,.

.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICTCOURT

.~

FOR THE NORTItERNDIS~RICTO’F0~AH0~ ....~ " ~

EQU~ EMPLO~.ENT oPPORTUmT.Y. }

"

COM~SSION, ........

} .....

~#~ ~ o 9~

Plaintiff, JOHN PICKLE COMPANY, INC.

¯ 02CV 979K
} COMPLAINT

Defendant.

NAT__~ UURE OF THE ACTION This is an action under Title VII ofthe.Civi!.Rights Act of 1964, as amended and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of national origin and race and to make who!e Jonathan¯ P. Moraes and a class 9f at least.. 5 !. other similarly situated individuals. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleges that the defendant, John Pickle Company, Inc., violated Title VK by subj coting Jonathan P. Moraes and similarly situated individuals to disparate treatment based upon their race, Asian, and their national origin, East Indian. The discrimination included disparate terms and conditions o.f employment, payment of unequal wages, and subjecting the East Indian workers to harassment creating a hostile work environment.
JURISDICTION ,,,AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Co~ is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 4.51, 1331, t337, 1343, and t 345. This action is authorized and instituted¯ .pursuant to Sections 706(0(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, ("Tide VII"), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(f)(l) and (3) and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § I981A.

2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were c.ommkted within the

jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the N0rthem District of Oklahoma.

¯ " " - " " ¯ " " -" ¯ .....

¯ ’ ’..~ ’ " : ~ ......;. , -.....:.~....:.~ ,...~ .: .qz...~::: .. ,.’..:. :.......;.:.) :,. i)5 .i- " .!...:. ::,.. .... :..~-.. .j:. ¯ ..

PARTIES

3. Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is an

agency of the United States of America .charged with the administration, inte~pretation and

enforcement of Title VII and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(f)(1) and (3)

of Title VII, 42 U.$.C. 2000e-5(f)(1)and(3)i

4. At all relevant times, defendant John Pickle Company, Inc., has been and is now

doing business in the State. of Ok!ahom.~:and.me City of Tulsa, and has continuously had at least

fifteen employees.

5. At all relevant times, defendant has continuously been an employer engaged in an

industry affecting commerce within.the mem!ing of Section 701(b), (g) and (h) of Titie VII, 42

U.S.C. Section 2000e-(b), (g) and (h).

STATEMENT OF CLAIM~.

6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Jonathan P. Moraes and

51 other charging parties flied a ct!arge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by the

defendant. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.

7. Sh~ce at least September 2001, the defendmat has engaged in unlawful employment

practices at its Tulsa facility, in violation of Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-

2(a) and Title I of the Civil. Rights¯ Act of 1991. Specifically, Jonathan P. Moraes..mad similgrly

situated individuals, all of the Asian race and East Indium nationa! 0rigin,.were subjected to disparat treatment including, but not. limited ..to. being paid lower wages than non-Asians and non-East

COMPLAINT

2

Indians; disparate terms and conditions, of employment such as being required to sleep and eat on the work site property, being restricted with regard to freedom to leave the wprk site while similar working conditions and restrictions were not imposed upon aon-Asian and non-East I~n di.a-n worker, s; .. and they were subjected to harassmentand int.im!.da.ti0,p !;e~i~ag a..h0sti!e work environment.

8. The effect of the practices complained of above has been.to deprive John Moraes and

a ciass of similarly situated AsianYEast Indian ye0rkers of.equal employment opportunities and has

otherwise adversely affected their status as. employees..

The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 7and 8, above, were

intentional.

10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 7 and 8, above, were

committedwith

malice

or

with ’

reckless . ’," ....

in.’"d~:i~f."f:e".r:.e.#n.~ic.:-e~ ~,tvo,.".it~h...e.!,..,f.ce.?d.,~e.~r.~.. .l.yprot. .e..c. ted

fights of . . . .. .-....

John

Moraes

and similarly situated individuals.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court;.

A. Grant a permanent.injunction enjoining the defendant, John Pickle Company, Inc.,

its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active ..conce.yt or participation with it from

engaging in any employment practice which discriminates on the basis of race..or national origin.

B. Order the defendant t° in~titute.a~td C.m’Y out policies, practices, andprograms which provide equal employment opportunities for John M0~’ges..an4:..S.~iI~rly situated individuals and. which eradicate the effegts Of its past and present tmlawfu.1 employment practices.

COMPLAINT

3

Order the defendant to make whole John Moraes and similarly situated individuals by providing appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be proved at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects¯ of its..unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to rightful-place reinstatement if.des!red by the aggrieved parties.
Order the defendant to make whole John Moraes and similarly situated individuals by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the m~lawfuI employment practices described in paragraphs 7 and 8, above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
Order the defendant to make whole John Moraes and similarly situated individuals by providing compensation for past and future non-pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described inparagraphs 7 and 8, above, including but not limited to emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life ..and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.
Order the defendant to pay John Moracs and similarly situated individuals punitive damages for its malicious or reckless conduct as described in paragraphs 7 and 8, above, in amounts to be determined, at trial.
Grant such further re!ief as the Court deems necessary and proper. Award the Commission its costs in this action.
Respectfully sl~bmitted, NICHOLAS M.INZEO Acting Deputy General Counsel

COMPLAINT

4

ROBERT A. CANINO Regional Attorney Oklahoma State Bar No.011782
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTI/NITY COMMISSION Dallas District office 207 SouthHousto~ 3rd Floor Dallas, Texas 75202 (214) 655-3333
Oklahoma State Bar No. 14084
EQUAL EM.PLOYMENT OPPORTIYNITY COMMISSION... Oklahoma Area Office 210 Park Avenue, Ste. 1350 Oklahoma.City, OK 73102 (405) 231-4363
(FAX) (405) 231-4340

COMPLAINT

5

 
 ·

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY }

COMMISSION,

}

}

CIVIL ACTION NO.

Plaintiff,

}

v.

o2bv 979&

JOHN PICKLE COMPANY, INC.

}

}

_______________D_e_fe_nd_a_nt_. ____1I

PLAINTIFF EEOC's MOTION TO CONSOUDATE AND REQUEST FQR HEARING
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Plaintiff in the above-captioned action, and pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Court Rule 7.l(G), moves to consolidate the above-captioned case, with Civil Action No. 02 CV 85 EA(M), Chellen et.1. v. John Pickle Company, Inc. et aI., which is pending before Judge Claire V, Eagan in the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Oklahoma.
Consolidation is sought because of common issues of fact and law in the EEOC's case and the private action that make consolidation appropriate and necessary to the consistent adjudication of the claims of the parties. Consolidation would not result in prejudice to any party or in undue delay. Consolidation would facilitate the orderly trial of all issues of the case for the individual as well as the public interests in a single proceeding, thereby conserving the resources and time of the Court and all parties.
The EEOC further requests that the Court order a hearing that would allow the parties an opportunity to be heard on the merits of consolidation if the court deems it necessary to entertain

oral argwnent. If, however, the Court Orders Consolidation without a hearing, the EEOC urges the court to conduct a hearing in which the Court and all affected parties could discuss the nature, extent and schedule for future proceedings consistent with consolidation of the cases.
The EEOC files contemporaneous with this Motion, a Memorandum in Support setting forth more fully the facts and grounds for the Motion. A proposed Order is also filed herewith.
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.l(e) for the United States District Court for the'Northem District of Oklahoma, EEOC Regional Attorney Robert Canino contacted Plaintiffs' attorneys, B. Kent Felty and Joe McDoulett, prior to filing its action and the anticipated Motion to Consolidate. The Plaintiffs' attorneys did not oppose consolidation. EEOC also attempted to contact defendant John Pickle Company's attorneys, Philip and Linda McGowan, to discuss the matter. Messages were left with the office of CARPENTER, MASON & MCGOWAN in an attempt to ascertain whether defense counsel agreed with or opposed the EEOC's Motion to Consolidate. The EEOC's attorney was infonned that defense counsel would not be available until Monday, December 30,2002, a situation quite understandable given the holiday season. A detailed message was left as to the purpose of the call with regard to obtaining defendant's position on EEOC's proposed consolidation. On Monday morning, De'cember 30, 2002, another attempt was made to obtain the defense counsel's position on the matter, but again, the attorneys could not be reached prior to the filing of this Motion. Despite the inability of the EEOC to confmn whether there were any objections by defendant, it is in the interest ofjustice, given the circumstances sUITOlmding the two civil actions, for the Court to Order consolidation on its own authority and discretion. In any event, if defense counsel is not reached prior to the filing of EEOC's suit and Motion, the Court will be holding a Pretrial Conference in the private action on December 30, 2002, and will be able to raise the matter with defense counsel at that time.

•
For the above stated reasons, and as more fully set forth in the Memorandum in Support filed herewith, the EEOC requests that the Court issue a11 Order consolidating this case filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission~ Civil Action No. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ with the prior filed private civil action No. 02 CV 85 EA(M) presently pending before
u.s. District Judge Claire V. Eagan. The EEOC further requests a hearing on this matter after
JanuaIY 3,2003, but before the scheduled trial date in the private aciion for the purpose of allowing the parties to meet with the Court and discuss any approaches to case management if consolidation is granted.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT A. CANINO Regional Attorney
klahoma State at No.01l782
Tria Attorney Oklahoma State Bar No. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Dallas District Office 207 South HOllston, 3rd Floor Dallas, Texas 75202 (214) 655-3333 (FAX) 655-3331

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy ofthc above Motion to Consolidate filed by
u.s. the EEOC was served on the fonowing persons by Mail delivery on this 30th day of
December 2002.
Philip J. McGowan and
Linda Cole McGowan, Attorneys CARPENTER, MASON & MCGOWA..'1 1516 South Boston, Suite 205 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119-4013
Attorneys for Defendant
B. Kent Felly, Attorney 403 South Cheyene, Suite 500-11 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103 and Joe McDoulett, Attorney Catholic Charities 1501 N. Classen Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73106 and Johnny C. Parker, Attorney University of Tulsa, College of Law 3120 East Fourth Street Tulsa, Oklahoma 74104 Attorneys for EEOC Charging Parties

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNi:TY )

COMMISSION,

)

J'l.intiff(s) )

) Case No. 02-C-979-EA

~

) Proceeding: Motion Hearing

) Date: 1-10-2003

JOHN PICKLE COMPANY, INC.,

) Court Time: 10:30 a.m.

Defet1dant(s).

MINUTE SHEET

Cl"he V. Eagan, U.S. Oistr~ictJUd~ge ~Mliller, ~epnty Clerk

Aaron LaDlli<e, Report"

7 [i:J..4U;CLN'---____ Counsel for Plaintiff:
Counsel for Defendant:

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 CM/ECF LIVE - U.S. District Court:oknd - Docket Report

https://ecf.oknd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?103525639425803-L_3...

CLOSED, CONSTR, DISCREF, LC-1
U.S. District Court U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. (Tulsa)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:02-cv-00979-CVE-FHM

EEOC, et al v. John Pickle Company Assigned to: Judge Claire V Eagan Referred to: Magistrate Judge Frank H McCarthy Demand: $0 Lead case: 4:02-cv-00085-CVE-FHM Member case: (View Member Case) Case in other court: USDC ND/OK, 02-CV-794-EA
USDC ND/OK, 02-CV-85-EA Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

Date Filed: 12/30/2002 Date Terminated: 09/22/2006 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Michelle M Robertson Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (OKC) 215 DEAN A MCGEE STE 524 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 405-231-4363 Fax: 405-231-5816 Email: michelle.robertson@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert A Canino US Equal Employment Dallas District Office 207 S HOUSTON ST DALLAS, TX 75202 214-253-2750 Fax: 214-253-2749 Email: robert.canino@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant John Pickle Company, Inc.

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

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12/30/2002 12/30/2002 12/30/2002 12/30/2002 12/30/2002 12/30/2002 12/30/2002 01/07/2003
01/08/2003 01/10/2003
01/10/2003 09/10/2004 10/15/2004 11/19/2004 11/24/2004

1 COMPLAINT (Summons(es) issued) (Consent form sent) (fee status: wv ) (tjc, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
2 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC to consolidate case with case # 02-CV-85-EA(M) , and request for hearing (O/J) (tjc, Dpty Clk) Modified on 01/03/2003 (Entered: 12/30/2002)
3 BRIEF by plaintiff EEOC in support of motion to consolidate case with case # 02-CV-85-EA(M) [2-1], of motion request for hearing (O/J) [2-2] (tjc, Dpty Clk) Modified on 01/03/2003 (Entered: 12/30/2002)
4 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff EEOC by Michelle M. Robertson (tjc, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
5 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff EEOC by Robert Canino (tjc, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
SUMMONS issued as to defendant John Pickle Company (tjc, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
REMARK: possible related cases are 02-CV-85-EA(M) and 02-CV-794-EA-(J) (tjc, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
6 MINUTE ORDER by Court Clerk : This case is hereby reassigned to Judge Claire V. Eagan, as this case is related to case no. 02-C-85-EA(M). The new case number is 02-C-979-EA(C), and all files should be marked accordingly. (cc: all counsel) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/08/2003)
7 MINUTE ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan : setting motion to consolidate case with case # 02-CV-85-EA(M) [2-1], HRG set for 10:30 1/10/02; granting motion request for hearing [2-2] (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/09/2003)
8 MINUTES: by Judge Claire V. Eagan; ptys appear and hrg held; ct grants motion to consolidate case with case # 02-CV-85-EA(M) [2-1]; depos of Mr. Ray Murzello to be held today at 2:30; disc conf between Canino and McGowan to be held to review personnel files; 2/3/03 NJT stricken; ptys to submit proposed sched order. c/r Aaron LaDuke (sjm, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/10/2003)
8 MINUTES: by Judge Claire V. Eagan consolidating case 4:02-cv-85 with member cases 4:02-cv-979 (dcap, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/21/2003)
9 MINUTE ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan : ; STATUS HRG set for 1:00 9/13/04 (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 09/13/2004)
10 MINUTE ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan directing ptys to file simultaneous brfs by 11/30/04 (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 10/18/2004)
11 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC in 4:02-cv-00979, Chellen Plaintiffs in 4:02-cv-0085 for addtl time to desgn repr witns (o/j) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/22/2004)
12 WITNESS (DESIGNATION OF REPRESENTATIVE WITNESSES FOR PHASE II TRIAL PROCEEDINGS) list by plaintiff EEOC, Chellen Plaintiffs (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/29/2004)

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02/03/2005 02/16/2005 02/22/2006 09/22/2006

13 MINUTES of Proceedings - held before Judge Claire V Eagan : Pretrial Conference held on 2/3/2005, striking/terminating deadline(s)/Hearing(s) (Court Reporter: Joanna Smith) (sjm, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
PROPOSED PRETRIAL ORDER by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, John Pickle Company, Inc., Chellen Plaintiffs (tjc, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/16/2005)
14 MINUTE ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan that pursuant to Dkt. # 8, this case was consolidated with and entries are to be made in designated BASE FILE Case No. 02-CV-0085-CVE-FHM; NO FURTHER ENTRIES IN THIS CASE (Re: 8 Minutes - Miscellaneous, ) (RGG, Chambers) (Entered: 02/22/2006)
***Civil Case Terminated (see document number [213 in 02-CV-85-CVE-FHM]) (lml, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 09/25/2006)

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 EEOC SUES PICKLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY FOR DISCR...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/1-2-03.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 2, 2003

CONTACT: Robert A. Canino Dallas Regional Attorney (214) 655-3333 (214) 289-6344 (cell)
TTY: (214) 655-3363

EEOC SUES PICKLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY FOR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WORKERS FROM INDIA

Low Wages, Mistreatment, Harsh Living Conditions Lead to Federal Suit on Behalf of Immigrants
TULSA, Okla. - The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) announced today that it has filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against the John Pickle Company, alleging that the Tulsa-based oil industry parts manufacturer discriminated against a class of at least 52 workers on the basis of their race (Asian) and national origin (East Indian) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
According to the EEOC's suit, (Civil Action No. 02-CV-979K) in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, Pickle recruited the East Indian workers - including high-tech welders, fitters, electricians, engineers and cooks - to the United States with assurances that they would work under conditions similar to those of American workers. The EEOC alleges that Pickle instead subjected these workers to racial and ethnic harassment, discriminatory pay, and other discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. Under the watch of armed guards and the constant threat of deportation, the EEOC charges, the East Indian workers were restricted in their ability to leave the premises and were forced to tolerate derogatory ethnic slurs, work long hours for little pay, and sleep in a warehouse.
Robert A. Canino, Regional Attorney of the EEOC's Dallas District Office, who also serves as an EEOC representative on a Worker Exploitation Task Force with the U.S. Department of Justice, said that the harsh working conditions ran afoul of several federal laws, prompting the Department of Labor to file suit earlier this year alleging minimum wage and overtime pay violations. Canino added that many of the workers had already filed a private suit earlier this year alleging various claims, but noted that the private suit did not include Title VII claims.
"These workers were lured to America with false promises of decent treatment and fair pay, only to find themselves exploited and subjected to harsh degradation based on their race and national origin," said Canino. "Their hopes for a better life were crushed."
The EEOC filed suit after exhausting its conciliation efforts to reach a voluntary pre-litigation settlement. The agency's suit seeks lost wages, as well as compensatory and punitive damages for the harm suffered by the employees. The EEOC is also seeking injunctive relief to enjoin the company from future violations. The agency is also seeking to consolidate its suit with the ongoing private suit, Chellen, et al. v. the John Pickle Company, Inc., et al.
In addition to enforcing Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex (including sexual harassment or pregnancy) or national origin and protects employees who complain about such offenses from retaliation, the EEOC enforces the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, which protects workers age 40 and older from discrimination based on age; the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which prohibits gender-based wage discrimination; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits employment discrimination against people with disabilities in the federal sector; Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits employment discrimination against people with disabilities in the private sector and state and local governments; and sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Further information about the Commission is available on the agency's web site at www.eeoc.gov.

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 New EEOC Publication Addresses Reasonable Accommodation for Atto...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/5-26-06.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Friday, May 26, 2006

CONTACT: Robert A. Canino Regional Attorney (214) 253-2750
TTY: (214) 253-2710

JUDGE ORDERS JOHN PICKLE CO. TO PAY $1.24 MILLION TO 52 FOREIGN WORKERS IN ‘HUMAN TRAFFICKING’ CASE
EEOC Said Skilled Laborers Recruited from India were Imprisoned, Exploited and Abused
TULSA, Okla. – In a significant legal victory for the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a federal judge has ordered John Pickle Company, Inc. (JPC) and its president, John Pickle, to pay $1.24 million to 52 male victims of national origin discrimination and “human trafficking” who were recruited from India as skilled laborers and then subjected to widespread abuse, intimidation and exploitation.
In its lawsuit, the EEOC charged the Tulsa, Okla.-based oil industry parts manufacturer with recruiting the class of foreign employees to the United States with assurances they would work under conditions similar to those of Americans. However, in her 71-page written opinion, Federal District Court Judge Claire V. Eagan detailed evidence of unlawful and egregious conduct by JPC against the Indian-born high-tech welders, fitters, electricians, engineers and cooks once they arrived in the United States.
The judge ruled that JPC was responsible for subjecting the Indian workers to fraud and deceit, inadequate pay, sub-standard living conditions, false imprisonment, lockdowns with an armed guard, phone tapping, food rationing, restrictions on freedom to worship, degrading job assignments, ethnic slurs, intimidation, and the non-payment of wages earned. The court concluded that this conduct violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, because the treatment was based on the national origin of the foreign workers.
“This is a case in which the American dream turned into a workplace nightmare,” said EEOC’s Dallas Regional Attorney Robert A, Canino, the agency’s trial counsel and member of a federal interagency Worker Exploitation Task Force. “We expect that a decision like this, which wraps the civil rights laws of Title VII and §1981 around the country’s growing problem of human trafficking, will serve as valuable precedent and give the government one more weapon in the fight against exploitation and forced labor.
Indian witnesses testified at trial to being deceived by JPC that they were being brought to the United States with the promise of lawful wages and appropriate working conditions. However, once they arrived, the workers had their identification and immigration documents confiscated by JPC, were crammed into a warehouse “dormitory,” and only paid between $1.00 and $3.17 per hour (while non-Indian employees of JPC were paid approximately $14.00 per hour for performing the same type of skilled work).
The court relied on findings from testimony that the highly skilled welders and fitters from India were also made to perform janitorial work, replace a septic tank, and perform kitchen duties and yard work for JPC officers. Beginning in October 2001, the Indian workers were forced to live behind the gates of the company until escaping from the facility in February 2002 with the aid of area churches.
Regional Attorney Canino added, “This case is a prime example of where the purposes of the U.S. anti-discrimination laws and immigration laws converge to protect both American and foreign workers with needed skills. American companies would be undermined by unfair competition if employers like JPC were allowed to engage in illegal schemes to obtain cheap foreign labor.”
Judge Eagan’s 71-page decision followed two earlier trials and prior “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” issued in August 2004. The EEOC’s lawsuit was joined with a related civil action which had been filed by the workers on their own behalf alleging false imprisonment, minimum wage violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), deceit, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Chellen et al. and EEOC v. John Pickle Company, Inc., Case No. 02-CV-0085-CVE-FHM [Base File] and 02-CV-0979-CVE-FHM [Consolidated] in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma). The total damages awarded by the Court addressed the claims in both the government’s suit and the private action.
The EEOC is responsible for enforcing the nation’s laws prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, color, gender (including sexual harassment and pregnancy), religion, national origin, age, disability and retaliation. Further information about the EEOC is available on its web site at www.eeoc.gov.

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This page was last modified on May 30, 2006. Return to Home Page

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6/11/2007 12:46 PM

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

BABU CHELLEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN PICKLE CO., INC. and JOHN PICKLE, Jr.,
Defendants.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff, v. JOHN PICKLE COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant.

)

)

)

)

Case No. 02-CV-0085-CVE-FHM

)

(Base File)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 02-CV-0979-CVE-FHM

)

(Consolidated)

)

)

)

)

)

____________________________________

FINAL JUDGMENT This Court, has conducted non-jury trials on all claim s and defenses presented in the above-styled case, by the parties , the U.S. Equal Em ployment Opportunity Com mission (“EEOC”), the Chellen Plaintiffs, and the Defendants, John Pickle Com pany, Inc. and John Pickle Jr. The proceedings have included a Ph ase I trial in Septem ber 2003 and a Phase II trial in March 2005. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were issued by this C ourt following each phase of trial. See Chellen and EEOC v. John Pi ckle Co., 344 F.Supp.2d 1278 (N.D.

Okla. 2004), and Chellen and EEOC v. John Pickle Co ., --F.Supp.2d--, 2006 WL 2456946

(N.D. Okla. August 22, 2006).

With this Judgm ent and Orde r, the Court incorporates all Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law previously issued. (See Dkt. ## 151, 210) The Court having rendered its

decision on all claims in favor of the EEOC and Chellen plaintiffs,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:

The EEOC and Chellen Plainti ffs have and recover a judgm ent from the Defendants:

John Pickle Co., Inc. and John Pickle, Jr., jointly and severally, in the total am ounts as listed

herein below, and as specifically calculated for apportionment to each of the 52 i ndividual

plaintiffs in the summary calculation attached hereto as Appendix A. (Appendix A: Calculations

of pay and prejudgment interest as performed by Dr. Burt Barnow, dated October 10, 2006)

a. FLSA Lost Wages: Less Offsets Credited: Total FLSA Loss Less Offsets:

$86,919.48 $25,396.72 $59,656.56

b. FLSA liquidated damages:

$59,656.56

c. Title VII/§1981 (portion above FLSA) Unpaid Wages:

$445,987.47

b. Title VII/§1981 (and Civil Rights Act of 1991)

Compensatory Damages for emotional harm

$ 52,000

c. Title VII/§1981 (and Civil Rights Act of 1991)

Punitive Damages for malice or reckless indifference

to federally protected rights

$ 52,000

d. Deceit/Fraud Ten Months Promised Wages Out of Pocket Expenses

$390,000 $ 82,056

2

e. False Imprisonment (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Damages Subsumed here and under Title VII/§1981/CRA 1991)

$ 52,000

f. Total Non-FLSA Prejudgment Interest (See Appendix A)

$128,446.21

TOTAL FLSA and NON-FLSA DAMAGES w/ INTEREST:

$ 1,321,802.80

Prejudgment interest awarded shall be apportioned in the am ounts specifically calculated for each of the 52 Chellen Plaintiffs as set forth in the sum mary calculation attached as Appendix A. Prejudgm ent interest was not calculated for FLSA loss of wages, in lieu of the Court’s award of Liquidated Damages under the FLSA.
Apportionment of dam ages to the 52 Chelle n Plaintiffs in specific am ounts for each individual on each claim is set forth in Appendix A.
Application for costs shall be submitted by counsel pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 16th day of October, 2006.

3

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

/S/ Philip J. McGowan___________ Philip J. McGowan, OBA #5997 Linda Cole McGowan, OBA #5996 McGOWAN AND McGOWAN, P.L.L.C. 406 South Boulder Avenue, Suite 200 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103 Tel No.(918) 599-9199 Fax: (918) 599-9189 attorneys@mcgowanlawyers.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

/S/ Robert A. Canino________ Robert A. Canino Regional Attorney, EEOC Oklahoma State Bar No. 011782
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Dallas District Office 207 South Houston, 3rd Floor Dallas, Texas 75202 Tel. No. (214) 253-2750 Fax No. (214) 253-2749 robert.canino@eeoc.gov
/S/_B. Kent Felty_ ________ Bill Kent Felty, and Johnny C. Parker, B. Kent Felty Law Office 7615 E. 63rd Street, Ste. 200 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74113 Tel. No. (918) 254-1414 Fax. No. (918) 254-1888 bkentfelty@aol.com
ATTORNEYS FOR CHELLEN PLAINTIFFS

4

 
 344 F.Supp.2d 1278 (2004)
Babu Thanu CHELLEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
JOHN PICKLE CO., INC., and John Pickle, Jr., Defendants. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff, v. John Pickle Company, Inc., Defendant.
No. 02-CV-85-EA (M).
United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma.
August 26, 2004.
1279 *1279 Richard D. Marrs, Fred Everett Stoops, Sr., Keith Allen Ward, Mark Louis Collier, Richardson, Stoops, Richardson & Ward, Jeff Nix, Eddie D. Ramirez, Bill K. Felty, Tulsa, OK, Joe W. McDoulett, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiffs.
J. Thomas Mason, Philip James McGowan, Linda Cole McGowan, Carpenter, Mason & McGowan, Robert A. Canino, Dallas, TX, Michelle Robertson, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (PHASE ONE)
EAGAN, District Judge.
In these consolidated cases, the fifty-two individual plaintiffs (collectively referred to herein as the "Chellen" plaintiffs for firstnamed plaintiff Babu Thanu Chellen) brought an action against defendants John Pickle Company, Inc. ("JPC") and John Pickle, Jr. ("John Pickle") for (1) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219; (2) race discrimination; (3) deceit; (4) false imprisonment; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (7) violation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"). The Court previously dismissed the Chellen plaintiffs' claims for violation of Title VII because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. It also dismissed the Chellen plaintiffs' claims for violation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The EEOC has brought an action against JPC for violations of the FLSA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3), and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981A.
The Court has chosen to proceed in three phases. First, the Court will determine whether the Chellen plaintiffs were "trainees" or "employees" under the FLSA. If the Court determines that they were "employees," the Court will proceed to a determination of liability on all claims. If defendants are found liable, the Court will proceed to a determination of damages. The Court held a non-jury trial in the first phase of these proceedings September 8-18, 2003.
INTRODUCTION
The Chellen plaintiffs, who are all citizens of India, came to work at JPC's Tulsa, Oklahoma facility in 2001. They allege that defendants made false representations when they recruited the Chellen plaintiffs for JPC employment, required them to work in excess of forty hours per week, paid them below minimum wage, compelled them to eat and sleep at the JPC facility, restricted their ability to leave or travel freely to other locations, placed armed guards at the gates of the facility to discourage their travel or compel them to stay at the facility when they were not on duty or working, and held them unlawfully against their will within the confines of the JPC facility. Defendants deny most of the allegations and allege, in defense, that the Chellen plaintiffs were employed by an 1280 Indian company, AL Samit International ("AL Samit"), to be trained in the United *1280 States by JPC for work at

a JPC-affiliated company in Kuwait. Defendants contend that the Chellen plaintiffs entered the United States with visas authorizing entry into the United States for the sole purpose of receiving training at JPC. Defendants maintain that JPC provided dormitories where the Chellen plaintiffs could sleep, and a cafeteria, staffed by Indian cooks, where the Chellen plaintiffs could eat. Whether the Chellen plaintiffs were "trainees" or "employees" is significant because, if they were "employees," they were entitled to minimum wage and overtime compensation.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Any conclusion of law which is more appropriately characterized as a finding of fact is incorporated herein.
JPC's Expansion into the Middle East
1. Prior to ceasing all operations on or about October 30, 2002, JPC designed and fabricated products for use in the petrochemical and power industries. JPC divided the fabrication of custom-made products into four areas: pressure vessel, structural, production equipment, and special products. In the late 1990s, JPC began developing business in Kuwait and the Middle East. To complete orders for its expanding business, JPC trained 6 individuals from Kuwait in 1999, and 20 individuals from India and Pakistan in 2001, at the JPC facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The training program for these individuals was structured and successful in equipping workers for JPC's Middle East business venture. John Pickle made remarks indicating that the training program was also a "good deal" for JPC because the trainees provided "cheap labor." (See Pl.Ex. 68; Tr. 268-69.)[1]
2. Thereafter, JPC entered into a joint venture, John Pickle Middle East ("JPME"), with a company known as Kuwait Pipe Industries and Oil Services Company ("KPIOS"). (Pl.Ex. 4.) KPIOS employed and paid all employees working at JPME. KPIOS recruited twenty welders and fitters from India, who signed employment agreements with KPIOS to work at JPME in Kuwait following the completion of their training at the JPC facility in Tulsa.
AL Samit's Recruitment
3. Defendants contend that 51 of the 52 Chellen plaintiffs were recruited for the same purpose as the 20 who signed employment agreements with KPIOS: to work at JPME in Kuwait upon completion of their training in Tulsa.[2] Unfortunately, this purpose was not communicated to the Chellen plaintiffs when they were hired by AL Samit in 2001, and both KPIOS and defendants denied this purpose in an agreement to terminate and settle the JPME joint venture in November 2002. (Pl.Ex. 70.) JPC contracted with AL Samit for AL Samit to recruit, prescreen, and arrange for testing of the Chellen plaintiffs and others.
4. AL Samit required large payments of money from the men who desired jobs with JPC, and it led them to believe that they would be able to obtain permanent jobs with JPC in the United States if they performed satisfactorily. (See, e.g., Tr. 440-42, 687-88, 690.) Specifically, the Chellen plaintiffs were told that: they would be 1281 given free room and board; their *1281 medical expenses and insurance would be paid by JPC; the job would be for at least two years, but could be long-term thereafter; and the job would pay from $650 per month plus overtime, with pay increases after six months, to $1,200 per month after 18 months.[3] (Tr. 441-43.) AL Samit prepared the Chellen plaintiffs' visa applications and obtained their signatures thereon. (Pl. Exs. 16A-16AAA; e.g., Tr. 456, 722.) Many of these plaintiffs left good jobs or their own successful businesses, and some obtained loans from family and friends to pay large "fees" required by AL Samit. (E.g., Tr. 444-48, 463-65, 683-86, 687-88, 694-97.) Some also traveled long distances, at their own expense, for testing and application purposes. (E.g., Tr. 457, 688-89.)
5. JPC's principal recruiter and Director of Marketing, Ray Murzello, testified that he sought workers with a track record working production equipment or with pressure vessels in a reputable indian company. He specifically sought persons with five to ten years of experience0907some with large industrial corporations such as Larsen & Toubro. The men he recruited were experienced, skilled workers who, in his opinion, simply needed to learn to work faster, more efficiently, and more independently. (Jt.Ex. 1, Depo. Tr. 38-42.) He described them as

"excellent" workers who could work independently. He also explained that JPC would not want workers who could not perform fabrication work on the vessels JPC produced for customers, because JPC could not risk losing business by tolerating unsatisfactory work product. (Id. 98-99.) Murzello described the Chellen plaintiffs as "professional" workers and not workers in "apprenticeship." (Id. at 107.) The Chellen plaintiffs' employment histories and qualifications substantiate and confirm the expertise of the Chellen plaintiffs in their respective trades; some had won national competitions for their work skills. (PI. Exs. 19A-19YY; Tr. 433-34.)
6. In a letter to the former United States Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), Murzello represented that the training period for the Indian nationals would be for a period up to 12 months, and the Indian nationals would be returned to India upon completion of their training. (Pl.Ex. 52.) In letters to the United States Consulate in India, Murzello repeatedly detailed the long-term financial benefits to JPC of the JPC "training program." (Pl.Exs.10, 38, 39.)
7. John Pickle traveled to India for a personal meeting with each of the Chellen plaintiffs, and a general meeting with all of them. He communicated through various translators, including AL Samit's owner, Gulam Peshimam, to confirm the terms of the Chellen plaintiffs' agreement to work at the JPC facility. In addition, John Pickle stated that the Chellen plaintiffs might be able to obtain drivers' licenses if they had driving experience, and they would be afforded the promised amenities according to American standards. After their meetings with John Pickle, the Chellen plaintiffs returned to their homes or stayed in Bombay and awaited instructions from AL Samit as to their departure dates. (Tr. 451-56, 688-92.)
Departure from India
8. When the Chellen plaintiffs arrived in Bombay for departure, AL Samit required each Chellen plaintiff to sign an "offer letter" as a condition of obtaining a position at the JPC facility. (Def.Exs.1E-48E, 49D-53D.) The Chellen 1282 plaintiffs *1282 were required to sign these and other documents before they boarded the airplane departing India for the United States. (Tr. 458, 464-65, 693-95.) AL Samit and defendants also required the Chellen plaintiffs to sign an "undertaking," which stated that they did not pay money to AL Samit for travel or the JPC job. (Def. Exs. 1F-48F; 464-65, 696-97.) Plaintiffs did not fully comprehend what they were signing or why, and some of them inquired as to the inconsistencies they perceived as to the terms in the written documents and prior representations. They were told that the differences were because of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. (Tr. 459-60, 462, 693-95, 698.)
9. Despite the inconsistencies, the Chellen plaintiffs felt they had no choice but to sign the documents, at the last minute, after having invested so much of then' money and time into the pursuit. They were assured by AL Samit that these were mere formalities, and not the true conditions of their impending employment. In particular, they were under the impression that they were being hired for employment, not selected for a training program. (E.g., Tr. 463-65, 695-97.)
10. JPC or AL Samit quickly obtained Bl or B2 visas for the Chellen plaintiffs. These are business visitor visas which can be obtained through a faster and less scrutinized process than an H2B visa for temporary work or an H3 visa for training. (Tr. 1278-83.)
At the JPC Facility
11. The Chellen plaintiffs arrived in three groups, on separate dates, at the JPC facility. Thirty arrived on October 11, 2001; seventeen arrived on November, 10, 2001; and five arrived on December 27, 2001. The last five worked in Kuwait at JPME for a short time before they came to JPC in Tulsa. Christina Pickle, John Pickle's wife, took the Chellen plaintiffs' passports, visas, return-trip airline tickets, and I-94s[4] and placed them in a safe. (Tr. 277-78, 293.) Defendants set up separate bank accounts for each Chellen plaintiff at Gold Bank in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and AL Samit paid the Chellen plaintiffs by depositing money into these accounts. The Chellen plaintiffs' pay per hour ranged from $2.89 to $3.17. (Pretrial Order, Dkt. # 132, § III(H).)

12. Defendants paid AL Samit a "marketing fee" or "commission" in an amount sufficient to reimburse AL Samit for AL Samit's payment of the Chellen plaintiffs' salaries while they were at the JPC facility in Tulsa. John Pickle's wife, Christina Pickle, wire-transferred approximately $81,400 per month for this purpose. The mechanism for the payments was set forth in the Proposal on Manpower Training Between AL Samit International and John Pickle Company Inc., dated September 30, 2001 (Pl.Ex. 25), and the Sales Representative Agreement dated September 27, 2001 (Pl.Ex. 26.). The Sales Representative Agreement provided that the "payment of the commission shall be made monthly for a period of two years; the duration of this agreement and will be subject to review and negotiations every six months," and the agreement was to be in force for a two-year period. (Id.) Likewise, the Proposal on Manpower Training contemplated a two-year period for the program. (Pl.Ex. 25.)
13. The original model for the routing of wages to the Chellen plaintiffs through a foreign business entity was set 1283 forth in documents pertaining to the JPME joint *1283 venture between JPC and KPIOS. (See PI. Exs. 9, 12.)
JPC provided time sheets of the prior 20 Indian workers' hours and submitted them to KPIOS monthly; then KPIOS wire-transferred the workers' salaries in a lump sum to JPC and JPC allocated it to the workers; KPIOS (JPME) then sent JPC an invoice for the total amount of salaries and other costs to be paid to KPIOS by JPC. Although JPC's vice president and chief operating officer, Joe Reeble, used the same process in the subsequent arrangement for the Chellen plaintiffs, the subsequent arrangement was with AL Samit, a recruitment agency, not an employer or joint venture partner like KPIOS. (Tr. 88-90.)
14. JPC's Director of Manufacturing, Dale Chasteen, was responsible for approving the hire of workers for shop operations. His practice when classifying steel fabricators was to review their employment background and experience. However, he never saw or made an effort to review the qualification packets or employment histories and test results of the Chellen plaintiffs during the classification, alleged training, or evaluation processes. He admits that this information would have been important to his assessment for classification at the time of hire. (Tr. 870-72.)
15. John Holcomb, JPC's Manufacturing Support Manager, saw the Chellen plaintiffs' employment histories and prior test results. He thought they were all classified as "C" once they passed the Tulsa tests, but he admits that they were not paid what class "C" JPC employees were paid. JPC later realized that some of the Chellen plaintiffs merited a higher classification. (Tr. 1090-92.)
16. Defendants produced training materials, including a syllabus or curriculum, which they allege were to be used by the Indian nationals recruited by KPIOS who worked for JPME. (Def.Ex. 55C.) However, these materials were not used by the Chellen plaintiffs, and had no bearing on their activities. The "program" purportedly attended by the earlier Indian nationals was never implemented as to the Chellen plaintiffs. Indeed, the Chellen plaintiffs did not receive any orientation or instruction different from that given by JPC to other non-Indian newly-hired employees.
Testing
17. Most of the Chellen plaintiffs were welders. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers ("ASME") sets standards by which welders are tested in the United States and elsewhere. There are five different welding processes which are primarily used in the fabrication of pressure vessels and related structural components as follows: SMAW (Shielded Metal Arc Welding); FCAW (Flux Core Arc Welding): GMAW (Gas Metal Arc Welding): GTAW (Gas Tungsten Arc Welding); and SAW (Submerged Arc Welding).
18. JPC required each welder in the Chellen group to be tested on welding procedures under the ASME code specifications, first in India and again in Tulsa. The Chellen plaintiffs were given the same test JPC gave to applicants for a full-time job at the Tulsa facility. Although not all of the Chellen welders initially passed all of the welding tests given at the JPC facility in Tulsa, within one week after arrival, all passed the qualifying welding test for hire of regular employees in the ordinary course of business at JPC: the 3G Flux Core Are Welding (FCAW) test. (E.g., Tr. 1082, 1463-67.) Ninety percent of the production work to be performed by all JPC welders required only the 3G/FCAW capability. (Tr. 1116, 1146-47.) The positions for new hire were not all entry-level "C"

1284 classifications, but could range from "A" (the highest) to "B" and *1284 "C" designations with commensurate pay rates. (Tr. 854-56.)
19. There was no predictable or consistent hiring practice with regard to the testing of fitters for employment at JPC. The Chellen fitters had passed the test given to them in India "as per JPC test." (E.g., Pl.Ex. 18R-18W.) Defendants did not require that the fitters be "retested" when they arrived at JPC's Tulsa facility. American or nonIndian fitters who applied in the ordinary course of business for employment at JPC were sometimes hired and well-paid despite failing or doing poorly on the JPC fitter's test. (Tr. 993-96, 99-1000; e.g., PI. Exs. 61B, 61D, 611, 61K.) One non-Indian JPC fitter received a pay increase even though he received only a 2.8 rating and needed more familiarity with ASME code. (Pl.Ex. 61J.) Another non-Indian hired as a "Fitter Trainee" had vocational education, but no industry-related experience; he was paid over $10 per hour while the Chellen plaintiffs were in Tulsa. (Pl.Ex. 61K.)
The Work
20. The welders, fitters, and roll/brake operators among the Chellen plaintiffs performed steel fabrication activities on jobs for which commercial products were made and sold to JPC customers. Indeed, the vast majority of their work time was spent on production related to job orders. (See PI. Exs. 31, 31A(1) and (2).) Invoices for jobs on which the Chellen plaintiffs worked totaled over $3 million. (Pl.Ex. 67.) No jobs on which the Chellen plaintiffs worked failed to be completed in a timely manner or at an expected level of quality. (E.g., Tr. 305-06.)
21. However, some of the Chellen plaintiffs' time was spent on janitorial duties, kitchen duties, cleaning the shop and yard, replacing a septic tank, converting a warehouse into the dormitory, and doing yard work for John Pickle and one other JPC officer. These job assignments would not have prepared the Chellen plaintiffs for placement and advancement within a technical trade such as steel fabrication or welding. Further, they were not the type of duties that would have been assigned, typically, to welders, fitters, and roll/brake operators although, on occasion, the lowest paid JPC employees other than the Chellen plaintiffs may have spent a minimal amount of time performing these tasks. Some of the Chellen plaintiffs' time cards reflect "refusals" to do the outside work assignments. (See, e.g., Ex. 31, 31A(a); e.g., Tr. 1150-52, 1179-82.)
22. JPC also assigned such duties as sandblasting, painting, and insulation work to the Chellen plaintiffs. While these duties may have assisted the Chellen plaintiffs in becoming "multi-skilled," these duties were typically reserved for the least skilled and lowest paid employees. (E.g., Tr. 622023.)
23. JPC management officials, supervisors, and leadmen produced employee evaluation forms for the Chellen plaintiffs in December 2001 and January 2002 in an effort to create the appearance of a legitimate training program. (Def. Exs. 148G; Pl.Ex. 66.) The evaluations included ratings and comments about the Chellen plaintiffs. The Chellen plaintiffs never saw the documents prior to this civil action, and, unlike evaluations JPC performed for its American or non-Indian employees, the evaluations for the Chellen plaintiffs were never discussed with them or signed by them. The evaluations were backdated so that it would appear plaintiffs were being assessed periodically as part of a progressive evaluation for training purposes. (Tr. 624-28, 887-88.) Some evaluations show a date of evaluation prior to the arrival date of the workers evaluated, and some show dates 1285 that were months after the last of the Chellen plaintiffs departed *1285 JPC. (E.g., Def. Exs. 27G, 34G, 35G, 48G.)
24. Nonetheless, the belated evaluation forms confirm that the Chellen plaintiffs performed at a level required by JPC's regular employees. The total percentage of "good" to "outstanding" ratings (3-5 numerical) for the relevant time period was 61-62%. (Pl.Ex. 66.) If "fair" ratings are included (those between 2 and 3 numerically), the percentage increases to 89%. (Id.) Progress for the Chellen plaintiffs from October through December was fairly insignificant. (Id.) Some of the Chellen plaintiffs were placed on the night shift based upon an assessment that they had good skills and an ability to work independently.
25. Although the work of the Chellen plaintiffs was not error-free, the Chellen plaintiffs required no more orientation or supervision than other new hires by JPC, and evaluators described some as requiring "little supervision." (See Pl.Ex. 66.) Even experienced, skilled welders and fitters and JPC employees made errors

requiring repairs. (Tr. 868, 1032-33, 1149-50.) At least one JPC employee was counseled during the time the Chellen plaintiffs were at the JPC facility for taking too much time on a job (Tr. 941-43; Pl.Ex. 61G), and another was given a pay raise even though his evaluations noted time management problems that could result in manhour overruns. (Tr. 1188-90; Pl.Ex. 61O.)
26. During the time of the purported training program, the joint production work by the Chellen plaintiffs and JPC employees had the effect of reducing the workload. Approximately 30 American or non-Indian JPC employees were displaced when their employment ended during the period of time relevant to the issues in this case. (Tr. 1085-88.) The Chellen plaintiffs not only displaced American workers, but also they encumbered positions that could otherwise have been filled by American workers. (See Pl. Exs. 59, 60A, 60B, 60C, 62A, 62B.)
27. JPC assigned extensive overtime work to the Chellen plaintiffs, and that also contributed to the displacement of American workers. Indeed, JPC workers complained about their loss of opportunity to work overtime hours during the time the Chellen plaintiffs worked at JPC. (E.g., Tr. 622, 865-67.)
28. Despite the detriment to JPC's American workers, the benefits to defendants of this "training program" were described by Ray Murzello to the United States Consulate in Kuwait. He pointed out that the joint venture was able to obtain a manufacturing order for $1.2 million, and boasted that JPME was able to compete on equal terms against its main competitors in the region. (Pl.Ex. 10.) He later claimed that JPME had exceeded its budget targets for 2001, and had the potential to exceed much higher budget targets for 2002. (Pl.Ex. 38.) He also stated that JPC expected to benefit from larger export orders. Indeed, JPC expected to undertake an additional $70 million in project work on an annual basis as a result of its training program for the Chellen plaintiffs, in particular. (Pl.Ex. 39.)
Living Conditions
29. JPC converted a building at its facility into a furnished dormitory to house the Chellen plaintiffs. Yet, the Chellen plaintiffs themselves were required to work on the "conversion." The "dormitory" was basically a bunkhouse or barracktype arrangement where partitions separated each worker's bed from another, and the bathroom from the living areas, and they shared a common living area. (See Pl.Ex. 3.) There was only one light switch, and one door in and out. Several Chellen plaintiffs testified or affined that they were led to believe that 1286 they would be housed in *1286 apartments. The Chellen plaintiffs facetiously began referring to the dormitory as the "Cram-a-lot Inn." (Tr. 636.)
30. JPC deducted from the paychecks of each Chellen plaintiff fifty dollars per month for food. Yet, defendants rationed food among the Chellen plaintiffs, and inspections by the Oklahoma Department of Health revealed problems at JPC. (Tr. 317-20.) In addition, defendants were, at times, inattentive to medical needs of the Chellen plaintiffs. (Tr. 362-71.) Defendants carried no workers compensation or health insurance for the Chellen plaintiffs. (Tr. 277.)
31. Defendants restricted the ability of the Chellen plaintiffs to leave JPC because defendants kept their passports, visas, tickets, and I-94s locked in a safe, and required them to obtain permission before leaving the JPC premises. (Tr.277-78,-292-94.) JPC manager John Holcomb told the Chellen plaintiffs that they faced possible arrest, investigation, or deportation if they left the property without proper documentation. JPC also discouraged the Chellen plaintiffs from leaving by posting a notice in the dormitory that failure to obtain permission to leave could lead to return to India (Pl.Ex. 41), and posting an armed security guard at the main gate. Further, JPC even recorded some of the Chellen plaintiffs' telephone conversations without their knowledge. (Tr. 278-82.) Defendants also recruited four of the Chellen plaintiffs to be "leadmen" responsible for keeping a watchful eye over the others and reporting their activities. These leadmen signed "Personal Agreements" that used the same job description language as agreements with JPC leadmen who were not from India. (E.g., Ex. 31N; Tr. 105-10.)

Departures from JPC
32. Beginning in November 2001, some of the Chellen plaintiffs began "unauthorized" departures from JPC. They crawled under a gate to come and go, and some never came back. Reeble required those who stayed to sign "Personal Conduct Agreements" in January 2002. (E.g., Def. Exs. 21K, 32V.) This agreement obligated the Chellen plaintiffs to "perform all the duties required of his training and any job specifically requested by his leadman, supervisor and/or JPC Management without hesitation or reservation," not to leave JPC for any "unauthorized reason," or have any communication to plan "unauthorized leave" from JPC, not to "assist or encourage any other Trainee to take any unauthorized leave from JPC," and to immediately inform John Pickle or the JPC Executive Vice President if they knew the location of those who had left, or the names of people who aided or planned to aid in the departure of any "trainee." (Id.) The agreement stated that departure from JPC was "a strict violation of your U.S. entry Visa and makes you subject to criminal prosecution." (Id.)
33. On January 28, 2002, JPC attempted to send seven of the Chellen plaintiffs back to India by way of Atlanta. Testimony indicated that this was against their will and several pleaded with JPC officials not to send them back. (Tr. 143-46, 396-98, 623-24, 1092-93.) A police or sheriffs car accompanied them to the Tulsa airport. They were very emotional as they were being driven to the airport, and fearful of returning to India under the circumstances. The INS intervened in Atlanta and prevented these Chellen plaintiffs from being sent back to India by JPC.
34. In early January 2002, the Chellen plaintiffs had submitted a complaint letter raising issues about their status with the company and the promises made to them. (Pl.Ex. 45.) One of the key issues presented was the Chellen plaintiffs' belief that they had been promised a job for two years. A videotaped meeting occurred in February 2002 1287 during which Chellen plaintiff *1287 representatives indicated that the they did not understand why Reeble had told the newspapers that the Chellen plaintiffs were only in training for six months. (Def. Ex, 99; Pl.Ex. 50.) Reeble explained to the Chellen plaintiffs' representatives that JPC was in the process of submitting requests for extensions of the 1-94 INS authorizations. JPC prepared the requests and sought extensions through May 2003. If the extensions had been granted, the cumulative period of "training" would have been 18 months, in contrast to the four months the prior group of 20 trainees spent at JPC in Tulsa.
35. The remaining Chellen plaintiffs left the premises on February 5, 2002, when a local man who had been assisting other Chellen plaintiffs brought vans to the JPC facility and transported them away.
The Aftermath
36. Since leaving JPC, most of the Chellen plaintiffs have found employment with legitimate and reputable employers in the United States. (See PI. Exs. 20-22, 24.) They have performed well and are paid "top" wages by industry standards. One plaintiff, for example, testified that he is making $18.75 per hour as a welder for J. Ray McDermott, Inc., a company in the petroleum industry. (Tr. 512.) His original work authorizations have been replaced by T-Visas issued under the authorization of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services ("CIS"), which is part of the Department of Homeland Security.
37. Five of the Chellen plaintiffs have taken the 6G Gas Tungsten and Shielded Metal Are Welding (GTAW/ SMAW) tests given by a Certified Welding Inspector for Standby Personnel Services. (Pl.Ex. 23A-23E.) These plaintiffs passed the tests and qualified to weld according to Oklahoma and AWS standards. (Tr. 659-66.) Approximately 17 others passed the 6G or 6GR test when they applied for employment with J. Ray McDermott, Inc. This test is the most difficult welding test. (Tr. 576-78, 1471-72.) A welder who passes this test is considered highly qualified for every pipe weld position. It is improbable that the Chellen welders could have advanced from trainee to highly proficient welder in a three to four month period 0907the amount of time they spent at JPC. (Tr. 595.)
38. Defendants agreed, in a November 2002 agreement terminating the joint venture between JPC and KPIOS, that the recruitment and hiring of the Chellen plaintiffs "has nothing to do with and bears no relation to" KPIOS or the joint venture, nor, in fact, had their recruitment and hiring "ever been brought to the attention of or approved by the Management Committee" of the joint venture. (Pl.Ex. 70.) JPC represented that the Chellen plaintiffs were

recruited and hired "by the sole act and at the sole responsibility of [JPC] and in its own name for its own account and for its own purposes." (Id.) John Pickle testified that this provision of the contract was untrue, but he felt compelled to sign the contract in any event because he had no alternative or choice under the circumstances: the other party had more money; he and JPC had already invested a lot a money into the endeavor; the other party was in a greater position of power; he was at a disadvantage in a foreign country which was the home country of the other party to the agreement; and the other party knew the laws of that country better than he. (Tr. 401-06.)
Findings Related to the Reich[5]Test
i. Vocational School Comparison
1288 39. The work performed by the Chellen plaintiffs was the kind of work typically *1288 done where production jobs fill the needs of customers and generate income for a business. Although defendants had a course syllabus and other training documents from its earlier training programs, these were not distributed or used with the Chellen plaintiffs. The "program" designed for the Chellen plaintiffs did not involve them in any course work, assignments, or duties typical of a vocational school trainee. In addition, it included general construction, janitorial work, kitchen duty, and other assignments unrelated to the jobs for which the Chellen plaintiffs were purportedly being trained.
40. JPC attempted to create evaluations that would be characteristic of a training program designed to develop skills within a craft. However, the evaluations were not created contemporaneously with the activities purportedly evaluated, and, in many instances, the date on many evaluation forms had no correlation to the activities or even presence of the Chellen plaintiffs. The evaluation forms were designed solely to create the appearance of a legitimate training program. Further, the evaluations were never discussed with the Chellen plaintiffs and, thus, they did not provide any information helpful to developing the skills of the Chellen plaintiffs. The manner in which the evaluations were created, in this case, means that they are not reliable indicators that JPC "training" was similar to that provided in vocational schools.
41. JPC also assigned "leadmen" from among the Chellen plaintiffs to oversee the non-work activities of all the Chellen plaintiffs. The assignment of such leadmen is not characteristic of a vocational training program. To the contrary, the Personal Agreements appointing the leadmen were characteristic of employment agreements, and contravened the terms of the Proposal on Manpower Training between JPC and AL Samit. Similarly, the "Personal Conduct Agreements" are not indicative of something trainees at a vocational school would be required to sign, and they, too, contravene the terms of the Proposal on Manpower Training.
42. The Chellen plaintiffs were not participants of any training program that would equate to the kind of training that would be given in a vocational school.
ii. Benefit of the Trainee
43. The Chellen plaintiffs had extensive experience and skill in their respective trades when they arrived at the JPC facility. Indeed, they were recruited for their high level of expertise. Their qualifications would preclude them from being considered "trainees," novices, or apprenticelevel workers who would have benefitted from their activities and conditions at JPC. The JPC "training program" did not serve to benefit them by teaching them new skills or improving the skills they already possessed.
44. The Chellen plaintiffs passed all the tests required by JPC and its agents in India for recruitment and selection purposes. They also met all pre-qualifying criteria that were typically required of applicants hired by JPC as employees who were paid United States wages. The required tests included the Flux Core Are Welding process test in the 3G position ("3G/FCAW"), in compliance with the ASME Sec. IX standards for welders, as well as oral and written mathematics tests and symbol-reading tests for fitters.
45. Performance by the Chellen welders of the production work required at the JPC Tulsa facility was evaluated, formally and informally, as the kind of work performed by JPC non-trainee, employee craftsmen classified as A,

1289 B, and C welders *1289 who earned well above the federallyrequired minimum wage. Given their proven proficiency, the alleged benefits of "training" these individuals were minimal, if any. JPC did not require the same level of qualifications, skill, experience or test results for hiring fitters, roll/brake operators, or electrical maintenance workers as it required for welders.
46. The Chellen welders, fitters, roll/ brake operators, and electrical maintenance personnel were able to obtain and maintain successful employment through subsequent employers. Some JPC leadmen even recommended the Chellen plaintiffs for raises. Their prior work experience, combined with excellence shown in their employment subsequent to JPC, demonstrates that the Chellen plaintiffs were not "trained" at JPC. The program was not designed primarily to benefit the Chellen plaintiffs.
iii. Displacement of Regular Employees
47. Although JPC hired some new employees during the time the Chellen plaintiffs were at the JPC facility in Tulsa, it fired or laid off even more. JPC's use of the Chellen plaintiffs for production, maintenance, and menial labor resulted in the displacement of JPC employees and potentially other American and non-Indian workers. The Chellen plaintiffs were competent to perform the work assigned to them at JPC, and they often worked overtime hours under minimal supervision. Indeed, American workers at JPC complained that the Chellen plaintiffs were "eating up" all the overtime.
48. Other evidence demonstrated that JPC could not have met the requirements for an H2B visa for skilled workers because it could not have shown that there were no American workers who were available and willing to work. The "training program" resulted in the displacement of regular employees at JPC.
iv. Impact on the Employer
49. JPC derived immediate advantage and financial gain, or the promise of contracts and increased exports, from the production work activities of the Chellen plaintiffs. In correspondence and internal memoranda, JPC's officers and managers made representations to United States consular officials expressly describing the benefits of their "training" plan as flowing to JPC and JPME. JPC boasted to United States officials that allowing the Chellen plaintiffs to work for JPC in Tulsa would permit the company to secure production contracts and increase JPC's immediate potential for expansion of its exports. JPC intended to create a competitive advantage and profit for itself by hiring the Chellen plaintiffs, who possessed specialized skills, at low wages. The Chellen plaintiffs' performance of menial tasks and duties other than welding and fitting also benefitted defendants, who would otherwise have had to pay for those services or use other JPC employees to perform them.
v. Job Expectations Upon Completion
50. The Chellen plaintiffs were led to believe that, if they performed satisfactorily, they would have a job with JPC for at least two years. Satisfactory performance is a condition of employment whether it occurs at the end of a training period, or at the beginning. Defendants assert that they intended to send the Chellen plaintiffs to JPME in the Middle East after a six-month training period at the JPC facility in Tulsa. All of the parties intended the relationship to end in long-term employment. The Chellen plaintiffs were necessarily entitled to a job upon successful completion of the so-called training period.
1290 *1290 vi. Understanding as to Wages
51. The Chellen plaintiffs never considered themselves "trainees"; they considered themselves employees entitled to the wages promised them by defendants through JPC's agent, AL Samit. They were not familiar with United States minimum wage laws and did not anticipate that they would not be paid what other foreign nationals (on proper visas and work authorizations) are typically paid in the United States. JPC gave ambiguous and

conflicting descriptions of the employment relationship to them, and defendants basically ignored their complaints or concerns about pay and working conditions. The Chellen plaintiffs' job expectations were never met.
52. Statements attributed to John Pickle by reliable witnesses demonstrated John Pickle's philosophy about possible utilization of foreign workers as cheap labor. JPC planned to implement a training program to increase production, exports, and profits for JPC and JPME by supplying the pressure vessel fabrication operation with highly skilled steel fabrication workers from India at low wages. JPC's vice-president, Joe Reeble, worked closely with Ray Murzello, JPC's marketing director, and with the full authority of John Pickle, to negotiate arrangements that would permit the defendants to pay the Chellen plaintiffs wages through third-party foreign companies. They arranged to secure the approval from United States consular authorities for issuance of business visitor B1/B2 visas which required that wages during the course of a training program not be paid by JPC, but by the foreign employer.
53. AL Samit was defendants' agent. The agency was established by defendants' contract with AL Samit to be the recruitment agency and a partner in selection and hire of Indian nationals. In addition, JPC officials and AL Samit jointly conducted meetings with Chellen plaintiffs.
54. Although the Chellen plaintiffs signed documents which contain the word "trainee," they did not intend to be treated as JPC trainees exempt from minimum wage. The documents presented to the Chellen plaintiffs at the last minute in India were apparently an attempt by defendants to have the Chellen plaintiffs waive their federal rights to minimum wages.
55. Ironically, defendants contend that the document signed by John Pickle terminating the joint venture with KPIOS is untrue to the extent it indicates that defendants' recruitment and hiring of the Chellen plaintiffs had no relation to the joint venture or KPIOS. John Pickle essentially asserts that he signed the termination agreement under duress. The duress John Pickle experienced, if any, was similar to that experienced by the Chellen plaintiffs when they were asked to sign the offer letters and statements of understanding prior to their departure from India. The intent of the parties was not premised on a mutual understanding that they were entering into a purely trainer/trainee relationship.
56. The misunderstanding as to wages is also evidenced by the "unauthorized" departures by the Chellen plaintiffs from the JPC facility beginning in November 2001 and ending in February 2002. Their reasons were: less pay than expected, food rationing, substandard living conditions, menial labor, job assignments outside their craft, restrictions on freedom of movement, threats of deportation and prosecution, physical threats, and verbal abuse. These are riot the characteristics of a legitimate work training program. The Chellen plaintiffs' expressed 1291 discontent over the terms and conditions of their work demonstrates a lack of mutual understanding *1291 as to their wages, employment expectations, and status.
57. The EEOC presented testimony at trial of three experts on exploitation of workers, circumvention of immigration laws, and human trafficking. The Court considered this testimony relevant only as to the character and nature of the working relationship between the parties. One expert described human trafficking practices in India and South Asia similar to those utilized by defendants and AL Samit in recruiting the Chellen plaintiffs. (See Tr. 760-838.) An immigration expert explained defendants' option in obtaining visas, and the significance of their choice to obtain B1/B2 visas for the Chellen plaintiffs. He concluded that JPC did not meet the requirements for the visa options available to it for trainees. (See Tr. 1275-1308.) EEOC's third expert testified, among other things, that the Offer Letter, although referencing the workers as "trainees," included payment of wages, which would not be characteristic of a bona fide training program. (See Tr. 1319-1349.)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Any finding of fact which is more appropriately characterized as a conclusion of law is incorporated herein.
1. To determine whether the Chellen plaintiffs were entitled to compensation as "employees," or as "trainees" to whom minimum wage and overtime are not due under the FLSA, the Court considers the broad statutory definitions of "employee" and "employ." "Employee" is defined as "any individual employed by an employer," 29

U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). To "employ" means "to suffer or permit to work," id. § 203(g). These definitions include all individuals employed by covered employers and impose no limitation based on nationality or immigration status. See Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 706 (11th Cir. 1988) (undocumented East Indian workers considered employees for purposes of coverage under the FLSA); cf. Donovan v. Burgett Greenhouses, Inc., 759 F.2d 1483, 1486 (10th Cir.1985) (employer required to pay wages, including overtime for work performed by illegal aliens).
2. The Tenth Circuit has followed Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 149-50, 67 S.Ct. 639, 91 L.Ed. 809 (1947), by adopting the six-factor test developed by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor ("DOL") for determining whether workers are to be considered "trainees" or "employees" under the FLSA:
[i.] The training, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the employer, is similar to that which would be given in a vocational school[;]
[ii.] The training is for the benefit of the trainee[;]
[iii.] The trainees do not displace regular employees, but work under close observation[;]
[iv.] The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the trainees and on occasion his operations may actually be impeded[;]
[v.] The trainees are not necessarily entitled to a job at the completion of the training period[; and]
[vi.] The employer and trainees understand that the trainees are not entitled to wages for the time spent in training.
Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting the Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 91:416 (1975)). The Reich test is based upon a "totality of the circumstances," and the Court looks at the 1292 "economic realities *1292 of the relationship." Id. at 1027. No one factor is dispositive. Id.
3. "A principal-agent relationship may be grounded in a formal arrangement or may be inferred from `conduct which shows that one is willing for the other to act for it, subject to its control, and that the other consents so to act'." St Anthony Hosp. v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 309 F.3d 680, 703 (10th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). Representations made by John Pickle and/or AL Samit's agents or subagents are attributable and imputed to the defendants. See Marshals v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 413 F.Supp. 377, 379 (N.D.Okla.1975).
4. "In Oklahoma, economic duress allows a party to avoid a contract that it has entered if a `wrongful act [of the other party was] sufficiently coercive to cause a reasonably prudent person faced with no reasonable alternative to succumb to the perpetrator's pressure.'" Strickland Tower Maintenance, Inc. v. AT & T, 128 F.3d 1422, 1426 (10th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). However, "[a] litigant cannot [] make out a claim of economic duress by alleging merely that the opposing party took advantage of [his] weak negotiating position or because of `business necessities.'" Id. (citations omitted). The Chellen plaintiffs signed the Offer Letter and Undertaking under duress.
5. Based on Findings of Fact Nos. 39-57, the Court concludes that the Chellen plaintiffs were "employees" under the FLSA and the Reich test, based on the totality of the circumstances and the economic realities of the relationship.
6. As a matter of law, federal rights to minimum wages cannot be waived by contract or other agreement. See Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981); see also Marshall v. Quik-Trip Corp., 672 F.2d 801, 806 (10th Cir. 1982).
7. In addition to the Reich factors, both parties urge the Court to examine other tests to determine whether a plaintiff is an employee or trainee under the FLSA. The EEOC cites to Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 112 S.Ct. 1344, 117 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992) (reviewing the issue in the context of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.) for factors evidencing a common law test for determining the existence of an employment relationship.[6] While most, if not all, of these factors

might weigh in favor of plaintiffs, the Darden court specifically noted that "the textual asymmetry between the two statutes precludes reliance on FLSA cases when construing ERISA's concept of `employee.'" Id. at 326, 112 S.Ct. 1344.
1293 *1293 8. The EEOC also urges the Court to consider Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F.Supp. 1450 (C.D.Cal.1996), where the court examined the employee/trainee issue in the context of allegations of involuntary servitude and false imprisonment. There the court determined that traditional tests for determining an employer-employee relationship under the FLSA were not controlling, but that an assessment based on the "economic realities" standard would be most appropriate. Id. at 1467-69; see Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., 366 U.S. 28, 33, 81 S.Ct. 933, 6 L.Ed.2d 100 (1961). The Court's consideration under Reich incorporates consideration of the "economic realities" present in this matter as well as plaintiffs' allegations of involuntary servitude. Bureerong adds little to the analysis.
9. Finally, the EEOC urges the Court to consider this matter by reference to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. (2000), and certain federal criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1592, 1589. However well the facts of this case may appear to fit within the definitions or prohibitions of these statutory provisions, the issue before this Court involves violations of the FLSA. Any evidence probative of human trafficking is relevant only to the extent it tends to show that the Chellen plaintiffs were employees 0907not trainees of 0907 JPC.
10. The defendants urge the Court to consider a "hybrid economic reality/control test" under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) used to determine whether a plaintiff is an employee for Title VII purposes. "This test requires the court to ask if a plaintiff claiming to be an employee is, as a matter of economic reality, dependent upon the business to which he renders service and to what extent the 'employer' controls the work of the `employee.'" St. Germain v. Simmons Airline, 930 F.Supp. 1144, 1146 (N.D.Tex. 1996). Although the Court has already dismissed the Chellen plaintiffs' Title VII claim, it finds that, as a matter of economic reality, the Chellen plaintiffs were dependent upon JPC and JPC controlled almost every aspect of their work. Most of the additional factors set forth in St. Germain, other than the fact that JPC did not withhold social security taxes or provide retirement benefits, also counsel in favor of plaintiffs.[7]
11. Defendants emphasize that the Chellen plaintiffs, as holders of Bl or B2 visas, were not authorized or eligible to be employed for wages in the United States. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 122 S.Ct. 1275, 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002) (no award of backpay to an undocumented alien). If the Chellen plaintiffs were not authorized to work in the United States, they may not be entitled to backpay. Id. at 140, 151, 122 S.Ct. 1294 1275. However, such an argument goes to the remedies available to the plaintiffs, not *1294 to the issue of whether the Chellen plaintiffs were, in fact, employees under the FLSA. Indeed, undocumented aliens may be considered employees under federal labor law. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892, 104 S.Ct. 2803, 81 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (finding that the National Labor Relations Act applies to unfair labor practices committed against undocumented aliens.)
12. The Court's determination is based upon the DOL factors, the totality of the circumstances, and the economic realities considerations set forth in Reich. Consideration of other "tests" or factors adds little or nothing to the analysis, and certainly does not change the outcome.
SUMMARY
In this phase of the proceedings, the Court finds that the Chellen plaintiffs were employees, and not trainees, under the FLSA. Although defendants' actions evidence an intent to evade the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA, the Court leaves for phase two a determination as to whether defendants' "arrangements were conceived or carried out in such a way as to violate the letter and spirit of the minimum wage law...." See Walling, 330 U.S. at 153, 67 S.Ct. 639. For that purpose, the Court sets a scheduling conference for September 13, 2004, at 1:30 p.m.
[1] "Tr." refers to the "Transcript of Non-Jury Trial Proceedings" held September 8-18, 2003.

[2] In addition to the welders, fitters, roll/brake operators, electricians, and maintenance personnel recruited, AL Samit recruited two cooks, at JPC's request, to prepare meals for the recruits at the JPC facility in Tulsa. One of the cooks is not a plaintiff in this case; the other is. The parties admit that the cooks were not trainees.
[3] Other testimony indicated that they were promised $800 per month (Tr. 689), and documents indicate that all of the workers other than the cooks would be paid from $500 to $550 per month. (Def. Ex. 54, at 3.)
[4] "An 1-94 Form is an alien arrival-departure record that serves as proof of the bearer's current immigration status and the time period during which his stay in this country is authorized." Mariscal-Sandoval v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 851, 853 n. 4 (9th Cir.2004).
[5] Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir.1993). See Conclusion of Law No. 2.
[6] "In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party." Darden, 503 U.S. at 323, 324, 112 S.Ct. 1344 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989)).
[7] These include:
(1) the kind of occupation with reference to whether the work is usually done under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without supervision; (2) the skill required in the particular occupation; (3) whether the "employer" or the individual furnishes the equipment used and the place of work; (4) the length of time during which the individual has worked; (5) the method of payment, whether by time or by the job; (6) the manner in which the work relationship is terminated, i.e., by one or both parties, with or without notice or explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the business; (9) whether the work accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the employer pays social security taxes, and (11) the intention of the parties.
Id. at 1146-47 (quoting Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, 847 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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 434 F.Supp.2d 1069 (2006)
Babu Thanu CHELLEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
JOHN PICKLE CO., INC., and John Pickle, Jr., Defendants. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff, v. John Pickle Company, Inc., Defendant.
Nos. 02-CV-0085-CVE-FHM, 02-CV-0979-CVE-FHM.
United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma.
May 24, 2006.
10701234567 *1070 *1071 *1072 *1073 *1074 *1075 *1076 *1077 Bill K. Felty, B. Kent Felty Law Office, Johnny Clyde Parker, Tulsa, OK, Joe W. McDoulett, Catholic Charities, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiffs Babu Thanu Chellen, et al.
Jon Thomas Mason, Linda Cole McGowan, Carpenter, Mason & McGowan, Philip James McGowan, McGowan & McGowan PLLC, Tulsa, OK, for Defendants.
Michelle M. Robertson, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Oklahoma City, OK, Robert A. Canino, US Equal Employment Dallas District Office, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(PHASE TWO)
EAGAN, Chief Judge.
In 2001, more than fifty men left their homes in India for work in Tulsa, Oklahoma at John Pickle Company, Inc. ("JPC"). In 2002, fifty-two of these individuals[1] sued JPC and John Pickle, Jr. ("John Pickle") with seven claims for relief, five of which remain: (1) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219; (2) race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) deceit; (4) false imprisonment; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") subsequently brought an action against JPC for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a), and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981"). Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief.
The Court initially planned to proceed in three phases and, after a non jury trial in the first phase, determined that the Chellen plaintiffs were employees, not trainees, under the FLSA. See Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 344 F.Supp.2d 1278 (N.D.Okla. 2004) (hereinafter "Chellen I"). With the agreement of the parties, the Court combined the second and third phases of the proceedings to determine liability as well as damages for all claims. The nonjury trial for this second and final phase was held in March 2005. The parties stipulated to representative witness testimony whereby a few individual plaintiffs testified at trial on behalf of all of the individual plaintiffs. The parties also stipulated, among other things, that all evidence of record in the Phase I proceedings could be used in support of any claim or defense presented in Phase II of the proceedings. Indeed, they presented overlapping 1078 evidence and argument affecting all issues, *1078 and many of the Court's earlier Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Dkt. # 151) apply to the merits of the entire case. Accordingly, the Court incorporates its prior findings and conclusions herein.

FINDINGS OF FACT
Any conclusion of law which is more appropriately characterized as a finding of fact is incorporated herein.
FLSA
1. Phase I of the trial was directed specifically at the Chellen plaintiffs' FLSA claim. The Court set forth 57 findings of fact therein that are directly applicable to the Court's determination of liability on this claim. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1280-91. Those findings need not be repeated in full, as defendants have stipulated that JPC did not pay the Chellen plaintiffs minimum wage as required by the labor and employment laws of the United States. Phase I Pretrial Order (Dkt.# 132), Stip. III(E). Defendants have not stipulated, however, to the damages recoverable by the Chellen plaintiffs or to plaintiffs' allegation that John Pickle is individually liable for any violation of the FLSA.
2. Defendants assert that the amounts reflected in Def. Ex. 101 accurately reflect the regular, overtime, and total hours worked by each Chellen plaintiff, as well as the actual wages paid to each worker, the minimum wage difference, the overtime difference and the gross total difference between the amount paid by JPC and the amounts owed under the FLSA to each Chellen plaintiff other than Mohammed "Hassan" Usman. Usman was not named as a plaintiff in Case No. 02-CV-85-CVE-FHM, but the EEOC apparently filed suit on his behalf in Case No. 02-CV-979-CVE-FHM. Usman settled a related claim for wages through the United States Department of Labor ("DOL").[2] The total amount set forth in Def. Ex. 101 is $86,919.48, less $2,250.13 (owed to Usman), which equals $84,669.35.
3. Defendants contend that they are entitled to offsets for JPC's expenditures for the Chellen plaintiffs' housing, food, medical needs, and telephone calls. Defendants offered the testimony of Christina Pickle, wife of defendant John Pickle, as to the costs incurred by defendants for housing and other items for which defendants seek credit. Ph. II Tr. at 879-82. For lodging, the defendants seek $4.50 per plaintiff per day, for a total of $23,679.00. Def. Ex. 62-E-2. Defendants seek a total of $16,011.81 as an offset for food, Def. Ex. 62-D-2; $8,062.62 for medical expenses, Def. Ex. 62-F-2; and $2,177.24 for telephone expenses, Def. Ex. 62-G-2. Although defendants initially sought credits for travel and transportation costs as well as uniforms and tools, they have abandoned those requests. See Def. Prop. Findings and Conclusions, Dkt. # 199, at 3-4. Therefore, the total amount of credit sought by the defendants is $49,930.67.
4. The EEOC's expert witness testified that offsets for housing against FLSA wages are allowed to an employer 1079 where *1079 the benefit is primarily to the employee as opposed to the employer. If allowed, an offset for housing
is calculated as (a) the cost of the structure divided by the number of employees; (b) the fair value of the housing; or (c) the reasonable value charged by the employer. Ph. II Tr. at 926. However, the expert concluded that the costs for housing provided by defendants to the Chellen plaintiffs should not offset the minimum and overtime wages owed. He reasoned that: living conditions in the dormitory were sub-standard; the Chellen plaintiffs did not use the facility voluntarily; and the defendants used an arbitrary "rental" cost in calculating what they argued was a fair market value for the housing. Ph. II Tr. at 924-28. The Court finds that JPC and John Pickle are not entitled to an offset for housing.
5. Plaintiffs argue that defendants' request for an offset for food is unconscionable, given the limited quantity and poor quality of the food provided by defendants to the Chellen plaintiffs. However, the Chellen plaintiffs were fed three meals per day. The Court finds that JPC and John Pickle are entitled to an offset for food. The EEOC concedes that a credit for medical treatment provided to the Chellen plaintiffs would be appropriate, and the Court finds it an appropriate offset. Finally, the Court finds that an offset for telephone expenses is appropriate.
6. The Chellen plaintiffs argue, for purposes of recovering liquidated damages, that the following facts give rise to a finding that defendants' violation of the law was willful and not in good faith: defendants sought "cheap labor," as stated by John Pickle, see Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1280 (FOF¶ 1), 1290 (FOF¶ 2); defendants knowingly obtained improper visas for defendants, see id. at 1282 (FOF ¶ 10), 1289 (FOF ¶ 48), 1290 (FOF ¶ 52), 1291 (FOF ¶ 57); defendants misrepresented to U.S. officials that the Chellen plaintiffs would be part of a "training"

program, id. at 1281 (FOF ¶ 6), 1285 (FOF ¶ 28), 1289 (FOF ¶ 49); defendants backdated employee evaluations in an effort to prove that the Chellen plaintiffs were "trainees," id. at 1284 (FOF ¶ 23), 1288 (FOF ¶ 40); and defendants routed wages to the Chellen plaintiffs through defendants' Indian recruitment agent, AL Samit International ("AL Samit"), id. at 1282-83 (FOF ¶¶ 12, 13), 1290 (FOF ¶ 52). John Pickle directly participated in the creation and execution of the plan to bring the plaintiffs to Oklahoma. Id. at 1280 (FOF ¶ 1), 1281 (FOF ¶ 7), 1287 (FOF ¶ 38), 1290 (FOF ¶ 52). The Court finds that John Pickle is personally liable for violation of FLSA. The Court further finds that an award of liquidated damage under the FLSA, equal to the amount of wages owed, is appropriate as against both defendants.
7. Given the Court's findings of fact as to the parties' wage stipulations, the Court concludes that all of the Chellen plaintiffs other than Mohammed "Hassan" Usman, who settled his wage claim through the DOL, are entitled to compensatory damages in an amount equal to the gross total difference between the amount paid by JPC and the amounts owed under the FLSA to each Chellen plaintiff (other than Usman), less offsets itemized in Jt. Ex. 2 for expenses related to food, medical needs, and telephone expenses. The total amount is $86,919.48 less $2,250.13 (owed to Usman), or $84,669.35, less $26,251.67 (offsets), for a total amount of $58,417.68, plus an equal amount of liquidated damages.
Civil Rights (Title VII and § 1981)
8. Each of the Chellen plaintiffs is a citizen of India. Defendants dispute that the Chellen plaintiffs' race differs 1080 from their *1080 own; defendants do not dispute that the Chellen plaintiffs' national origin is East Indian. The
EEOC asserts that the race of the Chellen plaintiffs is Asian; defendants assert that no evidence was presented to show that the Chellen plaintiffs are of a race other than the Caucasian race. The Chellen plaintiffs do not specify their race but simply state that they are citizens of India and that "white," "American" employees at JPC received different treatment. See Pl. Proposed Findings and Conclusions, Dkt. # 200, at 32-36. The Court finds it unnecessary to make a determination of the Chellen plaintiffs' race, given its findings and conclusions based on the Chellen plaintiffs' national origin, ethnicity, and culture.
Disparate Treatment
Wages
9. The Chellen plaintiffs were qualified for the jobs for which they were recruited, tested, transported, and employed and which, ultimately, they performed at JPC. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1288-89 (FOF ¶¶ 43-46). The Chellen plaintiffs who worked as welders, fitters, roll/break operators, and electrical maintenance workers were paid less than their non-Indian JPC counterparts who had similar skills, abilities, and job duties. See Pl. Ex. 62B; Ph. II Tr. at 827-29. JPC did not employ any non-Indian cooks.
Testing
10. The Court's prior findings detail the testing requirements for the Chellen plaintiffs in comparison with nonIndian JPC employees. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1283-84 (FOF ¶¶ 17-19). In short, JPC required all the Chellen plaintiffs to pass skill tests in India before they were hired, and the welders were required to pass a second test when they arrived at JPC in the United States. JPC required its non-Indian welders to pass only one test before hire, and it did not consistently require fitters to pass a skill test.
Classifications
11. Unlike their practice for new hires of non-Indians, JPC managers did not view the test results, qualification documents, certifications, or employment histories of the Chellen plaintiffs before assigning them a classification upon which to base their pay. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1283 (FOF ¶ 14). Although the record is unclear on this point, it appears that JPC managers initially assigned most of the Chellen plaintiffs an entry level "C" classification, although some may have received a "B" classification. Id. (FOF ¶ 15); Pl. Ex. 66. None received an "A" classification.
12. Near the end of the time the Chellen plaintiffs were at JPC, JPC managers evaluated and reclassified several of the Chellen plaintiffs, but the Chellen plaintiffs were unaware of these evaluations or reclassifications until the

lawsuit was filed. Id. at 1284 (FOF ¶¶ 23-24), 1288 (FOF ¶ 40); see Def. Exs. 22G, 26G; Pl. Ex. 66. JPC did not offer the Chellen plaintiffs the same opportunities it offered its non-Indian employees for evaluation, selfassessment, and reclassification for pay increases related to performance.
Job Assignments
13. JPC required the Indian employees to perform jobs such as grinding welds, painting, sandblasting, and insulating, as well as janitorial duties, kitchen duties, and yard work unrelated to the skills for which the Chellen plaintiffs were hired. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1284 (FOF ¶ 21), 1286 (FOF ¶ 32). The Chellen plaintiffs did not view these jobs as desirable or part of their employment responsibilities. Prior to the arrival of the Chellen 1081 plaintiffs, *1081 these jobs were performed either by the least skilled and lowest ranking non-Indian JPC employees or not at all. Id.; see Phase I Trial Transcript, entered Jan. 20, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as "Ph. I Tr.") at 389-92, 622-23, 1150-52, 1180-81; Ph. II Tr. at 215-16, 593-94.
14. Five of the Chellen plaintiffs were also required to assist in the replacement of a septic tank. The septic tank was attached to a small house which served as the Chellen plaintiffs' original quarters. Replacement of the tank was required because of JPC's failure to anticipate and prepare for the use of the bathroom by more than 30 men. See Ph. II Tr. at 340, 532-33, 542-43, 780-82. In addition, JPC required the Chellen plaintiffs to work on the conversion of a building at the JPC facility into a dormitory. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1284 (FOF ¶ 21), 1285 (FOF ¶ 29). Similarly-situated JPC non-Indian employees were not required to perform the job assignments considered by the Chellen plaintiffs to be undesirable. See Ph. I Tr. at 622-23, 865, 989-92, 1176-77; Ph. II Tr. at 98-101, 110, 184-85, 208, 287-94, 334-36, 532-33, 542-43, 588-90, 611, 629-30, 662, 773-74, 780-82.
Restrictions
15. JPC restricted the Chellen plaintiffs' movement, communications, privacy, worship, and access to health care. No similar restrictions were placed on JPC's non-Indian employees. Many of the facts applicable to this comparison are also relevant to the Chellen plaintiffs' tort claims.
16. As set forth in the Court's prior findings and conclusions, immediately upon the Chellen plaintiffs' arrival in Tulsa, defendants placed the Chellen plaintiffs' passports, visas, return-trip airline tickets, and 1-94 Forms in a safe to which the Chellen plaintiffs had no access. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1282 (FOF ¶ 11). Defendants denied access to the documents even when the Chellen plaintiffs requested it in writing. Pl. Ex. 46; Ph. II Tr. at 330-31, 636, 677-78. JPC ultimately refused to release the passports and visas of the Chellen plaintiffs until the Court ordered the release soon after the lawsuit was filed. See Minutes, Dkt. # 6.
17. JPC restricted the Chellen plaintiffs' ability to leave JPC in several other ways, as set forth in the Court's prior findings and conclusions. See Chellen 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 31). JPC employee Sharon Sartain provided transportation to the Chellen plaintiffs at her convenience in a small bus that could transport only 17 persons at a time. Ph. II Tr. at 771-72, 960-61, 965-66, 978.
18. Defendants point out that Sharon Sartin provided transportation to Catholic churches, Hindu temples and Islamic mosques. Ph. II Tr. at 427, 570, 956-58, 963-64. Further, some of the Chellen plaintiffs used the pedestrian gate that led into Sharon Sartin's yard to walk to a local church. Ph. I Tr. at 346, 956-57. One admitted that he used public bus transportation to look for other work in Tulsa. See Ph. II Tr. at 130-31. Another testified that he used other forms of public transportation for a trip to New York. Ph. II Tr. at 229-30.
19. The Chellen plaintiffs testified that, in some instances, friends or family had to provide significant personal information to "check them out" for short visits off the JPC premises. Id. at 306-07, 466-67, 588. Defendants initially told the Chellen plaintiffs that, if they left JPC premises, they might be harmed by Americans who were angry about the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and further, that black residents of the surrounding area were dangerous and could shoot them. Ph. II Tr. at 295, 448, 581, 601, 637-38, 659, 979. Later, defendants told 1082 the Chellen plaintiffs *1082 that, if the Chellen plaintiffs left the premises without permission, they would be reported to law enforcement authorities and jailed. Ph. I. Tr. at 1102-04; Ph. II Tr. at 102, 187, 189, 202, 301-02, 461-62, 498, 632-33.

20. Eventually, an armed guard was hired to prevent "unauthorized departures" by the Chellen plaintiffs from the facility. See Ph. II Tr. at 203-04, 452, 502, 522-23, 585-86, 777, 785-86. The main gates at the JPC were locked over the Thanksgiving holiday. Ph. I Tr. at 375, 486; Ph. II Tr. at 446-48, 451, 966. Two plaintiffs testified that, on one occasion, their dormitory door was chained shut during the night and the guard was posted outside the door. Id. at 452-55, 491-92, 778-80, 822-23.[3] One Chellen plaintiff testified that, on one occasion when he left the property unaccompanied, he was picked up, admonished, and returned to the facility. Id. at 86-87. Several Chellen plaintiffs who left the facility unauthorized were labeled "runners" on JPC timecards. See Pl. Exs. 31A(1), 31A(2). At least one plaintiff left his personal belongings behind when he departed. Ph. II Tr. at 615. Trial testimony implicated John Pickle as stating, with regard to one of the plaintiffs who left JPC after using without permission and causing damage to a company truck, "Even if he is hiding underground, I'll pull him up by his hair and bring him to justice. And I am an American, I would be able to do that." Id. at 109.
21. Defendants also monitored the Chellen plaintiffs' off-duty computer Internet activity and e-mail communications in an effort to enforce the unauthorized leave policy. Ph. II Tr. at 307-08, 591-92, 771. The Court previously found that defendants recorded some of the Chellen plaintiffs' telephone conversations without their knowledge. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 31); Ph. II Tr. at 308, 592. Further, JPC required the Chellen plaintiffs to sign "Personal Conduct Agreements" by which they agreed that they would not "place any phone calls, e-mails, or have any other communication . . ." to plan or aid unauthorized leave from JPC. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 32); e.g., Def. Exs. 21K, 30H, 31V, 32V, 39R.
22. Defendants paid four of the Chellen plaintiffs extra money to be "leadmen," whose primary responsibilities were to watch over the other Chellen plaintiffs and report to JPC managers any "unauthorized" activities outside the facility. See Chellen II, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 31); Ph. II Tr. at 149-50, 183-84, 468, 561-63; Def. Exs. 1911, 22H, 31N, 45Q. Prior to Tha.Zasgiving, John Pickle gave one of the leadmen, Marshall Suares, the keys to the locked gates and specifically instructed him not to allow anyone out of the dormitory on Thanksgiving. Ph. II Tr. at 448. Suares followed that instruction. Id. at 451. Some of the plaintiffs nonetheless crawled through a drainage ditch and under the barbed wire perimeter fence of the JPC premises. Ph. I Tr. at 487, 776; see Ph. II Tr. at 966.
23. John Pickle had the "leadmen" read an email authored by Ray Murzello, an Indian who served as JPC's principal recruiter and Director of Marketing. The email contains the threat of deportation for two Chellen plaintiffs identified by defendants as "troublemakers" or potential "runaways." Pl. Ex. 40; Ph. II Tr. at 188-92, 237-38, 1083 665-66; see Ph. I Tr. at 1101-02. *1083 The Court has already detailed what could be described as an attempt at a "forced deportation" for seven other Chellen plaintiffs. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 33).
24. In Phase II of the trial, defendants presented the testimony of Captain Bill Bass, a member of the Tulsa County Sheriff's Department. He testified that he arrived at JCP when the Chellen plaintiffs were getting on the bus for their departure back to India, and he saw no indication of a disturbance or any attitude of resistance by the plaintiffs Ph. II Tr. at 736-38, 740-41, 751-52. He did follow the bus to the bank, and then to the airport. Id. at 738-43.
25. Plaintiffs considered the presence of the police officers intimidating. Id. at 214-15, 474-75, 802-08. Further, part of the event included unnecessary physical intimidation, invasion of privacy while the "deportees" dressed, showered, and used the bathroom, and a prohibition on communications between the co-workers. Ph. II Tr. at 93-96, 214-15, 308-09, 473-76, 595-96, 798-809. John Pickle personally participated in the attempted deportation. Id. 95, 214, 801-03; see Ph. I Tr. at 396-97.
26. Defendants' restrictions on movement of the Chellen plaintiffs affected the Chellen plaintiffs' ability to worship freely. Although all of the men were from India, they had different languages, diets, and faiths. Some were Hindu, others Christian, and a few were Muslim. The first Chellen plaintiffs to arrive at JPC testified that defendants, and John Pickle in particular, would not permit them to attend church services regularly, although eventually they were permitted to go. Ph. II Tr. at 87-89, 303-06, 463-65, 633. When one Catholic member of the second group to arrive asked to go to church, John Pickle questioned him as to whether he actually believed in God before acceding to his request. Id. at 463. When another Chellen plaintiff asked to go to church, Pickle told him that he should just stay in the dorm and watch the Playboy channel. Id. at 303-04, 633.

27. The Chellen plaintiffs who were Catholic testified that defendants eventually permitted Sharon Sartin to transport them to Mass. E.g., id. at 324. However, they were required to immediately report back to the bus after Mass for return to the JPC facility. This constraint left no time for them to speak with priests or parishioners. Ph. II Tr. at 305-06, 463-64, 633. On one occasion when they were delayed in returning to the JPC facility after Mass, John Pickle became very angry. Id. at 600, 984-85. When the Hindu Chellen plaintiffs realized that their worship opportunities would be similarly limited, they built themselves a small personal shrine in a makeshift cabinet for worshiping in the warehouse. See Ph. II Tr. at 567-68; Def. Ex. 58T.
28. John Pickle also discouraged the Chellen plaintiffs from attending church by telling them that the Christian or "church" people who reached out to them were breaking the law and would be "punished," or jailed. Ph. II Tr. at 212, 303, 598-99, 633. Defendants initially refused to allow the Chellen plaintiffs to observe Christmas as they wished. See id. at 88-89, 306-07, 464-67. Defendants offered to drive the men to see Christmas lights, but only a few men at a time could fit on the small bus. Id. at 772, 978. Marshall Suares was able to convince defendants to permit plaintiffs to go to church, and to visit with friends or family over the 2001 Christmas holiday after promising to be personally responsible for the men who left and taking personal information from the people whom they 1084 would visit. Id. at 306-07, 465-67. Defendants argue that three of *1084 the nine plaintiffs who testified made arrangements with JPC employees to attend Thanksgiving dinners and bicycle races off the JPC premises.
29. Some of the men were able to attend a nearby Pentecostal church and met Mark Massey, a man who would assist with their final departure from the JPC premises. Ph. II Tr. at 212, 346-47, 598-99, 606, 667-70, 677-79. On February 5, 2002, plaintiff and leadman Marshall Suares testified that he called Massey, who came to the JPC premises with three or four vehicles and a local television station cameraman. Suares testified that, when the Chellen plaintiffs began entering the vehicles, Joe Reeble raised his hands and shouted: "Stop, stop! You are on private property. You are not supposed to take my men. Leave them here." Id. at 485-86, 680. Reeble followed the vehicles to Massey's house and parked his vehicle in front of the house. Id.
30. Finally, defendants restricted the Chellen plaintiffs' access to health care. The Court previously found that defendants were inattentive to the medical needs of the Chellen plaintiffs and carried no workers' compensation or health insurance for them. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF 1130). Testimony in Phase II of the proceedings demonstrated that defendants made arrangements for a few of the Chellen plaintiffs to obtain medical or dental care, but denied the requests of others. Ph. II Tr. at 102-03, 502-04, 634-36, 775-76, 784-86. John Pickle and other JPC officials made comments indicating that they viewed the Chellen plaintiffs' health issues as minor matters or hypochondria. Ph. I Tr. at 353-54, 362-65, 894-95. There was no evidence indicating that defendants limited the access of non-Indian JPC employees to health care. See Ph. II Tr. at 830-34 (discussing health plan and sick leave policy for non-Indian JPC employees).
Living Conditions
31. Many of the facts applicable to the comparison in living conditions are more relevant to the Chellen plaintiffs' tort claims, but consideration of these conditions goes to the amount, if any, of offset for the wages awarded to the Chellen plaintiffs as damages. Defendants did not require the non-Indian JPC employees to live at the JPC facility. Hence, the non-Indian JPC employees were not subjected to the same substandard living conditions as the Chellen plaintiffs. The Court described some of these conditions in its prior findings. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1285-86 (FOF ¶¶ 29-30).
32. Defendants describe the converted warehouse and office space as including a room with living room furniture, a large color television, two computers with Internet access, and places for hanging work uniforms and storing work boots. See generally Def. Exs. 58A-58GG. There was also a second large room, in which some of the plaintiffs slept in bunk beds, which contained tables and equipment to make tea, coffee and other beverages. All of the other rooms in which plaintiffs slept were individual rooms with either doors or partitions. In addition, a modern bathroom facility in the building contained 16 lavatories, 8 showers, and two washers and dryers which were supplied by three 100 gallon sequentially firing hot water heaters. The building also had toilets that had been specifically modified to include a hand-held hose for washing. The dormitory had windows which could be opened, doors which could be opened to provide ingress and egress, and a suitable heating and ventilation system. Id.

1085 33. Contrary to defendants' description, the Chellen plaintiffs described the dormitory *1085 in which they lived as similar to a "refugee camp" or place to house displaced persons after a "disaster." Ph. II Tr. at 283-84; see generally Pl. Ex. 22 (photo of dorm); Pl. Ex. 50 (videotape). Some of the mattresses on which they slept were obtained by JPC from a salvage store and their beds were assigned by number pursuant to a lottery. Id. at 183, 581-82, 660-61, 870, 874; Def. Ex. 62E-13, at 98, 108. The warehouse dormitory, with its concrete floors and partial walls, was noisy and uncomfortable with no place for personal belongings. Id. at 175, 178. Several Chellen plaintiffs described their inability to obtain proper rest because of the openness of the building and the disturbances resulting from the arrival and departure of day and night shift crews. See Ph. II Tr. at 175-76, 331-32, 559, 582-83, 610, 660-61; see generally Def. Exs. 58A-58GG. Two of the Chellen plaintiffs testified that they were exposed to radiation from a machine in the manufacturing building located within inches of the exterior wall of the dormitory. Ph. II Tr. at 174-75, 559. The cooks were required to live in a small room adjacent to the kitchen because of the approximately 18 hours of work they were required to perform each day. Ph. II Tr. at 64, 67-68. The Chellen plaintiffs complained about their assigned quarters and did not choose to live there voluntarily.
34. The Chellen plaintiffs also complained about the nature, quantity, and quality of the food provided to them by defendants. Again, there is no evidence that JPC furnished its non-Indian employees with food, but these facts are relevant to the offsets, if any, for the wages to which the Chellen plaintiffs are entitled, as well as any punitive damages awarded. While the non-Indian JPC workers were compensated at a rate of pay that would allow them to feed themselves, JPC deducted from the Chellen plaintiffs' paychecks fifty dollars per month for food. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 30).
35. John Pickle essentially admitted to rationing food for the Chellen plaintiffs. Ph. I Tr. at 317-19. One plaintiff testified that John Pickle would sometimes sit down next to the Chellen plaintiffs while they were eating and say "Do you eat this much food in India?" Ph. II Tr. at 284, 628. The Chellen plaintiffs rejected a statement by Ray Murzello, who stated that the food at JPC's facility was better than what they had in India, where they were starving, at least according to Murzello. Ph. II Tr. at 60-61. A representative of the company that provided food ordered by JPC for the Chellen plaintiffs testified to the quantity of food ordered by JPC. That quantity was based on a representation by John Pickle that he needed to feed 25-30 men, and that allocation did not change over time. Id. at 718, 720-21.
36. The Chellen plaintiffs complained particularly of the lack of milk, which was a dietary concern for a number of the Hindu workers who were vegetarian. Ph. II Tr. at 115-16, 173-74, 559-61. On one occasion, John Holcomb, JPC's Manufacturing Support Manager, served the milk himself to ensure that each Chellen plaintiff received only one small glass during mealtime. Id. at 55. On another occasion, John Pickle responded to a request for milk by dipping a piece of bread in a cup of water and said, "If I can eat this, you can also eat it." Id. at 560. Despite his knowledge of the dietary concerns of certain Chellen plaintiffs, he continued to restrict the quantity of milk provided. Ph. I. Tr. at 482-83.
37. One of the two cooks among the Chellen plaintiffs testified that he was provided with inadequate cooking 1086 utensils and facilities. Ph. II Tr. at 48, 53, 83. He testified that he was even made to serve rotten *1086 apples,
although a visit by health inspectors subsequently led to a disposal of large quantities of food and utensils. Id. at 57-59. He tried to fashion the American food provided to him into food that would be more palatable to the men who were accustomed to the cultural and religious diets of India, as the Muslim workers could not eat pork, the Hindu workers could not eat beef, and the vegetarians could not eat meat or eggs. Id. at 115-16.
Hostile Work Environment
38. The conduct of JPC employees and John Pickle subjected the Chellen plaintiffs to harassment in the nature of a hostile work environment characterized by abusive language, demeaning job assignments, and threats and intimidation based on their national origin. Chellen plaintiff Jagdish Prajapati testified that he was at the private property of John Pickle when John Pickle's grandson was also present, and John Pickle stated to his grandson, "These are my Indian animals I brought from India to work." Ph. II Tr. at 519. Prajapati also stated that his first supervisor used obscene language in reference to the Indians, and, although Prajapati complained to John

Pickle, nothing was done to stop the conduct. Id. at 520-21. Chellen plaintiff U.C. Patel testified that John Pickle once stated, "bloody Indians work here and live here." Id. at 558.
39. Two of the Chellen plaintiffs testified that John Pickle called them his "Indian dogs." Ph. II Tr. at 601-02,686-87. The cook, Toofan Mondal, told of an occasion when John Pickle came into the kitchen with Ray Murzello's son, who was Indian. John Pickle called the boy over, referring to him as an "Indian dog," and called to the boy like a puppy. Id. at 105. George Panackalpuracal recalled a meeting at which John Pickle called the Chellen plaintiffs "dirty" and accused them of unsanitary practices. Id. at 638-39.
40. Chellen plaintiff Bharathakumaran Nair testified that, when he complained about doing janitorial work, John Holcomb followed him to his room, repeatedly called him "lazy," and threatened to send him back to India. Ph. I Tr. at 705-08. Nair stated that Holcomb specifically said, "[T]his is why Americans say that Indians are lazy people." Id. at 708. According to Nair, Holcomb raised his arm as if to strike Nair. Id. at 708-09. Another Chellen plaintiff testified that he witnessed Holcomb yelling at Nair, suspending him from work for the day, sending him to his room, and calling him a "lazy Indian." Ph. II Tr. at 293. On another occasion, Holcomb raised a chair over his head, threatened to hit one of the Chellen plaintiffs with it, and beat it against the floor as he verbally berated plaintiff Himanshu Patel. Ph. II. Tr. at 500-01,563-64.
41. In one incident, John Holcomb called a few of the Chellen plaintiffs into the office of JPC's vice president and chief operating officer, Joe Reeble, to discuss some of the Chellen plaintiffs' complaints. Ph. II Tr. at 195-97,459-61. In the meeting, Reeble called Gulam Peshimam, the owner of AL Samit.[4] When Reeble described the problems to Peshimam, Peshimam proposed that JPC managers beat the Chellen plaintiffs and 1087 "break their damn legs." Ph. I Tr. at 126. Reeble testified that it was just a joke and he *1087 laughed. Id. Two of the Chellen plaintiffs testified at the second phase of the proceedings that, when Reeble laughed, he also said "not a bad idea." Ph. II Tr. at 197, 461.
42. The threat of deportation was especially significant in defendants' creation of a hostile working environment. The Chellen plaintiffs feared Gulam Peshimam and the harm he could inflict on themselves or their families if they were made to return to India. E.g., Ph. II Tr. at 138, 190-97, 462, 816. As set forth in the Court's prior findings, many of these plaintiffs left good jobs or their own successful businesses, and some obtained loans from family and friends to pay large "fees" required by AL Samit. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1281 (FOF 114.) They had debts to repay, and they believed that a vindictive Gulam Peshimam would seek retribution and make it impossible for them to return to their former jobs and businesses or obtain other work to repay their debts.
43. Chellen plaintiff Jeron Peter testified that he was called to the office of John Holcomb, and Ray Murzello was also present. After Holcomb reviewed a list of Peter's faults, Peter asked Murzello why he was being treated in that manner. Murzello responded: "You are an Indian. That is why they treat you this way, and that is all you expect here because they don't like Indians." Ph. II Tr. at 333. Peter testified that Holcomb often called him into the office and stated: "I don't like Indian guys. I'm going to send you back to India." Id. at 334. On one occasion, Peter and an American fitter were in Holcomb's office with Chellen plaintiff Baburajan Pillai. Holcomb shouted at Peter and called him lazy. Id. at 338. The American fitter said to Holcomb, "[H]e's an Indian. He's no good. And, you know, we'll send him back." Id. at 339. Peter also testified that Holcomb and Dale Chasteen, JPC's Director of Manufacturing, called him a "fucking Indian." Id.
44. At a meeting called after one of the Chellen plaintiffs had damaged a company truck, JPC managers and John Pickle verbally abused the Chellen plaintiffs by calling them "Indian bastards," "fucking bastards," "fucking Indians," and "sons of bitches." Ph. II Tr. at 106-09, 198-200, 455-57, 497-98. Dale Chasteen, JPC's Director of Manufacturing, went into a tirade, cursing at the Chellen plaintiffs, implying that they had no jobs in India and were starving there when John Pickle hired them, and stating that "Americans, we know what to do, how to deal with guys like you." Ray Murzello's wife, who was interpreting for the Indians at the meeting, began to cry. Id. at 456-57. Expert witness Florence Burke confirmed that, in private interviews, many of the Chellen plaintiffs told her of the names they were called at the JPC facility, such as "52 Indian donkeys," "dirty Indian," "Indian bastard." Id. at 406-07.
45. At a meeting in January 2002, JPC managers told the Chellen plaintiffs that, by American laws or rules, they were required to perform any tasks they were asked to do, including any and all cleaning or undesirable tasks.

Ph. II Tr. at 110, 184-86, 291-93, 588-90, 670-71. JPC managers then asked the Chellen plaintiffs who refused to agree to this demand to move to another side of the room, and all but three or four moved. Id. John Holcomb reacted later by spitting on the floor when the Chellen plaintiffs attempted to greet him. Id. at 294, 591. Holcomb also threatened one of the leadmen with demotion as a result of the leadman's failure to agree to the tasks. Id. at 186.
Damages
Compensatory
1088 46. The parties have stipulated to various elements relevant to an award of *1088 compensatory damages under Title VII and § 1981. See Ph. II Pre0907Trial Order, Dkt. # 178. These include: the number of days worked by each Chellen plaintiff for JPC per month, as reflected in Def. Ex. 62C; the number of regular and overtime hours worked for JPC by each Chellen plaintiff (with the exception of the cooks), Def. Ex. 76; the amount of money paid by the Chellen plaintiffs to AL Samit during the recruitment process, Def. Ex. 77; and the average hourly rate of pay for the non-Indian JPC employees in 2001 and 2002, as calculated by job position and classification within each position, Pl. Ex. 62B. The parties disagree, however, on the classifications and, thus, the pay rate, merited by each of the Chellen plaintiffs.
47. Defendants have submitted wage classifications and calculations based upon evaluations by JPC managers of the Chellen plaintiffs near the end of the Chellen plaintiffs' time at JPC. The evaluations resulted in a scores from 1-5. For purposes of trial, JPC's counsel arbitrarily assigned each evaluated plaintiff a classification based upon his score. Those employees scoring 3.5 or below were assigned a "C" classification; those scoring 3.5 to 4.5 were assigned a "B" classification; and those scoring 4.5 or higher were assigned an "A" classification. Id. at C-2. Defendants assert that the cooks and six other plaintiffs were not evaluated, and one additional plaintiff was not given a classification. See Def. Prop. Findings and Conclusions, Dkt. # 199, Ex. C-2. JPC arbitrarily assigned one plaintiff a "C" classification, one an "A" classification, and five were assigned a "B" classification. JPC assigned no classification for the two cooks (JPC ## 129, 130), and did not include them on the accompanying wage classification calculations. Id., Ex. C-3.
48. The Court finds the basis for defendants' classifications unsound. As set forth in the Court's prior findings, the evaluation forms were created in a belated effort to give the appearance of a legitimate training program, although they did confirm that the Chellen plaintiffs performed at a level required of JPC's regular employees. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1284-85 (FOF ¶¶ 23-24), 1288 (FOF ¶ 40). Further examination of the evaluation forms indicates that the plaintiffs were evaluated by six or seven JPC managers or supervisors. Pl. Ex. 66; Def. Exs. 1G-48G. Some evaluators consistently gave high scores while others consistently gave low scores. Classifications are actually indicated on many of the evaluation forms, and the classifications generally do not correspond to the scores. For example, welder Poulose Maleril Varkey (JPC # 116) was designated "B Class" although his score was only 1.8. Def. Ex. 16G.U.C. Patel (JPC # 119) earned a 3.4 score but received a "C" classification. Def. Ex. 19G. Bala Raju Salupa (JPC # 122) received an "A" classification even though he had a 2.8 score. Def. Ex. 22G.
49. The EEOC urges the Court to assign each of the Chellen plaintiffs a classification of "A" given the Court's prior findings as to the qualifications, skills, and experience of the group as a whole, Chellen 344 F.Supp.2d at 1281 (FOF ¶ 5), 1288 (FOF ¶¶ 43, 44), as well as the quality of their work while they were at JPC, id. at 1284 (FOF ¶ 20), 1285 (FOF ¶¶ 24, 28), 1288-89 (FOF ¶¶ 45, 47), and the pay earned by many of the representative witnesses in similar employment after they left JPC, id. at 1287 (FOF ¶¶ 36, 37), 1289 (FOF 1146); Ph. II Tr. at 30-31, 156-57, 274-75, 329-30, 432-33, 495, 512-13, 557-58, 579-80, 610, 627, 654; Ph. I. Tr. at 710-14. The Court previously acknowledged the inconsistency between JPC's classification of the Chellen plaintiffs and JPC's 1089 classification of non-Indian JPC employees. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at *1089 1283-84 (FOF ¶¶ 15, 18-19). Given the lack of reliable evidence as to each individual plaintiff, and the overwhelming evidence regarding the group as a whole, the Court finds that a classification of "A" is appropriate.
50. The EEOC also urges the Court to find that four of the five men who were designated as "leadmen" by JPC managers deserve to be paid the same as the non-Indian JPC leadmen. Four of the five plaintiff leadmen signed a "Personal Agreement" on December 19, 2001 which references the same job descriptions as agreements with

JPC leadmen who were not from India. E.g., Ex. 19H; 22H; 31N; 45Q; Ph. I Tr. at 105-10. These agreements show that the plaintiff leadmen were to receive additional $100 per month, separate quarters, different uniforms, and free food in the JPC cafeteria. Holcomb referred to the leadman who did not sign a personal agreement as a "dormitory leadman." Ph. I Tr. at 1128-29.
51. The evidence is not persuasive that any of these leadmen actually performed the same duties as the nonIndian JPC leadmen. Instead, it indicates that the defendants recruited these five Chellen plaintiffs to assist JPC managers in controlling and containing the other Chellen plaintiffs and reporting their activities. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 31); Ph. I Tr. at 105-10. One leadman specifically testified that he knew the duties of a lead man, but he did not do that work. Ph. II Tr. at 149-50. Instead, he was responsible for organizing the dormitory, taking complaints, explaining the work, and reporting any plans by other Chellen plaintiffs to leave JPC. Id. at 150. Accordingly, the Court finds that the five Chellen plaintiff "leadmen" were not entitled to "leadman" pay commensurate with that received by non-Indian JPC leadmen.
52. The plaintiffs hired by JPC to cook for the other Chellen plaintiffs were not "classified" in the same manner as the other JPC employees and there were no cooks at JPC with whom they could be compared for purposes of determining an appropriate hourly wage. As set forth above, one of these two cooks settled a wage claim with the DOL. The EEOC proposes for the other cook, Toofan Mondal, that he be paid at the rate of pay that approximates (1) what he earned at his first job after JPC ($2,200 per month) in salary exclusive of room and board, and (2) at a rate that is reasonably situated among JPC pay levels, see Pl. Ex. 62B. Assuming forty hours worked per week at his post-JPC job, Mondal's wage would be approximately $12.79 per hour. The EEOC submits, for ease of calculation, that Mondal's pay rate at JPC should have been $12 per regular hour and $18 per overtime hour. The Court finds this proposal helpful and fair.
53. Finally, defendants assert that all non-FLSA claims of three Chellen plaintiffs, Joshy Mathappan Aleparambu (JPC # 138), Poulouse Maleril-Varkey (JPC # 116), and Jose Varghese Mannalil (JPC # 113) should be dismissed because these plaintiffs did not submit affidavits or otherwise appear at trial. Pursuant to the parties' Joint Case Management Plan, the Court ordered plaintiffs to submit, by December 17, 2004, affidavits on the part of all plaintiffs who wished to remain in the case. Defendants requested the affidavits in exchange for their agreement to allow plaintiffs to proceed by representative testimony.
54. The affidavits were not filed with the Court, and the Court has no evidence that they were otherwise produced or submitted to defendants. However, no mention was made of dismissal as a sanction for failure to file, produce, 1090 or submit the affidavits, *1090 either in that order, in subsequent orders, or in the Phase II proceedings. The Court finds that these three individuals should not be dismissed merely because their counsel may have failed to obtain their affidavits, as defendants did not draw this fact to the Court's attention before or during the Phase II proceedings and have not shown any prejudice from the lack of those three affidavits.
55. As discussed below, compensatory damages for discrimination may include damages for mental anguish or emotional distress. While many of the Chellen plaintiffs testified as to their psychological and emotional state during their time at the JPC facility, the EEOC also presented compelling testimony through its expert witness Florence Burke. Burke opined that the Chellen plaintiffs were essentially "trauma" victims, much like those in worker exploitation cases with which she is familiar. She testified specifically regarding depression, extreme anxiety, and fear experienced by the Chellen plaintiffs. Ph. II Tr. at 382-84. She maintained that language limitations and unfamiliarity with the civil law and individual rights had the effect of increasing their confusion, hampering understanding of their expectations, and creating stress because of their uncertainty about criminal law and immigration issues. Id. at 384, 394. She also discussed the erosion or undermining of the Chellen plaintiffs' support system of family, culture, and religious faith, especially since they felt they could not communicate freely about their experience with their families in India. Id. at 389-93.
56. Burke acknowledged that defendants treated the Chellen plaintiffs in a positive manner on occasions, but she explained that defendants' practice of coupling this positive treatment with negative treatment kept the Chellen plaintiffs "off-balance" with regard to their expectations and hope, thus increasing their stress. Id. at 397-98. Burke testified as to the Chellen plaintiffs' lack of privacy and ability to communicate as well as their personal discomfort, humiliation, increased isolation, and an atmosphere of distrust caused by their constant awareness of surveillance by JPC and the leadmen recruited from their own group. Id. at 398-400. The leadmen, in particular,

experienced additional feelings of isolation and guilt due to their role. Id. at 401-02; see id. at 204-08, 473-76, 485.
57. The EEOC urges the Court to consider the emotional harm caused by the Chellen plaintiffs' health concerns as a result of JPC's alleged food rationing and denial of access to medical attention. The EEOC also urges the Court to consider the emotional harm experienced by the Chellen plaintiffs who were made to perform the dirtiest and lowest-level jobs not being performed by the comparably qualified non-Indian co-workers at JPC. The Court finds that the "A" classification adequately compensates the Chellen plaintiffs for the emotional distress they experienced as a result of defendants' disparate treatment and hostile work environment.[5]
58. Given the Court's findings of fact as to the parties' wage stipulations, the Court concludes that all of the Chellen plaintiffs other than Mohammed "Hassan" Usman, who settled his wage claim through the DOL, are entitled to compensatory damages in an amount equal to the difference between the actual wages paid to the Indian employees, as set forth in Def. Ex. 101, and the average hourly wage earned by similarly-situated nonIndian JPC employees according to the job positions and "A" classifications as set forth in Pl. Ex. 62B, less 1091 offsets itemized in Jt. Ex. 2 for expenses related to food, medical needs, and *1091 telephone services. The Court concludes that the defendants are not entitled to offsets for expenses related to housing, uniforms, tools, and travel. While the amounts for each individual will vary, the total amount awarded for compensatory damages on the EEOC's claims for violations of Title VII and § 1981 is $607,006.85. The amount is the difference between $633,258.52, the amount shown in the "Total Pay Earned" column of the "Class A" calculations set forth in Attachment A of the EEOC's Proposed Findings and Conclusions (Dkt.# 201), less $26,251.67, the amount shown in the "Total Offsets" column of the calculations set forth in Attachment B of the EEOC's Proposed Findings and Conclusions (id.).
Punitive
59. Defendants' actions in obtaining inappropriate visas and setting up a scheme to pay the Chellen plaintiffs through AL Samit demonstrates that they knew that they were acting in violation of federal law. The hostile work environment they created for the Chellen plaintiffs, and the disparate treatment afforded them, was intentional and discriminatory. Punitive damages may not deter these defendants from malicious and willful conduct based on the race or national origin of future employees, but it may serve to deter other employers from attempting the same. The Court finds that an award of punitive damages against both JPC and John Pickle for their violations of the Chellen plaintiffs' civil rights is appropriate.[6] Accordingly, the Court awards punitive damages in the amount of $1,000 per Chellen plaintiff, against both defendants, jointly and severally, for a total amount of $52,000 on this claim.
State Law Tort Claims
Deceit
Liability
60. As set forth in the Court's prior findings, defendants hired the Chellen plaintiffs after a prior experience of bringing a group of 20 Indian men[7] to Tulsa in preparation for work in Kuwait for joint venture between JPC and a Kuwaiti company. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1280 (FOF ¶¶ 1-2). Defendants contend that they recruited the Chellen plaintiffs for the same purpose, but that purpose was not communicated to the Chellen plaintiffs when they were hired. Id. at 1280 (FOF ¶ 3). The original group of 20 workers stayed at JPC four months, and were sent to work in Kuwait at the end of that period. Ph. I Tr. at 66-67, 73-79, 81-86; see Pl. Exs. 9-12; Def. Exs. 69-75, 77, 78. Joe Reeble testified that he, Ray Murzello, and John Pickle put together the plan to bring the Chellen plaintiffs to work at JPC in Tulsa as part of the same alleged training program. Ph. I Tr. at 63.
61. Also as set forth in the Court's prior findings, John Pickle personally met with the Chellen plaintiffs, individually, in India. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1281 (FOF ¶7); Ph. I Tr. at 406. He knew that they looked to him 1092 as a father figure and believed that they would be working for *1092 him and not AL Samit. Id. at 414. While translators were present at both the individual and group meetings in India, many, if not all, of the plaintiffs could understand English and understood the promises being made by John Pickle individually. Ph. I Tr. at 691-92; Ph.

II Tr. at 434-35; 516. Similar representations were made by AL Samit representatives, as agents of John Pickle and JPC. E.g., Ph. I Tr. at 442-43; Ph. II Tr. at 34-37.
62. The Court's prior findings summarize the sacrifices the Chellen plaintiffs made in reliance on defendants' misrepresentations. They traveled long distances and paid substantial service charges to agents of AL Samit to obtain JPC employment, and they left their jobs, their businesses, and their families to come to the United States. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1281 (FOF ¶ 4.) Testimony at Phase II of the trial provided further detail for these findings. See Ph. II Tr. at 38, 270, 329, 437-38, 494-95, 510, 577-78, 609.
63. The Court has previously described the circumstances of the Chellen plaintiffs' departure from India, and the representations that were made to them by defendants and defendants' agents with regard to the Undertakings and Offer Letters the Chellen plaintiffs were required to sign at that time. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1281-82 (FOF ¶¶ 8-10). When the Chellen plaintiffs inquired as to inconsistencies between what they were promised and certain terms in those documents, defendants told them that the differences were a result of the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and defendants assured them that signing of the documents was a mere formality. Id.; see Ph. I Tr. at 698. The Undertaking, in particular, required the Chellen plaintiffs to "confirm" that they had "neither paid any service charges nor ticket money to M/s. Al Samit International for going to John Pickle Co., INC USA. . . ." Def. Exs. 153F. Defendants claim that they told AL Samit not to collect any fees and that they never knew about the Chellen plaintiffs' payments to AL Samit.
64. At the Phase II trial, a Chellen plaintiff testified that John Pickle personally deflected their concerns by telling them that "everything would be taken care of" and "fixed" upon their arrival in America. Ph. II Tr. at 44-45. One of the things that should have been "fixed" were the visas obtained by defendants for the Chellen plaintiffs. As previously described, defendants obtained B1/B2 "business visitor" visas instead of H3 "trainee" visas or H2B "temporary non-immigrant worker" visas. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1282 (FOF ¶ 10), 1290 (FOF ¶¶ 51, 52, 57).
65. During the individual and group meetings in India, defendants and/or their agents represented to the Chellen plaintiffs that they would receive good wages and overtime pay, free food, free living accommodations, free insurance, free medical services, an American driver's license for those plaintiffs who had Indian licenses, a cell phone, and a job for at least two years. Ph. I. Tr. at 454, 689; Ph. II Tr. at 160-61, 435-36; see Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1280-81 (FOF ¶¶ 4, 7). In Phase I of the trial, one Chellen plaintiff testified he was told he would be paid from $650 per month plus overtime, with pay increases after six months, to $1,200 per month after 18 months. Ph. I. Tr. at 442-43. Other testimony indicated that they were promised $800 per month. Id. at 689. The Court finds that defendants made the misrepresentations as to pay, food, insurance, and duration of the job as positive assertions that they knew were false, or that they made recklessly without knowledge of the truth. 1093 Defendants had prior experience with recruiting workers from India, and they used that experience *1093 to attempt to expand their labor force in a manner that violated U.S. law and took unfair advantage of the workers they recruited.
66. In Phase II of the trial, several plaintiffs testified that they relied on representations made by AL Samit and/or John Pickle on behalf of JPC, and such reliance caused them to pay monies to AL Samit or its subagents before the Chellen plaintiffs executed the written "Undertakings" and "Offer Letters." Ph. II Tr. at 38-40, 167-68, 251-52, 281, 437, 516-17, 558, 605, 620-21, 691, 767-68, 821-22. Some testified that they were offered the same amount of money, or less, as they agreed to accept in the Undertakings and Offer Letters, or what they were actually paid by JPC. Id. at 545, 603-05, 620-22, 640-41. Others testified that they were to receive more in wages than set forth in the Undertakings and Offer Letters. Id. at 41, 133-34, 168-69, 691, 766. The Court finds that defendants acted with the intention that their false material misrepresentations be acted upon. They intended that the Chellen plaintiffs would act upon their misrepresentations by agreeing to work for defendants in Tulsa, and by traveling to Tulsa to perform that work. The Chellen plaintiffs relied on the misrepresentation to their own detriment. As set forth above, they traveled long distances and paid substantial service charges to agents of AL Samit to obtain JPC employment, and they left their jobs, their businesses, and their families to come to the United States. They suffered detriment in the form of wages lower than expected, poor living conditions and food, and unwarranted restrictions on their movement, communications, worship opportunities, privacy, and access to health care. They also endured a discrimination due to their national origin through disparate treatment and a hostile work environment. Plaintiffs have established fraud by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.

67. The Proposal on Manpower Training Between AL Samit International and John Pickle Company Inc., dated September 30, 2001 (Pl. Ex. 25), indicates that JPC would pay the Chellen plaintiffs as follows:
0905 Welders0907USD 550 per month (based on 40 hours per week + 1.5 times overtime)
0905 Fitters0907USD 500 per month (based on 40 hours per week + 1.5 times overtime)
0905 Electrical Maintenance Technician-USD 500 per month (based on 40 hours per week + 1.5 times overtime)
0905 Roll Operators0907USD 500 per month (based on 40 hours per week + 1.5 times overtime)
0905 Cooks0907USD 400 per month (based on 40 hours per week + 1.5 times overtime)
Pl. Ex. 25, at 3 ¶ 22. JPC also agreed that the work hours for the Chellen plaintiffs would be an average of 53 hours per week, which included 13 hours overtime. Id. at 2 ¶ 6. The Proposal also indicates that JPC would provide to the Chellen plaintiffs health insurance, accommodations, three meals a day, transportation from "residence to the works" and for shopping once a week, and leave to include eight public holidays plus annual leave after a year, among other things. Id. at 1, 2, ¶¶ 2, 3, 4, 5, 7.
68. The Offer Letters to each Chellen Plaintiff reflect the hours set forth in the Proposal. See Def. Exs. 1E-51E. The Offer Letters represent that the welders were to be paid for a minimum of 13 hours overtime, and a total minimum wage per month of $794. All of the other Chellen plaintiffs except the cook were to be paid a minimum 1094 of 13 hours overtime, and a total *1094 minimum wage per month of $722. The cook was promised $100 of fixed overtime per month and $500 in regular wages per month. Def. Ex. 30E.
69. Contrary to the representations made to the Chellen plaintiffs in the Offer Letters, defendants paid them between $2.89 and $3.17 per hour, Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1282 (FOF ¶ 11), which would have meant a monthly paycheck for regular hours in an amount between $462.40 and $507.20. The Chellen plaintiffs were also charged a monthly fee of $50, which was deducted directly from their paychecks. As discussed above, the living conditions were far from what the Chellen plaintiffs were promised. The cooks, in particular, were not provided adequate facilities, cookware, and utensils necessary to cook for 30 men, much less 52. See Ph. II Tr. at 47-48, 53. The Chellen plaintiffs' access to medical care was sometimes restricted, and defendants never provided them with insurance, a driver's license, a cell phone, or a job beyond the few months they were employed at JPC.
Damages
70. After the Chellen plaintiffs left JPC on February 5, 2002, the Chellen plaintiffs were prohibited from gainful employment by immigration laws and the terms of the visas procured for them by the defendants. Until they began receiving authorization to work in November 2002, most of them relied on charitable organizations and American citizens for their survival. See Ph. II Tr. at 112, 340-41, 499-500. As stipulated by the parties, the Chellen plaintiffs were authorized to work after their departure from JPC on the dates indicated by Certification Letters issued by the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement. Pl. Ex. 81. Although the plaintiffs were promised wages for two years after their arrival at the JPC facility in Tulsa, the Chellen plaintiffs have stipulated that they do not seek pay for wages lost as a result of the deceit beyond the certification dates cited in the Certification Letters. Ph. II Pretrial Order, Dkt. # 178, at III(F). For some of those plaintiffs, the date is November 18, 2002; for others, it is November 26, 2002. Pl. Ex. 81.
71. The Chellen plaintiffs assert that, by November 30, 2002,[8] most of them would have been authorized to work and would have had the opportunity to obtain work in the United States. Pl. Ph. II Proposed Findings and Conclusions, Dkt. # 200, at 38. This date is almost ten months after the February 5, 2002 departure date from JPC for the Chellen plaintiffs remaining after the attempted deportation of seven Chellen plaintiffs. Since the pay promised to defendants was per month, the Court finds this ten-month period appropriate for calculating deceit damages. Deceit damages for the period of time the Chellen plaintiffs worked at JPC prior to their departure on February 5, 2002 are subsumed in and would be duplicative of any damages awarded for violations of the FLSA, Title VII, and § 1981 as those damages are more, per month, than what plaintiffs were offered. While some of the

plaintiffs left earlier than February 5, 2002, the record is not clear as to the dates those plaintiffs left. 1095 Consequently, the Court will consider only this ten-month period an appropriate measure for such damages:
*1095 72. As the factual basis for deceit damages during this ten-month period, since the testimony at trial was not clear as to exactly what each Chellen plaintiff was promised, the Court accepts the amount set forth in the Offer Letter for each Chellen plaintiff. Although that amount varies by job duty, at approximately $750 per month, the total amount of deceit damages is $7,500 per Chellen plaintiff. Since there are 52 plaintiffs, the total amount is $390,000. This amount does not include the overtime the plaintiffs were promised, as it is not possible to calculate how much overtime, or at what rate, each plaintiff would have expected when defendants, through their agent, AL Samit, deceived or defrauded the Chellen plaintiffs. In addition, defendants are entitled to the amounts each paid to AL Samit to obtain their employment with JPC. This amount is set forth in Def. Ex. 102 and, although the amount varies by individual, the total is $82,056. Although the Chellen plaintiffs sought punitive damages in their Fifth Amended Complaint on this count, they did not request punitive damages in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on this claim. In any event, the Court has awarded punitive damages, based on the same or similar facts, for defendants' violations of the Chellen plaintiffs' civil rights. Hence, any additional punitive damages would be duplicative and constitute a double recovery.
False Imprisonment
73. As set forth above, defendants restricted the Chellen plaintiffs' movement, communications, privacy, worship, and access to health care. The evidence demonstrates that defendants kept the Chellen plaintiffs' travel documents. At the Phase II trial, expert witness Kevin Bales testified that confiscation of travel documents is a common non-physical method of restraint. Ph. I Tr. at 782-83. He opined that this and other methods of restraint utilized by defendants were "more efficient" than physical or violent control because "a worker who can retain some hope . . . will simply work much harder and . . . in a more cooperative way." Id. at 784-85.
74. The Court finds that defendants unlawfully restrained the Chellen plaintiff's ability to move about as they wished. Although initially defendants permitted the Chellen plaintiffs some ability to leave the JPC plant for shopping, worship, visiting friends and relatives on their own, or other activities, defendants discouraged the plaintiffs from leaving by telling them of unfounded dangers outside the gates. Later, defendants required the Chellen plaintiffs to obtain permission before leaving the premises, locked the main gates, employed an armed security guard to watch them, hired four "leadmen" from among the Chellen plaintiffs to report on the activities of the others, threatened the Chellen plaintiffs with arrest and deportation, and attempted to deport several of them back to India. Defendants assert no valid justification for these actions.
75. Defendants assert that plaintiffs could, and did, leave the JPC premises by the pedestrian gate, but there is undisputed evidence that the pedestrian gate led into the private yard of JPC employee Sharon Sartin. Given defendants' threats and the presence of the armed security guard, the Chellen plaintiffs would not have felt free to leave through that gate. The evidence indicates that some plaintiffs crawled under a fence at another, less visible place on the property to leave the premises. Defendants' actions constitute unlawful restraint, detention, or confinement.
76. John Pickle personally participated in, or proximately caused, the false imprisonment of the Chellen plaintiffs. 1096 While *1096 there is no direct evidence that he personally committed, ordered, or directed most of the acts that
constitute the false imprisonment in this case, he did discourage the Chellen plaintiffs from leaving to attend worship services and he threatened, with respect to one of the plaintiffs who left, that he would "pull him up by his hair and bring him to justice." Ph. II Tr. at 109. He also indirectly participated in the actions of JPC managers that constitute false imprisonment by allowing such actions to occur or otherwise indicating his approval by failing to end the unlawful practices.
77. Although the restrictions on movement of the Chellen plaintiffs is part of the disparate treatment claim under Title VII and § 1981, and thus subsumed in damages under those statutes for their working hours, the restrictions were endured during non-working hours and weekends. Accordingly, the Court awards damages for false imprisonment for these periods in the amount of $1,000 per Chellen plaintiff, for a total amount of $52,000 on this claim. As with their claim for deceit or fraud, the Chellen plaintiffs sought punitive damages in their Fifth Amended Complaint on their claim for false imprisonment, but they did not request punitive damages in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on this claim. In any event, the Court has awarded punitive damages,

based on the same or similar facts, for defendants' violations of the Chellen plaintiffs' civil rights. Hence, any additional punitive damages would be duplicative and constitute a double recovery.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
78. Many of the facts relevant to the Chellen plaintiffs' claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress are also set forth above in relation to their civil rights claims. In particular, the job assignments, restrictions, and living conditions to which they were subjected, as well as the hostile work environment, all contributed to the emotional distress they experienced. In particular, the seven individuals whom defendants attempted to deport suffered significant personal embarrassment, humiliation, and fear. See Ph. II. Tr. at 215, 308-09, 798-814, 817.
79. Defendants cursed at, embarrassed, and harassed all of the plaintiffs to maintain physical and psychological control over them. The cultural significance of profanities implying that the Chellen plaintiffs were illegitimate children made such language particularly offensive to them. Id. at 200-01, 664-65. John Pickle admitted using abusive and profane language in reference to the Chellen plaintiffs. Ph. I. Tr. at 393.
80. Defendants admit that JPC managers John Holcomb and Dale Chastain used profanity, but they argue that such use was appropriate in the context it was used. That context involved a meeting to find out who among the plaintiffs had taken a JPC vehicle without permission, drove it without having a driver's license and after having consumed alcohol, and damaged the JPC vehicle before returning it. See Ph. II Tr. at 198-201, 611-13. Defendants also point out that John Pickle arranged a roller-skating party for the first group of Chellen plaintiffs to arrive, took them to see Christmas lights, and was otherwise friendly to them. Id. at 298, 323, 342-43, 488, 584, 631, 644, 953-54, 958-59; e.g., Def. Exs. 8M, 15N, 28H, 31R, 33P, 41Q.
81. The Chellen plaintiffs tell a different story, and many plaintiffs suffered physical problems as a consequence of defendants' conduct. At least two explained that the rationing of food caused them physical problems which 1097 interfered with their ability to work. Ph. II Tr. at 285, *1097 561. The food rationing also caused some of the plaintiffs to violate the dietary tenets of their religion and eat foods that they would never have considered eating but for the circumstances. Id. at 561.
82. Several plaintiffs testified to other effects of the emotional distress they felt. Chellen plaintiff Bharathakumaran Nair testified that, as a result of John Holcomb's actions toward him, he contemplated suicide. Ph. I. Tr. at 708-09. Jeron Peters similarly recalled that, as a result of Holcomb's treatment of him, "I was upset. . . . I just prayed to God that something would change." Id. at 334. The cook, Toofan Mondal, testified to the indignation he suffered when he felt compelled to fall at John Pickle's feet to beg for relief. Ph. II Tr. at 81. He felt that working conditions at JPC were causing him to temporarily lose his sense and his mind. Id. He stated:
I felt that if I went back to India and I had died in the midst of my family, my children, and mother around me . that would be a better outcome than living like a dead man here with all the pressure and not be able to sleep at night, not be able to rest. I didn't know what I was doing.
Id. at 82. Similarly, Roy Panackalpurackal testified that he felt "totally destroyed and . . . mentally and in every way after coming here and experiencing this torture." Id. at 603. He stated "I was emotionally and in every way so drained I couldn't even tell my wife about the situation," and that he felt he had "pretty much . . . destroyed all my life." Id. Defendants' actions towards the Chellen plaintiffs progressively worsened over the period they worked at JPC. As set forth supra, several JPC managers and John Pickle created a living and working environment for the Chellen plaintiffs that was highly stressful and oppressive. Complaints by the Chellen plaintiffs were met with hostility and greater restrictions. If the defendants did not know that their actions would cause emotional distress, they acted recklessly in inflicting emotional distress upon the Chellen plaintiffs. The job assignments, restrictions, living conditions, name-calling, profanity, and threats to which the Chellen plaintiffs were subjected might not be considered outrageous alone, but in combination and considering the totality of the circumstances, they constituted extreme and outrageous conduct. John Pickle contributed personally to the emotional distress the Chellen plaintiffs experienced by his management style, his derogatory and insulting words, and his persistent threats. Defendants' conduct went far beyond "inconsiderate and unkind" acts, "abusive outburst[s], or offensive verbal encounter[s]," id., given the manner in which they employed, housed, paid, fed, and guarded the Chellen plaintiffs. The Chellen plaintiffs are entitled to recover on their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

83. However, the Chellen plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based on much of the same evidence supporting their civil rights claims. Accordingly, any damages awarded for intentional infliction of emotional distress experienced during working hours are subsumed in and would be duplicative of any compensatory or punitive damages awarded for defendants' disparate treatment of the Chellen plaintiffs and creation of a hostile work environment. Any damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress during nonworking hours are subsumed in and would be duplicative of any awarded for defendants' false imprisonment of the Chellen plaintiffs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Any finding of fact which is more appropriately characterized as a conclusion of law is incorporated herein.
1098 *1098 FLSA
Liability
1. In its prior findings and conclusions, the Court found that the Chellen plaintiffs were employees, and not trainees, under the FLSA. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1294. Persons determined to be "employees" under the FLSA were entitled to minimum wage of $5.15 per hour during the time period that the Chellen plaintiffs worked for JPC. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). For overtime hours, they were entitled to one and one-half times the rate for regular hours. Id. § 207(a). It is undisputed that JPC did not pay the Chellen plaintiffs at the statutory rates.
2. The Court previously concluded that the definition of "employee" under the FLSA imposes no limitation based on nationality or immigration status. See Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 706 (11th Cir.1988) (undocumented East Indian workers considered employees for purposes of coverage under the FLSA); cf. Donovan v. Burgett Greenhouses, Inc., 759 F.2d 1483, 1486 (10th Cir.1985) (employer required to pay wages, including overtime for work performed by illegal aliens);[9]see also In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir.1987). The Court also recognized that other federal labor laws, the National Labor Relations Act in particular, have been held applicable to unfair labor practices committed against undocumented aliens. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1294 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892, 104 S.Ct. 2803, 81 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984)).
3. Defendants argued that the Chellen plaintiffs, as holders of B1 or B2 visas, were not authorized or eligible to be employed for wages in the United States, and they cited Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140, 122 S.Ct. 1275, 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002), in support. The Court essentially determined that, given the holding of Hoffman, the argument was not relevant to its determination for Phase I purposes, but could be relevant to the issue of damages. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1293-94 (COL ¶ 11). The Court left that determination for a later stage of the proceedings, and it permitted the parties to brief the issue prior to the Phase II trial proceedings. Id.
Damages
4. After reviewing the parties' briefs on the issue, the Court concludes that Hoffman does not preclude an award for work actually performed by the Chellen plaintiffs. It may preclude an award of back pay, but plaintiffs do not seek back pay. Thus, the award for work performed should equal the difference between what JPC actually paid them and what they would have earned if they had been paid minimum wage for the hours they worked, including overtime, less any offsets (for compensation other than salaries paid) to which JPC may be entitled.
5. In Hoffman, the United States Supreme Court held that federal immigration policy foreclosed the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") from making a back pay award to an undocumented alien[10] who had never 1099 been legally authorized to work in the United States. 535 U.S. at 140, 122 S.Ct. 1275. Backpay was an issue *1099 because the worker had been fired for union-related activities. The Hoffman court emphasized that the employee was guilty of serious illegal conduct in connection with his employment as he had provided fraudulent work documentation to the employer when he applied for the job. Id. at 141, 122 S.Ct. 1275. Significant for purposes of this decision, the Hoffman court noted that the NLRB sought "to award backpay to an illegal alien for

years of work not performed, for wages that could not lawfully have been earned, and for a job obtained in the first instance by a criminal fraud." Id. at 148-49, 122 S.Ct. 1275.
6. The Chellen plaintiffs did not seek to enter the United States illegally or to work illegally here. Instead, they were misled by their employer to believe that their employment was legal. Defendants hired them knowing that they could not be legally employed in the United States, given the types of visa obtained for the Chellen plaintiffs by the defendants. At least one case decided since Hoffman has explicitly determined that Hoffman does not preclude FLSA protection for undocumented workers, as an award against a "knowing employer" would be consistent with immigration policies referenced by Hoffman. Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R.'s Oil, Inc., 214 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1061 (N.D.Cal.2002).
7. Further, Hoffman does not purport to preclude a backpay award for work that was actually performed by undocumented workers. The backpay at issue in Hoffman involved an amount calculated for a period of time after the date of the undocumented worker's termination of employment. 535 U.S. at 141-42, 122 S.Ct. 1275. It did not involve wages for work already performed. The EEOC is not seeking backpay for the time subsequent to the Chellen plaintiffs' work at JPC.
8. Courts in several jurisdictions have found that Hoffman does not limit backpay for work already performed. Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499, 501-02 (W.D.Mich.2005) (Hoffman did not compel discovery regarding immigration status of workers in FLSA case to recover backpay for work already performed); Martinez v. Mecca Farms, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 601, 604-05 (S.D.Fla.2002) (Hoffman limitation inapplicable where plaintiffs did not seek post-termination backpay under Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act); Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F.Supp.2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (Hoffman did not justify discovery related to plaintiffs immigration status in an FLSA claim involving work actually performed); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F.Supp.2d 462, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (protective order was appropriate regarding immigration status, despite Hoffman, where plaintiff sought unpaid overtime for work performed rather than backpay for future unperformed work); Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., 2002 WL 1163623 at *5 (C.D.Cal. Apr.9, 2002) ("Hoffman does not establish that an award of unpaid wages to undocumented workers for work actually performed runs counter to IRCA.").
9. Significantly, a case decided since the parties submitted their briefs on this issue addresses the issue in depth and holds that workers are not precluded by virtue of their undocumented status from seeking relief under the FLSA for unpaid minimum wage and overtime claims. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 295 (D.N.J.2005). The Zavala court discusses Hoffman extensively and supports the plaintiffs' arguments that: (1) unlike the plaintiffs in Hoffman, the Zavala plaintiffs were seeking unpaid wages for work already performed; (2) 1100 the statutory text of the FLSA does not limit relief to citizens; (3) the DOL interprets the FLSA *1100 to cover undocumented workers even after Hoffman; and (4) post-Hoffman decisions have construed the FLSA to cover undocumented workers. Id. at 321-25. The Court is persuaded by the thorough analysis set forth in Zavala.
Offsets
10. Section 203(m) of the FLSA provides, in relevant part:
"Wage" paid to any employee includes the reasonable cost, as determined by the Administrator, to the employer of furnishing such employee with board, lodging, or other facilities, if such board, lodging, or other facilities are customarily furnished by such employer to his employees: Provided, . . . That the Secretary is authorized to determine the fair value of such board, lodging, or other facilities for defined classes of employees and in defined areas, based on average costs to the employer or to groups of employers similarly situated, or average value to groups of employees, or other appropriate measures of fair value. Such evaluations, where applicable and pertinent, shall be used in lieu of actual measure of cost in determining the wage paid to any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 203(m). The applicable regulations defining "reasonable cost" provide that the "cost of furnishing `facilities' found by the Administrator to be primarily for the benefit or convenience of the employer will not be recognized as reasonable and may not therefore be included in computing wages." 29 C.F.R. § 531.3(d). Such items include tools, the cost of any constructions by and for the employer; and the costs of uniforms where the nature of the business requires the employee to wear a uniform. 29 C.F.R. § 531.3(d)(1). In determining whether

a facility is "primarily" for the benefit of the employer or the employee, courts have focused on whether a particular facility has substantial value to and could be freely used by the employee independent of the job performed. See, e.g., Soler v. G & U Inc., 833 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (2d Cir.1987).
11. While some courts have held a presumption to exist that lodging is a reasonable cost deductible from wages where an employer requires an employee to live on site to meet a particular need of the employer or when an employee is required to be on call at the employer's behest, the presumption may be rebutted. Soler, 833 F.2d at 1109-10; Marshall v. Truman Arnold Dist. Co., Inc., 640 F.2d 906, 909 (8th Cir.1981); Marshall v. Bernard Debord, No. 77-106-C, 1978 WL 1705 at *6 (E.D.Okla. July 27, 1978) (unpublished); Masters v. Maryland Management Co., 493 F.2d 1329, 1334 (4th Cir.1974); Bailey v. Pilots' Assoc., 406 F.Supp. 1302, 1309 (E.D.Pa.1976); see 1996 WL 1005231 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Op. Ltr. of the Wage and Hour Div. (Nov. 5, 1996). Courts have not permitted credit for lodging when the housing furnished by the employer is "seriously substandard" or not "customarily furnished" to other employees. See Archie v. Grand Central Partnership, Inc., 86 F.Supp.2d 262, 269-70 (S.D.N.Y.2000); Castillo v. Case Farms of Ohio, Inc., 96 F.Supp.2d 578, 638 (W.D.Tex.1999); Osias v. Marc, 700 F.Supp. 842, 845 (D.Md.1988). Similarly, courts have refused to permit offsets for housing provided to employees when the employer fails to keep or produce records or other credible evidence as to the reasonable cost of such housing. See Donovan v. Williams Chem. Co., Inc., 682 F.2d 185, 189 (8th Cir.1982); Brock v. Carrion, Ltd., 332 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1326-27 (E.D.Cal.2004).
12. The Court concludes that the defendants are not entitled to offsets for expenses related to housing, uniforms, 1101 tools, and travel. They are entitled to offsets for *1101 food, medical expenses and telephone expenses.
Liquidated Damages
13. The FLSA provides, in relevant part: "Any employer who violates the provisions of Section 206 or Section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional amount as liquidated damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Tenth Circuit has remarked that "[t]he purpose for the award of liquidated damages is the reality that the retention of a workman's pay may well result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages." Jordan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 379 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir.2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Jordan court agreed with the Second Circuit that "[1]iquidated damages are not a penalty exacted by the law, but rather compensation to the employee occasioned by the delay in receiving wages due caused by the employer's violation of the FLSA." Id. (quoting Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir.1999)).
14. Specifically with regard to liquidated damages, the statute further provides:
In any action commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947 to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.], if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 260; see Pabst v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F.3d 1128, 1136 (10th Cir.2000). Without the required showing, the trial court is required to award liquidated damages. Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 1237, 1245 (10th Cir.2000) (citation omitted); Renfro v. City of Emporia, Kan., 948 F.2d 1529, 1540 (10th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). "The good faith requirement mandates the employer have `an honest intention to ascertain and follow the dictates of the Act.' . . . `The additional requirement that the employer have reasonable grounds for believing that his conduct complies with the Act imposes an objective standard by which to judge the employer's behavior.'" Renfro, 948 F.2d at 1540 (quoting Marshall v. Brunner, 668 F.2d 748, 753 (3rd Cir.1982)).
15. Defendants have not shown that they acted in good faith and that they had reasonable grounds for believing their acts were not a violation of the FLSA.[11] They have asserted that they thought they were creating and

executing a training program, but several factors in the record belie this assertion: the manner in which they recruited the Chellen plaintiffs; the representations made to induce the Chellen plaintiffs to work for JPC; the visas obtained for the Chellen plaintiffs; the type of work they expected from plaintiffs; the backdated evaluations 1102 for the Chellen plaintiffs; and the manner in which they *1102 routed wages to the Chellen plaintiffs, among others. They have not attempted even to show "reliance on attorneys or other experts in personnel matters-that courts have found particularly persuasive in holding FLSA violations reasonable." See Pabst, 228 F.3d at 1136; Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 726 (10th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). As award of liquidated damages to the Chellen plaintiffs is warranted.
16. The Jordan court concluded that "liquidated damages are statutorily calculated, under . . . the FLSA . . . based on the full amount of wages that were denied or lost because of a statutory violation." Id. The Jordan court cited with approval an Eighth Circuit decision holding that the FLSA requires an award of liquidated damages equal to the full amount of back pay. Id. (citing Braswell v. City of El Dorado, Ark., 187 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir.1999)). That amount is further reduced, however by the offset awarded for food, medical needs, and telephone services. See generally Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1555 (10th Cir.1988) ("offsets of interim earnings, severance pay, pension benefits, and the like must be taken against back pay before the award is doubled as liquidated damages," although an offset for an arbitral award would not be applied). The Court's award of liquidated damages precludes an award of prejudgment interest, "because it is settled that such interest may not be awarded in addition to liquidated damages." Dep't of Labor v. City of Sapulpa, Okla., 30 F.3d 1285, 1290 (10th Cir.1994) (citations omitted).
John Pickle
17. The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to hold John Pickle personally liable for JPC's violation of the FLSA. The statute provides, in relevant part,: "`Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee . ." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
18. In determining whether a person is an "employer" under this provision, many courts use an "economic reality test" which "encompasses the totality of the circumstances, no one of which is exclusive." Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir.1999); see United States Dep't of Labor v. Cole Enters. Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir.1995); Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir.1984); Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1510 (1st Cir.1983). Courts look to "whether the alleged employer possessed the power to control the workers in question," Herman, 172 F.3d at 139. They also consider the person's position in the company, ownership interest, and has "control over significant functions of the business." Cole Enters. Inc., 62 F.3d at 778; see Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d at 971-72; Agnew, 712 F.2d at 1511.
19. John Pickle meets all of these tests. As president of JPC, John Pickle acted directly in the interest of JPC 0907the company that bears his name. He personally acted to recruit the Chellen plaintiffs, and was personally involved in many, if not all, of the decisions which resulted in payment of less than minimum wage for the work performed by the Chellen plaintiffs. He played the leading role in causing JPC to under-compensate the Chellen plaintiffs. The Court concludes that he is individually liable to the Chellen plaintiffs under the FLSA.
Civil Rights (Title VII and § 1981)
Liability
20. The statutory provisions relevant to the plaintiffs' claims of discrimination in employment begin with the 1103 following: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United *1103 States shall have the same right in every State
and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The subsequently-enacted, more detailed remedial scheme of Title VII provides, in relevant part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
Combined Title VII and 1981 Claims

21. Both § 1981 and Title VII afford a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race, and both these causes of action may be prosecuted by the same plaintiff based upon the same facts. E.g., Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 440-41 (4th Cir.2000) (citing Johnson v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 458, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975)). "In a case under Title VII and § 1981 arising out of the same facts, the commonality of factual issues between the § 1981 and Title VII claims is nearly allencompassing. The elements of each cause of action have been construed as identical." Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1444 (10th Cir.1988); see Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1307 (10th Cir.2006) (citation omitted); Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210, 1218 n. 3 (10th Cir.2005). Accordingly, the standards to be applied in evaluating a claim of racial discrimination in employment are the same in § 1981 actions as those applied in actions brought pursuant to Title VII. E.g., Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir.1998); Wilson v. Legal Assistance of North Dakota, 669 F.2d 562, 563-64 (8th Cir.1982). In particular, "[t]he allocations of burdens under Title VII applies to proving intentional discrimination under § 1981 as well." Durham v. Xerox Corp., 18 F.3d 836, 839 (10th Cir.1994); see McCowan v. All Star Maintenance, Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 921-22 (10th Cir.2001); English v. Colorado Dep't of Corrections, 248 F.3d 1002, 1007 (10th Cir.2001); Amro v. Boeing Co., 232 F.3d 790, 796 (10th Cir.2000).
22. However, John Pickle cannot be held liable in an individual or personal capacity under both statutes. He can be held personally liable under § 1981, see Allen v. Denver Public School Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 983 (10th Cir.1991), disapproved on other grounds, Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir.2000), but not under Title VII, see Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1316 (10th Cir.2006) (citing Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir. 1996)); see Grimes, 929 F.Supp. at 1095.
23. Further, "the remedies available under Title VII and under § 1981, although related, and although directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct and independent." Johnson v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). Prior to 1991, Title VII plaintiffs were limited to "backpay commencing not more than two years prior to the filing of a claim with the EEOC, reinstatement, and other affirmative relief as may be appropriate." Skinner, 859 F.2d at 1443 (citing Johnson, 421 U.S. at 458, 95 S.Ct. 1716); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Individuals who proved a violation of § 1981, by contrast, could recover both compensatory and punitive damages, as well as back pay and lost benefits for an unlimited period of time. Id. (citing Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460, 95 S.Ct. 1716). With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, plaintiffs in 1104 Title VII cases are also entitled to compensatory *1104 and punitive damages, but those damages are subject to a cap that is not applicable in § 1981 cases. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; see O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1257 (10th Cir.2001).
24. Section 1981a thus expands the remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs. E.g., West v. Boeing Co., 851 F.Supp. 395, 401 (D.Kan.1994). It does not permit double recovery under § 1981; at the same time, it does not limit the scope of, or relief available, under § 1981. See id. at 398 n. 4; Johnson v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 926 F.Supp. 874, 876 (E.D.Mo.1996); Bradshaw v. University of Maine System, 870 F.Supp. 406, 407 (D.Me.1994). "Where a plaintiff has alleged violation of both Title VII and Section 1981, the court will consider the alternative remedy under Section 1981 if violation of that statute can be made out on grounds different from those available under Title VII." Grimes v. Superior Home Health Care of Middle Tennessee, Inc., 929 F.Supp. 1088, 1095 (M.D.Tenn.1996).
Race and National Origin
25. Obviously, plaintiffs would prefer to recover under § 1981 to avoid the statutory damages cap applicable to Title VII claims. Defendants assert that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was enacted for the purpose of eliminating intentional discrimination on the basis of race, and that § 1981 does not encompass claims of discrimination based on national origin. Further, they contend that there was no evidence produced, whatsoever, that the Chellen Plaintiffs are of a race different than the Caucasian race, and that Caucasian is the race of JPC's management and most of its employees. At least two courts have recognized that some anthropologists have classified some Indians as Caucasian. See United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 210, 43 S.Ct. 338, 67 L.Ed. 616 (1923); Chandoke v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 843 F.Supp. 16, 18 n. 2 (D.N.J.1994). The United States Supreme Court has rejected "the assumption that all those who might be deemed Caucasian today were thought to be of the same race when § 1981 became law in the 19th century." Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-11,

107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (discussing the concept of race as it has evolved since the passage of § 1981.)

26. Accordingly, courts have struggled with the distinctions between race and national origin in the context of § 1981 claims. Some merely recite that § 1981 does not prohibit discrimination based solely on national origin. E.g., Chimarev v. TD Waterhouse Investor Servs., Inc., 280 F.Supp.2d 208, 224 (S.D.N.Y.2003); Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, Ltd., 798 F.2d 731, 735 (5th Cir.1986). However, it is appropriate to analyze § 1981 claims in terms of ancestry and ethnic characteristics where discrimination is not based solely on national origin. Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 613, 107 S.Ct. 2022; Daemi v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 931 F.2d 1379, 1387 n. 7 (10th Cir.1991); Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1979).

27. As set forth in the Court's order addressing defendants' motions to dismiss (Dkt.# 85), the Tenth Circuit has stated that "often the line between discrimination based on race and discrimination based on national origin is "not a bright one." " Daemi, 931 F.2d at 1387 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 614, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)). The Tenth Circuit further observed:

1105

The concept of race under § 1981 is broad. It extends to matters of ancestry which are normally associated with nationality, not race in a biological *1105 sense. See Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 802 F.2d 111, 114-15 (5th Cir.1986) (noting that persons of Iranian descent are a protected race under § 1981, although anthropologists classify them as Caucasian); Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.1979) (noting that § 1981 is "no[t] necessarily limited to the technical or restrictive meaning of `race'"). . . . As the Supreme Court has noted, Congress intended § 1981 to "protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 613, 107 S.Ct. at 2028.

Daemi, 931 F.2d at 1387 n. 7.

28. The Daemi court ruled that, "[a]s a person of Iranian descent, Daemi was protected by § 1981's bar against discrimination on the ground of race." Id. Plaintiffs point out that several courts have allowed individuals of Indian/ East Indian descent to proceed with § 1981 racial discrimination claims. Chandoke v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 843 F.Supp. 16, 18 n. 2 (D.N.J.1994) ("Although Indians are technically classified as `Caucasian,' they may still state a claim under Section 1981"); Jatoi v. Hurst-Euless-Bedford Hospital Auth., 807 F.2d 1214, 1218 (5th Cir.) (allegation that plaintiff was East Indian sufficient to invoke protection of § 1981), modified on other grounds, 819 F.2d 545 (5th Cir.1987); Banker v. Time Chemical Inc., 579 F.Supp. 1183, 1187 (N.D.Ill.1983) (collecting cases); Baruah v. Young, 536 F.Supp. 356, 363 (D.Md.1982). The Court finds that the Chellen plaintiffs' ancestry and ethnic characteristics likewise entitle them to claim the protections of § 1981.

Disparate Treatment

29. To prevail under a disparate treatment theory, "a plaintiff must show, through either direct or indirect evidence, that the discrimination complained of was intentional." Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1307 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1191 (10th Cir.2000)). The discrimination, of course, must be for a reason prohibited by the applicable statutes. Jaramillo v. Colorado Judicial Dep't, 427 F.3d 1303, 1306 (10th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). Disparate treatment claims may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. E.g., Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir.2000); EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1192 (10th Cir.2000); Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1134 (10th Cir.1999).

30. Plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims in this case have been established by direct evidence. Defendants recruited Indian workers'in India, brought them to the United States, housed and fed them separately from the non-Indian JPC employees, identified them as Indians and made numerous discriminatory comments about their ancestry, ethnic background, culture, and country which leads to the conclusion that they treated the Chellen plaintiffs differently, and less favorably, due to their race and national origin. In particular, defendants subjected the Chellen plaintiffs to greater testing requirements, lower job classifications, and less desirable job assignments. They also restricted the Chellen plaintiffs' movement, communications, worship opportunities, and

access to health care, and they required the Chellen plaintiffs to live in substandard housing and to subsist on food that was poor in quality and quantity. The Chellen plaintiffs were paid lower wages and subjected to 1106 disparate terms, conditions, and privileges of employment *1106 as compared to similarly situated non-Indian workers.
31. The Chellen plaintiffs were subject to disparate treatment and discrimination at the hands of JPC, its officers, managers, and agents. The Court concludes that the circumstances of their recruitment, their work, and their living conditions show defendants' intent to discriminate on a racial basis.
Hostile Work Environment
32. The Supreme Court has "broadly read Title VII `to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive work environment.'" McCowan, 273 F.3d at 922 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)). "When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated." Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367). The Court is to "judge that atmosphere both objectively and subjectively . [and] look at all the circumstances 'from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position.'" McGowan, 273 F.3d at 923 (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit has also emphasized that, where the plaintiff alleges discrimination under § 1981 on the basis of ancestry, the harassment must be based on the victim's ancestry0907general harassment is not actionable. Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1410 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir.1994)).
33. The JPC workplace was characterized by the severe and pervasive intimidation, ridicule and insult for the Chellen plaintiffs. Defendants set the stage for such an environment with the way in which they recruited the plaintiffs, classified them, set up the means of paying them wages, housed them, and fed them. The conditions of their employment were not favorable even in the beginning, and they progressively worsened as several of the plaintiffs left to escape conditions at the plant. Toward the end of their time at the plant, defendants' threats, intimidation, and abusive language became intolerable. Given the evidence as to the language used and the manner in which it was directed at the Chellen plaintiffs, and not others employed by JPC, there is no doubt that defendants based their harassment on the Chellen plaintiffs' national origin, ancestry and ethnicity.
34. There is no "mathematically precise test" to determine whether an environment is hostile or abusive, but some factors that may be considered include: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367. Actual psychological harm, while relevant, is not required. Id. Defendants' conduct was frequent, severe, physically threatening, and humiliating. As discussed above in connection with the Chellen plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it also caused psychological harm.
35. In particular, the Tenth Circuit has long recognized that "a working environment dominated by racial slurs constitutes a violation of Title VII." Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1412 (10th Cir. 1987). (citations omitted). Defendants' obscene and derogatory references with the word "Indians" in reference to the Chellen 1107 plaintiffs constitute far more than the "few *1107 isolated incidents of racial enmity" or "[c]asual comments, or accidental or sporadic conversation, [that] will not trigger equitable relief pursuant to the statute." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, they reflect a "steady barrage of opprobrious racial comment" indicative of a hostile work environment so "heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy the emotional and psychological stability of the minority [employee]." Id. at 1412-13 (citations omitted).
36. Defendants' offensive language was only part of the daily harassment experienced by the Chellen plaintiffs at the JPC plant. "We have repeatedly stated that in a case alleging a violation of Title VII and the presence of a racially hostile work environment, the existence of [racial] harassment must be determined in light of the record as a whole, and the trier of fact must examine the totality of the circumstances, including the context in which the alleged incidents occurred." McGowan, 273 F.3d at 925 (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Court concludes that the job assignments, restrictions on their freedom, privacy, communications, and worship, along

with the living conditions created an oppressive, hostile, and abusive working environment for the Chellen plaintiffs.[12]
Personal Liability of John Pickle
37. To impose personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, an individual defendant must be personally involved and have an affirmative link to the acts of intentional discrimination to causally connect the defendant with the claimed discriminatory practice. Allen v. Denver Public School Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 983 (10th Cir.1991), disapproved on other grounds, Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir.2000). "[P]ersonal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence." Figures v. Board of Public Utilities of Kansas City, Kan., 731 F.Supp. 1479, 1483 (D.Kan.1990). In this case, there is substantial evidence of John Pickle's individual conduct of discrimination, as shown by, among other things, his remarks to the Chellen plaintiffs as well as to JPC employees. He was personally involved in the discriminatory decisions and acts that led to the harm suffered by the Chellen plaintiffs. The Court concludes that John Pickle is personally liable for violating § 1981 in his actions towards the Chellen plaintiffs.
Damages
38. The Chellen Plaintiffs are entitled to recover lost wages, as well as compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII or § 1981, but not both. Initially, the Court notes that the analysis under Hoffman for purposes of an FLSA claim does not change the analysis for purposes of a Title VII claim. See Rivera v. NICO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067-69 (9th Cir. 2004); see also De La Rosa v. Northern Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237, 238-39 (C.D.Ill.2002). Nor does it change the analysis for purposes of a § 1981 claim, as aliens are entitled to the 1108 protections of § 1981. See, e.g., Anderson v. Conboy, 156 *1108 F.3d 167, 180 (2d Cir.1998) (§ 1981 provides a claim against private discrimination on the basis of alienage); Chacko v. Texas A & M Univ., 960 F.Supp. 1180, 1190-91 (S.D.Tex.1997) (same).[13] The legal status and citizenship of the plaintiff employees, or the type of visas obtained for them by defendants and under which defendants required them to work, does not preclude the aggrieved individuals from recovering full and fair compensation for work actually performed, whether under the FLSA, Title VII, or § 1981.
Compensatory Damages
39. While the measure of damages under the FLSA may be minimum wage, under Title VII and § 1981, the measure of damages is the rate of pay that each Chellen plaintiff should have earned, given his skills and qualifications, compared to that of similarly-situated non-Indian JPC workers, less any applicable offsets.
In the case of injury of an economic nature the injured party is to be placed as near as possible in the situation he would have been in had the wrong not occurred. Thus damages for the relevant period are to be determined by measuring the difference between plaintiff's actual earnings for the period and those which he would have earned absent the discrimination of defendants.
T & S Serv. Assocs., Inc. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722, 728 (1st Cir.1981) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Taylor v. Philips Industries, Inc., 593 F.2d 783, 786 (7th Cir.1979) (citations omitted). The Chellen plaintiffs have the burden of proving that they lost earnings as a result of defendants' discrimination, see id., which they did. However, the minimum wage measure of damages for violations of the FLSA is subsumed in the calculation of lost wages under Title VII and § 1981. To permit the recovery of compensatory damages under both FLSA and the civil rights statutes would mean a double recovery for plaintiffs for the same harm. However, the FLSA liquidated damage award serves a different purpose and is not subsumed in the lost earnings portion of the damages recoverable by the Chellen plaintiffs under Title VII and § 1981.
40. In addition, compensatory damages are recoverable under § 1981 or Title VII for emotional or mental harm. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); Hampton v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1114-15 (10th Cir.2001) (§ 1981 case); Atchley v. Nordam Group, Inc., 180 F.3d 1143, 1149-53 (10th Cir.1999) (Title VII case); see also Bryant v. Aiken Regional Medical Centers Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 546-47 (4th Cir.2003) (plaintiff alleged violation of both Title VII and § 1981). Admittedly, a precise calculation for this kind of damage is not easy. "Emotional

distress is an intangible damage, and is an issue of fact which is within the province of the jury." Canady v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 970 F.2d 710, 715 (10th Cir.1992).
41. "Most courts hold that emotional harm under § 1981 is presumed from the violation of the constitutional right when plaintiff's testimony establishes humiliation or mental distress; specific proof of out-ofpocket loss or medical testimony is not necessary." Charles R. Richey, 1 Manual on Employment Discrimination and Civil Rights Actions § 4.34 (2d ed.2003) (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit has held an award of emotional damages excessive where no treating physician or psychologist testified, plaintiffs continued in their vocation, and the employer could 1109 not *1109 prevent insensitive remarks made toward plaintiffs. Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 68 F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (10th Cir.1995). However, the Tenth Circuit has stated that medical testimony is "one suggested method of proving emotional damages but is not the sole dispositive requirement." Smith v. Northwest Financial Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1417 (10th Cir.1997). The Smith court upheld a district court's denial of a motion for remittitur where an employee's testimony of emotional distress injury was corroborated by independent evidence but not medical testimony, and the employee did not continue to work in her chosen field after the discriminatory conduct. Id. at 1416-17.
42. The Court concludes that compensatory damages for the Chellen plaintiffs' mental and emotional distress is appropriate. Although they were able to continue in their chosen professions after the discriminatory conduct and they offered no medical testimony as to the degree of distress they alleged suffered, their testimony and that of expert witness Florence Burke as to the hostile work environment created by defendants and the resultant humiliation, degradation, and loss of self-respect they experienced was both credible and compelling.[14]
Punitive Damages
43. Punitive damages are recoverable under Title VII if the plaintiff proves that the defendant "engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). In Kolstad v. American Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999), the United States Supreme Court explained that the provision does not require egregious misconduct; instead, the appropriate inquiry is whether the employer engaged in the alleged conduct with the "knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law." Id. at 535, 119 S.Ct. 2118; see Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc., 189 F.3d 1177, 1186 (10th Cir.1999); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir.1999). In other words, "an employer must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its action will violate federal law to be liable in punitive damages." Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118.[15] Because JPC employed more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees during the relevant time period, the sum of the amount of compensatory and the amount of punitive damages awarded may not exceed $100,000 per plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(B).
44. Likewise, punitive damages are recoverable under § 1981 where a plaintiff proves "that the defendant acted 1110 with malicious, willful or gross disregard of a plaintiff's rights over and above intentional *1110 discrimination."
Guides, Ltd. v. Yarmouth Group Property Management, Inc., 295 F.3d 1065, 1077 (10th Cir.2002); see Hampton v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1115-16 (10th Cir.2001). "The allowance of such damages inherently involves an evaluation of the nature of the conduct in question, the wisdom of some form of pecuniary punishment, and the advisability of a deterrent. Therefore, the infliction of such damages, and the amount thereof when inflicted, are of necessity within the discretion of the trier of fact." Hampton, 247 F.3d at 1115 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir.1984) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The standard of proof applicable to punitive damages claims under both Title VII and § 1981 is preponderance of the evidence. See Karnes v. SCI Colorado Funeral Servs., Inc., 162 F.3d 1077, 1081 (10th Cir.1998). The Court exercises its discretion to conclude that punitive damages are appropriate in this case based upon the egregious conduct of defendants.
Prejudgment Interest
45. Prejudgment interest serves the purposes of Title VII, as it "helps to make victims of discrimination whole and compensates them for the true cost of money damages they incurred." Reed v. Mineta, 438 F.3d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 1994)). That purpose is

"limited, however, by recognition that prejudgment interest does not accrue until the victim actually sustains monetary injury." Id. (finding that employee's monetary injuries were incrementally inflicted from the date of his termination through the entry of judgment as each pay period passed and employee went unpaid). Courts have routinely awarded prejudgment interest on backpay or lost past earnings and benefits in cases where liability has been established on claims of discrimination under Title VII and/or § 1981. E.g., Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1170 (6th Cir.1996); Cooper v. Paychex, Inc., 960 F.Supp. 966, 976 (E.D.Va.1997); Du-Bose v. Boeing Co., 905 F.Supp. 953, 960 (D.Kan.1995).
46. Under Tenth Circuit law,
an award of prejudgment interest under federal law is governed by a two-step analysis. First, the trial court must determine whether an award of prejudgment interest would serve to compensate the injured party. Second, when an award would serve a compensatory function, the court must still determine whether the equities would preclude the award of prejudgment interest.
U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1257 (10th Cir.1988), implied overruling on other grounds recognized by Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1231 (10th Cir.1996). The Court concludes that an award of prejudgment interest would serve to compensate the Chellen plaintiffs for the true cost of money damages they incurred. Further, the equities would not preclude the award of prejudgment interest although it has taken some time for this matter to be resolved through the judicial process. The Court and the parties have worked, however, to move the case as expeditiously as possible. Prejudgment interest on the amount awarded for defendants' violations of plaintiffs' civil rights is appropriate.
Injunctive Relief
47. The issue of injunctive relief is reserved for the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), incorporating by 1111 reference Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of *1111 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
If the court finds that the [defendant] has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the [defendant] from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but not be limited to reinstatement or hiring of employee . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). The Court has broad authority to construct appropriate equitable relief, both the remedy past discrimination and to prevent future discrimination. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Intern. Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 446, 106 S.Ct. 3019, 92 L.Ed.2d 344 (1986); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975).
48. The Tenth Circuit has stated, in reviewing a district court's decision to deny injunctive relief for abuse of discretion, that "[t]he most important factor for a district court to consider is whether the facts indicate a danger of future violations of the Act." Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1230 (10th Cir.1997) (ADA claim); see EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir.1999) (ADA claim). To satisfy the Court that relief is needed, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
"there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive. The [district court's] decision is based on all the circumstances; [its] discretion is necessarily broad and a strong showing of abuse must be made to reverse it. To be considered are the bona fides of the expressed intent to comply, the effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some cases, the character of the past violations."
Roe, 124 F.3d at 1230 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953)); see EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir.1999).
49. As set forth above, JPC ceased operations soon after the Chellen plaintiffs left the facility and filed this lawsuit. Nonetheless, the EEOC requests that the Court order directing defendants to post a specific notice informing their employees of their employment rights and obligations under federal law, and to provide contact

information for the EEOC. The EEOC also asks that such order require defendants to train their employees regarding the applicable requirements of Title VII, and in particular, requiring defendants to initiate a Title VII policy and complaint procedure to ensure that their employees are aware of their rights and what to do if they feel they have experienced discrimination. Finally, the EEOC asks that defendants be enjoined from engaging in any employment policy, practice or decision that deprives an applicant or employee of equal opportunity on the basis of national origin. However, the EEOC has failed to show anything more than a mere possibility of recurrent violations given the complete cessation of operations by JPC. The Court concludes that injunctive relief is not warranted.
State Law Tort Claims
Deceit
50. Under Oklahoma law, deceit or fraud must be established by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence and requires a showing of: "1) a false material misrepresentation, 2) made as a positive assertion which is either 1112 known to be false, *1112 or made recklessly without knowledge of the truth, 3) with the intention that it be acted upon, and 4) which is relied on by the other party to his/her own detriment." Rogers v. Meiser, 68 P.3d 967, 977 (Okla. 2003) (citation omitted).[16] "Prior similar dealings by the alleged wrongdoer may be considered in determining fraud." Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 760 P.2d 174, 177 (Okla.1988) (citing Cates v. Darland, 537 P.2d 336, 338 (Okla.1975)).
51. Defendants argue that John Pickle cannot be held personally liable on the Chellen plaintiffs deceit claim. "A person cannot be liable for a fraudulent misrepresentation unless he made it himself or authorized another to make it for him or in some way participated therein." Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Minton, 181 Okla. 298, 73 P.2d 440, 442 (1937) (citation omitted). As set forth in the Court's findings of fact, supra, John Pickle personally met with the Chellen plaintiffs, individually, in India. While translators were present at both the individual and group meetings in India, many, if not all, of the plaintiffs could understand English and understood the promises being made by John Pickle individually. He also personally reassured some of them Chellen plaintiffs, en route to the United States, with regard to the misrepresentations upon which they relied. The Court concludes that John Pickle is personally liable on the Chellen plaintiffs' claim for deceit.
False Imprisonment
52. Under Oklahoma law, false imprisonment has been defined as "the unlawful restraint of an individual's personal liberty or freedom of locomotion," "the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another," and "[a]n act which directly or indirectly, is a legal cause of confinement of another within boundaries fixed by the actor for any time, no matter how short in duration. . . ." S.H. Kress & Co. v. Bradshaw, 186 Okla. 588, 99 P.2d 508, 511 (1940) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The elements of the tort of false imprisonment are: "(1) the detention of a person against his or her will and (2) the unlawfulness of the detention." Walters v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 82 P.3d 578, 583 (Okla.2003); S.H. Kress, 99 P.2d at 512. False imprisonment "makes the actor liable to the other irrespective of whether harm is caused to any legally protected interest of the other, if the act is intended to confine the other or a third person, and the other is conscious of the confinement, and the confinement is not otherwise privileged." S.H. Kress, 99 P.2d at 511.
53. The S.H. Kress court explained that "[f]alse imprisonment may be accomplished without actual arrest, assault, or imprisonment, and may be committed by words alone or by acts alone, or by both." Id. at 512 (citations omitted); see Mayo Hotel Co. v. Cooper, 298 P.2d 443, 444-45 (Okla.1956). Physical restraint is not necessary in order for the defendant's conduct to constitute false imprisonment. Halliburton-Abbott Co. v. Hodge, 172 Okla. 175, 44 P.2d 122, 125 (1935). If a defendant's words and conduct induce in a plaintiff "a reasonable belief that resistance or physical attempts to escape . . . would be useless and futile, then it is nevertheless false 1113 imprisonment, regardless of the absence of physical restraint." Id. Further, a defendant cannot *1113 avoid liability for false imprisonment if he believes the person allegedly confined is unaware of the means of escape or if the circumstances are such as to make the means of escape "offensive to a reasonable sense of decency or personal dignity." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 36 cmt. a (1965).

54. "[A]ll who by direct act or indirect procurement, personally participate in, or proximately cause, the false imprisonment or unlawful detention or another are liable." Mayo Hotel Co., 298 P.2d at 445 (citing S.H. Kress, 99 P.2d at 514). The Court concludes that John Pickle is personally liable on the Chellen plaintiffs' claim for false imprisonment.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

55. Under Oklahoma law, to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that: "(1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the Defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe." Estate of Trentadue ex. rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 855-56 (10th Cir.2005). The Trentadue case recently explained each of these elements in detail. While the actions of defendants' actions could be deemed intentional, the term "`recklessness' in the first element includes actions that are in `deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow.'" Id. at Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. i.

56. The Trentadue court elaborated on the second element as follows:

The second element of the tort requires proof that the tortfeasor's conduct was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Kraszewski v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Okla., Inc., 916 P.2d 241, 248 n. 25 (Okla.1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d). Generally, the case is one where "the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, `Outrageous!'" Id. at 249 n. 25. In addition, whether the tortfeasor's conduct was extreme and outrageous must be considered in the setting in which the conduct occurred. Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77 (Okla.1986) (holding that nature of the conduct should not be considered in a sterile setting, detached from the milieu in which it took place); see also Starr v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 54 F.3d 1548, 1559 (10th Cir.1995) (applying Oklahoma law and noting that court must focus on the totality of the circumstances).

397 F.3d at 856.

57. "The third element of an emotional distress claim requires proof that the tortfeasor's conduct caused the plaintiff's emotional distress." Id. (citing Computer Publ'n, [Inc. v. Welton,' 49 P.3d 732, 735 (Okla.2002)).

1114

58. Finally, the fourth element requires proof that the plaintiff's emotional distress was "so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it." Computer Publ'n, 49 P.3d at 736 (quoting Breeden [v. League Services Corp.], [1978 OK 27,] 575 P.2d [1374,] 1377 n. 6 [1978] ). While emotional distress includes "all highly unpleasant mental reactions," it is only where the emotional distress is extreme that liability *1114 arises. Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887, 901 n. 44 (Okla.1998). "The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity." Breeden, 575 P.2d at 1378 n. 6 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j). Moreover, although severe distress must be proved, "in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed." Id.

Trentadue, 397 F.3d at 856.[17]

59. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does not extend "to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities." Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77 (Okla.1986) (quoting Restatement of Torts (Second), § 46, comment d).

Personal Liability of John Pickle

60. John Pickle is personally liable for the tortious acts he committed towards Chellen plaintiffs. He cannot rely on the corporate shield of JPC to protect himself from liability. Oklahoma law has consistently recognized that an

officer or director of a corporation may be held personally liable for his torts "irrespective of whether the corporation for which he was acting was a tort-feasor or not or whether the defendant was acting in its behalf as an agent." Garrett v. Myers, 190 Okla. 273, 123 P.2d 965, 967 (1942) (citing Rogers v. Brummett, 92 Okla. 216, 220 P. 362 (1923)). Because the instant lawsuit involves tort claims against John Pickle personally and is not merely an action to recover on a corporate debt, neither the statutory nor the common law of Oklahoma shields him from liability. Oklahoma Federated Gold & Numismatics, Inc. v. Blodgett, 24 F.3d 136, 141 (10th Cir.1994) ("Under Oklahoma law, an officer may be held liable for the torts he personally commits."); see Preston-Thomas Const., Inc. v. Central Leasing Corp., 518 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla.Ct.App.1973). The preponderance of the evidence at both the Phase I and Phase II trials establishes that John Pickle directly participated in the creation and execution of the plan to bring the plaintiffs to Oklahoma, including the misrepresentations made to them and the intentional infliction of emotional distress they experienced. The Court concludes that John Pickle is jointly and severally liable with JPC for the damages awarded on the Chellen plaintiffs' tort claims.
Prejudgment Interest
61. Under Oklahoma law, prejudgment interest is mandated upon "a verdict for damages by reason of personal injuries or injury to personal rights including, but not limited to, injury resulting from bodily restraint, personal insult, defamation, invasion of privacy, injury to personal relations, or detriment due to an act or omission of another. . . ." Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 727.1(E). Damages awarded for false imprisonment, a form of bodily restraint, would appear to warrant prejudgment interest under this statute. Similarly, prejudgment interest is appropriately 1115 awarded on damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress under *1115 § 727.1(E). See Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 713 P.2d 589, 593 (Okla.1985). Actions for fraud and deceit do not come within the purview of this section. See Rainbow Travel Serv. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 896 F.2d 1233, 1243 (10th Cir.1990); Sade v. Northern Nat. Gas Co., 501 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir.1974).
62. However, prejudgment interest may be awarded on damages for fraud and deceit under Okla. Stat. tit. 23, §§ 6, 7; see Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308, 1317 (10th Cir.1998). Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 6 provides: "Any person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except during such time as the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt." Id. Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 7 provides: "In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud or malice, interest may be given in the discretion of the jury." Id. The Court concludes that an award of prejudgment interest on each of the Chellen plaintiffs' state law tort claims is appropriate.
SUMMARY
In summary, the EEOC has proven its civil rights claims against JPC for violation of Title VII and § 1981 based upon the disparate treatment afforded the Chellen plaintiffs and the hostile work environment created by JPC. The Chellen plaintiffs have established their claims against both defendants for violation of the FLSA and § 1981 as well as their tort claims for deceit, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. All of the Chellen plaintiffs other than Mohammed Hassan Usman are entitled to relief.
The damages awarded to the Chellen plaintiffs jointly and severally against defendants JPC and John Pickle are:

0905 FLSA liquidated damages:[18]
0905 Title VIII § 1981[19] Compensatory damages: Punitive Damages:
0905 Deceit: Ten Months Promised Wages:

$ 58,417.68
607,006.85 52,000.00
390,000.00

Amounts Paid by Plaintiffs to AL Samit:

82,056.00

0905 False Imprisonment 0905 Total

52,000.00 _____________ $1,241,480.53

Counsel for the EEOC and Chellen plaintiffs are directed to determine appropriate apportionment of these amounts. If counsel are unable to do so, United States Magistrate Judge Frank H. McCarthy is hereby appointed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 53 to act as a Special Master for apportionment and disbursement. Counsel for the EEOC and Chellen plaintiffs are also directed to calculate the appropriate amount of prejudgment interest per these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and to submit a proposed form of judgment, approved as to form by counsel for defendants, within 30 days of this date.

[1] The Court refers to these individual plaintiffs collectively as the "Chellen plaintiffs" for first-named plaintiff Babu Thanu Chellen. The initial complaint, filed February 1, 2002, named 13 plaintiffs, including John Doe and Richard Roe. Complaint, Dkt. # 1. The fifth and final complaint in this matter, filed July 9, 2002, names 54 plaintiffs, including John Doe and Richard Roe as unidentified plaintiffs. Fifth Amended Complaint, Dkt. # 47.
[2] The EEOC points out that, while the pay rate for most of the plaintiffs ranged from $2.89 to $3.17 per hour, see Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1282 (FOF ¶ 11), the rate for the two cooks was considerably less. The cooks claim to have worked approximately 18 hours per day, 7 days per week, at a salary of $500 per month. Phase II Trial Transcript, Dkt. ## 189-96 (hereinafter referred to as "Ph. II Tr.") at 36-37, 40-42, 67, 69. Therefore, the hourly rate paid to them would have been less than $1.00 per hour. However, the EEOC has no FLSA claim, and the differential in wages is subsumed in the EEOC's Title VII claim for damages. The EEOC does not claim damages for Usman, but it does claim damages for Toofan Mondal, the other cook hired by defendants to work at JPC.
[3] Defendants dispute this testimony, arguing that there was no method by which the main door could be locked or secured by a chain or otherwise, but they cite to no evidence other than unidentified photographs in support of this argument. See Def. Proposed Findings and Conclusions, Dkt. # 199, at 11-12.
[4] As set forth in the Court's prior findings, JPC contracted with AL Samit to recruit, prescreen, and arrange for testing of the Chellen plaintiffs and others in India. Chellen 344 F.Supp.2d at 1280 (FOF 113). Later, defendants paid AL Samit a "marketing fee" or "commission" in an amount sufficient to reimburse AL Samit for AL Samit's payment of the Chellen plaintiffs' salaries while they were at the JPC facility in Tulsa. Id. at 1282 (FOF ¶ 12). The Court held that AL Samit was JPC's agent. Id. at 1290 (FOF ¶ 53).
[5] See Conclusion of Law ¶ 42, infra.
[6] Since JPC employed over 100 but fewer than 201 employees for each month from January 2001 through January 2002, Ph. II Tr. at 836-38; Pl. Ex. 82, the combined amount awarded for compensatory and punitive damages per plaintiff is limited under Title VII, see Conclusion of Law ¶ 43, infra. Further, John Pickle cannot be held personally liable under Title VII, but he can be held personally liable under § 1981. See id. II 22, infra.
[7] Joe Reeble, JPC Executive Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer, testified that one of the 20 may have been from Pakistan; the remainder were from India. Ph. I. Tr. at 67.
[8] The date asserted by the Chellen plaintiffs in their proposed findings and conclusions is November 30, 2003, see Dkt. # 200, at 38, but that appears to be a typographical error, given other representations on page 12 of the same document, and the dates set forth in the Certification Letters admitted as Pl. Ex. 81.
[9] The relevant rationale is found in the text of the district court decision being reviewed by the appellate court, Donovan v. Burgett Greenhouses, Inc., No. 76-173, 1983 WL 2139 (D.N.M. Nov.23, 1983).

[10] Significantly, the Chellen plaintiffs were not "undocumented." They had visas, albeit ones that did not permit them to work in the United States. They were not in the United States illegally, although they were working here illegally due to the failure of defendants to obtain proper visas.
[11] The Court need not determine whether defendants acted willfully as there is no issue as to whether the plaintiffs brought their claim within the applicable statute of limitations. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a); Brinkman v. Dep't of Corrections, 21 F.3d 370, 372 (10th Cir.1994).
[12] In its proposed findings and conclusions, the EEOC discusses the invalidity of an employer's affirmative defense set forth in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), and Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), to vicarious liability for an actionable hostile work environment created by a supervisor. As the defendants did not affirmatively plead the defense and do not attempt to assert in their proposed findings and conclusions that it is applicable, the Court does not address it.
[13] Again, the Court has not concluded that the Chellen plaintiffs were "illegal" or undocumented aliens, although, as holders of the B1 or B2 visas obtained for them by defendants, they were not authorized or eligible to be employed for wages in the United States.
[14] However, the Court found that the "A" classification adequately compensates plaintiffs for these damages. See Finding of Fact ¶ 57, supra.
[15] The Kolstad court further held that "an employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the employer's `good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.'" Id. at 545, 119 S.Ct. 2118 (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has also stated: "[E]mployer malice or reckless indifference in the failure to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which management-level employees knew or should have known is premised on direct liability, not derivative liability. . . ." Deters v. Equifax Credit Information Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir.2000). Although the EEOC raised the issue of vicarious liability, defendants do not dispute the liability of JPC if it is found in violation of Title VII.
[16] Fraud may be actual or constructive. See generally Howell v. Texaco Inc., 112 P.3d 1154, 1161 (Okla.2004); Patel v. OMH Medical Center, Inc., 987 P.2d 1185, 1199 (Okla. 1999). The elements set forth herein pertain to actual fraud only because the Chellen plaintiffs do not allege constructive fraud.
[17] The Trentadue court ultimately found that, although the plaintiffs had proven the first three elements of the tort, the district court had not make explicit findings as to severity of each individual plaintiff's emotional distress, and it remanded accordingly. 397 F.3d at 857-58. Since the parties here stipulated to representative witness testimony, the Court finds no need to determine the severity of the emotional distress for each of the Chellen plaintiffs.
[18] As concluded above, FLSA unpaid minimum wages are subsumed in the Title VII and § 1981 compensatory award. See Conclusion of Law ¶ 39, supra.
[19] As the EEOC brought its claim under Title VII and § 1981, the Court awards these damages jointly to the EEOC as well.
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 446 F.Supp.2d 1247 (2006)
Babu Thanu CHELLEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
JOHN PICKLE CO., INC., and John Pickle, Jr., Defendants. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff, v. John Pickle Company, Inc., Defendant.
Nos. 02-CV-0085-CVE-FHM, 02-CV-0979-CVE-FHM.
United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma.
August 22, 2006.
124589012345 *1248 *1249 *1250 *1251 *1252 *1253 *1254 *1255 Bill K. Felty, B. Kent Felty Law Office, Tulsa, OK, Eddie Dee Ramirez, Ramirez Law Firm, Tulsa, OK, Johnny Clyde Parker, University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa, OK, Joe W. McDoulett, Catholic Charities, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiffs.
Jon Thomas Mason, Carpenter Stanley & Myers, Tulsa, OK, Linda Cole McGowan, Philip James McGowan, McGowan & McGowan PLLC, Tulsa, OK, for Defendants.
Michelle M. Robertson, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (OKC), Oklahoma City, OK, Robert A. Canino, U.S. Equal Employment Dallas District Office, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.
1256 *1256 AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
EAGAN, Chief Judge.
(PHASE TWO)
In 2001, more than fifty men left their homes in India for work in Tulsa, Oklahoma at John Pickle Company, Inc. ("JPC"). In 2002, fifty-two of these individuals[1] sued JPC and John Pickle, Jr. ("John Pickle") with seven claims for relief, five of which remain: (1) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219; (2) race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) deceit; (4) false imprisonment; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") subsequently brought an action against JPC for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a), and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (" § 1981"). Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief.
The Court initially planned to proceed in three phases and, after a non-jury trial in the first phase, determined that the Chellen plaintiffs were employees, not trainees, under the FLSA. See Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 344 F.Supp.2d 1278 (N.D.Okla. 2004) (hereinafter "Chellen I"). With the agreement of the parties, the Court combined the second and third phases of the proceedings to determine liability as well as damages for all claims. The nonjury trial for this second and final phase was held in March 2005. The parties stipulated to representative witness testimony whereby a few individual plaintiffs testified at trial on behalf of all of the individual plaintiffs. The parties also stipulated, among other things, that all evidence of record in the Phase I proceedings could be used in support of any claim or defense presented in Phase II of the proceedings. Indeed, they presented overlapping evidence and argument affecting all issues, and many of the Court's earlier Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Dkt.# 151) apply to the merits of the entire case. Accordingly, the Court incorporates its prior findings and conclusions herein.

The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law include revisions to paragraph 57 of the findings of fact and paragraph 42 of the conclusions of law. The Court has reconsidered its previous findings of fact and conclusions of law to include a separate award of compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a for emotional anguish and distress.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Any conclusion of law which is more appropriately characterized as a finding of fact is incorporated herein.
FLSA
1. Phase I of the trial was directed specifically at the Chellen plaintiffs' FLSA claim. The Court set forth 57 findings of fact therein that are directly applicable to the Court's determination of liability on this claim. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1280-91. Those findings need not be repeated in full, as defendants have stipulated that JPC did 1257 not pay the Chellen plaintiffs minimum wage as required by the labor and employment laws of the *1257 United States. Phase I Pretrial Order (Dkt.# 132), Stip. III(E). Defendants have not stipulated, however, to the damages recoverable by the Chellen plaintiffs or to plaintiffs' allegation that John Pickle is individually liable for any violation of the FLSA.
2. Defendants assert that the amounts reflected in Def. Ex. 101 accurately reflect the regular, overtime, and total hours worked by each Chellen plaintiff, as well as the actual wages paid to each worker, the minimum wage difference, the overtime difference and the gross total difference between the amount paid by JPC and the amounts owed under the FLSA to each Chellen plaintiff other than Mohammed "Hassan" Usman. Usman was not named as a plaintiff in Case No. 02-CV-85-CVFHM, but the EEOC apparently filed suit on his behalf in Case No. 02-CV-979-CVE-FHM. Usman settled a related claim for wages through the United States Department of Labor ("DOL").[2] The total amount set forth in Def. Ex. 101 is $86,919.48, less $2,250.13 (owed to Usman), which equals $84,669.35.
3. Defendants contend that they are entitled to offsets for JPC's expenditures for the Chellen plaintiffs' housing, food, medical needs, and telephone calls. Defendants offered the testimony of Christina Pickle, wife of defendant John Pickle, as to the costs incurred by defendants for housing and other items for which defendants 'seek credit. Ph. II Tr. at 879-82. For lodging, the defendants seek $4.50 per plaintiff per day, for a total of $23,679.00. Def. Ex. 62-E-2. Defendants seek a total of $16,011.81 as an offset for food, Def. Ex. 62-D-2; $8,062.62 for medical expenses, Def. Ex. 62-F-2; and $2,177.24 for telephone expenses, Def. Ex. 62-G-2. Although defendants initially sought credits for travel and transportation costs as well as uniforms and tools, they have abandoned those requests. See Def. Prop. Findings and Conclusions, Dkt. # 199, at 3-4. Therefore, the total amount of credit sought by the defendants is $49,930.67.
4. The EEOC's expert witness testified that offsets for housing against FLSA wages are allowed to an employer where the benefit is primarily to the employee as opposed to the employer. If allowed, an offset for housing is calculated as (a) the cost of the structure divided by the number of employees; (b) the fair value of the housing; or (c) the reasonable value charged by the employer. Ph. II Tr. at 926. However, the expert concluded that the costs for housing provided by defendants to the Chellen plaintiffs should not offset the minimum and overtime wages owed. He reasoned that: living conditions in the dormitory were sub-standard; the Chellen plaintiffs did not use the facility voluntarily; and the defendants used an arbitrary "rental" cost in calculating what they argued was a fair market value for the housing. Ph. II Tr. at 924-28. The Court finds that JPC and John Pickle are not entitled to an offset for housing.
1258 5. Plaintiffs argue that defendants' request for an offset for food is *1258 unconscionable, given the limited quantity and poor quality of the food provided by defendants to the Chellen plaintiffs. However, the Chellen plaintiffs were fed three meals per day. The Court finds that JPC and John Pickle are entitled to an offset for food. The EEOC concedes that a credit for medical treatment provided to the Chellen plaintiffs would be appropriate, and the Court finds it an appropriate offset. Finally, the Court finds that an offset for telephone expenses is appropriate.

6. The Chellen plaintiffs argue, for purposes of recovering liquidated damages, that the following facts give rise to a finding that defendants' violation of the law was willful and not in good faith: defendants sought "cheap labor," as stated by John Pickle, see Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1280 (FOF ¶ 1), 1290 (FOF ¶ 2); defendants knowingly obtained improper visas for defendants, see id. at 1282 (FOF ¶ 10), 1289 (FOF ¶ 48), 1290 (FOF ¶ 52), 1291 (FOF ¶ 57); defendants misrepresented to U.S. officials that the Chellen plaintiffs would be part of a "training" program, id. at 1281 (FOF 116), 1285 (FOF ¶ 28), 1289 (FOF ¶ 49); defendants backdated employee evaluations in an effort to prove that the Chellen plaintiffs were "trainees," id. at 1284 (FOF ¶ 23), 1288 (FOF ¶ 40); and defendants routed wages to the Chellen plaintiffs through defendants' Indian recruitment agent, AL Samit International ("AL Samit"), id. at 1282-83 (FOF ¶¶ 12, 13), 1290 (FOF ¶ 52). John Pickle directly participated in the creation and execution of the plan to bring the plaintiffs to Oklahoma. Id. at 1280 (FOF ¶ 1), 1281 (FOF ¶ 7), 1287 (FOF ¶ 38), 1290 (FOF ¶ 52). The Court finds that John Pickle is personally liable for violation of FLSA. The Court further finds that an award of liquidated damage under the FLSA, equal to the amount of wages owed, is appropriate as against both defendants.
7. Given the Court's findings of fact as to the parties' wage stipulations, the Court concludes that all of the Chellen plaintiffs other than Mohammed "Hassan" Usman, who settled his wage claim through the DOL, are entitled to compensatory damages in an amount equal to the gross total difference between the amount paid by JPC and the amounts owed under the FLSA to each Chellen plaintiff (other than Usman), less offsets itemized in Jt. Ex. 2 for expenses related to food, medical needs, and telephone expenses. The total amount is $86,919.48 less $2,250.13 (owed to Usman), or $84,669.35, less $26,251.67 (offsets), for a total amount of $58,417.68, plus an equal amount of liquidated damages.
Civil Rights (Title VII and 1981)
8. Each of the Chellen plaintiffs is a citizen of India. Defendants dispute that the Chellen plaintiffs' race differs from their own; defendants do not dispute that the Chellen plaintiffs' national origin is East Indian. The EEOC asserts that the race of the Chellen plaintiffs is Asian; defendants assert that no evidence was presented to show that the Chellen plaintiffs are of a race other than the Caucasian race. The Chellen plaintiffs do not specify their race but simply state that they are citizens of India and that "white," "American" employees at JPC received different treatment. See Pl. Proposed Findings and Conclusions, Dkt. # 200, at 32-36. The Court finds it unnecessary to make a determination of the Chellen plaintiffs' race, given its findings and conclusions based on the Chellen plaintiffs' national origin, ethnicity, and culture.
Disparate Treatment
Wages
1259 9. The Chellen plaintiffs were qualified for the jobs for which they were recruited, *1259 tested, transported, and employed and which, ultimately, they performed at JPC. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1288-89 (FOF ¶¶ 43-46). The Chellen plaintiffs who worked as welders, fitters, roll/break operators, and electrical maintenance workers were paid less than their non-Indian JPC counterparts who had similar skills, abilities, and job duties. See Pl.Ex. 62B; Ph. II Tr. at 827-29. JPC did not employ any non-Indian cooks.
Testing
10. The Court's prior findings detail the testing requirements for the Chellen plaintiffs in comparison with nonIndian JPC employees. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1283-84 (FOF ¶¶ 17-19). In short, JPC required all the Chellen plaintiffs to pass skill tests in India before they were hired, and the welders were required to pass a second test when they arrived at JPC in the United States. JPC required its non-Indian welders to pass only one test before hire, and it did not consistently require fitters to pass a skill test.
Classifications
11. Unlike `their practice for new hires of non-Indians, JPC managers did not view the test results, qualification documents, certifications, or employment histories of the Chellen plaintiffs before assigning them a classification upon which to base their pay. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1283 (FOF ¶ 14). Although the record is unclear on this

point, it appears that JPC managers initially assigned most of the Chellen plaintiffs an entry level "C" classification, although some may have received a "B" classification. Id. (FOF ¶ 15); Pl.Ex. 66. None received an "A" classification.
12. Near the end of the time the Chellen plaintiffs were at JPC, JPC managers evaluated and reclassified several of the Chellen plaintiffs, but the Chellen plaintiffs were unaware of these evaluations or reclassifications until the lawsuit was filed. Id. at 1284 (FOF ¶¶ 23-24), 1288 (FOF 1140); see Def. Exs. 22G, 26G; Pl.Ex. 66. JPC did not offer the Chellen plaintiffs the same opportunities it offered its non-Indian employees for evaluation, selfassessment, and reclassification for pay increases related to performance.
Job Assignments
13. JPC required the Indian employees to perform jobs such as grinding welds, painting, sandblasting, and insulating, as well as janitorial duties, kitchen duties, and yard work unrelated to the skills for which the Chellen plaintiffs were hired. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1284 (FOF ¶ 21), 1286 (FOF ¶ 32). The Chellen plaintiffs did not view these jobs as desirable or part of their employment responsibilities. Prior to the arrival of the Chellen plaintiffs, these jobs were performed either by the least skilled and lowest ranking non-Indian JPC employees or not at all. Id.; see Phase I Trial Transcript, entered Jan. 20, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as "Ph. I Tr.") at 389-92, 622-23, 1150-52, 1180-81; Ph. II Tr. at 215-16, 593-94.
14. Five of the Chellen plaintiffs were also required to assist in the replacement of a septic tank. The septic tank was attached to a small house which served as the Chellen plaintiffs' original quarters. Replacement of the tank was required because of JPC's failure to anticipate and prepare for the use of the bathroom by more than 30 men. See Ph. II Tr. at 340, 532-33, 542-43, 780-82. In addition, JPC required the Chellen plaintiffs to work on the conversion of a building at the JPC facility into a dormitory. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1284 (FOF ¶ 21), 1285 (FOF ¶ 29). Similarly-situated JPC non-Indian employees were not required to perform the job assignments 1260 considered by the Chellen plaintiffs to be undesirable. See *1260 Ph. I Tr. at 622-23, 865, 989-92, 1176-77; Ph. II Tr. at 98-101, 110, 184-85, 208, 287-94, 334-36, 532-33, 542-43, 588-90, 611, 629-30, 662, 773-74, 780-82.
Restrictions
15. JPC restricted the Chellen plaintiffs' movement, communications, privacy, worship, and access to health care. No similar restrictions were placed on JPC's non-Indian employees. Many of the facts applicable to this comparison are also relevant to the Chellen plaintiffs' tort claims.
16. As set forth in the Court's prior findings and conclusions, immediately upon the Chellen plaintiffs' arrival in Tulsa, defendants placed the Chellen plaintiffs' passports, visas, return-trip airline tickets, and 1-94 Forms in a safe to which the Chellen plaintiffs had no access. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1282 (FOF ¶ 11). Defendants denied access to the documents even when the Chellen plaintiffs requested it in writing. Pl.Ex. 46; Ph. II Tr. at 330-31, 636, 677-78. JPC ultimately refused to release the passports and visas of the Chellen plaintiffs until the Court ordered the release soon after the lawsuit was filed. See Minutes, Dkt. # 6.
17. JPC restricted the Chellen plaintiffs' ability to leave JPC in several other ways, as set forth in the Court's prior findings and conclusions. See Chellen 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 31). JPC employee Sharon Sartain provided transportation to the Chellen plaintiffs at her convenience in a small bus that could transport only 17 persons at a time. Ph. II Tr. at 771-72, 960-61, 965-66, 978.
18. Defendants point out that Sharon Sartin provided transportation to Catholic churches, Hindu temples and Islamic mosques. Ph. II Tr. at 427, 570, 956-58, 963-64. Further, some of the Chellen plaintiffs used the pedestrian gate that led into Sharon Sartin's yard to walk to a local church. Ph. I Tr. at 346, 956-57. One admitted that he used public bus transportation to look for other work in Tulsa. See Ph. II Tr. at 130-31. Another testified that he used other forms of public transportation for a trip to New York. Ph. II Tr. at 229-30.
19. The Chellen plaintiffs testified that, in some instances, friends or family had to provide significant personal information to "check them out" for short visits off the JPC premises. Id. at 306-07, 466-67, 588. Defendants initially told the Chellen plaintiffs that, if they left JPC premises, they might be harmed by Americans who were angry about the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and further, that black residents of the surrounding area

were dangerous and could shoot them. Ph. II Tr. at 295, 448, 581, 601, 637-38, 659, 979. Later, defendants told the Chellen plaintiffs that, if the Chellen plaintiffs left the premises without permission, they would be reported to law enforcement authorities and jailed. Ph. I. Tr. at 1102-04; Ph. II Tr. at 102, 187, 189, 202, 301-02, 461-62, 498, 632-33.
20. Eventually, an armed guard was hired to prevent "unauthorized departures" by the Chellen plaintiffs from the facility. See Ph. II Tr. at 203-04, 452, 502, 522-23, 585-86, 777, 785-86. The main gates at the JPC were locked over the Thanksgiving holiday. Ph. I Tr. at 375, 486; Ph. II Tr. at 446-48, 451, 966. Two plaintiffs testified that, on one occasion, their dormitory door was chained shut during the night and the guard was posted outside the door. 1261 Id. at 452-55, 491-92, 778-80, 822-23.[3] One Chellen plaintiff testified *1261 that, on one occasion when he left the property unaccompanied, he was picked up, admonished, and returned to the facility. Id. at 86-87. Several Chellen plaintiffs who left the facility unauthorized were labeled "runners" on JPC timecards. See Pl. Exs. 31 A(1), 31A(2). At least one plaintiff left his personal belongings behind when he departed. Ph. II Tr. at 615. Trial testimony implicated John Pickle as stating, with regard to one of the plaintiffs who left JPC after using without permission and causing damage to a company truck, "Even if he is hiding underground, I'll pull him up by his hair and bring him to justice. And I am an American, I would be able to do that." Id. at 109.
21. Defendants also monitored the Chellen plaintiffs' off-duty computer Internet activity and email communications in an effort to enforce the unauthorized leave policy. Ph. II Tr. at 307-08, 591-92, 771. The Court previously found that defendants recorded some of the Chellen plaintiffs' telephone conversations without their knowledge. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 31); Ph. II Tr. at 308, 592. Further, JPC required the Chellen plaintiffs to sign "Personal Conduct Agreements" by which they agreed that they would not "place any phone calls, e-mails, or have any other communication . . ." to plan or aid unauthorized leave from JPC. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 32); e.g., Def. Exs. 21K, 30H, 31V, 32V, 39R.
22. Defendants paid four of the Chellen plaintiffs extra money to be "leadmen," whose primary responsibilities were to watch over the other Chellen plaintiffs and report to JPC managers any "unauthorized" activities outside the facility. See Chellen II, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 31); Ph. II Tr. at 149-50, 183-84, 468, 561-63; Def. Exs. 19H, 22H, 31N, 45Q. Prior to Thanksgiving, John Pickle gave one of the leadmen, Marshall Suares, the keys to the locked gates and specifically instructed him not to allow anyone out of the dormitory on Thanksgiving. Ph. II Tr. at 448. Suares followed that instruction. Id. at 451. Some of the plaintiffs nonetheless crawled through a drainage ditch and under the barbed wire perimeter fence of the JPC premises. Ph. I Tr. at 487, 776; see Ph. II Tr. at 966.
23. John Pickle had the "leadmen" read an email authored by Ray Murzello, an Indian who served as JPC's principal recruiter and Director of Marketing. The email contains the threat of deportation for two Chellen plaintiffs identified by defendants as "troublemakers" or potential "runaways." Pl.Ex. 40; Ph. II Tr. at 188-92, 237-38, 665-66; see Ph. I Tr. at 1101-02. The Court has already detailed what could be described as an attempt at a "forced deportation" for seven other Chellen plaintiffs. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 33).
24. In Phase II of the trial, defendants presented the testimony of Captain Bill Bass, a member of the Tulsa County Sheriff's Department. He testified that he arrived at JCP when the Chellen plaintiffs were getting on the bus for their departure back to India, and he saw no indication of a disturbance or any attitude of resistance by the plaintiffs Ph. II Tr. at 736-38, 740-41, 751-52. He did follow the bus to the bank, and then to the airport. Id. at 738-43.
25. Plaintiffs considered the presence of the police officers intimidating. Id. at 214-15, 474-75, 802-08. Further, part of the event included unnecessary physical intimidation, invasion of privacy while the "deportees" dressed, 1262 showered, and used *1262 the bathroom, and a prohibition on communications between the co-workers. Ph. II Tr. at 93-96, 214-15, 308-09, 473-76, 595-96, 798-809. John Pickle personally participated in the attempted deportation. Id. 95, 214, 801-03; see Ph. I Tr. at 396-97.
26. Defendants' restrictions on movement of the Chellen plaintiffs affected the Chellen plaintiffs' ability to worship freely. Although all of the men were from India, they had different languages, diets, and faiths. Some were Hindu, others Christian, and a few were Muslim. The first Chellen plaintiffs to arrive at JPC testified that defendants, and John Pickle in particular, would not permit them to attend church services regularly, although eventually they were

permitted to go. Ph. II Tr. at 87-89, 303-06, 463-65, 633. When one Catholic member of the second group to arrive asked to go to church, John Pickle questioned him as to whether he actually believed in God before acceding to his request. Id. at 463. When another Chellen plaintiff asked to go to church, Pickle told him that he should just stay in the dorm and watch the Playboy channel. Id. at 303-04, 633.
27. The Chellen plaintiffs who were Catholic testified that defendants eventually permitted Sharon Sartin to transport them to Mass. E.g., id. at 324. However, they were required to immediately report back to the bus after Mass for return to .the JPC facility. This constraint left no time for them to speak with priests or parishioners. Ph. II Tr. at 305-06, 463-64, 633. On one occasion when they were delayed in returning to the JPC facility after Mass, John Pickle became very angry. Id. at 600, 984-85. When the Hindu Chellen, plaintiffs realized that their worship opportunities would be similarly limited, they built themselves a small personal shrine in a makeshift cabinet for worshiping in the warehouse. See Ph. II Tr. at 567-68; Def. Ex. 58T.
28. John Pickle also discouraged the Chellen plaintiffs from attending church by telling them that the Christian or "church" people who reached out to them were breaking the law and would be "punished," or jailed. Ph. II Tr. at 212, 303, 598-99, 633. Defendants initially refused to allow the Chellen plaintiffs to observe Christmas as they wished. See id. at 88-89, 306-07, 464-67. Defendants offered to drive the men to see Christmas lights, but only a few men at a time could fit on the small bus. Id. at 772, 978. Marshall Suares was able to convince defendants to permit plaintiffs to go to church, and to visit with friends or family over the 2001 Christmas holiday after promising to be personally responsible for the men who left and taking personal information from the people whom they would visit. Id. at 306-07, 465-67. Defendants argue that three of the nine plaintiffs who testified made arrangements with JPC employees to attend Thanksgiving dinners and bicycle races off the JPC premises.
29. Some of the men were able to attend a nearby Pentecostal church and met Mark Massey, a man who would assist with their final departure from the JPC premises. Ph. II Tr. at 212, 346-47, 598-99, 606, 667-70, 677-79. On February 5, 2002, plaintiff and leadman Marshall Suares testified that he called Massey, who came to the JPC premises with three or four vehicles and a local television station cameraman. Suares testified that, when the Chellen plaintiffs began entering the vehicles, Joe Reeble raised his hands and shouted: "Stop, stop! You are on private property. You are not supposed to take my men. Leave them here." Id. at 485-86, 680. Reeble followed the vehicles to Massey's house and parked his vehicle in front of the house. Id.
1263 *1263 30. Finally, defendants restricted the Chellen plaintiffs' access to health care. The Court previously found that defendants were inattentive to the medical needs of the Chellen plaintiffs and carried no workers' compensation or health insurance for them. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 30). Testimony in Phase II of the proceedings demonstrated that defendants made arrangements for a few of the Chellen plaintiffs to obtain medical or dental care, but denied the requests of others. Ph. II Tr. at 102-03, 502-04, 634-36, 775-76, 784-86. John Pickle and other JPC officials made comments indicating that they viewed the Chellen plaintiffs' health issues as minor matters or hypochondria. Ph. I Tr. at 353-54, 362-65, 894-95. There was no evidence indicating that defendants limited the access of non-Indian JPC employees to health care. See Ph. II Tr. at 830-34 (discussing health plan and sick leave policy for non-Indian JPC employees).
Living Conditions
31. Many of the facts applicable to the comparison in living conditions are more relevant to the Chellen plaintiffs' tort claims, but consideration of these conditions goes to the amount, if any, of offset for the wages awarded to the Chellen plaintiffs as damages. Defendants did not require the non-Indian JPC employees to live at the JPC facility. Hence, the non-Indian JPC employees were not subjected to the same substandard living conditions as the Chellen plaintiffs. The Court described some of these conditions in its prior findings. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1285-86 (FOF ¶¶ 29-30).
32. Defendants describe the converted warehouse and office space as including a room with living room furniture, a large color television, two computers with Internet access, and places for hanging work uniforms and storing work boots. See generally Def. Exs. 58A-58GG. There was also a second large room, in which some of the plaintiffs slept in bunk beds, which contained tables and equipment to make tea, coffee and other beverages. All of the other rooms in which plaintiffs slept were individual rooms with either doors or partitions. In addition, a modern bathroom facility in the building contained 16 lavatories, 8 showers, and two washers and dryers which

were supplied by three 100 gallon sequentially firing hot water heaters. The building also had toilets that had been specifically modified to include a hand-held hose for washing. The dormitory had windows which could be opened, doors which could be opened to provide ingress and egress, and a suitable heating and ventilation system. Id.
33. Contrary to defendants' description, the Chellen plaintiffs described the dormitory in which they lived as similar to a "refugee camp" or place to house displaced persons after a "disaster." Ph. II Tr. at 283-84; see generally Pl.Ex. 22 (photo of dorm); Pl.Ex. 50 (videotape). Some of the mattresses on which they slept were obtained by JPC from a salvage store and their beds were assigned by number pursuant to a lottery. Id. at 183, 581-82, 660-61, 870, 874; Def. Ex. 62E-13, at 98, 108. The warehouse dormitory, with its concrete floors and partial walls, was noisy and uncomfortable with no place for personal belongings. Id. at 175, 178. Several Chellen plaintiffs described their inability to obtain proper rest because of the openness of the building and the disturbances resulting from the arrival and departure of day and night shift crews. See Ph. II Tr. at 175-76, 331-32, 559, 582-83, 610, 660-61; see generally Def. Exs. 58A-58GG. Two of the Chellen plaintiffs testified that 1264 they were exposed to radiation from a machine in the manufacturing building located within inches of the exterior *1264 wall of the dormitory. Ph. II Tr. at 174-75, 559. The cooks were required to live in a small room adjacent to the kitchen because of the approximately 18 hours of work they were required to perform each day. Ph. II Tr. at 64, 67-68. The Chellen plaintiffs complained about their assigned quarters and did not choose to live there voluntarily.
34. The Chellen plaintiffs also complained about the nature, quantity, and quality of the food provided to them by defendants. Again, there is no evidence that JPC furnished its non-Indian employees with food, but these facts are relevant to the offsets, if any, for the wages to which the Chellen plaintiffs are entitled, as well as any punitive damages awarded. While the non-Indian JPC workers were compensated at a rate of pay that would allow them to feed themselves, JPC deducted from the Chellen plaintiffs' paychecks fifty dollars per month for food. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 30).
35. John Piekle essentially admitted to rationing food for the Chellen plaintiffs. Ph. I Tr. at 317-19. One plaintiff testified that John Pickle would sometimes sit down next to the Chellen plaintiffs while they were eating and say "Do you eat this much food in India?" Ph. II Tr. at 284, 628. The Chellen plaintiffs rejected a statement by Ray Murzello, who stated that the food 'at JPC's facility was better than what they had in India, where they were starving, at least according to Murzello. Ph. II Tr. at 60-61. A representative of the company that provided food ordered by JPC for the Chellen plaintiffs testified to the quantity of food ordered by JPC. That quantity was based on a representation by John Pickle that he needed to feed 25-30 men, and that allocation did not change over time. Id. at 718, 720-21.
36. The Chellen plaintiffs complained particularly of the lack of milk, which was a dietary concern for a number of the Hindu workers who were vegetarian. Ph. II Tr. at 115-16, 173-74, 559-61. On one occasion, John Holcomb, JPC's Manufacturing Support Manager, served the milk himself to ensure that each Chellen plaintiff received only one small glass during mealtime. Id. at 55. On another occasion, John Pickle responded to a request for milk by dipping a piece of bread in a cup of water and said, "If I can eat this, you can also eat it." Id. at 560. Despite his knowledge of the dietary concerns of certain Chellen plaintiffs, he continued to restrict the quantity of milk provided. Ph. I. Tr. at 482-83.
37. One of the two cooks among the Chellen plaintiffs testified that he was provided with inadequate cooking utensils and facilities. Ph. II Tr. at 48, 53, 83. He testified that he was even made to serve rotten apples, although a visit by health inspectors subsequently led to a disposal of large quantities of food and utensils. Id. at 57-59. He tried to fashion the American food provided to him into food that would be more palatable to the men who were accustomed to the cultural and religious diets of India, as the Muslim workers could not eat pork, the Hindu workers could not eat beef, and the vegetarians could not eat meat or eggs. Id. at 115-16.
Hostile Work Environment
38. The conduct of JPC employees and John Pickle subjected the Chellen plaintiffs to harassment in the nature of a hostile work environment characterized by abusive language, demeaning job assignments, and threats and intimidation based on their national origin. Chellen plaintiff Jagdish Prajapati testified that he was at the private

1265 property of John Pickle when John Pickle's grandson was also present, and John Pickle stated to his grandson, *1265 "These are my Indian animals I brought from India to work." Ph. II Tr. at 519. Prajapati also stated that his first supervisor used obscene language in reference to the Indians, and, although Prajapati complained to John Pickle, nothing was done to stop the conduct. Id. at 520-21. Chellen plaintiff U.C. Patel testified that John Pickle once stated, "bloody Indians work here and live here." Id. at 558.
39. Two of the Chellen plaintiffs testified that John Pickle called them his "Indian dogs." Ph. II Tr. at 601-02, 686-87. The cook, Toofan Mondal, told of an occasion when John Pickle came into the kitchen with Ray Murzello's son, who was Indian. John Pickle called the boy over, referring to him as an "Indian dog," and called to the boy like a puppy. Id. at 105. George Panackalpuracal recalled a meeting at which John Pickle called the Chellen plaintiffs "dirty" and accused them of unsanitary practices. Id. at 638-39.
40. Chellen plaintiff Bharathakumaran Nair testified that, when he complained about doing janitorial work, John Holcomb followed him to his room, repeatedly called him "lazy," and threatened to send him back to India. Ph. I Tr. at 705-08. Nair stated that Holcomb specifically said, "[T]his is why Americans say that Indians are lazy people." Id. at 708. According to Nair, Holcomb raised his arm as if to strike Nair. Id. at 708-09. Another Chellen plaintiff testified that he witnessed Holcomb yelling at Nair, suspending him from work for the day, sending him to his room, and calling him a "lazy Indian." Ph. II Tr. at 293. On another occasion, Holcomb raised a chair over his head, threatened to hit one of the Chellen plaintiffs with it, and beat it against the floor as he verbally berated plaintiff Himanshu Patel. Ph. II. Tr. at 500-01, 563-64.
41. In one incident, John Holcomb called a few of the Chellen plaintiffs into the office of JPC's vice president and chief operating officer, Joe Reeble, to discuss some of the Chellen plaintiffs' complaints. Ph. II Tr. at 195-97, 459-61. In the meeting, Reeble called Gulam Peshimam, the owner of AL Samit.[4] When Reeble described the problems to Peshimam, Peshimam proposed that JPC managers beat the Chellen plaintiffs and "break their damn legs." Ph. I Tr. at 126. Reeble testified that it was just a joke and he laughed. Id. Two of the Chellen plaintiffs testified at the second phase of the proceedings that, when Reeble laughed, he also said "not a bad idea." Ph. II Tr. at 197, 461.
42. The threat of deportation was especially significant in defendants' creation of a hostile working environment. The Chellen plaintiffs feared Gulam Peshimam and the harm he could inflict on themselves or their families if they were made to return to India. E.g., Ph. II Tr. at 138, 190-97, 462, 816. As set forth in the Court's prior findings, many of these plaintiffs left good jobs or their own successful businesses, and some obtained loans from family and friends to pay large "fees" required by AL Samit. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1281 (FOF ¶ 4.) They had debts to repay, and they believed that a vindictive Gulam Peshimam would seek retribution and make it impossible for them to return to their former jobs and businesses or obtain other work to repay their debts.
1266 *1266 43. Chellen plaintiff Jeron Peter testified that he was called to the office of John Holcomb, and Ray Murzello was also present. After Holcomb reviewed a list of Peter's faults, Peter asked Murzello why he was being treated in that manner. Murzello responded: "You are an Indian. That is why they treat you this way, and that is all you expect here because they don't like Indians." Ph. II Tr. at 333. Peter testified that Holcomb often called him into the office and stated: "I don't like Indian guys. I'm going to send you back to India." Id. at 334. On one occasion, Peter and an American fitter were in Holcomb's office with Chellen plaintiff Baburajan Pillai. Holcomb shouted at Peter and called him lazy. Id. at 338. The American fitter said to Holcomb, "[H]e's an Indian. He's no good. And, you know, we'll send him back." Id. at 339. Peter also testified that Holcomb and Dale Chasteen, JPC's Director of Manufacturing, called him a "fucking Indian." Id.
44. At a meeting called after one of the Chellen plaintiffs had damaged a company truck, JPC managers and John Pickle verbally abused the' Chellen plaintiffs by calling them "Indian bastards," "fucking bastards," "fucking Indians," and "sons of bitches." Ph. II Tr. at 106-09, 198-200, 455-57, 497-98. Dale Chasteen, JPC's Director of Manufacturing, went into a tirade, cursing at the Chellen plaintiffs, implying that they had no jobs in India and were starving there when John Pickle hired them, and stating that "Americans, we know what to do, how to deal with guys like you." Ray Murzello's wife, who was interpreting for the Indians at the meeting, began to cry. Id. at 456-57. Expert witness Florence Burke confirmed that, in private interviews, many of the Chellen plaintiffs told

her of the names they were called at the JPC facility, such as "52 Indian donkeys," "dirty Indian," "Indian bastard." Id. at 406-07.
45. At a meeting in January 2002, JPC managers told the Chellen plaintiffs that, by American laws or rules, they were required to perform any tasks they were asked to do, including any and all cleaning or undesirable tasks. Ph. II Tr. at 110, 184-86, 291-93, 588-90, 670-71. JPC managers then asked the Chellen plaintiffs who refused to agree to this demand to move to another side of the room, and all but three or four moved. Id. John Holcomb reacted later by spitting on the floor when the Chellen plaintiffs attempted to greet him. Id. at 294, 591. Holcomb also threatened one of the leadmen with demotion as a result of the leadman's failure to agree to the tasks. Id. at 186.
Damages
Compensatory
46. The parties have stipulated to various elements relevant to an award of compensatory damages under Title VII and § 1981. See Ph. II Pre-Trial Order, Dkt. # 178. These include: the number of days worked by each Chellen plaintiff for JPC per month, as reflected in Def. Ex. 62C; the number of regular and overtime hours worked for JPC by each Chellen plaintiff (with the exception of the cooks), Def. Ex. 76; the amount of money paid by the Chellen plaintiffs to AL Samit during the recruitment process, Def. Ex. 77; and the average hourly rate of pay for the non-Indian JPC employees in 2001 and 2002, as calculated by job position and classification within each position, Pl.Ex. 62B. The parties disagree, however, on the classifications and, thus, the pay rate, merited by each of the Chellen plaintiffs.
47. Defendants have submitted wage classifications and calculations based upon evaluations by JPC managers of the Chellen plaintiffs near the end of the Chellen plaintiffs' time at JPC. The evaluations resulted in a scores 1267 from 1-5. For purposes *1267 of trial, JPC's counsel arbitrarily assigned each evaluated plaintiff a classification based upon his score. Those employees scoring 3.5 or below were assigned a "C" classification; those scoring 3.5 to 4.5 were assigned a "B" classification; and those scoring 4.5 or higher were assigned an "A" classification. Id. at C-2. Defendants assert that the cooks and six other plaintiffs were not evaluated, and one additional plaintiff was not given a classification. See Def. Prop. Findings and Conclusions, Dkt. # 199, Ex. C-2. JPC arbitrarily assigned one plaintiff a "C" classification, one an "A" classification, and five were assigned a "B" classification. JPC assigned no classification for the two cooks (JPC # # 129, 130), and did not include them on the accompanying wage classification calculations. Id., Ex. C-3.
48. The Court finds the basis for defendants' classifications unsound. As set forth in the Court's prior findings, the evaluation forms were created in a belated effort to give the appearance of a legitimate training program, although they did confirm that the Chellen plaintiffs performed at a level required of JPC's regular employees. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1284-85 (FOF ¶¶ 23-24), 1288 (FOF ¶ 40). Further examination of the evaluation forms indicates that the plaintiffs were evaluated by six or seven JPC managers or supervisors. Pl.Ex. 66; Def. Exs. IG-48G. Some evaluators consistently gave high scores while others consistently gave low scores. Classifications are actually indicated on many of the evaluation forms, and the classifications generally do not correspond to the scores. For example, welder Poulose Maleril Varkey (JPC # 116) was designated "B Class" although his score was only 1.8. Def. Ex. 16G.U.C. Patel (JPC # 119) earned a 3.4 score but received a "C" classification. Def. Ex. 19G. Bala Raju Salupa (JPC # 122) received an "A" classification even though he had a 2.8 score. Def. Ex. 22G.
49. The EEOC urges the Court to assign each of the Chellen plaintiffs a classification of "A" given the Court's prior findings as to the qualifications, skills, and experience of the group as a whole, Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1281 (FOF ¶ 5), 1288 (FOF ¶¶ 43, 44), as well as the quality of their work while they were at JPC, id. at 1284 (FOF ¶ 20), 1285 (FOF ¶¶ 24, 28), 1288-89 (FOF ¶¶ 45, 47), and the pay earned by many of the representative witnesses in similar employment after they left JPC, id. at 1287 (FOF ¶¶ 36, 37), 1289 (FOF ¶ 46); Ph. II Tr. at 30-31, 156-57, 274-75, 329-30, 432-33, 495, 512-13, 557-58, 579-80, 610, 627, 654; Ph. I. Tr. at 710-14. The Court previously acknowledged the inconsistency between JPC's classification of the Chellen plaintiffs and JPC's classification of non-Indian JPC employees. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1283-84 (FOF ¶¶ 15, 18-19). Given

the lack of reliable evidence as to each individual plaintiff, and the overwhelming evidence regarding the group as a whole, the Court finds that a classification of "A" is appropriate.
50. The EEOC also urges the Court to find that four of the five men who were designated as "leadmen" by JPC managers deserve to be paid the same as the non-Indian JPC leadmen. Four of the five plaintiff leadmen signed a "Personal Agreement" on December 19, 2001 which references the same job descriptions as agreements with JPC leadmen who were not from India. E.g., Ex. 19H; 22H; 31N; 45Q; Ph. I Tr. at 105-10. These agreements show that the plaintiff leadmen were to receive additional $100 per month, separate quarters, different uniforms, 1268 and free food in the JPC cafeteria. Holcomb referred to the leadman who did not sign a *1268 personal agreement as a "dormitory leadman." Ph. I Tr. at 1128-29.
51. The evidence is not persuasive that any of these leadmen actually performed the same duties as the nonIndian JPC leadmen. Instead, it indicates that the defendants recruited these five Chellen plaintiffs to assist JPC managers in controlling and containing the other Chellen plaintiffs and reporting their activities. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (FOF ¶ 31); Ph. I Tr. at 105-10. One leadman specifically testified that he knew the duties of a lead man, but he did not do that work. Ph. II Tr. at 149-50. Instead, he was responsible for organizing the dormitory, taking complaints, explaining the work, and reporting any plans by other Chellen plaintiffs to leave JPC. Id. at 150. Accordingly, the Court finds that the five Chellen plaintiff "leadmen" were not entitled to "leadman" pay commensurate with that received by non-Indian JPC leadmen.
52. The plaintiffs hired by JPC to cook for the other Chellen plaintiffs were not "classified" in the same manner as the other JPC employees and there were no cooks at JPC with whom they could be compared for purposes of determining an appropriate hourly wage. As set forth above, one of these two cooks settled a wage claim with the DOL. The EEOC proposes for the other cook, Toofan Mondal, that he be paid at the rate of pay that approximates (1) what he earned at his first job after JPC ($2,200 per month) in salary exclusive of room and board, and (2) at a rate that is reasonably situated among JPC pay levels, see Pl.Ex. 62B. Assuming forty hours worked per week at his postJPC job, Mondal's wage would be approximately $12.79 per hour. The EEOC submits, for ease of calculation, that Mondal's pay rate at JPC should have been $12 per regular hour and $18 per overtime hour. The Court finds this proposal helpful and fair.
53. Finally, defendants assert that all non-FLSA claims of three Chellen plaintiffs, Joshy Mathappan Aleparambu (JPC # 138), Poulouse Maleril-Varkey (JPC # 116), and Jose Varghese Mannalil (JPC # 113) should be dismissed because these plaintiffs did not submit affidavits or otherwise appear at trial. Pursuant to the parties' Joint Case Management Plan, the Court ordered plaintiffs to submit, by December 17, 2004, affidavits on the part of all plaintiffs who wished to remain in the case. Defendants requested the affidavits in exchange for their agreement to allow plaintiffs to proceed by representative testimony.
54. The affidavits were not filed with the Court, and the Court has no evidence that they were otherwise produced or submitted to defendants. However, no mention was made of dismissal as a sanction for failure to file, produce, or submit the affidavits, either in that order, in subsequent orders, or in the Phase II proceedings. The Court finds that these three individuals should not be dismissed merely because their counsel may have failed to obtain their affidavits, as defendants did not draw this fact to the Court's attention before or during the Phase II proceedings and have not shown any prejudice from the lack of those three affidavits.
55. As discussed below, compensatory damages for discrimination may include damages for mental anguish or emotional distress. While many of the Chellen plaintiffs testified as to their psychological and emotional state during their time at the JPC facility, the EEOC also presented compelling testimony through its expert witness Florence Burke. Burke opined that the Chellen plaintiffs were essentially "trauma" victims, much like those in 1269 worker exploitation cases with which she is *1269 familiar. She testified specifically regarding depression, extreme anxiety, and fear experienced by the Chellen plaintiffs. Ph. II Tr. at 382-84. She maintained that language limitations and unfamiliarity with the civil law and individual rights had the effect of increasing their confusion, hampering understanding of their expectations, and creating stress because of their uncertainty about criminal law and immigration issues. Id. at 384, 394. She also discussed the erosion or undermining of the Chellen plaintiffs' support system of family, culture, and religious faith, especially since they felt they could not communicate freely about their experience with their families in India. Id. at 389-93.

56. Burke acknowledged that defendants treated the Chellen plaintiffs in a positive manner on occasions, but she explained that defendants' practice of coupling this positive treatment with negative treatment kept the Chellen plaintiffs "off-balance" with regard to their expectations and hope, thus increasing their stress. Id. at 397-98. Burke testified as to the Chellen plaintiffs' lack of privacy and ability to communicate as well as their personal discomfort, humiliation, increased isolation, and an atmosphere of distrust caused by their constant awareness of surveillance by JPC and the leadmen recruited from their own group. Id. at 398-400. The leadmen, in particular, experienced additional feelings of isolation and guilt due to their role. Id. at 401-02; see id. at 204-08, 473-76, 485.
57. The EEOC urges the Court to consider the emotional harm caused by the Chellen plaintiffs' health concerns as a result of JPC's alleged food rationing and denial of access to medical attention. The EEOC also urges the Court to consider the emotional harm experienced by the Chellen plaintiffs who were made to perform the dirtiest and lowest-level jobs not being performed by the comparably qualified non-Indian co-workers at JPC. The Court finds that compensatory damages should be awarded to the Chellen plaintiffs for emotional harm suffered as a result of defendants' actions. Accordingly, the Court awards compensatory damages for emotional distress in the amount of $1,000 per Chellen plaintiff, against both defendants, jointly arid severally, for a total of $52,000 on this claim.
58. Given the Court's findings of fact as to the parties' wage stipulations, the Court concludes that all of the Chellen plaintiffs other than Mohammed "Hassan" Usman, who settled his wage claim through the DOL, are entitled to compensatory damages in an amount equal to the difference between the actual wages paid to the Indian employees, as set forth in Def. Ex. 101, and the average hourly wage earned by similarly-situated nonIndian JPC employees according to the job positions and "A" classifications as set forth in Pl.Ex. 62B, less offsets itemized in Jt. Ex. 2 for expenses related to food, medical needs, and telephone services. The Court concludes that the defendants are not entitled to offsets for expenses related to housing, uniforms, tools, and travel. While the amounts for each individual will vary, the total amount awarded for compensatory damages on the EEOC's claims for violations of Title VII and § 1981 is $607,006.85. The amount is the difference between $633,258.52, the amount shown in the "Total Pay Earned" column of the "Class A" calculations set forth in Attachment A of the EEOC's Proposed Findings and Conclusions (Dkt.# 201), less $26,251.67, the amount shown in the "Total Offsets" column of the calculations set forth in Attachment B of the EEOC's Proposed Findings and Conclusions (id.).
Punitive
1270 59. Defendants' actions in obtaining inappropriate visas and setting up *1270 a scheme to pay the Chellen plaintiffs through AL Samit demonstrates that they knew that they were acting in violation of federal law. The hostile work environment they created for the Chellen plaintiffs, and the disparate treatment afforded them, was intentional and discriminatory. Punitive damages may not deter these defendants from malicious and willful conduct based on the race or national origin of future employees, but it may serve to deter other employers from attempting the same. The Court finds that an award of punitive damages against both JPC and John Pickle for their violations of the Chellen plaintiffs' civil rights is appropriate.[5] Accordingly, the Court awards punitive damages in the amount of $1,000 per Chellen plaintiff, against both defendants, jointly and severally, for a total amount of $52,000 on this claim.
State Law Tort Claims
Deceit
Liability
60. As set forth in the Court's prior findings, defendants hired the Chellen plaintiffs after a prior experience of bringing a group of 20 Indian men[6] to Tulsa in preparation for work in Kuwait for joint venture between JPC and a Kuwaiti company. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1280 (FOF ¶¶ 1-2). Defendants contend that they recruited the Chellen plaintiffs for the same purpose, but that purpose was not communicated to the Chellen plaintiffs when they were hired. Id. at 1280 (FOF ¶ 3). The original group of 20 workers stayed at JPC four months, and were

sent to work in Kuwait at the end of that period. Ph. I Tr. at 66-67, 73-79, 81-86; see Pl. Exs. 9-12; Def. Exs. 69-75, 77, 78. Joe Reeble testified that he, Ray Murzello, and John Pickle put together the plan to bring the Chellen plaintiffs to work at JPC in Tulsa as part of the same alleged training program. Ph. I Tr. at 63.
61. Also as set forth in the Court's prior findings, John Pickle personally met with the Chellen plaintiffs, individually, in India. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1281 (FOF ¶ 7); Ph. I Tr. at 406. He knew that they looked to him as a father figure and believed that they would be working for him and not AL Samit. Id. at 414. While translators were present at both the individual and group meetings in India, many, if not all, of the plaintiffs could understand English and understood the promises being made by John Pickle individually. Ph. I Tr. at 691-92; Ph. II Tr. at 434-35; 516. Similar representations were made by AL Samit representatives, as agents of John Pickle and JPC. E.g., Ph. I Tr. at 442-43; Ph. II Tr. at 34-37.
62. The Court's prior findings summarize the sacrifices the Chellen plaintiffs made in reliance on defendants' misrepresentations. They traveled long distances and paid substantial service charges to agents of AL Samit to obtain JPC employment, and they left their jobs, their businesses, and their families to come to the United States. 1271 Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1281 (FOF ¶ 4.) Testimony at Phase II of the trial provided further detail for *1271 these findings. See Ph. II Tr. at 38, 270, 329, 437-38, 494-95, 510, 577-78, 609.
63. The Court has previously described the circumstances of the Chellen plaintiffs' departure from India, and the representations that were made to them by defendants and defendants' agents with regard to the Undertakings and Offer Letters the Chellen plaintiffs were required to sign at that time. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1281-82 (FOF ¶¶ 8-10). When the Chellen plaintiffs inquired as to inconsistencies between what they were promised and certain terms in those documents, defendants told them that the differences were a result of the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and defendants assured them that signing of the documents was a mere formality. Id.; see Ph. I Tr. at 698. The Undertaking, in particular, required the Chellen plaintiffs to "confirm" that they had "neither paid any service charges nor ticket money to M/s. Al Samit International for going to John Pickle Co., INC USA. . . ." Def. Exs. 1F-53F. Defendants claim that they told AL Samit not to collect any fees and that they never knew about the Chellen plaintiffs' payments to AL Samit.
64. At the Phase II trial, a Chellen plaintiff testified that John Pickle personally deflected their concerns by telling them that "everything would be taken care of and "fixed" upon their arrival in America. Ph. II Tr. at 44-45. One of the things that should have been "fixed" were the visas obtained by defendants for the Chellen plaintiffs. As previously described, defendants obtained B1/B2 "business visitor" visas instead of H3 "trainee" visas or H2B "temporary non-immigrant worker" visas. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1282 (FOF ¶ 10), 1290 (FOF ¶¶ 51, 52, 57).
65. During the individual and group meetings in India, defendants and/or their agents represented to the Chellen plaintiffs that they would receive good wages and overtime pay, free food, free living accommodations, free insurance, free medical services, an American driver's license for those plaintiffs who had Indian licenses, a cell phone, and a job for at least two years. Ph. I. Tr. at 454, 689; Ph. II Tr. at 160-61, 435-36; see Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1280-81 (FOF ¶¶ 4, 7). In Phase I of the trial, one Chellen plaintiff testified he was told he would be paid from $650 per month plus overtime, with pay increases after six months, to $1,200 per month after 18 months. Ph. I. Tr. at 442-43. Other testimony indicated that they were promised $800 per month. Id. at 689. The Court finds that defendants made the misrepresentations as to pay, food, insurance, and duration of the job as positive assertions that they knew were false, or that they made recklessly without knowledge of the truth. Defendants had prior experience with recruiting workers from India, and they used that experience to attempt to expand their labor force in a manner that violated U.S. law and took unfair advantage of the workers they recruited.
66. In Phase II of the trial, several plaintiffs testified that they relied on representations made by AL Samit and/or John Pickle on behalf of JPC, and such reliance caused them to pay monies to AL Samit or its subagents before the Chellen plaintiffs executed the written "Undertakings" and "Offer Letters." Ph. II Tr. at 38-40, 167-68, 251-52, 281, 437, 516-17, 558, 605, 620-21, 691, 767-68, 821-22. Some testified that they were offered the same amount of money, or less, as they agreed to accept in the Undertakings and Offer Letters, or what they were actually paid by JPC. Id. at 545, 603-05, 620-22, 640-41. Others testified that they were to receive more in wages than set 1272 forth in the *1272 Undertakings and Offer Letters. Id. at 41, 133-34, 168-69, 691, 766. The Court finds that defendants acted with the intention that their false material misrepresentations be acted upon. They intended that

the Chellen plaintiffs would act upon their misrepresentations by agreeing to work for defendants in Tulsa, and by traveling to Tulsa to perform that work. The Chellen plaintiffs relied on the misrepresentation to their own detriment. As set forth above, they traveled long distances and paid substantial service charges to agents of AL Samit to obtain JPC employment, and they left their jobs, their businesses, and their families to come to the United States. They suffered detriment in the form of wages lower than expected, poor living conditions and food, and unwarranted restrictions on their movement, communications, worship opportunities, privacy, and access to health care. They also endured a discrimination due to their national origin through disparate treatment and a hostile work environment. Plaintiffs have established fraud by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.
67. The Proposal on Manpower Training Between AL Samit International and John Pickle Company Inc., dated September 30, 2001 (131.Ex.25), indicates that JPC would pay the Chellen plaintiffs as follows:
&squf; Welders0907USD 550 per month (based on 40 hours per week + 1.5 times overtime)
&squf; Fitters0907USD 500 per month (based on 40 hours per week + 1.5 times overtime)
&squf; Electrical Maintenance Technician0907USD 500 per month (based on 40 hours per week + 1.5 times overtime)
&squf; Roll Operators0907USD 500 per month (based on 40 hours per week + 1.5 times overtime)
&squf; Cooks0907USD 400 per month (based on 40 hours per week + 1.5 times overtime)
Pl.Ex. 25, at 3 ¶ 22. JPC also agreed that the work hours for the Chellen plaintiffs would be an average of 53 hours per week, which included 13 hours overtime. Id. at 2 ¶ 6. The Proposal also indicates that JPC would provide to the Chellen plaintiffs health insurance, accommodations, three meals a day, transportation from "residence to the works" and for shopping once a week, and leave to include eight public holidays plus annual leave after a year, among other things. Id. at 1, 2, ¶¶ 2, 3, 4, 5, 7.
68. The Offer Letters to each Chellen Plaintiff reflect the hours set forth in the Proposal. See Def. Exs. 1 E-51 E. The Offer Letters represent that the welders were to be paid for a minimum of 13 hours overtime, and a total minimum wage per month of $794. All of the other Chellen plaintiffs except the cook were to be paid a minimum of 13 hours overtime, and a total minimum wage per month of $722. The cook was promised $100 of fixed overtime per month and $500 in regular wages per month. Def. Ex. 30E.
69. Contrary to the representations made to the Chellen plaintiffs in the Offer Letters, defendants paid them between $2.89 and $3.17 per hour, Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1282 (FOF ¶ 11), which would have meant a monthly paycheck for regular hours in an amount between $462.40 and $507.20. The Chellen plaintiffs were also charged a monthly fee of $50, which was deducted directly from their paychecks. As discussed above, the living conditions were far from what the Chellen plaintiffs were promised. The cooks, in particular, were not provided adequate facilities, cookware, and utensils necessary to cook for 30 men, much less 52. See Ph. II Tr. at 47-48, 1273 53. The *1273 Chellen plaintiffs' access to medical care was sometimes restricted, and defendants never provided them with insurance, a driver's license, a cell phone, or a job beyond the few months they were employed at JPC.
Damages
70. After the Chellen plaintiffs left JPC on February 5, 2002, the Chellen plaintiffs were prohibited from gainful employment by immigration laws and the terms of the visas procured for them by the defendants. Until they began receiving authorization to work in November 2002, most of them relied on charitable organizations and American citizens for their survival. See Ph. II Tr. at 112, 340-41, 499-500. As stipulated by the parties, the Chellen plaintiffs were authorized to work after their departure from JPC on the dates indicated by Certification Letters issued by the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement. Pl.Ex. 81. Although the plaintiffs were promised wages for two years after their arrival at the JPC facility in Tulsa, the Chellen plaintiffs have stipulated that they do not seek pay for wages lost as a result of the deceit beyond the certification dates cited in the Certification Letters. Ph. II Pretrial Order, Dkt. # 178, at III(F). For some of those plaintiffs, the date is November 18, 2002; for others, it is November 26, 2002. Pl.Ex. 81.

71. The Chellen plaintiffs assert that, by November 30, 2002,[7] most of them would have been authorized to work and would have had the opportunity to obtain work in the United States. Pl. Ph. II Proposed Findings and Conclusions, Dkt. # 200, at 38. This date is almost ten months after the February 5, 2002 departure date from JPC for the Chellen plaintiffs remaining after the attempted deportation of seven Chellen plaintiffs. Since the pay promised to defendants was per month, the Court finds this ten-month period appropriate for calculating deceit damages. Deceit damages for the period of time the Chellen plaintiffs worked at JPC prior to their departure on February 5, 2002 are subsumed in and would be duplicative of any damages awarded for violations of the FLSA, Title VII, and § 1981 as those damages are more, per month, than what plaintiffs were offered. While some of the plaintiffs left earlier than February 5, 2002, the record is not clear as to the dates those plaintiffs left. Consequently, the Court will consider only this ten-month period an appropriate measure for such damages.
72. As the factual basis for deceit damages during this ten-month period, since the testimony at trial was not clear as to exactly what each Chellen plaintiff was promised, the Court accepts the amount set forth in the Offer Letter for each Chellen plaintiff. Although that amount varies by job duty, at approximately $750 per month, the total amount of deceit damages is $7,500 per Chellen plaintiff. Since there are 52 plaintiffs, the total amount is $390,000. This amount does not include the overtime the plaintiffs were promised, as it is not possible to calculate how much overtime, or at what rate, each plaintiff would have expected when defendants, through their agent, AL Samit, deceived or defrauded the Chellen plaintiffs. In addition, defendants are entitled to the amounts each paid to AL Samit to obtain their employment with JPC. This amount is set forth in Def. Ex. 102 and, although 1274 *1274 the amount varies by individual, the total is $82,056. Although the Chellen plaintiffs sought punitive damages in their Fifth Amended Complaint on this count, they did not request punitive damages in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on this claim. In any event, the Court has awarded punitive damages, based on the same or similar facts, for defendants' violations of the Chellen plaintiffs' civil rights. Hence, any additional punitive damages would be duplicative and constitute a double recovery.
False Imprisonment
73. As set forth above, defendants restricted the Chellen plaintiffs' movement, communications, privacy, worship, and access to health care. The evidence demonstrates that defendants kept the Chellen plaintiffs' travel documents. At the Phase II trial, expert witness Kevin Bales testified that confiscation of travel documents is a common non-physical method of restraint. Ph. I Tr. at 782-83. He opined that this and other methods of restraint utilized by defendants were "more efficient" than physical or violent control because "a worker who can retain some hope . . . will simply work much harder and . . . in a more cooperative way." Id. at 784-85.
74. The Court finds that defendants unlawfully restrained the Chellen plaintiff's ability to move about as they wished. Although initially defendants permitted the Chellen plaintiffs some ability to leave the JPC plant for shopping, worship, visiting friends and relatives on their own, or other activities, defendants discouraged the plaintiffs from leaving by telling them of unfounded dangers outside the gates. Later, defendants required the Chellen plaintiffs to obtain permission before leaving the premises, locked the main gates, employed an armed security guard to watch them, hired four "leadmen" from among the Chellen plaintiffs to report on the activities of the others, threatened the Chellen plaintiffs with arrest and deportation, and attempted to deport several of them back to India. Defendants assert no valid justification for these actions.
75. Defendants assert that plaintiffs could, and did, leave the JPC premises by the pedestrian gate, but there is undisputed evidence that the pedestrian gate led into the private yard of JPC employee Sharon Sartin. Given defendants' threats and the presence of the armed security guard, the Chellen plaintiffs would not have felt free to leave through that gate. The evidence indicates that some plaintiffs crawled under a fence at another, less visible place on the property to leave the premises. Defendants' actions constitute unlawful restraint, detention, or confinement.
76. John Pickle personally participated in, or proximately caused, the false imprisonment of the Chellen plaintiffs. While there is no direct evidence that he personally committed, ordered, or directed most of the acts that constitute the false imprisonment in this case, he did discourage the Chellen plaintiffs from leaving to attend worship services and he threatened, with respect to one of the plaintiffs who left, that he would "pull him up by his hair and bring him to justice." Ph. II Tr. at 109. He also indirectly participated in the actions of JPC managers that

constitute false imprisonment by allowing such actions to occur or otherwise indicating his approval by failing to end the unlawful practices.

77. Although the restrictions on movement of the Chellen plaintiffs is part of the disparate treatment claim under Title VII and § 1981, and thus subsumed in damages under those statutes for their working hours, the restrictions 1275 were endured during non-working hours and weekends. Accordingly, the Court awards damages *1275 for false imprisonment for these periods in the amount of $1,000 per Chellen plaintiff, for a total amount of $52,000 on this claim. As with their claim for deceit or fraud, the Chellen plaintiffs sought punitive damages in their Fifth Amended Complaint on their claim for false imprisonment, but they did not request punitive damages in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on this claim. In any event, the Court has awarded punitive damages, based on the same or similar facts, for defendants' violations of the Chellen plaintiffs' civil rights. Hence, any additional punitive damages would be duplicative and constitute a double recovery.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

78. Many of the facts relevant to the Chellen plaintiffs' claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress are also set forth above in relation to their civil rights claims. In particular, the job assignments, restrictions, and living conditions to which they were subjected, as well as the hostile work environment, all contributed to the emotional distress they experienced. In particular, the seven individuals whom defendants attempted to deport suffered significant personal embarrassment, humiliation, and fear. See Ph. II. Tr. at 215, 308-09, 798-814, 817.

79. Defendants cursed at, embarrassed, and harassed all of the plaintiffs to maintain physical and psychological control over them. The cultural significance of profanities implying that the Chellen plaintiffs were illegitimate children made such language particularly offensive to them. Id. at 200-01, 664-65. John Pickle admitted using abusive and profane language in reference to the Chellen plaintiffs. Ph. I. Tr. at 393.

80. Defendants admit that JPC managers John Holcomb and Dale Chastain used profanity, but they argue that such use was appropriate in the context it was used. That context involved a meeting to find out who among the plaintiffs had taken a JPC vehicle without permission, drove it without having a driver's license and after having consumed alcohol, and damaged the JPC vehicle before returning it. See Ph. II Tr. at 198-201, 611-13. Defendants also point out that John Pickle arranged a roller-skating party for the first group of Chellen plaintiffs to arrive, took them to see Christmas lights, and was otherwise friendly to them. Id. at 298, 323, 342-43, 488, 584, 631, 644, 953-54, 958-59; e.g., Def. Exs. 8M, 15N, 28H, 31R, 33P, 41Q.

81. The Chellen plaintiffs tell a different story, and many plaintiffs suffered physical problems as a consequence of defendants' conduct. At least two explained that the rationing of food caused them physical problems which interfered with their ability to work. Ph. II Tr. at 285, 561. The food rationing also caused some of the plaintiffs to violate the dietary tenets of their religion and eat foods that they would never have considered eating but for the circumstances. Id. at 561.

82. Several plaintiffs testified to other effects of the emotional distress they felt. Chellen plaintiff Bharathakumaran Nair testified that, as a result of John Holcomb's actions toward him, he contemplated suicide. Ph. I. Tr. at 708-09. Jeron Peters similarly recalled that, as a result of Holcomb's treatment of him, "I was upset. . . . I just prayed to God that something would change." Id. at 334. The cook, Toofan Mondal, testified to the indignation he suffered when he felt compelled to fall at John Pickle's feet to beg for relief. Ph. II Tr. at 81. He felt that working conditions at JPC were causing him to temporarily lose his sense and his mind. Id. He stated:

1276

I felt that if I went back to India and I had died in the midst of my family, my *1276 children, and mother around me . . . that would be a better outcome than living like a dead man here with all the pressure and not be able to sleep at night, not be able to rest. I didn't know what I was doing.

Id. at 82. Similarly, Roy Panackalpurackal testified that he felt "totally destroyed and . . . mentally and in every way after coming here and experiencing this torture." Id. at 603. He stated "I was emotionally and in every way so drained I couldn't even tell my wife about the situation," and that he felt he had "pretty much . . . destroyed all my life." Id. Defendants' actions towards the Chellen plaintiffs progressively worsened over the period they worked at JPC. As set forth supra, several JPC managers and John Pickle created a living and working environment for the Chellen plaintiffs that was highly stressful and oppressive. Complaints by the Chellen plaintiffs were met with

hostility and greater restrictions. If the defendants did not know that their actions would cause emotional distress, they acted recklessly in inflicting emotional distress upon the Chellen plaintiffs. The job assignments, restrictions, living conditions, name-calling, profanity, and threats to which the Chellen plaintiffs were subjected might not be considered outrageous alone, but in combination and considering the totality of the circumstances, they constituted extreme and outrageous conduct. John Pickle contributed personally to the emotional distress the Chellen plaintiffs experienced by his management style, his derogatory and insulting words, and his persistent threats. Defendants' conduct went far beyond "inconsiderate and unkind" acts, "abusive outburst[s], or offensive verbal encounter[s]," id., given the manner in which they employed, housed, paid, fed, and guarded the Chellen plaintiffs. The Chellen plaintiffs are entitled to recover on their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
83. However, the Chellen plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based on much of the same evidence supporting their civil rights claims. Accordingly, any damages awarded for intentional infliction of emotional distress experienced during working hours are subsumed in and would be duplicative of any compensatory or punitive damages awarded for defendants' disparate treatment of the Chellen plaintiffs and creation of a hostile work environment. Any damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress during nonworking hours are subsumed in and would be duplicative of any awarded for defendants' false imprisonment of the Chellen plaintiffs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Any finding of fact which is more appropriately characterized as a conclusion of law is incorporated herein.
FLSA
Liability
1. In its prior findings and conclusions, the Court found that the Chellen plaintiffs were employees, and not trainees, under the FLSA. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1294. Persons determined to be "employees" under the FLSA were entitled to minimum wage of $5.15 per hour during the time period that the Chellen plaintiffs worked for JPC. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). For overtime hours, they were entitled to one and one-half times the rate for regular hours. Id. § 207(a). It is undisputed that JPC did not pay the Chellen plaintiffs at the statutory rates.
2. The Court previously concluded that the definition of "employee" under the FLSA imposes no limitation based 1277 on nationality or immigration status. See Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 706 *1277 (11th Cir.1988)
(undocumented East Indian workers considered employees for purposes of coverage under the FLSA); cf. Donovan v. Burgett Greenhouses, Inc., 759 F.2d 1483, 1486 (10th Cir.1985) (employer required to pay wages, including overtime for work performed by illegal aliens)[8]; see also In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir.1987). The Court also recognized that other federal labor laws, the National Labor Relations Act in particular, have been held applicable to unfair labor practices committed against undocumented aliens. Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1294 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892, 104 S.Ct. 2803, 81 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984)).
3. Defendants argued that the Chellen plaintiffs, as holders of B1 or B2 visas, were not authorized or eligible to be employed for wages in the United States, and they cited Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140, 122 S.Ct. 1275, 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002), in support. The Court essentially determined that, given the holding of Hoffman, the argument was not relevant to its determination for Phase I purposes, but could be relevant to the issue of damages. See Chellen I, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1293-94 (COL ¶ 11). The Court left that determination for a later stage of the proceedings, and it permitted the parties to brief the issue prior to the Phase II trial proceedings. Id.
Damages
4. After reviewing the parties' briefs on the issue, the Court concludes that Hoffman does not preclude an award for work actually performed by the Chellen plaintiffs. It may preclude an award of back pay, but plaintiffs do not seek back pay. Thus, the award for work performed should equal the difference between what JPC actually paid

them and what they would have earned if they had been paid minimum wage for the hours they worked, including overtime, less any offsets (for compensation other than salaries paid) to which JPC may be entitled.
5. In Hoffman, the United States Supreme Court held that federal immigration policy foreclosed the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") from making a back pay award to an undocumented alien[9] who had never been legally authorized to work in the United States. 535 U.S. at 140, 122 S.Ct. 1275. Backpay was an issue because the worker had been fired for union-related activities. The Hoffman court emphasized that the employee was guilty of serious illegal conduct in connection with his employment as he had provided fraudulent work documentation to the employer when he applied for the job. Id. at 141, 122 S.Ct. 1275. Significant for purposes of this decision, the Hoffman court noted that the NLRB sought "to award backpay to an illegal alien for years of work not performed, for wages that could not lawfully have been earned, and for a job obtained in the first instance by a criminal fraud." Id. at 148-49, 122 S.Ct. 1275.
6. The Chellen plaintiffs did not seek to enter the United States illegally or to work illegally here. Instead, they were misled by their employer to believe that their employment was legal. Defendants hired them knowing that 1278 they could not be legally employed in the United States, given the types of visa obtained for the Chellen *1278 plaintiffs by the defendants. At least one case decided since Hoffman has explicitly determined that Hoffman does not preclude FLSA protection for undocumented workers, as an award against a "knowing employer" would be consistent with immigration policies referenced by Hoffman. Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R.'s Oil, Inc., 214 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1061 (N.D.Cal.2002).
7. Further, Hoffman does not purport to preclude a backpay award for work that was actually performed by undocumented workers. The backpay at issue in Hoffman involved an amount calculated for a period of time after the date of the undocumented worker's termination of employment. 535 U.S. at 141-42, 122 S.Ct. 1275. It did not involve wages for work already performed. The EEOC is not seeking backpay for the time subsequent to the Chellen plaintiffs' work at JPC.
8. Courts in several jurisdictions have found that Hoffman does not limit backpay for work already performed. Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499, 501-02 (W.D.Mich.2005) (Hoffman did not compel discovery regarding immigration status of workers in FLSA case to recover backpay for work already performed); Martinez v. Mecca Farms, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 601, 604-05 (S.D.Fla.2002) (Hoffman limitation inapplicable where plaintiffs did not seek post-termination backpay under Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act); Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F.Supp.2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (Hoffman did not justify discovery related to plaintiff's immigration status in an FLSA claim involving work actually performed); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F.Supp.2d 462, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (protective order was appropriate regarding immigration status, despite Hoffman, where plaintiff sought unpaid overtime for work performed rather than backpay for future unperformed work); Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., 2002 WL 1163623 at *5 (C.D.Cal. Apr.9, 2002) ("Hoffman does not establish that an award of unpaid wages to undocumented workers for work actually performed runs counter to IRCA.").
9. Significantly, a case decided since the parties submitted their briefs on this issue addresses the issue in depth and holds that workers are not precluded by virtue of their undocumented status from seeking relief under the FLSA for unpaid minimum wage and overtime claims. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 295 (D.N.J.2005). The Zavala court discusses Hoffman extensively and supports the plaintiffs' arguments that: (1) unlike the plaintiffs in Hoffman, the Zavala plaintiffs were seeking unpaid wages for work already performed; (2) the statutory text of the FLSA does not limit relief to citizens; (3) the DOL interprets the FLSA to cover undocumented workers even after Hoffman; and (4) post-Hoffman decisions have construed the FLSA to cover undocumented workers. Id. at 321-25. The Court is persuaded by the thorough analysis set forth in Zavala.
Offsets
10. Section 203(m) of the FLSA provides, in relevant part:
"Wage" paid to any employee includes the reasonable cost. as determined by the Administrator, to the employer of furnishing such employee with board, lodging, or other facilities, if such board, lodging, or other facilities are customarily furnished by such employer to his employees: Provided, . . . That the Secretary is authorized to determine the fair value of such board, lodging, or other

1279

facilities for defined classes of employees and in defined areas, based on average costs to the employer or to groups of employers similarly situated, *1279 or average value to groups of employees, or other appropriate measures of fair value. Such evaluations, where applicable and pertinent, shall be used in lieu of actual measure of cost in determining the wage paid to any employee.

29 U.S.C. § 203(m). The applicable regulations defining "reasonable cost" provide that the "cost of furnishing `facilities' found by the Administrator to be primarily for the benefit or convenience of the employer will not be recognized as reasonable and may not therefore be included in computing wages." 29 C.F.R. § 531.3(d). Such items include tools, the cost of any constructions by and for the employer; and the costs of uniforms where the nature of the business requires the employee to wear a uniform. 29 C.F.R. § 531.3(d)(1). In determining whether a facility is "primarily" for the benefit of the employer or the employee, courts have focused on whether a particular facility has substantial value to and could be freely used by the employee independent of the job performed. See, e.g., Soler v. G & U Inc., 833 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (2d Cir.1987).

11. While some courts have held a presumption to exist that lodging is a reasonable cost deductible from wages where an employer requires an employee to live on site to meet a particular need of the employer or when an employee is required to be on call at the employer's behest, the presumption may be rebutted. Soler, 833 F.2d at 1109-10; Marshall v. Truman Arnold Dist. Co., Inc., 640 F.2d 906, 909 (8th Cir.1981); Marshall v. Bernard Debord, No. 77-106-C, 1978 WL 1705 at *6 (E.D.Okla. July 27, 1978) (unpublished); Masters v. Maryland Management Co., 493 F.2d 1329, 1334 (4th Cir.1974); Bailey v. Pilots' Assoc., 406 F.Supp. 1302, 1309 (E.D.Pa.1976); see 1996 WL 1005231 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Op. Ltr. of the Wage and Hour Div. (Nov. 5, 1996). Courts have not permitted credit for lodging when the housing furnished by the employer is "seriously substandard" or not "customarily furnished" to other employees. See Archie v. Grand Central Partnership, Inc., 86 F.Supp.2d 262, 269-70 (S.D.N.Y.2000); Castillo v. Case Farms of Ohio, Inc., 96 F.Supp.2d 578, 638 (W.D.Tex.1999); Osias v. Marc, 700 F.Supp. 842, 845 (D.Md.1988). Similarly, courts have refused to permit offsets for housing provided to employees when the employer fails to keep or produce records or other credible evidence as to the reasonable cost of such housing. See Donovan v. Williams Chem. Co., Inc., 682 F.2d 185, 189 (8th Cir.1982); Brock v. Carrion, Ltd., 332 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1326-27 (E.D.Cal.2004).

12. The Court concludes that the defendants are not entitled to offsets for expenses related to housing, uniforms, tools, and travel. They are entitled to offsets for food, medical expenses and telephone expenses.

Liquidated Damages

13. The FLSA provides, in relevant part: "Any employer who violates the provisions of Section 206 or Section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional amount as liquidated damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Tenth Circuit has remarked that "Wile purpose for the award of liquidated damages is the reality that the retention of a workman's pay may well result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages." Jordan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 379 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir.2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Jordan court agreed with the Second Circuit that "[l]iquidated 1280 damages are not a penalty exacted by the law, but rather compensation to the *1280 employee occasioned by the delay in receiving wages due caused by the employer's violation of the FLSA." Id. (quoting Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir.1999)).

14. Specifically with regard to liquidated damages, the statute further provides:

In any action commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947 to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.], if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title.

29 U.S.C. § 260; see Pabst v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F.3d 1128, 1136 (10th Cir.2000). Without the required showing, the trial court is required to award liquidated damages. Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 1237, 1245 (10th Cir.2000) (citation omitted); Renfro v. City of Emporia, Kan., 948 F.2d 1529, 1540 (10th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). "The good faith requirement mandates the employer have `an honest intention to ascertain and follow the dictates of the Act.' . . . `The additional requirement that the employer have reasonable grounds for believing that his conduct complies with the Act imposes an objective standard by which to judge the employer's behavior.'" Renfro, 948 F.2d at 1540 (quoting Marshall v. Brunner, 668 F.2d 748, 753 (3rd Cir.1982)).
15. Defendants have not shown that they acted in good faith and that they had reasonable grounds for believing their acts were not a violation of the FLSA.[10] They have asserted that they thought they were creating and executing a training program, but several factors in the record belie this assertion: the manner in which they recruited the Chellen plaintiffs; the representations made to induce the Chellen plaintiffs to work for JPC; the visas obtained for the Chellen plaintiffs; the type of work they expected from plaintiffs; the backdated evaluations for the Chellen plaintiffs; and the manner in which they routed wages to the Chellen plaintiffs, among others. They have not attempted even to show "reliance on attorneys or other experts in personnel matters-that courts have found particularly persuasive in holding FLSA violations reasonable." See Pabst, 228 F.3d at 1136; Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 726 (10th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). As award of liquidated damages to the Chellen plaintiffs is warranted.
16. The Jordan court concluded that "liquidated damages are statutorily calculated, under . . . the FLSA . . . based on the full amount of wages that were denied or lost because of a statutory violation." Id. The Jordan court cited with approval an Eighth Circuit decision holding that the FLSA requires an award of liquidated damages equal to the full amount of back pay. Id. (citing Braswell v. City of El Dorado, Ark., 187 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir.1999)). That amount is further reduced, however by the offset awarded for food, medical needs, and 1281 telephone services. See generally Cooper v. Asplundh *1281 Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1555 (10th Cir.1988) ("offsets of interim earnings, severance pay, pension benefits, and the like must be taken against back pay before the award is doubled as liquidated damages," although an offset for an arbitral award would not be applied). The Court's award of liquidated damages precludes an award of prejudgment interest, "because it is settled that such interest may not be awarded in addition to liquidated damages." Dep't of Labor v. City of Sapulpa, Okla., 30 F.3d 1285, 1290 (10th Cir.1994) (citations omitted).
John Pickle
17. The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to hold John Pickle personally liable for JPC's violation of the FLSA. The statute provides, in relevant part,: "`Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
18. In determining whether a person is an "employer" under this provision, many courts use an "economic reality test" which "encompasses the totality of the circumstances, no one of which is exclusive." Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir.1999); see United States Dep't of Labor v. Cole Enters. Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir.1995); Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir.1984); Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1510 (1 st Cir.1983). Courts look to "whether the alleged employer possessed the power to control the workers in question," Herman, 172 F.3d at 139. They also consider the person's position in the company, ownership interest, and has "control over significant functions of the business." Cole Enters. Inc., 62 F.3d at 778; see Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d at 971-72; Agnew, 712 F.2d at 1511.
19. John Pickle meets all of these tests. As president of JPC, John Pickle acted directly in the interest of JPC 0907the company that bears his name. He personally acted to recruit the Chellen plaintiffs, and was personally involved in many, if not all, of the decisions which resulted in payment of less than minimum wage for the work performed by the Chellen plaintiffs. He played the leading role in causing JPC to under-compensate the Chellen plaintiffs. The Court concludes that he is individually liable to the Chellen plaintiffs under the FLSA.
Civil Rights (Title VII and § 1981) Liability

20. The statutory provisions relevant to the plaintiffs' claims of discrimination in employment begin with the following: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The subsequently-enacted, more detailed remedial scheme of Title VII provides, in relevant part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
Combined Title VII and § 1981 Claims
21. Both § 1981 and Title VII afford a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race, and both these causes of action may be prosecuted by the same plaintiff based upon the same facts. E.g., Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 440-41 (4th Cir.2000) (citing Johnson v. Railway Exp. Agency, 1282 Inc., 421 U.S. 454, *1282 458, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975)). "In a case under Title VII and § 1981 arising out of the same facts, the commonality of factual issues between the § 1981 and Title VII claims is nearly all-encom-passing. The elements of each cause of action have been construed as identical." Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1444 (10th Cir.1988); see Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1307 (10th Cir.2006) (citation omitted); Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210, 1218 n. 3 (10th Cir.2005). Accordingly, the standards to be applied in evaluating a claim of racial discrimination in employment are the same in § 1981 actions as those applied in actions brought pursuant to Title VII. E.g., Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir.1998); Wilson v. Legal Assistance of North Dakota, 669 F.2d 562, 563-64 (8th Cir.1982). In particular, "[t]he allocations of burdens under Title VII applies to proving intentional discrimination under § 1981 as well." Durham v. Xerox Corp., 18 F.3d 836, 839 (10th Cir.1994); see McGowan v. All Star Maintenance, Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 921-22 (10th Cir.2001); English v. Colorado Dep't of Corrections, 248 F.3d 1002, 1007 (10th Cir.2001); Amro v. Boeing Co., 232 F.3d 790, 796 (10th Cir.2000).
22. However, John Pickle cannot be held liable in an individual or personal capacity under both statutes. He can be held personally liable under § 1981, see Allen v. Denver Public School Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 983 (10th Cir.1991), disapproved on other grounds, Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir.2000), but not under Title VII, see Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1316 (10th Cir.2006) (citing Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir. 1996)); see Grimes, 929 F.Supp. at 1095.
23. Further, "the remedies available under Title VII and under § 1981, although related, and although directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct and independent." Johnson v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). Prior to 1991, Title VII plaintiffs were limited to "backpay commencing not more than two years prior to the filing of a claim with the EEOC, reinstatement, and other affirmative relief as may be appropriate." Skinner, 859 F.2d at 1443 (citing Johnson, 421 U.S. at 458, 95 S.Ct. 1716); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Individuals who proved a violation of § 1981, by contrast, could recover both compensatory and punitive damages, as well as back pay and lost benefits for an unlimited period of time. Id. (citing Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460, 95 S.Ct. 1716). With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, plaintiffs in Title VII cases are also entitled to compensatory and punitive damages, but those damages are subject to a cap that is not applicable in § 1981 cases. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; see O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1257 (10th Cir.2001).
24. Section 1981a thus expands the remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs. E.g., West v. Boeing Co., 851 F.Supp. 395, 401 (D.Kan.1994). It does not permit double recovery under § 1981; at the same time, it does not limit the scope of, or relief available, under § 1981. See id. at 398 n. 4; Johnson v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 926 F.Supp. 874, 876 (E.D.Mo.1996); Bradshaw v. University of Maine System, 870 F.Supp. 406, 407 (D.Me.1994). "Where a plaintiff has alleged violation of both Title VII and Section 1981, the court will consider the alternative remedy under Section 1981 if violation of that statute can be made out on grounds different from those available under Title VII." Grimes v. Superior Home Health Care of Middle Tennessee, Inc., 929 F.Supp. 1088, 1095 (M.D.Tenn. 1996).
1283 *1283 Race and National Origin

25. Obviously, plaintiffs would prefer to recover under § 1981 to avoid the statutory damages cap applicable to Title VII claims. Defendants assert that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was enacted for the purpose of eliminating intentional discrimination on the basis of race, and that § 1981 does not encompass claims of discrimination based on national origin. Further, they contend that there was no evidence produced, whatsoever, that the Chellen Plaintiffs are of a race different than the Caucasian race, and that Caucasian is the race of JPC's management and most of its employees. At least two courts have recognized that some anthropologists have classified some Indians as Caucasian. See United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 210, 43 S.Ct. 338, 67 L.Ed. 616 (1923); Chandoke v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 843 F.Supp. 16, 18 n. 2 (D.N.J.1994). The United States Supreme Court has rejected "the assumption that all those who might be deemed Caucasian today were thought to be of the same race when § 1981 became law in the 19th century." Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-11, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (discussing the concept of race as it has evolved since the passage of § 1981.)
26. Accordingly, courts have struggled with the distinctions between race and national origin in the context of § 1981 claims. Some merely recite that § 1981 does not prohibit discrimination based solely on national origin. E.g., Chimarev v. TD Waterhouse Investor Servs., Inc., 280 F.Supp.2d 208, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, Ltd., 798 F.2d 731, 735 (5th Cir. 1986). However, it is appropriate to analyze § 1981 claims in terms of ancestry and ethnic characteristics where discrimination is not based solely on national origin. Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 613, 107 S.Ct. 2022; Daemi v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 931 F.2d 1379, 1387 n. 7 (10th Cir.1991); Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1979).
27. As set forth in the Court's order addressing defendants' motions to dismiss (Dkt.# 85), the Tenth Circuit has stated that "often the line between discrimination based on race and discrimination based on national origin is `not a bright one.'" Daemi, 931 F.2d at 1387 n. 7 (10th Cir.1991) (quoting Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 614, 107 S.Ct. 2022 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)). The Tenth Circuit further observed:
The concept of race under § 1981 is broad. It extends to matters of ancestry which are normally associated with nationality, not race in a biological sense. See Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 802 F.2d 111, 114-15 (5th Cir.1986) (noting that persons of Iranian descent are a protected race under § 1981, although anthropologists classify them as Caucasian); Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.1979) (noting that § 1981 is "no[t] necessarily limited to the technical or restrictive meaning of race'"). . . . As the Supreme Court has noted, Congress intended § 1981 to "protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 613, 107 S.Ct. at 2028.
Daemi, 931 F.2d at 1387 n. 7.
28. The Daemi court ruled that, "[a]s a person of Iranian descent, Daemi was protected by § 1981's bar against discrimination on the ground of race." Id. Plaintiffs point out that several courts have allowed individuals of Indian/ 1284 East Indian descent to proceed with § 1981 racial *1284 discrimination claims. Chandoke v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 843 F.Supp. 16, 18 n. 2 (D.N.J.1994) ("Although Indians are technically classified as `Caucasian,' they may still state a claim under Section 1981"); Jatoi v. Hurst-Euless-Bedford Hospital Auth., 807 F.2d 1214, 1218 (5th Cir.) (allegation that plaintiff was East Indian sufficient to invoke protection of § 1981), modified on other grounds, 819 F.2d 545 (5th Cir.1987); Banker v. Time Chemical, Inc., 579 F.Supp. 1183, 1187 (N.D.Ill.1983) (collecting cases); Baruah v. Young, 536 F.Supp. 356, 363 (D.Md.1982). The Court finds that the Chellen plaintiffs' ancestry and ethnic characteristics likewise entitle them to claim the protections of § 1981.
Disparate Treatment
29. To prevail under a disparate treatment theory, "a plaintiff must show, through either direct or indirect evidence, that the discrimination complained of was intentional." Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1307 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1191 (10th Cir. 2000)). The discrimination, of course, must be for a reason prohibited by the applicable statutes. Jaramillo v. Colorado Judicial Dep't, 427 F.3d 1303, 1306 (10th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Disparate treatment claims may be

established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. E.g., Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir.2000); EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1192 (10th Cir.2000); Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1134 (10th Cir.1999).
30. Plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims in this case have been established by direct evidence. Defendants recruited Indian workers in India, brought them to the United States, housed and fed them separately from the non-Indian JPC employees, identified them as Indians and made numerous discriminatory comments about their ancestry, ethnic background, culture, and country which leads to the conclusion that they treated the Chellen plaintiffs differently, and less favorably, due to their race and national origin. In particular, defendants subjected the Chellen plaintiffs to greater testing requirements, lower job classifications, and less desirable job assignments. They also restricted the Chellen plaintiffs' movement, communications, worship opportunities, and access to health care, and they required the Chellen plaintiffs to live in substandard housing and to subsist on food that was poor in quality and quantity. The Chellen plaintiffs were paid lower wages and subjected to disparate terms, conditions, and privileges of employment as compared to similarly situated non-Indian workers.
31. The Chellen plaintiffs were subject to disparate treatment and discrimination at the hands of JPC, its officers, managers, and agents. The Court concludes that the circumstances of their recruitment, their work, and their living conditions show defendants' intent to discriminate on a racial basis.
Hostile Work Environment
32. The Supreme Court has "broadly read Title VII `to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive work environment.'" McCowan, 273 F.3d at 922 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)). "When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an 1285 abusive working environment, Title VII is violated." *1285 Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367). The Court is to "judge that atmosphere both objectively and subjectively" . . . [and] look at all the circumstances "from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position." McGowan, 273 F.3d at 923 (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit has also emphasized that, where the plaintiff alleges discrimination under § 1981 on the basis of ancestry, the harassment must be based on the victim's ancestry 0907general harassment is not actionable. Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1410 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir.1994)).
33. The JPC workplace was characterized by the severe and pervasive intimidation, ridicule and insult for the Chellen plaintiffs. Defendants set the stage for such an environment with the way in which they recruited the plaintiffs, classified them, set up the means of paying them wages, housed them, and fed them. The conditions of their employment were not favorable even in the beginning, and they progressively worsened as several of the plaintiffs left to escape conditions at the plant. Toward the end of their time at the plant, defendants' threats, intimidation, and abusive language became intolerable. Given the evidence as to the language used and the manner in which it was directed at the Chellen plaintiffs, and not others employed by JPC, there is no doubt that defendants based their harassment on the Chellen plaintiffs' national origin, ancestry and ethnicity.
34. There is no "mathematically precise test" to determine whether an environment is hostile or abusive, but some factors that may be considered include: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367. Actual psychological harm, while relevant, is not required. Id. Defendants' conduct was frequent, severe, physically threatening, and humiliating. As discussed above in connection with the Chellen plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it also caused psychological harm.
35. In particular, the Tenth Circuit has long recognized that "a working environment dominated by racial slurs constitutes a violation of Title VII." Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1412 (10th Cir. 1987). (citations omitted). Defendants' obscene and derogatory references with the word "Indians" in reference to the Chellen plaintiffs constitute far more than the "few isolated incidents of racial enmity" or "[c]asual comments, or accidental or sporadic conversation, [that] will not trigger equitable relief pursuant to the statute." Id. (citations omitted).

Instead, they reflect a "steady barrage of opprobrious racial comment" indicative of a hostile work environment so "heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy the emotional and psychological stability of the minority [employee]." Id. at 1412-13 (citations omitted).
36. Defendants' offensive language was only part of the daily harassment experienced by the Chellen plaintiffs at the JPC plant. "We have repeatedly stated that in a case alleging a violation of Title VII and the presence of a racially hostile work environment, the existence of [racial] harassment must be determined in light of the record as a whole, and the trier of fact must examine the totality of the circumstances, including the context in which the alleged incidents occurred". McGowan, 273 F.3d at 925 (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Court 1286 concludes that the job assignments, restrictions on *1286 their freedom, privacy, communications, and worship, along with the living conditions created an oppressive, hostile, and abusive working environment for the Chellen plaintiffs.[11]
Personal Liability of John Pickle
37. To impose personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, an individual defendant must be personally involved and have an affirmative link to the acts of intentional discrimination to causally connect the defendant with the claimed discriminatory practice. Allen v. Denver Public School Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 983 (10th Cir.1991), disapproved on other grounds, Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir.2000). "[P]ersonal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence." Figures v. Board of Public Utilities of Kansas City, Kan., 731 F.Supp. 1479, 1483 (D.Kan.1990). In this case, there is substantial evidence of John Pickle's individual conduct of discrimination, as shown by, among other things, his remarks to the Chellen plaintiffs as well as to JPC employees. He was personally involved in the discriminatory decisions and acts that led to the harm suffered by the Chellen plaintiffs. The Court concludes that John Pickle is personally liable for violating § 1981 in his actions towards the Chellen plaintiffs.
Damages
38. The Chellen Plaintiffs are entitled to recover lost wages, as well as compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII or § 1981, but not both. Initially, the Court notes that the analysis under Hoffman for purposes of an FLSA claim does not change the analysis for purposes of a Title VII claim. See Rivera v. NICO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067-69 (9th Cir. 2004); see also De La Rosa v. Northern Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237,238-39 (C.D.Ill.2002). Nor does it change the analysis for purposes of a § 1981 claim, as aliens are entitled to the protections of § 1981. See, e.g., Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 180 (2d Cir.1998) (§ 1981 provides a claim against private discrimination on the basis of alienage); Chacko v. Texas A & M Univ., 960 F.Supp. 1180, 1190-91 (S.D.Tex.1997) (same).[12] The legal status and citizenship of the plaintiff employees, or the type of visas obtained for them by defendants and under which defendants required them to work, does not preclude the aggrieved individuals from recovering full and fair compensation for work actually performed, whether under the FLSA, Title VII, or § 1981.
Compensatory Damages
39. While the measure of damages under the FLSA may be minimum wage, under Title VII and § 1981, the measure of damages is the rate of pay that each Chellen plaintiff should have earned, given his skills and 1287 qualifications, compared to that of similarly-situated non-proposed *1287 Indian JPC workers, less any applicable offsets.
In the case of injury of an economic nature the injured party is to be placed as near as possible in the situation he would have been in had the wrong not occurred. Thus damages for the relevant period are to be determined by measuring the difference between plaintiff s actual earnings for the period and those which he would have earned absent the discrimination of defendants.
T & S Serv. Assocs., Inc. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722, 728 (1st Cir.1981) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Taylor v. Philips Industries, Inc., 593 F.2d 783, 786 (7th Cir.1979) (citations omitted). The Chellen plaintiffs have the burden of proving that they lost earnings as a result of defendants' discrimination, see id., which they did. However, the minimum wage measure of damages for violations of the FLSA is subsumed in the calculation of

lost wages under Title VII and § 1981. To permit the recovery of compensatory damages under both FLSA and the civil rights statutes would mean a double recovery for plaintiffs for the same harm. However, the FLSA liquidated damage award serves a different purpose and is not subsumed in the lost earnings portion of the damages recoverable by the Chellen plaintiffs under Title VII and § 1981.
40. In addition, compensatory damages are recoverable under § 1981 or Title VII for emotional or mental harm. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); Hampton v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1114-15 (10th Cir.2001) (§ 1981 case); Atchley v. Nordam Group, Inc., 180 F.3d 1143, 1149-50 (10th Cir.1999) (Title VII case); see also Bryant v. Aiken Regional Medical Centers Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 546-47 (4th Cir.2003) (plaintiff alleged violation of both Title VII and § 1981). Admittedly, a precise calculation for this kind of damage is not easy. "Emotional distress is an intangible damage, and is an issue of fact which is within the province of the jury." Canady v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 970 F.2d 710, 715 (10th Cir.1992).
41. "Most courts hold that emotional harm under § 1981 is presumed from the violation of the constitutional right when plaintiffs testimony establishes humiliation or mental distress; specific proof of out-of-pocket loss or medical testimony is not necessary." Charles R. Richey, 1 Manual on Employment Discrimination and Civil Rights Actions § 4.34 (2d ed.2003) (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit has held an award of emotional damages excessive where no treating physician or psychologist testified, plaintiffs continued in their vocation, and the employer could not prevent insensitive remarks made toward plaintiffs. Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 68 F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (10th Cir.1995). However, the Tenth Circuit has stated that medical testimony is "one suggested method of proving emotional damages but is not the sole diapositive requirement." Smith v. Northwest Financial Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1417 (10th Cir.1997). The Smith court upheld a district court's denial of a motion for remittitur where an employee's testimony of emotional distress injury was corroborated by independent evidence but not medical testimony, and the employee did not continue to work in her chosen field after the discriminatory conduct. Id. at 1416-17.
42. The Court concludes that compensatory damages for the Chellen plaintiffs' mental and emotional distress is appropriate. Although they were able to continue in their chosen professions after the discriminatory conduct and they offered no medical testimony as to the degree of distress they alleged suffered, their testimony and that of 1288 expert witness Florence *1288 Burke as to the hostile work environment created by defendants and the resultant humiliation, degradation, and loss of self-respect they experienced was both credible and compelling.
Punitive Damages
43. Punitive damages are recoverable under Title VII if the plaintiff proves that the defendant "engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a(b)(1). In Kolstad v. American Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999), the United States Supreme Court explained that the provision does not require egregious misconduct; instead, the appropriate inquiry is whether the employer engaged in the alleged conduct with the "knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law." Id. at 535, 119 S.Ct. 2118; see Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc., 189 F.3d 1177, 1186 (10th Cir.1999); EEOC OC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir.1999). In other words, "an employer must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its action will violate federal law to be liable in punitive damages." Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118.[13] Because JPC employed more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees during the relevant time period, the sum of the amount of compensatory and the amount of punitive damages awarded may not exceed $100,000 per plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(B).
44. Likewise, punitive damages are recoverable under § 1981 where a plaintiff proves "that the defendant acted with malicious, willful or gross disregard of a plaintiff's rights over and above intentional discrimination." Guides, Ltd. v. Yarmouth Group Property Management, Inc., 295 F.3d 1065, 1077 (10th Cir.2002); see Hampton v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1115-16 (10th Cir.2001). "The allowance of such damages inherently involves an evaluation of the nature of the conduct in question, the wisdom of some form of pecuniary punishment, and the advisability of a deterrent. Therefore, the infliction of such damages, and the amount thereof when inflicted, are of necessity within the discretion of the trier of fact." Hampton, 247 F.3d at 1115 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir.1984) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The standard of proof

applicable to punitive damages claims under both Title VII and § 1981 is preponderance of the evidence. See Karnes v. SCI Colorado Funeral Servs., Inc., 162 F.3d 1077, 1081 (10th Cir.1998). The Court exercises its discretion to conclude that punitive damages are appropriate in this case based upon the egregious conduct of defendants.
Prejudgment Interest
1289 45. Prejudgment interest serves the purposes of Title VII, as it "helps to *1289 make victims of discrimination whole and compensates them for the true cost of money damages they incurred." Reed v. Mineta, 438 F.3d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 1994)). That purpose is "limited, however, by recognition that prejudgment interest does not accrue until the victim actually sustains monetary injury." Id. (finding that employee's monetary injuries were incrementally inflicted from the date of his termination through the entry of judgment as each pay period passed and employee went unpaid). Courts have routinely awarded prejudgment interest on backpay or lost past earnings and benefits in cases where liability has been established on claims of discrimination under Title VII and/or § 1981. E.g., Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc:, 90 F.3d 1160, 1170 (6th Cir.1996); Cooper v. Paychex, Inc., 960 F.Supp. 966, 976 (E.D.Va.1997); Du-Bose v. Boeing Co., 905 F.Supp. 953, 960 (D.Kan.1995).
46. Under Tenth Circuit law, an award of prejudgment interest under federal law is governed by a two-step analysis. First, the trial court must determine whether an award of prejudgment interest would serve to compensate the injured party. Second, when an award would serve a compensatory function, the court must still determine whether the equities would preclude the award of prejudgment interest.
U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1257 (10th Cir.1988), implied overruling on other grounds recognized by Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d, 1215, 1231 (10th Cir.1996). The Court concludes that an award of prejudgment interest would serve to compensate the Chellen plaintiffs for the true cost of money damages they incurred. Further, the equities would not preclude the award of prejudgment interest although it has taken some time for this matter to be resolved through the judicial process. The Court and the parties have worked, however, to move the case as expeditiously as possible. Prejudgment interest on the amount awarded for defendants' violations of plaintiffs' civil rights is appropriate.
Injunctive Relief
47. The issue of injunctive relief is reserved for the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), incorporating by reference Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
If the court finds that the [defendant] has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the [defendant] from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but not be limited to reinstatement or hiring of employee . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). The Court has broad authority to construct appropriate equitable relief, both the remedy past discrimination and to prevent future discrimination. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Intern. Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 446, 106 S.Ct. 3019, 92 L.Ed.2d 344 (1986); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975).
48. The Tenth Circuit has stated, in reviewing a district court's decision to deny injunctive relief for abuse of discretion, that "[t]he most important factor for a district court to consider is whether the facts indicate a danger of 1290 future violations of the Act." Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., *1290 124 F.3d 1221, 1230 (10th Cir.1997) (ADA claim); see EEOC Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir.1999) (ADA claim). To satisfy the Court that relief is needed, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
"there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive. The [district court's] decision is based on all the circumstances; [its] discretion is necessarily broad and a strong showing of abuse must be made

to reverse it. To be considered are the bona fides of the expressed intent to comply, the effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some cases, the character of the past violations."
Roe, 124 F.3d at 1230 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953)); see EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir.1999).
49. As set forth above, .JPC ceased operations soon after the Chellen plaintiffs left the facility and filed this lawsuit. Nonetheless, the EEOC requests that the Court order directing defendants to post a specific notice informing their employees of their employment rights and obligations under federal law, and to provide contact information for the EEOC. The EEOC also asks that such order require defendants to train their employees regarding the applicable requirements of Title VII, and in particular, requiring defendants to initiate a Title VII policy and complaint procedure to ensure that their employees are aware of their rights and what to do if they feel they have experienced discrimination. Finally, the EEOC asks that defendants be enjoined from engaging in any employment policy, practice or decision that deprives an applicant or employee of equal opportunity on the basis of national origin. However, the EEOC has failed to show anything more than a mere possibility of recurrent violations given the complete cessation of operations by JPC. The Court concludes that injunctive relief is not warranted.
State Law Tort Claims
Deceit
50. Under Oklahoma law, deceit or fraud must be established by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence and requires a showing of: "1) a false material misrepresentation, 2) made as a positive assertion which is either known to be false, or made recklessly without knowledge of the truth, 3) with the intention that it be acted upon, and 4) which is relied on by the other party to his/her own detriment." Rogers v. Meisel, 68 P.3d 967, 977 (Okla. 2003) (citation omitted).[14] "Prior similar dealings by the alleged wrongdoer may be considered in determining fraud." Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 760 P.2d 174, 177 (Okla.1988) (citing Cates v. Dorloed, 537 P.2d 336, 338 (Okla.1975)).
51. Defendants argue that John Pickle cannot be held personally liable on the Chellen plaintiff's deceit claim. "A person cannot be liable for a fraudulent misrepresentation unless he made it himself or authorized another to make it for him or in some way participated therein." Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Minton, 181 Okla. 298, 73 P.2d 1291 440, 442 (1937) (citation omitted). As set forth in the Court's findings of fact, supra, John Pickle personally *1291 met with the Chellen plaintiffs, individually, in India. While translators were present at both the individual and group meetings in India, many, if not all, of the plaintiffs could understand English and understood the promises being made by John Pickle individually. He also personally reassured some of them Chellen plaintiffs, en route to the United States, with regard to the misrepresentations upon which they relied. The Court concludes that John Pickle is personally liable on the Chellen plaintiffs' claim for deceit.
False Imprisonment
52. Under Oklahoma law, false imprisonment has been defined as "the unlawful restraint of an individual's personal liberty or freedom of locomotion," "the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another," and "[a]n act which directly or indirectly, is a legal cause of confinement of another within boundaries fixed by the actor for any time, no matter how short in duration. . . ." S.H. Kress & Co. v. Bradshaw, 186 Okla. 588, 99 P.2d 508, 511 (1940) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The elements of the tort of false imprisonment are: "(1) the detention of a person against his or her will and (2) the unlawfulness of the detention." Walters v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 82 P.3d 578, 583 (Okla.2003); S.H. Kress, 99 P.2d at 512. False imprisonment "makes the actor liable to the other irrespective of whether harm is caused to any legally protected interest of the other, if the act is intended to confine the other or a third person, and the other is conscious of the confinement, and the confinement is not otherwise privileged." S.H. Kress, 99 P.2d at 511.
53. The S.H. Kress court explained that "[f]alse imprisonment may be accomplished without actual arrest, assault, or imprisonment, and may be committed by words alone or by acts alone, or by both." Id. at 512 (citations omitted); see Mayo Hotel Co. v. Cooper, 298 P.2d 443, 444-45 (Okla.1956). Physical restraint is not

necessary in order for the defendant's conduct to constitute false imprisonment. Halliburton-Abbott Co. v. Hodge, 172 Okla. 175, 44 P.2d 122, 125 (1935). If a defendant's words and conduct induce in a plaintiff "a reasonable belief that resistance or physical attempts to escape . . . would be useless and futile, then it is nevertheless false imprisonment, regardless of the absence of physical restraint." Id. Further, a defendant cannot avoid liability for false imprisonment if he believes the person allegedly confined is unaware of the means of escape or if the circumstances are such as to make the means of escape "offensive to a reasonable sense of decency or personal dignity." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 36 cmt. a (1965).
54. "[A]ll who by direct act or indirect procurement, personally participate in, or proximately cause, the false imprisonment or unlawful detention or another are liable." Mayo Hotel Co., 298 P.2d at 445 (citing S.H. Kress, 99 P.2d at 514). The Court concludes that John Pickle is personally liable on the Chellen plaintiffs' claim for false imprisonment.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
55. Under Oklahoma law, to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that: "(1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the Defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe." Estate of 1292 Trentadue ex. rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d *1292 840, 855-56 (10th Cir.2005). The Trentadue case recently explained each of these elements in detail. While the actions of defendants' actions could be deemed intentional, the term "`recklessness' in the first element includes actions that are in `deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow.'" Id. at Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. i.
56. The Trentadue court elaborated on the second element as follows:
The second element of the tort requires proof that the tortfeasor's conduct was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Kraszewski v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Okla., Inc., 916 P.2d 241, 248 n. 25 (Okla.1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d). Generally, the case is one where "the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, `Outrageous!' " Id. at 249 n. 25. In addition, whether the tortfeasor's conduct was extreme and outrageous must be considered in the setting in which the conduct occurred. Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77 (Okla.1986) (holding that nature of the conduct should not be considered in a sterile setting, detached from the milieu in which it took place); see also Starr v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 54 F.3d 1548, 1559 (10th Cir.1995) (applying Oklahoma law and noting that court must focus on the totality of the circumstances).
397 F.3d at 856.
57. "The third element of an emotional distress claim requires proof that the tortfeasor's conduct caused the plaintiffs emotional distress." Id. (citing Computer Publ'n, [Inc. v. Welton,] 49 P.3d 732, 735 (Okla.2002)).
58. Finally, the fourth element requires proof that the plaintiffs emotional distress was "so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it." Computer Publ'n, 49 P.3d at 736 (quoting Breeden [v. League Services Corp.], 575 P.2d [1374,] 1377 n. 6 [Okla. 1978] ). While emotional distress includes "all highly unpleasant mental reactions," it is only where the emotional distress is extreme that liability arises. Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887, 901 n. 44 (Okla.1998). "The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity." Breeden, 575 P.2d at 1378 n. 6 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j). Moreover, although severe distress must be proved, "in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed." Id.
Trentadue, 397 F.3d at 856.[15]

59. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does not extend "to mere insults, indignities, threats, 1293 annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities." *1293 Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77 (Okla.1986) (quoting
Restatement of Torts (Second), § 46, comment d).
Personal Liability of John Pickle
60. John Pickle is personally liable for the tortious acts he committed towards Chellen plaintiffs. He cannot rely on the corporate shield of JPC to protect himself from liability. Oklahoma law has consistently recognized that an officer or director of a corporation may be held personally liable for his torts "irrespective of whether the corporation for which he was acting was a tort-feasor or not or whether the defendant was acting in its behalf as an agent." Garrett v. Myers, 190 Okla. 273, 123 P.2d 965, 967 (1942) (citing Rogers v.Brammett, 92 Okla. 216, 220 P. 362 (1923)). Because the instant lawsuit involves tort claims against John Pickle personally and is not merely an action to recover on a corporate debt, neither the statutory nor the common law of Oklahoma shields him from liability. Oklahoma Federated Gold & Numismatics, Inc. v. Blodgett, 24 F.3d 136, 141 (10th Cir.1994) ("Under Oklahoma law, an officer may be held liable for the torts he personally commits."); see Preston-Thomas Const., Inc. v. Central Leasing Corp., 518 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla.Ct.App.1973). The preponderance of the evidence at both the Phase I and Phase II trials establishes that John Pickle directly participated in the creation and execution of the plan to bring the plaintiffs to Oklahoma, including the misrepresentations made to them and the intentional infliction of emotional distress they experienced. The Court concludes that John Pickle is jointly and severally liable with JPC for the damages awarded on the Chellen plaintiffs' tort claims.
Prejudgment Interest
61. Under Oklahoma law, prejudgment interest is mandated upon "a verdict for damages by reason of personal injuries or injury to personal rights including, but not limited to, injury resulting from bodily restraint, personal insult, defamation, invasion of privacy, injury to personal relations, or detriment due to an act or omission of another. . . ." Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 727.1(E). Damages awarded for false imprisonment, a form of bodily restraint, would appear to warrant prejudgment interest under this statute. Similarly, prejudgment interest is appropriately awarded on damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress under § 727.1(E). See Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 713 P.2d 589, 593 (Okla.1985). Actions for fraud and deceit do not come within the purview of this section. See Rainbow Travel Serv. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 896 F.2d 1233, 1243 (10th Cir.1990); Sade v. Northern Nat. Gas Co., 501 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir.1974).
62. However, prejudgment interest may be awarded on damages for fraud and deceit under Okla. Stat. tit. 23, §§ 6, 7; see Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308, 1317 (10th Cir.1998). Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 6 provides: "Any person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except during such time as the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt." Id. Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 7 provides: "In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud or malice, interest may be given in the discretion of the jury." Id. The Court concludes that an award of prejudgment interest on each of the Chellen plaintiffs' state law tort claims is appropriate.
1294 *1294 SUMMARY
In summary, the EEOC has proven its civil rights claims against JPC for violation of Title VII and § 1981 based upon the disparate treatment afforded the Chellen plaintiffs and the hostile work environment created by JPC. The Chellen plaintiffs have established their claims against both defendants for violation of the FLSA and § 1981 as well as their tort claims for deceit, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. All of the Chellen plaintiffs other than Mohammed Hassan Usman are entitled to relief.
The damages awarded to the Chellen plaintiffs jointly and severally against defendants JPC and John Pickle are:

0905 FLSA liquidated damages:[16] 0905 Title VII / § 1981[17]

$ 58,417.68

Compensatory damages:

607,006.85

Emotional Distress

52,000.00

Punitive Damages:

52,000.00

0905 Deceit:

Ten Months Promised Wages:

390,000.00

Amounts Paid by Plaintiffs to

AL Samit:

82,056.00

0905 F. Imprisonment

52,000.00

____________

0905 Total

$1,293,480.53

Counsel for the EEOC and Chellen plaintiffs are directed to determine appropriate apportionment of these amounts. If counsel are unable to do so, United States Magistrate Judge Frank H. McCarthy is hereby appointed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 53 to act as a Special Master for apportionment and disbursement. Counsel for the EEOC and Chellen plaintiffs are also directed to calculate the appropriate amount of prejudgment interest per these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and to submit a proposed form of judgment, approved as to form by counsel for defendants, no later than September 15, 2006.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of August, 2006.

[1] The Court refers to these individual plaintiffs collectively as the "Chellen plaintiffs" for first-named plaintiff Babu Thanu Chellen. The initial complaint, filed February 1, 2002, named 13 plaintiffs, including John Doe and Richard Roe. Complaint, Dkt. # 1. The fifth and final complaint in this matter, filed July 9, 2002, names 54 plaintiffs, including John Doe and Richard Roe as unidentified plaintiffs. Fifth Amended Complaint, Dkt. # 47.
[2] The EEOC points out that, while the pay rate for most of the plaintiffs ranged from $2.89 to $3.17 per hour, see Chellen 1, 344 F.Supp.2d at 1282 (FOF ¶ 11), the rate for the two cooks was considerably less. The cooks claim to have worked approximately 18 hours per day, 7 days per week, at a salary of $500 per month. Phase II Trial Transcript, Dkt. # # 189-96 (hereinafter referred to as "Ph. II Tr.") at 36-37, 40-42, 67, 69. Therefore, the hourly rate paid to them would have been less than $1.00 per hour. However, the EEOC has no FLSA claim, and the differential in wages is subsumed in the EEOC's Title VII claim for damages. The EEOC does not claim damages for Usman, but it does claim damages for Toofan Mondal, the other cook hired by defendants to work at JPC.
[3] Defendants dispute this testimony, arguing that there was no method by which the main door could be locked or secured by a chain or otherwise, but they cite to no evidence other than unidentified photographs in support of this argument. See Def. Proposed Findings and Conclusions, Dkt. # 199, at 11-12.
[4] As set forth in the Court's prior findings, JPC contracted with AL Samit to recruit, prescreen, and arrange for testing of the Chellen plaintiffs and others in India. Chellen 344 F.Supp.2d at 1280 (FOF 113). Later, defendants paid AL Samit a "marketing fee" or "commission" in an amount sufficient to reimburse AL Samit for AL Samit's payment of the Chellen plaintiffs' salaries while they were at the JPC facility in Tulsa. Id. at 1282 (FOF ¶ 12). The Court held that AL Samit was JPC's agent. Id. at 1290 (FOF ¶ 53).
[5] Since JPC employed over 100 but fewer than 201 employees for each month from January 2001 through January 2002, Ph. II Tr. at 836-38; PI.Ex. 82, the combined amount awarded for compensatory and punitive damages per plaintiff is limited under Title VII, see Conclusion of Law ¶ 43, infra. Further, John Pickle cannot be held personally liable under Title VII, but he can be held personally liable under § 1981. See id. ¶ 22, infra.
[6] Joe Reeble, JPC Executive Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer, testified that one of the 20 may have been from Pakistan; the remainder were from India. Ph. I. Tr. at 67.

[7] The date asserted by the Chellen plaintiffs in their proposed findings and conclusions is November 30, 2003, see Dkt. # 200, at 38, but that appears to be a typographical error, given other representations on page 12 of the same document, and the dates set forth in the Certification Letters admitted as P1.Ex. 81.
[8] The relevant rationale is found in the text of the district court decision being reviewed by the appellate court, Donovan v. Burgett Greenhouses, Inc., No. 76-173, 1983 WL 2139 (D.N.M. Nov.23, 1983).
[9] Significantly, the Chellen plaintiffs were not "undocumented." They had visas, albeit ones that did not permit them to work in the United States. They were not in the United States illegally, although they were working here illegally due to the failure of defendants to obtain proper visas.
[10] The Court need not determine whether defendants acted willfully as there is no issue as to whether the plaintiffs brought their claim within the applicable statute of limitations. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a); Brinkman v. Dep't of Corrections, 21 F.3d 370, 372 (10th Cir.1994).
[11] In its proposed findings and conclusions, the EEOC discusses the invalidity of an employer's affirmative defense set forth in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), and Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), to vicarious liability for an actionable hostile work environment created by a supervisor. As the defendants did not affirmatively plead the defense and do not attempt to assert in their proposed findings and conclusions that it is applicable, the Court does not address it.
[12] Again, the Court has not concluded that the Chellen plaintiffs were "illegal" or undocumented aliens, although, as holders of the B 1 or B2 visas obtained for them by defendants, they were not authorized or eligible to be employed for wages in the United States.
[13] The Kolstad court further held that "an employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the employer's `good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.'" Id. at 545, 119 S.Ct. 2118 (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has also stated: "[E]mployer malice or reckless indifference in the failure to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which management-level employees knew or should have known is premised on direct liability, not derivative liability. . . ." Deters v. Equifax Credit Information Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir.2000). Although the EEOC raised the issue of vicarious liability, defendants do not dispute the liability of JPC if it is found in violation of Title VII.
[14] Fraud may be actual or constructive. See generally Howell v. Texaco lac., 112 P.3d 1154, 1161 (Okla.2004); Pate.) v. OMH Medical Center, Inc., 987 P.2d 1185, 1199 (Okla. 1999). The elements set forth herein pertain to actual fraud only because the Chellen plaintiffs do not allege constructive fraud.
[15] The Trentadue court ultimately found that, although the plaintiffs had proven the first three elements of the tort, the district court had not make explicit findings as to severity of each individual plaintiff's emotional distress, and it remanded accordingly. 397 F.3d at 857-58. Since the parties here stipulated to representative witness testimony, the Court finds no need to determine the severity of the emotional distress for each of the Chellen plaintiffs.
[16] As concluded above, FLSA unpaid minimum wages are subsumed in the Title VII and § 1981 compensatory award. See Conclusion of Law ¶ 39, supra.
[17] As the EEOC brought its claim under Title VII and § 1981, the Court awards these damages jointly to the EEOC as well.
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