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states but would not be accepted in South Carolina (e.g., marriages of first cousins or a young partner) are routinely accepted in South Carolina if those marriages are legal in the jurisdiction where they are celebrated. This recognition of opposite-sex marriages but rejection of same-sex marriages that do not meet the South Carolina criteria for marriage violates the rights secured to the Plaintiffs by the United States Constitution.
3. The State of South Carolina's exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage adversely impacts the Plaintiffs and same-sex couples across South Carolina by excluding them from the many legal protections available to spouses: For example, when one partner dies, the surviving partner may face serious financial hardship, including the loss of her home, because she is denied the inheritance tax exemption provided to widows. Lesbian and gay police officers, firefighters and other first responders are denied the peace of mind of knowing that if they make the ultimate sacrifice, their partner will be taken care of through the financial support available to help those who lost their spouses in service to the community. Because of South Carolina's refusal to allow or recognize their marriages, same-sex couples are also denied many federal protections afforded to married couples such as the ability to take time off work to care for a sick spouse under the Family Medical Leave Act and access to a spouse's social security retirement benefits.
4. The exclusion from marriage undermines the Plaintiff couple's ability to achieve their life goals and dreams, threatens their mutual economic stability, and denies them "a dignity and status of immense import." United States v. Windsor, supra, 133 S. Ct. at 2681. Moreover, they and their children are stigmatized and relegated to a
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second class status by being barred from marriage. The exclusion "tells [same-sex couples and all the world that their relationships are unworthy" of recognition, id. at 2223, and it "humiliates the ... children now being raised by same- sex couples" and "makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives." /d., 133 S.Ct. at 2694.
5. South Carolina's exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage infringes on the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This discriminatory treatment is subject to heightened scrutiny because it burdens the fundamental right to marry and because it discriminates based on sex and sexual orientation. It cannot stand under any level of scrutiny because the exclusion does not rationally further any legitimate government interest. It serves only to disparage and injure lesbian and gay couples and their families. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (holding that a statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the "right of privacy" guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Plaintiffs bring this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek: (a) a declaration that the State of South Carolina's prohibition of marriage for same-sex couples and its refusal to recognize marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into outside of the State of South Carolina violate the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (b) a
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permanent injunction directing Defendants to recognize the marriages of the Plaintiff couple and same-sex couples validly entered into outside of South Carolina.
7. There is no adequate remedy at law. The Plaintiffs are suffering irreparable injury. There is no harm to the state or local governments by granting an injunction and prohibiting enforcement of the challenged statute and South Carolina Constitution. The harm to the Plaintiffs is severe. The public interest is clearly served by this Court acting to order recognition 'in South Carolina of same-sex marriages celebrated in other jurisdictions consistent with the manner in which South Carolina treats similarly situated opposite-sex couples. Only prompt action by this Court ordering declaratory and injunctive relief will serve the public interest.
II. PARTIES 8. The Plaintiff Katherine Bradacs is a citizen and resident of the State of South Carolina, County of Lexington. 9. The Plaintiff Tracie Goodwin is a citizen and resident of the State of South Carolina, County of Lexington. 10. The Plaintiffs were lawfully married in the District of Columbia on April 6, 2012 (Exhibit 1-Marriage License from the District of Columbia). 11. The Defendant Nikki Haley is the Governor of the State of South Carolina. In her official capacity, she is the Chief Executive Officer of the State and is, pursuant to Article IV, Section 15 of the South Carolina Constitution, responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the State of South Carolina, including the laws that exclude same-sex couples from marrying or having their marriages recognized.
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12. The Defendant Alan Wilson is the Attorney General of the State of South Carolina. He is sued in his official capacity pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 1 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina.
Ill. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 13. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3) and (4), because the suit raises federal questions under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 14. Venue is proper in the District of South Carolina under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) because Defendants Haley and Wilson reside in this District.
W. FACTUALBACKGROUND 15. South Carolina's Marriage Laws, Title 20, Chapter 1, Article 1, governs marriages in South Carolina. In 1996, the Marriage Law was amended to expressly prohibit marriage for same-sex couples, and to prevent the recognition of valid samesex marriages contracted elsewhere. S.C. Code § 20-1-15, "Prohibition of same sex marriage," provides, "A marriage between persons of the same sex is void ab initio and against the public policy of this State." As a result, by declaring that a marriage between persons of the same sex is both (a) void ab initio and (b) against the public policy of this State, marriage is legally available only to opposite-sex couples. Same-sex couples may not marry in South Carolina, and if they are married elsewhere, their marriages are not recognized in South Carolina. 16. The South Carolina Constitution was amended in 2007 to expressly prohibit marriage for same-sex couples, and to prevent the recognition of valid samesex marriages contracted elsewhere. S.C. Const. Art. XVII, § 15, provides: "A marriage
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between one man and one woman is the only lawful domestic union that shall be valid or recognized in this State. This State and its political subdivisions shall not create a legal status, right, or claim respecting any other domestic union, however denominated. This State and its political subdivisions shall not recognize or give effect to a legal status, right, or claim created by another jurisdiction respecting any other domestic union, however denominated. Nothing in this section shall impair any right or benefit extended by the State or its political subdivisions other than a right or benefit arising from a domestic union that is not valid or recognized in this State. This section shall not prohibit or limit parties, other than the State or its political subdivisions, from entering into contracts or other legal instruments." As a result, marriage is legally available only to opposite-sex couples. Same-sex couples may not marry in South Carolina, and if they are married elsewhere, their marriages are not recognized in South Carolina.
V. DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW 17. The Supreme Court has called marriage "the most important relation in life," Zablocki u. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted), and an "expression[] of emotional support and public commitment." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987). It is "a far-reaching legal acknowledgement of the intimate relationship between two people...." United States v. Windsor, supra, 133 S.Ct. at 2692. This is as true for same-sex couples as it is for opposite-sex couples. 18. Same-sex couples such as the Plaintiff couple are identical to oppositesex couples in all of the characteristics relevant to marriage.
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19. By refusing to recognize their marriages from others states, South Carolina law deprives them of numerous legal protections that are available to oppositesex couples. More than 1,000 federal benefits, privileges, and responsibilities are impacted by marital status. Numerous South Carolina benefits are also impacted by

marital status. By way of example only:

A.

A married person is exempt from tax on property left to him by an

opposite-sex spouse, including the spouse's share of the couple's home, and,

thus, protected against economic distress or loss of a home because of an estate

tax bill. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-6-1630, 12-37-220, 12-37-265 (2007 & Cum.

Supp.) A same-sex surviving spouse or partner is denied this exemption.

B. A widow or widower of an opposite-sex spouse is entitled to 50% to

100% of his or her deceased spouse's estate if the spouse died without a will

depending upon whether there are issue of the opposite couple. S.C. Code Ann.

§ 62-2-102 (1986 & Cum. Supp.). A same-sex surviving spouse or partner in this

situation receives nothing in this scenario.

C. A widow or widower of an opposite-sex spouse is entitled to claim

an elective share of the net probate estate of the deceased spouse even if the

deceased spouse did not nominate the surviving spouse as a beneficiary under

his or her will. S.C Code Ann §62-2-201. A same sex surviving spouse or

partner in this situation receives nothing.

D. If an opposite-sex spouse becomes incapacitated, her spouse is

automatically authorized to make decisions regarding her care. S.C. Code Ann.

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§ 62-5-301 (b) (1986 & Cum. Supp.). This protection does not extend to a same-

sex spouse or partner under this scenario.

E. Under the workers' compensation laws, the opposite-sex spouse of

someone who dies or is injured in the workplace is entitled to damages and may bring suit. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 42-9-110, 42-9-290, and 42-9-320 (1976 & Cum.

Supp.). Same-sex spouses or partners have no legal standing to sue over their

spouse or partner's workplace injury.

F. South Carolina requires opposite-sex spouses to support one

another financially. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-3-130 and 20-3-140 (1979 & Cum.

Supp.) . There is no support obligation for same-sex spouses or partners.

G. South Carolina laws promote the stability of marriages through

rules such as mandatory waiting periods prior to divorce by mutual consent. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-3-10 (2), (5) and 20-3-80 (1979 & Cum. Supp.). The divorce

laws, including these provisions, do not apply to same-sex spouses or partners.

H. Opposite-sex widows and widowers of military personnel and

veterans are eligible for numerous assistance programs 10 U.S.C.A. §1408; 10

U.S.C.A. §1450; 38 U.S.C.A. §1 01. These programs are not available to same-

sex surviving spouses or partners of military personnel and veterans.

I.

Opposite-sex widows and widowers of public employees in the

South Carolina are eligible to receive various pensions and survivor benefits

upon their spouse's death. S.C. Code Ann. §9-8-11 0 ; S.C Code Ann. §9-11-140;

S.C. Code Ann. §12-37-220(receipt of police officer spouse's pension by

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surviving spouse); (tax exemption of public employee spouse's retirement allowance); (lifetime survivor benefits for spouse of retired pensioner); (receipt of fireman's pension by surviving spouse);(exemption from ad valorem taxation for surviving spouse of permanently and totally disabled law enforcement officer, firefighter, or veteran). These benefits are not provided to surviving same-sex spouses or partners of public employees.
J. Opposite-sex public employees in the State of South Carolina are eligible to nominate and receive health insurance coverage for their spouse. S.C. Code Ann. §38-71-170. These benefits are not provided to same-sex spouses or partners of public employees.
K. Opposite-sex widows and widowers of firefighters, police officers, and other first responders killed in the line of duty are provided financial assistance. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-11-730(A)(5), (8)(5) (2008) (spouse of person covered by state health plans who is killed in the line of duty is eligible for continued coverage under the plans); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-220(8) (1)(b), (e)(iii) (1976 & Cum. Supp.) (providing exemption for ad valorem taxes on a house owned by a qualified surviving spouse of a law enforcement officer or firefighter who died in the line of duty); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-6-100 (1997) (providing the SC Highway Patrol Division shall transfer the service sidearm of an active duty state trooper killed in the line of duty to that trooper's surviving spouse upon request at no charge once the sidearm is rendered permanently inoperable). This assistance is not provided to same-sex surviving spouses or partners of first responders.
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L. Property tax exemptions are available under South Carolina law to certain people age 65 or over who are widows and widowers of opposite-sex spouses. S.C. Code Ann. §12-37-250 (1976). They are not available to same-sex surviving spouses or partners.
M. Opposite-sex spouses are eligible for a "two wage earner" credit for state tax purposes under certain circumstances. S.C. Code Ann. §12-6-3330 (1995 & Cum. Supp.) Same-sex married couples would not be eligible under any circumstances for the state tax credit. 20. In this case and by way of example, Plaintiff Bradacs is a public employee. Because her marriage to Plaintiff Goodwin is not recognized in the State of South Carolina, she cannot nominate her spouse, nor her biological children, on her health insurance policy through the State of South Carolina just as opposite-sex couples whose marriage is recognized in the State of South Carolina can. 21. Plaintiff Goodwin is 80% disabled from the United States Air Force and receives disability from the Veterans Administration. If her marriage to Plaintiff Bradacs was recognized in the State of South Carolina, not only could Plaintiff Bradacs be entitled to make a claim as a surviving beneficiary on Plaintiff Goodwin's VA benefits, but Plaintiff Goodwin would be entitled to receive more in disability from the VA if her marriage to Plaintiff Bradacs was recognized in the State of South Carolina. Plaintiffs Bradacs and Goodwin cannot claim being married as a standard exemption on their federal tax returns while residing in the State of South Carolina because their marriage
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is not recognized, among many of the other federal benefits they each would be entitled to if their marriage was recognized in South Carolina.
22. The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage also denies them eligibility for numerous federal protections afforded to married couples including in the areas of immigration and citizenship, taxes, and social security. Some of the federal protections for married couples are only available to couples if their marriages are legally recognized in the state in which they live. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (marriage for eligibility for social security benefits based on law of state where couple resides at time of application); 29 C.F.R. § 825.122(b) (same for Family Medical Leave Act). Thus, Plaintiffs, though legally married, cannot access such federal protections as long as South Carolina refuses to recognize their existing marriage.
23. Although the Plaintiff couple is in a long-term committed relationship, this couple and other same-sex couples are denied the stabilizing effects of marriage, which helps keep couples together during times of crisis or conflict.
24. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage also harms couples and their children by denying them the social recognition that comes with marriage. Marriage has profound social significance both for the couple that gets married and the family, friends and community that surround them. The terms "married" and "spouse" have universally understood meanings that command respect for a couple's relationship and the commitment they have made. VI. EXCLUDING SAME-SEX COUPLES FROM MARRIAGE IS NOT RATIONALLY
RELATED TO A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST, AND IS NOT ABLE TO WITHSTAND HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY.
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25. The prohibition against marriage for same-sex couples in South Carolina and the prohibition against recognition of marriage validly contracted outside South is not closely tailored to serve an important government interest or substantially related to an exceedingly persuasive justification. The prohibition fails any level of constitutional scrutiny. It is not rationally related to any legitimate justifications that were offered in support of it when the Marriage Law was amended in 1996 or when the Constitution was amended in 2007. None of the justifications offered in support of these measures, or any other justification that might now be offered, passes constitutional muster.
26. Neither tradition nor moral disapproval of same-sex relationships or marriage for lesbian and gay couples is a legitimate basis for unequal treatment of same-sex couples under the law. The fact that a discriminatory law is longstanding does not immunize it from constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has made clear that the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give effect to private biases and has expressly rejected moral disapproval of marriage for same-sex couples as a legitimate basis for discriminatory treatment of lesbian and gay couples. United States v. Windsor, supra, 133 S.Ct. at 2693 (an "interest in protecting traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws" was not a legitimate justification for federal Defense of Marriage Act).
VII. CLAIMS FIRST CLAIM: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, DUE PROCESS UNDER
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 27. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
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28. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes any State from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Canst. amend. XIV, § 1. Governmental interference with a fundamental right may be sustained only upon a showing that the legislation is closely tailored to serve an important governmental interest.
29. The Supreme Court has long recognized that marriage is a fundamental right and that choices about marriage, like choices about other aspects of family, are a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
30. South Carolina law denies the Plaintiff couple and other same-sex couples this fundamental right by denying them access to the state-recognized institution of marriage and refusing to recognize the marriages they entered into in other states and foreign countries where such marriages are legal.
31. South Carolina can demonstrate no important interest to justify denying the Plaintiff couple this fundamental right. Indeed, it cannot demonstrate that the denial is tailored to any legitimate interest at all.
32. South Carolina's prohibition of marriage between persons of the same sex and its refusal to recognize marriages entered into by same-sex couples in other jurisdictions violates the Due Process Clause.
33. Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiff of rights secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
SECOND CLAIM: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
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34. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
35. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "no State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Canst. amend. XIV.
36. By denying the Plaintiff couple and other lesbian and gay couples the ability to marry and to have their out-of-state marriages recognized, South Carolina, through Defendants, disadvantages lesbian and gay people on the basis of their sexual orientation. It denies them significant legal protections. It "degrade[s] [and] demean[s]" them by "instruct[ing] ... all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children," that their relationship is "less worthy" than the relationships of others. United States v. Windsor, supra, 133 S.Ct. at 2696.
37. Same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples are similarly situated for purposes of marriage.
38. Classifications based on sexual orientation demand heightened scrutiny. 39. South Carolina's prohibition of marriage for same-sex couples and its refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples entered into elsewhere violates the Equal Protection Clause. 40. Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiffs of rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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THIRD CLAIM: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ON THE BASIS OF SEX 41. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 42. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "no State shall ...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'.' U.S. Canst. amend. XIV,§ 1. 43. S.C. Canst. Art. XVII, § 15, provides: "A marriage between one man and one woman is the only lawful domestic union that shall be valid or recognized in this State." 44. By defining marriage in this way, South Carolina discriminates on the basis of sex. 45. The Supreme Court has made clear that perpetuation of traditional gender roles is not a legitimate government interest. Given that there are no longer legal distinctions between the duties of husbands and wives, there is no basis for the sexbased eligibility requirements for marriage. 46. Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiffs of rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
FOURTH CLAIM: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, BY FAILING TO HONOR THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE 47. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
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48. Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
49. 28 USC § 1738 reads: "The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto. The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form. Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."
50. State law prohibits marriage between persons of the same sex, and marriage between a man and a woman is the only marriage the State will recognize.
51. By prohibiting the Courts and officials of the State of South Carolina from recognizing marriage contracted in another state, the State is violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.
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52. Defendants, acting under color of state law, by refusing to honor the Full Faith and Credit Clause, are depriving Plaintiffs of rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
VIII. PRAYERS FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Court: A. To issue a declaratory judgment that the statute and South Carolina constitutional provision at issue in this case, as applied to Plaintiffs, violate the constitutional and statutory rights of Plaintiffs; B. To ssue a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants and all those acting in concert prohibiting enforcement of the laws, as applied, at issue in this action, enjoining these Defendants from denying the Plaintiff couple and all other same-sex couples the right to marry, and directing the Defendants to recognize marriages validly entered into by the Plaintiff couple and other same-sex couples outside the State of South Carolina; C. To award to Plaintiffs reasonable costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees; and D. To award such other and further relief as this Court shall deem just and reasonable.
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Respectfully submitted,
!Sf Carrie A. Warner Carrie A. Warner Federal ID Number 11106
Warner, Payne & Black, LLP
1531 Blanding Street Post Office Box 2628 Columbia, South Carolina 29201 (803) 799-0554 Facsimile: (803) 799-2517 carriewarner@wpb-law. net
John S. Nichols FederaiiD Number 11598 Bluestein, Nichols, Thompson & Delgado, LLC 1614 Taylor Street Post Office Box 7965 Columbia, South Carolina 29202 (803) 779-7599 Facsimile: (803) 771-8097 jsnichols@bntdlaw.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
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 3:13-cv-02351-JMC Date Filed 11/10/14 Entry Number 89 Page 1 of 21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Katherine Bradacs and Tracie Goodwin, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

Nimrata (“Nikki”) Randhawa Haley, in her )

official capacity as Governor of South

)

Carolina; Alan M. Wilson, in his official )

Capacity as Attorney General,

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 3:13-cv-02351-JMC ORDER AND OPINION

Plaintiffs Katherine Bradacs (“Bradacs”) and Tracie Goodwin (“Goodwin”) (collectively

“Plaintiffs”) filed this civil rights action pursu ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 s eeking “to challenge the

constitutionality of South Carolin a’s laws and constitu tional provisions th at deny lega l

recognition in South Carolina to the marriages of same-sex couples who are married in one of the

many states and numerous foreign countries where same-sex marriages are legal.” (ECF No. 41

at 1 ¶ 1 (citing S.C. Const. Art. XVII, § 15; S.C. Code § 20-1-15 (1976)).)

This matter is bef ore the court purs uant to a Motion by Defendants Nim rata Randhawa

Haley (“Defendant Haley”), in her official capacity as Governor of South Carolina; and Alan M.

Wilson (“Def endant W ilson”), in his of ficial capac ity a s Attorn ey General, ( collectively

“Defendants”) for Judgm ent on the Pleadings pursua nt to F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). (E CF No. 78.)

Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ Motion asserting that they have failed to establish that they are

entitled to judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). (E CF No. 82.) For the reasons set f orth below,

the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion for Judgm ent on

the Pleadings.

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I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND TO THE PENDING MOTION

Plaintiffs, who are both fe male, we re m arried in the District of Columbia on April 6,

2012. (ECF No. 41-1.) Despite that their ma rriage is legally recognized by the federal

government pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor,

___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), Plaintiffs’ m arriage is not recognized in the State of South

Carolina. As a result, Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other

Relief on August 28, 2013, seeking relief for claim s based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of

due process, claims based on 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of equal protection under the United

States Constitution on the basis of sexual orientat ion and on the basis of s ex, and claim s based

on 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of due proce ss and equal protection by failing to honor the

Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, all in v iolation of th e Fourteenth

Amendment to the United Sta tes Constitution . (ECF No. 1.) Pla intiffs seek a declar atory

judgment that the South Carolina statutes

and constitutional prov isions disallowing the

recognition of their same-sex m arriage violate their rights to due process and equal protection

under the laws, a prelim inary and permanent injunction against Defendants and others enforcing

the app lication of thes e allegedly illeg al laws and directing the State of South Carolina to

recognize Plaintiffs’ marriage and those m arriages validly entered into by other sam e-sex

couples outside of the State of South Carolina. (Id.)

Defendants filed their A nswer on N ovember 14, 2013. (EC F No. 29.) In their Answer,

Defendants deny that Plaintiffs’ suit has any legal merit or that Plaintiffs are entitled to any relief

or that sam e-sex marriage is a f undamental right. Defendants furthe r assert that Plaintiffs lack

standing to raise any claim s on behalf of the mselves or as to other same-sex couples, that the

State of South Carolina is not required to give recognition of sa me-sex m arriages from othe r

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jurisdictions and that such recognition would be contrary to the Tenth Am endment and the

sovereign interests of the State, and that Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Am endment

Immunity. (Id.)

On January 23, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Mo tion to Am end the Co mplaint to add an

additional cause of action regard ing due proce ss and equal protection under the C onstitution of

South Carolina. (ECF No. 37.) In their Ve

rified Am ended Complaint for Declaratory,

Injunctive, and Other Relief, Plai ntiffs also requested th at th e court enjoin Defendants from

denying Plaintiffs and all othe r sam e-sex couples the right to m arry. (ECF No. 37-1.)

Defendants consented to the m otion. (ECF No. 38.) Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed Verified

Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief on Febr uary 21, 2014. (ECF

No. 41.) Defendants filed an Answer to th e Amended Complaint on March 14, 2014, asserting

essentially the same or similar defenses as s tated in the Ans wer to the o riginal Complaint. (ECF

No. 45.)

On April 3, 2014, Defendants filed a Motion to Stay and Hold Cross-Motions Deadline in

Abeyance in which they requested that the court stay the proceedings in this case until the United

States Court of Appeals for the F ourth Circuit issued its final opinion in the appea l of the same-

sex marriage decision of the United States District Court for the Eas tern District of Virginia in

Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014). (E CF No. 47.) The court

granted Defendants’ Motion to Stay on April 22, 2014. (ECF No. 54.) The Fourth Circuit issued

its ruling in the Bostic case on July 28, 2014. Bo stic v. Schaeffer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014).

Thereafter, on October 6, 2014, the United States Suprem e Court denied certiorari in the

companion matters of Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 286 (2014), Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308

(2014), and McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 314 ( 2014). By denying certiorari in these cases, the

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Supreme Court, in effect, did not overturn the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit in B ostic v. Schaefer, 760 F .3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014). In Bostic, the Fourt h

Circuit held that m arriage laws prohibiting le gal recognition of sam e-sex relationships in

Virginia “violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to

the extent that they prevent sam e-sex coupl es from m arrying and prohibit Virginia from

recognizing same-sex couples’ lawful out-of-stat e marriages.” Id. at 384. On October 7, 2014,

the court sua sponte lifted the stay in this ca se and directed the parties to subm it a proposed

Amended Scheduling O rder and/or Briefing Sche dule to the court by October 15, 2014. (ECF

No. 70.) The parties consented to a Scheduli ng Order which required that the dispositive

motions in this case be filed by October 23, 2014, w ith responses and replies to follow thereafter

in acco rdance with the schedu ling order. (ECF No. 71.)

.

On October 20, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting that the

court declar e as unconstitu tional the South Carolin a statutes and constitu tional provisions

precluding persons from entering same-sex marriages or having their out-of-state valid sam e-sex

marriages recognized in South Carolina and enter judgment in their favor. (ECF No. 75.) On

October 23, 2014, Defe ndants filed a Motion for J udgment on the Pleadings arguing that this

action is barred by federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, and that Plaintiffs lack standing to

sue Defendants. (ECF No. 78.) On October 31, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to

Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, to which Defendants filed a reply in support

of their motion on November 4, 2014. (ECF Nos. 82, 85.)

Although Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Su mmary Judgment first in this case, the court

finds it m ore prudent to rule first on Defenda nts’ Motion f or Judgment on the Pleadings since

such a motion is based solely on the pleadings.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings1
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party m ay m ove for judgm ent on the pleadings.” Id. “A fairly restrictive standard” is applied in ruling on a Rule 12(c) m otion, as “hasty or im prudent use of this summary procedure by the courts violates the policy in f avor of ensuring to ea ch litigant a full and fair hearing on the m erits of hi s or her cl aim or defens e.” Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Garrell, Civil Action No. 4:11–cv–02743–RBH, 2013 WL 869602, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2013) (quoting 5C Charles A. W right and Arthur R. Mille r, Federal P ractice and Pro cedure § 13 68 (3d ed. 2011)). A motion for judgm ent on the pleadings is intended to test the le gal sufficiency of the complaint and will operate to dispose of claims “where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the m erits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noted facts.” Cont’l Cleaning Serv. v. U PS, No. 1:98CV1056, 1999 W L 1939249, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 13, 1999) (citing Herbert A bstract v. Touchstone P rops., Inc., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990)). “[ A] m otion for judgm ent on the pleadi ngs is decided under the sam e standard as a m otion to dism iss under Rule 12(b)(6).” 2 Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. IRS,
1 Notably, Defendants did not discuss the legal st andard relevant to th e adjudication of the Motion for Judgm ent on the Pleadings. The prope r legal standard inf orms the sc ope of the analysis relating to the is sue before the court. Thus, the court defines the legal standard for this motion without input from the moving party. 2 “The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint; “importantly, [a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion] does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the m erits of a claim , or the applicability of defenses.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) ). “The Rule 12(b)(6) motion also must be distinguished fr om a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which goes to the m erits of the claim and is designed to test whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.” Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Ohio Valley Health Servs. and Educ. Corp., C/A No. 5:10CV67, 2010 WL 4977987, at *4 (N.D. W . Va. Dec. 2, 2010) (citing 5B Charles A. W right and Arthur R. Mille r, Federal P ractice and Pro cedure § 13 56 (3d ed.
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361 F. App’x 527, 529 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Indepe ndence News, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 568 F.3d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 2009)); see also Masse y v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 353 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999)); W alker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 2009).
The key difference between a Rule 12(b)(6 ) motion and a Rule 12(c) motion is “that on a 12(c) motion, the court is to consider the answer as well as the com plaint.”3 Fitchett v. Cnty. of Horry, S.C., C/A No. 4:10-cv-1648-TLW-TER, 2011 WL 4435756, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 10, 2011) (quoting Cont’l Cleaning Serv., 1999 WL 1939249, at *1); see also A.S. Abell Co. v. Balt. Typographical Union No. 12, 338 F.2d 190, 193 (4th Cir. 1964). “ When considering a m otion for judgment on the pleadings, the court m ay consider the pleadings, exhib its attached thereto, documents ref erred to in the com plaint tha t ar e cen tral to the p laintiff's claim s, and other ‘materials in addition to the com plaint if such m aterials are public re cords or are otherwise appropriate for the taking of judi cial notice. ’” In re MI W indows & Doors, Inc. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2333, Nos. 2:12-mn-00001, 2:12- cv-02269-DCN, 2013 W L 3207423, at *2 (D.S.C. June 24, 2013) (citation s omitted); cf. Philips v. Pitt Cnty. M em’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (“In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6 ) dism issal, we m ay properly take judicial notice of m atters of public record. We m ay also consider documents attached to the com plaint,
1998)). Because such a m otion is intended to test the legal adequacy of the complaint, not to address the m erits of any affirm ative defenses, a defense m ay ge nerally be raised under Rule 12(b)(6) “only if it clearly appears on the face of the complaint.” Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 229 (4th Cir. 1997). Otherwise, affirmative defenses are “more properly reserved for consideration on a motion for summ ary judgm ent.” Id. In considering the foregoing, the court only addresses in this order the defenses cited by Defendants in their Answer to the Am ended Com plaint tha t a re applicable to th e cou rt’s analy sis at th is sta ge of the proceedings. 3 The factual allegations of the answer are taken as true, to the extent “they have not been denied or do not conflict with the complaint.” Fitchett, 2011 WL 4435756, at *3 (citing Pledger v. N.C. Dep’t of He alth & Human Servs., 7 F. Supp. 2d 705, 707 ( E.D.N.C. 1998); Jadoff v. Gleason, 140 F.R.D. 330, 331 (M.D.N.C. 1991)).
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as well as those attached to the m otion to dism iss, so long as they are integral to the com plaint and authentic.”) (citations omitted).
In order to survive a motion for judgm ent on the pleadings, the complaint must contain sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “state a claim to relief that is p lausible on its f ace.” Bell Atl. Corp. v . Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has f acial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content th at allows th e court to dra w th e reaso nable inference that th e defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing T wombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing the com plaint, the co urt accepts all well-plead ed allegations as true and construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Venkatram an v. REI S ys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005). However, the court is no t required to accept th e legal con clusions the p laintiff sets forth in the com plaint. Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244. “W hen there are we ll-pleaded factual alle gations, a court should assume their verac ity a nd then dete rmine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlem ent to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. A well-p leaded complaint may proceed even if it app ears “that a recovery is very rem ote and unlikely.” Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). B. Standing
Article III of the Constitution cons trains federal courts to r esolve only a ctual cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Because of this constitutional limitation, plaintiffs must dem onstrate they have standing to adjudicate th eir claim in federal courts. 4 Steel Co. v.
4 Because questions of standing are jurisdiction al in nature, they m ay be raised at an y time by a party or sua sponte by the court. Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 n.6 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that issues regarding subject-matter jurisdiction “may be raised at any time by either party or sua
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Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 ( 1998). Therefore, to establish standing, the plaintiffs must show: (1) that they “suffered an ‘injury in fact’–an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’”; (2) “a cau sal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of – the injury has to be ‘f airly . . . trac e[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of som e third party not before the c ourt’”; and (3) that it is “‘likely’, as opposed to m erely ‘speculative’, that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Lujan v. Defende rs of W ildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal citations omitted). “ The plaintiff bears the burden of esta blishing injury, tracea bility, and redressab ility because it is the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Friends for Ferrell Park way, LLC v. Stasko, 282 F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2002). “Each elem ent must be supported in the sa me way as any other m atter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the m anner and degree of evidence requ ired at the su ccessive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. These requirem ents help to prevent federal c ourts from issuing opin ions on abstract or hypothetical questions, or from giving advisory opinions. S ee Fed. Election Comm ’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (noting th at federal courts should decide concrete, living contests between adversaries rather than abstract problems). Thus, at th e pleading stage in the litigation, the facts as alleged in the pleadings must indicate that Plaintiffs have standing in this action.
sponte by this court”); Center S tate Farms v. Ca mpbell Soup Co., 58 F.3d 1030, 1038 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Because objections to standing are jurisdic tional in nature, they m ay be raised at any time, . . . even if raised for the first time on appeal . . . .”) (interna l citations omitted). “A court does not have subject m atter jurisdiction over an individual who does not have standing.” AtlantiGas Corp. v. Colum bia Gas Transm ission Corp., 210 F. App’x 244, 247 (4th Cir. 2006). Thus, before reaching Defenda nts’ Motion for Judgm ent on the P leadings, the court m ust examine whether Plaintiffs have standing in this action.
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C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity The Eleventh Am endment to the United St ates Constitution provide s: “The jud icial
power of the United States sha ll n ot be construed to ex tend to any suit in la w or equity , commenced or pros ecuted agains t o ne of the U nited States by citizen s of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Though not explicitly stated in the language of the amendm ent, courts have long held that this guarantee also protects a state from federal suits brought by its own citizens, not only from suits by citizens of other states. Hans. v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney , 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990). “The ultimate guarantee of the Elev enth Amendment is that non-consenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.” Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). The phrase “against one of the Un ited States” has long been interpreted to include certain s tate agents and stat e instrumentalities such that these may also be immune f rom suit in f ederal court. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe , 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). Sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Am endment “is concerned not only with the States’ ability to withstand suit, bu t with their pr ivilege no t to be sued ” in the f irst instan ce. Alabama v. North Carolina , 560 U.S. 330, 362 ( 2010) (quoting P.R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 n.5 (1993)). A ccordingly, once the defendant raises the jur isdictional is sue of immunity, the court m ust resolve this thr eshold m atter prior to addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. See Steele Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (extensively discussing the importance of establishing proper jurisdiction before considering the merits of a claim).
However, under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), an exception to Eleventh Amendment imm unity exists where in a f ederal court m ay “ issue prospec tive, in junctive re lief
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against a s tate officer to prevent ongoing violations of federal la w, on the rationale that such a

suit is not a suit agains t the state for purposes of the Eleventh Am endment.” McBurney v.

Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159–60). “The

requirement that the violation of federal law be ongoing is satisfied when a state officer’s

enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state la w is threatened, even if the threat is not y et

imminent.” Id. (citing Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmor e, 252 F.3d 316, 330 (4th Cir.

2001)). Moreover, the plaintiff bears the “burd en of showing that h e has standing for each typ e

of relief sought” and, thus, for inj unctive relief he m ust allege that “he is under threat of

suffering “injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized; the th reat m ust be actual and

imminent, not conjectu ral or hypoth etical; it m ust be fairly traceable to the challenged action of

the defendant; and it m ust be likely that a favorab le judicial decision will prevent or redress the

injury.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citing Friends of Earth, Inc. v.

Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)).

The Ex parte Young exception is directed at “o fficers of the state, [who] are clothed with

some duty in regard to the enforcement of the la ws of the state, and wh o threaten and are abou t

to commence proceedings . . . to en force against parties affected [by] an unconstitutional act.”

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155–56. Thus, a defe ndant must have “som e connection with the

enforcement of the act” or “special relation” to the challenged state action in order to properly be

a party to the suit. Lytle v. Griffith, 240 F .3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ex parte Young,

209 U.S. at 157); McBurney, 616 F.3d at 399.

This requirem ent of “proxim ity to and

responsibility for the challenged state action,” S.C. W ildlife Fed’n v. Lim ehouse, 549 F.3d 324,

333 (4th Cir. 2008), is not m et when an official merely possesses “[g]eneral authority to enforce

the laws of the state.” Gilm ore, 252 F.3d at 331 (citatio n om itted). “T his ‘special relatio n’

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requirement ensures that the approp riate party is before the federal court, so as no t to inte rfere with the lawful discretion of state official s.” Lim ehouse, 549 F.3d at 332–33 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 158–59).
III. ANALYSIS A. Plaintiffs’ Standing to Challenge the Provisions at Issue
The court’s standing analysis begins with the alleg ations in Pla intiffs’ Am ended Complaint. Plaintiffs are both fem ale citizens of the State of South Carolina. (ECF No. 41 at 4 ¶¶ 8, 9.) Bradacs “is a public em ployee” and Goodwin is “80% disab led from the United States Air Force and receives disability from the Vetera n’s Administration.” (Id. at 10 ¶¶ 20, 21. ) Plaintiffs were legally married as a same-sex couple in the District of Columbia on April 6, 2012, and this sam e-sex m arriage is legally recognized by the District of Co lumbia and the United States Government. (Id. at 1 ¶ 2; see also EC F No. 41-1.) As a result of the decision by the State of South Carolina to not recognize their sam e-sex m arriage, Plaintiffs allege that (1) Bradacs cannot nom inate either Goodwin or their biol ogical children on her health insurance policy; (2) Bradacs cannot m ake a claim as a surviving beneficiary on Goodwin’s Veteran’s Administration (“VA”) benefits; (3) Goodwin recei ves less disability in come from the VA; and (4) they can not claim being m arried as a standard exem ption on their federal tax retu rns.5 (Id.) Plaintiffs also alleg e th at South Carolina ’s ac tions deprive them of “the stabilizing effects of marriage, which helps keep couples together during times of crises or conflict.” (Id. at 11 ¶ 23.)
In considering these harm s identified in th e Amended Complaint, and without deciding the relevant issues in the case, the court finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege suffering an injury in f act, which injury is m ade m ore evident by the Fourth Circuit’s controlling statem ents in
5 The court acknowledges that P laintiffs also allege general harm s applicable to all sam e-sex couples.
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Bostic: When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is fo r members of another group, . . . . [t]he “injury in f act” . . . is th e denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier[.] [Second,] [s]tigmatic injury stemming from discrim inatory treatment is suf ficient to satisf y standi ng’s injury requirem ent if the plaintiff identifies “some concrete interest with respect to which [he or she] [is] personally subject to discriminatory treatment” and “[ t]hat interest independently satisf[ies] the causation requirement of standing doctrine.”
Bostic, 760 F.3d at 372 (citations omitted). Additionally, the cour t finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged how their inju ry in
fact is traceable to actions taken at leas t by Defendant W ilson with respect to recognition of same-sex marriages in South Carolina. 6 In the Am ended Com plaint, Plaintif fs allege th at Defendant Wilson “is sued in his official capacity pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 1 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina .” (ECF No. 41 at 5 ¶ 1 2.) Chapte r 7 of Title 1 of the South Carolina Code requires Defendant W ilson to appear “in the trial and argument of all c auses . . . in whic h the State is a party or interested, and in these causes in any other court or tribunal when required by the Governor or either branch of the General Assembly” and “to defend the right of the State” in “all cases wherein the right of the State m ay be involved.” S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-7-40, -710 (2013). In the context of the authority provi ded by South Carolina stat utory law, Defendant Wilson has specifically acted to stop the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples in the wake of the Bostic decision. See State of South Carolina ex rel. W ilson v. Condon, Petition for Original Jurisdiction and Motion for Te mporary Injunction, filed Oct. 8, 2014, available at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/whatsnew/displaywhatsnew.cfm?indexID=980 (last visited Nov. 10, 2014). Therefore, the court finds that Defenda nt W ilson has directly contributed to som e 6 The relationship between Plaintiffs’ injury in f act and the actions of Defendant Haley is m ore tenuous. As discussed m ore fully below, the court finds that Defendant Haley is not an appropriate party in this action and concludes that Plaintiffs ar e unable to m aintain this action against her.
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aspect of Plaintiffs’ injury and/or that at leas t part of their inju ry is trace able to Def endant Wilson. Cf. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 370–71 (“The Plaintiffs’ claims can therefore survive Schaefer’s standing challenge as long as one couple satisfies the standing requirem ents with respect to each defendant.”)
Finally, should Plaintiffs prevail against th ese Defendants, an injunction requiring South Carolina to recognize the m arriage validly entered into by Plaintiffs would redress their injuries by allowing them to gain access to the benefits they are currently denied.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ Amended Com plaint a sserts sufficient facts and claim s to satisfy all three (3 ) components of the Lujan standard. Therefore, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have asserted a legally cognizable injury, redressable by suing these Defendants. Accordingly, P laintiffs have stand ing to bring this action se eking leg al recognition of their same-sex marriage in the State of South Carolina.7 B. Sufficiency of the Allegations in the Amended Complaint
Even assuming all well-pleaded facts in th e com plaint are presum ed to be true, and drawing all reasonab le inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Defe ndants still m aintain that Plaintif fs have not sufficiently pled a constitutional violation. The court disagrees.
Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants alleging that South Ca rolina’s rejection of same-sex marriages, y et recogn ition of opposite sex m arriages, vio lates their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of th e Fourteen th Am endment to the United States Constitution and exclud es them f rom m any legal pro tections and var ious benef its available to opposite sex couples. (ECF No. 41 at 1 ¶ 2, 2 ¶ 3, and 3 ¶ 5).
7 Since Plaintiffs are already m arried and only se ek legal recognition of that marriage in South Carolina, the court does not find that Plaintiffs have suffici ently established standing to seek relief regarding the appl ication and issuance of marriage licenses to sam e-sex couples in South Carolina.
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1. Due Process

In Counts One, Four, and Five of the Am ended Com plaint, Plaintiffs allege that South

Carolina’s exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage denies them due process. (ECF No. 41

at 13–14, 16–18.)

The Due Pr ocess Claus e of the Fourteen th Am endment states th at “No state shall . . .

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property wit hout due process of law.” U.S. Const. am end. XIV, § 1. Due process includes both procedural and substantive com ponents.8 Plaintiffs do not

specify whether they are alleging violation of th eir procedural due proce ss rights or substantive

due process rights. Neverthele ss, they claim that South Caro lina’s failure to reco gnize their

marriage deprives them of a fundamental liberty interest—without due process of law.

Upon review, the court is convinced that at

the pleadings stage, Plaintiffs have

sufficiently alleged the existen ce of a lib erty interest in the right to m arry to su stain a cla im for

violation of due process. Accordingly, the court will allow Plaintiffs to proceed with their claims

alleging violation of due process.

2. Equal Protection

In Counts Two through Five of t he Am ended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that South

8 In order to establish a violation of procedural due process, the plaintiffs m ust show that: (1) they had a liberty or property interest, (2) of which the Governm ent deprived them , (3) without due proces s of law. United States v. Hicks, 4 38 Fed. App’x 216, 21 8 (4th Cir. 2011) (citin g Sunrise Corp. of Myrtle Beach v. City of Myrtle Beach , 420 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2005)) . Procedural due process requires, at a m inimum, fair notice a nd an opportunity to be heard. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “Substantive due process is a far narrower concept than procedural; it is an absolute check on certain governmental actions notwithstanding the fairness of the procedures used to i mplement them.” Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 122 (4th Cir. 19 95) (in ternal citations and quotatio n m arks omitted ). The residu al p rotections of substantive due process “run only to state action so arbitrary and i rrational, so unjustified by any circumstance or gov ernmental inter est, a s to be liter ally incapable of avoidance by any predeprivation procedural protecti ons or of adequate rectifica tion by any post-deprivation state remedies.” Rucker v. Harford Cnty., 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991).
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Carolina’s exclusion of sam e-sex couples from marriage denies them equal protection under the laws. (ECF No. 41 at 14–18.)
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteen th Amendment provides that a state m ay not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To that end, the E qual Protection Clause affords that “all persons sim ilarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Livi ng Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To e stablish a n e qual prot ection vi olation, a pl aintiff m ust first dem onstrate that he or she has been “treated differently from others with who m he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination;” once this showing is made, the cou rt p roceeds to d etermine whether the d isparity in treatm ent can be ju stified under the requisite level of sc rutiny. See Arlington Heights v. Me tro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977) (requiring proof of racially discrim inatory intent or purpose to show an equa l protection violation).
Whether heightened scrutiny applies to Plainti ffs’ particular claim s is subject to debate, given the United States Suprem e Court’s recen t decision in United States v. W indsor, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). In Windsor, the Supreme Court held that denying same-sex couples equal status under the law serves no constitu tionally legitim ate purpose. Id. at 2693–96. However, the Suprem e Court did not definitively state which stan dard of review applies to discriminatory classifications based on sexual orientation. Id. at 2696.
Regardless of whether the applicable standard of review is rational basis or heightened scrutiny, the court finds that the Amended Compla int articulates a viable equal protection claim at the plead ings stage. Accordingly, Plaintiffs shall be allowed to proceed with their claim s alleging violation of equal protection.
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3. Bostic Without ruling on the m erits at this stage, this court finds that the Bostic decision (although brought by couples residing in the State of Virginia) furthe r underscores that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation in their pleading. The Fourth Circuit in Bostic specifically found Virginia’s m arriage laws “vio late[d] the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourte enth Am endment to th e extent that they… prohibit Virginia f rom recognizing sa me-sex couples’ law ful out-of-st ate m arriages.” Bostic, 760 F.3d at 384. The Bostic analysis focuses largely on granting the right to marry a same-sex partner in Virginia, and less on the recognition of a lawful out-of-state same-sex marriage as in the case here. However, it cannot be ignored that the Bost ic decision establishes that, if proven, a failure to recognize a lawful out-of-state same-sex marriage and bestow the rights that go along with it runs contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. C. Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment Immunity Defendants assert that this suit is barred against them under the Eleventh Am endment, as “they lack specific enforcem ent authority re garding S outh Carolina’s sam e-sex m arriage provisions” and thus do not fa ll under the Ex parte Young exce ption. (ECF No. 78-1 at 18.) Indeed, the South Ca rolina Cons titution bes tows a general enforcem ent authority upon Defendants: “The Governor shall take care that th e laws be faithfully executed. To this end, the Attorney General shall assist and represent the G overnor.” S.C. Const. art. IV, § 15. Further, as Defendants point out, the text of S.C. Code § 20 -1-15 (2012) and S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15 do not bestow specific enforcem ent authority on eith er Defendant. Absent m ore than the general authority granted through the South Carolina Constitution, Defendants argue, the Ex parte Young exception does not apply. (ECF No. 78-1 at 20.)
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In Stanley v. Darlington County School Dist., the court found the Governor to be a proper party to a suit involving racial desegregation in schools, as the plaintiffs in that case did “not rely simply upon the Governor’s genera l obligation to enforce the laws of the state, but instead relie[d] upon evidence of discri minatory acts by the Governor ’s pred ecessors as well as a continuing failure to rem edy the effects of the past acts.” 879 F. Supp. 1341, 1362 n.9 (D.S.C. 1995), rev’d in part on other grounds 84 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 1996). However, no such allegations of discriminatory acts by Defendant Haley’s pr edecessors nor of specific failures by Defendant Haley to remedy those acts are present in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.
To establis h a “spec ial re lation” to th e challenged provisions, P laintiffs point to statements by Defendant Haley in news reports to show that she has “publicly claim ed a duty to enforce the current laws.” (ECF No. 82 at 16.) Under Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), a court m ay “judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute becaus e it: (1) is genera lly known within the trial court’s territo rial jurisd iction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy canno t reasonab ly be question ed.” Id. Generally, a news article cannot be judicially noticed for the truth of what is reported, but can be judicially noticed for facts such th at a fact was printed, see Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, 214 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997), or such that a collect ion of numerous articles to s how that a f act was widely known, see In re Cree, Inc. Secs. Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 461, 470 (M.D.N.C. 2004); Caner v. Autry, Case No. 6:14-cv-00004, 2014 WL 2002835, at *3 n.11 (W.D. Va. May 14, 2014). Although the news stories to which Plaintiffs cite quote Defendant Haley’s offi cial spokesman and statements issued by the governor’s office, Pl aintiffs do not offer an official release from the Governor herself, and offer only the two (2) articles.
Regardless, even if this court we re to take notice of the artic les as showing the
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Governor’s stance on th e laws at is sue was well es tablished within the terr itorial ju risdiction, these statements do no t establish more than a ge neral authority. The statem ents note Defendant Haley is “duty bound to support our law” and that sh e “remains resolute in her support of South Carolina’s constitution and state’s rights and this lawsuit doesn’t change that.” These statements are simply not enough. As the Fourth Circuit stated in W aste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gil more in finding suit against the Governor of Virginia was barred by the Elev enth Amendment in that action, “The fact that [the Governor] has publicly endorsed and defended th e challenged statutes does not alter our analysis. The purpose of allo wing suit a gainst sta te of ficials to enjoin their enforcement of an unconstitutional statute is not aided by enjoining the a ctions of a state official now directly involved in enforcing the subject statute.” 252 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2001). Thus, Defendant Haley does not fall under the Ex parte Young exception and suit against her to challenge the laws at issue is barred under the Eleventh Amendment.
Defendant W ilson, however, is not shielded by the Eleventh Am endment in this case. Beyond the state constitutional duty to assist th e Governor in faithfully executing the laws of South Carolina, state statutes outline a m ore active ro le f or the Attorney Gene ral in the enforcement of state law s and interests: “He shall appear for the State in the Suprem e Court and the court of appeals in the tr ial and argument of all causes, crim inal and civil, in which the State is a party or interested, and in these causes in any other court or tribunal when required by the Governor or either branch of the General Assem bly.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1-7-40 (2013). Further, “[i]n all cases wherein the right of the State m ay be involved, the persons claim ing under the State shall call on the A ttorney General . . . to de fend the right of the State.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1-7-710 (2013). South Carolina cas e law further establishes a m ore active duty for the Attorney General.
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In 2003, the South Carolina Suprem e Court stat ed, “[t]his Court has recognized that the Attorney General has broad statutory and common law authority in his capacity as the chief legal officer of the State to institut e actions involving th e welfare of the State and its citizens.” Condon v. State, 583 S.E.2d 430, 434 (S.C. 2003). The stat e Supreme Court further noted, “[a]s the chief law officer of the State, [the Attorn ey General] m ay, in the absence of som e expres s legislative restriction, to the contrary, exercise all such power and author ity as public interests may, from t ime to ti me, require, and m ay ins titute, condu ct and m aintain all such suits and proceedings as he deems necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the State, the preserv ation of order, and the protection of public rights.” State ex rel. Daniel v. Broad River Power Co., 153 S.E. 537, 560 (S.C. 1929) (in ternal citation an d em phasis om itted). In State of S.C. ex rel. Condon v. Hodges, the Suprem e Court of South Caro lina noted, “the office of attorney general exists to properly ensure the administration of the laws of this State.” 562 S.E.2d 623, 627–28 (S.C. 2002) (citing Langford v. McLeod, 238 S.E.2d 161 (S.C. 1977)).
Despite this, Def endants cite to Robicheau v. Caldwell, 986 F. Supp. 2d 749 (E.D. La . 2013) to bolster their assertion that the Attorney General has no m ore than general enforcem ent authority over the laws at issue and therefore he is protected by the Eleventh Am endment under Ex parte Young. In Robicheau, Defendants note, the court found that the “Attorney General’s sweeping responsibility to enforce the laws of the State of Loui siana lacks the Ex parte Young specificity nexus between the Attorn ey General and the alleged unconstitutional provisions that is essential to defeat sovereign immunity.” (ECF No. 78-1 at 21, citing R obicheau, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 752.) To establish that th e Attorney General had undertaken specific enforcem ent of the law at issue, the plaintiffs in Robicheau cited to a case pending concurrently with theirs that had also named the Attorney General as a defendant and alleged sim ilar facts. 986 F. Supp. 2d a t
19

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752. However, the court found that “[t]he refe renced case m ight demonstrate the Attorney General’s willingness to defend the provis ions at issue here, but it in no way focuses or establishes his willingness to enforce them.” Id. at 752-53 (citing K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 124 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “a state actor must be connected with an act’s ‘enforcem ent’ for the [Ex parte Young] exception to apply,” a nd that “‘[e]nforcem ent’ typically involves compulsion or constraint.”) (emphasis in original).
In ligh t of the Atto rney General’s action s regarding the laws at is sue in this case, Robicheau serves to weaken Defendants’ positio n and instead helps to establish a specific nexus between Defendant W ilson and the provisions at issue. T his court ta kes judic ial notice 9 of Defendant Wilson’s motion in th e Supreme Court of South Caro lina for a tem porary injunction to stop the issuance of m arriage licenses to same-sex couples in the wake of the B ostic decision. See State of S.C. ex rel. W ilson v. Condon, Petition f or Original Jur isdiction and M otion f or Temporary Injunction, filed Oct. 8, 2014, available at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/whatsnew/ displaywhatsnew.cfm?indexID=980 (last visited Nov. 10, 2014). Defendant Wilson states in that motion that “it is th e sworn duty of the Atto rney General to seek to uphold State law until set aside by the courts.” Id. at 1. Defendant W ilson cannot take such action to specifically enforce the laws at issue and then hope to invoke Eleven th Amendment immunity under a theory that he simply has only “general authority.” Defe ndant W ilson’s m otion cl early demonstrates a willingness to specifically enforce these laws, and thus, he falls squarely within the Ex parte Young exception and action against him is not barred.
9 The court m ay take judicial not ice of court files and records. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“W e note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice of ascertainable facts is in noticing the content of court r ecords.’”); see also Aloe Creme Lab., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970).
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IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENI ES IN PART the Motion by Defendants Ni mrata (“Nikki”) Randhawa Haley, in her official capacity as Governor of South Carolina; and Alan M. W ilson, in his official capacity as Attorney General, for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF No. 78.) The court DENIES the Motion as to Plaintiffs ’ Amended Com plaint finding that they have stated plausible allegations of constitu tional violations in the denial of recognition by the St ate of South Carolina of Plaintiffs’ sa me-sex marriage. Thus, it would be prem ature to grant Def endants’ Motio n based solely on the allegations in the pleadings. The court GRANTS the Motion as to Defendant Nimrata (“Nikki”) Randhawa Haley’s on Eleventh A mendment immunity grounds and DISMISSES her from this lawsuit. All other aspects of Defendants’ Motion are DENIED. By this ruling, the court does not make any co mment on the m erits of this action. Such ruling will be set forth in the court’s order on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED.

November 10, 2014 Columbia, South Carolina

United States District Judge

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 3:13-cv-02351-JMC Date Filed 02/21/14 Entry Number 41 Page 1 of 19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA COLUMBIA DIVISION

Katherine Bradacs and Tracie

)

Goodwin,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

Nimrata (“Nikki”) Randhawa Haley, in )

her official capacity as Governor of

)

South Carolina; Alan M. Wilson, in his )

official capacity as Attorney General of )

South Carolina,

)

)

Defendants.

)

_______________________________

Civil Action No.:3:13-CV-02351-JMC
VERIFIED AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY, INJUNCTIVE,
AND OTHER RELIEF

I. NATURE OF ACTION 1. Plaintiffs br ing t his ac tion t o c hallenge t he c onstitutionality of South Carolina’s l aws and c onstitutional provisions t hat deny l egal r ecognition i n S outh Carolina t o t he marriages of s ame-sex c ouples w ho ar e m arried i n one o f t he m any states and n umerous f oreign c ountries w here s ame-sex m arriages ar e l egal. S .C. Const. Art. XVII, § 15; S.C. Code 1976 § 20-1-15. 2. Plaintiff Katherine Bradacs and Tracie Goodwin were legally married in the District of Columbia on April 6, 2012. The marriage of the Plaintiffs is legally recognized in t he D istrict of C olumbia, an d t heir m arriage i s l egally r ecognized by t he f ederal government by virtue of the decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (U.S., June 2 3, 2013), b ut t hey ar e t reated as l egal s trangers i n t heir home s tate of S outh Carolina. M eanwhile, t he m arriages of o pposite-sex c ouples t hat ar e l egal i n ot her

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states but would not be accepted in South Carolina (e.g., marriages of first cousins or a young partner) are routinely accepted in South Carolina if those marriages are legal in the j urisdiction w here t hey ar e c elebrated. T his r ecognition o f opp osite-sex m arriages but r ejection o f s ame-sex m arriages t hat do not m eet t he South Carolina c riteria for marriage v iolates t he rights s ecured to th e Plaintiffs by t he U nited S tates C onstitution and the Constitution of South Carolina.
3. The S tate o f S outh C arolina’s exclusion o f s ame-sex couples f rom marriage adversely impacts the Plaintiffs and same-sex couples across South Carolina by excluding them from the many legal protections available to spouses: For example, when one partner di es, t he s urviving par tner m ay f ace s erious f inancial hardship, including t he l oss o f her hom e, b ecause s he i s deni ed t he i nheritance t ax ex emption provided t o widows. Les bian an d g ay p olice o fficers, firefighters an d other first responders ar e d enied t he p eace o f m ind of k nowing t hat i f t hey m ake t he ultimate sacrifice, t heir par tner will be t aken c are o f t hrough t he financial s upport av ailable t o help t hose w ho lost their s pouses i n s ervice t o t he c ommunity. B ecause of South Carolina’s r efusal t o allow or r ecognize t heir m arriages, s ame-sex c ouples ar e al so denied many federal protections afforded to married couples such as the ability to take time off work to care for a sick spouse under the Family Medical Leave Act and access to a spouse's social security retirement benefits.
4. The ex clusion from marriage under mines t he Plaintiff c ouple’s ability t o achieve t heir l ife g oals and dr eams, t hreatens t heir m utual economic s tability, and denies them "a dignity and status of immense import." United States v. Windsor, supra,
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133 S. Ct. at 2681. Moreover, they and their children are stigmatized and relegated to a second c lass s tatus by bei ng bar red from m arriage. The exclusion " tells [ same-sex couples and all the world that their relationships are unworthy" of recognition, id. at 2223, a nd i t "humiliates t he . .. c hildren now bei ng r aised by s ame- sex c ouples" a nd "makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives." Id., 133 S.Ct. at 2694.
5. South C arolina’s exclusion o f s ame-sex couples f rom m arriage infringes on t he D ue P rocess Clause and t he E qual P rotection C lause o f t he F ourteenth Amendment t o t he U nited S tates C onstitution and t he C onstitution o f S outh C arolina. This di scriminatory t reatment i s s ubject t o h eightened s crutiny bec ause i t burdens t he fundamental r ight t o marry and bec ause i t di scriminates based on s ex and s exual orientation. It cannot stand under any level of scrutiny because the exclusion does not rationally f urther any l egitimate g overnment i nterest. I t s erves on ly t o di sparage an d injure lesbian and gay couples and their families. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 247 2, 15 6 L. Ed.2d 508 ( 2003) ( holding t hat a s tatute making i t a c rime f or t wo persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the “right of privacy” guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Plaintiffs bring this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19 83 for declaratory and injunctive relief ag ainst Defendants. S pecifically, Plaintiffs s eek: ( a) a d eclaration t hat the S tate of S outh C arolina’s pr ohibition o f m arriage f or s ame-sex c ouples an d i ts refusal to recognize marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into outside of the State o f S outh C arolina v iolate t he D ue P rocess C lause and t he E qual P rotection
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Clause o f t he F ourteenth A mendment t o t he U nited States C onstitution and of t he Constitution o f the S tate o f S outh Carolina; and ( b) a per manent i njunction directing Defendants t o r ecognize t he m arriages o f t he P laintiff c ouple an d s ame-sex c ouples validly entered into outside of South Carolina.
7. There i s no ad equate r emedy at l aw. The Plaintiffs ar e s uffering irreparable i njury. T here i s no har m t o t he s tate or l ocal g overnments by gr anting an injunction and pr ohibiting enforcement o f t he challenged statute and S outh Carolina Constitution. The harm to the Plaintiffs is severe. The public interest is clearly served by this Court ac ting to or der r ecognition i n S outh C arolina o f same-sex m arriages celebrated i n ot her j urisdictions c onsistent w ith t he m anner i n w hich S outh C arolina treats similarly situated opposite-sex couples. Only prompt action by this Court ordering declaratory and injunctive relief will serve the public interest.
II. PARTIES 8. The P laintiff Katherine Bradacs is a c itizen and r esident o f t he S tate of South Carolina, County of Lexington. 9. The Plaintiff Tracie Goodwin is a citizen and resident of the State of South Carolina, County of Lexington. 10. The Plaintiffs were lawfully married in the District of Columbia on April 6, 2012 (Exhibit 1-Marriage License from the District of Columbia). 11. The Defendant Nikki Haley is the Governor of the State of South Carolina. In her official capacity, she is the Chief Executive Officer of the State and is, pursuant to Article IV , S ection 1 5 of t he S outh C arolina C onstitution, r esponsible f or t he f aithful
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execution o f t he l aws o f t he State o f South Carolina, i ncluding t he l aws t hat ex clude same-sex couples from marrying or having their marriages recognized.
12. The Defendant Alan Wilson is the Attorney General of the State of South Carolina. He is sued in his official capacity pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 1 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina.
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 13. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3) and (4), because the suit raises federal questions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 14. Venue i s pr oper i n t he D istrict o f S outh C arolina un der 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendants Haley and Wilson reside in this District.
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 15. South C arolina’s M arriage Law s, T itle 20, C hapter 1, A rticle 1, g overns marriages i n S outh C arolina. I n 19 96, t he Marriage Law was a mended t o ex pressly prohibit m arriage f or same-sex c ouples, an d t o prevent t he r ecognition o f v alid s amesex m arriages c ontracted el sewhere. S .C. Code § 20 -1-15, “ Prohibition o f s ame s ex marriage,” provides, “A marriage between persons of the same sex is void ab initio and against the public policy of this State.” As a result, by declaring that a marriage between persons of the same sex is both (a) void ab initio and (b) against the public policy of this State, m arriage i s l egally a vailable onl y t o opposite-sex c ouples. S ame-sex c ouples may not marry in South Carolina, and if they are married elsewhere, their marriages are not recognized in South Carolina.
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16. The S outh C arolina Constitution w as a mended i n 20 07 t o ex pressly prohibit m arriage f or same-sex c ouples, an d t o prevent t he r ecognition o f v alid s amesex marriages contracted elsewhere. S.C. Const. Art. XVII, § 15, provides: “A marriage between one man and one woman is the only lawful domestic union that shall be valid or r ecognized i n this State. This S tate an d its pol itical s ubdivisions s hall not c reate a legal status, right, or claim respecting any other domestic union, however denominated. This S tate and i ts pol itical s ubdivisions s hall not r ecognize or g ive ef fect t o a l egal status, r ight, or c laim c reated by ano ther j urisdiction r especting any ot her d omestic union, how ever deno minated. N othing i n t his s ection s hall i mpair any r ight or ben efit extended by t he S tate or i ts pol itical s ubdivisions ot her t han a r ight or b enefit ar ising from a domestic union that is not valid or recognized in this State. This section shall not prohibit or l imit par ties, ot her t han t he S tate or i ts pol itical s ubdivisions, f rom e ntering into contracts or other legal instruments.” As a r esult, marriage is legally available only to op posite-sex c ouples. S ame-sex c ouples m ay not m arry i n South C arolina, and if they are married elsewhere, their marriages are not recognized in South Carolina.
V. DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW 17. The S upreme C ourt has c alled m arriage " the m ost i mportant r elation in life," Zablocki u. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted), and an " expression[] o f emotional support and publ ic commitment." Turner v. S afley, 482 U .S. 7 8, 95 ( 1987). I t i s " a f ar-reaching l egal ac knowledgement o f t he i ntimate relationship between two people...." United States v .Windsor, supra, 133 S.Ct. at 2692. This is as true for same-sex couples as it is for opposite-sex couples.
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18. Same-sex c ouples s uch as t he P laintiff c ouple ar e i dentical t o op positesex couples in all of the characteristics relevant to marriage.
19. By r efusing t o r ecognize t heir m arriages f rom others states, S outh Carolina law deprives them of numerous legal protections that are available to oppositesex c ouples. M ore t han 1 ,000 federal benefits, pr ivileges, and responsibilities ar e impacted by m arital s tatus. N umerous S outh C arolina ben efits ar e al so i mpacted by marital status. By way of example only:
A. A married person is exempt from tax on property left to him by an opposite-sex s pouse, including t he s pouse's s hare o f t he c ouple's ho me, and, thus, protected against economic distress or loss of a home because of an estate tax b ill. S.C. C ode A nn. §§ 12-6-1630, 1 2-37-220, 12 -37-265 (2007 & Cum. Supp.) A same-sex surviving spouse or partner is denied this exemption.
B. A widow or widower of an opposite-sex spouse is entitled to 50% to 100% o f hi s or her d eceased s pouse's es tate i f t he s pouse died without a w ill depending upon whether there are issue of the opposite couple. S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-102 (1986 & Cum. Supp.). A same-sex surviving spouse or partner in this situation receives nothing in this scenario.
C. A widow or widower of an opposite-sex spouse is entitled to claim an elective s hare of the ne t pr obate estate o f the deceased spouse even if the deceased spouse did not nominate the surviving spouse as a beneficiary under his or her w ill. S .C Code A nn §62-2-201. A s ame s ex s urviving s pouse or partner in this situation receives nothing.
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D. If an o pposite-sex s pouse becomes i ncapacitated, h er s pouse i s automatically authorized to make decisions regarding her care. S.C. C ode A nn. § 62-5-301(b) (1986 & Cum. Supp.). This protection does not extend to a samesex spouse or partner under this scenario.
E. Under the workers' compensation laws, the opposite-sex spouse of someone who dies or is injured in the workplace is entitled to damages and may bring suit. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 42-9-110, 42-9-290, and 42-9-320 (1976 & Cum. Supp.). S ame-sex spouses or partners have no l egal standing to sue over their spouse or partner's workplace injury.
F. South C arolina r equires opp osite-sex s pouses t o s upport one another f inancially. S.C. Code A nn. §§ 20-3-130 an d 20-3-140 ( 1979 & C um. Supp.) . There is no support obligation for same-sex spouses or partners.
G. South C arolina l aws promote t he s tability of m arriages t hrough rules such as mandatory waiting periods prior to divorce by mutual consent. S.C. Code A nn. §§ 20-3-10 (2), (5) and 20 -3-80 (1979 & Cum. S upp.). The divorce laws, including these provisions, do not apply to same-sex spouses or partners.
H. Opposite-sex widows and w idowers of m ilitary per sonnel an d veterans ar e eligible for nu merous as sistance pr ograms 10 U .S.C.A. §1408; 10 U.S.C.A. §1450; 38 U.S.C.A. §101. These programs are not available to samesex surviving spouses or partners of military personnel and veterans.
I. Opposite-sex w idows and w idowers of p ublic em ployees i n t he South C arolina ar e el igible t o r eceive various pens ions and s urvivor bene fits
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upon their spouse's death. S.C. Code Ann. §9-8-110 ; S.C Code Ann. §9-11-140; S.C. Code Ann. §12-37-220(receipt o f po lice of ficer s pouse's pens ion by surviving s pouse); ( tax ex emption of public em ployee s pouse's r etirement allowance); (lifetime survivor benefits for spouse of retired pensioner); (receipt of fireman's pension by surviving spouse);(exemption from ad v alorem taxation for surviving s pouse o f p ermanently and t otally di sabled l aw en forcement o fficer, firefighter, or v eteran). T hese b enefits are not pr ovided t o s urviving s ame-sex spouses or partners of public employees.
J. Opposite-sex publ ic em ployees i n t he S tate of S outh C arolina ar e eligible to nominate and receive health insurance coverage for their spouse. S.C. Code Ann. §38-71-170. These benefits are not provided to same-sex spouses or partners of public employees.
K. Opposite-sex widows and w idowers of f irefighters, pol ice o fficers, and other first r esponders k illed i n t he l ine o f d uty ar e pr ovided financial assistance. S.C. C ode A nn. § 1 -11-730(A)(5), (B )(5) (2 008) (s pouse o f p erson covered by s tate he alth pl ans w ho i s k illed i n t he l ine o f d uty i s el igible f or continued c overage u nder t he plans); S.C. Code A nn. § 12-37-220(B) (1 )(b), (e)(iii) (1976 & C um. Supp.) ( providing ex emption for ad v alorem t axes o n a house ow ned by a q ualified s urviving s pouse o f a l aw en forcement o fficer or firefighter w ho di ed i n t he l ine o f du ty); S.C. C ode A nn. § 23 -6-100 ( 1997) (providing the SC Highway Patrol Division shall transfer the service sidearm of an active dut y s tate t rooper k illed i n t he l ine of d uty t o that t rooper’s s urviving spouse upo n r equest at no c harge onc e t he s idearm i s rendered per manently
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inoperable). This as sistance i s no t pr ovided t o s ame-sex s urviving s pouses or partners of first responders.
L. Property tax exemptions are available under South Carolina law to certain peo ple age 65 or ov er who ar e w idows and w idowers of opp osite-sex spouses. S.C. Code Ann. §12-37-250 (1976). They are not available to same-sex surviving spouses or partners.
M. Opposite-sex spouses are eligible for a “two wage earner” credit for state t ax pur poses under c ertain c ircumstances. S .C. C ode A nn. §12-6-3330 (1995 & Cum. Supp.) Same-sex married couples would not be eligible under any circumstances for the state tax credit. 20. In this case and by way of example, Plaintiff Bradacs is a public employee. Because her marriage t o P laintiff Goodwin i s no t r ecognized i n t he S tate o f S outh Carolina, s he c annot nom inate her s pouse, nor her bi ological c hildren, on h er heal th insurance p olicy t hrough t he S tate o f S outh C arolina j ust as opposite-sex c ouples whose marriage is recognized in the State of South Carolina can. 21. Plaintiff G oodwin i s 80% di sabled from t he U nited S tates A ir F orce and receives disability from the Veterans Administration. If her marriage to Plaintiff Bradacs was r ecognized i n t he S tate o f S outh C arolina, not o nly c ould Plaintiff Bradacs b e entitled t o m ake a c laim as a s urviving benef iciary on P laintiff Goodwin’s V A ben efits, but P laintiff Goodwin would be e ntitled t o receive m ore i n d isability f rom the V A if her marriage to Plaintiff Bradacs was recognized in the State of South Carolina. P laintiffs Bradacs and G oodwin c annot c laim being married as a s tandard ex emption on t heir
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federal tax returns while residing in the State of South Carolina because their marriage is not recognized, among many of the other federal benefits they each would be entitled to if their marriage was recognized in South Carolina.
22. The e xclusion of s ame-sex couples f rom marriage al so deni es them eligibility f or numerous f ederal protections afforded to m arried couples including in t he areas o f i mmigration and c itizenship, t axes, and s ocial s ecurity. S ome o f t he federal protections for m arried c ouples ar e onl y av ailable t o c ouples i f t heir m arriages ar e legally recognized in the state in which they live. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (marriage f or el igibility f or s ocial s ecurity bene fits b ased o n l aw of s tate where c ouple resides at time of application); 29 C.F.R. § 825.122(b) (same for Family Medical Leave Act). Thus, Plaintiffs, though legally married, cannot access such federal protections as long as South Carolina refuses to recognize their existing marriage.
23. Although the Plaintiff couple is in a long-term committed relationship, this couple and other same-sex couples are denied the stabilizing effects of marriage, which helps keep couples together during times of crisis or conflict.
24. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage also harms couples and their children by denying them the social recognition that comes with marriage. Marriage has profound social significance both for the couple that gets married and the family, friends and community that surround them. The terms "married" and "spouse" have universally understood m eanings t hat c ommand r espect for a couple's r elationship a nd t he commitment they have made.
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VI. EXCLUDING SAME-SEX COUPLES FROM MARRIAGE IS NOT RATIONALLY RELATED TO A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST, AND IS NOT ABLE TO WITHSTAND HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY. 25. The prohibition against m arriage for same-sex couples in S outh Carolina
and t he pr ohibition ag ainst r ecognition o f marriage validly c ontracted o utside S outh i s not closely tailored to serve an important government interest or substantially related to an ex ceedingly persuasive j ustification. The pr ohibition fails a ny l evel of c onstitutional scrutiny. I t i s not r ationally r elated t o any l egitimate j ustifications t hat w ere of fered i n support o f i t w hen t he M arriage Law was am ended i n 1 996 or w hen t he C onstitution was amended in 2007. None of the justifications offered in support of these measures, or any other justification that might now be offered, passes constitutional muster.
26. Neither t radition nor m oral di sapproval o f s ame-sex r elationships or marriage f or lesbian and g ay c ouples i s a l egitimate b asis for unequal treatment of same-sex couples under the law. The fact that a discriminatory law is longstanding does not immunize it from constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has made clear that the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give effect to private biases and has expressly rejected moral di sapproval o f m arriage f or s ame-sex c ouples as a l egitimate b asis for discriminatory t reatment o f l esbian a nd g ay c ouples. United S tates v . Windsor, supra, 133 S .Ct. at 2693 (an " interest i n protecting t raditional moral teachings r eflected i n heterosexual-only marriage laws" was not a legitimate justification for federal Defense of Marriage Act).
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VII. CLAIMS FIRST CLAIM: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, DUE PROCESS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 27. Plaintiffs i ncorporate by r eference al l of the preceding p aragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 28. The F ourteenth A mendment t o t he U nited States C onstitution precludes any State from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Governmental interference with a fundamental right may be sustained only upon a showing that the legislation is closely tailored to serve an important governmental interest. 29. The S upreme C ourt h as l ong r ecognized t hat m arriage i s a fundamental right and t hat choices about marriage, like choices about other aspects of family, are a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. 30. South Carolina law denies the Plaintiff couple and other same-sex couples this f undamental r ight by deny ing t hem ac cess t o t he s tate-recognized i nstitution o f marriage and refusing to recognize the marriages they entered into in other states and foreign countries where such marriages are legal. 31. South C arolina c an demonstrate n o i mportant i nterest t o j ustify deny ing the Plaintiff couple this fundamental right. Indeed, it cannot demonstrate that the denial is tailored to any legitimate interest at all. 32. South Carolina’s prohibition of marriage between persons of the same sex and i ts r efusal t o r ecognize m arriages ent ered i nto by s ame-sex c ouples i n o ther jurisdictions violates the Due Process Clause.
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33. Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiff of rights secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
SECOND CL AIM: 4 2 U. S.C. § 1 983, E QUAL P ROTECTION U NDER THE UNI TED S TATES CO NSTITUTION O N T HE B ASIS O F SEXUAL ORIENTATION 34. Plaintiffs i ncorporate by r eference al l of the preceding p aragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 35. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States C onstitution p rovides t hat " no S tate s hall . ..deny t o an y per son w ithin i ts jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 36. By deny ing t he Plaintiff c ouple a nd other l esbian and g ay c ouples t he ability t o m arry and t o hav e t heir ou t-of-state m arriages recognized, S outh C arolina, through Defendants, disadvantages lesbian and gay people on the basis of their sexual orientation. It denies them significant legal protections. It "degrade[s] [and] demean[s]" them by "instruct[ing] ...all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own c hildren," t hat t heir r elationship i s " less w orthy" t han t he r elationships o f ot hers. United States v. Windsor, supra, 133 S.Ct. at 2696. 37. Same-sex c ouples an d op posite-sex c ouples ar e s imilarly s ituated for purposes of marriage. 38. Classifications based on sexual orientation demand heightened scrutiny.
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39. South C arolina’s prohibition o f m arriage for s ame-sex c ouples and i ts refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples entered into elsewhere violates the Equal Protection Clause.
40. Defendants, ac ting u nder c olor o f s tate l aw, ar e depr iving Plaintiffs o f rights s ecured by t he E qual P rotection C lause of the F ourteenth A mendment t o t he United States Constitution.
THIRD CLAIM: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ON THE BASIS OF SEX 41. Plaintiffs i ncorporate by r eference al l of the preceding p aragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 42. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States C onstitution p rovides t hat " no S tate s hall . ..deny t o an y per son w ithin i ts jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'.' U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 43. S.C. Const. Art. XVII, § 15, provides: “A marriage between one man a nd one w oman i s t he onl y l awful do mestic union t hat s hall b e v alid or r ecognized i n t his State.” 44. By def ining m arriage i n t his w ay, S outh C arolina di scriminates on t he basis of sex. 45. The Supreme Court has made clear that perpetuation of traditional gender roles i s not a l egitimate g overnment i nterest. G iven t hat there ar e no l onger l egal distinctions be tween t he d uties of husbands and w ives, t here i s no bas is for t he s exbased eligibility requirements for marriage.
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46. Defendants, ac ting under c olor o f s tate l aw, ar e depr iving Plaintiffs o f rights s ecured by t he E qual P rotection C lause of the F ourteenth A mendment t o t he United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
FOURTH CL AIM: 4 2 U. S.C. § 1 983, DUE P ROCESS AND E QUAL PROTECTION UNDE R T HE UNI TED S TATES CO NSTITUTION, BY FAILING TO HONOR THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE 47. Plaintiffs i ncorporate by r eference al l of the preceding p aragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 48. Article I V, S ection 1 of t he U nited S tates Constitution s tates: “ Full F aith and C redit s hall be given i n eac h S tate to t he p ublic A cts, R ecords, an d j udicial Proceedings of every other S tate. And the Congress m ay by general Laws pr escribe the M anner i n w hich such A cts, R ecords a nd Proceedings s hall be pr oved, and t he Effect thereof.” 49. 28 USC § 1738 reads: “The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the s eal o f s uch S tate, Territory or P ossession t hereto. The r ecords a nd j udicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be pr oved or admitted i n other c ourts within t he U nited S tates an d i ts Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, t ogether w ith a c ertificate o f a j udge o f t he c ourt t hat t he s aid at testation i s i n proper form. S uch A cts, r ecords a nd j udicial pr oceedings or c opies t hereof, s o authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United
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States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.”
50. State l aw pr ohibits m arriage be tween per sons o f t he s ame s ex, an d marriage between a man and a woman is the only marriage the State will recognize.
51. By prohibiting the Courts and officials of the State of South Carolina from recognizing marriage contracted in another state, the State is violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.
52. Defendants, acting under color of state law, by refusing to honor the Full Faith an d C redit C lause, ar e depriving Plaintiffs o f r ights s ecured by t he E qual Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
FIFTH CL AIM: DUE P ROCESS AND E QUAL P ROTECTION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 53. Plaintiffs i ncorporate by r eference al l of the preceding p aragraphs of t his Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 54. South C arolina C onstitution, Art. I , § 3, provides: “ The pr ivileges an d immunities of citizens of this State and of the United States under this Constitution shall not be abridged, nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” 55. However, S outh C arolina C onstitution, A rt. X VII, § 15 pr ovides, “ A marriage between one man and one woman is the only lawful domestic union that shall be valid or recognized in this State.”
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56. Same-sex c ouples an d op posite-sex c ouples ar e s imilarly s ituated for purposes of marriage.
57. Marriage i s a f undamental r ight s ecured und er t he U nited States Constitution and the South Carolina Constitution.
58. South Carolina’s prohibition of marriage between persons of the same sex and i ts r efusal t o r ecognize m arriages ent ered i nto by s ame-sex c ouples i n o ther jurisdictions v iolates t he due process c lause and the eq ual pr otection c lause o f S outh Carolina Constitution, Art. 1, § 3.
VIII. PRAYERS FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Court: A. To i ssue a dec laratory judgment t hat t he s tatute an d S outh Carolina constitutional provision at i ssue i n t his c ase, as a pplied t o Plaintiffs, v iolate t he constitutional and statutory rights of Plaintiffs; B. To issue a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants and all those acting in concert prohibiting enforcement of the laws, as applied, at issue in this action, enjoining these Defendants from denying the Plaintiff couple and all other same-sex couples the right to marry, and directing the Defendants to recognize marriages validly entered into by the Plaintiff couple and other same-sex couples outside the State of South Carolina; C. To a ward t o Plaintiffs r easonable c osts, ex penses, a nd attorneys’ fees; and
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D. To award such other and further relief as this Court shall deem just and

reasonable.

February 21, 2014

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John S. Nichols John S. Nichols Federal ID Number 02535 Bluestein, Nichols, Thompson & Delgado, LLC 1614 Taylor Street Post Office Box 7965 Columbia, South Carolina 29202 Telephone: (803) 779-7599 Facsimile: (803) 771-8097 jsnichols@bntdlaw.com

Carrie A. Warner Federal ID Number 11106 Warner, Payne & Black, LLP 1531 Blanding Street Post Office Box 2628 (29202) Columbia, South Carolina 29201 Telephone: (803) 799-0554 Facsimile: (803) 799-2517 carriewarner@wpb-law.net

Laura W. Morgan Family Law Consulting 108 5th St. SE, Suite 204 PO Box 497 Charlottesville, Virginia 22902 goddess@famlawconsult.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

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 Case: 3:13-cv-2351 As of: 11/05/2017 04:55 PM EST 1 of 10

U.S. District Court District of South Carolina (Columbia) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:13−cv−02351−JMC

CLOSED

Bradacs et al v. Haley et al Assigned to: Honorable J Michelle Childs related Cases: 3:14−cv−04155−JMC
6:14−cv−04246−JMC
Case in other court: USCA, 14−02337 Cause: 28:1332 Diversity−Injunctive & Declaratory Relief
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 08/28/2013 Date Terminated: 11/18/2014 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Diversity

Katherine Bradacs

represented by Carrie A Warner Warner Payne and Black PO Box 2628 Columbia, SC 29202 803−799−0554 Email: carriewarner@wpb−law.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Shannon Nichols Bluestein and Nichols PO Box 7965 Columbia, SC 29202 803−779−7599 Fax: 803−779−8995 Email: jsnichols@bntdlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura W Morgan Family Law Consulting 108 5th Street SE Suite 204 Charlottesville, VA 22902 434−817−1880 Email: goddess@famlawconsult.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tracie Goodwin

represented by Carrie A Warner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Shannon Nichols (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura W Morgan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.

Case: 3:13-cv-2351 As of: 11/05/2017 04:55 PM EST 2 of 10

Movant Chris Sevier TERMINATED: 10/14/2014
Movant Don Boyd TERMINATED: 11/18/2014
V. Defendant Nimrata Randhawa Haley in her official capacity as Governor of South Carolina TERMINATED: 11/10/2014 also known as Nikki Haley TERMINATED: 11/10/2014

represented by Chris Sevier Radcliffe Street Charleston, SC 29403 615−500−4411 PRO SE
represented by Don Boyd 345 Charwood Drive Columbia, SC 29223 PRO SE
represented by Alan Wilson SC Attorney General's Office PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211 803−734−3656 Email: agwilson@scag.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan McDonald Federal Bureau of Prisons Consolidated Legal Center FCC Yazoo City Low 2225 Haley Barbour Parkway PO Box 5666 Yazoo City, MS 39194 662−751−4800 Fax: 662−751−4859 Email: bmcdonald@scag.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ian Parks Weschler Office of Attorney General (SC) PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211 803−734−3718 Email: iweschler@scag.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Emory Smith , Jr SC Attorney General's Office PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211 803−734−3970 Fax: 803−734−3677 Email: esmith@scag.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Dewayne Cook SC Attorney General's Office PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211 803−734−3792

Case: 3:13-cv-2351 As of: 11/05/2017 04:55 PM EST 3 of 10

Defendant Alan M Wilson In his official capacity as Attorney General of South Carolina
Amicus Lawyers' Committee for Children's Rights

Fax: 803−734−3524 Email: bcook@scag.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan Wilson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ian Parks Weschler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Emory Smith , Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Dewayne Cook (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexander M Sanders , Jr Sanders and Nettles 2008 Lincoln Street Columbia, SC 29201 803−779−9966 Email: goffp@cofc.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bert Glenn Utsey , III Peters Murdaugh Parker Eltzroth and Detrick PA 1 Wesley Drive Suite 1B PO Box 30968 Charleston, SC 29407 843−549−9544 Fax: 803−914−6716 Email: butsey@pmped.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John D Elliott John D Elliott Law Office PO Box 607 Columbia, SC 29202 803−252−9236 Fax: 803−799−2079 Email: jayel@mindspring.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:13-cv-2351 As of: 11/05/2017 04:55 PM EST 4 of 10

Date Filed 08/28/2013
08/28/2013 08/28/2013 08/28/2013 09/06/2013
09/09/2013 09/10/2013
09/12/2013 09/12/2013 09/12/2013
09/12/2013 09/23/2013 09/24/2013 09/24/2013
10/03/2013 10/03/2013 10/04/2013

# Docket Text
1 VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY, INJUNCTIVE, AND OTHER RELIEF against Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M. Wilson ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0420−4907050.), filed by Tracie Goodwin, Katherine Bradacs. Service due by 12/30/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Certificate of Marriage)(bshr, ) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
3 Local Rule 26.01 Answers to Interrogatories by Katherine Bradacs, Tracie Goodwin.(bshr, ) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
4 Summons Issued as to Alan M. Wilson. (bshr, ) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
5 Summons Issued as to Nimrata Randhawa Haley. (bshr, ) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
7 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Tracie Goodwin, Katherine Bradacs. Nimrata Randhawa Haley served on 9/6/2013, answer due 9/27/2013. (Attachment(s): # 1 Proof of Service) (Warner, Carrie). Modified on 9/10/2013 to add notice of filing and to correct filing date(bshr, ). (Entered: 09/09/2013)
8 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Tracie Goodwin, Katherine Bradacs. Alan M Wilson served on 9/6/2013, answer due 9/27/2013. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Warner, Carrie) (Entered: 09/09/2013)
9 DELETION OF DOCKET ENTRY NUMBER 6. Reason: Proof of Service refiled with Notice of Filing and Affidavit of Server. Corrected Filing Document Number 7 . Modified filing date to that of original filing: 09/06/2013. Response due date modified to that of original filing: answer due 9/27/2013 (bshr, ) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
11 MOTION for Extension of Time by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson. Response to Motion due by 9/30/2013. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
12 Local Rule 26.01 Answers to Interrogatories by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson.(Smith, James) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
14 ORDER granting 11 Motion for Extension of Time, extending deadline to answer, move, or otherwise respond to the complaint to 11/15/2013 and notifying parties the court will conduct a status conference on 10/08/2013 at 10:00 AM to discuss whether any discovery will be necessary or whether the case can be submitted to the court on stipulated or undisputed facts. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 09/12/2013.(bshr, ) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
15 NOTICE of Hearing: Status Conference set for 10/8/2013 at 10:00 AM in Columbia # 4, Matthew J. Perry Court House, 901 Richland St, Columbia before the Honorable Joseph F. Anderson Jr. (bshr, ) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
17 MOTION to Continue (Postpone) Hearing by Katherine Bradacs, Tracie Goodwin. Response to Motion due by 10/10/2013. No proposed order.(Nichols, John) (Entered: 09/23/2013)
18 TEXT ORDER granting 17 Motion to Continue (Postpone) Hearing. Entered at the direction of the Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr on 09/24/2013.(bshr, ) (Entered: 09/24/2013)
19 NOTICE of RESCHEDULED Hearing: Status Conference rescheduled to 10/8/2013 at 03:00 PM in Columbia # 4, Matthew J. Perry Court House, 901 Richland St, Columbia before Honorable Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ***Change in time only***(bshr, ) (Entered: 09/24/2013)
20 NOTICE of Cancellation of Hearing: Status Conference set on 10/8/2013 at 03:00 PM until further notice. (mflo, ) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
21 Case Reassigned to Judge Honorable Richard M Gergel. Judge Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr no longer assigned to the case. (glev, ) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
22 Case Reassigned to Judge Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr. Judge Honorable Richard M Gergel no longer assigned to the case. (mflo,) (Entered: 10/04/2013)

Case: 3:13-cv-2351 As of: 11/05/2017 04:55 PM EST 5 of 10

10/04/2013 10/08/2013
10/18/2013 11/11/2013
11/12/2013 11/14/2013 11/26/2013 11/26/2013
01/21/2014 01/22/2014 01/23/2014
02/10/2014 02/18/2014 02/20/2014 02/21/2014 02/21/2014

23 NOTICE of Hearing: Status Conference set for 10/8/2013 03:00 PM in Columbia # 4, Matthew J. Perry Court House, 901 Richland St, Columbia before Honorable Joseph F Anderson Jr. (mflo, ) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
24 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr: Status Conference held on 10/8/2013. Counsel informs the court there will be very little discovery needed. Counsel are to submit proposed scheduling order 7 days after defendant files a responsive pleading. Court Reporter Daniel Mayo. (mflo, ) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
26 Case Reassigned to Judge Honorable J Michelle Childs. Judge Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr no longer assigned to the case. (glev, ) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
27 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Laura W. Morgan ( Filing fee $ 250 receipt number 0420−5031051) by Katherine Bradacs, Tracie Goodwin. Response to Motion due by 12/2/2013. (Attachments: # 1 Supporting Documents, # 2 Proposed Order)Proposed order is being emailed to chambers with copy to opposing counsel.(Nichols, John) (Entered: 11/11/2013)
28 TEXT ORDER granting 27 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 11/12/2013.(asni, ) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
29 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson.(Smith, James) (Entered: 11/14/2013)
30 NOTICE of Request for Protection from Court Appearance by John Shannon Nichols for 1/15/14, 1/23−24/14 (Nichols, John) (Entered: 11/26/2013)
31 SCHEDULING ORDER Discovery requests due by 12/6/2013, Responses to discovery due by 1/7/2014, Motions due by 2/3/2014, Responses to motions due three weeks after the dates the respective motions are filed, replies to responses to motions due two weeks after the respective responses are filed. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 11/26/2013. (asni, ) (Entered: 11/26/2013)
34 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson, Tracie Goodwin, Katherine Bradacs. Response to Motion due by 2/7/2014. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 01/21/2014)
35 TEXT ORDER granting 34 Motion for Extension of Time to file dispositive motions due March 5, 2014. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 1/22/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 01/22/2014)
37 First MOTION to Amend 1 Complaint by Katherine Bradacs, Tracie Goodwin. Response to Motion due by 2/10/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amended Complaint)No proposed order.(Warner, Carrie). Modified on 1/23/2014 to replace amended complaint with corrected version per the request of the filing user(bshr, ). (Entered: 01/23/2014)
38 RESPONSE to Motion re 37 First MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint, Response filed by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson.Reply to Response to Motion due by 2/21/2014 (Smith, James) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
39 TEXT ORDER granting 37 Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint, with Defendant's consent 38 and ability to file all claims and defenses. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 2/18/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
40 MOTION for Extension of Time by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson. Response to Motion due by 3/10/2014. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 02/20/2014)
41 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson, filed by Tracie Goodwin, Katherine Bradacs. Service due by 6/26/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Marriage Certificate) (Nichols, John) (Entered: 02/21/2014)
42 TEXT ORDER granting 40 Motion for Extension of Time. Answer due March 18, 2014, cross−motions due April 11, 2014. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 2/21/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 02/21/2014)

Case: 3:13-cv-2351 As of: 11/05/2017 04:55 PM EST 6 of 10

03/14/2014 04/03/2014 04/03/2014 04/04/2014 04/16/2014 04/17/2014 04/22/2014
04/22/2014 04/22/2014 04/23/2014 04/23/2014 04/23/2014 04/23/2014 04/23/2014 05/05/2014 10/07/2014

45 ANSWER to 41 Amended Complaint by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson.(Smith, James) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
47 MOTION to Stay and Hold Cross−Motions Deadline in Abeyance by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson. Response to Motion due by 4/21/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Addendum Copy of Bostic v. Rainey decision)No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 04/03/2014)
48 MOTION for Extension of Time to file Dispositvie Motions by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson, Tracie Goodwin, Katherine Bradacs. Response to Motion due by 4/21/2014. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 04/03/2014)
49 TEXT ORDER granting 48 Motion for Extension of Time to File Cross−Motions due April 25, 2014. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 4/4/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
51 MOTION for Extension of Time with consent by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson, Katherine Bradacs and Tracie Goodwin. Response to Motion due by 5/5/2014. No proposed order.(Smith, James) Modified on 4/17/2014 to add parties(jada, ). (Entered: 04/16/2014)
52 TEXT ORDER granting 51 Motion for Extension of Time Entered by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 4/17/14.(jada, ) (Entered: 04/17/2014)
54 TEXT ORDER: Defendants' Motion to Stay and Hold Cross−Motions Deadline in Abeyance 47 is granted in part and denied in part. The Motion to Stay is granted since the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit will hear arguments in the case of Bostic v. Rainey, 2: 13CV395, 2014 WL 561978 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014) on May 13, 2014 ( a same−sex marriage case in Virginia). The stay is in effect until the Fourth Circuit issues its final opinion. Additionally, the parties consented to extend the cross motions deadline for dispositive issues until May 2, 2014, with responses to these motions due three weeks after the dates the respective motions are filed, and replies to these motions due two weeks after the respective responses are filed. Therefore, the briefing in this case will not be completed until June 6, 2014, approximately three weeks after the Fourth Circuit hears oral argument in the Bostic v. Rainey case. Based on the parties' consent to extend the cross−motions deadline, Defendants' Motion to Hold Cross−Motions Deadline in Abeyance is denied as moot. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 4/22/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
55 MOTION to Intervene by Chris Sevier. Response to Motion due by 5/12/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support)No proposed order.(asni, ) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
56 MOTION to Stay re 54 Order on Motion to Stay,,,, Motion to Include Cross−Motions in Stay by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson. Response to Motion due by 5/12/2014. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
57 PROPER FORM ORDER Case to be brought into proper form by 5/19/2014. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 4/22/2014. (asni, ) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
58 ***DOCUMENT MAILED 57 Proper Form Order placed in U.S. Mail to Chris Sevier (asni, ) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
60 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson re 56 MOTION to Stay re 54 Order on Motion to Stay,,,, Motion to Include Cross−Motions in Stay (Smith, James) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
61 TEXT ORDER granting 56 Motion to Stay the cross−motions deadlines along with the other deadlines in this case. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 4/23/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
62 ***DOCUMENT MAILED 61 Order on Motion to Stay placed in U.S. Mail to Chris Sevier (asni, ) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
63 Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Addressee: Chris Sevier. Document Returned: 57 Proper Form Order (asni, ) (Entered: 05/06/2014)
70 ORDER LIFTING STAY and returning this matter to the active docket. The parties are hereby directed to jointly submit a proposed amended scheduling

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10/14/2014 10/14/2014
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10/28/2014 10/31/2014 10/31/2014 10/31/2014

order and/or briefing schedule to the court by Wednesday October 15, 2014. ( Specific Document due by 10/15/2014.) Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 10/7/2014. (asni, ) (Entered: 10/07/2014)
71 CONSENT SCHEDULING ORDER Motions due by 10/23/2014, Responses to the Motions are due 14 days after the dates the respective motions are filed, Replies to the responses to motions must be filed 7 days after the respective responses are filed. If the Court decides to have a hearing, it will be scheduled no earlier than 14 days after the filing of replies. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 10/14/2014. (asni, ) (Entered: 10/14/2014)
73 TEXT ORDER: This matter is before the court pursuant to a motion filed pro se by Movant Chris Sevier ("Movant") to intervene in this matter. (ECF No. 55.) As a result of certain deficiencies in the motion, the court entered a "Proper Form Order" on April 23, 2014, giving Movant until May 19, 2014, to "sign the[] signature page of the Motion, Memorandum and Proposed Intervening Complaint and return to the Clerk[']s Office" and "provide the clerk with his full mailing address to include street number." (ECF No. 57 at 12.) The court also instructed Movant that any failure to comply with the Proper Form Order would "negatively impact[]" the adjudication of his motion. (Id. at 2.) Despite the court's warnings, Movant did not satisfy either of the requirements to bring his motion into proper form. Therefore, as a result of Movant's aforementioned failure to comply with the Proper Form Order and address specific deficiencies in his motion, the court must deny the motion of Chris Sevier to intervene in this matter without prejudice. denying 55 Motion to Intervene Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 10/14/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 10/14/2014)
74 ***DOCUMENT MAILED 73 Order on Motion to Intervene placed in U.S. Mail to Chris Sevier (asni, ) (Entered: 10/14/2014)
75 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Katherine Bradacs, Tracie Goodwin. Response to Motion due by 11/6/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support, # 2 Exhibit List of Cases, # 3 Exhibit Statutory Comparison, # 4 Exhibit Map, # 5 Affidavit Katherine Bradacs, # 6 Affidavit Tracie Goodwin, # 7 Exhibit List of Cases and Decisions Outside District)No proposed order.(Nichols, John) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
76 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson. Response to Motion due by 11/7/2014. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
77 TEXT ORDER granting 76 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 10/21/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
78 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson. Response to Motion due by 11/10/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support, # 2 Addendum Attachment A − Conde− Vidal v. Garcia − Padilla, # 3 Addendum Attachment B − 1712 Statute, # 4 Addendum Attachment C − 1871 Statute)No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Attachment 2 replaced on 10/27/2014) (asni, ). Modified to replace document at the request of the attorney to include complete documents that were inadvertently left out on 10/27/2014 (asni, ). (Entered: 10/23/2014)
79 RESPONSE in Opposition re 75 MOTION for Summary Judgment Response filed by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson.Reply to Response to Motion due by 11/7/2014 (Smith, James) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
80 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Katherine Bradacs, Tracie Goodwin. Response to Motion due by 11/17/2014. No proposed order.(Nichols, John) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
81 TEXT ORDER granting 80 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 10/31/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
82 RESPONSE to Motion re 78 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings Response filed by Katherine Bradacs, Tracie Goodwin.Reply to Response to Motion due by 11/10/2014 (Nichols, John) (Entered: 10/31/2014)

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11/03/2014 11/03/2014 11/04/2014 11/05/2014
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11/18/2014

83 PRO SE MOTION to Intervene by Don Boyd. Response to Motion due by 11/20/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Don Boyd, # 2 Request for Judicial Notice)No proposed order.(asni, ) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
84 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Restricted Access) by Don Boyd. Response to Motion due by 11/20/2014. No proposed order.(asni, ) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
85 REPLY to Response to Motion re 78 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings Response filed by Nimrata Randhawa Haley, Alan M Wilson. (Smith, James) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
86 Amicus Curiae APPEARANCE entered by Bert Glenn Utsey, III on behalf of Lawyers' Committee for Children's Rights. (Attachments: # 1 Supporting Documents Pawelski et al, The Effects of Marriage..., # 2 Supporting Documents Perrin et al, Promoting the Well−Being..., # 3 Supporting Documents Shapiro et al, The Impact of Birth Innovations..., # 4 Supporting Documents Smith, Equal Protection for Children...)(Utsey, Bert) (Entered: 11/05/2014)
88 REPLY to Response to Motion re 75 MOTION for Summary Judgment Response filed by Katherine Bradacs, Tracie Goodwin. (Nichols, John) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
89 ORDER AND OPINION granting in part and denying in part 78 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The court DENIES the Motion as to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint finding that they have stated plausible allegations of constitutional violations in the denial of recognition by the State of South Carolina of Plaintiffs' same−sex marriage. Thus, it would be premature to grant Defendants' Motion based solely on the allegations in the pleadings. The court GRANTS the Motion as to Defendant Nimrata ("Nikki") Randhawa Haley's on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds and DISMISSES her from this lawsuit. All other aspects of Defendants' Motion are DENIED. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 11/10/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
91 MOTION to Stay arguendo this court grants summary judgment to plaintiffs, by Alan M Wilson. Response to Motion due by 12/1/2014. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
92 ***DOCUMENT MAILED 89 Order on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, placed in U.S. Mail to Don Boyd (asni, ) (Entered: 11/12/2014)
93 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Katherine Bradacs, Tracie Goodwin re 88 Reply to Response to Motion on Don Boyd (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Service)(Nichols, John) (Main Document 93 replaced on 11/12/2014) (alew, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 11/12/2014) (alew, ). Modified on 11/12/2014 to replace with corrected documents provided by filing user (alew, ). (Entered: 11/12/2014)
95 ORDER AND OPINION denying 83 Motion to Intervene; finding as moot 84 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 11/17/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 11/18/2014)
96 ***DOCUMENT MAILED 95 Order on Motion to Intervene, Order on Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis placed in U.S. Mail to Don Boyd (asni, ) (Entered: 11/18/2014)
97 ORDER AND OPINION granting in part and denying in part 75 Motion for Summary Judgment. The court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' claims that South Carolina's denial of legal recognition to the marriages of same−sex couples who were married in other states or jurisdictions violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' claim asserting that South Carolina's denial of legal recognition to the marriages of same−sex couples who were married in other states or jurisdictions violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 11/18/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 11/18/2014)
98 TEXT ORDER: This matter is before the court pursuant to a motion by Defendant Alan M. Wilson ("Defendant"), in his official capacity as Attorney

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General, to stay pending appeal the relief granted to Plaintiffs in the order entered by the court on November 17, 2014 (the "November Order"). (ECF No. 91.) In the November Order, the court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their claims that South Carolina's denial of legal recognition to the marriages of same−sex couples who were married in other states or jurisdictions violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 97.) Defendant now requests that the November Order be "stayed until appellate review is completed at the Court of Appeals or that, alternatively, this Courts [November] order be stayed until such time as the Defendant can obtain a ruling from the Court of Appeals on a motion made in that Court to stay a summary judgment ruling." (ECF No. 91 at 1.) "[A] party seeking a stay must show (1) that he will likely prevail on the merits of the appeal, (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury if the stay is denied, (3) that other parties will not be substantially harmed by the stay, and (4) that the public interest will be served by granting the stay." Long v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1970). Upon review, the court is simply not persuaded that Defendant "will likely prevail on the merits of the appeal" or "suffer irreparable harm if the stay is denied." In this regard, Bostic establishes that the failure to recognize same−sex marriages runs contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment and Defendant has not suggested an appropriate reason to ignore this precedential authority. Because Bostic is controlling authority in this circuit, the court does not have any justification to continue the deprivation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court DENIES both Defendant's motion to stay pending appeal and his request for a temporary stay to allow the Fourth Circuit to consider his position. denying 91 Motion to Stay. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 11/18/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 11/18/2014)
99 SUMMARY JUDGMENT in favor of plaintiffs against defendant. (asni, ) (Entered: 11/18/2014)
100 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs by Katherine Bradacs, Tracie Goodwin. Response to Motion due by 12/19/2014. Proposed order is being emailed to chambers with copy to opposing counsel.(Nichols, John) (Main Document 100 replaced on 12/2/2014) (asni, ). Modified to replace document at the request of the attorneys on 12/2/2014 (asni, ). (Entered: 12/02/2014)
101 ORDER granting 100 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs filed by Katherine Bradacs, Tracie Goodwin (Motion due by 12/16/2014, Response to Motion due by 1/13/2015.) Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 12/2/2014. (asni, ) (Entered: 12/02/2014)
102 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 97 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,, 89 Order on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,,, 99 Summary Judgment by Alan M Wilson. − Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0420−5679535. The Docketing Statement form, Transcript Order form and CJA 24 form may be obtained from the Fourth Circuit website at www.ca4.uscourts.gov (Smith, James) (Entered: 12/05/2014)
103 Transmittal Sheet for Notice of Appeal to USCA re 102 Notice of Appeal, The Clerk's Office hereby certifies the record and the docket sheet available through ECF to be the certified list in lieu of the record and/or the certified copy of the docket entries. (asni, ) (Entered: 12/08/2014)
105 ORDER of USCA as to 102 Notice of Appeal, filed by Alan M Wilson. The court consolidates Case No. 14−2241(L)(2:14−cv−4010−RMG) and Case No. 14−2337. Entry of appearance forms and disclosure statements filed by counsel and parties to the lead case are deemed filed in the secondary case. In light of the order entered this day in case No. 14−2241, both cases are now in abeyance. All briefing schedules are rescinded. (sshe, ) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
106 MOTION to Stay or Continue Atty's Fee Deadlines by Alan M Wilson. Response to Motion due by 1/5/2015. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
108 TEXT ORDER granting 106 Motion to Stay Attorney's fee and responsive memoranda in this case and proceedings related thereto until the Court of Appeals makes a final decision regarding the appeal in this case. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 12/17/2014.(asni, ) (Entered: 12/17/2014)

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110 USCA MANDATE and ORDER voluntarily dismissing the case pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the FRAP as to 102 Notice of Appeal, filed by Alan M Wilson (Attachments: # 1 Order)(asni, ) Modified to correct filing date on 7/21/2015 (asni, ). (Entered: 07/21/2015)
111 TEXT ORDER: This matter is before the court to address the posture of the case regarding attorney's fees. Previously, on December 17, 2014, the court granted Defendant's Motion to Stay Attorney's Fee Deadlines until the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals "makes a final decision regarding the appeal in this case." (ECF No. 106 at 2.) On July 20, 2015, the Fourth Circuit granted a motion to dismiss the appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). (ECF No. 110.) As a result, the court sua sponte lifts the aforementioned stay and hereby pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) directs Plaintiffs to file their Motion for Attorney's Fees on or by Tuesday, August 4, 2015. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 7/21/2015. (asni, ) (Entered: 07/21/2015)
113 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Memo in Support by Katherine Bradacs, Tracie Goodwin. Response to Motion due by 8/21/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit with Supporting Documents for John Nichols, # 2 Affidavit with Supporting Documents for Carrie Warner, # 3 Affidavit with Supporting Documents for Laura Morgan)No proposed order.(Nichols, John) (Entered: 08/04/2015)
115 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 113 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs and Memo in Support by Alan M Wilson. Response to Motion due by 9/4/2015. No proposed order.(Smith, James) (Entered: 08/18/2015)
116 TEXT ORDER granting 115 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 113 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs. Response to Motion due by 9/4/2015. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 8/18/2015.(asni, ) (Entered: 08/18/2015)
117 MOTION for Attorney Fees Motion to Resolve Attorney's Fees and Costs by Alan M Wilson. Response to Motion due by 9/18/2015. Proposed order is being emailed to chambers with copy to opposing counsel.(Smith, James) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
118 ORDER AND OPINION denying as moot 113 Motion for Attorney Fees; granting 117 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 9/3/2015.(asni, ) (Entered: 09/03/2015)
120 SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT re 118 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees, by Alan M Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Addendum Satisfaction of Judgment)(Smith, James) (Entered: 09/24/2015)