ORIGINAL
Receipt Number
5'1' 53'3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAT, INC.,NEW GALILEE MISSJONARY)

BAPTIST CHURCH, PLEASANT HILL )

BAPTIST CHURCH, AND PHILLIP

)

PEAKE

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

)

v.

)

)

NATIONAL CITY BANK OF THE

)

MIDWEST and NATIONAL CITY

)

CORPORATION.

)

)

De rendants. )

)

,

-

.

,,_I

SACHS WALDMAN, Professional Corporation

By: JOHN R. RUNYAN (P 19763)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

1000 Farmer Street

Detroit, Michigan 48226

(313) 965-3464

ROSE & ROSE, p,c. By: DAVID L. ROSE
TERRI N. MARCUS Attorneysfi)r Plaintiffs 1320 19°' Street, N. W., Suite 60 I Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-8555

Case: 2: 06-cv.11937 Assigned To: Edmunds, Nancy G Referral Judge Majzoub, Mona K Filed 04-25-2006 At 0205 PM CMP JAT INC, ET AL V NATIONAL CITY BANK OF THE MIDWEST (EW)
CIVTI, ACnON NO. HON.
Poor Quality Original

COMPLAINT OF RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY LENDING PRACTICES
or I. The Plaintiff§. bring this action to enf()fCC Title VTII the Jiair II(JU~ing Act of 1968,
M amcnded by the Fair Housing Amendments A~t of 1988, 42 U.S.c. §§ 3601-3619, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870,42 U.SC'. § 1981 and § 1982, and the Equal Credit Opportunity

Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-169If. 2. This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C.
#1343,42 U.S.C. § 3613 and 15 U.S.c. § 1691(e).
3. Plaintiff JAT, Inc., abo known as Turner Tours & Charters, ("JAT") is a travel and tourism business, providing charter motor coach service throughout the United States and
Canada. It is owned and operated by John and Yvonne Turner. Thc Turners are both African-
American. The majority (,I' .JAT's clientele is African-American. Tn 2005, .JAT applied for a business loa!1 from Defendant. DeH.mdan! rejected their application. J AT suhsequently obtained a $950,000 loan from Bank One at a higher rate of interest.
4. Plaintiff New Galilee Missionary Daptist Church ("New Oalilec") is located at 11241
Gunston, Detroit, Michigan 48213 in Wayne Count)'. The majority of parishioners at New Galilee are AITican-Americim. New Galilee applied for an. $80,000 loan from National City Bank of Michigan. The loan was not granted. New Galilee subsequently was approved for such
It loan by Bank Onc. S. Plaintiff Pleasant Hill Baptist Church ("Pleasant Hill") is 10c,lted at 5207 Lovett
Street, Detroit, Michigan 48210 In Wayne County. The majority of parishioners at Pleasant Hill are African-American. Pleasant Hill applied for a loan from National City Bank in the amount of approximately $734,000. Defendant Bank did not grant the loan, and as a practical matter rejected il. Pleasant Hill subsequently obtained a loan from Bank One in the amount of $734, 472.00 for additions and improvements to its building.
6. Plaintiff Phillip Peake ("Peake") is an African American ("black") man. He was born and raised in Detroit, Michigan. He resides in Detroit in li:ip code 48235, and owns the house he
live~ in. 2

7. The Defendant National City Bank of the Midwest. like its predecessor, the National City Bank of Michigan, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the National City Corporation.
8. National City Corporation ("NCC") is (ln~ or the nation's largest financial holding companies. NCC operates through a banking network primarily in Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri and Pennsylvania. Its core businesses include commercial and retail banking, mortgage financing and servicing, consumer .linance and asset mun..'.lgcment.
Its corporate headquarters are located at 1900 East Ninth Street Cleveland, Ohio 44114-3484.
9. On May 5, 2003, Plaintiff Peake was hired by the National City Bank of Michigan as a Small Business Banking Ollicer ("SB130").
10. While Plaintiff Peake was an employee, the Defendant National City Bank of Michigan took the name or National City Bank or the Midwcst. Plaintiffs employmcnt by the
Bank ended in April 2005. 11. As a Small Business Banking Ofii~er, Plaintiff Peake's primary duties were to attract
applications from smail busil1t'sse~ ancl other institution~ for loans that were ~overed by real estate or other securities and to close the loan applications that were approved by the Bank.
12. TIlC Small Business Administration, an executive agency of the United States (15
U.S.C. § 633), insures loans to smail bLlsinesses. Most of the loan applications that Plaintiff
Peake solicited were for amounts less than $1,000,000 and were SBA eligible k"llW
13. Plaintiff Peake successfully performed the duties of his position each year. He re(:t;lived awards and high evaluations for his SU~Ct;lSS in attracting and closing on loan applications ii'om small business owners and other persons ancl organ)".atiolls.
14. The City of Detroit is located in Wayne County. Detroit has a popUlation 01'951,270
residents, of whom 777,235 (81.6%) arc African American ("black"), according to the census of
3

2000. Michigan has a population of' 9,938,444, of whom 1,411,259, or 14.1%, are African American. Approximately 55'YO of the AIlican Americans in l\-1i~higan reside in the City of Detroit.
15. Wayne County, Michigan has a population 0[2,061,162, of whom 869,910, or 14%, are African American. Of those 869,910 African American residents of Wayne County, about 777,235, or 89%, reside in the City of Detroi!.
16. Tn 2004, Defendant National City Rank was named Michigan Lender of the Year by the llnited States Small Business Administration ("SBA") (See Exhibit I).
17. In 2004, Defendant National City Rank originated 339 small busines~ guaranteed loans in the State of Michigan. Of those SBA guaranteed loans 13, or 3.1l%, were originated for businesses in the City of Detroit In 2003, Ddendant National City \:lank originated 384lmms in the Stale of Michigan. Of those loalis 12, or 3.1 %, were originated Ihr businesses in (he City of Detroit. (See Exhibit 1).
18. In 2003 and 2004, Defendant National City Bank originated $57,056,500 in SBA guaranteed loans in the State of Michigan, of which $2,911,200, or 5%, were originated for businesses in the City of Detroil.
19. In 2004, National City Corporation, a lending institution with ownership the same or similar to that of the Defendant National City Bank, originated 350 SBA loans totaling about $27,743,000 in the State of Michigan (including all of the loans of the Defendant National City Rank), but it originated only 24 SBA loans, or approximately 7%, for African Americans. Of the total of $27,743,000 amount loaned, a total or ahout $1,700,000, or 6%, were loaned to African Americans in the State of Michigan. (Sec Exhibit 2).
20. Of the 227 branch oftlces the Defendant National City Rank has located in the State 4

of Michigan, only eight (8), or less than 3%, arc locatcd within the City of Detroit. Two of the Defendant Bank's branch offices arc located in Hamtramck, which is surrounded by the City of Detroit. Of those eight branches in the City of Detroit, one is located on the western border slreel of De(roit, and one is located on the northern border, and three are located vcry close to the eastern border of Detroit. Not one of the branches is located in a predominanlly black census tract or zip code. (Sec Exhibit 3).
21. The Defendanl National City Flank has 36 branches located in Wayne County in areas of primarily white residents outside of Detroit. In addition, the DeJbndant Na(ional City Bank has about 43 branches located in Oakland County, whose residents are 82% white and only 10% African American. It has sixteen branches in Macomh County, whosc residents are 93% white and only 2. 7~/;' Ail·jean American.
22. The Defendant National City Flank has "red-lined" the majority black areas of Detroit and its immediat~ suburbs. It docs not seck to make loans in the red-lined areas, nor does it make loans secured by property in the red-lined areas. Plaintiffs New Galilee and Pleasant Hill are located in a red-lined area.
23. Defbndant's policy and practice of not making loans in red-lined are<l.~, or securing loans by property in red-lined areas, is not written. Detbndant adopted the policy before its employment or Plaintiff Peake, and continued that policy throughout the period of Plaintiff's employment. Upon information and belief that policy and practice continues.
24. In 2004 and 2005, Plaintiff Peake processed loan applications based upon real property located in census tracts and zip code areas where the residents were predominantly African Ameri(;'\n. [n 2004 and early 2005, he processed twelve loan applications frolll applicants who resided or sought loans upon property located in heavily African-American
5

residential areas. The~e loans totaled $7,714, 472.12. IIe recommended approval of these twelve loan applications based upon real estate values in these predominantly black areas.
25. The deltmdant National City Dank declined the loan applications of eaeh or the twelve loan applicants reconunended hy Plaintiff Peake. The policy and practice of the Defendant Bank is to not seck or accept applications from churches, non-prol1t organizations, or other entities located in predominantly Ati'ican American residential areas; ra!lWf, its policy and practice is to reject such loans as "not desirahle hased upon National City criteria."
26. Plaintiff Peake's manager advised him that:
rilt is an SBBU's responsibility to target opportunities that have the highest chance of success .. ,' Targeting doctor's orlices, professional firms, all-star customers with high deposit dollars arc all examples or ways Phil could target better opportunities. As indicatedli'om the list of declin~d J!)an~, Phil has three churches and a non-profit organization. ... These types of businesses are not desirable based on National City criteria. . .. Phil and I have had several conversations regarding targeting the right types ofhusinesses ...."
27. In residential areas of the City of Detroit and nearhy municipalities with predominantly African American populations, churches and other non-profit organizations are likely to have more valuable property than most of the individual residents or resident families.
28. Under the revised Conununity Reinvestment Act regulations of the Ol'flce of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the federal Reserve Board, and the Ontce of Thrift Supervision, loans by banks to churches located in low and moderate income areas, and churches with predominantly minority congregations and
memberships for church premises, and Community Development Corporations atliliated with ~uch religious organizations, are favored by the four agencies, ancl receive favorable c(ln~ideration from the foul' bank regulating agencies. Interpretive Lelter # 765, dated January 1997, That Ldter has represented and continues to represent the po~itiol1 or the four Federal
6

agencie~ since it was issued. 29. Rather than favoring applications from qualified churches and not for proti!
organizations in heavily African American re~iden(ial areas, the policy and practice of the Defendant National City Bank is to treat such applications as "not desirable" and not to make
loans even ir the applications arc received.
30. Other lenders, including banks in Detroit and other parts of Michigan, seek and accept loan applicatiom and nITer loans to persons, organizations and businesses residing in thc City of Detroit, including such persons, organizations and businesses residing in predominantly African American areas of the City of Detroit.
31. Each of the twelve loan applications recommended by PlaintiiT Peake described above in paragraphs 24 and 25 that were declined by tile Defendant National City Dank were accepted by another bank that is located in or docs business in the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area and in the City of Dctroit.
33, The Defendant National City Flank has engaged in a pattern or practice of red-lining African American residential neighborhoods of the Detroil Metropolitan Statistical Area, The Dellmdant Bank's policies and practices dellY residents of African American neighhorhoods, on accoullt (lCthe racial compositions of those neighborhoods, an equal opportunity to obtain credit. Those policies and practices harm residents and businesses in such areas and arc not justified by business necessity or by other legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. The Defendant Bank's actions as alleged herein constitute:
a. DisCl;minatinn on the basis of race and/or color in making availahle real estate-related transactions in violation oflhe Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a); and
b. Discrimination against applicants with respect to loan and other credit transactions on 7

the basis of race and/or color in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1691 (a)(l).
34. The policies and practices of the Defendant National City Bank as alleged herein constitute a pattern 01' practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of rights secured by the Fail' Honsing Act, 42 lJ. S. C. §§ 3601 et seq.
35. The policies and practices of the Defendant National City Bank as allcged herein constitute a pattern and practice of activity in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15
u. S.c. § 1691e(h).
36. Residents of the predominantly African-American residential area~ of the City of Detroit and businesses and oilier organi:l:ations located in such areas of the City of Detroit have been haJined by and are victims of the Defendant National City Bank's racially discriminatory
* policies and practice. They are aggrieved persons as defincd in 42 U.S.C. 3602(i), and have
suffered damages as a result of the conduct of the Deft-mdanl National City Bank as descri.bed herein. Plaintifh JAT, Tn~., PlaintilTNew Galilee, ~l1d PiaintiffPleas3nt IIill Baptist Church are each an aggrieved victim of that conduct, because the Defendant Bank denied their application Ii:>r a loan, although eadl o/' them wa~ credit worthy. Plaintiff Peake is also an aggrieved victim of tllat conduct because many of his prospective clients resided in, had busines~es in, or owned property in predominantly African American residential areas, and the Del'endant National City Bank declined to authori".e such loans and thus denied him the opportunity to have those loan applicatiol1s considered when the Bank considered his income from the Bank.
37. PlailltifIs and other residents of and property owners locatcd in the predominantly African-American residential areas of the City of Detroit and businesses and other organizations located in such an:as of the City of Detroit have been victims of the Defendant National City
II

Bank's racially discriminatory policies and practices. They are aggrieved applicants, as del1ned
in 15 U.s.C. §§ 1691a !md 169Je, and Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. §§ 202 et seq. and have suffered
damages as a result of the Defendant National City Bank's conduct. Plaintiff Peake is such a resident and is an owner of property in a predominantly A frlean American rcsidential area, and the value of his property has been and is lower than it would otherwise be because of the racially discriminatory practices of the Defendant National City Bank.
38. The discriminatory policies and practices of the Defendant National City Bank described above were and are intentional, willful and they were and are implemented with reckless disregard for the Tights of African·American business owners and home owners and othcr business owners and home owners in majority African American aTeas throughout tlle City of Detroit and other areas in the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for entry or an Injunction or other Order that: (1) Declares that the policies and practice~ or the National City Bank constitute violations of the F,lir Housing Act, 42U. S. C. §§ 3601·3619, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1870, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691·1691 f; (2) Enjoins the Defendant National City Rank, their agents, employees and successors, and its prior employees, and to all other persons acting in active concert with them, from
or (a) discriminating on the basis race or color in any aspect or their husiness
practices or the Defendant Agency from further discriminatory and retaliatory conduct or transactions; (b) failing OT refusing to take such affirmative steps as may be necessary to restore, as nearly as practicahle, the victims of National City Rank's unlawful practices to the position in which they would have been but for the discriminatory
9

conduct; (c) failing or refusing to take such affirmative steps as may be neces~ary to

prevent the recurrence of any racially discriminatory conduct in the future, and to

eliminate to the extent practical the effects of the National City Hank's unlawful

practices to expressly include in its Community Redevelopment Act assessment
or area the predominantly AIrican Amcrican areas the City of Detroit, and to

service those areas at least as well as the predominantly white areas it has served

in the past; (3) Awards such actual and compensatory damages that full y compensate all 0 t' the

victims of the National City Bank's unlawfully discriminatory policies and practices for the

iqjuries it has caused, pursuant 10 42 U. S. C. § 3613(d)(1) (ll) and/orl5 U S.c. § 1691e(h); and

(4) Awards such punitive damages to the extent authorized by law to all victims of the

Defendants' lllllawiul discriminatory policies and practices; (5) Awards the plaintiffs the costs of litigation including reasonably incurred expenses

and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U,S.C. § 36 \3 and 15 U.S.c, § 1691c(d); (6) Assesses a civil penalty against the Defendant National City Bank in an anlOunt

authorized by 42U.S.C.§ 36130(10(C) and 15 U.S.C. § 169Ie(b); and

(7) Such other relief as may he just.

"",",~W~,ALDMAN, Professional Corporation

R. RUNYAN (P 197 . )

Attorneys t(lT Plainti ffs

.

1000 Farmer Street

Detroit, Michigan 48226

(313) 965-3464

10

Dated: April 25, 2006

ROSE & ROSE, P.C.
By: ~ {. /~(.J#«<.) lAVID L. ROSE TERRI N. MARCliS Attorneys for PlaintilTi; 1320 19u, Street, N.W., Suite 60] Washington, D.C. 20030 (202) 331-8555

11

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------..

National City Bank
Midwest
Branch Offices
e Branch Office Location
f:i] Census Tracts Outside City
o of Detroit Census Tracts Inside City of Detroit

National City Bank
Midwest
2004 SSA Loan Distribution
• Borrower Location
@ Bank Office Location
liiiI CeIl$U$ Tract$ Outside City
o of Detroit Census Trects Inside Cly of Detroit

National City Bank 7A Small Business Loans 2004

;-$2,354,000, 8% , $329,900, 1% .-$90,000, 0%
$1,700,200,6%

• Asian • Native America
o Hispanic o African Am
D Non Minority

23,431,300,85%

N.ltional City Bank Midwest
Branch Locations In City Of
De1roil
o Bunch Office Location
~ CetlSUS Tracts Outside City
o of Detroit Census Tracts Inside City of Detroit

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COlJRT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN,
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAT, INC.,NEW GALILEE MISSIONARY)

BAPTIST CIIURCH, PLEASANT HILL )

BAPTIST CHURCII, AND PHILLIP

)

PEAKE

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

)

v.

)

)

NATIONAL CITY BANK OF THE

)

MIDWEST and NATIONAL CITY

)

CORPORATION.

)

)

Defendants. )

)

..........

. ...----~)

SACHS WALDMAN, Professional Corporation

By: JOHN R. RUNYAN (P 19763) Attorney~ for Plaintiffs

1000 Fanner Street

Detroit, Michigan 48226

(313) 965-3464

Case: 2:06-cv-11937 Assigned To Edmunds. Nancy G Referral Judge: Majzoub, Mona K Filed: 04-25-2006 At 02:05 PM CMP JAT INC, ET AL V NATIONAL CITY BANK OF THE MIDWEST (EW)
CIVIL ACTION NO. HON.

ROSE & ROSE, P.c.
By: DAVID L. ROSE TERRI N. MARCUS
Attorneys for Plaintitl's 1320 19th Street, N.W., Suile 60 I Wa~hington, D.C. 20036
(202) 331-8555

DEMAND .FOR JURY TRIAl, Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs JAT, INC., NRW GALILEE IvlISSIONARY BAPTIST CHURCH, PLEASANT HILL BAPTIST CHURCII and PHILLIP PEAKE, demand trial by jury of any and all issues triable of right by aiury.

SACHS WALDMAN, Professional Corporation ROSE & ROSE, P.C.

By: ~-"-."l--".,~~';:";-:-:-it,l,.~:3:::::::::­
JQ R. RUNYAN (P 1 63)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 1000 Farmer Street Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 965-3464

Hy: )zw;;q L. ~ (fft2-\

DAVID L. ROSE

")

TRRRI N. MARCUS

Altomeys for Plaintiffs 1320 19th Street, N,W" Suile 601

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 331-8555

Dated: April 25, 2006

2

-

•

JS 44 11/99

The JS-44 l:ivil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filil"l9 and sarvlce of plaadlngs or other papers as required

by law, except as provided by local fl,.lles of court. This fOnTI, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required

for use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of iliitlatlng the civil docket sheet.

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

DEFENDANTS NANCY G. eDMUNDS'

JAT, Inc., New Galilee IVlissionary Baptist Church, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church, and Phillip Peake

National City Bank of the Midwest and National City Corporation

(b) County of Residence of J=lr,st Llstec

WAYNE

j County of Residence of First Listed

CUYAHOGA (Cleveland

NOTe: IN I.AND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE Ohio

Jum'(j:,' ",,", ROSE & ROSE, P.C.

By: David L. Rose

1320 19" Street, N. W., Suite 601 W""blngton, DC 20036

and

(800) 966-5298

" . ., " OF

SACHS WALDMAN, p.e.
By: John R. Runyan 1000 Farmer Street J)etroit, Michigan 48216 (313) 965-3464

Attorneys (If Known)
Steven J. Weiss (P .. 23tH) Hertz, Schram & Saretsky, P.C.
1760 S. Telegraph Road, Suite 300 Bloomfield,Hills. MI 48302 248 335-5000

00_ ~ ""'

III CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (PIS,e an "X" In On. Box for PI.'nt'ff

(For Diven;;ity Cases Ol'lly)

sod One Box for Defendant)

o 1 U,S. Government Plaintiff

~ F'ederal Question (U.S. Govemment Not , p,rty)

PLA DEF

n 0 Citizen ofThis State

I

I

pLA DEF
0 4 04 Incorporated or Pnncipal Place of Business In This State

2 U.S. C!overnment Defendant

4 Divers.ity (Indicate Crti;!;en~njp ot Parties
In Item 11t)

IV. NATURE OF SUIT
CONTRACT

(Plate an "X" in One Box Onlv) TORTS

Citi:l!en of Another

n 2

2

LJ3 D Citizen or Subject of a 3 Fnro'on co;'nt",

Incorporated iilnd Principal

5

5

of Business In Another Stale

Foreigh Nation

06 0 6

FORFEITURE/ PENAL'I'I

BANKRUPTCY

OTHER STATUTES

f

0 11 0 Insuranc.c
r.1 120 Milliint: 0 130 Miller Act CJ 140 Negotiableln&trumorrt 0 150 Reco....ery of
o\lerp~yment and Enforcement Of Jl,ldgment
0 151 Medicanl Act
0 152 A.ecoIIl!lry of Defaulted Student L¢:I\t'I!!I; (E.xcl. Veterans)
U 153 Raoov,,1'V or a,.."'ftl&ymern
of Veteran's Benefits
0 1eo SI(lCkhOltjel'S;' $UItS
iJ 190 Other Contract
195 Conttad PltldUCI Ulibility
REAL PROPERTY
IJ 210 land Condemnation
0 no FOted(l$l,Ire
[J 230 R~nt LoIS" & EJectmlllinl
0 240 Troa ta Land U 245 Tort Product liability 0 290 All OIMr RIJIllI PrQP'rty

PERSONAL INJURY

PE~SONAL INJURY 0 610 Mr'ic~ltl,lre

CJ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158

tJ 31 0 Airplane

C 362 ~el'!;onsllnjury~ 0 820 Other Food &. Drug

0 315 Airp~ne Product

Mcd. Malj)t~~IC:1!:I 0 62~ Drug Rt:llated Seizure :J 423 Withdrawal

!.,Iability (J

r:1 365 ~r'il88.g~Ill'MI}' "

I]

~f f'ropelrty ~1: 1le1 630 I"lquor laW!!

28 USC 157

3.20 Assault LIbel

And Sl~nder

0 368 Asbestos Personal 0 640 A..R. So Truck

PROPF,iRTY RIGfITS

Iniu~ p","~

0 330 Fi3t!llIr,aj !;;mplcyt!rr'tl'

Llab illY

C G50 Airline Reg$

Liability
0 340 Marine Cl 345 Marine Product

0
pe~SONAL P~OPERTY

CJ 370 other Friiud

0

660 Occupational S:\lreWIHeilhh
890 Other

0 820 Copyrights
CJ aao Pa1enl
0 840 irademark

Uabillty
iJ 350 Moto( Vehlelill

0 371 TMl'lln L.tndlng 0 :saO Other Persooal

tABOR

$CX.;IAL SECuRITY

(J 355 Motor Vehh::le Product Liability
(J 360 other Par!!onal Injury
CIVIL RIGHTS

Prop"rty D<lmag~
0 JeS PI'QPerty Damage

C

PrQr,;hJr;t L.i;;'\bllltY Il

PRISON.R P.TITIONS Ii

71 0 P"lIir l...'Ibor SlilM&rds Act
720 LoWQr/Mgmt. Relalions
730 L~bort'MgmL Rep~lilt'Pl:l

0 861 H IA (1 395ft) C1 8$2 Blil;k L.lJng (9:/3) 0 863 DI'M.::IDlww (4f)!i(!])i
0 ee4 5510 Tille XVI D 665 RSI ("5(g))

o 441 Votlng_

Cl 51 0 Mo~on~ tQ V;a,~~

~Io~ent........... ~.

S~n~nt:e
Habeas Corpus:

.c~~r;ct;lmmodl~lILj(;II'i~· ;;;.

530 Gcnc~1

.j 535 Death Panalty

0p o o 44D umer l;lvil Right5

540 M~~mu~ &.

!·I 550 Civil Rights '

o 555 Prison Condltl

& DisClosure Act I'::"; 740 Railway Labor Act.

F60E::RAL TAX SUITS

L:: 790 Other Labor 1.11193 tl0l'l

o 870 Taxa!! (U.S. Plaintiff
or Defendant)

5S'S~~Lr I 1 B71 [RS~Third Party 26 USC 7609

D 400 Stale R~~pportlonmenl o 41 D Anlltru!lt
oU 4:30 Banks snd Banking 450 CommeteeJlCC ::1 41$0 Deportlltion
o 470 RaCketeer Irrnuenood 8.
CQmJpt Orgllllilz.aliOrl&
o aia Selective Service
o 860 50cu rilll!'.llCom mod itiesl
E:o:chllngilll
LJ 875 Customer Challeng.
12L15C 3410
o 1391 AgrICultural Acts o 892 E::t.Dr'l6l'1'1iC St8~liUltion Act o 893 ;;rwirormenlill M~Itet'$
n B94 EnelVY Alloeation Ad
o 895 Frlliedom Of
Information Act
o 900 1r::~~~I~~ Unct.r E~uaj Acceaa to JusUce
o 950 Gon.s;tiMlon.ality of Slate StBtUte&
o 890 OtMr $tQtym-y AI;tiQt'\lio

?, ''~ ''' ''G \'IN

,-NIO N.nLA~t D (PLACE AN "X" IN ONE BOX ONLY}.; .~. " ; :.: I\j

U 0 iginal

2 Removed from

~ FilI!!MBl'lded from

LJ 4 Reinstated

iIIInoth~r district 5 (specify)

roce"ding

Stiittr: Cou~

Appellate Court

~eo ened

App~~[ to

Di${I'Ie-t

· 7 Judge from

U.

M8~I!.ttate

. CAUSE OF ACTION (Cite the u.s. Civil Statute under which yOU are fUing Mi!l write brief 9tstement 01 cause.
Do not cite jurl$r:lletlOn.a1 .s.1:atl,lte$ l.m~~!. diversity.)

Complaint of Discrtmdnatory Lending Practices under 42 USC 13601-3619, 42 USC 11981 and

§l982 and 15 IT
Vii REQUESTED IN

o CH.CK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION

$ DEMAND

cHE.CK YES onl

COMPLAINT:

UNDER F,R.C.P. 23 Declaratory ,In "unctive and JORt DBt1AND.

No

IS..
ViiI. RELATED CASE(S) Instructions):

IFANY

Denise Page Hood

05-72520

DATE April 25. 2006

PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE 83.11

1.

Is this a case that has been previously dismissed?

If yes, give the fOllowing information: Court: ___________________________________

Case No.: ______________________

Judge: ________________________-

~ Yes
ONO

2.

Other than stated above, are there any pending or previously

discontinued or dismissed companion cases in this or any other

court, including state court? (Companion cases are matters in which

it appears substantially similar evidence will be offered or the same

or related parties are present and the Cases arise out of the same

transaction or occurrence.)

If yes, give the fOllowing information: Court: US District Court lor the Eastern District of Michigan

Case No.: .0...5...-._7.2..5.:;:2.0...__________________

Judge: Denise PaAe Ilood

Notes:

 
 Case 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM Document 9 Filed 07/31/2006 Page 1 of 14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

____________________________________

JAT, INC., BODY OF CHRIST

)

CHRISTIAN CENTER, GOOD FIGHT )

OF FAITH MINISTRY, PLEASANT

)

HILL BAPTIST CHURCH,

)

SAMARITAN BAPTIST CHURCH,

)

3M CONTRACTING, INC. and PHILLIP )

PEAKE, and Others Similarly Situtated )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

)

v.

)

Civil Action No. 2:06-cv-11937

)

NATIONAL CITY BANK OF THE

)

MIDWEST and NATIONAL CITY

)

CORPORATION.

)

Demand for Trial By Jury

)

Defendants. )

)

Class Action

____________________________________)

AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT OF RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY LENDING PRACTICES

1. The Plaintiffs bring this action to enforce Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968,

as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, the Civil

Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982, and the Equal Credit Opportunity

Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f.

2. This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. §

1343, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 and 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e).

3. Plaintiff JAT, Inc., also known as Turner Tours & Charters (“JAT”), is a travel and

tourism business, providing charter motor coach service throughout the United States and

Canada. It is owned and operated by John and Yvonne Turner. The Turners are both African-

American. The majority of JAT’s clientele is African-American. In 2005, JAT applied for a

business loan from Defendant. Defendant rejected their application. JAT subsequently obtained

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a $950,000 loan from Bank One at a higher rate of interest. 4. Plaintiff Body of Christ Christian Center (“Christ Christian Center”) is located at
11780 Ohio St., Detroit, Michigan 28204. The majority of parishioners at Christ Christian Center are African American. Christ Christian Center applied for a loan from National City Bank in the amount of $600,000. Defendant did not approve the loan. Christ Christian Center subsequently obtained the loan from Bank One.
5. Plaintiff Good Fight of Faith Ministry is a predominantly African-American congregation with an African-American Pastor. Although it has been and is currently holding its services in a building located in Wayne County, Michigan, outside the City of Detroit, it sought to purchase real estate within the City of Detroit to use as a church. It submitted and filed an application in early 2006 to the Defendant National City Bank for a loan of $350,000 to be secured by a mortgage on that property. That property was located at 8590 Esper, Detroit, MI 48204. The Defendant National City Bank did not promptly act upon the loan, but sought additional information from the Good Fight of Faith Ministry. After that congregation submitted additional information, the Defendant Bank still did not approve the loan. Shortly after the Good Fight of Faith Ministry determined that the Defendant Bank did not intend to grant the loan, it obtained a loan in the amount of $350,000 from another major bank to be secured by a mortgage on the same property. However, because of the delay caused by the Defendant Bank, another bidder obtained the property, to the harm of the Good Fight of Faith Ministry.
6. Plaintiff Pleasant Hill Baptist Church (“Pleasant Hill”) is located at 5207 Lovett Street, Detroit, Michigan 48210 in Wayne County. The majority of parishioners at Pleasant Hill are African-American. Pleasant Hill applied for a loan from National City Bank in the amount of approximately $734,000. Defendant Bank did not grant the loan, and as a practical matter rejected it. Pleasant Hill subsequently obtained a loan from Bank One in the amount of $734, 472 for additions and improvements to its building.
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7. Plaintiff Samaritan Baptist Church (“Samaritan Baptist”) is located at 8806 Mack Avenue, Detroit, Michigan 28214. The majority of parishioners at Samaritan Baptist Church are African-American. Samaritan Baptist applied for a loan from National City Bank in the amount of approximately $600,000. Defendant Bank did not grant the loan, and as a practical matter rejected it. Samaritan Baptist subsequently obtained a loan from Bank One in the amount of $785,000.
8. Plaintiff 3M Contracting, Inc. is a small business located at 11000 W. McNichols Rd., Detroit, Michigan 48221. 3M Contracting, Inc. is a black owned business. 3M Contracting applied for a $50,000 loan from National City Bank under the Capital Assistance Program of Michigan law in which the State would guaranty 80% of the loan, and it offered purchase orders as collateral. Defendant Bank did not grant the loan and as a practical matter rejected it. Instead, the National City Bank required the owner of 3M Contracting, Inc. to place a lien upon the residence owned by him and his wife to obtain a smaller loan from National City Bank that was not so guaranteed. In addition the Defendant provided that its loan be renewed frequently so that the rate of interest 3M Contracting, Inc. is obliged to pay has been sharply increased.
9. Plaintiff Phillip Peake (“Peake”) is an African American (“black”) man. He was born and raised in Detroit, Michigan. He resides in Detroit in a zip code that has a predominantly African-American (black) population.
10. The Defendant National City Bank of the Midwest, like its predecessor, the National City Bank of Michigan, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the National City Corporation.
11. National City Corporation (“NCC”) is one of the nation's largest financial holding companies. NCC operates through a banking network primarily in Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri and Pennsylvania. Its core businesses include commercial and retail banking, mortgage financing and servicing, consumer finance and asset management. Its corporate headquarters are located at 1900 East Ninth Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44114-3484.
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12. On May 5, 2003, Plaintiff Peake was hired by the National City Bank of Michigan as a Small Business Banking Officer (“SBBO”).
13. While Plaintiff Peake was an employee, the Defendant National City Bank of Michigan took the name of National City Bank of the Midwest. Plaintiff’s employment by the Bank ended in April 2005.
14. As a Small Business Banking Officer, Plaintiff Peake’s primary duties were to attract applications from small businesses and other institutions for loans that were covered by real estate or other securities and to close the loan applications that were approved by the Bank.
15. The Small Business Administration, an executive agency of the United States (15 U.S.C. § 633), insures loans to small businesses. Most of the loan applications that Plaintiff Peake solicited were for amounts less than $1,000,000 and were SBA eligible loans.
16. Plaintiff Peake successfully performed the duties of his position each year. He received awards and high evaluations for his success in attracting and closing on loan applications from small business owners and other persons and organizations.
17. The City of Detroit is located in Wayne County. Detroit has a population of 951,270 residents, of whom 777,235 (81.6%) are African American (“black”), according to the census of 2000. Michigan has a population of 9,938,444, of whom 1,411,259, or 14.1%, are African American. Approximately 55% of the African Americans in Michigan reside in the City of Detroit.
18. Wayne County, Michigan has a population of 2,061,162, of whom 869,910, or 42%, are African American. Of those 869,910 African American residents of Wayne County, about 777,235, or 89%, reside in the City of Detroit.
19. In 2004, Defendant National City Bank originated 339 small business guaranteed loans in the State of Michigan. Of those SBA guaranteed loans 13, or 3.8%, were originated for businesses in the City of Detroit. In 2003, Defendant National City Bank originated 384 loans in
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the State of Michigan. Of those loans twelve (12), or 3.1%, were originated for businesses in the City of Detroit.
20. In 2003 and 2004, Defendant National City Bank originated $57,056,500 in SBA guaranteed loans in the State of Michigan, of which no more than $2,911,200, or 5%, were originated for businesses in the City of Detroit.
21. In 2004, National City Corporation, a lending institution with ownership the same or similar to that of the Defendant National City Bank, originated 350 SBA loans totaling about $27,743,000 in the State of Michigan (including all of the loans of the Defendant National City Bank), but it originated only 24 SBA loans, or approximately 7%, for African Americans. Of the total of $27,743,000 amount loaned, a total of no more than $1,700,000, or 6%, were loaned to African Americans in the State of Michigan.
22. Of the 277 branch offices the Defendant National City Bank has located in the State of Michigan, only eight (8), or less than 3%, are located within the City of Detroit. Two of the Defendant Bank’s branch offices are located in Hamtramck, which is surrounded by the City of Detroit but does not have a predominantly African-American population. Of those eight branches in the City of Detroit, one is located on the western border street of Detroit, and one is located on the northern border, and three are located very close to the eastern border of Detroit. Not one of the branches is located in a predominantly black census tract or zip code that is inhabited predominantly by African Americans.
23. The Defendant National City Bank has 36 branches located in Wayne County in areas of primarily white residents outside of Detroit. In addition, the Defendant National City Bank has about 43 branches located in Oakland County, whose residents are 82% white and only 10% African American. It has sixteen branches in Macomb County, whose residents are 93% white and only 2.7% African American.
24. The Defendant National City Bank has “red-lined” the majority black census tracts
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of Detroit and its immediate suburbs. It does not seek to make loans in the red-lined areas, nor does it seek to make or approve loans secured or to be secured by property located in those areas. Plaintiffs JAT, Christ Christian Center, Good Fight Pleasant Hill, Samaritan Baptist, and 3M Contracting are located in red-lined areas as described above. The property that the Good Fight of Faith Ministry attempted to purchase was also located in an area of Detroit that the Defendants had red-lined.
25. Defendant Bank’s policy and practice of not making loans in red-lined areas, or securing loans by property in red-lined areas, is not written. Defendant Bank adopted the policy before its employment of Plaintiff Peake, continued that policy throughout Plaintiff Peake’s employment and continues to follow this policy.
26. In the latter part of 2003, and in 2004 and until April , 2005, Plaintiff Peake processed loan applications based upon real property located areas where the residents were predominantly African American, as well as loans in other places. In 2004 and early 2005, he processed twelve loan applications from churches whose members were predominantly African American and other organizations that were owned or operated by African Americans. These loans totaled $7,714, 472.12. He recommended approval of these twelve loan applications based upon real estate values in these predominantly black areas.
27. The defendant National City Bank declined the loan applications of each of the twelve loan applicants recommended by Plaintiff Peake. The policy and practice of the Defendant Bank is to not seek or accept applications from churches, non-profit organizations, or other African American entities located in predominantly African American residential areas; rather, its policy and practice is to reject such loans as “not desirable based upon National City criteria.”
28. By an internal memorandum of October 19, 2004, Plaintiff Peake’s manager, Scott Wolffis, advised him that:
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[I]t is an SBBO’s responsibility to target opportunities that have the highest chance of success . . .. Targeting doctor’s offices, professional firms, all-star customers with high deposit dollars are all examples of ways Phil could target better opportunities. As indicated from the list of declined loans, Phil has three churches and a non-profit organization. . .. These types of businesses are not desirable based on National City criteria . . . . Phil and I have had several conversations regarding targeting the right types of businesses . . ..” 29. Under the revised Community Reinvestment Act regulations of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, loans for church premises to churches located in low and moderate income areas and/or churches with predominantly minority congregations and memberships and to Community Development Corporations affiliated with such religious organizations, are favored by the four agencies, and receive favorable consideration from the four bank regulating agencies. Interpretive Letter # 765, dated January 1997. That Letter has represented and continues to represent the position of the four Federal agencies since it was issued. 30. Rather than favoring applications from qualified churches and not for profit organizations in heavily African American residential areas, the policy and practice of the Defendant National City Bank is to treat such applications as “not desirable” and not to make loans even if the applications are received and the applicant is credit worthy. 31. Other lenders, including banks in Detroit and other parts of Michigan, seek and accept loan applications and offer loans to persons, organizations and businesses residing in the City of Detroit, including such persons, organizations and businesses residing in predominantly African American areas of the City of Detroit. 32. Each of the twelve loan applications recommended by Plaintiff Peake and declined by the Defendant National City Bank as described in paragraphs 26 and 27 was later accepted by another bank that is located in or does business in the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area and in the City of Detroit.
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33. In 2002, 2003 and 2004, the Defendant Bank accepted approximately 981 loan applications for loans to be guaranteed by the Small Business Administration of the United States for a total of approximately $90,000,000, of which only twenty-four (24) applications were from businesses located within the City of Detroit.
34. Of the $4,219,000 in SBA loans the Defendant Bank granted to businesses located within the City of Detroit, only $430,000 or approximately 10%, were awarded to nineteen (19) African-American owned businesses located in the City of Detroit. Such businesses received less than one half of one per cent (0.5%) of the amount of SBA insured loans by the Defendant Bank in those three years.
35. In 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and in 2006, the Defendant National City Bank has engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against African American churches, businesses and other institutions for loans on the basis of race that has harmed Plaintiffs and members of the class described below.
36. The Defendant National City Bank has engaged in a pattern or practice of red-lining African American residential neighborhoods of the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area. The Defendant Bank’s policies and practices deny African-Americans and other residents of African American neighborhoods, on account of the racial compositions of those neighborhoods, an equal opportunity to obtain credit. Those policies and practices harm residents and businesses in such areas and are not justified by business necessity or by other legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.
37. The Defendant National City Bank has adopted and uses procedures and practices which are intended to exclude African American institutions from equal credit opportunities. The Defendant National City Bank has adopted and uses procedures and practices which disproportionately exclude African American churches and small businesses and non-profit organizations from an equal opportunity to obtain its loans. One such procedure used by the
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Defendant Bank is a special credit scoring matrix for churches which tends to exclude African American churches disproportionately from loans by the Defendant Bank. That credit scoring matrix has not been validated as showing credit worthiness.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 38. Numerosity. The class is comprised of more than 500 churches with predominantly African American congregations, and other African-American not-for-profit organizations and business owned or operated by African Americans (blacks) located in or desiring to purchase property in the predominantly African American census tracts of Detroit as well as individuals owning real estate such census tracts. They are too numerous to be joined as parties to this action. 39. Commonality. The questions of fact and law of Plaintiffs JAT, Inc. and 3M Contracting Inc. are common to members of the class who operate businesses in those predominantly African American census tracts of Detroit; and the claims of the Plaintiffs Body of Christ Christian Church, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Pleasant Hills Baptist Church and the Good Samaritan Baptist Church are typical of the claims of other churches and non-profit organizations located in those census tracts or desiring to purchase property in those census tracts. Similarly, the claims of Plaintiff Peake to loss of value of real estate in such census tracts is similar to the claims of discriminatory treatment by the other members of the class. The following allegations of fact are common to the class (Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(c)(2) and (3)): (a) The congregations and staff of the churches and the members and staffs of the other not-for-profit organizations and the owners and operators of the businesses are predominantly African American owning real estate or desiring to purchase real estate in the predominantly African American census tracts located in the City of Detroit; (b) The Plaintiffs and members of the class sought to obtain loans from the Defendant Bank, and were worthy of credit but were denied applications for loans or would have been
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denied such loans under the policies and practices of the Defendant Bank challenged by this suit; or
(c) The Plaintiffs and members of the class own or sought to own property in the African American census tracts and the value of such property has been diminished by the failure and refusal of the Defendant Bank to make loans to them.
40. Typicality. Plaintiffs have claims of discrimination in lending that are typical of the members of the class.
41. Adequacy. The Plaintiffs will adequately represent the interests of the class. The plaintiffs have no interests that conflict with the interests of the class. Their legal representative, Rose & Rose, P.C., will adequately represent the class. The firm has litigated cases in the federal courts under Title VII since 1989 and has represented and is representing plaintiffs in pattern or practice cases and collective actions and class actions under Rule 23.
42. The Defendant Bank’s actions as alleged herein constitute: a. Discrimination on the basis of race and/or color in making available real estate-related transactions in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a); and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982. b. Discrimination against applicants or candidates for loan applications with respect to loan and other credit transactions on the basis of race and/or color in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1691a(1) and 42 U.S.C. 1981, as amended. c. Discrimination against African American businesses, churches and other not for profit organizations because of the race and color of their owners, their members, and their officials and high ranking employees, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, as amended. 43. The policies and practices of the Defendant National City Bank as alleged herein constitute a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of rights secured by the Fair Housing Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3601 et seq., and in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981.
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44. The policies and practices of the Defendant National City Bank as alleged herein constitute a pattern and practice of activity in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U. S.C. § 1691e(h), and in violation of 42 U. S. C. 1981 and 1982.
45. Business entities owned by African-Americans and residents of the predominantly African-American residential areas of the City of Detroit and businesses and other organizations located in such areas of the City of Detroit have been harmed by and are victims of the Defendant National City Bank’s racially discriminatory policies and practices. Those entities are aggrieved persons and have suffered damages as a result of the conduct of the Defendant National City Bank as described herein. Plaintiffs JAT, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church, Samaritan Baptist Church and 3M Contracting, Inc. are each an aggrieved victim of that conduct, because the Defendant Bank denied their application for a loan, although each of them was credit worthy. Plaintiff Peake is an aggrieved victim of that conduct because the value of his real estate is reduced by the unwillingness of the Defendant Bank to make loans in the predominantly African American areas of Detroit.
46. Plaintiff Peake is also an aggrieved victim of that conduct because many of his prospective clients resided in, had businesses in, or owned property in predominantly African American residential areas, and the Defendant National City Bank declined to authorize such loans and thus denied him the opportunity to have those loan applications considered when the Bank determined the adequacy of his performance and his income from the Bank. If those loans had been approved, Plaintiff Peake would have exceeded or met the goals for loans set for him by the Defendant Bank. The denial of those loans by the Defendant resulted in a lower performance appraisal than that he would have received if many of the loans to such potential customers had been authorized by the Bank.
47. On April 22, 2005 Plaintiff Peake had brought in an application for a loan in the amount of $1,050,000. The Defendant Bank approved that loan. That loan together with loans
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he secured for the Defendant Bank earlier in 2005 had resulted in his achieving in April 2005 more than half of the goal for him set by the Bank of approximately $4,000,000 for the calendar year 2005. The Defendant Bank terminated Plaintiff Peake’s employment on April 22, 2005, without giving him a stated reason.
48. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant Bank terminated Plaintiff Peake’s employment by the Bank in substantial part because many of the loans he brought to the Defendant Bank were from African American churches or businesses or African American applicants for a loan, and the Defendant Bank terminated his employment with it in substantial part because it was unwilling to make loans to those prospective African American customers and in retaliation for his complaints about the Bank’s discriminatory lending practices. Such retaliation is unlawful under federal laws.
49. The discriminatory policies and practices of the Defendant National City Bank described above were and are intentional, willful and were and are implemented with reckless disregard for the rights of the members of African-American churches and African-American business owners.
50. Even if the discriminatory policies and practices of the Defendant Bank were deemed to be unintentional, they violate the Fair Housing Act as amended, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for entry of an Injunction and Order that: (1) Declares that the policies and practices of the National City Bank constitute violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3601-3619, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U. S.C. 1981 and 1982, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f; (2) Enjoins the Defendant National City Bank, their agents, employees and successors, and its prior employees, and to all other persons acting in active concert with them, from
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(a) discriminating on the basis of race or color in any aspect of their business practices or the Defendant Agency from further discriminatory and retaliatory conduct or transactions; (b) failing or refusing to take such affirmative steps as may be necessary to restore, as nearly as practicable, the victims of National City Bank’s unlawful practices to the position in which they would have been but for the discriminatory conduct; (c) failing or refusing to take such affirmative steps as may be necessary to prevent the recurrence of conduct by the Defendant Bank which has the purpose or effect of discriminating on the grounds of race in the future, and to eliminate to the extent practical the effects of National City Bank’s unlawful practices to expressly include in its Community Redevelopment Act assessment area the predominantly African American areas of the City of Detroit, and to service those areas at least as well as the predominantly white areas it has served in the past; (3) Awards actual and compensatory damages that fully compensate Plaintiffs and the members of the class who are victims of the National City Bank’s unlawfully discriminatory policies and practices for the injuries it has caused, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 3613(d)(1) (B) and/or 15 U S.C. § 1691e(h); and 42 U. S.C. 1981. (4) Awards such punitive damages to the extent authorized by law to the plaintiffs and other victims of the Defendants’ unlawful discriminatory policies and practices; and (5) Awards the Plaintiffs the costs of litigation including reasonably incurred expenses and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3613 and 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d) and other provisions of federal law; (6) Assesses a civil penalty against the Defendant National City Bank in an amount authorized by 42 U.S.C.§ 3613()(10(C) and 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b).
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Case 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM Document 9 Filed 07/31/2006 Page 14 of 14 (7) Such other relief as may be just.

/s/ John R. Runyan, Jr. John R. Runyan, Jr. Sachs Waldman, PC 1000 Farmer Street Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 965-3464

/s/ David L. Rose David L. Rose Henry P. Gassner Rose & Rose P. C. 1320 19th St. N.W., Suite 601 Washington, D. C. 20036 (202) 331-8555
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY Plaintiffs hereby demand the right to a trial by jury.

/s/ John R. Runyan, Jr. John R. Runyan, Jr. Sachs Waldman, PC 1000 Farmer Street Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 965-3464

/s/ David L. Rose David L. Rose Henry P. Gassner Rose & Rose P. C. 1320 19th St. N.W., Suite 601 Washington, D. C. 20036 (202) 331-8555
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

July 31, 2006

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 Case 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM Document 119 Filed 11/08/2007 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAT, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-CV-11937-DT

VS.

DISTRICT JUDGE NANCY G. EDMUNDS

NATIONAL CITY BANK OF THE MIDWEST, et al.,
Defendants.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB

/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL AND
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE FOR PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT REPORTS
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Compel Discovery filed on September 25, 2007. (Docket no. 108). This Motion has been fully briefed. (Docket nos. 112, 116). The Court heard oral argument on November 7, 2007. In addition, Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Extend the Deadline for Plaintiffs’ Expert Reports. (Docket no. 113). Defendants have responded to this Motion. (Docket no. 117). This Motion will be decided on the briefs in this Opinion although the parties addressed this Motion during oral argument on November 7. These matters are therefore ready for ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). (Docket nos. 110, 114).
This is an action in which Plaintiffs allege that Defendant National City Bank discriminates against African-American churches and small businesses in the granting of loans in the City of Detroit. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification was denied in July 2007. (Docket no. 74). In their Joint Statement of Resolved/Unresolved Issues, the parties state that the unresolved issues are: (1) whether Defendants must produce interest rate spread and costs of funds data for loans made; (2) whether Plaintiffs’ depositions of Weitz, Rowe, Rivera, and Fynn should go forward; (3) whether Plaintiffs’

Case 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM Document 119 Filed 11/08/2007 Page 2 of 5
depositions of Smith, Wolfiss, and Bickers should go forward; and (4) whether the deadline for Plaintiffs’ Expert Reports should be extended for 60 days.
1. Interest Rate Spread and Cost of Funds Data Plaintiffs request the interest rate spread and cost of funds data from Defendant Bank because it will allegedly show if Defendant Bank offered credit on similar terms to those in African-American census tracts versus the White tracts of the Detroit Metro area. This data is therefore relevant to a claim of interest rate discrimination. Defendant Bank argues that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint does not include such a claim. The Court agrees. During oral argument Plaintiffs’ counsel pointed only to the allegations of Plaintiff 3M Contracting as a basis for this type of discrimination. Plaintiffs allege in their Amended Complaint that Defendant Bank required 3M to place a lien upon the owner’s residence and “provided that its loan be renewed frequently so that the rate of interest 3M Contracting, Inc. is obligated to pay has been sharply increased.” (Docket no. 9 at 3). This is the only reference in the Amended Complaint identified by Plaintiffs and the only one found by the Court. Judge Edmunds’ Order of October 27, 2006 does not characterize the Plaintiffs’ claims as alleging interest rate discrimination. The allegation by 3M is not that its original loan rate was higher than the Bank would have charged but for the fact that 3M is a minority business. It is that the loan term was short which has resulted in a higher loan rate, presumably because the interest rates have increased in the interim. There is no allegation that Defendant Bank charged Plaintiff 3M a higher rate than it was charging other customers during any renewal process. Therefore, this data is not relevant to the claims or defenses of any party, and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel the production of this data will be denied. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 2. Plaintiffs’ Depositions of Weitz, Rowe, Rivera, and Fynn
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Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs noticed the depositions of Weitz, Rowe, Rivera, and Fynn before discovery closed. Defendants also do not dispute that these depositions fall within the number of depositions that Plaintiffs are allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2). The parties disagree on why these depositions did not go forward during the discovery period. Defendants argue that the notices for the depositions of Rowe and Weitz were late, but the Court finds that Plaintiffs reasonably explained why these two notices were served just before discovery ended. Therefore, these four depositions should go forward, and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel these depositions will be granted.
3. Plaintiffs’ Depositions of Smith, Wolfiss, and Bickers Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs noticed these depositions well before discovery closed. Also, there is no dispute that these depositions also fall within the number of depositions that Plaintiffs are entitled to take under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2). Therefore, Plaintiffs have shown that these three depositions should go forward. Defendants have filed a Motion for Protective Order in a related case, the Peake case, which is now pending before Judge Hood. They wish to preclude the use of any testimony from these depositions in that case because discovery in the Peake case has closed and Peake allegedly has not taken any depositions. Defendants state that they will produce these deponents and facilitate Wolfiss’s appearance if Plaintiffs will stipulate that the depositions will not be used in the Peake case, or if a protective order is entered by this Court or by Judge Hood. This Court may issue a protective order on good cause shown pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Courts have under some circumstances limited the use of deposition testimony to trial preparation in the case in which the depositions are taken. See Baker v. Buffenbarger, 2004 WL 2124787 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2004). However, in such cases the moving party has shown some evidence that a party intends to use the deposition testimony to embarrass or for some other purpose set out in Rule 26(c). Plaintiffs’ counsel
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during oral argument agreed that discovery should not be taken in this case for use in the Peake case. Defendants argue that they suspect Plaintiffs may attempt to use the testimony in the Peake case because: (1) these three persons will be key witnesses in the Peake case; (2) these three depositions were the first noticed by Plaintiffs; and (3) Plaintiffs allegedly agreed that the deposition testimony would only be used in this case and later retracted that agreement. Although such circumstances do raise suspicions, they are not sufficient for this Court to conclude that Plaintiffs intend to use the depositions in the Peake case or otherwise for an improper purpose.
The traditional limits of relevance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and 30(d)(4) will apply during these depositions. In addition, Fed. R. Civ. P. 32 limits the use of deposition testimony at trial to impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness and for other limited purposes. Given the failure of Defendants to show an improper purpose, the limitations already in place for the scope of allowable questions and the use of such testimony, in addition to the fact that Judge Hood apparently will rule on this issue in the Peake case before deposition testimony is used in that case, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel these depositions will be granted. The Court expects Plaintiffs’ counsel to limit questioning to the issues relevant to this action .
4. Extension of Deadlines The final issue is whether Plaintiffs’ deadline for filing expert reports should be extended. The present deadline was October 12, 2007. Defendants contend that if Plaintiffs’ deadline is extended, all of the deadlines in the July 9, 2007 (docket no. 75) scheduling order must be extended. Given the additional depositions that will be taken in this action, the Court finds good cause for extending these dates. Accordingly, all of the dates will be extended 60 days. Plaintiffs’ expert reports will be due December 12, 2007. Defendants’ expert reports will be due January 12, 2008. The deadline for filing
4

Case 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM Document 119 Filed 11/08/2007 Page 5 of 5

dispositive motions will be February 7, 2008. The parties may approach Judge Edmunds for the new dates for the Final Pretrial Conference and for trial.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Compel Discovery (docket no. 108) is GRANTED to the extent that on or before November 22, 2007 Plaintiffs will renotice the depositions of Weitz, Rowe, Rivera, Fynn, Smith, Wolfiss, and Bickers.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel as to the information concerning “interest rate spread” and “cost of funds” data is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Extend the Deadline for Plaintiffs’ Expert Reports (docket no. 113) is GRANTED to the extent set out above.
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), the parties have a period of ten days from the date of this Order within which to file any written appeal to the District Judge as may be permissible under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1).

Dated: November 08, 2007

s/ Mona K. Majzoub MONA K. MAJZOUB UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

PROOF OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of this Opinion and Order was served upon Counsel of Record on this date.

Dated: November 08, 2007

s/ Lisa C. Bartlett Courtroom Deputy

5

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAT, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-CV-11937-DT

VS.

DISTRICT JUDGE NANCY G. EDMUNDS

NATIONAL CITY BANK OF THE MIDWEST, et al.,
Defendants.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB

/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO BAR THE TESTIMONY OF PHILLIP PEAKE (DOCKET NO. 125)

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Bar the Testimony of Phillip Peake filed on March 4, 2008. (Docket no. 125). Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Bar the Testimony of Phillip Peake on March 19, 2008. (Docket no. 126). Defendants filed a Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Bar the Testimony of Phillip Peake on March 31, 2008. (Docket no. 129). The Parties filed a Joint Statement of Resolved/Unresolved Issues Regarding Defendants' Motion to Bar the Testim ony of Phillip Peake on April 4, 2008. (Docket no. 130). The motions have been referred to the undersigned for decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). (Docket no. 127). The Court heard oral argument on this motion on April 10, 2008. The motion is therefore ready for ruling.
This is an action in which Plaintifs allege that Defendant National City Bank discriminates against African-American churches and small businesses in the gr anting of loans in the City of Detroit. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification was denied in July 2007. (Docket no. 74).

Defendants move to bar the testimony of non-party Phillip Peake because Peakehas refused to appear for depos ition despite being subpoenaed by Defendants in this case on May 8, 2007. (Docket no. 125-3). Peake was a Plaintiff in this action but his claims against Defendants were dismissed on October 27, 2006 and he was terminated as a Plaintiff. (Docket no. 20). Defendants allege that Peake is a former employee and is the "impetus for, and mastermind behind, the instant lawsuit, having solicited each of the Plaintiffs . . . to file claims against Defendants." (Docket no. 125). Plaintiffs conceded at the hearing that Peake is a material witness.
The subpoena commanded Peake to produce documents at the offices of Phifer & White, P.C. in Detroit on May 24, 2007 at 1:00 p.m. and appear on May 29, 20061 (sic) at 9:30 a.m. at the same place. (Docket no. 125-3). Plaintiffs and Peake share the same counsel, Rose & Rose, P.C. in Washington D.C. Rose & Rose agreed to andin fact did accept serviceof the subpoena on Peake. (Docket no. 125-3).
Peake's attorney advised Defendants via email dated May 10, 2007 that Peake was available for deposition on May 30 or 31, 2007 instead of May 29. (Docket no. 125-4). On May 17, 2007 Plaintiff’s and Peake’s attorney notified Defendants’ attorney that Peake was not available on May 30 and that they would “have to find a new date frohis dep.” (Docket no. 125-5). Thereafter, Peake refused to appear. D efendants through their a ttorneys made numerous attempts to reschedule Peake's deposition pursuant to the continuing May8, 2007 subpoena. Plaintiffs do not contest that Defendants made diligent efforts to schedule Peake's deposition. (Docket no. 126 at 2). On October 19, 2007 Peake’s attorney notified Defendants’ attorney via email that Peake was taking the position
1 The subpoena at Exhibit 1 to Defendant's Motion is dated both 2007 and 2006 in various places on the subpoena. (Docket no 125-3). None of the parties contest that the subpoena was issued in 2007 for Peake's appearance in 2007.
2

that he would only appear after the other ten witnesses whom Plaintiff had noticed were deposed.
(Docket no. 125-7). On Novem ber 19, 2007 Peake’s attorney notified Defendants’ attorney via
email that Peake would be available on January21, 2008, Martin Luther King, Jr. day. (Docket no.
125-8). In January 2008 Peake took the position that hewould only appear after his trial in another case pending before the court2.
In a Joint Motion to Extend All Remaining Dates in the Scheduling Order filed January 3,
2008, the parties stated that
. . . Peake is willing to be deposed only after his trial before Judge Hood, which set (sic) to begin on Tuesday, January 22, 2008. As a courtesy to Mr. Peake, Defendants agreed to continue Mr. Peake's deposition on multiple occasions (most recently to January 21, 2007 (sic) since serving himwith a lawful subpoena in May, 2007. Mr. Peake has been identified by Plaintiffs as a material witness and his deposition is necessary for the filing of summary judgment. Counsel for Plaintiffs and Mr. Peake expect to produce Mr. Peake for his depositi on in this case within thirty (30) days after his trial is completed.
(Docket no. 122 at 2). Although Peake was the Plani tiff in the other case, he did not appear
for trial and Defendant bank has a Motion to Dismiss pending in that action. (E.D. Mich.
Case No. 05-cv-72520, Docket nos. 72-76,).
In both Plaintiff’s Response brief and at the April 10, 2008 hearing on Defendants' Motion
to Bar Testimony, Plaintiff's and Peake's attorney stated that it remains Peake's position "today" that
he will not appear in this case until after the other trial. (Docket no. 126 at 7). In spite of further
efforts by Peake's attorneys and Plaintiffs to convince Peake to appear, Pe ake's position has not
changed since December 2007. (Docket no. 126 at 7). Plaintiffs state that they and their “counsel
remain firmly committed to facilitating Mr. Peake’s deposition in this case,” however, they admit
2Peake and National City Bank of Michigan are Plaintiff and Defendant respectively, in E.D. Mich. Case No. 05-cv-72520.
3

that “neither Plaintiffs nor undersigned counsel have the capacity to produce Mr. Peake for his deposition in the meantime.” (Docket no. 126 at 7). Analysis
Defendants ask the Court to enter an order barring Peake from offering any testimony on behalf of Plaintiffs in this case because of his continued refusal to obey the May 8, 2007 subpoena. In the alternative, Defendants request that Peake be found in contem pt, ordered to appe ar for deposition before March 31, 2008 and required to payDefendants for the attorneys’ fees and costs expended in bringing this motion. (Docket no. 125 n.12). Plaintiffs argue that the Court does not have authority to bar Peake' s testimony and that the rem edy is in substance a Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 remedy not available for Peake’s failure to comply with the subpoena. Plaintiffs'counsel conceded at the hearing that Peak e is on their witness list 3, he is their m aterial witness and they will be prejudiced if he is not allowed to testify. Plai ntiffs also argue that be cause Defendants deposed Peake in the other lawsuit, they will not be substantially prejudiced without Peake’s deposition in this case.
As an initial matter, it is irrelevant to thesisues herein that Peake was deposed by Deefndants in E.D. Mich. case no. 05-cv-72520. That deposition was taken on July 12, 2006. Plaintiffs filed a Complaint initiating this case on April 25, 2006 and filed a First Amended Complaint on July 31, 2006, after Peake was deposed in the other action. (Docket nos. 1, 9). Plaintiffs provide no legal authority for their proposition tha t taking a deposition in one case precludes deposing the sam e person in a case filed thereafter involving different claims and additional parties.
3Peake does not appear on Plaintiff's witness list filed with the Court on May 7, 2007, but may be listed as a witness on other documents exchanged between the parties. (Docket no. 46).
4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 governs the issuance, serviceand enforcement of subpoenas. "Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon that person may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued." Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e). "Courts have often found a person in contempt for refusing to comply with a validly issued subpoena without objecting to it or making a motion to quash." See Bariteau v. Krane, 206 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 2001). "A subpoena presents a continuing duty to appearand does not expire upon its stated date."Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., 126 F.R.D. 80, 81 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
"Although there are no specific procedural stepsto follow in civil contempt proceedings, due process requires that the appellant be given the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Fisher v. Marubeni Cotton Corp., 526 F.2d 1338, 1343 (8th Cir. 1975). Defendants' Motion to Bar Testim ony of Phillip Peake was fil ed and served on March 4, 2008, including service on Peake's attorneys at Rose and Rose. (Docket no. 125). The attorneys for the parties, including the attorney representing both Plaintiffs and Peake appeared before the Court at the April 10, 2008 hearing on DefendantsM' otion to Bar the Testimony of Phillip Peake4. Therefore Peake had both notice of Defendants' Motion seeking relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e) and a n opportunity to be heard on the sam e. (Def's Br. at 5, Docket no. 125). The Court finds that the
4 The May 8, 2007 subpoena was served on Josh Rose of Rose & Rose, P.C. (Docket no. 125-3). The Rose & Rose attorneys of record in this case are David L. Rose and Yuval Rubinstein. Although Josh Rose did not file an appearance in case no. 06-11937, he filed a “Declaration” on September 18, 2007 stating that he is lead counsel in this case and the record is replete with email correspondence between Mr. Josh Rose and Defendants’ counsel in this matter, including communications regarding dates for Peake’s deposition. (Docket nos. 106-3, 125-4). Mr. Rubinstein appeared at the April 10, 2008 hearing and indicated that he also had communicated with Peake regarding the deposition and subpoena.
5

objects of due process are met with respect to Defendants’ request that Peake be found in contempt of the May 8, 2007 subpoena.
Plaintiffs and Peake's attorney conceded at the hearing that Peake neither objected to nor moved to quash the May 8, 2007 subpoena. Peake repeatedly failed to appea r and provided no adequate excuse for these failures. The Court will find Peake is in contempt for failing to obey the May 8, 2007 subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e).
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are in substance moving for sanctions against Plaintiffs and barring his testimony would prejudice Plaintiffs. Thisis not so. As stated above, the Court has the authority to find a served person in contem pt for failure to obey a subpoena. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) ("The power to punish for contempt s is inherent in all courts."). Second, "[a] court surely can bar the testimony of a witness who refuses to submit to a deposition or to produce the m aterials he review ed prior to testifying." See Northbrook Excess and Surplus Insurance Co. v. The Procter and Gamble Co. , 1988 U.S. Di st LEXIS 14895 *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Dec.28, 1988). Defendants should havehad the opportunity to depose Plaintiffs' material witness on important issues prior to the close of discovery.
The Court will bar the testimony of Peake at the trial in this matter. The Court finds that this is an adequate rem edy for the following reasons. First, ordering Pe ake to comply with the subpoena would be futile because Peake has not cmo plied with the subpoena to date and his position remains that he will not comply with the subpoena until after the conclusion of the other trial, a now unknown date. Second, ordering Peake to comply with the subpoena now would be an insufficient remedy. Discovery is closed and the dispositivemotion deadline is past. Third, allowing Peake to testify would be prejudicial to Defendants. Defendants in their Reply Brief allege that they should
6

be able to use Peake’s “deposition to contradict or impeach the testimony given by the deponent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(1). Further, Plaintiffs have not identified the prejudice they will suffer if Peake is not allowed to testify, discovery is cl osed, dispositive motions due on April 11, 2008 and Plaintiffs may have had access t o Peake through their own attorney when Defendants did not. Finally, Defendants acted diligently in pursuing Peake's appearance pursuant to the subpoena.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDEREDthat Mr. Peake is in contempt of Court for failing to obey the May 8, 2007 subpoena.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Bar the Testim ony of Phillip Peake (docket no. 125) is GRANTED in part and Mr. Peake will have no opportunity to testify either by deposition or at trial after the close ofdiscovery in this action, which closed on September 1, 2007. (Docket no. 75).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees is DENIED without Prejudice.
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), the parties have a period of ten days from the date of this Order within which to file any written appeal to the District Judge as may be permissible under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1).

Dated: April 22, 2008

s/ Mona K. Majzoub MONA K. MAJZOUB UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
7

PROOF OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of this Order was served upon Counsel of Record on this date.

Dated: April 22, 2008

s/ Lisa C. Bartlett Courtroom Deputy

8

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAT, INC., et al,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NATIONAL CITY BANK OF THE MIDWEST and NATIONAL CITY CORP.,
Defendants. /

Case No. 06-11937 Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [131]
Plaintiffs JAT, Inc. (“JAT”); Body of Christ Christian Center (“Body of Christ”); Good Fight of Faith Ministry (“Good Fight”); Pl easant Hill Baptist Church (“Pleasant Hill”); Samaritan Baptist Church (“Samaritan”); 3M Contracting, Inc. (“3M”); and Phillip Peake filed this action against Defendants National City Bank of the Midwest (“the Bank”) and National City Corporation. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19; the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECO A”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 16911691f; and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1870 (“CRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. Plaintiffs’ claims are premised upon De fendants’ alleged poli cy of “redlining” 1 against African-American-owned businesses in the City of Detroit with respect to commercial loans. In a previous opinion and order, the Court dismsised the FHA claims of all Plaintiffs except
1Redlining is “[c]redit discrimination (usu[ally] unlawful discrimination) by a financial institution that refuses to make loans on properties in allegedly bad neighborhoods.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1283 (7th ed. 1999).

3M; the ECOA claims of JAT, Pleasant Hill, Samaritan, and Peake; and the CRA claim of Peake. (Docket Text # 20).
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. I. Facts
The bulk of the relevant f acts in this case have been set forth in the Court’s prior opinions and orders. Nonetheless, because thisis a factually intensive case, and because additional facts are necessary to resolve Deefndants’ motion, the Court will restate the facts here.
The Bank is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant National City Corporation, and it provides a variety of financial services throughout Michigan and the surrounding states. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.)
Plaintiff JAT is an African-American owned travel business that specializes in charter motor coach service throughout the U.S. and Canada.(Compl. ¶ 3; Pls.’ Resp. at 10.) JAT is owned and operated by John and Yvonne Turner. I(d.) JAT used a broker named EVO Accounting & Financial Services, Inc. (“EVO”)to apply for a commercial loan from the Bank in 2004.2 (Defs.’ Mot. at 6; Pls.’ Resp. at 10.) The Bank denied the application on March 10, 2004, for the following reasons: insufficientcash flow, excessive obligations related to income, insufficient net worth, and insufficient financial statements. (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. F at Ex. 8.) JAT claims that it subsequently obtained a loan from Bank One at a higher rate of interest. (Compl. ¶ 3.) In contrast to this assertion, however, JAT’s owner, Mr. Turner,
2The complaint states that JAT sought the loan in 2005. (Compl. ¶ 3.) The supporting documentation makes clear that the loan was sought in 2004.
2

testified that the borrower on t he Bank One loan is KAI Management, 3 not JAT. (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. F at 55.) Although JAT applied for the loan, Bank One “turned the loan around and put it in KAI Managementbecause of the property. JAT applied, but KAI Management had the property for the collateral.” ( Id. at 56.) Mr. Turner conceded that the statement “JAT subsequently obtained a $950,000 loan from Bank one at a higher rate of interest,” found in paragraph 4 of the complaint, is “incorrect.” (Id.)
Plaintiff Body of Christ is a church lo cated in Detroit with a predominantly Af ricanAmerican congregation. (Pls.’ Resp. at 7.) In 2004, Body of Chr ist contacted the Bank seeking a loan. (Id.) One of the Bank’s loan officers responded with a loan proposal letter dated September 7, 2004. (Pls.’ Resp., Ex. 20.) In response, Body of Christ submitted a loan application on October 21, 2004. (Id., Ex. 21.) Body of Chrsi t then decided to submit a loan package through EVO because EVO had access to more banks and because EVO has a contracting company and Body of Christ needed repair workdone on its church. (Id., Ex. 19 at 43-44.) On January 11, 2005, EVO requested a loan for Body of Christ from three different financial institutions, including the Bank. (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. B at 50.) Bank One responded to EVO’s letter on February 4, 2005, and offered terms and conditions that were better than those requested by EVO. (Id., Ex. C at 56-57.) Body of Christ accepted the Bank One loan on February 14, 2005. (Defs. ’ Mot. at 4; Pls.’ Resp. at 7.) Body of Christ claims that Mr. Peake (a former em ployee of the Bank) later stated that he discriminated against Body of Christ when he failed to contact the church to inform it that it had been “totally rejected” for the loan. (Pls.’ Resp., Ex. 19 at 34.)
3KAI Management is owned by John and Yvonne Turner and is a company “separate and apart from JAT.” (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. F at 11.)
3

Plaintiff Good Fight is a church located in Wayne County, outside of Detroit, with a predominantly African-American congregation and an African-American pastor. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Good Fight used EVO to search for financing to purchase a pr operty located in Detroit. (Defs.’ Mot. at 5; Psl .’ Resp. at 6.) EVO prepared three identical letters addressed to three different banks: the Bank, Comerica, and First Independence National City Bank. (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. D at 65.) The letters were dated January 27, 2006, and sought financing on behalf of Good Fight. (Id. at 65-66.) Although Good Fight claims that it doesn’t know who received the letters, it does concede that the Bank and Comerica both received the letters from EVO. (Id. at 68.)
After a few weeks passed, Good Fight asekd why it hadn’t heard back from the Bank4. EVO inquired, and the Bank requested a formal loan applic ation. ( Id.) Good Faith submitted the application on February 14, 2006. (Pls.’ Resp., Ex. 14.) More time passed, Good Fight again asked about the delay, and Vince Jackson (who works for EVO) told Good Fight that “someone at National City told him that they weren’t interested.” (Pls.’ Resp., Ex. 12 at 72.)
On March 9, 2006, Good Fight learned that Comerica had approved its loan application. (Id. at 73.) Good fight received a loan commitment letter from Comerica on March 14 and approved the loan commitment on March 22. (Id. at 73, 75.) By this time, however, the property for which Good Fight sought financing was put under contract to another buyer. (Id. at 55.)
4According to Good Fight, it didn’t ask about responses from the other banks because it didn’t know if the other banks had received the loan package, but it did know that the Bank had received the package. (Pls.’ Resp., Ex. 12 at 70.)
4

Plaintiff Pleasant Hill is a church located in Detroit with a predo minantly AfricanAmerican congregation. (Pls.’ Resp. at 11. ) Pleasant Hill u sed EVO to apply for a commercial loan from the Bank. (Defs.’ Mo t., Ex. E at 11.) Pleasant Hill applied for a $725,000 loan; $695,000 was to refinance existni g debt, and $30,000 was to build a senior citizen center. (Defs.’ Mot. at 6; Pls.’ Resp. at 11.) The Bank conditionally approved the $695,000 loan, but it denei d the $30,000 loan. I(d.) On the Bank’s “processing worksheet,” the underwriter listed as a weakness, “future use of raw land questionable.” (Pls.’ Resp., Ex. 44 at 79.) The underwriter noted with respect to the senior center that “cost of project + how it will be financed & padi for is questionable.” (Id.) Indeed, Pleasant Hill admits that there were no plans or blueprints for the porject, that there was“nothing on paper,” and that the project basically amounted to “a vision.” (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. E at 80-81.) Pleasant Hill subsequently received a commitment letter from Bank One for a loan in the amount of $734,472. (Pls.’ Resp., Ex. 44 at 75-76.)
Plaintiff Samaritan is a c hurch located in Detroit with a predominantly AfricanAmerican congregation. Samaritan used EVO to apply for a commercial loan from the Bank. (Defs.’ Mot., Ex . G at 31.) On June 15, 2004, the Bank denied the loan due to “insufficient financial statements.” (Id., Ex. H at 015.) The loanofficer on the case was Mr. Peake. (Id. at ¶ 18.) He asked Nathaniel Mosley , the Vice President and Underwriting Team Leader in the Bank’s Small Business Banking Credit Services Unit, to review the loan application. (Id.) Mr. Mosley did so and was assist ed by Bethany Rivera, the Regional Senior Credit Officer. (Id. at ¶ 19.)
On June 23, 2004, Ms. Rivera e-mailed Mr. Peake with four “questions that are still outstanding on this loan request.” ( Id. at 018.) Her concerns related to various ratios,
5

Samaritan’s liquidity, and the cost per squar e foot of the propo sed expansion, $155.55, which Ms. Rivera considered “really high.” I(d.) On July 12, Ms. Rivera again e-mailed Mr. Peake and wrote, “We still do not have good explanaitons for any of the points listed in my original email. The loan is declined at th is point and that decision will not be changed unless we can get comfortable with their ability to repay the loan, the collateral value, the giving units, etc.” (Id. at 016.) Ultimately, because “Mr. Peake was not able to adequately respond to these concerns[,] the loan application remained declined.” (Id. at ¶ 20.)
Scott Wolfiss, the Bank’s former Area Sa les Manger, testified that the loan was denied because the Bank “felt t hat the cust omer was getting a raw deal from their contractor because their construction reques t was at $155 a square foot, and typically that’s higher than our normal.” (Pls.’ Resp.,Ex. 11 at 72.) Samaritan eventually obtained a loan from Bank One for a greater amount than it initially sought from the Bank. (Compl. ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff 3M is an African-American owned business. (Pls.’ Resp. at 9.) On March 16, 2004, 3M applied for a commercial loan from the Bank that was to be partially secured by a State of Michigan loan guaranty program. (Defs.’ Mot. at 3; Psl .’ Resp. at 9.) 3M sought a $50,000 loan. (Pls.’ Resp., Ex. 32.) The Bank offered a $400, 00 loan that required 3M’s owner to put a lien on his residenc e. (Id., Ex. 31 at 66-67.) The Bank also insisted that 3M’s purchase orders (worth $165,000)be put up as collateral. I(d.; Ex. 32.) 3M accepted the loan and closed the deal on March 25, 2004. (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. A at 54-55.)5
5In their brief, Plaintiffs discuss the experience that two non-party companies had with the Bank. (Pls.’ Resp. at 11-12.) Because these other companies are not parties in this suit, the facts relating to their experience are not relevant and will not be considered by the Court for purposes of this motion.
6

II. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©. The central inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish t he existence of an element essential to the party’s case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party meets this burden, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, theevidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co,. 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The non-moving party may not rest upon its mere allegations, however, but rather “must set forth specific facts showingthat there is a genuine issue for tiral.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidencein support of the non-moving party’s position will not suffice. Rather, there must be evidenceon which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Hopson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 2002). III. Analysis Plaintiffs assert three claim s in this case; they allege Defendants violated the Fair
7

Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19; the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f; and theCivil Rights Act of 1866 and1870 (“CRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. The FHA provides, in relevantpart, “It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes engagi ng in r esidential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transac tion, because of race.” 42 U.S.C. § 360 5(a). Similarly, the ECOA provides, “It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of race.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). And the CRAstates that “[a]ll citizens ofthe United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property” and “to make and enforce contracts.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a) and 1982.
The familiar McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework applies to all three of Plaintiffs’ claims. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying framework to FHA and CRA claims); Mays v. Buckeye Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 277 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir. 2002) (same with respect to ECOA claim). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie caseof discrimination. If the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the defendant to illust rate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must show that the proffered reason is a pretext that masks discrimination. See id.
A prima facie case of racial discrimination can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Hood v. Midwest Savs. Bank , 95 Fed. Appx. 768, 777 (6 th Cir. 2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Plaintiffsconcede that they have not
8

offered direct evidence of discrimination in this case. (Pls.’ Resp. at 13-14.) The prima facie case necessary to establish a claim with circumstantial evidence is the same under the FHA, CRA, and ECOA. Hood, 95 Fed. Appx. at 778 (noting that prima facie case for FHA and ECOA is the same);Mencer v. Princeton Square Apartments, 228 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that prima facie case for FHA and CRA is the same).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination using circumstantial evidence, each Plaintiff must show:
1) It is a member of a protected class; 2) It applied for and was qualified for a loan; 3) The loan application was rejected despite its qualifications; and 4) The lender continued to approve l oans for applicants with qualif ications similar to those of Plaintiff. Hood, 95 Fed. Appx. at 778 (citing Mich. Prot. and Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 346 (6th Cir. 1994)).6 The Hood court elaborated on the fourth element: while each Plaintiff “does not have toshow an exact match between [tis] application and the applicants outside of the protected class who received a loan, the comparator loan files must be ‘significantly parallel in every material respect.’” Id. at 779 (citingSallion v. SunTrust Bank, Atlanta, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1330-31 (N.D. Ga. 2000)). The Hood court concluded that
6The Hood court discussed the alternative prima facie elements set forth in Mays, 277 F.3d at 876. The Mays court stated that a prima facie case could be established without having to show the fourth factor discussed in Hood. As the Hood court noted, however, Mays’ holding was based on a case out of the Tenth Circuit, even though the elements already had been established by the Sixth Circuit in Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., 18 F.3d at 346. Because the Mays court did not acknowledge or attempt to distinguish that case, the Hood court concluded that the Mays court simply overlooked the existing Sixth Circuit formulation. Hood, 95 Fed. Appx. at 778 n.7.
9

the plaintiff in that case had not established the fourth element of a prima facie case of lending discrimination because he did “not atte mpt to compare his own qualifications to these other applicants; he simply relie[d] on the fact that these applicants received loans, while he did not.” Id.
The Court will address each Plaintiff’s c laims in turn. First, though, the Court will address the argument made by Plaintiffs at oral argument – that they are unable to meet the fourth prong of a prima facie case because they were not permitted to conduct adequate discovery. Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to send a letter and questionnaire to loan applicants in the City of Detroit for the purpose of learning the applic ants’ race. (Docket Text # 96.) Plaintiffs did not disclose the contents of the proposed letter and questionnaire to the Court, however. The C ourt therefore denied Plaintiffs’ motion. (Docket Text # 109.) The Court did not foreclos e the possibility of Plaintiffs learning the applicants’ race; rather, the Court invited Plaintiffs to seek relief “in a proper motion.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiffs never followed up. Accordingly, any lack of discovery on this issue is due to Plaintiffs’ own inaction, not due to any order of this Court.
A. Plaintiff 3M Plaintiff 3M has as serted claims under the FHA, the ECOA, and the CRA. Defendants argue that 3M’s FHA and ECOA claim s are time-barred. Plaintiffs did not address this argument in their response br ief. The Court agrees that these claims are untimely. The statute of limitations istwo years for the FHA, 42 US. .C. § 3613(a)(1)(A), and for the ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f). 3M’s claims are premised on the fact that its owner was required to place a lien on his personal resi dence as a condition of loan approval. 3M
10

applied for the loan on March 16, 2004, and it acecpted the Bank’s loan offer on March 25, 2004. The Bank’s allegedly wrongful conduct,requiring 3M’s owner’s house to be used as collateral for the loan, therefore occurred on or before March 25,2004. Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed on Apr il 25, 2006. (Docket Text #1.) 3M was not added as a party until the amended complaint was filed on July 31, 2006. (Docket Text # 9.) As both the initial and amended complaints were filed more than two years after the conduct that gave rise to 3M’s FHA and ECOA claims, those claims are time-barred. See also Mays, 277 F.3d at 879 (noting that ECOA’s limitations period focuses on the discriminatory conduct, not the consequences of that conduct);Tolbert v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 172 F.3d 934, 939 (6th Cir. 1999) (calculating FHA limitat ions period from time when the defendant denied the plaintiffs’ request). Because 3M’s FHA and EC OA claims were not timely, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to those claims.
With respect to its CRA claim, 3M has faeild to establish a prima facie case. First, 3M has offered no evidence to establish that it was qualified for the loan it initially sought. 3M sought a loan under the Contractors Assistance Program ("CAP"). (Defs.' Mot. at 10; Pls.' Resp. at 9.) To qualify for a CAP loan, an applicant must have "a bona fide contract on a project receiving funding/financing from the [Michigan State Hous ing Development] Authority under any of its programs." (Docket Text # 59-4at 7.) During its deposition, 3M was asked:
Q. You ever done any work for the Michigan State Housing Development Authority?
A. No, no. I was thinking -- no, not directly. Q. When you say not directly, what do you mean?
11

A. I mean that they certify people to do lead abatement, so we have that status.
Q. They do training and certification? A. Yes. Q. But you haven't worked on any of their projects? A. No. Q. And that's true for the entire period of 1989 'til today [August 15, 2007]? A. Right. (Defs.' Mot., Ex. A at 10.) Plaintiffs complain that Defendants' counsel misstated the eligibility requirements for a CAP loan by asking if 3M had any projects directly with the Housing Development Authority, which "cut[] out the middle man." (Pls.' Resp. at 21.) Even if this were true, 3M has not offered any evidence to show that it met the actual eligibility requirements for a CAP loan. Accordingly, 3M cannot establish the second element of a prima facie case. Second, 3M has not shown that the Bank continued to approve loans for applicants who were “significantly parallel in every material respect.” Hood, 95 Fed. Appx. at 779. Instead, 3M simply points toa $22,000 loan the Bank grantedto a company in Wyandotte, Michigan (a locale Plaintiffs claim is 96.3% white) in which the company’s owner was not required to collateralize his residence. This evidence is deficient in several respects. To begin, 3M sought a loan for more than twice the amount than that given to the Wyandotte company. Further, and more significant ly, 3M made no attempt to compare its own qualifications with those of the other company. Instead, 3M simply relies on the fact that the other company received a loan while 3M did not. As the Hood court recognized, such
12

a showing is not sufficient toestablish a prima facie case. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED with respect to 3M’s CRA claim.
B. Plaintiff Body of Christ Plaintiff Body of Christ’s claims agai nst Defendants arise under the ECOA and the CRA. The claim s stem from the Bank’s del ay in processing Body of Christ’s loan application. Body of Christ has met the first thr ee elements of a prima facie case. It has established that it is a member of a protected class. Additionally, the loan proposal from the Bank constitutes evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Body of Christ was qualified forthe loan. With respect to thethird element of a prima facie case, Body of Christ has provided the test imony of the Bank’s branch manager, Cynthia Smith, who believes that the loan was declined. (Pls.’ Resp., Ex. 22 at 40.) Viewed in the light most favorable to Body of Christ, this testimony creates a triable issue of fact. Body of Christ runs into trouble with the fourth element of a prima facie case. In an attempt to satisfy this element, Body of Christ points out that Lakeshore Presbyterian Church, “located in 96.9% white St. Claire Shores, was approved” for a $700,000 loan on February 25, 2005. But Body of Christ has provided no evidence to the Court to establish that its qualifications were similar to thoseof Lakeshore Presbyterian. Moreover, according to the documents submitted by Plaintiffs, Lakeshore Presbyterian applied for that loan on October 25, 2004. (Pls.’ Resp., Ex. 26 at 3421.) Thus, that loan took four full months to be approved. Body of Christ first submitted a loan application to the Bank on October 21, 2004, and it accepted a loan with Bank One on February 14, 2005, a period of less than four months. Accordingly, Lakeshore Presbyterian’s loan application was not processed
13

in a more timely manner. Since Body of Chrsi t’s claim is premised on the relative delay to its own application, this fact is fatal to Body of Christ’s argument.
In support of its claim , Body of Christ seeks to admit the alleged statement of Mr. Peake that “he himself had discriminated against Body of Christ by not informing Pastor Tate that Body of Christ’s application was ‘tot ally rejected.’” ( Pls.’ Resp. at 19.) This statement is inadmissible on a number of levels. First of all, the statement is inadmissible hearsay, and "evidence submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be admissible. Hearsay evidence . . . must be disregarded.” Alpert v. United States, 481 F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Contrary to Body of Christ's assertion, the statement is not admissible pursuant to Fed. R. Ev. 804(b). The case cited in support by Body of Christ, Gilmore v. Davis , 185 Fed. Appx. 476, 484 ( 6th Cir. 2006), is easily distinguishable, as the statement at issue in that case was made in prior testimony. Here, in contrast, Mr. Peake's alleged statement wa s made out-of-court. This is a dispositive difference under Rule 804(b).
A party must make two showings under Rule 804 before a hearsay statement may be admitted. First, the party must s how that the declarant is "unavailable." Fed. R. Ev. 804(a). A declarant is considered unavailabl e if he "persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so." Id. at (a)(2). Here, Mr. Peake was subpoenaed for a deposition, but he continually refused to obey the subpoena. (See Docket Text # 135.) For purposes of this motion, the Court will assume that this constitutes a refusal to testify despite a court order.
This does not end the Court's inquiry, however. Once a declarant is found to be unavailable, his testimony is admissible only if it falls under one of the hearsay exceptions
14

set forth in Rule 804(b). As discussed above,Mr. Peake's statement was not made in the form of prior testimony; therefore,that exceptiondoes not apply, andGilmore is inapposite. The only other exception under which Mr. Peak e's statement might fall is a "statement against interest." Id. at (b)(3). Mr. Peake's alleged statement was made some time after Body of Christ's loan request was denied, and MrP. eake joined Body of Christ as a Plaintiff in a discrimination lawsuit against the Bank. Given that the statement constitutes the bulk of the proposed evidence for Body of Christ’s claims, and that Mr. Peake’s own claims in this case were premised on the Bank’s denial of the other Plaintiffs’ loans, see Compl. ¶¶ 45, 46, Mr. Peake's statement can hardly be said to have been "against interest.” Because the statement does not fall under an exception in Rule 804(b), it is inadmissible hearsay and cannot be considered by the Court for purposes of this motion.
The statement is inadmissible for a different reason, too. The Court previously held Mr. Peake in contempt f or failing to obey the subpoena; as a result, the Court granted Defendants' motion to bar Mr. Peake's testimony and ordered that "Mr. Peake will have no opportunity to testify either by deposition or at trial." (Docket Text # 135.)
In light of the above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Body of Christ’s claims.
C. Plaintiff Good Fight Plaintiff Good Fight's claims also arise under the ECOA and the CRA. With respect to the ECOA, Good Fight alleges two violationsby the Bank. First, Good Fight argues that the Bank violated 12 C.F.R. §202.9, which is found in "Regulation B, the series of Federal Reserve Board regulations im plementing the ECOA." Mays, 277 F.3d at 878. This regulation requires a creditor to notify an appliacnt when an adverse action is taken and the
15

reasons for that action. 12 CF. .R. § 202.9(a). Theregulation provides an exception to this
requirement for "applications submitted to a third party." Id. at (g). Under this exception,
"[w]hen an application is made on behalf of an applicant to more than one creditor and the
applicant expressly accepts or uses credi t offered by one of the credi tors, notification of
action taken by any of the other creditors is not required." Id.
Here, EVO applied for the loan on behalf of Good Fight, and the applic ation was
made to more than one creditor. Additionally, Good Fi ght accepted credit from another
creditor when it accepted the loan from Comerica7. Accordingly, the exception applies, and
the Bank was not required to notify Good Fight of any ac tion taken on its application. 8
Thus, the Bank's failure to send a notice to Good Fight was not a violation of the ECOA,
and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as it relates to this claim.
Good Fight’s second claim is that the Bank violated the ECOA and the CRA “by
rejecting Good Fight’s loan application despite its qualifications, while approving loans to
two churches located in white areas in a far more timely and solicitous manner.” (Pls.’
7Plaintiffs argue that notice is required if the applicant "does not use any credit offered." (Pls.' Resp. at 19 n.14 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(g).) Plaintiffs' citation is incomplete. The regulation states that notice is required if "no credit is offered or if the applicant does not expressly accept or use the credit offered." Id. (emphasis added). Because Good Faith expressly accepted the credit offered by Comerica, notice was not required.
8Plaintiffs argue that the exception does not apply because “there is no evidence that Defendant Bank even follows this exception in its ordinary course of business.” (Pls.’ Resp. at 18 n.14.) Plaintiffs cite no authority to support their position, and the Court fails to see how the fact that the Bank provided adverse action notices to other parties when it was not required to somehow obligated the Bank to provide such a notice to Good Fight, even though the exception in § 202.9(g) applies.
Plaintiffs also argue that the exception does not apply because “Pastor Jackson [of Good Fight] was not put in contact with Comerica until after Defendant Bank had declined the application.” This alleged fact is irrelevant, since it is undisputed that the letters prepared by EVO bore the same date and were sent to and received by the Bank and Comerica.
16

Resp. at 18.) This claim fails. Good Fight has offered sufficient evidence to show that it was qualified f or the loan, since it was approved by Comerica. Good Fight has not demonstrated, however, t hat the “two churc hes located in white areas” had similar qualifications to t hose of Good Fight; i ndeed, Good Fight does not address the other churches’ qualifications at all. Because Good Fight has failed to make these showings, it has not established a prima facei case of discrimination underthe ECOA or under the CRA. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to those claims is therefore GRANTED.
D. Plaintiff JAT Plaintiff JAT’s claim arises under the CRA. The claim is based on the fact that JAT’s loan application was denied, while a “Caucasai n business with a lower DSC ratio received an SBA-guaranteed loan.” (Pls.’ Resp. at 20.) JAT’s claim fails because it cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination. JAT has failed to present evidence that shows it was qualified for the loan. Although JAT claims that it obtained a similar loan from Bank One, JAT’s owner testified that this allegation is “incorrect.” (Defs.’ Mot., Ex . F at 56.) It was KAI Management, a separate company owned by JAT’s owners, that rece ived the loan from Bank One, becaus e “KAI Management had the property for the collateral.” (Id.) Additionally, JAT has failed to establish that the “Caucasian” business had similar qualifications to those of JAT. JAT’s only attempt to compare the two companies ’ qualifications is its statement that the other company had “a DSC ratio of 0.92, lower than JAT’s 1.21.” (Pls.’ Resp. at 10.) But as the document su bmitted by JAT to support this assertion shows, the Bank looks at a number of criteria, including the DSC ratio, the total
17

potential exposure, the business total sco re, the scored SIC code, and loan guarantors. (Pls.’ Resp., Ex. 41.) Addit ionally, the Bank looks to factors such as the proportion of certain ratios and the applicant’s liquidit y. (Defs.’ Mot., Ex . H at ¶ 20.) JAT has not addressed any of these areas. Accordingly, its comparison of DSC ratios is insufficient to show that it was “significantly parallel in every material respect” to the “Caucasian” business that was approved. Hood, 95 Fed. Appx. at 779.
JAT cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to JAT’s CRA claim.
E. Plaintiff Pleasant Hill Plaintiff Pleasant Hill’s claim is based on the CRA and stems from the Bank’s denial of its $30,000 loan request (notwithstanding the Bank’s apporval of Pleasant Hill’s $695,000 loan request) and the Bank’s approval of a $50,000 loan to Covenant Alliance Church, which is located in “93.2% white Beverly Hills, MI.” (Pls.’ Resp. at 11, 22.) Here, Pleasant Hill has raised a gen uine issue of fact with re spect to its qualification for the additional $30,000, as it subsequently received a commitment letter from Bank One for a $734,472 loan. Like the other Plaintiffs, however, Pleasant Hill has offered no evidence to establish the similarity of its own qualif ications with those of Covena nt Alliance. Further, while Pleasant Hill was approved for a $695,000 loan, Cvoenant Alliance only received a $50,000 loan. This is har dly a good comparison by which to prove the Bank’s supposed discrimination against Pleasant Hill. In any event, Pleasant Hill’s lack of evidence to establish that it shared simila r qualifications with Covenant A lliance is fatal to its claim. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is therefore GRANTED as to Pleasant Hill.
18

F. Plaintiff Samaritan Plaintiff Samaritan’s claim arises under the CRA. The claim is based on the Bank’s denial of Samaritan’s loan application and approval of a loan for Columbus Bible Church, “located in 97% white Colum bus Township.” (Pls.’ Resp. at 9.) Samaritan has raised a triable issue of fact with respect to its qualifications for the loan, for it obtained a loan from Bank One for a greater amount than it sought from the Bank. Samaritan’s claim fails, however, for the same reas on as the other Plaintiffs’ clai ms; namely, it has failed to establish that it was similarly qualified with Columbus Bible Church. While Samaritan does point out that Columbus had a lower “church matrix score” than Samaritan, Samaritan has not addressed the numerous other factors the Bank considers when it determines how to proceed with a loan application. See supra at 16-17. As discussed above, this is an insufficient showing to establish a prima facie case, and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to Samaritan’s claim. Ultimately, Plaintiffs do “not attempt to compare [their] own qua lifications to these other applicants; [they] simply rel[y] on the fact that these applicants received loans, while [they] did not.” Hood, 95 Fed. A ppx. at 779. The C ourt therefore reaches the same conclusion as the Hood court, and holds that Plaintiffs have “not created a genuine issue of material fact as to the fourth element of [their] prima facie case.” Id. G. Plaintiffs’ Expert Plaintiffs have submitted the report of their proposed expert, Dr. Adrian Lottie, in an attempt to show that “pattern and practice evidence” contained therein “establishes that Defendants have acted with a discriminatory animus against African-American borrowers
19

in Detroit.” (Pls.’ Resp. at 14.) The thrust of the report is that as the African-American population of a given area increases, the numbeor f small business ol an approvals from the Bank to businesses in that area decreases. ( See id.) Thi s evidence does not save Plaintiffs’ claims.
First, it does not help the individual Plai ntiffs establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiffs concede that Dr. Lottie did not analyze the Bank’s underwriting guidelines. (Pls.’ Resp. at 15-16.) Indeed, DrL. ottie himself stated thathe is “not an expert in that area.” (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. K at 121.) Dr. Lottie’s report therefore cannot demonstrate that Plaintiffs were qualified for the loans they sought, which is the second element in a prima facie case.
Dr. Lottie also acknowledged that he did not know the race of the applicants whose files he reviewed. ( Id. at 119.) In fact, Plaintiffs point out that financial institutions are prohibited by law f rom inquiring about the race of nonmortgage loan applicants. (Pls.’ Resp. at 16 n.10 (citing12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(5).)9 As a result, Dr.Lottie could not analyze the likelihood of equally qualified minority and non-minority applicants being approved for a loan by the Bank. (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. K at 119.) Thus, Dr. Lottie’s report also cannot help Plaintiffs establish the fourth element of a prima facie case, that non-minority applicants who were “significantly parallel in every material respect” were approved for loans, while minority applicants were not.
Plaintiffs suggest that Dr. Lottie’s report shows redlining based on the racial composition of neighborhoods, and that such evidence is sufficient to maintain Plaintiffs’
9Plaintiffs have not rebutted Defendants’ evidence that its underwriters do not know the race of loan applicants. (See, e.g., Defs’ Mot., Ex. H at ¶ 22.)
20

claims. (P ls.’ Resp. at 16.) The C ourt disagrees. Fi rst, the only support offered by Plaintiffs is a district court case from 1987which does not stand for the proposition put forth by Plaintiffs. In Old West End Ass’n v. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan, 675 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (N.D. Ohio 1987), the court was simply setting forth the plaintiff’s allegation when it stated, “Plaintiffs allege that defendants hav e discriminated in the financing of housing based upon the racial composition of the neighborhood in which the property is located.”
Second, and more im portantly, “the pattern-or-practice method of proving discrimination, in which the plaintiff shows that the company had a policy of discriminating against a protected class, is not available to individual plaintiffs.” Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004). Such evidence is limited to “class actions or suits by the government,” id., and the Court denied Plaintiffs’motion for class certification. (Docket Text # 74.) As the Bacon court explained, “there is a ‘manifest’ and ‘crucial’ difference between an individual’s claim of discrimination and a class action alleging a general pattern or practice of discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted). The court concluded that because pattern-or-practice evidence “does not address individual . . . decisions, it is inappropriate as a vehicle for proving dsi crimination in an individual case.” Id. While such evidence “may be relevant to proving an otherwise-viable individual claim,” id., Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims are not “otherwise-viable.”
Equally unavailing is Plaintiffs’ attempt to equate this case with Paschal v. Flagstar Bank, 295 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2002). In that case, an expert witness compared the minority plaintiffs’ mortgage applic ations with those of Caucasian applicants who had similar
21

financial qualifications.10 Id. at 582. Such acomparison was directly relevant and specific to the plaintiffs’ individual discrimination claims. Here, in contrast, Dr. Lottie admittedly did not conduct a similar analysis, and any conclusoi ns reached by Dr. Lottie are therefore not specific to Plaintiffs’ individual claims. Accordingly, underBacon, those conclusions cannot be used to establish Plaintiffs’ individual claims. IV. Conclusion
Plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case for any of their discrimination claims. Accordingly, it is not necessary for the Court to engage in the remainder of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in its entirety.
10For mortgage loan applications, financial institutions are required to collect data on applicants’ race. 12 C.F.R. 203.4(a, b).
22

 
 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM Doc # 160 Filed 06/10/08 Pg 1 of 1 Pg ID 3129

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAT, INC., et al,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NATIONAL CITY BANK OF THE MIDWEST and NATIONAL CITY CORP.,
Defendants. /

Case No. 06-11937 Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds

JUDGMENT The Court having reviewed the pleadings inthis matter and being fully advised in the premises; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

s/Nancy G. Edmunds Nancy G. Edmunds United States District Judge
Dated: June 10, 2008
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or counsel of record on June 10, 2008, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Carol A. Hemeyer Case Manager

 
 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM Doc # 165 Filed 12/19/08 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 3169

Case No. 08-1848
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ORDER

JAT, INCORPORATED; PLEASANT HILLS BAPTIST CHURCH; BODY OF CHRIST CHRISTIAN CENTER; GOOD FIGHT OF FAITH MINISTRY; SAMARITAN BAPTIST CHURCH; 3M CONTRACTING, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiffs - Appellants and NEW GALILEE MISSIONARY BAPTIST CHURCH; PHILLIP PEAKE,
Plaintiffs v. NATIONAL CITY BANK OF THE MIDWEST; NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION,
Defendants - Appellees

In accordance with Rule 33(d), Rules of the Sixth Circuit, and upon consideration of the
parties' stipulation to dismiss,
It is ORDERED that the case is dismissed pursuant to 42(b), Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
ENTERED PURSUANT TO RULE 33(d), RULES OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Leonard Green, Clerk

Issued: December 19, 2008

___________________________________

2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM Doc # 165 Filed 12/19/08 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 3170

Leonard Green Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
100 EAST FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540 POTTER STEWART U.S. COURTHOUSE
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202-3988

Tel. (513) 564-7000 www.ca6.uscourts.gov

Filed: December 19, 2008

Ms. Diane M. Kehl Vedder Price 222 N. LaSalle Street Suite 2600 Chicago, IL 60601
Mr. David L Rose Rose & Rose 1320 19th Street, N.W. Suite 601 Washington, DC 20006-0000
Re: Case No. 08-1848 , JAT, Incorporated, et al v. National City Bank of the Midw, et al Originating Case No. : 06-11937
Dear Sir or Madam,
The Court issued the enclosed Order today in this case. No mandate to issue.
Sincerely yours,

cc: Mr. David J. Weaver Enclosure

s/Teresa Mack Mediation Administrator Direct Dial No.

 
 460 F.Supp.2d 812 (2006)
JAT, INC., et al, Plaintiffs, v.
NATIONAL CITY BANK OF the MIDWEST and National City Corp., Defendants.
No. 06-11937.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.
October 27, 2006.
8134 *813 *814 John R. Runyan, Jr., Sachs Waldman, Detroit, MI, David L. Rose, Rose & Rose, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Erin L. Toomey, Philip B. Phillips, Foley & Lardner, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART [10]
EDMUNDS, District Judge.
815 This matter came before the Court on Defendant National City Bank of the Midwest's *815 and Defendant National City Corporation's motion to dismiss, filed on August 14, 2006. National City and NCC are collectively referred to as Defendants. Plaintiffs[1] JAT, Inc. ("JAT"), Body of Christ Christian Center ("Body of Christ"), Good Fight of Faith Ministry ("Good Fight"), Pleasant Hill Baptist Church ("Pleasant Hill"), Samaritan Baptist Church ("Samaritan"), 3M Contracting, Inc. ("3M"), and Phillip Peake (collectively, "Plaintiffs") brought suit against Defendants alleging violations of several federal anti-discrimination laws related to Defendants' alleged policies of "redlining"[2] against African-American-owned businesses in the city of Detroit with regards to commercial loans. Plaintiffs also claim that this case is properly brought as a class action, although there is no motion on that issue at the present time. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege violations of (1) the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, (2) the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691 f, and (3) the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870 ("CRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.
Defendants argue that (1) the FHA only applies to residential real estate transactions, and none of the alleged loan applications concerned residential real estate, (2) not all plaintiffs meet the ECOA statutory requirement that they actually applied for credit, (3) the ECOA's statute of limitations has run with respect to some plaintiffs, (4) Plaintiffs do not plead intentional discrimination as required by the CRA, and (5) Plaintiffs' allegations of discriminatory action by Defendants is merely conclusory speculation and not supported by government statistics.
Being fully advised in the premises, having read the pleadings, and for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby orders as follows:
Defendant National City Bank of the Midwest's and Defendant National City Corporation's motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. FACTS
A brief summary of the parties is necessary before moving on to the substantive facts of this case. Plaintiff JAT is an African-American-owned travel business specializing in charter motor coach service throughout the U.S. and Canada that is located in Redford, Michigan. (Compl. ¶ 3; Defs.' Mot., Ex. 3.) JAT applied for a commercial loan from Defendant Bank in 2005, but the application was denied. JAT subsequently obtained a loan from Bank One at a higher rate of interest. (Compl.¶ 3.)

Plaintiff Body of Christ is a church located in Detroit with a predominantly African-American congregation. Body of Christ applied for a commercial loan from Defendant Bank,[3] but the application was denied. Body of Christ subsequently `obtained the loan from Bank One. (Compl.¶ 4.)
816 *816 Plaintiff Good Fight is a church located in Wayne County, outside of Detroit, with a predominantly AfricanAmerican congregation and an African-American pastor. Good Fight applied for a commercial real estate loan from Defendant Sank in 2006 to purchase property within the city of Detroit to be used for a church. Bank requested additional information and delayed on approving the loan, so Good Faith obtained a loan in the same amount from another bank. Due to Bank's delay, however, another buyer bought the property that Good Fight was interested in. (Compl.¶ 5.)
Plaintiff Pleasant Hill is a church located in Detroit with a predominantly African-American congregation. Pleasant Hill applied for a commercial loan from Defendant Bank, but Bank did not grant the loan.[4] Pleasant Hill subsequently obtained a loan from Bank One in the same amount as the one sought from Defendant Bank. (Compl.¶ 6.)
Plaintiff Samaritan is a church located in Detroit with a predominantly African-American congregation. Samaritan applied for a commercial loan from Defendant Bank, but Bank did not grant the loan.[5] Samaritan subsequently obtained a loan from Bank One for a greater amount than they sought from Defendant Bank. (Compl. ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff 3M is an African-American-owned business located in Detroit. 3M applied for a commercial loan from Defendant Bank that was to be partially secured by a State of Michigan loan guaranty program, but Bank did not approve the loan under the program and required 3M's owner and his wife to secure the loan with a mortgage on their personal residence.[6] The loan terms require frequent renewal, and the interest rate has since increased. (Compl.¶ 8.)
Plaintiff Phillip Peake was a Small Business Banking Officer ("SBBO") for Defendant Bank from May 2003 until April 2005. (Compl.¶¶ 12, 13.) Peake is African-American, born and raised in Detroit, and still lives in the city. (Compl.¶ 9.) As a result of his termination by the Bank, Peake filed an employment discrimination and retaliation lawsuit against Bank in June 2005 that is currently set for trial in October 2006 before the Hon. Denise Page Hood, Eastern District of Michigan. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 1.)
Defendant Bank is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant NCC, and provides a variety of financial services throughout Michigan and the surrounding states. (Compl.¶¶ 10-11.)
As an SBBO for Bank, Peake was responsible for generating applications for small business commercial loans and closing loans approved by the Bank. (Compl.¶ 14.) Most of the loans that Peake solicited were insured by a federal executive agency, the Small Business Administration ("SBA"), and were for less than $1 million. (Compl.¶ 15.) The SBA is also the source of detailed lending statistics by geographic location and bank that both parties cite in their briefs.
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have an unwritten policy of not making loans to businesses located in areas of Detroit that are predominantly African-American. While Peake was a loan officer for the Bank, he processed 817 twelve loan applications totaling over $7.7 million for churches with predominantly African-American *817 congregations that were denied by the Bank. (Compl.¶¶ 26, 27.) All twelve of the churches that the Bank declined had subsequent loan applications approved by other banks in the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area. (Compl.¶ 32.) Plaintiffs also note a number of SBA statistics for the years 2002-2004 to indicate that the overall percentage of SBA loans funded by Defendants to African-American-owned businesses and in the city of Detroit are small relative to the overall number of SBA loans Defendants funded. (Compl.¶¶ 19-21.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that the percentage of Defendants' branches located in Detroit is small relative to the number existing in the surrounding suburbs. (Compl.¶¶ 22, 23.) In further support of this claim, Peake notes that his manager once recommended:
[I]t is an SBBO's responsibility to target opportunities that have the highest chance of success. . . . Targeting doctor's offices, professional firms, all-star customers with high deposit dollars are all

examples of ways Phil could target better opportunities. As indicated from the list of declined loans, Phil has three churches and a non-profit organization. . . . These types of businesses are not desirable based on National City criteria. . . . Phil and I have had several conversations regarding targeting the right types of businesses. . . .
(Compl.¶ 28.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 0907 RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a Complaint. In a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court must assume that Plaintiff's factual allegations are true and determine whether the Complaint states a valid claim for relief. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994); Bower v. Federal Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir.1996); Forest v. United States Postal Sen., 97 F.3d 137, 139 (6th Cir. 1996).
This standard of review "`requires more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions.'" In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir.1995)). The Complaint must include direct or indirect allegations "respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." See In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). A court should not grant a 12(b)(6) motion unless the movant shows "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Claims Against Defendant NCC
Defendant NCC argues that all claims against it should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have not asserted any substantive allegations against NCC beyond it simply being a parent holding company of Defendant Bank. Although Plaintiffs' complaint does not provide any detail of particular allegations against NCC itself, their response to Defendants' motion to dismiss makes several allegations sufficient to avoid that motion if the additional allegations are considered amendments to Plaintiffs' complaint. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that NCC assisted Bank in creating a credit scoring matrix for churches, the underwriting decisions for the loans at issue were made by employees located in Indianapolis who may be NCC employees, and Plaintiff Peake received a letter from an NCC corporate employee in Cleveland on letterhead bearing Bank's name at the top. (Pls.' Resp. 818 at 9, 10.) Such assertions indicate that NCC may be more than a mere holding company, and could be involved *818 in setting policies for Bank which could lead to liability on NCC's behalf.
In support of the motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that "it is well-established that a pleading may not be amended in a response brief." Jocham v. Tuscola Co., 239 F.Supp.2d 714, 732 (E.D.Mich. 2003). This Court does not find Jocham and the Seventh Circuit case it cites on this issue to be dispositive, however, given that both of those cases were at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, rather than the motion to dismiss that this Court is considering here. Furthermore, in the context of a defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit has noted that "Mills court in the past has treated legal theories first raised in the plaintiff's response to a motion for summary judgment as an implicit motion to amend the complaint when all of the relevant facts had previously been pled." Super Sulky, Inc. v. U.S. Trotting Ass'n, 174 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639-40 (6th Cir. 1982)).
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party must receive leave of court to amend its pleadings once a responsive pleading has been served, but "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Where Plaintiffs are not attempting to plead new causes of action against Defendants, but are merely providing additional support to their initial pleading, this Court is inclined to allow an implicit motion to amend at this stage. With the additional allegations from Plaintiffs' response, Plaintiffs have made sufficient allegations against NCC to warrant a denial of NCC's motion for a complete dismissal at this stage of the proceedings.
B. Defendants' Additional Information

In conjunction with their motion to dismiss, Defendants submitted exhibits that included underwriting documents from several of Plaintiffs' loan applications and data from the SBA that were not included in the complaint. Defendants seek to use the underwriting documents to show that the two-year statute of limitations under the FHA and ECOA has run as to plaintiffs JAT, Pleasant Hill and Samaritan. At oral argument, Plaintiffs conceded that these three claims are time-barred, so the issue is moot as to these pieces of additional information. As to the SBA statistics, Plaintiffs assert that by submitting additional documents that were not included in the complaint, Defendants converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment (Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' Mot. at 10.) Defendants respond that a court may consider certain information that a plaintiff did not include in its complaint without transforming its motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Both parties cite to Weiner v. Klais, Inc., 108 F.3d 86 (6th Cir.1997) to support their arguments.

Weiner involved an ERISA dispute where the defendant included the plan documents, summary plan descriptions and other collateral agreements as exhibits to its motion to dismiss. Id. at 89. None of the documents were included in the plaintiffs complaint. In general, "[m]atters outside of the pleadings are not to be considered by a court in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Id. at 88. But the court also noted that

a plaintiff is under no obligation to attach to his complaint documents upon which his action is

based. However, a defendant may introduce certain pertinent documents if the plaintiff fails to do

so. Otherwise, a plaintiff with a legally deficient claim could survive a motion to dismiss simply by

failing to attach a dispositive document on which it relied. Hence, the Seventh Circuit has held that

819

"[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches *819 to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the

pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim."

Id. at 89 (internal citations omitted).

In holding that the plan documents and summary plan descriptions could be considered part of the pleadings, the Weiner court noted that the plaintiff referred to the "plan" several times in the complaint, and the summaries contained identical information to what was in the plan itself. The court refused to consider the collateral agreements, however, noting that they "were not mentioned directly or indirectly in the complaint." Id.

Defendants' information regarding SBA statistics is inappropriate for consideration. Although Plaintiffs did mention certain SBA figures in the complaint, Defendants included completely different numbers with their motion. By citing certain figures from the SBA, Plaintiffs did not open themselves up to the possibility that Defendants could raise any of the hundreds or thousands of other SBA statistics in response. Analysis of competing figures such as this could be properly considered under a motion for summary judgment at a future date, but not under the motion to dismiss currently at bar. For the above reasons, this Court will not consider Defendants' SBA statistics in ruling on this motion.

C. The Fair Housing Act

The FHA prohibits any person "engaging in residential real estate-related transactions" from discriminating on the basis of a number of characteristics, including race. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a). Residential real estate-related transactions include "[t]he making or purchasing of loans or providing other financial assistance (A) for purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling; or (B) secured by residential real estate." 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)(1). A dwelling is defined as "any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families". 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (b).

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the transactions involving JAT, Body of Christ, Good Fight, Pleasant Hill, Samaritan and Peake did not involve a dwelling and were not secured by residential real estate, so the FHA claim is dismissed as to those plaintiffs. The loan for 3M, on the other hand, was allegedly secured by a first mortgage on the owners' personal residence, so Plaintiff 3M does have a valid claim under the FHA.

D. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act

1. Statutory requirements for a claim under the ECOA

The ECOA states: "[i]t shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction 0907 (1) on the basis of race [or] color . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). "The term `applicant' means any person who applies to a creditor directly for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1691 a(b). Plaintiff Peake has not alleged that he ever applied for credit with Defendants, so his ECOA claim must be dismissed.[7]
820 Defendants assert that an applicant must also be "denied credit for reasons prohibited by ECOA" in order to *820 have a valid claim under the Act. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 12, emphasis added.) Neither the ECOA nor the cited case of Barney v. Holzer Clinic, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1207 (6th Cir.1997) list actual denial of credit as a specific requirement for an ECOA violation, however. In fact, the only two cases this Court's research uncovered held that an actual denial is not necessary to have a violation. Wilson v. Toussie, 260 F.Supp.2d 530, 540-41 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (citing Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F.Supp.2d 7, 22 (D.D.C.2000)). While complete denial would certainly be a form of prohibited discrimination, it could not be the sole possibility, as that interpretation would allow banks to discriminate by "approving" loans to disfavored groups but attaching higher interest rates, increased collateral requirements and more restrictive loan terms than those offered to other approved applicants. Therefore, the mere fact that 3M and Pleasant Hills' loans were approved and Good Faith withdrew their application with Bank do not mean that Bank's actions did not violate the ECOA. Specifically, 3M has alleged that other applicants did not have to pledge personal real estate to secure a commercial loan with Bank (Compl.¶ 8.) and Good Faith stated that it withdrew the application due to delay by Bank in the approval process (Compl.¶ 5.) Such delay, if proven, could constitute another form of hidden discrimination covered by the ECOA. Therefore, this Court agrees with the previous holdings in Wilson and Hargraves, and finds that the remaining plaintiffs have stated valid ECOA claims even if Defendants did not actually deny their applications.
2. Statute of limitations
All actions under the ECOA must be brought within "two years from the date of the occurrence of the violation." 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f). As noted previously, Plaintiffs concede that the ECOA claims of JAT, Pleasant Hill and Samaritan are time-barred under this provision of the Act. Plaintiffs respond that the separate employment discrimination lawsuit that Peake filed on June 25, 2005 gave Defendants notice of the potential ECOA claims, however, because Peake's complaint in that lawsuit mentioned the alleged lending practices at issue here. Plaintiffs assert that this notice to Defendants tolled the applicable statute of limitations under the ECOA.
The argument that Peake's employment discrimination lawsuit tolls the applicable statute of limitations under the ECOA is without merit. Two of Plaintiffs' cited cases involved employment discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), which has a statutory requirement that plaintiffs must first file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission ("EEOC") in order to have a valid ADEA claim. Foster v. Ruhrguntpen, Inc., 365 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir.2004); Howlett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 49 F.3d 189 (6th Cir.1995). Neither case involved any discussion of the ECOA or tolling an applicable statute of limitations under the ADEA that could be analogized to the issue at bar in this case. Furthermore, an employer is clearly put on notice of an applicable employment discrimination claim under the ADEA when a corresponding complaint is filed with the EEOC. Such notice is not so clear when, as in Plaintiffs' case, the first lawsuit alleges employment discrimination and the second involves unlawful lending practices. Therefore, this Court finds that Foster and Howlett are not applicable here.
Plaintiffs' third case, Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983), held that filing a class action tolled the applicable statute of limitations for individual plaintiffs who were 821 part of the class in a situation where the class certification was *821 denied. Crown is clearly not applicable here, as Plaintiffs were never part of a putative class that was eventually denied. Outside of these cases, Plaintiffs do not provide any further authority for the assertion that the statute of limitations is tolled in this case, so the argument does not require further consideration.
E. The Civil Rights Act
1. Plaintiff Peake's claim

Peake has plead a valid claim under the Civil Rights Act, but no part of this claim has anything to do with the case at bar, which focuses on Defendants' alleged discriminatory lending practices. A review of Plaintiffs' complaint where the allegations of action taken against Peake are described (Compl.¶¶ 46-48.) confirms that his claims against Defendants are for employment-related matters. Nowhere does Peake allege that he ever applied for a loan with Defendants. Since Peake already has an employment discrimination lawsuit pending before another judge in the Eastern District of Michigan, these claims will be adequately addressed in that forum, and are dismissed from this case.
2. Loan applicants' claims
Defendants argue that the remaining plaintiffs' CRA claims are merely an attempt to raise duplicative claims that would survive their failed claims under the FHA and ECOA. In support of this assertion, however, Defendants simply restate the previously rejected argument that there can be no discrimination if a plaintiffs loan application was either approved or withdrawn. At the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiffs must merely allege sufficient facts to show that they may have a valid claim under the specific law at issue. Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs must plead intentional discrimination in order to have a valid claim, Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982), but Plaintiffs' complaint makes precisely this allegation, (Compl.¶ 49.) which is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment on this issue. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have alleged specific occurrences where Defendants conduct, if true, could constitute a violation under the CRA for unlawful discrimination.
Finally, Plaintiffs cite to Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), although the case is not directly on point here. Swierkiewicz was an employment discrimination case where the Court held that the plaintiffs did not have to meet any heightened pleading standard in a Title VII employment discrimination case. Here, Defendants are not arguing that any standard besides the regular notice requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply, so Swierkiewicz is inapplicable to this issue.
As this court has found that Plaintiffs have met their minimal burden to avoid a motion to dismiss on this point, Defendants' motion to dismiss the CRA claims is denied, with the exception of Peake's CRA claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. As a result, all of Plaintiff Peake's claims are dismissed, and the following claims remain against Defendants: (i) an FRA claim by 3M, (ii) ECOA claims by Body of Christ, Good Fight and 3M, and CRA claims by JAT, Body of Christ, Good Fight, Pleasant Hill, Samaritan, and 3M.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Plaintiffs JAT, Pleasant Hill, Peake and New Galilee Missionary Church ("New Galilee") filed their original Complaint on April 24, 2006. New Galilee voluntarily dismissed its claims against Defendants on June 13, 2006, and the current plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on July 31, 2006 to add Body of Christ, Good Fight, Samaritan and 3M as additional plaintiffs. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 1-2.) Any reference to the Complaint in this opinion refers to the Amended Complaint.
[2] "Credit discrimination (usu[ally] unlawful discrimination) by a financial institution that refuses to make loans on properties in allegedly bad neighborhoods." Black's Law Dictionary 1283 (7th ed.1999).
[3] Plaintiffs do not state when Body of Christ applied for this loan.
[4] Plaintiffs do not state when Pleasant Hill applied for this loan.
[5] Plaintiffs do not state when Samaritan applied for this loan.
[6] Plaintiffs do not state when 3M applied for this loan.

[7] Plaintiff Peake asserts, despite the fact he is not an applicant for purposes of the ECOA, that the Act grants him a distinct claim for retaliation that is separate from his employment discrimination lawsuit pending before Judge Hood. This Court's review of the ECOA failed to uncover any such provision, however, so dismissal of Peake's ECOA claim remains proper.
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 JAT, Inc. v. National City Bank of Midwest, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 1880389 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan,
Southern Division.
JAT, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
NATIONAL CITY BANK OF the MIDWEST, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 06-CV-11937-DT. | June 29, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
John R. Runyan, Jr., Sachs Waldman, Detroit, MI, David L. Rose, Rose & Rose, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Jeffrey G. Collins, Phifer & White, Detroit, MI.
Opinion
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL AND PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL
MONA K. MAJZOUB, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 This matter comes before the Court on three discovery motions. Defendants’ Motion to Compel was filed on April 20, 2007. (Docket no. 39). Plaintiffs’ Motion to Quash was filed on May 8, 2007. (Docket no. 48). The parties resolved these two motions before the hearing held by the Court on June 27, 2007. Accordingly, the Court finds these two motions to be moot. They will be denied on that basis.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery filed on April 30, 2007 is still at issue. (Docket no. 43). Defendants responded to this motion. (Docket no. 56). Plaintiffs filed a Reply brief. (Docket no. 63). The Court heard argument on this motion on June 27, 2007. The matter has been referred to the undersigned for decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). (Docket no. 44). This motion is therefore ready for ruling. The Court will first address the three major issues on which the parties disagree. The Court’s ruling on these issues controls the decisions on the individual Interrogatories and Production Requests that are before the Court for decision. This is a case involving allegations of several federal anti-discrimination laws related to Defendants’ alleged policies of “redlining” against African-American-owned

businesses in the city of Detroit with regard to commercial loans. Plaintiffs also claim that this case is properly brought as a class action, although no decision on that issue has been made at the present time. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19; the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f; and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870(CRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.
1. Geographic Scope The parties first disagree on the geographic area of the loan data which Plaintiffs should be able to discover from Defendants. Plaintiffs initially argued that they were entitled to data on loans made by Defendants for the entire state of Michigan. During the June 27, 2007 hearing, Plaintiffs narrowed their request to data from the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area which Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated included roughly the counties of Macomb, Oakland, Lapeer, and Wayne. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should be allowed discovery only on their loan data from the city of Detroit.
Rule 26(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., governs the scope of discovery and generally allows discovery of matters that are not privileged and that are relevant to the claim or defense of any party. In seeking to prove their claims of racial discrimination, Plaintiffs must show that the lender continued to approve loans for applicants with qualifications similar to those of a Plaintiff after denying a loan for the Plaintiff. See Hood v. Midwest Savings Bank, 95 Fed. App’x 768, 778 (6th Cir.2004). Loan data will therefore be relevant to this issue on applicants from both inside and outside of the allegedly “redlined” areas in the city of Detroit. The Court finds that loan data from the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area is relevant to the claims and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Accordingly, the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area is the geographic scope of allowable discovery on the loan data of Defendants.
2. Temporal Scope *2 The parties also disagree on the years for which the loan data of Defendants may be discovered. Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs should be limited in their discovery of loan data to the years 2002-2006, the years in which Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have engaged in a pattern of loan discrimination. Plaintiffs argue that they should be allowed to discover loan data from 2000-2006, to attempt to show a pattern of discriminatory lending by Defendants. They rely on the practice in employment discrimination cases generally allowing discovery extending back a few years before the alleged act which
1

JAT, Inc. v. National City Bank of Midwest, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

forms that basis of the plaintiff’s claim. See E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 26 F.3d 44 (6th Cir.1994) (allowing discovery 3 years and 300 days before charge was filed). The plaintiff in that case alleged continuing discrimination beginning in 1984, when she was promoted, up until 1991 when she filed her complaint of discrimination. The court found that comparative information is essential in such a discrimination case and allowed discovery extending back 3 years before the expiration of the plaintiff’s limitation period which was 300 days prior to the filing of her complaint.
In the present action, Plaintiffs allege discrimination beginning in 2002. They will receive data from numerous loans made or denied from 2002 to 2006. Defendants’ counsel stated during the June 27 hearing that 1700 pages of data had already been disclosed. During the June 27 hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel was unable to state specifically how Plaintiffs would benefit from data from the years 2000 and 2001. The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that they should be allowed discovery back to the year 2000 because Defendants are required by federal regulations to maintain loan data extending back to that year. The plaintiff in E.E.O.C. v. Ford was not granted discovery for the entire period during which she claimed discrimination, but Plaintiffs in this action will receive discovery for this period. The Court agrees that Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery of data for some period of time pre-dating their allegations in their quest for comparative information. However, data from the period beginning January 1, 2001 rather than January 1, 2000 should be sufficient to allow Plaintiffs to collect comparative information and yet avoid unduly burdening Defendants. Accordingly, the years 2001-2006 will be the temporal scope of allowable discovery on the loan data of Defendants.
3. Scope of Types of Loans Plaintiffs seek to discover Defendants’ loan data for mortgage and other types of loans. Defendants contend that because Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges discrimination only in small business or church loans that discovery should be limited to these types of loans. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint raises allegations of discrimination in commercial and small business loans only. There are no denials of mortgage loans asserted. The surviving claim under the FHA is one made by Plaintiff 3M alleging that Defendants required 3M to execute a lien upon the residence of 3M’s owner to secure a business loan. Therefore, this claim is not one of discrimination in the making of a mortgage loan. Also, Plaintiffs cite the “declaration” of Priscilla Norris-Johnson claiming that Defendants discriminated against her in the making of a residential mortgage. However, she fails to state when she applied for this mortgage loan, and, more importantly, the Amended

Complaint has not been amended to name her as a plaintiff. Therefore, her declaration may not be considered as a claim in this case as of this time.
*3 Plaintiffs have failed to show that discovery regarding loan types other than small business/commercial loans are relevant to their claims. The scope of discovery will therefore be limited to small business and commercial loans, excluding residential mortgage loans.
4. Individual Discovery Requests Based on the above discussion, the Court rules as follows on the disputed individual discovery requests.
A. Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories Interrogatory 1 seeks data from January 1, 2000 from the entire state of Michigan with regard to “any loans.” Therefore, the motion to compel is denied.
Interrogatory 2 asks Defendant to identify each witness and document it will rely on for proof of “any fact” that it expects to prove and/or in proving “any affirmative defense.” The motion to compel is denied because the interrogatory is overly broad and unduly burdensome.
Interrogatory 3 lacks a limitation for the type of loan and covers the state of Michigan. The motion is denied as to this request.
Interrogatory 3(sic) also lacks a limitation for the type of loan and covers the state of Michigan. The motion is therefore denied as to this request.
Interrogatory 11 asks for mortgage loan information. The motion as to this request is denied.
B. Plaintiffs’ First Set of Requests for Production Requests 2, 3, 4, 5, and 14 seek documents for any state extending back into the year 2000. The motion to compel is denied as to these requests.
Requests 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 seek mortgage loan information. Also, many of the requests are for the entire state of Michigan for the time period beginning in 2000. Therefore, the motion is denied as to these requests.
Requests 17 and 22 seek loan information with no time limitation and without being limited to small business/commercial loans. The requests also lack a geographical limitation. The motion is denied as to these requests.
2

JAT, Inc. v. National City Bank of Midwest, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

Request 19 lacks a time limitation. The motion is denied as to this request.
5. Miscellaneous Matters The parties raised an issue during the June 27 hearing regarding a disagreement on the number of interrogatories Plaintiffs had served. After the hearing counsel conferred and according to Plaintiffs’ counsel this issue has been resolved because Defendants’ have served answers to another set of interrogatories that Plaintiffs had earlier served upon Defendants. Therefore, the Court consider this issue to be resolved.
The only remaining matter is a disagreement among counsel regarding how many depositions have already taken place and how many Plaintiffs will be allowed. Plaintiffs have already taken one deposition. Therefore, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 30, Plaintiffs may take 9 more depositions before leave of court is required, unless

Defendants stipulate to additional depositions.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Compel (docket no. 39) and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Quash (docket no. 48) are DENIED as moot.
*4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel (docket no. 43) is DENIED as set out above.
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), the parties have a period of ten days from the date of this Order within which to file any written appeal to the District Judge as may be permissible under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1).
	  

3

 
 JAT, Inc. v. National City Bank of the Midwest, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 2004877 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan,
Southern Division.
JAT, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
NATIONAL CITY BANK OF THE MIDWEST and National City Corp., Defendants.
No. 06-11937. | July 9, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
John R. Runyan, Jr., Sachs Waldman, Detroit, MI, David L. Rose, Rose & Rose, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Jeffrey G. Collins, Phifer & White, Detroit, MI.
Opinion

ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION [38], AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS’ TWO
MOTIONS TO STRIKE DECLARATIONS AND PLEADINGS [51, 68]

NANCY G. EDMUNDS, United States District Judge.
*1 Pending before this Court are three motions in this case. First, Plaintiffs’1 moved for class certification on April 16, 2007. Then, on May 10, 2007, Defendants2 moved to strike several declarations that Plaintiffs filed in support of their class certification motion. Finally, on June 12, 2007, Defendants moved to strike Plaintiffs’ replies regarding the motion for class certification and four additional supporting declarations.

1

Used collectively, “Plaintiffs” refers to JAT, Inc., Body

of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith

Ministry, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church, Samaritan

Baptist Church, and 3M Contracting, Inc.

2

Used collectively, “Defendants” refers to National City

Bank of the Midwest and National City Corporation.

At this time, Plaintiffs are asking the Court to certify a class under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) for the limited purpose of determining whether Defendants engaged in a pattern

or practice of lending discrimination, which would support injunctive relief if Defendants are found liable for such conduct. Subsequently, Plaintiffs may seek to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3) to settle the issue of monetary damages, assuming, of course, that Defendants are found liable in the first stage.
Plaintiffs’ suit against Defendants asserts violations of several federal anti-discrimination laws related to Defendants’ alleged policies of “redlining”3 against African-American-owned businesses in the city of Detroit with regards to commercial loans. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ claims involve (1) the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, (2) the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f, and (3) the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870 (“CRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.

3

“Credit discrimination (usu[ally] unlawful

discrimination) by a financial institution that refuses to

make loans on properties in allegedly bad

neighborhoods.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1283 (7th

ed.1999).

Defendants assert that (1) Plaintiffs’ motion fails to meet the four threshold requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), and (2) does not fall within the asserted class action category of Rule 23(b)(2) covering requests for injunctive relief because monetary damages predominate the equitable remedy Plaintiffs seek. Defendants’ associated motions to strike argue that procedural and substantive defects preclude this Court from considering several of Plaintiffs’ pleadings and declarations related to the instant motion for class certification.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Given that disposition of the primary motion before the Court, Defendants’ two motions to strike are DENIED AS MOOT.

I. FACTS

Plaintiffs are a group of churches with predominantly

African

American

congregations

and

African-American-owned businesses that applied for

commercial loans with Defendants to be secured by real

estate or other property located in the City of Detroit.

Plaintiffs’ loan requests were either denied outright, or

allegedly delayed in a purposeful fashion, thus forcing

Plaintiffs to seek alternative financing from other local

financial institutions.

1

JAT, Inc. v. National City Bank of the Midwest, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW-MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION Plaintiffs, as the party seeking to certify a class, bear the burden of showing Rule 23’s requirements have been satisfied. See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. 591, 614, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997); In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir.1996). As observed by the Sixth Circuit, “[t]he district court retains broad discretion in determining whether an action should be certified as a class action, and its decision, based upon the particular facts of the case, should not be overturned absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir.1988). Nonetheless, the Court must “conduct a ‘rigorous analysis’ into whether the prerequisites of Rule 23 are met before certifying a class.” In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at 1078-79 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982)).
*2 In addressing a motion for class certification, courts do not examine the merits of the plaintiffs’ underlying claims. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). “A Rule 23 determination is wholly procedural and has nothing to do with whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the substantive merits of its claim.” Little Caesar Enter., Inc. v. Smith, 172 F.R.D. 236, 241 (E.D.Mich.1997). Courts also assume that the substantive allegations of the complaint are true and that cognizable claims are stated. See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178. “Nonetheless, the Court must undertake an analysis of the issues and the nature of required proof at trial to determine whether the matters in dispute and the nature of plaintiffs’ proofs are principally individual in nature or are susceptible of common proof equally applicable to all class members.” Little Caesar, 172 F.R.D. at 241. “[W]hen a court is in doubt as to whether to certify a class action, it should err in favor of allowing a class.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS In order for the Court to grant Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, they must demonstrate that the four requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)-numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy-are met, and that this case falls within one of the three categories of Rule 23(b). Here, Plaintiffs seek to confirm an initial class under Rule 23(b)(2), which allows class actions in cases where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to meet any of the four Rule 23(a) requirements, and, alternatively, that this case does not fit within the parameters of Rule 23(b)(2).

A. Rule 23(a) Requirements Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1), Plaintiffs must first show that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” It is true that “[t]he numerosity requirement is met when plaintiffs demonstrate that the number of potential class members is large, even if plaintiffs do not know the exact figure.” In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 601 (E.D.Mich.1985). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has “observed that ‘[t]here is no strict numerical test for determining impracticability of joinder.’ “ Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 965 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at 1079). That said, the plaintiffs must support their claim of numerosity with something more than mere speculation of the number of other individuals or entities that the alleged conduct affected. Id. at 965-66.
In Golden, the plaintiff was a tenant who brought a class action alleging that the City of Columbus acted illegally by shutting off her water, and that of other similarly-situated tenants, when the landlord or prior tenant failed to pay water bills for the rented property. To support her claim that Rule 23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement was met, the plaintiff noted that “the number of renters in Columbus ... is 150,000.” (Id. at 966). In holding that the Golden plaintiff did not make a sufficient showing of numerosity, the Sixth Circuit stated:
*3 Golden must offer something more than bare speculation to link the gravamen of her claim for liability to the class of individuals she purports to represent. The gravamen of Golden’s equal protection claim is that the City irrationally terminates certain tenants’ water service. Golden does not allege that all tenants in Columbus are at risk of constitutional harm, only those whose predecessors or landlords are indebted to the City. Thus, reference to the total number of tenants in Columbus is not probative of the number of tenants reasonably likely to face the harm for which Golden seeks redress. Of course, the total number of tenants in Columbus is probative in the very limited sense that it represents the absolute maximum number of plaintiffs that could be in any class action brought by a tenant against the City. But the district court must engage in a “rigorous analysis”
2

JAT, Inc. v. National City Bank of the Midwest, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

when evaluating the plaintiff’s proof of numerosity, see Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161.

relevant in analyzing the commonality and typicality requirements.

Id. (parallel citation omitted).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs posit that “there are tens of thousands of businesses, churches and mortgage applicants in the red lined zones, many of whom are likely to seek loans of the kind defendant makes in other parts of town.” (Pl.’s Mot. for Class Certification (hereinafter, “Pl.’s Mot.”) at 15.) In support of this claim, Plaintiffs note that “[a]ccording to Census Bureau estimates, there were over 19,500 black owned businesses in Detroit in 2002. A commercial company lists some 4,381 Churches in the City. Given the City’s 80%+ black population, it is fair to assume that there are thousands of black churches.” (Id. at 8 (citations omitted).)
Defendants do not dispute Plaintiffs’ statistic regarding the number of African-American-owned businesses in Detroit and, rightfully so, they also do not contest that it is logical to assume that there must be a significant number of churches with predominantly African American congregations in the City, due to the fact that a sizeable majority of Detroit’s residents are members of that race. Instead, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ statements do not speak to the operative question of whether any of these entities applied for a loan with Defendants.4 Given the claims at issue in this case, Plaintiffs’ speculation is insufficient to span the gap between general demographic statistics about Detroit and the bottom-line allegations that many other similarly-situated borrowers were denied credit by these particular Defendants.5 Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not satisfied the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1).

4

Or would have applied for a loan, were it not for

Defendants’ failure to place more bank branches in the

City of Detroit or adequately market its lending

services there.

5

To reiterate, parties may use statistics in discrimination

cases, but the cited figures must be specific enough that

they address the relevant comparisons applicable to the

underlying dispute. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc.

v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-51, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104

L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (holding that a general disparity

between the percentages of minorities holding

non-skilled cannery positions and those in skilled,

non-cannery jobs was insufficient to support a claim of

discrimination-the plaintiffs instead needed evidence of

a disparity between the percentage of qualified

minorities in the relevant labor market for non-cannery

workers and the racial makeup of the individuals who

actually held those positions). In addition to

numerosity, statistical considerations may also be

Putative class plaintiffs who fail to establish any one of the four initial requirements under Rule 23(a) are not entitled to class certification. Golden, 404 F.3d at 965. Therefore, consideration of the remaining three factors becomes irrelevant now that the Court has found Plaintiffs’ proposed class lacks numerosity .6

6

Nothing in this Order should be taken to indicate that

the named plaintiffs in this case cannot pursue their

own individual claims against Defendants following the

denial of their request to proceed as a class.

B. Rule 23(b) Categories *4 Even assuming, for sake of argument, that Plaintiffs had met all four of the Rule 23(a) requirements, they would still not be entitled to have the putative class certified under this category of available class actions. First of all, Plaintiffs recognize that in cases where monetary damages are the exclusive or predominant remedy sought, Rule 23(b)(2) does not provide a proper avenue for certifying the purported class. Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443, 446 (6th Cir.2002). There, the plaintiff alleged discriminatory lending practices under the ECOA and requested injunctive relief as well as monetary damages to compensate class members for being charged higher rates of interest on automobile loans than white consumers. Of concern to the Coleman court, as well as other federal circuit courts that have considered the question, are several issues, primarily that:

the inclusion of [a monetary

damages] claim [in a class action

under Rule 23(b)(2) ] undermines

the assumption of homogeneity

because each member of the class

has an individual stake in the

outcome of the litigation that could

be protected by the opportunity to

opt out of the class. Second, the

individualized

determinations

necessary to calculate the amount

of damages each class member

would be entitled to eliminates the

efficiencies created by adjudicating

these claims on a classwide basis.

Id. at 449 (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit also held in Coleman that “compensatory damages under the ECOA are not recoverable by a
3

JAT, Inc. v. National City Bank of the Midwest, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

23(b)(2) class.” Id. at 447.
To be sure, certain Plaintiffs also have claims under the FHA and CRA, in addition to the ECOA, so not all of their compensatory damages are explicitly excluded under Coleman, especially since that court did recognize that a plaintiff could seek some monetary damages and still qualify under Rule 23(b)(2). Regardless, Plaintiffs’ attempt to argue that this Court should follow the reasoning in Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383, F.3d 495, 510-11 (6th Cir.2004) rather than Coleman is unpersuasive. While the Olden court noted that “[d]isputes over whether [an] action is primarily for injunctive ... relief rather than a monetary award neither promote the disposition of the case on the merits nor represent a useful expenditure of energy,” this statement was qualified by the assumption that all of the Rule 23(a) requirements were met, which is not the case here. Id. at 510. Furthermore, the district court below in Olden had determined that the plaintiffs’ case qualified as a class

action under both Rule 23(b)(2) and (3), another factor that is not present in the instant dispute. For these reasons, the Court finds Olden distinguishable and concludes that the reasoning in Coleman applies here. Thus, Plaintiffs’ requested class action fails for the additional reason that it does not fit within the category for Rule 23(b)(2) cases.
IV. CONCLUSION *5 Being fully advised in the premises, having read the pleadings, and for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby orders that Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is DENIED and Defendants’ two motions to strike are DENIED AS MOOT.
SO ORDERED.
	  

4

 
 Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 1 of 18
CLOSED, APPEAL
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:06−cv−11937−NGE−MKM

JAT, Incorporated et al v. National City Bank of the Midwest et al Assigned to: District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds Referred to: Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub
Case in other court: U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit, 08−01848
Cause: No cause code entered
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 04/25/2006 Date Terminated: 06/10/2008 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 443 Civil Rights: Accomodations Jurisdiction: Federal Question

JAT, Incorporated

represented by John R. Runyan , Jr. Sachs Waldman 1000 Farmer Street Detroit, MI 48226 313−965−3464 Fax: 313−965−0268 Email: jrunyan@sachswaldman.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David L. Rose Rose &Rose 1320 19th St. NW Suite 601 Washington, DC 20036 202−331−8555 Email: daver@roselawyers.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yuval Rubinstein Rose &Rose 1320 19th St. NW Suite 601 Washington, DC 20036 202−331−8555 Fax: 202−331−0996 Email: yrubinstein@roselawyers.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
New Galilee Missionary Baptist Church TERMINATED: 06/09/2006

represented by John R. Runyan , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David L. Rose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Pleasant Hill Baptist Church

represented by John R. Runyan , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David L. Rose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 2 of 18

Plaintiff Phillip Peake TERMINATED: 10/27/2006
Plaintiff Body of Christ Christian Center
Plaintiff Good Fight of Faith Ministry
Plaintiff Samaritan Baptist Church
Plaintiff 3M Contracting, Incorporated

Yuval Rubinstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John R. Runyan , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David L. Rose (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David L. Rose (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John R. Runyan , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yuval Rubinstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David L. Rose (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John R. Runyan , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yuval Rubinstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David L. Rose (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John R. Runyan , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yuval Rubinstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 3 of 18
David L. Rose (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John R. Runyan , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yuval Rubinstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Intervenor Plaintiff
Agape Tours LLC TERMINATED: 01/17/2007

represented by John R. Runyan , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant National City Bank of the Midwest

represented by Erin L. Toomey Foley &Lardner 500 Woodward Avenue Suite 2700 Detroit, MI 48226 313−234−7100 Email: eabrahams@foley.com TERMINATED: 03/27/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey G. Collins Collins &Collins, P.C. 1323 Broadway Suite 800 Detroit, MI 48226 313.963−2303 Fax: 313.963−2312 Email: jcollins@phiferwhite.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip B. Phillips Foley &Lardner 500 Woodward Avenue Suite 2700 Detroit, MI 48226 313−234−7100 Email: pphillips@foley.com TERMINATED: 03/27/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael G. Cleveland Vedder, Price, 222 N. LaSalle Street Suite 2400

Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 4 of 18

Chicago, IL 60601−1003 312−609−7500 Fax: 312−609−5005 Email: mcleveland@vedderprice.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant National City Corporation

represented by Erin L. Toomey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/27/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey G. Collins (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Philip B. Phillips (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/27/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael G. Cleveland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/25/2006
05/12/2006 05/12/2006 05/12/2006 06/09/2006
06/13/2006 07/18/2006 07/31/2006 07/31/2006 08/14/2006

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by JAT, Incorporated, New Galilee Missionary Baptist Church, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church, and Phillip Peake against National City Bank of the Midwest and National City Corporation; Receipt No: 541533 − Fee: $ 350; with Exhibits 1−3(JJoh, ) (Entered: 04/26/2006)
2 NOTICE of Appearance by Philip B. Phillips on behalf of National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation. (Phillips, Philip) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
3 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed. National City Bank of the Midwest waiver sent on 5/8/2006, answer due 7/7/2006; National City Corporation waiver sent on 5/8/2006, answer due 7/7/2006. (Phillips, Philip) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
4 NOTICE of Appearance by Erin L. Toomey on behalf of National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation. (Toomey, Erin) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
5 [SIGNATURE AND ATTORNEY APPEARANCE VIOLATIONS] NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by New Galilee Missionary Baptist Church as to New Galilee Missionary Baptist Church (Rose, David) Modified on 6/12/2006 (AGre, ). (Entered: 06/09/2006)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by David L. Rose on behalf of all plaintiffs. (Rose, David) (Entered: 06/13/2006)
7 STIPULATED ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT [see order for dates]. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem, ) (Entered: 07/18/2006)
8 [FILED IN ERROR; ATTORNEY RE−FILED] AMENDED COMPLAINT filed by all plaintiffs against all defendants.(Rose, David) Modified on 8/1/2006 (AGre, ). (Entered: 07/31/2006)
9 AMENDED COMPLAINT filed by all plaintiffs against all defendants.(Rose, David) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
10 MOTION to Dismiss by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit 1 − Amended

Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 5 of 18

08/14/2006 08/17/2006 08/17/2006 08/18/2006 08/22/2006 09/01/2006 09/01/2006 09/06/2006 09/18/2006
10/04/2006
10/13/2006 10/27/2006 11/02/2006 11/07/2006 11/08/2006 11/13/2006 11/13/2006

Complaint# 3 Exhibit 2 − Westlaw Cases# 4 Exhibit 3 − Letter to JAT, Inc.# 5 Exhibit 4 − Letter to Samaritan Baptist Church# 6 Exhibit 5 − Pleasant Hill's Loan Documents# 7 Exhibit 6 − Data from the SBA)(Toomey, Erin) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
11 REQUEST for Judicial Notice by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Property and Land Search Results)(Toomey, Erin) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
12 MOTION to Consolidate Cases and to Assign the New Case to Judge Presiding Over the Older Case by JAT, Incorporated. (Rose, David) (Entered: 08/17/2006)
13 MOTION to Consolidate Cases to Assign the New Case to Judge Presiding Over the Older Case by JAT, Incorporated. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Rose, David) (Entered: 08/17/2006)
14 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 12 MOTION to Consolidate Cases and to Assign the New Case to Judge Presiding Over the Older Case filed by JAT, Incorporated. (Rose, David) (Entered: 08/18/2006)
15 ORDER denying 12 and 13 Motion to Consolidate Cases− Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem, ) (Entered: 08/22/2006)
16 RESPONSE to 10 MOTION to Dismiss (Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss) filed by all plaintiffs. (Runyan, John) (Entered: 09/01/2006)
17 NOTICE of hearing on 10 MOTION to Dismiss. Motion Hearing set for 9/27/2006 02:00 PM before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem, ) (Entered: 09/01/2006)
Re−Set Motion Hearings as to 10 MOTION to Dismiss: Motion Hearing re−set for 10/4/2006 02:00 PM before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem, ) (Entered: 09/06/2006)
18 REPLY to Response re 10 MOTION to Dismiss filed by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit 1 − Unpublished Case Griffus v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.# 3 Exhibit 2 − Unpublished Case Meyers v. ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc.)(Toomey, Erin) (Entered: 09/18/2006)
Minute Entry −Motion Hearing held on 10/4/2006 re 10 MOTION to Dismiss filed by National City Corporation,, National City Bank of the Midwest, before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (Court Reporter Suzanne Jacques) (CHem, ) (Entered: 10/04/2006)
19 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 16 Response to Motion Notice of Additional Authorities filed by JAT, Incorporated. (Rose, David) (Entered: 10/13/2006)
20 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 10 Motion to Dismiss− Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem, ) (Entered: 10/27/2006)
21 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Scheduling Conference set for 12/4/2006 02:00 PM before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem, ) (Entered: 11/02/2006)
22 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 10 MOTION to Dismiss Notice of Additional Authorities filed by JAT, Incorporated. (Rose, David) (Entered: 11/07/2006)
23 ORDER DENYING pleading construed as a motion for reconsideration 22 Supplemental Brief filed by JAT, Incorporated,. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem, ) (Entered: 11/08/2006)
24 ANSWER to Amended Complaint with Affirmative Defenses by all defendants.(Toomey, Erin) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
25 STATEMENT of DISCLOSURE of CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS and FINANCIAL INTEREST by National City Corporation.(Toomey, Erin) (Entered: 11/13/2006)

Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 6 of 18

11/13/2006 11/15/2006 11/28/2006 11/30/2006 12/04/2006 12/04/2006
12/05/2006 12/15/2006 01/05/2007
01/08/2007 01/17/2007 01/17/2007 03/26/2007 03/27/2007
03/28/2007 04/16/2007
04/20/2007

26 STATEMENT of DISCLOSURE of CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS and FINANCIAL INTEREST by National City Bank of the Midwest.(Toomey, Erin) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
27 STATEMENT of DISCLOSURE of CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS and FINANCIAL INTEREST by JAT, Incorporated. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Rose, David) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
28 MOTION to Intervene by Agape Tours, Inc. by JAT, Incorporated. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Rose, David) (Entered: 11/28/2006)
29 NOTICE of Appearance by Erin L. Toomey on behalf of all defendants. (Toomey, Erin) (Entered: 11/30/2006)
Minute Entry −Scheduling Conference held on 12/4/2006 before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem, ) (Entered: 12/04/2006)
30 SCHEDULING ORDER: Final Pretrial Conference set for 9/27/2007 02:00 PM before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. Jury Trial set for 10/2/2007 09:00 AM before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. Discovery due by 6/1/2007. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (Refer to image for additional dates)(CHem, ) (Entered: 12/04/2006)
31 NOTICE of hearing on 28 MOTION to Intervene by Agape Tours, Inc.. Motion Hearing set for 1/17/2007 02:00 PM before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem, ) (Entered: 12/05/2006)
32 RESPONSE to 28 MOTION to Intervene by Agape Tours, Inc. filed by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Toomey, Erin) (Entered: 12/15/2006)
33 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene by Agape Tours LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit A Reply Memorandum# 3 Exhibit B Claims of Agape Tours LLC)(Runyan, John) (Entered: 01/05/2007)
TEXT ONLY ORDER granting 33 Motion for Leave to File− Entered by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem, ) (Entered: 01/08/2007)
Minute Entry −Motion Hearing held on 1/17/2007 re 28 MOTION to Intervene by Agape Tours, Inc. filed by JAT, Incorporated, before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (Court Reporter Suzanne Jacques) (CHem, ) (Entered: 01/17/2007)
34 ORDER denying 28 Motion to Intervene− Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem, ) (Entered: 01/17/2007)
35 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation Substitution of Attorneys (Toomey, Erin) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
36 STIPULATION AND ORDER for Substitution. Attorney Jeffrey G. Collins for National City Bank of the Midwest and National City Corporation added. Attorney Philip B. Phillips and Erin L. Toomey terminated. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CGre) (Entered: 03/27/2007)
37 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 03/28/2007)
38 [FILING ERROR:RULE 18, NO INDEX, LABELING] MOTION to Certify Class by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Brief# 2 Exhibit 1# 3 Exhibit 2# 4 Exhibit 3# 5 Exhibit 4# 6 Exhibit 5# 7 Index of Exhibits 6# 8 Exhibit 7# 9 Exhibit 8# 10 Exhibit 9# 11 Exhibit 10# 12 Exhibit 11# 13 Exhibit 12) (Rose, David) Modified on 4/17/2007 (Hamel, D.). (Entered: 04/16/2007)
39 [SEE DOC 40 FOR BRIEF] MOTION to Compel and to Deem Admitted Defendants' Requests for Admissions to Plaintiffs by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit A − First Request to Produce to Good Fight of Faith Ministry# 3 Exhibit B − First Interrogs. to Good Fight of Faith Ministry# 4 Exhibit C − First Request to Produce to 3M Contracting# 5 Exhibit D − First Request to Produce to JAT# 6 Exhibit E − Defendants' First Set of Requests for

Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 7 of 18

04/20/2007 04/24/2007 04/30/2007 04/30/2007
05/01/2007
05/03/2007 05/07/2007 05/08/2007
05/08/2007
05/09/2007 05/09/2007
05/10/2007

Admissions to Plaintiffs# 7 Exhibit F − First Interrogs. to JAT# 8 Exhibit G − First Request to Produce to Body of Christ Christian Center# 9 Exhibit H − First Interrogs. to Body of Christ Christian Cente# 10 Exhibit I − First Interrogs. to Samaritan Baptist Church# 11 Exhibit J − First Request to Produce to Samaritan Baptist Church# 12 Exhibit K − First Request to Produce of Pleasant Hill Baptist Church# 13 Exhibit L − First Interrogs. to Pleasant Hill Baptist Church# 14 Exhibit M − First Interrogs. to 3M Contracting# 15 Exhibit N − Plaintiff's Responses to Defs.' First Set of Requests for Admissions) (Collins, Jeffrey) Modified on 4/24/2007 (Hacker, L.). (Entered: 04/20/2007)
40 MOTION to Compel and to Deem Admitted Defendants' Requests for Admissions and Supporting Brief by all defendants. (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
41 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Mona K Majzoub: 39 MOTION to Compel and to Deem Admitted Defendants' Requests for Admissions to Plaintiffs filed by National City Corporation, National City Bank of the Midwest. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 04/24/2007)
42 NOTICE by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church (Rose, David) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
43 MOTION to Compel Discovery by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits List# 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B# 4 Exhibit C# 5 Exhibit D# 6 Exhibit E# 7 Exhibit F# 8 Exhibit G.1# 9 Exhibit G.2# 10 Exhibit H# 11 Exhibit I.1# 12 Exhibit I.2# 13 Exhibit I.3# 14 Exhibit I.4# 15 Exhibit I.5) (Rose, David) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
44 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Mona K Majzoub: 43 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by 3M Contracting, Incorporated, JAT, Incorporated, Samaritan Baptist Church, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Body of Christ Christian Center, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
45 RESPONSE to 40 MOTION to Compel and to Deem Admitted Defendants' Requests for Admissions and Supporting Brief, 39 MOTION to Compel and to Deem Admitted Defendants' Requests for Admissions to Plaintiffs Opposition filed by all plaintiffs. (Rose, David) (Entered: 05/03/2007)
46 Plaintiffs' WITNESS LIST by JAT, et al (Runyan, John) (Entered: 05/07/2007)
47 NOTICE of hearing on 39 MOTION to Compel and to Deem Admitted Defendants' Requests for Admissions to Plaintiffs and 43 MOTION to Compel Discovery. Resolved/Unresolved Issues due by 6/13/2007 and Motion Hearing set for 6/18/2007 @ 01:30 PM before Honorable Mona K Majzoub (LBar) (Entered: 05/08/2007)
48 [FILING ERROR:RULE 18, NO INDEX, OR LABELING] MOTION to Quash or Modify Defendants' Subpoenas Duces Tecum by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum Points and Authorities# 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B# 4 Exhibit C# 5 Exhibit D# 6 Exhibit E# 7 Exhibit F) (Rose, David) Modified on 5/8/2007 (Hamel, D.). (Entered: 05/08/2007)
49 Motion To Quash Subpoena Exhibit List by JAT, et al. (Rose, David) (Entered: 05/09/2007)
50 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Mona K Majzoub: 48 MOTION to Quash or Modify Defendants' Subpoenas Duces Tecum filed by 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Samaritan Baptist Church, JAT, et al, New Galilee Missionary Baptist Church, JAT, Incorporated, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Body of Christ Christian Center, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church, Phillip Peake. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 05/09/2007)
51 MOTION to Strike 38 MOTION to Certify Class by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit 1 − Dec of Pastor Jackson# 3 Exhibit 2 − Dec of Pastor Tate# 4 Exhibit 3 − Dec of Pastor Starghill# 5 Exhibit 4 − Dec of Malik Salaam# 6 Exhibit 5 − Dec of John Turner# 7 Exhibit 6 − Decl of Phillip Peake# 8

Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 8 of 18

05/10/2007
05/10/2007 05/15/2007
05/17/2007 05/17/2007
05/21/2007 05/21/2007 05/23/2007 05/24/2007 05/24/2007 05/25/2007 05/25/2007

Exhibit 7 − Case of Tseng vs. Home Depot USA# 9 Exhibit 8 − Pltfs. Response to Defs. 1st Request for Admissions# 10 Exhibit 9 − Plaintiffs' Answers to Defs. 1st Interrogs.# 11 Exhibit 10 − Correspondence to Attorney David Rose# 12 Exhibit 11 − Email from Phillip Peake# 13 Exhibit 12 − Excerpts of Dep Trans of Don Narup# 14 Exhibit 13 − Email from Josh Rose) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/10/2007)
52 RESPONSE to 38 MOTION to Certify Class Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit 2 − Defs. Object and Answers to Pltfs. 1st Set of Interrogs.# 3 Exhibit 3 − Summary of Deposits# 4 Exhibit 4 − SBA 7(a) Guaranteed Loans# 5 Exhibit 5 − Case of GMC v. Dex−Cool Products) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/10/2007)
53 EXHIBIT 1A − Pltfs.' Answers to Defs. 1st Interrogatories re 52 Response to Motion, by all defendants (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1B − Pltfs.' Answers to Defs. 1st Interrogs.) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/10/2007)
54 AMENDED NOTICE of hearing on 39 MOTION to Compel and to Deem Admitted Defendants' Requests for Admissions, 48 MOTION to Quash or Modify Defendants' Subpoenas and 43 MOTION to Compel Discovery. Resolved/Unresolved Issues due by 6/20/2007. Motion Hearing set for 6/27/2007 @ 01:30 PM before Honorable Mona K Majzoub (LBar) (Entered: 05/15/2007)
55 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 45 Response to Motion, 40 MOTION to Compel and to Deem Admitted Defendants' Requests for Admissions and Supporting Brief Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel and to Deem Admitted filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit 1− Excerpts of Dep of Don Narup) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
56 RESPONSE to 43 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit 1 − Email Dated April 11, 2007# 3 Exhibit 2 − Plaintiffs' Answers to Defs. First Set of Interrogs.# 4 Exhibit 3 − Plaintiffs' Response to Defs. First Set of Request to Admit# 5 Exhibit 4 − Letter Dated February 1, 2007# 6 Exhibit 5 − Email from Josh Rose Dated April 13, 2007# 7 Exhibit 6 − Excerpts of Dep of Don Narup) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
57 NOTICE of hearing on 38 MOTION to Certify Class, 51 MOTION to Strike 38 MOTION to Certify Class MOTION to Strike 38 MOTION to Certify Class MOTION to Strike 38 MOTION to Certify Class. Motion Hearing set for 6/27/2007 02:00 PM before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 05/21/2007)
58 (FILING ERROR − EXHIBITS NOT PROPERLY LABELED) REPLY to Response re 38 MOTION to Certify Class filed by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit # 3 Exhibit # 4 Exhibit # 5 Exhibit) (Rose, David) Modified on 5/22/2007 (Paul, P.). (Entered: 05/21/2007)
59 (EXHIBIT LIST) Supplemental Reply Brief Exhibit List by JAT, et al. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Supp Exh 1# 2 Exhibit Supp Exh 4# 3 Exhibit Exh 5) (Rose, David) Modified on 5/24/2007 (Paul, P.). (Entered: 05/23/2007)
60 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct 30 Scheduling Order, by all parties. (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/24/2007)
61 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation re 60 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct 30 Scheduling Order, (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/24/2007)
62 RESPONSE to 51 MOTION to Strike 38 MOTION to Certify Class MOTION to Strike 38 MOTION to Certify Class MOTION to Strike 38 MOTION to Certify Class filed by JAT, Incorporated. (Rose, David) (Entered: 05/25/2007)
63 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 56 Response to Motion, to Compel Discovery filed by JAT, et al. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits# 2 Exhibit 1A−Detroit Loan Applications# 3 Exhibit 1B−Detroit Loan Applications) (Rose,

Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 9 of 18

05/29/2007 05/30/2007 05/31/2007 05/31/2007 06/07/2007 06/12/2007
06/13/2007 06/20/2007
06/22/2007 06/22/2007 06/27/2007
06/27/2007

David) (Entered: 05/25/2007)
64 RESPONSE to 48 MOTION to Quash or Modify Defendants' Subpoenas Duces Tecum filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit 1 − Westlaw Citation# 3 Exhibit 2 − Emails from Chad Schiefelbein# 4 Exhibit 3 − Emails from Josh Rose) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/29/2007)
Set Deadline as to 60 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct 30 Scheduling Order,. Motion Hearing set for 6/27/2007 02:00 PM before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds (CHem) (Entered: 05/30/2007)
65 Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Discovery Supplemental Exhibit List by JAT, et al. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1) (Rose, David) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
66 Memo in Opposition to Deft Motion to Strike Declarations Exhibit List by JAT, et al. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Exe Dec Starghill# 2 Exhibit Exe Dec Tate) (Rose, David) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
67 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 64 Response to Motion, to Quash or Modify Subpoenas Duces Tecum filed by JAT, Incorporated. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits# 2 Exhibit A − May 10, 2007 Email) (Rose, David) (Entered: 06/07/2007)
68 MOTION to Strike Plaintiffs' Reply, Supplemental Rreply, and Four New Declarations Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit 1 − Excerpts of Deposition of Don Narup# 3 Exhibit 2 − Email from Josh Rose to Don Narup# 4 Exhibit 3 − Correspondence from Charles Odgers to David Rose# 5 Exhibit 4 − Copy of CAP's Website Page) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/12/2007)
Set Deadline as to 68 MOTION to Strike Plaintiffs' Reply, Supplemental Rreply, and Four New Declarations Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. Motion Hearing set for 6/27/2007 02:00 PM before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds (CHem) (Entered: 06/13/2007)
69 JOINT STATUS REPORT on Resolved and Unresolved Issues by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation, JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church (Rose, David) (Entered: 06/20/2007)
70 RESPONSE to 68 MOTION to Strike Plaintiffs' Reply, Supplemental Rreply, and Four New Declarations Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification filed by all plaintiffs. (Rose, David) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
71 DECLARATION by Pastor Lawrence J. London re 38 MOTION to Certify Class filed by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church (Rose, David) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
Minute Entry −Motion Hearing held on 6/27/2007 re 48 MOTION to Quash or Modify Defendants' Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 43 MOTION to Compel Discovery and 39 MOTION to Compel and to Deem Admitted Defendants' Requests for Admissions to Plaintiffs − before Honorable Mona K Majzoub. (Tape #MKM 07−029) (LBar) (Entered: 06/27/2007)
Minute Entry −Motion Hearing held on 6/27/2007 re 38 MOTION to Certify Class filed by 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Samaritan Baptist Church, New Galilee Missionary Baptist Church, JAT, Incorporated, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Body of Christ Christian Center, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church, Phillip Peake, 68 MOTION to Strike Plaintiffs' Reply, Supplemental Rreply, and Four New Declarations Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification filed by National City Corporation, National City Bank of the Midwest, 51 MOTION to Strike 38 MOTION to Certify Class MOTION to Strike 38 MOTION to Certify Class MOTION to Strike 38 MOTION to Certify Class filed by National City Corporation, National City Bank of the Midwest before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (Court Reporter Suzanne Jacques) (CHem) (Entered: 07/09/2007)

Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 10 of 18

06/29/2007 07/05/2007 07/09/2007 07/09/2007 07/19/2007
07/24/2007
07/25/2007 07/25/2007 07/31/2007
07/31/2007 08/01/2007 08/01/2007

72 ORDER finding as moot 39 Motion to Compel; denying 43 Motion to Compel; finding as moot 48 Motion to Quash− Signed by Honorable Mona K Majzoub. (LBar) (Entered: 06/29/2007)
73 DECLARATION by Philip Peake re 38 MOTION to Certify Class filed by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church (Rose, David) Additional attachment(s) added on 8/7/2007 (Greer, A.). (Entered: 07/05/2007)
74 ORDER denying 38 Motion to Certify Class; denying as moot 51 Motion to Strike and 68 Motion to Strike. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 07/09/2007)
75 STIPULATION AND ORDER Amending Scheduling Order: Discovery Cut off set for 9/1/2007; Dispositive Motion Cut−off set for 12/7/2007,Trailing Trial Docket set for 3/4/2008, Final Pretrial Conference set for 2/19/2008 02:00 PM before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds (see order for additional dates) Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 07/09/2007)
76 [EXHIBIT B STRICKEN 8/2/07] MOTION for Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, to Re−File For Class Certification at the Close of Discovery by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit A − June 20, 2007 Email# 3 Exhibit B − Philip Peake Declaration) (Rose, David) Modified on 8/2/2007 (Hacker, L.). (Entered: 07/19/2007)
77 ERRATA Sheet re: 76 MOTION for Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, to Re−File For Class Certification at the Close of Discovery filed by 3M Contracting, Incorporated, JAT, Incorporated, Samaritan Baptist Church, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Body of Christ Christian Center, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. by JAT, Incorporated, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church (Rose, David) (Entered: 07/24/2007)
78 MOTION to Strike the Declaration of Phillip Peake by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit A − Excerpts of Deposition of Phillip Peake) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 07/25/2007)
79 MOTION for Leave to File Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Response Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider# 2 Index of Exhibits) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 07/25/2007)
TEXT ONLY ORDER re 78 MOTION to Strike the Declaration of Phillip Peake Defendants shall file a Supplemental Brief to their Motion to Strike on the issue of whether Defendants complied with the Stipulated Protective Order 37 , particularly whether such allegedly confidential information was marked as "CONFIDENTIAL" prior to its delivery to Plaintiffs in accordance with the Stipulated Protective Order, in particular, Paragraph 4. Due by 8/1/2007. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 07/31/2007)
80 ORDER denying 76 Motion for Reconsideration ; denying as moot 79 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 07/31/2007)
81 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 78 MOTION to Strike the Declaration of Phillip Peake filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit 1 − Email Between Schiefelbein and Gassner# 3 Exhibit 2 − Defs.' Objections and Responses to 1st Request for Production) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/01/2007)
82 INDEX of Exhibits re 81 Supplemental Brief, by all defendants CORRECTED (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Defendants' Objections and Responses to Requests for Production# 2 Exhibit 2 − Emails between Schiefelbein and Gassner) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/01/2007)

Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 11 of 18

08/01/2007 08/02/2007 08/02/2007 08/02/2007 08/02/2007 08/02/2007 08/02/2007 08/02/2007 08/02/2007 08/02/2007 08/02/2007 08/02/2007 08/07/2007
08/31/2007 08/31/2007
09/05/2007
09/06/2007 09/06/2007 09/06/2007 09/06/2007

83 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation re 82 Exhibit Index, (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/01/2007)
84 ORDER granting 78 Motion to Strike the Declaration of Phillip Peake. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (LHac) (Entered: 08/02/2007)
85 Sealed Matter − NC001609 through NC001611 (KWil) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
86 Sealed Matter − NC001343 through NC001372 (KWil) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
87 Sealed Matter − SBA Credit Services New Loan Underwriting 1/1/02−12/31/02. (KWil) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
88 Sealed Matter − SBA Credit Services New Loan Underwriting 1/1/05−12/31/05. (KWil) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
89 Sealed Matter − Enlargement of NC 001343 (KWil) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
90 Sealed Matter − Small Business Loans Booked Since 1/1/02 in the City Of Detroit. (KWil) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
91 Sealed Matter − National City Small Business SBSS Scorecard Validation as of 12/31/06. (KWil) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
92 Sealed Matter − SBA Credit Services New Loan Underwriting from 1/1/03 thru 12/31/03. (KWil) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
93 Sealed Matter − SBA Credit Services New Loan Underwriting from 1/1/04 thru 12/31//04. (KWil) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
94 Sealed Matter − SBA Credit Services New Loan Underwiting from 1/1/06 thru 12/31/06. (KWil) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
95 Stipulated ORDER to Remove Image Containing Confidential Information from Electronic Case Filing System re 73 Declaration filed by 3M Contracting, Incorporated, JAT, Incorporated, Samaritan Baptist Church, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Body of Christ Christian Center, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (AGre) (Entered: 08/07/2007)
96 MOTION for Leave to File to Contact Detroit Loan Applicants by JAT, Incorporated. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum In Support# 2 Exhibit A) (Rose, David) (Entered: 08/31/2007)
97 [RULE 18 VIOLATION] MOTION for Leave to File to Take 4 Additional Depositions and Extend Discovery by all plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support# 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B) (Rose, David) Modified on 9/4/2007 (Hacker, L.). (Entered: 08/31/2007)
98 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Mona K Majzoub: 96 MOTION for Leave to File to Contact Detroit Loan Applicants filed by JAT, Incorporated, 97 MOTION for Leave to File to Take 4 Additional Depositions and Extend Discovery filed by 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Samaritan Baptist Church, New Galilee Missionary Baptist Church, JAT, Incorporated, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Body of Christ Christian Center, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church, Phillip Peake. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 09/05/2007)
99 ORDER Set Motion Deadlines as to 96 MOTION for Leave to Contact Detroit Loan Applicants: Responses due by 9/17/2007 − Signed by Honorable Mona K Majzoub. (LBar) (Entered: 09/06/2007)
Set Deadlines as to 96 MOTION for Leave to Contact Detroit Loan Applicants. Responses due by 9/17/2007 (LBar) (Entered: 09/06/2007)
100 ORDER Set Motion Deadlines as to 97 MOTION for Leave to File to Take Four Additional Depositions and Extend Discovery: Responses due by 9/17/2007 − Signed by Honorable Mona K Majzoub. (LBar) (Entered: 09/06/2007)
Set Deadlines as to 97 MOTION for Leave to File to Take Four Additional Depositions and Extend Discovery. Responses due by 9/17/2007 (LBar) (Entered:

Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 12 of 18

09/07/2007 09/10/2007 09/17/2007 09/17/2007 09/18/2007 09/18/2007
09/19/2007

09/06/2007)
101 ORDER Referring Pretrial Matters− Settlement Conference− to Magistrate Judge Virginia M Morgan. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 09/07/2007)
102 NOTICE of Appearance by Yuval Rubinstein on behalf of JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. (Rubinstein, Yuval) (Entered: 09/10/2007)
103 RESPONSE to 97 MOTION for Leave to File to Take 4 Additional Depositions and Extend Discovery filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit 1 − Excepts from Dep of Michael Harrity# 3 Exhibit 2 − Excerpts from Dep of William Collon# 4 Exhibit 3 − Email Dated August 20, 2007# 5 Exhibit 4 − Email dated August 22, 2007) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 09/17/2007)
104 RESPONSE to 96 MOTION for Leave to File to Contact Detroit Loan Applicants filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit 1 − Press Release) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 09/17/2007)
105 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Settlement Conference set for 10/1/2007 10:00 AM before Honorable Virginia M Morgan (BRad, ) (Entered: 09/18/2007)
106 REPLY to Response re 97 MOTION for Leave to File to Take 4 Additional Depositions and Extend Discovery filed by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit A− Declaration of Joshua N. Rose# 3 Exhibit B − Feb. to Sept. 2007 Chronology# 4 Exhibit B−1 − Plaintiffs' First Requests For Production of Documents# 5 Exhibit B−2 − March 16 and March 23 Email Correspondence Between Chad Schiefelbein and Henry Gassner# 6 Exhibit B−3 − April 11, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 7 Exhibit B−4 − April 11, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 8 Exhibit B−5 − May 4, 2007 Email Correspondence Between Josh Rose and Chad Schiefelbein# 9 Exhibit B−6 − May 6, 2007 Email from Chad Schiefelbein to Josh Rose# 10 Exhibit B−7 − May 7, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 11 Exhibit B−8 − May 8, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 12 Exhibit B−9 9 May 9, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 13 Exhibit B−10 May 10, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 14 Exhibit B−11 − May 15−17 Email Correspondence Between Josh Rose and Chad Schiefelbein# 15 Exhibit B−12 − May 21, 2007 Email form Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 16 Exhibit B−13 − May 22, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 17 Exhibit B−14 − May 22, 2007 Email Correspondence Between Yuval Rubinstein and Chad Schiefelbein# 18 Exhibit B−15 − June 1, 2007 Email Correspondence Between Yuval Rubinstein and Chad Schiefelbein# 19 Exhibit B−16 − June 12, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 20 Exhibit B−17 − −June 13, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 21 Exhibit B−18 − June 14, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 22 Exhibit B−19 − July 9, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 23 Exhibit B−20 − July 9, 2007 Email from Chad Schiefelbein to Josh Rose# 24 Exhibit B−21 − July 20, 2007 Email from Yuval Rubinstein to Chad Schiefelbein# 25 Exhibit B−22 − August 13, 2007 Email from Yuval Rubinstein to Chad Schiefelbein# 26 Exhibit B−23 − August 28, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 27 Exhibit B−24 − August 31, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 28 Exhibit B−25 − September 5, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 29 Exhibit B−26 − September 6, 2007 Email Correspondence Between Josh Rose and Chad Schiefelbein# 30 Exhibit B−27 − September 6, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 31 Exhibit B−28 − September 18, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein) (Rubinstein, Yuval) (Entered: 09/18/2007)
107 REPLY to Response re 96 MOTION for Leave to File to Contact Detroit Loan Applicants filed by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. (Rubinstein, Yuval) (Entered: 09/19/2007)

Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 13 of 18

09/25/2007
09/28/2007 10/01/2007 10/03/2007 10/04/2007 10/04/2007 10/11/2007 10/12/2007 10/15/2007
10/18/2007 10/18/2007 10/22/2007

108 Second MOTION to Compel Discovery by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit A− Plaintiffs' First Requests for Production of Documents# 3 Exhibit B − Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories# 4 Exhibit C − August 28, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein# 5 Exhibit D − August 29, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein and Diane Kehl, and Notices of Deposition for Rob Rowe and Keith Weitz# 6 Exhibit E − September 18, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein and Diane Kehl# 7 Exhibit F − Sample PROCLOG# 8 Exhibit G − Plaintiffs' Third Set of Requests for Production of Documents and Things# 9 Exhibit H − September 20, 2007 Email from Josh Rose to Chad Schiefelbein and Diane Kehl) (Rubinstein, Yuval) (Entered: 09/25/2007)
109 ORDER denying 96 Motion for Leave to Contact Detroit Loan Applicants and Granting 97 Motion for Leave to Take Four Additional Depositions − Signed by Honorable Mona K Majzoub. (LBar) (Entered: 09/28/2007)
Minute Entry −Settlement Conference held on 10/1/2007 before Honorable Virginia M Morgan. Disposition: Case did not settle. (JJoh) (Entered: 10/01/2007)
110 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Mona K Majzoub: 108 Second MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by 3M Contracting, Incorporated, JAT, Incorporated, Samaritan Baptist Church, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Body of Christ Christian Center, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 10/03/2007)
111 NOTICE of hearing on 108 Second MOTION to Compel Discovery. Responses due by 10/11/2007, Resolved/Unresolved Issues due by 11/1/2007, Motion Hearing set for 11/7/2007 @ 02:00 PM before Honorable Mona K Majzoub. (LBar) (Entered: 10/04/2007)
Set Deadlines as to 108 Second MOTION to Compel Discovery. Responses due by 10/11/2007, Resolved/Unresolved Issues due by 11/1/2007 and Motion Hearing set for 11/7/2007 @ 02:00 PM before Honorable Mona K Majzoub (LBar) (Entered: 10/04/2007)
112 RESPONSE to 108 Second MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by all defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit 1 − WestLaw Cases# 3 Exhibit 2 − Objections to 1st Set of Requests to Produce# 4 Exhibit 3 − Objections to 1st Interrogatories# 5 Exhibit 4 − Objections to 3rd Requests to Produce) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/11/2007)
113 MOTION for Leave to File to Extend the Deadline for Plaintiffs' Expert Reports by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − October 10, 2007 Letter of Chad Schiefelbein) (Rubinstein, Yuval) (Entered: 10/12/2007)
114 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Mona K Majzoub: 113 MOTION for Leave to File to Extend the Deadline for Plaintiffs' Expert Reports filed by 3M Contracting, Incorporated, JAT, Incorporated, Samaritan Baptist Church, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Body of Christ Christian Center, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 10/15/2007)
115 ORDER re 113 MOTION for Leave to File to Extend the Deadline for Plaintiffs' Expert Reports: Responses due by 10/26/2007 − Signed by Honorable Mona K Majzoub. (LBar) (Entered: 10/18/2007)
Set Deadlines as to 113 MOTION for Leave to File to Extend the Deadline for Plaintiffs' Expert Reports. Responses due by 10/26/2007 (LBar) (Entered: 10/18/2007)
116 REPLY to Response re 108 Second MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits # 2 Exhibit A − July 26, 2007 Notice of Deposition for Cynthia Smith# 3 Exhibit B − July 26, 2007 Notice of Deposition

Case: 2:06-cv-11937-NGE-MKM As of: 06/21/2012 02:48 PM EDT 14 of 18

10/26/2007 11/01/2007 11/07/2007 11/08/2007 11/28/2007 11/29/2007 01/03/2008 01/07/2008 01/16/2008 01/16/2008 03/04/2008
03/19/2008
03/26/2008

for Michael Bickers) (Rubinstein, Yuval) (Entered: 10/22/2007)
117 RESPONSE to 113 MOTION for Leave to File to Extend the Deadline for Plaintiffs' Expert Reports and Brief in Opposition filed by all defendants. (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/26/2007)
118 STATEMENT of Resolved and Unresolved Issues by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation, JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church (Rubinstein, Yuval) (Entered: 11/01/2007)
Minute Entry −Motion Hearing held on 11/7/2007 re 113 MOTION for Leave to File to Extend the Deadline for Plaintiffs' Expert Reports and 108 Second MOTION to Compel Discovery − before Honorable Mona K Majzoub. Disposition: Taken Under Advisement (Tape #MKM 07−064) (LBar) (Entered: 11/07/2007)
119 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 108 Motion to Compel and granting 113 Motion to Extend Deadline for Plaintiffs' Expert Reports − Signed by Honorable Mona K Majzoub. (LBar) (Entered: 11/08/2007)
120 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael G. Cleveland on behalf of National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation. (Cleveland, Michael) (Entered: 11/28/2007)
121 STIPULATED ORDER MODIFYING SCHEDULING ORDER: Final Pretrial Conference set for 4/16/2008 02:00 PM before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds,Dispositive Motion Cut−off set for 2/7/2008,Trailing Trial Docket set for 5/1/2008 Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (Refer to image for additional dates) (CHem) (Entered: 11/29/2007)
122 Joint MOTION TO EXTEND All Remaining Dates in the Scheduling Order by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation, JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church, Phillip Peake. (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 01/03/2008)
123 Notice of Failure to Comply with ECF Policies and Procedures as to attorney Yuval Rubinstein. (DHam) (Entered: 01/07/2008)
124 ORDER granting 122 Motion to Extend Dates. Signed by Honorable Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 01/16/2008)
Set Deadlines/Hearings:Defendants' Rebuttal Report due 3/12/2008; Dispositive Motion Cut−off set for 4/11/2008, Final Pretrial Conference set for 8/26/2008 02:00 PM before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds, Jury Trial set for 9/9/2008 09:00 AM before Honorable Nancy G Edmunds (CHem) (Entered: 01/16/2008)
125 MOTION to Strike /Bar Testimony of Phillip Peake by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Email dated 5/8/07 and Subpoena for Dep of Peake, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Email dated 5/11/07, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Email dated 5/17/07, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Email dated 8/28/07, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Email dated 10/19/07, # 7 Exhibit 6 − Email dated 11/19/07, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Email dated 12/18/07, # 9 Exhibit 8 − Email dated 2/14/08, # 10 Exhibit 9 − WestLaw Case − Northbrook v Pine Top) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 03/04/2008)
126 RESPONSE to 125 MOTION to Strike /Bar Testimony of Phillip Peake filed by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − July 12, 2006 Deposition of Phillip Peake − Pages On and Off Record, # 3 Exhibit B − Exhibit List for July 12, 2006 Deposition of Phillip Peake, # 4 Exhibit C − December 18, 2007 Email) (Rubinstein, Yuval) (Entered: 03/19/2008)
127 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Mona K Majzoub: 125 MOTION to Strike /Bar Testimony of Phillip Peake filed by National City

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Corporation, National City Bank of the Midwest. Signed by District Judge Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 03/26/2008)
128 NOTICE of hearing on 125 MOTION to Strike /Bar Testimony of Phillip Peake. JOINT Resolved/Unresolved Issues due by 4/3/2008 Motion Hearing set for 4/10/2008 @02:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Mona K Majzoub. (LBar) (Entered: 03/31/2008)
129 REPLY to Response re 125 MOTION to Strike /Bar Testimony of Phillip Peake filed by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − Peake's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 03/31/2008)
130 STATEMENT of Resolved and Unresolved Issues by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation, JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 04/04/2008)
Minute Entry −Motion Hearing held on 4/10/2008 re 125 MOTION to Strike /Bar Testimony of Phillip Peake − before Magistrate Judge Mona K Majzoub. (Tape #MKM 04/10/08) (LBar) (Entered: 04/10/2008)
131 MOTION for Summary Judgment by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − Excerpts of 3M Contracting, # 3 Exhibit B − Excerpts of Body of Christ Christian Center, # 4 Exhibit C − Excerpts of Vince Jackson, # 5 Exhibit D − Excerpts of Good Fight Faith Ministry, # 6 Exhibit E − Excerpts of Pleasant Hill Missionary, # 7 Exhibit I − SBA 7(a) Guaranteed Loans, # 8 Exhibit J − FDIC Deposit Market Share Reports, # 9 Exhibit K − Exceripts of Dr. Adrian Lottie, # 10 Exhibit F − Excerpts of JAT, Inc., # 11 Exhibit G − Excerpts of Samaritan Missionary, # 12 Exhibit L − West Law Case Anderson v. Frye, # 13 Exhibit M − Statement of Jeffrey A. Brown, Ph.D.) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 04/11/2008)
132 EXHIBIT H − Declaration of Nathaniel Mosley, III re 131 MOTION for Summary Judgment by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 04/11/2008)
133 ERRATA Sheet re: 131 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by National City Corporation, National City Bank of the Midwest. by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − Table of Contents, pages 13 and 14 of Brief) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 04/14/2008)
134 NOTICE of hearing on 131 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Motion Hearing set for 6/4/2008 02:00 AM before District Judge Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 04/18/2008)
135 ORDER granting in part 125 Motion to Bar the Testimony of Phillip Peake − Signed by Magistrate Judge Mona K Majzoub. (LBar) (Entered: 04/22/2008)
136 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. (Rubinstein, Yuval) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
137 RESPONSE to 131 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Filed Under Seal, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Expert Report of Dr. Adrian J. Lottie, # 3 Document Continuation of Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2 − Supplemental Declaration of Dr. Adrian J. Lottie, # 5 Exhibit 3 − Excerpts From Deposition Transcript of Jeffrey Corrigan, # 6 Exhibit 4 − Metro Market Delivery Review, # 7 Document Continuation of Exhibit 4, # 8 Document Continuation of Exhibit 4, # 9 Document Continuation of Exhibit 4, # 10 Document Continuation of Exhibit 4, # 11 Exhibit 5 − Excerpts From the Deposition Transcript of Bethany Rivera, # 12 Exhibit 6 −Excerpts From the Deposition Transcript of Mary Kay Schneider, # 13 Exhibit 7 − Nov. 11, 2002 Lender/Servicer Agreement, # 14

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05/06/2008
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Exhibit 8 − First Independence Bank January 1999 CAP Report, # 15 Exhibit 9 − Excerpts From the Deposition Transcript of Michael Bickers, # 16 Exhibit September 25, 2007 Email, # 17 Exhibit 11 − Excerpts From the Deposition Transcript of Scott Wolffis, # 18 Exhibit 12 − Excerpts From the Deposition Transcript of Pastor Karlan Jackson, # 19 Exhibit 13 − Jan. 27, 2006 Loan Package Cover Letter, # 20 Exhibit 14 − February 14, 2006 Loan Application of Good Fight of Faith, # 21 Exhibit 15 − Romeo, MI 2000 U.S. Census Fact Sheet, # 22 Exhibit 16 − Filed Under Seal, # 23 Exhibit 17 − Troy, MI 2000 U.S. Census Fact Sheet, # 24 Exhibit 18 − Filed Under Seal, # 25 Exhibit Excerpts From the Deposition Transcript of Pastor Kenneth Tate, # 26 Exhibit Sept. 6, 2004 Proposal Letter, # 27 Exhibit 21− Oct. 21, 2004 Body of Christ Application, # 28 Exhibit 22 − Excerpts From the Deposition Transcript of Cynthia Smith, # 29 Exhibit 23 − Excerpts From the Deposition Transcript of Anthony Davis, # 30 Exhibit 24 − Jan. 11, 2005 Body of Christ Loan Package Cover Letter, # 31 Exhibit 25 − St. Claire Shores 2000 U.S. Census Fact Sheet, # 32 Exhibit 26 − Filed Under Seal, # 33 Exhibit 27 − Excerpts From the Deposition Transcript of Pastor Robert Starghill, # 34 Exhibit 28 − Declaration of Pastor Robert Starghill, # 35 Exhibit 29 − Columbus Township 2000 U.S. Census Fact Sheet, # 36 Exhibit 30 − Filed Under Seal, # 37 Exhibit 31 − Excerpts From the Deposition Transcript of Malik Salaam, # 38 Exhibit 32 − March 16, 2004 3M Contracting Application, # 39 Exhibit 33 − Wyandotte, MI 2000 U.S. Census Fact Sheet, # 40 Exhibit 34 − Filed Under Seal, # 41 Exhibit 35 − Excerpts From the Deposition Transcript of John Turner, # 42 Exhibit 36 − Filed Under Seal, # 43 Exhibit 37 − Filed Under Seal, # 44 Exhibit 38 − Excerpts From the Deposition Transcript of Michael Harrity, # 45 Exhibit 39 − JAT Relook Request Form, # 46 Exhibit 40 − South Lyon, MI 2000 U.S. Census Fact Sheet, # 47 Exhibit 41 − Filed Under Seal, # 48 Exhibit 42 − Excerpts From the Deposition Transcript of Vince Jackson, # 49 Exhibit 43 − Excerpt From the Deposition Transcript of Rev. Terry White, # 50 Exhibit Filed Under Seal, # 51 Exhibit 45 − Filed Under Seal, # 52 Exhibit 46 − Sept. 22, 2005 Letter, # 53 Exhibit 47 − Filed Under Seal, # 54 Exhibit 48 − Excerpt From the Deposition Transcript of Robert Rowe, # 55 Exhibit 49 − SBA Lending in Michigan 2002−06, # 56 Exhibit 50 − Excerpt From the Deposition Transcript of David Morrison, # 57 Exhibit 51 − Excerpt From the Deposition Transcript of David Fynn, # 58 Exhibit 52 − Miller v. Americor Lending Group, Inc., 2007 WL 107664 (W.D.Mich., Jan. 9, 2007), # 59 Exhibit 53 − Jefferson v. Briner Inc., 2006 WL 1720692 (E.D.Va., Jun. 21, 2006), # 60 Exhibit 54 − National City Nonprofit Guidelines, # 61 Exhibit 55 − Filed Under Seal, # 62 Exhibit 56 − Excerpt From the Deposition Transcript of Scott Burns, # 63 Exhibit 57 − Oct. 19, 2004 Memo, # 64 Exhibit 58 − Beverly Hills, MI 2000 U.S. Census Fact Sheet) (Rubinstein, Yuval) (Entered: 05/05/2008)
138 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
139 Plaintiffs' Exhibit List Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
140 Plaintiffs' EXHIBIT 18 Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
141 Plaintiffs' EXHIBIT 26 Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
142 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16 Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
143 Plaintiffs' EXHIBIT 30 Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
144 Plaintiffs' EXHIBIT 34 Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
145 Plaintiffs' EXHIBIT 36 Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
146 Plaintiffs' EXHIBIT 37 Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
147 Plaintiffs' EXHIBIT 41 Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/07/2008)
148 Plaintiffs' EXHIBIT 44 Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/07/2008)
149 Plaintiffs' EXHIBIT 45 Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/07/2008)
150 Plaintiffs' EXHIBIT 47 Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/07/2008)

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151 Plaintiffs' EXHIBIT 55 Filed Under Seal (JCre) (Entered: 05/07/2008)
TEXT ONLY ORDER granting in part and denying in part 136 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages; brief shall not exceed 25 pages; Document #137 is STRICKEN only with respect to response brief; all attachments and exhibits are not stricken and do not need to be re−filed when response brief is re−filed. Signed by District Judge Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 05/08/2008)
152 RESPONSE to 131 MOTION for Summary Judgment Re−Filed Pursuant to May 8, 2008 Order filed by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. (Rubinstein, Yuval) (Entered: 05/09/2008)
153 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to 131 MOTION for Summary Judgment [FILED UNDER SEAL]. (DEld) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
154 ERRATA Sheet re: 152 Response to Motion, filed by 3M Contracting, Incorporated, JAT, Incorporated, Samaritan Baptist Church, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Body of Christ Christian Center, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church (Rubinstein, Yuval) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
155 REPLY to Response re 131 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − Community Reinvestment Act Performance Evaluation, # 3 Exhibit B − Excerpts of Dep of Dr. Adrian Lottie) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
156 MOTION to Strike 155 Reply to Response to Motion, Exhibit A of Defendants' Summary Judgment Reply Brief by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − Witherow v. Crawford, 2006 WL 2987917 (D.Nev., Oct. 27, 2006), # 3 Exhibit B − Birmingham, MI 2000 U.S. Census Data) (Rubinstein, Yuval) (Entered: 05/22/2008)
157 RESPONSE to 156 MOTION to Strike 155 Reply to Response to Motion, Exhibit A of Defendants' Summary Judgment Reply Brief MOTION to Strike 155 Reply to Response to Motion, Exhibit A of Defendants' Summary Judgment Reply Brief filed by National City Bank of the Midwest, National City Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Excerpts of dep testimony of William A. Collon with dep exhibit) (Collins, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/30/2008)
158 ORDER denying 156 Motion to Strike. Signed by District Judge Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 06/03/2008)
Minute Entry −Motion Hearing held on 6/4/2008 re 131 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by National City Corporation, National City Bank of the Midwest before District Judge Nancy G Edmunds. (Court Reporter Suzanne Jacques) (CHem) (Entered: 06/05/2008)
159 ORDER granting 131 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 06/10/2008)
160 JUDGMENT Signed by District Judge Nancy G Edmunds. (CHem) (Entered: 06/10/2008)
161 TRANSCRIPT of Motion for Summary Judgment held on 6/4/208. (Court Reporter: Suzanne Jacques) (Number of Pages: 35) (Jacques, S.) (Entered: 06/12/2008)
162 NOTICE OF APPEAL by JAT, Incorporated, Body of Christ Christian Center, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Samaritan Baptist Church, New Galilee Missionary Baptist Church, 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church, Phillip Peake re 159 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. (Runyan, John) (Entered: 06/23/2008)

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163 Certificate of Service re 162 Notice of Appeal,. (DHam) (Entered: 06/23/2008)
164 Appeal Fee received for 162 Notice of Appeal, filed by 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Samaritan Baptist Church, New Galilee Missionary Baptist Church, JAT, Incorporated, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Body of Christ Christian Center, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church, Phillip Peake in the amount of $ 455.00 − Receipt No. 571872. (DEld) (Entered: 06/24/2008)
165 ORDER from U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit dismissing 162 Notice of Appeal, filed by 3M Contracting, Incorporated, Samaritan Baptist Church, New Galilee Missionary Baptist Church, JAT, Incorporated, Good Fight of Faith Ministry, Body of Christ Christian Center, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church, Phillip Peake [Appeal Case Number 08−1848] (ATee) (Entered: 12/21/2008)