B Claim of New Communities, Inc. by ANN VENEMAN (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 9/8/2010 Letter to Sanders from Defendant's Attorney, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 09/15/2010)

09/17/2010

MINUTE ORDER: The defendant has moved for an extension of time in which to respond to the fee petition filed by Rose Sanders on September 7, 2010. Because Ms. Sanders is presently travelling and will not return to her office for another week, the defendant was not able to learn before filing its motion whether Ms. Sanders would oppose it. Consequently, the Court will not act on the motion until Ms. Sanders has advised whether she consents to or opposes it. Until Ms. Sanders so advises the Court,

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the defendant's obligation to respond to the fee petition is stayed. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 17, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 09/17/2010)

09/22/2010 1678 OBJECTION to (663 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 356 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 383 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Report and Recommendations filed by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 09/22/2010)

09/23/2010 1679 STIPULATION Settling Attorney Fee Claims of Michael W. Beasley by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 09/23/2010)

09/27/2010

MINUTE ORDER granting (1677) defendant's Motion for Extension of Time to respond to the fee petition filed by Rose Sanders in the matter regarding the Track B claim of New Communities, Inc. 1675 . The defendant shall have 30 days following receipt of the hourly rates that were used to calculate the fee sought and the dates and charges (or provide bills or receipts) for the expenses sought. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 27, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 09/27/2010)

09/27/2010

MINUTE ORDER approving 1679 the settlement agreement resolving all claims by Michael W. Beasley, Esq. for fees, expenses, or other costs incurred in connection with his work on the Track A claims of Howard and Joyce Deselle, Jerome and Debra Bryant, and Luis and Carmen Rodriquez. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 27, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 09/27/2010)

09/30/2010

1680

ORDER that, upon consideration of the monitor's sixth report on debt relief implementation filed 9/14/10, the monitor shall file a report on or before January 28, 2011 (see order for specifics). Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 30,2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 09/30/2010)

09/30/2010 1682 MOTION for Attorney Fees, Costs and Expenses during the period from 7/1/2010 through 9/30/2010 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (znmw, ) (Entered: 10/05/2010)

09/30/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report due by 1/28/2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 10/06/2010)

10/04/2010 1681 ORDER approving monitor's invoice for the period of August 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 10/1/10. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 10/04/2010)

10/04/2010 1683 MOTION for Attorney Fees and expenses incurred by Chestnut,Sanders,Sanders & Pettaway, LLC for implementation work during the period from July 1, 2010 through September 30, 2010 by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 10/07/2010)

10/08/2010 1684 MOTION for Attorney Fees Phillip L. Fraas for 3Q 2010 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Phillip L. Fraas Itemization of Hours and Expenses)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 10/08/2010)

10/12/2010 1685 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Third Quarter, 2010 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 10/12/2010)

10/12/2010 1686 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply, filed by ROSE M. SANDERS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(dr) (Entered: 10/14/2010)

11/02/2010 1687 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of September 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 2, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 11/02/2010)

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11/16/2010 1688 Memorandum in opposition to re (1683 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 993 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for 3Q 2010 (Chestnut Sanders) filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/16/2010)

11/18/2010 1689 STIPULATION Settling 3rd Quarter 2010 Fee Petition of Conlon Frantz by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/18/2010)

11/19/2010 1691 NOTICE of insurance claim by ANGELA DOZIER−CARTER (td, ) Modified on 12/1/2010 (td, ). (DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REMOVED PENDING DECISION FROM CHAMBERS ON WHETHER OR NOT IT SHOULD BE ENTERED ON THE DOCKET.) (Entered: 11/23/2010)

11/22/2010

MINUTE ORDER approving 1689 the settlement agreement resolving all claims by Conlon, Frantz& Phelan for fees, expenses, or other costs incurred for the quarter July 1 − Septmber 30, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 22, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 11/22/2010)

11/22/2010 1690 Memorandum in opposition to re (993 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway L.L.C filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 11/22/2010)

11/29/2010

1692

REPLY to opposition to motion re (1683 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 993 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for 3Q2010 by Chestnut Sanders and re Document 1690 filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/29/2010)

11/30/2010

Leave to File Denied Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 11/24/2010. Appearance Affidavit. (dr) (Entered: 11/30/2010)

11/30/2010 1693 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of October 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 30, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 11/30/2010)

12/02/2010 1694 STIPULATION Settling Beasley Track A Attorney's Fees by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 12/02/2010)

12/06/2010

MINUTE ORDER approving 1694 settlement agreement which resolves motion for attorney's fees and costs of the Law Office of Michael W. Beasley with respect to Track A claims of Jay Price, Jr. #16109, David A. and Terry M. Quaker, #19827, Robert Lee and Elouise Farmer, #18422, and James L.B. Caesar, #22033. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 6, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/06/2010)

12/06/2010

Leave to File Denied. Notice of Insurance Claim filed by Angela Dozier−Carter "Leave to file DENIED" by Judge Paul L. Friedman Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 12/06/2010)

12/14/2010 1695 STIPULATION Settling 3Q2010 Fee Petition of Phillip Fraas by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 12/14/2010)

12/16/2010

MINUTE ORDER approving 1695 settlement agreement which resolves motion for attorney's fees and costs of Phillip L. Fraas for the quarter July l − September 30, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 16, 2010.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (MA) (Entered: 12/16/2010)

12/17/2010 1696 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of November 2010. Signed by Judge Richard W. Roberts for Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 16, 2010. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lcplf2) (Entered: 12/17/2010)

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12/17/2010 1697 Supplemental MOTION for Attorney Fees by ROSE M. SANDERS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 12/17/2010)

12/20/2010

1698

RESPONSE re (1697 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1005 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) Supplemental MOTION for Attorney Fees Seeking to Award Fees For Lack of Timely Objection filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 12/20/2010)

12/23/2010 1699 REPLY to opposition to motion re (1697 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Supplemental MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 12/23/2010)

01/03/2011 1700 Supplemental MOTION for Attorney Fees and Cost and Expenses by J.L. CHESTNUT Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 01/03/2011)

01/07/2011 1701 ORDER that the monitor's request for a total budget amount for the period of January 1, 2011 through March 31, 2011 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 7, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 01/07/2011)

01/19/2011 1702 MOTION for Attorney Fees for 4th Quarter, 2010 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 01/19/2011)

01/25/2011 1703 Monitor's Request for Extension of Time to Report, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 01/25/2011)

01/26/2011

MINUTE ORDER granting 1703 the Monitor's request for an extension of time to report on the tasks outlined in the Court's September 30, 2010 Order. The Monitor shall file her report on or before February 15, 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 26, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lcplf2) (Entered: 01/26/2011)

01/26/2011

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report due by 2/15/2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 01/27/2011)

01/28/2011

Leave to File Denied. Proof of Service Affidavit on the office of the Clerk U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia by U.S. Postal Service Mail Farmers and Ranchers Cooperative Association, Inc. 11/05/2010 Appearance Affidavit Complaint submitted by Dwight E. Brooks ("Leave to File Denied" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 02/01/2011)

01/31/2011

1704

Memorandum in opposition to re (1008 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF, 1700 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Supplemental MOTION for Attorney Fees and Cost and Expenses re Chestnut Sanders' 4Q2010 Fee Petition filed by ANN VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 12/30/10 Sanders letter)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 01/31/2011)

02/02/2011 1705 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of December 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on Febriaru 2, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 02/02/2011)

02/07/2011 1706 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Philllip L. Fraas for 4Q 2010 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Itemized Time Entries and Fees)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 02/07/2011)

02/10/2011 1707 STIPULATION AND ORDER by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 02/10/2011)

02/10/2011 1708 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of December 31, 2010, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 02/10/2011)

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02/10/2011

1709

Memorandum in opposition to re (985 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF, 1675 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Chestnut Sanders re Track B Claim of New Communities, Inc. filed by ANN VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Sample Tinubu bill)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 02/10/2011)

02/15/2011 1710 Monitor's Seventh Report on Debt Relief Implementation, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 02/15/2011)

02/17/2011 1711 ORDER re Monitor's Seventh Report on Debt Relief Implementation filed February 15, 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 17, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 02/17/2011)

02/17/2011 1712 STIPULATION AND ORDER setting forth responsibilities of Independent Monitor. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 2/17/11. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(lin, ) (Entered: 02/17/2011)

02/17/2011

1713

REPLY to opposition to motion re (1008 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) Supplemental MOTION for Attorney Fees and Cost and Expenses Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Response to Chestnut, Sanders Motion to Award Fees filed by ROSE M. SANDERS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 02/17/2011)

02/17/2011

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report due by 6/15/2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 02/18/2011)

02/23/2011 1714 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of January 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 23, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 02/23/2011)

02/24/2011 1715 STIPULATION re (1702 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for 4th Quarter, 2010 of Conlon Frantz by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 02/24/2011)

02/28/2011

MINUTE ORDER approving 1715 settlement agreement which resolves motion for attorney's fees and costs of the firm of Conlon Frantz & Phelan for the quarter October 1 − December 31, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 28, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/28/2011)

03/02/2011 1716 ENTERED IN ERROR.....PER CHAMBERS.....MOTION for Leave to File a $1.25 Billion Personal Injury Claim Against the United States Department of Agriculture and Federal Crop Insurance by ANGELA DOZIER−CARTER (td, ) Modified on 3/3/2011 (td, ). (Entered: 03/03/2011)

03/23/2011 1717 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of February 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 22, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 03/23/2011)

03/23/2011 1718 STIPULATION re (1706 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for Philllip L. Fraas for 4Q 2010 by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 03/23/2011)

03/25/2011 1719 ORDER that the monitor's request for a total budget amount of $712,071.00 for the period of April 1, 2011 through June 30, 2011 is approved. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 25, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 03/25/2011)

03/25/2011

MINUTE ORDER approving 1706 settlement agreement which resolves motion for attorney's fees and costs of Phillip L. Fraas for the quarter October 1 − December 31, 2010. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 25, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 03/25/2011)

04/06/2011 1720 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 1Q−2011 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Phillip L. Fraas Exhibit 1Q−2011)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 04/06/2011)

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04/06/2011 1721 Quarterly MOTION for Attorney Fees Expenses and Cost by ROSE M. SANDERS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 04/06/2011)

04/13/2011 1722 MOTION for Attorney Fees FOR FIRST QUARTER, 2011 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/13/2011)

04/25/2011

1723

Memorandum in opposition to re (1026 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF, 1721 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Quarterly MOTION for Attorney Fees Expenses and Cost of Chestnut Sanders filed by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 04/25/2011)

04/28/2011 1724 Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for First Quarter 2011 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/28/2011)

04/28/2011 1725 ORDER approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of March 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 28, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 04/28/2011)

05/02/2011 1726 MOTION for Hearing re (1494 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees on behalf of Cross & Kearney PLLC by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 05/02/2011)

05/04/2011

MINUTE ORDER denying 1697 the Motion to Declare Attorney Fees and Expenses Due and Payable for Defendant's Failure to Timely File Objections. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 4, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 05/04/2011)

05/04/2011 1727 STIPULATION re (1720 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 1Q−2011 Settling Same by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 05/04/2011)

05/06/2011

MINUTE ORDER approving 1727 the settlement agreement resolving all claims by Phillip L. Fraas for fees, expenses, or other costs incurred for the quarter January 1 − March 31, 2011 1720 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 6, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 05/06/2011)

05/11/2011 1728 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of March 31, 2011, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 05/11/2011)

05/24/2011 1729 STIPULATION re (1724 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for First Quarter 2011 Settling Attorney's Fees and Expenses by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 05/24/2011)

05/25/2011 1730 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND ORDER regarding Attorney's Fees and Expenses signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 5/25//11. (ad) Modified on 5/25/2011 (ad). (Entered: 05/25/2011)

05/25/2011

1731

REPLY to opposition to motion re (1026 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) Quarterly MOTION for Attorney Fees Expenses and Cost and Expenses Incurred By Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway From January−March 2011 filed by ROSE M. SANDERS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 05/25/2011)

05/27/2011

1732

Monitor's Report Regarding Implementation of the Consent Decree for the Period of January 1, 2010, Through December 31, 2010 (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1, # 2 Appendix 2, # 3 Appendix 3, # 4 Appendix 4, # 5 Appendix 5, # 6 Appendix 6, # 7 Appendix 7, # 8 Appendix 8), Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 05/27/2011)

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06/01/2011

DEPOSIT of Funds into registry of the Court in the amount of $909,762.00, received from USDA. Receipt Number 4616039216 (dr) (Entered: 06/02/2011)

06/03/2011 1733 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of April 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 3, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 06/03/2011)

06/14/2011 1734 Monitor's Eighth Report on Debt Relief Implementation, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 06/14/2011)

06/16/2011

Leave to File Denied. Personal Injury Claim by Angela Dozier−Carter. "Leave to file DENIED" by Judge Paul L. Friedman (td, ) (Entered: 06/16/2011)

06/30/2011 1735 MOTION for Attorney Fees Cost & Expenses from April 1, 2011 to June 30, 2011 by ROSE M. SANDERS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 06/30/2011)

07/05/2011

1736

ORDER approving the Monitor's request for a total budget amount of $1,500,979.00 for the period of July 1, 2011 through January 31, 2012. In accordance with paragraph 17 of the Order of Reference, the United States Department of Agriculture shall deposit with the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a sum equal to a pro−rata month's portion of the approved budget within the first fifteen (15) days of each month. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 7/5/2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 07/05/2011)

07/12/2011 1737 ORDER approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of May 2011. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan for Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 12, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 07/12/2011)

07/18/2011 1738 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for 2nd Quarter 2011 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 07/18/2011)

08/04/2011 1739 STIPULATION re (1735 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees Cost & Expenses from April 1, 2011 to June 30, 2011 of Chestnut Sanders Sanders & Pettaway LLC by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/04/2011)

08/04/2011 1740 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 2Q−2011 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Phillip L. Fraas Exhibit 2Q−2011)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 08/04/2011)

08/05/2011

MINUTE ORDER approving 1739 settlement agreement which resolves the motion for attorney's fees and costs of the law firm of Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway with respect to fees requested by the firm for the quarter April 1 through June 30, 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 5, 2011.(MA) (Entered: 08/05/2011)

08/08/2011 1741 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of June 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 8, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 08/08/2011)

08/09/2011 1742 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of June 30, 2011, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 08/09/2011)

08/09/2011 1743 MOTION to hear movants' motion to vacate the arbitration award in the claims of William Burris, Muhammad Robbalaa and Henry Burris by HENRY BURRIS, MUHAMMAD ROBBALAA; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman signed 8/8/11) (td, ) (Entered: 08/09/2011)

08/12/2011 1744 Second MOTION for Hearing on Fee Request by Cross & Kearney PLLC by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 08/12/2011)

08/29/2011 1745 STIPULATION Settling 2Q2011 Fee Petition of Phillip Fraas. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/29/2011)

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08/30/2011

MINUTE ORDER approving 1745 the settlement agreement resolving 1740 the motion by Phillip L. Fraas for attorney's fees and costs for the quarter April 1, 2011 through June 30, 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 30, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 08/30/2011)

09/02/2011 1746 ARBITRATOR'S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS on Fees of Cross & Kearney PLLC in the Track B Arbitration of Alvin Steppes. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 09/02/2011)

09/02/2011

1747

ORDER that, on or before September 16, 2011, any party who wishes to do so shall file any objections to the Arbitrator's September 2, 2011 findings and recommendations as to Cross & Kearney's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Any responses to the objections shall be filed on or before September 23, 2011. Cross & Kearney's motions for a status conference (Docket Nos. 1726 and 1744 in Civil Action No. 97−1978) are DENIED. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 2, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 09/02/2011)

09/02/2011

Set/Reset Deadlines: Objections to the Arbitrator's 9/2/2011 findings and recommendations as to Cross & Kearney's motion for attorneys' fees and costs due 9/16/2011. Responses to objections due by 9/23/2011. (zmm, ) (Entered: 09/08/2011)

09/07/2011 1748 STIPULATION Settling Attorney's Fees for the Track B Claim of Lymon Wilson. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 09/07/2011)

09/12/2011 1749 STIPULATION re (1738 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for 2nd Quarter 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 09/12/2011)

09/13/2011 1750 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of July 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 13, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 09/13/2011)

09/13/2011 1751 ORDER approving settlement agreement regarding attorneys' fees and expenses Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 9/12/2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 09/13/2011)

09/14/2011 1752 ORDER approving settlement agreement regarding 1738 Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs for Conlon, Frantz, & Phelan LLP for Second Quarter 2011 in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 9/14/2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zalg, ) (Entered: 09/14/2011)

09/15/2011

MINUTE ORDER in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF; granting (1057) defendant's unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including September 30, 2011 to file objections to the Arbitrator's findings and recommendations re the Track B arbitration of Alvin Steppes Claim No. 17906, Arbitration No. 069, in case 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 15, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 09/15/2011)

09/15/2011

Set/Reset Deadlines: Objections to Arbitrator's findings and recommendations re the Track B arbitration of Alvin Steppes Claim No. 17906, Arbitration No. 069 in case 1:98−cv−1693 due by 9/30/2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 09/20/2011)

09/16/2011 1753 ENTERED IN ERROR. . . . . DUPLICATE OF DOCKET ENTRY NO. 1754 IN 97−1978. . . . .STIPULATION. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Bensing, Daniel) Modified on 9/19/2011 (td, ). (Entered: 09/16/2011)

09/16/2011 1754 STIPULATION and Order Regarding Termination of Monitor's Paragraph 12 Duties by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 09/16/2011)

09/21/2011 1755 ORDER approving 1754 Stipulation Regarding Termination of Monitor's Paragraph 12 Duties. See Order for specifics. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 9/21/2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered:

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09/22/2011)

09/30/2011 1757 MOTION for Attorney Fees (for July 1, 2011−September 30, 2011) by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(znmw, ) (Entered: 10/03/2011)

10/03/2011

1756

ORDER approving 1060 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF Stipulation of Dismissal of Claims fpr Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Expenses. In re: The Track B Arbitration of Alvin Steppes Claim No. 17906, Arbitration No. 069. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 10/3/2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 10/03/2011)

10/11/2011 1758 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of August 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 11, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 10/11/2011)

10/17/2011 1759 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Third Quarter, 2011 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 10/17/2011)

10/19/2011 1760 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 3Q−2011 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Phillip L. Fraas Exhibit 3Q−2011)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 10/19/2011)

10/27/2011 1761 STIPULATION re (1760 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 3Q−2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 10/27/2011)

10/28/2011

1762

ORDER approving 1761 Settlement Agreement Regarding Attorney's Fees and Expenses regarding 1760 Phillip L. Fraas' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs for the Quarter July 1−September 30, 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 10/28/2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 10/28/2011)

11/02/2011 1763 STIPULATION re (1757 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees Of Chestnut Sanders for 3Q2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/02/2011)

11/08/2011 1764 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of September 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 8, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 11/08/2011)

11/09/2011

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1763 that resolves Chestnut Sanders Sanders & Pettaway LLC's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter July 1 − September 30, 2011 1757 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 9, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 11/09/2011)

11/21/2011

1765

STIPULATION re (1603 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1664 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1646 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1721 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Quarterly MOTION for Attorney Fees Expenses and Cost, (1683 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1675 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1573 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1620 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1700 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Supplemental MOTION for Attorney Fees and Cost and Expenses −− Settling and Dismissing Same. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/21/2011)

11/22/2011 1766 MOTION for Default Judgment as to all respondents by HENRY BURRIS, MUHAMMAD ROBBALAA; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td, ) (Entered: 11/23/2011)

11/22/2011 1773 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Curtis Dixon, 374 Broadview Drive, Jackson, MS 39209; Type of Document Returned: 1750 and 1751 Orders in 1:97−cv−1978 and 1053 and 1054 Orders in 1:98−cv−1693; No new address on file. (zmm, ) (Entered: 12/12/2011)

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11/22/2011 1774 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Curtis Dixon, 374 Broadview Drive, Jackson, MS 39209; Type of Document Returned: 8/30/11 Minute Order; No new address on file. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 12/12/2011)

11/22/2011 1775 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Curtis Dixon, 374 Broadview Drive, Jackson, MS 39209; Type of Document Returned: 1762 Order in 1:97−cv−1978 and 1066 Order in 1:98−cv−1693; No new address on file. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 12/12/2011)

11/23/2011

1767

STIPULATION re (1603 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1664 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1574 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1646 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1721 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Quarterly MOTION for Attorney Fees Expenses and Cost, (1683 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1682 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1675 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1573 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1620 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees, (1700 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Supplemental MOTION for Attorney Fees and Cost and Expenses −− Settling and Dismissing Same. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/23/2011)

11/28/2011

1768

ORDER approving stipulation and order of settlement and dismissal that resolves Chestnut Sanders Sanders & Pettaway LLC's motions for attorney's fees and expenses 1573 , 1603 , 1620 , 1646 , 1664 , 1668 , 1683 , 1700 , 1721 , and their fees, expenses and costs for the Track B claim of New Communities Inc. 1675 , 1697 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 28, 2011. associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) Modified on 12/2/2011 (jeb, ). (Main Document 1768 replaced on 12/2/2011) (zmm, ). (Main Document 1768 replaced on 12/2/2011) (zmm, ). (Entered: 11/28/2011)

11/30/2011 1769 STIPULATION re (1759 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Third Quarter, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 11/30/2011)

12/01/2011 1770 Monitor's Ninth Report on Debt Relief Implementation, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 12/01/2011)

12/02/2011

MINUTE ORDER approving 1769 settlement agreement which resolves 1759 motion for attorney's fees and costs of Conlon, Frantz & Phelan, LLP for the quarter July 1 − September 30, 2011 in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 2, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 12/02/2011)

12/06/2011 1771 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period October 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 6, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 12/06/2011)

12/08/2011 1772 ORDER re Monitor's Ninth Report on Debt Relief Implemendation. The Monitor shall file a report with the Court on or before December 15, 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 8, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 12/08/2011)

12/08/2011

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report due by 12/15/2011. (zmm, ) (Entered: 12/12/2011)

12/13/2011 1776 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of November 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 13, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 12/13/2011)

12/15/2011 1777 Monitor's Tenth Report on Debt Relief Implementation, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 12/15/2011)

12/19/2011 1778 ORDER: On or before January 12, 2012, the Monitor shall report to the Court regading 1. The tasks remaining to complete Pigford debt relief review, implementation, and verification process for all prevailing claimants who may be entitled to Pigford debt relief; and 2. The timeframe for completing these tasks,

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including a recommendation on whether the Monitor's appointment should be extended beyond 1/31/2012, to permit the Monitor to continue to participate in the debt relief review, implementation, and verification process. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 12/19/2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 12/20/2011)

12/27/2011 1785 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Curtis Dixon, 374 Broadview Drive, Jackson, MS 39209; Type of Document Returned: 12/2/2011 Minute Order. No new address on file. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) Modified on 1/10/2012 (zmm, ). (Entered: 01/10/2012)

12/27/2011

Leave to File Denied. Obie L. Beal's notice to monitor "Leave to file denied" by Judge Paul L. Friedman (td, ) (Entered: 01/11/2012)

12/28/2011 1779 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Curtis Dixon; Type of Document Returned: Order [1771 in 97−cv−1978] and (1074) in 98−cv−1693. No new address on file. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 12/28/2011)

12/30/2011 1780 MOTION for Attorney Fees Cost & Expenses Incurred by ROSE M. SANDERS (Toure, Faya) (Entered: 12/30/2011)

01/02/2012 1781 Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees incurred by Faya Rose Toure' for Implementation Work During the Period from October 1, 2011 − December 30, 2011 by ROSE M. SANDERS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 01/02/2012)

01/09/2012 1782 STIPULATION and Order Regarding Monitor's Duties by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 01/09/2012)

01/09/2012 1783 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 4Q−2011 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Phillip L. Fraas Exhibit 4Q−2011)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 01/09/2012)

01/10/2012

1784

STIPULATION AND ORDER REGARDING MONITOR DUTIES: It is stipulated and ordered that 1. Paragraph 1 of the September 21, 2011 Stipulation and Order is amended to permit the Monitor to complete the substantive responsibilities set forth in paragraph 12 of the Consent Decree no later than March 31, 2012. All other provisions of the Stipulation and Order shall remain in effect. 2. The funds to support the Monitor's work through March 31, 2012, shall be drawn from the total budget amount approved by the Court's Order filed on July 5, 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 1/10/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 01/10/2012)

01/10/2012

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: File date corrected for 12/27/2011 mail returned docket entry. Corrected from 1/10/2012 to 12/27/2011. (zmm, ) (Entered: 01/10/2012)

01/12/2012

1786

Memorandum in opposition to re (1781 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1082 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees incurred by Faya Rose Toure' for Implementation Work During the Period from October 1, 2011 − December 30, 2011, (1780 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees Cost & Expenses Incurred. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 01/12/2012)

01/12/2012 1787 Monitor's Eleventh Report on Debt Relief Implementation, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 01/12/2012)

01/17/2012 1788 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Fourth Quarter, 2011 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 01/17/2012)

01/18/2012 1789 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1780 MOTION for Attorney Fees Cost & Expenses Incurred October 1, 2011 through December 30, 2011 filed by ROSE M. SANDERS. (Toure, Faya) (Entered: 01/18/2012)

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01/30/2012 1800 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Curtis Dixon; Type of Document Returned: 1764 Order and 11/9/2011 Minute Order in 1:97−cv−1978−PLF and 1068 Order and 11/9/2011 Minute Order in 1:98−cv−1693−PLF; No new address on file. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 02/17/2012)

01/30/2012 1801 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Curtis Dixon; Type of Document Returned: 1768 Order in 1:97−cv−1978−PLF and 1071 Order in 1:98−cv−1693−PLF; No new address on file. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 02/17/2012)

02/01/2012

1790

ORDER: Upon consideration of the Monitor's Eleventh Report on Debt Relief Implementation (filed January 12, 2012), and for the reasons stated therein, it is ordered that on or before February 3, 2012, the Monitor shall report to the Court regarding 1. The progress that has been made in resolving any remaining questions regarding the debt relief claimants are entitled to receive and implementing the appropriate debt relief in the cases identified in the Monitor's Eleventh Report; and 2. Any additional steps that should be taken prior to March 31, 2012, to complete the debt relief review, implementation, and verification process for all prevailing claimants who may be entitled to Pigford debt relief. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 1/31/2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 02/01/2012)

02/02/2012 1791 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew Josephson on behalf of ANN M. VENEMAN Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 02/02/2012)

02/02/2012 1792 MOTION for Relief from Judgment as to John Tyler's Track A Claim by ANN M. VENEMAN Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 02/02/2012)

02/02/2012

1793

ENTERED IN ERROR. . . . .MOTION for Relief from Judgment as to John Tyler's Track A Claim by ANN M. VENEMAN (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Adjudicator Decision, # 2 Exhibit Confession and Claim Sheet)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Josephson, Matthew) Modified on 2/3/2012 (td, ). (Entered: 02/02/2012)

02/02/2012 1794 MEMORANDUM re (1792 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1091 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Relief from Judgment as to John Tyler's Track A Claim filed by ANN M. VENEMAN by ANN M. VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 02/03/2012)

02/03/2012 1795 Monitor's Twelfth Report on Debt Relief Implementation, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 02/03/2012)

02/07/2012

1796

ORDER: On or before February 17, 2012, the Monitor shall report to the Court regarding the status of the debt relief review, implementation, and verification process, and, in particular, the status of any unresolved questions regarding the appropriate debt relief that individual claimants are entitled to receive. See Order for further specifics. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 2/7/2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 02/08/2012)

02/10/2012 1797 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of December 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 10, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 02/10/2012)

02/14/2012 1798 Monitor's Request for an Extension of Time to Report on Debt Relief Implementation, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 02/14/2012)

02/14/2012 1799 STIPULATION re (1783 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 4Q−2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 02/14/2012)

02/15/2012

MINUTE ORDER approving 1799 settlement agreement which resolves motion for attorney's fees and costs of Phillip L. Fraas for the quarter October 1 − December 31, 2011 1783 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 15, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 02/15/2012)

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02/16/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting the Monitor's request for an extension of time to report on debt relief implementation (see Docket No. 1798). The Monitor shall report to the Court by March 2, 2012. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 16, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 02/16/2012)

02/16/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's Report due by 3/2/2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 02/16/2012)

02/22/2012 1802 STIPULATION re (1788 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Fourth Quarter, 2011. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 02/22/2012)

02/23/2012

MINUTE ORDER approving 1802 settlement agreement which resolves motion for attorney's fees and costs of Conlon Frantz & Phelan for the quarter October 1 − December 31, 2011 1788 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 23, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

03/02/2012 1803 Monitor's Thirteenth Report on Debt Relief Implementation, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 03/02/2012)

03/02/2012

MINUTE ORDER denying 1653 the motion to intervene filed by the Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association, Inc. This motion relates to In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation, Misc. No. 08−0511, not to this case. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 2, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 03/02/2012)

03/09/2012 1804 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of January 2012. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 9, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 03/09/2012)

03/22/2012 1805 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Exhibits 2 − 8 to Motion of Prentiss and Ellen Guyton to Enforce the Consent Decree by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 03/22/2012)

03/22/2012 1806 MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 03/22/2012)

03/23/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting (1805) consent motion for leave to file under seal Exhibits 2−8 to motion of Prentiss and Ellen Guyton to enforce the consent decree in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF; granting (1104) Motion for Leave to File in case 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 23, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 03/23/2012)

03/26/2012 1807 NOTICE of Filing Materials Under Seal by ALL PLAINTIFFS re (1806 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 03/26/2012)

03/26/2012 1808 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3, # 2 Exhibit 4, # 3 Exhibit 5, # 4 Exhibit 6, # 5 Exhibit 7, # 6 Exhibit 8)(ztd, ) (Entered: 03/29/2012)

03/28/2012

MINUTE ORDER directing the Monitor to respond by March 31, 2012 to the facts involved in Docket No. 1806 (motion to enforce consent decree) as she understands them, and to supply the Court under seal with any relevant documents in her possession. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 28, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 03/28/2012)

03/30/2012 1809 Monitor's Response to Motion to Enforce Consent Decree, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 03/30/2012)

03/30/2012 1810 Notice of Filing Under Seal Exhibits to the Monitor's Response to Motion to Enforce Consent Decree, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 03/30/2012)

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03/30/2012 1811 MOTION for Attorney Fees Cost & Expenses Incurred by ROSE M. SANDERS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 03/30/2012)

04/01/2012 1812 Monitor's Final Report on Good Faith Implementation of the Consent Decree and Recommendation for Status Conference, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Attachment 1 replaced on 4/2/2012) (zmm, ). (Entered: 04/01/2012)

04/02/2012

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Docket entry 1812 corrected to attach correct image of appendix. Chambers notified by Monitor that incorrect appendix was attached.(zmm, ) (Entered: 04/02/2012)

04/03/2012 1813 SEALED EXHIBITS to 1809 Document filed by RANDI ILYSE ROTH. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zmm, ) (Entered: 04/03/2012)

04/04/2012 1814 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for First Quarter, 2012 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/04/2012)

04/05/2012 1815 Memorandum in opposition to re 1806 MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree and to 1809 Monitor's response to motion to enforce consent decree filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Sitcov, Michael) Modified on to add linkage 4/6/2012 (td, ). (Entered: 04/05/2012)

04/05/2012 1816 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 1Q−2012 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Phillip L. Fraas Exhibit 1Q−2012)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 04/05/2012)

04/06/2012 1817 ORDER approving the Monitor's invoice for the period of February 2012. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 6, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 04/06/2012)

04/10/2012 1818 REPLY to opposition to motion re (1105 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION to Enforce Consent Decree. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/10/2012)

04/24/2012 1819 ORDER approving the monitor's invoice for the period of March 2012. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 24, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 04/24/2012)

04/26/2012

1820

ORDER that, in accordance with the Monitor's Final Report on Good Faith Implementation of the Consent Decree filed on March 31, 2012, a status conference in this case is scheduled for Wednesday, May 23, 2012 at 2:30 p.m. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 26, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 04/26/2012)

04/27/2012

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 5/23/2012 02:30 PM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (zmm, ) (Entered: 04/27/2012)

05/03/2012 1821 STIPULATION re (1816 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 1Q−2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 05/03/2012)

05/03/2012 1822 STIPULATION re (1814 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for First Quarter, 2012 of Conlon Frantz. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 05/03/2012)

05/04/2012

MINUTE ORDER approving 1822 settlement agreement which resolves motion for attorney's fees and costs of Conlon Frantz & Phelan for the quarter January 1 − March 31, 2012 1814 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 4, 2012.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 05/04/2012)

05/04/2012

MINUTE ORDER approving 1821 settlement agreement which resolves motion for attorney's fees and costs of Phillip L. Fraas for the quarter January 1 − March 31, 2012 1816 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 4, 2012.Associated Cases:

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1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 05/04/2012)

05/16/2012 1823 STIPULATION re (1811 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees Cost & Expenses Incurred by Chestnut Sanders. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 05/16/2012)

05/17/2012

MINUTE ORDER approving 1823 settlement agreement which resolves motion for attorney's fees and costs of Faya Rose Toure a/k/a Rose Sanders for the quarter January 1 − March 31, 2012 1811 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 17, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) Modified on 5/18/2012 to indicate the correct docket number 1811 of the motion (zmm, ). (Entered: 05/17/2012)

05/18/2012

MINUTE ORDER denying as moot 1660 motion to dismiss defendant's opposition to motion for attorney fees. The underlying motion for attorney fees to which this motion relates, Docket No. 1573, has been resolved by stipulation. See Docket No. 1768. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 18, 2012. (lcplf2) (Entered: 05/18/2012)

05/21/2012 1824 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 1743 motion to hear movants' motion to vacate the arbitration award in the claims of William Burris, Muhammad Robbalaa, and Henry Burris; and denying 1766 motion for default judgment. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 17, 2012. (lcplf2) (Entered: 05/21/2012)

05/23/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Status Conference held on 5/23/2012. (Court Reporter Wendy Ricard) Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 05/23/2012)

06/21/2012 1825 Monitor's Request for an Extension of Time to Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of March 31, 2012, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Roth, Randi) (Entered: 06/21/2012)

06/22/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting the Monitor's Request for an Extension of Time to Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of March 31, 2012. The Monitor's report shall be due on July 6, 2012. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 22, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2, ) (Entered: 06/22/2012)

06/27/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Monitor's report on surplus registry funds due by 7/6/2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 06/27/2012)

06/27/2012 1826 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Second Quarter Billing 2012 by ROSE M. SANDERS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 06/27/2012)

06/27/2012 1827 RESPONSE re (1120 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF, 1826 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Extension of Time to File Second Quarter Billing 2012 . Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 06/27/2012)

07/05/2012 1828 Monitor's Request for an Extension of Time to Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of March 31, 2012, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 07/05/2012)

07/05/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting Motion for Extension of Time to File Quarterly Fee Petition (Dkt. No. 1826 in 97−cv−1978; Dkt. No. 1120 in 98−cv−1693). The fee petition shall be due on July 17, 2012. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 5, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 07/05/2012)

07/05/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting the Monitor's Request for an Extension of Time to Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of March 31, 2012. The Monitor's report shall be due on August 3, 2012. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 5, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 07/05/2012)

07/06/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Quarterly Fee Petition due by 7/17/2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 07/06/2012)

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07/06/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Montior's Report due by 8/3/2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 07/06/2012)

07/16/2012 1829 MOTION for Attorney Fees Cost and Expenses incurred by ROSE M. SANDERS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 07/16/2012)

07/18/2012 1830 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Second Quarter, 2012 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 07/18/2012)

07/18/2012 1832 NOTICE of appeal of the District Court Decision dated May 22, 2012 which is being taken to the United States Court of Appeals in the 10th Circuit located in Denver, Colorado by HENRY BURRIS, MUHAMMAD ROBBALAA (td, ) (Entered: 07/19/2012)

07/19/2012 1831 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 2Q−2012 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Phillip L. Fraas Exhibit 2Q−2012)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 07/19/2012)

07/30/2012 1833 STIPULATION and Order by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 07/30/2012)

08/02/2012

1834

STIPULATION AND ORDER: Randi Ilyse Roth shall be appointed as Monitor pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Consent Decree and pursuant to the April 4, 2000 Order of Reference for the sole purpose of reviewing the record and preparing and issuing a Monitor decision in claim number 19985. Ms. Roth may invoice funds currently in the Court Registry to pay for this work. Invoicing procedures will be the same as those specified in the Order of Reference. The due date of the Monitor's last unspent funds report shall be extended until 15 days after the issuance of the Monitor decision referenced above. If the Monitor is not able to issue the decision on or before August 30, the Monitor shall report to the Court as to the date on which the decision will issue. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 8/1/2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 08/02/2012)

08/08/2012 1835 STIPULATION re (1830 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Second Quarter, 2012 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 08/08/2012)

08/08/2012 1836 STIPULATION re (1781 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees incurred by Faya Rose Toure' for Implementation Work During the Period from October 1, 2011 − December 30, 2011 . Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/08/2012)

08/08/2012 1837 STIPULATION re (1831 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 2Q−2012 . Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/08/2012)

08/09/2012

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1835 that resolves Conlon Frantz & Phelan's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter April 1 − June 30, 2012 1830 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 9, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 08/09/2012)

08/09/2012

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1836 that resolves motion of Faya Rose Toure a/k/a Rose Sanders, of Counsel to Chestnut Sanders Sanders & Pettaway LLC, for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter October 1 − December 31, 2011 [1780, 1781]. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 9, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 08/09/2012)

08/09/2012

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1837 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter April 1 − June 30, 2012 1831 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 9, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 08/09/2012)

08/20/2012 1838 STIPULATION re (1829 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees Cost and Expenses incurred 2d Quarter 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,

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1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 08/20/2012)

08/21/2012

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1838 that resolves Faya Rose Toure a/k/a Rose Sanders' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter April 1 − June 30, 2012 1829 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 21, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 08/21/2012)

09/04/2012

1840

NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 1824 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Default Judgment by MUHAMMAD ROBBALAA. Filing fee $ 0.00. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. Parties have been notified.*original notice filed 7/18/12 was sent to US Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit per appellants request* (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(rdj) (Entered: 09/19/2012)

09/05/2012 1839 Mail Returned as undeliverable sent to Curtis Dixon. Type of Document Returned: Court's Minute Order dated 8/21/2012. No forwarding information provided. (cdw) (Entered: 09/05/2012)

09/19/2012 1841 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Fee remains to be paid and another notice will be transmitted when the fee has been paid in the District Court re 1840 Notice of Appeal. (rdj) (Entered: 09/19/2012)

10/03/2012

1842

ORDER of USCA as to 1840 Notice of Appeal, filed by MUHAMMAD ROBBALAA ; USCA Case Number 12−5302. ORDERED, on the court's own motion, that by October 31, 2012, appellant either pay the $455 appellate docketing and filing fees to the Clerk of the District Court, see Fed. R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1917, or file a motion in district court for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, see Fed. R. App. P. 24(a). (kb) (Entered: 10/03/2012)

10/08/2012 1843 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 3Q−2012 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Phillip L. Fraas Exhibit 3Q−2012)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 10/08/2012)

10/11/2012

USCA Case Number 12−5302 for 1840 Notice of Appeal, filed by MUHAMMAD ROBBALAA. (td, ) (Entered: 10/11/2012)

10/11/2012 1844 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Third Quarter, 2012 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 10/11/2012)

10/16/2012 1845 MOTION for the presiding Court Judge to redress Bate's grievance on the merits pursuant to the constitution by THEODORE F.B. BATES' "Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman (td, ) (Entered: 10/17/2012)

10/22/2012 1848 MOTION for Leave to Appeal in forma pauperis by MUHAMMAD ROBBALAA (mmh) (Entered: 11/01/2012)

10/22/2012 1854 MOTION for Leave to Appeal in forma pauperis by MUHAMMAD ROBBALAA (td, ) (Entered: 11/05/2012)

10/26/2012

1849

ORDER of USCA as to 1840 Notice of Appeal, filed by MUHAMMAD ROBBALAA ; ODERED that the motion to appeal in forma pauperis be referred to the district court for resolution in the first instance; FURTHER ORDERED that this case be held in abeyance pending further order of the court. USCA Case Number 12−5302. (mmh) (Entered: 11/01/2012)

10/30/2012 1846 STIPULATION of settlement 3Q 2012 fee petition of P. Fraas by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 10/30/2012)

10/31/2012

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1846 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter July 1 − September 30, 2012 1843 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 31, 2012. Asociated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 10/31/2012)

10/31/2012 1847 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Theodore F.B. Bates's Motion (Dkt. 1845) by DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN, DAN GLICKMAN, ANN VENEMAN (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed

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Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 10/31/2012)

11/01/2012 1850 STIPULATION re (1844 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs for Third Quarter, 2012 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 11/01/2012)

11/01/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting (1847 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) (1132 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Theodore F.B. Bates's Motion. Response due 11/2/2012. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 1, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 11/01/2012)

11/02/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to Theodore F. B. Bates' motion due by 11/2/2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 11/02/2012)

11/02/2012

1851

Memorandum in opposition to re (1132 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) re 1845 MOTION for the presiding Court Judge to redress Bate's grievance on the merits pursuant to the constitution , filed by DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN, DAN GLICKMAN, ANN VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration James F. Radintz)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Josephson, Matthew) Modified on 11/2/2012 to edit relationship (dr). (Entered: 11/02/2012)

11/02/2012 1852 NOTICE of Appearance by John M. Shoreman on behalf of Maurice McGinnis Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Shoreman, John) (Entered: 11/02/2012)

11/02/2012 1853 MOTION to Enforce Consent Order by Maurice McGinnis (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Shoreman, John) (Entered: 11/02/2012)

11/05/2012 1855 Supplemental Record on Appeal transmitted to US Court of Appeals re 1854 MOTION for Leave to Appeal in forma pauperis, 1840 Notice of Appeal, ;USCA Case Number 12−5302. (td, ) (Entered: 11/05/2012)

11/09/2012

1856

Memorandum in opposition to re (1136 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION to Enforce Consent Order filed by DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN, DAN GLICKMAN, ANN VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Adjudication Decision, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Adjudication Reexamination Decision)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 11/09/2012)

11/15/2012 1857 ORDER granting 1848 Motion for Leave to Appeal in forma pauperis Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 11/15/2012. (zmm, ) (Entered: 11/15/2012)

11/16/2012 1858 Supplemental Record on Appeal transmitted to US Court of Appeals re 1857 Order on Motion for Leave to Appeal in forma pauperis, 1848 MOTION for Leave to Appeal in forma pauperis ;USCA Case Number 12−5302. (td, ) (Entered: 11/16/2012)

11/28/2012

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1850 that resolves Conlon, Frantz & Phelan's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter July 1 − September 30, 2012 1844 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 28, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 11/28/2012)

12/11/2012 1859 RESPONSE (Objections) filed by AVA L. BATES, BRAD E, BATES, THEODORE F.B. BATES, THEODORE B. BATES, Jr, KARLA K. BATES−ADAMS, TERRIE L. BATES−BEST; ("Let This Be Filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td, ) (Entered: 12/12/2012)

12/17/2012 1860 Monitor's Report on Surplus Registry Funds as of December 17, 2012, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (Roth, Randi) (Entered: 12/17/2012)

12/20/2012 1861 ORDER re surplus registry funds as of December 17, 2012. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 20, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF,

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1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 12/20/2012)

12/20/2012 1862 ORDER that the parties shall submit on or before January 30, 2013 either separate or joint filings addressing the interest that has accrued on the principal amount in the court registry. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 20, 2012. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 12/20/2012)

12/20/2012 1863 MOTION for Summary Judgment by THEODORE F.B. BATES; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td, ) (Entered: 12/20/2012)

12/21/2012

Set/Reset Deadlines: Parties to submit filing(s) which address the issues raised in 1862 Order by 1/30/2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 12/21/2012)

12/21/2012 1864 Memorandum in opposition to re 1863 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 12/21/2012)

01/08/2013 1865 ORDER approving the Monitor's invoice for work completed pursuant to the court's order dated 8/2/12. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 8, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 01/08/2013)

01/11/2013 1867 MOTION for Order to strike Mathew A. Josephson pleadings and proposed order by THEODORE F.B. BATES Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(td, ) (Entered: 01/15/2013)

01/14/2013 1868 ERRATA by THEODORE F.B. BATES 1867 MOTION for Order filed by THEODORE F.B. BATES. (td, ) (Entered: 01/15/2013)

01/15/2013 1866 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Fourth Quarter, 2012 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 01/15/2013)

01/17/2013 1869 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip L. Fraas for 4Q−2012 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Phillip L. Fraas Exhibit 4Q−2012)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 01/17/2013)

01/17/2013 1870 MOTION for Order asking/requesting the Honorable presiding court Judge Paul L. Friedman to RUle on the Status of the Consent Decree by THEODORE F.B. BATES (td, ) (Entered: 01/18/2013)

01/22/2013 1871 Memorandum in opposition to re 1870 MOTION for Order, 1867 MOTION for Order, 1863 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 1845 MOTION for Order filed by DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN. (Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 01/22/2013)

01/22/2013

1872

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting (1792) defendant's motion for relief from John W. Tyler, Jr., Track A claim; John W. Tyler, Jr.'s Track A claim is vacated; he shall receive no benefit as a result of his claim application (claim No. 12519). Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 22, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 01/22/2013)

01/29/2013

1873

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying (1845) Motion for Order; denying (1863) Motion for Summary Judgment; denying (1867) Motion for Order; denying (1870) Motion for Order in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 29, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 01/29/2013)

01/30/2013 1874 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 1862 Order, filed by DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN. (Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 01/30/2013)

01/30/2013 1875 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 1862 Order, Recommendations Regarding Disposition of Accrued Interest Earned on Funds in the Court Registry filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Frantz, David) (Entered: 01/30/2013)

02/20/2013 1876 STIPULATION of Settlement 4Q 2012 Fee Petition of P. Fraas by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 02/20/2013)

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02/20/2013 1877 STIPULATION of Settlement Regarding Attorney's Fees and Expenses by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 02/20/2013)

02/25/2013

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1876 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter October 1 − December 31, 2012 1869 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 25, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 02/25/2013)

02/25/2013

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1877 that resolves Conlon, Frantz & Phelan's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter October 1 − December 31, 2012 1866 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 25, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 02/25/2013)

02/25/2013 1878 ENTERED IN ERROR.....ORDER approving the Ombudsman's invoice for the period July 2012. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 25, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) Modified on 2/25/2013 (zmm, ). (Entered: 02/25/2013)

02/25/2013

NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: 1878 Order was entered in error. Wrong case. (zmm, ) (Entered: 02/25/2013)

02/26/2013 1879 MOTION for Reconsideration of Memorandum Opinion and Order on the merits under the Constitution by AVA L. BATES, BRAD E, BATES, THEODORE B. BATES, Jr, THEODORE F.B. BATES, KARLA K. BATES−ADAMS, TERRIE L. BATES−BEST (td, ) (Entered: 02/27/2013)

02/28/2013 1880 Memorandum in opposition to re 1879 MOTION for Reconsideration filed by DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN. (Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 02/28/2013)

03/04/2013 1881 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 1872 Order on Motion for Relief from Judgment, 1873 Order on Motion for Order, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,,,, filed by THEODORE F.B. BATES. (td, ) (Entered: 03/05/2013)

03/08/2013 1882 REPLY to Plaintiffs' Objection 1881 to the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order filed by DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN. (Josephson, Matthew) Modified on 3/11/2013 (td, ). (Entered: 03/08/2013)

03/13/2013 1883 ORDER denying (1879) Theodore Bates' motion to reconsider this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of January 29, 2013. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 13, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 03/13/2013)

03/13/2013 1884 Joint MOTION for Entry of Final Judgment by ANN VENEMAN (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Stipulation)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Bensing, Daniel) (Entered: 03/13/2013)

03/14/2013 1885 Memorandum in opposition to re (1149 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) Joint MOTION for Entry of Final Judgment filed by MAURICE MCGINNIS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Shoreman, John) (Entered: 03/14/2013)

03/20/2013 1886 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1884 Joint MOTION for Entry of Final Judgment filed by DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN. (Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 03/20/2013)

03/25/2013 1887 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1884 Joint MOTION for Entry of Final Judgment filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Frantz, David) (Entered: 03/25/2013)

03/25/2013 1888 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1879 MOTION for Reconsideration filed by AVA L. BATES, BRAD E, BATES, THEODORE B. BATES, Jr, THEODORE F.B. BATES, KARLA K. BATES−ADAMS, TERRIE L. BATES−BEST. (td, ) (Entered: 03/27/2013)

03/25/2013 1889 REPLY re 1882 Reply to Document filed by AVA L. BATES, BRAD E, BATES, THEODORE B. BATES, Jr, THEODORE F.B. BATES, KARLA K. BATES−ADAMS, TERRIE L. BATES−BEST; (See docket entry no. 1888 to view document) (td, ) (Entered: 03/27/2013)

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04/08/2013 1890 MOTION for Attorney Fees for First Quarter, 2013 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/08/2013)

04/10/2013 1891 OPINION granting (1806) Prentiss and Ellen Guyton's Motion to Enforce the Consent Decree in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF. An order consistent with this opinion will issue this same day. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 10, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 04/10/2013)

04/10/2013 1892 NOTICE of Settlement Agreement Regarding Attorney's Fees and Expenses by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES re (1890 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for First Quarter, 2013 Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 04/10/2013)

04/10/2013 1893 ORDER that the United States Department of Agriculture shall, within 20 days of the entry of this order, refund the sum of $254,981.14 to claimants Prentiss Guyton and Ellen Guyton. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 10, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 04/10/2013)

04/11/2013

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1892 that resolves Conlon, Frantz & Phelan's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter January 1 − March 31, 2013 1890 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 11, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 04/11/2013)

04/12/2013 1894 MOTION for Attorney Fees , and Costs and Expenses, Incurred by Phillip L. Fraas for Implementation Work During the Period January 1, 2013, to March 31, 2013 by PHILLIP L. FRAAS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 04/12/2013)

04/16/2013 1895 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that the Clerk of Court shall transfer whatever monies remain in the Court Registry to the US Department of Agriculture. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 16, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 04/16/2013)

04/22/2013 1897 Civil Statement (Objections to the two notices of electronic filings) from Theodore F. Bates, Theodore B. Bates, Jr., Ava L. Bates, Karla K. Bates (Adams), Brad E. Bates, Terrie L. Bates (Best).. (td, ) (Entered: 04/24/2013)

04/23/2013 1896 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Pay Claimant's Prentiss Guyton and Ellen Guyton by DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Hinton Declaration)(Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 04/23/2013)

04/25/2013 1898 RESPONSE re 1897 Civil Statement filed by DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN. (Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 04/25/2013)

04/25/2013

MINUTE ORDER granting Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Pay Claimants Prentiss Guyton and Ellen Guyton (Dkt. 1896 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF). An extension is granted until June 10, 2013. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 25, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 04/25/2013)

04/26/2013

Set/Reset Deadlines: Time to pay Claimants Prentiss Guyton and Ellen Guyton extended to 6/10/2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 04/26/2013)

05/07/2013

1899

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that on or before May 31, 2013, Phillip L. Fraas and David J. Frantz are directed to file with the Court affidavits or declarations that describe what representations were made to the Facilitator or Monitor regarding Mr. McGinnis' choice between Track A adjudication and Track B arbitration before the issuance of the Monitor's decision, who made those representations, and on what basis those representations were made. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 7, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 05/07/2013)

05/08/2013

Set/Reset Deadlines: Affidavits or Declarations by Phillip L. Fraas and David J. Frantz due by 5/31/2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 05/08/2013)

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05/23/2013 1900 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re (1157 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) Memorandum & Opinion,, filed by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 05/23/2013)

05/28/2013 1901 NOTICE Class Counsel Phillip Fraas's Submission in Response to the Court Order of May 7, 2013 by PHILLIP L. FRAAS (Attachments: # 1 Declaration)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 05/28/2013)

06/03/2013

1902

STIPULATION re (1894 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees , and Costs and Expenses, Incurred by Phillip L. Fraas for Implementation Work During the Period January 1, 2013, to March 31, 2013 by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 06/03/2013)

06/04/2013

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1902 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter January 1 − March 31, 2013 1894 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 4, 2013.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 06/04/2013)

06/27/2013 1903 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Second Quarter, 2013 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 06/27/2013)

07/16/2013 1904 STIPULATION re (1903 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for Second Quarter, 2013 Settling Attorney Fees of Conlon Frantz & Phelan by ANN VENEMAN. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 07/16/2013)

07/17/2013

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1904 that resolves Conlon Frantz & Phelan's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter April 1 − June 30, 2013 1903 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 17, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 07/17/2013)

07/19/2013 1905 MOTION for Attorney Fees , and Costs and Expenses Incurred by Phillip L. Fraas for Implementation Work During the Period April 1, 2013, to June 30, 2013 by PHILLIP L. FRAAS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 07/19/2013)

08/08/2013 1906 STIPULATION of Settlement of 2Q 2013 Fee Petition of P. Fraas by PHILLIP L. FRAAS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 08/08/2013)

08/08/2013 1907 ORDER granting (1853) the motion to enforce the Consent Decree filed by claimant Maurice G. McGinnis. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 8, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 08/08/2013)

08/08/2013 1908 OPINION granting Mr. McGinnis' motion to enforce the Consent Decree. An order consistent with this opinion will issue this same day. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 8, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 08/08/2013)

08/09/2013

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1906 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter April 1 − June 30, 2013 1905 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 9, 2013.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 08/09/2013)

09/30/2013 1909 NOTICE OF APPEAL TO DC CIRCUIT COURT as to 1907 Order on Motion to Enforce, 1908 Memorandum & Opinion, by ANN M. VENEMAN, DAN GLICKMAN. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 09/30/2013)

10/01/2013 1910 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals docketing fee was not paid because the fee was an Appeal by the Government re 1909 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court. (td, ) (Entered: 10/01/2013)

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10/17/2013

USCA Case Number 13−5303 for 1909 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court filed by ANN M. VENEMAN, DAN GLICKMAN. (td, ) (Entered: 10/17/2013)

12/04/2013

1911

MANDATE of USCA (certified copy) as to 1840 Notice of Appeal, filed by MUHAMMAD ROBBALAA ; ORDERED that the motion for appointment of counsel be denied; FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for sumary affirmance be granted; FURTHER ORDERED that the motions to vacate and to stay be dismissed as moot. USCA Case Number 12−5302. (md, ) (Entered: 12/04/2013)

12/16/2013 1912 Arbitrator's Findings and Recommendations regarding Class Counsel fees for the review of Track A non−credit benefit claims. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 16, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/16/2013)

12/23/2013 1913 MONITOR'S FINAL EXPENSE REPORT, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Roth, Randi) (Entered: 12/23/2013)

12/23/2013

1914

ORDER that any party wishing to file objections to the Arbitrator's Findings and Recommendations filed on December 16, 2013 [Dkt. 1912 in Civil Action No. 97−1978; Dkt. 1167 in Civil Action No. 98−1693] shall do so on or before January 17, 2014. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 23, 2013. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 12/23/2013)

12/26/2013

Set/Reset Deadlines: Objections to Arbitrator's Findings and Recommendations due by 1/17/2014. (zmm, ) (Entered: 12/26/2013)

12/30/2013 1915 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip Fraas 4Q 2013 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Documentation of Hours 4Q 2013)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 12/30/2013)

01/14/2014 1916 STIPULATION Regarding Arbitrator's Findings and Recommendations (#1912), and Settling 1Q2011 and 2Q2011 Fee Petitions (#s1722, 1738) by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 01/14/2014)

01/21/2014 1917 MOTION for Attorney Fees Claimant's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees by Edward L. Scott, Jr. (Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 01/21/2014)

01/21/2014 1918 MEMORANDUM re 1917 MOTION for Attorney Fees Claimant's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees filed by Edward L. Scott, Jr. by Edward L. Scott, Jr.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit A−1, # 3 Exhibit A−2, # 4 Exhibit A−3, # 5 Exhibit A−4, # 6 Exhibit A−5, # 7 Exhibit A−6)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 01/21/2014)

01/23/2014

MINUTE ORDER approving stipulation [Dkt. No. 1916] that resolves Conlon, Frantz & Phelans claim for attorneys fees with respect to non−credit claim reviews requested in the Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs for the Quarter January 1 March 31, 2011 [Dkt. No. 1722] and the Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs for the Quarter April 1 June 30, 2011 [Dkt. No. 1738]. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 23, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 01/23/2014)

01/31/2014 1919 STIPULATION Staying Proceedings on Fee Petition of Phillip Fraas by PHILLIP L. FRAAS. (Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 01/31/2014)

02/03/2014

MINUTE ORDER. In view of the stipulation [Dkt. No. 1919] filed jointly by attorney Phillip Fraas and the government, Mr. Fraas's petition for attorney's fees and costs for work on the Track B claim of Edward Scott [Dkt. No. 1917] is hereby stayed pending further order of the Court. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 3, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 02/03/2014)

02/12/2014

1920

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Sean W. Colligan, :Firm− Stinson Leonard Street LLP, :Address− 1201 Walnut, Suite 2900. Phone No. − 816−842−8600. Fax No. − 816−412−1079 by EDWARD L. SCOTT, JR (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 02/12/2014)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 188 of 203

02/19/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting (1920) motion for admission pro hac vice of Sean W. Colligan on behalf of claimant Edward Scott. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 19, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 02/19/2014)

02/28/2014 1921 NOTICE of Change in Firm Status by PHILLIP L. FRAAS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 02/28/2014)

03/12/2014 1922 NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL by Tamra Tyree Moore on behalf of All Defendants Substituting for attorney Michael Sitcov (Moore, Tamra) (Entered: 03/12/2014)

04/02/2014

1923

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Levi Boone, III, Esq., :Firm− Boone Law Firm, P.A., :Address− 401 West Sunflower Road, P.O. Box 1772, Cleveland, MS 38732. Phone No. − 662−843−7946. Fax No. − 662−843−7950 by LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. BRANCH Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Branch, David) (Entered: 04/02/2014)

04/14/2014 1924 STIPULATION on Attorney's Fees by PHILLIP L. FRAAS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 04/14/2014)

04/15/2014

MINUE ORDER granting (1923) motion for admission pro hac vice of Levi Boone, III on behalf of Edward L. Scott, Jr. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 15, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 04/15/2014)

04/15/2014

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1924 that resolves Phillip Fraas's claims for implementation fees, requested in his fee petition for the 4th Quarter of 2013 1915 , and Mr. Fraas's claims for non−credit claim review fees requested in his fee petitions for the 2d Quarter of 2011 1740 , 3d Quarter of 2011 1760 , 4th Quarter of 2011 1783 , 1st Quarter of 2012 1816 , and 4th Quarter of 2013 1915 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 15, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 04/15/2014)

04/18/2014 1925 MOTION for Attorney Fees by PHILLIP L. FRAAS (Attachments: # 1 Order, # 2 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 04/18/2014)

05/12/2014 1926 STIPULATION Settlement Agreement Regarding Attorney's Fees and Expenses by PHILLIP L. FRAAS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 05/12/2014)

05/13/2014

1927

MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs of Boone Law Firm, P.A. by LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. BRANCH (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit List of Exhibits)(Branch, David) (Entered: 05/13/2014)

05/14/2014

MINUTE ORDER approving settlement agreement 1926 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the quarter January 1 − March 31, 2014 1925 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 14, 2014.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 05/14/2014)

05/24/2014 1928 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Fee Petitions of Phillip Fraas and Levi Boone by TOM VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 05/24/2014)

05/27/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting (1928) defendant's unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including July 15, 2014 to respond to the fee petitions of Philip Fraas (1917) and Levni Boone (1927) in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 27, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 05/27/2014)

05/28/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to 1917 and 1927 fee petitions due by 7/15/2014. (zmm, ) (Entered: 05/28/2014)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 189 of 203

06/23/2014 1929 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen McCoy Elliott on behalf of All Defendants Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Elliott, Stephen) (Entered: 06/23/2014)

06/24/2014

1930

MOTION to Dismiss , and to Bifurcate Consideration of, the Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs of Boone Law Firm, P.A. by DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Text of Proposed Order, # 6 Text of Proposed Order)(Elliott, Stephen). Added MOTION to Bifurcate on 6/24/2014 (jf, ). (Entered: 06/24/2014)

07/07/2014

1931

MOTION for Attorney Fees by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit Declaration of Jesse Kearney, # 3 Exhibit Declaration of David Fierst, # 4 Exhibit Time records, # 5 Exhibit Laffey Matrix, # 6 Exhibit Time Records for Seeking fees, # 7 Exhibit Expenses)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 07/07/2014)

07/11/2014

1932

ORDER granting in part and holding in abeyance in part [#1930] defendant's motion to dismiss and to bifurcate consideration of the fee petition filed by the Boone Law Firm, P.A. Consideration of the Boone fee petition is bifurcated from consideration of the Fraas fee petition. The defendant's motion is held in abeyance with respect to its request to dismiss the Boone petition. The July 15, 2014 deadline for defendant's response to the Boone petition is vacated. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 11, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (MA) (Entered: 07/11/2014)

07/11/2014

1933

SHOW CAUSE ORDER. On or before July 25, 2014, Boone Law Firm shall show cause in writing why the defendant's motion to dismiss its fee petition should not be granted, and if Boone does not respond in the time permitted, the petition will be dismissed. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 11, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 07/11/2014)

07/14/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to Show Cause due by 7/25/2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 07/14/2014)

07/15/2014

1934

Memorandum in opposition to re (1174 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees by Phillip Fraas (1918 in 1:97−cv−01978) filed by TOM VILSACK. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Exhibit Index, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J, # 13 Exhibit K, # 14 Exhibit L, # 15 Exhibit M, # 16 Exhibit N, # 17 Exhibit O, # 18 Exhibit P)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 07/15/2014)

07/15/2014 1935 MOTION for Mediationand To Stay Proceedings Pending the Outcome Thereof by TOM VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 07/15/2014)

07/16/2014 1936 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Motion of Cross & Kearney for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses by ANN M. VENEMAN (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Moore, Tamra) (Entered: 07/16/2014)

07/17/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting (1936) defendant's unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including September 12, 2014 to respond to motion of Cross & Kearney PLLC for attorneys' fees and expenses in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF; granting (1184) defendant's unopposed Motion for Extension of Time up to and including September 12, 2014 to respond to motion of Cross & Kearney PLLC for attorneys' fees and expenses in case 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 17, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 07/17/2014)

07/18/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to Cross & Kearney PLLC's motion for attorneys' fees and expenses due by 9/12/2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 07/18/2014)

07/23/2014 1937 RESPONSE re 1935 MOTION for Mediationand To Stay Proceedings Pending the Outcome Thereof Petitioner's Response to Defendant's Motion to Refer Parties to Mediation and Stay Further Proceedings, and Cross−Motion to Refer to Arbitrator

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 190 of 203

Michael Lewis filed by EDWARD L. SCOTT, JR. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 07/23/2014)

07/25/2014

1938

MEDIATION REFERRAL ORDER granting (1935) defendant's motion for appointment of a mediator through the Circuit Executive's Mediation Program and a stay of proceedings with respect to Mr. Fraas' petition for fees and expenses. This matter is referred to mediation for a one−day session and shall conclude on or before August 31, 2014, unless terminated earlier or extended at the request of the parties. Mr. Fraas' motion for an award of attorney's fees 1917 is stayed during the pendency of the referral to the Circuit Executive's Mediation Program. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 25, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 07/25/2014)

07/25/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Mediation to conclude by 8/31/2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 07/25/2014)

07/25/2014

1939

RESPONSE re ( 1930 in 97−cv−1978− PLF, 1178 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF, 1178 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION to Dismiss , and to Bifurcate Consideration of, the Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs of Boone Law Firm, P.A. MOTION to Bifurcate filed by LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. BRANCH. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Branch, David) Modified to add additional linkage on 7/28/2014 (td, ). (Entered: 07/25/2014)

07/28/2014 1940 Unopposed MOTION to Clarifythe Court's July 25, 2014 Order by DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN, TOM VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Elliott, Stephen) (Entered: 07/28/2014)

07/29/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting (1940) the defendant's unopposed Motion to Clarify the Court's July 25, 2014 Order in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF. The defendant's deadline to file a response to petitioner's cross−motion to refer the matter to Arbitrator Michael Lewis is stayed pending the parties' effort to mediate this matter; in the event the mediation fails, defendant shall file his response to the cross−motion within fourteen days of the expiration of the stay. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 29, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 07/29/2014)

07/30/2014

1941

REPLY to opposition to motion re (1178 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF, 1178 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION to Dismiss , and to Bifurcate Consideration of, the Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs of Boone Law Firm, P.A. MOTION to Bifurcate filed by TOM VILSACK. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Elliott, Stephen) (Entered: 07/30/2014)

08/26/2014

MINUTE ORDER. The deadline for the conclusion of mediation that was set forth in the Court's Mediation Referral Order [Dkt. No. 1938 in Civil Action No. 97−1978], is hereby extended up to and including September 22, 2014. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on August 26, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 08/26/2014)

08/27/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Mediation to conclude by 9/22/2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 08/27/2014)

09/08/2014 1942 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Motion of Cross & Kearney PLLC for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses by THOMAS J. VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Moore, Tamra) (Entered: 09/08/2014)

09/10/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting (1942) joint Motion for Extension of Time for the defendant to respond to motion of Cross & Kearney PLLC for attorneys' fees and expenses until seven days after the defendant receives petitioner's written response to defendant's settlement proposal in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF; granting (1189) joint Motion for Extension of Time for the Secretary to respond to motion of Cross & Kearney PLLC for attorneys' fees and expenses until seven days after the defendant receives petitioner's written response to defendant's settlement proposal in case 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 10, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered:

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 191 of 203

09/10/2014)

09/18/2014 1943 MOTION to Set Aside Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4−6) by LUCIOUS ABRAMS, JR (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Dowdy, William) (Entered: 09/18/2014)

09/22/2014

MINUTE ORDER. The deadline for the conclusion of mediation that was set forth in the Court's Mediation Referral Order [Dkt. No. 1938 in Civil Action No. 97−1978], is hereby extended up to and including September 30, 2014. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 22, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 09/22/2014)

09/24/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Mediation to conclude by 9/30/2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 09/24/2014)

10/08/2014 1944 Memorandum in opposition to re 1931 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by ANN M. VENEMAN. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Moore, Tamra) (Entered: 10/08/2014)

10/08/2014

MINUTE ORDER. The defendant is hereby ORDERED to respond to the motion [Dkt. No. 1943] to vacate the Arbitrator's dismissal of the Track B claim of Lucious Abrams. The defendant's response shall be filed on or before October 24, 2014. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 8, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 10/08/2014)

10/14/2014 1945 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to (1931 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees by Cross & Kearney PLLC Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 10/14/2014)

10/14/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting (1945) Cross & Kearney's unopposed motion for extension of time to file response/reply in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF; granting (1191) Cross & Kearney's unopposed motion for extension of time to file response/reply in case 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 14, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 10/14/2014)

10/14/2014 1946 RESPONSE re (1183 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Mediationand To Stay Proceedings Pending the Outcome Thereof − Defendant's Opposition to Petitioner's Cross−Motion to Refer to Arbitrator Michael Lewis. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Elliott, Stephen) (Entered: 10/14/2014)

10/20/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Cross & Kearney PLLC reply in support of motion for attorneys' fees and expenses due by 10/31/2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 10/20/2014)

10/20/2014 1947 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1943 MOTION to Set Aside Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4−6) Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) FRCP and Federal Arbitration Act Sec. 10 by LUCIOUS ABRAMS, JR (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Dowdy, William) (Entered: 10/20/2014)

10/20/2014 1948 Amended MOTION for Relief from Judgment to Set Aside and to Vacate Arbitration Order in Track B Claim in Pigford Case by LUCIOUS ABRAMS, JR (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Dowdy, William) (Entered: 10/20/2014)

10/21/2014

1949

First MOTION for Relief from Judgment Specifically, Arbitration Order Denying Plaintiff's Track B Claim Under Pigford Case by CECIL BREWINGTON (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Rule 60(b)(4) FRCP, Federal Arbitration Action Section 10, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit Arbitrator's Order Denying Track B Claim in Pigford Case)(Dowdy, William) (Entered: 10/21/2014)

10/21/2014 1950 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply in Support of Cross−Motion to Refer to Arbitrator Michael Lewis by PHILLIP L. FRAAS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 10/21/2014)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 192 of 203

10/21/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting fee petitioner Phillip L. Fraas' unopposed motion [Dkt. No. 1950 in Civil Action No. 97−1978; Dkt. No. 1193 in Civil Action No. 98−1693] for an extension of time to file a reply memorandum in support of his cross−motion to refer the pending fee dispute to Arbitrator Michael Lewis. Mr. Fraas shall file his reply memorandum on or before November 4, 2014. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 21, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2) (Entered: 10/21/2014)

10/22/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Fraas' Reply in support of Cross Motion due by 11/4/2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 10/22/2014)

10/24/2014 1951 NOTICE of Appearance Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Crowley, Megan) (Entered: 10/24/2014)

10/24/2014

1952

Memorandum in opposition to re (1943 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1190 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION to Set Aside Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4−6), (1948 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Amended MOTION for Relief from Judgment to Set Aside and to Vacate Arbitration Order in Track B Claim in Pigford Case . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Text of Proposed Order (Proposed Order))Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Crowley, Megan) (Entered: 10/24/2014)

10/29/2014 1953 REPLY to opposition to motion re (1179 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 10/29/2014)

11/04/2014 1954 STIPULATION re 1917 MOTION for Attorney Fees Claimant's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees Stipulation Staying Proceedings on Fee Petition of Phillip Fraas by PHILLIP L. FRAAS. (Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 11/04/2014)

11/04/2014

MINUTE ORDER approving stipulation 1954 to stay proceedings related to Phillip Fraas' fee petition 1917 for a period of thirty days to allow finalization of the parties' settlement terms. Proceedings concerning Mr. Fraas' fee petition are hereby stayed until December 4, 2014. The parties shall notify the Court upon the finalization of their settlement terms. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 4, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 11/04/2014)

11/17/2014 1955 NOTICE of Settlement Joint Notice of Settlement Regarding Fee Petition of Phillip Fraas (#1917) by PHILLIP L. FRAAS (Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 11/17/2014)

12/01/2014

MINUTE ORDER. The defendant is hereby ORDERED to respond to the motion [Dkt. No. 1949] to vacate the Arbitrator's dismissal of the Track B claim of Cecil Brewington. The defendant's response shall take care to address the claimant's argument under the Federal Arbitration Act, and the response shall be filed on or before December 10, 2014. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 1, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 12/01/2014)

12/02/2014 1956 MOTION for the court appointed neutral to reconsider the denials by AVA L. BATES, BRAD E, BATES, THEODORE B. BATES, Jr, KARLA K. BATES−ADAMS, TERRIE L. BATES−BEST; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td, ) (Entered: 12/02/2014)

12/02/2014

1957

Amended MOTION for the court appointed neutral to reconsider the denials of the valid claims by AVA L. BATES, BRAD E, BATES, THEODORE B. BATES, Jr, THEODORE F.B. BATES, KARLA K. BATES−ADAMS, TERRIE L. BATES−BEST ; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td, ) (Entered: 12/02/2014)

12/02/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to 1949 motion to vacate due by 12/10/2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 12/02/2014)

12/02/2014 1959 Motion by BERNARD BATES ; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td, ) Modified on 12/8/2014 (td, ). (Entered: 12/05/2014)

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12/05/2014 1958 RESPONSE re 1957 MOTION for Order, 1956 MOTION for Order filed by TOM VILSACK. (Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 12/05/2014)

12/08/2014 1960 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying motions and objections filed by Mr. Bates [1956, 1957, 1959] in Civil Action No. 97−1978. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 8, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/08/2014 1961 MOTION for Attorney Fees by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/10/2014

1962

Memorandum in opposition to re (1949 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) First MOTION for Relief from Judgment Specifically, Arbitration Order Denying Plaintiff's Track B Claim Under Pigford Case filed by THOMAS J. VILSACK. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Crowley, Megan) (Entered: 12/10/2014)

12/17/2014

1963

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 1930 defendant's motion to dismiss Boone Law Firm's motion for award of attorney fees and costs; and denying 1927 Boone Law Firm's motion for award of attorney fees and costs. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 17, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 12/17/2014)

12/18/2014 1964 ENTERED IN ERROR.....ORDER approving the Ombudsman's invoice for the period of October 2014. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 18, 2014. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) Modified on 12/19/2014 (zmm, ). (Entered: 12/18/2014)

12/18/2014

ENTERED IN ERROR −− DOCKET #1964 ENTERED IN ERROR. PLEASE DISREGARD. (MA) Modified on 12/19/2014 (zmm, ). (Entered: 12/18/2014)

12/22/2014 1965 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to , MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to (1961 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees by THOMAS J. VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Moore, Tamra) (Entered: 12/22/2014)

12/22/2014

ORDER granting the government's consent motion for extension of time to respond to Cross & Kearney PLLC's motion for attorneys' fees 1965 . The government shall file its response on or before January 22, 2015. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 22, 2014. (lcplf3) (Entered: 12/22/2014)

12/22/2014

Set/Reset Deadlines: Government's response to Cross & Kearney PLLC's motion for attorneys' fees due by 1/22/2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 12/22/2014)

12/31/2014 1966 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Faya Toure 4Q 2014 by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 12/31/2014)

01/01/2015 1967 MOTION for Extension of Time to File time records for Hank Sanders by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 01/01/2015)

01/05/2015

MINUTE ORDER granting (1967) Henry Sanders' motion for an additional time of twelve days to file his fourth quarter billing for the time period October 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 5, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 01/05/2015)

01/14/2015 1968 MOTION to Withdraw by ROSE M. SANDERS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Toure, Faya) (Entered: 01/14/2015)

01/14/2015

1969

WITHDRAWN PURSUANT TO MINUTE ORDER FILED 1/20/15. . . . .Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Motion of Cross & Kearney PLLLC for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses by THOMAS J. VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Moore, Tamra) Modified on 1/20/2015 (td, ). (Entered: 01/14/2015)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 194 of 203

01/20/2015

MINUTE ORDER granting (1968) Henry Sanders' motion to withdraw motion for extension of time to file time records in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 20, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 01/20/2015)

01/20/2015

MINUTE ORDER granting (1969) defendant's consent motion for second extension of time up to and including February 27, 2015 to respond to motion of Cross & Kearney for attorneys' fees and expenses in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 20, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 01/20/2015)

01/20/2015 1971 NOTICE (Judicial) by AVA L. BATES, THEODORE B. BATES, Jr, THEODORE F.B. BATES, KARLA K. BATES−ADAMS, TERRIE L. BATES−BEST (td, ) (Entered: 01/22/2015)

01/21/2015

1970

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that the motion to vacate and set aside the arbitrator's order filed by Lucious Abrams and Sons and Lucious Abrams, Jr. 1943 is denied; Mr. Abrams' motion to amend his previously filed motion 1947 is granted; Mr. Abrams' amended motion 1948 to vacate and set aside the arbitrator's order is denied; and the motion to vacate and set aside the arbitrator's order filed by Cecil Brewington 1949 is denied. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 21, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 01/21/2015)

01/21/2015

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to Cross & Kearney motion for attorneys' fees and expenses due by 2/27/2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 01/21/2015)

01/30/2015

1972

MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to (1966 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for Faya Toure 4Q 2014 by THOMAS J. VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 01/30/2015)

01/30/2015

MINUTE ORDER granting (1972) Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply in case 1:97−cv−01978−PLF; granting (1206) Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply in case 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. Defendant's response to the 4Q2014 motion for fees, costs, and expenses of Faya Rose Toure' shall be filed on or before February 4, 2015. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on January 30, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF. (lcplf2) (Entered: 01/30/2015)

02/02/2015

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to 4Q2014 motion for fees, costs, and expenses of Faya Toure due by 2/4/2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 02/02/2015)

02/04/2015 1973 RESPONSE re (1966 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees for Faya Toure 4Q 2014 filed by THOMAS J. VILSACK. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 02/04/2015)

02/27/2015 1974 NOTICE of Appearance by Andrew Marshall Bernie on behalf of All Defendants Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Bernie, Andrew) (Entered: 02/27/2015)

02/27/2015 1975 MOTION to Dismiss by TOM VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Text of Proposed Order)(Bernie, Andrew) Modified on 3/2/2015 (jf, ). (Entered: 02/27/2015)

03/02/2015

1976

Memorandum in opposition to re (1961 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1198 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by TOM VILSACK. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Bernie, Andrew) (Entered: 03/02/2015)

03/09/2015 1977 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Opposition to Motion for Fees and Expenses by Cross & Kearney PLLC by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 195 of 203

(Entered: 03/09/2015)

03/11/2015

MINUTE ORDER granting (1977) Cross & Kearney's unopposed motion for an extension of time to respond to the defendant's opposition to Cross & Kearney's fee motion. Cross & Kearney shall file its reply on or before March 20, 2015. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 11, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (lcplf2). (Entered: 03/11/2015)

03/13/2015

Set/Reset Deadlines: Reply to response to Cross & Kearney's fee motion due by 3/20/2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 03/13/2015)

03/20/2015 1978 REPLY to opposition to motion re (1198 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 03/20/2015)

03/23/2015

1979

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO DC CIRCUIT COURT as to (1970 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1970 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Memorandum & Opinion, Order,,,, by CECIL BREWINGTON. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0090−4032041. Fee Status: Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Dowdy, William) (Entered: 03/23/2015)

03/23/2015

1980

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO DC CIRCUIT COURT as to (1970 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1970 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Memorandum & Opinion, Order,,,, by LUCIOUS ABRAMS, JR. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0090−4032076. Fee Status: Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Dowdy, William) (Entered: 03/23/2015)

03/24/2015

1981

MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to (1975 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION to Dismiss and Opposition to Petition of Cross & Kearney PLLC for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses for the Track B Claim of Warren Miller and Motion to File a Combined Surreply in Opposition to the Petition by TOM VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Bernie, Andrew) (Entered: 03/24/2015)

03/24/2015 1982 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals fee was paid this date 3/23/15 re 1979 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,. (td, ) (Entered: 03/24/2015)

03/24/2015 1983 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals fee was paid this date 3/23/15 re 1980 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,. (td, ) (Entered: 03/24/2015)

03/25/2015

1984

Memorandum in opposition to re (1214 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to (1975 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION to Dismiss and Opposition to Petition of Cross & Kearney PLLC for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses for the Track B Claim of Warren Miller and filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 03/25/2015)

03/25/2015

MINUTE ORDER granting (1981) defendant's Motion for Extension of Time up to and including April 15, 2015 to file combined reply in support of its motion to dismiss the petition for attorneys' fees and expenses and surreply in opposition to the petition. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 25, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 03/25/2015)

03/26/2015

Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendant's combined reply in support of its motion to dismiss the petition for attorneys' fees and expenses and surreply in opposition to the petition due by 4/15/2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm, ) (Entered: 03/26/2015)

03/26/2015 1985 STIPULATION Regarding Various Outstanding Attorney's Fees by THOMAS J. VILSACK. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 03/26/2015)

03/27/2015 1986 ORDER approving Stipulation regarding various outstanding attorney's fees for non−credit claim reviews during 4Q2011 (##1780−81] of the law firm of Chestnut,

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 196 of 203

Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway LLC. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 27, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 03/27/2015)

03/30/2015 1987 WITHDRAWN PER NOTICE FILED 9/2/2015.....MOTION for Attorney Fees by PHILLIP L. FRAAS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) Modified on 9/2/2015 (zmm). (Entered: 03/30/2015)

03/31/2015 1988 OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 1931 motion of Cross & Kearney PLLC for attorneys' fees and expenses. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 31, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 03/31/2015)

04/15/2015

1989

REPLY to opposition to motion re (1975 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION to Dismiss and Opposition to Petition of Cross & Kearney PLLC for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses for the Track B Claim of Warren Miller and Surreply in Opposition to the Petition filed by TOM VILSACK. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Bernie, Andrew) (Entered: 04/15/2015)

04/16/2015

DISREGARD THIS NOTICE. . . . .NOTICE OF ERROR re 1989 Reply to opposition to Motion; emailed to andrew.m.bernie@usdoj.gov, cc'd 55 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Two−part docket entry, 2. Please file the second part of your document. (td, ) Modified on 4/16/2015 (td, ). (Entered: 04/16/2015)

04/27/2015

1990

Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Pay Attorneys' Fees and Costs and For Relief From the Obligation to Pay Interest on the Fee Award As Set Forth in the Court's March 31, 2015 Opinion and Order by THOMAS J. VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Moore, Tamra) (Entered: 04/27/2015)

04/28/2015

MINUTE ORDER granting (1990) the defendant's consent motion for extension of time to pay attorneys' fees and costs and for relief from the obligation to pay interest on the fee award as set forth in the Court's March 31, 2015 Opinion and Order. Absent further court order, defendant has until August 31, 2015 to pay the fee award in accordance with this Court's Opinion and Order of March 31, 2015; and defendant is relieved of the obligation to pay interest on the fee and cost amounts as set forth in the Court's March 31, 2015 Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 28, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 04/28/2015)

04/29/2015

Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendant to pay the fee award in accordance with the Court's Opinion and Order of 3/31/2015 by 8/31/2015. (zmm, ) (Entered: 04/29/2015)

04/30/2015 1991 NOTICE by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 04/30/2015)

05/21/2015 1992 ORDER directing Epiq Class Action & Claims Solutions, Inc. to transfer certain records in its possession to the National Archives and Records Administration [see order for specifics]. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 21, 2015.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 05/21/2015)

05/27/2015

1993

MANDATE of USCA (certified copy) as to 1909 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court filed by ANN M. VENEMAN, DAN GLICKMAN. ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the District Court appealed from in this cause is hereby affirmed, in accordance with the opinion of the court filed herein this date. USCA Case Number 13−5303. (Attachments: # 1 USCA Opinion)(rd) (Entered: 05/28/2015)

06/24/2015 1994 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Fee Petitions by ALL PLAINTIFFS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 06/24/2015)

06/25/2015 1995 RESPONSE re 1994 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Fee Petitions filed by TOM VILSACK. (Moore, Tamra) (Entered: 06/25/2015)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 197 of 203

06/29/2015

MINUTE ORDER granting 1994 Cross & Kearney's motion for an extension of time. Cross & Kearney shall take note of USDA's accurate observation, as stated in USDA's opposition 1995 , that any petition filed by Cross & Kearney must be strictly limited to the purposes stated in its Notice of April 30, 2015 1991 , concerning Cross & Kearney's entitlement to fees rather than the amount of fees. Cross & Kearney shall have until July 31, 2015, to file any such limited petitions. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 29, 2015.Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF MA) (Entered: 06/29/2015)

06/30/2015

Set/Reset Deadlines: Cross & Kearney to file any limited petitions referenced in the 6/29/2015 Minute Order due by 7/31/2015. (zmm) (Entered: 06/30/2015)

07/22/2015 1996 NOTICE by ALL PLAINTIFFS re Order on Motion for Extension of Time to,, Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fierst, David) (Entered: 07/22/2015)

08/06/2015 1997 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 08/06/2015)

08/20/2015 1998 NOTICE of Change of Address by Phillip L. Fraas Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 08/20/2015)

09/02/2015 1999 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION by ALL PLAINTIFFS withdrawal of Fraas 3−30−15 fee motion Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 09/02/2015)

09/08/2015

2000

MANDATE of USCA (certified copy) as to (1980 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1213 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court, filed by LUCIOUS ABRAMS, JR., (1979 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1212 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court, filed by CECIL BREWINGTON. ORDERED that this case be dismissed for lack of prosecution. USCA Case Number 15−5095; Consolidated 15−5096 and 15−5097. (rd) (Entered: 09/09/2015)

09/30/2015

2001

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 1961 Motion of Cross & Kearney PLLC for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses. The parties shall have thirty days up to and including October 30, 2015 to submit a stipulation agreeing to this determination as a final decision with no right of appeal by any party, or, alternatively, a motion to reopen or reconsider. Further ordered that, within thirty days of the approval of the stipulation, the United States Department of Agriculture shall pay Cross & Kearney PLLC $120,000.00 in attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses, and Stein, Mitchell, Cipollone & Beato, LLP $10,000.00 in attorneys' fees. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 9/30/2015. (zmm) (Entered: 09/30/2015)

10/09/2015 2002 MOTION to Compel Pigford Consent Decree Arbitrator, Facilitator, Monitor and Adjudicator to Produce Written Consent to Opt Out of Both Track A and B in Provision 2(b) of Decree Pursuant to FRCP 23(c)(2) by DOROTHY WISE, EDDIE WISE; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td) (Entered: 10/13/2015)

10/09/2015 2003 MOTION for Contempt of and to Enforce the Pigford Consent Decree by DOROTHY WISE, EDDIE WISE; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman (td) (Entered: 10/13/2015)

10/09/2015 2004 WITHDRAWN PER MINUTE ORDER ENTERED 5/9/2016..... MOTION to Enforce the Pigford Consent Decree by EDDIE SLAUGHTER; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td) Modified on 5/9/2016 (zmm). (Entered: 10/13/2015)

10/22/2015 2006 MOTION for Temporary Injunction and a Preliminary Injunction against Foreclosure Pending Disposition of Pending Motions of Contempt of Pigford Consent Decree by DOROTHY WISE, EDDIE WISE (td) (Entered: 10/27/2015)

10/23/2015 2005 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Motions Filed By Claimants Eddie Wise, Dorothy Wise, and Eddie Slaughter (ECF Nos. 2002, 2003, and 2004) by THOMAS J. VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Josephson, Matthew) (Entered: 10/23/2015)

10/27/2015

MINUTE ORDER granting 2005 Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time up to and including November 9, 2015 to respond to 2002 2003 2004 motions filed by

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 198 of 203

claimants Eddie Wise, Dorothy Wise, and Eddie Slaughter. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on October 27, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 10/27/2015)

10/28/2015

Set/Reset Deadlines: Responses to motions 2002 , 2003 and 2004 due by 11/9/2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm) (Entered: 10/28/2015)

10/30/2015 2007 STIPULATION Concerning the Court's September 30, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order by THOMAS J. VILSACK. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Bernie, Andrew) (Entered: 10/30/2015)

11/02/2015 2008 Wind−down Stipulation and Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 2, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 11/02/2015)

11/02/2015 2009 Final Privacy Act Protective Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 2, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 11/02/2015)

11/05/2015

MINUTE ORDER. Pursuant to the Court's 2001 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court approves the parties' 2007 Stipulation that USDA pay Cross & Kearney $120,000 in attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses and its counsel, Stein, Mitchell, Muse, Cipollone & Beato, $10,000 in attorneys' fees. The parties agree to this determination as a final decision with no right of appeal by any party, making it unnecessary to reach the merits of Cross & Kearney's fee motion. The Court amends its 2001 Memorandum Opinion and Order to delete the requirement that USDA make payment within 30 days of this order and to add the requirement that USDA make payment as soon as is reasonably practicable. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 5, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 11/05/2015)

11/09/2015

2010

Memorandum in opposition to re (2003 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Order, (2006 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Order, (2002 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION to Compel filed by THOMAS J. VILSACK. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Crowley, Megan) (Entered: 11/09/2015)

11/09/2015 2011 Memorandum in opposition to re (2004 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Order filed by THOMAS J. VILSACK. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Crowley, Megan) (Entered: 11/09/2015)

11/10/2015 2012 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by THOMAS J. VILSACK re (2011 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Memorandum in Opposition . Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Crowley, Megan) (Entered: 11/10/2015)

11/12/2015 2013 REPLY to opposition to motion re 2003 MOTION for Order, 2006 MOTION for Order, 2002 MOTION to Compel filed by DOROTHY WISE, EDDIE WISE. (td) (Entered: 11/16/2015)

11/19/2015 2015 REPLY to opposition to motion re 2004 MOTION for Order filed by EDDIE SLAUGHTER. (td) (Entered: 11/23/2015)

11/23/2015 2014 OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 1966 motion of Faya Rose Toure f/k/a Rose M. Sanders for attorney's fees, costs and expenses. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on November 23, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 11/23/2015)

12/09/2015 2016 MOTION to Modify and/or For Relief From Judgment by THOMAS J. VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 12/09/2015)

12/10/2015

MINUTE ORDER granting (2016) the Secretary's motion to extend the time period up to and including February 29, 2016 within which to pay the fees to Faya Rose Toure and relief from the obligation imposed by the Court to pay interest if the fees are not remitted by this date. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on December 10, 2015. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(MA) (Entered: 12/10/2015)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 199 of 203

01/04/2016 2017 MOTION for Order by AVA L. BATES, THEODORE B. BATES, Jr, THEODORE F.B. BATES, KARLA K. BATES−ADAMS, TERRIE L. BATES−BEST (td) (Entered: 01/06/2016)

01/04/2016 2018 Civil Statement from Theodore F.B. Bates. (td) (Entered: 01/06/2016)

01/14/2016 2019 RESPONSE to Motion and Objection (ECF Nos. 2017 & 2018) filed by THOMAS J. VILSACK. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Crowley, Megan) (Entered: 01/14/2016)

01/18/2016 2020 MOTION for Attorney Fees for Phillip Fraas relating to wind−down of the consent decree by ALL PLAINTIFFS (Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 01/18/2016)

01/19/2016 2021 MOTION for Attorney Fees for January 1, 2015 to November 2, 2015 by CONLON FRANTZ PHELAN & PIRES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Frantz, David) (Entered: 01/19/2016)

01/28/2016 2022 MOTION for Attorney Fees by ROSE M. SANDERS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Sanders, Rose) (Entered: 01/28/2016)

01/28/2016 2023 Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees by ROSE M. SANDERS Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Sanders, Rose) (Entered: 01/28/2016)

02/22/2016 2027 SURREPLY response and objection to defendant's attorneys response to plaintiff's objection and motion filed by THEODORE F.B. BATES; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td) (Entered: 02/24/2016)

02/23/2016

2024

Memorandum in opposition to re (1244 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF, 2023 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees of Faya Rose Toure a/k/a Rose Sanders filed by THOMAS J. VILSACK. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 02/23/2016)

02/23/2016 2025 MEMORANDUM by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 02/23/2016)

02/23/2016 2026 STIPULATION Settling Fee Petition of Conlon, Frantz & Phelan [Dkt. 2021] by THOMAS J. VILSACK. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 02/23/2016)

02/26/2016 2028 NOTICE of Change of Address by Phillip L. Fraas Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Fraas, Phillip) (Entered: 02/26/2016)

02/29/2016 2029 ORDER approving settlement agreement 2025 that resolves Phillip L. Fraas' motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the period January 1 − November 2, 2015 2020 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 29, 2016. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 02/29/2016)

02/29/2016 2030 ORDER approving settlement agreement 2026 that resolves Conlon Frantz's motion for attorney's fees and expenses for the period January 1 − November 2, 2015 2021 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on February 29, 2016. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 02/29/2016)

03/09/2016

ENTERED IN ERROR.......MINUTE ORDER. On January 28, 2016, Faya Rose Toure a/k/a Rose Sanders filed 2023 a Motion for Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Expenses. On February 23, 2016, the defendant filed 2024 a Response to Ms. Sanders Petition for Final Implementation Fees. The Court directs Ms. Sanders to file a reply, if any, to 2024 the government's response or a motion for an extension of time on or before March 24, 2016. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 9, 2016. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) Modified on 3/9/2016; Order was entered in this case in error. (zcdw). (Entered: 03/09/2016)

03/14/2016 2031 Emergency MOTION for Order [DN2003] by DOROTHY WISE, EDDIE WISE; ("Let This Be Filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td) (Entered: 03/14/2016)

03/14/2016 2032 MOTION to Withdraw [DN2004] by EDDIE SLAUGHTER; ("Let this be Filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td) (Entered: 03/14/2016)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 200 of 203

03/24/2016 2033 Memorandum in opposition to re (2031 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Order filed by THOMAS J. VILSACK. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Crowley, Megan) (Entered: 03/24/2016)

03/24/2016 2034 REPLY to opposition to motion re (1244 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF, 2023 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by THOMAS J. VILSACK. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 03/24/2016)

03/25/2016

MINUTE ORDER directing Faya Rose Toure a/k/a Rose Sanders to file on the public docket on or before March 28, 2016 a copy of her "Response to Defendant's Challenge to Fee Petition" that she submitted informally to Arbitrator Michael Lewis. The version Ms. Sanders files on the public docket shall redact (1) the identities of specific claims and claimants consistent with 2009 the Final Privacy Act Protective Order, and (2) the amounts of various settlement offers made by the defendant. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 25, 2016. (lcplf2) (Entered: 03/25/2016)

03/25/2016

Set/Reset Deadlines: Faya Toure to file on public docket by 3/28/2016 a copy of her "Response to Defendant's Challenge to Fee Petition". Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm) (Entered: 03/25/2016)

03/28/2016 2035 REPLY to opposition to motion re (1244 in 1:98−cv−01693−PLF) Amended MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by ROSE M. SANDERS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Sanders, Rose) (Entered: 03/28/2016)

03/30/2016 2036 Memorandum in opposition to re 2006 MOTION for Order, 2002 MOTION to Compel filed by EDDIE WISE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(td) (Entered: 03/30/2016)

03/30/2016 2037 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment by DOROTHY WISE, EDDIE WISE (td) (Entered: 03/31/2016)

04/14/2016

2038

MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to (2037 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Declaratory Judgment by THOMAS J. VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Crowley, Megan) (Entered: 04/14/2016)

04/18/2016

MINUTE ORDER granting 2038 Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time up to and including May 2, 2016 to respond to 2037 Eddie Wise and Dorothy Wise's Motion for a Declaratory Judgment. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 18, 2016. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 04/18/2016)

04/19/2016

Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to 2037 motion for declaratory judgment due by 5/2/2016. (zmm) (Entered: 04/19/2016)

05/02/2016 2039 Memorandum in opposition to re (2037 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Declaratory Judgment filed by THOMAS J. VILSACK. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Crowley, Megan) (Entered: 05/02/2016)

05/04/2016 2040 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment, MOTION for Injunctive Relief to prevent Foreclosure, Offset pending the Disposition of this Case by ESTATE OF ROBERT J. PARKER, CARL J. PARKER; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/09/2016

MINUTE ORDER granting 2032 plaintiff Eddie Slaughter's motion to withdraw 2004 his Motion to Enforce the Pigford Consent Decree. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 9, 2016. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 05/09/2016)

05/12/2016 2041 REPLY to opposition to motion re 2037 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment filed by DOROTHY WISE, EDDIE WISE. (td) (Entered: 05/16/2016)

05/19/2016 2042 LEAVE TO FILE DENIED− Helen D. Timmons' Request for an Expedited Formal Hearing Before the Administrative Law Judge, Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction This document is unavailable as the Court denied its filing.. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 5/19/16. (ztd) (Entered: 05/20/2016)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 201 of 203

05/20/2016

2043

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part the Motion for Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Expenses, Incurred by Faya Rose Toure f/k/a Rose M. Sanders, for Implementation Work During the Period from January 1, 2015 − January 28, 2016 2023 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 20, 2016. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 05/20/2016)

05/23/2016

Set/Reset Deadlines: Stipulation due by 6/20/2016. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(zmm) (Entered: 05/23/2016)

05/23/2016

2044

Memorandum in opposition to re (2040 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 2040 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION for Declaratory Judgment MOTION for Injunctive Relief filed by THOMAS J. VILSACK. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Certificate of Service)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Crowley, Megan) (Entered: 05/23/2016)

06/13/2016 2045 REPLY to opposition to motion re 2040 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment MOTION for Injunctive Relief filed by CARL J. PARKER; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman (td) (Entered: 06/14/2016)

06/20/2016 2046 STIPULATION re (2043 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 2043 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) Memorandum & Opinion, Order,, by THOMAS J. VILSACK. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Newmark, Andrea) (Entered: 06/20/2016)

06/21/2016

2047

ORDER approving Stipulation 2046 in accordance with May 20, 2016 Order 2043 with respect to attorney's fees and costs of Faya Rose Toure a/k/a Rose Sanders for the period January 1, 2015−January 28, 2016 2023 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 21, 2016. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 06/21/2016)

09/01/2016

2048

MOTION To Intervene on Behalf Pigford Claimants Who File Track "A" and Track "B" To Freeze the Remaining Funds Allocated by Congress for Pigford Litigation to Prevent Manifest Injustice and Abuse of Discretion Pursuant FRCP 24 by COWTOWN FOUNDATION INC.; ("Let this be filed" by Judge Paul L. Friedman) (td) (Entered: 09/02/2016)

09/15/2016

2049

ORDER denying the Wises' Motion to Compel Written Consent to Op Out 2002 ; denying the Wises' Motion for Contempt and to Enforce the Pigford Consent Decree 2003 ; denying as moot the Wises' Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction Against Foreclosure 2006 ; denying as moot the Wises' Emergency Motion for an Order on Dkt. 2003 2031 ; denying the Wises' Motion for a Declaratory Judgment 2037 ; denying the Bateses' Motion 2017 ; denying the Bateses' Objection 2018 ; denying Parker's Motion for a Declaratory Judgment 2040 ; and denying Cowtown's Motion to Intervene and Freeze the Remaining Funds 2048 . Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 15, 2016. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 09/15/2016)

09/15/2016 2050 OPINION denying all pending motions. An Order consistent with this Opinion shall issue this same day. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on September 15, 2016. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 09/15/2016)

10/07/2016

2051

LEAVE TO FILE DENIED− Corey Lea, Representative for Cowtown Fondation Inc.,'s Notice of Appeal or In The Alternative Writ of Mandamus Intervenor CowtownFoundation Inc., and Core Lea, Representative for Multiple Claimants Before the Secretary of Agriculture Pursuant 1.26 Representation before the Department of Agriculture... This document is unavailable as the Court denied its filing.. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 10/7/16. (td) (Entered: 10/11/2016)

05/25/2017

MINUTE ORDER directing the parties to appear for a status conference at 10:30 a.m. on June 5, 2017, to discuss issues relating to Maurice McGinnis' Track B claim. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on May 25, 2017. (MA) (Entered: 05/25/2017)

05/25/2017

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 6/5/2017 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 29A before Judge Paul L. Friedman. (gdf) (Entered: 05/25/2017)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 202 of 203

06/05/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Paul L. Friedman: Status Conference held on 6/5/2017. Parties to submit a status report to the court by 7/5/17 informing the court on how to proceed in this action. (Court Reporter: Patricia Kaneshiro Miller.) (Entered: 06/05/2017)

06/05/2017

2052

ORDER staying the 30−day deadline by which the U.S. Department of Agriculture must respond to McGinnis' Petition for Monitor Review. The parties shall file a joint status report on or before July 5, 2017. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on June 5, 2017. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 06/05/2017)

06/14/2017 2053 Mail Returned: Minute Order dated 5/25/17 sent to Angela Dozier−Carger, P.O. Box 581, Franklinton, NC 27525; No New Address Provided. (tj) (Entered: 06/19/2017)

07/05/2017 2054 Joint STATUS REPORT by THOMAS J. VILSACK. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Bernie, Andrew) (Entered: 07/05/2017)

07/12/2017

MINUTE ORDER correcting 2052 the Court's June 5, 2017 Order to reflect that the Court has stayed the 60−day deadline by which the United States Department of Agriculture must respond to Maurice McGinnis Petition for Monitor Review, as established in 342 the Court's September 12, 2000 Stipulation and Order. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 12, 2017. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 07/12/2017)

07/12/2017 2055 SCHEDULING ORDER on defendant's motion to dismiss the petition for monitor review in in re: the arbitration of Maurice McGinnis, Claim No. 12512. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on July 12, 2017. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF (MA) (Entered: 07/12/2017)

07/18/2017

Set/Reset Deadlines: Motions due by 7/28/2017. Responses due by 8/31/2017 Replies due by 9/14/2017. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(tj) (Entered: 07/18/2017)

07/28/2017

2056

SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by THOMAS J. VILSACK (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Sealed (Unredacted) Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, # 2 Sealed Exhibits to Declaration of Andrew M. Bernie (Part 1 of 3), # 3 Sealed Exhibits to Declaration of Andrew M. Bernie (Part 2 of 3), # 4 Sealed Exhibits to Declaration of Andrew M. Bernie (Part 3 of 3), # 5 Proposed Order Granting Motion to Seal)(Bernie, Andrew) (Entered: 07/28/2017)

07/28/2017

2057

MOTION to Dismiss the Petition for Monitor Review of Maurice McGinnis by THOMAS J. VILSACK (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Partially Redacted Memorandum in Support (Unredacted Version Filed Under Seal), # 2 Declaration of Andrew M. Bernie, # 3 Exhibits to Declaration of Andrew M. Bernie, # 4 Index of Exhibits to Declaration of Andrew M. Bernie, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Bernie, Andrew) (Entered: 07/28/2017)

07/31/2017

2058

SEALED ORDER granting the defendant's MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL 2056 . Defendant's unredacted Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the Secretary's Motion to Dismiss the petition for Monitor Review in the above referenced matters as well as Exhibits 5−6, 32−37, 39−40 and 43 to the declaration of Andrew M. Bernie are accepted for filing under seal. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on 7/31/17).(ztj) (Entered: 07/31/2017)

07/31/2017 2059 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by THOMAS J. VILSACK. re 2057 MOTION to Dismiss the Petition for Monitor Review of Maurice McGinnis filed by THOMAS J. VILSACK, 2058 Sealed Order,,. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(ztd) (Entered: 08/01/2017)

08/10/2017 2060 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to SONNY PERDUE. Attorney Caroline Lewis Wolverton terminated. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Wolverton, Caroline) (Entered: 08/10/2017)

Case: 1:97-cv-1978 As of: 10/26/2017 10:49 PM EDT 203 of 203
08/17/2017 2061 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by SONNY PERDUE Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Lin, Elbert) Modified event title on 8/18/2017 (znmw). (Entered: 08/17/2017)
08/31/2017 2062 RESPONSE re (2057 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION to Dismiss the Petition for Monitor Review of Maurice McGinnis filed by MAURICE MCGINNIS. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Shoreman, John) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
09/14/2017 2063 REPLY to opposition to motion re (2057 in 1:97−cv−01978−PLF) MOTION to Dismiss the Petition for Monitor Review of Maurice McGinnis filed by SONNY PERDUE. Associated Cases: 1:97−cv−01978−PLF, 1:98−cv−01693−PLF(Bernie, Andrew) (Entered: 09/14/2017)

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

)

CECIL BREWINGTON, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary,

)

United States Department of Agriculture,

)

)

Defendant.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF) Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

OPINION Forty acres and a mule. As the Civil War drew to a close, the United States government created the Freedmen’s Bureau to provide assistance to former slaves. The government promised to sell or lease to farmers parcels of unoccupied land and land that had been confiscated by the Union during the war, and it promised the loan of a federal government mule to plow that land. Some African Americans took advantage of these programs and either bought or leased parcels of land. During Reconstruction, however, President Andrew Johnson vetoed a bill to enlarge the powers and activities of the Freedmen’s Bureau, and he reversed many of the

policies of the Bureau. Much of the promised land that had been leased to African American farmers was taken away and returned to Confederate loyalists. For most African Americans, the promise of forty acres and a mule was never kept. Despite the government’s failure to live up to its promise, African American farmers persevered. By 1910, they had acquired approximately 16 million acres of farmland. By 1920, there were 925,000 African American farms in the United States.
On May 15, 1862, as Congress was debating the issue of providing land for freed former slaves, the United States Department of Agriculture was created. The statute creating the Department charged it with acquiring and preserving “all information concerning agriculture” and collecting “new and valuable seeds and plants; to test, by cultivation, the value of such of them as may require such tests; to propagate such as may be worthy of propagation, and to distribute them among agriculturists.” An Act to establish a Department of Agriculture, ch. 71, 12 Stat. 387 (1862). In 1889, the Department of Agriculture achieved full cabinet department status. Today, it has an annual budget of $67.5 billion and administers farm loans and guarantees worth $2.8 billion.
As the Department of Agriculture has grown, the number of African American farmers has declined dramatically. Today, there are fewer than 18,000 African American farms in the United States, and African American farmers now own less then 3 million acres of land. The United States Department of Agriculture and the county commissioners to whom it has delegated so much power bear much of the responsibility for this dramatic decline. The Department itself has recognized that there has always been a disconnect between what President Lincoln envisioned as “the people’s department,” serving all of the people, and the widespread belief that
2

the Department is “the last plantation,” a department “perceived as playing a key role in what some see as a conspiracy to force minority and disadvantaged farmers off their land through discriminatory loan practices.” See Pls’ Motion for Class Certification, Exh. B, Civil Rights at the United States Department of Agriculture: A Report by the Civil Rights Action Team (Feb. 1997) (“CRAT Report”) at 2.
For decades, despite its promise that “no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program or activity of an applicant or recipient receiving Federal financial assistance from the Department of Agriculture,” 7 C.F.R. § 15.1, the Department of Agriculture and the county commissioners discriminated against African American farmers when they denied, delayed or otherwise frustrated the applications of those farmers for farm loans and other credit and benefit programs. Further compounding the problem, in 1983 the Department of Agriculture disbanded its Office of Civil Rights and stopped responding to claims of discrimination. These events were the culmination of a string of broken promises that had been made to African American farmers for well over a century.
It is difficult to resist the impulse to try to undo all the broken promises and years of discrimination that have led to the precipitous decline in the number of African American farmers in the United States. The Court has before it a proposed settlement of a class action lawsuit that will not undo all that has been done. Despite that fact, however, the Court finds that the settlement is a fair resolution of the claims brought in this case and a good first step towards assuring that the kind of discrimination that has been visited on African American farmers since
3

Reconstruction will not continue into the next century. The Court therefore will approve the settlement.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE The plaintiffs in this case allege (1) that the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) willfully discriminated against them and other similarly situated African American farmers on the basis of their race when it denied their applications for credit and/or benefit programs or delayed processing their applications, and (2) that when plaintiffs filed complaints of discrimination with the USDA, the USDA failed properly to investigate and resolve those complaints. See Seventh Amended Complaint at 4-5. Plaintiffs allege that defendant’s actions violated a number of statutes and the Constitution, but both sides agree that this case essentially is brought under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (“ECOA”). See Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999, at 19.1 The Court certified this case as a class action on October 9, 1998, and preliminarily approved a Consent Decree on January 5, 1999. After a hearing held on March 2, 1999, the parties made some revisions to the proposed Consent Decree and filed a revised

1

Most of the class members are complaining about racial discrimination in the

USDA’s credit programs. ECOA provides the statutory basis for claims of discrimination in

credit transactions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691. A small number of class members, approximately 5%

of the class, complain about the USDA’s administration of its benefit programs, especially its

disaster relief programs. See Seventh Amended Complaint at ¶ 76. The benefit programs are not

subject to ECOA, and the claims against the USDA for alleged acts of discrimination in these

programs are brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. The differences

between the two types of claims lead to slight variations in the burdens of proof and the relief

provided.

4

proposed Consent Decree with the Court on March 19, 1999. The Court now concludes that the revised proposed Consent Decree is fair, adequate and reasonable.
A. Factual Background Farming is a hard way to make a living. Small farmers operate at the whim of conditions completely beyond their control; weather conditions from year to year and marketable prices of crops to a large extent determine whether an individual farmer will make a profit, barely break even or lose money. As a result, many farmers depend heavily on the credit and benefit programs of the United States Department of Agriculture to take them from one year to the next.2 For instance, if an early freeze kills three-quarters of a farmer’s crop one year, he may not have sufficient resources to buy seeds to plant in the following season. Or if a farmer needs to modernize his operations and buy a new grain harvester in order to make his operations profitable, he often cannot afford to buy the harvester without an extension of credit. Because of the seasonal nature of farming, it also is of utmost importance that credit and benefit applications be processed quickly or the farmer may lose all or most of his anticipated income for an entire year. It does a farmer no good to receive a loan to buy seeds after the planting season has passed. The USDA’s credit and benefit programs are federally funded programs, but the decisions to approve or deny applications for credit or benefits are made locally at the county level. In virtually every farming community, local farmers and ranchers elect three to five member county committees. The county committee is responsible for approving or denying farm credit

2

The technical differences among USDA’s various credit and non-credit programs

are set forth in detail in a previous Opinion of this Court. See Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D.

341, 342-44 (D.D.C. 1998).

5

and benefit applications, as well as for appointing a county executive who is supposed to provide farmers with help in completing their credit and benefit applications. The county executive also makes recommendations to the county committee regarding which applications should be approved. The salaries of the county committee members and the county executives are paid from federal funds, but they are not considered federal government employees. Similarly, while federal money is used to fund the credit and benefit programs, the elected county officials, not federal officials, make the decision as to who gets the federal money and who does not.
The county committees do not represent the racial diversity of the communities they serve. In 1996, in the Southeast Region, the region in the United States with the most African American farmers, just barely over 1% of the county commissioners were African American (28 out of a total of 2469). See CRAT Report at 19. In the Southwest region, only 0.3% of the county commissioners were African American. In two of the remaining three regions, there was not a single African American county commissioner. Nationwide, only 37 county commissioners were African American out of a total of 8147 commissioners -- approximately 0.45%. Id.
Throughout the country, African American farmers complain that county commissioners have discriminated against them for decades, denying their applications, delaying the processing of their applications or approving them for insufficient amounts or with restrictive conditions. In several southeastern states, for instance, it took three times as long on average to process the application of an African American farmer as it did to process the application of a white farmer. CRAT Report at 21. Mr. Alvin E. Steppes is an African American farmer from Lee County, Arkansas. In 1986, Mr. Steppes applied to the Farmers Home Administration
6

(“FmHA”) for an operating loan. Mr. Steppes fully complied with the application requirements, but his application was denied. As a result, Mr. Steppes had insufficient resources to plant crops, he could not buy fertilizer and crop treatment for the crops he did plant, and he ended up losing his farm. See Seventh Amended Complaint at ¶ 14.
Mr. Calvin Brown from Brunswick County, Virginia applied in January 1984 for an operating loan for that planting season. When he inquired later that month about the status of his loan application, a FmHA county supervisor told him that the application was being processed. The next month, the same FmHA county supervisor told him that there was no record of his application ever having been filed and that Mr. Brown had to reapply. By the time Mr. Brown finally received his loan in May or June 1984, the planting season was over, and the loan was virtually useless to him. In addition, the funds were placed in a “supervised” bank account, which required him to obtain the signature of a county supervisor before withdrawing any funds, a requirement frequently required of African American farmers but not routinely imposed on white farmers. See Seventh Amended Complaint at ¶ 11.
In 1994, the entire county of Greene County, Alabama where Mr. George Hall farmed was declared eligible for disaster payments on 1994 crop losses. Every single application for disaster payments was approved by the Greene County Committee except Mr. Hall’s application for four of his crops. See Seventh Amended Complaint at ¶ 5. Mr. James Beverly of Nottaway County, Virginia was a successful small farmer before going to FmHA. To build on his success, in 1981 he began working with his FmHA office to develop a farm plan to expand and modernize his swine herd operations. The plan called for loans to purchase breeding stock and equipment as well as farrowing houses that were necessary for the breeding operations. FmHA
7

approved his loans to buy breeding stock and equipment, and he was told that the loan for farrowing houses would be approved. After he already had bought the livestock and the equipment, his application for a loan to build the farrowing houses was denied. The livestock and equipment were useless to him without the farrowing houses. Mr. Beverly ended up having to sell his property to settle his debt to the FmHA. See id. at ¶ 12.
The denial of credit and benefits has had a devastating impact on African American farmers. According to the Census of Agriculture, the number of African American farmers has declined from 925,000 in 1920 to approximately 18,000 in 1992. CRAT Report at 14. The farms of many African American farmers were foreclosed upon, and they were forced out of farming. Those who managed to stay in farming often were subject to humiliation and degradation at the hands of the county commissioners and were forced to stand by powerless, as white farmers received preferential treatment. As one of plaintiffs’ lawyers, Mr. J.L. Chestnut, aptly put it, African American farmers “learned the hard way that though the rules and the law may be colorblind, people are not.” Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999, at 173.
Any farmer who believed that his application to those programs was denied on the basis of his race or for other discriminatory reasons theoretically had open to him a process for filing a civil rights complaint either with the Secretary of Agriculture or with the Office of Civil Rights Enforcement and Adjudication (“OCREA”) at USDA. USDA regulations set forth a detailed process by which these complaints were supposed to be investigated and conciliated, and ultimately a farmer who was unhappy with the outcome was entitled to sue in federal court under ECOA. See Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 342-44 (D.D.C. 1998). All the evidence developed by the USDA and presented to the Court indicates, however, that this system was
8

functionally nonexistent for well over a decade. In 1983, OCREA essentially was dismantled and complaints that were filed were never processed, investigated or forwarded to the appropriate agencies for conciliation. As a result, farmers who filed complaints of discrimination never received a response, or if they did receive a response it was a cursory denial of relief. In some cases, OCREA staff simply threw discrimination complaints in the trash without ever responding to or investigating them. In other cases, even if there was a finding of discrimination, the farmer never received any relief.
In December of 1996, Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman appointed a Civil Rights Action Team (“CRAT”) to “take a hard look at the issues and make strong recommendations for change.” See CRAT Report at 3. In February of 1997, CRAT concluded that “[m]inority farmers have lost significant amounts of land and potential farm income as a result of discrimination by FSA [Farm Services Agency] programs and the programs of its predecessor agencies, ASCS [Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service] and FmHA [Farmers Home Administration]. . . . The process for resolving complaints has failed. Minority and limitedresource customers believe USDA has not acted in good faith on the complaints. Appeals are too often delayed and for too long. Favorable decisions are too often reversed.” Id. at 30-31.
Also in February of 1997, the Office of the Inspector General of the USDA issued a report to Secretary Glickman stating that the USDA had a backlog of complaints of discrimination that had never been processed, investigated or resolved. See Pls’ Motion for Class Certification, Exh. A (Evaluation Report for the Secretary on Civil Rights Issues). The Report found that immediate action was needed to clear the backlog of complaints, that the “program discrimination complaint process at [the Farm Services Agency] lacks integrity, direction, and
9

accountability,” id. at 6, and that “[s]taffing problems, obsolete procedures, and little direction from management have resulted in a climate of disorder within the civil rights staff at FSA.” Id. at 1.
The acknowledgment by the USDA that the discrimination complaints had never been processed, however, came too late for many African American farmers. ECOA has a two year statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f). If the underlying discrimination alleged by the farmer had taken place more than two years prior to the filing of an action in federal court, the government would raise a statute of limitations defense to bar the farmer’s claims. For instance, some class members in this case had filed their complaints of discrimination with the USDA in 1983 for acts of discrimination that allegedly occurred in 1982 or 1983. If the farmer waited for the USDA to respond to his discrimination complaint and did not file an action in court until he discovered in 1997 that the USDA had stopped responding to discrimination complaints, the government would argue that any claim under ECOA was barred by the statute of limitations.
In 1998, Congress provided relief to plaintiffs with respect to the statute of limitations problem by passing legislation that tolls the statute of limitations for all those who filed discrimination complaints with the Department of Agriculture before July 1, 1997, and who allege discrimination at any time during the period beginning on January 1, 1981 and ending on or before December 31, 1996. See Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2297, Notes).
B. Procedural Background
10

From the beginning, this case has been a contentious and hard fought battle on both sides. The original complaint in this action was filed on August 28, 1997, by three African American farmers representing a putative class of 641 African American farmers. At an initial status conference on October 30, 1997, plaintiffs requested that the case be referred to Magistrate Judge Alan Kay for the purpose of discussing settlement. The government opposed that request. The Court refused to require the government to engage in settlement negotiations if it was not prepared to do so in good faith and with an open mind, but it made clear that the case would move quickly.
From plaintiffs’ perspective, the most important pieces of evidence necessary to ensure speedy resolution of the case were the files of the individual farmers that were held by the government. The Court ordered both sides to comply with their obligations under Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by November 14, 1997, and it ordered the government to provide plaintiffs with any files in its possession on any farmer who was part of the putative class. See Order of November 4, 1997. The government complied with the Court’s discovery ruling, and since then has continued to provide class counsel with the files of putative class members that it has. See Def’s November 17, 1997, Report to the Court.
In the meantime, a number of motions to intervene were filed on behalf of putative class members represented by other attorneys. The two attorneys who originally had filed the Pigford action, Mr. Alexander Pires and Mr. Philip Fraas, stated in open court that any attorney was welcome to serve as of counsel in the case, on the condition that he or she would agree that (1) any compensation would be provided only under the attorneys’ fees provisions of ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d), or other statutory fee-shifting provisions, and (2) he or she would neither
11

collect any fees from individual farmers nor enter into a contingent fee arrangement by which the attorney would take a percentage of the farmer’s settlement or award. Class counsel also represented that any putative class member on whose behalf a motion to intervene was filed would be added as a named plaintiff in an amended complaint.
The motions to intervene subsequently were withdrawn, and a number of lawyers entered appearances as of counsel for plaintiffs. The resulting team of lawyers in the case represents an extraordinary range of experience, specialties and geography: Mr. Pires and Mr. Fraas, both of Washington D.C., have represented farmers in cases against the Department of Agriculture for many years; Mr. J.L. Chestnut from Selma, Alabama, Mr. Othello Cross from Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and Mr. Dennis Sweet, from Jackson, Mississippi, all are experienced civil rights lawyers; Mr. T. Roe Frazer from Jackson, Mississippi, and Mr. Gerard Lear of Arlington, Virginia both are complex litigation and class action specialists. In addition, Mr. Hubbard Saunders, IV, an attorney from Jackson, Mississippi with nearly twenty-five years of experience, and Mr. Willie Smith from Fresno, California have worked on the case.
By mid-November of 1997, the government had rethought its original position with respect to mediation and agreed to explore the option of settlement. The parties quickly agreed upon a mediator, Mr. Michael Lewis, but an agreement on the details of the mediation process required a number of status hearings and conference calls. Finally, in late December the parties agreed to stay the case for a period of six months during which time they would pursue mediation. The parties agreed to “commence” settlement discussions on a case-by-case basis but left open the possibility of discussing a global resolution of the case. See Order of December 24, 1997.
12

At a status conference just over two months later, however, there appeared to be a fundamental disagreement about the process of mediation: plaintiffs wanted to negotiate a settlement structure that would address the claims of all putative class members while the government continued to want to mediate claims on a case-by-case basis. Plaintiffs’ counsel, in particular Mr. J.L. Chestnut, argued that the stay had to be lifted, legal issues briefed and decided, and a prompt and firm trial date set. If mediation continued on a case-by-case basis, Mr. Chestnut argued, “Well, Your Honor can look at my gray hair; I won’t live that long. Many of my clients won’t live that long. . . . Please, please give my people a trial date. It took us, Judge, 15 long miserable years to get here and now they want to go case by case. That will be another 15 years of injustice. The only way you can stop it, Your Honor, is a straightforward statement to the government: Settle it or try it.” Transcript of Hearing of March 5, 1998, at 37-39.
The Court lifted the stay so that the parties could brief plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the statute of limitations. See Order of March 6, 1998. The Court also set a trial date of February 1, 1999. Id. Upon the representations of the parties that they wanted to continue trying to mediate the case with Mr. Lewis, the Court also extended the time for mediation. See Order of April 6, 1998.
In the meantime, plaintiffs had filed a second putative class action, Brewington v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 98-1693. The putative class in Brewington included those who had filed their discrimination complaints with the USDA after February 21, 1997, the cutoff date for the putative Pigford class, but before July 7, 1998, the filing date of Brewington. With the exception of the date of filing of discrimination complaints, the allegations of the Brewington complaint mirrored those of the Pigford complaint.
13

On October 9, 1998, the Court granted the motion for class certification in Pigford. The Court also ordered the parties jointly to file a draft notice to class members by October 30, 1998. At a status hearing on October 13, 1998, plaintiffs informed the Court that Congress had passed a bill that would toll the statute of limitations for African American farmers who had filed complaints of discrimination with the USDA and that they would be withdrawing their motion for partial summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue as soon as the President signed the bill into law because that motion then would be unnecessary. On October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed into law the bill tolling the statute of limitations that had been enacted by Congress. See Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2297, Notes). The waiver of the statute of limitations provides that “a civil action to obtain relief with respect to the discrimination alleged in an eligible complaint, if commenced not later than 2 years after the enactment of this Act, shall not be barred by any statute of limitations.” An “eligible complaint” is defined, in relevant part, as “a nonemployment related complaint that was filed with the Department of Agriculture before July 1, 1997 and alleges discrimination at any time during the period beginning on January 1, 1981 and ending December 31, 1996” in violation of ECOA or “in the administration of a commodity program or a disaster assistance program.” See id.
Faced with a February 1, 1999, trial date, the parties continued their efforts at mediation with the help of Mr. Lewis. At some point after the March 5, 1998 status hearing, the focus of negotiations shifted from case-by-case analysis to structuring a global resolution of the claims of all class members. By December 1998, the parties had informed the Court that they
14

were very close to agreeing upon a global settlement of plaintiffs’ claims in both Pigford and Brewington. Finally, on January 5, 1999, the parties filed with the Court (1) a motion to consolidate the two cases, (2) a motion to alter the definition of the class certified in Pigford to include members of the Brewington action and to certify the class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (3) a motion for preliminary approval of a proposed Consent Decree, and (4) a notice to class members. The Court consolidated the two cases, preliminarily approved the Consent Decree, approved the notice to class members, notified class members of their right to file written objections by February 15, 1999, and scheduled a fairness hearing for March 2, 1999.
Within ten days after the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree, the facilitator mailed a copy of the Notice of Class Certification and Proposed Class Settlement to all then-known members of the class.3 The facilitator also arranged a print notification program with one-quarter page advertisements in 26 general circulation newspapers for January 21, 1999, and in 100 African-American newspapers between January 13, 1999 and January 27, 1999. See Def’s Memorandum in Support of Consent Decree (Declaration of Jeanne C. Finegan). The facilitator also arranged to have a full page advertisement announcing the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing placed in the editions of TV Guide that were distributed in an 18-state region, and a half page advertisement in the national edition of

3

The “facilitator” is the Poorman-Douglas Corporation. See Consent Decree at

¶ 1(i). Among other responsibilities, the facilitator is required to mail copies of the Notice of

Class Certification and Proposed Class Settlement to all known class members within ten days of

the Court’s preliminary approval of the proposed Consent Decree and to undertake an advertising

campaign notifying potential class members of the class certification and proposed class

settlement. See id. at ¶¶ 3, 4.

15

Jet Magazine. See id. In addition, the facilitator aired 44 commercials announcing the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing on the Black Entertainment Network and aired 18 similar commercials on the Cable News Network over the course of a two-week period. The facilitator estimates that on average, the print and television notice campaign “reached 87 percent of African-American farm operators, managers or others in farm-related industries, an average frequency of 2.4 times.” Id. at 6. As of February 19, 1999, the facilitator had received 15,132 telephone calls as a result of its notification campaign. Id. at 7.
The USDA exerted efforts to obtain the assistance of community based organizations, including those organizations that focus on African American and/or agricultural issues, in communicating to class members and potential class members the fact that the Court had preliminarily approved the Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing. Def’s Memorandum in Support of Consent Decree (Declaration of David H. Harris). USDA officials also were notified that, to the extent possible, they had an obligation to communicate to class members information about the Consent Decree and the fairness hearing. The Court posted a copy of the proposed Consent Decree and the Notice of Class Certification on the Internet Website of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Finally, class counsel held meetings in counties throughout the country, particularly in the South, to notify farmers of the settlement, the process for filing a claim package and the time, place and purpose of the fairness hearing.
The Court timely received approximately eighteen written objections from organizations or individuals. See Order of February 25, 1999. The Court also received a number
16

of letters after the February 15, 1999 deadline which it also has considered. With the exception of one objection filed after the hearing, see Order of March 11, 1999, the Court has considered all letters and filings received before and since the hearing that have expressed objections to or comments on the proposed Consent Decree. Class counsel and counsel for the government also filed memoranda in support of the proposed Consent Decree and supplemental responses to the objections raised.
The Court conducted a fairness hearing on March 2, 1999, which lasted an entire day. The Court allocated time for all objectors who previously had filed written objections to the Consent Decree and also allocated time at the end of the day for others who wished to express their views. See Order of February 25, 1999. The Court provided time for class counsel and counsel for the government to explain the proposed Consent Decree and to discuss their view of its fairness. The Court heard from representatives of eight organizations that had filed written objections, six individuals who had filed written objections and ten individuals who had not filed written objections. The Court also heard from class counsel, counsel for the government and the mediator.
After the hearing, the Court sent a letter to the parties summarizing some of the objections that had been raised at the hearing and suggesting changes to the proposed Consent Decree that might alleviate some of the concerns raised. The Court indicated that it would not issue a final ruling on the fairness of the proposed Consent Decree until March 19, 1999, in the event that the parties wanted to file a revised proposed Consent Decree addressing the concerns raised at the hearing and by the Court. By letter of March 19, 1999, the parties transmitted to the Court a revised proposed Consent Decree which includes those changes or clarifications that the
17

parties believed they could make to the proposed Consent Decree without fundamentally altering the framework and basis for their agreement. The Court posted the revised Consent Decree to the Court’s Internet Website and issued an order granting any objector leave to file any comments with respect to the revisions to the proposed Consent Decree by March 29, 1999. The revised proposed Consent Decree now is before the Court to determine whether it is fair, reasonable and adequate.
II. CLASS CERTIFICATION The Court originally certified a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for purposes of determining liability. The class was defined as
All African-American farmers who (1) farmed between January 1, 1983, and February 21, 1997; and (2) applied, during that time period, for participation in a federal farm program with USDA, and as a direct result of a determination by USDA in response to said application, believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race, and filed a written discrimination complaint with USDA in that time period. Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. at 352. Plaintiffs had asserted that the class could be certified under either Rule 23(b)(2) or Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the Court found that it was most appropriate for purposes of determining liability to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2), governing class actions seeking primarily injunctive or declaratory relief. At the time, the Court also noted that “[i]f liability is found and the case reaches the remedy stage, the Court will have to determine the most appropriate mechanism for determining remedy. It is possible that at that point it would be appropriate to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). . . .” Id. at 351 (citing Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (in class action
18

seeking both injunctive and monetary relief, court may adopt “hybrid” approach and certify (b)(2)
class for former and (b)(3) class for latter)).
By Order of January 5, 1999, upon motion of the parties, the Court vacated the
Order certifying the class and certified a new class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The newly certified class is defined as:
All African American farmers who (1) farmed, or attempted to farm, between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996; (2) applied to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) during that time period for participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program and who believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race in USDA's response to that application; and (3) filed a discrimination complaint on or before July 1, 1997, regarding USDA's treatment of such farm credit or benefit application.
Order of January 5, 1999.
There are three changes to the substantive definition of the class. The first change
relates to the time frame within which a class member is required to have filed his or her
discrimination complaint with the USDA. Under the original class definition, a class member was
required to have filed his complaint with the USDA before February 21, 1997. The putative class
in Brewington included those who had filed their complaints of discrimination with the USDA
between February 21, 1997, the cutoff date in Pigford, and July 7, 1998, the date of filing of the
Brewington action.
The definition of the class certified by Order of January 5, 1999, modifies the class
definition so that the filing date is consistent with the recently-enacted legislation tolling the
statute of limitations. See Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and
19

Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2297, Notes). The legislation specifies that in order to toll the statute of limitations, a farmer must have filed his complaint of discrimination with the USDA before July 1, 1997, and the new class definition includes the same cut-off date. The resulting class has a broader definition than the original Pigford class but a slightly narrower definition than the proposed class definition in Brewington. The members of the proposed Brewington class who are not a part of the newly certified class -- that is, those who filed discrimination complaints after July 1, 1997 -- are on a different legal footing because the statute of limitations has not been tolled for them and resolution of their claims therefore is not appropriate in this action.
The second change also involves timing issues. The original class definition specified that class members must have farmed between January 1, 1983, and February 21, 1997, and applied for a credit or benefit program during that same time period. The definition of the class certified by Order of January 5, 1999, requires class members to have farmed or attempted to farm between January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1996, and to have applied for a credit or benefit program during that time period. As with the changed discrimination complaint filing dates, this change in class definition is consistent with the recently-enacted legislation tolling the statute of limitations. See Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2297, Notes).
The third change relates to the way in which a class member’s complaint of discrimination was transmitted to the USDA. Under the original class definition, a class member must have filed a “written” complaint of discrimination with the USDA. The revised class
20

definition provides that the class member must have “filed a discrimination complaint,” and under the terms of the proposed Consent Decree, class members who have participated in “listening sessions” or have complained to members of Congress in certain case are deemed to have “filed” a discrimination complaint. See Consent Decree at ¶ 1(h). None of the substantive changes to the class definition in any way affects the Court’s analysis or conclusion that the case properly is certified as a class action. See Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. at 344-45.
The primary difference between the class certified by the Court on October 9, 1998 and the class certified by the Court on January 5, 1999, is more procedural than substantive: the former was certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for purposes of determining whether the USDA is liable to class members and the latter was certified for all purposes pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).4 Rule 23 provides that all class members in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action are entitled to notice and an opportunity to exclude themselves from -- or “opt out” of -- the class and pursue individual remedies. See Rule 23(c)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P. The Rule contains no explicit opt-out provision with respect to a class certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2), although a court may have discretion to permit class members to opt out of the class in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions. See Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d at 92-95. The

4

An action may appropriately be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds

generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or

corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.”

An action may appropriately be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the Court finds that “the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”

21

parties in this case agreed that it was more appropriate -- and fairer to members of the class -- to ask the Court to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3) for all purposes, particularly since the proposed settlement involves primarily monetary relief. See id. at 95. The decision to certify the class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) was made largely in order to allow class members to opt out of the class if they wanted to pursue their remedies individually either before the USDA or by separate court action.
The Court already has determined that a class exists and that the class meets the four criteria of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. at 346-50. Because the Court has certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it also must ensure that the separate and additional requirements of (b)(3) are satisfied before approving the proposed settlement. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622 (1997) (court’s fairness analysis for settlement purposes under Rule 23(e) cannot substitute for determination whether class is appropriately certified in the first place); Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227, 234 (D.C. Cir.) (requirements of predominance and superiority in subsection (b)(3) are additional to requirements of subsection (a) which apply to all class actions), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 576 (1998).
Rule 23(b)(3) requires the Court to find (1) that questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and (2) that a class action is “superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Rule 23(b)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. It is designed to cover cases in which a class action would promote “‘uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.’ The Advisory Committee had
22

dominantly in mind vindication of ‘the right of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.’” Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. at 615, 617 (quoting Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P., Adv. Comm. Notes). This is just such a case.
The ultimate settlement of this action envisions the creation of a mechanism on a class-wide basis that will then be utilized to resolve the individual claims of class members outside the traditional litigation process, most of them (Track A) in a rather formulaic way. Most members of the class lack documentation of the allegedly discriminatory transactions at issue. Without any documentation of those transactions, it would be difficult if not impossible for an individual farmer to prevail in a suit in federal court under a traditional preponderance of the evidence standard. The parties acknowledge, however, that it is not the fault of class members that they lack records. Since class members’ lack of documentation is at least in part attributable to the passage of time which has been exacerbated by the USDA’s failure to timely process complaints of discrimination, there is a common issue of whether and how best to provide relief to class members who lack documentation, and that common issue “predominate[s] over any questions affecting only individual members.” See Rule 23(b)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. This class action and its settlement as proposed in the Consent Decree provide a mechanism to address that common issue. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. at 619 (“Settlement is relevant to a class certification”).
In addition to the lack of documentation making individual adjudication of most claims so difficult, the sheer size of the class makes the prospect of individual adjudication of damages virtually unmanageable. For this or any other court to adjudicate the individual claims of
23

the 15,000 to 20,000 African American farmers now estimated to be members of the class would take years or perhaps even a decade or more. Any “fair and efficient” resolution of the claims therefore necessitates the implementation of some sort of class-wide mechanism such as the creative and speedy Track A/Track B procedures proposed by the parties in the Consent Decree. The Court therefore finds that “a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” See Rule 23(b)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. The Court concludes that this action appropriately is certified for resolution pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The remaining question is whether the proposed Consent Decree is fair, adequate and reasonable under Rule 23(e).
III. PROVISIONS OF PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE The proposed Consent Decree, as revised after the fairness hearing and jointly filed by the parties on March 19, 1999, is a negotiated settlement that resolves all of the claims raised by plaintiffs in the Seventh Amended Complaint. The purpose of the Consent Decree is to ensure that in the future all class members in their dealings with the USDA will “receive full and fair treatment” that is “the same as the treatment accorded to similarly situated white persons.” Consent Decree at 1-2. As with all settlements, it does not provide the plaintiffs and the class they represent with everything they sought in the complaint. Instead it is a negotiated settlement intended to achieve much of what was sought without the need for lengthy litigation and uncertain results. See Stewart v. Rubin, 948 F.Supp. 1077, 1087 (D.D.C. 1996) (“inherent in compromise is a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes”), aff’d 124 F.3d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1997). It is impossible to know precisely how much the overall settlement in this case will cost
24

the government, in part because the exact size of the class has not been determined and because the Consent Decree provides for debt relief that is dependent on the amount of debt that individual class members owe to the USDA, but plaintiffs estimate that the settlement is worth at least $2.25 billion, the largest civil rights settlement in the history of this country. See Pls’ Response to Post-Hearing Submissions at 7.
The Consent Decree accomplishes its purposes primarily through a two-track dispute resolution mechanism that provides those class members with little or no documentary evidence with a virtually automatic cash payment of $50,000, and forgiveness of debt owed to the USDA (Track A), while those who believe they can prove their cases with documentary or other evidence by a preponderance of the evidence -- the traditional burden of proof in civil litigation -have no cap on the amount they may recover (Track B). Those who like neither option provided by the Consent Decree may opt out of the class and pursue their individual remedies in court or administratively before the USDA. The essential terms of the proposed Consent Decree and settlement are summarized below.
Under the terms of the proposed Consent Decree, any class member has the right to opt out of the class and pursue his remedies either administratively before the USDA or in a separate court action. See Consent Decree at ¶ 2(b). A class member who opts out of the class cannot collect any relief under the settlement, but he retains all of his legal rights to file his own action against the USDA. In other words, if a class member opts out of the class, nothing in this settlement affects him. Any class member who wishes to opt out of the class must file a written request with the facilitator within 120 days of the date on which the Consent Decree is entered. See id.
25

Those who choose to remain in the class have 180 days from the entry of the Consent Decree within which to file their claim packages with the facilitator. Consent Decree at ¶ 5(c).5 When a claimant submits his claim package, he must include evidence that he filed a discrimination claim with the USDA between January 1, 1981 and July 1, 1997. See id. at ¶ 5(b).6 In the absence of documentation that a complaint was filed with the USDA, a claimant may submit a declaration from “a person who is not a member of the claimant’s family” stating that he or she has first-hand knowledge that the claimant filed the complaint. See id.7 A claimant also must include a certification from an attorney stating that the attorney has a good faith belief in the truth of the factual basis of the claim and that the attorney will not require compensation from the claimant for his or her assistance. See id. at ¶ 5(e).8

5

The Court may grant an extension of this 180 day period “where the claimant

demonstrates that his failure to submit a timely claim was due to extraordinary circumstances

beyond his control.” Consent Decree at ¶ 5(g).

6

For a claimant who otherwise meets the class definition but who filed his complaint

of discrimination after July 1, 1997, the claims package will be forwarded to JAMS-Endispute,

Inc. JAMS-Endispute, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services Endispute, is a California-

based corps of retired judges with offices throughout the country that provides alternative dispute

resolution mechanisms. JAMS-Endispute will determine whether the claimant should be allowed

to proceed as a class member despite his failure to timely file his discrimination complaint. See

Consent Decree at ¶¶ 1(a)(ii), 6.

7

For purposes of the proposed Consent Decree, a “discrimination complaint” means

either a communication directly from the class member to the USDA or a communication from

the claimant to a member of Congress, the White House, or a state, local, or federal official who

forwarded the communication to the USDA asserting that the USDA had discriminated against

the claimant on the basis of race in connection with a federal farm credit transaction or benefit

application. Consent Decree at ¶ 1(h).

8

Class counsel is available to perform these services without charge to the claimant.

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At the time that they submit their claim packages, claimants asserting discrimination in credit transactions also must choose between two options: adjudication of their claims under the Track A mechanism or arbitration of their claims under the Track B mechanism. Consent Decree at ¶ 5(d).9 The choice made between Track A and Track B has enormous significance. Under Track A, the class member has a fairly low burden of proof but his recovery is limited. Under Track B, there is a higher burden of proof but the recovery is unlimited. The claims facilitator, the Poorman-Douglas Corporation, has 20 days after the filing of a claims package within which to determine whether the claimant is a member of the class and, if he is, to forward the materials to counsel for the USDA and to the appropriate Track A or Track B decision-maker. Id. at ¶ 5(f)
Under Track A, a claimant must submit “substantial evidence” demonstrating that he or she was the victim of race discrimination. See Consent Decree at ¶¶ 9(a)(i), 9(b)(i). Substantial evidence means something more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence but less than a preponderance. See Burns v. Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 41 F.3d 1555, 1562 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Put another way, substantial evidence is such “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support [the] conclusion,” even when “a plausible alternative interpretation of the evidence would support a contrary view.” Secretary of Labor v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 111 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1997).10

9

Claimants asserting discrimination in non-credit benefit programs are only entitled

to proceed under Track A. Consent Decree at ¶ 5(d).

10 The Consent Decree defines “substantial evidence” as “such relevant evidence as appears in the record before the adjudicator that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion after taking into account other evidence in the record that fairly detracts from that conclusion.” Consent Decree at ¶ 1(l).

27

A claimant asserting discrimination in a credit transaction can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence of four specific things: (1) that he owned or leased, or attempted to own or lease, farm land; (2) that he applied for a specific credit transaction at a USDA county office between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996; (3) that the loan was denied, provided late, approved for a lesser amount than requested, encumbered by restrictive conditions, or USDA failed to provide appropriate loan service, and such treatment was less favorable than that accorded specifically identified, similarly situated white farmers; and (4) that USDA’s treatment of the loan application led to economic damage to the class member. See Consent Decree at ¶ 9(a)(i). A claimant asserting discrimination only in a non-credit benefit program can satisfy his burden by presenting evidence (1) that he applied for a specific non-credit benefit program at a USDA county office between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996, and (2) that his application was denied or approved for a lesser amount then requested and that such treatment was less favorable than that accorded to specifically identified, similarly situated white farmers. See id. at ¶ 9(b)(i).
The USDA has sixty days after it receives notice of a Track A referral to provide the adjudicator and class counsel with any information relevant to the issues of liability and damages. Consent Decree at ¶ 8. After receiving any material from the USDA, the facilitator will either make a recommendation with respect to whether the claim should be approved or indicate its inability to make a recommendation. The entire packet of material, including the submissions by the claimant and the USDA and the recommendation of the facilitator, then is referred to a member of JAMS-Endispute, Inc., for a decision which is to be made within 30 days. See id. at ¶ 9(a). That decision is final, except that the Monitor, whose responsibilities are discussed further
28

below, shall direct the adjudicator to reexamine the claim if he determines that “a clear and manifest error has occurred” that is “likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See id. at ¶¶ 9(a)(v), 9(b)(v), 12(b)(iii).
If the adjudicator finds in the claimant’s favor and the claim involves discrimination in a credit transaction, the claimant will receive (1) a cash payment of $50,000; (2) forgiveness of all debt owed to the USDA incurred under or affected by the program that formed the basis of the claim; (3) a tax payment directly to the IRS in the amount of 25% of the total debt forgiveness and cash payment; (4) immediate termination of any foreclosure proceedings that USDA initiated in connection with the loan(s) at issue in the claim; and (5) injunctive relief including one-time priority loan consideration and technical assistance. Consent Decree at ¶¶ 9(a)(iii); 11. If the adjudicator finds in the claimant’s favor and the claim involves discrimination in a benefit program, the claimant will receive a cash payment in the amount of the benefit wrongly denied and injunctive relief including one-time priority loan consideration and technical assistance. Id. at ¶ 9(b)(iii).
Track B arbitration is the option for those who have more extensive documentation of discrimination in a credit transaction. Under Track B, an arbitrator will hold a one day mini-trial and then decide whether the claimant has established discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Consent Decree at ¶ 10.11 Class counsel will represent any claimant who chooses Track B, or a claimant may be represented by counsel of his choice if he so
11 The arbitrator will either be Mr. Michael Lewis, the mediator, or will be a person selected by Mr. Lewis from a list of arbitrators pre-approved by class counsel and counsel for the government. See Consent Decree at ¶ 1(b); Letter of March 19, 1999 from the Parties to the Court at ¶ 1.
29

desires. Track B is designed to balance the need for prompt resolution of the claim with the need to provide adequate discovery and a fair hearing. The entire Track B process will take a maximum of 240 days. During the first 180 days, there is a mechanism for limited discovery and depositions of witnesses. Following the one day mini-trial, the arbitrator will render a decision within 30 to 60 days. Id. at ¶ 10(g).
If the arbitrator finds that the claimant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the victim of racial discrimination and that he suffered damages from that discrimination, the claimant will be entitled to actual damages, the return of inventory property that was foreclosed and other injunctive relief, including a one-time priority loan consideration. Consent Decree at ¶¶ 10(g), 11. As with Track A claims, the decision of the arbitrator is final except that the Monitor shall direct the arbitrator to reexamine the claim if he determines that “a clear and manifest error has occurred” that is “likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See id. at ¶¶ 10, 12(b)(iii).
The proposed Consent Decree also provides for an independent Monitor who will serve for a period of five years following the entry of the decree. The Monitor will be appointed by the Court from a list of names proposed by the parties and cannot be removed “except upon good cause.” Consent Decree at ¶ 12(a). The Monitor is responsible for making periodic written reports to the Court, the Secretary of Agriculture, counsel for the government and class counsel, reporting on the good faith implementation of the Consent Decree and efforts to resolve disputes that arise between the parties under the terms of the decree. Id. at ¶ 12(b).12 He or she will be
12 The parties indicated in their letter of March 19, 1999, that one of the changes to the original Consent Decree would be that the Monitor would provide copies of his report to the Court. That change was not reflected in the revised Consent Decree that was filed by the parties
30

available to class members and members of the public through a toll-free telephone number to facilitate the lodging of Consent Decree complaints and to expedite their resolution. Id. at ¶ 12(b)(iv).
The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree through contempt proceedings. Consent Decree at ¶ 21. If one side believes that the other side has violated the terms of the Consent Decree, there is a mandatory procedure for attempting to resolve the problem with the assistance of the Monitor that the parties must follow before filing a contempt motion with the Court, but the Court remains available in the event that the terms of the decree are violated. Id. at ¶ 13. Finally, the Consent Decree provides that class counsel shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d), and under the Administrative Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), for the filing and litigation of this action and for implementation of the Consent Decree. Id. at ¶ 14(a).
IV. FAIRNESS OF PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, no class action may be dismissed, settled or compromised without the approval of the Court. Rule 23(e), Fed. R. Civ. P. Before giving its approval, the Court must provide adequate notice to all members of the class, id., conduct a “fairness hearing,” and find, after notice and hearing, that the “settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable and is not the product of collusion between the parties.” Thomas v.
on March 19, 1999, but the parties have since filed a corrected page 21 of the revised Consent Decree so that the Monitor in fact will be required to provide copies of the report to the Court. See Notice of Filing of April 9, 1999.
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Albright, 139 F.3d at 231. In performing this task, the Court must protect the interests of those
unnamed class members whose rights may be affected by the settlement of the action.
In this circuit there is “no obligatory test” that the Court must use to determine
whether a settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. Osher v. SCA Realty I, Inc., 945 F.Supp.
298, 303-04 (D.D.C. 1996). Instead the Court must consider the facts and circumstances of the
case, ascertain what factors are most relevant in the circumstances and exercise its discretion in
deciding whether approval of the proposed settlement is fair.13 By far the most important factor is
a comparison of the terms of the compromise or settlement with the likely recovery that plaintiffs
would realize if the case went to trial. See Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d at 231 (“The court’s
primary task is to evaluate the terms of the settlement in relation to the strength of plaintiffs’
case”); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1996) (“the relative strength of plaintiffs’ case
on the merits as compared to what the defendants offer by way of settlement, is the most
important consideration”); Maywalt v. Parker and Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1079 (2nd
Cir. 1995) (“[t]he primary concern is with the substantive terms of the settlement: Basic to this is
the need to compare the terms of the compromise with the likely rewards of litigation”) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). Having carefully considered all of the objections that have been
13 The Third Circuit has adopted a nine-factor test for determining the fairness of a settlement of a class action, see Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3rd Cir. 1975), while the Tenth Circuit has adopted a four factor test, see Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1014 (10th Cir. 1993), and the Eleventh Circuit has developed a six factor test. See Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1984). Other circuits, including ours, have not imposed such rigid sets of factors, instead recognizing that the relevant factors may vary depending on the factual circumstances. See Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d at 231; Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 137576 (9th Cir. 1993), cert denied sub nom, Reilly v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 512 U.S. 1220 (1994). To the extent that the factors enumerated by the other circuits are at all relevant to the determination of whether this Consent Decree is fair, adequate and reasonable, however, the Court has considered and addressed those factors in this Opinion.
32

filed with the Court or expressed at the fairness hearing in relation to the strength of plaintiffs’
case, the Court concludes that the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable and is not the
product of collusion between the parties.14
A. The Process of Settlement
Preliminarily, the Court considers those objections that address the fairness of the
way in which the settlement negotiations were conducted, the amount of discovery completed at
14 The Court has received written objections or comments from the following organizations: Black Farmers and Agriculturists Assoc.; Black Farmers of North Carolina; Central Piedmont Economic Assoc.; Concerned Black Farmers of Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, Georgia and North Carolina; Coordinating Council of Black Farm Groups; Kansas Black Farmers Assoc.; Land Loss Prevention Project; Federation of Southern Cooperatives Land Assistance Fund; Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; NAACP; National Black Farmers; National Council of Community Based Organizations in Agriculture; National Family Farm Coalition; Oklahoma Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Assoc.; and United States Dept. of Agriculture Coalition of Minority Employees.
The Court has received written objections or comments from the following individuals (on behalf of themselves and/or on behalf of other class members): Theodore F.B. Bates; Robert R. Binion; Abraham Carpenter, Jr.; Leonard C. Cooper; Harold M. Dunkelberger; George and Larry Ephfrom; Percy Gooch, Sr.; Estell Green, Jr.; Patricia Gibson Green; Brown J. Hawkins; Clarence Hardy; George and Patricia Hildebrandt; George Hobbs; Dave J. Miller; Jessie Nimmons; Timothy C. Pigford; Amelia Roland Washington; Roy L. Rolle, Jr.; Luis C. Sanders; Herbert L. Skinner, Jr.; Gregory R. Swecker; V.J. Switzer; George M. Whitehead; Gladys R. Todd and Griffin Todd, Sr.; Andrew Williams; Jerome Williams; and Eddie and Dorothy Weiss.
All of the organizations and most of the individuals who had submitted written comments or objections spoke at the hearing on March 2, 1999. In addition, the following individuals spoke at the hearing: Mattie Mack; Kevin Pyle; Sherman Witchler; Eddie Slaughter; Ridgeley Mu’Min Muhammed; Willie Frank Smith; John Bender; Troy Scroggins; and Willie Head.
All of the objections and comments, whether received in the form of letters to the Court or as formal filings, have been filed as part of the official record of this case. To the extent possible, the Court has attempted to address all of the objections that have been raised. Whether or not specifically mentioned in this Opinion, the Court has carefully considered the objections and appreciates the extent to which the objectors have shared their thoughts and views.
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the time of settlement, the definition of the class, whether there is any evidence of collusion between class counsel and counsel for the government, and whether class members have had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on the proposed settlement. See Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d at 231; Durrett v. Housing Authority of City of Providence, 896 F.2d 600, 604 (1st Cir. 1990); Mars Steel v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank and Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 1987); Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3rd Cir. 1975); Osher v. SCA Realty I, Inc., 945 F.Supp. at 304.
1. Timing of Settlement and Extent of Discovery Completed Some of the objectors maintain that settlement came too early and that class counsel undertook insufficient discovery in this case before settling it. A review of the history of the case, however, reveals that “[t]here has been a literal mountain of discovery provided and reviewed.” Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 170 (Comments of Mr. J.L. Chestnut). Less than three months after the case was filed, the Court ordered the USDA to open its files to plaintiffs within fifteen days. On the fifteenth day, the government provided plaintiffs with ten boxes of documents containing approximately 35,000 to 40,000 pages of records related to approximately 105 pending claims of race discrimination. See Def’s November 17, 1997 Report to the Court, Declaration of Arnold Grundeman at ¶ 4. Three days later, the government delivered an additional 20,000 pages related to another 30 pending cases of discrimination. See id. at ¶ 5. At the time, the government represented that it was continuing to search for files, many of which had already been sent to a federal records repository. Since that time, the government has continued to provide plaintiffs with the files of class members.
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The problem for plaintiffs has been that files simply do not exist for many class members. Providing additional time for discovery would not have solved that problem. As class counsel has pointed out, on the issue of liability of the USDA, the government’s own documents and own admissions are the most damning evidence. See Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 184 (Comments of Mr. Alexander Pires) (“I have an office full of admissions. I have tape recordings of Mr. Glickman. I have tape recordings of Governemnt officials. I’ve interviewed everybody there is to interview. I have documents. I have the CRAT Report annotated. I have all the [Office of the Inspector General] Reports”). There really was no other discovery that could have made a difference. The same is true on the issue of damages. The government delivered to class counsel all of the files it had on individual class members. But without documentary evidence that does not exist, an individual farmer would be hard-pressed to provide evidence beyond his own testimony, and additional discovery from the government would not be helpful.
In addition, a relatively extensive amount of litigation had occurred by the time the parties agreed to a settlement. The issue of class certification had been extensively briefed by the parties and decided by the Court. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of the statute of limitations was fully briefed when the statute of limitations was tolled by legislative action. The government also had filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and for partial summary judgment that was fully briefed. In sum, the discovery, investigation and legal research conducted by class counsel before entering into settlement was thorough and supports the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement. See Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d at 1200.
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2. Class Definition The class is defined to include all African American farmers who (1) farmed, or attempted to farm, between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996; (2) applied to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) during that time period for participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program and who believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race in USDA's response to that application; and (3) filed a discrimination complaint on or before July 1, 1997, regarding USDA's treatment of such farm credit or benefit application. Some characterize this class definition as too narrow. They claim that the class should be broadened to include all African American farmers who claim to have faced discrimination in credit transactions or benefit programs with the USDA, regardless of whether they filed a complaint of discrimination with the USDA. The legal issues for those who never have filed a discrimination complaint, however, are much more difficult than those facing the members of the class as currently defined. The statute of limitations issue still exists for those who never have filed complaints of discrimination because Congress tolled the statute of limitations only for those who filed discrimination complaints by July 1, 1997. Moreover, from the beginning, plaintiffs’ complaint only sought relief for those who had filed discrimination complaints with the USDA. Accordingly, the Consent Decree in this case cannot provide relief for those who never purported to complain to the USDA in any way about the alleged discrimination. Cf. United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Some also have objected that the class as currently defined does not include all members of the putative Brewington class because under the current class definition, the farmer is
36

required to have filed a complaint of discrimination prior to July 1, 1997, while the proposed class in Brewington would have included African American farmers who had filed their discrimination complaints prior to July 7, 1998. As previously discussed, see page 20 above, the statutory waiver of ECOA’s two-year statute of limitations as recently enacted by Congress applies only to those farmers who filed complaints of discrimination by July 1, 1997. The claims of those who do not meet that deadline face separate and additional legal barriers not faced by the class as currently defined. Broadening the class would inject legal and factual issues into the case that are not now present and would only serve to hinder a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement for the African American farmers who are a part of the class as currently defined. The Court therefore concludes that this class definition is appropriate.
The Consent Decree also requires each class member to provide proof that he filed a “discrimination complaint” with the USDA. The term “discrimination complaint” is defined broadly to include “a communication from a class member directly to USDA, or to a member of Congress, the White House, or a state, local or federal official who forwarded the class member’s communication to USDA, asserting that USDA had discriminated against the class member on the basis of race in connection with a federal farm credit transaction or benefit application.” Consent Decree at ¶1(h). In the absence of specified documents, a class member may submit an affidavit from a non-family member stating that he or she has personal knowledge that a discrimination complaint was filed and describing the way in which it was filed. See Consent Decree at ¶ 5.
Some objectors maintain that it is unfair to require an affidavit from someone who is not a family member because, as Mr. Vernon Breckinridge put it, “getting loans from USDA is just like you go to a normal bank and get a loan. You don’t normally go around and tell
37

everybody in the neighborhood that you’ve gone to the bank to secure a loan.” Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 101. While it may be that some will be precluded from obtaining relief because they cannot use affidavits from family members, the class membership determination is designed to be mechanistic so that it can be done quickly by the facilitator. If family members were permitted to submit affidavits, the facilitator would be required to make credibility determinations that inevitably would slow the process of determining class membership.
3. Asserted Collusion The Court finds that there is absolutely no evidence of collusion between the class counsel and counsel for the government. See Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d at 231. From the outset, all settlement negotiations were conducted in the presence of the mediator, Mr. Michael Lewis, a neutral and detached mediator with twenty-five years of experience who has mediated many complex class action cases including employment and environmental cases. Mr. Lewis has stated quite emphatically that there was no collusion in this case: “If this case represented collusion or the negotiations in this case represented collusion I as a mediator never ever want to mediate a case in which the parties are at each others’ throats. To term this negotiation intensive . . . understates the difficulty. This was an arduous negotiation. It took a year. It was hard fought.” Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 21-22. Nor has the Court has seen any evidence of collusion or other impropriety on the part of counsel on either side. From the day this case was filed, Mr. Alexander Pires has tenaciously asserted that his clients had a right to receive relief from the government. Even faced with difficult statute of limitations issues and a serious lack of documentation, he has never
38

wavered from his fundamental position that the government had wronged generations of African American farmers and must provide compensation. Even when settlement negotiations were ongoing, both sides maintained their positions and continued to assert the interests of their respective clients in every filing and at every status conference. At the status hearing on March 20, 1998, for example, Mr. Chestnut pleaded for a trial date because he had no faith that the case would settle and he wanted to protect the interests of the class. Government counsel continued to file motions and protect the legal interests of the USDA. Certainly the Court can attest to the fact that the parties litigated vigorously all of the issues that were or logically could have been raised.
4. Notice, Opportunity to Be Heard and Reaction of the Class When a class is certified and a settlement is proposed, the parties are required to provide class members with the “best notice practicable under the circumstances.” Rule 23(c)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P.; see Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172-77 (1974). The Court concludes that class members have received more than adequate notice and have had sufficient opportunity to be heard on the fairness of the proposed Consent Decree. See Durrett v. Housing Authority of City of Providence, 896 F.2d at 604. First, the timing and breadth of notice of the class settlement was sufficient under Rule 23. Notice was mailed to all known class members by January 15, 1999, nearly six weeks before the fairness hearing and a month before the deadline for comments, providing class members with ample time to submit their objections. See Maywalt v. Parker and Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d at 1079; Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1374-75 (9th
39

Cir. 1993), cert denied sub nom, Reilly v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 512 U.S. 1220 (1994).15 The parties also exerted extraordinary efforts to reach class members through a massive advertising campaign in general circulation and African American targeted publications and radio and television stations. See pages 15-16 above.
Second, the content of the notice was sufficient because it “fairly apprise[d] the . . . members of the class of the terms of the proposed settlement and of the options that are open to them in connection with [the] proceedings.” See Maywalt v. Parker and Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d at 1079 (internal quotations omitted). The notice provided class members with information on the class, the purpose and timing of the fairness hearing, opt-out procedures and deadlines, and the deadline and process for filing claims packages. In addition, it provided telephone numbers for the facilitator and for class counsel to the extent that anyone had any questions.
Third, the Court gave objectors ample opportunity to present their objections to the Consent Decree. As noted above, the Court considered all of the written objections that were filed and provided objectors with an opportunity to present their objections orally at the fairness hearing. While the Court denied a request for an evidentiary hearing made by one group of objectors, see Order of March 11, 1999, the Court is not obligated to hold an evidentiary hearing, especially in view of the fact that it accepted and considered affidavits in place of testimony. See Jones v. Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc., 741 F.2d 322, 325 (10th Cir. 1984); Weinberger v. Kendrick,
15 One objector maintains that notice was insufficient because the facilitator did not advertise in the United States Virgin Islands. With the exception of that one objection, no one appears to believe that the scope of the notice provided was insufficient.
40

698 F.2d 61, 79 (2nd Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom, Coyne v. Weinberger, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); cf. United States v. Cannons Engineering Corp, 899 F.2d 79, 93-94 (1st Cir. 1990).
Finally, because the Court has received a number of objections, it is clear that class members do not unanimously support the settlement. It is significant, however, that there are relatively few objections to the settlement in comparison with the size of the class. See Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d at 232. This is a large class. As of March 26, 1999, 16,559 farmers had requested claims packages from the facilitator, and the facilitator already has received 1686 completed claim packages. By contrast, only 85 farmer class members have elected to opt out of the class. See Pls’ Response to Post-Hearing Submissions of Objections at 6-7. Given the low rate of opt-outs and the relatively small percentage of class members objecting to the Consent Decree, the Court concludes that those objections do not warrant rejecting the Consent Decree. See Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d at 232 (settlement can be fair even if “a significant portion of the class and some of the named plaintiffs object to it”).16
B. Substantive Fairness: Likely Recovery at Trial Compared with Terms of Proposed Settlement
As our court of appeals has said, in considering a proposed class action settlement, the Court first must compare the likely recovery that plaintiffs would have realized if they had gone to trial with the terms of the settlement. See Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d at 231. The Court must look at the settlement as a whole and should not reject a settlement merely because
16 Certain of the original named plaintiffs, including both Mr. Timothy Pigford and Mr. Cecil Brewington, have objected to the terms of the settlement. The Court has carefully considered their objections but nonetheless concludes that the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. See Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d at 232 (fact that named class representatives object to proposed settlement does not preclude court from finding that settlement is fair).
41

individual class members claim that they would have received more at trial. The Court should scrutinize the terms of the settlement carefully, but the discretion of the Court to reject a settlement is restrained by the “principle of preference” that encourages settlements. See Durrett v. Housing Authority of City of Providence, 896 F.2d at 604; Stewart v. Rubin, 948 F.Supp. at 1086. The Court has received approximately sixty written submissions from forty-three groups or individuals objecting to or commenting on the fairness of the settlement. The Court also heard from numerous individuals and organizations at the fairness hearing on March 2, 1999.17 Some of the objectors have argued persuasively that the settlement could have included broader relief, but that is not the test. See Stewart v. Rubin, 948 F.Supp. at 1087 (“the Court [should not] make the proponents of the agreement justify each term of settlement against a hypothetical measure of what concessions might have been gained”). The question is whether the structure of the settlement and the substantive relief including the amount of money provided are fair and reasonable when compared to the recovery that plaintiffs likely would have realized if the case went to trial. The Court concludes that they are.
The settlement provides a measure of certainty for most class members. The vast majority of class members probably will be entitled almost automatically to recovery under Track A, while Track B, which has no cap on the amount of damages available, provides those with stronger cases with the opportunity to realize greater recoveries. It is clear from the structure and terms of the settlement that class counsel were trying to strike a delicate balance between ensuring
17 With one exception, see Order of March 11, 1999, the Court has considered all objections and comments that it received by April 2, 1999. Some of those who have submitted objections do not appear to be members of the class and therefore lack standing to challenge the fairness of the Consent Decree, see Mayfield v. Barr, 985 F.2d 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1993), but the Court has considered their objections anyway.
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that as many class members as possible would receive compensation and ensuring that any compensation was adequate for the harm suffered. In striking this balance, class counsel were forced to recognize that most of the members of the class had little in the way of documentation or proof of their claims and likely would have recovered nothing if they were required to prove their cases by the traditional preponderance of the evidence standard. Track A was devised to provide a set amount of compensation for those class members who could meet only a minimal burden of proof, while Track B was not so limited. The Track A/Track B mechanism also ensures that this compensation is distributed as promptly as possible.
The Court is sympathetic to the reasons that various class members would have wanted class counsel to strike the balance differently in their negotiations. Nonetheless, the Court is not persuaded that striking a different balance would have been either achievable in the negotiating process or more favorable to all or even most members of the class. It certainly is not convinced that a better result would have been achieved by taking this case to trial where a substantial number of class members would have been unable to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence and thus would have recovered nothing. While each class member understandably wants the settlement to provide the greatest possible compensation to himself, the Court cannot conclude that the final balance struck by class counsel is anything but fair.
1. Likely Recovery If Case Had Proceeded to Trial If the case had proceeded to trial, plaintiffs would have had in their possession strong evidence that the USDA discriminated against African American farmers. The reports of the Inspector General and the Civil Rights Action Team provide a persuasive indictment of the
43

civil rights record of the USDA and the pervasive discrimination against African American farmers. There does not appear to be much dispute that racial discrimination has occurred throughout the USDA and that the USDA and the county committees discriminated against African American farmers for decades in evaluating their applications for farm credit and benefits. In addition, when Congress took the unprecedented action of tolling the statute of limitations for ECOA, one of plaintiffs’ major obstacles to establishing defendant’s liability to the class was removed.
The problem is that even with that evidence, 80 to 90 percent of the class members lack any documentary evidence of the alleged discriminatory denial of credit or benefits to them. See Pls’ Response to Written Objections at 11; Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 180 (Mr. Alexander Pires) (“What would happen . . . in this case if we went to trial? 90 percent of our clients do not have files. . . . 90 percent do not have files”). In order to recover damages under ECOA at a trial, a class member would have to be able to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a discriminatory denial of loans or terms of credit, the extent of the injury to him caused by the denial and the amount of damages he suffered. Absent any documentation, this would have been an impossible burden for the majority of class members. In addition, many class members lack any documentation to prove that they ever filed a complaint of discrimination with the USDA and therefore would have encountered great difficulty in even establishing their membership in the class. With no documentary evidence that they fall within the parameters of the class, it is not at all clear that those plaintiffs would have been able to recover anything.
Some objectors have suggested that the issue of damages could have been resolved by trying the claims of representative members of the class. See Transcript of Hearing of March
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2, 1999 at 46. As Mr. Alexander Pires explained, however, “I would never take the thousands of clients we have now and say bet your claim on those 12 or 13 cases that are your lead cases. Even though we helped pick them. I know what’s in those 12 cases, and that’s risky.” Id. at 180. In fact, class counsel discovered during the process of negotiating the settlement that mediating the cases individually was risky. When the parties were in the initial stages of settlement negotiations, they agreed to mediate twelve individual test cases: six chosen by the government and six chosen by plaintiffs. The lack of documentation presented serious obstacles to the resolution of those cases. The parties worked for an entire month trying to settle eight of those twelve cases, and at the end of that month, not one case had been resolved. See Transcript of Hearing of March 5, 1998 at 32.
Moreover, bringing this case to trial likely would have been a very complex, long and costly proposition. Practically speaking, prevailing class members likely would not have obtained relief for many years. Trial on the issue of liability was scheduled to last the month of February 1999. Trial probably would have involved a number of experts, and the government probably would have raised a number of legal issues for the Court to resolve. Even if the Court devoted all of its resources and time to deciding the issue of liability, it is unlikely that a decision would have been issued before the summer of 1999. If the Court had found the USDA liable, it then would have had to resolve the issue of remedy for each farmer. A mechanism for establishing class or subclass membership and for resolving issues of individual damages for each farmer in the class or subclass would have been necessary. If the remedy phase were tried on an individual basis for each farmer -- as the government might have urged again as it has in the past, because of the acknowledged lack of documentation in so many cases -- the remedial process
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would have dragged on for years. If the remedy phase were not tried on an individual basis for each farmer, it is not inconceivable that a mechanism much like that negotiated in this settlement ultimately would be utilized. Even barring the inevitable appeal that the government would have taken in the event that plaintiffs prevailed, it is unlikely that any class member would have received any recovery for his injury for many years.
By contrast, the settlement negotiated by the parties provides for relatively prompt recovery. The claim of a claimant who chooses Track A will be resolved within 110 days of the date that the claim is filed. For those who choose Track B, the wait is a little longer because of discovery and trial, but the total time required is at most 240 days from the date that the claim is filed. Because neither side may appeal, the claimant will receive his compensation long before he would have if the case had gone to trial.
2. Overall Structure of Settlement: Track A and Track B As currently structured, class members have three options: they have 120 days after the entry of the Consent Decree within which to notify the facilitator if they want to opt out of the class altogether, they may remain in the class and choose Track A or they may remain in the class and choose Track B.18 Those who do not opt out have 180 days from the entry of the decree within which to file their claim packages and, for those who choose Track A, to submit their proof. Consent Decree at ¶¶ 5(c), 5(d). A number of class members complain that they lack sufficient information to select among these three options and that the settlement is structured to force class members to choose
18 For those class members who allege only discrimination in a benefit transaction, Track B is not an option.
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Track A. At meetings throughout the country, class counsel currently is making every effort to reach all class members, to explain the options and to sit down with individual class members to provide advice. See Pls’ Response to Post-Hearing Submissions, Exh. C. The turnout for these meetings has been overwhelming and has far exceeded everyone’s expectations: literally hundreds of farmers show up for each meeting. It has become clear that there are more class members than anyone had anticipated and some class members contend that although they show up at the meetings, class counsel does not have time to meet with them. Class counsel is in the midst of scheduling more meetings and providing more time for each meeting, and they have assured the Court that they will be able to meet with all class members prior to the deadline for filing claim packages.
Those who assert only discrimination in non-credit, benefit transactions, rather than discrimination in credit transactions, do not have the option of proceeding under Track B, see Consent Decree at ¶ 5(d), and one objector complains that those who have faced discrimination in the USDA’s benefit programs ought to be allowed to proceed under Track B. The problem is that programs that do not involve credit transactions are not subject to ECOA. The cause of action for those who allege discrimination in benefit programs arises solely under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, which does not provide for the same measure of damages as is provided under ECOA. For that reason, those who allege only that they have suffered discrimination in a benefit program are afforded a slightly different form of relief than the relief provided for those who suffered discrimination in a credit transaction with the USDA. In other words, the different statutory predicates for the two different kinds of claims restricted the solutions that counsel could negotiate in each context.
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A class member who selects Track A must submit “substantial evidence” demonstrating that he was a victim of race discrimination in a credit or benefit transaction with the USDA. Consent Decree at ¶¶ 9(a), 9(b). Some have objected that the “substantial evidence” standard is too high a burden of proof. Part of that concern stems from a misunderstanding of the “substantial evidence” standard. While the phrase “substantial evidence” makes it sound as though the burden of proof is high, the substantial evidence standard actually is one of the lowest possible burdens of proof known to the law. A “substantial evidence standard” is significantly easier for the claimant to meet than a “preponderance of the evidence” standard. A “preponderance of the evidence” standard means that the claimant has to show that it is more likely than not that discrimination happened, while under a “substantial evidence” standard, the claimant only has to provide a reasonable basis for the adjudicator to find that discrimination happened. See Consent Decree at ¶ 1(l); see also page 28 above. The substantial evidence standard therefore should not be a bar to the claims of most class members.
In order for a claimant to prevail under Track A, he must present specified evidence, including evidence that he was treated less favorably than a “specifically identified, similarly situated” white farmer. See Consent Decree at ¶¶ 9(a)(i)(C), 9(b)(i)(B). Some objectors contend that it will be too difficult for some claimants to present evidence of a specific, similarly situated white farmer who received more favorable treatment, especially since there is no right to discovery under Track A. At this point, however, class counsel has amassed a significant amount of material regarding the treatment by the USDA of both African American farmers and white farmers, and claimants will be able to call upon that material in completing their claim packages. Class counsel should be able to provide most claimants with the evidence they need.
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Under Track B, after limited discovery the claimant has a one day mini-trial before an arbitrator, and the claimant has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the USDA discriminated against him in a credit transaction. There are a number of objections to the Track B mechanism. First, the original Consent Decree defined Track B arbitrators as Michael Lewis and “any other person or person who he assigns to decide Track B claims.” Some objectors contended that the definition of arbitrator was too vague and that those who were thinking about choosing Track B would have no way of knowing who the arbitrator might be. As Mr. James Morrison put it, “If Mr. Lewis chooses to have distinguished jurists, lawyers, former judges, I think he has that right as the four corners of the document gives him the authority. But if he wishes to choose Mickey Mouse, he could choose Mickey Mouse.” See Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 75. The parties addressed this concern in the revised Consent Decree by defining arbitrators as either Michel Lewis or “other person or persons selected by Mr. Lewis who meet qualifications agreed upon by the parties and by Mr. Lewis and whom Mr. Lewis assigns to decide Track B claims. . . .” See Consent Decree at ¶ 1(b). The parties have specified that Mr. Lewis will “develop a single list of alternates which the parties would pre-approve and from which Mr. Lewis can select an arbitrator for any arbitration that he is unable to handle himself.” See Letter of March 19, 1999 from Parties at ¶ 1. While a claimant may not know the identity of the arbitrator at the time that the claimant chooses Track B, he will know who the potential candidates are and that they were not unilaterally selected by Mr. Lewis. In addition, class counsel can provide background information about the people on the list so the claimant will be able to make a more informed decision about whether he wants to select Track B.
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Track B provides for limited discovery prior to the one day mini-trial. Discovery is limited essentially to an exchange of lists of witnesses and exhibits and depositions of the opposing side’s witnesses. See Consent Decree at ¶ 10(b)-(d). Some contend that discovery should be much broader. While it undoubtedly is true that the Track B mechanism anticipates less discovery than is ordinarily provided in the course of civil litigation, the Track B mechanism also resolves the claim much more quickly than an ordinary civil case would be resolved, in large part because of the shortened discovery period. Expanding the scope of discovery would take significantly more time, and class counsel in their judgment reasonably weighed the possible benefits of additional discovery against the delays that would ensue and determined that this was an adequate amount of discovery.19
A hearing on a Track B claim lasts eight hours. Consent Decree at ¶ 10(f). There is no live direct testimony. All direct testimony is submitted in writing. The eight hours at the hearing are comprised entirely of cross-examinations: each side is allotted four hours to crossexamine any witness of the opposing side. Several objectors contend that the claimant should be able to present live direct testimony, rather than presenting it only in written form. As with the Track B discovery issue, class counsel clearly was trying to balance the need for expedition with
19 In fact, several objectors contend that the Track B mechanism, even with the shortened discovery period, takes too long to resolve claims. It is clear from the tensions between these two sets of objections that class counsel had to strike a delicate balance between resolving Track B claims expeditiously and obtaining the necessary discovery, and the balance finally struck appears eminently reasonable to the Court.
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the need to ensure that the process produces just results. Again, the Court cannot conclude that the balance that counsel ultimately struck renders the terms of the settlement unfair.20
In order to prevail on his claims, a Track B claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “he was the victim of racial discrimination and that he suffered damages therefrom.” See Consent Decree at ¶ 10(g). One objection maintains that this standard is too high and that claimants will be unable to meet this standard. To the extent that a claimant is concerned that he lacks sufficient evidence to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard, the traditional standard in civil litigation in all states and federal courts in this country, Track A provides a safer option. A claimant who cannot meet the preponderance of the evidence standard is not barred from all relief; instead, he is required to choose Track A rather than choosing Track B. Another objector also contends that a Track B claimant should not be required to establish economic damage in order to prevail on a Track B claim, and that the claimant should be able to prevail even if he can only establish emotional injury. As class counsel has pointed out, however, the economic damage requirement stems from ECOA, which provides the cause of action for all Track B claimants.
Some objectors complain about the Track A/Track B structure because those claimants who select Track B and fail to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that they were the victims of race discrimination and that they suffered economic harm as a result will recover nothing under the settlement, see Consent Decree at ¶ 10(h), rather than being permitted
20 The Court also notes that it is not unprecedented to conduct hearings in this way, even in trials in federal court. See Transcript at 51; Charles R. Richey, “Rule 16 Revised and Related Rules: Analysis of Recent Developments for the Benefit of Bench and Bar,” 157 F.R.D. 69, 83-84 (1994).
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to proceed under Track A if they lose under Track B. The decision whether to proceed under Track A or under Track B therefore takes on a great deal of significance. If a claimant who has sufficient evidence to meet Track A requirements but insufficient evidence to prevail in Track B nonetheless chooses Track B, he will receive nothing.
As class counsel and counsel for the government have pointed out, however, there simply is no way that those who fail on a Track B claim could be permitted to proceed under Track A without entirely undermining the settlement. The settlement is designed to resolve the claims of all class members as promptly as possible. Because of the absence of documentary proof in most cases, the vast majority of claimants will select Track A, and Track A is designed to be a mechanistic way to deal with claims very quickly. Track B, by contrast, involves a much lengthier, fact-specific inquiry, but it is anticipated that very few class members will opt for Track B. If there were a fallback mechanism to provide relief for claimants who failed in their Track B claims, every class member would choose Track B and the settlement structure would collapse under its own weight. See Letter of March 19, 1999 from the Parties to the Court at 4 (if a class member whose claim was denied under Track B nonetheless were permitted to recover under Track A, “virtually every class member who elects to seek relief under the Decree would choose to proceed under Track B. Not only would such a change increase exponentially the cost to the parties of implementing the Decree, it also would make it impossible for the parties or the arbitrator to come close to adhering to the deadlines for disposition of Track B claims imposed by ¶ 10(a)-(e). Thus this change would make the Decree unworkable”).
Finally, the decisions of the adjudicators on Track A claims and the decisions of the arbitrators on Track B claims are final; there is no right to appeal those decisions, except that
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the Monitor shall direct the arbitrator or adjudicator to reexamine the claim if he determines that a “clear and manifest error has occurred” that is “likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Consent Decree at ¶¶ 9(a)(v), 9(b)(v), 10(i), 12(b)(iii). Many objectors contend that the absence of appeal rights renders the settlement structure unfair and/or that it gives the arbitrators and adjudicators too much power. As Mr. Willie Head expressed it, “[w]ould you send your sons and daughters off to war with one bullet.” Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 165. While the objection has force, class counsel made a strategic decision not to press for appeal rights because the government would have insisted that any appeal rights be a two-way street. See Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 179. Any appeal process inevitably would delay payments to those claimants who prevailed on their claims. Since it is anticipated that most class members will prevail under the structure of the settlement, the Court concludes that the forfeit of appeal rights was a reasonable compromise.
3. Track A Relief: The $50,000 Objection Any claimant who prevails on a Track A claim for discrimination in a credit transaction will receive: (1) a cash payment of $50,000; (2) forgiveness of all debt owed to the USDA incurred under or affected by the program that formed the basis of the claim; (3) a tax payment directly to the IRS in the amount of 25% of the total of the debt forgiveness and cash payment; (4) immediate termination of any foreclosure action that USDA initiated in connection with the loan(s) at issue in the claim; and (5) injunctive relief including one-time priority loan consideration and technical assistance. This relief package is the source of two objections.
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Many objectors claim that a $50,000 cash award is insufficient to compensate them
for the losses they sustained as a result of the USDA’s discrimination. As Mr. Willie Head
expressed it, “imagine that your home has been taken, your land has been taken, your automobile
has been taken, and then you can make a decision and see if $50,000 will be enough for you.”
Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 165-66. Putting a monetary value on the damage done
to someone who has experienced discrimination at the hands of the government obviously is no
easy matter, and it is probable that no amount of money can fully compensate class members for
past acts of discrimination. It is quite clear, as the objectors point out, that $50,000 is not full
compensation in most cases.
To the extent that a specific value can be put on such compensation, however,
class counsel have thoroughly researched the issue and provided persuasive evidence that the
amount is fair.21 As class counsel points out, every claimant who prevails under Track A will
receive not $50,000 but at least $62,500 (the sum of a $50,000 cash payment plus $12,500 in tax
relief). And most who prevail under Track A will receive much more than that. The government
21 To the extent that objectors are claiming that class counsel had no economic basis for agreeing to settle the case for the amount they did, that argument is belied by the fact that class counsel consulted a number of economists. See Pls’ Response to Post-Hearing Submissions. Moreover, while one objector submitted affidavits from other economists that contend that the value of class members’ claims may have been worth more than $50,000, those economists do not take into account the breadth of relief provided by the settlement. See id., Exh. A (Declaration of Dr. Mervin J. Yetley).
Class counsel also conducted an extensive study of the settlement of four previous civil rights actions in which plaintiffs alleged egregious violations of civil rights, including the case brought by Japanese Americans interned during World War II and the Tuskegee case involving the claims of African Americans injected with syphilis as part of government experiments. See Pls’ Response to Post-Hearing Submissions at 2, n.2. Class counsel reasonably concluded that this settlement, which affords class members greater monetary relief than that afforded to individuals in those four cases, was fair and adequate.
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estimates that the average African American farmer carries government debt of approximately $100,000, and those debts will be forgiven under Track A; in addition, the settlement provides for a tax payment of 25% of the debt forgiveness. See Pls’ Response to Post-Hearing Submissions, Exh. A (Declaration of Dr. Mervin J. Yetley) at ¶ 5(c)-(d). The average cash value of relief for a claimant who prevails under Track A therefore totals $187,500. Id. at ¶ 6. Class members undoubtedly would have liked to have received a larger settlement. But $187,500 is a significant amount of money, especially in view of the fact that a claimant who lacks the detailed records required in a normal civil action to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence need only establish his claim by substantial evidence in order to receive that compensation. The Court therefore concludes that class counsel had an adequate basis for agreeing to this amount and that it is fair and reasonable.
Some objectors also contend that the tax relief provided under Track A is insufficient because it may not cover all the federal taxes owed on the settlement and because it does not cover state taxes. Any effort to determine the exact amount of federal tax owed on a settlement, however, would have required scores of auditors and inevitably would have resulted in delays. The logistical problems presented by a provision covering state taxes would have been even more complicated, since every state has a different method of assessing income taxes and different tax rates. Again, class counsel in its judgment determined that a flat tax payment was in the best interests of the class and in assuring a prompt resolution of the claims, and the Court is unwilling to second-guess that judgment.
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4. Other Objections to Individual Relief The failure of both Track A and Track B to include certain measures of individual relief also has led to objections. First, some contend that the USDA should provide relief from loans owed to creditors other than the USDA. They argue that because the USDA discriminated in its credit programs, many African American farmers either had to obtain loans from private banks at very high interest rates or had to buy their equipment and supplies on credit from private companies at high interest rates. They therefore seek to have all of those loans forgiven or at least to have loans that were guaranteed by the USDA forgiven. Class counsel clearly tried to negotiate for as much debt forgiveness as possible. But as Mr. J.L. Chestnut put it, “There is no likelihood the United States government is going to go around to . . . commercial banks paying off private loans of black farmers, whether it relates to discrimination or not. Nobody is going to be able to negotiate that with the United States government. How do I know that? Because I tried.” Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 168. Second, some have objected that the Consent Decree does not contain a provision to protect a class member’s settlement award from his bankruptcy estate. The parties to this action cannot, however, determine whether the bankruptcy estate has a right to a claimant’s settlement award. Those matters are controlled by operation of the bankruptcy laws and will turn on issues such as whether the claim is considered the property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Those matters properly are resolved in bankruptcy court between the parties to those actions and cannot be resolved by the parties to this action. Third, a claimant who prevails under Track B is entitled to “any USDA inventory property that was formerly owned by the class member but which was foreclosed in connection
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with the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member’s favor by the arbitrator.” See Consent Decree at ¶ 10(g)(iv). With that one exception, however, the Consent Decree has no provision for returning land to prevailing claimants. A number of objectors have stated the need for more extensive land return provisions. Again, this was a matter that class counsel clearly tried to negotiate, and they obtained the best possible resolution they could.
Finally, one objector expressed concern that the credit records of many claimants have been damaged by the discrimination they experienced at the hands of the USDA and that it therefore will be difficult for those farmers to obtain credit from the USDA or others in the future. In response to that objection, the parties agreed to revise the Consent Decree to include a provision stating that “outstanding debt discharged pursuant to [Track A or Track B] shall not adversely affect the claimant’s eligibility for future participation in any USDA loan or loan servicing program.” See Consent Decree at ¶ 11(c). In sum, while some class members clearly would have liked the terms of the settlement to be slightly different, the terms of the settlement are fair when compared with the likely recovery plaintiffs would have obtained at trial.
C. Monitoring and Enforcement Provisions Some objectors contend that at the very least the enforcement and monitoring provisions of the Consent Decree must be strengthened. The Consent Decree provides for the appointment of a Monitor for a period of five years to track and report on the USDA’s compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree. Under the original proposed Consent Decree, the Monitor was appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture, subject to class counsels’ approval. A number of objections noted that the USDA did not have any incentive to appoint a strong and
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independent Monitor, and that the Monitor provision therefore needed to be changed. In response to those concerns, the parties revised the Monitor provision so that the Court now appoints the Monitor from a list of names submitted by the parties. See Consent Decree at ¶ 12(a). The Monitor is removable only for “good cause.”
A number of objections also noted that the original proposed Consent Decree appeared to prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction in the event that the USDA did not comply with the terms of the decree. The law is clear that the Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Consent Decree. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1989); Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 995 F.2d 280, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (principle is well-established that trial court “retains jurisdiction to enforce consent decrees and settlement agreements”); Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 855 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (in action to enforce terms of consent decree, district court “unquestionably had power to hold the District of Columbia in civil contempt for violations of the consent decree”). The parties also have clarified that the Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Decree.
D. Absence of Provisions Preventing Future Discrimination The stated purpose of the Consent Decree is to “ensur[e] that in their dealings with the USDA, all class members receive full and fair treatment that is the same as the treatment accorded to similarly situated white persons.” Consent Decree at 2. The Consent Decree does not, however, provide any forward-looking injunctive relief. It does not require the USDA to take any steps to ensure that county commissioners who have discriminated against class members in the past are no longer in the position of approving loans. Nor does it provide a mechanism to
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ensure that future discrimination complaints are timely investigated and resolved so that the USDA does not practice the same discrimination against African American farmers that led to the filing of this lawsuit. In fact, the Consent Decree stands absolutely mute on two critical points: the full implementation of the recommendations of the Civil Rights Action Team and the integration and reform of the county committee system to make it more accountable and representative. The absence of any such provisions has led to strong, heart-felt objections. It also has caused the Court concern. After comparing the terms of the settlement as a whole with the recovery that plaintiffs likely would have received after trial, however, the Court cannot conclude that the absence of any such prospective injunctive relief renders the settlement as a whole unfair.
There are several legal responses to the objections about the lack of forwardlooking injunctive relief. First, while plaintiffs sought both declaratory and monetary relief in the complaint, they never sought an injunction requiring the USDA to restructure or to fire people who may have engaged in discrimination. See Complaint at 40-42; Seventh Amended Complaint at 60-63. All of the objectors who seek to have the USDA restructured therefore are going beyond the scope of the complaint in this case. The role of the Court in approving or disapproving a settlement is limited to determining whether the settlement of the case before it is fair, adequate and reasonable. The Court cannot reject the Consent Decree merely because it does not provide relief for some other hypothetical case that plaintiffs could have but did not bring. Cf. United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459-60 (court cannot “reformulate the issues” or “redraft the complaint”).
Second, nothing in the Consent Decree authorizes the USDA to engage in illegal conduct in the future, and the Consent Decree therefore should not be rejected for its failure to
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include such prospective injunctive relief. See Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d at 1197 (“we cannot approve a class action settlement which either initiates or authorizes the continuation of clearly illegal conduct . . . [but] we are mindful that . . . any illegality or unconstitutionality must appear as a legal certainty on the face of the agreement before a settlement can be rejected on this basis”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Third, even if plaintiffs had prevailed on their ECOA claims at trial, it is not at all clear that the Court could have or would have granted the broad injunctive relief that the objectors now seek. The injunctive relief that the objectors seek, essentially an injunction requiring the USDA to change the way it processes credit applications, may be authorized where plaintiffs prove a constitutional violation, see Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 297 (1976), but plaintiffs in their Seventh Amended Complaint do not allege a constitutional violation and they have not undertaken to prove one. Moreover, while ECOA authorizes the Court to “grant such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce the requirements imposed under this subchapter,” 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c), in employing its broad equitable powers the Court must exercise “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.” See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 280 (1990)).
Those legal responses, however, provide little comfort to those who have experienced discrimination at the hands of the USDA and who legitimately fear that they will continue to face such discrimination in the future. The objections arise from a deep and overwhelming sense that the USDA and all of the structures it has put in place have been and continue to be fundamentally hostile to the African American farmer. As Mr. Leonard Cooper put it, “You cannot mediate . . . institutionalized racism.” Transcript of Motions Hearing of
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March 2, 1999 at 142. Another class member expressed it more personally: “They have humiliated me and my family since [1989]. . . . And I was just wondering if there couldn’t be something put in the provisions that would stop these FSA agents from humiliating and degrading [us] as they do. . . . my wife has almost had a nervous breakdown by dealing with our agent and he continues to do the same things that he has done in the past and I just wish there was some way for you to put something in that provision that would stop some of that stuff.” Id. at 146.
Most fundamentally, these objections result from a well-founded and deep-seated mistrust of the USDA. A mistrust borne of a long history of racial discrimination. A mistrust that is well-deserved. As Mr. Chestnut put it, these objections reflect “fear which reaches all the way back to slavery. . . . That objection, you heard it from many today, it really asks you to retain jurisdiction over this case in perpetuity. Otherwise they say USDA will default, ignore the lawful mandates of this Court, and in time march home scot-free while blacks are left holding the empty bag again.” Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 172. The Court cannot guarantee class members that they will never experience discrimination at the hands of the USDA again, and the Consent Decree does not purport to make such a guarantee. But the Consent Decree and the Court do provide certain assurances.
First, under the terms of this Consent Decree, the USDA is obligated to pay billions of dollars to African American farmers who have suffered discrimination. Those billions of dollars will serve as a reminder to the Department of Agriculture that its actions were unacceptable and should serve to deter it from engaging in the same conduct in the future.
Second, the USDA is not above the law. Like many of the objectors, the Court was surprised and disappointed by the government’s response to the Court’s modest proposal that
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the Consent Decree include a simple sentence that in the future the USDA shall exert “best efforts to ensure compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations prohibiting discrimination.” Letter from the Court to Counsel, dated March 5, 1999; see Response Letter from the Parties to the Court, dated March 19, 1999. Whether or not the government explicitly states it in this Consent Decree, however, the Constitution and laws of the United States continue to forbid discrimination on the basis of race, see, eg., U.S. CONST. amend. V; 15 U.S.C. § 1691; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, as do the regulations of the USDA. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.1, 15.51. The actions of the USDA from now into the future will be scrutinized closely -- by class members, by their now organized and vocal allies, by Congress and by the Court. If the USDA or members of the county committees are operating on the misapprehension that they ever again can repeat the events that led to this lawsuit, those forces will disabuse them of any such notion.
Most importantly, the farmers who have been a part of this lawsuit have demonstrated their power to bring about fundamental change to the Department of Agriculture, albeit more slowly than some would have wanted. Each individual farmer may feel powerless, but as a group they have planted seeds that are changing the landscape of the USDA. As a group, they spurred Secretary Glickman in 1996 to look inward at the practices of the USDA and to examine African American farmers’ allegations that the discrimination of the USDA was leading them to the point of financial ruin. As a group, they led Secretary Glickman to create the Civil Rights Action Team, a team that recommended sweeping changes to the USDA and to the county committee system. Indeed, in February 1997, the USDA Civil Rights Action Team itself recommended that the county committee system be revised by converting all county non-federal positions, including the county executive directors, to federal status, that the committee selection
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process by changed, that voting members of underrepresented groups be appointed to state and county committees, and that county committees be removed from any farm loan determinations. CRAT Report at 64-65.
As a group, the farmers mobilized a broad coalition within Congress to take the unprecedented action of tolling the statute of limitations. As a group, they brought Secretary Glickman to the negotiating table in this case and achieved the largest civil rights settlement in history. And as a group, they have made implementation of the recommendations of the CRAT Report a priority within the USDA. See Statement of February 9, 1999, by Secretary Dan Glickman, Before the Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate (“I also want to emphasize the importance that the President and I have placed on USDA civil rights issues; this priority is reflected in the [FY 2000] budget. The President’s budget provides the necessary funding to continue to carry out the recommendations of the Civil Rights Action Team (CRAT) as well as the recommendations of the National Commission on Small Farms which supports our civil rights agenda”). While the USDA landscape has remained resistant to change for many seasons, the labors of these farmers finally are beginning to bear fruit. This settlement represents one significant harvest. It is up to the Secretary of Agriculture and other responsible officials at the USDA to fulfill its promises, to ensure that this shameful period is never repeated and to bring the USDA into the twenty-first century.
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V. CONCLUSION 64

Forty acres and a mule. The government broke that promise to African American farmers. Over one hundred years later, the USDA broke its promise to Mr. James Beverly. It promised him a loan to build farrowing houses so that he could breed hogs. Because he was African American, he never received that loan. He lost his farm because of the loan that never was. Nothing can completely undo the discrimination of the past or restore lost land or lost opportunities to Mr. Beverly or to all of the other African American farmers whose representatives came before this Court. Historical discrimination cannot be undone.
But the Consent Decree represents a significant first step. A first step that has been a long time coming, but a first step of immeasurable value. As Mr. Chestnut put it, “Who really knows the true value, if there is one, for returning a small army of poor black farmers to the business of farming by the year 2000 who otherwise would never make it back? I am not wise enough to put a dollar value on that and I don’t think anybody on this planet is wise enough to reduce that to dollars and cents.” Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 171. The Consent Decree is a fair, adequate and reasonable settlement of the claims brought in this case. It therefore will be approved and entered.
SO ORDERED.

DATE:

_______________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

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 1212

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

ute before resting our decision on an ancillary provision that made Congress’s intent sufficiently clear to resolve the case at Chevron step one. Id. at 1340–48. By comparison, the merits panel’s rejection of the Department’s argument in this case rested on the easily ascertainable plain meaning of one provision, section 2104(a).
A final point about our analysis of the merits panel’s decision. The panel characterized the Department’s position in various ways, including ‘‘patently erroneous’’ and ‘‘irreconcilable with’’ canons of construction. Halverson, 129 F.3d at 185. Of course, not all panels use language the same way. Another panel equally unpersuaded by the Department might have used words like ‘‘unsupported,’’ ‘‘unconvincing,’’ or simply ‘‘without merit.’’ We thus think it would be unwise for a prevailing party’s eligibility for EAJA fees to turn solely on the particular words a particular merits panel uses to describe the Government’s position. Thus in Vollmer, although we took account of the merits panel’s characterization of the Government’s position as ‘‘incredible,’’ we ultimately rested our award of EAJA fees on our own conclusion that the Government had offered nothing to demonstrate that its position was substantially justified. Here too we have certainly considered the merits panel’s words, but our EAJA conclusion rests primarily on our view, informed by an analysis of the merits panel’s opinion, that the case was easy and the Department’s arguments worthy of little credence, as well as on the Department’s failure to offer any convincing reasons for believing that its interpretation of section 322(b) was substantially justified.
The decision of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for the district court to calculate the amount of fees and expenses the Department must pay to the Pilots.
So ordered.
,

Timothy C. PIGFORD, et al., Appellees,
Leonard C. Cooper, Appellant,
v.
Dan GLICKMAN, Secretary, The United States Department of Agriculture, Appellee.
Nos. 99–5222, 99–5223.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Feb. 28, 2000. Decided March 31, 2000.
Class of African–American farmers brought suit alleging that United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) systematically discriminated against them on basis of their race in administration of credit and benefit programs. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Friedman, J., 185 F.R.D. 82, approved consent decree under which United States was likely to provide an estimated $2 billion in debt relief and monetary payments. One plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, Rogers, Circuit Judge, held that district court did not abuse its discretion by approving consent decree.
Affirmed.
1. Federal Civil Procedure O2397.1 Decision to approve consent decree is
committed to sound discretion of district court.
2. Federal Civil Procedure O2397.1 District court’s role in reviewing con-
sent decree settling class action is to protect interests of absent class members, and that is done primarily by evaluating terms of settlement in relation to strength of their case.
3. Federal Courts O763.1 On review of district court’s approval
of consent decree settling class action, ap-

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pellate court is not to substitute its views class action alleging that United States

of fairness for those of district court and Department of Agriculture (USDA) sys-

parties to agreement, but is only to deter- tematically discriminated against African–

mine whether district court’s reasons for approving decree evidence appreciation of relevant facts and reasoned analysis of those facts in light of purposes of governing rule. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.
4. Federal Courts O813

American farmers; decree, which contained one paragraph that assigned to class the risk that Congress might nullify agreement in some respect by future legislation and another paragraph that limited mode of enforcing the decree in event of default, was fair and reasonable resolution of class complaint.

On appeal of district court’s approval

of consent decree settling class action, appellant bears burden of making ‘‘clear showing’’ that abuse of discretion has occurred. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.
5. Federal Civil Procedure O2397.2 Under consent decree settling class
action alleging that United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) systematically discriminated against African–American

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 97cv01978) (No. 98cv01693).
David M. Schnorrenberg argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Richard T. Seymour, Teresa A. Ferrante, Stephon J. Bowens, Marcus Jimison, J. Michael Klise and Matthew C. Hans. Julie Nepveu and Julie L. Gantz entered appearances.

farmers, paragraph providing that decree did not impose any duty on USDA inconsistent with federal statutes or regulations did not render USDA’s promise to perform illusory; rather, provision assigned to plaintiff class the marginal risk that Congress might nullify agreement in some respect by future legislation, a risk class would have borne even in absence of that provision.

Alexander J. Pires, Jr. argued the cause for appellees Freddie Jones, et al. With him on the brief was Phillip L. Fraas.
Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee Dan Glickman, Secretary, The United States Department of Agriculture. With him on the brief were David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Marleigh Dover, Special Counsel, and Wil-

6. Federal Civil Procedure O2397.5

ma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney.

Under consent decree settling class Before: SENTELLE, ROGERS and action alleging that United States Depart- TATEL, Circuit Judges. ment of Agriculture (USDA) systematical-

ly discriminated against African–American Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit

farmers, paragraph providing that if gov- Judge ROGERS.

ernment defaulted on its obligations, plaintiff class could enforce decree only by motion for civil contempt would not bar class from seeking modification of decree if Congress passed legislation nullifying decree.
7. Federal Civil Procedure O2397.2

ROGERS, Circuit Judge:
Leonard C. Cooper appeals the district court’s order approving a consent decree settling lawsuits brought by a class of approximately 20,000 African–American farmers, of which Mr. Cooper is a member,

District court did not abuse its discre- against the United States Department of

tion by approving consent decree settling Agriculture (‘‘USDA’’).1 See Pigford v.

1. Mr. Cooper is the only member of the class to appeal although in noting his appeal he purported to file on behalf of himself individ-

ually and as a representative of a class of African–American farmers, sending copies to nine named persons. None of those persons

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Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C.1999). Under the decree, the United States is likely to provide an estimated $2 billion in debt relief and monetary payments in consideration for the dismissal of the class’ complaint alleging that USDA systematically discriminated against them on the basis of their race. See id. at 111. Making no claim that the farmers’ individual claims cannot be fairly and justly resolved under the decree, Mr. Cooper contends instead that the benefits of the consent decree are illusory because USDA has reserved the right in paragraphs 19 and 21 to undo the decree by regulatory fiat, depriving the farmers of any judicial relief and, thus, the district court abused its discretion in approving the decree as fair, adequate, and reasonable under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As clarified by stipulations in the briefing and oral argument on appeal, no basis exists to conclude that USDA would promulgate such a regulation under laws in effect when the decree was approved by the district court. While paragraph 19 leaves the class exposed to potential congressional enactments nullifying or modifying the consent decree, the class would bear that risk in any event, at least so long as the decree remains executory. Additionally, Mr. Cooper’s contention concerning the limitation of the district court’s authority by paragraph 21 is inconsistent with the plain language of that provision. Accordingly, because Mr. Cooper’s contentions are unpersuasive on their own terms, and, in light of the benefits conferred on the class by the decree taken as a whole, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court, and we affirm.
I.
The consent decree settling the class action was the product of lengthy and, at times, contentious negotiations. The background is set forth in Judge Friedman’s comprehensive opinion, Pigford, 185

F.R.D. at 89–92, familiarity with which is assumed, and we repeat only the details necessary for this opinion.2
USDA indirectly administers programs that provide credit and other benefits to farmers. The USDA’s credit and benefit programs are federally funded, but the decisions to approve or deny applications for credit or benefits are made at the county level by a committee of three to five members elected by local farmers and ranchers. In addition to acting on credit and benefit applications, the county committee appoints a county executive to assist farmers in completing their applications and to recommend to the county committee which applications should be approved. Id. at 86. USDA has promulgated a number of regulations governing how these officials are to administer the credit and benefit programs, but the evidence before the district court shows that USDA has exercised little oversight regarding how applications historically have been processed at the county level. Id. at 86– 88. For years, African–American farmers, who have been significantly underrepresented on the county committees, see id. at 87, have complained that county officials have exercised their power in a racially discriminatory manner, resulting in delayed processing or denial of applications for credit and benefits by African–American farmers not experienced by white farmers who are similarly situated. Id. at 87–88. Such discriminatory treatment is prohibited by statute and by regulation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1994); 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.51, 15.52 (1999). In December 1996, the Secretary of Agriculture appointed a Civil Rights Action Team to investigate allegations of racial discrimination in the administration of USDA credit and benefit programs, and, in February 1997, the USDA Inspector General reported that USDA had a backlog of discrimination complaints in need of immediate attention.

is a named appellant, however. The class representatives, the named plaintiffs in the district court, and the Secretary of Agriculture are appellees.

2. The district court’s opinion appears as an appendix to this opinion.

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The President and the Secretary thereaf- and agreed to a consent decree that con-

ter sought appropriations to carry out the templated a two-track dispute resolution

recommendations to improve USDA’s civil mechanism to determine whether individu-

rights efforts. Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 111. al class members had been the victims of

On August 28, 1997, three African– discrimination and, if so, the amount of

American farmers filed suit on behalf of a monetary relief to which they were enti-

putative class of similarly situated Afri- tled. If a class member opts for resolution

can–American farmers alleging racial dis- under Track A, ‘‘class members with little

crimination in the administration of USDA or no documentary evidence [will receive]

programs and further harm from the al- a virtually automatic cash payment of $50,-

legedly surreptitious dismantling of 000 and forgiveness of any debt owed to

USDA’s Office of Civil Rights in 1983, USDA,’’ id. at 95; whereas, class members

which together were alleged to violate the opting for Track B resolution have the

Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (‘‘ECOA’’), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, prohibiting discrimination in consumer credit. Following amendments to the complaint, the district court granted class certification in October 1998. See Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 90. At that time, most of the farmers’ ECOA claims were arguably barred by a two-year statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f). Responding to petitions from class members, Congress enacted, and the President signed in November 1998, an amendment to retroactively extend the limitations period for persons who had filed administrative complaints between January 1, 1981, and July 1, 1997, for acts of discrimination occur-

opportunity to prove their claims in a oneday mini-trial before an arbitrator and, if successful, the amount of monetary damages is not capped. Id. Class members dissatisfied with the opportunity for resolution of their claims under either Track A or Track B could opt out of the class within 120 days of entry of the consent decree, and file individual lawsuits. Id. The district court is to appoint a monitor from a list of names provided by the parties ‘‘to track and report on USDA’s compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree.’’ Id. at 109.
By law, the proposed consent decree could not take effect until the district court had approved it, see FED.R.CIV.P. 23(e), and the district court’s approval could not be granted until notice had been

ring between January 1, 1981, and Decem- given to the class of the proposed settle-

ber 31, 1996.3 A second class action, ment and a fairness hearing had been held

Brewington v. Glickman, Civ. No. 98– to determine whether the ‘‘settlement is

1693, filed in July 1998 and making similar fair, adequate, and reasonable and is not

allegations covering a different time peri- the product of collusion between the par-

od, was consolidated with Pigford for pur- ties.’’ Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 98 (quoting

poses of settlement, and a new class was Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227, 231

certified. See Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 90. (D.C.Cir.1998)). The district court held a

As the February 1999 trial date drew day-long hearing in which representatives

near, the parties’ negotiations shifted from of eight organizations and sixteen individu-

individual claims to a global settlement, als, including Mr. Cooper, voiced their ob-

id., and with the assistance of a court- jections to the terms of the proposed con-

appointed mediator, the parties developed sent decree. Many, including Mr. Cooper,

3. See Pub.L. No. 105–277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2279, notes); see also Statement By President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 4328, 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2108 (Nov. 2, 1998) (‘‘This bill will also address the long-standing dis-

crimination claims of many minority farmers by adopting my request to waive the statute of limitations on USDA discrimination complaints that date back to the early 1980s.’’), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 582.

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objected to the absence of certain forms of prospective structural relief, notwithstanding the fact that the complaint, as amended, did not seek such injunctive relief. Id. at 110. While USDA was likely to face billion-dollar monetary liability under the decree, no changes to the county committee system were mandated, and objectors feared that no improvements would be made to the way in which the farm credit and non-credit programs are administered. See Transcript of Fairness Hearing (‘‘Tr.’’), Mar. 2, 1999 at Joint Appendix (JA) 388 (Mr. Bowens); 493 (Mr. Cooper). They also maintained that insufficient information had been exchanged during the discovery period leading up to the settlement. However, at the fairness hearing, neither Mr. Cooper nor his counsel voiced the objections raised now on appeal to paragraphs 19 and 21 of the decree. Instead the National Council of Community Based Organizations in Agriculture (‘‘NCCBOA’’) argued to the district court that paragraph 19 ‘‘contemplates that a future statute or regulation may interfere with the relief that is provided by the decree.’’ Tr. at JA 410. Without specifically mentioning paragraph 21, NCCBOA objected to that provision on the grounds that the class members ‘‘are remitted to contract law claims against the Government, but the contract here expressly provides that they can’t have their claims

reinstated and the Government has got a defense because of its new regulation to the relief that’s provided by the Consent Decree.’’ Tr. at JA 411.
Following the hearing, the district court suggested fourteen changes to the proposed consent decree, including modifying paragraph 19 to require USDA to use its best efforts to comply with laws prohibiting discrimination and modifying paragraph 21 to make clear that the district court retained jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree with its contempt power. The class and USDA rejected the first suggestion and adopted the second. The district court then allowed another round of written objections to be filed to the revised consent decree.4 After considering all of the objections and the entire record, the district court approved the proposed consent decree as fair under Rule 23 and ordered that the decree be entered. Mr. Cooper noted an appeal from the order, but he did not seek a stay of proceedings under the consent decree pending appeal.5
II.
[1–4] The law is well settled that the decision to approve a consent decree is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 299 (3d Cir.1998). The district

4. Objections made directly by Mr. Cooper questioned whether class counsel truly represented the interests of the class members and suggested that the decree contain a provision rendering it void if either USDA or class counsel took steps to obstruct the district court’s jurisdiction to enforce the proposed decree. Mr. Cooper’s counsel, on behalf of Mr. Cooper, filed eight pages of objections, which also questioned the capacity of class counsel to represent the class, but made no mention of either paragraphs 19 nor 21 nor of the enforceability of the decree as a general matter. In addition, the North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers Land Loss Prevention Project at North Carolina Central University Law School filed a set of objections jointly with three other organizations, including NCCBOA, which stressed, among other things, the view that in light of paragraphs 19 and 21, the district court’s con-

tempt power was inadequate to enforce the decree.
5. Although the figures differ, USDA and class counsel represented in their respective briefs that more than 20,000 persons have filed claims under the decree. See Appellee USDA’s Br. at 15; Appellee Plaintiff Class’ Br. at 12. At oral argument, class counsel represented that as of February 25, 2000, decisions in 9,573 Track A cases had been rendered of which 5,746 claims were granted and paid in an amount totaling $359,125,000. Of the 3,827 Track A claims that were denied in whole or in part, one third have been appealed under the terms of the consent decree. In addition, approximately 146 class members have opted for resolution under Track B. Four cases have been completed, and eighty others are in discovery.

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court’s role in reviewing the decree is to bers specifically of the terms of the two

protect the interests of absent class mem- paragraphs and by approving the decree

bers, and that is done primarily by evalu- without requiring alteration or deletion of

ating the terms of the settlement in rela- the two paragraphs.6

tion to the strength of their case. See Thomas, 139 F.3d at 231. The appellate court is not to substitute its views of fairness for those of the district court and the parties to the agreement, see Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir.1992), but is only to determine whether the district court’s reasons for approving the decree evidence appreciation of the relevant facts and reasoned analysis of those facts in light of the purposes of Rule 23. See Thomas, 139 F.3d at 231; see also Kickapoo Tribe v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1495 (D.C.Cir.1995). Mr. Cooper bears the burden on appeal of making a ‘‘clear showing’’ that an abuse of discretion has occurred. See Moore v. National Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 762 F.2d 1093, 1107 (D.C.Cir.1985). He has not done so; on the contrary, the district court fulfilled the requirements of Rule 23 in exemplary fashion.
On appeal Mr. Cooper has abandoned the objections he raised in the district court regarding the lack of prospective structural relief and confines his challenge to the consent decree to paragraphs 19 and

[5] In his opening brief, Mr. Cooper contended that USDA can use paragraph 19 to renege on its agreement in the consent decree in one of three ways: (1) Congress could pass new legislation that USDA could interpret to preclude some or all of the relief provided by the decree; (2) USDA could promulgate new regulations to the same effect without new legislation; or (3) USDA could interpret existing law to bar the relief provided in the decree without promulgating a rule. In subsequent briefing by appellees class counsel and USDA, and at oral argument, it has been clarified that there was no intent that paragraph 19 include the second and third possibilities; rather, USDA stipulates, and class counsel concurs, in their respective briefs that paragraph 19 ‘‘simply recognizes the legal reality that Congress makes the laws, and that it is the obligation of the government to perform prospectively in conformance with the then binding laws enacted by Congress.’’ See Appellee USDA’s Br. at 25; Appellee Plaintiff Class’ Br. at 11.

21, which he contends give USDA, in ef- With that clarification, USDA’s promise

fect, the right to unilaterally withdraw to perform under the consent decree is not

from the consent decree leaving class illusory because USDA has not reserved a

members with no judicial remedy. Mr. unilateral right to withdraw, cf. Gray v.

Cooper thus contends that the district American Express Co., 743 F.2d 10, 19

court erred by failing to notify class mem- (D.C.Cir.1984) (interpreting New York

6. The paragraphs under attack provide:

19. Defendant’s Duty Consistent With Law and Regulations
Nothing contained in this Consent Decree or in the Final Judgment shall impose on the defendant any duty, obligation or requirement, the performance of which would be inconsistent with federal statutes or federal regulations in effect at the time of such performance.

.

.

.

.

.

21. No Effect if Default Subject to the terms of ¶ 17, above, [con-
ditioning the decree’s obligations on a final judgment dismissing the complaint] and following entry by the Court of Final Judg-

ment, no default by any person or party to this consent Decree in the performance of any of the covenants or obligations under this Consent Decree, or any judgment or order entered in connection therewith, shall affect the dismissal of the complaint, the preclusion of prosecution of actions, the discharge and release of the defendant, or the judgment entered approving these provisions. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed to affect the Court’s jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree on a motion for contempt filed in accordance with ¶ 13 [requiring parties to conciliate before filing contempt motion]. The last sentence of paragraph 21 was added after the fairness hearing.

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law), rather it would take action by Congress to enable USDA to withdraw from the consent decree. Consequently, under elementary principles of contract law, USDA’s promise to perform was backed by consideration at the time it was made and the parties have assigned to the plaintiff class the marginal risk that Congress might nullify the agreement in some respect by future legislation. Although the evidence before the district court establishes the basis for class members’ mistrust of USDA and concern that the risk may be more than hypothetical, see Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 110, the fact that Congress and the President acted quickly to remove a limitations bar to the plaintiffs’ recovery indicates that as of October 1998 all three branches of the federal government had taken steps to aid in the final resolution of the farmers’ claims on the merits. The district court noted the priority commitment of the President and the Secretary of Agriculture, spurred by the efforts of the African–American farmers, to obtain funding to carry out recommendations improving USDA’s civil rights efforts, as well as Congress’ ‘‘unprecedented action of tolling the statute of limitations.’’ Id. at 111. And Mr. Cooper acknowledged through counsel on appeal that he has no evidence that this three-branch commitment has waned. The district court could therefore reasonably conclude when approving the decree that the risk of a radical about-face in current federal policy was remote.
More fundamentally, even in the absence of paragraph 19, the class would bear the risk of such hypothetical legislation, at least so long as the decree remains executory. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431–32, 15 L.Ed. 435 (1855); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 692–93 (D.C.Cir.1998); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 273–274, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994); Rufo

v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992).7 Thus, we need not pass upon Mr. Cooper’s’ contentions concerning possible constitutional limitations on Congress’ power to enact such legislation, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995), nor address the ramifications of such legislation under the reasoning of United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996), to conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by approving the proposed consent decree, as amended, which assigns a risk to the plaintiff class that it would have borne in any event.
[6] As to Mr. Cooper’s contention that paragraph 21 deprives the farmers of the right to ask the district court to modify the decree or reinstate their lawsuit in the unlikely event that Congress passes legislation nullifying the decree, it too relies on a misplaced concern. Paragraph 21 provides that if the government defaults on its obligations under the decree, the plaintiff class can enforce the decree only by motion for civil contempt. Mr. Cooper reads this provision to also ‘‘strip[ ] the district court of its authority to reopen the final judgment’’ if Congress enacts legislation allowing for the decree to be nullified in whole or in part. However, the very basis for Mr. Cooper’s contention concerning paragraph 19 is, and USDA agrees, that USDA would not be in default under the agreement if Congress passed new legislation nullifying, or directing the Secretary to nullify by regulation, the consent decree. Because that action would not qualify as a default, the provisions of paragraph 21 would not apply. Thus, Mr. Cooper’s contention that the consent decree is unfair because the class would not be able to seek relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is mistaken. On its face, paragraph 21 does not foreclose that avenue of relief when USDA has not

7. It is to be noted that the relief Mr. Cooper seeks, an order vacating the decree and remanding for trial, could require that plaintiffs’ cases be tried over a number of years,

see Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 104, and thus could expose class members to this risk for a far longer period.

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1219

defaulted, and thus were Congress to en- otherwise unfair or unreasonable. As a

act the hypothesized legislation, paragraph result, Mr. Cooper has failed to meet his

21 would not bar the class from seeking burden to show that the enforcement pro-

modification of the decree, subject to its visions of the decree are so infirm as to

ability to ‘‘establish that a significant render the entire agreement unfair or un-

change in facts or law warrants revision of reasonable. Furthermore, our reasons for

the decree and that the proposed modifica- finding Mr. Cooper’s substantive conten-

tion is suitably tailored to the changed tions unpersuasive also lead us to reject

circumstance.’’ Rufo, 502 U.S. at 393, 112 his procedural contentions that the district

S.Ct. 748.

court did not address the objections to

Moreover, not only do Mr. Cooper’s contentions collapse under their own weight, but even were they to retain some persuasive force, the court must evaluate the

paragraphs 19 and 21 with sufficient specificity and that notice to the class was inadequate because it did not specifically describe paragraphs 19 and 21.

district court’s decision to approve the consent decree, with whatever shortcomings paragraphs 19 and 21 might present, in light of the agreement as a whole. See Thomas, 139 F.3d at 231. In that context, there is no doubt that the district court exercised its discretion well within the boundaries of the law. The serious concerns and objections to the proposed consent decree were carefully considered by the district court and balanced against the likely alternatives in a manner reflecting a considered and compassionate conclusion. See, e.g., Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 101–04, 109–111. Neither Mr. Cooper nor, to our knowledge, any other class member contends at this point that the provisions of the consent decree providing monetary payments and loan forgiveness are unfair

[7] The ultimate question before the court is whether the district court abused its discretion by approving a consent decree, the principal provisions of which are an indisputably fair and reasonable resolution of the class complaint, containing one paragraph that assigns to the class a risk it would have borne in any event and another paragraph that limits the mode of enforcing the decree in the event of default. To ask the question is to answer it. Because it is clear that no abuse of discretion occurred we do not reach the government’s alternative argument concerning whether it would be equitable for this court to vacate the decree in light of the number of claims that have been resolved in reliance on the decree.

or unreasonable, and we have no occasion Accordingly, we affirm the order of ap-

to consider whether these provisions are proval of the district court.

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PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1251

cadc(00)65-32

1252

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-33

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1253

cadc(00)65-34

1254

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-35

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1255

cadc(00)65-36

1256

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-37

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1257

cadc(00)65-38

1258

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-39

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1259

cadc(00)65-40

1260

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-41

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1261

cadc(00)65-42

1262

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-43

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1263

cadc(00)65-44

1264

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-45

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1265

cadc(00)65-46

1266

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-47

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1267

cadc(00)65-48

1268

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-49

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1269

cadc(00)65-50

1270

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-51

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1271

cadc(00)65-52

1272

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-53

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1273

cadc(00)65-54

1274

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-55

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1275

cadc(00)65-56

1276

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-57

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1277

cadc(00)65-58

1278

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-59

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1279

cadc(00)65-60

1280

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-61

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1281

cadc(00)65-62

1282

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-63

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1283

cadc(00)65-64

1284

206 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

cadc(00)65-65

PIGFORD v. GLICKMAN
Cite as 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

1285

cadc(00)65-66

,

 
 Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (2002) 352 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 53 Fed.R.Serv.3d 275
292 F.3d 918 United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Timothy C. PIGFORD, et al., Appellees, v.
Ann M. VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Appellant.
Nos. 02-5052 & 02-5053. | Argued May 1, 2002. | Decided June 21, 2002. | Rehearing Denied Aug. 26,
2002.
Class of African-American farmers brought suit alleging that United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) systematically discriminated against them on basis of their race in administration of credit and benefit programs. After entry of consent decree creating settlement fund, plaintiffs moved to endow arbitrators who were ruling on individual claims with discretion to extend arbitration deadlines. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Paul L. Friedman, J., 182 F.Supp.2d 50, granted the motion, and the USDA appealed. The Court of Appeals, Tatel, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) where the enforcement clause of the decree was limited to situations involving decree violations, the district court could not extend the decree’s deadlines through either some “ancillary” authority to enforce the decree absent a violation or “inherent” authority to interpret it; (2) class counsel’s failure to meet critical deadlines amounted to an “unforeseen obstacle” that made the decree “unworkable,” warranting modification; but (3) vesting arbitrators with generic authority to revise deadlines “so long as justice requires” did not satisfy requirement that modification be suitably tailored to the changed circumstances.
Reversed and remanded.
*919 **215 Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 97cv01978) (No. 98cv01693).
Attorneys and Law Firms
Howard S. Scher, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice.

Jason A. Levine argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Anthony Herman and Alexander J. Pires, Jr.
Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and TATEL, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
TATEL, Circuit Judge:
The question presented in this appeal concerns a district court’s authority to interpret or modify a consent decreehere, the settlement of a class action brought by over 20,000 African-American farmers charging the United States Department of Agriculture with racial discrimination in lending practices. Due to class counsel’s failure-“bordering on legal malpractice,” the district court called it-to meet critical consent decree deadlines, the district court interpreted the decree to allow extension of such deadlines “so long as justice requires.” Although we find that the district court exceeded its interpretive authority under the decree, we hold that class counsel’s conduct justifies modifying the decree under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). But because the order does not satisfy the “tailor[ing]” requirement for a Rule 60(b)(5) modification, see Rufo v. Inmates *920 **216 of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383, 112 S.Ct. 748, 760, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Proceeding under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f, three African-American farmers filed this class action against the United States Department of Agriculture alleging racial discrimination in the administration of federally funded credit and benefit programs. The class ultimately included 22,000 similarly situated farmers from fifteen states. Shortly before the farmers filed suit, the Department released a report commissioned by then-Secretary Dan Glickman “to address [the agency’s] long-standing civil rights

Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (2002)
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problems,” documented since the 1960s by numerous federal government “[s]tudies, reports, and task forces.” CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION TEAM, USDA, CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 2-3 (1997), available at http://www.usda.gov/news/civil/cr_next.htm. Examining the “painful history” of its dealings with AfricanAmerican farmers, the Department concluded that local credit and loan agencies responsible for administering Department programs often discriminated against the farmers. Id. at 6. According to the Glickman report, Department officials had “effectively dismantled” the Office for Civil Rights Enforcement-the very office charged with addressing discrimination complaints. Id. at 47-48 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[O]ften mak[ing] matters worse,” the “complaints processing system” was a “bureaucratic nightmare” that “processed [complaints] slowly, if at all,” resulting in a huge “backlog,” while at the same time the agency “proceed[ed] with farm foreclosures-even where discrimination may have contributed to the farmers’ plight.” Id. at 22-25. “Minority farmers,” the report concluded, “lost significant amounts of land and potential farm income as a result of discrimination by [USDA] programs.” Id. at 30.
After Congress intervened to preserve the farmers’ claims by tolling the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s two-year statute of limitations, see Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 88-89 (D.D.C.1999) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f)), the parties entered into a consent decree. Designed to “ensur[e] that in their dealings with USDA, all class members receive full and fair treatment that is the same as the treatment accorded to similarly situated white persons,” the decree establishes procedures for resolving class members’ individual claims. Consent Decree at 2. Specifically, the decree allows class members to choose between two claims procedures, known as Tracks A and B. In recognition of the fact that “most ... [class] members ... had little in the way of documentation or proof” of either discriminatory treatment or damages suffered, Track A awards $50,000 to those farmers able to “meet only a minimal burden of proof.” Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 103. Track B-the mechanism at issue here-imposes no cap on damages, but requires farmers who choose this track, after limited discovery consisting “essentially [of] an exchange of lists of witnesses and exhibits and depositions of the opposing side’s witnesses,” to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence in oneday mini-trials before an arbitrator. Id. at 106. Set forth in paragraph 10 of the decree, Track B establishes strict time frames: the arbitrator sends a hearing notice within 10 days of receiving a Track B claim and holds a hearing no

more than 150 days later; at least 90 days before the hearing, the Department and claimant file and serve on each other witness lists, summaries of direct testimony, and copies of all exhibits; discovery ends no later than 45 days before the hearing; and no fewer than 21 days before the hearing, both sides *921 **217 list witnesses they intend to crossexamine and file summaries of all legal and factual issues. Consent Decree ¶ 10(a)-(e). Track A and B decisions are final, except that the losing side may petition for review by a court-appointed monitor. Id. ¶ ¶ 9(a)(v), 9(b)(v), 10(i), 12(b)(iii).
Following notice to the class and a hearing, the district court approved the consent decree as “fair, adequate, and reasonable,” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 113. According to the district court, the decree represents an “historical first step toward righting the wrongs visited upon thousands of AfricanAmerican farmers for decades by the [USDA].” Pigford v. Glickman, 127 F.Supp.2d 35, 40 (D.D.C.2001). Our opinion affirming the district court’s approval of the decree noted its importance for both the farmers and the government: the “United States is likely to provide an estimated $2 billion in debt relief and monetary payments in consideration for the dismissal of the class’[s] complaint.” Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212, 1214 (D.C.Cir.2000). Ultimately, 21,546 claims were accepted for review-21,358 under Track A and 188 under Track B.
The decree provided for class counsel to receive an advance payment of $1 million in fees to cover decree “implementation.” Consent Decree ¶ 14(b). The decree entitled counsel to seek additional fees under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d), for their work in connection with filing the action and implementing the decree, Consent Decree ¶ 14(a). One year into the implementation process, the district court “took the extraordinary step of awarding a second advance”-this time for $7 million. Order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia at 2 (Mar. 8, 2001) (No. 97cv01978). The Department and class counsel eventually settled all fee claims for $14.9 million. Attorneys and firms sharing the fees were: Alexander J. Pires, Jr., of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan, Pires & Leavy; Philip L. Fracas, of Tattle, Tabor & Heron; JB. Chestnut, of Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettily; T. Roe Framer, of Langshan, Frazer, Sweet & Freese; Hubbard Saunders IV, of The Terney Firm; Othello Cross, of Cross, Kearney & McKissic; Gerard Lear, of Speiser Krause; and William J. Smith.
Several months after class counsel received their second fee advance and just two weeks prior to the deadline for

Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (2002)
352 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 53 Fed.R.Serv.3d 275
filing petitions for monitor review for the “vast majority of claimants [in both tracks],” class counsel filed an emergency motion seeking an extension of time. Order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia at 2 (Nov. 8, 2000) (No. 97cv01978). Counsel revealed that they had filed only a small fraction of the total petitions requested by the farmers. Concerned that “counsel’s failings ... not be visited on their clients,” id. at 3, and relying on “explicit assurances” by counsel as to the work load they could realistically shoulder into the future, Pigford v. Veneman, 141 F.Supp.2d 60, 62 (D.D.C.2001), the district court permitted counsel to file pro forma petitions by the original deadline and then to either file supporting materials or to withdraw the petitions at the rate of at least 400 petitions per month, see Order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia at 5-6 (Nov. 8, 2000) (No. 97cv01978).
A few months later, the district court observed “a very disturbing trend”: class counsel had failed to meet their monthly quota “even once.” Pigford, 141 F.Supp.2d at 62. Worse still, counsel had “drastically cut [their] staff, bring[ing] Class Counsel’s ability to represent the [farmers] into serious question.” Id. “[A]larmed by Class Counsel’s consistent failure” to meet decree timelines, the district *922 **218 court noted counsel’s “ remarkable admission that they never had a realistic expectation of meeting” agreed-upon or court-ordered deadlines for the monitor review process. Order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia at 2-3 (Apr. 27, 2001) (No. 97cv01978). The court described counsel’s performance as “dismal”-“border [ing] on legal malpractice”-and “wonder[ed]” whether class counsel would have been in such a predicament had they not filed “three new sister class actions” against the Department. Id. at 2-3 & nn. 1, 5.
The district court eventually imposed a series of escalating daily fines on class counsel for untimely monitor review filings. Pigford v. Veneman, 143 F.Supp.2d 28, 32 (D.D.C.2001). Instead of simply submitting materials in support of their clients’ petitions in a more timely fashion, however, counsel drastically increased the rate at which they withdrew petitions for monitor review-from 19% to 48%-“once again” leading the district court to “question Class Counsel’s fidelity to their clients.” Pigford v. Veneman, 148 F.Supp.2d 31, 33 & n. 1 (D.D.C.2001).
Class counsel’s failure to cope with their responsibilities extended to the Track B process. Consider the case of Earl Kitchen, a farmer from Arkansas who filed a Track B claim. Kitchen was initially represented by Jesse L.

Kearney, a member of one of the firms sharing in the fee award, Cross, Kearney & McKissic. During the course of representing Kitchen, Kearney obtained extensions of several paragraph 10 deadlines either with consent or over the Department’s objection. Around the time the Department agreed to pay class counsel $14.9 million, Kearney missed the deadline (already extended by mutual consent) to submit written direct testimony. Kearney’s failure could have drastic consequences, for absent submission of testimony, Kitchen’s claim will “be extinguished.” Appellees’ Br. at 12; see also Consent Decree ¶ 10(g) (putting the burden of proof on the claimant).
In the meantime, the district court, deeply concerned about the decree’s viability, asked the American Bar Association Committee on Pro Bono and Public Services to “assemble a team of pro bono lawyers to assist Class Counsel on an emergency basis.” Order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia at 7 (Apr. 27, 2001) (No. 97cv01978). In response, lawyers from the Pro Bono Committee and the firms of Arnold & Porter and Crowell & Moring recruited some of Washington’s largest law firms: Covington & Burling; Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood; Steptoe & Johnson; Swidler, Berlin, Shereff & Friedman; and Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering. The district court, recognizing the competing demands on class counsel arising out of their representation of multiple claimants in both tracks and at various stages of the claims resolution process, hoped that this added assistance would lift the “heavy burden of Track B litigation from the shoulders of Class Counsel,” enabling them to “focus on the petition [for monitor review] process.” Pigford, 143 F.Supp.2d at 30 n. 1.
Pro bono counsel took over the representation of Earl Kitchen and asked the Department to extend the time for filing written direct testimony. The Department refused. As a result and because class counsel had apparently missed deadlines in other Track B cases, pro bono counsel filed a “motion to endow,” asking the district court “to interpret (and if necessary, to modify) the Consent Decree, so that Arbitrators have discretion to extend deadlines when strict compliance with the original scheduling framework would defeat the Decree’s overarching remedial purposes.” Pls.’ Mot. to Endow at 1. *923 **219 Granting the motion, the district court found it “implicit” in the Decree’s terms that arbitrators have such discretion. Pigford v. Veneman, 182 F.Supp.2d 50, 53 (D.D.C.2002).
The Department appeals. At its request, we entered a stay pending appeal.

Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (2002) 352 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 53 Fed.R.Serv.3d 275
II.
[1] [2] District courts possess two types of authority over consent decrees. First, they may interpret and enforce a decree to the extent authorized either by the decree or by the related order. See Bd. of Trustees of Hotel & Rest. Employees Local 25 v. Madison Hotel, Inc., 97 F.3d 1479, 1484 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1996) (observing that a district court retains enforcement jurisdiction over a settlement if litigants so provide in their stipulation of dismissal or the dismissal order incorporates the settlement terms). Second, they may modify a decree pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378-79, 112 S.Ct. at 757-58 (holding that the Rule 60(b)(5) standard for modifying judgments applies to consent decrees). These two sources of authority reflect a consent decree’s hybrid character, having qualities of both contracts and court orders. See id. at 378, 112 S.Ct. at 757 (explaining that a consent decree “is contractual in nature” but also “an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree”).
The farmers based their “motion to endow” on both sources of authority. In granting the motion, the district court explained that it was exercising its “authority to enforce and to interpret an approved Consent Decree.” Pigford, 182 F.Supp.2d at 51. Although the court thus never addressed the question of its Rule 60(b)(5) authority, the farmers maintain that we may affirm the order on either ground. We consider each in turn.
Interpretation and Enforcement
Reasoning that the decree “explicitly allows for its construction in a liberal manner,” and that paragraph 10 “delegate[s]” the district court’s authority over Track B claims to arbitrators, the district court found it “implicit in the terms of the Consent Decree” that arbitrators “have essentially the same authority over Track B hearings that a trial judge would have over a trial or related pre-trial proceedings,” including “discretion to allow for revision of certain deadlines, even after the deadlines have passed, so long as justice requires the revisions and provided that the burden on the defendant is not so great as to outweigh the interest of the claimant in fully presenting his or her

claim.” Id. at 51-53. The Department argues that the consent decree gives the district court no such authority. According to the Department, the district court’s only authority either to interpret or enforce the consent decree comes from paragraph 13, which “concern[s] ... alleged violation[s] of any provision of th[e] ... Decree,” and directs “[t]he person seeking enforcement of a provision of th[e] ... Decree” to attempt to resolve any problems without court intervention and then to seek enforcement through contempt proceedings. Consent Decree ¶ 13; see also id. ¶ 21 (retaining the court’s authority to enforce the decree through contempt proceedings). Since the farmers neither alleged a violation nor invoked the procedures for “seeking enforcement,” the Department contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the “motion to endow.” Defending the district court’s order and relying on our statement in Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n that it is a “well-established principle that a trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce its consent decrees,” 995 F.2d 280, 286 (D.C.Cir.1993), the farmers argue that the order was “properly grounded on jurisdiction ‘ancillary’ to that explicitly conferred *924 **220 by paragraph 13,” Appellees’ Br. at 21. Pursuant to this “ancillary jurisdiction,” the farmers contend, the district court properly “enforce[d]” the decree’s “overarching remedial purposes.” Id. at 20. The farmers also argue that quite apart from paragraph 13, the district court had “ inherent” authority to interpret the decree. Id. at 21.
[3] We agree with the Department. In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, the Supreme Court held that a district court lacked “ancillary jurisdiction” to enforce a consent decree because neither the decree nor the order dismissing the case expressly retained jurisdiction to do so. 511 U.S. 375, 380-81, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1676-77, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Although Kokkonen differs from the situation here-the consent decree in this case does retain certain enforcement jurisdiction-the decision teaches that district courts enjoy no free-ranging “ancillary” jurisdiction to enforce consent decrees, but are instead constrained by the terms of the decree and related order. See id. at 381, 114 S.Ct. at 1677 (explaining that if the dismissal order had retained jurisdiction or incorporated the settlement, then “a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist”). Accordingly, an enforcement clause limited by its plain language, as is paragraph 13, to situations involving decree violations confers no ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the decree’s “overarching ... purposes.” Indeed, when the district court approved the decree, it observed that the parties added the enforcement provision because the original version “appeared to

Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (2002)
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prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction in the event that the USDA did not comply with [its] terms,” Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 110, bolstering our view that the enforcement provision means what it says.
Beckett does not warrant a different result. Not only did the Beckett decree preserve the district court’s “jurisdiction over [the] case to enforce the terms of [the] ... decree,” 995 F.2d at 286, but the party seeking enforcement in Beckett-unlike the farmers here-alleged that the other party had violated the decree’s terms, id. at 281.
[4] Equally unpersuasive is the farmers’ argument that we need not worry about paragraph 13’s limitations because the district court possesses “inherent” interpretive power over the decree “whether or not for explicit enforcement purposes.” Appellees’ Br. at 21. For one thing, we see no way the district court’s interpretive authority can be unhinged from its enforcement authority. If the district court lacks paragraph 13 enforcement authority (because the farmers alleged no violation), then the farmers gain nothing from an interpretation that arbitrators may adjust paragraph 13 deadlines. Furthermore, none of the appellate cases cited by the farmers supports their assertion that “many cases ... have recognized the ‘inherent’ jurisdiction of courts to interpret consent decrees,” id., apart from any enforcement power. Two of the cases involved decree modifications, not interpretations. See Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc. v. Dayton, 132 F.3d 1142, 1146 & n. 4 (6th Cir.1997); Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 46 F.3d 1347, 1365 (5th Cir.1995). The third upheld, as a valid consent decree interpretation, a district court’s imposition of interim deadlines not specified in the decree. See Juan F. By and Through Lynch v. Weicker, 37 F.3d 874 (2d Cir.1994). The order in that case, however-unlike the one here-provided for court intervention “when plaintiffs showed the defendant was ‘likely’ to be in noncompliance”; the additional deadlines represented a permissible *925 **221 interpretation because they served to “ensur[e] compliance.” Id. at 879.
[5] Our conclusion that the district court’s interpretive and enforcement authority depends on the terms of the decree and related court order, rather than on some “ancillary” or “inherent” power, comports with a consent decree’s contractual character. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378, 112 S.Ct. at 757. In this case, for example, the farmers and the Department bargained over Track B’s time frames. Track B’s “abbreviated and unambiguous deadlines,” the Department candidly tells us, serve its interests by “limit[ing] the number of class members who ... opt for the Track B process and ... enhanc[ing] the government’s

ability to defend against [those] claims.” Appellant’s Br. at 24-25. The parties also bargained over paragraph 13, agreeing to limit district court enforcement authority to situations where the decree is violated. To hold now that the district court, through either some “ancillary” authority to enforce the decree absent a violation or some “inherent” authority to interpret it, may permit extensions of Track B deadlines would not only deny the Department the benefit of its bargain, but would also discourage settlements. Who would sign a consent decree if district courts had free-ranging interpretive or enforcement authority untethered from the decree’s negotiated terms?
Modification
The farmers argue that even if the district court lacked authority to interpret the decree to allow extension of Track B deadlines, we may still affirm the order as a proper modification pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). This rule permits courts, “upon such terms as are just,” to “relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding ... [if] it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” “[A] significant change in circumstances,” the Supreme Court has held, may “warrant[ ] revision of [a] decree.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 760. Such changed circumstances include “unforeseen obstacles” that make a decree “unworkable.” Id. at 384, 112 S.Ct. at 760. Any modification must be “suitably tailored to the changed circumstances.” Id. at 370, 112 S.Ct. at 753.
According to the farmers, two “significant change[d] ... circumstances” make the consent decree “unworkable.” They first point to a “dramatic and unexpected expansion in class size”-from 2000 (the number originally estimated) to 22,000 (the final number). Appellees’ Br. at 31. As the Department points out, however, at the time the district court approved the decree, the parties realized the class already had between “15,000 and 20,000” members. Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 94. Although this may well suggest that the actual increase was not “significant” enough to justify modification, we decline to resolve that issue, for the district court did not rely on the larger class size as a basis for the order at issue here.
[6] Class counsel’s “inability to represent all Track B claimants adequately,” Pigford, 182 F.Supp.2d at 52, the farmers next argue, also provides a basis for a Rule 60(b)(5) modification. The Department concedes not only that counsel for “Kitchen and a number of other class

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members” committed “what appears to be malpractice,” but also that this represents a “relevant new fact.” Appellant’s Br. at 28. Even so, the Department insists, the farmers’ remedy is not to deny the Department the benefit of its bargained-for Track B deadlines, but rather to sue class counsel for malpractice. “ ‘[C]lients must be held accountable for the acts and omissions of their attorneys.’ ” Id. at 29 (quoting *926 **222 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 396-97, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1499, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)).
As a general matter, the Department is correct. In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., the case on which the Department primarily relies, the Supreme Court held that the failure of plaintiff’s lawyer to attend a pretrial conference justified dismissing the case for want of prosecution. 370 U.S. 626, 633, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). Because plaintiff “voluntarily chose [his] attorney as his representative,” the Court held, he could “[ ]not ... avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.” Id. at 633-34, 82 S.Ct. at 1390.
Neither Link nor any other case the Department cites, however, was a class action. In this case, except for the three named plaintiffs, not one of the thousands of class members “voluntarily chose” class counsel. Quite to the contrary, by certifying the class, the district court effectively appointed counsel for the farmers. Under Rule 23(a)(4), moreover, the district court, as a condition of class certification, had to find that class counsel would “adequately protect the interests of the class.” FED.R.CIV.P. 23(a)(4); see also McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1411 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1984) (noting that Rule 23’s requirement of adequate representation encompasses “concerns about the competency of class counsel” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Exercising this responsibility, the district court found that “Mr. Alexander Pires and Mr. Phillip Fraas as lead counsel and Mr. J.L. Chestnut, Mr. Othello Cross, Mr. T. Roe Frazer, Mr. Hubbard T. Saunders, IV, Mr. Gerald Lear and Mr. James Myart, Jr., all serving as of counsel ... demonstrated that they will advocate vigorously for the interests of the class” and therefore “adequately will represent the interests of the class.” Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 350 (D.D.C.1998).
[7] In so distinguishing Link, we do not mean to suggest that the presumption of client accountability for attorney conduct has no applicability in class actions. Certainly a contrary rule would make class action settlements problematic. Moreover, the Rule 23(a)(4) finding of class counsel adequacy may partially substitute for the free choice found in conventional non-class litigation. Like

most presumptions, however, this one is rebuttable. And in litigation involving a class-defined from the outset by its numerosity-where counsel is not in fact freely chosen by class members, it is logical that the presumption should be more easily overcome than if the clients had in fact freely chosen their attorneys.
At oral argument, the Department pointed out that even though the farmers may not have “freely selected” class counsel to pursue the underlying litigation, the decree permits them to choose other lawyers for Track A or B representation. Accordingly, the Department argues, holding the farmers accountable for their lawyers’ dismal performance is perfectly appropriate. We disagree. Although the decree technically permits class members to retain other lawyers, we think the circumstances of this case, together with the terms of the decree itself, make such choices unlikely. For one thing, the decree prohibits lawyers from charging for their work in claims proceedings, see Consent Decree ¶ 5(e), so lawyers desiring payment must seek fees pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d). Class counsel, however, received an advance fee award to provide such services. Class counsel also benefit from the district court’s Rule 23 seal of approval. No wonder Earl Kitchen (the only claimant for whom the record contains relevant information) was represented by Jesse Kearney, a member of one of the firms that shared in the fee advance and ultimately the $14.9 million settlement. *927 **223 Because Kitchen did not “voluntarily cho[o]se” Kearney in the usual sense, we see no basis for holding Kitchen responsible for Kearney’s failure to file direct testimony on time.
Contrary to the Department’s argument, we see nothing unfair about this result. Although we have no doubt that the Department expected Track B’s tight deadlines to discourage claims-even to make them less winnable-the Department never counted on class counsel’s virtual malpractice. Indeed, the decree itself assumes competent representation for the farmers. The decree’s express purpose is to “ensur[e] that in their dealings with USDA, all class members receive full and fair treatment,” Consent Decree at 2, and its “main accomplishment was the establishment of a process to adjudicate individual claims.” Opinion and Order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia at 8 (Mar. 8, 2001) (No. 97cv01978) (emphasis added). Unless the farmers have competent counsel, we cannot imagine how they could ever obtain “full and fair treatment” in a claims process where (as in Kitchen’s case) missing a single deadline could be fatal.

Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (2002)
352 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 53 Fed.R.Serv.3d 275
For all of these reasons, we conclude that class counsel’s failure to meet critical Track B deadlines amounts to an “unforeseen obstacle” that makes the decree “unworkable.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. at 760. To hold otherwise would sanction the farmers’ double betrayal: first by the Department, see CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 2-30, and then by their own lawyers.
[8] Having said all this, however, we cannot affirm the challenged order as a proper Rule 60(b)(5) modification because of Rufo’s second requirement-that the modification be “suitably tailored to the changed circumstances.” 502 U.S. at 391, 112 S.Ct. at 763. Because the district court viewed its order as an interpretation, not a modification, it had no occasion to consider the tailoring requirement. In our view, the order, vesting arbitrators with generic authority to revise deadlines “so long as justice requires,” Pigford, 182 F.Supp.2d at 52-53, is far too broad. Although the order restores the farmers to the position in which they would have been but for counsel’s dismal performance (it may even, as the Department argues, put them in a better position), the order potentially deprives the Department of all Track B deadlines. By contrast, a “suitably tailored” order would return both parties as nearly as possible to where they would have been absent counsel’s failures. In Kitchen’s case, a properly “tailored” remedy would, for example, reset the Track B clock at the point in the process where Kearney dropped the ball, establishing a new deadline for submitting direct testimony and leaving subsequent deadlines unchanged. Whatever tailoring

method the district court ultimately adopts, see United States v. Western Elec. Co., 46 F.3d 1198, 1207 (D.C.Cir.1995) (recognizing a district court’s “considerable discretion” in fashioning a Rule 60(b)(5) modification), it must preserve the essence of the parties’ bargain: for the farmers, an opportunity to have their individual claims pursued by competent counsel; and for the Department, the benefit of the consent decree’s tight deadlines.
III.
We reverse the district court’s order and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion, Rule 60(b)(5), and Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 377, 112 S.Ct. 748, 756-57, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (authorizing federal appellate courts to “remand the cause and ... require *928 **224 such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances”).
So ordered.
Parallel Citations
352 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 53 Fed.R.Serv.3d 275

 
 Pigford v. Veneman, 369 F.3d 545 (2004) 361 U.S.App.D.C. 345, 58 Fed.R.Serv.3d 461
369 F.3d 545 United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Timothy C. PIGFORD, et al., Appellees, v.
Ann M. VENEMAN, Secretary, The United States Department of Agriculture, Appellant.
Nos. 03-5079 and 03-5080. | Argued Feb. 17, 2004. | Decided May 14, 2004.
Synopsis Background: Class of black farmers filed a lawsuit alleging the Department of Agriculture discriminated against them on account of their race. Following entry of consent decree which provided for arbitration and mediation to resolve farmers’ individual claims, counsel for farmers applied under consent decree for interim award of fees. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 239 F.Supp.2d 68, Paul L. Friedman, J., awarded fees, and government appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Ginsburg, Circuit Judge, held that:
[1] order was not final for purposes of appeal, and
[2] government did not show likelihood of irreparable harm in event that interim award was eventually reduced.
Appeal dismissed.
*545 **345 Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 97cv01978) (No. 98cv01693).
Attorneys and Law Firms
Howard S. Scher, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice.
Alexander J. Pires, Jr. argued the cause and filed the brief

for appellees.
Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.
GINSBURG, Chief Judge:
The Secretary of Agriculture appeals an order of the district court requiring the Department of Agriculture to advance $500,000 against attorneys’ fees due counsel representing a class of black farmers in an antidiscrimination suit against the Department. The Government contends the *546 **346 district court abused its discretion because it failed to support the order with any findings regarding the hours claimed and the hourly rates sought by class counsel. Class counsel argue we lack jurisdiction to entertain the Government’s appeal because the order to pay is not a “final decision” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We agree with class counsel and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
I. Background
In 1997 a class of black farmers filed a lawsuit alleging the Department of Agriculture discriminated against them on account of their race, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691, et seq. See Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212, 1215 (D.C.Cir.2000). In 1999 the Government and the plaintiff class agreed upon the terms of a consent decree settling the lawsuit. The Consent Decree established a two-track system for resolving the claims of individual class members: Each class member chose either arbitration or mediation as the process for obtaining the relief available under the Consent Decree. Class counsel continue to work to implement the Consent Decree and to represent class members in both types of proceedings.

Pigford v. Veneman, 369 F.3d 545 (2004) 361 U.S.App.D.C. 345, 58 Fed.R.Serv.3d 461
The Consent Decree also provided (¶ 14(a)) that class counsel
shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under [the] ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d), and to reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses under the APA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (as appropriate), that are generated in connection with the filing of this action and the implementation of this Consent Decree.
The Government and class counsel have since settled for $14.9 million all claims for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred from the filing of the case in 1997 through June 30, 2001.
The present appeal arises out of class counsel’s November 2002 petition for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses for the year ended June 30, 2002. Class counsel seek $858,685 for work in “implementation” of the Decree generally, and $836,000 for “nonimplementation work,” which is the parties’ term for work representing a claimant in either arbitration or mediation.
In December 2002 the district court ordered the Government to advance class counsel “$500,000 for implementation fees and costs.” The Government paid the advance and now appeals the order to pay.
II. Analysis
[1] The Government argues its appeal presents an issue of first impression in this circuit, to wit: Whether “an advance of fees or an ‘interim’ fee award in the postjudgment period of litigation is immediately appealable” as a “final decision” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. (Emphasis in original.) The Government argues the post-judgment phase “should be treated as legally different from the pre-judgment period” for purposes of § 1291 because “the post-judgment period can theoretically extend indefinitely,” creating substantial uncertainty as to whether and when a party may appeal an adverse order.
Class counsel respond that we resolved this issue in Trout v. Garrett, 891 F.2d 332, 333 (1989). Trout was an appeal from an order requiring an advance of $276,044 in

attorneys’ fees. A motions panel of this court, following the lead of the Ninth Circuit in Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717 (1988), had “dismissed the appeal *547 **347 for want of a final or otherwise appealable order,” and upon rehearing a merits panel did the same. 891 F.2d at 333 (“the sum and substance of the particular interlocutory order before us is not immediately appealable”). Because the appeal in Trout did not arise, however, after entry of a final judgment upon the merits of all the claims advanced against the appellant, Trout did not decide the precise jurisdictional issue presented here.
The Government argues Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir.1994), “supports the proposition that all postjudgment orders to pay fees are immediately appealable.” Class counsel maintain Gates does not support the rationale for jurisdiction advanced by the Government, and we quite agree. In that case the Ninth Circuit had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to § 1291 because the orders of the district court disposing of several petitions for attorneys’ fees “follow[ed] a final judgment on the merits, and they [did] dispose of the issue of attorneys’ fees for monitoring work performed during the first period of the consent decree.” Id. at 1450 (emphasis added). Where an order does not finally dispose of a fee petition even for a finite part of the post-judgment period, it is irrelevant that, as the Government points out, the post-judgment phase may be of indefinite duration.
The fee order here simply could not be a final decision under § 1291 regardless when issued because it “determines neither the total amount of fees due ... nor [the] absolute entitlement to attorney’s fees.” Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 720; see Trout, 891 F.2d at 335 (“The award does not even dispositively determine fees due up to this stage of the litigation”). In fact, the district court “clearly contemplates revising [the] fee award” at a later time. Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 722. The district court would hardly have encouraged the parties to settle if the order finally had resolved counsel’s claim for attorneys’ fees for the year ended June 30, 2002. Cf. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633-34, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945) (a final decision “leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment”).
[2] In a more practical and discriminating vein, the Government also argues a post-judgment order to pay attorneys’ fees “should be immediately appealable where counsel is unlikely to be able to repay an overpayment.” The suggestion is that “irreparable harm to the government fisc ... bolsters the finality of orders like the one[ ] at issue here.”

Pigford v. Veneman, 369 F.3d 545 (2004)
361 U.S.App.D.C. 345, 58 Fed.R.Serv.3d 461
The courts of appeal have considered “irreparable harm” relevant in determining whether jurisdiction is available pursuant to the collateral order doctrine - which the Government does not invoke - but not pursuant to § 1291 itself. See Trout, 891 F.2d at 335; Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 721-22; Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir.1986). Although the Government does not cite the case, its irreparable harm argument finds some support in Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204, 12 L.Ed. 404 (1848), which held an interlocutory appeal will lie from an order that “directs the property in dispute to be delivered to the complainant” and “subject[s the appellant] to irreparable injury.” We have questioned, however, whether “Forgay has continuing vitality apart from the collateral order doctrine.” Petties v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 469, 472 (D.C.Cir.2000) (“The Supreme Court has recognized but a single variation on the theme of finality, namely the collateral order doctrine”). If Forgay indeed has been overtaken by the collateral order doctrine, then the Government’s present argument is surely foreclosed.
Be that as it may, the Government has failed to establish it is likely to suffer *548 **348 irreparable harm as a result of the fee order in this case. See Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 721-22 (government bears burden of proving it could not obtain repayment). The Government can be deemed irreparably harmed ex ante only if the party and counsel awarded fees will “ likely be unable to repay the fees if the award is later reduced or overturned.” National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 182 F.3d 981, 985 (D.C.Cir.1999); see Trout, 891 F.2d at 335 (requiring “real prospect of irreparable harm” to permit exercise of appellate jurisdiction pursuant to collateral order doctrine). The Government does not present any evidence from which we could infer that class counsel “ will likely” be unable to repay any amount advanced in error. Before the district court the Government disputed class counsel’s entitlement to $413,500 of the $500,000 it was required to advance. When the Government filed this appeal, however, class counsel had pending petitions for almost $1.7 million in fees. Although some of the $1.2 million not here at issue may be disputed as well, we think it unlikely counsel will not ultimately be awarded at least enough to cover the

amount now in dispute. In fact, the district court explicitly stated, “It is inconceivable that the Court would disallow as much as $792,000 of the fees sought based on poor record keeping, unreasonable hourly rates [,] or too many hours (or too many lawyers) spent on a given task.”
Of course, if the district court were to continue to award class counsel additional advances against fees disputed by the Government, then at some point the amount in dispute may become so large in relation to counsel’s fee petitions (and other assets) that the risk of default, should the Government prevail on its objections, would indeed constitute irreparable harm to the Government. The Government has not, however, made such a showing at this time.
Finally, the Government argues that, if the order at issue is not deemed final, then the district court may become inclined to issue a series of “interim” advances rather than to address and to resolve in a timely fashion the multiple attorneys’ fees petitions pending before it. We cannot merely assume, however, the district court will shirk its responsibility to decide fee questions. The district court now has before it petitions for attorneys’ fees covering a period of more than two years, which petitions it will, we trust, resolve soon, and not in a piecemeal fashion, lest the Government’s fears of irreparable harm acquire some substance.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is
Dismissed.
Parallel Citations
361 U.S.App.D.C. 345, 58 Fed.R.Serv.3d 461

 
 Pigford v. Johanns, 416 F.3d 12 (2005) 367 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 62 Fed.R.Serv.3d 441

416 F.3d 12 United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Timothy C. PIGFORD et al., Appellants v.
Mike JOHANNS, Secretary, The United States Department of Agriculture, Appellee Cecil Brewington et al., Appellants v.
Mike Johanns, Secretary, The United States Department of Agriculture, Appellee.
Nos. 04-5171, 04-5172. | Argued March 14, 2005. | Decided July 15, 2005. | Rehearing En Banc Denied
Oct. 19, 2005.
Synopsis Background: Class of African-American farmers sued Secretary of Department of Agriculture (USDA) alleging that Department had systematically discriminated against them on the basis of race in administering credit and benefit programs. After approval of consent decree, 185 F.R.D. 82, and adjudication of claims under decree, farmers whose discrimination claims had been denied and whose petitions appealing from those denials had been ruled untimely by facilitator moved for judicial relief from facilitator’s determinations. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Paul L. Friedman, J., 265 F.Supp.2d 41, denied motion, and farmers appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge, held that:
[1] stipulation and order (S & O) fixing deadlines for filing of petitions for review constituted final judgment or order, and thus civil procedure rule governing relief from judgment or order applied;
[2] District Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to further modify S & O’s deadline pursuant to rule governing relief from judgment or order; and
[3] District Court also did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant relief pursuant to its inherent equitable authority.

Affirmed.
Rogers, Circuit Judge, filed opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
*13 Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 97cv01978) (No. 98cv01693).
Attorneys and Law Firms
Alexander J. Pires, Jr. argued the cause for the appellants.
Howard S. Scher, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellee. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Kenneth L. Wainstein, United States Attorney, and Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, were on brief.
*14 Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON.
Separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.
KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge.
**352 This appeal arises from a longstanding discrimination action by black farmers against the United States Department of Agriculture (Department) alleging racial discrimination in the administration of federallyfunded credit and benefit programs. The appellants are farmers whose discrimination claims were denied in adjudications conducted pursuant to a Consent Decree and whose petitions for review of the adverse adjudications were rejected as untimely because they were filed after the stipulated deadlines that the parties negotiated and the court approved in a Stipulation and Order (S & O). The appellants challenge the district court’s denial of their motions for relief from the

Pigford v. Johanns, 416 F.3d 12 (2005)
367 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 62 Fed.R.Serv.3d 441
stipulated deadlines under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) and the court’s inherent equitable authority. Because the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions, we affirm its judgment.
I.
In 1997 a class of black farmers filed this action in the district court alleging racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq.1 On April 14, 1999 the district court entered the Consent Decree which established a two-track system for resolving the individual class members’ claims. Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C.1999), affirmed, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C.Cir.2000). Under Track A, a class member with little or no documentary evidence could submit his claim to an adjudicator and obtain payment of $50,000 and forgiveness of debt owed the Department if he proved discrimination by substantial evidence. Such a claimant “has a fairly low burden of proof but his recovery is limited.” Id. at 96. Track B, by contrast, set no dollar cap on a claimant’s recovery but the claimant must prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, “a higher burden of proof.” Id. A claimant in either track could file a petition for review of an adverse decision by the adjudicator with an independent monitor who “shall direct the adjudicator to reexamine the claim if he determines that ‘a clear and manifest error has occurred’ that is ‘likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’ ” Id. at 97 (quoting Consent Decree ¶ 12(b)(iii), at 21).
Because the Consent Decree provided no timetable for seeking review by the monitor, the parties negotiated filing deadlines which are set out in the S & O entered by the district court on July 14, 2000. Under the S & O any claimant who had received an adverse adjudicator decision as of the date of the S & O had 120 days from that date (i.e., by November 13, 2000) to file a petition with the monitor. Any claimant who received an adverse decision after the S & O’s date had 120 days from the date of the adjudication to file a petition. The S & O expressly recites: **353 *15 “No extensions of these deadlines will be granted for any reason.” Id.
On October 31, 2000 the claimants’ class counsel filed a motion seeking to “redesign” the “unworkable” petition filing process, noting that as of that date counsel had filed petitions on behalf of only 297 of the 3,873 claimants requesting filing assistance. Pls.’ Mot. for Expedited

Hearing at 7, 3-4 (filed Oct. 31, 2000). Following a conference with the parties the district court issued an order on November 8, 2000 directing that, in lieu of a completed petition for each of the claimants, counsel could satisfy the November 13, 2000 deadline by submitting a “Register of Petitions” (Register) which simply listed the name and claim number of each claimant who had sought counsel’s assistance in filing a petition for review of an adverse decision issued as of the S & O date. Pigford v. Glickman, C.A. Nos. 97-1978, 98-1693, 2000 WL 34292618 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 8, 2000). The court explained that, while “counsel should be held to the commitments to which they agreed,” nonetheless “counsel’s failings should not be visited on their clients.” Id. at 3, 4, 2000 WL 34292618, at *1. The court further directed that class counsel file 400 of the Register’s petitions by December 15, 2000 and another 400 by the 15th of each month thereafter up to a final filing date of May 15, 2001. The order recited: “Under no circumstances shall the Monitor accept supporting materials or withdrawals after May 15, 2001.” Id. at 5, 2000 WL 34292618, at *3. In effect, the court doubled the stipulated time to file a petition for review of an adjudication decided as of the date of the S & O.
On March 15, 2001 the appellants filed a motion for an order suspending the May 15, 2001 deadline. The district court held a status conference and on April 27, 2001 issued an order directing “that all deadlines set forth in the Court’s Order of November 8, 2000, are suspended until further order of the Court” pending a scheduled meeting on May 1, 2001 between class counsel and outside lawyers “who might be able to assemble a team of pro bono lawyers to assist class counsel on an emergency basis.” Pigford v. Veneman, 144 F.Supp.2d 16, 20 (D.D.C.2001). In addition, the court ordered that if, after the May 1 meeting, class counsel decided additional time was necessary they should file a motion for extension no later than May 4, 2001 setting out a “realistic” filing schedule.
After the pro bono meeting the appellants proposed extending the filing deadline to September 15, 2001 and the district court so ordered on May 15, 2001, finding the new deadline “both realistic and reasonable” in light of the “impressive commitment made by pro bono counsel to assist Class Counsel.” Pigford v. Veneman, 143 F.Supp.2d 28, 30 (D.D.C.2001). The May 15, 2001 order warned that “[u]nder no circumstances ... shall the Monitor accept supporting materials or withdrawals that are filed after September 15, 2001.” Id. at 31. Class counsel, with pro bono assistance, succeeded in filling all of the remaining petitions by the new deadline.

Pigford v. Johanns, 416 F.3d 12 (2005) 367 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 62 Fed.R.Serv.3d 441
On July 19, 2002 class counsel filed a motion seeking relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) or the court’s inherent equitable authority on behalf of 387 claimants whose review petitions had been rejected as untimely. On June 2, 2003 the district court denied the motion, concluding there were no changed circumstances that justified modifying the S & O deadlines (as amended). Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F.Supp.2d 41 (D.D.C.2003). The claimants moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied on March 10, 2004. Pigford v. Veneman, 307 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C.2004). This appeal followed.
*16 **354 II.
[1] The appellants comprise two groups of late-filing claimants: (1) those represented by class counsel, now numbering 92, and some 208 others who either proceeded pro se or were represented by lawyers unaffiliated with class counsel. Class counsel argues on behalf of each group that the district court erred in denying relief from the filing deadlines under either Rule 60(b)(5) or its inherent equitable power. We review the district court’s decision whether to modify a consent order, either under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) or pursuant to its inherent authority, for abuse of discretion. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (Rule 60(b)); Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1475 (D.C.Cir.1995) (inherent authority). We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellants’ motion for relief.
A. Class Counsel Petitions
The district court denied the appellants’ motion for relief as to the 92 petitions filed late by class counsel because the appellants failed to demonstrate “changed circumstances” to warrant modifying the S & O schedule under Rule 60(b)(5), which provides in relevant part: “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (5) ... it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application ....” The appellants challenge the court’s Rule 60(b)(5) decision on two grounds. We address each in turn.

[2] First, the appellants assert the district court incorrectly invoked Rule 60(b)(5) because the rule governs only orders that are final.2 The appellants contend that the S & O was not a final order and that therefore the court should have decided whether to grant relief solely under its inherent equitable authority. See Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1240 (D.C.Cir.1980) (“The power of a District Court sitting as a court of equity to modify the terms of a settlement agreement it previously adopted cannot be drawn into question.”). As a practical matter, it makes little difference whether the district court resolved the motion under Rule 60 or under its equitable authority as the standard for each is substantially the same. Compare Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 393, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (under Rule 60(b)(5), “a party seeking modification of a consent decree must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance”), with Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc, 636 F.2d at 1240 (“[S]ound exercise of judicial discretion may require that terms of a consent decree be modified when there has been a significant change in the circumstances obtaining at the time the consent decree was entered.”). Nonetheless, we conclude that the court correctly invoked Rule 60(b)(5).
*17 **355 The appellants do not dispute that the Consent Decree itself is final within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5). See Appellants’ Br. at 19. They contend, however, that because the S & O simply “establish[es] procedures for enforcing or implementing the decree,” the S & O is “not considered ‘final’ within the meaning of Rule 60.” Id. (citing United States v. W. Elec. Co., 777 F.2d 23 (D.C.Cir.1985); Bogard v. Wright, 159 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir.1998)). The authorities the appellants cite do not support their position. In Western Elec. this court reviewed the district court’s denial of a request for waiver from restrictions in a consent decree based on the district court’s decision not to consider the merits of such a waiver request until a later time when “ ‘there is substantial competition in local tele-communications service.’ ” 777 F.2d at 25 (quoting United States v. W. Elec. Co., 592 F.Supp. 846, 868 (D.D.C.1984)). We explained that the district court’s order denying the request was not “final” “because the district court contemplated further proceedings before ruling on the requests.” Id. at 26. Similarly in Bogard, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an order that extended the term of a monitor initially appointed for a three-year term “unless extended by order of this court” was not a final order because it had “no termination date” and therefore “[t]he postjudgment proceeding could drag on for many years

Pigford v. Johanns, 416 F.3d 12 (2005)
367 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 62 Fed.R.Serv.3d 441
and involve a host of far-reaching orders the consequences of which could not be undone when (if ever) the postjudgment proceeding ended with a showing of compliance so complete that the monitor’s services could be dispensed with.” 159 F.3d at 1062-63. By contrast, the district court’s S & O fixed final deadlines for filing petitions with the monitor. See S & O ¶ 5, at 4 (“No extensions of these deadlines will be granted for any reason.”). As with the Consent Decree, which the S & O supplemented, no further court action was contemplated at the time the S & O issued. That the S & O was in fact subsequently modified by the court in response to the appellants’ requests does not make it any less final. Such modification of a final order is precisely what Rule 60(b) contemplates.3
[3] Next, the appellants contend that even if the S & O is a final order subject to Rule 60(b), the district court abused its discretion in failing to modify the S & O for changed circumstances. Again we disagree.
In the June 2, 2003 order denying the appellants’ motion for relief, the district court rejected their contention that “the large volume of claimants requesting assistance with petitions during a short period of time” constituted a changed circumstance because it “occurred before, not after, the relevant deadlines were agreed to by the parties and endorsed by the Court.” 265 F.Supp.2d at 46 (emphasis by court). The court explained: “The exponential increase in claimants was fully apparent when plaintiffs and defendant negotiated and agreed to the July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order, including its clear provision that ‘no extensions of these deadlines will be granted for any reason.’ ” Id. at 46 (quoting (S & O ¶ 5, at 4)). The appellants do not quibble with the court’s analysis, see Appellants’ Br. at 22, but contend the court abused its discretion by failing to grant relief based on four other changed **356 *18 circumstances: (1) the unusually high number of claimants with meritorious grounds for review of their claim denials (caused by an unusually high rate of errors by the adjudicators); (2) the extreme work load borne by the two small class counsel firms because outside “of counsels” participated only “minimally” in the review petition filing (particularly after the court’s March 8, 2001 ruling that attorney’s fees for monitor review work not be available until after readjudication of reviewed claims produced a “disincentive to work on the monitor review process,” Appellants’ Br. at 24); (3) the exhaustion of class counsel’s funds and credit by March 2, 2001; and (4) the “extra step” created by the Register provision. It is no surprise that the district court did not address these four changed circumstances in its initial decision as the

appellants raised them for the first time in their motion for reconsideration. Compare Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Relief at 32-34 (filed July 19, 2002) and Pls.’ Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Relief at 4-7 (filed Nov. 6, 2002) with Pls.’ Mot. for Recons. at 9-16 (filed June 16, 2003). When the court addressed these newly raised circumstances in the reconsideration order, its response was admittedly brief: “The Court is well aware of the circumstances surrounding these petitions and further elaboration does not change this Court’s opinion that plaintiffs have not demonstrated changed circumstances sufficient to justify modification of the Court’s Orders under Rule 60(b)(5).” 307 F.Supp.2d at 48. The court’s brevity, however, is understandable given what had come before.
To the extent the four new circumstances adversely affected the petition filing process, the court had already taken them into account and provided the appellants with relief. In response to class counsel’s October 31, 2000 plea of an unexpectedly high volume of meritorious review petitions, the court modified the S & O on November 8 to permit class counsel to satisfy the November 13, 2000 filing deadline through the simple Register listing, a remedy the appellants accepted without complaint.4 When class counsel sought relief in spring 2001 because of their depleted resources, both financial and human,5 the court granted a four-month extension until September 15, 2001, by which deadline all of the remaining petitions were filed. Given the district court’s repeated accommodation of class counsel’s continuing delinquency, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in denying the appellants’ motion for further relief.6
*19 **357 The dissent contends the district court erred in two respects. First, it argues the court erred in relying on a finding of fact that the “critical changed circumstances” occurred before the parties agreed to the deadline in the S & O. Dissent at 24, 27. We perceive no such error. The court was correct when it found as a fact in its June 2, 2003 decision denying relief that “[t]he exponential increase in claimants was fully apparent when plaintiffs and defendant negotiated and agreed to the July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order,” 265 F.Supp.2d at 47, as the appellants acknowledge.7 The district court was also correct when it stated in the June 2, 2003 order that “the critical ‘changed circumstance’ on which plaintiffs rely occurred before, not after, the relevant deadlines were agreed to by the parties and endorsed by the Court.” 265 F.Supp.2d at 47 (first emphasis added).8 The appellants had argued at that stage that relief from the deadlines was warranted because of “[t]he predominant change in circumstances, since the Consent Decree was approved in

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1999,” namely, that “the number of participants, with or without counsel, has increased 400-500%, overwhelming the system set up by the Consent Decree,” Pls.’ Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Relief at 4-5, plainly referring to the increased number of claimants. It is not at all surprising if, as the dissent notes, Dissent at 23, the court’s June 2, 2003 order “ignored the key distinction argued by appellants in the motion for reconsideration” of the order, which was filed on June 16, 2003. Further, as we noted supra, the court had already granted relief from the increase in meritorious petitions when it established the simplified Register procedure for meeting the November 13, 2000 filing deadline.
Second, the dissent asserts the district court erred as a matter of law by failing to consider whether class counsel’s failures to meet the deadlines amounted to an “unforeseen obstacle warranting relief.” Dissent at 27. The dissent relies on the court’s decision in Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (D.C.Cir.2002) (Pigford I ), for the proposition that “where class members lack competent counsel, counsel’s failure to meet deadlines itself may amount to an ‘unforeseen obstacle’ that makes the decree ‘unworkable.’ ” Dissent at 25 (quoting Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 925). Pigford I, however, presented a different situation in two respects. First, contrary to the dissent’s characterization, Pigford I did not present “the same issue of modification of deadlines” as here, Dissent at 26 (emphasis by dissent), so as to implicate law of the case. In Pigford I the court modified the consent order to permit arbitrators to extend the deadlines for filing evidentiary materials in Track B litigation, set out in paragraph 10 of the Consent Decree, based on class counsel’s “malpractice” in the Track B litigation, namely, “its inability to represent all Track B claimants **358 *20 adequately,’ ” Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 925 (quoting 182 F.Supp.2d at 52), as exemplified by one lawyer’s failure to timely file a claimant’s direct testimony with the arbitrator. Here, the appellants seek to modify the S & O’s Track A deadlines for filing review petitions under paragraph 12(b)(iii), relying on their repeated failures to meet the filing deadlines. Second, Pigford I came before us in a different posture. In that decision, we rejected the district court’s determination that the consent decree could be interpreted to permit extending deadlines but affirmed the decision to extend deadlines based on the alternative ground, not addressed by the district court, that the decree could be so modified under Rule 60(b)(5) because counsel’s failures amounted to changed circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(5). Because we affirmed the district court’s decision, we were free to do so, as we did, on a ground not reached by the district court and without reviewing the district court’s

rationale. EEOC v. Aramark Corp., 208 F.3d 266, 268 (D.C.Cir.2000) (“Although the district court never addressed the safe harbor provision, the issue is fully briefed, and because we review the district court’s judgment, not its reasoning, we may affirm on any ground properly raised.”) (citing Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316, 1321-22 (D.C.Cir.1993)). In this case, however, we review the district court’s decision not to grant relief and “may overturn such an order only for abuse of discretion.” Summers v. Howard Univ., 374 F.3d 1188, 1192 (D.C.Cir.2004) (citing Computer Prof’ls for Soc. Responsibility v. U.S. Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 903 (D.C.Cir.1996); Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C.Cir.1988)). Although the district court might have been warranted in modifying the deadlines based on class counsel’s failure to meet deadlines, as we explained supra, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to do so. For us to decide the question sua sponte or require the district court to do so as a matter of law, as the dissent suggests, would infringe on the district court’s discretion and run counter to “the presumption of client accountability for attorney conduct” which, as we confirmed in Pigford I, applies in class actions. See Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 927.
B. Pro Se and Unaffiliated Counsel Petitions
[4] Next, the appellants contend the district court abused its discretion in denying relief under its inherent equitable authority to the late filing claimants who were not represented by class counsel and did not, class counsel contends, receive actual notice of the S & O deadlines.9 In their motion for relief the appellants cited lack of notice as a “changed circumstance” supporting modification of the S & O under either Rule 60(b)(5) or the court’s inherent authority because “Track A decision letters issued after July 14, 2000 mistakenly omitted language informing claimants that they had 120 days from the date of the decision to petition the Monitor for review.” Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Relief at 13-14. The district court rejected this argument because the S & O did not require the letters to include such notice and therefore its absence was not a changed circumstance.10 **359 *21 On reconsideration, the appellants took a different tack, arguing that when class members “do not receive actual notice of a deadline by which they must take some action to preserve their claims, and therefore miss the deadline, the District Court may ‘exercise its equitable authority to excuse the late filings.’ ” Pls.’ Reply to Def.’s Resp. to Mot. for Recons. at 11-12 (quoting In re Orthopedic Bone

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Screw Prods. Liability Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir.2001) (alteration original)). The appellants further urged the court to apply the “excusable neglect” standard in exercising its inherent authority as well as the four factors the Third Circuit adopted under the standard in Orthopedic, namely:
1) the danger of prejudice to the nonmovant; 2) the length of the delay and its potential effect on judicial proceedings; 3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant; and 4) whether the movant acted in good faith. 246 F.3d at 322-23 (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). The district court applied the Third Circuit’s formulation and under the first and third factors found no excusable neglect warranting equitable relief because of the potential prejudice to the Department and the appellants’ role in drafting the S & O. The court concluded (1) that the government “ ‘will “be prejudiced to the tune of almost one million dollars” if the Court permits consideration of the late petitions and if even five percent of them are successful,’ ” 307 F.Supp.2d at 50 (quoting Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F.Supp.2d at 50), and (2) “because the deadlines were negotiated and agreed to by plaintiffs, it logically follows that the resulting failure to meet those deadlines had been within the reasonable control of plaintiffs,” id. at 50-51. In so concluding the court did not abuse its discretion. As the district court pointed out in the May 27, 2001 order suspending the deadlines: “As part of the bargain struck between the parties and approved by the Court in the Order of July 14, 2000, class counsel agreed to meet the 120 day deadline in return for the government’s agreement to admit more than 1,100 Track A claimants into the class who otherwise would have been excluded.” 144 F.Supp.2d at 19 n. 2. If the district court had granted the requested relief from the deadlines, the government would have lost the benefit of its bargain-certainty and finality as to its maximum liability as of the agreed upon date-while the claimant class would have recovered the bargainedaway right to compensation for claimants filing review petitions beyond the stipulated deadlines (as extended by the court).11 The prejudice to the government **360 *22 distinguishes this case from In re Orthopedic in which the court found the defendant would suffer no prejudice because the addition of claimants would have “no effect on the amount [the defendant] would pay to those aggrieved by its products” as its liability had been capped by a settlement agreement. 246 F.3d at 323. Here, because there is no cap, the expansion of the

number of successful claimants (which would result from extending the deadline) will substantially expand the Department’s monetary liability. See id. (noting consideration of prejudice there was “a unique inquiry” and expansion of plaintiff class “in the ordinary class action will be to the detriment of the defendant”); cf. Grace v. Detroit, 145 F.R.D. 413, 417 (E.D.Mich.1992) (“Unlike the cases cited by Plaintiff, ... in this case there is no fixed settlement fund. Every tardy claim accepted would be an expansion of Defendant City’s liability for a reason not originally ordered. The total sum of Defendant’s liability is yet to be determined, and increases with each successive claimant.”). For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s orders denying the appellants’ motions are affirmed.
So ordered.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The history of this litigation bears witness to the many obstacles to relief for the class of African American farmers covered by a consent decree based on their allegations of unlawful racial discrimination by the United States Department of Agriculture in administering its farm loan programs. The task has not been easy for a number of reasons, including the complications necessarily associated with ensuring relief to eligible class members and the deficiencies of class counsel, as determined by the district court. While the district court’s efforts so far have ensured that only a small portion of the class will not have their claims for Monitor review considered, as a result of the court’s decision today, the claims of 305 class members are unduly extinguished: 97 farmers will lose the opportunity to have independent administrative review of their claims by a Monitor in accordance with the claims procedure in the consent decree, and 208 farmers (170 without counsel), who may not have received notice of the filing deadlines, will lose their opportunity to pursue their claims at all.
In denying appellants’ motion of July 19, 2002 for relief for these 305 class members, and the motions for reconsideration of June 13 & 16, 2003, the district court clearly erred in relying on a finding of fact regarding the increased claims workload, and erred, alternatively, as a matter of law by failing to consider, in accordance with Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“Pigford I ”), whether class counsel’s untimely filings was a changed circumstance within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). It also erred by

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failing to inquire whether 208 claimants’ late filings were due to the inadequacy of the notice procedures before determining whether to deny any relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b). Accordingly, while I concur in the holding that the July 14, 2000 Order establishing the original filing deadlines was a final appealable order, see Op. at 17, I would reverse and remand the case to the district court to determine whether the filing deadlines were “unworkable,” and thus warranting relief for 97 class members pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5), and to determine whether 208 class members failed to receive notice of the filing deadlines as a result of inadequate notice procedures and were entitled to relief under Rule 6(b).
I.
The question on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying **361 *23 appellants’ motions for an extension of the filing deadlines, and for reconsideration under Rule 60(b). Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292, 1299 (D.C.Cir.2000); Peters v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d 1483, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1992). While our review is deferential, an abuse of discretion occurs when the district court relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, fails to consider a relevant factor, or applies the wrong legal standard. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 327 F.3d 1207, 1209 (D.C.Cir.2003); Evans, 206 F.3d at 1298; Marina Mgmt. Servs. Inc. v. Vessel My Girls, 202 F.3d 315, 321 (D.C.Cir.2000); see also Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1497 (D.C.Cir.1995).
Rule 60(b)(5) provides, in relevant part, that “the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order or proceeding [if] ... it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5). A movant under Rule 60(b)(5) must demonstrate “changed circumstances” since the entry of the judgment from which relief is sought. Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383, 385, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). Such change need not be “unforeseeable, but only unforeseen.” Id. at 385, 112 S.Ct. 748. The Supreme Court in Rufo explained,
Ordinarily ... modification should not be granted where a party relies upon events that actually were anticipated at the time it entered

into a decree. [citations omitted] If it is clear that a party anticipated changing conditions that would make performance of the decree more onerous but nevertheless agreed to the decree, that party would have to satisfy a heavy burden to convince a court that it agreed to the decree in good faith, made a reasonable effort to comply with the decree, and should be relieved of the undertaking under Rule 60(b).
Id. In Pigford I, the court held that changed circumstances may include “unforeseen obstacles” that make an order “unworkable.” Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 925; see Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748.
The district court found that the large increase in the number of claimants occurred before the deadlines in the July 14th Order were agreed to, and therefore did not amount to unanticipated “changed circumstances” rendering the deadlines “unworkable” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5). See Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F.Supp.2d 41, 47 (D.D.C.2003), reconsideration denied, Pigford v. Veneman, 307 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C.2004). In so finding the district court, as does the court today, Op. at 19 - 20, ignored the key distinction argued by appellants in their motion for reconsideration and supported by evidence in the record. Appellants pointed out that the critical “changed circumstance” was not the vastly greater number of total claimants, but the unanticipated large number of claimants seeking Monitor review because their claims likely had been denied erroneously in the first instance by the adjudicator, and had potentially meritorious grounds for seeking Monitor review. Appellants explained that class counsel originally had anticipated that the vast majority of would-be seekers of Monitor review would not meet the high standards for such review set forth in the consent decree-“clear and manifest error” that is “likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice,” Consent Decree ¶ 12(b)(iii)-and therefore, at the time they agreed to the July 14th Order deadlines, had estimated that only approximately 2,500 petitions would require processing for Monitor review. However, class counsel subsequently discovered that a much higher number of the claims rejected by the adjudicator were potentially meritorious claims even under the high standard for Monitor review. In fact, the total volume **362 *24 of claims actually processed for Monitor review was much higher than 2,500: Class

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counsel and the of-counsel law firm Chestnut, Sanders ended up processing 3,700 Track A requests for Monitor review, with other firms processing other, smaller numbers of requests.
In support of this distinction, appellants pointed to the high success rates of claims upon Monitor review: The facilitator’s report cited by appellants indicated that approximately 48% of the claimants who had filed for review with the assistance of counsel had been approved by the Monitor for reexamination by the adjudicator, and 100% of reexamined petitions prevailed on the merits. This statistical evidence substantiated class counsel’s argument that many meritorious claims had been erroneously denied by the adjudicator, necessitating the filing of petitions for Monitor review and creating more work for class counsel than was anticipated when the July 14th Order deadlines were agreed to.
The record further indicates that the number of class members seeking Monitor review was unanticipated by either party or by the district court when the parties agreed to those deadlines. As noted, when the district court established the Register of Petitions process in the November 11, 2000 Order, class counsel was estimating a total of 2,500 petitions for Monitor review. The district court relied on this estimate to set the filing schedule for fully supported petitions. The November 11th Order further indicated that the higher volume of petitions for Monitor review was not anticipated, for the district court acknowledged that neither the Department nor the Monitor were prepared to handle and process the higher volume of petitions. The court stated:
It is obvious that if Class Counsel, Of Counsel and all unaffiliated counsel were forced to file thousands of fully supported Petitions by November 13, the government would be unable to respond to them in a meaningful way within the 60 days that it has to file a response. [citation omitted] Furthermore, the Monitor informed the Court at the hearing that even if the government had the resources to complete such a task, the Monitor initially will be unable to decide the Petitions at a pace greater than 200 to 300 each month.

Indeed, the district court later acknowledged at the April 19, 2001 status conference that “some of the failings of the lawyers, if we want to call them that, are simply because people were overworked. There was much more to be done than people thought.” (emphasis added).
In light of the record evidence that the high number of class members seeking Monitor review was unanticipated at the time the July 14th Order deadlines were agreed to, the district court clearly erred in relying on its finding in its opinion of June 2, 2003 that the “critical ‘changed circumstance’ ” had “occurred before, not after, the relevant deadlines were agreed to,” in denying appellants’ motion for reconsideration in its opinion of March 19, 2004, Pigford, 307 F.Supp.2d at 48, without distinguishing between the overall number of claimants and the number of petitions for Monitor review. Instead, the district court denied reconsideration stating that, notwithstanding appellants’ “further elaboration,” “the [c]ourt declines to revisit its determination that the asserted ‘changed circumstances’ presented by [appellants] do not justify modification of the [c]ourt’s prior orders under Rule 60(b)(5).” Id. While the court states that the district court established the Register procedure to provide relief from the increased volume of meritorious petitions, Op. at 19, that relief created filing problems of its own and, in any event, the district court underestimated the volume of Monitor-review petitions even then.
*25 **363 Moreover, in denying appellants’ motions, the district court failed to consider the instruction of Pigford I that where class members lack competent counsel, counsel’s failure to meet deadlines itself may amount to an “unforeseen obstacle” that makes the decree “ unworkable” under Rule 60(b)(5). Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 925. In Pigford I, this court embraced the concept that the district court has a duty to protect class members where such members did not choose their counsel and where retention of other lawyers is unlikely, 292 F.3d at 926-27, a concept embraced by other circuits as well.1 Noting that the consent “decree’s express purpose is to ‘ensur [e] that in their dealings with [the Department], all class members receive full and fair treatment,’ Consent Decree at 2, and its ‘main accomplishment was the establishment of a process to adjudicate individual claims,’ ” this court distinguished between the failings of class counsel and the opportunity of class members to avail themselves of the remedial scheme under the consent decree: The court opined that there was “no basis for holding [the class members] responsible for [counsel’s] failure” to meet deadlines which had been bargained for by the parties, Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 927, and held that relief was

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appropriate under Rule 60(b)(5) because “class counsel’s failure to meet critical Track B deadlines amounts to an ‘unforeseen obstacle’ that makes the decree ‘unworkable,’ ” id. at 927 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748).
This conclusion in Pigford I is no less applicable now than it was then, for “[t]o hold otherwise would sanction the farmers’ double betrayal: first by the Department ... and then by their own lawyers.” Id. In granting an extension of Track B deadlines missed due to attorney error, the district court had previously acknowledged that the general rule that attorney error is not excusable should not apply here, where “[t]he history of this case is unique ... and requires more than hasty application of general practice.” Pigford v. Veneman, 182 F.Supp.2d 50, 52 (D.D.C.2002). This court observed in Pigford I that,
[T]he decree itself assumes competent representation for the farmers. The decree’s express purpose is to “ensur[e] that in their dealings with [the Department], all class members receive full and fair treatment,” ... and its “main accomplishment was the establishment of a process to adjudicate individual claims.” ... Unless the farmers have competent counsel, we cannot imagine how they could ever obtain “full and fair treatment” in a claims process where ... missing a single deadline could be fatal.
292 F.3d at 927 (quoting Consent Decree, at 2; Pigford v. Glickman, No. 97cv01978 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2001)). Not only has the district court found class counsel’s performance sanctionable and imposed severe monetary fines on them, Pigford v. Veneman, 307 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C.2004), but at a time when there was, as the district court stated, “much more to be done than people thought,” and the critical filing deadlines were drawing near, class counsel **364 *26 and of-counsel were in dire financial straits as a result of the lack of payment of interim fees by the government, as appellants reminded the district court in their motion for reconsideration.2 The district court recognized at a status conference held on April 19, 2001 that the delay in awarding interim fees
had an impact on the number of lawyers and the amount of time that those lawyers are spending on the Monitor petition process.... if you have to succeed or prevail to get paid, then getting new lawyers in the act would be hard, and I understand that it is also having an impact on the existing lawyers. [Class counsel] has cut back on [its] staff. (emphasis added).

Today, by affirming the denial of appellants’ motions, the court ignores our analysis in Pigford I and the duty of the trial judge to protect class members who do not chose their own counsel when unanticipated circumstances have created “a situation where there were too many cases and too few lawyers.” Br. for Appellants at 22. By declining to account for Pigford I ‘s contrary holding as an infringement of the district court’s discretion, Op. at 20, the court ignores that Pigford I involved the same unique history, the same consent decree, the same class counsel, and the same issue of modification of deadlines missed by class counsel under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) considered in the same court, and as such its holding is nearly akin to the law of the case, in addition to being law of the circuit. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393, 1395 (D.C.Cir.1996) (en banc). That Pigford I involved claims under Track B rather than Track A does not change the fact that the legal issue before the court is the same: whether appellants are entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(5) for counsel’s failures **365 *27 to meet filing deadlines. See Op. at 19 - 20. While the court points out that Pigford I acknowledged “the presumption of client accountability for attorney conduct,” id., it ignores that Pigford I also found this presumption overcome because class counsel was not freely chosen by class members and the circumstances of the case, together with the terms of the decree, made retention of other lawyers “unlikely.” Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 926. Here, the very same circumstances remain, and were further exacerbated by additional unanticipated circumstances which created “a situation where there were too many cases and too few lawyers.” Br. for Appellants at 22. This court cannot avoid, by pointing to “a different procedural posture,” Op. at 19, that the district court is bound, under Pigford I, see LaShawn A., 87 F.3d at 1393, 1395, to separate class counsel’s failings from the claims of the class members, particularly in light of the district court’s affirmative duty to “renew its stringent examination of the adequacy of class representation throughout the entire course of the litigation,” In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 22, 27 (3d Cir.1980), and that the district court’s failure to do so is an abuse of discretion, Evans, 206 F.3d at 1298.
Finally, while the Secretary would distinguish Pigford I as concerned with extinguishing a class member’s claim, see Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 922, from the denial of an opportunity to seek Monitor review, from the perspective of the class member whose claim has been wrongfully denied, the effect is the same: Neither class member will have the opportunity to utilize the remedial process established in the consent decree. Taken together, the circumstances identified in appellants’ motions suggest that the 97 class members should not bear the burden of

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counsel’s failures to meet filing deadlines. In order to avoid a “double betrayal” of the class members, the district court was required to separate the failures of counsel from the claims of the class members in order to ensure that the opportunity to pursue the claims process established in the consent decree not be foreclosed. Id. at 927. It did not do so, and the court today fails to explain how the district court fulfilled its responsibilities in accordance with the analysis in Pigford I.
Because the district court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, erroneously relied on its finding in its opinion of June 2, 2003 that the “critical changed circumstance” occurred before the July 14th Order deadlines were agreed to without taking into account record evidence demonstrating that the volume of petitions for Monitor review-the relevant change in circumstance-was not anticipated at the time the deadlines were agreed to, and in the alternative erred as a matter of law by failing to consider whether class counsel’s failures to meet the deadlines amounted to an “unforeseen obstacle” warranting relief, I would reverse and remand the case to the district court to address whether the deadlines were “unworkable” under Rule 60(b)(5).
II.
Additionally, the district court failed to inquire whether adequate notice was provided to 208 class members, for whom appellants proffered evidence that these class members had not received notice of the filing deadlines for Monitor review, in determining whether relief was warranted under the “excusable neglect” standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b).
The July 14 Order modified the consent decree to limit the period within which class members could seek Monitor review of denied claims and, as the district court noted, it did not provide for individual notice to unsuccessful Track A class members **366 *28 Instead, the July 14th Order required only that a copy of it be (1) posted in every USDA Farm Services Agency county office, and (2) sent by the facilitator to those persons who requested a claim sheet and election form. According to the Monitor’s Report, “few people eligible to file a petition with the Monitor would have received direct notice of the 120-day deadline from the mailing,” and many claimants would not see a posting in a USDA Farm Services Agency county office. See Monitor’s Report to the Court Regarding Notice to the Class of the 120-Day

Deadline to File a Petition for Monitor Review (May 30, 2003). The Monitor attempted to remedy the situation by mailing additional notices to farmers who had either requested or made telephonic inquiries regarding claim forms. Still, appellants proffered evidence that 208 class members had received no notice of the filing deadlines. See, e.g., Joint Appendix at 186; 218-233, 248, 254, 256, 258, 265, 268, 269, 286, 321; id. at 423.
Nonetheless, the district court denied relief under the “excusable neglect” standard of Rule 6(b). Applying the four-factor test of Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 398-99, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), the district court found first, that the government would be “prejudiced to the tune of almost one million dollars” by allowing consideration of late petitions if five percent were successful, and second, that “because the [July 14th Order] deadlines were negotiated and agreed to by the [appellants], it logically follows that the resulting failure to meet those deadlines had been within the reasonable control of [appellants].” Each finding is problematic given the district court’s duty to ensure that adequate notice procedures were, in fact, established to provide class members with notice of filing deadlines. The district court made no finding that appellants were not proceeding in good faith or that there would be undue delay of the proceedings by granting relief.
The district court’s finding of “prejudice” to the government is ironic. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 95 (D.D.C.1999); see also Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 927. In approving the consent decree, the district court observed that “the settlement is a fair resolution of the claims brought in this case and a good first step towards assuring that the kind of discrimination that has been visited on African American farmers since Reconstruction will not continue into the next century.” Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 86 (emphasis added). The July 14th Order deadlines were not imposed in order to limit the government’s liability as such, but rather, according to the district court, to bring closure to the process through fair procedures that would identify the number of class members seeking Monitor review. Moreover, the dollar amount of prejudice claimed by the Secretary represents 0.04% of the estimated settlement, see Pigford, 206 F.3d at 1244, and 0.125% of the amount actual paid out by the government at that time. This court, in turn, mistakenly relies on the Secretary’s argument that class counsel’s agreement that the July 14th Order deadlines would not be extended was the quid pro quo for its agreement to admit other Track A claimants into the class who would otherwise have been excluded. See Op. at 21 - 22; Br. for

Pigford v. Johanns, 416 F.3d 12 (2005) 367 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 62 Fed.R.Serv.3d 441

the Appellee at 24. This is not the analysis adopted by the district court in denying appellants’ motions; instead, the district court addressed that quid pro quo in imposing monetary sanctions on class counsel in a separate order, see Pigford v. Veneman, 144 F.Supp.2d 16, 19 n. 2 (D.D.C.2001), which is not on appeal.
The district court’s second finding, that the failure to meet the deadlines was within the farmers’ control because they **367 *29 agreed to the July 14th Order deadlines, is clearly erroneous because it ignored the threshold question of whether the agreed-to notice provisions ensured that adequate notice would be provided to class members, many proceeding pro se, whose claims had been denied by the adjudicator. The fact that class counsel agreed to the notice procedures did not discharge the district court’s obligation to ensure notice was directed in a reasonable manner. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(1)(B); Doe v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 407 F.3d 755, 761 (3d Cir.2005); Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 926 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4)). Once the Monitor determined that the notice procedures were inadequate and appellants proffered evidence that 208 class members claimed not to have received notice, the district court had a duty to inquire whether the notice procedures were adequate in fact. In an analogous context, the Second Circuit pointed out that the district court has “the inherent power and duty to protect unnamed, but interested persons,” Zients v. LaMorte, 459 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1972), and although the notice procedures in the settlement agreement were complied with, the Second Circuit reversed the exclusion of claims filed late due to the lack of actual notice, id. As

the Third Circuit observed, the district court’s equitable powers under Rule 23 “are retained by the court until the settlement fund is actually distributed.” In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir.2001).
Whether the prejudice to the government outweighed other considerations could not be determined by the district court until it first determined-in light of the proffered evidence that the agreed-to notice procedures were inadequate for 208 class members-the adequacy of the agreed-to notice procedures, and whether the late filings were the result of inadequate notice. Only then could the district court determine whether the 208 class members were entitled to relief under Rule 6(b). Therefore, I would reverse and remand the case for the district court to determine the adequacy of the notice procedures and whether the 208 class members were entitled to relief. See Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 925-27; In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d at 321-29; Zients, 459 F.2d at 630.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Part II of the court’s opinion.
Parallel Citations
367 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 62 Fed.R.Serv.3d 441

Footnotes

1

The complaint also alleged violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act,

5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., but, according to the district

court, “both sides agree that this case essentially is brought under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.” Pigford v. Glickman, 185

F.R.D. 82, 86 (D.D.C.1999), affirmed, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C.Cir.2001).

2

Initially the appellants moved to modify the S & O under Rule 60(b)(5). It was not until their motion for reconsideration that they

first suggested the S & O was not final and therefore not subject to Rule 60(b). Hedging their bets on appeal, they invoke the

court’s jurisdiction either under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which establishes this court’s “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of

the district courts of the United States,” or under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which allows appeals of “[i]nterlocutory orders of the

district courts of the United States ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or

modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” See Appellants’ Br. at 1.

3

Because the S & O is a final order subject to Rule 60(b), the district court’s order denying relief is likewise final so that we have

appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 rather than under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), see supra note 2. See Lasky v. Cont’l

Prods. Corp. 804 F.2d 250, 253 (3d Cir.1986) (“ ‘[I]t is now well established that orders denying a motion for relief from a

judgment under Civil Rule 60 are final.’ ”) (quoting 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3916,

at 610-11 (1976)).

4

Contrary to the appellants’ characterization, the Register was not an “extra step” but a substitute step, and a less onerous one,

which relieved class counsel of their commitment to file all petitions by the November 13, 2001 deadline. The district court

therefore reasonably rejected the notion that the Register was a changed circumstance warranting relief.

Pigford v. Johanns, 416 F.3d 12 (2005) 367 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 62 Fed.R.Serv.3d 441

5

After the court ordered payment of an interim $7 million fee award on August 4, 2000, class counsel did not seek additional fees

until they moved for a third interim award on January 12, 2001, when they did not allege any existing financial hardship but only

that they then “face[d] significant hardship based on their financing of the implementation of the Consent Decree” for which they

had “incurred substantial financial obligations in the form of bank loans.” Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Third Award of Atty’s Fees at

3 (filed Jan. 12, 2001) (emphasis added).

6

The court’s abbreviated response on reconsideration may have been influenced as well by its perception of class counsel’s

indifference toward the filing deadlines: “At the April 19 status conference, Class Counsel made the remarkable admission that

they never had a realistic expectation of meeting the November 13, 2000, deadline they had negotiated with the government, nor

did they have any intention of meeting the modified May 15, 2001, deadline set by the Court.” 144 F.Supp.2d at 18.

7

The appellants state in their brief: “In its June 2, 2003 order, the District Court correctly noted that, as of July 14, 2000 plaintiffs

were aware of the vastly greater number of claimants than originally had been anticipated.” Appellants’ Br. at 22.

8

Notwithstanding the contrary suggestion in the Dissent at 27, the only reference to “critical changed circumstances” in the

reconsideration decision came when the court repeated the statement first made in its June 2, 2003 decision to explain (correctly)

that the new argument raised by lawyers who had been “of counsel” when the S & O was entered-that the S & O “itself was a

change in circumstances” because non-class counsel “was not involved in the decision to negotiate and agree to the deadlines

imposed” in it-likewise suffered from “ ‘the fundamental flaw ... that the critical ‘changed circumstance’ on which plaintiffs rely

occurred before, not after, the relevant deadlines were agreed to by the parties and endorsed by the Court.’ ” 307 F.Supp.2d at 49

(quoting 265 F.Supp.2d at 46).

9

We note that the appellants did not establish below that all of the 208 claimants in fact lacked notice and there is reason to believe

that at least some of them did not. See Surreply to Pls.’Reply to Def.’s Resp. to Mot. for Recons. at 6 (filed Aug. 15, 2003).

10 The S & O expressly required only that a copy of its text be posted in every Department Farm Services Agency county office and mailed to everyone who “requested a Claim Sheet and Election Form” but “did not submit a [timely] completed Claim Form.” S & O ¶ 7, at 5. The actual notification procedures, however, were far more extensive as the monitor mailed notices to all claimants who filed a completed claim form by August 17, 2000 (approximately 20,652 in all) and all decision letters sent after November 15, 2001 explained the filing deadline. Monitor’s Report to Court Regarding Class Notice at 3-5.

11 The dissent inexplicably faults our reference to the district court’s May 27, 2001 finding that the government bargained for the November 13, 2000 filing deadline in explaining the district court’s finding of prejudice to the government made in its June 2, 2003 order denying the appellants’ motion for Rule 60(b) relief. See Dissent at 28. We doubt that in the interim the district court either forgot or changed its mind about the quid pro quo nature of the order setting the deadlines, the modification of which, the court found, would prejudice the government in an amount upwards of $1 million. Nor do we agree with the dissent’s characterization of the district court’s findings regarding the government’s negotiation of the July 14, 2000 S & O deadline and potential prejudice from its extension as “ironic” or in any way inconsistent with its earlier finding on the fairness of the Consent Decree (which notably lacked a filing deadline) in its April 14, 1999 order. See Dissent at 28.

1

See In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir.2005) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)); In re

Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir.2001); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 22, 27 (3d

Cir.1980); Zients v. LaMorte, 459 F.2d 628, 629-30 (2d Cir.1972); see also In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 307 (3d

Cir.2005); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat. Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280-81 (7th Cir.2002); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 75 (5th

Cir.1973). While the district court noted that these cases involved earlier stages of class action proceedings, it failed to articulate

any reason why this principle would not apply at the remedial stages of class action proceedings. See Pigford, 307 F.Supp.2d 43,

50 (D.D.C.2004).

2

Six months before the November filing deadline, the motion of May 8, 2000 for an interim award of attorneys’ fees, costs and

expert fees filed by class counsel and certain of-counsel stated:

It is now nearly three years since this case began. During this time the firms incurred crushing expense. For example, [class

counsel] Conlon, Frantz incurred substantial obligations-borrowing $1,000,000 simply to remain solvent. Mr. Pires was not

paid for over 15 months. He obtained multiple mortgages to pay his personal expenses.... [The Of-counsel law firm of]

Chestnut, Sanders was forced by the scope of the litigation to borrow $1 million, hire new employees and cut partner salaries

by 60%.

On August 4, 2000, the district court, acknowledging “the dire financial straits in which several firms affiliated with class

counsel currently find themselves,” ordered an immediate preliminary award to counsel of $7 million, which covered only

Pigford v. Johanns, 416 F.3d 12 (2005)
367 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 62 Fed.R.Serv.3d 441
previously incurred costs and amounted to less than one-half the cumulative loadstar amount of $14,582,703. Although, in response to class counsel’s motion for an extension of the July 14th Order deadlines, the district court set up the Register of Petitions process in November 2000, counsel still missed filing deadlines. When the parties’ attempt, at the district court’s suggestion, to resolve their differences regarding counsel’s May 8th request fees and costs proved unsuccessful, on January 12, 2001 class counsel, of-counsel, and one counsel moved for additional interim fees alleging “significant hardship” as a result of continued financing of implementation of the Consent Decree, without the regular payment of fees, through bank loans to cover staff salaries and expenses. A further payment of interim fees and costs was ordered on March 8, 2001, well after the filing deadlines, and still, because of the government’s resistence, class counsel did not receive any payment until July 2001, of $14.9 million, see Pigford v. Veneman, 369 F.3d 545 (D.C.Cir.2004); a further payment of $500,000 was ordered on December 2, 2002, Pigford v. Veneman, 239 F.Supp.2d 68, 71 (D.D.C.2003). The delay in approving payment and the delay in actual receipt of interim fees by class counsel are ignored by the court in discussing the district court’s “repeated accommodation of class counsel’s continuing delinquency.” Op. at 19.