Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/14/14 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Johnathan Lacy,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

-vs-

)

)

Thomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, )

Cook County, Illinois, Sgt. Johnson, )

Correctional Officer Nawara, )

Correctional Officer Lopez, and )

Correctional Officer Wilson,

)

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 14-cv(jury demand)

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy, by counsel, alleges as follows:

1. This is a civil action arising under Section 202 of the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12132, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29

U.S.C. §794(a), and 42 U.S.C. §1983. The jurisdiction of this Court is conferred

by 28 U.S.C. §12133, 29 U.S.C. §794a(a)(2), and 28 U.S.C. §1343.

2. Plaintiff Jonathan Lacy is a wheelchair bound disabled resident of the

Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiff is currently confined at the Cook County Jail

as detainee number 2014-0514252.

3. Defendant Thomas Dart is the Sheriff of Cook County. Plaintiff sues

Dart in his official capacity only on his claims under the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act.

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4. Defendant Cook County is joined in this action pursuant to Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324 F. 3d 947 (7th Cir. 2003) and is liable for the wrongdoing as more fully described below.
5. Defendants Sgt. Johnson and correctional officers Nawara, Lopez, and Wilson are employees of the Cook County Sheriff. Plaintiff sues these officers in their individual capacity solely on his excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
6. As a wheelchair bound person, plaintiff requires access to a special sink, toilet, shower, and bed in order to take part in these basic life activities.
7. Plaintiff is one of more than fifty wheelchair bound persons who have entered the Cook County Jail in the past five years.
8. As the result of a lawsuit known as Phipps v. Sheriff, 07-cv-3889, defendants Sheriff and Cook County became aware that the Cook County Jail was failing to accommodate the needs of wheelchair bound detainees.
9. In the course of the Phipps litigation, defendants Sheriff and Cook County took a variety of actions to accommodate wheelchair bound detainees at the Jail.
10. After resolving the Phipps litigation, defendant Sheriff agreed to allow a greater number of wheelchair bound pre-trial detainees to enter the Jail than could be accommodated in ADA compliant facilities.
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11. Plaintiff entered the Cook County Jail on May 14, 2014. At that time, the Jail did not have sufficient facilities to accommodate another wheelchair bound pre-trial detainee.
12. In June 2014, and for about eight day, plaintiff was assigned to a cell in Cermak Infirmary at the Cook County Jail which did not have the facilities required to accommodate a wheelchair bound prisoner. While confined in this cell, plaintiff was required to sleep on the floor and did have access to toilet and sink facilities as defendants Sheriff and Cook County provide to non-wheelchair bound prisoners. Confinement in this cell caused plaintiff to experience tremendous hardship in performing activities of daily living.
13. After plaintiff had been subjected to about eight days of confinement in the above described unlawful conditions, correctional officers sought to place plaintiff into a cell in the Cermak Infirmary. This cell likewise failed to provide toilet and sink facilities for plaintiff as a wheelchair bound person.
14. Plaintiff peaceably complained about being transferred to another inaccessible cell. Defendants Johnson, Nawara, Lopez, and Wilson then used force to place plaintiff into the inaccessible cell.
15. The force used by defendants Johnson, Nawara, Lopez, and Wilson was grossly excessive, inflicted without a legitimate basis, intended to harm plaintiff, caused plaintiff to suffer serious personal injuries, and thereby deprived
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plaintiff of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
16. Plaintiff attends court at the Criminal Court Building at 2650 South California Avenue about once per month. The facilities at the Criminal Court Building are under the control of defendant Cook County.
17. Each morning before a scheduled court appearance, correctional officers transport plaintiff from his living unit to the basement of the Criminal Court Building.
18. Plaintiff is segregated from non-wheelchair bound detainees in the basement of the courthouse.
19. Non-wheelchair bound detainees are held in cells with free access to a toilet and a sink; wheelchair bound detainees, like plaintiff, are required to sit in his (or her) wheelchair in a hallway without access to a toilet and sink.
20. Defendants Sheriff and Cook County are aware that wheelchair bound detainees are deprived of access to toilet and sink facilities before and after court appearances at the Criminal Courts Building at 2650 South California Avenue.
21. Plaintiff has complained to numerous members of the medical staff, members of the correctional staff, and has filed several grievances regarding the above described wrongdoing, including a request for proper toileting accommodations on days when he is required to attend court at the Criminal Court Building. Despite the written and oral requests, plaintiff continues to be deprived
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of rights secured by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and continues to suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.
22. Plaintiff hereby requests trial by jury. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff requests that he receive appropriate compensatory damages and punitive damages against the individual defendants Johnson, Nawara, Lopez, and Wilson and compensatory damages against defendants Sheriff and Cook County. Plaintiff also requests that the Court fashion appropriate injunctive relief against defendant Sheriff and Cook County and that the costs of this action, including attorney’s fees, be taxed against defendant Cook County.
/s/ Patrick W. Morrissey Patrick W. Morrissey ARDC No. 6309730 Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10249 S. Western Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60643 (773) 233-7900
Kenneth N. Flaxman 200 S Michigan Ave, Ste 201 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427-3200 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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 Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 9 Filed: 08/26/14 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:34

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Johnathan Lacy, Kenneth Farris, )

Marquis Bowers, and Maurice Boston, )

individually and for all others )

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

-vs-

)

)

Thomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, )

Cook County, Illinois, Sgt. Johnson, )

Correctional Officer Nawara, )

Correctional Officer Lopez, and )

Correctional Officer Wilson,

)

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 14-cv-6259 (Judge Gettleman) (Magistrate Judge Martin)

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Pursuant to leave of Court, plaintiffs, by counsel, allege as follows:

1. This is a civil action arising under Section 202 of the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12132, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29

U.S.C. §794(a), and 42 U.S.C. §1983. The jurisdiction of this Court is conferred

by 28 U.S.C. §12133, 29 U.S.C. §794a(a)(2), and 28 U.S.C. §1343.

2. Plaintiffs Jonathan Lacy, Kenneth Farris, Marquis Bowers, and

Maurice Boston are wheelchair bound disabled residents of the Northern District

of Illinois. Each plaintiff is currently confined at the Cook County Jail.

3. Defendant Thomas Dart is the Sheriff of Cook County. Plaintiffs sue

Dart in his official capacity only.

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4. Defendant Cook County is joined in this action pursuant to Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2003) and is liable for wrongdoing as more fully described below.
5. Defendants Sgt. Johnson and correctional officers Nawara, Lopez, and Wilson are employees of the Cook County Sheriff. Plaintiff Lacy sues these officers in their individual capacity solely on his excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
ADA VIOLATIONS AT CERMAK INFIRMARY
6. As wheelchair bound persons, each plaintiff requires access to a special sink, toilet, shower, and bed in order to take part in these basic life activities which are available to non-wheelchair bound detainees at the Cook County Jail.
7. More than fifty wheelchair bound persons have entered the Cook County Jail in the two year period preceding the filing of this lawsuit.
8. As the result of a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class action known as Phipps v. Sheriff, 07-cv-3889, defendants Sheriff and Cook County became aware that the Cook County Jail was not accommodating the needs of wheelchair bound detainees and did not comply with the standards of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
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9. Phipps was concerned with conditions of confinement at the Cook County Jail and did not involve any issue about the manner in which wheelchair bound detainees are treated when brought to court.
10. Defendants Sheriff and Cook County are aware that wheelchair bound detainees are deprived of access to toilet and sink facilities before and after court appearances at the main criminal court building and in each of the five suburban Cook County courthouses.
11. Defendants Sheriff and Cook County took a variety of actions in an attempt to bring the Cook County Jail into compliance with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act in the course of the Phipps litigation. Defendants Sheriff and Cook County did not make any material changes to the conditions of confinement before and after court appearances by wheelchair bound detainees.
12. The changes made to the Cook County Jail during the Phipps litigation allowed for a small number of wheelchair bound detainees to be confined at the Cook County Jail in facilities compliant with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
13. At all times relevant, defendant Sheriff has had the power and the duty to refuse to accept any person who, as a detainee at the Cook County Jail, would be subjected to unlawful conditions of confinement.
14. At some time after resolving the Phipps litigation, and continuing to the present time, defendant Sheriff had been deliberately indifferent to his above
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described power by agreeing to accept a greater number of wheelchair bound detainees than could be lawfully accommodated at the Cook County Jail.
15. At all times relevant, defendant Cook County has had the power to make capital improvements to the Cook County Jail.
16. At some time after resolving the Phipps litigation, and continuing to the present time, defendant Cook County became aware that Sheriff was seeking to hold a greater number of wheelchair bound detainees than could be lawfully accommodated at the Cook County Jail.
17. Defendant Cook County acted in deliberate indifference to its power to make capital improvements to the Cook County Jail after learning that the Sheriff was seeking to hold a greater number of wheelchair bound detainees than could be lawfully accommodated at the Cook County Jail.
PLAINTIFF JOHNATHAN LACY
18. Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy is wheelchair bound. 19. Lacy entered the Cook County Jail on May 14, 2014. At that time, the Jail did not have sufficient facilities to detain Lacy in compliance with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 20. In June 2014, and for about eight days thereafter, Lacy was assigned to a cell in the Cermak Infirmary at the Cook County Jail which did not have the facilities required to accommodate a wheelchair bound prisoner.
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21. While confined in the above referred cell, Lacy was required to sleep on the floor and he did not have access to toilet and sink facilities as defendants Sheriff and Cook County made available to non-wheelchair bound prisoners.
22. Confinement in the above referred cell caused Lacy to experience tremendous hardship in performing activities of daily living.
23. After Lacy had been subjected to about eight days of confinement in the above described unlawful conditions, correctional officers sought to place plaintiff into a different cell in the Cermak Infirmary. This cell likewise failed to provide adequate toilet and sink facilities.
24. Plaintiff Lacy complained about being transferred to another inaccessible cell. Defendants Johnson, Nawara, Lopez, and Wilson then used force to place plaintiff into the inaccessible cell.
LACY’S INDIVIDUAL EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIM
25. The force used by defendants Johnson, Nawara, Lopez, and Wilson was grossly excessive, inflicted without a legitimate basis, intended to harm plaintiff, caused plaintiff to suffer serious personal injuries, and thereby deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
ADA VIOLATIONS BEFORE COURT APPEARANCES
26. Plaintiff Lacy, like most pre-trial detainees at the Cook County Jail, attends court once each month.
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27. Lacey, like all other detainees at the Cook County Jail, is transported from the Jail to court by correctional officers employed by the Sheriff of Cook County.
28. Lacy’s criminal case is assigned to the main Criminal Court Building at 2650 South California Avenue
29. In the early morning hours before each court appearance, correctional officers transport plaintiff Lacy from his living unit to the basement of the main Criminal Court Building.
30. Non-wheelchair bound detainees awaiting court appearances at the main Criminal Court Building are held in cells with unrestricted access to a toilet and a sink; wheelchair bound detainees, like plaintiff Lacy, are required to sit in his (or her) wheelchair in a hallway without access to a toilet and sink.
31. Plaintiff Lacy has complained to numerous members of the medical staff, members of the correctional staff, other employees of defendant Sheriff, and has filed several grievances about the above described wrongdoing, including a request for accessible toilet accommodations when he is required to attend court at the Criminal Court Building.
32. Despite these written and oral requests, plaintiff continues to be deprived of rights secured by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and continues to suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.
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KENNETH FARRIS
33. Plaintiff Kenneth Farris is wheelchair bound. 34. Farris entered the Cook County Jail on April 1, 2014. At that time, the Jail did not have sufficient facilities to detain Lacy in compliance with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 35. For about two weeks after entering the Jail, plaintiff Farris was assigned a cell in the Cermak Infirmary at the Cook County Jail which did not have the facilities required to accommodate a wheelchair bound prisoner. 36. While confined in the above described cell, plaintiff Farris was required to sleep on the floor and he did not have access to toilet and sink facilities as defendants Sheriff and Cook County provide to non-wheelchair bound prisoners. Confinement in this cell caused plaintiff Farris to experience tremendous hardship in performing activities of daily living.
ADA VIOLATIONS IN TRANSPORT TO COURT
37. Plaintiff Farris attends court at the Bridgeview Courthouse located at 10220 South 76th Avenue in Bridgeview, Illinois about once each month.
38. Farris, like all other detainees at the Cook County Jail who attend court outside of the main Criminal Court Building, is transported to court in motorized vehicles operated by employees of the Sheriff of Cook County.
39. The above described vehicles are maintained and furnished by defendant Cook County.
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40. The vehicles provided by defendant County for the transport of nonwheelchair bound detainees permit each detainee to be transported in a safe manner.
41. The vehicles provided by defendant County for the transport of wheelchair bound detainees (hereinafter “handicap vans”), permit each detainee to be transported in his (or her) wheelchair and safely secured in the vehicle.
42. At all times relevant, defendant County has failed to provide defendant Sheriff with a sufficient number of “handicap vans.”
43. Notwithstanding the failure of defendant County to provide a sufficient number of “handicap vans,” defendant Sheriff permits his correctional officers to transport wheelchair bound detainees in vehicles which do not permit wheelchair bound detainees to be transported in his (or her) wheelchair and be safely secured in the vehicle.
44. On several occasions while being transported from the Jail to the Bridgeview Courthouse, wheelchair bound prisoners are removed from their wheelchair and required to sit on a bench designed for able bodied persons.
45. In the spring of 2014, plaintiff Farris incurred serious personal injuries while being transported from the Bridgeview Courthouse to the Cook County because of defendants’ above described deliberate indifference to the needs of wheelchair bound detainees.
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ADA VIOLATIONS WHILE AWAITING A COURT APPEARANCE
46. On each occasion when plaintiff Farris arrives at the Bridgeview Courthouse, employees of the Sheriff of Cook County, acting in accordance with a long standing and widespread practice, segregate Farris from non-wheelchair bound detainees.
47. The above referred practice places non-wheelchair bound detainees in cells with free access to a toilet and a sink; wheelchair bound detainees, like plaintiff Farris, are required to sit in his (or her) wheelchair in a “coat room” without access to a toilet and sink.
48. On several occasions when plaintiff Farris has been transported to the Bridgeview Courthouse for a scheduled court appearance, he could not be transported to his assigned courtroom because the hallway was not wide enough to permit the passage of Farris’ wheelchair. On each occasion, Farris would be granted a “bullpen continuance,” in which his criminal case would be postponed for a month without his having appeared before the judge.
49. Plaintiff has complained to the medical staff, members of the correctional staff, other employees of the Sheriff of Cook County, and has filed several grievances regarding the above described wrongdoing, including a request for proper toileting accommodations on days when he is required to attend court at the Bridgeview Courthouse. Despite the written and oral requests, plaintiff continues to be deprived of rights secured by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
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and continues to suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.
MARQUIS BOWERS
50. Plaintiff Marquis Bowers, who entered the Cook County Jail in November of 2011, became paralyzed on or around January 1, 2013 and is now permanently confined to a wheelchair.
51. Since around January 2013, plaintiff Bowers has been assigned to various inaccessible living units in the Cermak Infirmary.
52. While confined in these inaccessible living units, plaintiff does not have access to toilet, sink, and shower facilities required for a wheelchair bound person. Confinement in these conditions caused plaintiff to experience tremendous hardship in performing activities of daily living and to sustain serious personal injuries.
ADA VIOLATIONS WHILE AWAITING A COURT APPEARANCE
53. About once each month plaintiff Bowers attends court at the Maywood Courthouse located at 1500 Maybrook Avenue in Maywood Illinois.
54. In the early morning hours before each scheduled court appearance, plaintiff Bowers is transported from his living unit to the Maybrook Courthouse.
55. As a result of the transportation policy described above, plaintiff Bowers has fallen and sustained personal injuries while being transported to and from the Maybrook Courthouse.
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ADA VIOLATIONS WHILE AWAITING A COURT APPEARANCE
56. When plaintiff Bowers arrives at the Maybrook Courthouse, he is segregated from non-wheelchair bound prisoners in the basement of the courthouse.
57. Unlike non-wheelchair bound prisoners who have access to a sink and toilet at the Maybrook Courthouse, plaintiff is frequently held in a cell without a toilet and sink.
58. The doorway designated for a prisoner to access the courtroom at Maybrook is not wide enough for a wheelchair bound prisoner, like plaintiff, therefore causing extreme hardship and humiliation for plaintiff to enter and exit his assigned courtroom.
59. Plaintiff Bowers has complained to the medical staff, members of the correctional staff, other employees of defendant Sheriff, and has filed several grievances about the above described wrongdoing, including a request for proper accommodations on days when he is required to attend court at the Maybrook Courthouse. Despite the written and oral requests, plaintiff continues to be deprived of rights secured by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and continues to suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.
MAURICE BOSTON
60. Plaintiff Maurice Boston is wheelchair bound and entered the Cook County Jail on July 4, 2012.
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61. Plaintiff Boston previously settled an individual lawsuit regarding the alleged inaccessible features of Division 2, Dorm 2, Tier M in a case known as Boston v. Sheriff, 13-cv-798. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, plaintiff Boston released all claims against defendants Sheriff and Cook County arising prior to about April of 2014.
62. Plaintiff Boston brings this action only for prospective relief relating to the inaccessible conditions of confinement when attending court and for damages resulting from acts undertaken after those he released in his previous lawsuit.
63. Plaintiff Boston attends court at the Bridgeview Courthouse located at 10220 South 76th Avenue in Bridgeview, Illinois about once each month
64. Boston has been subjected to the same unlawful transportation policy described above.
65. Plaintiff Boston has complained to the medical staff, members of the correctional staff, other employees of defendant Sheriff, and has filed several grievances regarding the above described wrongdoing, including a request for proper toileting accommodations on days when he is required to attend court at the Bridgeview Courthouse. Despite the written and oral requests, plaintiff Boston continues to be deprived of rights secured by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and continues to suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.
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66. The above described violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are applied to all wheelchair bound detainees confined at the Cook County Jail when they attend court.
67. There is no adequate remedy at law for the refusal of the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County to provide accessible features for prisoners when attending court.
68. Plaintiffs, who continue to be subjected to the above described policy, bring this action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain prospective injunctive relief for all wheelchair bound detainees presently confined at the Cook County Jail.
69. Plaintiffs also seek damages individually and for all others similarly situated, and requested that the Court allow this to proceed as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for all wheelchair bound persons who were detained at the Cook County Jail after August 18, 2012.
70. Plaintiffs hereby request trial by jury on their claim for damages.
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WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs request that appropriate injunctive relief be granted for the class of persons presently confined at the Jail who are wheelchair bound, and that appropriate damages be awarded to plaintiffs and to each member of the putative class. Plaintiff Lacy also requests that appropriate compensatory and punitive damages be awarded against defendants Johnson, Nawara, Lopez, and Wilson. In addition, plaintiffs request that the Court grant whatsoever other relief as may be appropriate, including an award of attorney’s fees and costs.
/s/ Patrick W. Morrissey Patrick W. Morrissey ARDC No. 6309730 Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10249 S. Western Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60643 (773) 233-7900 patrickmorrissey1920@gmail.com
Kenneth N. Flaxman 200 S Michigan Ave, Ste 201 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427-3200 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 9 Filed: 08/26/14 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:48
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 26th day of August, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the attorneys of record. I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service and email the document to the following non CM/ECF participants: Maureen Hannon, ASA, 69 W. Washington St. Suite 2030, Chicago, Illinois 60602, maureen.hannon@cookcountyil.gov, Michael Gallagher, ASA, 500 Richard J. Daley Center, Chicago, IL 60602, michael.gallagher@cookcountyil.gov and Michael Sorich, ASA 500 Richard J. Daley Center, Chicago, IL 60602, michael.sorich@cookcountyil.gov.
/s/ Patrick W. Morrissey Patrick W. Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10249 S. Western Ave. Chicago, Il. 60643 (773)233-7900 Patrickmorrissey1920@gmail.com
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 Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 84 Filed: 01/13/15 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:1704

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Johnathan Lacy, Kenneth Farris, Marquis Bowers, Maurice Boston, and Kevin Dawson, individually and for all others similarly situation
Plaintiffs
-vs-
Thomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois
Defendants

) ) ) ) ) ) ) 14-CV-6259 ) ) (Judge Gettleman) ) ) ) ) )

AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT
Pursuant to leave of Court, plaintiffs, by counsel, file the following as

an amendment to move the Court to allow the addition of Kevin Dawson as

a plaintiff and for leave to file an amendment to their amended complaint

(ECF #9):

1. Plaintiff Kevin Dawson is a wheelchair using detainee at the

Cook County Jail.

2. Dawson entered the Cook County Jail on March 22, 2010.

3. Plaintiff Dawson, like most pre-trial detainees at the Cook

County Jail, attends court once each month.

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 84 Filed: 01/13/15 Page 2 of 5 PageID #:1705
4. Dawson is a defendant in a case pending at the Leighton Courthouse; he is also a defendant in a case pending at the Skokie courthouse.
5. Dawson attends court in each of his criminal cases about once each month.
6. Dawson attended court in the Leighton Courthouse on December 30, 2014.
7. Before attending court, Dawson was held in “bullpen 34/5” in the “RCDC building” for several hours. This bullpen has a toilet that cannot be used by persons, like Dawson, who require a wheelchair. Nor does the bullpen have a sink that can be used by wheelchair using persons like Dawson.
8. Dawson expects to continue to attend Court once each month at the Leighton Courthouse.
9. Absent relief from this Court, defendants will continue to deprive Dawson of access to a toilet and sink before his appearances at the Leighton courthouse.
10. After several hours in “bullpen 34/5,” Dawson was required to wheel himself, without assistance, through a long basement tunnel and
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then to wheel himself up a steep ramp to the Leighton courthouse. No one offered to assist Dawson in this journey.
11. Absent relief from this Court, defendants will continue to require Dawson to wheel himself without assistance through a long tunnel and up a steep ramp.
12. After wheeling himself up the steep ramp, a Sheriff’s employee escorted Dawson to a bullpen behind Courtroom 306. Dawson could not enter this bullpen on his own, but was able to do so with assistance from another detainee.
13. Dawson could not reach the toilet in the bullpen behind Courtroom 306 because of physical barriers.
14. Absent relief from this Court, defendants will continue to hold Dawson in the above described bullpen behind Courtroom 306 at each future court appearance.
15. Dawson sought to attend a scheduled court appearance in the Skokie courthouse on January 6, 2015.
16. Employees of defendant Sheriff transported Dawson to the Skokie courthouse along with two other wheelchair detainees who had scheduled court appearances at the Markham Courthouse.
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17. The van used to transport Dawson on January 6, 2015 was designed to secure and safely transport no more than two wheelchair using persons.
18. The employees of defendant Sheriff who transported Dawson to the Skokie Courthouse on January 6, 2015 did not secure Dawson’s wheelchair in the van.
19. Dawson arrived at the Skokie Courthouse at about 1:30 p.m. and was required to wheel himself up a steep ramp without assistance.
20. As he entered the lockup area, an employee of defendant Sheriff told Dawson that his case had been continued and that he would be returned to the Jail.
21. Dawson was then required to roll down a steep ramp without assistance.
22. Absent relief from this Court, defendants will continue to transport Dawson in overloaded and insecure vans and will require Dawson to wheel himself without assistance up and down the steep ramp at the Skokie courthouse.
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Wherefore plaintiff Dawson requests that the Court grant appropriate injunctive relief and monetary damages.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Kenneth N. Flaxman
Kenneth N. Flaxman ARDC No. 08830399 Joel A. Flaxman 200 S Michigan Ave, Ste 201 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427-3200 Thomas G. Morrissey Patrick W. Morrissey 10249 S. Western Ave. Chicago, IL. 60643 (773) 233-7900 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHNATHAN LACY, KENNETH FARRIS,

)

MARQUIS BOWERS, MAURICE

)

BOSTON, KEVIN DAWSON, individually

)

and for all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

THOMAS DART, SHERIFF OF COOK

)

COUNTY, COOK COUNTY,

)

ILLINOIS, SGT. JOHNSON, CORRECTIONAL )

OFFICER NAWARA, CORRECTIONAL

)

OFFICER LOPEZ, CORRECTIONAL

)

OFFICER WILSON,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 14 C 6259 Judge Robert W. Gettleman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs Jonathan Lacy, Kenneth Farris, Marquis Bowers, Maurice Boston, and Kevin Dawson,1 filed a putative class action amended complaint against defendants Thomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois (the “Sheriff”), Cook County, Illinois, and correctional officers Nawara, Lopez, and Wilson,2 alleging violations of section 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court held an extensive evidentiary hearing on plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief, and oral arguments are scheduled. Plaintiff has also

1 Dawson was added as a named plaintiff on January 13, 2015. See docket no. 84.
2 These individual officers were sued only as a part of plaintiff Lacy’s excessive force claim. A motion to sever Lacy and his excessive force claim is currently pending.

moved under Fed. R. Civ. P 23(b)(2)3 to certify a class defined as: “all persons presently confined at the Jail who have been classified by Jail officials as requiring a wheelchair.”4 Defendants oppose class certification. For the reasons described below, the court grants plaintiffs’ motion.
BACKGROUND Plaintiffs are five wheelchair using detainees at the Cook County Jail (“Jail”), who seek, individually and on behalf of the proposed class, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, preventing “defendants from continuing to deprive wheelchair bound detainees of rights secured by” section 202 of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that, like all Jail detainees, they attend court each month in connection with their underlying criminal cases at either the Leighton Criminal Courthouse (“Leighton”) or one of five suburban courthouses: Maywood; Markham; Skokie; Rolling Meadows; and Bridgeview. Plaintiffs complain that as wheelchair using detainees they are subject to numerous ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations in connection with their criminal court appearances. A. Trip to Courthouse 1. Transport Vans – Suburban Courthouses Plaintiffs and other wheelchair using detainees are transported from the Jail to suburban courthouses by correctional officers employed by the Sheriff using transport vans. According to plaintiffs, Cook County, which provides the vehicles, “has failed to provide defendant Sheriff
3 Plaintiffs have withdrawn their request for certification of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) class.
4 Plaintiffs’ reply brief has a slightly altered class definition: “all persons who are assigned a wheelchair on entry to the [Cook County] Jail.”
2

with a sufficient number of ‘handicap vans.’” Plaintiffs also complain that even when appropriate handicap vehicles are used, Sheriff’s employees fail to properly strap and secure wheelchair using detainees into the van, resulting in detainee injuries.
2. Leighton Courthouse Plaintiffs also allege that their rights under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are violated when they are transported from their living quarters at the Jail to the Leighton courthouse. According to plaintiffs, before traveling to the Leighton building, wheelchair using detainees are staged at the entrance to the tunnel connecting the Jail to the Leighton courthouse. Plaintiffs complain that whereas non-wheelchair using detainees are held in holding cells with accessible toilets and sinks while awaiting transport to the Leighton building, wheelchair using detainees are forced to sit in their wheelchairs in the basement hallway without access to an accessible toilet or sink. B. Ramps Upon arrival to the suburban courthouses, Sheriff’s employees unload wheelchair using detainees in the loading dock areas of the respective courthouses. According to plaintiffs, despite a policy to the contrary, wheelchair using detainees often must propel themselves up non-ADA compliant ramps, without assistance, to access the courthouse from the loading dock. Plaintiffs allege that when returning to the vans for transport back to the Jail, wheelchair using detainees also must maneuver unassisted down the non-ADA compliant loading dock ramps. C. Holding Cells At both the Leighton and suburban courthouses, detainees are held in basement holding cells prior to being brought up to their respective courtrooms. Plaintiffs allege that these holding
3

cells are not accessible, and that defendants fail to provide accommodations necessary to overcome physical barriers in the cells. According to plaintiffs, the basement holding cells do not have accessible toilets or sinks.
Plaintiffs also allege that wheelchair bound detainees are held in holding cells outside of their respective courtrooms prior to their cases being called. Plaintiffs complain that as with the basement holding cells, the holding cells adjacent to the courtrooms do not have accessible toilets or sinks, and that defendants have not provided adequate accommodations to make the existing fixtures accessible.
DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard
Class action suits are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Under Rule 23(c)(1)(A), the court should determine whether to certify an action as a class action “at an early practicable time.” A two-step analysis is required to determine if class certification is appropriate. First, plaintiffs must satisfy all four requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 1993). Second, the action must also satisfy one of the conditions of Rule 23(b). Joncek v. Local 714 Int'l of Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund, No. 98-C-4302, 1999 WL 755051, *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1999). Here, plaintiffs pursue injunctive relief and seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(2), which states that a class action may be maintained if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
4

B. Ascertainability As a threshold matter, defendants argue that class certification is not appropriate because
the putative class is not clearly ascertainable. Separate and apart from the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), the Seventh Circuit requires that “a class must be sufficiently definite that its members are ascertainable.” Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, 668 F.3d 481, 493 (7th Cir. 2012). Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ class definition is “‘fatally indefinite’ because [it] . . . . does not distinguish between detainees that [sic] were provided a wheelchair for convenience, based on subjective complaints, . . . or based on objective medical determinations.” According to defendants, the proposed class definition would improperly “include members that do not medically require a wheelchair along with members that were not ‘disabled,’ ‘qualified individuals’ as defined by the ADA.” The court disagrees.
Plaintiffs’ proposed class is ascertainable and definite. In their response brief, defendants state that “approximately 60 detainees require the use of a wheelchair to assist in some way with movement throughout” the Jail. Contrary to defendants’ arguments, the fact that some of these detainees are not permanently confined to their wheelchairs or have more mobility than others, is irrelevant for purposes of certifying the putative class. The ADA and Rehabilitation Act protect persons who have a record of impairment or have been regarded as having an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The 60 detainees using wheelchairs at the Jail are doing so because defendants provided them with wheelchairs. As such, these detainees are regarded as having an impairment, or at least have a record of impairment, negating the need to perform an individualized disability determination to identify class members. Moreover, class members are
5

easily identifiable through the Sheriff’s “CCOMS” computer system, which keeps track of each detainee who has been assigned a wheelchair.
Defendants also complain that the proposed class is “‘fatally indefinite’ because it would include all wheelchair bound detainees that [sic] have been ‘deprive[d]’ their rights under the ADA regardless of where this deprivation has occurred.” According to defendants, under the proposed class definition “a wheelchair bound detainee would be a member of the class if the violation occurred in their cell, in the division, at Cermak, or in transport to and from court.”
Given that this lawsuit seeks to redress ADA violations related to court appearances by wheelchair using detainees, it is unclear how a detainees’ ADA claims related to Jail cells, Jail divisions, or Cermak would come into play here. Accordingly, the present case does not encroach on the consent decree involving Jail conditions being overseen by another judge in this district. United States v. Cook County, Illinois, No. 10-C-2946 (Kendall). Plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in the present case involve only the Leighton courthouse and five outlying courthouses, along with transportation to each. Because all wheelchair using detainees attend court in at least one of these six courthouses, each of the prospective class members face the same alleged structural barriers at the respective courthouses. Moreover, the fact that putative class members may have been subject to conditions that have varying degrees of accessibility does not preclude class treatment. See Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 249 F.R.D. 298, 301 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
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C. Application of Rule 23(a) 1. Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the members of the prospective
class are so numerous as to make joinder impracticable. See e.g., Parker v. Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 206 F.R.D. 211, 212 (N.D. Ill. 2002). “Although there is no ‘bright line’ test for numerosity, a class of forty is generally sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1).” McCabe v. Crawford & Co., 210 F.R.D. 631, 643 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Plaintiffs allege that their proposed class consists of more than 30 individuals. Moreover, defendants concede in their response brief that “approximately 60 detainees require the use of a wheelchair to assist in some way with movement throughout” the Jail. According to defendants, “[a]pproximately 30 of those detainees require a wheelchair at all times, including in their living unit, while the other 30 only require a wheelchair for purposes of transport or for long distances.” Consequently, the court finds, and defendants do not contest, that a class consisting of wheelchair using detainees in the Jail is sufficiently numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
2. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires the presence of “questions of law or fact common to the class.” The rule does not mandate absolute commonality; a common nucleus of operative fact is usually enough to satisfy the requirement. Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1998). Defendants argue that class certification is not appropriate because “Plaintiffs have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of issues of fact or law common to potential class members.” Specifically, defendants contend that class members require and receive different levels of accommodation, thereby making it “impossible for the class to generate common
7

answers,” as required by Rule 23(a)(2). According to defendants, evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing illustrated only random occurrences of individual discrimination. The court disagrees.
The instant case presents several common questions of law and fact. A threshold question is whether the ramps and holding cells at the six courthouses are compliant with the ADA and Rehabilitation Act’s structural requirements and, more significantly, whether the facilities have to comply with those requirements at all. If the courthouses, because of their age, need not meet the statutory technical requirements, another common question is whether defendants’ policies and actions sufficiently overcome structural barriers so as to satisfy the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 488-91 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding commonality despite the fact that defendant’s policies were carried out in different offices, by different managers, and an individualized determination as to which class members were actually adversely effected would still be required). These questions constitute a common nucleus of operative fact, which is sufficient to establish the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2).
Contrary to defendants’ arguments, no individualized determination is required concerning whether certain plaintiffs are sufficiently accommodated. As the court held in Dunn v. City of Chicago, 231 F.R.D. 367, 372 (N.D. Ill. 2005), “[t]he variations identified by defendant in the actual treatment of certain detainees . . . do not eliminate the common nucleus of fact.” Here, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a common discriminatory practice by defendants. See Phipps, 249 F.R.D. at 301. Moreover, because plaintiffs have withdrawn their request for a Rule 23(b)(3) class, no determination of class damages is required. Plaintiffs seek
8

only injunctive relief for the class which, if granted, would resolve each class member’s claims at once. For example, regardless of the level of accommodation a wheelchair using detainee may need or whether the detainee is always pushed up courthouse ramps, a ramp that is brought within the structural requirements of the ADA would cure the detainee’s injury.
3. Typicality Typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied if a plaintiff's claim “arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” De La Fuente v. Stokely–Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983). Typicality focuses “on whether the named representatives' claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” Id. Because commonality and typicality are closely related, a finding of one often results in a finding of the other. Id. Defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the typicality requirement because “any discriminatory conduct against the Plaintiffs themselves is uneven at best,” requiring a determination by the court as to “whether Defendants offered any accommodation at all and whether that accommodation was reasonable under the circumstances [as to each class member].” Defendants also argue that the prospective class lacks typicality because “Plaintiffs must not only make a showing of disability, but that they are also qualified to make use of the services, programs and activities in question.” The court rejects defendants’ arguments for reasons similar to its rejection of their commonality arguments. Plaintiffs and the putative class allege that courthouse ramps, holding cells, and transport vans are not compliant with the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and that
9

defendants have not provided adequate accommodations to overcome this non-compliance. Because plaintiffs, along with prospective class members, each use a wheelchair and attend court in at least one of the six courthouses at issue, they experience the same structural barriers and accommodations defendants allegedly provide. As such, plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same events and course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other class members, and are based on the same legal theories.
As discussed previously, the putative class members are already identified as qualified for protection under the ADA because they are regarded as disabled or have a history of impairment. Defendants’ argument that plaintiffs must show that they are qualified to make use of the “services, programs and activities in question” is nonsensical, because plaintiffs have a constitutional right to attend their court proceedings. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). Plaintiffs’ claims do not require an individual evaluation of plaintiffs’ disabilities or the accommodations allegedly provided, but rather ask the court to determine whether courthouse facilities and defendants’ actions comply with federal statutes.
4. Adequacy of Representation To be an adequate class representative under Rule 23(a)(4), plaintiff must have a “sufficient interest in the outcome to ensure vigorous advocacy.” Chapman v. Worldwide Asset Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 04-C-7625, 2005 WL 2171168, *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2005). The requirement has “two parts: the adequacy of the named plaintiff’s counsel, and the adequacy of representation provided in protecting the different, separate, and distinct interest of the class members.” Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993)
10

(internal quotes omitted). However, the burden of demonstrating the class representative’s adequacy is not heavy. Sledge v. Sands, 182 F.R.D. 255, 259 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
Defendants do not contest that plaintiffs’ lawyers are adequate. Rather, they challenge the named plaintiffs’ ability to represent the class due to their lack of credibility. In support of this contention, defendants point to testimony and evidence from the preliminary injunction hearing that allegedly impeached plaintiff Farris’ and Bowers’ claims of disability and plaintiff Dawson’s claim that he could not transfer from his wheelchair onto a commode chair in the courthouse holding cell. According to defendants, the impeachment “went directly to the central issues of this case including whether [plaintiffs] are actually disabled under the ADA, whether they medically required a wheelchair, and whether the accommodations provided by the Sheriff and County were adequate.”
“A class is not fairly and adequately represented if class members have antagonistic or conflicting claims,” Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992), and some courts in this district have found that a named plaintiff with credibility problems may be considered to have interests antagonistic to the class. See Searcy v. eFunds Corp., No. 08-C-985, 2010 WL 1337684 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2010); Kaplan v. Pomerantz, 132 F.R.D. 504, 508-10 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Conversely, some courts in this district, including this court, have held that a class representative’s credibility is irrelevant. See Levie v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 496 F.Supp.2d 944, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2007)(“Credibility is not a requirement of a class representative, and whether or not a plaintiff is credible is irrelevant to that person’s ability to be a class representative”); Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 256 F.R.D. 609, 613 (N.D. Ill. 2009). Even in courts where credibility is considered, a lack of credibility does not automatically render a named plaintiff
11

inadequate. Instead, such courts have generally found inadequacy only where the plaintiff’s integrity is questioned on an issue that relates directly to a central part of the litigation. See CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 2011).
The fact that plaintiff Dawson was able to transfer to a commode chair in the courthouse holding cell, with what appeared to be with some difficulty, does not mean defendants are in compliance with federal statutes, which is the central issue to be decided by this case. Likewise, doctor DeFuniak’s testimony concerning plaintiff Bowers’ disability is not conclusive evidence that he is not disabled or does not require the assistance of a wheelchair. While the court has serious doubts about plaintiff Farris’ credibility in light of the video evidence showing him standing and walking, as discussed above, his level of mobility is not at issue at this stage of the case. Moreover, striking him from the class at this point would be meaningless because there are other credible named plaintiffs, one of whom also attends court at the Bridgeview courthouse. See Phipps, 249 F.R.D. at 301 (“To the extent that [the named plaintiff’s] credibility on this particular issue were relevant and problematic, the remaining named plaintiffs would arguably alleviate this concern.”). Nothing about plaintiff Dawson, Bowers, and Farris’ alleged credibility issues indicate that they have an antagonistic or conflicting claim, or that they do not have sufficient interest in the outcome of this case to ensure vigorous advocacy.
Plaintiffs have been assigned wheelchairs by defendants, they use these wheelchairs during court appearances, and therefore they face the same structural barriers as other wheelchair using detainees. The court again rejects defendants’ argument that a central issue to this case is whether plaintiffs are actually disabled or medically require wheelchairs. As discussed
12

numerous times above, as individuals who have a history of impairment or have been regarded as disabled, plaintiffs are protected by the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
The court finds that the remaining named plaintiffs also satisfy the requirement of adequacy of representation. D. Application of Rule 23(b)(2)
Rule 23(b)(2) states that a class action may be maintained if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 392 (7th Cir. 2010). As noted in the sections discussing commonality and typicality above, defendants have acted on grounds that apply generally to the class by allegedly failing to comply with the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
Contrary to defendants’ arguments, and as discussed at length in previous sections, the instant action does not require a “factual inquiry into each potential class member regarding their individual need for accommodation” or whether they received an accommodation. The injunctive relief plaintiffs seek as a class would resolve their alleged injuries at one time, regardless of the level of accommodation individual class members require. For example, toilet facilities that comply with the ADA’s structural requirements will be accessible for all wheelchair using detainees (and non-wheelchair using detainees), even if the particular class member may be able to transfer to a commode chair. Consequently, as required by Rule 23(b)(2), a single injunction in the instant case would provide relief to each member of the class.
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Certification of the proposed class furthers the goal of judicial economy because it avoids the duplicative litigation of identical claims. As such, the court finds that the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). E. Propriety of Class Treatment
Finally, defendants argue that class treatment is inappropriate because it would deprive them of their statutory right to assert an exhaustion defense. However, as plaintiffs point out, courts in this district have repeatedly held that each plaintiff to a class need not have exhausted administrative remedies for the case to proceed as a class action. See Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 681 F.Supp.2d 899, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (holding that if any single member of the class exhausted the available remedies, the entire class can be deemed to have done so); Lewis v. Washington, 265 F.Supp.2d 939, 942 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“one class member’s exhaustion of administrative remedies satisfies the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement as to the entire class”); In re Household Int’l Tax Reduction Plan, 441 F.3d 500, 501 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that unnamed class members are not required to exhaust remedies under ERISA plan); Romasanta v. United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 1976) (exhaustion requirement satisfied when one member of a class to a Title VII suit has complied with the requirement).
Defendants’ reliance on Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006), and Jamie S., 668 F.3d 481, is misplaced. Woodford was not a class action, and therefore did not involve class certification. Contrary to defendants’ assertion, the Seventh Circuit in Jamie S. did not address vicarious exhaustion, explicitly or otherwise, but instead questioned the propriety of the district court’s assumption that exhaustion of administrative remedies would have been futile for a particular group of proposed class members, thereby waiving the requirement. Jamie S., 668
14

F.3d at 494. Accordingly, Jamie S.’s discussion relating to exhaustion has no bearing on the instant action.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the court finds that plaintiffs have satisfied the class certification requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), and plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is granted. The class is defined as: All Cook County Jail detainees who have been assigned and currently use a wheelchair.5
ENTER: April 30, 2015
_________________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge
5 District courts have wide latitude to redefine class definitions to resolve any ambiguity. See, e.g., Metro. Area Housing Alliance v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., 69 F.R.D. 633, 638 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
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 Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 203 Filed: 10/08/15 Page 1 of 30 PageID #:6660

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHNATHAN LACY, KENNETH FARRIS,

)

MARQUIS BOWERS, MAURICE

)

BOSTON, KEVIN DAWSON, individually

)

and for all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

THOMAS DART, SHERIFF OF COOK

)

COUNTY, COOK COUNTY,

)

ILLINOIS, SGT. JOHNSON, CORRECTIONAL )

OFFICER NAWARA, CORRECTIONAL

)

OFFICER LOPEZ, CORRECTIONAL

)

OFFICER WILSON,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 14 C 6259 Judge Robert W. Gettleman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1 Plaintiffs Jonathan Lacy, Kenneth Farris, Marquis Bowers, Maurice Boston, and Kevin Dawson, filed a putative class action amended complaint against defendants Thomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois (the “Sheriff”), Cook County, Illinois (the “County”), Sergeant Johnson, and correctional officers Nawara, Lopez, and Wilson,2 alleging violations of section 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Rehab Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Following oral

1 This opinion contains both findings of fact (“Findings”) and conclusions of law (“Conclusions”). To the extent any Findings may be deemed conclusions of law, they shall also be considered Conclusions. To the extent that any Conclusions may be deemed findings of fact, they shall also be considered Findings. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113–14 (1985).
2 The individual sergeant and officers were sued as a part of plaintiff Lacy’s excessive force claim only. These claims, however, have been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. See doc. no. 193.

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arguments and an extensive evidentiary hearing on plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief, this court certified a class under Fed. R. Civ. P 23(b)(2) of “All Cook County Jail detainees who have been assigned and currently use a wheelchair.” Lacy v. Dart, No. 14-C6259, 2015 WL 1995576 (N.D. Ill. April 30, 2015). Since originally seeking a preliminary injunction in September 2014, plaintiffs have sought various types of relief. See doc. nos. 43, 120, 143, 162. In their final reply, however, plaintiffs ask the court to:
enter a final declaratory judgment that detainees are being denied rights secured by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act when they are transported to and from the Jail and court appearances and enter a permanent injunction requiring the Sheriff to change Order 11.14.35.0 to require: Employees of the Sheriff shall push each detainee who is using a wheelchair up and down ramps in all courthouses. (Emphasis included). In the alternative, plaintiffs request that the court “grant this relief in the form of a preliminary injunction.” For the reasons discussed below, plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND Plaintiffs, like all Cook County Jail detainees, attend court periodically in connection with their underlying criminal cases at either the Leighton Criminal Courthouse in Chicago (“Leighton”) or one of five suburban courthouses: Maywood; Markham; Skokie; Rolling Meadows; and Bridgeview. Plaintiffs complain that as wheelchair-using detainees they are subject to numerous ADA and Rehab Act violations in connection with their criminal court appearances. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that their rights are violated when being transported to and from court and while waiting at the courthouses for their cases to be called. Plaintiffs contend that courthouse ramps, holding cells, and transport vans are not compliant with the ADA
2

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and Rehab Act’s architectural accessibility standards (or “structural requirements”) and that defendants have not provided reasonable accommodations to overcome structural barriers.
The court held seven days of hearings on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. At the hearings, the evidence focused on a number of subjects, including: (1) the accessibility of the courthouses under current conditions; (2) accommodations defendants provide to overcome structural barriers; (3) construction the County was undertaking contemporaneously with the hearings to remove structural barriers; (4) the credibility of the testifying named plaintiffs and putative class members; (5) the County’s future plans to make the courthouses compliant with current ADA structural requirements; and (6) the applicability of the ADA and Rehab Act’s structural requirements to the courthouses. Since the evidentiary hearing concluded on February 17, 2015, the parties have submitted numerous status reports concerning defendants’ compliance with existing ADA-policies, implementation of new ADA-policies, and ADAfocused construction at all six courthouses.
DISCUSSION A. Defendants’ Statutory Obligations
Plaintiffs claim that defendants have violated section 504 of the Rehab Act and Title II of the ADA. Section 504 prohibits a “qualified individual with a disability” from being “excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” as a result of his disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Similarly, Title II of the ADA provides that, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
3

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 203 Filed: 10/08/15 Page 4 of 30 PageID #:6663
discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Given that the analysis under each statute is the same (with the exception that the Rehab Act requires receipt of federal funding) and that plaintiffs can recover under only one of the statutes, the court will analyze the two statutes as one, referring predominantly to the ADA. See Jaros v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 67172 (7th Cir. 2012).
To succeed on a Title II claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that he is a “qualified individual with a disability”; (2) that was denied “the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity,” or otherwise was discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such denial or discrimination was “by reason of” his disability.3 Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1996); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II’s implementing regulations provide that “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). Thus, discrimination can be established by evidence that the defendant refused to provide a reasonable accommodation. Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 1999).
Title II’s “reasonable modification requirement can be satisfied in a number of ways.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532 (2004). Buildings constructed or renovated after 1992,4 must comply with specific architectural accessibility standards. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151. For
3 To recover damages under either statute, which is currently not an issue before the court, a plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant intentionally discriminated. CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland School Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 528 n.4 (7th Cir. 2014).
4 As discussed below, the Rehab Act’s architectural accessibility standards have a different effective date than the ADA.
4

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buildings constructed before 1992, “a public entity may comply with Title II by adopting a variety of less costly measures, including relocating services to alternative, accessible sites and assigning aides to assist persons with disabilities in accessing services.” Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1)). The parties agree that the ADA and Rehab Act’s structural requirements do not apply to the Leighton, Maywood, Markham, and Skokie courthouses because of their early construction dates. Accordingly, defendants’ statutory obligations with respect to those courthouses are limited to providing pretrial detainees with reasonable accommodations that overcome structural barriers. See id.
Plaintiffs argue, however, that the Rehab Act’s structural requirements were applicable to the Rolling Meadows and Bridgeview courthouses at the time of their construction in the late 1980s. Plaintiffs first argue that the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (“UFAS”) imposed structural requirements on the two courthouses. The parties agree that as of March 7, 1988, the Rehab Act required buildings constructed or renovated by a state or municipality to comply with the UFAS. 28 C.F.R. 42.522(b). According to the County, because the Rolling Meadows courthouse was fully constructed in 1987, the building did not have to be constructed in compliance with the UFAS.
The County argues that while the Bridgeview courthouse was not opened until 1989, its construction, including design and permitting, began in 1986, thereby making the UFAS inapplicable. Defendants do not cite any authority for their position that “the latest event that could trigger compliance with [the UFAS] is the beginning of construction of the new facility,” nor could the court find any such authority. However, the court does note that under the ADA “the commencement of physical construction,” is “the triggering event for application of the
5

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2010" structural requirements “for entities covered by title II.” See Guidance on the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, “State and Local Government Facilities: Guidance on the Revisions to 28 CFR 35.151,” U.S. Department of Justice, Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.ada.gov/regs2010/2010ADAStandards/Guidance2010ADAstandards.htm.
Given the apparent inapplicability of the UFAS to the two courthouses, plaintiffs also argue that prior to the Rehab Act’s adoption of the UFAS in 1988, the Act imposed other accessibility standards called the American National Standard Specifications for Making Buildings and Facilities Accessible to, and Usable by, the Physically Handicapped (“ANSI requirements”). 28 C.F.R. § 45.522 (1980). According to plaintiffs, the 1980 ANSI requirements called for the same maximum slope for ramps as today’s statutory construction standards. As such, plaintiffs argue that despite the Bridgeview and Rolling Meadows’ late1980s construction dates, the County was required to comply with the slope standards specified in the 1980 ANSI requirements when constructing the ramps at both courthouses.
The court is not persuaded by either of plaintiffs’ arguments. The Rehab Act prohibits “discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794. The Rehab Act defines “program or activity” as the operations of “a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A). The defendant County, which is responsible for construction and maintenance of the courthouses at issue, does not fit this definition. Instead, as found in Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 715 F. Supp. 222, 225 (N.D. Ill. 1989), the County “embodies an entire local government,” and “is not a department or instrumentality of a local government.” Through the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Congress intended “to include federally funded institutions
6

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 203 Filed: 10/08/15 Page 7 of 30 PageID #:6666
like hospitals or universities within the amended definition of ‘program or activity.’ By contrast, nothing in the amendment’s legislative history suggests that Congress contemplated classifying an entire municipality . . . as a ‘program or activity.’” Id. at 225; see also Hodges by Hodges v. Public Bldg. Com’n of Chicago, 864 F. Supp. 1493, 1505-06 (N.D. Ill. 1994). As such, the County’s statutory obligations under the ADA with respect to all six courthouses, including the Rolling Meadows and Bridgeview courthouses, are limited to providing pretrial detainees with reasonable accommodations that overcome structural barriers. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 532. B. Evidentiary Record5
i. Transport Vans Plaintiffs complain that their rights pursuant to the ADA are violated when they are transported to and from court appearances at the suburban courthouses in the Sheriff’s transport vans. According to plaintiffs, correctional officers employed by the Sheriff: (1) transport more wheelchair-using detainees at one time than there are ADA-compliant wheelchair straps; (2) fail to secure wheelchair-using detainees with ADA straps during transport; and (3) at other times, fail to properly secure wheelchair-using detainees with the ADA-compliant straps during transport. Plaintiffs allege that these violations have resulted in injuries to some wheelchairusing detainees. The evidentiary record establishes that defendant Sheriff utilizes four handicap accessible vans to transport wheelchair-using detainees to and from court appearances at the suburban
5 The evidentiary record currently before the court includes the seven days of hearings on plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief and the many status reports and additional evidence that the parties have submitted since the last hearing date on February 17, 2015. Given this voluminous record, the court does not address every piece of evidence submitted by the parties, but instead focuses on what it finds to be most relevant.
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courthouses. The Lieutenant of Transportation for the Sheriff, Grant Martin, testified that two of the vans were purchased in 2014 and that the other two vans had been in service for approximately four or five years. At the time the new vans were purchased, Lieutenant Martin, along with four sergeants and two officers, were trained on how to properly use the ADA restraints in each van. The other Sheriff’s officers were instructed on proper use of the vehicles during morning roll call.
Lieutenant Martin testified that two Sheriff’s officers are assigned to each van during the transport of wheelchair-using detainees. There are two S-hook straps attached to the floor of the vans that are secured to the wheels of a detainee’s wheelchair, and once the straps are tightened they “keep the wheelchair immobile.” There is also a traditional seatbelt that goes across the detainee’s body. The officers assigned to each van are required to inspect the vans, including verifying that the ADA equipment is present and functional, each morning before transporting any detainees. Lieutenant Martin testified that two to three wheelchair-using detainees are transported in the vans at one time, depending on how many ADA straps are available. While the new vans are pre-equipped with two sets of straps, additional straps can be added to the vans to accommodate a third wheelchair-using detainee. Wheelchair-using detainees are not handcuffed during transport to and from court. According to Lieutenant Martin, detainees can remove and adjust both the seat belt and S-hook straps without assistance. Lieutenant Martin testified that he has received approximately four to six grievances in the last two months from wheelchair-using detainees concerning van transport and that he had not received any such grievances previously.
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Plaintiffs’ ADA expert, Maureen Reagan, testified that she inspected two of the transport vans used by the Sheriff to take wheelchair-using detainees to court proceedings – one older model and one newer model. Reagan testified that in one van there were enough restraints to transport two wheelchair-using detainees at once, while the other van had a single set of S-hook straps. Reagan testified that with the exception of “lacking a handhold inside,” the vans were compliant with the 2010 ADA accessibility standards. The vans had ADA-compliant lifts, hooks to secure each side of a wheelchair, and seatbelts.
Plaintiffs submitted six witnesses – Harold Vaughn, Marquis Bowers, Kevin Dawson, Shelly Gaston, Daryl Harper, and Cornelius Purnell – who testified about being transported to and from court in the Sheriff’s transportation vans. The six wheelchair-using detainees testified about a myriad of experiences, but collectively complained about not having their wheelchairs secured at all, and on other occasions, being strapped in, but not securely, during transport to court appearances. Gaston and Harper complained that even when they are properly restrained, the S-hook straps are too old to ensure that they will not be shaken around during the trip. Bowers, Vaughn, Purnell, and Dawson testified to falling out of their wheelchairs or tipping over in their wheelchairs during transport as a result of not having their wheelchairs secured. The detainees also testified to witnessing other wheelchair-using detainees fall out of their wheelchairs during transport.
In addition to not being secured in the vans, Dawson and Purnell testified to being transported with as many as four other wheelchair-using detainees at one time over the past two years. Both detainees, however, testified that on such occasions two detainees would be taken out of their wheelchairs and placed in the van’s seats. According to Dawson and Purnell, this
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practice had recently changed, and over the past several months they had been transported with only one other wheelchair-using detainee when going to and coming from court.
The detainees testified to the proper way Sheriff’s employees are supposed to secure wheelchair-using detainees into the vans, with an S-hook strap attached to each wheel of the detainee’s wheelchair and a seatbelt across each detainee’s chest. However, the detainees testified that they were unable to secure or unsecure themselves in the vans. Purnell testified that despite the fact that video evidence showed him picking-up an object from the floor while seated in his wheelchair, he cannot tighten or loosen the van’s ADA straps because, “[f]irst of all, it’s the officers’ job to do that. And plus . . . [he doesn’t] know how to work the belt.” Similarly, Bowers admitted that the latches that tighten the S-hook straps are only a few inches from his hands, but that he is unable to tighten or loosen the straps himself because “he doesn’t know how to do the straps.” Video evidence, however, showed Bowers coming out of a transport van on November 7, 2014, – a day on which Bowers testified to having been properly secured within the van – without a Sheriff’s officer helping him undo the ADA straps.
Lieutenant Martin testified that an investigation into whether Dawson was properly secured during transport on January 6, 2015, revealed that he had unstrapped himself upon arrival to the Skokie courthouse. To address the problem of wheelchair-using detainees unstrapping themselves while in the transportation vans, the Sheriff’s ADA Coordinator, Marlene Fuentes, testified about a notice she began drafting in February 2015 to warn detainees against removing the ADA straps while in the vans. Fuentes explained that she intended to place the notice in each of the Sheriff’s wheelchair accessible vans.
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ii. Ramps When attending court at any of the five suburban courthouses, wheelchair-using detainees encounter ramps between the loading dock where they are deposited by the transportation van and the courthouses’ lower-level holding cells. Similarly, detainees with appearances at the Leighton courthouse maneuver a ramp in the tunnel between the Cook County Jail and the courthouse’s lower-level staging area. The parties agree that the ramps leading to the lower-level holding cells at each of the six courthouses are not compliant with current ADA slope or landing requirements, and that a reasonable accommodation is for defendants’ employees to push wheelchair-using detainees up and down the ramps. Although defendants’ witnesses testified that there is a policy and practice requiring wheelchair-using detainees to be pushed up and down the courthouse ramps, plaintiffs complain that wheelchair-using detainees are frequently unassisted. Plaintiffs presented three witnesses – Dawson, Harper, and Purnell – who testified that they are not consistently pushed up and down the courthouse ramps. Harper testified that he normally pushes himself up the ramp at the Markham courthouse, but that “sometime[s] [he’ll] get a nice [officer] that will help [him].” Harper has never asked for assistance with maneuvering the Markham ramp. Purnell testified that he occasionally is given assistance with the ramp at the Bridgeview courthouse, but that nine out of ten times over the last six months he was not assisted. Dawson complained that he rarely receives assistance going up and down the Skokie and Leighton courthouse ramps. At least five videos (dated December 30, 2014, January 6, 2015, April 2, 2015, April 3, 2015, and August 4, 2015) submitted by plaintiffs show Dawson using the
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ramps without assistance. Video footage from December 30, 2014, and April 2, 2015, depicts Dawson maneuvering up and down the Leighton courthouse ramp unassisted (despite allegedly requesting help on April 2, 2015). Video evidence from August 4, 2015, shows Dawson rolling himself down the Leighton courthouse ramp. The videos submitted by plaintiffs from Dawson’s April 3, 2015, visit to the Leighton courthouse show him both receiving and not receiving assistance up and down the ramps.
Although video footage from the Skokie courthouse ramp area on January 6, 2015, depicts Dawson pushing himself up the ramp, video footage from the loading dock area shows Dawson leaving the loading dock without the guards. Lieutenant Martin testified that because operation of the van lift requires the vehicle to remain on, Sheriff’s officers must secure the transport van before escorting detainees to the lower-level holding cells. According to Lieutenant Martin, it is possible for a detainee to leave the loading dock area while the officers are securing the vehicle.
Some of the videos submitted by plaintiffs also depict Dawson receiving the assistance he denies obtaining. For example, on August 24, 2015 (long after the hearings had concluded), plaintiffs moved to submit additional video evidence of three occasions on which Dawson was allegedly not assisted with the ramps. However, in two of the three videos (dated July 16, 2015, and August 4, 2015), Dawson was provided assistance going up the courthouse ramps. Bowers and Farris (who was called as a witness by defendants) both testified to always receiving assistance when maneuvering the ramps at the Maywood and Bridgeview courthouses. Gaston did not testify concerning whether he is routinely given assistance with the ramp at the Markham courthouse, but did testify to being helped up the ramp on December 10, 2014.
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James Banks, Assistant Chief of the Leighton courthouse, testified that it is policy and practice for court services officers to push wheelchair-using detainees up and down the ramps at the Leighton courthouse, but that most of the time detainees do not want assistance. Likewise, both Lieutenant Martin and ADA Coordinator Fuentes testified that it is the Sheriff’s policy and practice to push wheelchair-using detainees up and down the ramps at all of the courthouses. Fuentes testified that she has conducted training on this policy, and Lieutenant Martin testified that he has reminded the Sheriff’s officers of the policy at least twice a week during morning roll call over the past year.
The first ADA complaint Fuentes received concerning a wheelchair-using detainee not receiving assistance with the courthouse ramps was on November 12, 2014, from Dawson. As with the notices to be placed in the transport vans, Fuentes began drafting a notice in February 2015 warning wheelchair-using detainees against traversing courthouse ramps without the assistance of a Sheriff’s or court services officer. Fuentes testified that she planned on posting these notices at the top and bottom of the ramps at each of the six courthouses. On March 13, 2015, the Sheriff issued a general order (“Sheriff’s Order 11.14.35.0"), effective March 27, 2015, stating that “When practicable, [Sheriff’s officers] shall provide assistance to wheelchair-bound subjects who are in CCSO custody,” including “[p]ushing subjects up and down ramps in CCSO facilities.”
iii. Holding Cells Plaintiffs complain that the holding cells wheelchair-using detainees are housed in while awaiting appearances at all of the six courthouses are not accessible, and that defendants have not provided reasonable accommodations to overcome structural barriers in the cells.
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Specifically, plaintiffs contend that: (1) the lower-level holding cells at the suburban courthouses do not have accessible bathroom facilities; (2) none of the holding cells adjacent to the courtrooms in any of the six courthouses have accessible toilets; and (3) there is no accessible toilet facility in bullpen 34/5, where detainees are held prior to being transported to the Leighton courthouse. Defendants do not dispute that the holding cells at all six courthouses are not compliant with the 2010 ADA architectural accessibility standards. However, defendants contend that they have provided reasonable accommodations to overcome any structural barriers, and beyond this statutory obligation, have begun construction to make holding cells at each of the six courthouses compliant with the current accessibility requirements.
1. Leighton Courthouse Since at least December 2014, wheelchair-using detainees attending court at the Leighton courthouse are brought from their living quarters in the morning to bullpen 34/5 at the lowerlevel exit of Division 5 of the Cook County Jail. Originally, bullpen 34/5's bathroom facility consisted of a toilet/sink combination, without grab bars. In May 2014, ADA Coordinator Fuentes placed a work order for grab bars to be placed in bullpen 34/5, which were installed in November 2014. ADA Compliance Project Director for Cook County, Michael Gumm, testified that he became involved with bullpen 34/5 improvements in September or October of 2014. On October 2, 2014, Gumm drafted a memo with a scope of work to make bullpen 34/5 compliant with the 2010 ADA standards. At the time of Gumm’s testimony on January 20, 2015, the toilet in bullpen 34/5 was ADA-compliant, but the newly installed sink was too close to the toilet and did not comply with ADA clearance standards. By the end of March 2015, a new, ADAcompliant sink was installed in bullpen 34/5.
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From bullpen 34/5, wheelchair-using detainees are brought through a tunnel to a staging area below the Leighton courthouse, known as “the bridge.” Wheelchair-using detainees are staged outside of a large holding cell in the bridge area until their court cases are called. While a large holding cell in the bridge has toilet facilities, it is reserved for non-wheelchair-using detainees who are held in the cell. If a wheelchair-using detainee wishes to use the restroom while staged in the bridge, he must request that a court services officer escort him to a bathroom in what is referred to as the “old female lockup” area, which is adjacent to the bridge.
According to Assistant Chief Banks, there is a sign posted in the bridge area alerting wheelchair-using detainees to the fact that they can request to use the old female lockup restroom. The old female lockup bathroom has a combination toilet/sink, over which a portable commode chair was placed in the spring of 2014. In January 2015, a privacy wall that was next to the toilet/sink combination was torn down and a grab bar was added to the wall next to the toilet to make the facility more accessible. Gumm testified that a grab bar could not be added behind the toilet/sink combination, as required by the 2010 ADA standards, because of structural reasons. Defendants argue that these adjustments make the restroom accessible to wheelchairusing detainees.
Assistant Chief Banks testified that in April 2014 he toured the Leighton courthouse and observed that there are no handicap accessible toilet facilities in the holding cells behind the courtrooms. Banks communicated these observations to his supervisor, Chief of Courts Eddie Avant, and Leighton building staff in an April 19, 2014, memorandum. The memo, which was read at the following ten roll calls, instructed court services officers to, “[i]n the event of emergency,” escort a wheelchair-using detainee from the lockup area to a public, ADA-
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compliant restroom. Banks’ memo articulated that “[t]hese measures are to be used only in emergencies until the facility is ADA compliant.” Banks testified that since the memo was published, he was not aware of any detainee being taken to a public restroom.
According to Banks and ADA Coordinator Fuentes, the policy and practice of the court services officers at the Leighton courthouse is to bring wheelchair-using detainees directly from the bridge area to their courtroom and back down again to the bridge area immediately following the court appearance. Dawson, however, testified that on December 4, 2014, he was held in a holding cell outside of his courtroom in the Leighton courthouse for over an hour. In addition, video footage from the Leighton courthouse on December 30, 2014, depicts Dawson waiting in that same holding cell for approximately two hours after his court appearance.
Dawson testified that on November 5, 2014, while waiting in the bridge, he requested that an officer take him to the old female lockup bathroom. According to Dawson, the officer told him that she did not know about an old female lockup restroom. Instead, Dawson was escorted to bullpen 34/5. Dawson testified that he could not use the restroom in bullpen 34/5 because it did not have grab bars. As a result, Dawson testified that he soiled himself prior to going to court. Dawson filed a grievance about this incident, to which Fuentes responded that grab bars had subsequently been installed in the bullpen. When Dawson returned to court on December 4, 2014, he observed that grab bars were now in bullpen 34/5. However, he testified that despite the grabs bars it was still difficult for him to use the toilet because it was too low.
2. Suburban Courthouses ADA Coordinator Fuentes testified that in June or July of 2014 she inspected the detention areas at all of the suburban courthouses. During her tour, Fuentes observed that all of
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the bathroom facilities in the holding cells at each of the five suburban courthouses had combination toilet/sinks. In addition, with the exception of the Maywood courthouse where two upper-level holding cells were compliant with current ADA standards, none of the bathroom facilities had grab bars. Following her tour of the suburban courthouses, and after receiving a grievance from a wheelchair-using detainee about not being able to access the toilet facilities at a suburban courthouse, Fuentes delivered portable commode chairs provided by the Cermak Infirmary to each of the suburban courthouses.
Fuentes testified that a holding cell in the lower-level of each suburban courthouse was chosen for wheelchair-using detainees to be held in. A portable commode chair was placed in each of the selected lower-level holding cells. Fuentes then posted signs alerting detainees at each of the five courthouses that commode chairs were available upon request and also spoke to the wheelchair-using detainees in their housing units about being able to request a commode chair. Fuentes also instructed court services officers to provide wheelchair-using detainees with commode chairs when they are placed in a suburban court holding cell. Fuentes, however, did not train the officers on how to assist a detainee using a commode chair, even though the chairs have a manufacturer’s warning on them requiring that they be used with assistance.
Fuentes testified that she did not supply the upper-level holding cells with commode chairs because the Sheriff’s policy at the suburban courthouses is, as it is at the Leighton courthouse, to escort wheelchair-using detainees up to their respective courtrooms immediately before their case is called and escort them back to the lower-level holding cells immediately thereafter. However, Purnell testified to being kept in a holding cell outside of his courtroom at the Bridgeview courthouse for up to two hours before his court appearance.
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Plaintiffs’ witnesses collectively testified to the bathroom facilities being inaccessible in the suburban courthouses. Even with the commode chairs in the lower-level holding cells, the witnesses complained that they could not safely transfer onto the chairs because some of the commode chairs did not have removable arms. Moreover, the detainees testified that because the chairs were not secured to the floor, they shift when being mounted. While some of the detainees were able to access the holding cell sinks, others testified that they could not use the sinks at all, or only with difficulty. Gaston testified that during his December 10, 2014, visit to Markham he was provided with a commode chair upon request, but that the court services officer told him that he could not help him use the chair. The officer, however, took Gaston to a public, accessible restroom on the lower-level of the courthouse.
Dawson testified to being able to use the toilet with the commode chair in the lower-level Skokie holding cell, but complained that transferring to the chair was difficult and not always successful. Video footage from November 18, 2014, depicts Dawson transferring to a commode chair; however, he testified that he could not use the facility because the chair shifted away from the toilet while he was transferring. Dawson testified that he cannot use the combination toilet/sink in the holding cell outside of his courtroom at the Skokie courthouse because his wheelchair does not fit past the privacy glass next to the toilet.
Harper testified that while at the Markham courthouse on December 10, 2014, he was provided with a commode chair, but that the officer told him that he could not provide assistance using the chair. Harper testified that he could not use the bathroom facilities, even with the commode chair, because the handrails on the commode chair do not allow for a side transfer.
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Harper testified to defecating on himself five months prior to his testimony because he was unable to use the toilet in the Skokie holding cell.
Video evidence from October 21, 2014, showed Purnell transferring to a commode chair in a lower-level Bridgeview courthouse holding cell. Although Purnell was eventually able to make the transfer, it took a substantial amount of time. As with the other detainee witnesses, Vaughn testified that the commode chair available at the Markham courthouse was not stable when trying to transfer.
iv. ADA Construction The evidentiary record establishes that defendants began contemplating the need for ADA-related improvements in detention areas at the six courthouses prior to the filing of the instant lawsuit in August 2014. In February 2014, the Sheriff hired ADA Coordinator Fuentes, who was responsible for handling all inmate-related ADA issues for the Sheriff, ensuring that the Sheriff’s policies and practices were compliant with the ADA, and conducting regular assessments of Cook County Department of Correction facilities and equipment for ADAcompliance. Fuentes began conducting ADA-related training for Sheriff’s employees in March 2014. In July 2015, Fuentes resigned from her position as ADA Coordinator. The court has been informed by the Sheriff that he is currently searching for an individual to fill the position. In June 2014, the County hired Gumm to act as the County’s ADA Compliance Project Director. In this position, Gumm focuses on implementing ADA improvements, including developing ADA-compliant designs for both larger capital projects and smaller facilities management projects. Gumm testified that when he first began working for the County in June
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2014, he assisted the Director of Capital Planning in developing a 2015 capital improvement plan for ADA-renovations of the detention areas at the Leighton courthouse.
In November 2014, the Cook County Board approved $8.3 million in funding for ADA renovations to the Leighton courthouse holding cells as a part of its 2015 budget. Since the evidentiary hearing, defendant County has undertaken a number of construction projects to bring the detention areas at both the Leighton and suburban courthouses into compliance with the 2010 ADA accessibility standards. On September 3, 2015, the County submitted an affidavit by ADA Project Coordinator Gumm attesting to the status of the ADA construction at each of the six courthouses. According to Gumm’s affidavit, as of September 1, 2015, the County had executed a contract with Prima Engineering for the renovation design of the holding cells in the lower and upper-levels at the Leighton courthouse.
Gumm testified that the Leighton courthouse construction will be completed in three phases over the course of 34 months (10 months for design and 24 months for construction). The first phase of construction will renovate the lower level/bridge holding cells, the second phase will renovate the holding cells behind the courtrooms on floors one and two, and the third phase will renovate the holding cells behind the courtrooms on floors three through seven. As specified in the County’s Request for Proposal No. 1555-14596, the Leighton renovations include “removing cell doors, cell walls, and plumbing fixtures & related piping, the reconfiguration of cell layouts, plumbing fixtures & piping . . . . in compliance with” current ADA structural requirements.
As of September 1, 2015, renovation of the lower-level holding cells at the Skokie, Rolling Meadows, and Markham courthouses had been completed, making the cells compliant
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with the 2010 ADA accessibility standards. Renovations to widen the lower-level holding cell doors at the Markham courthouse had also begun. In addition, the affidavit asserts that a purchase order had been issued for a new ADA-compliant dock and intake ramp at the Skokie courthouse, with installation projected to take place in October 2015. According to the affidavit, a contractor was in the process of providing cost estimates to the County for new docks and intake ramps at the Rolling Meadows and Markham courthouses, with installation projected to take place in the winter of 2015.
Gumm further asserts in the affidavit that renovations on the lower-level holding cell bathroom facilities at the Maywood and Bridgeview courthouses were projected to be completed in September 2015. As with the other suburban courthouses, as of September 1, 2015, a contractor was in the process of providing costs to the County for new ADA-compliant docks and intake ramps at both courthouses, with installation projected to take place in the winter of 2015. C. Declaratory Judgement
Plaintiffs request that regardless of what injunctive relief – preliminary or permanent – that the court imposes, it find that “detainees are being denied rights secured by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act when they are transported to and from the Jail and court appearances.” Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he evidence presented at trial demonstrates that wheelchair-using detainees at the Cook County Jail are discriminated against when they are transported to and from court and while they wait at the courthouse for their cases to be heard.” According to plaintiffs, defendants’ efforts to accommodate wheelchair-using detainees in overcoming structural barriers at the six courthouses are inadequate.
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To succeed on a Title II claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that he is a “qualified individual6 with a disability”; (2) who was denied “the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity,” or otherwise was discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such denial or discrimination was “by reason of” his disability.7 Love, 103 F.3d at 560. As previously discussed by this court, plaintiffs and the class members they represent are qualified individuals with a disability. Lacy, 2015 WL 1995576 at *2. Because defendant Sheriff provides plaintiffs and class members with wheelchairs to use during their court proceedings, they “are regarded as having an impairment, or at least have a record of impairment,” id., and therefore are considered persons with disabilities pursuant to § 12102(1) of the ADA. Likewise, plaintiffs’ constitutional right to attend their criminal court proceedings, Lane, 541 U.S. 509, ensures that they are qualified to make use of the services, programs, and activities in question.
Transportation to court appearances and the facilities made available to detainees at the six courthouses are services provided by defendants within the meaning of the ADA. See, e.g., Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672 (showers and meals made available to inmates qualify as a program or activity); Bramlett v. Dart, No. 14-C-5939, 2015 WL 4148711, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2015) (showers, toilets, and transportation made available to inmates are services). Defendants,
6 Persons with disabilities are “qualified” if they, “with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meet[ ] the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
7 As noted previously, to recover under section 504 of the Rehab Act, a plaintiff must also establish receipt of federal funds. Jaros, 684 F.3d at 671. In addition, to recover damages under either statute, a plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant intentionally discriminated. CTL, 743 F.3d at 528 n.4.
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however, rely on Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2015), to argue that plaintiffs’ allegations do not amount to a denial of these services. In Wagoner, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s complaints about “longer waits and humiliation, as when he had to crawl off the regular [Illinois Department of Corrections] van because it did not accommodate his wheelchair . . . . do not amount to a denial of services within the meaning of either” the ADA or Rehab Act. Id. at 593. According to defendants, “[t]here is no evidence suggesting [they] denied access to any activities, programs, or services.”
Wagoner, however, is distinguishable from the present case because the Seventh Circuit in Wagoner held that the plaintiff’s allegations of inconvenience and humiliation did not sufficiently allege a denial of access to services. Id. Here, as in Bramlett, plaintiffs argue that “defendants failed to make reasonable accommodations to provide [them] with access to critical services . . . on the same basis as other inmates.” Bramlett, 2015 WL 4148711 at *3; see also Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672 (“The refusal to accommodate [plaintiff’s] disability kept him from accessing meals and showers on the same basis as other inmates.”). Moreover, failing to provide a reasonable accommodation, which plaintiffs are alleging here, is sufficient to establish discrimination under Title II. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 847.
i. Transport Vans With respect to the transport vans, the court is not convinced that Sheriff’s employees, and not the detainees themselves, are responsible for failing to adequately secure wheelchairusing detainees during transport to and from court appearances. The record establishes that the Sheriff uses four ADA-compliant vehicles to transport wheelchair-using detainees and that Sheriff’s personnel are trained on how to use the ADA restraints in the vehicles and are required
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to inspect the equipment prior to use. While six witnesses testified to not being secured properly in the vans, the court questions the credibility of their testimony on this topic given the fact that the witnesses knew how the ADA straps are supposed to be attached to their wheelchairs, but denied knowing how to secure the straps themselves. Unlike with the ramps and holding cells, the witnesses’ testimony was not supported by other evidence, such as video footage, calling into question the Sheriff’s practice of securing wheelchair-using detainees prior to transport. Instead, video evidence of Bowers coming out of the transport van without assistance on a day he testified to being properly restrained supports Lieutenant Martin’s testimony that detainees can secure and un-secure themselves within the transport vans.
ii. Ramps The evidentiary record, however, establishes that plaintiffs’ rights under the ADA have been violated in the past with respect to the courthouse ramps. As discussed above, plaintiffs have submitted video evidence, including video footage taken as recently as August 4, 2015, of wheelchair-using detainees not being pushed up and down courthouse ramps. Although defendants presented evidence that it is their policy and practice to assist wheelchair-using detainees maneuvering the courthouse ramps as a reasonable accommodation to overcome the ramps’ steep slopes, such a policy can qualify as a reasonable accommodation only if it is consistently practiced. The evidence here, however, establishes that the policy was not in fact consistently observed in the past. iii. Bathroom Facilities More significantly, the evidentiary record establishes that plaintiffs have historically been denied access on the same basis as non-disabled detainees to bathroom facilities at the six
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courthouses. As discussed in detail above, none of the holding cell bathroom facilities in any of the six courthouses (with the exception of two upper-level holding cells at the Maywood courthouse) were ADA complaint at the time this lawsuit was filed in August 2014. To overcome structural barriers in accessing the toilet facilities, defendants began providing wheelchair-using detainees with portable commode chairs in the Spring of 2014. However, the record is devoid of any evidence that the commode chairs actually assisted wheelchair-using detainees use the restroom facilities, let alone solved accessibility problems with the holding cell sinks that were located behind the toilets.
ADA Coordinator Fuentes testified that the commode chairs are not considered ADAcompliant, and despite the fact that the manufacturer of the chairs specifically instructs that the chairs be used with assistance, no such assistance was provided. Plaintiffs’ witnesses consistently and credibly testified to being unable to use the toilet facilities or being able to do so only with great difficulty, even when provided with a commode chair. As such, the portable commode chairs were not a reasonable accommodation to overcome the structural barriers faced by wheelchair-using detainees trying to access bathroom facilities in the courthouse holding cells. Because the commode chairs were not a reasonable accommodation, defendants’ policy and practice of bringing wheelchair-using detainees to and from their court appearances directly from the lower-level holding cells was also not a reasonable accommodation to overcome the lack of accessible bathroom facilities in the upper-level courthouse holding cells.
Even assuming arguendo that the commode chairs were a reasonable accommodation, they were not supplied to the Leighton courthouse until early 2014 and to the suburban courthouses until mid-2014. Accordingly, wheelchair-using detainees were without this
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accommodation prior to those periods. Likewise, defendants’ policy and practice of bringing wheelchair-using detainees to a public accessible restroom was not implemented (if at all) until April of 2014. Given that defendants did not consistently assist wheelchair-using detainees up and down courthouse ramps or provide a reasonable accommodation to allow wheelchair-using detainees to use holding cell bathroom facilities on the same basis as non-disabled detainees, the court finds that defendants have, in the past, violated plaintiffs’ rights pursuant to the ADA.
Although the court has found past ADA violations, plaintiffs are not entitled to the declaratory judgment they request, that “detainees are being denied rights secured by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act when they are transported to and from the Jail and court appearances.” (Emphasis added.) To begin with, contrary to the underlying purpose of such relief, the declaratory judgment plaintiffs request would do nothing to protect the plaintiffs “with regard to some future acts,” Global Parking Sys. of Indiana, Inc. v. Parking Solutions, Inc., No. 13-CV-00284, 2015 WL 1186787 (S.D. Ind. March 16, 2015), nor would it help define the parties’ rights going forward. Moreover, in light of the injunctive relief plaintiffs seek, a declaratory judgment would not serve a “useful purpose.” See Cohn v. Guaranteed Rate Inc., No. 14-C-9369, 2015 WL 5307625, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2015) (declining to exercise its jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim for declaratory judgment, because it was duplicative of plaintiff’s other claims). Finally, contrary to evidencing present ADA violations, the record establishes that defendants have undertaken extensive construction, beyond what is required of them by the ADA or the Rehab Act, that has remedied the majority of the violations about which plaintiffs complain.
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D. Injunctive Relief According to plaintiffs, “[t]he record in this case shows the need for” a permanent
injunction, “requiring the Sheriff to change Order 11.14.35.0 to require: Employees of the Sheriff shall push each detainee who is using a wheelchair up and down ramps in all courthouses.” (Emphasis included). On June 10, 2010, the court held that it would rule on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction only, despite the fact that it had previously combined the evidentiary hearing with a trial on the merits. However, in light of plaintiffs’ most recent request for a permanent injunction, and the fact that the evidentiary record has continued to grow since this issue was last addressed, preliminary injunctive relief is no longer before the court. Accordingly, the court now considers plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction.
As discussed above, on March 13, 2015, the Sheriff issued a general order effective March 27, 2015, stating that “When practicable, [Sheriff’s officers] shall provide assistance to wheelchair-bound subjects who are in CCSO custody,” including “[p]ushing subjects up and down ramps in CCSO facilities.” Plaintiffs argue that “when practicable” does not ensure that wheelchair-using detainees will be given assistance up and down courthouse ramps. Defendants, however, contend that the “when practicable” language is necessary because an emergency situation, such as instances requiring all available officers to respond to a security matter, may arise in which no officer is available to provide ramp assistance. According to the Sheriff, “[t]hese circumstances rarely occur; yet the Sheriff should be allowed the latitude to craft policies and procedures to permit officers flexibility when they do.” The Sheriff, however, concedes that it “is not opposed to changing language within the Order.” Doc. no. 158.
27

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A permanent injunction “requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiffs have suffered irreparable harm; (2) monetary damages are inadequate to remedy the injury; (3) an equitable remedy is warranted based on the balance of hardships between the plaintiffs and defendant; and (4) the public interest would be well served by the injunction.” Kartman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir. 2011). Given the court’s ruling that defendants have discriminated against wheelchair-using detainees by failing to consistently push them up and down courthouse ramps, plaintiffs have succeed on the merits of their ADA claim with respect to this alleged statutory violation. Notwithstanding this finding, the ramps at some or all of the six courthouses remain non-compliant with current ADA standards and plaintiffs have established that defendants’ current policy and practice of helping detainees maneuver the ramps continues to be applied sporadically, despite the Sheriff’s order. As such, the court’s finding does not rectified plaintiffs’ injuries. See Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir. 1992) (“‘Irreparable’ in the injunction context means not rectifiable by the entry of a final judgment.”). Although plaintiffs seek to recover damages pursuant to Title II, these damages are not an adequate remedy because they are meant to compensate plaintiffs for past instances of discrimination, but, if rewarded, will do nothing to protect plaintiffs’ rights going forward.
Where, as here, the plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction requiring defendants to perform an affirmative act, the balance of harms inquiry is particularly important as a part of the court’s evaluation of whether injunctive relief is appropriate. See Kartman, 634 F.3d at 892. Defendants adamantly assert that they already provide the relief requested and have expressed their willingness to revise the Sheriff’s order to ensure that all wheelchair-using detainees
28

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receive the required assistance. As such, there is no significant harm imposed by requiring defendants to alter the order at issue. Conversely, without injunctive relief, plaintiffs’ rights under the ADA and Rehab Act will likely continue to be violated. Because the balance of harms favors plaintiffs and an injunction protecting their federal rights is in the public interest, plaintiffs have established their right to permanent injunctive relief.
Although plaintiffs are entitled to permanent injunctive relief, their proposed amendments to the Sheriff’s order do not adequately take into account the corrections context under which the order will be imposed. As discussed above, defendants have expressed a legitimate concern that plaintiffs’ proposed order, requiring an officer to push wheelchair-using detainees up and down the ramps no matter the circumstances, may cause safety and security issues in the event of an emergency. However, as the evidence has established, the Sheriff’s order is presently too broad and indefinite to protect plaintiffs’ federal rights under the ADA. For example, an officer may not find it “practicable” to push a wheelchair-using detainee up a courthouse ramp when carrying something in his hands. Accordingly, cognizant of defendants’ concerns and the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a),8 which requires injunctive relief to be narrowly drawn in the corrections setting, defendants should be given an opportunity to propose an amended Sheriff’s order that more specifically addresses the exceptional circumstances about which they are concerned.
8 Although the instant case predominantly involves conditions at the six respective courthouses and not “prison conditions,” as specified by the PLRA, the parties appear to agree that the PLRA is applicable to any injunction this court may enter. Because plaintiffs and class members are incarcerated during their time at the courthouses, the court agrees that the PLRA is applicable.
29

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CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered: 1. Plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment is denied; 2. Plaintiffs’ request for mandatory injunctive relief requiring defendants to alter
Sheriff’s Order 11.14.35.0 to state that: “Employees of the Sheriff shall push each detainee who is using a wheelchair up and down ramps in all courthouses,” is denied, in light of paragraph 3 below; 3. Defendant Sheriff is directed to amend the order referenced in paragraph 2 above with language ensuring that wheelchair-using detainees are consistently assisted when maneuvering courthouse ramps that are not compliant with the ADA, explaining clearly what exigent circumstances would excuse such assistance. The Sheriff is directed to submit a proposed amended order on or before October 29, 2015; 4. Defendants are ordered to submit a verified report on the status of the ADArelated construction at the six courthouses in question on or before October 29, 2015; 5. Plaintiffs may respond to defendants’ submissions on or before November 12, 2015; 6. This matter is set for a hearing on the status of the matters discussed above on November 18, 2015, at 10:00 a.m. ENTER: October 8, 2015
__________________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge
30

 
 Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 218 Filed: 11/19/15 Page 1 of 11 PageID #:6835

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHNATHAN LACY, KENNETH FARRIS,

)

MARQUIS BOWERS, MAURICE

)

BOSTON, KEVIN DAWSON, individually

)

and for all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

THOMAS DART, SHERIFF OF COOK

)

COUNTY, COOK COUNTY,

)

ILLINOIS, SGT. JOHNSON, CORRECTIONAL )

OFFICER NAWARA, CORRECTIONAL

)

OFFICER LOPEZ, CORRECTIONAL

)

OFFICER WILSON,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 14 C 6259 Judge Robert W. Gettleman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs Jonathan Lacy, Kenneth Farris, Marquis Bowers, Maurice Boston, and Kevin Dawson, filed a putative class action amended complaint against defendants Thomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois (the “Sheriff”), Cook County, Illinois (the “County”), Sergeant Johnson, and correctional officers Nawara, Lopez, and Wilson,1 alleging violations of section 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Rehab Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Following oral arguments and an extensive evidentiary hearing on plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief, this court certified a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) of “All Cook County Jail detainees who have been assigned and currently use a wheelchair.” Lacy v. Dart, No. 14-C-

1 The individual sergeant and officers were sued as a part of plaintiff Lacy’s excessive force claim only. These claims, however, have been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. See doc. no. 193.

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 218 Filed: 11/19/15 Page 2 of 11 PageID #:6836
6259, 2015 WL 1995576 (N.D. Ill. April 30, 2015). On October 8, 2015, the court granted in part plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, requiring defendant Sheriff to redraft an order mandating that wheelchair-using detainees be given assistance when maneuvering courthouse ramps. Lacy v. Dart, No. 14-C-6259, 2015 WL 5921810 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8 2015).
Currently before the court is plaintiffs’ motion [doc. 164] for partial summary judgment as to each of their individual ADA and Rehab Act claims and defendants’ motion [doc. 183] for summary judgment as to all of plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants have also filed a motion [doc. 178] to strike portions of plaintiffs’ local rule 56.1 statement of fact. For the reasons discussed below, the court grants plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and denies defendants’ motion for summary judgment and motion to strike.
BACKGROUND2 The extensive factual and evidentiary history of this case was comprehensively discussed in the court’s October 8, 2015, memorandum opinion and order (the “October 8 Order”). Lacy, 2015 WL 5921810. Nevertheless, the court briefly reiterates that plaintiffs are or were3 wheelchair-using detainees held at the Cook County Jail. Plaintiffs, like all Cook County Jail detainees, attend court periodically in connection with their underlying criminal cases at either the Leighton Criminal Courthouse in Chicago (“Leighton”) or one of five suburban courthouses:
2 Ordinarily, the following facts would be undisputed and come from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements and responses. However, because the court has already made factual findings in this case as a part of its October 8, 2015, memorandum opinion and order, Lacy, 2015 WL 5921810, the following facts are taken from those findings.
3 After this lawsuit was filed, plaintiff Lacy was transferred into the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections and plaintiff Dawson was released from pretrial detention at the Cook County Jail.
2

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Maywood; Markham; Skokie; Rolling Meadows; and Bridgeview. Plaintiffs complained that as wheelchair-using detainees they were subject to numerous ADA and Rehab Act violations in connection with their criminal court appearances. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the Sheriff’s transportation vehicles, along with courthouse ramps and holding cells were not compliant with the ADA and Rehab Act’s architectural accessibility standards (or “structural requirements”) and that defendants had not provided reasonable accommodations to overcome these barriers.
After seven days of evidentiary hearing, multiple pre and post-hearing briefs, and additional submissions of evidence, the court found, as articulated in the October 8 Order, that plaintiffs’ rights under the ADA had been violated in the past with respect to courthouse ramps and bathroom facilities. The evidentiary record established, and defendants did not dispute, that the ramps in the detention areas of the six courthouses were not compliant with the ADA’s current slope requirements. As such, the parties agreed that a reasonable accommodation to overcome the ramps’ steep slopes was for court and Sheriff’s personnel to provide assistance to wheelchair-using detainees when maneuvering the ramps. The evidence, however, established that wheelchair-using detainees were not consistently assisted up and down courthouse ramps.
Similarly, the parties agreed that the bathroom facilities in the courthouse holding cells were not compliant with current ADA accessibility standards. Although defendants argued that providing portable commode chairs was a reasonable accommodation to overcome structural barriers, the court concluded that the commode chairs did not provide wheelchair-using detainees access on the same basis as non-disabled detainees to bathroom facilities at the six courthouses. Moreover, the record evidenced that wheelchair-using detainees were even without
3

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this accommodation until early 2014. The court did not find that the evidentiary record supported a finding that plaintiffs’ rights had been violated with respect to the Sheriff’s transportation vehicles.
DISCUSSION I. Motion to Strike
Defendants’ motion to strike is denied. While plaintiffs’ L.R. 56.1 statement suffers from numerous defects, as discussed above the court has already made factual findings with respect to many of the statements of fact defendants seek to strike. As a result of the findings made in the October 8 Order, many of the parties’ statements of fact are now moot. To the extent that any of plaintiffs’ still relevant statements of fact offend this court’s local rules, the court will not consider them. See Gittings v. Tredegar Corp., 2010 WL 4930998, at *1 n.4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2010). II. Motions for Summary Judgment
A. Legal Standard A movant is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 when the moving papers and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once a moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Becker v. Tenenbaum–Hill Assoc., Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990). The court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light
4

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most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Green v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1987).
A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The nonmoving party must, however, “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.4
B. Analysis To succeed on a Title II claim under the ADA,5 a plaintiff must establish: (1) that he is a “qualified individual with a disability”; (2) who “was denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity” or otherwise was discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such “denial or discrimination was by reason of his disability.” Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II’s implementing regulations provide that “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are
4 The court acknowledges, as it did in its earlier order, that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a), is applicable to this litigation.
5 As the court held in the October 8 Order, plaintiffs’ Rehab Act claims as applied to the original construction of the courthouses fail because the County, which was responsible for construction of the courthouses, does not fit the definition of “program or activity” under the statute. Lacy, 2015 WL 5921810 at *3. However, this holding has little impact of the instant motions because the analysis under each statute is essentially identical, and plaintiffs can recover under only one statute.
5

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necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). Thus, discrimination can be established by evidence that the defendant refused to provide a reasonable accommodation. Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 1999).
As discussed above, plaintiffs have already established that they were discriminated against in violation of the ADA.6 However, to recover damages under the ADA, as plaintiffs now seek to do, they must prove that defendants intentionally discriminated. CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 528 n.4 (7th Cir. 2014). Although not settled by the Seventh Circuit, see Strominger v. Brock, 592 Fed. Appx. 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2014), the majority of circuits that have addressed this issue, as well as courts in this district, have adopted a deliberate indifference standard for establishing intentional discrimination. See Reed v. Illinois, No. 14-C-2247, 2015 WL 4727754, *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2015) (holding that allegations of deliberate indifference satisfy the intentional discrimination requirement for ADA and Rehab Act claims). Deliberate indifference under the ADA “requires both ‘(1) knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely,’ and (2) ‘a failure to act upon that likelihood.’” Id. (quoting S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2013)). Under this standard, negligence or bureaucratic inaction is not sufficient to establish liability under the ADA. Durrell, 729 F.3d at 263. Given the apparent consensus that deliberate indifference is an appropriate standard for establishing intentional discrimination
6 The court is aware of defendants’ argument the certain plaintiffs do not qualify as “qualified individuals with a disability.” However, as the court has previously held, plaintiffs are regarded as having a disability or at least have a record of impairment, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1), and therefore qualify for protection under the ADA. Lacy, 2015 WL 1995576 at *2. Arguments concerning certain plaintiffs allegedly malingering will go to the issue of damages.
6

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under the ADA and the parties’ acceptance of such, the court will analyze plaintiffs’ claims under this standard. Defendants argue that the evidence establishes that they did not have notice of the accessibility issues faced by plaintiffs until July 2014 when Lacy filed a grievance related to the holding cell bathroom facilities at Leighton. In addition, defendants argue that they did not fail to act to address potential ADA violations, because upon receiving notice they immediately took steps to accommodate plaintiffs. The court disagrees. The record establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to defendants’ knowledge of likely ADA violations and their failure to act in light of that knowledge.
Because defendants provided plaintiffs with wheelchairs, defendants knew that plaintiffs had certain disabilities that resulted in mobility issues. Defendants also knew that wheelchairusing detainees, like all detainees, must traverse courthouse ramps and wait in holding cells prior to court. Defendants knew that while waiting for their cases to be called, detainees, including plaintiffs and other wheelchair-using detainees, may need to use the restroom (hence providing bathroom facilities in the holding cells).
Defendants also knew that the ramps and bathroom facilities in the detention areas of the courthouses were not compliant with current ADA architectural standards. Defendants’ knowledge is evidenced by the extensive, county-wide project begun in 1998 to bring “publicly accessed areas” of County owned facilities into compliance with then-current ADA structural requirements. The County determined, through the help of a consultant, that the public areas of the County courthouses were not in compliance with ADA architectural standards and should be reconstructed to conform to the 1991 statutory standards. On August 6, 2004, the Project Director of the Cook County Office of Capital Planning announced that once the renovations
7

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were complete, the County would be “the first government to have tackled the ADA issue and won.” Construction in the county courthouses was completed in September 2004, including bringing ramps and bathroom facilities in the public areas of the courthouses into compliance. Because the County knew that the public areas of the courthouses were non-compliant with ADA structural requirements, it also knew that the detention areas, constructed at the same time as the public areas, were also out of compliance, therefore requiring defendants to provide accommodations to wheelchair-using detainees.
Defendants were also put on notice concerning accessibility issues by other litigation7 that alerted them to the fact that accommodations to overcome structural barriers may be necessary for wheelchair-using detainees. For example, in 2007, several wheelchair-using detainees held at Cook County Jail filed a lawsuit seeking damages for alleged discrimination on the basis of their disabilities at the jail. Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 249 F.R.D. 298 (N.D. Ill. 2008). Phipps involved the same class of individuals and at least one of the same accessibility issues – toileting– as the instant case, putting the Sheriff on notice that wheelchairusing detainees may require accommodations. Although Phipps involved accessibility at the jail and not the courthouses, the Sheriff’s duties to this class of individuals is not limited to their housing at the jail, but also to their custody and care while attending court proceedings.
Similarly, in February 2014, a wheelchair-using detainee filed a federal lawsuit complaining about, among other things, his inability to use the restroom in holding cells outside
7 To the extent that defendants argue that outside litigation constitutes inadmissible hearsay, the court notes that it is not relying on the evidence for the truth of the matter asserted, but for defendants’ state of mind with respect to the condition of the courthouses. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(3).
8

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 218 Filed: 11/19/15 Page 9 of 11 PageID #:6843
of the Leighton courthouse courtrooms. Givens v. Dart, case no. 14-C-1269. Shortly thereafter, in April 2014, Assistant Chief of Sheriff’s Court Services, James Bank, issued a memorandum discussing the fact that there are no handicap accessible toilet facilities in the holding cells behind the courtrooms at the Leighton courthouse. From these undisputed facts, it is evident that defendants had knowledge of the substantial likelihood that plaintiffs’ federally protected rights against discrimination on the basis of their disability were being violated.
Armed with this knowledge, the record establishes that defendants deliberately failed to act to protect plaintiffs’ rights until 2014. With respect to the courthouse ramps, the Lieutenant of Transportation for the Sheriff, Grant Martin, testified on January 22, 2015, that he had been instructing Sheriff’s employees to push wheelchair-using detainees up and down courthouse ramps only for the past year. Similarly, while the Sheriff’s ADA coordinator conducted training on the Sheriff’s policy of assisting wheelchair-using detainees to maneuver the ramps, such training began only in March 2014. In addition, the Sheriff’s policy concerning wheelchairusing detainees receiving ramp assistance was not put into writing until March 13, 2015, and as the court found, was not consistently followed. Lacy, 2015 WL 5921810 at *6.
Defendants did not begin providing any accommodations to wheelchair-using detainees with respect to the bathroom facilities until the Spring of 2014 when ADA Coordinator Fuentes began placing commode chairs in the courthouses’ lower-level holding cells. However, as discussed at length in the court’s October 8 Order, the commode chairs were not considered ADA-compliant and specifically required that they be used only with assistance, but no such assistance was provided. Nor is there any evidence that defendants followed up to determine whether the chairs actually assisted wheelchair-using detainees to use the holding cell bathroom
9

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 218 Filed: 11/19/15 Page 10 of 11 PageID #:6844
facilities. Based on consistent and credible testimony from plaintiffs’ witnesses, supported by video evidence, the court held that the commode chairs were not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Likewise, defendants’ policy and practice of bringing wheelchair-using detainees to a public accessible restroom was not implemented (if at all) until April of 2014.
Because defendants were on notice of the need to provide accommodations for wheelchair-using detainees attending court at the six courthouses as early as 1999, their deliberate decision not to provide such assistance prior to 2014 establishes intentional discrimination.8
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court grants plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, denies defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and enters a judgment of liability in favor of plaintiffs, and against defendants with respect to plaintiffs’ individual damages claims. At the December 2, 2015, hearing previously set, the court will set a schedule for determining damages. ENTER: November 19, 2015
__________________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge
8 The court, however, acknowledges and commends defendants on the extensive ADArelated improvements it has made to the detention areas at the six county courthouses since mid2014. Although not legally obligated to do so under the ADA, defendants have undertaken construction at each of the courthouses to bring the lower-level detention areas into compliance with the ADA’s 2010 accessibility standards. While not all of the scheduled construction has been completed, the court and the parties anticipate addressing the remaining work at future proceedings.
10

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 Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 368 Filed: 05/02/17 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:8440

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHNATHAN LACY, KENNETH FARRIS,

)

MARQUE BOWERS, MAURICE BOSTON,

)

KEVIN DAWSON, individually and for all

)

others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

THOMAS DART, Sheriff of Cook County and )

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 14 C 6259 Judge Robert W. Gettleman

ORDER

Plaintiffs Johnathan Lacy, Kenneth Farris, Marque Bowers, Maurice Boston and Kevin

Dawson brought an amended class action complaint against defendants Thomas Dart, Sheriff of

Cook County, Illinois (the “Sheriff”) and Cook County, Illinois (the “County”), alleging

violations of § 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, Section

504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Rehab Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Following oral argument and an extensive evidentiary hearing on plaintiffs’ request for

preliminary injunction, this court certified a class of “all Cook County jail detainees who have

been assigned an currently use a wheelchair.” Lacy v. Dart, 2015 WL 1995576 (N.D. Ill.

Apr. 30, 2015). On October 8, 2015, the court granted in part plaintiffs’ request for injunctive

relief, requiring the Sheriff to redraft an order mandating that wheelchair-using detainees be

given assistance when maneuvering courthouse ramps. Lacy v. Dart, 2015 WL 5921810 (N.D.

Ill. Oct. 8, 2015).

On November 19, 2015, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary

judgment, denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment and entered judgment of liability in

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 368 Filed: 05/02/17 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:8441
favor of plaintiffs and against defendants with respect to plaintiffs’ individual damage claims. Lacy v. Dart, 2015 WL 7351752 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2015). In reaching that conclusion, the court found that the holding cells in the suburban courthouses, including the courts in Bridgeview and Markham, Illinois, were not ADA compliant, and that defendants had not been providing reasonable accommodations to overcome the structural barriers. Id. at *2. The court noted, however, that defendants had made and were continuing to make extensive ADA-related improvements to the detention areas at the six county courthouses, and that although not legally obligated to do so under the ADA, defendants had undertaken construction at each of the suburban courthouses to bring the lower level detention areas into compliance with the ADA’s 2010 Accessibility Standards. Id. at *4, n.8.
Now before the court is plaintiffs’ motion for supplemental injunctive relief (Doc. 236) seeking a permanent injunction ordering defendant Cook County to remove a “privacy screen” from each of the two holding cells at the Maywood Courthouse that defendants have altered to comply with the ADA accessibility standards. Also pending is plaintiffs’ motion (Doc. 287) for supplemental injunctive relief regarding the detention cells at the Bridgeview Courthouse. After initial briefing, the court held an evidentiary hearing and then received supplemental briefing. For the reasons described below, plaintiffs’ motion regarding the Maywood Courthouse (Doc. 236) is granted. Plaintiffs’ motion regarding the Bridgeview Courthouse (Doc. 287) is denied.
2

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BACKGROUND The extensive factual and evidentiary history of this case was discussed in the court’s previous opinions, particularly its October 8, 2015 Order, Lacy, 2015 WL 5921810, and will not be repeated. In brief, plaintiffs are or were wheelchair-using detainees held at Cook County Jail. Like all Cook County Jail detainees, plaintiffs’ periodically attended court hearings in connection with their underlying criminal cases at either the Leighton Criminal Courthouse in Chicago, or one of the five suburban courthouses: Maywood; Markham; Skokie; Rolling Meadows; and Bridgeview. Plaintiffs’ allege that as wheelchair-using detainees they were subject to numerous ADA and Rehab Act violations in connection with their criminal court appearances, including that the holding cells and bathroom facilities at the suburban courthouses were not compliant with the ADA and Rehab Act’s Architectural Accessibility Standards, and that defendants had not provided reasonable accommodations to overcome those barriers. After seven days of evidentiary hearings and extensive briefing, the court found that plaintiffs’ rights under the ADA had been violated. With respect to the suburban courthouses, it was undisputed that the bathroom facilities in the holding cells were not compliant with current ADA Accessibility Standards. The court rejected defendants’ argument that providing portable commode chairs was a reasonable accommodation to overcome the structural barriers because those chairs did not provide wheelchair-using detainees access on the same basis as non-disabled detainees. The court declined to enter an injunction, however, because defendants had presented extensive evidence that the holding cells at the suburban courthouses were being renovated to bring them into compliance with current ADA Accessibility Standards. Indeed, defendants have
3

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been successful in bringing three of the five suburban courthouses into total compliance. As will be seen, however, despite defendants’ commendable efforts, a little work remains to be done.
DISCUSSION The ADA was enacted to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Title II, under which plaintiffs bring their claims, proscribes discrimination against individuals with disabilities with respect to access to public services, programs, and activities, and provides that “subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied in the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516-17 (2004); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II’s implementing regulations provide that “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). As already noted, the holding cells at Bridgeview and Maywood did not meet the 2010 Standards for Accessibility. Because both buildings were constructed prior to 1992, defendants were not required to remove barriers, even if removal was readily achievable. Title II Technical Assistance Manuel (“ADATAM”) § II-5200. Because of the age of the courthouses, defendants’ obligations are limited to providing wheelchair-using pretrial detainees with reasonable accommodations that overcome the structural barriers. Lacy, 2015 WL 5921810 at *2. Physical changes to a building are required only when there is no other feasible way to make the programs accessible. ADATAM § 2-5200.
4

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Nevertheless, if the public entity elects to make physical alterations, the alteration must be done “in a manner that the altered portion of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. 35.151(b). When, as in the instant case, the physical alterations commenced after March 15, 2012, the alterations must comply with the 2010 Accessibility Standards. 28 C.F.R. 35.151(c)(3). Maywood Courthouse
The evidence shows that the toilet areas in the modified detention cells at the Maywood Courthouse do not comply with the clean-floor space requirements of the ADA. Specifically, the 2010 Standards for Accessible Design § 604.3.1 provides that “clearance around a water closet shall be 60" (1525 mm) minimum measured perpendicular from the side wall and 56" (1420 mm) minimum measured perpendicular from the rear wall.” The evidence shows that the privacy screens located in front of each toilet stand 54 ½" from the rear wall perpendicular, or 1 ½" too close.
Defendants argue that because they did not intend to alter the entire holding cell, they were entitled under the 2010 Standards, § 202.3, to “alter as many elements within a room or space without triggering the requirement to make the entire room or space accessible based on the alteration of individual elements.” According to defendants, they never intended to change the privacy screen element because of the amount of work involved.
The court rejects this argument. Defendants have repeatedly represented to this court that their intent was to make the holding cells accessible by bringing them up to 2010 Standards. Moreover, even if defendants were technically correct that they do not have to remove (or move) the privacy screens (which they are not), the screens nonetheless create a structural barrier for
5

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which defendants must provide a reasonable accommodation. There is no evidence that they have done so. The privacy screens are too close to the rear wall and must be moved to render the cell and its toilet facilities readily accessible to wheelchair-using detainees. It makes little sense to modify the toilet as defendant did, and yet leave too little space to use it.
Nor have defendants demonstrated that removing the privacy screens is “technically infeasible.” A public entity that elects to alter a facility must do so in a manner that makes the facility “readily accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities to the maximum extent feasible.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(b)(1). The feasibility requirement has been construed as meaning “technical feasibility” rather than “economic feasibility.” See Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 635 F.3d 87, 94-95 (3d Cir. 2011). Defendants have attempted to demonstrate technical infeasibility by presenting evidence that the two privacy screens at Maywood, unlike the screens at the other suburban courthouses, are imbedded into the concrete walls and floors. When pressed on the subject, however, defendants’ expert, Mr. Gumm, could not say that removing the screens would diminish the structural integrity of the wall in a manner that would pose any significant risk. Nor did he say that the walls’ integrity could not be repaired once the bracing for the screens was removed. Consequently, the court concludes that defendants have failed to demonstrate that removing the screens would be technically infeasible. Bridgeview Courthouse
Defendants admit that the entire two holding cells (6 & 7) at the Bridgeview Courthouse were altered. The evidence demonstrates that a new accessible door opening/wall assembly was installed. A new toilet with a new privacy screen was installed. A new ADA compliant bench
6

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was installed. Because the original sliding door was too narrow, a new front wall with a wider door was installed, ultimately requiring an alteration of the floor plan of the cells.
It is undisputed that the two holding cells are fully compliant with the 2010 ADA Accessibility Standards in all but one respect. The turning space within each cell does not comply with § 304.32 of the 2010 Standards, which requires that “the turning space shall be a Tshaped space within a 60" sq. minimum with arms and base 36" wide minimum.” It is undisputed that one of the four legs in each cell is 34" in width instead of the required 36".
Defendants argue that it is technically infeasible to comply with the full 36" width base based on the size of the cells, and that to do so would require removal of a wall. According to defendants, “where compliance with applicable requirements is technically infeasible, alteration shall comply with the requirements to the maximum extent feasible.” 2010 ADA Standards 202.3, exception 2. Although it is unfortunate that defendants did not discover this problem until after the renovations were complete, it appears that the problem is the result of having to alter the floor plan to accommodate the wider sliding door.
Plaintiffs argue that defendants should have elected to renovate a larger holding cell (18) rather than the two smaller holding cells. This decision was made by the Sheriff, however, based on the number of detainees that attend court. It is a decision that is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and will not be disturbed by this court. The evidence provided demonstrates that despite the 2" deviation, wheelchair-using detainees are able to complete a Tturn within the cell with no difficulty. Consequently, the court concludes that defendants have demonstrated “technical infeasibility” and that the Bridgeview Courthouse holding cells do not violate the ADA.
7

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For the reasons described above, the court grants plaintiffs’ motion for supplemental injunctive relief (Doc. 236), and orders defendant Cook County to move the privacy screens in each of the two holding cells at the Maywood Courthouse to provide the required 56" from the rear wall of the cells. The court denies plaintiffs’ motion for supplemental injunctive relief (Doc. 287) regarding the detention cells at the Bridgeview Courthouse.1 ENTER: May 2, 2017
__________________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge
1This order adjudicates the remaining substantive issues in this case, and thus is final and appealable. At the next status hearing the court will address the issues of attorneys fees and costs.
8

 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHNATHAN LACY, KENNETH FARRIS,

)

MARQUE BOWERS, MAURICE

)

BOSTON, KEVIN DAWSON, individually

)

and for all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

No. 14 C 6259

v.

)

)

Judge Robert W. Gettleman

THOMAS DART, SHERIFF OF COOK

)

COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

ORDER

This matter came before the court for Kevin Dawson’s damages trial. Prior to

empaneling the jury, a settlement was reached. A final settlement agreement should be

completed by the next conference date. Plaintiff Kenneth Farris’ damages trial is set for

October 24, 2016, at 9:30 a.m. The court will hold a supplemental injunction hearing following

the conclusion of Farris’ trial. This matter is set for a pre-hearing conference on October 6,

2016, at 10:00 a.m. The parties are ordered to file an agreed agenda for the pre-hearing

conference on or before September 30, 2016.

ENTER: September 14, 2016

__________________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge

 
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In the
United States Court of Appeals

No. 17-2141

For the Seventh Circuit
____________________

JOHNATHAN LACY, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS and THOMAS J. DART,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:14-cv-06259 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
____________________

ARGUED APRIL 19, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 30, 2018 ____________________

Before RIPPLE, MANION, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Five wheelchair-using detainees brought this lawsuit against Cook County, Illinois, and the ěǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱes Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RHA”). Their claims are based on purportedly inaccessible ramps and bathroom facilities at six county courthouses. The district court ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ

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ȱ ěȱ also sought damages individually for the same alleged violations.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the equitable claims first. The parties then filed cross motions for sum¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ entered ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ and legal conclusion that the defendants had violated the ADA. Then, relying largely on these findings, the court ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ity in their personal damage actions. The court then submitted ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ Ȭ
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ class.
We hold that the district court improperly relied on its own findings of fact when it granted paȱ¢ȱȬ ment to the plaintiffs on their damage claims. When equitable ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¡¢ȱȬ cumstances or an unequivocal waiver by all parties of their ¢ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ waiver by the defendants. We therefore vacate the grant of ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ question of liability. As a result, we also vacate the court’s ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȂȱȬ terminations of damage awards. We leave undisturbed the district court’s decisions to certify the class and to grant supȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ is not related to the questions that should have been submitȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱ and remand for further proceedings.
I

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BACKGROUND
A.
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA to provide “a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). This sweeping legislation was animated by the finding that “individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination,” ranging from “outright intentional exclusion” to “the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers.” Id. § 12101(a)(5). The ADA was crafted “to advance equal-citizenship stature for persons with disabilities,” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 536 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring), and to remedy their status as “a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limiǰȱȱȱ a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society,” id. at 516 ǻ¢ȱǼȱǻȱŚŘȱǯǯǯȱȗȱŗŘŗŖŗǻǼǻŝǼǼǯ
The ADA is organized into three titles prohibiting disȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱ¢Ȭ ment (Title I); public services, programs, and activities (Title II); and public accommodations (Title III). This case arises from the protections of Title II.1 The primary mandate of Title II is that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

1 The plaintiffs also filed suit under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Because Title II was modeled after section 504, “the elements of claims under the two provisions are nearly identical.” Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 181 F.3d 840, 845 n.6 (7th Cir. 1999). Therefore, absent circumstances not present here, we apply precedent under one statute to cases involving the other. See id.

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reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. This broad directive has been developed further by the Department of Justice through implementing regulations, accessibility standards, and administrative guidance. See id. § 12134(a) (instructing Attorney General to promulgate regulations implementing pertinent part of Title II).2
To prove a prima facie case of discrimination under Title II, a plaintiff must show: (1) “that he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’”; (2) “that he was denied ‘the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity’ or other-
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȅǲ and (3) “that the denial or discrimination was ‘by reason of’ his disability.” Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132). It is well established that a failure to make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures” can constitute discrimination under Title II. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i)3; see also A.H. by Holzmueller

2 The Supreme Court has not specified whether the DOJ’s Title II regulations warrant deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597–98 (1999). The Court has said, however, that the DOJ’s views “warrant respect” given that Congress directed the agency to implement Title II. Id.
3 Section 35.130(b)(7) states, in relevant part, that “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i).

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v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587, 592–93 (7th Cir. 2018); Wis. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 753 (7th Cir. 2006).
The obligation to make “reasonable modifications” parallels the obligations to make “reasonable accommodations” in the context of Titles I and III. See A.H., 881 F.3d at 592 (recognizing corresponding language in Title II regulations and Title III). These requirements derive from the understanding that certain practices can discriminate against individuals with disabilities even when those practices are facially neutral and consistently applied. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 536 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Congress understood in shaping the ADA [that addressing discrimination] would sometimes require not blindfolded equality, but responsiveness to difference; not indifference, but accommodation.”).
Perhaps the most obvious example of such discrimination is when structural barriers prevent people with disabilities from accessing otherwise available public services. To remedy this form of discrimination, the DOJ has adopted structural accessibility standards that apply to newly constructed ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ See 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(c).4 Of course, structural renovations can be prohibitively costly for some public entities, so the regulations provide flexible compliance options for facilities built before 1992 and unaltered since: compliance can be achieved “through

4 The 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, which we refer to as the “accessibility standards,” consist of the Title II regulations at 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 and the 2004 ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”) at 36 C.F.R. part 1191, appendices B and D.

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such means as redesign or acquisition of equipment, reassignment of services to accessible buildings, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, … alteration of existing facilities … or any other methods that result in making its services, programs, or activities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” Id. § 35.150(b)(1). “And in no event is the entity required to undertake measures that would impose an undue financial or administrative burden, threaten historic preservation interests, or effect a fundamental alteration in the nature of the service.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 532 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.150(a)(2), (a)(3)).
When public entities offer services at inaccessible facilities built before 1992, it is clear that they can comply with Title II by making reasonable modifications to their policies, practices, or procedures. It is often less clear, however, whether a given modification is reasonable. This distinction has generated a significant amount of litigation, to which we add one more case today.

B.
This case centers on the facilities of six courthouses in Cook County, Illinois. The plaintiffs are five wheelchair-using detainees: Johnathan Lacy, Kenneth Farris, Marque Bowers, Maurice Boston, and Kevin Dawson. They each attended court approximately once per month in connection with their individual criminal cases. Their court appearances took place at the Leighton Criminal Courthouse in Chicago or at one of five suburban courthouses in Maywood, Markham, Skokie, Rolling Meadows, and Bridgeview. All of these courthouses
ȱȱȱŗşşŘȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ

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structural accessibility standards. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 532; 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1). Nonetheless, to the extent that the facilities prevent individuals with disabilities from meaningfully accessing public services, reasonable modifications are required. 42 U.S.C. §§ 35.130(b)(7)(i), 35.150(a).
The plaintiffs contend that Cook County and Thomas J. Dart, the Sheriff, failed to provide reasonable modifications with respect to two structural barriers at the courthouses: ramps and bathroom facilities.5 In order to access the courthouses for their monthly appearances, the plaintiffs had to traverse steep entrance and exit ramps in their wheelchairs. Once inside, they waited in holding cells until their cases were called, which could take several hours. The holding cells contained bathroom facilities—typically a combination sink and toilet, set off by a translucent “privacy screen.”
During the relevant time period, the ramps and bathroom facilities did not comply with the latest accessibility standards.6 None of the parties disputes that the ramps did not meet the relevant sloping requirements and that the bathroom facilities did not include grab bars or sufficient clearfloor space under the 2010 standards. Rather, the parties dispute whether the defendants’ policies and practices provided reasonable modifications to overcome these physical barriers.

5 Initially, the plaintiffs also alleged ADA violations based on their transportatiȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ relief on that claim, and the plaintiffs have not appealed its ruling. We thus limit our discussion to the ramps and bathroom facilities.
6 Two holding cells at the Maywood courthouse had been renovated to comply with the accessibility standards. The plaintiffs’ allegations do not implicate those two facilities.

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The defendants maintain that they have complied with the ADA by enacting a policy of assisting wheelchair-using detainees with the ramps and by providing portable commode chairs in at least one holding cell per courthouse. They also submit that courthouse personnel were instructed to escort wheelchair-using detainees to public, ADA-compliant restrooms in the event of an emergency. According to the plaintiffs, however, they were not consistently assisted and often had to maneuver the ramps alone. They also insist that they could not use the commode chairs, or could do so only with great difficulty, and that they were not escorted to public, ADA-compliant restrooms as an alternative.

C.
The plaintiffs filed this action in August 2014. They sought ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬ lations. At the start of the proceedings, the plaintiffs sought a ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ing the ADA. Shortly thereafter, they sought certification of a class of all wheelchair-bound detainees presently confined at the Cook County Jail. As the parties were preparing for a ȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ to consolidate the hearing with a trial on their request for a ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ 65(a)(2). The court denied consolidation and began the hearing on December 17, 2014. The next day, however, it reversed its interlocutory decision and consolidated the hearing with a ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ
The evidentiary hearing lasted seven days over a span of two full months. The plaintiffs presented testimony from

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ADA experts and a number of wheelchair-using detainees, including Mr. Dawson and Mr. Farris, who testified to the barriers they faced when attending court. The hearing also featured testimony from court service officers and Sheriff’s personnel, including the ADA compliance coordinator and ADA ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ County courthouses. The parties also submitted video footage showing wheelchair-using detainees traversing the ramps and using the holding cell bathrooms with disputed degrees of difficulty. Throughout the proceedings, the parties fiercely contested whether the Sheriff enforced the ramp-assistance policy and whether the portable commode chairs adequately accommodated the plaintiffs. Notably, although the district ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ tion hearing with a trial on the merits, it referred throughout ȱȱȱȱȃ¢ȱǯȄ7
After the close of the hearing but before it issued a decision, the court granted the plaintiffs’ pending motion for class certification and certified the class of “[a]ll Cook County Jail detainees who have been assigned and currently use a wheelchair.”8 The plaintiffs immediately filed a motion on behalf of ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ramp-assistance policy. The court denied this motion as premature; although the hearing had ended, the court still was reviewing evidence and conducting status hearings about the defendants’ ongoing courthouse renovations.

7 See note 24 and text accompanying notes 25–28. 8 R.142 at 15.

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On June 10, 2015, the court again reversed its earlier ruling and stated that it would “not combine its consideration of the ȱ ȱ ǽǾȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǽǾȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ final merits of the case.”9 Nevertheless, in their final memoȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȬ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ-assistance policy to ensure its consistent enforcement.
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ plaintiffs’ individual damage claims. The named plaintiffs ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ e question of ADA liability, and the defendants filed a cross ȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱȱȬ ted Local Rule 56.1 statements of material fact and responded ȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱǯȱ
On October 8, 2015, bȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ Ȭ knowledging its most recent decision to rule on only the request for a preliminary ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ yet again. It explained that “in light of plaintiffs’ most recent ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ dentiary record has continued to grow since this issue was ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ fore the court.”10 Accordingly, the opinion addressed the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.

9 R.159 at 1. 10 R.203 at 27.

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The court’s opinion contained extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based on “what it [found] to be most relevant” in the record, the court found that the defendants had not consistently helped wheelchair-using detainees maneuver the ramps.11 It also found that the plaintiffs’ “witnesses consistently and credibly [had] testified to being unable to use the toilet facilities or being able to do so only with great difficulty, even when provided with a commode chair.”12 The court further found that commode chairs were not provided, and the alternative policy of escorting detainees to public restrooms was not implemented, until mid-2014— after the plaintiffs’ claims arose. Therefore, the court concluded that the “defendants have, in the past, violated plaintiffs’ rights pursuant to the ADA.”13
Based on these findings, the court granted the plaintiffs’ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ramp-assistance policy, but it denied their request for a dec¢ȱ ǯ14 “Although the court has found past

11 Id. at 7 n.5.
12 Id. at 25.
13 Id. at 26. While the court focused on the second element of a Title II violation—namely, whether the defendants failed to provide reasonable modifications to overcome noncompliant facilities—it also found that the first and third elements were satisfied. See id. at 22 (explaining that plaintiffs are otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities under the ADA).
14 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ facilities; the plaintiffs’ most recent filings did not request such relief.

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ADA violations,” it explained, “the defendants have undertaken extensive construction, beyond what is required of them by the ADA or the Rehab Act, that has remedied the ¢ȱȱȱȱt which plaintiffs complain.”15
On November 19, 2015, the court granted partial summary ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ individual damage actions. The court acknowledged that “[o]rdinarily, the following facts would be undisputed and come from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements and responses.”16 However, because the court already had made ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Rule 56.1 statements as largely “moot” and relied on its existing findings insofar as they informed the determination of ¢ȱǯ17 As the court explained, the “plaintiffs have already established that they were discriminated against in violation of the ADA.”18 Therefore, the only remaining element for them to prove in order to collect damages was the intentional nature of the defendants’ discrimination. See Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 278 ǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŖŝǼȱǻȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȬ trict court properly found no intentional discrimination); Love, 103 F.3d at 561 (acknowledging standard of intentional discrimination for compensatory damages under the RHA and implicitly applying same standard to ADA claim).

15 Id. at 26. 16 R.218 at 2 n.2. 17 Id. at 4. 18 Id. at 6.

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The district court recognized that we have not yet spoken on the proper standard for establishing intentional discrimination. See Strominger v. Brock, 592 F. App’x 508, 511–12 (7th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging our silence on the matter). Absent guidance from our court, the district court adopted the deliberate indifference standard advocated by the parties and em¢ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǯ19 This standard requires proof of (1) “knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely” and (2) “a failure to act upon that likelihood.” S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001)).
The court held that there was “no genuine issue of material fact as to defendants’ knowledge of likely ADA violations and their failure to act in light of that knowledge.”20 The court observed that the County previously had undertaken significant ADA-related construction at the courthouses but had limited its renovations to the public-facing portions of the buildings. It also noted the defendants’ involvement in past litigation involving very similar claims under the ADA. Based on this circumstantial evidence of the defendants’ knowledge, the court did not think that a reasonable trier of fact could rule in the defendants’ favor on the issue of deliberate indifference.
After granting the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ

19 See note 33 (comparing cases). 20 R.218 at 7.

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determine the amount of damages owed to each named plainǯȱȱ¢ȱ ȱǯȱ¢ȱǞŜŖŖȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱǯȱ ȱǞŖȱȱǯȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȬ ants reached a private settlement. Mr. Farris and the defendȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȂȱȱȱǞŖǯ
On January 7, 2016, the plaintiff class filed a motion for a ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ alleged failure to bring two holding cells at the Maywood courthouse into compliance with the ADA’s clear-floor-space requirements. According to the plaintiffs, the County had made alterations to these holding cells, thereby triggering its obligation to bring the facilities into complete compliance with the latest accessibility standards. But, under the pertinent standards, the privacy screens in the holding cells were 1.5 inches too close to the rear walls. The County maintained that it was excused from strict compliance with the accessibility standards because it altered only certain elements within the holding cells and because moving the screens was techni¢ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ be moved, but it stayed its order pending this appeal.

II
DISCUSSION
The defendants now challenge four of the district court’s ǱȱǻŗǼȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ǻŘǼȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǞŜŖŖȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱ¢ǰȱǻřǼȱȱȱ of the class, and (4) the ȱȱȱȱȱȬ garding the Maywood privacy screens. For the reasons laid

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out below, we vacate the district court’s grant of partial sum¢ȱǲȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱǲȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ g the Sheriff’s ramp policy; affirm the certification of the class; and affirm the class- ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱȬ dress these issues in turn.

A.
The defendants contend that the district court erred in ȱ¢ȱȱo the plaintiffs on the issue of ADA liability in their individual damage actions. They submit that, by relying on findings of fact from its prior decision ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ weighed competing evidence and made credibility determiȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȬ tiffs’ damage claims. We agree.
In this action, the plaintiffs sought both equitable and legal relief to remedy the defendants’ alleged ADA violations. They pursued the equitable claims on behalf of the class, seekȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ Simultaneously, the named plaintiffs brought damage actions on an individual basis, seeking monetary compensation for past ADA deprivations that they each claim to have suffered. These equitable and legal claims all required the factfinder to determine whether the defendants had violated the ADA by failing to provide reasonable modifications for wheelchair-using detainees with respect to the courthouse ramps and bathroom facilities.
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȁȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ

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claim, including all issues common to both claims, remains intact.’” Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor Truck Co., 816 F.2d 348, 354 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.11 (1974)).21 ȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ before the court decides the equitable claims. See New West, L.P. v. City of Joliet, 891 F.3d 271, 273 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Judges ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢-trial issues ahead of bench-trial issues because that order is most respectful of constitutional interests … .”). Otherwise, the court might limit the parties’ op¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ claims by affording preclusive effect to its own findings of fact on questions that are common to both the legal and equitable claims. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959). Although this order of proceedings is not constitutionally mandated, see New West, 891 F.3d at 273, the Supreme Court has instructed that “only under the most imperative cirȱǳȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ through prior determination of equitable claims,” Beacon, 359 U.S. at 510–11.22

21 ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ claims, R.9 (Amended Complaint) at 13, and the defendants were entitled to rely on ȱ¢ȱǰȱsee Lamex Foods, Inc. v. Audeliz Lebrón Corp., 646 F.3d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Where one party has made a demand, others are entitled to rely on the demand with respect to issues covered by the demand and need not make an independent demand of their own.” (quoting In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1982))).
22 We recognize that issue preclusion can be applied properly to foreclose the relitigation of issues underlying a legal claim when those issues already have been decided conclusively in a prior equitable lawsuit. See

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In this case, the order of proceedings was complicated further by the plaintiffs’ request to consolidate the hearing on preliminary ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ permanent ȱǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ icant, because in granting or denying a preliminary ǰȱ the court would decide only the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits, whereas in granting or denying a permanent inunction, it would decide their actual success on the merits. See Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 782 (7th Cir. 2011). In other words, only a hearing on permanent Ȭ tive relief would result in conclusive findings as to the defendants’ actual liability under the ADA; a¢ȱȱȱ made in deciding preliminary ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ change. See id. ǻȃǽǾȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ tion stage do not bind the district court as the case progresses.”).

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333–35 (1979); Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1009–10 (7th Cir. 1982). However, this rule does not control in the present circumstances where the legal and equitable claims sharing common issues ȱȱȱȱȱ ǯ See Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 550–51, 553–54 (1990) (distinguishing Beacon Theatres from Parklane on ground that Beacon involved legal and equitable claims ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Parklane involved two lawsuits, the prior of which already had been affirmed on appeal); New West, L.P. v. City of Joliet, 891 F.3d 271, 273 (7th Cir. 2018) (making similar observation); Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 471–72 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȃȱ¢ȱ will resolve common factual disputes, and its resolution will control when ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȄǼǯ

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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2), the district court was authorized to consolidate the hearing on prelimi¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǲȱ ǰȱȱȱ doing, the court was obligated to “preserve any party’s right ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǯȄȱ ed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).23 In some cases, the ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ consolidation and participating in the hearing on permanent ȱȱbefore trying any overlapping legal claims to ȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱ ǰ if all of the parties do not waive ȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȃȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ hearing itself on the permaȱǯȄȱSouthland Reship, Inc. v. Flegel, 534 F.2d 639, 644 (5th Cir. 1976).
Here, throughout the hearing, the district court sent extremely mixed messages about the nature of the hearing itself. The record reveals that none of the participants understood exactly what the court was deciding—preliminary or permaȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ court denied the plaintiffs’ request for consolidation. Then, during and after the hearing, the court reversed this decision three separate times. Moreover, even at the time when the

23 Rule 65(a)(2) reads in full: “Before or after beginning the hearing on a ȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ merits and consolidate it with the hearing. Even when consolidation is not ordered, evidence that is received on the motion and that would be admissible at trial becomes part of the trial record and need not be repeated at trial. But the court must preserve ¢ȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȄȱǯȱ R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).

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court had consolidated the hearing as a formal matter, it con¢ȱȱȱȱȃ¢ȱȄȱȱȱ¢ȱ at stake.24 It also said that “[t]his isn’t a final trial,”25 that it was “not making any substantive rulings,”26 and that the proper relief was “a moving target.”27 When the defendants sought clarification and reminded the court of its latest conȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȃȱȂȱȱȂȱ a total trial on the merits, because these folks do have individual damage claims.”28 These ambiguous statements introduced significant confusion as to whether the court was considering preliminary or permanent relief and, consequently, whether it would make any conclusive findings about the alleged ADA violations.
After the close of the hearing, the court continued to send conflicting messages. On June 10, 2015, the court reversed its earlier order and ruled that it would not “combine its consideration of the motion for prelim¢ȱȱ ȱȱ

24 See, e.g., R.132 at 184–85 (“[R]emember, we’re talking about a prelimi¢ȱȱǯȄǼǲȱid. ȱŗŞŝȱǻȃȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱ did say that we were going to combine it into—to ultimate relief. But from what I’m hearing is, this is sort of a moving target … .”); R.134 at 131 (refȱȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȄǼǲȱid. at 132 (noting that the class certification motion had been “put off until we ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȄǼǯ
25 R.132 at 185.
26 R.130 at 32.
27 Id. at 14; R.132 at 187; R.134 at 135.
28 R.134 at 131–32.

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on the final merits.”29 Then, before issuing its decision on inȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ on the plaintiffs’ individual damage claims. If anything, this order of proceedings suggested that the court’s decision on the equitable claims would not incorporate conclusive findings that would affect the resolution of the legal claims. Indeed, the parties appear to have understood as much, for they submitted Local Rule 56.1 statements of material fact in conȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱǰȱ when the district court finally ruled, it granted a permanent ǯ
In these confusing circumstances, the defendants certainly ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ in the ȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ-finding proceeding.30 However, ”there is a presumpȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ trial,” Middle Tenn. News Co. v. Charnel of Cincinnati, Inc., 250 F.3d 1077, 1083 (7th Cir. 2001), and we will not infer waiver absent “clear, unequivocal evidence that the party intended to waive its right,” Reboy v. Cozzi Iron & Metal, Inc., 9 F.3d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1993). Indeed, we have made it clear that we will not infer waiver from a party’s participation in non¢ȱȱȱȃȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ to make fact determinations.” Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496,

29 R.159 at 1.
30 See Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2004); Middle Tenn. News Co. v. Charnel of Cincinnati, Inc., 250 F.3d 1077, 1083 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]his court has not required strict compliance with Rules 38 and 39 to effect a
ȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȄǼǯ

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503 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223, 227 (7th Cir. 1987)).
Based on the record before us, we have no doubt that the district court failed to communicate its intent to make concluȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ Given these particular circumstances, the defendants’ particiȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ stood as “clear, unequivocal evidence” of waiver. Reboy, 9 F.3d at 1306. Absent such a waiver, the court should have ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱ ǯȱ See Southland, 534 F.2d at 644. Instead, by granting a permaȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȬ solidation, and then affording preclusive effect to its own findings of fact on central disputed questions, the court deȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȬ ability. This is reversible error. See Lamex Foods, Inc. v. Audeliz Lebrón Corp., 646 F.3d 100, 107 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[O]rdering consolidation ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȬ ing is reversible error when little or no notice is given of this change and the effect is to deprive a party of the right to present his case on the merits.” (quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2950 (2d ed. 1995))).31 We therefore vacate the ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ udgment and reȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯ

31 We note that the plaintiffs have not argued, nor could they reasonably do so, that this case presents the kind of “imperative circumstances” that might warrant an extraordinary order of proceedings. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959).

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B.
The district court’s error in relying on its own factual findings with respect to the damage claims has several important ramifications. We address them now.
First, it follows from our decision above that we must vaȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ Ȭ ¢ǰȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱǯȱ¢ǰȱǯ Boston, and Mr. Bowers are vacated for further proceedings. Mr. Dawson entered into a monetary settlement with the defendants, and ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǞŖȱȱǯȱȱȱȬ clear from the record, however, whether either of these agreements was conditioned on the defendants’ right to challenge the underlying proceedings or whether the defendants waived their rights to review as to those two plaintiffs. See McMillian v. Sheraton Chi. Hotel & Towers, 567 F.3d 839, 843–44 ǻŝȱ ǯȱ ŘŖŖşǼȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ senting party’s right to review); Hudson v. Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 922 F.2d 1306, 1312–13 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the importance of “practicalities” and explaining that, although settlements generally are not appealable, a stipulated ȱ ¢ȱ ot foreclose appellate review if the stipulation extends only to the matter of damages). We thus leave it

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to the district court, which is far more familiar with the record, to determine whether it is proper to include Mr. Farris ȱǯȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱtrial on remand.32
Second, we must address the effect of our holding on the ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ spect to the Sheriff’s ramp policy. Had the district court followed the instruction in Beacon and submitted the common ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱǯȱ See Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 471–72 (7th Cir. 2004); Hussein, 816 F.2d at 355. Therefore, if not for the court’s error, the ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ on all of the facts underlying the alleged ADA violations. Because “most if not all of [the] elements [of the damage claims were] presented to the wrong trier of fact,” the court’s error “infect[ed] the disposition” of the equitable claims as well. Bouchet v. Nat’l Urban League, Inc., 730 F.2d 799, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
In these circumstances, “relitigation is the only mechanism that can completely correct the error of the court below.” Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 553 (1990). This approach comports with the practice of the Supreme Court in related cases. See id. at 552–53 (listing cases where Court has “reversed and remanded each case in its entirety for a trial ȱȱ¢Ȅȱ ȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱ

32 Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.12 (1975) (“When this Court has entertained doubt about the continuing nature of a case or controversy, it has remanded the case to the lower court for consideration of the possibility of mootness.”).

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ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǼǯȱǰȱȱȱȃȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȄȱ¢ȱȱȃȱ¢ȱ of inconsistent determinations of the same question.” Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1972). In order to vindicate ¢ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȂȱȱŞǰȱŘŖŗśǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ plaintiffs’ first equitable ǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȬ mon questions of fact, the court will be “prohibited from reconsidering any issues necessarily and actually decided by ȱ¢ǯȄȱHussein, 816 F.2d at 355.

C.
We now address those matters raised on appeal that are ȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱ
1.
The district court, noting that the matter was undecided in this court, determined that damages could be awarded for the ADA violations upon a showing of deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants. ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȬ termine in the first instance whether the defendants have violated the ADA with respect to each named plaintiff. If it finds ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ill have to decide whether any ADA violations were the result of intentional discrimination. See Love, 103 F.3d at 561 (upholding award of damages in ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽǯȱ As the district court recognized, many courts of appeals have spoken on the standard for establishing intentional discrimi-

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nation, although we have yet to decide the issue. See Strominger, 592 F. App’x at 511–ŗŘǯȱȱȱȱȬ omy counsel that we decide it today.
As this question has percolated through the courts, our sister circuits have considered two standards for intentional discrimination: deliberate indifference and discriminatory animus. See S.H., 729 F.3d at 262–63 (laying out both standards and adopting the former); Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 344–45 (11th Cir. 2012) (same); Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). Deliberate indifference occurs when “the defendant knew that harm to a federally protected right was substantially likely and … failed to act on that likelihood.” Liese, 701 F.3d at 344 (alteration and emphases in original) (quoting T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 604 (11th Cir. 2010)). It is meant to identify indifference that is a “deliberate choice.” Id. (quoting Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 276 (2d Cir. 2009)). “Discriminatory animus, by contrast, requires a showing of preǰȱǰȱȱȱ ǰȄ and is “generally thought to be a combination of intentionally differential treatment and a disdainful motive for acting that way.” Id.
Although some courts of appeals appear to have applied heightened standards in certain contexts, most of our sister circuits have adopted deliberate indifference as the proper standard for obtaining compensatory damages under Title II and section 504.33 In this case, the district court required a

33 Compare S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2013) (adopting deliberate indifference standard for intentional discrimination); Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 344–45

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showing of deliberate indifference, and the parties do not disȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȬ ity of courts that have spoken on the question and hold that a plaintiff can establish intentional discrimination in a Title II damage action by showing deliberate indifference. Specifically, we adopt the two-part standard applied by most other courts, “requiring both (1) ‘knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely,’ and (2) ‘a failure to act upon that likelihood.’” S.H., 729 F.3d at 263 (quoting Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139).
This standard is sensible based on the clear purpose and evolution of the ADA. Title II was modeled after section 504, which was meant to combat discrimination that is “most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect.” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985). One commentator interpreted the ADA’s statutory findings in light of its legislative history and concluded that, “[e]ven absent animus-ȱǰȱ people with disabilities may be deprived of opportunities”

(11th Cir. 2012) (same); Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 275–76 (2d Cir. 2009) (same); Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999) (same), with Nieves-Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 126–27 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that compensatory damages are not available under Title II and section 504 absent “evidence of economic harm or animus toward the disabled,” but not deciding whether such damages may be available in other circumstances); Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cty., 302 F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[t]here is no ‘deliberate indifference’ standard applicable to public entities for purposes of the ADA,” but not adopting definitively an alternative standard for proving intentional discrimination).

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which the ADA aims to protect. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 Va. L. Rev. 397, 423 (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (statutory finding that “the Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity [and] full participation … .”). Moreover, the “reasonable modification” requirement at the heart of this case clearly indicates the intent to combat exclusion that “is literally built into our physical and social environment,” Bagenstos, Subordination, supra, at 425, even if it is not motivated by spite or ill will. Given this statutory framework, we agree with the Third Circuit that “the deliberate indifference standard is better suited to the remedial goals of the … ADA than is the discriminatory animus alternative.” S.H., 729 F.3d at 264.

2.
The defendants next challenge the district court’s certification of the class of “[a]ll Cook County Jail detainees who have been assigned and currently use a wheelchair.”34 We review class certification under an abuse of discretion standard. Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 828 F.3d 541, 549 (7th Cir. 2016). An abuse of discretion “can occur when a district court commits legal error or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 800 F.3d 360, 373 (7th Cir. 2015). “Our review is deferential, but exacting: ‘A class may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites’ for class certification have been met.” Id. (quoting CE Design, Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637

34 R.142 at 15.

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F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 2011)). The burden rests on the party seeking certification to show by a preponderance of the evidence that certification is proper. Id.
The prerequisites for certification are twofold. First, the plaintiffs must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). There are four prongs to this analysis:
(1) ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ members is impracticable (numerosity);
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality);
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class (typicality); and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy of representation).
Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). Second, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that one of the conditions of Rule 23(b) is met. Here, the plaintiffs sought certification under Rule 23(b)(2), which applies when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ lief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Lastly, we have required that a class be “sufficiently definite that its members are ascertainable.” Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 493 (7th Cir. 2012).
The defendants first contend that the class is not ascertainable because “it encompassed anyone who could possibly require assistance of a wheelchair, regardless of if they suffered

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any deprivation under the ADA.”35 This argument evokes our case law about classes that are defined too broadly to permit certification. We have said that a class should not be certified if “it sweeps within it persons who could not have been inȱ¢ȱȱȂȱȱǳȱǽǾȱȱȱȱȱȱ it contains a great many persons who have suffered no in¢ǯȄȱKohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009). We have acknowledged simultaneously, however, that ȃȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ by the defendant’s conduct; indeed this is almost inevitable,” given that a class can be certified yet fail to prove its case on the merits. Id.
There is no precise tipping point at which a class includes too many people who have not been harmed. “Such determinations are a matter of degree, and will turn on the facts as they appear from case to case.” Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, we are confident that the balance tips in favor of certification. According to the Department of Corrections, which keeps records of detainees who are assigned wheelchairs, there were approximately sixty detainees who qualified for the class at the time of certification.36 The defendants have not suggested  ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ

35 Appellants’ Br. 37.
36 The fact that the Department of Corrections keeps records of all wheelchair-assigned detainees also undermines the defendants’ argument that ȱȱȱȱȃȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȬ teria’ [and] will require ‘complex, highly individualized’ determinations.” Id. (quoting Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 496 (7th Cir. ŘŖŗŘǼǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ for ascertaining the class.

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under the ADA, let alone shown “a great many” who evaded harm. Kohen, 571 F.3d at 677. To the contrary, considering the regularity of detainees’ courthouse visits and the structural noncompliance of the facilities at all six courthouses, the class definition is well tailored to reach those individuals who would have suffered the deprivations alleged here.
Next, the defendants attack the commonality of the class. They submit that the reasonableness of a given accommodation will vary for each class member, making it impossible for the litigation to generate common answers.37 To satisfy commonality, the plaintiffs must do more than show that they “suffered a violation of the same provision of law.” Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 497 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. řřŞǰȱ řŚşȱ ǻŘŖŗŗǼǼǯȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ that is “capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).

37 The defendants also suggest that commonality is undermined by the plaintiffs’ need to prove on an individual basis whether each class member is actually disabled under the ADA. The ADA defines disability, in relevant part, as a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of thȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȄȱ ŘŞȱ ǯǯǯȱ ȗȱ řśǯŗŖŞǻǼǻŗǼǻǼǯȱ Ȭ hough the “determination of whether an impairment substantially limits ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ǰȄȱ id. § 35.108(d)(1)(vi), some “types of impairments will, as a factual matter, ¢ȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ activity,” id. § 35.108(d)(2)(ii). This includes “mobility impairments requiring the use of a wheelchair.” Id. § 35.108(d)(2)(iii)(D). Given that the assessment of these plaintiffs’ impairments “should be particularly simple and straightforward,” id. § 35.108(d)(2)(ii), the individualized nature of their disabilities does not undermine commonality here.

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In other words, the key to commonality is “not the raising of common ‘questions’ … but, rather, the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id. (emphasis in original). “The critical point is ‘the need for conduct common to members of the class.’” Phillips, 828 F.3d at 553 (emphasis in original) (quoting Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2014)).
Although it is true that the reasonableness of a given accommodation will vary among individuals with differing disabilities, any dissimilarities among the proposed class members will not impede the generation of common answers in this case. We have acknowledged that “[w]hether a requested accommodation is reasonable or not is a highly fact-specific inquiry and requires balancing the needs of the parties.” A.H., 881 F.3d at 594 (quoting Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002)). The factspecific nature of this inquiry may preclude class certification in some cases, for instance if the plaintiffs here had alleged a variety of disabilities or had sought a variety of accommodations based on their differing abilities. See, e.g., Phillips, 828 F.3d at 555 (finding lack of commonality where purported class members “each present a different situation that involved a different type of dental pain, took place at a different time, involved different medical professionals and prison staff, and concerned a different alleged deficiency in the treatment process”).
Here, however, commonality abounds. The plaintiffs share a common physical impairment, as they are all confined to wheelchairs when attending court. Furthermore, they face common physical barriers when they confront steep ramps

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and noncompliant bathroom facilities. And finally, they seek common modifications in the form of mandatory policies for assistance in pushing them up and down the ramps and escorting them to ADA-compliant restrooms. This is not a situȱ ȱȃȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȬ fers from plaintiff to plaintiff,” Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2014); rather, they all complain about the same failure to implement and enforce policies that would accommodate all wheelchair-using detainees.38
The defendants’ challenge to the typicality requirement fails for largely the same reasons. Cf. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349

38 ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ hes this case from Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352, 359 (2011) (finding lack of commonality where “respondents wish to sue about literally millions of employment decisions at once” without identifying “a common mode of exercising discretion” in making such decisions), and Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 497–98 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding lack of commonality where class members alleged IDEA violations ranging from school district’s failure to identify eligible students, to its failure to timely refer them for evaluation and its failure to hold properly constituted meetings regarding their individualized education programs).
We note that many courts have certified classes based on allegedly unreasonable accommodations. See, e.g., Yates v. Collier, 868 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2017) (upholding class certification against commonality challenge where disabled prisoners with heat sensitivities alleged failure to provide reasonable accommodations regarding regulation of temperatures in prison); Holmes v. Godinez, 311 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (finding commonality in Title II case where detainees alleged system-wide failure to accommodate deaf and hearing-impaired inmates); Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587 (D. Or. 2012) (“[I]n almost every case involving a challenge under Title II of the ADA and/or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to discriminatory governmental policies and practices, courts have certified a class.”).

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n.4 (noting that the “commonality and typicality requirements … tend to merge” (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982))). A “plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and [is] based on the same legal theory.” Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting De La Fuente v. Stokley-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983)). This requirement “is meant to ensure that the named representative’s claims ‘have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.’” Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 597 (7th Cir. 1993)). Here, the named plaintiffs alȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ modifications as the class at-large. We see no reason to question the typicality of their claims.
Finally, the defendants ask us to decertify the class because Mr. Farris, Mr. Dawson, and Mr. Bowers supposedly are not credible and thus are not adequate representatives of the class. “A named plaintiff who has serious credibility problems or who is likely to devote too much attention to rebutting an individual defense may not be an adequate class representative.” CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 2011). That is only the case, however, if the evidence is “so severely undermining [of his] credibility that a fact finder might reasonably focus on [his] credibility, to the detriment of the absent class members’ claims.” Id. at 728 (quoting Dubin v. Miller, 132 F.R.D. 269, 272 (D. Colo. 1990)).
Although the district court harbored “serious doubts about plaintiff Farris’ credibility,” it concluded that

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“[n]othing about plaintiff[s] Dawson, Bowers, and Farris’ alleged credibility issues indicate that they have an antagonistic or conflicting claim, or that they do not have sufficient interest in the outcome of this case to ensure vigorous advocacy.”39 We do not think that this conclusion rested on clearly erroneous factual findings or legal error. See Bell, 800 F.3d at 373. Rather than turn a blind eye to the issue of credibility, the district ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ witnesses’ integrity did not relate to a central element of the litigation, such as the defendants’ compliance with the accessibility standards or the reasonableness of a mandatory rampassistance policy. Absent more compelling evidence that their ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱwide claims, we will not decertify the class on this ground.40

39 R.142 at 12.
40 In their reply brief, the defendants submit that Mr. Lacy did not have ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȬ charged into the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections before ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ Ȭ quently, they claim, he is not an adequate representative of the class. Even if the defendants are correct and Mr. Lacy no longer had constitutional standing at that point, this conclusion does not undermine the certification of the class or the court’s subsequent decisions regarding class-wide inȱǯȱSee Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The named plaintiff who no longer has a stake may not be a suitȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ not disqualify him from continuing as class representative until a more suitable member of the class was found to replace him.” (quoting Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 513 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 2008))). This rule makes good sense given the transient population that typically brings litigation on behalf of prisoners. Here, there was no shortage of suitable class members to replace Mr. Lacy.

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Because the defendants have not undermined the ascertainableness of the class or the district court’s findings of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, we affirm the class’s certification under Rule 23(b)(2).

3.
The defendants’ final challenge relates to the district Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ this litigation commenced, the County modified two holding cells at the Maywood courthouse to bring them into partial compliance with the latest accessibility standards. The County updated the holding cell entryways, replaced the metal benches, and installed new lavatory fixtures and grab bars; however, it did not remove or reposition the privacy screens.
The parties agree that under the latest accessibility standards, these privacy screens are 1.5 inches too close to the rear walls of the cells. They disagree, however, as to whether the accessibility standards require the County to remove or reposition the screens. After receiving supplemental briefing and conducting a limited evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that the accessibility standards mandated the County’s full compliance with the clear-floor-space requireǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ County to move the privacy screens by 1.5 inches.
ȱ  ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ abuse of discretion; however, we review its factual determinations for clear error and its underlying legal conclusions de novo. See ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire Prot. Dist.

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(ADT IIǼǰȱŝŘŚȱǯřȱŞśŚǰȱŞŜřȱǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŗřǼǯȱȱȬ tive relief is appropriate when a plaintiff has shown: “(1) success … on the merits; (2) irreparable harm; (3) that the benefits ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȬ ant; and, (4) that the public interest will not be harmed by the relief requested.” ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire Prot. Dist. (ADT I), 672 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Collins v. Hamilton, 349 F.3d 371, 374 (7th Cir. 2003)). The defendants contest only the merits, so we limit our analysis accordingly.
Although the ADA does not require public entities to renovate facilities built before 1992, once a public entity alters such facilities, it is generally required to bring them into compliance with the latest accessibility standards. The implementing regulations codify this requirement as follows:
Each facility or part of a facility altered … in a manner that affects or could affect the usability of the facility or part of the facility shall, to the maximum extent feasible, be altered in such manner that the altered portion of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.
28 C.F.R. § 35.151(b)(1). Furthermore, if these alterations are commenced after March 15, 2012, they must comply with the latest accessibility standards: the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, which incorporate the 2004 ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”). See id. § 35.151(c)(3).
The County contends that its alterations to the Maywood holding cells did not trigger this complete compliance requirement for two reasons: (1) it did not intend to alter the

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entire holding cells but only certain elements, and (2) it is technically infeasible to modify the privacy screens. The County relies on section 202.3 of the ADAAG, which states that “[w]here existing elements or spaces are altered, each altered element or space shall comply with the applicable requirements.” 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191, app. B at 202.3. Section 202.3 continues to set out the so-called technical infeasibility exception: “In alterations, where compliance with applicable requirements is technically infeasible, the alteration shall comply with the requirements to the maximum extent feasible.” Id. A “technically infeasible” alteration is defined, in relevant part, as “something that has little likelihood of being accomplished because existing structural conditions would require removing or altering a load-bearing member that is an essential part of the structural frame.” Id. at 106.5.
We agree with the district court that these provisions do not exempt the County from its obligation to move the privacy screens. Whether the privacy screens are part of the altered elements or spaces, and thus must comply with the 2010 standards, depends on the intended scope of the alteration. The DOJ has explained the reach of section 202.3 in its commentary to the ADAAG:
Under section 202.3 of the 2010 Standards[,] entities can alter as many elements within a room or space as they like without triggering a requirement to make the entire room or space accessible based on the alteration of individual elements. This does not, however, change the requirement that if the intent was to alter the entire room or space, the entire room or space must be

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made accessible and comply with the applicable requirements of … the 2010 Standards.
Dep’t of Justice, Guidance on the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design 74 (2010), www.ada.gov/regs2010/2010ADAStandards/Guidance_2010ADAStandards_prt.pdf (emphasis added).
The district court concluded that the County intended to alter the holding cells in their entirety. It based this finding on the defendants’ repeated representations that they planned to bring all of the holding cells into compliance with the latest standards. We see no clear error in this factual determination, especially given the circumstantial evidence that the County modified the privacy screens in all of the other renovated holding cells, in line with its supposed plan.
The County’s second argument is equally unavailing. The ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ rector that the privacy screens are “embedded into the wall and the floor” and that removing the screens “will diminish the structural integrity of [the] wall.”41 In response, the plaintiffs highlight deposition testimony by the building contractor who prepared an estimate for moving the privacy screens. The contractor explained how the screens are “anchored in the concrete floor [and in] the structural glazed block wall” and that moving them would require saw cutting into both structures.42 Nonetheless, when asked about the effect of such

41 R.362 at 20, 31. 42 R.364-2 at 38–40.

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alterations on structural integrity, he said directly that both the wall and the floor would remain structurally sound.43
As the finder of fact on this matter, the district court was entitled to discredit the conclusory testimony of the ADA proȱǰȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȬ timony from the contractor. We see no clear error in the court’s factual determination that moving the screens would not diminish the integrity of the structural frame. In so holding, we are not endorsing a strict liability standard for noncompliance with the ADAAG, as the County suggests. Rather, questions of technical infeasibility turn on detailed factual determinations about the effects of construction on the structural integrity of altered facilities. In this case, the district court reached a reasoned conclusion based on the competing evidence before it, and we see no reason to disturb its factual findings.44
The County has not shown any abuse of discretion by the ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ

Conclusion
For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we vacate the ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱ¢’s verdicts as to Mr. Lacy, Mr. Bowers, and Mr. Boston,
43 Id. at 46. 44 The County also advances an infeasibility argument based on “disproportionate” costs. Appellants’ Br. 52. However, this disproportionality argument was not raised before the district court so we deem it waived on appeal. See Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012).

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ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ the Sheriff’s ramp policy. The effect of our holding on the setȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱȱǯȱǰȱȬ tively, will depend on the district court’s finding of waiver, or lack thereof, by the defendants of their right to appellate review as to those two plaintiffs.
ȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱ defendants violated the ADA for purposes of the relevant plaintiffs’ damage actions, and, if so, whether any violations were the result of intentional discrimination. We affirm the ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ relief with respect to the Maywood privacy screens.
In sum, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party shall bear its own costs for this appeal.

 
 Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 453 Filed: 10/22/18 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:10186

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHNATHAN LACY, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

) No. 14 CV 6259

-vs-

)

) Judge Gettleman

SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and )

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

PLAINTIFFS’ STATUS REPORT

Pursuant to the Court’s order of September 27, 2018, ECF No. 451,

the plaintiffs submit the following status report concerning outstanding is-

sues relating to the Rule 23(b)(2) class and the claims of the individual plaintiffs.1

1. A current list of class members.

2. Status of the Leighton ADA construction as memorialized in the

Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated October 8, 2015, ECF No.

203 at 19-20, including $8.3 million in funding for ADA renovations to the

Leighton courthouse holding cells as part of its 2015 budget. At the time of

the hearings, Michael Gumm, the ADA Compliance Project Director, repre-

1 Plaintiffs’ counsel reached out to defendants on October 16, 2018 to schedule a conferral regarding this status report. The following day, the lead attorney for defendants requested plaintiffs to propose a draft status report. Plaintiffs provided a status report to defendants on October 18, 2018. Counsel for defendants, however, were unable to provide feedback on the status report and indicated that they will file a motion for additional time to submit the report.

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 453 Filed: 10/22/18 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:10186
sented that construction would be completed in three phases over three years. Construction has not commenced on this project.
3. Plaintiffs’ counsel has reason to believe that wheelchair users who attend court at Leighton continue to be held in holding cells adjacent to courtroom while on trial and are not provided reasonable accommodations to toilet.
4. It is unclear whether Sheriff’s employees provide assistance to wheelchair users who attend court at Leighton going up and down the lower level ramps. Plaintiffs request a video audit covering one month when class members move up and down the ramps.
5. It is unclear whether the Sheriff is providing reasonable accommodations for wheelchair users attending each of the suburban courthouses (Skokie, Rolling Meadows, Maywood, Bridgeview, and Markham). According to an ADA Status Report from Cook County in March 2017, “additional work” needs to be done to assist individuals with disabilities to comply with the ADA for the holding cells and conference rooms on the 1st and 2nd floor of each suburban courthouse. Plaintiff is not aware of any further improvements done to these facilities.
6. Compliance with Court’s supplemental permanent injunction over renovations for two Maywood courthouses affirmed by the Seventh Circuit on July 30, 2018. Lacy v. Cook County, 897 F.3d 847, 867-69 (7th Cir. 2018)
-2-

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 453 Filed: 10/22/18 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:10186 7. A trial date for each of the named plaintiffs needs to be set. Respectfully submitted, /s/Patrick W. Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10150 S. Western Ave., Suite Rear Chicago, IL 60643 (773)233-7900 patrickmorrissey1920@gmail.com
-3-

 
 Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 457 Filed: 10/26/18 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:10194

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOHNATHAN LACY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
-vs-
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,

No. 14 CV 6259 Judge Gettleman

Defendants.

DEFENDANT DART’S STATUS REPORT

Defendant THOMAS J. DART, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cook

County (the “Sheriff”), by his attorney, KIMBERLY M. FOXX, State’s Attorney of

Cook County, through her assistants, RAANA V. HAIDARI and MICHAEL GOR-

MAN, submits the following status report in this matter:

1. The Sheriff appealed this Court’s order granting summary

judgment as to liability. One of the issues on appeal was as follows:

When granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to liability, did the district court err when it relied on disputed evidence from an evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief?

The Seventh Circuit concluded that this Court did err:

Based on the record before us, we have no doubt that the district court failed to communicate its intent to make conclusive factual determinations in the hearing on injunctive relief. Given these particular circumstances, the defendants' participation in and failure to object to the hearing cannot be understood as "clear, unequivocal evidence" of waiver. (citation omitted). Absent such a waiver, the court should have held a hearing on the preliminary injunction, then tried the legal issues to a jury, and then held a hearing on the permanent injunction. (citation omitted).

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 457 Filed: 10/26/18 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:10194
Instead, by granting a permanent injunction without clear notice of consolidation, and then affording preclusive effect to its own findings of fact on central disputed questions, the court deprived the defendants of their right to a jury trial on ADA liability. This is reversible error.
Lacy v. Cook County, 897 F.3d 847, 860-861 (7th Cir. 2018).
2. The Seventh Circuit then noted that this Court’s “error in rely-
ing on its own factual findings with respect to the damage claims has several
important ramifications.” Id. at 861.
3. With respect to the damage claims that went to trial, the Sev-
enth Circuit stated:
First, it follows from our decision above that we must vacate the jury's verdicts on the question of damages. Accordingly, the jury's verdicts respecting Mr. Lacy, Mr. Boston, and Mr. Bowers are vacated for further proceedings. Mr. Dawson entered into a monetary settlement with the defendants, and Mr. Farris consented to a judgment of $0 in damages. It is unclear from the record, however, whether either of these agreements was conditioned on the defendants' right to challenge the underlying proceedings or whether the defendants waived their rights to review as to those two plaintiffs. See McMillian v. Sheraton Chicago Hotel & Towers, 567 F.3d 839, 843-44 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that consensual nature of a judgment does not affect appellate jurisdiction but may affect the consenting party's right to review); Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 922 F.2d 1306, 1312-13 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the importance of "practicalities" and explaining that, although settlements generally are not appealable, a stipulated judgment may not foreclose appellate review if the stipulation extends only to the matter of damages). We thus leave it to the district court, which is far more familiar with the record, to determine whether it is proper to include Mr. Farris and Mr. Dawson in the jury trial on remand.
Id.
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Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 457 Filed: 10/26/18 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:10194
4. A jury verdict entered for plaintiff Johnathan Lacy and against the Sheriff on Lacy’s damage claim in the amount of $600.00. (R. 341.) The Sheriff submits that Mr. Lacy’s ADA claim for damages needs to be re-tried. That claim should be set for trial.
5. With respect to the claims of Plaintiffs Bowers and Boston, those claims should not be re-tried. Even though the juries in the Bowers and Boston trials assumed that the Sheriff was liable for violating the ADA, those juries still awarded no damages to either Bowers or Boston. (R. 342; R. 346.)
6. As two juries -- even assuming liability under the ADA -- have already found that Bowers and Boston had no injury, Bowers and Boston no longer have Article III standing to seek damages. See Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2017) (without a redressable injury, a plaintiff lacks Article III standing to press a damages claim). Lack of Article III standing may be raised at any time. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 n.1 (1996) (holding that Article III "standing . . . is jurisdictional and not subject to waiver").
7. Plaintiffs Dawson and Ferris entered into settlement agreements with the Sheriff and the Seventh Circuit’s remand of this matter does not disturb those agreements.
8. Consequently, the only ADA damages claim to be tried in Lacy’s claim. That claim should be set for trial.
-3-

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 457 Filed: 10/26/18 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:10194
9. The Seventh Circuit made further observations about the re-
mand:
Second, we must address the effect of our holding on the district court's grant of permanent injunctive relief with respect to the Sheriff's ramp policy. Had the district court followed the instruction in Beacon and submitted the common questions of fact to a jury before rendering its own decision on the permanent injunction, the court would have been bound by the jury's factual determinations. See Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp.,358 F.3d 469, 471-72 (7th Cir. 2004); Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor Truck Co., 816 F.2d 348, 355 (7th Cir. 1986). Therefore, if not for the court's error, the defendants would have been entitled to a jury determination on all of the facts underlying the alleged ADA violations. Because "most if not all of [the] elements [of the damage claims were] presented to the wrong trier of fact," the court's error "infect[ed] the disposition" of the equitable claims as well. Bouchet v. Nat’l Urban League, Inc., 730 F.2d 799, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
In these circumstances, "relitigation is the only mechanism that can completely correct the error of the court below." Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 553 (1990). This approach comports with the practice of the Supreme Court in related cases. See id. at 552-53 (listing cases where Court has "reversed and remanded each case in its entirety for a trial before a jury" where petitioners were wrongfully denied their right to a jury trial on legal issues). Moreover, it protects "the integrity of the judicial process" by avoiding "the possibility of inconsistent determinations of the same question." Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123, 131 (2nd Cir. 1972). In order to vindicate fully the defendants' jury trial rights, we hereby vacate the district court's October 8, 2015, judgment on the merits of the plaintiffs' first equitable claim. After a jury decides the common questions of fact, the court will be "prohibited from reconsidering any issues necessarily and actually decided by the jury." Hussein, 816 F.2d at 355.
Lacy, 897 F.3d at 861-862
-4-

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10. The Seventh Circuit vacated the October 8, 2015 judgment on the merits of the plaintiffs' first equitable claim. This order stated, in part, that: 2. Plaintiffs’ request for mandatory injunctive relief requiring defendants
to alter Sheriff’s Order 11.14.35.0 to state that: “Employees of the Sheriff shall push each detainee who is using a wheelchair up and down ramps in all courthouses,” is denied, in light of paragraph 3 below; and 3. Defendant Sheriff is directed to amend the order referenced in para graph 2 above with language ensuring that wheelchair-using detainees are consistently assisted when maneuvering courthouse ramps that are not compliant with the ADA, explaining clearly what exigent circumstances would excuse such assistance. The Sheriff is directed to submit a proposed amended order on or before October 29, 2015. The Sheriff subsequently amended Sheriff’s Order 11.14.35.0 to comply with the relief issued in this order. Accordingly, any future request from Plaintiffs for this relief is moot. Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to seek this relief. Lewis v, 518 U.S. at 349, n.1. 11. Consequently, this matter was solely remanded for jury trial on the issue of whether the “Defendants violated the ADA for purposes of” Lacy’s damage claim and if that was done with intentional discrimination. (17-2141, Dkt. 63 at p. 40). See Lacy, 897 F.3d at 863 (adopting deliberate indifference as the standard for establishing intentional discrimination in a Title II damage action). 12. That is the only matter to be considered on remand. This matter was not remanded to re-open discovery on the issues. As such, Defendants do not believe it would be prudent to re-open discovery.
-5-

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13. The Seventh Circuit never reversed the class certification, the

class is not at issue here, therefore, there is no reason to re-open class discov-

ery or determine if there are still inmates who would qualify under the class.

14. This matter was also not remanded on the status of construction

of the Leighton courthouse. The status of the construction is irrelevant to the

relevant issues on remand.

15. As previously discussed, the Sheriff’s General Order has been

changed since the onset of this litigation, to say that detainees in wheelchairs

will be offered assistance to be pushed up the ramps at the court houses. Re-

opening discovery for incidents that occurred after the appeal is outside the

scope of this matter.

16. The Sheriff submits that the only order of business for this Court

is to set Lacy’s ADA damages claim for trial.

Respectfully submitted, KIMBERLY FOXX State's Attorney of Cook County

By:

Raana V. Haidari

Assistant State’s Attorney

500 Richard J. Daley Center

Chicago, Illinois 60602

312) 603-3618

Raana.haidari@cookcountyil.gov

-6-

 
 Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 1 of 25 PageID #:10312

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Johnathan Lacy, et al., Plaintiffs,
-vsThomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, and Cook County, Illinois,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) No. 14-cv-6259 ) ) Judge Gettleman ) ) ) )

PLAINTIFFS’ STATUS REPORT

Pursuant to the Court’s order of December 12, 2018, ECF No. 467,

the plaintiffs submit the following status report concerning outstanding is-

sues relating to the Rule 23(b)(2) class.

I. Material in possession of defendants Sheriff and Cook County relating to barriers faced by class members

1. Defendants are in possession of reports by Michael Gumm identify-

ing “broad issues” in the following courthouses: Bridgeview, Rolling Mead-

ows, Skokie, Markham, and Domestic Violence. These reports were refer-

enced by Daniel Tardy, a Sheriff’s employee, in an email dated April 3,

2018. See Exhibit 1, D. Tardy emails dated 4/3/2018. A copy of one report

by Mr. Gumm dated March 2017 is attached as Exhibit 2.

2. Defendant Sheriff is in possession of emails from ADA Compliance

Officer Sabrina Rivero-Canchola that “[t]rans needs more wheelchair vans

to accommodate the court and medical movement of wheelchair detain-

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 2 of 25 PageID #:10312
ees.” Exhibit 1, D.Tardy email dated 4/3/2018; Exhibit 6, Del Russo Dec ¶ 3; Exhibit 8, Isom Dec ¶ 4.
3. Defendant Sheriff is in possession of daily emails titled “ADA Movement” identifying the duration wheelchair users attend court at Leighton. As reflected in an email for July 2, 2018 some wheelchair users spend hours at the Leighton Courthouse, an area without any ADA compliant toilets on the secured side of the building. See Exhibit 3, V.Payton email dated 7/2/2018.
4. Defendants Sheriff and County must have information regarding compliance with Court’s supplemental permanent injunction over renovations for two Maywood courthouses affirmed by the Seventh Circuit on July 30, 2018. Lacy v. Cook County, 897 F.3d 847, 867-69 (7th Cir. 2018). II. Evidence defendants continue to violate the rights of class mem-
bers when attending court 1. Movement up and down ramps. Sheriff refuses to push wheelchair users up and down ramps. In response to a grievance by class member Cornelius Walker concerning no assistance moving up and down ramps, Lt. Greer responded on behalf of the Sheriff on October 25, 2018 that “[i]t is not the responsibility of security staff to push inmates in wheelchairs.” Exhibit 13, Cornelius Walker Grievance. In addition, five class members executed declarations explaining movement up and down ramps without
-2-

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 3 of 25 PageID #:10312
assistance. Exhibit 4, Brewer Dec ¶¶ 3-4; Exhibit 5, Burns Dec ¶ 5; Exhibit 7, Dunn Dec ¶ 3; Exhibit 8, Isom Dec ¶ 3; Exhibit 12, Turner Dec ¶ 5.
2. The Leighton Courthouse. Class members attending court at Leighton are held adjacent to the courtroom in non-ADA compliant bullpens or in the clerk’s office. Exhibit 5, Burns Dec ¶ 5; Exhibit 10, Perkins Dec ¶ 3. Some class members attending court on the upper floors must pass through a gate that is too narrow to allow for the passage of a wheelchair. Exhibit 5, Burns Dec ¶ 5; Exhibit 10, Perkins Dec ¶ 4. Class members are not provided notice of the Sheriff’s purported practice to allow class members to use public ADA compliant bathroom. Exhibit 5, Burns Dec ¶ 5; Exhibit 10, Perkins Dec ¶ 3. 3. Other courthouses. The Sheriff continues to hold inmates in bullpens without ADA compliant toilets before and after court appearances. Exhibit 5, Burns Dec ¶ 3; Exhibit 6, Del Russo Dec ¶¶ 4-5; Exhibit 7, Dunn Dec ¶ 4; Exhibit 8, Isom Dec ¶ 5; Exhibit 9, McCowen Dec ¶¶ 3-4; Exhibit 11, Rosales Dec ¶ 3; Exhibit 12, Turner Dec ¶ 4. III. Discovery necessary to prepare for injunction hearing and/or reso-
lution 1. ADA Status Reports from January 1, 2016 to the present prepared by Michael Gumm and/or his successor. 2. Emails and documents maintained by the Sheriff and ADA Compliance Officer Rivero-Canchola about a need for more wheelchair accessi-
-3-

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 4 of 25 PageID #:10312
ble vans to move class members to court from January 1, 2016 to the present.
3. From November 1, 2018 to the present, the daily email of “ADA Movement” identifying class members move to and from the Leighton Courthouse.
4. Inspection of the path of travel for class members when attending court. This includes measurement and photographs of any ramps.
5. Evidence class members are transported to public ADA compliant bathrooms and evidence that class members are provided notice of this accommodation. Pursuant to a Sheriff memorandum, the use of a public ADA bathroom must be documented in a logbook maintained by a supervisor.
6. Depositions of Sheriff and County employees with knowledge of ADA barriers when class members attend court.
Respectfully submitted, /s/Patrick W. Morrissey
Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10150 S. Western Ave., Suite Rear Chicago, IL 60643 (773)233-7900 patrickmorrissey1920@gmail.com
-4-

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 5 of 25 PageID #:10312

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Johnathan Lacy, et al., Plaintiff,
-vsThomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) 14-cv-6259 ) ) Judge Gettleman ) ) ) ) )

PLAINTIFFS’ INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit No. 1 2
3
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Description Daniel Tardy email dated April 3, 2018 Cook County Public Safety Portfolio ADA Status Report March 2017 Vincent Payton email dated July 2, 2018 titled “ADA Movement for 7/2/2018 Darrell Brewer Declaration Jeffrey Burns Declaration Lawrence Del Russo Declaration Ayo Dunn Declaration Jason Isom Declaration Andrew McCowen Declaration Michael Perkins Declaration Antonio Rosales Declaration Leshawn Turner Declaration Cornelius Walker Grievance dated 10/17/2018

CCaassee::11:1:144--ccvv--0066225599DDooccuummeenntt##::447834FFilieledd::0011/0/167/1/199PPaaggee163ooff2153PPaaggeeIDID##:1:100321527

From: Sabrina Rivero Canchola (Sheriff) <(Sheriff)>

Sent: 4/3/2018 1:41:13 PM

To:

Daniel Tardy (Sheriff)

Cc:

John Murphy (Sheriff),Matthew Burke (Sheriff),Andrew Achterhof (Sheriff)

Subject: RE: Business Cases

Hi Dan
The items highlighted in blue are not capital planning projects. Those are the responsibility of the CCSO (trans) and possibly central services for the phones.
I will be submitting business cases for divisions six, nine and ten. 11 is GP/non-medical housing, 4 will eventually be closed, and five is transitory so I’m not sure we are going to submit one for that division, but I will speak with the Chiefs about that. I will submit these to Mike Boyce and Scot before the 4/10/18 deadline.
What is it that you need from me for this Thursday’s meeting?

Thanks, Sabrina Rivero-Canchola ADA Compliance Officer 773-674-7768 (DOC)

From: Daniel Tardy (Sheriff) Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2018 1:33 PM To: Sabrina Rivero Canchola (Sheriff) Cc: John Murphy (Sheriff); Matthew Burke (Sheriff); Andrew Achterhof (Sheriff) Subject: Re: Business Cases

Hello Sabrina, Thank you for getting back to us. We were reaching out to you because there are issues identified in emails and memos from you as well as in Gumm's report that may require corrective action but are not, to the best of our knowledge, included in the approved Capital Projects for 2018 and potentially require a Business Case for FY 2019.

Using your emails and memos, the notes from the walk throughs, and Gumm's report, John and I compiled a list of every ADA issue those documents identified. We then used the FY2018 CIP list and tried to place all of the issues your emails and memos, the notes from the walk throughs, and Gumm's report identified under the corresponding project (see attached). The majority of the issues identified in your emails/memos, Gumm's report, and the walk throughs are going to be covered by projects included on the FY2018 CIP list. However, there are items remaining that do not appear to pertain to any project and may require their own business case. For example, in a 7/6/17 you wrote that: "Â§Trans needs more wheelchair vans to accommodate the court and medical movement of wheelchair detainees. Â§ Deaf and hard of hearing detainees do not have equal access to phones. Calls have to be scheduled with the social workers who are not on site during the weekend. We are installing video phones which should be completed by the end of the summer. (This is more policy than structure)"

Gumm's report identified broad issues in DIV4, DIV5, DIV6, DIV9, DIV10, and DIV11 as well as at the JTDC, Domestic Violence, Bridgeview, Markham, Maywood, Rolling Meadows, and Skokie.

Are these issues that a business case should be composed for? If so, who is responsible to draft it? Please let me know if there is any more information I can try and provide.

Thanks, Daniel Tardy Project Manager Quality Improvement and Accountability

Exhibit 1 Page 1

CCaasese: 1: 1:1:148-c-vc-v0-064225698DDoocucummeennt #t #: 4: 3854 FFiilleedd:: 1021//3117//1189 PPaaggee 172oof 2f 157PPaaggeeIDID##:1:3003912
Cook County Public Safety Portfolio
ADA Status Report March 2017

Cook County owns and operates a large number of buildings throughout the county. These buildings are managed through Cook County’s Bureau of Asset Management. The Bureau is comprised of three departments; Asset Management, Facilities Management, and Capital Planning & Policy. DCPP, in 2016, changed the way it manages capital improvements for Cook County. DCPP developed a portfolio system comprised of Public Safety, Health & Hospitals, and Corporate Facilities. This report will address the Public Safety Portfolio only.
The way DCPP addressed ADA improvements in the past was through a project by project approach. In 1998 DCPP procured an A&E consultant to provide an assessment of ADA issues with County owned buildings. The result of the assessment led to improvements of courthouse “public” spaces, which included entries, corridors, restrooms, and courtrooms. The assessment specifically omitted secure areas of the facilities, including spaces secured for detainee holding and movement.
In 2014 DCPP created a new position directed directly toward ADA compliance. DCPP developed a job description, advertised for the position, interviewed and hired an ADA Compliance Project Director. The main duties of the DP is to address ADA compliance issued in all portfolios. However, an unanticipated consequence was the ADA CPD became involved with several federal ADA court cases, representing the County as an ADA expert.
The result of this involvement was the development of ADA projects based upon the alleged complaints in the civil suits. The Public Safety Portfolio has become the major focus of the ADA CPD since joining the County.

The Public Safety Portfolio includes the following facilities:

Leighton CCB

CC Administration Building

District 1 Skokie CH

District 2 Rolling Meadows CH

District 4 Bridgeview CH District 5 Markham CH

Boot Camp District 3 Maywood CH Domestic Violence CH

Division I Scheduled for Demolition and utilities have been severed.
Division II Dorm I Dorm style living, First floor showers, toilet, and sink have been modified in 2013 to meet current ADA
Standards.
Exhibit 2 Page 1
Lewis v. Dart, Case No. 17-cv-4181 CC101075

CCaasese: 1: 1:1:148-c-vc-v0-064225698DDoocucummeennt #t #: 4: 3854 FFiilleedd:: 1021//3117//1189 PPaaggee 183oof 2f 157PPaaggeeIDID##:1:3013012 Division II Dorm II
Dorm style living, first floor showers, toilet, and sink have been modified in 2013 to meet current ADA Standards.
Division II Dorm III Dorm style living, currently there is no ADA accessible showers, toilet, or sink.
Division II Dorm IV Dorm style living, currently there is no ADA accessible showers, toilet, or sink.
Division III

Division III - Annex

Division IV

Division V

Division VI

Division VII

Division VIII – RTU/RCDD The RTU was newly constructed and opened for occupancy in August 2014. However, the design met
the minimum ADA requirements for the tier dorms and segregation cells. When occupied additional ADA compliant beds and desk were needed. In addition there were other deficiencies noted, including placement of swing seats, shower head angle to wet the built in ADA seat, and ADA compliant table seating. The 2017 CIP includes funds to address these deficiencies and expand the capacity of ADA beds and desks. The toileting features for all tiers are ADA compliant and meet code requirements for the occupancy of each tier.
Division IX

Division X

Division XI Cermak Health Center

Leighton Criminal Courts Building

Exhibit 2 Page 2
Lewis v. Dart, Case No. 17-cv-4181 CC101076

CCaasese: 1: 1:1:148-c-vc-v0-064225698DDoocucummeennt #t #: 4: 3854 FFiilleedd:: 1021//3117//1189 PPaaggee 194oof 2f 157PPaaggeeIDID##:1:3013112
Criminal Courts Administration Building
District 1 Skokie Courthouse Part of 1998 County wide ADA upgrades project, courtrooms and public restrooms were altered to
meet ADA Standards. Two male and one female lower level holding cells were altered to meet ADA Standards, including conforming toilet, sink, grab bars, bubbler, and bench.. The court room holding cells on the 1st and 2nd floors are technically infeasible to meet all of the ADA Standards. However, grab bars can be installed to assist individuals with disabilities using the toilet. The courtroom conference rooms on the 1st and 2nd floor need to be updated to meet current ADA Standards.
District 2 Rolling Meadows Courthouse Part of 1998 Countywide ADA upgrades project, courtrooms and public restrooms were altered to meet ADA Standards.In 2014 two male and one female lower level holding cells were altered to meet current ADA Standards, including conforming toilet/sink combination units with front deck mounted bubbler, grab bars, and benches. In 2015 an ADA conforming ramp was constructed in the sally port providing an accessible route from the detainees transport to the lower level holding cells. Additional work needed includes updates to courtroom holding cells on the 1st and 2nd levels, as well as improvements to the adjacent conference rooms.
District 3 Maywood Courthouse Part of 1998 County wide ADA upgrades project, courtrooms and public restrooms were altered to meet ADA Standards. In 2014 one male and one female lower level holding cell was updated by replacing the toilet/sink combination unit with an ADA compliant toilet/sink combination unit. The benches in the two cells were also replaced with ADA compliant benches. In 2015 an ADA conforming ramp in the sally port was constructed providing an accessible route from the detainees transport to the lower level holding cells. Additional work need includes updates to the 1st and 2nd floor courtroom holding cells.
District 4 Bridgeview Courthouse Part of 1998 County wide ADA upgrades project, courtrooms and public restrooms were altered to meet ADA Standards. In 2014 two male and one female lower level holding cell was updated by installing an ADA compliant toilet/sink combination unit with an ADA compliant toilet/sink combination unit with a front deck mounted bubbler, grab bars, and benches. In 2015 an ADA conforming ramp was constructed in the sally port providing an accessible route from the detainees transport to the lower level holding cells. Additional work need includes updates to the 1st and 2nd floor courtroom holding cells and conference rooms.
District 5 Markham Courthouse Part of 1998 County wide ADA upgrades project, courtrooms and public restrooms were altered to meet ADA Standards. In 2014 two male and one female lower level holding cell was updated by installing an ADA compliant toilet/sink combination unit with an ADA compliant toilet/sink combination unit with a front deck mounted bubbler, grab bars, and benches. In 2015 an ADA conforming ramp was constructed in the sally port providing an accessible route from the detainees transport to the lower level holding cells. Additional work need includes updates to the 1st and 2nd floor courtroom holding cells and conference rooms
Exhibit 2 Page 3
Lewis v. Dart, Case No. 17-cv-4181 CC101077

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 10 of 25 PageID #:10312
Exhibit 3 Page 1
CCSAO BENNETT 0410

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 11 of 25 PageID #:10312

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Johnathan Lacy, et al. ,
Plaintiffs, -vsThomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) No. 14-cv-6259 ) ) Judge Gettleman ) ) )

DECLARATION OF DARRELL BREWER

Under penalties of perjury as provided by law, the undersigned certifies

that the following statements are true:

1. My name is Darrell Brewer. I am a detainee at the Cook County Jail

assigned booking number 2018-0615021.

2. I have used a wheelchair during my detention for court appearances

at the Leighton Courthouse.

3. When I attend court in a wheelchair I must move up and down ramps

near the Cermak Infirmary. I do not believe I have received assistance moving up

and down these ramps.

4. Although I am generally pushed UP. the Leighton ramp by inmates, I

do not believe I am assisted down the ramp. ·
Dated: January }7 , 2019

Exhibit 4 Page 1

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 12 of 25 PageID #:10312

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Johnathan Lacy, et al. ,

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

-vs-

) No. 14-cv-6259

)

Thomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, ) Judge Gettleman

et al. ,

)

)

Defendants.

)

DECLARATION OF JEFFREY BURNS

Under penalties of perjury as provided by law, the undersigned certifies that the

following statements are true:

1. My name is Jeffrey Burns. I am a detainee at the Cook County Jail

assigned booking number 2018-0424105.

2. I have used a wheelchair during my detention for my court appearances at

111th Street in Chicago and the Leighton Courthouse.

3. When I attended court at 111th Street, I had to get out of my wheelcha ir to

pass between a gate on the secured side of the building. The holding area did not have

an accessible bathroom and I did not observe any notice that I may use a public

accessible bathroom upon request.

4. When I attend court at Leighton, I generally have to push myself up and

down ramps from my housing unit in the Cermak Infirmary.

5 . I attend court on the 6th floor and must get out of my wheelchair to pass

through a gate on the secured side of the floor. After I pass through this gate I am

generally held in the clerk's office before court. Although I do not have a watch , it feels

as if I am held in this office for hours on days when I attend court. I have never been

offered access to a public accessible bathroom.

-~

Dated : January I 7, 2019

~~ BS ; <e~

Exhibit 5 Page 1

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 13 of 25 PageID #:10312

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Johnathan Lacy, et al.,

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

-vs-

) No. 14-cv-6259

)

Thomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, ) Judge Gettleman

et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

DECLARATION OF LAWRENCE DEL RUSSO

Under penalties of pe~ury as provided by law, the undersigned certifies that the following statements are true:
1. My name is Lawrence Del Russo. I am a detainee at the Cook County Jail assigned booking number 2013-0508249.
2. For a little over one year I have used a wheelchair to attend court at Markham.
3. About six months ago I was not transported to the courthouse for a scheduled appearance.
4. Each time I attend Markham I am held in the lower level. About half of the time when I use a wheelchair I am not assigned to an accessible cell in the lower level.
5. I am also routinely held in a holding cell adjacent to courtroom103 in a small cell. It is difficult to enter and exit this cell and there are no grab bars near the cell toilet. I believe I am held in this cell for an hour or more. It is also very difficult and uncomfortable to move from this holding cell to my courtroom due to various barriers.

Dated : January \ 1. 2019

j_(llJDOMI~J ~
Lawrence Del Russo

Exhibit 6 Page 1

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 14 of 25 PageID #:10312
Exhibit 7 Page 1

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 15 of 25 PageID #:10312
Exhibit 7 Page 2

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 16 of 25 PageID #:10312
Exhibit 8 Page 1

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 17 of 25 PageID #:10312
Exhibit 8 Page 2

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 18 of 25 PageID #:10312

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Johnathan Lacy, et al. ,

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

-vs-

) No. 14-cv-6259

)

Thomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, ) Judge Gettleman

et al. ,

)

)

Defendants.

)

DECLARATION OF ANDREW MCCOWEN

Under penalties of perjury as provided by law, the undersigned certifies that the

following statements are true:

1. My name is Andrew McCowen . I am a detainee at the Cook County Jail assigned booking number 2018-0826132.

2. I have used a wheelchair during my detention for my court appearances at the Domestic Violence Courthouse at 555 W . Harrison.

3. When I attended court I was held in the lower level. I do not believe the holding cell had any grab bars near the toilet. I remember using the toilet during most court appearances and having to rock my body to get off the toilet because ther~ .was no grab bar to assist with transferring .

4 . I also was routinely held in the bullpen behind my courtroom. I believe the

toilet in this bullpen only had one grab bar near the toilet.

Dated: January J::Z._, 2019

Andrew McCowen

Exhibit 9 Page 1

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 19 of 25 PageID #:10312
Exhibit 10 Page 1

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 20 of 25 PageID #:10312
Exhibit 10 Page 2

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 21 of 25 PageID #:10312

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Johnathan Lacy, et al. ,
Plaintiffs, -vsThomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, et al. ,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) No. 14-cv-6259 ) ) Judge Gettleman ) ) )

DECLARATION OF ANTONIO ROSALES

Under penalties of perjury as provided by law, the undersigned certifies

that the following statements are true:

1. My name is Antonio Rosales. I am a detainee at the Cook County Jail

assigned booking number 2016-1230002.

2. I have used a wheelchair during my detention for my court

appearances at the Markham Courthouse.

3. When I attended court I am routinely held in a bullpen adjacent to

room 108. Although I do not have a watch , I believe I am held in this bullpen for

approximately one hour. This bullpen does not have grab bars around the cell

toilet.
Dated: January Jt., 2019

Antonio Rosales

-1-

Exhibit 11 Page 1

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 22 of 25 PageID #:10312
Exhibit 12 Page 1

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 23 of 25 PageID #:10312
Exhibit 12 Page 2

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 24 of 25 PageID #:10312
Exhibit 13 Page 1

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 484 Filed: 01/17/19 Page 25 of 25 PageID #:10312
Exhibit 13 Page 2

 
 Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 503 Filed: 03/19/19 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:10364

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Johnathan Lacy, et al., Plaintiffs,
-vsThomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, and Cook County, Illinois,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) No. 14-cv-6259 ) ) Judge Gettleman ) ) Magistrate Judge Weisman ) )

JOINT STATUS REPORT

Pursuant to the Court’s order entered February 6, 2019, ECF No.

491, the parties submit a joint status report.

1. Magistrate Judge Weisman is supervising limited discovery in prepa-

ration for a settlement conference. See ECF No. 496, Minute entry.

2. Cook County has agreed to produce two witnesses for class counsel

to understand the current status of renovations at the Leighton Courthouse

and the outlying Cook County Courthouses.

3. Plaintiff also seeks limited production of documents that were dis-

cussed in open court on February 26, 2019 and memorialized in a minute

entry by the Magistrate Judge. See ECF No. 496.

4. The parties return to Magistrate Judge Weisman on April 1, 2019 at

9:15 a.m. to report on the status of discovery and anticipate setting a date

for a settlement conference. ECF No. 496, Minute entry.

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 503 Filed: 03/19/19 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:10364

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Patrick W. Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10150 S. Western Ave., Suite Rear Chicago, IL 60643 (773)233-7900 patrickmorrissey1920@gmail.com Attorney for the plaintiff class

/s/ Miguel Larios (with consent) Assistant State’s Attorney 69 W. Washington, Suite 2030 Chicago, IL 60602 Attorney for Cook County

/s/ Michael Gorman (with consent) /s/ Raana Haidari (with consent) 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 Attorneys for the Sheriff of Cook County

-2-

 
 Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 523 Filed: 08/05/19 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:10427

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHNATHAN LACY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

No. 14 C 6259

THOMAS DART, Sheriff of Cook County, et al.,
Defendants.

Judge Robert W. Gettleman Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman

DEFENDANT COOK COUNTY’S STATUS REPORT Defendant, Cook County (“Cook County”), by its attorney, Kimberly M. Foxx, Cook County State’s Attorney, through her Assistant State’s Attorney, Miguel E. Larios, pursuant to this Court’s Order dated July 11, 2019 (dkt. 517), states as follows: 1. Timeframe and Administrative Requirements Necessary to
Complete Work for ADA Compliance at Maywood Courthouse. The Maywood project was an FY2019 project that Cook County had planned to have designed by one of the Task Orders, part of an effort to accelerate delivery of design services in FY2019. That approach was rejected by the Board of Commissioners and the Procurement office, which has severely impacted the schedule of that work and many other projects. As such, a new proposed timeline has been created by the Cook County Department of Capital Planning and Policy. The proposed timeline of the Maywood project is attached hereto.

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 523 Filed: 08/05/19 Page 2 of 5 PageID #:10427
2. Timeframe for Completion of Modifications to the Leighton Courthouse Ramp (also known as the “bridge”).
In the case of the scope for the Leighton bridge, that was never identified as a separate scope item in the architecture/engineering (A/E) firm’s original contract; it was simply part of the path into the building and up to the holding cells, within the courthouse, that were the subject of the project as a whole. In order to expedite the work and to respond to litigation focused specifically on the bridge, the Sheriff asked Capital Planning in 2018 to separate that portion of the work and move it ahead of the larger ADA holding cells project, which because of exceptionally complex phasing requirements (i.e. the need to work around all 20+ courtrooms within a criminal courthouse that had to remain fully operational) was taking longer to complete the design and procure the construction. In July 2018, Cook County issued a change order to the A/E firm to create a separate bid package just for the bridge. The delineation of the area to be separated was not defined beyond simply referring to the bridge in the change order request.
A proposed timeline of the Leighton bridge project is attached hereto.
2

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 523 Filed: 08/05/19 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:10427

Dated:

July 30, 2019

Respectfully submitted,
KIMBERLY M. FOXX State’s Attorney of Cook County
By: /s/ Miguel E. Larios Miguel E. Larios Assistant State’s Attorney Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office 50 West Washington Street, Suite 2760 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 603-1434 Miguel.Larios@cookcountyil.gov
Counsel for Cook County

3

JAN FEB Mar Apr May Jun July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 523 Filed: 08/05/19 Page 4 of 5 PageID #:10427

CCPSP PROGRAM SCHEDULE Maywood Privacy Screens and ADA Ramps at Courthouse Lockup

2019

2020

2021

PROJECT

Maywood Privacy Screens and ADA Ramps at Courthouse Lockup

Program Planning Develop Scope Procure Design (Traditional A/E) Design Procure Construction (JOC Project) Secure Permit and Materials Construction Substantial Completion Closeout

Data Date: 07/25/19 Print Date: 07/26/19

DCPP / BAM

Page 1 of 1

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JLY AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB Mar Apr May Jun July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Case: 1:14-cv-06259 Document #: 523 Filed: 08/05/19 Page 5 of 5 PageID #:10427

CCPSP PROGRAM SCHEDULE DOC Detainee Bridge - 23349

2018

2019

2020

PROJECT

Duration

Start

Finish

DOC Detainee Bridge - 23349

599

A/E Procurement Design Procure Construction to PO (JOC Project) Secure Permit Fabricate Bridge and Southern Folger gate Construction Substantial Completion Closeout

161 06/21/18 132 11/30/18 148 04/12/19
60 09/08/19 120 09/08/19
90 01/07/20 1 04/07/20
30 04/09/20

11/29/18 04/11/19 09/07/19 11/07/19 01/06/20 04/06/20 04/08/20 05/09/20

Data Date: 07/25/19 Print Date: 07/25/19

DCPP / BAM

Page 1 of 1

 
 APPEAL,PROTO,REOPEN,TERMED,WEISMAN
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:14-cv-06259

Lacy et al v. Dart et al Assigned to: Honorable Robert W. Gettleman Demand: $25,000 Case in other court: 17-02141
17-02202 Cause: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

Date Filed: 08/14/2014 Date Terminated: 02/18/2020 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 446 Civil Rights: Americans with Disabilities - Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy

represented by Thomas Gerard Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey 10150 South Western Ave. Suite Rear Chicago, IL 60643 (773) 233-7900 Email: tgmorrisseylaw@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel A. Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C. 200 S Michigan Ave Ste 201 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427-3200 Email: jaf@kenlaw.com TERMINATED: 01/24/2018

Kenneth N Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman, P.C. 200 South Michigan Avenue Suite 201 Chicago, IL 60604-6107 (312) 427-3200 Email: knf@kenlaw.com TERMINATED: 01/24/2018

Patrick William Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10150 South Western Ave.

Plaintiff Kenneth Farris
Plaintiff Marque Bowers
Plaintiff Maurice Boston

Suite Rear Chicago, IL 60643 (773) 233-7900 Email: patrickmorrissey1920@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2018
Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2018
Patrick William Morrissey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2018
Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2018
Patrick William Morrissey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2018
Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2018
Patrick William Morrissey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kevin Dawson
V. Defendant Thomas Dart Sheriff of Cook County

represented by Kevin Dawson #2010-0322194 Cook County Jail P.O. Box 089002 Chicago, IL 60608 PRO SE
Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2018
represented by Michael Gorman Cook County State's Attorney's Office 50 W. Washington St. Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603-7954 Email: michael.gorman@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Raana Vakilzadeh Haidari Cook County State's Attorney's Office 50 West Washington Street Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603-3618 Email: raana.haidari@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Miel Zebelian Schiller DuCanto & Fleck LLC 200 North LaSalle Street 30th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 609-5526 Email: amielzebelian@sdflaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anthony E. Zecchin Hale Law LLC 53 West Jackson Blvd. Suite 330 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 870-6933 Email: azecchin@ahalelaw.com TERMINATED: 01/16/2019
Brian M Casey Cook County State's Attorney's Office Richard J. Daley Center, 50 W. Washington St., Ste. 500 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603-3374 Email: brian.casey@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 01/30/2018
John Power Cook County State's Attorney's Office Richard J. Daley Center, Fifth Floor Chicago, IL 60602 312-603-4370 Email: John.Power@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael L. Gallagher Wise Morrissey Kaveny, LLC 161 N. Clark Street Suite 3200 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 580-2040 Email: mlg@wmklawfirm.com TERMINATED: 09/08/2015
Michael Jude Sorich Cavanagh Law Group 161 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 425-1900 Email: mjs@CavanaghLawGroup.com TERMINATED: 04/20/2016
Nicholas E Cummings , IL Email: nicholas.cummings@cookcountyil.gov

Defendant Cook County, Illinois

TERMINATED: 09/12/2017
Nicolas Paul Castiglione DuPage County State's Attorney's Office 503 N. County Farm Road Wheaton, IL 60187 (630) 407-8093 Email: nicolas.castiglione@dupageco.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James Chandler Cook County State's Attorney's Office 50 West Washington Street, 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60602 312 603-5471 Email: james.chandler@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lyle Kevin Henretty Cook County State's Attorney 2760 50 West Washington 20th Floor Chicago, IL 60602 312-603-1424 Email: lyle.henretty@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony E. Zecchin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2019
David Richard Condron O'Rourke, Hogan, Fowler & Dwyer 10 South LaSalle Street Suite 3700 Chicago, IL 60604 (312)739-3500 Email: dcondron@ohfdlaw.com

TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
Jacqueline Carroll Goodman Law Group Chicago 20 North Clark Street, Suite 3300 Chicago, IL 60602 312 626-1814 Email: jc@glgchicago.com TERMINATED: 08/03/2017
Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon Cook County State's Attorney's Office (69W) 69 W. Washington Suite 3110 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603-1424 Email: maureen.hannon@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 08/15/2017
Miguel E. Larios Cook County State's Attorney's Office 50 West Washington Street Suite 2760 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 690-3543 Email: miguel.larios@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 08/26/2019
Nicholas E Cummings (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2017
Thomas E. Cargie Cook County State's Attorney's Office (69W) 69 W. Washington Suite 3110 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603 1426 Email: thomas.cargie@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Sgt. Johnson
Defendant Correctional Officer Nawara
Defendant Correctional Officer Lopez
Defendant Correctional Officer Wilson

represented by Sgt. Johnson PRO SE
Anthony E. Zecchin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Correctional Officer Nawara PRO SE
Anthony E. Zecchin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2019
represented by Correctional Officer Lopez PRO SE
Anthony E. Zecchin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2019
represented by Correctional Officer Wilson PRO SE
Anthony E. Zecchin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2019

Date Filed 08/14/2014
08/14/2014 08/14/2014

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Johnathan Lacy; Jury Demand. Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0752-9766617.(Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
2 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy by Patrick William Morrissey (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
3 CIVIL Cover Sheet (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/14/2014)

08/14/2014 08/14/2014 08/14/2014 08/15/2014 08/18/2014 08/18/2014 08/18/2014 08/26/2014 08/27/2014 08/27/2014 09/02/2014 09/02/2014 09/03/2014

CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Daniel G. Martin. (nsf, ) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
4 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy by Thomas Gerard Morrissey (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart (pg, ) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Johnathan Lacy as to Cook County, Illinois on 8/15/2014, answer due 9/5/2014; Thomas Dart on 8/15/2014, answer due 9/5/2014. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/15/2014)
6 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy by Kenneth N Flaxman (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
7 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for leave to file amended complaint and add parties (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amended Complaint)(Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
8 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for leave to file 7 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/26/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
9 AMENDED complaint by Johnathan Lacy, Kenneth Farris, Marquis Bowers, Maurice Boston against All Defendants (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/26/2014)
10 MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy to expedite discovery and to schedule hearing for preliminary relief (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/27/2014)
11 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion to expedite 10 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/3/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/27/2014)
12 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion for leave to file 7 amended complaint and add parties is granted. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/02/2014)
13 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Thomas Dart by Michael Jude Sorich (Sorich, Michael) (Entered: 09/02/2014)
14 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 09/03/2014)

09/03/2014
09/10/2014 09/17/2014 09/17/2014 09/18/2014 09/18/2014 09/19/2014 09/19/2014 09/23/2014 09/24/2014 09/24/2014 09/24/2014
09/29/2014

15 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 9/3/2014 regarding motion to expedite 10 discovery and schedule a hearing for preliminary relief, which is continued to 9/24/2014 at 11:30 a.m. A motion for preliminary injunction is due by 9/17/2014. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
16 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by Jacqueline B. Carroll (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
17 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy by Joel A. Flaxman (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 09/17/2014)
18 MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy for preliminary injunction (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/17/2014)
19 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for preliminary injunction 18 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/24/2014 at 11:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
20 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by Thomas E. Cargie (Cargie, Thomas) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
21 MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy to certify class (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
22 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to certify class 21 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/24/2014 at 11:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
23 ANSWER to amended complaint by Cook County, Illinois(Cargie, Thomas) (Entered: 09/23/2014)
24 ANSWER to amended complaint by Thomas Dart(Sorich, Michael) (Entered: 09/24/2014)
25 NOTICE by Thomas Dart (Sorich, Michael) (Entered: 09/24/2014)
26 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 9/24/2014. Motion to expedite 10 discovery is set for 10/1/2014 at 10:30 a.m. Preliminary injunction hearing is set for 12/16/2014 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/26/2014)
27 MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy TO PROHIBIT FURTHER

09/29/2014 09/29/2014 09/29/2014
10/01/2014 10/01/2014 10/16/2014
10/16/2014

COMMUNICATIONS BY DEFENDANTS WITH NAMED PLAINTIFFS, etc. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/29/2014)
28 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 27 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/1/2014 at 10:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/29/2014)
29 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Thomas Dart by Nicholas E Cummings (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 09/29/2014)
30 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on September 24, 2014, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov - 312.435.7626.
IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.
Redaction Request due 10/20/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/30/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/29/2014. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 09/29/2014)
31 STATUS Report by Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/01/2014)
32 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 10/1/2014. Scheduling Conference set for 10/21/2014 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/03/2014)
33 RESPONSE by Thomas Dart to MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy TO PROHIBIT FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS BY DEFENDANTS WITH NAMED PLAINTIFFS, etc. 27 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 4 Affidavit Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit 9)(Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 10/16/2014)
34 NOTICE by Thomas Dart re response to motion, 33 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 10/16/2014)

10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/20/2014 10/21/2014 10/22/2014
11/04/2014
11/04/2014

35 STATUS Report by Johnathan Lacy (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
36 MOTION by Defendant Thomas DartStrike Plaintiffs' Second Status Report (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
37 NOTICE of Motion by Nicholas E Cummings for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 36 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/23/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
39 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Scheduling conference held on 10/21/2014. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
38 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/22/2014: Parties are to submit list of witnesses that will be called at the injunction hearing by 11/4/2014. Expert reports are to be exchanged. Preliminary injunction briefs are due by 11/21/2014. Defendants are to provide plaintiffs with unredacted exhibit 3 and a copy of the DVD noted in document 33 . Plaintiffs are granted permission to take depositions of detainees disclosed pursuant to document 33 . Scheduling conference is set for 11/25/2014, at 2:30 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
40 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on October 1, 2014, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.
IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.
Redaction Request due 11/25/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/5/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/2/2015. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
41 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on October 21, 2014, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

11/19/2014 11/21/2014
11/21/2014 11/21/2014 11/21/2014 11/21/2014 11/21/2014
11/25/2014

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.
Redaction Request due 11/25/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/5/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/2/2015. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
42 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Thomas Dart by Michael L. Gallagher (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 11/19/2014)
43 TRIAL Brief by Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy (Attachments: # 1 Index To Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10)(Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
44 MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy to consolidate trial on the merits with hearing on preliminary injunction (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
45 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 44 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/25/2014 at 02:30 PM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
46 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart to file instanter to file Trial Brief in Excess of Allowable Limits (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
47 NOTICE of Motion by Nicholas E Cummings for presentment of motion to file instanter 46 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/26/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
48 TRIAL Brief by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A - Defendant Expert Report, # 2 Affidavit Exhibit B - Affidavit of Marlene Fuentes, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C - General Order, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit D - Commode Chair Notice)(Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
49 RESPONSE by Thomas Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy to

11/25/2014 11/25/2014 11/28/2014 11/28/2014 12/01/2014 12/02/2014
12/04/2014 12/04/2014 12/04/2014 12/05/2014

consolidate trial on the merits with hearing on preliminary injunction 44 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
50 NOTICE by Thomas Dart re response in opposition to motion 49 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
51 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/25/2014: Plaintiffs' motion 44 to consolidate trial on the merits with hearing on prelminary injunction is denied. Scheduling conference held on 11/25/2014. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
52 MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy to set a briefing schedule for plaintiffs' certification motion (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 11/28/2014)
53 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion by filer to set a briefing schedule 52 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/4/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 11/28/2014)
54 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion 27 to prohibit communications is withdrawn. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 12/01/2014)
55 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart, Sgt. Johnson, Correctional Officer Lopez, Correctional Officer Nawara, Correctional Officer Wilsonin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy to set a briefing schedule for plaintiffs' certification motion 52 (Cargie, Thomas) (Entered: 12/02/2014)
56 WITNESS List by Johnathan Lacy (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/04/2014)
57 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/04/2014)
58 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 12/4/2014 regarding plaintiffs' motion to set a briefing schedule 52 , which is continued generally. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 12/04/2014)
59 ORDER : Plaintiffs' petition 57 for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is granted. Writ to issue. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/5/2014. Mailed notice (tg, ) (Entered: 12/05/2014)

12/05/2014 12/05/2014 12/05/2014 12/08/2014 12/10/2014
12/15/2014 12/15/2014

60 WRIT of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued as to the the U.S. Marshal's Office for service for the following dates of 1)December 17, 2014: Marquis Bowers, 2011-1020029; Kenneth Farris, 2014-0401095; Shelly Gaston, 2012-0906238; Kevin Dawson, 2010-0322194. 2) December 18, 2014: Cornelius Purnell, 2012-0325154; Harold Vaughn, 2012-0125276;Darryl Harper, 2013-0312001. Sent to the Marshals via email. (tg, ) (Entered: 12/05/2014)
61 ORDER : The Clerk is directed to issue the (amended) writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/5/2014. Mailed notice(tg, ) (Entered: 12/05/2014)
62 AMENDED WRIT of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued as to the the U.S. Marshal's Office for service for the following dates of 1)December 16, 2014: Marquis Bowers, 2011-1020029; Kenneth Farris, 2014-0401095; Shelly Gaston, 2012-0906238; Kevin Dawson, 2010-0322194. 2) December 17, 2014: Cornelius Purnell, 20120325154; Harold Vaughn, 2012-0125276;Darryl Harper, 20130312001. Sent to the Marshals via email (tg, ) (Entered: 12/05/2014)
63 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by David Richard Condron (Condron, David) (Entered: 12/08/2014)
64 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on December 4, 2014, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435-7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.
IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.
Redaction Request due 12/31/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/12/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/10/2015. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 12/10/2014)
65 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for sanctions (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/15/2014)
66 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for sanctions 65 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/16/2014 at 10:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/15/2014)

12/15/2014 12/15/2014 12/16/2014
12/17/2014 12/18/2014 12/18/2014
12/22/2014 12/24/2014 12/31/2014

67 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for sanctions 65 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 12/15/2014)
68 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re response in opposition to motion 67 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 12/15/2014)
69 ORDER: Preliminary injunction hearing begins. Evidence heard in part. Hearing is continued to 12/17/2014, at 9:30 a.m. The writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum are continued as to Kenneth Farris andMarquis Bowers. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/16/2014. Mailed notice (sxw) (Entered: 12/17/2014)
70 ORDER: Preliminary injunction hearing resumed. Further evidence heard. The hearing will be continued to a future date. Status hearing is set for 12/18/2014, at 9:30 a.m. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/17/2014. Mailed notice. (sj, ) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
71 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/18/2014. Mailed notice.(sj, ) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
73 ORDER: Status hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion 10 to expedite discovery, etc. is withdrawn without prejudice. Defendants' motion 36 to strike plaintiffs second status report is denied. Defendants' motion 46 to file brief in excess pages is granted. Plaintiffs' motion 52 to set briefing schedule is granted. Plaintiffs' amended motion for class certification is due by 1/8/2015; defendants' response is due by 3/5/2015; plaintiffs reply is due by 3/26/2015. Plaintiffs motion 65 for sanctions is denied as to issues I and II. Further injunction hearing is continued to 1/12/2015 at 10:15 and then to 1/20/15 at 10:00 a.m. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/18/2014. Mailed notice (mmy, ) (Entered: 12/24/2014)
72 Document Entered in Error Modified on 12/24/2014 (mmy, ). (Entered: 12/23/2014)
74 NOTICE of Correction regarding order 72 (mmy, ) (Entered: 12/24/2014)
75 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on December 18, 2014, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.
IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may

01/08/2015 01/08/2015 01/08/2015 01/09/2015 01/09/2015 01/12/2015
01/12/2015 01/12/2015 01/12/2015

be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.
Redaction Request due 1/21/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/2/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/31/2015. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 12/31/2014)
76 MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy to certify class [amended] Responses due by 3/5/2015 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/08/2015)
77 MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum and to compel production of video evidence (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/08/2015)
78 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 77 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/12/2015 at 10:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/08/2015)
79 TRIAL Brief Supplemental Joint Trial Memorandum by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
80 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re trial brief 79 (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
81 TRIAL Brief [supplemental] by Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - UFAS standards, # 2 Exhibit 2 - 1991 ADA Standards, # 3 Exhibit 3 ADAAG Standards, # 4 Exhibit 4- Excerpt of 2010 ADA Standards, # 5 Exhibit 6 Explanation of 2010 Standards, # 6 Exhibit 6 - DOJ Pamphlet Accessible Cells)(Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/12/2015)
82 MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy to amend/correct complaint and add Kevin Dawson as plaintiff (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/12/2015)
83 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert Gettleman on 1/12/2015: The writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum are continued as to Kenneth Farris #2014-04-01095 and Marquis Bowers #2011-102-0029 to 1/12/2015, at 10:15 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 01/12/2015)
87 ORDER :Injunction hearing resumed and is continued to 1/20/2015, at 10:00 a.m. Plaintiffs' motion 21 to certify class is withdrawn. Response

01/12/2015
01/12/2015
01/13/2015 01/13/2015 01/14/2015 01/14/2015 01/15/2015 01/16/2015 01/20/2015

to plaintiffs' amended motion 76 to certify class is due by 3/5/2015. Reply is due by 3/26/2015. Plaintiffs' motion 82 to add Kevin Dawson as a party plaintiff is granted. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/12/2015. Mailed notice (rp, ) (Entered: 01/14/2015)
88 ORDER: Plaintiffs' petition 77 for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to cause Kevin Dawson to be brought to this court on 1/20/2015, at 10:00 a.m. is granted. Writ to issue. Plaintiffs' motion 77 to compel is continued to 1/20/2015, at 10:00 a.m. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/12/2014 Mailed notice(ks, ) (Entered: 01/14/2015)
89 ORDER: The writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum are continued as to Kenneth Farris #2014-04-01095 and Marquis Bowers #2011-1020029 to 1/20/2015, at 10:00 a.m. The Cook County Sheriff is directed to bring those person to the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Courtroom 1703 before Judge Robert Gettleman on that date and time. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/12/2015 Mailed notice (ks, ) (Entered: 01/14/2015)
84 amendedment to AMENDED complaint by Kevin Dawson against Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/13/2015)
85 MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kevin Dawson, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy to compel (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 01/13/2015)
86 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion to compel 85 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/15/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 01/14/2015)
90 WRIT of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued as to Kenneth Farris #2014-04-01095 and Marquis Bowers #2011-102-0029 for January 20, 2015. (ks, ) (Entered: 01/14/2015)
91 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' motion 85 to compel is set for 1/20/2015, at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
WRIT of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued to the US Marshal's Office for service as to Kevin Dawson via email. (sj, ) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
92 ORDER: Injunction hearing resumed and is continued to 1/22/2015, at 10:00 a.m.Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/20/2015 Mailed notice (ks, ) (Entered: 01/21/2015)

01/20/2015

93 ORDER: The writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum are continued as to Kenneth Farris #2014-04-01095, Marquis Bowers #2011-102-0029, and Kevin Dawson #210-032-2194, to 1/22/2015, at 10:00 a.m. The Cook County Sheriff is directed to bring those person to the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern division, courtroom 1703 before Judge Robert Gettleman on that date and time for a further injunction hearing. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/20/2015 Mailed notice (ks, ) (Entered: 01/21/2015)

01/21/2015 94 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Dawson for permanent injunction (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/21/2015)

01/22/2015

95 ORDER: Injunction hearing resumed and is continued to 2/11/2015, at 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff Dawson's motion 94 for permanent injunction is continued to that date. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/22/2015. Mailed notice (mmy, ) (Entered: 01/26/2015)

01/22/2015

96 ORDER: The writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum are continued as to Kenneth Farris #2014-04-01095, Marquis Bowers #2011-102-0029, and Kevin Dawson #2010-032-2194, to 2/11/2015, at 10:00 a.m. The Cook County Sheriff is directed to bring those persons to the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern division, courtroom 1703 before Judge Robert Gettleman on that date and time for a further injunction hearing. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/22/2015. Mailed notice (mmy, ) (Entered: 01/26/2015)

01/26/2015

FORWARD Certified Copy of Order 96 dated 1/22/2015 to U.S. Marshal's via email (mmy, ) (Entered: 01/26/2015)

01/28/2015

97 MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois for protective order and, MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to quash Subpoena for Third Party Depositions (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 01/28/2015)

01/28/2015

98 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion for protective order, motion to quash 97 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/3/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 01/28/2015)

02/03/2015

99 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 2/3/2015 regarding defendant's motion 97 for protective order, and to quash subpoena, which are continued to 2/11/2015, at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 02/04/2015)

02/10/2015 100 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan LacyRule 26(b)(5)(B) review (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/10/2015)

02/10/2015

101 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart to file instanter Supplemental Authority to Trial Brief (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 02/10/2015)

02/10/2015

102 NOTICE of Motion by Nicholas E Cummings for presentment of motion to file instanter 101 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/11/2015 at 10:00 AM. (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 02/10/2015)

02/11/2015

104 ORDER: Preliminary injunction hearing resumed and is continued to 2/17/2015, at 10:00 a.m. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/11/2015. Mailed notice (mmy, ) (Entered: 02/17/2015)

02/11/2015

105 ORDER: The writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum are continued as to Kenneth Farris #2014-04-01095, Marquis Bowers #2011-102-0029, and Kevin Dawson #2010-032-2194, to 2/17/2015, at 10:00 a.m. The Cook County Sheriff is directed to bring those persons to the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern division, courtroom 1703 before Judge Robert Gettleman on that date and time for a further injunction hearing. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/11/2015. Mailed notice (mmy, ) (Entered: 02/17/2015)

02/13/2015

103 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: The witness portion of the 2/17/2015 hearing will begin at 2:15 p.m. rather than the 2:45 p.m. time announced in open court. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 02/13/2015)

02/17/2015

106 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman:Motion for permanent injunction 94 is denied without prejudice. Motion 97 for protective order and to quash is granted in part. Subpoenas and third party depositions are stayed until further order. Motion 100 to determine whether documents are privileged is granted in part and denied in part. Motion 101 to supplement trial brief is granted. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 02/19/2015)

02/17/2015 107 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/17/2015:Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 02/19/2015)

02/17/2015

108 ORDER: Preliminary injunction hearing resumed and is concluded. Post-hearing briefs are due by 3/17/2015. Defendants' report on status of construction and alterations is due by 3/25/2015. Status hearing is set for 4/2/2015, at 11:00 a.m. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/17/2015. Mailed notice (mmy, ) (Entered: 02/20/2015)

02/17/2015

110 ORDER: The writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum as to Kenneth Farris #2014-04-01095, Marquis Bowers #2011-102-0029, and Kevin Dawson #2010-032-2194 are discharged. Signed by the Honorable

Robert W. Gettleman on 2/17/2015. Mailed notice (mmy, ) (Entered: 02/23/2015)

02/20/2015

109 STATUS Report on Production of Videos by Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kevin Dawson, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 02/20/2015)

02/27/2015 111 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart for extension of time (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 02/27/2015)

02/27/2015

112 NOTICE of Motion by Nicholas E Cummings for presentment of extension of time 111 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/4/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 02/27/2015)

03/03/2015

113 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendants' motion 111 for extension of time to 3/12/2015 to respond to plaintiffs' amended motion for class certification is granted. Motion presentment date of 3/4/2015 is stricken. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 03/03/2015)

03/12/2015

114 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart to file instanter motion to file in excess of page limit (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 03/12/2015)

03/12/2015

115 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy to certify class [amended] 76 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Trial Transcript, January 12, 2015 - Marlene Fuentes, # 2 Exhibit Trial Transcript, December 17, 2014, # 3 Exhibit Deposition Transcript of Johnathan Lacy, # 4 Exhibit Deposition Transcript of Maurice Boston, # 5 Exhibit Trial Transcript, December 16, 2014 - Maurice Bowers, # 6 Exhibit Deposition Transcript of Kenneth Farris, # 7 Exhibit Trial Transcript, December 16, 2014 Kevin Dawson, # 8 Exhibit Trial Transcript, December 16, 2014 Shelly Gaston, # 9 Exhibit Trial Transcript, January 20, 2015 - Michael Gumm)(Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 03/12/2015)

03/12/2015

116 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re response in opposition to motion,,, 115 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 03/12/2015)

03/17/2015

117 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart for leave to file excess pages for their Joint Post Trial Brief Instanter (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 03/17/2015)

03/17/2015 118 TRIAL Brief Defendants' Joint Post Trial Brief by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Index, # 2 Exhibit A

12.16.14 V. 1, # 3 Exhibit A 12.16.14 V. 2, # 4 Exhibit A 12.17.14, # 5 Exhibit A 1.12.15, # 6 Exhibit A 1.20.15, # 7 Exhibit A 1.22.15, # 8 Exhibit A 2.11.15, # 9 Exhibit B, # 10 Exhibit C)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 03/17/2015)

03/17/2015

119 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart for leave to file excess pages for their Joint Post Trial Brief Instanter 117 , trial brief, 118 Joint Post-Trial Brief (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 03/17/2015)

03/18/2015 120 TRIAL Brief by Johnathan Lacy (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/18/2015)

03/18/2015

121 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for leave to file excess pages , MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to Accept Untimely (by Less than One Minute) Filing, and to File Corrected Exhibits (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 03/18/2015)

03/18/2015

122 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages, motion for miscellaneous relief 121 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/2/2015 at 11:00 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 03/18/2015)

03/19/2015 123 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart to sever (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 03/19/2015)

03/19/2015

124 NOTICE of Motion by Nicholas E Cummings for presentment of motion to sever 123 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/2/2015 at 11:00 AM. (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 03/19/2015)

03/25/2015

125 STATUS Report on Construction by Cook County, Illinois (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A- Affidavit and Chart)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 03/25/2015)

03/25/2015 126 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re status report 125 (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 03/25/2015)

03/26/2015 127 REPLY by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to response in opposition to motion,,, 115 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/26/2015)

03/30/2015 128 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for leave to file supplemental post-trial brief (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/30/2015)

03/30/2015

129 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for leave to file 128 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/2/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/30/2015)

04/02/2015

130 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on February 17, 2015, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 4/23/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/4/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/1/2015. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 04/02/2015)

04/02/2015

131 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on January 20, 2015, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR / 312.435.7626 / nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 4/23/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/4/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/1/2015. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 04/02/2015)

04/02/2015

132 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on January 12, 2015, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at

www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 4/23/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/4/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/1/2015. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 04/02/2015)

04/02/2015

133 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on January 22, 2015, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR / 312.435.7626 / nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 4/23/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/4/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/1/2015. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 04/02/2015)

04/02/2015

134 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on February 11, 2015, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 4/23/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/4/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/1/2015. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 04/02/2015)

04/02/2015

135 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 4/2/2015: Motion 114 to file in excess of 15 page brief is granted. Defendants' motion 117 for leave to file excess pages brief is granted. Motion 121 for leave to file excess pages brief is granted. Motion 128 for leave to file supplemental post trial brief is granted.

Response to defendants' motion to sever Mr. Lacy is due by 4/16/2015. Reply is due by 4/23/2015. Status hearing and ruling on amended motion 76 for class certification and oral argument on motion for injunction is set for 5/5/2015 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) Modified on 4/6/2015 (gds). (Entered: 04/06/2015)

04/16/2015

136 TRIAL Brief Defendants Joint Supplemental Post Trial Brief Opposing Classwide Injunctive Relief by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 04/16/2015)

04/16/2015

137 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re trial brief 136 Joint Supplemental Post-Trial Brief (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 04/16/2015)

04/16/2015 138 MEMORANDUM by Johnathan Lacy in Opposition to motion to sever 123 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/16/2015)

04/17/2015 139 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to compel (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 04/17/2015)

04/17/2015

140 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion to compel 139 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/22/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 04/17/2015)

04/22/2015

141 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 4/22/2015 regarding plaintiffs' motion to compel 139 which is continued to 5/5/2015, at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/22/2015)

04/30/2015

142 Motion to certify class 76 is granted; Memorandum Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/30/2015: Plaintiffs' motion 76 to certify class is granted. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/30/2015)

05/01/2015

143 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for permanent injunction pertaining to assisting detainees up and down ramps (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/01/2015)

05/01/2015 144 NOTICE by Johnathan Lacy [of filing of electronic media] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/01/2015)

05/01/2015

145 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for permanent injunction 143 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/5/2015 at 10:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/01/2015)

05/05/2015 146 NOTICE by Thomas Gerard Morrissey of Change of Address (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 05/05/2015)

05/05/2015 147 NOTICE by Patrick William Morrissey of Change of Address (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 05/05/2015)

05/06/2015

148 Motion hearing held on 5/5/2015. Order signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/6/2015: Plaintiffs' motion to compel 85 surveillance material is withdrawn. Plaintiffs' motion to compel 139 discovery without a watermark is granted in part and denied in part. Motion for permanent injunction 143 is denied as premature. Defendants' reply to motion 123 to sever is due by 5/12/2015. Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction 18 is continued until further order of court. Status hearing is set for 5/27/2015 at 10:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 05/07/2015)

05/08/2015 149 REPLY by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart to memorandum in opposition to motion 138 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 05/08/2015)

05/08/2015 150 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re reply to response to motion 149 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 05/08/2015)

05/22/2015 151 STATUS Report by Thomas Dart (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 05/22/2015)

05/22/2015

152 STATUS Report pursuant to this Court's May 6, 2015 Order by Cook County, Illinois (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 05/22/2015)

05/26/2015

153 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kevin Dawson, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy to status report 152 , status report 151 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1-4)(Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 05/26/2015)

05/27/2015

155 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion to sever 123 is denied; Status hearing held on 5/27/2015 and is continued to 6/10/2015 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 05/29/2015)

05/28/2015

154 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on May 27, 2015, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at

www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 6/18/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/29/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/26/2015. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 05/28/2015)

06/05/2015

156 REPLY by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to Response 153 , status report 152 pursuant to this Court's May 27, 2015 Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 06/05/2015)

06/05/2015 157 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re reply 156 (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 06/05/2015)

06/08/2015 158 Memorandum pursuant to Court's May 27, 2015 Order by Thomas Dart (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 06/08/2015)

06/10/2015

159 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/10/2015. Status hearing held on 6/10/2015. Plaintiffs' final response to defendants' 'briefs is due by 6/26/2015. Plaintiffs' proposal regarding handling of individual claims is due by 6/16/2015. Defendant Cook County shall disclose the name of the contractor on 6/17/2015. Counsel for the COunty will inform plaintiffs and the court on 6/17/2015 whether they can disclose the entire contract before the 7/1/2015 County Board meeting. Status hearing is continued to 6/18/2015 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 06/10/2015)

06/16/2015

160 STATUS Report Plaintiff's Proposal Regarding the Handling of the Individual Claims by Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kevin Dawson, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 06/16/2015)

06/18/2015

161 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 6/18/2015. Status hearing and ruling on the preliminary injunction issue is set for 8/27/2015 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is due by 7/89/2015. Defendants' response and cross-motion for summary judgment is due by 8/28/2015. Plaintiffs' reply and response are due by 9/11/2015. Defendants' final reply is due by 9/25/2015. Status hearing and ruling is set for 11/24/2015 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 06/18/2015)

06/26/2015

162 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kevin Dawson, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy to reply 156 , other 158 (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 06/26/2015)

06/29/2015 163 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on June 18, 2015, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information:

Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 7/20/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/30/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/28/2015. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 06/29/2015)

07/08/2015

164 MOTION by Plaintiffs Marquis Bowers, Maurice Boston, Johnathan Lacy, Kenneth Farris, Kevin Dawson for partial summary judgment (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/08/2015)

07/08/2015

165 RULE 56 1(a)(3) Statement by Marquis Bowers, Kevin Dawson, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy regarding motion for partial summary judgment 164 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/08/2015)

07/29/2015 166 STATUS Report by Cook County, Illinois (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 07/29/2015)

07/30/2015 167 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to status report 166 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/30/2015)

08/24/2015 168 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan LacyTo Submit Additional Evidence (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/24/2015)

08/24/2015

169 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 168 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/27/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/24/2015)

08/24/2015

170 NOTICE by Johnathan Lacy re MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan LacyTo Submit Additional Evidence 168 [of filing of electronic media] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/24/2015)

08/25/2015 172 NOTICE of filing by plaintiff's counsel Kenneth N. Flaxman. (jl) (Attachment # 1 DVD Exhibit) (jl). (Entered: 08/27/2015)

08/26/2015

171 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: The time of the 8/27/2015 status hearing and motion hearing is reset to 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 08/26/2015)

08/27/2015

173 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 8/27/2015. Motion 168 to submit additional evidence is granted. Defendants' response, which may be in excess of 15, but not more than 20 pages, to motion for summary judgment, and cross motion for summary judgment are due by 9/4/2015. Plaintiffs' reply and response are due by 9/18/2015. Defendants' reply is due by 10/2/2015. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/02/2015)

09/02/2015 174 MOTION by Defendant Thomas Dart to withdraw appearance of ASA Michael L. Gallagher (Sorich, Michael) (Entered: 09/02/2015)

09/02/2015

175 NOTICE of Motion by Michael Jude Sorich for presentment of motion to withdraw 174 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/9/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Sorich, Michael) (Entered: 09/02/2015)

09/03/2015

176 MEMORANDUM by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart in Opposition to motion for partial summary judgment 164 (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/03/2015)

09/03/2015

177 RESPONSE by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart to Rule 56 statement 165 pursuant to L.R. 56.1(b)(3) (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/03/2015)

09/03/2015

178 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart to strike Rule 56 statement 165 strike portions of Plaintiffs' 56.1 statements of fact (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/03/2015)

09/03/2015

179 RULE 56.1(b)(3)(c) Statement by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart regarding motion to strike, motion for relief 178 Statements of Additional Fact (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants' Joint Exhibit List for Opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and Defendants' motion for summary judgment, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/03/2015)

09/03/2015

180 EXHIBIT by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart Exhibits J-S regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 176 , Rule 56 statement,, 179 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit K, # 2 Exhibit L, # 3 Exhibit M, # 4 Exhibit N, # 5 Exhibit O, # 6 Exhibit P, # 7 Exhibit Q, # 8 Exhibit R, # 9 Exhibit S)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/03/2015)

09/03/2015

181 NOTICE of Motion by Jacqueline B. Carroll for presentment of motion to strike, motion for relief 178 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/9/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/03/2015)

09/03/2015

182 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re exhibit, 180 , Response 177 , memorandum in opposition to motion 176 , notice of motion 181 , Rule 56 statement,, 179 , MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart to strike Rule 56 statement 165 strike portions of Plaintiffs' 56.1 statements of fact 178 (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/03/2015)

09/04/2015 183 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart for summary judgment (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 09/04/2015)

09/04/2015

184 Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Material Facts STATEMENT by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 09/04/2015)

09/04/2015

185 MEMORANDUM by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart in support of motion for summary judgment 183 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 09/04/2015)

09/04/2015

186 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re memorandum in support of motion 185 , MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart for summary judgment 183 , statement 184 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 09/04/2015)

09/08/2015

187 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Response to defendants' motion to strike a portion of plaintiffs' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of material fact is due by 9/17/2015. The motion will be taken with the motion for summary judgment. Motion hearing date of 9/9/2015 is stricken. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/08/2015)

09/08/2015

188 ORDER: Motion to withdraw and substitute counsel is granted. Michael L. Gallagher is given leave to withdraw as counsel for defendants. Michael J. Sorich is given leave to appear as substitute counsel. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/8/2015. Mailed notice. (jl) (Entered: 09/09/2015)

09/10/2015

189 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on December 17, 2014, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at

www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 10/1/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/13/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/9/2015. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 09/10/2015)

09/17/2015 190 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for extension of time to file respons to defendants (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/17/2015)

09/17/2015

191 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 190 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/24/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/17/2015)

09/18/2015

192 AMENDED AGREED NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 190 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/28/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/18/2015)

09/24/2015 193 STIPULATION of Dismissal as to defendants Johnson, Nawara, Lopez, and Wilson only (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 09/24/2015)

09/25/2015

194 RESPONSE by Johnathan Lacy to MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart to strike Rule 56 statement 165 strike portions of Plaintiffs' 56.1 statements of fact 178 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/25/2015)

09/25/2015 195 MEMORANDUM by Johnathan Lacy in Opposition to motion for summary judgment 183 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/25/2015)

09/25/2015

196 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to statement 184 (Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 Statement) (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 09/25/2015)

09/25/2015 197 REPLY by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to memorandum in opposition to motion 176 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/25/2015)

09/25/2015

198 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to Rule 56 statement,, 179 (Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Statement of Additional Facts) (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 09/25/2015)

10/07/2015

199 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' agreed motion 190] for an extension of time to 9/25/ to file response and to give defendants to 10/9/2015 to file reply is granted. Telephone notice (gds) (Entered: 10/08/2015)

10/08/2015

200 Defendants Reply to Plaintiffs Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) Statement of Additional Facts by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 10/08/2015)

10/08/2015 201 REPLY by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart to memorandum in opposition to motion 195 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 10/08/2015)

10/08/2015 202 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re other 200 , reply to response to motion 201 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 10/08/2015)

10/08/2015

203 Memorandum Opinion and order signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/8/2015: Plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment is denied. Motion for preliminary injunction 18 is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' report is due by 10/29/2015. Plaintiffs' response is due by 11/12/2015. Status hearing is set for 11/18/2015 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/09/2015)

10/23/2015

204 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for bill of costs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Itemization and documentation)(Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 10/23/2015)

10/28/2015 205 BILL of Costs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 10/28/2015)

10/29/2015

206 STATUS Report on the ADA related construction of the Cook County Courthouses by Cook County, Illinois (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 10/29/2015)

10/29/2015 207 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re status report 206 (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 10/29/2015)

10/29/2015 208 MOTION by Defendant Thomas Dart to vacate in part this Court's October 8, 2015 Order (Sorich, Michael) (Entered: 10/29/2015)

10/29/2015

209 NOTICE of Motion by Michael Jude Sorich for presentment of motion to vacate 208 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/3/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Sorich, Michael) (Entered: 10/29/2015)

10/30/2015

210 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion for bill of costs 204 is stricken. Telephone notice (gds) (Entered: 10/30/2015)

11/03/2015

211 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 11/3/2015. Defendant Dart's motion to vacate in part this Court's order of 10/8/2015 is denied. This case remains set for status on both 11/18/2015 and 11/24/2015, at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) Modified on 11/18/2015 (gds). (Entered: 11/06/2015)

11/12/2015 212 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for award of expert witness fees (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/12/2015)

11/12/2015

213 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 212 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/18/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/12/2015)

11/12/2015 214 STATUS Report by Johnathan Lacy (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/12/2015)

11/12/2015 215 NOTICE by Johnathan Lacy re status report 214 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/12/2015)

11/13/2015

216 NOTICE of filing of electronic media by Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kevin Dawson, Kenneth Farris, and Johnathan Lacy (Document and Disc kept as paper). (Attachments: # 1 Disc: Exhibit 1 to plaintiffs' status report, ecf no. 214 ) (sxn, ) (Entered: 11/17/2015)

11/18/2015

217 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 11/18/2015. Status hearing date of 11/24/2015 is reset to 12/2/2015 at 1:00 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 11/19/2015)

11/19/2015

218 Memorandum Opinion and order signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/19/2015: Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment 164 is granted; Defendants' motion to strike 178 is denied. Defendants' motion for summary judgment 183 is denied. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 11/20/2015)

11/24/2015

219 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: The time of the 12/2/2015 status hearing is reset to 2:00 p.m. mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 11/24/2015)

11/24/2015

220 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for leave to file petition for award of interim fees and non-taxable costs (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/24/2015)

11/24/2015

221 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for leave to file 220 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/2/2015 at 02:00 PM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/24/2015)

11/24/2015 222 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for sanctions (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/24/2015)

11/24/2015

223 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for sanctions 222 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/2/2015 at 02:00 PM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/24/2015)

12/02/2015

224 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 12/2/2015. The motion 222 for sanctions is withdrawn. Defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion 212 for award of expert fees is due by 12/9/2015. Reply is due by 12/14/2015. Defendants' response to plaintiff's motion 220 for leave to file a petition for fees is due by 12/9/2015. Plaintiffs' reply is due by 12/14/2015. A status report is due by 12/9/2015. Status hearing is continued to 12/22/2015 at 09:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) Modified on 12/7/2015 (gds). (Entered: 12/04/2015)

12/09/2015

225 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinoisin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for leave to file petition for award of interim fees and non-taxable costs 220 , MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for award of expert witness fees 212 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 12/09/2015)

12/09/2015 226 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re response in opposition to motion, 225 (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 12/09/2015)

12/09/2015 227 STATUS Report by Thomas Dart (Sorich, Michael) (Entered: 12/09/2015)

12/09/2015 228 NOTICE by Thomas Dart (Sorich, Michael) (Entered: 12/09/2015)

12/14/2015 229 REPLY by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to response in opposition to motion, 225 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/14/2015)

12/21/2015

230 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/21/2015: Plaintiff's motion 220 for leave to file petition for award of interim fees and non-taxable costs and plaintiffs' motion 212 for award of expert witness fees are denied without prejudice. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 12/21/2015)

12/22/2015

231 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 12/22/2015. Status hearing set for 1/5/2016 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 12/23/2015)

12/28/2015 232 STATUS Report (Plaintiffs' Report on Maywood Modifications) by Johnathan Lacy (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 12/28/2015)

12/31/2015 233 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/31/2015)

12/31/2015

234 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) 233 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/14/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/31/2015)

01/05/2016

235 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/5/2016: Defendant Sheriff shall amend section IX.H of Sheriff's Order 11.14.35.0. Plaintiffs' motion 233 for entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) is denied. Status hearing held on 1/5/2016. A pretrial order is due by 2/5/2016. Initial pretrial conference set for 2/18/2016 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 01/05/2016)

01/07/2016

236 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for permanent injunction (Motion for Supplemental Injunctive Relief) (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 01/07/2016)

01/07/2016

237 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion for permanent injunction 236 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/19/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 01/07/2016)

01/19/2016

238 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 1/19/2016 regarding plaintiffs' motion 236 for supplemental injunctive relief. Response is due by 2/9/2016. Reply is due by 2/16/2016. This matter is continued to the 2/18/2016 10:30 a.m. pretrial conference. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 01/22/2016)

02/01/2016 239 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for extension of time [AGREED MOTION] (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 02/01/2016)

02/01/2016

240 [AGREED MOTION] NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of extension of time 239 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/4/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 02/01/2016)

02/05/2016

241 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion for extension of time 239 is granted. Pretrial order is due by 2/19/2016. Pretrial conference date of 2/18/2016 is reset to 3/3/2016 at 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 02/05/2016)

02/09/2016

242 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for permanent injunction (Motion for Supplemental Injunctive Relief) 236 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 02/09/2016)

02/09/2016 243 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re response in opposition to motion, 242 (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 02/09/2016)

02/16/2016 244 REPLY by Johnathan Lacy to response in opposition to motion, 242 (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 02/16/2016)

02/19/2016

245 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart for leave to file Supplemental Pleading (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 02/19/2016)

02/19/2016

246 NOTICE of Motion by Nicholas E Cummings for presentment of motion for leave to file 245 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/3/2016 at 01:30 PM. (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 02/19/2016)

02/19/2016 247 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dartin limine motions in limine (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 02/19/2016)

02/19/2016 248 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacyin limine (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 02/19/2016)

02/19/2016 249 PROPOSED Pretrial Order (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 02/19/2016)

02/22/2016

250 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Pretrial conference date of 3/3/2016 is reset to 3/10/2016 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 02/22/2016)

03/07/2016 251 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to compel production of video evidence (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 03/07/2016)

03/07/2016

252 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion to compel 251 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/15/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 03/07/2016)

03/10/2016

253 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/10/2016: Pretrial conference held. Plaintiff's motion 251 to compel production of video evidence is granted. Motion in limine 247 is granted in part and denied in part. Motion in limine 248 is granted. Jury instructions, witness list and informational status report re: construction at courthouses are due by 4/8/2016. Pretrial conference set for 4/20/2016 at 10:00 a.m. Jury trial is set for 8/1/2016, at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) Modified on 4/11/2016 (gds). (Entered: 03/11/2016)

03/16/2016

254 MEMORANDUM by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart in support of motion for leave to file 245 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1 Certified Circuit Court Records of Boston, Dawson)(Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 03/16/2016)

03/16/2016 255 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re memorandum in support of motion 254 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 03/16/2016)

03/31/2016 256 RESPONSE by Maurice Boston, Kevin Dawsonin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart for leave

to file Supplemental Pleading 245 (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
04/07/2016 257 REPLY by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart to response in opposition to motion 256 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 04/07/2016)

04/07/2016 258 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re reply to response to motion 257 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 04/07/2016)

04/07/2016 259 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy appoint lead counsel (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/07/2016)

04/07/2016 260 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 259 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/12/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/07/2016)

04/08/2016

261 STATUS Report suburban courthouses by Cook County, Illinois (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit photos)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 04/08/2016)

04/08/2016 262 WITNESS List by Johnathan Lacy (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 04/08/2016)

04/08/2016 263 PROPOSED Jury Instructions by Johnathan Lacy (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 04/08/2016)

04/12/2016

264 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on April 12, 2016, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 5/3/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/13/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/11/2016. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 04/12/2016)

04/12/2016

267 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 4/12/2016 regarding plaintiffs' motion 259 to appoint lead counsel. Response is due by 4/15/2016. Reply is due by 4/18/2016. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/14/2016)

04/13/2016

265 MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Kenneth Farris to compel production of video evidence (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 04/13/2016)

04/13/2016

266 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion to compel 265 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/20/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 04/13/2016)

04/13/2016

268 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert Gettleman on 4/13/2016: defendant's motion 245 to file supplemental pleading is denied. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/14/2016)

04/15/2016 269 RESPONSE by Johnathan Lacyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy appoint lead counsel 259 (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 04/15/2016)

04/18/2016 270 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to status report 261 (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 04/18/2016)

04/18/2016 271 REPLY by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to response in opposition to motion 269 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/18/2016)

04/19/2016

272 MOTION by Plaintiffs Maurice Boston, Marquis Bowers, Kevin Dawson, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy for reconsideration regarding order on motion for sanctions, order on motion in limine,, pretrial conference, set/reset hearings,,,,,,,,,, 253 to reconsider damage instruction (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 04/19/2016)

04/19/2016

273 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion for reconsideration, motion for relief,,,,,,,,,, 272 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/26/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 04/19/2016)

04/19/2016 274 PROPOSED Jury Instructions by Johnathan Lacy (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 04/19/2016)

04/20/2016

275 ORDER signed by The Honorable Robert Gettleman on 4/20/2016: Pretrial conference held on 4/20/2016. Motion 259 to appoint lead counsel is withdrawn. Motion 265 to compel production of video evidence is withdrawn. Plaintiff's motion 272 to reconsider a damage instruction is denied. Pretrial conference is continued to 5/5/2016 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/21/2016)

04/20/2016

276 ORDER: Michael Sorich's oral motion to withdraw as counsel for defendants is granted. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/20/2016. Mailed notice.(sxn, ) (Entered: 04/21/2016)

04/22/2016

277 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on December 22, 2015, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 5/13/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/23/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/21/2016. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 04/22/2016)

04/22/2016

278 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on January 5, 2016, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 5/13/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/23/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/21/2016. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 04/22/2016)

04/23/2016

279 MOTION to withdraw and substitute counsel for Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart, Sgt. Johnson, Correctional Officer Lopez, Correctional Officer Nawara, Correctional Officer Wilson. (Zecchin, Anthony) (Docket Text Modified by the Clerk's Office on 4/25/2016) (sxn, ). (Entered: 04/23/2016)

04/25/2016 280 NOTICE of Correction regarding 279 . (sxn, ) (Entered: 04/25/2016)

04/26/2016

281 MOTION by Plaintiffs Marquis Bowers, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy to sever housing unit claims (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 04/26/2016)

04/26/2016

282 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion to sever 281 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/5/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 04/26/2016)

05/03/2016

283 ORDER: Defendants' motion 279 to withdraw Michael J. Sorich as counsel and to substitute appearance of Anthony Zecchin is granted. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/3/2016. Mailed notice. (kp, ) (Entered: 05/03/2016)

05/04/2016 284 MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to continue the trial date until after August 15, 2016 (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016

285 to continue the date of trial NOTICE of Motion by Jacqueline B. Carroll for presentment of motion to continue 284 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/10/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016

286 MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to substitute attorney Substitute and Withdraw within same firm (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016

287 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for Supplemental Injunctive Relief Regarding Detention Cells at Bridgeview Courthouse (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016

288 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 287 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/10/2016 at 09:45 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/05/2016

289 (Refiling to Correct Time in CM/ECF Entry) NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 287 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/10/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 05/05/2016)

05/05/2016

290 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Pretrial conference and all noticed motions are reset to 5/10/2016 at 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 05/05/2016)

05/10/2016 291 ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/10/2016. Mailed notice. (kp, ) (Entered: 05/12/2016)

05/12/2016 292 ORDER severing claims signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/12/2016: Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 05/13/2016)

05/31/2016

293 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for Supplemental Injunctive Relief Regarding Detention Cells at Bridgeview

Courthouse 287 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B1, # 3 Exhibit B2, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 05/31/2016)

05/31/2016 294 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re response in opposition to motion, 293 (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 05/31/2016)

06/01/2016

295 RESPONSE by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Wide Supplemental Injunctive Relief Regarding Brideview; Notice. (Exhibits) (Documents kept as paper) (sr, ) (Entered: 06/03/2016)

06/13/2016 296 REPLY by Johnathan Lacy to response in opposition to motion, 293 (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 06/13/2016)

06/20/2016

297 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Pretrial conference date of 6/24/2016 is reset to 6/28/2016 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 06/20/2016)

06/28/2016

298 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/28/2016: Final pretrial conference set for 8/3/2016 at 10:30 AM. Plaintiffs' objections to witnesses Davis and Cohen are denied. Exhibit lists are due by 7/15/2016. Hearing on motions 236 287 is set for 9/1/2016, at 10:00 a.m. Motion 284 to continue trial date is granted. Jury trial date of 8/1/2016 is reset to 9/6/2016 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 06/29/2016)

07/01/2016

299 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy FOR PRE-TRIAL RULING ON STIPULATING TO AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AND PRESERVING APPELLATE RIGHTS (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/01/2016)

07/01/2016

300 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 299 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/7/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/01/2016)

07/07/2016

301 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 7/7/2016 regarding motion 299 for pretrial ruling on stipulating to amount of damages, which is continued to 8/3/20126, at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 07/11/2016)

07/19/2016

302 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing, to select a settlement conference date, is set for 7/26/2016 at 9:30 a.m. mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 07/19/2016)

07/26/2016

303 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 7/26/2016. A settlement conference is set for 8/3/2016, at 10:00 a.m. mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 07/27/2016)

08/02/2016 304 Plaintiffs' Proposed Trial Order by Johnathan Lacy (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/02/2016)

08/03/2016

305 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/3/2016. Pretrial conference held on 8/3/2016 and is continued to 8/23/2016, at 10:00 a.m. Jury trial is set for 9/7/2016 at 10:00 a.m.. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 08/04/2016)

08/05/2016 306 Exhibit List and witnesses [Plaintiff Boston] by Maurice Boston. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/05/2016)

08/05/2016 307 Exhibit List and witness list [Plaintiff Lacy] by Johnathan Lacy. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/05/2016)

08/05/2016 308 Exhibit List and witness list [Plaintiff Bowers] by Marquis Bowers. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/05/2016)

08/05/2016 309 Exhibit List and witness list [Plaintiff Dawson] by Kevin Dawson. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/05/2016)

08/05/2016 310 Exhibit List and witness list [Plaintiff Farris] by Kenneth Farris. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/05/2016)

08/11/2016

311 STATUS Report regarding location of each plaintiff and status concerning housing plaintiffs during trial by Johnathan Lacy (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/11/2016)

08/22/2016

312 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to compel Sheriff's records in anticipation of September 1, 2016 hearing (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/22/2016)

08/22/2016

313 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion to compel 312 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/25/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 08/22/2016)

08/23/2016

314 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/23/2016: Final pretrial conference held on 8/23/2016 and is continued to 8/31/2016 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 08/26/2016)

08/23/2016

317 ORDER: The complaint is amended to correct the first name of plaintiff Bowers to Marque instead of Marquis. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/23/2016. Mailed notice. (bg, ) (Entered: 08/29/2016)

08/25/2016

315 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 8/25/2016 regarding plaintiff's motion to compel 312 which is continued to the pretrial conference on 8/31/2016, at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 08/26/2016)

08/27/2016 316 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Thomas Dart by Adam Miel Zebelian (Zebelian, Adam) (Entered: 08/27/2016)

08/29/2016

318 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on August 23, 2016, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 9/19/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/29/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/28/2016. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 08/29/2016)

08/30/2016

319 NOTICE OF MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois (Hannon, Maureen) (Docket Text Modified by the Clerk's Office on 8/31/2016) (sxn, ). (Entered: 08/30/2016)

08/30/2016

320 MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to stay Injunction Hearing of September 1, 2016 (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 08/30/2016)

08/30/2016

321 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion to stay 320 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/6/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 08/30/2016)

08/30/2016 322 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Thomas Dart by Nicolas Paul Castiglione (Castiglione, Nicolas) (Entered: 08/30/2016)

08/30/2016 323 MOTION by Defendant Thomas Dartin limine (Castiglione, Nicolas) (Entered: 08/30/2016)

08/31/2016

324 SEALED EXHIBIT by Defendant Cook County, Illinois regarding MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to stay Injunction Hearing of September 1, 2016 320 (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 08/31/2016)

08/31/2016

325 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert Gettleman on 8/31/2016: Defendant's motion to stay 320 injunction hearing is granted, and the hearing date of 9/1/2016 is stricken. Defendants' oral motion to reconsider motion in ilmine no. 1 is granted. Defendants' motion in

limine 323 regarding plaintiff Bowers is granted. Final pretrial conference held on 8/31/2016. Proposed writs re to be delivered by 9/1/2016. Trial exhibits are due by 9/2/2016. Damage trials are set for 9/7/2016, at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/01/2016)

09/01/2016

326 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing is set for 9/6/2016 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) Modified on 9/1/2016 (gds). (Entered: 09/01/2016)

09/01/2016

327 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing is set for 9/6/2016 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/01/2016)

09/06/2016 328 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Thomas Dart by Brian M Casey (Casey, Brian) (Entered: 09/06/2016)

09/06/2016

329 ORDER: The return date on the writs of habeas corpus as to plaintiffs MARQUE BOWERS, KEVIN DAWSON and KENNETH FARRIS are reset from 9/7/2016 to 9/12/2016, at 9:00 a.m. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/6/2016. (nsf, ) (Entered: 09/06/2016)

09/06/2016 330 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Thomas Dart by John Power (Power, John) (Entered: 09/06/2016)

09/06/2016

331 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/6/2016: Status hearing held. Defendants are ordered to redact certain medical records. Evidence of plaintiff Boston's damages will be confined to 4/14/2014 through 11/6/2015. Marlene Fuentes' trial subpoena is continued for the duration of plaintiffs' trials. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/06/2016)

09/06/2016

332 MOTION by Plaintiff Maurice Boston to amend/correct Plaintiff Boston's proposed jury instructions (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 09/06/2016)

09/06/2016

333 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion to amend/correct 332 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/7/2016 at 10:00 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 09/06/2016)

09/07/2016

339 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Jury trial began as to plaintiff Maurice Boston on 9/7/2016. Evidence heard in part Jury trial continued to 9/8/2016 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/15/2016)

09/08/2016 340 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Jury trial resumed as to plaintiff Maurice Boston and is completed on 9/8/2016.

Jury returns its verdict finding that plaintiff Boston is entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of $0.00. The jury is discharged. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/15/2016)

09/08/2016

342 JURY Verdict entered in favor of Thomas Dart, Cook County Illinois and against Maurice Boston. (Mailed Notice) (RESTRICTED) (nsf, ) Modified on 9/19/2016 (nsf, ). (Entered: 09/16/2016)

09/09/2016 334 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart for directed verdict (Power, John) (Entered: 09/09/2016)

09/09/2016

341 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman:Jury trial begins as to plaintiff Jonathan Lacy. Evidence heard and concluded. Jury trial ends on 9/9/2016. Jury returns its verdict finding that plaintiff Jonathan Lacy is entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of $600.00. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/15/2016)

09/09/2016

345 JURY Verdict entered in favor of Johnathan Lacy and against Thomas Dart, Cook County Illinois. (Mailed Notice) (RESTRICTED) (nsf, ) (Entered: 09/16/2016)

09/11/2016 335 MOTION by Plaintiff Marque Bowersin limine to limit testimony of Dr. DeFuniak (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 09/11/2016)

09/11/2016

336 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion in limine 335 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/12/2016 at 09:00 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 09/11/2016)

09/12/2016

337 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart for judgment as a Matter of Law (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 09/12/2016)

09/12/2016

343 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiff Bowers' motion in limine 335 to limit testimony is granted in part and denied in part. Jury trial begins as to plaintiff Bowers on 9/12/2016. Evidence heard in part. Jury trial is continued to 9/13/2016 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/16/2016)

09/13/2016

338 MOTION by Plaintiff Marque Bowersin limine to allow plaintiff Bowers to introduce evidence of injury during rebuttal (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 09/13/2016)

09/13/2016

344 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiff Bowers' motion 338 to allow plaintiff to introduce certain evidence is granted in part and denied in part. Jury trial as to plaintiff Bowers resumed and completed on 9/13/2016. Jury returns its verdict finding

that plaintiff Bowers is entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of $0.00. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/16/2016)

09/13/2016

346 JURY Verdict entered in favor of Thomas Dart, Cook County Illinois and against Marque Bowers. (Mailed Notice) (RESTRICTED) (nsf, ) Modified on 9/19/2016 (nsf, ). (Entered: 09/19/2016)

09/14/2016

347 ORDER: This matter came before the court for Kevin Dawson's damages trial. Prior to empaneling the jury, a settlement was reached. A final settlement agreement should be completed by the next conference date. Plaintiff Kenneth Farris' damages trial is set for October 24, 2016, at 9:30 a.m. The court will hold a supplemental injunction hearing following the conclusion of Farris' trial. This matter is set for a prehearing conference on October 6, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. The parties are ordered to file an agreed agenda for the pre-hearing conference on or before September 30, 2016. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/14/2016. Mailed notice (nsf, ) (Entered: 09/19/2016)

09/30/2016 348 STATUS Report Joint Agenda for Pre-Hearing Conference by Cook County, Illinois (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/30/2016)

09/30/2016 349 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re status report 348 Joint Agenda for Pre-Hearing Conference (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/30/2016)

10/06/2016

350 ORDER: This matter came before the court for a pre-hearing conference. For the reasons stated and discussed on the record, it is hereby ordered: (1) The court approves by separate document the settlement with plaintiff Dawson. (2) The Farris trial is set to begin at 9:30 a.m. on October 24, 2016. Plaintiff's counsel will inform the court whether he requires Mr. Farris to be writted in prior to that date. (3) The injunction hearing will begin at 10:00 a.m. on October 26, 2016, and will be limited to the issues concerning the cells in the suburban courthouses and the services being provided to wheelchair-bound inmates at the Leighton Courthouse. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/6/2016. Mailed notice (nsf, ) (Entered: 10/11/2016)

10/13/2016 351 MOTION by Plaintiff Kenneth Farris to dismiss damage claim pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 10/13/2016)

10/13/2016

352 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion to dismiss 351 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/19/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 10/13/2016)

10/19/2016

353 ORDER: Motion 351 to dismiss plaintiff Kenneth Farris damage claim is denied. By agreement, judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff Kenneth Farris and against defendants in the amount of $0.00. Signed

by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/19/2016. Mailed notice (nsf, ) (Entered: 10/21/2016)

10/24/2016

354 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman:Injunction hearing date of 10/26/2016 is reset to 10/27/2016 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/24/2016)

10/27/2016

355 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Preliminary Injunction hearing held on 10/27/2016. Evidence heard in part. A conference is set for 11/2/2016 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/28/2016)

11/02/2016

356 ORDER: This matter came before the Court for a scheduling conference. For the reasons stated on the record, it is hereby ordered: 1. Plaintiffs are to determine what additional discovery they may need, including the possibility of additional expert testimony. 2. This matter is set for a further scheduling conference on December 5, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., at which time the court will set a definitive prehearing schedule and a hearing date on plaintiffs' motions for supplemental permanent injunctive relief (Docs. 244 and 287). Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/2/2016. Mailed notice (nsf, ) (Entered: 11/04/2016)

11/30/2016

357 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Scheduling conference date of 12/5/2016 is reset to 12/7/2016 at 11:00 a.m. mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 11/30/2016)

12/07/2016

358 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Scheduling conference held on 12/7/2016. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 12/09/2016)

12/08/2016 359 ORDER: Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/8/2016. Mailed notice (nsf, ) (Entered: 12/09/2016)

01/03/2017

360 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 1/3/2017. Status hearing set for 5/17/2017 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 01/04/2017)

01/03/2017

361 ORDER: This matter came before the Court for a conference to set a briefing schedule on plaintiffs' motion for supplemental permanent injunction. For the reasons stated on the record, it is hereby ordered: 1. Plaintiffs' brief in support of their motion for supplemental permanent injunction is due on or before February 3, 2017. 2. Defendants' response is due on or before March 3, 2017. 3. Plaintiffs' reply is due on or before March 17, 2017. 4. Ruling is set for May 17, 2017. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/3/2017. Mailed notice (nsf, ) (Entered: 01/04/2017)

01/25/2017

362 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on October 27, 2016, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 2/15/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/27/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/25/2017. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 01/25/2017)

01/31/2017

363 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on September 9, 2016, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312.435.7626 nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 2/21/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/3/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/1/2017. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 01/31/2017)

02/03/2017

364 SUPPLEMENT to motion for permanent injunction 236 , motion for miscellaneous relief 287 (Plaintiffs Supplemental Brief in Support of Motions for Supplemental Injunctive Relief) (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 02/03/2017)

03/03/2017

365 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for permanent injunction (Motion for Supplemental Injunctive Relief) 236 (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J,

# 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M, # 15 Exhibit N)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 03/03/2017)

03/03/2017

366 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re response in opposition to motion,, 365 Opposition to Supplemental Injunctive Relief (Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 03/03/2017)

03/17/2017 367 REPLY by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to response in opposition to motion,, 365 (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 03/17/2017)

05/02/2017

368 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/2/2017. Plaintiffs' motion for supplemental injunctive relief 236 is granted. Plaintiffs' motion 287 for supplemental injunctive relief regarding the detention cells at the Bridgeview Courthouse is denied. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 05/03/2017)

05/02/2017 369 ENTERED JUDGMENT on 5/2/2017: Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 05/03/2017)

05/02/2017 370 ENTERED JUDGMENT (mmy, ) (Entered: 05/03/2017)

05/17/2017

371 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 5/17/2017. Plaintiffs are given leave to file an initial fee petition by 6/5/2017, with leave to supplement per order of court. Status hearing set for 6/27/2017 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 05/22/2017)

05/30/2017 372 BILL of Costs (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 05/30/2017)

05/31/2017

373 NOTICE of appeal by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart regarding orders 218 , 369 , 235 , 368 , 370 , 142 Filing fee $ 505. Receipt Number 4624183474 (ek, ) (Entered: 06/01/2017)

06/01/2017 374 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record regarding notice of appeal 373 (ek, ) (Entered: 06/01/2017)

06/01/2017 375 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 373 . Notified counsel (ek, ) (Entered: 06/01/2017)

06/01/2017

376 ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 373 ; USCA Case No. 17-2141. (tt, ) (Entered: 06/01/2017)

06/05/2017 377 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacyfor award of expert witness fees (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 06/05/2017)

06/05/2017 378 PETITION for award of fees and non-taxable costs (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 06/05/2017)

06/09/2017

379 NOTICE of cross appeal by Maurice Boston, Marque Bowers, Kevin Dawson, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy regarding orders 370 ; Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0752-13262518. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 06/09/2017)

06/12/2017 380 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record regarding notice of cross appeal 379 . (smm) (Entered: 06/12/2017)

06/12/2017 381 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of cross appeal 379 . Notified counsel (smm) (Entered: 06/12/2017)

06/12/2017

382 ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of cross appeal 379 ; USCA Case No. 17-2202. (tt, ) (Entered: 06/12/2017)

06/14/2017

383 Exhibit List Trial Exhibits for Preliminary Injunction and Supplementary Injunction trials by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. 1 DVD slip op, # 2 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. 2. photos 34/5, # 3 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. 3 grievance Dawson, # 4 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. 4 ADA scoping requirements, # 5 Exhibit Sheriff's Ex. 5 Leighton guidelines, # 6 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. 6 commode chair sign, # 7 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. 7 DOC G.O., # 8 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. 8 Avant Memo, # 9 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. 9 presentation, # 10 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. G.O. draft, # 11 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. 11 Fuentes spreadsheet, # 12 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. 12 Sign for vans, # 13 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. 13 sign for ramps, # 14 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. 14 Biebel memo, # 15 Exhibit Sheriff Ex. 22 DVD slip op, # 16 Exhibit Cook County Ex. 3 Medical records, # 17 Exhibit Cook County Ex. 4 Gumm report, # 18 Exhibit Cook County Ex. 5 Declaration of Vaughn, # 19 Exhibit Cook County Ex. 6 Purnell complaint, # 20 Exhibit Cook County Ex. 7 emails, # 21 Exhibit Cook County Ex. 8 Suburban proposals, # 22 Exhibit Cook County Ex. 9 Leighton scope of work draft, # 23 Exhibit Cook County Ex. 10 photos, # 24 Exhibit Cook County Ex. 11 DOJ Standards, # 25 Exhibit Cook County Ex. 12 Leighton RFP, # 26 Exhibit Cook County Ex. 13 Rolling Meadows Contract, # 27 Exhibit Cook County Ex. 14 Skokie contract, # 28 Exhibit County Supp Ex. 1 blueprint Maywood, # 29 Exhibit County Supp Ex. 2 picture Maywood pre-modification, # 30 Exhibit Cook County Supp. Ex. 3 parital JOC, # 31 Exhibit Cook County Supp. Ex. 4 Borg submittal, # 32 Exhibit Cook County Supp. Ex. 5 photos post modification, # 33 Exhibit County Supp. Ex. 6 photos of screen, # 34 Exhibit Cook County Supp. Ex. 7 Paul Borg estimate, # 35 Exhibit Cook County Supp. Ex. 8 blueprint Maywood, # 36 Exhibit Cook County Supp. ex. 9 Bridgeview Scope, # 37 Exhibit Cook County Supp. Ex. 10 drawing of Bridgeview, # 38 Exhibit Cook County Supp. Ex. 11 photo Bridgeview pre-modification, # 39 Exhibit Cook County

Supp. Ex. 12 photos post modification, # 40 Exhibit Cook County Supp. Ex. 13 202.3, # 41 Exhibit Cook County Supp. Ex. 14 Technical infeasibility)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 06/14/2017)

06/14/2017

384 TRIAL EXHIBIT list and attached exhibits by Defendants' (Attachments: # 1 CD's) (Paper Document On File). (tt, ) (Entered: 06/15/2017)

06/15/2017

385 DESIGNATION by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart of record on appeal (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A. December 16, 2014 Dawson, # 2 Exhibit B December 16, 2014 Bowers, # 3 Exhibit C December 16, 2014 Gaston, # 4 Exhibit D May 5, 2016)(Carroll, Jacqueline) (Entered: 06/15/2017)

06/27/2017

386 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 6/27/2017. Plaintiff's motion 377 for fees is stayed pending appeal. The Court will examine previous briefing on the issue. Status hearing set for 7/25/2017 at 9:15 a.m. mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 06/28/2017)

07/21/2017

387 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing date of 7/25/2017 is re-set to 8/2/2017, at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 07/21/2017)

07/29/2017

388 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to compel production of Sheriff's Order or for issuance of rule to show cause to the Sheriff of Cook County (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 07/29/2017)

07/29/2017

389 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion to compel 388 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/15/2017 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 07/29/2017)

08/01/2017

390 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing date of 8/2/2017 is reset to 8/15/2017 at 9:15 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 08/01/2017)

08/03/2017

391 WITHDRAWING Jacqueline B. Carroll as counsel for Defendant Cook County, Illinois and substituting James J. Chandler as counsel of record (Chandler, James) (Entered: 08/03/2017)

08/14/2017 392 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to supplement Motion to Compel, ECF No. 388 (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 08/14/2017)

08/14/2017

393 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion to supplement 392 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/22/2017 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 08/14/2017)

08/15/2017

395 ORDER: Status hearing held. Nicholas E. Cummings is given leave to appear as counsel for defendant Cook County. Leave is granted to withdraw the appearances of defense counsel Condron, Hannon, Carroll and Zecchin. Plaintiff Lacy's motion 377 for award of expert witness fees is stayed pending appeal. Plaintiff Lacy's motion 392 to supplement motion to compel is granted. Defendants' response to the motion 388 to compel is due by 9/5/2017. Plaintiff's motion regarding the privacy screen is due by 9/5/2017. Status hearing is set for 9/7/2017, at 11:00 a.m. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/15/2017. Mailed notice. (sxb, ) (Entered: 08/22/2017)

08/15/2017

396 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy regarding MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to compel production of Sheriff's Order or for issuance of rule to show cause to the Sheriff of Cook County 388 (sxb, ) (Entered: 08/22/2017)

08/21/2017

394 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on August 15, 2017 before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany - nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov 312.435.7626.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 9/11/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/21/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/20/2017. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 08/21/2017)

09/04/2017

397 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to supplement motion to compel and/or for issuance of rule to show cause, ECF No. 388 (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 09/04/2017)

09/05/2017

398 RESPONSE by Thomas Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to compel production of Sheriff's Order or for issuance of rule to show cause to the Sheriff of Cook County 388 , MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to supplement motion to compel and/or for issuance of rule to show cause, ECF No. 388 397 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, Deposition of Sabrina Rivero-Canchola in Hacker v. Dart, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, Draft Order, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3, Final Order)(Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 09/05/2017)

09/05/2017 399 NOTICE by Thomas Dart re response in opposition to motion,, 398 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 09/05/2017)

09/05/2017

400 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to enforce judgment [regarding the privacy screen at the Maywood Courthouse) (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/05/2017)

09/06/2017

401 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion to supplement 397 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/12/2017 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 09/06/2017)

09/06/2017 402 REPLY by Johnathan Lacy to response in opposition to motion,, 398 (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 09/06/2017)

09/06/2017

403 MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to stay regarding order on motion for permanent injunction, order on motion for miscellaneous relief, order on motion for directed verdict, order on motion for judgment,, terminated case,,,,,, 368 (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 09/06/2017)

09/06/2017

404 NOTICE of Motion by Nicholas E Cummings for presentment of motion to stay, 403 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/12/2017 at 09:15 AM. (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 09/06/2017)

09/07/2017

405 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 9/7/2017. Status hearing set for 9/12/2017 at 9:30 a.m. mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/07/2017)

09/07/2017

406 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 9/7/2017. Status hearing set for 9/12/2017 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/08/2017)

09/11/2017

407 RESPONSE by Johnathan Lacyin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to stay regarding order on motion for permanent injunction, order on motion for miscellaneous relief, order on motion for directed verdict, order on motion for judgment,, terminated case,,,,,, 368 403 (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 09/11/2017)

09/12/2017

408 ORDER: Defendant's motion for a stay pending appeal (Doc. 404) is granted. Plaintiffs' motion for supplemental injunctive relief (Doc. 400), is denied without prejudice to renewal if appropriate at the conclusion of the appeal. Plaintiffs' motions to supplement (Docs 392 and 397) are granted. Nicholas Cummings' oral motion to withdraw his appearance is granted. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/12/2017. Mailed notice. (sxb, ) (Entered: 09/15/2017)

09/12/2017 409 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/12/2017. Mailed notice. (sxb, ) (Entered: 09/15/2017)

10/30/2017

410 ORDER dated 10/30/2017 from the 7th Circuit regarding notice of appeal 373 , notice of cross appeal 379 ; Appellate case no. : 17-2141 & 17-2202: Upon consideration of the MOTION TO MODIFY STAY, filed on October 26, 2017, by counsel for the appellees, crossappellants, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED to the extent that no extensions of time to file the briefs will be granted absent extraordinary circumstances. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to modify the stay of the district court's order of May 2, 2017. (bg, ) (Entered: 10/30/2017)

01/10/2018

411 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for rule to show cause to defendant Sheriff of Cook County (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 01/10/2018)

01/10/2018

412 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for rule to show cause 411 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/16/2018 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 01/10/2018)

01/11/2018

413 NOTICE of Filing of Electronic Media by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy regarding MOTION for rule to show cause to defendant Sheriff of Cook County 411 (Attachments: # 1 Document Not Imaged Letter)(sxb, ) (Entered: 01/11/2018)

01/15/2018

414 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to supplement motion for issuance of rule to show cause, ECF No. 411 (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 01/15/2018)

01/15/2018

415 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion to supplement 414 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/18/2018 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 01/15/2018)

01/16/2018

416 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 1/16/2018. Plaintiff's motion 414 to supplement the motion for issuance of rule to show cause is granted. Defendants' response to plaintiff's motion 411 for issuance of rule to show cause to defendant sheriff of Cook County for failure to comply with the Court's January 5, 2016 Order and the supplement thereto (to include documentation of inmates who refused assistance) is due by 1/30/2018. A status hearing is set for 2/6/2018 at 8:45 a.m. Mailed notice (cn) (Entered: 01/16/2018)

01/17/2018 417 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Thomas Dart by Raana Vakilzadeh Haidari (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 01/17/2018)

01/19/2018

418 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy appoint lead counsel for appeal [motion submitted on behalf of unnamed members of class] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/19/2018)

01/19/2018

419 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 418 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/24/2018 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/19/2018)

01/19/2018

420 RESPONSE by Johnathan Lacyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy appoint lead counsel for appeal [motion submitted on behalf of unnamed members of class] 418 (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 01/19/2018)

01/24/2018

421 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 1/24/2018. Plaintiff's motion 418 to appoint lead counsel for appeals is denied. Attorneys Joel A. Flaxman and Kenneth N Flaxman's oral motions to withdraw as counsel in this case are granted. Mailed notice (cn) (Entered: 01/24/2018)

01/29/2018

422 MOTION by Defendant Thomas Dart for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion for rule to show cause 411 (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 01/29/2018)

01/29/2018

423 NOTICE of Motion by Raana Vakilzadeh Haidari for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 422 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/1/2018 at 09:15 AM. (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 01/29/2018)

01/30/2018

424 WITHDRAWING Brian M. Casey and John Power as counsel for Defendant Thomas Dart and substituting Anthony E. Zecchin as counsel of record (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 01/30/2018)

02/01/2018

425 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendant Thomas Dart's motion 422 for extension of time to 2/2/2018 to file response to motion for rule to show cause is granted. Mailed notice (cn) (Entered: 02/02/2018)

02/02/2018

426 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on September 12, 2017, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Order Number: 29806. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov - 312.435.7626.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at

www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 2/23/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/5/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/3/2018. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 02/02/2018)

02/02/2018

427 RESPONSE by Thomas Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for rule to show cause to defendant Sheriff of Cook County 411 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing, # 2 Exhibit A)(Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 02/02/2018)

02/05/2018 428 REPLY by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to motion for rule to show cause 411 (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 02/05/2018)

02/05/2018

429 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing set for 2/6/2018 is reset to 2/7/2018 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cn) (Entered: 02/05/2018)

02/06/2018 430 SEVENTH CIRCUIT transcript information sheet by Thomas Dart (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 02/06/2018)

02/07/2018

431 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on Plaintiff's Motion 411 for Issuance of Rule to Show Cause to Defendant Sheriff of Cook County and related pleadings on 2/7/2018. Defendant to provide plaintiff's counsel with a random sample of dates along with corresponding videos of the Leighton ramp, of a dozen dates from the last 3 to 4 months, to check compliance with the Court's January 5, 2016 Order and any documentation of any inmates that have refused to be pushed up the ramp. Status hearing set for 2/14/2018 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cn) (Entered: 02/07/2018)

02/13/2018

432 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing set for 2/14/2018 is reset to 2/20/2018 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (cn) (Entered: 02/13/2018)

02/19/2018

433 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to supplement motion for issuance of rule to show cause, ECF No. 411 (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 02/19/2018)

02/19/2018

434 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion to supplement 433 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/22/2018 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 02/19/2018)

02/20/2018

435 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 2/20/2018. Plaintiff's motion 433 to supplement motion 411 for issuance of rule to show cause is granted. The Court

directs plaintiff's counsel to draft an order complying with the Court's instructions stated on the record at today's hearing, for consideration by counsel for defendants. Parties to submit a proposed order with any objections or suggestions on or before 2/27/2018. Plaintiff's motion 411 for issuance of rule to show cause is continued to 3/1/2018 at 9:15 a.m. Mailed notice (cn) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/20/2018

436 NOTICE of Filing of electronic media by Maurice Boston, Marque Bowers, Kevin Dawson, Kenneth Farris, Johnathan Lacy (Attachments: # 1 Document Not Imaged Letter)(sxb, ) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

03/01/2018

437 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/1/2018: Motion hearing held on 3/1/2018 regarding plaintiff's motion 411 for rule to show cause. The Court enters the attached Order and terminates motion 411 . Mailed notice (cn) (Entered: 03/01/2018)

03/05/2018

438 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on March 1, 2018 before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany - nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov - 312.435.7626.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 3/26/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/5/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/4/2018. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 03/05/2018)

03/12/2018

439 CERTIFIED copy of order dated 3/12/2018 from the United States Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit regarding notice of cross appeal 379 ; Appellate case no. : 17-2202 (ek, ) (Entered: 03/14/2018)

03/12/2018

440 MANDATE of USCA dated 3/12/2018 regarding notice of cross appeal 379 ;USCA No.17-2202 ; No record to be returned. (ek, ) (Entered: 03/14/2018)

03/21/2018 441 NOTICE to Transmit Record on Appeal regarding notice of appeal 373 ; USCA Case No. 17-2141. (sxb, ) (Entered: 03/21/2018)

03/27/2018 442 CERTIFIED and transmitted to the USCA for the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal 373 (USCA no. 14-2141) (ek, ) (Entered: 03/27/2018)

03/27/2018 443 USCA RECEIVED on 3/27/18 the long record regarding notice of appeal 373 (ek, ) (Entered: 03/27/2018)

08/21/2018

444 NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF MANDATE of USCA dated 8/21/2018 regarding notice of appeal 373 ; USCA No.17-2141: RECORD ON APPEAL STATUS: Entire record returned consisting of Pleadings: 7 vol. of loose pleadings. (yap, ) (Entered: 08/21/2018)

08/21/2018

445 CERTIFIED COPY OF OPINION from the USCA for the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals; Argued April 19, 2018; Decided July 30, 2018 in USCA case no. 17-2141. (yap, ) (Entered: 08/21/2018)

08/21/2018 446 FINAL JUDGMENT dated 8/21/2018 regarding notice of cross appeal 379 ; USCA No. 17-2141. (yap, ) (Entered: 08/21/2018)

08/23/2018

447 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit returning the record on appeal in USCA no. 17-2141 consisting of 7 vol of loose pleadings. (aee, ) (Entered: 08/23/2018)

08/28/2018

448 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: This matter is set for a status hearing on 9/11/2018 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 08/28/2018)

09/06/2018

449 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing set for 9/11/2018 at 9:00 a.m. is reset to 9/11/2018 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 09/06/2018)

09/07/2018

450 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing set for 9/11/2018 is stricken and reset to 9/27/2018 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 09/07/2018)

09/27/2018

451 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status and motion hearing held on 9/27/2018. Plaintiff's motion 377 for award of expert witness fees is withdrawn with leave to reinstate. The parties are to file a joint status report on the matters discussed at the hearing on or before 10/22/2018. Status hearing set for 11/1/2018 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 09/27/2018)

10/02/2018

452 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by Miguel E. Larios Cook County State's Attorney's Office (Larios, Miguel) (Entered: 10/02/2018)

10/22/2018 453 STATUS Report by plaintiffs by Johnathan Lacy (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 10/22/2018)

10/22/2018 454 MOTION by Defendant Thomas Dart for extension of time to file status report (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 10/22/2018)

10/22/2018

455 NOTICE of Motion by Raana Vakilzadeh Haidari for presentment of extension of time 454 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/30/2018 at 09:00 AM. (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 10/22/2018)

10/26/2018 456 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Thomas Dart by Michael Gorman (Gorman, Michael) (Entered: 10/26/2018)

10/26/2018 457 STATUS Report Defendant Dart by Thomas Dart (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 10/26/2018)

10/30/2018

458 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendants' unopposed motion 454 for extension of time to file status report is granted. Status report due by 10/26/2018. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 10/30/2018)

11/01/2018

459 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 11/1/2018. Status hearing set for 12/12/2018 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 11/02/2018)

12/03/2018 460 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to compel defendant Sheriff to produce class information (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 12/03/2018)

12/03/2018

461 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion to compel 460 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/6/2018 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 12/03/2018)

12/06/2018

462 RESPONSE by Thomas Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to compel defendant Sheriff to produce class information 460 and Motion for a Protective Order (Gorman, Michael) (Entered: 12/06/2018)

12/06/2018

463 NOTICE by Thomas Dart re response in opposition to motion 462 and Motion for a Protective Order (Gorman, Michael) (Entered: 12/06/2018)

12/06/2018

464 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 12/6/2018. For the reasons stated on the record, plaintiff's motion to compel defendant Sheriff to produce class material 460 is granted. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 12/07/2018)

12/11/2018

465 MOTION by Defendant Thomas Dart for reconsideration regarding response in opposition to motion 462 and Motion for a Protective Order (Gorman, Michael) (Entered: 12/11/2018)

12/11/2018

466 NOTICE of Motion by Michael Gorman for presentment of motion for reconsideration 465 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/18/2018 at 09:15 AM. (Gorman, Michael) (Entered: 12/11/2018)

12/12/2018

467 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status and motion hearing held on 12/12/2018. For the reasons stated on the record Thomas Dart's motion 465 for reconsideration of the court's denial of his Rule 26 motion for entry of a protective order is denied with respect to the list of class members. Defendant is required to turn over to plaintiff the list of class members, including the courthouse that the class members are sent to, by 12/19/2018. The court reserves ruling on the remainder of defendant's motion 465 until 1/30/2019 at 10:30 a.m. The parties are to file a status report and deliver a courtesy copy to chambers by 1/22/2019. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 12/12/2018)

12/21/2018 468 MOTION by Defendant Thomas Dart for protective order (Gorman, Michael) (Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/21/2018

469 NOTICE of Motion by Michael Gorman for presentment of motion for protective order 468 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/3/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Gorman, Michael) (Entered: 12/21/2018)

12/27/2018

470 AMENDED NOTICE of Motion by Michael Gorman for presentment of motion for protective order 468 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/11/2018 at 09:15 AM. (Gorman, Michael) (Entered: 12/27/2018)

12/27/2018

471 SECOND AMENDED NOTICE of Motion by Michael Gorman for presentment of motion for protective order 468 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/8/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Gorman, Michael) (Entered: 12/27/2018)

12/28/2018

472 AMENDED NOTICE of Motion by Michael Gorman for presentment of motion for protective order 468 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/8/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Gorman, Michael) (Entered: 12/28/2018)

01/06/2019

473 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for sanctions for failure to comply with order entered 12/12/2018, ECF No. 467 (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 01/06/2019)

01/06/2019

474 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion for sanctions 473 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/10/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 01/06/2019)

01/07/2019

475 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on December 12, 2018 before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Order Number: 33284. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov - 312.435.7626.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 1/28/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/7/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/8/2019. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 01/07/2019)

01/08/2019

476 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendant's motion for entry of Confidentiality and HIPAA Protective Orders 468 is granted. Enter orders. Defendant is ordered to respond to plaintiffs' motion for sanctions 473 by 1/16/2019, plaintiffs reply due by 1/22/2019. Status hearing set for 1/30/2019 stands. Motion presentment hearings set for 1/8/2019 and 1/10/2019 are stricken. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 01/08/2019)

01/08/2019 477 CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/8/2019. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 01/08/2019)

01/08/2019

478 AGREED QUALIFIED HIPAA PROTECTIVE Order Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/8/2019. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 01/08/2019)

01/10/2019

479 MOTION by Attorney anthony Zecchin to withdraw as attorney for Thomas Dart, Sgt. Johnson, Correctional Officer Lopez, Correctional Officer Nawara, Correctional Officer Wilson. No party information provided (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 01/10/2019)

01/10/2019

480 NOTICE of Motion by Raana Vakilzadeh Haidari for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 479 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/16/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 01/10/2019)

01/10/2019

481 MOTION by Attorney Anthony Zecchin to withdraw as attorney for Cook County, Illinois. No party information provided (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 01/10/2019)

01/14/2019

482 RESPONSE by Thomas Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy for sanctions for failure to comply with order entered 12/12/2018, ECF No. 467 473 (Gorman, Michael) (Entered: 01/14/2019)

01/16/2019

483 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendants motions to withdraw Anthony Zecchin as counsel of record 479 481 are granted. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 01/16/2019)

01/17/2019 484 STATUS Report [plaintiffs' status report] by Johnathan Lacy (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 01/17/2019)

01/18/2019 485 REPLY by Johnathan Lacy to response in opposition to motion 482 (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 01/18/2019)

01/28/2019

486 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart for leave to file status report (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

01/28/2019

487 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart re MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart for leave to file status report 486 (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

01/28/2019

488 Re- NOTICE of Motion by Raana Vakilzadeh Haidari for presentment of motion for leave to file 486 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/5/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

01/28/2019

489 Re- NOTICE of Motion by Raana Vakilzadeh Haidari for presentment of motion for leave to file 486 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/6/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

01/29/2019

490 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Due to the extreme weather conditions forecasted for Wednesday, 1/30/19, the District Court will be closed. Status hearing set for 1/30/2019 is stricken and reset to 2/6/2019 at 10:00 a.m. Motion presentment hearing set for 2/6/2019 at 9:15 a.m. is reset to 2/6/2019 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 01/29/2019)

02/06/2019

491 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status and motion hearing held on 2/6/2019. Defendants' motion for leave to file status report instanter 486 is granted. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions for failure to comply with order entered 12/12/2018 473 is withdrawn. Status hearing set for 3/26/2019 at 1:30 p.m. The parties are to file a brief joint status report by 3/19/2019. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 02/06/2019)

02/06/2019

492 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Honorable M. David Weisman for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: discovery supervision and settlement. (cn) Mailed notice. (Entered: 02/06/2019)

02/07/2019

493 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: This case has been referred to Magistrate Judge Weisman for the purposes of discovery supervision and to conduct a settlement conference. Initial status hearing scheduled for 2/14/19 at 9:15 a.m. Prior to the status hearing, the Court specifically requests that counsel consult the Court's standing order. If the parties believe the case is ready for a settlement conference, counsel should have available dates for a settlement conference for all necessary parties in advance of the status hearing, and to the extent possible, consult with opposing counsel in an attempt to identify mutually convenient and feasible dates for the settlement conference. Judge Weisman generally conducts settlement conferences Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays at either 10:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. or 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. Other dates and times may be available as required by the Court or the parties. If the parties do not wish to set a settlement conference at this time, the parties should be prepared to discuss discovery scheduling and related issues. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 02/07/2019)

02/14/2019

494 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Status hearing held and continued to 2/21/19 at 9:15 a.m. for the parties to send agreed proposed dates for a settlement conference to the Courtroom Deputy, Alyssia Owens, at Alyssia_Owens@ilnd.uscourts.gov. If the parties and the Court arrange a settlement conference date, the status hearing will be stricken. By agreement, Plaintiffs will conduct some limited discovery (as discussed in open court) in advance of the settlement conference. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 02/14/2019)

02/20/2019

495 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: On the Court's own motion, the status hearing set for 2/21/19 is stricken and reset to 2/26/19 at 9:15 a.m. If the parties jointly email the Courtroom Deputy, Alyssia Owens, at Alyssia_Owens@ilnd.uscourts.gov, with agreed dates for the settlement conference, the status will be stricken. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 02/20/2019)

02/26/2019

496 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Status hearing held. Parties addressed respective positions regarding amount of discovery necessary to engage in a productive settlement conference. Parties shall meet and confer on the following issues: (1) update to Cook County Public Safety Portfolio ADA Status Report; (2) documents showing that holding cells and restroom facilities at Maywood Jail have been retrofitted; (3) documents reflecting that Defendants are generally working towards retrofitting holding cells at Leighton Jail; (4) documents showing that prisoners are currently being accommodated when using public restroom in holding cells; (5) ADA

movement log; and (6) updated class list. Status hearing set for 4/1/19 at 9:15 a.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 02/27/2019)

03/15/2019

497 MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to take deposition of Johnathan Lacy pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(B) (Larios, Miguel) (Entered: 03/15/2019)

03/15/2019

498 NOTICE of Motion by Miguel E. Larios for presentment of motion to take deposition 497 before Honorable M. David Weisman on 3/20/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Larios, Miguel) (Entered: 03/15/2019)

03/18/2019

499 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Motion for leave to take the deposition of the incarcerated Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy 497 is granted. If there is an objection, a motion objecting to the deposition should be promptly filed. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 03/18/2019)

03/18/2019

500 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Motion hearing set for 3/20/19 is stricken. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 03/18/2019)

03/18/2019 501 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy objecting to the deposition of plaintiff Johnathan Lacy (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 03/18/2019)

03/18/2019

502 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: The Court has received Plaintiff's motion objecting to the deposition of Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy 501 . Parties shall be prepared to argue the motion at the status/motion hearing scheduled for 4/1/19 at 9:15 a.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 03/18/2019)

03/19/2019 503 STATUS Report Joint by Johnathan Lacy (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 03/19/2019)

03/21/2019

504 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: In light of the settlement discussions before Magistrate Judge Weisman, the status hearing set for 3/26/2019 is stricken and reset to 4/18/2019 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 03/21/2019)

03/22/2019

505 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to compel defendant Sheriff to produce documents (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 "ADA Movement" email, # 2 Exhibit 2 Eddie Avant Memorandum dated 8/28/2014, # 3 Exhibit 3 P.Morrissey e-mail dated 3/7/2019)(Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 03/22/2019)

03/22/2019

506 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion to compel, 505 before Honorable M. David Weisman on 4/1/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 03/22/2019)

03/25/2019

507 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 02-26-2019 before the Honorable M. David Weisman. Order Number: 33893. Court Reporter Contact Information: Pamela S. Warren http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/transcript-order-form.aspx. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 4/15/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/25/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/24/2019. (Warren, Pamela) (Entered: 03/25/2019)

03/31/2019

508 RESPONSE by Thomas Dartin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to compel defendant Sheriff to produce documents 505 (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 03/31/2019)

04/01/2019

ORAL MOTION by Defendant Thomas Dart to depose putative class members who provided declarations attached to Plaintiffs' 1/17/19 Status Report 484 . (ao,) (Entered: 04/02/2019)

04/01/2019

509 ORDER: Magistrate Status/Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated on the record, the Court generally grants Plaintiff's motion to compel 505 as follows: (1) ADA movement emails from 1/1/19 to the present shall be produced by 4/4/19 with the redactions discussed in open court, without objection; (2) Defense counsel shall provide an updated class list by 4/4/19; and (3) By 5/16/19 and without objection, Superintendent Ed Sajdak shall be deposed concerning (i) notice to inmates that wheelchair accessible restrooms were available while at Leighton Courthouse and (ii) based on his knowledge, wheelchair accessible restrooms were not requested. By 4/4/19, Cook County shall produce business cases and relevant design drawings addressing areas discussed on the record from 2018 to the present. Plaintiffs' counsel shall provide a list of current class representatives and identifying information to defense counsel by 4/4/19. The Court grants without objection the Sheriff's oral motion to depose putative class members who provided declarations attached to Plaintiffs' 1/17/19 Status Report 484 . The depositions of these putative class members shall be completed by 5/31/19. The Sheriff will use the booking numbers provided to identify C-COMS records as to each deponent and provide copies of those records reflecting putative class members' movements to Leighton Courthouse from date of entry at Cook County Jail to the present. These records shall be provided by 4/12/19, along with medical alerts for each deponent. For the reasons stated on the record, Plaintiff's

motion objecting to the deposition of Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy 501 is granted. Plaintiff's deposition shall be limited to any incarceration period after Plaintiff's 11/10/14 deposition, without prejudice to Defendants seeking a third deposition of Plaintiff if further discovery is necessary after the settlement conference. A settlement conference is set for 6/7/19 at 10:00 a.m. Plaintiffs' settlement letter shall be delivered to Defendants, with a courtesy copy delivered to the Court, in chambers, on or before 5/24/19. Defendants' settlement letter shall be delivered to Plaintiffs, with a courtesy copy delivered to the Court, in chambers, on or before 6/3/19. The parties must also submit their respective documents by email to Proposed_Order_Weisman@ilnd.uscourts.gov. However, please note that settlement letters are not to be filed on the CM-ECF system. Parties have no objection to the Court having ex parte discussions with counsel in advance of the settlement conference if the Court believes such conversations would be warranted. Parties may jointly email the Courtroom Deputy, Alyssia Owens, at Alyssia_Owens@ilnd.uscourts.gov, if a status hearing would be productive prior to the settlement conference. The Court directed defense counsel to file its motion for leave to withdraw Michael Gorman with the District Court. Signed by the Honorable M. David Weisman on 4/1/2019. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 04/02/2019)

04/04/2019

510 CERTIFICATE of Service Class List and ADA movement by Raana Vakilzadeh Haidari on behalf of Thomas Dart (Haidari, Raana) (Entered: 04/04/2019)

04/17/2019

511 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: In light of the ongoing settlement discussions before Magistrate Judge Weisman, the status hearing set for 4/18/2019 is stricken and reset to 6/13/2019 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 04/17/2019)

05/03/2019 512 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Thomas Dart by John Power (Power, John) (Entered: 05/03/2019)

05/20/2019

513 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: On the Court's own motion, the settlement conference set for 6/7/19 will begin at 9:00 a.m. rather than 10:00 a.m. (PLEASE NOTE TIME CHANGE.) Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 05/20/2019)

06/05/2019

514 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Due to a conflict in the Court's schedule and by agreement of the parties, the settlement conference set for 6/7/19 is stricken and reset to 7/11/19 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 06/05/2019)

06/12/2019

515 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing set for 6/13/2019 is stricken and reset to 7/11/2019 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 06/12/2019)

06/12/2019

516 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing set for 7/11/2019 is stricken and reset to 7/30/2019 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 06/12/2019)

07/11/2019

517 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Settlement conference held. All parties appeared. Defendants are to file a status report by 7/26/19 outlining the timeframe and administrative requirements necessary to complete necessary work for ADA compliance at the Maywood courthouse. Defendants are to file a status report by 7/26/19 outlining the timeframe for completion of modifications to the Leighton Courthouse ramp. Defendants are to produce to Plaintiffs by 7/26/19 so-called business cases for ADA compliance work related to the Leighton Courthouse ramp, Leighton Courthouse generally, and outlying criminal courthouses. Defendants are to produce to Plaintiff by 7/26/19, the construction design / drawings for the ramp connecting Cermak Health Center with the Leighton Courthouse and/or Cook County Jail. Status hearing set for 9/12/19 at 2:00 p.m. The Court thanks all counsel for their professionalism in attempting to resolve this matter. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 07/12/2019)

07/23/2019

518 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing set for 7/30/2019 is stricken and reset to 9/19/2019 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 07/23/2019)

07/29/2019

519 MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to file instanter status report re Maywood and Leighton (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Status Report)(Larios, Miguel) (Entered: 07/29/2019)

07/29/2019

520 NOTICE of Motion by Miguel E. Larios for presentment of motion to file instanter 519 before Honorable M. David Weisman on 8/1/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Larios, Miguel) (Entered: 07/29/2019)

07/29/2019

521 AMENDED NOTICE of Motion by Miguel E. Larios for presentment of motion to file instanter 519 before Honorable M. David Weisman on 8/7/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Larios, Miguel) (Entered: 07/29/2019)

07/30/2019

522 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Defendant Cook County's motion for leave to file status report instanter 519 is granted. Defendant shall file document as a separate entry. Motion hearing set for 8/7/19 is stricken. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 07/30/2019)

08/05/2019

523 STATUS Report pursuant to this Courts Order dated July 11, 2019 (dkt. 517) by Cook County, Illinois (Larios, Miguel) (Entered: 08/05/2019)

08/05/2019

524 MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois for extension of time to complete discovery pursuant to this Court's Order dated July 11, 2019 (dkt. 517) (Larios, Miguel) (Entered: 08/05/2019)

08/05/2019

525 NOTICE of Motion by Miguel E. Larios for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 524 before Honorable M. David Weisman on 8/15/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Larios, Miguel) (Entered: 08/05/2019)

08/14/2019

526 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: The Court grants Defendant Cook County's motion for extension of time to comply with July 12, 2019 order 524 . Defendant Cook County shall file a status report on the document search and production by 8/19/19. Motion hearing set for 8/15/19 is stricken. Status hearing set for 9/12/19 at 2:00 p.m. remains. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 08/14/2019)

08/19/2019 527 STATUS Report by Cook County, Illinois (Larios, Miguel) (Entered: 08/19/2019)

08/26/2019

528 MOTION by Attorney Miguel E. Larios to withdraw as attorney for Cook County, Illinois. No party information provided (Larios, Miguel) (Entered: 08/26/2019)

08/26/2019

529 NOTICE of Motion by Miguel E. Larios for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 528 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/5/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Larios, Miguel) (Entered: 08/26/2019)

08/26/2019

530 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Attorney Miguel E. Larios' motion to withdraw as counsel 528 is granted. Motion presentment hearing set for 9/5/2019 is stricken. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 08/26/2019)

09/10/2019

531 MOTION by Plaintiff Johnathan Lacy to enforce order entered by the Court on July 12, 2019, ECF No. 517 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Portion of Eric Davis Deposition, # 2 Exhibit 2 Portion of Sabrina River-Canchola Deposition, # 3 Exhibit 3 FY19 Business Case Regarding Maywood Courthouse, # 4 Exhibit 4 Notes Regarding Cermak Ramp, # 5 Exhibit 5 M.Larious e-mail dated 8/30/2019)(Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 09/10/2019)

09/10/2019

532 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick William Morrissey for presentment of motion to enforce, 531 before Honorable M. David Weisman on 9/19/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 09/10/2019)

09/12/2019

533 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Status hearing held. For the reasons stated on the record, Plaintiff's motion to compel 531 is denied without prejudice. By 9/27/19, defendant Cook County is to produce to Plaintiff's counsel, the business plan related to the Leighton Courthouse addressing the ADA compliance issues alleged in this matter or present a letter to counsel advising that production will not occur and setting forth the reasons for non-production. The parties remain interested in a continued settlement conference Status hearing set for 9/26/19 at 9:15 a.m. to set a date for a settlement conference. If the parties jointly contact Courtroom Deputy, Alyssia Owens, via email at Alyssia_Owens@ilnd.uscourts.gov with proposed agreed dates for a settlement conference, the hearing will be stricken with no appearance required. Motion hearing set for 9/19/19 is stricken. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 09/12/2019)

09/19/2019

534 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 9/19/2019. Status hearing continued to 11/20/2019 at 9:10 a.m. The parties are directed to file a Joint Status Report by 11/13/2019. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 09/19/2019)

09/23/2019 535 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by Lyle Kevin Henretty (Henretty, Lyle) (Entered: 09/23/2019)

09/26/2019

536 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Status hearing held. A continued settlement conference is set for 10/30/19 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 09/26/2019)

10/30/2019

538 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Settlement conference held. All parties appeared. Parties were able to reach a settlement in this matter. Status hearing set for 2/12/20 at 9:15 a.m. If a stipulation of dismissal is filed prior to the next hearing, the status will be stricken and no appearance will be necessary. The Court sincerely thanks counsel for the professionalism and diligence in working to resolve this matter. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 10/31/2019)

10/31/2019

537 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing set for 11/20/2019 is stricken and reset to 11/7/2019 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 10/31/2019)

11/07/2019

539 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 11/7/2019. For the reasons stated on the record, this matter is continued to 1/27/2020 at 9:00 a.m. for a final status hearing. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 11/07/2019)

11/26/2019

540 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Settlement Conference set for 12/3/19 at 3:30 p.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 11/26/2019)

12/03/2019

541 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Settlement hearing held regarding the form of the settlement papers. The parties maintain an agreement as to all material settlement terms. Status hearing set for 12/11/19 at 9:15 a.m. If the parties need additional time for a productive status hearing, they shall jointly contact Courtroom Deputy, Alyssia Owens via email at Alyssia_Owens@ilnd.uscourts.gov and the Court will reset the status. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 12/04/2019)

12/11/2019

542 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on November 7, 2019 before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Order Number: 36737. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov - 312.435.7626.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

Redaction Request due 1/2/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/13/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/10/2020. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 12/11/2019)

12/11/2019

544 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate status hearing held. Parties reported on the status of the settlement agreements and the anticipated approval of those agreements. Status hearing set for 2/12/20 is stricken and reset to 2/27/20 at 9:15 a.m. If a stipulation of dismissal is filed prior to that date, the status hearing will be stricken and no appearance will be necessary. The Court thanks counsel for their professionalism in resolving this matter. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 12/13/2019)

12/12/2019

543 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing set for 1/27/2020 is stricken and reset to 1/23/2020 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 12/12/2019)

01/17/2020

545 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: At the parties' request, status hearing set for 1/23/2020 is stricken and reset to 2/19/2020 at 9:10 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 01/17/2020)

01/21/2020 546 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Status hearing set for 2/27/20 is stricken. All matters relating to the referral of

this case having been resolved, this matter is returned to the District Judge. Referral terminated. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 01/21/2020)

02/18/2020 547 STIPULATION of Dismissal with prejudice and without costs (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 02/18/2020)

02/18/2020

548 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: On Stipulation 547 and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), this case is dismissed with prejudice and without costs in accordance with settlement agreements executed by all parties. Status hearing set for 2/19/2020 is stricken. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 02/18/2020)