Case 2:16-cv-00030-RWS Document 1 Filed 02/17/16 Page 1 of 34

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

_________________________________

)

RITA SANDERS LUSE,

)

)

MARIANNE LIGOCKI,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

) CLASS ACTION

v.

)

) CIVIL ACTION NO._2_:1_6_-c_v_-0_0_0_3_0_-W__CO

SENTINEL OFFENDER

)

SERVICES, LLC,

) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

)

STACY MCDOWELL-BLACK,

)

Probation Officer, Sentinel Offender )

Services, LLC, Cleveland, Georgia, )

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________ )

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Rita Sanders Luse and Marianne Ligocki, on behalf of themselves

and the class alleged herein, state as follows for their Complaint:

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an action to stop Defendants—a private probation company

and a private probation officer—from requiring people on probation for minor

traffic offenses to submit to and to pay for drug tests that were not ordered or

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authorized by any court. The company requires probationers to submit their urine to company employees and to pay the company for drug tests, in violation of law, solely to increase its revenue.
2. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC (“Sentinel”) is one of the largest providers of private probation services in Georgia. Sentinel contracts with the White County Probate Court to supervise probation cases.
3. Plaintiffs are two women who received traffic citations in Cleveland, Georgia. Rita Luse is a 62-year-old grandmother on a limited income. Marianne Ligocki is a 45-year-old mother, also on a limited income. Both women appeared in court and pleaded guilty to driving while unlicensed before Judge Garrison Baker, the presiding judge of the White County Probate Court. Judge Baker fined each Plaintiff and placed her on probation with Sentinel.
A. Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests 4. Judge Baker did not order that either Plaintiff would be required, as
part of her sentence, to produce a urine sample to Sentinel for drug testing. The sentencing documents in Plaintiffs’ cases clearly show that no drug tests were ordered in either case. See Exhibits B and C.
5. Despite the absence of any written or verbal court authorization permitting drug testing, the Sentinel probation officer, without legal authority,
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informed each Plaintiff that she would be required to urinate in a cup and submit her urine to a Sentinel employee. In the case of Plaintiff Ligocki, her Sentinel probation officer required her to urinate in a cup with the bathroom door open, and in the presence of a Sentinel employee.
6. In each case, the Plaintiff objected to the test. In each case, the Sentinel probation officer falsely told the Plaintiff that drug tests were a courtordered requirement of probation and that failure to submit a urine sample would result in revocation of probation.
7. Over the course of her probation, Plaintiff Luse was required to submit to about four drug tests and to pay Sentinel about $60 in fees that were not ordered by any court. To date, Plaintiff Ligocki’s probation officer has required Ligocki to submit to at least five drug tests and to pay Sentinel $95 in drug test fees. Ligocki is still on probation and is subject to further illegal drug testing.
8. Sentinel employees do not have legal authority to require people to submit their urine to a private probation officer without a court order. Sentinel employees do not have legal authority to require such people to urinate in view of a Sentinel employee.
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9. A review of White County Probate Court files shows numerous instances in which people on probation were required to submit to drug tests that were not ordered by the court.
10. Defendants have a policy, custom, and practice of falsely representing to probationers that they are required to submit their urine to Sentinel employees in cases in which drug testing was not court-ordered (“the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy”).
11. Defendants’ policy, custom, and practice of forcing people to submit their urine for drug testing and to pay for such testing violates the United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution. Further, it violates Georgia law and constitutes invasion of personal privacy and conversion of Plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ money. Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia law.
B. False Threats of Jail for Nonpayment 12. Plaintiffs further bring this litigation to challenge a second, illegal
business practice by Sentinel—its practice of intentionally coercing people to pay Sentinel with false threats that nonpayment will result in immediate incarceration at the sole discretion of the probation officer. Plaintiff Luse, a 62-year-old grandmother, was subject to this practice, as described herein.
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13. The Plaintiffs’ Sentinel probation officer has a practice of coercing payments from probationers by falsely representing that failure to pay fines and fees will result in immediate incarceration in her sole discretion (“the False Threats of Jail for Nonpayment Policy”).
14. Through this policy, Sentinel has intentionally caused Plaintiff Luse and others stress, anxiety, humiliation, and fear of incarceration.
15. Sentinel uses threats of incarceration to ensure that probationers will prioritize payments to Sentinel over probationers’ other financial obligations, such as rent, child care, food or medical expenses.
16. The threats made by Plaintiffs’ probation officer are inconsistent with legal authority limiting the company’s power to revoke probation. Sentinel’s practice in this regard constitutes fraud and misrepresentation under Georgia law.
17. Plaintiffs seek damages and declaratory and injunctive relief as set forth herein.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 18. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this action arises under the laws and Constitution of the United States; pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983; pursuant to its supplemental
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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367; and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as an actual

controversy exists within this Court’s jurisdiction. This Court is authorized to grant

declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

19. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because at least one

Defendant resides in this District and all Defendants reside in this State, and

because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims set

forth in this Complaint occurred within this District.

A. Plaintiffs

PARTIES

20. Rita Sanders Luse is a 62-year-old woman who resides in Cleveland,

Georgia. She has one son and three grandchildren. Luse works for a group that

provides community support to people with serious mental illness. She is on a

limited income. In March 2014, Luse pleaded guilty in the White County Probate

Court to driving while unlicensed.

21. Marianne Ligocki is a 45-year-old woman who resides in Cleveland,

Georgia. Ligocki has nine children and is on a limited income. In July 2015,

Ligocki pleaded guilty in the White County Probate Court to driving while

unlicensed.

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B. Defendants 22. Defendant Sentinel Offender Services, LLC, is a Delaware company
that does business in the State of Georgia, in this District, and in this Division. Sentinel is headquartered in the State of California. Sentinel performs a public function that was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State—supervision of people on probation. Georgia law authorizes the White County Probate Court to contract with Sentinel to perform that public function. O.C.G.A. § 42-8-101(a)(1). Sentinel has caused, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved, and knowingly participated in a policy and practice of (A) requiring probationers in the White County Probate Court to produce their urine and to pay for drug tests, without court order or legal authority, and (B) falsely representing to probationers that they will be immediately jailed in the Sentinel probation officer’s sole discretion if they are unable to pay fines and fees. Sentinel is a state actor and a person acting under color of state law and is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
23. Defendant Stacy McDowell-Black is a private probation officer employed at Sentinel’s office in Cleveland, Georgia. She resides in this District and this Division. McDowell-Black is a “private probation officer” performing a public function. O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100. McDowell-Black has caused, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved, and knowingly participated in a policy and practice
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of (A) requiring probationers to produce their urine and to pay for drug tests, without court order or legal authority, and (B) falsely representing to probationers that they will be immediately jailed in her sole discretion if they are unable to pay fines and fees. At all times pertinent to this action, McDowell-Black was acting under color of state law.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 24. Plaintiffs bring this class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) and/or (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on their behalf and on behalf of a class similarly situated and affected during the pendency of this lawsuit and in the future. Plaintiffs will seek to certify a class to seek relief with respect to the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy. The class is defined as all persons with criminal charges requiring them to appear in the White County Probate Court who are, were, or in the future will be subject to the Defendants’ practice of requiring probationers to submit to and to pay for drug tests, in the absence of any court order authorizing such drug tests. 25. Plaintiffs meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) in that:
a. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The class consists of an unknown number of probationers, who can be readily identified through court and probation records, who have been 8

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or will be under a legal obligation to appear before the White County Probate Court, and who are subject to Defendants’ policy of requiring submission to and payment for drug tests in cases in which no such tests were court-ordered. b. There are questions of law and fact common to the class concerning the constitutionality and lawfulness of the Defendants’ policy challenged in this Complaint. The absence of any lawful basis for forcing probationers to submit their urine and to pay for drug tests presents a question of fact and law common to all class members. Similarly, there is a common question as to whether the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy violates state and federal law. c. The policy challenged in this action applies with equal force to the named plaintiffs and all members of the class so that the claims of the plaintiffs are typical of those of the class. Ligocki and Luse were subject to the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy. d. The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The Plaintiffs possess the requisite personal interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit and possess no interests adverse to other class members. The Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys at the
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Southern Center for Human Rights, a nonprofit organization with extensive experience in complex class action litigation. 26. Plaintiffs meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) in that the Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. 27. Plaintiffs meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting individual class members. A class action is superior to any other method of adjudicating this dispute because hundreds of people are subjected to the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy described in this Complaint, but few are likely to have the time, legal acumen, and resources to pursue the claims at issue in this case on their own.
STATEMENT OF FACTS A. The White County Probate Court’s Delegation of Probation Services to
Sentinel 28. The Georgia Code authorizes governing authorities to contract with private companies to provide probation supervision services. O.C.G.A. § 42-8101(a)(1). The White County Probate Court, with the approval of the government of White County, entered into such a contract with Sentinel. (Exhibit A.)
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B. Sentinel’s Violation of Its Contract with White County and of Georgia Rules and Regulations Governing Fee Collection 29. The contract between the White County Probate Court and Sentinel
states that Sentinel agrees to “[c]ollect from probationers, court-ordered fines, restitution and other costs associated with order of the Court.” Exhibit A at 2 (emphasis supplied). The contract further provides that “[d]rug counselling and urine surveillance will be provided to probationers identified by the Court has having drug or alcohol related problems. Probationers will assume the cost of random drug and/or alcohol testing.” Id. at 3 (emphasis supplied).
30. The Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia place further limitations on the circumstances under which probation companies may assess fees. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 503-1-.30 states:
a. No probation entity shall assess, collect, or disburse any funds as it pertains to the collection of court-ordered monies, except by written order of the court or as required by State law.
b. No probation entity, owner, director, agent, or employee may offer any program service or component for an additional fee unless the fee charge has been ordered by the court or as required by State law.
31. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 503-1-.31 further states: “No owner, operator, director, agent or employee shall collect or disburse any funds as it pertains to
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O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100, except by written or oral order of the court or as required by State law.”
32. Defendants’ practice of drug-testing Plaintiffs and charging them money for such tests violates both Sentinel’s contract with the Probate Court and Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia governing private probation entities.
C. Application of Defendants’ Policies to Rita Sanders Luse 33. On March 12, 2014, Luse appeared in the White County Probate
Court and pleaded guilty to the charge of driving while unlicensed.1 34. The Probate Court sentenced Luse to pay a fine of $775.75. Because
Luse could not pay on the day of court, Judge Baker placed Luse on probation for 12 months and ordered her to pay $44 per month in probation supervision fees.
35. Judge Baker memorialized Luse’s sentence in a disposition form. (Exhibit B.) The disposition form contains a number of boxes that the judge can check if he wishes to impose special conditions of probation. The policy and practice of the Probate Court, consistent with Georgia law and the Constitution, is
1 Unbeknownst to her, Luse’s license had been suspended due to a then-unresolved citation involving Luse’s car registration.
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to write all court-imposed obligations on the disposition sheet so that probationers understand what is required of them.
36. The disposition form in Luse’s case shows that no special conditions of probation were imposed. In particular, Judge Baker did not impose the special condition printed on the form that states: “Probationer shall upon request by the Probation Officer or any Law Enforcement Officer, produce specimen of bodily substance for analysis for the presence of a substance prohibited by the Law of the State of Georgia, the United States or by the terms of this sentence.” (Exhibit B.)
37. Although the court did not order drug-testing in Luse’s case, Sentinel drug-tested her anyway. When Luse reported to Sentinel’s Cleveland office, Defendant McDowell-Black told Luse that she would be required to take a drug test. Luse objected. McDowell-Black falsely told Luse that drug testing was a condition of her probation and that she was required to submit a urine sample.
38. McDowell-Black required Luse to sign a document that would purport to permit Sentinel to collect and test Luse’s urine for controlled substances. Luse signed the document, believing, due to McDowell-Black’s misrepresentation, that her probation could be revoked if she refused to comply with her probation officer’s directions.
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39. Luse was then instructed to urinate in a cup and to deliver her urine specimen to a Sentinel employee.
40. Sentinel charged Luse a $15 fee for each drug test. 41. McDowell-Black repeatedly caused Luse to submit to and pay for drug tests over the course of her year on probation. 42. Luse never tested positive for any controlled substance. 43. Luse does not drink any alcohol or use illegal drugs. During the course of her probation sentence, Luse never manifested any signs or symptoms of a person under the influence of or dependent on drugs or alcohol. 44. McDowell-Black further falsely threatened to immediately jail Luse when Luse was unable to pay her fines and fees. 45. About halfway through her probation term, Luse reported to McDowell-Black without her payment. Luse explained that she did not have any money left in her bank account, but that she would receive a pay check from her employer in a few days. Luse asked for a brief extension on Sentinel’s payment deadline. McDowell-Black falsely informed Luse that if she did not have her full payment of approximately $140 within a few hours, McDowell-Black would have Luse immediately arrested.
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46. Luse was forced to call a relative to ask for a loan, to rush across town to collect the loaned money, to obtain a money order, and to rush back to Sentinel’s office with the payment. She did so believing that she would be sent to jail if she did not pay that day.
47. McDowell-Black’s use of the false threat of imminent jail to coerce an immediate payment from Luse caused Luse anxiety, stress, and humiliation.
D. Application of Defendants’ Policies to Marianne Ligocki 48. On February 10, 2015, Ligocki was on her way to pick up her son
from school when a White County Sheriff’s Deputy stopped her vehicle at a roadside checkpoint. The deputy discovered that Ligocki’s driver’s license was suspended,2 and he cited her for driving on a suspended license.
49. On July 8, 2015, Ligocki appeared in the White County Probate Court and pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of driving while unlicensed.
50. Judge Baker sentenced Ligocki to a fine and surcharges totaling $313.02. Because Ligocki was unable to pay the fine on the day of court, Judge
2 Ligocki’s license was suspended due to a traffic ticket from the DeKalb County Recorder’s Court from 2011. Ligocki believed that she had paid the Recorder’s Court ticket and that the case had been resolved. Following her arrest in White County, Ligocki resolved the DeKalb County Recorder’s Court ticket and had her license reinstated.
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Baker sentenced her to 12 months on probation at $44.00 per month. Judge Baker also sentenced Ligocki to 20 hours of community service, to be suspended upon payment of all fines and surcharges.
51. Judge Baker memorialized Ligocki’s sentence in a disposition form. (Exhibit C.) The disposition form contains a number of boxes that the judge could check if he wished to impose special conditions of probation.
52. The disposition form in Ligocki’s case shows that no special conditions of probation were imposed. In particular, Judge Baker did not impose the condition printed on the form that states: “Probationer shall upon request by the Probation Officer or any Law Enforcement Officer, produce specimen of bodily substance for analysis for the presence of a substance prohibited by the Law of the State of Georgia, the United States or by the terms of this sentence.” (Exhibit C.)
53. On July 23, 2015, Ligocki reported for her first visit to McDowellBlack at Sentinel’s Cleveland office. Upon arrival, Ligocki was required to submit to a pat-down search of her person by a Sentinel employee.
54. McDowell-Black then told Ligocki that Ligocki would be required to submit a urine sample for a drug test. Ligocki objected, pointing out that the Probate Court had not ordered drug testing in her case.
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55. McDowell-Black falsely told Ligocki that drug testing was a condition of her probation and that she was required to submit a urine sample.
56. McDowell-Black forced Ligocki to sign a “waiver” document that purported to permit Sentinel to test Ligocki’s urine for drugs. Ligocki protested again and asked what would happen if she did not sign the “waiver” document. McDowell-Black falsely responded that if Ligocki did not sign the document she could not be on probation and her probation could be revoked. Ligocki signed the document, believing, due to McDowell-Black’s misrepresentation, that she could be sent to jail if she refused to comply with her probation officer’s directions.
57. McDowell-Black then instructed Ligocki to submit a urine sample. Ligocki was required to take down her pants and urinate in a cup with the door partially open and with a Sentinel employee standing by the door to the bathroom. McDowell-Black alleged that she tested positive for THC.
58. Ligocki was subsequently drug-tested repeatedly over the course of her probation. Each time, she was required to urinate with the door open and with a Sentinel employee standing at the door. Sentinel charged Ligocki a fee for each drug test.
59. On September 17, 2015, McDowell-Black alleged that Ligocki’s drug test was positive for THC.
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60. McDowell-Black told Ligocki that she was “violating” her. McDowell-Black told Ligocki that she would be required to perform 30 hours of community service or bring Sentinel $217.50 in 30 days. McDowell-Black also told Ligocki that she would be required to take and pay for additional monthly drug tests for the next six months, and that she would not be eligible for early termination of probation. Ligocki completed the community service.
61. On December 4, 2015, Ligocki reported for a pre-scheduled probation appointment and submitted her required payment. At this appointment, McDowell-Black instructed Ligocki to return to the Sentinel office for another drug test on December 10, 2015. Ligocki did so.
62. On December 10, 2015, Ligocki appeared at the Sentinel office and McDowell-Black instructed her to submit to a drug test. On this occasion, Ligocki was required to urinate in a cup while the bathroom door was wide open, and with a Sentinel employee watching her urinate.
63. Following the December 10 drug test, McDowell-Black claimed that Ligocki had again tested positive for THC. The drug test result was in error because Ligocki had not used marijuana. Ligocki objected that the test result was erroneous.
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64. McDowell-Black called Ligocki a “liar,” told her she was going to issue a warrant for Ligocki’s arrest, and instructed her to immediately leave her office. McDowell-Black told Ligocki “I’ll see you in jail.”
65. Since December 2015, Ligocki has experienced stress and anxiety from the fear that she could be imminently arrested in connection with drug tests that no court ordered her to take.
66. To date, Sentinel has collected far more money for itself than it has allocated to the fine imposed in Ligocki’s case. The following chart shows Ligocki’s payments and the manner in which Sentinel has distributed them:

Date July 23, 2015 August 19, 2015 September 17, 2015 October 26, 2015 October 26, 2015 October 26, 2015 November 16, 2015 November 16, 2015 December 4, 2015 December 4, 2015 December 4, 2015 Total Paid

Fine $41 $34 $19 $4
$33
$131

Sentinel’s Drug Test Fee $15 $15 $30
$15 $20
$95

Sentinel’s Probation Supervision Fee $35 $35 $35
$35
$24
$46
$210

Ga. Crime Victim Emergency Fund $9 $9 $9
$9
$18 $54

Ligocki’s Total Payment $100 $78 $78 $34 $35 $9 $24 $15 $53 $46 $18 $490

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67. To date, Ligocki has paid $490 in connection with her citation for driving while unlicensed. Only $131 of that amount has been applied to her fine. By contrast, Sentinel collected $305 for itself.
68. To date, Ligocki has submitted to drug screens on five occasions. She has paid Sentinel $95 in drug test fees that were never ordered by any court.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT ONE
Unconstitutional Search and Seizure Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Violation of Art. I, Sec.
I, Para. XIII of the Georgia Constitution (by all Plaintiffs against Defendants)
69. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68.
70. Without probable cause or legal authority, Defendants required Plaintiffs and other probationers to submit their urine to Sentinel employees and to pay for drug tests not ordered by any court. They did so for the purpose of generating revenue for their company.
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71. Defendants required Plaintiffs to submit to drug tests even though they had no basis to believe that either Plaintiff had committed or was committing any criminal offense or violation.
72. Defendants required probationers to take drug tests at their own expense without any involvement of a court or objective standards governing when or how often this invasive procedure would occur.
73. The search of each Plaintiff’s urine was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under Ga. Const. art. I, sec. I, para. XIII.
74. The urine tests administered to Plaintiffs constituted a search for which judicial oversight was required. There was no such oversight permitting such an intrusive search in Plaintiffs’ cases.
75. The Defendants had fair warning that their conduct would violate the Constitution and no reasonable officer or probation officer could have believed that requiring Plaintiffs to submit to these drug tests was legal.
76. In each and every instance set forth above, Defendants acted intentionally, with malice, and with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of their official functions. Defendants knew or should have known that requiring
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Plaintiffs to submit to drug tests, without any legal authority, violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
77. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ illegal policies and practices, Defendants searched Plaintiffs’ urine in violation of law. Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the violations of Plaintiffs’ rights, and the harm they suffered as a result, because each Defendant either personally participated in the actions or failures to act, or implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly condoned or failed to remedy the wrongs at issue.
78. Defendants’ above-described actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT TWO Due Process Clause Violations Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Violation of Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I of the Georgia Constitution (by all Plaintiffs against Defendants) 79. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68.
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80. Defendants drug-tested Plaintiffs and other probationers without notice to the probationers that they would be required to submit to drug tests, and without any process available to challenge the legality of such tests. By drugtesting Plaintiffs without notice or legal authority to collect their urine samples and by requiring Plaintiffs to pay for such testing, Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their privacy interests and property without due process of law in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Ga. Const. art. 1, § I, ¶¶ I and II.
81. Defendants jointly and severally caused deprivations of Plaintiffs’ privacy interests and money, under color of law, without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard. In addition, Defendants jointly and severally caused deprivations of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights through their deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ right to privacy and their conscience-shocking treatment of people under their control.
82. Defendants further violated Luse’s due process rights when McDowell-Black falsely told Luse, who had no money, that she would have to pay $140 within a few hours or be immediately jailed. Certainly, Luse was under an obligation to pay court-ordered monies. However, Georgia law provides that “the imposition of sanctions for failure to pay [monies assessed by the court] shall be within the discretion of the court through judicial process or hearings.” O.C.G.A. §
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42-8-102(e)(2). Sentinel violates probationers’ due process rights when it demands and collects the probationers’ last dollar (or, in Luse’s case, borrowed money), under threat of immediate incarceration, without judicial process.
83. Defendants knew or should have known that the conduct described herein violated Plaintiffs’ rights. Defendants’ above-described actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against individual Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT THREE Money Had and Received (by all Plaintiffs against Defendants) 84. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 85. An action for money had and received is founded upon the equitable principle that no one ought to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, and is maintainable in all cases where one has received money under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it.
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86. A cause of action based on the theory of money had and received may be brought against a private probation company to recover probation fees which it unlawfully collected from misdemeanor probationers in contravention of law.
87. Defendants placed themselves in the position of receiving and retaining money from the Plaintiffs which the Plaintiffs were not lawfully required to pay and which Sentinel was not lawfully entitled to receive.
COUNT FOUR Conversion
O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1 (by all Plaintiff against all Defendants) 88. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 89. Defendants’ practice of appropriating Plaintiffs’ and others’ money without legal authority constitutes conversion – an intentional tort under Georgia law. See O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1 (“The owner of personalty is entitled to its possession. Any deprivation of such possession is a tort for which an action lies.”).
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90. Defendants took and converted to their own use the funds set forth above from Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the amount of money converted, plus interest from the date of the conversion.
91. Defendants’ above-described actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive damages as permitted by law and in an amount to be determined at trial.
COUNT FIVE Fraud
(by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants) 92. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 93. Defendants committed the tort of fraud against Plaintiffs. The tort of fraud has five elements: false representation, scienter, inducement, reliance, and injury. 94. McDowell-Black made a series of false, verbal representations to both Plaintiffs that they were required to submit to and to pay for drug tests. McDowell-Black knew when making this false representation to Plaintiffs that Sentinel had no legal authority to require drug tests in these cases. Sentinel,
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through McDowell-Black, nonetheless induced Plaintiffs to submit to drug tests and to pay for them. Defendants undertook these acts with malice and intent to deceive Plaintiffs. McDowell-Black further made a false representation to Plaintiff Luse that if Luse was unable to pay, she would be jailed immediately at the sole discretion of her probation officer.
95. Plaintiffs Luse and Ligocki relied on Defendant McDowell-Black’s false representations regarding drug-testing and, as a proximate result of the false representations, Plaintiffs submitted their urine to Sentinel and paid Sentinel drug testing fees. Plaintiff Luse relied on McDowell-Black’s false threats that Luse would be jailed immediately at the sole discretion of McDowell-Black if she failed to pay Sentinel on the day her payment was demanded.
96. Plaintiffs were injured by their reliance on McDowell-Black’s false representations regarding drug testing because they were required to submit to repeated and intrusive searches and paid money they did not owe. Luse was further injured by her reliance on McDowell-Black’s false threats that Luse would be jailed immediately, at her probation officer’s sole discretion, if she could not pay in accordance with Sentinel’s payment deadline. Luse suffered worry, anxiety, and humiliation as a consequence of her probation officer’s false statements.
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COUNT SIX Tortious Coercion (by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants) 97. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 98. Tortious coercion occurs when a threat coupled with an apparent intention and ability to carry out the threat coerces action or inaction contrary to the victim’s will. See Peavy v. Bank South, N.A., 474 S.E.2d 690, 693, 222 Ga. App. 501, 503 (1996); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 871 cmt. f (1979). 99. McDowell-Black threatened Plaintiffs with probation revocation if they failed to submit to and to pay for drug tests. McDowell-Black had no legal authority to require drug tests in these cases and thus no lawful basis for her threats. 100. McDowell-Black further threatened to jail Luse if Luse was unable to pay her fines and fees, contrary to established law holding that a person may not be jailed solely for inability to make a payment. 101. McDowell-Black had the apparent intent and ability to carry out her threats through her role as a private probation officer for Sentinel.
28

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102. Plaintiffs unwillingly provided urine samples and unwillingly paid money as a result of McDowell-Black’s threats.
103. Plaintiffs were injured because they were required to submit to repeated, intrusive searches and repeatedly paid money they did not owe.
104. Plaintiff Luse was further injured by her submission to McDowellBlack’s threats to jail Luse if she could not pay. Luse suffered worry, stress, anxiety, and humiliation as a consequence of her probation officer’s threats.
COUNT SEVEN Invasion of Privacy (by Plaintiff Ligocki against all Defendants) 105. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 106. An individual has a right of privacy regarding her use of a restroom. McDowell-Black required Ligocki to urinate in a cup with the bathroom door open in view of a Sentinel employee, without any legal authority. In so doing, she intruded on Ligocki’s seclusion in a restroom in a manner that would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person, and that was so to Ligocki.
29

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107. Being required to urinate with the bathroom door open in view of a Sentinel employee caused Ligocki embarrassment and humiliation. Defendant McDowell-Black invaded Ligocki’s right to personal privacy in violation of law.
COUNT EIGHT Injunctive Relief (by all Plaintiff Ligocki against Defendants) 108. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, the allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 109. Ligocki is still on probation and is under the supervision of McDowell-Black and Sentinel. 110. Ligocki seeks an injunction to prevent Defendants from requiring her and other probationers to submit to drug tests that were not ordered by the Probate Court. Ligocki seek an injunction to prevent Sentinel and Sentinel probation officers from falsely informing probationers that they will be immediately jailed at the sole discretion of the probation officer if they are unable to pay. 111. Defendants’ conduct is not authorized by any Georgia law and violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
30

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112. Defendants’ conduct is likely to continue unless enjoined. Defendants’ conduct is causing Plaintiff and other current probationers immediate irreparable harm that cannot be remedied by the award of money damages. Plaintiff has no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to redress the wrongs described herein.
113. The balance of hardships and public policy strongly favor the Court entering a preliminary injunction and thereafter permanently enjoining Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices as described herein.
COUNT NINE Declaratory Relief (By Plaintiff Ligocki Against Defendants) 114. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68.. 115. Ligocki is still on probation and is under the supervision of McDowell-Black and Sentinel. 116. Without legal authority, Defendants forced Ligocki and other probationers to submit to drug tests and to pay for drug tests that were never ordered by any court. McDowell-Black further has a practice of coercing
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payments by using false threats that nonpayment will automatically result in immediate incarceration in the sole discretion of the probation officer.
117. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Ligocki seeks a declaration by the Court that Defendants may not require probationers to submit to drug test that have not been ordered by any court. Plaintiff further seeks a declaration by the Court that Sentinel probation officers may not coerce payments from probationers by employing false threats that nonpayment will result in immediate jail in the sole discretion of the probation officer.
118. Plaintiffs and putative class members will be adversely affected if Defendants continue to drug-test people in cases in which no drug testing has been ordered by the court. Ligocki and others will be adversely affected if Defendants continue to coerce payments through false threats that nonpayment will result in immediate incarceration in the sole discretion of the probation officer.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court: a. Assume jurisdiction over this action; b. Determine by Order pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that this action be maintained as a class action;
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c. Award Plaintiffs all actual damages, including damages for deprivation of money, mental anguish and emotional distress;
d. Award Plaintiffs nominal and presumed damages for violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights;
e. Award Plaintiffs punitive damages to the extent permitted by law; f. Declare that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by:
1. requiring probationers to submit their urine to Sentinel probation officers and to pay for drug tests that were never ordered by any court;
2. coercing probationers to make payments by using false threats that nonpayment will result in immediate incarceration in the sole discretion of the probation officer.
g. Enjoin Defendants from: 1. requiring probationers to submit their urine to Sentinel probation officers and to pay for drug tests that were never ordered by any court; 2. coercing probationers to make payments by using false threats that nonpayment will result in immediate incarceration in the sole discretion of the probation officer.
h. Award costs and reasonable attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable provision of law; 33

Case 2:16-cv-00030-RWS Document 1 Filed 02/17/16 Page 34 of 34
i. Award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully submitted this 17th day of February, 2016.3
s/Sarah Geraghty Sarah Geraghty Georgia Bar No. 291393 Ryan Primerano Georgia Bar No. 404962 Gerald Weber Georgia Bar No. 744878 SOUTHERN CENTER
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 83 Poplar Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303 Telephone: (404) 688-1202 Facsimile: (404) 688-9440 sgeraghty@schr.org rprimerano@schr.org gweber@schr.org Counsel for the Plaintiffs
3 Counsel hereby certifies that this document has been prepared in compliance with Local Rule 5.1C using 14-point Times New Roman font.
34

 
 Case 2:16-cv-00030-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/01/16 Page 1 of 38

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

_________________________________

)

RITA SANDERS LUSE,

)

)

MARIANNE LIGOCKI,

)

)

CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiffs,

)

)

NO. 2:16-CV-30-RWS

v.

)

)

CLASS ACTION

SENTINEL OFFENDER

)

SERVICES, LLC,

)

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

)

STACY MCDOWELL-BLACK,

)

Probation Officer, Sentinel Offender )

Services, LLC, Cleveland, Georgia, )

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________ )

VERIFIED AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Rita Sanders Luse and Marianne Ligocki, on behalf of themselves

and the class alleged herein, state as follows for their Amended Complaint:

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an action to stop Defendants—a private probation company

and a private probation officer—from requiring people on probation for minor

traffic offenses to submit to and to pay for drug tests that were not ordered or

Case 2:16-cv-00030-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/01/16 Page 2 of 38
authorized by any court. The company requires probationers to submit their urine to company employees and pay the company for drug tests, in violation of law, solely to increase its revenue.
2. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC (“Sentinel”), is one of the largest providers of private probation services in Georgia. Sentinel contracts with the White County Probate Court to supervise probation cases.
3. Plaintiffs are two women who received traffic citations in Cleveland, Georgia. Rita Luse is a 62-year-old grandmother on a limited income. Marianne Ligocki is a 45-year-old mother, also on a limited income. Both women appeared in court and pleaded guilty to driving while unlicensed before Judge Garrison Baker, the presiding judge of the White County Probate Court. Judge Baker fined each Plaintiff and placed her on probation with Sentinel. A. Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests
4. Judge Baker did not order that either Plaintiff would be required, as part of her sentence, to provide a urine sample to Sentinel for drug testing. The sentencing documents in Plaintiffs’ cases clearly show that no drug tests were ordered in either case. See Exhibits B and C.
5. Despite the absence of any written or verbal court authorization permitting drug testing, the Sentinel probation officer, without legal authority,
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informed each Plaintiff that she would be required to urinate in a cup and submit her urine to a Sentinel employee. In the case of Plaintiff Ligocki, her Sentinel probation officer required her to urinate in a cup with the bathroom door open, and in the presence of a Sentinel employee.
6. In each case, the Plaintiff objected to the test. In each case, the Sentinel probation officer falsely told the Plaintiff that drug tests were a courtordered requirement of probation and that failure to submit a urine sample would result in revocation of probation.
7. Over the course of her probation, Plaintiff Luse was required to submit to about four unauthorized drug tests and to pay Sentinel associated fees for those tests. To date, Plaintiff Ligocki’s probation officer has required Ligocki to submit to at least two unauthorized drug tests and to pay Sentinel associated drug test fees. Ligocki is still on probation and is subject to further illegal drug testing.
8. Sentinel employees do not have legal authority to require people to submit their urine to a private probation officer without a court order. Sentinel employees do not have legal authority to require such people to urinate in view of a Sentinel employee.
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9. A review of White County Probate Court files shows numerous instances in which people on probation were required to submit to drug tests that were not ordered by the court.
10. Defendants have a policy, custom, and practice of falsely representing to probationers that they are required to submit their urine to Sentinel employees in cases in which drug testing was not court-ordered (“the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy”).
11. Defendants’ policy, custom, and practice of forcing people to submit their urine for drug testing and to pay for such testing violates the United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution. Further, it violates Georgia law and constitutes invasion of personal privacy and conversion of Plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ money. Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia law. B. False Threats of Jail for Nonpayment
12. Plaintiffs further bring this litigation to challenge a second, illegal business practice by Sentinel—its practice of intentionally coercing people to pay Sentinel with false threats that nonpayment will result in immediate incarceration at the sole discretion of the probation officer. Plaintiff Luse, a 62-year-old grandmother, was subject to this practice, as described herein.
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13. The Plaintiffs’ Sentinel probation officer has a practice of coercing payments from probationers by falsely representing that failure to pay fines and fees will result in immediate incarceration in her sole discretion (“the False Threats of Jail for Nonpayment Policy”).
14. Through this policy, Sentinel has intentionally caused Plaintiff Luse and others stress, anxiety, humiliation, and fear of incarceration.
15. Sentinel uses threats of incarceration to ensure that probationers will prioritize payments to Sentinel over probationers’ other financial obligations, such as rent, child care, food, or medical expenses.
16. The threats made by Plaintiffs’ probation officer are inconsistent with legal authority limiting the company’s power to revoke probation. Sentinel’s practice in this regard constitutes fraud and misrepresentation under Georgia law.
17. Plaintiffs seek damages and declaratory and injunctive relief as set forth herein.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 18. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this action arises under the laws and Constitution of the United States; pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983; pursuant to its supplemental
5

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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367; and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as an actual

controversy exists within this Court’s jurisdiction. This Court is authorized to grant

declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

19. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because at least one

Defendant resides in this District and all Defendants reside in this State, and

because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims set

forth in this Complaint occurred within this District.

A. Plaintiffs

PARTIES

20. Rita Sanders Luse is a 62-year-old woman who resides in Cleveland,

Georgia. She has one son and three grandchildren. Luse works for a group that

provides community support to people with serious mental illness. She is on a

limited income. In March 2014, Luse pleaded guilty in the White County Probate

Court to driving while unlicensed.

21. Marianne Ligocki is a 45-year-old woman who resides in Cleveland,

Georgia. Ligocki has nine children and is on a limited income. In July 2015,

Ligocki pleaded guilty in the White County Probate Court to driving while

unlicensed.

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B. Defendants 22. Defendant Sentinel Offender Services, LLC, is a Delaware company
that does business in the State of Georgia, in this District, and in this Division. Sentinel is headquartered in the State of California. Sentinel performs a public function that was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State—supervision of people on probation. Georgia law authorizes the White County Probate Court to contract with Sentinel to perform that public function. O.C.G.A. § 42-8-101(a)(1). Sentinel has caused, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved, and knowingly participated in a policy and practice of (A) requiring probationers in the White County Probate Court to produce their urine and to pay for drug tests, without court order or legal authority, and (B) falsely representing to probationers that they will be immediately jailed in the Sentinel probation officer’s sole discretion if they are unable to pay fines and fees. Sentinel is a state actor and a person acting under color of state law and is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
23. Defendant Stacy McDowell-Black is a private probation officer employed at Sentinel’s office in Cleveland, Georgia. She resides in this District and this Division. McDowell-Black is a “private probation officer” performing a public function. O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100. McDowell-Black has caused, authorized, condoned, ratified, approved, and knowingly participated in a policy and practice
7

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of (A) requiring probationers to produce their urine and to pay for drug tests, without court order or legal authority, and (B) falsely representing to probationers that they will be immediately jailed in her sole discretion if they are unable to pay fines and fees. At all times pertinent to this action, McDowell-Black was acting under color of state law.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 24. Plaintiffs bring this class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) and/or (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on their behalf and on behalf of a class similarly situated and affected during the pendency of this lawsuit and in the future. Plaintiffs seek to certify a class to seek relief with respect to the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy. The class is defined as all persons with criminal charges requiring them to appear in the White County Probate Court who are, were, or in the future will be subject to the Defendants’ practice of requiring probationers to submit to and to pay for drug tests, in the absence of any court order authorizing such drug tests. 25. Plaintiffs meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) in that:
a. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The class consists of an unknown number of probationers, who can be readily identified through court and
8

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probation records, who have been or will be under a legal obligation to appear before the White County Probate Court, and who are subject to Defendants’ policy of requiring submission to and payment for drug tests in cases in which no such tests were court-ordered. Plaintiffs expect to show that at least 50 to 70 people become class members in a given year, with approximately the same number on probation with Sentinel at any given time. b. There are questions of law and fact common to the class concerning the constitutionality and lawfulness of the Defendants’ policy challenged in this Complaint. The absence of any lawful basis for forcing probationers to submit their urine and to pay for drug tests presents a question of fact and law common to all class members. Similarly, there is a common question as to whether the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy violates state and federal law. c. The policy challenged in this action applies with equal force to the named plaintiffs and all members of the class so that the claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of those of the class. Ligocki
9

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and Luse were subject to the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy. d. The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The Plaintiffs possess the requisite personal interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit and possess no interests adverse to other class members. The Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys at the Southern Center for Human Rights, a nonprofit organization with extensive experience in complex class action litigation. 26. Plaintiffs meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) in that the Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. 27. Plaintiffs meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting individual class members. A class action is superior to any other method of adjudicating this dispute because hundreds of people are subjected to the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy described in this Complaint, but few are likely to have the time, legal acumen, and resources to pursue the claims at issue in this case on their own.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS A. The White County Probate Court’s Delegation of Probation Services to
Sentinel 28. The Georgia Code authorizes governing authorities to contract with private companies to provide probation supervision services. O.C.G.A. § 42-8101(a)(1). The White County Probate Court, with the approval of the government of White County, entered into such a contract with Sentinel. (Exhibit A.) B. Sentinel’s Violation of Its Contract with White County and of Georgia Rules and Regulations Governing Fee Collection 29. The contract between the White County Probate Court and Sentinel states that Sentinel agrees to “[c]ollect from probationers, court ordered fines, restitution and other costs associated with the order of the Court.” Exhibit A at 2 (emphasis supplied). The contract further provides that “[d]rug counselling and urine surveillance will be provided to probationers identified by the Court has having drug or alcohol related problems. Probationers will assume the cost of random drug and/or alcohol testing.” Id. at 3 (emphasis supplied). 30. The Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia place further limitations on the circumstances under which probation companies may assess fees. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 503-1-.30 states:
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a. No probation entity shall assess, collect, or disburse any funds as it pertains to the collection of court-ordered monies, except by written order of the court or as required by State law.
b. No probation entity, owner, director, agent, or employee may offer any program service or component for an additional fee unless the fee charge has been ordered by the court or as required by State law.
31. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 503-1-.31 further states: “No owner, operator, director, agent or employee shall collect or disburse any funds as it pertains to O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100, except by written or oral order of the court or as required by State law.”
32. Defendants’ practice of drug-testing Plaintiffs and charging them money for such tests violates both Sentinel’s contract with the Probate Court and the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia governing private probation entities. C. Application of Defendants’ Policies to Rita Sanders Luse
33. On March 12, 2014, Plaintiff Luse appeared in the White County Probate Court and pleaded guilty to the charge of driving while unlicensed.1
1 Unbeknownst to her, Luse’s license had been suspended due to a then-unresolved citation involving Luse’s car registration.
12

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34. The Probate Court sentenced Luse to pay a fine of $775.75. Because Luse could not pay on the day of court, Judge Baker placed Luse on probation for 12 months and ordered her to pay $44 per month in probation supervision fees.
35. Judge Baker memorialized Luse’s sentence in a disposition form. (Exhibit B.) The disposition form contains a number of boxes that the judge can check if he wishes to impose special conditions of probation. The policy and practice of the Probate Court, consistent with Georgia law and the Constitution, is to write all court-imposed obligations on the disposition sheet so that probationers understand what is required of them.
36. The disposition form in Luse’s case shows that no special conditions of probation were imposed. In particular, Judge Baker did not impose the special condition printed on the form that states: “Probationer shall upon request by the Probation Officer or any Law Enforcement Officer, produce specimen of bodily substance for analysis for the presence of a substance prohibited by the Law of the State of Georgia, the United States or by the terms of this sentence.” (Exhibit B.)
37. Although the court did not order drug-testing in Luse’s case, Sentinel drug-tested her anyway. When Luse reported to Sentinel’s Cleveland office, Defendant McDowell-Black told Luse that she would be required to take a drug
13

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test. Luse objected. McDowell-Black falsely told Luse that drug testing was a condition of her probation and that she was required to submit a urine sample.
38. McDowell-Black required Luse to sign a document that purported to allow Sentinel to collect and test Luse’s urine for controlled substances. Luse signed the document, believing, due to McDowell-Black’s misrepresentation, that her probation could be revoked if she refused to comply with her probation officer’s directions.
39. Luse was then instructed to urinate in a cup and to deliver her urine specimen to a Sentinel employee.
40. Sentinel charged Luse a $15 fee for each drug test. 41. McDowell-Black repeatedly caused Luse to submit to and pay for drug tests over the course of her year on probation. 42. Luse never tested positive for any controlled substance. 43. Luse does not drink any alcohol or use illegal drugs. During the course of her probation sentence, Luse never manifested any signs or symptoms of a person under the influence of or dependent on drugs or alcohol. 44. McDowell-Black further falsely threatened to immediately jail Luse when Luse was unable to pay her fines and fees.
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45. About halfway through her probation term, Luse reported to McDowell-Black without her payment. Luse explained that she did not have any money left in her bank account, but that she would receive a pay check from her employer in a few days. Luse asked for a brief extension on Sentinel’s payment deadline. McDowell-Black falsely informed Luse that if she did not have her full payment of approximately $140 within a few hours, McDowell-Black would have Luse immediately arrested.
46. Luse was forced to call a relative to ask for a loan, rush across town to collect the loaned money, obtain a money order, and rush back to Sentinel’s office with the payment. She did so believing that she would be sent to jail if she did not pay that day.
47. McDowell-Black’s use of the false threat of imminent jail to coerce an immediate payment from Luse caused Luse anxiety, stress, and humiliation. D. Application of Defendants’ Policies to Marianne Ligocki
48. On February 10, 2015, Ligocki was on her way to pick up her son from school when a White County Sheriff’s Deputy stopped her vehicle at a
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roadside checkpoint. The deputy discovered that Ligocki’s driver’s license was suspended,2 and he cited her for driving on a suspended license.
49. On July 8, 2015, Ligocki appeared in the White County Probate Court and pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of driving while unlicensed.
50. Judge Baker sentenced Ligocki to a fine and surcharges totaling $313.02. Because Ligocki was unable to pay the fine on the day of court, Judge Baker sentenced her to 12 months on probation at $44.00 per month. Judge Baker also sentenced Ligocki to 20 hours of community service, to be suspended upon payment of all fines and surcharges.
51. Judge Baker memorialized Ligocki’s sentence in a disposition form. (Exhibit C.) The disposition form contains a number of boxes that the judge could check if he wished to impose special conditions of probation.
52. The disposition form in Ligocki’s case shows that no special conditions of probation were imposed. In particular, Judge Baker did not impose the condition printed on the form that states: “Probationer shall upon request by the
2 Ligocki’s license was suspended due to a traffic ticket from the DeKalb County Recorder’s Court from 2011. Ligocki believed that she had paid the Recorder’s Court ticket and that the case had been resolved. Following her arrest in White County, Ligocki resolved the DeKalb County Recorder’s Court ticket and had her license reinstated.
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Probation Officer or any Law Enforcement Officer, produce specimen of bodily substance for analysis for the presence of a substance prohibited by the Law of the State of Georgia, the United States or by the terms of this sentence.” (Exhibit C.)
53. On July 23, 2015, Ligocki reported for her first visit to McDowellBlack at Sentinel’s Cleveland office. Upon arrival, Ligocki was required to submit to a pat-down search of her person by a Sentinel employee.
54. McDowell-Black then told Ligocki that Ligocki would be required to submit a urine sample for a drug test. Ligocki objected, pointing out that the Probate Court had not ordered drug testing in her case.
55. McDowell-Black falsely told Ligocki that drug testing was a condition of her probation and that she was required to submit a urine sample.
56. McDowell-Black forced Ligocki to sign a “waiver” document that purported to allow Sentinel to test Ligocki’s urine for drugs. Ligocki protested again and asked what would happen if she did not sign the “waiver” document. McDowell-Black falsely responded that if Ligocki did not sign the document she could not be on probation and her probation could be revoked. Ligocki signed the document, believing, due to McDowell-Black’s misrepresentation, that she could be sent to jail if she refused to comply with her probation officer’s directions.
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57. McDowell-Black then instructed Ligocki to submit a urine sample. Ligocki was required to take down her pants and urinate in a cup with the door partially open and with a Sentinel employee standing by the door to the bathroom. McDowell-Black alleged that she tested positive for THC.
58. On September 17, 2015, McDowell-Black again required Ligocki to submit a urine sample, and again alleged that Ligocki’s drug test was positive for THC.
59. McDowell-Black told Ligocki that she was “violating” her and required Ligocki to sign paperwork waiving a probation revocation hearing. McDowell-Black did not advise Ligocki that she had a right to a hearing before a judge. McDowell-Black told Ligocki that she would be required to perform 30 hours of community service or bring Sentinel $217.50 in 30 days. McDowellBlack also told Ligocki that she would be required to take and pay for additional monthly drug tests for the next six months, and that she would not be eligible for early termination of probation. McDowell-Black later submitted the purported waiver to the Probate Court, which signed the paperwork without a hearing. Ligocki completed the community service and submitted to the additional urinalysis tests.
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60. At the time this case was filed, Sentinel had collected far more money for itself than it had allocated to the fine imposed in Ligocki’s case. The following chart shows Ligocki’s payments and the manner in which Sentinel had distributed them:

Sentinel’s

Sentinel’s

Probation

Date

Fine Drug Test Fee Supervision Fee

July 23, 2015

$41 $15

$35

August 19, 2015 $34

$35

September 17, 2015 $19 $15

$35

October 26, 2015 $4 $30

October 26, 2015

$35

October 26, 2015

November 16, 2015

$24

November 16, 2015

$15

December 4, 2015 $33 $20

December 4, 2015

$46

December 4, 2015

Ga. Crime Victim
Emergency Fund
$9 $9 $9
$9
$18

Ligocki’s Total
Payment $100 $78 $78 $34 $35 $9 $24 $15 $53 $46 $18

Total Paid

$131 $95

$210

$54

$490

61. Ligocki had paid $490 in connection with her citation for driving

while unlicensed. Only $131 of that amount had been applied to her fine. By

contrast, Sentinel had collected $305 for itself.

62. To date, Ligocki has submitted to unauthorized drug screens on at

least two occasions and paid associated drug test fees. She is at risk of further

unauthorized drug screens until her probation terminates in July 2016.

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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT ONE
Unconstitutional Search and Seizure Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Violation of Art. I, Sec. I,
Para. XIII of the Georgia Constitution (by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants) 63. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-62. 64. Without probable cause or legal authority, Defendants required Plaintiffs and other probationers to submit their urine to Sentinel employees and to pay for drug tests not ordered by any court. They did so for the purpose of generating revenue for their company. 65. Defendants required Plaintiffs to submit to drug tests even though they had no basis to believe that either Plaintiff had committed or was committing any criminal offense or violation. 66. Defendants required probationers to take drug tests at their own expense without any involvement of a court or objective standards governing when or how often this invasive procedure would occur.
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67. The search of each Plaintiff’s urine was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and under corresponding provisions of the Georgia Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. IV; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Ga. Const. art. I, § I, ¶ XIII.
68. The urine tests administered to Plaintiffs constituted a search for which judicial oversight was required. There was no such oversight permitting such an intrusive search in Plaintiffs’ cases.
69. The Defendants had fair warning that their conduct would violate the Constitution and no reasonable officer or probation officer could have believed that requiring Plaintiffs to submit to these drug tests was legal.
70. In each and every instance set forth above, Defendants acted intentionally, with malice, and with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of their official functions. Defendants knew or should have known that requiring Plaintiffs to submit to drug tests, without any legal authority, violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
71. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ illegal policies and practices, Defendants searched Plaintiffs in violation of law. Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the violations of Plaintiffs’ rights, and the harm they suffered as a result, because each Defendant either personally participated in the
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actions or failures to act, or implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly condoned or failed to remedy the wrongs at issue.
72. Defendants’ above-described actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT TWO Due Process Clause Violations Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Violation of Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I of the Georgia Constitution (by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants) 73. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-62. 74. Defendants drug-tested Plaintiffs and other probationers without notice to the probationers that they would be required to submit to drug tests, and without any process available to challenge the legality of such tests. By drugtesting Plaintiffs without notice or legal authority to collect their urine samples and by requiring Plaintiffs to pay for such testing, Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of
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their privacy interests and property without due process of law in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Ga. Const. art. I, § I, ¶¶ I and II.
75. Defendants jointly and severally caused deprivations of Plaintiffs’ privacy interests and money, under color of law, without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard. In addition, Defendants jointly and severally caused deprivations of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights through their deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ right to privacy and their conscience-shocking treatment of people under their control.
76. Defendants further violated Luse’s due process rights when McDowell-Black falsely told Luse, who had no money, that she would have to pay $140 within a few hours or be immediately jailed. Certainly, Luse was under an obligation to pay court-ordered monies. However, Georgia law provides that “the imposition of sanctions for failure to pay [monies assessed by the court] shall be within the discretion of the court through judicial process or hearings.” O.C.G.A. § 42-8-102(e)(2). Sentinel violates probationers’ due process rights when it demands and collects the probationers’ last dollar (or, in Luse’s case, borrowed money), under threat of immediate incarceration, without judicial process.
77. Defendants’ above-described actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights and
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should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT THREE Money Had and Received (by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants) 78. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-62. 79. An action for money had and received is founded upon the equitable principle that no one ought to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, and is maintainable in all cases where one has received money under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it. 80. A cause of action based on the theory of money had and received may be brought against a private probation company to recover probation fees which it unlawfully collected from misdemeanor probationers in contravention of law. 81. Defendants placed themselves in the position of receiving and retaining money from the Plaintiffs which the Plaintiffs were not lawfully required to pay and which Sentinel was not lawfully entitled to receive.
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82. Defendants’ above-described actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT FOUR Conversion
O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1 (by all Plaintiff against all Defendants) 83. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-62. 84. Defendants’ practice of appropriating Plaintiffs’ and others’ money without legal authority constitutes conversion—an intentional tort under Georgia law. See O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1 (“The owner of personalty is entitled to its possession. Any deprivation of such possession is a tort for which an action lies.”). 85. Defendants took and converted to their own use the funds set forth above from Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the amount of money converted, plus interest from the date of the conversion.
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86. Defendants’ above-described actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT FIVE Fraud
(by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants) 87. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-62. 88. Defendants committed the tort of fraud against Plaintiffs. The tort of fraud has five elements: false representation, scienter, inducement, reliance, and injury. 89. McDowell-Black made a series of false, verbal representations to both Plaintiffs that they were required to submit to and to pay for drug tests. McDowell-Black knew when making this false representation to Plaintiffs that Sentinel had no legal authority to require drug tests in these cases. Sentinel, through McDowell-Black, nonetheless induced Plaintiffs to submit to drug tests and to pay for them. Defendants undertook these acts with malice and intent to
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deceive Plaintiffs. McDowell-Black further made a false representation to Plaintiff Luse that if Luse was unable to pay, she would be jailed immediately in the sole discretion of her probation officer.
90. Plaintiffs Luse and Ligocki relied on Defendant McDowell-Black’s false representations regarding drug-testing and, as a proximate result of the false representations, Plaintiffs submitted their urine to Sentinel and paid Sentinel drug testing fees. Plaintiff Luse relied on McDowell-Black’s false threats that Luse would be jailed immediately in the sole discretion of McDowell-Black if she failed to pay Sentinel on the day her payment was demanded.
91. Plaintiffs were injured by their reliance on McDowell-Black’s false representations regarding drug testing because they were required to submit to repeated and intrusive searches and paid money they did not owe. Luse was further injured by her reliance on McDowell-Black’s false threats that Luse would be jailed immediately, in her probation officer’s sole discretion, if she could not pay in accordance with Sentinel’s payment deadline. Luse suffered worry, anxiety, and humiliation as a consequence of her probation officer’s false statements.
92. Defendants’ above-described actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights and
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should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT SIX Tortious Coercion (by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants) 93. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-62. 94. Tortious coercion occurs when a threat coupled with an apparent intention and ability to carry out the threat coerces action or inaction contrary to the victim’s will. See Peavy v. Bank South, N.A., 474 S.E.2d 690, 693, 222 Ga. App. 501, 503 (1996); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 871 cmt. f (1979). 95. McDowell-Black threatened Plaintiffs with probation revocation if they failed to submit to and to pay for drug tests. McDowell-Black had no legal authority to require drug tests in these cases and thus no lawful basis for her threats. 96. McDowell-Black further threatened to jail Luse if Luse was unable to pay her fines and fees, contrary to established law holding that a person may not be jailed solely for inability to make a payment.
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97. McDowell-Black had the apparent intent and ability to carry out her threats through her role as a private probation officer for Sentinel.
98. Plaintiffs unwillingly provided urine samples and unwillingly paid money as a result of McDowell-Black’s threats.
99. Plaintiffs were injured because they were required to submit to repeated, intrusive searches and repeatedly paid money they did not owe.
100. Plaintiff Luse was further injured by her submission to McDowellBlack’s threats to jail Luse if she could not pay. Luse suffered worry, stress, anxiety, and humiliation as a consequence of her probation officer’s threats.
101. Defendants’ above-described actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT SEVEN Invasion of Privacy (by Plaintiff Ligocki against all Defendants) 102. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-62.
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103. An individual has a right of privacy regarding her use of a restroom. McDowell-Black required Ligocki to urinate in a cup with the bathroom door open in view of a Sentinel employee, without any legal authority. In so doing, she intruded on Ligocki’s seclusion in a restroom in a manner that would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person, and that was offensive to Ligocki.
104. Being required to urinate with the bathroom door open in view of a Sentinel employee caused Ligocki embarrassment and humiliation. Defendant McDowell-Black invaded Ligocki’s right to personal privacy in violation of law.
105. Defendants’ above-described actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law.
COUNT EIGHT Injunctive Relief (by Plaintiff Ligocki against all Defendants) 106. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, the allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-62.
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107. Plaintiff Ligocki is still on probation and is under the supervision of McDowell-Black and Sentinel.
108. Ligocki seeks an injunction to prevent Defendants from requiring her and other probationers to submit to drug tests that were not ordered by the Probate Court. Ligocki seeks an injunction to prevent Sentinel and Sentinel probation officers from falsely informing probationers that they will be immediately jailed in the sole discretion of the probation officer if they are unable to pay.
109. Defendants’ conduct is not authorized by any Georgia law and violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
110. Defendants’ conduct is likely to continue unless enjoined. Defendants’ conduct is causing Plaintiff and other current probationers immediate irreparable harm that cannot be remedied by the award of money damages. Plaintiff has no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to redress the wrongs described herein.
111. The balance of hardships and public policy strongly favor the Court entering a preliminary injunction and thereafter permanently enjoining Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices as described herein.
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COUNT NINE Declaratory Relief (by Plaintiff Ligocki against all Defendants) 112. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-62. 113. Plaintiff Ligocki is still on probation and is under the supervision of McDowell-Black and Sentinel. 114. Without legal authority, Defendants forced Ligocki and other probationers to submit to drug tests and to pay for drug tests that were never ordered by any court. McDowell-Black further has a practice of coercing payments by using false threats that nonpayment will automatically result in immediate incarceration in the sole discretion of the probation officer. 115. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Ligocki seeks a declaration by the Court that Defendants may not require probationers to submit to drug testing that has not been ordered by any court. Plaintiff further seeks a declaration by the Court that Sentinel probation officers may not coerce payments from probationers by employing false threats that nonpayment will result in immediate jail in the sole discretion of the probation officer.
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116. Plaintiffs and putative class members will be adversely affected if Defendants continue to drug-test people in cases in which no drug testing has been ordered by a court. Ligocki and others will be adversely affected if Defendants continue to coerce payments through false threats that nonpayment will result in immediate incarceration in the sole discretion of the probation officer.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court: a. Assume jurisdiction over this action; b. Determine by order pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that this action be maintained as a class action; c. Award Plaintiffs all actual damages, including damages for
deprivation of money, mental anguish and emotional distress; d. Award Plaintiffs nominal and presumed damages for violations of
Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; e. Award Plaintiffs punitive damages to the extent permitted by law; f. Declare that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by:
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1. requiring probationers to submit their urine to Sentinel probation officers and to pay for drug tests that were never ordered by any court;
2. coercing probationers to make payments by using false threats that nonpayment will result in immediate incarceration in the sole discretion of the probation officer.
g. Enjoin Defendants from: 1. requiring probationers to submit their urine to Sentinel probation officers and to pay for drug tests that were never ordered by any court; 2. coercing probationers to make payments by using false threats that nonpayment will result in immediate incarceration in the sole discretion of the probation officer.
h. Award costs and reasonable attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable provision of law;
i. Award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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April 1, 20163

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Ryan Primerano Sarah Geraghty Georgia Bar No. 291393 Gerald Weber Georgia Bar No. 744878 Ryan Primerano Georgia Bar No. 404962 SOUTHERN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 83 Poplar Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303 Telephone: (404) 688-1202 Facsimile: (404) 688-9440 sgeraghty@schr.org
Counsel for Plaintiffs

3 Counsel certifies that this document has been prepared in compliance with Local Rule 5.1C using 14-point Times New Roman font.
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VERIFICATION I, Rita Sanders Luse, do hereby swear and affirm under penalty of perjury that I have reviewed the foregoing document and that the factual information contained therein is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
~~duLK_
Rita Sanders Luse Sworn to and subscribed before me this~ day of__.M'----"---'a.._t_c_V_\ _ _ _ _, 2016.

Case 2:16-cv-00030-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/01/16 Page 37 of 38
VERIFICATION I, Marianne Marie Ligocki, do hereby swear and affirm under penalty of perjury that I have reviewed the foregoing document and that the factual information contained therein is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
My commission expires:

Case 2:16-cv-00030-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/01/16 Page 38 of 38
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on April 1, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of filing to the following attorneys of record:
Michael D. St. Amand Harvey S. Gray GRAY, RUST, ST. AMAND, MOFFETT & BRIESKE, LLP 1700 Atlanta Plaza 950 East Paces Ferry Road Atlanta, GA 30326
/s/ Ryan Primerano

 
 Case 2:16-cv-00030-RWS Document 40 Filed 08/14/17 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION

RITA SANDERS LUSE, et al. Plaintiffs,
V.
SENTE^^EE OFFENDER SERVICES, LLC, et al,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-CV-30-RWS

CONSENT ORDER This Consent Order is submitted and entered into as a resolution of Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated persons. Having considered the agreement of Plaintiffs Rita Sanders Luse and Marianne Ligocki, and Defendants Sentinel Offender Services, LLC, and Stacy McDowell-Black, the Court enters the following Order. I. BACKGROUND The Plaintiffs bring this action to challenge alleged policies and practices of Sentinel Offender Services, LLC ("Sentinel"), and its employee Stacy McDowellBlack. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violate the rights of Plaintiffs and others

Case 2:16-cv-00030-RWS Document 40 Filed 08/14/17 Page 2 of 11
similarly situated by requiring them to submit to drug testing that has not been authorized by court order. (Doc. 17^^29-32.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants use unlawful threats of jail to coerce payment from probationers unable to pay. (Doc. 17 ]ff 44-47.) In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to Defendants' alleged policies. (Doc. 17 106-16.) Defendants deny the Plaintiffs' allegations and specifically deny that probationers in the Probate Court of White County, Georgia, have been required to submit to drug testing that has not been authorized by the Probate Court. (Doc. 21; Doc. 22.)
On joint motion of the parties, the Court previously entered preliminary injunctive relief with respect to Defendants' alleged drug-testing policies. (Doc. 16.) The parties subsequently participated in mediation and reached a settlement agreement in this case ("the Agreement"), which requires entry of this Consent Order. II. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Parties Bound 1. This Order represents the mutual agreement of the parties and shall not be deemed to be an admission by either Plaintiffs or Defendants concerning the
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merits of the case. Defendants Sentinel Offender Services, LLC ("Sentinel"), and Stacy McDowell-Black, hereby agree to abide by the terms set out herein.
2. This Order shall bind each of the Defendants and the officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys for each Defendant.
3. As used in this Order, "Defendants" refers to Sentinel, Stacy McDowell-Black, and the officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys for Sentinel and/or McDowell-Black.
B. Effective Date 4. This Order shall become effective upon the Court's final approval of the Agreement and dismissal of all claims for damages. 5. The preliminary injunction entered by the Court on March 31, 2016 (Doc. 16), shall remain in effect until this Order becomes effective, 6. Provided that the Court finally approves the Agreement of the parties and grants final class certification, and this Order becomes effective, the preliminary injunction shall be deemed withdrawn and replaced by this Order, in. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS A. Drug Testing of Probationers 7. Defendants shall not require probationers to submit to drug screening unless the screening is specifically authorized by a written order of the court.
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8. For purposes of this Order, "drug screening" refers to the administration or use of any device, instrument, or test designed or employed to indicate whether a person's urine, blood, saliva, hair, or other bodily specimen contains components consistent with the person's use of alcohol or controlled substances.
9. For purposes of this Order, "specifically authorized by a written order" means that a valid written order expressly authorizes drug screening of a particular probationer.
B. Failure of Probationers to Pay Fines, Supervision Fees, and Other Amounts
10. Defendants shall not threaten probationers with jail solely for failure to pay fines, supervision fees, or other monetary obligations.
11. Defendants may truthfully inform probationers that willful failure to pay fines and fees can resuh in revocation of probation. However, Defendants must also inform probationers that they have the right to seek modification of their probation conditions, including reduction or waiver of any fines and probation supervision fees owed, at any time.
12. Defendants shall not direct probationers to borrow money to pay fines and fees. Defendants may remind probationers that probationers have a duty to
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make reasonable efforts to lawfully obtain funds to comply with their probation conditions. Defendants may also remind probationers that probationers should notify the probation officer i f a personal hardship prevents the probationer from complying with his or her probation conditions so that the probation officer may request a court hearing.
13. I f Defendants learn that a probationer has or appears to have a financial hardship that prevents the probationer from making payments, Defendants shall advise the probationer of his or her right to request a probation modification hearing. I f the probationer requests a hearing, Defendants will promptly take steps to notify the court and schedule a hearing,
14. Defendants shall establish written guidelines and procedures for probation officers to follow in requesting probation modification hearings,
C. Modification of Probation 15. Defendants shall inform each probationer, verbally and in writing, that (a) the sentencing court has authority to modify probation at any time to accommodate hardships; and (b) in certain circumstances, the sentencing court is required to modify fines and fees by waiving them, reducing them, or converting them to community service.
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16. Defendants shall not impede probationers in requesting modification of probation to accommodate hardships—including medical, financial, transportation, or family-related difficulties—^that prevent good-faith compliance with probation conditions. Defendants will promptly schedule a probation modification hearing i f the probationer requests one.
17. I f a probationer's only probation violation is failure to pay fines and fees. Defendants shall not seek revocation of probation, but shall, unless the probationer knowingly and voluntarily waives his or her right to a hearing, request a hearing date and allow the probationer to voluntarily appear in court at a future date, ^ee O.C.G.A. § 42-8-102(f)(2)(A).
18. I f a probationer has failed to report to the probation officer, Defendants shall not seek an arrest warrant unless the probation officer has sent a letter to the probationer's last-known address and made reasonable efforts to contact the probationer by telephone or other means. Defendants may seek an arrest warrant only i f the probationer fails to respond in person or by telephone within ten days of the date ofthe warning letter required by this paragraph.
19. I f modification or revocation of probation is sought by a probation officer. Defendants shall provide written notice to the probationer of the hearing
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date. Unless the Probate Court of White County specifically requires different
language, the notice shall contain language substantially identical to the following:
Your probation officer has asked the court to hold a hearing on whether to revoke or modify the terms of your probation sentence. I f you have an explanation for your failure to comply with your probation conditions, the hearing will be your opportunity to inform the judge about your circumstances. In addition, the judge has discretion to modify your probation conditions i f you show that you are unable to comply with your current probation conditions. To help the court understand your circumstances, you should bring any helpful witnesses and documents with you to the hearing. In particular, i f you are claiming a financial, medical, or other hardship, you should bring any evidence you have about the hardship with you to the hearing. In certain circumstances, the law may require the judge to waive or reduce the fine and fees you owe, or convert the fines and fees to community service hours. 20. I f modification or revocation of probation is sought by a probation
officer, the probation officer shall not obtain or attempt to obtain from the
probationer a waiver of the probationer's right to a judicial hearing without first
specifically informing the probationer of the right to a hearing before an impartial
judge and that the hearing will be the probationer's only opportunity to contest the
facts, raise a defense (e.g., inability to pay), or explain the probationer's
circumstances to the sentencing judge.
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D. Training of Probation Officers 21. Defendants shall ensure that each probation officer receives training before supervising probationers, and on a regular basis thereafter, in the statutory provisions and constitutional requirements governing probation and probation revocation. Defendants shall further ensure that each probation officer supervising probationers sentenced by the White County Probate Court receives training in the terms of this Order and in any policies or procedures established or required by this Order. IV. PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS A. Notice 22. Defendants shall provide a copy of the Notice attached hereto as Appendix A to each probationer during Defendants' standard intake process. 23. Defendants shall allow any probationer under the supervision of the White County Probate Court to review a copy of this Order upon request. 24. Defendants agree to provide a copy of this Order to Sentinel's officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys who participate in the supervision of probationers sentenced by the White County Probate Court. A copy of this Order shall be presented to each such person within seven days of entry of
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this Consent Order, or within seven days of establishing an employment, contractual, agency, or other relationship with any person or entity.
B. Modification and Enforcement 25. The Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Order. 26. Plaintiffs' counsel shall have reasonable access to documents maintained by Defendants concerning their compliance with this Order. Upon request for documents or information by Plaintiffs' counsel, Defendants shall respond within fwe business days by either providing the requested records or information, or providing a timeline for the production of the requested records or information. 27. Any party may seek to enforce or modify this Order for good cause. A party seeking to compel compliance or to seek modification must make a written request to all parties to this Order. I f no party responds within ten days, the party seeking enforcement or modification may file a motion with the Court. 28. I f any party objects to enforcement or modification of the Order, the objecting party shall make a written request for a dispute resolution conference. The parties shall hold the conference within ten days of the request. A l l parties shall seek in good faith to resolve the dispute. In the event that the parties are
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unable to resolve the dispute, any party may seek a determination from the Court resolving the dispute.

29. Counsel shall be entitled to seek reasonable attorney's fees in the

event that contempt proceedings are required to enforce this Order,

SO ORDERED, this / ^ ^ d a y of ^ ^ ^ ^ y ^ , , ^ ^ ^

20/^.

he Honorable Richard W ^ ^ ^ r y United States District Court Judge

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APPROVED AND CONSENTED TO BY:
Isi Sarah Geraghty Sarah Geraghty Ga. Bar No. 291393 Gerald Weber Ga. Bar No. 744878 Ryan Primerano Ga. Bar No. 404962 SOUTHERN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 83 Poplar Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 688-1202 (404) 688-9440 (facsimile) sgeraghty@schr.org
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Isl Michael D. St. Amand Michael D. St. Amand Ga. Bar No. 004180 Harvey S. Gray Ga. Bar No. 305838 GRAY, RUST, ST. AMAND, MOFFETT & BRIESKE, EEP 1700 Atlanta Plaza 950 East Paces Ferry Road Atlanta, GA 30326 (404) 870-7383 (404) 870-7374 (facsimile) msaintamand@grsmb.com
Counsel for Defendants
December 20, 2016
11

 
 Case 2:16-cv-00030-RWS Document 42 Filed 08/21/17 Page 1 of 25 FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U.S.D.C. - Gainesville
AUS 2 1 2017
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ^ FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION

RITA SANDERS LUSE, et al. Plaintiffs,
V.
SENTINEL OFFENDER SERVICES, LLC, etal,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-CV-30-RWS

ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT This matter having come to be heard on August 14, 2017, to determine the
fairness of the parties' settlement agreement and whether the agreement should be given fmal approval, the Court enters the following order approving the settlement reached on behalf of the class. I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiffs' Claims Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant Sentinel Offender Services, LLC ("Sentinel"), is a private Delaware company that provides probation supervision services in non-felony probation cases for courts throughout the State of Georgia. Sentinel had a contract with the goverrutnent of White County, Georgia, to

Case 2:16-cv-00030-RWS Document 42 Filed 08/21/17 Page 2 of 25
supervise probationers sentenced by the White County Probate Court. Defendant Stacy McDowell-Black was a private probation officer employed by Sentinel to supervise probationers sentenced by that court.
Plaintiffs Rita Sanders Luse and Marianne Ligocki alleged that Defendants required probationers to submit to and pay for random urine screening for the presence of controlled substances, despite lacking authority to impose drug testing on probationers. Probationers were required to pay Sentinel a fee of approximately $15 for, each drug test. Defendants agreed that certain probationers were required to undergo urine screening, but denied that the practice was unauthorized or unlawful. Defendants further contended that certain probationers signed enforceable arbitration agreements, and that certain probationers consented to random drug screening.
Plaintiff Rita Sanders Luse was sentenced by the White County Probate Court and placed on probation on March 12, 2014, for the traffic offense of driving while unlicensed. She was supervised by Defendants until around March 11, 2015, During her time on probation, Plaintiff Luse was required to undergo urinescreening approximately four times at a total cost of $60. In the amended complaint. Plaintiff Luse also alleged that Defendant McDowell-Black threatened her with jail when she was unable to pay her fines and fees.
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Plaintiff Marianne Ligocki was sentenced by the White County Probate Court and placed on probation on July 8, 2015, for the traffic offense of driving while unlicensed. She was supervised by Defendants until around July 7, 2016. During her time on probation. Plaintiff Ligocki was required to undergo urinescreening approximately six times at a total cost of $90. In addition. Plaintiff Ligocki paid $40 for confirmation tests by an outside laboratory after allegedly testing positive for marijuana use.
Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants on February 17, 2016, asserting claims under the United States Constitution and the laws of the State of Georgia. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiffs also sought to certify a class consisting of "all persons with criminal charges requiring them to appear in the White County Probate Court who are, were, or in the future will be subject to the Defendants' policy and practice of requiring probationers to submit to and to pay for drug tests in the absence of any court order authorizing such drug tests." (Doc. 6 at 2.)
B. Terms of Proposed Settlement On July 8, 2016, the parties attended a mediation session. During the mediation, the parties agreed to a framework upon which the claims asserted in this
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case could be resolved. In accordance with the framework developed during the mediation, the parties entered into a settlement agreement ("the Agreement"), {See Doc, 37-2,) The Agreement requires the parties to move the Court to certify a class of persons ("the Damages Class") consisting of each individual who meets the following requirements: (1) the person was sentenced to probation by the Probate Court of White County, Georgia; (2) the person's sentencing order did not specifically authorize drug testing; (3) the person was subjected to drug testing by Defendants on or after February 17, 2012; and (4) the person was not under a written order by another court specifically requiring the person to submit to drug testing by Defendants.
Based on a review of documents and files by Defendants and their attorneys, the parties determined that the Damages Class consists of 276 individuals who had submitted to a total of approximately 964 drug tests (approximately 3.5 tests per Class Member). The Agreement provides that each member of the Damages Class will be notified of the terms of the Agreement and his or her right to opt out of the Damages Class, The Agreement further provides that Defendants will make available an $80,000 fund ("the Class Fund") to reimburse all Class Members, Each member of the Damages Class who completes and submits a claim form within the designated time period is presumptively entitled to receive: (1)
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restitution of any fees paid for drug screening, with "7 percent per annum simple interest," see O.C.G.A. § 7-4-2(a)(l)(A), in connection with unauthorized drug testing conducted on or after February 17, 2012 ("the Restitution Amount"); and (2) provided that there is a surplus after setting aside the Restitution Amounts for all responding Class Members, damages of up to $90 per unauthorized drug test conducted on or after February 17, 2012 ("the Damages Amount"). In the event that the Class Fund were not large enough to provide both the Restitution Amount and the full $90-per-test Damages Amount to each responding Class Member, the Damages Amount was to be determined by (1) calculating the Restitution Amount for each Class Member, (2) subtracting the aggregate of the Restitution Amounts from the Class Fund, and (3) dividing the remainder of the Class Fund by the number of unauthorized drug tests imposed on responding Class Members. Any money remaining in the Class Fund after paying the ftill Restitution and Damages Amounts to each responding Class Member will be returned to Defendants after all responding Class Members have been paid. The Agreement also provides that Defendants will pay attomey fees and costs in the amount of $25,000.
The Agreement provides that, i f the Agreement is finally approved by the Court, the members of the Damages Class will release any claims that they may
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have against Defendants as a result of the imposition of drug screening during their respective probation terms.
The Agreement further requires the parties to move the Court to certify a class of persons who are or will be placed on probation by the Probate Court of White County, Georgia ("the Injunctive Class"). The claims for prospective relief by Plaintiffs and the members of the Injunctive Class have been resolved by entry of the Consent Order. (Doc. 40.)
The Court preliminarily approved the Agreement and notice procedure on January 13,2017. (Doc. 38.)
C. Results of Notice Procedure and Final Fairness Hearing On August 14, 2017, the Court held a fmal hearing to determine the fairness of the settlement and to hear any objections to or concerns about the terms of the settlement. No objections were lodged with the Court concerning the settlement in this case, no one intervened in the case, and no one appeared at the hearing to object to the terms of the settlement. At the hearing, counsel for the parties reported that 106 of the 276 class members responded to the settlement notice. One class member opted out of the settlement and will not be bound by the Agreement or this Order. The remaining class members opted for payment under the ternis of the Agreement. The parties' counsel further reported that the $80,000
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fund provided by Defendants would be sufficient to pay full restitution and the full $90 in damages per unauthorized drug test. II. NOTICE
Rule 23(e) provides that "[t]he court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise." The parties proposed, and the Court approved and ordered (Doc. 38 at 3-4), a process consistent with the notification requirements of Rule 23(e). The Court finds that the parties have complied with the notice procedure. III. CLASS CERTIFICATION
A. The Damages Class Satisfies the Requirements of Rule 23(a). The analysis required by Rule 23(a) focuses on numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(a). The Damages Class satisfies each of these requirements.
1. Numerosity Rule 23 requires that the class be "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). "There is no single fixed number of Class Members required to meet the numerosity requirement." Hillis v. Equifax Consumer Services, Inc., 2007 WL 1953464, *7 (N.D. Ga. 2007). However, the
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Eleventh Circuit has noted that "generally less than twenty-one is inadequate, [and' more than forty [is] adequate . . . ." American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986).
In this case, the Damages Class consisted of 276 individuals, a number more than sufficient to make joinder of all class members impracticable. See id. In addition, "the proposed class is 'adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.'" Carriuolo v. General Motors Co., 823 F.3d 977, 984 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Little V. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012)). The parties represent that each member of the Damages Class has been ascertained by examining records in Defendants' possession identifying whether a particular probationer was drug tested during the period in question, whether the sentencing court authorized the testing, and how much each probationer paid for the dmg testing.
2. Commonality Rule 23 requires the existence of "questions of law or fact common to the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). A common question is one "capable of classwide resolution" such that "determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." Carriuolo v.
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General Motors Co., 823 F.3d 977, 984 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dulles, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)).
The claims of the members of the Damages Class are all predicated on the common legal question of whether requiring probationers to submit to and pay for urine screening is unlawful in the absence of a written court order requiring such testing. Therefore, Rule 23 (a)(2)'s commonality requirement is satisfied. See, e.g., In re Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Securities Litig., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1325 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (finding commonality requirement met where all claims were based on defendant's "series of false or misleading statements during the class period").
3. Typicality Rule 23 requires that 'the claims or defenses of the representative parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). This requirement is satisfied when "the claims or defenses of the class and the class representative arise from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the same legal theory." Ault, 692 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Kornbergv. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1984)). Here, the Plaintiffs and the other members of the Damages Class all assert claims based on Defendants' practice of drug screening every probationer for a fee
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regardless of whether drug screening was specifically ordered by the sentencing court. The "strong similarity of legal theories" asserted by each Class Member is sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3). Local 703, LB. ofT. Grocery & Food Employees Welfare Fund v. Regions Financial Corp., 762 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009)); see Ault, 692 F.3d at 1216.
4. Adequacy "The adequacy of representation prerequisite of Rule 23 requires that the class representatives have common interests with the non-representative class members and requires that the representatives demonstrate that they will vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel." In re Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Securities Litig., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2007). Here, Plaintiffs Rita Sanders Luse and Marianne Ligocki have no interests antagonistic to those of the other Class Members, and Plaintiffs have vigorously prosecuted this action to date. Plaintiffs' attorneys have litigated numerous class actions in the state and federal courts. Therefore, the interests of the Class Members will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiffs and their attorneys.
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B. The Damages Class Satisfies the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) "allows the maintenance of a class action when 'the court fmds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.'" Carriuolo v. General Motors Co., 823 F.3d 977, 985 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). The two parts of this Rule are referred to as the "predominance" and the "superiority" requirements.
1. Predominance "[T]he focus of Rule 23(b)(3) is on the predominance of common questions." Amgenlnc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013) (emphasis omitted). Common issues predominate " i f they have a 'direct impact on every class member's effort to establish liability that is more substantial than the impact of individualized issues in resolving the claim or claims of each class member.'" Id. (quoting Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F,3d 1256, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009)); see also Williams, 568 F.3d at 1357 (noting common questions predominate " i f they have a direct impact on every class member's effort to establish liability and on every class member's entitlement to injunctive and monetary relief"). Whether common issues predominate requires courts to "take
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into account the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law." Coastal Neurology, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 458 F. App'x 793, 794 (11th Cir.2012) (quoting Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2004)). Common issues may predominate over individualized ones " i f those issues that are subject to generalized proof predominate over those that are subject to individualized proof" Kubiakv. S W. Cowboy, Inc., 2014 WL 2625181, at *18 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2014).
In this case, common questions of law and fact predominate over individualized issues. Defendants supervised hundreds of probationers in White County who were subjected to drug tests for a fee. Plaintiffs assert that the administration of these drug tests and the collection of these fees was unlawful and unconstitutional. I f every Class Member brought an individual action, each would attempt to prove essentially the same set of facts and Defendants would generally assert the same defenses. Similarly, i f the Court were to hold that the drug test policy is unlawful, that conclusion would establish Defendants' liability in all of the Class Members' cases. As such, the proposed class here is "sufficiently cohesive to wan-ant adjudication by representation." See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
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2. Superiority The second part of Rule 23(b)(3) requires that Plaintiffs establish that a class action is "superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Factors bearing on this determination include: (A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. Id. In weighing the relative advantages of a class action, courts consider what is "realistically available to plaintiffs." Klay, 382 F.3d at 1269. The proposed class action is a fair and superior method of adjudication because individual legal representation is unlikely due to class members' lack of resources and the modest damages involved. The parties' counsel represent that they are unaware of any similar litigation brought by Class Members, which indicates that the "small recoveries" that would likely be available to potential plaintiffs "do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights." Amchem Products, 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace V. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). The Court is unaware of any reason why Class Members would have an interest in prosecuting separate
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actions. Given Class Members' likely financial limitations and the small sums involved, a class action may be the only opportunity many Class Members have to assert their rights.
This class action is also an efficient and superior method of adjudication because requiring each Class Member to adjudicate a separate claim would be "repetitive, wasteful, and an extraordinary burden on the courts." Kirkpatrick v. J.a Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 725 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Kennedy v. Tallant, 710 F.2d 711, 717-18 (11th Cir. 1983)). Concentrating this action in a single forum promotes efficiency as well as Class Members' interests. This forum is ideal because most of the Class Members reside in or near White County, Georgia. IV. THE INJUNCTIVE CLASS SHOULD BE CONDITIONALLY
CERTIFIED FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES. C. The Injunctive Class Satisfies the Requirements of Rule 23(a). The Injunctive Class satisfies Rule 23(a) for the same reasons as the Damages Class. As explained above, hundreds of probationers are supervised by Defendants and the identities of those probationers are easily ascertainable, satisfying the numerosity requirement. Similarly, the practices subject to the proposed Consent Order involve, for the reasons discussed above, common questions of law and fact, and those practices impacted the named Plaintiffs in a
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manner typical of other members of the Injunctive Class. As discussed above, Plaintiffs and their counsel will adequately represent the Injunctive Class.
D. The Injunctive Class Satisfies the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). Under Rule 23(b)(2), class certification is warranted when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory rehef is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 23(b)(2); see MelanieK. v. Horton, No. l:14-cv-710-WSD, 2015 WL 1308368, at *5 (N.D. Ga. March 23, 2015). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants unlawfully drug-screen probationers absent an order authorizing the screening by the sentencing court. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants and their employees threaten probationers with jail solely for their inability to pay fines and fees. The Consent Order contains provisions that will prevent similar conduct on behalf of the Injunctive Class, thereby remedying on a class wide basis any injury Defendants' alleged conduct would cause current and future Class Members. See, e.g., Melanie K., 2015 WL 1308368, at *5; see Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1155(11th Cir. 1983) (stating Rule 23(b)(2) applies to "claims resting on the same grounds and applying more or less equally to all members of the class").
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V. FINAL APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[t]he claims, issues,
or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court's approval." Fed. R. Civ. P. (e); see Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 692 F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2012) ("Class actions can only be settled with the approval of the court."). To finally approve a settlement, the Court must find that the parties' proposed resolution of the claims is fair, reasonable, and adequate to the affected Class Members. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2), Relevant factors include "(1) the likelihood of success at trial; (2) the range of possible recovery; (3) the range of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable; (4) the anticipated complexity, expense, and duration of litigation; (5) the opposition to the settlement; and (6) the stage of proceedings at which the settlement was achieved." Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 668 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Nelson v. Mead Johnson & Johnson Co., 484 Fed. App'x 429, 434 (11th Cir. 2012).
A. Likelihood of Success at Trial Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their rights under the United States Constitution and Georgia law by requiring them to submit to and pay for drug tests that were unauthorized, having not been ordered by the sentencing court. (Doc. 17
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at ^j^ 1-11.) Defendants deny that the drug tests were unauthorized, claiming that the drug tests were in fact authorized by the terms of the White County Probate Court's probation orders. (Doc. 11 at 6-8.) Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs consented to the testing by signing paperwork completed by every probationer supervised by Defendants. {Id.) In addition, Defendants claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction over certain claims because Plaintiff Ligocki and other probationers consented to arbitrate their claims by signing "Sentinel's Program Rules and Instructions agreement." (Doc. 9 at 20-21; Doc. 10 at 21.)
At a status conference before this Court, Defendants indicated that they intended to file a motion to compel arbitration, which could impact the claims of probationers who signed purported arbitration agreements. Other defenses raised by Defendants included that Sentinel is not a person acting under color of law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 10 at 23), that the claims against McDowellBlack are barred by qualified immunity (Doc. 9 at 22), and that the claims asserted by Plaintiffs and Class Members are barred by the favorable-termination requirement announced mHeckv. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (Doc. 9 at 23; Doc. 10 at 24).
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Defendants' factual and legal defenses have not been tested. However, the parties have acknowledged (Doc. 37-1 at 19-20) that there is uncertainty about how the merits of Plaintiffs' claims would ultimately be resolved.
B. Range of Possible Recovery "In determining whether a settlement is fair and reasonable, the court must also examine the range of possible damages that plaintiffs could recover at trial and combine this with an analysis of plaintiffs' likely success at trial to determine if the settlements fall within the range of fair recoveries." Columbus Drywall, 258 F.R.D. 545, 559 (N.D. Ga. 2007). The "challenge Plaintiffs would face, i f their claims did sui-vive on the merits, in proving damages," is a factor the Court may consider in evaluating the range of potential damages. See Greco v. Ginn Development Co., 635 F. App'x 628, 632 (11th Cir. 2015). I f this case went to a trial and class wide liability were established, the Class Members might recover only slightly more than the Restitution Amount. See, e.g.. Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 720 F.3d 887, 892 (11th Cir. 2013); cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978) (holding plaintiff could "recover nominal damages not to exceed one dollar" for violations of right to procedural due process).
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In contrast, the Agreement provides for not only restitution of money paid for drug tests, with interest, but damages of up to $90 per test. Defendants have agreed to make available a fund of $80,000 to compensate Class Members for allegedly unauthorized drug testing. Counsel for the parties represent that the fund will reimburse each of the 105 Class Members who opted into the settlement for any drug-testing fees paid to Defendants, with interest, and $90 per test.
Given the uncertainties discussed in the preceding section—^which could reduce Class Members' recovery to zero if the parties prolonged the litigation and Defendants prevailed on one or more defenses—^the Court fmds that the proposed settlement is fair and within the range of possible recovery at trial. See Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 692 F.3d 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2012) ("If [defendant] prevails at trial, the class will be left with no remedy at all.").
C. Point on or Below the Range of Possible Recovery at Which a Settlement Is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable
Since Fourth Amendment and Due Process Clause violations can result in nominal damages awards even when a plaintiff prevails, and because there is a risk that Class Members would lose on the merits if they proceeded with this litigation, see Greco, 635 F. App'x at 632-33, the settlement range is fair, adequate and reasonable. Settlements have been approved where they provided far less than the damages that plaintiffs could possibly recover at trial. Columbus Drywall, 258
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F.R.D, at 559; see, e.g., In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 325 (N,D, Ga, 1993) (approving a comprehensive settlement equal to 12.7 to 15.3 percent of the potential recovery); see also In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 2006 WL 3247396, *6 (S.D. N.Y. 2006) (approving settlement of "roughly 10-15%" of the allegedly illegal fees collected from the class).
Here, by contrast, the Agreement allows a potential recovery well in the range of what Class Members could recover after a full trial. Class Members who have opted into the settlement will recover the fees that they paid, with interest, and $90 per drug test. These amounts are more than what might be awarded after a trial. This weighs in favor of finding the Agreement fair and reasonable. See, e.g., Poertner v. Gillette Co., 618 Fed. App'x 624, 628 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding settlement fair and reasonable where "the $6 that could be claimed [by certain class members] exceeded the damages that an average class member would have received i f the class had prevailed at trial").
In addition to the monetary relief that the Agreement provides, the Court should also consider the benefits conferred on Class Members by the proposed Consent Order. See Poertner v. Gillette Co., 618 Fed. App'x 624, 628-29 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding district court did not abuse discrefion in treating "the value of the nonmonetary relief as "part of the settlement pie"). The Consent Order in this
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case bars Defendants from requiring probationers to submit to drug screening unless it has been specifically ordered in writing by the sentencing court. The Consent Order also requires Defendants to assist probationers who have difficulty making payments and forbids unlawful threats of jail for probationers who cannot pay. The proposed Consent Order will ensure that any Class Member cuiTcntly on probation with Defendants, or who is placed on probation with Defendants in the future, will not be subjected to the alleged practices challenged in this lawsuit.
For these reasons, the payments called for by the Agreement are within the range that would be fair, adequate and reasonable.
D. Complexity, Expense, and Duration of Litigation Litigating this case would likely be expensive and time consuming. Defendants have proposed an extended discovery period (Doc. 25 at 8), and sought a three-phase discovery process (Doc. 25 at 14-16), likely interrupted by a motion to compel arbitration and, depending on the outcome of that motion, an interlocutory appeal. Further discovery would also be necessary with respect to class certification and the parties' claims and defenses. Litigation of this case would involve extensive adversarial proceedings and would require a substantial amount of time and effort by the parties as well as the Court. Cf. Melanie K. v. Horton,¥^o. 1:14-CV-710-WSD, 2015 WL 1799808, at *3 (N.D. Ga, Apr. 15,
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2015) (granting preliminary approval of settlement partly because "the Parties w[ould] be highly motivated to aggressively litigate this case if a settlement was not approved").
E . Substance and Degree of Opposition to the Settlement "In determining whether to certify a settlement class, a court must also examine the degree of opposition to the settlement." Columbus Drywall, 258 F.R.D. at 560. Here, the parties' counsel represent that they are unaware of any objectors or intervenors. At the fmal fairness hearing held in open court on August 14, 2017, no objections were voiced to the settlement agreement. Therefore, the Court fmds no opposition to the settlement. F. Stage of Proceedings at Which the Settlement Was Achieved "The stage of the proceedings at which a settlement is achieved is evaluated to ensure that Plaintiffs had access to sufficient information to adequately evaluate the merits of the case and weigh the benefits of settlement against further litigation." Lipuma v. Am. Express Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2005). Here, the parties represent (Doc. 37-1 at 26) that Plaintiffs' counsel thoroughly investigated the case using public records, interviews with probationers, and other information sources. The Class Members have been identified by consulting paperwork in the parties' possession. Therefore, the Court
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finds that the parties had sufficient information to reasonabiy conclude that the benefits of settling under the terms of the Agreement outweigh the potential benefits of continued litigation. And while the Agreement was reached relatively early in the litigation, it is the product of good-faith, arm's-length negotiations assisted by an experienced and neutral mediator.
G. Conclusion "[T]he Eleventh Circuit has held that a court should certify a settlement i f it is fair, reasonable, adequate and free of collusion." Columbus Drywall, 258 F.R.D. at 559. "It has been repeatedly recognized that settlements are highly favored in the law and will be upheld whenever possible because they are means of amicably resolving doubts and preventing lawsuits. Settlements in class action cases are also favored because they conserve judicial resources by avoiding the expense of a complicated and protracted litigation process . . . . " Hillis, 2007 WL 1953464, at *9 (intemai citations omitted). Moreover, "[i]n considering the settlement, the district court may rely upon the judgment of experienced counsel for the parties." Nelson, 484 Fed. Appx. at 435. VI. FINAL ORDER ON SETTLEMENT For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby GRANTS final approval to the settlement agreement and ORDERS as follows:
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1. Within 30 days of entry of this Order, Defendants shall provide a check for the Total Damages Amount to Plaintiffs' attorneys.
(Doc. 37-2 Tl 18.)
2. Within 30 days of this Order, Defendants shall provide the Luse Check, the Ligocki check, and a check for attorney's fees and mailing expenses to Plaintiffs' attorneys. (Doc. 37-2 6, 2021, 28.) Following execution of the Releases attached to the Settlement Agreement as Appendices E and F, Plaintiffs' attorneys will deliver the Luse Check to Plaintiff Luse, and the Ligocki Check to Plaintiff Ligocki.
3. Within 21 days of receiving from Defendants the check for the Total Damages Amount, Plaintiffs' attorneys will mail a check for the Individual Payment Amount to each member of the Class who is entitled to payment. Each check will be mailed to the address shown on the completed Claim Form submitted by each Class Member.
4. Excluding Class Member Samuel Jason Payne, who timely opted out of the class action settlement in this case, all of the Class Members identified in the List of Potential Class
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Members filed in this case (Doc. 37-2 at 29), will be bound by this and all subsequent orders and judgments of the Court, and will be precluded from asserting any claim or lawsuit against Sentinel Offender Services, LLC, or Stacy McDowell-Black, and their respective agents, officers, employees, officials, and personal representatives as a result of the imposition of drug screening during the time period covered by this Agreement. 5. The Court hereby dismisses with prejudice all claims for damages that members of the Class may have against Defendants with respect to the imposition of drug screening between February 17, 2012, and August 14, 2017.

SO ORDERED, this ^ / ^ a y of

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 Case: 2:16-cv-30 As of: 01/27/2018 08:35 PM EST 1 of 5
4months,CLOSED
U.S. District Court Northern District of Georgia (Gainesville) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:16−cv−00030−RWS

Luse et al v. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC Assigned to: Judge Richard W. Story Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Rita Sanders Luse
Plaintiff Marianne Ligocki

Date Filed: 02/17/2016 Date Terminated: 08/22/2017 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Gerald R. Weber Law Offices of Gerry Weber P.O. Box 5391 Atlanta, GA 31107 404−522−0507 Email: wgerryweber@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Primerano Southern Center for Human Rights 83 Poplar Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303 404−688−1202 Fax: 404−688−9440 Email: rprimerano@schr.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah E. Geraghty Southern Center for Human Rights 83 Poplar Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303−2122 404−688−1202 Email: sgeraghty@schr.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gerald R. Weber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Primerano (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah E. Geraghty (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Sentinel Offender Services, LLC

represented by Harvey Scott Gray Gray Rust St. Amand Moffett & Brieske

Case: 2:16-cv-30 As of: 01/27/2018 08:35 PM EST 2 of 5

1700 Atlanta Plaza 950 East Paces Ferry Road Atlanta, GA 30326 404−870−7376 Fax: 404−870−7374 Email: hgray@grsmb.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael D. St. Amand Gray Rust St. Amand Moffett & Brieske, LLP 950 East Paces Ferry Rd. 1700 Atlanta Plaza Atlanta, GA 30326 404−870−7383 Email: mds@grsmb.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Stacy McDowell−Black Probation Officer, Sentinel Offender Services, LLC, Cleveland, Georgia,

represented by Harvey Scott Gray (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael D. St. Amand (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/17/2016
02/17/2016 02/23/2016 02/25/2016 02/26/2016 02/26/2016 02/29/2016

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT with Jury Demand, filed by Rita Sanders Luse, Marianne Ligocki. ( Filing fee $ 400.00 receipt number 113E−6293592.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Contract, # 2 Exhibit B − Luse Disposition, # 3 Exhibit C − Ligocki Disposition, # 4 Civil Cover Sheet)(rsg) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/commonly−used−forms to obtain Pretrial Instructions which includes the Consent To Proceed Before U.S. Magistrate form. (Entered: 02/17/2016)
2 Electronic Summons Issued as to Sentinel Offender Services, LLC, Stacy McDowell−Black. (Attachments: # 1 Summons Stacy McDowell−Black) (rsg) (Entered: 02/17/2016)
3 Certificate of Interested Persons by Marianne Ligocki, Rita Sanders Luse. (Primerano, Ryan) (Entered: 02/23/2016)
4 Return of Service Executed by Rita Sanders Luse, Marianne Ligocki. Stacy McDowell−Black served on 2/18/2016, answer due 3/10/2016. (Primerano, Ryan) (Entered: 02/25/2016)
5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Brief In Support by Marianne Ligocki, Rita Sanders Luse. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Supp. of Prelim. Inj.)(Primerano, Ryan) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
6 MOTION to Certify Class with Brief In Support by Marianne Ligocki, Rita Sanders Luse. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Supp. of Class Certification)(Primerano, Ryan) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
7 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to Judge Richard W. Story for all further proceedings. Judge William C. O'Kelley no longer assigned to case. NOTICE TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD: The Judge designation in the civil action number assigned to this case has been changed to 2:16−cv−30−RWS. Please make note of this change in order to facilitate the docketing of pleadings in this case. Signed by Judge

Case: 2:16-cv-30 As of: 01/27/2018 08:35 PM EST 3 of 5

02/29/2016 03/10/2016 03/11/2016 03/14/2016 03/14/2016 03/14/2016 03/25/2016 03/25/2016 03/30/2016 03/31/2016 03/31/2016 03/31/2016 04/01/2016
04/11/2016 04/11/2016 04/11/2016 04/15/2016 04/15/2016

William C. O'Kelley on 02/29/16. (sk) (Entered: 02/29/2016)
8 Return of Service Executed by Rita Sanders Luse, Marianne Ligocki. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC served on 2/19/2016, answer due 3/11/2016. (Primerano, Ryan) (Entered: 02/29/2016)
9 ANSWER to 1 COMPLAINT with Jury Demand by Stacy McDowell−Black. Discovery ends on 8/8/2016.(St. Amand, Michael) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions. (Entered: 03/10/2016)
10 ANSWER to 1 COMPLAINT with Jury Demand by Sentinel Offender Services, LLC.(St. Amand, Michael) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions. (Entered: 03/11/2016)
NOTICE of Hearing on Motion re: 5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Motion Hearing set for 4/1/2016 at 10:30 AM in GAIN Courtroom 303 before Judge Richard W. Story. (rag) (Entered: 03/14/2016)
11 RESPONSE in Opposition re 5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Stacy McDowell−Black, Sentinel Offender Services, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Gray, Harvey) (Entered: 03/14/2016)
12 RESPONSE in Opposition re 6 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Stacy McDowell−Black, Sentinel Offender Services, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Gray, Harvey) (Entered: 03/14/2016)
13 REPLY to Response to Motion re 5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Marianne Ligocki, Rita Sanders Luse. (Primerano, Ryan) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
Submission of 5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (sk) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
14 REPLY to Response to Motion re 6 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Marianne Ligocki, Rita Sanders Luse. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Chaudhuri Decl.)(Primerano, Ryan) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
Submission of 6 MOTION to Certify Class , submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (sk) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
15 Joint MOTION for Order by Marianne Ligocki, Rita Sanders Luse. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Consent Order)(Geraghty, Sarah) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
16 ORDER granting 15 Motion for Consent Order re Preliminary Injunction (See order for specifics). Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 03/31/2016. (rsg) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
17 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants with Jury Demand, filed by Rita Sanders Luse, Marianne Ligocki. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Contract, # 2 Exhibit B: Luse Disposition, # 3 Exhibit C: Ligocki Disposition)(Primerano, Ryan) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/commonly−used−forms to obtain Pretrial Instructions which includes the Consent To Proceed Before U.S. Magistrate form. (Entered: 04/01/2016)
18 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Initial Disclosures by Marianne Ligocki, Rita Sanders Luse.(Primerano, Ryan) (Entered: 04/11/2016)
19 Initial Disclosures by Stacy McDowell−Black.(St. Amand, Michael) (Entered: 04/11/2016)
20 Initial Disclosures by Sentinel Offender Services, LLC.(St. Amand, Michael) (Entered: 04/11/2016)
21 ANSWER to 17 Amended Complaint by Sentinel Offender Services, LLC.(St. Amand, Michael) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions. (Entered: 04/15/2016)
22 ANSWER to 17 Amended Complaint by Stacy McDowell−Black.(St. Amand, Michael) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions. (Entered: 04/15/2016)

Case: 2:16-cv-30 As of: 01/27/2018 08:35 PM EST 4 of 5

05/06/2016 05/06/2016 05/13/2016 05/17/2016 06/08/2016
06/08/2016
07/06/2016 07/15/2016
11/03/2016 11/04/2016 11/04/2016 11/14/2016 12/12/2016 12/13/2016 12/14/2016
12/14/2016 12/14/2016

23 Verification of ANSWER to 17 Amended Complaint by Sentinel Offender Services, LLC.(St. Amand, Michael) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions. (Entered: 05/06/2016)
24 Verification of ANSWER to 17 Amended Complaint by Stacy McDowell−Black.(St. Amand, Michael) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions. (Entered: 05/06/2016)
25 JOINT PRELIMINARY REPORT AND DISCOVERY PLAN filed by Marianne Ligocki, Rita Sanders Luse. (Primerano, Ryan) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
NOTICE of Hearing: Scheduling Conference set for 6/8/2016 at 11:30 AM in Atlanta Courtroom 2105 before Judge Richard W. Story. (rag) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
26 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard W. Story: Scheduling Conference held on 6/8/2016, Court grants a 30 day stay for mediation. Parties to submit a status report after the 30 day period. Hearing concluded. (Court Reporter Amanda Lohnaas)(rsg) (Entered: 06/08/2016)
27 ORDER that this action be STAYED for 30 days pending mediation by the parties. The parties are ORDERED to file a status report in 30 days regarding the scheduling and/or outcome of mediation. (Status Report due by 7/8/2016.) Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 06/08/2016. (rsg) (Entered: 06/08/2016)
28 NOTICE by Marianne Ligocki, Rita Sanders Luse Regarding Mediation (Geraghty, Sarah) (Entered: 07/06/2016)
29 ORDER that the 6 Motion to Certify Class is DENIED as MOOT with leave to re−file in the event that settlement is not consummated. The case will remain open for entry of any necessary orders regarding procedures for notification of class members and authorization of payment. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 07/15/2016. (rsg) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
30 MOTION for Hearing/Conference Regarding Proposed Settlement by Marianne Ligocki, Rita Sanders Luse. (Geraghty, Sarah) Modified on 11/3/2016 to correct event type (sk). (Entered: 11/03/2016)
NOTICE of Conference: Conference regarding Proposed Settlement set for 11/14/2016 at 10:30 AM in ATLA Courtroom 2105 before Judge Richard W. Story. (rag) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
Verbal ORDER granting 30 Motion for Hearing/Conference. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 11/4/16. (rag) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
31 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard W. Story: Settlement Conference held on 11/14/2016. Parties have two weeks to provide full disclosure documents and 28 days for settlement documents.(rsg) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
32 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Settlement Documents by Marianne Ligocki, Rita Sanders Luse. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Geraghty, Sarah) (Entered: 12/12/2016)
33 ORDER granting 32 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 12/13/2016. (rsg) (Entered: 12/13/2016)
34 Joint MOTION for Order Entry of Consent Confidentiality Order Regarding Document Production by Sentinel Offender Services, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Consent Confidentiality Order Regarding Document Production)(St. Amand, Michael) (Entered: 12/14/2016)
35 Court Notice Of Filing: Standing Order by Judge Richard W. Story. (rag) (Entered: 12/14/2016)
36 ORDER granting 34 Motion for Confidentiality Order Regarding Document Production with minor change to modify Paragraph No. 4 − If any document or motion is to be filed with the Court making reference to or appending a document designated as CONFIDENTIAL by any party under this Confidentiality Order, compliance with the undersigned's 35 Standing Order regarding Civil Litigation, &para 7(e) is required. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 12/14/2016. (rsg) (Entered: 12/14/2016)

Case: 2:16-cv-30 As of: 01/27/2018 08:35 PM EST 5 of 5

12/20/2016
01/13/2017 05/08/2017 08/14/2017 08/14/2017
08/21/2017 08/22/2017

37 Joint MOTION to Certify Class Conditionally with Brief In Support by Marianne Ligocki, Rita Sanders Luse. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support of Conditional Certification of Settlement Class, # 2 Exhibit A: Settlement Agreement (with Appendices A − F), # 3 Exhibit B: Consent Order for Injunctive Relief, # 4 Exhibit C: Proposed Order Conditionally Certifying Settlement Class)(Primerano, Ryan) (Entered: 12/20/2016)
38 ORDER granting 37 Motion to Certify Class. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 01/13/2017. (rsg) (Entered: 01/13/2017)
39 NOTICE of Hearing:FINAL FAIRNESS HEARING set for 8/14/2017 at 09:30 AM in GAIN Courtroom 303 before Judge Richard W. Story. (sk) (Entered: 05/08/2017)
40 CONSENT ORDER is submitted and entered into as a resolution of Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated persons. (See order for more details.) Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 08/14/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A)(rsg) (Entered: 08/14/2017)
41 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard W. Story: Settlement Conference held on 8/14/2017. The Court noted that no objectionswere received by class members. Counsel will present a proposed final order to the Court on Monday, August 21st consideration. The Court stated that the proposed consent injunctive relief order will be approved and entered on the docket today. (Court Reporter Amanda Lohnaas) (dgr) (Entered: 08/14/2017)
42 ORDER GRANTING Final Approval of Class Settlement. See Order for specifics. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 08/21/2017. (dgr) (Entered: 08/22/2017)
Civil Case Terminated. (dgr) (Entered: 08/22/2017)