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Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 13

•Filed 12/12/2001

Page 1 of 10

Earnest C.S. Bell, CSB# 159387 3897 Market Street 2 Ventura, California 93003 Telephone (805) 650-5458 3 Facsimile (805) 650-3778
Attorney for Plaintiff, elle Way

:~
U

FILED CLERK. US DISTRICT COURT
Al.-~I)

Or " 1 2 ' " '-"

L\..",I

CENTRAL DIS BY

ALiFORNIA DEPUTY

UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COUR

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRlCT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 NOELLE WAY,

)

)

12

Plaintiff,

)

II

)

13 1 v.

)

I

)

141 COUNTY OF VENTURA; ROBERT BROOKS, )

individually and as Sheriff for the County of)

15 Ventura; VENTURA POLICE OFFICER)

ROBERT ORTIEZ; DEPUTY K. HANSON and )

16 Does 1 through 9, inclusive.

)

1711,

)
Defendants.)

18 - - - - - - - - - 19 1

CASE NO. 01-05401 CBM (Ex)
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Priority
Send Enter Closed
JS-5/JS-6_ JS-2/JS-3_ Scan Only_

1

20 1

JURISDICTION

21 I

1. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections1983 and 1988 and on the

221,' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. sections 1331 and 1343
23 and aforementioned statutory and constitutional provisions. Plaintiff further invokes the pendant

24 jurisdiction of the Court to consider claims arising under state law.

25

PARTIES

26 I

2. Plaintiff, Noelle Way, is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of

27 California, and offull age.

28 !

3. Defendant Officer Robert Ortiez, at all times relevant heretoc,was:iind'-isan

...111 tl\~1J \!I~ ; .',' '"

I
.I

[DEC IIlt1 /2>

'V

• Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E

Document 13

•Filed 12/12/2001

Page 2 of 10

employee of the Ventura County Police Department, and at all times herein was acting in such

2 capacity as the agent, servant, and employee of the City of Ventura.

3

4. Defendant Deputy K. Hanson, at all times relevant hereto, was and is an

4 employee ofthe Ventura County Sheriff's Department, and at all times herein was acting in such

5 capacity as the agent, servant, and employee ofthe County of Ventura.

6

5. Defendant Robert Brooks ("Brooks") is and was at all times described in this

7 Complaint Sheriff of the County of Ventura. As such, he was the commanding officer of

8 the jail and was responsible for the training, supervision, and conduct of said defendants as more

9 fully set forth below. Brooks is also responsible by law for enforcing the regulations of the

10 Ventura County Sheriff's Department and for ensuring that Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs obey

II the laws of the State of California and the United States. He is sued individually and in his

12 official capacity.

13

6. The defendant County of Ventura is, and at all times mentioned herein was a

14 county within the State of California and at all times hereto employed the defendants and Brooks

15 respectively.

16

7. At all times relevant hereto, and in all their actions described herein, the persons

17 named in paragraph 3 and 4 were acting under color oflaw and pursuant to their authority as law

18 enforcement personnel for The County of Ventura.

19

8. Plaintiff does not know the true names of defendants, DOES I through 10

20 inclusive and therefore sues them by these fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint

21 to include theirnames and capacities once they are known. Plaintiff is infonned and believes, and

22 based on that infonnation and belief alleges that each of the defendants designated as a DOE is

23 legally responsible in some manner for the occurrences alleged in this complaint and unlawfully

24 caused the injuries and damages to plaintiff as alleged in this complaint.

25

9. Allegations described in this complaint on the part of the County of Ventura, its

26 agents and employees constitute state action.

27

FACTS

28

10. On August 7, 2000, at approximately 2;10 a.m. plaintiff was arrested for

2

I I Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 13

•Filed 12/12/2001

Page 3 of 10

suspicion of being under the influence of a controlled substance.

2

11. Plaintiff was working at the Red Cove in Ventura. She was a bartender at this

3 establishment.

4

12. Earlier on August 7, 2000, plaintiff had asked a customer to leave the Red

5 Cove because he had too much to drink. The customer left the area at first but after the bar

6 closed he returned and sat in front ofthe bar.

7

13. Officers from the Ventura Police Department saw the individual sitting outside

8 the door and went to talk to him. The Officers knocked on the door of the bar to ask plaintiff,

9 the bartender, why the man was there. Plaintiff spoke to the officers and at that time they

10 determined that she was under the influence of methamphetamine.

11

14. Plaintiff was arrested for Health and Welfare Code Section 11550, and put in a

12 patrol car. While she was silting in the patrol car the officers searched her purse that WaS in

13 the bar and took her keys.

14

15. Plaintiff was then taken to the hospital for blood tests and then to the Ventura

15 County jail. She was in jail for approximately 12 hours.

16

16. While waiting in the holding cell, plaintiff was taken into the "changing

17 room/women's shower"at the Ventura County main jail and stripped searched including a

18 body cavity search. This search involved plaintiff having to remove a tampon and tearing it

19 apart for the deputies inspection.

20

17. Plaintiff was verbally harassed by deputies while in jail. She was called a

21 "street walker", "ronk" and "whore".

22

18. Plaintiffs bail was initially $5,000 and then raised to $10,000. Her ex-husband

23 appeared and produced bail for her and she was released.

24

19. On November 6, 2000, the blood tests came back negative and the district

25 attorney declined to file charges against plaintiff.

26 II II

27 II II

28 II II

3

- II
Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E

Document 13

-Filed 12/12/2001

Page 4 of 10

I .

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 2 Against Defendants Officer Robert Ortiez and The County or Ventura and Does 1-9

3

Civil Rights Violation 4th and 14th Amendments,

4

Right To Be Free From Illegal Search And Seizure.

5

20. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 19 inclusively in this

6 complaint are incorporated herein as if fully set forth.

7

21. After plaintiff was arrested and while she was sitting in the police car, two

8 officers went into the bar and searched plaintiffs purse. The officers took plaintiffs keys

9 from her purse and gave them to the owner of the bar. Plaintiff did not consent to this search

10 of her personal property and the seizure of her keys.

II

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

12

Against Defendants Officer Ortiez, The County of Ventura and Does

13

Civil Rights Violation 4th and 14th Amendments,

14

Illegal Arrest and False Imprisonment

IS

22. The allegations set forth in paragraphs I through 21 inclusively in this

16 complaint are incorporated herein as if fully set forth.

17

23. Plaintiff was cooperative with Officer Ortiez when he came to her place of

18 business. She fully answered all of his questions.

19

24. Plaintiff assured the officer that she had not been drinking and does not do

20 drugs.

21

25. When asked why she was sweating plaintiff responded that she had just

22 restocked the bar. She also told him that her pulse was fast because she had been drinking

23 coffee all night.

24

26. Officer Ortiez decided to arrest plaintifffor Health and Welfare Code Section

25 11550, suspicion of being under the influence of a controlled substance. There was no

26 probable cause to arrest plaintiff.

27

27. Officer Ortiez transported plaintiff to the main jail for booking.

28 II II

4

.. Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E

Document 13

•Filed 12/12/2001

Page 5 of 10

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

2

Against Defendants Sheriff Bob Brooks, Officer K. Hanson and

3

The County of Ventura and Does 1·9:

4

Civil Rights Violation 4'h and 14th Amendments,

5

Invasion of Privacy

6

28. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 27 inclusively in this

7 complaint are incorporated herein as if fully set forth.

8

29. While waiting in the holding cell at the Ventura County Main Jail, plaintiff was

9 stripped searched which included a body cavity search.

10

30. Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee who was given bail and made bail.

II

31. Plaintiff was indiscriminately strip searched. There was no probable cause to

12 believe that a weapon or contraband was secreted on plaintiffs body. Plaintiff was arrested

13 without probable cause and definitely without probable cause that she was in possession of

14 drugs or weapons.

15

33. Without specific facts as to why plaintiff was to undergo a body cavity search,

16 Officer K. Hanson proceeded to strip search plaintiff.

17

34. Plaintiff had to remove her tampon while being stripped searched in order for

18 the Deputy to perform a body cavity search. Plaintiff was also required to tear apart her

19 tampon to show that there was nothing hidden in it. This intrusion was not reasonable under

20 the circumstances in particular, the plaintiff was charged with suspicion of being under the

21 influence of a controlled substance and was released on bail.

22

35. Plaintiffundcrwent an extremely intrusive unreasonable stiplbody cavity

23 search when there was no probable cause to believe that plaintiff was carrying contraband in

24 her genital area/within her body. This was a violation of her constitutional right to privacy.

25 II II

26 II II

27 II II

28 II II

5

.. Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E

Document 13

..Filed 12/12/2001

Page 6 of 10

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

2

Against Defendants Officer Ortiez, Sheriff Bob Brooks,

3

The County of Ventura and Does 1-9

4

State Claim

5

False Imprisonment

6

36. The allegations set forth in paragraphs I through 35 inclusively in this

7 complaint are incorporated herein as if fully set forth.

8

37. Defendants intentionally and unlawfully confined plaintiff against her will.

9

38. Plaintiff was arrested and held in jail for 12 hours without probable cause.

10

39. Plaintiff's false imprisonment lead to her having to undergo an illegal stip and

II body cavity search.

12

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

13

Against Defendants Officer Ortiez, Sheriff Boh Brooks,

14

The County of Ventura and Does 1-9

15

State Claim

16

False Arrest

17

40. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 39 inclusively in this

18 complaint are incorporated herein as if fully set forth.

19

41. Plaintiff was arrested without probable cause. Plaintiff was at work and was

20 closing up the bar when she was approached by defendant officers. She spoke to them briefly

21 about the man who was sitting outside the bar.

22

42. After speaking to plaintiff for a couple of minutes the officer began to question

23 her about any drinking or drug use.

24

43. Plaintiff denied drinking or taking any drugs and told the officers that she had

25 about 7 cups of coffee that night.

26

44. Plaintiff was cooperative and fully coherent and did not display signs of a

27 person under the influence.

28

45. Plaintiff was arrested for the suspicion of being under the influence of a

6

.. Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E

Document 13

..- - - -------
Filed 12/12/2001 Page 7 of 10

controlled substance. Plaintiff was held injail for 12 hours where she was Slip searched and

2 then posted bail and was released on her own recognizance.

3

46. The drug tests later came back negative and the charges against her were

4 dismissed.

5

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

6

Against Defendants Sheriff Bob Brooks, The County of Ventura and Does

7

State Claim

8

Invasion of PrivacylIllegal Strip Search

9

47. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 46 inclusively in this

10 complaint are incorporated herein as if fully set forth.

II

48. While in the Ventura County Jail plaintiff was stip searched and body cavity

12 searched.

13

49. Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and had bail posted. As such the strip and body

14 cavity search of plaintiff was in violation of Penal Code Section 4030.

15

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

16

Against Defendants Sheriff Bob Brooks and The County of Ventura

17

Monell Claim- Failure to Superviseffrain

18

50. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 49 inclusively in this

19 complaint are incorporated herein as if fully set forth.

20

51. Plaintiff was arrested without probable cause by officers of the Ventura Police

21 Department. The arresting Ventura Police Officers also illegally searched and removed

22 property from her purse The County of Ventura has failed to train and supervise its officers on

23 the probable cause standards required to arrest a citizen in particular, the ability to point to s

24 specific articulable facts.

25

52. Deputies at the Ventura County Jail illegally stip searched and performed a

26 body cavity search on plaintiff.

27

53. Penal Code Section 4030 did not authorize a striplbody cavity search on

28 plaintiff and therefore the search was performed illegally.

7

I •

.. Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E

Document 13

..Filed 12/12/2001

Page 8 of 10

54. Sheriff Bob Brooks is the supervisor of the Ventura County Jail and is

2 therefore liable for failing to train and supervise his deputies on the procedures and laws of

3 strip searching a pretrial detainee.

4

55. The County of Ventura developed and maintained policies or customs

5 exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of person in the County of

6 Ventura, which caused the violations of plaintiff's rights.

7

56. It was the policy and/or custom of the County of Ventura to inadequately and

8 improperly train and supervise their Deputies on the laws pertaining to stip searching and body

9 cavity searches of pretrial detainees.

10

57. The above described policies and customs demonstrated a deliberate

11 indifference on the part of policymakers of the County of Ventura to the constitutional rights

12 of persons within the County, and were the cause of the violations of plaintiff's rights alleged

13 herein.

14

58. With no specific articulable facts that would lead a reasonable officer to believe

15 that plaintiff was concealing a weapon or contraband on her body, defendants condoned her to

16 be not only strip searched but to undergo a body cavity search as well.

17

59. The way the above referenced Defendants were trained and supervised

18 regarding when and to whom to do body cavity searches, was so inadequate that it showed

19 deliberate indifference to the alleged offensive

20 practices.

21

60. The supervisor of the jail, Sheriff Bob Brooks, who also supervises the

22 Deputies involved in strip searches at the County jail, reasonably should have known that such actions by his Deputies would cause Plaintiff constitutional injury.
23 61. Sheriff Bob Brooks failure to train his subordinate Deputies in the necessary
24
constitutional policies of strip searching forms an affirmative causal link between the
25
defendants actions in this case and the particular 26
constitutional injuries suffered by the plaintiff. 27
62. This is a blatant failure to exercise his duty to supervise/train the Deputies
28
under his control, this subjects the supervisor, Sheriff Bob Brooks, to be vicariously liable.

8

.. Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E

Document 13

..Filed 12/12/2001

Page 9 of 10

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands the following relief, jointly and severally against 2 all the defendants:

3

1. Compensatory, special, and punitive damages in an amount the court deems

4 appropriate.

5

2. Such other and further relief as this Court may deem appropriate, including costs

6 and reasonable attorney fees.

7

3. A jury trial is hereby demanded.

8

9

/2 - 10 Dated:

~-c;;.(

11

12

By: ~.s;~G.S.~

Eamest C.s:eu

13

Attorney for Plaintiff,

Noelle Way

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

.. Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E

Document 13

..Filed 12/12/2001

Page 10 of 10

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

2

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF VENTURA

3

4

I am employed in the county ofVentura, State ofCalifornia. I am over the age of 18 and

5 not a party to the within action. My business address is 3897 Market Street, Ventura, California

6 93003.

7

On December 4, 2001, I served the attached documents described as, First Amended

8 Complaint, on the interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a

9 sealed envelope addressed as follows:

10 Mr. Jeffrey Held Law Offices of Alan Wisotsky
11 300 Esplanade Drive, Suite 1500 Oxnard, CA 93030
12

13

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the

14 foregoing is true and correct.

15

16 Executed on December 4,2001, at Ventura, California.

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 
 Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 55 Filed 07/22/2002 Page 1 of 12

1

2

3

Priority ~ Send ~

4 Enter _

Closed _

5 JS-S/JS-6_

JS-2/JS·3_ 6 Scan Only_

7

8

FILED CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

JUL 2 2 2002

CENTRAL DIST~7 CAI.IFORNIA

. BY

DEPUTY

<4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

WESTERN DIVISION

11

12 OELLE WAY,

) No. CV 01-5401 CBM (Ex)

)

13

Plaintiff,

) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'

) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

14

vs.

) AND GRANTING IN PART

) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL

15 OVNTY OF VENTURA, et aI.,

) SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

16

Defendants. )

)

17 1r-----------------------)

18

19

The matters before the Court, the Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall, United States District

20 Judge presiding, are Defendants County of Ventura, Robert Brooks, and Karen Hanson's Motion

21 for Summary Judgment (docket #16) and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against

22 Defendants County ofVentura, Robert Brooks, and Karen Hanson (docket #18). Counsel appeared

23 before the Court for oral argument. Upon consideration ofthe papers and arguments presented, the

24 Court DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs

25 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

26

JURISDICTION

27

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

28 III

JUL 22m

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 55 Filed 07/22/2002 Page 2 of 12

1

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

2

The operative complaint in this action is the First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), filed on

3 December 12, 2001. The FAC alleges violations ofthe Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments based

4 on illegal search and seizure, illegal arrest and false imprisomnent, and invasion of privacy, and a

5 Monell claim based on failure to supervise and train. The FAC also alleges state claims of false

6 imprisomnent, false arrest, and invasion of privacy.

7

Defendants County ofVentura ("County"), Robert Brooks,1and Karen Hanson (collectively

8 referred to as "Defendants") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed an Opposition.

9 No Reply has been filed to date. Plaintiff filed her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

10 Defendants filed an Opposition. No Reply has been filed to date.

11

BACKGROUND

12

The parties submit that the legal issues that the Court needs to resolve are the following:

13 I. What constitutes the reasonable suspicion required to conduct a visual unclothed body

14

cavity search of a pretrial detainee?

15 2. Can the arresting agency's charge that the pretrial detainee violated Health and Safety Code

16

Section 11550, without more, equal the reasonable suspicion needed to justify a visual

17 18 3.

unclothed body cavity search? Is apolicy ofperforming visual unclothed body cavity searches ofpretrial detainees arrested

19

for being under the influence of an illegal controlled substance, in violation of Health and

20

Safety Code Section 11550, constitutional?

21 4. Constitutionally, before conducting a visual unclothed body cavity search, should a pretrial

22
23 5.

detainee be given an opportunity to post bail? Was the visual unclothed body cavity search ofthe plaintiff in accordance with California

24

Penal Code Section 4030?

2S

The Court finds that the issues that have been briefed and are before the Court are whether

26 the policy of conducting visual unclothed body cavity searches of pretrial detainees not placed

27

28 Robert Brooks is the Sheriff ofthe County of Ventura.

-2-

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 55 Filed 07/22/2002 Page 3 of 12

1 within the general jail population based solely on the fact that they have been charged with a 2 violation of Health and Safety Code Section 115502 is constitutional and whether the visual

3 unclothed body cavity search ofthe plaintiff was in accordance with California Penal Code Section

4 4030.

5

The parties have stipulated to the following facts for purposes of the present motions:

6 1. Plaintiff Noelle Way was arrested on September 6,2000, at approximately 2:10 a.m. by

7

non-movant defendant Robert Ortiz.

8 2. Robert Ortiz was acting in the capacity of a City of San Buenaventura police officer when

9

he arrested the plaintiff.

10 3. Officer Ortiz's arrest of the plaintifftook place at her place of employment, the Red Cove

11

bar, located at 1809 East Main Street in the City of San Buenaventura.

12 4. Officer Ortiz arrested the plaintiff for being, in his opinion, under the influence of a

13

controlled substance in violation of California Health and Safety Code Section 11550(a) at

14

the time of her arrest.

15 5. The offense for which Officer Ortiz arrested the plaintiff was a misdemeanor.

16

17 Section 11550(a) provides as follows:

18

No person shall use, or be under the influence of any controlled substance which is

19

(1) specified in subdivision (b), (c), or (e), or paragraph (1) of subdivision (f) of

20

Section 11054, specified in paragraph (14), (15), (21), (22), or (23) ofsubdivision (d)

of Section 11054, specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11055, or specified

21

in paragraph (I) or (2) of subdivision (d) or in paragraph (3) of subdivision (e) of

Section 11055, or (2) a narcotic drug classified in Schedule ill, IV, or V, except when

22

administered by or under the direction of a person licensed by the state to dispense,

23

prescribe, or administer controlled substances. It shall be the burden ofthe defense to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of violating this

24

subdivision is guilty ofa misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to serve a term of not

less than 90 days or more than one year in a countyjail. The court may place a person

25

convicted under this subdivision on probation for a period not to exceed five years

26

and, except as provided in subdivision (c), shall in all cases in which probation is granted require, as a condition thereof, that the person be confined in a county jail for

27

at least 90 days. Other than as provided by subdivision (c), in no event shall the court

have the power to absolve a person who violates this subdivision from the obligation

28

of spending at least 90 days in confinement in a county jail.

-3 -

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 55 Filed 07/22/2002 Page 4 of 12

1 6. 2 3 4 7. 5 6 8. 7 8 9 10 11 12 9.
13
14 10. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

After transporting the plaintiff to the Ventura County Medical Center to obtain a blood sample, Officer Ortiz took the plaintiff to the pretrial detention facility (county jail) to be booked on the stated charge. Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at all times relevant to her contact with the moving defendants. Defendant Deputy Karen Hanson is a female custody deputy employed by the Ventura County Sheriffs Department who was the booking officer and deputy who performed all activities relating to the plaintiffs booking on September 6, 2000, including reception booking, master booking, and the visual unclothed body cavity search ofthe plaintiff at the Ventura County Jail; Deputy Hanson has worked for the Ventura County Sheriffs Department for 21 years. Approximately an hour after her arrest, at about 3: 10 a.m., the plaintiffarrived at the pretrial detention facility and her booking process began. During the plaintiffs booking process, as part ofroutine procedure, Officer Ortiz prepared and submitted two documents to Karen Hanson, the custody deputy handling plaintiffs booking: (a) One document was the booking information sheet in which Officer Ortiz stated that
he had arrested the plaintiff for misdemeanor violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11550(a) at 2:10 a.m. on September 6, 2000, at the Red Cove bar in Ventura, among other information; (b) The second document prepared by Officer Ortiz was a declaration for probable cause hearing, which he signed under penalty of peIjury on September 6, 2000, in which Officer Ortiz stated that he was a peace officer employed by the Ventura Police Department; that at 2: 10 a.m. on September 6, 2000, he developed probable cause to form the opinion that the plaintiff was violating Health and Safety Code Section 11550; that he observed the plaintiffexhibit certain symptoms on September 6,2000, in Ventura indicative ofbeing under the influence ofa controlled substance stimulant; that he prepared a police report; and that the plaintiff had been given a

- 4-

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 55 Filed 07/22/2002 Page 5 of 12

1 2 II. 3 4 5 12. 6 7 8 13. 9 10 11 14. 12 15. 13 14 15 16. 16 l7 18 17. 19 18. 20 21 22 19. 23 24 20. 25 26 27 21. 28

chemical test whose results were pending; While defendant Karen Hanson does not recall any particulars about this case or the plaintiff, her custom and practice would be to read the two documents prepared by Officer Ortiz during the course of booking the plaintiff. The Ventura County Sheriffs Department, in the operation ofits pretrial detention facility, contends that a fresh misdemeanor charge of violating Health and Safety Code Section 11550 supplies the basis for a visual unclothed body cavity search. Under the policy of the Ventura County Sheriffs Department, a visual unclothed body cavity search is performed by a custody deputy ofthe same sex as the pretrial detainee and does not involve any touching ofthe person of the pretrial detainee by the custody deputy. The plaintiff was booked between 3:10 a.m. and 3:36 a.m. by Deputy Hanson. Deputy Hanson obtained permission to perform the visual unclothed body cavity search upon the plaintiff from Senior Deputy Dave Brantley, who authorized Deputy Hanson to conduct the strip search of the plaintiff. Approximately 20 minutes transpired between the time the plaintiff was informed of the amount of her bail and the time of the performance by Deputy Hanson of the visual unclothed body cavity search of the plaintiff. Deputy Hanson performed a visual-only unclothed body cavity search of the plaintiff. The visual unclothed body cavity search took place in a private room in the women's booking area of the pretrial detention facility with only Deputy Hanson and the plaintiff present. During the search, defendant Hanson observed that the plaintiffhad a tampon and required the plaintiff to remove, tear, and discard the tampon in the adjacent wastebasket. If a pretrial detainee is having a menstrual period, she will be required to remove her tampon, pull it apart during the strip/visual body cavity search, and discard it in the wastebasket. Deputy Hanson performed the visual unclothed body cavity search of the plaintiff solely because the plaintiff was charged by Officer Ortiz with violating Health and Safety Code

-5-

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 55 Filed 07/22/2002 Page 6 of 12

1 2 3 22. 4

Section 11550; Deputy Hanson did not have any other information leading her to believe that the plaintiff was concealing contraband in her body cavities. It is the policy of the Ventura County Sheriffs Department in the operation of its pretrial detention facility to perform visual unclothed body cavity searches ofeverypretrial detainee

5 6 23. 7 8 9 10 24. 11 12 13 25. 14

arrested for alleged violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11550, a misdemeanor. Upon the plaintiffs arrival at the pretrial detention facility, in women's booking, Deputy Hanson performed a pat-down search ofplaintiff, during which Deputy Hanson did not see or feel anything which would lead her to believe that the plaintiff was concealing drugs or weapons on her person or in her body cavities. There is no waiting period to see ifan inmate arrested on charges ofHealth and Safety Code Section 11550 will be able to post bail before performing the visual unclothed body cavity search of such pretrial detainee. The strip search ofthe plaintiff did not yield any contraband, weapons, or drugs hidden on or in her person.3

15 26. No charges were ever filed against the plaintiff.

16 27. The blood sample obtained from the plaintiff at the Ventura County Medical Center and

17

analyzed by the Ventura County Sheriff s Department Criminalistics Laboratory did not

18

reveal the presence of any controlled substances or drugs in the plaintiffs blood - the test

19 20 28. 21

was negative for controlled substances. The plaintiff contends that while naked, she was called derogatory and insulting names by defendant Deputy Hanson, such as "raunch" and "whore."

22

Defendants supplemented the Joint Statement with additional facts, to which Plaintiffs have

23 not stipulated. Defendants provide declarations stating that the purpose of conducting visual 24 unclothed body cavity searches is to provide facility security and ensure the health and safety ofthe 25 individuals, that mUltiple female arrestees may be held in the same holding cell while they are being

26 booked, and that the purpose of searching Plaintiff was to ascertain whether she had concealed

27

28 efendants dispute the relevance of Facts 26-29.

-6-

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 55 Filed 07/22/2002 Page 7 of 12

1 drugs or drug paraphernalia.

2

DISCUSSION

3 I. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment as to Defendants County, Brooks, and Hanson

4

A. Standard of Law

5

Summaryjudgment against aparty is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers

6 to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, ifany, show that there is no

7 genuine issue as to any materialfact and that the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter

8 oflaw." FED. R. Cry. P. 56(c) (emphasis added).

9 initial burden ofinforming the court ofthe basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of

10 the pleadings and discovery responses which demonstrate the absence ofa genuine issue ofmaterial

11 fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). Where the

12 nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, the movant can prevail merely by pointing

13 out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See id. If the

14 moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must then set forth, by affidavit or as

15 otherwise provided in Rule 56, "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED.

16 R. Cry. P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250,106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986).

17

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court does not make credibility

18 determinations or weigh conflicting evidence and draws all inferences in thc light most favorable

19 to the nonmoving party. T. W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass 'n, 809 F.2d 626,

20 630·31 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible. FED. R. Cry. P.

21 56(e).·-

. affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise

22 genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp.,

23 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

24

B. Analysis

25

1. Constitutionality of Visual Unclothed Body Cavity Search

26

The Supreme Court addressed visual unclothed body cavity inspections ofpretrial detainees

27 in institutional settings in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979), holding that such

28 inspections could be conducted on less than probable cause without violating the reasonableness

·7·

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 55 Filed 07/22/2002 Page 8 of 12

1 standard of the Fourth Amendment. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559-60. "ill detennining whether an

2 institutional search policy is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a court must balance 'the

3 need for the particular search against the invasion ofpersonal rights that the search entails. '" Fuller

4 v. M.G. Jewelry, 950F.2d 1437, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991)(quotingBell, 441 U.S. at 559). The Supreme

5 Court set forth factors to be considered in detennining reasonableness: the scope of the intrusion,

6 the mamler in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is

7 conducted. See id. at 559. The Ninth Circuit has held that such searches must be supported by

8 reasonable suspicion that the arrestee "is carrying or concealing contraband." See Kennedy v. Los

9 Angeles Police Department, 901 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614

10 (9th Cir. 1984)). ill detennining whether there is reasonable suspicion, courts should consider the

11 nature ofthe offense, the arrestee's appearance and conduct, and the prior arrest record. See Giles,

12 746 F.2d at 716. The rationale for allowing visual unclothed body cavity searches of pretrial

13 detainees supported by less than probable cause "is to protect prisons and jails from smuggled

14 weapons drugs or other contraband which pose a .threat to the safety and security of penal

15 institutions." Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1447.

16

To hold the County liable, the Plaintiff must show that the County maintained a custom,

17 policy, or practice that caused a violation of her federal constitutional rights. Monell v. New York

18 City Department o/Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The parties have stipulated that the

19 visual unclothed body cavity search of Plaintiff was conducted pursuant to the County's policy.

20

The parties have stipulated that the only fact supporting the search ofPlaintiffwas that she

21 had been charged with violating Health and Safety Code Section 11550. Defendants argue that

22 their search policy is justified because it ensures that arrestees do not injure themselves by ingesting

23 drugs or their containers and to make sure that they do not injure or pass drugs to other arrestees

24 who are also being held at the pretrial detention facility. Defendants provide the declaration of

25 BOffilie Gatling, facility administrative sergeant in charge oftraining custodydeputies at the Ventura

26 County Pretrial Detention Facility in support of this proposition. She states that "imnates have

27 occasionally managed to evade our facility security protocols and ingested drugs or their containers,

28 usually balloons." Gatling Dec!. at ~ 8. Defendants provide no evidence regarding whether these

- 8-

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 55 Filed 07/22/2002 Page 9 of 12

1 inmates were charged with violating Health and Safety Code Section 11550, or whether visual

2 unclothed body cavity searches ofpretrial detainees charged with violating Health and Safety Code

3 Section 11550 have resulted in the discovery ofconcealed drugs or contraband or prevented injury

4 to the detainees. Therefore, Defendants have not established that the policy of conducting visual

5 unclothed body cavity searches ofpretrial detainees charged with violating Health and Safety Code

6 Section 11550 effectively promotes the stated justification for the search.4

7

The present case is analogous a Tenth Circuit case, Foote v. Spiegel, 118 FJd 1416 (10th

8 Cir. 1997). In Foote, a highway patrol officer arrested Foote for being under the influence of

9 marijuana. Asearch ofFoote's vehicle and athorough pat-down search ofFoote's person disclosed

10 no drugs. In addition, Foote did not engage in any behavior consistent with an attempt to hide

11 something beneath her clothing. Foote was booked at the County Jail and strip searched, which

12 revealed no drugs. Foote was never placed in the general jail population and was released on bond

13 shortly after her confinement. The Tenth Circuit held as follows:

14

[B]ecause Foote had no opportunity to hide anything beneath her clothing after [the

highway patrol officer] had stopped her vehicle and a thorough pat-down search at

15

the jail had revealed no drugs, the strip search could be justified only if it were

16
17 The Court notes the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit that courts not ... . .. . for those ofthe jails' administrators. See Giles,
18 46 F.2d at 617 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584-85, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3232 (1984». he deference accorded jail administrators does not exempt Defendants from showing that the jail's
19 'nterests warrant the level of intrusion caused by their policy. See Giles, 746 F.2d at 617 (holding 20 hat the policy of strip searching all persons booked into the jail was unconstitutional because the
ounty had not demonstrated that its security interests warranted "serious invasion of privacy 21 nflicted by its policy"). Although in Giles the Ninth Circuit required that the County make such a
howing, in Thompson v. City ofLos Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit 22 id not. See Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1447 (holding, without considering the effectiveness of the 23 earch, that the offense ofgrand theft auto is "sufficiently associated with violence to justify avisual
trip search"). The two cases are distinguishable, however, in that in Giles, the pretrial detainee was 24 ot placed within the general jail population whereas in Thompson, the pretrial detainee was placed
ithin the general jail population. This suggests that jail administrators are afforded greater 2S eference when a pretrial detainee is intermingled with the general jail population than when a 26 retrial detainee is not placed within the general jail population, however greater deference will not
e afforded absent a showing that such intermingling was unavoidable. See Giles, 746 F.2d 618-19 27 stating that heavy reliance on the intermingling of temporary detainees with the general jail
0pulation was misplaced because such intermingling was "limited and avoidable") (internal 28 uotations omitted).

-9-

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 55 Filed 07/22/2002 Page 10 of 12

1

reasonable to believe persons driving while Wlder the influence of marijuana, who

have no particular reason to expect they will be searched, routinely carry a personal

2

stash in a body cavity. That belief is unreasonable.

3 Foote, 118 FJd at 1426 (distinguishing cases in which possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia

4 provided reasonable suspicion for strip search).

5

Similarly, the facts before the Court in the instant case indicate that Officer Ortiz arrested

6 Plaintiff for being under the influence of a controlled substance. Deputy Hanson conducted a pat-

7 down search ofPlaintiff, during which Deputy Hanson did not see or feel anything that would lead

8 her to believe that the Plaintiff was concealing drugs or weapons on her person or in her body

9 cavities. There is no evidence that Plaintiff engaged in any behavior consistent with an attempt to

10 hide something beneath her clothing, and Defendants do not contend that Plaintiff had any

II opporlWlity to hide drugs from the time she was stopped by Officer Ortiz Wltil the time she

12 underwent the visual unclothed body cavity search. As part of the booking process ofPlaintiff at

13 the pretrial detention facility, Deputy Hanson conducted a visual unclothed body cavity search of

14 Plaintiff, which revealed no contraband, weapons, or drugs. There is no evidence that Plaintiffwas

15 ever placed in the general jail popUlation. Plaintiff was released on bond approximately five to 16 eight hours after her arrival at the pretrial detention center.s Thus, the Court finds that under these

17 circumstances, it is unreasonable to believe that a person under the influence of a controlled
18 substance in violation ofHealth and Safety Code Section 11550 "routinelycarr[ies1apersonal stash

19 in a body cavity." The Court holds that the visual Wlclothed body cavity search of Plaintiff was

20 Wlconstitutional.

21

In evaluating the necessityofastrip search, courts have consistentlyrecognized adistinction

22 between detainees awaiting bail and those entering the jail popUlation. Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1448;

23 see also Cottrell v. Kaysville City, 994 F.2d 730, 735 (10th Cir. 1993) ("We agree that the security

24 concerns inherent in a bail situation are very different from those present when the detainee will

25 enter the jail for a greaterlength of time."); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981)

26
27 Plaintiffscounselrepresented to the Court at the hearing that Plaintiffwas released five to six hours fter her arrival. Defendants' counsel represented to the Court at the hearing that Plaintiff was
28 eleased eight hours and ten minutes after her arrival.

- 10-

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 55 Filed 07/22/2002 Page 11 of 12

1 (considering fact that detainee would not be intermingled with the jail population as one of many

2 factors in determining that strip search was not justified). in this case, counsel for Plaintiff and

3 Defendants represented to the Court at the hearing that Plaintiffposted bail, and there is no evidence

4 that she was housed with the general j ail population. Therefore, the Court expresses no opinion on

5 the constitutionality of a visual unclothed body cavity search of an arrestee charged with violating

6 Health and Safety Code Section 11550 who is searched prior to entering the general jail population.

7

The Court rejects Plaintiffs contention that the reasonable suspicion determination must

8 always be made on a "case-by-case" basis. In Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit stated that in certain

9 instances, "the charge itself may give rise to reasonable suspicion." Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 716

10 (citing Thompson v. City olLos Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1989), which held that the

11 offense ofgrand theft auto is sufficientlyviolent to authorize ablanket strip search policy applicable

12 to arrestees charged with it who are to be intermingled with the general jail population).

13

2. California Penal Code Section 4030

14

Plaintiff argues that "the visual unclothed body cavity search of Plaintiff was not in

15 accordance with California Penal Code Section 4030." Plaintiff argues that the California Penal

16 Code Section 4030 requires that misdemeanor arrestees must be given a minimum ofthree hours

17 to post bail before being placed in the general jail population. California Penal Code Section

18 4030(g) exempts from this requirement arrestees who have been charged with offenses involving

19 controlled substances. Further, there is no evidence before the Court that Plaintiff was ever placed

20 into the general j ail popUlation. Accordingly, there is no evidence before the Court from which it

21 could conclude that California Penal Code Section 4030 was violated.

22

CONCLUSION

23

Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and

24 Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART. The Court finds that

25 the search of Plaintiff was conducted pursuant to the County's strip search policy, that the search

26 III

27 III

28 III

- 11 -

---------

- - - - -------------

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 55

Filed 07/22/2002 Page 12 of 12

1 constitutes a violation of Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights, and that the Defendants are liable

2 for damages proximately caused by the search. Defendants may file motions addressing whether

3 they are entitled to qualified immunity.

4

5 SO ORDERED.

6 7 DATE: July&2002 8

L-R-p~.~
CONSUELO B. MARSHALL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

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- 12 -

 
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:0, CLERK, US DISTRICT COURT ,.::

8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

WESTERN DIVISION

II NOELLE WAY,

No. CV 01-5401 CBM (Ex)

12

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

13

v.

14 COUNTY OF VENTURA, et aI.,

15

Defendants.

16

17

18

The matter before the Court, the Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall, Chief

19 Judge, presiding, is Defendants Karen Hanson and Sheriff Robert Brooks'

20 Motion for Summary Judgment based on qualified immunity. The parties
21 appeared before this Court for oral argument on January 29,2004. Upon
I
22 consideration of the papers submitted and the arguments presented, the Court
23 DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

24

JURISDICTION

25

This Court has jurisdiction pursuantto 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and

26 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

27

DOC}(ETED ON eM

28

FEB 202004

BY

\1./ 006 'to

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 90 Filed 02/18/2004 Page 2 of 12

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

,

III

2

Plaintiff Noelle Way ("Plaintiff') was arrested on September 6, 2000':'by

3 City of San Buenaventura Police Officer Robert Ortiz for being under the,
i /1
4 influence of a controlled substance in violation of California Health and Safety

5 Code § 11550(a), a misdemeanor. Plaintiff was taken to the Ventura County

6 MedicalCenter so that she could provide a blood sample, and then to the pretrial

7 detention facility ("county jail") to be booked on the charge. Pursuant to

8 Ventura County Sheriffs Department's policy of performing visual body cavity

9 searches of every pretrial detainee arrested for an alleged § 11550 violation,

10 Deputy Sheriff Karen Hanson perfornled a visual unclothed body cavity search

11 of Plaintiff. After being in jail for approximately 12 hours, Plaintiff was released

12 after her ex-husband produced the $10,000 bail for her. On November 6, 2000,

13 plaintiffs blood tests were returned and the district attorney declined to file

14 charges.

15

In her First Amended Complaint, filed December 12,2001, Plaintiff

16 alleges Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations arising out of the search

17 against the County of Ventura; the Sheriff of Ventura County, Robert Brooks;

18 and the deputy sheriff who performed the search, Karen Hanson. Plaintiff also

19 sues Ortiz for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other state law claims.

20

On July 22, 2002, this Court ruled on summary judgment that Ventura

21 County's strip search policy allowing the visual unclothed body cavity search of

22 Plaintiff without her ever being released into the general prison population and

23 without a determination of reasonable suspicion, violated Plaintiffs

24 constitutional rights. The Court did not reach the issue of whether a strip search

25 of a plaintiff who was released into the general prison population would also

26 constitute a constitutional violation. At the conclusion of this Court's Order

27 denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the Way case, the Court

28 invited the Defendants to file briefs as to whether they were entitled to qualified

-2-

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 90 Filed 02/18/2004 Page 3 of 12

immunity. Prior to filing any briefs on this issue, Defendants appealed this.
, .~
2 Court's decision regarding the constitutionality of the search to the Ninth i~

3 Circuit. On November 26, 2003, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal holding
,.I',
4 that the District Court had only reached the first issue under Saucier v. Katz, 533

5 U.S. 194 (2001) - whether a constitutional right had been violated - and had not

6 reached the second issue as to whether the right was clearly established. The

7 Ninth Circuit held that this Court's decision was not a final, appealable order and

8 that the County must wait to appeal until the Court rules upon the second prong

9 of Saucier.

10

As a result of the Ninth Circuit's dismissal of the appeal, Defendants

11 Deputy Karen Hansen and Sheriff Bob Brooks now move this Court for

12 Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity. Plaintiff filed a timely

13 opposition.

14

LEGAL STANDARD

15

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary judgment

16 against a party when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

17 admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

18 genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

19 judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A party seeking summary

20 judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its

21 motion and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery

22 responses which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See

23 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In judging evidence at the

24 summary judgment stage, the Court docs not make credibility determinations or

25 weigh conflicting evidence and draws all inferences in the light most favorable

26 to the nonmoving party. See T W Elec. Svc., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors

27 Ass 'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence presented by the

28 parties must be admissible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative

-3 -

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 90 Filed 02/18/2004 Page 4 of 12

testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine i~~ues

11;
2 of fact and defeat summary judgment. See Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. GTE.~~

-'1

3 Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

'...1

.. , ~,

4

DISCUSSION

5 I. Defendants' Motion for Qualified Immunity

6

A. Test for Qualified Immunity

7

Qualified immunity provides public officials sued in their individual

8 eapacities with "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability."

9 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in original). In

10 determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must

11 first consider whether, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do the

12 facts as alleged show the officers' conduct violated a constitutional right.

13 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If a constitutional violation exists

14 "on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to

15 ask whether the right was clearly established." Id.; see Martinez v. Stanford, 323

16 FJd 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating the two-part test for qualified immunity

17 as: "(1) whether the facts alleged 'show [that] the officer[s'] conduct violated a

18 constitutional right;' and (2) whether the constitutional right in question was

19 'clearly established' such that 'it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

20 conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. ''').

21

Whether the law was clearly established is a pure question oflaw for the

22 Court to decide. See Mendoza v. Block, 27 FJd 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1994).

23 This inquiry "must be undertaken in light of the speeifie eontext of the case, not

24 as a broad general proposition." Id. at 201. The Ninth Circuit has noted that, in

25 order to find a clearly established right, "we need not find a prior case with

26 identieal, or even 'materially similar,' facts. Our task is to determine whether the

27 preexisting law provided the defendants with 'fair warning' that their conduct

28 was unlawful." Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, 324 FJd 1130,

-4 -

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 90 Filed 02/18/2004 Page 5 of 12

1 1137 (9th Cir. 2003) citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). "Precedent
Il!
2 directly on point is not necessary to demonstrate that a right is clearly
4
3 established. Rather, if the unlawfulness is apparent in light of preexisting ,la,)w,
4 then the standard is met. In addition, even ifthere is no closely analogous caSe

5 law, a right can be clearly established on the basis of 'common sense.'" Giebel v.

6 Sylvester, 244 FJd 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

7

B. Whether the Acts Committed By Defendant Constitute a

8

Violation of Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights

9

In this Court's July 22,2002 Order Granting in Part Plaintiff's Motion for

10 Summary Judgment, the Court held that "the visual unclothed body cavity search

11 of Plaintiff was unconstitutiona1." Under the circumstances of this case, where

12 the undisputed facts show that the only basis for her body cavity search was that

13 she had been charged with violating Health and Safety Code Section 11550 and

14 she was released on bail prior to ever having been placed in the general jail

15 population, the search was umeasonable and violated Plaintiff's constitutional

16 rights.

17

Therefore, the Court has already ruled upon the first prong of the qualified

18 immunity inquiry, finding that Defendants' acts were unconstitutiona1.

19

C. Whether the Constitutional Right At Issue Was Clearly

20

Established At the Time of the Violation

21

In the present motion, Defendants Karen Hansen and Bob Brooks seek

22 qualified immunity on the grounds that the constitutional right in question was

23 not clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs search. Defendants contend that

24 the law was not clearly estahlished that prohibited the blanket search policy to

25 which Plaintiff was subjected primarily because the acts of Defendants were

26 permissible under the law.

27

28

-5-

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 90 Filed 02/18/2004 Page 6 of 12

1. Established Law Regarding Body Cavity Searches;:1

IU

2

a. Justification for Body Cavity Searches on Less~Than

,1'

3

Probable Cause

I j

1,/,

4

It is important to first note that the intrusiveness of a body cavity search,

5 no matter what the circumstances, cannot be overstated. "Strip searches

6 involving the visual exploration of body cavities is dehumanizing and

7 humiliating." Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 901 F.2d 702, 711 (9th Cir.

8 1990). In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979), after balancing the

9 significant security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the

10 inmates, the Supreme Court held that visual body-cavity inspections could be

11 conducted on less than probable cause. In evaluating whether or not a search

12 was permissible, "Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the

13 manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in

14 which it is condueted." Id. at 559. The "clearly-stated rationale underlying" the

15 decisions in which body-cavity searches of prisoners and detainees are allowed

16 on less than probable cause, "is to protect prisons and jails from smuggled

17 weapons, drugs or other contraband which pose a threat to the safety and security

18 of penal institutions." Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1447 (9th Cir.

19 1991); see also Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 713 ("The critical inquiry is whether the

20 LAPD has sufficient justification for imposing its blanket search policy.")

21 Because ofthis underlying rationale, "courts have distinguished between

22 searches of detainees who were simply awaiting bail, and searches conducted on

23 inmates admitted or about to be admitted to the general jail population." Id. at

24 1448.

25

b. Circumstances Allowing Body Cavity Search On

26

Less Than Probable Cause

27

In Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit

28 applied the rule in Bell to hold that "arrestees for minor offenses may be

-6

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 90 Filed 02/18/2004 Page 7 of 12

subjected to a strip search only ifjail officials have a reasonable suspicion that
! I'
2 the particular arrestee is carrying or concealing contraband..." Giles, 746,:.F- .2d "1-
3 at 614 (holding that strip searching every arrestee booked into County Jaih~ not " ,
4 necessary to protect the institution's security interest). "Reasonable suspicion

5 must be based on such factors as the nature of the offense, the arrestee's

6 appearance and conduct, and the prior arrest record. [d. at 617 (emphasis

7 added). The Ninth Circuit applied this reasonable suspicion test in holding the

8 Los Angeles Police Department's policy of requiring a perfunctory body-cavity

9 search of all felony arrestees unconstitutional. Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 716 (strip

10 search of grand theft arrestee was unconstitutional where circumstances of arrest

11 provided no reasonable suspicion to believe that arrestee concealed contraband);

12 see also Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Applying

13 Kennedy, it is clcar that the visual body cavity inspection cannot be justified

14 based on the blanket strip-search policy"). The Ninth Circuit summarized its

15 jurisprudence in this area by pointing out that prior cases had held "such

16 searches were lawful only if an officer had an individualized suspicion that a

17 person was carrying or concealing contraband." Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1451.

18

c. Relevant California Law Regarding Body Cavity

19

Searches

20

California Penal Code Section 4030 was passed in 1984 by the California

21 Legislature with the intention of protecting the constitutional rights of California

22 citizens. See Cal. Pen. Code § 4030. This section provides that

23

No person arrested and held in custody on a misdemeanor or

infraction offense, except those involving weapons, controlled

24

substances or violence. .. shall be subjected to a strip search or

visual body cavity search prior to placement in the general jail

25

population, unless a peace officer has determined tfiere is reasonable

suspicion based on specific and articulablc facts to believe such

26

person is concealing a weapon or contraband, and a stip search will

result in the discovery of tne weapon or contraband.

27

Cal. Pen. Code § 4030(f).

28

-7-

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 90 Filed 02/18/2004 Page 8 of 12

In People v. Wade, 208 Cal. App. 3d 304, 307-08 (1989), the California

.

1--

LU

2 Court of Appeals upheld the warrantless body cavity search of an arrestee eyen

3 though it did not entirely comply with Section 4030. The court noted that .
'/,1
4 Section 4030 was passed in an attempt to codify existing federal constitutional

5 law regarding searches. The court found the fruits of the search need not be

6 suppressed because the search was constitutional under federal law based on the

7 circumstances of the arrest in this case, where the arrestee was visibly under the

8 influence of an opiate and the police who stopped the vehicle in which he was a

9 passenger noticed him rise in his seat several times and his right shoulder dipped,

10 as though he were trying to adjust something in his waist. See id. at 307-08. In

11 People v. Pifer, 216 Cal. App. 3d 956, 962 (1990), the court evaluated the

12 constitutionality of an X-ray search of a state prison inmate and held that the

13 search "under all the ambient circumstances of this case was reasonable within

14 the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. The court in Pifer also included,

15 "[w]e hasten to add, however, that we do not suggest prison authorities could

16 conduct a body cavity search on prisoners merely because they are prison

17 inmates without more. There must be some circumstance or information in

18 addition to the mere fact of imprisonment to justify such an invasive procedure."

19 Id.

20

2. Relevant Facts in the Body Cavity Search Declared

21

Unconstitutional In This Case

22

Defendants contend that, based on federal constitutional and state law, a

23 reasonable officer would believe the search in this case was not violating

24 Plaintiff's constitutional rights and was, in fact, in accordance with the law.

25 Defendants cite to California Penal Code Section 4030 and the decision in

26 People v. Wade, in which body cavity searches are allowed under certain

27 circumstances. Defendants contend that Plaintiff's arrest on a drug-related

28 charge, alone, was sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to perform this

-8

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 90 Filed 02/18/2004 Page 9 of 12
I c,

search. PlaintifT responds and argues that the law was clear at the time of the '~d LU
2 search in question in September 2000 that a strip search could not be perfoqned
>
3 without reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable facts. The partie_s
'",.oJ
4 stipulate that the only basis for the search in this case was Plaintiffs arrest for

5 the misdemeanor charge of violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11550

6 and Defendant County of Ventura Sheriff s Department policy of searching all

7 arrestees for Section 11550 violations.

8

a. Purpose of Search

9

Defendants contend that this search was justified under current law

10 because the purpose of the policy is to ascertain the presence or absence of

11 concealed narcotics or narcotics paraphernalia. According to Defendants, the

12 policy is exclusively designed and necessary to maintain jail security by ensuring

13 the safety of such individuals who might otherwise ingest the drugs or destroy

14 evidence of the commission of a crime, attempt suicide, or get high. See Defts'

15 Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 7. Defendants argue that searching all Section 11550

16 arrestees serves this policy.

17

In considering the asserted justification for the search in question, it is

18 important to note that this search was performed on an arrestee who was never

19 actually released into the general jail population. Plaintiff Way posted bail

20 before being released into the jail population, but the search was performed on

21 her regardless of this fact. The clearly established rationale for body cavity

22 searches on less than probable cause has been the protection of jail security by

23 preventing the smuggling of weapons, narcotics, and other contraband into the

24 jail facility. See Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1447. If an arrestee is not released into the

25 general jail population, then the security justification for this search is not

26 present and such a harsh and humiliating search should not be performed absent

27 probable cause, consistent with clearly established Fourth Amendment

28 jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and this Circuit. Defendants also do not

-9-

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 90 Filed 02/18/2004 Page 10 of 12

provide any evidence of seizure of contraband during searches performed c,

UJ
2 pursuant to this policy to provide justification for this blanket policy.

'1'

3

Additionally, in examining the actual policy that was implemented by the

(."!

4 Sheriff's Department and followed by the deputy here, the purported justification

5 is also absent. The policy allows body cavity searches of misdemeanor arrestees

6 involving weapons, controlled substances or violence without any articulable

7 reasonable suspicion that is based on specific facts to believe such person is

8 concealing a weapon or contraband. However, with respect to allfelony arrests,

9 a strip search "should not be done unless a reasonable suspicion exists that the

10 person is concealing a weapon or contraband. (I.) Reasonable suspicion may be

11 based upon the nature of the offense, the arrestees appearance and conduct, and

12 the prior arrest record." Jt. Stmt. of Uncontroverted Facts, Exh. Cat 14. A

13 cursory examination of this written policy demonstrates that the Ventura County

14 Sheriff's Department allows the body cavity strip search to be performed absent

15 an articulable reasonable suspicion on misdemeanor drug or weapon arrestees,

16 but requires a showing of reasonable suspicion on all felony arrestees. Tfthe

17 Defendants' justification for the blanket seareh of certain misdemeanor arrestees

18 were jail security, then the felony arrest policy should mirror the misdemeanor

19 arrest policy. This incongruence between the policy for certain misdemeanor

20 arrests and the policy for felony arrests casts severe doubt upon the need for this

21 blanket search policy and Defendants' justification for this policy.

22

The policy in this case both (a) failed to recognize a difference between

23 detainees who were released on bail and those who entered the general

24 population and (b) unexplainably provided a higher standard to perform this

25 same search on felony drug or weapons arrestees who, under Defendants' theory,

26 should provide the same (ifnot greater) risk of contraband as misdemeanor

27 arrestees. A reasonable officer reviewing the policy and knowing the established

28 law in this area would have recognized that the policy of the Sheriffs

- 10 -

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 90 Filed 02/18/2004 Page 11 of 12

Department was unconstitutional because the policy did not serve to further,any L ....o
2 legitimate penalogical interests.

3

b. Basis for Search In This Case

4

Defendants contend that, based on California law, a fresh misdemeanor

5 charge of violating Health and Safety Code Section 11550 supplies the basis for

6 a visual unclothed body cavity search. Plaintiff asserts that established law

7 requires that more than a misdemeanor charge of being under the influence of a

8 controlled substance to provide reasonable suspicion that the arrestee has

9 concealed contraband.

10

The parties have stipulated that the sole basis for the visual body cavity

11 search of the plaintiff was that she was charged with violating Health and Safety

12 Code Section 11550. The parties have also stipulated that there is no waiting

13 period to see if an inmate arrested on charges ofviolating Section 11550 will be

14 released on bailor will enter the general jail population. Since 1991 and the

15 Ninth Circuit decision of Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1446 (9th Cir.

16 1991), it has been clearly established that a body cavity search cannot be

17 justified on the basis of a blanket strip search policy alone. This Circuit has

18 repeated that an officer conducting a body cavity search without probable cause

19 must have reasonable suspicion based on such factors as the nature of the

20 offense, the arrestee's appearance and conduct, and the prior arrest record.

21 Ventura's blanket search policy does not allow for individualized suspicion, but

22 instead subjects all arrestees, merely because of their status as arrestees, to this

23 highly invasive search. This is inconsistent with both California and Ninth

24 Circuit law. See, e.g., People v. Pifer, 216 Cal. App. 3d 956, 962 (1990); Fuller

25 v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1991); Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police

26 Dept., 901 F.2d 702, 712 (9th Cir. 1990). A reasonable officer searching

27 Plaintiff in this case should have known that this invasive search violated Ms.

28 Way's constitutional rights ifthere was no particular belief that Ms. Way was

- 11 -

Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E Document 90 Filed 02/18/2004 Page 12 of 12
! '

1 carrying or concealing contraband and no knowledge that she would be ad,!9itted

UJ
2 to the general jail population (rather than being released on bail, as she wa~2.

3

There are sufficient cases in this area regarding policies allowing b~dy

4 cavity searches for a reasonable officer to know that the body cavity search of

5 Plaintiff, without ever being admitted to the general jail population and based

6 solely on her misdemeanor arrest, was unconstitutional. Therefore, both the .

7 justification for the blanket search policy and the decision to search Plaintiff in

8 this case are contrary to clearly established law.

9

CONCLUSION

10

The Court D~NIES Defendants Deputy Sheriff Karen Hanson and Sheriff

11 Bob Brooks' Motion for Summary Judgment based upon qualified immunity and

12 finds that the law prohibiting the visual unclothed body cavity search of Plaintiff

13 under the circumstances of this case was clearly established at the time of the

14 search.

15

16 IT IS SO ORDERED.

17
18 DATED: February .LL 2003
19
20

L.-e-A2~~
CONSUELO B. MARSHALL Chief, United States District Judge

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

 
 (;
.'
"

- • Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E

Document 98

• Filed 05/02/2007

Page 1 of 5

~.

1 Alan E. Wisotsky (SBN 68051)
:i Jeffrey Held (SBN 106991)

2 LAW OFFICES OF ALAN E. WISOTSKY

300 Esplanade Drive, Suite 1500

3 Oxnard, California 93036

Tel:

(805) 278-0920

4 Fax:

(805) 278-0289

E-mail: lawyers@wisotskylaw.com

5

At torneys for COUNTY OF VENTURA, ROBERT

F CALIFORNIA

6 BROOKS, ROBERT ORTIZ (erroneously sued aSL~~~~~~~~OE~P~UT~Y

Ventura Police Officer Robert Ortiez), 7 and KAREN HANSON (erroneously sued as

Deputy K. Hanson)

8

9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11

12 NOELLE WAY,

No. CV 01-05401 CBM (Ex)

13

Plaintiff,

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-~B~ROOUOJN<T:~S,

OF VENTURA; individual

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ROBERT y and

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9.'6 :SJ:(,eri;ff for the county of

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In Ventura; VENTURA POLICE

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(']7 OFFIGER ROBERT ORTIEZ; DEPUTY

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g: K'; HANSON; and DOES 1 through

::2-8. ;9; ~'r'1clusive,

<:::)
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Defendants.

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20

[PR8reSBD] STIPULATED ORDER OF PREJUDICIAL DISMISSAL OF ALL DEFENDANTS

Priority --?_

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Enter ~
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JS-5/,JS-6 _

JS-2/JS-3_

Scan Only_

21

22

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties, plaintiff,

23 Noelle Way, and defendants, County of Ventura, Robert Brooks,

24 Robert Ortiz (incorrectly sued and served as Robert Ortiez), and

25 Karen Hanson (incorrectly sued and served as K. Hanson), as

26 evidenced by the signatures of their attorneys below, as follows:

27

1. This stipulation is entered into in accordance with

28 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) (1) (ii) 'r-~~~===-~~~~--
DOCI<ETED aN C:;
1
MAY - 32007

"

• Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E

Docu..ment•

98
i

• Filed 05/02/2007

Page 2 of 5

. '

1

2.. All defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice to

(j

2 refiling in this or any other federal court and with prejudice\!to

3 .any refiling in any state court.

4

3. All individual defendants, Brooks, Hanson, and Ortiz, are

5 dismissed with prejudice to refiling in this or any other federal

6 court or in any state court in all of their potential capacities,

7 personal, individual, and official, and regardless of whether their

8 names were misspelled in the caption of the complaint.

9

4. All fictitious defendants associated with any entity

10 defendant or individual defendant is also fully and finally dis-

11 missed with prejudice from this lawsuit or any other lawsuit filed

12 in any other federal court or in any state court.

13

5. The consideration for the dismissal of the defendants is

14 the agreement reached at the conclusion of the three-day mediation

15 held at the Los Angeles JAMS office on March 14, 15, and 29, 2007.

16

6. Both sides, plaintiff and defendant, and their counsel,

17 fully reserve all rights, arguments, and legal positions in the

18 companion Gamino class action. No one is waiving any rights to

19 take legal positions or make legal arguments in any aspect of the

20 companion class action case as a result of entry into the full and

21 final resolution of all aspects of this individual litigation.

22

7. Plaintiff agrees that she is not part of and will not

23 join as a party in the companion class lawsuit, Gamino v. County of

24 Ventura, et ai ..

25

8. Plaintiff fully and finally waives any and all past,

26 present, and future damages; past, present, and future equitable

27 and declaratory relief; and past, present, and future rights of

28 discovery; and plaintiff fully and finally waives any and all past, ~

2

• Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E

Document 98

• Filed 05/02/2007

Page 3 of 5

, i

1 present, and future attorneys' fees, whether of record or not, and
c'.J
2 additionally fully and finally waives all past, present, and future
""!'.
3 costs, ordinary and extraordinary, incurred or paid.

f .\

4

9. As a result of the full and final resolution of all

5 aspects of this litigation, the parties agree that all pending and

6 future litigation events and deadlines, including the pretrial

7 confer'ence and trial, are unnecessary and should be vacated by the

8 Court.

9

IT-IS SO STIPULATED.

10

11 Dated: April 12

, 2007

EARNEST C.S. BELL Attorney for Plaintiff

13
14 Dated: April~, 2007
15
16

J:Ej:' ,~'D La f" es of Alan E. Wisotsky ~tt rn ys for Defendants

17

18

19

ORDER

20

Good cause appearing therefor, based upon the stipulation of

21 the parties contained above, the Court does hereby order the

22 stipulation adopted and further orders that:

23

1. The defendants, County of Ventura, Robert Brooks, Robert

24 Ortiz, and Karen Hanson, in every capacity, are dismissed with

25 prejudice from this litigation and any other lawsuit in any other

26 federal or,any state court;

27

2. Both sides retain the right to make whatever arguments

28 they believe necessary in the companion class action, Gamino;

3

s

' .

.
"

.

• Case 2:01-cv-05401: -CBM-E

. Documen,t 98

• Filed 05/02/2007

Page 4 of 5

. ,

,

"

1

3. The plaintiff, in exchange for consideration recited in

c~
:2 the agreement terminating the JAMS mediation on March 29, 20Q.7, It: .. "'1~! ,
3 waives all past, present, and future damages; equitable and
u

4 declaratory relief i discovery rights i and joinder as a pai'cy

5 plaintiff or claimant in the companion class action, Gamino; and

6 further waives all past, present, and future attorneys' fees,

7 whether of record or not, plus a full and final waiver of all past,

8 present, and future ordinary and extraordinary costs.

9

IT IS SO ORDERED.

10
11 Dated:
12

MAY: 2 2007

CONSUELO B. MARSHALL, Chi",", Judge United States District Court

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

• Case 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E

Document 98

• Filed 05/02/2007

Page 5 of 5

1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF VENTURA:

2

,

,

i '}

I am employed In the County of Ventura, State of Callforn~a.

I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; :'iny

3 business address is 300 Esplanade Drive, Suite 1500, Oxnard,

~.~-:/, descri~~d California 93036.

(.'

4

5

as

[PORn OAPpOrSiEl D1~PUL2A0T0E7,D

I

served the foregoing
ORDER OF PREJl,lDICIAL

document
DISMISSAL

OF

ALL

6

DEFENDANTS on all interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as

7 follows:

8

Earnest C.S. Bell Attorney at Law

9

3897 Market Street Ventura, CA 93003

10 I caused such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid
11 to be placed in the United States mail at Oxnard, California.

12

I am "readily familiar" with this rm's practice of collect-

ing and processing correspondence for mailing. It is deposited

13 wi th the U. S. Postal Service on that same day in the ordinary

course of business. I am aVlare that on motion of party served,

14 service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or

I postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for
15 mailing in the affidaVi~.

16

Executed on April~, 2007, at Oxnard, California.

17

I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the

18 bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 
 CM/ECF - California Central District - Docket Report

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(Ex), CLOSED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (Western Division - Los Angeles)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:01-cv-05401-CBM-E

Noelle Way v. Ventura County, et al Assigned to: Judge Consuelo B. Marshall Referred to: Discovery Charles F. Eick Demand: $0 Case in other court: 9th CCA, 04-55457 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Noelle Way
V. Defendant Ventura County
Defendant Robert Brooks individually

Date Filed: 06/19/2001 Date Terminated: 07/07/2003 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Earnest C S Bell Earnest C S Bell Law Offices 3897 Market St Ventura, CA 93003 805-650-5458 Fax: 805-650-3778 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan E Wisotsky Alan E Wisotsky Law Offices 300 Esplanade Dr, Ste 1500 Oxnard, CA 93036 805-278-0920 Fax: 805-278-0289 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey Held Alan E Wisotsky Law Offices 300 Esplanade Dr, Ste 1500 Oxnard, CA 93036 805-278-0920 Fax: 805-278-0289 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan E Wisotsky (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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Defendant Robert Brooks as Sheriff for the County of Ventura
Defendant Robert Ortiez Ventura Police Officer
Defendant Does 1 through 9, inclusive Defendant Deputy K employee of the Ventura Cnty Sheriff's Dept

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey Held (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan E Wisotsky (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey Held (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan E Wisotsky (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan E Wisotsky (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey Held (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/19/2001 06/19/2001 07/11/2001

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT filed Summons(es) Issued referred to Discovery Charles F. Eick (pc) (Entered: 06/22/2001)
2 NOTICE OF INTERESTED PARTIES filed by plaintiff Noelle Way (pc) (Entered: 06/22/2001)
3 PROOF OF SERVICE executed upon defendant Ventura Police Officer Robert Ortiez; Service on 6/29/01 via personal svc by serving S/C to Lt. Fenwick, Person in charge, over the ageof 18, auth to accept svc on behalf of Ventura Police Officer Robert Ortiez (ir) (Entered: 07/12/2001)

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07/23/2001 07/23/2001 07/24/2001 07/31/2001
07/31/2001 08/23/2001 10/22/2001 11/08/2001
12/06/2001
12/12/2001 12/12/2001
12/18/2001 01/07/2002 01/07/2002

4 NOTICE OF INTERESTED PARTIES filed by dfts Ventura County, Robert Brooks, Robert - Brooks, Robert Ortiz err sued as Robert Ortiez (el) (Entered: 07/24/2001)
5 ANSWER filed by dfts Ventura County, Robert - Brooks, Robert - Brooks, Robert Ortiz, err sued as Robert Ortiez to complaint [1-1]; jury demand (el) (Entered: 07/24/2001)
6 MINUTES: Proc: On the Crt's own motion, this case is set for mandatory status/scheduling conf set for 9:00 10/22/01 (see doc for specifics) by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (Send) (el) (Entered: 07/25/2001)
7 PROOF OF SERVICE of S/C executed upon defendant Robert - Brooks, individually and as Sheriff for the County of Ventura; Service by Fed/State not indicated on 7/2/01 via personal delivery by serving S/C to Donna Smith, subpoena clerk, auth to accpt svc (el) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
8 PROOF OF SERVICE executed upon defendant Ventura County; Service by Fed/State not indicated on 7/2/01 via personal delivery by serving S/C to Karel Placencia, Deputy Clerk, auth to acpt svc (el) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
9 JOINT REPORT re SCHEDULING CONFERENCE purs to Rule 26(f) (el) (Entered: 08/24/2001)
10 MINUTES: by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall ; mandatory status/scheduling conf set for 9:00 11/26/01 CR: N/A SND (yc) (Entered: 10/23/2001)
11 MINUTES: It is ORDERED as fol(s): that the mandatory status/scheduling conference is taken off cal; discovery ddl is set on 11/30/01; Final Pretrial Conference set for 2:30 2/25/02; 4 day jury trial set on 10:00 3/26/02 (see doc for fur details) Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (SEND) (el) (Entered: 11/08/2001)
12 NOTICE AND REQUEST Of Settlement Procedure Selection fld Parties request to apr bef a randomly selected judicial officer frm the Civil Settlement Panel for sttlmnt procdgs Order by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall granting settlement procedure selection request [12-1] SND (yc) (Entered: 12/06/2001)
13 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [1-1] by plaintiff Noelle Way; adding Deputy K Hanson; jury demand. Summons not issued (el) (Entered: 12/14/2001)
14 STIPULATION and ORDER by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall for filing of 1st A/C; fur stip that the dft Deputy Hanson waives ntc & svc of the A/C & shall not be required to ans the amendment and that all denials, resp & affirmative defenses contained in the ans filed by dfts to the original cmp shall be responsive to the A/C (el) (Entered: 12/14/2001)
15 REQUEST FOR ASSIGNMENT OF SETTLEMENT JUDGE - pursuant to Local Rule 23.5.4, case assigned to Judge Wm. M. Byrne for settlement conference. (cc: all counsel) (rn) (Entered: 12/18/2001)
16 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION by dfts Ventura County, Robert Brooks, K Hanson for summary judgment ; motion hearing for 10:00 1/28/02; Mem of PA in suppt; Lodged propsd ord; Uncontroverted facts (el) (Entered: 01/08/2002)
17 SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS in suppt by defendants re motion for summary judgment [16-1] (el) (Entered: 01/08/2002)

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01/07/2002
01/10/2002 01/15/2002 01/15/2002 01/22/2002
01/25/2002
01/25/2002 01/31/2002
03/07/2002 03/07/2002 03/07/2002 03/08/2002 03/12/2002 03/12/2002 03/20/2002

18 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION by plaintiff Noelle Way for partial summary judgment agnst dft dep K Hanson, Cnty of Ventura & Sheriff Robert Brooks ; motion hearing set for 10:00 1/28/02; Mem of PA; Decl of Earnest C.S. Bell; Lodged propsd ord (el) (Entered: 01/09/2002)
19 MINUTES before Judge Consuelo B. Marshall: Dfts motion for summary judgment [16-1] is deemed SUBMITTED w/o oral argument as of 01/28/02. CR: N/A (Send) (jp) (Entered: 01/11/2002)
20 OPPOSITION by dfts Ventura County, Robert Brooks, K Hanson to motion for partial summary judgment agnst dft dep K Hanson, Cnty of Ventura & Sheriff Robert Brooks [18-1], motion for summary judgment [16-1] (el) (Entered: 01/16/2002)
21 OPPOSITION by plaintiff Noelle Way to dfts' motion for summary judgment [16-1]; Mem of PA; DEcl of Earnest C.S. Bell (el) (Entered: 01/17/2002)
22 MINUTES: Proc(s): the hearing on plf's motion for partial summary judgment agnst dft dep K Hanson, Cnty of Ventura & Sheriff Robert Brooks [18-1] is set on 10:00 2/4/02, and hearing on dfts' motion for summary judgment [16-1] is set on 10:00 2/4/02 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (el) (Entered: 01/24/2002)
23 MINUTES: The hearing on plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment agnst dft dep K Hanson, Cnty of Ventura & Sheriff Robert Brooks [18-1] is continued to 10:00 2/25/02, the hearing on motion for judgment [16-1] is continued to 10:00 2/25/02 Final Pretrial Conference continued to 3:00 4/1/02; jury trial continued to 10:00 5/7/02 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: N/A (bp) (Entered: 01/28/2002)
24 MINUTES: The court has set this matter for a telephone conference call on 1:30 1/31/02 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: N/A (bp) (Entered: 01/28/2002)
25 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS): Telephone Conf is held; The Court schedule a settlement conference for 9:30 3/7/02; Counsel are instructed to submit a confidential sttlmnt position letter, no greater than three pages in length, by Tuesday, 3/5/02 by Judge Wm. M. Byrne; CR: (n/a) (nhac) (Entered: 02/05/2002)
26 STIPULATION filed requesting clarification of status of x-motions for summ jgm (el) (Entered: 03/08/2002)
28 MINUTES: settlement conference set 3/7/02 taken off calendar ; once the mot for summ jgm is ruled on cnsl will contact this Crt to set a new sttlmnt conf date by Judge Wm. M. Byrne CR: Not Present (el) Modified on 03/08/2002 (Entered: 03/08/2002)
27 DEFENDANTS' IN LIMINE OBJS TO BE HEARD AT PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled for 4/1/02 at 3:00 p.m. (el) (Entered: 03/08/2002)
29 MINUTES: Proc(s): On the Court's own motion, the Cross-Motions for summary judgment [18-1], [16-1] are cont to 11:00 3/25/02 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (el) (Entered: 03/11/2002)
30 MEMO OF CONTENTIONS OF FACT and LAW by defendants (el) (Entered: 03/13/2002)
31 WITNESS list submitted by defendants (el) (Entered: 03/13/2002)
32 MINUTES: On the Court's own motion, Cross motions for partial summary judgment agnst dft dep K Hanson, Cnty of Ventura & Sheriff Robert Brooks [18-1] and for summ judgment [16-1] are continued to 10:00 3/27/02 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (el) (Entered: 03/21/2002)

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03/20/2002 03/20/2002 03/26/2002 03/27/2002
04/02/2002
04/10/2002 04/10/2002 04/12/2002 04/12/2002 04/16/2002
04/19/2002 04/23/2002
04/24/2002 04/24/2002 04/24/2002 05/02/2002
05/06/2002 05/08/2002

33 PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Annotated and Unnotated) filed by dfts Ventura County, Robert Brooks, Robert Ortiez, K Hanson (el) (Entered: 03/21/2002)
34 PROPOSED VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION filed by defendants (el) (Entered: 03/21/2002)
35 MINUTES: Proc: On the Court's own motion, the Final Pretrial Conference is cont to 1:30 4/22/02 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (el) (Entered: 03/27/2002)
36 MINUTES: Arguments had; that the motion of dfts & plf's for partial summary judgment [18-1] and motion for summary judgment [16-1] areb submitted without fur oral argument by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: Lori Moriaka (el) (Entered: 03/28/2002)
37 STIPULATION and ORDER by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall ; Final Pretrial Conference set for 3:00 4/22/02 , ;the current trial date fo 5/7/02 to be cont at PTC (yc) (Entered: 04/04/2002)
38 MEMO OF CONTENTIONS OF FACT and LAW by plaintiff Noelle Way (ir) (Entered: 04/11/2002)
39 DESIGNATION OF WITNESS to be called @ trial submitted by plaintiff Noelle Way (ir) (Entered: 04/11/2002)
40 JOINT EXHIBIT list by plaintiff (ir) (Entered: 04/12/2002)
LODGED PRETRIAL CONF ORD submitted by plaintiff Noelle Way (FWD TO CRD) (ir) (Entered: 04/15/2002)
41 MINUTES: On the Court's own motion, Final Pretrial Conference is cont to 3:00 5/13/02; jury trial cont to 10:00 6/25/02 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (el) (Entered: 04/17/2002)
42 MOTION by plaintiff Noelle Way in limine No.1 to exclude testimony of Marijuana found after arrest ; Mem of PA; Lodged Order (el) (Entered: 04/23/2002)
43 MINUTES: ON the Court's own motion, plf's motion in limine excluding testimony of Marijuana found after arrest [42-1] is submitted w/out oral argument by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall; CR: (n/a) (nhac) (Entered: 04/24/2002)
44 ORDER by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall that ALL in limine motions [42-1] shall remain under submission pending fur order of this Court. (el) (Entered: 04/25/2002)
45 RE-NOTICE of hearing of dfts' in limine objections by defendant Ventura County (el) (Entered: 04/25/2002)
46 NOTICE of Non-opp to plf's motion in limine by defendants (el) (Entered: 04/25/2002)
47 MINUTES: (In chambers) The Court hereby grants plf's motion in limine No.1 to exclude testimony of Marijuana found after arrest [42-1] by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: N/A (el) (Entered: 05/03/2002)
48 MINUTES: On the Court's own motion, the Final Pretrial Conference s cont to 3:00 6/10/02 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (el) (Entered: 05/07/2002)
49 PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT/GENERAL VERDICT with special interrogatories filed by defendant Robert Ortiez (el) (Entered: 05/09/2002)

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06/07/2002 06/13/2002 06/20/2002 06/28/2002 07/16/2002 07/22/2002
08/06/2002 08/14/2002
08/15/2002 08/20/2002 08/20/2002 08/27/2002 08/27/2002 08/27/2002 08/29/2002 08/30/2002

50 MINUTES: On the Court's ownmotion, Final Pretrial Conference is cont to 3:00 6/17/02 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (el) (Entered: 06/07/2002)
51 MINUTES: Proc: On the Court's own motion, Final Pretrial Conference is cont to 3:00 8/19/02; jury trial cont to 10:00 9/24/02 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (el) (Entered: 06/14/2002)
52 OBJECTIONS filed by plaintiff Noelle Way to document proposed Verdict Form [49-1] (el) (Entered: 06/21/2002)
53 PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED VERDICT Form (ir) (Entered: 07/03/2002)
54 NOTICE OF CHANGE Of Address (ZIP CODE to 93036) filed by atty Alan E Wisotsky for defendant K Hanson (el) Modified on 07/17/2002 (Entered: 07/17/2002)
55 ORDER by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall that Dfts' motion for summary judgment [16-1], is DENIED and Plf's motion for partial summary judgment agnst dft dep K Hanson, Cnty of Ventura & Sheriff Robert Brooks [18-1], is GRANTED IN PART. The Court finds tht the search of plf was conducted purs to the County's strip search policy, that the search constitute a viol of plf's Fourth Amendment rights, and that the dfts are liable for dm proimate caused by the search. Dfts may file motions addressing whether they are entitled to qualified immunity. (el) (Entered: 07/22/2002)
56 MINUTES before Judge Consuelo B. Marshall: The Crt CONT the pretrial Conference to 3:00 on 9/16/02 CR: N/A (jp) (Entered: 08/07/2002)
57 MINUTES: Dfts propsd stip ord re case management lodged on 8/9/02 is DENIED. The prosd sched will no tpermit the Crt enough time to consider the rule on a mot for class certification. The sched dates pertaining to dft Ortiz remains in full force and effect by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall. IT IS SO ORDERED. CR: none present present (el) (Entered: 08/16/2002)
PLACED IN FILE - NOT USED propsd stip Order re Case Management (el) (Entered: 08/16/2002)
58 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant Ventura County, defendant Robert Brooks, defendant K Hanson to 9th C/A from Dist. Court ord fld 7/22/02 [55-1] (cc: Jeffrey Held, Earnest C.S. Bell) Fee: Paid (dlu) (Entered: 08/21/2002)
59 TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATION and ordering form for dates: 3/27/02 CR: Lori Muraoka (dlu) (Entered: 08/21/2002)
61 RE-NOTICE OF REQUEST filed by defendant Robert Ortiez for the Court to rule upon his propsd voir dire at the pretrial conf (el) (Entered: 08/29/2002)
62 RE-NOTICE of REQUEST filed by defendant Robert Ortiez for issuance of Verdict with Special Interrogatories (el) (Entered: 08/29/2002)
63 RE-NOTICE of hearing of dfts' in limine motions by defendants (el) (Entered: 08/29/2002)
60 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number appeal [58-1] 02-56457. (ghap) (Entered: 08/29/2002)
LODGED Civil Appeals Docketing Statement (FWD TO 9th CCA). (cbr) (Entered: 09/03/2002)

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09/04/2002
09/04/2002 09/04/2002 09/16/2002 10/02/2002 10/16/2002 10/18/2002
12/09/2002 12/09/2002 12/10/2002 12/30/2002 01/14/2003 01/30/2003 02/21/2003 02/26/2003 03/13/2003 03/17/2003

64 MINUTES: Proc(s): On the Crt's own motion, Final Pretrial Conference is cont to 3:00 10/7/02; jury trial cont to 10:00 11/19/02 that all the pending motions re stipulation clarification of status of x-motions for summ jgm [26-1]; the request for the Court to rule upon his propsd voir dire at the pretrial conf [61-1] is submitted, that the request for issuance of Verdict with Special Interrogatories [62-1] stand submitted without oral argument by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (el) Modified on 09/05/2002 (Entered: 09/05/2002)
65 PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS filed by plaintiff Noelle Way (el) (Entered: 09/05/2002)
66 OBJECTIONS filed by plaintiff Noelle Way to dfts proposed Jury Instructions [33-1] (el) (Entered: 09/05/2002)
67 NOTICE of Non-Availability of plf's cnsl Earnest C.S. Bell from 9/28/02 to 10/15/02 by plaintiff Noelle Way (el) (Entered: 09/17/2002)
68 STIPULATION and ORDER CONT by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall ; Final Pretrial Conference set for 3:00 11/4/02 (pj) (Entered: 10/02/2002)
69 RE NOTICE by defendant of hearing of motions in limine, prop voir dire, jury instructions, & proposed verdict at cont ptc (pj) (Entered: 10/17/2002)
70 MINUTES: On the Court's own motion, Final Pretrial Conference is continued to 3:00 12/16/02; jury trial set on 10:00 1/28/03 ; In limine motions shall stand submitted without oral argument, motion of Robert Ortiz for hearing on In Limine Motions is denied by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (el) (Entered: 10/21/2002)
72 RECEIPT OF TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 3/27/02 (Re: [58-1] ) CR: C. Mizell (Trans Dorothy Babykin) (dlu) (Entered: 12/11/2002)
TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings held on 3/27/02 (dlu) (Entered: 12/11/2002)
71 MINUTES: On the Court's own motion, Final Pretrial Conference is continued to 3:00 1/6/03 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (el) (Entered: 12/11/2002)
73 MINUTES: Continued ; Final Pretrial Conference set for 3:00 2/3/03 ; jury trial set on 10:00 3/4/03 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (pj) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
74 CERTIFICATE of Record Transmitted to USCA-02-56457. (cc: all parties) (wdc) (Entered: 01/14/2003)
75 MINUTES: Court on own motion continues: Final Pretrial Conference set for 3:00 2/24/03 jury trial set on 10:00 4/1/03 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: none (lc) (Entered: 01/30/2003)
76 MINUTES: Court on own motion: Final Pretrial Conference continued for 3:00 3/3/03 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: none (lc) (Entered: 02/24/2003)
77 MINUTES: Court on own motion: Final Pretrial Conference continued for 3:00 3/17/03 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: none (lc) (Entered: 02/27/2003)
78 MINUTES: Court on own motion: Final Pretrial Conference continued for 10:00 3/18/03 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: none (lc) (Entered: 03/13/2003)
79 MINUTES: Final Pretrial Conference continued for 3:00 3/31/03 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: none (lc) (Entered: 03/17/2003)

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03/28/2003 04/16/2003 06/17/2003 06/18/2003 07/07/2003
11/24/2003
11/26/2003 11/26/2003 11/26/2003 12/04/2003 01/09/2004 01/14/2004
01/29/2004
02/18/2004 03/04/2004

80 MINUTES: Court on own motion: Final Pretrial Conference continued for 3:00 4/21/03; jury trial continued on 10:00 5/20/03 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: none (lc) (Entered: 03/28/2003)
81 MINUTES: Pre Trial Conference/Jury Trial; On Court's own motion, Pretrial Conference continued to Monday 6/16/03 at 3:00; jury trial continued to 10:00 7/22/03 by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: n/a (ir) (Entered: 04/16/2003)
82 STIPULATION and ORDER by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall that the Pretrial Conference date currently scheduled for 6/16/03 at 3:00 pm be continued to 7/7/03 at 3:00 pm (nhac) Modified on 06/17/2003 (Entered: 06/17/2003)
PLACED IN FILE - NOT USED; Stipulation and Order to continue pretrial conference date attached declaration of Earnest CS Bell; Lodged 6/17/03 (mch) (Entered: 06/19/2003)
83 MINUTES: Status conference held in lieu of pretrial conference ; defendants motions in limine: granted as to 1-6, denied as to 8-10; acton stayed pending further order of court; ex aprte status reports be field on or before 1/12/04 terminating case (MD JS-6) case stayed pending further order by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall CR: Leni LeBlanc (lc) (Entered: 07/09/2003)
86 NOTICE OF HEARING OF MOTIION AND MOTION by defendants K Hanson, Bob Brooks for summary judgment ; motion hearing set for 10:00 1/26/04; memorandum of Points and Authorities; Lodged Order and Statement (ir) (Entered: 12/02/2003)
84 CERTIFIED COPY of Appellate Court Order: dismissing the appeal [58-1] (lc) (Entered: 12/01/2003)
85 MINUTES: MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing appeal be filed and spread on minutes of this court (lc) (Entered: 12/01/2003)
Lodged certified copy of 9thCCA judgment, appeal is hereby dismissed. (02-56457) (wdc) (Entered: 12/01/2003)
87 Notice of change of hearing to 1/26/04 re defedants' motion for summary judgment [86-1] (lc) (Entered: 12/05/2003)
88 OPPOSITION to defendants Motion for Summary Judgment[86] filed by Plaintiff Noelle Way. (mch, ) (Entered: 01/13/2004)
89 MINUTES OF In Chambers Conference held before Judge Consuelo B. Marshall : On the Court's own motion, [86] Motion of Defendants Karen Hanson and Bob Brooks for Summary Judgment is continued for hearing on 1/29/2004 at 10:00 AM before Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall. (shb, ) (Entered: 01/14/2004)
92 MINUTES of Motion Hearing held on defendants Karen Hanson and Bob Brooks Motion for Summary Judgment[86], Order by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall denying Motion for Summary Judgment[86]; court to issue formal orde; Court Reporter: Leandra Amber. (lc, ) Modified on 3/9/2004 (lc, ). (Entered: 03/09/2004)
90 ORDER by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall : denying [86] defendants Karen Hanson and Sheriff Rovert Brooks Motion for Summary Judgment (lc, ) (Entered: 02/20/2004)
91 NOTICE OF APPEAL to 9th CCA filed by defendants Ventura County, Bob Brooks, Karen Hanson. Appeal of Order 90, Filed On: 2/18/04; Entered On: 2/20/04; Order 55 Filed On: 7/22/02; Filing fee $255, Paid, receipt number 60357. cc: Alan E. Wisotsky;

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03/04/2004 03/12/2004 03/19/2004 10/26/2005 06/02/2006 10/25/2006 12/18/2006 05/02/2007
05/14/2007

Ernest C.S. Bell. (weap, ) (Entered: 03/04/2004)
Civil Appeals Docketing Statement received from defendants Ventura County, Bob Brooks, Karen Hanson forwarded to 9th CCA. RE: Appeal to Circuit Court, [91] (weap, ) (Entered: 03/04/2004)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re: Appeal to Circuit Court [91]. (cbr, ) (Entered: 03/12/2004)
93 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 04-55457, 9th CCA regarding Appeal to Circuit Court, [91] filed by Ventura County. (cbr, ) (Entered: 03/19/2004)
94 RECORD ON APPEAL sent to Circuit Court re: Appeal number, 04-55457 Record consists of 1 thru 2 volumes, 1 transcript. (cbr, ) (Entered: 10/26/2005)
95 MANDATE of 9th CCA filed as to Appeal to Circuit Court, [91], CCA # 04-55457. The appeal is Affirmed in part and Reversed in part. Mandate received in this district on 6/9/06. (dmap, ) (Entered: 06/13/2006)
96 APPEAL RECORD RETURNED from 9th CCA Received: Volume(s): 1 through 2; Transcripts(s): 1; RE: Appeal Record Sent to USCA (A-26)[94] (et) (Entered: 10/28/2006)
97 REQUEST for a status conference date at which time an Order for setting pretrial and trial dates filed by plaintiff Noelle Way. (et) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
98 STIPULATED ORDER OF PREJUDICIAL DISMISSAL OF ALL DEFENDANTS by Judge Consuelo B. Marshall: Ordered that the Defendants, County of Ventura, Robert Brooks, Robert Ortiz, and Karen Hanson, in every capacity, are dismissed with prejudice from this litigation and any other lawsuit in any other federal or any state court. Both sides retain the right to make whatever arguments they believe necessary in the companion class action, Gamino. The Plaintiff, in exchange for consideration recited in the agreement terminating the JAMS mediation on 3/29/2007, waives all past, present, and future damages; equitable and declaratory relief; discovery rights; and joinder as a party plaintiff or claimant in the companion class action, Gamino; and further waives all past, present, and future attorneys' fees, whether of record or not, plus a full and final waiver of all past, present, and future ordinary and extraordinary costs. (gk, ) (Entered: 05/03/2007)
99 WRITTEN NOTICE of Entry of Order of Prejudicial Dismissal of All Defendants filed by Defendants County of Ventura, Robert Brooks, Robert Ortiz (erroneously sued Ventura Police Officer Robert Ortiez), and Karen Hanson (erroneously sued as Deputy K. Hanson. (gk, ) (Entered: 05/23/2007)

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 445 F.3d 1157 (2006)
Noelle WAY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
COUNTY OF VENTURA; Robert Brooks; Karen Hanson, Defendants-Appellants, and Robert Ortiez, Ventura Police Officer, Defendant.
No. 04-55457.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2005. Filed April 20, 2006.
1158 *1158 Alan E. Wisotsky and Jeffrey Held, Law Offices of Alan E. Wisotsky, Oxnard, CA, for the defendantsappellants.
Earnest C.S. Bell, Law Offices of Earnest C.S. Bell, Ventura, CA, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Before RYMER and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and EDWARD C. REED, JR.,[*] District Judge.
RYMER, Circuit Judge.
We must decide whether Ventura County Sheriff Bob Brooks and Deputy Karen Hanson are entitled to qualified immunity for conducting a strip search with a visual cavity inspection of Noelle Way during the booking process at a pre-trial detention facility on a misdemeanor charge of being under the influence of cocaine or methamphetamine in violation of California Health & Safety Code § 11550(a). This requires us first to decide whether a strip search with a visual cavity inspection can be justified based on Ventura County's blanket stripsearch policy allowing such a search for arrestees charged with any controlled substance offense before placement in the general jail population. The district court held that the search was unconstitutional, and we agree. However, it was not clearly established at the time of Way's booking that strip searching persons arrested on drug charges is unreasonable. As the district court thought otherwise on this issue, we reverse.
I
On September 6, 2000, Ventura Police Officer Ortiz encountered Way at her work place, the Red Cove Bar, where she was a bartender. He observed that she had dilated pupils, a rapid pulse rate, a nervous attitude and rapid speech. Based on these observations, he suspected that she was under the influence of cocaine or methamphetamine, a misdemeanor violation of California Health & Safety Code § 11550(a), and arrested her at 2:10 A.M. A blood sample taken from Way at a hospital the night of the arrest revealed that the officer's suspicion was incorrect.
Meanwhile, Ortiz took Way to Ventura County's pretrial detention facility for booking. The booking policy of the Ventura County Sheriff's Department provided for a visual body cavity search of all persons arrested on fresh misdemeanor drug charges. The search must be performed by a deputy of the same sex as the detainee, and it involves no touching. The person arrested was to be searched immediately upon booking, without a waiting period for posting bail.
1159 *1159 Pursuant to the policy, Hanson sought and obtained her supervisor's approval to perform a body cavity search upon Way. The sole justification was that Way had been arrested for violating California Health & Safety Code § 11550(a). According to Hanson, "the nature of the charges is viewed as providing the reasonable suspicion required under the law to perform a visual strip search."
The search involved a visual inspection of Way's unclothed body cavities, and it took place in a private room with only Hanson present. Hanson directed Way to remove all her clothing. She then directed Way to remove her

tampon and to tear it and discard it in a wastebasket. Pursuant to the search policy, Way was required to "bend forward, spread the buttocks, and cough to allow for a visual inspection of the anal area" as well as to "spread her labia at the same time to allow a check of the vaginal area." The search yielded no contraband, weapons or drugs.
The booking process lasted 26 minutes, from 3:10 A.M. to 3:36 A.M. Within 20 minutes after the completion of the body cavity search, Way learned the amount of her bail. She was placed in a holding cell with five or six other women, where she was allowed to make phone calls. She remained there for several hours. She then posted bail, and was released without entering the jail's general population.
Way brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Brooks and Hanson, as well as the County of Ventura, alleging that they violated her civil rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by subjecting her to a body cavity search following her arrest. The parties both filed motions for summary judgment. The district court held that the search violated Way's constitutional rights because individualized suspicion is required for arrestees who are not admitted to the general jail population. It denied qualified immunity to Brooks and Hanson on the basis of Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 616-17 (9th Cir.1984) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 n. 1 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc); Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 702, 711 (9th Cir.1990) (as amended), implied overruling on other grounds recognized by Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 971 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir.1992); and Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1446 (9th Cir.1991), holding that a reasonable officer reviewing Ventura's policy and the established law would have recognized that the Sheriff Department's policy was unconstitutional because it did not further any legitimate penological interests.[1] That ruling is the subject of this appeal.
II
We analyze qualified immunity using the two-step inquiry set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). The first step of the Saucier analysis requires us to decide whether this body cavity search violated Way's constitutional rights. Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If so, "the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established." Id. For a right to be clearly established, its contours "`must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the right.'" Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). The 1160 protection afforded *1160 by qualified immunity "safeguards `all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)).
A
Brooks and Hanson argue that the visual body cavity search violated no constitutional rights because Sheriff's Department officials are entitled to deference on jail security matters, and their interest in securing this jail during the booking process outweighs Way's right to be free from a compulsory visual inspection of her genitalia and anus. They also contend that the Sheriff Department's strip search policy complies with state law as set out in California Penal Code § 4030.[2] Way responds that drug charges alone are insufficient to justify such an extreme intrusion, where she was merely a misdemeanor arrestee charged with being under the influence of a controlled substance, who was detained for only a few hours and was never housed with the jail's general population.
We assess the constitutionality of a search by balancing "the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). This requires us to weigh "the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." Id.
The scope of the intrusion here is indisputably a "frightening and humiliating" invasion, even when conducted "with all due courtesy." Giles, 746 F.2d at 617. Its intrusiveness "cannot be overstated." Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 711

; see also Kirkpatrick v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 485, 489-90 (9th Cir.1986) ("[T]he fact that a strip search is conducted reasonably, without touching and outside the view of all persons other than the party performing the search, does not negate the fact that a strip search is a significant intrusion on the person searched. . . ." (citation omitted)); Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir.1989) ("The feelings of humiliation and degradation associated with forcibly exposing one's nude body to strangers for visual inspection is beyond dispute.").
1161 The parties agree that the search took place in a private room, behind closed *1161 doors, with no one present but Way and Hanson, and there is no issue about how it was conducted.
This leaves the question whether the intrusion was justified. We recognize the difficulty of operating a detention facility safely, the seriousness of the risk of smuggled weapons and contraband, and the deference we owe jail officials' exercise of judgment in adopting and executing policies necessary to maintain institutional security. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546-47, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861. However, this does not mean that a blanket policy is constitutionally acceptable simply by virtue of jail officials' invocation of security concerns. Giles, 746 F.2d at 616. Rather, the policy must be "`reasonably related' to the [detention facility's] interest in maintaining security." Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 713 (citing Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 540, 99 S.Ct. 1861).
Brooks and Hanson failed to show any link between their blanket strip search policy and legitimate security concerns for detainees such as Way. See Giles, 746 F.2d at 617 (imposing burden on officials to demonstrate that security interests warrant the serious invasion of privacy inflicted by a strip search policy). They made only a conclusory submission that the purpose of the search protocol is "to provide facility security and to ensure the inmate's health and safety," and that inmates have "sometimes" ingested drugs to evade detection. Nor did they adduce evidence of any deterrent effect on persons such as Way who are spontaneously arrested and detained temporarily at the facility for being under the influence.[3]Cf. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (noting evidence in the record documenting detainees' attempts to secrete money, drugs, weapons and other contraband in body cavities). In effect, they ask us to take security implications on faith. This we cannot do. See Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 713 (declining to accept the Los Angeles Police Department's justification for a blanket strip search policy as it rested only on assumptions and societal judgments without documentation of risk).
Brooks and Hanson maintain that all drug offenses inherently heighten security concerns because of the risk that persons arrested on drug charges will bring drugs with them. Perhaps with respect to other types of drug offenses 0907 about which we express no opinion 0907 but the record shows us nothing about this jail (or any other jail's) experience with those arrested on § 11550(a) charges. We do not disagree that in some cases, the charge itself may give rise to reasonable suspicion; indeed, we so held in Thompson, where the felony charged was grand theft auto and the offense was "sufficiently associated with violence to justify a visual strip search." 885 F.2d at 1447. We have also been careful to distinguish charges that involve drugs and contraband as well as violence when invalidating blanket strip search policies applied in other contexts. See Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 716 (holding unconstitutional a strip search policy applied to person arrested for stealing a roommate's belongings, observing that "[n]o weapons, no drugs, no contraband, no violent acts of any kind were involved"); Giles, 746 F.2d at 618 (declaring unconstitutional a policy requiring that all persons booked on minor traffic offenses be strip searched, while noting that the "offense was minor and was related neither to drugs nor to weapons"). However, 1162 we have never said that all offenses of any particular nature support reasonable suspicion. To the contrary, *1162 the charge in Kennedy was for grand theft as it was in Thompson, but we held that a strip search policy was unconstitutional as applied to Kennedy because the grand theft charge there arose out of an ordinary disagreement that did not in itself pose a threat of violence in jail.
We cannot see how the charge of being under the influence of a drug necessarily poses a threat of concealing (and thereby using or trafficking) additional drugs in jail during the limited time between booking and bail, or booking and placement in the general population. If not, it was unreasonable to assume that Way harbored drugs in some cavity or other.[4] "Reasonable suspicion may be based on such factors as the nature of the offense, the arrestee's appearance and conduct, and the prior arrest record." Giles, 746 F.2d at 617. Way was under the control of the arresting officer from the time she was taken into custody at work until booking. The officer perceived no indication that she was carrying drugs or contraband. Compare, e.g., People v. Wade, 208 Cal. App.3d 304, 306-07, 256 Cal.Rptr. 189, 190-91 (Cal.Ct.App.1989) (holding that a body cavity search was justified

by the arresting officers' observation of the suspect apparently trying to put something beneath his waistband). Hanson conducted a pat down search before obtaining permission for the visual cavity search, and it turned up nothing.[5] Way was held with several other detainees, but was not in the facility for long and was never put into the general jail population. See Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1448 ("In determining the constitutionality of strip searches of arrestees, courts have distinguished between searches of detainees who were simply awaiting bail, and searches conducted on inmates admitted or about to be admitted to the general jail population."); Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir.1986) ("In most instances the unreasonableness of a strip search conducted prior to an [own recognizance] release determination is plain."). In these circumstances, we conclude that an arrest for being under the influence of a drug does not supply reasonable suspicion that drugs are concealed in a bodily cavity.
As there is no evidence that security concerns require strip searching all arrestees on all drug offenses before placement in the general jail population, and none that all persons arrested for being under the influence of a drug are likely to have concealed more drugs in a bodily cavity, the Sheriff Department's blanket policy cannot be a proxy for reasonable suspicion. There was no individualized suspicion that Way concealed drugs in a bodily cavity. Therefore, subjecting her to a strip search with visual cavity inspection offended her constitutional right to be free of an unreasonable search.
B
Having determined that Way's constitutional rights were violated, the remaining question is whether it was clearly established at the time of the search that the search was unconstitutional. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 1163 S.Ct. 2151. "If *1163 the law did not put [Brooks and Hanson] on notice that[their] conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate." Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151.
We had held prior to Way's search that performing a strip search with visual cavity inspection before determining whether the person was eligible for release on his own recognizance could not be justified based on a blanket policy of subjecting all minor offense arrestees to a strip search, Ward, 791 F.2d 1329; that a visual body cavity search of a person arrested on an offense that did not involve violence could not be justified by a blanket policy of subjecting all those arrested for felonies to such a search, Kennedy, 901 F.2d 702; and that a strip and body cavity search of all felony arrestees could not be justified based on the jail's blanket search policy regardless of the crime with which they were charged, Fuller, 950 F.2d 1437. However, we had never previously addressed the constitutionality of a body cavity search policy premised on the nature of this or any other drug offense. More importantly, we had held that the nature of the offense alone may provide reasonable suspicion, Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1447, and twice pointed to charges involving drugs, contraband and violence as the kind of offense that might give rise to reasonable suspicion. Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 716; Giles, 746 F.2d at 618. In these circumstances, we cannot conclude that a reasonable officer would necessarily have realized that relying on a Department policy that excepted arrestees being held on controlled substance offenses from the general prohibition on strip searches, and subjecting Way to a strip search with visual cavity inspection pursuant to it, was unconstitutional.
The district court came to a different conclusion by analogy to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416 (10th Cir.1997). There, a highway patrol officer arrested Foote for being under the influence of marijuana. Id. at 1420. She was strip searched when booked at the county jail and was released without being placed in the general jail population. Id. at 1421. The court held that the search was unconstitutional, and that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. However, Foote's qualified immunity analysis turned on the fact that before the Foote search was conducted, Cottrell v. Kaysville City, 994 F.2d 730, 734-35 (10th Cir.1993), clearly established that merely being arrested for driving under the influence of drugs does not justify a strip search. Foote, 118 F.3d at 1421. Our law was not so clear (until now), hence our reluctance to hold Brooks and Hanson personally liable for damages.
We therefore conclude that subjecting Way to a strip search with visual cavity inspection during the booking process on a misdemeanor charge of being under the influence of a drug was not justified by the jail's blanket policy of strip searching all those arrested on charges involving a controlled substance. Undocumented security

needs of the jail facility do not outweigh the invasion of Way's personal rights. Nor is such an intrusive search warranted solely on account of the nature of the charge in this case, as being under the influence of a drug does not necessarily indicate that the person has concealed more drugs in a body cavity. This said, a reasonable official in the position of Brooks and Hanson would not have understood that following the jail's policy violated Way's rights because the unconstitutionality of the search they conducted was not clearly established at the time.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
1164 *1164 WARDLAW, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur with all but part B of the well-written majority opinion. I depart from the majority because I believe that at the time of Way's body cavity search, the Fourth Amendment principles governing blanket searches prohibited strip and body cavity blanket searches and required individualized reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts before such a search could be conducted on a misdemeanor arrestee. I particularly disagree with the majority's parsimonious approach to the analysis of our precedent, which focuses on the application of clearly established Fourth Amendment principles to each penal code section we have addressed and not on the wellestablished principles themselves. The fact of the matter is that Ventura County had an unconstitutional blanket strip search policy which permitted such searches based upon no specific, articulable facts at all 0907 a policy we have repeatedly held unconstitutional. I cannot go so far as to say that under the circumstances the individual officers acted objectively unreasonably, however, only because reasonable officers in Brooks' and Hanson's position could have believed that the Ventura County Sheriff's Department policy comported with the Constitution. Therefore I concur in holding that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.
I
I disagree that we can find clearly established law in this case only if we have previously addressed the constitutionality of a strip and body cavity search of a misdemeanor drug arrestee. To the contrary, a constitutional right may be clearly established when "[t]he reasoning, though not the holding" of a prior decision applies to a set of facts, Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 743, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002), and "officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances," id. at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508. "Otherwise, officers would escape responsibility for the most egregious forms of conduct simply because there was no case on all fours prohibiting that particular manifestation of unconstitutional conduct." Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1286 (9th Cir.2001). The Supreme Court has rejected this parsimonious approach to the Fourth Amendment principle of reasonableness, stating that the balancing test fashioned in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), is "not capable of precise definition or mechanical application."
The clearly established general Fourth Amendment principle of reasonableness, which we have applied to strip and body cavity searches of arrestees, see Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1445 (9th Cir.1989), rendered the Ventura County blanket strip and body cavity search policy unconstitutional. We have interpreted the principle of reasonableness in the context of misdemeanor pretrial detainees to require application of a standard of individualized reasonable suspicion, such that "arrestees . . . may be subjected to a strip search only if jail officials have a reasonable suspicion that the particular arrestee is carrying or concealing contraband or suffering from a communicable disease." Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 615 (9th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (emphasis added), overruled in part on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 n. 1 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc). Only consideration of the multiplicity of factors giving rise to individualized reasonable suspicion, such as "the nature of the offense, the arrestee's appearance and conduct, and the prior arrest record," properly balances the "intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against [the] promotion 1165 of legitimate governmental interests." Id. at 617 (emphasis added). Moreover, "[i]n most instances *1165 the unreasonableness of a strip search conducted prior to an [own recognizance] release determination is plain." Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir.1986). We have routinely struck down blanket strip search policies as applied against misdemeanor arrestees, and we have gone so far as to state that "no published state or federal case since Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908

(1966) . . . upholds the constitutionality of a blanket policy of strip searches of minor offense arrestees." Ward, 791 F.2d at 1332.
While the majority broadly asserts that we held in Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1447, that the nature of the charge alone, when it involves drugs, contraband, or violence, warrants a departure from the standard of individualized reasonable suspicion, I read our holding in Thompson much more narrowly. First, we explicitly limited Thompson to the facts of the case, stating that "our decision is extremely narrow and only applies to theft of an automobile." Id. at 1447 n. 6. Second, the Thompson case does not control Way's case because Thompson was strip searched not at the time of booking, but rather when he entered the general county jail population, where he remained for five days. Id. at 1442. While this additional factor alone will not justify a strip search, id., "[i]n determining the constitutionality of strip searches of arrestees, courts have distinguished between searches of detainees who were simply awaiting bail, and searches conducted on inmates admitted or about to be admitted to the general jail population," Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1448 (9th Cir.1991). The majority bolsters its argument by pointing out that in Giles, 746 F.2d at 618, and Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 702, 716 (9th Cir. 1990), implied overruling in part on other grounds recognized by Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir.1993), we pointed to charges involving drugs, contraband, and violence as the kind of offenses that might give rise to reasonable suspicion. However, our holdings in those cases considered the nature of the charge only in combination with other specific and individualized factors.
Departure from the standard of individualized reasonable suspicion in deference to the security concerns of prison officials, see Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, is appropriate only when there is "sufficient justification for [the] blanket search policy," Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 713. We struck down a blanket policy similar to the Ventura County Sheriff's Department's in Giles, 746 F.2d at 617 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861), because no security concerns comparable to those in Bell had been demonstrated. Demonstration of legitimate security concerns is required because the Court in Bell "did not . . . read out of the Constitution the provision of general application that a search be justified as reasonable under the circumstances." Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 800 (2nd Cir.1986). As the majority concludes, there is no documentation of security concerns in this case which are serious enough to justify a departure from the general rule requiring individualized reasonable suspicion. The facts of this case amply demonstrate the perils of such a blanket search policy, because all of the circumstances surrounding Way's arrest and detention negate the conclusion that Way, a detainee who had no chance to secrete drugs, was to post bail shortly after her arrest, and who would never be mingled with the general jail population, was concealing contraband. At the time the search was performed, it was clearly established that absent a showing of serious security concerns tipping the balance in favor of the government interest, the Fourth Amendment required application of the standard of individualized reasonable suspicion.
1166 *1166 II
While it is generally the case that "[i]f the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct," Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), in measuring the "objective reasonableness" of the officer's conduct we have looked beyond the existing body of case law to whether the officer relied on a state statute, regulation, or official policy that explicitly sanctioned the conduct in question, see Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999); Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 1994). While reliance upon a statute does not render the officer's conduct per se reasonable, Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1252 (10th Cir.2003), "the existence of a statute or ordinance authorizing particular conduct is a factor which militates in favor of the conclusion that a reasonable official would find that conduct constitutional," because "police officers on the street are ordinarily entitled to rely on the assumption that the [legislature] ha[s] considered the views of legal counsel and concluded that the ordinance is a valid and constitutional exercise of authority," Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1209.
In this case, the Ventura County Sheriff's Department policy authorized the conduct in question. Officers Brooks and Hanson complied with that policy. In addition, California Penal Code § 4030(f) specifically exempts those arrested on misdemeanor "weapons, controlled substances or violence" charges from the general prohibition on strip and body cavity searches of persons arrested for misdemeanors. Because the policy and the state statute

had not fallen into desuetude, Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1209 n. 19, nor were they "patently violative of fundamental constitutional principles," id. at 1209, it was objectively reasonable for officers Brooks and Hanson to rely on the policy and the state statute in performing the strip search on Way. I therefore concur with the majority in finding that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.
[*] The Honorable Edward C. Reed, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
[1] Brooks and Hanson previously filed an appeal from the district court's order denying qualified immunity, which we dismissed as premature because the court had not also determined whether Way's constitutional rights were violated. Way v. County of Ventura, 348 F.3d 808 (9th Cir.2003).
[2] California Penal Code § 4030(a) provides:
The Legislature finds and declares that law enforcement policies and practices for conducting strip or body cavity searches of detained persons vary widely throughout California. Consequently, some people have been arbitrarily subjected to unnecessary strip and body cavity searches after arrests for minor misdemeanor and infraction offenses. Some present search practices violate state and federal constitutional rights to privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to protect the state and federal constitutional rights of the people of California by establishing a statewide policy strictly limiting strip and body cavity searches.
Subsection (f) provides that "[n]o person arrested and held in custody on a misdemeanor . . . offense, except those involving weapons, controlled substances or violence . . . shall be subjected to a strip search or visual body cavity search prior to placement in the general jail population" without "reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts to believe such person is concealing a weapon or contraband, and a strip search will result in the discovery of the weapon or contraband." To conduct such a search requires authorization of the supervising officer on duty, which "shall include the specific and articulable facts and circumstances upon which the reasonable suspicion determination was made by the supervisor." Cal.Penal Code § 4030(f).
[3] Counsel suggested at oral argument that the facility had experienced difficulties since the district court's ruling in this case, but the record contains no evidence of whatever they might be.
[4] We have no occasion to comment on any other kind of drug offense, which may have different characteristics that might lead to a different analysis on a different record. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Rincon, 36 F.3d 859, 861, 864 (9th Cir.1994) (discussing narcotics smuggler who carried 73 balloons of cocaine in her rectum and alimentary canal).
[5] At argument, counsel suggested that LSD, for example, can be smuggled on postage stamps or the like that are not readily discoverable during a pat down search. However, there is no evidence to this effect in the record and it is not self-evident that cocaine or methamphetamine (which is what Way was suspected of being under the influence of) are routinely concealed in this way.
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 348 F.3d 808 (2003)
Noelle WAY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
COUNTY OF VENTURA; Robert Brooks; Karen Hanson, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 02-56457.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted October 9, 2003.[*] Filed October 31, 2003.
809 *809 Alan E. Wisotsky and Jeffrey Held, Law Offices of Alan E. Wisotsky, Oxnard, California, for the defendantsappellants.
Earnest C.S. Bell, Ventura, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Before: J. Clifford WALLACE, RYMER, Pamela Ann Rymer, and Richard C. TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Submitted October 9, 2003.[*] Pasadena, California.
OPINION
WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge:
Robert Brooks, Karen Hanson, and County of Ventura (together, County) appeal from an order (Order) denying their motion for summary judgment and granting in part Noelle Way's motion for partial summary judgment. Because we lack appellate jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.
810 *810 Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, we have jurisdiction only to hear appeals from "final decisions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. An order is final under section 1291 "if it (1) is a full adjudication of the issues, and (2) clearly evidences the judge's intention that it be the court's final act in the matter." United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Order here falls short of this standard. By inviting the County at the end of the Order to "file motions addressing whether they are entitled to qualified immunity," the district court's intention clearly was not that the Order "be the court's final act in the matter," but rather that the court would entertain additional arguments. See Nat'l Distrib. Agency v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 117 F.3d 432, 434 (9th Cir.1997) ("A district court ruling is not final if the court reserves the option of further modifying its ruling.").
The County argues that we nonetheless have jurisdiction to hear "immediate interlocutory appeals from district court decisions adjudicating any of the [two] qualified immunity component inquiries." The Supreme Court's analysis in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), requires us to address qualified immunity defenses as follows: "the first inquiry must be whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged; second, assuming the violation is established, the question whether the right was clearly established must be considered on a more specific level." Id. at 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151. In this case, the district court decided the first inquiry, and the County seeks to appeal this ruling before the second is reached.
By not considering the second inquiry in Saucier's analysis, however, the district court did not arrive at a final, appealable decision on the County's qualified immunity. It is well-settled that "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable `final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). It is likewise beyond dispute that multiple appeals are possible in certain circumstances: "Mitchell clearly establishes that an order rejecting the defense of qualified immunity at either the dismissal stage or the summary judgment stage is a `final' judgment subject to immediate appeal."

Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996). It is decidedly not true, however, that we can exercise appellate jurisdiction midway through the qualified immunity analysis, before the district court makes a complete, final ruling on the issue. The County has not cited, nor are we able to find, any authority providing for appellate jurisdiction in this situation.
The County seeks to support its novel proposition by focusing on the rationale underlying Saucier's direction that courts conduct the required inquiry in sequence: the court's answer to the first inquiry, if it does not relieve the County of the pending lawsuit immediately, at least serves the important function of clarifying the implicated constitutional right and thus informing law enforcement conduct going forward. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. It is hard to see, though, how this objective would be materially advanced by the multiple appeals advocated by the County. After all, in deciding the first Saucier inquiry (i.e., whether a constitutional right was violated), the district court has gathered all the legal materials necessary to decide the second: whether the law 811 affording that right was "clearly *811 established." See id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 ("In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated on the premises alleged, a court might find it necessary to set forth principles which will become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly established."). The minimal amount of additional time needed to conduct the second inquiry deprives neither the County of a swift end to a lawsuit from which it may be immune nor law enforcement of timely judicial guidance on constitutional rights. In fact, multiple interlocutory appeals might only prolong the County's exposure to unmeritorious litigation.
In its response to an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the County also invoked the "Gillespie doctrine," referring to what we derived from Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 85 S.Ct. 308, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964), and have come to call the "practical finality" or "pragmatic finality" doctrine. To fit under this "very narrow exception to the final judgment rule" and thereby qualify to appeal a partial summary judgment, the County must satisfy four factors:
(1) the case was a marginally final order, (2) disposed of an unsettled issue of national significance, (3) review implemented the same policy Congress sought to promote in § 1292(b), and (4) the finality issue was not presented to the appellate court until argument on the merits, thereby ensuring that policies of judicial economy would not be served by remanding the case with an important unresolved issue.
Williamson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 160 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir.1998); see also In re Subpoena Served on Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 813 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir.1987) (cautioning that the doctrine "must be sparingly used"), citing Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152-53, 85 S.Ct. 308. The County does not make it past the first criterion: leaving half of the qualified immunity inquiry pending is hardly "marginal." Cf. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir.1990), ("The challenged order is `marginally final' because the pending proceedings have little substance and will not affect the potentially dispositive and obviously central issue....").
Appeal DISMISSED.
[*] This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a) (2).
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