IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

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CLARK and JANE MOELLER,

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JEFFREY GONZALEZ, LAURA BLAIN, )

KRIS SCHWENKE, and

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TIM THURSTON,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

) Civil Action No. __________

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BRADFORD COUNTY;

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CARL J. ANDERSON, in his official

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capacity as Executive Director

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of the Pennsylvania Commission

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on Crime and Delinquency;

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ALBERTO GONZALES, in his

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official capacity as Attorney General

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of the United States; and

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THE FIRM FOUNDATION

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OF AMERICA, doing business as

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THE FIRM FOUNDATION

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OF BRADFORD COUNTY,

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Defendants.

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___________________________________ )

COMPLAINT

I. Introduction 1. Defendant The Firm Foundation of America receives federal, state, and local
government funding to operate a vocational training program for inmates in the Bradford County Correctional Facility, which is the jail for Bradford County, Pennsylvania. A significant proportion of inmates’ time in the program is spent not on the learning of job skills, but on religious discussions, religious lectures, and prayer. The Firm Foundation describes its program as “a prison ministry.” Program staff are required to be “believer[s] in Christ and Christian Life today” and to “shar[e] these ideals when opportunity arises.” Program staff proselytize inmates in the specific religious beliefs of the Firm Foundation. Inmates are pressured to take part in prayer.
2. Virtually all expenses of the Firm Foundation program are paid with federal, state, and local government funds. The Firm Foundation makes no effort to segregate government funds for solely secular uses; nor, as a practical matter, could it do so, given the nature of the Firm Foundation program. The government is thus financing religious activity and instruction. And because government funds are being used to pay the salaries of Firm Foundation employees, who must meet a religious test to be hired, the government is also financing religious discrimination in employment.
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3. For these and other reasons, the government’s financing and support of the Firm Foundation program violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the religious-freedom provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The plaintiffs — taxpayers whose tax dollars are used to finance the Firm Foundation program, and a former inmate participant in the program — seek, among other relief, an injunction barring the defendant governmental entities and officials from continuing to fund the Firm Foundation’s religious indoctrination and discrimination.
II. Jurisdiction and Venue 4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1343, and 1367. 5. The Court has the authority to grant declaratory relief pursuant to the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. 6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as the Firm
Foundation program is operated within this district, and most of the parties are located within this district.
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III. Parties 7. Plaintiffs Clark and Jane Moeller are residents of Bradford County. The
Moellers pay income taxes to the United States and to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and they pay property taxes to Bradford County. The Moellers oppose government funding and support for indoctrination into any religious view. They object to and are offended by the use of their tax dollars to finance the Firm Foundation program and thus to finance the Firm Foundation’s promulgation of its religious beliefs. By so using tax dollars, defendants have harmed and continue to harm the Moellers.
8. Plaintiff Jeffrey Gonzalez is a resident of Bradford County. Gonzalez pays income taxes to the United States and to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and he pays property taxes to Bradford County. Gonzalez opposes government funding and support for indoctrination into any religious view. He objects to and is offended by the use of his tax dollars to finance the Firm Foundation program and thus to finance the Firm Foundation’s promulgation of its religious beliefs. By so using tax dollars, defendants have harmed and continue to harm Gonzalez.
9. Plaintiff Laura Blain is a resident of Bradford County. Blain pays income taxes to the United States and to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and she pays property taxes to Bradford County. Blain opposes government funding and support
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for indoctrination into any religious view. She objects to and is offended by the use of her tax dollars to finance the Firm Foundation program and thus to finance the Firm Foundation’s promulgation of its religious beliefs. By so using tax dollars, defendants have harmed and continue to harm Blain.
10. Plaintiff Kris Schwenke is a resident of Bradford County. Schwenke pays income taxes to the United States and to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and he pays property taxes to Bradford County. Schwenke opposes government funding and support for indoctrination into any religious view. Schwenke therefore objects to and is offended by the use of his tax dollars to finance the Firm Foundation program and thus to finance the Firm Foundation’s promulgation of its religious beliefs. By so using tax dollars, the defendants have harmed and continue to harm Schwenke.
11. Plaintiff Tim Thurston is a resident of Bradford County and a former inmate of the Bradford County Correctional Facility. When he was incarcerated there, Thurston participated in the Firm Foundation program. Thurston does not subscribe to the religious beliefs taught in the Firm Foundation program; nor does he subscribe to any religious faith. Thurston enrolled in the Firm Foundation program because doing so was the only way for him to obtain vocational training while incarcerated. Before he signed up for the program, Thurston was not informed by county-jail or Firm Foundation staff about the program’s religious nature. Instead, the jail and
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program staff-members told him that although the program staff held certain religious beliefs, religion was not part of the program.
12. But after Thurston entered the program, program personnel proselytized him in their religious beliefs without his consent, and they pressured him to engage in prayer. Because Thurston did not share and could not adopt the Firm Foundation’s religious beliefs, he felt like an outsider within the program. Thurston felt coerced by jail officials and Firm Foundation staff into submitting to religious proselytization and attending prayer sessions. Thurston believes that the County is endorsing religion through its sponsorship and support of the Firm Foundation program. For all of these reasons, the conduct of the County and the Firm Foundation harmed Thurston.
13. Defendant Bradford County is a municipality of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that is situated within this federal judicial district. As detailed below, the County has paid federal, state, and County funds to the Firm Foundation and continues to do so, and has given the Firm Foundation other forms of support and continues to do so.
14. Defendant Carl J. Anderson is sued in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (“PCCD”). The PCCD is an administrative commission within the Executive Offices of the Governor of Pennsylvania. The PCCD’s purposes include “assist[ing] the criminal and juvenile
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justice systems [to] function more productively.” The PCCD administers the distribution of certain federal and state grant funds, including grant funds awarded to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by the U.S. Department of Justice from the Department’s Drug Control and System Improvement program. The PCCD’s responsibilities include reviewing applications for sub-grants out of Drug Control and System Improvement funds, financial management of such sub-grants, and auditing of such sub-grants.
15. Defendant Anderson has served as Executive Director of the PCCD since February 2003. His office is in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which is within this judicial district. As detailed below, defendant Anderson authorized the payment of Drug Control and System Improvement funds to the County for the Firm Foundation program, and he failed to cause the PCCD to monitor or audit the Firm Foundation to ensure that the Firm Foundation was not using federal funds for religious activities or other unconstitutional purposes.
16. Defendant Alberto Gonzales is sued in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States. The Attorney General is the chief executive officer of the U.S. Department of Justice. The Justice Department approved the granting of federal Drug Control and System Improvement funds to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and some of those funds were paid to the Firm Foundation. As head
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of the Department of Justice, Gonzales has the authority to cause Bradford County and defendant Anderson to stop providing federal Drug Control and System Improvement funds to the Firm Foundation. Gonzales has not done so.
17. Defendant The Firm Foundation of America is a non-profit corporation incorporated in Pennsylvania and headquartered in the Borough of Towanda, which is in Bradford County. The Firm Foundation does business in Bradford County under the fictitious name “The Firm Foundation of Bradford County.” The Firm Foundation describes itself as a “Faith based, non-profit organization.” It operates the Firm Foundation program for the Bradford County Correctional Facility. As detailed below, the Firm Foundation has received federal, state, and local funds from the County and from other governmental entities for the Firm Foundation program, and has signed contracts with the County and other governmental entities providing for the operation and funding of the Firm Foundation program.
18. The Firm Foundation is named as a defendant on the ground that its conduct constitutes state action. The Firm Foundation operates the Firm Foundation program under the terms of contractual and administrative rights and privileges granted to it by Bradford County. Virtually all of the Firm Foundation’s funding comes from government grants, and the County otherwise significantly aids the Firm Foundation program, including by providing the county-jail inmates who participate
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in the program. The County has delegated to the Firm Foundation the performance of a traditionally public function — supervision and rehabilitation of jail inmates. For these reasons, the conduct of the Firm Foundation may fairly be treated as conduct of the state itself, and is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
19. In addition, and in the alternative, the Firm Foundation is named as a defendant because it is an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. The Firm Foundation has a contractual relationship with Bradford County that plaintiffs allege is unconstitutional. Part of the relief sought by this action is an order requiring the Firm Foundation to return government funds received by it to the governmental entities that paid out those funds. Thus, plaintiffs could not obtain full relief if the Firm Foundation were not a party to this action. Resolution of this action in the absence of the Firm Foundation will subject the other parties to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations, for the Firm Foundation could attempt to protect its contractual relationship with the County through a separate action. Moreover, both the Firm Foundation’s interest in obtaining government funds and that organization’s ability to indoctrinate jail inmates in its religious views would be affected if this action were to proceed without its participation.
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IV. General Allegations A. The Government’s Funding of the Firm Foundation 20. The Firm Foundation’s initial funding was awarded in late 2002 out of
federal grant funds provided by the United States Department of Labor under the Workforce Investment Act. The Department of Labor awarded a “Faith-Based and Community Initiative” grant of Workforce Investment Act funds to the Team Pennsylvania Workforce Investment Board (a state body that manages Workforce Investment Act funds in Pennsylvania). The Board then awarded some of those funds as a sub-grant to the Northern Tier Regional Planning and Development Commission (“the NTRPDC,” a regional body that manages Workforce Investment Act funds for a portion of Pennsylvania that includes Bradford County). The NTRPDC in turn awarded some of those funds as a sub-grant to the Firm Foundation. This sub-grant to the Firm Foundation, in the amount of $57,000, was for the time period from December 1, 2002, through June 30, 2003. The NTRPDC and the Firm Foundation signed a contract providing for the payment of the sub-grant for the Firm Foundation program. In September 2003, the NTRPDC awarded an additional $5,150 in Workforce Investment Act funds to the Firm Foundation.
21. In April 2003, Bradford County and the PCCD began funding the Firm Foundation. The County applied on behalf of the Firm Foundation to the PCCD for
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funding of the Firm Foundation program. Under the authority of defendant Anderson, the PCCD approved the application; and the County and the PCCD awarded a $129,125 grant to the Firm Foundation. The County and the Firm Foundation signed a contract providing for the payment of the grant. The grant consisted of $92,344 in federal funds from the Drug Control and System Improvement program — which the Department of Justice awarded to the PCCD and the PCCD in turn provided to Bradford County — and $36,781 from the County’s general fund. This grant covered the period from April 1, 2003, through June 30, 2004.
22. In mid-2004, the County applied to the PCCD for a continuation grant to fund the Firm Foundation for the period from July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2005. Under the authority of defendant Anderson, the PCCD approved this application. The total amount of the grant again was $129,125. This time, $64,562 of the grant came from the federal Drug Control and System Improvement program, and the remaining $64,563 came from state funds.
23. Projects supported by the federal Drug Control and System Improvement program are eligible for twelve-month grants that are renewable twice (for a maximum of three years’ funding). Accordingly, in its application to the PCCD on behalf of the Firm Foundation for funding for 2004-05, Bradford County stated that it intended to apply for a second continuation grant for the Firm Foundation program for 2005-06.
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24. In addition, the Firm Foundation has received other forms of government funding and support. In or about early 2004, Firm Foundation inmates received for participating in the program hourly wages that were paid from federal funds provided under the Workforce Investment Act to the NTRPDC, which had in turn provided the funds to a non-profit organization called Bradford County Action. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the amount of such payments exceeded $11,000. In or about August 2004, the Borough of Towanda, Pennsylvania, provided an additional grant in the amount of $15,000 to the Firm Foundation out of federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families funds received by the Borough from the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the Firm Foundation has received other forms of support from government entities.
25. Virtually all of the funding received by the Firm Foundation has come from federal, state, and local governmental sources. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that, up through October 2003, all but $25 of the Firm Foundation’s income consisted of payments from governmental entities, and that, thereafter, more than ninety percent of the Firm Foundation’s income consisted of payments from such entities. Most of the government funds received by the Firm Foundation are used to pay the salaries and benefits of Firm Foundation employees. The Firm Foundation makes no effort
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to use private funds to pay for the religious activity and instruction that it provides to inmates.
B. The Firm Foundation’s Religious Proselytization and Coercion of Inmates
26. The Firm Foundation operates a program for inmates who are incarcerated in the Bradford County Correctional Facility, which is the County’s jail. In its newsletter, the Firm Foundation describes itself as a “prison ministry.” According to the Firm Foundation’s executive director, “We see ourselves as missionaries and live accordingly.” In a document promoting its program, the Firm Foundation states, “This program is based on the belief that lives are changed as hearts become open to Faith. The administration, trainers, and staff have committed their lives to this belief and are examples of Jesus Christ the Lord.” The Firm Foundation’s newsletter also states the following about the program:
As the men interact over the course of the day, and as the vocational skills are passed along and the satisfaction of a job well-done is earned, someone else is present there with them. His is an unseen presence, manifested through the trainers.
That someone is Jesus Christ. 27. The Firm Foundation claims that it provides inmates of the Bradford County Correctional Facility with vocational training in the construction field, life skills training, and mentoring. As part of their vocational training, inmates
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participating in the Firm Foundation program work on construction projects at various sites in Bradford County outside the jail. Once inmates participating in the program leave the jail to go to a project site, the Firm Foundation conducts, directs, and manages the entire program and has full supervisory control over the inmates.
28. A significant proportion of inmates’ time in the Firm Foundation program is spent not on vocational training, but on religious discussions, religious lectures, and prayer.
29. For example, at the beginning of each program day and at lunch, Firm Foundation staff (who, as stated above, are paid with government dollars) and inmates pray. The Firm Foundation’s publicly-funded staff pressure inmates to take part in these prayers. Program personnel proselytize inmates in the Firm Foundation’s specific Christian beliefs both in formal education sessions and informally during the program day. Program personnel make statements to inmates that pressure inmates to express professions of faith and adopt the specific Christian beliefs of the Firm Foundation.
30. The Christian beliefs that the Firm Foundation advocates reflect a specific form of Christianity whose teachings differ from those of many Christian denominations such as Catholicism and many mainline Protestant denominations.
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31. The Firm Foundation’s publicly-funded staff engage in religious proselytization of inmates when the inmates are a captive audience, including during transport of inmates between the jail and project sites.
32. The Firm Foundation’s publicly-funded staff also give inmates Bibles and religious literature.
33. The Firm Foundation relies on an organization called Prison Fellowship Ministries to provide written materials, mentors, and training of mentors for the Firm Foundation program. Prison Fellowship is an Evangelical Christian religious organization that describes itself as “the largest prison ministry in the world” and states that it “is in the business of saving souls for Christ.” Prison Fellowship further describes itself as “Compelled to Evangelize in our passion to bring Jesus Christ to the lost and to witness the Kingdom.”
34. As part of a post-release phase of the Firm Foundation program, Firm Foundation staff have taken inmates to church.
C. The Firm Foundation’s Religious Discrimination in Employment 35. The Firm Foundation discriminates in hiring on the basis of religion, employing only Christians.
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36. A Firm Foundation job description states that an employee “will be a [sic] example of a believer in Christ and Christian Life today, sharing these ideals when opportunity arises.”
37. In a document promoting its program, the Firm Foundation states, “This program is based on the belief that lives are changed as hearts become open to Faith. The administration, trainers, and staff have committed their lives to this belief and are examples of Jesus Christ the Lord.”
38. As described above, the Firm Foundation uses government funds to pay the salaries of its employees, despite requiring the employees to meet a religious test in order to be hired.
39. The governmental entities that fund the Firm Foundation are thus financing invidious religious discrimination in employment with federal, state, and local tax revenues obtained from plaintiffs and other taxpayers.
D. The Firm Foundation’s Construction Work for a House of Worship 40. One construction project that the Firm Foundation undertook with its inmates was demolition work for a church, the Greater Valley Assembly of God.
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E. The Firm Foundation’s Use of Government Funds for Religious Purposes
41. As described above, virtually all of the funding received by the Firm Foundation has come from federal, state, and local government sources; most of those funds are used to pay the salaries and benefits of Firm Foundation employees; and the Firm Foundation makes no effort to use private funds to pay for religious activity or instruction. As further described above, Firm Foundation staff, who must meet a religious test to be hired, lead inmates in prayer, proselytize inmates in specific Christian religious beliefs, provide religious instruction to inmates, and pressure inmates to participate in religious activity.
42. The Firm Foundation thus uses government money, including tax dollars obtained from the plaintiffs, to pay for and support religious activity, instruction, and proselytization, religious coercion of inmates, and religious discrimination in employment.
43. If tax funds were not being granted to the Firm Foundation, either the tax funds would be used in a constitutional manner benefitting plaintiffs and their fellow taxpayers, or else the amount of taxes paid by plaintiffs and other Bradford County residents would be reduced.
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44. Defendants Bradford County, Anderson, and Gonzales have failed to establish safeguards sufficient to prevent the Firm Foundation from using government funds for religious activities and purposes. The County, the PCCD, and the Department of Justice do not audit or monitor the Firm Foundation program to determine whether government money is being used for religious activities or other unconstitutional purposes. Indeed, the government did not even make any attempt to determine whether the Firm Foundation was complying with its non-religion-related statutory, regulatory, and contractual obligations in its use of government funds until the Bradford County Alliance for Democracy (in which some of the plaintiffs are members) provided the County with evidence of financial irregularities and thereby persuaded the County to undertake a financial review (which was inadequate) of the Firm Foundation’s handling and expenditure of public monies.
45. The County is paying government funds directly to the Firm Foundation. Government money is therefore being delivered directly into the coffers of a religious organization. Those funds are readily available for diversion, and have in fact been diverted, to uses that violate the federal Establishment Clause as well as the Pennsylvania Constitution.
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F. Inmates are Wrongfully Induced to Enroll in the Firm Foundation Program
46. The Firm Foundation program is the only program available to inmates in the Bradford County jail that provides vocational training or teaches employment skills to inmates. The County’s failure to make secular alternatives to the Firm Foundation program available to inmates coerces, induces, and gives inmates incentives to enroll in the program (and thereby to subject themselves to the program’s religious instruction, prayer, and proselytization) even if they do not subscribe to the religious beliefs of the Firm Foundation or do not desire religious instruction or experiences.
47. Before inmates enroll in the Firm Foundation program, County jail and Firm Foundation staff fail to provide them with complete information about the religious nature of the program or the nature of the specific religious beliefs presented therein. The County’s and the Firm Foundation’s inadequate disclosures further coerce and induce inmates to enroll in the program even if the inmates do not subscribe to the religious beliefs of the Firm Foundation or do not desire religious instruction or experiences.
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G. The County’s Endorsement of and Entanglement with the Firm Foundation
48. Bradford County gave the Firm Foundation the support of the County and of the County jail’s officials.
49. The County has given the Firm Foundation access to the jail and the jail’s inmates; it has permitted the Firm Foundation to involve those inmates in the organization’s program; it has cooperated with and assisted the Firm Foundation with respect to the recruitment of inmates and the operation of the program; and plaintiffs are informed and believe that the County has aided the Firm Foundation in other ways.
50. The County’s conduct thereby communicates a message of governmental endorsement of and preference for religion in general and the specific religious tenets of the Firm Foundation in particular.
51. The County’s involvement with the Firm Foundation program has also resulted in excessive government entanglement with religion.
H. The Defendants Knowingly Acted Unlawfully 52. The contract between the Firm Foundation and the County (under which the Firm Foundation has been receiving federal Drug Control and System Improvement funds, state funds, and county funds) prohibited the Firm Foundation from discriminating based on religion in employment or in the operation of its
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program. The contract between the Firm Foundation and the NTRPDC (under which the Firm Foundation received Workforce Investment Act funds) not only prohibited the Firm Foundation from engaging in any form of religious discrimination, but also provided:
No funds may be used in support of any religious activity, nor may any trainee be employed in the construction, operation, or maintenance of such part of any facility which is used or intended for use for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious worship. Trainees shall not be involved in, or funds expended for, religious or anti-religious activities. 53. These contractual provisions, which are in accordance with the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions, were based on a statute prohibiting the use of Drug Control and System Improvement funds to support religious discrimination (see 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)(1)), and on a statute prohibiting the use of Workforce Investment Act funds to support religious discrimination or activity (see 29 U.S.C. § 2938(a)). Defendant Firm Foundation blatantly violated the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against religious discrimination and religious uses of government funds that were set forth in the very contracts it signed. (While plaintiffs do not bring a statutory or contractual cause of action, the statutes and contracts support the relief plaintiffs seek against the Firm Foundation, as described below.) 54. An organization in which some of the plaintiffs are members — the Bradford County Alliance for Democracy — informed Bradford County and
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defendant Anderson that the Firm Foundation was using government funds to support proselytization of inmates and religious discrimination in employment. Nevertheless, Bradford County and defendant Anderson continued to fund and support the Firm Foundation.
V. Claims for Relief Count One
(Violation of the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution) 55. Paragraphs 1 through 54 above are incorporated as if fully set forth herein. 56. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” The Establishment Clause also applies with full force and effect to the acts of state and local governments and officials under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 57. By financing and supporting the Firm Foundation program, the defendants have violated and continue to violate the Establishment Clause in many ways, including as described below. 58. The government’s financing and support of the Firm Foundation program has the primary effect of advancing religion. It results in governmental indoctrination.
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Government funds are being used to pay for and support religious activity, instruction, and proselytization, religious coercion of inmates, and invidious discrimination in employment based on religion. Government funds have also been used to pay for construction-related work for church property. Governmental cash aid is being delivered directly into the coffers of a religious organization. No adequate monitoring or other safeguards exist to prevent the aid from being used for religious instruction or other unconstitutional purposes.
59. The defendants’ conduct coerces, induces, and gives inmates incentives to participate in and submit to religious instruction, activity, and proselytization. The defendants’ financing and support of the Firm Foundation program convey to reasonable observers a message of endorsement of religion in general and of the specific form of Christianity presented by the Firm Foundation program in particular. The defendants’ financing and support of the Firm Foundation program further constitute a governmental preference for Christianity in general and for the specific form of Christianity presented by the Firm Foundation program in particular. The County’s involvement with the Firm Foundation program has also resulted in excessive government entanglement with religion. In addition, by giving the Firm Foundation full authority over the supervision and rehabilitation of inmates enrolled
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in the program when the inmates are outside the jail facility, the County is delegating governmental power to a religious organization.
60. By violating the Establishment Clause as set forth above, defendants Bradford County, Anderson, and the Firm Foundation have, under color of federal and state statutes, ordinances, regulations, custom, or usage, deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, entitling plaintiffs to a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By violating the Establishment Clause as set forth above, defendant Gonzales has deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the First Amendment, entitling plaintiffs to a remedy under the U.S. Constitution.
61. Moreover, defendants Firm Foundation and Bradford County have entered into a combination, agreement, or understanding to maintain and facilitate the constitutional violations detailed herein and the resulting constitutional injury to plaintiffs. Since at least July 2004, the County has been aware that the Firm Foundation provides religious instruction to inmates, coerces inmates to take part in religious activity, and discriminates in employment based on religion. But the County has not demanded that such activities cease. Instead, the Firm Foundation and the County have conspired and acted to continue the unconstitutional use of government funds to promote religion. The Firm Foundation has continued and the County has permitted the continuance of prayers, religious lectures, coerced worship, and
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religious discrimination in the Firm Foundation program. The Firm Foundation has failed to provide financial records and an accounting sufficient to enable monitoring or oversight of the program that would have the goal of ensuring that government funds not be used in an unconstitutional manner, and the County has failed to conduct such monitoring or oversight or to demand such financial records or accounting. The County and the Firm Foundation have proceeded with the above-described conduct in concert with the purpose of maintaining the unconstitutional use of public funds to support religion and religious discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
62. By virtue of defendants’ violations of the Establishment Clause, plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief, declaratory relief, nominal damages, and recoupment.
Count Two (Violation of Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights
of the Pennsylvania Constitution) 63. Paragraphs 1 through 62 above are incorporated as if fully set forth herein. 64. Section 3 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.
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65. By compelling taxpayers to support a ministry, by coercing jail inmates to attend and take part in worship, by interfering with the rights of conscience of inmates, by exhibiting a preference for the particular Christian teachings presented by the Firm Foundation, and through the other conduct described above, defendants have violated Section 3 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
66. By virtue of defendants’ violations of Section 3 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution, plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief, declaratory relief, nominal damages, and recoupment.
Count Three (Violation of Section 29 of Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution)
67. Paragraphs 1 through 66 above are incorporated as if fully set forth herein. 68. Section 29 of Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: No appropriation shall be made for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes to any person or community nor to any denominational and sectarian institution, corporation or association: Provided, That appropriations may be made for pensions or gratuities for military service and to blind persons twentyone years of age and upwards and for assistance to mothers having dependent children and to aged persons without adequate means of support and in the form of scholarship grants or loans for higher educational purposes to residents of the Commonwealth enrolled in institutions of higher learning except that no scholarship, grants or loans for higher educational purposes shall be given to persons enrolled in a theological seminary or school of theology.
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69. By making appropriations to a denominational and sectarian institution, corporation, or association, which is using for sectarian purposes the funds appropriated, defendants have violated Section 29 of Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
70. By virtue of defendants’ violations of Section 29 of Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution, plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief, declaratory relief, nominal damages, and recoupment.
VI. Prayer for Relief 71. Paragraphs 1 through 70 above are incorporated as if fully set forth herein. Injunction 72. The plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs
respectfully request a permanent injunction prohibiting Bradford County, the Executive Director of the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, and the Attorney General of the United States from funding the Firm Foundation program so long as the program continues to include any of the following: (i) religious activity, instruction, or proselytization; (ii) religious coercion of inmates; or (iii) religious discrimination in employment. In the event that said relief is insufficient to ensure full compliance with the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions, plaintiffs request a
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permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from providing any public funds at all to the Firm Foundation. Plaintiffs further request an injunction requiring Bradford County, the Executive Director of the PCCD, and the Attorney General to monitor all grants given to religious or faith-based organizations by them, or by government entities subject to their authority, so as to ensure that the funds so given are not used in a manner prohibited by the federal Establishment Clause or by the religiousfreedom provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Declaratory Judgment 73. An actual controversy exists between the parties as to whether the funding and operation of the Firm Foundation program violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the religious-freedom clauses of the Pennsylvania Constitution. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request a declaratory judgment that: (a) defendants Bradford County, Anderson, and Gonzales violated the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions by providing government funds to the Firm Foundation and by failing to provide adequate monitoring of the Firm Foundation’s use of those funds;
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(b) defendant Bradford County violated the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions by authorizing the operation of and supporting the Firm Foundation program;
(c) defendant Firm Foundation violated the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions by using government funds to support religious activity, instruction, and proselytization, religious coercion of inmates, and religious discrimination in employment; and
(d) defendants Bradford County and the Firm Foundation violated the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions by coercing and inducing plaintiff Thurston to submit to religious proselytization and attend prayer sessions.
Nominal Damages 74. Plaintiffs’ rights under the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the religious-freedom clauses of the Pennsylvania Constitution were violated by defendants. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request nominal damages against: (a) defendant Bradford County for authorizing the operation of and supporting the Firm Foundation program, and for failing to adequately monitor the Firm Foundation’s use of government funds;
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(b) defendant Firm Foundation for using government funds to support religious activity, instruction, and proselytization, religious coercion of inmates, and religious discrimination in employment; and
(c) defendants Bradford County and the Firm Foundation for coercing and inducing plaintiff Thurston to submit to religious proselytization and attend prayer sessions.
Recoupment 75. As described above in paragraphs 52 and 53, defendant Firm Foundation blatantly violated the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against religious discrimination and religious uses of government funds that were set forth in the very contracts it signed. Defendant Firm Foundation therefore knew or reasonably should have known that its receipt and uses of government funds were unconstitutional and unlawful, and the Firm Foundation therefore could not have reasonably relied on payments of government funds for its expenses. Return to the governmental entities that made payments to the Firm Foundation of the government funds so paid would protect and advance the constitutional rights raised by this action by deterring the Firm Foundation and other private organizations from accepting government funds in the future where, as here, such payments of funds are clearly unconstitutional and unlawful. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request an order requiring the Firm
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Foundation to return all government funds ever received by it to the governmental entities that paid out those funds, or, in the alternative, an order requiring return (after an appropriate accounting, if feasible) to the paying governmental entities of all government funds used by the Firm Foundation to support religious activity, instruction, and proselytization, religious coercion of inmates, and religious discrimination in employment.
Other Relief 76. Plaintiffs further respectfully request an order awarding plaintiffs the costs of this action, including attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 77. Plaintiffs further respectfully request that the Court award any other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

By: s/ Alex J. Luchenitser Alex J. Luchenitser, Esq.

Date: February 17, 2005

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Ayesha N. Khan, Esq. (DC 426836; application for admission pro hac vice submitted
herewith) Richard B. Katskee, Esq. (DC 474250; application for admission pro hac vice
submitted herewith) Alex J. Luchenitser, Esq. (DC 473393; application for admission pro hac vice
submitted herewith)
Americans United for Separation of Church and State
518 C Street NE
Washington, DC 20002
Phone: (202) 466-3234
Fax: (202) 466-2587 E-mail: akhan@au.org / katskee@au.org / luchenitser@au.org

By: s/ Witold J. Walczak Witold J. Walczak, Esq.
Witold J. Walczak, Esq. (PA 62976) ACLU of Pennsylvania 313 Atwood Street Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Phone: (412) 681-7864 Fax: (412) 681-8707 E-mail: vwalczak@aclupgh.org
Mary Catherine Roper, Esq. (PA 71107) ACLU of Pennsylvania P.O. Box 1161 Philadelphia, PA 19105 Phone: (215) 592-1513 Fax: (215) 592-1343 E-mail: mroper@aclupa.org

Date: February 17, 2005

31

Paula K. Knudsen, Esq. (PA 87607) ACLU of Pennsylvania 105 N. Front St., Suite 225 Harrisburg, PA 17101 Phone: (717) 236-6827 Fax: (717) 236-6895 E-mail: pknudsen@aclupa.org Counsel for plaintiffs
32

 
 - - - - - - - ---------------Case 3:05-cv-00334-JMM-TMB Document 172 Filed 04/04/07 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Clark and Jane Moeller, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. Bradford County, et al.,

CIVIL ACTION No. 3:05-CV-334
Judge James M. Munley Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Blewitt

Defendants.

CONSENT ORDER Plaintiffs Clark Moeller, Jane Moeller, Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, and Kris Schwenke ("Plaintiffs"), and Defendant Bradford County, having agreed to resolve this dispute in the manner set forth below, this Court orders that: 1. All contracts that provide for payment by Bradford County of federal,
state, or local funds (collectively, "Public Funds") to any other entity ("Funded Entity") shall contain the following restrictions:
a. Public Funds shall not be used to support any Religious Activities (the tenn "Religious Activities'' includes religious instruction, worship, rituals, proselytization, and indoctrination, and any other religious activity).
b. Public Funds shall not be used to purchase religious materials or pay for the supervisory, administrative, labor, or other costs of

Case 3:05-cv-00334-JMM-TMB Document 172 Filed 04/04/07 Page 2 of 9
construction, maintenance, or repair of buildings that are used primarily as houses of worship or primarily for Religious Activities. c. The Funded Entity's officers, employees, and volunteers shall not pressure or coerce any beneficiary of or participant in the program that is funded with the Public Funds ("Funded Program") to attend or participate in any Religious Activities. d. If the Funded Entity offers or engages in Religious Activities, the Religious Activities must occur separately in time and space from the Funded Program, must be wholly voluntary, and must occur in a manner that protects program beneficiaries and participants from any pressure or coercion to take part in the Religious Activities. e. The Funded Entity shall keep Public Funds in an account that is separate from any account it uses to support Religious Activities, and shall maintain separate financial records for the account that contains Public Funds. f. In admitting beneficiaries or participants into the Funded Program, and in rendering assistance to beneficiaries of and participants in the Funded Program, the Funded Entity must not discriminate against or among beneficiaries or participants based on religion, a
2

Case 3:05-cv-00334-JMM-TMB Document 172 Filed 04/04/07 Page 3 of 9
religious belief, a refusal to express or to hold a religious belief, or a refusal to attend or participate in a Religious Activity. 2. If a statute or regulation applicable to particular Public Funds prohibits the recipient of the Public Funds from discriminating in hiring or employment based on religion, then the contract between Bradford County and the Funded Entity must incorporate that prohibition. 3. Bradford County officials or employees shall monitor the compliance of each religious, religiously·affiliated, and faith-based Funded Entity with paragraphs 1 and (where applicable) 2. Such monitoring shall include at least the following measures: a. Unannounced visits, occurring at least four times each year, to the site ofthe Funded Program. b. Confidential interviews, at least four times per year, of beneficiaries of and participants in the Funded Program. c. Annual reviews ofthose financial and accounting records maintained by the Funded Entity that relate to the Public Funds. d. Where paragraph 2 is applicable, annual reviews of any employment-related policies and any advertisements and notices of employment openings maintained or issued by the Funded Entity.
3

Case 3:05-cv-00334-JMM-TMB Document 172 Filed 04/04/07 Page 4 of 9
e. Preparation of written reports documenting each visit, set of interviews, and annual review required above.
4. Bradford County shall provide notice and explanation of the requirements of this Consent Order ("Order'') to all its officers and employees who are involved with the dissemination of Public Funds and to all personnel ofFunded Entities who are involved with Funded Programs. Bradford County shall require each person who must receive such notice and explanation to sign a statement that they have received the notice and explanation and that they understand the requirements of this Order.
5. Bradford County shall require each entity (henceforth, "Intermediary") that receives Public Funds from it and then provides the Public Funds to other entities to comply with the requirements ofparagraphs 1 and 2. Bradford County shall itself perform the duties required under paragraphs 3 and 4 with respect to the programs that receive Public Funds from such Intermediaries, unless the Intermediary is a governmental body that agrees to and does perform those duties.
6. If any Bradford County taxpayer, or any other person who has recognized legal standing, notifies Bradford County in writing that he or she believes that a Funded Entity is engaging in conduct that is prohibited by
4

Case 3:05-cv-00334-JMM-TMB Document 172 Filed 04/04/07 Page 5 of 9
paragraphs 1 or (where applicable) 2, or that Bradford County or an Intermediary is not complying with any of its duties under this Order, then Bradford County shall conduct an investigation of the complaint and shall make the results of its investigation available to the complaining party within 60 days of receiving the complaint. 7. At the request ofany of the Plaintiffs, Bradford County will provide to the requesting Plaintiff(s) a copy ofeach report that it or an Intermediary prepares pursuant to paragraphs 3(e) and 6. Any such reports required under these paragraphs may be redacted to protect from disclosure infonnation that is required to be kept confidential by law. 8. By entering into this Order, Bradford County, its officials, and its employees do not admit that they have committed any violation ofthe law or other wrongdoing. 9. In the event that Bradford County is found by a court ofcompetent jurisdiction to have violated any ·term ofthis Order, Plaintiffs may request attorney's fees, costs, and expenses for enforcement of the Order and for the work undertaken in connection with Plaintiffs' claims against Bradford County in this action prior to entry ofthis Order. For purposes of adjudicating such a request for fees, costs, and expenses, Plaintiffs will be deemed prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 with respect to both
5

Case 3:05-cv-00334-JMM-TMB Document 172 Filed 04/04/07 Page 6 of 9
said enforcement work and said prior work; the Court will determine the amount ofthe fees, costs, and expenses for both the enforcement work and the prior work in accordance with the case law under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for awarding fees to prevailing parties. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no violation ofthis Order that occurs more than two years after the entry ofthis Order may serve as a basis for a request by Plaintiffs for any fees, costs, or expenses for the work undertaken in connection with Plaintiffs' claims against Bradford County in this action prior to entry of this Order. Furthennore, ifBradford County complies with this Order, Bradford County shall not be required to pay any of the fees, costs, and expenses of Plaintiffs' attorneys in this case. I0.This Court reserves jurisdiction to enforce this Order. In the event that Bradford County fails to comply with this Order, Plaintiffs may file a motion with this Court seeking enforcement of the Order. 11. This Order is intended to resolve all claims made in this action against defendant Bradford County by Plaintiffs Clark Moeller, Jane Moeller, Jeff Gonzalez, Laura Blain, and Kris Schwenke. Except as provided herein, the parties do not waive their rights or obligations with regard to future claims.
6

Case 3:05-cv-00334-JMM-TMB Document 172 Filed 04/04/07 Page 7 of 9

12.A full and final Order having been entered with respect to the claims of

Plaintiffs Clark Moeller, Jane Moeller, Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain,

and Kris Schwenke against defendant Bradford County, those claims are

dismissed with prejudice and without costs or attorneys' fees (except as

may be required under paragraph 9) to any party.

~~yof ~ft' SOORDEREDthis

(

THE PARTIES HEREBY CONSENT TO THE FORM AND ENTRY OF THIS ORDER:

CO?nSeifor Plaintiffs Clark Moeller, Jane Moeller, Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, and Kris Schwenke
Bruce R Kelly (BK 2962) Daniel M. Kuhn (OK 4725) Yue-Han Chow (YC 4393) Arnold & Porter LLP 399 Park Avenue New York, NY I 0022 Tel: (212) 715-1000 Fax: (212) 715-1399
7

Co for Defendant Bradford County
Michael J. Donohue, Esq. Kreder, Brooks & Hailstone 220 Park Avenue Suite 220 P.O. Box 596 Scranton, PA 18501 Tel: (570) 346-7922 Fax: (570) 346-3715 Email: mdonohue@kbh-law.com

- - - - -·-- -• - - - - • -•••••• • •••-

----III-II~ I I.._,

I 11"'"-'4 V"""TI""'"'"------------

Case 3:05-cv-00334-JMM-TMB Document 172 Filed 04/04/07 Page 8 of 9

t·

Email: Bruce.Kelly@aporter.com I Daniel.Kuhn@aporter.com I YueHan Chow@aporter.com Murray R. Garnick (DC 399260) Alexander E. Bennett (DC 000737) Arnold & Porter LLP 555 12th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004 Tel: (202) 942-5000 Fax: (202) 942-5999 Email:
Murray_Garnick@aporter.com I Alexander_Bennett@aporter.com

Larry L. Crain Senior Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice Brentwood Law Offices 5214 Maryland Way- Suite 402 Brentwood, 1N 37027 Tel: (615) 376-2600
Fax:(615)345-6009 Email: lcrain@brentwoodlaw.com

Ayesha Khan (DC 426836) Richard Katskee (DC 474250) Alex J. Luchenitser (DC 473393) Americans United for Separation of Church and State 518 C St., NE Washington, D.C. 20002 Tel: (202) 466-3234 Fax: (202) 466-2587 Email: akhan@au.org I katskee@au.org I
luchenitser@au.org

Witold J. Walczak (PA 62976) ACLU of Pennsylvania 313 Atwood Street Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Tel: (412) 681-7864 Fax: (412) 681-8707
Email: vwalczak@aclupgh.org

Mary Catherine Roper (PA 711 07} ACLU ofPennsylvania
P.O. Box 40008 Philadelphia, PA 19106 Tel: (215) 592-1513
8

- - - - - _____......,...,...,_.._.......,......,.,..........,,.........,"'""--r-vl••••• • •••...,.

I II'""'"" V~l - - ,...~----------------------

..

Case 3:05-cv-00334-JMM-TMB Document 172 Filed 04/04/07 Page 9 of 9

..

Fax: (215) 592-1343 Email: mroper@aclupa.org

9

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CLARK MOELLER; JANE MOELLER; : No. 3:05cv334

JEFFREY GONZALEZ; LAURA BLAINE; :

KRIS SCHWENKE; and TIM THURSTON, :

(Judge Munley)

Plaintiffs

:

v.

:

:

BRADFORD COUNTY; CAROL L.

:

LAVERY, in her official capacity as

:

Acting Director of the Pennsylvania

:

Commission on Crime and Delinquency;

:

ALBERTO GONZALEZ, in his official

:

capacity as Attorney General of the United :

States; THE FIRM FOUNDATION OF

:

AMERICA, d/b/a THE FIRM

:

FOUNDATION OF BRADFORD COUNTY; :

Defendants

:

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court for disposition are objections to two Reports and

Recommendations from United States Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Blewitt, each disposing

of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The first

suggests that we grant Defendant Firm Foundation of America’s motion in part and deny it in

part, and the second suggests we dispose of Defendant Alberto Gonzalez’s motion in the

same manner. The Firm Foundation and Defendant Bradford County have filed objections to

the first Report and Recommendation, and Plaintiffs have filed an objection to one portion of

the second. These matters have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition. For the

following reasons, we will overrule the defendants’ objections and adopt the first Report, and

we will sustain the Plaintiffs’ objection to the second.

I. Background1 The Firm Foundation received federal, state, and local government funding to operate a vocational training program for inmates in the Bradford County Correctional Facility, which is the jail for Bradford County, Pennsylvania. The program not only provides vocational training, but spends a significant amount of time and resources on religious discussions, religious lectures, and prayer. The Firm Foundation describes its program as a prison ministry. It requires its staff to adhere to Christian beliefs and to share these beliefs when the opportunity arises. The Firm Foundation routinely proselytizes to the inmates in the vocational training program, and does not make an effort to segregate government funds for the purely secular purpose of vocational training. This program is the only program available to Bradford County inmates that provides vocational training or teaches employment skills. The Firm Foundation received funds derived from a federal grant under the Workforce Investment Act from the United States Department of Labor. The Department of Labor awarded the funds to the Team Pennsylvania Workforce Initiative Board, which manages the funds in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Board then awarded a portion those funds as a sub-grant to the Northern Tier Regional Planning and Development Commission. The Regional Commission then granted some of those funds to the Firm Foundation. The Firm Foundation also received funds from Bradford County and the Pennsylvania
1 The following background facts are derived from the Complaint (Doc. 1). 2

Commission on Crime and Delinquency. The County applied to the Commission on Crime for funds for the Firm Foundation, and, under the authority of Defendant Carol L. Lavery, the Commission on Crime approved the application. The County and the Firm Foundation then signed a contract governing payment of the grant. In the middle of 2004, the County applied to the Commission on Crime for a continuation grant. Again, the funds were approved, but on this occasion some of the funds came from the Federal Drug Control and System Improvement Program, and the remaining money came from state funds. Additionally, the Firm Foundation inmates received hourly wages from Bradford County Action, which received the funds from the Regional Commission, which received the funds under the Workforce Investment Act.
Plaintiffs Clark Moeller, Jane Moeller, Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, and Kris Schwenke are residents of Bradford County who pay taxes to the United States, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Bradford County. Each objects to the Firm Foundation’s use of taxpayer funds for a religious purpose. Plaintiff Tim Thurston is a resident of Bradford County, a former inmate of the jail, and a former participant in the Firm Foundation’s program.
On February 17, 2005, Plaintiffs filed the instant three count Complaint. In Count I, they allege that the government’s support of the Firm Foundation violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Count II, they allege the support violates Section Three of the Declaration of Rights of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
3

In Count III they allege the support violates Section 29 of Article II of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Plaintiffs seek an injunction prohibiting the defendants from funding the Firm Foundation so long as the program continues its religious instruction and activity, religious coercion of inmates, or discrimination in employment. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction requiring Bradford County, Carol Lavery, and Defendant Alberto Gonzalez, the United States Attorney General, to monitor all grants given to faith based organizations to ensure that the funds are not used in a manner prohibited by the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions. They seek a declaration that providing funds that flow to the Firm Foundation without adequately monitoring the use of the funds violates the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. They also seek monetary damages for the recoupment of the funds used for religious purposes, and finally, they seek nominal damages.
II. Jurisdiction As this case is brought pursuant to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). We have supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. III. Standard When a 12(b)(6) motion is filed, the sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations are tested. The issue is whether the facts alleged in the complaint, if true, support a claim upon
4

which relief can be granted. In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and give the pleader the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can fairly be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). “A court should not dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief.’” Pryor v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
IV. Discussion The Firm Foundation and Alberto Gonzalez have each filed a motion to dismiss. Magistrate Judge Blewitt issued a Report and Recommendation proposing that we grant the Firm Foundation’s motion in part and deny it in part, and issued a separate Report and Recommendation suggesting that we also grant Gonzalez’s motion in part and deny it in part. The Firm Foundation objected to the first Report and Recommendation, and Plaintiffs objected to the second. We will address the two seperately. A. The Firm Foundation Before Magistrate Judge Blewitt, the Firm Foundation argued Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because: 1) it was not a state actor, and thus the constitutional claims must fail; 2) Plaintiffs have no private cause of action to enforce any right under the Pennsylvania Constitution; 3) Plaintiffs, as taxpayers, cannot recover nominal
5

damages for the violation of their rights under the Establishment Clause; and 4) Plaintiff
Thurston’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot because he is no longer an
inmate.
Magistrate Judge Blewitt found: 1) the Complaint sufficiently alleged that the Firm
Foundation was a state actor; 2) we should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the state constitutional claims because they present novel issues of state law; 3) Plaintiffs
may recover nominal damages; and 4) Plaintiff Thurston’s claims for injunctive relief and
declaratory judgment are moot. The Firm Foundation objects to the first and third
conclusions.2 In disposing of the objections we make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report to which the objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C); see also
Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1987). We may accept, reject, or modify,
in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.3 For the
2 The Firm Foundation and Bradford County also objected to Magistrate Judge Blewitt’s characterization of the Firm Foundation as having a primary mission to convert inmates. Not only is this ultimately irrelevant to the disposition of the issues at this stage, Magistrate Judge Blewitt accurately portrays the Complaint. It specifically states that the Firm Foundation proselytized. (Compl. ¶ 12). “Proselytize: to induce someone to convert to one’s faith.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 937 (10th ed. 1999). The complaint also specifically states, “Program personnel make statements to inmates that pressure inmates to express professions of faith and adopt the specific Christian beliefs of the Firm Foundation” (Compl. ¶ 29). Thus, Magistrate Judge Blewitt accurately characterized the Complaint’s allegations.
3 For those portions to which no objections have been filed, we must determine whether a review of the record evidences plain error or manifest injustice. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077, 1085 (3d Cir. 1983); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) 1983 Advisory Committee Notes (“When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record to accept the recommendation”); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). We find no plain error or manifest injustice, and therefore we will adopt these portions.
6

reasons that follow, we will overrule the Firm Foundation’s objections,4 and will adopt the Report and Recommendation in full.
1. State Actor A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must establish: 1) the defendants deprived him of a federally protected constitutional or statutory right, and 2) the defendants acted under color of state law. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 931 (1982). The Firm Foundation argues that Magistrate Judge Blewitt erred in finding that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that it acted under color of law. Plaintiffs argue that the Firm Foundation performed a traditionally public function of supervising and controlling inmates, and therefore is a state actor. To demonstrate that a private entity acted under color of state law, two elements must be present. First, the alleged constitutional deprivation resulted from either: a) an exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority; or b) a rule of conduct imposed by the State or a person for whom the state is responsible. Id. at 937. Second, the defendant “‘could be described in all fairness’” as a state actor. Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 801 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991)). Any of the following three conditions satisfies this element: a) the defendant “is a state official,” b) the defendant “acted together with or obtained significant aid from state officials,” or c) the defendant’s “conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.” Lugar, 457
4 For the same reasons, we will overrule Bradford County’s objections. 7

U.S. at 937. The Supreme Court has employed several tests to determine whether a private party’s
actions are “otherwise chargeable to the State,” and thus “convert the party into a state actor.” Id. at 937-38. These include the “public function” test, the “state compulsion” test, the “nexus” test, and the “joint action” test (Id. at 938-39), as well as the “symbiotic relationship” test. Brown, 250 F.3d at 801. Plaintiffs rely on the public function analysis.5
Under the public function test, ‘when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations.’ . . . The provision of municipal services is a traditional public function for which a private party can be held accountable as a state actor. Robison v. Canterbury Village, Inc., 848 F.2d 424, 427 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)). Moreover, it is not enough that a private group serves a public function; instead, “the question is whether the function performed has been ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (citations omitted). The Complaint alleges, “The County has delegated to the Firm Foundation the performance of a traditionally public function - the supervision and rehabilitation of jail inmates. For these reasons, the conduct of the Firm Foundation may fairly be treated as conduct of the state itself.” (Compl. ¶ 18). Under some circumstances, private actors working within a prison system are state actors. See West v. Atkins, 47 U.S. 42, 54-55
5 We also find that Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Firm Foundation conspired with Bradford County sufficient to support a claim that they were joint actors. (Compl. ¶ 61).
8

(1988) (holding that a prison doctor was state actor because he performed a function that was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State); Rosborough v. Management & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 460-61 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that private prison management companies and their employees are state actors); Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 10102 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a private company managing a prison is a state actor because it performs a public function).
Defendants attempt to factually distinguish these cases. This effort is premature at this stage of the litigation because we must take every fact as true and take all inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. Thus, it is sufficient that we find there is some set of facts Plaintiffs could prove that would entitle them to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Accordingly, we find Plaintiffs have stated facts upon which relief may be granted and we will overrule the objection. 2. Nominal Damages
The Firm Foundation argues that Plaintiffs cannot recover nominal damages and the appropriate remedy instead is injunctive or declaratory relief. Bradford County has joined in this objection. They both argue that Plaintiffs have failed to plead an Establishment Clause violation, and even if they have, nominal damages are not an available remedy.
a. Establishment Clause Violation We find that Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated an Establishment Clause violation. Bradford and the Firm Foundation argue that the vocational program in the prison is not
9

sufficiently coercive to support this claim. They explain that the prison does not require prisoners to participate in the Firm Foundation’s program, and thus even though the prison offers no alternative vocational or education training, it is not sufficiently coercive to violate the Establishment Clause. Magistrate Judge Blewitt relied on Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) in finding that Plaintiffs allege that the program was sufficiently coercive. Bradford distinguishes Lee because the plaintiffs there were high school students, who are particularly impressionable and vulnerable to subtle coercive pressures, whereas the present case deals with adults.
This distinction is not fatal to Plaintiffs’ claim. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. amend I. The Establishment Clause requires that the “government may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or organization, may not discriminate against persons on the basis of their religious beliefs and practices, may not delegate a governmental power to a religious institution, and may not involve itself too deeply in such an institution’s affairs.” Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1988). In Lee, the unique impressionability of children was relevant to the coercive effect of government action in question. 505 U.S. at 581. There, the plaintiffs challenged a school policy that included prayer in the middle school and high school graduation ceremonies. Id. Although participation in the prayer was not required, the Court found that public and peer pressure in the school setting upon children and teenagers gave the prayer policy an unacceptable coercive effect. Id. at 593-94.
10

Furthermore, the importance of the graduation ceremony to a youth rendered the option to skip the ceremony unavailable for all practical purposes. Id. at 594-95.
Lee, however, does not limit impermissible coercion to teenagers, but establishes “[c]oercion is impermissible when it takes the form of ‘subtle coercive pressure’ that interferes with an individual’s ‘real choice’ about whether to participate in worship or prayer.” Destefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 412 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 592). “The fulcrum of this inquiry, we think, is individual conscience and free will.” Id. In Destefano, the state provided funding to an alcohol detoxification and treatment facility. Id. at 402. The treatment program included Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, which involved prayer in treatment. Id. at 402-03. The court found that the level of coercion presented a triable issue of fact, even though patients were not forced to seek treatment at all. Id. at 413.
The ‘choice’ between forgoing the alcohol treatment provided by the State and coping with one’s alcoholism without professional assistance or with assistance at substantial expense or inconvenience, on the one hand, and availing oneself of that treatment and thereby ‘facing a personally offensive religious ritual,’ on the other, may be no choice at all. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000)). Similarly, the choice between foregoing educational and vocational training in prison or enduring the Firm Foundation’s efforts to proselytize may be no choice at all. Thus, Plaintiffs have stated facts upon which relief may be granted and we will overrule the
11

objection and adopt this portion of the Report and Recommendation. 6 b. Appropriate Remedy The Firm Foundation argues that even if Plaintiffs can establish a violation of the
Establishment Clause, they cannot recover nominal damages and would be entitled only to injunctive or declaratory relief. The Firm Foundation recognizes that a plaintiff can recover nominal damages for a violation of a constitutional right, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978), but argues that the Establishment Clause does not create an individual constitutional right, and instead is a structural restraint on the government. It further argues that Plaintiffs cannot recover nominal damages because their standing is not based on a personal injury, but rather on taxpayer standing.
These arguments lack merit. Numerous courts have found nominal damages an appropriate remedy for a violation of the rights protected by the Establishment Clause. O’Connor v. Washburn University, 416 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2005); Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 878-79 (10th Cir. 2001); Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1077 (2d Cir. 1996).
Moreover, that Plaintiffs rely on their position as taxpayers as the basis for standing
6 Additionally, a coercive effect may be sufficient to establish an Establishment Clause violation, but it is not necessary. Lee, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J. concurring) (“Although our precedents make clear that proof of government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation, it is sufficient. Government pressure to participate in a religious activity is an obvious indication that the government is endorsing or promoting religion.”). Thus, even if the coercive effect on prisoners is not sufficient, Plaintiffs may be able to prove an Establishment Clause violation through other means.
12

does not preclude recovery of nominal damages. “[N]ominal damages are the appropriate means of ‘vindicating’ rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.” Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n.11 (1986) (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 266).
Common-law courts traditionally have vindicated deprivations of certain ‘absolute’ rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury through the award of a nominal sum of money. By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed. Carey, 435 U.S. at 266. Thus, the availability of nominal damages is not based on the severity of the injury, but is based on the importance of the observance of the right in question. We need not detail the importance of the Establishment Clause, as this is not in debate. Thus, we find that Magistrate Judge Blewitt did not err in holding that Plaintiffs can recover nominal damages. B. Defendant Gonzalez’s Motion Defendant Gonzalez, sued in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States, also moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. First, he divided Plaintiffs’ allegations against him into two categories: 1) the federal government disbursed funds that flowed to the Firm Foundation which used them for religious purposes; and 2) the federal government failed to monitor the use of the federal funds or enforce safeguards to ensure that the funds were not used for religious activities and purposes. He characterized these allegations as constituting separate ‘funding’ and ‘monitoring’ claims, although the
13

Complaint does not characterize two different claims and advances only one § 1983 claim against Gonzalez.
After separating the allegations, Gonzalez argued that: 1) Plaintiffs have no standing to advance the funding claim; 2) they have no standing to request injunctive relief as to all future Department of Justice (DOJ) grants; and 3) he is entitled to summary judgment on the merits of the monitoring claim. Magistrate Judge Blewitt agreed that Plaintiffs have no standing to advance the funding claim and may not request injunctive relief as to all future DOJ grants, but found it premature to decide the merits of the monitoring claim, and suggested we deny the summary judgment motion without prejudice. Plaintiffs object solely to the portion of the Report and Recommendation that suggests we dismiss the funding claim for lack of standing. Gonzalez filed no objection.7
Thus, the sole issue before this Court is whether Magistrate Judge Blewitt erred when he agreed with Gonzalez that Plaintiffs have no standing to bring their funding claim because their injury is not sufficiently traceable to Gonzalez. Magistrate Judge Blewitt observed that the DOJ did not provide funds directly to the Firm Foundation, but rather it provided funds to a Commonwealth of Pennsylvania agency, which provided them to another agency, which
7 Thus, neither party objected to the disposition of the latter two parts of Gonzalez’s motion. For these portions to which no objections have been filed, we must determine whether a review of the record evidences plain error or manifest injustice. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077, 1085 (3d Cir. 1983); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) 1983 Advisory Committee Notes (“When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record to accept the recommendation”); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). We find no plain error or manifest injustice, and therefore we will adopt the portions to which no objections have been filed.
14

funded the Firm Foundation. Thus, he concluded the causal link between Gonzalez’s conduct and Plaintiffs’ injury was too attenuated to support Plaintiffs’ standing. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with Magistrate Judge Blewitt, and will sustain Plaintiffs’ objection to the Report and Recommendation.8
The standing doctrine derives from Article III of the United States Constitution, which limits the judicial power of the United States to “resolution of ‘case’ and ‘controversies.’” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). Although the standing doctrine covers both constitutional and prudential considerations, “at an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to ‘show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, . . .that the injury ‘fairly can be traced to the challenged action’ and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 472 (internal citations omitted). Gonzalez argues that Plaintiffs’ claims cannot satisfy the second element, traceability. We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, we will not separate the Complaint’s single § 1983 Establishment Clause claim into a ‘monitoring’ and ‘funding’ claim for the purposes of determining standing. The Complaint alleges that the combination of the funding with the failure to monitor the funds violated the Establishment Clause. “[D]efendants Bradford
8 Magistrate Blewitt addressed the standing issue on the pleadings, and therefore we will as well. At the pleading stage, general factual averments of injury resulting from the defendants’ conduct are sufficient, and we must take the alleged facts as true. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
15

County, Anderson, and Gonzalez violated the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions by providing government funds to the Firm Foundation and by failing to provide adequate monitoring of the Firm Foundation’s use of those funds” (Compl. ¶ 73) (emphasis added). Thus, separation of the funding from monitoring allegations would conflict with the Complaint.
More important, viewing each aspect of the alleged improper conduct without regard to the remaining allegations conflicts with the purpose of the standing doctrine. If we ignore some part of Gonzalez’s conduct, we will not be able to properly determine whether the parties are sufficiently adverse.
The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated. The ‘gist of the question of standing’ is whether the party seeking relief has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (emphasis added). Thus, we must focus on whether Plaintiffs’ injuries are sufficiently traceable to Gonzalez’s conduct on the whole, not whether the injuries are sufficiently traceable to a particular alleged improper action.9 “[W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.” Id. at 99-100. The particular
9 As a practical matter it makes no sense to analyze the monitoring claim without also considering the funding. Plaintiffs do not allege that Gonzalez must monitor the Firm Foundation’s use of all funds no matter their source, but the Establishment Clause only becomes an issue because he allegedly failed to monitor the federal government’s funding.
16

issue sought to be adjudicated in this case is whether Gonzalez’s conduct violated the Establishment Clause, and thus we must determine whether Plaintiffs are the proper parties to raise this issue.
Gonzalez argues that the Plaintiffs are not sufficiently adverse to the DOJ because the DOJ played no part in the decision to fund the Firm Foundation. Rather, the money passed from the DOJ through two state agencies before a state agency provided the money to the Firm Foundation. We find that Plaintiffs’ injuries are sufficiently traceable to the DOJ, and thus Plaintiffs have standing.
In Flast v. Cohen, the United States Supreme Court established that federal taxpayers have standing to challenge exercises of the taxing and spending power under Article I section 8 of the United States Constitution that violate the Establishment Clause. 392 U.S. 83, 10506 (1968). A group of taxpayers challenged expenditures of federal funds under Titles I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). Id. at 85. They sued the executive branch officials charged with administering the funds in their official capacities, including the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Id. The ESEA provided educational assistance to low income families, and distributed the funds through federal payments to state educational agencies, which passed the payments to local educational agencies. Id. at 86. The court noted that the crux of the standing issue was whether the parties where sufficiently adverse, and then enumerated the circumstances where a taxpayer has standing. Id. at 101.
17

A taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of constitutional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I § 8 of the constitution. . . . . Secondly, the taxpayer must establish that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8. Id. Thus, the Court found that the plaintiffs had standing because they challenged an exercise of congressional power under Art I. § 8, and alleged “that the challenged expenditures violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.” Id. Significantly, the Court found Plaintiffs had standing even though the defendants did not directly fund the religious activity, and the money flowed through intermediaries. In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court reaffirmed Flast and taxpayer standing to challenge government expenditures pursuant to Article I, section 8. 487 U.S. 589 (1988). A group of taxpayers sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services, challenging the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) on its face and as-applied because religious groups carried out the programs. Id. at 597-98. The Court inquired whether the taxpayers had standing to bring their as-applied challenge under the Flast framework. Id. at 618. The government argued that the plaintiffs had no standing because the as-applied challenge did not attack the taxing and spending power under Article I § 8 because it challenged the executive branch’s administration of funds. Id. at 619. The Court disagreed. “We do not think, however, that appellee’s claim that AFLA funds are being used improperly by individual grantees is any less a challenge to congressional taxing and spending power simply because the funding
18

authorized by Congress has flowed through and been administered by the Secretary.” Id. Thus, the injury is the exercise of the taxing and spending power. Indeed, the Court found that the plaintiffs could establish an as-applied violation if they were able to show “aid is flowing to grantees that can be considered ‘pervasively sectarian.’” Id. at 621 (emphasis added).
Recently, in Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Chao, a group of taxpayers complained that money appropriated by Congress under Article I section 8 was used by various executive-branch agencies to fund conferences to promote the President’s “FaithBased and Community Initiatives.” – F.3d – , 2006 WL 73404, at *5 (7th Cir. Jan. 13, 2006). The complaint alleged that the conferences were designed to promote religious organizations over secular ones. Id. at *5. The complaint, however, could not identify a specific congressional appropriation or statute that earmarked the funds for the conferences. Id. Rather, the conferences were entirely conceived of and run by the executive, and the funds were obtained from appropriations for general administrative expenses. Id. The court found this distinction from Flash and Bowen irrelevant for the purposes of standing. Id. It observed that the complaint alleged that “the conferences are funded by money derived from appropriations, which means from exercises of Congress’s spending power rather than from, say, voluntary donations from private citizens.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, to establish standing, taxpayers need not “show that a statute violated the establishment clause, all they had to show was the a statute enacted pursuant to Congress’s taxing and spending powers
19

under Art. I, section 8 had been necessary for the violation to occur, it did not have to be sufficient.” Id. at *4.
Contrary to Gonzalez’s assertion, Plaintiffs’ claim against him does not challenge the decision to expend funds on religious activity, but it challenges the disbursement of funds. Just as in Bowen, Plaintiffs claims “call into question how the funds authorized by Congress are being disbursed.” Bowen, 487 U.S. at 620. Plaintiffs allege Gonzalez provided funds to state agencies and enforced no restrictions on the use of the money. As a result, federal tax dollars were used to proselytize. Thus, the injury, the expenditure of Plaintiffs’ tax dollars, is directly traceable to Gonzalez. Whether or not the administration of the funds has the requisite connection to religion to violate the Establishment Clause is ultimately a question on the merits, and not a question of standing.10 Thus, we find that Plaintiff’s injury is sufficiently traceable to Gonzalez’s conduct for standing purposes.
IV. Conclusion We will adopt in full the Report and Recommendation on Defendant Firm Foundation’s motion. Plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims will be dismissed, as will Plaintiff Thurston’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. We will adopt the second Report and Recommendation in part. As proposed, Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief as to
10 The administration of funds will violate the Establishment Clause if it “promote[s] or affiliate[s] [the government] with any religious doctrine or organization . . .discriminate[s] against persons on the basis of their religious beliefs and practices, . . . delegate[s] a governmental power to a religious institution, . . .[or] involve[s] itself too deeply in such an institution’s affairs.” Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1988).
20

all future DOJ grants will be dismissed and we will deny Gonzalez’s motion for summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim without prejudice. We will allow Gonzalez to re-file his summary judgment motion following discovery. We will not, however, dismiss the ‘funding’ aspect of the Establishment Clause claim because we find Plaintiffs have standing as taxpayers to challenge the Gonzalez’s administration of the funds. An appropriate order follows.
21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CLARK MOELLER; JANE MOELLER;

:

No. 3:05cv334

JEFFREY GONZALEZ; LAURA BLAINE; :

KRIS SCHWENKE; and TIM THURSTON, :

(Judge Munley)

Plaintiffs

:

v.

:

:

BRADFORD COUNTY; CAROL L.

:

LAVERY, in her official capacity as

:

Acting Director of the Pennsylvania

:

Commission on Crime and Delinquency;

:

ALBERTO GONZALEZ, in his official

:

capacity as Attorney General of the United

:

States; THE FIRM FOUNDATION OF

:

AMERICA, d/b/a THE FIRM

:

FOUNDATION OF BRADFORD COUNTY; :

Defendants

:

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

ORDER

AND NOW, to wit, this 10th day of February 2006, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1) The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 89) is ADOPTED; the Objections (Doc. 94, 95, 96) are DENIED; and the Firm Foundation’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is granted to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state claims and Plaintiff Thurston’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. It is denied in all other respects.

2) The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 93) is ADOPTED in part, and the Objection (Doc. 97) is SUSTAINED. We decline to adopt the portion of the Report and Recommendation that proposes that we dismiss Plaintiffs’ ‘funding’ claim against Defendant Alberto Gonzalez, as described in the above opinion. Defendant Gonzalez’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is granted to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief as to all future Department of Justice grants, and it is denied in all other respects.

3) This matter is remanded to United States Magistrate Judge Blewitt for further proceedings.

BY THE COURT:

s/ James M. Munley JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY United States District Court

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CLARK MOELLER; JANE MOELLER; : No. 3:05cv334

JEFFREY GONZALEZ; LAURA BLAINE; :

KRIS SCHWENKE; and TIM THURSTON, :

(Judge Munley)

Plaintiffs

:

v.

:

:

BRADFORD COUNTY; CAROL L.

:

LAVERY, in her official capacity as

:

Acting Director of the Pennsylvania

:

Commission on Crime and Delinquency;

:

ALBERTO GONZALEZ, in his official

:

capacity as Attorney General of the United :

States; THE FIRM FOUNDATION OF

:

AMERICA, d/b/a THE FIRM

:

FOUNDATION OF BRADFORD COUNTY; :

Defendants

:

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court for disposition are objections to a Report and

Recommendation from United States Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Blewitt disposing of

Defendant Bradford County’s (“the County”) motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Plaintiffs have filed an objection and the County

has filed three. These matters have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition. For the

following reasons, we will sustain the Plaintiffs’ Objection and overrule the Defendants’. I. Background1

The Firm Foundation received federal, state, and local government funding to operate

1 The following background facts are derived from the Complaint (Doc. 1). This summary is contained in our previous Order of February 10, 2006, which adopted two previous Report and Recommendations.

a vocational training program for inmates in the Bradford County Correctional Facility, which is the jail for Bradford County, Pennsylvania (“the County”). The program not only provides vocational training, but spends a significant amount of time and resources on religious discussions, religious lectures, and prayer. The Firm Foundation describes its program as a prison ministry. It requires its staff to adhere to Christian beliefs and to share these beliefs when the opportunity arises. The Firm Foundation routinely proselytizes to the inmates in the vocational training program, and does not make an effort to segregate government funds for the purely secular purpose of vocational training. This program is the only program available to Bradford County inmates that provides vocational training or teaches employment skills.
The Firm Foundation received funds derived from a federal grant under the Workforce Investment Act from the United States Department of Labor. The Department of Labor awarded the funds to the Team Pennsylvania Workforce Initiative Board, which manages the funds in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Board then awarded a portion of those funds as a sub-grant to the Northern Tier Regional Planning and Development Commission. The Regional Commission then granted some of those funds to the Firm Foundation.
The Firm Foundation also received funds from Bradford County and the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency. The County applied to the Commission on Crime for funds for the Firm Foundation, and, under the authority of Defendant Carol L. Lavery, the Commission on Crime approved the application. The County and the Firm Foundation then
2

signed a contract governing payment of the grant. In the middle of 2004, the County applied to the Commission on Crime for a continuation grant. Again, the funds were approved, but on this occasion some of the funds came from the Federal Drug Control and System Improvement Program, and the remaining money came from state funds. Additionally, the Firm Foundation inmates received hourly wages from Bradford County Action, which received the funds from the Regional Commission, which received the funds under the Workforce Investment Act.
Plaintiffs Clark Moeller, Jane Moeller, Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, and Kris Schwenke are residents of Bradford County who pay taxes to the United States, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Bradford County. Each objects to the Firm Foundation’s use of taxpayer funds for a religious purpose. Plaintiff Tim Thurston is a resident of Bradford County, a former inmate of the jail, and a former participant in the Firm Foundation’s program.
II. Procedural Background On February 17, 2005, Plaintiffs filed the instant three count Complaint. In Count I, they allege that the government’s support of the Firm Foundation violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Count II, they allege the support violates Section Three of the Declaration of Rights of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In Count III, they allege the support violates Section 29 of Article II of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Plaintiffs seek an injunction prohibiting the defendants from funding the Firm
3

Foundation so long as the program continues its religious instruction and activity, religious coercion of inmates, or discrimination in employment. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction requiring Bradford County, Carol Lavery, and Defendant Alberto Gonzalez, the United States Attorney General, to monitor all grants given to faith based organizations to ensure that the funds are not used in a manner prohibited by the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions. They seek a declaration that providing funds that flow to the Firm Foundation without adequately monitoring the use of the funds violates the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. They also seek monetary damages for the recoupment of the funds used for religious purposes, and finally, they seek nominal damages.
Defendant Firm Foundation filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It argued: 1) it was not a state actor; 2) Plaintiffs have no private cause of action to recover damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution; 3) Plaintiffs cannot recover nominal damages if they have standing solely as taxpayers; and 4) Plaintiff Thurston’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot because he is no longer an inmate. Magistrate Judge Blewitt issued a report and recommendation suggesting: 1) the Complaint sufficiently alleged that the Firm Foundation was a state actor; 2) we should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional claims because the issue of whether Plaintiffs can recover damages for violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution is a novel issue of state law; 3) Plaintiffs may recover nominal damages, and 4) Plaintiff Thurston’s claims for injunctive relief are moot. The Firm Foundation objected to
4

the state actor and the nominal damages issues, and Plaintiffs filed no objections. We overruled the objections and adopted the Report and Recommendation.
Defendant Alberto Gonzalez also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6). He argued that: 1) Plaintiffs lacked standing to complain about his funding decisions; 2) they lacked standing to request injunctive relief as to all future Department of Justice (DOJ) grants; and 3) he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims that he failed to appropriately monitor his funding.
Magistrate Judge Blewitt issued a Report and Recommendation agreeing with Gonzalez on the first and second issues, but found it premature to grant summary judgment. Gonzalez filed no objections and Plaintiffs objected to Magistrate Judge Blewitt’s conclusion that they lacked standing to complain about the funding. We sustained this objection, but adopted the Report and Recommendation in all other respects.
II. Jurisdiction As this case is brought pursuant to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). We have supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. III. Standard “Under Rule 12(c), judgment will not be granted ‘unless the movant clearly
5

establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Jablonski v. Pan American World Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Society Hill Civic Association v. Harris, 632 F.2d 1045, 1054 (3d Cir. 1989)). The standard for a motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is the same for those filed under 12(b)(6). Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997). When a 12(b)(6) motion is filed, the sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations are tested. The issue is whether the facts alleged in the complaint, if true, support a claim upon which relief can be granted. In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and give the pleader the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can fairly be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). “A court should not dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief.’” Pryor v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
IV. Discussion The County advanced six arguments before Magistrate Judge Blewitt in support of its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. First, it argued that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a claim against it. Second, it argued that Plaintiffs’ allegations of religious coercion are insufficient to state an Establishment Clause claim. Third, it maintained that Plaintiffs failed
6

to state an Establishment Clause claim under theories other than religious coercion. Fourth, it asserted that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support the claim that the County is financing religious discrimination in employment. Fifth, it contended that Thurston’s claims are moot. Finally, it argued that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
In his Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Blewitt proposed that we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Pennsylvania constitution claims. He further suggested that Plaintiffs have standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim and have in fact stated this claim. Plaintiffs filed an objection to the former conclusion and the County filed objections to the latter two. Plaintiffs argue that it is clearly established that a claimant may bring suit for injunctive relief based on the Pennsylvania Constitution. The County again argues that Plaintiffs failed to state an Establishment Clause claim. We will address these issues seperately.
A. Plaintiffs’ Objection: Injunction for State Constitutional Violations The Report and Recommendation proposes that we dismiss the Pennsyvlania Constitutional claims based on the reasoning of our February 10, 2006 Order. There, we adopted a Report and Recommendation suggesting that we decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Pennsylvania Constitution claim because the issue of whether a plaintiff can recover damages for a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution is an unsettled area of state law. Plaintiffs did not file objections to that Report and Recommendation. Here, Plaintiffs have filed objections and argue that since they have requested
7

injunctive relief, we should maintain jurisdiction solely for the purpose of determining whether injunctive or declaratory relief is available. As they correctly note, it is well settled that individual plaintiffs may bring suit for injunctive relief under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Klump v. Nazareth Area School District, 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (dismissing claim for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution but retaining claim for injunctive and declaratory relief).
Although our previous Memorandum and Order and the prior Report and Recommendation were broadly worded, they did not address whether Plaintiffs may maintain a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief. The law is well settled that they can. Id. As our prior reasoning established, our previous Order declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction solely to the extent that Plaintiffs sought damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Therefore, we will sustain the objections and hold that Plaintiffs’ claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution will proceed to the extent that they seek injunctive and declaratory relief.
B. The County’s Objections The County raises three objections to the Report and Recommendation: 1) Plaintiffs’ pleadings fail to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a); 2) Plaintiffs’ allegation that the County granted funds to the Firm Foundation is insufficient to establish that it violated the Establishment Clause; and 3) Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to state an Establishment Clause claim based on the Firm Foundations’ religious
8

discrimination. 1) Notice Pleading under Rule 8(a) A complaint must contain, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). This requires that the pleading provide “the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Lundy v. Amadar of New Jersey, 34 F.3d 1173, 1194 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957)). Plaintiffs alleged that the County hired the Firm Foundation to provide vocational training to inmates. The County provides funds to the Firm Foundation to run this program, and it is the only vocational training program available to the inmates. The Firm Foundation, however, not only provides vocational training, but also proselytizes to inmates, considers itself a prison ministry, and discriminates in its hiring practices on the basis of religion.
The County argues that these allegations are insufficient to place them on notice of Plaintiffs’ claim because Plaintiffs have not identified the time and place of the alleged wrongdoing, and has not identified the responsible officials. We find that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is sufficient to place the defendants on notice because a civil rights complaint is not subject to heightened pleading standards, and thus, it need not identify the time and place of the alleged wrongdoing or the identity of the specific officials responsible. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Fundamentally, a heightened pleading requirement for civil rights complaints no longer retains vitality under the Federal Rules.”).
9

Therefore, we will overrule this objection. 2) Grant Funds Next, the County argues that Plaintiffs have failed to allege an Establishment Clause
violation because it alleges that the County provided the funds on a religion neutral basis. We disagree. Plaintiffs allege that the County chose to fund the Firm Foundation, which was a prison ministry that proselytized to inmates, for its vocational program in the County prison system, and it funded no other vocational program in the County prison system. Therefore, without commenting on the ultimate merits of this claim, we find that Plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Bugher, 249 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[S]tates may not make unrestricted cash payments directly to religious institutions.”) (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 68083 (1971)); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002) (citations omitted) (“[O]ur decisions have drawn a consistent distinction between government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools . . . and programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals); Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 933 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (finding state funding provided to prison rehabilitation program that included prayer as part of the rehabilitation process violated the Establishment Clause because it amounted to government sponsored indoctrination and created excessive entanglement of the government with the ministry).
10

Accordingly, we will deny this objection as well. 3) Employment Discrimination Finally, the County argues that Magistrate Judge Blewitt erred in finding that
Plaintiffs stated a claim for employment discrimination. Again, we disagree. As Magistrate Judge Blewitt noted, Plaintiffs do not advance an employment discrimination claim. Rather, as part of their claim that the County’s prison program violates the Constitution, they allege that the Firm Foundation discriminated on the basis of religion in hiring the program staff. This is one of many allegations regarding the Firm Foundation’s religious activities, including that the vocational program spends a significant amount of time on religious discussions and prayer, the publicly funded staff pressures inmates to pray, and the program used inmates as labor for demolition work for the Greater Valley Assembly of God. No single allegation is its own claim, but all of the allegations are part of one Establishment Clause claim. These allegations are relevant to whether the program has the effect of advancing religion. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648-49 (“The Establishment Clause . . . prevents a State from enacting laws that have the ‘purpose’ or ‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion.’”). Therefore, we will deny the motion on this ground.
In conclusion, we will overrule each of the County’s objections, and will sustain Plaintiffs’ objection. We find that Plaintiffs have satisfied the notice pleading requirements and have stated a claim based on the Establishment Clause. In addition, Plaintiffs may maintain their Pennsylvania Constitutional claims solely to the extent that they seek
11

declaratory or injunctive relief. An appropriate order follows. 12

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CLARK MOELLER; JANE MOELLER;

:

No. 3:05cv334

JEFFREY GONZALEZ; LAURA BLAINE; :

KRIS SCHWENKE; and TIM THURSTON, :

(Judge Munley)

Plaintiffs

:

v.

:

:

BRADFORD COUNTY; CAROL L.

:

LAVERY, in her official capacity as

:

Acting Director of the Pennsylvania

:

Commission on Crime and Delinquency;

:

ALBERTO GONZALEZ, in his official

:

capacity as Attorney General of the United

:

States; THE FIRM FOUNDATION OF

:

AMERICA, d/b/a THE FIRM

:

FOUNDATION OF BRADFORD COUNTY; :

Defendants

:

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

ORDER

AND NOW, to wit, this 10th day of August 2006, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1) The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 113) is hereby ADOPTED in part and DECLINED in part. We reject the Report and Recommendation to the extent that it suggests we should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims for preliminary and injunctive relief based on the Pennsylvania Constitution. We adopt it in all other respects.

2) Plaintiffs’ Objection (Doc. 118) is SUSTAINED.

3) Defendant Bradford County’s Objections (Doc. 117) are OVERRULED.

3) This matter is remanded to United States Magistrate Judge Blewitt for further proceedings.

BY THE COURT:
s/ James M. Munley JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY United States District Court

 
 Moeller v. Bradford County, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 431889 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
Clark MOELLER and Jane Moeller, et al., Plaintiffs v.
BRADFORD COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 3:CV-05-0334. | Feb. 5, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Alex J. Luchenitser, Ayesha Khan, Richard B. Katskee, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Alexander E. Bennett, Alicia A. W. Truman, Matthew R. Turnell, Murray R. Garnick, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, DC, Bruce Kelly, Daniel M. Kuhn, Yue-Han Chow, Arnold & Porter, LLP, New York, NY, Mary Catherine Roper, American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, Paula Kay Knudsen, American Civil Liberties Union of PA, Harrisburg, PA, Witold J. Walczak, American Civil Liberties Union of PA, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Kristina J. Wenberg, Vincent P. McCarthy, New Milford, CT, Michael J. Donohue, Kreder, Brooks, Hailstone & Ludwig, Jennifer Clark, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Scranton, PA, Amy C. Foerster, Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Linda S. Lloyd, Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, Michael L. Harvey, Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA, Anthony J. Coppolino, U.S. Department of Justice, Elizabeth J. Kelhoffer, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fed. Programs Branch, Washington, DC, Leonard G. Brown, Clymer & Musser, P.C., Lancaster, PA, M. Casey Mattox, Steven H. Aden, Springfield, VA, for Defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
THOMAS M. BLEWITT, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Background. *1 The Plaintiffs, Clark and Jane Moeller, Jeffery Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Chris Schwenke and Tim Thurston, all residents of Bradford County, Pennsylvania, filed this action, through counsel for Americans United

for Separation of Church and State and Pennsylvania American Civil Liberties Union, on February 17, 2005, seeking a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, et seq. (Doc. 1). The named Defendants are Bradford County; Carl J. Anderson, (former) Executor Director of Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (“PCCD”); Alberto Gonzales, United States Attorney General; and The Firm Foundation of America, d/b/a/ The Firm Foundation of Bradford County (“FF”). On November 29, 2005, Defendant Bradford County (“BC”) filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. 101).1

1

By Order of February 14, 2006, we directed Defendant

Gonzales and Defendant FF to file their Answers to the

remaining portions of the Complaint against them, Doc.

112. These Defendants filed their Answers on February

28, 2006(FF) and March 2, 2006 (Gonzales). (Docs.

114 & 115).

On February 10, 2006, after BC filed its stated Motion, the District Court issued a Memorandum and Order in which it granted Defendant Firm Foundation’s Motion to Dismiss to the extent that it dismissed Plaintiffs’ state Constitutional claims and Plaintiff Thurtson’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. (Doc. 111).2 The District Court also granted Defendant Gonzales’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief with respect to all future DOJ grants. (Id.). The Court denied the Motions to Dismiss in all other respects.3

2

See 2006 WL 319288 (M.D.Pa.).

3

Defendants Bradford County and the Current Acting

Director of PCCD (formerly Defendant Anderson) filed

their Answers to Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Docs. 19 & 22,

respectively). Previously, we directed the Clerk of

Court to substitute Lavery as a Defendant in place of

Anderson. (Doc. 88). As noted above, the Answers of

Defendants Gonzales and FF have been filed.

On February 24, 2006, we issued a Report and Recommendation in which we recommended that the BC Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 101) be granted in part and be denied in part. It was recommended that Defendant’s Motion be granted with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution (Counts Two and Three).4 It was also recommended that Defendant’s Motion as to the mootness of Plaintiff Thurston’s claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief be granted. Further, it was recommended that Defendant’s Motion be denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim (Count One), violation
1

Moeller v. Bradford County, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

of the Establishment Clause. Finally, it was recommended that Defendant’s Motion be denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ religious employment discrimination claim under the Establishment Clause. (Doc. 113).

4

Based on the District Court’s February 10, 2006

Memorandum (Doc. 111), it was also recommended

that Plaintiffs’ claims under the Pennsylvania

Constitution (Counts Two and Three) as to all

Defendants be dismissed.

that the Plaintiffs have cited the proper standard governing the instant Motion, we shall not repeat it. Suffice to say that this Court “has broad discretion to stay proceedings incident to its power to control its docket, however, a party seeking a stay bears the burden of establishing that it is needed.” DePalma v. Medical Mavin, Ltd., 1998 WL 113432, * 2 (E.D.Pa.) (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1650-51, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997).

On August 10, 2006, the District Court issued a Memorandum and Order adopting, for the most part, our Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 132). The District Court rejected our Report and Recommendation only with respect to allowing Plaintiffs’ claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution to proceed to the extent that they seek injunctive and declaratory relief.
This case was remanded to the undersigned for further proceedings.5 A case management conference was held on September 11, 2006, and deadlines were set. (Docs. 140 & 141). Discovery then ensued.

5

We have been assigned this case for pre-trial matters.

Subsequently, on December 27, 2006, Defendant BC filed a Motion to Stay all proceedings in this case until the United States Supreme Court decides the case of Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir.2006), cert. granted sub nom. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, ---U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 722, --L.Ed.2d ---- (2006). (Doc. 148). Defendant BC and Plaintiffs have briefed the Motion to Stay. (Docs. 149, 154, 156 & 160).6 Presently ripe for disposition is Defendant BC’s Motion to Stay all proceedings.

6

By Order, we allowed Plaintiffs to file a Sur-Reply

Brief. Doc. 159.

*2 Upon Stipulation of the parties that an extension of discovery was required, the Court issued an Order on January 19, 2007, extending the discovery deadline to March 30, 2007, and the dispositive motions deadline was extended to April 20, 2007. (Doc. 157).

II. Standard.
A. Motion to Stay Plaintiffs correctly state the applicable standard which governs a Motion to Stay. (Doc. 154, p. 6). Since we find

II. Discussion. Defendant BC argues that this Court should stay all proceedings in this case until the Supreme Court renders its decision in Hein since the Hein case may resolve the important Constitutional issue of standing that is also a central issue in the instant case. Defendant indicates that the Supreme Court has set oral argument on Hein for February 28, 2007, and it anticipates that the Court will issue its decision in June 2007. Defendant asserts that the standing issue in Hein is very similar to the important issue in our case as to whether Plaintiffs have standing to institute this action. Thus, Defendant points to the interests of judicial economy as a basis to grant its Motion. Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs have not claimed any prejudice from waiting several months to see the Supreme Court’s decision in Hein.
Plaintiffs argue that this Court’s previous finding that they indeed have standing to bring this suit was based on settled Supreme Court precedents and that the issue in Hein will not require the Supreme Court to reconsider these established precedents. It is entirely possible that the Hein decision will not have any effect on this Court’s finding with respect to Plaintiffs’ standing.
We agree with Plaintiffs, for the reasons asserted in their Briefs, that the basis of Defendant’s present Motion and its reliance on the cases of Hein and Laskowski v. Notre Dame, 443 F.3d 930 (7th Cir.2006), cert. petition filed, No. 06-582 (Oct. 27, 2006), to support its argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in these case may show that our Plaintiffs lack standing, is simply too speculative. It is speculative as to if any decision issued by the Supreme Court in Hein would in fact affect our case and the standing decision this Court has rendered, and it is speculative as to when the Supreme Court will issue its decision. Further, as Plaintiffs state, the Supreme Court has not yet granted certiorari in Laskowski. Also, as Plaintiffs indicate, all federal litigation proceeds in light of the possibility that the Supreme Court, some day, may issue a future decision which might affect the outcome. However, if this Court were to stay all federal cases in which relevant issues, that have already been decided by this Court based on settled Supreme Court precedents, may arise in cases in which the Court has granted certiorari, we would have a needless backlog of cases
2

Moeller v. Bradford County, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

when it is not even clear if the future decisions will affect the outcome of the pending cases. This Court is well aware, particularly in the civil rights litigation, that the Supreme Court is constantly issuing new decisions which may affect the ultimate outcome of the pending cases. Nonetheless, this Court proceeds with its cases and if required to do so, simply revisits an issue if a recent Supreme Court decision has an effect on any case.
*3 We find the prudent course in this case is to deny, without prejudice, the Defendant’s Motion to Stay. We do not find that the requested stay is necessary under the circumstances presented in our case. If the Supreme Court in fact issues a decision in either Hein or Laskowski, or both, which actually affects the issue of Plaintiffs’ standing in our case, then Defendant will be permitted to re-file its Motion. This procedure will alleviate the guess work which we find inherent in Defendant’s current Motion. We also find that an indefinite stay of the entire case would be too prejudicial to Plaintiffs, since it is not clear to this Court that the Hein case will in fact cause us to revisit the standing issue, and since discovery has now

been proceeding for some time, with the extended deadline of March 30, 2007 approaching. Further, we do not find that any Defendant will be prejudiced by a prompt resolution of this case.
Based on our consideration of the interests of the respective parties, the possible prejudice to Plaintiffs from a several-month delay, the interests of this Court in the management of its cases and the timely disposition of its cases, and the interests of judicial economy, we find that discovery in our case should continue. We see no reason at this time to indefinitely delay this case, and shall deny Defendant’s Motion to Stay.
AND NOW, this 5th day of February, 2007, upon consideration of the Briefs of the parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendant’s Motion to Stay all proceedings in this case (Doc.148) is DENIED without prejudice.
	  

3

 
 Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 1 of 24
CLOSED,EXPEDITED,SCR
United States District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania (Scranton) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:05−cv−00334−JMM−TMB

Moeller et al v. Bradford County et al Assigned to: Honorable James M. Munley Referred to: Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Blewitt Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 02/17/2005 Date Terminated: 06/12/2007 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

Clark Moeller

represented by Alex J. Luchenitser Americans United for Separation of Church and State 518 C St., NE Washington, DC 20002 202−466−3234 Email: luchenitser@au.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander E. Bennett Arnold &Porter LLP 555 Twelfth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20004 202−942−5192 Email: alexander.bennett@aporter.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alicia A. W. Truman Arnold &Porter LLP 555 Twelfth Street, NW Washington, DC 20004 202−942−5798 Email: alicia_truman@aporter.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ayesha Khan Americans United for Separation of Church and State 518 C Street., NE Washington, DC 20002 (202)466−3234 Email: akhan@au.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bruce Kelly Arnold &Porter, LLP 399 Park Avenue New York, NY 10022 212−715−1080 Email: bruce_kelly@aporter.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel M. Kuhn Arnold &Porter LLP 399 Park Avenue New York, NY 10022

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 2 of 24
212−715−1000 Email: daniel.kuhn@aporter.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elta Lea Johnston Arnold &Porter, LLP 555 Twelfth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20004 202−942−6013 Email: lea_johnston@aporter.com TERMINATED: 08/01/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathy A. Ladun Arnold &Porter LLP 555 Twelfth Street NW Washington, DC 20004−1206 202−942−5348 Email: kathy_ladun@aporter.com TERMINATED: 01/03/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Roper American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania P.O. Box 40008 Philadelphia, PA 19106 215−592−1513 ext 116 Email: mroper@aclupa.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew R. Turnell Arnold &Porter LLP 555 Twelfth Street, NW Washington, DC 20004 202−942−6624 Email: matthew.turnell@aporter.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Murray R. Garnick Arnold &Porter, LLP 555 Twelfth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20004 202−942−5716 Email: murray_garnick@aporter.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paula K Knudsen Burke Gibbel, Kraybill &Hess, LLP 41 East Orange Street Lancaster, PA 17602 717−291−1700 Fax: 717−291−5547 Email: pburke@gkh.com TERMINATED: 02/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard B. Katskee

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 3 of 24

Americans United for Separation of Church and State 518 C. St., NE Washington, DC 20002 (202)466−3234 Email: katskee@au.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak American Civil Liberties Union of PA 313 Atwood Street Pittsburgh, PA 15213 (412) 681−7864 Email: vwalczak@aclupa.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yue−Han Chow Arnold &Porter LLP 399 Park Avenue New York, NY 10022 212−715−1120 Email: yue−han_chow@aporter.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jane Moeller

represented by Alex J. Luchenitser (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander E. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alicia A. W. Truman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ayesha Khan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bruce Kelly (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel M. Kuhn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elta Lea Johnston (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/01/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 4 of 24

Kathy A. Ladun (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew R. Turnell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Murray R. Garnick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paula K Knudsen Burke (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard B. Katskee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yue−Han Chow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jeffrey Gonzalez

represented by Alex J. Luchenitser (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander E. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alicia A. W. Truman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ayesha Khan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bruce Kelly

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 5 of 24

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel M. Kuhn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elta Lea Johnston (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/01/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kathy A. Ladun (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew R. Turnell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Murray R. Garnick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paula K Knudsen Burke (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard B. Katskee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yue−Han Chow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Laura Blain

represented by Alex J. Luchenitser (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander E. Bennett

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 6 of 24
(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alicia A. W. Truman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ayesha Khan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce Kelly (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel M. Kuhn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elta Lea Johnston (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/01/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathy A. Ladun (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew R. Turnell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Murray R. Garnick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paula K Knudsen Burke (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard B. Katskee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 7 of 24

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yue−Han Chow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kris Schwenke

represented by Alex J. Luchenitser (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander E. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alicia A. W. Truman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ayesha Khan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bruce Kelly (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel M. Kuhn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elta Lea Johnston (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/01/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kathy A. Ladun (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew R. Turnell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Murray R. Garnick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 8 of 24

Plaintiff
Tim Thurston TERMINATED: 05/31/2007

Paula K Knudsen Burke (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard B. Katskee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yue−Han Chow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alex J. Luchenitser (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander E. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alicia A. W. Truman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ayesha Khan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce Kelly (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel M. Kuhn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elta Lea Johnston (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/01/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathy A. Ladun (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 9 of 24

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew R. Turnell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Murray R. Garnick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paula K Knudsen Burke (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard B. Katskee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yue−Han Chow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Bradford County

represented by Kristina J. Wenberg American Center for Law &Justice P.O. Box 64429 1000 Regent University Drive, RH Suite 422 Virginia Beach, VA 23467 757−226−2815 Fax: 757−226−2836 Email: kwenberg@aclj.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Larry L. Crain 5214 Maryland Way Suite 402 Brentwood, TN 37027 615.376.2600 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Donohue Kreder, Brooks, Hailstone &Ludwig 220 Penn Avenue Suite 200

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 10 of 24

Scranton, PA 18503 570−346−7922 Fax: 3463715 Email: mdonohue@kbh−law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vincent P. McCarthy American Center for Law &Justice P.O. Box 1629 8 S. Main Street New Milford, CT 06776 860−355−1902 Email: vpm08@msn.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Carol L. Lavery in herfficial capacity as Acting Director of the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency

represented by Amy C. Foerster Bucknell University − Office of General Counsel 1 Dent Drive Lewisburg, PA 17837 570−577−1149 Email: amy.foerster@bucknell.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda S. Lloyd Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board 303 Walnut Street Strawberry Square Verizon Tower, 5th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17101−9060 (717) 346−8300 Email: lilloyd@state.pa.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael L. Harvey Office of Attorney General 15th Floor Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120 (717) 783−6896 Email: mharvey@attorneygeneral.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Alberto Gonzales in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States TERMINATED: 03/26/2007

represented by Anthony J. Coppolino U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Room 6102 Washington, DC 20530 202−514−4782 Email: tony.coppolino@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth J. Kelhoffer Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fed.

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 11 of 24

Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Room 6132 Washington, DC 20530 202−514−4964 Email: elizabeth.kelhoffer@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Clark U.S. Attorney's Office (NO LONGER WITH THEM) 235 N. Washington Avenue Suite 311 Scranton, PA 18501 570−348−2800 TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
The Firm Foundation of America doing business as The Firm Foundation of Bradford County

represented by Leonard G. Brown Clymer &Musser, P.C. 408 W. Chestnut Street P.O. Box 1766 Lancaster, PA 17608−1766 717−299−7101 Fax: 17172995115 Email: len.brown@clymerlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

M. Casey Mattox Center for Law &Religious Freedom 8001 Braddock Road Suite 300 Springfield, VA 22151 703−642−1070 Ext 3505 Email: cmattox@clsnet.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven H. Aden Alliance Defense Fund 801 G Street, NW Suite 509 Washington, DC 20001 202−393−8690 Fax: 202−347−3622 Email: saden@telladf.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy J. Tracey Center for Law and Religious Freedom 8001 Braddock Road Suite 300 Springfield, VA 22151 703−642−1070 ext 3501 Email: tjtracey@clsnet.org TERMINATED: 10/24/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 12 of 24

Cross Claimant
The Firm Foundation of America doing business as The Firm Foundation of Bradford County

represented by M. Casey Mattox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy J. Tracey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Cross Defendant Bradford County
Cross Defendant Carol L. Lavery in herfficial capacity as Acting Director of the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency Cross Defendant Alberto Gonzales in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States TERMINATED: 03/26/2007

represented by Larry L. Crain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Michael J. Donohue (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anthony J. Coppolino (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/17/2005 02/17/2005 02/17/2005 02/17/2005 02/17/2005 02/28/2005

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Bradford County, Carl J. Anderson, Alberto Gonzales, The Firm Foundation of America ( Filing fee $250, Receipt Number 333 100436), filed by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(mg, ) (Entered: 02/17/2005)
Summons Issued as to Bradford County, Carl J. Anderson, Alberto Gonzales, The Firm Foundation of America and provided to attorney Witold J. Walczak for service on Defendant(s). (mg, ) (Entered: 02/17/2005)
2 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Richard B. Katskee on behalf of plaintiffs Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston and Jane Moeller. ( Filing fee $25, Receipt Number 111 142753) (jc) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
3 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Alex J. Luchenitser on behalf of plaintiffs Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. ( Filing fee $25, Receipt Number 111 142753) (jc) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
4 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Ayesha Khan on behalf of plaitniffs Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. ( Filing fee $25, Receipt Number 111 142753) (jc) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
5 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael J. Donohue on behalf of Bradford County. (Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 02/28/2005)

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 13 of 24

03/03/2005 03/03/2005 03/03/2005 03/15/2005 03/16/2005 03/21/2005 04/11/2005 04/13/2005
04/21/2005 04/21/2005 04/22/2005 04/22/2005 04/29/2005 05/02/2005 05/02/2005 05/02/2005 05/02/2005
05/02/2005
05/02/2005
05/03/2005 05/03/2005
05/03/2005

6 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Alex J. LuchenitserSigned by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 3/2/05. (jb, ) (Entered: 03/03/2005)
7 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Richard B. KatskeeSigned by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 3/2/05. (jb, ) (Entered: 03/03/2005)
8 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Ayesha N. Khan.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 3/2/05. (jb, ) (Entered: 03/03/2005)
10 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael J. Donohue on behalf of Bradford County. (Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 03/15/2005)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by Anthony J. Coppolino on behalf of Alberto Gonzales (Coppolino, Anthony) (Entered: 03/16/2005)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by Leonard G. Brown on behalf of The Firm Foundation of America (Brown, Leonard) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by Elizabeth J. Kelhoffer on behalf of Alberto Gonzales (Kelhoffer, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/11/2005)
14 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. Carl J. Anderson waiver sent on 3/3/2005, answer due 5/2/2005. (ts, ) (Entered: 04/13/2005)
15 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Kristina J. Wenberg by Bradford County.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 04/21/2005)
16 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Vincent P. McCarthy by Bradford County.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 04/21/2005)
17 SP Admission Filing fee: $ 25.00, receipt number 333 101334, Vincent P. McCarthy (ga, ) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
18 Special Admission Filing fee: $ 25.00, receipt number 333 101335, Re: Kristina J. Wenberg. (ga, ) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
19 ANSWER to Complaint by Bradford County.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 04/29/2005)
20 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Kristina J. WenbergSigned by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 5/2/05. (ts, ) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
21 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Vincent P. McCarthySigned by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 5/2/05. (ts, ) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
22 ANSWER to Complaint by Carl J. Anderson.(Lloyd, Linda) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
23 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) by The Firm Foundation of America.(Brown, Leonard) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
24 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, MOTION for Summary Judgment by Alberto Gonzales. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Coppolino, Anthony) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
25 CERTIFICATE of Counsel re 24 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment Certification of Non−Concurrence to Motion Under Local Rule 7.1 by Anthony J. Coppolino on behalf of Alberto Gonzales (Coppolino, Anthony) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
26 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Alberto Gonzales. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Coppolino, Anthony) (Entered: 05/03/2005)
27 CERTIFICATE of Counsel re 26 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by Anthony J. Coppolino on behalf of Alberto Gonzales (Coppolino, Anthony) (Entered: 05/03/2005)
28 CERTIFICATE of Nonconcurrence by The Firm Foundation of America and Proposed Order on Motion to Dismiss. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Brown,

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 14 of 24

05/04/2005 05/09/2005 05/09/2005 05/09/2005 05/10/2005 05/16/2005
05/16/2005
05/18/2005 05/18/2005 05/18/2005 05/19/2005 05/19/2005 05/24/2005 05/31/2005 06/01/2005 06/07/2005

Leonard) (Entered: 05/03/2005)
29 ORDER granting defendants 26 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 5/4/05 (ts, ) (Entered: 05/04/2005)
30 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Steven H. Aden on behalf of The Firm Foundation of America ( Filing fee $25, Receipt Number 333 101540) (ts, ) (Entered: 05/09/2005)
31 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Timothy J. Tracey on behalf of The Firm Foundation of America ( Filing fee $25, Receipt Number 333 101539) (ts, ) (Entered: 05/09/2005)
32 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation by The Firm Foundation of America. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Brown, Leonard) (Entered: 05/09/2005)
33 ORDER granting 32 defendants Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 5/10/05 (ts, ) (Entered: 05/10/2005)
34 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 23 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by The Firm Foundation of America. Brief in Opposition due by 6/3/2005 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A# 2 Exhibit(s) B# 3 Exhibit(s) C# 4 Exhibit(s) D# 5 Exhibit(s) E# 6 Exhibit(s) F# 7 Exhibit(s) G# 8 Exhibit(s) H# 9 Exhibit(s) I# 10 Exhibit(s) J# 11 Exhibit(s) K# 12 Exhibit(s) L# 13 Exhibit(s) M)(Brown, Leonard) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
36 DECLARATION by Alberto Gonzales re MOTION to Dismiss Or For Summary Judgment by Timothy S. Wight. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A# 2 Exhibit(s) B# 3 Exhibit(s) C# 4 Exhibit(s) D# 5 Exhibit(s) E# 6 Exhibit(s) F# 7 Exhibit(s) G# 8 Exhibit(s) H# 9 Exhibit(s) I# 10 Exhibit(s) J# 11 Exhibit(s) K# 12 Exhibit(s) L# 13 Exhibit(s) M# 14 Exhibit(s) N)(Kelhoffer, Elizabeth) Modified on 5/18/2005 (admin, ). (Entered: 05/16/2005)
Attorney Kelhoffer is hereby notified that Doc #35 the Brief in Support of Document #24 (Motion) was incorrectly filed as a motion. This Brief needs to be refiled using the correct event now. (jw, ) (Entered: 05/18/2005)
37 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 24 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Alberto Gonzales. Brief in Opposition due by 6/6/2005 (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Material Facts)(Kelhoffer, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/18/2005)
Document #35 entitled Motion to Dismiss or for summary judgment filed by defendant, Alberto Gonzales, deleted. Attorney Kelhoffer has refiled the document correctly as document #37 entitled Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss. (admin, ) (Entered: 05/18/2005)
38 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Steven H. AdenSigned by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 5/19/05. (ao, ) (Entered: 05/19/2005)
39 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Timothy J. TraceySigned by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 5/19/05. (ao, ) (Entered: 05/19/2005)
40 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael J. Donohue on behalf of Bradford County. (Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 05/24/2005)
41 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Responsive Briefs by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Jane Moeller. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence# 2 Proposed Order)(Knudsen, Paula) (Entered: 05/31/2005)
42 ORDER granting 41 Motion to Extend Time and to file brief of 35 pages by 6/3003; Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 6/1/05 (kn, ) (Entered: 06/01/2005)
43 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Alexander Bennett by Clark Moeller.(Roper, Mary) (Entered: 06/07/2005)

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 15 of 24

06/07/2005 06/07/2005 06/07/2005 06/07/2005 06/07/2005 06/07/2005 06/07/2005 06/07/2005 06/07/2005 06/10/2005 06/13/2005 06/30/2005
06/30/2005 06/30/2005
06/30/2005
06/30/2005
06/30/2005
06/30/2005

44 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Murray Garnick by Clark Moeller.(Knudsen, Paula) (Entered: 06/07/2005)
45 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Lea Johnston by Clark Moeller.(Roper, Mary) (Entered: 06/07/2005)
46 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Bruce Kelly by Clark Moeller.(Roper, Mary) (Entered: 06/07/2005)
47 Special Admission Filing fee: $ 25.00, receipt number 333 101901, Murray R. Garnick (ga, ) (Entered: 06/07/2005)
48 Special Admission Filing fee: $ 75.00, receipt number 333 101902, Re: Johnston, Bennett, &Kelly (ga, ) (Entered: 06/07/2005)
49 ORDER granting 46 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Bruce R. Kelly.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 6/7/05 (jb, ) (Entered: 06/09/2005)
50 ORDER granting 45 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Elta Lea Johnston.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 6/7/05 (jb, ) (Entered: 06/09/2005)
51 ORDER granting 44 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Murray R. Garnick.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 6/7/05 (jb, ) (Entered: 06/09/2005)
52 ORDER granting 43 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Alexander E. Bennett.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 6/7/05 (jb, ) (Entered: 06/09/2005)
53 NOTICE of Appearance by Paula Kay Knudsen on behalf of Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Jane Moeller. (Knudsen, Paula) (Entered: 06/10/2005)
54 NOTICE of Appearance by Paula Kay Knudsen on behalf of Tim Thurston. (Knudsen, Paula) (Entered: 06/13/2005)
55 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 23 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on behalf of all plaintiffs filed by Clark Moeller. Reply Brief due by 7/15/2005. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Roper, Mary) (Entered: 06/30/2005)
56 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 23 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by Tim Thurston. (Roper, Mary) (Entered: 06/30/2005)
57 REPLY BRIEF re 23 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) Response of Defendant Attorney General Gonzales to Firm Foundation's Motion to Dismiss filed by Alberto Gonzales. (Coppolino, Anthony) (Entered: 06/30/2005)
58 ANSWER TO STATEMENT OF FACTS re 24 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment filed for all plaintiffs filed by Clark Moeller. (Roper, Mary) (Entered: 06/30/2005)
59 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 24 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment on behalf of all plaintiffs filed by Clark Moeller. Reply Brief due by 7/15/2005. (Roper, Mary) (Entered: 06/30/2005)
60 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 24 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment Rule 56(f) affidvait for all plaintiffs filed by Clark Moeller. (Roper, Mary) (Entered: 06/30/2005)
61 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 24 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment on behalf of all plaintiffs filed by Clark Moeller. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) # 2 Exhibit(s) # 3 Exhibit(s) # 4 Exhibit(s) # 5 Exhibit(s) # 6 Exhibit(s) # 7 Exhibit(s))(Roper, Mary) (Entered: 06/30/2005)

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 16 of 24

07/11/2005 07/11/2005 07/12/2005 07/12/2005
07/29/2005 08/01/2005 08/01/2005 08/02/2005
08/02/2005 08/04/2005 08/04/2005 08/04/2005
08/04/2005 08/04/2005 08/04/2005 08/04/2005 08/04/2005 08/04/2005

62 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief in Support of Defendant Gonzales' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment by Alberto Gonzales.(Coppolino, Anthony) (Entered: 07/11/2005)
63 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief to 55 Brief in Opposition, filed by The Firm Foundation of America. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Aden, Steven) (Entered: 07/11/2005)
64 ORDER granting 62 deft Gonzales' Motion to Extend Time to file a reply brief in support of his motion to dismiss or for sum judg to Aug 4, 2005. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 7/12/05 (jb, ) (Entered: 07/12/2005)
65 ORDER granting 63 deft Firm Foundation's Motion for Extension of Time to file a reply Memo in support of it's Motion to Dismiss until Aug 4, 2005. SO ORDERED.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 7/12/05 (jb, ) (Entered: 07/12/2005)
66 MOTION Schedule Initial Case Management Conference by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller.(Knudsen, Paula) (Entered: 07/29/2005)
67 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 66 MOTION Schedule Initial Case Management Conference filed by The Firm Foundation of America. Reply Brief due by 8/15/2005. (Aden, Steven) (Entered: 08/01/2005)
68 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment by Alberto Gonzales.(Coppolino, Anthony) (Entered: 08/01/2005)
69 ORDER granting 68 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Defendant Attorney General Gonzales may file a reply of up to 20 pages in support of his motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 8/2/05 (ts, ) (Entered: 08/02/2005)
70 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Alexander Bennett to appear by Tim Thurston.(Roper, Mary) (Entered: 08/02/2005)
71 Special Admission Filing fee: $ 25.00, receipt number 333 102644, Alexander Bennett. (ga, ) (Entered: 08/04/2005)
72 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Alexander E. Bennett.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 8/4/05. (rm, ) (Entered: 08/04/2005)
73 REPLY BRIEF re 24 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Alberto Gonzales. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Anthony J. Coppolino)(Coppolino, Anthony) (Entered: 08/04/2005)
74 REPLY BRIEF re 23 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by The Firm Foundation of America. (Aden, Steven) (Entered: 08/04/2005)
75 ORDER denying Pltf's 66 Motion to Schedule Initial Case Management Conference.Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 8/4/05. (rm, ) (Entered: 08/04/2005)
76 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Bruce Kelly on behalf of by Tim Thurston.(Roper, Mary) (Entered: 08/04/2005)
77 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Lea Johnston on behalf of by Tim Thurston.(Roper, Mary) (Entered: 08/04/2005)
78 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Murray Garnick on behalf of by Tim Thurston.(Roper, Mary) (Entered: 08/04/2005)
79 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Alicia Truman on behalf of by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller.(Roper, Mary) (Entered: 08/04/2005)

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 17 of 24

08/04/2005 08/05/2005 08/08/2005 08/08/2005 08/08/2005 08/08/2005 08/08/2005 09/16/2005 10/14/2005 10/20/2005
10/21/2005 10/24/2005 11/03/2005 11/03/2005

80 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Kathy Ann Ladun on behalf of by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller.(Roper, Mary) (Entered: 08/04/2005)
81 Special Admission Filing fee: $ 125.00, receipt number 333 102653, Re: Ladun, Truman, Garnick, Kelly, Johnston. (ga, ) (Entered: 08/05/2005)
82 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Bruce R. KellySigned by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 8/8/2005. (bg, ) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
83 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Kathy Ann LadunSigned by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 8/8/2005. (bg, ) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
84 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Alicia A. W. TrumanSigned by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 8/8/2005. (bg, ) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
85 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Murray R. GarnickSigned by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 8/8/2005. (bg, ) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
86 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Elta Lea Johnston.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 8/8/2005. (bg, ) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
87 NOTICE of Change of Address by Steven H. Aden (Aden, Steven) (Entered: 09/16/2005)
88 ORDER that the Clerk of Court is directed to substitute Deft Lavery, Acting Director, for Deft Anderson in teh above−captioned action.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 10/14/05. (rm, ) (Entered: 10/14/2005)
89 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: IT IS RECOMMENDED that the FF deft's motion to dismiss (Doc 23) be granted in part and be denied in part. It is recommended that deft's motion be granted with respect to the dismissal of plfs' claims under the Pa Constitution (Counts two and three). It is also recommended that deft's motion to dismiss as moot plf Thurston's claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief be granted. It is recommended that deft's motion to dismiss plfs' (including Plf Thurston) claim for nominal damages be denied. Further, it is recommended that deft's motion be denied with respect to plfs' Sec1983 claim (Count one). It is also recommended that this case be remanded to the undersigned for further proceedings, including the direction of Deft FF to file an Answer to the complaint, for scheduling of a Joint Case Mgm confr (after Defendant Gonzalez's Summary Judgment Motion is disposed of) and for discovery. NOTICE; Exceptions to be filed within l0 days. Objections to RRdue by 11/7/2005Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 10/20/05. (jb, ) (Entered: 10/20/2005)
90 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Timothy J. Tracey by The Firm Foundation of America. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Aden, Steven) (Entered: 10/21/2005)
91 ORDER granting 90 Unopposed Motion of Deft Firm Foundation and FURTHER ORDERED the appearance of Timothy J. Tracey in this case is withdrawn. SO ORDERED.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 10/24/05 (jb, ) (Entered: 10/26/2005)
92 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: TEXT REMOVED − WRONG REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DOCKETED. FOR CORRECT REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION SEE DOCKET ENTRY 93. (Entered: 11/03/2005)
93 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: IT IS RECOMMENDED that Deft Gonzales' Motion to Dismiss (Doc 24) be granted with respect to plfs' funding claim and that this deft be dismissed based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction to address the merits of plfs' funding claim as against him. It is recommended that deft Gonzales' Motion to dismiss plfs'monitoring claim for lack of standing be denied. It is also recommended that deft's Motion be granted with respect to the dismissal of plfs' request for prospective injunctive relief to require deft to monitor all DOJ grants awarded to faith−based organizations. (Doc 1, Par 72.). It is further recommended that deft Gonzales' summary judgment motion with respect to plfs' monitoring claim and alleged violation of the Establishment Clause be denied without prejudice to re−file it after discovery. Finally, it is recommended that this

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 18 of 24

11/07/2005 11/07/2005
11/09/2005 11/09/2005 11/21/2005 11/22/2005 11/23/2005 11/23/2005 11/29/2005 12/09/2005 12/09/2005 12/13/2005
12/23/2005 12/23/2005
01/03/2006

case be remanded to the undersigned for further proceedings, including the scheduling of a Joint Case Mgm Confr (after defts FF and Gonzales file their Answers to the Complaint) and for discovery. NOTICE; Exceptions to be filed within l0 days. Objections to RRdue by 11/21/2005Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 11/3/05. (jb, ) (Entered: 11/03/2005)
94 OBJECTION to 93 Report and Recommendations As to the Firm Foundation's Motion to Dismiss by Bradford County. (Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 11/07/2005)
95 APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Court by The Firm Foundation of America re 89 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 1 Complaint, filed by Clark Moeller,, Jane Moeller,, Jeffrey Gonzalez,, Laura Blain,, Kris Schwenke,, Tim Thurston, (Aden, Steven) (Entered: 11/07/2005)
Doc 95 to be re−filed properly as an "objection to the Report and Recommendation" (ts, ) (Entered: 11/09/2005)
96 OBJECTION to 89 Report and Recommendations. (Aden, Steven) (Entered: 11/09/2005)
97 OBJECTION to 93 Report and Recommendations. (Ladun, Kathy) (Entered: 11/21/2005)
98 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation with Certificate of Service and proposed Order by Bradford County. (Attachments: # 1)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 11/22/2005)
99 OBJECTION to 89 Report and Recommendations Plaintiffs' Opposition to Firm Foundation 95 and Bradford County 94 Objections to R(Ladun, Kathy) (Entered: 11/23/2005)
100 ORDER granting 98 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages re support of motion for judgmentSigned by Judge James M. Munley on 11/23/05 (sm, ) (Entered: 11/23/2005)
101 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings with Certificate of Service and proposed Order by Bradford County. (Attachments: # 1)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 11/29/2005)
102 NOTICE by The Firm Foundation of America re 101 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings with Certificate of Service and proposed Order Joinder (Aden, Steven) (Entered: 12/09/2005)
103 RESPONSE by Alberto Gonzales to 97 Objection to Report and Recommendations. (Kelhoffer, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/09/2005)
104 BRIEF IN SUPPORT of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with Certificate of Service and Exhibits A through D re 101 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings with Certificate of Service and proposed Order filed by Bradford County. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
105 OBJECTION to 93 Report and Recommendations Plaintiffs' Reply to Opposition of Defendant Gonzales 103 to Plaintiffs' Objection to Report and Recommendation 97 . (Ladun, Kathy) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
106 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief in Response to 104 Bradford County's Brief in Support of its 101 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed, Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Brief in Response to 104 Bradford County's Brief in Support of its 101 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Attachments: # 1 Rule 7.1 Certificate of Concurrence# 2 Proposed Order)(Ladun, Kathy) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
107 ORDER granting 106 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 101 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings with Certificate of Service and proposed Order, granting 106 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Brief in Opposition due by 1/17/2006 .Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 1/3/06 (sm, ) (Entered: 01/03/2006)

Case: 3:05-cv-334 As of: 08/02/2013 12:54 PM EDT 19 of 24

01/17/2006 01/17/2006 01/31/2006 02/10/2006
02/14/2006 02/24/2006
02/28/2006 03/02/2006 03/08/2006 03/08/2006 03/09/2006 03/10/2006 03/13/2006 03/24/2006

108 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 101 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings with Certificate of Service and proposed Order filed by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Attachments: # 1)(Ladun, Kathy) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
109 REPLY BRIEF re 101 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings with Certificate of Service and proposed Order −− Response of Defendant Attorney General Gonzales to Motion for Judgment of the Pleadings by Bradford County filed by Alberto Gonzales.(Coppolino, Anthony) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
110 BRIEF IN SUPPORT with attached Exhibit "A" and Certificate of Service re 101 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings with Certificate of Service and proposed Order filed by Bradford County.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
111 MEMORANDUM and ORDER GRANTING in part and DENYING in part Firm's 23 Motion to Dismiss; GRANTING in part and DENYING in part 24 Gonzalez's Motion to Dismiss; ADOPTING 89 Report and Recommendation; and ADOPTING 93 Report and Recommendation as Objection 97 is sustained. Case is REMANDED to MJ Blewitt for further proceedings.Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 2/10/06 (sm, ) (Entered: 02/10/2006)
112 ORDER; IT IS ORDERED that defts Alberto Gonzalez and The Firm Foundation are directed to file their Answers to the remaining claims against them in Plfs' Complaint (See Doc. lll) within l0 days of the date of this Order. Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 2/14/06. (jb, ) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
113 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT the BC deft's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 101 be granted in part and denied in part. It is recommended that deft's Motion be granted with respect to pltfs' claims under the PA Constitution (Counts Two and Three). It is also recommended that deft's Motion as to the mootness of pltf Thurston's claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief be granted. Further, it is recommended that deft's Motion be denied with respect to pltfs' 1983 claim (Count One), violation of the Establishment Clause. It is recommended that deft's Motion be denied with respect to pltfs' religious employment discrimination claim under the Establishment Clause. It is also recommended that this case be remanded to the undersigned for further proceedings, including the scheduling of a Joint Case Mgmt Conf and setting deadlines for discovery, etc. Objections to RRdue by 3/10/2006Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 2/24/06. (ao, ) (Entered: 02/24/2006)
114 Defendant Firm Foundation's ANSWER to Complaint and, CROSSCLAIM against Bradford County, Carol L. Lavery, Alberto Gonzales by The Firm Foundation of America.(Aden, Steven) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
115 ANSWER to Complaint of Plaintiffs by Alberto Gonzales.(Coppolino, Anthony) (Entered: 03/02/2006)
116 ANSWER to Crossclaim by Carol L. Lavery, Carol L. Lavery.(Lloyd, Linda) (Entered: 03/08/2006)
117 OBJECTION to 113 Report and Recommendations as to the County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 03/08/2006)
118 OBJECTION to 113 Report and Recommendations. (Ladun, Kathy) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
119 NOTICE by The Firm Foundation of America re 117 Objection to Report and Recommendations as to the County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Aden, Steven) (Entered: 03/10/2006)
120 ANSWER to Crossclaim of Defendant Firm Foundation by Bradford County, Bradford County.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 03/13/2006)
121 OBJECTION to 113 Report and Recommendations Pls. Response to Bradford County's Objections. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4)(Ladun, Kathy) (Entered: 03/24/2006)

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05/01/2006 05/01/2006 05/25/2006 05/25/2006 06/05/2006 06/15/2006 06/29/2006 07/05/2006 07/05/2006 08/01/2006 08/10/2006
08/15/2006
08/24/2006 08/24/2006 08/24/2006 08/31/2006
09/01/2006 09/06/2006 09/08/2006

122 ANSWER to Crossclaim Against Attorney General Alberto Gonzales by Defendant Firm Foundation by Alberto Gonzales, Alberto Gonzales.(Coppolino, Anthony) (Entered: 05/01/2006)
123 STATUS REPORT by Laura Blain. (Knudsen, Paula) (Entered: 05/01/2006)
124 Letter from Murray Garnick. (Truman, Alicia) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
125 NOTICE by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller re 124 Letter (Attachments: # 1)(Truman, Alicia) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
126 Letter from Murray Garnick. (Attachments: # 1)(Truman, Alicia) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
127 Letter from Michael J. Donohue, Esquire and Vincent P. McCarthy, Esquire with enclosure. (Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
128 NOTICE of Appearance by Timothy J. Tracey on behalf of The Firm Foundation of America, The Firm Foundation of America (Tracey, Timothy) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
129 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael L. Harvey on behalf of Carol L. Lavery (Harvey, Michael) (Entered: 07/05/2006)
130 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Carol L. Lavery.(Lloyd, Linda) (Entered: 07/05/2006)
131 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller.(Truman, Alicia) (Entered: 08/01/2006)
132 MEMORANDUM and ORDER ADOPTING in part and DECLINING in part the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Blewitt; SUSTAINING pltfs' objection 118 ; OVERRULING dft Bradford County's objections; REMANDING to MJ Blewitt for further disposition.Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 8/10/06 (sm, ) (Entered: 08/10/2006)
133 ORDER; IT IS ORDERED: 1. A phone case mgm confr will be conducted by the court on 9/11/06 at 2 PM. It will be the responsibility of cn for plf to place the call. Cn shall complete the attached scheduling order and it shall be either mailed to the address below or faxed to 570−207−5749 and must be received no later than 3 business days prior to the joint case mgm confr. Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 8/15/06. (jb, ) (Entered: 08/15/2006)
134 NOTICE Notice of Appearance of Counsel for Defendant Bradford County, filed by Bradford County.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 08/24/2006)
Atty Donohue is requested to re−file Doc 134 as a Attorney Appearance−Entry of Appearance. (ts, ) (Entered: 08/24/2006)
135 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael J. Donohue on behalf of Bradford County. (Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 08/24/2006)
136 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Paula Kay Knudsen on behalf of Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller Attorney Daniel Kuhn is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 855205.. (Knudsen, Paula) (Entered: 08/31/2006)
137 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Daniel M. Kuhn.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 9/1/06. (jb, ) (Entered: 09/05/2006)
138 Letter from All Parties Regarding August 15, 2006 Order. (Knudsen, Paula) (Entered: 09/06/2006)
139 CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN (Joint) by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Knudsen, Paula) (Entered: 09/08/2006)

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09/11/2006
10/25/2006 10/25/2006 10/26/2006 10/26/2006 12/21/2006 12/22/2006 12/27/2006 12/27/2006 12/29/2006 01/03/2007 01/03/2007 01/09/2007 01/11/2007 01/18/2007

141 SCHEDULING ORDER − A joint case mgm confr has been conducted and although the parties have stated they do not consent to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge this court will continue to oversee the p/t mgm of the matter. IT IS ORDERED that the following case mgm deadlines are established. 1. All discovery shall be completed by Jan 26, 2007. 2. Reports of plfs' retained experts due 11/22/06; Defts due 11/22/06; Supplementions due 12/22/06. 3. Joinder of parties due 11/17/06; 4. Amendments to the pleadings due 11/17/06; 5. All case dispositive motions due 2/9/07; 6. Case placed on the EXPEDITED CASE MANAGEMENT TRACK. 7. The parties shall adhere to the schedule. 8. The parties agree that the case may be appropriate for trial in April 2007 and have suggested a date in March 2007 for a p/t confr. As Judge Munley will preside over the trial, no dates are set for a final p/t confr or trial. However, Judge Munley is being notified of the suggested dates by copy of this Order. Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 9/11/06. (jb, ) (Entered: 09/11/2006)
142 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Paula Kay Knudsen on behalf of all plaintiffs Attorney Yue−Han Chow is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 893858.. (Knudsen, Paula) (Entered: 10/25/2006)
143 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Paula Kay Knudsen on behalf of all plaintiffs Attorney Matthew R. Turnell is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 893859.. (Knudsen, Paula) (Entered: 10/25/2006)
144 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Yue−Han ChowSigned by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 10/26/06. (ga, ) (Entered: 10/26/2006)
145 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Matthew R. TurnellSigned by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 10/26/06. (ga, ) (Entered: 10/26/2006)
146 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by M. Casey Mattox on behalf of The Firm Foundation of America Attorney M. Casey Mattox is seeking special admission. Filing Fee: 25.00 Receipt Number: 333000516. (ga, ) (Entered: 12/21/2006)
147 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to M. Casey MattoxSigned by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 12/22/06. (jb, ) (Entered: 12/22/2006)
148 MOTION to Stay by Bradford County. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 Proposed Order)(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 12/27/2006)
149 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 148 MOTION to Stay filed by Bradford County.(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 12/27/2006)
150 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiffs by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ladun, Kathy) (Entered: 12/29/2006)
151 ORDER granting 150 Atty Ladun's Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for plfs.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 1/3/07 (jb, ) (Entered: 01/03/2007)
152 NOTICE of Appearance by M. Casey Mattox on behalf of The Firm Foundation of America, The Firm Foundation of America (Mattox, M. Casey) (Entered: 01/03/2007)
153 NOTICE of Appearance by Amy C. Foerster on behalf of Carol L. Lavery. (Foerster, Amy) (Entered: 01/09/2007)
154 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 148 MOTION to Stay Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Bradford County's Motion to Stay filed by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller.(Kuhn, Daniel) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
155 STIPULATION and Proposed Order Amending Scheduling Order by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Kuhn, Daniel) (Entered: 01/18/2007)

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01/19/2007 01/19/2007
01/22/2007 01/23/2007 01/24/2007 02/05/2007 02/09/2007 03/05/2007 03/07/2007 03/07/2007
03/08/2007 03/23/2007 03/26/2007

156 REPLY BRIEF re 148 MOTION to Stay filed by Bradford County. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 01/19/2007)
157 STIPULATION AND ORDER − Parties having determined that more time is needed to complete discovery, the Court order of 9/11/06 shall be amended as follows: Discovery ddl 3/30/07. Dispositive motion ddl 4/20/07. Pre−trial conf in 7/07 and trial late 8/07. By copy of this Order, Judge Munley is being notified of the suggested dates.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 1/19/07. (ao, ) (Entered: 01/19/2007)
158 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Sur−Reply in Opposition to Defendant Bradford County's Motion to Stay by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed sur−reply memorandum# 2 Proposed order)(Kuhn, Daniel) (Entered: 01/22/2007)
159 ORDER granting 158 plfs' Motion for Leave to File a Sur−Reply in oppos to deft Bradford County's Motion to Stay. Plfs are directed to file their Sur−Reply Brief within 5 days of the date of this Order.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 1/23/07 (jb, ) (Entered: 01/23/2007)
160 SUR REPLY to REPLY to Response to Motion re 148 MOTION to Stay Plaintiffs' Sur−Reply in Opposition to Defendant Bradford County's Motion to Stay filed by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller.(Kuhn, Daniel) (Entered: 01/24/2007)
161 ORDER; Upon consideration of the Briefs of the parties, IT IS ORDERED that Deft's Motion to Stay all proceedings in this case (Doc l48) is DENIED without prejudice. Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 2/5/07. (jb, ) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
162 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Paula Kay Knudsen terminated on behalf of Plaintiffs. (Knudsen, Paula) (Entered: 02/09/2007)
163 STIPULATION and Proposed Order Amending Scheduling Order by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Kuhn, Daniel) (Entered: 03/05/2007)
164 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Michael J. Donohue on behalf of Bradford County Attorney Larry L. Crain is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 983416.. (Donohue, Michael) (Entered: 03/07/2007)
165 STIPULATION AND ORDER − All Parties hereby jointly move and stipulate, and the Court Orders, that the Court's prior case mgm order of 9/11/06, amended by order of Jan l9, 2007, shall be amended as follows: 1. The deadline for discovery shall be extended from March 30 to April 30, 2007. 2. The deadline for dispositive motions shall be extended to May 21, 2007; oppos to motions shall be due 6/18/07; Replies in support of motions shall be due 7/9/07. 3. The parties agree that the case may be appropriate for trial by late Sept, 2007 and suggest a date in the latter part of Aug, 2007 for a p/t confr. As Judge Munley will preside over the trial, no dates are set for a final p/t confr or for the trial of this matter. However, by copy of this Order, Judge Munley is being notified of the suggested dates. (Copy sent from chambers)Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 3/7/07. (jb, ) (Entered: 03/08/2007)
166 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Larry L. Crain.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 3/8/07. (jb, ) (Entered: 03/08/2007)
167 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by Alberto Gonzales Stipulation of Dismissal of Defendant Attorney General Gonzales (Kelhoffer, Elizabeth) (Entered: 03/23/2007)
168 ORDER APPROVING 167 Stip re− Notice of Voluntary Dismissal filed by Alberto Gonzales Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 3/26/07. (sm, ) (Entered: 03/26/2007)

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04/03/2007 04/03/2007 04/04/2007 04/04/2007 04/12/2007
04/13/2007 04/16/2007 04/26/2007 04/30/2007 04/30/2007 05/01/2007
05/10/2007 05/14/2007 05/31/2007 05/31/2007

169 MOTION for Order Joint Motion For Entry of Consent Order by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller.(Kuhn, Daniel) (Entered: 04/03/2007)
170 STIPULATION Proposed Consent Order by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Kuhn, Daniel) (Entered: 04/03/2007)
171 ORDER granting 169 Motion for Order Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 4/4/07 (sm, ) (Entered: 04/04/2007)
172 CONSENT ORDER Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 4/4/07. (sm, ) (Entered: 04/04/2007)
173 STATUS REPORT ORDER 1) On or by April 30, 2007, plaintiffs and defendant Bradford County shall file a joint status report addressing the status of defendant Bradford County in light of the entry of the Consent Order 172 . 2)Said status report shall specifically address the issue of whether it was the intent of the plaintiffs and defendant Bradford County that Defendant Bradford County be dismissed entirely as a defendant in this action at the time of the entry of the consent order. 3) On or by April 30, 2007, plaintiffs are directed to file a separate status report as to their remaining claims against the remaining defendants. Status Report due by 4/30/2007.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 4/12/07. (ts, ) (Entered: 04/12/2007)
174 STIPULATION and Proposed Order Amending Scheduling Order by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Kuhn, Daniel) (Entered: 04/13/2007)
175 SCHEDULING ORDER: Discovery due by 6/14/2007. Dispositive Motions due by 7/5/2007. Pre−Trial Conf and Trial may be appropriate for trial by late 11/07 and suggest a date in early 10/07 for a pre−trial conf.Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 4/16/07. (ao, ) (Entered: 04/16/2007)
176 STIPULATION of Dismissal of Plaintiff Timothy Thurston's Claims Against Defendants and Proposed Order by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Kuhn, Daniel) (Entered: 04/26/2007)
177 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Kuhn, Daniel) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
178 STATUS REPORT Plaintiffs' Status Report by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Kuhn, Daniel) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
179 ORDER; IT IS ORDERED that within l0 days of the date of this Order, plfs and deft Firm Foundation shall file with the Court joint status report regarding plfs' claims against Firm Foundation and Firm Foundation's cross−claims against the other defts. Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 5/1/07. (jb, ) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
180 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report of Plaintiffs and Firm Foundation by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Jane Moeller. (Kuhn, Daniel) (Entered: 05/10/2007)
181 ORDER; IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. A phone status confr shall be conducted on May 30, 2007 at 2 PM. 2. The confr shall be initiated by cn for plfs. Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 5/14/07. (jb, ) (Entered: 05/14/2007)
182 ORDER; IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. A phone status confr shall be conducted on June 18, 2007 at ll AM. 2. The confr shall be initiated by cn for plfs. Signed by Judge Thomas M. Blewitt on 5/31/07. (jb, ) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
184 ORDER APPROVING 176 Stipulation filed by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Kris Schwenke, Jane Moeller, Tim Thurston, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller− Tim Thurston terminated.Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 5/31/07. (sm, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 6/1/2007 (sm, ). (Entered: 06/01/2007)

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06/08/2007 06/12/2007 06/13/2007

185 STIPULATION of Dismissal STIPULATION/JOINT MOTION DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING CLAIMS AND FIRM FOUNDATION'S CROSS−CLAIM by Clark Moeller. (Kuhn, Daniel) (Entered: 06/08/2007)
186 ORDER APPROVING 185 Stipulation of Dismissal filed by Clark Moeller ; Case CLOSEDSigned by Judge James M. Munley on 6/12/07. (sm, ) (Entered: 06/12/2007)
Docket Annotation − Pursuant to TC from CNSL's Office, Document # 187 −STIPULATION /Joint Motion Dismissing Plaintiff's Remaining Claims and Firm Foundation's Cross−Claims by Jeffrey Gonzalez, Laura Blain, Clark Moeller, Kris Schwenke, Tim Thurston, Bradford County, Carol L. Lavery, Alberto Gonzales, The Firm Foundation of America, Jane Moeller. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Foerster, Amy) will be DELETED due to being unnecessarily filed in error. (kjn) (Entered: 06/13/2007)